The Communist Movement in Indonesia (memorandum CIA, 1962)

Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, August 15). *The communist movement in Indonesia* [Intelligence memorandum]. CIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 (Approved for release n.d.) [release date unverified]. PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.5 US Intelligence and Government Reports/CIA (1962) - The Communist Movement in Indonesia.pdf PDF PAGES 1 to 27 of 27. Text from the PDF text layer where present, otherwise Tesseract OCR (ind+eng); OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === Approved For Release: SMERAT73-00915R00140019WO01:5——... 0. 15 Aug 1962 THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA kh Intraduction | The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) is the largest Communist | party outelide the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party and of ite youth organization totais 3,250,000. Asa legal party, its membars hold positions ta government service at all levels, up to cabinet positions just below full ministerial rank. It directs several important mass organizations. Partai Murba is an avowedly oationalist Communist party, otherwise differing little from the PKI. Not a mass party, a aumber of its members have political influence due to personal prestige. Communiat activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Organisations (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citizenship Body, (BAPIRKI). 1, Tha Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) Apparatus. Strength: Claimed 2,000, 0009 Estimated - 1,750,900 Central Java 690, 009 East Java 650, 000 Also strong in plantation and oll centers of Sumatra. Character: A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological level of the rank and file fs low, but an extensive and systematic party training program is having some effect in devoloping second and third level leaders. Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the polit-bureau. No open dissension has been chserved although some straine GROUP Ladomalit related $ Ang ant Approved For Release: CIA-RDP78-0ESR56 190001-5 === [PDF page 2] === Approved For Rele#SSRGRNWRSP73-00915R001400190001-5 may be occurring under the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Personal direction by politbureau and central committee members of secretariat and mass organization work ensures central control, Some secret party members have been identified and there are »* probably many more. An illegal party stracture paralleling the legal party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action ie carried on covertly byt for local, tactical purposes. “mt Principal Propaganda Media \ Hartan Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper Circutation 58,000. Bintang Timur party-line paper, buat act formally party-controlied, | Circulation "as, 000 Bintang Merah PKI monthly theoretical journal. IV, Party Assets in Government Klectoral Strength: 5» 1955 general dlection 6,000,009 votes 1957 muaicipal election. “ (incomplete) 7,206,000 votes The party in the 1955 election was fourth nationally and third ia Java. | Cabinet:. No PKI members In Inner cabinet. 2 PKI members were appointed in February 1962 to newly created |. State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank, However, the Party considers the Cabinet reorganization of February 1962 a net setback. Gotong Rojong Parliament: 43 PKI representatives ' 20 functional representatiyas who are PKI members. Approved For Release: CIA-RDP7gA864+5R001 400190001-5 | === [PDF page 3] === Approved For Release: CIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 setang” Supreme Advisory Council: R PKI represeotatives 6 functional representatives who are PKI members. National Pianning Council: 16-22 PKI-controiled members out of 77. Civil Service; 30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affiliates — ef the Communist trade union federation. Central Organisation of Labor of AU Indonesia. (SOBSI): PKI participation {a regional governments is most pronounced in Kast and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities in local councile, There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other ’ provinces, particularly in Sumatra. Y, Party Assets in Civic Institutions The PKI controls a number of mass organisations through fractions within them at both the central and regional levels, Of the important ones only the Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI), the labor front, does not have a department in the PKI secretariat devoted to its affairs. PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Politbureaa. members and other PKI members in the organization's central offices, Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI) Claimed membership — 3,033,000 Affillate of WFTU Principal areas Of strength: Oil, estate, transportation and communication and public worke workers, (Java, Sumatra and Celebes.) Four of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and Secretary-general, are PKI members. SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organisations in Indonesia, It has a potential capacity for tying up communications and disrapting economic life through strikes and demonstrations, Youth Organisations PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth) Claimed mambership -" 1,250,000 Principal strength in Java Affiilate of WEDY and has permanent representative at WFDY headquarters,. Approved For Releaga GTA 01400190001-5 === [PDF page 4] === MER BPR Approved For Release MRAM P78.0091 5R001400190001-5 Pemuda Rakjat overtiy acknowledges its aliegiance to the PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. Itte ~ militant and its members have played a leading part in anti-Western demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers, Initially 100, 000, “ for the liberation of West Irlan. Pernuda Rakjat's membership le. drawa principally from youth of the working class, Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements, (CGMI) Claimed membership -— ~3, 000-5, 000, Affiliate of IUS | Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers through laflitration of larger, non-Commaunist student organisations. CGMI membership is much more solidly Communist thas ie the case ia most fronts, For example, all but 2 of 22 officers chosen by the Gadja Mada CGMI branch in March 1961 were PKI members. Indonesian Peasant Movement (BTI) Claimed membership (1959) More than 4, 000, 009 Not affillated with WFTU but has sent delegates te international coaferences sponsored by WFTU. Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and. North Sumatra. ". The BTI is the PKI lostrument for grass roote organising and propaganda activity, la the countryside, It endeavors to substitute itself for appointed officials in local administratig, and was the instigator of some recent peasant disturbances. Indonesian %iumen's Movement (GER WANI) Claimed membership 800,000 (January 1961); Affiliate of WIDF ie Principal usefulness to the PKI ie as a propaganda instrament, GERWANI has brought a aumber of prominent non-Commasist women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National Federation of Women's Organizations. The League for People's Culture (LEKRA) Bore Claimed membership more than 60,000 (February 1962) 9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra, fin Borneo Has close contacts with both 1US and WFDY and works with friendship societies and peace movement. 400190001-5 === [PDF page 5] === Ate mek Approved For Release: CIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 LEKRA te the most active cultural organization in Indonesia, performing functions which have beea negtected by the Ministry of Education, Training, and Culture. It has given a Marxist coloration to much of Indonesian current writing aad promotes attacks against European sad U, &, cultural activities, LEKRA sent 8 delegates to the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent im 1958 and participated ine similar conference at Cairo in early 1962. Indonesian Peace Committee (IPC) No membership figures available 1952 Stockholm Appeal 217,496 signatures 1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650,000 signatures Claime 66 branches of which 55 are in Java. The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organised peace movement, Consequently the movement receives widespread support ia all sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders, ‘Afro-Aaslan People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO).... The AAPEO, a Commualst-directed lnastrument for fomenting ‘the national Hberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian concepta of foreign policy and Internaticoal aligaments and therefore enjoya wide support in Indonesia, including the positive endorsement of President Sukarno, A PKI member is the permanent representative of ~ Tndowonia on the secretariat in Cairo. Friendship Societies Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist bloc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for all the countries of the bloc except Albania. PKI members participate in their leadership and activities as do Partai Murba leaders, Most of this activity is in Java, although the Indonesian-Chinese society claims 19 branches in Sumatra aad the Indonesian-Soviet society has branches ia Sumatra and Bali. VI, International Ties The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented, Its leaderg have spent cousiderable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union, - acd party policy has generally been gonsistent with the Soviet line. There are signe that since November 1966, and more spparently siace the 2Zad Approved For MBM: CIA-RDP738 UU 15R001400190001 5 | === [PDF page 6] === with which the government already regards the Chinese minority. : enim Approved For Releasd® a eeP78-0091 5R001400190001-5 Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy requirements over its own national interests is a key question under debate, vm, Partai Murba Claimed strength 175,000 et Principally in Java ‘ Electoral strength (1955) 225,000 votes Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist Party. Other than its rejection of international ties the Murba policies are indistinguishable from those tifthe PKI, It has no significant mass following but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of ite leaders and their associations With Sukarno., VIII, Overseas Chinese Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the PKI, This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suapicion Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI) Estimated membership. §0,000 BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the Chinese Gommunist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a particular appeal to Chinese youth. Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH) A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and property rights, CHCTTAH accepts direction from the Chinese Communist Embaasy, having severed its former KMT ties. It eccasionaily acts as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing policy towards the overseas Chinese, === [PDF page 7] === Menata Approved For Releas Ega 78-00915R001400190001-5 IX, Objectives and Tactics Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after the ill-fated Madiun uprising ia 1948, the Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building both a mass party and @ broad following, emphasizing legal political activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno. This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would bring them increasing influence as their political activities were unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It hae been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic and forelga, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain power, elther through constitutional electoral procedures or through their admission by President Sukarno to a ahare of power at the cabinet level. TS maintain this guasi-siliance, the PKI has brought itself to accept some presidental actions which must have been distasteful; e.g. the decrees severely limiting all political party activity and, more ree cently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitutional | ’ principles of Pantjasita, which inchs affirmation of a belief in God. President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the political leaders around him, has accepted the PHI's cooperation as @ means of maintaining bis own political position vis-a-vis other . potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point where it might endanger his government, To this end the President has accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force in the “country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political or the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to approach closely enough to Communist programa to forestall Communtet exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support, The Indonesian foreign policy of neutraliam and anti-colonialism is in accord with Communist poticy but it also appeals to strong public feeling which the Communist would exploit if the government did not, A program of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) euterprises, and industrialization are other examples of this attempt to ateal the Communist. thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective. The factor which has perhaps thrown the President'a caleulations ONsape ding and aclassiticatton Approved For Release: CIA* ' Off has been the unexpected flexibility of the PKI in adjusting itself to the. === [PDF page 8] === .to adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces _ wearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President. most recent development in the process was the President's speech at Approved For Release: SESSEEI.00915R001400190001-5, measures. The party hae been able to endorse Sukarno's objectives while retaining freedom to criticize deficiencies in thelr implementatioa, . The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance, permits the Communists to capitalise on the resulting popular discontent while still endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicized intentions of the government. | To a considerable degree the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal by borrowing Marxist programa has only served to give the Communist objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the PKI of these key iscucs for exploitation. The Communists have also been able in some caase to pressure | the government into more extreme positions or to hastior actions than it | might otherwise have taken. Intransigence on West Irian may well | alienate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence upon the Communist bloc from which escapo would be very difficult. Yet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies and programs of national mobilisation the government has felt compelled agaiust the rival claims of the PKL The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises by the unauthorised action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelied te step in and proceed to legitirnise the seizure which it had not planned and for which it was not prepared, The economic dislocation caused by these events has made the government vulnerable to new PKI pressures. In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of cooperation and competition between the government and the PKI which each has carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more The PHI has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position of the Communiat bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian affairs ie stronger than ever. The government has found itself steadily drawa into positions on both the national and international level which are ever closer to tha Communist program, more dependent upon Communist Support, and increasingly estranged from non-Communist forces, The key point in this process was perhaps reached with the adoption in 1960 Of the NASAKOM (nationallst, raligious, Cemmunist) formula which. established as a matter of principle the right of the PKI to equal represent+ ation at all levels of the country's political and economic structure. The 60190001-5 Approved For Release "RBar 78- AI === [PDF page 9] === Approved For Relea $ehtges DP78-0001 5R001400190001-5 the PKI 7th Congress in April 1962 in which he denounced “antis . Gommunist phobias" and gave the PKI his full endorsement as loyal, patriotic, nationalist revolutionaries, Other hopes, that this process might inspire @ nationalist, TITOIST trend in the Communist party leadership, have also been disappointed, for the PKI is one of the most open advocates of international Communist unity. . Excluded tg Approved For Release Dpatoo: PASS, A1 === [PDF page 10] === Approved For Release! GMERIRRI 3-00915R00146b190901-5....— 15 Aug 1963 THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA I. Introduction | The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) is the largest Communist party outside the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party and of its youth organization totais 3,250, 009, As a legal party, ite members hold positions ia government service at all levels, up to cabinet positions just below full ministerial rank. It directs several important mass organizations. Partai Murba is an avowedly nationalist Communist party, otherwise differing little from the PKI, Not a mass party, a eurmber of its members have political influence due to personal prestige. Communlat activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Orgasisationa (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citlsenship Body, (BAPERKI), II, The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) Apparatus, Strength: | Claimed 2,090,000 Estimated / - 4,750,009 Central Java 600, 000 East Java 650, 090 Also strong ia plantation and ofl centers of Sumatra. Character: | A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological level of the rank and file is low, but an extensive and systematic party training program is having some effect in developing second and third level leaders. Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the polit-bureau. No open dissension has been observed although some strains === [PDF page 11] === Approved For Release DP78-00915R001400190001-5 may be occurring under the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Personal direction by politbureau and central committee members of secretariat and maps organization work ensures central control. Some secret party members have been identifled and there are. * probably many more. An illegal party stracture paralleling the legal party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried on covertly byt for local, tactical purposes, Iu. ‘Principal Propaganda Media " N Harian Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper Circulation 58,000. Bintang Timur party-line paper, but act formally party-controiled, Circulation "2s, 000 Bintang Merah PKI menthly theoretical jouraal, IV. Party Assets in Government Electoral Streagth: es 1955 general dlection 6,000,009 votes 1957 municipal election. (iucom plete) 7,200,000 votes The party in the 1955 election was fourth nationally and third tu Java, | Cabinet: No PKI members in inner cabinet. 2 PKI members were appointed in February 1962 to newly created | _- State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank. However, the Party considers the Cabinet reorganization of February 1962 a net setback. Gotong Rojong Parliament: 43 PKI representatives 20 functional representatives who are PKI members, Approved For Relea € CIA-RDP75 === [PDF page 12] === Approved For ReleagaeCIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 Sapreme Advisory Council; f PUI representatives 6 functional representatives who are PKI members. National Planning Council: 16-22 PKi-controlled members out of 77. Civil Service; 30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affiliates of the Communist trade union federation. Central Organisation of Labor of AU Indonesia. (SOB5I): PKI participation in regional governments is most pronounced in Kast and Central Java whera in a number of cases they hold pluralities im local councils. There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other | provinces, particularly in Sumatra,: Y. Party Assete in Civic Institutions The PKI controls a number of mass organizations through fractions within them at both the central and regional levels, Of the important ones only the Central Organization of Laber of Ali Indonesia (SOBSI), the labor front, does act have a department in the PKI secretariat devoted to its affairs. PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Potitbursau ' members and other PKI members in the organization's central offices, Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI) Claimed membership — 3,933, 000 Affiliate of WETU Principal areas of strength: Oil, estate, transportation and communication and public works workers, (Java, Sumatra and Celebes.) Four of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and Secretary-general, are PKI members. SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organisations fa Indonesia, It hes a potential capacity for tying up communications and disrupting economic [ife through strikes and demonstrations, Youth Orgaaizations PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth) Claimed membership - "1,250,000 Principal strength in Java;. Affiliate of WFDY and has permanent representative at WFDY headquarters, wey co apa a ada Tg 001400190001-5, Approved For Rela -R Ora Moclanci{icattOe === [PDF page 13] === Approved For Releas# KK DP73-00915R001400190001-5 Pemuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance to the PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. Itie ~ militant and its members have played a leading part in anti- Western 1 demonstrations, They have also voluntcered in numbers, initially 100, 000, ~.. fer the liberation of West Irian. Pemuda Rakjat's membership is. drawa principally from youth of the working class. Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements, (cami) + uO Claimel membership = 3, 000-5, 000 Aifillate of IUS ' Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers through iafiltration of larger, non-Communist student organisations. CGMI membership is much more solidly Cornmuniet thas le the case in most fronts, For example, all but 2 of 22 officere chosen by the Gadja Mada CGMI branch ia March 1961 were PKI members. Indonesian Peasant Movement (BTI) Clairned membership (1959) More thas 4,000,000 Not affiliated with WFTU but has cent delegates te international cosferences sponsored by WFTU. Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and - North Sumatra. “ - The BTI is the PKI Instrument for grass roots organising, and propaganda activity, la the countryside. It endeavors to eubstitate itself shar. for appointed officials in local administratio, and wae the instigator of seme recent peasant disturbances. — Indonesia Bumen's Movement (GER WANI) Claimed membership 800,000 (January 1961) | Affillate of WIDF =e. Principal usefulness to the PKI ie ae a propaganda. ta Imstrument,. GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non-Communist women into the movement and exerts some infiuence in the National Federation of Women's Organisations. The League for People's Culture (LEKRA) Mowe Claimed membership more than 60,000 (February 1962) 0. 9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra, Fin Borasa Hae close contacte with both IUS and WFDY and works with friendship societies and peace movement. Approved, For Refempemf@lA-RDP78-Oe Sa 2400190001 -5 === [PDF page 14] === Aku of President Sukarno. A PKI member ie the permanent representative of “ Indonesia on the secretariat in Cairo. - Approved For Release: CIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 LEKRA is the most active cultural organisation in Indonesia, performing functions which have been neglected by the Ministry of Education, Training, and Culture. It has given a Marxist coloration ta much of Indancalan curreat writing and promotes attacks against European and U. 5. cultural activities, LEKRA sent 8 delegates to the Afro-Asian Writera Conference in Tashkent in 1958 and participated ia a similar conference at Cairo in early 1962, Indonesian Poace Committee (IPC) No membership figures avallable 1952 Stockholm Appeal 217,496 signatures 1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650,000 signatures Claims 66 branches of which 55 are in Java. The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organized peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread support in all sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders, ‘Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO).... The AAPSO, a Communist-direc:ed instrument for fomenting ‘the national Hberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefore enjoys wide support in Indonc#ia, including the poditive endorsement Friendship Societies | | Friendship societies area device by which the Communist sy bloc gains direct acceas to the masses to promote Communist objectives and improve the Communist image, Such societies exist in Indonesia for all the countries of the bloc except Albania, PKI members participate in their leadership and activities ae do Partai Murba leaders, Most of this activity is in Java, although the Indonesiaa-Chinese society claims 19 branches in Surmnatra and the Indonesian-Soviet society has branches in Sumatra and Bali. VI. International Ties The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its leadere have: spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union, and party policy has generally boen gonsistent with the Soviet line. There are sigus that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22ad Approved: Fo help, Se CIA-RDP73-S === [PDF page 15] === Approved For ReleaSET EA p73-00915R001400190001-5 Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions on both foreign and domestic questions and may be seassensing its own basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy requirements over its own national interests is a key question under debate, vm, Partai Murba Claimed strength 175,000 On mma Principally in Java: Electoral strength (1955) 225,000 votes Partai Murba (Proletarisn Party) is a nationalist Communist Party, Other than ite rejection of international ties the Murba policies are indistinguishable from those tfthe PKI. It has no significant mass following but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of ite leaders and their associations with Sukarno., VIII, Overseas Chinese Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the PKI, This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion with which the government already regards the Chinese minority. Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI) Estimated membership ' 59,000 BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a particular appeal to Chinese youth. Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH) A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and property rights, CHGTTH!'i accepts direction from the Chinese Communist Embassy, having severed ite former KMT ties. It occasionally acts as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing policy towards the overseas Ghinese, .. iene ve ae | Approved For RE n-RDPy p88 5001 400190001-5 === [PDF page 16] === Approved For RelegagemmigeRBP78-00915R001400190001-5 IX, Objectives and Tactics Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after tbe ili-fated Mariiun uprising in 1943, the Communist movement in Indonesia bas adhered to a program bullding both a mass party and a broad following, emphasizing legal political activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno. This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would bring them increasing influence ae their political activities were anrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It has been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic and forelga, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain power, elther through constitutional electoral procedures of through their admission by President Sukarno to a share of power at the. “4 cabinet level, TO maintain this guasi-alllance, the PKI bas brought , itself to accept some presidental actions which must have been distaetefal; e.g. the decreas severely Limiting all political party activity and, more Free cently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's - demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitutional. ’ principles of Pantjasila, which inclid affirmation of a belief iu God. President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the 4S. political leaders around him, has accepted the PKI's cooperation as & means of maintaining bie own political position vis-a-vis other potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken aa that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point where it might endanger his government. To this end the President has accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force la the “country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political _. er the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to approsch closely enough to Communist programs to forestall Communtet exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support. The Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism and anti-colonialism is in accord with Communist policy but it also appeals to strong public feeling - which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and induetrialization are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective. The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's calculations off has been the unexpected flexibility of the PKI in adjusting itself to there OMS ae Approved For REAK JA-RDPHE SES '5R001400190001-5 yoo === [PDF page 17] === Approved For Release “ QMEIMEIT 8-00915R001400190001-5 measures. The party has been abla to endorse Sukarno's objectives while retaining freedom to criticize deficiencies in their implementation. . The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance, permits the Communists to capitalize on the resulting popular discontent while still endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicized intentions of the government. To a considerable degres the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal by borrowing Marxist programs has only served te give the Communist ’ objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the PKI of there key issues for exploitation. The Communists have also been able in some cases to pressure the government into more extreme positions or te hastior actions then ft might otherwise have takea. Intransigence on West Irian may well:. allenate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence upon thea Communist bloc from which escape would be very difficult.. Yet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies and programs of national mobilisation the government has felt compelled. ta adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces ’. agaiaust the rival claims of the PKL The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises by the unauthorized action of Communist-controlled trade unionists, But these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled te step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it had not planned ‘and for which it was not prepared, The economic dislocation caused by these events has made the governmoxt vulnerable to new PKI pressures. In sum it sppoars that the outcome of the delicate balancing of cooperation and competition between the government and the PKI which each has carried on with an eyo to its own profit has accorded more nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President, The PKI has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian affairs is strooger than ever, The government has found itself ateadily drawn into positions on both the national and international level which are ever closor to the Communist program, more dependent upon Communist support, and increasingly estranged from non-Communist forces, The key point in this process was perhaps reached with the sdoption im 1960 _ of the NASAKOM (nationalist, religious, Communist) formula which established as & matter of principle the right of the PKI to equal represent / ation at all levois of the country's political and economic structure. The most recent development in the process was the President's speech at - | Chow Excluted {tage Approved For Releasomsaiaaie@ P78-( GA === [PDF page 18] === ort Approved For Releas#MEMRDP738-00915R001400190001-5 the PKI 7th Congress in April 1962 in which he denounced ‘anti-. Communist phobias" and gave the PKI his full endorsement as loyal, patriotic, nationalist revolutionaries. Other hopes, that this process. taight inspire a nationalist, TITOIST trend in the Communist party leadership, have also been disappointed, for the PKI ie one of the most open advocates of international Communist unity. Approved For Releasgagataddid@DP 718,888 R00H 400190001-5 === [PDF page 19] === Pai Ta.. “5 A ~- parut oe Approved For Release:@#P78-00915R00140019600T26z%-— 15 AUG 1962 ~ THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA I, Introduction "The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) Is the largest Communist party outside the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party and of ite youth organization totals 3,259, 900. Asa logal party, its members hold positions in government service at all levels, up to cabinet positions just below full ministerial rank. ik directs several important mass organizations. Partai Murba is an avowedly nationalist Communist party, otherwise differing little from the PKI. Not amass party, a number of its membere have political influence due to personal prestige. Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Orgaafaations (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citizenship Body, (BAPERKI), Il, The Partai Komanis Indonesia (PKI) Apparatus. Strength: Claimed 2,000,009 Estimated - 4,750,900 Distributions., Central Java 600,009 East Java 650, 000 Also strong in plantation and oll centers of Sumatra. Character: A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological level of the rank and file is low, but an extensive and systematic party training program is having some effect in developing second and third level leaders. ‘ Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the polit-bureau. No open dissension has been observed although some straine Sadino NOREEN Approved For Release: CIA-RDP78-0Q§ er o === [PDF page 20] === Approved For Release amen 78-0091 5R001400190001-5 may be occurring under the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Personal direction by politbureaw and central committee members of secretariat and mase organization work ensures central control, Some secret party members bave been identified and there are |." probably many more. An illegal party structure paralleling the legal party ie belleved to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried ea covertly byt for local, tactical parposes. i. Principat Propaganda Media. N Harian Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper Circulation 58,000. Bintang Timur party-line paper, but act formally party-controlied, | Circutation Bg, 000 Bintang Merah PKI monthly theoretical journal. IV. Party Assets in Government. Electoral Strength: . 1955 general dlection 6, 000,090 votes. 1957 municipal election. (incomplete) 7,200,006 votes The party in the 1955 election was fourth nationally and third im Java. | Gabinet: No PKI members in Inner cabinet. 2 PKI members were appointed in February 1962 to newly created | _- State Leadership positions just below full ministerial sank. However, the Party considers the Cabinet reorganisation of February 1962 « net setback. Gotong Rojong Parliament: 43 PKI representatives 20 functional representatives who are PKI members, Approved For Release " CIA-RDP78- 0190001-5 === [PDF page 21] === Approved For Relegggesem-.RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 Saprome Advisory Council: PKI representatives 6 functional representatives who are PKI members. National Planning Council: 16-22 PKI-controlied members out of 77. Civil Service: 30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affillates ef the Communist trade union federation. Central Organisation of Labor of All Indonesia. (SOBSI): PKI participation in reglonal goveraments fe moat pronounced in Kast and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities ia local councils, There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other ' provinces, particularly in Sumatra. Y. Party Assete in Civic Institutions The PKI controls a number of mass organizations through fractions within them at both the central and regional levele, Of the important ones only the Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI), the labor front, does not have a department in the PKI secretariat devoted to its affairs, PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Politbureaa. members and other PKI members in the organization's central offices. Central Organization of Labor of Ali Indonesia (SOBSI) Claimed membership 3,033,000 Affiliate of WFTU Principal areas of strength: Oil, estate, transportation and communication and public works workers. (Java, Sumaira and Celebes.) Your of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and | Secretary-general, are PKI members. SOBSI is one of the more militant Communiat organisations tu Indonesia, It has a potential capacity for tying up communications and disrupting economic Mfe through strikes and demonstrations, Youth Organizations PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth) Ciaimed membership - “ 1,250,000 Principal strength in Java Aifiliate of WFDY and has pe at WFDY headquarters. et Approved For Relea: neut representative === [PDF page 22] === Approved For Release SEN p78-0091 5R001400190001-5 Pemuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance te the PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. itte - rallitant and its members have played a leading part in anti-Western. demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers, initially 100, 906, ~ syn dex the Uberation of West Irian. Pernuda Rakjat's membership is, draws principally from youth of the working class. Coacentration of Indonesian Student Movements, (CGMI) et, Claimed membership “3,000-5,000 | Affiliate of 1US Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers through inflitration of larger, non-Communist student organizations, CGMI membership is much more solidly Communist than le the cage in most fronts, For example, ali but 2 of 22 officers chosen by the Gadja Mada CGMI branch in March 1961 were PKI members, Indonesian Peasant Movement (BTI) Clairned membership (1959) More than 4,000, 009 Not affillated with WFTU but has sent delegates to international conferences sponsored by WFTU. Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and. North Sumatra. 0 ": The BTI is the PKI instrument for grass roots organising - and propaganda activity, in the countryside. It endeavors to substitute itself tinct. for appoiated officials in local administratiq, and was the instigator of seme recent peasant disturbances. —: Indonesian Wumer!s Movement (GERWANI) Claimed membership 800,000 (January 1961) Affiliate of WIDF eee, Principal usefulness to the PKI is as a propaganda. #lastrument, GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non-Communist women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National Federation ef Women's Organizations. The League for People's Culture (LEKRA} 7. ne Claimed membership more than 60,000 (February 1962). 9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra, fin Borneo Has close contacte with both IUS and WFDY and works with friendship societies and peace movement. === [PDF page 23] === agile Approved For Release: CIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5 LEKRA is the most active cultural organization in Indonesia, performing functions which have been neglected by the Ministry of Education, Training, and Culture, It has given a Marxist coloration to much Of Indonosian current writing and promotes attacks against European and U, 5, culturat activities, LEKRA sent 8 delegates to the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent in 1958 and participated ia a similar conference at Cairo in early 1962, Tadonesian Peace Committee (IPC) No membership figures available 1952 Stockholsn Appeal 217,496 signatures 1955 Vienna Peace Pact 656,000 signatures Claime 66 branches of which 55 are in Java. The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organixed peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread support in all sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders. ‘Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)..... . The AAPSO, a Communist-directed instrument for fomenting the national liberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefore enjoys wide support in Indonesia, including the poditive endorsement Of President Sukarno. A PKI member is the permanent representative of “ Tndowesia en the secretariat in Cairo, Haa Friendship Societies to Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist — bioc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for all the countries of the bloc except Albania. PKI members participate in their leadership and activities as do Partai Murba leaders. Most of this activity is in Java, although the Indonesian-Chinese society claims 19 branches in Sumatra and the Indoneslan-Soviet seciety has branches in Sumatra and Bali, “- VI. International Ties The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its lendere have spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union, ' and party policy has generally been gonsistent with the Soviet line. There are signe that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22nd === [PDF page 24] === with which the government already regards the Chinese minority, " rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the Approved For Release $PEMP73-00915R001400190001-5 Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy requiremonts over its own national interests ia a key question under debate. vm, Partai Murba Ciaimed strength 175, 000 Gaara Principally in Java Electoral strength (1955) 225,000 votes Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist Party. Other than its rejection of international tles the Murba policies are indistinguishable from those tifthe PKI. It has no significant mass following but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of ite leaders and their associations with Sukarno. |, VII. Overseas Chinese Gommunist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the PKI, This no doubt reilects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI) Estimated membership ' 50, 000 BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has s particular appeal to Chinese youth. Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH) A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and property rights, CHCTTH!i accepts direction from the Chinese Communist Embassy, having severed its former KMT ties. It occasionally acts as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing policy towards the overseas Chinese, ~GAdue Ai Excluded gg a ath ng and.. Foclassiticatiog. P73-009195R001400190001-5 Jana Approved' For Release: CIA-R === [PDF page 25] === TX, Objectives and Tactics Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after the ill-fated Madiun uprising in 1948, the Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building both a mass party and a broad following, emphasising legal political activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno, This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would bring them increasing influence as thelr political activities were unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It has been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic and foreign, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain power, either through constitutional electoral procedures or through their adrnission by President Sukarno toa share of power at the cabinet level. TO maintain this guasi-alliance, the PKI has brought itself to accept some presidentsl actions which must have beea distastefal: e.g. the decrees severely limiting ail political party activity and, more ree cently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's demand to satisfy hie requirement that all parties accept the constitutlesal | ’ principles of Pantjasila, which inchs affirmation of a belief in God. , President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the political leaders around him, has accepted the PKI's cooperation as a means of maintaining his own political position vis-a-vis other | potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point where it might endanger his government, To this end the President has accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force in the “country rather than challenging it to a showdown In either the political or the military arena, To blunt the competition of the Communist Party for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to approach closely enough to Communist programs to forestall Communtet exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support. The Indonesian foreign policy of neutraliem and anti-colonialism is In accord with Gommunist policy but it also appeals to strong public feeling which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and industrialization are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective. The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's calculations: off has been the unexpected flexibility of the PKI in adjusting Steelf to these | ON pe ~“. ae === [PDF page 26] === Approved For Release: Clasbanis.00915R001400190001-5 measures. The party has beon able to endorse Sukarno's objectives while retaining freedom to criticize deficiencies in their implementation. . The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance, permits the Communists to capitalize on the reaulting popular discontent while still eadorsing and in fact exploiting the publicized intentlons of the government. 7 To @ considerable degres the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal by borrowing Marxist programs has only served to give the Communist objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the PKI of these hey iscusa for exploitation. The Communists have also been able in soma cases to pressure the government into more extreme positions or to hastior actions than it might otherwise have taken. Intransigence on West Irian may well: alienate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence upon the Communist bloc from which escape would be very difficult,. Yet any recession on this isoue is made extremely difficult by the policies and programs of national mobilisation the government has felt compelled to adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces against the rival claims of the PKL The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises by the unauthorized action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled te step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it had uot planned and for which it waa not prepared, The economic dislocation caused by these events has made the governmont vulnerable to new PKI pressures, In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of cooperation and competition between the government and the FKI which each hae carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President, The PKI has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian affaire is stronger than ever, The government has found itself steadily drawa into positions on both the national and International level which are ever closer to the Comraunist program, more dependent upon Communist support, and increasingly estranged from non-Communist forces, The | key point in this process was perhaps reached with the adoption in 1960 _ of the NASAKOM (nationalist, religious, Communist) formula which established as a matter of principle the right of the PKI to @gual reprasent» ation at all levels of the country's political and economic structure. The ‘ most recent development in the process was the Peosident's speech at Approved For Release ARP 73 HASH === [PDF page 27] === Approved For ReleaQ@a@4NR DP78-00915R001400190001-5 the PKI 7th Congress in April 1962 in which he denounced “antl- _ Gommunist phobias" end gave the FRI his full endorsement as loyal, patriotic, nationalist revolutionaries. Other hopes, that this process might inspire a nationalist, TITOIST trend in the Communist party leadership, have also been disappointed, for the PRI ts one of the most open advocates of international Communist unity. #9001400190001-5 - Approved For Relea SAMA emas