Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance (WIDF 20th anniversary; Gerwani; 30 September Movement)

=== [PDF page 1] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 25X1010b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 2] === NOV. 10 11 19 20° 22 26 29 NOV. Co @j]Q 10 Approved For Rele Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution (Julian calendar date is 25 Oct). 1917. World Youth Day (Communist). To celebrate 20th anniversary of founding of the WFDY (1945). International Student Week, concluding with an International Student day on the 17th (celebrated by communist IUS). Milovan Djilas arrested. 1956. U.S. lifts naval quarantine of Cuba. 1962. Charles de Gaulle born 1890 (75th birthday). Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF -- Communist) founded 1945, 20th anniversary. Yugoslavia proclaimed People's [Communist] Republic. 1945. 20th anniversary. USSR vetoes Security Council resolution requesting withdrawal Chinese Communist "volunteers" from Korea. 1950. Proposed meetings of Communist controlled groups -- no firm dates -- AAPSO (Afro-Asiar Peoples Solidarity Organization) Executive Committee Meeting, Conakry, Guinea. -- AAPSO sponsored Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Algiers. -~- Joint Spark, World Marxist Review Seminar, Accra, Ghana. [Previously postponed. Republic of China establishes seat of government at Taipei, Taiwan; leaves mainland in Communist hands. 199. Sth Congress, International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR), Budapest, 8-12 December (Communist). UN General Assembly adopts, 48-0, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Soviet Bloc abstains. 1948. USSR expelled from League of Nations for unprovoked aggression against Poland and Finland. 1939. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 ninja === [PDF page 3] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: - - - pp 17:CIA ROGARahS) 000300050008 2 25 October 1965 MEDIA LINES 25X1C10b A Rm RH ARMY TAKES CONTROL OF THE PRESS AWAY FROM THE PKI. The coup recently attempted in Indonesia has had significant repercussions in the press of that country. At the beginning of the year, the Indonesian Government banned some twenty-one newspapers, including many of the older, and more respected ones, because they had supported the nationalist, non-Communist group which was known as the Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism (BPS). The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), which feared the BPS, had instigated the suppression of these papers; but, still not satisfied, also demanded the elimination of forty more papers which it alleged supported counter-revolution (in other words did not support the PKI). Following the banning of the twenty-one papers plus several weeklies and other periodicals, the PKI influenced most of the remaining newspapers. However, its power over the press did not stop there: all of the remaining papers and magazines depended heavily on the Government-owned ANTARA News Agency, the sole news agency in the country. ANTARA, which was so heavily infiltrated by the Communists as to be under their control, supplied nearly all the domestic news to all newspapers, and was also their source for most international news. ANTARA in turn had turned to the Chinese Communist New China News Agency as its (ANTARA's) source of foreign news. On 4 June 1965, the Indonesian Ministry of Information published new regulations which were expected to further tighten the government control over the press. And since Sukarno and his deputy, Subandrio, were increasingly and openly working hand in hand with the PKI, most observers saw this step as one which would lead to complete Communist control over the press. Sukarno himself was quoted at this time as saying that, "of course we have no press freedom; we are in a revolution." On 26 September, just four days before the PKI attempted its coup d'etat, Minister of Information, Achmadi, announced plans to implement the 4k June regulations. The..events of 30 September caused a sudden about face. Although Sukarno retained his post, the Army was in control. On 6 October the same Achmadi, still Minister of Information, announced over Radio Djakarta Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 4] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Ste that any newspapers, dailies or weeklies, which had supported the rebels in the 30 September coup, whether by "their methods of carrying news, their editorials, their corner columns or their photos," were to be henceforth banned. One of the first.papers to be suppressed was Harian Rakjat (People's Daily), the official PKI organ in Djakarta, which had come out unequivocally on the side of the rebels in its 2 October edition. Within a few days, the order banning Communist and pro-Communist papers was carried out, even in such previously leftist strongholds as Surabaya. The Indonesian national news agency, ANTARA, which as noted, had become increasingly dependent upon the New China News Agency (NCNA) was reorganized and the pro-Communist management replaced by more independent, nationalist (and incidentally, more professionally competent) men. Shortly after the pro-Communist and Communist papers were banned, some of the better newspapers which had been banned early in the year were allowed to re-open and to resume publishing. One of these is Suara Islam (Voice of Islam), formerly the leading Moslem paper of Indonesia. Although as of this writing, there has been no news of any of the journalists and writers who had been held in prison for political reasons by Sukarno, there is hope that Indonesia will soon enjoy a freedom of expression which it has been denied for some ten years. Approved For Release 1999/09/47: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Gute, furwdeen Ttmnen \ === [PDF page 5] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 6] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #64 29 Sept-12 Oct 1965 September 29-October 2: The CPSU/CC plenum which began 27 Sept. (#63) Closes on the 29th, followed by a USSR Supreme Soviet session the ist and 2nd -- hoth apperently devoted primarily to measures to improve economic performance. In the international section of his major speech on the 29th, Brezhnev states that in the year since “our Party adopted a line toward normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and the reestablishment of unity between the CPSU and the CCP on a principled basis," the CPSU has made “a number of major moves in this direction.’ "Unfortunately,... these efforts by the CPSU have not been supported by the CCP leaders," but “we must consistently continue to search for ways of settling the disagreement and consolidate friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese peoples and between our parties and countries.’ The plenum resolves to convene the 23rd CPSU Congress on 29 March 1966 and names Brezhnev and Kosyzin to deliver principal reports. Further strengthening of Brezhnev's position is also indicated by several relatively minor personnel shifts. September 29: NCNA publicized an editorial from the Karachi paper Jang accusing the Soviet Union of being partial to India on the question of Indian aggression: ‘In the past the Soviet Union has been with the oppressed, but now it has betrayed this stand." September 30: indonesian CP elements are implicated in a coup attempt in which © of the top 7 army generals are murdered: coup is frustrated by the surviving army leadership; which professes continuing loyalty to Sukarno while carrying out or permitting anti-PKI measures throughout this period despite Sukarno'’s plea for no vengeance. CPSU and other parties voice thinly veiled alarm but make no overt moves or commitments thus far. September 30-October 7: The extremely bellicose 4-hour press conference held in Peking on the 29th by Chinese Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Chen ¥i in the presence of several hundred journalists visiting for the national holiday (#63, Addendum) draws sharp criticism from Soviet= aligned CP media (but not from the Soviets themselves, thus far) as well as from the non-Communist world. Czech party daily Rude Pravo on the 30th denounces it as “irresponsible.* Belgrade Borba on the ist writes that "China hag left no doubt of the unpeacefulness of Chinese policy," demonstrated that it “now hardly cares to be represented"in the UN, and tries, "after having compromised itself in the Pakistan~Indian conflict, to make the holding of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers uncertain.” Budapest Nepszabadsag on the 7th carries a lengthy report by its Peking correspondent, with the prefatory editorjal comment: Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 7] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Led by the consider:tion of serving unity, our Party refrains from open polemics. Unfortunately, the CCP leaders do not follow this practice. In order te let our publie see clearly the length to whieh the Chinese lenders have gone in eertain questions, the paper gives detaiis of some of the Chinese Foreign Minister's views. The interview is not mentioned in Chinese~aligned media (as far as we are aware), other than a Japanese CP daily Akahata report on the lst «+ which omits the chalienge to the Soviets to jcin in an invasion of China. Peaking finally prblisnes it prominently in all papers on the 7th, confirming the belifcosity réported by Western correspondents. Noceworthy passages include: ... The Chinese Government ie firmly opposed to Soviet participation in the Afro~Astan Conference.... This ts a major issue of principle on which there can be no compromise or concession. China ts not afraid of an all-round debate with the Soviet Union. The injection of the Soviet Union into the Afro-Asian_Conference will mean nothing more than the opening of a new battLeont in the struggle against modern revisiontem.... In brtef, we ghould make a success of the conference, Otherwise, tt would be better for the conference to be postponed until conditions are ripe an to drag everybody together to make a hodgepodge.... ... WELL the inpertaltsts allow the socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to live in security? The Khrushchev revistonists place implictt trust in what U.S. imperialism eaye, and they will sooner or later come to grief for it. Khrushchev satd that, instead of liberating Hong Kong and Macao, China was making other Asiane and Africans fight impertaliem and colontaliem Lre and pull chestnuts out of the f for China. This ts a malictous provocation. K wanted to dictate China's policy. Our reply ts: China's policy must be decided by China itself and not by the k revisionists. The Chinese people are ready to make all necessary sacrifices in the fight against impertaliem. It ts up to the U.S. prestdent and the Pentagon to decide whether the U.S. wants a big war with China today.... We ave fully prepared against U.S. aggresston. If the U.S. imperialiste are determined to launch a war of aggres~- ston against ue, they are weleome to come sooner, to come as early as tomorrow. Let the Indian reacttonartes, the British imperialists, and the Japanese militarists come along with them! Let the modern revtstontats act in eoordination with them from the north! We weeL BELLE win in the end. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 2 {Chronology Cont.) === [PDF page 8] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 The great Soviet people and the CPSti will not allow thetr leaders to take such a ertminal decistons.... For 16 years we hove been watting for the U.S. impertaltsts to_come tn and attack us. My hatr has turned gray tn waiting. Perhaps I wilt not have the tuck to see the U.S. imperialist invaston of China, but my children may see it, and they will resolutely carry on the fight. Let no correspondent think I an bellicose!.... ... The modern revisionist way of seeking peace and comfort at the expense of princtples ts a blind altley.... October 1: The 16th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Peo-~ le?s Republic is celebrated as usual -- but Peking's listing of distinguished guests does not include delegations from any of the Communistruled countries, other than "a delegation of the Aibantan Ministry of interior. The only non-ruling CPs listed as represented are from Japan, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, and the pro-Chinese splinters of Belgium and Australia. Chinese speeches and articles include anti-Soviet barbs, @.g., in People's Daily on the Ist: The Khrushchev revistontsts have betrayed M-L and proletarian internationalism, Their coiluston with U.S, imperialism and their selling out of the revolutionary interests of the people of the wortd have greatly encouraged the U.S. impertaltet poltey of aggression and war. They act as the agent of U.S. impertaliam within the international workers’ movement.... Pravda and Izvestiya articles on the anniversary reflect Brezhnev's plenum speech, affirming the CPSU's intent to continue to "work toward unity in practical matters," "despite all ideological differences." The speech by Albanian boss Hoxha at the Chinese Embassy reception in Tirana, as broadcast by Tirana Radio contains the most scurrilous denunciations yet of "the Khrushchevite renegades Brezhnev and Kosygin," including a call for stronger unity of Communists "fighting resolutely, openly, and ferociously against the Soviet revisionists, Titoists, etc." October 2: Pravda strikes at the Chinese with an I. Ivanov article, "Li Chung-jen'’s Return,” denouncing the “grand press conference on 26 September" n Peking for the 75-year-old former comrade-in-arms of Chiang Kai-shek who had just defected to ComChina from his inactive exile in the U.S.: wo. Thte latter-day tuminary of "revolutionary" thought specifically advieed: emash the CPSU. It ts noteworthy that Lt Chung-jen is a real _spectattst in combatting Communiste. In 1927, as Chtang Katng, he exterminated many thousands of Chinese Communtete. In 1936, he supervised the suppression of Communists and democrats in Kwangst Provinee; in 1941, he was comnander-in-chtef of the so-called anti-Comnmist armies that launched perfidtous attacks on troops directed by the CCP....(ete.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Chronology Cont.) === [PDF page 9] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Now Li tasues tn the CPR recommendations on the problems of the revolutionary movement. But these reconmendations look rather atrange. After saying that he has become disenchanted with impertaliem, the speaker suddenly turned 180 degrees, intimating that as a matter of faet there are no problems between China and the_U.S. save that of Tatucn which ean not be settled upon destre through a deat with the Chiang Kat-shekites. So, Li's political program can be compressed to two points: to destroy Communism ani reach agreement with impertaliam.... The only thing to wonder at ts that the newspaper People's Daily, the central organ of the CCP, allowed ite pages to be used by a man for whom the garbage heap of history ts the only fitting place. October 3: Belgrade Politika article by A. Nenadovic thoughtfully treats title question: “Asia in World Relations -- All Together or Everything for China?" He concludes: “t present. tt ts quite Mftieult to find a reasonable explanctton for Chinese polite. The conviction ts growing that the Crinece strive ot all costs tc obstruct reconciliations -- in the [Unreadable] first place betueen the Covtet Unton and America -~ and for thte reason relentlessly instigate and utiliae all conflicts as they also did in the case of the war between Tidta and Pakistan. They were partl:; suecessful. They do not lose anything by this. The war te being waged autaide of China and peace eannot be reac’ ed without tt. But will China gain something by it?... One ean rather say that Asta, and the world along with it, te faced with a hegemony which, in the last analysts may prove most tarmful_ for China itself. Asta and the whole progressive world demand the redtetrtbution of the world's resources, but certainly not at the cost of a redistribution of territories in favor of Chinese or other nationaltetie views on the relations among peoples and states. Asia is not struggling againet Western imperialism only to be subjected to Carnese or anybody else's great-power ambitions. Octoher 3-5: The Kadar-led Hungarian party-state delegation to Mongolia SLQpSs off in Moscow en route home: Tags says Kadar discussed international problems with Brezhnev "in the course of a conversation held in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship, cordiality, and complete mutual understanding." October 4; In the keynote speech at "a scientific conference devoted to the 2Cth anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress" in Moscow, Suslov repeatedly stresses the need for unity in the ICM -- but he also Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050Q04 2 nology Cont.) === [PDF page 10] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 affirms the CPSU's dedication to "the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Congresses" and again calis for a "world forum of Communists to be held after thorough, all-round preparations.’ Qetober 4 and continuing: A New Zealand CP delegation headed by SecyGen Wilcox is welcomed by Albanian boss Hoxha and other leaders of the AWP for a visit which is continuing at the end of our period. October 6: Pravda editorial expands on Brezhnev's plenum speech regard- [Unreadable] ing Soviet foreign policy, the essence of which "consists in strengthening the world socialist comity in every way, supporting the liberation struggle of the people, and in safeguarding peace on earth," a policy set by V.I. Lenin! It again refers to “important steps" taken during the last year "for improvement of relations with the CPR," -- which "so far has not shown any interest in this matter." NCNA reports that an Executive Committee meeting of the International Organization of Journalists -- I0J -~ in Santiago, Chile, 23-25 September was the scene of a sharp struggle with regard to the line of the I0J": In his report, IOJ SecyGen Metaner energetically preached the polictes of so-called “peaceful coexistence” and “disarmament” of Khrushchevtan veviatontem.... The delegates from Mali, Indonesia, and Ceylon expressed objection to the report.... Neither the Soviet delegates, nor the president and secygen of the IOs could reply to the accusattone. (Lt Ping-chuan, head of the Chinese delegation) called on progressive journaltate all over the world to give wide publicity to the just proposttions of the Vietncmese people, expose the U.S. impertalist achemas of peace talks, strip the revisionists o all thetr disguise and expose their deception, and give resolute support to the struggle of the Vietnamese people until final victory. He denounced the service rendered by the K revisionists to U.S. imertaltsm with regard to the tssues of Vietnan ana tne Domintcan Republie and the collusion between U.S. imperialism and the K revisionteats to protect the Indian reactionaries in their aggression against Pakistan. He severely eriticized the Ids Secretariat for stubbornly following the instructions of the K revtstonists on major international questions.... ... The Indonesian delegate denounced the role played by the Soviet Union tn the U.N. Security Counett.... (on Vietnam and Kashmir). ... the Chinese delegation voted against the meeting's general resolutton.... Indonesia and Ceylon voted against while the delegates from Rumania, Peru and Argentina abst.ined. October 7: NCNA reports that "an acute struggle between two lines was unfolded” at’a 16-19 September Prague conference of several international trade unions affiliated with WFTU. "The modern revisionists, by means Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 5 (Chronology Cont.) === [PDF page 11] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 of the so-called majority, vammed through the conference a general resolution and an appeal for united action -- documents that contain a series of errors of principle,” over the objections of the delegations of China, Albanta, Indonesia, Korea, Ceylon and some other countries. TASS announces that Cuban Deputy Premier and Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro arrived in the USSR for a visit "at the invitation of Marshal Nalinovsky, Minister of Defense." Qetober 8: NCNA reports that the Fighth General Assembly of the World Federation of Scientific Workers in Budapest 24-26 September “witnessed an acute struggle between the delegations of China and many other coun- Erne TRTE one, tries on the one hand the Soviet delegation and its followers on the other hand...." A draft resolution "submitted by the Soviet, British, and other delegates at the disarmament subcommittee meeting" “failed to win approval owing toe the vigorous opposition of the Chinese, Korean, and delegates." The Soviet delegation “did not say a word in answer to their repudiation" byt "set the voting machine in action and had the draft resolution passed by the Assembly." Chinese Chou Pei-yuan issued a short statement denouncing such undemocratic conduct as "a page of shame and disgrace in the history of the WFSW." NCNA adds that the Soviet delegation and Chairman Powell “three times took the lead in walking out of the conference room" during "refutations" by the Chinese delegate. “In addition, they directed others to create distrubances by booing, whistling, and turning out the lights." October 8 and cqntinuing: The “Sixth World Congress of Trade Unions" Sponsored by W meets in Warsaw, with preliminary Polish estimates of 600 representatives from 98 countries attending. Various reports confirm that "violent clashes" have already occurred in the noisy sessions. (See further reparting in next issue. ) Qetober 10: NCNA publicigzes an article from the Karachi newspaper Dawn on indian efforts to promote "joint U.S.-Soviet machinery to pursue a policy of support for India and opposition to China.” The i Congress of the Chilean CP opens in Santiago, with a strong Soviet delegation headed by CPSU Presidium member Kirilenko in attendance. hronology) Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-8DP78-03061A000300050003°5 BY === [PDF page 12] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 eebeteleiee 25 October 1965 955. LATEST SOVIET POLICY MOVES CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SIXTH SESSION OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET 25X1C10b x Fe F KK SITUATION: Moscow press and radio have reported at length on the three-day Central Committee Plenum (27-29 Sept 65) of the CPSU and the two-day Sixth session (1-2 Oct 65) of the USSR Supreme Soviet (substitute for parliament). Top billing as speakers at the conferences was shared by Premier Aleksei Kosygin and Party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, thus dampening speculation that one or the other of them was about to suffer some loss of position in the leadership struggle rumored to be fought behind the scenes. Premier Kosygin led off on the first of the Party Plenum's two agenda items with a brutally candid description of problems in the domestic industrial sector. He admitted that labor resources in the "social" economy are being insufficiently utilized, and stressed the need for foreign [read: "capitalist" ] technology. Then he presented a comprehensive scheme for economic reorganization and reform, stressing widely expanded enterprise rights (in which profit is to play a key role); complete abolition of Khrushchev's "regional economic councils" or "sovnarkhozes" and the Supreme Economic Council; a return to the industrial branch ministerial system of management of the economy; and a strengthening of "Gosplan" (the State Planning Committee). The CPSU Central Committee unanimously approved a resolution which incorporated Kosygin's proposals on (a) improving the management of industry, (b) perfecting planning, and (c) strengthening economic incentives for industrial production. Brezhnev reported on the Plenum's second agenda item, the convocation of the 23rd CPSU Congress for March 1966. A resolution incorporating his recommendations was also carried unanimously. The Sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet began on 1 October with a lengthy speech by First Deputy Premier Kirill T. Mazurov. The speech was essentially a rehash of Kosygin's report to the Plenum, and was notable mainly in that it was made by Mazurov instead of by Kosygin, as head of government. The session rubberstamped into law the Soviet government reorganization proposed by the Party Plenum, including the creation of 28 Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 eajuinQuheiap (955 Cont.) === [PDF page 13] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17,: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 ener sndustrial ministries. Brezhnev's appointment as a member of the Council of Ministers’ Presidium reinforces his leading position ("first among equals") by providing him with status in the government structure. Dmitry Polyansky was promoted to First Deputy Premier, so that he and Kirill Mazurov, holding the same rank, are now "above" Shelepin, an "unnumbered" Deputy Premier. [However, Shelepin, member of the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, continues to hold far greater real power.] Finally, the Supreme Soviet approved the Plenum's proposal to convene the 23rd Regular CPSU Congress on 29 March 1966. It is believed that this postponement of the Congress beyond its October 1965 "due date” is to give more opportunity to prepare the five-year plan that is to start in 1966, taking into account the far-reaching reforms in the industry sector which the party has just adopted, as well as the reorganization of the agricultural sector adopted last March. News from Moscow on the two conferences has various implications, including the following: From a power-political potnt of view, Kosygin's economic reform may reduce the supremacy of the party apparat over the government hierarchy at the working level. One of the aims of Khrushehev in setting up of sovnarkhozes in 1957, no doubt, was to break the grtp on the economy of Moscow's ministerial bureaucracy (Kaganovieh and the like). This he succeeded in doing in that the sovnarkhozes became an instrument for party influence on the economy - through the loeal party organs. With the return to the ministerial structure, the possibilities for economie interference by local party organs have been considerably diminished [but this also reduces party responstbility for economic failures at the grass roots]. The speeches by Soviet leaders and Moscow commentaries thereon were misleading as to the scope of and reasons for their economicindustrial fatlures, were over-sanguine with promises of economic triumphe to come, and were notably defensive in tone vis-a-vis the West. Although sprinkled with ideological denials and disclaimers, the announcements could not conceal the fact that the Kremlin leadership ts being forced to put a very un-Maraist economic pragmatism ahead of ideological considerations. This was reflected in the alleged decisions to (a) infuse every aspect of the economy with men teehnically qualified (rather than party hacks) for the jobs they are to perform, (b)the call for increased decentralization of tnittative and decision in production matters, (ce) the emphasts on need for material incentives, (d) the insistence on acknowledgement of responsibility, (e) the emphasis on setentific and modern methods, (f) the elimination of parallel production, (g) the repeated admonttions that the government's administrative or bureaucratic apparatus must not be increased, but must be whittled down, and (h) the substitution of "sold output" for "gross production" as the measure of enterprise efficiency. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 a a (955 Cont.) === [PDF page 14] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIAO etapegn® 1A000300050003-2 Although avoiding such Khrushchevian promises as "We will bury you," or "We will overtake you (America) in per captta industrial 4 production by 1970," the Sovtet leaders still proclaimed the tnevitabtlity of Communist triumph in all fields. Brezhnev summed up Soviet foreign policy aims as "strengthening world soctalist communtty in every possible way, supporting ltberatton struggle of peoples, and preserving peace on earth. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 aint (955 Cont.) === [PDF page 15] === 5X1C010b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 16] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CLA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 25 October 1965 956 AF,FE,NE,WH. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NO FATHERLAND: Ernesto "Che"! Guevara. 25X1C10b tk Re eH SITUATION: "Though not tn substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeotsie ts at first a nattonal struggle........ "The Communists are distingutshed from the other working class parttes by this only: 1. In the nattonal struggles of the proletartans of the dtfferent countries, they potnt out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletartat, independently of all nationality. 2, In the various stages of development whteh the struggle of the working class against the bourgeotste has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole." "The workingmen have no country. Since the proletariat must first of all aequtre poltttcal supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute iteelf the nation, it ts, so far, ttself nattonal, though not in the bourgeots sense of the word." "National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing.... The supremacy of the proletartat will cause them townish still faster. United action, of the leading ctvtliaed eountrtes, at least, is one of the first conditions for the emanetpatton of the proletartat." Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 aiuinfaainlp (956 Cont.) === [PDF page 17] === Approved For Release 1999/0 QigaieipiaieteiRD P 78-0306 1A000300050003-2 "The proletartans have nothing to lose but thetr chains. They have a world to win. Proletartans of all countries unite!” The Communist Manifesto Karl Marx, February 1848. Even today, the Communist Manifesto is regarded as one of the most significant political documents ever written. Millions of copies in more than a thousand editions in almost a hundred different languages have been published. Translations into various dialects of the new nations of Africa are in progress. The Manifesto remains the 'bible' of international communism and the basis of the world communist movement in spite of the political, social and economic developments of the last century and the ideological differences between parties, particularly those of the USSR and Communist China. "The suecess of the working-class cause in any country ts unthinkable without the internattonalist solidarity of all Marxist-Leninist parties.... Whenever a party wants to clear up questions relating to the activittes of another fraternal party, its leadership approaches the leadership of the party concerned.... Mutual asststance and support in relations between all the fraternal Marxist-Lentntst parttes embody the revolutionary principles of proletarian internattonalism applied in practice." Declaration of Representatives of the bighty-One Communist Parties, Meeting in Moscow, November - December 1960. Argentine-born, physician-revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara, once considered the key adviser to Fidel Castro, has been mysteriously absent from the public scene since shortly after his return to Cuba on 14 March 1965 from a three-months tour of eight African countries and a trip to Communist China. Almost seven months of speculation as to his activities and whereabouts - including allegations of his death or imprisonment in Cuba; his having been killed in the fighting during the recent coup in the Dominican Republic; reports that he is continuing his guerrilla warfare training for "national liberation movements" in several Latin American countries - were dramatically climaxed by Castro in early October. Amid widespread rumors that former Minister of Industry Guevara had lost favor with Castro because of their irreconcilable differences over economic and foreign policies, Castro announced on 28 September he would soon explain Che's absence. On 1 October, it became evident that Che had been dropped from the Cuban Communist hierarchy: Castro announced the creation of a 100-man Communist Party Central Committee - from which Che Guevara and four of his proteges were excluded. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 ane (956 Cont.) === [PDF page 18] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA BPE E0806 14000300050003-2 In a rambling address on 2 October, Castro read a letter allegedly written by Che Guevara on 1 April 1965 in which Guevara resigned from his political, military and government positions, gave up his honorary Cuban citizenship and stated he had left Cuba for "new fields of battle." The letter was read in the presence of his wife who was dressed in black and seemed on the verge of tears. There was no mention made of his current location nor of his activities during his prolonged and silent disappearance, nor any explanation why the letter of April was not revealed until October. Among other things, Guevara is quoted as having said in his letter, "I feel that I have fulfilled that part of my duty which tied me to the Cuban revolution...and I take leave of you and my comrades, and of your people which are also mine.... Other lands of the world demand the need of my modest efforts." Speculation continues to grow concerning Che Guevara. There is no firm evidence at this time to indicate whether or not he is still alive. Most observers familiar with Communist affairs doubt that the letter is genuine. If Che is alive, he may still be in Cuba or may be operating as a revolutionary elsewhere in Latin America, in Africa, possibly even in North Vietnam. (See unclassified attachment for biography of Guevara) 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 TPP le, (956 Cont.) === [PDF page 19] === 5X1C010b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 20] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: ClAgiaiiattiaia@6 1A000300050003-2 October 1965 957. CPR-PKI INDONESIAN OBJECTIVES Background on the "30 September Movement" 25X1C10b SITUATION: In the early hours of the first of October, 1965, a coup was launched in Indonesia by the "30 September Movement" led by Lt. Colonel Untung of the Palace Guard. The rebels immediately killed six of the Army's top generals, but failed in their attempt to assassinate Defense Minister Nasution, succeeding only in wounding him. They controlled Djakarta for 24 hours, announced that President Sukarno was safe from Army plotters and under their protection, read a list of the purported 45 members of the new Revolutionary Council (many of whom immediately denied knowledge of or membership in such a body), and came perilously close to complete success. Only the quick counter action of the loyal nationalist Army, and the refusal of the people to rally to the "cause" of the leftists, prevented a takeover of Indonesia by the Communists. It has been fairly well established that Sukarno's role in the "revolt" was only incidental. For the rebels he constituted a potential symbol, a symbol which they failed to exploit in the initial proclamation. Typically unwilling to align himself firmly with one side as opposed to another, Sukarno vacillated. While hesitating, the army regained control of the situation, and power polarized. Responsibility for the instigation of the coup must be laid to the joint connivery of Deputy Premier Subandrio, Air Force Vice Marshal Dani and Aidit. It is Communist practice to move first into a power vacuum -- and to claim the rightness of their cause by charging that a reactionary coup is being plotted, or that reactionary, bourgeois forces must be removed from the government. The PKI did believe that Sukarno's health was rapidly deteriorating, and its leaders had for months stepped up their maneuvers to place the party in legal government positions to fill the power vacuum which would occur with Sukarno's official exit. While they held the most powerful and influential position in political and civilian affairs in the country, they were well aware and concerned with the lack of paramilitary strength, compared with the Army's powerful organization. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 § FR (957 Cont.) === [PDF page 21] === Approved For Release 1999/09 ssala@itein™? 8-03061000300050003-2 Sukarno's Guided Democracy and National Front. President Sukarno, "Mr. Indonesia," is probably one of the most successful (yet reckless) charismatic leaders of all time. A revolutionary who fought for Indonesian independence from the beginning, he pictured himself as the Father of all Indonesians -- later expanding his own image as leader of the emerging nations of the world. His Constitution of 1945 (reinstituted in 1958) placed all power in the Presidency; his "Guided Democracy" called for organizations in which Nationalist, Religion and Communist (NASAKOM) groups provided manipulable political forces for the government, and in which other representation in government and throughout the social life of the country was based on functional groupings. To this end he gradually absorbed all groups (politi¢al, religious, cultural) into single national groups -- one for each type, e.g., youth, students, veterans, women, labor. By 1960 he completed the task of placing them all under the control of one National Front. The Army, early recognizing that the Communists had achieved a high degree of influence within many of the groups, sought to expand its own sphere of influence within the National Front, and to create institutions more directly susceptible to military manipulation. The PKI, while supporting Sukarno's concept of the National Front, never submerged their own efforts to build the strength of their individual front activities. Sukarno, constantly alert to maintain a balance between the Army and the PKI, sought to contain the Armys military power while correspondingly increasing the influence of the PKI in the government and society. The PKI, which had finally organized itself solidly behind D.N. Aidit's national, popular front strategy propounded in 1951, cooperated with, supported, and adjusted to Sukarno's whims and demands. After all, mass organizations constituted a primary weapon in their doctrine and practice: Sukarno*s accent on functional group representation suited their strategy of popular fronts and parliamentary, ostensibly non-violent, takeover. The PKI's major front organizations, which provide a good proportion of its claimed 3 million membership are: Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) and SOBSI (labor). It has substantial organized strength in all other fields also -- €.g., peasants, veterans, journalists, peace, women (GERWANI). PKI Revolts: 1926 and 1948. The PKI, founded in 1920, has twice before fallen prey to left opportunism, been catapulted into undisciplined, illprepared and poorly supported coup attempts, and failed. On both occasions the Party went underground and its leaders fled. The first coup attempt, an uprising which failed to gain momentum, was against the Dutch in 1926. Musso, one of the leaders, returned in 1935 to set up an "illegal PKI"; another, Tan Malaka, organized an underground from Bangkok and returned under Japanese auspices in 1944; and the third, Alimin, remained in the USSR until after WW II. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 22] === Wap’ ear Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 caine The second coup, the more widely known Madiun Revolt of September 1948, was made against Sukarno's government. The army recaptured Madiun itself on September 30th -- the current leftist coup attempt took the name of the "30th September Movement." Of the leaders of the ill-fated 1926 revolt, Tan Malaka had been arrested in 1946 for conspiring against Sukarno; Alimin, after 20 years in Moscow, had taken control of the PKI in 1946; but Musso had been returned from Moscow in August 1948 to take charge of preparations to take over the government. In spite of Party policy to take power through the parliamentary techniques used in Czechoslovakia, PKI leaders fought over the breadth of the popular front to be used and other still advocated violent overthrow. Undisciplined Communist revolutionaries engaged in civil disturbances, demonstrations and sabotage and finally catapulted the PKI into the Madiun Revolt. Sukarno's government put down the revolt, the Party was again smashed and its leaders went underground or fled (Musso was killed). Dipa Nusantara Aidit (not active in the Revolt), who had reportedly sought refuge in Communist China and the Communist zone of Vietnam following the unsuccessful Madiun Revolt, returned to Indonesia in 1950 to assume formal control of the Party from Alimin in 1953. However, Aidit had set the Party's new direction in mid-1951, adopting the Soviet's national united front strategy. This strategy was followed meticulously (including infiltration of veterans and armed services groups) and with solid progress, until the latest PKI coup attempt of 1965. Positions after the coup. The Army would like to crush the PKI but, in the full knowledge that Sukarno still holds substantial influence over the people, presumably can not risk a clash or open break with him. The people have demanded that the communists be punished and the party dissolved -- e.g., in mammoth demonstrations, destruction of communist party and group headquarters, and petitions by all major political and religious groups to the President. The Army pursued a strong anti-Communist campaign against the President's wishes -- making raids, arrests and seizing arms. Further, it reminded Sukarno through its paper Berita Yukdha of a statement he had made earlier in the year: "I willcoppose Communism if it disrupts the Republic of Indonesia. But I do not oppose Communism itself." On the other hand, the Army continues to support Sukarno's Guided Democracy and his anti-colonialism, -imperialism. It has made clear its position as a nationalist group, independent from foreign influence. Sukarno would like to return to the status quo ante-coup. He has refused to condemn the PKI or the 30th September Movement; instead, he calls for unity of Indonesia and asks that no vengeance be taken by one group against another. But, he has not succeeded in forcing the Army to abandon its anti-PKI activities and, on the other hand, he has bowed to their demand by appointing its single candidate General Suharto as head of the Army. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 intel tT. (957 Cont.) === [PDF page 23] === Approved For Release 1999/09ssi=@GHiFeP P 78-0306 1A000300050003-2 It appears that Sukarno may offer a compromise which might well place the communists back approximately where they were; and it is ap= parent that his Prime Minister Subandrio, with the assistance of deputy secretaries of the PKI Lukman and Njoto, is advising and supporting him " in this maneuver. Reports indicate that he might formally abolish the PKI; organize a new nationalist communist organization whose members would be dedicated Indonesians -- "not like Aidit and his associates who served foreign interests"; place PKI second deputy secretary Njoto at its head; and sponsor the new party himself. If the Army accepts this "new form' or "new shape" communist party, it may be faced with the same balance in official government influence as pertained before the coup. The one thing which may really have changed would be the people's temper with regard to communist activities and their willingness to oppose them. Indonesia, the USSR and the CPR. On the level of government-togovernment relations, Sukarno has received his greatest communist country a. support from the Soviet Union. He has been given more than one billion —_ dollars, some economic aid, but mostly military assistance -- a sum which he is apparently neither able nor willing to repay, despite strong Soviet efforts over the past several years to force him to do so. Without such massive Soviet aid, Sukarno could not have taken his aggressive position on West Irian, nor could he have pursued his present aggressive confrontation -- complete with landing guerrillas and taking armed action -- against Malaysia. It is ironic that, for the last two years or so, Sukarno has not only arrogantly turned to the People's Republic of China (which has supplied only minumum aid of any sort) but has taken its side against the USSR -- especially in the question of Soviet admission to Afro-Asian meetings and organizations. The two facets of the CPR's blueprint for world domination (spelled out in Lin Piao's statement) for which Indonesia may be serving as the model puppet are: the thesis of rural encirclement of urban areas (within a given country as well as between underdeveloped and mature countries); and the thesis of aggression and armed revolution. The record of overt Indonesian collaboration with the CPR shows the increasing use which the CPR has made of Indonesia to further its own conquest of the world, for example: -- Sukarno has repeatedly assisted the CPR in excluding Soviet delegates from Afro-Asian meetings in Indonesia and in establishing international organizations in competition with Soviet fronts, e.g., for labor, journalists, peace; -- Sukarno's plans for a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO), whether his idea or one initiated by the Chicoms, have been encouraged by the CPR to compete with the United Nations; Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 enjuinpahainie (957 Cont.) === [PDF page 24] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: On edekeee® 14000500050003-2 -- The CPR's hand is seen behind Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations; -- The CPR encourages Sukarno's aggressive confrontation with Malaysia; -- The CPR applauds, if it did not instigate, Sukarno's stand against India in its present dispute with Pakistan; -- The CPR has used Indonesia as a middleman in offering aid to African countries in its efforts to penetrate that continent; -- The CPR is engaged in talks with Sukarno's government to supply and detonate a nuclear device on Indonesian territory, and has encouraged Indonesia to reverse its support of the ban on nuclear testing. -- And Sukarno has led the fight to exclude the Soviet Union from the II Afro-Asian Bandung Conference -- which the CPR says it will not attend if Soviet delegates are admitted. The PKI, CPSU andthe CCP. On a party-to-party basis, the PKI supported the CPSU and oriented its policies accordingly, until the open split between the CPSU and the CCP. First Party Secretary Aidit successfully led his Party to greater and greater strength within Indonesia on the basis of the popular front tactic -- and received substantial support from CPSU-controlled international fronts in the process. Even within the past six months, Aidit has vigorously pressed for greater representation in government circles -- and with some success. Nonetheless, and in spite of general Indonesian antipathy to Chinese, PKI officials did sympathize with individual CCP proposals here and there throughout the years, and some Party leaders have leaned toward the Chinese for many years. With the open break between the CPSU and the CCP, the PKI's leadership gradually gave support to the Chinese and then came out solidly for Mao's hard line -- still following the CPSU doctrine in practice within Indonesia. Additionally, the leftist Baperki Party, with its major strength perhaps in rural areas, is largely Chinese-Indonesian in membership. In all Afro-Asian gatherings, the PKI has supported the CCP -- excluding CPSU delegates where possible, creating new organizations to compete with Soviet front groups. Evidence of close collaboration with the Chicoms is seen, for example, in the following: shipments of arms have been secretly delivered by sea along the coast’of Java (the Communists main stronghold, where even the Army has been substantially infiltrated); close to 3,000 communist youths were given military training in September at an air force base; arms were issued to youth groups at the outset of the revolt. And the PKI's official paper, Harian Rakjat, urged support of the 30th September movement on Saturday, October second. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 eee (957 Cont.) === [PDF page 25] === 5X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 26] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003- 2) tober 1965 958 WE,WH. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A MAJORITY IN SEARCH OF LEADERSHIP TT ae 25X1C010b ae A KK SITUATION: The intervention of American troops in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 has been a cause for interminable debate over the justification for intervention, over the real cause of intervention -- to save American lives or to prevent a Communist take over -- and over the true nature of the Dominican Revolution itself. While these are fundamental matters and of proper concern for study and debate, the smoke of the argument over the past seems to be beclouding the realities of the present. And the present reality is that the political leadership of what, at least in the past, was the majority party of the nation, the PRD, is seemingly lost in bitter and sterile recriminations, failing to offer practical, positive, constructive solutions to the myriad problems facing the country, and doing nothing to support the task of the Provisional Government. In the process, this leadership is only slowly coming to realize that the Communist are extremely active and are rapidly attracting to their cause large numbers of persons theretofore counted among the democrats. It is essential to stop this erosion of the democratic majority. The leaders of the PRD must be induced to realize that under the present circumstances in the Dominican Republic collaboration, cooperation, or even a laissez-faire attitude toward the Communists:'can only result in further Communist expansion at the expense of the PRD itself. Additionally, the PRD must be made to realize their stake in the success of the Provisional Government, which is the only acceptable alternative to a military junta on the one hand, or a Communist regime on the other. Attached will be found an account of the Dominican rebellion which broke out in April 1965, of the expansion of the Communist elements since that time, and of the dangers facing the democratic majority as a consequence. [A translation in Spanish is included for use by appropriate Stations. ] Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 @ainied tT, (958 Cont.) === [PDF page 27] === 5X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 28] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Fact Sheet eee SD October 1965 USSR and Free World Economic Growths Compared Since 1960 the USSR has made no progress toward its fundamental economic goal of catching up with the US in total and per capita output. The rate of growth in the USSR -- which in the decade of the 1950's was double that in the US -- has been slowing down in the 1960's, whereas US growth has been picking up in an era of unprecedented prosperity and orderly expansion. Thus in the period 1961-65 the average annual rate of growth in the two economies has been the same, (4.3 percent annually), but because the US economy is twice as large, the absolute gap in output (gross national product or "GNP*) has widened by approximately $60 billion in favor of the US. Soviet growth, which in the 1950's averaged an impressive 6 1/2 percent a year, has slowed down to a yearly average of about 4 1/2 percent. This lower rate of growth is still respectable by the standards of modern industrial nations but is below both what the Soviet leadership hag come to expect and what is necessary to support the Soviet leadership's worldwide ambitions. The slowdown is attributable especially tq three fundamental causes: (1) the expansion of Soviet military programs that have taken high-quality men, machinery, and materials needed for modernizing the economy; (2) the failure of Soviet agriculture to provide a rapidly expanding and reliable source of food and industrial raw materials; and (3) the Soviets' inability to run an economy of rapidly increasing complexity by their traditional authoritarian methods. Furthermore, Soviet economic institutions are inherently sluggish in absorbing modern technology and turning out the complex products of present-day economic life. On the other side of the equation, the rise in US growth in the 1960's is the result of a combination of favorable factors, including vigorous and sustained spending by business firms on new capital plant, the success of government fiscal measures, and steady advances in consumer income and spending. And the actions of the Soviet leadership at the recent CP Plenum and Supreme Soviet sessions indicated that the lessons in the US example were not lost on them. Having exhausted most of the possibilities for low-cost exploitation of Western technological superiority, the Soviets are manifestly trying to copy US economic and management techniques. But they are not relinquishing Moscow's centralized control of the economy to any serious extent. Just as in their past borrowing attempts, they are seeking to reap the benefits that go with Free World methods without really giving rein to that which makes those methods work, i.e., private initiative and competitive free enterprise. (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 29] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Comparing a market economy valued in dollars to a pianned economy valued in rubles is at best a speculative undertaking. One example of why this is so is reflected in remarks attributed to some prominent Soviet economists who have been rather outspoken in their complaints that official Soviet statistics are unreliable. One of these economists went so far as to state that Soviet economists have to use figures worked out by American commentators for their own work on the Soviet economy. In any case, most current comparisons are biased in favor of the USSR in that the poor quality of Soviet production and the failure of the system to respond to the demands of industry and consumers have not been fully taken into account. But a caution in the opposite direction is important: in spite of the slowdown in growth, the Soviet economy is still growing rapidly, and its very considerable energies are still being concentrated on uses that seriously challenge US national security interests. Available figures on year-to-year rates of growth fluctuate widely within both the Soviet and US economies, but fcr quite different reasons. In the USSR, agriculture accounts for a large part of the GNP, and changes in weather conditions result in great fluctations in agricultural production and hence in GNP. In the US, in contrast, fluctuations in annual growth are tied to changes in non-agricultural business inventories, in business needs for additional plant capacity, in consumer spending on durable goods, and in government fiscal policy. For the year 1965 a forecast of economic performance can be made with much greater assurance in the case of the US than the USSR, where final agricultural results are still uncertain. In the US the pattern of business conditions for the past six months foreshadows business conditions for the next six months, especially in the current period of sustained and balanced prosperity. The forecast for 1965 of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, for a 4 percent increase in GNP in real terms, can therefore be accepted as reliable. In the USSR the overall rate of growth in 1965 will be ruch less than the 7 percent achieved in 1964 because the 12 percent increase in agricultural production in 1964 makes that year very hard to improve on. In 1965, crops will show a drop from 1964 -- a drop that may be only partly offset by gains in livestoak which is benefiting from the large feed crops of 1964. Drought in the "new lands" has damaged the wheat crop, and on the basis of current evidence, Soviet agricultural production as a whole is estimated to be in for a drop of four percent for 1965. Soviet industrial production in 1965 will grow at a rate of roughly six percent -- up from five percent in 1964 because of the improved supply of agricultural raw materials carried over from 1964. Pecause of the current agricultural difficulties, Seviet GNP probably will increase only about three percent in 1965, Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 30] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 The long-run slowdown in Soviet growth is the result of persistent underlying economic forces and is not likely to be reversed over the next five years. In 1966-70, Soviet growth possibly will be greater than in the US in terms of percentag e -~ but this is not assured. Suppose that over the next five years the USSR is able to halt the declining trend in the rate of growth which has developed in recent years and maintains for example a rate of 4 IY/2percent, while the US economy continues to grow as it is at a rate of 4 percent. Then the Soviet GNP in 1970 would still be about 50 percent of US GNP, and the absolute gap between US and Soviet GNP would have widened by $60 billion more. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 31] === 25X6F Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 32] === " Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Fact Sheets 25X10 10b 25 October 1965 INDONESTA: 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT Highlights from worldwide press and radio reports Introduction. About midnight on a Thursday, Lt. Colonel Untung, a battlion commander in the regiment of the palace guard, started the ‘30 September Movement’ revolt against the Government of Indonesia. For some twenty hours on Friday October first, leftist military and civilian rebels controlled Djakarta and in a brutal slaughter attempted to wipe out the leadership of its major opponent, the loyal, nationalist Army. Wounded Defense Minister Nasuticn and Strategic Armed forces commander General Suharto escaped the fate of their five assassinated colleagues, rallied their forces, and, with the support of the police and navy, gained control of Indonesia's capital by the end of the day. Although the rebels continued to fight and extended their armed revolt to Sumatra and Central Java where leftist strongholds and redoubts had been organized, the Army never lost control and restored order to the country in the ensuing days. Leaders of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) fled or went underground; many of their military collaborators were still unaccounted for two weeks later; but some of the associated military leaders, including Untung and Latif, were apprehended and hundreds of PKI members (some 1500 in Djakarta alone) were placed under arrest. With the single exception of the PKI and its affiliates, all political parties and organized groups in the nation, and the people as a whole, united in condemning the coup attempt and in demanding that the perpetraters of the revolt be punished and the PKI abolished. Untung, a little known officer who is reported to have taken part in the PKI's Madiun Revolt of 1948, said he was acting on orders. These erders now appear ta have been a product of collaboration between PKI Secretary Aidit, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, and Air Force Vice Marshall Omar Dani. The PKI was known to have been seriously concerned with reports given them by Sukarno's Chinese Communist doctors (more precisely, acupuncturists) who had abandoned their efforts to treat Sukarno. Their concern with Sukarno's failing health centered on their determination to fill the power vacuum when he became incapacitated. The PKI had long plotted against the Army in preparation for assuming control of the government when the President would be forced to step aside. Only weeks before the coup attempt, their supporter in the government, Subandrio, had (Cont. ) Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 33] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 said that drastic action should be taken against the capitalist bureauerats of the army. Some 3,000 members of the PKI youth and women group affiliates were trained during September at the Halim Air Force Base. The bedies of the five murdersd Army Generals and the junior officer, were found in a well at the Halim base, an area near which the headquarters of Pemuda Rakjat (PKI youth) and Gerwani (PKI women) were also located. The evidence shows that Untung had persuaded Sukarno that a Council of Generals (which did not exist) was plotting a coup against him for Armed Services Day, 5 October. Furthermore, it appears clear that Sukarno, taking precautionary measures by going to Halim Air base at the beginning of the coup, was actually in “protective custody by leaders of the coup who intended to maintain control over the President after eliminating their only major organized opposition in the country. President Sukarno conferred the title "Heroes of the Revolution" on the five generals who were tortured, mutilated and murdered by the 30 September Movement. This group had attempted to label them imperialist subversives, counterrevolutionaries (i.e., to Indonesia's own revolution) and coup plotters. The involvement of the Chinese People's Republic in the leftist coup attempt ig indicated by many factors, for example: the CPR Embassy, alone of all foreign representations in the country, was allowed special handling of its cargo (building materials to house CONEFO) -- many of the weapons used by the rebels had CPR markings. Military weapons were smuggled also to the PKI by sea to central Java; PKI collaboration with official CPR representatives was extensive; CPR personnel treating Sukarno, informed the PKI leaders that he was failing rapidly and would soon be physically and mentally incapacitated. (Some believe that this nrecipitated the timing of the coup). The CPR's long delayed reaction to the coup attempt finally appeared in People's Daily and NCNA press reports on 19 October. In this round up of the Indonesian situation, the Chinese Communists expressed extreme hostility to the Indonesian Army (and referred to the slain Generals as “executed"), supported the actions and statements of the 30 September Movement (in spite of the fact that the coup was determined to be counter-revolutionary, and that Sukarno had given the lie to their story of the purported General's Council coup by making the Generals "Heroes of the Revolution"). The CPR objectéd to the Soviet's official Izvestiya calling the coup a “rebellion” and its leaders "rebels." They further defended Harian Rekjat's support of the 30 September Movement by condemning Izvestiya for charging this official PKI paper with supporting a movement which lacked popular support. The Indonesian governments reaction to the position taken by the People's Republic of China on the coup and its outcome has been stated in Sura Islam, a Djakarta daily, on 24 October which was also reported Sater Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RBP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 34] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 upon by the New China News Agency to Peking. Entitled "Unfriendly Attitude of China," the article makes the following points: We are forced to voice our disappointment over the attitude of the CPR Gavernment which is one of unfriendliness and of showing under kind of pretext its partiality for the rebels. The CFR endeavors, in fact has started to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs. The CPR Embassy failed to fly its flag at half mast; CPR radio broadcasts have abused the Armed Forces and the people of Indonesia. ‘If the CPR continues in its attitude of siding with the counterrevolutionary group in Indonesia, and of launching dirty abuse and slander and provocative actions, we will naturally be forced to review our friendly and diplomatic relations with the CPR. If we oppose British Nekolim for manipulating its puppets in Malaysia, we must also oppose another which resorts to the same evil tactics by creating puppets and manipulating them for its own evil purposes.” On 22 October, another Indonesian paper Nusa Putera said that Radio Peking is apparently standing behind the 30 September Gestapu. Movement and “using filthy terms has shamelessly disgraced the armed furces and interfered in our domestic affairs." Foreign Minister Subandrio has been asked to make official protests to Peking over the broadcasts. "Radio Peking has a number of listeners in Indonesia.... We cannot idly sit back and let aur people be driven by the venomous voice of Peking." As the Kortan says "A hostile attitude must be replied to in kind.” Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) -~ Pre-coup. 1. Aidit receives medal as hero of the revolution -- 16 September 1965. At a ceremony at Merdeka Palace, President Sukarno conferred the medal of “Mahaputera” -- Great Son -- on Aidit for his excellent service and loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia. Sukarno said that Aidit is an exemplary patriotic hero of the Indonesian people particularly.in "political leadership" and in implementing the policy of Nasakom -- nationalist, religious, and communist cooperation. The President said that every revolution has its national heroes and that some of them lose their lives in the revolution while others survive. Aidit is one of the living heroes. {Aidit was a member of the PKI at the time it rebeled against Sukarno's government in the Madiun Revolt of 1948. At that time Aidit sought refuge in Communist Chinese territory before returning to Indonesia. ] 2. Aidit demands more PKI representation -- 22 September 1965. In a speech to studentsof an Agricultural Department school entitled "Masakomization of the government,’ Aidit charged that "there need be no doubt that the present cabinet is not a Nasakom cabinet.... The inclusion of myself and several other communists in the cabinet shows that Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 35] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 the present cabinet has only started to 'smell' of Nasakom." "The alternative of Nasakom is fighting between the political forces that exist in the country....‘' [Note: President Sukarno has complete control over the composition of his cabinet. The PKI has constantly pressed him to increase its represertation.] In similar fashion, Aidit, seeking to place PKI members in positions of control in the military, demanded that the armed services also be Nasakomized. 3. Aidit asks arms for peasants. In recent months, Aidit has inereased his pressure on the President to arm the peasants and workers (i.e., those belonging to Communist auxiliaries) as a "fifth force" to resist the so-called British imperialist forces of Malaysia. [The CPR had also proposed to Sukarno that he arm the peasants as "volunteers to crush Malaysia."] 4. Aidit's strategy for world revolution. The PKI-leftist coup was in direct line with the CCP’s blueprint for world revolution as deseribed in Lin Piao's statement in particular. Early statements by Aidit coincide so closely as to show that there had been close collaboration between the PKI and the CCP for some time. For example, Aidit's speech at the PKI's Central Committee meeting in December 1963 said: "On a world scale, Asia, Africa and Latin America are the village of the world, while Europe and North America are the town of the world, if the world revolution is to be victorious, there is no other way than for the world proletariat to give prominence to the revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that is to say, the revolutions in the village of the world. In order to win the world revolution, the world proletariat must 'go to these three continents. '" This statement was quoted exactly by Peng Chen at a speech at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences in Indonesia in May 1965. In the now famous statement of 3 September 1965, Lin Piao in effect requoted Aidit as follows: "Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the 'rural areas of the world.'" The CCP advocates rural encirclement of the urban world by armed force to achieve their world revolution. 5. PKI announces its base for the revolution. This spring, Harian Rakjat published an article which said that "the revolutionary situation is ripening." [Reminiscent of Chou En-lai's "Africa is ripe for revolution."] The paper laid down the line of attack, namely through peasants and by seizing government posts. [Use of peasants follows Peking's line of rural encirclement of the urban areas.] And Aidit labeled Jogjakarta (250 miles away from the capital) as "the base of our revolution." Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 36] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 6. Murba Party banned: charged with plans to depose President Sukarno. On September 22, 1965, Sukarno'’s government banned the nationalist communist Murba party. This was an important victory for the PKI which had been exerting pressure on Sukarno, particularly since the baginning of the year, to eliminate the party. The Murba party, formed in 1948, was the last publicly organized anti-PKI political party in Indonesia. The PKI demanded dissolution of the influential Murba Party for more than ene year on grounds that some Murba members allegedly had lans to depose President Sukarno. [Note: the PKI charged that the Coun- Gil of General's was planning to depose Sukarno. ] 7, PKI open challenge to Sukarno. On September 28, 1965, two nights before the coup attempt, Sukarno was principal speaker at a mass rally of the CGMI, a Communist-dominated student organization holding a congress in Djakarta. Speaking before the President, Aidit, "in a highly emotional outburst, urged the students to persist in their demands for the banning of the HMI, a leading Moslem student organization. The President, dis-~ turbed, left the platform for an anteroom where he stayed for a time before returning to make his addreas. Then he told the CGMI it should behave and not deviate from the path of the Indonesian revolution he was guiding.” (Washington Star 17 October 1965, datelined Jakarta) On September 19, 1965, Sukarno addressed a conference of national technicians in the same sports hall. Communists boycotted the rally. “The President again appeared uneasy and touched on no controversial subjects." (ibid) 8. The PKI was informed by Chinese Communists acupuncturists that Sukarne was gravely 111 and was deteriorating mentally and physically; he would soon not be able to carry on his duties, and had not long to live. The PKI held emergency meetings to speed their plans for taking action against the Army in order to fill the vacuum left by Sukarno. According to some reports, it was the information on Sukarno's health which led to the decision for the coup. The timing was also right to attempt to sustain the charge that the Army was moving forces into Djakarta -~ Armed Forces Day was October 5. 9, Communists trained at Halim Air Base. The first group of some 120 Communist Party special cadres was given a seven day training course hy mid-September. A second class of some 1500 was trained by the Indonesian Air Force at Halim a week or so later. Included in these thousands were members of the PKI's youth group (Pemuda Rakjat) and women's organization (Gerwani). 10. Ranking PKI members remain in Indonesia. None of the important Communist Party leaders was absent from the country at the time of the coup attempt 30 September -- an unusual situation considering their reg~- ular and frequent travel to China, the USSR and elsewhere. [On the other hand, more leading non-communist government figures were absent from the Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDB78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 37] === ‘ Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 country than usual: many of them to the CPRin large agricultural and scientific delegation, the naming of which were under Subandrio's control.] The absence of the top three PKI leaders -- Aidit, Lukman and Njoto -- in the 10 man delegation to celebrate Communist China's National Day celebration of October 1 was particularly noticeable. The delegation, led by a central committee member, arrived in Peking on 28 September. ll. 30 September Movement. The coup may have received its name from the date on which the Army quelled the last PKI revolt in September 1948. This was the date on which the Army reoccupied Madiun. October 1 may also have been significant to the PKI -- this is the Chinese Nationalist day which the Communists celebrate, and the day on which the coup leaders announced their takeover of Indonesia. 12, The night before the coup, PKI leaders were given orders (at Halim air base) for their specially trained forces; they were informed that they would he issued uniforms and weapons, and that they might be away from home for some time. 13. The PKI knew the exact location of each of the leading officers of the Aymy the night the Coup took place. The PKI -- Coup. 14. The morning of the coup, Untung's command issued weapons to Communist cadres -- including members of the youth and women's groups. 15. Communist youth in uniform were among those who invaded the hemeg of the six Generals in the early hours of October lst, and who tortured, killed and mutiliated the bodies of five and a Lieutenant, and wounded the sixth. The officers assassinated were: Lieutenant General Achmad Yani; Major General's Suprapto, S. Parman, and Harjono; and Brigadier General's Pandjaitan and Sutedjo. Also assassinated was Lieutenant Panduan. Defense Minister Abdul Haris Nasution was wounded but escaped; and Major General Suharto escaped without injury. Nasution's five year old daughter was wantonly killed. 16, Untung's 45-member Revolutionary Council, announced mid-day of October lst, did not include Sukarno's name, It did include members of many political parties and other groups -- almost all of whom immediately denied knowledge of or support of the Council. But the Communist-named members -- at least a dozen were known Communists or crypto communists (Aidit and Lukman in the former and Subandrio, Omar Dani and Martadinata in the latter) -- did not deny membership or reject the authority of the Council. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-R@P78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont.) === [PDF page 38] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 17. PKI papers support the 30 September Movement. Harian Rakjat, the main PKI satis conconed the coup in an editorial on Saturday October 2, in a paper thet came out just a few hours after the successful counter-coup, and said: "The people will certainly be on the side of the 30 September Movenent. We call on the people to remain vigilant and ready to meet any eventuality." The Warta Bhakti and Gelera Indonesia, two other PKI dailies in Djakarta, alse supported the Movement. The East Java Pemuda Rakjat (Communist youth organization) said: ".... We, in the name cf 750,000 members of the Pemuda Rakjat in East Java completely support and stand behind the 30 September Movement in forming regional Indonesian Revolutionary councils.” [Untung’s announcement. proclaiming the Revolutionary Council to be the sole authority of the land, outlined its organizational structure down to the village level. 18, By October 3, virtually all political parties and organized groups except the PKI and its puppet party, Partindo, had voiced support of General Suharto and the government forces. 19. D.N. Aidit fled to Java and disappeared -- immediately after Suharto rallied Army forces against the rebels. Various reports said he had been seen in Java, Sumatra and other islands and one said he had escaped to the CPR. But none of the reports was verified two weeks after the coup failed and Aidit's whereabouts remained unknown. 20. Army forces searching Communist quarters found a letter among other Communist literature, in a Youth leader's home it was from Dipa Nusantara Aidit and said that the nationalist air forces were joining the PKI in the coup effort. 21, lLukman and Njoto fled Djakarta some time during the fateful day of October Ist, but returned, purportedly from Java, with Subandrio to seek the protection of Sukarno. They took part in Sukarno's Cabinet meetings, first at Bogor and then in Djakarta. They remained quiet as Sukarno worked to impose a "unity without vengeance" behind his Nasakom and anti-Necolim policies, and to achieve a political settlement which would preserve his balance of power between the army and the communists. 22. Non-refugee Communist leaders appear to have agreed with Subandrie to sacrifice Aidit, dissolve the PKI as pro-Peking and to disavew foreign orientation; and to propose a new communist party which would be nationalist and dedicated to Nasakom. It has been reported, as in Mimbar Revolusi of October 10, that: "... the group wanted to form a new party to absorb communists who wish to dedicate their lives to the interests of the country, not like Aidit and his associates who served foreign interests. The group will soon contact President Sukarno to ask for his blessing for the formation of a new party. It is expected that "the formation of a communist party will be proclaimed soon after the Indonesian head of state has proclaimed Aidit's Communist Party banned." Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDF'78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) ont. === [PDF page 39] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Chinese People's Republic (CPR): Pre-coup. 1. Only the CPR had the privilege of handling its cargo (building materials for CONEFO headquarters) without inspection of Indonesian officlals. Under this guise they brought in arms and munitions for the PKI. 2. Officials of CPR instalations supplied extensive support for the PKI; for example, they gave massive financial support for the PKI's 45th anniversary celebration. For this as well as other FKT activities they "persuaded" Chinese businessmen to contribute. [The CPR has always considered all Overseas Chinese to be CPR citizens and has forced them, under threat of harm to friends and relatives in the CPR, to contribute to Communist party activities.] 3. The CPR smuggled arms and munitions to the PKI by sea to Java (a major communist stronghold): some of these were found in caches, complete with Chinese markings, and others were recovered from rebel communist youth guerrillas. 4, The parallel between CCP doctrine and strategy for world takeover and PKI action has been noted above. In addition, Aidit said that “sueryilla warfare is one of the correct forms of struggle to achieve independence if there is a friendly neighboring country." The collusion of Communist China as that friendly neighboring country cannot be doubted. The PKI, after the open break between Moscow and Peking, took the side of and supported the Chinese in their every move. 5. The CPR had assurcd Sukarno over a long period of time that its acupuncturists could cure him (of organic ailments that Western doctors diagnesed as needing surgery). The CPR informed Sukarno, finally, that they could not cure him; at the same time they informed the PKI as to the serious nature of his condition ana the fact that he would soon be incapacitated physically and mentally. 6. Among other activities undertaken by Indonesia for the CPR, the government was acting as frontman for Chinese aid to African countries. CPR: Coup. 7. No word was heard from the CPR until an official message dated 3 October was sent to President Sukarno (4 Oct. over Djakarta radio) which read in part: ‘May the Great Indonesian people, under the leadership of Your Excellency and President, develop still further the spirit of opposing imperialism and old and new colonialism, and of opposing 'Malaysia.'" [The CPR has influenced Sukarno's anti-Nekolim policy in some of his most adventurist moves -- e.g., against Malaysia, withdrawal from the United Nations, efforts to establish CONEFO, attempts to dominate the Afro- Asian organizations with the Chinese. ] Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDF,/8-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 40] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 8. The first word to the Chinese people was an NCNA broadcast on 4 October, which said only: "President Sukarno left Djakarta owing to a sudden domestic incident which occurred in Indonesia. According to the 3 October broadcasts from the Djakarta stations, President Sukarno declared in a recorded broadcast that he was in good health." [This understatement and the paucity of news in Communist China occurred when sizeable delegations of Indonesians were there on economic and scientific missions and to celebrate the Chinese National Day, October 1.] 9. Flags were ordered flown at half mast for a week, to start on 5 Octoker, in honor of the slain Army heroes. In all of the Diplomatic community, only the CPR Embassy in Djakarta and its Consulate in Medan (along with the Cuban Embassy in Djakarta) continued to fly flags at full mast for some days. [PKI buildings flew no flag at all.] 10. The CPR Embassy, again alone of all the embassies, locked its doors tight after the coup and no officials came or went. ll. The CPR published its first official statement on the Indonesian leftist revolt on 22 October -- three full weeks after it had started and failed. Peking's People's Daily in a lengthy report, also broadcast by the New China News Agency, thus continued its support of the 30 September Movement, saying among other things that: Untung's movement was a "patriotic and revolutionary action"; The Council of generals was engaged in a subversive movement; Sukarne calls the coup an “internal army affair"; The Army began "wholesale arrests in Djakarta.... worked up a great agitation over the execution... of Yani... and some other army generals"; the Army banned all progressive forces "in this atmosphere of terror eee 9 Nasution called the 30 September Movement "traitorous" and lauded the Generals as "heroes"; hooligans were responsible for anti-communist demonstrations and slogans; "Chairman Aidit condemns the ‘Council of Generals’ and calls on the whole party to heighten vigilance... and smash the ‘Five Evils'" (a report on purported Aidit letter of 6 October to Djalan Rakjat); Suharto is going against Sukarno's orders to “restore law and order" by continuing to suppress progressive forces; and t tries to explain why CPR flags were not lowered. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 (cont. ) ont. === [PDF page 41] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 12, Indonesian government reaction to the CPR's hostile position and interference in its internal affairs appeared in papers on 22 and 24 October (see Introduction above). Among other things, the papers said that Indonesia's relations with the CPR might have to be reconsidered, Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A00030005000@2nt. } 10 === [PDF page 42] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Subandrio (First Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister). 1. Subandrio was out of the city touring Sumatra during the course of the coup. He was named to the Revolutionary Council. He did not return until October 6th, and then in the company of Lukman and Nijoto, second and third in command of the PKI respectively. 2. Subandrio had long supported the PKI in its demands for greater influence in the Government and all functional activities throughout the country. 3. It is likely that Subandrio knew of, if he did not authorize, the trips of sizeable delegations of non-Communists to Peking which took them from the country at the time of the coup. 4, Subandrio had said that drastic action should be taken against the high command of the Army if it did not change its capitalist bureaucratic ways. 5. There is a strong similarity between several of Subandrio's speeches and those by PKI head D.N. Aidit. For example, Subandrio developed themes which were new for him, namely: That the heroes of the "physical revolution" (i.e., those who fought against the Dutch) are not necessarily heroes today: now it is necessary to crush capitalist bureaucrats, and corruptors (same as PKI attack on Army leaders and especially Yani). ([Subandrio played no significant role in the fight against the Dutch.] He stressed this and related themes: 1) on 14 September to the "Generation of 1945" organization, reminding them that many former heroes had turned revisionist or traitor; 2) on 13 September in a speech to SOBSI, communist dominated labor union, outlining government policy to crush capitalist bureaucrats; 3) on 23 September, repeating the above at a sports award presentation when he also said that Indonesia has known but two complete patriots: Sukarno and the farmers and peasants -- other heroes had weakened and failed; and 4) 28 September at the opening session of the Immigration Directorate, where he said that leaders should no lenger live on past contributions but should implement present aims of the national revolution and that there should be a "drastic change" in policy to “do away firmly with all elements which cannot follow the course of the revolution." Air Force 1. Elements of the Air Force trained some 3,000 special Communist eadres at its Halim Air base during September 1965. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP%8-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 43] === ’ Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 2. The bodies of the five assassinated Generals and the Lieutenant were found in the Crocodile Hole area -- part of Halim Air Force base on the outskirts of Djakarta. 3. Vice Marshal Cmar Dani fled with Aidit and Untung from the city toa Java when the Army counter attacked. But Dani went to Bogor to seek Sukarno's protection a day later. 4, Vice Air Marshal Omar Dani's order of the day, issued on Friday 1 October 1965 at half past nine (i.e., while the rebels were in control) read: "On 30 September 1965 night a movement was launched by ‘Gerakan Tigapuluh September’ to safeguard the revolution and great leader of the revolution.... In thig connection, the body of the army has been cleansed of elements who are manipulated by foreign subversive elements who are endangering the Indonesian Revolution. ",,.. Herewith I order all members of the Indonesian Republican Air Force to remain vigilant against any provocation and undermining acts and moreover increase their preparedness against any eventualities from inside as well as from outside.” %. After the Army regained the city, Vice Air Marshal Omar Dani issued a statement for the Air Force on 2 October 1965, as follows: "The Air Force... is not involved in the 30 September movement. The Air Force... agrees with any cleansing movement in the body of any tool of the Revolution in conformity with the line of the Great Leader of the Revolution. The Air Force of the Republic... does not interfere in the internal issues of other services. The Air Force... has no knowledge of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council and the compesition of its personnel." 6. Air Force Order broadcast over Djakarta domestic Radio, 4 Oct 65, read: "Thanks be to Almighty God for the confidence of the President, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia and Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution Bung Karno and the Indonesian people in the air force of the Republic of Indonesia so that Nekolim (imperialism) has failed in its attempt to set us off against each other, I herewith order: a) to remain calm and vigilant against any provocation; b) to preserve the existing good relations with other branches of the apmed forces and the people in general and ¢) to enhance the vigilance of all combat units to cope with any possible Nekolim attack. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: cIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont.) === [PDF page 44] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 "If it is proven that elements within the air force are involved in the 30 Sept incident and the creating of the so-called Revolutionary Council, such elements obviously have betrayed the Indonesian revolution and stained the good name of the air force. Djakarta, 4 Oct. Signed Minister and Air Force Commander Omar Dani." 7. Vice Marshal Omar Dani, according to a broadcast by Djakarta radio on 20 October, was sent on an assignment with a "construction aireraft industrial plant carried out with the cooperation of the Netherlands." In other words, he was removed from his command. 3Q SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT: Statements by Lieutenant Colonel Untung [Note: The 30 September Movement failed, after some twenty hours during which it controlled the capital city Djakarta, in its attempt to seize the Government of Indonesia. Its spokesman, Lt. Col. Untung was captured, more than a week after he fled the city, by two Army personnel with the help of the local community near Tegal in central Java. One of his clasest collaborators in the fighting, Col. Latif, had been captured a few days earlier near Djakarta. Of those leaders implicated in the plot with him, Vice Marshal Omar Dani fled the city but returned a day later af his own volition; PKI First Secretary D.N. Aidit fled and had not been found some three weeks later; PKI deputies Lukman and Njoto fled but returned with Foreign Minister Subandrio to Sukarno's side in Bogor on 6 October. The murdered Army Generals, whom Untung had charged with being disloyal to the Indonesian Revolution and with plotting a coup against President Sukarno, were given full funeral honors and President Sukarno hestowed upon them the title of Heroes of the Revolution. Weeks after the failure of the coup, officials of the People's Republic of China restated and supported the claims of the 30 September Movement, in spite of the evidence that it was a rebellion and that the President had discredited it and its leaders.] hoe se te te % Messages broadcast in the name of Lt. Col. Untung over the Djakarta radio on 1 October 1965: The First broadcasts started with the statement that they were "now safeguarding the Indonesian President and Republic." First message: "The Dewan Djenderal [Council of Generals]... had planned to conduct a power exhibition on armed forces day, 5 October this Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP-28-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 45] === ’ Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 year, by sending to Djakarta troops from east, central, and west Java.... It was to prevent such a counterrevolutionary coup that Lieutenant Colonel Untung took the initiative to launch the 30 September operation, which has proven to be a success." [I+ is possible that the Generals, who were thought only to be kidnapped, were murdered by this time.] "Lieutenant Colonel Untung personally thinks that as a member of the Tjakrabirawa regiment [the palace guard] he must launch the operation, because it is his duty to protect the President and the Indonesian Republic." “As commancant of the 30 September operation, Lieutenant Colonel Untung called on the entire Indonesian people to always increase vigilance and fully support the 30 September operation in order to safeguard the Indonhesian Republic from the wicked schemes of the Council of Generals and its agents.... "Lieutenant Colonel Untung called on all army officers and men in the country to be fully determined to completely eradicate the influence of the Council of Genarals end its agents in the army. Generals and of+ ficers... mist be kicked out of the army and subsequently punished accordingly. The army is not for the generals. It is the property of all army personnel who are loyal to the ideals of the revolution of 17 August 1945. "... Lieutenant Colonel Untung thanked all armed units outside the army for their assistance in the mopping up operation of the army....” Decree No. 1 of the Indonesian Revolution Council: ieneeinaaennen nes teenie inet a pee eiaenmiemennmnnn anne a ate ae "A number of generals were arrested.... "The 30 September movement is a movement entirely confined within the bedy of the army to put an end to indiscriminate actions of generals who were members of the Council of Generals and other officers who were henchmen and sympathizers of the members of the Council of Generals. This movement was assisted by armed troops not belonging to the army. [ive., communist paratroops. | Decree No. 2 of the Indonesian Revolution Council: "Vee. the 30 September movement will set up an Indonesian Revolution Council..,. [The names of 45-members were released that same day.] "For the time being, pending general elections for the People's Consultative Council (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) in line with the constitution of 1945, the Indonesian Revolution Council will constitute the ‘source of all authority' in the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian Revolution Council is a tool of the entire Indonesian people to realize Pantjasila and all five charms of the revolution.” [Sukarno was not named on this 45-member council.] Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RPP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont.) === [PDF page 46] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Decree No. 3 of the Indonesian Revolution Council: “With the falling of the authority of the state into the hands of the Indonesian Revolution Council the Dwikora Cabinet automatically assumes a_ decommissioned status. [i.e., Sukarno'’s Cabinet.] Until the formation of a new council of ministers by the Indonesian Revolution Council former ministers are dutybound to carry out routine tasks and preserve order in their respective departments. They are prohibited from appointing new employees and from taking actions which may have broad consequences. All former ministers are obliged to give account to the Indonesian Revolution Council. New ministers will be appointed by the Indonesian Revolution Council," Decree No. 4 of the Indonesian Revolution Council: This provided for setting up similar councils throughout Indonesia (i.e., at the regional, provincial, district, sub-district and village levels) as "tools of the Indonesian Revolution Council." Sukarno and Major General Suharto. On October 1, when the rebels controlled the radio in Djakarta, a pre-recorded statement by President Sukarno was played. His voice was recognized, but it was weak and dis-spirited. In a second pre-recorded speech played over the radio on 2 October, after the Army had retaken the city, Sukarno said: "Brothers, I repeat my order... which was announced on 1 October 1965.... I am sound and well and continuously carrying out the leadership of the government of the Republic of Indonesia.... ",...I instruct the entire population to continuously increase vigilance and preparedness in the framework of the implementation of Dwikera [the cabinet which Untung had "decommissioned'']. "At present the leadership of the army is vested with me, and to discharge the daily tasks of the army, I have appointed previsionally Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudro, third assistant to the army commander. "To restore security and order in connection with the 30 September incident, I have appointed Major General Suharto,...." [General Suharto, after consultation with wounded Defense Minister Nasution, had taken charge of the Army's counter-coup. He was later named by President Sukarno to head the Army. ] In another 2 October statement, Sukarno said: "The charge against AURI (Indonesian Air Force) of involvement in the socalled 30 September incident is not true. [Later evidence shows that only some elements of the Air Force, were involved in the coup.] (Cont. ) === [PDF page 47] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 "My visit to the Halim airbase on the morning of 1 October was at my own will as I was of the opinion that the best place for me is a place near an airplane which can transport me at any moment to another place if something which is not expected takes place. "We must remain vigilant and should prevent the playing off between the air force and the army so that the Nekolim and other side will benefit from it...." Sukarno held a Cabinet meeting at Bogor on 6 October 1965. After ee BS BR OO ee it was over, his Deputy, Subandrio reported to the press as follows: "The President gave a preliminary explanation concerning the 30 September incident and: "Denounced the brutal killing of the army officers who have now been appointed by His Excellency the President and the entire people of Indonesia as heroes of the revolution; "Expressed his profound grief over the loss of these heroes of the revolution; "Did not justify the creation of the Revolution Council; "Urged the need for a calm and orderly atmosphere to take the necessary actions against those elements from all groups who took part in the 40 September incident and to seek a political settlement. ",.. At the session His Excellency the President also announced that the commander of the air force of the Republic of Indonesia, Omar Dani, had reported to him on the arrest of a number of instructors of men and women volunteers at Halim Perdana Kusuma, who are believed to have been involved in the 30 September incident...." kkk kk & On October 1, the Information Center of the Department of the Army broadcast the following message: "There has been cooperation and full action by the army, navy, and olice force to crush a counterrevolutionary movement that called itself gerakan tigapuluh September (30 September Movement)." "It is clear that persons of the gerakan tigapuluh September are counterrevolutionaries who have taken over the authority of the Republic of Indonesia from His Excellency the President... Bung Karno, kidnaping a number of officers of the army." Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 48] === eee ° Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 "The community should remain calm and remain vigilant and prepared." At a later broadcast the same afternoon of October 1, the Army said: ve Sent tegen nen Ee SAME arternoon of October 1, the Army said "The 30 September Movement in Djakarta "kidnaped a number of high officers, namely: Lieutenant General Achmad Yani; Major General Suprapto; Major General S. Parman; Major General Harjono; Brigadier General Pandjaitan; and Brigadier General Sutodjo." “His Excellency President, Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Republican Armed Forces and Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno and his honorable coordinator minister for defense and security, General A. H. Nasution, were brought to safety and are in sound and healthy condition." "The leadership of the army is for the time being in the hands of Major General Suharto, commander of Kotrad. [Army strategic command. ]" Early evening of the same day, General Suharto reported: LE TE ATR Asrastrntsenintnnansenensipaesinr tne “Brother listeners... the self-styled "Gerakan Tigapuluh September" has formed what they referred to as "Dewan Revolusi Indonesia" (Indonesian Revolution Council). They have taken over the state authority, which is usually called a coup, from the hands of His Excellency the President, Supreme Commander of the Republic of Indonesia and Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno, and... decommissioned (the cabinet) besides kidnaping a number of high-ranking army officers. "... We are convinced... our Indonesian republican state... will remain under the leadership of His Excellency the President... who we love." In a statement on 4 October, General Suharto speaks of the murdered Generals: eerie "Today, 4 October 1965, we witnessed together with our own eyes the recovery of the bodies of our generals--6 generals and one junior officer from an old well. As you already know, our generals and our junion officer have fallen victims to the uncivilized actions of the adventurers of the so-called 30 September movement. If we survey the place, it is in Lubang Buaja. Lubang Buaja is within the area of the Halim Airbase. Here you will also see that the area near the well has been used as a training center for (volunteers) under the auspices of the air force. They have trained members of Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) and Gerwani (Indonesian Women's Movement) [both Communist]. "In a word, it is possible that they are undergoing training in the framework of the defense of the airbase. But the fact is that a member ef Gerwani who has been trained here and captured in Tjirebonhails from central Java, far away from this area...." Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 17 === [PDF page 49] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 | Fact: Sheet 25.1610: 25 October 1965 The Dominican Republic: A Majority in Search of Leadership Thirty one years of Trujillo~style absolutism is a heritage not. easily overcome, although it looked for awhile as though the Dominican Republic might be able to turn almost directly into a true democracy. Trujillo's assassination on Mey 30, 1961 was followed by six months of maneuvering on the part of his son, Lt. Gen. Rafael Trujillo, Jr. to retain power in the family's hands. However, he was forced out of the country in November of that year and was succeeded in power by Joaquin Baleguer, who had already been established as puppet President by Trujillo in August of 1960. Balaguer, in turn, was soon forced out by a combination of diplomatic pressure by the Organization of American States (oas) and serious street riots. A Council of State ruled for 11 months thereafter, until December 20, 1962, when free elections were held resulting in the election of Juan Bosch as President by a 2 to 1 majority. Juan Bosch, then 53 years old, had spent most of his life in exile, principally in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He had established a reputation as a poet and author; he was a close friend of the most noted leaders of the democratic left in Latin America, including José Figueres of Costa Rica, President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre of Peru and Governor Luis Mufioz Marin of Puerto Rico. The end of the Trujille era in the Dominican Republic, the fact of free elections within less than two years after his assassination, the choice of an articulate liberal, dedicated to social reform and modernization, al11 combined to galvanize opinion in the hemisphere in his favor. President Kennecy sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson at the head of a prestigious delegation to Bosch's inauguration. The Dominican Republic was to become, in the aspirations of many inside and outside that land, a showcase of progress and reform, @ startling example of the benefits which can accrue to a country rida of its tyrant -- all, of course, in sharp contrast to the Republic's next door neighbor, Cuba, a Communist showcase already going awry. Therefore the installation of Bosch as President was greeted with enormous optimism. His ouster seven months later was greeted with some surprise, same dismay, but mostly stoicism. The explanations for this turn of events vary widely, as might be expected. His opponents, consisting essentially of businessmen and military leaders, charged him with inept administration, procrastination, unrealistic thinking; they pointed to an increase in unemployment and a general decline in the enconomy. But the issue that led them to act was a conviction that Bosch was either naively or wittingly permitting the Communists to infiltrate his government and his party. Bosch and his supporters, of course, deny these charges. Regarding the crucial issue (Cont. ) Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 50] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 of Communism, Bosch defiantly maintains that he was dealing with the problem in hia own way: that of demonstrating the effectiveness and virtue of a democratic state in action, a demonstration which, he is convinced, will prevail in the end more surely then repressive measures which only force people to join the Communists. The essential qualification for this approach, however, is 5 sufficiently long period of internal peace ta permit substantial achievements, and a Communist opposition sufficiently weak end inactive to ellay the danger of imminent and violent overthrow. The presence of Castro's Cuba, next door, weighs heavily in this consideration. Whichever side may have been right in the circumstance, the essential point ig that Bosch failed to convince those who controlled the decisive power, i.e., the military leaders. And so they overthrew hin and installed a civilian junta, which soon came to be dominated by J. Donaid Reid Cabral. The United States, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Bolivia all quickly suspended diplomatic relations. But Reid soon revealed himself to be no Trujillo. In fact he turned out to be a competent administrator who made considerable progress in stabilizing the country's economy and in improving the quality of its government. He even began to tackle the reform of the armed forces, a grossly oversized, corrupted legacy of Trujillo. But Reid's position was essentially extremely weak. He had no real political base, and his illegitimate rise to power gave him little popular support. And so, predictably, when an uprising burst out against Reid on April 24, 1965, he found the armed forces unwilling to obey his commands. In the hope of avoiding bloodshed, he resigned the next day. The full details of the revolt of Saturday, April 24, and the following days are obscured by the confusion of the times and by partisan pleading. However the principal facts are less obscure than some claim. The revolt was touched off by a group of pro-Bosch army officers collaborating with leaders of Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). The officers seized control of the "27th of February" military camp, outside Santo Domingo. Shortly thereafter Pena Gomez, who had been a member of the Bosch government end was a regular radio commentator, began broadcasting over Radio Santo Domingo that a pro-Bosch coup had occurred, that Reid had been overthrown and that the people should gather in the streets to hail the revolution. Reid, who was at that point still in power, managed to impose a curfew that evening and clear the streets. He appeared on television to announce that all was calm and to summon the rebellious officers to surrender by the next morning or face attack by the army. The rebels did not surrender and Reid then found that the army would not carry out his orders to attack. He had no choice then but to resign and go into hiding. Upon his abdication civilians and Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP?78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 51] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 military alike swarmed into the streets to release years of pent-up emotions. The pro-Bosch leaders met and decided to proclaim Rafael Molina Urena, a veteran PRD leader, Provisional President, pending the return of Bosch from exile. The anti-Bosch military leaders, including most of the senior officers, many of whom had been instrumental in ousting Bosch, warned that they would fight if Molina Urena was sworn in. At that point trucks from the "27th of February” camp began rolling into Santo Domingo loaded with pistols, rifles, machine guns and grenades seized from the arsenal at the camp. These weapons were distributed to the crowds of civilians, who also armed themselves with Molotov cocktails. This distribution of weapons proved to be a decisive turning point in the political course of the rebellion, because by this time the Communist groups, having planned for, and lain in wait for, disorder to break out, were quickly organized and they managed to see to it that their adherents received the bulk of the arms. The Communists were actually divided into three separate parties: The orthodox, Moscow-line party was the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), with an estimated membership of 800-1000. (Interestingly enough, this party changed its name, in August 1965, to the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), partly because it was safe to do so in the security of the rebel zone of Santo Domingo, but principally because it wanted to preempt the title "Communist," before some other party adopted it.) A smaller, pro-Chinese party also existed, known as the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD); its membership was estimated at around 500. The third party, containing an admixture of Communists and non-Communists, but essentially dominated by pro-Castroites, was the "ihth of June” (APCJ) group with 3000 to 5000 members. The leaders of each of these groups were hard-core professional Communists, most of whom had traveled to the Communist countries, including notably Cuba, and many of whom had received intensive training courses in guerrilla warfare in Havana, Moscow, or Peking. Faced now with an armed mob, as well as with rebellious officers, and confronted with the naming of Molina Urena as Provisional President, the Air Force began strafing attacks against the city. The fighting grew increasingly intense during Sunday and Monday, the 25th and 26th of April. Gangs of rebel soldiers together with armed civilians roamed the streets ef the capital, hunting down policemen, looting warehouses and committing arson. At least five political party headquarters were set afire, according to the New York Herald Tribune. By the afternoon of Tuesday, April 2T, however, the rebel forces were tired and demoralized as a result of the continuous attacks by Loyalist Dominican Air Force planes and the advance of Loyalist ground forces from the East and West. Earlier in the day PRD Secretary-~General Antonio Martinez Francisco had gone to the loyalist headquarters at the Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 === [PDF page 52] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 San Isidro base in the eastern outskirts of the capital, and had broadcast a speech over San Isidro radio appealing to the rebels to lay down their arms in order to avoid further bloodshed, saying: "I ask that everyone lay down their weapons, because this is no longer a fight between political parties." By late evening the original rebel leaders, as is amply clear from their actions, considered the rebellion to have been defeated. Individually and in small groups they sought asylum in the embassies in the capital. Among them were Provisional President Molina, dose Francisco Pena Gomez, PRD propaganda secretary, Jose Brea Pena, PRD financial secretary, Jorge Yeara Nasser, and high ranking PRD leaders Maximo Lovaton Pittaluga, and Leopoldo Espaillat. Many of the military leaders of the rebellion, led by Col. Hernando Ramirez, the principal planner and primary military leader of the revolt, also took refuge. The defection of the major rebel civil and military leaders left the rebellion in the hands of a desperate group of extreme leftist leaders (who apparently felt there was no escape for themselves) and a handful of determined and equally despzrate military officers, among the latter Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. Caamano, the naval Capt. Montes Arache, and a handful of other officers were not convinced that the situation was lost and after some further consideration returned to Ciudad Nueva, the stronghold of the rebels, to help organize a last ditch resistance. Caamano then had under his nominal command a number of extreme leftist leaders and their cadres plus a roughly equal number of non-Communist troops and irregulars. On April 28 the loyalist military began moving in on the rebel redoubt in Ciudad Nueva. The rebels, led and inspired largely by the desperate extreme leftist leaders, had spent the previous night erecting barricades, deploying machine guns, artillery, bazookas, mortars and riflemen, establishing fortifications and observations posts on rooftops and making other preparations for the next day's fighting. By dawn they were much heeter entrenched and prepared than the loaalist military expected. The loyalists moved in, met stubborn resistance, and the fighting see-sawed back and forth during the day. By late afternoon it became apparent that the loyalists would not be able quickly to quash the rebels, indeed they were forced back in several sectors. It was clear that the country was now faced with a protracted, bloody and destructive civil war. The extreme left, with its superior training and organization for revglutionary action, had established a whip hand on one side, while the militarists were in control of the other. The political moderates had abandoned the field. It is hardly necessary to dwell at length on the future prospects of such a state of affairs. The military situation was stabilized by the arrival of U.S. Marines on 28 April and thereafter, who quickly cordoned off the rebel zone. This prevented the revolution from spreading outside the capital. It also provided opportunity for the moderate civilian and military leaders of the Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RIP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont.) === [PDF page 53] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 rebellion to return to Ciudad Nueva under conditions in which they could recapture a measure of their leadership. The leaders of the extreme left were quick to realize that if they attempted to exercise the potential control which their position afforded they would give further substance to the charges of Communist control already being made on all sides. This, they feared, would quickly alienate international as well as much of their domestic support and provide a pretext for OAS forces to either move in themselves or support a general advance by the loyalist military. They therefore had no course but to make some room at the top for the returning moderates. Thus the complexion of the new "Constitutionalist Government” established in early May under the presidency of Col. Caamano; was at least superficially free of Communist participation. The "commandos” organized by the APCT, MPD end PCD remained intact and under independent command, however. During the succeeding months the Communists in the rebel zone profitably spent their time in training their members in guerrilla warfare tactics, in caching arms both in the rebel zone and in the countryside, and in spreading their propaganda throughout the land. Having control of the main offices of Santo Domingo's newspapers, the Communists were able to prevent the publication of opposition papers as well as to inaugurate their own daily, Patria, the first avowedly Communist journal in Dominican history. The PRD also gave some half-hearted training to a few of its members during this time. The negotiations which led to the establishment of the Provisional Government received little support from the rebel zone. The PRD adopted the position that the Provisional Government was entirely the creation of the OAS “occupation” forces, which merited neither support uor opposition. To its credit, however, the PRD did support the decision of Col. Caamano to sign the Act of Reconciliation and the Institutional Act, which led to the establishment of the Provisional Government under Hector Federico GARCIA-GODOY Caceres. Unfortunately, however, this was about the only matter in which the PRD was able to provide any positive leadership for the non-Communist left, which it claimg to represent. Indeed, the PRD's lack of leadership cost it dearly in dealing with the aggressive Communists, the prime example being its loss of control over the nominally PRD dominated labor confederation, Foupsa-Cesitrado. This confederation was already heavily infiltrated by members of the various Communist parties. But to ensure full control in order completely to unite the Dominican labor movement, the Communists convened a "special" meeting of about twenty self-appointed delegates of the confederation late in August 1965. Even though only a few of the delegates could claim to represent labor unions, the meeting elected a "Provisional Executive Committee" which parallels the Foupsa- Cesitrado National Executive Committee and by implication replaces it. According to a news report of the meeting, the Provisional Executive Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RBP78-03061A000300050003-2 cont. ) === [PDF page 54] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 Committee is charged with calling a general “congress” to elect a new National Executive Committee "in accord with the by-laws and with the task of uniting the Dominican Labor Movement." In other words, the Communists convened a rump meeting which then appointed a committee to convene a congress which would thereafter control the labor confederation. And the PRD was left out in the cold. The Communists used exactly the same method in an attempt to take over the university. They simply declared that the established rector was not in step with the Revolution, named a new rector and directing committee of faculty and student members and baldly declared that they conatituted the new direction of the university. The old rector has objected to this procedure and is doing his best to retain his position, with only half-hearted support from the Provisional Government. Here again is a circumstance which cries for leadership from the non-Communist left. While the university faculty is not beholden to the PRD, the party nevertheless has an obligation to assure that the country's principal university does not fall into the hands of left-wing extremists who most assuredly will destroy it as a place of learning and will turn it into an arm of subversion and upheaval, Once the Provisional Government was installed in the Dominican Republic, on the first of September 1965, talk revived of an imminent return of the PRD's leader, Juan Bosch, from Puerto Rico where he had enjoyed asylum since his ouster two years before. At first undecided, Bosch finally resolved to return on the 25th of September, the anniversary of his overthrow. Bosch's decision to return was greeted with scorn by some who blamed him for sitting out the revolt in security in Puerto Rico instead of entering the fray and providing the leadership so greatly needed by his followers. Others, such as the Santo Domingo magezine La Nacion were elated: "The arrival of the leader of the nation's great majority, Juan Bosch, will certainly be an important event at a time when the Dominicans pursue peace. Bosch is a man without hatreds or grudges.... The announcement of the arrival of the former constitutional President has evoked an unquestionable feeling of confidence and security among the people of the Dominican Republic. Everyone is referring to it; everyone expects this man to pronounce words of encouragement and guidance, at a time when uncertainty lingers in obscure areas and sinister corners despite all the efforts for peace." Imagine, then, the consternation of the elated when Bosch arrived to speak before a cheering throng wildly waving red banners emblazoned with the image... not of Bosch... but of Lenin! And the 60,000 supporters promised by Bosch's lieutenants were more nearly 6,000. Later, a PRD activist bemoaned the fact that when he had arrived at the square early that morning with a pile of pro-Bosch posters to put up, he discovered that the Communists had been there during the night and had covered every possible space with their own posters. How typical of the eggresgive initiative show by the Communists throughout the rebellion... Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 (Cont. ) === [PDF page 55] === Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2 and how characteristic it was thatthe PRD activist did not simply paste his posters over thase of the Communists! But the most disappointing aspect of the occasion was Bosch's speech. Far from pronouncing the "words of encouragement and guidance” which La Nacion had heralded, Bosch uttered a long, ubridled harangue against the United States, demanding one billion dollars in “reparations,” and exhorted the mob to continue their resistance, with strikes and what— ever other forms of protest were available, until the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was driven from the land. The sterility of Bosch's position was evident even to his close followers, once the passion of the moment had faded away. Essentially the Dominican Republic had two alternatives at that point: either support the Provisional Government, established with the agreement of Bosch's party, in its effort to re-establish normal political and economic life on the island and to prepare for free elections, or else to continue and increase the anarchy prevailing in the land in the hope that the OAS peace force would leave in sheer frustration. Bosch's opting for the latter course was not only unconscionable, it was self-defeating. For the great majority of the people, which the PRD could truly claim to represent when Bosch was elected in December, 1962, clearly did not support this choice. A few thousand cheering activists in Santo Domingo's rebel zone hardly represented a majority of a nation of over 3 million people. The Communists, meanwhile, were actively promoting a United Front, joining together the three Communist groups, the leftist controlled labor elements, and the left-wingers of the PED itself. This in turn provoked great concern in the more moderate wing of the PRD, and its leaders such as Martinez Francisco and Pena Gomez have privately expressed concern over the situation. There were even reports in mid-October that Juan Bosch was beginning to realize that the Communists were far more numerous than he had imagined and that they had gained far more influence in his party than he dared admit. But, as far as one could see, Bosch was still so preoccupied with venting his spleen against those who, in his view, blocked his return to power, that there appeared little indication that he intended to work in a constructive fashion to heal the deep wounds in the Domican body politic or to moderate the bitter and violent tone of his public pronouncements. These partisan positions of the non-Communists did little to help the Provisional Government, which was in truth the only salvation of the country. It was established as an apolitical government of strictly limited duration, for the sole purpose of re--integrating the opposing forces, of getting the country's economy moving again, and of preparing for and holding free elections. Surely it was more important to help achieve these objectives than to demand the withdrawal of the IAPF, a move nobody seriously believed would happen until peace was established. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2