Dossier of a slaughter (Tribune, 29 Juni 1966)

=== [PDF page 1] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 Dossier slaughter Reports were last week militarist regime consolidating tus, Jakarta j jof the from its further grip President Attacks on Sukarno as Head of State are more becoming open and continu-1 National Library of Australia cotoducAustralia are ting a sustained campaign the Jakarta make respectappear able. and/! oils. regime Council. more major organs of the press' Nasution General Pro the chairman visional People's Consultative time, same with the election of the Thus the Sydney Morn ing Herald has featured articles by Denis Warner military exalting the strong-man, harto, and General Su-y claiming that general air of there freedom in Jakarta. http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 2] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (2) The purpose campaign is to ternally, this taken expunge from the public mind been built basis the enormous froni the BritMi "New Left Review" reconstruction of the last attempted coup October and the subse-, left-demo Indonesian people. No other regime since Hitler's Third Reich has cratic actually risen to power such <Ptent counter-revolution. While not necssarily cor massively criminal democrats publishes massacre To assist in this task, Tribune on this page re regime has the sole the of all countries. this fact that be under must fashion. rect set the seal on the white-washing cam the words; paign came last week in Canberra of article throws if to Jesus Vargas who, as general secretary, is the authentic voice of all respects, more vincing light terrible events than that has the con these any far appeared General The shooting thousands of com- JSEATO. munists in Indonesia was: blow struck for freedom," he said. Vargas' inhuman words would never have been spoken had they not accorded with the views of his SEATO principals, the of the United others, including Australia. The massacre- "trials" and the are still continuing. in the time of Hitler, the task of exposing, protesting and ultimately ending the government States and militarist brutal regime and the danger that it represents, both internally National Library of Australia and "THE mainspring forces which the briefly in Djakarta seized power last year October officers dissident were http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 3] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (3) were the plotters to the from and troops (Diponegoro) Seventh sympathetic the capital Division of the Indonesian Army, stationed normally in Central Java. They now junior officers Div Java Central the top com army the parade. troops avail the spot, not hours Central Java. The away plotters set about perfecting their plan. In particular, they to their side the Com won mander of the Guard at the Halim Airbase, just outside Djakarta, Plight Major Sujono. apparently become ision had the con with disenchanted duct for had group this from able battalions aims into move to their mand. They accused deca falling into corruption, habits luxurious dent and dragging seriously, most and, Confrontat their heels over them ion with Malaysia. They American suspected undue fluence. Accordingly they Control would them some and operations centre of keeping contact with Central Java. They also invol ved Commander Brigade appear considered the role and Revolution. resemblance They bore some Officers in Japto the Young their say, in Turkey counterparts today. thing plot in Semarang to be Jogjakarta, another in a real position to act. But However, one sit and opportunity One the presented itself. officers, junior col. Untung, was trans the ferred Presidential Guard (Tjakrabirawa Regi in Djakarta, ment) Bat talion Commander. More than that. He was put in charge of arranging a historical pag eant for Army Day. the marchpast This was crucial; the plotters to move National Library of Australia enabled battalions Division Army, Colonel Latief. Finally they made prepar ations to use being trained auxiliaries the Halim of the pro armed Airbase jected Fifth part Armed auxiliaries volunteers Force. mostly were the from Commun the Fifth ist People's Youth; Armed Force, inaugurated proper army Indonesian in the Fifth local the These its of the the from definite anti-commun how ist records. They were of what highly conscious ever they duty sec means have both give them ure also the nation rid termined these the Revolution and parasites. concer junior officers The not necessarily leftned were wing; Base Halim the over about three months previously effect (Indonesian Party) a military the event, this presence. unauthorized involvement affair to cost the PKI was the dear. designed was the give Communist PKI The plot was put into action of October early hours three The first stage had under parts. First, action was in the taken to seize generals bring them These generals members top army seven their villas Halim were and Base. named the clandes tine Generals' Council, which been had to take prepared over in the the State event of Sukarno's death or, indeed, should other favourable any http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 4] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (4) should other any favourable itself. opportunity suggest are There strong signs of the existance of at least a close clique; the exclusion of the KOSTRAD Army HQ Com General manded, Suharto, from the list the fact did seven that exist but member staff officer, due to clique was such not was His omission was to prove disastrous the plotters; it is hard other wise to imagine why he was overlooked. Those arrested cluded almost every other top including the finance and political activity. Second, key installations in the city centre were to be seized: the Presidential Palace, the Radio Station, the Telephone Ex change, crucial road inter chiefs of intelligence, sections. the (For KOSTRAD some reason, Supreme Army was neglected). Thirdly, various other personalities, in cluding Sukarno himself, were to he brought to Halim. The Moves AT aboutarmed into seven groups, size ranging from roughly twenty left .hundred the men, Halim Base for Djakarta. They proceeded to the of the seven gener als and, in all cases, suc swiftly ceeded in over powering the guards. villas After, met that, with Three pf however, uneven the success. generals National Library of Australia they were killed eral during the raids. Gen Yani, Minister-Comman der his lost the Army, refused when permis sion to bathe and change out of his pyjamas. stormed hack into his bedroom and was shot down through the glass door. General Harjono heard the intruders coming, all switched off lights the and tried to overpower the temper first man come through the bedroom door. was shot. General Pandjaitan lived in two-storey house, unlike http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 5] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (5) two-storey house, unlike She slammed the door shut Nasution. He insisted looking for himself and nearly got shot. The soldiers outside started try and the break door down. While and great deal the down and shouting up stairs eventually agreed the others. After come down threatened. Besides jammed. sten-gun had family his his when put resistance the front sister doing this, Nasut appeared with his into vestigate. the front yard. ojo was into room went seized was General the waiting were com truck. These arrests pleted shortly o'clock. But after far the four most Abdul important general, Haris Nasution, the Minister Defence, managed The intruders success escape. fully disarmed his look-outs and quite well extensive guard, as the his guard neighbour, Dr. Leimena, the Second Minis Deputy Prime ter. They then entered the house. General Nasution's wife, hearing the noise doors opening and shutting, went to see what was hap pening. When she door standing asked herself. the opened the bed she saw a soldier there.with gun. National Library of Australia daughter young fat was ally wounded. Meanwhile had Nasution made his get and away managed wall garden the scramble over into next-door the bassy. got over Iraqi was shot the wall and fell the other side, break down then lay ing his ankle. still, the Iraqi Embassy garden, for about three hours until the coast well seemed clear. Sutin his bed blindfolded before taken being the When the door was opened, soldiers opened fire again; The arrested and room and the burgled and the garden being down daughter yard more Three generals were into successfully bundled trucks and taken off to Halim. General Suprapto had recently some teeth had out; he was unable to sleep and, hearing to the down dogs bark, went front was where door, General Parman seized. thought the next-door house room were ion's more shot. was was they was However, and told second part of the plan achieved without incid time the three still live generals and Lt. Tendean at Halim. arrived back the crucial installations of in the Djakarta were hands the plotters. The third part also went well. Sukarno was at the house of his Japenese wife, Dewi. Untung went there, told the President that the top generals had launched and him asked coup to Halim come for the sake was ent. the his safety; the Air Forcq Presidential Guard the loyal. Sukarno had remained agreed. and personality was Halim asked to come Omar Dhani, Commander the Air Force; he himself was The second disliked the staff http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 6] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (6) staff by the top army creature and regarded had got Sukarno's; tension disliked since worse the was supposed to be tho suspected was full its Fifth agreed well tion—picked threat was ity Chairman the oto instead of General ques Pram Suharto. Gen. the also personal mystery General Brig. Commander Presidential Guard, fetched. The fourth was out the Halim. Sabur, seized Army obviously Untung new eventually Dhani, for Com had Dhani was around withholding the staff. army himself officer to train and Armed Force, seen PKI Force also direct mander charge co-operation and Fdrce the Air since agreed suitable Kalimantan which the Army from Air North action, casting Sukarno, Aidit, PKI. Spme surrounds Aidit's that plotters presence. seems the have calculated as fol military sup since our must lows: port thin two from the Guard, the Air Force, from auxiliaries— some armed need Sukarno's reason, Halim. brought agreed over sumably shall need For backing. must this has battal paratroop ions, elements elements relatively fact, pre backthe Once radio, we demonstra street there support. fore need MbreAidit too. (Veil over, it will also be Hhiim to have him safely in order to paralyze the Pkl until has Sukarno ophnly Otherwise backed iinbe might pre-empted by PKI planned-for action. two things went However, tions wrong. First, General swiftly the Army siderable seized and Suharto command acted with competence. Second, around National Library of Australia con for http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 7] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (7) Alarm The CJUHARTO Given wakenwas got itt Deputy also Suharto command. ed by neighbours at touch with the First and about half past five, told to the Navy Commander Police Conimthe Djakarta shots had been heard and ander. They agreed to keep number of generals and their troops confined. Suharto other personalities indentifying next set about all the the whereabouts been have peared to battalions various army sup after abducted. Soon to be in Djakarta. Most posed wards, a colleague came of them, he ascertained, had and confirmed the news. turned expected his for rehersal for Suharto jeep Senajan got parade. and drove himself to the the army Kostrad headquarters, parachute battal However, CJen454 and 530, from ions ariving about 6.30. tral and he assumed abducted and set of the army been command about Yani that Having confirmed had contacting cers and the other offi fellow representatives services. armed the Djakarta Umar, had Territorial Commander, Nas been alerted by already had done ution's family and General listless rather some reconnoi tell able to Suharto Presidential Palace under control was the commanded troops by Brig. was the Gen. Supardjo, the Commander Combat Command from Kaliman Mandau, West tan. (Supardjo had flown to Djakarta receiving go-ahead telegram saying daughter was gravely ill. However, he had not reported his arrival in Djakarta to any now body. It was clear to Suharto that junior officers that his were put acting himself illegally). under National Library of Australia Umar East Java respectively, These also, missing. insignia, judging from seemed battalions the holding Pres Merdeka Square, the idential Palace, etc. Suharto also ascertained that the Air Force being evasive was contacted them. when did not however the yet know of the President, whereabouts the the status coup force tring. that were the the role Halim 7.00 being played Base. the first tung broadcast came the air. (They wait till had 7.00 because that national began). the 30th was only then broadcasting this broadcast, Move September ment, under the command Lt. Col. Untung, was- credited with saving the President from coup. were Generals' Council In particular, generals accused of the fact that Continued Page Suharto's http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 8] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (8) from Continued Page 5 luxury, led a life, women insulted our gay wasted government funds', ana well as plotting to over throw Sukarno. 'lived they little very stress himself. arno ing broadcast the However, laid Sukarno had thrown behind the 30th that himself September Evidently he was Movement. for time. was with contact hear Nobody imagine would playing priority Suk: first His re-establish outside the at Halim, world; information all sifted through Untung, was inadequate for making vital decisions. Accordingly, number messengers were sent summoning advisers fer with the the State arta civil top the the time. con Most PKI Djak Subandrio, one leaders, was in Sumatra. Charul Saleh and Ali Sastroamidjojo, leaders of and Nationalist par in Peking, Lukman the Murba ties, were and Sakirman, PKI leaders, the other Semarwere Java, Abdulghani, ang, Central the second leading Nationalist, also was Sukarno ter, Deputy to feel his wards diplomatic Prime 1.15 p.m. But ident read Deputy Commander Guard himself. and issued Pranoto mander order the President signed the About President the General the Sabur time, the Sabur's Presidential same Pres control situation, went the that was way outcome. broadcast announcing out was appointing Acting Com Army, under and former daya to-day basis. Pranoto was the Division/ whose mand had Nasution. term been com Central Java com short cut was now Assistant res to Yani, with ponsibility for personnel. All this pointed to a situation in Sukarno which would soon the re-emerge, ber Movement 30th Septem would rewarded and the presumably turn leftward Nasakom would be consolidated. How ever, Sukarno had sonally committed anything. not himself per get the Minis mid-morning. accumulate managed Halim the the Minister-Com- Navy since Sukarno and Minister-Commander mander dismissed Police. the beginning was Sukarno card. strong released then not was about also the town. did manage with Leimena, touch Second out Omar hoped. statement Dhani signed throwing the Air Force hind the coup. Although this 9.30 mander Njoto, top out, officials out were accompanied Move September ment the President. the 30th the now things began might National Library of Australia look the way http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 9] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (9) Suharto at the Kostrad this about possibly earlier, harto from reached Su armed forces various political likely youth forwarded they were for looking Pranoto. Suharto able to sum now was the the morning had subvert most 530th Java) (East Batt former sending the from officers (mostly talk Irian West campaign) felt confident he to them. the with could do the same battalion, Vas Base 30th the the centre September far Halim was alive, hiding. He thai Air Force and must have sus the other all refused let later that remarking already six dead. Pranoto and had lost quite generals'. enough of our clearly Untung himself was in desperate straits. At 2.00 actual proclamation, strangely, not mention Sukarno had issued lamation over another National Library of Australia the pears something throw. It was the crunch was coming. sent for them clear last 4.00 Sukarno his children and had flown to safety much 6.00 Ban the Parachute Battalion had the followed 530th into Suh arto's hands. 7.00 p.m. Suharto had all installations in Djakarta under was hurt though were rate, Halim, the Then at 3.30 they released Dhani's morning statement Air Force this support: key bombed. But, on the whole, militarily in a position speaking, he was to be confident. Also he now Nasution knew that probably any Umar This did care concerned; possibility Djakarta would generals meant there pected 454th the tread the was promiscuously some dung. Movement This operations. would have fully time. given that knew now and all. alion, 454th with journalists, rector plotters. :ituation. the commanders, personalities, leaders, university all mixed there by Umar were During managed announcing the formation a Revolutionary Council, made in an apparently random fashion of the names of top had the Kostrad HQ. seems little messsengers Sukarno time, his control. About this further messengers left Sukarno; their aim, in effect was to find out what Suh arto's conditions were. time must indicated that disassociate no's arrival. Sukarno himself from Untung; in fact, he leave the Halim must Base. left Ha Accordingly Sukarno lim for his out-of-town pal ace at Bogor. Suharto asked colleague to check Sukar himself went nouncing his 9.00 Suharto the air full control. proc radio, http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 10] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (10) Flames the Halim things looked Central Java Base, have must gloomy indeed. still However, there was some hope for the 30th Movement. September Following the 7.00 a.m. number their colleagues, including Col. Suherman, head of intelligence in the army Diponegoro division and probably the brains of the had seized control coup, in the principal cities of Central Java. broadcast, By evening Semarang, Surakarta jakarta and all officers, the hands associated September 30 Some ted. could flew days later he was Dhani, on the other still save from himself field arres hand, field, hav ing talks, finally returning to the Semplak Airfield, near Bogor, at 4.00 that afternoon, immediately proceeding to the Palace to be with Sukarno. Jog were junior with the movement. The stage was now set for the second, brief, eventually tragic act. At about midnight the Jetstar President's flew into Halim Base. It contained the Air Force Second-in-Comwho with been had mand, Subandrio in North Sumatra (Subandrio himself had sage ly decided to stay put). More consultations took place. Soon afterwards two planes left Halim for Central Java, both Hercules transports. One, which landed at Semarang about 1.30, contained Untung. The other, which arrived at Jogjakarta at about 2.00, con tained Omar Dhani and D. N. Aidit. dawn Halim the Base had fallen to Suharto. went into hiding. Untung National Library of Australia http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 11] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (11) The PKI yIDIT was compromised in by far the most difficult tion. How far FKI compromised? posi the How far could itself clear? In know, lost. The pull fact,, all was PKI was now already had already been fatally compromised in the following ways: The involvement of Peo ple's Youth auxiliaries in the of the generals,,the abduction occupation of installations in most serious of Djakarta and all the killing of the three had survived generals who arrest. These three generals had been shot place called Crocodile Hole, within the perimeter of the Halim after their Base, a few hours arrival there. them One also Lt. Tendean, mis and for taken Nasution, /were beaten with rifle butts/ After execution they were thrown into a well to join the corpses of the other.three generals previously killed. Involved all this were auxiliaries, dergoing training at Halim the Com both Base, from Youth and munist People's Communist the Gerwani structions, but merely to have been obeying, in a blind way, Force the Air officers who their military superiors were at the Halim Base. 2. The of Peo involvement ple's Youth in the elements rising in Jogjakarta, where they demonstrated against the Generals' covered Council, the town with pro -September 30 Movement placards, seized the radio and Again, they do not seem acting under any instructions. some to have been kind of PKI serious, in More the support given was ways, .the coup the munist mayor Surakarta, Com women's movement. The executions were given kind of ritual character by singing and mass firing at the bodies. dead There is no hard evidence however of disfigure atrocities. The ments or other auxiliaries involved definitely to have not been act appear ing under any kind of PKI in National Library of Australia Ramelan. Utomo This was stupid mistake. The PKI paid the price for backing a 'popu lar' man for instead mayor more worthy politically trust cadre. editorial, hedging vio lently but nonetheless indi cating support for the the main appeared coup, PKI Rakja,t, on Harian It had October gone the afternoon. previous press explicit was cartoon More published at the bottom the front mentioning page, Movement the September 30 and associating the Generals' wi,th the Council CIA. It is difficult these explain blunders. is possible newspaper, course that the. paper was set the awaiting go-ahead some from PKI responsible leader, found the presses in that state by the Army .they seized the works when and finally printed deliberately by the Army, in order to dis credit the PKI. On the other http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 12] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (12) have may hand, editorial look not was whichever for 90% PKI other parti .It is 10%. strange since an Debunewspaper, Baru, confine itself to other dajaan point let slip editorial if you pris in the all the more you there hedging suitable managed short item box, reading: THE SITUATION CAPITAL THE in the capital situation Life continues remains calm. day The usual streets remain crowded with traffic, offices con usual. So also street tinue work vendors, shops, schools and so on. The Njono, head of the in Djakarta, was to make 4. Later, PKI —and withdraw confession to the Army, admitting PKI complicity in the coup. How does not ever,,this confession It is full of bear examination. obvious flaws. People were said to have been at meetings they could not have attended; have would others who con omitted. No tended are attributed crete actions are the PKI; all depends on the coup being a master-plan Aidit's head. course, did nothing since the PKI the fateful day, 'whatever it is difficult for to invent role them. Aidit's presence compro exten,t. How has not used it since: perhaps because they have not yet cooked up a sat isfactory story; perhaps be it would be embarras cause far as was sing as Sukarno would concerned and anyway have to be squared with his Aidit version. Subsequently mistake made have may own Halim Base mising to some the Army ever, the National Library of Australia was for heading Jogjakarta. better might have stick like a burr to Sukarno. As it was, by the time Luk and man Njoto arrived cam the anti-PKI Bogor, well under paign was way. it back never Aidit made all. Aidit imme However, diately on his arrival set about (that PKI ensure trying members stayed at home, did nothing to provoke the Army confined themselves and political the following path trodden by the President done got immediately in Sujono Atmo, the -PKI Acting Gov pro of Central Java, with Bogor. .touch with young ernor Utomo mayor Ramelan, PKI with Surakarta and top PKI and leaders Lukman were who kirman, staying in Semarang. After talks, they got into ministerial car and Lukman's round Central Java drove efforts down making put PKI demonstrations any flared up. Aidit which had requisition also tried to plane to fly to Ball, another PKI stronghold, but by now get opportunist officials were him ting rather chary unsuccessful. and was in his However, major indeed he was deavours suc cessful: fur there were ther Central Java control sumpeno the manifestations PKI and the renewal General Surjonot resisted. On was 5th, Lukman set off Bogor. Aidit tried to plane, failed and set get a almost out was by road. He cer,tainly arrested on his way and back shot. car for http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 === [PDF page 13] === Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 (13) Malign Twist of Fate UNDOUBTEDLY unnerving that party of the strength of the PKI can be so result of stroyed seems what malign twist of fate. The main course was that had been armed Sukar once unquestionable no's was problem authority blemished, there shield which the rely on. Evidently PKI could the Party was of its aware this potential weakness; lay behind plans to create the Fifth Armed. Force. (Plans, of which backfired, as we have seen, in a quite disas trous way.) Nevertheless, what really astonishing is the lack of any contingency plan ning. What happened when Aidit his home taken was from soldiers Presidential the of the Guard in the middle seems night? Nothing. There been no contingency to have plan whereby, for instance, Njono— head of the Djakarta party was informed and in a position to put pre-arranged instructions to effect while contact awE.iting renewal with Aidit or else Lukman Njoto. course, National Library of Australia http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367