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Further Report on Confessions of Njono

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=== [PDF page 1] === FURTHER REPORT ON CONFESSIONS OF NJONO Djakarta ANTARA in English 1323 GMT 2 December 1965--B (Text) Djakarta, 2 December--A top communist leader has admitted that it was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which was responsible for and has masterminded the bloody counterrevoluticnary couc oy the so-called 30 September Movement on 1 October. Communist leader Njono of the Politburo of the PKI Central Committee and concurrently General Chairman of the Communist All-Indonesia Labor Central Organization (Sobsi), during interrogation by military authorities revealed the prior to the coup, the Politburo held continuous meetings for one-and-a-half months from mid-July to the end of August. The usually flamboyant trade union leader was crestfallen before his questioners as he disclosed the contents and nature of the meetings and discussions, which were presided over directly by PKI Chairman D.N. Aidit. One of the chief topics at these communist talks was President Sukarno's illness, which occurred around iast July, he revealed. Officers of the Central Information Service of the army, at a special press conference here today, reported that Njono's confessions about the Politburo's talks showed plans to change the course of the state and wrest power from the legal government. The talks were held at the headquarters of the central committee here, they added. The Politburo comprised respectively Aidit, M.H. Lukman, Njono, Sudisman, (?engineer) Sakirman, Jusuf Adjitorop, Anwar Sanusi, and Rowang. But only seven of them participated in the discussions as Jusuf Adjitorop was in Peking and Rowang in Central java at the time. Njono further disclosed that all decisions made by the Politburo during these meetings had to be implemented strictly by the Djakarta committee of PKI as well asthe party's regional committees throughout Indonesia. During the meetings, party boss Aidit gave detailed information about the health of President Sukarno and outlined plans for wresting power from the legal government and the President. Under these designs, supreme leadership for military operations of the 30 September Movement:” was held in the hands of Aidit himself while Njono was ordered to (word indistinct) operations in the area of Djakarta Raya. === [PDF page 2] === The communist trade union leader said Aidit told the Politburo that the army was not compact and united, and the air force would give facilities to the coup planners, while the navy and the ‘police..forces could: be indoctrinated: Military operations launched by the 30 September Movement under the command of Aidit would also receive support from already trained and armed PKI units such as its youth organization (Pemuda Rakjat), and the militant Peasants Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia--BTI), Sobsi, Gerwani women's organizations, and other cover organizations. With regard to the other political parties, Aidit was of the view that the Politburo should not worry about the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) because of differences within PNI ranks. Aidit admitted that the powerful Nahadatul Ulama Party (NU) could pose some problems because the latter's Nasakom-mindedness was doubtful. To launch the 30 September Movement, notorious for its viciousness and inhuman murder of the six army generals, the Politburo ordered a division of tasks between its members, Njono disclosed. Aidit, as reported earlier, would lead military operations as well as "D-Day" operations the day the coup was launched. Aidit also had the task of drafting the composition of the so-called "revolutionary council" after the coup. Njono had the mission of establishing a supporting force for the Djakarta Raya area comprising militant units gf Pemuda Rakjat, Bti, Gerwani, Sobsi, and other organs. Sudisman would be in charge of financial matters. In this connection, Njono said he did not know where the money came from but every time He (Njono-~ANTARA) asked for more, Sudisman gave it to him. The final decision to launch the coup was taken by the Politburo by the Politburo by the end of last August, he revealed. Extensive preparations were made, including secret instructions to the commanders of the various sectors and military drill at Lobang Buaja, the infamous site for the killing of the army generals near Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base, one of Djakarta's suburbs. Njono said that on 29 September at 0500 hours a courier identified by him as Sukatno, general chairman of Pemuda Rakjat, came to him from Lobang Buaja to inform him that the coup would be launched. Sinee the beginning of September, Njono himself had been busy arranging the military training of volunteers at Lobang Buaja and holding briefings with PKI cadres, to whom he stressed that a "eouncil of generals" would soon launch a coup dletat in the country, "Stand by on 30.September and listen continuously to broadcasts of Radio Republic Indonesia," he told the PKI cadres and activists. Njono himself was told to stand by on 30 September because arms, rice supplies, and clothes would then be distributed. Njono did not know the origin of the arms but only knew that they came from Lobang Buaja. On 1 October at 0800 hours local time, Njono received reports while at home from various sectors concerning the action launched under the name of the 30 September ‘Movement. The reports said that the radio station and the new head office of telecommunications had already been occupied by the communists as well as the ©. palace compounds and the surrounding area. Njono was also informed that several generals had been kidnaped, with the exception of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, minister coordinator for national security and chief of staff of the armed forces, === [PDF page 3] === Also submitt ing reports that day were Naibaho, then editor in chief of the now- banned HARIAN RAKJAT (PEOPLE'S DAILY), and Anwar Sanusi. "I also received many reports," Njono added, "the:eontcnts of which I no longer remember." After the announcement by Major General Suharto, then strategic reserves commander of the army commander and now minister and army commander, over Radio Djakarta that the coup launched by the PKI was a counterrevolutionary step, Njono left his home at Salemba and moved to the compounds of the state printing works where he was captured on 3 October. The squalling communist leader told his questioners that PKI and its affiliated organizations had participated in implementing the decisions of the Politburo to wrest power from the government and to declare the Dwikora Cabinet decommissioned and thus were all equally responsible for the counterrevolutionary coup adventure. In his revelations, Njono also said that only members of the Politburo knew that the ultimate aim of the mevement was to wrest power from the legal government while the other PKI leaders were only informed about their respective missions and tasks. And even the Politburo members, with the exception of Aidit, did not know all the plans connected with the coup, he revealed. Although it was thought that 2,000 communists would be enough to control the Djakarta Raya district, Njono promised the Politburo to have 5,000 well-trained and armed PKI cad#es and activists ready. The PKI Politburo also assured the communist rebels that victory would be theirs as soon as the coup was launched, which, however, turned out to be a complete flop. Speaking about the other members of the Politburo, the army information officers. said that their whereabouts were known and that their arrest was a matter of time. — The press conference today, organized by the army information center, was attended by seores of Indonesian and foreign journalists. Njono, member of the “PKI Politburo and secretary general of Sobsi, had also many pseudonyms. One of thom was Sugijono, which he used when he was arrested by the security authorities on 3 October at the state printing works, Njono also often used the name of Tukimin, particularly among Sobsi members. When among fellow members of the Djakarta Raya committee, he was sometimes known as "Rukma." Njono became a member of the PKI in 1946 and in 1955 took charge of Sobi while elected to the Politburo. A son of a pensioned worker of the state railways, Njono had four brothers who were all members of PKI.