The September 30 Affair: Background to the Coup (US Embassy Airgram A-300, Johnson Library copy)

=== [PDF page 1] === S| XS IG ATA coon, LE] copy No1.9~ SERIES | B EPAXKIMENT “Or SLATE » DOD, CIA, WHITE HOUSE CINCPAC FOR POLAD; AMEMBASSY CANBERRA, AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR, AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSY MANILA, AMCONSUL MEDAN, AMCONSUL SINGAPORE, AMCONSUL SURABAYA, AMEMBASSY TOKYO, AMEMBASSY WELLISCTON, (MANILA FOR FELG/RSO), HONG KONG, PARIS Mm US MANODLING INDICA TOR : Amembassy DJAKARTA DATE: October 22, 1965 The September 30 Affair CLASSIFIED sY = . EXEMPT FROM & : 2 - SCHEDULE OF E. 0. INS Embte? 1184 (Transmitting Summary) g sB(0),4 SENITIZED AUTO! rs Authority STATE letter ta. 19 Introduction | _—___—_ ARS, Late 3-8-7272 The history and interpretation of the ettempted coup in Indonesia which has become knowm as the September 30 Affair will probably be the subject of study end speculation for years to come. The present peper is designed to yresent within the short perspective of only three weeks, the story of this extraordinary Affair in the light of the Esbassy’s best cvrrent informetion, while the recollection of it is fresh and its effects are critical though not fully clear factors in current political life.. 2. As the world now knows, the coup struck in the early morning | | hours of October 1 with raics on the homes of seven members of the arog’ s general staff in Djakarta, six of whom were murdered. One, Chief of Steff of the Armed Forces General Masution, escaped, and together with his deputy General Suharto managed during the following critical dey to recapture the city and turn the tide. Instigator of the coup > insoler - as the public wes told, was en obscure officer in the Presiden *s petace gucre, Colonel Untung, who announced the formation of a Revolutionary - Council to govern the country end save the President from alleged usurpation of authority by a "Generals Council.” 3. As the story unyvinds facts become tongled ané, as is evident” in the attached paper, there are importent gaps in confirmed information. Meny questions are unensvered, including the extent of parti civation of. the Indonesian Air Force in the cou», the complicity of such an influential memper of the government 2s Subanizio and the full influence and roles of the PKI and the Chinese Commnists. Over 211, perhaps forming the biggest | _ qvestion mark of all, is the role of Presideat Sukarno in the whole Af ffair. nf ———— FOR DEPT. USE ONLY. FORM - 2.02 05-323 [hte (Occ entencs aod Ciassiiscation Approved by: Political Section PCL: ErvMasters IM Figalbraith ARMA - Col. Ethel ef Ng - ome co Bik aavndon Baines Johnson _Iibrar ary ig an ey. a ee | 2. oY oe eae a Ba veer er ese === [PDF page 2] === Page 75 AWS00. Frou Djaksarts 4. Tne present paper takes 2 look at the background of the Affair, traces what is known of its facts, and offers considered speculation concerning some of the gaps mentionec above and the prospects for the future now offered by the amazing events which will continue to be felt and assessed Zor 2 long time to come. aa be === [PDF page 3] === [Unreadable] ee Page 3, A-300 From Djakarta THE SEPTEMBER 30 AFFAIR Contents Section 1. Background Attack on the Moderates Growing Political Tensions The Post-Takari Revolutionary Offensive Section 2 ~ that Really Eappenec: A Summary The Attack The New Order The Retreat The Troops,. The Field Conmanders a The Generals and the Strategists.? The Plot: What Went Wrong " -§ [Unreadable] 6 seams see we me 0 eaene © om comps enn stole emmpenst's an auant> o@mmie Guru «> ea EE Section 3 - Bole of the PKI FG The PKI Before the Seytember 30 Affair. cos. Indications of PKI Involvenent Some Evidence Against PKI Instigation of the Coup Conciusions Section 4 - Role of Sukamo Theoretical Backgrcund The Bare Facts of Sukerno'’s Actions: Other Circumstantial Zvidence | 3: Reservations: Section 5 - ‘that Mignt Have Been Successful Elimination of Senior Generals Capture of Army Leadership Alive, Nithovt Executions Section 5 - Future Prospects [Unreadable] a: ot oe o.. oe +O ee eee eee eee -: oO ete one eee ee Hon er ene - - ences aerators see 7 - Site ae ere ees The Ary Fa! The PRI oo | i. ‘. The Army vw the PYI _ 8 fo, Ce eb ss Conclusions me. Co RS seuss [Unreadable] -- —S remmee mt ae ; core: = Iandon Baines’ Jotnece Epbreee [Unreadable] ie ~ c St om nen «f y . ei WEA ye Sia ree d noi a === [PDF page 4] === aie P-390, Djakarta. Tage 4 1. BACKGROUND Attack on the Moderates, 1964-65 a. Aware of his declining health and afraid that gradual evolution in Indonesia would not permit the accomplishment of his grand design, the establishment of a communist totalitarian state controlled by the PKI after his death, Presicent Sukarno over the past year | has speeded up the process of nettralizing or liquidating all independent power centers obstructing achievement of this goal. As these centers were removed or reduced, the PKI moved quickly and Geftly to control them, within the context of a vicious anti-American campaign designed to sow war psychosis under the threat of a “foreign enemy.” Assisting the PKI and Sukarno in this task wag the Indonesian Air Force, Pirst Deputy Prime Minister - Subandrio, and a host of comunist symoathizers, as well 2s an increasing number of opportunists who climbed on tne bandwagon with alacrity once it got rolling.. b. The process of eradicating opposition pro-.ceeced by stages, directed by Sukarno end implemented vigorously by the PKI. After rumors became current in the fail of 1964 that Sukarno was suffering increasing Gisability from his kidney disorder, a movement supported behind the scenes by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaérul ' €alen began a major polemic with the PKI. Known as the “Bocy to Support Sukarnosm,” or BPS, the movement’s major - public leader was Minister of Trade Adam Malik. Although Murba Party involvement was obvious, at the beginning, the BPS was treated purely as an association. of non-commnist newspapers attempting to “preserve the true teachings of Bung Karno." cc. Uoon Sukarno’s return from cverseas in the late fall, he bannec the BPS, setting off a domino-game of subsequent bannings and purges each of which strengthened the status and power of the PXI. Cn January 8, after witr- Grawing from the United Nations, Sukarno banned: the Murba Party. On Pebruary 24, following a dramatically heignhtening anti-2?merican campaign in Djakarte, Sukarno ordere@ the ° ip:. mys oS wee oe * - CORES ~ lyndon. Baines’ Johnson Pe Oe. teens ree - 9 LE a cee Oe aie 5 cae aN === [PDF page 5] === aia h=-300, Djakarta, Page 5 closing cf the newspapers which had supported the BPS, which he characterized as a CIA plot to "kill Sukarnoism anc Sukarno.” The bans on these newspapers enabled the PKI to complete its hold on the informational field, and crypto-communists rapidly took over the direction of the Indonesian writers Association, Antara, the Publishers Guild, and other communications media. aA few Gays after these papers were banned, Sukarno ordered the retooling of the °45 Generation, another Saleh political vehicle which also, however, had widespread connections among government and military officials. ad. In April, a largely PKI governing board was installed in the °45 Generation organization, and by | the summer, Murba-ites Saleh and Adam Malik, had effectively been "re-tooled” by losing control of most of their operational governmental responsibilities. Saleh himself ha@ made a bad mistake by disavowing his membership in Murba and by allowing PKI Chief Aidit to accuse him of spreading a “PKI false document” without rejoinder. In September, Sukarno announced that the °45 Generation was compietely under his control, aid Saleh publicly begged him for forgiveness. The emasc:ulation of Saleh was complete. Growino Political Tensions a. Following the banning of the BPS press, what had been a steady attack on the banned Masjumi’s HMI youtk group was stepped-up strikingly in the now-—commnist ccntrolled press. This campaign among other thirgs appeared to nave the effect of partially solidifying resistance to the PXI in the Moslem community in general. Tne PWI Congress in Malang March 7 was broxen up by a large group of Moslem students, and following the Afro- Asian Islamic Conference later in the month, all major ifoslem parties except the PKi-controlled Perti issued a joint statement which in effect Geclared that an.attack | On one Moslem group would be considered an attack on the religion. A pro-EMI demonstr=tion was nelé at Kotrar and tne NU attacked Antara for being “one-sided.” Concurrently, throughout Java ané varticularly in East Java, a burgeoning + Tone = eres. on ‘eam. Coe: nde es wale oh. San 0 153 ne Ghwtatelinns dwar Cea OO ee @ 7 TD TT! ee omnes. » Bee ew ee tee ee. Saas [Unreadable] 6, wg 7 - e: ee - [Unreadable] Cc O:.P °° +e oo 7 - oe ee Te a ants rer [Unreadable] sre SRE men ae “; === [PDF page 6] === sn A-390, bjakarta Page 6 ecrics of incidents bctween Moslem and pro-PKI peasants, deriving from energetic efforts to implement land reform laws, heightened tensions between the two groups. By July, a number of new Moslem newspapers had appeared in Djakarta which, although initially treading gingerly on PKI toes, gave promise of. eventually wplacing the BPS papers in attacking the PKI. b. Pacee with this resistance--which would remain ineffectual in Djakarta as long as its leadership remained weak at the top--Sukarno decided to neutralize the Moslems, while he concentrated his forcea for the attack on the two most important citadels of anti-PKI power-—the PNI right-wing and the Army leadership. In 2 series of Kotrar decisions, the HMI was placed anéer the supervision of Subandrio, who incidentally thereby increased his own power position by giving the impression of having Moslem support. In effect the Moslem-PKI issue had been dampened by September, and peasant incidents apparently stopped completely, although there were still ~- reports of high tensions between the two groups in Surabaja. _ c. Althousis over the past several years, Sukarno ras peen working to convert the PNI into a virtual mirror | of tae PKI in terms of espousai of pro-comaunist positions and attituces, in March of 1965 the tempo was stepped up to the point where it wae obvious’ that purges were socn to occur. Although the PHI had gone along with the pro-communist orientation of tne GOI, tnere was considerable foot—- @ragging on the part of a small group of moderates in the leadership, identified nation2lly with First Chairman Haréi, anc specifically in Centrzi Java, the main base of PNI sunport, with anti-commnist Central Java Chairman Hadisubeno. Opposing this group of mocerates was the crypto—commnist PNI Secretary General, Surachman, assistec by cpportunistic Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo and several central board members, _. as well as PKI agents and sympathizers planted within the party at all levels and in most regions. G. On March 25 and 26, Sukarno addressing an extraordinary PNI meeting in Djakarta pointed out that "recent === [PDF page 7] === ae A-30N, Djakarta Page 7 events” had cleared the road into the socialist stage of the Indonesian revolution-~i.e. the situation wherein all independent centers of power have been exterminated: and totalitarian controls can be applied without fear of resistance-~-and called unequivocally for the ouster of “false Marhaenists” from the PNI. These elements he iden— tified implicitly as anti-commnists. e. On May 4, the first “false Marhaenist” was | ousted. A special meeting of the PNI central board removed Hacisubeno from control of the Central Java PNI. In an “ erfort to sweeten this pill, Mrs. Hardi was named by Sukarno =. 2s a Deputy Minister of Basic Education and Culture, but tne moderate leadership was not placatec. Hardi and his followers rejected Hadisubeno’s ouster, and reportedly issued a letter ordering Hadisubeno to retain his position until the convening of a party congress. Surachman and others continued the pressure against the right-wing, how- |, ever, and at the PNI anniversary celebration on July 25,; Sukarno again calleé for the owster of false Marhzenists. About ten Gays later, a specially-—convened meeting of the PNI leadership council officially purged Hardi and his.. followers from the party, and gracually thereafter replaced: thea with either pro-commnists or communist sympathizers. i The PNI had collapsed as a political force without a chance, of resisting Sukarno.,. ee ee er ed SPOS OOS OO Ne CD ON SS SLT > STL SEND ASRS eaeED SESSLER REET £. The Army began to generate a stiffening to the continuing Sukarno-PKI thrustin Januery, when Yani appointed a “brain trust" to advise the Army on voliticgal matters. Among the members of this brain trust were/the Generals later slain on the morning of October 1. A few weeks before the banning of the BPS newspapers, the Army securec control /éiie of them, Berita Indonesia, which it. i reissued as Berita Yucha (War Kews). ‘hen the BPS. + Merdeka was banned, the Army reopened it as Angkatan | Bersendjata (Armed Forces) with names of Nasution and the four military Chie Chiefs of Staff on the masthea@. Also, early in the year, two imoortant events took vlace; the killing or tne Sulewesi rebel Kahar Muzakhar, permitting return of se o.. ee eee re oa a a ne a an i nn tt ot ey ee ee ee soe. ao ob nm on cpm ee cette eee > eee oo eee comes - tog or cone am © wrmew © ¢ ee ie) SsaSa—_ ¢ - ee — tn a enone “ > cORSw. Yamion Baines’ Johnson torkry 2 ao oe BS ae eS a pie a eee a as === [PDF page 8] === iit A-300, njakarta Paye 2 Siliwangi division troops to West Java, ané@ Yani’s success in removing the leftist CO of East Kalimantan, General Suharjo, from his post. g. In late January, one direction of the thrust against the Army was revealed when Aidit announced that he had requested Sukarno to arm peasants and workers in order to fight against KNekolim. Although this proposal was. publicly rejected by Sukarno, only a month later Yani ercered Sumatran Regional CO Mokoginta to begin arming oné:.company of peasants and workers in each military district. Mokoginta was to ensure that the arms, however, remained firmly,in Army control. h. Following the BPS newspaver bannings in Djakarta, the communist-led PwI attempteé to have a num ber of provincial BPS papers closed. West Java CO Adjie, nowever, was. able tc protect the BPS paver in Bandung. This success may have encouraged the Army to relax tem-— porarily, and in April Sukarno himself began the process of crushing the Army. Calling a especial meeting of Military Commanders, Sukarno oréered the army to get into step with the revolution and completely revise its defense’ doctrine to be Cirected against Nekolim rather than against Communist China. Army officers were deeply concerned at these changes, which tney believed opened the way for dis— integration of the Army's anti~-communist posture. Concurrently, it became increasingly apparent during these months that Omar Dani, Chief of the Air Force, had sold out — to the PKI and was actively assisting its advance. -Although the Army held a series of conferences to “turn the wheel toward tne left” as Sukarno cemanced, Yani himself and 2a number of senior Army officers-—-many of whom were in the. “prain trust"--quietly formed a “Generals: Council” to provide political guidance. i.e In early May, Sukarno oréereG that the newly creates National Defense Institute be effectively placed under civilian control and tnat its course nave a high tee Mle © ENE Ce Daew 0 ( ‘ e- TOR wg Oe oe Dao ee *; OO ge Teaoe Meines’ Johnson erent a 3 soba g Saraget === [PDF page 9] === as A-300, Djakarta Page 9 " pro-communist content. A few days later, Aidit proposed tnat Nasakom councils be formed to advise the Military Commanders from the top echelon down to the military Gistricts. A PKI functionary later revealed that what the PKI desired by this proposal was the institution of | a political commissar system, similar to that cof Comaunist Cnina. Sukarno himself then cited the example of Communist China and proposed the creation of a "Pifth Force" of volunteers in order to implement the Army's new anti-Nekolim ° Gefense doctrine. Both Yani and Nasution squirmed on this nook but succeeded in avoiding formation of the Fifth Force. Seizing on the killing of a warrant officer by PKI peasants: in North Sumatra, Yani attempted to display Army resistance to the Fifth Force plan. By September, it appeared that “ although the Army had been forced to mouth support for Sukarno’s pro-communist attempts to crush it, it was still largely integrally sound and had successfully resisted implementation of the two main proposals which would have destroyed it as a political as well as an anti-commnist force. + 8 @ ar cee Bee en em 6 ENED ¢ CCE EEE Gee > GnEene ee ene oe The Post-—Takari Revolutionary Offensive Oe O00 a. As of early August, Sukarno’s balance sheet of his success showed a mixed picture. On the one hand, nme had crushed the Saleh forces and removed the anti- _ comnunist strength in the PNI. He had circumvented anc neutralized the Mosiems, making it possible to crush them at a later date. But the Army had faltered and then, apparently neld. At this point, on August 3 and 9, Sukarno suffered two apparent pnysical seizures of unknown Origin, and conveniently went into hibernation to prepare nis August 17 speech., Oe ee ee, b. In his August 17 "Takari”® speech, Sukarno mace it clear that the “revolutionary offensive” was to ~ be heightenea in all fieids in the near future, and particularly against the Army. After warmly praising the ™ countries of Eastern Europe for having established "People's Democracies” after World War II, he listed Indonesia along with North Viet-Nam and Communist China as the logical 20 omn-O 0-8 CRP OSE O GTO Gr 0 +> cE oF OFE: OTe OOH. aly ome, ° ee ee ee eee ee ee c woe Speer *: Cc, OP acy trmaon. Baines’ Johnson ei aren Aa * a :. * ced 2.3 on # a Pee; fo ooae rans - - pete e inet 3 x a5 A pose Bate te === [PDF page 10] === CR A~300, Djakarta Page 10 allies of Indonesia, which had aiso "liberated" themselves in the same perioc. He called for the creation of a Djakarta-Pnanom Penh-Hanoi~Peking-—Pyongyang axis asa fulfillment of the Gemands of history. c. A few passages later, Sukarno warned that ne had always maintained that the class struggle had to give wey to the national struggle. Now, ne said, “I warn corruptors that if they continue their operations, the people will burn them up.” wo paragraphs Later, Suxarno continued, “iven tnougn you were Generals from the Peta”? wio boast of your revoiutionary services, if now you try tc upset the Nasakom offensive, you are reactionary forces!” Finaily, Sukarno expressed his annoyance at Army resistance to the Pifta Force ccncept, saying in part: °"rvery time = suggest something, there is always a reaction...in this. case, tney accuse me of copying otners. But our Constitution yives every citizen the right to Gefend the nation. HEter stucying this matter furtner, I as Supreme Commander will make tae decisicn.” His mention of tae accusation of copying otners referres to the tniniy-veilecé remarks in the Szmay newsvapers linking his proocsal to Comaunist China's militia systen--ancé in fact, GSurarno originaliy stated that chou En-lai hae suggested tne Pifth Force system. A further warning to tne Army came in a speech on Septenber 1, when ne told Yani (by name) to straight ten ‘things out, or risk being “lert behino by the peovle” if he, Sukarno, invoked ais charismatic powers. <¢. Building on the Takxari attacks on economic corruptors, wno are callec “capitalist bureaucrats” in Local terminology ane are identified with Army officers ~ YColcing positions in Government and state enterprises, as well as we the remnants of Saleh's-empire, the PKI becan a mass snrieking caimaicn of invective anc abuse against tone Peta was a self-cefense iorce cf Indonesians oxrganizec @uring the Japanese cccupation. The "Peta Group” in the _ Zrmy incluceé Generals Yani, Suharto, Farmen, ane other members oi the “brain trust" ang the "Generale’ Council.” === [PDF page 11] === Se 72-300, Djakarta raye 11 Mee ee ee ee oe these clements. Towarc the end of September, the point ned been reached that a Chicom-influenced paper directed tne "people" to Grag such elements out of their offices anc shoot them in the street. Concurrently, pressure was stepped up on the former members of the BPS, who were haulea@ successively into police neadgquarters for questioning. The Police Commander of Djakarta indicated that any of the expelled PNI elements who attempted political activities would be jailed, and the PKI again stepped up its attacks on the HiIl. Pressures were accelerated acrogs the board against non-comnunist elements until the Indonesian informational envirenment reacneG a fever pitch cof prco—communism hitherto unmatcheé even in Indonesia. e. This was tne frenetic picture within the political arena on the eve of September 30. In scmewhat lees rarified atmoevhnere there was the general continuing economic deterioration which plagued the iives of the “pecple at all leveis. This was reflected in the skyrocketing price of rice which soared to unprececented heights Guring September. The situation affected the staple food supply of practically every Indonesian, anc was tne standard tcpic cf conversation in every market place and kamponqd. It was exploiteé by various PKI front crganizations, which carried loud protests to the doors of the Minister of Trace, — and in Surabaya even invaded tne Governer’s Gining rocn o ans upset the fooc on the table. These inspired mob actions.. j represented manipulation by a siall well-dJisciplined minority, Gecicateé to the early attainment of the socialist state ane viewing attacks on the economic corruptors, whom the President/Great Leader of the Revolution had condemned, as a part of the psychological preparation. Sane! [Unreadable] t- © es.@ we 0 Toren pieg . Cc fz iv Iyndon: Baines | Tohnsort Eiby === [PDF page 12] === eet £.~300, Djakarta ~ age 12 2. WHAT REALLY FAPPENED A Court of Inquiry. It is unlikely that we snall ever know the full facts of the September 30 affair. The maxim “the truth will out" has never had much validity © in Indonesia, where the final and official account of important political crises describes not past events but subsequent volitical accommodation tothe2 events. As Sukarno works towards a “political solution” for the September 30 affair, the process of obfuscation will speed up. It is, thus, perhaps not too early for the Emoassy to hold its own court of inquiry. This inguiry will move from the known to the suspected, describing first the attack itself, the new order proposed by the Movement in - its Decree and Decisions, and the retreat as documented principally in news reports. It will then attempt to sort out the cast of characters, first identifying the Movement's troops and its field commanders, and then ferreting out the generale and hidéen strategists behind the affair. Prom this evidence, some speculation will be. advanced on the nature of the original plot and the reason it failed. fhe Attack. The Seotenber 30 Movement’s attack. in the early morning of October 1 possessed aspects of both a standard coup @’etat and a simple act of terror. In the space of approximately five hours organized Army units seized those key points which are normally targets of coup attempts while several small bands of terrorists attempted | to kidnap the top Army command. Although not a complete success, the maneuver ceme dangerously close to obtaining all of ite first objectives, suggesting that it had benefited from reasonably expert planning and ccordination. a. Something less than three battalions of Army — troons besan to move at 2 a.m. By 4 a.m. they had sealed off the palace and assumed pcesitions around Merdeka Square cn which the palace, the Embassy end one of the city’s largest railway stations face. Other units quickly toox over the telegraph office, the telecomminications building ané perhaps the National Bank, from which several billions o£ rupiah were reportedly taken. *. 6 co. Fearnyedon Baines Johnson Libraree eo “Vv. 2 de: wee Big: ae a7: als eae Meee io we ies === [PDF page 13] === Paye 13 b. Many other key objectives were obtained largely through the use of “inside men.” The railway lines into the city were blocked by communist rail workers. Telephone exchanges in all key suburbs were shut down between 3:40 and 4:30 a.m., by their communist attendants, members of the SOBSI affiliate P.N. Postel (later suspended for this act). In one case, at least, the telephone workers received help from armed men in uniform. ¢. The attacks on the Generals’ homes occurred between 3:30 and 5:00 a.m. by several teams (perhaps one per house). Reportedly the first to be hit was General - Soetojo. After his door was battered down, he was pulled from the house and taken away in a jeep. (Some sources have emphasized that Soetojo was not important in the Army hierarchy, but was killed because he signed the order tno execute the principal communist leaders in the Madiun ~~ rebellion in 1948.) General Yani's guards exchanged ‘shots with nis attackers. The Army Chief of Staff was wounced as ne attempted to escape and then carried away. General Suprapto went with his assailants without a struggle apparently under the impression that they possessed a genuine order for his arrest from those in authority. General Pandjaitan apparently fired on his attackers but © in the exchange of fire he was killed and his nephew; mortally wounded. General Harjono was snot, wounded and - carried away at 4 a.m. General Parman was kidnapped half. an hour later and carried away in a truck. ee. A-300, Djakerta | failures. Nasution’s attackers pretended to be summoning him to the President. Profiting from the attackers’ mistake as to his identity, Nasution managed to jump over a | garden wall and, despite an injury to his foot or leg,. ‘ succeeded in reaching the home of an Army officer who. carried him immediately to a “safe place," perhaps in. Bogor. His aide, Lieutenant Pierre Tendean was, however, captured and Nasution’s six-year old daughter fatally wounded. General Suharto, who was later to command the G. The terrorists also, fortunately, had their.; —— SECRET awe: Pe wen cowie a tye ree. .; S, c 0. P Fl igre Baines Johnson be ara === [PDF page 14] === Page 14 forces suppressing the Movement, was at a local hospital visiting his sick daughter and his would-be attackers were unable to learn his whereabouts from his household. There are unconfirmed reports that Minister of Veterans Affairs General Saztini, and Generals Moersjid and Taswin were also terror targets but received prior warning and were able to escape. Police Minister Sutjipto’s house - was reportedly visited by armed civil s.but he was out. of town. Second Deputy Prime Minister, g imeta ent ly (and unaccountably) the only civilian on the Movement’s first death list. His guards managed to beat the attackers off after losing one police officer. e. The Generals and Nasution's aide were taken to Lubang Buaja on the grounds of Halim Air Force Base where they were reportedytaunted and humiliated by members of the PKI women’s organization Gerwani, then tortured and put to death. The bodies were dumped into a 12 meter | Geep well and covered with trash and earth. They were not discovered until the night of October 3. Although it is conceivable that the Generals were killed only after. it had become clear that the September 30 Movement had failed, the facts seem to point to a preconceived assassination plot. (See Section 3) Om --@ Sramrere weed Sewer 8-6 o e+ e280 cee ce £. The Embassy has as yet only fragmentary accounts of what occurred in the provinces at the time of the September 3C affair. With the possible exception of Central Java, however, there appears-to have been no closely coordinated action in the regions. In Jogjakarta, — the Movement’s troops as of October 2 were known to have been in possession of the radio station, post office, bank and other centers although it is not known when they moved into these positions. Three Diponegoro officers ~ were reported abducted by these troops and at least twa were later killed. Their bodies were not discovered until October 19. (During the day of October 4, however, the Movement's troops were expelled from Jogja). In Semarang, Madiun and perhaps smaller Central Java areas the Movements forces appeared to have held some points for a time, but none were in rebel hands for more than two days. Diponegoro Division neadguarters in Semarang remained in the hands of its commander who chose Suharto’s side when the Movement’s chips were down. SECRET — <<. SOC COUENED ERS © 00 GIRSEEs wapereD ce GO E> SER SOwweuwmme COQ COe & 0+¢-e- ED OU ere com + <> c.0FE 2 yndon. Be. ares anv” oa Baines’ Johnson Hibrs os ww Pakgle heat Sy xo ceees ae a a een === [PDF page 15] === Page 15 ee A~300, Ljakarta The New Order. If it is difficult to distinguish whether the September 30 Movement’s attack constituted a coup d’etat or a simple act of terrorism and revenge within the Army, the radio announcements during October 1 on the nature of the Movement only served to highlight these contradictory attributes.! a. The Movement’s first words were a terse 7:a.m. radio announcement claiming that the September 30 Movement under Lieutenant Colonel Untung had saved the President from a coup planned by a CIA-sponsored Council of Generals to come off during the Army anniversary celebrations beginning October 5. This and a more lengthy 10 a.m. announcement.. noted that the Movement was totally within the Army and directea against the Generals who were announced as having been arrested.. b. Although the morning radio announcements haa mentioneé the formation of a Revolutionary Council, it was only with the reading of the Movement’s Decree Number One at 2 p.m. that it became clear that this Council was to replace Sukarmo'’s Dwikora Cabinet, which was placed in ce. The Revolutionary Council as outlined in the Movement ‘s Decision Number One issued immediately after its sole Decree was anything but an internal Army affair. Its membersnip of 45 included a wide range of prominent figures, most of whom were quite clearly never connected with the insurgents and whose inclusion was a rather obvious attempt to curry support. (The Council’s menbership was transmitted by &mbtel 795.) The list, nowever, had an overall leftist cast. At any rate, the Council’s make-up seemed to be of little importance since all authority under Decree Numper Cne was relegated to the Presidium which was allegedly icenticai with the September 30 Movement’s top command ané incluced Untung as its Chairman. The Revolutionary Council _ was never convened.: " a. Fa te owe or. _ & “~. % 6, @ Soe pee ~ emerge mens . CQPY - lyndon Baines’ Johnéon Libr F. ot ek - 1 Beata -~ ee Lt gene eae ae ¢ [Unreadable] oo =a we ne eee RBS LS oe wee em eee me ewe oe meee te ree Ge a0. 0 cape 2 eeeew er ergueenrwame 0-0 eee es: ° === [PDF page 16] === ce 4-300, Ojakarta tage Lb ve. Decree Number Une also incluied an appeal £or the formation of Revolutionary Councils at the provincial, district (Kabupaten) and sub-district levels, thus indicating that the entire structure of the national government was to be replaced. (A Jogjakarta Revolutionary Council apparently ruled for three or fonr days and it is possible that other Revoiuctionary Councils were formed in smaller Central Java localities. There was even a Dijakarta newspaper report that an “Indonesian People’s Republic” nad been proclaimed in Central Java.. Although there is a report of the formation of a Revolutionary Council in a North Sumatra District even before Untung’s first announcement, it would appear that the September 30 Movement appeal for a new revolutionary structure Grew little response outside Dijakarta and Central Java.) e. Dramatic changes were also envisaged for the Armes6 Forces. Untung appealed to enlisted men to rise up against Generals and other officers living luxuriously or. the suffering of their troops, and with his Decision Number Two he wipecé out ranks above Lieutenant Colonel, promoted all enlisted ranks one grade, and raised the ranks of the Movement’s enlisted personnei two grades. The Retreat. The Sevtember 30 Movement hac scarcely installed iteel£f in the capital city when it began to retreat. Oe a. General Suharto started to assemble his troops around 10 a.m. but even before they moved, Untung's support began to meit. At least two companies of the Movement’s troops, who were perhaps at first unaware of whose cause they were serving, Cefected by early afternoon before contact with opvoesing forces. Many of these East an@ Central Java troops apparently were misled as to the nature of the operation in which they were participating. Minister of Veterans General Sardini, who had once served in the Diponegoro command, was able to talk at least one company of his former troops into defecting while General Basuki Rachmat, East Java Commander, also reportedly brougnt some of his men back to the fold. oe ORRY gen tines SEE ; fen inion Beton inion | oa at ip Pg BT Tee Meg: === [PDF page 17] === ae #—-300, Djakarta Pase 17 oe ofa Gam ee “ecw Oe b. At sunsct troops from Suharto’s Strategic Commana moved into the center of the city, capturing the radio station and telecommunications center at 7 p.m A Cavalry Battalion from General Adjie’s Siliwangi Division arrived in Djakarta during the evening and secured the ' National Bank and@ other points. By. midnight, the Movement’s military commanders and most of their remaining troops had retreated to Halim Air Bage. Colonel Untung and Omar Dani accompanied by probably no more than one © company from the palace guard flew to the Hiswahjudi Air Base near Madiun around 3:30 a.m. October 2. [Unreadable] | c. Strategic Command “Raiders” moved into Halim Air Base at 4 p.m. on October 2 meeting no resistance - from its Air Force defenders, who, according to press ° reports, were ordered by Air Vice Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang not to resist. ces we twee + ote ad. After a week's clean-up campaign. the Suharto forces captured Colonel Latif of the Djakarta Comnane -. (KODAM V) and 86 Tjakrabirawa troops in the Jogijakarta area on Cctober 9. Untung, himself, was captured alive on October 11 near Tegal, Central Java, when civil defense troops spotted him ona bus. By this time, 90% of the Movement’s forces had been put out of action, zccording tc Army claims. While this would appear to be true as recards the regular troops definitely committed to Untung, many paramilitary units remained at large (which were perhaps never subject to Untung’s direct command but working with him) in the Djakarta area and other parts oz Java and Sumatra. The Troops. The Seovtember 30 Movement’s field forces were a motley group composed of Army units from. three separate regional commands, Air Force elements. and paramilitary forces formed from communist ‘cadres. The force appeared to be divided into three bread groups _ with separate functions: the Army trcops secured the re oe palace and certain key points, the Air Force provided ~~ §— ee passive defense of the Halim Air Base, and the paramilitary units probably participetedé in sabotage and terror but nerhaps had a mucn more extensive role in later, unpiayec acts of the affair. we nfo te itceememeneeee : » © 0. £3 tyndon bats Johnson : ek ee ae: ey Ce pahnnante —... apamepn viv witness === [PDF page 18] === eT 2-309, wjakacta Pezreger Lis ve Urabtury rced tlsce Acay boaltalions alo hin eispurai in Djakartoe, tne 539th Battalion Crom the Brawidjaja Division in East Java, the 454th Battalion from the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, which’ Untung had commanded some XMO* months earlier, and Untung’s own First Battalion from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Palace Guards. The Tjakrabirawa Battalion was the inner core of Untung’s forces and may have furnished the majority of the Generals’ kidnappers, most of wnom were in Tjakra uniforms. The Brawidjaja and Diponegoro units, which had come to Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day ceremonies scheduled for October 5, were used primarily to secure the palace and some nearby key points and, according to newspaper reports, may also have provided defense for the Halim Airport on the second and third days of the affair. b. The Movement’s paramilitary forces apparently consisted of members of the PKI, the Pemuda Rakjat and even of the PKI women's arm Gerwani grouped in Special Security Force (TIK) units. During the month of September approximately 2,700 communists, Waitin pepe rennspan were given a 7-day training course conducted Dy the ‘Air Force within the Halim Air Base perimeter near the area which was later to become one of the September 30 Movement’ s strongholds and the burial ground for the Generals. : 9 these cadres were called in on Septe - A few rs prior to the attack they were reportedly provided olive green field aniforms and weapons from Air Force stock at Halim Air Base and in the city. The Army now claims to have confessions and other proof that the TIK units participated in the capture and murder of the Generals. The TIK units were apparently also given other tasks in the days following the coup. A group of some 35 TIK elements reportedly was captured near the Hotel Indonesia ard the telegraph office on October 2 in what might have been an effort to retake the “telegraph office. Three TIK men also teportedly engaged in sniper fire from an upper floor of Djakarta’s principal hotel during this operation. The Army announced on October 18 that 1,334 of those participating in the September 30 ct eee Ste ag te? ~~ ~Ne@ er o et coe [Unreadable] pips, Beines'Jotmac Li 7 === [PDF page 19] === Pe A-300, njakarta Pase 19 Movement had been arrested. The majority of these were probably TIK elements. There would appear to be many more TIK units at large, and the Army so indicated in its press announcement. c. The Air Porce’s Special Action Troops (PGT) seemed to have been purposely kept in the background. They provided security for the Halim Air Base during the firs. part of the coup. One PGT company also assisted the Tjakrabirawa in protecting the President. There appears to have been at least one small clash between the PGT and Suh2rto’s forces near Halim Air Base during which three Air Force men were captured. d. The number of September 30 Movement troops in Central Java is very difficult to estimate as many units purposely did not indicate a clear commitment one way or the other. A field grace Army officer estimated on October 3 that three regimental areas, Tegal, Pekalongan and Jogjakarta were sympathetic to the rebels. oor eet - + Qn + exes + ce- amp:.eb ao +e @esce ee ere ep nna ae we eee ee ee ere er eee nt ee ee = me me ee nee ee ee === [PDF page 20] === - 1-300, Djaxarta fase 20 Tne Ficle “Comsamcac. The anonymity of the Septe:aoer 30 Movenent’s leaderri39 ie perneps best illustrated by the fact that several proninent Inconesians were convinced during the first Gays of the coup that Untung (which means lucky in Indonesian) was a fictitious name. Although there is now definite proof that Untung - exists in flesh and pdlood, little other information hag. peen offered either by the press or private sources to Gigpel the anonymity of the Movement’s fielé commanders. 3. Untung, according to a biography printed in tne official Army newspaper, attendéed an officere’ course in Bancgung in 1959, eabsequently served in West Sumatra as a lieutenant during the PRRI rebellion, in Central Java’as a battalion commancer, and in Vest Irian during the anti- Dutch campaign there. He cid not, as previously reported, etucy in the Unitec States. iiinister of Veterans Sardini in a private converzgation stateé that Untung’s military nistory gcee back fifteen years beyond that pxrintecé in tae Arny journal ani taat when serving under nim in 1945, Untung nad displayet definite commnist sympatiies. Sources too numercus tc ce icnorecé have maintained that Untung also fought in the 1943 Iiadiun rebellion on tae communist side. Bee os Saciun record was brought to te Pres eri Seition when Untung was first provosed for the Palace Suaré but the Presicent permitted his appointment as Comwmancer of the Pirst fjaxrabirawa Battaiion in late 1963. Untunsg is reportedc to be a tough soldier, not overly bright, and devoured wij indignation over the corruption sf immorai living of/General officers. He was, in short, a perfect commnist candidate for the role of an Indonesian Kong Le. b. Much less is known about the other members of the Hovement's top leadership. Brigacier General Supardjo was Comnander of the Pourtna Combat Command in Pontianak, Kalinantan, at the time of the affair. He is still at larce, “most wanted man at the present time. Lieutenant Colonel Heru was Assistant Directrof Air Force Intelligence and previously === [PDF page 21] === Page Za goemt a yeer in Air Force intelligence schools in “exes. His actual participation in the Movement is still in Goubt. Ke hes not been discharged from the Air Force and there are no reports of his being arrested.* Navy Colonel Sunardi was an; acministrative assistant in the Navy Minister's office and for- - it merly commander of a destroyer. His Navy colleagues describe ° hin as a radical who got in bad company. He is now under arrest anc reportedly has been relatively cooperative under interroga- — tien. He also was erroneously reported as having studied in the.: United States. However, the career of Police Lieutenant Colonel Anwas, Chief of Staff of the.Djakarta Police on September 30,. was in large part sponsored by the United States. He studied uncer American euspices for a year in the Philippines an6 on two ‘ s¢parate occasions in the United States. Although he was first pusiicly absolved from complicity in the Movement by nis police superiors, he is now believed to be uncer arrest. Only a few weoks before the coup attempt Anwas had been transferred from cxcies connected with, among other things, security of foreign «iigsions in Djakarta to a post as one of Subandrio’s aides. ee h- 300, Qjpakarla ee arte ort ree eee mee, c. Two of the Movement’s commanders most mentioned. in “12 press, Colonel Latif and Colonel Suherman, were not listed axong its top leaders but were nameu as ordinary members of the Revolutionary Council. Latif, formerly commander of the Second Regiment of tne Djaxkarte military command, was shot in the left xnee upon capture and nas reportedly resisted interrogation. ({{.onei Sunerman, who was intelligence officer for the Centrai Java military command, apparently was and pernaps still is in; command of the Movement’ forces in the Jogjakarta aree. a Tae Generals ané tne Strategists. The Keng Le-like .isyuise assumec by the September 30 Movement failed to hice one ni¢h-level strategists behinc it. The vrincival ¢efensants ic. thls case are not the fieiu grade crificers commanding tne asvecent butb. NS. Ricit ang the Inccnesian Communist Perty ar.. Oar Bani and tne Indcnesian Bir Force. Communist Cnine 2.6 stanas eccuses ano Sudanuric arc Sukarnc must texe the svaiu, altnough the case against tnem is less clear. oer be [Unreadable] [Unreadable] REELS OT a DS SE OEP be oo mg eae on te aa Cinna ee 2 cal OME PhS eB ee 008 A oa ee es [Unreadable] a. Omar rani wes in this affair us te his neck. The we ONL, sir Ferce training anc arming Of the FIL neramilitary ceéres, Z€ use Of Halim Air Base as comusend centesx, escape rocte anc: wie wes arresteo after this was written, ano hes now been cis-; [Unreadable] =e aN ee. te f ne Yo women os ares Pees ms, _ ¢ op x: - tyndon. Baines’ Johnson. Library s wo? - - ee we be eos TS “3 ag rss fe i: === [PDF page 22] === ———= os, Bjakarta rage 22 eoomclery, Gaeure OL 21, cena plows nok only to ferry Jurcting ni mis Lroops te Central Java but eisc reportedly to Sraine Genezal Suparcjo “from Kalimantan to Liakarta on the eve ct the affair, anc Pani’s own flignt to Central Java with Untuny provide enough circumstantial evidence to nang Dani. There are in addition unconiirmec reports that he moved his family to Central Java on September 29 and tnat he held an urgent meeting of nis principal aices a few hours before the “ovenent began its march. To top it all ofz, Dani issued a etatement a few hours after the Movement had made its attack claiming tnat it haa safeguaréed the Indonesian revolution from a supversive plot. This statement was later (but too late) ccrrected to desecrive the Movement as an internal Army affair in which tae Air Force had no intention of interfering. anotaer unconfirmed report put vani’s famiiy in Sukarno’s Bogor oalace as of only a few cays vefcre thie is written. This again would point the finger at Presicert Sukarac. b. It ie not yet clear how far the Air Force was involves as a whole. cther Air Force officere under interxegation have incicatec that tne training, arming and services oficred the iovement’s trocps was e closely held and well. cloaked oseration involving only a few Air Force figures. c. The circumstanial evicence azainst the PKI is Likewise sufficient for ccnviction. Communist youth do not umeertaxen Xicnmappings and xitlings and comzauaist union men—- Lexs «cic not bleck railways ance close teleprone excnaanges witncuc the xnowlecge ci the Central Committee. Djakarta nuwsvapers Aa@ve Made aech Of a spcech by PKI Central Com— mitteoman 2.nwar Sanusi cn tne eve cz tre Septemoer 30 affair im wnich he scaic tnat Ljakaerta was abcut to give birth to a new Nasaxo:n oolitical force ané evervthing had been readied for the event. It is doubtful whether a large section of the PKI apparatus knew of the plot but party members in the provinces appeareé to nave respondec quickly to tae Movement once it was announced, acccorcing to nevspaper xseps rts. é. LD. N. Aidit’s personal actions Curing the aztflaix icllovwec a strikingly similer course te tnose of: Omar yani. After the PAI orsan Harian Rajat oz petober aii — === [PDF page 23] === " festation of sclidarity with deféated revclutionaries whicihy * See A-300, Djakarta Page 23 had extolled the "correctness of the action taken by the September 30 Movenent,” Aicit issued a letter to a Surabaja newspaper treating the matter as an internal Army affair. (This letter was first printed undated on October 6 and then amended to show an October 2 date in a transparent attempt to absolve Aidit from the Harian Rakjat pronouncement. The PKI Politburo, meanwhile issued a statement on October 5 also treating the Movement ase an. internal Army matter.) Aidit, like Dani, also turneé up in Central Java although there is inconclusive evidence to prove that he accompanied X¥ Dani and Untung from Halim to Iswahjudi Air Base near Madiun. (See Section 3 for a more detailed wrap-up of PKI involvement in the September 30 Movement.) ) e. The Army leadership is now building a good case against the Chinese People's Republic based generally on traditicnal anti-Chinese feeling, and specifically on the Gigcovery of Chinese arms in the nané@s of PKI paramilitery elements and in Chinese shipments cisguised eas construction materials for the Djakarta Conefo complex. Tne Chinese have not helped their defense by resolutely refusing to fly their. £lag at half mast for the dead Generals, @ most unwise ands te: cannot be excused, as Sukarno suggested, by feigned ignoranke of the national mourning.. f£. The case against Subandrio is more @ifficult to substantiate. There can be little Coubt that his Central - intelligence Boaré provided the stories of a "Generals wee Council” on which the Movement justified its action. but tne President’s testimony would be necessary to make this stick. Army officers privately and a newspaper publicly have Grawn attention to the unusual number of Indonesian officials absent from Djakarta on September 30. A 45— member delegation from the People’s Provisional Consultative Assembly including Zaira Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul - Saleh, PNE Chairman 721i Sastroami¢joje, anc Army Major General Wilujo Puspojuco, a National Defense Institute. grcup of 59, no less than three economic teams including tvo of Indonesia's strongest anti-commnist military leaders [Unreadable] RBS Boe Jest e sh SRI atk! na 5, - aoe -_- 7 "€ ofa * op Pt ‘yndos. Haines! Sohnach 1b: rerLg === [PDF page 24] === ae A~309, Dijakarta Page 24 “Generals Sukendro ane Jusul Amir, and a group of 57 senicr Air Force pilots whe openly harbored anti-PKI feclings left for China during the month of September. Subandrio would, of course, have been the most likely person to snare so many Chicom invitations at one time. The First Deputy Prime Minister, himself, was on tour in Sumatra with 11 other ministers. The Army claims to have intercented an October 2 cable to Subandrio in Medan, which read “objective not achieved, return home immediately,” but this may well have been a forgery. It is fairly well substantiated, however, that a Jetstar was sent from Halim Air Base, while it wae still in the Movement’s hands, to Sumatra to pick up Subdandrio. g- The President’s role in the September 30 Movement may be a puzzle for historians in years to come but that ne had a role is now widely accepted (although not: publicly expressed) by most Indonesians. There can be no doubt that Sukarno was thoroughly briefed on the alleged plot of the “Generals Council” and that he was a susceptible subject for such talk. Some Indonesians have spoken (in whispers) cf the President’s egpeech to a cormunist student group on September 2° in which he talked of “those who were Generals but who now are cGefenders of counterrevolutionary elements ané whom we must crush.” While it would be unwise to take these words, which are similar to those he epoke on August 17, as an indication that Sukarno was privy to the plot against the generals, they are, however, a good clue as to his general frame of mind. h. much attention has been placee on Sukarno’s ections Guring September 30 anc October 1 which are regarded as indications of his position vis~a-vis the- September 39 affair. So much so, in fact, that thre palace f2lt compelled to publish an explanation (or as one Indonesian official suggested, an over-explanation) of his exact movements Guring tie crucial hours While there can de no Goubt that Sukarne was in the hands of members of tae Sentember 30 Movement, that he voluntarily accompanied them {or oreceded them) to their Halim Air Base center and escape route but that he Gid not (or refused to} accompany them to Central Java, these mcvements, however, do not in tremselves prove Presidential complicity in tne plot. === [PDF page 25] === [Unreadable] cs, ee A-500, Djakarta B’steger o's i. Much morc suspect ace Sukarno’s actions after tne September 30 afFair. His first move was to name a weak and reportedly somewhat leftist General. ®xranoto Reksosamudera as Acting Prmy Chief of Stafi although General Suharto was clearly in actual command of tae Army. He then proferred his personal protection. to those inmost suspected of staging the uprising. He callea “:'; Cmar Dani to his side from-Central Java and summoned Suban¢erio back from Sumatra. he released three Air Force Vice Marshele arrested by the Army oa suspicion of complicity in the Movement. He per~_ naps harbored PKI First and Second Leputy Chairmen Lukman * anc Njoto in his Bogor palace and has made every effort to receem their bankrupt party. Although he eventually disapproved tie Revolutionary Council he took a noticeably long time to GO so. Such a clear Gispiay of favoritism, cannot. be attributed solely to a desire to preserve national unity. - (For a nore detailed account anc interpretation of Sukarno’s rcle in the affair, see Section 4.). 028 emT - Oe @ oo ecembpasEErseene fhe Plot. Tne action and the cast of the Septenber 30 Grama suysests tnat the plot na¢ been conceived at a high level, probably by the FKI leacers, Omar Lani and perhaps Sabanczio. One can snveculate tnat there were three levels ~ ” ox conprehension of this plot; tiat is, that Sukarno on one AanG anc Untung and his lieutenants on the other hand, _ altnough both deeply engagec in the plot nad a different 7 conception of what was soing to happen than did the original -:' plotters. Following is an imaginary reconstruction of what. foretaought might have taken place. Waoile it is, of course,” unlixely events occurred exactly as depicted, it is believed tnat this exvosition Gives an approximate picture of the orincivals’® relations to each other ané@ to the crime. a. PKI leacers, Gmar Lani, and Subanério, aware. taat, tne Army leadersisip was in a co:manding position to *. seize power upon Sukarno’s Geath, began a systematic cam-. vaign to Cestroy their main opponent. Even with the Je pos President’s cooperation, however, they realized that a. ~. gracual strangulation of the -Arny leadersnip «wight not be ~~ fast enough and tnat a cecisive stroke was recessary while Suxarno was around to crive it note. Perhaps afraid tnat the Azxmy planned a precmptive coup curing the Armed Forces. - wre ita. we Tren verre ot sere “ s c 0. e: tyndon. Baines’ Johnson Lib: ee === [PDF page 26] === jae A-390, bDjakarta bAgGe 20 Day ceremonies, or more likely simply fearful that a show o£ strength by the Armed Forces at that time would prolong the military's ascendancy, the plotters precipitatively advanced their stroke to the week preced— ing Armed Forces Day. b. By confiding the action to the Untung group, the plotters may have hoped to preserve two options: (i). The country, with the crushing inflation and the pressure built up against corruption and high living by “capitalist bureaucrats” might well lend itself to a Kong Le-type coup, the plotters may have argued. And Sukarno, himself, might be counted on to give it his blessings once success was assured. If Untung were indeed successful in setting up a "Revolutionary Council Government," the PKI and its principal allies could in short order gain control of it. There was thus the option of a total (excepting Sukarno) coup. (ii) If, however, the Untung group did not succeed in setting up a "Revolutionary Council Government" it still nad an excellent chance of accomplishing its most immediate odjective,. the murder of the Generals and that was a boon in itself. The plotters could then disavow Untung as an Army “internal matter" and look to Sukarno for protection. c. For Untung, the plot had only one option, the establishment of a new revolutionary government of the proletariat, under Sukarno’s eventual aegis. Although he must nave expressed some general wish for such a master stroke, which led him to be chosen as its instrument, it is unlikely that he had any real role in the hatching ofthe scheme. Untung and his lieutenants were probably promised sufficient military forces to give the coupa,, good chance of success. In event of failure, he was perhaps promised an escape route to Central Java and the PKi’s full conmitment to a prolonced insurgency. Untung was in short [Unreadable] Ga. Sukarno probably had only a vague comprehension of the September 30 plot. Had more details been offered he probably would have refusec to hear them. In all such decisive action he has preferred to take a Getached position which wouid allow him tne greatest Senn? [Unreadable] 1 Wado, Baines Johnson, ibe oe ort Rens - tae eee Rais t 1 ie === [PDF page 27] === Page 27 possible maneuverability. (It is well to remember at this time, that Sukarno even had to be forced to sign the 1945 Declaration of Independence.) One can imagine that Sukarno nodded in agreement when Dani, Subandrio and others told him of the Generals’ nefarious scheme and. when they proposed that something be done about it before October 5, he perhaps refused to hear more, leaving the rest to his trusted lieutenants. (A stronger view of the s ‘: President’s involvement is argued in Section 4.) - What Went Wrong. The plot perhaps failed because, it climaxed somewhere between the two options. Untung ~ gained control of the capital city and the radio station and there was during these first moments no sign of organized’: resistance. The coup conceivably needed only the added push that the Air Force and the PKI could give it with their announcement of support. Dani and Aidit then threw - their cards on the table, but before they could get Sukarno to declare his hand, resistance had developed and the Presicent, perhaps with genuine alarm, learnec of the ‘murder of the Generals. Instead of giving his blessing to the Movement and preceeding to Central Java with Dani ané Untung, Sukarno went home to Bogor. Dani ané Aidit tnen attempted, too late, to withdraw to the first option. had in the meantime limited nis ability to offer the imeé@iate protection which the plotters now nad more need of than they had first speculatec. A partially successful — vlot thus turned quickly into a nightmare of a defeat. 7 49% *: cor is “yriel [Unreadable] The Presicent’s delay and open association with the plotters — pe My eis eee, rene soF ye oo Basnen souna bon xs === [PDF page 28] === Ee 1-300, Otazarta [Unreadable] 2 uve aus 3. TS PRCSABLE ROLE OF THE PKI IN THE SEPTEMBER 30 Az EFAIR Evidence of PKI involvement in the September 30 Movement is extensive although the PKI wus only one of several ele—_ ments that joined the action. It is Army strategy to make the PKI the principal scapegoat for tne affair age President Sukarno, who appears O*fave been moperericy guilty, may be — wnite-washed for reasons of state policy if he is not too uncooperative. a. The PKI Sefore the Septembe- 20 -fiair . Oe --a-@ caw se: «+ epee (i) Since 1952, tne PKI has pursueé a united front strategy in which aGventurist tactics h nave peen eschewed. it is true that the PKI leadership haz publicly proclaimed an increasingly revolutionary Situaticn but it Gid not equate this, at least until quite recentiy, with the proposition, that a violent overthrow of the government was necessary. " -Tne PKi has felt, rather, that its pcsition within the government was constantly improving an¢ that ite enemies were being gradually reduced by non-vicient action. Its prospects were improving at an even more rapie pace in recent months, in fact, with such acts as the purge of the. PNi and the permanent dan of Murba. Txsre wes considerable xreason to believe that a full Nasakonm cabinet was imminent and that Aidit would enter the Cabinet Presiciun. ee eo (ii) The PKI stressed that the country was still in the "“national—democratic stage” and tne dominant tren@ of thought, at least until recently, was that the transition to the “socialist stage" would be gradual and peaceful. As recently es @uring the PKi Central Committee plenum in May, 1955, Aidit Gisplayec his usual cautious approach toward the use cf violence by criticizing some local PKI branches for vushing unilateral lang reform acticns too hard where the Sround was not sufficiently prepared. Aidit said that strong unilateral action should be taken only in locations where the PKZ had an obvious just issuve that would attract mass support and where the PKI could attract a large measure of sympathy from other groups. This cautious approach locally was fully in accord with the national strategy. 8 OP Ot OF OREw Rt teE, COUN OID ERM s: BERK? + 90qm epeamee ame <-@ oe ( ¢*. BRT. e aD ety or os === [PDF page 29] === sare 4-390, Ljakarta Pag. 29 D>. Indications of PKI Involvement. Nevertheless, the PKI did become concerned. about a possible threat toits position in mid-September. According to” = _ reports, the PKI began taking such security measures as destruction or hiding of documents, movement of PKI leaders from house to house, preparations to go underground on sudden notice, increased paramilitary training of selected cadres, etc. However, these measures could be interpreted as being of a precautionary or defensive nature as if the PKI saw an increased possibility of an Army coup or of the early Geath of President Sukarno. Numerous. ~ reports have demonstrated some PKI paramilitary involvement in the Septenber 30 Movement. There is good reason to believe that Colonel Untung himself was a PKI member or at least a sympathizer and a veteran of the Madiun rebellion in 1948. PKI-~-affitiated railroad workers sought to block the arrival of Army forces from West Java. PKi~affiliated communications workers helped to take over communications facilities in Djakarta during the Untung “coup.” There are reports that some members of the goon squads that seized and killed the top generals were PKI and that the Generais were killed at a PKI paramilitary training center adjacent to the Halim Air Base. ‘There is also the circumstantial evidence of the obvious sympathy for the September 30 Movement shown in Harian Rakjat and other pro-commnist papers on the morning of October 2. These papers appeared after Suharto’s _ recapture of Djakarta and the apparent failure of the Untung.- coup but they may have been prepared earlier. (A local anti-commnunist publisher told the reporting officer that Yarian Rakiat normally goes to press about midnight and is printed Guring the early morning. Thus, if normal practice had been followed, it would not have begun to publish until some four hours after recapture of the capital by Sunarto.) SSE [Unreadable] guerre ere renentnn's €. cogt: 4: ~ yidon Baines’ Johnson: Lab wt ms ee =< harm Sn ai === [PDF page 30] === ce a-3N0, vjakarta Page 30 There is also the apparent flight of Aidit with. Untung to Central Java. Aidit’s movements are by no means as Clear as Sukarno’s, however. We do not yet know for sure that he was with Sukarno, Untung and Dani at the palace on the morning of October 1 or when he went to Halim if, indeed, he did go there. While several reports mention him as being on the plane with Untung and Dani to Jogjakarta, his role is much more shadowy than that of Dani, for example. The leftist complexion of Untung’s “Revolutionary ~- Council” is another indication of PKI involvement, particularly since most of the non-commnist names were apparently included as a cover ané @idé not reflect the consent of the’ people concerned. Becording to __ ‘Untung’s Revolutionary Council list included persons who were really involved in the coup, perscnse believed to have sgrudces against the captured Army leaders but who were not consulted in aGvance, and some additional names to create confusion. This report seems to be borne out by the nature of the list itself. c. Some evidence Against PKI Instigaticn ci the Coup There were _ ™ reports received early in the "coup” which indicated tnat the timing and nature of the action were not cf the party’s choosing although the PKI felt it wouid have.to support ‘the September 30 Movement. Harian Rakjat, although it supported Untung for allegedly preventing a generais’ coup, also tried from the beginning to depict the effair as an internal armed forces matter. The PXI as such never came out into the open, never attempted tc use its mass strength and never appealed to its sympathizers or to the people at large to rise against a threatened Army coup. It is indeed difficult to unéerstand why the PKI shoulé Gecide to rely on Organizations outside its own command stxructure and whica were not numercus sai‘nuRdss while failing tc employ its own + remem ee PTT 1don, Baines’ Johnson ‘Libs rie aye ak Pavey Shay 3253. ssa oa os === [PDF page 31] === 7), pjanarta . bose LM bodes, mnt bie: vaien Cuatme Cai ve ~ rh Sadun where Che PRG rebellion “wae also initiates Py Pro-PL Aruy units.) Ge. Coenclusicn: tenile sowe CL tie iacte are ctill too unclear co Cetermanc win any exactiticée PXI motives and the exact extent of the Pal role in planning the Septe.tber 39 affair, tuere le nc Guestion of FAI invelvement in it. there is comsicerabie evidence that Sukarno ninse lf was invelvec altacu,k acy Zar Eus.arne actually mQucnitécad himself to the PKI, Untiuug, Deni ané the others is 20 certain. If Cusarnoe was a priwe mover cf the plot, the PRI woulc nave presally ielt itecli compelled te so aleng with nis. even Lf trie coursc of acticn seemed somewnat acventuxces. On titz Otner hanc, the FKI itselz was uncsubtediy uncer tns sane preesurce as Suxarne to “entex 2n¢ gcclalist stase” keforc fukerne’s Ceati. ox incavacitaciou--tuat is te achicve 2n ‘tationa lization Of com— waisisin andi tie elimination noestile Army leadershio tu2c could turn on the Pat woe. Cuiarne was ns lonaer Mrecent to proecect tne Far Li the PxL Learea an amainent AQay coup, anc the re is some evicence to thinx 2 cic, thie wouls ne anceer factcr tencing tc precinitate wesperete Purl gambie to eliminate tae Ariny leacersniv au. “enter tre socialist evage" sconer rather than later. Bae PHL then vas probably in a state or willingness to meperate in 2a plot tc eliwinate the ton Army leacershin. z. Ki waether the PKi and probably Ctucx erements vanexric an beni @ecisced te act o ackr them Latex, kelieving such tnat he weuld cicotent, cx whetner the pilot was = Suxarno ninseif end the PKX was — re is strong circumstantial evicence -: ee en eo re eo ee > “ys s: C, OF twlandon Baines! _ Johnson - itor ’ i cat xy ae i _. yd. ~ ie es ries ac aerel Cima a de rs === [PDF page 32] === 2.2390, ssjakarca Peer 32 (eee Seehinan 5) Co caope|ert the secon! view, even LE it as truc, tne evicenes: will prebebly be obscured buth by Sukarno himself and ky the Army ané other non-commnist elemente that feel taney necd Sukarno as a symbol of national unity. If indeec Sukarno niaself was involved in a cold-blooded decision to climinate the army leadersnainp, @ decision tnat was probably worked out in cooperation witn the PAI and other top Suxarno sunporters egucn as Subancric and Dani, a general and pernaps tentative decision to “do something” against the generals may have been taken as far back ag mic-summer when the Army shoved it woule not agree to the Fifth irmed Force and Nasakom aGvisory councils. A more specific commitment could have come any time later and it may be that the concept of viclent action grew gradualty while fears of an Army coup cr Suxarno’s Geatn grew simultancously until a climate of thought was reached in mid or late September where a pian. was worxec out that nad been long in ccnception Eut was nuxried in its details. Pernans the CGetaile had not even peer Eully worked out wnen the atnesphere/Eécalation Gave riee to a hasty decizicn. Another key question is the timing of the Gecisicn tc affect the coup anc the timing of the PXI Gecision to act, ii tne latter was supplemental to the former. PKI arms acquisitions, PKI militery training, wnich seems to have Seen carried out on 2 crash basis, anc other PRI emergency moves, all of which were concentrated in a relatively short meriosd of a few weexs before Gctcber 1, may show tnat the éecision to act wes taken in early September. These actg ma; also neve been a reaction to fear of a “Genzrals’® plot” or to a propable early Gemise of the President. In either case, the PXI decision tc narticipate scems to have been a Aurried one. === [PDF page 33] === ee A-390, Njakarta Pago 33 4. The Pole of Sukarno in the Septeaber 30 Affotr Many knowledgeable Indonesians and most foreign diplomats in Djcarta believe that President Sukarno was involved in the September 30 Movement although there is not universal agreement on the extent of his involvement. reported a confession by the deputy of Colonel Latif, one of the leading "rebel" comanders, which is said to fully implicate | Swicarno and there are other ceports from Army sources and from an official of the PKI Secretariat (Hardojo) which indicate Sukarno complicity in the Seotember 30 plot. There were also reports that Untung implicated Sukarno. although later reports say the contrary, possibly because of Army willingness to protect Sukarno’s reputation in exchange for a quid pro quo. There isin — addition a mass of circumstantial Hshoce and plain logic that points to | Sukarno's involvement and possibly/its corception and direction of the plot. This section will primarily be concerned with this circumstantial evidence. a. Treoretical Backrround (?) First, there is the record of Sukarno’s close cooperation with the PRI merging in recent nonths into a virtual oublic identification sith the PKI. Sukarno had oublicly ennounced in Merch that Indéonesia “had sirsst completed the National-Democratic stage and vas now entering the Sociciist stage" of the Indonesian revolution. Sulszrno repeated this essertion ae the HP2S session in April and on sever2l occasions thereafter. The P&I fatinated that Sekarno was being premature and empnasized that Indonesia was still {n the National-Democratic stage and would remain so until certain: ohjective conditions were fulfilied including a Nasatzom Cabinet, completion o* lend reform anc nationalization of all foreign enterprises. Sukarno éid not juarrel with these conditions and, in Hsy, also erpnasized that Indonesia was still in the Netional-Denocratic stage. He did not say again that Indonesia was “entering the socialist stage" until <« veek or so before the October 1 | "couo” attempt. Did this indicate a renetzl of his ceterstnation to bring about soon the elimination of all importert opposition to totalitarian control? (it) After Sukarno first degen his emphasis on “entering the Soctelist stage” tast March, he Llsunchec tvo practical campaigns for the polftical liquidation of moderste elewents that anveared at the time to be closely associated with the theoretical concert of entry into the Socialist ~ stcze. The first of these was the great purge of the PNI which resulted in the custer of moderate elerents in a campaign that lasted from March to susust (although mopping-up actions were continuing thereafter). The second ' Line of Sukarno’s political offensive was efmed at the Army leadership. A zore important target, it was far less susceptible to attack, however. (iii) Sukarno first demanced a reorfentation of the Amnay’s thincing (a "sharp turn of the shee!” as Sukarno put it) which would include; renunciation of the Army idea that Indonesia's potential enemy lay to the === [PDF page 34] === or a-390, vjakarta Poge 34 rete (China) and rcaiization that Indonesis end Communist China were alliesspaiast aerolim, neaded by the United Staies. Internally, the Army was also to stress Marxise in its indoctrination. aidit, with the apparent support of Sukarny, soon demanded "Rasskom advisory councils" which the Army correctly —- interpreted as a euphemism for s nascent system of political comnissars. Aidie also called for erming the workers and peasants end Sukarno followed vith the concept of a "fifth armed force” which was only a slight variation on the Aidit theme. The Army gave way to some degree but not to the point. of relinquishing power over its own destiny as Sukarno and the PKI desired. (iv) The Army agreed in some areas to arm workers and peasants but tried to do so in a manner that would ainimize PKI benefit. The Fifth Armed Force and Nasakom Advisory Council ideas were-not expressly rejected but there was rather a recasting of these iceas by the Army in its counterpronosels which would redound to Army rather than PKI benefit. The President. referred to such activity as ‘soot-dragging (olintst-pls ntut). Furthermore, the Sukarno-PKI offensive frightenec the Army into forming a Generals Council to map political strategy. (v) Im the fece of Army reczicitrance snd an increasing belief £n 2 snort life expectancy, Sukarno probably kad core to the conclusion that scree form of strong, decisive action wes necessary if ke were to succeed in his announced design to “enter the Socialist stage," which required che elirination of any independent political power on che part of the Army. (wi) At the iFI enniversary celebration, Sukarno began to seke up a new but related thene. He praised, to a PHI audience, not the past ef the 2XI but rather the unsuccessful PKI revelt of 1926. He claimed: that ke nad founded the 2E in 1927 to carry cn ia 2 new form the armed struggle — eceinst the Dutch end he exccriated those «20 hac advocated a policy of arecualisn and conciliation. te repeated this theme in a number of. Speeches thereafter elthouch these remarks did not receive much publicity.. On one occasion, he referred to five genczetions of Indonesian revolutionact es froxr (1) the Sarelzet Islam througn (2) tne 1926 PKI, (3) the Algenene Studie Stub and (4) the '45 Generation to (5) the present generation. He then ecserted “hat he himsel£ belenved to the second generation based on the 1926 eM. Me sttacked the thircé generation ss collaborators ond revisionists. (vit) ‘This public ‘dentification efth the violent revolutionsry teetfes of the 1926 PHI revelt seers to skow in retrospect that Sukarno hivael£ tec Secawve convinced of the need for a violext transition from the Rationsl | penmocrstie to the Sectalist Stzge. This hyzothesis fs reinforced by other ststererts. In kis August 17 or “Tekart£” soeech, Sutarno said thet class e-arfere had nct yet taken olace {nm Inéoanesia but warned thet it might tf sorruction 2nd estentations living by tke rich (capitalist bureaucrats) contiaued. In Iadonesia, “capitalist bureaucret” is a PEL label applied Sea : “fer . ow eta oe a to a “~: 8 Rhinwrten ates en ibrene - poneeo ia a === [PDF page 35] === ee Pr-390, UJakarta Page 35 weuttcviar’y tu the bureaneratie eschine bugle by Coairel Caleh in the vew ote Departments (ministries) an¢ to the managers of state enterprises of ver e lerge proportion are irny officers, (viii) Sut:arne’s thinking also seems to be shown in a speech te the CSNI Congress on Septerder 29. As cuoted by Harian Rakiat of October 1 (enc it hes been ceafirmeé that he ectuely said this) Sukarno stated that “Earlier there vere persons who were revolutionary but now they heve become counterrevolutionary. And as explained in Tekeri, there also were loyal generals dut now thev. have becone protectors of counterrevolutionary elenents. These we must crush.” Even by ttself this sounds like an allusion to planned Violent ection egainst the Army leadershin. 5. The Bare Fects of Sukerrs’s Actions (i) £4 Ithnougs mci: has not come out pudlicly on ‘the Septembez 30 2ifctz, Sukerno's owm ections and stctements show a desire to protect the P&I é initially even the Untung group itself. ‘They ere peculiar to say the least. © (ii) Sukarno apnointec General Treanoto-Reksosemodra~-generally onsicereé to be sympathetic to the PEL or at least malleable--to take temporary > comnené cx the Army under Sukarno himself. Furthernore, this order was dated Octozer i end was printed in Herter Rak*at, the PKI paper, on October 2 and vies ebsent from other newspoters. It is also knovm thet, after Sukerno went to Begor oa October 2, he favorec Franote over Suharto indicating thet his aroointment or attempted eppointrent of Prenoto wes not made under duress fror sne Untung grouvo. (iii) Sukarno publicly showed no eppreciation for General Suhazrro’s elferts to put dow the Untung “coup” end has tendec in fact to shun and dow szrace Suharto. (His subsequent epoointment of Suharto as Amry commander vas wece only vhen the Az>ry refused to accept enyone els-.) He has shown no real nuplic remorse for the surcers cf the genercls. He hos defended -e Air Force role. He nas indicated that his owm moverent to Eelin Air Base t 3 voluntary anc thet it was cone in order to de prepared for flight if necessary. In other words he has implied thec there was a generals’ plot and that the Tjakrabirawa was merely protecting him. He has thus attempted to leave the door open to expand on such charges if and when he regains control of the. situation. ec. Other Circumstantial Evidence (i) A third chain of circumstantial evidence lies in the absurdity of any plot of this kind that did not involve Sukarno. It is not reasonable to believe that the PKI, which had been doing so well riding Sukarmo's coattails, would attempt to seize power through such 2 plot if it did not have the approval of Sukerno. It is unreasonable to supyose that the PKI, if it _=SECRES — -- ae Let mee sg. 0 ons x utynton Baines Johnson ibrary, oa arate one 08 De ams + © ©: © & HED EP Crete. eee Srrehe-mere mewn epete ace nae [Unreadable] or ae © 78 e+ wes ceneen CEE ceneeue sone 00 ate Qe am © omemene commana apace ennmmeivnne NSLS ecamewenece ~~ Mee be et ee. an: === [PDF page 36] === ee h=300, Djanarta Page 30 did decide to seize power on its ow, would fail to employ the classic we2pons of communist revolutionary action and would rely on a small group of men rather than employing the Party's mass bulk. It is also difficult to believe that the PKX would give so much control to groups not in its chain of command such as the Air Force and the Tjakrabirawa. (ii) Some apologists for Sukarno argue that Aidit insulted Sukarno at the CGMI Congress on September 29 and Sukarno then beceme angry at the PKI, forcing the latter to move. This explanation has been given by Ganis Harsono, the Foreign Department press spokesman,.> foreign journalists for example. A recheck of the speeches that evening shows this not to be the case, however. Sukarno actually followed Aidit'’s speech with a speech that was very friendly to the CGMI in which he even hinted at a future ban of the HME although he held back from actually doing so. (iii) It is also difficult to imagine an unknown minor officer Like Untung seriously hoping to achieve power over a nation of more than 100,000,000 with a large standing Army and large military forces intact and far removed in other islands,through employment of a handful of men at the center. And it is hard to see how the Air Force could expect to be an effective instrument for a coup as air power is unsuited to this kind of use and, in fact, was not actually employed as such. (iv) The circumstences then point toward a plan of limited action for a limited objective--not a seizure of power but rather the liquidation of a particular group, the top leadership of the Army. Fortunately, some key officers escaped and one, Suharto, was prepared to fight and had the troops ~ to do so. If the plot had not been bungled in the execution, it appears that the stage had been set to pretend a narrow escape from a generals’ coup. Sukarno then would have been free to step back on the stage and the last obstacke to "the socialist stage" or unrestricted commitment to a communist Indonesia would heve been cleared. ad. Reservetions (i) There are still questions to be answered, of course, that may alter | this possible explanation. ‘Why did Untung’s second statement reduce all officers to Lieutenant Colonel and substitute 2 "evolutionary Council” for iutserno0? Had Susarno decked cut when execution of the plot was badly handled? Ses Untung left holding the beg end decided to grat power for himself if he were to take the main riss? Oc were these red herrings designed to obscure Suxermo'’s role:men it became cuestionevle whether the plot would succeed? Is there elso a possibility, however remote, that the PKI, Supandrio end Dani proceeded on their own in the hope that Sukarno would follow along i£ they were successful? This latter possibility is conceivable but seems aalitely when one recalls tie overwhelming extent to vhich Sukarno involves simseif in political intrigue. Tois man is a vily, suspicious political 0 <0 ee ES © ape ce COCED: CUED OPED teres Ee em 0s emp Ge Gm -me +-s a + ames sere eo —see “ c.0-RY. Lyndon, Baines’ J, oo: ow Ane are —we oy ee eee ohnson Library: Biwec ar 9 ~ , ets eee === [PDF page 37] === A- 300, LjaKwarta Pores 37 fectictan of the first order ané it is almost impussttle to {imagine hin ejpeering et the palace for severcl hours on the morning of October 1, then being at Halim in the very center of activity and not understanding the situation. (ii) The case is not conplete but the circumstantial evidence abeve indicates that Sukarno may be guilty of being the chief architect or at the central figure of the September 30 Movement. The odds seez overwielringly thet, ef the very least, he knew what vase afoot and had given his tecit blessing to those tho were ectually executing seast the maneuver. Cc 0. P y: -. Lyndon. Baines! Johnson Liban :. ainw a omy 4. >. Te ey ‘ a Le. === [PDF page 38] === ae A-300, Djakarta Page 38 5S. What Might Have Been a. Successful Elimination of Senior Generals (1) In its pre-dawn capture and elimination of six key Arny generals, the 30 September movement came close to eliminating entirely the group of Arny leaders most able by position and temperament to mobilize effective counter-action. At least four additional officers are reliably reported to have been on the purge list. Nasution escaped by a hair. Major General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD, and Major General Mursjid, Army Deputy I for Operations were either warned in time to leave their homes or were already out. Brig. General Sukendro, Secretary General of KOTOR snd Minister attached to the Presidium, was in Peking and while thus physically safe he was also effectively removed from the possibility of prompt reaction. (14) If the elimination raids had been successful in snaring Nasution, Mursjid and Suharto in addition to the others, as planned, tinely response by organized military force would have been highly problematical. The possibility of such a response would have centered around four figures; 1) Major General Djamin Gintings, Operations Officer; 2) Major General Umar Wirahadikusuma, Djakarta area 3) Major General Basuki Rachmat, Fast Java Commander (KODAM VIII), who was temporarily in Djakarta; and 4) Major General Adjie, West Java Commander (KODAM VI), based in Bandung. (111) It is noteworthy that it was apparently not these four, but the three officers slated for elimination (Suharto, Mursjid and Nasution), who did mobilize action on October 1. Without them, would the political urgency of the situation have presented itself with sufficient clarity to the remaining officers in tine? Probably not. Adjie would have been prepared to act firmly, but it is unlikely that at his distance he would have been sure enough of the true situation in time. It was Djakarta-based troops which reasserted local control October 1. Only later did Siliwargi Division elements move in to assist. (iv) The success of an effort such as that staged in Untung’s name would depend heavily upon prolonging the period before the situation became clear enough for reaction to be mobilized. If the purge had been wholly successful, it is likely that Untung would have been able to hold Lee SECRET a ae meaty om Sr enn reas r ao iT +. c, 0, oP a reyndon Baines’ Johnson Libre ree. ge Pk he aes pee ab Be poles: ie ead === [PDF page 39] === =396, Bjakarta ae Mag VW Djakarta October 1. His control over comnunication media would have inhibited a prompt response from Adjie in Bandung. By October 2, if Untung’s forces had still presented the impression of success, additional @lements would probably have gravitated to their side and the political momentum would have begun to gain real force. At this stage, Sukarno might well have come out openly on behalf of the “revolutionary counci1” and the opportunity for remaining Army leaders to coalesce their scattered echelons and plan effective stopping action would have been largely lost. Under these circumstances, the brutal murder of the generals would probably have been revealed only later, under circumstances in which the emphasis could be placed on the threat that this was what happened to “enemies of the revolution”, who “plot against the President.” With the Sukarno-PKI bandwagon then in high gear, the intimidation factor of the murder revelations would have overbalanced their stimulation to effective counteraction. Cv) In assessing the nearness of Untuag’s success, it is necessary also to take into account the major reduction in Army troops available on > Java to maintain security. Over a period of tine, major elements of the Java Arny commands have been moved to the “front-line” areas in Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi in support of confrontation. This had been a cause of concern to the senior Army leadership, which before the coup attempt had bees attempting to get some of these troops back to Java. Certainly this reduction in forces available provided an unusually favorable opportunity for the type of action which was attempted and would have made subsequent terrorism by PKI mass action groups much more effective. General Umar had only two of his usual three battalions under his command in the Djakarta area. Almost all of the Siliwangi Division’s infantry had been sent elsewhere. Thus only a few additional key battalion unit: defections to Untung could have made a major difference in the Djakarta area. With momentum established, these could have easily been forthcoming, perhaps from the Tjakrabirawa or infiltrated elements of the Diponegoro Division, in the city for Armed Forces Day, if not from XODAM V itself. Even. ww, Djakarta is guarded primarily by raider, paratroop, and armored elements of the Siliwangi Division, there being no infantry to spare. (vi} The odds therefore are that only the ability to nip Untung’s momentum in the bud beginning October 1 prevented the development of an almost irreversible victory for the PKI and Sukarno waich would have tipped the Indonesian political balance drastically and probably definitively toward an avowed communist state, and st the least would have permanently cor t,. iyndon. Baines ‘Johnson Lib: 3 ae patie s Be o- « we wee orem + === [PDF page 40] === a A-300, Ljakarta Paice AO emasculated the Army as a united opposition political force. Without men such as Suharto and Nasution still alive in Djakarta, men who commanded prestige and loyalty and who at the same time quickly grasped the stakes of the game and the necessity to move quickly, it must be questioned whether the response would have come promptly enough. b. Capture of Arny Leadership Alive, Without Executions. (1) If the Army leadership had merely been seized and not executed, the entire episode would have taken on a different character. In such circumstances, the necessity for an accompanying armed seizure of Djakarta in the name of the "revolutionary council” would not seem to be necessary, thus this possibility is somewhat more theoretical than that under "a” above. (11) The logical course of action would have been to denounce the Generals for plotting against Sukarno. With Sukarno's participation in this denunciation and denigration, the prestige of the Army would be seriously damaged; a majority of other officers would in most likelihood try to exonerate themselves personally through effusive pledges of support to the Great Leader of the Revolution. While some would have serious doubts that such 2 plot ever existed, it would not be politically safe to suggest this. (i111) Such a course of action would thus emasculate the Arny leadership and appear to pave the way for acceptance of the PKI/Sukarno pressure to install political commissars within the Army command structure, ostensibly to prevent any further "counterrevolutionary” plotting. It would have dangers, however. Sukarno would have to be completely and irrevocably committed in advance and not subject to later persuasion by the captured generals. The detention of the generals would be a continuing problem. As long as they were alive they would be a potential nucleusc opposition to the march of the revolution. Their families and their military colleagues would still have influence and power. An assisted escape, followed by attempts to mobilize Arny elements or external opposition would continue to be possible. (iv) In conclusion, to have settled for capture and denigration of Arny leaders with Sukarno’s collaboration would have entailed considerably fewer inmediate risks of counteraction and would have been almost equally effective in emasculating the Army as a political force. However, it would have had some long-term instabilities and would not have clearly shaken-up the status quo end provided a clean unimpeded impetus toward the “socialist state’ which Sukarno has repeatedly indicated as a goal. opY- Lyndon: Baines’ Johnson Lib beg sated os o... -eN7 ate "let: bE we. een. sew ee et === [PDF page 41] === ee A-200, bjakarca Pade 4} (v) That the onsier course was not taken may have heen due to a combination of factors. Among these may have been soma PKI fear that at some point Sukarno would weaken in his opposition to the generals’ group, the inherent tendency to violent action inherent in communist doctrine and propaganda, and the desire of all concerned to shift the spectrum dramatically and irrevocably toward the far left. One other important factor is not to be discounted, however. The peaceful capture of the Arny leadership would have required Sukarno's own prompt denunciation of them and their "plot” to generate the necessary momentum against the Arny as an institution. The more violent course of force enabled Sukarno. to hold back his own overt conmitment somewhat longer and thus avoid exposing himself prematurely as a partisan of a cause which might fail. Since any plan might fail, the course which allowed the safety factor of delayed commitment may have been much more attractive. It had the advantage not only of preserving the President’s own position, but also of strengthening the effectiveness of his future influence in removing the worst effects of defeat for the PKI and the Air Force leadership. 2 eb wetness wee - O10 8O% 2 9 obec tre === [PDF page 42] === a “309, Djakarta ase A » 6. Future Prospects a. The future development of the situation will depend importantly ca the Amy's will and skill for united political action, Sukaermo's ability to outmeneuver the Army (without bringing on a clear showdowm in which Amy power would be effectively wieided), end the PKI estimate of its chances for renewed political respectability. ® — @we- ee com b. In the shert run (i.e. up to about two months hence), three alternative courses are open: (i) the Army and Sukarno continue to parry for position and concessions, «with one or the other succeeding in welding a position of structural strength for the future; (ii) an open Army versus PKI clash occurs involving guerrilla fighting, sabotage and virtual civil war; or iii) a direct Army initiative is taken to circumscribe Sukarno’s power and retain hin only as a national figurehead. c. Tnese developments will in their turn probably lead to one of | the following three results which should be apparent in their major outline ‘sithin six months: (i) Sukarno ascendency and progress toward renewed communist | domination of the political scene; (ii) a condition of insurgency and anarchy! ' with the PKI in rebellion; or (iii) Army control of the government, possibly through an Army junta, but more likely through hand-picked civilian leaders. | The Army a. A key factor in assessing these possibilities is the political will and cohesion of the Army. Sukzrno'’s own broad strategy is clear. He will try to whittle away Army initiative through apparent concessions, probably -even to the extent of banning the present PKI. In so doing, however, he will try to reassert the preeminence of his own position and stop the anti-communist attacks short of long-term structural damage to the far left in Indonesia. b. Tne PKI hes three alternstives: (i) rebuild its domination under the protecting wing of the President's influence, probably under an ostensibly new aegis; (ii) go underground and slowly begin the process of rebuilding the party; or (iii) go into active guerrilla opposition from prepared redoubts while using mass orgenizations to disrupt theeconomy and urban life as well as terrorize anti-corrwnist elements. In the short run, however, the PKI has lost the initiative. Which of the three choices open to it is tzken x= depends first of all on what the Army does and the success = °. {|. of Sukarno’s tactics. Let us first look at the Amy. oy c. Tne Arm leadezship has been emotionally arousec by the; terroristic decimation of its ranks. I£f the Army is to act as 2 positive! political force beyond the ismediate present, it must capitalize on the present momentum ance sense of outrage. Such a clear opportunity is not ares ae ere St re 2 *¢: ‘0: opt: " tyndon. B Baines Johnson’ Libs ee anw age oe eae oe we Bee Ba ae rea mca og hee === [PDF page 43] === a 4-300, ojakarta Poop 43 Litely to be evlered again white the presen! Army lealere still lead. The hnvonesian Arry has always lacked the strength of a monolithic organization, however, and has lscked cohesion or unity of political action. During the yvesrs of Yani command, the territorial nature of the Army was reduced in signi ficence and greeter centralization effected, but the Army still offers scmething less than a smoothly unified force which its commanders can depend upon to stand behind them no matter what the situation. d. Never before has the Army been willing to force through its pelicies in the face of strong Presidential opposition. Nasution himself has in the past been identified with a policy of military subordination to the President's will. Now, much of the politically oriented leadership of the Army is gone. The group left lacks depth of numbers. Many middle grade officers and most in the lower ranks represent a more professionally oriented post-revolution group which views the military as properly subordinate to the President and the political scheme of things, in contrast with the older officers who won their spurs in the revolution and have always felt the Army hes 2 role to play in determining the political order of things. e. These factors, plus recent events, indicate that it may be difficult for the Arny leadership to combine for clear and effective longrenge political goals and that it is even less likely that they could directly ehczllenge Sukarno’s power and prevent fragmentation of their command while going so. Sukarno's skill in looking beycnd immediate command relationships ane concessions of form to problems of political power cannot be underestimated. £. The Army has moved suiitly in the first half of October to ezeck down on the PKI and has encouraged non-communist political groups to cerry the torch further in wrecking the facilities of PKI organizations and dexandzing the PKI’s dissolution. In a challenge such as this--a clash with the PKI as the physical adversary--Army capabilities are most effective. ‘ir.e political aspects are simplified. The task reduces to the physical crushing of an opponent. On the present basis, however, the campaign may be already close to tapering off es Sukarno reassexts political preeminence anc calls the Army to heel. From the Amy's point of view, perhaps the most favorable development at present (short of Sukarno'’s demise) would be for the ‘PKI to go into open rebellion or guerrilla warfare. Some intelligence from Army sources speaks with ill-disguised anticipation of the imminence of such a development. The ciash would enable the Army to continue to ride the wave - of its present preeminence. A state of war could be declared throughout the country, instead of just in Djakarta as at present. Issues would be reduced to black and white, and the political maneuvering which the Army understandably fears, would have to take a back seat to the military prosecution of a campaign which, if successful, would reduce communist organized strength and nrestige virtually to the post-Madiun period and leave the Army as the undisputed power in the country. It is not unreasonable to suppose thgt the ” SR taT C08 pL ~ lyndon. Baines Johneon Lis a eo ee ee iy eyes tweet ~: Lag es oe ee * oN conte compe <0 n'a: wie teens ve0e + peewwaa cen @& 6 wet em wemwe - fae seer. 208 Od et nag peat 7 === [PDF page 44] === a= A-W), Dtakorca rage 44 violence of Avoy and amyeinspized actions azainst the PXI in the second weck of Cctover acy have been partly sursved in the hope that a violent PKI reaction could be provoked and thus settle the entire question without further talk. Now is the ideal time in some ways for the Army to be committed to a struggle. to the death with the PKI. The Army starts with its elements purged and strengthenedc and with a record of having saved the country in the nick of time; whereas the party starts with part of its organization and communications shattered and with the onus of one ill-conceived adventure freshly laid at its. door. The PKI a. Will the PKI shift to active insurgency? It may, but probably only if it concludes that Sukarno has been and will continue to be unsuccessful in reestablishing sufficient control.to offer protection from continued systematic harassment of the party. Another alternative is for the party quietly to submerge underground to lick its wounds and begin the long process of rebuilding sufficient strength in secret to challenge once more the course of Indonesian © political development. However, the sense of imminent success which has been _ Geveloped in the party followers in recent years calls for more forthright action. The party’s gospel of violence, combined with its unwieldy size end tne difficulty of maintaining discipline for a long, slow and undramatic tecovery after the major successes of secent years would seem to make such a caoice unlikely. b. Furthermore, the party still must be considered as having the Capacity for insurgency of sufficient magnitude at least to cause serious security problems and bring on economic crisis. Contingency planning for such activity is known to exist. Redoubts have been prepared. Infiltration aad FXI control in unions and other mass organizations offer adequate tools for perelyzing the econony and estimates of the number of weapons in the hands of PXI ca¢res have constantly grown as more information has become available. Only an insignificant fraction of these weapons have yet been recovered. Thus insurgency may be the second alternative for the PKI if it is pressed, but the time to decide would appear to be short. The Army is acutely aware of the present shortage of troops on Java end is moving rapidly to bring home additional “units from "the border areas.” By mid-November, the Army will probably be much vetter prepared to contain an insurgency situation. The ovtimum outcome for the PKI is still Sukarno's protection for its overt legal recuperation and open participation on the Indonesian political scene. © isk Ye ~ tyndon Baines’ Johnson! iibri aise re? —— J. aa Se eS rene is : Serr 5 Ae aa as fen - 7 === [PDF page 45] === eee A-300, Djakarta Page 46 Cloogves Pea vanes a. The PKI has received a serlous setback to its prestige and structure. The task of rebuilding will be a long one, but with Sukarno’s support, the party can return to a position of political importance if the Army pernits this to happen. b. Direct Army action against Sukarno now seems unlikely. It appears thet the Army believes it needs Sukarno es a symbol of unity and will not etterpt publicly to link him with the September 30 Movement. ce. The President will not, for the foreseeable future, regain the degree of power and prestige which was his before September 30 but he will orcebably again be the single most important figure. d. While the degree to which the Army will stand up to Sukarno cannot be predicted with any certainty, odds are that the Army will exercise a far greater restraining influence on Sukarno than before September 30. e. Sukarno will probably be successful in restoring communist " legitimacy in some form, perhpas as one pillar of a united party. f. The cormunist capability for insurgency which could cause serious difficulty is still significant, but will probably not be resorted to except in extreris. g- The Army would be most effective in a direct power confrontation with the PKI, despite the chaos which this could cause., h. If Sukarno dies in the near future, recent events will essist the Army in taking over effective control and moving against the PKI. i. The immediate future is a critical time for non-communist - political forces. Tney must move quickly and effectively into the organizational - vacuums throughout the bureaucracy left by the PKI’s disordered retreat, and establisn a precedent of non-communist policy direction. j. Some changes of emphasis are likely in the foreign policy field, at least unless Sukarno regains absolute control. The Army will attempt to. downgrade Indonesia's de facto alliance with Peking. Anti-western themes will continue, though new ones will not be created so facilely by an Army-influenced government. Confrontation against Malaysia will also continue, but new military adventures in implercentetion of confrontation are extrerely unlikely for the time being. Military forces and energies will be directed primarily to the domestic situation. Indonesia may devote less of its energies to enti-western ' international conferences, particularly if Djakarta’s relations with Peking worsen and Communist China becomes less willing to finance and support Indonesia’s adventurisa. For the Anas or: <Lyad) 4yasm Edward E. Masters ( Counselor of Eebassy for litical Affairs a. fale Le _7~. + 8” em 60 oP eee ee pe 10 qQuEeD ce Or eee co Oe ae ee: eae Te o ae * * €,0-P.¥ = Lyndon: Bair rae 4 ' Lao o Somton tipen ee Ff === [PDF page 46] === [Indonesia] The September 30 Affair [background to the coup as Sukarno speeded up the process of eliminating all moderate power centers in order to accomplish his goal of establishing "a communist totalitarian state controlled by the PKI"; events of the coup, including activities of Undung Supardjo, Dani, Aidit, and Subandrio; probable roles of the PKI, Sukarno, and China in the coup; post-coup prospects of the army, PKI, and Indonesia's foreign policy]. Am Emb Djakarta, Airgram A-300. Oct. 22, 1965. 45 p. SECRET. SANITIZED copy. Released May 8, 1979. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Indonesia, Vol. 5. Department Of State, 22 Oct. 1965. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/ CK2349419378/GDCS?u=ucalgary&sid=bookmark-GDCS. Accessed 18 Oct. 2026.