FCO 15/155: Indonesia, Political Affairs Internal, Arrests and Trials (1967-1968)

=== [PDF page 1] === retiree cn atta (N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.) ae FOREIGN DEPT. _ OFFICE SOUTH _ AST ASTA DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A. FILE FILE No. | PART OPENED CLOSED D + } SECLEE AN.B. The grading of this jacket musi - Fe Co eer a contained in it. 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V ast oe iE ae Nod ob WJwmoUiL tos oii © e 3g ' L OT aC) ON ULltLo Loy vv a Tose ta a uA ke [Unreadable] ben @ - & 20: a 3 es ge AC i ae..: om “| tat ‘fas > > | D Ct alt iCaetl u C nd 6O Upek | ” = y~ry 5 4°. \ eS -) e ) | ob be yy AD NY GA he 4s ob mm t,; i U 2 ¢) LY oa ad si ‘ ie TD dW dd et Po, BLA he ake tt Le J. & a & a a.. [Unreadable] : 2: Tfesics | 1 we, el | JOY and cL ek! oll ase os CHaneCerie» (Aw +t» Leeice Duin JUL 5 Scr ee; Aw AK sD - - : eng Se a s RAY uy vA a [Unreadable] Teg Qastinonl ann [Unreadable] | ike elie wu LLilG L taiiin } [Unreadable] 4 rn 4 a > | prs ( Te ahd eg Nd ae Caw gg. Mess 1% @t om ab: ~ eo PE poet Otte: 7 PAPER ry x h 3 whe S © sha epi Coe Ty TIAT I =~ Cr TIT AD) ' \ Si a * Hie? cba ow © mabe a dud \ pI a a NT ee === [PDF page 4] === RESTRICTED | DJAKARTA. 29 June, 1968. Moscow telegram No. 998 of 29 June reported the publication in "Pravda" of a protest by the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the countries of Asia and Africa against the continued imprisonment of a large number of Indonesian political prisoners. This has inevitably drawn a sharp reaction here and Adam Malik has publicly rejected the charges, which incidentally he attributes to the Soviet magazine “New Times” rather than to "Pravda". Malik is quoted as saying that thousands of PKI detainees were released some time ago (which is in fact true - it was done largely to ease the pressure on the gaols and camps) and as rejecting all foreign interference in Indonesia’s internal i ae airTalrse Le It is I think clear that any campaign by Moscow on behalf of the remaining PAL prisoners, of whom there are still azlarge number despite the recent releases, will have absolutely no effect, except perhaps to.increase the determination of the Indonesian Government to keep these "Undesirable elements” in wnat they regard as thelr proper place -—- 1.e. behind bars. 4 I am copying this letter to Chamcery Moscow, to Valerie Gibson I.R.D., to Bob Longmire in JRD and to Northern Vepartment. fom — P.L. O'Keeffe, isq., ow A WT) WI eluetile * 9 Foreign Office. RESTRICTED === [PDF page 5] === RECEIVED “IN KN CLALI ARCHIVES No 14 MOSCOW ‘TO FOREIGN OFFLCK TRELNO 998 Oo) JUNE, 1968 ICLASSI FLED ry x pepe [Unreadable] ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 998 OF 21 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO DUAKARTA. PRAVDA OF 21 JUNE PRINTS STRONGLY WORDED PROTEST BY GOVIET Comm TTEE OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE COUNYRIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA MBAINST THE CONTINUED IMPRISONMENT OF OVER 15¢,¢¢¢ INDONESI ANS FOR THEIR QUOTE PROGRESSIVE OPINIONS UNQUOTE, THE COMMITTEE EXPRESGED {TS SOLIDARITY WITH THE QUOTE DEMOCRATIC FORCES UNQUOTE OF INDONES( A) AND DEMANDED THE END OF REPRESSION AND ARBITRARY RULE, AND CALLED FOR THE LIBERATION OF INDONESI AN POLITICAL PRISONERS. STR G. HARRISON DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTI ON NORTHERN DEPT. S.E.A.D. NEWS DEPT. E.-W. C.D. RESEARCH DEPT. === [PDF page 6] === met ee. + Tae the Trial of bx—BrigadiersGeneral Soepardjo In paragraph 5 or our letter 12/67 of 8 July on the trial of udismam, I promised to give you the Gone Luding details of the earlier trial of tne ee Brigadier General Soepardjo, who was Sentenced to death on ee ois AL the last session of the Military Your, the presiding judge, Lit. Col. Sugiri, read out 100 page verdict pronouncing Soepardjo ouilty OL: € ri the charges laid AgAalNst nim Cs ee tne attachment t O Ronald Higgins' letter 1642/67 of 28 February). Oe Before passing the death sentence the court revoked ame djo's richt to be a member of the Armed Forces of Ind ng sla, claiming that he had betrayed his soldier's oath end been responsible for the death of several senior Army Officers. pr 2¢S 4, throughout the trial, Soepardjo participated in tne | conductiwe of his ow def fence mainta ing that the party threatening the legal government at Halim was in fact the generals who were at hat time at Kostrad, 1.6. Nasution & t end s0eharto. He claimed that he had never taken part in the xevolutionary Council, which was the L100, Of ao jam t ac ne, that he was not even a member ne PsK.1. and had been decorated for his part in hing the ne cevolt in oe Colonel Untung himself confirmed both these claims. insisted that the testimonies of Sumirat, sae ian: end Bambang Widjanarko proved that oukerno Knew nothing about and haa never been involved in the 40 September Movement. 201 [Unreadable] === [PDF page 7] === Os He claimed that his own actions, under tne orders of President Sukarno in aero eae the main streneth of the movement, the 550 and 404 Batte lions, had been the overriding factor in thwarting a coup and that nad 2b not been for the treasonable action of Generals Nasution and Soeharto prohibiting General Pranoto and Lt. General Umar Wirahadi Kusumah from meeting the President, the situation could have been settled without bloodshed. [Unreadable] ie DO Uf CX= Alt Wia rshal Wa: UDOETL. ang ex-Bris arLeLr General Sabur si voneTtel Soepardjo's denial of the use of armed force or of psychological pressure on Sukarno. 8, Finally Tjiam, the defence counsel, maintained that she purpose of the Gestapu hed in any ase been aimed at, the elimination of the 'Council of Generals' and not at the overthrow of the legal government. Ge The prosecuter, Lt. Col. Soebari, at times seemed to be defending Gen: srals Soeharto and Nasution rather than attacking Soepardjo. His case was substantiated by several, most ly military, w ritnesses, but he failed to produce any concrete or documentary evidence to refute the brilliant defence. However, Indonesian, unlike British, judicial logic firmly believes that a defendént should be assumed ¢ lilty until proved innocent, whatever his crime and cpaninaic was judged accordingly. 10. I am copying this letter to de Burlet in Polad pingapore,. (Tan Morgan) === [PDF page 8] === VOOM WOU STO OARTT NOL coer rrrTm a: een aay [Unreadable] Wis ore 78 any * ene i io T7 ‘yO A Nn aon Tat o " \ 7 ~TITTT FT Sa ae ™~ = ' [Unreadable] 09 Tt reTd TM ( ATPTOMTON TO TTATITT t LN AD AT or:: OF} UGTA UMO pr LGroudsy LOL LOUnGt) DOSOoTTS) oud AdwWoe-9.T¢ +r af UCYVIS LOA OUNN AwealeT LO AUT AOTUSS i CLTLO 1087 UT SBM ANOS at. 16174. SsWTIeT) 2 PNA TADAL A -:.: L. ao N ui iL a -\ 4 } Ln I: t; } e) ‘: Cc 4) L4 SOL WO Tt IUSD TOUTOO PSPUuTU-TS sew 7OU sem dnoo poaduerirze et. ae. ato [Unreadable] SUOTZOB SOATSTOAQNS J9U270 UTM Pue £(dnoos pyorduer1e stm To \j Jui % oi Lit\/e/ [Unreadable] SeSunNoo JO e2ep ou GOT Sedue1aea onc wo AUSUIIOAO TeRSOT OTTO e kL ~ eTAdoz of ADVI TASUOS B peyouNeT BSuTAeG UTM DEeSreUO Sem oT *needngyTTod s47T JO SeAaTINoOSxE ot) [Unreadable] [Unreadable] IMd 94} fO Joequowu JOTUSS pesseyUuoo-jTes ve st JO pue 9029 TWUIODN Ter2Ues FO ens wy > coos naan er / _ - or «. i akin a <7 ‘ fr ‘> * - - tl a oa 4 [Unreadable] SS EEE RY EE 2 RE eR Wo Seer EN ER See UBUISTpNS JO Teta, ou, ene a Dav [Unreadable] vet o an. oe Com om) oy “Qu oP? === [PDF page 9] === CONFIDENTIAL KECEIVED IN BRITISH EMBASSY (1642/67) fARCHIVES No 14] — 3 MAR 1967 | DJAKARTA 28 February 1967 I mentioned in another context recently that the trial of ex Brigadier General Supard jo, allegedly a leading plotter in the attempted coup of 1965, was shortly due to begin. 2. The trial began on 23 February and you may be interested in the enclosed copy of a report on its opening days composed by the Defence Attache. 3. At least until the President's agreement on 20 February to hand over his remaining powers to General Soeharto, the plan seems to have been to exploit Supardjo's apparent willingness to talk in order to blacken the President to the utmost before the MPRS meets next week on ¢ March. someone in the Ministry of Justice told me they thought the trial could be completed by then adding, with a rigidly straight face, that this trial would really finally establish the President's involvement. Le Something has clearly gone wrong. As you will see from the enclosure, Supardjo has either obstinately recanted the alleged confession he made under interrogation, or Soeharto has let it be known that the dogs are to be called off the Presidential trail. Which is the right answer will not become clear for several days. We shall of course send you an account of the remainder of the trial. 5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Bob de Burlet in POLAD Singapore. Te. Al (Ronald Higgins) P.L. O'Keeffe, Esq., South East Asia Dept., Foreign Office. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 10] === The trial before the Extraordinary Military Tribunal of ex Brigadier General Mustafa Sjarif Supardjo was opened in Djakarte on Thursday, 25 February. The presiding judge was Lt. Col. Sugiri, SH. Ze Supardjo was born in 1923 at Gombong, East Java, ani ut the time of the coup was commanding & Combat Command in Kalimantan (a gombat command in the Indonesian army is a tactical formation and is a near aoulivalont to « division). 4 Combat Command was part of Siaga Comnand 4@@.%he accused was therefore serving under the operational command of Air Wie Marshal Omar Dani aad Supard jo commanded some of the forces engaged in confrontation tasxs. he was deprived of his rank from 50 September 1965 and he was arrested in the eastern suburbs of Djakarta on 12 January 1967. The charras ly ace d were read out by the prosecutor, Lt. Col. Subari, SH, and were as toiloy (4) that between August and October 1965 he plottod conspirecy with other persons which involved staging a rebellion against the legal Goverment, (43) that on about 1 October 1965 he staged in Djakarta against the legal Governmer an organisation calilai the 59 September | and he used troops to kidnap army zencra.* were later murdered, that he, with other persons, in October 1965 admitted to 2zstablishiny a Hevolutionary Commecil and that he asked the @hief d&ecutive to charge the army leadership; (iv) between 2 October 1965 ani 12 January 1967 he was engaged in various activities ained at umicrmining the legal Covernment. Ceuns el 5. After the charges were read the Defence Geomeet], F.C. “lam assisted by Dr. Sumad ji, questioned the competence of the Court “y the acoused on the grounds that the Court was not oonvened undsr the Cons. tthon of lou). The objeetion was overruicd. During the submission Supsardjo in loud elear terms attempted to makes a plea. He likened the present rerio with that of Ancient Rome and in the end had to be firmly shut up by to presiding judge and prosecutor. 4. In denying the charges, Supardjo complained about the wetied of iis preliminary examination and several times denied that he tad mete sane of the statements submitted to the Court. According to the statements S ypaunijo said that he made monthly visits to Djakarta to repart to Usar Dhani. The last visit was on 26 September 1965 when he was told his cnild was ili. ‘le admitted on arrival that he went to the house of one Wr. ojan, who was a menver of the P.K.I. Central Committee. He later reported to Siac Dhani and was told by the latter not to return until 3 October. Omar Dani also told him of the proposed coup by the “Council of Generals”. On the ever * of 30 September he admitted going to “Uubang Buaja, where he said 1.2 sae nothing, not aven a briefing by ex -t. vol. Latif. He was, according * 7 a previcus statement, appoinie. « ~ pore tc che President about the apurehonsion of General Parman and for this rsason he went to the Memleks Pulscu carty on the morning of 1 October. He later went to Halim, where %¢@ repurtci to toe President. According to his statement Supardjo said that he tol’ President Sukarno about the kidnapping of the army generals and telling iin that General Nasution had escaped capture. Present at the time was Oirar Dhani, /tol. Saelan === [PDF page 11] === Cel. Saelan, General Sunarjo, and Air Viee Marshal Leo “att? The judge questioned the accused closely about what he had rep2tad nd Silpaa 29 repeated what he had said, adding that he was asked also to make a detailed port about the Gestapu Movement. As for being embraced by the President accused denied that this was so but admitted he had been patted on the back whilst the President made some joking remarks. He admitted knowing about the Gestapu but said it was only “Untung and his friends". About his report to the President, he said that at this time the President ordsred the movement to be stopped. 5. On questions relating to events at the command post at Halim, he eimitted meeting Untung and Latif and passing to them the President's order that the movement should be stopped. This was at 1200 hours. Only Sjam, who was also there, questioned the order Saying “if so, we are not acting according to plan". Supardjo denied having any hand in forming the Revolutionary Council and said he put a cross against his name on the list. 6. On the question of a new Winister/Army C. in C. Sypsrijo seid he suggested the names of Basuki Rachmat and Pranoto. There was some discussion amongst those present who included Admiral Martadinata, the Navy C. in C.: and General Sujipto, the Police C. in C., Omar Dhani and Dr. Liemena. ‘The names put forward included Generals Adjie, Mursid, Pranoto, Basuld. Rachmat end Soeharto. The President withdrew for five minuiss aid later announced the name of Pranoto. 11 this occured between 1500 and 1800 hours on 1 October 1965. The civilian, Sjam, had by this time left to carry the news to Aidit. About 1800 hours those at Halim learnt frou Col. Bambang Wid jarmako that KOSTRAD were about to attack Halim and thet some generals (by implication Soeharto) refused to come to Halim. Supardio said he regarded this as disobedience. Supardjo said that he xsked Omar Dhani to make preparations for the defence of Halim but the latter refused on the grounds that a cease fire had been ordered. Supardjo adwitted that next day he had a meeting with Untung and they both decided not to fight with the remnants of 15) and 530 Battalions, who were deployed rouun:!!!alim. Supard jo then left the air base and went into hiding. 7. One of the preliminary witnesses, Suéjono, testified that Supardjo was @ leader of the plot and the leading contender against the Coimeil of Generals. He desoribed the operations room at Halim which had been propsred for the Gestapu, and at 4.30 a.m. on 1 October he was told by the accused to prepare for the President's arrival at 0700 hours. Supardjo counents at the trial were to deny all that Su@jono had said, adding that the witness must be sick. 8. The trial continues. === [PDF page 12] === CKYL NIGHTLEAD TRIAL- 2: DJUAKARTA 2 SUPARDJO SAID HE HAD DEPLOYED TWO BRIGADES OF INFANTRYMEN ALONG THE BORNEO BORDER TO INVADE MALAYSIA WHEN THE ORDER CAME. "BUT THE GENERALS AT GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS PLACED THEM UNDER REGIONAL COMMANDERS, AND WHEN! GOT THERE I COULD NOT DIRECT THEM. I THINK THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE CONFRONTATIONS INDONESIA SIGNED A PEACE TREATY WITH MALAYSIA LAST AUGUST AFTER THREE YEARS OF FINANCIALLY=RUINOUS ARMED CONFLICT. SUPARDJO'S COCKILY CONFIDENT MANNER AND HIS OBVIOUS LACK O EAR OF A PROBABLE DEATH SENTENCE BROUGHT SMILES AND SOME APPLAUSE FROM THE PACKED COURTROOM YESTERDAY. BUT TODAY THE CROWD BOOED HIM TO SILENCE WHEN HE. DECLARED: "THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS ARE IN POWER IN INDONESIA, WHILE THE LEGAL MINISTERS ARE IN JALbc CHIEF JUDGE ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL SUGIRI, PALE WITH ANGER, RAPPED OUT "DON'T GO TOO FAR.". 2 neers MORE PJM/MG 21450 RECEIVED IN + ARCHIVES No. 14 CKY1. NIGHTLEAD TRIAL 3 DJAKARTA SUPARDJO TOLD THE TRIBUNAL TODAY HE HAD BRIEFED PRESIDENT SUKARNO ON THE MORNING OF THE COUP THAT SIX GENERALS HAD BEEN: KIDNAPPED AND MURDERED AND ANOTHER, THEN DEFENCE MINISTER GENERAL ABDUL HARIS NASUTION, HAD BEEN WOUNDED. THE PRESIDENT CLAPPED HIM ON THE SHOULDER AND SAID: "THAT SORT OF THING WILL HAPPEN IN A REVOLUTION." THE PRESIDENT'S APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN OVER THE FATE OF HIS FORMER REVOLUTIONARY COMRADES IN ARMS HAS ALREADY BEEN USED IN THE CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT HIM FOLLOWING WIDESPREAD DEMANDS FOR HIS RESIGNATION. REUTER PJM/MG 514571 === [PDF page 13] === ie cis TRIAL CSCHEDULED) BY JACK GILLON DJAKARTA, FEBe- 24, REUTER -—- A FORMER TOP ARMY OFFICER ON TRIAL FOR HIS LIFE HERE TODAY DEFIED THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMY STRONGMAN GENERAL SUHARTO AND SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT THE NOW-POWERLESS PRESIDENT SUKARNO TO THE DEATH. IN AN IMPASSIONED DECLARATION BRIGADIER=GENERAL SUPARDJO, Ad, TOLD A SPECIAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: "I WILL DEFEND SUKARNO UNTIL IT IDIEs” SUPARDJO, FORMER COMMANDER OF TROOPS IN WEST BORNEO AND ALLEGED MILITARY STRATEGIST BEHIND THE 1965 ABORTIVE COMMUNIT COUP, 1S CHARGED WITH TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BY THE CHARGE CARRIES THE DEATH SENTENCE. HE HAS PLEADED NOT GUILT Yeo SUPARDJO AGAIN LASHED OUT AT THE INDONESIAN GENERALS, WHOM HE CLAIMS ARE RUNNING THE COUNTRY, ACCUSING THEM OF SABOTAGING INDONESIA'S CONFRONTATION OF NEIGHBOURING MALAYSIA. MORE PJM/MG 98 74 3€2 === [PDF page 14] === ® CONFIDENTIAL : } RECE! J C 0 HN H ARCHIVES No. 14 LONDON, S.W.1. N7FEB b/ | 46 February, 1967. Ji ET RRIEE Dit Thank you for your letter 1642/67 of 7 February in whieh you encloseda very comprehensive account of the trial of Omar Dhani prepared by Group Captain Charney. This account is by far the most comprehensive we have seen both of the trial itself and of the September 30 coup. Wik has been copied to the departments principally coneerned and I am sure they would wish me to propose a vote of thanks to Group CaPtain Charney for this most valuable contribution to our understanding of the events which his report describes. (P. L. O'Keeffe) R. T. Higgins, Esq., British Embassy, DJAKARTA, CONFIDENTIAL “ot [ A === [PDF page 15] === CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH EMBASSY ARCril\ BS | y. 14) [Unreadable] 7 February 1967 Dwh_ In my letter 1642/67 of 3 January I explained that instead of compiling our own account of the trial of former Air Marshal Omar Dhani we would send you a copy of that by the Air Attache. Ze This has just been completed. It is perhaps too long for some purposes but you may yourself find quite useful the Appendix on the abortive coup of 1965. Research Department may like to see the detailed account of the trial. 5e The copy enclosed is our only one and our photocopier is out of action. I should be grateful therefore if you could have a copy made for POLAD and another to be returned to us. Le I am sending a copy of this letter to Bob de Burlet in POLAD. Laat (Ronald Higgins) P.L. O'Keeffe,Esq., south East Asia Dept., CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 16] === AA/DIAK/25/1 THE COURT MARTIAL OF OMAR DANI, LATELY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF @ F THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE, ON A CHARGE OF TREASON APPENDIX:= AN ACCOUNT OF THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP OF THE 30TH SEPTEMBER 1965 BASED ON REVELATIONS MADE DURING THE TRIAL OF OMAR DANI Introduction 1. The Court Martial of Omar Dani, (p.s.c. Andover), former Air Marshal and lately Commander~in-Chief of the Indonesian Air Force (A.U.R.I.) until his replacement by A.V.M. Sri Muljono Herlambang on the 15th December 1965, by the Extraordinary Military Tribunal (MAHMILLUB), is now over. Predictably, Omar Dani was found guilty and sentenced to death just before midnight on Christmas Eve 1966, this final act being televised live throughout Java, The purpose of this paper is to give an account of his trial and to inolude a summary of the events surrounding the abortive Communist Coup of the 30th September 1965 which finally brought him before a Military Court accused of treason, I give the confusing story as I have been able to make it out, bearing in mind that it is based on indifferent and often differing unofficial translations of the procedings from the vernacular Press, in the Appendix. I have here and there commented on or clarified situations which would otherwise mean little to one not acquainted with the subject. These notes are enclosed in square brackets. | The Charges Ze The two charges against Omar Dani were that he:- (a) Not only gave every facility to certain persons to stage an armed rebellion against the legal Governnent6f Endonesie, but that he obstructed the Government's efforts to crush this rebellion, and that (b) In his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of A.U.R.I. he had separately of together with other persons conspired to overthrow the legal Government of Indonesia. The Case for the Prosecution 36 These charges were based mainly on his activities between April and October 1965 when it was alleged that amongst other things he provided an opportunity for, or at least approved of, military training for members of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) youth front organisations, the Pemuda Rakjat (male) and the Gerwani (female), by A.U.R.I. Quick Action Troops (P.G.T.) at Lobang Buaja, near if not actually within the perimeter of Halim A.F.B. Djakarta. And further, that he provided A.U.R.I. weapons, transport and other facilities for the abduction and murder of the Army Chief of Staff, five other Army Generals and one junior officer, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 17] === he Together with a number of other Air Attaches, and in the company of many of the present batch of senior A.U.R.I. officers, I attended the first session of the triel which was held in Djakarta on the 5th December 1966. As usual the temporary Court House was heavily cuarded, all roads leading to it were blocked and light A.A. guns were sighted round the vicinity as they were for the recent trial of Dr Soebandrio, the former Foreign Minister. Omer Dani arrived in an armoured personnel carrier escorted by armoured cars, scout cars in the van motor cycle outriders, with sirens wailing, cleared the streets. He cam°into the court room wearing a dark suit and was placed facing the judges with his back to the spectators. De I had not seen him since I attended a passing-out parade at the A.U.R.I. academy at Jogjakarta (C.Java) some 18 months ag (when he was kind enough to come over and shake hands with myself and my American colleague, neither of us very popular in those days} but I was nevertheless astonished at the change in him. He had lost a lot of weight and looked pale and gaunt. Much different from the smiling, handsome and confident man I had seen and spoken to a number of times before. Although perfectly calm and composed he spoke in a low, barely audible voice. 6. What I saw of the trial, conducted by a Presiding judge (A.U.RsI. Lt.Col. SOKBONO MANTOFANI S.H. of the Legal Branch) assisted by three other judges from the Services, seemed to me entirely unobjectionable and the accused was | treated with civility, although the procedure differed somewhat from our own. After the reading of the charges by the Prosecutor, the Presiding Judge then went through the equivalent of what I assume was the Summary of Evidence, step by step with the accused. His object was to clarify vague and misleading replies to questions posed to Omar Dani during the preliminaries to the trial. This he did most expertly, getting him in no time to state among other things that he considered the dead generals to have been "reactionary" whereas he considered himself to be “progressive revolutionary". The%e could hardly be a more damning admission in the present political climate. Omar Dani‘*s Defence Te A summary of Omar Dani's plea»apologia might be a better description is given in the paragraphs that follow. Much is self explanatory but it will help if the story at the Appendix is read first. 8. Before Omar Dani took the stand to make his plea his Defence Council, SOENARJO S.H., demandéd that allcharges against the accused be dropped as they had not been proven. Omar Dani, as a Minister and the A,U.K.1I. Commanderin-Chief was only one of the President's Aides, “as it just to try him without also trying his master? (This fairly accurately reflects public sentiment here in Djakarta). His only fault had been loyalty to the President and to the Foreign Minister, Dr SOZBANDRIO. His visit to China was on the President's orders as was his visit to Holland, after the coup, on Government business. This could only mean that as far as the President was concerned OMAR DANI had not been guilty of any offence. Furthmore, he returned to Indonesia of his own free will. Omar Dani, through still a young man, had built up A.U.RI. into one of the strongest Air Forces in S.& Asia and he proposed that he be appointed as the expert to supervise Indonesia’ Military build-up. === [PDF page 18] === 9. Soenarjo ended this plea by challenging the authority of the Court, It had not been convened in a legal manner, but merely by a Presidential decree which had never been ratified by Parliament, In addition, it was against the rules of justice to permit no appeal to be made against the verdict, the only recourse left to the accused in the event of his being found guilty was an appeal to the President for clemency, Good legal points I imagine but carrying little weight in Indonesia these days. 10. OMAR DANI himself spoke for some 23 hours and ended by saying that his defence might be summed up as follows:- (a) He was the one responsible for his and A.U.R.I.'S reckless actions whilst he was its Commander-in-Chief. (b) He knew nothing of the prologue or epilogue to the counter revoluntionary coup and was not implicated in it. (c) He had never conceived any plot to change the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia, 11. The other main points he made were that it had not yet been ascertained who were the "main actors" in the coup. He denied that he was Communist inclined or that he wanted to make A.U.R.I. Communist. Was it wrong if he sought to publicise and explain President Soekarno's teachings on NASAKOM (Unity of Nationalist, Religious and Communist elements in Society)? He said that all along he had been guided by the teachings of the President Soekarno and if he had misinterpreted their meaning he would accept full responsibility. However, if indeed he had misinterpreted them and the PKI had benefited it was not entirely his fault. He defended his instruction for Marxism to be taught at the A.U.R.I. Staff College by PKI lecturers, saying he agreed with President Soekarno that Marxism was "a sharp knife analysing historical events". And, if one was to learn anything about Marxism what more natural than to have it expounded by a Communist? He had never in his capacity as A.U.R.I. Commander—in-Chief urged it to lean towards the P.K.I. He had merely made it clear that considered the P.K.I. a well organized, disciplined and militant party. Was it wrong then if he advised A,U.R.I. to follow its example? 126 Referring to the "Council of Generals" Omar Dani admitted that he had stubbornly refused to belive that it had never existed, because in the past opposition to the President's policy had always come from certain groups within the Army, This conviction was strengthened when he was shown the "Gilchrist letter". Also he had been told earlier by Soepardjo, whose information he had always trusted, that he had seen with his own eyes evidence that a racial incident in BANDOENG (W.JAVA) in 1965 had been supported by a group of Army Officers. However, he denied having endorsed (though it was wetl known that he was the only Service Commander who did) the setting up of the"5th Force" ( i.e, the arming of the peasants or the creation of a Peoples Militia in Indonesia there are 4 Forces, viz:- Army,Navy,Air Force and Police) which Soekarno started to push after his talks with the Chinese Premier, Chou En Lai. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 19] === CONFIDENTIAL @: 3. Omar Dani rejected the written testimonies given by SUJONO (who apparently said that Omar Dani jad known of the Coup three months before it took place) and HERU ATMODJO, regreting that he was not confronted with these witnesses. Although the statement made by both Sujono and Heru were read to the Court there does not appear to have been any record published of what they contained, One can only assume, from Omar Dani's reaction, that they showed his complicity in the Coup and that the part they played in it was on his orders. His message to Gen SOEHARTO, from his €130 Hercules cruising over Java on the night of 1st October 1965, in which he requested him not attack Halim A.F.B., was sent he said to prevent bloodshed, (It was noteworthy that in his plea Omar Dani never once referred to Soekarno's presence at Halim A.F.B. on the ist October 1965). e Trial achieved 14. In many ways this trial may seem at first sight to have been something of an anti-climx. When Soebandrio failed to implicate President Soekarno during his trial everyone thought that Omar Dani would do so in the process of trying to exonerate A,U.R.I., the reason for which it has always been assumed that he returned to Indonesia, It was expected that he would say trat the part he and A.U.R.I. played in the Coup was on the direct orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, President Soekarno, and roundly declare that full res= posibility must rest with him, In the event he did not do this although his Defence Counsel made it fairly clear whom he considered was the real culprit. Omar Dani took the blame himself and tried to shield Soekarno. However, he did state emphatically that whatever A.U.R.1. did whilst he was it's Commanderin-Chief must be his responsibility and his alone. This ceurageous though foolhardy admission has had something of the desired effect, 156 Inevitably, some of the evidence produced at Omar Dani's trial by various witnesses, particularly that regarding Soekarno's presence at Halim A.F.B. on the ist October 1965, has served to prove, if further proof were needed to convince the man in the street, that he knew very well what was going on and had given the movement his blessing if not his actual support. Whilst one had the feeling that, as was the case during the Soebandrio trial, a good deal more could have been said to incriminate Soekarno that the little ( relativley speaking) that was, it has had the effect of bringing home Soekarno's involvement in a far more subtle and convincing way, As it so often the case what has only been partially revealed has set imaginations working overtime. Soepardjo captured 16. As I write it is announced that Brig.Gen. Soepardjo was captured at Halim A.F.B. on 12th January 1967. This event as 1 see it is the last nail in Soekarno‘'s coffin. The trial of the pan who carried out the Coup, however reticent he may wish to be, will add futher if not conclusively to our knowledge of Soekarno's involvement. Soepardjo's capture will have been a serious set back for Soekarno and he may now decide to clear out, if he can. He has probably by now realised that, if the worst comes to the worst, he too will end up in the dock. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 20] === The Verdict and Sentence 17. The trial ended on the 24th December, having lasted for 16 sittings @f up to 5 hours each during which over 40 witness gave evidence either in person or in writing. The verdict was one of guilty and the death sentence was imposed. In addition, Omar Dani was dismissed the Service with dishonour and made to forfeit his awards and decorations. During the 34 hours it took the Judge to read his summing up Omar Dani sat motionless but attentive, indifferent to the television arc lights and camera flashbulbs. When it was over he was asked whether he intended to appeal to the President for clegency. He replied that he did so intend. He then stood up and,now a convict, stretched out his arms to have handcuffs fitted. Hie was led away amidst a huddle of Military Police. 18. I ought here to explain a peculiarity of the Indonesian judicial system. On conviction by the MAHMILLUB the accused is given 30 days in which to appeal for clemency, if he wishes to do sa, to the President, There is however no time limit during which the President must make up his mind and the unfortunate convict may therefore rot in goal for ever. Thus a death sentence is automatically commuted to life imprisonment if he neither grants a reprieve nor turns down the appeal. This is all somewhat academic since Soekarno is not at present in a position to do either. He cannot reprieve someone sentenced for complicity in the hated Communist Coup without causing a public outery. Neither can he confirm the sentence without alienating his supporters and Communist syupathisers,. Continued rotection of the President 19. Exactly why both Soebandrio and Omar Dani should have taken such pains to protect the arch-villain Soekarno, who is no longer ( but they may have had different views) in a position to do very auch to help them, is something of a puzzle. In Soebandrio's case it might possibly be attributed te strong ideological convictions, but I do not think this will bear closer examination. Soebandrio may be a Communist but I doubt whether he is sufficiently fervent in his beliefs, or possessed of the necessary amount of personal courage, to martyr himself for this or any other cause. Omar Dani Ate:2 would say certainly not a Communist, rather a rogue who saw that a considerable persoiel power and advantage would be his in return for his active support of the Communist cause. If this is so then I would have expected that he would, having nothing left to lose, have made this perfectly clear; that in fact he hitched his wagon to the wrong star. Nothing more nor less than that. 20. The only obvious explanation is that it was out of a sense of loyalty to Soekarno, perhaps misplaced but nevertheless sincere, I find this a little hard to accept unless one considers an even more sinister possibility; that Seebandrio and Omar Dani both judged that Soekarno would ‘win’ in the end and played their cards accordingly. A year ago this might have been any even money bet, but by the time they were put on trial the odds had shortened very considerably. Nevertheless, it may explain what has always been an enigma to me at any rate. This is why Soebandrio and the other arrested ministers did not make a bolt for it while the going was good, and why Omar Dani returned to Indonesia ostensibly of his own free will. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 21] === a return 216 Whether Omar Dani did in fact come back to Indonesia of his own free will or not is a moot point, given his physical appearance at his trial. The circumstances are now fairly well known. He came back to Djakarta in an A.U.R.I. hercules on or about the 2th April 1965, escorted by Air Commodore Suwondon, from Phom Phen. Assuming that he was not kidnapped one can only surmise that it was either because he wanted to do so for reasons know only to himself, or that some strong inducement, perhaps blackmail might be a better word, was offered to him. His wife and children are as far is known still in Cambodia. I have no real evidence to go on but I feel that Omar Dani’s decision to return was not entirely his own and that some trick was played on him. He must after allhave had some idea of the probable concequences. Having said all this I would not wish to preclude the possibility, since he is a fellow airman, that it was the strong sense of duty common to so many of us. Conclusion _ 226 The Omar Dani trial was, as Courts Martial go, fairly straight forward and most would agree that he is guilty of the offences with which he was charged. But I think that it will be remembered in later years not s@ much as an instance of justice meted out to yet another of Indonesia's rebels; rather as part of the tortuous and prolonged manoeuvres which were to lead to the downfall of President Soekarno, for which purpose ( let us face it) was established the whole paraphenalia of MAHMILLUB, 236 As an afterthought one might add that perhaps only in Indonesia, where the bizarre is commonplace, could Mahmillub, in effect a Court Martial, be established to try civilians as well as members of the Armed Forces without Martial Law having been declared. It is all the more perplexing when one considers that the latter by the time they appear in court are in fact civilians, having been deprived of their military status. Be that as it may, these military courts in Djakarta, Jogjakarta (C.Java) and Medan(Sumatra) have between them tried 5 civilians (all death sentences) and 11 former officers (8 death, 5 life imprisonment) for offences arising out of the Coup. This does not take into account countless others like D.N. Aidit, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the P.K.I., who were summarily executed shortly after their capture, or who were shot down "whilst attempting to escape", an occupational Yazard for anyone with Communist sympathies captured in Indonesia these days. However, considered in relation to the more than half a million (sic) people who have died in Indonesia as a result of the Coup, these few constitute a mere drop in the ocean. One can I suppose draw cold comfort from the thought that had the Coup succeeded the P.K.I., under its ruthless leader, would have enjoyed a field day marked by greater slaughter coupled with extreme Djakarta, Indonesia (K, L. CHARNEY) |6" January,1967 Group Captain Air Attache CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 22] === Appendix to AA/DIAK/25/1 dated 16th January 1967 1. Before reading this account it may help those who have had no occasion to concern themselves with Indonesian politics if I explain briefly what happened. Soekarno, founder and first President of Indonesia, a sick, ageing, long-time Communist sympathise, is working, aided and abetted by his Foreign Minister Dr Soebandrio, toward the fulfillment of a long cherished dream of turning his country into a Communist State. His posture over the last few years has become increasingly pro-China and anti-Yest, and he has for some time been actively assisting the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) to infiltrate and to increase its power and influence in the Government, in the Armed Forces and throughout the country generally. In addition, he has been able to persuade the Commander-in-Chief of a powerful ally, the Indonesian Air Force (A.U.R.I.), to support him in the furtherence of this aim. In this he is strongly opposed by the Army, which has already put down one Communist uprising in Indonesia (at Nadiun in 1948) in the short period of its independence, and is only waiting for the moment when Soekarno departs the political scene to deal with the Communists once and for all. The Master Plan 26 The Communists are fully aware of al) this and realise that a clash is inevitable. They appreciate that their main hope is to strike first, perferably while soekarno is still alive and able to hold the balance in their favour until the opposition is neutralised. Their master plan, for which they have obtained promises of aid and arms from China, is therefore to stage a Coup in 1970 when, they judge, the time will be ripe for revolution. Ittis intended as abirthday gift for a certain President" and will be carried out in the following stages:- Elimination of the Army leadership. “stablishment of a Revolutionary Council. Removal (elimination of all anne een civil and military leaders. Sstablishment of a Peoples Republic and the formation of a Peoples “ilitia. Ve. Setting up of Communes as a way of life. The "30th September Movement" | 3. However, in June 1965 Chinese doctors supplied by Chou in Lai to treat Seekarno report that he may not have much longer to live. This coupled with reports that the Army is now aware of its plans and is about to start a large scale investigation into its activities, leaves the P.K.I. no alternative but to advance drastically its Coup target date. It sust act quickly if it is to act at all. Accordingly, preparations are hastened and the Communists embark on CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 23] === CONFIDENTIAL Stage I during the night of the 30th September 1965 fo hence the 30th sale. Novement” or GESTAPU in the vernacular/ when they manage to abduct and murder the Army Chief of Staff and five other General. A matter of hours —- Stage II is implemented with the announcement of the establishment of | Revolutionary Council. But the Coup, so very nearly successful, is doomed to failure and the forces which will decimate the Communists and later ban the P.K.I. are already on the move. Soekarno cannot or will not do anything to prevent it. It is perhaps because he is quick to sense this failure and sees there is nothing to be gained by openly supporting a, however temporarily, lest case, THE PROLOGUE The Council of Generals he Omar Dani claimed that in April 1965 he was told by Brig.Gen Soepardjo Commander of the 4th Combat Command in Borneo) that there was dissatisfaction among younger Army officers over the policies adopted by the Army leadership. Referring to Soepardjo, a subordinate of his in the Alert Theatre Command, he sai“that he regarded him as a good officer who cared for the welfare of his men and that he. and Soepardjo could appreciate each other's way of thinking. It is probable that it was from him that Omar Dani first heard ef the existence of the so-called Council of Generals, although he said as far as he could remember it was the President who had told him about it at a casual meeting sometime in June. But it came out in evidence that an A,U.R.I. Conference had been held at Tkibogo (W.Java) that same month at which its existence was disclosed by Lt.Col. Heru Atmodjo (A.U.R.I. D.D.of Int) Omar Dani said that he heard that it consisted of Generals Nasution, (Chief of the Armed Forces Steff) Adjie (Commander of the Sili Division, Kodam VI) and those later abducted and murdered by the P.K.I. / Whether the Council of Generals existed for the purpose with which it was credited in effect the leadership of the anti-left Wing forces in Indonesia- has never been proved. My own view is that it did exist, and for the purpose stated,/: The “Gilchrist Letter" De On the 25th April Omar Dani was told about the "Gilchrist letter" by A.V.M. Sir Muljono Herlambang, one of the Special Advisers to the President. He was eventually shown a copy_on the 26th May and noted a reference in it to "our local Army friends". / This notorious forgery, copies of which Dr Soebandrio: distributed in Cairo, was published by Al Ahram in its issue of the 5th July 1965. It purports to be a draft of a telegram to be sent as a reply from Sir Andrew Gilchrist (then British Ambassader to Indonesia) to the Foreign Office, on questions raised by a planned Anglo-American invasion of Indonesia, In this document mention is made of “our local Army friends". This was faked by Soebandrio as proof of the existence of the "Council of 6. In his evidence Herlambang said that in May (not April) he had represented Omar Dani (he was still A.U.R.I. Deputy for Operations) at a ineeting of the Armed Forées Commanders at the Palace at which both the Council of Generals" and the Gilchrist letter” had been raised. He said that the President had asked Gen. Yani what was meant by the phrase “our local Arny friends" which appeared in the “Gilchrist letter", and whether there were individuals or groups of Army officers who made contacts with foreign embassies. Yani had replied that there were. He had entrusted liaiason with the American Embassy to Gen.Sukendro and with the British lmbassy to Gen.Parman. All this he had reported to Omar Dani. 7. It is very doubtful whether this conversation ever took place. === [PDF page 24] === UUN FLUENTLAL Qoenuni t Youth Fronts Given Military Training ro In’ Hay A.U.R.I. Base Defence Troops (P.P.P.) began giving military training to civilians with a view to “mobilising the people who lived in the vicinity of airbases for the defence of those bases". But it turned out that the trainees were members of the male and female Communist Youth Fronts, the Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani reapectively. In all some 1.200 were trained at Lobang Buaja (Crocodile Hole) near Halim A.F.B., where the abducted generals were later to be taken and thrust down a well. Omar Dani stated that this was undertaken on Major Soejono's initiative (Sujono, a key figure in the Coup, was the P.P.P. Regiment Commander) and that it was only after the first patch #84 been trained that Sujono reported what he was doing to him. Sujono denied this. | | 8. When he heard that most of the participants were members of the P.K.I. Omar Dani said he gave orders to the effect that more elements of the Nationalist and Religious groups were to be included. The object nevertheless * '/ ices decidedly le In his evidence Air Commodore Dewanto (A,U.R.I. Deputy r Operations and also D. of Int.) confirmed this, saying that Sujono had on his own initiative selected Communists for training and increased the numbers from 120 to 1200. However, he admitted that the original instructions had in fact come from Omar Dani. Sujono, for his part, had always maintained that what he had done had not only been on Omar Danis orders but that he knew perfectly well who was being trained. 9. On the 4thAugust Herlambang reported to Omar Dani that Soekarno was ill. That evening Col. Sudijono (A.U:R.I. D of Personal Maintenance) and an informant named Walujo (since gone to ground) told him about the President's failing health and that in the event of his decease there would be a struggle for power between the “Progressive Revolutionaries" * i i.e. the P.K.I./ and the Army. On the following day Omar Dani held a meeting with his senior officers and told them that the President‘s illness was serious and that A.U.ReI. should consider the possibility of clashes taking place if he were to die, adding that in any conflict A.U.R.I. would unhesitatingly side with the “Progressive Revolutionary" group. It may weal be that Omar Dani had more than a passing interest in Soekarno's illness and in any clash which might follow his death. 10. When Air Commodore Wattimena (Commander of Operations Command) was giving evidence he was asked whether the P.X.I. had ever approached Omar Dani on the possibility of his succeding Soekarno. He replied that Omar Dani had once "casually" let it be known to several A.U.R.I. officers that they should be aware that he was considered the most likely candidate to succeed the President in the event of his death. Wattimena did not know however from what quarter this suggestion had cone. / I think this probably an exaggeration. Even Omar Dani can hardly have taken this sort of flattery seriously. According to my own information his ambition was to step into Nasution's shoes as head of the Armed Forces Staff, at that time the only four star post in Indonesia/ * was that they should all be turned into "Progressive Revolutionaries” CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 25] === CONFIDENTIAL cae S$ 11. At the suggestion of Dewanto Omar Dani decided to launch Operation Utuh (Utuh = Intact, undamaged) this was designed to safeguard the President { but it was never explained what it involved/, Sujono, to whom Omar D had once remarked that in the interests of the "Revolution" the A.U.2.I. Arms Depot at Mampang (near Halim A.F.B.) could be broken into, reported at about this time that Soepardjo was ready to launch a military operation to counter a Coup being prepared by the “Council of Generals". 12. Between the 16th and 19th September Omar Dani, Herlembang, Air Commodore Andoko (A.U.R.I. Deputy for Logistics) and 5 Technical officers went to Peking on instructions from Soekarno, in one of the Presidential Jetstars, to inquire about China's promise of 100.000 small arms. According to Andoko only 25.000 could be made available and the shipment amounting to _ 400 tons would have to be arranged by the Indonesians. As far as he knew it had never arrived. The Armed Forces Staff was not informed about this mission to purchase arms fas it ought to have been/ but it Soon found out.iGn his return Omar Dani reported the results of his mission only to Dr Sosbandrio, the Foreign Minister. However, he revealed in evidence that the main task which had been given him by the President was to foster co-operation between Indonesia, China and Pakistan. During the visit he had on his own initiative asked the Chinese whether they could provide A.U.8... with facilities for overhauling aircraft. He had also asked the Deputy Commander of the Chinese Air Force whether small arms could be exchanged for military equipment for SoU.ReI. Curiously, Omar Dani admitted that Herlambang was given a special assignnent by the President, saying that what it was the Court had better hear from Herleambang himself. But what it was did not come out. Just before leaving for China Omar Dani said that he saw D.N, Aidit at a mecting at the Palace. Aidit asked him whether it was true khat he was going to China. On being told that it was he said "Don't be too long". 1 3S When he gave his version of what the visit was about Herlambang said that Omar Dani had asked the President for permission for him (Herlambang) tp accompany him to China, In China they had discussed joint Indonesian- Chinese aid to Pakistan and the possibility of getting spare parts for A.U.ReIe from China. The question of light arms was, according to lierlambang, Omar Dani*s idea and was not included in the instructions, as he knew then, from the President or Soebandrio. On their return he accompanied Omar Dani to see Soebandrio and report the results of the mission. Asked by the Judge why they had reported to Soebandrio and not to the President, who had ordered them to go to China, he said he did not know. The President's version, given in a written statement is that as far as he could remember Omar Deni came to sen kim to discuss the possibility of obtaining arms from China for DWIKORA (Twofold Command te crush Malaysia) purposes and that he had agreed to the mission. the General Nasution gave this account in his written testimony. He said he was told nothing about Omar Danis mission to China, only finding out about it leter when Brig.Gen. Mursjid (The Army Deputy for Operations) appealed to him not to accept aid from China. Nasution stressed that the purchase of arms from abroad had to be erranged through him in his capacity as Minister for Defence and National Security and Chief of the Armed Forces Staff and the procedure was well established. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 26] === ow GQ) The Hen are Becoming Restive 15. On the 29th September Soepardjo reported that "the men are becoming restive". On the same day Omar Dani told Soekarno that 20.000 troops would be in Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day parade on the 5th October and expressed his concern for Soekarno's safety. Soekarno, who gave Omar Dani the impression that he was already aware of this, told him to come to Palace at Bogor (W.Java) on the 3rd October, with Soepardjo ee Why hin? to discuss it. Qperation TAKARL ° 16. On the 30th September at 4 p.m. Heru Atmodjo visited Omar Dani to tell him the “The Soepardjo group would stage an action on the following day" but he did not divulge the sero hour. That evening Omar Dani held a meeting at his house attended by A.V.M, Makki Perdanakusuma (Deputy for Logistics, Armed Forces li.0.), and Air Commodores Soesanto, Wattimena, Andekeo and Dewanto. At this meeting Hefu Atmodjo gave a briefing on Soepardjo's intentions. Heru told them that the "Council of General" planned to carry out a Coup on the 5th October when there would be a large concentration of troops in the capital for the Armed Forces Day parade, The Generals would hold a meeting at Tjipanas (¥.Java) on 2nd October to finalise their plans., q7. He then revealed that that very night Soeparde would start a: t" to frustrate them. It would be known as Operation TAKARI This is an acronym of Tahun Berdikeari, itself an acronym of, I give the Mnglish translation, “Year of Standing on Ones Own Feet", the title of Soekarno's Independence Day speech on the 17th August 19657 He informed those present that those against the General's Coup (i.e. Soepardjo and his men) wanted to use A,U.R.I. vehicles and arms, Asked why Soepardjo's counter Coup could not be prevented Heru replied that "it was an internal affair of the Army” and that A,U.R.I. “agreed to a purge in the Revolutionary tools.? In Indonesian "Alat Revolusi", a popular catch-phrase in those days. Everyone and everything had to be a "tool of the Revolution", or else In the discussion that followed fears were expressed that the "internal affairs of the Army" would become a national one, but it was decided that 4eU.RoI. would adopt a “wait and see but remain alert” attitude. As Bol. Decides to Help Soepardio 18. Through Heru Atmodjo, Omar Dani was pressed by Sujono to lend A.U.RI. vehicles and arms to Soepardjo and to let him use the Penas (Aerial Survey) building, which belonged to A.U.R,I. and was situated on the Djakarta by pass near Halim A,F,B, This was all discussed at this meeting and it was decided that "it could not be prevented” and that this was a movement from below". This being so, A.U.R.I. might well get itself into trouble if these requests were not granted. Omar Dani therefore instructed Andoko to arrange - for vehicles, Dewanto for arms and Wattimena to take charge of Operation Utuh. The Generals be abducted were named at this meeting. In_his evidence Makki Perdanakusuma / after whose brother Halim A,F*,B. is named_/ expressed his shame and regret that he had taken no action when he heard that General . Nasution, one of whose Deputies he was in the Armed Forces Headquarters, was one of then, | CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 27] === CONFIDENTIAL 19. Omar Dani and his officers evidently justified their actions to 6 themselves by taking the line that the Soepardjo movement was"an internal affair of the Arny" in which they could not interfere. / This must have taken some swallowing. Perhaps, like the Irishman, they were neutral ‘for Soepardjo and neutral ‘against’ the Generals! / It was decided at this meeting that Omar Dani should spend the night at Halim A.F.B. because "Soepardjo's movement might endanger the Minister/Commander-in-Chief of A.U.R.I." At this stage the Judge, somewhat surprised, asked why this should have been so. Omar Dani had no answer. He arrived at Halim at about midnight and stayed with his adjutant in the Operations Command building. 20. Col.Sunarjo (Commander of Air Regional Command V, Djakarta) said in evidence that Dewanto came to his house at 10,30 peme on the 30th September and told him that there would be some upheaval in the Army but that A.U.R.I. would not interfere. However, should there be a request for arms from Army sources Sunarjo would receive a message from him beforehand. Dewanto explained that Soepardjo was going to take action against certain senior Army officers, but he did not mention their names. Later Sunarjo received a report from the Arms Depot to the effect that it had been broken into and weapons removed. Sunarjo also said that when he heard about the training being given at Lobang Buaja he orderd it to be stopped, but as things turned out it carried on. THE COUP AU-Rale Transport, Arms and Ammunition Commandeered 21. At about 10 p.m. that evening some 17 cars were taken from the A.U.RI. HQs M.T., pool and driven to the Tjawang-Tjililiton crossroads (on the outskirts of Djakarta). Later a further 7 vehicles were commandeered from the pool by uniformed and armed men who claimed they were acting on orders from Omar Dani. It was also at about this time that several trucks full of, again, uniformed and armed men acting on the orders of the A.U.R.I. Commander-insChief (though no authority could be produced) arrived. at the A.U.R.I. Arms Depot and told the guard there to open it. He demurred but the doors were forced open and some 300 pistols, bren guns and other arms and ammunition were removed. President Soekarno’s Movements 22.6 Meanwhile, what had Soekarno been up to? On the evening of the 50th September he had addressed a large gathering (a Conference of Technicians) at the Sports Stadium in Djakarta. During his usual harangue he had faltered and had to leave the platform for a while. However, he recovered and finished his speech. Lt.Col. Suparto, the President's Private Assistant, told the court that he then accompanied Soekarno to Ibu Dewi's house in the Djakarta suburb of Slipi, only to discover that she had not returned from the Hotel Indonesia where she was dining with the Persian Ambassador { They went to the hotel and while Soekarno waited in the car Suparto got hold of Dewi. They all returned to her house and Suparto then went home. 2356 He returned the following morning at dawn and met Police Chief Commissioner Mangil who told him to wake up the President as “Nasution's and Leimena‘s houses had been shot at". But shortly after this Soekarno appeared and Suparto told him what he had just heard, Soekarno, accompanied by Suparto and Maggil, then set out for the Palace, but as the road was blocked they went instead to Grogol (another Djakarta suburb) to Ibu Harjati's house. { Harjati Soekarno is the President's 3rd, since divorced,.wife CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 28] === Zhe There they were met by Col. Saelan, the Military Police A.D.C. to the President, who was told by Mangil that Soekarno should not stay there longer than necessary-Saelan ordered Suparto to go and find out what Was happening. The Police Commander was not at home and Suparto eventuaily reached Omar Dani's house, from whence he contacted him at Halim by telephone, At this point in the trial the Judge asked Suparto why he had not also tried to get in touch with the Army and Navy Commanders. His excuses (lack of time,they lived too far away,etc) did not satisfy him and he was reprimanded for, giving evasive answers. Omar Dani would not say anything on the telephone and when, on his own initiative, Suparto told him that the President wanted to see him, he replied that this was impossible and that Suparto must leok elsewhere for information. Suparto returned to Grogol, where he saw that B,Gen. Sunarjo Tirtonegoro (Assistant Attorney General) had now joined the party at Harjati's house} criticised in court by the Judge for giving the court the impression that he knew a let more than he was willing to admit) had apparently been to the ‘ Palace to see Soekarno and,not finding him there, had come to Grogol, 256 While Suparto was away Saelan told the President that Dr Leimena's Gen Nasution's and Gen Pandjaitan's houses had been shot at and that the Palace was surrounded by unidentified troops. Soekarno is then alleged to have exclaimed "Well! I am overwhelmed! What do you want to do with me?" Four alternatives were discussed. These were that Soekarno should be taken to a house in Kebajoran (yet another Djakarta suburb), to Halim A.F.B., to Tandjong Priok where the R.I. Faruna, the Presidential yacht, was moored or, lastly, that he should move somewhere by road with the Presidential amoured car escort, Saelan said that as therehad not so far been any contact. with the Navy and the President's armoured car escort was at the Palace he ought to go either to Kebajoran or to Halim A.F.B, Soekarno himself decided that he must go to Halim, where the Presidential Jetstars were based, and the party arrived there by road at 9.50 a.m, The Abduction of the Generals 26. We return now to earlier that morning at about 4a.m. when the abduction of the Generals was’ taking place. Soepardjo's men, who may have included members of the Tjakrabirawa (Presidential Guard), P.G.T. troops and- possibly P,K.I. thugs wearing their uniforms, set out in teams using Tjakrabirawa and A,U,R.I. transport to the General’ houses, ostensibly to summon them to the Palace for an urgent meeting with the President. This suggests that those who actually showed themselves were in Tjakrabirawa uniform as a visit by them at that hour would arouse least suspicion. When the Generals appeared’ at the doors of their houses they were either shot without further ade (Gen. Pandjaitan) wounded by gunfire (Gen. Yani) or merely overwhelmed and bundled into cars or landrovers to be taken to Lobang Buaja, near Halim A.F.B., there to provide sport for the P.K.I. youths and females before finally being thrown down’ a deep well. The four other generals involved were Harjono, Soeprapto, Parman and Sutojo. In addition, General Nasution's A.D,C., Lt Tendean,. was also captured in. mistake for Nasution but this did not save him from the fate accorded to | the others. Elsewhere in Indonesia the murder of selectected civil and | military leaders was getting under way. | | CONFIDENTIAL \ === [PDF page 29] === 27e The deployment of Soepardijo's forces had also been made before daw. 6 In his evidence Major Bambang Supeno, former Commander of the 550th Para Battalion (Brawidjaja/Division, i.Java), said that he had come to Djakarta with five companies to attend the Armed Forces Parade on the 5th October. One of ‘these.com es was attached to the Tjakrabirawa at the request of Lt. Col. Untung / one of the Tjakrabirawa Company C rs and ostensibly leader of the abortive coup, since sentenced to death,/ Bambang confessed that this was somewhat unusual but as the request came. from the Presidential Guard he agreed to it. At-4 a.m. on the ist Octobeyp the day after his arrival in Djakarta, he moved with his remaining four companies to the vicinity of the National Monument (in front of the Palace) as a result of an order signed by Untung, whom he later met a 5 a.m. in the Aerial Survey Building which had been loaned to Soepardjo ey A.U.K.I. There he saw Soepardjo, Heru and Seejono, among others. Soepardjo and Heru invited him to accompany them to the Palace to report to the President but on arrival they discovered that Soekarne was not there. ) 28, Bambang later accompanied Soepa rdjo to Halin A.?.B, in the helicopter sent by Omar Dani to pick them up. When he entered the Operations Conmand building he met Omar Dani who said to nia “Success”, Bambang then discovered that the company he had loaned to Untung was.on guard near this building. When he saw a copy of the composition of the Revolutionary Council he asked 'Sujono why the President's name was not included Soejonc answered that the President was being asked to give his’ blessing. The 454th Paratroep Battalion (Diponegoro Division C.Java) was also acting on orders from the Coup leaders and it is probable thet it was used to occupy the Radic Indonesia. Studios and the Telecomunications Building. The Oppestion Goes into Action 29. Whet remained of the opposition was not slow in going into action. At 4.30 a.m. on the ist Gctober lirs Nasution got in touch with Maj.Gen. Umar Wiradikusumeh, the Djakarte.Militery Commander, end told him what had happened at her house. / General Nasution had by then vanished over his garden wall, seriously injuring a foot, into. the safety of the Iraqi Enbassy next door. Hie A.D.C. had been taken and his young daughter shot. She died a few days later. / Brig. Gen Sutardjo (Attorney General) recalled in his evidence that he had alse received a phone call esrly that morning from Wire Sutejo, the wife of one of. the kidnapped Generals, who told him that. her husbend, had been taken away by armed mon. Gen. Umar immediately ordered roads leading out of the. capital to be blocked and sent patrols out within the city. At the Palace he saw Scenardjo who ought, as Umar well knew, to have been on the North Borneo border. This erroused his suspicions and. he returned to his HQs and ordered the entire gerrison to stand to.. 7 | |: 30, °Maj. Gen. Shoeharto was also taking firm measures to get the situation under control from his HQs at Kestrad (the Army Strategic Reserve) where Cen,. Umar managed to get in touch with him at 7.30 a.m. ( the announcement of the Revolutionary Movement having just been made over the radio). At the suggestion of his colleagues, and as the senior Aray officer remaining, - Gen, Soeharto took over temporary command of the Aray. He acted swiftly. First he neutralised the treops surrounding the Palace and they eventually retreated at 3.30 that afternoon. At 9 asm. he ordered the R.P.K.A.D. ( Army Para-Commando traops) to regain control of the Telecomaunications Building and the Radio studios occupied by Soepardje’s treops. This they did. By that evening Soeharto hed the situation under control and at 8 p.m. he made a troadeast condeming the 3th September Movement". im evidence Onear Deni admitted that he had heard this broadcast. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 30] === ATS @ Announcement of the Revolutionary Movement 31. The story now shifts to Halim A.F.B. a 6.30 a.m. Wattinena said that he found Omar Dani. sleeping. When he returned a short while later he saw him in earnest conversation with Sujono, although in his evidence Omar Deni denied this. He maintained that he had summoned Sujono much later to make security arrangements in connection with the President's impending arrival at Halim A.F.B, Omar Dani said that he then heard from Wattimena that “there were already victims". At 7.15 a.m. the launching of the Revolutionary Movement was broadcast by Radio Republik Indonesia (R.R.I.), Soepardjo's men having secured the Telecommunications building and the R.R.I. studios, as well as the Palace. Dani Issues his r of the 32. Omar Dani concluded that ‘ o “had moved" and shortly after this issued his Order of the Day $ As it happened a fatal move, but probably part of the pre-arranged sequence of the events/ In it he gave A,U.R.I.'s full support to the Revolutionary Movement and referred to “elements masterminded by the C.I.A.". Before being issued it was given to Dewanto to edit if he wished. In his.evidence Omar Dani said that he had believed Soepardjo when he told him that the C.I.A. was behind the “Council of Generals". He said that he had discussed his Order of the Day with Soekarno, but it is not clear whether Soekarno actually read it. The discussion may only have revolved around the advisability of issuing one. Omar Dani stated that on receipt of a telegram from the Alert Theatre Command at Bandjermasin (Borneo) enquiring about the situation he asked the President whether it would be proper for him in his capacity of 5 Commander of the Armed Forces to issue an Order of the Day. Soekarno / doubtless’ becoming wary now/ replied that he wanted to meet the other Service Commanders first, but that Sens Tonk G601d go cheek Af be wished to / ond stitk bis sack « Oddly, Omar Dani's Order of the Day made no mention of A.U.R.1l. support for the Great Leader of the Revolution (Soekarno) / de rigeur in public announcements of this sort in those days{ Wattimena stated in court that when he was shown the draft Order of the Day by Omar Dani he saw reference to the "Council of Generals". He told him that if this was issued as it stood AeUeReI. would be “committed”.: , discussed 550 In his written statement to the Court Soekarno said that he had not/ 4t with Omar Dani; he read it “in a newspaper” on the 2nd October. He said he summoned Omar Dani and told him that it was a mistake which should be corrected. Since it could not be, Omar Dani then tendered his resignation [Unreadable] President Soekarno arrives at Halim A,F.5. 3%. Omar Dani now (it must have been about 8 a.m.) récéived a phone call from Suparto to say that President Soekarno was coming to Halim A.F.B. He then, at Heru's instigation, sent a helicopter to fetch Soepardjo from the Palace so that he could meet Soekarno. Soepardjo arrived before the President and disclosed to Omar Dani that the movement had been launched but that General Nasution had disappeared. When Omar Dani asked him how Nasution could have got away Soepardjo replied that, he probably had a trapdoor in his house. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 31] === — CONFIDENTIAL Soepardjo also told him the names of the other generals who had been captured but he "didn’t know exactly where they were" Omar Dani admitted that he had then offered his congratulations to Soepardjo. According to Heru, Soepardjo also told Omar Dani that “similar action was being tak in Jogjakarta (C.Java) which would enjoy the support of the people,’ 356 At this stage Omar Dani admitted that he was of the opinion that "Soepardjo's act constitued an insubordination, but it was for an improvement and was his own affair". Fi sic / Asked by the Judge whether he endorsed . Seepardjo's movement, Omar Dani unhesitatingly replied "I endorsed, justified and supported it. I authorised the use of the helicopter to bring Soepardjo to Halim so that the President might hear about the movement at first hand". 36. | When Soekarno arrived at Halim A.F.B. he immediately asked whether there was any news about the Generals. Omar Dani replied that there wasn't but that Soepardjo wanted to report to him. Soekarno then asked Soepardjo who the Generals were who had been taken into custody but he pretended not to know. However, when Soekarno named them himself / sic/ Soepardjo admitted that “asution had escaped and that only six had been captured. On hearing this Soekarno, according to Omar Dani and others said “Good, very good! This happens in a Revolution, especially a big revolution with its ups and ' dofms and which some times becomes bloody. But a revolution must not become stagnant. Now be calm, I don't want any more bloodshed", 37. Soepardjo now submitted ‘proofs’ to justify his movement, Among other things he said the racial disturbance in Bandoeng, "the 10th May Affair", earlier that year was backed by a group of Army officers who received money from a certain foreign embassy / meaning American{ Soepardjo claimed that he had witnessed the handing over of the money himself, He also told Soekarno that the economic plight in which the country found itself had been created by the "Council of Generals", saying that he had proof to substantiate this statement. Soepardjo also said that during an Army meeting there had been officer present who violently opposed the implementation of NASAKOM cooperation between the National, Religeous and Communist groups but in effect a sch designed to facilitate the spread of Communism thro the Armed Forces _/ saying that he would rather cooperate with NEKOLIM / another acronym meaning the Neo-Colonialists, Colonialists and Imperialists i.e. the British and Americans _/ rather than with the Communists. When Soekarno asked whether he still had proof of this in his possession Soepardjo answered in the affirmative. | 38. Brig. Gen Sabur (Commander of the Tjakrabirawa) now arrived and told Soekarno that "there was blood in the house of General Yani but that it was not known where he had been taken". He also said that General Pandjaitan was dea@. Soepardjo was still there with Soekarno and the Judge asked Omar Dani whether Soekarno had given any order for the arrest of Soepardjo. He replied that he did not hear one, neither had the President given any > instructions for a search to be made for the missing Generals. Halim A.F.B, Reinforced 39 That morning Omar Dani spoke to Wattimena about alerting and sending aircraft to Halim A.F.B. This contingency he said, had been discussed at the meeting at his house on the previous night and was part of Operation UTUH, the pain to safeguard the President. In his evidence Sol. Sudarman, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 32] === @ tre Commander of Wing 002 at Abdulrachman Saleh A.F.B. (Malang, E.Java) said that on the 1st October he received a signal from Wattimena requesting the despatch that same night of B 25 and P 51 aircraft. Sudarman promptly sent two of each, combat ready, to Halim A.F.B. He was not told what they were required for, Speekarno Appoints a "Caretaken" Army Commander-in-Chief 40. The President, with Omar Dani, Wattimena, Sabur, Saelan and Sunarjo adjourned at about 11 a.m. to Soesanto's quarter where a room had been prepared for him. At midday Brig.Gen Sutardhio (Attorney General), Admiral Martadinata (Naval Cein-C), Police General Sutjipto (Police C-inC), Dr Leimena (2nd Deputy Prime Minister) and senior officers of the Tjakrabirawa arrived, having been summoned by the President. Soekarno chatted with them. He then called Omar Dani and told him that he wanted to appoint a caretaken Commander. Omar Dani said that he told him the next in line was Soeharto / This was correct. During the Chief of S *s absences abroad Gen. Soeharto had always acted as the Army Commander_/ but Soekarno turned him down as being “stubborn". Martadinata proposed General Mursjid, but he was not acceptable because he was “always fighting. Omar Dani then suggested General Basuki Rachmat, but he did not fill the bill either, being “often sick" (but in his evidence Dr Leimena denied that Omar Dani had mentioned any names to the President, He added that General Adjie’s name had also come up for consideration) A little later Soekarno himself chose General Pranoto Reksosamudro / a weak man and noted Communist sympathiser. Altogether a peculiar choice which effectively cooked Pranoto's goose for him. He has been in Army custody ever since / and told Sabur to summon him. In court Sabur disclosed that he had by then received a message from Gen. Soeharto guaranteeing the President's dafety. The"Revolutionary Council" is Announced ki. At 2 pem. Gen. Sabur brough a radio set into the room so that everyone could listen to the announcement gjving the formation and composition of the "Revolutionary Council".Soekarno / all innocence asked what it was about and was told that it waa "Soepardjo's Movement". Soekarno made no further | comment, but when asked “From which side is the Revolutionary Council?" he replied that it obviously wasn't from the P.K.I.'s as he could find only three P.K.I. names in it. At this stage during the trial Omar Dani was asked whether he did not suspect that the Government had been overthrown by Soepardjo movement, since the Revolutionary Council had replaced the Cabinet. He could give no satisfactory answer beyond saying that "the President was still there" and it was all treated "as rather a joke". When asked by the Judge whether the abduction and murder of the Generals was also treated as a joke Omar Dani, somewhat subdued, replied that it wasn't, | 42, At 4.50 p.m. six or seven lorries loaded with troops of the 530th and 454th Battalions arrived at Halim A,F.B., having forced their way through the sentry posts. Their leader told the Base Commander, Col. Wisnu, that they had come on the orders of Soépardjo and that th eir instructions were to safeguard the President. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 33] === COLLAPSE OF THs COUP [Unreadable] 430 At 5 pem. Soepardjo came to Soesanto's house and told..s Omar Dani that his forces were withdrawing as they were being attacked by Gen Soeharto's Kostrad troops and proposed that an attack be made by A.U,R.I. on Kostrad HQ's. Omar Dani s that he could not do this as the President had already made a statement about the Army leadership and wanted no more bloodshed. The President spoke to Soepardjo but Omar Dani said that he did not know what they talked about. At about this time Soeparto left Halim to take a letter from Soekarno to Ibu Dewi, the President's Japanese wife. 3 cides attack Halim A,F.B. hh. Col(Navy)Bambang Wildjanarko, the President's Senior Adjutant, arrived at 7 pem. whilst Soepardjo was paying his third visit to Soekarno. He reported that he had just come from Kostrad HQ's where he had seen Martadinata, who had earlier left Halim A.F.B. to return to Navy H.Q.‘'s to brief his staff. There Martadinata had read Soekarno's statement nameing Gen Pranoto as Caretaker Army Commander. He had also reported to Soeharto that it was difficult to enter or leave Halim A.F.B. Soeharto had then decided to mount an attack on Halia, by known to be the nest of the Soepardjo movement. At this news Dr Leimene proposed that wherever he was going the President should leave Halim immediately. The President turned to Omar Dani and asked where he was going to take him. Omar Dani replied that two aircraft were standing by to take the President anywhere and proposed that he should go either to Bali, Mediun (E.Java) or to Jogjakarta (C.Java). Ibu Dewi now arrived and saw the President privately. In her published story she relates that she tried, but without success, to persuade the President not to go to East Java. 456 It seems that it was Dr Leimena who eventually got the President to abandon his wish to go to Madium and _ to go instead to the Palace at Bogor, within easy reach of Djakarta. / The story has it that it was only at the Last moment, when the President and Dr Leimena were in the Presidential car, that they drove out of Halim instead of going to where Omar Dani und the two Jetstars were waiting,/ The time was now 10.30 pom. Just before they left Dr Leimena turned to the tearful Ibu Dewi and told her that he would look after Soekarno for her. 4,6. That evening Omar Dani hed heard Soeharto's broadcast on R.R.I. condeming the Coup yet he made no effort / not unexpectly_/ to pledge his support. D.N.Aidit, who had been in Djakarta, arrived at Halim at about 9 pem. that evening, but there is no record of whether or not he saw Soekarno. n Feb Ze Omar Dani now decided that he must leave Halim A.F.3B. forthwith for Madium to “broadcast the President's statement, to brief AU. ReIe officers there and to convey a Presiden message not to forget Dwikora-/ the twofold Command to crush Malaysia/. Accompanied by Wattimena, he left Halim 4.F.B. in a C130 Hercules ond flew around for some six hours before landing at Madium A.F.B. at day break on the 2nd October. Wattinena stated in Court that in fact the destination was kept secret and he had no idea where they were going to land. During the Oe Sone Sank: hee ees in touch with various A.U.k.I. bases, among them Halim, Hussein, /-' === [PDF page 34] === Adisutjipto and Iswahjudi. fle also sent a message to Soeharto requesting / warning? the evidence is not altogether clear / him not to attack Halim as A.U.ReI. would fight back if he did so. 48. At Madium Omar Dani briefed Air Commodore Suwondo, the Base Commander, on what had happened at Halim on the previous day. In his evidence Suwondo stated that he had strongly urged Omar Dani to retract his Order of the Day and to issue a statement disassociating A.U.R.I. fromthe Coup and supporting Gen. Soeharto;, This was done and was followed up that evening by a broadcast by Andoko supporting this retraction and_reiterating that A.U.R.I. was not involved in the Revolutionary Movement / It was of cgurse by now far too late for this last minute attempt to have any effect. 49. In his evidence Col Sudaraan (who sent the combat aircraft to Halim A.F.B.) said that he went to Madium on 2nd October and that Omar Dani had briefed him there om Soepardjo's movement and ordered him to broadcast a statement from the R.R I. Studio at Malang. It declared, among other things, that A.U.R.I. was not meddling in the internal purge going on in this Aray because it approved of "purges in the tools of the Revolution". In the event no broadcast was made. Sudarman added that he knew about the existence of Omar Dani's Order of the Day fro™a signal he had received fro Operations Command, This said that the Army was conducting a purge within itself, it was called the 30th September Movement and was led by a Lt.Col. Untung of the Tjakrabirawa. 50. Before he left Halim Omar Dani had been approached by Soepardjo with a request from Aidit for an aircraft to take him to Djogjekarte “to calm down the situation there" Omar Dani said he took this to mean “calm down the Communists". He agreed and Aidit, accompanied by two companions somewhat dubiously identified by witnesses as Gen Pranoto Reksosamudro and Col Wisnu (then Base Commander at Halim, now A.A, in Washington) arrived at Adisutjipto A.F.B, (Jogjakarta) at 2 aem. on the 2nd October in an A.U.R.I. C 47. He was met, as he held the rank Minister/Cordinator, by the Commandant of the A.U.R.I. Academy, Air Commodore Dono Indarto, who said in his evidence that Aidit told him that he wa s the advance party of a survey team" because the President aight wish to come to Jogjakarta". Dono Indarto, having already heard Soeharto’s broadcast, doubted this. Later Omar Dani told him tha Aidit was infact trying to escape from the Army.. 51. In his evidence Air Commodore Soesanto said that two further aircraft left Halim during the night of the ist October. One was a C 150 Hercules which left for China? and the other a Jetstar which went to Medan (Sumatra) to fetch Sri Muljono Herlambeng. Oddly enough the Judge did not think fit to ask why, on that of all nights, a Hercules should be going to China, nor did it come out during the trial. It was very prob;.ie that this was the aircraft which took Heru, Sujono and others to Biak (E.Indonesia) in a futibe attempt to escape. The Army soon found out and they were rounded up and brought back to Java. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 35] === CONFIDENTIAL | 526 Omar Dani admitted that he sent a courier, Maj Kadarismo Commande of the P.G.1T. and his forme’A.D.C., to Biak, whilst they were there, wi a message for Sujono asking him in effect to assume responsibility for A.U.eKel.*s involvement in the Coup and never to implicate him in the effair. Giving evidence, Maj Sukarto, who had lectured at Lobang Buaja, and was also detained at Biak, said that Maj Kadarismo hed also conveyed an appeal from Omar Dani to himself and Sujono to be prepared to make sacrifices on behalf of A.U.R.I., a3 he was compelled to discharge them from the Service, Ke assured them thet theh* families would be looked after. 53. That morning (the 2nd October) Omar Dani flew to Semplak A. F.3, (Bogor) and then to the Bogor Palace in answer to a summons from the President, who later gave hia permission to stay there because, Omar Dani told hin, “Djekarta is no longer a safe place for mo". The Bodies of the Murdered Generals are found She On the 3rd October Major Hanafi (Int, officer of “ing 001 at Halim A.F.B.) received a report from a subordinate about murders at Lobang Buaja which he in turn had picked up in the locel market gossip. On orders from Col. Wisnu, Hanafi went to Lobang Buaja and found the place deserted, but he saw 5 vehicles there and firearms of various types, red and green pieces of cloth and magazines and lettexs scattered about. It did not take long to discover that there were bodies in the narrow well at Lobang Buaja. Their removal, by men wearing, breathin: eparatus, was shown on television. Mercifully the picture was a poor one, but it was not a pleasant sicht. 556 7s. There was very considerable indignation throught Indonesia, which the Army did nothing to temper, when the torture and butchery of the Generais was made known. This, probably more than any other single factor, accounted for the terrible reprisals taken againgst the Communists © generally, © consequence they can hardly have bargained for. Soekarno tried in various ways to play down this ghastly affair, even going so far as to get a tame doctor to state that the bodies had been mutulated after death. Just recently Haj. Gen. Sutjipto, then Chairman of Group VY of the Supreme Ope,’ations Cowmand and once a friend of the President, revecled that two weeks after the abortive Coup took place ‘oekarno told hin that the Generals had in fact been treated with kindness. The decision to execute them had been made by a kind of "People’s Court" and it had been carried out in an “orderly and graceful manner". Before the Generals were shot they were blindfolded and told by their killers, with apologies, that they were forced to do it “in the interests of the Revolution". Sutjipto said that he wondered then how Soekarno had come to hear these details, and from whom 7 FELLOGUE Omar Dani Resigns 56. On the ard October Omar Dani submitted his resignation as A.U. RI. Commander~in-Chief to the President. It was accepted and Herlambang took over until his formal installation on the 15th December 1965. On the 19th October Omar Dani left Indonesia for Holland in his capacity of Minister/Commander of the State Aviation Industry (Kopelapip) ostensibly to continue negotiations for the establishment of an aircarft industry in CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 36] === Indonesia in conjunction with Fokker Company. As far as it is known he travelled extensively in Europe but the Directors of Fokker never set eyes on him. However, in his evidence he disclosed that the purpose of his trip was to contact the Chief of the Russian Air Force because as a result of Indonesia's support of Pakistan in its conflict with India it was thought that spare parts for aircraft would no longer be received from Russia. He also visited France and Italy to try and find replacement for A.U.R.I.'s obsolete Mustang fighters. He added that he had been promised U.S. Dollars 50.000 as representation money but had only received half of that sum. Somewhat mysteriously Omar Dani next turned up in Phnon Penh with his family on the 19th December 1965 and remained there until his return to Indonesia in April 1966. From that date until his Court Martial he has been in custody. Sri Muliono Herlembang Resigns 57 Unfortunately for him Sri Muljono's days as A,U.R.I. C-in-C were also numbered. Tarnished with the same brush and unwilling to give up his support of soekarno, he was eventually replaced on Army insistence on 1966 by Air Commodore (now Air Marshal) Rusmin Nurjadin, who had shortly before returned from Moscow, where he was the Air Attache, to become A.U.R.I. Deputy for Operations. Sri Muljono was taken into custody by the Army, where he remains. Many of the others who supported Omar Dani have not fared any better. Andoko and Dewanto (who temporaily replaced Rusmin as A.A, in Moscow, but who was later recalled to Indonesia) are more or less under house arrest. Wattimena (now an A.V.M.) and Soesanto have so far survived unscathed, Of the lesser fry who were (admittedly more actively) involved only Supono and Heru have been dealt with really severely. They have both been tried by Mahmillub, the former receiving the death sentence, the latter life imprisonment. Seenardic is captured It was announced on 12th January 1967, that that morning Brig.Gen. Soepardjo had been captured at Halim A.F.B,, having bean hunted relentlessly by the Army for some 155 months. === [PDF page 37] === BRITISH EMBASSY (1642/67) DJAKARTA 3 January 1967 [Unreadable] In case you were wondering why you have not had a report on the Omar Dhani trial I should explain that, short-handed as we are, we have decided to send you one that our Air Attache is doing. It should be ready by next week. Zs Meanwhile I should report that the former Air Marshal' was tried amongst much publicity from 5 December, when he pleaded guilty, to 24 December when he was dishonourably discharged from his Service, sentenced to death and appealed against the sentence. 5. I need otherwise only say now that he bore himself with military correctness, accepted responsibility for his acts and those of the Air Force, tried to avoid implicating the President but inevitably failed. This of course was the main ob jective of the prosecution. Dhani's defence was on the lines of "Why try the monkey while the organ grinder sits comfortably in the Palace". This was a common popular view. L I am sending a copy of this letter to POLAD Singapore. (Ronald Higgins) P.L. O'Keeffe, Esq., South East Asia Dept., Foreign Office.