Wieringa's 2011 article condensing her research: the army's sexual slander of Gerwani was the spark without which the genocide would not have happened; reconstructs the Lubang Buaya night (about 70 women and girls, mostly Pemuda Rakyat volunteers) and reads the monument mural. Programmatic synthesis.
Tempo, 1 October 2012: Because of the general's authority (why West Java escaped the killings)
Tempo piece (1 Oct 2012) explaining why West Java saw no mass killings: Siliwangi commander Ibrahim Adjie ordered detentions without violence (per Benedict Anderson via Umar Said), and RPKAD, whose arrival triggered killings elsewhere (Cribb, Anderson), did not enter. Notes Suharto's 2 Oct 1965 letter claiming to preve
Tempo, 1 October 2012: Mass killings 1965-1966 - vendetta and jingoism
Tempo historiography essay (1 Oct 2012) on the 1965-66 mass killings, outlining three phases of writing about 1965 and proposing 'jingoism' and 'vendetta' (macho, anomie-driven local score-settling) as cultural explanations, with the label 'PKI lu' as a channel for hatred. Argues history is interpretation and need not
Tempo, 1 October 2012: After 'God died' at Mlancu
Tempo report (1 Oct 2012) on the Mlancu massacre (Kediri-Jombang border), where about 700 alleged PKI were killed in November 1965, drawing on Hermawan Sulistyo's research and witnesses. Presents PKI land reform, ludruk plays and 'Seven Village Demons' lists as roots of tension with kiai and NU/Ansor. Mentions the Peng
Tempo, 1 October 2012: After the pistol fired at Tegalbadeng (killings in Bali)
Tempo report (1 Oct 2012) on how mass killing began in Bali from Tegalbadeng, Jembrana, after a shooting on 30 Nov 1965; PNI 'Tameng Marhaenis' squads, trucks and beach executions, with RPKAD arrival in Dec (Geoffrey Robinson). Testimony from Ida Bagus Raka Negara and others on the Toko Wong detention site. Gerwani is
Tempo, 1 October 2012: The question of victim statistics
Tempo explainer (1 Oct 2012) on victim statistics for 1965-66 (estimates 200,000 to 3 million; most likely about half a million), weighing the Oei Tjoe Tat commission's 78,000, Kopkamtib's 1 million, Sarwo Edhie's 3 million and census evidence. It notes army propaganda about torture of the generals at Lubang Buaya was
Incitement to Genocide against a Political Group: the anti-communist killings (Pohlman, 2014)
Pohlman's 2014 article arguing the 1965-68 killings were political genocide and that the military's post-coup propaganda, including fabricated stories, constituted incitement to genocide; critiques the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention.
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 607 (17 Oct 2017) presenting 39 declassified US Embassy Jakarta documents (1964-68) showing detailed US knowledge of and support for the army's mass killing of PKI members. Finding aid for the telegram series in this corpus.
The Indonesian Genocide of 1965: Causes, Dynamics and Legacies (McGregor, Melvin, Pohlman, eds., 2018)
Edited volume (Palgrave 2018; McGregor, Melvin, Pohlman) arguing the 1965 violence was genocidal, covering causes (Aceh army documents, Bali, Pohlman on women's testimonies of sexual violence in West Sumatra) and legacies. Key scholarship on 1965 violence.
Jess Melvin's 2018 monograph arguing the 1965-66 killings were a genocide planned and coordinated by the army, based on about 3,000 pages of Aceh military records and interviews. Key evidence on army responsibility.
The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66 (Robinson, 2018)
Geoffrey Robinson's 2018 synthesis of the 1965-66 violence (about 500,000 killed, a million detained), arguing the army provoked and organised it, the US and allies facilitated it, and colonial and Cold War history set the preconditions. Context; Gerwani in the propaganda chapters.