Foreign Office/CRO papers on the Indonesian Communist Party and Malaysia confrontation (DO 169/516, 1964)

=== [PDF page 1] === CONFIDENTIAL § FAR EAST AND PACIFIC DEP] EE TH FILE BEGINS FILE ENDS ) — Ee | mz E tas D FILE ATTEE FILE NUMBER INDEX HEADINGS Wohoyrr SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TRANSMISSION AND STORAGE IN THE COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFF:iCE (DOWNING STREET, KING CHARLES STREET, MATTHEW PARKER STREET AND PALACE CHAMBERS), OF TOP SECRET, SECRET, AND CONF:iDENTIAL FILES FILE NUMBER Classification Transmission Storage TOP SECRET In C.R.O. numbered boxes (no In safes or security cupboards. envelope required). If a box is not available, but only then, double a standard Top _ Secret label to be used on inner envelope. Economy labels not permissible. SECRET In C.R.O. numbered boxes In safes, or security cupboards, or envelope required). If a box is steel pull-out drawer cabinets available, double envelopes; strengthened with locking bar. single envelope jnar Seqret taken direct by§ han a labels be ufed if*envgloges in gogd c ion. CONFIDENTIAL In uches or Ysingle envelopes In ordinary steel cupboards or arked “ConfideMtial”. Economy steel pull-out drawer cabinets. O labels may be used if envelopes in good condition. The security classification of this file must be the same as that of the highest classified document in it. CONFIDENTIAL C.R.O.R. 12. (8169) Wet. 51356/P.93 5,000 3/64 P.I. Gp, 610 === [PDF page 2] === RELATED FILES:— ) -é reds, ee ha Cae + hea ss Ladue Aimietior ak CekGA5 =e Rea (404 bx PUBLIC RECORDS ACT, 1958. (See paragraphs 24.1 to 24.4 of Part D of Digest of Office Procedure) When the officer dealing with this file considers that it is unlikely to be used again, or when the file is automatically closed at the end of a three-year cycle, the Higher Executive Officer (or Officer of higher rank) responsible for the subject should recommend in the appropriate space on the back cover of the file whether the file should be destroyed after a prescribed period or preserved. If he is unable to form a firm view, one of the spaces for ‘‘ Consider at First/Second Review’ should be signed: where this is done, a note must be placed on top of the file as the last paper giving reasons for deferring a decision. CROSS REFERENCED UNDER:— Teak oe ae PRECEDENTS NOTED UNDER:— === [PDF page 3] === Plec. bh fae. he fix JaAwd 2 RS ps ~ 7 hOB BES Ee i‘ (en Je Corn echt Pitre acd tax x £~ hk e Jha = Are le lm NOAA he Pr rtaiite Ge date a. 2 x cl [Unreadable] Pow Set ¢ Jade Je Ass x A. : os rae Lea YA,. (ite rete NY Ly/r be Me. Tek ds VE ee GUC ath lab beds tT. mer \ ee eee (0A) Woe he PI no Hee devs) feree belt lee es Oe ge ae wot = === [PDF page 4] === fe f i. oe: A s ~ Jee/etau dy ne [Unreadable] ; I J OS s/ he ae a Se wy, ec bine save st Bahyk ago 4 Vin Gee VE |: [Unreadable] GY re avd Pret, Zo Duce oe 4 Ke Ary The re” LAW Beef tall tjVe—) jh Coke an. Traits cz JL fone x Son Pa Was tn bee I Yorn Os 1%, hang A bew Jv Ci Se ) letk Foird 5: Me. Gasunt, Soir x40: e: = ee fax han fir CGA Pak. daLed June / Gi O¢ Colles [nd enevee Ane por Sie. “Ca lnbntan eth Swaod sat Aas tos CL LGY fu Jae Ae eng ding jt Me 4 a ee thu. ¢ (rspoiied Cyey hk oee Movie i Ma «/?/b¥ === [PDF page 5] === spemesey fey yt “ay ee * ~eshepqy eye DEED Ty Vowel ~ 4 meeps yey rms my sere SVP a ce ~ TP Ape SsOsD vr ety Bs ' ane ee re ‘ Wonras * DARA. Wyo © “S\N woh AO @)= (oS Se 3 Curencekc +e A S290 a sased corre) haromarnd >} a cam gorwd eo i DO Lo Sar >} “oN ces eMy ae YW OMS ~O Sg “OSTA dn Cryoy eT RHR ORTON and Ay | woe —m™_m yicewd ea aA aw === [PDF page 6] === \ 8. 412 Le). [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Deer === [PDF page 7] === Mr. Kevin Burns (Far East and Pacific Department) Thank you for letting me see these papers. It looks as if there has been some difference of Opinion between the people concerned in the Foreign Office and here as to the proper assessment of the extent of P.K.I. influence, their relationship with Sukarno and the extent of their involvement in "ge confrontation". 2 I have informally enquired about this from LeReDs As I understand it, the view in the Foreign Office, in general terms, is that Sukarno's relationship with the P.K.I. is one of mutual dependence. Each needs the support of the other. This has enabled the P,K.I. to put its weight behind Sukarno's policy of confrontation. This policy, however, stems as much from Jarvanese imperialism as from Communist pressure. 3a Although the facts may be as above, for publicity purpose it has been considered necessary to stress either the Communist aspect or the imperialist aspect of confrontation according to the audience addressed. ue It is not, however, for me to get involved in this discussion. Any differences of emphasis which there may have been in the past will no doubt now be thrashed out and resolved in the new Department Je.M.I.D. as soon as it starts to function. (C. DUKE) 25th September === [PDF page 8] === £0 (end Sic.) le onaees anol a -. te CLO. have wilh od eae 55 cs ‘1. eotes bs = se car, anid, bau, oni tes Aptcert Ye loseguen the CLO oe Perlite === [PDF page 9] === [tre KOLA Wn oes he 0, A Pleo Se Ares: tarhy ti Oe Cx Js Joke. hae. 170 loan Phe. Sa oo, or hte HAC Pe a+ |? an MMe APeust<d tf Bi het: Be Acted af xs Put an, V cbOn fy it Ae LkS Te padi (- Jo fey Ad They 4 jprede c~ Jeu, fond) [Unreadable] Up (tai, fhe Jans “/d x 2 oe . hao Pe J TeMang tion AWufp@y as Jha / Hitt = Fa ae Cor MTimy he ffs oe. =: fF geee eS 6: Me Fe Ree he PAT Pio oO fu dine, Epa A ke fe CRA Hendin 5 cad jb. aggre Paes a. hi lc Fae Now o.b. hy (ix itil Jaictiedn; 8 ton 4 s/o t ka, === [PDF page 10] === MALAYSIA Drwneng ot. MALAYA/INDONESIA RELATIONS 3lst AUGUST, 1957 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1963 === [PDF page 11] === MALAYSIA MALAYA/INDONESIA RELATIONS 31st AUGUST, 1957 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1963 DI-CHETAK DI-JABATAN CHETAK KERAJAAN OLEH THOR BENG CHONG, A.M.N., PENCHETAK KERAJAAN KUALA LUMPUR 1964 === [PDF page 12] === MALAYA/INDONESIA RELATIONS 31st AUGUST, 1957 To 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1963 There has always been a strong desire on the part of the Malayan people for very close and friendly relations with the people of Indonesia not only because of the sentimental and blood ties which bind a major part of the population of the Federation of Malaya with that of Indonesia but also because, apart from Thailand, Indonesia is the nearest neighbour of the Federation with which close cultural and economic relations existed. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War (despite being separated by different colonial masters) close ties were maintained and there was a free flow of visitors between the Malayan mainland and the Netherlands East Indies. When the Indonesian people fought for their independence from the Netherlands soon after the end of the Second World War the people of Malaya gave not only moral and material support but hundreds of Malayans went over to Indonesia to join the Indonesians, fighting side by side with them, and many sacrificed their lives for the sake of the independence of the people for whom they had the closest regard and affection. After the attainment of Indonesian independence many of these volunteers settled down in Indonesia becoming Indonesian citizens. 2. The regard and esteem for Indonesian national leaders became a source of guidance and inspiration to Malayan people in their struggle for independence. 3. The strong moral support and backing which the Indonesian leaders gave to the independence movement in the Federation was highly appreciated by Federation leaders and it became a basic principle in the Federation’s foreign policy after independence to forge the closest links with Indonesia. Even before Merdeka, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in 1955 in his capacity as Chief Minister, paid an official visit to Indonesia to foster further goodwill and friendly ties with Indonesia. 4. Early in 1957 it was decided to open a Federation Mission in Djakarta and an officer of the newly formed External Affairs Service of the Federation Government was sent to establish a Mission, thus creating history by forming the first Mission overseas in a country other than a member of the Commonwealth. On 31st August, 1957 on the attainment of independence this Mission was converted into a full Embassy, one of the first to be established after Merdeka. Enche’ Senu bin Abdul Rahman was sent as the Federation’s first Ambassador in Djakarta while Dr Mohamad Razif became Indonesia’s first Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. In September, 1962, Enche’ Senu was succeeded by Dato’ Kamaruddin bin Haji Idris while Dr Mohamad Razif was succeeded by Lt-General G. P. S. Djatikusumo in April, 1963. In November, 1958, a Consulate was also established in Medan to meet the growing need of trade and cultural relations. 5. In November, 1958, Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister, then in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, led a goodwill mission to Indonesia, and in a major speech after his arrival affirmed our faith in the ability of the Indonesian nation to give inspiration to the Federation === [PDF page 13] === people and strongly urged the strengthening of relations between the two countries. This sentiment was reciprocated by Mr Ruslan Abdul Gani, a Minister in the Indonesian Government who declared that the Federation and Indonesia were historically inseparable and that their friendship was inspired by ideals of freedom and justice. Throughout the visit members of the mission were treated with the greatest kindness and courtesy both by President Sukarno and other leaders as well as by the Indonesian people. The splendid success of this first goodwill mission from an independent Malaya to Indonesia was considered a happy augury for future relations between the two countries. 6. At the end of the visit a Joint Communique* was issued which proposed, inter alia, the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship which would not only serve to give formal expression to the close friendship which existed between the two countries and of their desire to strengthen it further but also provide the basis for cooperation and collaboration towards the growth of a common language and a common culture. 7. Soon after this decision was reached steps were immediately taken to draft the text of the Treaty and, when in April 1959 the late Dr Djuanda, then Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, paid a State Visit to the Federation, the opportunity was taken to finalise and sign the Treaty at Kuala Lumpur. The Treaty was warmly welcomed not only in Indonesia and the Federation but also by the rest of the world, because it formally signified the establishment of the close ties which are so essential for the well-being and peace in this region of Asia. It also represented the common desire of both peoples to bringing about mutual cooperation on matters affecting both countries, thereby providing the basis for much closer relations between them, a happy augury for peace, stability and progress in the area. 8. This was the first treaty signed by the newly independent Federation of Malaya and to date the only one of its kind. This treaty symbolised the very strong and sincere desire among the Malayan people to work closely with the Indonesian people. The text of the Treaty is attached as an Appendix? to this paper. 9. During his State Visit, the late Dr Djuanda received a tremendous welcome and was given every courtesy and hospitality as befitting the Prime Minister of a very close and esteemed neighbour and a very good friend of the Federation. He was personally received on arrival by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman who spent much time with him even after Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned temporarily from the office of Prime Minister. Dr Djuanda’s visit was climaxed by the investment of one of Malaya’s highest honours, the Seri Mangku Negara, by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and Dr Prijono who accompanied Dr Djuanda was made a Panglima Mangku Negara. 10. The existence of the Treaty of Friendship and Cultural Agreement gave bright prospects of very close and friendly relations with Indonesia and on its part the Federation Government lost no time in taking action to implement the various clauses contained in the Treaty. Groups of civic workers and other leaders were sent to Medan and Jakarta not only to study developments there * Appendix I. + Appendix II. o-- es but also to maintain friendly contacts with the Indonesian people especially with local leaders and the man-in-the-street. 11. On their part Indonesia sponsored an art exhibition in Kuala Lumpur in February 1959. It was held at the National Art Gallery and participated by about 90 artists. The exhibition was attended by more than 6,000 persons. 12. In 1960 Indonesia sent a troupe ot artistes to show examples of the rich and variegated culture of Indonesia. These cultural shows drew large audiences and revealed the close interest which the Malayan people have for Indonesia and there was no doubt that the shows provided a better understanding and appreciation of Indonesian life and culture. In 1962 the Indonesian Government kindly agreed to second one of their leading artistes, Bing Selamat, whose name is a household word in Southeast Asia, for a period with Radio Malaya in order to train Malayan musicians and artistes. In the Koran Reading Competition in 1961 Indonesia sent a delegation together with their Minister of Religious Affairs, Kiai Hj. Wahib Wahab, who brought a proposal for the holding of an Afro-Asian Koran Reading Competition to be held in Djakarta the following year. From 1962 onwards Indonesia sent no further delegation to the Annual Koran Reading Competition. The Federation Government also received a number of scholarships from the Indonesian Government. 13. In October, 1960, General Abdul Haris Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian National Army, together with his wife and a group of other officials, visited the Federation and was given every courtesy and hospitality. His programme in the Federation included visits to various military establishments and meetings with the Prime Minister and high officials, both of the Government and Armed Services of the Federation. After his return to Djakarta General Nasution wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the courtesy and hospitality which was shown to him and he expressed the hope that the close ties of blood and friendship between the two nations would last forever. 14. Early in 1961 disastrous floods occurred in West Java rendering tens of thousands of Indonesians homeless and destroying thousands of acres of rice fields. As an expression of sympathy for those who suffered in the floods the Federation Government gave assistance in food and clothing. The Prime Minister personally wrote to his counterpart, the late Dr Djuanda, expressing his sympathies. 15. One of the most important clauses in the Treaty of Friendship and Cultural agreement related to the closer collaboration and cooperation in enlarging and developing the Malay and Indonesian languages so that the differences between the two could be reduced to the minimum. It was hoped that in the future the two nations would have one common language thus paving the way for greater understanding between the peoples of the two countries. The Federation Government therefore proceeded with its plans for the introduction of reforms which would facilitate this objective. 16. In December 1959 a delegation led by the Director of Dewan Bahasa, Tuan Syed Nasir Ismail, went to Indonesia for discussions with the Indonesian Language Implementation Committee. After deliberations lasting several days agreement was finally reached between the two official delegations as to a new spelling system to === [PDF page 14] === be introduced in both countries, and it was agreed further that as soon as the respective governments had given approval to the new system there would be a simultaneous announcement of the date for the adoption of the new spelling system and the effective date on which it was to be implemented. It was then hoped that the date would not be later than January, 1961. When the proposal was put to the Federation Government it quickly gave approval to the recommended spelling system and to its adoption from the date which would be agreed upon between the two governments. This was made known to the Indonesian Government, but the Indonesian Government had made no decision as to the adoption of this new spelling system. 17. Early in 1959, the Prime Minister made a major proposal for closer association and cooperation among the nations in Southeast Asia, which was within the scope of the Treaty in so far as it concerned relations between the Federation and Indonesia. This proposal was the setting up of an organisation which would provide the basis for facilitating cooperation and collaboration in the economic, cultural and social fields. Even before the matter was put officially to the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Government spokesman as well as the Indonesian press launched a scathing attack on the whole concept. Despite the unfavourable reaction, in October, 1959, the Prime Minister wrote to President Sukarno as well as to other Southeast Asian leaders outlining in greater detail what he had in mind and proposing a meeting to be held early in 1960 at a place to be decided upon in order to examine further the proposal and to exchange views.* President Sukarno replied in January, 1960, rejecting the proposal of a multilateral relation among nations in Southeast Asia because he believed that it would only give rise to undesirable speculations on the part of other nations and that it would prevent the attainment of the desired objective of close cooperation. Instead, the President favoured bilateral arrangements. f 18. Despite the refusal on the part of Indonesia to associate with the Prime Minister’s proposal the Federation Government went ahead and, eventually, the Association of Southeast Asia or ASA as it later became commonly known was formed, the members, apart from the Federation, being the Philippines and Thailand. The progress of this Association since its inception has amply demonstrated to the world the value of close multilateral association in the economic, social and cultural fields. 19. In 1957 the PRRI rebellion broke out in Indonesia. In conformity with the spirit of friendship and in accordance with international practice the Federation Government adopted a position of strict non-involvement and considered the rebellion to be purely an internal matter for the Indonesian people. Furthermore, the Indonesian Government did not declare a state of insurgency. 20. This attitude of the Federation Government came under bitter criticism by the Indonesian Government who urged the Federation Government to adopt the extraordinary stand of taking active measures to assist the Indonesian Government in its campaign to suppress the rebellion. 21. One of the questions which was brought up by Indonesia during this period was that concerning the grant by the Federation * Appendix III. + Appendix IV. Government of political asylum to a number of rebels. Towards the latter part of the rebellion some Indonesian rebels, realising that their cause was bound to fail, escaped to the Federation to seek asylum here rather than give themselves up to the Indonesian Government who then had not yet issued their amnesty offer. For purely humanitarian reasons the Prime Minister acceded to their request but only after obtaining an undertaking from them that they would not participate in any further activities aimed at overthrowing the Government with which the Federation Government was in the closest and friendliest terms. This was strictly in conformity with international law and practice. 22. During the early part of the rebellion a number of Indonesians who were alleged to be taking part in the rebellion had been visiting and staying in the Federation. In this regard, the Federation Government was placed in a very awkward and difficult position, because these visitors were in possession of valid travel documents issued by the Indonesian Government which the Federation Government was bound to honour; but the Indonesian Government alleged that the Federation by this action was actively giving help to the rebels. This problem was put to the Indonesian Government and eventually they decided to cancel the travel documents of persons believed to be actively engaged in the rebellion and in the spirit of close cooperation and friendship the Federation Government took immediate action by refusing entry into the Federation of holders of such disowned or cancelled documents. A close liaison was kept with the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in this regard. 23. In January 1960, 30 Indonesians were found to have landed illegally in Penang and were arrested. The Indonesian Embassy claimed that these people were rebels and requested that they be handed over to the Indonesian authorities. The Federation Government could not accede to this request because that would be tantamount to recognising a state of insurgency in Indonesia in which case the proper procedure would have been to intern these alleged rebels. It was explained to the Indonesian Charge d’Affaires in Kuala Lumpur that in the interest of close relations between the Federation and Indonesia no action should be taken which would indicate that the Federation was giving cognizance to a state of civil war in Indonesia. The Indonesian Charge d’Affaires appreciated this stand and expressed gratitude for it. Accordingly, the 30 Indonesians were regarded as illegal entrants and were prosecuted in accordance with the law. Subsequently, they were told to leave the territorial limits of the Federation. 24. On 28th January, 1960, Dr Subandrio, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting in accordance with the clause of the Treaty of Friendship which provided that the two countries agree to consider the signing of an Extradition agreement, wrote to the Federation’s Minister of External Affairs proposing that an extradition treaty be concluded between Indonesia and the Federation.* Having an extradition treaty is a common practice between close neighbours on the friendliest relations and the proposal normally would have received a favourable consideration if not for the fact that the letter referred to above contained the unprecedented request for an extradition of political refugees. * Appendix V. === [PDF page 15] === 25. Accordingly, the Federation’s Minister of External Affairs drew the attention of the Indonesian Government to the irregularity of such a treaty, for extradition arrangement should only cover criminal offenders.* No reply has since been received to this letter but apparently, from comments which appeared in several leading Indonesian newspapers, this reply has been regarded by the Indonesian Government as substantiating their allegation that the Federation Government was actively aiding and abetting the Indonesian rebels. 26. In October 1960, a request was received by the Federation Government from a group of Indonesians who were formerly members of various Indonesian diplomatic missions in Europe who, during the rebellion, had defected to the rebel movement to be given political asylum in the Federation. At first the Federation Government turned down the request but, owing to repeated pleas and taking into account their pathetic plight, the Federation Government acceded to their request after obtaining an undertaking from them that they would not engage in any political activities. 27. It is clear that in keeping with the Federation’s policy of maintaining the most cordial and closest relationship with Indonesia, the stand of non-involvement adopted during the rebellion was in the best interests of both countries. The policy of non-interference in the rebellion enabled the Indonesian Government to have a much freer hand in dealing with their internal situation and the granting of political asylum to certain Indonesian rebels, whose number indeed was very small, while consistent with humanitarian considerations, ensured that these so-called rebels would not participate in activities which would be harmful to the Indonesian Government. Indeed, it was this act of the Indonesian Government which made it possible for the Indonesian authorities to contact them in the Federation and offer them amnesty which the majority of them accepted. 28. In this connection it may be mentioned that prior to Merdeka a number of Malayans had left their own shores for Indonesia to escape arrest by the authorities for activities aimed at overthrowing the then government. Some were communists who were connected with the terrorist movement during the Emergency, while some were nationalists, many of whom when in Indonesia came under the influence of extremists and communists and became their fellow-travellers. Prominent among the latter group was one Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob who was connected with the Kesatuan Melayu Muda, a body declared illegal soon after the outbreak of World War II. He became a prominent member of the Partai Nasional Indonesia changing his name to that of Iskandar Kamil and with Indonesian support led a movement aimed at making the Federation a part of Indonesia. Even after Merdeka, Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob continued his activities and it was known that he was in contact with extremists and communists in the Federation. He has been leading a movement called the Kesatuan Melayu Merdeka based in Medan which has as its objective the overthrow of the present government. Among its activities is the operation of a radio station spewing propaganda lies and hatred against the Malaysian Government. * Appendix VI. 29. In 1957 the Indonesian Government issued a decree extending the territorial waters of Indonesia up to 12 miles from the outermost limits of Indonesian territory and that all waters separating the Indonesian islands were declared territorial waters. Thus, the Indonesian Government did without the normal courtesy of informing, if not consulting, its neighbour whose territorial waters are affected by this claim, despite the fact that in certain pe @ns of the Straits of Malacca Indonesian territorial waters as now claimed overlapped Federation territorial waters which conform with the practice of three miles. In addition, the Indonesian Government closed certain areas which they certainly knew were traditional fishing areas for Malayan fishermen. Thus by this act they had deprived hundreds of fishermen of their livelihood. Those who dared to continue to fish in their traditional fishing grounds were arrested by the Indonesian authorities and molested and their catch and other properties confiscated. 30. Since August, 1957, there has been a long series of incidents in the Straits of Malacca which had placed small boats plying in the Straits of Malacca either for fishing or trade in considerable danger. These incidents had taken the form of intrusions by Indonesian gunboats into Federation waters in the most blatant manner followed by acts of piracy and other misdeeds. In some cases Malayan traders and fishermen were severely manhandled and some were brought to Indonesia and imprisoned or fined without proper trial. 31. Strong protests were made to the Indonesian Government from time to time without avail. In 1960 alone there were 31 violations of Federation territorial waters by Indonesian gunboats, defence motor launches and patrol crafts. In some cases these craft came so close to the Federation’s coast that the nature and type of crafts could easily be identified by people standing along the shore. In addition cases of piracy in the Straits of Malacca have increased considerably due to the fact that pirates were able to seek shelter in the Indonesian waters where the authorities appeared to connive at their activities. In 1961 there were 21 cases of piracy and in 1962 the number of incidents increased to 24 and there might well have been a number of such incidents which were not reported to the Government. If not for the fact that the Federation Government have provided protection to small crafts and fishing in the Straits such incidents would have affected a considerable number of people whose livelihood depend on fishing and coastal trading in the Straits of Malacca. 32. Despite Indonesia’s coolness towards the Federation’s policy of strict non-involvement during the PRRI rebellion in Indonesia, the Federation Government pursued a policy of active friendship towards the Republic of Indonesia. This support has not been more convincingly displayed than in the question of Indonesia’s claim over Irian Barat (West New Guinea). 33. At the 82ist Plenary Meeting of the 14th Session of the United Nations General Assembly held on Monday, 5th October, 1959, Dr Ismail bin Dato’ Abdul Rahman, leader of the Federation delegation, referred to colonialism in general and to Dutch colonialism in West Irian in particular. He said inter alia: “The Government of the Federation of Malaya condemns colonialism in any form, be it in West Irian, Algeria, Hungary === [PDF page 16] === or Tibet. The Federation of Malaya is pledged actively to support subject peoples of nations in their legitimate aspiration to self determination and independence. “Although the question of West Irian has not been included in the agenda of this Session of the General Assembly, my delegation nevertheless feels it necessary to express the profound regrets of the Government of the Federation of Malaya that no amicable settlement of this question is yet in sight. I should lik@——” e- @ once again to reiterate that, in the view of my delegation, the question of West Irian is one of vestigal colonialism, and it is in this light that we must express our concern in this matter.” Dr Ismail then referred to the Federation’s relations with Indonesia in the following terms: “One of the greatest events in the life of our young nation had been the conclusion this year of a Treaty of Friendship with Indonesia—the first of its kind entered into by the Federation of Malaya—reflecting our desire to restore those ties of race and culture with Indonesia; ties which were interrupted by the accidents of history.” 34. However, the Federation Government was not content merely to pay lipservice to the ideal of freedom from colonialism and offered its good offices available to both parties in the West Irian dispute, the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, wrote to President Sukarno on 20th September, 1960 to inquire whether the Federation could assist in bringing about a solution to the dispute which was fraught with immense danger to world peace and stability and, in particular, to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, and he further put forward certain proposals which he considered would provide the basis for negotiation leading to a settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian. 35. The essence of the Prime Minister’s proposal was to transfer West Irian to the United Nations as a trust territory with the purpose of an eventual transfer of the territory directly to the Republic of Indonesia and furthermore that the Trusteeship should not exceed a certain specified period.* The late Dr Djuanda, who was then acting President of the Republic of Indonesia in the absence of President Sukarno who was abroad on vacation, replied to the Prime Minister’s letter agreeing in principle to the proposal put forward and specifying that the period of trusteeship should not exceed that of one year.t 36. In November, 1960, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, went on an Official visit to Canada and the United States. In his conversation with the leaders in Canada and in the United States the Prime Minister particularly stressed on the importance of finding a solution to the West Irian problem which he considered should not be left unsettled. A conflict would provide an opportunity for the communists to exploit the situation for their own ends. He told these leaders of his proposal for the settlement of the dispute and requested their full support and backing in his efforts to mediate between Indonesia and the Netherlands. * Appendix VII. + Appendix VIII. 37. The Prime Minister also met the late Mr Dag Hammerskjold the then Secretary-General of the United Nations and similarly expressed to him his fears regarding the security and peace of his part of the world if the West Irian problem remained unsettled. The late Mr Dag Hammerskjold appreciated the position and promised his wholehearted support in the efforts of the Prime Minister. The efforts of the Prime Minister had made a deep impression on the United States Government which realised the need for the United States to take a much more active interest in this dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands for the sake of peace in this region of Asia. 38. On his way back from his official visit the Prime Minister proceeded to the Netherlands and held preliminary discussions with the Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr Jan de Quay, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Luns, and the States Secretary for Netherlands in New Guinea, Mr Bot. At the end of his preliminary talk a Joint Communique was issued which revealed that the Netherlands Government was willing to subject their policy in Netherlands New Guinea to the security and judgment of the United Nations. This willingness on the part of the Netherlands did not by itself provide a solution to the West Irian dispute, but it indicated a significant departure from their hitherto intransigent position, a departure which could serve as a starting point from which further negotiations could be held which would facilitate convergence of Indonesian and Netherlands views on the West Irian problem. This willingness to subject their policies in Netherlands West New Guinea would facilitate the introduction of the United Nations into the problem. Bearing in mind the willingness of the Indonesian to agree to a U.N. Trusteeship as an intermediate step leading to the eventual transfer of Netherlands West New Guinea to Indonesia, it represented a step forward in the realisation of the Prime Minister's proposal for the solution of the West Irian dispute, to which the Indonesians had given their approval. 39. Unfortunately, however, before the Prime Minister could report to the Indonesian Government the substance of his discussions with the Netherlands Government, in fact before he arrived at Kuala Lumpur from Holland, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio, quick to find fault, attacked the efforts of the Prime Minister claiming that he had acted without referring the matter to Indonesia. According to him, the only solution to the West Irian dispute was a quick transfer of the administration of the territory to Indonesia and that it would serve no purpose to introduce the U.N. into the dispute, despite an agreement to the contrary from Dr Djuanda in the capacity of Acting President. He stated that the only U.N. intervention in the matter which he could agree to was the supervision of the transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia. 40. A sustained attack by the Indonesian press on the efforts of the Prime Minister to mediate in the West Irian dispute followed the statement made by Dr Subandrio. This press campaign ranged from mild reproach to bitter insinuations. “Suluh Indonesia” an organ of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PND), rejected internationalisation of West Irian and said that Indonesia was determined to recover West Irian with or without other people’s assistance. It stated that foreigners should not, === [PDF page 17] === 10 despite their goodwill, be welcome to the Indonesian people. “Berita Indonesia” accused the Prime Minister of not consulting the “leaders with authority” such as President Sukarno, Tun Djuanda, Leimena, Subandrio and Maladi. The “Merdeka” alleged that the Prime Minister had treated Indonesia as the accused before a court and as the guilty party in the dispute. According to “Merdeka” the Prime Minister was an agent of the British and of SEATO and only the Indonesian people and the Indonesian armed forces could solve the problem. 41. When the Federation Government made representations to the Indonesian Government over the Indonesian press campaign against the Prime Minister and Dr Subandrio’s premature criticism of the Prime Minister’s peace efforts, Dr Subandrio addressed a letter dated 30th November, 1960, to the Prime Minister in which he stated, inter alia: “Rakjat dan Pemerintah Republic Indonesia sangat menghargai segala usaha Jang Mulia itu.” The letter was conveyed to the Prime Minister by a Mr Suska, Head of the Directorate of Asian Pacific Affairs in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. At a meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on the Ist December, 1960, Mr Suska informed the Prime Minister that the Federation Government had misunderstood Indonesia’s position on this matter. When asked whether it was not true that once the principle of trusteeship was accepted, any claim of sovereignty must be surrendered, Mr Suska agreed that this was so. It appeared that the Indonesian Government had reconsidered their position and would not after all agree to allow the United Nations to take over the territory of West Irian in trust for a period of one year and then turn it over to Indonesia. 42. Asa gesture of goodwill towards Indonesia, so that unfavourable public reaction in Indonesia might be prevented, the Prime Minister informed Mr Suska that the contents of Tun Djuanda’s letter would not be divulged to the public. Mr Suska was relieved and ey the assurance that no more press statements would be issued. 43. The Prime Minister then wrote a letter to President Sukarno on 3rd December, transmitting a report of his endeavour to obtain a settlement of this long and vexing problem of Irian Barat.* President Sukarno replied to the Prime Minister on 14th December. t+ 44. On the Sth December, 1960, a press report appeared in Djakarta to the effect that a senior Indonesian Government official had declared that the Indonesian Government believed that the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had misused his rights as a mediator. A demarche in the form of a Note Verbale was immediately sent by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Indonesian Ambassador requesting the Indonesian Government to refute this statement. In delivering the Note to the Indonesian Ambassador, the Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, said that if the Indonesian Government chose to remain silent then the Federation Government would interpret such silence as an endorsement of that statement, and that should there be a deterioration in Federation-Indonesian relations as a consequence, the Indonesian Government alone would be held responsible. * Appendix IX. T Appendix X. 11 2 45. On the 7th December, 1960, a spokesman of the Indonésian Foreign Ministry issued a press statement denying that a senior Indonesian official had made such a statement to the press. The Foreign Ministry spokesman added, “if such reports were published in Malayan newspapers then such reports were not originating (sic) from the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.” 46. Despite the Indonesian rebuff over the Prime Minister’s attempts to mediate in the West Irian issue, the Federation Government consistently refused to grant facilities to the Netherlands Government in cases where the approval of such facilities would in the opinion of the Federation Government serve to increase tension in the area. Even after the West Irian issue had been settled when the Netherlands requested permission for their ships to stopover in Malaya en route from West Irian to Europe, the Federation Government would not give its approval. The Federation Government also made it quite clear to the British Government that it would take an unfavourable view of Netherlands troops going ashore at Singapore. As a result of the Government’s firm attitude in this matter, Dutch troops did not land on Federation or Singapore soil but proceeded to Europe without delay. This is clear proof of the Federation Government’s determination not only to preserve a strict policy of non-involvement in the Netherlands/ Indonesia dispute but also to avoid taking any step which might offend against Indonesian susceptibilities. 47. Indonesia was giving the appearance of seizing control of West Irian by force of arms and began equiping herself with weapons bought largely from Russia. Guerilla fighters were dropped into Netherlands West New Guinea and the situation in the area became very tense, but fortunately the United States took active steps to bring about an amicable solution to the problem largely through the effort of Mr Elsworth Bunker and eventually, the Bunker plan was accepted by both parties thus settling the whole dispute peacefully. The Bunker plan did not differ materially from the proposal made by the Prime Minister. 48. In May 1961, the Prime Minister put forward his historic proposal for the formation of Malaysia. H.M.M. Ambassador in Djakarta took steps to inform the Indonesian Government of this proposal and the initial Indonesian reaction was not unfriendly, which raised hopes in the Federation that the Indonesian Government had adopted a policy of genuine friendship and cooperation towards the Federation. On November 13, 1961, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, in a letter to the New York Times regarding West Irian inter alia wrote as follows: “As an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent, one fourth of the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) consisting of three Crown Colonies of Great Britain, is now becoming the target of the Malayan Government for a merger. Of course, the people there are ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. Still, we do not show any objection toward this Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with this plan.” === [PDF page 18] === 12 49.,, the 20th November, 1961, in a statement made to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of West Irian, Dr Subandrio said inter alia: “We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island, but—more than that—when Malaya told us of its intentions to merge with the three (sic) British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom. For the sake of clarification, I may tell this Assembly that three-quarter of the island of Borneo is Indonesian territory, while the remainder constitutes the aforementioned three (sic) British Crown Colonies. Naturally, ethnologically and geographically speaking, this British part is closer to Indonesia than, let us say, to Malaya. But we still told Malaya that we had no objection to such a merger, based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned.” 50. At the end of December, 1961, i-e., approximately 5 weeks after Dr Subandrio’s statement to the United Nations General Assembly in which he referred to the Malaysia Plan, the Central Committee of the Partai Komunis Indonesia passed a Resolution on Malaysia to the effect that Malaysia was a form of neocolonialism and that its purpose was to suppress “democratic and patriotic movements” of the people in the territories concerned and that it was a threat to peace and security in the area. The P.K.I. then called on the Indonesian people and Government to heighten national vigilance against the establishment of Malaysia and to support the resistance of the people in the territories which Malaysia was to comprise. The text of the resolution is attached as an Appendix.* 51. The Resolution by the Central Committee of the PKI is one of the key factors in any assessment of the motivations of Indonesian atic towards Malaysia. The Resolution referred to Malaysia suppressing “the democratic and patriotic movements of the peoples in these 5 territories which aimed at the attainment of genuine national independence and freedom from imperialism.” 52. Since the phrase “democratic and patriotic movements” in Marxist-Leninist jargon means precisely Communist and pro- Communist movements, the reason for the opposition by the PKI, the world’s largest Communist Party in the non-Communist world, to Malaysia is obvious; this opposition is the direct result of the challenge which Malaysia poses to the overall Communist strategy in Southeast Asia. It is also noteworthy that the slogan “neocolonialism” in relation to Malaysia received its first public and definitive expression in the above resolution. Before lon the PKI-instigated campaign against_ Malaysia succeeded” in increasing tension between Indonesia and the ederation and in inciting Indonesian leaders, through the powerful Communist press and mass “front” organisations, to “confront” the Federation. * Appendix XI. 13 53. The PKI’s opposition can be related to international Communist opposition to Malaysia in particular that of Communist China. When in 1959 Communist China annexed Tibet the Federation was in the forefront in condemning Communist China’s aggression against the Tibetan people and the Federation was one of the principal sponsors of a Resolution in the United Nations General Assembly Session in 1959 condemning Communist China’s denial of fundamental rights to the Tibetan @ people. In October, 1962, Communist China mounted a major offensive on the Sino-Indian Border annexing parts of Indian territory. The Federation immediately reacted to this act of aggression. The Prime Minister was forthright in his condemnation of Communist China and immediately launched a Fund to assist India to repel the Communist incursion into her territory. It is therefore significant that in the opposition to Malaysia, Indonesia was strongly supported by Communist China. In April, 1963, Liu Shao Chi, the Communist China’s Vice Chairman, visited Indonesia where he declared that Indonesia and China were “comrades in arms” and praised Indonesia’s “just stand” in opposing the “neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia and supporting the revolutionary struggle of the people of North Borneo”. Before leaving Djakarta on 20th April Mr Liu together with President Sukarno issued a Joint Communique which categorically declared their opposition to Malaysia and their determination to work together for the destruction of Malaysia. 54. Gradually, the Indonesian Press took its cue from the Communist Press and eventually, Malaysia was unanimously described a “neocolonialist tool of the imperialist powers.” Early in 1962 the PKI implemented its Central Committee Resolution on December 1961 by launching an intensive attack against the Malaysia Plan. For example, on 4th October, 1962, “Harian Rakjat” revealed the sinister designs of the PKI when it predicted that Malaysia would not materialise by the 31st August, 1963, because of the victory of the Party Ra’ayat, Brunei, led by Sheikh A. M. Azahari, and the Philippine claim to North Borneo. The evolution of Indonesian policy towards Malaysia clearly demonstrates the role of Indonesian Communism in arousing national hostility towards Malaysia. 55. However. as late as November, 1962, the official Indonesian attitude to Malaysia appeared to remain uncommitted. Mr Ruslan Abdul Gani, who was then Vice Chairman of the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council, was reported to have said on his return from an unofficial visit to the Federation on 1st November, 1962, that he saw “positive and negative points in the plan to merge Singapore and the British Borneo territories into a Malaysia Federation.” “The plan is still developing. Personally, I welcome any new country around us that wants to get rid of colonial chains,” he added. 56. It was not until a few days after the revolt in Brunei broke out on the 8th December, 1962, and as mass rallies inspired and led by the PKI took place in Djakarta and elsewhere in ass that a reversal in the Indonesian official attitude i apparent. 57. On 11th February, 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio, at a press conference held at his home officially declared Indonesia’s opposition to Malaysia. === [PDF page 19] === 14 58. On 13th February, President Sukarno declared that Indonesia’s opposition to the proposed Malaysia Plan was not because of Communist influence but because Malaysia represented forces of neo-colonialism. On the other hand, Indonesia supported the Brunei rebels because they were fighting for independence against “Malaysian neo-colonialism”. He added “nations who will become strong and famous nations should be ready to face moments of danger. To members of the armed forces I have stated that we are standing on a principle of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. We are supporting all nations who are struggling for their independence. What is the reason for our opposition to Malaysia? Malaysia is neo-colonialism and we do not agree with this.” President Sukarno also described the Malaysia Plan as an attempt “to save rubber, tin and oil for the imperialists” and went on to say “that’s why now I declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia.” President Sukarno stressed that if the Prime Minister, and the Federation leadership continued their present policy, Indonesia would have no choice but to face it with political and economic confrontation. 59. On 19th February, President Sukarno issued the following order to his troops: “You have carried out your duties successfully (in West Irian) but other duties are still not finished. Your fatherland still calls you to defend the Republic. Our struggle is not over yet. The Republic is still being undermined by threats while the enemy is besieging us. Therefore, keep on the alert and I order you to keep your weapons in your hands.” 60. On 19th February, an Indonesian naval patrol intercepted a Malayan fishing vessel, towed it to Belawan harbour in Northern Sumatra and took the crew into custody. The Commander of the First Navy Maritime District (North and Central Sumatra) was reported by Antara to have ordered his forces to “burn on the spot” any Malayan fishing boat caught in Indonesian waters. 61. The Indonesian Government justified its so called “confrontation” against the Federation for an ever-increasing number of reasons. These included the charges that the Federation had always been hostile to Indonesia, that the Federation had tried to “annex” Sumatra during the PRRI revolt, that Malaysia is a “neo-colonialist” plot, that the Federation was trying to “encircle” Indonesia, that Malaysia is against the “Revolution of Mankind” and the “New Emerging Forces”, that Malaysia would be used as a “base for foreign domination”, that Malaysia would become a “haven for the economic subversion of Indonesia”, etc. This farrago of lies and distortions was rapidly built up through the press, radio and statements by leaders of the Government and pro-Sukarno political parties and organs. But this smokescreen of wild and emotional charges could not obscure the following facts: (a) Before the proposal for the establishment of Malaysia was made Indonesia had never expressed concern over the presence of British bases in Southest Asia. The first public expression of hostility in Indonesia towards the Anglo-Malayan Treaty of Defence and Mutual Assistance was made in December 1961 in the Resolution of the PKI Central Committee. It is also a fact that practically all the turgid Marxist-Leninist jargon contained in that Resolution 15 has since been parrotted by the entire Governmentcontrolled press and radio and by the Indonesian leaders themselves. (b) The Indonesian Government’s complicity in the Brunei rebellion was expressed when the Federation Government announced on December 11, 1962, that groups of Brunei rebels had received military training in Indonesian Borneo. This was later admitted by the Indonesian authorities. (c) The Indonesian Government officially support a fictitious “sovereign” state described as “The Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara” (comprising Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah) which has a spurious propaganda organisation including its own radio station. (d) The Indonesian Government is using Sheikh A. M. Azahari as a tool of Indonesian propaganda. (e) The Indonesian Government began to advocate openly the use of force by “freedom fighters” against “neocolonialism” in “Kalimantan Utara” and this was reinforced by “physical confrontation”, ie., the threat of force by Indonesia herself. 62. This brazen interference in the internal affairs of the Borneo States was accompanied by virulent press and radio attacks on the Federation Government and on the person of its Prime Minister. The object of these attacks was clearly to arouse hatred against the Federation Government and thereby to incite the people, as the Deputy Secretary-General of the Indonesian Government-sponsored National Front Convention suggested on the 18th February, 1963, “to act to topple their own Prime Minister”. Dr Subandrio himself was responsible for one of the most venomous attacks on the Prime Minister when he accused the Prime Minister of seeking to annex Sumatra in 1957 because “he needs Indonesia badly to face Chinese equality with the Malays inside Malaya”. 63. One of the most blatant insults to the Federation was made by President Sukarno during an official Reception given by him in honour of the delegates to the Asian-African Journalists Conference held in Djakarta in April, 1963, when he called upon the gathering to sing a popular version of a tune which had become the National Anthem of the Federation. In August, 1957, when it was announced that this tune had been selected to be the National Anthem of the Federation the Indonesian Government issued a decree banning the singing or playing of this song in Indonesia. By this action the President had shown to the journalists present and to the whole world the contempt he had for the Federation. 64. In February, 1963, the Vice President of the Philippines, Mr Emmanuel Pelaez on his way back to Manila from the Anglo- Philippines Talks, proposed a Summit Meeting among President Macapagal, President Sukarno and the Prime Minister in order to discuss the differences which had arisen as a result of the proposal for the formation of Malaysia with a view to arriving, if possible, at an amicable solution in the interest of peace and security and good neighbourly relations in the area and especially among the Malay nations. The proposal for the Summit Meeting was immediately welcomed by the Prime Minister, but on the other hand === [PDF page 20] === 16 President Sukarno was rather noncommittal. The Philippine Government pursued the matter further during the ECAFE Ministerial Conference in Manila and as a result of exchange of views among the Deputy Prime Minister, who led the Federation delegation to the Conference, Dr Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister who was the leader of the Indonesian delegation, and Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez of the Philippines, it was agreed that Talks at Foreign Ministers level should be held in Manila to be preceded by one at Sub-Ministerial level in order to draw up the agenda for the Talks. 65. The Tripartite Talks at Sub-Ministerial level was held from April 9 to 17 in Manila with Indonesia represented by Dr Suwito Kusumowidagdo, First Deputy Foreign Minister; the Federation by Enche’ M. Ghazali bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary for External Affairs; and the Philippines by Mr Salvador P. Lopez, Under- Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The Agenda and the procedure for the Tripartite Talks were discussed and it was agreed that the Agenda should be: (i) A general exchange of views on current problems concerning stability, security, economic development and social progress of each country and of the region as a whole and exposition of the efforts being exerted by the three countries either individually or jointly to solve them; (ii) Discussion of ways and means by which the three countries can achieve closer co-operation and assist one another in solving the problems referred to above on the basis of mutual respect and consistent with their national, regional and international responsibilities and obligations. 66. Early in April 1963 the Prime Minister while leading the Federation Delegation to the ASA Foreign Ministers Meeting met President Macapagal several times and reaffirmed his willingness to attend a Summit Meeting with President Macapagal and President Sukarno in an honest and sincere endeavour to settle their differences and to remove any misunderstanding among themselves in the interest of peace and security and close relations among the three countries. On May 31, 1963, in order to pave the way for a successful Summit Meeting and to create an atmosphere which would be conducive towards the lessening of tension in the area the Prime Minister went out of his way to meet President Sukarno who was in Tokyo on a vacation at the invitation of the latter. The meeting was held in an atmosphere of bonhomie and warm friendship. At this meeting the Prime Minister explained to President Sukarno that he was going to London to sign an Agreement which would fix the date for Malaysia on 31st August, 1963. President Sukarno asked if the date could be varied or postponed. The Prime Minister explained that for various reasons it would not be desirable to postpone the Malaysia date to any day later than 31st August. President Sukarno did not express any objection after that and appeared to have appreciated the Malayan view point. The two leaders then issued a joint statement in which they reaffirmed their sincere desire to settle their differences and to meet together with President Macapagal in Manila.* These peace efforts brought about a significant reduction in the tense relation between the * Appendix XI. 17 Federation and Indonesia whose confrontation activities were lessened. 67. On July 9, 1963, an Agreement was signed in London which provided for the establishment of Malaysia on 31st August, 1963. President Sukarno then accused the Prime Minister of breaking a promise which he alleged the Prime Minister had made to him during their Tokyo Meeting when he claimed the Prime Minister had agreed not to proceed with the formation of Malaysia until after the Summit Meeting. This was flatly denied by the Federation Government, and the Indonesian Government could not plead ignorance of the Federation Government’s intention to finalise the London Agreement since the Tripartite Foreign Ministers themselves had to adjust the dates for the meeting at a Summit level taking into account the dates of the London Meeting. At neither the Sub-Ministerial nor the Ministerial Talks had the Indonesian representatives voiced any objection to, or doubts about, the Federation Government’s intention to proceed with Malaysia. 68. President Sukarno claimed that he had been personally insulted and renewed his confrontation policy against the Federation while simultaneously threatening to frustrate the efforts of the Philippine Government to convene a Summit Meeting. 69. The Prime Minister while refuting President Sukarno’s charges nevertheless asserted that he still stood by his promises to attend a Summit Conference in a sincere and earnest desire to resolve their differences and to bring about happy and cordial relations among the three countries. The holding of the Summit Conference was scheduled for 30th July to Sth August, 1963 and it was in doubt until the eleventh hour when the Indonesian President agreed to go to Manila for the Meeting. 70. The Summit Conference ended on a note of relief, if not optimism, since President Sukarno agreed, firstly, to welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the United Nations Secretary- General or his representative ascertained that the majority of the people in Sarawak and Sabah supported its establishment, and secondly, by agreeing to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by the holding of frequent and regular consultations at all levels. Furthermore, the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers were accepted by President Sukarno and a declaration was issued by the three leaders in which was embodied the “common aspiration and objectives” of the peoples and Governments of the three countries and in which the three leaders pledged themselves to co-operate and work together in the common interest of their countries for their economic, social and cultural progress and to maintain better relations in the interests of peace and security in the region. 71. With reference to the Recommendations regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the people in Sabah and Sarawak in regard to Malaysia the Summit spelt out certain details regarding the manner in which the United Nations Secretary- General was to carry out his task. The Secretary-General or his representative was asked to carry out his task within the context of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (xv) Principle IX of Annex by a fresh approach which in the opinion of the Secretary-General was necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of === [PDF page 21] === 18 self-determination within the requirements embodied in Principle IX taking into consideration: (i) the recent elections in Sabah and Sarawak but nevertheless further examining, verifying and satisfying himself as to whether: (a) Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue, (b) electoral registers were properly compiled, (c) elections were free and there was no coercion, and (d) votes were properly polled and properly counted; and (ii) the wishes of those who, being qualified to vote, would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had it not been for their detention for political activities, imprisonment for political offences or absence from Sabah or Sarawak. In addition the Federation Government undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak in order to enable the Secretary-General or his representative to carry out his task. Further the three Heads of Government considered it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the United Nations and that the Federation Government would obtain the co-operation of the governments concerned in this regard. The texts of the documents signed in Manila—the Manila Declaration, the Manila Accord and the Joint Statement are attached respectively as Appendices.* 72. One matter is worth recalling here and that is on the subject of observers. When agreement was reached there was no mention of observers but the Prime Minister had agreed to allow observers as a result of a request by Dr Subandrio and by way of showing favour to Indonesia. It was, however, stressed that observers should not participate in the discussion, or take any part in the work of the U.N. Team. 73. They were there only to see that the U.N. Team did its work well and in strict observance of the terms of reference given to the Secretary-General. 74. Insofar as the relationship between the Federation and Indonesia was concerned the Summit Conference closed with a happy augury. There was rejoicing in the Federation at the successful outcome of the Summit Conference because the people felt that at last the way was open for close and friendly relations between the two countries and that the people were willing to let “by-gones be by-gones” and to look instead to a happy future. 75. However, the hopes of the people were soon dashed to pieces for even before the ink on the Manila Accord was dry, the Indonesian Government announced that the policy of confrontation against Malaysia would continue despite the settlement arrived at in Manila. Furthermore the Indonesian * Appendices XII, XIII and XIV. 19 Government, followed by the Philippine Government, put difficulties in the way of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his effort to help. 76. Indonesia insisted that she be allowed to send a team of thirty persons as observers and signified that she would not accept the findings of the U.N. teams unless her request was approved. The British Government refused to accede to the request and would only agree to four observers. Thirty was considered too many and it was impossible to provide suitable accommodation. Later, however, after representations were made by the Federation Government to the British Government and as a result of the efforts of U Thant, the Secretary-General of United Nations, Indonesia and the Philippines agreed to eight persons, four clerical assistants and four observers. However, matters were further held up because the four clerical assistants from Indonesia were refused facilities on the grounds that these persons were not clerical assistants but were senior officials and furthermore some of them were intelligence officers. Eventually, however, matters were sorted out but it resulted in the holding up of the work of the U.N. Survey Team for one week and in their carrying out part of their work in the absence of the observers who were able only to witness the survey towards the closing stages. 77. Insofar as the question of observers was concerned the figure of four allowed by the British Government was acceptable to the Federation Government, whose attitude on the whole controversy was that the observers were not an integral part of the ascertainment exercise nor were they essential in view of the fact that the Manila Agreement merely stated that the three Governments considered it “desirable” to have observers present during the ascertainment exercise. 78. A number of the Indonesian observers including the leader, Brig. Otto Abdul Rachman and his deputy returned to Djakarta before the work had actually been completed. Brig. Otto Abdul Rachman made a press statement that the U.N. assessment team had “worked very hard” and conducted its survey “impartially”. 79. The Federation Government was watching the progress of the U Thant survey team. It became clear that the work could not be completed by 31st August, 1963. The Federation Government had agreed in Manila that the ascertainment by U Thant should be made prior to the establishment of Malaysia. There was considerable agitation particularly in Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak that Malaysia Day should not be deferred. The Federation Government however firmly adhered to the Manila Agreement and obtained the approval of Parliament to vary the date so that Malaysia could be established after U Thant had completed his task in accordance with what was agreed to in Manila. 80. In accordance with Section II of the Malaysia Act it became a statutory requirement that the new date for the formation of Malayasia be proclaimed before 31st August, 1963. Advance information and the reasons for the Federation Government’s decision to announce the new date were forwarded to the Indonesian Government beforehand. It was also necessary to inform the British Government which was then legally and constitutionally responsible for Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore, and the British Government had to make the necessary amendments to the === [PDF page 22] === 20 documents consequent upon the postponement of the date of Malaysia. Dr Subandrio was invited to come to Singapore to meet the Federation’s Deputy Prime Minister so that the latter could inform him of the new date for Malaysia and to explain personally the reasons therefor. Dr Subandrio pleaded illness and, therefore, the Federation Government sent the Permanent Secretary for External Affairs to Djakarta on 28th August to meet Dr Subandrio. It was pointed out to the Indonesian Government that in view [Unreadable] of the Federation’s constitutional obligations and the Nations Secretary-General’s indication to the three parties that the task of ascertainment was expected to be completed and the findings made known by the 14th September, 1963, the Federation Government’s decision to announce 16th September as the new date for Malaysia was fully consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Manila Accord. 81. The Federation’s strict adherence to the Manila agreement was to enable the Governments of the Philippines and Indonesia to “welcome the formation of Malaysia”. 82. On 14th September, 1963, the U.N. Secretary-General published his Report which stated that a great majority of the people in Sabah and Sarawak were in favour of Malaysia. Instead of welcoming Malaysia, as it was bound to do under the Manila Accord, the Indonesian Government chose to criticise the manner in which the Secretary-General had conducted his Survey and rejected the findings of the Secretary-General. 83. On 16th September the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio summoned the Malaysian Ambassador, Dato’ Haji Kamaruddin and informed him that as from that date he had no status in Indonesia. This was tantamount to severance of diplomatic relations with Malaysia and accordingly the Malaysian Government had no choice but to withdraw immediately its diplomatic mission from Djakarta. This was followed by most atrocious and uncivilised behaviour on the part of the Front Nasional, a Communist dominated organisation led by a Minister of the Government, which committed acts of arson, pillage and destruction on Malaysian properties and buildings in Djakarta. Properties owned by Malaysians in Indonesia have been confiscated and other acts violating international rules might be expected from Indonesia in furtherance of her policy of confrontation against Malaysia. 21 APPENDIX I GOODWILL VISIT TO INDONESIA—JOINT COMMUNIQUE At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia the Goodwill Mission of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu headed by Dato’ Abdul Razak bin Dato’ Hussein, the Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Defence, arrived at Djakarta on 19th of November for a visit of Indonesia which lasted until today. Included in the Mission is Enche’ Khir bin Johari, the Minister of Education. 2. The Mission visited several places to observe objects of military, educational and cultural importance. 3. The Mission was received by His Excellency President Soekarno and held discussions with Indonesian authorities. It also visited the Parliament and National Council where they were received by respectively the Speaker and the Deputy Chairman. 4. At the conclusion of the visit, the First Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr Hardi, and the Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Defence of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, Dato’ Abdul Razak bin Dato’ Hussein, agreed to state jointly the following: 5. As a result of the discussions held during the visit of the Mission, an agreement was reached, inter alia on the following points: 1. There exist ties of tradition, culture and kinship between the people of Indonesia and the people of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu as well as mutual interests in various fields which must be maintained and strengthened as best as possible for the mutual benefit of both countries. The contacts made between the Mission and the people of Indonesia during this first visit of a Goodwill Mission from an independent Persekutuan Tanah Melayu have rendered it even more evident to both the Mission and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia that the peoples of the two countries were closely bound to each other by ties of history, race, language and culture. The Mission and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia would wish to affirm the desirability of the two Governments to closely co-operate and collaborate in the promotion of the national languages and cultures, and to this end, appropriate language and cultural bodies in the two countries should take concrete steps to exchange and interchange cultural groups and studies, and also to discuss ways and means of adopting a uniform spelling system and its usages for both languages. In order to bring about closer co-operation and to strengthen further the already close ties of friendship existing between the two countries, the Mission and representatives of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia exchanged views on matters of common interest and mutual benefit, and in particular as a first step thoroughly examined the possibility of concluding a Treaty of Friendship and Cultural Agreement between the === [PDF page 23] === 22 two countries. The representatives of the Government of € the Republic of Indonesia and the Goodwill Mission also discussed detailed provisions and already reached an agreement, that such a treaty and agreement should be signed in the near future at Kuala Lumpur. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Mission of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu are convinced, that the visit of the Mission of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu to Indonesia has brought both parties to a more profound mutual understanding, and that the results achieved during this visit can be used as a more concrete basis to strengthen still further the existing ties of friendship, kinship and the co-operative spirit between the peoples of Indonesia and the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu. First Deputy Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister and and concurrently Minister for concurrently Minister of De- Foreign Affairs ad interim of fence of the Persekutuan Tanah the Republic of Indonesia, Melayu, Dr Harp1 DaTo’ ABDUL RAZAK BIN Dato’ HuSsEIN DJAKARTA, November the 26th, 1958. 23 PERNJATAAN BERSAMA Atas undangan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Perutusan Muhibah Persekutuan Tanah Melayu dibawah pimpinan Dato Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein, Wakil Perdana Menteri merangkap Menteri Pertahanan, tiba di Djakarta pada tanggal 9 Nopember untuk mengadakan kundjungan di Indonesia jang berlangsung sampai hari ini. Dalam Perutusan itu termasuk Inche Khir bin a Johari, Menteri Pengadjaran. 2. Perutusan telah mengadakan kundjungan-kundjungan keberbagai tempat untuk menindjau objek-objek militer, pendidikan dan kebudajaan. 3. Perutusan telah diterima oleh Paduka Jang Mulia Presiden Soekarno, dan telah mengadakan perundingan-perundingan dengan pembesar-pembesar Indonesia. Perutusan djuga mengundjungi Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat dan Dewan Nasional dimana mereka diterima masing-masing oleh Ketua Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Nasional. 4. Pada achir kundjungan itu, Wakil Perdana Menteri Pertama merangkap Menteri Luar Negeri ad interim Republik Indonesia, Mr. Hardi, dan Wakil Perdana Menteri merangkap Menteri Pertahanan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, Dato Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein, telah bersepakat untuk bersama-sama mengumumkan seperti berikut: Dari perundingan-perundingan jang telah diadakan selama kundjungan itu telah tertjapai kata sepakat antara lain mengenai hal-hal berikut: 1. Antara rakjat Indonesia dan rakjat Persekutuan Tanah Melayu terdapat ikatan-ikatan tradisi, keturunan dan kekeluargaan, serta kepentingan-kepentingan bersama diberbagai lapangan jang perlu diselenggarakan dan diperkuat sebaik-baiknja untuk manfaat kedua belah fihak. Hubungan-hubungan jang diadakan antara Perutusan dan rakjat Indonesia selama kundjungan pertama Perutusan Muhibah dari Persekutuan Tanah Melayu merdeka ini memberikan suatu bukti kepada Perutusan dan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, bahwa rakjat dari kedua negara itu satu sama lain erat hubungannja karena ikatanikatan sedjarah, keturunan, bahasa dan kebudajaannja. Perutusan dan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia ingin sekali menegaskan bahwa kedua Pemerintah menghendaki kerdja sama jang erat dan bantu-membantu dalam usahanja memadjukan bahasa dan kebudajaan nasional dan untuk maksud itu badan-badan bahasa dan kebudajaan jang lajak dikedua negara perlu mengambil langkahlangkah untuk tukar menukar rombongan-rombongan kebudajaan dan pengetahuan, dan djuga untuk membitjarakan tjara-tjara moentijiptakan persamaan_ sistim edjaan kedua bahasa dan penggunaannja. Untuk mewudjudkan kerdja sama jang lebih erat dan untuk lebih memperkuat tali persahabatan jang erat jang telah ada diantara kedua negara, Perutusan dan wakilwakil Pemerintah Republik Indonesia telah mengadakan tukar menukar pandangan tentang soal-soal mengenai === [PDF page 24] === 24 kepentingan bersama jang berguna bagi kedua belah fihak, dan chususnja sebagai langkah pertama telah mempeladjari sedalam-dalamnja kemunginan untuk mengadakan Perdjandjian Persahabatan dan Persetudjuan Kebudajaan antara kedua negara. Wakil-wakil Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Perutusan Muhibah telah membitjarakan djuga perintjian-perintjiannja dan telah tertjapai kata sepakat bahwa perdjandjian dan persetudjuan seperti itu sebaik-baiknja ditanda tangani dalam waktu singkat di Kuala Lumpur. Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Perutusan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu mempunjai kejakinan sepenuhnja, bahwa kundjungan Perutusan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu ke Indonesia ini telah lebih menambah saling pengertian jang mendalam, dan bahwa hasil-hasil jang telah ditjapai selama kundjungan itu dapat dipergunakan sebagai dasar jang lebih njata untuk tambah mempererat lagi hubungan persahabatan dan kekeluargaan serta kerdja sama jang selama ini telah terdjalin antara rakjat Indonesia dan rakjat Persekutuan Tanah Melayu. Wakil Perdana Menteri Per- Wakil Perdana Menteri metama merangkap Menteri Luar rangkap Menteri Pertahanan Negeri ad interim Republik Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, Indonesia, Mr. HarpIi DATO ABDUL RAZAK BIN DaTo HUSSEIN DJAKARTA, 26 Nopember, 1958. 25 APPENDIX II TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN FEDERATION OF MALAYA/INDONESIA JANG MULIA DATO’ ABDUL RAZAK BIN DATO’ HUSSEIN, PERDANA MENTERI, PERSEKUTUAN TANAH MELAYU JANG MULIA IR. H. DJUANDA KARTAWIDJAJA, PERDANA MENTERI, REPUBLIK INDONESIA Jang satelah saling memeriksa surat-surat kepertjajaan masingmasing dan mendapatkannja benar serta dalam keadaan baik, menjetudjui pasal-pasal sebagai berikut: PASAL 1 1. Kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji akan saling menghormati kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan masing-masing serta akan berusaha untuk memelihara hubungan-hubungan tradisionil, kebudajaan dan sedjarah jang telah mengikut mereka bersama. PASAL 2 2. Kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji bersetudju untuk memelihara dan melandjutkan hubungan diplomatik dan konsuler diantara mereka sesuai dengan azas-azas serta kebiasaan internasional, lagi pula bersetudju bahwa wakil-wakil diplomatik dan konsuler dari Kedua Pihak akan memperoleh, atas dasar timbalbalik, segala hak-hak, hak-hak istimewa, kebebasan-kebebasan dan kekebalan-kekebalan, menurut kedudukan dan pangkat mereka sesuai dengan azas-azas jang umumnja diakui dalam hukum dan kebiasaan internasional. PasaL 3 3. Kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji, mengakui bahwa, dalam batas-batas pertimbangan-pertimbangan keamanan, ketertiban serta kesehatan umum dan pengawasan imigrasi dari negara masing-masing, warga-negara mereka sedapat-sedapatnja akan dikenakan pembatasan sedikit-dikitnja, apabila (a) mengadakan perdjalanan ke dan didalam; dan (b) bertempat tinggal dinegara pihak lain menjetudjui untuk menjelidik tiap? pembatasan jang diadakan terhadap, dan kesukaran jang kini dialami oleh warga-negara mereka jang mengadakan perdjalanan dan bertempat tinggal demikian dengan tudjuan untuk mengadakan persetudjuan-persetudjuan guna mengurangi kesukaran itu, merobah atau menghilangkan pembatasan-pembatasan itu atas dasar timbal-balek. PASAL 4 4. Apabila terdjadi perselisihan mengenai soal-soal jang langsung dan semata-mata menjangkut kedua negara, kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji menjetudjui akan berichtiar memetjahkannja dalam semangat persaudaraan dan muhibbah jang sungguhsungguh melalui saluran-saluran diplomatik biasa dan djikalau dengan tjara demikian tidak dapat diperoleh penjelasaian dalam waktu jang lajak, maka mereka akan menempuh djalan dan tjara-tjara lain sesuai dengan Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa dan azas-azas jang dinjatakan pada konperensi Bandung tahun 1955. === [PDF page 25] === 26 PASAL 5 5. Guna melaksanakan kerdjasama jang lebih erat, kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji menjetudjui menjelidiki persoalan-persoalan mengenai hubungan-hubungan konsuler, perdagangan, perhubungan, penjerahan pendjahat-pendjahat jang melarikan diri serta segala soal-soal lainnja jang mendjadi kepentingan bersama bagi kedua negara, dengan tudjuan, dimana dan bilamana mungkin, untuk mengadakan persetudjuan-persetudjuan atas dasar timbalbalek. PASAL 6 6. Kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji, sadar akan kenjataan bahwa Bahasa Melayu dan Bahasa Indonesia berasal sama, akan berusaha dengan tjara kerjasama, bantu-membantu dan perundingan-perundingan, untuk mentjapai persamaan seluas-luasnja dalam pemakaian dan perkembangannja. PASAL 7 7. Kedua Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji, didorong oleh keinginan untuk mentjapai kerdjasama jang seluas-luasnja dalam lapanganlapangan kebudajaan, kesardjanaan, ilmiah dan pendidikan, menjetudjui dalam batas-batas pertimbangan keamanan dan ketertiban umum dimasing-masing negara untuk: (a) memadjukan tukar-menukar ahli-ahli pendidikan, ahliahli ilmiah, guru-guru, para peladjar, rombongan penjelidikan, para seniman dan wakil-wakil organisasi-organisasi kemasjarakatan dan kebudajaan; (b) memadjukan pertukaran kesimpulan-kesimpulan dan hasilhasil dari penjelidikan ilmiah dan penjelidikan umum; (c) memadjukan melalui saluran-saluran resmi pertukaran penerbitan-penerbitan jang bersifat pendidikan dan kebudajaan, film-film, surat-surat kabar, tindjauan-tindjauan dan siaran-siaran radio, guna menambah pengetahuan dan saling pengertian; (d) memadjukan pertukaran benda-benda jang bernilai purbakala, sedjarah dan kebudajaan; (e) bantu-membantu memadjukan latihan-latihan dalam lapangan pendidikan, ilmu pengetahuan, teknik dan perindustrian; (f) menggiatkan dan memudahkan penjelenggaraan pertunjukan konser-konser, serta pameran-pameran kesenian, ilmiah dan kesusasteraan; (g) Saling menggiatkan para peladjarnja untuk beladjar diuniversitas-universitas serta lembaga-lembaga pendidikan dinegara Pihak lain; (h) menggikatkan serta memadjukan usaha-usaha dalam lapangan olahraga diantara kedua negara; dan (i) melindungi milik-milik kebudajaan dan purbakala mereka masing-masing, selama hal itu tidak tertjantum dalam persetudjuan-persetudjuan umum jang bersifat internasional. PASAL 8 8. Perdjandjian ini akan berlaku mulai tanggal pertukaran Piagam Ratifikasi jang akan dilangsungkan selekas-lekasnja di Djakarta. 27 e PASAL 9 9. Masing-masing Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji berhak mengachiri Perdjandjian ini dengan memberitahukannja kepada Pihak lain dan pembatalan demikian mulai berlaku enam bulan sesudah hari pemberitahuan itu. Pasa 10 co 10. Perdjandjian ini dibuat dalam bahasa Melayu, Indonesia dan Inggris jang mempunjai nilai jang sama. Tiap perbedaan tafsiran dari ketiga naskah akan diselesaikan dengan perundingan. Untuk menjaksikannja, para Wakil Berkuasa Penuh dari Pihak- Pihak Agung jang Berdjandji telah menanda-tangani Perdjandjian ini dan membubuhkan Meterai-Meterai Mereka. Dibuat di Kuala Lumpur pada hari tanggal Tudjuhbelas bulan April tahun Seribu sembilanratus limapuluh sembilan. Untuk Persekutuan Tanah Untuk Republik Melayu Indonesia Dato’ ABDUL RAZAK BIN Ir. H. DJUANDA KarTA- DaTo’ HUSSEIN WIDJAJA === [PDF page 26] === 28 The English text of the Treaty is as follows: “TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA Aware of the existing ties of history, race and culture, which from time immemorial have bound together the people of both countries, prompted by the desire to restore the relations, which have interrupted by accidents of history and to bring about and strengthen close mutual co-operation on matters exclusively affecting both countries consistent with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles as enunciated at the Asia-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and to this end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: THE HONOURABLE DaTO”’ ABDUL RAZAK BIN DATO’ HUSSEIN, PRIME MINISTER, FEDERATION OF MALAYA HE. Dr H. DsuaNpA KaRTAWIDIAJA, PRIME MINISTER, REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. Who, having examined each other’s credentials and having found them good and in due form, have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1 1. The two High Contracting Parties shall respect the independence and sovereignty of each other and shall strive to maintain the traditional, cultural and historical ties that have bound them together. ARTICLE 2 2. The two High Contracting Parties agree to maintain and continue between them diplomatic and consular relations in accordance with international principles and usage and agree that the diplomatic and consular representatives of either Party shall enjoy, on a reciprocal basis, all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded to officers of their status and rank in conformity with the generally accepted principles of international law and usage. ARTICLE 3 3. The two High Contracting Parties, recognising that, subject to consideration of security, public order, public health and 29 immigration control of their respective countries, their nationals should be subject to the minimum of restrictions when (a) travelling between and within; and (b) residing in the two countries, agree to examine any restrictions imposed on, and inconvenience now suffered by, their nationals so travelling and residing with a view to the conclusion of agreements alleviating such inconvenience or modifying or removing such restrictions on a reciprocal basis. ARTICLE 4 4. The two High Contracting Parties agree that in case any dispute on matters directly and exclusively affecting them should arise they shall endeavour to settle such dispute through usual diplomatic channels in a true spirit of friendship and goodwill. If a settlement cannot be found through such channels within a reasonable time, they shall endeavour to settle them by other ways and means in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles enunciated at the Asia-African Conference in Bandung in 1955. ARTICLE 5 5. The two High Contracting Parties, in order to bring about closer cooperation, agree to examine questions relating to consular relations, trade, communications, the surrender of fugitive offenders and all other matters of common interest with a view, wherever and whenever possible, to the conclusion of agreements on a reciprocal basis. ARTICLE 6 6. The two High Contracting Parties, conscious of the fact that the Malay and Indonesian languages have a common origin, shall strive through cooperation, collaboration and consultation to achieve the greatest possible uniformity in their use and development. ARTICLE 7 7. The two High Contracting Parties, desiring to achieve the maximum cooperation in the cultural, intellectual, scientific and educational fields, agree subject to considerations of security and public order in their respective countries: (a) to promote the exchange of educationists, scientists, teachers, students, study groups, artists and representatives of social, and cultural organisations; (b) to promote the exchange of the findings and results of scientific and general research; (c) to promote the exchange through official channels of educational and cultural publications, films, newspapers, reviews and radio broadcasts in order to increase knowledge and mutual understanding; (d) to promote the exchange of objects of archaeological, historial and cultural interest; (e) to assist each other in the promotion of training in the educational, scientific, technical and industrial fields; === [PDF page 27] === 30 (f) to encourage and facilitate the holding of concerts, and of art, scientific and literary exhibitions; (g) to encourage their students to study in the universities and educational institutions of each other; (h) to encourage and promote activities in the field of sports between their two countries; and (i) to protect the cultural and archaeological property of each other in so far as this is not covered by general agreements of an international character. ARTICLE 8 8. This Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the Instruments of Ratification which shall take place as soon as possible in Djakarta. ARTICLE 9 9. Each High Contracting Party reserves the right to terminate this Treaty by means of a notification to the other High Contracting Party and such termination shall have effect at the expiration of six months from the date of such notification. ARTICLE 10 10. This Treaty is drawn up in the Malay, Indonesian and English languages which have equal value. Any divergent interpretation of the three texts shall be settled by negotiation. IN FAITH THEREOF the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed Their Seals. Done in Kuala Lumpur on the Seventeenth Day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-nine. For the Federation of For the Republic of Malaya Indonesia Dato’ ABDUL RAZAK BIN Dr H. DSUANDA KartTI- DaTo’ HUSSEIN WIDJAJA This is to certify that the text reproduced herein is a true and complete copy of the treaty and it includes all reservations made by the parties thereto.” 31 APPENDIX III PRIME MINISTER’S INVITATION TO INDONESIA REGARDING FORMATION OF ASA (Salinan) 28hb Oktober, 1959. Paduka yang mulia Tuan Presiden, Dengan segala hormat dan sukachita-nya saya melayangkan sa-puchok surat kapada Paduka Yang Mulia dengan harapan supaya dapat melaksanakan hasrat dan chita? buat mendirikan satu pertubohan bagi melancharkan perundingan dan merapatkan kerjasama di-antara negeri* di-Tenggara Asia. 2. Mengikut pendapat saya negeri? yang menjadi anggota pertubohan ini ada-lah masok dengan suka rela-nya dengan tidak tersinggong sadikit pun kadaulatan dan kamerdekaan mereka itu. Sa-terus-nya, tiap? suatu negeri mempunyai kebebasan yang penoh buat menentukan dasar*nya, baik pun tentang hal ehwal dalam atau pun luar negeri. Demikian juga negeri? yang menjadi ahli pertubohan ini, tidak-lah pula akan terganggu segala perhubongan mereka yang berasaskan surat perjanjian atau apa jua kesanggupan dengan kumpolan? atau persatuan? yang lain. Dan lagi bebas-lah mereka mengundi mengikut suka hati mereka sendiri di-Pertubohan Bangsa? Bersatu. 3. Tujuan? pertubohan yang di-chita? ini ia-lah menggalakkan perhubongan rapat di-antara negeri? di-Tenggara Asia, dengan mengadakan perbinchangan bersama dan mengambil persetujuan yang bebas. Dengan chara ini, di-harap tiap? negeri_ akan dapat memahami dengan lebeh mendalam lagi hal negeri? yang lain. Juga pertubohan ini bertujuan hendak menyelideki chara? tolong menolong di-antara satu negeri dengan lain terutama di-lapangan iktisad, kemusharakatan, kebudayaan dan sains. 4. Saya perchaya banyak faedah? yang besar yang akan dapat kita nikmati hasil daripada tertuboh-nya pertubohan yang saperti ini. 5. Yang Mulia sedia ma‘alom, oleh kerana beberapa sebab dalam sejarah kita maka perkembangan kebudayaan dan iktisad kebanyakan negeri? di-Tenggara Asia dalam kurun ini telah dipengarohi oleh perhubongan yang mengikat-nya dengan negeri* di-luar kawasan ini. Dengan kerana ini, terbantut-lah segala perasaan hidup bersama di-Tenggara Asia, yang sama mempunyai pusaka kebudayaan yang kaya. Di-sebabkan oleh kejadian? sejarah, maka kita telah selalu sangat mengharapkan pertolongan dan chontoh dari luar—dan jarang sekali kita meninjau ka-dalam buat berdiri dengan tenaga dan hasil kita sendiri. 6. Pada hal Yang Mulia sendiri tahu bahawa Tenggara Asia ini kaya dengan hasil mahsul-nya sendiri, bukan sahaja di-lapangan kebudayaan dan sejarah, bahkan juga dari segi kebolehan maanusia, hasil bumi, ayer dan galian. Saya perchaya dengan === [PDF page 28] === 32 mempeiratkan lagi perhubongan di-antara kita maka kita akan dapat menggunakan kebolehan? dan hasil mahsul ini dengan lebeh tegas lagi buat faedah bersama, serta memperkayakan negeri kita sendiri dengan bekerjasama dalam berbagai chara. 7. Juga dalam perhubongan luar negeri, saya perchaya dengan terdiri-nya satu pertubohan di-antara negeri? di-Tenggara Asia maka dapat-lah kita mengemukakan pendapat kita kapada Dunia dengan lebeh tegas lagi, terutama dalam lapangan iktisad antara bangsa, kerana banyak kepentingan? kita yang sama. Walau pun kita barangkali tidak dapat menchapai persetujuan yang penoh dan sarupa dalam satu? perkara, sa-kurang’-nya menerusi pertubohan ini dapat-lah kita memahami dengan lebeh dalam lagi sebab?-nya kita tidak menchapai satu persetujuan itu. 8. Pada pendapat saya, pertubohan yang di-hajatkan ini akan di-tubohkan menerusi satu Perundingan Tenggara Asia yang dihadhiri oleh Perdana Menteri? serta Ketua* Pemerentah negeri yang mungkin menjadi ahli?, atau pun di-hadhiri oleh Menteri* Hal Ehwal Luar Negeri sa-bagai wakil diri Perdana Menteri?. Pertubohan ini akan memberi keutamaan kapada soal iktisad, sains, kebudayaan, pelajaran dan kemusharakatan; soal? siasah boleh juga di-binchangkan kalau di-kehendaki dengan menerima persetujuan bersama, tetapi ini tidak pula akan menyinggong satu? pendirian negeri yang menjadi ahli* pertubohan ini. 9. Satu Jabatan Setia-Usaha yang kechil untok pertubohan ini akan di-dirikan buat menyelenggarakan Perundingan, melaksanakan chadangan?, dan menguruskan kerja kajian yang telah di-buat oleh kumpolan? jawatan-kuasa2 yang di-tubohkan oleh Perundingan. 10. Di-dalam beberapa bulan yang lalu saya telah mengambil kesempatan membinchangkan perkara ini bila sahaja saya berjumpa dengan pemimpin? yang bertanggong-jawab di-negeri? tetangga. Perbinchangan? ini telah menggalakkan saya buat mengambil satu keputusan bahawa soal pertubohan Negeri* di-Tenggara Asia ini menerima sokongan umum sa-kurang?-nya atas dasar-nya. Saya juga perchaya bahawa segala kesulitan? yang berkenaan dengan penegasan-nya akan dapat di-atasi kalau dapat kita uruskan satu meshuarat di-antara Ketua? kerajaan di-Tenggara Asia. 11. Saya chadangkan meshuarat ini di-adakan di-awal tahun hadapan, bulan February atau pun March mungkin sesuai. Tempat meshuarat-nya pula, pada rasa saya, elok-lah di-adakan di-satu tempat yang di-persetujui oleh ramai. Tetapi kalau Yang Mulia, dan ketua2 Pemerentah serta Perdana Menteri? lain sudi, saya sedia dan bersukachita menjemput Ketua? Pemerentah dan Perdana Menteri2 Kerajaan? yang bersangkutan, atau wakil* mereka, supaya datang ka-Kuala Lumpur menghadhiri meshuarat ini sabagai Tetamu Kerajaan Duli Yang Maha Mulia. 12. Oleh itu saya mengirim surat ini kapada Paduka Yang Mulia juga kapada President? Filipina serta Vietnam dan Perdana Menteri2 Burma, Cambodia, Laos dan Thailand buat bertanya kalau bersetuju menyokong chadangan ini. Kalau Yang Mulia bersetuju, satu Meshuarat di-antara Ketua? Pemerentah dan Perdana Menteri? kerajaan? di-Tenggara Asia boleh-lah di-uruskan 33 di-awal tahun hadapan. Di-situ nanti kita akan dapat membinchangkan soal mengadakan perundingan dan kerjasama yang lebeh rapat di-antara kerajaan* kita, dengan tujuan buat mendirikan satu pertubohan saperti yang tersebut di-atas tadi. 13. Di-dalam surat ini saya chuma mengemukakan dasar?-nya sahaja dengan sa-chara rengkas. Sudah tentu banyak lagi perkara? yang lain yang mesti di-putuskan, tetapi kalau dasar? Persatuan ini di-terima, pada rasa saya soal? lain itu boleh-lah di-putuskan dengan persetujuan bersama. Kalau Yang Mulia terima chadangan saya ini maka saya dengan sukachita akan menghantar sa-orang wakil istimewa ka-Djakarta sakira di-kahendaki buat membinchangkan perkara ini dengan Yang Mulia sendiri atau penasehat* Yang Mulia dengan lebeh lanjut lagi. 14. Sekian-lah sahaja saya ma‘alumkan dan saya berharap Paduka Yang Mulia sudi memberi perhatian kapada chadangan saya yang ikhlas ini bagi kepentingan bersama negara? kita. Saya berdoa’ kapada Ilahi agar Paduka Yang Mulia serta keluarga sekalian berada di-dalam kandongan sehat wal’afiat dan aman sentosa sa-lama?-nya. Wassalam. Dengan uchapan salam bahgia, Saya TunkKU ABDUL RAHMAN Putra AL Haj, Perdana Menteri, Persekutuan Tanah Melayu PaDUKA YANG MULIA, TUAN PRESIDEN SUKARNO, PANGLIMA TERTINGGI DAN PERDANA MENTERI, REPUBLIK INDONESIA. === [PDF page 29] === 34 APPENDIX [V INDONESIAN REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER REGARDING FORMATION OF ASA (Salinan) KEDUTAAN BESAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA, 174 Batu Roab, KuALa LUMPUR, Talpon: 88941 Jang Mulia, Surat Jang Mulia tertanggal 28 Oktober 1959 jang menjampaikan tjita-tjita dan maksud Jang Mulia untuk membentuk suatu badan kerdjasama antara negara-negara Asia-Tenggara telah saja terima dengan selamat. 2. Setelah mempeladjari isi surat itu dengan saksama, saja ingin mengemukakan pandangan saja agar dapat Jang Mulia djadikan bahan pertimbangan. Memang sudah selajaknja, bahkan seharusnya, djika negara-negara tetangga jang bersahabat mengadakan kerdjasama jang seerat-eratnja diberbagai lapangan jang dimungkinkan keadaan. Tetapi menurut hemat saja, suatu gabungan baru jang meliputi negara-negara di-Asia-Tenggara hanja akan menimbulkan prasangka dan mungkin sekali spekulasi jang bukan-bukan pada negara-negara lain, dan ini dapat merupakan rintangan dari keinginan kita untuk bekerdja-sama. 3. Oleh karena itu saja lebih tjondong agar tudjuan kerdjasama antara negara-negara Asia-Tenggara itu dilaksanakan melalui perdjandjian-perdjandjian dan persetudjuan-persetudjuan bilateral diberbagai lapangan jang telah ada ataupun jang dapat diadakan. 4. Menurut pendapat saja akan lebih besar hasilnja djika kita memusatkan usaha kita untuk memberi isi jang tegas dan njata kepada perdjandjian-perdjandjian dan persetudjuan-persetudjuan bilateral jang telah ada dan dimana perlu mengadakan perdjandjian-perdjandjian dan persetudjuan-persetudjuan bilateral baru. 5. Djika hendak mengadakan kerdja-sama dalam lingkungan jang luas maka saja lebih melihat pelaksanaannja dalam hubungan Asia-Afrika jang luas, sesuai dengan hasil-hasil Konperensi Asia- Afrika jang diadakan di Bandung pada tahun 1955. Lingkungan Asia-Afrika tadi sudah di terima oleh seluroh dunia sebagai kenjataan. 6. Sungguhpun demikian, saja tetap mengikuti usaha-usaha Jang Mulia dengan penuh minat. Semoga pandangan-pandangan saja diatas dapat Jang Mulia gunakan sebagai bahan tambahan dalam melaksanakan udjud Kerdja-sama antara negara-negara Asia- Tenggara. 7. Achirnja, Jang Mulia, sambutlah salam saja diiringi do’a semoga Tuhan Jang Maha Esa tetap melindungi Jang Mulia serta seluruh keluarga. Wassalam, SUKARNO, Presiden/Perdana Menteri, Republik Indonesia JANG MULIA, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PuTrRA AL-HAgJ, PERDANA MENTERI, PERSEKUTUAN TANAH MELAYU. Jang mengambil turuna, (Zoebir) 35 APPENDIX V PROPOSAL FOR EXTRADICTION TREATY DJAKARTA, 28 Djanuari, 1960 Jang Mulia Dr Ismail, Pertemuan kita beberapa waktu jang lampau_ ketika Konperensi Kolombo sungguh sangat berguna oleh karena dengan begitu kita dapat menanam dasar-dasar saling pengertian tentang masalah-masalah jang dihadapi oleh kedua negara kita. Dalam masa pertumbuhan dan masa peralihan usaha merobah susunan masjarakat kolonial menjadi dasar-dasar penghidupan nasional merupakan salah sesuatu kegiatan pokok dari Pemerintah dan Bangsa Malaya dan Indonesia. Kita semua sadar, bahwa proklamasi kemerdekaan dan penobatan Pemerintah_nasional hanja merupakan langkah pertama sadja dari tjita-tjita suatu bangsa jang merdeka dan berdaulat. 2. Dalam hal ini kita mengakui, bahwa kadang-kadang kita menempuh djalan jang berbeda untuk mentjapai tudjuan jang sama, djustru oleh karena sifat warisan politis, warisan ekonomis atau warisan militer dari pemerintah kolonial dimasing-masing negara kita djuga berbeda. 3. Antara Indonesia dan Malaya setjara konvensionil-diplomatis sebetulnja tidak ada persoalan-persoalan jang menghalangi pertumbuhan ppersahabatan. Perdjandjian Persahabatan dan Kebudajaan jang baru-baru ini disetudjui oleh kedua belah fihak merupakan landasan kuat untuk memperkembangkan hubungan antara kedua Bangsa. 4. Sebagai warisan dari zaman jang lampau, maka hubungan antara kita diliputi oleh berbagai kegiatan-kegiatan illegal jang berlangsung antara pantai Indonesia dan pantai Malaya. Kegiatan illegal ini disamping mengandung unsur-unsur politis, ekonomis, djuga mengandung unsur persendjataan. Kami jakin bahwa Jang Mulia dengan Pemerintah dan Bangsa Malaya umumnja menindjau hubungan illegal ini sebagai suatu sumber dari kerusuhan atau kesulitan jang dapat mengganggu stabiliteit dari negara kita masing-masing. Atas dasar fikiran ini maka Pemerintah Indonesia sudah memadjukan usul untuk mengadakan Perdjandjian Penjerahan (Extradition) antara kedua negara kita. Perdjandjian demikian akan mengurangi niat warganegara masing-masing jang melanggar hukum nasional untuk melarikan diri keseberang laut Selat Malaka dan mentjari perlindungan dinegara jang lain. Memang djika keadaan sekarang ini kita biarkan bertumbuh dan membiarkan pelarian-pelarian dari satu negara mentjari suaka (asylum) dinegara jang lain, maka ini hanja memperkuat kedudukan unsur-unsur jang kurang baik dimasjarakat kita masing-masing. Tjontoh diberbagai negara Amerika Latin merupakan bukti jang tjukup, bahwa keadaan serupa itu tidak menambah kemadjuan kearah stabiliteit nasional. 5. Inilah sebabnja Pemerintah Indonesia meminta perhatian istimewa dari Pemerintah Malaya mengenai soal pelarian 30 orang kaum pemberontak ke Malaya baru-baru ini. Pemerintah Indonesia tidak hanja melihat dari sudut kegiatan 30 orang tadi jang mungkin pada waktu sekarang dengan mudah dapat kita === [PDF page 30] === 36 atasi, akan tetapi lebih-lebih bahwa proses demikian, djika kita benarkan atau biarkan, merupakan precedent bagi masa jang akan datang. Oleh karena djika anasir-anasir buruk atau golongan pemberontak dapat melarikan diri dari Indonesia ke Malaya, maka tentu bukan mustahil, bahwa pada suatu waktu anasiranasir buruk atau golongan pemberontak djuga dapat melarikan diri dari Malaya ke Indonesia. Dalam hal ini Pemerintah Indonesia ingin mentjapai pengertian setjara mendalam dengan Pemerintah Malaya untuk kepentingan kita bersama. Dengan tegas dapat kami kemukakan, bahwa kita tidak semata-mata memperdjoangkan kepentingan Indonesia dalam hal ini, akan tetapi djuga kepentingan Malaya tersangkut, dan seperti djuga telah disimpulkan oleh Perdjandjian Persahabatan dan Kebudajaan, kepentingan kedua negara kita, Indonesia dan Malaya, sangat terdjalin dan mempengaruhi satu sama lain. 6. Kami mengharap dapat menerima fikiran Jang Mulia dalam hal ini, dan djika dianggap perlu kami sendiri bersedia pergi ke Malaya untuk membitjarakan soal ini. Sebaliknja, djika Jang Mulia dan Njonja mempunjai kesempatan, kami dengan sangat ingin mengundang Jang Mulia dan Njonja untuk mengundjungi Indonesia. Kesempatan ini tidak hanja dapat kita pergunakan untuk membitjarakan hubungan antara Malaya dan Indonesia, akan tetapi lebih-lebih djuga dapat dipergunakan oleh Jang Mulia dan Njonja beserta rombongan untuk menindjau keadaan di Indonesia, untuk beristirahat dan mengenal alam dan rakjat Indonesia. Wassalam, Menteri Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia, Dr SUBANDRIO KEPADA JANG Mu tia Dr IsmaiL BIN Dato ABDUL RAHMAN, MENTERI Luar NEGERI, PERSEKUTUAN TANAH MELAyu, DI KUALA LUMPUR. 37 APPENDIX VI REPLY TO INDONESIAN PROPOSAL FOR EXTRADITION TREATY 28hb April, 1960. Yang Amat Berhormat Dr Subandrio, Berhubong dengan surat saya yang bertarikh 26 March, 1960, maka adalah di-ma‘alomkan dengan sukachita-nya bahawa Kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu bersetuju dengan chadangan Yang Amat Berhormat untok mengadakan satu Perjanjian Penyerahan (Extradition Agreement) di-antara Indonesia dengan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu. 2. Sabagai mana Yang Amat Berhormat sendiri ma‘alom bahawa satu chadangan buat mengadakan Perjanjian Penyerahan di-antara dua buah negeri sudah tentu mempunyai beberapa soal dan kesulitan yang tidak boleh tidak akan terbit pada waktu perundingan-nya kelak. Ini boleh jadi menimbul-kan perselisehan faham dan menggagal-kan ranchangan itu. 3. Maka pada hemat saya untok menjauhkan salah faham eloklah bagi kita antara dua pehak dengan perasaan muhibbah dan persaudaraan berterus terang menyatakan pendirian asasi masing? di-dalam hal ini. Kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu senantiasa sanggup bahawa sa-kira-nya ada apa jua usul? yang boleh memberi manafa‘at bersama Insha Allah chadangan? itu akan di-sambut dengan baik-nya. Sambil itu Kerajaan Persekutuan adalah berpatoh tegoh kapada dasar yang sudah di-tentukan dari segi hukum? dan amalan internasional, umpama-nya di-dalam hal perjanjian penyerahan maka soal penyerahan tidak akan timbul terhadap orang? yang di-da‘awa atau di-tuduh atau menjadi benduan kerana perkara? yang ber-unsur politik (Political crimes). Satu daripada tiang? asasi di-dalam perkara penyerahan ini ialah ada-nya hak satu? negara yang berdaulat buat memperkenan-kan suaka politik kapada mereka yang berkehendakkan-nya. 4. Oleh yang demikian maka saya sangat-lah bersukachita sakira-nya dapat penjelasan berkenaan dengan ayat di-dalam surat Yang Amat Berhormat: “Kegiatan illegal ini di-samping mengandung unsur? politis, ekonomis, djuga mengandung unsur persenjataan”. 5. Apabila di-terima penjalasan yang di-kehendaki itu kelak dan kita bersama berpuas hati bahawa amalan dan hukum internasional yang biasa senantiasa di-pertahankan maka boleh-lah kaki tangan atau pegawai kerajaan pehak masing? berrapat dan berrunding untok menchapai persetujuan yang lanjut. Pada satu peringkat yang di-tentukan di-dalam rundingan itu boleh-lah Yang Amat Berhormat dan saya bagi pehak kerajaan kita masing? mengambil bahagian baik di-Kuala Lumpur atau pun di-Jakarta supaya satu perjanjian penyerahan dapat di-laksanakan dengan sempurna-nya. 6. Berkenaan dengan tempat di-mana pegawai? ini akan berrunding saya menerima sahaja apa? chadangan dari Yang Amat Berhormat. 7. Dengan hormat-nya saya menguchapkan berbanyak terima kaseh di-atas kesudian Yang Amat Berhormat menjemput saya === [PDF page 31] === 38 dan isteri saya ka-Indonesia. Oleh kerana keuzuran isteri saya pada masa ini maka dengan dukachita-nya tidak-lah dapat kami buat semantara ini mengunjungi Indonesia. 8. Saya akhir-kan warkah ini dengan salam hormat kapada Yang Amat Berhormat dan Njonja dan berdoa moga? keluarga semuanya di-dalam kandongan sehat wal-afiat ada-nya. Yang benar, Dato’ Dr ISMAIL BIN DATO’ ABDUL RAHMAN, Menteri Hal Ehwal Luar Negeri, Persekutuan Tanah Melayu YANG AMAT BERHORMAT DR SUBANDRIO, MENTERI LUAR NEGERI, REPUBLIC INDONESIA. 39 APPENDIX VII PRIME MINISTER’S OFFER TO MEDIATE IN WEST IRIAN ISSUE 20hb September, 1960. Yang Mulia Tuan Presiden, Saya sasunggoh-nya bersukachita mendengarkan kesudian Yang Mulia Tuan bertemu dengan Inche Senu di-hari Ahad I1 September yang lalu. Saya sangat menerima kaseh di-atas uchapan selamat daripada Tuan yang di-sampaikan oleh Inche Senu. 2. Sa-benar-nya bila saya menyuroh Inche Senu berjumpa dengan Yang Mulia Tuan tentang soal Irian Barat yang rumit ini, saya berharap mungkin dapat saya memberi sadikit sa-banyak sumbangan buat menchapai satu penyelesaian yang memuaskan. Pada fikiran saya sangat-lah mustahak-nya di-hapuskan puncha perselisehan antara Indonesia dan Belanda ini. Maka sangat-lah mustahak-nya penyelesaian di-adakan untok keamanan dunia, lebeh? lagi buat ketenteraman Tenggara Asia bagi kepentingan kita bersama. 3. Sa-masa saya di-Hague di-awal tahun ini, Kerajaan Belanda telah menyatakan yang mereka sedia menyerahkan penguasaan mereka atas Irian Barat kapada amanah (trusteeship) Bangsa? Bersatu. Mengikut kata? dari pehak Belanda, Jabatan Setiausaha Agong Bangsa? Bersatu tidak berapa suka memikul tanggong jawab yang berat di-atas Irian Barat. 4. Saya sedar tentang kerumitan? yang berkaitan dengan soal amanah ini, terutama sa-kali tentang pendirian bahawa Irian Barat ia-lah sa-bahagian daripada negara Indonesia. Tetapi perlu saya nyatakan di-sini bahawa hajat saya ia-lah untok menchapai mutlamat yang di-harapkan. Mengikut keadaan sekarang ini nampak-nya kita kena bergerak sa-langkah demi sa-langkah buat menchapai mutlamat itu. 5. Mengikut perchakapan? saya dengan pehak Belanda, mereka menerangkan bahawa mereka tidak sekali? bersetuju menyerahkan kuasa atau pun kedaulatan atau apa pun sebutan yang di-gunakan, atas Irian Barat terus kapada Indonesia; tetapi nampak-nya mereka tidak akan membantah penyerahan Irian Barat kapada Pertubohan Bangsa? Bersatu. Apabila Irian Barat telah di-serahkan kapada Bangsa? Bersatu, pehak Belanda tidak lagi ada kena mengena-nya dengan apa? langkah yang harus di-ambil oleh Bangsa? Bersatu berkenaan dengan daerah ini. Penyerahan Irian Barat kapada Majlis Amanah boleh di-tetapkan dengan sharat bahawa daerah ini akan di-serahkan kapada Indonesia sa-sudah satu tempoh amanah yang di-persetujukan oleh ahli? Bangsa? Bersatu. Saya perchaya bahawa Bangsa? Bersatu akan menerima sharat ini. 6. Dengan rengkas-nya saya nyatakan buah fikiran saya saperti berikut: (i) Kerajaan Belanda hendak-lah bersetuju menyerahkan Irian Barat kapada Bangsa? Bersatu sa-bagai sa-buah daerah amanah. (ii) Bangsa? Bersatu hendak-lah menerima daerah ini sa-bagai sa-buah daerah amanah dan di-tadbirkan mengikut chara sistem amanah. === [PDF page 32] === 40 (iii) Amanah itu hendak-lah mengandongi satu sharat bahawa Irian Barat akhir-nya akan di-serah kapada Indonesia dengan saberapa segera-nya menurut tempoh yang ditentukan oleh Majlis Amanah. (iv) Daerah ini akan di-tadbirkan oleh Pertubohan Bangsa? Bersatu atau pun beberapa negeri yang di-tugaskan untok mentadbirkan-nya. 7. Inche Senu telah menerangkan kapada saya pandangan Tuan tentang hal ini saperti berikut: (i) Indonesia tidak akan membantah pelaksanaan penyerahan pentadbiran Irian Barat kapada Republik Indonesia menerusi Bangsa* Bersatu. (ii) Penyerahan akan di-laksanakan dengan tidak boleh diubah? lagi dan dengan tiada bersharat. (ili) Sa-lepas sahaja penyerahan kuasa daripada Belanda kapada Bangsa? Bersatu, Bangsa? Bersatu akan mengambil segala langkah dengan segera untok menyerahkan kuasa itu kapada Republik Indonesia. (iv) Untok melaksanakan penyerahan kuasa atas Irian Barat daripada Bangsa? Bersatu kapada Republik Indonesia dengan lanchar dan segera maka Bangsa? Bersatu akan melantek satu Surohanjaya Jasa Baik yang mengandongi beberapa ahli? Bangsa? Bersatu. Surohanjaya ini juga perlu untok menghindarkan perhubongan chara terus antara Indonesia dan Belanda. (v) Penyerahan kuasa atas Irian Barat ini, daripada Bangsa? Bersatu kapada Republik Indonesia, mesti-lah di-sudahkan dengan sa-berapa segera yang boleh, dalam tempoh satu tahun. (vi) Dalam penyerahan kuasa atas Irian Barat daripada Belanda kapada Bangsa? Bersatu, juga daripada Bangsa? Bersatu kapada Republik Indonesia, kepentingan? pendudok? Irian Barat buat perkembangan siasah dan iktisad mereka mesti-lah di-beri perhatian penoh. 8. Saya telah memikirkan perkara ini dengan teliti dari segala segi, dan saya berpendapat bahawa banyak kerumitan yang akan berbangkit sabagai hasil daripada chadangan bahawa penyerahan kuasa hendak-lah di-buat menerusi Bangsa? Bersatu yang dilaksanakan oleh sabuah Surohanjaya Jasa Baik. Pada taksir saya kalau kita kemukakan chadangan Tuan itu harus susah kita mendapat sokongan yang chukop di-Bangsa* Bersatu kelak kerana luar biasa pada Pertubohan Bangsa? Bersatu melantik satu perkakas salain daripada yang tersedia di-dalam sistem amanah untuk menguruskan hal yang sa-umpama ini. Dan lagi barangkali sukar bagi memujok Belanda menyerahkan daerah yang berkenaan itu kapada Pertubohan Bangsa? Bersatu melainkan melalui sistem amanah. 9. Dengan ikhlas-nya saya berharap agar sudi Yang Mulia Tuan menimbangkan semula chadangan saya ini. Sunggoh pun samentara ini saya tidak dapat memberi janji yang tepat tentang kejayaan chadangan itu tetapi, sa-kira-nya Tuan bersetuju Inshaallah tidak-lah bagitu sukar-nya bagi saya untok menchari peluang bagi menyelesaikan soal ini. 41 10. Saya akan berangkat ka-America Sharikat pada 14hb October, 1960, dan besar-lah hati saya sekira-nya menerima jawapan tuan sabelum itu supaya dapat saya mengambil tindakan di-atas hal ini dengan negara? yang berkenaan. 11. Saya sudahi surat ini dengan uchapan salam hormat kapada Yang Mulia Tuan Presiden. TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA YANG TERUTAMA Dr AHMED SUKARNO, ISTANA PRESIDEN, DJAKARTA, INDONESIA. === [PDF page 33] === 42 APPENDIX VIII INDONESIA’S ACCEPTANCE OF PRIME MINISTER’S OFFER TO MEDIATE IN WEST IRIAN ISSUE PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA DJAKARTA, 28 September, 1960 Jang Mulia Tunku Perdana Menteri. Dengan penuh penghargaan serta rasa terima kasih, Paduka Jang Mulia Presiden Sukarno telah menerima surat Jang Mulia jang dibawa oleh Saudara Mohamad Razif. Paduka Jang Mulia Presiden Sukarno menjesal bahwa beliau tidak berkesempatan lagi untuk membalas sendiri surat Jang Mulia itu karena kesibukan beliau dalam mempersiapkan segala sesuatu bagi kundjungan beliau ke Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa. Akan tetapi Paduka Jang Mulia Presiden Sukarno telah memberikan perhatian setjukupnja atas surat Jang Mulia dan setelah membitjarakan isinja dengan saja, beliau minta kepada saja selaku Pedjabat Presiden untuk membalas surat Jang Mulia itu atas nama beliau. 2. Sebagaimana Jang Mulia telah mengetahuinja, perdjoangan mengembalikan Irian Barat kedalam wilajah kekuasaan Republik Indonesia, adalah perdjoangan nasional jang selama sepulah tahun lebih ini diselenggarakan terus menerus oleh Pemerintah dan iar Indonesia dengan semangat jang tidak pernah kundjung padam. 3. Pemerintah dan rakjat Indonesia sangat menghargai sokongan jang selalu diberikan oleh Pemerintah dan rakjat Malaya dalam perdjoangan ini dan kini chususnja ingin saja menjampaikan penghargaan saja atas perhatian Jang Mulia pribadi dalam turut mentjarikan djalan penjelesaian soal Irian Barat ini. 4. Setalah mempeladjari surat Jang Mulia dengan seksama, maka saja memang dapat melihat bahwa dengan sjarat-sjarat tertentu saran saran Jang Mulia dalam surat itu mengandung kemungkinankemungkinan jang dapat dipergunakan. 5. Perlu saja kemukakan terlebih dahulu, bahwa dalam soal Irian Barat ini, dasar-dasar fikiran Pemerintah Republik Indonesia adalah sebagai berikut: 1. Sesungguhnja wilajah Irian Barat itu adalah bagian integral dari wilajah kedaulatan Republik Indonesia; 2. Penjerahan wilajah ini kepada Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa sebagai daerah perwalian akan bertentangan dengan dasar fikiran tersebut diatas dan akan berarti bahwa Indonesia melepaskan hak kedaulatan atas sebagian wilajahnja, dan oleh karenanja sukar sekali untuk diterima oleh rakjat Indonesia; Sepandjang pengetahuan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, daerah perwalian jang masih ada pada waktu ini adalah merupakan warisan dari keadaan sebelum perang dunia kedua, dan sedjak itu tidak ada lagi pembentukan daerah perwalian baru; 43 Bistim daerah perwalian ini pada masa sekarang merupakan sesuatu jang masih mengandung unsur-unsur kolonialisme jang pada waktu sekarang tidak sadja ditentang, bahkan diperdjoangkan penghapusannja oleh tiga perempat dari seluruh umat manusia didunia ini. Dengan kenjataan-kenjataan tersebut diatas djelas pula kiranja, bahwa mendjadikan Irian Barat ini sebagai daerah perwalian baru dizaman sekarang akan merupakan suatu anachronism dan tidak sesuai lagi dengan derasnja perdjoangan bangsa-bangsa diseluruh benua Asia-Afrika untuk mentjapai kemerdekaan nasionalnja. 6. Dalam rangka fikiran tersebut diatas Pemerintah Republik Indonesia sebetulnja mau mentjari suatu penjelesaian masalah Irian Barat tanpa melewati sistim perwalian. 7. Saja memang sependapat dengan Jang Mulia bahwa jang penting adalah tertjapainja tudjuan pokok dari penjelesaian soal Irian Barat ini, jaitu supaja dalam waktu jang_ sesingkatsingkatnja Irian Barat itu dapat dikembalikan kedalam wilajah kekuasaan Republik Indonesia. 8. Berhubung dengan itu dan atas dasar-dasar fikiran dan pendirian jang telah saja kemukakan diatas, maka: 1. Pertama-tama harus diusahakan diperolehnja kepastian tentang adanja kesediaan jang njata dari Pemerintah Belanda untuk menjerahkan Irian Barat kepada Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa: Pada saat Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa menerima Irian Barat itu dari Pemerintah Belanda, harus sudah ditetapkan pula djaminan-djaminan jang njata, bahwa penerimaan itu bertudjuan untuk menjerahkan Irian Barat langsung kepada Republik Indonesia tanpa sjarat dan dengan tidak dapat diganggu-gugat lagi; Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa kemudian segera membentuk suatu komisi chusus jang misalnja dapat dinamakan “United Nations Commission for Irian Barat” (UNCIB) jang bertugas mempersiapkan penjerahan Irian Barat kepada Republik Indonesia jang telah terdjamin itu dalam waktu jang sesingkat-singkatnja dan tidak melebihi waktu satu tahun. 9. Andaikata pada Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa, berhubung dengan ketentuan-ketentuan jang berlaku sekarang dalam organisasi itu sendiri tidak ada prosedure lain untuk mentjapai tudjuan tersebut diatas, dari pada melewati suatu Perwalian, maka perlu diselidiki apakah tidak dapat diperdjoangkan untuk menjebut masa peralihan satu tahun itu, sebagai masa perwalian (“trustperiod”) jang bertudjuan menjelenggarakan penjerahan kekuasaan de facto atas Irian Barat dari Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa kepada Republik Indonesia setjara seksama. Dengan demikian maka Irian Barat tidak mendjadi daerah perwalian (“trust-territory”), tetapi tetap sebagai wilajah kedaulatan Republik Indonesia, dimana kepada UNCIB sebagai “Trustee” dari Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa dipertjajakan suatu tugas untuk dalam tempo selama-lamanja satu tahun mempersiapkan perpindahan kekuasaan setjara_tertib (orderly transfer of authority) kepada Republik Indonesia. === [PDF page 34] === 44 10. Djikalau modus tersebut diatas tidak tertjapai, maka Pemerintah Republik Indonesia tidak berkeberatan menempuh djalan lewat trusteeship dengan ketentuan: 1. Trusteeship tersebut berlangsung selama-lamanja satu tahun; 2. Trusteeship tersebut bertudjuan satu-satunja: penjerahan kekuasaan atas Irian Barat kepada Republik Indonesia tanpa sjarat. 11. Sebagai alasan satu-satunja bagi Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa mengambil putusan ini ialah apa jang tertera dalam artikel 76, sub a, dari Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa, jang berbunji “to further international peace and security”. 12. Menurut pendapat saja, maka jang saja kemukakan kepada Jang Mulia ini, mendekati maksud Jang Mulia untuk mentjari sesuatu djalan lewat Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa menudju tertjapainia. maksud mengembalikan Irian Barat kewilajah_ kekuasaan Republik Indonesia, djalan mana masih dapat dipertanggung-djawabkan oleh Pemerintah Republik Indonesia kepada 90 djuta rakjat Indonesia dari Sabang sampai Merauke. 13. Achirulkalam sekali lagi saja menjatakan penghargaan saja kepada hasrat Jang Mulia untuk membantu menjelesaikan soal Irian Barat tersebut. Mudah-mudahan jang saja kemukakan diatas dapat dipertimbangkan oleh Jang Mulia, untuk didjadikan dasar bagi segala daja-upaja sehingga tertjapai maksud kita bersama. 14. Saja ingin menutup surat ini dengan salam dan hormat saja jang tulus ichlas kepada Jang Mulia Perdana Menteri. Pd. Presiden, Republik Indonesia, Tun Ir Hapsr DyUANDA KARTAWIDIJAJA JaNG MuLiaA TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA, PERDANA MENTERI PERSEKUTUAN TANAH MELAJU, DI KuALA LUMPUR 45 APPENDIX IX PRIME MINISTER’S REPORT ON HIS EFFORTS AT MEDIATING IN WEST IRIAN DISPUTE 3hb December, 1960. Yang Mulia Tuan Presiden, Dengan perasaan yang penoh penghormatan saya menyampaikan kapada Yang Mulia Tuan suatu laporan mengenai usaha usaha yang telah saya jalankan bagi menchapai suatu penyelesaian dalam soal Irian Barat yang rumit dan telah lama belum dapat di-selesaikan itu. Yang Mulia Tuan tentu maseh ingat lagi bahawa Tun Djuanda telah menulis surat kapada saya pada 28hb September, 1960, atas kehendak tuan, yang menyebut satu persatu-nya dasar fikiran Kerajaan Negeri Indonesia atas soal ini dan surat ini juga menyatakan bahawa Indonesia tidak ada galangan sa-kira-nya penyelesaian itu di-buat dengan pertolongan Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu menurut sharat-sharat yang tertentu. 2. Saya sentiasa ma‘alum akan sebab sebab yang menimbulkan bantahan kapada chara pemindahan kuasa melalui amanah (Trusteeship) Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu. Sunggoh pun bagitu saya berani meneruskan ikhtiar yang saperti ini apakala saya telah di-ma‘alumkan oleh Tun Djuanda bahawa Indonesia tidak akan menolak amanah Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu bagi Irian Barat itu, sa-benar-nya tuan telah bersetuju bahawa “satu jalan maseh dapat di-pertanggong jawabkan oleh Pemerentah Republik Indonesia kapada 90 juta ra‘ayat Indonesia dari Sabang sampai Merauke” menurut sharat sharat yang berikut: (a) Trusteeship tersebut berlangsong sa-lama?-nya satu tahun; (b) Trusteeship tersebut bertujuan satu satu-nya: penyerahan kekuasaan atas Irian Barat kapada Republik Indonesia tanpa sharat. e 3. Dengan mempunyai pengertian sa-bagaimana di-atas ini-lah saya telah berjumpa beberapa orang penganjor penganjor dunia yang telah mendengar chadangan itu dengan perasaan yang simpati tetapi tidak pula mereka memberi sebarang pendapat di-atas chadangan chadangan yang di-atas itu. Sa-benar-nya salah sa-orang daripada mereka telah memberi galakan kapada saya dengan berkata “Jika tuan sendiri meninjau fikiran Perdana Menteri atau Menteri Luar Negeri Belanda atas perkara itu tuan mungkin mendapat peluang untok mempengarohi jalan jalan atau chara penyelesaian itu dapat di-buat.” Dalam masa perundingan perundingan itu telah timbul satu fikiran bahawa sa-kira-nya Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu bersetuju dengan Trusteeship maka Australia atau pun Belanda di-jadikan salah satu pehak yang berkuasa bagi mentadbirkan kawasan itu. Saya telah menyatakan fikiran saya bahawa negara-negara Afro-Asia tidak akan bersetuju dengan chadangan yang saperti itu. 4. Sa-lepas daripada perjumpaan saya dengan Mr Hammarskjoeld di-New York pada 3hb November, 1960 dan hasil daripada perundingan saya dengan beliau, beliau telah bermurah hati memberi nasihat-nya kapada saya yang merupakan suatu penerangan tentang peratoran-peratoran berkaitan dengan Trusteeship itu. Setiausaha Agong itu telah menyatakan bahawa “Menurut Article 19 maka sharat-sharat perjanjian trusteeship itu hendak-lah di-luluskan oleh pehak yang berkuasa yang mentadbirkan negeri itu dan negeri-negeri yang ada perkaitan === [PDF page 35] === 46 yang rapat dengan-nya. Oleh sebab itu sa-barang perjanjian trusteeship yang mungkin di-hadapkan di-dalam Perhimpunan Agong berkait dengan Irian Barat kena-lah di-persetujukan oleh Kerajaan Belanda dan mungkin juga Kerajaan Indonesia ia-itu sa-buah negeri yang harus di-sifatkan sa-bagai sa-buah daripada Kerajaan Kerajaan yang berkaitan rapat dengan-nya.” 5. Setiausaha Agong itu menyatakan bahawa pada pendapat-nya Perjanjian Trusteeship itu akan berkehendakkan supaya di-tanya pendudok-pendudok negeri itu di-akhir suatu tempoh yang di-tentukan tentang sama ada mereka mahu menchapai kemerdekaan dengan sendiri sahaja atau pun bersekutu dengan Kerajaan negeri lain. Menurut Setiausaha Agong itu, sa-barang sharat yang di-masokkan di-dalam Perjanjian Trusteeship yang menentukan bahawa wilayah itu mesti di-serahkan kapada Indonesia yang berma‘ana menjadikan trusteeship itu suatu perjalanan sementara bagi pehak Kerajaan itu akan berlawanan dengan kandongan dan semangat Piagam Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu. 6. Sunggoh pun bagitu Setiausaha Agong itu telah mengatakan bahawa bergantong-lah sa-mata-mata kapada Kerajaan Belanda untok menyatakan kehendak-nya dalam perkara ini tetapi beliau juga telah melahirkan waham-nya sama ada Belanda akan bersetuju dengan sa-barang Perjanjian Trusteeship yang tidak memasokkan Kerajaan-nya sa-bagai salah satu daripada ditentang dengan sa-kuat kuat-nya oleh Indonesia. Sunggoh pun bagitu mungkin dapat di-pujok Belanda supaya melepaskan tuntutan ini jika sa-kira-nya tuntutan yang saperti itu boleh menghalangkan kemajuan dalam ikhtiar menchapai penyelesaian kapada perselisehan itu. 7. Saya sukachita memperhatikan penerangan Mr Hammarskjoeld atas Article yang berkenaan dalam Piagam Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu itu bahawa beliau tidak menyebutkan Kerajaan Belanda sa-bagai sa-buah Kerajaan yang berdaulat di-atas kawasan Irian Barat, tetapi sa-balek-nya beliau menyebutkan Kerajaan Belanda sa-bagai salah sa-buah Kerajaan Kerajaan yang berkaitan rapat dengan wilayah itu. Ini tentu-lah membuka satu harapan untok berlaku-nya satu pertukaran pehak yang berkuasa atas wilayah itu. 8. Saya telah pergi ka-negeri Belanda pada 25hb November, 1960. Di-sana saya telah menerangkan pandangan-pandangan saya dalam perkara ini kapada Belanda dan pada akhir perundingan itu satu kenyataan bersama telah di-keluarkan yang menyebutkan di-dalam-nya “Perdana Menteri Persekutuan Tanah Melayu telah mengambil pandangan dengan puas hati bahawa Kerajaan Belanda sanggup meletakkan policy-policy-nya di- Netherlands New Guinea kapada penelitian dan hukuman Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu.” 9. Dalam satu Persidangan Akhbar di-Hague saya telah menerangkan fahaman saya atas kenyataan bersama di-atas, ia-itu Belanda sekarang ini sanggup menyerahkan Irian Barat untok disiasat oleh Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu dan hukuman-nya kelak akan di-hormati oleh Kerajaan Belanda. Oleh kerana Persidangan Agong mesti bergantong kapada satu laporan untok membuat “hukuman-nya” di-atas kedudokan soal itu maka tidak ada jalan 47 lain untok-nya melainkan dengan menghantar suatu Surohanjaya ka-Irian Barat bagi membuat “penelitian” itu. Maka terpaksa-lah saya mendapat fikiran Indonesia tentang burok baik-nya chadangan itu sa-belum dapat di-beri persetujuan. Saya telah berkata jia-itu sa-kira-nya chara yang saperti ini di-terima oleh Indonesia maka harus-lah dapat di-minta India dan Ceylon menjadi anggota Surohanjaya ini dan jika mustahak Malaya. 10. Dalam perjalanan kami dari Hague ka-Lapangan Terbang Schiphol, Menteri Luar Belanda, Mr Luns, telah menerangkan kapada saya bahawa fahaman saya itu tidak-lah begitu tepat. Tujuan Kerajaan Belanda ia-lah menyerahkan policy-policy-nya di-Irian Barat pada “penelitian dan hukuman Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu.” Ini tentu-lah sakali berbeza daripada fahaman fahaman saya atas kenyataan itu. Saya telah fikirkan bahawa policy policy itu berma‘ana policy policy Irian Barat keselurohan-nya dan bukan-lah sa-takat yang mengenai dengan perkara perkara pentadbiran sahaja. 11. Oleh yang demikian supaya saya tidak di-tudoh hendak mengelirukan orang ramai saya telah memberi tahu kapada Pemberita Akhbar di-Schiphol apa yang di-maksudkan oleh Belanda dengan kenyataan yang tersebut. Maka saya tentu-lah merasa kesal dan tentu-lah saya tidak bersetuju dengan kenyataan ini sa-kira-nya maksud Kerajaan Belanda itu di-terangkan dengan jelas kapada saya. 12. Dalam masa perundingan perundingan saya dengan Kerajaan Belanda saya dapat mengagakkan bahawa mereka sekarang ini bersetuju hendak menyambong balek perundingan-perundingan dengan Kerajaan Indonesia atas soal Irian Barat yang telah terputus itu. Sekarang saya merasa yakin bahawa tidak-lah berguna lagi di-adakan perundingan perundingan yang saperti itu melainkan pehak-pehak yang berkenaan sanggup membuat pengorbanan supaya dapat terchapai suatu pengertian di-atas soal ini. Perkara ini telah lama benar berpanjangan dengan tidak ada sebarang tanda untok beroleh penyelesaian kerana perasaan benchi dan bermusohan telah sampai kapada tingkat yang boleh meletus kerana kedua-dua pehak tidak lagi ada perasaan bertolak ansur. 13. Mungkin dapat saya menjalankan usaha-usaha yang lebeh lanjut lagi untok menchapai penyelesaian itu dengan pertolongan daripada sa-tengah sa-tengah negeri yang telah mula sedar dan insaf akan soal Irian Barat. 14. Saya mesti mengaku bahawa saya telah terkejut oleh bantahan yang di-buat dengan chara berterang-terang oleh Dr Subandrio dengan tidak kena pada masa-nya ia-itu sa-belum daripada saya dapat peluang untok melaporkan kapada tuan. Perbuatan ini telah menyebabkan timbul-nya pandangan pandangan orang ramai yang burok terhadap diri saya terutama sa-kali di-Indonesia dan dengan itu mustahil-lah dapat saya meneruskan usaha saya dengan lebeh lanjut dalam perkara ini pada masa ini. 15. Saya suka menegaskan di-sini bahawa saya benar-benar faham sikap Indonesia atas Irian Barat. Tetapi saya berfikir bahawa sikap yang saperti itu yang telah di-pegang oleh Indonesia sa-lama beberapa tahun yang lepas telah tidak menghasilkan sebarang faedah dan suatu langkah yang baharu patut di-buat untok membuka jalan perundingan. === [PDF page 36] === 48 16. Dengan langkah yang baharu ini dan dengan ada sedikit pengorbanan dari kedua-dua belah pehak, maka mungkin-lah dapat kita meletakkan Irian Barat di-bawah Trusteeship Bangsa Bangsa Bersatu dengan tujuan yang tuan telah sebutkan di-dalam surat tuan. 17. Tentu-lah saya merasa kesal dan bimbang untok masa hadapan, dan merasa dukachita bahawa sekarang ini tidak-lah ada banyak peluang yang dapat saya buat untok memberi pertolongan. 18. Sa-bagai penutup-nya saya suka memberi akuan kapada Yang Mulia Tuan bahawa saya tidak mempunyai sabarang tujuan yang berselindong sa-lain daripada menawarkan diri saya dengan suchi hati sa-bagai sa-orang Islam dan kerana Allah bagi kebaikan semua. 19. Izinkan-lah saya menggunakan peluang ini untok menyampaikan uchapan salam hormat yang sa-tinggi-tinggi-nya kapada Yang Mulia Tuan Presiden. Tunku ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA YANG TERUTAMA DR AHMED SUKARNO, PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA, ISTANA PRESIDEN, DJAKARTA, INDONESIA. 49 APPENDIX X PRESIDENT SUKARNO’S REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER’S REPORT DJAKARTA, 14hb Desember, 1960 Qiang Mulia Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Saja mengutjapkan banjak terima kasih atas surat Jang Mulia tertanggal Desember, 1960, dan saja merasa sangat gembira, bahwa Jang Mulia telah selamat tiba kembali di Kuala Lumpur dalam keadaan sehat wal‘afiat dari perdjalanan untuk membantu penjelesaian soal Irian Barat. 2. Sekali lagi saja ingin menegaskan, bahwa kami sangat menghargai usaha-usaha Jang Mulia dalam membantu_pengembalian Irian Barat kedalam wilajah kekuasaan Republik Indonesia. 3. Dalam pertemuan permulaan dengan Duta Besar Enche’ Senu Abdul Rahman mengenai hal Irian Barat perasaan ini telah saja kemukakan, meskipun djuga saja tegaskan kepada beliau, bahwa saja sangat ragu-ragu terhadap sikap Belanda untuk dapat menjelesaikan soal Irian Barat, jang pada achirnja dalam waktu singkat harus kembali kedalam wilajah kekuasaan Republik Indonesia. Kami jang mengetahui sifat pitjik dari Belanda, harus mengambil kesimpulan, bahwa selama Tuan Luns mendjabat Menteri Luar Negeri, sukar dapat ditjapai persetudjuan dengan Belanda mengenai Irian Barat. Meskipun demikian kami mendoakan lahir dan bathin agar usaha Jang Mulia dapat berhasil. Dalam hal ini, Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, selama perdjalanan Jang Mulia keluar negeri, tidak mengeluarkan keterangan apapun sampai Jang Mulia tiba di Nederland, sambil menunggu keterangan Jang Mulia pada kami mengenai hasil dari usaha-usaha Jang Mulia itu. 4. Tentu Jang Mulia dapat maklum, bahwa tiap-tiap keterangan jang Jang Mulia berikan diluar negeri, diikuti oleh chalajak ramai di Indonesia dan tiap perkataan ditindjau setjara mendalam, chususnja dinilai, apakah Indonesia tidak bersikap kompromistis terhadap Belanda. Jang Mulia mengetahui, bahwa rakjat Indonesia setjara keseluruhannja mudah tersinggung perasaannja dalam masaalah Irian Barat. Apalagi djika keterangan tadi hanja merupakan sebahagian dari kebenaran-kebenaran jang dapat menimbulkan kesalah fahaman. 5. Meskipun Pemerintah Indonesia tidak menduga bahwa akan dikeluarkannja Joint-Communique antara Jang Mulia dengan Pemerintah Nederland, kami pada waktu itu tidak mengeluarkan sesuatu keterangan apapun, walaupun Joint-Communique itu sudah menimbulkan keragu-raguan dikalangan masjarakat Indonesia. Selandjutnja dikeluarkan lagi keterangan tambahan atas Joint-Communique sebagai berikut: 1. Keterangan Jang Mulia di Schiphol, bahwa menurut anggapan Pemerintah Nederland “scrutiny and judgement United Nations” tidak mengandung pernilaian mengenai kedaulatan Nederland atas Irian Barat. === [PDF page 37] === 50 Menteri Luns mengeluarkan keterangan, bahwa missi Persatuan Bangsa-Bangsa ke Irian Barat tidak bertugas untuk menjelidiki kedaulatan Nederland atas Irian Barat. Keterangan Jang Mulia di Cairo, bahwa Jang Mulia menganggap missi Jang Mulia gagal, karena sikap Belanda. 6. Jang Mulia dapat mengerti, bahwa Joint-Communique densa keterangan-keterangan tambahan tersebut akan menimbulka reaksi jang maha hebat di Indonesia, ditudjukan pada Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan pada Jang Mulia, djika tidak ada bantahan tegas dari Jang Mulia sendiri atau dari fihak kami. Maka dari itu, Menteri Luar Negeri Subandrio menganggap perlu, demi persahabatan antara bangsa Indonesia dengan bangsa Melaju, untuk mengeluarkan keterangan jang membantah keterangan Tuan Luns atas sikap Belanda jang menentang Indonesia. 7. Seperti Jang Mulia mengetahui, baik dalam pendjelasan saja, maupun dari surat Pedjabat Presiden Saudara Djuanda, rakjat Indonesia menganggap daerah Irian Barat, adalah wilajah Republik Indonesia dan sama sekali tidak menerima, bahwa Belanda mempunjai kedaulatan atas daerah tersebut. Atas dasar pertimbangan ini, maka rakjat Indonesia menganggap bahwa_ keterangan tambahan atas Joint-Communique, seolah olah Pemerintah Indonesia dipaksakan untuk mengakui kedaulatan Belanda atas Irian Barat. 8. Dari sikap Belanda ini, sudah njata dengan djelas, bahwa tidak dapat diharapkan adanja kemauan baik dari fihak Belanda untuk menjelesaikan soal Irian Barat. 9. Djika ada bantahan dari Jang Mulia sendiri terhadap keterangan-keterangan Tuan Luns, maka itu akan berarti, bahwa Joint-Communique tidak mengandung kekuatan apapun lagi, sedangkan djika seperti sekarang Jang Mulia tidak memberikan bantahan setjara resmi, maka rakjat Indonesia diberi kesan seolaholah kita membenarkan interpretasi Belanda itu. Untuk mendjaga interpretasi ini, maka Pemerintah melalui Menteri Luar Negeri Subandrio merasa perlu untuk memberi keterangan setjara tjepat dan tegas. Pula, ini untuk mendjaga agar kita tidak disalahkan oleh dunia asing, djika kelak kita tidak dapat menerima isi Joint- Communique serta missi Persatuan Bangsa-Bangsa ke Irian Barat sesuai dengan interpretasi Belanda. 10. Atas keterangan tersebut diatas kami mengharap Jang Mulia dapat menerima, bahwa reaksi kami sama sekali tidak ditudjukan kepada Jang Mulia pribadi atau kepada Pemerintah Persekutuan Tanah Melaju; sebaliknja keterangan kami dan reaksi rakjat Indonesia ditudjukan pada Pemerintah Nederland, selain untuk mendjaga supaja perasaan persahabatan antara rakjat Indonesia dan rakjat Persekutuan Tanah Melaju tidak terganggu. 11. Saja kira, meskipun usaha Jang Mulia belum mendapat hasil seperti jang diharapkan, oleh karena sikap sempit dari Belanda, namun kami pertjaja bahwa usaha Jang Mulia tentu sudah menanam kesan diseluruh dunia tentang kehangatan persoalan Irian Barat, jang segera meminta penjelesaian. 51 12. Untuk ini kami sekali lagi atas nama Pemerintah dan rakjat Indonesia mengutjapkan diperbanjak terima kasih atas segala usaha dari Jang Mulia. SOEKARNO, Presiden Republik Indonesia APADA JANG MULIA TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA, PERDANA MENTERI PERSEKUTUAN TANAH MELAJU, DI KUALA LUMPUR === [PDF page 38] === 52 APPENDIX XI RESOLUTION OF PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA—DECEMBER, 1961 During discussions between their representatives in London, the Malayan Government and the British Government have reached agreement on the establishment of a Federation of Malaysia which will be composed of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Bruncig®yeand North Borneo. 2. It is stipulated that, when the Federation will have been set up, the Malaysian Government will grant the United Kingdom the right to continue to use its war bases in Singapore to “assist in the defence” of Malaysia, for the “defence interests of the British Commonwealth” and for the “preservation of peace” in South East Asia. 3. The establishment of the Malaysian Federation will not obstruct Britain in the pursuance of its “international responsibilities”, its “responsibilities” towards the British Commonwealth. Britain’s so-called “international responsibilities” in South East Asia are basically the responsibilities it bears as a member of SEATO. Should British troops be required for a SEATO operation, these troops could be sent from Singapore. This means that the Federation of Malaysia will be smuggled into SEATO. 4. From their own experiences, the Indonesian people know only too well the meaning of the words “preservation of peace in South East Asia”, the meaning of the words “international responsibilities”, the word “responsibilities” towards the Commonwealth and other such words used by the imperialists. Colonial practices, acts of intervention and aggression by the imperialists in South Vietnam, Laos, the Congo, as well as the plans for the landing of U.S. troops in Pakan Baru (Sumatra) which were foiled by Indonesia, and the occupation of West Irian, etc., speak clearly of this. 5. The British colonialists have a great interest in the existence of such a Federation because their position in Singapore is becoming weaker and weaker with the growth of the democratic movement and the influence of patriotic political parties, whereas in Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo, people’s organisations are raising the demand for independence. 6. The British colonialists are no longer able to continue with colonialism in the old form, that is, with the open restoration of their colonial regime. 7. By unifying their colonies in Kalimantan (Borneo) with Malaya, the military agreement in force between Malaya and Britain will safeguard Britain’s position in these colonies, especially now that Malaya and Britain have agreed that this military agreement must be extended to include Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. 8. It is evident that the Federation of Malaysia which is to be set up is but a form of neo-colonialism. By establishing this Federation, the British colomialists intend to utilise native hands, particularly those of the Prime Minister of this Federation of Malaysia, to suppress the democratic and patriotic movements of the peoples in these five countries which aim at the attainment of genuine national independence and freedom from imperialism. 33 The main point is that the British colonialists no longer dare to beat the people’s movement with their own hands and they therefore borrow native hands for this. This is why the efforts towards the formation of this Federation—an unacceptable colonial intrigue—meets with resistance of all democratic and progressive forces in Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. -@ 9. The Federation of Malaysia will strengthen the position of the imperialists in South East Asia in implementing their SEATO activities which are also aimed against Indonesia, a country that does not like SEATO and that wages a resolute struggle against imperialism and colonialism. 10. The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia which was held in Djakarta during the last days of December 1961 calls upon the Indonesian people and Government to heighten national vigilance against the imperialists, especially in face of the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the formation of a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of our country. 11. The Indonesian people will certainly support the righteous, patriotic and just resistance of the people of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo against the efforts for the establishment of this Federation of Malaysia. === [PDF page 39] === 54 APPENDIX XII JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER TOKYO MEETING The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr Sukarno, and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, having agreed that there was need for them to meet and clarify matters regarding problems arising from the proposal for the formation of Malaysia, held discussions on 31 May and 1 June, 1963 in Tokyo. Their amicable and frank exchange of views over the two days has achieved this purpose. 2, The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their faith in the Treaty of Friendship between Indonesia and Malaya concluded in 1959 and agreed that any outstanding differences on matters directly and exclusively affecting them the two countries should seek to settle them in a spirit of neighbourliness and goodwill through every available channel as envisaged in the Treaty of Friendship. 3. The two Heads of Governments recognising the desirability of restoring and maintaining friendly relation and historical ties which have bound the two countries, decided that their respective Governments would take every possible measure to refrain from making acrimonious attacks on and disparaging references to each other. 4. The President and the Prime Minister have also cleared the way for a meeting of Ministers to be held on 7 June in Manila amongst Indonesia, Philippines and Malaya which they hoped would lead to a meeting of Heads of Governments of the three countries. They would strive towards the achievement of a closer understanding between the three countries in matters of common concern and mutual interest. 5. The President and the Prime Minister wish to thank the Prime Minister and the Government of Japan for their kind hospitality, in particular the Foreign Minister of Japan who so generously made available his house for the purpose of this historical and eventful occasion. Ist June, 1962. 55 APPENDIX XIII TRIPARTITE SUMMIT MEETING—MANILA DECLARATION The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, assembled in a Summit Conference in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963, following the Meeting of their Foreign Ministers held in Manila from June 7 to 11, 1963: Conscious of the historic significance of their coming together for the first time as leaders of sovereign States that have emerged after long struggles from colonial status to independence; Desiring to achieve better understanding and closer cooperation in their endeavour to chart their common future; Inspired also by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955; Convinced that their countries, which are bound together by close historical ties of race and culture, share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and their region in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples; and Determined to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and their neighbors in a world dedicated to freedom and justice; DO HEREBY DECLARE: First, that they reaffirm their adherence to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enunciated in the United Nations Charter and the Bandung Declaration; Second, that they are determined, in the common interest of their countries, to maintain fraternal relations, to strengthen cooperation among their peoples in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote economic progress and social well-being in the region, and to put an end to the exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another; Third, that the three nations shall combine their efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations and for the eradication of the vestiges thereof in the region in particular and the world in general; Fourth, that the three nations, as new emerging forces in the region, shall cooperate in building a new and better world based on national freedom, social justice and lasting peace; and === [PDF page 40] === 56 Fifth, that in the context of the joint endeavours of the three nations to achieve the foregoing objectives, they have agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo. MANILA, August 5, 1963. SOEKARNO, President of the Republic of Indonesia DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, President of the Philippines Tunku ABDUL RAHMAN PuTRA AL-Haj, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya 57 APPENDIX XIV TRIPARTITE SUMMIT MEETING—MANILA ACCORD The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines, prompted by their keen and common desire to have a general exchange of views on current problems concerning stability, security, economic development and social progress of the three countries and of the region and upon the initiative of President Diosdado Macapagal, agreed that a Conference of Ministers of the three countries be held in Manila on 7th June, 1963, for the purpose of achieving common understanding and close fraternal cooperation among themselves. Accordingly, Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya; Dr Subandrio, Deputy First Minister/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia; and Honourable Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, met in Manila from 7 to 11 June, 1963. 2. The deliberations were held in a frank manner and in a most cordial atmosphere in keeping with the spirit of friendship prevailing in the various meetings held between President Soekarno of the Republic of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra of the Federation of Malaya, and President Diosdado Macapagal. This Ministerial Conference was a manifestation of the determination of the nations in this region to achieve closer cooperation in the endeavour to chart their common future. 3. The Ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities, and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and of their region, in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples. 4. In the same spirit of common and constructive endeavour, they exchanged views on the proposed Confederation of nations of Malay origin, the proposed Federation of Malaysia, the Philippine claim to North Borneo and related problems. THE MACAPAGAL PLAN 5. Recognising that it is in the common interest of their countries to maintain fraternal relations and to strengthen cooperation among their peoples who are bound together by ties of race and culture, the three Ministers agreed to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and for their neighbours. 6. In this context, the three Ministers supported President Macapagal’s plan envisaging the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty. This calls for the establishment of the necessary common organs. 7. The three Ministers agreed to take the initial steps towards this ultimate aim by establishing machinery for frequent and regular consultations. The details of such machinery will be further defined. === [PDF page 41] === 58 This machinery will enable the three governments to hold regular consultations at all levels to deal with matters of mutual interest and concern consistent with the national, regional and international responsibilities or obligations of each country without prejudice to its sovereignty and independence. The Ministers agreed that their countries will endeavour to achieve close understanding and cooperation in dealing with common problems relating to security, stability, economic, social and cultural development. 8. In order to accelerate the process of growth towards the ultimate establishment of President Macapagal’s plan, the Ministers agreed that each country shall set up its own National Secretariat. Pending the establishment of a Central Secretariat for the consultative machinery, the National Secretaries should coordinate and cooperate with each other in the fulfilment of their tasks. 9. The Ministers further agreed to recommend that Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meet at least once a year for the purpose of consultations on matters of importance and common concern. MALAYSIA AND NORTH BORNEO 10. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries’ adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of non-self-governing territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative. 11. The Federation of Malaya expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines and undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of the Borneo territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of those territories. 12. The Philippines made it clear that its position on the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia is subject to the final outcome of the Philippine claim to North Borneo. The Ministers took note of the Philippine claim and the right of the Philippines to continue to pursue it in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes. They agreed that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. Moreover, in the context of their close association, the three countries agreed to exert their best endeavours to bring the claim to a just and expeditious solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration. 13. In particular, considering the close historical ties between the peoples of the Philippines and North Borneo as well as their geographical propinquity, the Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia the Government of the latter and the Government of the Philippines 59 should maintain and promote the harmony and the friendly relations subsisting in their region to ensure the security and stability of the area. MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT 14. The Ministers agreed to recommend that a Meeting of their respective Heads of Government be held in Manila not later than the end of July 1963. 15. The Ministers expressed satisfaction over the atmosphere of brotherliness and cordiality which pervaded their Meeting and considered it as a confirmation of their close fraternal ties and as a happy augury for the success of future consultations among their leaders. 16. The Ministers agreed to place on record their profound appreciation of and gratitude for the statemanlike efforts of President Macapagal whose courage, vision and inspiration not only facilitated the holding of this historic Meeting but also contributed towards the achievement for the first time of a unity of purpose and a sense of common dedication among the peoples of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. Approved and Accepted, MANILA. July 31, 1963 SOEKARNO, President of the Republic of Indonesia DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, President of the Philippines Tunku ABDUL RAHMAN PuTRA AL-HAJ, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya === [PDF page 42] === 60 APPENDIX XV TRIPARTITE SUMMIT MEETING—JOINT STATEMENT The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines, and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya met at a summit conference in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963. 1. Moved by a sincere desire to solve their common problems in an atmosphere of fraternal understanding, they considered, approved and accepted the report and recommendations of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries adopted in Manila on June 11, 1963 (hereafter to be known as the Manila Accord). 2. In order to provide guiding principles for the implementation of the Manila accord the Heads of Government have issued a declaration known as the Manila declaration, embodying the common aspirations and objectives of the peoples and governments of the three countries. 3. As a result of the consultations amongst the three heads of Government in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Manila declaration, they have resolved various current problems of common concern., 4. Pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Manila accord the United Nations Secretary-General or his representative should ascertain prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (15), principle 9 of the annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in principle 9, taking into consideration: (D the recent elections in Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak but nevertheless further examining, verifying and satisfying himself as to whether (a) Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue; (b) Electoral registers were properly compiled; (c) Elections were free and there was no coercion; and (d) Votes were properly polled and properly counted; and (II) the wishes of those who, being qualified to vote, would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had it not been for their detention for political activities, imprisonment for political offences or absence from Sabah (North Borneo) or Sarawak. 5. The Secretary-General will be requested to send working teams to carry out the task set out in paragraph 4. 6. The Federation of Malaya, having undertaken to consult the British Government and the Governments of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak under paragraph 11 of the Manila accord on behalf 61 of the three Heads of Government, further undertake to request them to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to extend to him the necessary facilities so as to enable him to carry out his task as set out in paragraph 4. 7. In the interest of the countries concerned, the three Heads of Government deem it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the working teams and the Federation of Malaya will use its best endeavours to obtain the co-operation of the British Government and the Governments of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak in furtherance of this purpose. 8. In accordance with paragraph 12 of the Manila accord, the three Heads of Government decided to request the British Government to agree to seek a just and expeditious solution to the dispute between the British Government and the Philippine Government concerning Sabah (North Borneo) by means of negotiation, conciliation and arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. The three Heads of Government take cognizance of the position regarding the Philippine claim to Sabah (North Borneo) after the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia as provided under paragraph 12 of the Manila accord, that is, that the inclusion of Sabah (North Borneo) in the Federation of Malaysia does not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. 9. Pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Manila accord and the fifth principle of the Manila declaration, that is, that initial steps should be taken towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo, it is agreed that each country shall set up a national secretariat for Maphilindo affairs and as a first step the respective national secretariats will consult together with a view to coordinating and co-operating with each other in the study on the setting up of the necessary machinery for Maphilindo. 10. The three Heads of Government emphasized that the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned, and that the three Governments undertake to have close consultations (MUSHAWARAH) among themselves on these matters. 11. The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. 12. President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman express their deep appreciation for the initiative taken by President Macapagal in calling the summit conference which, === [PDF page 43] === 62 in addition to resolving their differences concerning the proposed Federation of Malaysia, resulted in paving the way for the establishment of Maphilindo. The three Heads of Government conclude this conference, which has greatly strengthened the fraternal ties which bind their three countries and extended the scope of their co-operation and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples will together make a significant contribution to the attainment of just and enduring peace, stability and prosperity in the region. 24490—2,000—22-1-64 === [PDF page 44] === [Blank page] === [PDF page 45] === iUeEN OLY 5 son Nn Washing JIA SOTL WaSDLNS , arcnre of mCuoulo.Od iL y cnt fil SLOAILSvCGL y I L nn AT eho Lay 11uU5 eC er Ulliwivuce cloukir aX r c an ioe }, snaord CA. 14; oballialu ho. DO scon SUPP A“ aye 2) 14 ye preiatvu;r S mi oht wmtettb VO ICN Ula’ Ab +e CLSPUtE Lae pourg cols === [PDF page 46] === CONFIDENTIAL Al Cpy 2 COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE, . DOWNING STREET, [Unreadable] 5 September, 1964. W. C. S. CORRY As you may have seen from your copy telegrams, Corry, the Secretary of the Malaysian Commercial Association has just left London for a short spell in Brunei as the Boundary Commissioner. On his way home in a month or so's time he will be spending a few days in Kuala Lumpur in connection with his Association's business. I suggested to him that he should call in on you (or possibly Jim Bottomley whom he knows) to have a brief word about a specific reference to the P.K.I. in the August 64 issue of the Association's Bulletin. In case you do not have @ copy readily available I enclose a photostat of page 7 which is the relevant piece. When I saw this reference Mere, I thought it might be prudent to tip off Corry that this line on communism was rather exaggerated and that in any case it did'nt help the Malaysians very much with their Afro-Asian colleagues to stress the dangers of Indonesia in terms of international communism. I guessed thet the "memorandum received in the office" had come from the Malaysians. I was hoping to see Corry before he left for Brunei on September 6th, but he became heavily involved with the Singapore ban and in the event I was only able to talk to him over the telephone and thus could not go into the subject very far. This was, perhaps, just as well as Corry said straightaway that he understood the "memorandum" to be an F.0O. inspired piece and so it proved. He had seen the I.R.D. publication B.712(R) (Stanley Budd has a copy) which is a hotted up version of the recent F.0. Intel on the Communist Party in Indonesia. It is inclined to give the impression that:- (a) the P.K.I. is the driving force behind confrontation; and (b) a P.K.I. takeover in fndonesia is in the offing. 7 I have discussed this with Kevin Burns who is expecting that some new arrangements with the F.0. for dealing with work on Confrontation will minimise the chance of this type cf situation arising again. In the meantime, we hope that you will be able to sive Corry the general background afresh perhaps explaining to him that we are anxious to steer the Malaysians off the argument /that D. Jd. KING, ESQ., KUALA LUMPUR. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 47] === CONFIDENTIAL that Sukarno is a pawn of the Communists and that Malaysia is a victim of an international Communist conspiracy rath than’ of Javanese imperialisn. You may also think it wort"®vhile to give Corry a more general background briefing. in view of his wide contacts with British firms I'm sure that this would be useful. I believe that Jasper Cross knows him and can give you a line on hin. (P. JENKINS) _ Far East and Pacific Department. P.S. I should explain that I am writing on this subject rather than Kevin Burns simply because I have been involved with Corry over his Brunei assignment. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 48] === BULLETIN THE MALAYSIAN COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION. (Perv vin7a Issuz. AUGUST 1964. Cap. I - GENERAL. we regret to report one recent resignetion from the Associétion, but are glac to welcome as new Members Messrs. Escombe McGrath & Co.Ltd. and Messrs. Shanks & Co.Ltd. who joinec. us just over a month ago. Since the appearance of the lest Bulletin in June, Office has issued a number of circulars to ali Members. subjects dealt with were: Employment of Malaysian citizens in the higher &6cnelons in British Firms (Circ. no.:133). The Biennial Congress of the I.C.C. to be held at New Delhi in February 1965 (Cire. no. 134). A provisional progremue has been received in the Office. Salaries and allowances paid to expatriate staff in Meluysia (Cires. nos. 135. and 138). The new Melaysian Companies Bill (Circ. no. 136). In addition to the draft comments on this Bill mentioned in the circuler, the Office has received some very detziled comments from Messrs. Cooper Bros., and these ére aveileble for perusel by Members: on request. The Singapore Minister of Nationel Development - Dato Lim Kim San - and the Chaimsan of the Singapore Economic Development Board - Mr. Hon Sui Sen - who were on a visit to Western Europe, arrived in the United Kingdom on 17th July. By courtesy of the Board of Trade, the efternoon of 25rd July was reserved for interviews with these gentleman by Members of the Associztion. Three Members interviewed Mr. Hon Sui Sen, and it is feared that the recent postal chaos inhibited one other from arrenging to do so. The Council of Management had the privilege of entertaining the Malaysian Prime Minister to dinner at Le Cog d'or Restaurant on Thursdéy, 16th July. This pleasent event took place shortly after the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and other guests of the Council included the Hon. Enche Seu, Minister for Information and Broadcasting; H.E. Tunxu Ye!'acob, the Malaysian High Comiissioner in the United Kingdom; Dato Nik Kemil, a former Malayan High Commissioner in London, and later Malayan ambassador in the United Stites of America, and Mr. E.W. Swanton, the well-known writer on cricket who orgénised the recent highly successful Comronwealth Cricket tour in South-East Asia and Hong Kong. === [PDF page 49] === ee sa It will be remembered thet many of our Members subscribed most generously to this tour, and after ell expenses have gen paid, there has emerged = surplus of over one thousand pou It was decided thet, after meeting one imperative commitment, the balence availeble should be given to Tunsau Abdul Rahman, wearing the hat of the Malaysian Minister of Sport, as a donation to Malaysian sport generally. A cheque for £1,000 was accordingly presented to the Minister of Sport at the conclusion of the dinner by Mr. Swanton. The Council of Menagez::emt. has given leeve of absence to the Seerctiry to fulfil on officisl missivn to..° deline:.te constituency boundiries in the Stite of. Brunei during the month of September next. On the conclusion of this mission, Mr. Corry will visit other parts of Malaysia on the business of the Association, end if eny Member has any.matter into which he would like Mr. Corry to enquire in Melaysia he is invited to get in touch at an early date with the Office. Cap. II -THE UNITED NATIONS 1964 CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT. The Royal Commonwealth Society held a 'Post-Geneva Conference! on 27th July last attended by a number of our Member firms. Mr. R.M. Govan of [.C.I. and the Secretary were guests of the Society in their capacities és the Associétion's two representetives on the Trade and Industry Committee of the Royal Commonwealth Society. The Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce, Mr. Edward Heath M.P., gave a cleer end interesting summery of what had taken place at Geneva, with pérticular reference to the part played there by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Mr. Heath's generél observations were later emphasisec in detail by Sir Petrick Reilly, the senior official in charge of the United Kingdom delegation to the Conference. From the speeches made by these two gentlazen the picture emerges of an outstending contribution made by Grect Britain to the not inconsiderebe measure of success achieved by the Conference. In fact the intervention of Mr. Heath ét a critical juncture some three weexs from the stert appears to have saved the whole affair from shipwreck. The princivel phenomenon revezled by the Conference was the cegree of cooperation and unanimity achievec by what cre known as the developing countries - now seventy-seven in number. Their case had been well prepared by Dr. Prebisch whose mein thesis is thet in internétional trade there is a built-in bias against the trade in primary products. This is still the mein economic activity of the developing countries, end he believes that there is an ever-wicening gap to be closed if these countries ere not to become progressively poorer vis-a-vis the jadcustrialised countries. In fact the developing countries wust aim at a rate of annual development increasing by 54 each yeer. === [PDF page 50] === After the preliminaries the Conference divided itself up into 5 main committees dealing with: (1) primary beet (2) menufactures and semi-menufactures; >) finenciea! essistance cri invisibles; (4) matters of procedure, and (5) generel principles. The main success registered by the Conference querged from the third Committee which, in the matter of suppiementary finencial assistence to. the developing countries, agreed that the International Bank should be asked to work out a schene for Long-term essistence to these countrics in cases woere their long-term Cevelopment plens were beius inhibited by adverse price changes and by adverse t 5 of trede.: This Committee also agreed that the developec countries shoul! ss: aside from now on 1%. of their gross nevional income tc be ear-marked as aid for the developing coun‘ ries, and that this figure of 1%, was to be in addition to any capital payments made to the developing countries on already existing occounts. The Committee also discussed fruitfully the question of the Overcll indebtedness of the developing coun ries, and made some rether reudical suggestions for the reform of the internationel shipping and insurance trades: In these matters the British delegetion pleyed a leading pert end it wes British initiative «hich led to the decision on long-term finencial.assistance. Committees 1 and 2 dealing with primary commodities and menufectures registered less success. The wain question here wes access by the developing countries to markets in the industrialised countries, and here again Greet Brituin took the initi«tive in suggesting that the present system of Commonweélth preferences, as applied to manufactured and sewi-menufectured goods, should be extended to all the developing countries by all the industrialised countries. In fact Great Britain, which already grants such preferences to some 600m. people in the Comuonwealth, is willing to extend this concession, to the other 700m. living in the developing countries (outside Chine) on condition that a similar concession is made to all these 1,300m. by the other industrialised countries. The Freneh had a counterproposél.in the shape of menagea markets for wenufactures which had little appeal to the Conference; end the proposed British initiative broke down largely owing to the built-in Americen objection to the granting of preferences under any circumstances. This matter however, having been raised,is now under discussion, end it will be debated by the permenent machinery to control internetional trede which has been set up by the Conference. In her proposals made to the Conference, itis interesting to leam that Greet Britain had the full support of the other Members of the Comuonweelth present at the Conference, and inceed it was one of Mr. Heath's first acts on arriving in Geneva to call a meeting of Commonweilth delegates in order to consult and work with them at all stzges of the Conference. The main fectual d4cisions of the Conference euerged from Committee 4 which has recommended permanent machinery, és &@ now major organ of the United Nations, to deal with international trade at the highest level. The Conference itself will be reconvened every three years, and there === [PDF page 51] === pl ie will be a permanent Trade Board with a Secretariat. There will also be set up powerful Concilliation Machinery to reconcile differences of opinion. This step was necessé in the light of the very radical proposals initially forced through by the voting strength of the 77 developing countries. Mr. Heath played no small part in arriving at the general compromises which the industrialised countries could accept. In many cases these compromises mean little more than the postponement of many rudical decisions for further consideretion by the new international wachinery. One obvious fact. to emerge was the evident lack of co-ordination and preperation for the Conference exhibited by the Western industrialised countries. They did not expect to be feced with the solid phelenx of the 77, end it is to be hoped thet the experience gained may have taught them é useful lesson for the future. There.weas however a considerable measure of general agreement on policy between the countries comprising the Furopeen Free Trade Association. Another interesting fact was the small part played by the Communist countries at the Conference. China was of course not present officially, because she is not @ member of the United Nations, but her representatives were in the 'corridors', and made themselves felt there. Russia had little to say, which is interesting in view of the fect that she originally proposed the holding of the Conference. No doubt in fact the Comnunist countries had very little to offer, anc their lack of initiative here wes in strong contrast to the decisive part played by the 77 developing countries. Amongst the speakers at the Royal Commonweelth Society was Mr. §.S. Jefri of Pexistan, who is Economic Minister and Finsencial Adviser to his country's High Comission in the United Kingdom. He spoke on the results of Geneva és seen by the representitive of a developing country, and he mace much of the Prebisch thesis of the widening gap between rich end poor. He also paéid a very considerable tribute to the pert played by Great Britain at Geneve, with péerticular emphasis on the personzl initiatives shown by Mr. Heath. Can. III - THE MALAYSIAN COMMON MARKET. Now thet a Cheirmean has been appointed to the Malaysian Tariffs Advisory Board - Mr. L.A.D? Willicmson of the New Zealenc Customs Department - one can expect that steps wiil be taken towards the formation of the Coiimon Market for the States of Maleysia as envisaged by the Rueff Report, which wes discussed in the 34th issue of this Bulletin for August last year. The Tariff Board has in fact sterted its enquiries in Sabeh end Sarawak. Mr. Williauson hts stressed the pan-Mulaysian néture of the Board end the necessity for a Malaysien outlook in its deliberations. In exphasising the vitel necessity for a Common Marxet he says "We are created to play an important role in the achievezent of economic integrétion following === [PDF page 52] === -5political integration. In this Malaysia starts with an advantage, for if the Europesn Common Market can be a ecess without political integration, Malaysia as an existing political etity should fina it exsier to have Similar success." This needed saying, as at present the component parts of Malaysia still levy tariffs agcinst each others! products, and there is stili much commercial jealousy between Singepore and Kuala Lumpur. As the 'Finencial Times! has recently pointed out, only 18 months ago Kuale Lumpur was demanding « duty on every Singapore egg crossing the Ceuseway, end Singapore wes retaliating with a duty on Malayen vegetables end fish. The picture is complicated by the free-port status of Singapore and Penang end by the barter-trede of certain Borneo ports. The policy of industrialisation is proving a solvent of the free-port problem. Industrial Estates are springing up in Singapore and the Malayan mainland, and when the Malaysian Minister of Trede speaks of steps to industrialisation being by way of joint ventures between foreign and domestic capital, he adds the rider thet such industrial projects will no doubt need the protection of a judicious system of teriffs. Today there is cépitil investment in Meleysia from 14 different comtries, and we have seen the establishuent of 113 pioneer industries in Singépore - emongst them a shipbreaking andship- building concern, which hes just built its fourth vessel, and a National Iron and Steel Mill. Industrielisation in Singapore is concentrated at Jurong, and at Appendix 'A' to this Bulletin is & progress report on Jurong for the first six months of 1964, by the Chairmen of the Singépore Economic Development Board. Cap. IV - INDONESIAN "CONFRONTATION" - THE POSITION TO DATE. Commenting on Confrontation's economic front the Singapore Minister of Finsence recently told the Legislitive Assembly that Indonesia's policy had hit Singapore much less severely then the Government had cared to hope. In his budget speech last year he had estimated that Singepore couid perhaps meke good the effects of Confrontation within tro years. This hed proved to be a too pessimistic forecast, Singapore's econonly remains strong; the building boom goes on, and the péce of industrialisation proceeds with vigour. Dr. Goh reminded his hearers that the Government had estimated that over 8,000 workers inight be iaid off, if the Indonesian blockade proved effective, and that the national income might be reduced by between 84 end 9%. Opposition members had grossly exaggerated thé likely losses and the Barisan Sosialis had predicted with relish a collapse of the Econony, which they gleefully expected. This, as Dr. Goh Saic, was in Keeping with their pro-Indonesian and anti- Meleysien line. === [PDF page 53] === The meximum possible effects had not occurred; ships ial temporarily laid up had resumed work on new routes, to Burma, Thailand, other Melaysian ports including Borneo, Hong Kong and other piaces; the complete closing down of processing factories had not happened. Stocks of raw materials were adequate to retain production and employment, because when these grew low alternative supply lines were opened, thus enabling meny firms to carry on. Laid-off workers who received a monthly allowemce equal to two-thirds of their income from employmwent totalled just over 4,000. at the maximum, end at the end of May this year tne figure had been reduced to 2,500 odd. The total sum of money paid - in equél shares by Government and the Employers - to such laidoff workers up to the end of May was $1.4m. On the political side we have seen the failure or the Tokyo meeting between the Heads of Government of Malaysic, the Philippines and Indonesia. On his return from Tokyo, Tunku Abdul Rahman said that if the Commonwealth did not rally round Malzysia, the situation there wight deteriorate to the low point reached in South Vietnan. Later at a meeting with Melaysian journelists, the Prine Minister szid thet the breek-down hed come as no surprise to hii, and that it hed shown beyond doubt Sukarno's real intentions towards Malaysia - which were nothing less than the complete dismentling of Melaysia as a neo-coLloniazlist British invention. He had told Sukarno that Melaye's freedom - like Melaysia - had been negotiated with the Britisn, and had asked him, if this wes the excuse for Confrontation, why he had not 'confronted! Malaya when it obtained its independence in 1957. To this Sukerno made no reply. The Tunku had wade it clear thet he couid not surrender to Military pressure end had reminded Sukxermo that his Malxeysien Government hea been returned et the recent genercl election with a solid mendate to defend the country. Since the Toxyo failure statenents of soliderity with Malaysia coming from the British Prime Minister ond the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealend have greatly heartened the Meleysian Government und people. Furthermore apart from one incursion by about 100 terrorists just after the Tokyo meeting, incidents on the Bornean border - at the date of the preparation of this Bulletin - have been elmost non-existent. But one should not read too much into this period of ceim, end the Times correspondent has recently pointed out the ominous fact thet Indonesian regular forces appear to be becoming more end more comiitted to the operations on the Border. One hears too assurances that the situetion is in hand, and thet the morale of the Security Forces is high, but it must of course be remembered that it can become demoralising to any forces to be continually on the defensive even though this may be necessary for political reasons. There has been some inconclusive talk about attacking Indonesian bases in Kalimenten, but this does not seen @ likely siove as yet. === [PDF page 54] === a ie The situation has been before the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and there are two references to Malaysie in the concluding. official coumunique. The @unonwealth Prime Ministers have expressed their satisfection at the establishment of Malaysia, end they have assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their syupethy. end support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country, and to promote a peeceful and honoureble settlement of the current differences between Maléysia and her neighbours. Subsequently, Tunku Abdul Rehwan hes visited President Johnson in Washington, end it is pleasing to read of the growing weesure.of support for Malaysia annunciated oo, by the American President. The evil end sinister pert played by the Indonesien Communist Party (P.K.I.) has recently been exposed in a memoranduia received in the Office. The Party continues to heKke progress towards éssuming power in Indonesia, by the classic Merxist techniques of infiltration and subversion end by clouking itself in the guise of a nationalist party. It has exploited the decline in living standards; it emcourages rural discontent, and it is orgenising a peesant revolutionary movenent. It claims to have 2sm.. members and to control enother 13 million persons in other subservient organisations throughout Indonesia. This means that it has the active support of over 154 of the whole population. A tekeover of the government by the P.K.I. within the next 5 years is a distinct possibility, but the party may find it difficult to get control of the outer Islands end a premature coup by bringing down upon it the army's wrath might be disastrous to its fortunes. It supports the policy of the Confrontation of Malaysia in en extreme form; Sukerno is becoming more and more cependent on it, and in November 1963 six P.«K.I. Members were admitted to the working Cabinet. It is the P.K.I. who has supplied the bulk of the Volunteers for the crushing of Maleysia. The Party encoureges Sukarno's penchant for politicel adventures eat the expense of economic development, and D.N. Aidit has dismissed as reactionary the view that economics ere uore importent than militent revolutions. The Party gloats over the serious food shortages in Java and has re-echoed Aidit's views thet there ccn be no improvenent until the whole economic appératus is in the hands of the revolutioneries. At the Party Congress in December 1963, D.N. Aidit ordered his cedres to penetrate regional Boards and Councils to the néximum possible end condenmed any ettenpt to settle the Mzlaysien question peacefully. He implied that while the P.K.I. was now defying Moscow it was not blindly following Peking, and thus couid merit the Support of the néetionalists. This line of thought shields the P.k.I. from the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute, though in foreign affairs the Party tends to support.the extreme militant policies of Chine. Aidit's ultimate move will probably be to use the peasants to overthrow all the other forces which have helped the P.K.I. to power, and thus achieve the complete overthrow of all bourgeois power in the State. an === [PDF page 55] === The office is in possession of’a number of thandouts! from the Malaysian Ministry of External Affairs giving details of Indonesian acts of aggression, the basis for the policy of Confrontation and an account of the overwhelming ambitions of the extreme nationalists, who wish to restore the historic Javenese euipire.of Majapanit, adopted by Sukarno and his followers és their goal after their Japenese masters had sent them into Java towerds the end of the War. All these documents are aveilable for perusel by Members on demand to the Office. Cap. V - SOME REVEALING STATISTICS. The estimated f.o.b. value of the States of Malaya's gross exports in 1963 wes $2,700m., an increase of 280n. over 1962. Rubber, including re-exports, accounted for over #1,900m. which was over 54 less than in 1962, the downward chenge being due almost qjmtirely to a drop in price. 85,000: tons of tin velued at $642m. were shipped in 1963 as compared with 81,400 tons worth $620m. in the previous year. The origins. of about one-quarter of the amounts received by smelters was from overseas. 7.2m. tons of ironore were mined in 1963 -— worth g176m. representing a small increase over the previous year. Of this emount 6.7m. tons were exported to Jépan - neéerly one-quarter of. her total imports. 450,000 tons of beuxite were exported valued at about g8m. - a 434 increase over the previous year. Other exports of metals included 147,000 tons of ilmenite, neerly 7,000 tons of manganese and nearly 2,000 tons of copper concentrates, which with smaller amounts of other metals, represented shipments valued et about £70. The nett value of all minerals exported in 1963 was $692m., an increase of 11% over 1962. Imports of cotton fabrics by the States of Malaya end Singapore rose to 227m. sq. yds. in 1963 (en approximate increase of 28%) while imports of synthetic fabrics dropped to 108m. sq. yds. Exports of cotton fabrics from the area elso increased by ebout 334 to 68m. sq. yds’ end exports of synthetics fell by 10% to 3lm. sq. yds. Japen wes the top supplier ‘of cottons and synthetics, at 37% of the totel market,and she was followed in descending order by Chine, India, Hong Kong and Russia. There were increased imports from Chine, India and Hong Kong into this market, and in the case of Hong Song shipments were up by nearly one-third. === [PDF page 56] === Chrysler and Volkswegon have applied for motor assembly sites near Kuala Lumpur, and other foreign manufacturers are similerly interested. Work is proceeding at Batu Tigu in Selangor on a subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. whose products will include fertilizer for/rubber and oil /the palm industries. Colgete-Pelmolive has just opened a detergent plant at Petzeling Jaya. Malayen Sugar Menufecturing, which is a joint Meleysian/ Japanese venture is about to open its Praisugar refinery. This will be the first of three such refineries,of which the other two will be at Port Swettenham, and may be commissioned by the end of the year. The Prai plant will begin by producing about 4,000 tons & month rising to about 10,000 tons. Raw suger for the refinery will be imported from Mauritius and Australia. A jetty hes been constructed on the Prai River for unloading the raw suger whence it is conveyed to a warehouse on conveyor belts. Experiments are in hand for the cultivation of suger cane locelly for these refineries. Dr. Lin Swee Aun, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, in a speech recently guve some figures about Pioneer Industries. There are 104 companies having a called-up capital totelling over $158m., of which 438 are joint ventures with a totel subscribed capital of over $1l7m., end 32 are local compenies end 14 foreign companies, having called-up cepital totalling $25.6m. and g15.4m. respectively. The nominal cepital of all these companies totals over $646m. In addition there are another 37 compunies whose Pioneer Certificetes have been approved in principal, with a total nominal capitel of $li7m. On 30th June this year, there were & total of 4,117 local and 1,225 foreign companies on the Register of Companies. === [PDF page 57] === APPENDIX ‘Aa! E-FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1964 AT JURONG: A PROGRESS REPORT. Highlights from the Press Conference conducted by Mr. HON SUI SEN, Chairman, Economic Development Boerd, Singapore on Monde} 5 6 The first 6 ronths of 1964 have thrown up some interesting facts about the progress at Jurong which are worth recording: As of todéy, 9 factories are in operation producing essential goods for the people of Malaysia and, in some instences, for export also. 29 new factories or projects are in different stages of construction and will be in production by the end of the year or in early 1965. The totel fixed investment of these 38 factories that are expected to be in operation by the end-of the yeur emounts to $90 miilion approximately. These 38 factories end the attendant services at Jurong will provide euployment for about. 7,200 persons by the end of 1964. This figure will shoot up to 15,000 in 1965 and 22,000 by the end of 1967 as more end more fectories go into production. By the ed of the year, the housing development at Jurong will provide for 1,374 units as egainst 221 units which have been built up to date. Land Allocation: The total area prepared to date is 1,960 acres of which 650 acres have been ellocated to industry. Roads: 11 miles of roads have been metelled and surfaced end another 5 miles nearing completion will not only provide the mein access roads from the north and south but will also complete the main network of roéds in the heavy industries area, Wharves: Despite initiel difficulties in 1965, the progress in the first half of 1964 has been repid. 1,000 feet of deep weter end 500 feet of coastal wharves have been dredged. The piling of the first 500 feet of deep weter wharves has been completed end the decking units are being installed. Piling of the coastal wharves has also been started. The first oceangoing ship will be able.to dock well before the end of the year. Reilway: Initial earthworks are now complete and the construction of 7 bridges and 5 tunnels involved in the mile raiiway from Bukit Timeh to Jurong is well in hend. The first train to Jurong is expected in early 1965. By 1970 the estimated expenditure on development of earthworks, roéds, railway, wherves works, electricity, water and other services for industries wiil be in the region of Z200million. This would not include housing and communi ty development on which a further sum of $20 miilion will be spent in 1965 alone. Less than 3 years ago, Jurong was @ jungle of mangrove swenps, hills end dilapidated rubber estates. === [PDF page 58] === From the time the first bulldozer moved into Jurong in September 1961, 17 million cubic yards of earth have been excavated end used to prepare 1,500 acres of land at Jurong. © In the process, 16 hills haye been lévelled and another 7 hills are being flettened. When viewed against this backdrop of mangrove swam s, giant excavations of forests, eurth end hills, the starting up of 9 factories in this relatively short time (including the gestation period of a minimux of one year from blue-print to production stage for en industrial project) is by any stendard a remarkable achievenent. APPENDIX 'B! SINGAPORE TRADE - 1962 & 1963. (in $ million). Imports from: | Exports to: | of Total Trade: 1962-1963 1962 1963 6 1963 Country of Origin and Destination. Stetes of Malaya United Kingdom Jéepéen U.S.A. Saréwek Theilend Australia W. Germeny Hong Kong China India SS At ne seinen at-een tessa asaenshh-pnsestes epee -y-aeepmngieseen SO = + ets NS tn apn am Sabah === [PDF page 59] === CONFIDENTIAL INTEL Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution 3 y Bag No. 78. INTEL June 15, 1964 From Foreign Office to certain of Her Majesty's Representatives THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY SUMMARY The Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.), with 24 million members, has made significant progress in recent years towards the assumption of power. “ Confrontation” against Malaysia was first sponsored by the P.K.I. (paragraphs 1-3). 2. Communist propaganda exploits the decline in living standards caused by “ confrontation ” to displace moderate internal influences and foreign enterprises (paragraphs 4-6). 3. By encouraging rural discontent and organising a peasant revolutionary movement, the Communists plan to secure a more direct role in a “ Nasakom” Government: one composed of National, Religious and Communist elements (paragraphs 7-11). 4. They have already extended their local influence through the National Front and the “volunteer *” movement (paragraphs 12-13). 5. The Communists insist that they are “nationalists ~ (paragraphs 14-15) but their ultimate aim is to set up an exclusively Communist régime (paragraphs 16-18). 6. Though claiming to pursue an “independent ” line in the Sino-Soviet dispute (paragraphs 19 and 20), the Indonesian Communists follow Peking particularly on international issues (paragraphs 21-24). 7. They claim that “ confrontation ” contributes as much as the Viet Cong to the spread of Communism in South-East Asia (paragraphs 25-27). 8. They oppose any attempts to settle the Malaysian question peacefully or to develop regional co-operation with the Philippines and Malaysia. They demand closer relations with the Communist 9. The possibility of a P.K.I. take-over in Indonesia during the next five years is now strong (paragraphs 31-33). 10. This Intel may be used to refute the view that Sukarno is a “ bulwark ” against Communism (paragraph 34). The Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I—Partai Komunis Indonesia) claims to muster 24 million members (about half the total of-all Party members outside the Communist bloc) and to control more than 13 million members of “ mass ” organisations in Indonesia. Its immediate programme is to increase its strength and influence with a view to securing direct participation in the Government and hence in the formation of domestic and foreign policy. 2. The P.K.I. can claim two significant successes in recent years: (a) It was the P.K.I. which in late 1961 launched opposition to Malaysia within Indonesia. At the same time that Dr. Subandrio, in November CONFIDENTIAL 19958—73 4400—10 === [PDF page 60] === 2 CONFIDENTIAL 1961, was cautiously welcoming Malaysia at the Uni i » W y we g ited Nat e P.K.L in a Resolution in December 1961 condemned pieces « a of ee ” and called on the Indonesian Government and people to heighten “ national vigilance ” i i oie g against the establishment (b) In the Government reshuffle in November 1963, six know or sympathisers were for the first time admitted to the Woiling Canis although no Communist sympathiser has yet attained the “ Inner Cabinet ” where major questions are considered. The Chairman of the PACE, i N. Aidit, was at the same time given the rank of “ Minister- Co-ordinator”, but apparently outside the Working Cabinet, in his Pkg Vice-Chairman of the Provisional People’s Conservative 3. Aidit made a Report to the Second Plenum of the P.K.I. Si i KI. Sixth é Congress last December. The Report is analysed at some length in this ‘hone only because it is the basic directive which P.K.I. cadres will follow until the next Plenum but also because events since it was delivered demonstrate how the P.K.1.- pomores and eas adopted policy of hostility to Malaysia, which President r described as “confrontation ”, h / achieve some of its objectives. ee ee ee Exploiting the Economic Situation 4. “Confrontation ” is in itself primarily re i ome onfr ition y responsible for the deterior oo economic situation in Indonesia during the last twelve months, and oe ae used as an excuse by the Government for not stopping the decline The ommunists have encouraged this preference for political adventurism at the See economic development. Aidit dismissed as “reactionary dogma” the v hat economics is more important than a “r i " policy ” Puli cas ta eed: p evolutionary policy”. The “greet every revolutionary call and policy of the Gover t € nment to come... even though this may lead to new temporary difficelties in met ees 4 elites shift to the right, even though this may ied by enou ood... this i i acne g this is nothing but postponement of In February 1964 (when there was serious distress due to foo i ea P.KI. propaganda did not, however, gloss ae Ae caniease = culties”. Communist newspapers reported that peasants were selling their children to buy food. In one area of Java, they said, “ most people could not afford to eat tapioca even once in two days” and they had “ not known rice for a lon time ”. Old people and widows could only wait for death.: 5. The Communists do not of course blame “ confrontation ” i Sukarno directly for such conditions, but so-called “ corre scene fis ace moderate and pragmatic economic policies of non-Communists in the Government and administration, and foreign economic influence. They particularly attack the Government Regulations of May 26, 1963 (an attempt to secure economic stabilit on sound financial lines which “confrontation ” and P.K.I. Opposition gener ily have practically killed). Aidit’s Report insisted that there could be no im ravenna until the “ economic apparatus is in the hands of competent bevolieeinarice as 6. He called for the dismissal of “ Right-win iali h Ss -wing Socialist experts ” i posts and declared that the ministers responsible for the May 36 denon tered pe States Imperialism. Aidit linked the “ weakness of the economy ” with a ee et ee ss wpreeai ” and demanded its liquidation icularly all British-owne 1 i Settee oh enna enterprises and the American Caltex and Mobilising the Peasants 7. Aidit’s Report renewed the directive to all party c attention on “ mobilising” and “ integrating ” theeenies ae seaniticces insisted that progress in every direction (including “confrontation” and livi standards) could only be made by the removal of non-Communist influences in che countryside and a radical land reform (although the absence of large landown: gives the campaign little rational basis and makes it chiefly dependent on exploiting CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 3 land hunger. Rural development depends on the Government being willing to divert much more attention and resources to agriculture). 8. Aidit claimed that the Communist-led Indonesian Peasants’ Front (B.T.1.) d over 7 million members with an organisation in practically every rural district "@ Gin about half the villages in the countryside. While he spoke at length of the B.TL he said little of the other Communist-led “ mass organisations ” (S.O.B.S.1., the All-Indonesia Central Federation of Workers, with over 3 million members, the Indonesian Youth League and the Indonesian Women’s Movement Association, each with 14 million members). He said that their task was primarily to help mobilise the peasants. 9. He told the Party Plenum that, backed by the “basic force” of the peasants, the P.K.I. could dominate a “ united national front ” formed with the “petty bourgeoisie” and “ national bourgeoisie” against the ~ die-hards ”. The peasants were the key to achieving a ~ Nasakom ” Cabinet. A “ Nasakom” Cabinet 10. The term “ Nasakom” (a combination of nationalist, religious and Communist forces) was originally formulated by Sukarno but has become the central theme of Communist propaganda. At the time of the Plenum, it had been established at many levels of activity and government, but not in all spheres nor in the inner Cabinet from which the Communists have so far been excluded (although some hold ministerial rank). All Communist efforts aim at setting up a “ Cabinet with Nasakom as its core ”. 11. The tactics and pressure groups so far described in this Intel are used by the Communists to bribe and threaten their way into such a Cabinet. Aidit listed the failure to introduce a “ Nasakom ” Cabinet as one of “ the chief obstacles in implementing the ‘ crush Malaysia * programme * Without one, it was not possible “to create ‘ social support ’, ‘ social participation ’ and “ social control’ ” to carry out the Government’s programme. He held that “ an attitude of genuine opposition to ‘ Malaysia” cannot possibly be combined with an anti-Nasakom attitude ”. He finally demanded that leaders of ~ Regional Legislative Assemblies, all members of Executive Boards and the various Councils who are in any way connected with Government, with the economy and with cultural affairs should be Nasakomised ”. Extending Local Influence 12. Since the Plenum, Sukarno’s growing dependence on the Communists has brought a “ Nasakom ” administration nearer. At a National Conference to discuss the food problem in March, Sukarno decided to include the local head of the National Front Organisation (dominated in most areas by the P.K.I.) in the regional quadrumvirates (hitherto made up of local Governors, Military Commanders, Chiefs of Police and Chief Judges). 13. Another opportunity for the Communists to extend their local influence came on March 16 when Sukarno called for “ volunteers ” to crush Malaysia. It is impossible to accept the figure of twenty-one million “ volunteers ” claimed to have registered within about three weeks. Two million is a closer estimate of those who may have been registered en bloc by streets or villages. There is no doubt that the chief response came from the P.K.I. and its affiliated organisations. Because of the army’s distrust of arming the Communists, it may be reluctant to train the “volunteers ” on any scale without screening. Nevertheless, the movement brings the P.K.I. a step nearer to controlling a para-military force and directly participating in the military “ confrontation ” of Malaysia. Its capacity to maintain the momentum of agitation against Malaysia is certainly increased. “ National Communism ” 14. Aidit implied in his report that the more extreme groups in the PEE criticised him for giving Sukarno too much support. (They were disappointed later when he did not attack Sukarno more directly for the food shortage.) Such criticism does Aidit little harm since it serves to reassure waverers that the P.K.I. is willing to concede some Communist aims and advantages in order to secure national unity and a “revolutionary ” foreign policy. He claims that he is “ Indonesianising 4 Marxist-Leninism and merely aims at “ completing the Revolution of 1945” and installing “ national democracy ”. CONFIDENTIAL 4400—10 === [PDF page 61] === CONFIDENTIAL _ 15. The basis of Aidit’s answer to his party critics is that his methods will bring the Communists to power more effectively than any other and that his strategy does not mean abandoning either the party’s independent identity or the ultimate goal of a Communist take-over. He argues, in effect, that the Communists should back Sukarno 100 per cent in fields where he is doing their work for them. ee 16. As Aidit explained to a rally in Peking in September 1963, the P.K.I. supports “without reservation” the Government’s “ progressive policies ”, attacking only non-progressive policies and Ministers. Nevertheless, “ unity with the bourgeoisie must not hinder the efforts of the proletariat to organise revolution. to develop its party and expand its revolutionary masses ”. 17. At the December Plenum, Aidit made clear that Communists in local Government were primarily agents of the party. He ordered party committees in the regions to establish a Commission on Governmental Representative Affairs “to control the activities of those comrades ” on regional boards and councils to make sure they carried out the “ party’s mandate”. The directive makes nonsense of Sukarno’s concept of “ Nasakom ” as a means of absorbing the Communists into a greater national movement. 18. In reply to the charge that the P.K.I. might be swamped by the mass revolutionary peasant movement he is organising, Aidit insisted at the Plenum that the P.K.I. would maintain firm control. “ The peasants ”, he said. “ did not want to take over the leadership from the proletariat; they ask to be led by the proletariat ” (i.e., the P.K.I.). The use of the peasants to give the united national front “a sound and militant basis ” was the essence of “ Indonesianising Marxism- Leninism ”, he said (i.e., reaching the stage defined in paragraph 9 above). Ultimately the force of the peasants would be needed when the time came to advance beyond the stage of “ national democracy ”, to “ build Socialism ” and to throw over the other forces which had helped the P.K.I. to power. Eventually the people must “ rise up under revolutionary leadership to completely overthrow bourgeois power”. International Communism 19. The conflict between China and the USSR has further prompted Aidit’s emphasis on “Indonesianising ” Marxism-Leninism. He claimed at the Plenum that, by insisting that the P.K.I. is taking an “independent and critical stand ”’, the party has the respect of “ non-Communist revolutionaries ”. He implied that the P.K.I. is defying Moscow and not blindly following Peking, thus meriting the support of genuine nationalists. By stressing his party’s “independence ”’, Aidit may even hope to gloss over the obvious comparisons between the P.K.I.’s strategy and classic Communist devices to gain power. 20. The “independent” line is also useful in shielding the unity of the P.K.I. from the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. By maintaining that the P.K_I. follows its own Indonesian pattern, Aidit may hope that the party and its members can avoid having to declare unequivocally for or against either side. Claiming that “ the conflicts within the international Communist movement have not been felt in our party’, Aidit declared at the Plenum that the P.K.I. belonged to the first of the four types of party “ crystallised ” by the dispute: the Marxist-Leninist. He thereby presumably hopes to prevent the “factionalism” breaking out in Indonesia which besets the three other types of party (those controlled by “ revisionists ’’, 7.e., pro-Soviet parties, with Marxist-Leninists either forming an opposition within the party or a “circle” or even a “ new party ” outside it). Support for China 21. Aidit accepted at the Plenum the view of “ comrades abroad ” (i.e., the Russians) that “ the P.K.I. is flexible in domestic questions but rigid in international questions ”. Indeed, however much Aidit’s internal tactics depend on the Soviet conception of “ national democracy ”, the foreign policy he advocates puts the P.K.I. closely behind China. 21. A clear indication was his approval of the “ anti-revisionist ” (i.¢., anti- Soviet) splinter groups and parties mentioned above. (His attacks on the arch- CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 3 revisionist Tito for taking a more genuinely national Communist line, can, incidentally, only bring into doubt Aidit’s claim to lead an independent Communist movement). 22. Soviet policies which Aidit attacked at the Plenum ranged from signing eo. Test Ban Treaty to sending arms to India (denounced as the “ United States watch dog in Asia”, whose hands were “dirty with aggression against China ”’). He charged the USSR with concentrating too much on the construction of Communism in the Soviet Union and not helping sufficiently “the struggle for national independence” in Asia and Africa. At the same time he rejected the idea that emerging countries could become Socialist through “ economic aid from the Socialist camp (which China cannot afford to give). Russian’s overriding offence was to blur the image of the United States as “the number one enemy”. It paralysed the fighting spirit against Imperialism. 23. Aidit had a special word on the success of the various international “front” meetings recently sponsored by the Chinese in Indonesia. (Described in detail in my Intel No. 1 of 1964), they give Peking a platform in Indonesia for propaganda aid policies which even the Russians regard as too dangerous.) He had nothing but praise for the recent Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) and only contempt for the view that diversion of resources to run them had, like “confrontation”, contributed to economic deterioration. They were part of the struggle against not only Imperialism but also “ revisionism ”. 24. The P.K.I.’s success in merging its foreign policy with Sukarno’s is particularly evident in the enlistment of GANEFO in the “ anti-revisionist ” struggle. The “ anti-revisionist ” success of GANEFO, he said, was due to the people and Government of Indonesia. Attitude to Malaysia 25. The P.K.I.’s support for China and its “rigid” approach to “ foreign questions ” are clearly illustrated in its line on Malaysia. At the December Plenum, Aidit fitted Malaysia into his overall picture of the region as part of the plot of the “ Imperialists.”” to “ prevent the influence of the Socialist revolution spreading from north to south” (i.e., from China and North Viet-Nam). He went on to compare the contribution of “confrontation” and the Indonesian Government to the Communist cause in South-East Asia with the work of the Viet Cong: “In Indonesia to-day there is no armed struggle such as is taking place in South Viet-Nam. But it is a mistake to think that because of this Indonesia’s role in South-East Asia is not very important. In Indonesia it is not only the people but also the Government that is urging a struggle against Imperialism, if necessary with arms. This latter is proven by... the struggle to crush ‘ Malaysia ’. With the upsurge in the wave of revolution in South-East Asia, it is no longer possible to prevent the total destruction of Imperialism in South-East Asia headed by the United States ”. 26. He recalled that the P.K.I. had been the first to warn the entire nation against the Malaysia project. The Communists’ hostility was based on their earlier objections to Malaya, before the wider Federation was even mooted, as a “ neocolonialist ” device, where the “ progressive movement ” (i.e., the Communists) had been stamped out. 27. Indonesia had signed a Treaty of Friendship with Malaya in 1959, and in 1961, when Malaysia was proposed, welcomed the project (see paragraph 7 of my Intel. No. 39). Many of the themes of official Indonesian propaganda against Malaysia were taken over from the Communists. Co-ordination of Communist and Indonesian policy was expressed in November 1963 when Sukarno said that Malaysia was a “ neo-colonialist project aimed at opposing Indonesia and the Chinese People’s Republic ”. 28. At the December Plenum Aidit condemned past and any future attempts to settle the Malaysia question peacefully. The Manila Conference of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines in August 1963 was a mistake. The “ reformists or moderates ” who dreamt of holding a second Manila Summit conference did not recognise that the question of Malaysia could “ not be settled at the negotiating table but must be settled through confrontation in all fields ”. It was most urgent CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 62] === 6 CONFIDENTIAL “to recognise the ‘ Unitary State of North Kalimantan with its North Kalimantan National Army, under the leadership of Prime Minister Azahari’” (leader of the Brunei revolt who claims to speak for all northern Borneo). Recognition of Azahari could become the basis for “all manner of assistance to the people’s struggle there ”. ae “ Maphilindo” and the Philippines 29. Aidit also condemned “ Maphilindo” (the grouping of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia suggested originally by President Macapagal of the Philippines and discussed in paragraph 10 of my Intel No. 39). Indonesia's domestic and foreign policy “ which is basically supported by the Communists ”, he said, was not in any way similar to the domestic and foreign policies of “these two foreign countries ”. The Maphilindo concept could only be harmful to “ the struggle of the Indonesian people and the struggle of the people in Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and the Philippines ”. (The P.K.I.’s line on the Philippines is that, like Malaysia, the country has yet to undergo a violent revolution to be independent and that the underground Communists—“ the people ”°—must be supported). 30. Aidit even condemned the idea that (since “ confrontation ” had destroyed Indonesia’s trade outlets in Singapore) transit centres should be set up in other places such as Manila, Bangkok or Colombo. This would serve only capitalists. Trade should rather be developed with the new emerging forces, especially “ the Socialist countries ”. 31. Whatever reservations the P.K.I. has about Moscow’s line in the Sino- Soviet dispute there seems little doubt that the party looks to the Communist bloc and its adherents in South-East Asia rather than the “ Maphilindo ” grouping of Indonesia’s immediate neighbours as the supra-national organisation with which she should co-operate. Conclusion 32. The slogan “Ever forward, no retreat”, introduced Aidit’s Report. It described the limits support from the P.K.I. places on Sukarno’s freedom of manoeuvre. As Aidit told the rally in Peking (mentioned in paragraph 16 above), where Sukarno’s policies coincide with Communist interests, he can expect perhaps even more backing than he wants. The P.K.I. reserves the strength (which it is gathering from “confrontation” and Sukarno’s neglect of economic and rural problems) to prevent any reverse or deviation from the prescribed Communist route. The Future 33. The assumption of power in Indonesia by the P.K.I. during the next five years is now a distinct possibility. It will become a probability if President Sukarno continues his present policies, most of which have the full backing of the PKJ. A P.KJ. coup in certain areas of Indonesia, notably Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), could probably be carried through at the present time. However, the P.K.I. are aware of the immense difficulties of controlling Indonesia’s 3,000 islands, and a premature coup, bringing down on the P.K.I. the army’s wrath, would be disastrous. The P.K.I. are therefore content to bide their time, to popularise political programmes (like “ confrontation *) to the point where the Indonesian Government are compelled to adopt these programmes as their own, and to infiltrate and extend their influence within the Indonesian Armed Forces to the extent that the latter would at least remain neutral in the face of an eventual P.K.I. coup. 34. Since this Intel is based on a P.K.I. policy document, you may draw on it freely to refute the view that Sukarno is a “ bulwark ” against Communism or that Indonesian Communism is rendered less dangerous by its exploitation of nationalism. [Copies to Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office for Overseas Distribution] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 63] === CONFIDENTIAL PROMOTE onc hedaiesoetinshentcnewe a Here are three copies of the Brief about which we spoke on the telephone. Sie (G. R. Gauntlett), September 4, 196, Miss Simmons, Gc2.0, \ spolee te Me Gaunnthtt areut S742 ey. He anced cps kD) akin certanrt, qme te Kh, but har gent an WOR ee Won Kh ¥ one te ae ~ i of afore [Unreadable] i b hy Bins 7 ed pd ity CODE 16-76 === [PDF page 64] === & COMMUNISTS SMOOTHING PATH TO POWER IN INDONESIA The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has made significant progress in recent years towards achieving its eventual aim of assuming power. This it has done adopting classic Marxist techniques such as infiltration and subversion. Cloaking itself as a nationalistic party the PKI has elamoured for a “united front" government while pursuing its ultimate goal of an exclusively Communist regime. At the same time it has exploited a decline in living standards to displace moderate internal influences and foreign-owned enterprises, and has encouraged rural discontent and organised a peasant revolutionary movement. Many of the present Indonesian Government's more extreme policies such as the "Crush Malaysia" campaign are either sponsored or supported by the PKI. A complete takeover by the PKI within the next five years is now regarded as a distinct possibility, and one which will even become a probability if Sukarno, increasingly dependent on the Communists, continues his present policies or is urged on to new excesses. But the party is aware of the immense difficulties in controlling Indonesia's 3,000 islands, and a premature COUD, bringdown the Army's wrath, would be disastrous. The PKI is therefore content to bide its time, to popularise extremist political programmes to the point where the Indonesian Government is compelled to adopt them as its own, and to infiltrate and extend its influence within the armed forces to the extent that the latter would at least remain neutral in the face of an eventual Communist coup. Party's widespread strength The PKI claims to have 2,500,000 members (about half the total of all party adherents outside the Communist camp) and to control more than 13,000,000 members of various "mass" organisations | in Indonesia, These include 7,000,000 in the Communist-led Peasants Front (B.T.1) with branches in nearly every rural district. There are also 3,000,000 members in the Indonesian T.U.C. (the All- Indonesia Central Federation of Workers) and 1,500,000 each in the Indonesian Youth League and the Indonesia Women's Movement Association, all of which are Communist-dominated. === [PDF page 65] === The PKI's immediate programme is to increase its strength and influence with a view to securing direct participation in the government, and hence in the formation of domestic and foreign policy, as a step towards the ultimate goal of complete power. This participation in the government is envisaged in the comceept of Nasakom (a coalition of nationalist, religious and Communist elements), a term originally formulated by Sukarno but now a central theme of Communist propaganda. By the end of 1963 this system had been established at many levels of activity and government. Communists have so far been excluded from the inner Cabinet, where major decisions are made, although some hold ministerial rank in the working, or outer, Cabinet. All Communist efforts are aimed at setting up a Cabinet with Nasakom as its core. The PKI's chairman, D.N. Aidit, told a party congress in December, 1963 that, backed by the “basic force" of the peasants, the PKI could dominate a "united national front" formed with the "petty bourgeoisie" and "national bourgeoisie" against the "diehards". The peasants were the key to achieving a Nasakom Cabinet, he added. Aidit directed all party cadres to concentrate on "mobilising" and “integrating” themselves with the peasants. Bribes and threats All kinds of tactics and pressure groups are being used by the Communists to bribe and threaten their way into a Nasakom Cabinet. Aidit even said that the failure to introduce such an Administration was one of the chief obstacles in implementing the “crush Nalaysia" programme. Without one, he said, it was not ossible "to creat ‘social support', ‘social participation’ and social control’ to carry out the Government's programme. Since Aidit's speech, Sukarno's growing dependence on the Communists has brought a Nasakom administration nearer. At a national conference in March, 1564, to discuss food shortages, the President decided to include the local head of the National Front Organisation (dominated in most areas by the PKI) in the regional quadrumvirates which hitherto have been made up of local Governors, military commanders, police chiefs and chief judges. It was in the Government reshuffle in November, 1963, that six known PKI members or sympathisers were first adcmitted to the working Cabinet. At the same time Aidit himself was given the rank of "Minister Co-ordinator", but apparently outside the working Cabinet. At the party congress in December Aidit made it clear that Communists in local government were primarily agents of the party. He ordered party committees in the regions to establish commissions “to control the activities of those comrades" on regional boards and councils to make sure they carried out the "party's mandate”. === [PDF page 66] === This directive shows how wrong Sukarno i§ in thinking that Nasakom can be a means of absorbing the Communists into a greater national movement. It was the PKI which first launched the opposition to the ception of a Malaysian federation although the call was eventually en over by Sukarno and has now become the "confrontation" policy. While Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, cautiously welcomed the Malaysia plan at the United Nations in November, 1961, the following month the PKI condemned the idea as a form of "neo-colonialism" and called on the Indonesian Government and people to heighten “national vigilance" against it. The Communists’ hostility to the project was based on their earlier onjections to Malaya, as a "neo-colonialist" device, where the "progressive movement' (i.e., the Communists) had been stamped out. Negotiation condemned Many of the subsequent themes of official Indonesian propaganda against Malaysia were taken over from the Communists. Co-ordination of Communist and official Indonesian policy was expressed in November, 1963 when Sukarno said that Malaysia was a "neo-colonialist project aimed at opposing Indonesia and the Chinese People's Republic. At the December party congress Aidit condemned past and any future attempts to settle the Malaysia question peacefully. He poured scorn on the "reformists or moderates" who did not recognise that the crisis could not be overcome at the negotiating table, "but must be settled through confrontation in all fields". » when, in March, Sukarno called for volunteers to “crush Malaysia it was claimed that 21 million people had registered within three weeks. It is, of course, impossible to accept this figure. Two million would be a closer estimate, but there is no doubt that the main response came from the PKI and its affiliated organisations. Because of the Army's anti-Communist views and its distrust of arming the Communists, it may be reluctant to train the “volunteers” on any scale without screening them, Nevertheless, the movement brings the PKI a step nearer to controlling a paramilitary force and directly taking part in the military "confrontation" of Malaysia. Its capacity to maintain the momentum of agitation against Malaysia is certainly increased. "Confrontation" has been primarily responsible for the deterioration in Indonesia's economic situation during the last twelve months and the Communists have encouraged Sukarno's preference for political adventurism at the expense of economic development. === [PDF page 67] === eee Aidit dismissed as “reactionary dogma" the view that economics are more important than a “revolutionary policy". The "working class", he said, “greet every revolutionary call and policy of the Government to crush Imperialism... even though this may lead to new temporary difficulties in their living ditions... If politics shift to the Right, even though this may be accompanied by enough food... this is nothing but postponement of severer suffering." No attempt to gloss over In February, 1964, when there were serious food shortages in parts of Java, PKI propaganda did not even try to gloss over the “temporary difficulties". Communist newspapers reported that peasants were selling their children to buy food. In one area, they said, “most people could not afford to eat tapioca even once in two days" and they had "not known rice for a long time". 01d people and widows could only wait for death. But the Communists do not blame "confrontation" or President Sukarno directly for these conditions. They criticise so-called “corrupt elements", the more moderate and pragmatic economic policies of non-Communists in the Government and administration, and foreign economic influence, They attack particularly the Government regulations of May 26, 1963, which were an attempt to secure economic stability on sound financial lines, but which “confrontation” and PKI opposition generally have practically killed. At the December party congress Aidit insisted that there could be no improvement until the “economic apparatus is in the hands of competent revolutionaries". He called for the dismissal of “Right-wing Socialist experts" and said that the Ministers responsible for the May 26 regulations "served United States Imperialism. Aidit also linked the "weakness of the economy" with the influence of "foreign monopoly capitalism" and demanded its liquidation. He mentioned particularly all British-owned enterprises and two American oil companies. PKI and Sino-Soviet dispute The ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union has further prompted Aidit's emphasis on "Indonesianising" Marxist-Leninism, He claimed at the congress that by insisting that the PKI is taking an “independent and critical stand", the party has the respect of “non-Communist revolutionaries". He implied that the PKI is defying Moscow and not blindly following Peking, thus meriting the support of genuine nationalists. By stressing his party's "independence", Aidit may even hope to gloss over the obvious comparisons between the PKI's strategy and classic Communist devices to gain power. === [PDF page 68] === The “independent” line is also useful in shielding the unity of the PKI from the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. By maintaining that the party follows its own Indonesian pattern, Aidit may hope that the PKI can avoid having to declare unequivocally for or against either side. But at the congress Aidit accepted a foreign assessment of his party as being "flexible in domestic questions but rigid in international questions". Certainly the PKI's internal tactics appear to depend on the Soviet conception of "national democracy", while the foreign policy puts it closely behind China. A clear indication of his support for China was Aidit's approval of the "anti-revisionist" (i.e., anti-Soviet) splinter groups, and his attacks on the "“arch-revisionist", Tito, for taking a more genuinely national Communist line, can only cast doubt on Aidit's claim to lead an independent Communist movement. Soviet policies which Aidit attacked at the recent congress ranged from signing the test ban treaty to sending arms to India which he denounced as the "United States watchdog in Asia", whose hands were "dirty with aggression against China", Aidit also accused the Soviet Union with concentrating too much on the building of Communism in Russia and not giving enough help to “the struggle for national independence" in Asia and Africa. At the same time he rejected the idea that emerging countries could become "Socialist" through “economic aid from the Socialist camp" - which China cannot really afford to give. But Russia's main offence in Aidit's eyes, was to blur the image of the United States as "the number one enemy". This "paralysed the fighting spirit against “imperialism". On the other hand Aidit commended the success of the various international "front" meetings recently sponsored by the Chinese in Indonesia. These conferences, mostly organised in rivalry with the similar but Soviet-led international meetings, have given Peking a platform in Indonesia for its propaganda and policies. Support for China The PKI's support for China and its “rigid” approach to foreign policy are clearly illustrated in its line on Malaysia, At the December party congress Aidit fitted Malaysia into his overall picture of the region as part of the plot of the "imperialists" to "prevent the influence of the Socialist revolution spreading from north to south" (i.e. from China and North Vietnam). He went on to compare the contribution of "confrontation" to the Communist cause in South-East Asia with the work of the Viet Cong, the Communist military arm now engaged in the guerrilla war against South Vietnam. === [PDF page 69] === idee Aidit also condemned the idea of Maphilindo, the grouping of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, suggested originally by President Macapagal of the Philippines, Indonesia's domestic and foreign policy "which is basically supported by the Communists", said Aidit, was not in any way similar to the policies of the other t@ countries. The Maphilindo concept could only be harmful to “the struggle of the Indonesian people and that of the people in Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sahah and the Philippines". The PKI‘'s line on the Philippines is that, like Malaysia, that country has yet to undergo a violent revolution to be independent, and that the underground Communists ("the people") must be supported. Aidit even condemned the idea that, since "confrontation" had destroyed Indonesia's trade outlets in Singapore, transit centres should be set up in other places such as Manila, Bangkok or Colombo. This, he said, would only serve capitalists. Trade should rather be developed with the new emerging forces, especially "the Socialist countries”, No retreat' slogan Aidit began his report to the party's December meeting with the slogan "Ever forward, no retreat" which describes perhaps the limits which support from the PKI places on Sukarno's freedom to manoeuvre, As Aidit explained to a rally in Peking in September, 1963, his party supports "without reservation" the Government's "progressive policies", attacking only "non-progressive" policies and Ministers. Nevertheless, “unity with the bourgeoisie must not hinder the efforts of the proletariat to organise revolution, to develop its party and expand its revolutionary masses". Evidently where Sukarno's policies coincide with Communist interests, he can expect perhaps even more backing than he wants. But the PKI reserves the strength which it is gathering from "confrontation" and Sukarno's neglect of economic and rural problems, to prevent any reverse of deviation from the prescribed Communist route. It was interesting to note that at the December congress Aidit had to calm some members' fears that the PKI might be swamped by the mass revolutionary peasant movement he is organising. Aidit assured them that the party would maintain firm control. "The peasants", he said, "did not want to take over the leadership from ae oe They ask to be led by the proletariat" (i.e. the PKI). The use of the peasants to give the united national front "s sound and militant basis" was the essence of "Indonesianising Marxist-Leninism",. === [PDF page 70] === Ultimately, Aidit added, the force of the peasants would be needed when the time came to throw over the other forces which had helped the PKI to power. Eventually, the people would have to "rise up under revolutionary leadership to overthrow beyrercts power completely". The ultimate goal Aidit also implied that the more extreme groups in the PKI had criticised him for giving Sukarno too much support. Such criticism does Aidit little harm since it serves to reassure waverers that the PKI is willing to concede some Communist aims and advantages in order to secure national unity and a "revolutionary" foreign policy. The basis of Aidit's answer to his party critics is that his methods will bring the Communists to power more effectively than any other and that his strategy does not mean abandoning either the party's independent identity or the ultimate goal of a Communist takeover. He argues, in effect, that the Communists should back Sukarno 100 per cent in fields where he is doing their work for them.