D.N. Aidit, 'Beberapa masalah revolusi Indonesia dan PKI', laporan di Beijing, 4 September 1963 (Renmin Ribao, 5 September 1963) (印度尼西亚革命的若干问题和印度尼西亚共产党)

人民日报 Renmin Ribao, 1963-09-05, 第3版 (page 3)标题: 印度尼西亚革命的若干问题和印度尼西亚共产党 印度尼西亚共产党主席迪·努·艾地九月四日在北京市欢迎大会上的报告English gloss: Aidit lecture in Beijing on Indonesian revolution; Gerwani 1.5 million membersSource: 人民日报图文数据库 (People's Daily database), via Columbia University Libraries; article URL http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19630905/3/349ddbfef41445f48c4498a5c1aa7e3cRetrieved 2026-10-18. Article full text as given by the database (replaces the earlier snippet-only file; full-page scan is in the matching PDF).印度尼西亚革命的若干问题和印度尼西亚共产党 印度尼西亚共产党主席迪·努·艾地九月四日在北京市欢迎大会上的报告亲爱的同志们！ 在我这次访问北京期间，中国共产党的领导同志邀请我在这个大会上作报告。我自己选的题目是《印度尼西亚革命的若干问题和印度尼西亚共产党》。我想这个题目是合适的，因为中国人民很关心印度尼西亚革命和印度尼西亚共产党，中国人民非常热爱印度尼西亚革命和印度尼西亚共产党。我知道中国人民喜欢听任何有关印度尼西亚革命和印度尼西亚共产党的情况。正如印度尼西亚劳动人民关心、热爱和喜欢中国革命和中国共产党一样，中国人民也是关心、热爱和喜欢印度尼西亚革命和印度尼西亚共产党的。 在这里，首先请允许我向大家转达印度尼西亚共产党中央委员会、二百五十多万印度尼西亚共产党党员和印度尼西亚劳动人民最热烈的、衷心的问候。今天在这宏伟壮丽的人民大会堂举行隆重热烈的集会，是中国人民对正在为反对以美国为首的帝国主义和国内反动派而进行着尖锐的斗争的印度尼西亚人民越来越高涨的声援大会。 一、关于印度尼西亚社会和革命的几个问题１、印度尼西亚的自然环境和居民印度尼西亚是由一万多个大大小小的岛屿组成的岛国，其中三千多个岛屿有人居住。这些岛屿散布在亚澳两大洲之间，并把太平洋和印度尼西亚洋两个大海洋联系起来。它的陆地面积将近二百万平方公里，如果和中国陆地面积（九百六十多万平方公里）比较起来，就没有多大。但是，这些岛屿分布得很辽阔。从沙璜（在印度尼西亚的西端）到马老奇（在印度尼西亚的东端）的距离大体等于天山山脉的西端到上海的距离。而南北之间的距离大体等于柏林到阿尔及利亚之间的距离。 从印度尼西亚将近一亿人口的数目来看，它是世界上第五个大国，仅次于中国、印度、苏联和美国。人口分布极不均匀，每平方公里最少的只有七人，最多的达四百六十人。爪哇岛人口密度最大，全印度尼西亚大约三分之二的居民居住在这个岛上。 印度尼西亚有一百多个族，有的族人数有几千万人，有的只有几千人。他们各自有自己的语言，而且还有各种方言，他们的文化水平也极不相同。但是他们都接受印度尼西亚语作为共同语，这非常有利于印度尼西亚人民的革命斗争。印度尼西亚语是在马来语的基础上发展起来的，马来语是印度尼西亚的一个人数较少的马来族所使用的语言。远在荷兰殖民统治之前，马来语就在印度尼西亚各岛屿之间、各族之间的交际中起着“通用语”的作用。因此，这种语言在印度尼西亚人民反对荷兰殖民主义的民族解放斗争的过程中就自然地成为共同语。印度尼西亚语从未成为殖民者的语言，它的发展甚至受到荷兰殖民者的阻碍。因此，印度尼西亚语是在民族独立的斗争中经过锤炼的语言，是解放者的语言。除了各族公民以外，印度尼西亚还有几百万外裔公民，如中国人后裔公民、欧洲人后裔公民和阿拉伯人后裔公民等。他们承认印度尼西亚语和印度尼西亚文化是自己的语言和文化，此外，也还有各自的语言和文化。 在荷兰殖民时代，荷兰殖民主义者在各族之间和当地各族公民同外裔公民之间实行分裂和挑拨离间的政策。这种殖民主义分裂和挑拨离间政策的影响，甚至到目前还存在着。帝国主义者和国内反动派鼓吹这种政策。一九五八年爆发的分裂主义的叛乱和一九六三年五月发生的种族主义反革命骚乱，就是反映了这一点。经验表明，只要有了坚决反对它的政策和印度尼西亚全民族团结一致，就能克服和消灭分裂主义和种族主义。各族不论大小一律平等的政策和全体公民不论是原居民或是外裔公民一律平等的政策，是唯一能保证印度尼西亚民族统一的政策。 印度尼西亚的土地非常肥沃，海洋资源和地下矿藏非常丰富。因此，难怪人们经常把印度尼西亚称为“赤道上的一条翡翠带”。但是，由于长期殖民统治的结果，印度尼西亚人民自己无法享用这些富饶的资源。印度尼西亚劳动人民的生活水平极低。印度尼西亚虽然在政治上已经获得独立，但是它的经济仍然具有殖民地和半封建的性质。在国家政权方面，那些维护帝国主义和封建主义利益的势力仍占统治地位。 与此同时，印度尼西亚人民的革命运动，已经获得巨大的发展，特别是在近十年里。印度尼西亚共产党党员人数已达二百五十多万人，也就是说占印度尼西亚总人口的百分之二点五。进步的革命群众团体也有了迅速的发展。在大约四百万组织起来的工人当中，有三百二十万参加了全印度尼西亚中央职工会。目前印度尼西亚的工人约有七百万人。农民运动的进展也是非常令人鼓舞的。印度尼西亚农民阵线的成员在短期内（约一年时间）从四百六十万人增加到六百三十万人。人民青年团拥有一百五十万团员，印度尼西亚妇女运动协会有一百五十万会员。此外，还有艺术家、文学家、大学生、科学家等进步组织，这些组织也有了迅速的发展。虽然如此，如果认为革命运动的发展不会遇到阻碍，那是非常错误的。困难还是很多，革命运动每向前进展一步，都要遇到反动派的新的阻挠。 印度尼西亚的情况的确非常复杂，充满着各种矛盾。一方面，据统计，印度尼西亚人有百分之九十以上信仰伊斯兰教，另一方面，共产主义的影响不断增长。一方面，印度尼西亚政府的内外政策方案有积极和进步的方面，那就是反对帝国主义，同时愿意同社会主义国家一起来发展“新兴力量”；但是另一方面，也有它消极和反动的一面，例如它在财政经济方面采取损害人民利益的措施，同外国资本妥协和勾勾搭搭。一方面，已经建立了广泛的、日益发展的民族统一战线。在印度尼西亚已经有了民族阵线的组织，它团结了所有的政党、群众团体、武装部队和个人，拥有二千多万成员，并有共同纲领，即反帝反封建的《政治宣言》。民族阵线领导机构的组成，从中央一直到基层组织，都反映出“纳沙贡”这三种政治潮流。但是另一方面，虽然有了这一切，直到目前为止，却还没能组成有共产党人担任负责职务的互助合作政府。 的确，印度尼西亚的情况并不简单，印度尼西亚革命的道路不是一条笔直的平坦大道。印度尼西亚是个群岛之国，海岸线很长，要抵抗外来的军事进攻和防止走私者的活动，都有困难。再加上，印度尼西亚的周围都是帝国主义国家或是通过一些军事条约而成为帝国主义势力的基地的国家。但是，面对这种情况，印度尼西亚的革命者从未气馁。最近几年来，他们努力地工作，获得了一定的成绩。上述这一切事实推动印度尼西亚革命者在开辟自己的道路来完成印度尼西亚革命时，更加努力更有成效地学习世界革命运动的丰富经验。 ２、印度尼西亚历史简况和民族运动的成长荷兰第一批商人到达印度尼西亚以前，印度尼西亚经历过了漫长的历史发展阶段。在印度尼西亚的国土上兴起过许多封建王朝，其中著名的有以巨港（南苏门答腊）为中心的室利佛逝王朝（七世纪到十三世纪），第一马打兰王朝（八世纪到九世纪）和麻喏巴歇王朝（十四世纪到十五世纪）。自公元初，首先在爪哇岛开始了封建主义的统治，而在整个封建时代，不断地发生农民起义。这些起义削弱了封建制度，但没能把它摧毁。 封建时期的另一标志就是封建王朝之间的多次战争。正是在封建主义四分五裂这种情况下，葡萄牙、荷兰、英国等欧洲国家的商人从十五世纪起就来到了印度尼西亚。荷兰在激烈的竞争当中击败了它所有的对手。荷兰商人的组织——东印度公司的活动并不限于做买卖，他们还巧妙地和狡诈地利用封建统治者之间的矛盾，直接夺取殖民地。 东印度公司时期是荷兰国内资本原始积累的重要阶段。荷兰商人用尽各种残酷的办法获得惊人的财富。正如马克思说过：“荷兰（十七世纪资本主义的标本国家）的殖民经济的历史展示了一幅背信弃义、贿赂、杀戮和卑鄙行为的无法比拟的图画。”（卡尔·马克思：《资本论》第一卷，人民出版社一九五八年，第九四九至九五○页）十七世纪末，东印度公司实际上控制了整个印度尼西亚，从此印度尼西亚完全沦为荷兰的殖民地。当时，荷兰进行的剥削是建立在印度尼西亚已有的封建剥削的基础上。因此，荷兰殖民统治初期占统治地位的生产关系是封建的生产关系。当时印度尼西亚社会可以确认为封建和殖民地社会。 十九世纪末，当荷兰的资本主义进入到帝国主义阶段时，情况开始发生变化。由于资本输出不断扩大的结果，资本主义势力远远渗入农村中去。封建经济的关系受到破坏，经济不再是单纯的自然经济。商品经济逐渐占了统治地位。封建制度再也不能单独存在，而只有依靠帝国主义的支持才能生存下去。对农民的封建剥削已经同在印度尼西亚社会经济生活中占决定地位的外国资本、买办资本和高利贷资本的剥削交织在一起。封建的印度尼西亚已经变为半封建的印度尼西亚。殖民地、半封建社会的这种状况一直延续到一九四五年八月人民革命爆发时为止。第二次世界大战时，荷兰殖民主义者几乎是不战而投降之后，日本军国主义者就在一九四二年三月占领了印度尼西亚。为时三年半的日本殖民统治代替了荷兰殖民统治。从而，印度尼西亚就从荷兰的殖民地变为日本的殖民地。但是，除了日本的剥削更加残酷以外，印度尼西亚的社会性质并没有发生任何变化。 在上述殖民地、半封建社会的阶段，印度尼西亚的阶级结构发生了变化。十九世纪末，随着帝国主义企业的建立，印度尼西亚的工人阶级诞生了。工人阶级一登上政治舞台，就把本阶级的解放斗争同整个印度尼西亚人民为争取民族独立的斗争结合起来。封建经济崩溃以及商品经济开始发展的结果，产生了另一个阶级，即民族资产阶级。但是，民族工业的发展由于外国垄断资本的竞争遇到严重障碍，以至于到目前为止，印度尼西亚的民族资产阶级中从事工业的人很少，大多数从事商业。这就是我国民族资产阶级的经济地位软弱的原因。这也就是说，印度尼西亚工人阶级的诞生先于民族资产阶级。这从两个阶级在民族解放斗争中所起的作用和影响也可以看到的。 随着资本主义向垄断阶段、帝国主义阶段的过渡，荷兰殖民主义者在十九世纪末和二十世纪初发动了大规模的殖民战争。通过这种战争，他们把整个印度尼西亚统一在一个集中的殖民政府统治之下和一个殖民地经济生活之中。 上述政治、经济和阶级结构的变化，也影响了印度尼西亚人民斗争的性质和形式。统一经济的形成，工人阶级的诞生和民族资本主义生产关系的发展是现代印度尼西亚民族发展的基础。过去，印度尼西亚人民反抗荷兰殖民者的斗争主要表现为农民起义，它是地方性的，而且往往是由那些企图恢复自己统治的地方封建贵族的代表人物所领导的。现在，人民的反抗表现为争取民族独立的斗争，参加斗争的包括了所有受到帝国主义和封建主义损害的阶级。二十世纪初期，出现了许多群众组织和政党，这标志着印度尼西亚人民反抗殖民者的民族觉醒。这种民族运动不同于过去在欧洲资本主义发展时期所出现的民族运动。印度尼西亚工人阶级及其政党——一九二○年五月二十三日诞生的印度尼西亚共产党，从一开始就同民族运动结合在一起并成为这个运动的左翼的先锋。一九二六年十一月，在印度尼西亚爆发了由印度尼西亚共产党领导的第一次全国性民族起义。这次起义虽然被荷兰殖民者镇压下去，但是这次起义教育了印度尼西亚人民：荷兰殖民统治并不是千秋万世的。第一次全国性的武装斗争是由印度尼西亚无产阶级政党——印度尼西亚共产党领导下进行的，这具有非常重要的意义。印度尼西亚资产阶级从未进行过像中国“辛亥革命”那样的革命。 一九四五年八月爆发的民族革命是印度尼西亚民族解放斗争的高潮之一。一九四五年八月十七日宣布成立印度尼西亚共和国以后，印度尼西亚人民把政权掌握在自己手里。印度尼西亚人民利用这个政权采取了反对帝国主义的各项措施，譬如，把外国企业收归印度尼西亚共和国所有，结束了寡头政府，在各地成立了印度尼西亚国民委员会，在各地直到乡村成立了人民治安机构，在一些地区把外资农场的土地分给农民，等等。这就是说，印度尼西亚人民在革命中为反抗他们最主要的敌人——帝国主义，进行了坚决的斗争。但是另一个主要的敌人——封建地主阶级并没有被推翻，而它是帝国主义统治的最重要的社会基础。那也就是说，没有把作为印度尼西亚革命主要力量的农民充分发动起来和争取到革命中来。因此，印度尼西亚虽然通过那次革命取得了独立，但是它的社会仍然是半封建性质的。 一九四八年九月以哈达为首的政府发动进攻，企图消灭共产党人。这个事件被称为“茉莉芬事件”或“茉莉芬挑衅事件”。当时几乎所有的印度尼西亚共产党领导人都被杀害或逮捕。当反帝国主义的中枢被摧残以后，荷兰便轻而易举地在一九四八年十二月发动了旨在征服整个印度尼西亚的殖民战争。一九四九年十一月，哈达政府和荷兰政府签订了罪恶的圆桌会议协定。通过这个协定，荷兰在形式上承认了印度尼西亚的主权和独立，但是荷兰帝国主义对印度尼西亚经济的控制却完全恢复了。这样，圆桌会议协定就确定了印度尼西亚半殖民地国家的地位。 但是，印度尼西亚人民并没有停止斗争，圆桌会议协定签订以后，就开始了争取废除这个协定的激烈斗争。一九五六年印度尼西亚政府单方面废除了圆桌会议协定，取得了巨大的胜利。一九五七年解放西伊里安斗争高涨的结果是，所有的荷兰企业，被接管而后又被国有化。当印度尼西亚人民一致表示要用武力收复西伊里安，而且派到西伊里安去的志愿人员和当地的人民游击队共同解放了一些城市和地区之后，一九六三年西伊里安重新归入印度尼西亚共和国的版图。社会主义国家和全世界进步人民的支持，对解放西伊里安的斗争的胜利起了重要的作用。 反对封建主义的斗争也取得了一些进展。譬如说，在立法方面，通过了《收成分配合同法令》和《土地基本法》，前者是规定农民和地主之间的收成分配比例，后者是关于有限度的土地改革的法令。但是，为实施这两个比较进步的法令而进行的斗争遇到了重重障碍，首先来自目前仍旧盘据在国家机构内部的反动派。 反帝反封建的斗争目前还在继续进行。帝国主义在政权方面或是在经济方面的影响还相当大。目前美帝国主义已经代替荷兰帝国主义而成为印度尼西亚人民的头号敌人。与此同时，荷兰帝国主义仍旧是危险的敌人，而其他帝国主义如英国、西德和日本正加紧对印度尼西亚进行渗透活动。封建地主势力基本上还存在，而且是国内反动力量的支柱之一。根据对印度尼西亚社会和革命的分析，印度尼西亚共产党党章强调指出：印度尼西亚的革命是长期的和复杂的。为了能领导这个革命，印度尼西亚共产党必须采取稳扎稳打、逐步前进的策略，把人民革命斗争向前推进。在斗争中，印度尼西亚共产党必须不断反对两种倾向，即投降主义和冒险主义。 上面谈到的是关于印度尼西亚的历史和印度尼西亚民族解放运动的成长与发展的简单情况。 ３、印度尼西亚革命的基本问题八月革命虽然遭到了失败，但是工人阶级及其政党在这次革命中获得了极其丰富的经验。“一年的革命，等于几十年常年的发展”，这是千真万确的。印度尼西亚共产党在这次革命中虽然犯了一些错误，但是工人阶级和印度尼西亚共产党不仅是积极参加了所有的革命活动，并且努力领导这次革命。因此，八月革命的经验对印度尼西亚共产党来说是非常宝贵的，印度尼西亚共产党在后来得到发展也是由于有了八月革命的经验。 八月革命教育了印度尼西亚共产党人，使得我们懂得：印度尼西亚革命的性质究竟是什么，哪些阶级支持革命和哪些阶级反对革命。八月革命教育了我们：为什么一定要有民族统一战线才能取得革命的胜利，谁是无产阶级可靠的同盟军，谁是动摇不定的、在一定的条件下会叛变革命的同盟军。八月革命也教育了我们：在革命中，武装斗争是最重要的斗争形式。八月革命最重要的经验教训之一就是：只有工人阶级掌握了革命的绝对领导权，印度尼西亚的民族民主革命才能取得胜利。为了实现这个领导权，印度尼西亚共产党就必须能够把马克思列宁主义的普遍真理和印度尼西亚革命的具体实践结合起来，印度尼西亚共产党必须使马克思列宁主义“印度尼西亚化”。 印度尼西亚共产党在一九五四年召开的第五次全国代表大会上，制定了一个完成印度尼西亚革命的一般纲领和要求纲领。这些纲领体现了印度尼西亚共产党在革命中所执行的战略和策略路线。这条战略和策略路线是马克思列宁主义和我们长期斗争的实践相结合的产物，它是从印度尼西亚共产党在四十三年前成立的那一天起，特别是在一九四五年八月革命时期，我们对印度尼西亚革命本身认识过程的结果。在制定和执行这条战略和策略路线的过程中，印度尼西亚共产党深深体会到列宁下面一段话的正确性：“只有客观地考察某个社会中一切阶级的所有相互关系，因而也考察该社会发展的客观阶段，考察该社会和其他社会之间的相互关系，先进阶级才能以此为根据制定出正确的策略。而在观察各个阶级和各个国家时，不应当认为它们处于静力学上的状态，而应当认为它们处于动力学上的状态，也就是说，不应当认为它们处于静止的状态，而应当认为它们处于运动的状态。（这个运动规律是从每个阶级的经济生活条件中产生出来的）。”（列宁：《卡尔·马克思》，《列宁选集》第二卷，人民出版社一九六○年版，第五六三页）过去，印度尼西亚共产党犯过几次宗派主义和教条主义的左倾毛病，而在八月革命时期却同时犯了左倾和右倾机会主义的错误。印度尼西亚共产党之所以还没有能够从自己过去的经验中吸取教训的原因之一，就是因为还没有总结这些经验。直到一九四八年八月，当印度尼西亚共产党举行代表会议、纠正了那段时期所执行的错误路线时，才开始总结这些经验。那次代表会议通过了《印度尼西亚共和国的新道路》的决议，总结了印度尼西亚共产党关于民族统一战线、党的建设和武装斗争的经验。这个决议标志着印度尼西亚共产党开始进入成年阶段。印度尼西亚共产党第五次全国代表大会（一九五四年）解决了印度尼西亚革命的一切重大和基本的问题，这最清楚不过地证明了印度尼西亚共产党进入了成年时期。后来这些重大和基本的问题在一九五七年七月中央委员会通过的关于《印度尼西亚社会和印度尼西亚革命》的著作中得到了明确的阐述。这本著作阐明了印度尼西亚社会的性质，印度尼西亚革命的主要对象和任务，以及革命的动力、性质和前途。 关于印度尼西亚革命的主要对象（敌人），由于印度尼西亚仍然是半殖民地、半封建的社会，所以革命的对象是帝国主义和封建主义。革命的任务是：进行民族革命以驱逐帝国主义，进行民主革命以消灭封建制度。革命的动力是工人阶级、农民、小资产阶级及其他为帝国主义所损害并坚决反对帝国主义的民主人士。而民族资产阶级是能够参加革命的。印度尼西亚现阶段的革命性质不是无产阶级社会主义革命，而是民族民主革命或资产阶级民主革命。革命的前途是社会主义和共产主义，不是资本主义。 印度尼西亚共产党在领导印度尼西亚人民革命斗争的过程中，从上述对印度尼西亚革命基本问题的认识出发，加深了对印度尼西亚革命的了解，并且提出了各种理论。事实证明，要保证革命的胜利绝对需要领会和运用这些理论。 印度尼西亚共产党提出了以下的理论，即目前印度尼西亚有三种力量：进步力量，中间力量和顽固力量。事实证明这一理论是正确的。党对这三种力量采取的路线是：发展进步力量，团结中间力量和孤立顽固力量。在团结中间力量的同时，党也进行了斗争。党团结中间力量反对帝国主义和封建主义，但是，如果他们要削弱党的独立性和劳动人民运动的独立性或是在反对帝国主义和封建主义的斗争中动摇不定，党就要同它进行斗争。 印度尼西亚共产党提出了这样的理论：在一九四五年到一九四八年革命期间的武装斗争中，党不可以抄袭外国武装斗争的理论，而应该采取三种斗争形式相结合的方法。一九四五年八月革命时期的游击战争是可以扩大和得到巩固、使八月革命的要求得以彻底实现的，只要当时印度尼西亚共产党在三种形式相结合的工作基础上来解决这个问题。这三种斗争形式就是：农村的游击斗争（参加者主要是雇农和贫农），敌占城市中的工人（主要是运输工人）的革命斗争和加强在敌人武装力量中间的工作。这个理论很重要，它是在像印度尼西亚这样一个岛国赢得游击战争胜利的理论。 现在，在印度尼西亚，没有敌人的武装部队，只有印度尼西亚共和国武装部队，它是在第二次世界大战之后，在反法西斯斗争中以及在具有民族民主性质的革命中迅速诞生的。工人阶级和印度尼西亚共产党在建设这支武装部队工作中起了重大的作用。印度尼西亚武装部队不是反动的武装部队。从它诞生的角度来看，它具有反法西斯的、民主的和反帝的特点。因此，印度尼西亚共产党的责任便是密切人民和武装部队两位一体的关系，以便在任何事变中，武装部队或是它的大部分能坚定地站在人民一边，站在革命一边。就像不久前印度尼西亚人民在反对和击败“印度尼西亚共和国革命政府——全面斗争约章集团”反革命的斗争中所证明的那样。 印度尼西亚共产党提出了这样的理论：为了赢得印度尼西亚革命的胜利，应该用爱国主义和无产阶级国际主义相结合的精神来教育全体党员和劳动人民群众。印度尼西亚共产党人应该反对民族虚无主义和资产阶级沙文主义。印度尼西亚的革命同一九一七年伟大的十月社会主义革命开始的、现在正在迅速发展的世界无产阶级革命是分不开的。印度尼西亚的革命是世界进步力量的一部分，是全世界人民争取民族独立、民主、和平和社会主义斗争的一部分。 印度尼西亚共产党提出了这样的理论：为了能够引导政治形势的发展，党必须实行这样的总路线：继续开展统一战线和党的建设的工作，以彻底实现一九四五年八月革命的要求。换句话说，印度尼西亚共产党人应该高举党的三面旗帜：统一战线的旗帜、党的建设的旗帜和一九四五年八月革命的旗帜。印度尼西亚共产党在建立统一战线方面的总的路线是：建立工人阶级领导的、以反封建的工农联盟为基础的工人阶级、农民、小资产阶级和民族资产阶级的反帝统一战线。关于党的建设方面的总的路线是：建设一个全国范围的、广大群众性的、思想上政治上组织上完全巩固的党。印度尼西亚共产党在一九四五年八月革命方面的总的路线是：运用一切斗争的经验，动员广大的群众，教育他们做好应付一切可能的准备。 印度尼西亚共产党是根据马克思列宁主义的普遍真理和印度尼西亚革命的具体实践相结合的经验，总结出了上述理论。有了印度尼西亚共产党长期积累的经验，才有这些基本总结。这些经验是印度尼西亚共产党员英勇斗争、成千上万的同志流血牺牲和印度尼西亚共产党人勤奋学习马克思列宁主义的结果。我们已经把这些理论运用于实践，并在行动中继续发展它。印度尼西亚共产党人在工作和学习中的口号是：“懂得马克思主义，熟悉情况”。只有通过这条道路，马克思列宁主义的普遍真理和印度尼西亚革命具体实践相结合的道路，即将马克思列宁主义印度尼西亚化的道路，印度尼西亚共产党才能领导印度尼西亚人民取得革命的胜利。马克思列宁主义越印度尼西亚化，马克思列宁主义同人民群众和印度尼西亚革命结合得越好，印度尼西亚共产党就越能够避免不管是古典的或现代的修正主义和不管是古典的或现代的教条主义的危险，这就意味着印度尼西亚革命越向前进。 ４、关于民族统一战线的几个问题印度尼西亚共产党得出结论，一九四五年八月革命没有能够达到目的的重要原因之一，就是因为印度尼西亚共产党当时对民族统一战线的必要性缺乏认识，同时不善于建立民族统一战线。当时共产党人忽视了建立作为反帝民族革命武器的民族统一战线。虽然后来他们开始认识到民族统一战线的重要性，但尚未真正懂得建立民族统一战线的方法。 这个总结推动共产党人更加积极地、不屈不挠地和踏踏实实地建立民族统一战线。印度尼西亚共产党第五次全国代表大会把建立民族统一战线的任务定为印度尼西亚共产党头等紧迫的任务。根据对印度尼西亚社会各阶级的分析，统一战线应该包括一切革命的民族力量即工人、农民、小资产阶级和民族资产阶级。同时，第五次全国代表大会强调指出：工农联盟是民族统一战线的基础。因为农民还遭受着严重的封建残余的剥削和压迫，所以只有当共产党人积极领导农民进行反对封建残余的斗争，从满足农民的部分要求到满足他们的根本要求——消灭封建所有制和分配土地，工农联盟才能建立起来并得到巩固。 关于民族资产阶级问题，八月革命向印度尼西亚共产党提供了有关这个阶级的动摇性的重要经验。在一定的情况下，民族资产阶级能够参加革命并采取明确的态度站在革命一边，正如在八月革命初期那样。但是，在另一种情况下，它会动摇和叛变，像在哈达政府发动“茉莉芬挑衅事件”时那样。民族资产阶级也向帝国主义投降，同意卖国的圆桌会议协定。因此，无产阶级和印度尼西亚共产党必须坚持不渝地努力争取民族资产阶级到革命方面来，但也必须防备他们背叛革命的可能性。 印度尼西亚资产阶级的另一部分是买办资产阶级。它们直接为外国大资本家的利益服务，因而它不是革命的力量，而是革命的对象。 资产阶级还有另外一部分是官僚资本家，它也是革命的敌人和对象。从它反动的本质来看，印度尼西亚的官僚资产阶级和中国的官僚资产阶级是有相同之处的。但是，印度尼西亚在目前还没有发展到像旧中国那样，官僚资本家主要集中在四大家族，形成了高度的集中。印度尼西亚的官僚资产阶级主要是在荷兰企业被接管和收归国有以后才发展起来的。一般地说，这些人是利用他们在政权机关或是国营企业中的地位，或是利用他们和政权机关或是国营企业中的要员的关系而变为资本家的。他们利用官僚势力，而在过去主要是利用紧急状态法令来获得和巩固资本家的地位。他们通过各种狡猾的手段来破坏国家的经济，企图把国营企业“私有化”和控制在自己的手里。如上所说，他们起着非常反动的作用，他们反对民主，反对人民群众组织，反对民族统一战线，他们加紧同帝国主义勾结，并同地主合伙镇压农民。他们成立了形形色色的“工会”和“群众组织”，实际上是资本家的团体和组织。这些团体和组织建立的目的在于摧毁革命的群众组织，特别是全印度尼西亚中央职工会。但是，这些官僚资本家的团体和组织的真面目在劳动人民群众中已经是暴露无遗，并受到强烈的反击。 在建立印度尼西亚民族统一战线的过程中，工人阶级应该站在全体人民斗争的最前列。印度尼西亚是个经济落后的国家，所以我国的工人阶级在客观上就存在一些弱点。第一个弱点是他们的人数要比农民少得多。为了克服这个弱点，应该建立和维护工人阶级内部的牢固团结。正如季米特洛夫同志所说：“所有农民和城市小资产阶级阶层的人数远远超过无产阶级人数的国家里，尤其重要的是竭尽全力建立起工人阶级内部坚强的统一战线，以便它在全体劳动人民的关系中能占据领导的地位”。目前在印度尼西亚可以说已经有了工人阶级的统一战线。社会民主党和修正主义在工人当中的影响是微小的。加入进步的全印度尼西亚中央职工会的工人占组织起来的工人的绝大多数。除此之外，在全印度尼西亚中央职工会同民族主义思潮以及宗教影响下的其他各种工人组织之间还存在着组织形式方面的或是具体行动方面的统一战线。当然，反动派将继续力图分裂工人战线，因此印度尼西亚共产党人和其他进步人士当然也必须继续努力工作来加强和巩固已形成的统一战线。 第二个弱点是：印度尼西亚工人阶级比先进的资本主义国家的无产阶级年轻些。因而它在工人运动方面的经验非常缺乏。工人阶级只有刻苦学习国际工人运动的经验，特别是已经取得胜利的工人运动的经验，努力学习马克思列宁主义，才能克服这个弱点。印度尼西亚共产党已经并将继续竭力克服这个弱点。当然，我们没有任何理由自满，学习是无止境的。 第三个弱点是：印度尼西亚工人阶级的文化水平比资产阶级要低些。这个弱点应该克服，以便工人阶级能更善于在革命中领导所有的阶级。工人阶级在文化、教育方面的进步是巨大而迅速的。甚至在一些政府部门和议会中，无产阶级的代表在知识领域方面，在了解和解决各种政治、经济问题方面也显示了他们的长处。但是，从整体来看，工人阶级还需要作许多努力来赶上先进水平。印度尼西亚共产党从今年八月十七日开始的、在文化方面的四年计划，将为达到这个目的发挥重要作用。 目前，反帝反封建的民族统一战线基本上在印度尼西亚建立了。印度尼西亚共产党的干部在农民中进行了艰苦的工作，研究了农村中的土地关系并领导农民进行反对地主的斗争。印度尼西亚共产党已经有了正确的、革命的、指导农民斗争的土地纲领。（⑶⑷）同民族资产阶级的联合也已经建立起来。特别是在印度尼西亚共产党制定了正确的政策，克服了自己队伍中的宗派主义之后，民族资产阶级开始回到革命的一边。同中国的经验一样，印度尼西亚共产党在和资产阶级建立统一战线时应该贯彻两个不可动摇的原则。第一个原则是又团结又斗争。这个原则也反映在印度尼西亚共产党对待民族资产阶级领导的、反帝的历届内阁的态度上。印度尼西亚共产党无保留地支持政府所执行的进步政策，批评它不坚定的政策，使它变为进步的政策，反对实行损害人民的政策的部长们。第二个原则是保持印度尼西亚共产党在民族统一战线中的独立自主。这意味着：同资产阶级的联合并不会妨碍无产阶级去组织革命，去发展党和革命的群众组织。也意味着：无产阶级有权利阐明自己的立场。印度尼西亚共产党坚持这个独立自主的原则。我们同印度尼西亚资产阶级合作已有十多年的历史。在这期间，革命的力量不是越来越缩小，而是越来越发展。而反革命的力量却受到多次的打击。甚至连五、六年前公开进行的反共叫嚣，现在已正式被谴责为反对团结的恐共病。在反对恐共病和加强民族团结方面，苏加诺总统起了重大作用。当然，反共活动现在还有，而且只要印度尼西亚还存在帝国主义和封建主义，就继续会有。但是由于受到革命力量的打击，他们的力量已经大大的削弱了。 根据同印度尼西亚民族资产阶级联合的经验，印度尼西亚共产党得出结论：只要进步力量强大，不断发展并善于打击敌人，而党的政策和策略又是正确的，那么就可以有把握地把资产阶级争取到革命方面来。在发展进步力量时，应该首先发展工人和农民的力量。 印度尼西亚共产党建立民族统一战线的经验表明：我们应该首先清楚地了解统一战线的阶级内容，它的基础和领导阶级。然后，把建立民族统一战线的工作贯彻到具体的政策中去，赋予本国政治生活中产生的特有的形式。譬如说，在争取成立包括所有的革命阶级参加的政府的斗争中，印度尼西亚共产党在初期是主张成立民族联合政府。后来，由于民族统一战线思想的广泛传播和群众斗争的发展，于一九五七年二月产生了苏加诺总统关于互助合作内阁的方案。这样，民族联合政府的内容也完全包括在希望建立互助合作内阁的要求里面。而民族团结的内容完全能够用民族互助合作这一字眼来概括。后来又产生了“纳沙贡”这一名词。“纳沙贡”一词反映了以反帝为纲领的民族主义、宗教以及共产主义各政治潮流之间的广泛合作。对于共产党人来说，民族统一战线的意思无非就是指革命阶级之间的团结。但是，各个阶级在政治生活中通过各自的政党反映本阶级的利益。在印度尼西亚，情形也是一样，各个阶级，无论是反动的阶级或是革命的阶级，它们的利益都是通过自己的政党明显地表现出来。从印度尼西亚民族解放斗争的传统来看，反对荷兰殖民统治的有三大政治潮流，即民族主义潮流、宗教（主要是伊斯兰教）潮流和共产主义潮流。因此，如果这三个政治潮流组成“纳沙贡”，那么印度尼西亚民族团结就可以说已经形成了。这种说法是合情合理的。在印度尼西亚目前情况下，提出以“纳沙贡”为核心的民族互助合作的口号不会模糊民族统一战线的阶级内容，因为这种团结是建立在明确的反帝并在一定程度上反封建的纲领的基础上的。两个亲帝国主义和亲封建的党——马斯友美党和印度尼西亚社会党已经从印度尼西亚的政治生活中消失了。　另一个也反映民族团结和“纳沙贡”团结的概念是建国五原则。（五项原则是：（１）神道；（２）人道主义和国际主义；（３）民族主义或爱国主义；（４）民主主义；（５）社会公平。）印度尼西亚共产党拥护和坚持建国五原则，虽然其中的一个原则是神道原则。因为建国五原则并不是代替它的拥护者的哲学，而是把存在于社会上的各种思潮联结起来。因此，印度尼西亚共产党坚决反对有些人企图把建国五原则中的一个原则作为主要的原则。建国五原则必须作为一个整体接受，作为一个整体，它就是团结的手段。建国五原则的创造者苏加诺总统也屡次这样强调，苏加诺总统并且说，如果把建国五原则压缩成一大原则，那么这一大原则就是互助合作。 除了工农联盟和“纳沙贡”团结之外，在印度尼西亚，民族团结也体现在苏加诺总统担任主席的民族阵线这一组织形式中。民族阵线的副主席包括了“纳沙贡”三方面的代表。民族阵线通过了革命的五点纲领，作为指导民族阵线活动的要求纲领。这五点纲领符合印度尼西亚共产党目前的三项任务。（印度尼西亚共产党的三项任务是：巩固已经取得的胜利，克服经济困难和继续进行反对新殖民主义的斗争。）我上面所谈的经验说明，只要民族统一战线的思想已经扎下了根，同时印度尼西亚共产党不屈不挠地进行艰苦不懈的工作去建立民族统一战线，那么就会有许许多多加强和巩固这一战线的形式。显然，印度尼西亚共产党在认识了民族统一战线的原则之后，就会努力找到符合印度尼西亚特殊情况的、行之有效的民族统一战线的形式。 印度尼西亚共产党认为，民族统一战线是取得革命胜利的绝对条件。民族统一战线工作的进展，大大有助于党的建设工作。反之，党的建设工作的进展也使民族统一战线的工作能够顺利进行。 ５、印度尼西亚共和国的政权问题我上面说过，印度尼西亚的形势是非常复杂的。只有很好地了解印度尼西亚政权的实质，才能理解这种复杂的局面。 一切革命的最根本的问题是政权问题。印度尼西亚共产党不仅仅从理论上认识到这一原理的正确，而且通过沉痛的经验教训，从实践中体会到它的正确。在一九四五年八月革命时期，印度尼西亚共产党就是在国家政权问题上犯了严重的错误。当时曾经成立了一个由共产党人阿米尔·沙利弗丁同志担任总理兼国防部长的政府。同时，还有一些内阁成员也是共产党人。内阁中也有右派分子。反动派利用印度尼西亚共产党在反对荷兰帝国主义的斗争中所犯的政策上的错误，撤回了他们的部长，图谋推翻阿米尔·沙利弗丁内阁。印度尼西亚共产党对右派的这一阴谋缺乏警惕。由于对国家政权的阶级本质缺乏认识，阿米尔·沙利弗丁内阁便自动解散，随后成立的、哈达领导的内阁就起而代之。反动派十分懂得如何利用国家政权来为它们的阶级利益服务。政权一离开了无产阶级的手，转到买办资产阶级哈达手中，这个政府便继续推行对荷兰调和的路线，同时进行反革命的准备工作。正如我在别的部分曾经讲过的，最后哈达政府通过茉莉芬挑衅事件发动了这一反革命行动。印度尼西亚共产党在国家政权问题上所犯的错误，就这样使我们付出了重大牺牲的代价。但是这一错误的经验教训，对印度尼西亚共产党却是极其深刻的。 目前印度尼西亚的国家政权是什么性质呢？圆桌会议协定签订以后，当时成立的历届政府都是完全代表帝国主义和封建势力利益的买办政府。虽然那几届政府也有民族资产阶级的政治代表，但是他们成了反动派的俘虏，执行同革命的敌人帝国主义及其走狗妥协的政策。根据一九五一年以来实行的印度尼西亚共和国临时宪法，苏加诺总统在政府中并不直接掌握权力。 印度尼西亚共产党从一九五一年起，就已经提出建立民族联合政府的要求，要求民族联合政府由同意废除圆桌会议协定的各民主党派和无党派民主人士组成。争取民族资产阶级回到革命方面来的正确政策取得了初步成效，结果在一九五二年成立了（印度尼西亚民族党的）韦洛坡政府。在韦洛坡内阁中还有右派（马斯友美党和印度尼西亚社会党）人物，但是这个内阁的政纲比较民主，所以印度尼西亚共产党支持它。印度尼西亚共产党对这个内阁的积极态度使顽固力量开始孤立和受到打击，而中间力量和进步力量开始更加团结和发展起来。 自韦洛坡内阁以来的历届政府，基本上都是比较左倾和进步的。右派分子在政府中的作用愈来愈小。这一点明显地表现在一九五五年八月成立的布哈努丁·哈拉哈普内阁。（布哈努丁·哈拉哈普是马斯友美党的要人，后来成了反革命叛乱分子）这个内阁显然是反动的，因而遭到印度尼西亚共产党的反对。由于力量对比发生了向左摆的变化，由于民族统一战线取得了进展，因此这个内阁没有能够维持多久，它的寿命不到一年。这个内阁破坏普选没有成功，被迫举行普选，并不得不承受马斯友美党—印度尼西亚社会党的联合所遭到的失败。民族统一战线取得进展所造成的重大发展之一，是革命派同哈达、马斯友美党、印度尼西亚社会党之间矛盾的尖锐化。这个矛盾尖锐化的高峰便是哈达辞去副总统职务和一九五九年七月五日总统命令的公布，这个命令宣布印度尼西亚恢复一九四五年宪法，即印度尼西亚共和国宣告成立时的宪法。一九四五年宪法规定由总统直接领导政府。 事态发展得十分迅速。在帝国主义支持下，国内反动派曾几次发动政变和谋杀总统。他们在阴谋遭到失败以后，便于一九五八年发动了旨在搞分裂的叛乱。政府在全体人民的敦促和大力支持之下，坚决镇压了叛乱。 一九六○年十一月，临时人民协商会议批准了《印度尼西亚共和国政治宣言》（简称《政治宣言》），把它作为国家的方针大纲。《政治宣言》是苏加诺总统一九五九年八月十七日所作的一篇演讲。这件事是人民革命斗争中的一个重大事件，因为这意味着关于印度尼西亚革命基本问题的概念已在国家的正式文件中被接受和体现出来。这样就使印度尼西亚全民族对印度尼西亚革命重大的基本问题取得了一致的正确认识。这一国家方针大纲指出，印度尼西亚革命的主要对象（主要敌人）是帝国主义和封建主义；印度尼西亚的革命任务不是建立一个阶级、一个阶层或一个政党的政权，而是建立全体人民的政权，互助合作的政权，反对军事的或个人的专制和独裁；印度尼西亚的革命力量不是一个阶级、一个阶层或一个政党，而是坚决反对帝国主义，反对封建主义和以工农为基本力量的全体人民；印度尼西亚革命的性质是民族民主革命；印度尼西亚革命的前途是社会主义，而不是资本主义。因此，《政治宣言》真正成了全体印度尼西亚人民完成革命的共同纲领。有了《政治宣言》之后，革命派反对反革命派的斗争便表现为《政治宣言》派反对反《政治宣言》派的斗争。 一九六三年三月，苏加诺总统又发表了另一篇重要文件，即《经济宣言》。“纳沙贡”三方面的人物在起草《经济宣言》中起了重要作用。《经济宣言》包含三个基本内容。第一，《经济宣言》规定了印度尼西亚目前革命阶段的经济基本战略，即民族民主革命阶段的任务是，彻底肃清和消灭帝国主义和封建主义残余。第二，《经济宣言》规定了克服当前经济困难所必须立即执行的短期措施。第三，《经济宣言》规定了实施《经济宣言》本身所绝对必要的政治条件，即通过政府和有组织的人民群众之间在施政和行政方面的相结合，实现以“纳沙贡”为核心的民族互助合作。换句话说，要成立以“纳沙贡”为核心的互助合作政府。 有了《政治宣言》和《经济宣言》，完成印度尼西亚革命的进步的政治和经济方案实际上便正式地成为国家的方针。但是为什么这些文件没有坚决地贯彻下去，甚至在执行中经常发生和原方案的精神相违背的现象呢？为了搞清这个问题，我们必须了解当前印度尼西亚共和国的政权性质。 印度尼西亚共产党认为，印度尼西亚国家政权包含有两个方面，即拥护人民的一面和反对人民的一面。拥护人民这一面的产生是和印度尼西亚共产党实行三种斗争形式相结合的方法中所取得的成就分不开的。拥护人民的一面愈来愈发展，并促使印度尼西亚政府采取各种反对帝国主义的革命措施。反对人民的一面，即代表帝国主义、买办、地主和官僚资本家利益的一面，竭尽全力企图破坏所有的进步措施。这一面至今仍占统治地位。在这种情况下，印度尼西亚共产党在国家政权方面的斗争就是要促使拥护人民的一面日愈增强起来并占统治地位，而把反对人民的力量从国家政权中排除出去。这就是人民关于改组（国家机构）的要求的内容，关于成立以“纳沙贡”为核心的互助合作内阁的要求的内容。 也正由于存在着这两个方面，印度尼西亚必须进行自上而下和自下而上的革命。自上而下就是说印度尼西亚共产党必须促使国家政权采取各种革命措施；在人事上和国家机构中进行改革。而自下而上就是说要发动、组织和动员人民来实现上述改革。印度尼西亚共产党就是通过这样的办法来改变帝国主义、官僚资本家、买办和地主同人民力量之间的力量对比。 有的同志问：这些进步的政治和经济方案难道不是资产阶级欺骗劳动人民的阴谋诡计吗？提出这样的问题并不奇怪。但问题在于这些进步的方案是在进步力量发展了和积极参预制定之下才产生的。有了政府正式的方案，便大大有利于进步人士教育、组织和动员人民群众坚决要求执行这些方案，并用来揭露一切背离这些方案的企图。因此，现政府所采取的一切进步的方案和措施，首先是印度尼西亚进步力量斗争的结果。整民族接受工人阶级及其政党的方案，便反映了工人阶级在革命中的领导权。 另外一些同志又问：印度尼西亚共产党要求在行政机构方面进行改组，成立以“纳沙贡”为核心的互助合作内阁，这和“结构改革论”不是一样吗？不，完全不一样！印度尼西亚共产党的确支持和促使国家机构进行改组，以便加强进步分子在国家政权中的地位。例如，印度尼西亚共产党完全同意和支持成立反映“纳沙贡”的最高谘询委员会、互助合作议会、临时人民协商会议等。但是这只是达到战略目标，完全实现《政治宣言》和印度尼西亚共产党纲领的局部要求或改良措施。印度尼西亚共产党纲领中明确说明，印度尼西亚共产党认为，只有人民民主政府，即在工人阶级领导下，以工农联盟为基础的民族统一战线政府，才能把印度尼西亚从半殖民地半封建的国家改变成为完全独立的、民主的、繁荣的和先进的国家。争取成立人民民主政府的一项重大步骤，就是印度尼西亚共产党在一九六三年二月七届一中全会提出的要求，就是成立敢于改变国内社会制度，敢于牺牲城乡少数大剥削者即官僚资本家、买办和地主的利益，维护多数人民的利益的、以“纳沙贡”为核心的互助合作内阁。因此当前成立“纳沙贡”内阁的要求是为达到战略目标的斗争中的一个重要事情。在这方面，印度尼西亚共产党人认为，成立“纳沙贡”内阁的问题是一个力量对比的问题，就是说问题的实质是夺取政权问题，是革命问题，而不是“结构改革”问题。只有全力以赴，坚持不懈地发展进步力量、团结中间力量和孤立顽固力量，才能改变力量对比。七届一中全会号召共产党人以“五更”：更勇敢、更机智、更警惕、更坚决和更埋头苦干的精神来执行这一路线。 以上便是有关当前印度尼西亚共和国国家政权的一些问题。 二、关于党的建设的一些经验１、把印度尼西亚共产党建设成为既是群众性的党又是精干的党在日本法西斯占领时期，印度尼西亚共产党完全在非法状态下进行活动。在反对日本法西斯的斗争中，涌现出许多年青的共产党人，他们分布在工人、青年、学生、农民等各种群众组织中以及日本军国主义者征募印度尼西亚青年建立起来的武装部队里。在准备宣布独立、反对企图镇压我们独立斗争的日本军队和联军的斗争中，这些共产党人是积极分子。但是，他们没有一个很好的中央领导，因为在一九四二年印度尼西亚共产党的大批领导干部遭到日本人的逮捕和杀害。正因为这样，在发动一九四五年八月革命中，印度尼西亚共产党缺乏组织上、政治上和思想上的准备。 由于组织、政治、思想等方面的弱点，便难于立即达到政治上和思想上的统一。在一九四五至一九四八年革命期间，成立了三个以马克思列宁主义为基础的党。由于这个缘故，印度尼西亚共产党在一九四八年八月的会议上纠正组织上、政治上和思想上的一切错误时，首先决定合并所有以马克思列宁主义为基础的政党。按照计划，合并将在下一次代表大会中完成。那次代表大会没能举行，因为事前发生了茉莉芬挑衅事件。但是印度尼西亚共产党的声誉是破坏不了的。一九四八年十二月，当荷兰发动第二次殖民战争的时候，由于茉莉芬事件而被投入牢狱的共产党人有一部分被释放了，另一部分则破狱而出。他们出狱后第一件事就是寻找武器，进行反对荷兰殖民军的战斗。他们的行动使群众睁开了眼睛，识破哈达在茉莉芬挑衅事件中关于共产党人要推翻共和国的谎言。组织遭到破坏的共产党人无法阻止妥协性的圆桌会议协定的签订。但是事实证明，共产党人在任何地方都站在反荷斗争的最前线并直接领导游击队。这对圆桌会议以后党的建设的发展具有重大的意义。 印度尼西亚共产党面临着领导一个由成千岛屿组成、拥有将近一亿人口、而人口密度又极不平衡的多族国家的革命任务。为了完成这一领导任务，印度尼西亚共产党在建设党的方式上就不能不考虑到本国的特点。一九五一年，党员和预备党员的人数不超过七千九百一十人，组织小、范围窄，而且主要只分布在爪哇和苏门答腊。因此，如果不大规模发展党，就不可能负起党所面临的艰巨任务。 因此，一九五二年初举行的印度尼西亚共产党全国代表会议具有极为重要的意义。这次会议讨论了当时印度尼西亚人民面临的重大政治问题，如：对曾经大肆逮捕共产党人的苏基曼政府的政策问题，对伊斯兰教国运动和印度尼西亚伊斯兰教军反革命匪帮的政策问题。除此之外，会议还严肃地讨论了根据马克思列宁主义学说来制定印度尼西亚革命自己的道路的必要性。在这个问题上，会议作出了关于三种斗争形式相结合的方法问题、同民族资产阶级建立民族统一战线问题、加强党的思想以及发展党员和组织等问题的重要结论。特别是关于组织问题，全国代表会议作出结论，认为必须克服宗派主义，并且同意政治局的发展党员的计划，争取在六个月内把党员从七千九百一十人发展到十万人。这就是党的领导为了把印度尼西亚共产党建设成群众性的党而采取的第一个步骤。 有些同志怀疑，共产党是不是应该成为群众性的党。他们只强调印度尼西亚共产党必须是质量高的党，意思就是说，印度尼西亚共产党的党员应该是“了不起的人物”，而“不是随随便便的什么人”。他们认为大规模发展党员只不过是追求数量而已。这些同志忘了，质量不能离开数量，群众性的党也可以同时是精干的党。 群众性的党包含两方面的意义。首先，是有大量的党员；其次，在群众中具有广泛和深刻的影响。的确，为了使党能够领导所有的革命阶级执行它的政策，第二点是最重要的。不过，如果党没有足够的干部在社会各阶层中进行广泛的宣传的话，这一点显然是不可能做到的，更不用说去领导他们周围的群众组织。那时许多干部必须兼任各种各样的工作，以致被人称为“万金油干部”或“无所不包的干部”。因此，群众性的党的这两个方面，不能把它们对立起来，而应该理解为统一的东西。 不同意群众性的党的提法的另一理由是，党员为数众多就会模糊先锋队和群众之间的区别，使党不能起新型的列宁式的党的作用，即不能成为先进部队和阶级组织的最高形式等等。同时，大量出身于小资产阶级的新党员参加了党，他们会把自己的思想意识带进党内来，并将无产阶级的思想意识溶化掉或淹没掉。当然，这种危险不是不存在的，我们可以从第二国际的党看到这种例子。但是，如果我们意识到这种危险并保持高度警惕，这种危险是可以避免的。最重要的是在发展党员和组织的同时，必须不断地和坚持不懈地进行马克思列宁主义的教育。而且必须把这种理论教育同实际斗争的教育和锻炼结合起来。 也有些同志担心，建立群众性的党，会使帝国主义和其他反动派的特务、密探和间谍容易渗入党内来。这种担心确是有道理的。但是即使党比较小，他们也还是会进行渗透活动的。我们应该相信群众，相信群众高度的革命精神，相信他们的忠诚。我们党员群众的政治觉悟越高，警惕性也就会越高。 上述全国代表会议通过的发展党员的计划，实际上是超额完成了。一九五二年底检查计划时，党员和预备党员已达到十二万六千六百七十一人。就是说，不到一年的时间内，党员人数增加了十五倍多。为什么会增加得这么快呢？一般来说，在比较短的时间内，在印度尼西亚能建立起群众性的党的客观条件和主观条件是什么呢？ 在印度尼西亚建立群众性的党的有利客观条件是，各阶层人民具有旺盛的革命精神。这种革命精神表现在一九二六年人民起义的传统、八月革命以及以后的反帝斗争中。印度尼西亚共产党人在所有的革命斗争中一贯站在最前列，起了重大的作用。因此印度尼西亚共产党享有劳动人民的保卫者的声誉。 国际条件也是有利的。十月革命和第二次世界大战期间苏联人民的英勇斗争发生了巨大的影响，促使印度尼西亚人民更加向往社会主义。东欧人民民主国家的成立，特别是中国人民革命的辉煌胜利和中华人民共和国的成立，使社会主义思想影响更加广泛。 另一个有利条件是，由于残酷的殖民统治的结果，在工人中没有工人贵族，因此，印度尼西亚工人运动中没有改良主义的传统。这样，工人统一战线就比较容易建立。有了工人阶级的牢固的团结，就形成了团结其他一切革命力量的核心，并使工人阶级能够处于先锋队的地位。 以上便是印度尼西亚共产党建成群众性的党的客观条件。 从主观条件即当时党本身的状况来看，情况也是有利的。一九五一年新政治局的成立，保证了党的领导的团结一致，这是把党重建成为真正的马克思列宁主义政党的首要条件和绝对条件。第二个条件是，有了马克思列宁主义的党章。它成为健全党内组织生活的基础。第三个条件是，党的正确纲领。党的纲领在具体政策中规定了印度尼西亚人民所必须立即完成的迫切任务。例如关于推翻极端反动的苏基曼政府的政策，关于消灭伊斯兰教国运动和印度尼西亚伊斯兰教军恐怖集团的政策，废除圆桌会议协定的口号等等。这些正确的政策把越来越多的群众争取到党的周围来。第四个条件是，在党内展开反对宗派主义、投降主义和冒险主义的斗争。这样，党就能够建立最广泛的民族统一战线，能够从各阶层人民中吸收最先进的分子参加到印度尼西亚共产党来。 印度尼西亚共产党第六次全国代表大会（一九五九年）在总结中指出，第五次全国代表大会提出的党的建设的任务基本上已经完成。因此，第六次代表大会提出了巩固已经取得的成就的任务，“继续在全国范围内建设同群众密切联系的，在思想上、政治上和组织上巩固的党。”２、马克思列宁主义教育对党的建设的意义一九五六年七月召开的五届四中全会着重指出：“只有在统一思想、统一意识的基础上，即在马克思列宁主义的思想意识的基础上，才有可能实现党内的团结。只有有了共产党员思想上的统一，才有共产党政策上和组织上真正的统一，才有共产党所领导的人民的行动的统一。”这一简单的真理，在印度尼西亚共产党开始要建设一个群众性的党的时候，尤其适用。而只有对全党进行了马克思列宁主义教育，才能实现马克思列宁主义的思想统一。 党的第五次全国代表大会最后清算了党的“左”倾和右倾机会主义偏向。但是，还有党员对有关印度尼西亚革命的问题，特别是有关印度尼西亚革命道路的问题，搞不清楚。由于党员的发展非常迅速，新党员人数大大超过了老党员人数，因此，情况就更复杂了。一九五四年第五次全国代表大会召开的时候，预备党员人数约占党员总人数的百分之七十。这些党员群众出身于各种不同的阶级，他们的家庭环境也是各式各样的，他们的文化水平和革命经验也极不相同。因此，他们会把形形色色的非无产阶级的思想意识带到党内来，从而产生各种各样的主观主义，那就不足为奇了。所以，马克思列宁主义教育问题就成为了今后党的建设成功与否的极其迫切的和决定性的问题。一九五二年以来，印度尼西亚共产党开展了几次大规模发展党员的运动，没有一次不是同开展对党员的教育活动同时进行的，特别是新党员要学习印度尼西亚共产党纲领和党章，而老党员必须学习党的文件和马克思列宁主义理论书籍。譬如，一九五一年和一九五二年，印度尼西亚共产党领导干部学习列宁著作《共产主义运动中的“左派”幼稚病》的运动，这次学习运动在使党摆脱宗派主义毛病方面起了决定性作用。学习刘少奇同志著作《论群众路线》的运动，对印度尼西亚共产党干部建设一个扎根于群众的党，帮助很大。同样的，毛泽东同志的著作《实践论》、《矛盾论》和一九五七年发表的《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》，对印度尼西亚共产党学习总结自己的经验和解决党内矛盾有极其重要的意义。类似的例子还很多。 从一九六三年八月十七日起，印度尼西亚共产党开始执行第三个计划，即为期四年的关于文化、思想和组织工作的计划。这个四年计划是前两个三年计划的继续。这个计划很重视文化工作，同时加强了思想和组织工作。执行了这个新的四年计划后，印度尼西亚共产党将更能够和更熟练地去对待一切任务和工作。 从党的建设经验可以得出结论：印度尼西亚共产党人具有三个特点：第一，用爱国主义和无产阶级国际主义精神教育印度尼西亚共产党党员；第二，在党的建设中，我们的立场是：组织建设重要，但思想建设更重要；第三，印度尼西亚共产党人要坚持马克思列宁主义原则，而又能灵活运用这些原则。印度尼西亚共产党人主要是从自己建党的实际经验中，自觉地认识到这三个特点并且把它变为自己所有。 印度尼西亚共产党人建设和加强自己的党的工作不能与国际共产主义运动的发展相割裂。国际共产主义运动的情况对印度尼西亚共产党的建设有很大影响。一方面，国际共产主义运动中存在着严重的、实质性的意见分歧是不好的。假如没有这些意见分歧和公开论战，对国际共产主义运动和印度尼西亚共产党来说，情况会更好一些。但是，最近几年里，任何共产党人都不能够置身于国际共产主义运动有严重的、实质性的意见分歧这一事实之外，也没有一个共产党人能对这些分歧采取中立的态度。 由于印度尼西亚共产党正确地对待国际共产主义运动中的意见分歧，所以党的建设并没有受到损失。这一点可以从下面的事实得到证明：印度尼西亚共产党日益发展和巩固，印度尼西亚共产党党员的马克思列宁主义理论水平和精神日益提高和加强。国际共产主义运动中存在着意见分歧，使得印度尼西亚共产党人更认识到独立自主态度的正确性。这是这一时期唯一正确的态度，是忠于马克思列宁主义和无产阶级国际主义，忠于一九五七年宣言和一九六○年声明的态度，是对主观主义、古典的和现代的修正主义以及古典的和现代的教条主义毫不留情的态度。国际共产主义运动中的意见分歧和公开论战促使印度尼西亚共产党人更努力学习和更富有创造性地运用马克思列宁主义。由于正确地对待国际共产主义运动中严重的、实质性的意见分歧，印度尼西亚共产党人的队伍就锻炼得更坚强，并日益成长为一个独立自主的党，因此也就更加成熟。这点听起来很奇怪，但却是一个事实。 ３、从强大的共产主义运动发展为强大的共产主义组织印度尼西亚共产党建党的重要经验之一是有计划地进行工作。从一九五一年起，有计划地进行工作开始成为党内普遍采用的工作方法。开始时，这些计划都是短期的，一个月、三个月、六个月。计划项目也不多。随着经验的积累，愈来愈多的党的工作列为计划的项目，计划的期限也延长了。像我在上面所说的，从一九五六年起，印度尼西亚共产党开始执行关于组织和教育工作的第一个三年计划，接着执行了关于教育和组织工作的第二个三年计划，现在我们党正处在关于文化、思想和组织工作的四年计划的初期。 由于大规模发展党员的结果，到印度尼西亚共产党第五次全国代表大会（一九五四年）召开的时候，党员人数比一九五一年增加了将近二十倍，预备党员和正式党员的比例是三比一。这样迅速的发展当然会带来某些缺点，例如：许多新入党的预备党员没有按应有的方式组织起来，许多新建立的组织，像支部、区委、各种党团党组，缺少经验。新党员虽然通过学习印度尼西亚共产党纲领和党章，受到了初步教育，但是系统的马克思列宁主义理论教育还很不够。因此，可以说，一九五五年初，在印度尼西亚已经有了强大的共产主义运动，但是，这一运动还应该变成强大的共产主义组织。随着党的第一个三年计划的完成，这一任务也就实现了。由于实施了这一计划，党的基层组织已经活跃起来，干部通过党校或党的训练班的学习，受到了理论教育。在反对反革命的斗争中所受到的锻炼，对巩固党的组织有重要作用。反对伊斯兰教国运动—印度尼西亚伊斯兰教军恐怖集团的斗争，反对“印度尼西亚共和国革命政府—全面斗争约章”集团旨在搞分裂的叛乱的斗争，大大提高了党组织和党员干部的战斗性。正是在这些地区，党的建设获得了迅速的发展。 ４、党的建设和党的政治路线的关系我们在党的建设方面所取得的巨大进展，肯定是和党的正确政治路线分不开的。甚至可以说，党的政策的正确是党的建设工作得到进展的决定性因素。反映各个革命阶级在反帝反封建斗争中的利益的正确政策，使愈来愈多的各阶层人民聚集在印度尼西亚共产党的周围和参加我们的队伍。 把这些政策具体化时，重要的问题是口号的问题。例如，印度尼西亚共产党一九五六年七月四中全会提出的战略口号“团结起来，彻底实现一九四五年八月革命的要求”，在普遍推广对印度尼西亚新型资产阶级民主革命的基本问题的正确认识方面，起了非常大的作用。在这方面，印度尼西亚共产党一九五七年五中全会提出的策略口号“改变力量对比，百分之百地实现苏加诺总统方案”，在团结革命力量、要求建立民族联合政府或是以“纳沙贡”为核心的互助合作内阁方面，发挥了很大作用。 党在建立民族统一战线方面的进展，对党的建设的进展也有重要意义。建立的民族统一战线越广泛、越强大，就能有越多的人民了解我们的党，团结在我们党的周围。 在维护党的安全方面，三种斗争形式相结合的工作方法具有决定性意义。这也将保证党的稳步发展。 另一方面，党的建设的进展为执行党的政策准备了更好的条件。因为在党的力量薄弱、党员人数很少的情况下，党的政策即使正确也不能实现。 同样的，党越强大，它就越有力量来建立民族统一战线。如果是小党，别的阶级是不会加以理睬的，何况是建立作为民族统一战线的基础的、巩固的工农联盟，印度尼西亚共产党应该在农民中真正扎下根。 亲爱的同志们和朋友们：关于印度尼西亚革命的几个问题和印度尼西亚共产党的情况，我就谈这一些。 我提出这些问题的目的是什么呢？这不外是要进一步增强印度尼西亚人民和中国人民、印度尼西亚共产党和中国共产党之间的亲密友谊。因此，我们需要更好地相互了解，这不是肤浅的或表面的相互了解，而是深入的、真正的相互了解。这意味着，首先我们需要相互了解彼此的社会、革命和共产党的情况。我认为，现在已经到了进行这种了解的时候了，而且这种了解是非常必需的。我们两国人民和我们两党必须为这一目的而努力工作。 最后，我高呼：伟大、英勇的印度尼西亚人民和中国人民之间的永恒友谊万岁！ 印度尼西亚共产党和中国共产党之间永恒的友谊和马克思列宁主义的团结万岁！ 在伟大的不可战胜的马克思列宁主义和无产阶级国际主义的旗帜指引下的国际共产主义运动万岁！ 完了，谢谢。 相关报道：

=== [Page 1] === 人民日报 Renmin Ribao, 1963-09-05, 第3版 (page 3) 标题: 印度尼西亚革命的若干问题和印度尼西亚共产党 印度尼西亚共产党主席迪·努·艾地九月四日在北京市欢迎大会上的报告 English gloss: Aidit lecture in Beijing on Indonesian revolution; Gerwani 1.5 million members Source: 人民日报图文数据库 (People's Daily database), via Columbia University Libraries; article URL http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19630905/3/349ddbfef41445f48c4498a5c1aa7e3c Retrieved 2026-10-18. Article full text as given by the database (replaces the earlier snippet-only file; full-page scan is in the matching PDF). Some Problems of the Indonesian Revolution and the Communist Party of Indonesia. Report by D. N. Aidit [Dipa Nusantara Aidit], Chairman of the Communist Party of Indonesia [PKI], at the Beijing welcome rally on 4 September Dear comrades! During my present visit to Beijing, the leading comrades of the Communist Party of China invited me to give a report at this rally. I myself chose the title "Some Problems of the Indonesian Revolution and the Communist Party of Indonesia." I think this title is appropriate, because the Chinese people are very concerned about the Indonesian revolution and the PKI, and the Chinese people dearly love the Indonesian revolution and the PKI. I know that the Chinese people like to hear any information about the Indonesian revolution and the PKI. Just as the Indonesian working people care for, love and like the Chinese revolution and the Communist Party of China, so the Chinese people care for, love and like the Indonesian revolution and the PKI. Here, first of all, please allow me to convey to you all the warmest and most heartfelt greetings of the Central Committee of the PKI, of the more than 2.5 million PKI members, and of the Indonesian working people. The solemn and warm rally held today in this magnificent Great Hall of the People is a rally in which the Chinese people express their ever-rising support for the Indonesian people, who are waging a sharp struggle against imperialism headed by the United States and against domestic reactionaries. I. Some questions concerning Indonesian society and revolution 1. Indonesia's natural environment and population Indonesia is an archipelago made up of more than ten thousand islands large and small, of which over three thousand are inhabited. These islands are scattered between the two continents of Asia and Australia and link the two great oceans, the Pacific and the Indian [Indonesian] Ocean. Its land area is nearly two million square kilometres, which is not large compared with China's land area (over 9.6 million square kilometres). But these islands are spread very widely. The distance from Sabang (at Indonesia's western end) to Merauke (at its eastern end) is roughly equal to the distance from the western end of the Tianshan range to Shanghai. And the distance between north and south is roughly equal to that between Berlin and Algeria. With a population of nearly one hundred million, Indonesia is the fifth largest country in the world, after only China, India, the Soviet Union and the United States. The population is very unevenly distributed, from as few as seven people per square kilometre to as many as 460. Java has the highest population density, and about two thirds of all Indonesia's inhabitants live on this island. Indonesia has more than a hundred ethnic groups; some number tens of millions, some only a few thousand. Each has its own language, and there are also various dialects; their cultural levels also differ greatly. But all accept the Indonesian language as the common language, which is very advantageous to the Indonesian people's revolutionary struggle. The Indonesian language developed on the basis of Malay, the language of a numerically small Malay ethnic group in Indonesia. Long before Dutch colonial rule, Malay played the role of a "lingua franca" in communication between the islands and between the ethnic groups of Indonesia. Therefore this language naturally became the common language in the course of the Indonesian people's national liberation struggle against Dutch colonialism. The Indonesian language never became a language of the colonisers; its development was even obstructed by the Dutch colonialists. The Indonesian language is therefore a language tempered in the struggle for national independence, a language of the liberators. Besides citizens of the various ethnic groups, Indonesia also has several million citizens of foreign descent, such as citizens of Chinese, European and Arab descent. They recognise the Indonesian language and Indonesian culture as their own language and culture, while also having their own respective languages and cultures. In the Dutch colonial era, the Dutch colonialists practised a policy of division and sowing discord between the ethnic groups, and between the local ethnic citizens and citizens of foreign descent. The influence of this colonial policy of division and discord persists even today. The imperialists and domestic reactionaries advocate this policy. The separatist rebellion that broke out in 1958 and the racist counter-revolutionary disturbances of May 1963 reflect this. Experience shows that separatism and racism can be overcome and eliminated, provided there is a policy resolutely opposed to them and the unity of the whole Indonesian nation. The policy of equality of all ethnic groups, large or small, and of equality of all citizens, whether of indigenous or foreign descent, is the only policy that can guarantee the unity of the Indonesian nation. Indonesia's land is very fertile, and its marine resources and underground mineral deposits are very rich. No wonder Indonesia is often called "a belt of emerald on the equator". But as a result of long colonial rule the Indonesian people themselves have been unable to enjoy these rich resources. The living standard of the Indonesian working people is extremely low. Although Indonesia has won political independence, its economy still has a colonial and semi-feudal character. In state power, forces that defend the interests of imperialism and feudalism still hold the dominant position. At the same time, the Indonesian people's revolutionary movement has made enormous progress, especially in the last ten years. The number of PKI members has reached more than 2.5 million, that is, 2.5 per cent of Indonesia's total population. Progressive revolutionary mass organisations have also developed rapidly. Of about four million organised workers, 3.2 million belong to the All-Indonesia Central Labour Organisation [SOBSI]. At present Indonesia has about seven million workers. The progress of the peasant movement is also very encouraging. The membership of the Indonesian Peasants' Front [BTI] grew in a short time (about one year) from 4.6 million to 6.3 million. The People's Youth [Pemuda Rakyat] has 1.5 million members, and the Indonesian Women's Movement [Gerwani] has 1.5 million members. In addition there are progressive organisations of artists, writers, university students, scientists and others, which have also developed rapidly. Even so, it would be very wrong to think that the development of the revolutionary movement will meet no obstacles. There are still many difficulties, and each step forward of the revolutionary movement meets new obstruction from the reactionaries. The situation in Indonesia is indeed very complex and full of contradictions. On the one hand, according to statistics, over ninety per cent of Indonesians profess Islam, while on the other, the influence of communism keeps growing. On the one hand, the Indonesian government's domestic and foreign policy programme has positive and progressive aspects, namely opposition to imperialism and a willingness to develop the "New Emerging Forces" together with the socialist countries; but on the other hand, it also has negative and reactionary aspects, for example its financial and economic measures harming the people's interests and its compromises and collusion with foreign capital. On the one hand, a broad and growing national united front has been established. Indonesia already has a National Front organisation which unites all political parties, mass organisations, the armed forces and individuals, has more than twenty million members, and has a common programme, namely the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal Political Manifesto [Manipol]. The composition of the leading bodies of the National Front, from the centre down to the grassroots organisations, reflects the three political currents of "Nasakom" [Nasakom]. But on the other hand, despite all this, up to now it has not been possible to form a mutual-cooperation government in which Communists hold responsible posts. Indeed, the situation in Indonesia is not simple, and the road of the Indonesian revolution is not a straight, smooth highway. Indonesia is an archipelagic country with a very long coastline, and it is difficult to resist external military attack and to prevent the activities of smugglers. Moreover, Indonesia is surrounded by imperialist countries or by countries that have become bases of imperialist forces through military treaties. But in the face of this situation Indonesian revolutionaries have never lost heart. In recent years they have worked hard and achieved certain results. All the above facts impel Indonesian revolutionaries, in opening up their own road to complete the Indonesian revolution, to study even more diligently and effectively the rich experience of the world revolutionary movement. 2. A brief account of Indonesian history and the growth of the national movement Before the first Dutch merchants arrived in Indonesia, Indonesia had gone through a long historical development. Many feudal kingdoms arose on Indonesian soil, the famous ones including the Srivijaya kingdom centred on Palembang (South Sumatra) (7th to 13th century), the First Mataram kingdom (8th to 9th century) and the Majapahit kingdom (14th to 15th century). From the beginning of the Christian era, feudal rule began first on the island of Java, and throughout the feudal age peasant uprisings occurred continually. These uprisings weakened the feudal system but could not destroy it. Another mark of the feudal period was the many wars between feudal kingdoms. It was precisely in this situation of feudal fragmentation that merchants from European countries such as Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain came to Indonesia from the fifteenth century. In fierce competition the Netherlands defeated all its rivals. The activities of the Dutch merchants' organisation, the East India Company [VOC], were not limited to trade; they also skilfully and cunningly exploited the contradictions among the feudal rulers and directly seized colonies. The East India Company period was an important stage in the primitive accumulation of capital in the Netherlands. The Dutch merchants used every kind of cruel method to obtain astonishing wealth. As Marx said: "The history of the colonial administration of Holland (and Holland was the model capitalist nation of the 17th century) 'is one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness.'" (Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, People's Publishing House, 1958, pp. 949-950) At the end of the seventeenth century the East India Company in effect controlled the whole of Indonesia, and from then on Indonesia became completely a Dutch colony. The exploitation carried out by the Netherlands at that time was built on the basis of the feudal exploitation already existing in Indonesia. Therefore the relations of production that dominated in the early period of Dutch colonial rule were feudal relations of production. Indonesian society at that time can be identified as feudal and colonial society. At the end of the nineteenth century, when Dutch capitalism entered the imperialist stage, the situation began to change. As a result of the continually expanding export of capital, capitalist forces penetrated deep into the countryside. Feudal economic relations were damaged, and the economy was no longer a purely natural economy. The commodity economy gradually became dominant. The feudal system could no longer exist alone, and could survive only by relying on the support of imperialism. Feudal exploitation of the peasants became intertwined with the exploitation by foreign capital, comprador capital and usurer's capital, which occupied the decisive position in Indonesian socio-economic life. Feudal Indonesia had become semi-feudal Indonesia. This colonial, semi-feudal state of society continued until the outbreak of the people's revolution in August 1945. In the Second World War, after the Dutch colonialists surrendered almost without a fight, the Japanese militarists occupied Indonesia in March 1942. Three and a half years of Japanese colonial rule replaced Dutch colonial rule. Thus Indonesia changed from a Dutch colony into a Japanese colony. But apart from the greater cruelty of Japanese exploitation, the nature of Indonesian society did not change in any way. In the above stage of colonial, semi-feudal society, the class structure of Indonesia changed. At the end of the nineteenth century, with the establishment of imperialist enterprises, the Indonesian working class was born. As soon as the working class stepped onto the political stage, it combined its class's struggle for liberation with the struggle of the entire Indonesian people for national independence. As a result of the collapse of the feudal economy and the beginning development of the commodity economy, another class arose, namely the national bourgeoisie. But the development of national industry met serious obstacles from the competition of foreign monopoly capital, so that up to now very few people in Indonesia's national bourgeoisie engage in industry, and most engage in commerce. This is the reason for the weak economic position of our country's national bourgeoisie. That is to say, the Indonesian working class was born before the national bourgeoisie. This can also be seen in the role and influence of the two classes in the national liberation struggle. With the transition of capitalism to the monopoly stage, the imperialist stage, the Dutch colonialists launched large-scale colonial wars at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Through these wars they united the whole of Indonesia under one centralised colonial government and within one colonial economic life. The above changes in political, economic and class structure also affected the nature and forms of the Indonesian people's struggle. The formation of a unified economy, the birth of the working class and the development of national capitalist relations of production are the foundation of the development of the modern Indonesian nation. In the past the Indonesian people's resistance to the Dutch colonisers mainly took the form of peasant uprisings, which were local and often led by representatives of local feudal nobles trying to restore their own rule. Now the people's resistance takes the form of a struggle for national independence, in which all classes harmed by imperialism and feudalism take part. In the early twentieth century many mass organisations and political parties appeared, which marked the national awakening of the Indonesian people's resistance to the colonisers. This national movement differed from the national movements that appeared earlier in Europe during the development of capitalism. The Indonesian working class and its party, the PKI, born on 23 May 1920, were united with the national movement from the beginning and became the vanguard of the left wing of this movement. In November 1926 the first nationwide national uprising, led by the PKI, broke out in Indonesia. Although this uprising was suppressed by the Dutch colonisers, it taught the Indonesian people that Dutch colonial rule would not last for ever. That the first nationwide armed struggle was carried out under the leadership of the Indonesian proletarian party, the PKI, is of very great significance. The Indonesian bourgeoisie never carried out a revolution like China's "Xinhai Revolution". The national revolution that broke out in August 1945 was one of the high points of the Indonesian national liberation struggle. After the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, the Indonesian people took state power into their own hands. Using this power the Indonesian people adopted various anti-imperialist measures, for example turning foreign enterprises into the property of the Republic of Indonesia, ending the oligarchic government, setting up Indonesian National Committees [KNI] in various places, setting up people's security organs everywhere down to the villages, and in some areas distributing the land of foreign-owned farms to the peasants, and so on. That is to say, in the revolution the Indonesian people waged a resolute struggle against their principal enemy, imperialism. But the other principal enemy, the feudal landlord class, was not overthrown, and it is the most important social basis of imperialist rule. That is to say, the peasants, the main force of the Indonesian revolution, were not fully mobilised and won over to the revolution. Therefore, although Indonesia won independence through that revolution, its society remained semi-feudal in nature. In September 1948 the government headed by Hatta launched an attack in an attempt to wipe out the Communists. This event is called the "Madiun Affair" [Peristiwa Madiun] or the "Madiun provocation". At that time almost all the Indonesian Communist leaders were killed or arrested. After the anti-imperialist nerve centre had been crushed, the Netherlands easily launched in December 1948 a colonial war aimed at conquering the whole of Indonesia. In November 1949 the Hatta government and the Dutch government signed the criminal Round Table Conference agreements. Through these agreements the Netherlands formally recognised Indonesia's sovereignty and independence, but Dutch imperialist control of the Indonesian economy was completely restored. Thus the Round Table agreements fixed Indonesia's status as a semi-colonial state. But the Indonesian people did not stop struggling, and after the signing of the Round Table agreements a fierce struggle began to abolish them. In 1956 the Indonesian government unilaterally abrogated the Round Table agreements, a great victory. As a result of the rising struggle in 1957 to liberate West Irian, all Dutch enterprises were taken over and then nationalised. After the Indonesian people unanimously declared they would recover West Irian by force, and after the volunteers sent to West Irian together with the local people's guerrillas liberated some towns and areas, West Irian was in 1963 returned to the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. The support of the socialist countries and of progressive peoples throughout the world played an important role in the victory of the struggle to liberate West Irian. The struggle against feudalism has also made some progress. For example, in legislation, the Crop-Sharing Agreement Law [UU Perjanjian Bagi Hasil] and the Basic Agrarian Law [UUPA] were passed, the former fixing the proportion in which the harvest is shared between peasants and landlords, the latter being a law on limited land reform. But the struggle to implement these two relatively progressive laws has met with many obstacles, first of all from the reactionaries who still entrench themselves inside the state apparatus. The anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle is still continuing. The influence of imperialism, whether in state power or in the economy, is still considerable. At present US imperialism has replaced Dutch imperialism as the number-one enemy of the Indonesian people. At the same time Dutch imperialism remains a dangerous enemy, while other imperialisms such as Britain, West Germany and Japan are intensifying their infiltration of Indonesia. The feudal landlord forces still basically exist and are one of the pillars of the domestic reactionary forces. Based on an analysis of Indonesian society and revolution, the PKI Constitution stresses that the Indonesian revolution is long and complex. In order to lead this revolution, the PKI must adopt the tactic of advancing steadily, step by step, to push the people's revolutionary struggle forward. In the struggle the PKI must constantly oppose two tendencies, namely capitulationism and adventurism. The above is a brief account of Indonesian history and of the growth and development of the Indonesian national liberation movement. 3. Basic problems of the Indonesian revolution Although the August Revolution failed, the working class and its party gained extremely rich experience in it. "One year of revolution equals decades of ordinary development": this is absolutely true. Although the PKI made some mistakes in this revolution, the working class and the PKI not only took an active part in all revolutionary activities but also strove to lead the revolution. Therefore the experience of the August Revolution is extremely valuable to the PKI, and the later development of the PKI was due to the experience of the August Revolution. The August Revolution taught the Indonesian Communists what the nature of the Indonesian revolution is, which classes support the revolution and which classes oppose it. The August Revolution taught us why a national united front is necessary to win victory in the revolution, who are the reliable allies of the proletariat, and who are the wavering allies who under certain conditions will betray the revolution. The August Revolution also taught us that in the revolution armed struggle is the most important form of struggle. One of the most important lessons of the August Revolution is this: only when the working class holds absolute leadership of the revolution can the Indonesian national-democratic revolution win victory. To realise this leadership, the PKI must be able to combine the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, and the PKI must "Indonesianise" Marxism-Leninism. At its Fifth National Congress, held in 1954, the PKI drew up a general programme and a programme of demands for completing the Indonesian revolution. These programmes embody the strategic and tactical line the PKI has followed in the revolution. This strategic and tactical line is the product of combining Marxism-Leninism with the practice of our long struggle; it is the result of the process by which we have come to know the Indonesian revolution itself, from the day the PKI was founded forty-three years ago, and especially in the period of the August 1945 revolution. In drawing up and carrying out this strategic and tactical line, the PKI has deeply felt the correctness of the following passage of Lenin: "Only by objectively taking into account the sum total of the interrelations of all the classes in a given society, and consequently, by taking into account the objective stage of development of that society and the interrelations between it and other societies, can we have a correct basis for the tactics of the advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are not regarded statically, but dynamically, i.e., not as motionless, but as in motion (the laws of motion being determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class)." (Lenin, "Karl Marx", Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1960 edition, p. 563) In the past the PKI committed several leftist errors of sectarianism and dogmatism, and in the period of the August Revolution committed errors of both left and right opportunism. One reason the PKI had not yet been able to draw lessons from its own past experience was that it had not yet summed up that experience. Only in August 1948, when the PKI held a delegates' conference and corrected the erroneous line followed in that period, did the summing up begin. That conference adopted the resolution "The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia" [Jalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia], summing up the PKI's experience on the national united front, Party building and armed struggle. This resolution marked the beginning of the PKI's entry into its adult stage. The Fifth National Congress of the PKI (1954) resolved all the major and basic problems of the Indonesian revolution, which most clearly proves that the PKI had entered adulthood. Later these major and basic problems were clearly expounded in the work "Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution" [Masyarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia], adopted by the Central Committee in July 1957. This work clarified the nature of Indonesian society, the main targets and tasks of the Indonesian revolution, and the motive forces, nature and prospects of the revolution. As to the main target (enemy) of the Indonesian revolution: since Indonesia is still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, the targets of the revolution are imperialism and feudalism. The tasks of the revolution are: to carry out the national revolution to drive out imperialism, and the democratic revolution to eliminate the feudal system. The motive forces of the revolution are the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and other democrats harmed by imperialism and resolutely opposed to it. The national bourgeoisie can take part in the revolution. The nature of the Indonesian revolution at the present stage is not a proletarian socialist revolution but a national-democratic revolution or bourgeois-democratic revolution. The prospect of the revolution is socialism and communism, not capitalism. In the course of leading the Indonesian people's revolutionary struggle, starting from the above understanding of the basic problems of the Indonesian revolution, the PKI has deepened its understanding of the Indonesian revolution and put forward various theories. Facts have proved that to guarantee the victory of the revolution it is absolutely necessary to grasp and apply these theories. The PKI put forward the theory that there are at present three kinds of forces in Indonesia: progressive forces, middle forces and die-hard forces. Facts have proved this theory correct. The line the Party adopts toward these three forces is: develop the progressive forces, unite the middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces. While uniting the middle forces, the Party also struggles. The Party unites the middle forces against imperialism and feudalism, but if they seek to weaken the independence of the Party and of the working people's movement, or waver in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, the Party struggles against them. The PKI put forward the theory that, in the armed struggle during the 1945-1948 revolution, the Party must not copy the theory of armed struggle of foreign countries, but should adopt a method combining three forms of struggle. The guerrilla war of the period of the August 1945 revolution could have been expanded and consolidated, and the demands of the August Revolution fully realised, if the PKI at that time had solved the problem on the basis of work combining the three forms. These three forms of struggle are: guerrilla struggle in the countryside (in which the participants are mainly farm labourers and poor peasants), the revolutionary struggle of workers (mainly transport workers) in enemy-occupied cities, and strengthening work among the enemy's armed forces. This theory is very important; it is a theory for winning guerrilla war in an island country like Indonesia. Now, in Indonesia, there are no enemy armed forces, only the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia, which were born rapidly after the Second World War, in the anti-fascist struggle and in a revolution of national-democratic character. The working class and the PKI played a major role in building these armed forces. The Indonesian armed forces are not reactionary armed forces. Judged by their birth, they have anti-fascist, democratic and anti-imperialist characteristics. Therefore the responsibility of the PKI is to cement the two-in-one relationship between the people and the armed forces, so that in any event the armed forces, or the greater part of them, will stand firmly on the side of the people and of the revolution, as the Indonesian people proved not long ago in the struggle to oppose and defeat the counter-revolution of the "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Permesta [Piagam Perjuangan Semesta, Universal Struggle Charter] group" [PRRI/Permesta]. The PKI put forward the theory that, in order to win victory in the Indonesian revolution, all Party members and the working masses should be educated in a spirit that combines patriotism and proletarian internationalism. Indonesian Communists should oppose national nihilism and bourgeois chauvinism. The Indonesian revolution cannot be separated from the world proletarian revolution, begun by the great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 and now developing rapidly. The Indonesian revolution is part of the world's progressive forces, part of the struggle of the peoples of the whole world for national independence, democracy, peace and socialism. The PKI put forward the theory that, in order to be able to guide the development of the political situation, the Party must carry out the following general line: continue the work of the united front and Party building in order to fully realise the demands of the August 1945 revolution. In other words, Indonesian Communists should hold high the Party's three banners: the banner of the united front, the banner of Party building and the banner of the August 1945 revolution. The PKI's general line in building the united front is: to build an anti-imperialist united front of the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, led by the working class and based on the anti-feudal alliance of workers and peasants. The general line in Party building is: to build a nationwide, broadly mass-based Party fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally. The PKI's general line concerning the August 1945 revolution is: to use the experience of all struggles, mobilise the broad masses, and educate them to be ready for every possible eventuality. The PKI drew the above theories from the experience of combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution. These basic conclusions came only because of the PKI's long accumulated experience. This experience is the result of the heroic struggle of PKI members, of the blood and sacrifice of tens of thousands of comrades, and of the diligent study of Marxism-Leninism by Indonesian Communists. We have put these theories into practice and continue to develop them in action. The slogan of Indonesian Communists in work and study is: "Understand Marxism, be familiar with conditions." Only by this road, the road of combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, that is, the road of Indonesianising Marxism-Leninism, can the PKI lead the Indonesian people to victory in the revolution. The more Marxism-Leninism is Indonesianised, and the better Marxism-Leninism is combined with the masses and the Indonesian revolution, the more the PKI can avoid the danger of revisionism and dogmatism, whether classical or modern, and this means the more the Indonesian revolution advances. 4. Some questions concerning the national united front The PKI concluded that one of the important reasons why the August 1945 revolution failed to achieve its aims was that the PKI at that time lacked understanding of the necessity of a national united front and did not know how to build one. At that time the Communists neglected to build the national united front as a weapon of the anti-imperialist national revolution. Although they later began to recognise the importance of the national united front, they did not yet truly understand the methods of building it. This summing up has impelled the Communists to build the national united front more actively, tenaciously and steadily. The Fifth National Congress of the PKI set the task of building the national united front as the most urgent task of the PKI. On the basis of an analysis of the classes of Indonesian society, the united front should include all revolutionary national forces, that is, workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. At the same time the Fifth National Congress stressed that the worker-peasant alliance is the foundation of the national united front. Because the peasants still suffer serious exploitation and oppression from feudal remnants, the worker-peasant alliance can be established and consolidated only when the Communists actively lead the peasants in the struggle against feudal remnants, from satisfying the peasants' partial demands to satisfying their fundamental demand, the elimination of feudal ownership and the distribution of land. On the question of the national bourgeoisie, the August Revolution provided the PKI with important experience concerning this class's vacillation. In certain circumstances the national bourgeoisie can take part in the revolution and take a clear stand on the side of the revolution, as in the early period of the August Revolution. But in other circumstances it wavers and betrays, as when the Hatta government launched the "Madiun provocation". The national bourgeoisie also capitulated to imperialism and agreed to the treasonous Round Table agreements. Therefore the proletariat and the PKI must persistently strive to win the national bourgeoisie to the side of the revolution, but must also guard against the possibility of their betraying the revolution. Another part of the Indonesian bourgeoisie is the comprador bourgeoisie. It directly serves the interests of foreign big capitalists, and therefore it is not a force of the revolution but a target of the revolution. The bourgeoisie has yet another part, the bureaucratic capitalists, which is also a target of the revolution and an enemy of the revolution. In their reactionary essence, Indonesia's bureaucratic bourgeoisie and China's bureaucratic bourgeoisie have something in common. But Indonesia has not so far developed to the point of old China, where the bureaucratic capitalists were concentrated mainly in the Four Great Families, forming a high degree of concentration. Indonesia's bureaucratic bourgeoisie developed mainly after the Dutch enterprises were taken over and nationalised. Generally speaking, these people became capitalists by using their positions in organs of power or state enterprises, or by using their connections with important officials in organs of power or state enterprises. They use bureaucratic power, and in the past used mainly the state of emergency regulations, to obtain and consolidate their position as capitalists. By all kinds of cunning means they sabotage the state's economy and attempt to "privatise" state enterprises and bring them under their own control. As said above, they play an extremely reactionary role: they oppose democracy, oppose the people's mass organisations, oppose the national united front, intensify their collusion with imperialism, and join with landlords in suppressing the peasants. They have set up all sorts of "trade unions" and "mass organisations", which are in reality organisations and bodies of capitalists. These bodies and organisations were established in order to destroy the revolutionary mass organisations, especially the All-Indonesia Central Labour Organisation [SOBSI]. But the true face of these bureaucratic-capitalist bodies and organisations has already been fully exposed among the working masses and has met strong counter-blows. In the process of building the Indonesian national united front, the working class should stand in the very front of the struggle of the whole people. Indonesia is an economically backward country, so our working class objectively has some weaknesses. The first weakness is that its numbers are much smaller than the peasants'. To overcome this weakness, firm unity within the working class should be built and maintained. As Comrade Dimitrov said: "In countries where all the peasants and urban petty-bourgeois strata far outnumber the proletariat, it is especially important to exert every effort to build a strong united front within the working class, so that it can occupy the leading position in its relations with all the working people." At present Indonesia can be said already to have a united front of the working class. The influence of social democracy and revisionism among the workers is slight. The workers who have joined the progressive All-Indonesia Central Labour Organisation [SOBSI] make up the great majority of organised workers. Besides this, there is also a united front, in organisational form or in concrete action, between SOBSI and various other workers' organisations under nationalist currents and religious influence. Of course the reactionaries will continue to try to split the workers' front, so Indonesian Communists and other progressive people must of course continue working hard to strengthen and consolidate the united front that has been formed. The second weakness is that the Indonesian working class is younger than the proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries. Hence its experience in the workers' movement is very limited. The working class can overcome this weakness only by studying assiduously the experience of the international workers' movement, especially of workers' movements that have already won victory, and by striving to study Marxism-Leninism. The PKI has already striven, and will continue to strive, to overcome this weakness. Of course we have no reason for complacency; learning has no end. The third weakness is that the cultural level of the Indonesian working class is lower than that of the bourgeoisie. This weakness should be overcome so that the working class can be better at leading all classes in the revolution. The working class's progress in culture and education is great and rapid. Even in some government departments and in parliament, the representatives of the proletariat have shown their strengths in the field of knowledge, in understanding and solving various political and economic problems. But taken as a whole the working class still needs to make many efforts to catch up with the advanced level. The PKI's four-year plan in the cultural field, beginning on 17 August this year, will play an important role in achieving this aim. At present the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal national united front has basically been established in Indonesia. PKI cadres have done hard work among the peasants, studied land relations in the countryside and led the peasants in the struggle against the landlords. The PKI already has a correct, revolutionary land programme guiding the peasants' struggle. [footnotes 3, 4] An alliance with the national bourgeoisie has also been established. Especially after the PKI formulated correct policies and overcame sectarianism in its own ranks, the national bourgeoisie began to return to the side of the revolution. As in China's experience, the PKI, in building a united front with the bourgeoisie, should carry out two unshakable principles. The first principle is both unity and struggle. This principle is also reflected in the PKI's attitude toward the successive anti-imperialist cabinets led by the national bourgeoisie. The PKI unreservedly supports the progressive policies the government carries out, criticises its unsteady policies so as to turn them into progressive ones, and opposes ministers who carry out policies harming the people. The second principle is to maintain the PKI's independence and initiative within the national united front. This means that an alliance with the bourgeoisie does not hinder the proletariat from organising the revolution and developing the Party and the revolutionary mass organisations. It also means that the proletariat has the right to state its own position. The PKI upholds this principle of independence and initiative. We have been cooperating with the Indonesian bourgeoisie for more than ten years. In that time the revolutionary forces have not shrunk but have grown ever greater, while the counter-revolutionary forces have been struck many times. Even the anti-communist clamour openly carried on five or six years ago is now officially condemned as communist-phobia opposed to unity. President Sukarno has played a major role in opposing communist-phobia and strengthening national unity. Of course anti-communist activities still exist, and will continue as long as imperialism and feudalism exist in Indonesia. But because they have been struck by the revolutionary forces their strength has been greatly weakened. On the basis of experience of alliance with the Indonesian national bourgeoisie, the PKI concluded: as long as the progressive forces are strong, keep developing and know how to strike the enemy, and the Party's policy and tactics are correct, the bourgeoisie can with certainty be won over to the side of the revolution. In developing the progressive forces, one should first develop the forces of the workers and peasants. The PKI's experience in building the national united front shows that we should first clearly understand the class content of the united front, its basis and its leading class. Then the work of building the national united front should be carried through in concrete policies, given the particular forms arising in the country's political life. For example, in the struggle for a government that includes all the revolutionary classes, the PKI in the early period advocated a national coalition government. Later, owing to the wide dissemination of the idea of the national united front and the development of the mass struggle, President Sukarno's concept of a mutual-cooperation cabinet [Kabinet Gotong Royong] emerged in February 1957. Thus the content of the national coalition government was also fully included in the demand for a mutual-cooperation cabinet. And the content of national unity can be fully summed up in the words national mutual cooperation. Later the term "Nasakom" appeared. The word "Nasakom" reflects broad cooperation among the political currents of nationalism, religion and communism on an anti-imperialist programme. For Communists the national united front means nothing other than the unity of the revolutionary classes. But the various classes reflect their class interests in political life through their respective parties. The same is true in Indonesia: all classes, reactionary or revolutionary, express their interests plainly through their own parties. From the tradition of the Indonesian national liberation struggle, there have been three great political currents against Dutch colonial rule, namely the nationalist current, the religious (mainly Islamic) current and the communist current. Therefore, if these three political currents form "Nasakom", Indonesian national unity can be said to have been formed. This formulation is reasonable. Under present conditions in Indonesia, putting forward the slogan of national mutual cooperation with "Nasakom" as its core will not obscure the class content of the national united front, because this unity is built on the basis of a clearly anti-imperialist and, to a certain extent, anti-feudal programme. The two pro-imperialist and pro-feudal parties, Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party [PSI], have disappeared from Indonesia's political life. Another thing that reflects the concept of national unity and "Nasakom" unity is the Five Principles of the state [Pancasila]. (The five principles are: (1) belief in God; (2) humanitarianism and internationalism; (3) nationalism or patriotism; (4) democracy; (5) social justice.) The PKI supports and upholds Pancasila, although one of its principles is belief in God. This is because Pancasila does not replace the philosophy of its adherents but links the various currents of thought that exist in society. Therefore the PKI resolutely opposes attempts by some people to make one of the principles of Pancasila the main principle. Pancasila must be accepted as a whole; as a whole, it is a means of unity. President Sukarno, the creator of Pancasila, has also stressed this repeatedly, and has said that if Pancasila is compressed into one principle, that one principle is mutual cooperation [gotong royong]. Besides the worker-peasant alliance and "Nasakom" unity, in Indonesia national unity is also embodied in the organisational form of the National Front, of which President Sukarno is chairman. The vice-chairmen of the National Front include representatives of the three sides of "Nasakom". The National Front adopted a revolutionary five-point programme as the programme of demands guiding its activities. These five points accord with the PKI's three present tasks. (The PKI's three tasks are: to consolidate the victories already won, to overcome economic difficulties, and to continue the struggle against neo-colonialism.) The experience I have discussed above shows that as long as the idea of the national united front has taken root, and as long as the PKI tenaciously and persistently does the hard work of building the national united front, there will be very many forms of strengthening and consolidating this front. Evidently, after recognising the principles of the national united front, the PKI will strive to find effective forms of the national united front that suit Indonesia's special conditions. The PKI considers the national united front an absolute condition for victory in the revolution. Progress in the work of the national united front greatly helps the work of Party building. Conversely, progress in Party building also enables the work of the national united front to go smoothly. 5. The question of state power in the Republic of Indonesia I said above that the situation in Indonesia is very complex. Only by understanding well the essence of Indonesian state power can one understand this complex situation. The most fundamental question of every revolution is the question of state power. The PKI has not only recognised theoretically that this principle is correct, but has also, through bitter lessons, come to know its correctness in practice. In the period of the August 1945 revolution the PKI made a serious mistake precisely on the question of state power. A government was formed at that time with Comrade Amir Sjarifuddin, a Communist, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Some other cabinet members were also Communists. There were also rightists in the cabinet. The reactionaries, exploiting the policy mistakes the PKI had made in the struggle against Dutch imperialism, withdrew their ministers, plotting to overthrow the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet. The PKI lacked vigilance toward this rightist plot. Because of a lack of understanding of the class nature of state power, the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet dissolved of its own accord, and the cabinet that followed, led by Hatta, took its place. The reactionaries knew very well how to use state power to serve their class interests. As soon as power left the hands of the proletariat and passed into those of the comprador bourgeois Hatta, this government went on pursuing a line of conciliation with the Dutch while making counter-revolutionary preparations. As I said in another part, the Hatta government finally launched this counter-revolutionary action through the Madiun provocation. The PKI's mistake on the question of state power thus cost us a heavy sacrifice. But the lessons of this mistake have been extremely deep for the PKI. What is the nature of Indonesia's present state power? After the signing of the Round Table agreements, the successive governments formed at that time were all comprador governments wholly representing the interests of imperialism and feudal forces. Although those governments also had political representatives of the national bourgeoisie, they became captives of the reactionaries and carried out policies of compromise with imperialism, the enemy of the revolution, and its running dogs. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in force since 1951, President Sukarno did not directly hold power in the government. From 1951 the PKI had already put forward the demand to set up a national coalition government, to be composed of the democratic parties and non-party democrats who agreed to abrogate the Round Table agreements. The correct policy of winning the national bourgeoisie back to the side of the revolution achieved initial results, and as a result the Wilopo government (of the Indonesian National Party [PNI]) was formed in 1952. There were still rightist figures (of Masjumi and the PSI) in the Wilopo cabinet, but the cabinet's programme was relatively democratic, so the PKI supported it. The PKI's positive attitude toward this cabinet began to isolate and strike the die-hard forces, while the middle and progressive forces began to unite more and develop. The governments since the Wilopo cabinet have basically been relatively leftist and progressive. The role of rightists in government has grown ever smaller. This was clearly shown in the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet formed in August 1955. (Burhanuddin Harahap was an important figure of Masjumi who later became a counter-revolutionary rebel.) This cabinet was clearly reactionary and was therefore opposed by the PKI. Because of the leftward shift in the balance of forces, and because of the progress of the national united front, this cabinet could not last long; its life was less than a year. This cabinet failed in its sabotage of the general elections, was forced to hold them, and had to bear the defeat suffered by the Masjumi-PSI combination. One of the major developments brought about by the progress of the national united front was the sharpening of the contradictions between the revolutionary side and Hatta, Masjumi and the PSI. The peak of this sharpening was Hatta's resignation as Vice-President and the promulgation of the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, which declared Indonesia's return to the 1945 Constitution, the constitution at the time the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed. The 1945 Constitution provides that the President directly leads the government. Events developed very rapidly. With imperialist support, the domestic reactionaries several times launched coups and attempts to murder the President. After their plots failed, they launched in 1958 a rebellion aimed at splitting the country. The government, urged and strongly supported by the entire people, resolutely suppressed the rebellion. In November 1960 the Provisional People's Consultative Congress [MPRS] approved the "Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia" (abbreviated "Political Manifesto" [Manipol]) as the state's outline of policy. The Political Manifesto was a speech given by President Sukarno on 17 August 1959. This was a major event in the people's revolutionary struggle, because it meant that the concepts concerning the basic problems of the Indonesian revolution had been accepted and embodied in an official state document. It thus gave the whole Indonesian nation a unified and correct understanding of the major basic problems of the Indonesian revolution. This state outline of policy pointed out that the main targets (main enemies) of the Indonesian revolution are imperialism and feudalism; that the task of the Indonesian revolution is not to establish the power of one class, one stratum or one party, but to establish the power of the entire people, a mutual-cooperation power, opposed to military or personal tyranny and dictatorship; that the revolutionary forces of Indonesia are not one class, one stratum or one party, but resolutely oppose imperialialism, feudalism and the whole people with workers and peasants as the basic force; that the nature of the Indonesian revolution is a national-democratic revolution; and that the prospect of the Indonesian revolution is socialism, not capitalism. Thus the Political Manifesto has truly become the common programme of the entire Indonesian people for completing the revolution. With the Political Manifesto, the revolutionaries' struggle against the counter-revolutionaries takes the form of a struggle of the Political Manifesto camp against the anti-Political-Manifesto camp. In March 1963 President Sukarno issued another important document, the Economic Declaration [Deklarasi Ekonomi, Dekon]. Figures from the three sides of "Nasakom" played an important role in drafting it. The Economic Declaration contains three basic elements. First, it lays down the basic economic strategy for Indonesia's present stage of revolution, namely that the task of the national-democratic stage is to thoroughly wipe out and eliminate the remnants of imperialism and feudalism. Second, it lays down the short-term measures that must be carried out immediately to overcome the current economic difficulties. Third, it lays down the political conditions absolutely necessary for implementing the Declaration itself, namely realising national mutual cooperation with "Nasakom" as its core through the combination of government and organised people in the conduct of government and administration. In other words, a mutual-cooperation government with "Nasakom" as its core must be formed. With the Political Manifesto and the Economic Declaration, the progressive political and economic programme for completing the Indonesian revolution has in fact officially become state policy. But why have these documents not been carried out resolutely, and why do cases often occur in implementation that run counter to the spirit of the original programme? To make this clear we must understand the nature of state power in the present Republic of Indonesia. The PKI holds that Indonesian state power has two aspects, a pro-people aspect and an anti-people aspect. The emergence of the pro-people aspect cannot be separated from the achievements of the PKI's method of combining the three forms of struggle. The pro-people aspect is growing ever stronger and is impelling the Indonesian government to adopt various revolutionary anti-imperialist measures. The anti-people aspect, representing the interests of imperialism, compradors, landlords and bureaucratic capitalists, does its utmost to sabotage all progressive measures. This aspect still holds the dominant position. In this situation, the PKI's struggle in the matter of state power is to make the pro-people aspect grow ever stronger and become dominant, and to exclude anti-people forces from state power. This is the content of the people's demand for reorganisation (of the state apparatus) and for the formation of a mutual-cooperation cabinet with "Nasakom" as its core. Precisely because these two aspects exist, Indonesia must carry out a revolution from above and from below. From above means that the PKI must urge state power to adopt various revolutionary measures, and reform personnel and the state apparatus. From below means arousing, organising and mobilising the people to bring about the above reforms. By this method the PKI changes the balance of forces between imperialism, bureaucratic capitalists, compradors and landlords on the one hand and the people's forces on the other. Some comrades ask: are these progressive political and economic programmes not a trick of the bourgeoisie to deceive the working people? It is not strange to ask such a question. But the point is that these progressive programmes came into being as the progressive forces developed and actively took part in drafting them. Having an official government programme greatly helps progressive people to educate, organise and mobilise the masses to demand firmly that these programmes be carried out, and to use them to expose every attempt to depart from them. Therefore all the progressive programmes and measures adopted by the present government are, first and foremost, the result of the struggle of Indonesia's progressive forces. The acceptance of the programme of the working class and its party by the whole nation reflects the working class's leadership in the revolution. Other comrades ask: the PKI demands reorganisation of the administrative apparatus and the formation of a mutual-cooperation cabinet with "Nasakom" as its core: is this not the same as "structural reformism"? No, it is entirely different! The PKI indeed supports and promotes the reorganisation of the state apparatus in order to strengthen the position of progressive elements in state power. For example, the PKI fully agrees with and supports the establishment of the Supreme Advisory Council [DPA], the Mutual-Cooperation Parliament [DPR-GR], the Provisional People's Consultative Congress [MPRS] and so on, which reflect "Nasakom". But these are only partial demands or reform measures on the way to the strategic goal, the full realisation of the Political Manifesto and of the PKI programme. The PKI programme clearly states that the PKI holds that only a people's democratic government, that is, a national united front government led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, can change Indonesia from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country into a fully independent, democratic, prosperous and advanced country. A major step in the struggle for a people's democratic government was the demand put forward by the PKI at the First Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in February 1963, the demand for a mutual-cooperation cabinet with "Nasakom" as its core, daring to change the domestic social system, daring to sacrifice the interests of the minority of big exploiters in town and country, that is, bureaucratic capitalists, compradors and landlords, and defending the interests of the majority of the people. Therefore the present demand to form a "Nasakom" cabinet is an important matter in the struggle to reach the strategic goal. In this respect the Indonesian Communists consider that the question of forming a "Nasakom" cabinet is a question of the balance of forces, that is, that the essence of the question is the seizure of political power, a question of revolution, and not a question of "structural reform". Only by going all out and persistently developing the progressive forces, uniting the middle forces and isolating the die-hard forces can the balance of forces be changed. The First Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee called on Communists to carry out this line in the spirit of the "five mores": more courageous, more resourceful, more vigilant, more determined and more devoted to hard work. These are some questions concerning the state power of the present Republic of Indonesia. II. Some experiences in Party building 1. Building the PKI into a Party that is both a mass party and a select (cadre) party During the Japanese fascist occupation the PKI operated entirely illegally. In the struggle against Japanese fascism many young Communists emerged, spread among the various mass organisations of workers, youth, students and peasants, and in the armed forces that the Japanese militarists set up by recruiting Indonesian youth. In preparing to proclaim independence, and in the struggle against the Japanese troops and Allied forces who tried to suppress our struggle for independence, these Communists were activists. But they did not have a good central leadership, because in 1942 a large number of PKI leading cadres were arrested and killed by the Japanese. For this reason, in launching the August 1945 revolution the PKI lacked organisational, political and ideological preparation. Owing to weaknesses in organisation, politics and ideology, it was difficult to achieve political and ideological unity immediately. During the 1945-1948 revolution three Marxist-Leninist-based parties were formed. For this reason, when the PKI at its August 1948 conference corrected all its organisational, political and ideological errors, it first decided to merge all the parties based on Marxism-Leninism. According to plan, the merger was to be completed at the next congress. That congress could not be held, because the Madiun provocation occurred beforehand. But the PKI's prestige could not be destroyed. In December 1948, when the Netherlands launched the Second Colonial War, some of the Communists thrown into prison because of the Madiun Affair were released, and others broke out of prison. The first thing they did after getting out was to look for weapons and fight the Dutch colonial army. Their action opened the masses' eyes and exposed Hatta's lie, told in the Madiun provocation, that the Communists wanted to overthrow the Republic. The Communists, whose organisation had been destroyed, could not prevent the signing of the compromising Round Table agreements. But facts proved that the Communists stood everywhere in the front line of the anti-Dutch struggle and directly led the guerrillas. This was of great significance for the development of Party building after the Round Table. The PKI faced the revolutionary task of leading a multi-ethnic country composed of thousands of islands, with a population of nearly one hundred million and a very uneven population density. In order to fulfil this leading task the PKI could not but take the country's special features into account in the way it built the Party. In 1951 the number of Party members and candidate members did not exceed 7,910; the organisation was small, narrow in scope, and spread mainly only in Java and Sumatra. Therefore, without large-scale development of the Party it would have been impossible to shoulder the heavy tasks facing the Party. Therefore the PKI National Conference held in early 1952 was of extremely great significance. This conference discussed the major political questions then facing the Indonesian people, such as the policy toward the Sukiman government, which had made mass arrests of Communists, and the policy toward the Darul Islam movement and the counter-revolutionary bands of the Indonesian Islamic Army [DI/TII]. In addition the conference seriously discussed the necessity of formulating the Indonesian revolution's own road according to Marxist-Leninist teaching. On this question the conference reached important conclusions on the method of combining three forms of struggle, on building a national united front with the national bourgeoisie, on strengthening the Party's ideology, and on developing Party members and organisation. Especially on organisation, the National Conference concluded that sectarianism must be overcome, and agreed to the Politburo's plan for recruiting members, to expand membership from 7,910 to 100,000 within six months. This was the first step taken by the Party leadership to build the PKI into a mass party. Some comrades doubt whether the Communist Party should be a mass party. They stress only that the PKI must be a party of high quality, meaning that PKI members should be "remarkable people" and "not just anybody". They hold that large-scale recruitment is merely the pursuit of quantity. These comrades forget that quality cannot be separated from quantity, and that a mass party can at the same time be a select party. A mass party has two meanings. First, it has a large membership; second, it has broad and deep influence among the masses. Indeed, in order for the Party to lead all the revolutionary classes in carrying out its policy, the second point is the most important. But if the Party does not have enough cadres to carry out broad propaganda among all strata of society, this is clearly impossible, to say nothing of leading the mass organisations around them. At that time many cadres had to hold concurrently all sorts of different jobs, so that they were called "all-purpose balm cadres" or "all-embracing cadres". Therefore the two aspects of a mass party must not be set against each other but should be understood as a unity. Another reason for disagreeing with the formulation of a mass party is that a large membership would blur the distinction between vanguard and masses, preventing the Party from playing the role of a new-type Leninist party, that is, from being the advanced detachment and the highest form of class organisation, and so on. Also, large numbers of new members of petty-bourgeois origin joined the Party, who would bring their own ideology into the Party and dissolve or drown the proletarian ideology. Of course this danger is not non-existent, as we can see from the parties of the Second International. But if we are aware of this danger and maintain high vigilance, it can be avoided. The most important thing is that, while developing membership and organisation, Marxist-Leninist education must be conducted constantly and persistently. And this theoretical education must be combined with education and tempering in practical struggle. Some comrades also fear that building a mass party would make it easy for agents, secret agents and spies of imperialism and other reactionaries to infiltrate the Party. This fear is indeed reasonable. But even if the Party were smaller, they would still carry out infiltration. We should trust the masses, trust the masses' high revolutionary spirit, and trust their loyalty. The higher the political consciousness of our Party membership, the higher their vigilance will be. The recruitment plan adopted by the above National Conference was in fact overfulfilled. When the plan was checked at the end of 1952, Party members and candidate members had reached 126,671. That is, within less than a year the membership grew more than fifteen-fold. Why did it grow so fast? In general, what are the objective and subjective conditions under which a mass party can be built in Indonesia within a relatively short time? The favourable objective condition for building a mass party in Indonesia is the vigorous revolutionary spirit of all strata of the people. This revolutionary spirit is shown in the tradition of the 1926 people's uprising, in the August Revolution and in the anti-imperialist struggles since. Indonesian Communists have always stood in the very front line in all revolutionary struggles and played a major role. Therefore the PKI enjoys the reputation of defender of the working people. The international conditions were also favourable. The October Revolution and the heroic struggle of the Soviet people during the Second World War had an enormous influence, making the Indonesian people yearn still more for socialism. The establishment of the people's democracies of Eastern Europe, and especially the brilliant victory of the Chinese people's revolution and the founding of the People's Republic of China, made the influence of socialist ideas still wider. Another favourable condition is that, as a result of cruel colonial rule, there is no labour aristocracy among the workers, so there is no reformist tradition in the Indonesian workers' movement. Thus a workers' united front can be built relatively easily. With the firm unity of the working class, a core was formed for uniting all other revolutionary forces and enabling the working class to occupy the vanguard position. These are the objective conditions for the PKI's building of a mass party. Judged by the subjective conditions, that is, the state of the Party itself at that time, the situation was also favourable. The establishment of the new Politburo in 1951 guaranteed unity of the Party's leadership, which was the primary and absolute condition for rebuilding the Party into a genuine Marxist-Leninist party. The second condition was having a Marxist-Leninist Party constitution, which became the basis for sound organisational life within the Party. The third condition was the Party's correct programme. The Party's programme laid down, in concrete policies, the urgent tasks that the Indonesian people had to accomplish immediately: for example the policy of overthrowing the extremely reactionary Sukiman government, the policy of eliminating the terrorist groups of Darul Islam and the Indonesian Islamic Army, the slogan of abrogating the Round Table agreements, and so on. These correct policies won more and more of the masses to the Party. The fourth condition was the struggle launched within the Party against sectarianism, capitulationism and adventurism. In this way the Party was able to build the broadest national united front and to draw the most advanced elements from all strata of the people into the PKI. In its summing-up, the Sixth National Congress of the PKI (1959) pointed out that the tasks of Party building put forward by the Fifth National Congress had basically been accomplished. Therefore the Sixth Congress put forward the task of consolidating the achievements already made: "continue to build, throughout the country, a Party closely linked with the masses and consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally." 2. The significance of Marxist-Leninist education for Party building The Fourth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee, held in July 1956, stressed: "Only on the basis of unity of thought and consciousness, that is, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology, is it possible to achieve unity within the Party. Only with the ideological unity of Communists can there be genuine unity of Communist policy and organisation, and unity of action of the people led by the Communists." This simple truth is especially applicable when the PKI began to build a mass party. And only when Marxist-Leninist education has been given to the whole Party can ideological unity of Marxism-Leninism be realised. The Party's Fifth National Congress finally settled accounts with the Party's "left" and right opportunist deviations. But there are still Party members who, on questions concerning the Indonesian revolution, especially concerning the road of the Indonesian revolution, are not clear. Because the Party's membership grew very rapidly and the number of new members greatly exceeded the number of old members, the situation was still more complicated. When the Fifth National Congress was held in 1954, candidate members made up about seventy per cent of total Party membership. These members came from various different classes, their family backgrounds were varied, and their cultural level and revolutionary experience differed greatly. It is therefore not surprising that they brought all sorts of non-proletarian ideologies into the Party, thereby giving rise to all kinds of subjectivism. So the question of Marxist-Leninist education became an extremely urgent and decisive question for the success of future Party building. Since 1952 the PKI has launched several large-scale campaigns to recruit members, and every one of them was carried out together with educational activities for members: in particular, new members study the PKI programme and constitution, while old members must study Party documents and books of Marxist-Leninist theory. For example, in 1951 and 1952, the campaign in which PKI leading cadres studied Lenin's work "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder played a decisive role in freeing the Party from sectarianism. The campaign to study Comrade Liu Shaoqi's work "On the Mass Line" was of great help to PKI cadres in building a Party rooted in the masses. Likewise, Comrade Mao Zedong's works "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" and, published in 1957, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" were of extremely important significance for the PKI in studying and summing up its own experience and resolving contradictions within the Party. There are many similar examples. From 17 August 1963 the PKI began to carry out its third plan, a four-year plan for cultural, ideological and organisational work. This four-year plan is a continuation of the previous two three-year plans. This plan attaches great importance to cultural work while strengthening ideological and organisational work. After carrying out this new four-year plan, the PKI will be better able and more skilled in handling all tasks and work. From the experience of Party building one can conclude that Indonesian Communists have three characteristics: first, educating PKI members in the spirit of patriotism and proletarian internationalism; second, in Party building our position is that organisational building is important but ideological building is more important; third, Indonesian Communists adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and yet are able to apply these principles flexibly. Indonesian Communists have mainly, from their own practical experience of building the Party, consciously recognised these three characteristics and made them their own. The work of Indonesian Communists in building and strengthening their Party cannot be separated from the development of the international communist movement. The situation in the international communist movement has a great influence on the building of the PKI. On the one hand, it is bad that serious, substantive differences of opinion exist in the international communist movement. Without these differences and the open polemics, things would be better for the international communist movement and for the PKI. But in recent years no Communist could place himself outside the fact that there are serious, substantive differences in the international communist movement, nor could any Communist adopt a neutral attitude toward these differences. Because the PKI has treated the differences in the international communist movement correctly, Party building has not suffered. This is proved by the following facts: the PKI is growing and consolidating, and the Marxist-Leninist theoretical level and spirit of PKI members are rising and strengthening. The existence of differences in the international communist movement has made Indonesian Communists recognise more clearly the correctness of an attitude of independence and initiative. This is the only correct attitude in this period, an attitude of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, loyalty to the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, an attitude of no mercy toward subjectivism, classical and modern revisionism, and classical and modern dogmatism. The differences and open polemics in the international communist movement have spurred Indonesian Communists to study harder and to apply Marxism-Leninism more creatively. Through correctly treating the serious, substantive differences in the international communist movement, the ranks of Indonesian Communists have been tempered stronger, and are growing into an independent Party, and are therefore more mature. This sounds strange, but it is a fact. 3. From a strong communist movement to a strong communist organisation One of the important experiences of the PKI's building of the Party is working according to plan. From 1951 working according to plan began to become a generally used method of work in the Party. At first these plans were short-term, of one month, three months, six months. The plans had few items. As experience accumulated, more and more Party work was made an item of planning, and the planning periods were extended. As I said above, from 1956 the PKI began to carry out the first three-year plan on organisational and educational work, followed by the second three-year plan on educational and organisational work, and now our Party is at the beginning of the four-year plan on cultural, ideological and organisational work. As a result of the large-scale recruitment, by the time of the PKI's Fifth National Congress (1954) membership had increased nearly twenty-fold over 1951, and the ratio of candidate members to full members was three to one. Such rapid growth of course brought certain shortcomings, for example: many newly admitted candidate members were not organised as they should have been, and many newly established organisations such as branches, district committees and various Party fractions and groups lacked experience. Although the new members received preliminary education through studying the PKI programme and constitution, systematic Marxist-Leninist theoretical education was still very inadequate. It can therefore be said that in early 1955 Indonesia already had a strong communist movement, but this movement still had to become a strong communist organisation. With the completion of the Party's first three-year plan this task was accomplished. Thanks to implementation of this plan, the Party's grassroots organisations became active, and cadres received theoretical education through study at Party schools or Party training courses. The tempering received in the struggle against counter-revolution played an important role in consolidating the Party organisation. The struggle against the Darul Islam-Indonesian Islamic Army terrorist groups, and the struggle against the "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia - Universal Struggle Charter" [PRRI-Permesta] group's rebellion aimed at splitting the country, greatly raised the fighting spirit of Party organisations and of Party members and cadres. It was precisely in these areas that Party building developed rapidly. 4. The relationship between Party building and the Party's political line The great progress we have made in Party building is certainly inseparable from the Party's correct political line. One may even say that the correctness of the Party's policy is the decisive factor in the progress of Party building work. Correct policies that reflect the interests of the various revolutionary classes in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle have caused more and more people of all strata to gather around the PKI and join our ranks. In making these policies concrete, the important question is that of slogans. For example, the strategic slogan put forward by the PKI's Fourth Plenum in July 1956, "Unite, and fully realise the demands of the August 1945 revolution", played a very great role in spreading widely a correct understanding of the basic problems of Indonesia's new-type bourgeois-democratic revolution. In this respect the tactical slogan put forward by the PKI's Fifth Plenum in 1957, "Change the balance of forces, realise President Sukarno's concept one hundred per cent", played a great role in uniting the revolutionary forces and in demanding the formation of a national coalition government or a mutual-cooperation cabinet with "Nasakom" as its core. The Party's progress in building the national united front is also of important significance for the progress of Party building. The broader and stronger the national united front built, the more people can come to understand our Party and unite around it. In safeguarding the Party's security, the method of combining three forms of struggle is of decisive significance. This will also guarantee the Party's steady development. On the other hand, progress in Party building prepares better conditions for carrying out the Party's policy. For where the Party's strength is weak and its membership very small, the Party's policy, even if correct, cannot be realised. Likewise, the stronger the Party, the more strength it has to build the national united front. If it is a small party, other classes will not pay it any heed, still less will they build a solid worker-peasant alliance as the basis of the national united front; the PKI should truly take root among the peasants. Dear comrades and friends: That is all I will say about some problems of the Indonesian revolution and the situation of the PKI. What is my purpose in raising these questions? It is nothing other than to further strengthen the close friendship between the Indonesian and Chinese peoples, and between the PKI and the Communist Party of China. For this we need to understand each other better, not a shallow or superficial mutual understanding but a deep and genuine one. That means that, first of all, we need to understand each other's societies, revolutions and communist parties. I believe the time has now come for such understanding, and that such understanding is very necessary. The peoples of our two countries and our two parties must work hard for this purpose. Finally, I cry out: Long live the eternal friendship between the great and heroic Indonesian and Chinese peoples! Long live the eternal friendship and Marxist-Leninist unity between the PKI and the Communist Party of China! Long live the international communist movement, guided by the great, invincible banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism! That is all. Thank you. Related reports: