Indonesia 1965: The Coup That Backfired (studi CIA, 1968)

Central Intelligence Agency. (1968). *Indonesia 1965: The coup that backfired* [Research study]. (Document No. C00186624; approved for release 2023). PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.5 US Intelligence and Government Reports/CIA (1968) - Indonesia 1965, The Coup That Backfired (Research Study).pdf PDF PAGES 1 to 100 of 357. Text from the PDF text layer where present, otherwise Tesseract OCR (ind+eng); OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624' 0033 _ CIA/RRS l’;?SS [Unreadable] \¢ENTR4( _ 574755 OF m (2 _';.',; [Unreadable] 1-o<)<)O_Gf3__4 Research Study INDONEYD1-1965 The Coup Tbat Backfired December I968 [Unreadable] ?15§_;'..“.'.‘ [Unreadable] 250'- A Approved for Relea Se: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 2] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are designed to meet the specific requiremenb of those ‘use:-s. U.S. Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to: l Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project Exchange and Gift Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540 Non~U.S. Government users not interested in the Project subscription service may purchase reproductions DOCEX of specific publications on an individual basis from: Photoduplication Servim Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540 Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 3] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 INDONESIA — 1965 The Coup That Backfired December 1968 Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 4] === BURMA 4aos THAILAND CAMBODIA. , vietNane PHILIPPINES aMedan: mT MALAYSIA coe [Unreadable] INDONESIA - i [Unreadable] : wots oy \ 7. AUSTRALIA. -DIAKART, Betas sconce | “Fle ab a3 Ayn tie MeO Len vd) <. Cres LA [Unreadable] : 5 gis £ BON! ot ‘ cf fa, melee Reine ‘el cS Road eeeyon he f a to sed ° 50 100 150 Mies 355 8) °o 50 100 150 Kilometers a [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 5] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Foreword What is C0mmOn1y referred to as the Indonesian coup is more properly called "The 30 September Movement,I1 the name the conspirators themselves gave their movement. In this paper, the term "Indonesian coup" is used interchangeably with "The 30 September Movement," mainly for the sake of variety. It is technically correct to refer to the events in Indonesia as a "coup" in the literal sense of the word, meaning "a sudden, forceful stroke in politics." To the extent that the word has been accepted in common usage to mean "the sudden and forcible overthrow of the government," however, it may be misleading. For it now seems clear that the Indonesian coup was not a move to overthrow Sukarno and/or the established government of Indonesia. Essentially, it was a purge of the Army leadership, which was intended to bring about certain changes in the composition-of the cabinet. In this sense, it is more correct to refer to the 30 September Movement as a purge, rather than a coup. A word should also be said about the organization of the paper. It is divided into four main sections. The first one treats the actual events of the coup ondl October; the second one traces the movements of the key figures in the coup up to the time of their capture or, in the case of Sukarno, up to March 1966, when he lost de facto control of the government to Gen. Suharto, who assumed full responsibility for restoring law and order; the third one discusses the planning for the coup that was done in the one month of September 1965; and the last one, perhaps the most important one, reviews the events leading up to the coup, including the decision to stage the coup. This organization was chosen for several reasons. First of all, there was the consideration of the evidence itself. For the most part,-the matters that are discussed in the first two sections are matters of established fact; in other words, they are part of the record against which we must examine the words and testimony of the various Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 6] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 ~individuals who were involved in the coup. Our knowledge of the conspiracy behind the events, which is the subject of the third section of the paper, comes entirely from the interrogation of the people involved in the conspiracy. Naturally, this kind of evidence must be considered in a slightly different light than the evidence that is presented in the first two sections. The reader is in a better position to make his own judgment, based on the evidence, if he has a clear understanding of the kind of evidence that is involved. The matters that are discussed in the fourth section are much more matters of judgment. The coup can only be understood, of course, against the background of Indonesian politics in 1965. Many of the events that form that background are open to varying interpretation, however. Again, the reader is in a better position to evaluate those events if he can view them from the vantage point of hindsight, as it were, with the events of the coup clearly drawn in his mind. The one difficulty with the arrangement of the paper, with the events of the coup at the beginning, is the possibility of its creating the false impression that the coup was a distinct occurrence, which can be treated apart from the rest of the Indonesian political scene., Of course, it can not. It should be viewed as the culmination of many events over the years. There has been a deliberate effort in telling the story of the coup to present the evidence in as straightforward a manner as possible, to let the facts speak for themselves. The purpose of this has been to allow the reader to make his own conclusions as he goes along. A final section at the end of the paper summarizes the conclusions of the author. All the events that are discussed in the paper, including the events of the coup itself and the major events leading up to the coup, are presented in chronological order in the Chronology of Events. Also included in the Appendix is a brief discussion of the validity of the Army interrogation reports as evidence. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 7] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The Coup that Backfired Contents Page Preface [Unreadable] Reflections of the Coup Throughout Indonesia.....60 PKI Recruitment of the Military Officers........107 Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 8] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Page The First Meeting; The Participants Meet..ll2.... The Second Meeting: Sjam Takes Charge..ll7....... The Third Meeting: The Question of Troops The Fourth Meeting; The Question of the Generals and the Choice of a Leader..l22........ The Fifth Meeting: The Question of Arms and an Important Newcomer to the Group....,..l30.... The Sixth Meeting; The Training of the Volunteers and a Promise from the Cavalry....l36 The Seventh Meeting: The Decision on D Day....l43 The Eighth Meeting: The Order to Go..l52......... Background to a Coup. September 1964 - The Month of September- A Flurry of Speeches....249 Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 9] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Bag II: Some Comments on the Interrogation Reports...311 [Unreadable] Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 10] === ~ ~ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624, Preface On 14 September 1965 Indonesian Army Intelligence, of which General Parman was the chief, presented a detailed report on the internal security situation to the Army Chief of Staff, General Yani. The report summarized all information known about the activities of the Indonesian Communist Party(PKI) as of that date. In particular, it mentioned a report of a plan to assassinate the army's top leadership, giving a list of the Army generals who were to be killed. In conclusion, it stated the Army Intelligence judgment that "something was going to happen." At first, General Parman had been reluctant to accept the judgment of his staff. He was more conservative on the question; in the end, however, he agreed to take the case to General Yani. Yani, in turn, presented the report to President Sukarno, laying particular stress on the "assassination list," which included the names of three generals——Suharto, Mursjid, and Sukend:o~-in addition to the seven generals who were later tu be the target of the Indonesian coup of 30 September. The report mentioned September 18 as the date‘of the planned attack, and, on that evening, the army took special security precautions; but nothing happened. After that, Yani apparently did not take the report seriously, and no special precautions were observed. Late in September the former military attache in Peking, Brig, Gen. Sudono, told Maj. Gen. M,T, Harjono, a subsequent victim of the coup, that he had learned that a number of Army generals would be abducted within a few days. Although General Harjono did not believe the information, he decided to call a staff meeting at Army headquarters on 30 September since General Sudono was so obviously in earnest. Apparently, PKI intelligence learned about this meeting but drew the wrong conclusions as to the subject under such high—level discussion. At the meeting, General Sudono reportedly became "the butt of laughter‘ I of everyone present. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 11] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 __ Yet, within a matter of hours of the staff meeting at Army headquarters, exactly what General Sudono said he had heard would happen "within a few days" happened that very night. That the Army was totally unprepared for an attack from its political enemies was the most obvious feature of the Indonesian coup. In one night alone, the army was to suffer the staggering loss of six of its most senior generals. Never before, in any of the great wars, have six generals been lost in a single night. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 12] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The Coup At approximately 0400 hours on the morning of l October 1965 the leaders of the 30 September Movement launched their surprise attack on the Army leadership in the form of simultaneous raids on the homes of seven generals. In a matter of hours, the military action involved in the coup was over; besides the raids, it involved only the securing of a few vital objectives——the Presidential Palace in Djakarta, the radio station of Radio Indonesia, the central telecommunications building, and an airbase just outside Djakarta. These purely military aspects of the coup are by now fairly clear. Thus, in beginning with a reconstruction~of the military operation of the coup itself, we can establish certain necessary facts about the coup before discussing what we do and do not know for sure about the planning of thq_coup. The Kidnapping of the Generals The staging ground for the attack was an abandoned rubber plantation that was within the confines of Lubang Buaja, a small village or hamlet on the outskirts of Halim Air Force Base, about seven miles from the Presidential Palace in Djakarta. Reached by another road than the main approach to the airbase, Lubang Buaja was a remote area that could easily be sealed off for purposes of security.* *In the tightly structured organization of local government in Indonesia, Lubang Buaja is properly referred to as a Kompung or "hamlet," which is smaller than a "village" or "town" or "city." It is the lowest level of local government in Indonesia. Usually, a Kompung is set apart by a fence that encloses the whole area of the Kompung. In the case of Lubang Buaja, the only road into the Kom— pung runs parallel to the road into Halim Air Force Base from the main Bogor-Djakarta Highway. A security guard on this road can guarantee the security of the whole area. (See map of "Djakarta and Vicinity.") ‘The literal meaning " of the name "Lubang Buaja" is "Crocodile's Hole," which suggests that the area was once a swamp land. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 13] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 - Early on the morning of 1 October, at about 0400 hours while it was still dark, some 10-15 trucks and buses left Lubang Buaja and began a 30-minute drive into Djakarta. The assortment of vehicles-—all of which belonged to the Air Force--carried 4 fully-armed companies of troops: one company from the special Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard that guarded President Sukarno, one company from the 454th battalion of Central Java, one company from the 530th battalion of East Java, and one company of the lst Infantry Brigade of the 5th Territorial Command. In view of the persistent belief that some civilians, namely Communist party members and sympathizers, participated in the kidnapping raids on the generals’ homes, it should be'emphasized that only regular military officers and men wearing army uniforms, were actually involved. The troops were under the command of Marine Lt. Dul Arief, a direct subordinate of Col. Untung, one of the three battalion Commanders of the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard L and the chosen leader for the coup. As it neared the residential area in which the top Army leaders lived, the caravan of trucks broke up into seven separate raiding parties destined for seven different targets, the homes of seven of the Army's senior generals.* A force of one fully-armed platoon was assigned‘ to handle each of the following five generals: General Suprapto, General Harjono, General Parman, General Pandjaitan, and General Sutojo. Special forces of one fullyarmed company each were assigned to the homes of Minister/ Coordinator of Defense Nasution and Army Minister/Commander Yani, respectively. Contrary to widespread belief, the *All of the generals except Gen. Pandjaitan lived in an elite residential section of Djakarta called Menteng. Before the caravan of trucks reached this section of town, one or two of the trucks must have turned off in the direction of Kebajoran, where Gen. Pandjaitan lived. As they approached the Menteng area, the others broke up into six separate raiding parties destined for the homes of the six other Army generals. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 14] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 coup leaders had not included General Suharto, a former commander of the Central Java Territorial Division (the Diponegoro Division) and the then chief of the army's strategic reserve force (KOSTRAD), with headquarters in Djakarta, in the list of generals to be eliminated as the top leadership of the army. The error of not seizing Suharto, known as a strong and capable officer but obviously underestimated and not foreseen to be the man who would quickly and effectively take command of the situation in the crisis hours of the coup was certainly a major error of the coup planners. It was an e:ror in the planning of the coup, not in its execution. Suharto did not escape from would—be kidnappers, as did Nasution. No effort was ever made to capture him. At the various target homes, the attacking parties followed the same general tactics. One-third of the force stood guard on the streets around the house,\onethird surrounded the house itself, and one-third entered the house to bring out the victim. A member of the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard told each general that he was wanted by Sukarno at the Palace immediately. It is clear from the reports of the kidnapping oi Harjono and Pandjaitan, that they. at least, suspected that they were being arrested on orders of the Palace. Harjono even went sol far as to cry out that he was about to be murdered. When he resisted further, he was, in fact, the first general shot that morning. A little later, General Pandjaitan was also shot and killed resisting capture. Generals Suprapto, Sutojo, and Parman, quickly oeerpowered, blindfolded, with their hands tied behind their backs, were forcibly pushed into the waiting trucks and rushed back to Lubang Buaja.* Meanwhile, the larger raiding parties were handling what was expected to be a more difficult assignment —-the capture of Generals Yani and Nasution--whose homes '*For a more detailed account of the actual capture the generals in their homes, see Indonesian tpheaval by John Hughes, Davis McKay Company, lnc., i967, pp{430—42. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 15] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 were normally more heavily guarded. At Yani's house, the attacking troops managed to engage the guards in conversation, telling them that they had an urgent message for Yani from the President. Seeing their Tjakrabirawa uniforms, the guards apparently suspected nothing until the invading group was near enough to overpower and disarm them. Yani himself does not seem to have doubted the story that Sukarno wanted to see him at once. He merely asked for time to bathe and dress. However, when he was told that there was not time for that, he apparently became angry and struck one of the men. Thereupon, they opened fire on him. Like the others, his body was carried out of the house, put aboard a truck, and taken back to Lubang Buaja. The attack on General Nasution‘s house was on the largest scale of all, altogether, about one hundred men were involved. That General Nasution--who was in the house at the time——could have escaped from such an ambush, with 60-70 soldiers surrounding his home and another 20- 30 searching the house, seems almost unbelievable. It was one of those twists of fate that all but re-shape history. The one and only failure in the execution of the coup, it was to prove nothing less than a major disaster for the coup leaders. * In part, it was due to mistaken identity. Awakened by the commotion outside, the Nasutions had quickly determined that someone was trying to kidnap General Nasution. They locked the door to their first—floor bedroom and, while the troops outside were still struggling with the door, Mrs. Nasution quickly led her husband through the next room, down a corridor and out a side entrance near the wall adjoining the residence of the Iraqi Ambassador. In Nasution's own words: I climbed the wall and from the top of the wall I first saw that my daughter Irma had been shot in the back. I was going to come back to face the soldiers that had done it, but my wife prevented me, imploring me to save myself. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 16] === ; BLES ap (ego SBsgh. = . at Etter tae:. oF Nee Eh es oa HR PERM rm oO G Jo sob ag ne 2 2 ee P SOREN Oo MRS DEE ed PT noe We x by a wit ER pee epee BRE ER Ste s+ BO i io RE Ses Cate. bie. Geek. oo va PEs a LEU SEM ETASILL. aiid a hee Pees (kee EE 2 TRE eo es a neers eas ‘ Ai RSS f 2.Sele Be Og gs lie A Ee nS te se a Eo ee a Bee SO TI Cia ad COR Ra BOR Se SBE RS Nese NCE Ee en PP OA ie eet i ag ap poe aks ey a Ga we be kiees BEE vy MES ae eB Be Fade Ba eet Ga aie ek. pee ae Res Sete Sen ain Gh Cag RATS EURO Be Die ert Bes DA yrs te Si Se eR RS eS Bc ONT Wo OD SR See eo US ea ee ek SS ea ae ay re ay Ae ae TL Hee 0: get i ee aD eee Seis es ards Sey CREPE BBs pelt POR iad emt a et ce Sau sera asd CEOS IN TAS & oe? oh, a SEAR et tl ESS IB 9 SEE | Pf RINE Bek icc ge steer eens Beto hea Soca Ft BEE, Dis boi on eRe ae en ine ace Nei TR ON nt Ree ses Seg gf Rey OYE AI oe Se RSW eee 1s Sas poche I BS trate aed \ Eb ite fet ON ena ee ROR GL PEN LEGA | \ BR eee rseh w oee oe ae re: en SRS, Rit hapa Re Retry an ee erate Aas Sea ap iet CREUSET GS Py Cooly eee eee ie pa tae OR aC Beagrie ge SPs gate oF Eg EOE Be a EES ree ete te eae parte CEES FDR One: ed; pee So oO Sa E EN Si raphe eg OAR ok SR ENNIS OO aad por de PES rT Lean mere Benepe og eR Ra, Ee ST BAS Eee ag ae oe as: Sa SI SFE eee Goede he os re aa ce re The road from Halim to Djakarta, the route travelled by the raiding parties on their mission to kidnap the generals [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 17] === “they shall not have died in vain.” : eer eer / gp! y Fae, hy. \A ee on =») Fae mS fe hey ~ ®& > 3S EN ‘en Be Cok 6 Sy ¥ 4 2 ANS ee reer Ear aegy 4 pec oe Px Pfs WA age ° ce ee Rs >.. bor Bs ty # fe i fa é tO EE [Unreadable] se y 7 BA FSD At P Bite: a SEN GEM ER 0S |? pa a EP, Ieee os: Genera] Yani. General Suprapto General Puirman ° exten ee, ee Fs a ea ae Ve pe ee AS : Pas e: Pe oy T Lee Me T¥3 Bae 8) ey PS ... SF ®TS i va er OS: SR eA f Ne Ay Le i: ¢S ees eae >. e:: ee ptetoe UN ore PD ihe iceman: ES? psn” are 7 Bia Re Be; ES b “i EA Eee ~ Pah Ns oD FF aor d-g * l Ye we: > 2 ee et eee. 2. fe ANE: CRISES EN Ch * EBA 7 SARE ee 3 f ie Fe ea SR ae ce a 3 FE OV Ee Pe ea TES ir Reese ae yt Qyeas; [Unreadable] MA) AR Sa Ee Peering Bee Mia of General Harjono General Sutojo General Pandjaitan [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 18] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 It later was determined that my house was closely surrounded. The person guarding the wall was only a few meters away, but I was protected from his view by a dense growth of vegetation near the wall. At the moment I jumped from the wall I was fired at by the Tjakrabirawa troops who were guarding the side of the house, but...n0ne of their bullets struck me. I heard the men who were shooting say something like, ’Someone escaped at this side. He wasn’t hit.‘ After jumping from the wall I hid behind a water barrel in the yard of the Iraqi ambassador's house.* While hiding there I thought to myself, ‘Why is the Tjakrabirawa staging this raid and trying to kill me? The Tjak— rabirawa is the palace honor guard of the President..aPerhaps the President has listened to slander and ordered the Tjakrabirawa troops *In jumping the wall between his house and that of the Iraqi ambassador next door, Nasution broke his ankle. To some degree, his broken ankle was probably responsible for his removal from the scene in the days immediately after the coup. Of course, the tragic death of his daughter as a result of the wounds she received during the raid on Nasution's home on the morning of l October was the main thing that preoccupied Nasution for weeks after the coup. The picture of Nasution hobbling around on crutches at the funeral of the slain generals on 5 October and the funeral of his own daughter several days later will probably never be forgotten by most Indonesians. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 19] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 to shoot me in my own house without a hearing!‘ I knew that I repeatedly had been slandered in untrue reports received by the President. I thought of trying to get to the house of Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, which was nearby (across the street from the house where I was hiding). I believed that he would not betray me if I asked for help in contacting the President and asking why ~ the Palace had ordered the Tjakrabirawa troops to shoot me in my own house. I gave up this idea after considering that I would have to go out on Teuku Umar Street to reach Pak Leimena's house. I knew that the -street certainly would be controlled by the Tjakrabirawa. I decided to remain hidden and wait for morning and the chance that help would come from my own troops. ...Prior to the l October 1965 incident I had not received at my house, in either an official or unofficial capacity, reports or information that an incident of this - type would occur...My escape was not due to any foreknowledge I had of the (coup) plans. It was due solely to the assistance and protection of Almighty God and the help of my wife that I escaped abduction and murder. Inside Nasution's house, confusion reigned. Clutching her bleeding child in her arms, Mrs. Nasution hurried to the telephone to call a doctor. A few moments later, she was not prevented from driving away from the house with her wounded daughter and a servant to the Army Hospital. Meanwhile, the soldiers continued to search the large house. By this time, Nasution's adjutant, Lt. Pierre Tendean, a man of the same general build and appearance as Nasution, though much younger, had had time to put on his chief's uniform-jacket and cap. He went out to the front pavilion to meet the attackers. The detail commander said: "General Nasution?" Tendean Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 20] === Beg eee “ rss gr A crease | a oS ay ao PIL 5g Pier Soe KAK PLN te 2 = eee ge Pet Aa ati : Poon ASN PSN AP pa KA aa, Rene Bm aR ol Bea Deana oh arty “ae Ana KE Ph 2 ata PN Oh NER ue poke SE ae < E18 | RAY Baas 5 AP KAA oD ge” fan Bos oes! BA Fa PN Na Sei ek LINA,: gt PERG AS ee EN ONES, past CESSES Se Ra Ee Dp ek BR fe Nee . SOL OTE RRR Ere ea Bp Tag dar DA Pe apa a “ oS Nah Tan =e oR gg SEs Ng ere Benes 5 NUR A Eee L SEs SENG so S NR antam AN ss At ae CSNY Se SS eee eS Bf ey ens . “ Ad uae IS General Nasution ' . papa 5 Ts rane Narr St Eat Bap Sr HE MEDAN NB na EN Haha Aan gs aa Na Pen AN RO oe Neta NA Ken EM ota Ren Nana OA Sa RE ba bana GTA Tar x AE ane ees Pe SI eS Ned Oat SIT ine KONE SOE SED a SE 5 Be TA PAN Ta Dah ang SET Sp ANK AN LEK = eee eae Ha Mt ir YA NN BE PLE ES ead falar Ia EE ee Na TP tan 3 PI RD i Pata reda PL AA AT IA AA PA Ta Te Pi ees TP: 2 2 CP KA DA DR aia Vero Bee” oo = BAP. Res al Sc Bete Ame ‘ Bey ol Tie 1 NS NT Pam Ai P Sa Ito, WA ta] 3: AR Be OTs Ea To ra se 3 2 Ra naa PA Aa wos at.... eT dhe, sty eee Ne ot phe es pp A eS Gay 2 see at a Be iK Dr AT An oe. Pa alan naa wa i,. Ka 1 an rd ERT NE S4 = Aim . Ie amp. 2 eg | = pa ~ CSF ok Ege PN 7 oe Sr: Te Eats ” 7 General Nasution and Mrs. Nasution with their daughter Irma (far left), who was fatally wounded during the raid on Nasution's home [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 21] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 replied with a curt "Yes. What is it?" He was immediately overpowered and bundled into a truck, and the convoy set off for Lubang Buaja. It was just 5:00 a.m. There is one final detail about the kidnapping raids that should be clarified because of the persistent confusion on the point. It concerns the supposed attack on Deputy Prime Minister Leimena's house. When the raiding party arrived at General Nasution's home, the troops first moved to disarm any armed guards (assigned to the homes of certain government officials) on the street. It so happened that Leimena's house, two doors down and across the street from Nasution's home, had a three-man guard in recognition of his status of Second Deputy Prime Minister. One of the guards came down the street and was shot by mistake. His was the only death other than those of the generals and Lt. Tendean to result from the coup action in Djakarta that day. No attempt was made to enter Leimena's house or to trouble him further. The only objective was to prevent the guards at his house from coming to the rescue of Nasution. No doubt, because of the death of the policeman guarding Leimena's house the incident received immediate and perhaps greater attention than some of the other raids on the generals’ homes. It was assumed that Leimena had been a major" target of the coup. In fact, the targets were the seven \-~ army generals; no one else. The killing of Leimena's guard was purely accidental. Suharto Takes Command of the Army Besides the heroism of Lt. Tendean in posing as General Nasution, thereby helping to save the life of his chief at the loss of his own, and the calm presence of mind of Mrs. Nasution in a crisis situation, it was the quick thinking of another member of the Nasution household that frustrated the coup plans for a fait accompli--the elimination of the top army leadership—— Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 22] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624. before the army could react to the first staggering blow. Namdan, an aide of Nasution, contacted the Djakarta garrison commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, on the special KOTI communication system, sometime around 0515 hours. General Umar went directly to Nasution's house arriving there about 0530 hours; shortly thereafter, five tanks he had ordered also arrived. As the vehicles of the raiding party had been seen to SE6 off in the direction of Bogor, General Umar ordered a pursuit by the tanks in that direction. The effort was not successful, however, as the tanks were unable to catch sight of any of the fleeing trucks or buses. Nasution, still in hiding next door in the yard of the Iraqi Ambassador's house, heard the commotion of the arrival of the men and tanks under General Umar, but uncertain as to who it was, he dared not come out of hiding. Not until about 0630 hours when he saw Col, Hidajat Wirasondjaja, the commander of the headquarters detachment of the Armed Forces Staff, near the wall did he venture to reveal himself to anyone. The colonel, one of Nasution's adjutants, and his brother—in-law accompanied Nasution, concealed on the floor of the car, to a safe place not far from KOSTRAD headquarters 0 General Suharto has given a detailed account of "WNW how he first learned about the raids that morning and what actions he took as the senior surviving general of the army (except for Nasution, whose whereabouts were still unknown). About 0530 hours, a neighbor of Suharto arrived at the General's home to inform him that shooting had been heard down the street. (Suharto was head of the neighborhood association that was concerned with law and order in the neighborhood; members were responsible for reporting anything unusual that they saw or heard to the head of the association.) Shortly thereafter, Suharto received a message from General Umar that a number of Army generals had been abducted by unknown parties. There was no information of the fate of the generals, and it was incorrectly reported that Deputy Prime Minister Leimena had also been taken. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 23] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Suharto did not hesitate. In his own words: I concluded that the leadership (of the Army) was paralyzed. I knew that without leadership things would become even more confused. I was the senior officer in the Army after the Commanderwof the Army (Yani) and was ordinarily designated to represent him when he went abroad...I decided without hesitation that I would take over the leadership of the Army until something was learned of the fate of its commander. As my driver had not yet arrived, I drove a jeep to KOSTRAD headquarters myself, arriving there between 0630 and 0700 hours....Soon General Umar arrived and was able to provide clearer information as to what had happened... He said that he had gone to several of the generals‘ homes and then to the Palace but was unable to meet with the President. He did see General Supardjo at the Palace, however, which surprised me, since I did not know he was in Djakarta.* ' I told General Umar that I was taking over the leadership of the Army; he agreed. I issued my first order to him, which was that all troops be placed on stand—by but that they not be allowed to go out except on my orders. This was done because we did not know who was friend and foe...and we wanted to avoid shooting until we knew. *As Commander of the 4th Combat Command of KOSTRAD in West Borneo, General Supardjo should have been at his post near Manggaian in West Borneo. Suharto would have known that he was in Djakarta if he had been there for proper reasons--either official or personal. His presence ' in the capital, unknown to Suharto, was thus immediately suspicious. _ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 24] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The Show of Force in Dgakarta Simultaneously with the raids on the homes of the generals, the coup forces had fanned out in the center of Djakarta, seizing control of the most important installations, above all the Palace and the radio station.* The troops used in this phase of the coup were those of the 454th Battalion and the 530th Battalion minus the one company from each that had been sent on the raiding missions. The two battalions mustered about 1,000 men each. As in the case of the army units assigned to kidnap the generals, these troops were dressed in regular army uniform and armed. There were no civilians, armed or unarmed, among them, as far as we know. - By 0600 hours component units of these two battalions were stationed at different points around Merdeka $quare, in front of the Presidential Palace, and around the radio station. General Umar had seen the troops on his drive to KOSTRAD headquarters to report to General Suharto. He was able to identify them as elements of the 454th and 530th battalions, which had arrived in Djakarta only two days previously to take part in the Armed Forces Day parade on 5 October. Since Suharto knew that these troops were to have taken part in a rehearsal for the parade that very morning and thus should not have been where they were, he could calculate that he *The location of the Palace, the radio station, the telecommunications building, and the railroad station around one large square, Merdeka Square, in the center of Dgakarta made it a relatively easy military operation to seize control of these vital objectives of any coup attempt. In this sense, Djakarta was the ideal city for a-coup, All of the coup forces, except those involved in the raids on the generals’ homes, were concentrated around Merdeka Square. (See the insert of Merdeka Square on the map of Djakarta and vicinity.) -19- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 25] === 4» *-\i.';;- I§_'_‘Apprbved for Release: 2023/01/23 000186624 7 ~ ¥.‘f”j VICINITY C. [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ?‘_Jff=§ Harjali's House‘ [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 51.: -:\ c [Unreadable] -‘- -~yGwr [Unreadable] Slltvinqi-Tfi [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ‘\-Genera‘lPandi\Jiu?1'sf1R;,._:”=‘} [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] T‘ kt‘ _ KEBAJORAN§. '-.v.~:Q-.'.L' 1.. ,@*’*-*'4MB§'§s7<-'9'“ [Unreadable] [Unreadable] -\‘°“°'~~""\'71 12 _~_~ 2 \- U P:-14:-§~=."."';;;’ D s-I [Unreadable] MERDEKA _" E:1=§'§F’Q:‘,0NQEfK;§E,Q§rQ,,z,m_,;2' PALACE 4‘*'|.us»I+4svau»,1A" <'l>§1=/ uzcnu ucnonu u-rg RA J5 I raL§frt(c- *1-41.. filo’ ARMY 13‘? .1;/37 rvr HUDQU ARTERS ' ".23-.'4 [Unreadable] xosnuo \,1 ' ha.yr’ [Unreadable] TJYCIIH [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ADIO STITION III MERDEKA lax [Unreadable] SQUAR E GANBIR [Unreadable] "f:S.hlA MINISTRY OF ‘r:»\s-;-er.‘-C DEFENSE - 1 ' [Unreadable] O IL g[OAN \u:RO€K A scurnl J \ J 78:. 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[Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] -u‘,--x/’37§.;1'- .1“.--‘i-13,7-' [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] _¢._4.-.-:11».-::'.~ [Unreadable] 252.); [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 11,- [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 26] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 was dealing with an enemy that had control of at least two main battalions of the Indonesian Army and at least part of the inter-service Tjakrabirawa unit that was Sukarno's special guard. What was unclear was Just who was giving the orders to these units. The Central Command in Djakarta Although Suharto did not know it, the Central C0mmand of the coup had established itself in the Aerial Survey Office building, next to the PENAS film studio, on the main road from Djakarta to Bogor. Situated near the juncture of the Djakarta-Bogor Highway and the road into Halim, the Aerial Survey office was only a few miles from Suharto's KOSTRAD headquarters. The five men who comprised the Command had been there most of the night, having moved there from Lubang Buaja where they had inspected the troops sometime around midnight.* Of these five men Suharto would have been personally acquainted with three of them--the three who were in the military. He would never have heard of the other two——the two civilians in the group. ‘ l. Lt. Col. Untung, aged 40, was a battalion commander of the special Tjakrabirawa Honor Guard that guarded President Sukarno. Newly appointed to the job, he had commanded the 454th Battalion of the Diponegoro Division (the Central Java Territorial Division) until a few mOntt> before the coup. Although limited in some respects and politically naive, he was well-thought of as a military officer and was considered to be on his way up in the Army. *One of the men who composed the Central Command, Air Force Major Sujono, had not arrived at the Aerial Survey Office until 0630 hours; the others had come several hours earlier, as soon as they had completed their review of the troops at Lubang Buaja. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 27] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 2. Air Force Najor Sujono, aged 45, was Regimental Commander, Air Base Defense Troops (PPP) in command of the troops that were assigned to guard Halim Air Force _Base, a major air base some seven miles distant from Djakarta. 3. Col. Latief was Commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the 5th Territorial Command, a post which involved control of a number of the mobile battalions in Djakarta. 4. Sjam, aged 42, was a man whose true identity -was known to only a very few people. The military officers involved in the coup knew him only as Sjam--one of his several aliases. They all accepted the fact that he spoke for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), without asking too many questions. Actually, they seem to have had some idea (whether they knew for sure or notL that he represented Aidit, the Chairman of the PKI personally.* Sjam's true identity and function in the PKI organization have now been clearly established. (It must be remembered that we now know more about the secret party organization of the PKI before the coup than we *. have ever known about most other Communist parties. Before the coup, only a few of the most trusted members of the PKI itself would have known of the secret organization Sjam headed, and even fewer would have known the identity of the man who ran the organization.) Sjam's real namewas Kamarusaman Bin Achmad Mubaidah, and he was *At his trial, Untung testified: "It is true that Sjam stated that he was a friend of Aidit; on one occasion, he said he was a messenger from Aidit, who had ordered him to attend the meetings in order to be in on the planning of the 30 September Movement. Whether this happened to be true or not, I did not know. My understanding was that he was simply from the PKI." Apparently, Sujono and Latief and the others had the same vague understanding of who Sjam really was. _12_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 28] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 the Chief of the Special Bureau of the PKI——the clandestine arm of the PKI. Established as a special apparatus for handling those matters that could not be accomplished through the overt PKI organization, the Special Bureau was primarily concerned with military matters, in particular PKI penetration of the Indonesian military organization. Among those in the military whom the Special Bureau "managed" were Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dani, Brig. General Supardjo, Col. Untung, Col. Latief, and Air Force Major Sujono.* (Apparently, Sjam personally "managed" Brig. Gen. Supardjo, while the others were "managed" by subordinates of his in the Special Bureau.) In its operations, the Bureau was apparently entirely free of the control of the politburo and maintained direct contact only with Aidit. - 5. Pono, whose real name was Marsudidjojo, was a subordinate of Sjam as the second-ranking m8mb€rLOf the PKI's Special Bureau. His job was to "manage" PKI contacts in the lst Infantry Brigade of the 5th Territorial Command (Latief's brigade), the PPP units guarding Air Force installations (Maj. Sujono's regiment), the Tjak— rabirawa Palace Guard, and the Djakarta Military Police. *These men were not necessarily Communist (in the sense of being Communist party members) because they had regular contacts with important PKI persons connected with the Special Bureau. They all deny being Communists and that may well be true, although it is also possible that one or two——like Dani or Supardjo or Untung--were "sleepers." There are some reports that Untung and Dani were secret party members. but there is no convincing evidence that this was true. Certainly, they were pro—Communist, and, being sympathetic to the party and its aims, they were able to be used by the PKI for,its own purposes. The PKI "managed" them in the sense of directing their thinking and their actions along certain lines. In carrying out the coup under PKI direction, they were in fact agents of the PKI, whether they chose to look at it that way or not. _13_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 29] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Pono personally "managed" both Latiei and Sujono.* In addition to the five men of the Central Command whom we know were at the Aerial Survey Office Building from the early morning hours, General Supardjo arrived there about 0400 hours while it was still dark; he, too, had visited Lubang Buaja earlier in the night. As commander of the 4th Combat Command of KOSYRAD in West Borneo, General Supardjo should have been at his post near Manggaion in West Borneo. He had no official reason to be in Dgakarta, and he had not reported his presence there to Army Commander Yani or KOSTRAD Commander Suharto. As we shall see later, only a few persons--including President Sukarno and Chief of the Air Force Dani--knew that he had arrived in Djakarta on 28 September, ostensibly to visit his sick daughter. In connection with events on the morning of l October, he had been given the assignment of contacting the President, with the purpose of informing him of the action that had been carried out against the generals and/or taking him to Halim Air Force Base, where a safe place had been prepared *The third-ranking member of the Special Bureau—-Walujo (whose real name is Subono) had the assignment of "managing" PKI contacts in the Air Force (excluding the Air Force PPP troops that guarded Air Force installations} and the Palace Guard. Thus, he was the PKI contact man for Omar Dani, Untung, General Pranoto, and others. He was not a member of the five—man Central Command of the coup, however; in fact, he is not known to have played any role in the coup or in the planning for it; his only known involvement was his presence at the 29 September meeting of the Central Command that was concerned with last-minute preparations for the coup. Since Walujo had been Untung's contact man from the Special Bureau, Untung had not met either Sjam or Pono before September 1965, when the planning for the coup got underway. He seems to have appreciated the fact that these men were all close associates of Aidit, however. At his trial, he stated that Pono was "also a buddy of Aidit, just as Sjam was." _14_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 30] === GO OT Re EES . ee OE ees a Fie ae Gs ry eae Peet 5 “— oA on -§ PSs ne 1 noe 4 ay Bes ee SE oo RES S yer ae ee Coe, gh: = Fae 8 = ‘¥ ” ate 3 ae ns ce ete: ee TR Oe: , ee ie: Bee 2 ESS Fn, “PaaS: Be aS - pai g Set aie a . RZ ee oe eee oe ee ae ma aor 4 aa Pe pee Ee tp a ‘} ie ie a RE weds. ane Be En Mises BSE Be ce, 4 eS oes Res e pe t RES eg sate ae: emits ' See DP Ce ee ied at Std Pree, ee ee a nies ois ae. BEET GI os “SE - é o> “3 ta og = PAS sag FJ AES: as age. PRES wh voce TS he a BTR qlee? - oS hee + TP EPSP ed Pa GF ies SPE PY eA SSF ake # ee i ee Ese bpp so 60 oes eS tees oe oa: Feed “oe a 8s 2 SRE SK Re Supardjo [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 31] === The Central Command os ee | oo, BES gaies vA peg Bae Jer SieRa GE Fa Sjam [Unreadable] Os es aoe [Unreadable] a Pee PTY SS Pees, We Pr — a ze ne ap Pe ee betes cee te pon sR oe eee Pg gE es peop rte es OF kei eA Eee eae FO Mei DNB Ha LOE . BRS ee Te SN power es - eee ols °F POOR Fg Untung Sujono Not pictured: Pono and Latief. [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 32] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 for him. There is reason to think that Supardjo actually intended to accompany Sukarno to Halim, although the coup leaders have preferred to explain Supardjo's mission as simply that of informing the President of the coup action that morning. Originally, Police Commissioner Anwas and Air Force Col. Heru were to accompany Supardjo in the party to inform Sukarno, and they were to await word from Lubang Buaja that all the generals had been taken captive. However, Anwas did not arrive at the Aerial Survey Office and, for some reason, Supardjo left before the Central Command had received a report from Lubang Buaja.* The commanders of the 454th and 530th battalions--Major Sukirno of the 454th and Major Bambang Supeno of the 530th-- had just arrived at the Aerial Survey Office to report on the successful securing of the Palace and the radio station, and it was decided that they would go with General Supardjo and Col. Heru to see Sukarno. The delegation arrived at the Palace around 0630 hours. It is important to an understanding of Sukarno's actions that day, as well as to an understanding of the source of the conflicting reports that all of the generals had or had not been captured, that one keep in mind that Supardjo left on his mission to the Palace under the impression that the kidnapping raids had indeed been a success. He was not to learn otherwise until some hours later, when he finally arrived back at Halim Air Force Base and after he had seen Sukarno. *In commenting on the change of plans, Supardjo has said simply: "It was decided to bring the President after the report that General Parman had been secured was received"——without explaining why it was decided not to wait for word about the other generals. Obviously, the coup group was confident of success. And it may be that time was pressing, and they were anxious to have Sukarno safely in their custody. _15_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 33] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Sukarno Hears the News The exact whereabouts of President Sukarno and his actions on the day of the coup have been fairly well established by a variety of sources. On the evening of 30 September, Sukarno had addressed the National Conference of Technicians at the Senajan Sports Stadium in Djakarta. Apparently, he returned to the palace sometime around 2300 hours.‘ Shortly after that, he suddenly left again to spend the night at his wife Dewi's home, accompanied only by his personal bodyguard. According to Dewi, Sukarno was furious upon arriving at her house to find that she had not yet returned home from a party at the Hotel Indonesia. He sent a message for her to return home immediately. Sukarno spent the night at Dewi's house, arising early in the morning as was his custom. It seems quite clear that he fully expected to be back at the Palace before anyone might want to see him that morning. At 0600 hours, he was enroute to the Palace when he received a report on the car radio (on the Tjakrabirawa radio communication system) that shooting had occurred at the homes of General Nasution, Dr. Leimena, and General Pandjaitan. Apparently, only the one personal bodyguard who had accompanied Sukarno to Dewi's house the night before knew where he was. Neither Col. Saelan, deputy commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard, nor Capt. Suwarno, company commander of Battalion I of the Tjakrabirawa, who were on duty at the Palace that morning had been able to locate him earlier, around 0530 hours, when they first received a report from Chief of Police Sumirat about the kidnappings. It might seem that Sukarno had deliberately put himself out of touch with the rest of the government machinery in order to protect his options as events developed--assuming that he knew beforehand of the coup plans. At other times of crisis in the past, it had been characteristic of him to disappear from the scene and remain incommunicado at some unknown hiding place until the situation cleared." In this case, however, he definitely seems to have been on his way to the Palace and would have been there in time to receive Supardjo if _15_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 34] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 everything had gone according to plan. Certainly, Supardjo and the other coup leaders expected to find him there. Col. Saelan and Capt- Suwarno had first looked for Sukarno at the home of Harjati, another of his wives. Not finding him there, they had finally succeeded in contacting the President on the car radio. Having learned from Chief of Police Sumirat that the Palace was surrounded by unidentified troops, Saelan ordered the presidential party not to enter the Palace but to proceed to Harjati's home in Grogol. By the time Sukarno arrived there, Saelan had received a later report that General Nasution had escaped his abductors, that the general's aide had been abducted, and that his daughter had been wounded. Saelan reported the news to the President as soon as he came inside Harjati's house. That Sukarno first learned the true story oi the raid on Nasution's home--before Supardjo (who was hen at the Palace) heard the news and before Untung and the rest of the Central Command at the Aerial Survey learned the true facts and, apparently, even before those at Lubang Buaja recognized the mistaken identity of Lt. Tendean, certainly before those at Halim Air Force Base were informed—-is a crucial fact about the coup that4has never been mentioned in any account of the coup. It gave Sukarno an advantage of time that the leaders of the coup did not have in considering their course of action in the light of the unexpected escape of Nasution. After Sukarno received Saelan's report, he is reported to have said that it came as an "absolute surprise" to him. It is unclear whether he meant the news of the action taken against the generals or the news of Nasution's escape. He then asked Saelan: "What will you do with On the grounds that Dewi's house, Harjati‘s house and the Palace were not safe, Sukarno made the decision himself to go to Halim Air Force Base, where he would be near an airfield in case of an emergency. Preceded by an escort, the President and his entourage were driven to Halim, arriving there about 0930 hours. He was welcomed at the air base's Operations Command Center by the Minis1e1/ -17_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 35] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Commander of the Air Force, Omar Dani, who seemed to be expecting him. There is an unaccounted—for period of almost three "hours from the time that Sukarno arrived at Harjati's house to the time that he must have left for Halim to arrive there at approximately 0930 hours. Apparently, he was at Harjati's house the whole time. He may have been awaiting word on the fate of Nasution. Sometime after 0630 hours, Lt Col. Ebram, the head of the Tjak— rabirawa intelligence section, and several of his men arrived at Nasution's house on the orders of the Presi- _dent, they said, to ask about the whereabouts and safety of General Nasution. No doubt. Sukarno did order such an independent check on the report that Nasution had escaped. Col. Ebram was the head escort of the Presidential party on the trip to Halim, so he was clearly acting on behalf of Sukarno that morning. He was unable to establish the truth regarding Nasution's whereabouts. The Murder of the Generals As already suggested, the Central Command at the‘ Aerial Survey Office had not heard the news of Nasution's escape. As a matter of fact, they did not learn about the unexpected turn of events until they had disbanded the Command Center at the Aerial Survey office and moved back to Halim Air Force Base. Around 0800 hours, Lt. Dul Arief, who had been in command of the troops on the raids to the generals‘ homes arrived at the Aerial Survey Office to report to Untung and Latief in person on the success of his mission. He had just come from Lubang Buaja where he had discharged his final duty in turning over the generals to Air Force Major Gatot Sukrisno, who had been designated to receive them there. As of that moment, it is clear that Arief did not realize the error of the mistaken identity of Lt. Tendean. He reported that four generals (supposing one to be General Nasution) had been captured alive and three had been killed in the process of capturing them. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 36] === : os x Nao VE. Pres ~ ¥y - bodes nia - ae Pe she we. le C Fe pe Be gle She arth PR} tS: oa a Oe Se} eae See Ee er ln: ene BERRY - 5: pe CAE ‘“. Pee ee a ". ee. Fh, en ee Pap LE CBM S [Unreadable] Pee nee gt at Rae RAITT ag Seah gist~ Te A’ i ecire «6 ES I [Unreadable] 1, BoEeN” PS: i: Be : be ria ° a7 ES A TB . AS ee genes 5s e i ae Raa rT OP 1 oor se \. 4 Fel me, = iy 4 t a ml on. “Eh an aero * 01) RRS A Seat RES cea So s Cea pm Ae LA A Sg cre See 2! Eh tog ee Set, a Ss i pre eee a 4 DR AEE aoe 4 Fe Senet mete ROA TE EN BR ae en ea Poh Ee Ae nig oF Hine Pyles 2 S MO os ae: ae — Me ae PES ~ SOs fot Fe Re ED ed Be Rae i EE EY On oe gle ad ae See ar aaa ieee ae es Em SR FS =; a Sar > aes RTE Eee od Bk a, Og A LS eS Bh Pe oy AES oe eS eae a on & pie SES Siig Le AO TS wo De i eS ote pe. ee SoA 0! Nott A SEES gp ee BY ae Pos ate res aA A Bee ea . < ee Ree hts eats s KS us 4: Li 4 Sorts Rass Ea xd aC S fd Waals Nt Nica ore GANS The well at Lubang Buaja in which the bodies of the generals were found & Puaj B [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 37] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 As to the fate of the generals at Lubang Buaja, they were taken inside a tent as each arrived on separate trucks at slightly different times. A reliable witness to the scene has described events as follows: When I entered the tent I saw 7 men treated as prisoners (he must not have realized that three were already dead) who were in a sad condition. Some lay on their backs, soiled and bloody, and two sat down, their hands bound and eyes covered with a red cloth. I heard a member of the Tjakrabirawa say: 'Yani has already been killed.‘ An officer of the Tgakrabirawa with the name Dul Arief on his uniform was The tent was near a small house with an old well close to the kitchen of the house. At\_ about half past six in the morning I saw some civilians crowd around the old well screaming 'Crush the unbelievers.‘ I saw then how the persons who had been lying on their backs were carried out of the tent and thrown into the well. This was followed by a burst of fire from an automatic weapon aimed into the J well by a member of the Air Force who had two white stripes on his shoulders. Then a handcuffed prisoner was taken to the well. His eyes were covered before he was thrown headfirst into the well, followed by a burst of rifle fire. I was afraid. Then a soldier of the Tjakrabirawa came over to me and said ‘You need not be afraid. This killing takes place on the orders of the President because these people are members of the Council of Generals and wanted to kill the President on Armed Forces Day. We are killing them therefore before they can kill the President. You know that it is the task of the Tjakrabirawa to protect the President.‘ -19- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 38] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 I saw how the last prisoner was dragged to the edge of the well, but I could not see his face clearly, as it was scratched and soiled with blood. He was thrown into the well like the others. The civilians piled litter and leaves in the well, and I saw how a helicopter hovered above us, apparently to watch the people working around the well. I could not see who was in the helicopter. The initial Army accounts of the killing of the generals placed great emphasis on the alleged torture and mutilation of the generals by the civilians mentioned above, who were Communist yOuth and women in military training at Lubang Buaja. This theme found lurid elaboration in many instances. Without doubt, these stories suffered from severe inflation. All of the victims except possibly Lt. Tendean were shot without any hint of torture or mutilation. Lt. Tendean may have received several blows from rifle butts before he was shot. There was none of the ghastly mutilation of the bodies that was recounted in the press, however. For the death of the generals and the actual circumstances of the deaths, the military officers at Lubang Buaja--and they alone—- must bear the responsibility, it would seem. There is J no convincing evidence that the PKI civilians who were at Lubang Buaja for military training (and who were armed by the Air Force later that morning to serve as "reserve troops" for the coup) played any significant role in the murders--except as witnesses to the scene.* *The "confessions" of the members of the PKI youth and women's organizations that were implicated in the as» sassinations leave the impression that they were little aware of what was happening and that they might have been used unwittingly. Their accounts of the murder scene differ markedly, so that it is difficult to put much faith_in any of their stories. No doubt many of the "confessions" were contrived by the army. In other cases, some of the people interrogated may have been in shock at seeing the murders and, later, they were unable to ' recall precisely what they had witnessed. -29- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 39] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The Coup is Proclaimed At precisely the moment that the generals were meeting death at Lubang Buaja, an impatient Captain Suradi was waving a pistol at the announcer of Radio Indonesia who was reading the morning news broadcast. With some 20 of his men standing guard outside the building, the captain, who was acting as commander of the troops dispatched to secure the Palace, the radio station, and the telecommunications building, had forced his way into the broadcasting room and threatened the station manager and the announcer if they refused to read a statement over the radio that he wanted broadcast. They agreed to read it at the end of the first news report of the day. And so at 0710 hours the official announcement of the coup was broadcast to the nation. In announcing the fact that a movement "directed against the generals who are members of the Council of Generals" had taken place that morning, the statement repeatedly stressed that the action was purely and simply an internal Army affair. Untung, as commander of the movement, assumed full responsibility for what he called "preventive action against a plot by the Generals‘ Council, a CIA-sponsored subversive movement...which planned to stage a coup on 5 October." The generals involved were said to have been arrested, and President Sukarno and "a number of other public figures who would have been targets of the Council of Generals" were said to be "safely under the protection of the 30 September Movement."* *It is to be remembered that at 0710 hours, when this announcement was made that Sukarno was under "the safe protection of the 30 September Movement," the President was still at Harjati's house, and the coup group had not yet made contact with him. Under these circumstances, it was a remarkably confident assertion to make unless the coup leaders had some prearranged understanding with Sukarno that he would be taken to some agreed upon place at a certain time that morning. _21_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 40] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The announcement was notable for the absence of the usual perfunctory praise of Sukarno; his name was scarcely mentioned except for the fact that he had been taken to a safe place. It was almost inconceivable that anyone staging a coup in Indonesia in 1965 would not have tried to make use of Sukarno's authority to swing public support behind their movement. Regardless of the facts, one would have expected the coup leaders to make a public statement claiming that they were acting on orders from Sukarno, to protect Sukarno from his enemies, to safeguard the Indonesian revolution. The fact that Sukarno was mentioned only as being "under the protection of the 30 September Movement" created a vague impression that the coup might be anti-Sukarno. The only other credible explanation, if this was not the case,.was that the conspirators felt that it would look better if Sukarno were not directly associated with the removal of the Generals but were to emerge later to give his blessing to the qoup In this case, one could hypothesize that Sukarno must have held out the promise of making a subsequent broadcast announcing his endorsement of the coup; either that, or the coup group must have felt absolutely confident that Sukarno would endorse their movement after the fact, even if he had not given his approval beforehand. The Central Command Moves to Halim The radio announcement was made at a time when the leaders of the 30 September Movement thought their movement had succeeded. Shortly afterwards, around 0900 hours the Central Command moved from the Aerial Survey Office in Djakarta to Halim Air Force Base. This was not a retreat; it was a move planned in advance as the coup moved into the political stage after the initial military action Sukarno, Commander of the Air Force Dani and a yet unmentioned but important figure in the coup--D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI-—were already there or on the way. . The principals were not together in one location at Halim; they were at three different places, all within a distance of less than one mile of each other..Couriers -22- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 41] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 were sent back and forth with important C0mmuniCatiOns; for instance, General Supardjo served as the main liaison between the President and the Central Command of Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono. As far as we know, Sukarno never had any direct contact with any of these five men in connection with the coup, either before the coup, the day of the coup, or after the coup. He was in the COmpany of Dani and Supardjo, mainly, while he was at Halim. Similarly, Aidit remained apart from the men actually directing the coup. He communicated with the Central Command only by courier and apparently with Sukarno and Dani not at all. Still, he was near enough to be in close touch with events as they developed, should his lieutenants Sjam and Pono need his advice Major Sujono had personally brought Aidit to Halim, picking him up at his home around 0200 hours that morning. He had made the arrangements himself for the use of the home of one of the enlisted men on the base; Aidit and his two bodyguards spent the day there. Dani appears to have spent the night at Halim's Command Operations office, which included sleeping accommodations for the senior Air Force Command Staff. It probably would not have seemed extraordinary for Dani to sleep there. He, too, stayed in the one place the whole day of thg coup. Sukarno came directly there when he arrived at the base. The Central Command of the coup was installed in the home of Air Force Sergeant Sujatno, an aide of HQJOY Sujono. Sergeant Sujatno had spent the whole day of the 30th as well as that night at the Aerial Survey Office, on a "stand by" order from Major Sujono. "0n the morning of the lst Sujono reportedly asked him if he could use his house at Halim Air Force Base for a while as his office. Sujatno drove ahead to get things ready for Sujono. Soon, Latief, Untung, Sjam, Pono and Sujono arrived. Sujatno's description of the five men while they were at his house seems worth quoting, as it gives the flavor of the day at the Central Command. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 42] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 I was ordered by Sujono to get something to eat for these gentlemen. So we sat down and had some rice and some meat side dishes. When I went to get the rice in my room, I noticed that someone was sleeping in my bed....It was Col. Latief. We sat eating for about an hour, and then Sugono called me and handed me an envelope, saying that I should take it to Capt. Suradi, who was supposed to be at Radio Republic... (When I got back) I was ordered to cook up some more rice. So 1 did. I noticed at this time that Untung had been seated in the back of the room, and neither changed his place nor said anything. There were two civilians there and I asked Sugono about them, and he answered that I didn't need to know. \I Then, after I had cooked enough rice for them, l was ordered by Sujono to take a sealed envelope to Air Sergeant Suwadi's place, which was located within the complex. When I got there, someone met me at the door; I learned later from Sujono that the man was 4 Aidit. I had to wait three or four minutes there, and then I was given a small envelope containing a reply and was ordered to deliver it. Aidit gave me the envelope; he was wearing glasses. General Supardjo had arrived back at Halim only a little while after Untung and Latief and the others. He came from the Palace by helicopter. (Omar Dani had sent the helicopter from Halim to pick up Supardjo after word had been received that the President was not at the Palace.) Dani is reported to have welcomed Supardjo with the exclamation “Success!” Then he explained that Sukarno would soon arrive at the air base. Since it would still be a little while before he could report to the President, SupardJo asked Dani for permission to meet with the leaders of the eoup at Sgt Sujatno's house _24_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 43] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 in order to obtain the latest information on the development of the coup from the Central Command. Sgt. Sujatno has confirmed that Supardjo came to his home soon after the other coup leaders arrived and that he joined them at the first meal served that morning. There is no information as to what was discussed, but presumably the formation of the Revolutionary Council was one of the topics. General Supardjo signed the Decree establishing the Revolutionary Council while he was at Sgt. Sujatno's house with the Central Command at this time. The New Order is Announced The Decree was one of three important orders issued by the Central Command that morning: Decree No. l, which was signed by Untung, Supardjo, and Air Force Colonel Heru, concerned the formation of the Revoldtion— ary Council; Decision No. l, which was signed by Untung only, listed the members of the new council; and Decision No. 2, which was also signed only by Untung, concerned ranks and promotions in the military. Untung has said that it was approximately 1000 hours when he signed the Decree and about 1100 hours when he signed Decisions No. l and 2. This would check perfectly with the time, as best we can calculate it, that Supardjo was at the Central Command. We know that he arrived there after Untung and the others did, around 0930 hours; he and Untung could well have signed the Decree at just about 1000 hours, as Untung claims. At ll00, when Untung is supposed to have signed the Decisions, Supardjo had left the Central Command and was with the President.* *There seems to have been a two-hour delay in the case of both the Decree and the Decisions between the time that the orders were signed and the time they were first broadcast on the radio. The apparent disagreement between various sources on the matter of the timing of the broadcasts would seem to result from the fact that the (footnote continued on page 26) -25- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 44] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The point to be emphasized in connection with the timing of these orders is that they were signed before Untung and the rest of the Central Command learned of Nasution's escape though they were broadcast after they.had finally received an accurate report. Untung seems to have made no attempt to stop the broadcasts after he realized that Nasution had actually escaped, but perhaps there would not have been time to do it, or he may have 1-ot;ht that it was already too late to stop them. The importance of settling the matter of the time that these orders were signed and then broadcast lies in the fact that it argues against the thesis that the Decree establishing the Revolutionary Council was an ad hoc decision of the Central Command, a last desperate effort of a failing movement. It has been argued that the coup leaders were obviously improvising at this point in the unforeseen situation of having missed one of the prime targets of the coup and having failed to get the public §npport of Sukarno for their undertaking. In support of this > hypothesis, it is argued that the rather peculiar assortment of names on the Revolutionary Council could only reflect an extemporaneous selection; furthermore, there is the established fact that many, if not most, of the persons on the Revolutionary Council had not been consulted ahead of time. The argument simply does not stand up in the face of what is known to have been the time sequence of the orders. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that the Revolutionary Council was always part of PKI planning for the coup, even if some of the major participants Yfootnote continued from page 25) orders were re-broadcast at regular intervals after they were first announced. Thus, Decree No. 1 was first broadcast at 1200 and again at 1300 and 1400 and 1430 hours. Untung heard the 1200 broadcast but Sukarno didn't hear the news broadcast about the Revolutionary Council until 1430 hours. The so-called Decisions were first announced at the 1300 hours broadcast. _26_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 45] === we ee. ee LAN Peran ry “ere DJAKARTA ON OF KEY PERSONS": THE 1 OCT 1965 Cou > AN Setara 1. dom Co # — Ssaxtp ton. Vero, Span, Sa Sasa #LOCATI DURING HARJATT8 HOUSE Suharan 00 bis wey te potece. 1 Oct 45, 0800 kere Oy oa 1 Oct 45, 6708 hers thy red HG) tome C10 “$8190 fF Temnragg Ma Pry for May toney OOZO "FH DO | “en nee semena A1 Mena $160 GE 20 f seven 0) elpredns wen, Gon. Superdje aces ox 1 Oct 65, 0930 hewn, 1015. FITS Maura, 1145 hours thy bed ol ‘wols ‘malas “jane Benun Saharan 00 Helm, 1 Oct 61, P30 Rowse ste vee Fa oproved for Release. 2023/01/23 C00186624 pS" firey DOTE “S90 | MURS ‘Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 CO0186624 “Herpneg 920 Leas posoy m1 ole ns pw tukar 0 Gage, 9 MO doa Mantan sn tar fey tory J » BUAJA Koba 00 penratarta | One A1 0) MD hemes thy stems Untung, Latief, Sujana, Sjam, Pena, Suparlya severe Ia Usapa ot Lubang Guaja, MO Sapixt Oct 45, 2120-6110 hours [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 46] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 of the coup (such as Sukarno perhaps) were unaware of its full implications.* From the beginning, the coup leaders were prepared to announce the formation of the Revolutionary Council as an element of the coup; they did so, very much according to plan, at a time when they still thought everything else had gone pretty much according to plan. Sjam is reported to have brought the original copy of Decree No. l out of his briefcase at Sgt. Sujatno's house. According to Untung, "we took turns reading it, first myself, then Supardjo, and then Lt. Col. Heru. Then we signed it.. I was (already) acquainted with the contents and purport of the decree." The purpose of the Decree was to eliminate the Generals‘ Council from the Dwikora Cabinet. We didn't mean to eliminate Sukarno from the cabinet. We intended that Sukarno would ap- L point a new cabinet, but the Decree said that the Revolutionary Council would appoint The precise formulation contained in the Decree was as follows: ,With the collapse of state power into the hands of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, the Dwikora Cabinet is considered to be decommissioned. Until a new cabinet is formed by the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, the former Ministers are authorized to conduct routine business, to maintain peace and security within their respective departments, but are prohibited from appointing new officials or taking any actions of consequence. *The evidence as far as Sukarno's knowledge of the Revolutionary Council is concerned is contradictory. For a fuller discussion of this point, see p. 91. _27_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 47] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 For the time being, the Indonesian Revolutionary Council will be the locus of all authority of the Republic of Indonesia... ,_As agencies of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, provincial revolutionary councils will be formed, as well as regency revolutionary councils, district revolutionary councils, and village revolutionary councils, with the councils consisting of both civilian and military personnel who support the 30 September Movement unreservedly. At the least, the statement is ambiguous. There is absolutely no mention of Sukarno in any context--a most curious omission. The office of the Presidency is not even mentioned. It is left entirely to one's own interpretation whether there would be any change in the office, either in the person holding the office or the power of the office itself. With the announcement of Decision No. 1 of the 30 September Movement, it was clear that Sukarno was not a member of the Revolutionary Council, whether it was presumed that he would continue as President or not. Untung was to serve as Chairman of the Council, and General Supardjo, Air Force Col. Heru, Navy Col. Sunardi, and Police Commissioner Anwas were to be the vice—chairmen. Omar Dani, Air Force Major Sujono, and Col. Latief were among the other 40 members. Thus, with the exception of Sukarno and Aidit and Aidit's two high-level agents, Sjam and Pono, all of the major participants of the coup who were at Halim were included as members of the Council. The coup group may well have intended that Sukarno's authority remain as before in the new government but may have had special reasons for not wanting to mention his name in connection with the coup. AS we will see later, this was probably the explanation for the curious omission of any reference to Sukarno in the Decree. It may not have occurred to them that their declaration might be construed as being aimed at the President rather than simply at the cabinet. Under the circumstances, however, _28_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 48] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 of its being absolutely routine to praise Sukarno at length at every occasion, the failure to make any reference whatsoever to the President was quite likely to be interpreted as an indication of anti—Sukarno motives. The Decree seemed to convey the impression that the President had been put aside. It is possible, of course, that the coup leaders did not intend that Sukarno continue as President, with undiminished powers. If so, the PKI must have been planning a double-cross of the President and some of the military leaders involved in the coup who clearly believed that they were acting in support of Sukarno. (This point is examined later, in connection with the testimony of various individuals who were involved in the planning of the coup.) From the point of view of the PKI, the Revolutionary Council would have been the perfect Nasakom Cabinet that the party had long been pressuring Sukarno to form.* On the face of it,_its membership was representatiwe of the major power groups in Indonesia. Almost half of the 45 members were government officials, a few of them highlevel, like Foreign Minister Subandrio and Deputy Prime Minister Leimena. Among the leading political figures were the top party leaders, either the chairman or the secretary-general, of the seven major non-Communist pplitical parties. There was no Communist party leader of equivalent status; of the five known Communists on the Council, three were lesser known members of the PKI Central Committee. In the case of the military, which composed the other half of the Council, there had obviously been the same deliberate effort to have all four of [~- donesia's armed services--the army, navy, air force, and *As the most immediate goal in its long—range plan to seize power peacefully, the PKI was demanding equal representation with the Nationalist and Religious parties in Indonesia in a so-called "Nasakom" cabinet. The word "Nasakom" was a word coined from the first letters of the_ Indonesian words NASionalis (nationalist), _Agama (religious), and KOMunis (Communist). Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 49] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 police--represented. Among the Army officers included were 6 Generals of the Army, one of them being Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah, the Commander of the Djakarta area who had been first on the scene at Nasution's home, after the raid on his house. Gen. Umar was one of the many Council members who have categorically denied knowing anything about the Revolutionary Council before they heard their names read off on the radio as members of the Council. A high-level PKI official has said that even the PKI members on the Council were not informed ahead of time nor was their approval requested. Actually, the Revolutionary Council was the perfect Communist front organization. With only one—ninth of its membership known to be Communist, it included as many well-known anti-Communists as Communists and pro- Communists together. From what was generally known at the time about its various members, therefore, Communést control of the group was not readily apparent. However, there was a group of middle-level military officers who were almost inconspicuous among the list of well-known figures; this group held the balance of power on the Council. Practically nothing was known about these men, especially their politics. Few people outside the Indonesian military had ever heard of Untung or Heru or, Sundardi or Sujono or Latief. It might be assumed that they were anti-Communist like the majority of the Indonesian military. Who would have suspected that they were so totally under PKI influence, even if not Communist party members, that they were prepared to do the party's bidding, even to the point of conspiring to murder the top Army leadership? President Sukarno at Halim Soon after signing the Decree establishing the Revolutionary Council, General Supardjo left the Central Command at Sgt._Sujatno's house and went back to Halim's Operations Command Center, where the President had arrived at about 0930 hours. Sukarno had received a general report from Omar Dani but was awaiting a detailed report from General Supardjo on the events of the day. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 50] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Supardjo's much—delayed meeting with the President, which finally took place about 1030 hours, has been the subject of conflicting stories, many of them pure speculation, no doubt. It would certainly be a major factor in determining the role of Sukarno in the coup if we knew for sure what transpired at the meeting. According to Untung (whose testimony on the coup seems to provide the most reliable and complete story of events), after General Supardjo reported on the coup and the kidnapping of the Generals, Sukarno asked two questions: (l) if it was true that General Nasution had been captured, and (2) why was Untung leading the movement. Supardjo replied that it was true that Nasution had been captured and that Untung assumed the leadership because "he was the one considered most appropriate by the comrades," Some reports have claimed that Sukarno also asked Supardjo where Untung was, but apparently it was General Sabur, the Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard and Untung'sLimmediate superior, who had come to Halim at Sukarno's call, who asked Supardjo that question later in the day.* According to the most we1l—known version of the Sukarno- Supardjo meeting (the official Army version), Sukarno is reported to have patted Supardjo on the back and said in Dutch: "Good job." Although it is quite believable--and it may well be true-—that he did this. it can not be proved; Supardjo denies it and Untung is not known to have commented on it. Similarly, there is disagreement as to whether or not Sukarno said to Supardjo: "Now, then, I shall take over the leadership and appoint another Commander-in-Chief." Untung has denied that Sukarno said *Apparently, General Sabur arrived at Halim while Supardjo was talking to the President. Once at Halim, General Sabur stayed close to Sukarno, accompanying him to Air Commodore Susanto's house (which was on the base) when the Presidential party moved there from Operations Command soon after 1200 hours. General Sabur remained with Sukarno all afternoon and finally accompanied him to the Presidential Palace at Bogor that evening after the collapse of the coup. _31_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 51] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 anything about taking over the leadership. Apparently, the subject of the new Commander-in—Chief of the Army did come up, because Supardjo asked that he be given an opportunity to consult with his "comrades" on the matter. The President answered: "Yes, all right, but return immediately." For a second time that morning, Supardjo went to the Central COmmand at Sgt. Sujatno's house and briefed Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono on the results of the meeting with the President. After conferring, they decided to recommend to Sukarno that he appoint Maj. General Pranoto, then third assistant to Army Chief of Staff Yani, as the new Commander of the Army.* *General Pranoto had succeeded General Suharto as Commander of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Territorial Division. Apparently, Nasution had been responsible for his removal as Commander before his normal tour of duty in that command was up. During his years as commander of the Diponegoro Division, he is reported to have done nothing to obstruct Communist influence in the military. ‘ At the time of the coup, Pranoto was director of personnel for the Army, which meant that he had authority in the crucial matter of military assignments. From the point of view of the PKI, he was ideally placed to serve the party's interests. Since the coup, it has been revealed that Pranoto was a "contact" of the PKI Special Bureau, just like Untung, Latief, Sujono, Supardjo, and Dani. He and Latief were both "managed" by Pono, the number two man in the Special Bureau and one of the central figures in the coup. Pranoto was known to be a close friend of Dani. It was rumored that his relations with Suharto were very cool, for personal as well as political reasons. In Pranoto, the PKI and Sukarno would have had a Commander of the Army as responsive to their wishes as Dani was as Commander of the Air Force. -32- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 52] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Apparently, the Central Command still had no definite information that Nasution had escaped, although by this time they seem to have been alerted to the possibility of this having happened. At both the Central Command and Operations Command there was general confusion and uncer— tainty as to what really had happened, as conflicting reports began to be received. When Supardjo re-appeared at Operations Command, the possibility that General Nasution had eluded his cap— tors was beginning to be seriously considered as more and more reports confirmed Sukarno's first information on the subject. For a matter of some hours now the President had been in doubt. As early as 0630 hours he had received a report from Col. Saelan that Nasution had escaped.,Since that time, he had been trying to verify that report. He had sent Col. Ebram to Nasution's house to check out the information, but the Colonel had been unable to learn anything definite about Nasution's whereabouts. General Supardjo had assured him that reports of Nasution's escape were not true, but soon thereafter Gen. Sabur arrived at Halim to tell him just the opposite. It is difficult to establish just when Sukarno finally was convinced by the reports that Nasution had escaped. As long as he continued to receive conflicting reports-—which was all morning long and into the afternoon--he may simply not have known what to believe. In that case, he--and the rest of the coup group-—may have made some of the important decisions of the day in a state of uncertainty, not knowing for sure what had occurred at Nasution's home but aware of the difference it made to their planning whether Nasution had escaped or not. At their second meeting of the day, which took place as soon as Supardjo returned to Operations Command following his conference with the coup leaders on the matter of the appointment of a new Army commander, Sukarno and Supardjo discussed the report that Nasution had escaped. According to Supardjo, the President said to him: "It is Nekolim that will benefit. Yes, in a _33_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 53] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 revolution, such things will happen, and when they do it is Nekolim that benefits."* Again according to Supardjo,Sukarno asked his advice about what to do now. Supardjo replied: "It depends on Bapak (Indonesian word for "father" which was commonly used to refer to Sukarno). I have two battalions that are at the President‘s disposal." Apparently, Sukarno did not make a decision at that moment» It seems that Nasution's escape--or the possibility of it-—had a profound effect on the President. If it was not the main reason, it was certainly a contributing factor in his final decision to stop the movement. We can only speculate as to the main factor influencing Sukarno's decision. It may have been_the failure of the coup to capture Nasution and realization that the coup plans had seriously gone awry. Or it may have been his shock and disapproval over certain aspects of the actqon, such as the murder of the generals, which he may not have anticipated. Or it may have been his concern that Suharto had rallied the army to oppose the coup in a way never anticipated by the coup leaders. Apparently, Sukarno was very much concerned to learn that two battalions of the RPKAD, the paracommando units of the Army under the command of Col. Sarwo Edhy, had arrived in Djakarta and were waiting further orders from Suharto. These two paratroop battalions, which had been stationed just outside the city, had been scheduled to depart for North Borneo several days before the coup. Unknown to Sukarno, their departure had been delayed because of some confusion over transportation. Quite possibly, the coup plans had taken into account the fact that the paratroopers would have departed for Borneo by the time of the coup; apparently, no one had checked to see whether they had actually departed on schedule. Sukarno is reported to have shown great interest in the Nekolim was an acronym for NEokolonialisme-KOLonialisme— TMperialisme, the three evil isms according to Sukarno. -34- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 54] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 RPKAD on the morning of the coup. According to a very reliable source, he protested to Supardjo at one point: "You told me the RPKAD would not be in Djakarta." Supardjo is reported to have assured Sukarno that it made no difference to the coup plans. However, around 1200 hours, Sukarno called Supardjo in to tell him of his decision to stop the movement. According to Supardjo, the President asked him to take care to prevent further bloodshed. Supardjo said that he and the two battalion commanders would see to this. Then, according to Supardjo, the President said: "If you can't stop the movement, you'll be butchered." In the official Army version of events, Sukarno is reported to have said: "Be careful. If you can't stop the movement, I'm the butcher." If Sukarno ever had any intention of making a public statement in support of the coup-—as the coup leaders have intimated that he did—-he had apparently given up all thought of it now. From the moment that he issued the order to stop the movement, his main concern was clearly to dissociate himself from it; he would hardly have considered anything that would implicate him further. At this point, President Sukarno left the Operations Command Center and moved to the nearby home of Air Commodore Susanto. Earlier that morning, Major Sujono had personally informed Susanto that his house would be occupied by the President at 0800 hours. (This would tend to confirm other indications we have that the coup leaders definitely expected Sukarno to join them at the air base that morning, either on his own initiative according to a prearranged plan or as a hostage of the coup group.) Apparently, Sujono had thought that Sukarno would go directly to Susanto's house when he arrived at Halim. ‘ Sukarno had asked to go to Operations Command first, however, possibly because he wanted to see Omar Dani. Sukarno was to spend all afternoon at the home of Susanto; he was there until about 2030 hours when he finally left Halim to go to Bogor Palace. Amazing as it might seem under the circumstances he apparently soent _35_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 55] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 a good part of his time there just resting and sleeping --and listening to the radio. He was at Susanto's house when he heard the radio broadcast about the Revolutionary Council. According to some reports, the President was surprised to learn about the establishment of such a Council. After the coup, he was quoted as saying that he disapproved of the Revolutionary Council; but, if that was true, he took no action whatsoever at the time to do anything about it. And the explanation for this would seem not to have been that he was a prisoner or virtual prisoner of the coup group and therefore not able to influence the course of events at Halim. On the contrary, Sukarno seems to have been very much his own free agent from the time that he went to Halim at his own initiative to the moment that he decided to leave for Bogor, several hours after Leimena and others at the airbase had first urged him to depart.* His complete independence of action that day was certainly clear from the fact that he sent his own emissaries back and forth from Halim all afternoon. It was from one of these emissaries that Gen. Suharto at KOSTRAD headquarters first learned that Sukarno was at Halim. Sukarno sent a courier to Nasution as well as *After the coup, Sukarno repeatedly emphasized his "freedom of action" throughout the day at Halim and the fact that he had gone there in the first place of his own free will to avoid the threat of "undesirable events" in Djakarta and to be near an airplane in case of emergency. It seems that he said this to prevent the Army from using his supposed "arrest" by the coup group and "vicious PKI elements" to destroy the PKI. He was concerned at all costs not to allow the Army to make it look as though the already implicated PKI had taken action against the President rather than against the Council of Generals. Despite his particular motives for stres— sing the point after the coup, it seems that he was not distorting history at all by emphasizing that he was not a“prisoner of anybody while he was at Halim. _35_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 56] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Suharto asking them both to come to Halim. Couriers dispatched by Sukarno were also in touch with Gen. Sabur, Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard, Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, Gen. Pranoto, Navy Commander Martadinata, and Police Commander Sutjipto. The message was the same in every case, that Sukarno wanted to see these men at Halim immediately.* Clearly, Sukarno was under no restraint from the coup leaders in communicating with people outside Halim Air Force Base. One of his most trusted and loyal advisers--First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio-- with whom Sukarno was also now anxious to confer, was not in Djakarta at the time. He had left town on the morning of the 29th, along with twelve other ministers of the cabinet, for an official inspection tour of Sumatra. (No specific reason for the trip was ever given.) On the *Apparently, Martadinata, Sutjipto, and Leimena checked first with Suharto before deciding to go to Halim. As we shall see, Leimena delivered a message to Sukarno from Suharto that the President should be out of Halim by1l630 hours, as Suharto was considering attacking the airbase if the coup forces had not surrendered by then. Leimena and Gen. Sabur were the only two men of those contacted by Sukarno who went to Halim. Suharto refused to allow Pranoto, Martadinata, and Sutjipto to go, on the grounds that the Army "had already lost enough generals." It is not clear whether Sabur asked Suharto's approval, first, as Leimena did, or whether he went on his own, as soon as he received Sukarno's summons; most likely, it was the latter. It is surprising that Sabur was not with Sukarno when the President went out to Halim in the morning. As Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard, he was usually with Sukarno whenever he went anywhere. The whereabouts of Gen. Sabur had been one of the questions that everyone had been asking all morning. Where was President Sukarno? Where was Gen. Sabur? And why was he not at Halim if Sukarno was there? _37_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 57] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 afternoon of the lst, when Sukarno suddenly had need of his confidant, Subandrio was in Medan. Sukarno ordered his own Presidential jet airplane, which was normally kept at Halim Air Force Base instead of Djakarta's commercial airport for reasons of security, to fly up to Medan to pick up $ubflHdriO.* The President may have been in communication with Subandrio earlier in the morning to tell him of the news of the coup, but this is not certain. There is still some confusion about the first communication Subandrio received about the coup. According to one story, he received a written note from a courier who said he was acting on instructions of the PKI representative in the North Sumatran National Fnant; this was about 1000 hours. Apparently, he was not informed that Sukarno"s personal plane was on its way up to Medan to get him; he does not seem to have realized that until the plane was already there. Sukarno probably did not think of sending a plane for Subandrio until the earlyL afternoon, when events made Subandrio's presence at Halim suddenly very important to him. Sukarno's independence of action at Halim extended to the use of the coup-controlled radio to broadcast a ' Presidential statement to the nation. For everyone listening to the radio that morning the most puzzling phenomenon of the day must have been the fact that the President did not speak. The original Untung announcement had strongly suggested that he would soon appear and explain to the nation what was going on; but he did not. Finally, at 1330 hours, an announcement was read over the radio that "Sukarno was alive, safe, in good health, and still in control of the state and the revolution. It was explained that the announcement was made on the authority of General Sabur, the commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential *It is unclear precisely when the Presidential plane left Halim; no one seems to have taken note of the time that they heard a plane overhead, as flley did later that evening when two planes departed Halim--one carrying Aidit and the other Dani—-and a third plane landed (it was Sukarno's jet returning from Medan). -38- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 58] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Guard. Later, it was announced that Sukarno had temporarily taken cver the leadership of the armed forces and that he had appointed General Pranoto as the "caretaker" commander of the army "to carry out the day—to-day business of the army."* In hindsight, the statement authorized by the President and issued in the name of Gen. Sabur seems to have been a move by Sukarno to dissociate himself from a failing movement. 'It may not have seemed that way at the time, however. Certainly, it was not the strong public endorse— ment of the coup by Sukarno that the coup leaders evidently expected him to make. The President carefully avoided committing himself on the coup. It might be presumed, however, that he was in agreement with what had been done since he did not condemn the action taken against the generals that morning. Moreover, in appointing General Pranoto as the "caretaker" commander of the army, he definitely was acting in.the interests of the coup leaders. *In the opinion of some observers, Sukarno's appointment of a "caretaker" commander of the army suggests 4 that he had definite information that the generals were dead. At the time, only the leaders of the coup and those directly involved in the killing of the generals knew this for sure. Sukarno could only have gotten this information from the coup leaders themselves. Suharto and the rest of the world, still in doubt about the fate of the generals, were quick to seize upon the announce— ment of Pranoto's appointment as an indication that Sukarno had inside information on what had happened to the generals; the announcement seemed to confirm their worst fears that the generals were already dead. In Sukarno's defense, however, it seems that this is not conclusive evidence. The President might have appointed a "caretaker" commander of the army if he thought that the generals had simply been kidnapped and were being held some place. The "caretaker" commander would be just that; he would take charge of the army temporarily, until there was definite word about the generals. _39_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 59] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The one thing that seemed clear from Lhe announcement was that Sukarno was not a prisoner of events. The fact that it was an announcement from the President, issued with the authority of his trusted security chief, and not an "Untung" announcement seemed to indicate that Sukarno was not the victim of any sort of coup attempt. But though the statement seemed to imply that Sukarno approved of the coup. that was not enough to save it. At a time when a public endorsement by Sukarno--and only that-—might well have turned the tide in its favor, Sukarno refused to commit himself on the coup explicitly, publicly. It is quite clear now that the coup leaders felt themselves betrayed by the President, whether they had good reason to expect a public statement of support from the President or not. Col. Latief is reported to have been "very aggressive" in urging General Supardjo "to force Sukarno to give his blessings to the movememt." He indicated that Supardjo should threaten Sukarno if he refused. It is clear that he had a radio broadcast by Sukarno in mind, as Latief is quoted as saying "Bring a tape recorder, so that Sukarno's voice can be taped and broadcast." Major Supeno, Commander of the 530th battalion, who heard the conversation, drew the conclusion that there was a possibility that Sukarno would he.‘ killed if he resisted their pressure. Although it was obviously a mistaken judgment, it suggests the amount of pressure the coup leaders tried to exert on Sukarno to get him to make a public statement of support. At this point, however. Sukarno was not about to be found support ing a dying movement. He was maneuvering to preserve his independence of action whatever the outcome of the coup; in the statement broadcast over the radio he hoped to re—assert his own authority over the situation without committing himself on the events of the past several hour S This was, of course, the turning point of the coup The coup leaders had tried and failed to get Sukarno's support at a crucial stage, when their coup plans had seriously gone awry with the escape of one of the prime targets of the coup and when their last hope lay with Sukarno. [Unreadable] Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 60] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Dani Seals His Fate Two hours after Sukarno had studiously avoided committing himself in public and after the coup was all but lost, it was announced over the radio that Air Force Chief Dani had pledged the support of the air force to the coup. This had been made official in an order—of— the—day signed by Dani himself.* The explanation for what would seem to have been an incredibly poorly timed decision on Dani's part was that he had drafted the order early in the morning—-when he apparently felt so sure things were going well that he was willing to commit the entire air force organization to the coup-—but it was not broadcast until that afternoon.‘ Dani has given the following account of his actions that morning: I awoke (he had spent the night at Operations Command) at about 0600, bathed, etc. till 0630. At 0710 I heard the radio news broadcast which mentioned the kidnapping of the army generals. Between 0730 and 0800 I received a telephone call from Major Suparto who said: 'Bapak (the President) will be taken to Halim.' I wanted to pick him up but Major Suparto would J not allow me. I called Major Sujono to take care of the President s security because the President was entering Halim. I remained at the Operations Command office and did not go outside. I then drafted the concept of my Standing Order. My custom in drafting an order was to draft points. I gave these points to Major Willyarto so that they could be refined before the order was sent to the Department of the Air Force. I told Major Willyarto not to broadcast the order yet. fDani's statement appeared in Harian Rakjat on 2 October, but it was announced over the radio before that, on the afternoon of 1 October. It was dated 0930 hours, 1 October _41_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 61] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 (Later) I accompanied the President to the house of Commodore Susanto for a rest. He ordered the summoning of the Navy and Police Force commanders. (After conferring with them) he decided to issue a statement. I then ordered Major Willyarto: ‘My statement may be issued. I need not examine it first.'* After stating that the coup action had been taken to safeguard the revolution and the president against "CIA subversion," Dani's order pledged that the air force would "always and continuously support and uphold any progressive revolutionary movement and combat any action which endangers the Indonesian revolution." With the broadcast of the order, Dani's fate was all~but sealed. His complicity in the coup was now documented; he could never hope to disclaim any involvement as Sukarno had left himself the option of doing. ' Suharto: The Making of a Hero It must be remembered that people who had any idea of what was going on during the period of Untung's dominance were very few. They were nearly all at Halim or KOSTRAD headquarters in Djakarta; the few others who were not —-such as the emissaries going back and forth between the two places and the military negotiators whom Suharto sent *Dani may have been under the impression that Sukarno intended to issue a statement of support for the coup rather than the noncommital statement about his still being "in control of the state and the revolution." It seems that Dani would not have-issued his order—of—theday pledging the support of the Air Force to the coup if he had not thought that Sukarno's statement would also commit the President to the side of the coup. _42_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 62] === ous: ees RN. : Meg 1) Sree. Bese 7 Oe: - ° Reeatee pn fe so fo Rae ee paket oeee. fone Eee. ee og ae VOLE eo aS eee [Unreadable] ¥ no eee > a oo rat bok Ra SR es ee Oi lo REAR eke eee ri, a 4 wy ES Mee ae era sees | moe Ted yo. Ros Berean eee et Beso, |: wo UR ME Re SENSES Eo. Meas ee. . SE Bis Oa ea ae oe ite one ae wis EAE Na ego aie eS ee UR A R E Se woe os Sa Viste. 1 CSR ay gles Se ES See. 21 BENS ECs 5 Sg ae Goer a ESSE ue Pie PRS GS OSS OF ae Bee es rer yr: BA see apy Pt ameate ab tos Fok SAG Buse ENERO g SEAR ee PN sy Dg cb otek’ Tas IP Bea Ais STAR, ' ESRD TAC RSE es gp DET ea RS OR eee: oe aS Tee el faites Fe opie eae Bo Peat ANTS OR ee thie SON ee en ax gee PS Ais: tse eee ON ROMER OTA 2 Ss TESS ESBS, Petaieite errr! ty fee Ste RS eat ieee rg ee 7 2 ERENASEICACS Ss - ar peraencetas Bp OE Ss alent eee Peery” Nee oe i pele TES AE ee) Re oe BN eS Ben Ge Ras eats | ND ie Bg ee rete PRS Ne” oi Roe ae pi Fe Reg Tae NR Son TR my ~ » 2 § ESS ieee i. : 2 ee a 3 fo eee BN? Py eee a SE TED. Page £8 85 we A ics ho ac eon ie Cea? PSEA a 6 Sle «fee ARES s ete AS RBS Le FS rhe as abet oe 7 Pong eS P ABS be Ge Bat ee = eel MRLs: fe ae “ase Pe a pte - Dev Fe OPA Ie OED ca BARGE eee EES VS gk a Stl ee 72 eS Me zs City? ee ae SER RR ONES Be GP ae - Paya sh oy se Se om ae: PQ Cag Ee IR es Teh Pee et Te, Ou: eR seg ene Chief of the Air Force Dani: [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 63] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 to confer with the troops surrounding the Palace and the radio station--were not discussing things with the general public. To the ordinary citizen, things probably seemed pretty much as usual. Except for the fact that the telephones were not working, business went on as usual. Only a few blocks away from Merdeka Square, one would have been unaware of the events taking place a short distance away. The streets of Djakarta were not guarded, and no curfew or state of emergency was declared. (The next day, a curfew was imposed.) One could move around the city freely. When the coup was first announced on the radio, most of Djakarta's government workers had already arrived at their offices. They put in a normal working day. It was noted that PKI headquarters was open, as usual; employees had been seen coming to work at the normal time. Contrary to some reports, the office had not been open all night. Even at Halim Air Force Base, the momentous events of the day might have gone unnoticed to an outside observer. The principal figures of the coup were quietly secured in three inconspicuous homes of air force personnel who lived on the base; besides these three homes, only one other building was being used by the coup forces—-the4 Operations Command Center, which was normally the center of activity on the base. The troops available to the coup which were not stationed around Merdeka Square in Djakarta were gathered at Lubang Buaja, out of sight of the main part of the air base. Around Merdeka Square, however, it was a different story. Troops were stationed all around the Square. Machine guns were set up in front of the U.S. Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the radio station and the telecommunications building, all of which fronted on the Square. All the main arteries into the square were sealed off, including the railroad station, which meant that traffic in the whole area was blocked off. Thus, in spite of the heavy concentration of troops and the presence of machine guns and other military equipment, there was an almost eerie quietness about everything. One could sense the tension in the atmosphere, but on the -43- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 64] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 surface everything was calm, abnormally calm. American observers who watched the events of the day from the win— dows of the U.S. Embassy, which had a view across Merdeka Square in the direction of the Palace, described it as "the spookiest day" of their lives. They, like most people. had little idea what was going on. Since the telephones weren't working, it was impossible to get news as to what was happening in other parts of the city. As one looked at Merdeka Square, the scene was one of seeming inactivity. The only noticeable activity, as the afternoon wore on, was that of emissaries and the officers from KOSTRAD who shuttled back and forth across the square; conferring with the commanders of the armed units in front of the Palace and radio station.* Suharto had taken care to avoid hasty action. With two battalions in revolt, stationed just across Merdeka Square from KOSTRAD headquarters, he had a potentially explosive situation on his hands. He was concerned above all else to prevent bloodshed. His strategy would be to try to talk the forces surrounding the Palace into surrender. It was a strategy of bluff, threat, negotiation, and cajolement--in the traditional Javanese manner. As his first move, Suharto had tried to contact 1 the commanders of the other three armed services to explain his strategy to them. He won assurances of help from both the naval command and the police force. However, he was never able to make contact with Air Force Chief Dani; as he later explained: *Merdeka Square is too large actually to see across it. On its long side, it is about half a mile long. It is a huge grassy expanse, with trees that obstruct one's vision across it. As mentioned earlier, the location of the Palace, Army Headquarters,-KOSTRAD Headquarters, Gambir Railroad Station, the U.S. Embassy, the telecommunications building, the Ministry of Defense, and the radio station around this one main square hi the center of Djakarta makes it a rather unique setup for seizing power. All of the vital objectives of a coup attempt are right there.. _44_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 65] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 ;%_lle,|.:1I,I W Q " ‘I'll -_?_.»__-V _£:3_s>:'§-§i_:_:. [Unreadable] [Unreadable] r.v’»H_ 150‘_,._.--'., P R 0 J E x \4;.vf~-it JMAHANPEGAVAI ~ ‘ ""'-Haw4.44;. 97’-5*-' EL mnoussm £3‘ 1» 31¢ i I 1 1 Rx .13 [Unreadable] Siliwangi troops from West Iava move into Djakarta under General Suharto's command nrlfrf "1 ."'_4'f'~.r-~'$i-1',‘/0‘ »'-"'- Ifiil...-FE-'.~.E!EI7i’I' -'t'; 155559;; ;R,PF§ "'40 PERUHAHAN P504»/AT[ H ‘IF? _s§-1'“ HOTEL moouesm 5 5373 '0:21 [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] "41-~' 04 [Unreadable] Q4 in“ .a§""‘T.;%&*§°"‘»¥”.»fz;§-é-11'-1=1¢» [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 05.0;-7§‘~ [Unreadable] [Unreadable] .‘ Irr$§gv_- [Unreadable] aeetég [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Jmge Siliwangi troops in front of the Hotel Indonesia Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 66] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Difficulty was experienced in attempting to contact the Air Force. I sent liaison officers to Halim...but things did not go as smoothly as they had with the Navy and police. They had assigned liaison officers to KOSTRAD to facilitate communication, but it was not so easy to establish coordination with the Armed Force. Suharto had received an early report that Dani had been abducted along with the generals, but about 0800 hours he received definite information that this was not true, that Dani had been "saved" by his own men, who had picked him up at his home about 0200 or 0300 hours and taken him somewhere. At this point, Suharto seems to have been more confused than suspicious about Dani's whereabouts and the reasons for the difficulty in establishing contact with the Air Force command. Naturally, he became snspi— cious of the role of the Air Force in the coup when he realized that Halim was being used by the coup forces as their center of operations, but apparently it was only after Dani's order—of-the-day was broadcast (around 1530 hours) that he finally accepted the fact of Dani's complicity in the coup. As he said later: “ ...Then, Dani made the announcement supporting the coup. First the leader of the Air Force had been 'saved‘ before the movement had been launched, then it had been difficult to achieve coordination with the Air Force, and lastly the statement of sunport had been issued. Even a fool could see that the Air Force had to be grouped with the foe. With pledges of support from the Navy and the police, ' and the run-a—round from the Air Force, Suharto set about the business of winning over the troops of the two battalions that were acting on the orders of Untung and associates. To help him in the task he assembled various officers who had friends in the two battalions or who had commanded them at one time or another. One of these was General Basukhi Rachmat, the commander of the East Java Territorial Division, who was in Djakarta to brief General _45_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 67] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Yani on Communist strength in the military in East Java. (He had conferred with Yani at the latter's home late pn the evening of the 30th, just a few hours before Yani was shot and killed in his home.) Suharto was able to discover that whereas the component units of the 454th and the 530th battalions were stationed at different key points around Merdeka Square, the commanders of the units themselves--Major Sukirno of the 454th and Major Bambang Supeno of the 530th--were inside the Palace. (It will be remembered that the two commanders had reported to the Central Command at the Aerial Survey Office after the troops under their command had taken up positions in front of the Palace; from there, they had gone with Gen. Supardjo to the Palace to report to Sukarno.) Suharto sent special emissaries to the deputy battalion commanders and the company gommanders left in charge. To their astonishment, the rebel troops snapped smartly to attention and saluted as they approached to confer with the officers in charge. This was an indication that at least the ordinary soldiers were confused, with no clear idea whom they were serving. The deputy battalion commanders told Suharto's emissaries that they were there to protect President Sukarno from a coup by " the Generals’ Council. Eventually, Suharto himself met with the deputy commanders. He assured them that there was no generals‘ coup, that they had simply been tricked into believing that when in fact they were being used to protect the activities of a coup movement. He explained that the Revolutionary Council had suspended the cabinet and Sukarno's name was not on the Revolutionary Council. Finally, he warned them that if they did not go back and collect their men and report to him at KOSTRAD headquart— " ers, he'd be "forced to take drastic action." Within about two hours, the 530th Battalion had assembled, boarded trucks, and reported to KOSTRAD. With the 454th Battalion, Suharto was not so successful. Just as the deputy commander was passing on-to his colleagues the story that Subaru: had told him, the battalion commander.returned, resumed control, and kept his men working in the service of the coup. - -46- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 68] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 At this juncture, the Presidential couriers from Halim began to arrive in Djakarta. Apparently, they had no trouble in persuading Deputy Prime Minister Leimena to go to Halim since the President wanted to confer with him there. They also contacted Gen. Umar and Gen Pranoto, but Gen. Umar, at least, referred them to Suharto, saying that he was acting only on Suharto's orders. The couriers then moved on to KOSTRAD headquarters to ask Suharto to send Pranoto and Umar to Halim. The arrival of the Presidential couriers at KOSTRAD headquarters (shortly after noon) and the exchange of messages that they delivered was to prove a turning point of the coup. Up to this point, Suharto did not know where Sukarno was, although it seemed clear that he was not in the Palace. Now he realized that the President was at Halim, but obviously not there as a prisoner in any strict sense, since he had the liberty to send messengers\into the city. His relationship to Untung was ambiguousl but the possibility that Sukarno was involved in the kidnapping of the generals was now wide open.* *According to one source, §uharto's first thought; -\ about Sukarno had been that he was dead. Early in the morning, as events started to unfold and there was no word from Sukarno, Suharto is reported to have figured that the coup leaders had learned of the President's death and moved quickly to neutralize the Army in the struggle for power that was expected after Sukarno's death. After Untung's announcement of a provisional government, Suharto was in touch with the Sultan of Jogjakarta, with whom he discussed the idea of the Sultan's going to Bandung to set up a rival government there. The Sultan is reported to have advised Suharto against this idea until they had more definite information on Sukarno. The Sultan apparently had a feeling that Sukarno just might be involved in the coup; he told Suharto that "the whole thing sounds like Sukarno to me." He realized that it would be a mistake to announce the formation of a rival government that might later seem to have been a move against Sukarno. After the coup; the President could have used this as (footnote continued on page 48) - -47- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 69] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Suharto decided to s end one person——Deputy Prime Minister Leimena-—to Halim to negotiate with the President He refused to allow Gen. Um ar and Gen Pranoto and the others whom Sukarno had ask ed to see to go there, on the -grounds that "we have alrea dy lost enough generals." Actually, Leimena delivered an ultimatum to Sukarno from Suharto. Suharto told the President to leave the airbase u; 1630 hours; if he didn't the Army would attack Halim.* lf the couriers gave Gen. Suharto the crucial information that he needed to take full command of the situation, their errand was of equal moment to Sukarno. When they returned to Halim with Suharto's flat refusal to allow Pranoto or Umar to confer with the President, Sukarno realized that Suha rto had not only declared against the conspirators bu t had effectively neutralized all the high army officers who might be used to cover up the Untung coup. No doubt to his shrewd eye, the situation seemed already hopeles s.** It is in the light of Yfootnote continued from pa ge 47) evidence that the Army was in fact plotting his overthrow. From this point on, Suharto is reported to have acted on the assumption that Sukarno might be involved in the coup. When he learned later in th e day that the President was at Halim, he had very defin ite reason to suspect his involvement. *As we shall see, Sukarn o did not leave Halim by 1630 hours and Suharto did not o pen fire on the airbase, as he had threatened. He decided to wait a little longer, in the hope of avoiding a dire ct fight with Sukarno. In the end, Leimena was successful in persuading the President to go to Bogor. He was the one who talked Sukarno out of going to Central Java wh ich Aidit and the other PKI leaders were trying to pers uade Sukarno to do. **An indication of Sukarn o's appreciation of the change in the balance of forces in the mid-afternoon was the "rescuing" of his children from the Palace, where they had been all day. At about 1600 hours, the children were brought out to Halim and fr om there flown to Bandung, out of harm's way. It is c lear that Sukarno felt at this point that the Palace would not stay much longer in Untung's hands and the childr en had to be removed before the Army took over there. _43_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 70] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 the information gained by Sukarno upon the return of the couriers that we must understand his decision to announce over the radio that he was "well and safe and still in control of the state and the revolution"--an announcement that seemed to be a move by Sukarno to dissociate himself from a failing movement. Meanwhile, Suharto had taken advantage of the new information that he had acquired to make one final attempt to break up the troop formations outside the radio station and the telecommunications building. This time he gave the 454th Battalion an ultimatum: either it must evacuate its positions by 2000 hours or he would blast it out with his own guns‘ and troops.* Suharto was still very much concerned to avoid bloodshed. By 1800 hours, however, he had his troops in offensive position, ready to assault the radio station and telecommunications building. However, the attack was not necessary. In ho mood to fight, the rebels quietly withdrew and moved out by truck in the direction of Halim; Suharto did nothing to hinder their orderly withdrawal. He was only too happy to have the center of the city cleared of couo forces without violence. *Actually, Suharto was not in a position of overwhelming military strength in threatening the coup forces in Djakarta with an ultimatum. As one of his first moves after assuming command of the army, he had called up from its base about l5 miles outside Djakarta the crack paracommando unit (RPKAD) led by Col. Sarwo Edhy. Together with a battalion of the Siliwangi (West Java) Division that was already in the capital for the Armed Forces Day parade on 5 October, the RPKAD units were the only troops that he had available at his disposal in Djakarta. He couldn't have taken the Palace or the radio station and the telecommunications building in the morning or even in the early afternoon. Only after the 530th Battalion withdrew, late in the afternoon, was he in a position to threaten the 454th Battalion, the sole remaining coup for== in the city. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 71] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 As the withdrawal of these troops proceeded, however, a new armed force appeared on the scene. Armed Communist youths suddenly emerged at the south end of Merdeka Square, having come from the direction of Halim, it seemed. To their obvious surprise, they were abruptly disarmed and arrested by Suharto's forces. They surrendered without a fight. Under interrogation, the Communist youths admitted that air force officers at Halim had issued them the weapons with which they were armed and had ordered them into the city.* ' This development in the coup has been the subject of much distortion. At the time, the presence of such armed and undisciplined elanents in the center of the city was the cause for genuine alarm on the part of Suharto, to whom it seemed that the PKI and its front groups had resorted to arms. More violent events, possibly a general attack, in Djakarta or elsewhere, could be expected. Such speculation, based on the involvement of a considerable number of Communist youths in a disorganized and pointless entry into Djakarta in the late hours of the coup, may have been responsible, in part, for the exaggerated reports of PKI involvement in the military events of the coup. As noted earlier, armed PKI civilians were incorrectly --but persistently--reported to have participated in the‘ raids on the generals‘ homes; they were also supposed to have been included among the troops guarding the Palace and radio station. When Suharto's forces finally occupied the radio station and telecommunications building, they apparently did find some of these Communist youth elements inside; but they had only just arrived on the scene. It is now an established fact that the Communist front groups that were armed by the coup leaders as a kind of "reserve *Estimates of the numbers of Communist volunteers who were sent from Halim into Djakarta vary considerably, with some estimates as high as 3,000. We are inclined to think that the reports of there being around 3,000 are exaggerated, although this is the figure most often reported. Apparently, not all of the Communist youths were armed. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 72] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 force" were not sent from Halim into Djakarta until late in the afternoon. They had played no role in the coup up to that point--except as witnesses to the murder scene at Lubang Buaja, where they had spent the whole morning and most of the afternoon. Early that morning, a certain Major Sukrisno of' the Air Force whom Major Sujono had personally recruited for the special coup assignment of commander of these "reserve troops" at Lubang Buaja, had received his orders from Sujono to "get weapons from the Air Force ammunition depot at Mampang Crossroads" (which was the headquarters of the Regional Air Force Command for the Greater Djakarta area). '$Ukri5H0 was informed that "His Excellency the Minister/Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Dani) has informed the Chief of Staff of the Regional Air Command of this matter; if he is not there and time is pressing, then the ammunition depot there can be broken intoh A vehicle for this purpose will be waiting at the 3rd light pole of the Djakarta Bypass." Estimates of the number of weapons taken from the Mampang depot and distributed to members of Communist front organizations that morning range from 300 to 10,000 with 3,000 probably being the best estimate. The weapons were all small arms of Chinese origin, with the "Chung" trademark stamped on them. The Indonesian army was known not to have any weapons of that type. There is absolutely no doubt that the arms were the property of the Indonesian Air Force. We have reliable information that the military leaders of the coup—-particularly Untung--had strong reservations about using the Communist volunteer troops in the military operation of the coup. Untung has testi— fied: _51_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 73] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 I had not given permission for the use of the People's Youth groups (in the raids on the generals‘ homes). My reasons had nothing at all to do with the battle experience and ability of the troops, but rather with discipline. If the militarily undisciplined and inexperienced troops of the People's Youth were used, a situation, could develop during the military action in which these forces would not obey the orders given by the leaders. Whereas what we required at the time was a discipline dedicated to the carrying out of orders. "That is why I rejected the idea of using the People's Youth. As we shall see later, it was the plan of the coup leaders to arm these volunteer troops with the thought of using them as a "reserve force" to guard Halim Air Force Base. However, when Suharto showed energetic opposition to the coup, never expected by the leaders of the coup, and whén Sukarno failed them in their hour of need, panic apparently struck the people at Halim. The handling of defense and logistics had proved completely inadquate. Air Force units promised had not shown up and neither had a cavalry unit. The coup leaders were desperately short of reinforcements for the units guarding the Palace and the radio station; these units had been on duty since early morning, and, among other things they had not eaten all day. The hundreds of Communist youth volunteers who _52_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 74] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 awaited orders at Lubang Buaja were neither well trained nor experienced and thus were totally unprepared to confront army units of proven capability; but it was decided to send them into Djakarta anyway, as the only reinforcements available. They were instructed in the use of the secret password with which they could identify themselves to the coup forces guarding the Palace and radio station. When they arrived in Djakarta at Merdeka Square, they confidently called out this password; but instead of the counter-password, they were greeted with pointed weapons and swiftly put under arrest by Suharto's forces. Unknown to them, the rebel army units previously in the area had quietly evacuated to Halim. By 2000 hours Suharto was in control of the whole downtown area around Merdeka Square. Soon thereafter, the radio station broadcast an announcement that it had been liberated from counterrevolutionary contrql by the armed forces loyal to Suharto. An official Army announcement then explained that the coup was definitely a counterrevolutionary action, that a number of army generals had been kidnapped and the radio station illegally occupied, that Suharto had temporarily taken over leadership of the army and was now in full control of the situation,and that both Sukarno and Nasution were: safe. At about this time Suharto received a second communication from Sukarno, who asked for a clarification of the situation. Suharto sent back the message that Sukarno "must move from Halim." Because of the dangex of more nonmilitary forces being armed by the Air Force and sent into Djakarta from Halim, Suharto had decided that he must establish control over the air base that night. He said that he would wait for confirmation that Sukarno had departed before attacking the base. The Collapse of The Coup Back at Halim, Sukarno was torn with indecision, as he received conflicting advice from his advisers. By -53.. Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 75] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 then, the coup leaders were in a state of desperate gloom and making plans to flee. Dani and others urged the President to fly with them to Madiun in Central Java, where they could establish a second front. Apparently, Sukarno seriously considered doing this. There is good evidence that Aidit fully expected Sukarno to join him when he made arrangements for a plane to fly him out of Halim. At the last moment, however, Sukarno was talked out of the plan. Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, who had been summoned to Halim by Sukarno and who had stayed close to the President all afternoon, seems to have been primarily responsible for changing Sukarno's mind. He argued that Sukarno ought to disentangle himself from the coup and go straight to his palace at Bogor, where he normally went every Friday afternoon (and it was then Friday evening) to spend the week-end. It is not known what words of wifely advice Sukarno may have received from Dewi on the matter. She hurried out to Halim byh car and talked with him shortly before he left Halim.* ”_'?Apparently, Sukarno had left a note for Dewi when he left her home early that morning. In it he is reported to have said that he had received information-from several persons about "things that had occurred in the Army the4 preceeding night." He explained that "the men who were carrying out this so-called revolution intended to safeguard Bapak and did not intend to oppose him," so Dewi should not worry because "Bapak was safe." Later, Dewi made the following comments about her meeting with Sukarno at Halim that evening: "As regards the conversation between Bapak and myself at that time, I asked Bapak what he knew about the things that had happened. Bapak said, as I recall, that there were several generals in the Army who wanted to try to stage a coup against Bapak and that several other men had learned of this before they could do so and had taken action to safeguard Bapak. Gen. Pandjaitan and another general (I forget whether it was Gen. Harjono or Gen. Parman) resisted arrest and a fight occurred and they were killed." Dewi appears to have been completely unsuspecting of any important event in the offing, before the coup. If Sukarno did know of the plans for the coup beforehand, (footnote continued on page 55/ _54_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 76] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Afterwards, she returned to her home in Djakarta; he went on to Bogor, his week—end home which he shared with his second wife Hartini. Suharto wanted to be very sure that Sukarno was safely out of Halim before he ordered any offensive action against the base; he recognized the grave consequences of anything happening to the President which might be considered his responsibility. At about 2200 hours he received a long distance call from Bogor saying that Sukarno had arrived there. Suharto ordered Col. Alex, who was in Bogor, to check out this information personally. He found Sukarno in the Palace. With the sure knowledge that Sukarno was no longer at Halim, Suharto began his move against the last stronghold of those forces. He selected the RPKAD paracommando unit led by Col. Sarwo Edhy to spearhead the attack on Halim. He ordered them to infiltrate the base undet'cover of darkness and not to shoot unless fired upon. Throughout the night, the paracommandos quietly surrounded the base and infiltrated its perimeter. The only shooting incident took place around midnight; Suharto's antiair— craft units opened fire on an incoming plane, which they thought might be bringing supplies to the rebels. It was Sukarno's own jet airplane that had been sent up to Medan to bring back Subandrio. Subandrio had decided not to return to Djakarta, Yfootnote continued from page 54) he apparently did not say anything about them to her. After the CG1p, she seemed slow to realize that he might have approved of the action taken against the generals - (she may still not believe that he did); for a long while, she seemed honestly not to understand why he did not take firm action against those responsible for the murders. About two weeks after the coup, when Dani and his family were living in the Palace under Sukarno's protection, she is reported to have remarked privately that she could not understand why Sukarno was protecting Dani as "everyone knows" that he was implicated in the coup. _55_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 77] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 however, so he was not on the plane. It managed to land safely without being hit. About an hour and a half later (around 0130 hours on the morning of the 2nd), another plane was heard overhead. It was definitely identified by several witnesses at the time as a plane of the Indonesian Air Force, but only a very few people would have known of its secret mission. Just before midnight, General Supardjo, who was still acting as the chief liaison between the Central Command of the coup at Sgt. SuJatno's house and Dani at Halim's Operations Command Center and Aidit at Sgt. Suwadi's house, arrived at the Operations Command Center and spoke to Dani about an urgent request from Aidit for the use of an Air Force planeto fly him to Joggakarta that evening. Dani immediately arranged for a plane. Col. Latief, who happened to be out searching for Mag. Sujono and Sjam at the time, actually saw the plane take off; he was gold that Aidit and his two bodyguards were being flown out to Jogjakarta; he later reported this to Untung when he returned to Sgt. Sujatno's house. According to one story (told by the sister of the pilot of the plane), Aidit was obviously furious about something; at one point, he reportedly threw his coat on the ground and stamped on it. This story, which may or may not be true, fits nicely - with other information we have about Aidit's state of mind that evening. Apparently, he was furious at Sukarno, who by then had left Halim and was at Bogor. He may have had some reason for thinking that Sukarno would accompany him to Central Java; as noted earlier, Sukarno seems to have considered this seriously and only at the last moment to have changed his mind. If Aidit had earlier felt betrayed by the President when he failed to make a public statement of support for the coup, his sense of outrage and betrayal must have been all the more acute when he _ realized that Sukarno had again changed his mind and was not going with him. Later, Aidit is reported to have said that it was Sukarno who ordered him to flee to Central Java and that he was to find a safe hiding place for the _55_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 78] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 President there.* It is possible that Aidit still had Central some hope of Sukarno eventually joining him in best Java when he left Halim, but he had already lost a his second chance for success in establishing some kind of front in Central Java, which we know that Sjam and Pono --and presumably Aidit--were arguing for during those last desperate hours at Halim--when he failed to convince Sukarno to go with him then.** Dani fled soon after Aidit. He and Air Commodore Leo Wattimena left together on a C-130 Hercules aircraft of the Indonesian Air Force. Some five hours later, they Madiun; finally landed at Iswahjudi Air Force Base inaround for most of that time, they had been flying aimlessly, as the pilot monitored the security situation at Halim and other airbases. The Central Command of Untung, Sujono, Latief, the Sjam, and Pono was now in utter despair. Apparentfy, original coup plans had not provided for this particular contingency, and Untung and the others seem to have been *When Aidit arrived in Semarang on the morning of Z October to confer with PKI leaders Lukman and Sakirman after the collapse of the coup, he is reported to have told them that the purpose of his coming to Central Java was "to prepare conditions for moving Sukarno to Jogjakarta Apparently, there was also another occassion on which he referred to Sukarno's plans to join him in Central Java; he indicated that the President had been the one to suggest the idea. **Apparently, Aidit and Sjam and Pono had no success in convincing-Untung and the other military leaders of the coup of the possibility of establishing a second-front in Central Java. According to Untung's testimony in court, "Sjam proposed that a follow-up movement be launched. We made no reply to Sjam's proposal. In general, our thinking was very much influenced by the unsuccessful Pasupati Movement (the operation to kidnap the seven generals)." _.57_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 79] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 at a compleae loss as to what to do under the circumstances Various sources have reported Untung as being "almost in a daze" or "bewildered" or "just sitting around, not doing anything." Even Sjam reportedly became confused and unsure what to do; he didn't have the ready answers toseemed Untung's questions that Untung had come to expect from him. It is not clear what contact Sjam have had with Aidit during those last hours at Halim; may it is possible that he acted pretty much on his own. In part, the lack of decisive leadership from the military leaders of the coup can be explained by their state of absolute exhaustion after the strain of the day ‘and the lack of sleep. But it also strongly suggests that they were not really used to making the crucial decisions on matters of such importance. It was almost as if they expected someone to tell them what to do in the situation. As we shall see later, this was exactly what had been the case with respect to Untung, Latief, and Sujono. JSjam had made all the important decisions, certainly all the political decisions, relating to the planning of the coup and he had always decided everything with the utmost confidence and assurance. It was not clear to Untung and the others whether he made certain decisions on his own or whether he checked everything out with Aidit, but they felt reasonably sure that Aidit at least knew and approved of the main lines of the coup planning. The fact that Sjam did not take the same control of the situation on the evening of the lst that he had earlier in the planning of the coup suggests that either he did really panic as his plans for a coup blew up in his face or he was not prepared to make the decisions involved without first checking with Aidit and there was neither the time nor the opportunity for the two men to coordinate a whole new plan of action in keeping with the fast-changing circumstances of the day. Probably, it was a little bit of both. Certainly, communications between Aidit and Sjam, as the day wore on, were not very frequent, if they occurred at all. There is nothing to indicate that Sjam knew ahead of time of Aidit's decision to fly to Central Java; it appears that he learned of it when Col. returned to the Central Command and reported it toLatief Untung and the others there. It is somewhat surprising that _58_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 80] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Sjam did not go with Aidit that night to Jogjakarta. They may have had some understanding, however. that Aidit would go to Central Java to try to keep the situation there in hand while Sjam would stay in Djakarta to help manage things there. In any case, Sjam left Halim, sometime in the early morning of 2 October, in the company of Gen. Supardjo. They made their way on foot to the home of a PKI member in Djakarta, where they spent that day and night together. The next day they went their separate ways. Untung and Latief left Halim together, about the same time. For at least a week, they stayed together, travelling around the environs of Djakarta but apparently not going into the city. Sujono seems to have stayed at Sgt. Sujatno's house that first night. It would have been natural for him to be at Halim, since (before the coup) he was the Commander of the Air Force troops assigned to the defense of the base. At dawn, when Col. Edhy's paratroopers rushed the airbase, the leaders of the coup had scattered. Many of the troops of the 454th Battalion, which had been evacuated to Halim after its earlier guard duty at the Palace, had wandered off during the night.* Those who were left *From the interrogation reports of the soldiers of the 454th who left their posts that night at Halim, it seems that they had no clear idea of where they were going or how they were going to get there. But they now realized that they had been tricked into believing that they were defending Sukarno against a coup attempt whereas in fact they had been used to defend a coup action. Some had some vague idea of returning to their post in Central Java but no idea how they would get there; others talked of turning themselves in. When Suharto the next day announced a general amnesty to all those soldiers involved in the coup who promptly turned themselves in, they did just that. Thus, none of them got very far from Halim that night, before turning around and going back into Djakarta to report to KOSTRAD headquarters. _ _59_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 81] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 put up practically no resistance. By 0610 hours, Suharto had taken Halim-—without the loss of a single man. Beilections oi the Coup Throughout lndonesia As there is a great deal of confusion about events connected with the 30 September Movement that occurred outside Ljakarta. it is important to clarify just what happened in cities like Semarang, Joggakarta, and Solo, which followed D3akarta's lead in establishing Revolutionary Counci1s,as called for in the Decree of the 30 September Movement broadcast from Djakarta at mid-day on 1 October. In the three key cities of Central Java, there occurred the same basic pattern of military action followed by a public statement of support for Untung's movement and an announcement of the formation of a Revolutionary ’ounci1. tery shortly after the Untung announcement on the radio, Col. Suherman,' Chief of Army Intelligence for __"7UnYUng_had_beenn§n_intimate confidant of Suherman when the latter was Battalion Commander and Untung a Company Commander in the Central Java Territorial Division. On the two trips that Untung made to Semarang after he was transferred to Djakarta in May 1965, he had stayed at Suherman’s house. Thus, he had last seen Suherman about a month and a half before the coup. On the second trip in August, he had stopped off in Srondol, staying at the home of MQJOP Sukirno, who had succeeded Untung as Commander of the 454th Battalion, In his testimony at Untung's trial, Sukrisno stated that there had been no discussion of a COup on that occasion. No doubt, Sukrisno was telling the truth. Untung himself was not brought into the planning ior.the coup until early September. Host likely, Lntung and Suherman never discussed the matzer of the coup. either. Suherman's activities on behalf of the coup were almost certainly arranged by _the regional bureau of the PKI Special Bureau in Semarang. There is no evidence that any of the military officers (footnote continued on page 6]) _50_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 82] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Central Java, stationed in Semarang, acting in close collaboration with Col. Marjono, chief of personnel, and Lt. Col. Sastrodibroto, bureau chief for civil-military relations, seized control of the Divisional headquarters and placed the Commander of the Central Java Division, Gen. Surjosumpeno, under arrest.* Sometime around mid—m0rning, Suherman occupied the studio of Radio Indonesia in Semarang to broadcast two important announcements: one, that he had taken over command of the division and, two, that a Revolutionary Council in Central Java had been formed in accordance with the Decree of the 30 September Movement. Subsequent to the radio announcement from Djakarta, a Major Muljono stationed in Jogjakarta'went to see his commanding officer, Col, Katamso, to urge him to accept the Untung proclamation and declare the Jogjakarta Command behind it. When Katamso stalled, Muljono sent a squad of men loyal to him to arrest Katamso and the deputy commander, Lt. Col. Sugijono.** The two men were taken Yfootnote continued from page 60) involved in the coup in Djakarta discussed plans for the coup with military officers in other cities. The PKP Special Bureau would have handled such matters as coordinating events in Semarang or Jogjakarta or Solo with those in Djakarta. *Surjosumpeno was able to trick the young officers who guarded him into leaving him alone long enough to allow him to make his escape from the Divisional Headquarters. From there he fled southwards out of Semarang to Magelang, where he contacted local military officers. Widespread reports that he was one of the victims of the 30 September Movement were not true. **Apparently, the troops that were sent to arrest Katamso first looked for him at his home before they went to the district military headquarters where they found him. The story was spread that, not finding him at home, they murdered his wife and 8 children ("brutally chopping them to bits"). Again, there was no truth to the story, although it is still widely believed, no doubt because it has been repeated so often. Katamso and Sugijono were " killed, however; they were the only victims of the 30 September Movement in Central Java.. -61- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 83] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 to the army barracks three miles outside Jogjakarta held there all day. Muljono then ordered his troops and surround the palace complex of the Sultan of Jogjakarta, who happened to be out of town at the time. He also seized the Jogjakarta Radio Station. At 2000 hours Radio Indonesia in Jogjakarta began broadcasting Untung's coup in Djakarta, which was itself support for now in the last stages of collapse. Sometime in the afternoon of 1 October, the newly appointed commander of the Solo (Surakarta) military district, Lt. Col. Ezy Suharto, together with his chief of staff and a brigade commander under him, were put under arrest by a certain Major Iskandan, after they had delayed in giving support to Untung's movement. At 1800 hours, some two hours before Jogjakarta, Radio Indonesia in Solo put out a statement on the formation of a Revolutionary Council for Solo on the model of the L Central Revolutionary Council announced by Untung. This initial statement was issued by the Communist mayor of S010, Utomo Ramelan, whom the top leaders of the PKI (Aidit, Lukman, and Sakirman) would visit the very day for high—level discussions of PKI policy in the next after math of the coup's failure. Nothing of the sort that happened in Jogjakarta, and Solo happened anywhere else Semarang, in Java, not even in East Java, where there were many powerful centers of Communist strength. According to one unconfirmed report, the Governor of Bali is reported to have made some statement about the formation of a Revo1ution— ary Council for Bali, but nothing more came of it, if in fact he ever made such a statement. There was much concern at the time about Sumatra, where the PKI was thought to have an impressive capability for paramilitary—type activities that could create widespread civil disorder. The leftist Governor of North Sumatra, Army General Ulung Sitepu, is known to have sent a cable to Djakarta congratulating Untung on his "move to save the Republic" and pledging the full support of North Sumatra to the 30 _52_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 84] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 September Movement.* But otherwise, there was no observable response from Sumatra to events in Djakarta. The city of Medan was quiet; no unusual activity by any group was noted at any time after the news from Djakarta was first received. There was no evidence of any unusual military action in Surabaya, either. In the days after the coup, certain wall posters that appeared in Surabaya supporting the coup were suspected to be the work of the PKI; otherwise, there was no known PKI activity in support of the coup anywhere in Sumatra. Between 2-12 October, about 150 PKI leaders, plus many ordinary members of the party from all areas of Sumatra, went into hiding in the jungle mountain areas of North Sumatra, at various prearranged locations. It was presumed that they were organizing themselves into a para-military force for an all-out showdown with the army, but no such showdown ever materialized. In keeping with Aidit's policy, they had simply gone into hiding until the situation cleared. They never challenged the army in any resort to armed force. Several hundred of them were finally captured by the army, having put up almost no resistance--which was the story of the PKI surrender to the army all over Indonesia after the coup. But on the day of l October, the prospect of military opposition from the supporters of the 30 September Movement in Central Java and other areas outside Djakarta seemed quite real to Suharto. Around 2000-2100 hours, messages began to be received in Djakarta from Central Java that the radio station in Jogjakarta and Semarang were in rebel hands. Once Sukarno decided to go to Bogo; rather than Central Java, Suharto was free to consider his move against the rebel strongholds in Central Java without the concern for the President's safety which had *On 8 October, after the collapse of the coup, Gov. Ulung Sitepu and his wife fled Medan, taking all their personal valuables with them. They were reported to have gone to the Kabandjahe area where he had a strong leftist following. _53_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 85] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 influenced his decision not to attack Halim until he was sure that Sukarno had left the airbase. Suharto's strategy of winning over the forces loyal to Untung in Central Java was very much the same strategy he had used against the troops acting under the orders of the coup leaders in Djakarta. He began with what was to prove a long series of appeals and countermanding of orders over the military telex system and the radio. ln a radiogram to Central Java he explicitly disavowed Col. Suherman's order to all commanders within the Central Java Territorial Division; as a former commander of that Division, he was undoubtedly hoping to rally loyalties to himself. In the meantime, _he ordered army units in Central Java to be placed on 24hour combat readiness to resist any seizures of government authority by the revolutionary councils; otherwise, they werenot to take any precipitate action that might lead to a civil war.* By late afternoon on l October the staff officers of the Central Java Territorial Command had decided without reservation against the rebel forces of Untung and Col. Suherman. The reason that some of the troops apparently hesitated in following the lead of the officers was their uncertainty as to Sukarno's position on the coup. At the height of the coup fortunes on l October, the troops of the rebels were estimated to have the strength of only one battalion; during the next two days, these forces gradually melted away, much as the troops of the 530th and 454th battalions deserted the cause of the coup in Djakarta and went over to the side of Suharto. *There was never any plan for the use of West Javanese or any other non—Central Javanese forces against the rebels Central Java Divisional Commander Surjosumpeno, who had escaped from the rebel officers who had put him under arrest, felt assured that he could deal with the situation, and Suharto thought he should be given the chance to do so. _54_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 86] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 Semarang was the first of the rebel cities to fall. The troops of Suherman had been hearing on the radio about the failure of Untung's coup in Djakarta. Suherman's authority dwindled rapidly after that. Division Commander Surjosumpeno had brought loyal troops to the outskirts of Semarang. After "Suharto—$tyle" negotiations with some of the rebel officers, the troops were largely won over. On the morning of 2 October, Surjosumpeno re—occupied Semarang without a shot being fired. Suherman, Marjono, and Sastrodibroto fled with a handful of troops still loyal to them.* Surjosumpeno began sending tank and paratroop units to Jogjakarta and Solo to try to win back the loyalty of individual units there. Some crucial battalions were won over, but the two cities were still in rebel hands that afternoon when the afternoon editions of the newspapers in the two cities came out. That afternoon a large demonstration supporting Untung's coup took place in the main part of Jogjakarta. The major PKI mass organizations were restrained from action, but the local Communist youth group was conspicious along with other youth groups of the other political parties. Apparently Muljono was able to influence the Communist youth more than the PKI leadership. Their participation in the demonstration was to prove very damaging to the PKI's effort to claim complete non—involvement in the coup. The only bloodshed of the coup in Central Java occurred that same afternoon in Jogjakarta. Katomso and Sugijono were removed from their temporary place of incarceration and taken out of town and shot. In Solo also, the pro—coup tide was still strong on 2 October. Placards indicating support for Untung were plastered all over the city. Groups of Communist *After the failure of the coup, Suherman and Col. Marjono hid in the mountains of Central Java in the region of Jogjakarta. They were finally captured in December 1965. _55_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 87] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 voith wandered about in a vaguely threatening way; almost exeryone else kept off the streets. Late in the day of the 2nd, there were signs that the tide had begun to change. At 0130 hours on the 3rd, Sukarno made his radio broadcast to the nation, and this was relayed to Jogjakarta and Solo. Anti-Untung placards vegan to appear. By 4 October, the radio stations in i~th 411165 were in the hands of Surjosumpeno's men, and local military commanders arrested by the coup group were released unharmed. The situation remained tense but calm with both pro—coup and anti-coup groups unwilling to start anything. As we shall see later, Aidit and other top PKI leaders were able to move about the city of Solo openly, even though it was militarily in Surjosumpeno's hands. By the morning of 5 October overt military resistance to Surjosumpeno had ceased throughout Central Jada. Aside from the murders of the two Jogjakarta army chiefs, there had been an astonishing lack of violence. Cities and loyalties had changed hands silently and peacefully. It had been a game of bluff and counter—bluff, threat and counter-threat, appeal and counter—appeal. The Coup de Grace for the PKI In Djakarta, the outcome of the coup had not hung in the balance even the short period of 2—3 days as it had in Central Java. By the end of the day on l October, the coup forces had fled in defeat and Suharto was in full control of the situation. Untung had not held the city long enough for any sort of mass demonstration of support ——either spontaneous or otherwise--to materialize. Had there been plans for a demonstration, like the one in Jogjakarta, for 2 October or the days following, it would naturally have been called off in the hopeless situation of the utter collapse of the coup. Thus, there never was the spectacle of groups of Communists and other leftists out on the streets of Djakarta in support of the coup-—as there was'in Jogjakarta and Solo. _55_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 88] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 In view of this, one important development of 2 October is all the more intriguing and mystifying. It is the editorial that appeared in the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat, published in Djakarta on the morning of 2 October. In its banner headline, Harian Rakgat claimed that Untung had saved President Sukarno from a coup of the generals’ council. Accompanying the headlines was a crude cartoon, showing a mighty fist, labeled 'the 30 September Movement‘, smashing into the face of an Indonesian general. The general's pockets were stuffed with money; he had dollar signs for epaulettes; his shoulder badges showed him to be a member of the Council of Generals; and his cap was stamped with CIA; propping him up was a particularly unpleasant-looking Uncle Sam. Next to the cartoon, on the front page, was a brief editorial, only 202 words in length, which condemned the Generals‘ Council and called Untung's action "a patriotic and revolutionary measure." Although it claimed that the "nature of the action was an internal army matter," the editorial expressed the thought that "the sympathy and support of the people" ought certainly to be for the coup.* On the whole, it was a rather cautious editorial, but this was really beside the point; the damage had already been done simply by going on record in support of the coup. In but 202 il1—advised words, which gave the coup the PKl's public endorsement, Harian Rakjat had provided the army with the documentary Justification for the PKI’s own obliteration. *The PKI was shrewd in deceiving the public into thinking that the 30 September Movement was nothing more than an internal problem of the Army. The coup had been deliberately staged to look that way, for instance, in the selection of Untung as the nominal leader of the coup. _ His first public proclamation of the coup emphasized the point that the coup was an internal matter within the army. The Harian Rakjat editorial simply picked up the theme that had already been decided on as the cover story for the coup. It proved to be a convincing cover story that was accepted by many people at the time, -57- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 89] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 In keeping with the paper's normal publishing routine, the 2 October morning edition was probably set and printed late the previous afternoon.* At that time, events seemed to be going well enough for the coup forces that the newspaper's editors would have felt confidence enough in expressing such an opinion. As far as the timing is concerned, they could have been reacting to events as they happened, but it seems clear that they were actually prepared for events to the extent of having the editorial ready for publication before l October. It is doubtful that the editors would have taken a stand on a matter of such importance except on the direct orders of the Politburo--or Aidit himself--which would almost have to have been agreed upon before the coup. The editorial reflects a cautious—but-positive attitude which would have appealed to Aidit and suggests that he may even have written it himself. For these reasons, which can be deduced from the editorial as it appeared and when\it appeared, it would seem that the PKI must have had foreknowledge of the coup. Considering all the other evidence we have that the PKI not only had foreknowledge of the coup but was deeply involved in planning the affair, it is obvious that the editorial was part of the planning from the beginning. The editorial stressed the point that the coup was purely an internal army affair which *Apparently, the 2 October edition of Harian Rakjat was on the newstands at the regular time on the morning of 2 October, which suggests that it was printed as usual the afternoon before. One other newspaper that appeared on 2 October-—Suluh Indonesia-—was published later than usual that day. _Although it was stated that it was due to "technical difficulties", obviously, it was due to the coup. Suluh Indonesia's reaction to the covp ifi interesting. It headlined its support and that of the PNI for Sukarno and denied knowing anything about the presence of PNI people on Untung's revolutionary council. In this way, it avoided taking a direct stand on the coup, in contrast to the stand taken by Harian Rakjat. _58_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 90] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 was the same point that Untung made in his first public announcement of the coup. Obviously, this was the story invented by the PKI to cover up PKI involvement in the coup. The editorial in Harian Rakjat was simply part of PKI planning ahead of time to have it accepted as the real explanation for the coup. There is still the unanswered question of why the PKI leaders who were responsible for Harian Rakjat did not stop its distribution early on the morning of 2 October when they must have realized that the coup had failed miserably. Though the newspaper would have been printed and ready for distribution, they could certainly have prevented its circulation. The fact that they did not was probably because they were acting on previous instructions from Aidit or the Politburo and they were not prepared to do anything different without new instructions on the matter. In the confusion of the moment, Aidit obviously did not have the time or the opportunity to contact the editors of Harian Rakjat, if the matter of the editorial even occurred to him. He was totally occupied at the time with more important matters, such as trying to get Sukarno to go with him to Central Java-—and when that failed, with the matter of his own flight to Central Java, his personal safety, and his urgent need to contact Lukman and other top PKI leaders to decide on party policy in the emergency situation of the coup's collapse. ~ Whatever the reason, the publication of the 2 OCtOuér edition of Harian Rakjat with its editorial endorsing the coup was an act of political suicide. In this instance, the practice of democratic centralism within the party, which normally gave the party a certain strength because of its ability to react quickly to change (since it was totally responsive to the will of the central leadership), worked against the party, since various leadership levels within the party waited for orders from above instead of acting on their own according to their own best judgment of the situation. When the chain of command\broke down ——as it did on the night of l October-—the party was all but paralyzed and suddenly made very vulnerahle to attack. -59- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 91] === apet Py ew aS cs SS. SAE 2 ee Ee AES wo Re. he Se a a i Bea gargs:. ae Sica. ‘ ER Be ae Oe rn i Free Foe ie, | ES ROA” BETS PS py, ake PR, Steed lis See a Sere Rea tieig iA 25 | BREE pa yr eer . PRS Bert; : x - ee. at pe r ae ee 4 RRGen - oN: a net pie © Se ot lt eat or — erty Pare eaten E” a A BS Co Sere ee EE 5 ENV ge 8s et yee Cos Stop «ot od Sees Seas a / ae”. fo ae pees a tee “ “a—at P< nin ee eres TR Me pet bey ein * wpe RL A TS on ‘ ee re ET Winangt i ]: # ‘ wor TY ra +R. % oR cae POM Burning of the Communist Youth Headquarters [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 92] === EE EPR AIS ee mera ee a "ee “s Bie IP Ens peng ii Te os i, rete: Oe, eines Pe) Bact: ae es Le soar ie pest | RS bs SARA, a OT RE RERY ere OS pase p st Pee ESOT ar EA TRULY DEHN AL pes le es CS FEE ES OR. a epee BE OSES SE SES icv eee SS Sa eater rage Pee Ne ee eed Deel ST | ap ee MOIR Meet ee re ik a og Oa a a ee ts ee '& ee | ae 3 \\\\(\\tse EReES a, : Vi ad Ane 3H on ae, TI ets a ‘ io ae A ROSES aT oh Ee vate aa AL Vt oie Bee} < Fe Lin iad.: De EO Eee See eg ee Bettman <a epee Bieta 21S Sas a A gee eG a ee SESS. ate ' = _ Liryt rs, Sy" BAA) Lady Vis: ee a j ors Bees eg RA bed pA:. Wa. BRS OR” ee ie | Be TN OA) BRA. if = if" SF <= tf on f we ve & "es | oS op RSET he BS tS Pe ee}: ce aor (Eee og. a Fes E a Se > = eo eee he “7. = [Unreadable] _ PKI Headquarters after the anti-Communist demonstration in Djakarta on 8 October 1965 [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 93] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 The Postlude The Indonesian coup of September 1965 may well prove to be one of the most significant events of the post-war period. The political repercussions of the coup have not only changed the whole course of Indonesian history but they have had a profound effect on the world political scene, especially that of Southeast Asia. In the three years since the coup we have seen in Indonesia (1) a massive purge of the Communist party organization in which thousands of people lost their lives in one of the ghastliest and most concentrated bloodlettings of current times,* (2) the toppling of President Sukarno, who before the coup had the stature of a demigod on the Indonesian scene, and (3) a complete turnaboutt in the country's international alignment-- from that of being one of Communist China's closest allies in growing estrangement from the rest of the world and one of the harshest critics of the West to a new posture of being a friend of the West, seeking the goodwill of all other nations of the world except Communist China. These developments have all come about as a direct result of the coup. In a sense, they are really part of the story of the coup. But since each is also a story in itself and since this paper is intended to focus on the coup itself, they will not be treated in detail. Only those post-coup developments that seem to shed more light on the actions or intentions or sympathies of the main actors in the coup will be included in this brief postscript to the coup. *Estimates of the number of people killed in Indonesia in the anti-PKI bloodbath after the coup range from 87,000, the official Indonesian government estimate, to 500,000. The figure of 87,000, which is the figure the official commission appointed by Sukarno to investigate the anti—PKI massacres accepted as the best estimate of the number of people killed, is probably too low. The U.S. Embassy estimated the figure to be closer to 250,000. It would be a mistake to put too much faith in any of the various estimates. It was impossible, even at the time, to get accurate figures of the number of people killed in one neighborhood. ' (footnote continued on page 71 ) Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 94] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 As with the actual events of the coup, which were treated in the preceding section, the post-coup developments discussed in this section are, for the most, matters of established fact; they are part of the record against which we must examine the words and testimony of various individuals as to their role in the coup. The Central Command in Hiding The five men who composed the Central Command of the coup, who had emerged from obscurity to play the main role in a drama of unforeseen consequence, disappeared from the scene altogether as quickly as they had first appeared. After midnight on the lst of October, they played no further part in influencing the course of events. They were hunted men, the object of an immediate a d unrelenting search by the Army for all those responsgble for the coup. Their-one and only concern became that of self-preservation. They were constantly on the move, and, (footnote continued from page 70 ) Since it wasn't safe to travel around in Indonesia in those days, many areas were never visited by anyone interested in determining the number of people killed. Thus, there never was--and never will be--a reliable figure of the numbers dead as a result of the Indonesian coup. Undoubtedly, vast numbers were killed. The killings in Java alone put the Mau Mau massacres and the killings in the Congo in the shadow, although the latter got much more publicity. In terms of the numbers killed, the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930's, the Nazi mass_murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950's. In this regard, the Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most significant events of the 20th century, far more significant than many other events that have received much greater publicity. -71- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 95] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 as the army search for them intensified, it became harder and harder for them to find safe places to hide; when they did, they were virtually confined to that place, day _ in and day out. General Supardjo, who evaded longer than any of the other military officers capture involved in the coup (he was finally arrested in February 1967), has described the torture of his life as a fugitive for almost one and one-half years. During the whole time, he found only two or three occasions to communicate with former coup associates who were also in hiding. Sjam came to the house twice but didn't stay there. Apparently he was dodging raids and discussing the security of various people. I didn't have any discussions with him. I moved around to various houses in Djakarta. I changed identity cards. I practically never‘ went out. I was introduced as a relative of my various hosts. During all that time I never left Djakarta. People with whom I lived financed me. Once, for a period of one month, I ate nothing but rice and slept on the floor on a mat and an old pillow. Once I was able to send a message to my family in Bandung; they replied only that they were all right. I never saw them. For nine days after the coup, Untung and Latief travelled around the countryside outside Djakarta. The next day Latief was arrested in his wife's home in Djakarta. Untung headed for Central Java. Two days later, * Apparently, Latief was shot in both legs before he was captured. An infection is reported to have developed, resulting in the amputation of both legs. Although there has never been any confirmation of this, it is interesting that Latief never appeared at any of the court trials. He was not given a trial like Untung, Dani, Subandrio, Sudisman, Sjam, and the others, and his testimony at other trials, such as Untung's trial, was written testimony. There has been no reliable report on his physical condition from an,» one who has seen him in prison. He may still be alive, out it is thought that he was probably one of the four military leaders of the coup (one of whom was Untung) who were executed in December 1967. _ .72_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 96] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 he was recognized by two soldiers (though he was wearing civilian clothes) as he rode on a public bus which was on its way to his home town, and he too was arrested. He has described his travels after the coup: From the time that I left Lubang Buaja up to ll October I remained out of Djakarta, but I kept going around and around between Polonia, Djatinegara, and Utan Kaju together with Col. Latief.* On l0 October Col. Latief requested that he and I split up and thus I split from Col. Latief, and on ll October I and Damiri left Djatinegara for Krawang and then went directly to Tjikampek where we spent the night. Between 12-13 October I went to Central Java but on 13 October I was arrested by the Tegal Branch of HANSIP in Tegal and taken to Bandung. and from there by armored car\- to Djakarta; where I have been under interrogation. According to one account of Untung's capture, which is probably apocryphal, the first words that Untung spoke after he was taken into custody were "That fellow Bung Karno (Sukarno) has let me down."** J Air Force Major Sujono was captured next, sometime around 15 October, though the circumstances of his arrest are not as well known. After these early arrests of three of the five men comprising the Central Command, it was almost a year and a half before the Army captured General Supardjo. He has commented as follows on his activities during that time: Sjam and I left Lubang Buaja and headed south toward-the highway. I was wearing civilian *Polonia, Djatinegara, and Utan Kaju are suburbs of Djakarta at the southern end of the city in the direction of Halim Air Force Base. Thus, Untung was traveling around in the area between Djakarta and Halim for over a week after the coup. **Tarzie Vittachi reports this in his book The Fall of Sukarno. He does not give the source of his information on Untung's capture. -73- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 97] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C 001 86624 /rv-3;. f--k\ [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] The capture of Untung Approved for Release: 2 023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 98] === s ES eee 3 Rie Sop RE NT west Rep eeere ee a fer Meteora OES. See, ESO aes ee te ete ree eae, EPS Be aa Soa Se Be renee RRS) Res Voy peat beaten Bs SEE, ss E Gee - 7 piames Sea: (2 oe set Sept [ie Reece iene. eS: Bee eyes Fy Pees ‘ een SE. FS mal &: ee LY, if ASN oy. ne; - pt - 7) ce Be SEARS 4ET oy x . ean i WT Be 3 > em AF a “4 eee NYE, { y a i [Unreadable] eee INR Ae A= eG, Eel) ye eee ms Ree GeR, on\<} $e ee - a oN SS ah: Seca £ i as ae esi |. —~. Ea ee’ Bae * BS [Unreadable] ae. 4 ey. ) ~ ~~ BS pe Oe, o S Ree Nw We XN BS Ps Lees —— c. s [Unreadable] 3 —. So 2 fs Untung at his trial [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 99] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 clothes. We boarded a small bus headed for Djakarta. We got off at the Tjitjih building and Sjam took me up an alley to a house behind the building. There Sjam and I separated. I had hoped that Sjam would take me to Sukarno so that things could be settled further. I was transferred to another house. The house probably belonged to one of the two civilians who were at the Central Command. I still had the letter from the President*.... My conversations with Marto Suwandi (in whose house Supardjo lived for a while) dealt mainly with my efforts to meet with Sukarno. My only intention was to discuss the follow-up to the dispersal of the troops, since I had been given the assignment (by the President) of dissolving the troops of the 30 September Movement. However, it was impossible to meet with Sukarno. I wrote a letter to the President saying that Sukarno's order had been carried out and the troops dispersed and explaining that this movement was not solely of a military nature since many of the people were involved. I asked the President to make a radio announcement which would allow me to meet safely with him. I gave it to another man, but there was no reply. I was considering being dropped near the palace and working my way in, but Suwandi didn't agree. No answer ever came from the palace. I wrote letters to the commander of KOSTRAD and the Army caretaker commander saying that I had not been consulted about the inclusion of my *Supardjo is reported to have had in his possession a letter from Sukarno which he used as a letter of introduction to the various people who befriended him during the time he was in hiding from the army after the coup. According to several reports, the letter was nothing more than the signed order which Sukarno is reported to have given Supardjo on the dispersing of the troops after the decision to stop the 30 September Movement had been made. _74_ Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 === [PDF page 100] === Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624 name on the list of members of the Revolutionary Council and that it should be stricken from the list. I was convinced that the situation would get better. I depended completely on the President. Once in mid-September 1966, Sudisman (the PKI leader) came to Suwandi's house. We talked about the security problem. They wanted to stay at Suwandi's house because this house seemed to be the safest, but I refused them. We also talked about the coup. Sudisman said the failure of the coup was due to the rashness of Aidit and his followers. I told him the problem was one of exploiting victory. It should not have been stopped when Sukarno so ordered. The Central Command lacked military technique. There was no unity of command, what with Untung, Sjam, and the others; and logistics were disorganized. We did not disquss the matter of rebuilding the PKI. I have never been a member of the PKI. The inclusion of my name (in the Revolutionary Council) was their doing. Supardjo's capture led to the arrest of Sjam in early March 1967 in Tjimahi, West Java, a small town near Bandung. On PKI orders, Sjam had left Djakarta within a week of*the coup and taken refuge in Bandung; he had left there for Tjimha only two days before his capture. During the months in hiding, he had been able to contact the new PKI leadership in Djakarta only three times--at the end of 1966, in January 1967, and in February 1967--if we are to believe Sjam's own testimony on these matters (and this writer at least, is prepared to accept Sjam's statements in this regard, for the reasons given on pages 311-316*). In mid—l966 Sjam had learned of the party 1eadership's decision to dissolve the Special Bureau, which he had headed, and transfer its functions to the West Java Greater Regional Committee. In reply to an inquiry regarding his status, he was informed that he was released from all responsibilities as Chief of the Old Special Bureau; it was emphasized that his safety was a matter of continuing concern to the party leadership. In his last communication with the party leadership, Sjam forwarded certain suggestions he had on the new organization of the party to the PKI leaders in Djakarta. *In addition to the general comments on the validity of ' interrogation reports as evidence that are made in the Appendix (pp. 311-316), there are one or two particular comments that should be made_in the case of Sjam. Once the Army got Sjam to (footnote continued on page 76) -75- Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624