Leeuwarder Courant, 1 December 1965, p. 11: relays armed-forces newspaper reports of SOBSI chief Njono's interrogation statements: planning began in July, Aidit's claim that Sukarno was gravely ill was decisive, and Njono was to raise a 2,000-man reserve from PKI, Pemuda Rakjat, Sobsi, BTI and Gerwani members, learning
Brig. Gen. Supardjo's 1966 analysis, addressed to 'comrade leaders', of why the 30 September Movement failed, published by John Roosa in 2008. The only first-hand assessment by a movement leader.
De Volkskrant report (24 Feb 1966) on unrest in Jakarta and the opening of Untung's trial. The prosecutor said his strike force of 5,000 included 2,000 communists, "men and women, of the organisations Gerwani, Pemuda Rakjat and the BTI". No claims of torture or sexual misconduct appear in this item.
Journal article by Coen Holtzappel (Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1979) analysing the Untung and Njono trial records to argue the 30 September Movement was steered by Air Force and Army intelligence, with Sjam's Pringgodani group deliberately compromising the PKI and Aidit. Gerwani is mentioned only once, in a footnote
Official Army history (Pusjarah TNI, Jakarta 2009), vol. IV of 'Komunisme di Indonesia', presenting Gerwani as a PKI mass organisation in the 1960-65 build-up and the G30S. It reports Gerwani's Nov-Dec 1964 housewives' seminar (p. 70), 'unilateral actions' (p. 122), the 27 Sept 1965 Surabaya governor's-office raid unde
Official Army history (Pusjarah TNI, Jakarta 2009), vol. IV of 'Komunisme di Indonesia', presenting Gerwani as a PKI mass organisation in the 1960-65 build-up and the G30S. It reports Gerwani's Nov-Dec 1964 housewives' seminar (p. 70), 'unilateral actions' (p. 122), the 27 Sept 1965 Surabaya governor's-office raid unde