Communism in the Free World (IR-6165), January 1953: Indonesia section on GERWIS

=== [PDF page 1] === “Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIASRBP86BO0269R000800080001-4. 2 [Unreadable] ’ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD IR -— 6165 January 1953 OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH Department of State ere Approved For Release 2007/( * === [PDF page 2] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.1 IR-6165.2 IR-6165.3 IR-6165.4 IR-6165.5 IR-6165.6 IR-6165.7 IR-6165.8 IR-6165.9 IR-6165.10 IR-6165.11 IR-6165.12 TR-6165.13 IR-6165.14 TR-6165.15 TR-6165.16 IR-6165.17 IR-6165.18 IR-6165.19 IR-6165.20 IR-6165.21 IR-6165.22 TR-6165.23 IR-6165.24 IR-6165.25 IR-6165.26 TR-6165.27 IR-6165.28 TR-6165.29 IR-6165.30 INDEX BURMA INDOCHINA INDONESIA MALAYA THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS THAILAND JAPAN ALGERIA EGYPT GREECE INDIA IRAN TRAQ ISRAEL MOROCCO PAKISTAN SYRIA — LEBANON TUNISIA FRANCE THE NETHERLANDS ICELAND ITALY SOUTH AFRICA SPAIN THE UNITED KINGDOM WEST GERMANY ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE GUATEMALA SECRET —- SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 3] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION TR-6165.1 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BURMA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 4] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Foreword IITs IIe III. VIe VII. VIII. XII. XTII. XIV. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, [Unreadable] Tactics Capabilities eevee Numerical Strength. Electoral Strength, ASSETS Military Strength and Organization Government Policy Toward Communism CAPABILITIES for Violent Action [Unreadable] Communist Influence in Labor «se eeeeecenves Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations. « e« «eese eee Communist Infiltration into Govermment. 2. «ee Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. Communist Infiltration of Non-Conmunist Political Parties Communist Propaganda Media.. « ee « e Financial Condition Soviet—Satellite Official Assets « 2 « e Communist International Organizations. Communist Communication Network SECRET =~ SHCURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Page [Unreadable] 10 13 13 14 15 18 19 === [PDF page 5] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. ‘SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 6] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN BURMA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Commnists in Burma are at present pursuing a two-pronged, \and not completely consistent, policy. The illegal Commnist underground+ is continuing the insurrection which began in 1948, and seems at present to be concentrating on maintaining and consolidating its control over “base areas,“ while training and strengthening guerrilla units for future action. Efforts are also being made to develop effective alliances with other insurgent groups such as the White Band element of the People's Volunteer Organization and the Karen National Defense Organization. At the same time, the above-ground, Commnist-dominated Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP), which is recognized by the government as a legal opposition group, seems most concerned with its own internal organization and with programs designed to develop popular support for the Party. The BWPP is agitating for an end to insurgency through formation of a coalition government including opposition elements. Communist efforts to recruit support within the Overseas Chinese Commnity are spearheaded by the China Democratic League (CDL). Within the framework of these general objectives, the Communist parties seek a number of immediate goals. Domestically, current efforts are concentrated on: 1. combating the growth of anti-Communist sentiment among the overseas Chinese; 2. penetrating Buddhist organizations; 3. increasing the membership of “mass organizations," which have thus far been relatively small in Burma; and 4. undermining the political position of the government and the Socialist Party which is its dominant element. Internationally, the chief immediate goal is to prevent a shift in official Burmese foreign policy toward the West and the US in particular. Tl. References in this section to insurgent activity refer principally to action by the Burma Commnist Party (BCP). Other Commnist underground groups include: (1) the Communist Party (Burma) -- CP(B) -- which is a relatively small splinter group, and (2) a band of China-trained guerrillas under leadership of the Kachin renegade Naw Seng, which does not appear to be in contact with the BCP. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 7] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There is, to some extent, a conflict between the policy of preparation for eventual overthrow of the government and “legal" efforts to establish a broad popular base and to create pressures leading to a coalition government. The GUB is unlikely to be responsive to demands for a coalition as long as armed insurrection contimes to threaten the political and economic stability of the nation, despite its apparent acquiescence in a rather artificial distinction between — ‘BCP insurgency and BWPP legal action. At the present time, overall Communist strategy seems to favor the “legal” efforts of the BWPP. II. TACTICS Current tactics include attempts to establish collaborative arrangements with other political groups and attempts to win direct following, for the party or its fronts, from diverse elements within the Burman and minority populations. The strength of the Communist appeal rests in the coincidence of certain aspeots of current Commnist policy with general Burmese fears and aspirations -- neutralist, anticolonialist, and “peace” sentiments. The basically Marxist orientation of most present-day Burmese leaders, and the lingering sense of attachment to the homeland among the Chinese commnity also favor Commnist efforts. Special appeals are directed to identifiable groups within the population -- particularly youth and students and, most recently, the Buddhist leaders. There are some reports that Commnist propagandists, perhaps aided by Chinese specialists, are attempting to subvert the minority peoples along the Sino-Burma border. The BWPP's small delegation in the Chamber of Deputies is important primarily as a focal point for expression of whet are basically extra-parliamentary political pressures. Popular organizations controlled by the BWPP or its labor wing, the Burma Trade Union Congress, are utilized to create the impression of popular cemand for policies favored by the Party. In addition to opposing the specific actions or presumed intentions of the Government, political pressures have been used in an attempt to destroy public confidence in the competence of the present Government. In planning its program, the BWPP seems to be responsive to direction from the Chinese Embassy, through which it apparently receives some financial support. At the same time, guerrilla activity is continuing among underground groups. Although the BCP forces have inoreasingly been broken up into small groups by Government military pressure, marauding bands still render large areas of the country insewre. Present insurgent military operations seem designed primarily to secure supplies and manpower, and to keep government forces off balance. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 8] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET » SECURITY INFORMATION III. CAPABILITIES The BCP is capable of continuing its present level of guerrillatype insurgency, thereby preventing the consolidation of government control over all Burma and retarding economic recovery and development. The BYPP appears to have sufficient leadership, and an adequately disciplined organization, to continue its agitational and penetration tactics, designed to maintain political pressure on the government and retard its slowly emerging trend toward a closer relationship with the West. The prospects for future Communist action will be determined largely by developments outside Burma, particularly decisions concerning broader Asian strategy. In the event of direct invasion or a greatly magnified program of direct aid to insurgent groups, the stability of the GUB would be seriously threatened. The Government might, in the absence of immediate and effective help from the West, seek accommodation with Asian Commnism, and it is relatively certain that the prestige and power of local Communist elements would be rapidly magnified. In the absence of external intervention, however, the Government will probably contime to make progress in its efforts to suppress the insurgents and may, as larger areas of the country are secured, be emboldened to take more restrictive measures against “legal” Commnist elements. In that event, the BVPP, which now appears to be the chief instrument of international Commnist policy in Burma, might find its access to propaganda outlets circumscribed and its ability to manipulate front groups curtailed before its present organizational efforts have born fruit. In the absence of actual or imminently threatened invasion, or of unforeseen internal economic disorders, it seems unlikely that the parliamentary position of the BWPP will improve significantly or that its mass base will grow materially. The capacity of Burmese Communist groups to support Soviet policy will, therefore, depend directly on Soviet (or Chinese) action. The 1948 insurrection by the BCP has thus far failed in its primary aim of overthrowing the government and, balanced against an improving government position, its future is even less promising. Were it not for the ever-present threat that the Burmese future will be overwhelmed by events beyond its borders, it might be predicted that the Communist conspiracy would continue to wither, although at an agonizingly slow rate. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 9] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM. IN BURMA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH An assessment of Communist strength in Burma must include both the illegal insurgent movement and above-ground Communist elements. Available data are insufficient to permit a definitive statement of total numerical strength. The Burma Communist Party (BCP) is the most important element of the underground movement. Its membership is estimated to be about 5,000. A small splinter group, the Communist Party (Burma) -- CP(B) -- was estimated in 1951 to have about 300 members and candidates. The CP(B) split from the BCP in 1946 as a result of personal differences within the Communist leadership. The two groups, however, reportedly concluded an agreement for at least limited military cooperation in August 1952. The principal above-ground group now appears to be the Burma Workers and Peasents Party (BWPP), which was formed in December 1950 by a group of dissident Socialists. The party membership is unknown, but it has become increasingly well disciplined and energetic, taking effective leadership of Communist-dominated "front groups." The most significant of the latter are: (1) the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC) with a present estimated membership of about 2,000; (2) the All- Burma Peasants Organization (ABPO), which claims a membership of 100,000, probably with considerable exaggeration; (3) the World Peace Congress (Burma) with a small but vocal membership; and (4) the People's Youth Organization (PYO), which was founded only in December 1952 but which has considerable potential importance. Communist organizations within the Overseas Chinese community are dominated by the China Democratic League (CDL), the nearest equivalent of a Chinese Communist Party. The League's membership is unknown. Although the membership of Communist organizations therefore seems relatively small, the number of individuals who are subject to Communist influence and pressure is probably significantly higher, partly because of widespread receptivity in Burma to a number of aspects of current Communist propaganda efforts. The number who are "strongly influenced” by Communist elements should probably include most of the membership of the non-Communist Trade Union Congress (Burma), and the membership of the People's Peace Front (PPF) and Mahabama parties, which collaborate with the BWPP. The Chinese population as a whole remains vulnerable to Communist pressure, but since 1950 vigorous efforts by non-Communist Chinese elements have probably reduced the number who are strongly influenced. Rural populations are exposed to Communist propaganda and organizational effort for short periods in the course of guerrilla operations. Although no adequate fignres are SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 10] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION ~5available, it seems likely that 5 percent of the total Burmese population may be controlled or strongly influenced by Communist elements. Geographically, Communist strength is heavily concentrated in Rangoon and the southern towns of Burma (the BWPP and CDL groups) and in insurgent pockets in central and northern Burma (BCP). The main sources of Burmese Communist recruits appear to have been students and youth, intellectuals, and peasants; urban labor has thus far been less significant. Among the resident Chinese, the leadership is predominantly middle class in origins laboring classes provide the bulk of membership; end a number of businessmen appear to be passive sympathizers. Comparatively little is known concerning the quality and reliability of the Communist membership or of its leaders, Although the guerrilla groups undoubtedly inolude some elements whose prinoipal motivation is organized banditry, the leadership appears to possess firm political resolve and to be in effective control of its following. The surrender rate among insurgent groups has remained relatively low ' despite mounting government military pressure. Most of the leadership has belonged to Marxist, if not Communist, organizations for a period of five to ten years. The above-ground BWPP has recently been reorganized and “purified" in a move which has apparently strengthened its internal homogeneity and removed elements of doubtful reliability. Although it is probable that the total membership has declined somewhat since mid-1961, it seems likely that the strength and dependability of the party has increased, and that it will continue to exercise effective leadership of above-ground pro=Communist groups. The leadership of the China Democratic League is relatively more experienced and many of its important leaders have been trained in China. The membership of the League increased markedly between 1946 and 1950; in the last two years, however, its total strength has remained relatively stable and may have declined somewhat. II. SLECTORAL STRENGTH Since the underground Communist parties are outlawed, Communist voting power is reflected only in the votes received by candidates of the BWPP and the parties which support it -= chiefly the People's Peace Front and the Mahabama. The parliamentary strength of these groups in the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1951, related to the representation of other parties, is as follows: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 11] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Party - Number of seats BWPP 9 PPF, 3 Mahabama 1 Other opposition groups 27 The Government Coalition, including the Socialist Party 196 The most recent test of Communist electoral strength occurred 4n the Rangoon municipal elections of February 20, 1952. The three opposition parties listed above ran joint candidates, under the banner of the Triple Alliance. The coalition won only one seat out of 35, in contrast with a representation of 15 seats for comparable parties in the Council elected in 1949. However, these figures do not reflect BYPP strength adequately, for Triple Alliance candidates are reported to have received almost half the total vote given to candidates of the governing coalition (the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League). Nevertheless, the drastic decline in Council seats is significant because of the predominant role of Rangoon in national life. Although the BWPP and its affiliated groups are currently agitating for a coalition government including the Communists, there is no evidence of specific planning for future elections. IIt. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Communist insurrection in Burma, coupled with Karen insurgenoy and the depredations of non-political bandit gangs, has effectively and seriously retarded Burmese recovery from wartime devastation. It is a continuing, though somewhat diminishing, threat to the integrity of the state. The insurgency is exploited by aboveground Communist elements in their attacks on the government. Of the various insurgent elements, the Burma Communist Party (BCP) has been and remains the most significant. The party controls. as many as 8,000 guerrillas, which are now organized in small bands.. There have been no recent report of concentrations of more than 300 in a single group. The BCP is reported to have succeeded recently in establishing a coalition with two other underground elements: (1) the Communist Party (Burma), with an estimated strength of 1,000; and (2) some elements of the White Band People's Volunteer Organization -- total PVO strength is estimated at 5,000, but the effective strength of collaborating groups is unknown. A potentially important group, which is now apparently independent of the BCP, is a force of Kachin-Burman-Chinese guerrillas, estimated at 1,500, under the SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 12] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -7T7leadership of the renegade Naw Seng. Naw Seng's two battalions have been trained in China, and may represent the best disciplined and most thoroughly indoctrinated insurgent group. All insurgent groups appear to be currently concentrating on strengthening their control of limited, relatively inaccessible “base areas." BCP groups have been pushed back within the past year by. government military operations; their current strength is located chiefly in central Burma south of Mandalay, in northern Burma, and in the western region stretching toward the Chin Hills. CP(B) groups are located primarily in the Irrawaddy delta and westward toward the Araken. Naw Seng's force is reported to be in the Bhamo area in northern Burma. No significant military operations have been undertaken recently by the insurgent groups except the BCP, and these have been confined to hit-end-run raids against government outposts, attacks on transportation and communications lines, and harassment of villages which are inadequately protected. Troops not so engaged are concerned primarily with protecting Communist-held areas from government forces, but in case of attack, the Communists prefer to withdraw rather than fight as long as it is possible to remove supplies and equipment. Little has been learned concerning the administrative apparatus established by BCP groups in areas which they control. Although the party claims to govern local areas <= appointing officials, directing education, and controlling marketing -~ it is doubtful whether any permanent administrative apparatus has been established. Aboveground Communist groups are primarily responsible for propaganda activity, but the BCP has undoubtedly carried on some propagande work in connection with local recruiting efforts. The degree of popular support which Communist guerrillas have received seems to be a function of the military force which they can apply in any area. For the most part, the rural population appears to be passive, reacting to preponderant military pressure and aiding guerrillas only when coeroion is present or threatened. The guerrilla groups live off the country, and no central supply organization is known to exist. Even though the several groups are relatively independent, there is some intercommunication (including radio), and Communist intelligence concerning government operations appears to have been generally good. The BCP leadership has made persistent efforts to secure effective working arrangements with other insurgent groups. In August 1962, an agreement was reportedly reached with representatives SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 13] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION of the Communist Party (Burme) and some White Band elements of the People's Volunteer Organization, providing for collaboration and demarcation of respective areas of activity. Because of past personal antagonisms among leaders of the various groups, the realization of a working arrangement would appear to reflect desperation born of declining strength, or perhaps a BCP effort to qualify for more extensive Chinese assistance by providing evidence of effective leadership of all guerrilla elements. External assistance (from China) to the Communist guerrillas has thus far been sporadic and at a relatively low level. Some BCP cadres are reported to have received training in Yunnen. Naw Seng's guerrilla units heave been trained in China, and may pose a more significant long-term threat to the government by establishing a protected base area in a remote region of northern Burma. There are no reliable reports of significant amounts of arms being furnished to Burmese guerrillas from China. In its efforts to suppress the Communist insurgency, the Burma Government has been handicapped by the necessity of simultaneously conteining Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, attempting to subdue Karen rebels, and suppressing Moslem dissidents in the Arekan. Total government strength of about 60,000, including the Union Military Police, is heavily taxed by its varied responsibilities, and the forces available for anti-Communist efforts fluctuates from time to time, in accordance with demands created by the actions of other dissident groups. Key posts are manned; mobile reserves are maintained at central locations; and from time to time offensive actions are taken against isolated pockets of resistance. In the absence of stepped-up external assistance, the future capabilities of the Communist insurgents are not likely to improve. Although the guerrilla forces have been able to maintain their strength for some time, no significant expansion has taken place. It jis not clear whether manpower or arms shortages represent the chief limitation. On balence, the government position has improved within the past year; perhaps the most significant development has been the increasing fragmentation of guerrilla forces and the restoration of agrioultural production in some areas of the Irrawaddy delta which have been cleared on insurgents. In addition to weakening the resource base of the Communists, this development will, in the long run, contribute to the strength and stability of the government. So far as is knowm, the above-ground BWPP has organized no paramilitary units, and has no plans for participation in violent action. In order to keep its present legal status, the party must at least preserve the appearance of being no more than an opposition political party. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 14] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET «= SECURITY INFORMATION IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM Present government policy draws a somewhat artificial distinction between political pressure and insurgency which, in turn, has led to the development of the two arms of the Communist movement in Burma. The insurrectionary Communist parties -- BCP and CP(B) -- have been outlawed by the Government, and exist only as underground movements. The BWPP, however, is a legal, political party, has a small parliamentary representation (9 seats out of 232) and is relatively unobstructed in its manipulation of front groups. (Exception: the government has occasionally denied passports to proposed delegates to international Communist meetings.) Because of official reluctance to prevent distribution of literature whioh is not openly seditious, Communist propagandists have secured important outlets for dissemination of printed propagenda, taking advantage of an existing market for any literature which is interpreted as shedding light on “experiments in socialism." Recently, however the Home Minister issued a strong werning to publicists who spread false information, advocate armed uprising, or undermine the security of the state. “Within the Chinese community, the CDL and other Communist fronts have been permitted considerable political freedom of action in Burma, owing to the Burma Government's neutralist foreign policy, its desire not to antagonize Communist China, and to the fact that Peiping has not encouraged the Burma Chinese to indulge in overt agitation against the Burma Government. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist political activity is limited by the Burmese constitutional provisions that only Burmese nationals may vote and by the exclusion of a large proportion of the Chinese from Burmese citizenship. - During 1951-52, the increasingly vitriolic anti-Western tone of local Chinese Communist propaganda, which the Burma government deemed injurious to Burma's neutral position, and the affiliation of pro- Communist Chinese with Burmese extreme leftist opposition elements, led to the government's tacit encouragement of anti-Communist elements in the Chinese community. It is expected that the government will continue its present policy of sharply scrutinizing, though not | severely restricting, local Chinese Communist political activities, and of tacitly encouraging the anti-Communist Chinese. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR There is relatively little organized labor in Burma; total union membership is probably less than 70,000. The Socielistcontrolled Trade Union Congress (Burma) -= TUC(B) <- split in SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 15] === EE EEE EEE EEE EE ED EES 'S<SISS C—O Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ee AL LON -10- December 1950 when the BWPP was organized; the dissident union leaders formed the Burma Trade Uhion Congress (BTUC), which is now Comnunistcontrolled. The most important affiliates of the BTUC are the All-Burma Ministerial Services Union (ABMSU), which is small but vital because its members staff government offices, and the Chauk Oilfields Workers Front. Total BIUC membership was estimated in mid-1952 at less than 2,000. The percentage of Communists to non-Communists within the BTUC unions is unknown; the leadership is Communist, however, and © appears to be in effective control. In addition to the BIUC, there are at least a dozen Chinese labor unions, most of them small and concentrated in Rangoon; all except the Carpenters Union are Comunist-controlled. The Most important are those which deal with food marketing and hendling,. the Teachers Union, and the Stevedores Union., Apart from Communist-controlled unions, there is probably some surviving Communist influence in most of the unions affiliated with the Socialist-led TUC(B). Since the 1950 split, the struggle for control between BIUC and TUC(B) leaders has been particularly strong in the Inland Water Transport Workers Union and its five subsidiary groups. Although the leadership now supports the TUC(B), Communist influence may still be prevalent in some locals. The Communist-controlled BIUC has been affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) since July 1951. The status of the TUC(B) in relation to WFIU is at present unclear. Prior to the 1950 split which led to formation of the BTUC, the parent organization had been affiliated. A 1951 May Day resolution expressed interest in | continued membership, but TUC(B) leaders have since stated that the, ‘group is not presently affiliated. It is certain that the TUC(B) has not been active in WFTU affairs. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORSANIZATIONS The most active Communist front organizations are in the fields of youth and student activities, international "friendship" societies and the Communist "peace movement," and among the Overseas Chinese. The following groups merit special mention: 1. Youth: There are two underground youth organizations, the Communist Youth League and the Democratic People's Youth League, which are probably small but under effective BCP control. The BYPP sponsored no distinct youth organization until December 1952, when the People's SECRET - SECURITY. INFORMATION a ne === [PDF page 16] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION OEE Youth Organization (PYO) was founded. Although at present, in the formative stage, the PYO may become the focal point for Communist activity among youth and students. The only non-Communist youth organization, the Burma Youth League, is non-political and relatively insignificant. 2. Students: The All-Burma Students Federation (ABSF) and the All-Rangoon Students Union are believed to be Communist-controlled. The ABSF is probably affiliated with the International Union of Students. The only competing organization is the Rangoon University Students Union (RUSU) which has experienced a continual struggle for control between Communist and non-Comnunist elements. The most recent elections for union officers reflect some persisting. Communist influence.. _-/3« The World Peace Council: The Burma Branch of the World Peace Council -- B) -- is probably one of the most significant "front" groups although its active membership is believed to be relatively small. Branches of the parent organization have been established in a number of towns, and the group may be the most effective instrument - for dissemination of Communist propaganda outside of Rangoon. The Council is controlled by the BWPP; its Secretary General, Ba Nyein, is a member of the BWPP Executive Committee and is considered the party's “leading thinker." 4. Chinese Organizations: A number of organizations within the Overseas Chinese community are Communist-controlled or at least pro= Peiping. Next to the China Democratic League, the most important Chinese group is the Chamber of Commerce. Its leadership is predominantly pro-Peiping, although control is being vigorously contested by anti-Conmunist elements within the Chamber. The Hui-an Young Men's Association, the Chinese Youth Society, and the Chinese Students Union attempt to spread Communist influence among youth and students; the first two are outstanding among all Chinese youth organizations. Of the several regional Chinese societies, the Fukienese Association is the only ohe which is considered to be Communist-dominated. Other Communist-controlled Chinese organizations include: the Chinese Women's Association, the Women's Welfare Workers Society, the Burma Chinese Relief Association, and the Burma Chinese Cultural Union. 5. Women: The All-Burma Women's Freedon League, formed by the BWPP in January 1951, is the most active of three legal women's organizations in Burma. A smaller group, the All-Burma Women's Union, is controlled by the BCP and has been underground since 1947. 6. Friendship Societies: The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society. and the Burma-Soviet Cultural Association are small but significant. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION beens ee === [PDF page 17] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -12groups, because membership is drawn largely from educated and therefore relatively influential classes. The former is now composed exclusively of Burmese, and is devoted to promoting interest in China and preserving "traditional ties of friendship." The latter was formed with tacit approval of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, but appears to be operated by Burmese, including some non-Communists, who are interested in Soviet culture. 7. Minorities: Apart from the numerous Chinese organizations, the principal minority groups controlled by Communists or Comnunistsympathizers are the All-Burma Indian Youth League and the All-Burma Indian Congress. Communist penetration of the Indian minority has been largely limited to laborers, some of whom are also represented in Communist-dominated unions. Organizational efforts appear to be directed at present toward enlarging Communist-controlled units within important organizations and securing mass support for the propaganda appeals of above-ground Communist groups. Most politically conscious Burmese support some policies which are currently advocated by local Comnunists: OSes resolution of the problem posed by the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, some aspects of the "peace™ campaign, and anti-colonialism. It has not been possible to determine the extent to which advocacy of such programs by non-Communist Burmese represents conscious support of particular Communist policies. Quite clearly, however, Commmist influence extends beyond those organizations which are controlled or strongly influenced by Comnunists. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ~ -SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 18] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Direct Communist infiltration of the Burma Government appears to have been slight. So far as is known, no Commnists are represented in policy-making bodies or in top levels of the military and police organizations. Although there are probably some Communists or Commmnistsympathizers on the staffs of. the several government departments, there is no evidence that they have had a direct impact on policies and pro= grams of the government. Nevertheless, it may be well to point out that, indirectly at least, Communist “influence” is present within the government at almost all levels. The most important Commnist asset is the strength of Comminist China; fear of antagonizing the powerful neighbor to the north has been directly responsible for the government's rigid verbal adherence © to a neutral foreign policy. Secondly, most government officials subscribe to Marxist views in ‘fields such as economic organization, and their background has stimulated an interest in “socialist experiments" in other parts of the world. Many are known to read Soviet and Chinese literature. This indirect influence is stronger with some individuals than others. The present Minister of Land Nationalization, Thakin Tin, for example, holds _ extreme leftist views on nationalization and collectivization, although he is not known to be a Commnist. In general, there is far more interest in the Chinese “experiment" than in the Soviet Union, and it is doubtful whether such interest is attributable, at the top levels of government, to direct Communist infiltration. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Just as there is some indirect Commnist influence at official levels, so interest in China and to a limited degree a curiosity about the USSR have opened the way to. some Commnist influence on the public opinion-forming process. This is attributable as mich to the predispositions of non-Communist Burmese as to direct efforts by Communist elements. There is some Comminist influence in educational circles, particularly the Chinese schools and in higher Burmese educational:institutions. Of the more than 200 Chinese schools in Burma, a majority appear to be using Peiping-approved textbooks, although there has been some recession _in Communist penetration since 1950. There is also continuing Communist penetration of student groups at Rangoon University. Penetration of Buddhist circles has thrs far been slight, although efforts to secure Buddhist support for international Commnist “causes” SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Re e 2007/01/20: CIA-RD - === [PDF page 19] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION are currently being intensified, apparently with some success. The government has shown genuine concern over these developments, and is endeavoring to counteract Communist influence by stimulating Buddhist revival programs, denying passports to Buddhist priests recruited ‘for internetions1 Communist conferences, etc. The Communist press is relatively small, but non-Communist publications, on their own initiative, supvoort some current Communist propaganda themes (most notably, the "menace" of Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, and evidences of "colonialism" in all parts of the world.) The Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has recently secured an outlet for Chinese and Russian films, by renting the King Theater on a monthly basis. During 1951 over 100 Chinese films were exhibited in Rangoon, and although the contents are not knowm, it seems safe to assume that. many ccentained Communist propaganda themes. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES No noteworthy infiltration of right-wing political organizations and parties has come to light. Among left-wing, non-Communist political groups, there has been considerable indirect influence; some elements of Communist dogma (anti-colonialism, collectivism) have wide appeal in most political circles in Burma, due to historical experience and Marxist training of most national leaders. Direct Communist influence, however, appears to be declining. There is an increasing tendency, particularly at the top levels, to distinguish between current Soviet behavior and the theoretical Marxist formations to which many Burmese leaders still adhere. Collaboration with Communist elements by some Karen leaders and Dr. Ba Maw's Mahabama party appears to be based on expediency, rather then on ideological -compatibility. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 20] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION X. COMMUNIST PROPACANDA MEDIA For practical purposes, the Rangoon press is synonymous with the Burmese press. Very little publishing activity is carried on outside the capital city, and for that reason, human-carrier techniques are probably more important in the dissemination of Communist propaganda than formal media of communication. In addition to the periodicals listed below, there is a considerable amount of pamphlet literature circulated within Burma, a good deal of it prepared or controlled by Communist organizationse A. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals Name Circulation - Remarks Ludu » 2,000. The nearest approach to a “party organ," except possibly for clandestine newsheets circulated in guerrilla areas. Pyi: Thu Ne Zin Unknown Said to be financed by (People's Daily) Chinese Embassy. Has appeared spasmodically since 1951. ‘Zin Min Pao 7 2,000 (1950 est.) Organ of CDL Be Pro-Communist Publications Guide Daily 35,000 Generally pro-Communist. Tainglonekyaw 3, 000 Sometimes prints Communist ‘propaganda materials. Red Star | 1,500 Generally follows interna-~ New Rangoon Evening 2,500 (1950 est.) Pro-Commnist New China Pao 4,000 (1950) Pro-Peiping, but does not follow Soviet "line." Life’ eekly (Chinese) Unknown ' A weekly “scandal sheet." SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release YOO //0 Oe CC IA-RDPS6BO002Z569RODOUSO008000 1-4 === [PDF page 21] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Co Printing Establishments The following information is incomplete, but probably covers the most important local sources of Communist publications, excluding newspapers: 1. Kyaw Linn Booksellers and Publishers, #180, 51st Street, Rangoon ~-= Kyaw Linn has translated and printed books on China and the USSR, in addition to distributing literature reportedly supplied through Soviet and Chinese Embassy channels in Delhi. Kyaw Linn reportedly has been aided by the Rangoon Chinese Embassy with an initial capital investment. The firm manages at least four — bookstalls on Bogyoke Street. The US Embassy has estimated that sales at each average more than 1,000 books per week. @e Myint Swe Publishing House, Rangoon -=|/ This firm is rete a reported to have translated and published some of the works of - Mao Tse-tung. It is not a prosperous concern. 3. Central Publishing House, Bogyoke Market, Rangoon <~ This firm publishes and sells Burmese translations of popular Comnunist literature. Do Imported Publications The following periodicals have been available, at various times, at the People's Literature House, 546 Merchant Street, Rangoon: l. Weekly New Times | Soviet Weekly Cross Roads Cominform Journal 2. Fortnightly Peoples China World Trade Jnion Movement. World Student Movement Soviet Land 3. Monthly Russia Today Soviet Literature Soviet Union SECRET - SECJRITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 22] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -17- Masses and Main Street Political Affairs Indo Soviet Czechoslovak Life China Monthly Review 4, Bi-Monthly Soviet Women In addition, “pamphlet literature seems to be distributed in fairly | large quantities. E. Publications of Soviet-Satellite Diplomtic Establishments Viet Minh representatives in Rangoon publish a weekly bulletin entitled “Vietnam Information." Its total circulation is unknowmm, Distribution to many parts of the world is handled in Rangoon. The Chinese Embassy apparently subsidizes one or more papers in- Rangoon, but is not known to publish any periodicals itself. Fe Radio Local radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, and no direct Communist influence has been discernible. There is no known Commnist broadcasting activity in Burma, except possibly for some radio communication among guerrilla units. The military network, if it exists, is probably used primarily for operational liaison and not for public propaganda activity. There is a limited audience for both Soviet and Chinese broadcastse Soviet broadcasting appears to be confined to daily transmissions in English directed to Southeast Asia, plus the Soviet Chinese-language service which can perhaps be heard in Burma. The audience for Chinese Communist broadcasts is probably limited to the Chinese community. Approximately 30 hours per week on international beams can be picked up in Burma. Although no figures are available, the number of radio receivers is sufficiently low so that radio is a much less significant medium for external propaganda than publications and personal contacte SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 23] === ——E—E————eoOoOomMN ee nee ee_ee ee nc, cn Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION KI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No quantitative data on Communist finances are available. It is doubtful whether the dues-paying membership of Communist organizations, particularly in the labor unions, is very large, and direot receipts of this kind can be only a minor element in total party finances. The underground guerrilla groups appear to be heavily dependent on local requisitioning and ‘Foraging in the. areas of current military operations. Above-ground Communist groups are known to receive contributions from businessmen and other groups which are vulnerable to persuasion or pressure. The China Democratic League, in particular, probably derives part of its financial support from merchants engaged in trade with Chinas It is not known, however, whether any of these firms exist primarily for purposes of financing Communist activitye Leaders of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party apparently receive som financial assistance through the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon. The money spent on local rallies (where, frequently, no collections are taken) suggests outside financial help. In addition, supplies of Chinese Communist publications are a direct contribution to local Communist propaganda activity. It is not known whether the Soviet Embassy has contributed directly to local party finances. In general, the financial condition of the Burmese. Communists appears to be poor, with the exception of activities connected with the increasingly virulent propaganda campaign. The guerrilla groups have been able to sustain their present level of activity, but do not appear to have financial resources adequate to attract wider support or to procure additional arms.. Chinese Communist elements, by virtue of their ability to exact donations from local businessmen, are in much better financial.condition than the Burmese groupse SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 24] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Ae Communi st China “the first Chinese Communist Ambassador to Burma presented his credentials in September 1950. By August 1952, the Embassy staff was. reported to include 15 principal officers and 26 other members. Many of these individuals are described as “active outside," implying that considerable efforts are made to keep in contact with local Chinese organizations of various types. Supplies of printed propaganda are apparently funneled through the Embassy for distribution throughout the Chinese community, utilizing schools, commercial, labor, and cul-~ tural organizations as outlets and as centers for displays. It is probable that propaganda activity, in the broadest sense, is an important responsibility of most members of the Embassy staff. The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society also functions with support from the Chinese Embassy. Its membership (total unknown but apparently relatively small) includes non-Communists interested in oultural relations with China as well as pro-Commmist elements. ( Be. USSR The Soviet Embassy was established in Rangoon in April 1951, with an original -steff of eight. In late 1951, the total staff was reported to number 31, including housekeeping and administrative personnel. The Embassy has a Press Attache, and it seems probable that other staff members are engaged in essentially propaganda and contact work, since the size of the Embassy is greater than regular Embassy activities would The Burma-Soviet Cultural Association, headed by a respected member of the Rangoon University faculty, was founded early in 1952. The Soviet Embassy appears to have left the initiative primarily to Burmese intellectuals interested in the USSR, with quiet encouragement for the society's activities. The first open meting was attended by about 200 persons, but active membership is not known. - Ce. European Satellites A Czechoslovak Consulate General was opened July 10, 1952, but no information on its staff is available. A Hungarian trade delegation is reported to be in Rangoon, but its size also is unknowne The activities of both the Czech Consul General and the Hungarian trade delegation members, although ostensibly directed toward increasing trade, probably include activities which should be labeled as propaganda. C |. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ved Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 25] === eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although no international Communist organizations maintain permanent bureaus or offices in Burma, the activities of some of these groups have been an important part of the total Communist propaganda effort in Burma. Local propaganda organs play up Burmese participation in international conferences both before and after Burmese delegations have gone abroad. Delegations have been sent to the following recent conferences: Meeting - Date - Size of Delegation World Youth Festival - Berlin Aug. 1951 5. Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 7 Asian and Pacific Peace Conference - Peiping Sept. 1952. 26 - International Cultural Conference = Moscow — Oct. 1952 10 WFTU General Council - Berlin Nov. 1952 3. World Peace Council ~ Vienna Dec. 1952 20 Although the delegations have usually included Comunists, they have not been composed exclusively of known party members e Burmese participation in the work of international "front" organizations seems to have been largely limited to attendance at these conferencese Although no reliable data are available, it seems unlikely that financial contributions have been received from Burmese groupse On the contrary, the international organizations appear to. subsidize the participation of Burmese groups, at least to the extent -of underwriting expenses while travelers are in orbit countriese SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 26] === — aaa, Nee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK A. International Party Channels All Commnist elements in Burma emphasize the country's ties to China, because of a general Burmese sense of nearness to China and an interest in Chinese developments. Outwardly, therefore, the closest international links. appear to be with Communist China. Ties with the Indian Commnist Party have not been olose, although one finds occasional references to liaison with representatives of the East Bengal Communist Party. There is ample, although circumstantial, evidence that aboveground Communist elements follow international Communist directives concerning propaganda drives, although local implementation of specific campaigns is frequently tardy. Under the direction of local "front" groups, the world-wide "signature campaigns" are carried on in Burma, and particular propaganda themes related to Far Eastern affairs are generally carried in local organs. It is not known, however, whether _ the Chinese or the Soviet Embassy is the original source of directives to local groupse ( Although there are frequent reports of directives from Chinese or Soviet officials concerning party strategy in Burma, it is impossible to determine whether specific moves, particularly with reference to guerrilla activity, are the direct result of Chinese or Soviet direction. So Since early in 1952, there seems to have been a shift in emphasis, from Oo direct military action to above-ground agitation for a “united front" | government and an end to insurgency. It is not clear whether the military weakness of the insurgent groups is responsible for the shift, or whether it was made.in response to a directive concerning general Asian Communist strategy. Be Communication Facilities 1. International courier system. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon is kmown to have a regular courier service, and it is probable that the Soviet Embassy provides similar facilities. In addition, commercial channels are readily available within the Chinese community. There are reports that crew members of ships calling at Rangoon serve as contacts with both Chinese and Soviet Embassies, but details are unavailable. There is also direct overland communication with China, but it is not possible to state whether these routes are more important than sea contacts. Available evidence suggests, without definite proof, that the above-ground BWPP has direct access to the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon, and that the underground BCP maintains overland contact with China. ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 27] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION - 22. It is probable that arrangements for guerrilla training in China are made by direct liaison with Chinese officials in Yunnan. 2e Domestic communications. The nature of current Communist operations reduces the need for close integration among the several elements. Above-ground activities are concentrated in Rangoon and in major towns, and personal travel is limited only by deficiencies in local transportation. Underground activity is apparently linked by courier and radio facilities between guerrilla areas, but details are unavailable. Radio equipment is frequently moved to avoid capture, and the location of present installations is unknown. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION | === [PDF page 28] === OOO EEE dee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.2 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: - CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDOCHINA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 29] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword e«eseeeeve eevee ereeee eee ee 0 Ai OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES eee 1 Ie Objectives » e+e eee seers crrrrrr ree 1 II. TacticS «+ eceseseevveeve eevee ee eee 0 0 1 III. Capabilities..eeesceeceeerrr ere eer ese 3 ASSETS ec eeseccvecs § 4& Ie Numerical Strength » se eeescesccsrveoes h It. Electoral Strength seesccececsceeseeee 5 III, Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism « ». «+ «eee se 10 Ve Communist Influence in Labor «ee ees ceces cee “12 VI. | Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and - Professional Organizations «. ee«e«eses see 0 6 @ 13 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government eoeceoseeee 1h VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation « « e 1h IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-—Communist Political Parties escececseseeeeeeeevee eevee ae 15 Xe Communist Propaganda Media..e«seseeeeseeeeve 15 XI. Financial Condition.« «© «e«sceerceer eee se oo e 17 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets...eeeeeeee 217 XIII. Communist International Organizations..2«eee«eees 18 XIV. Communist Communication Network. eee eeceecvece 19 C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 30] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 31] === Approved For Release’ 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 - SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDOCHINA; OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES All of the immediate objectives of the Communists in Indochina are related to their effort to win the bitter civil war which they are waging against the forces of the French Union. Within the area which they have conquered, the Communist objective is to improve their control over population and resources in order to maximize their total military effort. Within the areas controlled by the legitimate Governmnts of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Communist objectives are: 1. To subvert the loyalty of the population. 2 To improve the party's covert organization. II. TACTICS Communism's objectives in Indochina are furthered by the Soviet and satellite-recognized "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," its Chinese~supported and equipped army, its administrative and control organizations (police, secret and security services, propaganda organizations, administrative. cadres), and by its popular front movement, the “Lien Viet" or "National Unity Front." The entire insurrectionary structure is held together and controlled by the Laodong (Commmnist) Party. It is the Laodong Party which, in the final resort, operates the complex mechanism of war, propaganda, and compulsion which appears to the people of Vietnam and to the outside world-as the “Viet Minh" movement. And the Laodong Party, in turn, is managed by a group of highly trained and thoroughly experienced revolutionary leaders. The Communist Party in Indochina uses both military tactics and political warfare tactics to further its over-all objectives. Its military tactics are designed: (1) to inflict maximum disruption and destruction on enemy forces and enemy war potential in the rear zones, with the minimum expenditure of Viet Minh forces; (2) to infiltrate, ocoupy, and consolidate territory with a view to securing a continuing reservoir of potential manpower recruitment for the army and to finding the necessary economic means (mainly food) to support intensification of the ware These tactics have been highly successful. For over six years the Viet Minh has inflicted heavy casualties on the Franco-Vietnamese forces, while paralyzing Indochinese. economic life and preventing the country's recovery. The Viet Minh is now strongly established in North and Northwest Tonkin, in the lightly industrialized and food-producing regions SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION eee ae === [PDF page 32] === 0 eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION of North Central Vietnam, and in the coastal plains of South Central Vietnam. Most of China's long common boundary with Indochina is now in Viet Minh hands, permitting continued Chinese Commmist assistance to the Viet Minh armed forces,. Commmist political warfare tactics are designed: (1) to extend Communist influence among all social and economic groups in the populations of Vietnan, Cambodia, and Laos; and (2) to consolidat Commmist control over conquered areas and populations.. Communist propaganda attempts to exploit sentiment "for independence" and "against French colonialism." To som extent, but only within carefully-drawn limits, the attempt to make the Viet Minh effort appear one of ganuine national resistance to a foreign colonizing power continues to displace certain other considerations in Communist tactics, Thus, Catholics in the Viet Minh zones have not. been persecuted, nor, until very recently, attacked ideologically, so that the pretense of continued Catholic support for the "war of resistance" could be maintained. Similarly, although agrarian reform has been strongly stressed,. landlords have been dispossessed only where it was essential to secure fuller cooperation on the part of the landless peasantry. Orthodox Communist doctrine has generally taken second place to “anti-imperialist" themes in Viet Minh propaganda. However, whenever the priority needs of intensifying the armed struggle have demanded that themes of "national unity" and nationalistic propaganda be soft-pedalled, this has been done, particularly since 1951. Efforts to consolidate Commmist control over areas and populations already under Communist influence center upon the peasantry. Basic Viet Minh policies and the major part of its propaganda output are calculated to increase the peasantry's contribution to the military effort. Both within and outside the zones under direct Viet Minh control, the Communists rely heavily upon conspiratorial methods and upon a large and widespread system of terror and compulsion. Such a system has been essential not only in providing the necessary vehicle for Communist control of the vast masses of people (som 12 million) and the variegated leader-~ ship which the Viet Minh movement has brought under its banners, but also in order to gather the necessary intelligence for military operations and political warfare. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 33] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. III. CAPABILITIES If Franco-Vietnamese military strength in Indochina does not increase, the Viet Minh may becom strong enough within the next few years to be able, without identifiable Chinese Communist intervention, to break the current stalemate. While the Viet Minh's military capabilities are at present limited by its exclusion from the more. productive regions of Vietnam, this might be overcome by significantly increased Chinese Communist materiel and technical assistance and by conquest of further territory. At the same time, although the regime continues to be based largely on compulsion and terror and to depend mainly for the achievement of its objectives upon increasingly harsh exploitation of a war-weary peasantry, the Viet Minh's administrative and control capabilities seem adequate to counteract any growth of ‘discontent among the populations and armies under its control. The Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial portions of the populations outside its own zones, based partly on military prestige, partly on continued nationalist appeal, end partly on a widespread mechanism of compulsion and terror, is likely to be increased or decreased in. proportion to the military power and ideological dynamism which the free world, and above all the free states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos may be able to bring to bear against it. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION =F 1 PBA ROOOCHORDODOSOOOSOO0 1A === [PDF page 34] === a aaa Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDOCHINA: ASSETS I. WUMERICAL STRENGTH Communist Party membership, following and strength are heavily concentrated in the areas of Indochina controlled by the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam.* In the “DRV", the official Communist party, the LAO DONG (Workers) Party,has a membership variously estimated at between 50,000 and 715,000. Although reliable data on the number of people under Communist Party discipline is lacking, the all-encompassing coverage of the constituent organisations of the Conmmunist-controlled National Unity Front (LIEN VIET), suggests that a majority of the 12.7 million inhabitants of the "DRV" may be considered under effective Communist control, In the areas under the control of the Associated States governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Communist party is prosoribed. However, there are obviously Commmists in all of these areas, due to the ease with which the non-Communist regions oan be infiltrated. In Vietmam particularly, but also in Cambodia and Laos, a number of clandestine Viet Minh or Chinese-Conmunist-controlled organizations are believed to be operating... How many of the 9.9 million population of free Vietnam are under Communist discipline cannot be estimated. Clandestine Communist operations are, however, relatively successful. In part, this is due to a Widespread Communist system of compulsion; on the other hand, the Viet Minh cause continues to exert considerable national appeal in the free zones of Vietnam. It is possible that a substantial portion of the Vietnamese population and of the 800,000 Chinese in Vietnam are sympathetic to the objectives of the Viet Minh and therefore susceptible to Communist influence. In Cambodia, it is unlikely that more than 10 percent of the population of 3 million (including the Chinese) are strongly influenced by Commmism. However, some 5000-10,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, mainly concentrated in the Southern provinces, are reported fighting in units of about companyesize against Franco-Kimer forces. In early 1952, the Chinese Communist regime claimed the loyalty of 60 percent of the 300,000 Chinese in Cambodia. While this claim is undoubtedly exaggerated, a substantial percentage of the Chinese in Cambodia are believed to be under Communist influence, In Laos, the number of people under Communist influence is believed to be extremely small - perhaps one percent of the one million population. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 35] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION The number of Viet Minh guerrillas in Laos is estimated at about 5,000. Communist strength is believed heaviest in the DRV-controlled provinces of North Tonkin and North Central Annam; less numerous in "DRY" areas in Central Annam and Cochinchina. Communist influence in free Vietnam is probably strongest in the urban areas of Saigon-Cholon, Hanoi, and Haiphong. In Cambodia, Viet Minh influence is strongest in the southern provinces where guerrilla units are concentrated, Chinese Communist influence in Cambodia is strongest in Phnom=Penh where the Chinese population is heavily concentrated. In Laos, Communist influence is strongest in the Bolovens Plateau region where the Viet Minh guerrillas are malnly based, Communist Party membership in Indochina is believed to be composed principally of professionals and government enployees. In the "DRV", industrial workers probably constitute an additional important membership groupe Communist leadership in Indochina is believed to be well-educated (Western Europe, China and the USSR), thoroughly experienced, completely dedicated, and competent to fulfill not only its present responsibilities but those it would inherit as a consequence of total victory in Indochina, The average age of the sixteen current top~level Communist leaders is 47. Many top leaders have been active since 1930, II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH On January 6, 1946, the Viet Minh Government held elections for a “Vietnam National Assembly" in an effort to legitimize its rule. In addition to the polling in areas of North and Central Vietnam under _. DRV control, clandestine votes were taken in parts of South Vietnam. There is considerable doubt as to the extent to which these elections reflected the popular will; an implausibly large vote was olaimed for a country where the parliamentary system is all but unknown, Among the 500-odd members of the “elected Assembly,” the Viet Minh (then ostensibly @ coalition of left-wing and nationalist parties under Communist domination) emerged as the largest party with 80 delegates. The 90 independents probably also included a significant number of Communists and another group of 15 Communists was elected umder the label of the “Marxist Party." No further elections have been held in the Communist~held areas of Indochine. Elections have, however, taken place in Laos and Cambodia and are now about to take place in free Vietnen, although, of course, without Communist participation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 36] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Ae Total Strength and Character of Communist Foroes The Viet Minh disposes of a total armed strength of about 315,000 men, distributed as follows: Regular Armys 130,000 Regional Forces: 75,000 People's Militias 110,000 The Regular “Aray is a well-trained, well-equipped, highly mobile, modern fighting force capable of waging effective positional warfare against Frence-Vietnamese forces. The Regional Forces are less well equipped and generally recruited regionally for static support of the Regular Army. The People's Militia is looally recruited for village defense and small-scale guerrilla action. Be ‘Security of Controlled Areas The Viet Minh armed forces of 315,000 men, which are employed both for the defense and security of controlled areas and for offensive operations based on these areas, are distributed within the "DRV"~controlled areas as follows: 174,000 men in Tonkin; 80,000 men in Central Vietnam; 46,000 in South Vietnam; 10,000 in Cambodia; and 5,000 in Laos. The population in Communist-controlled areas has generally been stable and tightly-controlled. Disturbances and riots have, however, occasionally been réported, particularly in the strongly Catholio Vinh and Thanh Hoa regions of North Central Vietnam. Civil administration in "DRV*-controlled zones is in the hands of administrative cadres directly responsible to the "DRV" Ministry of Interior. It is logical to suppose, although no information is available on the subject, that the Viet Minh armed forces have at least temporary control of civil administration in regions only recently conquered. This control is presumably exercised by political and administrative cadres of the Army. C. Military Support Organizations "DRV" supply, cqmmunications, and intelligence organizations are highly developed units operating at all levels of the military administration. Their authority is derived from Directorates attached to the General Staff of the army. Information concerning the strength of the various support organizations is not available although these organizations may be assumed to be quite large. Their networks are known to embrace all of Vietnam, including Franco-Vietnemese areas. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 37] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY. INFORMATION In view of the fact that North Vietnam is not only the theater of the most active military operations but also the seat of the "DRV® government, supply, conmunications, and liaison functions are presumably con-= centrated in that area. Intelligence activities are probably concentrated in urban centers (chiefly Hanoi and Saigon) as strongly as in strategic military areas, Available reports indicate that "DRV" support organizations have achieved a high degree of efficiency. D. External Military Support Reports from a variety of sources, in most cases neither evaluated nor confirmed, suggest that while certain supplies may originate elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, Communist China is the main source of military support to the Viet Minh. The following types of supplies have been reported:l — 1. Arms and amaunitions Mountain guns; anti-airoraft guns; light machine guns; heavy machine guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars; rifles, including Browning automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers; spare parts; ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators; projectiles; grenades and grenade throwers; and land mines, 2- Comniss 2 a. Foods Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and soy beans, flour. b. Clothing: Uniforms; cotton material; army blankets; cloth shoes; rubber shoes; steel helmets. _ 3. Transportation and communication equipment: Trucks; tires; spare parte; sasoltas; oil; kerosene; radio sets and field transmitters.. 4. Other: Medical and clinical supplies; X-ray metal testing equipment; balances; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives; saw T. Reports often include quantity figures, frequently between. 400 and 800 tons per month. Overlapping of the time periods covered and non-comparable quantity designations (e.g. rounds, cases, or tons of. ammunition), however, make it impossible to arrive at meaningful totals. Moreover, in a few cases where cross-cheoking of reported totals has been possible, resultant discrepancies have cast further doubt upon the validity of the figures reported. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 38] === Ne a ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION blades; iron and steel for making cables; electrical distributing machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers; oxygen~generating machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery. E. Military Operations Military operations in Indochina since 1946 have been conducted in virtually all areas of the peninsula, but have.been principally concentrated in North Vietnam (Tonkin). There, Communist forces have been fighting a savage battle for over six years for control of the crucial rice= producing Red River Delta (in which the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong are located), At present about 174,000 Communist troops are pitted against an estimated 185,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces in the Tonkin region. The principal tactic of the Communist forces has been to harrass ‘the Franco-Vietnamese Army by guerrilla warfare inside the Delta and by! massive attacks against isolated French posts aud cities outside the | Delta.: A turning point in the battle for Tonkin was reached in the fall of 1950, when Viet Minh forces, in quick succession. seized all French posts along. the China border (Langson, Caobang, Laokay)}, excepting only Monoay in the extreme eastern coastal sector. In the fall of 1952, Communist forces expelled the French from all of Northwest Tonkin, except Laichau and Nasan. At this moment, therefore, the Communist forces hold most of Tonkin outside of the key Delta region. The latter, however, in which the vast bulk of Franco-Vietnamese forces is now oconcentrated, has been heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh forces and is besieged at its periphery by some five Viet Minh divisions. In Central Vietnam, an estimated 75,000 Franco~-Vietnamese forces hold the narrow coastal plain from Faifo to Dong Hoi against some 80,000 Communists who are in control of the remainder of the area. In South Vietnam, an estimated 162,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces control most of the region, but conduct frequent and difficult operations against some 46,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, concentrated principally in the unhealthy and almost impenetrable swamps of the Plaine des Joncs, In Laos and Cambodia, Communist military operations are at present limited to smallscale harrassment by guerrilla forces, F. Popular Attitudes Toward the War The peasantry of Indochina has borne the main brunt of the long war, The peasantry serves as a reservoir of manpower for the armies involved, performs the coolie duties of supply, engages in sabotage and informer SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION © === [PDF page 39] === eee oe a ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -9operations at the order of one side or the other, constructs public works, and -- over and above all this ~~ produces the food for its om subsistence and that of the non-productive hundreds of thousands in the armies, By this time, the peasantry clearly abhors the war and anxiously hopes for its end, General passivity toward either side in the conflict may in fact be said to characterize the sentiments of the vast majority of Indochina's civilian population, However, passivity is less noticeable, and the effects of political warfare and propaganda by either side are more marked, among city dwellers. The nationalist pretentions of the Viet Minh, rather than Communiam itself, continue to hold much appeal for Indochina's urban population, whethor inside the Viet Minh zones or in areas of Franco-Vietnamese control, Ge Current Strategic and Tactical Objectives of the Communist Insurrection Current strategic and tactical objectives of the Communist insurrection are military and political consolidation over newly-won territories in northwest Tonkin, and intensified penstration by Viet Minh regular forces into the Franoco-Vietnamese~held Tonkin Delta area, The "DRV* probably will intensify guerrilla warfare in the plateaux region of Central Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam and may also attempt a limited military penetration into Laos, In Central Vietnam, the Communist forces will probably continue to maintain strong pressure against the Franco-Vietnamese forces along the coast, H. Relations of Communist to Non-Communist Insurrectionary Organizations 1. Vietnam. In June 1952 Colonel Trinh Minh The, former Chief of Staff of the armed forces of the autonomous politico-religious Caodaist movement, took to the bush with 2,500 men in South Vietnam to set up "the National Resistance Front," a "third force” opposed to both the Viet Minh and the French. Since the spring of 1952, when the French launched military operations against this group, Colonel The has not been heard from and his current whereabouts are unknown. There is no evidence that Colonel The has collaborated with the Viet Minh. 2. Cambodia, In March 1952, Son Ngoc Thanh, a leading Cambodian nationalist, organized a dissident nationalist movement. At first, the activities of this group seem to have been limited to propaganda attacks against the French and Cambodian King. In recent months, broadcasts of Son Ngoc Thanh have been increasingly favorable to the Viet Minh, but the present relationship between these two movements is not clear, 3. Cambodian and Leotian Issaraksa, The Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks, under the leadership respectively of Son Ngoo Minh and Prince SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 40] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Souphanouvong, have been formally allied with the Viet Minh movement since March 1951 when the “United National Front of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" was established. In the past, military efforts of the Issaraks have been for the most part limited to sporadic guerrilla warfare, banditry, and arms smuggling across the Thai border. A closer degree of cooperation seems to have been achieved during the past year between the Viet Minh and the Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. From 5,000 to 10,000 Viet Minh are reportedly with the Cambodian Issaraks and 5,000 with the Laotian Issaraks. In October and November, 1952, a Laotian delegate accompanied the Viet Minh delegation to the Asian and ‘Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping. In December delegates from both "Free Cambodia" and "Free Laos" participated in the World Peace Conference in Viennae I. Capabilities for Expansion and Action in the Near Future Despite the relatively low level of military industrial production within "DRV" areas and a reportedly increasing food shortage, the "DRV" could probably expand the present scope of its military activities to a limited extent without significantly increased support from Communist China or from other Orbit countries. If, as seems likely, the Issaraks receive greater material assistance and technical advice from the Viet Minh, they would be able to expand their numbers and extend their operations. - IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM A. Repressive Capabilities of the Associated States and France French and Associated States policy toward Communism in Indochina is the military destruction of the Viet Minh armed forces and complete eradication of Communist activities and influence throughout the peninsula. No Communist parties, groupings, or organizations are allowed to exist or operate in the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The overt circulation of Communist publicationsin Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas is prohibited and the possibility of Communist-oriented material appearing in the controlied press is negligible due to tight censorship exercised by both the French and the Associated States. Severe repressive measures are taken against any individuals, groups, or organizations believed operating under Communist instructions or for Communist SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 41] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION purposes. Such repressive measures are expected to contime until hostilities in Indochina have ceased and internal political stability ‘is assured. They are carried out by civilian seourity services of France and the Associated States, and insofar as the security of components of the French Union Armed Forces is concerned, by the military intelligence and counter-intelligence services of these forces. At present, the scope and effectiveness of repressive action of which the French and Associated States civilian and military seourity agencies are capable in Indochina cannot be rated better than fair. By contrast, Communist subversive operations are believed to be, on the whole, very effective. Possibly the greatest asset of Communist underground and subversive organizations of all types lies in the generally apathetic attitude of the Vietnamese population as a whole toward the conflict which is raging in its territory. B, Extent and Effectiveness of Communist Subversive Operations Communist subversive operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos fall into two major categories: those carried out by Viet Minh subversive teams end underground networks, and those carried out by clandestine Chinese Communist organizations,. Viet Minh organizations operating in the French and Associated States-controlled zones of Indochina are for the most part responsible directly to the central "DRY" government, or its regional representatives. They perform three general types of assigned tasks: propaganda; political, economic, and counter-intelligence;! and terrorism and sabotage. The propaganda function is carried out by teams responsible to the Information Services of the central "DRV" government. The total number or size of such teams is unknown,” but their effectiveness seems to have been considerable. Espionage activities are carried out by organizations and units of unknown size believed to be attached to the regional Cong An (Public Seourity Service) of the Viet Minh, which is the latter's Internal seourity organization, Espionage agents reportedly are assigned specialized tasks, the most important of which is the infiltration of French and Associated States intelligence and security services. Terrorism - and sabotage within the free zones is performed by the Dich Van which includes Death Volunteer Brigades, apparently assigned to operate in specific regions. The effectiveness of the Dich Van is reportedly great; it has seriously disrupted highway and rail traffic, damaged industrial and I.” Wilitary espionage is carried out by intelligence organizations responsible to the Directorate for Military Intelligence of the. “*DRV" Armed Forces General Staff. 2. Certain types of sabotage activities are carried out by organized guerrilla and commando units of the Armed Forces, 3 In 1951, ten such Information teams were reported to be operating in South Vietnam. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 42] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. -12-. military installations, and organized numerous terroristic acts in major urban centers, the most important of which was the assassination of a number of highly prominent French and Vietnamese civil and military personalities. One of the most successful activities of Viet Minh subversive organizations has been the extortion of money from prominent French and Chinese as well as from Vietnamese business firms. Many of these firms regularly pay large sums of "protection money” to Viet Minh agents in order to avoid bombing of their premises. The "DRV" benefits considerably by the intelligence activities carried out by Chinese Communist underground organizations in the non= Communist zones. Since 1949, the Comnunist-directed “Association for the Liberation of Overseas Chinese in Indoohina” has organized various clandestine student, women's and workers' organizations in Saigon-Cholon where approximately 80 percent of the total overseas Chinese population of some 800,000 is concentrated. During 1952, the creation of @ clandestine “United Action Committee of Democratic Sino-Vietnamese” was reported, also in Saigon-Cholon. In North Vietnam, the “Society of New Chinese Demoorats of Hanoi and Haiphong" reportedly intensified intelligence activities during 1952. The size of these organizations is unimom although it is believed they have been fairly successful in gaining the sympathy of certain of the Chinese population, particularly among students and workers. Specific underground aetivities which have been reported inolude extortions of money for the protection of relatives in China, the circulation of Communist tracts and publications believed to be for the most part procured in Hong Kong, and the placement or pro-Comunist instructors in Chinese schools, In Cambodia, the Chinese Communist Party, whose headquarters reportedly is leoated in Phnom-Penh, claims the sympathy of 60 percent of the 300,000 overseas Chinese in that country. No information is available concerning its activities or effectiveness, V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR In “DRV" controlled areas, all workers in key industries are controlled by Communist elements, although the number of Party members in specific enterprises is unknown. In the Associated States of Vietnan, Cambodia and Laos, the number of Communists in key industries, if any, is unknown.; In "DRV" areas of Vietnam, the General Confederation of Labor, which is controlled by the Communist Party, claimed "300,000 members” in 1952. The Confederation is composed of numerous affiliated trade unions organized at provincial levels throughout Vietnam. It has peen reported that although not all of its directors are Party members, those exercising any real authority are. The Confederation has been affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) since the former's organisation in 1946 and has been represented at WFTU Conferences since 1948, “In addition to the General Confederation of Labor, the Viet Minh reportedly organized a Trade Union Council in 1950 to embrace “intellectuals and civil servants." SECRET _ - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 43] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION No further information is available concerning this Council. In the free arefs of Vietnam, labor organizations were prohibited until the promulgation of the Labor Code on November 16, 1952. The principal Vietnamese labor union, which until last November operated as an association, is the Christian Confederation Vietnamienne du Travail Chretien, reported to have 5,000 members. A number of civil servants {in both the French and Vietnamese administrations, belong to Force Ouvriere which has its headquarters in France, Although provisions of the new Labor Code in Vietnam do not extend to the overseas Chinese population, Chinese labor groups have for some time been loosely associated in a Federation of Chinese Mutual Aid Societies, The 19 organizations comprising this Federation claim an aggregate membership of some 11,000. No information is available on Communist infiltration of, or ine fluence in, these labor unions in Franco-Vietnamese areas of Vietnam, However, the Chinese organizationa are the most likely to have been infiltrated or influenced by Communists. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIO ORGANIZATIONS In both the free and the Communist zones, the Lien Viet (National ( Unity) Front has developed an extensive and intricate network of front organizations to enlist the support of the peasants and special interest groups for the "resistance against French aggression.” The leaders of the front organizations are believed to be mostly well-indoctrinated and capable party cadres, many of whom work in more than one organization,. What appear to be the most important front organizations are listed belows 1. The Union of Vietnamese Youth claims a membership of 2,500,000 and has been affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth since 1947. 2. The Union of Vietnamese Students and Pupils has been affiliated with the International Students Union since 1948, 3. The Union of Vietnamese Women claimed 3,000,000 members as of 1950. It has been affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation since 1945, 4. The Catholic Association for National Salvation. 5. The Association of Vietnamese Journalists has been affiliated with the World Federation of Journalists sinoe 1950. 6. The Vietnam World Peace Committee is affiliated with the World Peace Council, ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] === [PDF page 44] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 144 7e The Vietnamese Peasants Association for National Salvation. 8. The Sino-Vietnamese friendship Association. 9. The SovieteVietnamese Friendship Association. In addition to Viet Minh front organizations, the Chinese Communist Party has organized various youth, workers‘, women's and cultural underground front organizations. These organizations are believed to be strongest in the Saigon-Cholon area of South Vietnam and in the Phnom- Penh region of Cambodia, where the majority of the overseas Chinese residents in Vietnam and Cambodia are located, - Many, if not all, of the "Lien Viet"front groups have effective. underground orgenizations within the areas under Franco-Yietnamese control, |, Little information is available concerning non-Communist social, cultural, or professional organizations which may have been infiltrated by Communists. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Such infiltration is unquestionably a serious problem for the anti-Communist govermmentSof the Associated States. Although policymaking bodies of these states are believed to be to a large extent free from subversive Communist personne] and influences, the seme can probably not be said with regard to the Armed Services, police and security services, and administrative cadres of the States. Communist subversion is believed to have reached particularly serious proportions within Vietnam's National Army. The Army Officer's Training Schoo] at Dalat has been reported strongly infiltrated by Communist elements, and certain Vietnamese troop companies in action in North Vietnam have proved of marked unreliability. The Vietnamese, and even French, security services in North Vietnam are also believed penetrated to some extent by Communist elements. No reports of Communist penetration of government agencies and services in Cambodia and Laos have been received, although it is likely that a limited degree of infiltration may be considered to have oocurred,. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION In the "DRV“-controlled zones of Vietnam, leaders of public proe pagenda organizations are usually Party cadres. Communist propaganda has undoubtedly reached nearly the entire population in these zones, chiefly through the effective organization of mass front organizations and compulsory study groups at provincial and village levels. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Annproved For Release DOO sip) ()_: A-RDPREROOQESROOORODDORO00 1.4 === [PDF page 45] === EE EEE EEE Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION In free Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, no known Communists are in a position to influence public opinion, There are probably a considerable number of concealed Viet Minh sympathizers or agents, however, in schools, journslistic, and literary groups. The prohibition of Communist publications, tight press censorship,and the extremely limited number of radio sets among the population in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas have tended to insulate the population from Communist publications and broadcasts. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist influence has been spread fairly successfully through clandestine operations and through direct contact of many individuals with underground Viet Minh agents. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON@COMMUNIST The most important non-Communist nationalist organizations and perties in Indochina are the Dai Viet Party, the Cao Dai politicoreligious group, the Vietnam Nationalist Party (vnqpp), and the Catholics in Vietnam, and the Democratic Party in Cambodia. Although information is generally lacking on their membership, these parties and groups are thought to embrace several hundred thousand members. The extent of Communist influence in these organizations is unknown, but is not bee lieved to be large due to the strongly anti-Communist, although clearly pro-nationslist, sentiments of most of their leadership. Branches of the above-mentioned organizations are still in some instances allowed to operate in "DRV"=-controlled zones, where the Catholics and some Caodaists, for exemple, maintain social organizations. However, the Communists have undoubtedly strongly infiltrated these branches and probably control them completely. The same would be true for nominally non-Conmunist parties and organizations existing only in the "DRV" Zones, such as the Vietnam Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, which the Communists continue to tolerate in order to bolster their nationalist pretensions, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA - A. Newspapers and Periodicals Listed below are the newspapers and periodicals know to have been published by the Viet Minh in 1951 or 1952. Where known, the frequency of publication and the principal area of circulation are indicated. These publications are also clandestinely distributed in Franco-Vietnamese-controlled areas by Viet Minh underground orgeniza= tions, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 46] === Approved For Release 2007/01/ e (Translation) ase 20070 URL _ClagBBBRABAR2EeR0000008000"- -4 - 16- Circulated When pub-= Organ of in lished Nam & 1. Ma jor Papers Tonkin (occasion= Cuu Quoo (National Salvation) Lien Viet ally oughout Daily Nhean Dan (The People ) When Dan (The People) Lao Dong (The Worker) Vie Laodong ‘North Vietnan Weekly (Worker's Party) (distributed in 27,000 copies) Laodong South Vietnam Monthly (Worker's Party) (distributed in 24,000 copies) Vietnam Federa- Unknown Unknown tion of Labor 2. Specialised and Provincial Publications | Gia Dink Quen Vist Bac China-Vietnem Doc Lap (Independence ) Tien Lien (Forward ) To Quoo Tran Het (The ~ Nation Above M1)” Dung Tien (To Go Forward —~"Bravely) Sang Danh Chua Dan Cay Quan Doi (New Strength) Economic Front Educational Review Administrative Unknown Two or Committee of three People's Army times Weekly People's Army and North Unknown Militia Vietnan Sino~Vietnamese Unknown Unknown Friendship Association Democratic Party Tonkin Unknown Socialist Party Unknown Unknown People's National Saigon-Cholon 3 or 4 Union times Weekly: _ “Organ of young men South Vietnam Unknown and children" Catholic Patriots Hanoi Sector Unknown Association Nambo of Unknown Unknown Peasants for National Salvation Unknow Phuyen Province Unknow South Trungbo Unknown Unknow Unknown Ministry of Educatim Unknown Unknow SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 47] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION BR. Radio The "DRV" controls the following broadcasting stations which have regularly scheduled programs beamed to Indochina and to Southeast Asias 1. Voice of Vietuam is regarded as the official government station. It is reportedly located in the Vinh area, News ig broadcast daily to Indochina and Southeast Asia in French, English, Tonkinese, Thai, Mandarin, and Cantonese. 2. Voice of South Vietnam has tentatively been located north Of Sal gone Tt broadcasts three programs daily of news and commentary in Cochinchinese and one in Mandarin. 3, Voice of Nambo is reputedly located in the Mekong Delta area. carries four programs of news and commentary daily, one each in Cochinchinese, French, Cantonese, and Cambodian. In Cambodia, the Voice of Issarak Cambodia is operated by the Issarak leader Son Ngoc Minh. Qnechalf hour of news and comment is broadcast daily in Cambodian. Radio Moscow broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese and occasionelly in Cochinohinese. Radio Peking broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese, and twice daily for 15 to 30 minutes in Thai. Reception of the Thai — language program is reported to be poor. Considering the small number of radio receiving sets in the Associated States, it is likely that Communist radio broadcasts reach only a very limited audience and achieve only limited propaganda effects outside the Commumist zones. Within these zones, however, they are used as an extremely important,and probably effective, means of disseminating propaganda and official orders to the population. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The "DRV" authorities collect both direct and indirect taxes, many of them in kind, impose "duties" on goods entering Communist zones from the Franco-Vietnamese zones, and exact "“voluntary*donations through various “enulation campaigns.” The emount of revenue thus collected is unknown, as is the size of any subsidies from international Communist organizations, donations or credits by Soviet or Satellite governments, or dues from party-controlled labor unions and fronts. Nor is any information available on the amount of revenue collected through extortion of Vietnamese, French, and Chinese business firms in the non-Communist ronese XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet bloc diplomatio establishments, trade, or cultural missions in free Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 48] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Although the USSR, Communist China, and other satellite countries have recognized the "DRV", they have not established diplomatic missions there. However, Communist China has sent various temporary military and economic missions to the Viet Minh. During 1952 a 50-man Chinese cultural mission was reportedly sent to Thai Nguyen in North Vietnam for the purpose of establishing political liaison with the "DRV" government, and an economic mission is said to have been-set up also in North Vietnam to study economic resources. Current estimates place the number of more or less permanent Chinese Communist personnel-- technicians, instructors, military and political advisors -~- with the Viet Minh at approximately 5,000. All Chinese Communist Missions are surrounded by secrecy. It is believed that contact between Chinese personnel and natives is held to a minimun. A Sino-Vistnamese Friendship Association and a Soviet-Vietnan Friendship Association were organised inside the "DRV"™ in early 1960. Both organizations are associated with the "Lien Viet Front” and have established branohes throughout "DRV"-controlled areas of Vietnam. These organizations are reported to have clandestine branches in the free areas, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon district. Propaganda committees are reported to have been established at the branch levels of both Associations. In addition to carrying out regular propaganda activities, these associations are responsible for sponsoring celebrations of major Chinese Commmist and Soviet holidays. The Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association has published a journal, China-Vietmam, since May 1950.. Oe XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS While it is not known to what extent, if any, the Viet Minh move-~ ment may have been aided materially by international Commmist organizations, it has been granted a significant extent of moral support by such organisations through invitations to participate, often in4® glorified role, in Communist international conferences. In the past two years, delegates from the "DRV" and in two instances from "Free Cambodia" and “Free Laos" have attended the following international Communist meetings: Meeting Date y Size of representation rom Indochina Vienna Peace Congress December 1952 11 (inoluding 2 from Cambodia and 1 from Laos) Asian and Pacific Peace October- 14 (including 2 Conference, Peiping November 1952 | from Laos ) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 49] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Size of representation Meoting Date = rom Indochina Preparatory Meeting for Peace June 1952 2 Conference of Asia and Pacific Regions, Peiping International Conference for June 1952 2 Defense of the Rights of Young People Chinese May Day Celebration, April-May 3 | Peiping 1952 | International Conference for April 1952 3 the Defense of Children, Vienna International Eoonomic March-April 4 Conference, Moscow 1952 World Peace Council, Vienna Nov.-Deo. 1951 5 Berlin Youth Festival August 195] 16 XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Communists in Indochina maintain closest international ties with Communist China, which recognized the "DRV" on January 18, 1950 and received the credentials of the first "DRV" Minister in April, 1951 (his status has now been raised to that of Ambassador), and with the USSR, which recognized the "DRV™ on January 30, 1950, and received the credentials of a "DRV" ambassador in April 1952. Close ties are __. .@€lso maintained, although much less prominently and for the most part covertly, with leaders of the French Communist Party. Relations have also developed between the Viet Minh leadership and leaders of the Eastern European and Korean Communist regimes. The clear harmony between Viet Minh and international Communist policies leaves no doubt that close coordination with the international Communist movement prevails. Proof that Communist China supplies highlevel guidance to the Viet Minh leadership was recently received in the form of a Chinese Communist broadcast supplying the "DRV" government with the draft of a proposed address by Ho Chi Minh, written in China by the "DRV" Ambassador to that country. It is likely that frequent consultations between China and the "DRV" take place, and that a certain amount of day-to-day guidance is provided by the temporary technical and military missions now present in the “DRV" areas, It is also probable that the Viet Minh representative in Moscow sends home frequent guidances and reports. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 50] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION Efficiency of "DRV" contacts with the main Communist centers in Peie-p'ing and Moscow is presumably very good, since the French now control only one of the customary routes across the Chinese-Vietnamese border, Radio contact between Communist China and the "DRV" is maintained through stations BAL 6 and GMH in China, which relay broadcasts between the "DRV", China, and other Communist countries. It is believed that contacts maintained by the Indochinese Communists with France and with other Southeast Asian or Pacific countries are probably less efficient. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 9 800080001-4 === [PDF page 51] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.3 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDONESIA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 52] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE CF CONTENTS Page Foreword.« « oe oeceoerereecre reer cece er ec eee ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. « « 1 Ie Objectives.. eccececs ce eresrercesresece 1 ITo Tactics «ee sees er ees creer roe vecee 1 III. Capabilities... sec ee cece ere eccece h ASSETS see ee eee cee § 6 ‘Te “Numerical Strengths... cececcccccecee 6 II. Electoral Strength... + eee eccccrvcse cece 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action. 7 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism «see e eee ce 7 V. Communist Influence inLabor..eseesccccsece 8 VIe Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations ««.eecesrscecvee 9 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government...eeeee VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation...e - ll IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Comnunist Political Parties a a 12 X. Communist Propaganda Media. «6 esceeceeccecvee 12 xI. Financial Condition. Coe cere err e er cee 13 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets...eseeeeeee 13 XIII. Communist International Organizations.«e«e«eeceee 14 XIV. Communist Communication Network...e.« e. eoeecees 15 - SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 53] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 54] === ———eeeeee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDONESIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The major current goals of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) are to gain general acceptance as a genuine nationalist party in Indonesia, to perfect the party organization and to consolidate control over a variety of front groups, including the largest of the labor federations in Indonesia. In pursuing these aims the PKI has attempted to recoup such prestige as it lost, first, in the course of the Madiun uprising in September 1948 and, second, as a result of a series of arrests of Communist leaders by the Indonesian government in August 1951. Secondarily, the PKI attempts, especially through the activities of its front organizations, to cause Indonesia's “independent foreign | policy" to be directed in such a way that ties with the Soviet bloc ere strengthened at the expense of relations with the West. Thus, the PKI advocates the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR, non~cooperation with the UN embargo on shipments of strategic items to Communist China, increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and rejection of US economic and military aid. The political climate in Indonesia, characterized by a lack of ( cohesive policy on the part of the major political parties and a general uncertainty as to the direction Indonesia will take in the | immediate future both domestically and internationally, enhances the PKI's capability to pursue these several objectives concurrently. While present emphasis is on furthering the domestic political fortunes of the party, particularly with the prospect of general elections in the next year, past experience suggests that should the requirements of international Communism demand it, a quick reversal might be effected, and international considerations be given precedence. At this stage it is not clear whether the PKI hopes to achieve its ultimate goal of direction of the Indonesian state through peaceful constitutional means, involving subversion of non-Commmnist groups, or through eventual armed insurrection. It is likely that the party's internal consolidation is pursued with both possibilities in view. II. TACTICS In its attempt to gain popular acceptance, the PKI has been — able to capitalize on existing anti-colonial sentiment and has taken a strong stand on a number of issues which also form a part of the programs of other political parties. Thus, the PKI advocates abrogetion of the Round Table Conference agreements with the Netherlands, SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 55] === 0 LL eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ~ termination of the activity of the Netherlands Military Miasion, "restoration" of Western New Guinea (Irian) to Indonesian control, end nationalization of such foreign enterprises as the North Sumatra oil fields and the Bangke and Billiton tin mines. These pronounced aims of the PKI, shared as they are with other political groups, appear to be only means to enhance the national standing of the party. More general tactics directed toward this same end are the publicly announced support of the present Wilopo government by the PKI and efforts apparently undertaken in various localities to form a series of "Representative Councils" under PKI leadership. These united front tactics were justified in a party statement issued in explanation of the first Communist support rendered an Indonesian government since Madiun: ‘ The formation of the Wilopo cabinet opened rather extensive possibilities to the PKI and the other people's orgenizations to work publicly; they need no longer perform underground activities as they did during the Sukiman...cabinet /preceding government/...This is the conclusion; in the present condition, the PKI and the people have to choose one of these two; a democratic bourgeois government or a fascist bourgeois one.... On several occasions since the end of the war, the PKI has stressed the desirability of a united front. The PKI has also attempted in the past year to seize the initiative in organizing celebrations of national holidays. - At the same time that the PKI has endeavored to reestablish a. patriotic reputation by positive action, it has refrained from outspoken opposition to the government's progrems, thus trying to. overcome a reputation for negativism. In conformance with this policy, the PKI was relatively restrained in recent Parliamentary debetes critical of the leadership of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense, and took care to deny complicity in the resulting anti- Parliament demonstrations. In paying lip service to respect for democratic institutions the PKI has probably also been concerned for its political future should anti-Communist military leaders seize a larger measure of control. The PKI has attempted to appeal to all social groups, and has had its greatest success in the organization of labor. SOBSI. (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the PKI-contfolled trade union federation, dominates the indonesian labor movement and is an affiliate of WFTU. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activity was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 56] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -~3strikes in vital industries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were brought to a virtual standstill. Since that time, the Indonesian government has restricted labor activity through a series of committees to which labor disputes are to be referred for compulsory settlement. Although SOBSI organizations have refrained from disruptive activity in the past several months in conformity to the PKI program of cooperation with the government, a potential for renewed agitation exists. Among the more important other PKI front organizations in Indonesia are women's, youth, students, and peasants organizations, the People's Cultural League and the Indonesian Committee for World Peace. These groups echo the PKI program and propaganda in parliament, communicate Communist propaganda to mass groups, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist causes, and ‘participate in national conferences and international meetings of Communist front organizations. SOBSI and two peasant organizations are represented in the Indonesian parliament. Although there is no separate Chinese Communist Party organization in Indonesia, many of the same purposes are accomplished within the Chinese community by a separate series of front organizations. In addition to controlling completely the activities of the above organizations, clearly recognizable as Communist front groups, PKI members attempt to infiltrate other mass organizations. - An article published in the official PKI organ in February 1951 on “The Role of the PKI and Mass Organizations" states: "Communists who are assigned to join organizations, such as labor unions which are under the leadership of Trotskyites or Social Democrats, are not to leave such orgenizations, for. that would mean that we were allowing these masses to continue under the leadership of those who are really enemies of the people.... Therefore, we Communists may not refuse to work in a mass organization, no matter how reactionary it is." Communist efforts are also made to infiltrate ministries of the government, the police and military forces. Apart from the known presence of Communists in the Ministries of Labor and Information, there is little evidence to indicate the degree of success enjoyed by the PKI to date in attaining this objective. Since the abortive Madiun rebellion in 1948, the PKI has, in general, refrained from violent activity. Nevertheless, the party controls several small armed bands and is believed to continue — attempts to infiltrate other dissident organizations. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 57] === OO ae ee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION The PKI in the course of its past history was often divided in | its leadership and evidenced the same lack of cohesion and direction | that characterized most other Indonesian political groups. Today, fol- | lowing the injection of considerable new blood into the party, there is every evidence that the PKI adheres closely to policy as transmitted through international Communist channels, Idaison is believed to be _ effected through the Chinese Communist Enbessy and at international ‘ Commmist meetings, Should the dictates of international Commmiem so demand, the PKI today would probably not hesitate to reverse its tactics, even at the risk of weakening seriously its domestic position, ITI, CAPABILITIES The PKI today is better organized and better: led than at any time in its past history. The party appears to be enjoying a considerable degree of success as a result of its policy of cooperation with the Indonesian government and its espousal of generally popular causes. As long as it adheres to this policy of united front tactics its potential for expanding membership and enhancing its following would appear great. At the same time, the fact that the other major political parties advocate much the same program and are not faced with the PKI's constant problem, of establishing its identity as an indigenous party, militates against. the party's becoming so strong that it might participate in an Indonesian goverment, One major purpose of the party's united front tactics has been to assure that it will not lose its present parliamentary representation eadlaprts when general elections are held, It is not possible to forecast election results at this time, but judging from the Indian experience in conducting elections with a largely illiterate electorate, the organization of the PKI, particularly among front organizations, will probably assure it representation disproportionate to its real popular support. As a vehicle for gaining sympathy for international Commmist causes, the PKI is limited in its success among politically articulate Indonesians by a general awareness of the nature of Commmism and the role played by front organizations, and by suspicion of the motives of advocates of either side in the cold war. The party's appeal among the masses, in turn, suffers from a lack of awareness on the part of most : Indonesians of all but immediately pressing local problems, Nevertheless, PKI propaganda as delivered through the several front organizations capitalizes on the strongly nationalist sentiment of the people. Thus it is probable that the people as a whole are more susceptible to Commmist propaganda influence than the more politically sophisticated leadership — groups. a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 58] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION . It is unlikely that the PKI will in the foreseeable future be able to wage organized warfare against the Indonegian state, but it may be expected that all opportunities will be developed to subvert dissident groups with an eye toward future eventualities. The party does continue to possess the capability of disrupting economic life through the activities of the labor unions it controls, but such activity would run counter to the law aiid wight jeopardize the reputation for cooperation and concern for the national intérest that the party has beén nurturing 80 carefully; SECRET = SECURITY iWFonsAaTiON SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 59] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION . COMMUNISM IN INDONESIA: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH Estimates of Indonesia Commmist Party (PKI) strength vary from.... 30,000-100,000 but no details are available. No separate Chinese Com.:-.. munist Party organization is known to exist in Indonesia, although the...... Chinese community, as noted below, possesses its own mass front organi-:. «- zations. The PKI is strongest in Java and Sumatra and party activity seems best organized in the major cities, but little information is available concerning regional organization. Much of the leadership and probably a large portion of party membership are middle class intellectuals, but the bulk of party sym pathizers are unskilled agricultural and industrial laborers and farmers. A majority of the party leaders have been educated or trained abroad, and Samaun, one of the PKI'S founders, is in Moscow where he is credited with _ playing a major role in Soviet planning for Indonesia, Other Indonesian Commmists are known to be in Prague, Pei-p'ing and Amsterdam. Beset by undistinguished and ineffective leadership throughout most of its history of three decades, the PKI in the postwar period has experienced a new vigorous direction on the part of both the overt Central Committee and its underground directorate. Party leadership today may be divided between a small group of older. prewar members and a majority group of more recent leaders — averaging 30-35 years in age -- who have ac-. ea as knowledged adherence to the party or front organizations only in the post- _ war period, While the government's seourity action of August 1951 against the Communists increased pressure on the party and for a time restricted its freedom of action, the most prominent and important leaders of the PKT escaped capture at the time, and many lesser lights have since been released. There has been no evidence of dissension within party ranks in the past two years, and the present leadership appears prepared to undertake whatever action party strategy demands. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH No general elections have been held in Indonesia to date. The PKI occupies 15 seats (7 percent) out of 220 in the provisional Parliament, If satellite parties and fellow travellers are included, a total of 40 seats (19 percent) are controlled by the PKI, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 60] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION IIL, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Current PKI policy is to refrain from violent activity and to enhance its popular support through ostensible cooperation with the government and other political parties. Past experience in the post— war period, however, indicates that the party will not hesitate to engage in violent action when strategy so demands. In September 1948 during negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands, the PKI undertook an armed uprising at Madiun in Republican-held territory, Party strategy at that time was apparently aimed at precipitating a renewal of Dutch military action against the Republic in the course of which the PKI hoped to seize leadership of the Indonesian resistance. Premature action on the part of some of the rebelling units and prompt counteraction on the part of the Republic resulted in the suppression of the Communists after considerable loss of life. In August 1951, the Commmists led-a raid on Tandjung Priok, port area of Djakarta, in order to test the party's ability to execute this type of maneuver as well as the government's capability of coping with disruptive activity. It was this action that hastened the Indonesian Government's decision to effect a series of security sweeps, in the course of which many prominent Communists and fellow-travellers were arrested, ( The Indonesian Commmists are believed to have infiltrated dissident organizations currently engaged in armed insurrection and may possess small armed bands of their own, but reliable information on this. subject is lacking, Judging from their conduct of and participation in = habediogis non-violent demonstrations, Party members presumably would be available in major cities for conducting violent demonstrations. Although the PKI probably has an organization for violent action and the quality of leadership is greatly improved over 1948, the success of any large-scale insur-. rection would probably depend on complete Commmist subversion of existing dissident groups or units of the armed forces. PKI control of most organized labor, the largest farmers! organizations and important youth groups might provide considerable backing for. whatever violent action the Party might undertake. no TV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The PKI enjoys the same freedom as other Indonesian political parties, but the Indonesian Government limits the extent to which the PKI and its allied organizations can engage in propaganda attacks on friendly states and the degree to which it may express its international ties. Thus, pictures of international Commmist leaders are occasionally prohibited at Communist rallies, and propaganda films of a flagrant nature are banned, In August 1951 the Government, fearing another attempted coup, arrested mmerous outstanding Commmists and fellow travellers. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 61] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION The Party's past experience with the ability of the Indonesian Goverment to curtail overt activity has presumably led it to form an underground organization. However, no details are known regarding the size or efficiency of such an organization. An elaborate array of front organizations and the probable existence of mumerous undercover party members would seemingly enable the PKI to maintain its structural organization and engage in limited activity in the face of Government repression of the Party proper. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The number of Communists in key industries is not known but is appreciable in view of the strength of PKI dominated unions. SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the trade union branch of the PKI, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and is an affiliate of the WFTU. It is represented in the Provisional Parliament, where it holds four seats. SOBSI claims three million members, although its actual membership is estimated at about 800,000. Its largest affiliate is SARBUPRI, a federation of estate workers unions which clains a membership of one million as against an estimated actual membership of 350,000, Other important SOBSI affiliates exist among ship, dock, railroad, transport, sugar, and oil workers. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activities was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread strikes in vital industries throughout Indonesia, Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were all brought to a virtual standstill. Because of the threat to security, strikes were banned by local military commanderg in several provinces in late 1950, followed by a nationwide ban in February 1951. In October of the same year the ban was replaced by a comprehensive decree calling for a three-week cooling-off period and es~ — tablishing committees of goverment officials for the compulsory settlement of disputes where voluntary mediation failed, A series of disruptive harbor strikes in March and April 1952 were settled by committee action, A strike of sugar estate workers in mid-1952 was called off only after the government threatened to arrest strike leaders, For the last several months there have been no strikes by SOBSI organizations, apparently in response to the PKI's avowed policy of cooperation with the government, Attempts by leaders of various non—Communist parties, particularly the Socialist, Labor and Masjumi parties, to organize non-Communist unions capable of challenging SOBSI's domination of labor have been largely unsuccessful, The lack of capable union organizers and funds and the desire of various party leaders to bolster their own political strength have thus far prevented the formation of a lasting united non-Communist federation © embracing all non-Commmist labor groups. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 62] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VI, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A. Front Organizations. The most important Commmist front organizations are described briefly below: 1, Ikatan Pema Peladjar Indonesia (IFPI), Indonesian Youth and - Students Union, This group claims a membership of 50,000 to 75,000, and is second in its field only to the Moslem youth organization, It is especially influential in the secondary schools and is affiliated with the International Students Union. 2. Pema Rakjat, People's Youth, With an estimated membership of | 30,000 this is the most active pomitscally of the numerous Indonesian youth groups. Pemuda Rakjat is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. 3. Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar (GERWIS), Enlightened Indonesian Women's Movement, GERWIS does not possess nearly as extensive an organization as the older women's organizations, although it is the most active politically, To date it has been unable to | ¢ influence the national Congress of Indonesian Women to affiliate with Women's International Democratic Federation, of which GERIIS is a member, sortie, 4. Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), Indonesian Farmers Corpa. This group is strongest in Central Java and is represented in Parliament, 5, Rulom Tani Indonesia (RTI), Indonesian Farmers Union, RII, active in West Java and South Sumatra, and BII are the two ‘most powerful Indonesian farmers organizations. Plans are in the offing for merger of the two groups. 6- Indonesian Committee for World Peace, This organization has branches in major cltiss and appeals to many non-Commmist intellectuals, 7. lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat (IEKRA), People's Cultural League. Apparently the successor to the Chinese-Indonesian Cultural League, this group also has branches in major cities. The above groups all serve as instruments for commmicating Commun st propaganda to mass groups, lend their names to the support of Communist | causes, attempt to enlist the support of non—Communist groups for Communist a _ SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20 - CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 63] === oOo Ree Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -10causes, and participate on behalf of Indonesian women, youth, etc., as the case may be, at international Commmist conferences. Within the Chinese commmity the most important Commumist organiza-— tion appears to be the Min Sheng She (People's life Society), incorporating a great many women's, youth, educational, professional and sports associations. Little detailed information is available concerning ite activities, but it appears to be the most active organization today among the overseas Chinese community. When the Chinese Communist Ambassador arrived in Indonesia he was greeted by representatives of 180 Chinese associations, which may serve as an indication of the complexity of the organization of the Chinese | commmity in Indonesia,.. In addition to the above group, perhaps a majority of the Overseas Chinese Associations (Chung Hua Chung Hui), which have existed since the prewar period organized on a regional basis, have declared their support for the Commmist cause. Many of these have been brought together in a - series of Commmnist—dominated United Overseas Chinese General Associations. The Chinese schools are a further vehicle for transmitting Comnmist propaganda, and a large number of these are mown to be Commmist-dominated, A majority of Chinese labor unions are believed to be affiliated with SOBSI, the overall Indonesian Communist labor organization, In North Sumatra, at least, the Chinese Communist Farmers Association is a member of the broad farmers front dominated by the Indonesian Communists. oe Few details are available concerning the operations, leadership or ate aati membership of this array of organizations, Chinese Communist leadership.. has been active in seizing control of a good many associations whose members were apathetic to the political implications of Communist efforts. In some cases comparable non-Communist organizations exist, generally organized by the KMT, but in general, the Communist—dominated organizations are predominant in the overseas Chinese community. B, Infiltration of Non-Communi st Organizations The fact that many of the non-—Commmist mass organizations in Indonesia are inclined to the left and have programs that bear a striking similarity to those under Commmist discipline makes it difficult to distinguvish all organizations that might properly be included in this category. it seems probable that the PKI attempts to infiltrate all such organizations. An article in the official organ of the PKI states, "It is the fundamental duty of the Communists to give gradual training to all mass organizations and to supply them with progressive leadership." This publication also declares, "Every Communist must work hard to unite all kinds of mass organizations into one mass organization." It appears to be the PKI ob= jective gradually to merge infiltrated organizations into larger Commnist— | dominated front groups. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 64] === , Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION It is doubtful whether any of the non-Commmist mass organizations consciously support Communist programs, but there is often considerable agreement between the Commmist and non—Commmist groups. The distinction between the two groups is often only in the degree of eagerness to take sides in international issues and willingness to affiliate with international Commnist front organizations. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT A number of Commmists are known to hold positions in the Ministry of Labor and Information and in their regional offices, The total mumber of Communists and Communist sympathizers in these offices is not known, but the ratio to total personnel is believed to be amall, The arrests of August 1951 ferreted out a mumber of Communists and Commmist sympathizers in the Ministry of Labor, - Djalan Baru (The New Road), often cited as a guide for PKI members, declares, "The armed forces must receive special attention as the most inportant instrument of national power. Armed forces cadres and personnel must be given special attention in line with their role as the most important instrument for the defense of the National Revolution." Although it is assumed that the PKI has attempted to infiltrate units of the armed forces, little evidence exists to indicate success to date, There are no known | Communists or Communist sympathizers at the top levels of the armed forces. The same publication further states, "The police and associated personnel ~ must learn the meaning of the National Revolution.... The police mst be ~ led by progressive cadres." Nevertheless, the mobile brigade, national _ police force, is regarded as the most reliable of the Indonesian government security forces and there is no evidence of Commmist success at subversion, VIII, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Antara, the national news agency is believed to be influenced by either Partai Murba, a so-called "nationalist Communist" party, or by the PKI,1 and a number of newspapers, avowedly independent, are believed to be operated by PKI members or sympathizers. Nevertheless, the fact that the Communists advocate many of the same issues that form part of the programs. of major non-—Commmist parties and Commmnist publications share many opinions with the non-Communist majority of the press makes it difficult to assess Communist influence on public opinion formation, It would seem that the influence exerted by the Communists on public opinion media is limited and of much less importance than the impact on public opinion of the activities of Communist-dominated front organizations., 1. Adam Malik, head of Antara is thought to be a member of Partai Murba, but the possibility exists that Murba itself is today a PKI front, In any case, attitudes of the two parties on most issues are similar, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 65] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES — Past experience indicates that attempts at infiltrating all political parties are probably made by the PKI, In 1948, several leading members of the Socialist and Labor parties joined the PKI in the Madiu rebellion pro= claiming themselves to have been Commmists for a mmber of years. Idttle concrete information is available, however, to support the above assumption, Partai Murba, which describes itself as "nationalist-Commmist," has a program that differs from that of the PKI only in refusing to subsoribe | to a world Communist order, Partai Murba cannot be described as Titoist or Trotskyist, since it acknowledges a position of world leadership for the USSR. Murba has four seats in Parliament, and has its own series of labor unions and front organizations, Failure of the PKI strongly to attack Murba suggests the possibility that since the death of its founder, Tan Malaka, who strongly opposed the PKI, the party may have been infiltrated by PKI . X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA AL. Newspapers and Periodicals _ Bintang Merah (Red Star) is the official publication of the PKI, Formerly restricted to Party members Bintang Merah is now available to. the general public, but its circulation is not know, The: most important | of the other Commnist newspapers is Sin Po, with a Chinese edition of — about 20,000 circulation and an Indonesian edition of about 15 9000 cir—- culation, There are seven other known Commmist dailies, none of which — is believed to have a large circulation, In addition, a large mumber of © Communist or pro-—Commmist books and pamphlets are sold at virtually all bookstores in Indonesia,. B. Publishing Houses Bintang Merah and all important PKI propaganda publications, including translations of foreign Commmist writings, now are published by the Jajasan Pembaruan (Modern Institute) in Djakarta, a corporation in. ~~ which the PKI is reported to have a financial interest. Jajasan Pembaruan may have replaced the translating committee (Komisi Penterdjemah) formed. in March 1951 by members of the Politburo, This committee was charged with translating books and essays on Commmist theory such as Lenin's State and Revolution, and Liu Shao-ch'i's On the Party. Three other known Communist publishing houses are the ‘Widjaja" publishing house - and the life Press Publishing Company, both in Djakarta, and the Hwang...... - Iamg (Yellow Dragon) Publishing Company in Makassar. oo C. Commmist Propaganda from Abroad The Soviet magazine New Times and the Soviet novel Star, both in English, have been seen on sale in Medan, Sumatra. Other specific foreign SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 66] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Communist publications available in Indonesia are not known, but translation of Soviet writings is a constant part of PKI propaganda efforts, and a great mmber of Chinese Commmist publications, including textbooks, are distributed among both the Chinese and Indonesian communities. _. The Soviet radio devotes one hour a day and Pei-p'ing radio a half hour daily to broadcasts in Indonesian. The effectiverioss of these programs, which is difficult to judge, is limited by the fact that only about 230,000 radio sets are registered in Indonesia. L oo XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION Party dues are collected monthly on a sliding scale in proportion to income, but do not exceed 14 percent of gross income. Details concern— ing other sources of Party revenues, including possible subsidies from 5 abroad are not mown. The PKI has had some difficulty in the past in financing its publications, but organizational capabilities of the party do not seem to have been hampered by want of funds. Demonstrations or= ganized by the PKI and its affiliates appear well-supplied with posters, etc, It does not appear that the party will suffer in the foreseeable: future from financial difficulties.,, ~ XTI,. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the USSR nor the East European satellites maintain diplo-: matic missions in Indonesia. There is a Tass representative and a Czech consul-general in Djakarta, however, both of whom are reported to be engaged in political activity. CO an Communist China has an embassy in Djakarta and consulates at Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, Banjermasin, and Djogjakarta, The embassy ‘gtaff is reported limited to fifteen persons, and in July 1951 the Indonesian goverment refused the entry of sixteen additional members. No details are available concerning the consulate staffs.:; In 1951 the Chinese Commmist representatives were active in organizing demonstrations on the part of the Chinese community, The poor reception accorded this activity by many Indonesians has caused greater restraint to be exercised so that the hand of the Chinese Communist embassy in such affairs in the past year has not been obvious.. There ig no Soviet-Indonesian Friendship Association, and the Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association appears to have been superseded by the People's Cultural League, the size of which ig not known. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 67] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No meetings of Commmist international organizations have been held in Indonesia, The following is a list of meetings of Communist international ore ganizations held abroad, which are known to have been attended by Indonesian Communists during the past two years:. me Meeting Date _ Known Size Indonesian: Representation International Students Union Executive meeting, Peiping — April 1951 i World Federation of Democratic Youth Exeoutive meeting, Budapest May 1951 oY) ‘World Federation of Trade Unions Oo. Conference, Vienna July 1951 RD Berlin Youth Festival August 1951 53 World Federation of Democratic Youth Annual Council Meeting,. oo Berlin.. August 1951 2 utter! Moscow Economic Conference | April 1952 13 International Student. Conference, -: Bucharest —: July-August 1952 unknown:.. World Peace Coune!1, Berlin July 1952 unknown.. Peiping Peace Conference September 1952 about 10 Netherlands Commmist Party, Congress November 1952 2 Viena Peace Congress December 1952 16 Czech Communist Party Congress, Prague - December 1952 2 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 68] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK Cloge relations are maintained by the PKI with the Commmist parties in the USSR, the Netherlands, and Commmist China. Leaders of the PKI have received training in these three countries, and, as noted above, Samaun, one of the founders of the PKI is in Moscow. Perhaps the most striking example of compliance with international Commmist directives took place in 1948. Indonesian delegates to the Congress of the Communist Party of India ahd the Calcutta Youth Congress held early that year reported home the adoption of a policy of armed insurrection, In September, following also the return of Muso, Samaun's lieutenant, from Moscow, the PKI instigated the Madiun rebellion. - A more recent example of direction from abroad was the criticism of SOBSI by WFIU representatives at the 1952 SOBSI national congress for not maintaining proper liaison with WFIU international headquarters and for failing to report SOBSI activities. in sufficient detail. Representatives of WFIU and foreign Commmist trade unions have attended past congresses of SOBSI, and a sixteen man delegation from Peiping is known to have been present at the national youth congress held in Djakarta in November 1952. Apart from liaison that is assumed to take place at such meetings, it is believed that the Chinese Commmist embassy is used as a channel of communication for the PKI. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION rere CL TD === [PDF page 69] === Te rene Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4, SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.4 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MALAYA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATS SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 70] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION . TABLE OF CONTENTS [Unreadable] OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES..... 1 I. Objectives. 2. 6 2 6 we ew we ew ew we ee wwe ew ew 1 Ii. Tactics. 1. 6. 2. 6 6 © eo ee ew we we te ee we ee ew ww 1 qt. Capabilities. 2. 2. 2 6 6 ee we ee ee ee we we ew we 2 ASSETS 6 6 ee ee ee ee SG I. Numerical Strength «© 6 6 2 6 ee ee ee ee ee ew es 5 II. Electoral Strength....- ee ee eee eee eeee SF Iii. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action. 5 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism.....-.-+-e«-s 7 Vv. Communist Influence in Labor.. 1... 2 ee ee ee eee 8 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and [Unreadable] VII. Communist Infiltration into Government.....-+..-. 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation...; 9 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9 X. Communist Propaganda Media...... +--+ eee ee ee 9 XI. Financial Condition a 10 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets wee ee ew we ew ee e660 XIII. Communist International Organizations... 1. 2. 6 2 «+ « « 10 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 71] === eee Eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, ( providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 72] === EEE, ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN MALAYA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . I. OBJECTIVES Communist guerrillas, 95 percent of whom are Malayan Chinese, have been carrying out hit-and-run warfare against the British and their supporters in the Federation of Malaya since mid~-1948, when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its fronts and labor organizations were banned. Documents captured near the beginning of the guerrilla campaign indicated that the objective of the MCP was to drive the British out of Malaya. This was to be accomplished in three successive phases by: 1) disrupting the economy 2) setting up governments in "liberated" areas 3) joining up liberated areas. The inability of the party to achieve its first goal -- disruption of the economy ~- in the first three years of the campaign has according to other, more recent, captured documents, brought about a revision of party policy from one of indiscriminate and wmbridled terrorist activity to an attempt to guide guerrilla warfare away from activities harmful to the interests of workers and peasants ( and toward military targets. This move, combined with others, is calculated to broaden the base of party support. MCP recognition of the necessity for this changed course of action has aroused some speculation, unsupported by any evidence, that the party, in admitting this initial failure, may also have reached the conclusion that it is incapable of achieving its ultimate objective through its own efforts, but must preserve itself as a guerrilla force until an outside power can undertake the "liberation" of Malaya. II. TACTICS During the past six months it has become increasingly apparent from the lessened number and changed character of terrorist incidents that the MCP, probably in response to progressively more effective pressure by British Security Forces, has put into effect its new strategic policies. The MCP's aim -- to gain the support of laborers and peasants ~- has required modification, rather than abandonment, of guerrilla warfare tactics. A party directive indicates that military and police targets may be attacked, but that the destruction of dwellings and public utilities, and the seizure of food without compensation is to be discontinued. The destruction of mine and estate property is also prohibited, since it affects the livelihood of laborers. Urbdan organizations, particularly labor unions, are to be infiltrated or, if necessary, secret unions formed. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 73] === TREE IEEE eee OE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The MCP's chief guerrilla organization, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) is estimated to have from 3,000 to 5,000 members. Grouped into twelve regiments, the MRLA usually utilizes the company or the platoon as its operating wit. The MRLA is supported by the MIN YUEN, or Peoples Movement, which is responsible for furnishing supplies, intelligence, and recruits to the MRLA, Rather than a single organization, the MIN YUEN is a collection of organizations controlled by party executives for work among the masses. Among the MIN YUEN organizations are groups of armed men- numbering about 4,000, cooperating closely with the MRLA. It is through MIN YUEN organizations that intelligence is secured, men recruited, and funds obtained. While some financial support comes from regular contributions by members ‘of MIN YUEN organizations, the bulk of the funds collected apparently comes from the "protection" money paid by Chinese businessmen, estate owners, and tin mine operators. The MIN YUEN probably numbers upwards of 10,000 members. MCP activity capitalizes on anti-British sentiment and, to some extent, the economic rivalry between the Malayan Chinese and the paramoumt British economic group. Since 1949 the nationalist character of the party has been stressed in propaganda, but there is little indication that this line has been effective. Despite the receipt of one small shipment of arms from Thailand, there is no evidence that the MCP regularly receives material aid from outside Malaya. There is reason to believe, however, that some trained leaders have been infiltrated from China. Propaganda circulated covertly by the party follows the lead of Peiping and Moscow broadcasts for the most part and it is likely that these broadcasts serve as one of the chief means of liaison between the MCP and both these Commmist centers. ITI. CAPABILITIES Malaya is not characterized by the existence of either a strong unified nationalist movement or depressed economic conditions that could be exploited by the Communists. The guerrillas do not have widespread public sympathy, and the movement appears to be inspired by a hard core of Communists acting in response to the policies of international Commmism. The party has sustained itself largely by intimidation of the Malayan Chinese community. The récent change in the MCP's strategic policy away from widespread terroristic activity and the intimidation of peasants and laborers is in part at least an admission of the failure of this course of action. The effectiveness of new emphasis on gaining SECHET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 74] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ~3the support of peasants and laborers, conducting a more selective terrorist campaign, and infiltrating labor unions and other orgenizations, cannot yet be evaluated. Over the past four years the British, utilizing military political, psychological, and socio-economic measures, have successfully contained but have failed to suppress the Communists. In addition to the difficulties of guerrilla warfare in the jumgle, the failure of the Malayan Chinese to cooperate in the anti-guerrilla campaign, political apathy, and the lack of a Malayan national consciousness have contributed to the inability of the British to eradicate the guerrillas. The diversity of Malaya's population has prevented the development of a national consciousness and hampered British attempts to arouse an anti-Comnmumist spirit based on nationalism. The largest slements of the population, the Malays (49 percent) and the Chinese (38 percent) form separate, mutually antagonistic commmities. Major causes of the friction are the Malay fear of eventual domination by the energetic. Chinese whom they regard as alien, and the Chinese resentment of the favored position traditionally accorded the Malays by the British. ¢ In contrast with the non-comnittal attitude of the Chinese toward the present struggle, the Malays support the British, forming the bulk of the police and staffing most of the lower ' echelon administrative posts. Traditionally oriented toward China as the Motherland, the Malayan Chinese have sought to preserve Chinese culture through their schools and their family life. Loyalty to the Motherland is basically cultural rather than political, however, and the majority of Malayan Chinese are committed neither to the Communist regime in Peiping nor to the Nationalists in Taipei. Apart from a few leaders, political apathy has extended to Malayan affairs, the primary Malayan Chinese interest in Malaya being -commercial. The Malayan Chinese attitude is also due to the emergence of a strong government in China to-which the overseas Chinese feel that they may eventually be able to look for protection of their interests; to the fact that the majority of the Communist guerrillas are Chinese; and to the British failure to demonstrate clearly the ability to eradicate the guerrillas. Moreover, the Chinese fear local reprisals should they aid the British, or the punishment of their relatives or the confiscation of their property in China should they openly support an anti-Communist drive. The new Communist course of action is likely to pose new problems to the British, particularly since the infiltration of labor unions is to be attempted. Nevertheless, it is likely that ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 75] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY. INFORMATION the British, now organized more effectively and imbued with better morale under the leadership of Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, will continue as during the past year to make slow progress against the guerrillas. It is wulikely, however, that the British will be able to wipe out the guerrillas completely; at the same time it is improbable that the guerrillas, without outside aid, can make the British position untenable. ‘The eventual outcome of Malaya's Commmist problem is probably to a large extent dependent upon events outside Malaya. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 76] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN MALAYA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Although more than 15,000 persons, or about 0.3 percent of Malaya's population, are controlled or strongly influenced by Communism, the MCP itself is estimated to have only 3,000 to 5,000 members drawn almost wholly from the peasant and laborer class of the Malayan Chinese community. Some 600 to 800 members are estimated to constitute the ‘hard core* of the party and to have been active in the MCP for more than ten years. During World War II, these hard core members took part in the Britishe-aided guerrilla organization known as the Malayan People's Anti- Japanese Army. Probably not more than 1,000 members have been associated with the party for more than five years. The actual leaders of the MCP are virtually unknown, but from the fact of continued guerrilla resistance over the past four years and from the statements of surrendered guerrillas it would appear that these leaders are determined, aggressive, well-trained men. Despite the strong leadership of the party, however, some of the rank and file members have ; become discouraged at the continual hardships of life in the jungle and ( have surrendered to British Security Forces. Nevertheless, few of those surrendering have been associated with the movement for a long period, and it is probable that the hard core of the party has remained virtually intact for the past four years. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH No general elections have been held in the Federation of Malaya. The MCP, banned in mid-19l8, has, of course, entered no candidates in the few manicipal elections that have been held. ITI. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Communist forces are estimated to consist of 3,000 to 5,000 members of the Malayan Races Liberation Party (MRIA) and approximtely 4,000 armed members of MIN YUEN organizations. Despite guerrilla casualties in surrendered, captured and killed, amounting to half the . estimated Communist force over the past four years, total guerrilla strength continues to be set at a constant level by British sources because of steady recruitment by the guerrillas. Lack of arms apparently prevents any expansion of guerrilla forces. All Communist support organizations, necessarily covert, are blanketed into the MIN YUEN or People's Movement. It is from these organizations that the MRIA receives recruits, funds, food, and C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 77] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -6information. The MIN YUEN has a strength estimated at 10,000 or more. MIN YUEN organizations and their functions are: _ 1. Self Protection Units -- to supply food 2- Protection Corps ~— to sabotage and ambush 3- Armed Work Force -- to propagandize and organize 4. District Unit — to propagandize and organize - 5. Suicide Squad — to assassinate reactionary leaders 6. Labor Protection Corps -- to lead strikes, to sabotage, to propagandize ‘ 7- Reserve Corps -- to train executives: 8. Executive Committee of the Masses -~ to gather information and food 9» Sympathizers Cells -- to train prospective party members, to gather funds and food, and to act as couriers. The guerrillas have employed hit-and-run tactics against police stations and villages, ambushed patrols, sabotaged transportation and public utilities, and attacked rubber estates and mines. Newly adopted tactics will, according to a captured directive, confine such attacks to military and police targets, or to the property of "reactionary capitalists." In the past, the guerrillas have received support because of their ability to intimidate the rural and to some extent the urban; populations. However, the recent resettlement of some 00,000 Chinese | “"squatters,"' who were living on the fringe of the jungle, into controlled and protected "new villages" has removed one major source of guerrilla support. Henceforth, the guerrillas must rely more upon Malay villagers, estate labor, and urban dwellers. Whether the newly adopted policy of paying for, rather than simply requisitioning food, and of safeguarding the interests of peasants and laborers will prove effective in winning voluntary support remains to be seen. The guerrillas have been unsuccessful in achieving the economic disruption of Malaya, but their tactics have nevertheless affected adversely the economies of both Malaya and the United Kingdom. Prospecting, on which the future of the tin industry in part depends, has been prevented for the past four years. Rubber trees have been slashed, and a largescale program of replanting made impossible. Nevertheless, current production has not been seriously affected, and it will probably be a number of years before Malayan production feels the full affect of the present situation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 78] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION a ae The expense of the anti-guerrilla campaign to the Federation has prevented the undertaking of needed economic development projects, while the expense of maintaining troops in Malaya and of contributing to extraordinary expenses of local government has constituted a financial drain on the United Kingdom. Guerrilla warfare has hampered the rapid achievement of political innovations desired by the populace and sponsored by the government as a means of encouraging Malayan nationalism as an anti-Communist force. Thus, while political progress toward autonomy has been slowed by guerrilla warfare, it is the opinion of high-ranking officials that political advance is nevertheless imperative if Malaya is to remain non-Communist. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Government banned the MCP, its fronts, and its labor organization in mid-198, when it also adopted Emergency Regulations placing extraordinary powers in the hands of the administration. British Security Forces consist of about 0,000 soldiers and 60,000 regular and special police. In addition, a part-time Home Guard of 140,000 has been recruited. The Home Guard and most of the special police are employed on static guard duty. In addition to the military campaign, the Government has undertaken special measures under the Emergency Regulations, as well as broader social, political, and economic steps designed to create a climate unfavorable to the growth of Communism. By the end of 1952, more than 00,000 Chinese "squatters living on the edges of the jungle and beyond administrative control had been moved to protected "new villages beyond the easy reach of Communist forces that had been intimidating them as a means of getting food, funds, and information. During 1952, as in previous years, several thousand Malayan Chinese and a lesser number of Indians were deported from Malaya, and additional thousands were detained. Moreover, in several instances entire villages were punished for refusing information to Security Forces or ignoring warnings to cease sheltering or feeding guerrillas. Under the Emergency Regulations all inhabitants have been required to carry identity cards; carrying arms without a license has been made a capital offense; the movement of food has been restricted; pro-Communist newspapers have been banned; and the solicitation of money or food for the guerrillas has been made a capital offense. An additional important regulation has placed in the hands of a comptroller the power to direct any person into the police or military forces or to perform any other duty., The announced British aim has been to guide the colonial territories to responsible self~govermment within the Commonwealth and, as a means to that end, to do everything possible to establish the required economic and social conditions. The Federation Government's SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 79] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION efforts in this direction has been given a sense of urgency by the belief of high-ranking Federation officials that such measures will provide a long term solution to the problem of Communism. Interracial harmony is seen as a prerequisite to the development of Malayan nationalism, and organizations, including political parties, embracing all communities in Malaya have been encouraged. Iocal elections have. been held in several municipalities, while some public members (as opposed to government officials) of the legislative Council have been given responsibility for government departments as a first step toward cabinet government. Citizenship provisions have been relaxed to allow a much larger number of Malayan Chinese to qualify, and agreement has been reached that a certain proportion of Malayan Chinese will be allowed in the Malayan Civil Service. In the field of education, regarded as a critical element in "Malayanizing” the Chinese, the decision has been taken to establish national schools based on the Malay and English languages. Economic development, although slowed by the present guerrilla preblem, has aimed at expanding the national income by improving and diversifying agricultural production, encouraging light industry, and improving power supply and communication. Propaganda measures, both with the guerrillas and with the civilian population, have been intensified recently. leaflets, posters, radio, and mobile public address systems are used. One of the most effective measures has been the use of surrendered guerrillas to recite their unfortunate experiences with the Communists to a group of villagers. The recent change in tactics by the MCP would seen to indicate that measures taken by the Government have, at a minimum, been effective in containing the guerrillas. The party's new tactics, however, will force the Government to adopt new methods, particularly since the infiltration of labor unions is to be attempted. Since police training has been directed toward the conduct of operations rather than the collection of intelligence it is possible that the new Communist methods may achieve some success before being checked by the Security Forces.. V. COMMUNIST INFIVENCE IN LABOR A policy of encouraging responsible trade unionism was inaugurated shortly after World War II in Malaya. In the early stages, the Malayan Communist Party gained control of the labor movement, organized general labor wmnions on a regional basis and finally established a top-level executive body known as the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), which claimed affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The PMFTU was declared illegal in Jue 1948. Subsequently, many unions rapidly disintegrated and many labor leaders went underground. Despite the fact that organized labor remains a Communist target, the Federation Government continues to encourage trade unionism as a SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 80] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -9means of developing social responsibility and combatting Communisn. Under government guidance, trade unions have been rebuilt and a modest nucleus of non-Communist unions now exists as a basis for further expansion. A Malayan Trade Union Council, which was formed in March 1950, subsequently affiliated with the International Confederation of Trade. Unions.: . No labor wions in Malaya are known to be Communist infiltrated at the present time and no Communist influence on the leadership has been observed. While Communists have forced strikes among rubber tappers in certain areas of Malaya, Communist pressure was exerted from outside the unions rather than from within. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There have been no indications of Communist influence in social, cultural, or professional organizations. It is highly probable, however, that there has been some Communist infiltration of Chinese secret societies. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT — There is no known Communist infiltration into the Government of the Federation of Malaya. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is some evidence pointing to the infiltration of the faculties of Chinese schools by operatives of the Chinese Communist Party. The placement of ‘pro-Communist teachers in Chinese schools appears to have been accomplished at times with the connivance of school trustees. Such infiltration appears to be designed not only to spread Communist doctrine but to recruit students to go to China for completion of their education.. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES There is no known Communist infiltration of any of the Malayan political parties. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Publications of the MCP, usually attributed to various of the District Committees, are mimeographed news sheets circulated clandestinely or covertly posted in a public place. Publications which have appeared with some regularity include Freedom News, Workers! ress, and Workers! and Students' News. The number of copies circulated is own. At one time, large numbers of Communist or pro-Communist Chinese publications were imported from Hong Kong. The police, however, have SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 81] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION now undertaken to prevent such trade, and overt importation has ceased. There is presumably some clandestine circulation of such publications. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No information concerning the financial condition of the MCP is available. XII, SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the USSR and its European satellites, nor the Pei-p'ing regime, maintain diplomatic, trade, or cultural missions in the Federation of Malaya. ~ XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No Communist international organizations maintain installations within Malaya, and no conferences of such organizations have been held in Malaya. Communist sources have reported the presence of Malayan representatives at meetings of various Communist international organizations. Since 1948, however, these representatives have been Chinese who at one time lived in Malaya. No representatives have left Malaya specifically to attend a particular meeting, or could be said to represent any particular Malayan organization. Many have been deportees. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The MCP is thought to maintain its closest ties with Communist organizations in Thailand, and in Sumatra, Indonesia, and with the Chinese Communist Party. It is assumed that at the present time instructions to the MCP are relayed through Pei-p'ing and Moscow radios, which have not only given propaganda support to.the MCP but have, prior to the adoption of a new propaganda line by the MCP, indicated what that line should be. The beginning of a campaign of violence in 198, already favored by some MCP leaders, was given impetus by the decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India, held concurrently with the Calcutta Youth Festival sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students in early 198. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 82] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.5 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:. CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ee LOLAND I OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET | SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 83] === eee, rr ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS | Page Foreword.. 1... 1 we ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee di OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES.... - 1 I. Objectives 2. ee ee ee 1 II. TacticS. 2. 2. 6 6 6 © © © ee tw we ee we et tw 1 III. Capabilities 2... ee te ee et ee ee eee 2 Iv. Supplementary Data, on the Chinese Communists in the Philippines... 1 2 + + es ee ee se ee ewe 3 I. Numerical Strength.. - 6 6 ee eee ee et ee es 5 II. Electoral Strength...- cee eee eee ee eee 6 ( IIT. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action.. 6 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. 2. 6 6 2 6 + es ee s 7 [Unreadable] VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations.. 2. «6 6s se ee we we 7 “Vit. Communist Infiltration into Goverment......-- - 8 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation..... 9 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9 X. Communist Propaganda Media.. 2. 6 se se eee ee ee 9 XI. Financial Condition... +. ee ee ee ee ee 9 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets..- 6 +s + + se LO XIII. Communist International Organizations.....+.+-.-. 10 XIV. Communist Communication Network. 2... +--+ 22+ + + 10 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 84] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 / SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational . potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, ( providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 85] === —_—_ eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The leadership of the Philippine Commmist Party apparently does not believe that the situation will favor a drive for immediate power for some years to come, They regard the present period as a preparatory one and place main emphasis on organizational and propaganda work, Their principal immediate objectives in rough order of priority, appear to be: ‘1. To win over the masses to the Commmist cause. 2. To discredit anti-Commnist parties and leaders. 3. To weaken the close ties existing between the Philippines and the US, 4. To prevent further dissipation of the party's military arm,. II, TACTICS Although the Philippine Communists consider the workers and the landless peasants as the backbone of their movement and plan to concentrate ( their organizational propaganda efforts on them, they are also striving to enlist the support of bourgeois groups with a populer front program, In order to facilitate its work of laying a basis for a seizure of power, the Philippine Communist. Party has outlined a program calling for the intensification of what it calls "legal" and "illegal" activities among the masses. (Although all Communist activities are illegal in the Philippines and have been driven underground, the Communists consider as illegal only their military activities and activities directly relating to the support of their military arm.) Their program consists of (1) revival of popular front political parties; (2) infiltration of cadres into Government agencies, - i.e., schools, military forces, into strategic industries, and into organizations and groups, i.e., labor unions, peasant organizations, women's and youth organizations, etc.; (3) increased indoctrination of the rank and file of the movement; and (4) intensification of propaganda activities. Party planning apparently envisages the possible negotiation of an amesty settlement with the Goverment which would enable it to expand its none military activities. Tactics for the 1953 Presidential and Congressional elections seem to call for support to candidates allegedly sympathetic to Communist propaganda planning calls for an intensification of the "peace" and "national independence" themes. "Peace" appears designed to bring about a weakening of public support for the Govermment's anti-Commmist policies in both the domestic and foreign fields, "National independence" SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 86] === eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION -~2ewill attempt to place blame for all the ills of the Philippines on US policies and US influence on its "puppets" — the major Philippine political parties. The Communists are charging that US military and economic aid pro are disadvantageous to the Philippine masses. Both themes are to be infused into all party activities and, with suitable adaptations, directed to all classes of the populace. Communists are using their military arm, the People's Liberation Army (HMB), for disrupting Government operations, ©.g- assassinations of prominent anti-Communists, sabotaging the economy, procuring supplies, and as an agency for recruiting the more violent malcontents among the masses. At present, however, a policy of conserving HMB strength and limiting its operations appears to be in effect. It may be that in the face of continued Government pressures and in order to gain from the Goverment freedom of operation for their organizational and propaganda programs, Philippine Communists might further reduce their military activities. III, CAPABILITIES The Philippine Communist Party, which in 1950 was strong enough to carry on widespread and well-coordinated armed rebellion, had by 1953 reached a low point in revolutionary potential and no longer constituted a serious threat to the Philippine Govermment. The party's once formidable military arm, the HMB, now has capabilities for only small-scale raids and ambuscades, ~ while the party is reduced to attempts to infiltrate and organize front | groups in the face of very severe goverment repressive measures. Moreover, the party is suffering from a serious shortage of capable executives and theoreticlans, its organizational apparatus is scattered and harassed by increasingly effective Goverment intelligence operations, its propaganda output ie small and distributed with difficulty, and its finances are in a precarious state. Whether the PKP can again develop sufficient strength to threaten the stability of the Philippine Government depends mostly on factors outside the control of the PKP. For the future strength or weakness of the PKP hinges on (1) whether or not the Philippine Government continues its strong anti- Communist programs; (2) whether or not the US can maintain effective economic and military aid to the Philippines; and (3) whether or not the Philippine Government increases its efforts to alleviate social and economic 4lls, In the event of fraudulent elections in 1953 with accompanying civil disorders and a loss of popular support for the Govermment, or the accom modation of one or the other major. political parties to amnesty negotiations, a situation probably would be created in which short term Commmist objectives and planning could operate with a fair degree of success, However, Commmist tactics and planning appear to envisage a lengthy period of time as necessary before they will be in a position to effectively challenge the Philippine Government with a resurgence of their military arm and SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 87] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION widespread mass support. With the uncertainties at present threatening the continuance of a strong anti-Communist policy on the part of some Government leaders, and in the absence of an effective Government reform program, it appears that the defensive strategy of the pKP is well suited to Philippine conditions through 1953. IV. SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES Because of excellent security practices, very little information fs available concerning the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the Chinese | Communists in the Philippines, Nevertheless, to judge by their known acm tivities, their objectives include the following: 1. To gain the loyalty and financial support of the Chinese community — numbering about 200,000 -- for the Chinese Communist cause, and, conversely, to subvert and discredit Kuomintang forces in the Philippines; 2. To construct an effective espionage network; 3. In general, to establish a firm mass base for more violent revolutionary action in the future, and; 4 To support the Philippine Commmist movement in any manner which does not jeopardize fulfillment of the first three objectives. Available evidence indicates that the Chinese Communists in the Philippines place highest priority on the objectives involving the Chinese community. in order to attain these goals, Chinese Commmists employ a variety of tactics, including infiltration, some terrorism, and propaganda, Up to now, Chinese Commmists have concentrated on infiltration of Chinese or= ganizations, particularly secret societies, chambers of commerce, and schools, However, some Chinese Communist infiltration of intelligence agencies of the Philippine Government has been reported, Chinese Communists extort contributions from rich Chinese merchants by threats of violence to them or their relatives in China, Some propaganda materials, most of which apparently are smuggled into the country, are distributed among the Chinese commmity. Apparently, the Chinese Communists in the Philippines still have fairly considerable capacity for future espionage, infiltration, and propaganda activities. The Philippine Government round-up of Chinese Commmist suspects in December 1952 evidently did not cause material damage to the Chinese Comnmist apparatus in the Philippines. Nevertheless, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 88] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -4ethe Philippine Government and the Kuomintang organization in the Philippines are united in opposition to Chinese Communist activity there. The great majority of the Chinese in the Philippines apparently are either anti- Communist or politically neutral. The ability of Chinese Communists in the Philippines for forming front groups or labor wions is very limited. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION i === [PDF page 89] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ao 5 ws COMMUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The membership of the Philippine Commnist Party (PKP) probably numbers about 3,000 to 5,000. There are about 8,000 to 10,000 Huks, the Peoples’ Liberation Army or military arm of the PKP, who are not PKP members and an estimated 40,000 members of Commnist-dominated mass organizations. The number of people influenced by partial, but significant, Communist infiltration of non-Commnist organizations is unknown.. Altogether, Commnists and those strongly influenced by Communism are estimated to account for 0.2 percent to one percent of the total population. Chinese Commnists are estimated to number 2,000-3,000 but there are no data on the number of members of organizations controlled or influenced by them. PKP membership increased from 1946 to 1950 but declined during 1951 and 1952; there has been a great increase in Chinese Communist strength since 1946. Approximately 90 percent of PKP members and following are located in Central and Southern Luzon with the balance in Northern Luzon and scattered localities in the Visayas and Mindanao. The leadership has come primarily from Manila, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan in Central Inzon. Chinese Commnists are primarily in Manila and the towns and cities of Southern luzon, Cebu, and Iloilo. The bulk of the PKP membership and sympathizers are peasants while Chinese Commnists are primarily merchants, school teachers, and administrators. Party members are for the most part poorly indoctrinated in Communist theory, have little education, but as a result of continuing governmental suppressive action, are probably reduced now to a loyal and hard working core. Morale and discipline among ordinary party members is generally good, although some instances of financial dishonesty and sexual profligacy Have occurred. The fanatical wellindoctrinated “hard core" probably amounts to 20 percent in the case of the PKP and 30 percent for the Chinese Communists. In the case of the PKP, few have been members more than ten years. The top leaders of the PKP apparently are not of high caliber but the Chinese are of generally good quality. According to William Pomeroy, the American Communist who served with the Huks for two years, the various leaders displayed poor executive ability, poor ideological training, or lack of flexibility. Taken as a group, the PKP leadership has suffered from shortages of good executives and theoreticians since at least 1948, On the other hand, most top PKP leaders are hard working, resourceful, and hardened by the conditions of harassment under which they live. They have close connections with the common people and are responsive to their motivations. For the most part they SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 90] === EE LL ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET » SECURITY INFORMATION -6are fairly young men in their late thirties or forties, and many have had only military experience during World War II and afterward as an occupational background. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Commnist Party is not a legal political party in the Philippines and cannot run candidates on a ticket of its own. During the last general elections the PKP called for a boycott of the elections. Chinese Commnists in the Philippines apparently do not vote and do not have an electoral strategy., All political parties in the Philippines receiving votes in the. last elections are avowedly anti-Communist. ‘III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The military arm of the PKP, the Peoples* Liberation Army (HMB) or Huks, numbers between 8,000-10,000. Not all of these are active at any one time. Approximately half are farmers who only occasionally participate in Huk raids, ambuscades, etc. HMB units operate as guerrillas with the strength of individual bands varying between five and 100. They have no heavy Weapons but an ample supply of small arms in fair to poor condition. So far as is known, the HMB receives no military support from outside the Philippines but may receive military advice from China. However, there is no definite information on the number or duties of Chinese Communists operating with the HMB. Opposed by approximately 235,000 government troops, the HMB retains capabilities for small scale raids, ambuscades, kidnappings, assassinations, and the dissemination of Comminist propaganda. As a result of their depredations, nearly one-third of total government expenditures goes to the armed services. While the HMB does not threaten the stability of the government, they nevertheless are a drain on its financial resources, hinder economic development, and tend to disrupt the food supply situation. HMB strength and activity is concentrated in Central and Southern Inzon; their plans for expanding operations in the central and southern islands apparently have been abandoned for the present. In the face of the increased effectiveness of government military action against then, it is doubtful whether the HMB can expand its activities in the near future unless in the event of a fraudulent national election in 1953. HMB operations are hindered also by the improved discipline of the Philippine Army which has had the result of gaining the cooperation of many townspeople and peasants. While a sizeable number of local residents in Central Iuzon remain sympathetic with the HMB or are SECRET «- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 91] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION oa 7 a fearful of HMB reprisals, large numbers are now supporting the Army's efforts to eliminate HMB activities. Still, approximately 40,000 members of PKP mass organizations and Communist sympathizers aid the HMB in the collection of intelligence, procure food and recruits, work at HMB “production bases“ in the Sierra Madres where root crops are grown, or act as couriers. They enable the HMB to sustain its present rather low level of activity. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Philippine Government and both major political parties are anti-Commnist and no overt Commnist activities are permitted. Although the PKP has not been outlawed by Congress, in 1951 a Philippine Court ruled that the PKP was a seditious and illegal association. Although this decision has been appealed, the Supreme Court probably will uphold the lower court's ruling. In any event, all PKP members and members of auxiliary organizations are subject to arrest. All front organizations are underground and severely hampered by government agencies. In areas of the Philippines where Commnists are most active, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail is denied to them. All Chinese Comminist activities are also forbidden and individual Chinese Communists are subject to deportation to Taiwan on the sole grounds of Communist membership., Very little is known of the “underground" activities of Filipino or Chinese Commnists. PKP organizations apparently are poorly trained and organized and with the exceptions of aiding Huks, collecting we intelligence, and passing on word of mouth propaganda, do not appear to be very active. V. COMMUNIST INFIVENCE IN LABOR During 1951, Communist influence in the Philippine Labor movement was reduced drastically, and at present there are no Communist unions or known significant infiltration of labor unions or key industries. The possibility of Commnist infiltration exists. Party members have been ordered to make lists including all factories, the organizational status of laborers and leaders therein, and the problems » of the laborers. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Communist front organizations apparently have been identified by the government and driven deeply underground in the Philippines. There appears to be no known significant infiltration of non-Commnist organizations by Philippine Communists. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 92] === OOo EE EEE EO EO ae eee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Since the suppression by the government of the large front labor organizations in 1951, the largest mass organization probably has been the National Peasants Union. It has an estimated 4,000-10,000 members located mostly in Central luzon and was formerly the largest peasants’ organization. For the type of organization it is, it appears to have had good leadership, and were the present severe restrictive measures of the government to be relaxed, it probably could be considerably expanded. Two other known Communist mass organizations are the National Women's League and the National Youth League. In 1951, the former had a reported membership of 1,500 and the latter 2,200, but again, these organizations are underground and very little is known of their present activities. All known Chinese Commnist organizations have gone underground. These include the Hwa Chi Comrades Association, the Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaborators League, and the K'ang Fan. There appears to have been a significant infiltration of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in several cities and reports indicate a possible infiltration of the leading Chinese anti-Communist association -- the Anti-Commnist Anti-Soviet Salvation Association. © Present Commnist planning calls for the organization and infiltration of various mass organizations -- youth, women, intellectuals, etc., but to date there is no indication that they have made significant progress with these plans. From Cavite Province comes a report that a “peace” organization (Katahimikan ng Mahirap - Peace for the Poor) was being organized. Party theory conceives of two main types of infiltration activities: "legal" and “illegal.” “Legal" infiltration activities consist of working toward a policy-making position within an organization, subtly exerting influence on its policies, and standing-by to replace an “illegal cadre if the latter is arrested. "Illegal" activities include industrial sabotage and recruitment of new members for the HMB. A party member sometimes engages in both types of ‘activities simltaneously. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known significant infiltration of the government by Commnists. That some infiltration has occurred was evidenced by the court conviction in May 1951 of an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs for participation in the Communist rebellion, and in 1952, of a Nacionalista Congressman on a similar charge. There are reports of suspected Communist sympathies on the part of fairly prominent - SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 93] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Administration officials, but these have not been confirmed. In the past there has also been some Chinese Comminist infiltration of the Military Intelligence Service. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is no known Philippine Commnist influence in Philippine public-opinion-forming circles, although a few journalists are reported to hold views sympathetic to Communism. There is some Chinese Communist. penetration of Chinese schools and possibly one radio station. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUN IST POLITICAL PARTIES There is no known Communist infiltration of the non-Commnist Philippine political parties. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Current Commnist periodicals are the Mapagpalaya (The Liberator), Titis (the Spark), and Freedom. They appear at uncertain intervals and none probably has a circulation exceeding 10,000. They are clandestinely mimeographed in several or perhaps all: Party Regions at HMB camps. Information on Chinese Commnist publications is not available. Two publications, Hungary, and The Working Youth in the Rumanian People's Republic, have been received unsolicited by individuals in Manila and Dumaguete and by the Philippine Education Company. There is no regular importing of Comminist publications from abroad, but occasionally US Communist Party publications and Chinese Communist newspapers are smuggled in, the latter from Hongkong. There are nO Communist radio stations in the Philippines, with the possible exception of one station in Manila (the Kuo Tai Station) which in October 1952 was organized by an alleged Chinese Commnist. Further information on this station is unavailable. There are no foreign Comminist broadcasts directed specifically at the Philippines. The reception and size of audience of Peiping's daily 30-minute broadcast in English to Southeast Asia or its programs in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Amoy dialects to overseas Chinese are unknown. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION In recent years PKP theoreticians have emphasized the significance of finance and supply operations, both of which are called finance in PKP terminology. Data about the actual financial status of the PKP as of January 1953 are not available. Although foreign sources, notably SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release OOO 4/0 ()- A -R1 PSO BOOP GO ROOOROOOS8000) 4-4 === [PDF page 94] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -10the US Commnist Party and Communist-dominated American labor unions, furnished fairly considerable financial aid to the PKP in the prewar period, the PKP apparently has received very little material assistance from abroad since World War II. In 1951, the party leadership promlgated a “one year program" for the PKP during fiscal year 1952, and expected party revenues for this period were budgeted at the fantastically high figure of US $4,621,000. The captured American Communist, William Pomeroy, testified in mid-1952 that only "a tiny fraction" of this sum was collected. Party finances in 1952 probably were below those during 1950, for example. The PKP "Statement of Income" for the first six months of calendar year 1950 lists total party income for thatperiod as US $10,750. Apparently, the greatest source-of income is from raids and extortion practices. (In contrast, according to the PKP "Statement of Income," only $28.50 was realized from the sale of Titis in the period April-June 1950.) ‘Data on the income of the Chinese Commnists are unknown. Several business firms are controlled by the Chinese Communists, but reveme figures from these sources are not available. Probably the over-all health of the Chinese Communists is better than that of the PKP, in view of the generally good financial standing of the Chinese commnity. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There are no Soviet or satellite establishments diplomatic or otherwise in the Philippines. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Since the suppression of the various Commmist front organizations in the Philippines, there has been no evidence of any affiliation of Philippine groups with Communist International Organizations. There are no installations or meetings of these latter within the Philippines and no known receipt or transmission of funds to or from them. Philippine Communists, however, have attended several Congresses or Conferences held abroad. One Filipino reportedly attended the meeting of the International Union of Students in Peiping in 1951, and Teodosio Lansang (alias Manuel Cruz) attended the Berlin and Vienna Peace Council meetings in 1951 and 1952 respectively, and the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping in 1952. There was no known attendance at such meetings by Chinese Communists in the Philippines. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The internal communication network of the PKP is a primitive one consisting primarily of the use of women couriers. The Philippine Army is supposed to have located the main north-south courier route on Luzon SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 95] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ~llwhich ran down through the Sierra Madres. Inter-island communication _ is by boat, and here there are infinite possibilities for the Communists _ to choose. There are reports that important leaders have radio. receivers and that the Chinese Commnists had established a transmitter in the Batanes Islands. Chinese Commnists apparently have excellent covert communication and courier systems. Contacts with the outside, of which China is most important and US next, mst be clandestinely arranged. The many islands and the long coastline of the Philippines offer many places for couriers to land. There are reports of couriers landing in Manila, Albay Province, and various places in the Sulu Archipelago. Landings from unidentified submarines off the east coast of Luzon are frequently reported but are to date unconfirmed. Most couriers apparently are Chinese who, after their arrival in the Philippines, manage to move about from place to place with no great trouble. The correlation of some PKP activities with general Communist strategy in the Far East possibly is effected at international Commnist conventions and through couriers, but detailed proof of this is lacking. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 96] === Manne Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET: SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.6 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: ~ CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THATLAND OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 97] === EE eGVO“OeE_ET eee a Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS | Page Foreword ssc ce ec cece cece eseececeece 44 OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES.. « 1 Ie Objectives ee. eccrccrcecrevresreresceeves 1 IT. Tactics see ce eee e cece ec eccccces 1 III. Capabilities «sess eee cer secsesecsee 2 ASSETS ee eeeescccvcs 4 I, Numerical Strength... se eecesecccccces re II. Electoral Strength «ee seecsssceccsssecve 5 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 C IV. Government Policy ‘Toward Communism eee eee eeece 6 Ve Communist Influence in Labor see sc ec cece ee 72 coe VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations. e«eecsccreerecece 8. ‘VII. Communist Infiltration into Government...seeeee 10 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. « *- 10 I. Communist Infiltration of Non-—Communist Political Parties ee cecereeecvcesesveceeecee.s 10 - Xe Communist Propaganda Media..eeescecesesee 10 XIe Financial Condition...e.eeeesceccsces 13 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets. seseescecee 1h XIII. Communist International Organizations...s..s.eeee 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network weeececcecees 16 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 98] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 99] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THAILAND: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The immediate goals of the Communists in Thailand are not easily discernible at the present moment, since the current vigorous anti- Communist drive of the Thai-authorities has presumably forced Communi at leaders to reconsider their past strategy. Before November 10, 1952, the date when the Thai Government began its most recent attempt to suppress Communist activity, the immediate Commnist objectives in Thailand appear to have been: 1. To expand and improve their own organizations, in preparation for the time when domestic events or external assistance might make a direct drive for power possible. 2. To mobilize all varieties of domestic sentiment against the present ruling group. 3. To undermine popular support for US policy in Asia and for Thailand's pro-American international orientation. 4. To render material and propaganda assistance to Comminist-led rebels in Indochina and Malaya. In the current crisis, these objectives have probably been subordinated to the overriding need to ensure the survival.of key personnel. If the Thai police persevere in -their suppression of overt Communist activity, Communist strategy will probably be altered to give ' greater attention to underground organizational work and less attention to propaganda activity. II. TACTICS Two distinct Comminist organizations have developed in Thailand; the Thai Commnist Party (TCP) and the Chinese Communist Party in Thailand (CCP(T)). The TCP is small and appears to be dominated -by the larger and better organized CCP(T). Two distinct parties are maintained, however, because of the long-standing antipathy with which many Thai regard the Chinese and the desire to create the appearance of an indigenous Communist movement. The CCP(T) has attempted to gain strength by recruiting personnel for training, both in Thailand and in China; by soliciting fumnis for local expenses and for transmission to the mainland; by penetrating ‘Chinese schools, labor unions, business organizations, and regional associations; and by utilizing newspapers, some of which are subsidized, to carry propaganda. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R 0 - === [PDF page 100] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET @ SECURITY INFORMATION The Thai Commnist Party remains small and relatively ineffectual. Its efforts have been confined largely to propaganda work. Because the Party, as such, is illegal, its overt activity has been carried on in the face of official tolerance or apathy. Although the TCP has met with some success in creating “front" organizations to carry its message -- most notably the National Peace Committee of Thailand -- | agitation has had an impact only among certain groups of people. Teachers and students, writers and newsmen, some lower grade govern- ‘ment officials, political opposition elements; and recently some. Buddhist groups have been the major targets. Both Thai and Chinese elements have used a variety of appeals in a “broadside” propaganda barrage designed to contain themes attractive _to diverse groups. The principal themes have been: 1.’ Denunciation of US “imperialism” -- responsible for the ' “sufferings” of the Thai people -- which is leading Thailand toward war. 2. Denunciation of the Thai Government -- for allowing itself to — become the "puppet" of the US; for failure to provide for the people's welfare while exploiting labor and taxing the population heavily; for suppression of political rights and for unequal treatment of minorities; and for its internal corruption. 5. Emphasis on the strength of Communist China. + ata ok. 4e “Demonstration” of the compatibility of Buddhism and Commnisn. In recent months there seems to have been an intensified effort to expand activity into the provinces, both to infiltrate administrative services and to build a mass base among the peasantry which has thus far been unresponsive to the Communist message. This change may be partly attributable to more effective police control in Bangkok, but it indicates the essentially long-range nature of Communist activity. Two other Comminist groups are concerned chiefly with creating conditions in bordering countries which might, eventually, promote local Communist objectives. Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist groups in northeast Thailand are supporting the rebellions in their own countries, securing money, arms, and supplies. These elements, however, appear to be operationally distinct from both the TCP and the CCP(T). Comminist groups in the southern provinces, largely an adjunct of the CCP(T), are aiding Mayalan Commnist guerrillas who ocoasionally enter Thailand for rest and resupply. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 101] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Local Commnist groups appear to receive guidance, and probably some financial support, from Chinese Communist liaison groups and through the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, but the precise pattern of external direction is unclear. III. CAPABILITIES Prior to the initiation of repressive measures by the Thai Government in November 1952, the CCP(T) had gained control of most Chinese labor unions, but never utilized its capability of instigating minor violence through strikes and sabotage. The TCP had, during the preceding year, increased the range, quantity, and quality of its propaganda activities. The future capabilities and prospects of the Communist movement will be directly determined by policies of the Thai Government. As long as the present governing military coup group remains cohesive, its control of the country will be firm. Police and military units ‘are believed capable of controlling any overt action initiated by local. Commnists. Although it will probably not be possible to suppress the covert dissemination of Commnist ideas or to eliminate underground. organizations, there is no prospect for a successful overthrow of the government as a result of local Communist aotivity. The policies which the Thai Government will pursue will, in turn, be heavily conditioned by external developments. Its performance in the past has been somewhat ambivalent. Official adherence to an anti- Commnist policy at home and support of the West internationally oontrast with apparent toleration of any Communist activity which was not judged a direct threat to the present regime. Disclosures of Communist plotting uncovered in the course of recent police actions seem to have alarmed some top government leaders, and the present repressive policies © ‘may be contimmed. On the other hand, an extension of Comminist control in adjacent areas in Indochina, Burma, or Malaya would be apt to produce sudden retrenchment. The Thai Government has historically sought to ride the balance between contending forces in Asia, accommodating its policies to the dominant foreign power. Its future actions might well be governed by similar expediential oalculations. If the Thai Government considered Chinese invasion imminent, it is probable that only direct and forceful intervention by the US to protect the integrity of Thailand would ~ prevent a swift reorientation. At such a time, indigenous Commmist elements would find renewed opportunity to exploit existing Thai discontent with the Government and general Chinese resentment over the repressive measures previously imposed on that + large and strategic minority. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 102] === eee EOE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THAILAND: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH Several Communist parties operate in Thailand and total membership figures cannot be determined. The Thai Commmist Party (TCP) is quite small, with an estimated 50-100 members; the overwhelming majority of Communists in Thailand belong to minority groups. The Chinese Communist Party in Thailand (CCP(T)) is the largest organization, with an estimated 2,000 members, Viet Minh and Cambodian Commmist cadres have been active in the northeastern and eastern provinces, but the. number of Party members is unknown, _, The Overseas Chinese in Thailand have been subject to strong pressures for adherence to Commmism and as many as 100,000 may be controlled or - strongly influenced by Commmists. If 25,000 (one-half the estimated Indo- - chinese refugees) is added to this total to allow for -the possible incidence of Communists or sympathizers among the Indochinese minority, the percentage of the total population of Thailand under Communist discipline or strongly influenced by Commnists would reach a probable maximm of 0,7 percent, TCP members have been recruited primarily from professionals, with lawyers and writers predominating, The TCP also exerts some influence among a small group of students at Bangkok universities, The CCP(T) is largely composed of businessmen and merchants; laborers corit). the bulk of the Chinese: population controlled or influenced by the CcoPp(T).. Most of the Indochinese refugees were originally farmers and laborers but most are now merchants and artisans due to the Thai government's restrictions on entering some occupations. Commmist agents have been able to control and organize many Indochinese by infiltrating and dominating village and welfare organizations, The center of known Communist strength is in the Bangkok metropolitan area where the TCP and the CCP(T) are believed to have covert headquarters, — Two other areas of concentrated activity are the southern border region and the northeastern section of Thailand: Ban Phei, Khon Keen, and Nong _ Khai are reported to be centers of the Communist apparatus in the northeast; Songkhla and Hat Yai are principal centers in the south with much activity along the Sadao-Betong frontier region, ; Much of the membership of the TCP appears to be opportunistic, Incontrast, probably the entire membership of the CCP(T) is "hard-core." The Communist organizers among the Indochinese minority are presumably well-indoctrinated Viet Minh agents of the "hard-core" category. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 103] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION The leadership of the CCP(T) is vested in a central executive com mittee of, according to one report, 36 members, A special characteristic of this central group is that many of its members are businessmen of long residence in Thailand; very few are believed to be professional revolutionaries with a long. history of Communist activity. It is believed that membership in the CCP(T) increased as a result of the Commmist conquest of Ghina to the present estimated figure of 2,000. Insufficient evidence precludes analysis of the quality of TCP. leadership or the stability of party membership. There probably has been little change, however, in the total strength of the TCP since 1946. The number of Communists in the Indochinese minority grew enormously during the 1946~1950 period as a vast mumber of refugees entered Thailand, Membership figures among this group have probably been fairly stable for the past two years (1951-1952). “Id. ELECTORAL STRENGTH . Even though political parties have been prohibited in Thailand, a. recent Thai law specifically outlaws the Communist Party as well as membéership in any type of Communist organization, This restriction plus complete goverment control over. electoral procedures virtually eliminates Communist participation in elections, As a further handicap, the great majority of Communists in Thailand are found in minority groups and are largely without voting privileges, III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Communists have not adopted violent action as a means of furthering Communist objectives in Thailand, Violent action, however, has occurred in the southern Thai provinces where raids, murders, and kidnappings are used in intimidating the local Chinese populace to supply and finance the Malayan guerrilla forces operating along the Thai-Malay border, Commmist activities in Thailand have so far been largely limited to fields of organization, propaganda, and espionage. There have been no strikes or sabotage, and, except in the southern provinces, no muders or violence of any kind that can be definitely attributed to Communist elements, Nor do the Communists appear to be in a position to carry on this type of | \direct action in the near future. Although during World War II some Communists were probably involved in ‘the Free Thai resistance movement, no indigenous Communist military resistance organization developed in’ Thailand, and no Communist insurrectionary attempts have ever occurred in Thailand. Rumors of i pnaidll involvement in various Sous dletat d'etat have never been confirmed. SECRET — SECURITY. INFORMATION === [PDF page 104] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Commmists were involved, it was probably on an individual basis and not as the result of a concentrated Commmist effort to overthrow the govern ment. In fact, it has apparently been Commmist policy to avoid involvement in the periodic political coups that are attempted in Bangkok, In view of the apparent lack of preparation for military action, no armed. Communist insurrection seems to be contemplated in the immediate future. Various unconfirmed reports, however, describe the organizing of a Commmnist underground armed force designed to accomplish sabotage or guerrilla operations. Probably some tentative plans have been drawn up and perhaps a small mmber of weapons have been cached, but there is no evidence of the existence of a Communist para-military organization in Thailand. Government restrictions and police surveillance seriously limit Commmist ability to arm and train a para-military force in Thailand. No reliable information is available regarding Commmist plans for a military resistance organization in case of war, The estimated. maximm number that could be organized for this type of activity is perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese, Although a few CCP(T) leaders are reported to have had guerrille experience in China, most of the leadership for guerrilla operations would have to be imported. Arms which were accumulated immediately after World War II are reported to have been shipped to Indochina to supply the Viet Minh between 1948 and 1950, and perhaps others © have been sent to Malaya. Present stores of weapons and equipment for guerrilla action are believed to be negligible. ‘IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The military group heading the government since 1948 has always been avowedly anti-Commnist. Implementation of governmental repressive measures, however, has been sporadic and largely ineffectual and Communist propaganda efforts (the major activity) multiplied. In November 1952, the government's anti—Commmist efforts were in-~ tensified, a law was passed outlawing Communism, and the police began a series of mass arrests of Commmists and fellow—travelers, Three major Commmist—sponsored newspapers were closed in December, In January 1953 arrests were continuing, The government has announced intentions to round up all Commmists and sympathizers in Thailand, - As of January 1953, no front organization was operating in Thailand since many Communist or fellow-traveler leaders were in jail or hiding from the police, Commmist propaganda output had dwindled to a trickle as police ‘censorship over newspapers was strictly enforced, a number of editors were arrested, and several leading Communist dailies were suppressed, Commmists still dominated the large Central Labor Union, but government sponsorship of a rival trade union presented a serious challenge to continued Communist control of the major portion of organized labor in Thailand, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 105] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Strict warnings by security police accompanied by an increase in patrol activity have usually sufficed to prevent the formation of antigoverment or protest demonstrations by Commumists or any other group. Only in the southern provinces on the Malayan frontier has That authority been seriously endangered by extensive Communist activity. A gradual ine crease in police efficiency in this area, however, has been discernible recently, and continued cooperation with Malayan authorities could probably reduce this threat, Although the Thai government did not outlaw membership in Commmist orgenizations until November 1952, the Commnist organizations in Thailand "have in effect been "underground" for at least five years. The Commmists have been fairly efficient in covert party activities such as arranging illegal entries into Thailand, sending students to China for training, and smuggling of limited amounts of goods and arms to Indochina and Malaya. Espionage is probably well developed. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The numerical strength of Commmists in various occupations is not known. The Commnist—controlled Central Labor Union (CLU), however, represents a majority of the workers in the important rice milling and rice exporting industries and the majority of all stevedore workers, Other occupational areas in which the CLU has organized unions incluie tugboats, merchant marine, streetcars, o11 companies, saw mills, match factories, textiles, the tea trade, the Bangkok vegetable growers, ‘the Makkasan railroad shopworkers, tobacco factories, ice factories, bakeries, watchmaking and goldsmithing, wood and metal processing, various service industries, hotels, restaurants, coffee shops, and laundries, Only about 2 percent of the labor force in Thailand is organized, Of this amount somewhere between 50-75 percent is organized in the CLU which had about 50,000- members in 1952, Approximately three-quarters of the strength of the ClU is in the Bangkok-Thon Buri area and 95 percent of its members and leaders are believed to be Chinese. Since February 7, 1949, the CLU has been a member of the WFIU, The WFTU does not maintain an office in Thailand and contact between CLU and WFTU is often concealed, The Executive Committee of the CLU is believed to control four eographic trade union federations with approximately 50 local branches a) the Bangkok Federation of Trade Unions, (2) the Chachoengsso Federation of Trade Unions, (3) the Ubon Federation of Trade Unions, and (4) the Songkhla Federation of Trade Unions, The Executive Committee of the CLU reportedly also has immediate control over some local unions in areas where no. federation has been established. In addition, a number of local unions are not members but are affiliated with the CLU. ” SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 106] === TE a eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Thai Government's continued antagonism to the CLU, expressed — through its active sponsorship of the rival Thai National Trade Union - Congress, is serving to reduce the preponderant position of the CLU. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ‘ A. Front Organizations Since the end of World War II a number of Communist-front organizations have been reported in Thailand. The great majority of these failed to develop beyond the initial planning stage, and claims of extensive membership have not been substantiated. No Thai front organizations are known to be active at present. On the other hand, a few Chinese associations of long standing are now Communist-dominated; these remain active and are likely to survive the current anti-Communist -drive of the government. ‘1. Communist-sponsored fronts. A student organization called the Union of Thai Students (UTS) with a claimed membership of 3,000 affiliated with the world-front International Union of Students (IUS) in September 1951. -In January 1953 the strength of this organization was estimated — to be a maximum of 80-100. The Thai government discourages political activity among students and no student movement not sponsored by the government is likely to gain much strength or importance, The UTS has been of little consequence; if it still exists it is probably located — in Bangkok, The National Peace Committee of Thailand (NPCT) was. organized in 1951 to support the Communist-sponsored peace petition. The Communists have used the NPCT to organize and foment opposition to the policies of the Thai government and as a propaganda outlet. A number of prominent journalists, opposition politicians, students, writers, and other intellectuals dominate the organization. It is affiliated with the World Peace Council and delegates were sent to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping in October 1952. Thai representatives have also attended other "peace" metings. Until recently, membership was re= ported to be from 70-100. As of January. 1953, however, most members of the NPCT were in jail awaiting trial. Police repressive measures will probably limit the usefulness of this organization in the future. _ Several women's organizations have been organized in the past by both Thai and Chinese Communists; they failed to gain popular support, however, and no women's "front" organization is known to exist at present. SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 107] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 2. Organizations captured by Communists. The Chtao Chou Hui Kuan _ (Swatow Association) with 7,000 members is the largest of seven. Chinese regional or dialect associations in Thailand. The leaders of this | organization are Communists or sympathizers and the association has strong contacts with individuals and groups in China. The majority of the members are in the Bangkok metropolitan area and the leadership has considerable influence in the Chinese commnity. It publishes a monthly magazine, operates several schools, sponsors a small clinic which provides cheap medical care for the poor, sponsors athletic - events, and performs countless welfare tasks. The Pao Te Shan T'ang (Philanthropic Association) with headquarters in Bangkok is the most important and most influential organization of its kind among the Chinese. Its board of directors contains some prominent Communists and sympathizers. Nearly all of its philanthropic work is carried on in Bangkok but it is nation-wide in so far as contributions come from Chinese throughout the country. More than any Chinese association, this welfare association has the means and the opportunity to contact most of the Chinese in Thailand. Its prestige -and charitable work make it an effective medium for the spread of Communist influence. Be Non-Communi st Organizations Infiltrated by Communists The only significant non-Communist Thai organization penetrated by the Communists and fellowstravelers is the Press Association of Thailand (PAT) composed of newspapermen and journalists from nongovernment publications. Since the PAT strongly opposes the government's press censorship policy (which policy directly affects the _ effectiveness: of Communist propaganda), this organization has been utilized by Communists to denounce the government. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Bangkok), with a. membership of 5,000 individuals and firms, includes both pro-Kuomintang and pro- Communi st cliquese It is the most influential Chinese organization in Thailand and often assumes the role of spokesman for the Chinese community. Despite strenuous efforts Chinese Communists have been unable to dominate this organization, though they still remain a significant minority within it. Penetration and domination of the _ Chinese Chamber of Commerce would enable Communists to exercise a strong influence among the Chinese minority in: Thailand. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 108] === 0 Eo LLL LLL TC ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET «= SECURITY INFORMATION VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known Communist influence at policy levels of the Thai government or any of its agencies. Frequent rumors of contacts between certain government officials and Communist agents are without VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION _ . Communists have been able to achieve only limited success in. penetrating or controlling public opinion forming circles in Thailand. The only appreciable influence of Communists on education is through the CCP(T) which controls a few Chinese schools. Apparently efforts have been made by Communists to infiltrate Buddhist organizations, but so far these attempts have been unsuccessful. Soviet bloc films are shown occasionally in a limited number of theaters. in Bangkok and the. provinces. Careful government control of the local broadcasting system has prevented any use of this medium by Communists. The prevalent custom in Thailand of permitting considerable leeway to individual newsmen makes it possible for fellow-traveler writers (often. sbsidized by the Communists) employed by neutralist and uncommitted newspapers ~— to inject Communist propaganda into the non-Communist press. However, it should be noted that it is often difficult to distinguish between - non-Communist criticism of the government and Communist propaganda. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON«COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES SL TT AA OCA EO OTT I AT aa Political parties as such are prohibited in Thailand and the only legal political organization is the pro-government bloc in the National Assembly. Communist influence in that body is either totally absent or negligible. |,; -. The government has alleged that the Free Thai followers of expremier Pridi Phanamyong are influenced by Communism and that these. individuals represent a cohesive political opposition movement. Although it is true that several former Pridi-ites are prominent fellowtravelers, it is believed that the majority are not pro-Communist. Inasmuch as there is no longer a formal Free Thai organization, Communist tendencies have become largely a matter of individual predilection. - X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Communist propaganda content in Thailand follows the current party line quite closely with special adaptations for the local situation. Daily items for Chinese and Thai publications usually are furnished by the New China News Agency (NCNA) and Radio Peiping. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 109] === ED EE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION AL LON Several daily newspapers regarded as party organs are supported by the Communists. In addition, a number of fellow-traveler publications and newsmen apparently receive subsidies from the CCP(T) or the Soviet Legation. A few Communist films have been imported into Thailand; the principal theater exhibiting this type of film is the Sri Ayuthia in Bangkok.. A. Newspapers and Periodicals Ee Oc cals Name Circulation Publisher - Remarks _e, ate A Ae RN teeta ae 1. Communist Ch'uan Min Pao ~ 6,000 Ordered to cease publication by Thai government December 1952. _ Nan Chton Pao S, 1,000 Puangchon. _ Ordered to cease’ publication by Thai government. December 1952. 2. Pro-Communist Daily Mail 10,900 _ Prae Khao Co., Ltd. Khao Phap 4,000, Phim Thai _ 15,000 Thad. Phanitkan Co., Ltd. (reportedly CCP(T) controlled) Siam Nikhon _ 7-8,000 ‘Thai. Phanitken Co., Ltd. Chung Yuan Pao 10-12, 000 Chung Yuan Wan Pao 12,000 Kuang Hua Tsao Pao 3,500 Kuang Hua Pao 5,500 Lok Mai (weekly) - Thai Kan Phim Press Phim Thai Wan Chan (weekly) Thai Phanitkan Co., Ltd. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 110] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Siam Samai (weekly) 7 Thai Phanitkan Co., Ltde Siang Thai (weekly ) Ordered to cease publication, by Thai government in December 1952. Yuk Mai (fortnightly). Thai Sathit Press Akson San (monthly) B. Imported Publications Most imported propaganda material is in Chinese, printed in Peiping, Shanghai, or Hongkong. Smaller shipments of Communist publications are received in Thai and English, and a relatively insignificant proportion of imported propaganda material is in Russian. The major Communist publication outlet for Thailand is the “dverseas Chinese Book Store” in Bangkok, which oarries about 600 assorted titles of books, magazines, and other publications. At various times the government has banned the importation of specific Communist publications but a large variety continued to be shipped in without restriction and sold openly by the Communist book-. store. In December 1952, however, the bookstore was raided by the police and many items were confiscated. Government restrictions may limit the usefulness of. this outlet inthe future. The Soviet Legation distributes a semi-weekly Thai-language information bulletin which includes articles on Communist ideology, life in the Soviet Union, verbatim accounts of speeches by Russian delegates in the UN, and official propaganda. The Viet Minh organization in Bangkok disseminated propaganda “until suppressed by the Thai government in 1950. However, a few Viet Minh pamphlets published in Rangoon have circulated in Thailand. C. Radio | _ All domestic broadcasting stations are government controlled, thus precluding any Communist influence. Several programs from Communist stations abroad can be heard. in Thailand. Moscow Radio broadcasts two half~hour programs daily in English and Radio Peiping has two daily programs in Thai, each of one-fourth te one-half hour duration. Programs in Chinese and English SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 111] === rer ae eR SN Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION can also be heard on this Chinese statione The gize of the listening audience is unknown. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The TCP and the CCP(T) apparently have adequate financial re= sources for their present limited programs, although no information is available on their total assets or income. The financial condition of Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist elements in Thailand also is unknown. Within Thailand, funds are obtained from numerous sourcese Some revenue is undoubtedly derived from membership fees, labor union revenues, and private donationse Also profits presumably accrue from trading transactions of party-controlled business firms and from the sale of party publications. Several Chinese business firms have apparently been established specifically to provide financial supporte These include the Fah Dan Thai Coe, Ltd, and the Andar Company which market Soviet, Chinese Commnist, and satellite goods. The Andar Company's branch in Hongkong is reported to have handled gold shipments to Bangkok for use in defraying party expensese The "Overseas Chinese Book Store" in Bengkok was established to sell party publications. Although informa tion is lacking on the amount of financial support given by these business undertakings, it is known that at least in part they subsidize Communist information services in Thailande Supplies and funds extorted from Chinese rubber growers, in the southern provinces are used locally to support the Communist guerrilla bands operating along the Thai-Malay border. Reports indicate that this region probably is being well organized in support of Communist activitiese:, The parties derive funds from external Communist sources as well as from their activities within Thailand. The Soviet Legation reportedly imports ourrency in the diplomatic pouch for the financial support of Communist activities. Also Chinese Communist officials are believed to have brought funds to Bangkok for ccP(T) operations. It is not clear, however, whether, on balance, the Communist movement in Thailand is the beneficiary of outside financial assistance or a source of revenue for other elemnts in the world Communist conspiracye The funds regularly solicited or extorted from Chinese residents in Thailend for transmission to Commnist China could conceivably be much larger than any funds received by the TCP and the CCP(T) from other parties.: “SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 112] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS No Commnist regime maintains a diplomatic establishment in Thailand except the Soviet Union. The USSR is represented in Thailand by a Minister and Legation in Bangkok. The Legation occupies 108 Sathon Road, Bangkok, which formerly was a hotel building. In addition, 6 Krung Kasem Road houses the Eksporthleb Office and provides accommodations for the business staff of Eksporthleb. The offices of Sovexport Film and TASS are at 21 Tung Mahamek, Bangkok; each has 4& Russian representative in charge. The ECAFE office in Bangkok usually has two Russian omphoyees in the past they had contacts with the Sovist Legation. The total number of Russians at the Legation, including families, remains about 30 to 40, only five of whom claim diplomatic rank: the minister, three secretaries, and a commercial attache. The remainder. of the Soviet Legation personnel are called “officials" on their applications for police identity cards, but it is assumed that some of them have duties at least as important as the diplomats. The business. staff of Eksporthleb remains about two although the wives and older children of these officials occasionally work in the office. Since the Legation's overt activities, with the exception of ' official functions, are confined almost wholly to propaganda, it is believed most if not all of the personnel are engaged in propaganda activities. The Soviet Legation issues a Thai-language semi-weekly bulletin on a rather irregular basis. It is believed that certain books actos containing basic Communist doctrine, which have appeared during the past several years, were subsidized by the Legation. In addition, it is. believed that certain ideological instructions and special feature articles are provided Thai fellow-traveler and Communist publications.e- According to various reports, translations of such works have been done on a contract basis by Thai, several of whom are minor government offi- ‘cialse It is likely that the Soviet Legation subsidizes certain Thai fellow-traveler publications since they obviously oould not exist on receipts from their limited circulation and advertisement, and the Thai Communist Party is not believed to be able financially to support the large number of such publications being printed. The Eksporthleb office keeps close contact with the Legation and it is possible that income from Eksporthleb is utilized for subsidizing propaganda activity. Certainly Eksporthleb's existence could not be justified by the extent of its business. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 113] === TE EE _-—eeeeeeeOOO e Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION: XIII. COMMUNIST: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No Communist international organization maintains a branch office or other installation in Thailand, and no meetings of these organizations have been held within the country. Local Communists and fellow-travelers, however, have attended meetings abroad to an increasing extent during the past two years. Few if any of these delegates have returned to Thailand. Recently, when members of the largest and the most publicized delegation to an international front meeting evaded police restrictions and departed for Peiping, the government announced that legal steps would be taken upon their return. No funds are known to have been received by local Commuriists from international organizations, but it seems probable that at least part of the travel expenses | of the representatives abroad is paid by international organizations. It is not known whether Thai organizations have contributed to the support of Commnist international organizations. Attendance of local Communists at meetings of international organizations held abroad is summarized below: ' Size of Local Meeting Date Representation Berlin Peace Conference Feb. 1951 2 delegates International Union of Students Conference,, Peiping Apre 1951 ‘1 observer Berlin Youth Festival Auge 1951 4 delegates International Union of Students Council Meeting, Warsaw Sept. 1951 1 delegate Youth League Meeting, a Moscow Sept. 1951 1 delegate World Peace Council, Vienna Nov. 1951 3 delegates Preparatory Conference for Asian and Pacific © Peace Conference, Peiping June 1952 2 delegates "SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 114] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ; Size of Local Extraordinary Session, World Peace Council,; Berlin July 1952 1 delegate Asian and Pacific Peace. Conference, Peiping Oot. 1952 11 delegates XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Bangkok is probably the center of the Communist communication network in Thailand and may be the center for Southeast Asia. Because use of regular mail is considered unsafe, the Communists rely on courier facilities and radio communication. The Chinese Overseas Bookstore is reported to be the center of commmications between Bangkok and “underground" Communists in the provinces, and a CCP(T) courier system appears to be operating efficiently and regularly between Bangkok and Songkhla in southern Thailand. A clandestine radio network has reportedly been established by the Communists in Thailand, for both internal and external communication. Although non-government transmitters are illegal, a number are in operation, many of them owned and operated by Chinese commercial firms | to transact business outside the countrye Some of these Chinese-operated transmitters are. probably used by the CCP(T). Commnists in Bangkok and .Hat Yai are reported to have radio communication with Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore. - Assertions that the Soviet Embassy operates a radio transmitter seem ‘plausible but are thus far unconfirmed. The Chinese Commnist Party in Thailand (CCP(T)), as a branch of the CCP in China, maintains close relations with the parent body. — Without, exception, the leaders of the CCP(T) have received training in China. High-level Chinese Communist intelligence and propaganda officials from a liaison office in China are frequently reported on covert visits to the CCP(T) organization in Bangkok and in the southern Thai provincese Although the precise pattern of external direction cannot - be determined, rumors of reorganization of the CCP(T), intensification of its propaganda and espionage activities, and fund-raising efforts frequently coincide with these reported visits. The Thai Commnist Party (TCP), on the other hand, apparently has the most direct contact with the Soviet Legation in Bangkok of any Commnist group in Thailand. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 115] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION SEU T — SECURITY INFORMATION -17- Vietnamese Communist cells in eastern Thailand have closer ties with Viet Minh groups across the border than with China or the TCP. In the southern provinces, the Communist organization (predominantly Chinese) seems to coordinat e its efforts with the guerrilla activities of the Malayan Communists, indicating direct coo peration between what are, in effect, two branches of the CCP. “ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 116] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET. SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.7 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, JAPAN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 117] === OE ae Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CON TENTS Page Foreword « ee es eee een eee cen eveeveeeve ti OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES.« « e L Ie Objectives. «se e«scere eevee eee eevee eve 1 II. Tactic8 e ecreceevere eevee vnereneseveres e 1 TIT. Capabilities. eee ee ee eee cere eer vee 3 ASSETS 2 eee ee eeeee 6 Ie Numerical Strength.. 2 cecscccecscsrevsecee oe 6 II, Electoral Strengths esse ceseceseoeseee 10 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 13 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism... eee cc ee 21 Ve Communist Influence in Labor «2 «eeeeecesese. 23 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and 2h Professional Organizations « «ee esesceesevse VII. Communist Infiltration into Government eee ee eee 28 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation.« « « 29 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-—Communist Political Parties oeeo35nwreeeeeeeeee ee eee ee @ 31 X. Communist Propaganda Media.eecececcsecceecece 33 XI. Financial Condition «4 se«ecccrsececeereveecee 37 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets.ssseeeseee 40 XIII. Communist International Organizations.«eeeeccee ho XIV. Communist Communication Network.e«eeeee e~ecee 43 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 118] === cc crccrmmnmmmmmmmmmnnn Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, ( providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 119] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES In compliance with the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, | the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) currently seeks as its principal short-term objective to undermine the alliance between the United States and Japan. In pursuit of this general objective, it seeks in particular to discredit the Japanese peace treaty, the agreements under which US forces are stationed in Japan, and all efforts to improve Japan's capacity for self-defense. Similtaneously, the party seeks to develop attitudes favorable to an orientation toward the USSR and Communist China or at least to promote and strengthen nevtralist attitudes. The JCP does not ignore domestic objectives; rather it seeks as far as possible to link them to the anti-US campaign. Where the achievement of a domestic goal conflicts with the policy dictated by the international interests of the USSR, it is the domestic goal that is sacrificed. Barring a change in the international policy of the USSR, there appears to be no immediate liklihood that the JCP will alter its objectives or their relative priority rating. Simltaneously with the pursuit of its general objective, the ( party is embarked on the covert preparation of a para-military organization to be employed when and as required in the international interests of the USSR. II. TACTICS The current program of the JCP is a dual operation in which a new policy involving extensive underground activity is being pursued side by side with an overt popular front policy. The party is thus: l. Attempting to secure the widest possible popular following, and 2. Creating an underground apparatus, including a para-military organization, in preparation for the ultimate implementation of @ program of violent action. A. Popular Front Tactics The groups to which the Commnist Party directs its appeals are so numerous as to include almost all Japanese except the large scale industrial and financial interests, the national leadership of the Liberal Party which controls the government, and to a lesser extent the leadership of the conservative-opposition Progressive Party. The Comminists have devoted particular attention to workers, farmers, youth, and intellectuals. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 120] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Elements in the Japanese situation which the Comminists seek to a exploit in the effort to secure members and sympathizers and to cultivate attitudes favorable to the achievement of their objectives include: 1. Fear of war and, specifically, fear that Japan may become involved in war not in pursuit of its own interests but as an involuntary participant in the conflict between the US and the USSR. 2e Resentment of the US position in Japan including the presence of US troops, military activities involving interference with normal activities, and what may be regarded as US control of Japanese policy., 3. Fear of the economic burden imposed by defense measures and by curtailment of trade with Soviet bloc countries especially China. 4, ‘Fear of retrogression toward reactionary government policies, repression of civil liberties, withdrawal of trade union rights, etc. 5. Desire to normalize diplomatic relations with countries still technically at war with Japan. The Japanese Party follows the familiar Communist tactics of: establishing front organizations, national and local, to cover the interests, aspirations, and activities of most of the major elements of society; linking such fronts in federations and congresses of various kinds; and utilizing the fronts to support the party‘s position on national and international issues. In the schematic terms of the JCP program, the front groups would become components of the "National Liberation Democratic United Front" whose envisaged role is that of a popular base for the overthrow of the existing government and establishment of a people's revolutionary government. At present probably the most active and effective front groups are those operating in the functional areas of promoting “peace” and relations with Communist China, especially those of trade. At present, of Japan's total union membership of approximately 6 million, only 7% are believed to be Communist Party members or sympathizers. The present capacity of the JCP to manipulate or benefit from the activities of the trade unions is therefore not a consequence of numerical strength or control of positions of. leadership. It arises rather from the fact that an important segment of labor's leadership, politically aligned with the left Socialist Party, supports policies © closely parallel to many of the positions assumed by the JCP,: particularly in the area of foreign policy. In the face of this situation and in view of the JCP's continuing incapacity to reassert SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 121] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION itself as an independent force in the Japanese trade union movement, the party appears to have dissolved what little remains of its own once-powerful trade union federation. It now appears to be seeking to infiltrate Sohyo, the Left Socialist controlled federation which, with.& claimed membership of approximately 3 million, is the largest in - Japan. The JCP has been active in national and local elections seeking to utilize the campaigns to: seat Commnists and sympathizers; promote propaganda objectives; and form alliances with other groups. In the\ October 1952 election for the lower house, JCP overtures to other leftwing groups for a united front campaign were rebuffed; the party polled only 2.5% of the total popular vote; and it failed to seat a single candidate. B. Underground Tactics The JCP program for underground para~-military action apparently envisages a three-stage development: l. Establishment of an organization to plan and carry out violent action, subversion, and sabotage, training of cadres for these purposes and their organization into a national network, and indoctrination of the masses with the necessity of armed action; 2. Formation of armed “resistance” and "self-defense" organizations among workers and farmers and conduct of local partisan activities involving initially sabotage and harassment and ultimately attacks on military facilities and equipment; 5. Conversion of these "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations _ into a revolutionary "people's army" to carry out a general armed The party is now engaged in the first of these phases and has probably made only limited progress toward its objectives. Nevertheless in the first half of 1952, the party carried on a campaign of violent action which demonstrated the existence of well-organized and trained action squads. Since mid-1952 however, in accordance with party directions to avoid actions that would alienate the masses, there has been no significant mass violence although continued espionage and sabotage efforts have been reported. III. CAPABILITIES So long as the party is able to continue on a legal entity, its overt organization, its "front groups," its limited penetration of SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Airnroved For RPelaaca 200 7/0 OQ: A-F IP S65 ROOPOOROOQOSO00S000 1-4 === [PDF page 122] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 — SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION non-Commmist organizations and parties, and its participation in orthodox political activities enables the party to contime its efforts to encourage popular discontents and divide the Japanese from their government and its policies. The party's efforts in this regard are facilitated by its ability to exploit the frequent parallels existing between its own position and that of groups and organizations, particularly of the Socialist left, not subject to direct Commnist influence and control. Also, despite the widespread popular support presently accorded to Japan's present policy of close alignment with the US, the Party is able to exploit dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the peace and security treaties and with present restraints on mainland trade. Present evidence indicates that the JCP including its underground organization now has a significant potential for espionage, - ‘sabotage, and propaganda, as well as for promoting at least limited and sporadic incidents of mass violence. The party is not believed capable of undertaking armed insurrection without external military assistance. The covert Comminist para-military organization could, however, provide valuable assistance to an external attack upon Japan., A number of factors appear to work against any great increase in the overt or covert capabilities of the JCP. Official restraints on party activities may be expected to become more effective as Japanese police and intelligence services are strengthened and further suppressive measures may. be undertaken, particularly if the party again resorts to violence or other forceful activities that disturb the public peace. The party's open identification with and virtual subordination to the interests and policies of the Soviet Union and its doctrinaire insistance upon certain manifestly unpopular policies -- notably the demand for overthrow of the Emperor system -- limit the party's general popular Appeal and make unlikely possibilities of fruitful, if transient cooperation, with extreme rightist elements. Finally, even the present limited continuance of illegal and violent activities, in the light of popular revwilsion against the party's militant program during the first half of 1952, serves to undercut its efforts of exploiting and developing Japanese discontent under conditions of close alignment with and dependence upon the United States. These limitations upon JCP capabilities extend to its efforts to recoup electoral support for the party and to infiltrate and gain control over the trade union movement and non-Commnist left wing organizations and parties. In sum the JCP has the capacity to exploit, intensify, or keep alive friction between the US and Japan. It does not, however, have the capacity seriously to undermine the US-dapanese alliance. While the creation of an underground structure including a para-military organization has given the JCP a greater capacity to resist suppression and to SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 123] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION resort to violent action when and as required by the tactics of international Communism, the party should not within the foreseeable future become capable of sustained armed insurrection without external military assistance. ( SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 124] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH A. JCP Membership and Following As of July 1952, the officially registered membership of the JCP was 48,596.4 This represented.a decline of approximately 60,000 (or more than 53 percent) since February 1950, when the party's registered membership had reached its postwar peak of 108,593; this membership continued to drop through mid-1952,; although the downward trend appeared to have slowed down during the first half of 1952 (the decline during that period was 2,500) as compared with that in 1950 (43,500) and 1951 (18,000) °” - In addition to registered members, it is estimated that there are 30,000-35,000 unregistered or secret JCP members. Most of these _ probably are former registered party members whose resignations or explusions were actually faked. These unregistered members are probably equally subject to party direction and discipline. The total 1. Registered membership refers.to figures filed periodically with the Japanese Government, a procedure required until July 1952 of all Japanese political parties. 2 Post-war party registered membership: . Registered Increase Date Member ship or Decrease May 1946 4,500 o- May 1947 13,378 4 8,878 May 1948 18,088 x 4,710 May 1949 57,000 #é 38,912 (February 1950 108,593 # 51,593) May 1950. 99,317 - 9,276 May 1951 58,035 f 41,282 July 1952 48,596 - 9,437 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Pm alaasca D()() 7/0) cm A-R IP SOBOOVGOROODOSO00S000 1-4 Annroved 0) === [PDF page 125] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION -7of registered and unregistered or secret members thus is probably between 80-85,000 persons. The JCP is believed to have imposed stricter admission qualifications and security precautions on prospective members than in the past. Thus, the apparent decline in the overt membership would not, from the party's viewpoint, necessarily indicate a loss but, rather, may suggest a strengthening of effective control and discipline over its membership. The JCP following includes: 1) An estimated 100,000 to 250,000 non-member sympathizers who actively participate in Communist~-sponsored movements. 2) An estimated 500,000 to 650,000 "leftists" who may be classed as "passive" sympathizers through their occasional participation in pro-Communist movement s.! Altogether, it is estimated that one million persons are strongly influenced or under Communist Party control. This total is slightly over two percent of the total adult population and corresponds roughly with the number of votes cast for Communist and fellow travelers in the recent election. ( B. Geographic Distribution and Class Composition Party membership and sympathizers are concentrated in the major metropolitan areas, notably the two primary industrial centers of Tokyo~Yokohama and Osaka-Kobe. (Tokyo alone has 16,000 knom party members.) The northern island of Hokkaido, three prefectures in central and northern Japan (Nagano, Gumma, and Niigata, and northern Kyushu) are other leading areas of concentration. In general, the party's centers of strength are urban and its areas of weakness rural. The classes from which the bulk of party membership and following is drawn has been estimated recently as follows -- an estimate generally in alignment with class breakdowns applicable to. party membership as of December 1951: 1. These figures apply to Japanese. In addition there are an estimated 80,000 active and 350,000 passive supporters among the Korean minority. (See III C, p. 8.) SECRET « SECURITY INFORMATION. === [PDF page 126] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 50 percent from Japanese intellectual, professional and white collar groups; 30 percent from industrial workers; 10 percent from rural workers; 10 percent others (e.g., national minorities, unemployed, eta -- outcaste class --, etc.) ; The age breakdown of party membership has been estimated recently as follows: under 20 years, 18 percent; 20-29 years, 37 percent; 30-39 years, 24 percent; 40-49 years, 12 percent; 50-59 years, 6.5 percent; above 60 years, 2.5 percent. The average length of party membership is estimated to be three to four yearse Ce Quality of Party Member ship The improvement of the quality of membership is currently one of | the party's major internal problems. From 1945 through early 1950, the party, is keeping with its posture as a bona fide political party, operated on a mass-member ship policy. Since Cominform criticism of its policies in January 1950, and especially since the revision of party rules and regulations in early 1951, the party has sought to weed out unreliables, indoctrinate the remainder more thoroughly, and in general convert itself into a hard-core organization. The extent of this task is suggested. by the fact that the great bulk of its membership has joined the party since the surrender. Even allowing for additional secret members in the period 1945-1950, it is apparent that the vast majority of the membership is comparatively young in age and in experience in party organizations and activities. The quality of the membership in terms of its capacity for following abrupt changes in the party line has not been put to test recently. However, the Cominform criticism resulted in internal dissension of such bitterness as to support a supposition that the party, despite the overt reconciliation of differences in the new program announced in late 1951, might again show internal fractures in the event of a change of line. The new program, with its dualism of "legal," overt activity and of underground preparation for violence, has provided other tests of the quality of the membership. That the party has an efficient underground apparatus, that it has mounted violent demonstrations, that it is organizing para-military units bespeak @ significant degree of readiness to risk or incur hardships in the course of illegal action. At the same time, the overt warning carried in the Cominform journal in mid-1952 against excessive violence of the sort perpetrated that spring, and the circumstances SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 127] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION —. surrounding that warning suggest that significant elements of the party, perhaps including its top leadership, lack the sophistication and discipline demanded by the program. D. Quality of Party Leadership The top leadership of the party, generally confined to prewar Communists, is considered to be of fairly high quality. It includes persons trained in Moscow and comprises those hardened through years of repression and adversity. Nearly all of this level of leadership is now underground, where, despite deficiencies of the sort previously mentioned, the development of an efficient organization gives testimony to their administrative capability. Opportunists and dilettantes are believed to have been generally weeded out. However, the leadership may be evaluated as relatively weak in its capacity to comprehend and handle ideological matters. The leadership failed to adjust its policies despite clear tokens of Moscow's displeasure before the publication of the Cominform criticism; it failed to resolve the theoretical differences in which the party schism thereafter focussed for more than a year; and its level of ideological discussion has invariably been low. The leadership of the overt organization consists of thirdrate figureheads. The core of the party -- those party members at all levels who oarry the principal burden of leadership and organizational activity and who may be expected to continue party activities under most adverse conditions and abrupt changes in line -- may be estimated at approximately 25,000. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 128] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -10- II. ELECTCRAL STRENGTH In the October 1952 House of Representatives general election, the JCP nominated one candidate each in all but 10 of the 117 election districts. These candidates polled 897,000 votes, or approximately 2.5 percent of the total valid ballots as compared with 2,985,000 votes (9.7%) for JCP candidates in January 1949. None of the JCP candidates was successful in 1952, while 35 had been returned in 1949. The JCP officially recommended 9 non-communist candidates, one each in 9 of the 10 districts in which no JCP candidates were entered. These recommended candidates, (four running under their party labels; five as independents) received a total of 200,000 votes and only one was successfule The portion of this vote attributable to Communist support cannot be isolated. However, the JCP added this total to the 897,000 won by its own candidates to attain its claim of 1.1 million pro-Communist votes. The JCP also identified a list of 12 candidates (four Progressive, five Left Socialists, and one Right Socialist, one Labor-Farmer, and one independent) as “Patriotic candidates," signifying their general acceptability, although all but one of these twelve competed with the Party's own candidates. Thesé twelve received a total of 475,000 votes. Ten of these twelve were successful. Beyond this it is difficult to identify candidates who may be labeled fellow-travelers in some degree. Only. Labor-Farmer candidates who received an aggregate of 261,000 votes may be regarded collectively as pro-Conmunist oriented. Two Labor-Farmer candidates had JCP support or approval. The Left Socialist Party whose policy toward relations with the U.S. security arrangements, rearmament, etc., is very similar to that of the JCP, officially spurned the JCP's “united front" platform. In any event, close cooperation between the two parties would probably have been unlikely in most of the some 80 election districts where they both nominated candidates. Only in four districts are Communits known to have obtained more votes than their Left Socialist rivals. (Six Left Socialist candidates had JCP support or approval). On the other hand, it is conceivable that Communist and Left Socialist votes were "pooled" in the 30 districts where the Left Socialists had no candidates but the Communists _ did. In the Third District of Hokkaido, neither the Left Socialists nor the Communists nominated a candidate and it is probable that at least some of their support went to the Labor-Farmer candidate. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 129] === —— eee ee ee ee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ' SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION Although the JOP has claimed partial credit for the electoral advance of the Left Socialist Party as a group (3,494,000 votes, 54 seats), the degree to which this claim might be justified cannot be judged. The following table presents a comparison of communist electoral strength with the strength of other major parties: October 1952 House of Representatives Election Party Votes Percent Seats JCP 897,000 2.5 0 Liberal (conservative gov't party) 16,928,000 48.0 238 Progressive (conservative- oo, opposition) 6,421,000 18.2 85 Right Socialists (opposition) 4,024,000. 11.4 57 Left Socialists, _. (opposition) 3,494,000 10.0 54 Independents (mostly conservative) 2 364,000 6.7 21 Other 1,159,000 302 1k Total 35,287,000 100.0 466 Slightly less than one-third (31%) of the Communist vote in October 1952 came from urban areas (comprising the entire prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka plus the districts in which are located the larger cities, namely, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, Kyoto, Sendai and Fukuoka), and over two-thirds, from the rural districts. The ratio of urban vote was exceeded only by that of the Right Socialists (36%); the Liberal Party drew 15% of its vote from the urban districts, the Progressives, 14%, and the Left Socialists 21%. Numerically, the heaviest Communist vote was found in Tokyo | Metropolis and Osaka Prefecture. In Tokyo where the total valid : ballots numbered 2,480,000, the Communists polled more than 93,000 (3.7%), as compared with 1,025,000 votes (41.3%) for the Liberals, 562,900 (22.7%) for the Right Socialists, 312,000 (12.6%) for the Progressives, and. 303,000 (12.2%) for the Left Socialists. In Osaka Prefecture, Communist candidates obtained 91,500 votes (6.0%) out of 1,503,000 valid ballots; in the same prefecture, the Liberals again received a plurality of 690,000 votes (45.9%), followed by the Right Socialists (288,000 -- 19.1%), the. Progressives (248,000 =. 16.5%), and the Left Socialists (149,000 -~ 9.9%). In the four major cities other than Osaka and Tokyo, Communist returns were as follows: SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 130] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET « SECURITY INFORMATION -12. Votes Percent of Total Kyoto 26,000 729 Nagoya 24,000 6.3 Yokohama 13,400 304 Kobe 11,600 369 Of the rural prefectures, where conservative parties without exception returned large majorities, Nagano had numerically the largest Communist vote (46,700 -- 4.9%) « In Hokkaido, Communist candidates polled 42,500 votes (2.6%), while the Labor-Farmer Party obtained nearly 110, 600. votes (6.7%). The vote for Communist and Labor-Farmer candidates was significant in two other prefectures: Okayama (Communist -= 21,000 or 2.8% and Labor Farmer -- 82,500 or 11.3%) and Ibaraki (Communist =-- 20,000, or 2.4% and Labor Farmer << 54, 000 or 6.6%). The JCP's very poor showing as compared with previous performances cannot be attributed to diminution of Communist interest in election activities except in the indirect sense that: 1) abandonment of the Nozaka line altered the position of parliamentary tactics in the hierarchy of Japanese Communist values; 2) the campaign of violence that for a time appeared to be the most conspicious expression of the new line, although terminated well before the election, alienated a large number of former party supporters. In the self-criticism in which it has engaged since the election, the JCP has not disavowed its basic campaign strategy -- the attempt to secure a united front, primarily with the Left Socialists but also with other groups, on the basis of neutralism, anti-Americanism, and opposition to rearmament. Self-criticism has instead focused on tactics and has indicated that the Communists find themselves guilty of: attempting to impose revolutionary activity on the people prematurely; failing to clarify to the people the party's role as the protector of their daily interests; and failing to integrate the struggle to achieve ourrent popular objectives of various classes and interest groups with the struggle for an "anti-imperialist" popular front. In a recent ennunciation of the party's campaign policies to be followed in the forthcoming election for half the members of the upper house, scheduled for May, 1953, it is emphasized that the party "must support, encourage, and endeavor to join hands with each and every political force that is opposed to the Yoshida Administration." SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 131] === 0 LLL Le Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Violent action has become an important policy and organizational question for the JCP only relatively recently. The Cominform criticism in January 1950 of the party's theory of peaceful revolution, end more particularly the new party program of late 1951 and accompanying covert policy statements, made it clear that underground preparation for violent action was to be undertaken concurrently with implementation of the above-ground united front program. The fact that the party is now. partly underground and that its program demands a continuation of legal and illegal, overt and covert operations makes it difficult to isolate the party's organization fer violent action from its total crganization, although the policy concerning violent action has become relatively _ clear. Ae Current Party Policy on Use of Violence By contrast with policy on preparation for violence, policy on use of violence was not explicitly indicated in Cominform criticism, the new party program, or accompanying covert statements. However, ‘organized violence soon became a prominent feature of Communist-led. demonstrations. This militancy began with an attack on US military ( personnel during a Communist demonstration in Tokyo on May 30, 1950, and reached its peak during the first half of 1952 when a series of armed clashes with the Japanese police occurred in many parts of the country. Episodes of mass violence on February 21, May 1, end May 30, 1952 gave evidence of participation by well-organized and trained Communist action squads. During the same period and previously there were also numerous episodes involving organized civil violence on a smaller scale, such as police harrassment end demonstrations against tax and grain collection. In July, however, an article in the Cominform journal attributed to TOKUDA Kyuichi, secretary-general who has been underground since mid-1950, in effect criticized resort to violence of a character that would alienate the party from the masses. Since then, there has been no significant mass violence, although continued efforts in the line of espionage and sabctage have been reported. Labor disputes, even in those unions subject to Communist direction or strong influence, have not been marked by violence. Party statements on the matter imply that resort to mass violence has not been repudiated in principle, but declared premature and inexpedient under present circumstances. i Armed insurrection is the ultimate goal of the JCP's “Military Policy," but the achievement of this goal is placed in the distant future and is declared attainable only after the populace has been thoroughly won over to the popular front and been made ready for a general uprising under the leadership of the party. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 132] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Be Party Organization for Planning and Execution of Violent Activities le Organization. The party's organization for violent action is a part of its underground organization which, since 1950, by all evidence has become the central machinery of the party, including its overt organization and operations. The JCP Central Committee, whose members were purged in 1950, has never been restaffed in the overt structure of the party. Instead a covert "Political Bureau," staffed by purged members of the former Central Committee and other selected leaders, is secretly directing the legal Central Guidance Department and coordinating the overt and covert activities of the party frem the underground. Under these covert executive bodies the party has evidently developed a nation-wide underground structure parallel to, and closely coordinated with, the existing legal organization. Most recent information on the structure of the covert organization reveals that while the regional, prefectural, district, and cell chain of command of the overt organizatipn is retained, regional boundaries have been revised and six region~ | al subdivisions (as compared to nine in the overt structure) are now aontrolled by organs designated as "bureaus" to distinguish them from the regional committees of the overt structure. The number of members in each of the new regional bureaus is set at five, as compared with some twenty members in each of the regional committees. A similar reduction in the number of members in the covert prefectural committees has been reported. In general, the organs of the underground apparatus are considerably smaller and more efficiently organized in order to insure security, In the evolution cf a covert structure, the JCP has given special emphasis to the development of a para-military: organization which would be capable of planning and executing a program of violence under the over-all direction of the underground “Political Bureau." Information to date indicates that the para-military organization is composed of: 1) The "Military Affairs Committee" (also called the "Y Organization"). This committee, apparently established in mid-1951 directly under the covert Political Bureau, constitutes a covert central administration to plan and operate a program for para-military organization and action, espionage, and subversion. It is believed to include specialized units designated Yl, Y2, Y3, Y4, and Y5 for operations directed, respectively, against Japanese security forces, civil police and investigative agencies, US forces, industrial targets, and military bases. Y4 is also reportedly charged with direction of the nuclear self-defense corpse SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 133] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 15 o 2) Local counterparts of Military Affairs Committee. Agencies planned, though not yet reported as in being, to direct and coordinate actual operations at local levels, and responsible to the central Military Affairs Committee. | 3) Nuclear Self-Defense Corps (Chukaku jiei tai). Aotion groups composed of up to 10 militant, ablebodied, disciplined party members, organized in factories, villages, towns, schools, to conduct agitation, sabotage, and harrassment; also to develop larger bodies of militants from among populace., Available evidence indicates that the JCP covert organization for the execution of its violent action programs is still in the process of establishment, although the party has made significant advances in this direction since 1950. In the case of the nuclear self defense corps -- the basic units of the organization for militant action «< estimates as of May 1952, on the basis of data obtained in a few prefectures, placed the total membership at between two and three thousand. Later estimates range up to 16 thousand for those who have received some form of para-military training. On the whole, it seems probable that establishment of the corps and of the lower echelons of the "Y organization" has taken place only in limited areas and that a nationwide network of such units does not yet exist. Similarly, gradual progress appears to have charecterized the development of a cadre to direct the activities of the various military units. On the basis of scattered reports, centers of strength appear to be the major industrial areas of Tokyo-Yokohama, Osaka-~Kobe, and northern Kyushu, and in Hokkaido. 2. Quality of leadership, mobility, available arms and equipment. High quality leadership is believed to be scarce, and limited for the most part tc the top echelons of party para-military structure. A number of factors indicate that leadership on the lower, operating levels is at a premium: the party's military program has been in effect for only a little more than a year; it demands a structure of scope and character which the party has never had in the past; implementation of the program has been accompanied by frequent indications that the development of competent cadre is a prime problem; and present JCP policy, which envisages an interweaving of its military-action and politicalaction programs, demands a high level of sophistication and discipline of its personnel. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 134] === ee OL ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Mobility is not believed to be a prime objective of present JCP military planning, which envisages rather a network of small local units mobile only within a limited area, Arms and equipment presently available consist of relatively few firearms and of crude though effective weapons of harrassment, sabotage, and street fighting, such as gasoline-filled bottles, teargas, timebombs, hand grenades, and tire-punching tools. | Se Plans and capabilities. Present indications are that the current stage of JCP organization for violent action is such as to restrict its use to more limited programs of sabotage and the instigation and leadership of relatively sporadic incidents of mass violence. It is believed that the principal task of such para-military organizations as are in being include training, orgenization, and self-development, espionage, 'and non-violent agitation. Undoubtedly, members of the para-military organizations also serve as integral parts of the underground security system protecting the missing top-level leaders. In part, the limited nature of the JCP organization for violent action when compared with the eventual. goal of “armed revolution" is reflected in the militant action program as envisaged by the party itself; without setting any precise time-table for the fulfillment of its plans, the party apparently envisages three stages of development: 1) The establishment of the Military Affairs Committee and its local counterparts and creation of the nuclear self-defense corps and their organization into a nationel network. Simultaneously, the masses are to be prepared psychologically to accept the necessity of armed action. Only this stage appears to be regarded as current. 2) Formation of armed "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations among the workers and farmers; conduct of partisan activities in localized sectors, initially involving sabotage and harrassment and ultimately attacks on military facilities and equipment. 3) Conversion of these "resistance" and “self-defense" organizations into a revolutionary “people's army" to carry out a general armed uprisinge Whatever its expectations, the capabilities of the JCP for exe panding the organization for violent action and for advancing the pace of its plans in this regard appear relatively limited under conditions currently prevailing. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 135] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] Apart from the increasing effectiveness of Japanese government countermeasures, the present level of economic activity and living standards, the prevailing Japanese support for Western alignment and suspicion of the Communist bloc, the current disrepute of the JCP, and the greater attraction and greater feesibility of alternative methods of seeking personal, group, and national objectives all militate against conclusion of the first phase let alone transition to the second. Nevertheless, the JCP undoubtedly has the capability further to expand, organize, and consolidate small action units composed of present members of the party, and to enhance their capacities for terrorism and other more or less limited subversive activities. At present, however, Communist policy appears to recognize that progress in the para-military program to embrace significant elements of the population not now Communist-inclined necessitates a wider and more profound popular disaffection with the Japanese government and its policies and, indeed, the structure of Japanese society itself. . Moreover, such progress necessitates avoidance of actions bringing severe and widespread popular censure on the party. ( ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 136] === ee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Ce. JCP Ability to Rally Hlements of the Population to Violent Action Despite the party's preparation for violent action, its capacities for such actions have not been tested since mid-1952. The Communist-led episodes of mass violence in the spring: of 1952 demonstrated a high quality of leadership insofar as the organizing and directing of demonstrations involving the use of force is concerned. They also demonstrated that the party apparatus possessed a store of crude though effective weapons for street fighting. Finally, they indicated that the party had a sizeable force available for mass violence. That the party since mid-1952 has improved its organizational and leadership for violent action seems altogether likely in view of policy emphasis on such preparation. It also seems likely that the party has made progress in equipping itself for violent action, especially in view of repeated reports of secret party pamphlets and instructions dealing with the tactics of and the manufacture of weapons for street fighting. (There is, however, no reason to believe that the party has any significant stock of firearms.) On the other hand, such advances have probably been at least offset, if not outweighed, by advances in the over-all efficiency of the civil police and in at least the size and equipment of the National Safety Force, a nuclear army trained among other things to cope with civil insurrection. Accordingly, the Communist capacity for mass violence would seem to rest largely with the quality and numbers of the human resources at the party's command and on the character and circumstances of the action. In general, the Japanese body politic at present includes few elements sufficiently disaffected to be led into violence without previous training and/or incorporation into the party's apparatuse Thus, the party cannot count on converting mass demonstrations sponsored by non-Communist groups into violent demonstrations. The 7,000 participants in the Tokyo May 1 riot of 1952 represented roughly two percent of the estimated three or four hundred thousand persons participating; throughout the nation some 35,000 took part in violence out of the total of 1,000,000 leftists and labor union members assembled. The most volatile elements are found in the Korean minority, the radical wing of the student group, and to some extent the day-labor ("free" labor) groupe These elements have been drawn into Communist-inspired violence either by prearrangement or because their smaller-scale demonstrations have proved susceptible to Communist exploitation. Where the party itself has. sought to generate mass demonstrations including violence, as opposed to exploiting occasions sponsored by other groups, the results have been far less impressive. The SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 137] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION observance of the "Third Anti-Colonialization Struggle Day" on February 21, 1952, brought out a total of some 6,000 leftists in rallies and demonstrations in 26 different localities throughout the country. Disturbances occurred chiefly in Tokyo, where about 900 out of an estimated total of 3,000 demonstrators were involved in riotinge In 4 pre- May Day rally in Tokyo on April 26, 1952 approximately 1,000 laborers, students and Korean clashed with the police. On May 30, 1952, the JCP attempted under the guise of an anniversary celebration for Japan's "labor martyrs" to stage a repetition of the May 1 display of mass violence. JCP directives reportedly called for a “nation-wide armed struggle" and ordered “action corps" to execute raids against police ~ stations and tax officese Demonstrations took place in various parts of the country but large numbers were not mobilized and nothing approaching the party's professed goal materialized. Again the most serious incidents took place in Tokyo where roughly 1,000 demonstrators fought with police. Assuming continued economic and political stability in Japan, the JCP in the foreseeable future is likely to prove no better able than in. the past to rally significant, non-Communist elements of the population to mass violence -- especially as the public and the police have now been alerted by the violence of last spring. Accordingly, its future capacities for mass violence will depend largely on the human resources it is able to marshall under its own standard. In these terms, the JCP has the following assets; ‘1) An estimated several thousand, at a minimun, . organized in nuclear self-defense or similar . corpse Estimates of numbers trained in some form of para-military exercise range to 16,000. 2) An estimated 80-85,000 party members, of whom perhaps a half might be considered to be of superior quality in terms of loyalty and disoipline. (The size of the party's underground is estimated at around 30,000.) 3) An estimated 100-250,000 active supporters, comprising those who consistently play an active role in supporting JCP programs and activities, to whom an estimated 80,000 members of the Korean minority may be added. 4) An estimated 500-650,000 passive supporters, comprising those who occasionally or in varying degrees support the JCP or JCP front activities. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 138] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION To these may be added perhaps 350,000 comprising the adult portion of those registered as north Koreans (400,000) plus those believed to be north: Koreans among the unregistered (estimated 200,000). While the foregoing elements to some extent would overlap, they provide a rough idea of the pattern of present party support. This pattern has developed under circumstances in which the party has remained legal, its activities have been preponderantly non-violent, and the chief pressures against it have been those of public opprobrium as contrasted with the pervasive police repression of the prewar period. Thus it is believed that only a minor portion of the million or more listed as party supporters or sympathizers constitutes the party's man- ‘power for violent action. Accordingly it is estimated that. at present, under optimum conditions, the party could order out between 20,000 and 50,000 to execute acts of violence in connection with mass demonstrations, although considerably more might be brought out to participate non-violently. _ Where Korean issues are prominent these totals might be augmented by elements from among the north Korean active supporters of the JCP. This is based in part on the participation in violence on May 1, 1952, and in part on the estimates of the party's hard core which is assumed to include its para-military forces. It is believed that for violent action of guerrilla or insurrectionary nature, the party's potential might range initially between 16,000 and 20,000. This is based on estimates of para-military forces with some allowance for progress and also for party elements not regularly engaged in para-military training which might readily be assimilated into such action. If this action were called for in connection with external attack, the figure might multiply in: the event. that a Communist takeover seemed assured of success, The increments would be drawn from the membership of the party and its active supporters who might render effective services in the form of sabotage and harrassmente SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 139] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The post-treaty Japanese Government has made clear its hostility to Communism and its intention at least to maintain the restrictive policies it previously had followed under occupation direction. These policies, although neither as comprehensive nor ~ as effective as the pre~surrender government's program of repression, nevertheless have limited the party's capabilities and have forced it to seek greater protection underground and to rely more heavily on front organizations. The legal basis of such political freedom of action as the party and its fronts possess rests on broad constitutional and statutory protections introduced during the occupation and designed, like similar protections in the US, to foster and safeguard political rights. Particularly during the latter half of the occupation, however, activities of the party and its fronts were severely circumscribed by the operation of supra~constitutional regulations laid down by the occupying authorities under powers stemming legally from the terms of surrender. The top leadership of the party was driven underground, the publication and distribution of major party organs banned, and other disabilities imposed under these regulations. Despite such disabilities, the JCP remained a legal political party, represented in the Diet, and continued to carry on a variety of both legal and illegal political activities. Since the end of the occupation on April 28, 1952, the party's freedom of action has continued to be limited. Laws passed during the occupation including provisions designed to bar Communits from governmental employment remain in force. Some.of the occupation restrictions have been carried on in newly enacted legislation. Almost all local governments have passed laws for the maintenance of public peace which have acted to curb Communist demonstrations. The question of whether those charged with offenses against occupation regulations ~- notably including the party's top leadership underground for two and a half years -- still remain liable to criminal Prosecution in post-treaty Japan is now under judicial review. The most important new law has been the Anti-Subversive. Activities Law, passed in July 1952. This law, an adjunct to the Criminal Code and designed to suppress organized threats to the governnent,, permits the government to prohibit the publication and distribution of subversive literature, to suspend or dissolve subversive groups posing a clear threat of violence, and to take action against officers and members of -such groupse The law, however, contains provisions which aim to inhibit arbitrary exercise of these powers. Perhaps in part for this reason, the government has moved very cautiously in implementing the law; only two persons have been. Teported indicted under the law, and no convictions have been reported to date. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 140] === Approved For Release, 2007/QH20kG4A 1RPRSRHIGRE9RO00800080001-4 In more general terms, the Communists have derived some advantage from the difficulties besetting law enforcement and judicial agencies now operating within a social and political structure less amenable than in pre-surrender days to tight control. Comprehensive anti-Communist measures have been opposed by.a variety of groups, not confined to those of leftist persuasion, for such reasons as fear @& governmental abuses, reluctance to antagonize the Soviet bloc, and belief that the Communists would be less controllable if driven underground completely. On the other hand, new law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been added to the existing surveillance and control network, and the police organization has been trained specifically to meet Conmunist-inspired disturbances. The government is also sponsoring, officially and unofficially, counter-propaganda campaigns. The party's loss of official representation in the Diet's Lower House as a result of the October elections deprived it of an advantageous - national forum. In addition to this evidence of a dropping-off in the party's popular support, opposition to official restrictive measures now may be less effective because of popular reaction to Comnunist-inspired violence during the first half of 1952. The threat posed by governmental restrictions has caused the JCP to concentrate on developing an efficient underground organizae tion and to emphasize front activities. The capability of the under= ground for circumventing governmental control measures is indicated by the fact that out of nine well-known, top echelon leaders of the JCP wanted by the police, only one has been apprehended after over two and a half years of intensive investigation. Another indication is the ability of the underground party press to publish illegal newspapers and pamphlets despite repeated efforts of the police to suppress its operation. The party's increased emphasis on fronts has also complicated the problems of governmental control agencies. The effectiveness of front activities, however, has been reduced by greater public alertness and by counter-propaganda. The freedom of action of the party and its fronts seems likely to be ciroumscribed more narrowly in the near future, although the party will probably not be outlawed. It seems probable that the government will: 1) introduce new restrictive legislation, perhaps including a bill regulating mass demonstrations that would standardize local regulations; 2) apply less cautiously existing legislation such as the Anti-Subversive Activities Law; 3) emphasize "preventive" action in the operation of its control network; and 4) step up its counter-propaganda activities, possibly by stronger appeals to nationalist sentiment. The government at present has the power to maintain surveillance and control over overt activities. Its capacities for dealing with covert activities are less complete, due in part to inadequacies in its intelligence system. Its police and military forces are capable of coping effectively with mass violence and armed insurrection, although the party could undoubtedly launch, and for sometime sustain, @ program of limited and sporadic sabotage and small-scale violence. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 141] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR No estimates are available for the number of Communists or sympathizers employed in specific key industries. Roughly ten percent (153,000) of the workers in heavy industries and in coal and metal mining are believed to be Communists. The major trade unions in these industries, however are not Communist controlled. Since, apart from heavy industries and coal and metal mining, the - major focus of Communist influence is among government office workers union, the overall proportion of Communists in all key industries (mining, chemicals, primary metals, transportation, communications, and other public utilities) probably is not significantly greater than 7 percent. Only three unions in key industries may be considered to be nationally controlled by the JCP: 1) the All Communications Workers Union (600); 2) the All Japan-Metal Workers Union (27,000); and 3) the Council of Greater Chemical Industry Workers Union (5,000). In addition to the three unions above comprising a membership of 32,600, there are five unions with a total membership of 115,900 that are not controlled but are strongly influenced by the JCP on the national level. The ratio of Communists to non-Comnunists in these unions is unknown. There are four major unions in key industries with a total membership of 850,000 whose policies have paralleled those advocated by the JCP, The leadership of these unions is almost exclusively in the hands of trade unionists closely supporting Left Socialist Party programs. There is no conclusive evidence as to whether the close parallel between the policies and actions of these unions ani that of the JCP is a consequence of a positive pro-Communist orientation on the part of nominally non-Communist leaders, or of their strong Left Socialist bias. The JCP has consistently attempted to exploit this parallelism, whatever its origins, and through it to advance its tactic of infiltration into non =-Communist unions. Since the period 1948-50 when overt/ Communist membership and influence was virtually extinguished by the anti-Comunist drive in Japanese trade unions, the JCP has been unable to regain the degree of leadership and control exercised before that date. Despite indications that left-wing trade unions are aware of the threat of Communist exploitation and infiltration and despite a resurgent anti-Communist movement among Right Socialist trade unionists, the parallel between Communist policies and programs and those of non- Communist, left wing trade unionists does render a major segment of organized labor vulnerablé to Communist tactics of propagandistic exploitation and of infiltration of membership and leadership. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION a TA ORAT TON Arppravad Far Palaaca O()) 7/() ) A —-RIP SH BOOOC GOR ODOS00OS000 1. === [PDF page 142] === 0 eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 © SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION ‘= 24 VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The same threat to its legal existence that caused the JCP to develop and strengthen its underground organization has led the party to emphasize front activities in an attempt to circumvent repression. While front organizations have always played an important role in the Communist program of propaganda and agitation among the populace, they have recently been given more attention by the JCP. Party directives issued late in 1952 have called upon party members to exert tighter control over leading front organizations at the policy level. The usefulness of these organizations to tne Communists, however, has been reduced by the fact that their status as fronts in most cases is well kmown. Moreover, their operations in the future may be further limited by tighter govern= mental controls, by official and unofficial counter-propaganda efforts, and by the activities of some competitive groups with an anti-Communist orientation. In any case, the significance of the role played by front groups remains an open question. Some Japanese, tncluding a large segment of the intelligentsia, have had a proclivity for positions similar to those advocated by front groups, such as “neutralism," out this proclivity may not have been induced by the front groups, and might not be removed even if the front groups disappeared entirely. National and local front organizations in Japan often center their activities around either a general theme (such as "peace" ,or promotion of trade relations with Communist China) intended to appeal to broad segments of the population or a specific theme (such as opposition to increases in university tuition rates) intended to appeal to local or special interests. Cultural and professional front groups have tended to concentrate in the Tokyo area; a number of front organizations have their headquarters in a single building in Tokyo sometimes referred to as a "Communist nest." Increased attention, however, has been paid recently to the development of local cultural fronts in non-metropolitan areas. One of the principal activities of many front groups is the publication of propaganda organs designed to reach persons outside as well as within the areas of concentrated population. In addition, following familiar practices, the Communists have attempted persistently to infiltrate various types of non- Communist social, cultural, and professional organizations. The Communists reportedly exert varying degrees of influence, ranging from very slight to moderate, within a number of non-Comnuniat organizations, such as: the Japanese Science Council (an organization including some of Japan's top scientists), the Japan Cultural Cooperative Union, the Japan Peace Promotion Peoples Congress (which was originally Socialist-sponsored), the New Japan Women's League SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 143] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION (a non-partisan league of women voters), the Pacific Problems Research Soctety (the Japan branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations), the Democratic Nurture League (which provides advice to parents on the "democratic" upbringing of children), and the Japan Organ Publications Association (which was designed to coordinate and improve leftist publications). Among the most active front organizations are the usual "peace" and Soviet bloc “friendship” groupse The two major peace fronts are the Japan Peace Protection Committee and the Overall- Peace Patriotic Movement Council, which may merge in the near future. They are affiliated with the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. Presumably these organizations will continue to be used for general propaganda operations, signature campaigns, and the like, and may derive some benefit from the current JCP de-emphasis on violent activities. Exact membership figures are not available, but the. membership at large is believed to include non-Communists holding a variety of political views. Among the "friendship" groups are the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, with a registered membership of 8,000; the Japan-Korea Friendship Society, whose exact membe re ship figures are not available; and the Japan-China Friendship Society, which in December 1951 had a membership of 700. Promotion of trade with Communist China is fostered not only by the Japan-China Friendship Society, but also by two other active groups specifically devoted to this theme. The Japan-China Trade Promotion Council and the Japan~China Trade Promotion Association reportedly receive some support from non-Communist commercial firms and individuals interested in trade prospects with the Chinese mainland. Membership data is unavailable, but the strength of these groups apparently is concentrated in. the Tokyo and Kansai regionse The largest and most active minority group fronts are among Koreans in Japan. It has been estimated that a substantial majority — of the approximately 600,000 registered and 200,000 unregistered Koreans in Japan are sympathetic to the North Korean regime. Some 20 Korean organizations in Japan have been reported either Comnunis tcontrolled or dominated. Durrently among the most active groups are the Korean Democratic Racial Front, which apparently includes a majority of the Communist and pro-Comnunist Koreans in Japan in its membership, and the Fatherland Defense Committee, which reportedly includes the more militant and extremist elements among the Korean minority. The former is affiliated with the North Korean Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland. There are reports of an effort to revive the Korean League, which under the name of the League of Koreans Resident in Japan was once the dominant Korean front in Japan. Before its dissolution by occupation authorities in 1949, its membership was reportedly about 400,000. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 144] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] The principal student front organization is the National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (Zengakuren), which is affiliated with the International Student Congress. The only nationwide university student organization, it reportedly has some 200 chapters throughout Japan. About 20 percent of its total membership of approximately 150,000 are estimated to be active Communists or sympathizers, who have tended to overshadow and dominate non-Conmunist student participation. Currently the organization reportedly is attempting to recoup its loss of membership during the past two years, as well as to organize and penetrate the few existing high school youth groups. The two principal fronts among high school and other non-university youth are the Japan Democratic Youth Association, with an estimated membership of 20,000, and the Japan Youth Fatherland Front, with an estimated membership. of 50,000. Both are reportedly affiliated with the Soviet-inspired Federation of Democratic Youth. There is no evidence indicating that these groups will undergo extensive expansion or inorease their. activities significantly in the near future. A number of cultural front organizations in the fields of music, art, literature, entertainnent, and general cultural promotion have been identified. Most are relatively small but active propaganda organizations, reportedly including in their membership some notable names in Japanese cultural circles. The major general cultural promotion group apparently is the Japan Cultural Peoples Congress. In the entertainment field, the People's Theatrical Group and the Progressive Troupe are the most publicized and most active. The former includes 363 Communist or pro-Commnist representatives of some 60 theatrical organizations. The latter, which reportedly includes 26 know JCP members, has recently sent out small groups on a "road-show" basis in an effort to reach more people. Local Communist units are encouraged to exploit for propaganda purposes audiences attracted to such performances as these. Several literary groups operate as front organizations, although specific data is lacking. Apparently the most active is the New Japan Literary Society, which has 1,700 members and publishes a monthly periodical. There are a few front organizations for professional groups, most of which have a small membership. Two of the most useful from the Communist viewpoint are the Liberal Lawyers Group and the Tokyo Joint Law Office, which supply legal counsel for Communists. The latter includes in its membership the more radical wing of the Liberal Lawyers Group, and the most able Communist lawyers in Japan. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 145] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET =~ SECURITY INFORMATION The New Japan Physicians' League, the chief medical front, consists of about 50 doctors and several operating clinics concentrated in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. One of the most influential academic front groups is the Democratic Scientists' Association. In the field of research, there are several small, but relatively influential, front groups devoted to disseminating propaganda in the form of selected data and "analysis" relating to Communist doctrine and conditions in Communist-controlled countries. Among these groups, whose names are indicative of their interests, are: the China Research Institute, the Soviet Research Association, the Marx-Lenin Research Institute, the World Policy Research Institute, and the Soviet Data Correspondence Company. However, several competitive anti-Communist research organizations have been established in Japan recently, in addition to the research and information activities of several government agencies. SECRET « SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 146] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Although there are indications that the JCP has attempted persistently to infiltrate the government at all levels, and particularly such key agencies as the National Safety Force, National Rural Police and other security organs, there is no evidence that the party has penetrated the top policy echelons. The Japanese government has been fully conscious of the potential threat posed by the JCP in this respect, and consistent efforts have been made to discover and discharge party members and sympathizers from agencies responsible for public safety and national security. JCP efforts in this direction are certain to continue, however, and it is possible that party members and sympathizers are present in limited numbers at lower echelons of the government and security agencies. Recent police counter—espionage has revealed that the JCP has obtained detailed knowledge of police plans through "Y~3" operations, otherwise known as the"Anti-Police Action Guidance Department" of the covert organization. There is no. indication, however, that such infiltration as has occurred is sufficient to subvert the administration of government or to impede the effective use of security agencies in coping with a serious threat to public order and safety. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 147] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The extent of direct Communist influence upon public-opinion leadership groups is believed to be slight. "Purges" carried out in 1949 and 1950 further reduced the number of Communists employed in educational, press, radio and entertainment enterprises. The majority of public-opinion leaders, whose prestige is usually based on social and family background, financial strength, and political connections, and whose influence is quietly but persuasively exerted, is politically conservative. . The extent of indirect Communist influence, while no doubt larger, is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy. One of the difficulties involved in any assessment is the fact that the outlook of some non-Commnist groups may in certain particulars coincide with that of the Communists. Such a situation permits the Communists to claim or be credited with a greater influence than perhaps is deserved. A large segment of Japants intelligentsia is inclined to be sympathetic politically with the left-wing, and many such Japanese have been attracted for some years by Marxist theories and terminology. _ However, the number of actual Communists or fellow-travellers among this group is believed to be relatively small compared to those who adhere to Socialist principles or programs. ( ' There are indications of some Communist youth activities in the secondary schools and suggestions that individual teachers and administrators may be either Communists or pro-Commmist, but there is no evidence indicating that any significant Communist influence has been exerted on youth or the local communities from these sources. The Japan Teachers Union, the most important organized group among Japanese school teachers, apparently supports the left-wing Socialists, so that on certain specific issues the view of the Teachers Union has paralleled that of the Communists. At the University and College level the percentage of active Communist or pro-—Communist professors or administrators is believed to be relatively small. A few professors were dismissed during 19)9 in connection with the "purge". Many professors alleged or known to be Communists or sympathizers apparently focus their attention upon the theoretical aspects of Communism. In a few universities, particularly Osaka Municipal University, a number of faculty members have been identified as party members or fellow-travellers. The extent of direct influence exerted by Communist and fellow-travelling faculty members cannot be isolated from the totality of Communist influence operating on the student body. In the entertainment field, individuals, who are either active Communists or pro-Communist, are known to be in the employ of \ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 148] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -30non-Communist enterprises, but their influence apparently is very limited. Some known Communists or sympathizers were purged from the entertainment industries in 199 and formed active front organizations devoted to propagandizing through entertainment media. These small groups are very active and are considered important by the JCP. ‘Evidence pertaining to the size of their audiences and their influence is otherwise only fragmentary. Radio enterprises and the non-Communist press carried out a purge of known Commnists and sympathizers in 1950. As a result, more than 600 persons were dismissed from various metropolitan and local newspapers and from the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan. Although a few individuals may have escaped the purge and others have infiltrated these organizations, there is no evidence that they either hold key positions or exert any significant degree of influence. However, a few individual publishing houses which publish and promote the distribution of Communist literature, such as the San Ichi Book Company of Osaka and Kyoto, may be controlled by either Communist or pro- Communist. It is highly doubtful that either Communists or sympathizers have acquired any positions of influence within Buddhist and Shinto institutions in Japan. There is no evidence suggesting that the few Buddhist groups which recently have publicly advocated a program for world peace have been under any direct Communist influence. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 149] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES The extent of direct influence by Communist party members or sympathizers upon the policies and activities of moderate and ultra right wing parties and organizations is negligible. Neither major conservative party is in any sense responsive to direct Communist influence and both have adopted uncompromising anti-Communist positions. Scattered and unconfirmed evidence suggests the presence of a very limited number of Communist party members or sympathizers in a few of the ultra-rightist, nationalistic organizations, Particularly in the field of foreign policy, the radically nationalistic cast of the policies advanced by many of these organizations is of benefit to Communist Party propagandistic efforts and conceivably is susceptible to limited Communist exploitation. Despite the similarity of certain of their objectives, there is no reliable evidence of even limited co- _ operation between the Communist Party and ultra-rightist organizations. Non-Communist, left-wing parties and organizations are more vulnerable to Communist exploitation and infiltration. It is difficult, however, to estimate with precision the extent of Communist Party influence in Japanese political, economic, and cultural organizations that generally exhibit either a radical or moderate socialist orientation. For a minor segment of Japan's non-Communist left, the presence C of Communist party members or sympathizers in positions of leadership undoubtedly has enabled the party to exert a positive, although not necessarily determining, influence on policy and activities. Such appears to be the case in certain non-Communist trade unions, both at the national and local levels, in certain segments of the Japan Farmers! Union (Nichino), in the Labor-Farmer Party, and among the extremist faction of the Left Socialist Party. A major segment of the non-Communist left ~~ including the bulk of the Left Socialist Party and those trade unions and farmer organizations closely allied with it at the leadership level — currently. supports policies and programs frequently paralleling positions assumed by the JCP. Despite the probable presence at the leadership levels of these groups of a limited number of Communist sympathizers, if not actual party members, this parallelism of policies and even of action programs does not appear to be the result of positive Communist influence. A more adequate explanation of the parallelism may be found in a tendency toward a doctrinaire, Marxist view of Japan's domestic and foreign problems, a radical socialist response to particular domestic political and economic circumstances, a political opportunism or, at most, a tolerance toward the Communist Party itself, While such circumstances render this segment of the non-Communist left potentially vulnerable to JCP exploitation or infiltration, present evidence does not indicate that the Communist Party SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 150] === . ment of the socialist left is Communist influence sufficient to exert a Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -—- SECURITY INFORMATION is able to exercise a positive and continuing influence on the formulation of policy and action programs. Moreover, despite the frequently close similarity of their policies, these groups consistently, since 1949, have rejected JCP "United front" overtures. Any estimate of the significance either of direct Communist in-~ fluence in non-Communist left-wing organizations and groups or of their potential exploitability by the Communists must be weighted by consideration of the actively anti-Communist segment of Japan's left-wing. Generally affiliated with the Right-Wing Socialist Party, this segment includes the so-called "right-wing" trade unions, farmers organizations, and quasi~political groups which increasingly have adopted positions of categorical opposition to the JCP and have sought to avoid policies closely identified with the Communist Party. Even within organizations whose leadership is closely allied to the Left Socialist Party, opposition right-wing socialist factions frequently act to moderate extremist leadership and serve as a counter to Communist Party efforts to influence significantly policy and action programs. Finally, it is significant that despite the apparent numerical superiority of the socialist left-wing, based principally upon the membership of trade unions whose leadership supports the Left Socialist Party, the Right Socialist Party polled a greater proportion of the total vote in the recent general elections. Assuming that Communist influence increases significantly within the socialist left, there is. reason to believe that the moderate, socialist right-wing will form the core around which a majority of those now supporting more radical leadership will reorganize. In sum, it is believed that only in the minority, extremist sega« positive influence on action programs and policies, although even here such influence is not necessarily constant or determinant. Nevertheless, the parallel between the policies and action programs of the major portion of the Socialist left and many of the positions taken by the JCP, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, is of considerable advantage to the Communists.. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 151] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION -33- X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Communist propaganda is disseminated in large quantities through a large variety of mass media. Published materials include newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, leaflets, and posters produced and distributed both overtly and covertly. Certain party publications, including Akahata (the official JCP newspaper), were forced underground as a result of suppressive action initiated in the summer of 1950 under authority of an occupation ordinance. Although this ban is no longer in force, the publications affected (some of which have reemerged as overt publications) have not been able to recover their former influencee Most of the available data on Communist publications pertains primarily to those official or quasi-official organs controlled directly by JCP headquarters. Overt publications currently are published by the JCP Publications Bureau. The principal overt newspaper, Akahata ("Red Flag") is regularly published every third day plus frequent supplemental "extras." Its present circulation is estimated at 85,000. Zenei ("Vanguard") and Atarashii-Sekai ("New World") are the two leading monthly periodicals controlled by party headquarters, each has a circulation of approximately 20,000. The weekly paper To Katsudo Shishin ("Party Activity Guide") apparently is an important publication within the party, although no circulation statistics are available. Several party organs continue to be clandestinely produced and distributed. Heiwa to Dokuritsu ("Peace and Independence"), presently the principal Clandestine paper, was last reported to be a daily with an estimated circulation of 100,000. Naigai Hyoron ("Foreign and Domestic News"), apparently a daily, has actually appeared irregularly under a variety of disguised titles. It is estimated that the 5,000 copies printed reach 100,000 persons. To Kensetsu Sha ("Party Constructor") apparently is an important publication, although specific data on its circulation is not available. The party presumably sponsors the Japanese edition of the Cominform Journal, Kokyo Heiwa no tame ni, Jimmin Minshu Shugi no tame ni ("For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy"). A weekly paper, it reportedly is a translation of the European version and has appeared under a variety of disguised titles. Party propaganda organs are supplemented by the extensive propaganda activities of the numerous front organizations. The various Soviet bloc "friendship" fronts sponsor several publications dedicated to promoting "friendly relations," as well as to encouraging the establishment of regular political and economic relations between Japan and Communist—controlled countries. The Japan-Soviet Friendship Society sponsors two publications, the monthly periodicals Sovietto Nyusu ("Soviet News") and Soviet Shiryo ("Soviet Data"), It is estimated that 5-10,000 copies of the former are printed, but no specific data is available regarding the latter publication, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 152] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Japan-China Friendship Society sponsors two bi-monthlies, Nippon to Chugoku ("Japan and China") and Chugoku Jijo ("China Digest"). Circulation data is not available. At least three publications are devoted to promoting the Soviet— inspired "peace campaigns" in Japan, The Japan Peace Protection Committee sponsors the publication of Sekai Heiwa ("World Peace!) and Heiwa no tame ni Kokusai Shiryo ("International Research Materials in the Cause of Peace"), both bi-monthlies; an estimated 3,000 copies of the former, and 5,000 of the latter are printed. Kowa Shimbun ("Peace Newspaper"), a weekly sponsored by the Over-all Peace Patriotic Movement Council, is the largest of its type and has an estimated circulation of 60,000. The Japan Peoples Relief Society, which is dedicated to the protection of civil rights against "oppressive police action" sponsors Jinken Mimpo ("Peoples Human Rights News"). Some 8,000 copies of this paper are published every ten days. The Japan Repatriates League publishes,000 copies of the Shinboku Shimbun ("Friendship Newspaper") for its members. Various publications cater to special population groups. Fujin Sengen ("Women's Manifesto"), sponsored by the Japan Yiomen's Democratic Council, is published every ten days and has an estimated printing of 2,000 copies. The Women's Democratic Club sponsors the Fujin Minshu Shimbun ("Women's Democratic Newspaper"), a weekly with an estimated circulation of 70,000. The monthly periodical Kagaku-sha ("Scientist") sponsored by the Democratic Scientists Association has an estimated cir culation of 30,000. The New Japan Literary Society sponsors the Shin Nippon Bungaku ("New Japan Literature"), a monthly periodical which has an estimated 12,000 circulation. The educators front, the Japan Demo-~ cratic Education Association, sponsors Akarui Kyoiku ("Bright Education"), a monthly periodical reportedly reaching 11,000 readers. Miscellaneous publications which apparently are published by private firms and which are consicered important propaganda organs include Jiyu Nippon Hoso (Radio Free Japan Broadcasts), a weekly containing transcripts of Radio Free Japan (RFJ) broadcasts which is published by Sekai News and Kaiho no Koe ("Voice of Liberation") a semi-weekly paper published by the same company. Party and front organization propaganda organs apparently are supplemented to some extent by the importation of publications from Communist—controlled countries. It is impossible to ascertain the impact of such imported publications because precise data is not availeble. Since April 28, however, SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 153] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ° ~35 - there has been no prohibition on the import of publications from these areas. Apparently all types of Communist publications are available on the open market in Japan, including Isvestia and Pravda from the Soviet Union and People's China from Commmist China. It is presumed from newstand and bookstore advertising that other major publications from these areas are readily available. There are no Communist-controlled broadcasting facilities in Japan and the extent of Communist or pro-Communist infiltration of existing broadcasting firms apparently is negligible. Propaganda breadcasts, however, are beamed to Japan from Moscow, Peiping, and Pyangyang as well as from Radio Free Japan, a Communist=controlled station located in Peiping. With the exception of the medium wave broadcasts of Radio Free Japan, all the programs apparently are broadcast on shortwave. Although Japan has approximately 9,000,000 radio receiving sets, only about 5 percent are capable of receiving shortwave ’ proadcasts. In an attempt to cope with this problem, the JCP has encouraged the development of "listening clubs," and also has published transcripts or selected portions of important broadcasts. Broadcasting schedules and the names of sets capable of receiving various foreign programs are also publicized. In at least one instance, names of firms where radios could be converted to shortwave have been published. Radio Free Japan now makes four one-hour broadcasts daily and ( uses two medium and two shortwave frequencies, Monitor reports indicate that its shortwave broadcasts are very difficult to tune and frequently the medium wave broadcasts are very faint. There are five broadcasts daily from Moscow in Japanese, two of 5S minutes each and three of 30 minutes each, while Radio Peiping broadcasts two programs daily of approximately a half-hour each. Ac= curate data on Pyongyang broadcasts is unavailable at the present time. Reliable data pertaining to the listening audiences of these various overseas broadcasts is unavailable. However, because of the poor quality of reception and the limited number cf receiving sets capable of tuning these breadcasts, it is presumed that the audiences are relatively small and generally limited to those Communists or sympathizers who would go to considerable effort to listen. Although the importation of foreign prepaganda films is under control, the JCP and front organizations have either produced movies or encouraged the showing of those domestic and imported films which they believe have propaganda value because they present the "proletariat" viewpoint. Films of this type produced in Japan include "The Stormy History of Hakone" by Zenshinza in collaboration with the North Star SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 154] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ° SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Motion Picture Company, "Being a Mother and Woman" by Kinuta Productions, "Mountair: Echo School" sponsored by the Japan Teachers Union, "Foghorn" by Toho, and "Oh We're Still Alive" produced by Zenshinza,e Attendance at the showings of such foreign films as "Bitter Rice," produced in Italy, is also encouraged. Special propaganda media include mass demonstrations and rallies, sound trucks, and other facilities used in connection with election campaigns, special lectures, and study groupse Local "struggle" campaigns arising from local grievances are also exploited to promote Communist propaganda. In the past house=toexhouse signature drives have also provided a highly personal means for spreading the party | line.. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 155] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Ae General Conclusions Statistics on the financial status of the JCP are only fragmentary. Information on the party's financial status not only is a closely guarded party secret but, since the development of an underground structure, party finances apparently are handled separately for the covert and overt organizations. Available statistical evidence is so inadequate that it permits ‘no quantification of the JCP's financial health. What statistical evidence is available, however, together with other evidence drawn from party activities seems to indicate that at least since 1951 the party has been faced with persistent but not crippling difficulties in financing both its overt and covert organizations and operations. Regular sources of income, such as party dues and the sale of party publications, do not appear to be providing a significant portion of total revenues, and the burden now appears to be carried by donations from wealthy party supporters, special contributions, front organiza tions, illegal activities, and Communist sources outside Japan. Evidence of continued financial difficulties. is to be found in the frequent reports of party drives for improved collection of dues and more . thorough party accounting systems, of the suspension of subsidies to ( certain organizations, and of reductions in the number and salaries of paid party workers, The impact of straitened financial circumstances appears to have fallen principally upon the JCP's overt organization and operations. Despite these indications, however, it is believed that the party as a whole continues to have access to sufficiently large funds from one source or another to continue active operations in all fields of effort and there is no indication that it will be forced to suspend any of its major operations in the near future. Indicative of the extent of the party's resources is the fact that, despite its Slight chances of success, the party expended at least ¥ 11,220,570 in the 1952 election campaigns. B. Revenues The JCP derives its revenue from party dues, sales of party pub- Llications, illegal covert activities, private donations, contributions of business firms interested in trade with the Chinese mainland, Com munist-controlled labor and front organizations, and international Communist organizations and the Soviet or.Soviet satellite governments, Very little detailed information is available on any of these sources, A possible indication of declining revenue during the past two years has been the increasing reliance on special fund-raising campaigns. ( In the most recent major campaign, during September 1952, a goal of SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 156] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 : SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ¥ 100 million was set. Despite several extensions, it is believed that the party failed to raise as much as 50 percent of its goal. le Dues and Party Publications. No recent figures are available on the total revenue collected from party dues. During 1949, when party membership was at its peak (approximately 110,000 registered members), income from dues is believed to have been only about two million yen nonthly. All recent evidence, however, indicates a decline in revenue from this source, and the party frequently has admitted difficulty in the collection of party dues. A similar decline in revenue appears to have been experienced in the sale of party publications, once one of most lucrative sources of revenue. Circulation of these publications appears not to have recovered from the suppressive measures carried out by the government from June 1950 to April 1952. 2-e Donations. Although the party apparently continues to receive substantial donations from wealthy party members and from certain business interests, there is evidence that donations to party election campaign funds no longer provide an important source of extra income. Total contributions, as reported by the party, for the 197 and 1952 Lower House general elections were ¥& 5,155,543 and ¥ 520,570 respectively. No figures are available regarding income from party-controlled business firms and from commissions in east-west trade. Such business enterprises as have been identified as controlled by party members are small (many of them being book stores or small merchandising enterprises) and it is not likely that these make a significant contribution to the party coffers. Nor is it likely that the party has received any substantial income in the form of commissions from east-west trade deals. There is evidence, however, that the party has received substantial dona tions from non-Communist firms interested in supporting party efforts to promote trade with the Chinese mainland. No significant estimate is possible of the amounts received from Communist—controlled labor unions and front organizations. In view of the relatively limited membership of Communist-controlled unions, their frequently loose organization, and the low state of union finances in general, it is unlikely that these unions provide an important source of income to the party. (A possible exception here is the All-Japan Automobile Workers Union which contributed ¥ 25,000 to the party's 1952 election campaign.) Incomplete information, however, suggests that front organizations provide a major source of party funds, both to the overt and covert etructures, and are an important means by which funds are channeled to the party from sources within and outside Japan. Thus » the SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 157] === : Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION party reportedly anticipated that front organizations would provide almost ¥ 2 million to its election campaign fund in September 1952. In addition, these front organizations frequently are the agency through which a variety of fund-raising drives -- such as the "peace" fund campaigns —~ are undertaken. A sizeable portion of such contributions probably is forwarded to the party. The fronts often are able to obtain funds from sources which would not normally contribute to the party directly. 3. International Support. No figures are available on the total of funds forwarded to the JCP from international Communist organizations or. from Communist governments, although incomplete reports suggest that these sources provide an important supplement to the party's total revenue. On at least two occasions, the transfer of funds to JCP front or— ganizations from the Chinese mainland has been confirmed: 1) a donation of $14,000 from the Chinese Communist Peoples Relief Association to the Japan Peoples Relief Society, a JCP front; 2) of a total of ¥ 3 million remitted during early 1952 by Japanese residents on the mainland to their families in Japan, over ¥ 1 million is believed to have gone to the party itself or front organizations. In September 1952, the party reportedly expected "Chinese sources" to provide ¥ 1 million toward its election campaign fund. Although there is no confirmation of reports that the Soviet mission in Japan has supplied the party with funds, it is possible that such contributions have been made. kh. Other Revenue. In addition to the sources of income noted above, unevaluated reports allege that a substantial portion of the party's revenue is derived from covert, illegal operation. Black-marketeering, smuggling, trade in narcotics, extortion rackets, and other illegal operations frequently have been reported as sources of party funds. C. Assets and Liabilities The JCP has never released publicly any complete and accurate statement of its total assets and liabilities. As of March 1951, however, the party's finance department reportedly listed the following as party assets: _ Land ¥ 20,000,000 Buildings ¥ 27,000,000 Equipment ¥ 13,000,000 Others ¥ 2,000,000 | | ¥ 62,000,000 As of the beginning of the fiscal year 1951452, the partyts total lia-~ bilities reportedly were ¥ 77,000,000. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | === [PDF page 158] === TE ee Lee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET =~ SECURITY INFORMATION XII. SOVIET-~SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Among the factors contributing to Communist strength must be included the diplomatic establishment of the Soviet Union in Japan and its political activities, A Soviet mission — the remainder of the office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council for Japan which constituted the official Soviet representation during the occupation -- continues to exist in Japan although without official acceptance by the Japanese Government. The mission occupies a building in central Tokyo that has been closed to the public for over six months and that has been reported kept under surveillance by Japanese authorities. The number of persons attached to the mission has steadily dwindled, 2h official members departed in September, 7 "unofficial" members left in November, Available information places the total official personnel still remaining at 39, plus us dependents. According to Japanese Government sources, the group of 39 Soviet nationals reported still officially attached to the mission can be broken down by function as follows: officers Others Political Section 5 3 Economic Section h 6 Consular Section 1 1 Press Section 1 - Military 3 1 Administrative Section 2 12 16 23 This breakdown should probably be regarded with suspicion, in view of the Soviet practice of masking functions and particularly in. view of the abnormal position of the mission. There is no information available as to how many of these officials may be engaged in propaganda activities. At present the mission conducts no known propaganda activities of an overt, orthodox character. The only activities along these lines reported in recent months have been an occasional newspaper story based on a press interview or on a private conversation between a Soviet official and Japanese. Even these activities may be construed as propaganda only in the sense that any Soviet moves have propaganda significance. On the other hand, it must be assumed that a major function of the mission is the clandestine operation of covert propaganda SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 159] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION activities, in which a large part of the personnel may be engaged. Pre-~ sumably the Soviet Mission still extends some assistance and guidance to the JCP and front groups. Among the front groups worthy of mention in connection with political activities of the Soviet Mission are: The Japan-Soviet Friendship Association with a registered membership in December 1951 of 8,000; the Japan-China Friendship Association reported to have a membership of 700; and the Japan-Korea Friendship Association, the membershin of which is unknown. Although the mission previously had sought informally to include Japanese government personnel in its propaganda functions, it was only on November 7, 1951, for the first time since the surrender, that high Japanese government officials were formally invited to a mission reception. Since April 1952, there have been no official functions; how-~ ever, the mission has evidently maintained informal and personal contact with some Japanese businessmen. There are no other Soviet or satellite establishments or missions in Japan. No diplomatic or other official relations between Japan and the Communist bloc have been established. None of the Communist bloc countries that had declared war on Japan have signed a peace treaty. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 160] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although international Communist organizations apparently have no official installations in Japan, a number of Communist-—controlled or dominated front groups are either affiliated with or maintain close liaison with various international Communist organizationse In the fall of 199 pro-Communist labor organizations in Japan sponsored the establishment of the World Federations of Trade Unions Japan Liaison Office to maintain relations with the Communist-dominated World Fed— ération of Trade Unions. Two Japanese youth organizations, the Japan Democratic Youth League and the Japan Youth Fatherland Front are af— filiated with the Soviet-inspired World Federation of Democratic Youthe The National Federation of Student Self-Government Associa» tion, the. only nationwide student organization in Japan, is affiliated with the International Students Unicn. The small but active Womens Democratic Club in Japan is affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation. No meetings of Communist International Organizations are know to have been held within Japan. Local Communists, however, have attended the following meetings of international Communist organizations held abroad: Known Meeting — Date Representatives World Peace Council February 1951 1 Berlin World Peace Council November 1951 1 Vienna Moscow Economic April 1952 3 Conference Peking Asian-Pacific October 1952 1h Peace Conference Vienna Peace December 1952 3 Conference It is not improbable that Japanese Communist groups have received some funds from international Communist organizations. It appears less likely that funds have been transmitted from Japan to such international organizationse However, no concrete evidence of such transmissions is available. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 161] === een OOO, nn Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATICN XIV.. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Information regarding the JCP communicaticns network is scattered and incomplete. The party's underground structure reportedly includes a specific liaison organization (designated by the code symbol "T") directly responsible either to the covert politburo or to one of its two immediate subdivisions. Within the "T" organization, special groups reportedly are responsible for the distribution of ccvert organ papers, the maintenance of liaison with the various specialized covert. departments, the transmission of directives and notifications to regional units, and the maintenance of communications network between the covert central organs and lower echelons. Although no detailed information is available on the extent of the communications network at lower echelons, there have been indications that the party on several occasions has had to undertake a reorganization of its system of internal communications in the interest of greater efficiency and security against the danger of compromise. Substantial evidence indicates that since 1950 the JCP has developed several ccde and cipher systems for communication between central, regional, and prefectural headquarters. In addition, the party reportedly maintains an emergency warning system involving commercial telegraphic communications according to prearranged texts. While comparatively simple, this system appears to be a very important part of the JCP com munications net. \ The bulk of the party's foreign liaison apparently is undertaken through the commercial mails, with various front organizations serving as the principal channels, There is evidence, however, that a covert international courier system is maintained by the party. Scattered reports indicated that courier bases are maintained on small islands off the west coasts of Hokkaido and Kyushu. During 1950-51, one such ccurier net for agents commuting between North Korea and Japan was uncovered by US intelligence agencies, The principal ecvert JCP international courier and communications system for which relatively detailed information is available is "Maritime Organizations". Comprised of party members enployed in shipping, this organization receives directives and ccmmunica— tions from, anc transmits communications to, Communist China and the Soviet Union and assists members and couriers illegally entering and leaving Japan. It is believed that the 1 Japanese delegates who illegally left Japan to attend the Pei-pting Asian and Pacific Peace Conference, October 1952, traveled by means of the network. There is no indication that the JCP maintains any substantial system of radio communication, either for internal or external use, Unverified reports indicated only limited use of radio ccmmunicatione One such report which described the transmitter as part of the JCP "international communications division" indicated transmission between northern Hokkaido and Vladivastok. During a recent investigation, ( SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 162] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Japanese security agencies arrested a Japanese radio operator who al-~ legedly had transmitted periodic communications from the JCP to the Soviet Union. Radio Free Japan broadcasts, while apparently not used to transmit detailed instructions and guidance to the JCP, does serve to supplement the distribution of propaganda material within Japan and to provide local guidance to party members and units in the more remote ‘areas of rural Japan. Ss Despite the limitations of this international communications network, recent reports indicate that the JCP is making increasingly fre. quent contact with Communist Parties in other countries. The bulk of the party's foreign liaison appears to be with the Chinese Communist Party and is generally carried on by such front organizations as the China Research Institute and the Japan-China Friendship Association. Although apparently less extensive, the party's connections with the USSR are believed to be at least as important as those with Commnist China. The degree to which the JCP has been the object of specific instructions and criticism from the Soviet Umton or Comminist China is not fully known, although, since 1950, known instances of such instructions and criticism have been of decisive importance for party policy. The first known instance of Cominform intervention in JCP affairs occurred in January 1950. Taking the form of a bitter criticism of the Nozaka theory of peaceful revolution, this attack, published in the Cominforn Journal, ultimately resulted in the theoretical reorientation of the JCP to accommodate the concept of violent revolution and in the initiation of efforts to create a covert organization capable of supporting paramilitary action. This criticism was supported, although in a more conciliatory tone, by the Pei-pting Jen Min Jih Pao which also called on the party to correct its past errors, “Thesame organ, on September 1950, intervened in the internal struggle which accompanied the JCPts response to the original Cominform struggle and although Pei-pting supported the dominant JCP faction it urged a more conciliatory treatment of party dissidents. Such an attitude subsequently was adopted by the JCP leaders, The most recent instance of international Communist intervention occurred in July 1952, this time ina Signed article of TOKUDA Kyuichi, Secretary General, appearing in the Cominform Journal, This criticism of the party for its excessive concentration on strikes and demonstrations at the expense of parliamentary activities was followed by a marked dimunition of JCP-inspired acts of violence, SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION en a nN Aoproved For Release 2007/01/20 - CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 163] === 0 LR en Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.8 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ALGERIA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 164] === eee re ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword «ses ec er cree cc srreeree seve ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. e e 1 Te Objectives «.ceccevececerec reer enn eeeee 1 Ile Tactic8 e «eee cecsersrecceeseeeerveeese 1 TIle Capabilities. e-eecexecreecevsecrcerereeee 3 ASSETS «cee ececccce 4 Ie Numerical Strength. «seeccecesecceveveccees bh IIe ~ Hlectoral Strength ees. esecesrccccvrceerse 4 III, Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 4 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism ss ese ee eee ly Ve Communist Influence in Labor «ee eeccecevese 5 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations 2... eecesecvee 5 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government. o..-eeee 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation « « « 6 KX. Communist Infiltration of Non—Communist Political Parties. wee ene crc evrerecreseves 6 Xe Communist Propaganda Media eeesccrvecervccsece 6 XI. Financial Condition «e.esecescevcecrcecevsees 7 XIIe Soviet-Satellite Official Assets...eececcecce 7 -XTITe Communist International Organizations..«-eecerecrce 8 XIV. Communist Communication Network «ee ececscecveae 8 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 165] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION “aii === [PDF page 166] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ALGERIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I.. OBJECTIVES The over-riding immediate goal of the Algerian Communist Party since August 196 has been to persuade the local independence movements to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation ultimately for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control and American imperialism. In the meantime, the Communists are seeking through propaganda, to destroy sympathy for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans, and to increase local hostility toward the French administration. The serious economic grievances of the population -—- both native and French -- receive particular attention from the Communists, who have a strong influence in the country's largest labor union. However, the Algerian Communist Party, in common with all other Communist groups in North Africa is faced above all with the task of recovering its own strength. II. TACTICS Having failed thus far to achieve a common front with the nationalists, except for the limited and now dormant front established in mid-1951, the Communists have attempted instead to participate, uninvited, in nationalist demonstrations, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly, Communist propaganda pamphlets and newspaper articles have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the popular mind the need and desirability of reviving and extending the common front of 1951. Occasionally, coincidentally with such tactics, they berate the nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a new popular front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating with the French even in a minor way. III. CAPABILITIES To date, the small Algerian Communist Party has had only limited influence on the Algerian nationalist movements, largely because (1) the nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in non-Communist areas; (2) the local Communist party is largely French in membership, and (3) the present nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would dislike as much as that of the French. As an autonomous unit, the Algerian Communist Party is weak. While it dominates Algeria's largest labor federation, the Algerian SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 167] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION CGT, the latter is no more able to maintain a general strike without support from non-Communist labor unions than is its counterpart in France. Moreover, while the Communist-dominated CGT includes possibly 50 percent of organized labor in Algeria, it is estimated that only about one-fifth of the Algerian labor force (estimated at. 00,000) is organized at all. French officials continue to hamper Communist party activities of all kinds in Algeria. The present capabilities of the Algerian Communist Party remain minimal either for achieving its own current local objectives or for furthering Soviet policy. Its own membership is small and believed declining although it has lost only slightly in percentage of total votes received in elections during recent years. The leaders of the two nationalist parties seem to be unwilling to resume the former cooperation, even on the limited scale provided by the Algerian Front for the Defense and Respect of Liberty ~- which was organized in mid-1951 primarily in protest against administrative interference in the June 1951 elections. This limited victory was achieved when the leading figures of the extreme nationalist movement led by Messali Hadj, the moderate nationalists led by Ferhat Abbas, and the Association of Ulema which comprises the leading teachers and scholars of the Islamic tradition, united with the Communists in July 1951 in the Algerian Front. However, each nationalist party to the alliance joined for the furtherance of its own ends and not through any basic sympathy with the objectives of international Communism. The Communist victory was based upon their initiative in taking advantage of local grievances, and the Front's program centered upon the issues of civil liberties and civil rights and French administrative control over Moslem religious affairs. The Moslem parties remained unwilling to let the Communists jointly appeal with them to the Moslem masses on the broader issues of _ nationalism and "neutralism." All three Moslem groups may also have hoped, by their association with the Communists, to frighten the US into bringing pressure to bear on France to make more political concessions, The disparate aims of the four groups prevented the Front from achieving either importance or permanence. Although the Front has given Communist speakers the prestige of appearing on the same plat forms as the 4oslem parties and enabled them to take such occasions to propagate the Communist line in international affairs, it is doubtful, unless conditions in the Arab world further deteriorate, that the Communists will be able to convert the particular "neutralism* of the SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 168] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Arab nationalist parties in Algeria into a pro-Soviet view of World affairs. Nonetheless, the Communists meanwhile have had an excellent opportunity to acquaint most of the educated Moslem leaders of Algeria with Communist tactics and perspectives. The Communists will doubtless continue their efforts to join forces with the nationalists, and there is some danger that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives, they would accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it is doubtful that the Communists will capture control of any Algerian nationalist movement, Communist influence might lead to the adoption of more anti-Western policies and to increasing resort to direct action on the part of the nationalist groups. SECRET —- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 169] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMINISM IN ALGERIA: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH No information is available concerning the numerical strength of the Algerian Communist Party, the membership of Commnist controlled organizations, or the mmber of persons controlled through Commnist infiltration of non-Commnist organizations. The usual estimate for the Algerian Party for several years has been 15,000 persons, However, recent developments point to a decline of membership and hence this figure appears too high, Indications are that the bulk of the members are found among Frenchmen especially workers, artisans, and lower bracket civil servants. The number of Moslem members and mmber of general sympathizers apparently varies with economic conditions. The hard core is primarily composed of Europeans, Strongholds of the movement are Algiers and Oran, which elected the only two Commnist members from Algeria to the National Assembly, There are also regional headquarters at Constantine, Bone, Sidi-Bel-Abbes and Blida, II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH Even allowing for the fact that Algerian elections are not entirely free, the Commnist Party's electoral strength is small, In the elections to the National Assembly, cantonal and by-elections, the Commnists have polled an average of 20 percent of the votes, In the Algerian Assembly, they have captured only one seat out of 75, IIl. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Because of lack of both funds and members, the Commnist Party is unable to employ violence at present, It is conceivable, however, that Communist agitators will try to use the discontent among the native population to stir up riots, or to exacerbate disturbances created by others, The Communist Party has tried to impart a political complexion to the strikes and work stoppages which have occurred during the last years, although their causes have been economic, The degree to which Commnist plans for violent action in Algeria can be made effective will depend primarily on the degree of cooperation which can be achieved with the nationalist movement, which has most popular support in Algeria, IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMINISM The Algerian Commmist Party is a legally recognized organization which is permitted to operate openly and, on the whole, without any disabling restriction in Algeria. Members of the party are permitted to compete with candidates of other indigenous political parties for SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 170] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION election to public office, to publish and circulate newspapers, and to convene "mss"meetings, Repression of local Communist groups or the Communist press by the French Administration has generally been sporadic. To date, repressive measures employed by the French authorities have served as irritating and discomforting restrictions on the Algerian Communist Party but have not been sufficiently extensive and crippling to drive it underground,. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR No information is currently available concerning the number of Commnists in Algerian defense plants and other key industries. Commnist influence in the Algerian labor union movement is enhanced by the refusal of the French Administration to allow the native population to establish its own labor organizations, Official recognition is restricted to the Commnist-dominated CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail), the Force Quvriere, and the CFIC (Christian Trade Confederation), It is estimated, for example, that out of a total labor force of approximately 400,000 workers (of which some 80,000 are in commerce, industry, and government unions), the Commnist-controlled CGT has maintained some 45-50 percent of union membership. Among some of the more important strategic labor organizations with which the CGT has affiliations are ( the General Confederation of Agriculture, the Inter-Union Central Committee of Government Employees, the Railroad Workers! Union, Electricity Workers Union, and the Union Algerienne des Travailleurs des Ports et Docks. Moreover, the Algerian Commnist Party, either ce independently or through the CGT, has been quick to throw its support to striking groups throughout Algeria, no matter whether members of the CGT or independent elements, While the Communists do not possess numerical superiority in the CGT, their dominant position permits them to disrupt the transport, stevedoring, telecommmications, and mining activities of Algeria if sufficiently popular causes can be found, The Algerian CGT, as an affiliate and subordinate of the French CGT, is a member of the Communiste-front WrTtu, VI, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Algerian Commnist Party has organized and subsidized a number of specialized social, cultural, and professional organizations, Generally, these groups are established either on a temporary basis to acquire French and Algerian support for short-term Commnist~inspired programs (such as soliciting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Petition), or are organized on a long-range basis with yearly allocations of funds, Normally, the latter groups formate programs seeking (1) the re-estab= lishment of Algerian independence and sovereignty; (2) the awakening SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 171] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION ~6of feminist political and social self-consciousness; and (3) the indoc~- trination of Algerian youths with Commnist ideology. Among the more important of these front organizations are the Commmist Youth Federation, France-USSR, les Amis de la Democratie, Secours Populaire d'Algérie, Union Al enne des Organiza Jeunesse Communiste, Union des Femmes _d'Aledrie, Association des Etudiants Musulmans and se 4 Etudiante du Comité d'Action des Intellectuels Algériens pour Ja paix. While no information is available concerning the overall strength of these organizations, their mmber is estimated to be extremely small, In the case of the last two groups, for example, it is reliably reported that their combined membership does not exceed 300 youths. Moreover, they are generally concentrated in the cities of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Philippeville, No information is available concerning the infiltration of non- Commnist organizations in Algeria, Occasionally individual members of certain Moslem groups, such as the Association of Ulema, are noted as having attended certain People's Peace Congresses, but these individual _ deviations do not mean that these groups as a whole are Commnist oriented or dominated. VII, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is little concrete information available concerning the infiltration of Commnists into the Algerian administration, Unconfirmed reports indicate. that there has been some Commnist infiltration in the lower governmental echelons, However, the number, influence, and areas of concentration of these elements, though unknown, is small at this time. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Some journalists working for conservative journals and a small mumber of primary and secondary school teachers are thought to be Commnist. No reliable information is available. IX, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES (For connections with nationalist parties, see Part I under Capabilities, ) X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The Algerian Commnist movement publishes and circulates one Arabic-language and three French-language newspapers, These include the Alger Republicain and Le Courier Algérien, which are published daily; Liberté, which is a weekly newssheet, and the Arabic-language New Algeria, a monthly. Alger Republicain, which is perhaps the most SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release YOO //0: A-R IP S6BOOP59OROOOSOO08000 1-4 === [PDF page 172] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION important Commnist newspaper in Algeria, utilizes the presses of the Societe Nationale des Edition de Presse, is estimated to have a total circulation of approximately 20,000, and is published by Pierre laffont under the directorship of Henri Alleg (member of Central Committee of Qlgerian Commmnist Party). Idberté is also estimted to have a total circulation of 20,000 and is also printed by SNEP, Alger Republicain is not a member of the local newspaper syndicate because it does not pay its employees the official minimm wage. The paper claims to do so, and has noted that its employees turn back part of their wages voluntarily in their desire to keep the paper solvent, Alger Republicain is the only newspaper in Algeria to print schedules of the broadcasts of the Soviet and satellite radios, It is assumed that all Commmist newspapers in Algeria, because they have considerable difficulty in making ends met, are subsidized in part from France. _ The French Commnist Party is also active in providing supple~- mentary reading material for native consumption in Algeria. Recent reports indicate, for example, that The Principles of Leninism by Joseph Stalin,has been published in Arabic by the Colonial Section of the French Commmnist Party and is currently being circulated in Algeria,. The Algerian Commmist Party has established a small book store in Algiers to further the circulation of such propaganda material, There ( is a paucity of material coming directly from the Soviet Union and its satellites. XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION Little is known of the financial situation of the Algerian» Commmist Party, Recent reports indicate that the party finds itself in a rather difficult position financially and is being ‘subsidized, at least in part, by the French Communist Party. In the quarter beginning July 1, 1949, the Algerian Communist Party is reported to have distributed party funds as follows: (a) 5,400,000 francs (approximately $15,500) for assistance and relief; and (b) 3,200,000 francs (approximately $9,000) for propaganda — 700,000 francs for the department of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, and 2,500,000 francs for Arab villages and the territories of the south, © XII, SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Consulate General at Algiers ceased to function on October 15, 1951, Its affairs were subsequently transferred to the consular section of the Soviet Embassy in Paris. It was reported that this action was taken by the USSR on its own initiative and without any 4ntervention on the part of the French Government,. The closing of the SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 173] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Soviet Consulate General currently leaves the USSR and its satellites without any official representatives in Algeria, or in French North Africa, XIII, COMMINIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Algerian Communist Party has been a continuous Supporter of international peace conferences, Most recently, representatives attended the Vienna World Congress for Peace. Members of the Algerian Communist Party also attended the Berlin Peace Conference which was held in the sumer of 1952, During 1951, the party claimed to have acquired 100,000 — signatures in its campaign to gain Algerian support of a Commnist-— inspired resolution calling for the conclusion of a peace pact among the five major world powers, XIV, COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK — No information is available concerning the channels by which confidential information is transmitted among members of the party. The Algerian Commnist Party maintains its closest ties with the French Commnist Party, which appears to serve as the parent, or guiding, organization. The French Commnist Party's hierarchy has been critical of the inability of the Algerian Party to remain solvent, strengthen its current ties with the nationalist parties, formate a program of action capable of attracting a larger number of native Algerians, and provide sufficient discipline within the party. SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 174] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURLTY INFORMATION TR-6165.9 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, EGYPT OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 175] === ————eeooEOEOEOEOEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword «se ee eo ee ee eee ee ee eee neo e es = it OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « e e« 1 I. Objectives «se eesererercereereoeevececn 1 IT. Tactics ececcecrseerececeevreesevee eve 1 III. Capabilities ese eee cece rsercscvceces 3 ASSETS seaccevececs 4 Te Numerical Strength «ee eececcecrcevrsreeee eee mn II. Electoral Strengthessescccsvcscesces 5. IIti. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 (. IV. Government Policy Toward Commnism.sessecece § 5 Ve Communist Influence in Labor. ee cceeveveseee 5 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations «e.«.eecerscvetecv ee 5 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government. « «eee 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation «ee. 7 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties seccececrceseevrevreesceecces 7 X. Communist Propaganda Media «eee cceecrvccie eee T XI. Financial Condition « «2«escseserevreecrevve® T | XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets.. « « « toe eve T XIII. Communist International Organizations. « « » « ee 8 XIV. Communist Communication Network 2 eeecccececce 8 \ SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 176] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 177] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 { SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN EGYPT: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I, OBJECTIVES The goals of Commmist activity in Egypt cannot be stated in terms of the pronouncements and major activities of a specific Communist Party. There does not appear to be any single organized Commnist Party in Egypt nor do any of the groups engaged in Communist propaganda and activities appear to be capable of giving central direction to the actions of the others,. The goal of what Commmist activity exists in Egypt is to discredit the West and weaken Western influence, In particular, Communists attempt to stimilate local efforts to oust the British, to prevent the establishment of a broad defense scheme which could act as a substitute for the present British military establishment, and to agitate against the acceptance of Western assistance, such as the Point Four program, Since the intent of, these goals is to achieve a political vacuum in the Middle East, their success would fulfill the major policy requirements of the USSR, The party is far from possessing power to secure these ains, however; thus, its principal immediate objective is the creation of a stronger and more effective party organization. ( II, TACTICS Commnist activity in Egypt is small and fractionalized, partly because a large part of its work is carried on among certain minority elements, such as Copts, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Italians, operating within the framework of separate minority organizations often connected — with similar groups abroad, In part also, Commmnist work is the work of separate individuals operating within existing parties or organizations, particularly among youth groups, At present the tactical aim of such _ activity apparently is to form, surreptitiously, a united national front of these splinter groups and leftist elements in the Socialist and Wafd Parties and in the Moslem Brethren, An attempt will undoubtedly be made:to reach the membership of other parties, such as the New Nationalist and new labor and peasants! parties, Certain women's organizations such as the Bint al-Nil (the Moslem Ladies' Society) and the Feninist Union, have become interested in the possibility of attracting local attention and getting some international recognition by cooperating with the Commmist movement, and have espoused Commmist aims and sent ' delegations abroad to Commnist~sponsored conferences, For example, the Wafdist Vanguard, a leftist group in the Wafdist Youth, is now headed by ‘Abd al~Muhazin Hamida, formerly Egyptian press attache in Washington, who was deported from the US in April 1952 as a SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 178] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Communist, Ahmad Husayn, president of Egypt's Socialist Party, | is an opportunist who was pro-Fascist prior to World War II and since 1945 has made numerous pro-Commnist statements and has reportedly received financial subsidies from the Commmnists, Ahmad Taha, pro- Commmnist brother of the murdered Lt. "Abd al-Qadir Taha (who is regarded as a martyr to their cause by the Liberal Officers), is prominent in Egypt's embryonic labor movement, He plays upon his fraternal connection to enhance his prestige and to ingratiate himself with the Liberal Officers, who hesitate to snub him because of his brother's memory, He is seeking to oust the present anti-Commmnist leader of the Egyptian labor federation movement in order to secure that key position for himself, Several efforts have been made under the Parties Law of September &, 1952 to secure recognition of a number of proCommnist political parties, but all have been turned down by the government, Until the recent outlawing of all Egyptian political parties, Muhammad al-Bindari, former Egyptian Minister to the USSR and leader of the Egyptian Partisans of Peace, was bending every effort to secure recognition of a. Commnist front party under the guise of a "national liberation" group, with members drawn from among Partisans of Peace and other left—wingers,. In the days immediately after the military coup of July 23, 1952, the Commmists, who were apparently taken by surprise, supported the arny officers against King Farouk and his entourage and pursued a policy of | "wait and see," on the domestic reform program of the military group. By | September 1952, the Commmnist movement had decided that the Nagib regime ) was its enemy. Since that time, the Communists have engaged in a campaign. of vilification directed particularly against Nagib and 'Ali Mahir, who was Prime Minister during the first month after the coup, Pamphlets have been distributed among army personnel characterizing the coup as an "Anglo-American imperialistic plot," and General Nagib as a "stooge of the imperialists" and as another tyrant, exactly like Farouk, who mst therefore be liquidated. It is said that the Commnists inspired the violent strike of textile workers at Kafr al Dawwar in August 1952 and that they organized an anti-Nagib conspiracy among non-commissioned arny officers in August or September 1952, which proved abortive, The Commmists seize every opportunity to sow dissatisfaction in Egypt. When a member of a prominent landowning family who also heads an important Bedouin tribe was imprisoned for attacking the police in protest against the application of the land reform law to the family landholdings, local Commnist propaganda took the line that Nagib was persecuting the | tribesmen, When it became apparent that the military regime intended to | purge party leaders, including Mustafa al-Nahas and other prominent members of the Wafd Party, the Commmists took the line that Nahas was a national leader who should be retained as the president of the Wafd, ‘he Communists have taken advantage of anti~British feeling in Egypt to urge the use of force in ousting United Kingdom troops. Since the econanic and political measures cf the Nagib regime have led to some decline in SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATI GN === [PDF page 179] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION business and industriel activity and resulted in rising unemployment, Communists are almost certain to exploit the dissatisfaction among urban labor which will follow any reduction of the already low standard of living. — Another possible field for the expansion of Commmist influence in the near future would seem to lie among the fellahin, The Nagib regime has removed the legal prohibition against agricultural labor unions, and has established agricultural cooperative societies as part of its, program of lend reform, The Commmists can be expected to infiltrate and attempt to gain control of both, Still another fertile field for Comminist activities has been among students, both in universities and secondary schools, and particularly in youth movements. This group is especially - vulnerable to Commnist propaganda, since many Egyptian students apparently feel that a Commnist economy and form of government could be adopted without the abandonment of Islam, Many student riots, organized to protest against the British, against martial law, and against "imperialism" generally, have no doubt been sparked or stimlated by Commnist agitators, working within the youth groups, Guerrilla warfare against the British in the Canal Zone, carried on mainly by youth groups in para-military organizations or student groups in late 1951 and early 1952, was partly Commnist-inspired, III, CAPABILITIES ‘The ultimate objective of the few disciplined and “thoroughly Moscow-oriented Commnists in Egypt -—— the establishment of a Communist state subservient in foreign policy to the USSR —- is far beyond the capabilities of the present Commnist movement, - As for the more immediate goals outlined above, the Communist movement may be able surreptitiously to keep up its propaganda against the UK and the West and against Western-sponsored regional defense organizations or programs such as Point 4. Some of the influence and capabilities of the Commnist movement in Egypt before the July 1952 military coup have been reduced at least temporarily by (1) the counter+ attraction of the new regime's direct attack on economic and social maladjustments, and (2) the adherence of certain previously left-wing and opportunist writers and leaders such as Fathi Radwan and Rashad al-Barawi to the new military regime, in which their basic desire for power and their bent toward nationalism find greater satisfaction than in their previous fellow-travelling role, In mid—Jamary 1953, moréover, the new regime also arrested a considerable proportion of the known Commnists in Egypt, and banned the publication of all newspapers which, have fairly consistently supported the Communist line on international. and domestic questions, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 180] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN EGYPT: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH There is no Commnist Party as such in Egypt. Communist activity in the country is carried on among a number of splinter groups, whose total membership is probably not over 4,000. It was reported in September 1952 that an organization called "The Nucleus of the Egyptian Communist Party" had recently been founded, with units in both Cairo and Alexandria. Most of its leaders were reported to be drawn from among technicians and industrial plant employees; its main source of funds reportedly was an Egyptian engineer. named Sa'd Muhammad Hasan. Most Communist sympathizers are centered in Cairo and Alexandria, and a rather high proportion are members of minority groups —- Copts, Armenians, Greeks, and Italians. Several Egyptian feminist organizations appear to be involved in front activity, having sent representatives to the Vienna Peace Congress of December 12, 1952. Madame Siza Nabarawi, head of both the Egyptian Feminist Union and the Women's Movement for the Popular Struggle, Madame Ragiyah Hamzah of the Binteal-Nil (Daughters of the Nile), and Madame Haja Zaynab al-Ghazali, president of the Moslem Women's Society, attended the Vienna meeting. . Students are another segment of the population where Communist sympathies appear to exist. A number of members of the Wafdist Vanguard, a part of the Wafdist Youth, are connected with the Commnist-—front Partisans of Peace. Student demonstrations against the British and against martial law have on occasion been exacerbated by Communist There is no reliable information available on the quality of the party membership in terms of its willingness to incur hardships or cling to the party line. Fourteen "hard-core" Communists were imprisoned after ‘the "Black Saturday" rioting (January 26, 1952), and have not been released,: There are no outstandingly effective leaders among the various Communist groups. Kamil al-Bindari (The Red Pasha) has attempted on several occasions to form a Communist political party, as has Fathi al-Rawli, the editor of al-Mu'arda (The Opposition). Their attempts _ have been unsuccessful, which may be attributed partly to the firm attitude of successive Egyptian Governments towards the Communists 4s well as to the opportunistic and dilettantist character of the latter's ‘activities. The feminist groups which have taken on a pro-Commnmist coloration have definite dilettantist overtones in this aspect of their SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 181] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 / SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -5activity, and are more likely to be using it as a lever'to secure political recognition of women's rights than from any sincere conviction regarding Communist tenets. TI, ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communists have never appeared on the Egyptian ballot, and no clearly identifiable fellow-traveller candidates are know to have participated in any election.. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Egyptian Commmists apparently have no military organization for violent action. However, some student disorders and nationalist demonstrations were undoubtedly supported and exacerbated by Communist ‘agitators. Communists have participated in anti-UK guerrilla activity in the Canal Zone. The number of guerrillas with military equipment might.be a few hundred., IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM ~ ( _ &s a result of an attempted counter coup in mid—January 1953, the Nagib government has: banned all political parties. The coup was attributed to army-Wafd—Communist collaboration, and as a result all existing Communist publications were banned and a number of Communist bee leaders, including Fathi al-Rawli, editor of al-Mu'arda, and Yusuf Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Partisans of Peace, were jailed. There is no definite information available on a Commmist underground, but it may be safely assumed that there is such a movement, although it is probably quite weak at this time. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Egypt is not extensively industrialized and imports practically all of its armaments, The pro-Commmnist elements have had some success in infiltrating the labor unions and have been attempting to gain control of Egypt's labor federation movement. Under normal conditions they could be expected to try to gain control of agricultural unions and the agricultural cooperatives set up under the Land Reform Law. However, since the Nagib government is apparently taking strong measures to repress pro-Commmnist activity, such efforts can be expected to fail. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The partisans of Peace is the only significant fellow-travelling Communist—controlled organization. It draws support from such groups as ( een youth, particularly students; women; and cultural and professional circles.; SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 182] === pproved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SECREL - VV EE SECRET - SECURITY _INFORMATIGN Probably several thousand Egyptians are sufficiently sympathetic to Communism to attend occasional mass meetings or read the organization's paper, Al-Katib, when it was published. Genters of strength are Cairo, Alexandria, and in the provinces of Miniah in Upper Egypt, and Mansurah in Lower Egypt. The Partisans of Peace, though stronger than any other known Communist organizations in Egypt, are of insignificant influence compared with most other political organizations. The leaders, such as Kamil al-Bindari, Yusuf Hilmi, and Sa‘td al-Din Kamil, seem to be mainly professional men and intellectuals; they are. neither Moscow-trained Communists nor skilled professional revolutionaries. However, they have read the Communist classics, are informed about 4nternational affairs, and are capable of carrying on propaganda activi= ties which are fairly successful with the Egyptian public, particularly when they parallel the slogans of nationalism and anti-imperialism., The Egyptian Partisans of Peace have often sent delegations to Communi st-inspired"peace" conferences. The most recent. was held in December 1952 in Vienna at which Bindari, the.president, and Yusuf Hilni, the secretary-general, and Dr. Ibrahim Rashad, the president of the delegation, represented the Egyptian organization. The Partisans of Peace reportedly plan to expand by establishing committees in the armed forces, particularly among the NCOts. Social committees are to be formed in towns and villages where they do not already exist. Their objectives are to (1) exploit the popularity in Egypt of the idea of neutralism and non-involvement in the EastWest conflict, and (2) make the Partisans of Peace the leading exponent of this idea. oo The Partisans of Peace probably are capable of a considerable expansion of their organization and an increase in the range and effective— ness of their activities if they are permitted to operate in relative freedom. It seems unlikely, however, that the authorities, and specifically the present military regime, will permit them to grow to formidable size. The Partisans of Peace do not seem capable of seriously challenging the policies of the military, but might become much more dangerous if (1) there is a breakdown of order due to factional disputes among the members of the present military junta, or (2) the regime should suffer a series of foreign policy setbacks which are widely ascribed to its having been too subservient to the Western powers., VIT. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no reliable information available on the exact extent of Communist and Commnist-sympathizer penetration of government, armed SECRET - SECURTTY INFORMATION === [PDF page 183] === Oe... ree Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -7services, police, and national industries. A situation which bears watching is the reliance of the military junta on civilian advisers who have manifested pro-Commnist tendencies in the past, notably Fathi Ridwan and Rashad Barawi. However, as noted above under "Tactics," most such men were determined opportunists who joined the Communists under the previous regime because they were frustrated in their desire for high office. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION As indicated in "Tactics" above, there is considerable attention to Commmism as a system in public opinion-forming circles, Even in the non-Commnist press, there are individual reporters who are quite sympathetic to certain aspects of Communism. However, such people are often unclear as to the extent to which they are supporting Communism or simply taking up a Communist cudgel against the West. Those Egyptian newspapers which at least occasionally print a pro-Communist article have a combined circulation of over 100,000. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES _ (: Since political parties were banned in Egypt effective January 16, 1953 (for a three year period), this question is no longer relevant. However, before this action, pro-Communist elements apparently had some success in infiltrating the Wafd youth groups, the Ikhwan, and the © Egyptian Socialist Party (formerly Young Egypt). X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDTA There are some consistently and by local standards sensationally pro-Communist newspapers such as al-Mur'ardah, edited by Fathi al-Ramli; al-Katib, edited by Yusuf Hilmi, and al-Malayin, but it is not known whether they are currently being published since such papers are. frequently banned or temporarily suspended. No well-established paper is pro-Commnist.. XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION The financial position of the Egyptian Communist Party has always been precarious. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Soviet and satellite countries having Legations in Cairo are manned by the following staffs: USSR, 11; Poland,1; Bulgaria, 1; Hungary, 4; SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION | === [PDF page 184] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Rumania, 1; Czechoslovakia, 6. None of these states have trade or cultural missions in Egypt. USSR and satellite Legations are reported to have personnel engaged in propaganda activities. Probably all personnel make some attempt to "sell" Egyptians whom they meet « on the advantages of the Communist system. The Soviet Legation and probably some of the satellite Legations _ have receptions on their national holidays. Egyptian Government officials are invited and many attend. The effect of these activities appears to be insignificant. oS XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Egyptian Student Union, which may be a member of the International Student Union, is reportedly organized under Partisan of Peace leader— ship. It urges students in various parties, particularly the Wafd and the Socialist, to join its organization. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK No reliable information available. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 185] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.10 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, GREECE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 186] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword e« ee ceceeec eve eeesrersereesese oe ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « « « 1 Ie Objectives «.s+ceecrceesre rere eres J. II. TacticS « «ee eeeeeer ee @ oe oececeeveee 1 TIIe Capabilities «4 eeeecseceecereeeveeeere @ 2 ASSETS eee eee ee sree 4 Ie Numerical Strength e-.eecsccreseevee ees en se k IT. Electoral Strength. «sececssesse et 2 © 8 © oo @ 5 III. Military Strength and Crganization for Vielent Action 6 ( | IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. e+e ec eeeee 9 Ve Communist Influence in Labor «ee«seeeeeeesee 10 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and. Professional Organizations «eeerssssee eee 10 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government. « « « « « « « 10 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation e « e 12 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties, «ce ececercececeveeveve eee eer ee @ le 4 Xe Communist Propaganda Media « eee eee eooeeeee 12 XII. Soviet—Satellite Official AssetSs «eceeeeeveee 14 XIII. Communist International Organizations.« e « «eeee 14 XIV. Communist Communication Network.« e «ee eeseseee | 1h SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 187] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, ( providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 188] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20.: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN GREECE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Communist revolt in Greece at the time when the country was liberated from Nazi occupation (December 1944), and the guerrilla war which the Greek Communist Party (KKE) undertook in the fall of 1946 demonstrated that the major and ultimate objeotive of the Communists is to bring Greece within the Soviet orbit. Since the defeat of the Communist guerrillas in the summer of 1949, the outlawed KKE has confined itself to political action designed to reorganize their underground apparatus in Greece and, in addition, to establish a front which can operate legally and openly. The immediate objective of the KKE seems to be to promote its domestic political fortunes by reestablishing prestige among the left wing elements of the population, Its propaganda hammers away at the alleged connection between poverty, "repression," and the increasing power of Greek "reactionaries" and Greece's participation in Western defense activities. The burden of the Greek defense budget and Greece's need to withdraw from the “war camp" are particularly stressed. II. TACTICS The principal tactical objective of the Communist Party appears to be to broaden the membership of its front organization, the “United Democratic Left" (EDA), which in the 1952 elections gained about 12 percent of the popular vote, by seeking to win another 20 percent of the electorate now constituting the left wing of the Progressive Democratic Party (EPEK). Thus, the Communists hope to make EDA Greece's principal opposition party. The KKE has on several occasions told voters that they could find "reliable" candidates in "all the parties" who could be supported. ' This would suggest that the Communists have infiltrated even into the more conservative political circles. Surer evidence indicates that they have recovered much lost ground among labor, Through the ESKE (United Trade Union Movement), which is the labor arm of EDA, the Communists have infiltrated labor unions to an extent that may make them capable of wielding considerable influence at the next Panhellenic Congress of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE). This Situation, however, is causing the present labor executive of the GSEE to take steps to block ESKE fron gaining control of locals and attaining a position of influence in the Confederation. The success which the Communists have had in recovering their operational position within labor is principally due to their ability to establish a united front with the union membership itself, Their attempt, however, to carry out SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 189] === eee eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION broad front tactics by formal alliance with the leadership of labor unions and political parties has met with little success, EPEK rebuffed the latest such attempt just prior to the elections. Although EDA, despite its constitutional conduct, has steadily become less a front group and more the KKE itself under a different name, the new Greek Government controlled by the Greek Rally has shown so far no inclination to take action against it. It is possible that, while EDA hopes to attract additional members under the new right=wing regime, the Greek Rally Government may let EDA continue in its present legal status in order to splinter its center opposition. III. CAPABILITIES The political capabilities of the KKS appear to have been blocked for the time being with the rise of a strong: govermmente As a result of the elections of November 16, 1952, the present Greek Government, headed by Marshal Alexander Papagos, gained about 49 percent of the popular vote and, under a revised electoral system, about 80 percent of the seats in Parliament. This governmental strength, which the Communists probably did not expect to develop, could serve as an effective deterrent for the next four years against Commnist subversive activity and infiltration in the institutional life of the country. Nonetheless, the Communists, despite the fact that they failed to elect any deputies, enjoy an electoral base for political consolidation and maneuver » The prospect of the KKE's gaining a position of significant influence is contingent on the capability of the Greek Rally to hold, or increase its popular support, and to the ability of the center coalition, composed of the Liberal Party and EPEK, to cooperate in carrying out a constructive opposition policy. The Communists probably anticipate that both pro-Western groups, the Greek Rally as well as the Liberal-EPEK coalition, will disintegrate, since both political groups are made up of heterogeneous political elements. Since the Greek Rally is held together by the prestige of Marshal Papagos and the opposition by the patriotism of General Plastiras, the political life of the country thus centers on two personalities who are at their career's end. This fact gives hope to the Communists, who are also encouraged by the economic situation, which imposes a low standard of living on the population, Unless overall Soviet strategy requires them to sacrifice EDA and go completely underground to resume their tactic of terroristio | activity, the Greek Communists will seek to increase their strength SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ( Eee === [PDF page 190] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION with time through a program of relatively moderate political action and propaganda, While the Comunists for the time being apparently are not planning to resume large-scale sabotage inside Greece, there are about 20,000 Greek Communists in the satellite countries who are kept in training for possible reinfiltration into Greece, The Greek Goverment, however, is acutely aware of this threat, and contimues accordingly to budget for strong and vigilant police and gendarme forces. The KKE has a reservoir of about 200,000 male voters and as many women to serve as an echelon of supply and support for any underground organization, The returns of the last three elections have show that the KKE has a constant popular support of about 10 percent of the voters, It is therefore significant that, with this small percentage of popular support, the KKE was capable of disrupting the country for almost three years (1946-49), It is also noteworthy that the Communists were able to preserve their electoral strength after the liquidation of the guerrilla war, The election returns make two points clear: (1) the absence of defection among the rank and file of the Greek Communists; and (2) the capability of the KKE, whose top leaders operate from within the Soviet orbit, to exercise remote control over its organization in Greece, While the Communists are presently aiming at strengthening and enlarging the legal status and political base of EDA, they may also have made progress in building up their underground by their partially successful campaign for the release of the Communist internees in concentration camps and prisons, The ultimate influence of the Comunists, however, will depend on the degree to which the anti- Communist parties can cooperate in solving domestio problems, especially improving Greece's economic situation. ‘ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 191] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN GREECE: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH No reliable figures are available on the membership of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), In 1949 Soviet sources claimed as many as 75,000 members, The Greek elections of 1952 revealed about 180,000 Communist sympathizers. Of these, the number of card-carrying members is probably not more than 100,000, of which 30,000 might constitute the hard-core, / There are probably 150,000 individuals in organizations controlled by the Communists, and an additional 300,000 persons are influenced by partial, but significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organ-— izations, In all 12 to 15 percent of the total population is subject to direct Commmist influence or control, or some 900,000 to 1,000,000. These figures are not documentary; they are merely the best estimate that can be made, The regional distribution of KKE strength is indicated in the following table, which shows areas in which the Conmunist—front party EDA is strongest as reflected in the November 16, 1952 elections: Voters Percent of Area (zee) Total. Voters Athens 30,000 15.5 Corfu 6,000 25.0 Canea (Crete) 7,000 25.0 Heraklion (Crete) 6,000 16,2 Kavalla 9,000 29.0 Lesvos (Mitilini) 15,000 39.5 Patras 4,000 12,5 Piraeus 17,000 2463 Rethymnon - 2,000, 1.1 Salonica 24,5000 2563 Serres 6,000 13.6 Veria 4,000 14.3 Volos 6,000 21.4 The bulk of party membership and sympathizers are drawn from industrial and agricultural workers, and secondarily, and to a. decreasing extent, from the intellectual-professional stratum, Additional pertinent data on the KKE membership are reflected in the following statistics of the Seventh Conference of the KKE, held October 1-6, 1945: (a) Total representatives 228, of whom 26 were women, (b) Social composition of the representatives: SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 192] === [Unreadable] SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET - ot Workers 119 52.2% Artisans 8 3.5% Agrarians 22 9.6% Employees 26 11.4% Professionals 29 12.7% Intellectuals g 3.5% Students vai 48h. Unspecified 5 2.3% (c) Of these representatives, 105 had prison, exile, or concentration camp experience. (a) Length of membership in the KKE: 63 representatives joined before 1930 75 representatives joined before 1940 85 representatives joined after 1940 (e) Age of the representatives: 73 between 20-30 years of age 100 between 31-40 years of age 16 between 41-50 years of age 3 between 51-60 years of age 1 between 61-70 years of age (f) The average age of the Central Committee membership -was 41 in 1945-46. No data are readily available on the length or annual turnover of the membership, the mumber of members of over 5 years standing, or the decline in membership since 1946. If membership has any relation to the voting strength, the KKE has had a consistent average of 10 percent of the popular vote in the last four elections. Its popular wote has not declined since the elections of 1946, but its card-carrying membership must have declined since the party is illegal. Probably more than 20,900 Greek Communists are outside the country. The KKE leadership can be characterized as youthful, enthusiastic, individualistic, and immature; despite the limitations imposed by these qualities, they have developed a high sense of party discipline and a tightly-knit organization, II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH The official returns for the 1952 elections showed 164,848 votes for the Communist-front EDA. Actually, EDA won more than SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 193] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 180,000 votes — about 12 percent of the total. The following tabulations compare the EDA vote with that of opposing parties and show its regional distribution: Comparison with other parties: EDA popular vote 12.0% Vote for the government party 49.3% Vote for the center opposition 36.5% . 7688 Independent vote 2.2 100.0% Centers of largest EDA vote: Communist Area (EDA) Government Opposition Independent Athens 29,572 91,262 725330 725 Corfu 5,629 11,199 7,005 0 Drama 3,6% 12,069 10,946 0 Kavalla 8,650 - 11,617. 10,512 7 Larissa 3 9466 6, 530 5» 569 50 Lesvos (Mitilini) 14,831 15,567 7,414 0 Lefkas 25429 25490 a 2,899 Salonica b/ 23, 227 36,555 325397 0 Samos 1,702 6,735 6,662 a4 Trikkela 1,588 8,141 7,369 695 Veria 34553 12,330 11,429 0 Volos 6,143 11,991 9,129 0 Xanthis 0 8,183 2,689 (7,677) a ian a, The center opposition supported an independent candidate. b. In the January 1953 by-elections, EDS made substantial gains: it received 43,037 votes as against 47,232 for the government party and 23,946 for the center opposition. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION A. World War II and 1944 Insurrection During World War II, the Communists controlled the principal resistance movement, the National Liberation Front (EAM). The principal centers of EAM strength were in Attika, Central Greece, Macedonia, Crete, and in the major Aegean Islands. Although no reliable estimate is available of the number of people who participated in the resistance, there were probably more than 500,000 men and women active in EAM, who probably had the sympathy and support of more than 50 percent of the Greek population. Most of those who supported EAM before the Decemher 1944 uprising were not Communist sympathizers and few were aware of SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 194] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Communist control of EAM or of Cormunist tactical and political objectives. EAM's military arm, ELAS, could have resisted the Axis more effectively if it had not been primarily concerned with achieving political domination, It is doubtful if EAM-ELAS contributed much to the liberation of Greece or to the success of the Allied military effort, During the wer, ELAS claimed as many as 65,000 armed members and 4t ig with this force thet it launched the December 1944 revolt. The revolt was probably supported by 35 percent of the Greek population and was terminated by British intervention, B, The Guerrilla War, 1946-49 In the fall of 1946, the Cormmists began another armed insurrection, using guerrilla tactics, The principal objective was to bring Greece / within the Soviet orbit and, secondarily, to prevent the West from. creating a situetion of strength in a strategic area, The uprising had the support of about 10 percent of the population and approximately 40,000 persons participated in guerrilla activity. Of these, a maximm of 25,000 were actively engaged in operations; probably another 10,000 were in reserve outside of Greece. The government forces, including the police-gendarmerie and the civil guard, totaled some 250,000.; The overwhelming sentiment of the Greek people was anti-guerrilla,. but morale fluctuated and was affected by international conditions and domestic issues. In areas controlled by the Communists, the guerrillas had some local support, but on the whole it was forced rather than voluntary. Since the guerrillas failed to hold populated areas for any length of time, their effectiveness in propaganda and espionage was spasmodic, There were no non-Commmist insurrectionary groups which the KKE could exploit. The principal areas controlled by the guerrillas were along the frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. By the middle of 1948, guerrillas had appeared throughout the mountainous regions of Greece and in the islands of the Aegean, Lesvos (Mitilini),.and Samos. The main operetions took place at Grammos-Vitsi and at the juncture of the Greek, Albenian, and Yugoslav borders; tactical operetions were conducted in Peloponnessos and Central Greece, Beginning with hit-and-run operations by bands of 10 to 50, guerrilla tactics had developed by 1948 to attacks on towns by forces of from 100.to 2,000 men, In 1949, the cuerrillas tried to employ orthodox military tactics involving holding operations. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 195] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Logistic support of the guerrillas came primarily from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, The volume of this support has not been — estimated satisfactorily.. The guerrilla war seriously affected Greek economic and political stability and it was primarily US aid and advice which saved the country from a complete collapse... The insurrection postponed the economic and | social reconstruction of Greece for three years and divided Greek political circles on both domestic and foreign policy. C, The Present Situation Current KKE policy is to refrain from any activity which will oo provoke drastic measures against its underground apparetus or against its ' front organization, EDA, KKE does not now appear to have the strength and popular support to resort to violence, and there is no prospect for a Commmist armed uprising in Greece at present, Although no violent demonstrations have taken place since the defeat of the guerrillas in the summer of 1949, the Communists are capable of limited acts of violence for diversionary purposes, The Commnists could organize orderly demonstrations through EDA but will probably refrain from doing so for the time being in order to avoid jeopardizing their front organization. No information is available on Communist plans for creating or activating military resistance organizations in the event of war, It is reasonable to assume, however, that such plans exist or are being formulated by the top KKE leadership. In an East-West war, the Greek Commnist apparatus would be capable of sabotage. In a localized war — between Greece and an orbit country (Albania or Bulgaria), Greek Commnists would split on the national issue and the KKE would find it difficult to — carry out sabotage to any appreciable extent. On the outbreak of conflict, the present EDA leadership would either withdraw or be liquidated and KKE underground operatives would try to take over, although many Commmist \ cells would probably break up in the event of a localized Balkan wer, Circumstantial evidence indicates that the KKE has stocks of hidden weapons and equipment in Greece, and more can be infiltrated from Albania and Bulgaria and from across the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. A maximum of some 20,000 to 25,000 combat—trained Greek Communists, both men and women, are readily available to the KKE from within the Soviet orbit; this figure could be increased to about 30,000 to 40,000 by drawing upon other Greeks living in the orbit. Underground recruiting in Greece could yield about 5,000 persons in the initial stages, In some respects, the Communist underground apparatus in Greece is a para-military organization, Vestiges of the wartime OPLA (Organization for the Protection of Popular Security) still exist. It was reorganized in 1947 as ODA (Democratic Security Organization), the terroristic and assassination unit of the KKE, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 196] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SEGRET — SECURITY INFORMATION . ODA -~ or its current equivalent -- is presently inactive, but it is probably kept in a state of readiness. Its strength is not known but. it is reasonable to assume that it is centered in Athens-Piraeus and Salonica, ODA is a mobile organization and its members probably possess enough weapons -- pistols for the most part, and hand grenades and sub. machine guns in some cases, The quality of its leadership is difficult to determine on the basis of available information, but usually the most fanatic and capable KKE members, many of whom have a criminal record, are recruited for this branch of Communist activity. A variety of interlocking "self-defense" wits have been reported, but little is- known of their present status. For example, the OA (Self-Defense Organization) was subordinated in Jamary 1951 to KOSSA (Commmist Organization of the Army and Security Corps). OA is also known as the "People's Avengers" (Laikoi Ekdikitai), Units of the OA are organized in three groups of three men each, under the command of a tenth man who is also responsible for the weapons. These "vigilance" officers are kept ready, under pseudonyms, for any assignments calling for violence, It is not know whether the MLA (Wide Popular Self-Defense), ereated in 1945, is still in existence, This was the first para-military © organization formed by the Commmists after the collapse of the December 1944 revolt. The Narrow Self-Defense and the Democratic Army (the ‘Communist guerrillas) were able to draw upon MIA for well-disciplined reinforcements, Sufficient data are not available to evaluate the current status of these para-military branches of the KKE, However, their capacity for expansion and action is contingent upon the success of the Greek security ' organs in uncovering “vigilance” operators. To date, the record of the Greek police in this respect has been good, IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Greek Commmist Party (KKE) and its affiliated organizations were outlawed in 1947. A leftist party appeared in the elections of 1950, which developed as the legal front of the KKE under the name United Democratic Left (EDA), There is enough evidence of its ties with the KKE to warrant suppression, but neither the recent government of the center, nor the present right-wing government of the Greek Rally have taken action against it. Under the center government, EDA's weekly party organ and youth organization were suppressed, Under the Rally government, however, the party enjoys the freedom accorded to the opposition parties and its daily newspaper continues to be published. The government has the capability and popular support to repress any Commmist-front group. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 197] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION While the effectiveness of the underground organization of the KKE cannot be estimated, some idea as to its efficiency can be gleaned from the effective support it gave EDA in the elections of 1952, The KKE was able to resolve the divided opinion in EDA on electoral tactics, ordering the front group to run its own ticket and preventing cooperation. with the center parties. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR’ There are no data available on the number of Commmnists in defense plants and other key industries, such as railways, communications, shipping, and chemical industries. In Athens-Piraeus and Salonica,; probably 30-50 percent of the industrial workers are EDA sympathizers. The percentage of Commnist sympathizers in the commmications system is smaller, since it is mostly under indirect government supervision, The General Confederation of lebor (GSEE) has managed to prevent Communists from holding crucial posts in its organization, and has been countering Communist infiltration, -EDA supports the labor organization known as ESKE (United Trade Union Movement), which was organized in June 1950. Its membership is not known, There are, in addition, several unions strongly influenced by ESKE on the national level, such as the | Tobacco Workers' Union in Salonica, which has about 5,300 members, but the total number of Commmist members is difficult to. determine,. None of the labor organizations operating within Greek law are affiliated with international Communist confederations, such ag WFTU, What the KKE calls the "elected" GSEE (which exists now only in Communist propaganda) belongs to the WFTU, The present GSEE is regarded by the KKE as "appointed," and is affiliated with the pro-Western ICFIU, VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL CROANTZATION Organizations which were known to be Commnist-controlled are out= lawed, but the KKE continues to use their names in its propaganda, Some of them went underground and many were absorbed by EDA, Little is known of EDA activity in these fields,. . - The extent of Commnist infiltration into’ non-Commnist organi= zations cannot be estimated, either in general or in connection with _particular organizations, Available reports on Communist infiltration are. inconclusive, vil. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO EE, 4 A. sipal. Le, lature ‘There « are no mown or declared Commmists in the national legis- | lature, The Parliament elected in 1951 had 10. EDA deputies, who voiced SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 198] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ' SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -ill1the Commnist line in domestic and international affairs, out of a total of 258 members. The present Parliament, elected on November 16, 1952, has no EDA representation. On the local level, the Commnists, through the "Democratic Front". (now EDA), attained a majority in 13 (45%) municipal councils of a total © of 218 which were elected April 15, 1951. Of the total municipal councilmen elected (1,840), about 10. percent (187) belong to the "Democratic Front." Extreme leftist mayors of the "Democratic Front" were elected in 11 municipalities: A, Stingos Egaleo in Attika - Vyron in Attika - A, Kostantileris Elefsis in Attika -~- Geo, Rigos Kaisariani in Attika - D. Manolidis Keratsini in Attike A, Patsilinakos [Unreadable] Nikea “in Attika - OD, Karakoulouxis Haidari in Attika -— M, Koutsokos Patras.. in Attila.. - V. Roufos Kavalla §- in Kavalla: — Emm. Melissakis | - D, Karathanos Larissa in Larissa a. A resort community for wealthy Athenians, B. Axmed Forces While the influence of the Commnists and their sympathizers in top levels of the armed forces is nil, the lower ranks contain a leftist element of about 2-5 percent. Two percent of the army vote in 1951. was for EDA, as compared with its civilian vote of about 10 percent. (In the 1952 elections, the army did not take part as.a separate entity.) The underground organization of the KKE for the armed forces, know as KOSSA (Commmist Organization of the Army and Security Corps) » pre=- sumably has agents in military circles, Little evidence has been reported of its effectiveness, C. Police No data are available on Commnist infiltration in the police and security services, D, Administration The number of Communists in the national and mmicipal administration SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 199] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -lcannot be ascertained. No estimate exists of the percentage of civil servants who voted for EDA, The total number of civil servants in the national government is about 60,000. It is probable that about 20-30 percent are EDA sympathizers. VIII, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Data inadequate to draw reliable conclusions, | IX, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON~COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Commmnist influence in right wing organizations and parties is difficult to ascertain in the case of Greece, It is reasonable to assume that the Commnists have planted their agents in conservative circles, — whose object is probably to affect the top levels rather than influence the rank and file, It is probable that some of the 31 deputies of the left—of-—center party EPEK have Commmist connections. There is enough evidence for at least one to be suspected as a crypto-Commmist, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A, Newspapers and Periodicals Commnist newspapers and periodicals are illegal in Greece, Nevertheless, the Communist underground prints and circulates clandestinely the principal long-standing organ of the KKE, Rizospastis, and other old or new titles, which appear at varying intervals and in various parts of Greece, Another publication of the KKE appearing irregularly is Neos Cosmos (New World), which reproduces texts of Central Committee pronouncements, Youth publications are: Floga (Flame), organ of the Communist underground student organization which shows Athens as its place of publication; and Leventia (Youthful Manhood) and Neos Agonistis (New Fighter), organs of the KKE youth organization, EPON, Publication of the clandestine Communist papers is irregular and the number of copies circulated unknown, EDA puts out a number of publications, which are not as openly Commmist as those published clandestinely by the KKE, Its first official organ, Dimokratiki, which began publication in August 1951, was suppressed by the center government on January 19, 1952. No circulation figures of EDA's publications are available, During the election period (October. November 1952), the caretaker government allowed EDA to publish Avgl (Dawn) as a daily organ, and its publication has continued under the right wing Greek Rally government. It started as a weekly, claiming 50,000 circulation, Its circulation figures as a daily are not available, EDA published a weekly called Isopolitia (Civil Rights Equality), but information on its present status is not available, It also published SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 200] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY TNFORMATION -13- Frouri tis Irinig (Guardians of Peace), which was suppressed, together with Dimokratiki, on January 19, 1952. This was intended to disseminate the youth organization EDNE's propaganda on the Communist peace campaign, It is not known if another publication took its place. Printing Establishments. Underground Communist printing establishnents exist, Indicative of how well the underground press operates is thefact that Rizospastis has had a continuous (although irregular) publication since the KKE was outlawed in 1947, 2. Import of Publications from Abroad. Communist publications can only be smuggled into Greece, and consequently, few are imported from abroad, No data are available on this traffic in Communist literature, There is some ground for suspicion that certain issues of Rizospastis -are printed abroad. Soviet-satellite diplomatic establishments in Athens issue frequent press releases, The Soviet Embassy is not known to release publications of any significance, B, Radio There are no domestic broadcasting stations in Greece controlled or influenced by Commmists. Communist broadcasts, however, are beamed to Greece from Moscow and all satellite capitals, The min station broadcasting in Greek is radio "Free Greece," operating probably from Rumania as the KKE's principal medium of communication, Radio "Free Greece" has proved effective in commmicating with the KKE's underground organization. It can be heard in most parts of Greece and reaches the Greek communities in the Near East. No attempt has been made so far to estimate its audience. Greek broadcasts from Radio Moscow and satellite countries are secondary to radio "Free Greece," They frequently quote KKE broadcasts, The size of their audience in Greece is also unknown, but is certainly less than that of radio "Free Greece," XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION The financial condition of the KKE is unkmown, The underground in Greece counts on collections and contributions from party members and sympathizers, It is unable, however, to extract sizable funds by extortion as it used to do before it was outlawed, although it still uses this method on a very limited scale. Evidence indicates that for operations and specific activities in Greece funds have been imported from abroad, On the basis of available data no estimate can readily be made of the total financial assets of the KKE, SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION | === [PDF page 201] === Eee ee ‘Greece are now engaged in political activity of any significant nature, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION XII, SOVIET~SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS A, Diplomatic Establishments The only Soviet bloc countries with which Greece has diplomtic relations are the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Embassy in Athens is small, consisting (as of October 1952) of about 5 individuals, headed by a chargé d'affaires, all of whom are listed as living in the chancellery, The Czechoslovak Legation in Athens is small, There is practically no political activity on the part of orbit diplomatic representatives in Greece, Reports in 1946 and 1947 indicated that bloc undercover agents have operated in Greece, but there has been no information of their existence since then, If the bloc diplomats in it must be covert, The only Soviet reception reported was held on November 7, 1950, It was well attended by the foreign diplomatic corps in Athens.,:.t The USSR and Poland had representatives on the UN Balkan Commission in 1947, but subsequently withdrew their delegates. Since then, no Soviet bloc representatives have participated in UN observation groups in the Balkans, toe, XTII, COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The KKE participates in Commnist international organizations and conferences, but since the party is illegal there is no opportunity for participation-from within Greece, EDA conducts no observable relations with international Commnist bodies, This is left to the KKE, which - operates from within the Soviet orbit and through its agents in Western capitals,! oe XIV, COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK A, Courier System An underground courier system of the KKE exists, This has been ‘ established by the arrest of Communist agents by the Greek police, but | information on the efficiency of the system and points of contact is not readily available, B, W/T System The clandestine W/T station in Kallithea (near Athens), which the SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 202] === OO EEO eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION - ~15- Greek police discovered and raided on November 14, 1951, was in operation. for several years, This suggests, and there is evidence, that more W/T - stations are in operation. About the same time another clandestine W/T station at Glyfada (outside Athens) was uncovered, Bucharest (Rumania) was the focal point of traffic from and to these stations,. It was rumored in May 1952 that another secret transmitter had been discovered in the. Kilkis area of Northern Greece, Nothing further was reported of this, but indications are that the Commnists have enough transmitters in Greece to carry on their espionage uninterruptedly, re It has been established from the messages captured from the W/T transmitters in Kallithea and Glyfada that EDA receives instructions from KKE leaders in the Soviet orbit, This was also seen clearly from the _ radio "Free Greece" broadcasts in connection with the recent elections in Greece, KKE ordered EDA to run on its own ticket, and this was carried out without deviation, EDA was also in consultation with the KKE on the selection of candidates,., SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 203] === OE ES Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION TR-6165.11 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDIA a Se OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 204] === OO EE EE Eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword « «ee eee cece e cere cer ee eres ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « e e 1 Ie. Objectives. ee. wee ecne creer vseseceeae ee 1 II. Tactic8 «ee eee ece seer ececveceevsere 3 III. Capabilities.. cece ec ere scrececvvees 3 | ASSETS oe eee ec ccces 5 Ie Numerical Strength «eee seeevscereceeceee 5 II. Electoral Strength..ecscececcsccccecccce 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 8. ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. «eee ececec 9 Ve Communist Influence in Labor «ee ecececcecveece 9 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations « « « ee cee ee eee i VII. Communist Infiltration into Government.. se eee ee 14 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation.« « e 15 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties..e.« oeeoen eee ee eam wee eee ete oe 16 Xe Communist Propaganda Media ss eescescccceceve 16 XIe Financial Condition..eseccccersccecrceccsecce 2k XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets eeesecececcece 25 XIII. Communist International Organizations «.«.eeeeee 2 XIV. Communist Communication Network. eeeweeeeesee 28 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 205] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational ( potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 206] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The objectives of the Indian Commnist Party, as set forth in an article by its General Secretary, A. K. Ghosh, in the December 1952 issue of For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, are defined as the "liquidation of all vestiges of British rule," "defense of the National independence and sovereignty threatened by the American aggressors," the “preservation of Peace," and the “promotion of a life of happiness for the people." While current developments do not provide many striking opportunities for the party to work towards the fulfillment of the first objective set forth above, the party does attack India's membership in the Commonwealth and British vested interests in India on every possible occasion. With regard to the second objective, the US Technical Assistance program and activities provides a major target and it is clear that an immediate objective of the CPI is to hinder so far as possible the community development projects undertaken with US financial and technical aid, and to discourage public cooperation with these projects. An additional set of objectives in the general field of foreign affairs is given in a list of the basic tasks facing the party drawn up by the General Secretary in the spring of 1952 following the general elections. These include a five-power peace pact; "solidarity with colonial peoples fighting for freedom"; friendship and closer economic ties between India and the USSR and China; withdrawal of the Kashmir issue from the UN; and the development of a peace pact between India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. In the main these objectives primarily fulfill the foreign policy requirements of the USSR rather than promote the party's domestic political fortunes. However, as indicated in many party documents, Indian Comminists are most actively concerned with building the party’s organizational strength, particularly among labor and peasant groups, and some of the party's most prominent immediate objectives are designed to further this end. Among the basic tasks facing the party todav, as outlined in the General Secretary's post-election report, are the follcwing: the development of a broad-based mass movement for civil liberties, including repeal of the Preventive Datention Act; intensification of the movement for linguistic provinces; the building of a “united movement for help to the people in the famine-stricken areas" to force government to increase relief measures, and "to mobilize people for adequate rations and against rise in prices of food-stuffs." Barring the dictation of a new line by Moscow, it now appears improbable that the party will in tie imaediate future revise its objectives or shift the relative emphasis among those it now pursues. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 207] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION II. TACTICS Present tactics of the CPI are characterized by attempts (1) to form, where possible, working alliances with left-wing or other anti- Congress political organizations with a view to building a united front; (2) to win a direct following and popular support among all social segments, particularly peasants, workers, students, and intellectuals; (3) to utilize constitutional procedures; and (4) to exploit its membership in the central and a number of the state legislative assemblies. Insofar as the party abides by constitutional procedures a principal method of propaganda consists in its legislative activities which enable party leaders in both the central and state legislatures to: put forward the party line and to express their opposition to the Congress government program. In recent months there have been mmerous and recurring opportunities for the party legislators to press their demands for civil liberties and for the formation of linguistic provinces. A principal motif of the party's propaganda appeals outside the legislatures is its use of “peace"“ movements to win support. To a certain extent the Communists specialize their appeals to various groups, and the “peace” propaganda is largely directed towards intellectuals, students, and other urban groups, whereas among peasants the emphasis is on agrarian problems. The Commnist Party does not hesitate to form alliances with left-wing or even, sub-rosa, with anti-Congress right-wing political parties in the legislative assemblies and for election purposes, when some advantage is to be gained. Such inter-party arrangements are not always for the purpose of augmenting the party's voting strength, but. are sometimes designed to reduce the strength of the Congress~dominated faction and if possible to keep that party out of office. On occasion, and to a limited extent, sacrifices have been made by the party to preserve such alliances and, where they have broken down, as in Madras, it has so far been due to the action of the allies rather than the Comminist Party. There is little evidence that the Commnists at present, in spite of their emphasis on the development of a united front, are making concessions in their program to win the adherence of groups usually considered beyond their reach. The party's extra-territorial loyalties, for example, are a definite liability as far as all non- Communist groups are concerned, yet the party does little to play them down. On the other hand, the Commnists are able to capitalize on the anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism which is universal in India, and on the definitely pro-Chinese sentiments of the literate population. Dissatisfaction with prevailing domestic policies of the Congress government is played upon with considerable success. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION. Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20 -: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 208] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Although the party is now work’ -¢ along constitutional lines, the leaders have not hesitated to state from time to time that the Communists would resort to violence to attain their ends should this become necessary. In fact, along with legitimate activities the party or those directly under its influence has continued to engage in armed violence in certain areas, notably South India and PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union). There are indications that party leaders, foresseing the possibility of a ban on Communist activities in certain States, or even in the country as a whole, are preparing for increased underground activity. At the present time, the party uses trade unions and "peace" movements as vehicles of propaganda, and to a lesser extent, as pressure groups. In rural areas where direct action has been resorted to, peasant organizations are used to stir up the agrarian population and to enlist support for subversive activities. The recent general elections revealed a marked weakness in Comminist influence among the working classes. Probably partly because of this lack of strength and capability, the party in recent months has seldom resorted to strike tactics in the trade unions which they control. Communist labor leaders, however, frequently join in or support strikes which they have not instigated, and claim credit for ( any concessions secured., With regard to the methods used by the Commnist Party to recruit and retain members, it is believed that active proselytising is carried out among student groups and labor organizations, and that a certain selection is exercised through a period of indoctrination and probation. Discipline appears to be strict, and to work fairly effectively to retain members in the party. There is growing evidence that the CPI receives both instructions and financial help from agencies and organs of the USSR in India. An important source of financial aid is the large number of books and printed materials brought into the country as part of the Soviet information program and sold at low cost for the benefit of the Indian Commnist Party. It is possible that party leaders are now under the direct influence and guidance of the Soviet Embassy officials. ITI. CAPABILITIES Insofar as a major current objective of the Indian Communist Party is to build up its organizational strength, the party is probably in a stronger position than ever before to achieve a degree of success. The party's victories in the 1951-52 elections have enhanced its capabilities for political action in the sense of providing a platform for party propaganda and for attacks on the government policy and program. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 209] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Hitherto, the party has suffered from dissension within its ranks and has periodically been greatly handicapped by a lack of unity among the leaders and a confusion based on conflicting views regarding policy and tactics. The establishment, during the past few years, of increasingly direct contacts with Soviet Union officials should go far towards reducing this factionalism and confusion, and so increase the party's organizational strength. How far the party will succeed in its efforts to increase its influence and widen its control over the trade unions is doubtful. The results of the general elections revealed that the party had little strength in this sector, and it may not even with increased efforts be able to make mch headway against its rivals, the labor organizations dominated by the Congress and the Socialists. Conditions seem somewhat more favorable for success in enlisting peasant support and building up effective peasant organizations. Agrarian unrest is widespread, and prospects for substantial improve-~- ment in rural standards of living in the near future are not bright. The Communists do not appear to be making much headway with the movement for a United Front of leftist parties, and it is probable that an alignment of non-Comminist leftist groups will have the effect of isolating the Commnist Party. To a considerable extent, party capabilities in respect to organization depend upon the attitude of the Indian Government and the various state governments towards the party. Present indications are that the governments’ attitudes are gradually crystalizing and that the dangers inherent in the Indian Communist movement are receiving more and more recognition. It is possible therefore that the Indian Communist Party, at least in certain areas, may be driven underground. The party's capacities in regard to building organizational strength, and to achieving its other objectives, would be, thereby, greatly impaired. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 210] === EEO OOOOa_E_Ea———————in—_OC”--rerTeerorrOOEE——— O73 _ ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN INDIA: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH The Commnist Party of India has an estimated membership of about 50,000, This figure reflects the probable increase Since October 1951 when the party claimed 30,000 members. The size of the party's following is roughly indicated by the more than 4,700,000 votes received by Communist Party or front candidates for the national legislature in the 1951-52 general elections, While the geographic distribution and class composition of the Communist membership is not definitely known, analysis of recent election returns indicates a concentration of Communist strength in south India (Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, and Madras) and West Bengal, and greater Communist support in rural areas than in the major industrial centers of the country. The larger segment of its urban support consists of middle~class intellectuals and white collar workers rather than members of the industrial working classes. The quality of the party membership has seldom been tested, and no useful conclusions can yet be drawn. During the Telengana disturbances in 1948-50, numerous small bands of Commnist-affected “hostiles" ravaged ( the countryside and eluded several thousand government troops for an extended period, In the general elections of 1951-52, the party line of constitutional opposition was generally adhered to, but Communist strength grew more from general anti-government sentiment than from the popular appeal of Commmist doctrine, Stability in point of total membership is not a characteristic of the Indian Communist Party, In February 1948, the party claimed 100,000 members; in October 1951, only 30,000, This decrease was caused by internal dissension and a policy of repression on the part of the ceritral and state governments, Since the election campaign of late 1951, membership has increased to an estimated 50,000. In its fluctuations since 1946, Conmmnist Party membership has probably never fallen below 20,000, This would appear to represent the "hard core," almost one-half of the present party. This "hard core" seems to be strongest in those areas of greatest electoral strength and is drawn from practically every social class, with probably a majority from the urban middle and working classes. Members of the "hard core" as a whole are estimated to average 30 years of age, with 8 years of membership in the party; leaders of the "hard core" average 45 years of age with 20 years of membership. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 211] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION The Commnist leadership is in general well-educated and able, but the party has lacked leaders with the qualities necessary to attract the Indian masses, The effectiveness of the leadership has also been lessened by personal rivalries and disputes over policy and tactics, From 1948 until 1951 there was serious dissension within the party with several strong local leaders unable to establish clear title to national leadership, The most serious internal differences were, however, resolved by mid-1951 and since that time the leadership has functioned. more harmoniously. Since the 1951-52 elections, the several provincial segments of the party have found a focus in the national Parliament, _where the Commmist delegation effectively directs party activity throughout the country, ably assisted by Commnist representatives in provincial legislatures. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Commnist Party, together with front or fellow-traveller affiliates, polled 4,712,009 votes in India's first national elections,. held between October 1951 and March 1952, These votes represent 4.45 percent of the valid total cast and won the party 23 seats in the House of the People, the lower house of Parliament, Other Marxist, far left splinter parties received approximately 1,500,000 votes (about 1.4 percent of the total) and four seats, The over-all Communist and near- Commnist vote, including an approximation for independents on whom specific data are not available, was between six and seven percent of the total vote, In elections to the state assemblies, the total Commnist vote was somewhat larger, approximately 6,100,000 or 6 percent of the total, Other far left parties gained approximately 1,200,000 votes or one percent of the total, Independent candidates with Commnist sympathies would probably increase the far left vote by about another one percent, By-elections since March 1952 do not indicate any trend in Comminist Party strength, A comparison of Commmist electoral strength with the strength of other major parties in the national Parliament (489 seats) follows: Party _. Votes Percent of Total Seats Won Congress (government) 47,528,911 14.85° 362 Communist and fronts. 4,712,009 445 23 Socialist® 11,126,344 10,50 12 Kisan Mazdoor Praja® 6,158,782 5.81 9 &. These two parties recently united to form the Socialist-Praja Party, with a total of 21 seats, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION ; Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20 - CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 212] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION There are no major parties supporting the Congress Party in the House of. the People. The Communist Party vote is concentrated in the southern states of Hyderabad, Travancore-Cochin, and Medras and in the northeastern States of West Bengal and Tripura. The tables below indicate the comparative strength of the Commnist Party in those states as shown in the 1951-52 elections, Hyderabad Assembly (175 seats) Percent of votes Seats won Congress 41.84 93 Communist 20,88 42 Socialist 11,37 11 Independents 14.46 wu Travancore-Cochin Assembly (108 seats) Congress 25.4 43 Commmist (United Front of Leftists) 21.4 32 Socialist 15.0 11 Independents 17.5 il ( Madras Assembly (375 seats) Congress 35.05 152 Commnist 12.90: 62 Kisan Mazdoor Praja ‘8,82. 35 Socialist. 6,58: 13 Other parties 21.76 34 West Bengal Assembly (238 seats) Congress 38.94 150 Communist 10.76 28 Kisan Mazdoor Praja 8.97 15 Jan Sangh 5.65 9 Independents 21.61 16 Tripura Electoral College (30 seats) Communist 43.10 12 Congress 18,17 9 Independents 21.72 6 ‘a, This state is without a~legislature but selects an electoral college which elects the state's representatives to the upper house of Parliament, the Council of States, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] === [PDF page 213] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION ITI, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The present policy of the Indian Communist Party is to refrain from violent demonstrations, except perhaps to a limited degree under special circumstances, but at the same time to maintain close contact with dissident groups and to join demonstrations when they occur. Most recent demonstrations cannot be attributed to the Commnists alone, although they have contributed significantly to some of those which have occurred, In December 1952, a series of demonstrations were staged to protest a state sales tax inSaurashtra, and two Commnists were on the committee of 10 which directed the action, Communists were conspicuously present in the Hyderabad City riots over the employment of non-Hyderabadis and in the massed demonstrations demanding the formation of a separate state of Andhra, Over the past year, there has been continuing but sporadic violence against landowners in PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union) in which it is thought the Commmnists have had a leading part, It is known that the Commnists are attempting to strengthen their underground apparatus but details are not available and nothing is know concerning any plans that the party may have for engaging in violence in the future. There have been reports of armed Commmist groups in Tripura and considerable numbers of Communists in Hyderabad are believed to have arms, There may also be small armed groups elsewhere, Several thousand members of the party have had past experience in riots and other violent tactics, but any precise estimate of their number is impossible, It is impossible to estimate the maximum number that the Communist Party could mobilize for violent demonstrations at present, but where an issue of importance to a specific group was involved, particularly a problem concerning regional susceptibilities, several thousand people could certainly be rallied, In March 1948 the party inaugurated a policy of violence and terror on the assumption that India was ripe for a proletarian revolution, Strikes; sabotage of railways, munition plants, and public utilities; mutiny in infiltrated armed services; arson; bomb-throwing; and murder were the weapons used in this civil warfare, and there was a consequent alienation of public sympathy from the Communist cause. In South India, the Andhra branch of the party, although opposed by the Commmnist high command, followed the Chinese path of agrarian revolt and of building rural bases of armed strength, and succeeded in bringing a large area on both sides of the Madras-Hyderabad border under Communist control, There is no reliable estimate of the total number of people involved in the 1948-50 period of violence but over 5,000 Communists were jailed. There were probably 2,000 to 3,000 involved in the Telengana area of Hyderabad and Madras, Other centers of violence where possibly several SEC RET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 214] === i ——er”rsiéi ir EE EE EEE Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION hundreds were engaged were in the states of Assam, Tripura and Manipur, and Calcutta in northeast India, and in the Tanjore and Kerala parts of Madras state and in the state of Travancore-—Cochin in south India, IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Communist Party, although outlawed in several states during the 1948-50 period of violence, is now legal throughout India and with its front organizations has full freedom in parliamentary and other legal activities, Under the constitution, the national and state governments have the powers of preventive detention in cases involving the security of a state, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of essential supplies or services, Ordinarily, detention without trial beyond three months must be authorized by an Advisory Board composed of persons who have the qualifications of High Court judges but the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, renewed and amended by the House of the People, permits detention for periods up to a year without reference to an Advisory Board in cases involving India's security, defense, or foreign relations; the security of a state; or the maintenance of public order, The Advisory Board may authorize a continuance of imprisonment so that in effect the government may detain a person indefinitely, During the period of Communist violence in.1948-50, the government made extensive use of the power of preventive detention, Since independence, the size of the Indian police forces has been appreciably increased, The central Intelligence Bureau and the state Criminal Investigation Departments are believed to have an extensive network of informers in the Commnist Party and its fronts, The higher levels of army and police forces, and most of the lower ranks, are loyal to the government and at present the government appears capable of repressing the party to a great extent, although undoubtedly some Commmist leaders would escape detection and some underground activity could continue, V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Most of the 3,000 primary unions in the country belong to one of the four major federations of unions, Since the federations are closely identified with political parties, affiliation is largely a matter of political rather than economic considerations, The largest federation in the country, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) has a total membership of 1,435,258, and is affiliated with the Congress Party. The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) was the only central labor organization in India prior to World War II and was non-partisan in character; it came under Communist control during the war, and remains today an organ of the Indian Commnist Party, It has 606,194 members organized in 729 unions, The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) is the labor SECRET —~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2700 //0 Q: A-RIPS6BOOPOOROOOSO00S000 1-4 === [PDF page 215] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -10organ of the Socialist Party, representing 464 unions with 704,987 workers. The United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), established in 1949 as a reaction against the policy of violence imposed by the Commmists on member unions of the AITUC, represents about 300,000 workers, Indian labor unions do not exert the same control and discipline over members that US unions do, Frequently, the unions are nothing more than very loose associations of workers who have little organization, pay no dues, and do not operate as a united force, Thus, figures as to total strength, which all unions greatly exaggerate, may be very misleading, Information available does not permit a comparative analysis of union strengths within industries, There is no industry which can be said to be unionized by any particular federation; all groups have influence in various industries, Geographically, Commnist trade union strength is greatest in Calcutta, the Andhra area of Madras, and Bombay city. Of the total unionized labor force in India, the Commnist unions may have very roughly 10-25 percent, Some of the locals in the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC ) may be influenced by Communists but no specific evidence is available, At the end of 1950, AITUC claimed 729 unions but a complete listing of them including the plants involved, is not available, Some specific information for Bombay, which is evaluated by the collector as probably true, is given in the three tables below: Approximate Indust: Comminist Union Strength Textile Mill Mazdoor Union 20,000 Silk Reshern Mazdoor Union 800 Railways Central Railways Labor Union 4,000 Indian Navy Dock Yards Armari Godi Kamgar Union 2,000 Seamen Bombay Seamen's Union 4,000 Oil industry Petroleum Workers' Union 3, 500 Air India Air India Employee's Union 500: Ordnance Depots na 400 Bombay Gas Co, na. 900 na not available SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 216] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -ljl- In the textile industry the following plants are affected: Jain Manufacturing Company Mill Number 1 Digvijay Mills Bombay Dyeing (Textile Mills) Elphinstone Mills India United Mill Number 1 New China Mills Western India Finlay Mills Madhusudan Mills Shriniwas Mills Gold Mohur New City of Bombay Tata Mills In addition, the Commnists have considerable (approximately 70 percent) influence among the workers of the following enterprises: Crompton Parkinson (Works) Ltd. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company Britannia Biscuit Company Acme Manufacturing Company Mukund Iron and Steel Company Tata Oil Mills Lever Brothers Ltd, Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company (Dalda) Glaxo Laboratories Mazagaon Docks Ltd, Metal Box Company of India Automobile Products of India VI, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The All India Youth Federation is a Commnist~controlled organiza- ‘tion affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Its numerical strength and its strength relative to that of other youth organizations are unknown, but all youth organizations in India are known to be weak, The Federation's leadership is mediocre, ‘The organization has as its objective the establishment of a united front with other youth groups, Its capabilities are probably very moderate, The All India Students Federation (AISF) is Commnist—controlled and is affiliated with the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, Its membership probably does not exceed a few hundred and its leadership is ineffective, The AISF convention in June 1951 stated that the organization's first aim was the unity of the SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 217] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -12student movement, which was to be achieved not by an insistance on the acceptance of a particular philosophy or ideology but only by promoting the day-to-day interests of the students. The Mahila Atma Raksha Samita (MARS) is a Commmist-controlled women's organization, Its membership probably does not exceed 200 and the organization is relatively unimportant as compared with the All India Women's Conference, a non-party but predominantly Congress organization, The leadership of MARS is inferior to that of the All India Women's Conference, A member of MARS attended the November 1949 meeting of the Women's International Democratic Federation, but it is not known whether MARS is an affiliate. The All India Progressive Writers Association (AIPWA) is a Communist~controlled professional organization, The size of its member~- ship is unknow, but there are provincial branches in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Bombay and local ones in Bhopal, Hyderabad City, Bangalore, and Gauhati, Although weaker than similar non-Communist groups, the AIPWA is nonetheless very active and some of its members have substantial literary reputations. Its main objective is to contribute to the overall Communist propaganda effort. The membership of the Commnist~controlled Indian People's Theater Association (IPTA) is unknow but there are branches throughout India, In comparison with other similar groups it ranks fairly high and the quality of its leadership is good, It contributes to the Commnist propaganda effort through such media as plays and dances, Its capabilities are fairly good,. The All India Friends of the Soviet Union (AIFSU) has branches in Bombay, Calcutta, Lashkai, Jamshedpur, Muzaffarpur, Madanpalie, Nellore, Ahmedabad, and Wardha, Its numerical strength is unknown, AIFSU's primary function is to conduct propaganda through cultural _ exchanges, | The Indo-China Friendship Association has branches in Calcutta, | Bombay, Patiala, Dehra Dun, and probably elsewhere, No information is | available on the number of members or the quality of its leadership, Like AIFSU, it is primarily concerned with cultural exchange as a | propaganda weapon. The All India Peace Council (AIPC) has over a score of provincial and sub-provincial branches, Its main centers are in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The AIPC is associated with the World Peace Congress and sends delegates to major Commnist~sponsored international "peace" meetings, Its primary purpose is to serve as a vehicle for Communist SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 218] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] There are no known Communist front organizations based on racial, religious, or nationality distinctions, although the Communist Party directs special appeals to the minority commmities, The Chinese consulate has made strenuous efforts to organize and control the roughly 10,000 Chinese — about half of India's Chinese population -- resident in Calcutta, At present the commnity is split with the Communists controlling perhaps 30 percent of it.. There is also fragmentary information which indicates that efforts have been made by agencies of the Czechoslovak Government to win over the tiny Czech communities centered in Batanagar in West Bengal, In addition to the above organizations, which represent the most important groups created or captured by the Commmist Party, there are a number of others of lesser importance controlled by or infiltrated by Communists, Information concerning these is almost entirely absent. A list of some of these organizations is presented below: Playback Singers Association Indie Cultural League Kerala Tyojalali Seva Sangh Vichar Vikas Mandal Tyagaraj Gyan Sabha ( Teachers' Association The Progressive Group Kerala Kala Mandalam City (Bombay) Yuvak Mandal C. Ward City (Bombay) Vidyarthi Mandal Deddhar School of Music People's Academy The Madanpura Youth Trichi Scheduled Cast Federation Trichi Press Worker's Association Scientific Workers Association Progathisil Yuvak Sangh Vile Parle Youth League Progathi Mahila Sangh Lawyers! Association The organizations appearing in the above list are almost all. located in Bombay city, Comparable Commnist~infiltrated or -controlled organizations can probably be found in all the major cities and large towns in India, The listed organizations represent fronts in which the Communists are active, such as youth, labor, women's, students', untouchables', professional, and cultural groups, The Commnists are also active in sports associations and in refugee organizations, SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 219] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION There is evidence of Commnist infiltration into the Indian’ _ Institute of Science and the Association of Scientific Workers of India. It is probable that other non-Commnist organizations of this nature have also been infiltrated, VII, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT As far as is known, there are no Communist Party members in the executive policy-making bodies of the central government or, with the possible exception of the State of Kashmir, of the states of the Indian Union, The Congress Party controls the national government and all; state governments except in the state of Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) where a United Front of right-wing parties controls the government, This United Front has recently made an opportunistic deal with the three Commmist members of the state's legislative assembly but this does not give the Commnist Farty much influence in the state government, There have been conflicting reports of Communists or fellowtravelers in the Kashmir government but the extent of Commnist influence is unknown, A few high officials of the Indian Government, such as V.K. Krishna Menon and K,M, Panikkar have approximated certain parts of the Comminist line in their utterances but the amount of influence they exert within the government is uncertain, The number of Commmists or sympathizers in the armed services is unknown but believed to be small, as strenuous efforts have been made to uncover and dismiss them, Reports indicate that Commmists are attempting to infiltrate the police forces, In general, there has been only limited success, although in West Bengal, Travancore-Cochin, and Madras infiltration has been more extensive than elsewhere, In early January 1953, there was a fairly serious revolt by the civil police in Madras which the military helped to put down, It was reported. that the Communists controlled the executive or negotiating body of the Madras constabulary association. There is no evidence of Commnist influence at the top levels of the Indian police, India's Atomic Energy program is very small and is limited to mineral surveys and research, It is not known whether Commnists have any influence within the three man Atomic Energy Commission which directs the program, There may be some Communist influence among other research scientists, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 220] === eee, ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 . SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION f -15- VIIIe COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION It i8 evident that the extent of Communist influence in publicopinion-forming circles is considerable, although an es8timate in numbers cannot be given. This is particularly the case in entertainment media. A number of films produced in India in recent years may contain Communist propaganda. Films imported into India from the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary represent a very small percentage of total film imports, but they add to the Communist propaganda effort; non-commercial showings of imported Communist films are said to be extensive. The consensus among the motion picture industry and the movie-going public is, however, that Soviet films are boring and valueless as entertainment. The Communists appear to have made a con6iderable study of the forms of communication and entertainment in rural India, and some of the more important folk forms have been adapted by them for use in dissemination of propaganda. Dances, plays, and dance-dramas are also used by the Communists for propaganda purposes in the urban areas. The Indian Communists encourage the composition of propaganda Songs by staging competitions. -: Communist propaganda from time to time finds its way into the non-Communist press. There is some Communist infiltration of the reportorial staff of certain papers. The vernacular langauge press uses ( Soviet news agency handouts rather frequently, largely because limited financial resources make them appreciative of any kind of matter which is already translated for them and which can be passed on to their printers with a minimum of editorial work. A number of non-Communist a. newSpapers which have large circulations relative to other Indian oe newspapers and which use TASS material (including reprints from the Soviet press) are listed below; | Name Place of Publication Language Circulation ee eer va ounaeton National Herald Lucknow English 40,000 Indian News Chronicle Delhi English 15,000 Nation Calcutta _ English 10,000 Sansar Benares Hindu 15,000 Pratap New Delhi Urdu 25,000 Tej Delhi Urdu 20,000 Milap New Delhi Urdu 20,000 Vir Bharat Delhi urdu 12,500 No information is readily available on the presence of party members or sympathizers in All-India Radio. Radio Moscow and Radio Tashkent make daily transmissions to listeners in Southeast Asia and English-language programs emanating from Radio Peiping can be heard in India. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 221] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Communist influence in Indian educational institutions is Significant. A considerable number of professors and instructors have been and are associated with Communist front organizations and Communists have infiltrated both the leadership and general membership of student federations. The number of people subject to Communist influences through these non-Communist channels is unknown. IX- COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES There is some Communist influence, not believed to be extensive as yet, in the Akali Dal, a Sikh communal party. The size of the Dal's membership is not known but in the 1951-52 elections it received slightly over 1,000,000 votes. Several small leftist parties which are fairly strongly influenced by the Communist Party are listed below: United Socialist Organization Socialist Republican Party of India All-India Forward Bloc (Marxist) Revolutionary Socialist party of India Socialist Unity Center Revolutionary Communist Party of India (Das Gupta Group) Bolshevik Party of India Indian National Army Peasants' and Workers’ party The Dravidian Federation All but the last two of these have their principal strength in Bengal. The Peasants' and Workers! party has most of its following in Bombay and Hyderabad and the Dravidian Federation is primarily a Madras party. X- COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A list of Indian Communist newSpapers and periodicals is given below. It i8 probably not exhaustive. Frequency of Place of Name publication a Publisher irculation Communist monthly Bombay M.Be Rao na Crossroads weekly Madras G. Alavandar, 25,000 Janasakthi Printing Press SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 222] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of Place of Name publication publication Publisher Circulation Desabhimani daily Calicut na na Jai Gujarat weekly Ahmedabad na na Janashakti do patna na na [Unreadable] Strength) Janashakti do Quilon A.V. Vasavan na Janashakti daily Madras (isin 5,000 Janashakti weekly do na 1,000 Janayugam monthly do na na [Unreadable] Age) Janjug weekly na na na (People's ( Age) Janvadi monthly Bombay VeM. Kaul na (Voice of _. the People) © Jugantar na na na na (New Age) Kamalan weekly Ernekulam na na (‘Travancore- Cochin) Lokyug do na na na (People's Age) Mashal daily Calcutta na na Nai Zindagi na Bombay United Fine Arts na (New Life) Lithographies SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 223] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of Place of Name publication publication Publisher Circulation Nevalokan daily na na 12,500 Navayugam weekly Trichur n an 5,000 New Age. Naya Daur (New Age) do Hyderabad na na Naya Dabera do Hyderabad Lakshman Shastri na (New Dawn) Naya Zamana do Lucknow na 1,500 (New Age) Pra jashakti bi-weekly Vijayawada na 20,000 eople (Beoplets Swadhinata na Calcutta na na Soviet Land monthly New Delhi TASS representative na na z= not available Indian communist-front organization organs are listed below. The list i8 probably. not complete. Name Abhidaya Indo-Soviet gournal Naya Adab Naya Sahitya Parichaya (Indicator) Frequency of Place of publication publication monthly Vi jayavada do Bombay do do do Allahabad do Calcutta SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Publisher Progressive Writers Association All-India Friends of the Soviet Union Progressive Writers Association All-India Progressive Writers' Association Progressive Writers Association, Bengal === [PDF page 224] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of Place of Name publication Publication Publisher Student bi-weekly Bombay All-India Federation; of Students Trade Union monthly do All-India Trade Record Union Congress Unity do Calcutta Indian Peoples Theatre Association The following is a list of pro-Communist, disguised publications: Frequency of Place of Name publication publication Publisher Circulation i na Kanpur na na Pioneer) a 77 Agramani weekly Calcutta na na ( Aton do Bombay Blitz Publica- 25,000 tions, Ltd. Blitz do do do 45,000 a Chaya Patha do na na na China Review daily Calcutta na na Dainadin na Bengal State na na Etathupaksham daily Ernakulam na na Hans (Swan) monthly Allahabad na na Ilm-o-danish do Bombay na na (Knowledge ) Indian Struggle na na na na India Today monthly Allahabad O.P. Sangal na Janata (People) bi-weekly Bezwada, Kavitilaka Press na Madras State SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION : -RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 225] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Frequency of Name publication Janavani weekly Janvadi monthly (Voice of the People) Kerala Bhoomi weekly (kerala Land) Manjil na Mannuni monthly ~ (vanguard) Marxist weekly Matamat do Nai Chetna na Nav _Yug na Naya Duar weekly. Naya Zamana - do (New Age) Oolaga Anasiyal (World Politics) do Pravaham (The Current) monthly Preetlari na “3 bee) Place of publication Madras Bombay Calcutta Madras Trichur Calcutta Bombay New Delhi Lucknow Madras Its New Delhi Circulation | Publisher na +5500 People's Book na House ~ Vallathol na Printing and ~ Publishing House na na Senguntha na Mitha Press ~~ Marxist Publishing House n a na na na aa nea na na aa aa na S.R- Sundara 15,000 Rajan Vijaya Printing na and Publishing ~ House na na na na SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 226] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION f -21- Frequency of Place of Name publication publication Publisher Circulation Sada Jug na Calcutta na na (Our Age) Sapthik Adhikar weekly Lucknow Lakshmi Das na Public Opinion do na Sanj Vartaman na —~ press Satya jug daily na na na Age of Truth) The Behar n a Patan na na Herald Viddi velli monthly Madras Vv. Vijaya 2,000 (Morning Star) Baskaran Visal Andhra do Madras na na ( Andhra) nas not available A oonsiderable volume of Communist non-periodical literature is published in India, including books, leaflets, and pamphlets. These publications include works written in India as well as translations and reprints of material written abroad. Translations are made into all of the important literary languages Of India. The following is a list of Commnist~controlled publishing houses; Name Location Peoples Publishing House, Ltd. Bombay (main office; branches in 6 other cities) New Age Printing Press Bombay Soviet Writer Publishing House na Marxist Publishing House na SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 227] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 22- No information regarding the quality of their equipment i8 available. - The following Communist publications are imported from the countries indicated; USSR. CZECHOSLOVAKIA Soviet Literature World Student News (organ of Sovi the International Union of oviet Woman Students) Soviet Union Czechoslovak Life New Times CHINA News China Pictorial RUMANIA - People's China For a Lasting Peace, For China Monthly Review a@ people's Democracy (organ of the Cominform) Chinese Medical Journal HUNGARY Chinese Literature World Youth (organ of | China Reconstructs the World Federation of Democratic Youth) FRANCE UNITED KINGDOM World Trade Union Movement (organ of the World Federation Labour Monthly of Trade Unions) In addition to the periodicals listed, a considerable quantity of books and pamphlets are imported into India from the USSR and Communist China. Some titles are; Advancing to Communism, Two Collective Farns, Public Education in the USSR, Mother and Child Care in the USSR, The Truth About American Truth About American Diplomats, Conspiracy A Against peace, The Chinese People's Liberation Army, People's Liberation Army, China Fights for peace, and China's youth March Forward. TASS news agency publishes a bulletin entitled News and Views from the Soviet Union and a periodical entitled Soviet Land, in English, Hindi, Bengali, and Telegu. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 228] === —_————eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee a Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION No broadcasting stations are controlled by Communists. The extent of Communist penetration into the government-controlled broadcasting service i8 unknown but probably slight. The following programs are received from stations in the USSR: Radio Moscow Radio Tashkent GMT 1400-1445 - English GMT 1500-1530 - English 1445-1500 - Hindustani 1600-1615 - Bengali 1500-1530 - Bengali 1615-1630.- English Although Radio Peiping has no Special service directed to India, its Signal is audible in India beginning at 0900 GMT, 1330 GMT, and 2200 GMT. TheSe programs are in English. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 229] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 SHORET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION. Al. FINANCIAL CONDITION Party membership fees are fixed by the Central Committee and are paid monthly, or, in the case of peasants, less frequently; no information is available on the size of the fees. Income from them goes to the district committee. The district, provincial, and central committees are also empowered to fix and collect levies on the income of party members, Individuals occasicnally donate sums of money to the party. The publication, distribution, and sale of party pamphlets, leaflets, and books, mainly by the Peoples' Publishing House, Ltd. of Bombay, is an economic enterprise of the central orgenization of the Communist Party. The sale of publications from abroad is also a source of party income. The maintenance of a party press is believed to be a considerable drain on the party's finances. It has been reliably reported that the World Federation of Trade Unions sent about $2,800 to the Secretary-General of the Communist-front All-India Trade Union Congress in 1951. It is not unlikely that grants from parties in other countries as well as from internstional front organizations augment the Indian party's income. There have been occasional reports thet Soviet and satellite governments are directly subsidizing the Indian Communist movement but there is no conclusive evidence to this effect. There have been reports recently that the Chinese Embassy in India has extended financial aid to local Indo-China Friendship Associations. No information regarding revenue received from par ty~controlled labor unions or front organizations is available, but receipts from such sources are probably smell if not non-existent. No estimate of the party's total assets is possible. It is believed that the disruption of the party organization as a result of government repression and the inner-party factionalism which arose in early 1948 cut the perty off from financial resources which it had previously commanded. The central organization was apparently having a difficult time meeting expenses during the first half of 1951 and by the middle of the year it had hardly a month's reserve of funds. This same situation seems to have obtained in all the provincial and district organizations. In mid-1951 the expenses of the central organizetion amounted to about $1,400 a month; this was increased to about $2,000 monthly by the additional work of organizing a campaign in connection with the general elections, reviving and intensifying the work of all front organizations, and preparing for the holding of an All-India Party Congress. The provincial and district committees also participated in this additional work and their limited finances also were heavily strained. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 230] === ence aaa caaaaaaaaaaaeaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaasaaaaaaaaaaaaaaascaaaaaasaaa—asatail Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATICN [Unreadable] It is believed that a significant percentage of the income of the Indien Communist Party goes for the maintenance of party organs, very few of which are self-supporting. For example, one Communist periodical which began publication in May 1951 reportedly had incurred an indebtedness of approximately $2,400 by October of that year. From time to time Communist publications such as. Crossroads, Swadhinata, and the Indo-Soviet Journal have had to make special appeals to their readers and to the general public for contributions to help the publications meet their obligations, XII. SOVIST-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi has the following staff: Ambassador Secretary --~ Counselor Commercial Counselor 3 First Secretaries Commercial Attache 4 Second Secretaries 3 TASS representatives 2 Atteches Pravda representative Third Secretary Film distributor At least 7 clerical employees The TASS News Agency's main office is located at Travancore ( House, Curzon Road, New Delhi. It also has a branch in Calcutta. More than 100 Indian nationals are employed by TASS, the Soviet Trade Agency's main office is located at 4 Camac Street, Calcutta. The Czech Embassy in New Delhi is staffed by a Charge d'Affaires, a Second Secretery, two Third Secretaries, and a Commercial Attache. No information on the clerical staff is available. There is a Czech Consulate in Bombay, but no information is available on its staff. The Czech Trade Commission in Bombay is headed by a Trade Commissioner. No data are available on the staff. The Hungarian Legation is staffed by a Charge d' Affaires, a Commerical Counselor, and two Attaches. No information on the clerical staff is available, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 231] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The Chinese Embassy at New Delhi has the following personnel: Ambassador First Secretary 2 Counselors 2 Second Secretaries Counselor for Consular Affairs 2 Third Secretaries Counselor for Commercial Affairs Attache Military Attache 2 Assistant Military Attaches No information is available regarding the clerical staff. The Chinese Consulete General in Calcutta is headed by a Consul General assisted by two Consuls and a Vice Consul. No information is available regarding the clerical staff. A Czechoslovak Oultural Festival which was held in Calcutta from Februsry 23 to March 2, 1951, showed puppet films in English and a full-length Czechoslovak feature film in English, Lost Frontiers; a lecture on planned economy in Czechoslovakia was also given. Czech and Russian pamphlets, books, and magazines in both Bengali and English were displayed on the sidewalk for public perusal and purchase. The University Institute Hall, where the festival was held, contained an exhibition of photographs of Czech industry, peasant life, and architecture. Samples of Czech textile work were draped about various stands. An estimated 15,000 people attended the exhibition. The Chinese Consulate at Calcutta held an exhibition of photographs of alleged atrocities by American troops and of life in Communist China. This exhibit drew large crowds. The Soviet Embassy sponsors film shows and exhibits and gives entertainments; its officials participate in front organization activities. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No international Communist organizations maintain offices in India. The only meeting of a Communist international organization held in India in recent years was the Southeast Asian Youth Conference, held in Calcutta in February 1948; it was sponsored jointly by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). The IUS executive committee is scheduled to meet in India in January 1953. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 232] === __eeS ee SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Indian Communists have attended the following meetings of international organizations held abroad: Meeting Third World Festival of Youth and Students (cosponsored by WFDY and Ius WFDY Council Meeting (7th Annual) WFDY Executive Comrittee Meeting, 1952 WFDY Executive Committee Meeting, 1951 IUS Council Meeting (Sth Annual) IUS Council Meeting (6th Annual) 1US Executive Committee Meeting, 1952 IUS Executive Committee Meeting, 1951 IUS Executive Committee Meeting, 1950-51 World Federation of Trade Unions(WFTU) International Conference (Textile and Clothing Workers! Trade Department ) WFIU Administrative Committee Meeting (Land and Air Transport Workers' Trade Department) SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION Date and Place _ August 5-19, 19561 (East Berlin) August 23-28,1951 (East Berlin) January 20-24, 1952 (Copenhagan May 24-27, 1951 (Budapest) August 31-September 7, 1951 (Warsaw September 6-10, 1952 (Bucharest) March 14-18, 1952 (Budapest) April 24-28, 1951 (Peiping) January 13-18, 1951 (East Berlin) October 1-4, 1952 (Berlin) July 16-19, 1951 (Vienna) Number of Indian Representativ 14 known 1 known 1 known 1 known 1 known A few Indians attended 1 known Undetermined number 1 known 6, reportedly 1 known === [PDF page 233] === eee eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Meeting Date and Place Number of Indian Representatives UAV ES Women's International Februery 1-6, 1951 Democratic Federation(WIDF(East Berlin) Council Meeting WIDF dxecutive Committee Meeting lst International Conference in Defense of Children (sponsored by WIDF) WIDF Executive Committee Meeting World Peace Council Plenary Session World Peace Council (Executive Meeting) World Peace Council Plenary Session Moscow Economic Conference: World Peace Council Plenary Session Asian-Pacific Peace Conference World Congress of Peoples for Peace June 20-24, 1951 (Sofia) April 12-16, 1952 (Vienna) July 18-22, 1952 (Bucharest) February 21-26, 1951 (East Berlin) May 5-7, 1951 (Copenhagen) November 1-7, 1951 (Vienna) April 3-12, 1952 (Moscow) July 1-6, 1952 (East Berlin) October 2-12, 1952 (Peiping). December 12-20, 1952 (Vienna) 2 known 1 known 19 known 1 known 2, reportedly 1 known 8 known 28 known 2 known 52, reportedly 50, reportedly XIV, COMMUNIS? COMMUNICATION NETWORK ee ALL ON NETWORK The Indian Communist Party is believed to have an extensive courier system within the country, but little reliable information It has been reported that the TASS employees regarding it is available, sometimes serve as couriers, and that motion used to convey party messages. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION picture film shipments are === [PDF page 234] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Charges that the party operates an extensive wireless system throughout India were made in June 1952 in the Indian Parliament. Confirmatory evidence of the truth of these charges is lacking, however. The closest foreign tie of the Indian Communist Party is believed to be with the Commnist Party of Great Britain, The Indian party for many years has maintained correspondence with the British party and in particular with R. Palme Dutt. The Communist Party of India follows ps best it can the general policy laid down by the Cominform. It has been definitoly established that the Indian Communist Party directs the activities of the Communist Party of Pakistan in East Pakistan, and there is ample evidence that the Indian party and the Communist Party of Nepal maintain close liaison, In addition, there have been a number of reports of contacts between Indian and Chinese Communists, It has also been well established that the Indian Commnists are in contact with the Communist Party of Burma, There is strong evidence that on two occasions criticisms and guidance from the Communist Party of Great Britain have exerted a dominant influence on the policies of the Indian Communist Party. In 1942, the Indian party was tardily brought to adopt the new line regarding World War II as the result of strong pressure from the British Communist Party. The Indian Party had continued to condemn the war long after world Commnism had dubbed it a "people's war." Intervention from the British Communists appears again to have been a decisive factor in the Indian Communists' shift to a united front policy in 1951, which is probably attributable to a letter received by the Indians from R,. Palme Dutt in the fall of the preceding year. Numerous active Communists from abroad have visited India in recent years. Among these are: Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet, in October 1950; D.N. Pritt, a British lawyer, in the autumn of 1950; Mrs. Jessie Street, in July 1950; Malcolm Nixon, the Secretary of the WFDY, in May 1952; and M. Joliot-Curie. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 235] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.12 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 236] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS | Page Foreword 2c « eee cvceevev eevee eee ee ee ee ee oe ti OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES ¢ e « L Ie Objectives «eee cece eevee eere seo eevesre 1 II. Tactics sce cecccscccccecccvecee 2 III. Capabilities. 2. ee eeeesecrceereereeeee 6 ASSETS 2 e eee eeve vee 8 Ie numerical Strength see ee ceeceeeceeees 8 IIe Electoral Strength es.eccececv esr secceves 8 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 9 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism eee eeeeeee 10 [Unreadable] VIo Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations eoeceevevevee ee eo @ 12 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government « « « «eeee 17 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ¢« « « 18 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties e.«eceecevrereeveevevneeve ee 6 @ 18 Xe Communist Propaganda Media « ee ee ee ee eee ee 18 XI. Financial Condition « e«eeeceeeseseveee 19 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets.s.eeecececceee 19 XIII. Communist International Organizations « e « ee«eee 20 XIV. Communist Communication Network ee «©e«eeeeeee 20 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 237] === NN eee eee eee eae Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries ‘of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out;.and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, ( providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 238] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN IRAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I, OBJECTIVES The major Commmist objective in Iran appears to be to get control of the Iranian Government by constitutional means, Commmism is represented organizationally in Iran by the Tudeh (Masses) Party, which emerged into public life in 1943 as a coalition of Iranian Liberals and Commmists. The Tudeh Party was declared illegal in February 1949 but has been maine tained since then clandestinely and has operated overtly through a variety of front organizations, of which the "Peace Partisans" and "The Society to Combat Imperialism" are the most prominent,; In moving toward its primary objective of getting control of the government through constitutional means, the Tudeh Party appears to have the following concurrent high priority intermediate goals: (1) legalization of the Tudeh Party; (2) replacement of Mosadeq as Prime Minister; (3) control of the key Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice; (4) control of the Mjlis (lower house of Parliament), if necessary by a coalition group; (5) neutralization or elimination of the Shah; (6) neutralization or elimination of the traditional governing groups; (7) transfer of the management of factories and services to union organizations; (8) confiscation of large landholdings for distribution ( to peasants, thereby neutralizing or eliminating large landlords; (9) neutralization or conversion of intellectuals; (10) elimination of all Western political influence; especially that of the US; (11) neutralization of UN influence; and (12) establishment of closer cooperation, especially in the economic field, with the Soviet Union. These objectives are set primarily to increase the capability of the Tudeh Party to exercise political power both through the ballot and the mechanisms of mass demonstrations, riots, and intimidation, employed to undermine public confidence in the authorities, Although the elimination of all Western, especially US influence, in Iran would fulfill a Soviet foreign policy requirement, the alleged threat to Iran arising from that source provides the Tudeh Party currently with one of its most valuable tools in seeking non-Commmnist cooperation. The current top priority short-term Tudeh goal appears to be to utilize its Commnist-educated, disciplined, devoted, and effective organization to expand its influence in non-Commmist circles, The degree of concentration on other objectives is opportunistic. For instance, the government's decree increasing the peasants’ share of agricultural production was utilized by the Tudeh Party to arouse support for its goal of confiscation of large landholdings; similarly, the ineptitude and ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Labor in protecting workers has been repeatedly used by the Tudeh Party to destroy non-Tudeh ( SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 239] === ee Eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -2unions and strengthen its own. Tudeh leadership has shown great flexibility and alertness in exploiting opportunities for advancing its objectives as they arise. There are no significant incompatabilities among these short-term Communist objectives, which are designed to destroy the capacity of the present governing groups to prevent ultimate Communist control of the entire bureaucracy and the army. Incompatabilities are likely to become apparent only after these short-term objectives have been achieved and the ultimate Tudeh objectives are exposed: (1) the complete Sovietization of Iran, including (a) neutralization of the middle class, (b) establishment of 2 single political -party, (c) imposition of police rule, and (d) replacement of the current curriculum in schools, colleges, etc., by the curriculum used in the USSR; and (2) transformation of Iran into a Soviet Satellite State., If the Tudeh believes it can muster an overwhelming prepon— derance of force, it might rapidly shift its strategy of achieving control through constitutional means to achieving it through a coup d'etat. Failure of such an attempt would result in the destruction of the organization and the indefinite postponement of success by legal means. We have no evidence to indicate that this shift in tactics is likely in the immediate future, although serious dise affection in the armed forces or simultaneous tribal and urban disturbances throughout the country could present an opportunity. The obstacles to movement which winter snows and spring floods present in the mountainous tribal areas make disturbances there unlikely in) any case before May. TI, TACTICS The underlying strategic policy of the Tudeh Party is threefold: (1) it is designed to build up a direct following among all social groups; (2) it attempts to enter working arrangements with or gain covert control of non-Communist political groups; and (3) it attempts to weaken by subversion and intimidation non-Communist political and social groups. Since the Tudeh Party is illegal, its efforts to build up a hard-core following are largely covert, although its activities through front organizations and its newspapers sre, in effect, overt. The Tudeh Party carries on its propaganda wherever there is an opportunity and in the manner best suited to the receptive capacity of the target. Emphasis is placed upon factors and grievances which affect the immediate personal lives of the particular audience and therefore varies in accordance with their background, prejudices, and aspirations. SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 240] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The bulk of the membership appears to be in urban centers, where the industrial and educational life of the country and governmental machinery are concentrated and where ease of comnunication and association facilitate organization. The Tudeh Party is apparently also attempting through sports clubs to establish a body of young men highly trained in the technique of street fighting to supplement the unorganized bands of thugs who have participated prominently in past Tudeh demonstrations. There is no evidence that an effective para-military organization as yet exists. Given the economic and social conditions in Iran since 195, it is probable that the Tudeh Party would have made more progress in the postwar period if non-Communist National Front groups had not emerged with objectives which in many respects duplicated those of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh propaganda promises a higher standard of living for 90 percent of the Iranian population, "social justice, " "national independence," and cultural autonomy. All of these objectives have very broad popular appeal in Iren. Furthermore, the experiences of Iranian students abroad, as well as both Western and Soviet propaganda during and since World War IT, encouraged Iranians, especially in urban centers, to expect and demand improvements in their economic and social conditions, but did not make clear alter- (| native methods for achieving these. Primarily through its newspapers and pamphlets and through discussion at cell meetings, the Tudeh Party, aided by radio propaganda from the USSR, has kept up a continuous barrage of criticism designed to destroy public confidence in the ability and good intentions of the governing groups in Tran. The members of the party are engaged actively in collecting damaging information. ~ There is a sufficient basis of truth in the Tudeh accusations of official — injustice, disloyalty, and incompetence to provide confidence among hearers in the exaggerations and untruths disseminated. Furthermore, by claiming credit for improvements in the working conditions of various groups of laborers, and by providing financial aid for Tudeh demonstrators injured or under arrest, the party has established sufficiently convincing evidence of its claims that it constitutes the only effective defense against "exploitation." In a country where official promises have remained traditionally unfulfilled, these small positive Tudeh actions have been effective, especially in urben areas. Tudeh activity in Iran has been greatly aided since March 1951 by the controversy over oil nationalization, which led to a concentretion of resentment against the UK. Under the guise of patriotic support for the national struggle. to free Iran from alleged British _ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 241] === ——EEeeeeee eee eGS<co5<u5uz EE eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -hcontrol, the Tudeh has been able to gain experience in the use of mass demonstration and has provided some of its members with practical experience in street fighting and the use of slogans. The party has also been aided by the activities of ultra-conservative Moslem leaders, such as the Majlis President, Mullah Kashani, whose agitation for the return to Islamic principles arouses misgivings in the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minority groups. Furthermore, sections of these minority groups were among the most active collaborators with Soviet officials during the Allied occupation of Iran. Their inability to emigrate and their fear of Soviet persecution in the event of another Soviet invasion of Iran encourage especially the younger people among them to join in Tudeh activities in the hope of ultimate personal gain or safety. The Tudeh Party has also been aided by the revolutionary policies and propaganda of the National Front group which, though less extreme, has seriously weakened the power of the traditional governing groups in Iran. Conditions governing foreign trade have also aided the Tudeh Party. The limited and costly transportation system in Iran makes exporters in the northern regions particularly vulnerable to attractive commercial offers from the Soviet Union. The proximity of those areas to the USSR and the fear of another Soviet invasion also incline merchants in the north to cooperate with the Soviet Trade Delegation and, indirectly, the Tudeh Party. The major propaganda line which the Tudeh Party employs to build up local support is that the present governing groups are unwilling and unable to establish and carry out policies which will improve the lot of the Iranian masses. It therefore argues that only through the united action of the people under the guidance of the party can a program of reform be executed which will provide the people with necessities and assure them social justice, health, education, and:‘opportunity for self-advancement. In moving toward its major current objective of replacing the government, the party utilizes its front organizations, such as the Peace Partisans, to discredit the West, especially the US, in the hope of forcing the government to weaken its position by rejecting aid from the US. It uses its trade unions to discredit the Ministry of Labor and to frustrate by strikes and repeated complaints official attempts to maintain some degree of stability in industrial enterprises. In the same way, the great variety of front organizations which relate to practically every phase of activity in Iran are used to hamper whatever steps the government may take toward orderly reform and to spread and increase popular distrust and dissatisfaction with officials and government organizations. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 242] === EE ERE Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION New members of the Tudeh Party are recruited by personal solicitation of old members after a thorough period of investigation. The new recruit's interest is usually based upon some personal grievance which Tudeh promises to remove. The recruit's active interest is maintained by a sense of purpose, of comradeship, of membership in a secret, exclusive organization, and of conviction that in the end he will be on top and his enemies destroyed. We have littled detailed information about the financing of the partys beyond the fact that members pay dues, that some profits are de- ‘rived from the sale of newspapers and publications, and that some is derived from Communists abroad and indirectly from foreign commercial transactions. Before the Tudeh Party was declared illegal, the composition of its directing committee was well known. It was composed of Iranians with various degrees of Soviet training. They are now dispersed, some in Europe, some: in the USSR, but is. is probable that some are in hiding in Iran and that they continue to direct policies there. The extent of direction from Soviet or satellite sources is not knowm, but it is probably significant. Control or influence in non-Commnist organizations (excluding fronts) is achieved by infiltration or bribery. The characteristic Iranian emphasis on individualism promotes disunity in organizations and so facilitates the acquisition of key posts by any determined minority acting as a unit. As a matter of policy, the Tudeh Party appears to prefer that the most prominent posts be filled by non-Communists, so long as the voting power and ideological direction remain in Tudeh hands. ; The Tudeh Party has been greatly handicapped in its efforts to obtain control by constitutional means by the fact that it is illegal and that the elections have never been free. It therefore resorted in the 1952 elections to the following devices: (1) supporting candidates proposed by front organizations; (2) bribing or making deals with candidates supported by either Mosadeq or Kashani. Support for front candidates was not only urged by Tudeh newspapers, but was promoted by instructions delivered in Tudeh cell meetings. In order to obtain Majlis representation, the Tudeh is now expressing its willingness to join with any political group. So far, however, the disadvantages to non-Communists of. such association appear to have prevented the success of this tactic. It is possible, should the National Front group leaders come into conflict over, say, the succession to Mosadeq, that some leader might accept the collaboration of the Tudeh Party. But at the present time the prospects are that any resort to such collaboration would unite the remaining non- Communist opposition and assure them the victory. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 243] === a a a a Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION III. CAPABILITIES In the absence of mich more serious disaffection in the amy, Simultaneous uprisings by various elements throughout the country, or some unexpected Soviet action, it is not believed that the Tudeh Party has the ability to get control of the Iranian Government by force. The ability of the Tudeh Party to achieve its major current objective of gaining control through legal methods will be in inverse proportion to the effectiveness of the present government in relieving traditional economic and social pressures on the bulk of the popula= tion and meeting the aspirations of the younger educated groups who provide an important element of National Front support. Tudeh leaders at present probably feel that they have no alternative than to bide their time while consolidating their strength, knowing that ‘any non-Communist government will be forced by continued financial and political difficulties to adopt strong regulatory measures which will increase strife between the "haves" and the ‘have nots." If the National Front government is unable to meet the mounting pressures, _it is probable that Tudeh will receive added strength and will obtain effective representation in the Majlis through elections and pressure on deputies. The ability of the Tudeh Party to exploit opportunities favorable to its current goal of gaining control of the Iranian Government stems primarily from four factors: (1) it is the only united and disciplined political party; (2) it has developed the techniques of the controlled use of mass demonstrations, strikes, riots, and intimidation for political purposes; (3) its policy of opposition to or evasion of established authority strikes a sympathetic chord with most Iranians who are acquainted from personal experience with social, political, and economic injustices; and (hk) the centralization in Tehran of control over governmental machinery provides Tudeh with a compact, crucial target. Because of these factors the Tudeh Party is likely to increase in power, unless it represents a clear political threat to a non-Communist government which would then try to destroy it. At the present time, the existence of an active Tudeh Party is politically advantageous to Mosadeq in conducting both his internal and foreign policies. Under those circumstances, it is probable that the Tudeh Party will be permitted to continue to operate through front organizations. It will attempt to further Soviet policy by discrediting and, if possible, forcing the rejection of US aid to Iran. The party may be expected to pursue its effortsto hamper the government's attempts at reform by complaining that actions taken are too slow or too limited and by publicizing instances of dishonesty or incompetence. It will also persist in using Tudeh unions to disrupt industrial and trans~- portation operations, . SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 244] === eee Eee re a ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] The disunity of the non-Communist forces in Iran and their ‘internal jealousies and conflicts will facilitate the expansion of Tudeh power and influence, despite the relatively small membership in the Tudeh Party. However, with patience and persistence, a non- Communist government can, with outside assistance, gradually improve the conditions which now provide the Tudeh Party with its major sources of support. Barring some unexpected development such as a political disintegration of the National Front, a serious crop failure, an unfavorable export market, or an abrupt change in Soviet tactics, the probability is that Tudeh strength in Iran will not increase proportionately more than non-Communist strength through 1953. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 245] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN IRAN: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The current estimate of card-carrying members of the Communist Tudeh Party in Iran is from 20,000 to 35,000, with an estimated hardcore of 1,000. The membership may be roughly estimated at 8,000 in Tehran, 5,000 in the Azerbaijan area, 4,000 in the Caspian region, 1,000 in Isfahan, and 3,000 in the Abadan area. The hard-core membership derives principally from industrial and transport workers, students, teachers, professional men, and government employees. Members of organizations controlled by the Communists may be estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000; those in non-—Communist organizations which have been infiltrated by the Tudeh Party, 160,000; and the total controlled or strongly influenced by the Tudeh Party at from 170,000 to a maximum of 400,000, or from 1 to 2.3 percent of the estimated population. The party's members and followers may be estimated in the major cities at 30,000 in Tehran, 20,000 in Azerbaijan, 10,000 in the Caspian region, 4,000 in Isfahan, and 12,000 in the Abadan area, The bulk of the party members and sympathizers come from among skilled and unskilled workers, veasants, teachers, students, minor €. government employees, professional men, Kurds and religious minorities (Assyrians, Armenians, and Jews). The individuals are of all ages, with an estimated average membership in the party of three to seven years. Possibly 1,000 members of the party have been active for over five years, with the "hard-core" members, who are in the 25 to 35 year age group, active for an estimated period of five to seven years. The quality of the "hard-core" leadership is believed to range from average to good. No information is available regarding the annual turnover of membership. The number of Tudeh sympathizers is extremely variable, depending upon specific issues raised and concurrent circumstances at a given time. This fact, combined with the covert character of most Tudeh activities, makes estimates of Tudeh membership and following “open to question. Although the general trend has been toward in- - creased membership, the party's following appears to have dropped sharply following the re~conquest of Azerbaijan in December 196, and the banning of the Tudeh Party in February 1949. On both of these occasions, the party tightened up its membership requirements, and the stricter policy also contributed to the drop in adherents. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH Rigged elections, as well as the illegal status of the Tudeh Party, make estimates of electoral strength of doubtful reliability. € SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 246] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION The Tehran elections, alone, provide a reasonable basis for estimates, There the Tudeh and supporter vote totalled 28,81, or roughly onequarter of the over-all vote. All successful candidates supported the National Front government. Of the 80 nationally elected representatives, 6 from Azerbaijan ( from Tabriz) are alleged to have Commnist connections. It is probable that sone urban centers, such as Isfahan, the proportion of votes from Tudeh members and sympathizers was also roughly one-quarter. Current major Tudeh objectives and tactics are (1) to increase the party following to support its own | candidates if the ban is lifted, otherwise to support "front" candidates or non-Communists who are amenable to bribery; (2) to plug simultaneously for free elections. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The current Tudeh policy appears to be to refrain from armed insurrection, but to fight back vigorously if attacked by other groups or the police. In recent cases of violent demonstrations, the estimated numbers of Tudeh followers involved ranges from 100 to 5,000. The number which could be brought out now for violent demonstrations under the most favorable conditions is estimated at a minimum of 35,000, a maximum of 200,000. The maximum number of party members capable of leading violent demonstrations. in key places probably does not exceed 500. On the basis of speculation, the party is probably capable of directing violent demonstrations in Tehran, Tabriz, the Caspian area, Isfahan, and the Abadan area. Quality of leadership is probably average to good, and equipment is believed to include small arms and home-made bombs as well as knives, clubs, etc. Tudeh’ sources claimed that 120,000 participated in the 1945 attempt to set up separate Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments under the protection of the Soviet Army; however, the actual force was probably not more than 50,000. There have been no reports that effective Tudeh para-~military organizations exist. The party has ‘relied upon groups of miscellaneous thugs in violent demonstrations. It is believed to be training young men for street fighting, but no organized units are known to exist as yet. The maximum force available throughout Iran now for armed insurrection is estimated at 200,000, but the number would depend on the issue involved and other circumstances. The quality of leadership would probably be good. The supply of available weapons and ammunition is probably inadequate now to equip potential manpower. No current plans or proposals for creating or activating a military resistance organization in case of war are known. In case of an East-West war, it is probable that lran would lose its indepen- SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 247] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION; € -10dence in a matter of days. Under Soviet occupation or domination, practically all able-bodied men and, to a lesser extent, women, would probably ultimately be mobilized to support the USSR in its resistance to the West. ‘This number can be roughly estimated at a maximum of 4,000,000. Leadership, arms, and equipment would have to be provided by the USSR. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Tudeh Party and its labor front, the Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU), were declared illegel in February 199. Since then they have been operating largely clandestinely, but also overtly under the cloak of many front organizations. Tudeh activities are hampered by (1) the government's imposition of martial law in the Tehran and Abadan aress; (2) a new press law which provides means of suppressing Tudeh publications; (3) new decrees forbidding the carrying of weapons and the holding of meetings without police permission; and (4) failure to weaken significantly the repressive potential of the police and.army. The government has the means to suppress Tudeh and its front organizations effectively, but is unlikely to do so as long as (1) the existence of the Tudeh threat is politically advantageous in carrying out internal snd foreign policies and (2) the Tudeh is regarded as presenting no clear and crucial threat to the maintenance € of power by a non-Communist government. The Communist Party, however, has exhibited impressive ability to circumvent repression in Iran. This record has been achieved largely as the result of (1) a skillful. organizational set-up whereby even its own members know only a few within the organization; (2) skillful direction of overt activities on the part of Communist groups; (3) skillful use of front organizations; (l) the parallel revolutionary and anti-Western propaganda and activities of the National Front (now in control of the government); (5) the lack of concerted effort by the government to repress Communist activities; (6) bribery of government officials; and (7) infiltration among officials within the Ministry of justice and prisons. Although the government has declared martial law in Tehran and Abadan-Khorramshar (oil industry area), Communist organizational activity continues uninterrupted. Repressive action by the government, such as imposition of martial law, does have positive results, particularly in reducing the occurrence of demonstrations. In the field of press publication, however, repressive action does not appear to be very effective. Government efforts to combat Communist organization of labor usually takes the ineffective form of trying to persuade the workers to join non-Communist organizations which are led by known government "stooges" or by men who are not. trusted by the workers. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION € Approved For Release YOO s/0 Q B-R LP BO BOOP BSOROOOSOOO8 OOO 14 === [PDF page 248] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY -INFORMATION The National Front government is currently encouraging non- Communist groups, such as the Pan-Iranists, SOMKA, and the Workers! Party, to clash in street fights with Communist-led demonstrators, and the police in each clash tend to act as a shield for these non- Communist groups. It should be kept in mind also that the existence of a genuine Communist "menace" in Iran is a useful factor in any government's efforts to obtain foreign economic aid and therefore it is probable that Prime Minister Mosadeq is not sincerely desirous of eliminating Commnist activity in Iran. Tudeh front organizations, of which the most prominent are the Peace Partisans, the Society to Combat Imperialism, the Tudeh Youth Organization, and the Tudeh Women's Organization, are unhampered in their organizations. Their activities are controlled by the provisions of martial law and their utility to the Tudeh is primarily through the appearance of their members at mass demonstrations. Their propaganda parrots the lines set by Moscow. The size of the Tudeh "underground" organization in Iran is estimated to be at a minimum 20,000, maximum 35,000, with concentration in Tehran, Isfahan, Azerbaijan, the Caspian region, and the Abadan area. The efficiency appears to be considerable in view of the success with which security is maintained. Communications appear to offer no difficulties. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The number of Communists in key industries in Iran is estimated to wary from 5 to 25 percent of the total labor force in such industries. There are an estimated 6,000 in the following categories: railway | workers, 1,000 —- many in key operational positions; communications unknown, but believed to be significant; arms plants and arsenals, 200 in the Tehran area; oil workers, 3,000 to 5,000; bus and truck drivers, 1,000 in a strong Tudeh unit. The membership in the Tudeh Central United Council of Trade Unions is estimated at 6,000, although the clandestine nature of this operation raises some doubt of the estimate. The number of active, dues-paying members of Communist unions at least equals and probably exceeds the total number of workers belonging to non-—Communist trade unions. However, only 1/10 of the total industrial workers, and only 1/30 of the total workers in professional services and distribution trades are organized. Communist influence is exerted through factory councils set up under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Labor. In many cases Tudeh members are in control. The extent of their influence is indicated by the fact that the government postponed the 1952 annual congress for elections of the workers! representatives on the High Labor Council for fear of possible Tudeh control. Tudeh unions do not have decisive control of the labor force in any key industry. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 249] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION € -12- The strongest Tudeh unions are among railway workers, especially at the hub of traffic, Tehran. The railway is the principal distributing agency for imports and exports and for the movement of internal fuel supplies to sub-stations. Another strong union is that of bus and truck drivers. Provincial areas are entirely dependent upon these services for merchandise and passenger traffic. In Tehran, especially, Tudeh unions among the workers at the silo where the city's grain supply is stored, and among the bakers who prepare the city's daily bread supply, present a potential threat, The affiliations of these unions are not in all cases confirmed, but all are believed to be associated with the Communist—dominated WFTU. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PRO JON. RGAN N A. Youth The principal Tudeh youth organizations are the Tudeh Youth Organization and the Iranian Democratic Youth Club, which serves as the Youth Organizations front. The estimated membership is ),000 to 6,000, mostly in Tehran. There are no other youth organizations as such in Iran, although youths do have an opportunity to engage in € organized activities in the schools and colleges and in political activity through the following National Front associated organizations: (1) the Pan-Iranists, (2) SOMKA (National Socialists), and (3) the Workers! Party. The Tudeh Youth Organization is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and appears to be well led. It often works through the Democratic Youth Club to avoid arrest and its members have, along with the Communist-front Society to Combat Imperialism, been in the forefront of Tudeh demonstrations, The Tudeh Youth Organization is considered to be a school for training young members to become members of the Tudeh Party itself. The party enjoins TYO members to "struggle for peace" and strengthen their contacts with the masses. Membership is open to youths 12~23 years of age. Therefore, the Tudeh Youth Organization could potentially include the bulk of students from the fifth grade up to and including college levels. Unless the non-Communist government can meet adequately the aspirations of young Iranians for employment and opportunities, an increase of members in the Tudeh Youth Organization is probable. B. Students The principal Tudeh organizations among students are: (1) Iranian Students' Organization, (2) Students' Organization of Tehran University, (3) Society of vewish Students of Tehran University, (4) Students SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION € relaase ij) //() cm A-R IPSOBOOVGOROODOSO00S000 1-4 Annroved Fo === [PDF page 250] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Organization of Tabriz University, (5) Tudeh Association of Higher Normal School Graduates, (6) Tudeh Association of Primary Normal School Graduates, (7) General Council of the Faculty of Soienoe Students! Organization, and (8) Karaj Faculty Tudeh Organization.. The estimated strength in various centers is 2,000 in Tehran, 500 in Tabriz, and 100 in Shiraz. In demonstrations at Tehran University, Communists have been able to get support from as much as 1/3 of the student body In early 1952, it was estimated that 30 percent of the secondary school teachers were affiliated with Tudeh. There are no comparable organizations in the universities and these are believed to be affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. They also have contacts with the Iranian Students Organization in Paris.. The leadership appears to be good. ‘The major current objectives are to (1) lead strikes at the universities; (2) campaign for a reduction in tuition fees, entrance requirements, and graduation or passing marks; (3) campaign for various popular issues affecting the welfare of students; and (4) attempt to organize a conference of students of the Near and Middle East. At Tehran University, expansion and action capabilities appear to be favorable, though probably less so than six months ago, since the government is beginning to exhibit more interest ( in controlling demonstrations, weeding out Tudeh students and professors and encouraging aggressive non-Commmist organizations to counteract Tudeh demonstrations. Ce Women Principal Tudeh organizations among women are the Iranian Women's Organization and the Society for the Protection of Children. . Membership figures are unavailable.- These groups are associated with the Women's International Democratic Federation and the International Preparatory Commission for the Protection of Children. These groups agitate for women's rights; spread Communist ideology among women, girls and ohildren; and exploit the humanitarian appeals inherent in any child-welfare program. The Iranian Women's Organization is unlikely _ to play a large role except under a Commnist government, but the Proe tection of Children program appears to have favorable prospects. D. Racial, Religious, Nationality Minorities The organizations which Tudeh has established to work among ‘minorities are principally the following: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 251] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION € (1) Armenian (a) Progressive (youth organization) (ob) Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization (c) Church Women's Union (4) Armenian Communist Party (2) Azerbaijani (a) Azerbaijan Democrat Party (b) The Azerbaijan Society (3) Kurds (a) Kurdish Democrat Party (4) Jews (a) Society of Jewish Students of Tehran University. Membership in the Armenian groups is estimated at 80 to 200, princiaplly in Tehran; in the Azerbaijani groups at 20,000, prinoipally in Azerbaijan; in the Kurdish group at 4,000, principally in Azerbaijan. € Membership of the Jewish group is unknown, but small. The Armenian group is opposed by the majority of Armenians, but appears to have con= siderable potential for terrorist activities. There is no organized opposition to the other groups except from the government. The leaders of these groups are not known, nor their international affiliations, if anye The objectives of these groups appear to be: (1) Armenian: to organize the entire Armenian Community to participate actively in Tudeh plans. (2) Azerbaijani: (a) The Azerbaijan Society to act as a front in Tehran for the Democrat Party, (b) the latter to carry out subversive activities comparable to those being undertaken by Tudeh outside of Azerbaijan, Principal current theme is cultural and political autonomy for Azerbaijan. (3) Kurds: to conduct similar subversive activities in north-western Azerbaijan appealing for Kurdish cultural and political autonomy. (4) Jewish: Unknown. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ¢ === [PDF page 252] === EE EEE EE EEE EEE Oe Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION -~15 - Capabilities for expansion and action among all of these groups appear to be good. The grievances toward the central government among the Azerbaijanis and Kurds are such that the presence in those areas of strong military establishments is probably the only deterrent to a general uprising today., E. Sports Groups The Tudeh sports organizations are the Tudeh Mountaineers League, - the Tudeh Wrestlers League, the Tudeh Swimmers League, and the Tudeh Basketball Players Association. The membership is probably small and unimportant from the point of view of sports, but significant in pro viding training for street fighters and expanding contacts. In view of the increasing general interest in sports in Iran, the capabilities of these groups for expansion are good. i. F. Cultural Groups The principal Tudeh organizations are the Artists League, the Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization, and the Society for Combatting Illiteracy. There are no competing organizations, The illiteracy program is the most effective since it reaches people unaffected by ( the regular school system through lack of opportunity or means to " attend. The objective in organizing these groups is probably to provide additional targets for propaganda, but the illiteracy program has, in addition, the purpose of teaching Tudeh members or potential recruits to read and write so they can understand written orders and submit written reports and begin to read Communist literature. The capabilities of the Artists League appear limited, but those of the Armenian group are probably favorable among younger Armenians, and those of the Tlliteracy Society are likely to be very favorable and an increasingly effective Tudeh tactic. C. Professional Groups The principal Tudeh organizations among professionals are (1) The Iranian Society of Democratic Lawyers, (2) The Judicial Society of Iran, (3) Union of Teacher Training College Graduates (4) Tudeh Medical Assistants Union, (5) Tudeh Union of Government Employees, and (6) National Association of Democratic Journalists. The membership is unknown but probably small. There are no effective non-Communist organizations in these fields, although the Communist membership is probably numerically a small proportion of the total employment. The jurists group is probably well-led and is affiliated with the International Association of Democratic Jurists (IADJ). Tudeh objectives through the legal groups appear to be to ‘assure Support for the Communist line regarding (1) international lan, SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 253] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION (2) the role of the UN in establishing peace, and (3) the "correct" interpretation of Iranian laws and the constitution. The teachers! organization is designed to spread the party line and add to the embarrassments of the government; that of the government employees, to facilitate Tudeh infiltration and eventual take-over; and that in the press, to enlist sympathetic Tudeh treatment in the press and support Tudeh's opposition to any restrictive official actions or legislation. ‘he capabilities for expansion and action in all of these fields appear to be good, He. "Peace" and Other Organizations Su rting Pro-Soviet, Pro~Satellite and Anti-Western Programs ‘ The principal "peace" and anti-Western Tudeh front organizations are’ (1) The Iranian Association for Peace, which has 10,000 to 15,000 dues-paying members concentrated in Tehran and Tabriz, although 900,000 signatures have been claimed by the organization; (2) The Free Iran Society, membership unknown, but concentrated in Tehreng (3) The Freno-Soviet Cultural Relations Society, with an estimated membership of 500, also concentrated in Tehrany and (kh) The National Society for’ Combatting Imperialism in Iran with an estimated membership of 15,000, concentrated in Tehran, Abadan, Khorramshar, Isfahan, and Resht. The "Peace" group has no effective opposition and has been very successful in attracting support from all classes, It is believed to provide the headquarters for overt Tudeh activities. The Free Iran Society is actively opposed by the Tehran Chamber of Commerce and the Cultural Society by the Iran-America Relations Society, although there © is some overlapping of membership. The anti-imperialist group is effectively opposed only by National Front groups. The direction of the associations appears to be generelly very good and the Peace Partisans and cultural groups are affiliated with the international Communist fronts, the former with the International Partisans of Peace Movement, and the latter with the Soviet VOKS organization. The current objectives of these Communist organizations appear to be as follows: for the Peace Partisans, to urge all Tudeh members to join the front and to recruit membership from all classes, especially from those who would not join Tudeh or other more obviously Communist- _ controlled groups; for the Free Iran Society, to band together, _ businessmen and small industrialists and to obtain an embargo against foreign, especially US, imports; for the Cultural Society, to serve aS a@ propaganda tool for VOKS, directed primarily toward younger Iranian intellectuals; for the anti-Imperialist group, to capitalize on the oil dispute between the UK and Iran and on the xenophobic atmosphere prevailing in the country to destroy Western influence. This organization has been used as the principal agency for conducting mass demonstrations. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 254] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -17- The capabilities for expansion and action of these organizations appear to be as follows: the Peace Partisans apparently have reached the peak of their ability to expand rapidly. However, a war scare would enhance the capability greatly. Aggressive action against its headquarters and demonstrations by groups adhering to the National Front, such as Pan-Iranists and SOMKA, aided by the police, has tended to reduce the field of activity. For the Free Iran Society, prospects appear to be limited because imports are being reduced by exchange shortages. For the Cultural Society, prospects are fairly good since the fact that it is ostensibly an Iranian Society permits the USSR to circumvent the Iranian Government's decree forbidding activity by foreign information centers outside Tehran. For the anti- Imperialists, the prospects will vary with the intensity of the UK-Iran oil controversy. ‘The government has recently severely limited ' the freedom of this group to hold demonstrations. No adequate information is available to provide the basis for a reliable estimate of the degree of Tudeh infiltration of non-Communist organizations. VIE. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT ( Less than 200 individuals participate in top policy-making bodies in Iran. None is known to be Communist and perhaps not more than six to ten can be regarded as potentially sympathetic to Commnisn. However, any estimates must be treated with reserve asthe willingness ' of non-Communists to cooperate with Communists would depend upon the specific issue and concurrent circumstances. Furthermore, bribery and pressure may lead to cooperation on either side. The highest estimates of Tudeh infiltration in the armed services are 1500 in the army, 500 air force, 110 gendarmerie, and none navy. Sympathisers’. may number 5,000 or more, depending upon the specific issue involved and circumstances. The potentialities of infiltration do not differ greatly from those among Jranians outside the armed forces. ‘The _ extent of Tudeh influence in top levels is believed to be negligible. at the present time. The National Police Force consists of approximately 20,000 men. The force is undoubtedly penetrated by Communists but the percentage. is probably not very high as the police are notoriously susceptible, - in any event, to bribery. he little information available concerning influence at the top indicates that penetration has not been accomplished. There is no reliable information on Tudeh penetration in the administrations of nationalized industries, but there may be 60 to SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 255] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION < 100 Communists among them, with sympathizers numbering perhaps 300, depending upon the specific issue. Their influence is of varying significance, but not yet controlling in any instance. VIITT. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION | It is estimated that the number of Communists and sympathizers actively engaged in trying to mold public opinion numbers from 20,000 to 35,000, with a potential audience of 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 depend— ing upon the issue raised. The number of persons strongly influenced by the Communists regardless of the issue is estimated at a minimum of 170,000 and a maximum of 00,000. The influence on ostensibly non-Communist efforts to mold public opinion cannot be estimated with any precision as most newspapers and publications at times espouse causes encouraged by the Communists and accept material for publication from all sources, EX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Although there is undoubtedly some Communist infiltration of these groups, adequate information is not available to make an estimate, Furthermore, the effectiveness of Tudeh influence would depend upon the specific issue involved and concurrent circumstances. Almost € identical Tudeh and National Front attitudes on some issues make it virtually impossible to determine what influence is Tudeh and what is non—Tudeh. Under such circumstances, Tudeh potential is high but its influence appears at the present time to be slight.. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The principal current propaganda media in Iran are newspapers - and publications and instruction in Tudeh cells, effectively supplemented by numerous broadcasts from Soviet radio stations in Persian, Turki (Azerbaijani), and Kurdish. Of the 27 Tudeh publications now appearing, the principal ones are Besuye Ayandeh, a Tehran daily morning paper with an estimated circulation of 6,000 to 8,000; Shahbaz, a daily evening Tehran paper with an estimated circulation of 3,000; Farhangian, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of 7,000; and Dehganan Iran, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of 2,000. These are all published in Tehran by the Haghsh Jehan press, which is supplied by TASS via the Soviet Embassy with World-wide news coverage, and probably also with newsprint. The quality of the press appears to be adequate despite mobster raids by partisans of the National Front. It is probable that the presses Which print the clandestine Tudeh papers and publications are located in the provincial centers and in Tehran, perhaps in some satellite Legation. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 256] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION ~19 - So far as is known neither the Soviet nor satellite missions publish overt propaganda, although they all assist in the importation:. of publications from abroad in Russian, Persian, and Turki. Furthermore, Soviet newspapers such as Pravda, and a great variety of cheap Soviet books are available in quantity in the bookshops and newsstands of Tehran and provincial cities. No information is available on the financial assets of importers.. Internal broadcasting facilities in Iran are controlled by the government and do not appear to be either controlled or influenced at the present time by Communists. It was reported in 1952 that there was a clandestine station in Tehran making infrequent broadcasts. The Communist radio programs, which are believed to have a Significant listening public, come from the USSR. Radio Moscow broadcasts halfhour programs in Persian four times daily; Radio Baku gives programs in Persian three times daily; Radio Tashkent beams half-hour programs in Persian twice daily; and Radio Democrat (Azerbaijan) has programs Seven hours a week in each language — Persian, Turki, and Kurdish. It is the last station which is most vicious in its progaganda and which has probably the most effective impact on Iranians, XI. FINANCTAL CONDITION The major source of Tudeh revenue appears to be from membersh ip dues and sales of publications, although no precise information is available. Considerable aid comes from Soviet-Iranian trade through private deals. and some from Communist organizations abroad, but no figures are available. Most commercial deals with orbit countries are carried on by official government agencies, but detailed information is-lacking. The Tudeh Party appears to have adequate funds, although reports indicate the necessity for continuous pressure on members to pay their dues and increase sales, XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The following diplomatic personnel including and above the rank of attache are officially listed in Iran: USSR = 253 Czech = 3; Rummanian - h; Polish ~ 13 and Hungarian -. ‘he total for all five countries is officially set at 37, but the actual staffs including service workers is probably nearer 150. All are currently located in Tehran, except for the temporary movements of’ members of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the trips of various officers to and from the Soviet Union, usually via Pahlavi or Tabriz. The; principal sections of the Soviet Embassy are (1) diplomatic, (2) Consulate-general, (3) trade delagation, (hk) VOKS, (5) Soviet hospital, (6) TASS, and (7) information and cultural services. It is estimated that the number of persons engaged in propaganda activities is between 50 and 100. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION LLL San eel ASERicantanAeasttasetnstatt === [PDF page 257] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATYON The Soviet Hospital in Tehran has a staff of about 20 Soviet doctors and nurses. It is well-run, but fees are high and there is no free clinic. Exhibits of Soviet films, paintings, etc. are periodic and shown either by invitation at the Soviet Embassy or at the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society. The Soviet Embassy has. claimed that 100,000 people in Tehran read Russian, although the actual number is probably nearer 50,000. The Irano~Soviet Cultural Society has an estimated membership of 500, mostly in Tehran, and provides the principal machinery for the dissemination of overt propaganda among the upper classes of Iran. Soviet domination and active operation of the Caspian Sea Fisheries under a concession due to expire January 31, 1953 provides the USSR with an invaluable means of unrestricted communication between Iran and the USSR, as well es the opportunity of supporting Soviet personnel and conducting activities in the Caspian area, - XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the Communist international organizations have instal- | lations in Iran at the present time; nor have any of them held congresses or conferences there. Fifteen Iranians attended the Moscow Economic Conference in 1952 and five Iranian Communists attended the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party the same year. There is some evidence that the Tudeh Party has received funds from Communist organizations abroad although information regarding the amounts is unavailable. There is also some evidence that Iranian Communists sent some funds to aid Egyptian Communists and North Korean war casualties, although, again, the amounts are unknown. iy. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK Tehran is the center for all Tudeh communications activity in Iran. Sub-centers appear to exist in Isfahan, Abadan or Ahwaz, Tabriz, Resht, and Meshed. The courier system, probably operating through the Tudeh truckers union, appears to be very effective. International terminals appear to be Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Warsaw, Geneva, Zurich, and Prague, and communications seem to be effective. It is assumed that the Soviet and satellite missions in Tehran provide pouch service as well as radio communications through their own services, The closest contacts are believed to be with the USSR, which serves as the principal source of instructions, literature, and news— print. France is the principal headquarters for overseas activity among Iranian students, and Egypt is the main recipient of Iranian Communist donations and propaganda support. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 258] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -21- The principal recent non-Soviet or satellite foreign emissaries have come from Italy, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. In 1952, Pietro Nenni, leader of the Italian Socialist Party and vice-President of the World Council of Peace Partisans visited Tehran; in 1951, Yusuf Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Egyptian Peace Partisans came from Cairo with the declared objective of organizing a "conference of peace supporters to be attended by Middle, Near Eastern, and North African: delegates." And Munim Ghazali, Secretary of the General Students! Organization of Egypt arrived, probably for the same purpose. Also in 1951, Arif al-Din, Secretary of the Syrian Comminist Party, visited Tehran; and in the same year 'Abd~al-Riaz Hashimi and Mustafa al-Aris, well known members of the Lebanese Communist Party, came to Iran. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 259] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -: | SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.13 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAQ net enna ret, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20 - CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 260] === en ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS . Page Foreword « ee«eeecervecrecerereereeereveer eevee di OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES «se 1 Ie Objectives «ec eseecereercc ee eeee oe ee 1 II. Tactics « «-ececsrecesreevreerervree ev eee L IIIe Capabilities.. « « « « oe eoceeeoeee oe eee 2 ASSETS «ee eee cccee 4 Ie Numerical Strength..eecccecececercvcececce 4 II. Electoral Strength « «e eeeecse eer ccc c ccs 5 TIT. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism eoececeneeeeee 5 Ve Communist Influence in Labor e eeecrceecevees 6 ca VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations « eeeseeseceeeece 7 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government. ee eeeee 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation.e e « 10 Xx. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political 10 Xe Communist Propaganda Media e ««eceeece. XI. Financial Condition..ee. cece i eceee 11 XIT.e Soviet—Satellite Official Assets e eeesrsrcecvece 11 XIIIe Communist International Organizations 2. e««.«eeeece 12, XIV. Communist Communication Network «6 e«-e«eserses ee 12 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 261] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to gupplement the. evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational ( potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather. the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 262] === EERE EEE EE IED I - O e Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN IRAQ: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Communist Party of Iraq, outlawed since its inception in 1927, had by 1951 been reduced to near impotence by a series of government roundups and trials. In that year, the party set out to rebuild its strength: it redefined its aims, called for the expulsion of all undesirable elements, and decreed that party cadres were henceforth to operate as a disciplined core under the cover of other broader groups. The party's program, issued in October 1951, aimed principally at (1) propagandizing the World Peace Appeal; (2) infiltrating and encouraging the trade union movement and organizing the workers of the State Railways; (3) organizing a campaign for the interests of slum dwellers; and (4) encouraging the formation of legal political parties representing labor groups. The party paid particular attention to the trade unions, but an attempt to organize a central Trades Union Congress was blocked by the Iraqi Government. The failure of a general strike called in connection with a nationalist memorial celebration on Portsmouth Treaty Day in January 1952 served to demonstrate the weakness of their October program. The party then began a new end somewhat more successful push to - bring students and young intellectuals into the Communist fold by ( emphasizing nationalist themes and most recently concentrated upon the formation of a broad populer front in opposition to the present government and Western influence, coe a. - II. TACTICS Changing Soviet policies, frequent goverrment repression, and factionalism stemming from its own organizational weakness, have led the Iraqi Communist Party to engage in frequent shifts in tactics and immediate objectives. At present, the party champions, directly or through front organizations, the most popular issues of the day ~~ enti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. It has likewise attacked government corruption and economic injustice, tying these themes to its anti-Western campaign by accusing the present ruling elements of being subservient to the British. Civil disorders have been fomented or prolonged and the party has not infreauently joined with other groups, including some of the extreme right in such endeavors. As in other Near Eastern countries the party has also made use of the national aspirations of various minority groups, especially the Kurds, whenever it appeared expedient to do so. In the latter half of 1952 the party profited from a favorable combination of factors. The esteblishment of the weak government of Prine Minister 'Umari in July 1952 resulted in four months of reletive ( SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 263] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION een freedom from government suppression. The government, uneasy at the prospect of trouble in the period of trensition toward the elections of January 17, 1953, made little attempt to restrain the opposition parties, including Communists. At the same time the party began to develop more vigorous leadership, received increased Support from the Soviet Legation and possibly from the Syrian Communist Party, and developed a more popular propaganda line. In April 1952, Sharif al-Shaykh became Secretary General of the Iraqi Communist Party after his attendance at the Berlin Peace Conference and a visit to Moscow. His tesk has been to reorganize the party. Soviet support to the party apparently consists largely of Soviet propaganda carried out covertly by Soviet Legation officials in Baghdad, who established contact with the Iraqi Lawyers! Association, provided it with newsprint, and utilized it as a distribution point for Arabic language propaganda printed locally or in the USSR and Prague. . Of particular significance in enhancing party strength and unity was the recent emphasis on promoting a nationalist united front. ‘this tactic was apparently being carried out in response to &@ policy directive by Khalid Bakdash, leader of the Syrian Communist Party, delivered in August 1952. Bakdash called for cooperation: with all democratic groups for the purpose of forming a nationel bloc € in which Communists would pley an important role. Communist influence soon increased in the leftist National Democratic Party (NDP) and the neutralist United Popular Front (UPF), both extremist nationalist groups with little representation in Parliament. The riots of November 22-25, 1952, and the abolition of all political parties and arrest of opposition leaders which followed, also frustrated Communist attempts to work through the Iraqi opposition parties. The imposition of martial law in Baghdad province has likewise contributed to keeping the party more or less dormant, and may compel it to search for yet another method of operation. ITI. CAPABILITIES The greatest. handicap to the formation of a united front movement in Iraq is the need of the Iraqi Communist Party to utilize local party organizations, none of which has as yet great organizational strength and forcefulness. As in its unsuccessful attempt to organize trade unions late in 1951 in order to achieve greater in-~ fluence in Iraqi national life, the party has once again found that the government can exercise sufficient pressure to collapse the broader organizational base of its movement. The Iraqi Communist Party organization remains lergely intact. However, the important party functionaries are known to the government and could presumably be arrested comparatively easily. C SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 264] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION The open manipulation of the January 1953 elections has assured the government, still dominated by the traditional elements grouped around former Premier Nuri a~-Satid and the Palace, of an overwhelm ing victory. Whether the opposition groups will decide or will have the chance to carry on activities outside Parliament, since they cannot function within it, remains to be seen. Unless the serious and fundamental organizational weaknesses of the opposition movement, especially those of the Communists, can be overcome, a Communistdominated popular movement is unlikely to emerge in the near future. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 265] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN IRAQ: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Now estimated at 10,C00 members, the Communist Party of Iraq contained only half that mumber a year ago. Its membership lacks internal organizational strength and resources, Though capable of attracting new followers rather rapidly under weak, yet reactionary goverments, the Iraqi Communist Party will, at present, fade rapidly if subjected to determined suppressione The degree of Communist Party control over other organizations is hard to determine in an area where the party is still seeking to gain support primarily by championing issues already popular locally, The party appears to have achieved some penetration of the National Democrats and the United Popular Front, and sevoral labor unions. The unions are small, poorly organized, and of no political importance, The two parties, officially disbanded after the riots of November 22- 23, 1952, but still operating informally have, on the contrary, an influence out of proportion to their numerical strength because they are vehicles for the extreme nationalists, the discontented young | € intellectuals of Baghdad, and the emerging, dissatisfied middle Class, Altogether, a maximum of 12-15,000, or 0.3 percent of the total population of about 5,000,000, may be under Communist influence. Most of these are to be found not among the poor, most of whom are still bound to traditional ways, but among educated, urban, and Westernized groups -- young intellectuals, minor civil servants, teachers in secondary schools, and members of religious and ethnic minorities. Communists and Communist sympathizers are strongest in Baghdad, where all political life centers, less so in Basra, the Kurdish provinces of Suleaimaniya and Erbil, and in Najaf and Kerbela.. While the bulk of the membership is illiterate, poorly disciplined, and inexperienced organizationally, the leadership core, derived primarily from the effendi and college group, tends to be contentious and jealous for prestige and power, and given to forming splinter movements. Under pressure, they have easily given ' up and turned state's evidence. Wholesale hangings during 1948 and 1949, and frequent arrests since, have sharply reduced the number of Communists whose membership dates back to an earlier period, The average age of the leadership is 19-30 years, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | € === [PDF page 266] === —————E—ESESESEEEOEOEOEOEOOO— eee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Iraqi elections are closely manipulated by the government and, since the Communist Party is illegal, no Communist candidates are allowed. Fellow-travellers, broadly defined by the government to include almost any opposition, are discouraged and hampered in every way possible. The present party chief, Sharif al-Shaykh, was temporarily arrested in 1948 when he attempted to stand for election from Sulaymaniya. Communists last ran for Parliament in 1937, when 11 were elected as independents or through legal parties. Parties as such are of no significance. The January 17, 1953 elections took place under martial law, and parties, which are in most cases merely convenient labels for the followers of individual politicians, have been panned. Comparison of party electoral strength is therefore neither meaningful nor possible. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION There have been no Communist attempts at insurrection in the past. The maximum opportunity for armed uprising in the near future would be through inciting tribal insurrection either in Iraqi ‘ Kurdistan, which has an irredentist nationalist movement, or among the Shia tribes of the south Euphrates. The Kurds might raise a ( force of 150,000 to 200,000 men, well-led, and redoubtable fighters. But they possess only rifles and limited ammunition, and while capable of giving the Iraqi army 4 sharp encounter, could be. contained without too much trouble unless promptly reinforced from outside. At 1S present, however,.the party has not the organization, strength, impetus, freedom, nor weapons to attempt to promote any such excitement. Since demonstrations are an acknowledged and time-honored form of political activity in Iraq, the Communist Party is prepared, as in the November 1952 riots in Baghdad, to cooperate, invited or uninvited, with any political group in fomenting or aggravating & riot. No recent riot, however, is known to have been initiated and carried on exclusively by Communist followers. The recent clain made by the local Communist Committees of Basra, Najaf, and Sulaimaniya in reporting to the Central Committee in December 1952 that they were capable of taking over and holding for a short time previously chosen key locations, typifies above all the romantic immaturity of many minor Communist functionaries in Iraq. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM activities, or publishing any matter expressing approval of its Membership in the Communist Party, taking part in any of its doctrines carry penalties ranging from seven years imprisonment to SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 267] === eee Ce Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET =- SECURITY INFORMATION outlaw certain unions, notably the railway and Basra port workers! unions, About 14 unions are still recognized by the zovermment, but none is of national scope, The two now reported to be Communistcontrolled (January 1953) are not of strategic importance -~ the cigarette workers and auto drivers, both in Baghdad. The dearth of capable labor leadership has permitted the Commmists to gain influence on the directing level in most unions at some time, The recent strike patterns indicate, however, that such influence is not decisive. No cloarly political strikes have taken place in the past two years, Communists. may have aggravated disorder in strikes stimulated by economic grievances in Basra, Habbaniya (British military airport), and also in two oil-fields, Iraqi unions are not affiliated to WFTU. The ICFIU recently sent a delegation on a regional tour which included Iraq, and plans are being laid for a regional office to assist non- Communist unions in the area, This should go far toward minimizing causes of labor discontent and providing a more effective non= Conmunist channel for their expression. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A. Front Organizations ( 1. Students! Union, Also called the Council of Iraqi: Students . Union and the Union of Youth,1 this organization maintains groups of probably not more than 20 to 30 students each in several colleges, particularly the Law, Medical, and Higher Teachers’ Colleges, It is reported that several of the leaders are maintained and financed in college by the Iraqi Communist Party in order to foster political activity among students, Their leadership talent is not conspicuous but Iraqi students have a tradition of political activity and ere easily responsive to political agitation, It was this Students Union which was particularly active during the November 1952 riots in Baghdad. so far as is known, there are no non=Communist student organizations, The Union has sent, or attempted to send, a representative to World Youth meetings since 1949; for the last two years, the government has denied passports for this purpose. 2. Committee for Aiding Justice. A front group within the Iraq Lawyers' Association, the Committee for Aiding Justice is now i. This organization may be identical with the Young Men's Democratic Association, said to have 500 menbers, f SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 268] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION the most active and effective center of Communist activity in Iraq. (See Bel for a discussion of the degree of infiltration of the Lawyers’ association.) 3. Partisans of Peace (Ansar al-Salam). Principally confined to Baghdad, this organization seems to be a secondary activity for most of the Communist and left-wing adherents of other organizations. Its actual membership is unknown. It was launched in 1950, The present chief of the Iraqi Communist Party, Sharif al-Shaykh, attended the Berlin Peace Conference in April 1952, The leaders of this front are predominantly Shia, including a respected divine and, until they were subjected to prosecution, two of Iraq's most noted living poets; they may have been mislead by an idealistic appeal to religious sentiment, Menbership seems to have fallen off, Activity has been limited to rather mild demonstrations and to collecting. signatures for various petitions and protests, which have had incidental propaganda value to the Communist cause. 4. Armenian Progressive Society, The leader of the Iraqi branch of this regional organization (centered probably in Jerusalem) is Krikor Bedrosian, an influential Communist. courier during and since World War II and a member of the Iraqi Central Committee, at present € serving a five-year prison term, Its strength is unimown, though a probably small.; Be Infiltrated Organizations le Lawyers' Association. The Communists have shown considerable shrewdness and ability in gaining control of this, the one professional organization for lawyers in Iraq. By rigging elections, they have now managed to place Communists in both the presidency and vicepresidency, and, more important, Communists and Comunistesympathizers now hold all but one post on the powerful Administrative Committee and all but two on the Disciplinary Committee. Infiltration of the Lawyers' Association is of considerable significance, because (1) all practicing lawyers in Iraq are required to belong; (2) the Association has semi-juridical powers, is@e, it can disbar lawyers who they believe have violated profes sional ethics; and (3) the scial status of lawyers is high, and the legal. profession plays a dominant role in Iraqi politics. . Announced Communist aims vis-a-vis the Lawyers! Association | are to use it (1) to spread propaganda; (2) recruit among students | and intellectuals and other hwyers; (3) give wider currency and SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION | Cc === [PDF page 269] === EE EEE OO Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION greater respectability to Communist aims and propaganda lines; and (4) use the courts wherever possible as a platform from which to spread Communist attitudes and defend Communist suspects, This activity can be easily expanded because the current Communist line is especially appealing to frustrated young graduates of the Law College who. greatly exceed the mumber that can be absorbed into government service and the current opportunities for private practice. This group has regular contact with the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party and also with the Soviet Legation in Baghdad, through Boris Khlysov, an attaché, 2. Political Parties. Until officially banned at the end of November 1952, two left-wing political parties, the United Popular Front and the National Democratic Party (both of which were infiltrated to some degree) readily collaborated with the Iraqi Comunist Party and Peace Partisans toward their common aims of (1) abrogation of the Iraq-British Treaty and withdrawal of British forces, (2) full sovereignty, (3) nationalization of foreign oil concessions, etc, These parties had no particular brief for world Communism; collaboration was based solely on what they conceived to be identity of interest on — local issues, The IraqiCommunist Party on its part was promted by specific directives to use existing parties as a base to forma C popular front movement. The parties have recently been banned, but the respective groups are meeting informally; it is not yet clear what form of organization the political opposition will assume or how much Communist influence it will contain. 3 New Iraq Stage Group, Reported in July '52 to have presented a play at Fine Arts Institute attacking the government and using a Communist line. Nothing further known of this group. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT No Communists are believed to be in government at the policymaking level. Small mmbers have been discovered from time to time in the army, where the main effort has been directed toward the noncommissioned grades, especially in the technical services, The. latest such discovery, in September 1952 involved about 30 students. in the Military Technical School; 16 students were convicted. A few police have turned to Comnunism, including several among the guards at the detention camp for political prisoners, where most Communists under sentence are held; police are somewhat more vulnerable to > Communist appeal than the armed services because of lower pay, prestige, and morale.; . SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 270] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Since the current Conmunist propaganda line is virtually synonymous with that of a large segment of the nationalist press, it is easy to place Communist propaganda material and thus emphasize party line themes without much prompting. All radio broadcasting originating in Iraq is government owned and free of Communist taint although not less anti-Western in its leading political commentary. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES. Until the dissolution of all political parties in November 1952, the Istiqlal party, a small group of right-wing extremists, occasionally collaborated with the Commmists in common tactics and demonstrations. One or two members of the central committee of the United Popular Front, as well as the secretary of the National Democratic Party and a member of its administrative committee are suspected to be Communists. For an account of Communist infiltration into the Lawyers’ Association, see VI.-B-1 above. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. MEDIA Al-Qa'tidah,: circulation unknown, is the official organ of the q Iraqi Communist Perty. It is produced clandestinely and distributed by hand, In recent weeks it seems to be printed on a press; formerly it was turned out on a Roneo machine, This small operation does not reach the general public, hence has far less impact than nationalist papers which, at times, echoed the Communist line, All conspicuously pro-Communist papers have been closed down subsequent to the martial law regime late in November 1952, There are no Communist owned or controlled printing establishments in Iraq. In 1952 a Lebanese Partisans-of=Peace-inspired book entitled America, the Land of Fictitious Freedoms was picked up in Baghdad. It probably ‘reached the country through the distribution system. of the publishers who have brenches in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. Soviet Legation Baghdad is believed to be financing and actively directing the recently expanded program of propaganda, both imported and locally printed. USSR broadoasts in Arabic are heard in Iraq. 11 hours per week from seven short-wave transmitters. The time is a convenient one attractive to Iraqi listeners: 8:00 to 8:30 poem. and 9:30 to 10:00 per. daily, with additional hours on Friday efternoon, the Moslem sabbath, Programs are received clearly, in good and fluent neo-classical Arabic and (in the case of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 271] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Azerbaijan Democratic clandestine station) good Kurdish. Listening to Moscow broadoasts is forbidden in Iraq, but there are indications that a good many do listen, Soviet broadcasts, however, pay little attention to internal Iraqi affairs. They emphasize any difficulties in Iraqi relations with Western powers. Azerbaijan station is also listened to widely in the Kurdish areas, both in Iraq and Syria, where it is about the only clearly~heard Kurdish~language broadcasting except for the very limited programs in Kurdish of Radio Baghdad. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Very little is known regarding party finances. The party is said to be so-poor as to be able only to pay small living allowances to its central cadre, its funds derived chiefly from sale of its publications, which in turn may be subsidized by the Soviet Legation, Subscriptions are solicited from members for special activities, such as sending of delegates to international front meetings, Oceasional assistance may come from the party in Beirut or Damascus, and the Iranian Tudeh Party reportedly furnished a printing press, Until the large-scale Jewish exodus in 1950-51, the Iraqi Communist Party obtained large contributions by threatening wealthy Jews with future. difficulties if they did not contribute to the now defunct Communist C front organization, the Anti-Zionist League. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Legation at Baghdad, the only official Soviet or SON satellite agency in Iraq, has an attachd, Boris Khlysov, who is the contact man with the Iraqi Communist Party's propaganda group and the Lawyers! Association cell, Overt propaganda activities of the Legation are not extensive; they appear to be limited to occasional invitational film showings at the Legation, No Iraqi-Soviet "friendship" societies are known to exist. The following are examples of information material handed out by the Legation: The Social and State Structure of the USSR, V. Karpinsky. In Engiish, Moscow, the Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948. Paper bound, 182 pp. Golden Prague (novel), Alexander Gonchar. In English. FLPH Moscow 1950, (The Stalin Frize Novel 1947-48). The Years of War 1941-1945, Vassili Grossman, English. Same ‘Publisher, 1946. 451 pp. C SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 272] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION -~12- | Soviet literature Monthly No. 2 of 1950, Moscow, in English. Voks Bulletin 1950, No. 62. The English edition of New TMmes, XIII, COMMINIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Iraqi delegates have attended: World Federation of Democratic Several unidentified Youth - 1949 Kurdish delegates alleged to represent Iraqi Kurdistan Peace Movement - 1950; 1951 Sharif al-Shaykh went from Syria to this meeting and returned via Moscow to Iraq to become Secretary-General of the Iraqi Commnist Party. At some of the international front meetings Iraq has been "represented" © by Arab students residing in Europe and probably deputed to go by Yusuf Isma'il (alias Mustan), head of an Arab Commnist group in Paris. This device served to overcome the denial ofpassports to persomel to attend such meetings, XIV. GOMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK General supervision of the party in Iraq is thought to be exercised by. the Syrian Commnist Party. Instructions originating ’ with Khalid Bakdash of Syria were last intercepted in the fall of 1951. An irregular system links the internal branches of the party, including members serving jail sentences, Contact with the Tudeh of Iran is maintained both through the Basra branch, which keeps in touch with Khorramshar, and via the northern border villages of | Zaynawi and Khanaqin, The border is easily crossed at many points. Also, the considerable pilgrim traffic to and from Iran to the Shia holy cities in Iraq offers excellent cover for passage of messages or personnel, and one very difficult to screen, Four Tudeh agents were reported to have com into Iraq in this way in 1952,. SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION € === [PDF page 273] === aero ne Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION TR-6165.14 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ISRAEL ——— eee ORAL OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 274] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword ee ee ee eee eee ee eoeo7eeeee 8 © @ @ ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « « « 1 Ie Objectives «ee seesse ee ereeer ee ee ee @ 1 II. Tactics «ee eerevrevtevveveeeveoeve 0 0 @ oe 1 III. Capabilities eooereevn ee eevo ee eee eee © © ee 3 ASSETS coc ere eee Ie Numerical Strength. eee eeecesescsssees § 5 II. Electoral Strength « «ee cecseerecesveveee 5 | “TTT. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. « e eee ee 0 © 6 Ve Communist Influence in Labor «ese sesecreceovece 6 VI. Commnist Influence in Social, Cultural, and — Professional Organizations «.eecesrceeere 6. VII. Communist Infiltration into Government « «eee 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation.« « e IX. Communist Infiltration of Non~-Communist Political Parties «ec cecerceeveerevreereeeevese eo. 7 Xe Communist Propaganda Media... esecceccceses 7 XIe Financial Condition...eeeeeesesessece 8 XII, Soviet-Satellite Official Assets.. ese eeceecee 8 XIII. Communist International Organizations.«.«e«eeseeee 9 XIV. Commmist Communication Network «2. ceescece vee 9 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 275] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | spe === [PDF page 276] === a EEE EEE eGV~_—~-Eer Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET =- SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM. IN ISRAEL: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES As expressed in the June 12, 1952 resolutions of the Israel Communist Party Central Committee, the major objectives of Israeli | Communists are to (1) increase their influence among the working _ class and the new immigrants; (2) capitalize on economic conditions resulting from the govermment's austerity policy; and (3) establish a Communist-controlled united front by creating peace committees wherever possible, expanding the activities of its front organizations,. and seeking to organize common action with the extreme leftists of Mapam, Internationally, the party attacks Israel's resumption of relations with. West Germeny, opposes Israeli cooperation with the West on military. defense, and instead makes propaganda for the Soviet-sponsored 5-power peace pact, and increased commercial relations with the Soviet bloc. . In dune 1952, the party's leader Samuel Milamis said that, once in power, the Communists would (1) void all treaties. with "warmongers"; (2) nationalize all foreign concessions; (3) dismiss all US experts and US army officers present in Israel as advisors: (4) call for the formation of a popular militia; and (5) adhere to the UN 1947 resolution on Palestine calling for the formation of a "democratic" ‘Arab state in Palestine, and call for the return of Arab refugees and the restoration of their property.; The Communists no doubt. find it difficult to gain the adherence of the working masses while at the same time attacking Mapai's economic policies. Labor has been the chief beneficiary of the socialist program. of Mapai and there are far more dissatisfied elements among the middle class than among labor. Moreover, by paying increased attention to the Arab minority in Israel, which like the Communists is anti~ Zionist and has many grievances against the existing Israeli regime, the party, which can now marshal only five percent of the electorate, is also oreating greater difficulties for itself in gaining recruits among Israeli Jews. II. Tactics The underlying strategic policy of the Israeli Communist Party has a double aim. Among the Arab minority, the aim is to attract Arabs to the party and the USSR so that when and if a separate Arab state is set up in former Palestine, in conformity with the 1947 UN resolution, this state will be Comnunist-controlled, As a parallel activity, Soviet diplomatic and religious personnel are attempting to entice the Greek Orthodox Arabs, who form a large proportion of the Arabs in Israel, away from Greek leadership SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION A a alaace: Approved ror k& 2 OO 7/0) () A-RIL PEO BOOP SBORODOOSOOOR 0001-4 === [PDF page 277] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION and orient them towards the Moscow Patriarchate, - Among the Jewish ° majority, the aim is to get control of all leftist and trade union organizations and create new ones with a view to isolating Israel from the West and orienting it toward the USSR. The Israeli Communist | Party also directs Communist activity in Jordan, the main object of which is to oust the British, The Israeli Communist Party at present is committed to constitutional procedures but may soon find it difficult to operate because of goverment repression and popular indignation caused by the current Soviet anti-Zionist campaign. There is no information on any preparations for underground activity.: _ The party's principal motifs in propaganda appeals are: (1) the Mapai goverment is permitting the US to prepare Israel as a springboard for an attack on the USSR and the precipitation of World War III; (2) bad economic conditions are due to excessive Mapai arms expenditures to support US aggressive aims; (3) justice must be ‘given to the Arab minority and discrimination against them mst cease. These themes in turn are carried through specialized media or orgenizations to the Arab minority, to intellectuals (for example, - through the Academic Committee for Peace), immigrants from satellite. countries (for example, through propaganda issued in Hungarian, € Rumanian, and Bulgarian in addition to Hebrew and Arabic), and, in still other ways, to students, and women. Among Arabs, the party has been able to capitalize chiefly on its attitude toward minorities, championing equal treatment for them. Among Jews, the party has benefited from sympathy among some for the official ideology of the Soviet state and the assistance which the Soviet bloc gave Israel at the beginning of the state's existence. Among the latter, it has also found support because the Soviet regime put an end to Czarist pogroms and was thought to have outlawed anti-Jewish discrimination. The USSR has also had some success in portraying itself as the principal force which destroyed. Hitler and as the main enemy of fascism, The fact that there are still some 3,000,000 Jews in the USSR and satellite countries whose. future might be jeopardized if Israel were to adopt a position of. Open antagonism to the USSR has until recently kept the Israeli Government from repressing Communist activities. The party's voting power in the Kneset (Parliament) and in municipal councils is augmented by tactical alliances with the left... wing of the Mapam Party and by supporting motions of other parties. _ (even right wing) which attack the government. As a labor party.. SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION. € === [PDF page 278] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET © SECURITY INFORMATION the Communist Party is a member of Histadrut (general federation of labor unions and parties) and its key members participate in high Histadrut councils, Communists have occasionally also gained’ control or influence in non-Communist organizations by cultivating the left-wing elements (especially Mapam) within such groups while simultaneously attacking their right-wing opponents. This is facilitated by the pronounced doctrinaire factionalism which is characteristic of Israeli organizational life, The same tactics and | conditions also work against the Communists, On occasion non=-Communists have expelled Communists from collective settlements. The only trade union which the Israeli Communist Party is known to control is the: ~ Congress of Arab Workers, Its appeal here is based on the party's - opposition to Zionism and the Mapai govermment, and upon its championship of minority rights against discrimination by the majority. The principal source of new Jewish members seems to be from Communists or sympathizers arriving among new immigrants, especially from the satellite countries, Iraq, and North Africa, New Arab members seem to be recruited mainly from the Nazareth and Haifa (including Acre) areas, where Arab demands for equal pay and treatment with Jews and cessation of harsh treatment by the Israeli security |. forces have been championed by the Israeli Communist Farty, The party C also attempts to exploit traditional Greek Orthodox friendship for ' Russia. III, CAPABILITIES The outlook for the Israeli Communist Party to carry out its current objectives and further Soviet policy is diminishing daily. The disappearance of Mapam leader Mordecai Oren in Czechoslovakia, followed by the Prague trials and the case of the Jewish Soviet doctors have resulted in an increasing number of physical attacks against local Communist institutions, including Soviet Embassy property, a Russian bookstore, and Israeli Communist Party headquarters in Jerusalem. On January 15, 1953, the Israeli Government forbade the ciroulation of the Israeli Communist Party newspaper, Qol hatam ("Voice of the People") among members of the armed forces and e party may find its operations increasingly hampered, Histadrut is reported considering the expulsion of the Israeli Communist Party from its ranks,. The developing situation will probably lead to a rapid decline in the party's influence among the Jewish majority at lerge and also among members of Mapam, where the extreme left elements can be expected to come under increasingly heavy fire, It is likely, therefore, that any increase in the relative and absolute strength of the Israeli Communist Party will be confined to the Arab conmunity, SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 279] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] which can be expected by approve rather than resent the anti-Zionist moves of the Soviet bloc. The conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalism, together with the anti-Zionist orientation of the USSR and Communism, have historically been the greatest disadvantages under which the Communist movement has had to labor, As the Arab-Jewish antagonism hes increased, it has become increasingly difficult for the Communist movement to weld both Arab and Jewish elements together into a single effort of cooperation. In the past, Soviet anti-Israeli moves, such as Soviet support in the UN for the internationalization of Jerusalem have always caused considerable defection from the party and reduced its influence. | SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION | Cc === [PDF page 280] === EEE EEE EEE IDE eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ISRABL: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH In the absence of concrete information, Communist Party strengtl in Israel may be roughly estimated at about 5,000. The membership is drawn largely from unskilled labor and white collar workers, particular among Jewish immigrants from the Balkans and the Arab countries. Party membership is concentrated largely in the cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Halt Jerusalem, and Rehovot, Arab membership especially in Nazaret The number of "hard-core" Communists is unknown, but their quality does not seem to be high. Nothing is known regarding the quality of the party membership in terms of its readiness to incur hardships or cling to the party line. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communist Party vote in the 1951 election was 27,234 or about 3 percent of the total vote. In addition, the oxtreme left Mapam Party polled 86,095 votes. In the same eleotion, the other C major parties received the following mmber of votes: Mapai (government party) 256 5456 General Zionists (opposition) 111,394. Ha Potel ha-Mizrahi (goverment) 46,347 Herut (opposition) 45,651 The Comunist vote in the five cities where they are largely concentrated compared with ‘the other principal parties as follows: General Communists Mapai Mapam ‘Zionists Tel Aviv 6,240 59,700 15,600 46,600 Haifa 4,369 42,890 15,300 21,400 Nazareth 3,146 246 325 478 Jerusalem 1,221 20,200 2,600 7,100 Rehovot, 368 -4,000 1,100 1,400 III, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION et LT TTI A TT CE SO CTS, There have been no recent cases of violent demonstrations, and it is estimted that not more than 300 persons could be recruited for. any such demonstration, Although the policy does not seem to be to create violent demonstrations, probably because of efficient suppressive (; SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 281] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION — een ey methods of the Israeli police, orderly demonstrations of citizens carrying banners protesting against government policies have. been organized by the Communist Party. Probably less than 500 Weapons could be gathered by the Communists in case of a Soviet-Western war. There are no reports that the Communist Party in Israel sponsors any para-military organizations. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM ene The Israeli Communist Party and its front-organizations have full freedom to operate openly but are watched by Israeli security services. Communists have been quietly ousted from the arity e Communists have freedom to travel abroad to Communist and front conferencese The policy of the government toward the party will probably become unofficially more repressive in the future, and the state is capable of controlling the party by force, Ve COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR etree Since Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor, is controlled by the government Mapai Party, it is unlikely that the Communist Party has been able to gain much of a foothold there, No data are available regarding the mumber of Communists in key industries, but it may be € assumed that the proportion would be roughly the same as that shown for voting strength in the principal cities of concentration, Histadrut has no affiliations with international Communist confederations, having left the WFIU in 1950, Vie CQCMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL SR TUNEL ORGANIZATIONS The following organizations are known to be Comunist-front: Israel-USSR Friendship League, Organization of Democratic Women (affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation), Tarbut Latam, Israel Peace Committee (affiliated with the World Peace Council), Democratic Youth Federation (affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Youth), and the Academio Committee for Peace, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT a a a a RENAE.. Of the 120 members of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament), 5 are Communist and 4 are extreme left Mapam members who have been closel; identified with the Communists. The mumber of Communists on the -: SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION |. € LL IS LTS > === [PDF page 282] === EE ED _ OOOO OE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION era eanrnet nee N -T7various parliamentary committees is shown below, together with the total membership on these comnittees;:, Communist Total Committees. members. members House 1 23 Finance 18 15 Economic 1 “15 Foreign Affairs and Defense yb. 15 Home Affairs:: 15 Constitution, Legislation and 1 23 - Lew Public Services 1 15 Labor 1 15 Total 8 136 &.. Extreme left Mapam member Woshe Snehie; oo — b. Extreme left Mapam member Jacob Riftin, C The number of Communists and Chomunist~sympathizers in the armed forces is unknowmm,. It is believed that the extent of their influence in top © level positions is nil, The number of. Communists and Comnmunistsympathizers in the police and security services is probably small. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION ETC Aa SAS noe atone ntvadn-dhesapninety-suhamaneseo The number of people influenced by Communist propaganda in non- Comnunist-controlled educational, religious, or entertainment groups, or in the non-Communi st-controlled radio and press is believed to be not over several thousand, - IX, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Ha-Shomer ha-Tsatir, the far left-wing group of Mapam, has been ~ ideologically close to the Comunists and cooperated with them, This influence and recent Soviet anti-Zionist moves has caused Mapam to split, with only a minority joining the pro-Commmnist faction, - X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA There are five known Conmunist publications in Israel.. Qol hatAm is a Hebrew daily, which also publishes weeklies in Bulgarian, C* SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION —. === [PDF page 283] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Hungarian, and Rumanian, Circulation of the daily Qol ha‘tAm is about 2,000. The circulation of the weeklies is unkmown. Frei Israel, a Yiddish weekly, has a circulation of 300 to 400. Circulation figures for the Arabic-language monthly al-Ittihad and the Hebrew monthly Ha- Derekh are unknown, No information is available regarding the Arabic-~ Tanguage al-Darb. Qol ha'am is believed to have its own printing press, but nothing further 1s known regarding Communist printing facilities, Over 50,000 books per year, including technical and non-technical publications, are imported from the USSR. They are dumped on the market regardless of import quotas and at only nominal prices, It is presumed that they have a wide circulation. Lepac, Ltd., a Tel Aviv bookshop, is controlled by the Communist Party. It imports only Soviet books and is currently under investigation by the Israeli Government for using. surreptitious means to surpass its import quotas. The Israeli Communists do not control any radio facilities but have been allowed to speak occasionally over the government-controlled Israeli Radio., Oo | A 1951 survey of 1,737 Israelis showed that 28 percent regularly | listened to Soviet bloo broadcasts. Those listening to USSR stations. were mostly of Polish (39 percent), Russian (24 percent), and Rumanian (10 percent) origin. Russian was the most popular language with 12 percent of those interviewed. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION In Maroh 1950, the Israeli Communist Party collected over Im5,000 in a fund drive. In 1952, the party announced a fund-raising campaign with the ambitious goal of Ibl5,000. It is not known whether the local party receives help from Soviet or satellite legations or consulates, In 1950 Jewish Communists and fellow-travelers were said to be preparing a world-wide fund-raising campaign under the slogan. of aid to Israel. -Tarbut la'am ("Popular Culture") clubs were used as a front for this purpose in North and South America, Amounts ‘ gollected are unknown, but one organization is said to have remitted $6,000 in goods and cash from the United States, XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania have both Legations and consulates in Tel Aviv. Hungary and Bulgaria have Legations in Tel Aviv. Poland has consulates in both Jerusalem and Tel Avive SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | € Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 284] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION =Q9Je XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratio Youth (WFDY), and the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) have affiliated organizations in Israel, (See above under VI.) ‘Two Israeli delegates attended the 19th Party Congress in Moscow in October 1952, one went to the World Peace Council mooting in Berlin in July of that year, and one left for Pragus in January 1953 to attend the World Federation of Democratic Youth Conference. XIV. COMMUNIST CCMMUNICATION NETWORK Soviet Embassy personnel appear to be cultivating Greek Orthodox Arabs in order to exploit the old antipathy between Arab and Greek Orthodox Church members and their Greek clergy. It is not known whether any financial assistance is given to the local Communists or whether there would be any prospect of military assistance in case, of an East-West conflict. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 285] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165..15 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MOROCCO OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 286] === ec RR Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword 2 eseeececvevecereereeer eee ee eee oe ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES eee 1 Ie Objectives ss eee es ee eee eee eee eeee 1 II. factics ss eee eee eer cece eresercs 1 IIIe Capabilities ss ee eee ee were recess 2 ASSETS eeeecreerecere 5 Ie Numerical Strength «.2«e-eceeee2 ee 0 0 © 0-0 © 5. II. Electoral Strength «~esececscseeeeesees © 5 Ill. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 (. IV. Government Policy Toward Communism « « ee ee ee ee 5 Ve Communist Influence in Labor. seeceecossece§ 6 cickeeretts VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations ee ecesesceceece 6 Vil. Communist Infiltration into Goverment..sessee- 6 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation « « e 6 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political | Parties eececcceccevceceovrsesersee ee 7 xX. Communist Propaganda Medias se eee ssc ccece 1 XIe Financial Condition cee ccc cece rete eee T XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets «se seeceeee T XIIT. Communist International Organizations «+e eeeeee T. XIV. Communist Communication Network ss eeceeeeces 8 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 287] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current. major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 288] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN morocco!; OBJECTIVES. TACTICS. AND CAPABILITIES I, OBJECTIVES The over-riding immediate goal of the Moroccan Communist Party since August 1946 has been to persuade the local independence movements to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation for a revolution for "national liberetion" and against French control and American imperialism, In the meantime, the Commnists are seeking, through propaganda, to destroy sympathy among Moroccans for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans and to increase local hostility toward the French administration, The serious economic grievances of the population — both native and French — receive particular attention from the Commnists who have a strong influence in the country's largest labor mion, To achieve its immediate goals, however, the Moroccan Commmist Party is faced above all with the task of recovering its own strength, II, TACTICS Having failed thus far in achieving a common front with the nationalists, the Communists have attempted instead to participate, uninvited, in strikes, demonstrations, and riots initiated by the ( nationalists, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly, Communist propaganda pamphlets have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework, Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their own, the Commnists try to impress upon the popular mind the need and desirability of a common front, Occasionally, such tactics are accompanied by attacks on the nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a popular front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for coopereting or conducting negotiations with the French, Moreover, Commmists have been known to facilitate the arrest of nationalists and to claim credit for successful nationalist demonstrations, 1. Since the Communists have no perty in Spanish Morocco and, in fact, are unable to operate in that zone to any appreciable degree, this discussion is confined to the French Zone and Tangier, SECRET — SE TY INFORMATION === [PDF page 289] === DE EEE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION III. GAPABILITIES | To date, the small Moroccan Commmist Party has had practically |; no influence on the nationalist movement, largely because (1) the nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in non-Communist areas; (2) the netionalists are concerned with maintaining close ties with the Sultan; (3) financial support for the nationalist movement is derived primarily from Morocco's upper middle class; (4) the local Commmist Party is largely French in membership, and (5) the present nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Commmism and the devotion of Commnmism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would dislike as much as that of the French. Moreover, the Moroccan Commmist Party, never large, has declined to its lowest postwar strength, The capabilities of the Moroccan Commmist Party at this time remain minimal either for achieving its own current local objectives or for furthering Soviet policy. It has always been hampered by the poor quality of its leadership. This is evidenced by the success of the Istiqial, Morocco's largest nationalist party, in infiltrating the Commnist-dominated labor federation, UGSCM (Union Générale des Syndicats Confeddérdés du Maroc, Moroccan affiliate of France's Communist-controlled € CGT), Although Moroccans are legally forbidden to belong to unions and carry on union activities only by official toleration, Istiqlal has been able to gain control of the organization. Three factors have been largely responsible for the decline of Communist influence among labor: (1) the ability of certain nationalist leaders, (2) the ineffectiveness of Communist leadership, and (3) deportation by the French of the ablest and most influential Commmists in the party and the Union, There is little likelihood of early improvement in the Communist leadership potentials either in the party or its labor federation, In his statement to the Central Committee of the Moroccan Commnist Party in late 1951, Ali Yata (Moroccan Commmist Party leader, now deported and imprisoned) perceived certain additional and fundamental reasons for the party's failures, He noted that the party had become so panicky that excessive secrecy prevented the organization from getting anything done, From November 1950 to the end of 1951, the Central Committee had held only one meeting and that lasted only one day. For two years, no sectional or regional meetings had been held except in Rabat, Not a petition for the Stockholm Peace Appeal or a Five Power Conference had been circulated up to that time, A more fundamental problem remained unsolved, Ali Yata said, Those sections having primarily Arab membership neglect Morocco's European SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION. q === [PDF page 290] === EEE IEEE EE EE EEX~——_ EO Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION . _3minority, believe it dishonorable to use the French language, and have even rid themselves in an "arbitrary and authoritarian" manner of comrades who had retained some colonial prejudices instead of helping such men change their minds. In sections in which French membership predominates, Ali Yata often found a "paternalistic, colonist" attitude shown toward Moslem members, The Moroccan Communist leaders also find themselves ina dilemma because of conflicts in nationality among its membership. In pretending to be part of the Moroccan nationalist movement, the Commnist Party alienates local French residents of the middle class who fear for their safety in an independent, nationalist Morocco, and loses many local skilled French workers who fear the competition of native labor without, however, gaining the support of nationalist Moroccans, This last group will continue to join instead the core of the nationalist movement —- the Istiqlal Party. Membership in Istiqlal, though not without its dangers, at least does not put any Moroccan under the double jeopardy of being suspect as both a Communist and a nationalist as well as defenseless against present police controls and the future uncertainties of Commnist intentions. Ali Yata, in his 1951 diagnosis, considered the wealness of the party to stem above all from the fact that it presented itself merely as a part ( of the nationalist movement. Although Ali Yata stated that it was correct for the Moroccan Commmist Party in August 1946 to place "national liber— ation" at the center of its program, he criticized it for subsequently using the traditional bourgeois nationalist concept of "independence" to mean formal independence without any social content, thus sacrificing the distinctive content of the Commmist Party's program, The party, he charged. dealt with all major nationalist problems, but failed to relate them to the daily needs of the laboring mn, Thus it neglected the "vanguard" and the "fundamental armies" of national liberation until even the labor union movement "ceased to be oriented by us," while the nationalist movement itself was left to seek independence both through the UN, an instrument of "imperialists," and through the United States which now “oceupies" Morocco, The French Government throughout 1952 has been increasingly firm in its repression of the Moroccan Communist Party. Some of the non— Moroccan leaders have been deported, and virtually all others not previously arrested for some infraction, have been held under arrest since the December 1952 riots which followed the death of the Tunisian labor leader, Ferhat Hached, The Moroccan Communist newspaper L'Espoir, long suspended from publication because of financial difficulties, had reappeared during 1952 but both the Commmist Party and its press have been legally proscribed since the December 1952 riots, SECRET - SECURIJY INFORMATION Aporoved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 291] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ‘SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION The Communist labor federation maintains considerable strength in railway, highway transport, power, and electrical commnications unions, and some strength in port unions, but it lacks capabilities for producing a complete tie-up by strikes in even a single industry without the assistance of one or both of the two anti-Commmnist Buropean labor federations. The effective leadership of the Moroccan Communist Party and almost all of the hard-core has always been European, With the membership estimated now at not more than 4,000 or 5,000, this probably still remains true. The Moroccan Communists who have thus far found the majority of their recruits among French residents have more recently had some limited success among young French-educated Moslem intellectuals, If the effectiveness of its leadership were not at such low ebb, the Communist potentials in Morocco, even given the present membership, might present a totally different picture, During the past year, an unhealthy political atmosphere has developed in which an astute Communist leadership might find more fertile ground than at any time since the end of World War II, This situation is the outgrowth of a. combination of factors, including (1) severe French repressive actions against the nationalists, (2) the exile or arrest of all the principal nationalist leaders, and (3) the total failure of the nationalists to achieve any of their aims during the past two years. Because of the small] number of Istiglal members of leadershiv calibre and the impatience of younger, more radical, yet inexperienced members, the absence of such essentially moderate Istiqlal leaders as Balafrej, leadership of an effective nationalist "underground" might become the prize of outsiders, However, the Commnist Party appears at this time to be too impoverished financially and too feeble in membership, organization, leadership, and influence to capitalize on the opportunity presented to them by nationalist frustrations and the absence of the _ relatively moderate, anti-Commnist and experienced top nationalist leadership. The Communists will probably contimue their efforts to join forces with the nationalists; and, in the long run, there is some danger that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives they would accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it presently remains doubtful that the Communists will capture control of the nationalist movement in Morocco, Commmist influence might ultimately induce the nationalist groups to adopt more anti-Western policies and increasingly to resort to direct action, . SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Apnoroved For Release YQ 7/0): A-R IP S6BOOP59UROOOSOO008S000 1-4 === [PDF page 292] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN MOROCCO: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The Commnist Party of Morocco is known to be quite small; however, the exact size of the present membership is not known, A total strength of about 3,000 members would seem to be a reasonable estimate in terms of the known activities of the party. While the Moroccan Communist Party has recently een most active in urban areas of the French Zone, particularly in Casablanca, the geographical distribution of party members is not known, The effectiveness of the party's leadership has diminished greatly as the result of the recent arrest of many of the principal leaders by the French Protectorate authorities. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH Since no general election has ever been held in any of the three zones of Morocco, and since, in local elections, the native electorate — by law and by choice is always very restricted, the electoral strength of the Communist Party of Morocco cannot be estimated, ( III, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The origin of the December 1952 riots in Casablanca and elsewhere in the French Zone in Morocco is not definitely known, Probably it was essentially nationalist, although Commmist agitators may have worked individually to provoke increased violence. Because of the relative weakness of the Communist Party, it has apparently hesitated to instigate violent demonstrations on its own initiative during recent months. But party members may well have capitalized upon situations stemming from grievances voiced by nationalists and others. At present, the party has no ability to rally sizable elements of the population to violent action. It can only capitalize upon the discontent aroused by other, more popular groups. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM ‘In the Spanish Zone, the local authorities have, of course, been relentless in their suppression of Communism ever since the advent of the Franco regime, In the French Zone, the Communists were tolerated, though hampered by the Protectorate authorities, until Tecember 1952, Since then, the party has been officielly outlawed, its newspapers suppressed, and its leaders either arrested or deported from the country. In addition, a number of less-important Commnists have been taken into custody. In the international zone of Tangier, where Communist groups are still permitted, the local police restrain Communist agitation whenever such agitation can be construed as a possible threat to public order, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 293] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON LABOR Because of the numerical weakness of the Moroccan Com:unists, no reliable estimate can be formed of their strength in key industries. Despite their modest numbers, the Commnists, because of their discipline and energy, were for some time able to wield control over the largest labor federetion in the French Zone, the General Union of Confederated Syndicates of Morocco (UGSCM), which is affiliated with the Commnistdominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France. But the Communists eventually proved unable to withstand*a bid for control by the more numerous and better-led netionalists, Although important posts in the UGSCM are undoubtedly still in the hands of Commnists, it is generally believed that leadership of this organization has, within the past year or so, definitely passed into the hands of the nationalists, The remaining two labor federations in the French Zone, the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC) and Workers Force (FO) are both anti- Communist. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Although a considerable number of Commnist front organizations were established in French Morocco immediately after World War II, few if any of these enjoyed any continued success. Consequently, by December € 1952, when the Protectorate officials outlawed the Commnist Party, most, if not all, of these front organizations had already ceased to function, Although information is not complete on the subject, it seems probable that if any such organizations exist at present, they are small and relatively inective, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT No information is available regarding the number of Communists and Communist sympathizers at the higher levels of the government, including the armed forces, either in the Spanish or in the French zones, The number appears, however, to be extremely low. Insofar as the number of Commnists and sympathizers in agencies of the government administering nationalized industries is concerned, no figures are available; but Communists are known to work at the lower levels in railroads, ports, telephone and telegraph - installations, and in mining operations, VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Except for occasional illegal pamphlets, the Communist press is now non-existent in Morocco, Since radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, no Communist influence has been felt in this field, There is likewise no evidence of Communist infiltretion in religious organizations. Though Commmists are known to hold’posts in the school system in the French zone, 4t seems probable that the mmber of such persons is small in terms of the total number of teachers.. ¢ SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 294] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION IX. GOMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES In the Moroccan Socialist Party, there is no evidence of Communist influence. However, in the nationalist Istiqlal Party, which follows an anti-Communist program, there are certain individuals, some of whom work as labor leaders in Istigqlal-controlled labor federation (UGSCM), who are said to follow the Communist "line," Reports of unknown reliability have also circulated that certain opportunistic leaders of some of the smaller nationalist splinter groups have upon occasion voiced pro-Communist sentiments, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Suppression of Commmism in the Spanish Zone is so rigorous and of such long standing that apparently very little propaganda activity takes place in that area, With’ the outlawing of the Communist Party in the French zone toward the end of 1952, Commnist propaganda in that region has been confined to occasional clandestine handbills and pamphlets, At least one of the pamphlets is thought to have been printed outside Morocco and smggled in for distribution. Prior to the suppression of the Moroccan Commmist Party, two Parisian Communist dailies circulated in the French Zone; but their total circulation was only about 225 copies daily. XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION No specific information is available regarding the financial resources of the Moroccan Communist Party. The small scope of the party's activities before it was suppressed indicate that they were small, The infrequency with which the Conmumist "weekly" newspaper appeared is further evidence of the perty's financial wealmess. Urgent appeals to the public for donations were very frequent, XII, SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites have consular, diplomatic, or trade representatives in any part of Morocco, Though the Soviet Union is entitled by treaty to participate in the international administration of Tangier, it has never availed itself of this privilege, XIII, COMMUNIST INTSRNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As a result of the recent outlawing of the Commnist Party of Morocco, Commnist international organizations can no longer function actively in Morocco, except in the international zone of Tangier, Even before the suppression of the Commmist Party in the French Zone, Commmist international organizations had ceased to be active in that area. Information is not available concerning the existence or operation of such organizations in the international zone, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 295] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The Commnist Party of Morocco, like those of Algeria and Tunisia, is under the direction of the French Communist Party. The influence of the French Communist Party is known to be exerted, at least in part, by French representatives to Moroccan Party Congresses. Furthermore, Communist couriers are known to pass through North Africa from time to time., SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION 7 é === [PDF page 296] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.16 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, PAKISTAN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 297] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword ese @ ee. eoeweeveee © eee ee © © © @ @ ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. « e 1 Ie Objectives ooeeseevoveeee ee ee eee ee e @ e 1 IIe Tactics eseeoeeeevev#e ee eeeerteteee ee @ 2 IIIe Capabilities Pa a er ee er ee ee Se Se eS 2 er h ASSETS 2 ec eeeecees 6 Te Numerical Strength « «eeesecceese see ee & @ 6 II. Electoral Strength. ss eeeeeccsccceese 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action T IV. Government Policy Toward Communism... eeeeeee T Vs Communist Influence in Labor ss eeeceeeceecs 8 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations e ee seresceee eee 8 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government « « « e see 9 VIIIe Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ¢ e e 9 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political : Parties e seeeceteuenvuaevreeeeerener 10 Xe Communist Propaganda Media e eee s2ceeecs eevee e 10 XIe Financial Condition e« «© «seerecesvcecece eevee & 11 XII. Soviet-Satellite official Assets ee5u«8uere88eee @ @ 11 XIII. Communist International Organizations e« « « « « e « « 12 XIV. Communist Communication Network « «eee scervcvcee 12 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 298] === EI ED LT! CCC OOO OOOO OOO Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 299] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The broad aims of the Communist party in Pakistan are to root out the vestiges and influence of Anglo-American "imperialism" in Pakistan and to.end the present regime in Pakistan and set up a "people's democracye" To achieve these larger goals, specific shortterm objectives of the Communist party include (1) the withdrawal of Pakistan: from the Commonwealth and the sterling bloc; (2) the nationalization of British-owned commercial enterprises in Pakistan; (3) the. removal of British personnel from all branches of the Pakistan Government and especially from the armed forces; (4) the reorientation of Pakistan's import-export policy and the country's trade relations with a view to making the economy less intermeshed with that of the Western powers; (5) a change in status of Pakistan from a dominion to a republic; (6) the removal of the Kashmir issue from.the UN; (7) the reduction of Pakistan's defense expenditures; (8) the dissolution of the present Constituent Assembly and its reelection on the basis of a broadened franchise; (9) the withdrawal of the draft of basic principles for the new Constitution recommended to the Constituent Assembly's Basic Principles Committee; (10) the repeal of laws granting the government the power to arrest persons without trial; (11) the confiscation of the holdings of large landowners without compensation. These objectives have been keyed primarily to the requirements of international Communism, with secondary emphasis on promoting the domestic political fortunes of the party. There are no indications now that the objectives, all of which are being pursued simultaneously, are likely to be revised in the near future. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 300] === ‘Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION II. TACTICS The party organization in Pakistan is following a united front policy. It appeals for the support not only of the working class but also of the peasantry and some bourgeois elements. Cutting across class boundaries, it appeals for the support of “anti-imperialist, anticapitalist, anti-feudal, and democratic elements." It does not reject support from any quarter, left or righte Communist attempts to build this united front appear to follow constitutional procedures and avoid or at least deemphasize illegal activity and violence. To employ, or urge the use of, force would tend to alienate the public, thereby isolating the party, and would also invite vigorous repressive action by the government. Opportunities do exist, however, for open activities and agitation. Past attempts to build a united front while employing violence have failed and there is no evidence at present of any positive preparations for launching a campaign of violence in Pakistan. While the present policy of the party in general envisages neither the advocacy nor the instigation of violence, it does allow participation in outbreaks of violence instigated by others if fairly broad-based and deemed likely to benefit the party; under special circumstances, the party might be prepared to instigate violence on a limited scale. Even with regard to strikes, _the party has directed its members to avoid fomenting strikes on the labor front, but has also advised them to lend full support when spontaneous strikes do break out and then to make every effort to end them successfully and quickly. The present program of building a united front and observing constitutional procedures assigns a prominent place to propaganda and agitation. Among the major propaganda themes employed in Pakistan are that (1) Pakistan is independent in name only and that imperialism, with which the present government is allied, still dominates the country, exploiting it and retarding its cultural and economic development; imperialism, the Communists say, prevents industrialization and impedes the liquidation of feudal and semi-feudal systems of agriculture; (2) foreign imperialist domination of Pakisten can be ended, and real progress achieved, as in China, only after the local bourgeois and feudal elements, and the Moslem League governments representing them, are defeated and power transferred to the people; (3) they can be defeated if the people unite; (4) in more and more areas of the world, especially in Asia, the democratic forces are already rising up against the cracking imperialist system and its netive servitors; (5) the imperialists will not hesitate to involve the world in a global war and in fact have SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 301] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ~ 3 aalready launched their aggressive war in Korea; and (6) the USSR and the People's Democracies strive for peace and support the people of Pakistan and the colonial countries in their struggle for true independence. The party makes a concentrated effort to relate its major propaganda themes to the interests, problems, and grievances of specific sections of the population -- students, workers, women, etc. In particular, the Communists seek to capitalize on nationalist, anti-imperialist feelings and economic interests by linking the rise in the cost-of-living to "capitalist-imperialist" preparations for war. In order to identify the party with the aspirations of the various sections of the population, they also agitate for a minimum wage law, agrarian reform, increased educational facilities, lower school tuitions, free medical aid, civil liberties, peace, and aid to refugees from India. In order to guide popular feelings on these issues in the direction the party desires, much of this propaganda and agitation is carried out through the various Communist front organizations tailored to reach and attract such special interest groups as peasants, workers, writers, students, women, and youthe Communication between the party in Pakistan and Communist forces outside the country probably does not represent any great difficulty: Communist publications are being imported, individual Communists and delegations come to, and go from, Pakistan fairly frequently, and both the USSR and Communist China maintain Embassies in the country. The © transfer of funds is not so easy. Various roundabout devices are resorted to, prominent among them being the retention by the party of proceeds from literature shipped in from Communist countries. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 302] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET +» SECURITY INFORMATION ITI. CAPABILITIES The ability of the party to attain its objectives is not great now and present indications are that it will not increase significantly within the next few years. An important factor severely limiting this ability is the condition of the party itself. It is a small organization and appears to have only a small popular following. Its representation in the central and provincial legislative assemblies of Pakistan is negligible. In the past, the party has been plagued with internal dissension and disunity and this may still characterize to some extent the organization in West Pakistan. Also, the party appears to be financially weak. The party's own view of its deficiencies in East Bengal toward the end of 1951 was that it was disorganized at the subprovincial levels, inefficient, lacking in sufficient mass contact and sympathy, inadequate in assuring publicity, and weak financially. Its financial position was in fact so bad that the party in East Bengal was even considering closing down the Provincial Center and some of the sub-provincial branches unless funds were forthcoming in the near future. Another important factor limiting the capabilities of the party is the strong position of the Moslem League and its attitude towards the Communist party. The League is the largest single political party in - Pakistan and has the largest popular following. It led the movement S for the establishment of Pakistan and has been the party in power at the national, provincial, and sub-provincial levels since the inauguration of the Dominion in August 1947. Moslem League governments do not hesitate to move against the Communist party when action is called for and the party has been hit hard on several occasions by the repressive measures taken against it by the government. The association of two top Pakistani Communists with the abortive Rawalpindi conspiracy in early 1951 exposed the party to such government repression as to practically inactivate it and its front organizations for a period of several monthse The student demonstrations leading to rioting in Karachi during the first half of January 1953 presented the government with another opportunity, which it was quick to seize, for moving against the Communists. Despite the party's lack of ability to achieve its short-term objectives through its own unaided efforts, the Communists in Pakistan may possibly see some of their short-term objectives fulfilled in the next few years. This is possible largely because some of the shortterm objectives of the Communists correspond to the goals of other diverse groupSe The withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth, for example, is demanded by the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the largest SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 200 //0 Q - A-RDPS6OBOOZ69RODDOGO00S000 1-4 === [PDF page 303] === nn OOO ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 . SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - 56 Opposition party in Pakistan, and by a number of other groups, some of them fanatical Moslem societies. There is a significant amount of popular sentiment for severance of ties with Britain and it is possible that within the next few years this sentiment, based on a variety of motivating factors, may prevail. SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 304] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN PAKISTAN: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH No precise figures are available for the membership of the Communist Party of Pakistan, The total almost certainly does not exceed 5,000 and may be considerably smaller, However, there may be as many as 50,000 members of organizations under Comaunist control, Even if all of these are considered to be strongly influenced by the Commnist Party —~ an assumption probably not justified -- the proportion of Communists and devoted followers in a total population of approximately 76,000,000 is well under 1/100 of one per cent, Geographically, the Communist membership and following is concentrated most heavily in the provinces of Punjab and East Bengal and in the capital city of Karachi, Communist Party members and sympathizers in Pakistan are drawn in largest part from the educated urban middle class, This is notably the case in West Pakistan; in heavily populated East Pakistan, the party's following apparently includes a proportionately larger number of workers and peasants, Very little is known about the tenacity with which members cling to the party. However, the precipitous decline in membership after € the exposure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in March, 1951 (See Section III) and recurrent reports of frequent internal conflicts in the party indicate that at the present time the Commmist movement in Pakistan is not particularly significant. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH Pakistan has had no general elections since it emerged as a nation in 1947. Partial elections held in Punjab province in 1951 brought a vote divided as follows: Number of Estimated Percentage Party Seats Won of the Vote Cast Moslem League 143 51.1 Jinnah Awami Moslem 31 18,3 League Independents 16 23.7 - Azad Pakistan Party 1 2.0 Islam League 0 yA Communist _2 ae Total 192 100.0 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 305] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION In the Northwest Frontier Province in 1951 three self-styled "Communist sympathizers" ran on the ticket of the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the dominant Moslem League's major opponent, All were defeated. It is probable that Communist vote-getting power would be greater in East Bengal (East Pakistan) than in any of the West Pakistan provinces, The test of the party's overall electoral potential will not be made until the first general elections, which are not expected to be held before late 1953 and probably considerably later, The Communist Party proposes to participate in these elections. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The present policy of the Pakistan Communist Party in respect of the use of violence appears to be one of making common cause with other groups whenever demonstrations occur, The party has little or no independent capability for violent action. As was demonstrated in the Dacca riots of early 1952 and the Karachi riots in January 1953, however, it is ready to seize opportunities to join in demonstrations and to attempt to turn them to Commmist purposes, In March 1951, the Pakistan Government arrested a small number of civilians and high ranking army officers on charges of conspiring to establish a military dictatorship and eventually a Communist state, Fifteen individuals were brought to trial and 14 were convicted, Although the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, as it is known, evidently did show connections between Communist members and sympathizers and a number of ranking army personnel, there is little evidence to suggest that Communist influence in the Pakistani armed forces is now other than negligible, IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Communist Party is a legal political organization in Pakistan and is free to conduct political activities openly, Communist leaders, however, are kept under close surveillance by Pakistan authorities. Both the provincial and the central governments in Pakistan are vested with sweeping powers to deal with threats to public safety. The central goverment, for instance, is authorized by the Pakistan Security Act to detain individuals, disband organizations, and censor or ban publications under specified conditions, Neither provincial nor central authorities have hesitated to exercise these powers and have shown themselves able to withstand Communist agitation against the application of public security legislation, There is no evidence that the Pakistan authorities could not deal effectively with any likely Commnist threat to the security of the state, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 306] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Commmist influence among Pakistan workers is believed to be reflected mainly in the Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF), a Communist - dominated organization affiliated with the Commnist international confederation, the World Federation of Trade Unions, PTUF affiliates are estimated to have no more than 25,000 members, or from 5 to 10 per cent of the unionized workers in Pakistan. Factional differences occurred in the PTUF in 1951 and were still in evidence at the organization's annual conference in April, 1952, Few other details are available on the PTUF. In particular, data on the size and location of its individual affiliated unions are largely lacking.. A small number of labor organizations led by members of the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the Pakistan Socialist Party, or by former members of the PIUF may be subject to some measure of Commmist influence. The limited information available indicates that these organizations are of negligible importance in Pakistan labor, VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS a Only sketchy data are available for the Communist front organizations active in Pakistan. Summaries of these date follow: Appealing to youth and student ¢roups are the East Pakistan Youth League, with headquarters in Dacca, East Bengel, the East Pakistan Youth Federation, and the Democratic Students! Federation, The last named organization, which is centered in the West Pakistan cities of Lahore and Karachi, is reported to have about 200 members and an additional 300 sympathizers. The Purba Pakistan Mahila Samiti is the Communist-—dominated women's organization in East Pakistan, It maintains contact with the Women's International Democratic Federation, Front organizations in "cultural" and professional fields are: (1) The Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association, with branches in Karachi, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Lyallpur, Okara, Multan, Sukkur, Shikarpur, Hyderabad, and Dac¢a. is engaged in organizing lectures, conferences, and dis-~ cussions on various aspects of life in the USSR, (2) The Pakistan-China Friendship Society, with branches in Lahore and Karz#chi and perhaps in other cities of Pakistan, is devoted to promoting Pakistani good will ‘ toward Commmist China, SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 307] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION (3) The Pakistan-Czechoslovek Cultural Society was reportedly established in December 1951. No other in~* formation about the organization is at hand. (4) The All-Pekistan Progressive Writers! Assoelation which has units in Karachi, lahore, Gujranwala, and Lyalipur, includes several writers of the first rank and the Association is probably the most important Communist propaganda organization in Pakistan. (5) The All-Pakistan Theater Association, the - main body of which is in Karechi, is closely related to the Progressive Writers' Association and the memberships of the two organizations overlap.; (6) The Three Arts Circle, located in Kerachi, also promotes Commnist propaganda. (7) The "peace" front in Pakistan is the Pakistan Peace Committee, with branches in Lahore, Gujranwala, Karachi, Peshawar, and Dacca. It is a standard Commmist "peace" organization and presumably works under the guidance of the international Communist "peace" movement. None of these front organizations is presently a major or even a significant force in Pakistan, The membership of the various fronts is smal] and to a considerable extent duplicating, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTC GOVERNMENT The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, which serves both as a central legislature and as a constitution-meking body, has among its 79 members three known Communist sympathizers. There are no known Commnists or ' sympathizers in the executive branch of the central government,.and there are very few in the provincial governments, With the exposure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy, the Pakistan armed forces are believed now to be substantially free of Communist influence at any level. And there is no indication of extensive Communist infiltretion into the police and security forces of the states and central government, VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The Comcunist Party itself has virtually no impact on Pakistani public opinicn, but some Comceunist influence is nonetheless exercised through front organizations and perty-controlled or influenced publications. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 308] === TR ne Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION. -~10-. IX, COMMUNIST INFILTRATICN OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES The Jama'tat-i-Islam, a right-wing religious-political organization devoted to furthering the principles of Islam, is known to have limited relationships with Commnist front organizations, but the degree of Communist infiltration is insignificant. The smali Pakistan Socialist Party has hed some association with Pakistan Communists since its preak with India's Socialist Party in 1947. A more important organization, the Azad Pakistan Party, which was founded in Lahore in 1950, is reported to have a Communist cell within its ranks. The leading figures in the Azad Pakistan Party are the wealthy Punjabi fellow travellers, Mian Iftikharuddin and Shaukat Hayat Khan, Communist influence in this leftist party is therefore believed to be substantial, The Jinnah Awami Moslem League, which has thus far constituted the principal opposition to the dominant Moslem Learue, includes among its members a few known Communists and sympathizers. Their influence is presumably of some consequence although the party cannot be classified as Communist-controlled, & The Civil Liberties Union of West Pakistan, an organization whose chief aim is to promote agitation against the provincial and central governments on the issue of civil liberties, is considered a united front of several opposition parties rather than a Comounist—controlled organization. Its leaders heve, however, included prominent Communists and: sympathizers, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Two students' papers, the Students’ Voice and the Students! Herald, about which few details are available, are believed to be the only outright Communist periodicals in Pakistan, Pro-Commmnist domestic publications are the Pakistan Times of Lahore, published by Mian Iftikharuddin, with a circulation of 18,000-20,000; the Socialist, with a circulation of 1,000; and Imroze, also published by ( Iftikharuddin, with a circulation of 3,000. Printing establishments available to Communists, if not under Communist control, are the People's Publishing House in Lahore, the Pakistan Times Press in Lahore, and the Imroze Press in Karachi and Lahore. The quality of the work done by these publishing houses is good, SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION t === [PDF page 309] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION There is a substantial flow of Communist propaganda material into Pakistan from India, the United Kingdom, and from Soviet/satellite countries. Imports of periodicals from the USSR were halted by the Pakistan authorities after the disclosure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in March 1951. However, the Soviet Embassy, the Czechoslovak Legation, and the Chinese Communist Embassy provide channels for the inflow of Communist books, pamphlets, and periodicals. Communist books and pamphlets are sold widely and cheaply in Pakistan cities. The Soviet Embessy in Karachi issues occasional press releases in the Bengali and Sindhi languages and a regular weekly bulletin in Urdu. The Commmist Party of Pakistan has no domestic radio facilities and no apparent influence over radio programs. Moscow programs beamed to India and Pakistan are broadcast daily in Fnglish, Hindustani, and Bengali. A program from Tashkent, in English and perhaps Bengali, is also beamed to India and Pakistan daily. XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION The Commnist Party of Pakistan apparently has limited funds. For a period of more than a year, from March 1950 to May 1951, the party in West Pakistan is reported to have spent only the eouivalent of US $8000 to $10,000. Available information is that the East Pakistan party is chronically in financial difficulties and presumably financially weaker than the West Pakistan organization. Sources of Communist Party income, in addition to or apart from subsidies from abroad, are membership dues, donations, levies on the incomes of party members, sales of propaganda material (supplied in largest part from abroad by the Communist movement), and, it is reported, profits from trade with the Communist bloc, No data are available as to the absolute or relative importance of these various sources of income, A Karachi firm entitled Traders is reported to have been set up under Commmnist Party auspices to conduct trade with the USSR, with the profits to be divided on a 30~70 basis between the firm and the party; no information has been received as to success or failure of this enterprise. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Official missions from the Commmist bloc countries to Pakistan. are the Soviet Embassy, with a staff of 14 officials; the Chinese Communist Embassy, with eight official personnel; the Czechoslovak Legation, the Polish Trade Mission, and the Hungarian Trade Mission, These three European satellite missions have a total of seven officials and an wlmown SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 310] === pproved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION ORG RE re ~ 12 number of clerks. The Soviet and Chinese missions engage jn limited overt propaganda activities such as the dissemination of publications like New Times and New China and the showing of motion pictures. XITI. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the Commnist international organizations maintains offices in Pakistan. Pakistani representatives appear frequently at meetings of Communist international organizations. Recent movements of Pakistani Commnists and sympathizers to Commnist meetings abroad are summarized in the following table: Meeting Date Size of Pakistan Delegation International Economic Conference (Preparatory Comittee) (Copenhagen) Oct. 1, 1951 1 World Peace Council (Vienna) Nov, 1-7, 1951 2-3 World Economic Conference (Moscow) Apr. 3-10, 1952 17-23 Peace Movement (Peiping) May 28, 1952 5 Vienna Peace Congress (Vienna) Dec, 1952 4 ( South Asian Conference of Youth and Feb, 19-28, 1948 9 Students (co-sponsored by WFDY and IUS) (Calcutta) Asian-Pacific Peace Conference (Peiping) Oct. 2-12, 1952 30 World Congress of Peoples for Peace Dee.12~20, 1952 7 (Vienna ) 1st International Conference in Defense Apr.12-16, 1952 4 of Children (sponsored by WIDF) (Vienna) XIV, COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK No detailed information is available on Communist commnications systems and techniques in Pakistan. The geographic separation of East and West Pakistan poses a difficult commmications problem for the Communist party in Pakistan; in practice, at least, party units in East Pakistan appear to be under the direction of the Indian Commnist Party rather than under the authority of the Pakistan Party. South Asian Stalinist parties have traditionally looked to the British Commnist Party for guidance, and Communist emissaries to the subcontinent have frequently been from UK or Commonwealth Stalinist groups in the past, Recent missions of Commmists to Pakistan include Ernest - Thornton, a high-ranking Australian Communist, who represented the SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION SEGRE = De = ee === [PDF page 311] === en OOO OOOO eee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -13- World Federation of Trade Unions at the 1950 conference of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation; T, E, McWhinnie of the WFIU secretariat, who was in Lahore in February 1952; and Ivor Montague of the World Peace Council, also in Lahore in February 1952, SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 312] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET. TR~6165.17 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: LITE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, SYRIA - LEBANON OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEAR DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET === [PDF page 313] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword « «cece ecevvrecreeceeeeeeoev ee eo 0 @ ii | OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « eo « 1 Ie Objectives «see ccececersr cere veer eevees @ 1 II. Tactics »«eececccrsecereseesrereeeeven 1 III. Capabilities « «.eesececrecreeseeveseer 3 ASSETS eccceesecee 5 Te Numerical Strength ee eescecesseecoeceveecs 2 IIe Electoral Strength. ecesceccececcccesevcecs 6 Tile MAlitary Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 ( IV. Government Policy Toward Communism » « «eee eee e 6 Ve Communist Influence in Labor « « « we ecoeosveevcece T eget ast VIe Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations «e«e«ercercecrervecee 8 VIIe Communist Infiltration into Government «. « « ee 0 « 9 VIIIe Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation e «. 12 IX Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties re a a a er a rr a er re rr 12 X. Communist Propaganda Media « « e oe eosceceveevee 12 XI. Financial Condition sseecccecsecsceece lt XII, Soviet-Satellite Official Assets... eeeeeee 15 XIII. Communist International Organizations. 2. +e«eee 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network ee eecneneerev eee 16 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 314] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational . potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, CC, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Cy ii === [PDF page 315] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, the oldest, largest, and best-organized Communist movement in the Arab world, was outlawed in Syria in December 1947 and in Lebanon in January 1948. Always closely linked since their inception in 1924, the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties: became separate entities at the end of 1943, following the dissolution of the Comintern, but by January 1951 had merged again into a single organization. Khalid Bakdash, a Moscow-trained Communist of Kurdish descent, has been the leader and theoretician of the Communist movement in Syria. and Lebanon since 1935. Bakdash, head of the joint Central Committee of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party as now constituted, and other highly-placed members of the Communist Party hierarchy and the principal Partisans of Peace organizers in Syria and Lebanon are. in close contact with the Soviet Legations in Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus, Syria. Bakdash is believed also to coordinate Communist activities in Iraq and to exercise a certain amount of influence over the Jordanian Communist Party, which, however, is controlled by the Arab Section of the Israeli Communist Party. Syria and Lebanon are declared, from the Communist viewpoint, to be in the phase of "democratic national liberation." The objectives are: (1) to put an end to “imperialist political and economic domination" and eliminate the agents of the "imperialist powers"; (2) to liquidate the remnants of feudalism in Syria and Lebanon; and (3) to establish a popular democratic regime. In September 1952, Bakdash described the specific duties of the party as follows: (1) extension of the campaign for peace and national independence through mass movements against the military projects of the Western powers and against the "treacheries" of the rulers in Syria and Lebanon; (2) the establishment of democratic freedom for the masses; (3) dissemination of propaganda concerning the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union; (4) attraction to the Partisans of Peace of the masses and notables, irrespective of social position, even regardless of their opinions of the internal situation. II.. TACTICS The Communist Party in Syria has been forced to slacken both overt and covert activities since the establishment of the Silu-Shishakli military regime, though some front organization activity persists. The Partisans of Peace operates legally in Lebanon, where most party energy is channeled into "peace" activities. Communist strategy in both SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 316] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION countries continues to be concerned primarily with: (1) strengthening the labor unions and extending the labor movement among the unorganized masses; (2) encouraging political activity among the workers, particularly in support of "peace" and in opposition to the military projects of the "imperialist" powers; (3) organizing activities among the peasants in support of their demands for land and water. The holding of peasant conferences and the formation of committees to defend and direct these demands is an immediate goal. Propaganda targets for the creation of a people's national front | movement have been members of government, the press, minorities (particularly the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox, and the Kurds), teachers, student groups, intellectual and professional elements, women's - organizations, and villagers. Up to the present, Soviet and Communist propaganda has made progress primarily by capitalizing on the parallels between (1) its alleged goals and those of local nationalism, and (2) the rising discontent of the urban bourgeoisie with the corruption, self-interest, and monopoly of power of the governing groups. Communist agitation among industrial workers in Syria has never reached serious proportions. Only two unions are considered to be under threat of Communist contro], the Mechanical Loom Operators (Aleppo, no estimate of membership) and the Mechanics (Damascus, 187 members). ( Communist membership in these two unions is probably small. In Lebanon, Mustafa al-'Aris, the leading Communist, is president of both the Printers' and Typesetters' Union and of the Federation of Labor Unions, an unincorporated body of some 19 unions. Of an estimated total Federation membership of 10,000, only a small portion (300) can be considered Communist. The majority of the members are leftist or neutral and willing to benefit from ‘Aris's enegetic leadership. The Hotel, Cafe, and Restaurant Union (800 members) is powerful and Communist-controlled. ‘Aris is also a member of the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions and has been a delegate to many Communist World Congresses. Few Communists in Syria and Lebanon pay regular dues, and the party depends largely upon contributions from wealthier members and sympathizers. Some of the contributions go toward party operations, most of the money being used for Partisan of Peace campaigns and special causes for which appeal is made locally. It is assumed that funds are also received from various outside sources, through the Soviet Legations. or in the form of “presents” from front groups abroad. The Communists have never succeeded in electing their candidates to either the Syrian or Lebanese Parliaments. In the 1951 Lebanese general elections, however, it is believed that only direct interference by the government prevented the elections of at least one pro-Communist deputy. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 317] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION III. CAPABILITIES Communist capabilities for recruitment appear greatest among the students and professional men, especially those in the legal profession. Strongly nationalist reactions among politically sensitive elements in Syria and Lebanon against the Western “imperialist” and the US and UK role in the establishment of Israel have tended to make even wealthier men sympathetic toward the USSR as the enemy of the US and the UK. Some of these have become interested in Communism, or at least in participating in various front activities. This same intense nationalism, however, is also a danger to the Communist movement and has caused considerable deviationism within party ranks. The general trend in the area toward some form of socialism is a factor which the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party has been able to exploit. Lack of ideological sophistication among the various socialist parties of Syria and Lebanon has also made it relatively easy for the Communists to penetrate into some of them.;, The strongest factor limiting Syro-Lebanese Communist Party effectiveness is that the party promotes the interests of a foreign country -- the Soviet Union. Communism is also still widely held to ( be anti-religious and to be destructive offamily life. Religion and family life are the two poles around which the life of the average Syrian and Lebanese revolves. Communism has had the strongest appeal for groups looking for outside support for nationalist or separatist demands, but the enthusiasm of some of these groups for the USSR has been noticeably tempered by a dislike of Communism as a political and economic system and by an antipathy toward all foreign, including Soviet, control. The working class in Syria and Lebanon contains large. numbers of religious and ethnic minorities -- especially Armenians -- whose leadership cannot easily be imposed on Arabs and Moslems. The Kurds have shown a reluctance to join a Soviet-led Kurdish independence movement in the absence of large-scale Soviet support. Among the villages, in the autonomy-minded Druze and Alawite areas and among the tribesmen in the Jazirah, the predominant concern with regional and clan loyalties, rather than a political or class-conscious awareness of economic, social, and ideological problems is the principal barrier to Communist effectiveness among the masses. Widespread illiteracy among the workers and peasants of Syria has hampered the spread of written propaganda. . Before the advent of reform-minded governments in Syria and Lebanon during 1952, nationalist organizations, both of the left and the right, accomplished much of the disruptive work the Communists ( - SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 318] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION would normally have expected to do themselves. Major Communist opportunity in Syria and Lebanon appears to lie not in the present strength of the movement itself, but in the weaknesses of the regimes in power. The Syro-Lebanese Communist Party remains incapable of developing effective cadres in rural and urban areas and has not yet overcome the, cultural and political estrangement of intellectuals from workers » city from countryside. Communism, theoretically appreciated according to ‘Stalinist classics, and energetically pursued, appears to be embodied in Syria and Lebanon in only a handful of over-worked leaders. Should the present ruling groups fail to remedy the outstanding social and economic inequities in Syria and Lebanon, however, the traditional bulwarks against Communism will be seriously weakened. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. € === [PDF page 319] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION TTT COMMUNISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH Always closely linked since their inception in 1923, the Lebanon and Syrian Communist Parties split along geographical lines after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1944, but merged again into a single organization in January 1951, The Syrian section, which is ‘closely supervised by the party's founder and prime mover, a Kurdish Moslem named Khalid Bakdash, has traditionally been stronger than the Lebanese, However, under the increasingly authoritarian Silu-Shishakli regime, Syrian Communists have been severely hampered in their activities in the past year, and the party is now virtually inactive in Damascus. The most recent estimates place the total Syrian membership in the neighborhood of 10,000 and the Lebanese at around 15,000; if sympathizers are included, these figures might be increased to 12,000 in the case of Syria, and 20,000 in Lebanon, There are approximately 30 front organizations in Lebanon, and some 25 such groups in Syria. From its beginning, the Syrian Commnist Party made particular efforts to recruit among minorities with nationalist or separatist aspirations, or among those with a keen sense of their unequal position ~ in the Syrian state -—- Kurds, Alawites, Druzes, and Armenians, An estimated 45 percent of the total party membership in Syria are Armenians, Among the Moslems, the party has attracted professional men, writers, lawyers, students, and white collar workers. Except for Palestine Arab refugees, few workers and peasants have thus far joined, and Communist influence is not significant among the labor unions, There are perhaps 2,500 hard-core Communists in Syria; and around 4,500 in Lebanon, coming mainly from trade unions and minority groups. The leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party have demonstrated little discipline, initiative, or administrative ability, leaving the accomplishment of their party's tasks to particular individuals, rather than to effective cadres. Moreover, as Bakdash has asserted, they "usually think only within the framework of the situation and activities of existing branch committees and cells Land often within a/ narrow provincialism which does not look beyond its quarter or city....They do not think of anything new." There is also a high turnover in personnel in both the Syrian and Lebanese sections, Commnist Party membership in both Syria and Lebanon is concentrated principally in the cities and larger towns. The following is a rough estimate of the distribution of party strength by towns: SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 320] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Syrja Lebanon | Aleppo 220043000 Beirut seceeee 283000 Damascus..2,000 Tripoli,....- «4 000 Homs......1,000 Mount Lebanon..3,000_ Latakia..,1,000 TI, ELECTORAL STRENGTH Although Communism was legally outlawed in December 1947 in Syria and in January 1948 in Lebanon, the party has continued to present candidates in local and national elections in both countries. In April 1951, for example, a known Commmist candidate was permitted to run openly: for public office in the Lebanese general elections, In Syria, the Democratic National Front, a Commmist political front organization, presented a list of its candidates for the Syrian national elections held in 1949. -In both contests, however, the Communists were defeated, registering some strength only in Beirut, Aleppo, and Damascus. ITI, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The Lebanese Communist Party habitually attempts to exploit local dissidence and unrest by organizing mass demonstrations and riots -—~ or < more commonly projecting themselves into those already taking place, Although Commnists in Damascus are disinclined to risk a serious clash with the armed forces, particularly the security police, they are known to have participated in demonstrations by both leftist and rightist groups. On October 12, 1951, a Partisans of Peace meeting in Homs clashed with police and was broken up with the temporary arrest of more than 100 of the estimated 800 participants; seven Communists were arrested, Before Colonel Shishakli's coup in November 1951 there were reports of clashes between small groups of Commmists and members of the anti-Communist Syrian Social National Party, nearly all of which occurred in the Latakia area, Since the coup, Communist demonstrations and open clashes with opponents have virtually. ceased, The party is said to have terrorist and goon squads in the Aleppo area; but their mumbers are probably small and their equipment scanty. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM Although both the Syrian and Lebanese parties have been legally proscribed, successive Syrian and Lebanese administrations, with the exception of the short-lived, firmly anti-Communist Za'im regime in Syria in 1949, have not been consistent in their efforts to curtail Communist activities, It has been only recently that the Silu-Shishakli government SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION € === [PDF page 321] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION in Syria hes clamped down on Commnist — including front organization — activities, It refused exit visas to delegates to the Berlin Youth Festival, Partisans of Peace pamphlets have been seized and distributors of tracts sent to prison. Demonstrations have been frustrated in Damascus, but the police found it more difficult to cope with Commmist and front organization activities in Aleppo and Homs, which are located in expanding industrial and agricultural areas, The illegal Syrian Communist Party confined its overt activities to issuing pamphlets and staging demonstrations, but was aided also by several Syrian newspapers which have often echoed the Commmist line, The party has more freedom in Lebanon, where Communist printing facilities operate with only occasional obstruction from the Lebanese security forces, Beirut is the regional headquarters for Commnist propaganda, and Commmist literature printed locally and abroad is disseminated to other countries uncensored by the lebanese authorities. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The manipulative labor strength of the Lebanese Commmnist Party is exceedingly small and is concentrated in essentially non-strategic labor organizations. In the Lebanese "Federation of Labor Unions", an ( unincorporated body of some 19 unions headed by the prominent Commnist Mustapha ‘Aris, only about 300 workers of the total 10,000 membership are estimated to be Communist Party members, Only the independent Lebanese Hotel Cafes, and Restaurant Workers Union (approximately 800 members) is Commnist—dominated, The Congress of Syrian Workers is the oldest and the major Communist front organization among Syrian labor, having been formed under Communist auspices in 1945, This clandestine organization, which claimed a membership of 17,250 (probably greatly exaggerated) in 1950, is affiliated with the WFIU,: The Congress has not been successful owing to poor discipline and to opposition from both labor and government. On the propaganda front, it has not been nearly as active or as effective as the "peace" groups. In December 1951, in conjunction with the Republican Student's Party, it unsuccessfully attempted to stir up a public protest against the repression of student groups in Barcelona and the jailing of pro- Commmist individuals in Greece,. Key Communist labor organizers from Lebanon (Sa'd ad-Din Mu'minah, liaison man between the Syrian and Lebanese Communist labor movements), Jordan (Muhammad Casim) and Syria (Ibrahim Bakri) and Iraq (Muhammad Fallah) were reported to have attended a congress in Damascus in SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 322] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION January 1952 over which Bakri presided. The following items were said to have been on the agenda: (1) the formation of a regional union of Near Eastern workers; (2) propaganda work within the unions; (3) bettering the economic condition of the workers; and (4) propaganda against the Western powers, The Society for the Salvation of the Worker. This Syrian group, with a current total membership of about 150, established itself in the fall of 1950 in the town of Masyaf, in the Alawite area, Generally it has been ineffectual in organizing labor groups in this region, Communist labor agitation occurs from time to time in Aleppo and Latakia but as yet has not reached serious proportions, According to available data, only two independent Syrian unions are under Communist control: the Mechanical Loom Operators! Union of Aleppo (membership unknown) and the Mechanics! Union of Damascus (187 members), There are no unions or guilds in Syria which can be classified as strategic, VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There are six main categories of front organizations in both Syria and Lebanon: women's organizations, intellectuals' organizations, youth € groups, student groups, labor groups, and religious groups. In all of: these, the main propaganda theme is "peace", A. Syria 1. The Partisans of Peace movement was built up around an inner core of Communists and dependable fellow-travelers who planned recruitment of | members and formulated operations and propaganda programs, All of the members of the original Syrian National Committee of the Partisans of Peace were prominent members of the Communist Party in Syria, They formed the core of the expanded National Committee of 12 as it existed in 1951, By December 1951, branches had been established in all parts of Syria except Jebel Druze, and the National Committee had managed to penetrate the Suret€é Générale, the Deuxifme Bureau, most of the government ministries, and a number of the political parties in Syria, No figures are available on the total membership. Financing appears to have been handled locally, 2. Women's Organizations have been established mainly by Commnist member Miss Falak Tarazi, a lawyer by education. The daughter of the late Muhammad 'Ali al~'Abid, one-time President of Syria from June 1932 to December 1936, she is a protege of Mrs. Zahra' al-'Abid, president of the non—Commnist Syrian League of Women's Clubs, Most of the members of the women's groups listed below are from the minority communities e None of these organizations is large or influential and membership on these groups probably overlaps to a considerable degree. SECRET —~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 323] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -9a. The League of Syrian Nationalist Women for the Defense of Peace is believed to have been organized by Miss Tarazi and Wisal Farhat (Mrs. Khalid Bakdash) in September 1949. Little has been heard of its activities, b. e League of S n W or the P ction o °; and Childhood has been the most active of all women's front organizations. Membership is drawn primarily from Kurdish, Greek Orthodox, and other minority elements, They have on a number of occasions called at the ws and other Legations in Damascus to deliver their messages, Ce Women's Section of the Democratic Yout tion. The women's section had about 100 members in December 1950, Activities of this group centered at Qamishliyah in the Jazirah (the Kurdish- Assyrian center), d. The League of Democratic Women as of May 1951 had a membership of about 150 in Syria, Headquarters were in Damascus at the home of Aminah ‘Arif, wife of Najah Qassab Hasan of the Communist Party's Damascus Regional Committee. Most of the members appear to be from Christian and Kurdish minority elements. Activities centered on organizing. female students in support of peace and on | spreading pro-Soviet propaganda in general, e. The League for Women's Rights. Little is kmown about its membership, 3. Student Organizations are believed to be confined to male students, in conformity with the general custom of segregation of the sexes followed in Near Eastern.countries, notwithstanding the contrary aims of other Communist front groups, a. The Stydent Youth Movement in Syria and Lebanon was headed by Wasfi al-Bunni of Homs and Ridwan al-Shahhal of Tripoli, both very active Communists. Bunni has recently been arrested in Syria and if his claim of Soviet nationality is upheld he will be deported to the USSR, b. The League of Democratic Students reportedly has a large membership, The leaders were reported to be five Syrian University students, one of whom, Muharmad Amin, is the brother of the leader of the Partisans of Peace in Syria, The activities of this group are centered in the Syrian University and in the Third Tajhiz (government secondary school) in Damascus, c. Gob Sonen Hawi was founded in 1943 after the Kurdish Congress in Erivan as a Kurdish student organization, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 324] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -10- 4. Youth Organizations a. The League of Democratic Youth actively participated in intensified front organization "peace" and "neutrality" propaganda in Damascus. Membership is largely from the minority elements. be Heina, a Kurdish youth organization, was represented at. the Berlin Youth Festival. It is reported to have ‘begun to form branches in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. 5. Organizations of Intellectuals - a. The League of ian Writers, a group of Communists and fellow-travelers Peaded = Tlya Dayrani, a member of the Greek Orthodox Community in Syria. He is reported to be a Communist and a teacher employed in the primary school section of the Ministry of Public Instruction. In May 1952, membership was composed of about 25 writers. Iwo of these were considered Communists and the rest fellow-travelers. The activity of this group consisted mainly in contributing to the press articles of topical interest to the Communist propaganda efforts, Translations were made of various Russian authors such as Gorki and - Tolstoy to which prefaces containing "peace" propaganda were added. b. The League of Democratic Lawyers was reported to consist mainly of stude aE at the Law school of the Syrian University. In May 1951 it was thought to have 35 adherents. Nassuh al-Ghaffari, a well-kmown lawyer and Communist Party leader, is probably closely connected with this group. Some adherents are in the Aleppo area, c. The League of Democratic Teachers'membership has been estimated at 50 or 60, consisting mostly of young (male) teachers. _ Kamal ‘Ayyad and Jamil Salibah, its leaders, were prominent in Syrian educational circles, 6. Religious Organizations A Moslem branch of the Partisans of Peace movement in Syria was reportedly formed in February 1951. Be. Lebanon Front organizations in Lebanon follow the same general pattern as those in Syria. As in Syria, the Partisans of Peace is an active front group. The League of Democratic Women 18 in contact with the Syrian League for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood. ‘The League of Democratic Students, and the League of Democratic Lawyers SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION | ( === [PDF page 325] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -llalso have branches in Lebanon. The Congress of Homeless Palestinians, organized in 1949, is directed by Communist sympathizers in contact. with the Beirut Regional Committee of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party. It has branches at six refugee camps and at the American University of Beirut. Firm action by University officials is believed to have greatly diminished Communist activity among the students. The ruling that demonstrations cannot be held on University grounds has proved a deterrent to Communist activity among American University students. "Zareh Nubar," a pro-Communist Armenian literary club was recently formed in Beirut for the propagation of literature on Soviet Armenia. Affiliated clubs are to be opened in Damascus and Aleppo, Sy ria. . VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Recent reports indicate that both the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties have managed to place a number of their members and sympathizers in the more sensitive agencies of the Syrian and _ Lebanese Governments. Thus, for example, the Syrian Army's peuxieme Bureau and Police Security department are known to have been penetrated by. several Communists who are currently supplying information to local Communist regional committees concerning anticipated repressive measures to be undertaken by the military and security forces against the Syrian Communist Party. SECRET - SECURFTY ENFORWATION === [PDF page 326] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -12- VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Communist penetration of the Syrian and Lebanese school system is reported to have reached significant proportions. Communist activity at present consists not so much of establishing Commmist groups per se among students or penetrating their existing organizations as in organizing them into front groups. These groups exist not only in the Syrian University in Damascus but also in its engineering school in Aleppo, in the government secondary schools (particularly in Aleppo), and in schools conducted by the various religious communities in both countries (particularly the Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities), The teaching profession has been penetrated primrily at the university and government secondary school level, especially in Syria, The dean of the Syrian University is said to be a Communist and there are several professors who may possibly be members, A number of Palestine Arab refugee teachers, employed by the Syrian Ministry of Public Instruction, have been dismissed for "Commnist tendencies." The only front organization aimed specifically at the teaching profession appears to be the League of Democratic Teachers., Moreover, the government's official radio station in Damascus is reported to be heavily penetrated by Commmist Party members and fellow travellers who have managed to secure relatively important administrative € and operational positions, IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Commmist penetration of other Syrian political organizations, such as the Arab Socialist and Resurrectionist Parties, was reported to be quite extensive prior to the promilgation of a Shishakli-~inspired decree in April 1952 outlawing all Syrian political associations and parties. The leaders of these parties were subsequently forced to flee ~ Syria after an abortive plot against the existing regime was uncovered, Cells of a para-military character have reportedly been formed by the neo~-fascist Islamic Socialist Front in Aleppo. This group, an offspring .of the Ikhwan (Moslem Brethren) movement probably would. not be adverse to accepting Communist tactical support in subverting the present regime, The Syrian Communist Party has also established some liaison with the clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Gregorian Armenian commnity, groups which maintain some influence with their own parochial political organizations, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Beirut serves as the geographic focal point for the distribution of Commmist propaganda material in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. From Beirut, the clandestine party organs Nidal ash-Sha'b, Ags-Salan, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 327] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -Band gl-Yanby (Partisans of Peace publications which are currently proscribed in Syria), and Al-Tarig are distributed to many of these areas. Most of these papers suffer from insolvency and local governmental suppression, Consequently, they appear only sporadically, Before its suppression early in 1951, the weekly organ Al-Salem ‘was said to have printed 4,000 copies per issue, but the proportion of copies sold to those distributed free is not mown. It may be significant that, unlike other Syrian newspapers, most issues of AJ-Salam do not have the price indicated on it. The paper was printed at the Matha ‘at Dimashq (Damascus Press) in Damascus,. At-Tarig is the monthly mgazine published in Beirut by Antun Tabit, head of the Partisans of Peace organization in Lebanon and possibly also in Syria, where the magazine mtil: recently circulated as well. Nidal ash-Sha'b is a clandestine Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party newspaper, probably printed in Beirut, which began to appear after the closing of the party's paper Sawt ash-Aha'b in December 1947, Nidal ash-Sha'b is published by a "Joint body.of the Syrian and Lebanese Commmist Parties," which Bakdash heads. ( Prior to the general emalgemation of the press instigated by the - Shishakli regime in Septenber'1952, there were seven Syrian newspapers which at times gave evidence of Commnist influence. Many of these were political party organs which, like other Syrian papers, had a small circulation (not over 2,000 copies for each issue) and were financially insolvent, These papers were: An-Nasy, a Damascus daily; Al-Ishtirekjyah, a Damascus weekly; Al-Hurriyah, a daily published in Aleppo; Al~Manar, - of Damascus; Al-Hadarah, a Damascus daily; Al-Hawadith, an Aleppo daily; and Sada al-Ittihad, a letakia daily. . The Soviet campaign to subvert the Syrian press appears to date from the beginning of 1948, following the suppression in December 1947 of the Beirut-published Sawt ash-Sha'bh (Voice of the People), organ of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties, Soon after this event, Soviet funds formerly allocated to this paper seem to have been diverted to - (1) supporting the clandestine Nidal asheSha and pamphlets, and (2) subsidizing and bribing of the editors and staff of existing newspapers,. A number of editors are reported to have been offered newsprint and/or cash to adopt the Soviet line. The seven above-listed newspapers appear to have succumbed to Communist blandishments,: Book publishing and. distribution are now carried on from Beirut, Some of the Beirut publications have recently turned up in England and probably are circulating in Syria too, One volume which is SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 328] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION - mown to have been issued recently in Beirut is a tome by Viadimir Pogner (member of the French Communist Party and ex—Hollywood screen writer) called USA_= The land of Fictitious Liberties, translated into Arabic by ‘Abdallah Sha'tito, No Russian-language publications are knowm to circulate in Syria. Apart from the Soviet orbit, Paris is an important source of Commmist propaganda material, The Al-Yaqazah publishing house in Damascus prints and distributes books translated from Russian into Arabic by the "League of Syrian Writers," Distribution points for Communist literature include the Gloria Bookshop in Beirut (owned and operated by Haygazun Najarian), On sale at this shop is the official journal of the Cominform, printed in Arabic, as well as Ihe USSR in Construction, a propaganda tract from Moscow, printed in French and English, The house of Aram Yeretizian, an Armenian Communist who lives in the Noshajian area of the Armenian quarter of Beirut, is the main center for all Commnist pamphlet distribution among the Beirut Armenians, The Syrian Broadcasting. Station in Damascus on occasion broadcasts material, particularly in news commentaries, which parallels the Communist propaganda line, The direction of the station has in the past been infiltrated by leftist, if not actually Commmist, personnel at a high level, Ahmad ad-'Assih, a left-wing member of the Populist Party was director of ¢ the station for a time in 1949 and since late 1951 has been Acting Director; Kamal 'Ayyad, director in May 1951, was a leader of the front organization called the League of Democratic Teachers and was a suspected Communist, . Najati Qassab Hasan, a Communist leader in Damascus, has assumed a position pre e of importance in local newspaper and radio circles, He is regularly publishing articles in the Damascus newspaper al-Naqqad and recently has begun broadcasting over the Syrian Broedcasting System, XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION Few Communists in Syria and Lebanon pay regular dues, and the party depends largely upon contributions from wealthier members, Some of the contributions go toward party operations, most of the money being used for Partisans of Peace campaigns and special causes for which appeal is made locally. It is thought that funds are also regularly received from various outside sources, through the Soviet Legation, or in the form of presents from Communist groups abroad, Thus, for example, while no Syrian publications are financed directly by the Soviet Union, cash sub~ _sidies disguised as payments for advertising space or bulk purchases of. particular issues are made by the Soviet press attache or by the TASS Agency representative to these papers when they publish TASS articles. This indirect form of subsidy avoids compromising the newspaper proprietor, who frequently has little control over editorial policy, and the trans-~ action is arranged privately between the editor and the Soviet press or TASS representative, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 329] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -15- Syrian Commnist Party finances do not appear-to be on a budget system, but are dispensed according to monthly commitments and resources, Party dues and contributions from non-Communist friends seem to be personally disbursed by party leader Bakdash, However, the increased vigilance of the security forces of the present anti-Communist Syrian Government has severely hampered the fund-raising activities of the Communist Party in Syria, u XII. SOVIET OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Legation in Beirut my be acting in part as the dis- ‘tributing center for Cominform material for Syria and Lebanon, - Its activities in the propaganda field are both overt and covert; the latter seem to be under the direction of Feodor Bespalov, Second Secretary of — the Soviet Legation. The Soviet Legation in Damascus appears to occupy @ secondary position in this respect, The only two overt Soviet propaganda agencies in Syria are VOKS and TASS, Although VOKS has an active center in Beirut, in Damascus it seems to do very little in the way of overt work and appears to serve mainly as a cover for the covert activities of the Second Secretary of the Soviet Legation (Feodor.Pisarenko), which consist of (1) guiding the ( propaganda and other activities of the local Commmist Party into conformance with the party line of international Communism, and (2) collecting intelligence information, TASS activities, until the recent Syrian Government clamp-down on the press and on foreign information activities, appear to have had three main aspects: (1) the distribution of TASS news and Soviet Press Information bulletins issued by the Press Section of the Soviet Legation in Beirut; (2) the influencing of Syrian newspapers with cash or newsprint to print Soviet-produced or inspired items and otherwise adopt a line. favorable to the USSR; and (3) the transmission to the USSR of local press items, frequently planted, for propaganda use by the Soviet and satellite press, radio, etc. In addition to being disseminated to the press through regular TASS channels, TASS and Soviet Press Information bulletins have been reported as having been distributed clandestinely by hand following the ban imposed by the Syrian Government on all foreign publications of this nature, The Al-Yagazak book shop in Damascus, the largest publishing house in Syria, is subsidized by the Soviet Legation. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Nearly all Communist front movements in Syria and Lebanon are geared today to the theme of “peace”, Responsibility for organizing groups in these two countries (and the Near East as a whole) was delegated to Khalid Bakdash and to a Middle East regional office of the World Peace Council, which was established in Beirut about May 1951. This office / formed a Lebanese National Committee for a Conference of Peoples of the ‘SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 330] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -16- Near and Middle East and North Africa which about December 1951 issued @ proclamtion calling for the convening of such a conference to combat Western inspired mtual security moves, No such meeting, however, ever took place,, Six Lebanese delegates attended the Berlin Youth Festival held in July 1951. They were: Victor Mughabghad, Kamil Mohammad Tawfiq al-Harb, Robert Vahan Garabedian, Khalil ‘Ali, Philippe Iskandar al-—Rasi, and Ilyas Musa Fahad, All of these returning delegates were subsequently held for trial by the Lebanese Surétdé Générale, Despite an official Lebanese security board decision not to approve passports of any Lebanese intending to participate in the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952, a hitherto little-known Lebanese, Hussayn Sij'han, was able to attend by travelling via Egypt and Czechoslovakia, Upon his return to Beirut, Sij*han was eminently successful in acquiring audiences among the businessmen of the commnity to listen to his glowing praise of life in the Soviet Union, The leader of the Partisans of Peace in Lebanon, Antu Tabit, presented a report to a session of the International Peace Council which met in Berlin in July 1952, It dealt with the "Struggle of the Middle Eastern people for peace and against war." € Khalid Bakdash was accompanied by Mustafa al-‘Aris, Farajallah al-Hilu, Wasfi Bunni, Artin Madoyan, and Ohannes Aghabashian to the 19th Commnist Party Congress, which convened in Moscow in October 1952, At this meeting Bakdash personally addressed the October 11 session and promised that "we, the Communists of Syria and Lebanon will do our best to be worthy of the great honor of being called Stalin's disciples." XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK ' The Soviet Legation in Beirut is the distributing center for Cominform and front organizations material for Syria and Lebanon, Beirut is the nodal point of Commnist propaganda in Syria as well as Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, Khalid Bakdash and other highly-placed members of the Communist Party hierarchy, such as officials of the central command and the principal Partisans of Peace organizers, are in close contact with the Soviet Legations in Damascus and Beirut, From the central command of the Syro-Lebanese Conmunist Party, printed propaganda and directives are handed down to the Regional Committees, Instructions are sometimes delivered directly to representatives of district committees by the central committee, thus by-passing the regional committees, It is believed that the Armenian section of the party has its own lines for channeling directives and propaganda, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION C === [PDF page 331] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 See SEGRET ‘~ SECURITY INFORMATION -17- | ‘The Aleppo regional committee is said to have 20 shock groups (terrorist squads), having no fixed headquarters, whose personnel is known only to the Regional Committee. The personnel of these groups is also, used for courier service between Aleppo and Damascus and between Aleppo and the regions under its jurisdiction (Deir ez-Zor and Qamishliyah). The clandestine newspaper Nidal_ash-Sha'b,the Lebanese Partisans of Peace periodical At Tarig, tracts, ‘and other publications are delivered from Beirut to Aleppo via Tripoli and Homs. Official party circulars and instructions are transmitted from Damascus by courier, and presumably are received direct from the Soviet Legation, ‘Subversive printed matter is said to be given out by the Soviet Legation in Beirut for smuggling into Turkey via the Kurdish areas of north Syria.. SLGtUo) = OEUVRES SECRET — SECURETY INFORMATION === [PDF page 332] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, TUNISIA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE. RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 333] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword « «ee eececererervree eevee ve eee eee @ OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « « e« Ie Objectives ooeoev54uvceveeeeeeveeeeee ee © @ @ ITe III. IIile VII. VIII. XII. XTII« XxIV. Approved TacticS « ecreesrecceeveeeee Capabilities oseeeeeeee &¢ & @ ASSETS « « e Numerical Strength «2. «ee«2ceecse Electoral Strength »esesesece Military Strength and Organization for Government Policy Toward Communism.. Violent ees Action Communist Influence in Labor ««ceceeecrereeeveee Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations «e«eeeeeeeecese Communist Infiltration into Government. @econnee Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation Communist Infiltration of Non—Communist Political Parties « eececeesesueeveseeneeenevee Communist Propaganda Media ee esee Financial Condition.« «oe e-e«eee Soviet-Satellite Official Assets.. « Communist International Organizations Communist Communication Network ¢ « e eeoee SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION or Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 [Unreadable] A“ Nn NW WS OW === [PDF page 334] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to. achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational C potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 335] === Re OL ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SBCURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN TUNISIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The over-riding immediate goal of the Tunisian Communist Party has been to persuade the local imdependence movements to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation ultimately for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control and American imperialism. In the meantime, as in the rest of French North Africa, the Communists are seeking, through propaganda, to destroy ‘sympathy for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans and to increase local hostility toward. the French administration. The serious economic grievances of the population also receive attention from the Conmunists. To achieve its immediate goals, however, the Tunisian Communist Party is faced above all with the task of reversing the steady trend toward decline in its membership and influence.: II. TACTICS Having failed thus far in achieving a common front with the nationalists, the Communists have attempted instead to participate, uninvited, in strikes, demonstrations and riots initiated by the nationalists, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly, ( Communist propaganda pamphlets have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the popular mind the need and desirability of a common front. Occasionally, such tactics are accompanied by attacks on the nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a united national front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating or conducting negotiations with the French. Moreover, Communists have been known to facilitate the arrest of nationalists and to have claimed credit for successful nationalist demonstrations. III. CAPABILITIES To date, the small Tunisian Communist Party has had practically no influence on the nationalist movement, largely because (1) the nationalists realize. that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in non—Communist areas, (2) the local Communist parties are largely French in membership, and (3) the present nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would dislike as mch as they do that of the French. The capabilities of the Tunisian Communist Party at this time remain minimal, either for achieving its own current local objectives SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 336] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SACURITY INFORMATION or for furthering Soviet policy. It has always been evidenced by the notable failure of its efforts to persuade the nationalists -—~ especially the principal nationalist party, the Neo—Destour, and the labor federation allied to it — to form a united national front with the Communists. The Communist labor federation, USTT (Union, Syndicale des Travailleurs de Tunisie) has been unable to penetrate the nationalist UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) to any appreciable degree. Moreover, the USTT has been completely outmaneuvered by the nationalists whose rival union has steadily gained in membership and influence at the expense of the Communists. There is little likelihood of an early improvement in the caliber of Communist leadership in the party or its labor federation. . The French Government throughout 1952 has been increasingly firm in its repression of the Tunisian Communist Party. Some of the non- Tunisian leaders have been deported, and virtually all of the others are being held under arrest. Both of its newspapers are suspended, and a clandestinely printed substitute for its proscribed Frenchlanguage weekly, plus occasional mimeographed pamphlets and leaflets, represent the maximum of its apparent propaganda capabilities at this tim. The Communist labor federation maintains its strongest position in port, mining, electrical communications, and railway but it lacks the strength to produce a complete tie-up by strikes in even a single industry without the assistance of at least one or more of the other three Tunisian labor federations. The effective leadership of the Tunisian Communist Party and almost all of the hard-core has always been European. With the membership estimated now at not more than 4,000, this probably still remains truee If the effectiveness of its leadership were not at sucha low point, the Communist potentials in Tunisia, even given the present. ’ membership, might present a totally different picture. During the past year, @ political atmosphere has developed in which an astute Communist leadership might find more fertile ground than at any time since the end of World War II. This situation is the outgrowth of a - combination of factors, including (1) severe French repressive actions against the nationalists, (2) the exile or arrest of the principal Neo-Destour party and union leaders, (3) the death of the able, influential labor chief, Ferhat Hached, (4) the total lack of Neo- Destour progress in achieving nationalist aims during the past two years, and (5) the greater inclination of Tunisian nationalists to accept aggressive tactics as evidenced by increasing riots and sabotage. However, the Tunisian Communist Party appears at this time to be too impoverished financially and too feeble in membership, SECRET — SRCURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 337] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET =— SACURITY INFORMATION ~3organization, leadership, and influence to capitalize on the opportunity presented by nationalist frustrations and the temporary dislocations among the relatively moderate, anti-Communist, and experienced top Neo-Destour leadership. The Communists will probably continue their efforts to join forces with the nationalists. In the longer run, there remains some danger that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives they would accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it — presently remains doubtful that the Communists will capture control of the nationalist movement in Tunisia, Communist influence might ultimtely induce the nationalist groups to adopt more anti-Western policies and more frequently to resort to direct action. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 338] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN TUNISIA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH Exact figures on the membership of the Tunisian Communist Party are not available, But from what is known of the party and the scope of its activities, a maximm estimate would be 3,000 members, There are, in addition, probably a thousand or so "fellow travelers." It my, therefore, be concluded in the light of these estimates, that the Communists control only about one-tenth of one percent of the total population of the coutry. Because of the relative weakness of the Communists, it is difficult to estimate their geographical distribution, It is, however, safe to assume that they possess cells in most, if not all, of the principal cities, Information regarding Commnist strength in the countryside is not available, Information is also lacking with regard to the proportion of Communist "militants" within the party ranks, The relatively limited scope of Communist agitation would, however, indicate that the number of party "militants" is very likely less than one thousand, Leadership of the party, in contrast to that of the nationalists, has not been outstanding. II, ELECTORAL STRENGTH. € No popular elections have ever been held in Tunisia, In local elections, only a restricted number of natives can vote, Hence it is not possible to form any reliable estimate of the proportion of the local population which might be induced to vote Commnist,. ITI, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Although there have been many violent demonstrations and acts of sabotage in Tunisia during the past two years, some may but none are known to have. been initiated by the Communists. Political violence of this type has usually been traceable directly to the Tunisian nationalists; however, the Communists regard an increase in tension between the nationalists and the French as favorable to their own interests. For this reason, it is possible that Commnist agitators have helped to provoke incidents leading to violence. If this has been the case, however, they - have been careful to remain in the background. In the light of present information, it appears that the Tunisian Communist Party, because of its lack of popular support, is unable to rally sizable elements of the population to violent action except insofar as it can capitalize upon nationalist sentiment aroused by other groups. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION. ( === [PDF page 339] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -~ SECURITY INFORMATION IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Tunisian Commmist Party was recognized as a legal political party in 1943, and was permitted to operate with relative freedom for some years thereafter, But during the past two or three years the French authorities have steadily restricted its activities, During the riots of early 1952, several Communist leaders were arrested, and some are still under detention, After the murder of the prominent Tunisian labor leader Ferhat Hached in December 1952, additional Commnist leaders were arrested, and Communist publications were suspended. Today, Commnist meetings and demonstrations are prohibited, and foreign Commmist newspapers are banned. No information is available concerning the present underground activities of the Tunisian Commnists, ‘ V, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The number of Commmnists in key industries is not known, For several years the Communists have controlled one of four labor federations — the Union Syndicate des Travailleurs de Tunisie (USTT), In 1948 the strength of this organization was estimated by the French authorities at between 25,000 and 26,000 members, But the USTT is known to have since. lost a great many of its members to the nationalist unions and to othe labor groups. The exact extent of its numerical decline, though considerable, is not known, VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS After World War II, the Commmists in Tunisia followed their usual | practice of establishing organizations with seemingly nonpolitical objectives, These groups included -- in addition to labor unions — youth groups, cultural societies, peace groups, women's organizations and social service groups. But these organizations did not flourish, and today the few that remin are relatively inactive, Now that the French authorities have undertaken rigorously to curteil Communist activity in Tunisia, the membership and activities of such "front" groups may be expected to decline still further, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT No information is available concerning the number of Communists and Communist sympathizers at the higher levels of the goverment, including the armed forces. Undoubtedly, however, the mumber is quite smll, for the French policy is to remove such persons whenever found. Figures are likewise lacking with regard to the number of Communists and sympathizers in those agencies of government administering nationalized industries, It appears likely, however, that Commmists occupy some low-level jobs in ports, railroads, telegraph and telephone installations, and mining operations, SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 340] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The publication of Communist newspapers has been suspended indefinitely by the French authorities in Tunisia, Inasmuch as radio broadcasting is government-controlled, the Commnists exert no influence through that medium. There is no indication that Commmists have infiltrated religious organizations in Tunisia. Though some Communist school teachers have been reported, they are not thought to be numerous, IX, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NONCOMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES No information is available concerning Commmist penetration of non-Communist political parties in Tunisia. Repeated Commnist attempts to form a coalition with the Neo-Destour, the principal nationalist party, _have been rebuffed in terms so strong as to indicate that Communist influence in the leading circles of that party is negligible. Some leaders in the Old-Destour Party, one of the smaller nationalist groups, have at times collaborated in specific Communist-front activities, X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Prior to their suspension in March 1952, Tunisia's two Communist: ¢ weeklies had a total circulation of about 6,000 copies, a considerable number of which were given away each week, The indefinite suspension, by the French authorities, of all Tmisian Communist publications and the ban on foreign Communist literature, have reduced Commnist printed propaganda to illicit handbills, which appear only occasionally. - XI, FINANCIAL CONDITION Specific information regarding the financial resources of the Tunisian Commmist Party is not available, Evidence exists that the Tunisian Communist Party has upon occasion received financial aid from the French Commnist Party. Such aid, however, has apparently been relatively small, for it has not saved the Tunisian Party from continual financial embarrassment, XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites have diplomatic, commercial, or cultural missions in Tunisia., XTII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the front groups affiliated with Commumist international organizations are at this time active in Tunisia. Nor have any congresses of Communist organizations been held in Tunisia in recent years, Certain ( SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 341] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Tunisian Commmist leaders have, however, attended conferences of Communist-sponsored organizations in other countries. Information is incomplete, but Tunisian Commmists are kmown to have attended such meetings in the Soviet Union, Red China, Poland, and Italy since 1950. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK It is know that the Tunisian Communist Party, like the Communist parties of Algeria and Morocco, is directed by the French Commmist Party, and that representatives of the French Party attend meetings of the Tunisian Party and transmit advice and instructions at that time, Though Communist international couriers are occasionally reported to pass through North Africa, detailed information is not available on the subject, SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 342] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET | ‘SECURITY INFORMATION TR~6165.19 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, FRANCE eee OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 343] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFCR MATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword « «e«sceervreereevoeeveve ee ee ee eo eo @ III. IIe III. VITe VIII. XII. XTIT. XIV. OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES.« o « Objectives. eee cee ee er reer eee een ce Tactics Ce Capabilities eeoeeeveeveeeweeeeeeee ee © 6 @ ASSETS ee eccecerescce Numerical Strength..«e««ececesceesceceveevee Electoral Strength.e«eeecesseeereeveee Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action Government Policy Toward Communism. « e eee eee e Communist Influence in Labor e ecsececcececevece Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations osoe@eeeeeeeeee Communist Infiltration into Government 2 « ««-«eee Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation «¢ « e Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties eceeecseeevreevneeesenees Communist Propaganda Media. ee eee eee esc ce Financial Condition s.eeeccec cc cccees Soviet-Satellite Official Assets «se eeececcecrce Communist International Organizations. ee e«eecee Communist Communication Network e« e eevee eee SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Apnoroved For Keleagse D1) //() () A - IP BO BOOPC OHO ROOOS8OO008S000 1-4 Page \o on On oO 13 14 15 16 16 19 19 22 === [PDF page 344] === REDE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities ‘of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, C providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information. is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 345] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN FRANCE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The French Communist Party's immediate objective, and the one which promises to remain foremost for the duration of the cold war, is the establishment of a government in Paris which would break off France's alliance with the West. Short of this major goal, the Communists are chiefly interested in hampering specific pro-Western policies of the present anti-Communist French Government. Among these policies, the key ones are those of waging war on the Communists in Indochina and of participating in NATO and related plans for rearming Western Germany, especially the EDC.. Accordingly, the Communists ‘are intent on securing immediate peace in Indochina on Ho Chi Minh's terms, withdrawal of US forces from NATO bases in France, progressive reduction in armaments, and rejection of any arrangement for rearming Western Germany. Always accompanying these specific goals are the Communists! various efforts to create a general frame of mind which is suspicious of the US, dubious of self-defense efforts, and sceptical of the strength and viability of the West as a whole. Realizing, in brief, the difficulties involved in making French opinion pro- Soviet, the Communists currently set their sights on encouraging neutralist and defeatist tendencies. ( There is no doubt that these Communist objectives are geared primarily to the furthering of Soviet foreign policy and impair the party's ability to promote its own popularity. The conditions under which the French Communists adopted their stand on the Indochina war oa: is instructive in this connection. For some months after hostilities ' ‘%roke outin Indochina, in December 1946, between the French troops and Ho Chi Minh, the Communists, who were then participating in the cabinet, avoided taking an anti-national position on this issue. Accordingly, when the government made it clear, in March 1947, that ° it had no intention of opening negotiations with Ho, the Communists went along with this policy. It was not wmtil after the Moscow Conference had ended the following month, with a break between the _ USSR and the West, and with France definitely associating herself with the US and Britain, that the Communists parted company with the other parties in the government. In short, the Communists did not fashion their stand on Indochina on the basis of local French attitudes toward the war but, rather, on Soviet foreign policy requirements. uo In the same way, the Communists! handling of the German rearmament issue illustrates the fact that their objectives are tailored to fit the needs of Soviet foreign policy. Ieft to their own devices in shaping their policy toward German rearmament, the { _ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 346] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION French Communists would unquestionably oppose all forms of such rearmament, thus enabling them to take a strong and consistent stand on a question which is traditionally of the greatest national concern. Instead, however, the party has been obliged, as a result of Soviet approval of East German rearmament, to modify its original position of thoroughgoing opposition to German rearmament and to distinguish between the rearmament of "democratic" East Germany and "imperialist" West Germany. II. TACTICS In pursuing their major objective, the French Conmunists' tactics are those of the "United National Front." This means, as the Communists: repeatedly point out, that they wish to make common cause with individuals from all social groups regardless of their religious or political bent, on the basis of a broad program of "peace, national independence, and democratic liberties." In accordance with this policy, — the Communists have set out to win the support not only of industrial workers and peasants, but also of white collar workers, shopkeepers, businessmen, and professional people. In contrast with the French Popular Front of the 1930's, the present United National Front is not an effort by the Communists to form alliances with entire non-—Communist political parties and their leaders, but an attempt to attract indi- C viduals and groups from all political parties and sections of society. Moreover, the Communists are not currently seeking, as they did in the 1930's, to remain in the background but are, instead, clearly announcing that they intend to remain at the head of the movement they hope to develop. The Comnunists' current tactics have been adopted in response to the increasingly unfavorable situation in which the French Communist Party finds itself, At present, and for the past five years or so, the party, despite its continued hold on about a quarter of the electorate and an important part of the trade union movement, has been facing increasing difficulties. This is evident, first of all, in the declining numerical strength of the party itself and of its various related organi-~ zations. Moreover, the party and its affiliated organizations have been increasingly unable to translate the mmerical strength they retain into political action geared to attainment of their major political objectives. Finally, the non-Communists have become increasingly anti-Communist and united in their opposition to the Communists regardless of how much they disagree on other issues. As a result the Communists find themselves so isolated that alliances between themselves and non-Communist parties are out of the question. In attempting to break out of their isolation, the French Communists try to establish a minimum basis of agreement with SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 347] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -~3non-Communists by proposing that these latter elements go along with them on issues which involve the practically universal fear of war, the subsidiary but almost equally important fear of Germany, and the widespread dissatisfaction with certain aspects of French society. Thus the. Communists! basic appeal is to the sense of international.insecurity, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the deep dissatisfaction which has long existed -- and which would exist in the absence of the Communists -- with what is widely regarded as the inadequate living standards, the inequality, and the generally restrictive nature of present French Society. Accordingly, French Communist propaganda within the past year has emphasized such motifs as bacteriological warfare, West German - rearmament, the war in Indochina, the Moscow Economic Conference, and various anti-American themes, At all times the Communists have tried to show that-these international causes are inextricably linked with pressing domestic problems, such as wages, housing for workers, heavy‘ taxes, and the maintenance of democratic liberties. These latter problems, the Communists assert, can be met only if France unloads herself of the burdens placed on her as a result of her membership in the Atlantic alliance. _In making all these appeals, the French Communists have at their disposal propaganda mechanisms which still remain large and active, ( despite their decline in size and effectiveness in recent years. In addition, they have an extensive network of front organizations, although there is increasing evidence that these organizations are steadily growing less important in fact than they may seem on paper. They also continue to dominate an important segment of the trade pe sheesh union movement, where their current tactic is to make their appeals as attractive as possible by couching them in exclusively economic terms. As a logical extension of this tactic the Communists seek to encourage unity of action between their own union organization and the non-Communist unions, Finally, as a political party the Communists try to play down those domestic issues which divide them from non-Communist Frenchmen and to emphasize their alleged championship of "peace" and higher living standards forthe great majority of the country. III. CAPABILITIES Broadly speaking, and assuming there is no major change in the international situation, the prospect for the next several years is that the French Communists will remain incapable of creating a "United National Front" so numerically strong and powerful as to force the government to take cognizance of it in forming foreign policy. The likelihood is, rather, that the French Communists will remain locked up in their present isolation, incapable of affecting government policy and continuing gradually to lose their numerical and organizational strength and to display an ever increasing lack of dynamism. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 348] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION The decline of the French Communist Party in size and influence since the end of the war, and varticularly since 1947-48, has been very considerable. For these past several years,*moreover, the party has displayed an ever increasing lack of dynamism and an inability to translate its remaining numerical strength as a political party and trade. union movement into political actions. At no time since the hig strikes of 1946-48 have the French Communists displayed any capacity for rallying considerable non-Communist trade union support. During 1952, on the two or three occasions when the Communists made particular efforts to give a show of popular strength in the form of mass. demonstrations, only the small corps of party militants turned out. At the same time, the French Communist Party remains one of the world's largest Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc, and it “promises to do so for some time. In France itself it is a major political party, an important power in the French trade union movement, and a large and active propaganda machine. The party derives still further Significance from the fact that it has had some success, although how much it is difficult to estimate, in penetrating the civil service, the lower levels of the armed forces, and various sensitive industries and communications services. The major factor contributing to the Communists! considerable C staying power as a political party and force in the trade union movement is the party's ability to express the psychological revolt of many Frenchmen against existing social and economic conditions. The great majority of the 5,000,000 Frenchmen who vote Communist unauestionably do so because they regard themselves as underprivileged and exploited by other members of society, and because they believe that the Communist Party is concerned with ameliorating their lot. lLikewise most of those who belong to the Communist—dominated trade union (CGT) do so because they view it as the only trade union organization which is strong and effective enough to wrest higher wages from employers. That the Communists, rather than a purely national French party, have succeeded in winning a near-monopoly of the strong protest sentiment which exists both in French politics and trade unionism is due largely to the evolution of the Socialists. While retaining their revolutionary vocabulary and traditions, the Socialists have long since become reformist in outlook and receive their chief support from government and other white collar workers rather than industrial labor. Under these conditions the Communists have become the heirs to the tradition of the extreme left, always an important tradition in French politics, and over the years they have succeeded in developing the conviction on the part of the majority of their supporters that they — and they alone -- hold out the promise of "democratic" social and economic reforms. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C === [PDF page 349] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION In more specific terms the party's outlook, judged both by the evidence of its decline and the signs of its staying power, may be summarized as follows: In terms of party membership some further contraction can be - expected. No drastic reductions are anticipated, however, since the more opportunistic members have already been lost by the party and its present membership may be assumed to be quite stable. Organizationally, it is unlikely that the party will be split or seriously hampered by a purge which the Marty-~Tillon affair in the second half of 1952 may foreshadow. The front organizations may be expected to maintain their paper strength, but will be unable to gain non-Communist support for their various causes. The drawing power of the "peace" movement, in particular, will remain very limited, primarily because the character of the "peace" organization and its propaganda has become increasingly transparent. The present volume of Communist propaganda can be expected to remain about the same since the party has the financial capacity to maintain its propaganda program. As the public becomes more familiar ( with the Communists' techniques, however, it becomes less receptive to their propaganda. Nevertheless, some of the Communists! slogans will unquestionably continue to be picked up by non-Communists and used without their Communist labels. A continued decline of Communist influence within the Communistled trade union (CGT) can be expected, and the CGT will remain incapable of actions threatening the government. If the CGT.were to follow its current policy of purely economic emphasis for any length of time its outlook might be brighter, but such a development is unlikely. The Communist electoral and parliamentary position will remain fairly stable. As already indicated, the Socialists have a limited capacity for weaning away Communist voters, and the other non-Conmunist parties have very little such capacity. Moreover, there are as yet no indications, despite the decline in the actual number of Communist voters, that the percentage of the Communist vote is decreasing, The decrease in the number of Communist voters can be turned into a percentage decline only if the non-Communist parties succeed in maintaining their voting strength as the Communists lose theirs, and to date they have not done so because of abstentions by their supporters. Nevertheless, the non-Communist parties will unquestionably continue to keep the Communists in a state of isolation and, in this way, prevent them from participating in the formation of national foreign and domestic policies. i _ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 350] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN FRANCE: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH Estimated membership of the French Communist Party (FCP), at the close of 1952, is about 450,000. It is not known how many persons, out of the total population of 40,000,000, are strongly influenced by the Communists. Judging by the votes of that half of the population which actually goes to the polls, it would appear that one out of four Frenchmen responds to some aspect of Communist activity. Geographically, FCP membership is concentrated in half a dozen centers: Paris and its industrial suburbs, the mining area of the north, the major port cities (La Pallice, Bordeaux, Marseille, Le Havre, Dunkerque), and the manufacturing centers of south-central France (especially Lyons and St. Etienne). Industrial workers are the preponderant element in FCP membership. Shortly after the war the party had a much more diverse class composition, but the loss of lower middle class elements since 1947-48 has reestablished the heavy predominance of workers in the party. Party sympathizers, judging from what groups vote Communist, have more varied backgrounds. According to the poll published last spring by € Realités, a magazine similar to Fortune, the largest groups which vote Communist are factory workers (38%) and women who are not employed outside the home and who are presumably members of workers' families (224). Thus 40 percent of the Communist voters come from groups other than the industrial working class. According to the poll, these groups include agricultural workers (8%) and a variety of lower middle class groups -- white collar workers, servants, tradesmen, farm operators, civil servants, small bondholders, and retired persons. Only four percent comes from the liberal professions, other intellectual circles, and industrial cadres. But individuals of this type, and particularly the intellectuals are given so much publicity by the party that they sometimes seem more numerous than they are. FCP members are as a whole well disciplined. Nearly all of the party's major leaders are men who accepted the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. For a time after the war the party, as a result of its rapid expansion during the war and immediately thereafter, included a considerable number of members who were imperfectly disciplined. As this element left the; | party, membership declined from about 850,000 to 450,000 between 1947 ‘ and 1952, with the big drop (from 850,000 to about 600,000) taking place between 1947 and 1948. The present membership appears to represent a fairly stable group of convinced Communists who are fully aware of the party's anti-national character. Judging from a Communist Party statement SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. Cy === [PDF page 351] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATZON of a year ago, the current annual rate of turnover in FCP membership is about 30,000, or approximately seven percent. Leadership of the FCP is, generally speaking, competent, with the party weeding out less effective leaders from time to time. The long absence of Secretary-General Thorez, who has been under medical treatment in Moscow since November 1950, however, has left the party without strong and unified leadership at the top. One result of this situation has ap ntly been that of making personal differences among members of inner cirole, such as figured in the Marty-Tillon case, more significant than they\were formerly. While the party's internal differences between the end of the war and 1951 'were restricted to its lower echelons and to the fellow-travelling ‘fringe, the Marty=Tillon case of 1952 affected the party's high command, as Marty’was a member of the secretariat and both men belonged to the Politburo. The basic issue in this case appears to have been the extent to which the party should seek the cooperation of non-Communist elements. Both Marty and Tillon apparently believed that the French Communists should have proceeded on their own to seize power when France was liberated in World War II, and since that time they seem to have been strongly out - of sympathy with the policy of collaborating with "peace partisans" and ( other groups remote from Communist discipline. At the same time, personal rivalries and antipathies undoubtedly played a part in the conflict between the two men and other FCP leaders, and it is probable that Thorez' absence also helped lay the party open to discord. With the party's action against Marty and Tillon still incomplete it is not clear whether these two men will be merely the first in a series of French Communist leaders who will be disciplined for their impatience with current FCP tactics. It can only be stated that during the past year the FCP has showm greater signs of internal dissension than at any time since the end of the war and that this dissension seems likely to grow as the party gives further evidence of its increasing ineffectiveness. There are no current indications, however, of any internal Communist crisis capable of disrupting the party or of producing an anti-Stalinist revolt. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH In national elections, the FCP polls about 5,000,000 votes out of a total of 19,000,000 votes cast, or slightly more than 25 percent. This vital statistic on French Communist electoral strength leads to three important observations: 1) The FPC receives more votes than any other French political SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 352] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION party. It has held this record with remarkable tenacity throughout the postwar period, having been edged out of first place in only one (June 1946) of the four postwar national elections. The Communists' position as the leading party must be seen, however, in the context of the French multiparty system, in which the non-Communist parties are so numerous that it is very difficult for any single one of them to become the nation's largest party. Despite the FCP's electoral lead, therefore, it is decidedly in the minority as the half dozen parties supporting the present Mayer government represent about 11,000,000 voters, while the Communist voters number about 5,000,000.. 2) Despite its position as the largest party, the FCP has been losing votes since the early postwar period, and partial elections held since the last national election of June 1951 show that this trend is continuing. That the Communists retain their lead and their percentage strength while losing votes is due to the abstention of non-Communist voters. The decline in Communist votes can be turned into a percentage decline only if the non-Communist parties succeed, as they have not done to-date, in maintaining their voting strength as the Communists lose theirs. 3) The FCP has a nationwide following throughout all geographical areas of France. Of the 103 electoral districts in the 1951 elections, there were only four in which the Communists polled 10 percent of the vote C or less. This record for well-distributed support was untouched by any non- Communist party. At the same time there are certain regions where the Communists are particularly strong. These include Paris and the neighboring regions, extending to the industrialized areas on the northern coast; the center and southwest; and the Rhone valley and the southeast, including the Mediterranean coast. The FCP continues to lay heavy emphasis on maintaining and extending its-electoral strength, even though the non-Communist parties devise various means of preventing the Communists from translating their electoral strength into representational strength. In elections the Communists are obliged to run alone since the non-Communist parties are unwilling to form electoral alliances with them. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION Current FCP policy definitely emphasizes non-violent action, but this emphasis does not exclude the possibility of demonstrations, riots, or strikes should the party believe that such actions might secure popular support or be necessary from the point of view of Soviet foreign policy requirements. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ( === [PDF page 353] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ‘SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION The last example of a violent demonstration by the FCP was the May 28, 1952 series of anti-Ridgway riots in Paris and some other towns, and the flurry of strikes which ensued. This episode was clearly designed to support Soviet propaganda to the effect that Ridgway was as unpopular in France as he had beer: in Japan, where the Communists had led a demonstration at the time of his departure. On the occasion of his arrival in Paris the Communists staged demonstrations at several points in the city, and equipped rioters with clubs and other crude weapons for their fights with the police. The French police,who promptly cracked down on the rioters and arrested a large number cf their leaders, have recently estimated that about 30,000 persons participated in these demonstrations in Paris and a number of provincial towns. The small size of this figure shows the FCP's current inability to rally popular support for violent action against the government. The FCP organization for planning and executing violent activity is believed to be the Service d'ordre, under the direction of the party's Central Committee. This Service, which is supposed to lead and control demonstrations called for by the party, is reportedly a small organizaticn, depending for its "troops" on the militants of the party's various federations. ( Another source of personnel for party demonstrations and the nucleus for any para-military action in the future is the Francs-Tireurs et Partisar which stems from the wartime resistance period. The membership of this grov is estimated at something under 50,000, and it is apparently a loosely organized body. Some of its members are persons with resistance experience, inasmuch as the Communists played a leading role in the military side of the anti-Nazi underground movement. Others, however, may be presumed to be new and untested. In any case, the spirit of the Francs-Tireurs is reported to have been adversely affected by the recent Tillon affair as Tillon was formerly the head of this organization. No large Communist arms caches have been found in France since the war, and it is not likely that any useful supplies of this sort exist. It would be contrary to the party's interests to maintain supplies of this kind, assuming it could do so effectively, because the discovery of them would expose the party to severe official reprisal. In the event of an all-out Communist attack on national defense, it is probable that the party would rely primarily on sabotage action by technical experts in strategic positions and on the presence of party members in various positions in the national economy, rather than on paraemilitary action.: IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The FCP is a legal political party and as such enjcys freedom of ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 354] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION action within the limits of the law. During the past several years, however, and particularly since 1948, the government, without directly attacking the FCP as such, has considerably restricted Communist activities through a series of practices and restrictions designed to maintain public order and protect national interests. Thus the government has transferred known Communists or Communist sympathizers from sensitive positions in the armed forces, the civil service, and the nationalized industries. It has frequently banned Communist demonstrations. In Parliament, the practice has developed of referring vital business to subcommittees inasmuch as the rule providing for proportional representation on committees does not apply to subcommittees. Special press laws have also been enacted with a view to preventing deputies, who enjoy parliamentary immunity, from directing newspapers. Several directors of Communist publications have used this protective device in the past. Moreover, foreign Communist publications have been prohibited. Despite the increasing stringency of the government's measures against the Communists, the party has thus far been inconvenienced rather than actually curbed. Its leadership and major front organizations are still virtually intact. Party members are not formally prohibited from holding trade union posts-and government positions (including teachers’ positions filled by the state), and the Communist-led trade union is recognized as a € collective bargaining agent. Moreover, persons arrested for disturbing the: peace in Communist demonstrations are usually given short sentences, and FCP leaders are still able to travel to the Soviet Union and to various international front organization congresses where Soviet leaders are present. In 1952, the government began to fill some of the gaps in its anti- Communist program by initiating a series of actions aimed directly ata number of top Communist leaders. To this end the government has requested the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of six Communist deputies in order to prosecute them, as well as several other FCP and front organization leaders, on the charge of attacking the external security of the state. Parliament has not yet lifted the Commmist deputies’ immunity, however. Parliament has alsc been requested by the government to consider a bill which would provide the government with legal means for dismissing Communists from the civil service, but no action has been taken on this proposal either. Limits on the French Government's anti-Communist action have existed, though to an increasingly less important extent, for three main reasons; (1) the very size of the Communist problem, which renders it extremely difficult for the government to weed out party members from all positions which might be identified as sensitive; (2) the widespread reluctance, especially on the part of the non-Communist left and center parties, to SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 355] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -llinfringe on the principle of civil liberties lest the type of political witch hunt that was carried on by Vichy be repeated; (3} French public opinion generally does not attach any special stigma to Communists and fellow travellers, and it is still widely believed that a person may vote Communist or belong to a Communist-controlled trade unicn or other organization without being disloyal. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR. The number of Communists in France's key industries is unknown. Since the members of the Communist-controlled trade union federation (Confederation Generale du Travail, CGT) are by no means all Communists, as repeatedly indicated by the fact that the Communist leaders of the CGT cannot rally union rank-and-file in behalf of Communist political causes, the strength of the CGT in a particular industry provides only a very rough and uncertain index to Communist strength in that industry. With this important reservation in mind about the CGT as an indicator of Communist strength, it may be pointed out that the CGT is stronger than any other union in nearly every key industry of France. This strength remains, despite the great decline of the CGT during the past five years, in the mines, the railroads, communications, docks and shipyards, and the metallurgical industry. In all these cases, however, correct perspective is maintained only if it is borne in mind that only from one-fourth to onehalf of the total working force is unionized. In the realm of organized labor as a whole, the CGT is unquestionably the strongest single force and, in fact, stronger than the several non- Communist unions together. CGT membership is currently estimated at 1,500,000, while most of the remaining 1,000,000 organized workers are divided between the Catholic CFIC (about 600,000-700,000 members) and the Socialist FO (about 300,000-400,000 members). The Communists are able to maintain this lead primarily because the CGT is. still considered by a large number of French workers as the only "real" trade union in. France. It has behind it a long tradition and prestige as a Marxist labor organization -- an important factor in a country where labor is strongly class-conscious. Moreover, when it leaves political issues alone and concentrates on economic demands, it still tends to function as the strongest and most aggressive champion of labor. The non-Communist unions, for their part, have remained weak, and unquestionably they have suffered from their widespread reputation of being connected with the government. Neither have the free trade unions found it | possible to move toward close cooperation. They continue instead to be ‘deeply divided by personal rivalries among their leaders and by the anticlerical issue. SECRET -_ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 356] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION While the Communists control the largest portion of organized labor, they have only succeeded in enrolling a fraction of the total number of wage-earners, estimated at 11,000,000. Thus the CGT is strong primarily in the sense that the non-Communist unions are weak and that the largest group of French workers is unorganized. Relatively strong though the CGT still is, moreover, it is only one-fourth as large as it was in 1946-47, prior to the wholesale defections it suffered as a direct result of the political strikes it called in the early stages of the cold war. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 357] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION -13- VI, COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Commmnist front organizations in France, viewed interms of their number, geographical distribution, and occupational or interest coverage, are very extensive, There are still well over 100 such organizations, each with a network of local organizations, and they are geared to the interests of a wide variety of groups, notably youth, students and teachers, women, nationality minorities, sports enthusiasts » veterans, and numerous professional groups. In addition there are, besides the CGT, the Peace Movement and a wide variety of cultural organizations, .The actual strength of these front organizations is impossible to assess, partly because their memberships overlap and are far from stable, and partly because some of the organizations, such as the Peace Movement particularly, have very loose rules concerning member- Ship. In any case, most of the fronts now appear to be nothing more than paper organizations, and in practically all cases they are so dependent on their Communist members that they can be said to hav almost no strength apart from the Commmist Party. Of the front organizations the one to which the FCP currently. gives the most attention and care is the Peace “ovement, Its active € supporters are estimated at 50,000, most of whom are Comnunists, and it has an organization, at least on paper, which covers all of France. The basic units in the organization are the Committees of Peace, which are set up either at a place of work or in a neighborhood, Strong efforts are made to include non-Communists in these comnittees, but except for a few who accept honorary posts or support occasional specific "peace" activities, leadership at all levels is Communist, . An insight into what lies behind the Peace Movement's nation= wide facade was offered in the famous Duclos notebook, which the police seized at the time of his arrest in the anti-Kidgway demonstration last May. According to Duclos, the Peace Movement no longer has any effective organization below the regional level, That the movement has been losing strength is also indicated by the decline of its press. Before its weekly newspaper, Action, folded up in May (for failure to follow the new party line in support of East German rearmament, as well as for financial reasons), its circulation had fallen from 75,000 to 30,000. of all the other fronts, the most important are those for women, youth, and various veteran and resistance organizations Stemming out of the two world wars. The women's organization _ ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | a - === [PDF page 358] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION (l'Union des Femmes Frangaises) still has local and regional wits as well as a national office, ough many of its local branches are reported to engage in little activity, Most of the work of the organization now appears to be done by women members of the FCP rather than by non-Communists, although a considerable number of non-Communist women are still willing to sign their names in signature campaigns, The major front organization for youth (Union de la Jeunesse kepublicaine de France) is important to the FCP both as a training ground for the party and as the means of injecting a mass element into various Communist actions which can be represented as being of particular interest to youth, Thus the youth organization, under the close supervision of the FCP itself, concerns itself particularly with such issues as length of military service and the war in Indochina, The various veteran and related organizations are primarily concerned with the particular grievances and demands of their members, and they make a special effort to secure the participation of non- Communists, Nevertheless, their activities, like those of the other front groups, are clearly carried on by Communist members, and consequently have no genuine popular character, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT C An over-all view of Communist infiltration into the French Government may be given by indicating the extent to which Communists are known to be present in various governmental bodies: “A. National Government 1. The Cabinet. No Communists have been present in the cabinet since they were expelled from the goverrment in May 197. 2. Parliament. In the lower house of Parliament (the National Assembly), the Communista have 100 seats out of a total of 625, while they have 15 seats out of a total of 320 in the consultative upper house (the Council of the Republic). 3. Civil Service and Nationalized Industries, In the civil service and nationalized industries, the nunber of Communists in highlevel positions is now believed to be negligible, but the number in minor positions probably remains sizeable, h. The Internal Security Forces, In the internal security forces, Communist influence is thought to be slight. In the civil police, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 359] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECHET - SECURITY INFORMATION. however, there is apparently some infiltration. During the past year, 20 members of the Paris police force were suspended and 60 were transferred to non-sensitive posts because they were suspected of Communist membership or Leanings., 5, The Armed Forces. The relatively few Communist officers in the armed forces are almost al] of junior rank. No Communist senior officer holds a post of command, 6, The Atomic Energy Commission. The French atomic energy commission was reorganized in 1951 with a view to eliminating Communist influence. Fragmentary reporting indicates, however, that some Communists and Communist sympathizers continue to be employed at the lower levels of the organization. -. B. Local Government _ In the field of municipal government, the Communists claim about 2,000 mayors out of a total of 37,930, and they have about 30,500 seats out of a total of 66,209 on the municipal councils. In the departmental councils, the Communists have 78 seats out of a total of 1,500. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION In circles and public institutions important in forming public opinion, Commmists or Communist sympathizers are unquestionably present, but always in a decidedly minor way. Thus it appears that Communists have some influence among primary and secondary school teachers.as a result of their presence in the autonomous teachers‘ union. There are no estimates, however, on how many: teachers either belong to the FCP or go along with some of its major causes, There are also some Communists on the faculties of the universities, but no estimate of their number is available. In the Catholic Church there are a few individuals, including some "worker priests" and the small group of Christian Progressives, whose social philosophy has led them to support the Communists, usually on such specific issues as peace and improved working-class living conditions, The abbé Boulier is, as the most prominent of the Christian Progressives, frequently pointed to by the Communists as alleged proof of Catholic support for the"peace movement and related causes, As far as is known, however, there is no considerable number of Communist sympathizers among either the parish priests or the higher SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 360] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -16- € In the programs currently produced by the nationally-owmed French broadcasting system (Radio Diffusion srangaise, RDF) there appears to be very little Commmist influence, ter the war RDF was heavily infiltrated by the Communists, but since then the government has taken all, or nearly all, pro-Communist broadcasters off the air. An estimated two-thirds of KDF's technicians, however, are believed to belong to a Commnist-controlled trade union. IX, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES No non-Communist parties are believed to have been infiltrated by Communists, On the fringe of the FCP, however, there are two small | parties, the Union of Progressives and the Unity-Socialist Party, Both of these groups are so obviously appendages of the FCP that they cannot > be regarded as non-Communist parties which have been infiltrated by the Communists., X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The chief propaganda medium for the FCP is the local Communist press, A mid-1952 review of Communist publications shows that the FCP and its related organizations publish three daily newspapers in Paris, Ll) dailies in the provinces, 61 provincial weeklies, and 83 C journals of greatly varying content and format. There are comics for children, film and sports reviews, picture magazines, literary journals, a law review, international news reports, and professional magazines. for teachers, doctors, and specialized workers of various kinds, Circulation figures for these publications vary widely, but it appears that at least a dozen of the publications have circulations of over 100,000, In fact some of them (such as 1'Humanite Dimanche with a reported circulation of about 300,000) are well above this figure. Nevertheless, circulation of the Communist press, including that of the official party organ, 1'Humanite, has unquestionably been declining. L'Humanite's circulation, as of January 1953, is estimated at 17,000 (with about 15,000 copies being sold and the rest given away), as compared with 224,000 in 1950 and 450,000 in 197. While the circulation of the entire French press is at a postwar low, l'Humanite appears to have suffered particularly heavy losses, and @ game can apparently be said for a considerable number of other Communist publications. In the provinces, the 1) Communist dailies had a total circulation in 1952 of 639,500, compared with 756,600 in, 1951. Despite its difficulties, 1'Humanite has increased from six to eight pages within the past year, indicating that the party is continuing to pump money into the paper to keep it alive, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ( === [PDF page 361] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION To facilitate the printing and distribution of their various publications the Communists maintain a number of firms of their own, | usually thinly disguised as commercial enterprises, These firms include a considerable number of publishing houses, printing companies, bookstores, and other companies whose business it is to see to the circulation and sale of Communist publications. Communist radio propaganda in France consists almost entirely of broadcasts, in French, from the Soviet Union and the bloc. These broadcasts are as follows: 1) Radio Moscow Six broadcasts daily. 7:00 A.M. on 31, hl, and 49 meters 8:00 A.M. (on same wavelengths) 12:30 P.M. on 25 and 31 meters. 7:00 P.M. on 41, 233, and 20 meters 8:30 P.M. on 49, 233, and 240 meters 10:00 P.M. on kl, 49, 233 and 240 meters 2) Kadio Budapest Two broadcasts daily: 9:00 P.M. on 30 meters, 50, 0 meters 50, and 252 meters Midnight on same wavelenghts. | 3) Radio Prague One broadcast daily; “Tonight in France." This is the most important of the bloc's broadcasts. It seeks to create the impression that it originates from a clandestine station in France, On 233 meters 30. h,) Radio Warsaw Two broadcasts daily: 9:30 P.M. on 31, 48 and 278 meters 225 P.M. on 31 and 8 meters. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 362] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] The potential French radio audience may be roughly estimated at 28,000,000, (The number of home radio sets is something under. 9,000,000, In addition there are about 100,000 radios in public places. If it is estimated that an average of three persons listen to each: set, - the potential radio audience may be set at between 27,000,000 and 28,000,000.) How large a part of this potential audience listens to Soviet and satellite broadcasts is wiknown. No polls have been conducted, so far as is known, to determine the extent to which Soviet bloc broadcasts are heard in France. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 363] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SBCRST - SECURITY INFORMATION XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION There appears to be very little dependable information available on FCP finances. The only faot which seems clear is that the FCPts expenses are considerable and its means of support are not easily visible. In roughly estimating FCP annual expenses, it may be assumed that these expenses are of two main kinds; salaries for party functionaries and propaganda expenses. Salaries, estimated at a monthly figure of roughly 30,000 francs, would amount to about $5,500,000. Propaganda expenses, admittedly extremely difficult to estimate, may be very roughly estimated at $28,500,000. Hence the party's total expenses, according to this very tentative estimate, are in the neighborhood of $35,000,000. In estimating FCP income, on the other hand, there are even fewer rough indicators at hand. The party's overt receipts (including dues and the standard remittances by Communist deputies and administrative officials of part of their salaries) probably do not amount to more than about 10 percent of the party's total expenditures. How much income the party receives from its publications, the CGT, and front organizations is unknown; nor is it known how much revenue the party secures from controlled business firms. Such sources as these, however, probably do produce some income. It is also possible that the FCP secures some funds from the Soviet Union and the satellites through:various channels, including especially the Communist-controlled Commercial Bank for Northern Europe. This bank, which handles the accounts of most of the Communist organizations, is believed to be the intermediary for the movement of funds from the Soviet Union, the bloc countries, and the international offices of the major front organizations. In the winter of 1948-49 the National Assembly became disturbed by reports that this bank was allegedly giving advances to the FCP, but their concern came to nothing when it appeared that there was nothing irregular in the Bank's activities. It has also been reported that the WFTU, through its contacts with the CGT, has occasionally made arrangements for contributions by unions of the satellite states to French strikers. XII. SOVEST SATSLLITS OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet Union and satellites maintain diplomatic establishments in Paris, with their missions being fairly small in size. According to. the official French diplomatic list of January 1952, these missions were SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 364] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION f iy made up as follows; Number in Diplomatic Mission Soviet Union Embassy 29 Albania Iegation 3 Bulgaria. Legation (charge) - 5 - Czechoslovakia Bmbassy 10 Finland Legation.. 5 Hungary Le gation. 8 . Po land Embassy (charge) 7 Rumania Legation (charge) | 3 The Bulgarian, Finnish, Hungarian, and Polish missions included persons specifically charged with press or cultural affairs, but how many individuals are actually engaged in propaganda activities is unknown, C -The Soviet Embassy, for its part, publishes the monthly Etudes Sovietiques. The French branch of TASS is also a Soviet propaganda instrument and liaison agent of note.. TASS occupies part of the office of the Soviet Information Bureau in Paris, and some of the personnel of TASS and the Soviet Information Bureau appears to be interchangeable. ~ Also noteworthy is the considerable number of Soviet or satellite "friendship" societies. By far the most important of these societies is France-USSR with an estimated membership of about 60,000 throughout the country. Its local departmental organizations are clearly directed by the Communist Party, and, like the other front organizations, it has no independent leadership and existence. Most of its non-Communist members merely attend meetings occasionally. ‘The pamphlet published by the organization, France-USSR, has a circulation of about 117,000, which is a fair sized ciroulation for a periodical of its kind in France. Additional activities of France-USSR inolude -holding lectures, showing films, helping to distribute Soviet books and magazines, and sending delegations to the Soviet Union. It appears that about a half dozen such delegations have been sent annually in recent years. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 365] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Other "friendship" societies, all of which seem to be little more than paper organizations, are; Amities Franco-Polonaises (French-Polish Friendship Society) France-Albanie: (France-A lbania ) Franoe-Bulgarie (France-Bulgaria) France-Espagne (France-spain) France-Hongrie (France-Hungary) France-Roumanie (France-Rumania) France-Tchecoslovaquie (France-Czechoslovakia France-Vietnam XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNEST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS None of the Communist international front organizations currently has its headquarters in Paris. The French Government expelled the head- (, quarters of the following organizations in 1951; the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Peace Movement, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the International Association of Democratic Jurists. ‘The French national organizations Which are affiliated with these internationals continu, however, to have their headquarters in Paris.. . During the past two years (1951-52) only one of these international organizations held a meeting in Paris. The First International Conference for a Peaceful Solution of the German Problem, sponsored by the Peace Movement, was held in Paris May 12-14, 1951. This meeting was attended by 226 delegates from 13 European countries. Wo information is available _ on the number of French participants. 4 check on the participents in attendance at the various international front organizationst meetings, whether of working committees or — ‘full congresses, shows that French delegates were invariably present. Such meetings, moreover, are fairly frequent, and a review of them indicates that the international front organizations offer opportunities for approximately 50 contacts each year between French Commmists or. pro-Communists and Soviet or satellite representatives. The WFTU held 22 conferences of various kinds from mid-1951 to mid-1952; the 7 International Federation of Resistance, 7 meetings during approximately the same period; the Peace Movement, 12 sessions from January 1951 to LL, | SECRET - SECURETY INFORMATION === [PDF page 366] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION November 1952; the woments organization, 5 sessions from early'1951 to ‘ July 1952; the lewyers, 5 from September 1951 to November 1952; and the “Worle Federation of Democratic Youth, 16 meetings from August 1$51 to the close of 1952. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK The FCP has no problem in maintaining connections with the Soviet Union and other portions of the international Cosmunist apparatus outside Frances As pointed out in the preceding section, FCP leaders and Communist sympathizers have numerous contacts with the Soviet Union and the satele lites, as well as with Communists outside the Soviet bloc, through the meetings of the international front organizations. ‘ In addition about a dozen FCP leaders travel to Moscow fairly frequently. ‘That they bring back, at least occasionally, fairly specific instructions is indicated by the discussion in Duclos! notebook of the wey in which the directive for a change in the FCP's emphasis was ~ transmitted from Moscow to the FCP in the spring of 1952. This directive, Duclos indicates, was given to Billoux by Thorez, and it may be assumed -- although this point is by no means certain -- that the latter had cleared this directive, at least in principle, with Soviet leaders. ‘Various delegations of Communists and pro-Communists who are leaders of the major front organizations also go to Moscow on missions. France~USSR is particularly active in this connection. The Soviet Embassy in Paris has good opportunities for keeping in touch with the FCP. A number of reports on contacts between the Soviet Embassy and the party indicate, however, that the Embassy tends to deal with the FCP through France-USSR, and specifically through its president, Fernand Grenier, rather than directlye SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 367] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.20 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: ~ CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE NETHERLANDS OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 368] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword « «se eeeececececre ree evreee ee ves li OBJHCTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « « « 1 Ie Objectives... i 1 II. Tactics e-ec«cecccececerer eve ev cessor eve oe 1 III. Capabilities 2. «+. se«eecercrer eee eee ov ee 2 ASSETS 2. «© ee eee we ww 4 Te Numerical Strength «4. «+eecceeecesreerevveree 4 II. Electoral Strength « ee seececerecereceesesee rT III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. 2. eee ecesee 6 Ve Communist Influence in Labor « «ee ecceeeceeve 7 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations « «esesececreseesee 8 VIIe Communist Infiltration into Government « « « ee eee 9 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation e « e 10 1X. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties ee ceesree reer eevee sosee ve 10 Xe Communist Propaganda Media...«+s«ecerevsveeeee 10 XIe Financial Condition.« «eesreccecreecseveeeeves 12 XIIe Soviet—Satellite Official Assets « «e«eececerveee 12 XIII. Communist International Organizations « « « eeeee 13 XIV, Communist Communication Network « eceevseesee8 14 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 369] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY DVFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 370] === TO, ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECKET - SECURITY INFORMATION a SEV NALLON COMMUNISM IN THE NETHEKLANDS: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES In the Netherlands, the Communists! (CPN) principal objective is to detach the Netherlands from the Western camp and their secondary objective is to obstruct as much as possible the progress of Western unity under US leadership. During the June 1952 electoral campaign, for instance, the first point in the Communist program was the creation of a "peace loving and independent Netherlands," According to the Communists, this goal could best be reached by holding a Big Five conference, increasing East-West trade, halting rearmament, withdrawing Dutch units from Korea, seceding from NATO, cooperating with a united and "peace-loving" Germany, and breaking off all agreements between the US and the Netherlands, Since the government and all non-Communist political parties and labor groups in the Netherlands Support moves toward Western unity, a closely related objective of the CPN is that of weakening the established political and social order by creating divisions and distrust between the government and the people and between the leadership and the rank and file of the non-Commnist parties and labor unions, Although the Dutch Communists are interested in promoting their own growth, this objective is generally subordinate to the aim of advancing the strategic interests cf the USSR, If, TACTICS In order to attain its objectives the Dutch Commmist Party seeks to win a direct following among all social groups. At their 16th Congress in Amsterdam last November, the Communist leaders issued a call for a "National United Front with all who are against the Americans and their collaborators," even including members of right-wing parties and classes. The Communists argue that once reactionary leadership has been repudiated by the rank and file of the various parties, no further obstacle will stand in the way of fruitful cooperation between the "democratic" and Communist parties, In their propaganda, the Communists generally relate political issues to economic demands, arguing that the workers! low standard of living is caused by the government's "war policy," Although the Dutch Communist Party poses most frequently as the champion of the underdog, advocating government construction of low-cost housing, reduction in the cost of living, and greater benefits for pensioners, it makes an attempt to be all things to all men, It appeals to the nationalism and anti- Americanism of some extreme right-wing groups; it appeals to the moral scruples of religious groups by attacking "immoral films and reading SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 371] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECUKITY INFORMATION. é matter such as American cartoons and newspapers"; it appeals to the bitter memories of the Nazi occupation in its protest against clemency for German war criminals and the rearmament of Germany; it appeals to Dutch business interests by playing up the economic advantages to be derived from an increase in East-West trade, Above all, it seeks to exploit the universal desire for peace and the fear of another war. The principal instruments in this campaign to gain a direct following among a great variety of social groups are the Dutch Peace Council and the Netherlands-USSK Association. By holding "peace congresses," “peace rallies," and "peace weeks," by agitating against the unloading of American arms and by collecting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal and later the appeal for a Hive Power Peace Pact, the Netherlands Peace Council has sought to obtain mass support for Conmunist objectives. On the whole, its efforts have had little success, The Netherlands-USSR Association has reportedly been slightly more successful in its efforts to advance Soviet prestige through cultural media and has also served as a recruiting ground for new Communist members, In the labor field, indications are that the Communist leaders have abandoned hopes of building up their own. Communist-dominated Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheids Vakcentrale, EVC) at the expense of the non-Communist unions, and are concentrating ( instead on direct infiltration of these unions, * especially the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions, which is most closely allied with the Netherlands Labor Party, III, Capabilities The constant decline in numerical strength of the party and its front organizations (with the possible exception of the Netherlands- USSK Association) during the postwar period is a clear indication of the ineffectiveness of Communist propaganda. From a peak of 53,000 early in 1947, Communist membership dropped to about 33,000 by the end of 1949. Since then it has apparently remained fairly constant; estimates range from 33,000 to 40,000 with the lower figure probably being more accurate. In the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, Communist representation dropped from ten seats in 1946 to six following the June 1952 election. The Communists polled 6.16 percent of the total valid vote in this election (328,571), compared with 7.7 percent in 1948 (381,953), Membership in the Communist-dominated Unity Trade Union Central declined from an estimated 200,000 in 1945 to an estimated 70,000 in 1952, Circulation of the official ’ Communist daily De Waarheid dwindled from an estimated peak of 00,000 in 1945 to the present estimated circulation of 100,000, The newspaper has been in serious financial difficulties at least since 1947. Periodic drives to increase SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ( === [PDF page 372] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the number of subscriptions have apparently met with little success. There is no prospect that the Dutch Communists will succeed in gaining sufficient popular support among the democratic parties and labor groups for their current anti-American policy to enable them to place any serious obstacles in the way of the official Netherlands policy of cooperation with the US and other Western nations, Certain supporters of the Labor Party and of the extreme right-wing parties are highly critical of American leadership but all these elements distrust the Communists far more then they do the US. Only a sharp | increase in unemployment and a worsening of the local economic situation would be likely to siphon off support from the +abor Party to the Netherlands Communists, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 373] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION. € COMMUNISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The estimated membership of the Netherlands Communist Party is 33,000. The aggregate membership figure of organizations controlled by Communists is about 125,000, but the actual total may be less as many individuals belong to more than one front organization and many members of such organizations as the Communist-controlled trade unions are not Communists. Slightly more than three percent of the population is influenced strongly enough by the Communists to vote the party ticket. The bulk of the party membership and sympathizers is drawn from the industrial working class and from members of the lower middle classes living on small pensions, with a few intellectuals, professional people, and white collar workers furnishing the rest. Geographically, Communist strength is greatest (1) in the highly urbanized and industrialized provinces of North and South holland, including the three largest cities of the country, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, (2) in the industrial Twente section of the province of Overijssel and (3) in certain poorly developed, isolated rural sections, notably the eastern corner of the province of Groningen, In this latter area, the town of Finsterwolde (population: 3,240) has a Communist—dominated é town council. The "hard core" of the Communist Party is only about 10 percent of the total party strength, or roughly 3,000. This hard core furnishes the militant leadership of the party. The rest of the member= ship is, on the whole, apathetic but continues to vote for the party in spite of numerous shifts in party line and tactics. The average age of the party leaders is between 45 and 50, and most of them joined the organization before the war. Several of the top leaders have been active in key posts in the party for fifteen or twenty years. Since the strength of the party prior to the war was never more than 10,000, at least two-thirds of the membership joined within the past five years, The "hard core" leadership is drawn almost exclusively from the laboring classes and is concentrated in the city of Amsterdam. A considerable number of old-guard Communists are located in some of the villages in the northern tip of the province of North Holland and in the small towns and villages of the province of Groningen. The membership of the party, which reached a maximum of 53,000 in 1947, dropped to 33,000 by 1950 and has remained constant at that level. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The Communist Party obtained 6.16 percent (328,571) of the 5,335,064 valid votes cast in the parliamentary elections of June 1952, compared with 7.74 percent (381,953) of 4,932,959 valid votes in the 1948 parliamentary elections, and 6.8 percent (329,365) of the 4,843,630 ( SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Release (0) //() Q- A-F IPS6 BOOP OORODOOSO00S000 1-4 === [PDF page 374] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET —- SECURITY INFORMATION -~5valid votes in the elections for the Provincial States in 1950. At present all non-Communist parties, except the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and the small Political Reformed and Catholic National Parties, are represented in the goverrment. Since these three parties are as opposed to Communism as these parties in the governing coalition, the Communist Party is isolated in its opposition. Following is the breakdown of votes and seats in the Second Chamber of the Dutch States General following the elections of June 1952.. Party Number_of £ of Total Number of Votes Vote Seats Party of Labor 1,545,414 28.97. 30 Catholic Peoples Party 1,529,464 28.67 30 Anti-Revolutionsry Party. 605,269 11.31 12 Christian Historical Union 476,175 8.92, 9 Peoples Party for. Freedom and Democracy 471,005 8.83 9 Communist Party Netherlands 328,571 6.16 6 Political Reformed Party 129,134 2042 2 Catholic National Party 144,435 2.71 2 The Communists obtain the greatest number of votes in the cities of Amsterdam (22.35 percent of the total vote in the June 1952 parliamentary elections), Rotterdam (9.6 percent), and The Hague (6.6 percent). The Communists also are strong in the province of Groningen where they received 9.0 percent of the total valid votes in 1952. As Communist overtures to several of the democratic parties in 1952 to form a "National Unity Front" were unsuccessful, the party campaigned independently in the June elections that year. Its faction in Parliament is completely independent from the other opposition groups. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The current policy of the Communist Party is to pose as a lawabiding, peace-loving organization. Communists have been active in SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 375] === OE EO EE ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION € leading meetings and parades protesting commutation of the sentences of war criminals and the rearmament of Germany, however, these demon— strations have had no violent aspects. During World War II, the Communists participated in the anti- German resistance, but, with the exception of some individuals, they seem to have played only a subsidiary role. The Dutch Communists are believed to have some arms available in hidden caches although nothing specific is known, nor is there any detailed information on plans for execution of violent action. According to current reports the Comunists plan to seize control of the railway network and to sabotage Dutch transportation in the event of war. The Netherlands Railways authorities are well aware of these plans and are closely scrutinizing any employees whose loyalty is questioned. There are also reports of an “agitation center" in Amsterdam which trains Communists for various tasks, but it is believed that this center concentrates on propaganda and developing leadership in the party, rather than on schemes for violent action, The Dutch Communists have no known para-military organization, and could probably rally no more than a 1,000 men for active guerilla warfare in the event of an East-West war. An attempt at armed insurrection in peace-time is most unlikely in the Netherlands, for the Communists probably would have available to them for such an attémpt only the several hundred "hard-core" members in the Amsterdam area. som IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Communists are a legally recognized party in the Netherlands and relatively few restraints have been imposed on their activities. The Dutch Constitution was amended in 1948 to grant the government wide powers in times of national emergency. This constitutional provision was implemented in 1952 by a law enabling the Queen in times of emergency, at the suggestion of the Minister of the Interior and with the approval of the States-General, to suspend normal legislative and judicial functions and to grant sweeping powers to the Minister of the Interior, the Queen's Commissioners in the 11 provinces, and the Dutch mayors. Although these powers have never been invoked, they act as a restraining force upon the Communists. At the time of the passing of the bill, there was some talk in Communist circles of going underground, but such a step will probably not be taken unless the government becomes far more restrictive in its policy towards the Communists. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 376] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION A further hindrance to the Communists is the practice of keeping Communist members of most town councils, provincial states and the States General from participating in key administrative and legislative committees. Since December 1951, civil servants have been prohibited by the Dutch government from being members of the Communist Party, its women's, youth, and labor organizations. Many” of the municipalities of the kingdom have followed the lead of the national government in this matter. Members of the Communist party working for the government of the city of Amsterdam have been seriously inconvenienced by this action and some of them have resigned their membership in the party as a result., The Communist trade union federation is not recognized as a bona fide bargaining agent by the government. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Most of the trade unions in the Netherlands are combined into four major federations. In the Catholic and Protestant federations, the Communists are barred from membership. Of the 400,000 members in the Socialist federation (The Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions), less than one percent is Communist. The Communist Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheidsvakcentrale EVC) claimed 164,000 members in 1951, although its actual strength is probably no more than 70,000. Its four most important components are the General Union of Transport Workers (Algemene Bedrijfsbond Transport), which includes the dockworkers and claimed 13,000 members in 19513 the General Union of Workers in the Building Trades (Algemene Bond van Werkers in de Bouwnijverheid) with 33,600 claimed members in 1951; the Union of Dutch Government Personnel (Bond van Nederlands Overheidspersoneel), which controls many of the manual laborers in the employ of the city of Amsterdam and claimed 18,900 members in 1951; and the Metal Workers'. Trade Union (Bond van Werknemers in de Ketaalnijverheid en Aanverwante Bedrijfstakken) with 27,110 claimed members scattered through the aircraft, shipbuilding and other defense industries. The actual membership of these unions is probably one-half the claimed membership. The Communists are not in control of any key industries, but> could probably considerably damare the economic life of the port of - Amsterdam where the Communist transport workers' union controls a _large number of longshoremen. Communist workers are too few in such vital industries as aviation and electronics to be a grave security threat. The Unity Trade Union Central is affiliated with and active in the work of the WFTU. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 377] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Vie COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANI ZATIONS The most important Communist front Organizations in the Netherlands are 1) The General Netherlands Youth Federation (Algemeen Nederlands Jeugdverbond) which has somewhat less than 5,000 members, about half of whom are concentrated in Amsterdam. It is the youth movement of the Communist Party and due to its weakness, offers practically no competition to non-Communist organizations in the same field. Its leadership is composed of "hard core" party members who control the organization, but the Federation suffers froma lack of trained youth leaders. The organization is an affiliate of the World Federetion of Democratic Youth. It is attempting to recruit new members by emphasizing hobbies rather than politics, but its capabilities for any expansion of membership or activity are limited. 2) The Organization of Progressive Student Youth (Organisatie van Progressieve Studerende Jeugd), an affiliate of the International Union of Students (IUS), is composed of several hundred secondary school students. It is relatively unimportant in youth and student circles and its efforts to influence the texts used in secondary schools have been unsuccessful. The organization is in financial difficulties and its membership is quite static. 3) The Netherlands Woments Movement (Nederlandse Vr ouwenbeweging, NVB) is the women's auxiliary of the Communist Party. Founded in 1946, it has about 5,000 members and is affiliated with. the Communist front Woments International Democratic Federation. Its membership is fairly constant and the possibilities for growth are negligible. The Netherlands Women's Movement supports the Communist Party in all campaigns and actions, 4) The Netherlands-USSR Association (Vereniging Nederland-USspR) was formed in March 1948 through a merger of many Local groups to stimulate friendly relations and establish social and cultural ties between the two nations. Originally appealing to non-Communists as well as to Communists and their sympathizers, its strict adherence to the party line has eliminated most of the non-Communist elements. The Association claimed a membership of 13,000 in 1951, but half that figure is probably more accurate. 5) The Netherlands Peace Council (Nederlandse Vredesraad) coordinates the work of various "peace" committees which function on a regional, local, and factory level. The Council cleims a circulation of 20,000 for its organ vrede (Peace). The Council Bupports such movements SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Seaside ett ctrl keckantichl === [PDF page 378] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION as the Stockholm Peace Petition, the Moscow Economic Conference, ete. Of late its rallies and meetings in behalf of werld peace and its open con-~ demnation of the US and the West have received only a luke-warm reception. 6) The Workers! Cultural Union (Arbeiders Bond voor Cultuur), founded in 1948 and claiming 10,000 members In January I950, {fs intended to promote the cultural development of the workers along Communist lines, Its leadership has been rather inactive, and the Union itself is closely allied with the Union of Socialist Choral and Musical Societies in the Netherlands (Bond van Socialistische Zang-en Muziekverenigingen in Nederland) whose purported membership in November 1949 was 1,500. The Musical Society's purpose is to enliven the meetings of Communist and Comnaunist front organizations. 7) The Qnited Resistance, 1940-1945 (Verenigd Verzet, 1940-1945) organization claims a membership of 1,000 and is affiliated with the international Communist front organization, the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR). 8) The Committee for Help to Indonesia (Comite Hulp aan Indonesie) and the Indonesian Association (Perhimpoenan Indonesia, Pl) have been the mouthpieces for the expression of the Gommunistst policy on Indonesia among Dutchmen and Indonesians in the Netherlands, respectively. 9) The Association of Scientific Ressarch Workers (Verbond van Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers, VWO) consists of about six hundred members, of whom approximatsly one-third are Communists or fellow travellers, It sent an observer to the last congrsass of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. Through its contacts in important laboratories, the VWWO might conceivably be able to engage in espionage work. The non- Communist sympathizers in the membership are chisfly interested in furthering the exchange of scientific information and devoting the results of scientific research to peaceful pursuits, The Third Way (De Derde Weg) movement, the Church and Peace (Kerk en Vrede) association, and the That Never Again (Dat Nooit Weer) organiza- Elon are small groups of individuals, none of which has more than a few hundred members. Although non-Communist, they are chisfly pacifist in Orientation, and nence frequently support such Communist maneuvers as the Stockholm Peace Petition and the Vienna Peace Conference. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMSNT The Dutch Communists virtually have been unable to infiltrate into top government positions in policy making bodies, either at the national or local level, nor have they been successful in penatrating the commands of the armed sarvioes and police and security services. There are SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 379] === EEE EE DEEZ EE OO Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION probably a fair number of Communists (proportionally the same as the national average) amongst the new recruits in the Dutch army, but most of these are known to security officers. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The Dutch Radio is government controlled and there is no evidence of Communist infiltration in this field. An occasional clergyman is interested and active in the "Peace" movement, but no appreciable Communist influence exists in any of the recognized Dutch church groups. The non-Communist press is suspicious of the Communists, with the pose sible exception of the weekly, The Green Amsterdammer (De Groene Amsterdammer), which occasionally follows the party line. A number of eminent authors, artists, and musicians are Communist sympathizers but influence only a small group of intellectuals. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST | ITICAL PARTIES The Communists exert no influence upon any of the other Dutch political parties. Although a few intellectuals in the Party of Labor may be sympathetic to some of the "Peace" campaigns and increased cooperation between Hast and West, there are no known Communist sympathizers in that party's parliamentary representation or in its headquarters. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA Following is a list of Communist newspapers and periodicals published in the Netherlands: 1) De Waarheid (Truth), the Communist Party daily; circulation c. 100,000; published by the "N.V. Uitgeverij Persorganen," Amsterdam. 2) Uilenspiegel, a family weekly; circulation about 50,000; published by the "N.V. Uitgeverij Persorganen." 3) Voor een Duurzame Vrede, voor Volks=Democratie (For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy), the Dutch edition of the Cominform waekly; about 2000 subscribers in the Netherlands; published by the Stichting Progressief Algemeen Vertaal Bureau (General Progressive Translation Foundation). 4) Werkend Nederland (Working Netherlands), organ of the Communist Unity Trade Union Central; printed by "N. V. Heiermann & Co., Amsterdam under the financial support of the Foundation "Bepenak." SBCRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 380] === 0 eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 5) Politiek en Cultuur (Politics and Culture), the Communist version of a scientific and cultural journal; published by Pegasus, Amsterdam; printed by "N.V. Heiermann & Co." and supported by “Bepenak." 6) Staat en Raad (State and Council), Feiten en Cijfers (Facts and Figures), and CPN Informatie Dienst (CPN Information Service) are bulletinsissued by the party for Instruction and guidance of members and leaders. 7) Jeugd (Youth) is the organ of the General Netherlands Youth Federation; circulation about 15,000. 8) Studie en Strijd (Study and Struggle) is the organ of the Organization of Progressive Student Youth. 9) Vrouwen voor Vrede en Opbouw (Women for Peace and Reconstruction) is the organ of the Netherlands Women's Movement. 10) Vrede (Peace) is the organ of the Netherlands Peace Council; circulation 20,000. 11) Muziek en Strijd (Music and Struggle) is the organ of the Union of Socialist Choral and Musical Societies in the Netherlands. 12) De Stem van het Verzet (The Voice of the Resistance) is the organ of the United Resistance. 15) Nederland-USSR (Netherlands-USSR) is the organ of the Netherlands=0SSR Association. With the possible exception of the Groene Amsterdammer (see above), with a circulation of 40,000, there are no pro-Communist disguised publications in the Netherlands. The only known Communist printing establishments of any importance in the Netherlands are "N.V. Drukkerij Dijkman & Co.," and "N.V. Heiermann & Coe," both of Amsterdam. No information is available as to their resources and equipment. The Netherlands Government has no ban on the importation of publications from abroad. All kinds of foreign materials are received in the Netherlands, including publications from the Soviet Union and the satellites. The Russian Institute of the University of Amsterdam (a non-Communist, scholarly research organization) makes many of its purchases of Soviet and Bastern Buropean publications from the Verzendsboekhandel Plus Ultra of Amsterdam. Rarely are purchases made directly from the USSR or the “Iron-Curtain"countries, but rather through the UK and other Western lands. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 381] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION f The Soviet and satellite diplomatic missions publish only occasional news bulletins in the Netherlands. There are no Communist controlled radio stations in the Netherlands but Soviet broadcasts are received clearly over both short and medium wave lengths. According to an opinion survey in 1951, only 4 percent of those interrogated admitted listening to Radio Moscow as compared with 6 percent for the VOA and 10 percent for the BBC. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No information is available on the finances of the Communist Party in the Netherlands. Reports were current in 1951 and repeated in the early party of 1952 that the Dutch Communists were being aided by funds disbursed through agents attached to the Czechoslovak embassy in The Hague. XII. SOVIBT-SATELLITR OFFICIAL ASSETS Following are the diplomatic and consular establishments of the Communist countrigs in the Netherlands, as of 1951: 1) Hungary is represented by an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, a commercial attache and two other attaches in The Hague. 2) Poland is represented by an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, a first secretary and a commercial attache in The Hague. Poland also has a consul general and an assistant in Amsterdam. 3) Rumania is represented by an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, a counselor and a second secretary in The Hague. 4) Czechoslovakia is represented by an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, an assistant commercial attache, and a, second secretary in The Hague. There is also a consul general in Amsterdam. 5) The Soviet Union is represented by an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, a commercial representative, a counselor, a first secretary, three third secretaries, and an attache in The Haguee Very little is known of the activities of the Russian and satellite official personnel in the Netherlands, although it is believed that the attaches (particularly the press attaches) have contact with the Dutch SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved Eor Release 2007/01/20 - CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 === [PDF page 382] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Communists and may be dealing in espionage. These missions have no independent information services, although the satellite missions occasionally sponsor film showings. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANI ZATIONS No Communist international organization has its headquarters in the Netherlands nor were any international meetings of such organizations | held in the Netherlands in 1951 or 1952. The Communist trade union federation was probably represented by at least one delegate at the two meetings of the WFTU Executive Bureau and one meeting of the WFTU Generel Council held in 1951 and 1952. The Communist Trade Unicn Central affiliates sent Gelegates, probably one each, to meetings of the administrative committees of the following WFTU Trade Departments: Building, Wood and Building Materials Workers, Miners, Seamen end Dockers, Land and Air Transport Workers, and Metal and Engineering Workers. Small Dutch delegations attended two European conferences directed primarily against the Schuman Plan sponsored by the last named Trade Department., Two or three Dutch delegates participated in at least two plenary sessions of the World Peace Council during 1951 and 1962 and may have attended meetings of the Bureau of this Council. Fifteen Dutchmen attended the Moscow Economic Conference and representatives from the Netherlands were present at two International Conferences for the Peaceful Solution of the German Problem, as well as at the recent World Congress of Peoples for Peace. Delegates from the Netherlends attended three or four meetings of Subsidiary bodies of the World Federetion of Democretic Youth (WFDY) and four meetings of subsidiary bodies of the International Union of Students (IUS). Three hundred and sixty Netherlanders participsted in the Third World Festival of Youth and Students, co-sponsored by the WFDY and the IUS and attended by 26,000 foreign delegates. An unknown number of Dutchmen were at the IUS "Unity" meeting in Bucharest in September 1952, At least one or two Dutch representatives attended a Council meeting and an Executive Committee meeting of the Woments International Democratic Federation (WIDF), and five Netherlanders participated in the First International Conference in Defense of Children, sponsored by the WIDF (out of a total of 537 participants). At least one Dutch delegate attended the international Congress of the International Federation of Resistence Fighters (FIR) and one probably participated in an FIR Executive Committee meeting. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 383] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION A Congress and e Council meeting of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers were attended by at least one Dutchman each. One Dutchman attended a meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Organization of Journalists. Witk the possible exception of the payment of travel and living expenses of delegates attending international meetings of the WFTU and its Trade Departments, the WFDY, and the IUS, no instance of financial support by an international front organization to any group in the Netherlands is known, XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK leading Dutch Communists travel freely and frequently to the Soviet Union and satellite countries and some of them undoubtedly act as couriers. They attend all Commumist front meetings and send repre sentatives to the party meetings of the various Communist countries. Many of the Dutch Communist leaders often vacation in the satellite lands. Dutch Communists seem to have the closest ties with Czechoslovakia, although nothing is known of the instructions or criticisms received by the CPN from the Soviet and satellites. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ety === [PDF page 384] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.21 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ICELAND OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 385] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword «se. e« ce ee ec een eee ere ec eco ec e eee ti OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES..« e 1 Ie Objectives. 1. eee rece er erecereer ese eve 1 II. Tactics 22. cee ecsre eevee eecvrececvesees 1 III. Capabilities.... cc ces cscs eccccece 2 ASSETS 2s ew ee we ee eee 4 Ie Numerical Strength...eeecccecvcecsecsece k II. Electoral Strength... ssc cccceccccsces 4 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 IV. Government Policy Toward Communism a 5 Ve Communist Influence in Labor..eecececcsvervsece 6 VI Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations «..se«escecsecee 6 VII.e Communist Infiltration into Government.....e.e.ee 7 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. e e. 7 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non~Communist Political Parties. eee ees sere creer evrcesevece 8 X. Communist Propaganda Media...eeccecrcersvecee 8 XIe Financial Condition 2... -e.c.cecsvevccvcvsvevee 8 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets....2.e-e-ccevee 8 XIII. Communist International Organizations...« eeeee 9 XIV. Communist Communication Network.«.«-e«eecsersee 10 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 386] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “agsets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-~- tion on “Assets” should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 387] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ICELAND: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The major current objectives of the Communist Party in Iceland are to secure the withdrawal of US forces from Iceland and to obstruct its participation in NATO. The party also is attempting to weaken and under-~ mine the present coalition government, as well as the Social Democratic Party, and to bring about increased trade with the Communist countries. ; In pursuit of these aims, the party seeks both to promote its own political interests and to further the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. Demands in behalf of labor and attacks on the presence of US troops in Iceland are made simultaneously and constantly, whereas propaganda for increased trade with the Soviet and Satellite countries is varied in intensity depending upon Iceland's own export difficulties. Icelandic Communists have avoided to some extent a too obvious subservience to Soviet interests by posing as Icelandic nationalists. It, Tactics Very considerable Communist propaganda efforts are directed against Iceland's relations with the United States. Communist directed violence was employed only once, however, in 1949 in an attempt to discourage the Parliament from signing the North Atlantic Treaty. Subsequent propaganda efforts were made to portray those members of the government who favored the treaty as traitors to their country, as well as to arouse public fears of war by asserting that Iceland, under US hegemony, would be made into an advance base for attacks on the Soviet Union. When US troops returned to Iceland under NATO auspices in the spring of 1951, Communist propaganda took a more personal tone by focusing on the visible representatives of the allegedly imperialistic US. Because many Icelanders are genuinely concerned over the possible racial and cultural impact of foreign troops in a small country, Communist propaganda tactics have played up reports of immoral, arrogant, or insulting behavior on the part of members of the US armed forces in their relations with the civilian population. The Communists also have sought to encourage the already considerable public sentiment favoring complete isolation of the troops from the natives. In domestic economic affairs, the party champions principally the interests of the working class,and its members continue to direct several trade unions. The Communists periodically appeal to the Social Democrats for trade union unity while seeking, at the same time, to undermine their leaders. Both because of its strident, and frequently successful, defense of the workers' economic interests, as well as through its nationalist appeals, the party has obscured to some extent its own international loyalties. The strike has seldom been used as a political weapon. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 200 //0 Q- A-RIPS6 BOOP O5OROOOS0008000 1-4 === [PDF page 388] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION One indication of Communist success as a "nationalist" party is the relatively minor emphasis placed on front organizations. Few "peace" organizations have been established and most have ended in failure. On the other hand, the Icelandic-Soviet Friendship Society has been relatively successful. Other organizations, such as the Retail Cooperative Society of Reykjavik, are established organizations which the Communists have infiltrated. Within the trade unions, the Communists openly campaign for office and are known by their party labels. Here, where the conflict with the Social Democrats is sharpest, less democratic methods to secure control have been employed, such as manipulating credentials, packing the unicn halls with followers, and delaying crucial votes until all but the most zealous have left. Efforts to combine for temporary advantage with the Social Democrats and other parties, either within or out of the trade unions, have not been successful. Communist Party activities are believed to be largely locally financed, although some outside assistance may be received. Aside from possible direct subsidization through the Soviet Legation in Reykjavik, funds may also be secured through the proceeds from the sale of Soviet literature, fees for admission to films provided by the Soviets, and the possible diversion of profits from Communist-controlled trading companies or import firms. Instructions from the Soviet Union may be freely received through the mails - and may be brought back by party members who visit periodically the East ( kuropean countries. III. CAPABILITIES A strong legacy of cultural nationalism kept alive by centuries of Danish domination and the recency of Icelandic independence (1944) continue to provide the Communist Party with political opportunities for attacking Iceland's departure from traditional neutrality through membership in NATO and close cooperation with the US in defense matters. Despite the strong support given by all non-Communist parties to this foreign policy reorientation, many Icelanders, particularly the more nationalistic, have felt reluctant and uneasy even if not strongly opposed. Not only has the country been forced out of its traditional neutral position through the new strategic emphasis given to the island by airpower, but foreign troops have returned to Iceland. This has posed a threat, even in the minds of the more pro-Western Icelanders, to the naticn's highly treasured racial and cultural purity. Icelanders are not opposed to foreign influences, but as a smal] nation they wish to be selective and to admit only those influences they feel can be compatibly absorbed. As the principal opposition group in the foreign policy field, the Communists will be able in the future as at present to stimulate, exaggerate, and publicize these uncertainties for their own political purposes. Economic conditions in Iceland since 1950, in particular, provide SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 389] === TL EEE eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3a further opportunity for Communist propaganda. Economic depression prevailed throughout much of Iceland before World War II. Swiden prosperity brought greatly improved living standards at a time when Communists not only were strong in the trade unions but were even serving in the government. Able Communist trade union leaders won important concessions for their members during a period when the Social Democrats were weak and on the defensive. This early postwar prosperity has largely disappeared, however, with unemployment a continuing problem. The political search for a means to restore a high level of economic activity has continued, with the Communists in the opposition vanguard against a weak coalition government. To many Icelanders the Communist Party remains merely another radical party in a country where all parties stand somewhat to the left of their counterparts in the US. It is not known to carry on any underground or para~military activity. Not only is the party law abiding, but it also enjoys the protection of the constitution: and of the laws. As recently as 1946, it participated in the coalition. government. In foreign affairs it directs an ostensibly patriotic and nationalistic appeal to all Icelanders regardless of class or party. As a consequence of successful exploitation of these favorable factors in Iceland, the Communist Party remains the third largest in the country with 9 out of the 52 seats in the Parliament. It has failed to improve this position for several years, however, and is limited largely toa disruptive and nuisance role. The Parliament in 1949, in the face of an open Communist resort to violence, approved Icelandic adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. Similarly, American troops returned to Iceland without incident in 1951 under NATO auspices and at the invitation of the Icelandic Government. In the trade unions, as at the polls, the party has not been able to enlarge its very considerable strength. It has failed to regain the control of the Icelandic Federation of Labor that it lost in 1944. But the party has avoided the sharp losses experienced by the Communists in the other Scandinavian countries by persistently exploiting economic conditions and nationalist sentiments peculiar to Iceland. Improvement of its current political and trade union position appears possibly only in the event of a drastic lowering of living standards or a wholly unforeseen deterioration in US-Icelandic relations arising out of or accompanied by unfortunate troop-civilian incidents in the country. Aside from its continuing nuisance role, the party also retains some limited capabilities for espionage, as well as for sabotage, in a period of emergency. Without outside help, however, it has no prospect of seizing and holding power in the country even in the event of a general war. SECRET - S&CURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 390] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION, € COMMUNISM IN ICELAND: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH In 1952, the Communist Party in Iceland had an estimated 950-1500 members, exact figures being unavailable. Just as the voting strength of the party in the postwar period has not fluctuated greatly, so has there been but a slight decline in total party membership. The Communi at Party, like the population, tends to be centered in the capital city of Reykjavik, with the remainder of its following located principally in two urban areas in the north and one in the south. As suggested by this distribution, Communist membership is almost exclusively urban, with very little support in the purely farm areas. Class lines are not sharply drawn in Iceland, but the membership can be identified as coming mainly from the working classes, particularly the unskilled, with a number drawn from among the intellectuals. Party leadership is varied in origin and marked by political skill as well as devotion to the party. Changes in party leadership have been very few in the postwar period with no purges of any importance having taken place. Although loyalty to the Soviet Union has been unquestioned, this attitude has not been marked by constant obsequiousness. Moreover, the party has not been a member of the Cominform; neither have its leaders found themselves under obligation, as was apparently true in the other ( European countries, to state publicly and unequivocally that they would welcome the Soviet army in the event. of a military conflict in Europe. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Communist voting strength in Iceland has remained at roughly 20 percent since the end of World War II. Out of 52 seats in the Parliament, the Communists retained 9 at the end of 1952, or third Place among the parties. The Conservativesand Progressives constitute the coalition government and the Social Democrats are the smallest party with only seven seats. Relative party positions in votes and seats, as registered by the last national parliamentary elections of 1949, are indicated below: Party Votes Percent Seats Conservatives 28,546 39.5 19 Progressives 17,659 24.5 17 Communists 14,077 | 19.5 9 Social Democrats 11,938 16.5 7 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 391] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Communist electoral strength, like party membership is concentrated in particular urban areas. In the national elections of 1949, for example, Communists received 28.5 percent of the vote cast in the capital city, compared to 19.5 percent in the country at large. Moreover, in the municipal elections of 1946, the returns from which did not differ groatly from the parliamentary elections of 1949, the Communists received the highest number of votes in the country's second largest town of Akureyri. At this time, the Communists held either first or second place among the parties in six other urban centers, III, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION a NE INO NE AU LLUN Use of violence for political ends is foreign as well as repugnant to Icelanders who have a pacifist tradition and no military establishment. Communist violence is also uncommon in the country. Resistance movements did not develop during World War II because of the official and public acceptance of the presence of American and British troops. Nevertheless, in March 1949 the Communists chose to organize a violent demonstration against the Parliament which was then preparing to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Weapons were limited to shouts, threats and stones. The effort failed amidst general condemnation of this un-Icelandic procedure, with the leaders of the demonstration losing their civil rights and being given prison sentences. Of the 800 to 1,900 persons, including spectators, present at the demonstration, not more than 200 are believed to have been Comnunist demonstrators. It is doubtful that the Communists can produce a gathering of similar size, a conclusion supported by their subsequent failure to resort to violent demonstrations even on the occasion of the arrival of American troops in 1951. The laying of plans or the gathering of equipment for violent purposes sometime in the future appears unlikely. On the other hand, events in Iceland that aroused national indignation might permit the Communists, appearing as extreme nationalists, to assume leadership of demonstrations. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TONARD COMMUNISM SE ET TOWARD COMMUNISM Aside from the legal penalties applied against Communist leaders for the 1949 demonstrations against the Parliament, no repressive measures have been taken against the party. It has the same privileges and is subject to the same legalrestraints as all other parties. Through administrative measures, rendered difficult by the protective features of civil service laws, the government has quietly sought to avoid assigning Communists to key positions while attempting to shift to other work those already in SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION a aetna anne ee === [PDF page 392] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION important posts. The Parliament in 1951 also sought to limit Communist access to material on foreign affairs by reducing the responsibilities of the Forsign Affairs Committee on which the Communists are represented. Ve. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Iceland has no strategic industry. Because of the dependence of the country on imports and exports, however, dockworkers occupy a strategic position in the economic life of the country, particularly in Reykjavik. Here the Communists have for a long time been in control of the unions to which the dockworkers and other unskilled laborers belong. Communist influence and control of the trade unions in Iceland is extensive, amounting to an estimated 30 percent of the total in 1952, or 40 unions with 6,900 to 8,000 members out of a national total of about 27,900. Leadership of the Icelandic Trade Union Federation has remained in the hands of the Social Democrats since 1948, however, where it is likely to continue as long as all of the non-Communist unions are willing to cooperate. On the other hand, Communist strength among the unions has ree mained fairly constant in the postwar period. The Communist record for Winning economic improvements for their members, particularly the unskilled workers, has given them a relatively entrenched position. Were the Comnunists to use the unions for political purposes their prestige would deoline rapidly, however, VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL,CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Front organizations are not extensive in Iceland, nor particularly successful. The Partisans of Peace movement represents one of the more conspicuous Communist failures with the party itself now spreading this _type of propaganda. Perhaps most successful is an organization that is not a front in the strict sense in that its purposes are obvious from its very title. This is the Cultural Contacts Between Iceland and the Soviet Union (Menningarsamband Islands og Radstjornairikjanna, MIR), which is the local friendship society for the Soviet Union. It had a total membership of 1,100 in 1952, and was the single largest pro-Conmunist group in Iceland. Reykjavik has the largest branch, while others are to be found in Akranes, Akureyri, and Hafnafjordur. Members are drawn from all walks of life. Leadersnip is considered to be effective, since MIR's cultural programs are reported to draw well. It has close liaison with the official Soviet agency for cultural ties with foreign countries (VOKS) and has been instrumental in sending delegations to the Soviet Union, as well as to Comunist China, and has received Soviet cultural delegations, SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 393] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Mal og Menning is a Communist front literary society which publishes a quarterly of the same name. It periodically holds meetings which are ostensibly of a literary nature and slanted toward intellectuals. Direction is by Communists. The Cultural and Peace Organization of Icelandic Women is another small front organization. It is cultural and nationalist in emphasis and stresses, among other things, the need for preventing contacts between US troops and Icelanders, particularly the youth of the country. The Federation of Icelandic Apprentices is ostensibly a labor orgenization that also doubles as a Communist-controlled youth movement. It has voted to affiliate with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The Association of Icelandic Painters and Sculptors is another cultural organization active in stressing cultural nationalism. The principal non-Communist organization successfully infiltrated by the Communists is the Kron, or Cooperative Retail Society of Reykjavik. Cooperatives throughout the country are not in Communist hands, however, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Communists are to be found in the Icelandic Government but are not believed to hold high policy making posts. Infiltration into the Reykjavik police force was at one time regarded as extensive, but by 1952 not more than four persons, out of a total of 140, were estimated to be party members, A number of Communists are also to be found among the school teachers, some of whom were placed while a Communist held the cabinet post responsible for education. Iceland has no military establishment, VIII, COMMUNIST INFLUSNCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Opinions of that 20 percent of the electorate voting Communist must be strongly influenced by Communist propaganda. Moreover, because of the cultural nationalist climate that prevails in Iceland, and to which the Communists have pitched their propaganda, others must be influenced to the extent that their fears are aroused over the possible cultural and racial impact of the presence of American troops. Reports of troopecivilian incidents, even though Communist inspired, frequently receive very wide and rapid ciroulation. At the same time, Icelanders are independent minded and not readily subject to the influence of propaganda when they can recognize its origin. In view of the strength of the democratic non-Communist parties and the willingness of the government to pursue measures unpopular with the Soviet Union, it can be concluded that the segment of the population strongly influenced by Communist propaganda remains in a minority. SSCRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 394] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SSCURITY INFORMATION IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES TAT AT AT LE A GS TS eA nce Shortly before World War II, the left wing of the Social Democratiae Party split off to join the Communists. None of the non-Communi st political parties has subsequently been successfully infiltrated. The Young Progressives' League, the youth adjunct of the Progressive Party, Iceland's second largest party, has shown some evidence of possible Communist infiltration in its stand on foreign policy matters. However, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between the stand of the extreme nationalists and that of the Communists in such matters. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The principal organ of the Communist Party in Iceland and the only Communist daily is Thjodviljinn, which is published in Reykjavik and has a circulation of between §,900 and 7,900 copies. A number of copies are believed to be distributed gratis. Baldur, a monthly, and Austurland and Mjolnir, both weeklies, have a combined ciroulation of not over 5,000 to 4,000. Five other periodicals with a combined circulation of 3,000 to 4,900 are pro-Communist, although not openly affiliated with the party. One, Mal o Monning, is a literary quarterly published by the Communist front of the same name, and described in detail under VI, Another, MIR, is the bi-monthly publication of the Icelandic-Soviet Friendship Soclety sponsored by the Soviet Embassy. ( XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Details are lacking on the means by which the Icelandic Communist Party finances its activities. Party funds are believed to be provided largely through indigenous sources. Outside assistance cannot be ruled out, however. The Communist nowspaper is periodically in financial difficulty. Aside from possible direct subsidization through the Soviet Legation in Reykjavik, funds may also be secured from the sale of Communist literature and the showing of motion pictures provided by the Soviet Legation, Another source may be the profits of Comunist owned or directed import and trading firms. XII, SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Two Communist dominated countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, in addition to the Soviet Union, maintain diplomatic establishments in Reykjavik. The Soviet Legation has 8 to 12 members,while the other two countries have a smaller number. Only the Soviet Legation appears to be openly active in propaganda activities. In addition to presenting a pictorial exhibit from time to time, it also sponsors the Icelandic-Soviet Friendship Society which is believed to have a membership of about 1,100. The latter publishes the bi-monthly magazine, MIR. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ( === [PDF page 395] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No Communist international organizations have headquarters in Iceland. The Icelandic Communist Party is not a member of the Cominform. Communi st-dominated organizations in Iceland are members of Comunistcontrolled international organizations, however. Local branches of the Partisans of Peace movement were organized in Iceland, although the majority if not all of these had apparently ceased to exist by the end of 1952, Because the Communist-dominated trade unions have, for the most part, remained within the Icelandic Federation of Lebor, which is controlled by the Social Democrats, they were not able to prevent the withdrawal of Iceland from the World Federation of Trade Unions. On the other hand, the Federation of Icelandic Apprentices voted in 1952 to join the World Federation of Democratic Youth. It also joined with the Federation of ' Young Communists and the Union of Radical Students to form an International Cooperation Committee of Icelandic Youth for the purpose of maintaining connections with both the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Idja, the Communist-dominated factory workers' union in Reykjavik, which is not a member of the Icelandic Federation of Labor, was represented at a meting in Vienna in 1952 of the International Federation of Transport. Workers. The following table sets forth the attendance of Icelanders in 1951 and 1952 at Communist sponsored international meetings: Meeting. Date: Size of local representation Moscow Cormunist Party Congress 1952 3 Nordic Labor Peace Conference 1952 unknown Congress of Partisans of Peace, 1951 unknown Stockholm. Berlin World Youth Festival 1951 40 Warsaw Peace Conference 1951 2 Sheffield International Peace 1951 3 Conference SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 396] === nO ae Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -10- XIV, COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Details are wholly lacking on this subject. Means of communication with other countries are for the most part unlimited. The Communist Farty of Iceland maintains particularly close connections with its counterparts in the other Scandinavian countries and Finland, Icelandic Communists, moreover, have attended the principal Communist-sponsored international meetings of the postwar period. Communicating with the Soviet Union would appear to be a relatively simple matter under these circumstances. Communists in Iceland can also go to the Soviet Legation in Reykjavik, or, presumably, arrange to meet. its representatives. SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 397] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.22 . COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITALY OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION. === [PDF page 398] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword e eceeccecevrvevevnevnereeveev ev oe eee & © ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « e « 1 Ie Objectives «eee cere essere ceecescere 1 II. Tactics sss eee cc ccccecccccccees 1 III, Capabilities «. eecceerevereeereneeeece 4 “ASSETS ce ec ececescce 5a Ie Numerical Strength ee sececcesccecscoses II. Electoral Strength ssseesccccsseccccece 7 - TIIe Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action, 8 € IV. Governnent Policy Toward Communism. «. eoeoeevece 11 Ve Communist Influence in Labor « « « ee ee; oeeeoe | 13 ne VIe | Communist. Influence in Social, Cultural, and 13 Professional Organizations »e eeecscerscerecrsecove VII. Communist Infiltration into Government.eesesees 17 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation « « « 17 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political. Parties e« «seereeevneanveveneeveoesd 18 Xe Communist Propaganda Media ee«ecceeveeeveee ea 20 XI. Financial Condition.eesccecscccecseve § 23 XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets «eeeceecesece 2h - XIII. Communist International Organizations sees. © 25 XIV. Communist Communication Network e evseseeneene0 6 26 C SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 399] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. . The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 400] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 . | SECKET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ITALY: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I, OBJECTIVES The major short-range objective of the Italian Communist. Party... (PCI) is not the conquest of political power by either constitutional or illegal means, but the impairment of governmental stability and the creation of conditions leading to eventual acceptance of a. » foreign: wos policy favorable to the Soviet Union. - - The Communists are currently preoccupied with preventing t the Lots democratic center. parties from winning a majority.of votes in the.) 2075. ° parliamentary elections scheduled for this spring. If they succeed,.-, the center parties will fail to secure their "premium" of Chamber seats as provided by the new electoral legislation now under discussion, and seats in the new Parliament will be distributed on the present basis..:;. of proportional representation. The Communists hope that under these | conditions the number of Communist-Nenni Socialist seats ‘in 1 Parliament would be. increased,. we Le pak ey In addition, the party aims at encouraging neutralist and - POE pacifist sentiment with a.view to eroding the base. of popular support . for Italian defense efforts and cooperation with the West. Its longe:: C range objective in this effort is to weaken. Italy's participation. in+:::: NATO. II, TACTICS -; “SRERS Lo The Italian Communists currently advocate. 2 a, "united national i front" based on popular support, rather. than on an inter-party coali+... tion, to wage their self-styled struggle against fascism and "to. defend the Constitution." The party faces strong. anti-Communist. forces“: ern which aim primarily at isolating it and exposing it as an alien,: me Soviet-directed movement... In response it seeks to pose as faecetaln political organization which is peacefully seeking legitimate-:social. and-economic reforms, protecting democracy and the Constitution, and.: opposing War, Since 1948 the Communists have pursued this typeof:. moderate and conciliatory policy, concentrating on issues designed to appeal to broad sections of the population. The party continues to use subsidiary, allied, and front _ boyd organizations to attract non-Communist bloc support. The. Communist - 40 Youth Federation has recently been directed to approach. fascist,.and; nationalist youth elements; the Partisans-of. Peace exploit:the: anti-war line; and the Communist-dominated labor organization. (CGIL) currently: concentrates on winning economic benefits for non-Communist,; as well-aa.Communist, workers, The CGIL ranks after the party itself and-thei/. >: fellow~travelling Nenni Socialists as the Communists!:most: effective = - weapon for: sustaining the left's popular:. strength, and -it isparticularly C useful in organizing economic. discontent * ‘The Communists haveimade=1ittle woos. BES $b as SECRET - SECURITY DIORMATION === [PDF page 401] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION use of the CGIL to promote mass political strikes and demonstrations since 1950-51 when their attempts to mobilize the CGIL unions for peace and anti-MDAP campaigns proved largely unsuccessful. The Communist Party hopes to increase its popular backing by an impressive volume of propaganda based on several principal themes, By stressing their opposition to the De Gasperi government, the Communists attempt to exploit widespread dissatisfaction with official policies and to capture the bulk of the protest vote. The party also aims to ’ capitalize upon existing discontent by demands for alleviation of Italy's unfavorable social and economic conditions, Its current emphasis on constitutionalism, moreover, represents the Communists as the chief - defenders of the republican form of government and the strongest opponents of a fascist revival, The party makes anti-clerical appeals designed to draw support. from elements which are apprehensive of the Catholic Church's political activities, without directly attacking religion. In stressing their charge that present Italian foreign policy is undermining the country's independence, the Communists direct a frank appeal to nationalism.: ‘The party's peace line is expressed in virulent anti-war polemics against." the goverment, the West, and the US. The party is not restricted to a single set of appeals but, instead, produces a variety of special appeals to various social and a economic groups. It tells the poorer peasants and the farm laborers, “SEES. for example, that the government land reform program is inadequate and riddled with corruption. Through the CGIL it attempts to exploit - working-class anxieties by means of grandiose’ plans for economic. -~. development and increased employment. Gultural activities are designed t© reach the intellectuals; while business elements are cultivated on: the basis of demands for increased East-West trade, The Comunists - also tailor their propaganda to suit particular localities. Since 1951: they have conducted an intensive electoral and membership drive in the - depressed southern regions of Ttaly. Communist electoral tactics hinge largely on the party's alliance with the Nenni Socialist Party which receives more than one out of every three Communist-bloc votes, In the 1948 national elections the two parties combined in a "Popular Democratic Front" coalition but. resorted to looser "linking" arrangements -- affiliating but not merging their lists of candidates -- in the local and provincial. <:~ elections of 1951-52. In the approaching parliamentary elections the’. Communists and the Nenni Socialists apparently will not re-form the’ ~ coalition of 1948, nor, according to recent statements by Nenni. himself, will they resort to linking. Instead they will enter separate lists. * _ allowing each party.to make its own distinctive appeal to the -voters.::« oe >. In addition, the PCI is promoting a separate list of "Left: Independents" C as it did in the 1951-52 elections.. mee: SECRET - SECURITY THFORMATION *. - === [PDF page 402] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There is no evidence that Communist tactics will include violent action in the near future. The few indications of Communist underground activity suggest that the party is confined to organizing a skeletal paramilitary apparatus. Communist direct-action strength has apparently declined in recent years, suggesting that the party has chosen to concentrate on overt lawful activities. ITI, CAPABILITIES _ The over-all position of the Italian Communist Party, in terns of effective power and influence, has slightly declined over the past few years, despite the continuing stability of its membership strength since. 1950 and a modest increase in its electoral support as revealed in the. 1951-52 lecal and provincial elections. The situation today is undoubtedly less favorable for the Communists -than in the immediate postwar period from 1945 to 1948. The political ‘climate in Italy has changed during that time from one of widespread anxiety that the Communist Party might actually win national power, either by votes. or. by insurrection, to one characterized by growing resistance and vigorous. reaction to Communist efforts. Thus the Communists are faced with ever in-. creasing pressure on the part of the government, the Catholic Church, and other anti-Communist forces to restrict the party's freedom of action and to reduce the influence it still possesses. At the same time many Italians, especially in the ranks of labor, have lost their individual fears of Communist threats and reprisals so prevalent in earlier years. These develop-; ments, as well as the strengthening of the West's defenses, have given the Italian people a new sense of security against both the internal and. external menace of Soviet Communism. Such conditions are reflected in the sentiment, ‘implied by pronouncements of Communist leaders and prominent fellow travellers, that the party and its allies are now on the defensive. The Communist bloc, moreover, is relatively isolated in Parliament and in the country's political life as a whole. Consequently, thé Communist Party finds it difficult to mobilize non-Communist support in its current campaign to form a broad front, recreating the unity of the wartime resistance, against the threat of what it terms a new "clerical fascism." In northern Italy, the party has | apparently reached the limits of both its membership and electoral strength, and even in the South there are signs that Communist efforts may be approach- _ ing a point of diminishing returns. It is likely that increases in the _ opposition or protest vote will benefit the extreme right to a greater degree than the Communist left. ‘The middle class, in particular, remains a potential source of rightist (i.e., neo-Fascist) rather than Communist support. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION —_ Approved For Release YOO //0 Q- A-RIPS6 BOOP OORODOOS0008000 1-4 === [PDF page 403] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Communist efforts to expand the party's political influence are also hindered by the probability that whatever gains it makes at the polls will not be translated into an equivalent increase. of representation or power. In the 1951-52 local elections, despite popular gains in most cities, the Communist-led bloc actually lost control of many municipalities on account, of the electoral system used. If electoral legislation now being debated is passed, it is likely that a similar prospect is in store for the Communist. drive to augment the left bloc's parliamentary strength. ‘In the 1953 elections, the Communists and their allies have no chance of winning a popular majority and thereby controlling the new Chamber. While the left is expected to secure roughly a third of the total popular vote, and to make a slight gain over its showing in the 1948 elections, it now appears probable that the Communists will not -- succeed in preventing the moderate center from winning a majority in popular ballots. In ‘the unlikely event that the left bloc, together with other opposition parties, polls enough votes to accomplish this aim,: the moderate democratic bloc would ‘be deprived of its "premium" of 65 percent of the seats. The | regional distribution of ballots, however, would probably allow the center to’ keep its majority in’ the Chamber by a slim margin. : tenuous marginal majority of the moderate. center parties in the Chainber would undoubtedly favor governmental instability, which the Communists could be expected to exploit fully in the post-election period. Although the * Comminist” Party could not reasonably hope to attract. significant non- Communist parliamentary elements to its side, divisions and dissensions © within the center would present the Communists. with an opportunity for mak-_ ing trouble, both in Parliament and in the country. Togliatti has threatened "mass political action" if the new Chamber is elected on the basis of the | new legislation. By doing everything possible to increase the government's difficulties in effectively exercising its authority, the Communists would run the risk of setting in motion a chain of circumstances leading to the formation of a rightist government pledged to a stronger and, perhaps, repressive anti- — Communist | policy. But the Communists may believe that such a development would facilitate the inclusion of non-Communists in a Communist~-led “anti- Fascist" front. . SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. === [PDF page 404] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION In the field of foreign affairs it remains unlikely that the Communists and allied groups, such as the Nenni Socialists, would be able. to bring about Italy's withdrawal from NATO, although governmental instability might seriously limit Italy's effectiveness in Western defense plans. The susceptibility of Italians to Communist arguments on foreign policy might be increased either by a heightening of East-West tension accompanied by a growing fear of immediate war, or by an apparent receding of the Soviet threat to Western Europe which would foster popular apathy toward Italian defense efforts. In their attempts to influence foreign policy, however, the Communists will continue to suffer from. the widespread popular identification of their front-sponsored peace campaigns | with the party and the Soviet Union. Although the Communist-controlled CGIL will continue to > dominate. Italian labor, its political influence or effectiveness probably will not. increase in the foreseeable future, partly because of the. anti-Communist efforts of the non-Communist trade union organizations.,. It. appears unlikely at the present time that the CGIL unions could be used successfully for.any mass political efforts other than brief protest strikes... The:.. ‘Communist Party, even with the help of its auxiliary organizations, is. now. considered incapable of overthrowing. the state or of mounting, any direct. action attempt that could not be controlled by the police... The Communists © can hope to achieve power by violence, even in regions where. the party: is strongest, only if the Soviet. Union invades Italy. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 405] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ITALY: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the largest Communist organ— S ization in the West. It claims more than 2 »100,000 members, although a ~ more accurate estimate would be about 1,700,000 to 1,800,000. The party's official member ship strength has declined. some 200,000 (about 9 percent) since its peak of over 2,300,000 in the winter of 1947-48. Since 1950 Communist membership has remained relatively. stable, with an estimated annual rate of turnover of approximately five percent ~ (100,000). According to party statements, the PCI lost 63,000 members between October 1951 and March 1952, while it recruited 100,000 new card~holders over the same period. The number of Communist sympathizers in Italy is difficult to - estimate. It is probable that about 5,000,000 people are enrolled in. organizations controlled by the party, including 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 - who belong to the Communist-dominated labor federation, the CGIL.. This _ - figure, however, includes party members as well as non-members, and ~*™ there’ is also considerable overlapping of membership‘in the various PCI-.— controlled groups. In addition, the Communists strongly influence‘ the *: © left-wing Socialist Party of Pietro Nenni, with an estimated 600,000. -~ members. In all, the Comunist- Party influences roughly’ 9,000,000 ee people, or about 20 percent of Italy's total population. Of these about 8,500,000 are adults, representing 25 percent of the country's. adult population over 20 years of age. The party is strongest numerically in the northern and central regions of Emilia-Romagna, where it has 480,000 members (13.7 percent of the total population) and a following, based on the electoral strength of the PCI alone, of 654,000 (31.1 percent of the total valid vote); Lombardy, which accounts for 315,000 members (representing, how= ever, only 5 percent of the region's population) and 672,000 followers, including both members and sympathizers (18.4 percent of the vote); Tuscany, with 311,000 members (10 percent of the population) and 546,000 followers (29.7 percent of the voters); Liguria, with a membership strength of 119,000 (7.8 percent) and a total following of 195,000 (20.8 percent); Piedmont, with 157,000 members (4.6 percent) and 376,000 sympathizers (18.2 percent); and Umbria, which contributes only 4,7,000 members (6.5 percent of the population) but a Commmist vote of 140,000, or 31.5 percent. Although the party has recently made an intensive effort to build its strength in southern Italy, in no region of the South does” its membership exceed 3.1 percent of the population, and in only one — SECURITY INFORMATTOI === [PDF page 406] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION region (Basilicata) does the PCI vote, apart from the vote given the entire left bloc, exceed 20 percent of the total number of valid ballots.; Communist Party members and sympathizers are drawn, in order of importance, from these classes: industrial workers, agricultural workers and peasants, other manual laborers, white collar workers, and the professional and managerial class. The class composition of the party varies somewhat from region to region, and from locality to locality. ‘In Turin, for example, the auto workers are probably the strongest Communist element, while in parts of the Po Valley, and especially in Emilia-Romagna, the agricultural laborers represent the greatest source of Communist strength. The party membership includes 500,000 women (25 percent of the total), and its subsidiary Youth Federation claims 455,000 members “between 14 and 21 years of age. According to a public opinion poll conducted in 1951, 43 percent of the Communist following among men is. under 35 years of age, 46 percent between 35 and 55, and 11 percent over 55.. ° oo Pest The PCI is a mass party which includes many elements who are. - - poorly indoctrinated ideologically, despite the party's efforts to -:. remedy this deficiency. It has been estimated that. only 800,000.-... members are really active in party affairs, and of this number prob-. -- ably 600,000 would remain active adherents regardless of possible hardships or drastic policy shifts. A still smaller number, roughly ' 400,000, are party militants or "activists." Many of these "hard core". ' elements havé backgrounds of clandestine partisan experience, and their loyalty has been attested to by the small number of defections as well... - as by their readiness to accept shifts in the party line, as, for OXee 7 ample, the PCI's decisions to cooperate. with the monarchy in 1944 and-~ to support the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution of -- The character of the Communist Party leadership on the middle. | and lower levels, and probably also of the PCI's hard core, is indicated by the personal data concerning the delegates to the most recent party congress held in April 1951. Of 750 delegates, 620 were men. and 130 were women; 313 were between 18 and 30 years old, 224 between 31 and 40, and 213 over 40. In party seniority, 128 had held their membership in the pre-Fascist and early Fascist periods (to 1926), 140 had joined the party between 1926 and the fall of Fascism in.- 1943,.260 had enrolled between 1943 and the date of final liberation,.._ (April 25, 1945), 185 had become members between April 1945 andthe.-. founding of the Republic in June 1946, and 37 had acquired party: cards since that time. As for social backgrounds, the delegates SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION. === [PDF page 407] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION included 302 industrial workers; 142 professional people, teachers, and. intellectuals; 118 white collar workers; 52 farm laborers and 41 farmers; 29 artisans; 29 students; and 16 housewives. During the Fascist and © wartime periods, 396 had been partisans, 25 had fought abroad, 207 had been imprisoned, and 80 had been deported.; ‘The party leadership, at least on the upper and medium levels, is of a generally high quality. In personal ability, political acumen, - and organizational know-how, the top rank of PCI leaders is probably. equal to the leadership of any other party in Italy. For the most part, the loyalty of these leaders to the party has been unquestioned, and their reliability is evidenced by the absence of any defections at this level.. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The administrative (local and provincial) elections held throughout Italy in 1951-52, and the regional election held in Sicily in 1951, » revealed an appreciable increase of Communist bloc electoral strength — over that of the Conmmunist—dominated Popular Democratic Front in the - national elections of 1948. In the 1951-52 elections, the PCI and its allies, the Nenni Socialists and the so-called "Left Independents," won 8,545,000 votes, or 34.7 percent of the total valid vote cast, compared to 8, 137,000 votes (31 percent of the total) won by the Communist-led Front. in 1948. The percentage won by the Camunist-Socialist left bloc in 1951-52. was only slightly under that given to the major government party, the Christian Democrats, which won 36 percent of the total valid vote. The ' democratic center parties as a group won barely a majority of the total. popular vote, or 50.6 percent. The extreme right parties, the Monarchists and the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MST) » accounted for 12 per cent of the total.. ‘Over half of the Communist bloc's electoral strength ——- like its. membership strength -- is concentrated in the five northern and northcentral regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, and Tuscany. In terms of percentages of the total vote, the central regions of Umbria and the Marche, despite relatively small numerical - totals cast for the left, must be included among the areas of heavy ‘Communist strength. In Umbria, the Communist bloc won 53.5 percent of the valid vote in the 1951-52 elections, more than in any other region in the country. Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany followed closely with- 52.7 and.50.5 percent respectively. In no other region did the PCI = and its allies win a majority. Although the northern regions of Pa Piedmont and Lombardy contributed large totals to the numerical volume SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION d For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R00 - === [PDF page 408] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION of leftist votes, the left bloc's percentage of the popular vote “ in these areas was relatively low, between 31 and 33 percent. In the 1951-52 administrative elections, the South made the greatest contribution to the Commnist bloc's gains over 1948. While the left increased its nationwide vote by some 400,000 ballots, its gain in southern Italy amounted to 500,000 votes. The leftist vote in the seven southern and insular regions went from 22.7 percent of. the total (1948) to 29.7 percent (1951-52). In central Italy, also, ‘. the. Communists and their allies improved their electoral strength to. a significant extent (about 150,000 votes), and in some areas the §*= increases equalled the gains in the South. In the North, however,. the. Communist bloc's percentage of the total valid vote remained stationary at 33.7 percent, and in this area the leftist parties actually lost mmerically, to the extent of about 240,000" votes. It is impossible to establish with accuracy the relative able strengths of the components within the Communist~led bloc on the basis of their respective showings in the 1951-52 local and provincial elec- _tions. Because of pre-electorel agreements among the Communists,: the. Nenni Socialists, and the Left Independents, the results of these... elections are inadequate as a barometer of the popular. support for. each, leftist tactics dictated the choice of a Communist candidate. =: in one voting district, a Socialist candidate in another, and an =... ~. "Independent" in another;.all the votes of the bloc were concentrated to support the chosen candidate. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VOLES ACTION The Communist Party's current policy is ‘to minimize the use of violence and to subordinate any preparations for future insurrectionary action to lawful political activity, which appears more promising of results. In preparation for the 1953 elections, the PCI is focusing its efforts on winning popular support by stressing immediate political issues. Secretary General Togliatti has threatened to employ "mass political action" following these elections if the new Chamber is selected on the basis of the government-sponsored electoral law. For the present, however, the PCI is amcious not to alienate potential leftist voters by resorting to violent methods. The party leadership, moreover, undoubtedly fears government reprisals and consequently wishes to avoid major showdowns with the police. Such a policy, however, does not rule out occasional mass demonstrations for political purposes..: The attempts of the police to: break up these unauthorized,demonstrations may result in clashes — SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 409] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION between Communists and the celere (police riot squads), but it is not believed to be the PCI's present - policy to carry such encounters - beyond the limits of minor disorders. There have been no violent Communist demonstrations involving the use of firearms since early 1950, when riots and bloodshed occurred in Modena and elsewhere. The. number and extent of peaceful mass demon= strations has also declined since that time. The only recent attempt to mobilize large-scale street demonstrations, in a protest against the proposed electoral law, took, place in Rome in January 1953 and brought out 3,000 participants. The minor violence which occurred in this: case. was apparently caused by the refusal of the Communist~led mobs to halt their. ' protest marches and to disperse at the order of the police. 0 0 As a reserve force for possible future violence of an insur- oe rectionary. nature, the Communist Party has reportedly maintained the existence of a para-military organization, the "Apparatus". (Aparato) + The elements of this force are estimated to number about 50,000 militants, and 75,000 at the maximm. A principal component of the ‘ Apparato is Likely to be reactivated units of the wartime resistance,’ the Gruppi Azione Patriotica (GAP), although such elements may exist ~ only in the planning stage. The entire POI. para-military force, in fact, may be only a skeletal organization, at least on a nationwide ~ € basis.. The para-military strength which reportedly exists is. largely | Zo restricted to the North and Tuscany. The Apparato is probably well: organized only in a few regions and local centers, such as Enilia~.. Romagna (Bologna), Tuscany (Florence), Liguria (Genoa ) » Piedmont (Turin), and Lombardy (Milan). There is some evidence that the PCI has recently attempted to organize a paramilitary: center in the strategic Veneto region.: The leadership of this direct action force is trained and experienced as the result of partisan activities during World War II. Weapons, too, are probably available in quantity, but are likely to | be in poor condition. A considerable amount of arms and ammunition. - is believed hidden by the Communists in strategic locations. This is suggested by the discovery and seizure by the police of large caches - of weapons, presumably stored by Communist elements. In the event of a decision to expand its para-military force, the PCI has a good. source of direct action elements in the ANPI, the Communist-controlled ex-partisans group. Communist capabilities for direct action, however, appear to have declined in the past few years. The number. of. active para- Last military elements has apparently decreased since the period between. =” 1945 and 1950, if any judgment can be based on the estimates of direct action strength reported since the war. The strengthening of the SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 410] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Italian police, moreover, has served as a powerful deterrent to Communist para-military activities. ‘There is no indication that the PCI plans _ to build up its direct action forces in the near future. Evidence sug~_ gests, ‘on the contrary, that the Communists have de-emphasized the role’ — . of its para-military apparatus, in line with the > party" 8 primary stress: “upon ostensibly legal activities. In the unlikely event of a ‘decision to use violent action in a ' Major insurrectionary attempt, or in an attempt to support the Soviet | - Union by behind-the-lines resistance in case of war, the Communists - would be able to count on no more than 75,000 men for immediate deploy-— ment. As a rough estimate, about 300,000 would be available ona’ = © “potential basis. (In World War II, it is likely that the Communists controlled 150,000~175,000 partisans of a total partisan force of: 280,000.) large. sections of the population, ranging from 15 to: 40 percent depending upon the regions involved, would be disposed to* - *"gupport a Communist revolutionary effort with non-military aid.” It: is doubtful, however, if the PCI could actually mobilize this popular backing, or even deploy any but guerrilla elements in the field, in the ‘face of an expectedly ruthless suppression by the state authority of | an insurrectionary attempt. Only in the event of a Soviet invasion ' would the Communists have any prospect of carrying out successful - revolutionary action. oe veins phe SECRET ~ SRCURTTY-INFORMATION === [PDF page 411] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM ALE The freedom of action of the Communist Party in Italy is becoming © inoreasingly restricted, not only as a result of electoral provisions which favor the democratic anti-Communist parties, but also as & consequence of a growing trend toward stronger anti-Communist policies on the part of - the government. During the past two years the Italian Government has taken.or proposed a@ number of measures designed to combat Communism and to limit the activities of its followers. The government's anti-Communist position has become more. explicit and has been increasingly expressed in concrete actions against... the PCI. Measures to insure public order, such as prohibiting public meetings without prior authorization, have been applied by local prefects to prevent Communist demonstrations. New internal security legislation to curb sub-.: versivé activities (the so-called "polivalente"” bill), containing fairly...... sweeping provisions for government action against the PCI'’s attacks on democratic institutions, has been introduced in Parliament. The government has already prosecuted or initiated proceedings against Communists for violations of. existing laws.. It has also hampered the international activities of Italian Communists by a tighter policy in respect to the issuance of passports and,. on occasion, has revoked passports held by Communist travellers. Loans The De Gasperi government, moreover, has taken specific: measures and € has proposed new legislation toregulate the dissemination and content of Communist propaganda. Local authorities are supposed to prohibit the distribution of newspapers by unlicensed vendors. The government has begun prosecuting Commumists for “defamation of Italy” during visits to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and it has taken legal proceedings against leading PCI figures for libelous or false statements in the domestic presse A new press bill introduced in 1952 would broaden the existing basis for action against Communist propaganda by permitting. government seizure of offending publications. In addition, the proposed subversive control law contains important provisions dealing with propaganda. In the past year influential Christian Democratic leaders have suggested a number of additional measures to crack down on Communist activities. These include (1) depriving the PCI and its subsidiaries of former Fascist property taken over in the latter stages of World War II and in the early postwar period; (2) closing Communist Party schools; (38) acting against Communist fairs and celebrations designed to raise money for the party; and(4) purging Communist elements from sensitive positions in vital industries,: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 412] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION It is clear from party pronouncements that Communist leaders are apprehensive that their existing freedom of action will be further restricted. Although the government is capable of further limiting and hampering Communist activities, an attempt to completely suppress the PCI would represent an exceedingly difficult task for a democratic regime. The Communists’ control and influence over the CGIL and the Nenni Socialist Party would provide. alternate organizations for PCI activity in the event of a government effort _ to suppress the » party., SECRET - BECURITY INFORMATION. === [PDF page 413] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR - The Communist dominated trade union confederation, the CGIL (Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro), controls. the bulk of the workers in all key Italian industries. In the field of communications, transportation, shipping, public utilities and in parts of basic industry, the Communists claimed almost 500,000 members in 1950. The actual strength of the CGIL is probably slightly less than this claim, but still accounts for roughly three quarters of the labor force in these industries, with the percentage declining among white collar and professional employees but rising among skilled and manual workers. The CGIL, which is affiliated with the WFTU, has member trade unions in every segment of the Italian economy and in every part of. Italy with a claimed total membership in 1950 of roughly 5,000,000. In each province there is a provincial labor organization of the.various craft unions, and these are paralleled by similar bodies on a communal and municipal level. They are uniformly CGIL controlled, although there is believed to be some local variation in degree of Communist influence. The national proportion of CGIL to non-Communist trade union strength is about three to one, but the non-Comnunist organizations are stronger in textiles, among white collar workers, professionals and women. ~ € VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND "PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS In their efforts to attract and influence broad groups in the population, the Italian Communists maintain or promote a number of auxiliary organizations. Except for the PCI Youth Federation, which is a subsidiary of the party proper, these organizations are "fronts," enrolling non-Communists as well as party members. Through these front groups the PCI tries to reach various elements on the basis of age, sex, cultural interests, partisan background, profession, and regional identification. Ae Youth The Italian Communist Youth Federation (FGCI) is part of the party structure and is not a front. It was founded in 1949 when the party leadership decided to organize its own youth group rather than continue to merge its efforts with the Nemni Socialists in the fronttype Youth Alliance. The FGCI currently claims 455,000 members between the ages of 14 and 21; some of these, between 18 and 21 years of age, also belong to the party proper. The membership strength of the FGCI has shown considerable fluctuation in recent years. In === [PDF page 414] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION March 1952 it was down to 392,000, a 10 percent decline compared to April 1951. The youth groups of Catholic action, with roughly 1,500,000 members, and the neo=Fascist MSI are strong competitors of the Communists in this field. The FGCI, like the party itself, is strongest in northern Italy.: At the present time, the PCI is using the FGCI in an attempt to attract non-Comunist youth to the partyts objectives on the basis of a patriotic, nationalistic appeal. FGCI members are.told specifically to approach neo~Fascist youth in order to win their adherence to the Comnunistst anti-Western policy. Some dissension within the organization over this tactical maneuver has been reported, and it may be that the FGCI has recently passed through a crisis on this issue. There have been no significant defections from the top level, however and on the whole the FGCI. leadership is able and reliable... The Communist Youth Federation possesses some capability for: expansion, since it can exploit the frustrations of countless unen- ~ ployed and disillusioned young people. The neo#Fascists, however, may be able to make an even stronger appeal to Italian youth during - the next few years on the basis of their nostalgic emphas is on the : "good old days" under Mussolini,’ Be. Students No figures are: available on the membership strength of Commnist organizations in the universities. Results of recent student elec-_ tions, however, show the Communists running fourth to the Christian Democratic-Catholic, non-Catholic democratic, and MSI candidates. -These results reflect the middle and upper class origin of most university students in Italy. Ce Women The PCIts largest front organization (excluding the CGIL, the labor federation) is the Union of Italian Women (UDI).. It claims ©: 1,000,000 members, including 500,000 PCI members and 500,000 non~ Communists. Its strength is surpassed only by the woments organization of Catholic Action. The UDI's primary objective is to win the support of women for the party's political aims and for PCI candidates in elections. So long as the present conciliatory PCI - policy continues, the UDI has same capacity for expansion, but this is limited by the strong Catholic orientation of many Italian women. De. Cultural The principal cultural organization sponsored by the PCI is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 415] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | the Italy-USSR Association, which attempts to create an interest among intellectuals and others in Soviet culture. No membership figures are available. The group is reportedly being reorganized because of its failure to become a "mass organization." Because it appeals primarily to intellectuals and is closely identified . with the Soviet Union, the capabilities of the Ttaly-USSR Association are limited. Be Bx-Partisans The National Association of Italian Partisans (ANPI) is one: of the most important Communist front. organizations. It claims 293,000 members, 100,000 or more of whom are probably non-parti sans (primarily youths who were too young to participate in the resistance.). Its strength is concentrated mostly in the North, and is based primarily on the 150,000-175,000 veterans of the World War II partisan activities who fought under Communist leadership. Its only competitor in this field, the anti-Comnunist — ex-partisans organization called the Italian Federation of Volunteers of Liberty (FIVL), is not be~, lieved to be as large as the ANPI. oo The Communists attempt to attract non-Communist elements to: party aims by using the ANPI to stress the anti-Fascist traditions of the unified wartime resistance. The ANPI, however, remains pre-. dominantly Communist in membership. It is closely tied to the PCI. and is considered a likely-source of potential para-military elements. Fe Peace Groups The Communist "peace" line is promoted by numerous local peace groups under the guidance of the Italian National Committee of the —. Partisans of Peace, affiliated with the World Peace Council. It is firmly controlled by the PCI, although one of the leading figures in the movement is Pietro Nenni, head of the left-wing Socialist Party. The Partisans of Peace carry on an intensive effort to encourage neutralist, pacifist, and anti-Western sentiment among all classes of Italians. The organization has won the cooperation of a few. eminent non-Communists, such as former Premier Francesco Nitti and - the late Vittorio Orlando. Nevertheless, its capabilities for ex« pansion are limited, since it has probably exploited this field to nearly the maximum extent in the present situation. The organizae tion is also hampered in its efforts to attract non-Communists by its close identification with the PCI. Should Rast-west relations become more tense, however, the Italians! profound fear of war might lead many more to support the Partisans of Peace, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 416] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Ge Regional Organizations The Communist Party has made intensive efforts, particularly in the South, to organize front activities on a regional basis. A number of front groups of a regional character were employed to win - southern votes in the 1951-52 elections. A "Movement for the Renaissance of the South" was constituted in early 1952, and more recently a "Patriotic Congress of Youth for the Renovation of the South" was held in Naples. He Communi st Infiltration in Non-Communist Organizations. In some cases it is difficult to distinguish between Comnunistcontrolled front organizations and ostensibly non-Comminist organiza- | tions which are strongly influenced by the Communists and which support PCI aims. For the most part, however, organizations of the type described above are Communist fronts rather than merely Commnist-. infiltrated. Aside from two political parties discussed in. section IX, there are no other major Communist-influenced or Comnunistinfiltrated organizations in Italy. - SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 417] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -17- VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Except on the local level, Communist influence in government is quite limited. There are very few Commmnists or their sympathizers remaining in national or regional executive bodies, but the Social- Communists control 24 of the 91 provincial councils and 1,733 of the 7,072 communes.: In these governments, consequently, they predominate in the administration. The central government, however, exerts a. very strong restraining influence upon local administrations through the prefects. The police and security forces of the central government are believed to be almost wholly free of subversive Communist elements since the government has been diligent in the development of these forces as instriments to curb Communist strength. The same may be said of the top levels of the armed forces, but, in a conscript army mirroring the population, a substantial number. of Communists and sympathizers probably exist. The Italian army claimed in 1951 that only — ‘about 15 percent of its personnel were Communist (about 25,000) but that most of these dropped their Communist affiliation and conviction after entering the service. Communist penetration in Italy's very limited atomic energy research program is believea to be insignificant, as is Communist influence in government-owned industries. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The Communist Party and its sympathizers have little direct influence upon non-Communist public opinion forming circles. Communist influence is probably most effective in moulding opinion leaders through the universities, where the traditions of academic freedom open the way for Communists and sympathizers to teach. In the lower schools, however, and even in the universities to a limited degree, Catholic control of education increasingly circumscribes Communist teaching activities. Communist influence upon the State-controlled radio network is minor, although all parties are represented on the parliamentary committee governing its operation. Communist influence upon other media of opinion formation is similarly limited. There is no important Communist influence through church bodies, although there is a Catholic- Communist faction in the party. Nor does the Communist Party make itself felt directly in the non-Communist press. All Italian newspapers are politically orientated and whatever the views of individual employees may be, the tone of the newspaper is invariably set by the owner or editor. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 418] === Se ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION The total direct impact of Communist influence through these and other non-Communist controlled media is impossible to estimate -accurately, but it is probably limited except in the case of higher education. The Communists are able to exploit the existing sentiments and prejudices of the non-Comunist public, however, by appeals to common values, interests, and desires. In this way the Communists - are often able to develop considerable support on a given issue, even though non-Communists have exactly opposed objectives. Despite instances of apparent Communist deception of public opinion leaders, - non-Communists almost always recognize the difference between their interests and those of the Communists, IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES . The major political organization in Italy, which is ostensibly non-Communist but which follows the PCI line, is the left-wing Socialist Party (PSI) headed by Pietro Nenni. It claims 750,000 members and probably has about 600,000. The Communist Party exerts a strong influence over the policies of the PSI. Pro-Communists control the Socialist Party, and Communist agents have reportedly infiltrated its organizational apparatus. € Since World War II,. the Nenni Socialist Party has remained the strongest and most faithful ally of the Communists in Italy. It is an important junior partner in the Communist-dominated alliance of the left, formalized by a long-standing "unity of action" pact, and its representatives in Parliament consistently follow the Communist line. Its press, except on those occasions when it temporarily strays from the "correct" path by premature comment on an issue on which PCI policy is unclear, gives open support to Communist objectives, In international affairs, the PSI generally adopts the Soviet position, although it takes a pseudo-neutralist attitude in contrast to the more obvious pro-Soviet line of the Communists. The Left Socialists serve Communist ends by exploiting "peace" and "independence" sentiment among elements that might be reluctant to support the PCI itself. Another important political group manipulated by the Communist Party is the organization of so-called "Independents of the Left." It includes non-Communists among its rank-and-file and its leadership, and has won the support of a few prominent independent politicians such as ex-Premier Nitti. The organization, however, is actually sponsored by the PCI, which uses the group to exploit anti-government sentiment among elements which have heretofore remained outside the leftist fold. In the 1951-52 elections the electoral lists of the Left Independents SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 419] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -19were affiliated with those of the Communists and the Nenni Socialists, and its candidates won over 455,000 votes. The membership strength of the organization is unknown, but it is probably far less than its electoral support. a Among the parties outside the Communist bloc, the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) represents a likely field for Comnunist attempts at infiltration. The positions of the extreme left wing of the MSI and that of the PCI frequently overlap, particularly in regard to the doctrinal justification of violence, certain social and economic emphases, opposition to the democratic state, and hostility toward the West and the United States. Many Fascists switched to Communism at the collapse of the Mussolini regime, which may have established a rapport among some segments of the MSI and Communist rank-and-file. ' Barly in the postwar period the Communists set up and financed a front to bring nationalists and Fascists under their control. More recently, the Commnists have reportedly approached certain extreme left-wing MSI leaders, who resigned from the neo-Fascist party in 1952, with a view to enlisting their support in a broad "nationalist front." The PCI also urges its members to discuss current issues with the MSI rank-and-file, especially its younger members, and to point out the common features of their positions. The possibility that Communist C agents may infiltrate the MSI is indicated by the MSI leadership's ‘ ez warning to its members to be on guard against Commnist propaganda and penetration. In the 1951-52 local elections, tacit agreements — apparently existed in some communities between the PCI and the MSI to concentrate their fire on the democratic center parties and to refrain from attacks on each other., Generally speaking, very few pro-Communists now belong to non- Commnist political groups, aside from the Nenni Socialists and the Left Independents, as the result of a sorting-out process which began in 1947. A few left-wing Social Democrats sometimes act to serve PCI interests, but there is no evidence suggesting that any tacit cooperation is intended. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION | =e === [PDF page 420] === nO ew, eae Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET + SECURITY INFORMATION X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The Italian Communist Party has at its disposal a powerful and effective propaganda machine run by competent journalists who are prepared to use any means to achieve the goals set by the — party. The great bulk of the newspapers and periodicals carrying. the Communist message are known to all as Commnist and it’ is likely that only a very few Communist-controlled publications with minor influence are ever mistaken by the public. In addition to | the daily and weekly newspapers and to a wide range of periodicals, | the party and its sympathizers also publish vast quantities of other propaganda in the form of pamphlets, wall newspapers, fliers, stickers, books, calendars, etc. Even the newspapers, ranging as they do from mimeographed factory news sheets to the great metropolitan daily L'Unita are so many in number that they cannot be listed here. The more important dailies, with a rough estimate of their daily circulation is given below. -: Newspapers. Daily Circulation L'Unita of Rome 80,000 (140-150,000 oo Sunday) € | L'Unita of Milan 140,000 L'Unita of Turin — 80,000 ‘L'Unite: of Genoa * 40,000 “Paese, Rome 30,000 - Paese Sera, Rome 15,000 Milano Sera, Milan. 50,000 Gazzetta, Leghorn 25,000 Progresso d'Italia, Bologna 40,000 Corriere del Po, Ferrara 10,000 Corriere Tridentino, Trento - 10,000 Ora del Popolo, Palermo 16,000 Reggio Democratico, Reggio Emilia 10,000 Avantil Rome (Nenni Socialist) 20~25,000 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 421] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 - SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The various front organizations have their organs as well, each designed to appeal to a particular age or interest groupe Probably the most important of these to Communist intellectuals is Togliatti's monthly Rinascita with a circulation estimated at about 50,000. Luigi Longo's weekly Vie Nuove is a popular propaganda “Magazine with an estimated circulation of about 100,000. In the specialized category are Gioventu Nuove and Gioventu al Lavoro for young adults, Pattuglia for teen agers, Lavoro for CGIL members, Quaderno del Attivista and ropagende for party activists, and Noi Donne for women. A number of publishing houses issue Communist propaganda, some being devoted exclusively to Communist literature, others to non-Commnist publications as well. The well know Turin publisher, Einaudi, falls in the first category with emphasis upon serious works in all fields. Low cost pamphlets are published by the Centro Diffusione Stampa of Rome, while the Edizioni Macchia of Rome publishes contemporary Russian works in translation and modern Italian Communist writings. Edizioni Rinascita of Rome specializes in the philosophic works of Communist thinkers both present and past,. particularly Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, etc. Other publishers include Milan Sera, Cultura Nuova, and Edizioni Sociali, all of Milen, The more important Communist media are printed by wellequipped printing houses capable of handling both large volume and complicated printing work. They range from the state printing office--the Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato--in Rome to the Stabilimento Tipografico U.E.S.1.S.A., Piazza Galeria 7, Rome; the Stabilimento Tipografico Esercizio Tipografici Italiani, Via Mario dei Rossi, 104, Rome; DeAgostini, Novara; Stampatore TRAG, Viale Universita, Rome; and many more which do smaller job printing on a local level.. It is believed that very little printed material is imported because of the more than adequate facilities available in Italy. Some international Communist publications like the Cominform — Journal and Cahiers internationaux are circulated, but probably in insignificant numbers. Other Communist propaganda, like the Soviet information bulletin Notizie Sovietiche, probably reaches ‘a fairly wide audience among opinion leaders. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION € === [PDF page 422] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ee LS [Unreadable] Although the Communist Party controls no domestic radio stations, it is backed up by Soviet bloc broadcasts beamed at Italy. The USSR broadcasts about 26 hours a week, two thirds short wave and the remainder long and medium wave. Czechoslovakia carries about 11 hours a week for Italy, three quarters short wave, and Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania broadcast five, three and a half, and three and a quarter. hours a week respectively, all in short wave. The reception of these broadcasts is not know nor is the size of the Italian audience. Only the Czechoslovak broadcasts are believed to be effective for they raised considerable protest among the anti-Communist parties during the provincial elections of 1951-52. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 423] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION = 23- XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION. Data of a financial nature regarding all Italian parties is at best nebulous and in the case of a semi-clandestine organization such as the PCI, they are even more uncertain. The net income from dues, publication sales, contributions, and festivities is estimated to be 4.43 billion lire ($7,000,000) and membership fees come to another 4 billion lire ($6,400,000), The party claims that it gorsses 30 billion lire ($48,000,000) and nets $ billion lire ($4,800,000) on its publications. It is believed that the Communist Party secures income from various Italian companies trading with the Soviet bloc. The names of all the firms alleged to be serving the Communist Party in trade with the Soviet bloc are not available, but some have been reported. The Ital-Coop Societa Responsabilita Limitata, 136 Viale del Policlinico, Rome, said to be controlled by the Communist dominated National Cooperative League may be. a leading agent engaged in trade with the Soviet orbit. Another frequently mentioned organization is the Societa Italiana Importazione Esportazione (Simes), Corso Rinascimento, 19, Rome. In Milan, the firm Omipol, S.A., Vie Baldiserra, 5, is allegedly another such firm dealing with the Czech Government, while in the same city Sicomet, S.p.a., Via dei Giordani, 7, is said to have relations with the Hungarian Government. There are many other such firms, but it is believed that the bulk € of Italian trade with the Soviet bloc is carried on with official knowledge and approval by legitimate Italian concerns often working on a part barter basis. One of the most important of these is the Italpolcarbo firm of 12 Piazza Soziglia, Genoa, which handles all Polish coal imports. This organization appears to be half owned by the major Italian coal consumers (Fiat, Ansaldo, Falck, Vetrocoke, and Snia Viscosa) and coal handlers (Consorzio Carbonifero Italiano, eto) on the one hand, and by Polish interests on the other. It is alleged that the firm drains off a part of its profits for the Italian Communist Party. Other commercial contacts of a similar nature probably exist, but current information on them is unavailable. The total revenue from these sources is not know, nor is information available concerning funds which may derive from the Communist-dominated trade union confederation. While it is said that the Soviet Union also helps to finance the party, the means of this financing and the extent of subsidization is not known. Although a listing of the total assets of the party is not available, it is very probable that the Communist Party is as well off, perhaps better off financially than any other Italian party. This means very substantial wealth. It has been estimated that in a year the party spends about 10.25 billion lire ($16,400,000) on all of its activities. Maintenance of party machinery is believed to cost about $6,400,000 - and the remaining $10,000,000 is probably spent on press and propaganda activities. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C === [PDF page 424] === _ Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION RT SD aaa er RIESE aan a -~ 24- XII, SOVIET~SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS eee arte a TATA Reena The Soviet Union does not operate a large propaganda organization in Italy, relying rather upon the Communist Party and its allies for this purpose. Whatever such activity is carried on by the Soviet Union or its satellites is probably directed by the diplomatic establishments listed below: 1) The Soviet Union is believed to have only a chancery, Via Gaeta, 5, Rome. There are no consulates. In September 1951, there were 25 officers accredited to Italy. 2) Poland has an embassy at Via Paolo Rubens, 20, Rome, a commercial office at the same address, and a consulate at V.S. Michele del Carso, 4, Milano. In September 195], there were eight officers accredited to Italy in Rome, but in April 1952 there was no consul general in Milan. 3) Czechoslovakia has a chancery at Via Luisa di Savoia, 16-18, Rome, and in September 1951 there were four accredited officers there. No consular posts were reported in 1952, _ 4) Bulgaria maintains a legation at Via Boncompagni, 26, Rome, and € a chancery at Via Nerva, 4, Rome. In September 1951, there were eight accredited officers in Rome. Bulgaria also has a consulate in Milan on Via Fr. Bronzetti, 20, with an accredited consul. 5) Rumania has a mission locatsd in a chancery on Via Alessandro Farnese, 1, Rome. In September 1951, it had eight diplomatic officers. There are no consulates. 6) Hungary maintains a chancery on Via dei Villini, 12-16, Rome, with seven accredited officers in September 1951, There are no consulates. 7) Albania maintained a chancery on Via dei Villini, 9, Rome, in September 1951, with seven accredited officers. In 1952 no consulates were reported, The extent of the propaganda machine which these governments maintain is not certain, although it is believed to be small. The press officer of the Soviet Embassy is believed to be the Second Secretary, Mikhail Rozov, N while Miklor Vass occupies that post for the Hungarian Legation, In 1951 Maria Baranowicz, was the cultural attache for Poland;. Anca Magheru, for Rumania; Ivan Gavora, for Czechoslovakia; and Valery Petrov-Mevorach, for Bulgaria. These are probably the core of the propaganda officers, but it is not known how many others may be engaged in the same activity. SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 425] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4. SECRBT ~ SECURITY INFORMATION | -25- There are, moreover, cultural institutes connected with the satellite governments which may or may not be employed for propaganda purposes. The following were listed in 1951: Istituto storico ozechoslovaceco, Via Crescenzio, 91, Rome. Acoademia di Polonia, Via della Fede, 2, Rome. Acoademia di Romania, Via Belle Arti, Rome. Istituto Romano di Storia, Pal. Corner, 8. Fosoo, Venice. Istituto ungherese di Storia dell'tArte, Palazzo Strozzi, Florence. Accademia di Ungheria, Via Giulia, 1, Rome. Scuola ungherese, Via Donizetti, 35, Milan.. The most direct vehicle of Soviet propaganda is the Associazione Italia-URSS which claims offices in all Italian cities having universities and in some others as well, Its membership and influence is not known, but it publishes the. following titles: Rassegna Sovietioa, circulation unknown. Biblioteca Scientifica Sovietica, circulation unknown. ae Medicina, circulation unknown. Quaderni Italia-URSS, circulation wuiknown. In addition to these instruments of Soviet propaganda, the news services of the Soviet Union and the satellite states perform an important function by providing much of the raw material for the Communist and pro- Communist press. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Italian Communist Party and its sympathizers are very active in all international Communist and Communist front meetings, congresses, etc. There is Italian representation in the WFIU, the Peace Movement, women's, youth, and lawyers organizations. During the past two years the Italians have been represented at about 50 meetings of these bodies and their SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION a ae A TC EE === [PDF page 426] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION erento rey subsidiary organs with delegations ranging from a single person to as many as several thousand. Other Communist meetings are attended as well, as for example the Russian Communist Party Congress of 1952 which was attended by six Italian delegates. These international meetings constitute a continuing means for exchanging ideas, building a sense of solidarity, and rewarding deserving party workers, XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK a erate meneame ee EON The organization of the relationship between the Italian Communist Party, the Soviet Union, and the Communist international organization is not known. There is little or no information about the means employed for communicating top level policy matters. Top level party leaders frequently travel to the Soviet bloc and France, while many foreign Comnunists visit Italy annually. These contacts are supplemented by those made through the front organizations noted above. The Soviet Embassy and the diplomatic establishments of the satellites probably provide another means of communication. It has been reported, also, that the Soviet Embassy maintains a radio transmitter in Rome without the permission of the Italian Government. In the recent past, the party has been publicly admonished only twice, once on the occasion of the attempted assassination of Togliatti in 1948 and again in 1950 because of the shortcomings of L'Unita. In the latter instance the Cominform Journal criticized the party daily for its lack of ideological content and the sparseness of the information it carried on the Soviet Union. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 427] === EE OO ene Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.23 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, SOUTH AFRICA OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 428] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ». ee ec cee ee cee ere ree eee eee se) it OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES.... 301 Ie Objectives a ee II. Tactics Pr a a re 1 III. Capabilities cece wc we eee eee e sees 2 ): | “ASSETS 2 we ee eee ee eee. I. Numerical Strength...esccccccsceecece f It. Electoral Strength see eee cceeeceeree fk III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent: Action.. C IV. | Government Policy. Toward Communism...eceeecseee FF ve Communist Influence in Labor. cece cece cece 6 sass. VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations....s+ese-seecececce 6 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government.2.eeee. 7. VIII. Commnist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. « « e 7 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political ~ | Parties sss sescsseescesessesesses 7. ‘ X. Communist Propaganda Media.....es0ceeeeee8 7. . XI. Financial Condition....ssccceccccccecce § 8 XII, Soviet-Satellite Official Assets 2..s.eeeeeee 8 XIII. Communist International Organizations.....see2-ee 8 XIV. Communist Communication Network.sseeceecesee 8 ~ oS SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 429] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities ‘of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-- vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. ‘) The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry ~ them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives.. assessed in the light of both past and present performance. ; The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational; potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, C J; providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best: available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] === [PDF page 430] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATIOn. COMMUNISM IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND. CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The South African Communists, whose party has been dissolved and declared illegal by Parliament, are primarily interested in fostering unrest among non-white groups and their joint resistance to white domination. Communist propaganda emphasizes domestic aims such as the legalization of Negro labor unions, the abolition of the industrial color bar, and the increase of the non-whites' political power. Attacks on the color bar are the most effective means of mass. appeal and; simultaneously favor the fortunes of the local party and the Soviet aim. of weakening and eventually overthrowing the whites in South Africa. om. Since the South African Communist movement is weak and the non- ; white resistance to-white policies is strong, the order of the Commnists' immediate goals is largely determined by circumstances beyond their. me control. Party members are opportunistic, attempting to circumvent the _ government's. campaign against them and to aid and control non-white protests. as.they develop. A shift in emphasis is unlikely in the immediate future, 'as initiative remains with the strongly anti-Communist government, not: with the weak Communist-movement, and the growing discontents of. the. C non-whites for a long time will remain the most fertile field; for exploitation.; “ Do II. TACTICS -The.Communists appeal primarily to the special grievances of éach. non-white racial group and to the common resentment of white domination. The main tactic is to assist the organizers of labor unions, particularly the extra-legal Negro unions, and non-white political bodies, and to infiltrate their leadershipe Communists also try to get the cooperation of liberals, students, and unionists in the white group by claiming that. official repression of Communism and non-white aspirations: is endangering -democracy. Electoral activity is necessarily limited to a few negro, — - - Colored (mixed caste), and urban constituencies, since the.non-whites.- - have only token political representation and the whites are strongly anti-Communist. Evidence of underground activity is scant. The Communists appear to be active chiefly through their work in other organizations. -Propagandists exploit growing Negro nationalisn,... resentment of low wages and inflation, the desire for better housing and. freer movement, and Colored and Indian opposition to.new. laws lowering::;,, their. status. Unions are used to train leaders and indoctrinate members, and:to pressure other unions in-to supporting such goals as legalization. of. Negro unions and acceptance of racially mixed unions.. In the. few. white C __- SECRET’ = SECURITY INFORMATION - === [PDF page 431] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -~2unions under Communist influence the main tactical line is largely negative: to defend the unions from the aggressive attempts by Afrikaner Nationalists to take the labor movement over for political purposes. — With their leaders on trial or imprisoned for crimes under the anti-Communist law and the rank and file under surveillance by detectives and spies, Communists apparently do not meet as members of the party but in connection with their activities in other organizations. Some members have traveled to Europe and behind the Curtain, but the government now -— refuses to authorize suspects to go abroad. Evidence is lacking regarding instructions or financial aid received from abroad, but the USSR has a. large consular staff in the Union which is hardly justified by the negligible commercial relations between: the two countries. III. CAPABILITIES Communist influence remains small. Whites with few exceptions ~ strongly oppose the party because of its position on the color bar. ~ a Distrust between racial groups hampers Communist activity. The great Negro majority suspect Communism because they regard it as a white ideology. Negro nationalists are antagonized by the Communists' emphasis on joint action of the racial groups against the whites because many of. them hate. the Indians and have contempt for the Coloreds. Likewise, —. Cc many Indians and Coloreds have little in common with the Negroes and even wo fear theme In the Negro reservations, the tribal leaders generally are intensely conservative and the tribe itself politically apathetic. Negro unions. are small and their membership fluctuates rapidly. A larger proportion of the Indians and Coloreds are éducated and politically conscious, but these racial groups are politically and economically weak. In.the past, inept actions have contributed to the Communists '* ineffectiveness: The small leadership included wealthy intellectuals; who had little contact with the worker level. The predominance of white leaders did not attract the support of other racial groups. Internal dissension over tactics, conflicts of personalities, and lack of effective organizers greatly impeded the spread of the movement. The smallness of the membership has made it particularly vulnerable to crippling action by the police.. Despite these many handicaps, the Communist Party's prospects. among urban non-whites appear good. The present quality, strength, and utility of the party apparatus are not known and probably are weak; but the. growing unrest among non-whites as a result.of their rigid repression by the government will provide the Communists with additional opportunities for exploitation. The failure of the government: to keep ~*~ contact with the non-white groups and to encourage the formation of Negro ~ SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ~~ C === [PDF page 432] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3unions under moderate leadership is giving Communists the field by default. Official deprivation of Indian and Colored privileges and ‘determination to increase segregation are facilitating Communist recruitment of leaders from these two groups. Although Communist progress among Negro organizations is slow, there is evidence that infiltration of the leadership is increasing as resistance to discrimination becomes more open. The Communists, however, have virtually no chance of improving their electoral position except by. promoting the election of radicals to represent the Negroes in Parliament. ae be ‘SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION’. === [PDF page 433] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ’ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: ASSETS I. NUMSRICAL STRENGTH The membership of the South African Communist Party is generally estimated at about 2,000. This estimate is not firm, as the main source, the South African Government, considers many to be Communist because they oppose official racial policies. Probably.- not more than 20,000 persons are members of organizations controlled:.- by Communists, but at least 100,000, about one percent of the population, are influenced by Communists who have infiltrated non-Communist labor unions and non-white political bodies. Much of the party leadership is drawn from the middle class, but the bulk of the party is composed of workers, particularly Indians and Coloredse Members are concentrated in Johannesburg and the Reef area, Cape Town, and Durban.. . Statistics on the quality and age of the members are lacking. Probably not more than 400, or 20 percent, are hard core, and even ‘ these are so designated only because they are more professional than the rank-and-file. Since the Communists have not been tested by severe class war, it seems likely that a large proportion of the professionals may prove unreliable when put to a severe trial. The average age probably is in the twenties and thirties. Turnover is 7 € rapid, particularly among the Natives. Disillusionment with Soviet co ' policy caused many to withdraw from the party, but others have become members as a gesture against the Government's racialism. Apparently the size of the party today is not much different from what it was in 1946. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH In the last general election in.1948, the Communist candidates polled only 1,783 votes, or about 0.16 percent of the total vote. The United Party polled over 500,000 votes, the Nationalists almost that, and the small Labor Party 27,360. Communist strength was chiefly in Cape Town and Johannesburg. In a by-election for a Native constituency in late 1952, however, the Communist candidate received an overwhelming; majority. With the party illegal and extremely unpopular among the, whites, who are the only group enjoying universal suffrage, the Communist tactic in elections has been to run its members or sympathizers se _ aS native candidates or in constituencies with a large proportion of Colored voters. Communist and leftist workers fan the discontent of the non-whites and assist them in many minor r WAYS, IiI. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The current tactic of the Communist party regarding violence is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 434] === EE EEE eOwenornr ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION PEE RE eT AN EURMA LT LON -5not known. Conmunists appear to be. lying low except for participation in civil disobedience and other non-violent protests against the color bar; but Communist agents may have encouraged recent rioting and damage to property. Violent demonstrations, as distinct from rioting, have. | not been held; and it is doubtful that Communists could organize such an activity unless special circumstances already had created anin- - flammable situation. The knowledge that the government will ruthlessly ' put down a violent demonstration is an effective deterrent. The party. organization is probably only equipped to abet a non-white protest. through the individual actions of members or sympathizers acting as | leaders in non-Communist organizations. No information is available on Communist intentions or capacity for guerrilla activity or sabotage. Probably only a few 100, perhaps less, than a 100, are available for armed insurrection.. Some intellec. 4Y- tuals and. professionals in the party are conspicuously able.as critics of the government, but leaders for armed action are nat apparent...... Only female Communist labor leaders have shown outstanding.abi lity.. - Doo. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM... 2-0 ot gee: ...., The government is sternly repressing Communism. It has declared.. the party illegal and has forced many Communists out of political and..; € labor union offices and positions in social and cultural organizations.... , Party leaders have. been prosecuted for furthering Communism, and have.-. - been restricted in movement and activities such as speaking or attend-.. ing meetings. Communist publications have been banned. cate Official repression has greatly handicapped strictly Communist. - activities, but the main Communist tactic of aiding non-white organizations has probably not been much affected and the official campaign. -: against Communists has to some extent made them martyrs. The banning | of the leading Communist newspaper has proved ineffective, as it still ‘appears under a new name, but with the same editor and policy. Leaders:: prevented from attending meetings have sent records of speeches in.- their stead. Prosecutions have furnished opportunities for popular demonstrations. The size and efficiency of the underground Communist organization is not known, but it is probably small and amateurish. Strictly front organizations are insignificant and subject to proscription. No legal labor union is wholly controlled by Communists, and their influence in white unions, witha few exceptions, is slight. The strength of the party has been exercised almost entirely. through the work of individuals in non-white organizations. Official repression has made.these individuals, except for a few well-known leaders, extremely cautious. C SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 435] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION © Ve. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Probably no known Communist is employed in defense plants and other key industries, but in all industries dissatisfied non-whites are employed. No strategic union is wholly controlled by the party, and Communist membership in strategic unions is believed to be minor. With few exceptions, Communist influence has been greatest in secondary and service industries of no strategic importance, particularly among small Negro and Colored unions with unstable memberships and extremely precarious finances. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1) Communist-controlled front organizations are of minor importance. The Young Communist League was banned by legislation in 1950. It had a membership of only about 60, located chiefly in Johannesburg and Cape Town;. and, presumably, outlawry has effectively ended most of its activities. Communist youth activity now is concentrated in the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), which has a large membership, at least several 1,000, in the Universities of Cape Town and Natal, and Rhodes and Witwatersrand Universities. Fort Hare, the negro college in South Africa, recently broke away from NUSASe NUSAS is neither C Communist nor a front, but Communists and leftists in its ranks are é sufficiently influential, because of rank-and-file apathy and ignorance, to keep the organization affiliated with the Communist-controlled International Union of students and to prevent the association of NUSAS with efforts to organize an anti-Communist students union at the ’ international conference in Copenhagen in January 1953. The Communists in NUSAS, however, are too weak to further Communist causes within the Union of South Africa. 2) The. South African Society for Good Will and | Friendship with the USSR is centered in Johannesburg and has a branch in Cape Town. From its peak during the war, when it was called the Friends of the Soviet | Union, membership has greatly dwindled, and now probably few are active members. In its heyday influential and able non-Communist leaders: participated in its cultural activities. The Springbok Legion and a. number of Communist-influenced labor unions were affiliated with it. The emphasis always was cultural, to improve knowledge and appreciation: of Soviet accomplishments. Considering the unpopularity of the Soviet Union among the whites, and the restrictions on propaganda work among the non-whites, the society has no future. 3). Springbok Legion is a veteran's organization. Its leadership was infiltrated by the Communists, but the rank-and-file remained non-Communist. Discredited by Communist manipulations, its membership SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | === [PDF page 436] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Sa EE ENPORMATION has declined so that now probably only a few hundred remain affiliated. Its strength has been chiefly in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. Its function of opposing the afrikaner Nationalists has been taken over by the Torch Commando, which has tried vigilantly to exclude Communists, As a discredited relic of the war, the Springbok Legion probably has. little future except as a small leftist mouthpiece.. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT _. There are virtually no. Communists or Communist sympathizers: in important parts of the government. - — VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION. maT INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Information on the nature of Communist influence on public . opinion formation among the non-whites, other than through the press, unions, and political organizations, is lacking. Influence in white circlés is negligible. Some Anglican clergymen at. the end of the war -. were Communist-inclined, and the Archdeacon of Kimberley openly pro-—. fessed being a Communist. A report has indicated that the small. ‘Theosophical Society may be a cover for proselytizing. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES NEST POLITICAL PARTIES _The Communists have most successfully infiltrated non-white political organizations. The executive bodies of the national and provincial Indian Congress organizations, which represent the majority of the politically conscious Indians in the Union, have been penetrated to a large extent. The president of the ‘Transvaal and the South African Indian Congresses in recent years has been a Communist, and the head of the important Natal Indian Congress has worked closely with the Communists. The great majority of the members and a majority of the executives, however, are non-Communist.; a he _ Communist influence in Negro and Colored organizations has been | -increasing, but details are lacking. On temporary bodies such as the ~ interracial Franchise Action Council able and aggressive Communists have been effective and perhaps even dominant. Their main tactic apparently has been to mobilize interracial resistance to the Nationalist government's policies, with the object of increasing unrest, sowing Communist ideas, and eventually overthrowing the government. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA - a RMA GANDA MEDIA The main Communist publication inthe, Union, Advance, isa weekly newspaper, the successor to the banned Guardian, which in 1949. had a circulati on of 40,000. Inkululeko, a. monthly newsletter in -° SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION... === [PDF page 437] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION several Negro languages, in 1950 had a claimed circulation of 10,000. Freedom and the Democrat are magazines with small circulations. Advance and other Communist materials are published by Competent Publishing and Printing Ltd., 6 Barrack St., Cape Town. The circula~ | tion of the Passive Resister, a Communist-influenced paper, is notknown. Publications such as Advance, which is printed by the Stewart Printing Co., Alfred St., Cape Town, are well-printed and well-edited. Foreign Communist publications formerly circulated in the Union. Stringent regulations against their circulation are probably effective, but information is lacking on this point. Only skilled owmmers of high-powered short-wave receivers can get Soviet broadcasts, and apparently none are specifically directed at the Union. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION Information is not available on the Communist Party's financial condition. The Guardian and its successor regularly plead for contri-. butions to the publication, and the police have suspected that the party was aided by funds from abroad. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The Soviet consulate at Pretoria and the consular agency in €: Cape Town have had about 15 Soviet staff members. Their political. activities are unknown. The local friendship society is very small. — XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Because the South African Govermment frowns on trips abroad by — Comunists and their sympathizers, the Union often is represented at | international meetings by persons living abroad. Sam Kahn,formerly © Communist MP for the natives, and others attended the Youth Rally in East Berlin in August 1951. According to a Communist announcement, five South Africans were to attend the Second World Peace Conference | held in late 1950 at Sheffield, England, and Warsaw. In September 1952 two delegates, one of whom was an anti-Communist, attended the International Union of Students meeting in Bucharest. At least two persons from the Transvaal Council of Non-European Trade Unions and the Trades and Labor Council attended the NFTU Conference in ueben in 1949.., XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK The South African authorities have cancelled permission for the Russian consulates to have courier service. The main ties of the party have been with the United Kingdom, Germany,and Canada. Instructions and criticisms from abroad probably are infrequent, as SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION | === [PDF page 438] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -9the South African party apparently has been more autonomous than most since its activities are largely determined by the local situation rather than by affairs beyond the Unionts borders. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. === [PDF page 439] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET. SECURITY INFORMATION TR-6165.24 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, SPAIN OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 440] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 IiI. VII. VITI« CO XI. XIIe XIII. XIV. SECRET — SECURITY INFORNATION TABLE OF CONTENTS OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES Objectives oso eee eewveeeweeeewe eee © Tactics eoeeee0e640u55 Capabilities eooeen Numerical Strength.. Electoral Strength « « ASSETS eee eeee Military Strength and Organization for Goverment Policy Toward Communism Foreword « «ee eceeee ee eee eee eevee Violent Action Communist Influence in Labor eeeeveee Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Communist Infiltration into Government ». « Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties gece escevrevceeccccvere Communist Propaganda Media oseec5e Financial Condition eoeeoeeeneeee Soviet-Satellite Official Assets. os Communist International Organizations Communist Communication Network.«...« SECRET » SECURITY INFORMATION Page nu wu uw Ff AN AN HA === [PDF page 441] === — gr ee eae ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | € SECRET: - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the.specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. ' The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, € providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 442] === TEE LEEDS OO OO Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ¢(, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - t,. COMMUNISM IN SPAIN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The small, illegal Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Espanol, PCE), which is strictly repressed by the Franco government, pursues two principal objectives at the present time. These are: 1) to build up its meager clandestine forces and effect working arrangements with other opposition groups; and 2). to create or intensify anti-Western ‘sentiment among the Spanish people. An increase in PCE membership and influence is essential in order for the party to undertake any significant action against the regime. There are at present only an estimated 10,000 Communists in Spain, and the party is particularly weak in the major industrial centers of Catalonie and the Basque provinces. Moreover, the Communists are completely isolated from the major clandestine groups opposed to Franco, a reflection of - ideological differences and the bitterness engendered by the Communist — attempt to liquidate other working class movements during the Spanish Civil "ar (1936-1939). The PCE, therefore, has virtually no ability to influence the course of Spanish developments; repeated appeals by it for. strikes and demonstrations have gone unheeded, while the party. reportedly - was totally unprepared for and unable to take advantage ‘of the. large- - C scale strikes and demonstrations in ‘the spring of 1951.. _ The other. major PCE objective stems from the requirements of Soviet foreign policy and from the apparent Communist. belief that many Spaniards- “resent and fear US negotiations with Spain. The PCE hopes to reinforce © neutralist sentiments among that large sector of the Spanish population which is anti-Communist, but also anti-Franco, and which believes that Western acceptance of the Spanish Government bolsters its stability.’ Moreover, the Communists recall that all Spaniards, regardless of party or class, traditionally have reacted violently against foreign intervention. By accusing the US of sinister designs on Spanish territory, the PCE has attempted to channel the people's nationalism to Communist advantage. : — II. TACTICS The PCE has been forced to rely almost exclusively on propaganda © from the USSR in its attempt to achieve its objectives. The non-Commnist opposition to Franco has been too wary to permit infiltration tactics to be utilized effectively, while the party lacks sufficient strength to - engage in strikes, widespread sabotage, or self-initiated internal propaganda. Soviet assistance, however, permits the PCE to carry on a.. widespread propaganda campaign in’ Spain. ~ Moscow, ‘Warsaw, - Prague,’ and.” oe Budapest beam a total of 46 hours a week to Spain, while’ “Independent”. ( |: SECRET + SECURITY INFO 0 oo . ‘ eo yet ors:. 2 Bele ec ete cee cata andl - woe:: aot Bae adietes Del ce - === [PDF page 443] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Spain, Station of the Pyrenees," identifying itself as a clandestine ¢ transmitter in the Pyrenees but actually located in Moscow, devotes 383 hours weekly to Spanish broadcasts. To achieve their first objective, an increase in influence and strength inside Spain, the Commmnists have attempted to wean individual workers and peasants away from their traditional anarchist or socialist loyalties, and to force other clandestine organizations to cooperate with the PCE. A large proportion of radio time is devoted to theoretical ' analyses of the superiority of Stalinist dogma to Bakuninist and democratic socialist theories. The PCE has also attempted to destroy the faith of the non-Communist opposition in its leaders; an index to the importance of an anarchist or socialist official is the number of time he has been castigated by Radio Moscow or Independent Spaine At the same time, the PCE since 1941 has called for the formation of an "anti-fascist front™ to group all elements opposed to the present Spanish regime. Theoretical articles on Communism, exaggeration of PCE exploits inside Spain, and glowing accounts of life in the "peoplest democracies" are designed in part to further these tactics and in part to maintain the enthusiasm of party members., In order to discredit the US in fulfillment of its second major objective, the PCE insistently has exploited the alleged US "colonization" of Spain.e The Communists contend that, as a result of the present., negotiations with the US, Spain is about to become a wcolonial atomic base," its ports “Yankee Gibraltars," and its people “gun fodder" for the imperialists. Only the Soviet Union, the "faithful and generous friend" of the Spanish Republic, protests this "sale of territorye" The Communists attempt to draw a parallel between present events and the British seizure of Gibraltar, the Napoleonic invasion, and the Italian and German intervention during the Civil War. TIT. CAPABILITIES The PCE is not likely in the immediate future to incréase significantly its membership inside Spain or to induce other opposition groups ~ to collaborate in a clandestine "popular front." It stands a better chance of intensifying distrust of the Western powers, although persons who believe Communist charges about US designs on Spanish territory are not likely to follow the Communist lead on other issuese The effectiveness of PCE propaganda designed.to gain new adherents is limited by a number of factors. Among these are: 1) the Embassy _ estimates that only some 57,000 radio sets equipped for short wave. reception are owned by the Spanish “poor," including a majority of ° the’ workers; 2) the PCE has never made much headway in Spain, and the factors limiting its success in the past presumably still operate; 3) to judge by the unwillingness of other opposition groups to cooperate with the PCE, SECRET - SECURITY INFO === [PDF page 444] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3widespread hatred of Communism remains an operative factor in Spanish politics. Communist capabilities based on the strength of the clandestine party would seem to be virtually nil. On the other hand, available evidence indicates that PCE and Soviet broadcasts are widely listened to by the middle and upper net largely because Communist attacks on Franco relieve the monotony of the * censored domestic media. While this audience is not’ likely to be won. over to any positive affection for the “Socialist fatherland," the constant J emphasis on the "sale" of Spanish territory: to the US" can be: expected mye to stir up a certain amount of anti-Western sentiment. ( SECRET = SECURITY. AMEORMATION TAkgt Cd ree coe ‘va "sate woke le some i TUF. S Se LL y nds amcttereat are === [PDF page 445] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATIO COMMUNISM IN SPAIN: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH There are an estimated 10,000 Communists in Spain, although certainty is precluded by the party's. clandestine status. This number includes, in addition to regular members of the Spanish Communist Party. (PCE), adherents of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (Partido. Socialista Unificada de Catalutia), the Catalan Communist Party,: and the-. Unified Socialist Youth (Juventudes des Socialistas Unificadas), the Communist youth group. There is also a reported Basque Communist organization, the Partido Comunista de Euzkadi, which is probably merely a paper ‘organization designed to demonstrate PCE sympathy for regionalism. It is impossible to establish with any degree of certainty the number of Communist sympathizers in the country, although these probably do not exceed the 31,205 persons claimed by the PCE to have signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal by August 1950. No reliable current information on the, geographic distribution of party membership is available. Under the Republic (1931-1936), however, party membership was concentrated in the Seville and Asturias areas, while the party was conspicuously weak in the important industrial areas of Catalonia and the Basque provinces. Virtually no information is > available on the party's activities in the areas of its traditional C importance. The Commnists are relatively insignificant compared to other clandestine groups in Catalonia, where a recent schism and police arrests apparently have crippled their weak organization. Some Communist activity has been reported from Bilbao, but the Basque nationalists and socialists would appear to be clearly dominant in that area. In the absence of any reliable direct information, the morale of the PCE inside Spain can only be estimated, but would appear not to be highe Party morale in exile has been extremely low, to judge from the refusal of the overwhelming. majority of PCE members arrested in France to go behind the Iron Curtain, numerous defections among top officials, and frequent articles on the subject in the Communist press and radio.. A characteristic of the party under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera o (1923-30) and the Republic was that its membership was drawn largely from dissident anarchists or revolutionary socialists who left after a few years to form dissident Communist organizations. At present, there are three dissident Communist organizations inside Spain: 1) the nationalist "Escudero" faction of the PCE; 2) the Titoist Circles of Socialist Action, headed by former members of the PCE central committee, and 3) the Comorera faction of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia.e Dissidence and poor morale in exile would seem of necessity to be reflected in the clandestine forces inside Spain, which SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 446] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. 7 28 5 depend to a considerable extent on the PCE abroad for material support and leadershipe: Moreover, high morale is unlikely in an ineffectual and repressed organization. Little information is available on the caliber of PCB leadership inside Spaine The central committee, however, is located in Moscow and is formed of individuals who came to power in the last years of the Republic and who skilfully guided its destinies during the Civil War. The only member of the hierarchy who was really respected and feared by other Popular Front leaders, however, is Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria), a heroine of the Asturias uprising and an effective orator. 4 A fundamental weakness of the: central committee is that its members, with few exceptions, have not been in Spain for 14 years and may be somewhat unrealistic in their estimates of the mood of the Spanish people. Ibarruri, moreover, has been ill for long periods of time and speaks only infrequently over Radio “Independent Spain." II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH There have been no free elections in Spain since 1936, nor will there probably be any for years to come. In the February 1956 elections for the Cortes (parliament), the Commmists won 15 seats compared to 267. for the left as a whole. Even this showing was largely the result of C. the Popular Front agreement and the electoral systems the PCE had an estimated $4000 members in 1936. — III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION. The PCE constantly calls for "intensification™ of. guerrilla. action against the present Spanish regime and claims a large number of successful actions of this type each year, but its capabilities in this field are - probably negligible. A-limited amount of guerrilla activity takes place in Spain today, as it has in the past, but it would appear to be largely the work of bandits as well as a few anarchists, socialists, and Communists who were unable to flee to France following the end of the Civil War and. escaped to the more inaccessible parts of the countrye No data is ’ available on party organization for violent action. The Communist Party* & ability to rally elements of the population to violent action against _ the regime is negligible at the present time. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The present Spanish regime is a rightist and violently anti-Commnist dictatorship which has outlawed the Communist Party and systematically represses its clandestine remnants. Frequent arrests and convictions ‘of’: PCE members take place. Apart from the large and efficient police forces, many other Spanish groups are militently anti-Commmist, including the church and the army. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 447] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN -LABOR There are probably few Communists in key Spanish industries although | little specific information is available. The PCE apparently finds it difficult to propagandize Spanish labor. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There are no known Communist front organizations active in Spain, and PCE infiltration of government or church-controlled social, cultural, and professional organizations is believed to be negligible. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no known Communist infiltration of the Spanish Government, nor is it likely that such ‘penetration would be permitted or go undetected. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION . The Communists have no influence | in education, the. church, | entertainment, the non-Commnist press, or the non-Commnist radio in Spain. oo IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES All political factions in Spain are anti-Communist, including the organized clandestine opposition to the present Spanish regime. Communists probably are purged from all Spanish political organizations as detected. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA | MEDIA The principal Communist propaganda medium is radio. The USSR and. satellites broadcast a total of 46 hours a week to Spain, while Espana Independiente, Estacién Pirenaica, identifying itself as a clandestine transmitter in the Pyrenees but actually located in Moscow, beams 385. _ hours a week to the country. Reception of all programs is reportedly good, but no estimate of the size of the audience has been made. The PCE prints a newspaper, Mundo Obrero (Workers' World), abroad and attempts to circulate it inside Spain, but distribution appears to be sporadic and haphazard. Recipients frequently have been chosen at . random from telephone books. The Cominform Journal also claims that the PCB ideological review, Nuestra Bandera (Our Banner), has resumed publication since its outlawing by France in September 1950, ‘but -no copies have been reported to circulate inside Spain. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 448] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | ( SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No information on PCE finances is availablee It seems clear, however, that the PCE could not carry on its propaganda activities without material Soviet support. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS No diplomatic representatives of Iron Curtain countries are permitted in Spain; the Soviet Union and the satellites have no official assets in Iberia. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS No Communist international organizations are active in Spain, nor will any be permitted to operate under the ‘present regime. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Data~is not available to gauge the effectiveness of the Commnist communications system. Control of the membership inside Spain by the central committee in Moscow is probably exercised by radio and by couriers C from France. ~, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 449] === ee ccccmmmmmmmemmmnemmmmmmmr Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.25 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:. CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 450] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword e «cecrecrcrersve eevee re eevee e ee ee @ ii . OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES « « « 1 Ie Objectives wes ee eee weer eer eerenee 1 ITe Tactics «+«escesceceererevesveereerer eve ee 1 III. Capabilities wee ee ee eee rece cccecce§ 3 ASSETS 2 eee cc ee eee 5 I. Numerical Strength. «ee eeccescece ee eeerens 5 IIe Electoral Strength «2 eeeecseseccerseesens 5 TIIe Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6 C IV. Governnent Policy Toward Communism. «eee eee ee 6 Ve Communist Influence in Labor «ee e«cececese eee e 7 VIe Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations « eeececesrevee ee 8 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ee eeceee 10 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation « « e lu IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-~Communist Political Parties.«.eeeserr rn tveoveer eevee 6 @ 11 Xe Communist Propaganda Media « e oeoeoeeoe eee ee @ 12 XI. Financial Condition « eeesececerveveen eee @ 14 XII. Soviet-—Satellite Official Assets. ee cecerete eee 14 XIII. Commanist International Organizations « « ««eeee 15 XIV. Commnist Communication Network eeeeceeasecss 16 C SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 451] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION — === [PDF page 452] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The primary aim of the British Communist Party (BCP) is to widen and consolidate its influence among organized labor groups, including the trade unions, local Labor Party groups, cooperatives, and workers in industrial plants of key importance to rearmament. Because the party has only about 35,000 members and is politically ineffective, it must limit itself largely to boring from within on the domestic labor front and to exploiting every situation of ‘internal unrest through propaganda, the fomenting of strikes, and the dislocation of production, transportation, and the essential services. The BCP seeks to persuade the workers that it advocates the most effective road to peace and socialism, purged of right-wing compromises and concessions to "bourgeois" principles. The party concentrates chiefly on the improvement of domestic living standards, on the extension of nationalization and on the alleged menace to the British workers from Conservative domestic and foreign policies, rearmament, and continued UK association with the US in the East-West strugglee,, With the ultimate aim of weakening British morale and the US-UK alignment, the party attempts to inflame anti-American sentiment and to represent the US as responsible for the threats to international peace. It hopes thereby to encourage neutralism, defeatism, and resistance to what it calls a “slavish" dependence on the US.. In view of the UK's weakened power and imperial position, the BCP also strives to sow unrest and lack of confidence among the people in Britain's ability, particularly under a Conservative government, to deal effectively with nationalist aspirations in colonial areas such as Malaya, Cyprus, or Kenya. II. TACTICS Because of the stable, middle class pattern of British government and society and the small size of the BCP, British Communists have been forced to adopt the following general tactics. They represent Communist aims for the UK as broadly compatible with the nationalist and class interests of the British labor movement,. though they do not conceal their desire to get rid of the moderate, rightwing leadership of the Labor Party and the trade unions. They avoid open advocacy of the use of force in bringing about a revolution in the UK; instead, they emphasize the gradualist and non-violent methods of their program as consistent with “British” principles of political and social change. SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 453] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION They seek to confuse the non-Communist worker, intellectual, or pacifist by systematically identifying the causes of his grievances with the capitalist bosses, the government in power, the character of © the right-wing leadership in the trade unions, or the direction and course of the "US inspired" cold war. They seek to live within the law and to avoid giving the government an excuse for outlawing the party. As the BCP has no representation in Parliament and little in local governments, it will continue to act chiefly through the trade unions and the industrial front. Communist opportunities in the civil service, the police and security services, and the armed forces are relatively more limited and less effective than among the ranks of labore. In the trade unions, the Communist tactic will be to share, where it cannot monopolize, the responsibility for sponsoring and carrying out a workers! program for higher wages, better conditions of work, increased social services, more housing,: and protection of the right to strike. Communists will try to retain places on the national or local executives of unions and in the factories. As shop stewards and foremen, they will attempt to control specific industrial operations and influence the rank and file of workerse, © They will be generally far more constant in attending workers’ meetings than most non-Commnist members, in the expectation, often based on fact, that they can in this manner control the routine work of unions, slant resolutions and agenda, ease’ out unfriendly officials, and use the physical facilities of workers' groups for their own propaganda purposes. Through every possible means the British Communists will intensify their peace campaign, though it is not anticipated that they will depart radically from the existing pattern, which advocates an ending of the war in Korea, the dissolution of NATO, all around disarmament, the banning of the atomic bomb, and the negotiation of a peace pact among the five great powers. They will continue to stress the “inner contradictions" of Western capitalism which, according to Communist doctrine, inevitably breed wars, as opposed to the essentially pacific aims of “peoples' democracies" everywheree L British Communists will greatly increase their anti-American attacks, representing the aims of the new administration as being expansion of the war in the Far East, involvement of the UK in wars of liberation directed against the Soviet-oriented governments behind the Iron Curtain, and desertion of Western Europe as a region of secondary US concern in the cold ware SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. € === [PDF page 454] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION III. CAPABILITIES ' British Communist capabilities for direct political action leading to incitement to revolution, seizure of the government, widespread subversion and sabotage, or serious undermining of morale are generally weak. The great majority of the British people will continue to reject Soviet totalitarianism and to view it as the chief menace to free world security and liberties. The British trade unions, which are predominantly pragmatic, democratic, and anti-Stalinist in principle and methods, will remain the chief target of Communist propaganda and action. They have become increasingly aware of the need to curtail Communist activities and to expose Communists acting for political ends under the guise of bona fide trade union causese Communists have been isolated or dismissed from many positions of influence on the national executives of trade unions or on local trades union councils. This anti-Communist drive is uneven in results, far from systematic, and sometimes resisted because of the aversion of rank and file members to summary action against fellow trade unionists who, though Communist, often have a good reputation for loyal service to the union. Since 1948, the government also has clamped restrictions on Communists working in sensitive civil service jobs and has partially screened out both Communists and fascists as security risks. The British regard the existing security precautions as adequate to deal with Communist threats to internal security. Certain soft spots, nevertheless, may exist in the UK in dealing with Communists. The small size of the BCP, its general political impotence, and its declining influence tend to encourage a certain amount of complacency about the threat of Communism. The British political climate is extremely tolerant of dissent and does not favor the present outlewry of the Communist Party, although the political and trade union leaders have denounced the party as a conspiracy against the national security and as definitely tied to the international Communist movement. The British are not given to witch-hunting and Red hysteria despite known instances of security violations or treason. The Communists themselves have made direct action against them somewhat more difficult through the calculated line of moderation they have adopted and by plausible identification with many of the domestic aims of the rank and file of the labor movement. In the trade union and industrial fields, British Communists may retain considerable potential for sabotaze, despite the fact that many of the known Communists are carefully watched and the non-Communist labor SECRST - SECURITY INFORM TION === [PDF page 455] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET =~ SECURITY INFORMATION movement has been frequently alerted to the danger of Communist infiltration and tactics. Communist capabilities in the industrial field have to be measured in terms of the location and influence of individual Communist workers or groups who may do damage out of all proportion to their numbers in a given industry. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 456] === ee eee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM.IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH In 1951, the British Communist Party (BCP) claimed 35,124 members and the Young Communist League claimed 3,107 members. Party membership had declined from a high of 64,300 claimed. in 1942 to 50,000 in 1945; 38,500 in 1947; 42,500 in 1948; and 38,850 in 1950. The party draws the bulk of its membership and sympathizers from the ranks of labor, intellectuals, and various groups of frustrated and disappointed individuals. Communist estimates indicate that a major proportion of the hard core is made up of members of cooperatives and the trade unions. The Communist hard core is estimated to number approximately 15,000 (about 40 percent of total party membership), and their calibre is probably relatively high judging from few known deviations among top BCP personnel. The average age of party members may be about 35 to 38 yearse Of the total membership, probably 25 percent is under 30 years of age, about 49 percent between $0 end 40 years, and about 26 percent over 40 years. The average length of party membership may be around C 12 years. The average annual rate of turn-over of members is about 10 to 15 percent; "floating members," who probably comprise more than agaeecean gt half the BCP, are estimated to change about every four to five yearse The chief geographical centers of the party's hard core activities are the London area, the Glasgow area, and Lancashire. Communist strength is also evident in Yorkshire, the Midlands, West Middlesex, Surrey, and South Wales. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The BCP has no representation in Parliament and little in local govermments. It has steadily lost ground in national and local elections since 1945. In the October 1951 general election, the party failed to elect any of its 10 candidates and polled only 0.08 percent of the total vote. In 1950, the party ran 100 candidates, none of whom was elected, and polled only 0.3 percent of the total vote. Only in the 1945 general election did the party succeed in electing two candidates to Parliament, but it polled only 102,780 votes, or 0.4 percent of the total electorate. In the last two general elections the relative standing of the British political parties was as follows: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 457] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION 1950 1951 Number of _ Number of Votes Percentage Votes ‘Percentage Conservative 12,441,153 43.2 13, 724,418 48.0 Labor 13,295,736 46.2 13,948,385 48.8 Liberal 2,621,489 9.1 730,551 _. 1.9 0.3 21,640 0.08 Communist 91,815 The Communists made a significant showing in the 1951 elections in only a few places. In the areas of London and Glasgow, and in South Wales, which were the chief points of Communist concentration, the party was overwhelmed by Conservative or Laborite candidates. I, the absence of CP candidates, Communist voters were usually instructed to vote for left-wing Labor candidates against right-wing Labor candidates, or- for any Laborite against: Conservative opponents. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The BCP does not ourrently advocate revolutionary violence to overthrow the government or to achieve its political and industrial aimse Because of the predominantly stable middle-class pattern of me. British government and society and the small size and relative ineffec- é tiveness of the BCP, the Communist strategy in the UK is one of tactical accommodation to the gradualist and parliamentary methods of the country. Many party members are probably quite gemuine in their support of relatively mild and pro-British aspects of the CP program. The BCP has no known para-military organization. In cases of violent demonstrations the party could not count on many of ita members outside the hard core to support sustained action. The ability of the party to rally elements of the population to violent action for Communist political ends, therefore, is extremely limited and cannot be considered a serious threat to national security. It is not known what plans the BCP may have for the staging of mass demonstrations and violence in the event of a war with the USSR or what arms supplies it may have succeeded in secreting, but all available evidence indicates that the Communist potential is very weak. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM British law permits the BCP to operate as a legal political party. In peace time it is unlikely that the government will outlaw the BCP, partly because such action runs counter to liberal political traditions in the UK and partly because the BCP is regarded as a political impotent and insignificant force. Therefore, the party is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 458] === Lee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -7able to operate in the open. Although there is no evidence of plans for a Communist underground organization, such plans probably do exist and will be applied in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In 1948, the government applied security restrictions against the employment of Communists and fascists in sensitive civil service jobs. This rule did not apply in blanket form to Communists or fascists serving in non-sensitive jobs. Considerable care was exercised by the government avoid indiscriminate charges and witch-hunting based merely on the known Communist affiliation of particular civil servants.. Under the 1948 law about 100 cases of dismissal or transfer have been completed. Although British Government security authorities (MI-5) seem confident that Communist activities in the civil service are not a menace, there exists considerable latitude for Communists to pursue various indirect forms of political propaganda in governmental departments.. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The organized British labor movement is the chief target of the BCP. The central and most important guiding tactic of the Communists in the labor movement is to build up a united labor front among Communist and non-Communist workers against the Tories and right-wing labor leaders. This front would be used to undermine the workers‘ morale, thereby impairing the government's rearmament program and Western political and military organization. The Communists seek to accomplish their aim by stressing the threat to living standards allegedly certain to result from rearmament and Tory domestic policies. They concentrate on questions of wages, housing, and other issues. close to the workers and try to disguise their political ends behind bona fide trade union interests and grievances., No reliable information is available to provide even approximately accurate estimates of the. number and distribution of Communists in defense plants and other key industries. It is believed, however, that Communists are most heavily concentrated in engineering, mining, electrical trades, wood working and construction, transport, and various municipal fire protection services. Probably less than one half of one percent (18,000 to 25,000) of the estimated total number of workers in these industries are cardholding Communists. The number of Communist sympathizers and fellow- ‘travelers doubtless runs much higher and fluctuates widely among industries, depending in part on the appeal of particular issues confronting the labor groups. ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 459] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION As far as is known, Communists are not in a position to control any key industry or national service essential to national security, with the possible exception of their strongly entrenched hold over the Electrical Trades Union. Except for the dominant position in the national executive of the Electrical Trades Union, numbering 176,000 members and representing about 95 percent of all organized trade unionists in the electrical field, the BCP does not have national control over strategic trade unions. ‘The Communists influence various trade unions at the national level, however, whose total number is about 2,750,000. The number of Communists in these unions is estimated at about one third of one percent of the total membership (2,750,000). The extent of their influence on union actions and policies depends upon the number of Communists on the national executives and the amount of support accorded to Communist-line resolutions at Trades Union Congress conferences. As of June 1950, the unions in which Communist infiltration was greatest included the following. Figures after each union represent the total membership. 1) Amalgamated Society of Wood-workers (200,000) 2) Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers (86,000).. 3) Amalgamated Engineering Union (800,000) é 4) Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers (73,000) 5) Metal Union of Mineworkers (611,000) 6). Association of Scientific Workers (13,000) 7) Civil Service Clerical Association (145,000) 8) Civil Service Union (23,000) 9) Constructional Engineering Union (20,000) 10) Fire Brigades Union (21,000) 11) National Union of Vehicle Builders (55,000) 12) Plumbing Trades Union (54,000) 13) Stevedores and Dockers National amalgamated (7,000) 14) Tobacco Workers Union (23,000) 15) United Society of Boilermakers and Iron and Steel shipbuilders (83,000) No union locals are known to be controlled by Communists, although party members reportedly hold some influential positions in local trade councils, in local union organizations, and among shop stewards. No British union is officially affiliated with any international Communist confederation of trade unions. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -. | C === [PDF page 460] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 |. SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION | VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS On both national and local. levels British Communists seek to expand their propaganda appeal to various social, cultural, and professional organizations. It is impossible to estimate the total numerical strength of Communists in these fields because their following is remarkably fluid and their activities are diffused. Except for heavy concentration on various peace societies and friendship groups, Communist activity in social, cultural, and professional organizations appears to reveal no set pattern. The absence of serious class friction in the UK, the high degree of political maturity, and the lack of minority conflicts do not generally provide a very favorable environment for extensive or effective party propaganda. The general aim of the Communists is to penetrate any and all susceptible groups. Communists are estimated to control about 30 national front organizations whose membership, organization, and effectiveness are not known in much detail. They include a number of pro-Soviet friendship societies, and such diverse groups as the British Section of the International Association of Democratic Jurists, C the British Section of the International Organization of Journalists, the Society for Socialist Clergy and Ministers, a so-called Womens! Parliament, the Unity Theater, and The World Federation of Democratic Most front activities have few international connections and are usually organized around national groups and objectives, with the exception of the peace groups and the organizations of jurists, journalists, and youths which are under Communist control. The Communists have infiltrated a wide variety of predominantly non-Communist groups which they have singled out as special targets for their propaganda. Typical of such groups are the British Association of Scientific Workers, the British National Union of Students, the International Day Comittee, the Society for Cultural Relations Between the British Comnonwealth and the USSR, the Peace Pledge Union, the Socialist Youth Camp, and the West african Students Union. Communist capabilities for expansion and action in the near future are limited in most cultural fields, but they will depend to some extent upon the prevailing economic and social situation and the course of the cold war. C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 461] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET: - SECURITY INFORMATION -10- VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE GOVERNMENT Communist infiltration of government positions vital to national security is estimated to be slight, despite security violations or acts of treason by British government servants such as Allen Nun May and Klaus Fuchs. The overwhelming majority of British civil servants is almost certainly loyal, although known or suspected Canmunists have been allowed to gain influence on the national executives of civil service and clerical unions. Communist infiltration at the national and regional levels of government is probably mown only to government security authorities, who regard the existing security regulations as generally adequate to deal with cases of attempted Communist subversion or sabotage. An unofficial estimate of questionable reliability placed the -tumber of Communists in the civil service at 14,000, but this figure makes no distinction between card-holding Communists, Comnunist sympathizers, and occasional fellow-travelers. In the British police ‘and security services and in the armed forces the number of Communists and/or sympathizers cannot be reliably estimated from existing information, but it is believed that no Communists exercise influence at the top levels. In view of the increased surveillance and screeing of Communists in sensitive government positions, their influence in government agencies and, particularly, in agencies concerned with atomic energy | is now thought to be very low. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 462] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION The ability of British Communists to influence public opinion in the UK on major issues connected with the cold war is negligible. They have had almost no success in arousing public interest or support for the particular world objectives pursued by international Communism as the failure of their political and propaganda drive generally indicates. The Commumists probably do exert some negative influence on public opinion, however, by stirring up or exploiting Anglo-American frictions, exaggerating the adverse impact of rearmament on living standards, playing on the fear of general war, and keeping alive the hope of some kind of East-West settlement through incessant peace propa gande. . Communists in the trade unions have been most effective where they have been able to identify their aims with those of non-Communists for high living standards, full employment, and social security. Government and labor leaders have exposed this tactic with increasing effectiveness in recent years. TK. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON=COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES, Communist infiltration of British political parties and groups is not significant at the top levels or. of serious dimensions among the rank and file. The Conservative Party and its affiliates are bitterly anti- Communist. There are no known or suspected Communists in the Labor Party leadership. The BCP has sought to exploit the rift in the Labor Party leadership by implying that the arguments. of left-wing leader Aneurin Bevan against present Labor Party policies were largely inspired by Communist ideology. This is far from true and few people were taken in by it. Bevan himself is strongly anti-Stalinist. The Labor Party has ruled that none of its members may belong to the BCP or to front organizations. This action has paralleled a fairly intensive anti- Communist drive in the trade unions by the TUC. No known Communists dominate the leadership of the British Cooperative Party, an affiliate of the Labor Party. Covert Communists or sympathizers probably exist in both parties. In many respects the social aims of the parties present a natural cover for Communist activities. Both the leadership and the membership of the Socialist Fabian Society are reportedly free of any Communist taint, but some individual members are probably borderline cases. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 463] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Xe COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MBDIA Communist propaganda media are extremely limited in range and effectiveness in the UK. The London Daily Worker is the chief organ of the BCPe It has an estimated circulation of around 100,000 which it finds hard to maintain. It is apparently in constant financial difficulties because of falling circulation and insufficient advertising support. Other Communist publications, the circulation of which is unknown, include World News and Views, Labor Monthly, Jewish Clarion, Country Standard, Challenge, Young Communist League Weekly an Commumist Reviews =" Three principal publishing houses -~ Lawrence and Wishart, Central Books Limited, and Collett's Limited -= are the chief outlets for BCP publications and Communist literature in general. All the major Russian language newspapers, periodicals, and journals are received in the UK shortly after publication. Owing to the language barrier their readers are fewe. Soviet English language publications -- New Times, News, and é Soviet Union (estimated circulation 10,000) -« are received on a fairly reguler basis. Russian and satellite language books are imported in limited number for use of scholars and front organizations. Other Soviet-satellite publications include Soviet News, tridigest of wireless news from the USSR (estimated free circulation of 12,000); Soviet Weekly portraying life in the USSR (estimated paid circulation of 75,000); and various Soviet news booklets. Several pro-Communist disguised publications also circulate in the UK. They include such publications as Searchlight on Germany, published by the Communist-front British Council for German Democracy; labor Research, published by the Communist-front Labor Research Department; Journal of Sctence and Mankind, published by the Communist infiltrated British Association of Scientific Workers; Women Today, published by the Communist infiltrated International Womanst Day Organization; and the Anglo-Soviet Journal, published by the Communist infiltrated Society for Cultural Relations between the British Commonwealth and the USSR. Programs received in the UK from Soviet and satellite stations abroad have been stepped up in recent months. As of January 1952, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C === [PDF page 464] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Radio Moscow was broadcasting five hours daily in English to the UK, and the various satellites (mainly Poland and Hungary) were broadcasting an additional nine hours, making a combined total of 14 hours. . Twelve of these 14 hours fell between 7 pem. and 12 pem. No information is available concerning the size of British audiences or the degree of effectiveness of this propaganda. It is presumed to be marginal. ‘ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 465] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION; XI. FINANCIAL CONDITIONS No adequate information is available concerning the financial condition of the BCP, but it is generally believed to be solvent and self-sustaining. In 1915 the BCP claimed an annual revenue of about L 65,000, of which about one fifth was derived from dues, a little less than a third from Communist literature, and a little more than a third fran contributions. In 1952, the BCP reported its revenue for the 18 month period from February 1950 to October 1951 to be & 98,113, or approximately L 50,000 per annum, The BOP, however, is probably in fairly chronic financial difficulties, Dues are known to have doubled, the price of all Communist publications has increased, and the Daily Worker is reported to be in dire need of funds although it manages to get out its daily issue. Frantic appeals for aid are now a familiar feature in the | Daily Worker, Fund-raising campaigns serve two main purposes: they provide money and they keep the local party leaders and legmen under constant pressure to get results. According to ex-Communist Douglas Hyde, a former editor of the Daily Worker, the BCP received no direct financial aid from the Soviet Union or its satellites, As far as is known, the BCP derives no ~ income from any Communist-controlled business enterprises or commissions, © or from Communist-dominated labor unions or fronts on any y regular sustaining basis, XII, SOVIETSATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS The number of persons in Soviet and satellite diplomatic establishments in the UK are estimated as follows: Albania, none; Bulgaria, lh; Czechoslovakia, 12 (including 1 press officer); Poland, 8 (including 1 press officer); Hungary, 6 (including 1 press attache); Rumania, 8; Soviet Union, 39. The Soviet Embassy apparently does not have a public affairs or press officer, This function is probably handled by TASS, the official Soviet news agency which maintains an office in London, The size of the TASS staff is not known, As far as is known there are no Soviet or satellite trade and cultural missions permanently located in the UK, although a number of Soviet cultural delegations have recently been sent to the country. All of the above-mentioned embassies or legations engage in some measure of political, economic, and cultural propaganda through the media of public speeches, official news releases, special, informational bulletins, films, art exhibitions, musicals, etc, The number of Soviet and satellite pereonnel engaged in propaganda activities on a full-time basis is not known nor is any information available concerning the size, location, character, frequency, and average C SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 466] === EEE EEE EETC!TSC OLE, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION attendance of officially sponsored Communist functions, Some figures are available on the size of local Soviet-satellite. "friendship" societies, The principal "friendship" groups include the following with estimated membership where available: British-China Friendship Society (2,50 in 1952); British-Czech Friendship League (600); British-Polish Friendship Society; British-Kumanian Friendship Association; British-Soviet Society (7,300 in 1949); Committee for Friendship in Bulgaria; Scottish - USSk Society (around 3,000); Society for Cultural Relations Between the British Commonwealth and the USSR; British Council for German Democracy; and League for Democracy in Greece, It is probable that most of these "friendship" leagues operate on a shoestring basis, occasionally issue propaganda brochures, and have a highly fluctuating membership, XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The UK seems generally to be of marginal importance as a base for the operation of Communist international organizations, although several of these groups have British branches, The WFTU has a publication office in London which comes closest. to being a center of Communist international activity. The World ¢ Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Association of Democratic Jurists, the International Organization of Journalists are all Communist-dominated and have branches in the UK. Certain target groups, such as the International Woman's Day, also have national sections in the UK, Little is know of the internal workings of most of these groups. Since the ommunist-sponsored Peace Conference at Sheffield in November 1950, the British Government has obstructed the holding of meetings of international Communists' organizations or fronts in the UK. During 1951-52 a number of such scheduled conferences had to be abandoned owing to the. refusal of the British Government to issue visas to foreign delegates, and since then no international Communist organization has met in England, Local British Communists have attended meetings of international Communist organizations held abroad on a fairly regular basis, though the size and identity of such representation are not known in every case, A number of local Communists, not always outstanding in party councils but selected from inconspicuous rank and file members to give the appearance of their "representative" character among the common people, attended the Moscow Economic Conference (April 1952), the Peking C SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 467] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Peace Conference (September 1952), and the Vienna Peace Conference (December 1952). XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK From 1940 to 1951 TASS was permitted by the British Government to maintain a powerful receiving station at Barnet, Hertfordshire. In October 1951 this permission was withdrawn. Nothing is known as to the eventual disposition of the TASS monitor equipment. Presumably, individual Comuunists may own receivers powerful enough to pick up all Soviet and satellite broadcasts and some may own sending sets, The BCP apparently has few close regular links with the Communist Party of any foreign country. It is not a member of the Cominform, but it probably receives Cominform instructions on a fairly regular basis through the French Communist Party and through the London Office of the WFTU instructions. on industrial warfare. From available evidence it would appear that the Cominforn regards the BCP as of marginal importance in international Communist strategy. Its relatively modest role may have been enhanced somewhat vy the recent Soviet propaganda stress on conflicts in the US-UK alignment, which the BCP is in the most strategic position to > exploit and intensify, Although the party is apparently allowed © considerable latitude in mapping strategy in the UK, its propaganda policies are expected to conform to those of the international Communist movement.. There are indications that BCP leaders have occasionally been reprimanded for failure to develop dynamic programs among the British workers, but no major examples are available of censure of the top command for deviationism, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 468] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.26 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, WEST GERMANY OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 469] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS - . Page Forevord esses cece cece s cer eeresecee ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. o « 1 Ie Objectives. eee reese cece ee eereseene 1 Ile Tactics e «.sececesver severe ee oe eee 1 Ill. Capabilities.eessceeesecescecccee § 2 - ASSETS cece ec eceee 5 Ie Numerical Strength. « eeeccrccececveveveeee 5 It,. Electoral Strength. sseeseccececceccsece 6 III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action | 6 C IV. Government Policy Toward Communism eee eeersecsee 7. Ve Communist Influence in Labor « cee ceo ece eee _ 7 se Vie Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations « «se ceecceseee 8 Vile Communist Infiltration into Government..s.e.eseee 10 VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. « « LL IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political | Parties SC 11 Xe Communist Propagamia Media... see ecccsscese 2 | XI. Financial Condition Seed e ccc ccc cc cees 20 _=iXITe SovietwSatellite Official Assets eoeceeceeveee © 20 XITT. Communist International Organizations..seeees al XIV. Communist Communication Network. se eececceece e oh C | SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 470] === EEE EEE EE —_ET OEEe Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | FOREWORD ‘This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current i major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational s potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, | C providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as. definitive; they are rather: the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] === [PDF page 471] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN WEST GERMANY: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES en The overriding task of the West German Communist Party (KPD) is to create, expand, and channel public sentiment in opposition to the align- | ment of the Federal Republic with the North Atlantic treaty nations. This objective has priority over every other party aim: strengthening the KPD's position in West Germany, rebuilding a party following among workers and intellectuals, or following traditional Marxist lines of..... conflict with “class enemies." In thus accepting the role of faithful agent of Soviet foreign policy, the West German party has forfeited the already very limited hopes it had for gaining any purely domestic end. _ - 48 a matter of practical policies, the KPD leadership undoubtedly considers that it had no real choice. Apart from the priority always accorded to Soviet interests by Stalinist parties outside the USSR, the. West German party can hardly be unaware that it can achieve power only with the direct assistance of the Soviet blec. Anything done to neutralize West Germany -~ and thus to maintain the power position of the USSRin.. Europe -- must be accounted, by the West German Communists, as an action..: contributing to their eventual success. [Unreadable] The small size of the following that Communism can attract in West. Germany necessarily shapes the tactics of the KPD. Since there is no. mass* “SES Communist membership to fight the foreign policy of the West German government, the Communist leadership seeks to cooperate with other groups opposed to the government's. foreign policy and to develop or to influence organizations potentially useful in the struggle against the integration of.Germany with the West. Doonnts A foremost target of Communist tactical policies is the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Communism's traditional rival for German working Class loyalties. It isa foregone conclusion, and the KPD leadership — knows it, that the top leaders of the SPD would summarily reject any Communist offer of cooperation. The KPD efforts have, therefore, been chiefly directed to the rank and file and the lower officers of the Social. mc, Democratic organization. "Unity of action" receives special emphasis in the trade union sphere. SPD adherents are continually propagandized for joint action against the "criminal designs of the Western imperialists and their Bonn lackeys." They are reminded by allusions to the pre-1933 pericd that. only... a "unified" working class -- that is, a KPD-SPD coalition -- can protect. C - SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 472] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the interests of the workers against the "reactionary war-instigators" alleged to be in control of the West German republic. In the political arena the KPD on a number of occasicns has refrained from nominating its ow parliamentary candidates and has directed its supportets to vote for SPD nominees. German workers adhering to the Christian Democratic Union (cDU) or to the Center Party (ZP) also come in for Communist attention. | Communist trade union members are instructed to become the "best" trade unionists, the strongest advocates of social and economic demands, in the plants where they are employed. The aim, of course, is to gain the trust and cooperation of non-Communist workers who can be influenced to join in strikes and demonstrations against West German foreign policy. . Communist appeals to West German "patriots" carefully explain that class or ideological differences are not obstacles to cooperation in seeking to block the "war agreement" of West Germany with the Western powers. © Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy according to the Communist statements, is calculated to prevent unification of Germany, to subject West Germany — to "imperialism", and to make West Germany the site of preparations for aggressive war. The consequences of this war are portrayed in graphic terms: German youth "marching into a mass grave", Germany destroyed, the German population wiped out., _ ‘Front organizations, either under full KPD control or heavily infiltrated with KPD members, have been another tactical arm of the Communist drive against West German adherence to the Western powers. Organizations ~ have been set up to appeal to youth, to women, to pacifists, to neutralists, to nationalists, to farmers, to businessmen, to political utopians, to oe intellectuals. Irrespective of the interest group concerned, each organization has been developed, in so far as the Communists could will it, into a mechanism for opposing West German foreign policy. The KPD is quite willing, also, to look for aid from organizations. that are impervious to Conmumist control and influence, if, that is, these organizations happen to follow policies likely to further the KPD goal of preventing West German integration with the West. Among other tactical lines, the Communists often attack such groups bitterly so as to dissociate them from any connection with an unpopular movement. III. CAPABILITIES _ The variety and imaginativeness of KPD tactics and the singlemindedness of the party's pursuit of its objective are not matched “by any — real ability to achieve the Communist goal. SECRET:- SECURITY INFORMATION © _ === [PDF page 473] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION From 1946 the KPD record in West Germany has been one of failure. Party membership has declined precipitously, voting strength has fallen off, and Communist attempts to influence other groups have had the most indifferent success. Communist “unity of action" with the Social Democrats has been a policy marked by complete failure. In political and trade union spheres alike, the SPD leadership has consistently rejected every Communist overture. Indeed, not only is the SPD firmly opposed to cooperation. with the West German Communists against the West but Social Democratic opposition to a German contribution to Western defense -- the single area of Communist interest -- is likely to be much modified after the coming West German elections., Communist influence in labor, despite all KPD efforts, is insignificant. KPD members have been systematically removed from positions as trade union functionaries and retain a foothold only in the "shop councils.". Their ability to use this limited base for directing labor discontent against the Adenauer government is severely circumscribed. The tactic of building front organizations to carry the Communist message has been equally unrewarding. Unwary citizens joining any of the various front groups have tended to withdraw immediately upon the pro- Communist nature of the groups becoming evident. A similar failure has ‘marked Communist efforts to bring non-Communist groups into coordinated opposition to the Bonn government's policies toward the West. None of this is a cause for surprise. The disabilities under which the West German Communist movement labors are extraordinarily great. To the average West German, Communism is associated with Soviet atrocities in Germany in 1945, with the character of the regime in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and with the loss of the territories east of the Qder-Neisse line. © Anything presented as "Communist" is rejected out of hand and policies in any way linked to Communism are viewed with extreme suspicion. As for the specific Communist aim of blocking West German association with the Western alliance, the actions of the USSR itself have made the KPD task immensely difficult. It has been within the power of the USSR at all times to hold out attractive promises to the West German ~ population; had it been willing to do so, the KPD might have been able _ to capitalize in some degree on the appearance of Soviet gocdwill. Instead, the Soviets, with ever-increasing speed, are recasting Eastern Germany in ‘the Soviet and Satellite mold, thereby convincing many Germans that West German adherence to a military association with the West is a necessary step.,. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION - === [PDF page 474] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION. It is probable that the Federal Constitutional Court will ban the KPD from political activity in the near future. This action will have relatively little effect on the party's capabilities, although the membership will undoubtedly decrease even further after overt political action has been made illegal. Continued attempts would be made to agitate against foreign policy through front groups. - Sections of the Communist apparatus engaged in intelligence or sabotage activities are already geared to underground life and would be comparatively un- — affected. The bar against Communist participation in elections would put an end, from the Communist point of view, tc the embarrassment of. electoral defeats and might thus be a partially favorable development. - In any event, whether the party operates legally or illegally, its independent capabilities are of the most limited sort. It can do very little to advance the primary Communist aim of ‘upsetting the course of West German foreign policy and it has virtually no prospects of expanding Communist influence in trade unions or other institutions and none | at all of converting West Germany to Communism. Only a Soviet invasion | or an economic debacle as shattering as that. of the early '30s could alter ~ the outlook in a direction favorable to the KPD. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION.. a eed C === [PDF page 475] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN WEST GERMANY: ASSETS I, NUMERICAL STRENGTH Latest available figures, for November 1951, give the German Communist Party (KPD) 127,138 members in West Germany and the Saar. There are no data or usable estimates for the membership of West German groups and organizations controlled or influenced by the KPD. Over all, it may be estimated that the party controls or strongly influences at most about 4 percent of the 49 million people in West Germany. Communist Party membership is drawn largely from German workers; a limited number of small shopkeepers and a few intellectuals comprise the balance of the KPD members. Geographically, the KPD is represented most strongly in three areas, as follows: Party membership in January 1951 Communist vote ‘ oe (latest date for breakdown of in post-1949 ~ membership by states) state-wide elections Northrhine Westphalia - 59,456 838, 926 Bavaria - | 17,347 178,693 | L in Wuerttemberg-Baden - 12,756 86, 738 J Communist Party membership in West Germany has declined ‘from a total. of approximately 300,000 in 1946. About 80 per cent of those retaining party membership pay dues. This group, it may be assumed, will cast ballots or take other non-hazardous actions in accordance with the | directives of party leaders. The number willing to carry out tasks of @ more arduous or dangerous nature is assuredly much smaller. An article in the party newspaper Sozialistischo Volkszeitung on December 4, 1952 ' indicated that the number of members taking an active interest in party “affairs may not exceed 15 to 18 per cent of the total membership. “KPD membership is weighted heavily with middle aged and older individuals. In January, 1951, about 80 per cent of all members were over 35 years of age, 34.7 per cent were over 50, and only 14.2 per cent were in the 26 to 35 year group. The party's failure to reoruit young people into its ranks has been a notable feature of Communisn's, postwar. decline in West Germany. 2, eg eee SECRET - ITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 476] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] The leadership of the KFD consists of individuals ready to subordinate every interest to the orders of the Communist authorities in East Germany. Changes in the ranks of the party functionaries are frequent, a reflection of the failure of the KPD to accomplish the | goals set for it by the Soviet Union. II, ELSCTORAL STRENGTH In the most recent federal elections » held in August, 1949, the KPD received 5.7 per cent of the valid vote, This represented practically:. the entire electoral following of the Communists, there being no fellow traveller candidates receiving a significant vote, AC comparison of the Communist vote with that of other * partion follows: _ . Per cent Christian Democratic Union = Christian Social Union 31 Free Democratic Party; 11.9 German Party. 4.0 Total, government coalition 46.9 Social Democratic Party 2962 €: Center Party a. 31 Bavaria Party 42 Communist Party BO 507 _ Communist voting strength is most heavily concentrated in: Northrhine Westphalia (where the KPD had 5.3 per cent of the total vote in post-1949 state elections), Bremen (KED vote 6.4 per cont), and Hamburg (74 per cent). III. COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENCE It is the policy of the KPD to utilize all feasible means to oppose the foreign policy of the West German government. Violence is one of these means. The party has sponsored violent demonstrations in the recent past and may be expected to continue to do so within the limits of” its capabilities., The party organization used to carry out demonstrations is the Communist youth organization, the Free German Youth. (FDJ). When banned. by the Federal Republic in July, 1941, the FDJ had 25,000 members; only ” a fraction of these can be relied upon for street fighting or other violent SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 477] === EEE EE EEE Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BO00269R000800080001-4 ’ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -JTaction. The headquarters of the FDJ in West Germany were in Duesseldorf in the Ruhr area. The organization is controlled directly from the Soviet Zone. Its activist members are tough and disciplined but relatively inexperienced. The largest recent demonstration called by the KPD was in Essen on May 11, 1952. About 3,000 persons responded to the Communist call. Since this demonstration represented an all-out effort and was conducted by. Communists from all of West Germany, it probably reflects the maximum that the KPD can do in the way of orgenizing mass violence. IV. GOVERNMENT FOLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The government of the West German Federal Republic imposes no specific disabilities on the Communist Party as such. The KPD has almost complete freedom of action in carrying out political propaganda, conducting electoral campaigns, and holding political rallies. “The Communist Party youth orgenization, the Free German Youth, has been banned since July 1951.. Some restrictions are placed on the importing of propaganda materials from the Soviet Zone and Communist news= papers are occasionally banned. These govermment actions do not impose C _ serious limitations on KPD capabilities. If, a8 ig likely, the prohibition placed on activities of the.. neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party is extended to the KPD, the Commmist Party will be outlawed, its publications banned, its assets confiscated, its electoral privileges withdrawn, and its members in federal and state legislative bodies expelled. These restrictions will not prevent the KPD from carrying out its primary tasks. The party's overt political activities are a comparatively minor part of its program and it has no prospect of acquiring significent. electoral strength in any case. It will be able, through front organiza= tions, to continue its attempts to build public sentiment against West — German foreign policy. Its espionage and intelligence gathering duties on behalf of the USSR will not be much affected by a legal ban on the party. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Communist strength among German industrial workers apparently is greatest among coal miners, about 20 per cent of whom are believed to be KPD members or sympathizers. About 10 per cent of the Bremen dock workers are in this. category. In the Ruhr steel works, 17 percent of the ‘member 8 of the plant shop councils are Commnists. These ere believed to be the areas of greatest Communist strength among West German workers. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 478] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION The KPD has no influence in West German labor organizations at the national level. The labor unions have conducted a systematic and successful housecleaning of Communists and Communist sympathizers from positions of leadership. There are no rival Communist unions. KPD influence is exerted in some local labor organizations. The data available are fragmentary but it is clear that even locally Communist power in - labor unions is limited.. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND OR A The West German Communist Party has devoted much of its efforts to promoting front organizations and to attempting to influence non-Communi st organizations in directions favorable to Communist objectives. Available data on these organizations, by category, follow: “a, Youth and Student Organizations The chief Commumist youth organization, the Free German Youth (the counterpart of the East German mass organization of the same name) was banned in July, 1951. Its activities are carried on through a _ of Communist controlled and infiltrated youth groups. These appear and. disappear with great frequency. It is estimated that a total of about. m= 30,000 members belong to the various groups. Religious youth organizations C have about twenty times as many. There are no stable front organizations in West German universities. Small pro-Communist groupings are ignored and ostracized by other students. West German students are represented by student governments, organized in a national union of students which pursues an actively anti-Communist program. Since World War II no Communist has been elected to a student government in Vest Germany., B. Women's Organizations The West German Conmmunist-front women's organization is the Democratic Women's League of Germany, the counterpart of the East German | mass organization of the same name. It claims to have 15,000 members, but this figure is probably vastly exaggerated. It is affiliated with the International Democratic Federation of Women, an international front organization which in 1950 claimed to have branches in 62 countries. C. Sports Organizations The "Committee for Freedom and Unity in Sport" is the West German - SECRET - SECUR === [PDF page 479] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION Communist-front sports organization. It is headed by Manfred von Brauchitsch end claims to have 116 memberse — D. Cultural Organizations The Democratic Cultural League of Germany is the West German counterpart of an East German mase organization of the same name. It has attracted only a few West German intellectuals and these are relatively unknown in their own fields. mo. E., Minority or Religious Organizations The most important front organization in this category is the Association of the Persecutees of the Nazi Regime (VVN) which has branches in all of the West German states and headquarters at Frankfurt. Although this group is still an important organization in its field, the majority of its original non-Communist members have turned to a non-Comnunist. organization, the Federation of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime (BVN). Communist religious fronts are the Patriotic Christians and the Association of Christians Friendly to the Soviet Union. These organizations have neither strength nor significance in West Germany. ¢ Fe - Professional Organizations Known Communist. "front" groups appealing to West German professional groups are as follows: the Working Committee of German Journalists, with its headquarters in Duesseldorf, under the chairmanship of Helmut Hansmanns the Working Committee of German Jurists; the Working Circle of Young German Politicians, located at Bad Harzburg, under the chairmanship of H. Pfeiffer; the All-German Association for Agriculture and Forestry, with its headquarters at Frankfurt, under the chairmanship of Dr. W. Christaller;. and the Association of People's Correspondents. - Only incomplete data are available for these groups. The overlapping nature of their membership totals make estimates of the strength of the fronts unreliable in any case. It can be stated with confidence, however, that these organizations are unimportant relative to the‘ non= — Communist bodies in the same professional fields., G. "Peace" and "Unity" Organizations Permanent front groups established ostensibly to promote peace or German unity or East-West understanding include the following: The Action Committee for Peace and International Understandings ets the Association for the Unification of Germany, with branches in all West German states; the Working Circle for an All-German Gonstitution; the SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 480] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION Association for East-West Conversations; the Working Association for Political, Economic, and Cultural Understanding between East and West; the Working Circle for German Understanding; the Working Circle for. All-German Questions, with- branches in all West-German states; the Preparatory Committee for Talks among Socialists, Communists, Christiens, and Non-Party Members; the Helmut von Gerlach Society for the Promotion of German-Polish Friendship, a front used as a cover for the promotion of illegal East-West trade; the Society for German-Soviet Friendship; the Committee of Fighters for Peace, with branches in all West German states; the Defense Committee for German Patriots, with units in Baden-Wuerttonberg, Northrhine Westphalia, and Bremen; and the World Peace Council, ‘ ' Despite the proliferation of such organizations, their influence in fact is much less than that of the non-Communist groups and individuals in West Germany who oppose the present course of West German foreign policy. He Organizations Infiltrated by Communists Non=-Communist organizations in West Germany into which the Communist. movement has infiltrated include the following: The League of Christian Socialists; the Association of those:. Opposing War; the League of the Friends of Nature; the Anarchist Yovenent of Germany; the German Peace Academy; the German Peace Society; the German Peace Ring; the Free German Culture Association; the Freedom League; the Peace Cartel; the Peace Ring; the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom; the International Association of Those Opposing War Service; the Left-wing Christians; the Pen Union of Germany; the Association for People's Culture; the Society for East-West Trade; the Deutsche Sanml (German Rally) led by former Reichs-chancellor Dr. Josef Wirth, which is. the “roof organization” for a number of neutralist and "front" groups; and, according to some reports, the Darmstadt Action Groups, led by the pacifist student chaplain Herbert Mochalski. This latter group is now being broken up and its members have reportedly been instructed to join the newly formed neutralist group, the All-German People's Party. These organizations are less important to the Communists in furthering present party objectives than the groups who advocate the same goals — independently of Communist control or infiltration. Communist tactics toward the organizations into which they have infiltrated are to play down, as much as possible, the extent of Communist influence on their policy formation. VII, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Communist influence in the policy making bodies in the West German federal and state governments is believed to be virtually non-existent. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 481] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION There are small Communist nuclei in the lower and middle levels of the West German polices forces; an estimate for the police forces in the U.S. Zone has put Communist strength at two per cent of the total number of individuals employed. It is probable that a small number of Comnunists or party sympathizers are employed in the state-controlled sectors of the transportation and communications industries. VIII.. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Apart from its own press and the propaganda activities of its members and its front organizations, the Communist Party in West Germany has little or no capability for influencing public opinion, -Party members ‘and fellow-travellers in public opinion forming circles are too few in mumber and too discredited politically to have any significant effect. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST ~————PULITICAL PARTIES SS vat There appear to have been at least loose conneotions between the Communist Party in West Germany and the now prohibited Socialist Reich. Party, formerly the most important of the rightist extremist groups. These ‘relationships probably reflected the identity of the two groups’ foreign policy objectives, that is, the blocking of West German adherence to:the West European and North Atlantic political-military system; it is: doubtful that the KPD has anything like full control over any of the organisations of the extreme right. Communism and the West German Communis ts have no “influence on the major left-wing party in Germany, the Social Democratic Party. An organization titled Social Democratic Action, established to attract leftinclined Social Democrats into a group friendly to Soviet foreign Policy aims, has been a failure, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 482] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET =| SECURITY INFORMATION -12-_ X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The West German Communist apparatus has its own press and printing establishments. It receives from East Germany and from international Communist organizations propaganda materials in quantity. The East German radio beams special propaganda programs. to West Germany. Ae The West German Communist Press The KPD publishes 14 periodicals in West Germany. These. -have a combined circulation of about 125,000; this figure compares with sale of 250,000 copies of a single large non-Communist newspaper, the Essen Westdeutsche Allgemeine. The West German Communist press is subsidized from the East Zone. Newsprint and presses are contributed by the East German Communist authorities. It is believed that receipts from advertising ', and sales are sufficient to cover wages and other costs of the. publications.. oh The major Communist printing establishments in West Germany;.. ~ are the Rheinisch-Westfaelische Volksdruck of Duesseldorf, which -prints three Communist papers, the Aisterdruck of Hamburg, the Isar=-Druck of Munich, the Rhein=-Main Druck of Frankfurt, and. the Druckerei AG of Stuttgart, all of which print two Communist paperse AII of these papers are up to the standard of other small West » German papers in appearance and legibility.. A list of West German Communist periodicals follows: Name Press Run, According Publishing wo to Publisher House Freies Volk 48,000 Freier Verlag, Duesseldorf; GmbH Central organ of KPD Daily Hamburger Volkszeitung 25,000 Hamburger Hamburg - Volkszeitung, Daily | GmbH SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - === [PDF page 483] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Name oO Press Run, According Publishing to Publisher House Neve Volkszeitung No information Westdeutscher Herne, - Volksverlag,, Herne \ Nordbayerische 50,000 Nordbayerische Volkszeitung Volkszeitung, [Unreadable] Three times a week Norddeutsches Echo - 12,000 Norddeutsche ~ Kiel Druckerei und. Daily a _— oe Verlagsgesellschart,, GmbH, Kiel Ce a Sozialistische «<~ 22,400 Verlagsgeselischaft C Volkszeitung «=... a Hessen/Frenkfurt [Unreadable] Daily.- ae St co [Unreadable] Volkszeitung Volksverlags= Munich und Vertriebs= Three times a week - gesellschaft,. Ses - GmbH, ‘Munich, Tribuene der No information No information Demokratie - oe Bremen Unsere Stimme 21,600 Progress-Verlag, Schwenningen am Neckar. GmbH, Daily Schwenningen C. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 484] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET » SECURITY INFORMATION Neme - Press Run, According ‘Publishing ; to Publisher House Unser Tag No information — Badische Zeitungs~ Mannheim ' verlags-Gesellschaft, Daily GmbH: Volxs-Echo _ 41,000 Se Vols-Echo Detmold ir Zeitungsverlag, GmbH, Detmold. Volksstimme No information _ Colonia-Verleg, Koeln | oe, GmbH Daily [Unreadable] Daily GmbH, Stuttgart _- Wahrheit No Information Niedersaechsische Hanover =. Volksstimme, GmbH, Daily -. So Hanover Be Imports of Publications The-major West German front organizations have East German counterparts which publish periodicals for circulation in both parts of Germany. These publications are undisguised Communist propagandae Other East German publications, all of them devoted... — to the presentation of Communist views, also are circulated in. West Germany. There are no reliable data on sales or distribution in West Germany, however. A partial listing of these East German Communist publications follows:: SECRET ~ SECURITY: INFORMATION: ae € === [PDF page 485] === BD eee Se Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4. C SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION ~15-— 1. ORGANS OF MASS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS Title. Place of Nescription —. Publication Tribuene Berlin Organ of the Federal Executive. ,. Committee of the Free German Trade Union Federation. Deutschlands Berlin;” _ "Germany's Voice" is the organ Stimme — _ Weekly of the National Front of. Democratic Germany. Junge Welt. Berlin; "The World of Youth" is the organ ' daily of the Central Council of the _ Free German Youth. Die Tat. Berlin; "The Deed" is the organ of the. ,; weekly Union of the Victims of the Nazi C regime. Die Frau von Heute Berlin;. "Today! s Woman" is the organ of she ' weekly | - the League of Democratic Women. Der Freie Bauer Berlin; "Free Peasant" is the organ of _ weekly the Central Union for Peasants Mutual Aid (Peasants! Trade Cooperatives). Aufbau. Berlin; _ “Building Upwards" is the organ |, monthly - of the Cultural League for the Democratic Renewal of Germany. a en th oneness nnneneeeenesg C SECRET. SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 486] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET «- SECURITY INFORMATION -16- 2, CULTURAL = POLITICAL JOURNALS Title Place of Description Sinn und Form Berlin; "Porm and Meaning" is a magazine monthly — published by the German Academy of Arts for the Communist literary. elite. Heute. und Morgen — Berlin; "Today and Tomorrow" is a culturalmonthly political magazine, an unofficial publication of the Cultural League, written for.a less restricted, more popular audience than oe Sinn und Form.. Die Neue Berlin; "New Society" is the culturale- Gesellschaft monthly political and popular scientific oo, magazine of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship. 3, OTHER IMPORTANT EAST GERMAN PERIODICALS Die Arbeit Berlin; "Labor" is a magazine dealing monthly § With trade-union matters and published by the Executive Committee of the Free German Trade Union Federation. Deutsche Berlin; * "German Sport Echo" is the organ. Sportecho twice a week of the Democratic Sport League e Einheit Berlin; "Unity" is a magazine for the monthly theory and practice of scientific os socialism, published by the Central Committee of the SED. nee CII | SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 487] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Title Place of Publication SECRET » SECURITY INFORMATION -17- Description SN a et hr unos nshsontshsh yen sare Friedenspost a nn ee ere nee en mearnsii neat aggregate Never Weg ; co.: ee Neue Justiz Die Neuve Schule [Unreadable] USA in Wort und Bild Berlin; weekly Berlin; bi-weekly Berlin; . monthly . Berlin; - monthly Berlin; monthly SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION questions. Primarily for "The Peace Post" is the journal of the German-Soviet Friendship | Society "New Path" is a "magazine for current problems of the labor movement" published by the Central Comnittee of the SED. "New Justice" deals with legal questions and is published by “ the Ministry of Justice. "The New School," published by the East German Ministry of » Education, is devoted to educational and pedogogical elementary school teachers, it shows how the Five Year Plan, the peace campaign, etc., are to be propagandized to children. "The USA in Words and Pictures" is a magazine purporting to show the United States as it really is. It emphasizes discriminatory treatment of “egroes, American "cultural:barbarism" and discusses the "exploitation" of the American worker under capitalisms === [PDF page 488] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C. International Communi st Publications _ A number of organs of the international Communist apparatus publish German language editions which circulate in West Germanye Circulation figures are not available. A listing of the publications having German editions follows: Title Place of Description Publication CL A CE AE TS A tae Fuer. dauerhaften — Bucharest "For a Lasting Peace for People's Frieden, fuer - Democracy" is the organ of the Volksdemokratie Information Bureau of the Communist and Worker's Parties. (Cominform) Sowjet~Literatur “Moscow; - &A journal of Soviet literature * monthly published in German, English, ' Polish and Spanish. Neve Zeit Moscow; The "New Times" is published in weekly Russian, German, English, French,.. Polish, and Swedish, and deals with questions of foreign policy and et - international relations. - Sowjetunion Moscow; "The Soviet Union" is an |. monthly illustrated magazine printed in color; it appears in Russian, Chinese, English, French, and Spanishe [Unreadable] Die Sowjetfrau Moscow; "Soviet Woman" appears in Chinese, monthly German, English, French, Spanish. Weltjugend The German Appears in several languages. edition is The journal of the World Federation published in of Democratic Youth. Berlin; monthly. Tt NE SPT sh PST ii shhh fergie SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 489] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET = SECURITY INFORMATION -19 - Title Place of Description Publication Friedenswacht The German "The Defense of Peace," the edition is _ organ of the World Peace Council, published in appears in twelve languages. Berlin; monthly Der Frieden The German "Peace" appears in Arabic, Chinese, edition is German, English, French, Portuguese, published in Rumanian, Russian, Spanish and.- Berlin; Hungarian. monthly Kaempfer fuer The German -§ "Partisans of Peace" is published - den Frieden edition is in German, Rumanian, Russian, and ce, published in Spanishe — uo Berlin; bi-weekly - D. The Commnist Radio | 7 Le a There are no West German radio stations controlled or noticeably influenced by Communists.: The East German radio system is the. vehicle of Communist radio propaganda to West Germany. All three programs «= Berlin I, II, and III -- are audible in West Germany, but Berlin I, the "all-German fighting program" broadcast by the most powerful East — German. transmitter, is specifically intended for West German consumption. So iy The main propaganda broadcasts are carried during the peak evening listening hours; among the anti-Western programs are "Behind the Racade", “Events Abroad", "The Truth About America", and "From the Wannsee to Moabit, West Berlin, Hotbed of Danger". The more important broadcasts which give accounts of the "happy life. and peaceful development" of the USSR, the People’s Democracies: - ° and East Germany are "On the Streets of Our Republic", "The Construction of Peace", and "World of Joyous Confidence". ‘The Size of the audience of this program is not known, but since its ' appeals are not. translated into action except by Communists, it... - -... may be assumed that its broadcasts are largely ignored in West Germany.. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 490] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION SSCRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] XY. FINANCIAL CONDI TIONS Communist Party expenditures in West Germany are estimated at between DM 14,000,000 and DM 18,000,000 (US $3,300,000 to US $4,300,000) annually. Se From one-half to three-quarters of these outlays are made possible by subsidies from the Soviet Zone government, the Soviet Zone trade union federation, and related Soviet Zone organizations. Any significant expansion of West German Communist activity Dts would require an increase in the Rast German Zone‘ subsidies to the KPD, other revenues accruing to the party being relatively non-expansible. 4 Sources of party income in West Germany are profits from illegal East-West trade, subscriptions to the party press, donations, _ deductions from the salaries of KPD members of the state and federal. legislatures, and membership dues. ee Party membership dues are much more a symbol of party discipline than a matter of fisoal importance. Seventy percent of these receipts are retained by the county KPD organizations and the fedéral organiza< tions has no real concern with the financial return from duese At the state level, the KPD organizations have as their most _ important overt source of income the returns fron subscriptions to’ the: - party press. The state organizations receive deductions from the salaries of KPD members in the state legislative bodies. ‘Contributions - from party members engaged in Rast-West trade and from assorted = = 9-00. © individuals anxious to “reinsure" themselves against the possible rigors of a Soviet occupation provide additional revenues. 7 The fedéral KPD organization has as its only open source: of | oat revenue the deductions made from party members in the Bundestag. ~~. - Profits from Bast-West trade accrue in some volume to the party, but. -” the main KPD revenue is quite clearly the Bast German subsidy. Because of the availability of this subsidy, financial problems are not likely in any circumstance to hamper Communist operations in West Germany, XII. SOVIBT-SATELLITE OFFICIAL Assets IN. WEST GERMANY The only official Soviet mission in West Germany is the Soviet o military mission in Frankfurt. A small Czechoslovakian trade*mission “+ is located in the same city. rs Both missions are’small in size. There are’ no reports® to indicate that these missions conduct political or propaganda activities in West”. a - wt: Bor YF oggey wal ee s PRET Germanys. 2 Yosgio. Sure fs. “ - dead SECRET < “SECURITY INFORMATION” SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 491] === eee ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANI ZATIONS Ae Communist Organizations Active in West Germany Communist international organizat ions active in Western. Germany — inolude: 1. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (DY), and 1 International Union of Students (IUS). 2. World Peace Council. | 3. International Federation of Democratic Women (WIDF). 4. International Federation of Democratic Lawyers (TADL) 5. World Federation of Trade Unionists CHrTU). 6. International Federation of Resistance Fighters, Vietins: and Prisoners of Fascism (FIR). woe 7. ‘International Organization of Journalists (105). C Be Meetings of Communist Organizations. Held in West’ Germany; . Meetings of Communist: international organizations held in Western Germany are as follows: The Communiat - pontrolled World Peace Couneil met in Western. Germany during 1951-1952. Co jootings outside Western Gersiany Attonded by West Germans: Meetings of Communist international. organizations outside: of Western Germany which were attended by West German delegations © are. a6 1. Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF). a. Women's International Democratic Federation Council Meeting, East Berlin, February 1-6, 1951.. 100 West:German delegates attended. ', -<’ De -Bxeoutive Committee of Women's International Democratic: Federation, Sofia, June 20-24, 1951, at least 2 delegates. from: Western. © Germany attended. 2 Ceo Firet Internetional conference» ‘in Defense of- ohitaréiy sponsored by WIDF, Vienna, April 12-16, 1952. 5 SEG PT on ty [Unreadable] SECRET - SECURITY THFORMATT ON === [PDF page 492] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURLTY INFORMATION de Woments International Democratic Federation Executive Committee Meeting, Bucharest, July 18-22, 1952. 2. World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), International Students Union & Third World Festival of Youth and Students, East Berlin, August 5-19, co-sponsored by International Union of. Students (TUS )5 35,000 to 70, 000 West German delegates attended. be Bleventh World University Summer Games, sponsored by Its, held during the Berlin Youth Festival, August 1951, unspecified number of delegates from Western Germany attended.. ce Seventh Annual Council Meeting of World Federation of Le Democratic Youth, Bast Berlin, August 25-28, 1951, representation from Western Germany. — an de Fifth Annual Council Meeting of 10S, Warsaw, Auguat 3l- September 7, 1951, the number of detogates | from Western Germany: is... unknown. @e World Federation of Democratic Youth Executive committee " ‘ Meeting, Budapest, May 24=27, 1951, representation from Western. Germany: C attendeds ‘f. International Union of Students Executive Committee Meeting,. SSUES Bast Berlin, January 15-18, 1951, representation from Western Germany 3. Meetings of International Association of Democratic Lanyers £ 00) fe Fifth Congress of IADL, Bast Berlin, * september 5-9, “1961, representation from Western Gormany-attonded. a 4. Meetinge of International Organization of Journalists od. &e Meeting of Presidium of I0J in East Berlin, March 15-16, 1951. No information available on representation from Western Germany. 5. World Federation of Trade Unionists WFTU)e —. Pe ae “WETU General Council, East Berlin,: November 15-21,. 1951, two ‘ or more 2 representatives from Western Germany.. ‘ ee ‘ b. Conference of Buropean Metal and Engineering ost’ ie February 12-15, 1962, at least six of all-German dologsti on were born in Western Germanye BO a Tk seek TS vo lvew: aetog ® See SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION — === [PDF page 493] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 |.: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -23- Co International Conference of Metal and Engineering Workers Against the Schuman Plan, East Berlin, September 23-25, 1952, some attendance from Western Germany. de Miners’ Trade Department of the WFTU, Loeben, Austria, January 50- February 1, 1951, one or two delegates from Western Germanys @. Administrative Committee, Sosnowieo, Poland, Jume 12-14, 19651, delegates from Western Germany. + fy. ‘Textile and Clothing Workers' Trade Department of the WFTU. International Conference, East Berlin, October 1-4, 1952. Fifteen representatives from Western Germany attended.. 6. Meetings of International Federation of Resistance Fighters, Viotims | and Prisoners of Fascism (FIR). - International Federation of Resistance Fighters ‘Congress,.. vienna, Jun 50- July 2, 1951. At least eight representatives. from. -. Western Germany attended.: Sat “De Rally of Former Tomates. Bucherwald, Bastern Germany, April wu, C 1952, some representation from Western Germanye - Ge Extended Presidium of FIR, Prague, July 6-9, 1962. One dele« gate from Western Germany attended. a de International Combet Week for the Fight bgetoat asoten end War, East Berlin, September 7-14, 19826 Some delegates from Western Germany attended. e. International Conference (of FIR) Weimar, Eastern Germany, October 26-27, 1952. Delegates from Western Germany attended. 7s Meetings of World Peace Council. | &e World Peace Council, Plenary Session, East Berlin, February 21-26, 1951. Four delegates from Western Germany attended, be International Conference for Peaceful Solution of the German Problem, Bast Berlin, November 8-10, 1952. Some representatives from Western Germany attended. Ge World Congress of Peoples for Peace, Vienna, December 12-20, 1952. Six representatives from Western Germany attended. SECRET’ ="SECURITY INFORMATION ~ === [PDF page 494] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] De Financial Contributions to Affiliates The WFTU does not make any financial contributions to its affiliates except possibly for the payment of fares for delegates to conferences. There is no information as to financial contributions by FIR to affiliates. It is impossible to say as to whether the I0OJ dis~-. tributes funds to its affiliates, or acts eas clearing house for transfer of funds from one affiliate to another. -There is no information as to whether the IADL subsidizes the expenses of delegates to its meetings. Both the WFDY and IUS subsidize travel and living expenses of many delegates to its meetings, particularly those: representing affiliates in colonial and undeveloped areas.: : XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NSTWORK Data on West German Conmmist communications facilities are. meager. The town of Kempten in Bavaria is reported to be the principal Communist center for the distribution of official instructions, -propaganda materials, and intelligence information, The same report states — that branch communications centers are located at Freilassing on the © Austro-Baverian frontier, at Grafenwohr in Bavaria, and at Furth in - Walde,: near the’ Czech and Soviet Zone frontiers. The West Germany party is closed tied to -= indeed is in all | C respects subordinate to -- the Communist authorities in East Germany., ' Movement between the two zones of Germany is still relatively a simple matter for Communist emissaries, a fact that greatly simplifies ‘the | party's communications problems. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION oo C === [PDF page 495] === DO eee eee, Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION EE ON IR-6165.27 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: a NS CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ARGENTINA reine ads NEL OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION ~ === [PDF page 496] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword « eeeeceecvreceer eer eo eee e ee ee eo @ ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES «. « « 1 I. Objectives «+. «esc ecere eee ee esr eoereeee 1 IT. Tactics »« «eccrcerecereceececvr eer ereve. 1 IIT. Capabilities. 2. ececcecsceceerececevreevece k ASSETS eee ee ceeee 5 Ie Numerical Strength ««eeceesssrececeeveeee 5 II. Electoral Strengths eeeesecsccececcesse 5 IIT. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5 € IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. «+e eee cee 6 Ve Communist Influence in Labor e eececeereecevecece 6 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations ««.e«ecececerseeeeve 7 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government « « eeerece 10 VIIIe Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation « « « 10 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties «e«ecerensevetevoseeeese 11 Xe Communist Propaganda Media ««eeecseeseseeees 11 XIe Financial Condition « ececeoeevsseevvsee58 13 XII. Soviet—Satellite Official Assets. esc eeceoereeoee 14 XIII. Communist International Organizations.« e« ee«esxeee 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network e eeeceecesece 16 C | SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 497] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific “assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current - major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, € providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on “Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C | it === [PDF page 498] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ARGENTINA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The immediate objectives of the Argentine Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Argentina, PCA) are to support the Perdn regime so long as it actively opposes US policy in the hemisphere, to infiltrate the administration, especially the Peronista labor organization, and to gain official toleration of Communist activities. PCA's decision to support the Perén regime was announced in August 1952. The Western Hemisphere Communist labor front, Confederation of Latin American Workers (Confederacidn de Trabajadores de América Latina, CTAL) soon thereafter indicated that it was ready to make common cause with Peronista operations among Iatin American workers. PCA's policy of support for the Perdén regime endangers its claim to speak for workers, students, and other groups that have resisted authoritarian practices of the regime, and adoption of the policy has caused dissension within the PCA, PCA's policy apparently conflicts with the line of at least one other important Latin American Communist organization, the Chilean Commnist Party, which continues to attack Perén as a fascist dictator whose inter-American labor federation, Association of latin American Trade Union Workers (Agrupacidn de C Trabajadores Ietino Americanos Sindicalistas, ATLAS) threatens the. organization of independent labor throughout Iatin America. II, Tacti¢es PCA's strategy, formulated at the party's 1946 Congress, is that of the "national and social liberation front", The "liberation front® was to be formed by organized labor, agricultural workers, farm tenants, and other groups that have come to constitute the bulk of Perén's civilian support. PCA's present policy of supporting the Perén regime is presented as part of the "liberation front" strategy. Peronista policies have brought rapid change in the traditional social order, expanded the audience for demagogic and utopian politics, and unified the workers in a mass labor federation. When the Perdén regime also attacks "US imperialism" and opposes US policy in the hemisphere, the Peronista program largely coincides with the Communist program of "national and social liberation". The record of the PCA "liberation front" program indicates that its tactics have responded to the ebb and flow of anti-US activities in Argentina since 1946, In 1946 PCA abandoned its war policy of support for the western powers, a policy under which the party opposed, Perén as a fascist dictator. PCA then adopted the "liberation front" — program and declared for conditional support of Perdén, who was at C SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 499] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION serious odds with the United States. PCA gave concrete evidence of its support for Perén by helping to break up independent unions and handing over unions still controlled by the Communists to the new state-controlled labor federation. In 1948-50, as US-Argentine relations improved and Perén adopted measures to suppress Communism, PCA violently attacked the regime as fascist. With an election campaign in 1951, a long-—drawn-out economic crisis, and the waxing of extremist power in the administration, Perén returned to an anti-US course and blamed all of Argentina's troubles on "US imperialism® and "Wall Street". PCA responded by denouncing an attempted anti-Perén coup of September 1951 as US-inspired. In August 1952, amid predictions that Perén would be forced to a more moderate course by Army pressure, PCA formally announced that it would support Perdn against "reactionary groups" allegedly plotting his overthrow under US instructions. At the same time, PCA asked Peronista cooperation in a "national liberation front", Most recently the party has declared its support of Perén's new Five Year Plan. The principal targets of PCA are the General Confederation of Labor, (Confederacién General del Trabajo, CGT), Slavic and other groups whose European background may increase their susceptibility to Communist influence, student and youth groups, intellectual circles, and isolationist and pacifist elements. ¢ PCA has concentrated on infiltration of organized labor at the second and third levels of leadership. This limited goal, dictated by recognition that Perén is determined to keep exclusive control of the top levels, is designed to enable the Commnists to retain their influence within labor at least on a stand-by basis. The leftist tendencies of top Peronista leadership of the CGT have been viewed as evidence of Communist infiltration, but reports of Commnist affiliation of these leaders have not been substantiated to date. PCA has devoted considerable attention to Slavic nationality minorities as a source both of new recruits and of financing. In these efforts it has had the cooperation of Soviet and Satellite diplomatic migsions which enjoy a special leverage on Slavs having family ties with the Soviet orbit. Nevertheless, anti-Soviet refugees have prevented formation of a united pro-Communist Slavic front, and the pro-~ Commnist Slavic Union (Unidn Eslava, UE), and most of its affiliates were dissolved by the Perén regime in early 1949. Student and youth groups have been a principal source of Com munist recruits and of prospective party leaders since the formation of the Argentine Communist Party. PCA has set up social, educational, and athletic organizations as fronts for its recruiting activities and SECRET —- SECURITY INFORMATIO; C === [PDF page 500] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3has sought to place its agents in influential positions within non~ Communist organizations. The Communists have sought to present the party as the standard bearer of liberal democracy and as the defender of civil liberties against reactionary forces everywhere. Similar tactics in appealing to inteliectuals have had some success with antifascist individuals and groups. In 1952, however, POA and Communist youth leaders supported the Perdn administration in putting down striking non-Commnist university students, and these groups may now be less vulnerable to Communist propaganda. Communist peace propaganda has appealed ‘to traditional Argentine isolationist and pacifist tendencies to keep Argentine support of US-UN action in the East-West struggle to the minimum. Its task has been eased by the Perén regime's heavy and increasing emphasis on the so-called "Third Position". Peronista propaganda has also paralleled the Communist line in opposition to US military assistance. The voice of the Peronist propaganda machine has been far more effective than the hit-or-miss efforts of Communist propaganda. The Communists have used Argentine trade with the Soviet orbit | as a peg for various propaganda activities, and have had some official support for their endeavors. Thus government officials and the government radio have dealt with the Communist-front "Argentine Committee for the Promotion of Trade", an offshoot of the 1952 Moscow Economic Conference, as though it were a bona fide national organization. It is believed that the Argentine Communist Party receives financial aid as well as policy and tactical directives from international Communist headquarters. During and immediately after World - War II, funds contributed by Slavic and other groups for relief purposes in the Soviet orbit apparently were turned over to PCA for use _ in Argentina. The Soviet orbit missions reportedly transmit funds as well as directives to the Argentine party. Communists making trips outside of Argentina and visiting Argentina probably also serve as couriers for both the Argentine Communists and the international Communist organization. A group of "dissident" Commnists, who have advocated outright and unconditional support of Perdén since 1946, have attained at least an advisory position within the Perén administration. This "dissident" faction formed a "National Reorganizing Commission of the Communist Party" and in 1949 established the Institute of Economic and Social Studies. The Institute's organ, Argentina de Hoy, has received 150,000 Argentine pesos by presidential decree. It has been suggested that the "dissidents" and Perdn both think that they are using the other and that the association will last SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 501] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION only as long as it is mtually advantageous. It is possible that the | expulsion of the "dissidents" and their subsequent collaboration with Perén is a Commnist plan to infiltrate the top level of the Perén government. The possibility also exists that their dissidence and expulsion from the party were genuine. In that event the "dissident" group may be a "Titoist" faction that has rejected Moscow's control in favor of.a truly Argentine Communist movement. There 4s also a strong possibility that the "dissidents" are still loyal to international Communism and are competing with the regular party organization for Moscow's favor, Information presently available is not sufficient to indicate which, if any, of these hypotheses is the correct one. III. CAPABILITIES The Argentine Communist Party's capabilities for carrying out its major current objectives and furthering Soviet policy are heavily dependent upon the orientation of the Argentine government towards the United States and the East-West conflict. The Perdén regime, although its police have kept PCA under surveillance and restricted its activities, has actually furthered Communist objectives by deliberately fostering isolationist and anti-US sentiments inside and outside Argentina. Moreover, "dissident" Communists are reported to exercise consu ates influence as politico-economic and agrarian advisers to Per De As long as Argentine-US relations continue to be strained, the _ Argentine Commnists will probably continue to play up to Perédn. Under these conditions, he is likely to allow the party to retain its legal status and to keep its organization largely intact. There is also the possibility that Perdén might seek an alliance with the Communists during a severe economic or political crisis when Communist discipline and organizational ability would be most effective. The Argentine government has at its disposition the legal machinery and police forces to crack down effectively on the Argentine Communists whenever it chooses to do so. The Communist Party has little popular support, polling less than 1% of the total votes cast in the presidential election of November 1951. It has been unable to elect a_ single candidate to the National Legislature since gaining legal status 4n1945. The Catholic Church, the armed forces, nationalist elements and the major opposition political parties are strongly anti-Communist. If driven underground the party's greatest potential would be in the field of sabotage since it is not numerically strong enough to stage a successful revolution. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION A 6 Palaacea: Approved For i 3 OO 7/0 () A 1 PRG BOOP HO ROOOROO0O0S000 14 === [PDF page 502] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN ARGENTINA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The membership of the Argentine Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Argentina, PCA), is estimated at about 35,000, It is largely drawn from the lower and middle classes which also supply the bulk of Communist sympathizers. The Argentine Commmist movement has its largest following in the Federal Capital, Buenos Aires, and in the neighboring industrial centers of the Province of Buenos Aires. Other major centers of Commnist strength are in the cities of Rosario and Santa Fé, in the Province of Santa Fé, and in the Provinces of Mendoza, Cérdoba and Tucumdn, The top-level leaders of the POCA are veteran Communists in their middle and late fifties. Several have been to Russia. Victor Codovilla and Rodolfo Ghioldi, two of the founders of the PCA, have also made frequent trips to other European Communist centers. Leaders on the secondary level tend to be somewhat younger and generally entered the party during the José Felix Uriburu dictatorship of 1930-32. The leadership of the PCA appears, in general, to be competent, devoted and ( well-trained. II. ZLECTORAL STRENGTH — In the most recent general election (November, 1951), the presies dential slate of the PCA polled 71;318 votes or less than 1% of the 7,594,148 ballots cast. The progovernment Peronista Party polled 4,745,168 votes for more than 63% of the total cast. The Radical Civic Union, the major opposition party, secured 2,415,770 votes or nearly 32% of the total vote. The totals for the other opposition parties -were as follows: National Democratic Party, 174,399 (2.3%) and the Argentine Socialist Party, 54,920 (0.7%). Over half of the votes for the PCA presidential ticket were cast in the Federal Capital and in the Province of Buenos Aires, 20,994 and 19,085 respectively. The cities of Rosario and Santa Fé contributed heavily to the 10,487 Communist votes garnered in the Province of Santa Fé. The PCA candidate received 7,743 votes in the Province of Mendoza and 3,172 in the Province of Cérdoba. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION The current PCA policy is to avoid the use of violence in favor of cooperation with the Perdn administration. Whenever overriding party principles preclude such cooperation the PCA tries to use ” SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 503] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET —- SECURITY INFORMATION -6constitutional means so as not to provoke the administration to use | the repressive measures at its disposal. The PCA has a Shock Forces Group organized to instruct members in street fighting and other forms of resistance. This organization probably staged the "flash" demonstrations which occurred during the 1948-50 period, The Perdn administration's wide popular base and its extensive police powers and police organization are important factors limiting the ability of the PCA to rally elements of the population to violent action. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM . The Perdn administration has allowed the PCA to retain its legal status, allegedly because Perdn believes Argentine Commnism would be -harder to control if it were driven underground. The PCA is subject to the same tactice tha administration uses to harass the other opposition parties, The PCA is kept under close police surveillance. Its requests for permission to hold public meetings are frequently denied and when approved are not granted police protection against raids by nationalist and other anti-Commnist forces. The party's press was closed down in 1950 and its present news organ issues on 4& sevicl.ncestine basis. PCA leaders and party members are subject to arrest and confinement without trial. The main Commnist instrument for penetrating Argentine Slavic groups, the Slavic Union (Unidn Eslava, VE) and its C affiliates, was dissolved in early 1949. Other Communist fronts have also been closed down. ‘The Perdén administration has appeared to be particularly concerned with checking Commnist infiltration of organized labor and student and youth groups. | The present administration has at its command the legislation, police powers and police forces to liquidate the PCA whenever it chooses to do so. The PCA has limited facilities for circumventing repressive official action. It has little effective popular support and its efforts to form a united front with other opposition groups have been flatly and publicly rejected. The PCA is believed to have an underground organization set up for use in the event that it is deprived of legal status. Information is lacking, however, as to the extent and capabilities of the Argentine Commnist underground. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR A. Communists in Key Industries ‘There is no reliable evidence that Communists have attained a dominant position in any key industry in Argentina, The pre-Perdén leadership of the Commnists among the railway workers union has apparently been broken by the present administration. There are no reliable recent figures on reported Communist infiltration of SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 504] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION -7metallurgical, meat packing, light and power and other key industries. There is no information as to the percentage of Communists to non- Communists in Argentina's strategic industries. B. Communist Influence in Lebor Organization No important labor unions are nationally controlled by the Argentine Communist Party. The General Confederation of Labor (Confederacién General del Trabajo, CGT), the government-controlled labor organization, reportedly has Commmists in influential positions but these charges have not been substantiated as yet. Communists are believed to have infiltrated the CGT's claimed 6,000,000 membership on the second and third levels of leadership. The similarity between the Peronista and Commmist anti-US lines, however, make it difficult to determine the extent of Communist influence on CGT actions and policies. In late 1952 a large-scale turnover in top CGT leadership removed several suspected Communists. On the other hand, two of their replacements are alleged to have Communist sympathies. The principal Commnist-controlled labor organization appears to be the Movement for the Democratization and Independence of Trade Unions (Movimiento Pro Democratizacidn e Independencia de los Sindicatos, C MPDIS) with an estimated membership in 1950 of 3,000 individuals. No unions as such are known to be affiliated and all the members of MPDIS are presumed to be Commnists or Commnist sympathizers. No union locals are known to be controlled by Communists although it is possible that they may exert important influence from their reported infiltration of the second and third levels of leadership. ‘The only Argentine labor organization believed affiliated with . international commnist confederations is the MPDIS, which sent a delegation to the CTAL meeting in Montevideo in March 1950 and to the CTAL Central-Committee Meeting in Mexico City in September 1952. In October 1952, the MPDIS secretary, Rubens Iscaro, asked for and received funds from the WFTU to send a delegation to the WFTU conference in — Berlin. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A. Front Organizations The Argentine Communists have utilized a wide variety of front organizations to provide vehicles for increasing their influence, The Slavic Union (Unidn Eslava, UE) and its affiliates were among the Communists! most effective instruments for securing funds and supporters C SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 505] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -8before their dissolution was ordered by the Argentine government early in 1949, It appears probable that underground counterparts of the dissolved entities have been constituted to maintain Communist influence among Slavic groups in Argentina. Information is lacking as. to which, if any, of the reported 150 affiliates of the Slavic Union presently have legal status. Before the 1949 dissolution order these entities were believed to have from 12,000 to 15,000 dues-paying members. They were also reported to control some 90,000 Communists or Communist sympathizers among a Slavic population estimated at some 600,000., The PCA formed a variety of front organizations as a result of the party's 1946 decision to concentrate on a “national and social liberation front". These include committees to promote agrarian reform, improved social conditions, and a reduction in the cost of living. Youth and student groups have continued to be primary Communist targets. ‘The Union of Argentine Girl Patriots (Unidn de Muchachas ‘Patriotas Argentinas, UMPA) maintains a liaison with other fronts. The PCA reportedly has issued instructions that UMPA ought to be considered as an auxilary organization for carrying out Communist international policy. The Union of Young Argentine Patriots (Unidn de Jévenes Patriotas Argentinos, UPA) is the masculine counterpart of the UMPA. The Communist Youth Federation (Federacién Juvenil Commistea, C. FJC) serves as a coordinating agency for Commnist penetration of Argentine youth groups and organizations. It is currently seeking to agganne unite Argentine youth groups behind its "peace" campaigns and to provide the leadership to forma "patriotic, anti-oligarchial and antiimperialist front" in Argentine youth circles. ~ The climate created by Peronista attacks on US policy has apparently favored an increase in Argentine Communist "peace" activities. The vehicles used include the Committee of Peace Partisans (Comité de Partidarios de la Paz), the Argentine Youth Movement for Peace (Movimiento Argentino Juvenil por Ja Paz, MAJP) and the Spanish Commission for the Defense of Peace (Gomisién Espafiola para Defensa de la Paz). These fronts are used to gather signatures to petitions for peace and for a meeting of the great powers, and to oppose Argentine aid for UN-US action in Korea. They work in close cooperation with the international Communist peace fronts. Fronts organized to attract liberal and left-wing intellectuals include the Argentine League for the Rights of Man (Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre) and the "dissident" Commnist—sponsore Institute of Economic and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudios Econémicos y Sociales). ‘The League for the Rights of Man had its greatest strength in the Federal Capital and the Province of Buenos Aires SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 506] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -~9among anti-Fascist and anti-Perdén groups. It sought to penetrate liberal groups by presenting the Commmists as the defenders of civil liberties and the opponents of reactionary forces. This organization was reported to have gone underground when closed down in 1949. Information is lacking as to its present status. The Institute of Economic and Social Studies affords "dissident" Communists and other former members of the opposition an opportunity to escape the repressive measures of the Perén administration by collaborating with Perén. It may also afford Communists an entry into the highest level of the present administration. It has competent leadership and appears to enjoy Perén's favor as evidenced in the 150,000 peso subsidy given ite organ Argentina de Hoy by presidential decree. The Institute has succeeded in winning over Dr. Enrique Dickmann, a veteran, high-ranking Socialist leader and has apparently fostered existing factionalism in the Socialist Party. In addition to its appeal to housewives through front groups. which demand a reduction in the cost of living and social improvements, PCA makes a direct appeal to Argentine women through the Womens! Union (Unidn de Mujeres). Communist feminine leaders and fellow travellers are prominent in the leadership of this organization which claims to promote the rights of Argentine women of all classes and in al) fields of activity. — B. Commmist-Infiltrated Organizations The PCA has sovght to infiltrate a wide variety of organizations. The General Confederation of Labor (CGT) has been a primary target for infiltration.. Perén's insistence on controlling the top-level leadership of the CGT is believed to have forced the Communists to concentrate on securing positions on the second and third levels of leadership. Evidence is lacking as to the extent of their penetration. The similarity between Peronista-CGT and Communist anti-US propaganda makes a _ reliable estimate of Communist influence in the CGT virtually impossible. Communist agents and sympathizers have apparently not had mich success: in retaining their influence in student organizations. The present administration has founded Peronista student associations. and federations and actively intervened in their behalf. The anti-Perén student organizations have reportedly ousted Communists who had formerly held influential positions in these entities. The various nationality groups in Argentina have also been a primary target for Communist infiltration. Anti-Soviet elements among the Slavs, Latin and other groups of European origin have resisted Communist influence and prevented the creation of a united SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 507] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -10pro-Soviet front. However, organizations such as the Federation of Ukranian Societies (Federacién de las Sociedades Ucranianas), the Catalan Cultural Group (Agrupacién Cultural Catalona, ACC) and other societies composed of immigrants and descendants of immigrants are reported to be Communist-infiltrated, VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT The Peronista majority in the National Chamber of Deputies allegedly includes both Communist sympathizers and former members of. the PCA. These reports, however, have not been confirmed, A small number of "dissident" Communists are also reported to exercise in~- fluence as politico-economic and agrarian advisers to Perén, Angel Borlenghi, the Minister of the Interior and the: person to whom the Federal Police, National Gendarmerie and Maritime Police report, is a veteran Marxist. Both Borlenghi and his wife have been the subjects of contradictory reports as to their alleged Commmist sympathies and connections. Two senior members of the Argentine Mining Chamber (Cdémare de Minerfa), Imis Agust{n Carnevale and Pascual Torchia, who ' were responsible for drafting the code governing +he export of Argentina's strategic minerals have been identified as known Communists, Delays in shipping tungsten to the United States are reported traceable to Carnevale's influence. More precise, detailed information as to possible Communist influence in State policy-making bodies is not available, Compulsory military service affords an opportunity for Com munists to enter the armed forces as draftees. Little, if any, Commnist penetration is believed to exist among commissioned officers and there is no substantial evidence of top level infiltration. In early 1952 the PCA reportedly received instructions to begin an energetic drive to create cells within the armed forces but further information is lacking. Some Communist penetration has been reported on the lowest levels of the Argentine police forces. Despite reports of Borlenghi's Communist sympathies, there is no substantial evidence of infiltration of the security forces or of the top level of the police. The numbers of Commmists and sympathizers in governnent agencies and their influence, if any, are not kmown. There is no evidence of pro-Commanists holding positions in the atomic research program allegedly being carried out under official sponsorship, VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Communists have relatively little influence in educational,. religious, entertainment, radio and press circles in Argentina. The SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 508] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION Perén administration has screened the nation's educators and subjected other public-opinion-forming circles to a careful scrutiny to eliminate those influences which were not pro-Peronista. Communists have been reported in the fields of entertainment, radio and in the pro- ‘administration press where they appear to be cooperating with Perén. The similarity between Peronista and Commnist anti-US lines make it difficult to distinguish propaganda originated by Communists from official Peronista propaganda. Perdén has the power to circumscribe further what Communist influence does exist, whenever it suits his purposes to do so. TX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES With the possible exception of the Argentine Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Argentino, PSA) Communist infiltration of non Communist political parties has had very little success since 1946, The Socialist Party has lost some members to both the PCA and the "dissident" Communist group but its directorate has joined the other major opposition parties in flatly and publicly rejecting PCA offers of collaboration against the Perén administration. Some infiltration of the left wing of the Socialist Party has been reported but there is little or no evidence of such penetration of other opposition € parties, The Peronista Party (Partido Peronista) reportedly includes some former Communists. Its penetration is facilitated by the important role of the CGT within the Peronista Party organization. The similarity between the anti-US utterances of the Perdén organization and the PCA, however, makes it difficult to identify Communist infiltration of the Peronista Party with any degree of precision. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A. Newspapers The principal PCA newspapers are: 1. Pueblo Unido, daily; circulation figures not available; 2. Nuestra Palabra, weekly; reported circulation of about 20,000. The "dissident" Communist newspapers are: 1. Qilase Obrera, circulation not available; directed by Rodolfo Puiggros, C SEORET - SECURITY [NFORMATION === [PDF page 509] === SEEDS SS SSE Q\e oO oO ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION -12- 2. Argentina de Hoy, weekly; circulation figures not available; directed by Adolfo J. Abello. The Communists utilize a number of other newspapers either directly or indirectly under their control or influence. These include: 1. Propdésitos, sporadic; circulation figures not available; directed by Marfa Rosa Oliver. 2. Nuestras Mujeres, bi-weekly; circulation from 6-8, 000; organ of Women's Union (Unidn de Mujeres). 3. La Semana, circulation not available. 4. Galicia, weekly; circulation figures not available; organ of the Federation of Galician Societies (Federacién de Sociedades Gallegas). The Communist line also appears. in foreign language publications including: i 1. Szabad Szo, circulation figures not known; organ of the Hungarian colony and directed by José Szekely. C 2. Nasha Gazeta, Russian-language weekly with some 2,000 circulation and directed by Alfonso Mackiewicz, saat 3. Tygodnik Polski, Polish-language bi-weekly; directed by Wenceslao Stasiejko; printed by the Crismo printing shop, Calle Paraguay 828. 4. Jselvenicks Riject, Serbo-Croat~language organ of the pro-Soviet, anti-Tito Yugoslavs in Argentina, B. Periodicals The most important Commnist periodical is Nueva Era, whose circulation figures are not known and which appears monthly under the direction of Victor Codovilla. The Commission of Economic Studies (Comisién de Estudios Econémicos) of the PCA edits the Boletin de Economfa for which circulation figures are not available. C. Publishing Houses and Printing Establishments The Perdén administration closed the principal Commnist publishing house, Unién Eslava, in 1948, and has followed a similar policy toward other Communist publishers. It has exerted heavy pressure to SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 510] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION stop the reproduction and issuance of Communist newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets. Editorial Lautaro, Calle José BE. Unburu 1225, Buenos Aires, and Editorial Futuro are Commmnist publishing companies which may also have been closed osed down. The Libraria Cérdoba, Calle Cérdoba 1888-90, Buenos Aires, was reported as the 3 the replacement for the Com munist official publishing houses, Editorial Anteo and Editorial Problemas, which were under Peronista disfavor. Non-Communist firms reproducing Communist materials have been warned to discontinue such practices. — D. Import of Publications from Abroad The Argentine government's close control over and censorship of publications from abroad make it very difficult for the Communists to import publications. Soviet and Satellite domestic newspapers and periodicals are not available for public purchase but are available to a limited group through the Soviet and Satellite embassies. H. Publications of Soviet and Satellite Diplomatic Establishments These include Polonia, the magazine of the Polish Legation directed by Stanislaw Ollewez, and Noticioso Checoeslavaco, the infor mation bulletin of the Czech Legation. Circulation figures are not available for either publication. F, Radio Argentine radio is under ‘the strict control and censorship of the Perén administration. No Argentine radio stations are known to be either controlled or influenced by Communists. There is no substantial evidence that any Argentine radio programs are produced or influenced by Communists. Broadcasts from behind the Iron Curtain are available to short-wave listeners on the 19, 25 and 30 meter bands. The Moscow radio broadcasts two and one half hours daily to Argentina from 8:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. ‘The Budapest radio transmits a one hour program daily from 6:50 p.m. to 7:50 p.m. Both programs are in Spanish and while reception depends on the weather it is reported usually to be very good, The broadcasts come through at the time when the maximm listening audience is available but the size of the audience actually reached is not known. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION . Precise information regarding the financial "health" of the PCA is not available. There is no information as to the size of its revenues from membership fees, donations and sales of publications. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 511] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRSD — SECURITY INFORMATION - 14- In 1950 the Soviet Embassy was reported to be receiving funds to finance Communist activities in Argentina and neighboring countries from individuals in close contact with the Rumanian Legation in Buenos Aires. It was also reported that the Argentine-Rumanian commercial pact would make large sums of Argentine pesos available to the Communist Parties in Argentina and other nearby countries, The funds collected for Soviet-Satellite relief were reportedly turned over to the PCA treasury. PCA revenues from labor unions, if any, and from its front ' organizations are not known. There is not enough information available to estimate PCA's total assets. Embassy Buenos Aires has estimated that the party has "sufficient" funds to carry out its undertakings. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS “A, Diplomatic Establishments, Trade and Cultural Missions, Current Soviet-Satellite diplomatic establishments in Buenos © Aires include the following number of personnel: 1. Soviet Embassy....... =.. © 14 members C 2. Czechoslovalcian Legation..... 8 members: Se Hungarian Legation........ 5S members 4. Bulgarian Legation........ 4 members 5. Polish Legation......... 3% members 6. Rumanian Legation........ 3& members A Russian trade mission was reported to have arrived in Buenos Aires in 1952, but there has been no definite information as to its size or what it has accomplished. Information relating to the political activities of Soviet- Satellite diplomatic establishments is largely limited to indications that they transmit funds and directives from Moscow to the PCA. The activities of Argentine-Russian Cultural Institute (Instituto Cultural Argentino-Ruso) were reported suspended after a police raid on the premises in 1949. The Institute's organ, Argentina y la USSR, had a circulation of about 5,000, Information is not available as to the present status of the Institute. SECRET ~ SECURITY TION C === [PDF page 512] === TN En Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION . -15- XIII. COMMUNIST I TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Attendance of Argentine delegations at meetings of Communist international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period 1951-523: . Meoting Date i --Azgentine Representation Regional: Meeting of: April 1961 Sd a Partisans of. Peace. bag (Montevideo ) Regional Conference of - May 1952 22s 1 Latin American Agriculture (Mexico City). hee - World Peace Council oS ‘November. 1951: oL (possibly..more) oe, American Continental ‘March 1952 cate! 88. Conference of Peace C Partisans. a: CEE AE (Montevideo) ~ ae ee (no public sessions held) woe Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 cello & (or more) sce. International Conference in. April 1952... =: 7.- Defense of Children - sole a (Vienna) 7 3 “ CTAL Central Committee. -.:. September 1952. 21. — Meeting _ ee (Mexico City) All-Union Communist October 1952. 1 Party Congress (Moscow) Continental Conference of Nov.-Dec. 1952 1 (possibly more) Democratic Jurists of America ~ 2.” (Rio de Janeiro) [Unreadable] Worla Congress of Peoples December 1952 30 (approximately) for Peace (Vienna) “TSS === [PDF page 513] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SEQGRET - SECURITY INFORMATION XIV. GO T ICGATION NETWORK A.. Courier Syste Argentine Commnists travelling abroad reportedly serve as couriers for the PCA and international Communism. Until the second half of 1952 Argentine Communists could travel freely to Montevideo, which is regarded as the distributing center for international Communism in austral South America. Members of other Commnist Parties visiting Argentina and Soviet-Satellite diplomatic personnel are reported to be serving as couriers in their travels between Argentines and other countries. B. Direct Communication by Wireless or Radio The only available information indicates that a Bulgarian- Argentine Communist returning to Buenos Aires from Bulgaria, in late 1947, brought back a short-wave receiving and transmitting set allegedly powerful enough to maintain contact with a radio station in Kostinbrod. C. Glosest International Ties The PCA appears to maintain its closest ties with the Soviet- Satellite group and with France in Europe, and with Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Brazil in Iétin America, D. Instructions from Abroad While it is. believed that PCA receives instructions and criticism from abroad, definite proof is still lacking. Reports fron usually reliable sources indicate that the Soviet-Satellite embassies in Buenos Aires are the transmitting agents. Instructions may also be imparted to the PCA by agents of Moscow travelling on diplomatic passports under assumed names, SE ~— SECURITY I TIO === [PDF page 514] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECURITY INFORMATION IR-6165.28 COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BRAZIL OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 515] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CON TENTS Foreword. 6 «ee «ee ee oeocoeceeveeeeenee ee @ III. III. VII. VIII. - XII. XIII. xTV. OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. [Unreadable] Tactic8 e«eerceevreceseseeeneeceeeoe Capabilities. 2. ee rec ecervn eee evececne Numerical Strength coeoeoeeevoeeveee eee @ @ Electoral Strength eoeee ° oe ee eee ee ee Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action Government Policy. Toward Communism a a a | Communist Influence in Labor. ee eecccvce Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations. 2. « eceeerecec ee Communist Infiltration into Government. eves Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation.« Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political [Unreadable] Communist Propaganda Media.. eoeeeoeeeee e@ Financial Condition. ee ee ° eoeceoeveceesee Soviet-—Satellite Official Assets oeceoereereee Communist International Organizations...eeee Communist Communication Network « se ececeerece SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION wo fF FP HF on nw ww 10 13 17 17 18 19 === [PDF page 516] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di- _ vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and. capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the. actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 517] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN BRAZIL: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The immediate objectives of the Commnist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCB) are to prevent ratification of the Brazil-US Military Agreement, to obstruct the implementation in Brazil of the US. Point IV Program, to block the export to the US of strategic materials, and totally to exclude private US and other foreig: capital from participation in the development of Brazil's petroleum resources. A more general objective discernible especially in its "peace" campaign, is to neutralize Brazil in the East-West conflict. The party's obvious subservience to the foreign policy requirements of the USSR have made the PCB vulnerable to the same currents of antiforeignism and nationalism which it exploits to the detriment of the United States. As a result, its own internal structure has been weakened, conservative opposition to Communism has hardened, and governmental and other efforts to discredit Communism among the populace have been facilitated. Priorities for party objectives have shifted from time to time in the past few years. These shifts have been largely in accordance with changing Soviet priorities but have reflected also changes in the local situation. There are no indications that the party will in the immediate future revise its major objectives or establish new priorities for them. II. TACTICS Since being deprived of its legality in 1947, the PCB has sought, through propaganda and infiltration, to obtain a direct following -- and, short of this, substantial influence -- among a wide variety of social groups. It has attempted to conclude with legal parties -- regardless of social or economic following -- . Working arrangements which would permit Communists to run for and hold elective office as nominal representatives of those parties. While relying mainly on the capacity of individual Commnists to further party purposes through normal political action, the PCB has since 1949 placed increased emphasis on subversive action. It has endeavored to fan local popular dissatisfactions into vio-= lence, and reportedly has promoted the organization of an underground "Army of National Liberation". The PCB's primary target recently has been the Brazilian. Armed Forces. Efforts to penetrate and influence the military have been conducted in large part through the Military Club, an organization of some 10,000 active, retired, and reserve officers of the armed services, and especially through that Club's monthly publi- SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION a RUA LUN RP elaaca 0) 7/0) OQ A 1 P RGB OO? DOR OOO8000S000 1-4 === [PDF page 518] === eer eee eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -2cation, whose editorial policy Communists or pro-Commnists managed to control until fairly recently. Similarly, associations of noncommissioned officers have been used for penetration of the military's lower echelons. Another important target is the group of middle class professionals and intellectuals, from whom the Communists have been outstandingly successful in drawing not only articulate support but also leadership for front and even strictly party activities. Urban and rural labor, lower levels of the urban white-collar class (including government workers), and student and youth groups have been additional targets of Communist efforts. Rural elements, along with the military, appear to have special significance for the Commmists in connection With plans for subversion. Segments of all these groups -- and indeed, Brazilians in general -- are vulnerable to appeals to nationalism, currently the main propaganda motif of the Communists. Essentially this motif consists in depicting Brazil as being cynically exploited by an imperialist United States and despoiled by private US enterprise of resources essential to realization of Yrazilian economic and political aspirations. An important component of the nationalist theme is the contention that private US economic interests and US military and eco-= *: nomic cooperation missions endanger political sovereignty. The é Communists point out also the danger of a contamination of Brazilian culture by gross American materialism. The "peace" theme is a second major Communist propaganda motif © with appeal which cuts across class lines. Here the party pictures the Soviet Union as a pacifist and humanitarian nation and the US as an imperialistic and brutal warmonger responsible for the Korean War. Communist propaganda on other than "peace" and nationalist themes -- and to a lesser extent even on these -- tends to be closely tailored to the susceptibilities of particular groups. Thus, to the masses, there is emphasis on the high cost of living; to the rural worker, on agrarian reform; and to the business man, landowner, and industrialist, on the advantages of trade with the Soviet bloc. Brazilian Communists place top priority on front organizations as vehicles for propaganda and political activity. The major fronts are nationwide organizations formed to. propagate the "peace" and nationalist themes. In other instances, the party has sought also, on a broad scale, to infiltrate existing non-Communist organizations -- such as the above-mentioned Military Club, veterans' organizations, professional associations, and youth and student groups -- and to SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION C === [PDF page 519] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -~3convert them into Communist instruments. Where Communists have been unable to gain, or have been deprived of influence in an infiltrated organization, they have sometimes established a purely Communist counterpart which is then represented as the legitimate entity. III. CAPABILITIES The outlawing of the PCB in 1947 brought an immediate sharp decline in the party's membership, funds and capabilities. Subsequently a number of factors favored the resurgence of Communist capabilities. The ability of Communists to infiltrate some non- Communist organizations and to secure nationalist support for various Communist fronts was enhanced by their exploitation of nationalist aspirations. Moreover, the 4razilian people's ignorance and apathy with regard to East-West issues made them receptive to "peace" propaganda. Finally, the economic grievances of the masses, given explosive potentialities in 1951 by President Getulio Dornelles Vargas' failure to fulfill his economic promises, favored a broadening of the Communists' popular following and the instigation of violence. PCB opportunities have tended! to be offset by various developments adverse to Communism. The principal adverse factor has been the growing appreciation of the reality of the Communist danger onthe part of both government and responsible sectors of public opinion. As a result, the repressive anti-Communist program initiated under President Eurico Gaspar Dutra has been pursued with greater vigor under Vargas, and anti-Communist members of various Communist-infiltrated organizations have sought with greater energy and increasing success to oust Communists from positions of control and influence. Vargas in March 1952 removed his Minister of War, General Estillac Leal, who had followed a lenient policy toward the Comnuriists, and _ replaced him with a man under whom determined efforts to eliminate Communists from the armed forces are still being carried on. Demo=. cratic forces in the Military Club subsequently prevented by a substantial majority the re-election of Estillac Leal to the presidency of the Club and eliminated alleged Communists and their extreme nationalist allies from positions of authority. Important national | organizations representing war veterans and university students likewise have been freed of Communist control at the national level, and the Communists also have lost some ground among intellectual groups. The administration has closed some Communist fronts and reduced the effectiveness of others (notably the "peace" front) by police and administrative harassment and by publicizing their Communist nature. Communist ability to infiltrate established parties or make deals with them to include Communists on their tickets appears to have declined. Governmental or party action has, in many instances, SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 520] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~— SECURITY: INFORMATION ANU LLON -4interfered with these practices by annulling candidacies, invalidating election of Commnists to office, and removing them from party posts. Meanwhile, the Communists have been unable to obtain registration of other parties to replace the PCB. Short-term prospects for any substantial increase in Communist capabilities, barring a serious economic or political crisis, appear poor. The Commnists have not been fully deprived of elements of strength in legislative bodies, the armed services, the civil service, and labor, intellectual, and student groups, and the fugitive PCB leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, remains a symbol of hope to many among the discontented masses. Communist capabilities of exploiting nationalism and isolationism, to gain non-Communist allies and an audience for anti-US propaganda, remain strong. Nevertheless, recent adoption of the new Security Law should strengthen the government's hand against subversion. The administrationts action against Communism in the military may be expected to continue, and there is increasing pressure for similar action against Communists in the civil Service. The disillusionment of the masses with President Vargas has tended to lose its initially dangerous political implications. The armed insurrectionary forces which the Communists reportedly are preparing do not constitute a serious present danger to national stability and are unlikely to become so in the foreseeable future. The PCBts capabilities may be further weakened by. the developing rift within C the party over the issue of the degree of emphasis to be placed on Soviet policy demands. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION C SAU AL LON === [PDF page 521] === EEE IDE EEO EO ew Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN BRAZIL: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH The total Communist Party (PCB) membership is estimated at 55,000, as compared with 130,000 members claimed by the PCB in 197. Party members and sympathizers come predominantly from urban labor, the lower middle class, and professionals and inteitlectuals. The party following -—- and presumably party membership -- is most numerous in the Federal District, and in the States of Slo Paulo, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul, especiatly the urban industrial sections of these states. There are no data permitting an estimate of the total number of people controlled or influenced by the Communists. A large proportion of the population is strongly influenced, however, by the Commnists in the sectors of its nationalist and isolationist activities:. Outlawing of the PCB in 1947 deprived it of many marginal supporters, thereby greatly increasing the percentage of hard-core members. The hard core tends to be young and aggressive, appears to derive mostly fram workers and the lower middle class, and apparently is strongest in the Federal District and its environs and urban areas of S20 Paulo, C / Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul. With regard to all party members, average length of membership probably does not exceed 5 years, and there may be between 25,000 and 30,000 members who have been in the party that long. Party leadership includes many able men who rigidly adhere to the Soviet line, but PCB emphasis on Soviet as opposed to local objectives appears to be alienating some leaders, and weakening the party's internal structure. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH ‘ The PCB, in the last generai election in which it could participate (1947), received 511,302 votes for federal deputies, or 4.6 percent of the total vote of 5,924,616; for state deputies it received 79,02) votes, or 9.2% of the total of 5,194,221. In these elections PCB's electoral strength was about one-fifth that of the major party (Social Democratic | Party), one-third that of the second largest (National Democratic Union), and much inferior to that of the third-ranking party (Brazilian Labor Party). Parties which Support the present government -- although not solidiy -- polled close to ) miliion votes in 1950. This was more than seven times the vote that the PCB received in 1947, when its electoral © following, it is believed, was much greater than it would have been in 1950. The Communist vote in the 1947 elections was greatest in Sao Paulo State (189,422 or 14.2 percent of the total vote for federal ' deputies); the Federal District (105,652 or 24.6 percent of the total SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION _ SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 522] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 | SECRET. - SECURITY INFORMATION: | vote for municipal councilmen); Pernambuco (3,563 or 18.1 percent of the total for state deputies); Rio de Janeiro State (38,399 or 11.8 percent of the vote for federal deputies); and Rio Grande do Sul (38,759 or 6.1 percent of the total vote for federal deputies). In S&o Paulo State the PCB was the fourth largest party, with about ho percent of the vote received by the major party, and 66 percent of the vote received by the runner-up. In the Federal District the PCB led all other parties in elections for municipal councilmen, with a vote more than 20 percent higher than either of its two closest rivals. In Pernambuco the PCB was third, with about half the vote received by each of the two leading parties., ‘IIT. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION — EEE ee UE LUNN .¢ Current Communist policy puts considerable emphasis on violence. Local party leaders in various parts of Brazil -- especially in Rio Grande do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais -- have in many instances in the past year taken advantage of mass economic grievances (rising prices, poor transportation, archaic landholding systems) to instigate or assume the direction of strikes, street — demonstrations, and rural disorders. Data are not immediately available as to the number of people involved in these disturbances, but in any single instance the number probably would not surpass several hundred, which probably would represent the maximum that the PCB could bring out €. in any locality for violent demonstrations in connection with any current “ issue. There is evidence that the PCB is preparing, through organization of an "Army of National Liberation", for an eventual insurrection in which Communist participation would be more direct and on a broader scale. Reliable detailed information concerning Communist efforts to recruit, train, and equip such a force are lacking. The State of Minas Gerais, and especially the strategically located "Minas Triangle" bordering S80 Paulo, Goids, and Mato Grosso, is generally indicated as the main center of insurrectionary preparations. This region would appear to be especially well suited to guerrilia activities designed to disrupt Brazilian internal communications and to obstruct the supply of Brazilian strategic materials to the United States. A recent report states that Minas Gerais has been supplanted by northern Brazil as the . place of emphasis for PCB revolutionary activities.: ; Probably not more than 50,000 persons would be available for guerrilla assistance to the Soviet Satellites in the event of an East- West war. Leadership would be available from a small number of active or inactive commissioned officers of the armed services and a larger number of noncommissionedl officers. Weapons would be limited largely to small arms and explosives, of which the PCB quite likely has enough available to permit, for a relatively short period, effective guerrilla activity and sabotage in places isolated from main population centers. C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 523] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM The Brazilian government for seven years has pursued a vigorous anti-Communist policy which has been highly effective in some sectors but of insignificant result in others. The PCB was outlawed in 19:7 and all those elected to governmental office on the PCB ticket were removed early in 1948. The PCB attempted to circumvent its illegality by simultaneous attempts to organize new parties as replacements for the PCB and to infiltrate or make deals with established parties to include Communists on their tickets. The government has refused to register parties organized to substitute for the PCB, and Commnist efforts to infiltrate political parties and thereby gain entrance to governmental bodies have in many instances been defeated by governmental or party action to annul candidacies, invalidate elections of Communists to office, and remove Communists from party posts. The PCB has been unable effectively to infiltrate any party at the national Level and its ability to do so at ‘the state devel, though perhaps not at the municipal level, appears to have declined since 1948-9. The PCB's success in achieving and retaining elective office for individual Communists likewise appears to have been minimal except in some municipalities. The government in general has moved ess vigorously and effectively against the PCB’s press and its front activities. Here governmental policy has been largely one of harrassment and obstruction rather than outright suppression, although it has acted to close some fronts and other Communist organizations which appeared especialiy threatening to internal security. The government has also sought actively and with some success to influente public opinion against Communist fronts and their propaganda. Communist ability to gain non- Communist allies for their front activities is, together with the opposition of some non-Commnist political opponents of the administration to any measure which might threaten civil liberties, doubtless a factor in the government's failure to take drastic action against the PCB's press and its front activities. The government has given especially close attention to the problem of Commnists in the labor movement. Under Dutra and until relatively recently under Vargas, the government has kept tight control over labor by intervention of unions, and legal proscriptions against voting the holding of Labor-union office by Communists. Current policy favors greater independence for unions. Shouid the Communists as a result make any important gain, government action to vitiate it would be a reasonable expectation. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 524] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] Government action against the Communist underground organization has untii recently been limited and somewhat haphazard, aithough the police, especially of Rio, S&o Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul, appear to be vigilant and well informed of the PCB's activities. In the past year, and especially in the past few months, the administration has moved to break up the Communist organization in the military and has arrested numerous allegedly Communist officers and enlisted men and brought them to trial. Pressure is now building up for similar action against Commnists in the civil service, where legal considerations have thus far been a bar to a thorough anti-Commnist purge. ~V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR A. Key Industries According to a mid-1952 report, a majority of the directors of the national dockworkers' organization (Sindicato Nacional dos Contra-mestres, Marinheiros, Mocos e Remadores em Transportes Maritimos) were Communists and had succeeded in appointing a Communist delegate of the organization in the port of Santos, a major shipping center. A negro Communist, Geraldo Rodriguez, who had been on several trips to Europe and was in touch with head officials of the international Communist labor front, WFTU, was said to be playing a leading part in dockworkers! circles in Santos. Moreover, the Commnist directorate of the national C. dockworkers' organization reportedly hoped to appoint Communist delegates to the ports of Belem, Porto Alegre, and Rio de Janeiro in addition to Santos. Roberto Morena, Commnist federal deputy and labor leader, was active in promoting a dockworkers' strike held in Rio de Janeiro in the summer of 1952. Commnist labor has pockets of strength in the national railroad system. In December 1952, according to the press, Communist labor leaders were active among Central do Brasil railway workers in an attempt to foment a railroad strike. PCB has had cells in government-operated arsenals. In the course of its anti-Communist campaign, the government discharged a number of Rio Naval Arsenal workers accused of Communist membership or ties, but there is no assurance that a complete purge has been effected. WFTU in December 1951 gave propaganda support to a national strike of airline employees and pilots. The extent of Commnist influence in national airlines is not known., B. Labor Unions Communist strength in the national labor movement is represented by the Brazilian Workers' Confederation (Confederacgao dos Trabalhadores. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 525] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION do Brasil, CTB). The Communist-dominated organization was outlawed in I9k7, but, operating underground, apparently still gives PCB some strength in the labor movement. Communist capabilities for organization and leadership in some sections of the Brazilian labor movement if unchecked, would probably compare favorably with those of independent or government~-controlled labor leadership. Under government repression, Communist labor leadership has only limited capabilities to construct an organization of its own, but it does have some power to undermine non-Communist efforts to gain leadership of the workers. Thus in November 1952 non-Communist labor elements called a meeting to establish a National Trade Union Center designed to invigorate the Brazilian labor movement. The Communists took over the meeting and established a Permanent Inter-Syndicate Committee (Commiss&o Inter-Sindical Permanente, CISP) with the reported purpose of destroying existing labor organizations at their national level and replacing them with a Communist apparatus. Communist influence is probably present to a considerable degree in many unions on the national level. Indeed, leaders of non-Commnist federations admitted as much in November 1952 when they announced plans for an educational campaign within their affiliates to alert the membership to both Communist and Argentine efforts at penetration. There are only two national unions which recent reports definitely indicate are under strong Conmunist influence. These are the dockworkers' organization mentioned above and the National Federation of Teamsters and Chauffeurs, with its 26 affiliated unions. In the 1952 union elections a Communist sympathizer was elected president, but only 6 of the 26 affiliates voted and the legality of the election was challenged by the defeated candidate with the support’ of the S80 Paulo teamsters! affiliate. The outcome of the challenge is not known. The strength of Commnists in local unions is a subject of widely varying estimates. Trade-union elections involving approximately 200 locals in the federal capital area during the period April-September, 1952 revealed no overall increase in Commnist strength as measured by changes made in leadership of the unions. Such figures as are available on Communist membership of local unions reveal that it is very small, but a handful of militant Commnists in local trade unions have shown ability to agitate the workers, prolonging and worsening strike situations. In view of PCB's apparent lack of a widespread, tightly organized following in the labor movement, its leaders probably could not hope to organize a general strike or even a series of significant strikes. The Communist national labor front, CTB, belongs to the hemisphere labor front, CTAL. Roberto Morena, CTB leader, is a member of the CTAL — Central Committee. Another Brazilian is a member of the CTAL Secretariat SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 526] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION, -10in charge of CTAL liaison with the Trades Union Departments of the international Communist labor front, WFTU. Still another Brazilian labor leader, Jo&o Amazonas, was a member of the WFTU Secretariat in 1952. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS There are probably between 500 and 1,000 Commnist front. organizations in Brazil, including Local branches of national front movements. The two largest and most widely effective national front organizations are the National Center for the Study and Defense of Petroleum and the National Economy (Centro Nacional de Estudos e Defesa do Petroleo e da Economfa) and the National Organization for the Defense of Peace and Culture (Organizag&o Nacional de Defesa da Paz e da Cultura, sometimes referred to as the Movimento Brasileiro dos Partidarios da Paz) designed to propagate nationalism and isola sm respectively. These organizations have branches in every state, in ali important cities, and in many smaller localities. The Centro Nacional de Estudos e Defesa do Petroleo, which aims at nationalization of Brazilian petroleum resources and the preservation of other Brazilian mineral resources from exploitation by US capital, has had much wider appeal than the "peace movement. In both cases, C Rio, S8 Paulo, and Porto Alegre appear to be the main centers of strength. Millions of Brazilians undoubtedly have been influenced by the activity of both the "petrolLeum-defense" and the "peace" campaigns, but active participants in these movements, and especially the "peace" movement, are relatively few. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, a city of more than two million population, there were, fairly recently, only 623 dues-paying members of the local peace organization. Communist or pro-Communist intellectuals tend to take the leadership of the peace movement, and Brazilian nationalists are especially prominent in the petroleum organization. A relatively small number of Brazilian legislators and government officials -- most of them minor -- are active in one or the other movement on the national level. Members and teaders in one movement tend to be active also in the other. Present indications are that both the peace and the petroleum frorits have reached the peak of their influence, and are probably incapable of any substantial expansion. This is probably especially true of the peace movement, which both the government and the responsible press have combatted vigorously. National fronts whose purposes and activities are to propagate anti-US nationalist and "peace" propaganda include the National Committee against the Brazil-US Military Agreement (Commissao Nacional Contra o Acordo Militar Brasil-Estados Unidos), the Humanitarian SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION. C a EE A LIN === [PDF page 527] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Crusade for the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons (Cruzada Humanitaria pela Prohibag&o das Armas Atémicas), and the League for the Defense of Electric Power (Liga de Defesa da Energia Elétrica). The last-nemed organization is active in Rio and other cities in combatting foreign control of public utilities. The Brazilian Association of Democratic Jurists (Associagéo Brasileira dos Juristas Democratas), whose activities are centered at Rio de Janeiro, is a national front which has special importance internationally, being affiliated with the Communist Internationai Association of Democratic Jurists. The League for the Defense of Democratic Liberties (Liga da Defesa das Libertades DemocrAticas) is another national front of considerable importance. All these organizations appear to be officered mostly by oid-line Communists and chronic joiners of Communist fronts and have few important non-Commnist adherents.: Among organizations of professionals and inteliéctuals Communist infiuence is strong and in some instances predominant. Communists have for several years completely controlled the Brazilian ¥Yriters! Association (Associagio Brasileira do Escritores) of Rio de Janeiro, as a resuot of the resignation of anti-Communist members in disgust at Communist tactics of fraud and force. Various state organizations of writers, over which the Rio de Janeiro organization pretends to exercise control, are in some instances dominated or-strongiy influenced by Communists or pro- Communists. The Communist group among the writers contains some firstrate literary men but in large degree appears to consist of pseudo intellectuals and journalistic hacks. In late 1952 anti-Commnist literary leaders took first steps toward organizing an anti-Communist writérs' association. . Communist organizations among minority groups are especially important among the Poles, who form a sizable colony in southern Brazil. The principal Communist organization among the Poles is the Polish Communist Party. There is also a Communist~infiltrated organization, the Polish Association. These organizations are countered by the Polish Cuitural Union of Brazil, the only national Polish organization in Brazil, which works for the defeat of Communism and the liberation — of Poland. The small Russian colony's Centro Russe, formed in 193 as, a nonpolitical social center, was suspected in early 1951 of being a Russian espionage organ. Armenian cultural associations in Rio de Janeiro and S&o Paulo are reported to be Communist or to contain pro- Communists. The Syrian-Lebanese colony in Belo Horizonte, estimated to consist of 250 to 300 members although not known to be formally organized, is reported to be the financial backbone of the PCB in that city. Among students the Communists stilt exert considerable influence, although in the past year or two they have lost control of the national SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION en TAN === [PDF page 528] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION organizations representing university students, the National Union of Students (Unido Nacional dos Estudantes) and high school students, the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students (Unido Brasileira dos Estudantes | Secundaérios). The Unio Nacional dos Estudantes decided in August 1952 to sever its ties with the International Students' Union, a Communist international front; the vote, 20h to 159, indicated the continuance of a strong Communist or pro-Communist minority in the organization, although for a year or more the group had been free of Communist officers. On both university and secondary school levels, Communists remain in control of some state students organizations. Communist strength among students appears to be especially pronounced in Sao Paulo. It is believed that as a general rule Communist influence among students as a whole is considerably less than in organizations formed to represent the group. The outstanding women's organization of political purpose in. Brazil is apparently the Communist-controlled Federation of Brazilian Women (Federag&o das Mulheres do Brasil), believed to have been founded about 1949 on Communist initiative. This organization, with headquarters at Rio, appears to have branches in S&o Paulo, Ceara, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco, and the State of Rio de Janeiro. It may have branches also in other states. The organization apparently is strongest in Sao Paulo. Delegates attending the first National Women's ms Congress, sponsored by the Brazilian Women's Federation in 1951, are €. reported to have been all Communists. Women in Brazil tend to be politicaliy apathetic. They are also strongly influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. These factors tend to limit expansion of the Federation's influence. VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There is no comprehensive detaiied information available concerning the extent of Communist infiltration of the government. The anti-Commnist press has alleged that there are a number of Communists in high government positions, including the head of the Price Control Commission, the director of the Public Service Administrative Department, President Vargas' private secretary, and several men in the Brazilian Foreign Office or its diplomatic missions. (The Foreign Office is now investigating charges against some of its ‘personnei.) The evidence brought out against most of these men in some instances is sufficient to raise strong doubts as to their loyalties, but it is not fully convincing, especially since the allegations have come in large part from newspapers interested in embarrassing President Vargas. A 1952 report states that there were at that time approximately 80 militants in the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works; 50 each in the Ministry of Education and Public Health and the Ministry of Justice; 4O each in the Ministries of Agriculture, Labor and Finance; C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 529] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -13and one cel] with an unknown number of militants in the Foreign Office. These figures, if correct, indicate that percentagewise, the strength of Communism in the agencies named is very small. Evidence to suggest the level at which their influence can make itself felt, and how, is not available. In the government-owned shipping company, Lloyd Brasileiro, and the nationalized railroad, Estrado do Ferro Central, Communist strength was reported in 1952 as being somewhat larger: about 200 militants and 450 contributing sympathizers in Lloyd Brasileiro and 150 militants and 200 contributing sympathizers in the Estrado do Ferro Central. A number of reports indicate a fairly heavy infiltration of the Federal Service for Protection of the Indians. Concerning infiltration of police and security services there is only scattered information. The low pay and social origins of many policemen would seem to tend to make them vulnerable to Communism, however. Communist Party membership in the armed services has frequently been estimated as about 5 percent at the maximum, with the navy probably _ less heavily infiltrated than the other two service branches. Membership is believed to be limited largely to enlisted men and noncommissioned officers and to include few, if any, commissioned officers above the middle echelons. According to a report of late 1951 there were 105 militants in the Ministry of Air, 90 each in the Ministries of War and Navy, and 150 militants and 450 contributing sympathizers at the Navy Arsenal. Apparently most of the Communist group at the Navy Arsenal, and presumably many of the alleged Communists in the service ministries, are civilian employees. The government recently dismissed a number of alleged Communist workers at the Navy Arsenal, and has been arresting and bringing to trial alleged Commmist servicemen. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION There is good indication that Communists and their sympathizers are fairly numerous in the fields of education and entertainment (including radio) and in the non-Communist press. For Brazil as a whole there are no precise data available as to the number of Commnists in these activities, and there is no adequate basis for estimating the number of people subject thereby to Commnist propagandae ~ A 1952 US Embassy report states that key positions in several Sao Paulo radio stations (unidentified) are held by Communists, including six Communists who are either program directors or station announcers. A similar situation is reported with regard to radio stations in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre. In the latter city one of the leading stations is directed by a suspected Communist. Radio Tupi and Radio Difusora may be two of the stations reported to be under Communist influence in - Sao Paulo. Communist influence in religious groups is small. The Greek Orthodox Church in Belo Horizonte, composed entirely of Syrians and Lebanese, reportedly looks to Moscow for its orientation. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 530] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -l- oo € IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES Except in isolated instances on the local level, Communist influence in right-wing organizations and political parties appears to be negligible, although the ultranationalism of some members of conservative groups sometimes appears to put them in the same camp with the Communists. Left-wing, non-Commnist organizations and parties are relatively few in Brazil. The most radical of these groups is the small Brazilian Socialist Party, which recently has appeared to be under considerable Communist influence. Other parties (such as Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party) offering programs more or less leftist in orientation tend to be officered at the top by conservatives, although in the lower echelons, and especially at municipal levels, there appears frequently to be considerable Commnist influence. X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA A. Communist Publications The Communists publish a fairly large number of newspapers and periodicals in Brazil, most of them small in circulation and poor in quality. Total circulation has been estimated at 50,000. Twenty~six Communist publications are listed below according to place of publication. In addition the Communists are believed to produce a number of small €. periodicals pointed toward special groups such as labor unions and the - armed forces. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals. Place of Publication Title and Frequency Circulation Rio de Janeiro Imprensa Popular (daily) Variously estimated (Federal District) at between 20~30,000 and at about 5,000 A Voz Operéria (weekly) 15-25,000 Momento Femenino (weekly) Literatura (monthly) Problemas: Revista Mensal de Nearly 20,000 of one Cultura Politica “issue published in a early 1951 (including 5,000 for S& Paulo, 3,500 for Fed. District, 1,500 for Rio Grande do Sul, more than 700 each for Rio de Janeiro, Cc Bahia, and Minas Gerais) Para Todos (monthly) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 531] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 Place of Publication S&o Paulo Belém Belo Horizonte Campo Grande Curitiba Florianopolis Fortaleza Goiana Guaratingueta Maceié Manaus Porto Alegre Recife Salvador . Santos Taubaté Vitoria Uberlandia SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -15- Title and Frequency O Popular de Hoje (weekly) Fundamentos (monthly) Tribuna do Para (semi-monthly) Jomnal de Povo (datiy) Micrdbio (clandestine publication) Jornal do Povo (weekly) Novos Dias (monthly) O Democratica (daiiy) Circulation 200 200 1,500 © Estado de Goias (thrice weekly) Folha Popular (weekly) Voz do Povo (irregular) A luta (weekly) Tribuna Géucha (daily but, irregular) Folha do Povo (daiiy) _ A Tribuna 0 Povo (weekly) Folha Capixaba (weekly) Tribuna do Povo SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION oo to 1,000 1,000 - 1,500 Reported 6,000 to 8,000, but probably much less [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 532] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION B. Pro-Communist, Disguised Publications There are undoubtedly some such publications in Brazil, but they would for the most part be of iittle significance. Two years ago, there were at least two publications of this type in the Federal District, one of which was entitled Emancipagao, which appealed to Brazilian nationalists interested in preventing foreign exploitation of Brazilian petroleum and other mineral resources. Emancipagao, which may still be published, very soon lost its nen-Conmunist disguise. C. Communist Printing Establishments Information on Communist printing establishments is scanty. Two publishing houses founded by the PCB -- Edigées Horizontes and Editorial Vitoria, in the Federal District -- are known to have published until 1947 Russian-language books in Portuguese translation. These firms may still be active. Waldir Duarte, Editor, Livros- Revistas-Jornais, of the Federal District, was reported in 1951 to be engaged in the publication and distribution of Voz Operaéria and other Communist publications. Grafico Luxo Arte e OZON, also in the Federal District, reportedly have been. used ©; by the PCB to print its propaganda. Commnist publishing houses in Belo Horizonte are reported to include Grafico Neptunia and Tipografia Cruzeiro. C DD. Import of Communist Publications from Abroad Soviet newspapers reportedly are not available for public purchase but may be obtained by a few select customers at a few bookstores or newsstands. A small number of Soviet publications also enters the country by mail on a subscription basis. Satellite publications from Czechosiovakia and especially Poland reportedly are received in much larger quantities directly from Europe, in part (at least until recently) by diplomatic pouch. Polish publications are believed to have a wide circulation among Slavic groups. Montevideo is reported to be an important transfer point for import into Brazil of some Communist publications from abroad. Foreign Communist publications which are reported received in Brazil include the Soviet publications Unién Soviética and Mundo Estudiantil, and the pro-Communist Ukrainian Daily News, of New York. The Soviet publications Tiempos Novo and Literatura Soviética probably also enter Brazil. E. Radio The Moscow radio broadcasts one-half an hour daily in Portuguese to Brazil. The broadcasts are of high intensity and intelligibility, but their potential audience is limited by the fact that they cannot SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 533] === IEE EE EE ELL LLL ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -17be received on standard home radios except those equipped with short wave bands. Soviet programs are not -- or were not in 1951 —-. rebroadcast from any point outside the USSR or within Brazil. The propaganda nature of Soviet broadcasts is completely obvious, and they probably have slight if any influence among non-Communist groups. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION No specific data which would serve to give a general picture. of PCB revenues and financial assets are available. The general. financial condition of the party appears to be shaky. The printing facilities and paper used for Communist publications in most instances are poor and the Communist press is frequently in financial difficulties. XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS Poland and Czechoslovakia are the only countries of the Soviet- Satellite Bloc which maintain diplomatic relations with Brazii. Their missions at Rio de Janeiro are small, consisting of two diplomatic representatives in the case of Poland and four in the case of Czechoslovakia. Poland maintains a consulate general at SHo Paulo and a consul at Curitiba. There is also a Polish consular agent at Porto Alegre. ( Both Poland and Czechoslovakia maintain ostensibly commercial enterprises in Brazil. These firms reportedly contribute to the financial support of the PCB and are also said to operate as centers for espionage. The commercial firms with Czechoslovakian connections are ASHES either subsidiaries of Czech state trading organizations bearing similar names or are appointed representatives of the state trading corporations. The Polish Legation sponsors two known trading organizations. A third such enterprise was established by a representative of the Polish Red Cross. With regard to propaganda, Polish representatives are much more active and influential than are the Czechoslovakians. Polish consular establishments in southern Brazil are especially important centers for ‘the distribution of propaganda among the large Slavic population of the vegion. Polish efforts appear to be directed mainly toward influencing Slavic groups. However, both the Polish Minister at Rio and the Consul General at SHo Paulo have also endeavored to promote Polish infiuence among non=Polish Brazilian groups through social and cultural activities, as have consular officials in other areas. | Polish diplomatic and consular establishments print or sponsor the printing of a number of publications in Brazil. These include A Polénia de Hoje, a monthly publication printed and distributed by the Pollsh ~~ mission at Rios; Siewca, a weekly controlled by the Polish mission and ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 534] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION serving as a propaganda organ of the Polish Communist party; Kurier Polski, a Polish-language weekly published in Sao Paulo under sponsorship of the. Polish mission; a Polish news bulletin — for distribution to the Brazilian press -- published by the Polish Cultural Union (Uniao ea ee SS Oe Polish mission; and Glos Marynarza, a clandestine newspaper published by the Polish consul gen general at Sao Paulo. The Czech mission puts out at least one propaganda magazinee XII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Brazilian front corresponding to the International Association of Democratic Jurists, international Commnist front, was host at a regional meeting, the * Continental Conference of Democratic Jurists of America held in Rio de Janeiro in November-December 1952. The meting was attended by Communists and fellow travellers from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, ‘Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Mexico. "Attendance of Brazilian delegations at meetings of Communist - international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period. 1951-52.- Meeting Date Brazilian Representation C World Peace. Council (Berlin) February 1951 a Regional Meeting, Partisans of Peace (Montevideo) April 1951 4 Conference of Latin American Land and Air Transport Workers (Guatemala City) May 1951 1 Third World Youth Festival (Berlin) August 1951 about 100 Sth Congress of International Association of Democratic Jurists (Berlin) September 1951 8 American Continental Congress of Peace Partisans (Montevideo) (no public sessions held) March 1952 about 100 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION { === [PDF page 535] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Meeting Date Brazilian Representation Moscow Economic. Conference. (Moscow) April 1952 12 (or more) International Conference in Defense of Children (Vienna) _ dpril 1952. 4 13th Session, Executive Council, International Federation of Democratic Women (Bucharest) July 1952 1 (possibly more) CTAL Central Committee Meeting (Mexico City) September 1952 1L Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference (Peiping) October 1952: 3 All-Union Communist Party Congress (Moscow) October 1952. 2 World Congress of Peoples for Peace (Vienna) December 1952 about 50 XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK Little is known definitely concerning the nature of the Communist international communications network. ‘The Czech and Polish missions at Rio are available for use in international communications.. The Soviet mission at Montevideo also may be important in the international communications network of the PCB, with the large and freely operating Communist-dominated Slaic Union of Uruguay possibly serving as an intermediary. Brazilian Communists travelling between Brazil and Europe doubtless serve frequently as couriers. Internally, intercommnication between Communists appears to be effected without difficulty. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 536] === SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION:. eee! ge Te he pd x ton ees Seas Y. fag, Be ett 3 Ne Sasa Ae TF sate:; eo ae " OFFICE SRESEARCE . nay soprge t Pe [Unreadable] eh PS 6 EA Kt 73 Ceaaa tee a “ mages Approved For Release 200//0 ): O9ROOUSO0008000 1-4 === [PDF page 537] === EE IEE EIEN ETE LT Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page Foreword eee eevee eee € @ © 0° eoeoeveeeee ere - id OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES o « e L Te Objectives see eee eee cece ccc eccee 1 II, Tactics see esecececesececcceves 1 III, Capabilities «se cevcccrssccsreecvscsecece 3 oe ASSETS 2c cece sccee 3 5 Te Numerical Strength sssesesecescececes 5 Tie Hlectoral Strength ss eeseececssececes 5 IIT, Military Strength and Organization for Violent action 6 C.. rv. Government Policy Toward Communism. e es ew cce ee 6 Ve ‘Communist Influence in Labor « « coors eccoce 7 vs VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and - Professional Organizations «eseececceccccee 9 Vit. Communist Infiltration into Goverment...-2.ee- VIIT. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. ee 12 IX. Communist Infiltration of Non—Commnist Political Parties © @ eee ee eo eee eo © ee 6 8 eee 12. Xe Communist Propaganda Media «se. ececessecceccvee 12 XI. Financial Condition..eesecsccceccccce it XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assete ws eesessees I XIII. Communist International Organizations.seeeses 15 XIV. Communist Communication Network. «eee. eeeee 16 | C.. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 538] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD . This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-. vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, C providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information - 48 inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - Cone. | | ii === [PDF page 539] === “Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN CHILE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES I. OBJECTIVES The chief concern of the Chilean Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile, PCCh) is repeal of the anti-Communist Defense of. Democracy Law of 1948 which seriously restricts the party's ability. to achieve its other objectives. These are mainly objectives which directly impair US-Chilean relations and by so doing fulfill foreign policy requirements of the USSR. They include (1) abrogation of the Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) with the United States, (2) nationalization of US-owned copper mines, (3) resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet bloc, and (4) creation of an anti-US... bloc of Latin American countries as advocated by Chilean nationalists. The ‘objective of regaining legal status through repeal of the » Defense of Democracy Law imposes certain tactical limitations upon | -. PCCh. efforts to attain its other immediate objectives, counseling.as-. it does moderate and constitutional methods of action. Such consti-. tutional methods of action are apparently viewed by the Chilean | Communists as more effective, at least for the time being, ‘than. violence.. It. TACTICS - The underlying strategic policy ofthe PCCh is to attempt to.» win a direct following among key social groups -- labor, students,and intellectuals -— and to use this following to exert pressure upon. | national policy. Current PCCh strategy is implemented through. the. Communist-led "People's Front", which serves as the political. instru-: ment of agitation for national liberation" and for the specific» »... immediate objectives of PCCh. Unlike the old Chilean Popular Front, - this political front is dominated by the Communists and is nota... | major political force. Communist organizational efforts among the. wee key social groups are directed to unifying these groups under the. “leadership of Communists and Communist sympathizers so that they may give strength to. the demands of the "People's Front". ; PCCh has not committed its political front to either the new regime led by nationalist ex-dictator Carlos Ibanez or to the defeated Radical Party which in.former years worked with the Communists -in the Popular Front. Although the Communists opposed Ibdnez in the September 4, 1952 election, they hailed his victory as a defeat for the United States and offered him the conditional support of the | "People's Front" for a program of "liberation" from-US influence. They present their political action as designed to offset ‘the influence of the rightists on the Tbanez administration and to force. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 540] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION the administration to keep its campaign promises, which included repeal. of the Defense of Democracy Law, opposition to US influence, and trade and diplomatic relations with all the countries of the world. On the other hand, the Communists are maneuvering into _ electoral combinations with the defeated Radical Party, which has been moving left since its fall from power, ‘and they have found Radical and other non-Commnist allies in labor and student groups © that oppose Ibanez. Long influential in labor, the Communists have used unions: under their domination as effective instruments to promote their ob-. jectives. Their ability to hold together a labor following has hinged largely upon their success in settling worker grievances and... the skill of Communist lawyers in handling involved labor-management negotiations. Communist-influenced unions have brought pressure on ‘government officials, have fomented numerous strikes, and have “ staged public demonstrations in favor of such Communist objectives «~ = as repealing the anti-Communist law. In its efforts to regain og legality:, the party has, when possible, avoided taking open leader—:” ship in strikes. To its labor target PCCh stresses the need of os unity to prevent government control of labor as in Argentina., Communist propaganda to students and. youth lays major stress on the peace motif. Emphasizing that in all countries youth is the i C first victim of war, the PCCh endeavors to create a feeling of international youth solidarity by recruiting delegates to international: Communist-dominated youth conferences and otherwise encouraging a ~ agkares spirit of international camaraderie. Enthusiastic delegates returning from such conferences have been widely used to rally new members for.... the PCCh. The Commnists have also used students effectively in. demonstrations against high prices and the Defense of Democracy Law because of government hesitation to use force against student — a demonstrators. — SO — le In addition to labor and student targets, the Communists are. attempting to influence many other groups through a wide variety of Communist fronts, including price-control committees which appeal to housewives, friendship centers for foreign groups in Chile, and clubs for artistic and literary groups. The Communists. developed clandestine methods of operation.in. the period 1948-50 when the Defense of Democracy Law was fully en-" forced and- PCCh still operates clandestinely to some extent. Its; underground tactics included attempts to exert influence on labor at” the lower levels and to continue propaganda operations through a.. range of Communist fronts and clandestine publications. mo SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 541] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION Contacts between the Soviet bloc and Chile are maintained by Chilean Communist officials or their trusted sympathizers, who at fairly regular intervals visit the Soviet orbit or exchange views with Communist party leaders from other Latin American countries who _- have been to Moscow. Moscow directs two and one-half hour radio programs to Latin America daily, and Budapest an hour program. Soviet literature comes into Chile direct from the Soviet bloc or from Uruguay, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. The PCCh is believed at the present time to receive little financial aid from outside the country. III. CAPABILITIES The Communists now face both favorable and unfavorable factors in attaining, their objectives. Favorable factors include the new Ibdnez administration's support for the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law and the similarity between Communist objectives and some of those advocated by Ibdénez' nationalistic supporters. The Interior Minister, the Public Works Minister, and the new chief delegate to the UN have long been sympathetic to certain Communist activities, such as propaganda for "peace", and agitation for greater revenues from the US copper companies. Apparently through their ties with the Interior Minister, the Communists have reportedly obtained permission to hold a meeting of the Communist-dominated Latin — American Confederation of Labor (Confederacién de Trabajadores de America Latina, CTAL) in Santiago in March and a Continental Cultural Conference at about the same time. The new foreign Minister, although long hostile to Communism, is nevertheless a leading advocate of a - Latin American economic bloc. The Communists are also having some success in interesting the Radicals in the restoratiaqn of a Popular Front. The Communist-Socialist candidate in the senatorial by-election of January 4, 1953 received considerable Radical support. The threat of possible government moves toward control of labor has played into the hands of the Communists in their efforts to rally labor unity against such a development. The Communists' greatest recent membership gains have reportedly been among youth groups. This may stem in part from the PCCh success in sending Latin America's most influential delegation, including some prominent Catholic student leaders, to the Berlin Youth Festival in 1951. Communist propaganda has also had considerable success among teachers, and the Teachers Federation shows strong Communist influence. The Communist press is allowed to circulate freely, and two Communist senators have been permitted ta remain in congress despite the illegality of the party. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 542] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - mn a e These factors favoring the Communists are balanced and in some respects outweighed by unfavorable factors. In the September 4, 1952 presidential election, the Communist-supported candidate won only 52,000 votes out of 900,000 in contrast to Ibadnez' huge vote of 435,000. The Radical Party and its allies ran well behind the anti- Communist right-wing parties. Ibanez is thus in a strong position to curtail Commnist activities as he did in his previous administra-_ tion if the party becomes more aggressive. Ibanez knows that the US is Chile's main copper market and its principal source of loans; hence, he is not likely to be easily influenced by Commnist demands that Chile pursue a clear-cut anti-US policy. The Communists also face increasing competition in labor, including the growing strength of the rival Popular Socialists, who now control the Labor Ministry, the expanding influence of the Catholic Falange in the nitrate fields, and the new labor confederation of Ibénez' leading woman supporter, violently anti-Communist Senator Marfa de la Cruz. Although the Popular Socialists and the Falange might join with the Commnists to oppose government control of labor, they are well versed in Communist maneuvers and would be unlikely to lend themselves to Commnist campaigns in general. Both parties have at times criticized the US but they have been even more critical of the USSR. Furthermore, the Commmnists have so far been notably unsuccessful in their efforts to penetrate the Armed Forces and the national police. C Although the political: situation in Chile is still fluid under the new administration, there seems little likelihood that the Communists will attain their immediate objectives, with the possible exception of the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law. Since its election, the Ibanez administration has specifically stated that itdoes not intend to nationalize copper, abrogate the Mutual Security Agreement, or resume relations with the Soviet. Although some of Ibanez advisers: favor a Latin American economic bloc, Ibanez himself has been noncommittal since his election. If Chile's economic situation should deteriorate, however, the administration would be under increasing pressure to pursué extremist policies, some of which would be favorable to the Communists. ‘SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION C === [PDF page 543] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN CHILE: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH PCCh is believed to have about 35,000 members at,the| present time, or about two-thirds of the membership it claimed in 1947 prior to the outlawing of the party. Most Communist membership is located in the strategically important mining centers of the north, in major urban centers, and in the coal-mining areas. Labor provides the bulk of PCCh membership although intellectuals, students, and professional people are qualitatively as important to the party. PCCh has apparently maintained a satisfactory level of organization and operation despite membership losses since being outlawed in 1948. The party has carried out several minor purges in this period to tighten party organization and to eliminate members suspected of weakness or disloyalty. Dissensions and purges do not seem to have lowered the readiness of the party membership that remained loyal after 1948 to accept the ‘party line. Party leadership is in the hands of a predominantly middle-aged "old guard", most of whom. have had 20 years or more of service in the Communist movement. Political Commission members must have at least 10 years as. militants in the party. Most of PCCh's 35,000 members have at least _ five years of service in the party ranks. Party membership dipped sharply following the outlawing of PCCh in 1948 and has made some slight recovery since 1950, when the party was able to resume more or less overt operation. a II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH The candidate of the Communist-Socialist People's Front _ (Frente del Pueblo) won only 52,000 votes (5 percent of the total) in the September 4, 1952 elections. Many fellow travellers reportedly ’ defected to the victorious candidate, Carlos Ibanez, who made a strong appeal to leftist and mass groups. In January 4, 1955 by-elections for Senator of Santiago Province (national capital and environs), the candidate of the People's Front won 68,000 votes ( 33 percent of the total). This area is a center of Communist strength and the Front candidate also had the support of,any members of the major opposition Radical Party. Should the Communists, as is now anticipated, regain legal status, the Communist-Socialist ticket might be able to rally 80,000 votes in the March 1953 elections for Congress, or approximately 9 percent of the probable total vote. The division of the national vote of about 900,000 in the March 1953 elections is expected to be about as follows: SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 544] === —— eee EE Eee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Government~supporting parties 380, 000 Rightist parties 255,000 Center-left parties 185,000 People's Front 80,000 Where the People's Front is strongest, its vote is expected to compare with that of the other major party groupings as follows: Santiago Antofagasta Concepcidn. Valparaiso People's Front 32,000 | 4,000 ' 10,000 8,000 Government 130,000 12,000 25,000 40,000 Right - 70,000 3,000 12,000 20,000 Center-left 40,000 6,000" 12,000 ~° 15,000 III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION - PCCh at present opposes use of armed insurrection or violence to effect Communist objectives. There have been no violent Communist demonstrations since April 1949 when 19 or more persons were wounded in resisting police action to break up an illegal meeting of several thousand Communists and sympathizers in Santiago. In 1951 three party leaders who favored use of violent tactics were expelled from | PCCh. Should PCCh revise its policy, which was outlined in a mani-~ C festo of August 1952, it is believed that the party. could, under certain circumstances, bring out four to five thousand demonstrators in the capital city of Santiago. Probably only a fraction of this SEL number would be willing to use violence. PCCh apparently has no; armed units, but some Communists have collected arms in their homes. — Police investigation of an explosio. in a Commnist worker's home in 1950 revealed an arms cache of 12 wzachine guns, a number of home-made cartridges, and other materiel i IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM PCCh was outlawed by the Defense of Democracy Law of September 3, 1948. The present administration has promised repeal of the law, which might be effected prior to the March 1953 congressional elections. In the event of Communist disturbances, however, the administration could» invoke the Law on the Internal Security of the State or request special emergency powers which are usually granted. For two years after the passage of the 1948 measure outlawing PCCh, its activities and ability to circulate propaganda were severely circumscribed. The law aroused strong opposition from non-Communist as well as Communist labor because of certain restrictive features affecting labor organizations in general, and it has not been strictly SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 545] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -7enforced since 1950. Communist activity was, in any case, never - wholly eliminated because PCCh set up a number of Communist fronts -and also continued to wield influence in labor at the shop level of labor organizations. Communist propaganda now circulates freely. — Should the government again undertake measures to curtail PCCh activity, the party would no doubt make use of its experience in the period 1948-50, when the anti-Communist law was enforced, to carry on covert operations and disseminate propaganda through fronts. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR Communists have been denied union office under Chile's anti- Communist legislation and the government made strong efforts in the period 1948-50 to stifle all Communist activity in the labor movement. These efforts did not succeed, in large part because of the absence of effective labor leaders of other parties and the inability of the Chilean workers to gain hoped-for unity and effectiveness without the collaboration of Communist labor elements. For a time it appeared that the National Association of White-collar Workers (Junta Nacional de Empleados de Chile, JUNECH), a strong and largely non-Communist organization, might point the way toward reorganization of workers on a unified basis independent of Communist influence. JUNECH, however, has recently been working in cooperation with the Communists to form a@ unified organization of white-collar and manual workers. The degree of collaboration of the white-collar unions with the Commnist-led - workers may increase as the two groups find’ a common cause in opposing a projected government-controlled workers federation. Commmist labor leaders are reportedly in virtually_uncontested control of unions in the nitrates fields and coal mines. The major” copper workers' federation is anti~Communist, but the Communists continue to command a minority following among copper-mine labor. At present the Communists are not believed to have mech strength in the railway federation or in communications. If, however, the promises of certain government officials to restore to their jobs workers discharged for political purposes are kept, there may occur a recrudescence of Communist influence in railway and communications unions. There are no reliable figures on the present membership of the Communist-controlled Confederation of Chilean Workers (Confederacién de Trabajadores de Chile, CTCh) or on the Communist element therein. CTCh claims to represent 400,000 manual and white-collar workers, although it admits that these workers are not all members of affiliates of the Communist CTCh. As the total legal trade-union membership in 1950 was 262,000 plus another 100,000 government employees and railroad workers in unions without legal status, this claim appears to be exaggerated. Most CTCh affiliates, as the National Mining Federation " SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 546] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION (Federacién Nacional Minera) and the National Metallurgical Federation (Federacion Nacional Metalirgica) are doubtless Communist-controlled. Nevertheless, the majority ot rank-and-file members probably have little real understanding of the meaning of Communism and are interested mainly in the material benefits promised to them by the Communist leaders. Labor organizations that are not controlled by the Communists, but that are strongly influenced by PCCh on the national level, include affiliates of the important National Association of White-collar Workers (JUNECH). Estimated membership of JUNECH is about 110,000 and includes both government and private employees. Communist penetration of JUNECH affiliates, though probably slight on a numerical basis, is significant because of the posts held by Communists. Thus the JUNECH official organ is under the virtual control of a Communist administrator and its Communist editor. The Secretary of Organization and the Secretary of Union Problems of the association of white-collar workers in private industry are Communists. The president of the association of government employees, while not a Communist, has become a complete tool of the Communists. The teacherst federation is reportedly Communist-controlled and if the new government rehires teachers dismissed by the previous regime under the Defense of Democracy Law provisions, Communist strength would be even further augmented. The president and two of the principal leaders of the semigovernment workers' federation are Communists. Thus, while JUNECH relatively seldom follows the Communist line as such, its affiliates are very susceptible to Communist influence. The Communists have taken the lead in groups working for a national labor confederation to include all workers, both manual and white-collar and have worked closely with leaders of JUNECH in these endeavors. Strong Commnist influence was apparent in the National Unifying Movement for Workers, formed in 1950, and the National Committee for Workers and Employees, set up in late 1951. The underlying Communist purpose in encouraging the establishment of these | committees was to try to unify labor into a central organization subject to Communist guidance. A so-called "National Committee for ‘Syndical Unity", which includes representatives of all major labor groups, was formed in October 1952. The Commnist CTCh is sponsoring -a meeting scheduled for February 1953 to carry out the objectives of this Committee. The Communist CTCh is affiliated with the Communist-controlled Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL) and is represented on the CTAL Central Committee. CTCh is also affiliated with the WFIU and the CTCh affiliate, the National Metallurgical Federation, is affiliated with WFTU's international trades department in this field. _ SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 547] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The PCCh has set up a wide variety of front organizations directed toward youths, women, professional, artists, intellectuals and miscellaneous groups that can be interested in the PCCh goals of "peace" and friendship with countries in the Soviet bloc. The largest and most influential front group is the Peace Movement (Movimiento por la Paz, MPP), which is affiliated with the World Peace Council. The size of its membership is not know, but it has branches in all the larger cities. Its directorate includes not only top Communists but also influential non-Comunists such as Interior Minister Guillermo del Pedregal, MPP president until his recent cabinet appointment. Since the organization has close ties with members of the Ibanez administration, its capabilities for expansion would appear to be improved. In addition to the MPP, the PCCh has set up additional peace fronts to attract specific groups, including the Youth Committee for Peace, the National Committee of Labor Partisans for Peace, and the Spanish Committee for Peace. Closely allied with the Peace Movement are the various centers of "friendship" with nations of the Soviet bloc, such as the Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union, three committees relating to Commnist China, one to Poland, and two each to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The © size of these "friendship" centers is not known, but more than 1,000 persons attended a function of the Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union on November 7, 1952, the anniversary of the Russian revolution. In the group. were members of the Chilean Committee of Friends of Czechoslovakia (Comité de Amigos de Checoeslovaquia), Friends of; Hungary Center (Centro de Amigos de Hungaria), Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute (Instituto Chileno-Chino de Cultura), Friends of Poland Center (Centro de Amigos de Polonia), and other front groups; numerous members of the Jewish colony, most of whom are foreigners; and many students from the Unitersity of Chile. PCCh apparently con- i - siders these "friendship" centers a valuable method of attracting non= Communists to help promote Soviet international objectives, including increased trade between Chile and the Soviet bloc. In some instances, an anti-Communist organization has sprung up to rival the Communist ' center. For example, the Polish Union of Chile and the Czech Union are both strongly anti-Communist. For Chilean youths, one of the key PCCh targets, the party continually organizes new fronts to attract additional non-Communist — leadership. Two youth fronts now in the field are the Popular Youth Movement (Movimiento Juvenil opel ) and the Front of Popular Youth (Frente de Juventudes Populares), which have their strongest following SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 548] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -10in the cities, particularly the university centers of Santiago, © Valparaiso, and Concepcidn. Although the Communists have hitherto been the most active party in the youth field, they are now receiving increasing competition from the new Ibanista youth movement. - Some of the most active Communist fronts have been set up to attract artistic and professional groups. Among these are the Alliance of Intellectuals of Chile (Alianza de Intelectuales de Chile, AICh), — Continental Art Group (Grupo de Arte Continente), "Gabriela Mistral" Artistic Society (Conjunto Artistico "Gabriela Mistral"), Union of Painters (Unién de Pintores), Experimental Theater (Teatro Experimental), ), and Committee of Democratic Lawyers (Comité de Abogados Democraticos), the Journalists’! Cooperative (Cooperativa de Periodistas). The numeri-. cal size of these fronts is not know. They are strongest in Santiago and other populous centers and they have succeeded in attracting a _ mumber of influential non-Communists, including poetess Gabriela Mistral, Nobel Prize winner. Communist fronts to attract women have not been particularly successful. The leading Communist front in this field, the Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Women (Movimiento Pro-Rnancipacién de la Mujer de Chile, MEMCh), which was originally established to work for national suffrage for women, is considerably less influential than the non-Communist Chilean Federation of Women's Institutions (Federacién Chilena de Instituciones Femininas, FECHIF). The PCCh failure to attract women was shown in the presidential election of September 1952 when the Communist-supported candidate had little feminine support in contrast to Ibanez' large following. The PCCh continues, however, to operate fronts designed to attract women such as the Foundation for the Protection of Childhood (Defensa de la Ninez) and the National Housing Front (Frente Nacional de la Vivienda). Among minority groups in Chile, the well-established Germans in southern Chile are the most important. ‘hey are generally anti- Communist, and so far as is known no Communist fronts exist for this group. The Yugoslavs, who are widely dispersed in Chile, are also preponderantly anti-Stalinist. Spanish refugees who have entered Chile in recent years are usually pro-Communist. They are active in the various "peace" fronts and in the Confederation for Aid to the Spanish Democracy (Confederacién de Ayuda a la Democracia Espanola). ~ A number of Communist fronts have been set up for Jewish residents and refugees. Among these are the Zionist Federation (federacién Sionista de Chile), Representative Comnittee of the Jewish Community (Comité Representativo de la Colectividad Israelita de Chile), - Maccabi Jewish Sport Club (Club Deportivo Israelita Maccabi), and the _ Committee for the Protection oF Jewish Immigrants (Comité de ‘Proteccién ®& los Imigrantes Israelitas). Many of these, however, have their | counterpart anti-Communist organization. One of the more recent PCCH - SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 549] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 — SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION | -fronts is the Chilean-lindu Cultural Center (Centro Cultural Chileno- Hindu), organized by top Communist leaders for the stated purpose of diffusing information on the attributes of Hindu culture. Since the PCCh was outlawed, it has set up one front after another to agitate for the repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law. The most active front in this field at present is the National Executive Committee of the Movement for Liberty and Human Rights (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional del Movimiento por la Libertad y Derechos Humanos), which includes on its directorate such influential non-Communists as Clotario Blest, president of the government employees federation. The PCCh also attempts to infiltrate non-Commnist organizations in addition to establishing its own fronts. Two of the most important successfully penetrated are the influential Students Federation of the. Communist propaganda campaigns. At present the Communists appear to be infiltrating some of the nationalist organizations such as the Committee to Defend the Interests of Chile and Latin America, which; could readily be used to create difficulties for the United States. © VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT Following the outlawing of PCCh in 1948, the Gonzalez Videla administration removed most Commmnists and fellow travellers from government positions. In the present regime of Prewident Ibénez, pgs two of the 12 members of the Cabinet are reportedly Communist sympathizers: Interior Minister Guillermo del Pedregal and Public Works Minister Humberto Martones. Whether they will stay in office long. “enough to bring Communists into their ministries in significant nunber remains to be seen. The Communists have been notably unsuccessful in efforts to gain influence in the armed services at the top level. The Commnist youth organization has been instructed to penetrate the armed services, but there is no indication that it is succeeding in this mission. There is no evidence of any Communist influence in the police and security. services. Communist influence in associations of government employees affiliated with the white coller workers federation (JUNECH) indicates that there is significant infiltration of the government service, especially in the teaching field, at middle and lower levels. With the relaxation of the Defense of Democracy Law, which forced many Com-.:*.. * munists out of government positions, some Communists have returned. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 550] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION a [Unreadable] VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Communist influence is strong in the educational system although the nunber of Communist teachers is not known. The Federation ‘of Teachers, the Union of Professors, and the Alliance of Intellectuals are Communist-dominated. The Director of the National Symphony is a Communist; the Experimental Theater is highly influenced by Communism; and the leading art magazine of Chile, Pro-Arte, is Communist. The important student federation at the University of Chile showed strong Communist direction in its latest student election, in which a Communist- Radical-Socialist coalition won control of the organization. | There is no Commmnist influence in the Church, which, on the contrary, is a leading anti-Communist force. Most of the press and all of the radio stations are anti-Communist. IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES When the Communists were disenfranchised by the Defense of Democracy Law in 1948, many of them infiltrated other parties, including. even some of the anti-Communist rightist groups. The Communists have very little, if any, influence in the top levels of the rightist parties. The parties most seriously infiltrated by Communists were those €. on the left, including the Radical Party, the Falange, and the People's, Democratic Party. The Social Christian Conservative Party (center) also may have been infiltrated to some extent. The Communists are curently trying to interest these parties and the Socialists in forming TERE a leftist front.: X. COMNUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA The principal Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and _ periodicals in Chile (most of which are published in Santiago) with estimated circulation, publisher and frequency of publication are as follows: Communist Name Circula tion - Publishing House Frequency El Siglo 25,000-30 000 Empresa Period{fstica daily Horizonte Vistazo 25,000 Empresa Periodistica weekly Horizonte SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION ae €. cored === [PDF page 551] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -13 - Name Circulation | Publishing House Frequency Nuestro Tiempo 3,000-10,000 Talleres Graficos monthly Lautaro Paz na Empresa Period{stica sporadic —_— Horizonte Principios na na sporadic Pro-Arte 5,000 na weekly Tribuna Feminina na na sporadic El Yespertar. na na na (Tarapaca) ee Popular na na na Antofagasta) aoe Siglo na na na Coquimbo ) Independencia de na organ of Communist sporadic Espana Spanish front Pro-Comnunist Las Noticias de. 18, 000-35, 000 Empresa Periodistica daily Ultima Hora Horizonte Las Noticias 15,000-45, 000 Empresa Periodfstica daily Fradicas Horizonte The major printing establishments of the Communist and pro- Communist press are the Empresa Periodfstica Horizonte and Talleres Graficos Lautaro (formerly Imprenta Pacifico). The equipment of the Empresa Empresa Periodistica Horizonte is good. It includes six linotypes, a large stock of type, a quarter-size mercury press, and a good supply of type correction instruments, among other equipment. Talleres Graficos recently installed a new press. Although Chile does not maintain relations with the Soviet orbit at the present time, publications of Soviet orbit diplomatic missions -in Mexico and international Communist fronts, especially the labor and peace fronts, are imported in unknown quantity. SECRET —- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 552] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] The Communists do not control or influence domestic radio broadcasting stations. Soviet orbit stations broadcast to Chile, including daily programs of two and one half hours from Moscow and one hour from Budapest. The broadcasting hours are in the early evening and the reception is good under favorable weather conditions. Many Communists are reported to listen regularly to these programs. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION The size of present party revenues is not know. “In 1948 PCCh reportedly received three million pesos (about $30,000) from membership fees. There are reported to be some three thousand pro- | fessionals in the party, each of whom was asked to lend the party 10,000 pesos (about $100) in 1950, but apparently only a limited number complied. The party also attempts to collect funds by means of quotas assigned to its units throughout the country and through | special fund-raising affairs. Few business firms in Chile are Commnist-controlled and funds from this source are believed to be small. PCCh, so far as is know, receives little financial aid from abroad for operations within Chile, with the exception of books sentywithout charge from Communist publishing houses abroad, which are sold to help maintain the expenses — of Communist propaganda. C Before the passage of the Defense of Democracy Law in 1948, the party was reported to receive a considerable part of its revenues SRROADY from Communist-controlled unions. No recent information has been re- - eeived on its present revenue from this source. The party receives - some revenues from collections regularly made at meetings of Communist front organizations. ’ Reports on PCCh finances in 1951 indicated that the party was in acute financial difficulties. Concrete reports for 1952 are not available, but the party's expanding publications program suggests that its financial condition has improved. MII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS ‘There are no Soviet orbit diplomatic, trade, or cultural missions in Chile. ; The local Communists have organized a Committee of Friends of of the Soviet Union (Comité de Amigos de la Unién Soviética) and binational "friendship" societies relating to China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (see section VI). ' SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 553] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -15 - XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Attendance of Chilean delegations at meetings of Communist international organizations held abroad was as follows in the period 1951-652: Meeting Date Chilean Representation Regional Meeting of April 1951 | 4 Partisans of Peace (Montevideo ) Latin American Land and May 1951 1 Air Transport Workers Conference (Guatemala City) Third World Youth August 1951 20 Festival (Berlin) World Peace Council ' November 1951. 1 (possibly WFTU General Council November 1951 © | 2 American Continental March 1952 — ~ 26 Conference of Peace Partisans (Montevideo) (No public sessions held) . Moscow Economic Conference April 1952 4. International Conference April 1952. 5 in Defense of Children ' (Vienna) Preparatory Conference for June 1952 1 the Asian and Pacific Regions. Peace Conference (Peiping) 13th Session, *xecutive. July 1952 Council, International Federation of Democratic Women (Bucharest) SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 554] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] Meeting - Date Chile an Representation Council, International Union September 1952 na | of Students (Bucharest) CTAL Central Committee September 1952 ~ 2 Meeting (Mexico City) Asian and Pacific Regions October 1952 25 Peace Conference (Peiping) All-Union Communist Party October 1952 1 Congress (Moscow) : Continental Conference of Nov-Dec. 1952 1 (possibly Democratic Jurists of more ) America (Rio de Janeiro) World Congress of Peoples December 1952 about 30 for Peace (Vienna); Chilean Communists have reportedly been given some financial aid in meeting their expenses for travel to the above Comnunist- Sponsored meetings, but the amount is unknown. The method of supplying C) funds appears generally to be through payment of passage for delegates oo to the European offices of the transport company involved, and of expenses when the delegates arrive in the Soviet orbit. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK PCCh leaders: have at fairly regular intervals gone to Moscow, Prague, or Vienna, either individually or as delegates to international Communist congresses, and have presumably received instructions from international headquarters in person. International contacts have also been supplied via members of other Latin American Communist parties who have travelled to the Soviet orbit. Concrete evidence of Soviet “instructions to PCCh. beyond that indicated above, is not avail- - able. PCCh maintains closest connections with the Communist parties of Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and Cuba. The Argentine Communist leader, Victor Codovilla, reportedly visited Chile recently en route to the All-Union Communist Party Congress in Moscow., SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION | () === [PDF page 555] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4, CAPABILITIES bid oe es iets amen 74 mos ged reennpae ae === [PDF page 556] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 . SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword e+e eeececevercecererceereseeoeeveee ii OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES «4 « e 1 I. Objectives «eee eevee eerener ee er ee ane 1 II. Tactics 4 see ce eeer eres eecereecerecce 1 III. Capabilities. 2.2 ee ecccceecerececerece see ee. 3 ASSETS 2. ee ecececevece 4 Ie Numerical Strength e eececvseereeveveeee 4 II. Electoral Strength ee. cecevceeseseceereen k III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 4 C _ IV. Government Policy Toward Communism. « coc eceee 5 Ve Communist Influence in Labor. « « « « « « oe eee e 5 VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations.. 26 eceeceescvee 6 VII. Communist Infiltration into Government » os. T VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation «ae ° 8 XX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Comnunist Political Parties sececcecessrtecsrevreceerececcs 8 Xe Communist Propaganda Media.ceseesveete eevee 9 XT. Financial Condition.cesesccecvcecsceseoes 9 XIIe Soviet-Satellite Official Assets «ese eeecvevee 9 XIII. Communist International Organizations.e « «eee | 10 XIV. Communist Communication Network « eececeerservee 11 C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 557] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 C SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION FOREWORD This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance. The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the © evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, € providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION [Unreadable] === [PDF page 558] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITINS I. OBJECTIVES The immediate objectives of the Communist Party of Guatemala, now the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT), are to extend the party's control over labor, to increase its influence _ in and infiltration of the leftist~-nationalist government, and to dominate the more radical intellectual circles of the country. The Commnists push "progressive" Guatemalan political groups toward extreme labor, agrarian, and educational reform, intensify nationalist dissatisfaction with US private interests in Guatemala, and portray US foreign policy as the instrument of “imperialistic warmongers", - Commnist objectives during the comparatively short period of three years of open existence have remained constant, Such alterations and diversions as have occurred were essentially related to the will of an administration which, in the final analysis, has the real power to. determine the Communist Party's life or death. Thus, with government support, Commnists played a key role in whipping up and organizing popular feeling against the United Fruit Company during the Companylabor disputes of 1951. Subsequently, however, Communist labor leaders silently accepted a government rejection of radical labor code revision.. And presently, Communist propagandists in key positions have sharply reduced their attacks upon the United States, apparently because the Guatemalan Government does not wish to prejudice negotiations for — assistance from the United States. II. TACTICS Among groups in Guatemalan society to which the Communists ' especially direct themselves are urban and rural labor. Intellectuals and the "progressive bourgeoisie" are also high on the list of targets, although the appeal to the latter is mixed with distrust and is, in part, inspired by reason of political necessity because of the middle class. core of the national revolutionary movement which has inspired. Guatemalan political life since 1944. Since they are few in numbers the Communists concentrate upon infiltrating and capturing existing organizational leadership, or, they may bring into existence their own front organization, especially with respect to peace, youth, and women's groups. The Communists, with the assistance of the government, have successfully directed the unification of labor and have joined the’ national General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (Confederacidn General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTC) with the regional Communist. - Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederacidn de Trabajadores de América Latina, CTAL) and the international Communist World SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 559] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The Communists now seek to expand their control over labor by ousting non-Communist leadership from important railway and rural unions, but especially by leading the government-supported agrarian reform program from which they may expect to realize thousands of recruits among the unorganized peasantry. Thus, the Communists can hope to extend their influence among the electorate and, therefore, over the government by control of voters and by their ability to organize mob demonstrations, while at the same time they strengthen Communist international labor organizations and a variety of front groups. Among the intellectuals the Communists have successfully concentrated their attention upon educators and writers. They and their sympathizers control the principal teachers' union and the most vigorous professional artists! and writers' union, and have strongly penetrated the official and semi-official press and the government propaganda agencies. From these positions they may hope more effectively © to accelerate the government's leftist and nationalist programs, while they cover the nation with propaganda in line with Soviet objectives. The political tactics of the Commnists are adjusted to international Communist strategy and the local environment. From the time of its public emergence in mid-1951 until very recently, the Communists, C without legal status, have encouraged and supported the dominant leftist government parties and have sought to work through them, as well as through friends in the executive branch of the government. The Communists have consistently taken a proprietary interest in the activities of the government parties, admonishing and criticizing in detail and urging a united "democratic front" against "reaction". Four admitted Communists have won seats in the national legislature as candidates of the government parties. There also are probably several crypto- 8 Communists seated in this body of 58 delegates which, on the whole, is either sympathetic toward or tolerant of Communism. Within the legislature the Communists successfully work for assignment to labor and agrarian committees and will be found in the vanguard of legislative support for nationalistic measures. This is in addition to the promotion of more direct Soviet objectives as represented, for example, by the "Korean solidarity" manifesto signed by 19 members of Congress in June 1952. The recent registration of the Communist Party as the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) now gives this group legal status for the first time. The maneuver in all probability does not, however, indicate alteration of Communist political tactics. In the executive they also seek out positions which best enable © them to promote their program, ‘Thus, they have heavily infiltrated _.- the Social Security System, the Agrarian Department and the propaganda - SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION ~ === [PDF page 560] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -3agencies. It is apparent also that Fortuny, PGT's General Secretary, has access to the inner circle of politicians who surround the President. He is credited with drafting the recently passed Agrarian Reform Law shich subsequently was steered through Congress under Communist leadership, III. CAPABILITIES Communist success in Guatemala is strongly conditioned by the superficially democratic, leftist, and nationalistic environment brought about by the Revolution of 1944, The social and economic backwardness of the country and the powerful role played by US business interest in the Guatemalan life provide the Communists with obvious ammunition. Nor is there any question about the relatively’ high efficiency of Communist leadership in Guatemala. So far, it has demonstrated an ability to lead groups heretofore outside of the nation's political life, as well as strongly to influence politicians who either cannot comprehend or who refuse to comprehend the significance of the tie between local and international Communisn. Finally, the traditional ruling groups in Guatemala, particularly the laniholders, are | so demoralized and divided, that they have been unable to offer serious opposition to Commnist development. At the same time, there are serious limitations to the Communist position. Although the Communists have enjoyed considerable success in capturing key positions among important groups in Guatemalan society, they have not yet gained a substantial consistent popular following. They must continually contend with an essentially inarticulate and conservative mass, On higher levels they must face the fact that the economic groups which subscribe to the principles of the Revolution of 1944 are not extremists and that many seeming pro-Commnist political allies are, in fact, primarily opportunists, The real answer to Communist success in Guatemala lies with the attitude of the administrations of Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951- ), for, despite democratic overtones, Guatemalan political life is still largely run by the executive. Arbenz, in ' particular, has favored Communist development because he has found its leadership cooperative and capable. Whether or not he fully appreciates the dangers of Communism, he apparently believes that he controls the Communist organization. He has the power to check or break the Communist organization at will. In the last analysis the Communists are dependent upon the executive's pleasure for their positions and probably the great bulk of their financial support. In themselves they lack the economic resources and popular following to contest determined opposition from the President. SECRET ~— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 561] === | Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA: ASSETS I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH There are probably less than 1,000 members of the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT). PGI's petition for registration in December 1952 carried 532 signatures. Cell organization may be found in predominantly rural areas, but Commmist strength is centered in the capital, Guatemala City. PGI membership is drawn from the middle class and labor and its leadership has come largely from among intellectuals and bureaucrats. On the whole, while there are opportunists and dilettantes in PGT, its membership is militant and well-disciplined. Leaders such as José Manuel Fortuny and Victor Manuel Gutiérrez are judged particularly capable. Short of engaging in violence against heavy odds, considerable personal sacrifice may be expected from members of this small group as long as they have backing within the government. II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH Until the registration of PGL (December 1952) Communist Party members gained a limited number of elected positions--~primarily in the national Congress--as candidates sponsored by the dominant ms government parties. In addition, some crypto-Commnists have attained C office as members of the progovernment parties. The present strategy of the newly registered PGT is continued reliance upon the "democratic front" support of other parties to provide electoral success. There are four acknowledged Communists presently in Congress. PGT can probably poll its largest vote in Guatemala City, but there it also faces the strongest opposition. In the mayoralty contests of 1951, the independent candidate in Guatemala City, with unusually wellunified, anti-Communist support, won over the progovernment and - Communist-backed candidate by 5,000 votes (24,000 - 19,000). In the most recent congressional election (January 1953), Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, was defeated as the progovernment candidate in the capital, while another coalition~sponsored Communist was winning in an outlying province. Independent Communist electoral strength in rural areas probably is not great. III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION As an ally of a friendly government, PGT has had little cause to organize and plan for violent insurrection and no such plans are known to exist. PGT has threatened violence against the government's opposition for alleged revolutionary plots, however, and there have been some reports of Communist—controlled wnions possessing firearms. Communist resort to force has been confined largely to rural areas SECRET ~- SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 562] === REDE! EERE ERE) ED EEE EEIIIOSGSS;=~C'SSS S:S:Ss=’U 's' S'S SS sore OOOO Ooh Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION -~5where they have had some success in promoting mob intimidation of local landowners. Should the Commnists have to face official opposition, it is doubtful that they could rally more than a few hundred willing to risk violence. IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM Communist freedom of action is essentially geared to the will of the present administration which has the capabilities, but not the inclination, to wipe out the small Communist organization. The Communists, in fact, receive from the government strategic political appointments and benefit from propaganda and indirect financial assistance. PGT operations are favored by a leftist, nationalist, and "democratic" climate, but the Party lacks a popular following and must work with a generally nonpolitical, apathetic mass. V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR The rank and file of Guatemalan union members, who are centered in plantations, farms, transport, communications, and small urban industrial enterprises, although susceptible to demagogic leadership, are essentially non-Commnist. Exceptions to this may exist in C professional unions, as in the case of the left-wing press guild. At the same time, except for a few groups, such as the railway union, the rank-and-file membership cannot be considered anti-Communist., It is largely undisciplined and, especially in the rural areas, is likely to be apathetic or conservative. Communist control of Guatemalan labor is centered in the leadership of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Labor (Confederacién General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG), a CTAL-WFIU associate, to which the principal labor unions in the country belong. The CGTG's total claimed member ship is 50,000. Possibly the largest union in the CGTG, and one of the most consistently pro-Commnist, is the teachers' union which has a claimed membership of 10,000. Certain unions in the CGIG, such as the United Fruit Company and the Pan American Airways organizations, have shown clear-cut Commmnist direction in recent labor disputes. Rural labor, other than United Fruit Company workers and those on the national coffee fincas, which are affiliated with the CGTG, is nominally controlled by the National Farm Workers Confederation (Confederacién Nacional de Campesinos de Guatemala, CNCG), an — associate of the CGTG, whose exaggerated claim of 200,000 members represents only a potential at best. CNCG apparently has recently fallen more definitely under pro-Communist leadership. It is currently engaged in exploiting the political advantages to be gained through the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law. SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 563] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION Local union leadership probably is less consistently in Communist hands. One important United Fruit Company union, at least, has sharply vacillated between Communists and opportunists. Anti-Communists or opportunists have offered especially strong resistance to Communist infiltration in the railway union which has a membership of 4,400 and which, by US standards, most closely approximates a trade union. VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Communist front groups are represented in the familiar realms of "peace", youth, women's, and intellectual activities. Their: activities center primarily in Guatemala City. A tolerant, often sympathetic, government provides not only protection, but also frequent official recognition, favorable propaganda, and indirect financial assistance. One of the oldest and most consistently prominent of the front groups is Grupo Saker-Ti, an organization formed by militant young intellectuals associated with the leftist-nationalist Revolution of 1944. Communist infiltration of this group has been heavy and its policies have been strongly pro-Comnunist, including advocacy of the. "neace™ movement. The orgenization publishes a locally well—known C journal of the same name. Grupo Saker-Ti probably receives Government financial assistance, a factor which, together with its historical national prestige, guarantees its future under present political circumstances. The National Committee of Peace Partisans (Comité Nacional de Partidarios de la Paz), the local organization of the international Communist peace front, with a reported membership of 88, under excellent leadership, has been an active "peace" organization. It has held local congresses and has strongly supported international meetings. Under present political circumstances, with the support of the administration's propaganda machinery and the dominant progovernment political. parties, the "peace" committee is in a favorable position. The Democratic University Front (Frente Universitaria Democr&tica) is a small organization in the humanities division of the University of San Carlos. Despite the aggressive character of its leadership, this group has not been successful in either capturing or weakening the anti-Commnist student organization, the Association of University Students (Asociacién de Estudiantes Universiterios). SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 564] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION The Guatemalan Alliance of Democratic Youth (Alianza de la Juventud Democrdtica Guatemalteca) is a front group dating from June 1950; it is affiliated with the Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. It has worked closely with the Communist Party for the promotion of Communi em in Central America and has been active in the promotion of international Communist youth meetings and local and international "peace" organizations. It has assisted in the dissemination of strong anti-US propaganda. The Guatemalan Feminine Alliance (Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca), with probably less than 100 active members, is an affiliate of the Women's International Democratic Federation. It has joined with other front groups in pushing the local Communist "peace" campaign. The National Conference for the Protection of Children, which firet met in December 1951, not only involved a number of Communist front groups, but its laudable aims initially attracted prominent non-Communists. It also received generous Government support; public buildings were donated for use by the Conference and sessions were addressed by the President's wife and a member of the cabinet. There are several small refugee groups in Guatemala, some of which may be considered front organizations. One of these is the Spanish Republican Center (Centro Republicano Espaffol), which has, perhaps, 50 members. VIT.. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT There are four known Communists, including the second ranking party member, Victor Manuel Gutiérrez, in the national Congress which has 58 seats. The majority of the 43 members of the dominant govern- _ment parties in Congress are either pro-Communist or tolerant of PGT and there are probably a number of crypto~Commnists among them. PG! members control three importent congressional committees: labor, aerarian reform, and that dealing with revision of public contracts, a factor of particular concern to US companies operating in the country. Commmists and their sympathizers heavily infiltrate the executive. At the top, José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, is believed to be a member of the President's inner circle of advisers. Communists are strategically located in the Secretariat of Propaganda from which they disseminate the Communist line through official and semiofficial press and radio and through an extensive poster campaign. They occupy key positions from top to bottom in the Social Security System. They not only were instrumental in pushing SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 565] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION -8through the Agrarian Reform program but now dominate much of its present field administration, particularly at the lower levels which afford direct contact with the landless peasantry and where confiscatory cases are initiated. The national coffee fincas, now administered by the Agrarian Department, have been major centers of Communist-dominated labor organization in the rural areas. There are possibly a few Communists at lower levels of the armed forces and police. If the recent appeal to soldiers in terms of the Agrarian Reform program is successful, the Communists will have improved leverage in this direction. None are believed to be among the higher ranking officers, even though these have been willing to go along with the government's policy of cooperation with the Communists. VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION Commnists strongly influence public educational circles, especially through their leadership in the teachers’ union and through their infiltration of traveling cultural missions in the interior. They are, however, strongly resisted in the University. As noted, the Communists have obtained strategic positions from which they disseminate propaganda through press, radio, and posters to large segments of the population. This is countered, to some extent, by the, fact that the largest newspaper circulation is in the hands of the anti-Communist press. The Communists are actively resisted by the. Catholic Church insofar as its resources permit, but that institution is reletively weak in Guatemala, IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES _ Forty-seven of 58 seats in the National Congress, including the four occupied by known Communists, are held by government~backed political parties. Most of these are either tolerant of, or sympathetic toward, PGT and a number are probably crypto-Communists. The largest end most influential of the progovernment parties is the Party of Revolutionary Action (Partido de Accién Revolucionaria, PAR), which is also the most pro-Communist. These parties have invited the numerically weak PGT to participate in national electoral "democratic fronts" and have successfully sponsored admitted Communist candidates. Except in Guatemala City, opposition parties are badly split and are handicapped by the government—controlled electoral machinery. As | already noted, of the two coalition-sponsored Communist candidates running in the most recent congressional elections (January 1953), Fortuny was defeated in Guatemala City, while another Communist was winning in an outlying province. SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 566] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MACHINERY The PGI newspaper is Octubre, a weekly. with an estimated circulation of 3,000. A recently established labor paper, which reportedly receives government subsidies, is Unidad, founded by Victor Manuel Gutiérrez and directed by Carlos Manuel Pellecer, who are probably the second and third ranking Communists in Guatemala, respectively. Pro-Communist newspapers are the official daily Diario de Centro América with a circulation of 5,000 and the semiofficial daily Nuestro Diario with 3,000. Among the cultural periodicals, the most prominent is probably Revista de Guatemala, edited by Luis Cardoza y Aragén, chairman of-the local "peace" committee. The well-known Saker-Ti has been noted. Other front publications with small circulation, include: Infancia, organ of the Protection of Children group, the Boletfn de la Paz, Mujeres, Orientacién, paper of the Dominican exiles, and Nuestra Lucha, organ of the Democratic University Front. TGW, the government-owned radio station in the capital, is the most powerful in Guatemala and reaches an estimated 500,000. It is fed the Communist line from a number of sources, including the Secretariat of Propaganda. Radio Nuestro Mundo in Guatemala City is also pro-~Communist in its policy. Communist—controlled and influenced organizations have easy access to time on these two stations. General Soviet broadcasts beamed to Latin America are poorly received and a wide audience is unlikely. Some Soviet~-Satellite propaganda literature and film comes in, principally by way of Mexico and Cuba, and from travellers returning from the Russian orbit. XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION _ The estimated financial condition of PGT is poor. It probably receives little from membership dues, nor are the labor unione or front groups able to contribute substantially. Some assistance to Communist operations has probably come through CTAL, and the expenses of delegates abroad have probably been paid by foreig sources. The principal source of support comes from the Government through patronage, free propaganda, meeting facilities and some subsidies given to front group activities. XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS There is no official diplomatic representation between Guatemala and Russia. Ozech and Polish ministers, resident in Mexico, are SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 567] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION accredited to Guatemala, along with other Central American Fepublics, but their visits to this area are rare. XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The Conference of Land and Air Transport Workers of Latin America, sponsored by the international Communist labor front, WFIU, and by the regional front, CTAL, was held in Guatemala City in May 1951. CTAL-WITU officials, including Lombardo Toledano and Louis Saillant, attended and prominent Guatemalan Government officials were also present at the meeting. International meetings in 1951 and 1952 to which Guatemala sent representatives were: Meeting Date Size of local representation” 1. Regional Conference of May 1951 1: Latin American Agricul ture (Mexico City) 2. Third World Youth Festival August 1951 | 6 or 7 (Berlin) 3. World Peace Council November 1951 il (Vienna) 4, WFIU General Council November 1951 | 1 Meeting (Berlin) 5. American Continental March 1952 6 Congress of Peace Partisans (Montevideo) 6. International Conference April 1952 2 on Defense of Children (Vienna) 7. Council of International September 1952 Union of Students (Bucharest) 8. CTAL Central Committee Septeaber 1952 1 SECRET -— SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 568] === REE EE ___< LT ee Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 ( SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION Meeting Date Size of local representation 9. Asian and Pacific Regions October 1952 5 Peace Conference (Peiping) 10. Continental Congress of Nov.~Dec. 1952 1 Democratic Jurists of America (Rio de Janeiro) 11. World Congress of Peoples December 1952 — 10-11, for Peace (Vienna) Although no definite information is available, it is probable that the Guatemalan labor affiliate of the CTAL and WFTU has received financial assistance from the parent organizations. It is also probable that the expenses of Guatemalan delegates to Communistsponsored international conferences have been paid from foreign sources. XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK Guatemala maintains closest relations with the Middle American area. Ties with Mexico and Cuba have been particularly close and € these two countries are among the principal American focal points for international Communist activity. Guatemala has also been a haven for small groups of political exiles, some of whom have strong Communist leanings, from neighboring countries. Guatemalans, Communists and fellow-travellers, have visited the Soviet orbit, usually to attend international meetings. It is certain that the Communists among these have been couriers for Soviet instructions. The best example of this was the visit which Gutiérrez made to Moscow in 1951. It probably. was no coincidence that his small Communist labor party was merged with the main Commnist group shortly after Gutiérrez' return to Guatemala. The most recent demonstration of the sensitivity of the Guatemalan party to Moscow came with the alteration of the party's name in December 1952 to the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), a maneuver traceable to the policies expressed at the Nineteenth Soviet Congress of 1952. SECRET ~ SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 569] === Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4 SECRET , SECURITY INFORMATION