FCO 15/2701 - Indonesia: Political Detainees in Indonesia (Folder 13, 1980)

=== [PDF page 1] === DSR 12. SECURITY GRADING Contents checked N.B, The grading of this file must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it for transfer to UPGRADE AS NECESSARY USING APPROPRIATELY COLOURED LABELS, DRO. e - UNCLASSIFIED fagh DEPT, H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE or POST FILE Nove 7G on) Pare) TITLE: qcasscsncetooconsa ol sansoconsvouyorasasagstosscnvccansoaseonecoso<uoewesonseoactouseinsensavecsnonsagenesoncobonssassnrseconeveetedb¥ereceosfe esc osesbes oveeuones olucouny restnsvrvepénboormensseenseetgorsssenms rutrahee® REFER TO’ | REFER TO REFER TO tn nt |S [PATE] asa Aneen | $2 [OATE| ais tren | 3 [PATE R B.U. OR PA. RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FO rat cal | ra ALINEX | Registry Address SECURITY GRADING~. YEAR STAMP NB, The grading of this file must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. UPGRADE AS NECESSARY USING APPROPRIATELY COLOURED LABELS. comme UNCLASSIFIED === [PDF page 2] === amnesty international International Secretariat, 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF, England Telephone: 01-836 7788 Telegrams: Amnesty London Telex: 28502 SGO/AG/bm The Rt Hon Lord Carrington, PC, KCMG, MC Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Foreign and Commonwealth Office LONDON SW1A 2AH 3 April 1980 Dear Secretary of State, I have the honour of enclsing herewith copy of a letter of 3 April, together with enclosure, addressed to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, regarding the forthcoming meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia. Yours sincerely, aa | oe led A C “ “Martin Ennals Secretary General teow Woes 1 KGS TKT 21 APR 198 a ise ena LAG 215} es Amnesty International is a worldwide human rights movement which works impartially for the release of prisoners of conscience: men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion or language, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence. Amnesty International opposes torture and the death penalty in all cases without reservation and advocates fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners. Amnesty International is independent of all governments, political factions, ideologies, economic interests and religious creeds. It is financed by its membership and by subscriptions from all parts of the world. Amnesty International has consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC), UNESCO and the Council of Europe, has cooperative relations with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and has observer status with the Organization of African Unity (Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees). === [PDF page 3] === amnesty international International Secretariat, 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF, England 1, L XXX Telephone: 01-836 7788 Telegrams: Amnesty London Telex: 28502 xx SGO/AG/bm Mrs Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister The Prime Minister's Office 10 Downing Street: LONDON SWL 3 April 1980 Dear Prime Minister, In anticipation of this year's meeting of the Inter- Governmental Group on Indonesia in May, Amnesty International wishes once again to draw the attention of participating governments to human rights violations in Indonesia of: particular concern to the organization. Amnesty International acknowledges that the Indonesian Government has taken steps in recent years towards resolving the long-standing problem of political detention created by the arrests which followed the coup of 1965. Most recently, Amnesty International has welcomed reports that the Indonesian Government has now released all those allegedly involved in the 1965 coup who were not to be brought to trial. Aside from the cases referred to in the attached document of persons officially released not being permitted to return to their homes, Amnesty International has no other reason to doubt that the Indonesian Government has formally fulfilled its commitment to complete its ‘release program' by the end of 1979. Moreover, Amnesty International is encouraged by the Indonesian Government's recently announced policy of granting remission on the same terms as ordinary criminal prisoners to political prisoners who had been sentenced for alleged involvement in the 1965 coup. At the same time, Amnesty International continues to be gravely concerned at what can only be described as gross violations of the human rights both of those allegedly involved in the 1965 coup and of others deemed by the Indonesian Government to be opponents of the regime. Specifically, Amnesty International is concerned by restrictions on released political prisoners amounting to serious curtailment of their civil and political rights; and by the continued detention of prisoners of conscience whose cases fall outside the scope of the 'release program' referred to in the attached document. o00/2 Amnesty International is a worldwide human rights movement which works impartially for the release of prisoners of conscience: men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion or language, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence, Amnesty International opposes 1s.ture and the death penalty in all cases without reservation and advocates fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners, Amnesty International is independent of all governments, political factions, ideologies, economic interests and religious creeds. It is financed by its nembership and by subscriptions from all parts of the world. Amnesty International has consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC), NESCO and the Council of Europe, has cooperative relations with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of merican States, and has observer status with the Organization of African Unity (Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees), === [PDF page 4] === SGO/AG/bm 3 April 1980 Mrs Margaret Thatcher Despite the strict embargo on the free flow of information from East Timor imposed by the Indonesian Occupation forces, Amnesty International has recently received reliable reports relating to the arrest, detention and non-judicial execution of inhabitants of East Timor since the Indonesian invasion of that territory in 1975. For that reason, it feels that the International Committee of the Red Cross presence in East Timor, which is now confined to a limited food relief program, should be expanded so that the International Committee of the Red Cross officials can undertake other functions including the tracing of missing persons and prison visitation. We very much hope that your government will express during_ the forthcoming IGGI meeting its serious concern at the wideranging violation of internationally-accepted principles of human rights still Occurring in Indonesia. The welcome tendency of the Indonesian Government in recent years towards recognition of these principles encourages Amnesty International to conclude that statement of your views on these matters can have an appreciable effect on the position of the many thousands of Indonesians deprived of fundamental rights. Yours respectfully and sincerely, Martin Ennals Secretary General === [PDF page 5] === amnesty international International Secretariat, 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF, England Telephone: 01-836 7788 Telegrams: Amnesty London Telex: 28502 ee Human Rights Award April: 1980 CONFIDENTIAL MEMCRANDUM ON INDONESIA FOR GOVERNMENTS ATTENDING THE MEETING OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP ON INDONESIA Releases In December 1976, the Indonesian Government announced that beginning in December 1977, it would start releasing all prisoners detained for alleged involvement in the coup of 30 September 1965, who had neither been tried nor would be brought to trial. This 'phased release program’ of so-called B-category prisoners was to be completed by the end of 1979. With the release of 105 prisoners on 20 December 1979, the Indonesian Government announced that all B-category detainees had been ‘returned to their families’ and that the release program was completed. According to Admiral Sudomo, the Commander of the security Organ, KOPKAMTIB (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), speaking at a release ceremony in Yogyakarta on 8 December 1979, When all but the final 105 B-category prisoners had been released, the following numbers had been released in the years 1975 to 1979: Year Detainees Released YS 1302 1976 2,500 ILS) 7/7 10,000 NTS! 10,000 OTS 9,180 TOTAL 32,999 On 21 December, Amnesty International sent a cable to President Suharto welcoming reports that the Government had released all B-category prisoners, and asking for confirmation of the latest releases in the form of a list of those detainees released. Although no reply was received from the Indonesian authorities in response to this request, Amnesty International has no reason to doubt the Indonesian claim to have formally reisased all B-category prisoners. Amnesty International is a worldwide movement which works impartially for the release of prisoners of conscience: men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion or language, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence. Amnesty International opposes torture and the death penalty in all cases without reservation and advocates fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners. Amnesty International is independent of any government, political grouping, ideology, economic interest or religious creed, It is financed by its membership and by subscriptions from all parts of the world. Amnesty International has consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC), UNESCO and the Council of Europe, has cooperative relations with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and is a member of the Coordinating Committee of the Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees of the Organization of African Unity. === [PDF page 6] === At the same time, Amnesty International continues to be concerned about the present position of former B-category prisoners. This concern relates to three matters: 1) the continuing curtailment of the civil and political rights of released prisoners entailing Substantially less than unconditional release; 2) evidence that a number of prisoners who have been formally released have not been permitted to return to their homes despite their wish to do so; 3) persons unaccounted for now that the release program has ended. Aside from the normal obliems of adjustment confronting persons who have been in detention for as long as 14 years, compounded in many cases by chronic ill-health directly attributable to prison conditions, released prisoners face administrative harassment and economic discrimination. It should be recalled that Amnesty International has always demanded the unconditional release of B-category detainees who by definition were those the Indonesian Government felt unable to bring to trial and who have therefore neither been charged with or convicted of any crime. Restrictions on released prisoners take the following forms: a) an outright ban on employment of released prisoners in government service and ‘vital industries'; b) the continuing informal requirement that released prisoners possess a ‘certificate of non-involvement in the 1965 coup for employment in any sector; c) the marking of released prisoners' identity cards (which all Indonesians must carry) with a code identifying the bearer as a former detainee; d) the requirement that all prisoners consent as a condition for release to a pledge which states that they will be available to report to the authorities at any time and will abjure all claims to wrongful imprisonment or ill-treatment while in prison; e) the requirement that released prisoners report to the Military authorities regularly (in the case of those most recently released, every week); f) the requirement that those wishing to travel must apply for permission from KOPKAMTIB; g) the denial of the right to join a mass or political organization and to stand as a candidate in elections; h) a prohibition on unauthorized submission of books or articles for publication and on speaking at public meetings; i) the denial of property and pension rights. (Persons whose property was confiscated or simply taken over by officials after the 1965 coup have generally not been able to reclaim it. Former government employees who had paid contributions before their arrest have been denied the pensions to which they are entitled.) === [PDF page 7] === In addition to these restrictions, released prisoners have been warned that they are subject to re-arrest at any time. Further uncertainty about their status has been created in the minds of released prisoners by periodic summonses from the military authorities to receive instructions affecting their freedom of movement about new restrictions and expression and orders to fill in questionnaires, which ask among other things whether the respondent is willing to area of the archipelago. Amnesty International believes circumscribed by these restrictions fear and uncertainty still prevails SCacus. Moreover, "transmigra te' to (resettle in) a remote that released prisoners are so that a general feeling of among them about their true the practical consequences of these restrictions severely limits the ability of released prisoners to readjust to society. For example, Amnesty International believes that possibly no more than five per cent of former detainees have been able to find regular employment since release. Whilst acknowledging that unemployment is a chronic problem facing large numbers of Indonesians, Amnesty International considers that this fact is Simply an additional reason why released prisoners should not be Singled out for discrimination in their efforts to find work. Im this context, Lt is worth quoting the remarks of one released prisoner: political prisoners in “TE i vase. the problem Of ithe seeking a livelihood, CittvocultLlcs, of Tonner this does not mean that I am asking the Government to give former political prisoners Einst priority im Obtaiming work and lower prionity to the millions of unemployed who are not former political prisoners. challenging is Government discrimination against former political prisoners. ' 2) Involuntary Resettlement Amnesty International believes What I am that some prisoners who have been formally released have not been permitted to return to their homes despite their wish to do so. described as transmigrants who have outside Java. Although Amnesty International released prisoners have voluntarily to join its transmigration program, These prisoners are officially voluntarily resettled in areas accepts that a number of chosen the Government's offer it believes that in some instances released prisoners have been settled against their will. These include possibly as many as 35 released prisoners who married While on Buru transmigrants. they and and remain there with their brides joined on Buru by their families - » declaring that they would settle for 10 years on RBurus the Ofrticial status OL It is known that when these 35 prisoners married, - the daughters of prisoners who had been vere required to sign a pledge Given the status of the bridegrooms as prisoners at that time and the situation of the brides who, virtually the same considers that the pledges made choice was offered to the has received reliable wish to return to Java, as daughters restrictions persons of prisoners, were subject to as the detainees, at that time involved. information that since their relatives have Amnesty International are invalid, since no Amnesty International a number of these prisoners now been able to leave Buru and they see no future for themselves there. === [PDF page 8] === Amnesty International believes that there are other instances of persons being refused permission to return to their homes from resettlement areas. The Indonesian news magazine Tempo reported the case of a man presently living in Amborawang, East Kalimantan: "He would like to go home and join his wife and family.... "But the local command of KOPKAMTIB has asked us to stay here," says MMM, a former member of the Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI).... "I can't go home and here there are no facilities." Now that the Indonesian Government has officially completed its release program, there are an unknown number of persons (but at least 3,000) may have been detained at some time after the coup of 1965 but whose present whereabouts are unknown. These include: 1) persons whose whereabouts are unknown but who may have been detained; 2) persons who were known to have been detained but have not been either tried or released. Amnesty International has received information that in Java alone over 2,800 persons who were detained after the 1965 coup have not been released or brought to trial or are awaiting trial and their whereabouts are unknown. Amnesty International urges that the Indonesian Government inform families of the fate or present whereabouts of these missing persons. The Indonesian Government should also be urged to supply any information it has relating to persons whose fate after the 1965 coup is unknown.* Imprisonment and Trial According to official Indonesian figures, as of December 1979, 1,014 A-category prisoners - those against whom there was alleged to be direct evidence of involvement in the 1965 coup - had been tried. Of these, 262 had already completed their sentences. In November 1979 President Suharto issued an instruction to the Minister of Justice to the effect that political prisoners who had been sentenced were now eligible for remission on the same terms as criminal prisoners. Previously, tried political prisoners had to serve out their full sentences. As a result of the new regulation, 331 tried A-category prisoners received remission of whom 118 were released in December 1979. In addition, approximately 450 untried This problem was strikingly illustrated by reports in the Indonesian press of the efforts of ten children to find their father, the artist Trubus (see Tempo, 29/12/79 and Merdeka, DON 29)) === [PDF page 9] === A-category prisoners were re-classified as B-category and released during 1979. At the end of that year, 23 A-category prisoners were still detained awaiting trial. There were therefore 657 A-category prisoners, both tried and untried, still Officially acknowledged to be in detention at the end of 1979. Amnesty International believes that a substantial number of those still in detention are prisoners of conscience who neither used nor advocated the use of violence. It believes that the sentences of all those already tried should be reviewed on the grounds that a fair trial was denied the defendants in all cases known to Amnesty International and was in fact impossible in the prevailing political climate. n addition, A-category prisoners have been tried on loosely~framed charges under the Subversion Law. This Law has been criticized in recent years by prominent Indonesian lawyers on the grounds of its ‘catch-all’ nature. The Government in recognition of these defects is reported to have drafted a National Security Law to replace the Subversion Law. While welcoming the Indonesian Government's recent policy on remission, Amnesty International has been disturbed to learn that the new regulation is not being applied uniformly. Amnesty International knows of no instance of a tried A-category prisoner outside Jakarta being released under the terms of the remission regulation. Indeed, it knows of cases of persons who would be eligible for release if the new regulation were being consistently applied but who continue to be held in detention. Thus, in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, there are persons still in prison whose sentences should have expired if remission had been counted but are being held because the prosecutor still has an appeal pending. In other cases, the sentence is counted from the date of sentencing rather than from the date of detention (a difference of nine years for some prisoners). In Jakarta, on the other hand, S has been calculated from the date of detention, even when the court handed down a sentence to run from the date of sentencing, and prosecutors have been instructed to arop pending appeals to enable the release of detainees. Aside from A-category prisoners who have been tried or are awaiting trial, there are other political prisoners in Indonesia whose cases fall outside the scope of the release program and whom Amnesty International regards as prisoners of conscience. These include students and Moslems arrested in connection with the protests of 1977-73 against the re-election of Suharto as President, and persons in detention for demanding greater provincial autonomy. Beginning in late January 1979, 36 student leaders were brought to trial in eight Indonesian cities charged primarily with insulting the Head of State, state officials and state institutions under laws inherited from the Dutch Colonial Code. The charges arose out Of the protests of 1977-78 whicl.-took the form of peaceful demonstrations and meetings, petitions to the Government and the setting up of a mock parliament to discuss pressing issues of the day. The students and their lawyers have claimed that these activities were protected by Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution which guarantees freedom of expression. By the end of 1979, 21 of === [PDF page 10] === the students had been sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from six months to two years and one had been acquitted. Ina number of cases, the Court declared the students Gulity of insulting State institutions but not guilty of insulting the Head of State Or of the most serious charge of having obstructed the Government's development program for which the Maximum penalty is death. A number of prominent Moslem politicians and their followers were also arrested in the period before and after the Presidential elections of March 1978. Many have now been released, including in the past year La Deputy Secretary General of the Moslem political party, the PPP: Professor El Rector of Muhammadiyah University; and [EBBB, popular hero of the struggle for independence. However, other Moslems primarily persons associated with the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI, Islamic Youth Movement) continued to be detained. In February 1980, one of these detainees, the former Editor of the newspaper Abadi, . who had been under arrest since 1978, was put_on trial _on subversion charges. Amnesty International regards as a prisoner of conscience. EAST TIMOR There have been persistent reports of violations of human rights (including imprisonment without trial and executions) in East Timor Since the Indonesian invasion of that territory in December 1975. Amnesty International has had considerable Gitttculey. in establishing the veracity of these reports primarily because of the strict embargo placed by the Indonesian occupation forces on access by international observers to the island and on the flow of information Out of it. However, in recent months, Amnesty International has received reliable information concerning these allegations and now believes that violations of human rights of concern to the organization have occurred and are still SOCcCUEE Ing in Hast Timon. This evidence suggests that the Indonesian Occupation forces in Bast Timor at least since 1979 may, as reports from other sources have indicated, have in fact employed a policy of executing FPretilin* members who surrendered under the terms of an amnesty guaranteeing their safety. Moreover, Amnesty International believes that of the approximately 800 persons being held in prisons in the c*#pital, Dili, alone, some, Who have bheeh in detention since 1975-76 ana took no part in the sighting either before cr after the i};vasion, covlc be regarded as prisoners of eonscle) * Fretilin - Frente Revolucionatiu do Timor Leste Independente: movement for an independent East Timor, which declared the territory's independence on 28 November 1975 and resisted the Indonesian invasion. === [PDF page 11] === During 1979, Amnesty International received a number of reports that Fretilin members who had surrendered to the Indonesian forces had subsequently disappeared. A specific instance was cited by an Indonesian Church source who, during a Visit to Ehe sland in the first half of 1979, reported that in late March 'the people of Dili were in a state of nervousness because of the news that the remaining (captured or surrendered) Fretilin leaders were kidnapped at night and no one knew of their whereabouts.' A Portuguese Priest describing the situation in Dili at approximately the same time noted: 'No one who had links with Fretilin is Sake peat. any, time they can be taken without their family knowing and put Somewhere else, put in a prison camp, or, sometimes, they just disappear.'* Amnesty International has been able to investigate these reports and has collected the names of more than 20 individuals who surrendered or were captured and whose present whereabouts are unknown. There are strong grounds for fearing that these individuals may have been executed by Indonesian forces. Moreover, although some of these persons are believed to have been killed almost immediately after surrender, the Majority disappeared after a period of detention and subsequent release spanning up to eighteen months. This latter group were picked up from their homes and have not been seen since. All cases of this pattern of disappearance known to Amnesty International occurred in Eo 97, Suggesting the possibility that the Indonesian authorities may have adopted a policy of eliminating Fretilin members in that year. ft should be noted that, while Many surrendered Fretilin members have disappeared, some well-known leaders, whose surrender or capture was well-publicized and were at one time believed to have disappeared, were alive and at liberty at the end of 1979. They include: Francisco Xavier do Amaral, former President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor; Alarico Fernandes, the Fretilin Minister of Internal Administration and security; and Arsenio Ramos Horta, a member of the Fretilin Central Committee. Their survival may be attributed in part to the concern for their safety expressed outside Indonesia. Similar expressions of concern, including requests that they be produced, may save the lives of other members of Fretilin who have surrendered to the Indonesian forces. a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, surrendered in Same in the Southwest of the territory in Carly 1978. The event was considered sufficiently important by the Indonesians 3 cf 'Reports from a variety of s--rces including US officials (off the record) describe summary executions of surrendering Fretilin guerrillas' (Benedict O'Gorman Anderson, Testimony on Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives, 6 February 1980, p. 13). === [PDF page 12] === for them to draw up a propaganda leaflet bearing his photograph and announcing his surrender. ie was detained for several months after his surrender in San Tai Ho prison, a converted warehouse in Dili. After his release he was required to report daily to the local military command and Indonesian officers were frequently seen eating at his house. In April 1979, he was taken by Indonesian troops and escorted to the house where his 17-year-old niece, lived. [EE 26 been detained £or six months in 1976 for her role ain the Pretilan studenu Organization, UNETIM. Both QR] anc ED were then taken away, purportedly to work in Baucau. Neither has been seen or traced since. ee «2s captured in March 1979 with her three-year-old child She was taken to Dili and detained. Nothing has been heard of i though her child is believed to be Laval ng, waite ee Latiiv — A former student in tasbon, Po been appointed principal of a primary SGMOOWs smn Dalle: cen 1974. In January 1975, she was selected by the Portugu 1eSe nistration to sit on a Commission for Education Reform. the Fretilin Minister of Education and Culture and helped Fretilin’s popular education program. She would now be ae toa: Pan A number of Timorese members of the Portuguese army including approximately 100 sergeants poe ed the Fretilin forces. Many are believed to have disappeared after surrender. They include Sa a7 vergeants ee was held for six months in an Daw HO prison er his surrender in early 1978. He remained at conditional liberty until April or May 1979 when he was picked up from his home } Indonesian soldiers and probably executed. He had surrendered with another Fretilin leader, [ERRRR. (Both were members of the Fretilin Central Committee.) Aged about 40 years old at the time of his disappearance, GS fought with the Portuguese army in Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). A younger brother, Ea. was still in the bush at the time of ' disappearance. Neither x occ EER was 2 leading figure in: Breta amy, But, before the events of 1975, both had been known in Dili as members of a popular musiicall group, the Cinco do Oriente. Prior to the invasion, the two were students at the Lyceo in Dili and members of the Fretilin student organization, UNETIM. They surrendered together in Maubisse in January 1979. They were taken Eo Dili and: held in San Tai HO prison. 9 im Apia 19/97 Shorey after being released from San Tai Ho, the appeared. Both would now be approximately 23 years old. Both and had relatives in Freeilin. [ER mother, » Was herself held in San Tai Ho. for a period after the Indonesian invasion. His cousin,, surcendered in mid-1978 and as of November 1979 was still in San Tai Ho prison. s father, EE who 21so === [PDF page 13] === fought with Fretilin, surrendered in June 1979 and was, as Of November 1979, at conditional liberty after two short periods of detention. was also a cousin of former ire(eqe idl ato! President,: Not all disappearances known to Amnesty International occurred in Dili after a period of detention. Some, including Sergeants Sarmento and Ribeiro, disappeared almost immediately after surrender. Others were permitted to return to their homes and disappeared some time later. NN, «2 member of the Fretilin Central Committee, surrendered in Uato-Carabau with his wife and eight children in October or November 1978. He and his family were escorted on foot the 40 kilometres to their home town Of Thos: Palos. There, BEEN) cesumed work as a nurse. In June 1979, he was summoned by the Indonesian military authorities and is believed to have been executed. The most recent known case of a Fretilin member disapvearing after surrender was that of Sergeant Rie disappeared from Dili in November 1979 three months after surrender. Among those surrendered Fretilin members believed to be still alive at the end of 1979 was ee former Fretilin Minister of Finance and a member of the Central Committee. Inacio surrendered in April 1979 and was taken to Dili where he was allowed to see his wife and two daughters for one day. He was then transferred to Baucau prison where he was still detained as of the most recent report in October 1979. Now 31 years old, was employed as an official with the rank of second officer in the Finance Department under the Portuguese administration. Imprisonment Amnesty International knows of three prisons in which DO Waste dee ae: prisoners are held. These are: the former San Tai Ho warehouse and the former Portuguese District Prison (Cadeia Comarca, still known as the Comarca), both in Dili, and Baucau Dsl Sones Detention centres are believed to exist in each of the other eleven district capitals, though these appear to be converted buildings which function as temporary holding centres for surrendering Fretilin fighters. ta cf 'The Timorese dignitary asserted that four concentration camps or political prisons existed - two here (in Dili), one in the second town of Baucau and one near Maliana.' (Henry Kamm, Timor's Legacy: Useless Currency, Stranded People, New York Times, 30 January 1980). Amnesty International has not been able to confirm the existence of a prison near Maliana. === [PDF page 14] === The Comarca is the largest of these prisons with approximately HO Collis and a capacity Of 7O0-1),000 prisoners. Ee is a one= Storey, three-sided building constructed 120 years ago. Located in the suburb of Balide in the southern pare of the city, it lies close to the Caicoli swamp. An informant who visited the prison in late 1979 said it was then overcrowded and many prisoners appeared to be seriously undernourished. The prisoners’ regular diet consists of rice and kangkung (a type of spinach) supplemented once a week on Sundays by a small amount of meat. Prisoners are required to work from 5 am to 5 pm every day, cultivating food for themselves and their guards, constructing roads and as servants in the houses ©f Tndonesian officers. Im addition to malnutrition, tuberculosis is rampant in the prison, aggravated by the stone floors, on which prisoners are forced to sleep in close proximity, and by the neighbouring swamp. Those held in the Comarca are believed to be largely rank-and-file members of Fretilin or its affiliated Organizations including some held since shortly after the invasion who never participated in the fighting. Fretilin supporters who surrendered to the Indonesians more recently are also held in the Comarca. The San Tai Ho warehouse, a two-storey building which was converted into an interrogation centre and prison soon after the indeonestan invasion, Lies an the commercial district OF Dadi cilose to the port. The ground floor consists of three rooms, comprising two cells holding approximately 20 prisoners each, and a garage. Upstairs are two smaller cells each holding approximately three women prisoners, and the prison administration office. In recent times, many captured and surrendering Fretilin members have been held in the San Tai Ho. San Tai Ho is also the only detention centre known to hold women prisoners. Amnesty International has received reports of prisoners in both the Comarca and San Tai Ho prisons being beaten. There have also been persistent reports of the use of torture to gain information from persons held in the San Tai Ho. These include allegations of the torture by burning with cigarettes of two women — [J end WS — beld in the San Tai Ho in 1976-77. Although, like the Comarca, San Tai Ho holds some long-term prisoners, it functions primarily as an interrogation centre and, unlike the Comarca, is administered not by the Military Police but by Military Intelligence. Conclusion In view of the number of East Timorese known to have disappeared after surrender to the Indonesian authorities, urgent action is required to trace those persons known to have disappeared and to investigate any other cases of disappearance in East Timor. Investigations by international observers into the conditions in which many hundreds of East Timorese are imprisoned in the territory are also called for. The Indonesian Government should be reminded of the resolution on disappeared persons adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1978* which Resolution 33/173 === [PDF page 15] === seo a) Yao inter alia calls upon governments ‘to co-operate with other governments, relevant United Nations organs, specialized agencies, inter-governmental organizations and humanitarian bodies in a common effort to search for, locate or account for such (disappeared) persons in the event of reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances'. More concretely, Amnesty International believes that the Indonesian Government should be urged to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to expand its activities in East Timor beyond the present limited food relief program so as to include tracing and prison visitation. === [PDF page 16] === British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 EDITORIAL THE DISAPPEARED In East Timor... A report issued by Amnesty International on 29 April 1980 contains details of a number of East Timorese who have disappeared in the last year or so, after being held or captured by Indonesian troops. These comprise only a tiny fraction of the people who have disappeared in East Timor since the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Amnesty quotes a priest who said, commenting in a report on the situation in Dili in early 1979: No one who had links with Fretilin is safe; at any time, they can be taken without their family knowing and put somewhere else, put in a prison camp, or sometimes, they just disappear. Moreover, disappearances represent only one aspect of the massive abuse of human rights to which East Timorese people have been subjected, at the hands of the Indonesian invaders, in the past five years. But the publication of detailed cases like this is to be welcomed as it provides the basis for pressing the Indonesian government to account for people known to have been in their custody, in a situation where not many people live long enough in detention for there to be a sizeable number of political prisoners. Amnesty also notes that a pattern seems to be emerging in the disappearances: a person is held in detention, is interrogated and tortured, but is then released, only to be taken again a short while afterwards, following which he or she disappears without trace. ... and in Indonesia Disappearances have been a feature of human rights abuse in Indonesia ever since the military came to power in 1965S. In the late nineteen sixties, literally tens of thousands of persons disappeared after being taken into custody by army personnel or other officials. Many of those included among the victims of the early massacres were not killed in their homes or villages by troops or fanatical civilians but disappeared, and must be presumed to have been killed whilst in detention. In some cases, families heard nothing more from the moment a person was arrested; in others, families were at first able to keep in touch (to visit or send food parcels) but were later told that no food could be accepted as the person had ‘‘been transferred”, and attempts to discover his or her whereabouts proved fruitless. Only now that all Bcategory prisoners are said to have been released are the families having to accept the bitter realisation that the person was probably killed many years ago. The UN and Disappearances In February this year, the UN Human Rights Commission set up a Working Group “to examine questions relevant to enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons” and instructed the Group “to seek and receive information from governments, intergovernmental organisations, humanitarian organisations and other reliable sources”. Addressing the Commission in support of this decision, the Amnesty International representative said: No government should be left alone until the last case of a disappearance on its territory has been cleared up. Even if in Continued on page 4 In this Issue: Disappearances in East Timor Disappearances in Indonesia Forced Repatriation for West Papuan Refugees Notes by a Blind Man === [PDF page 17] === DISAPPEARANCES IN EAST TIMOR At the end of April, Amnesty International wrote to President Suharto about human rights abuses in East Timor. The following is from “Statement of Amnesty International’s Concerns in Indonesia and East Timor”, 29 April 1980. During 1979, Amnesty International received a number of reports that Fretilin members who had surrendered to the Indonesian forces had subsequently disappeared. Amnesty International has been able to investigate these reports and has collected the names of more than 20 individuals who surrendered or were captured and whose present whereabouts are unknown. There are strong grounds for fearing that these individuals may have been executed by Indonesian forces. Moreover, almost immediately after surrender, the majority disappeared after a period of detention and subsequent release spanning up to eighteen months. This latter group were picked up from their homes and have not been seen since. All cases of this pattern of disappearance known to Amnesty International- occurred in 1979, suggesting the possibility of eliminating Fretilin members in that year. Leopoldo Joaquim, a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, surrendered in Same in the Southwest of the territory in early 1978. The event was considered sufficiently important by the Indonesians for them to draw up a propaganda leaflet bearing his photograph and announcing his surrender. He was detained for several months after his surrender in San Tai Ho prison, a copverted warehouse in Dili. After his release he was required to report daily to the local military command and Indonesian officers were frequently seen eating at his house. In April 1979, he was taken by Indonesian troops and escorted to the house where his 17-year-old niece, Maria Gorete Joaquim lived. Maria Gorete Joaquim had been detained for six months in 1976 for her role in the Fretilin student organisation, UNETIM. Both Leopoldo and Maria Gorete Joaquim were then taken away, purportedly to work in Baucau. Neither has been seen or traced since. Dulce Maria da Cruz was captured in March 1979 with her three-year-old child. She was taken to Dili and detained. Nothing has been heard of her since, though her child is believed to be living with relatives in Ostico. A former student in Lisbon, Dulce Maria da Cruz had been appointed principal of a primary school in Dili in October 1974. In January 1975, she was selected by the Portuguese administration to sit on a Commission for Education Reform. She was the Fretilin Minister of Education and Culture and helped institute Fretilin’s popular education program. She would now be 29 years old. A number of Timorese members of the Portuguese army including approximately 100 sergeants joined the Fretilin forces. Many are believed to have disappeared after surrendder. They include Sergeants Sebastiano Doutel Sarmento, Joao Bosco Soares, Joao Baptista de Jesus Soares. Jo&%o Baptista de Jesus Soares was held for six months in San Tai Ho prison after his surrender in early 1978. He remained at conditional liberty until April or May 1979 when he was picked up from his home by Indonesian Soldiers and probably executed. He had surrendered with another Fretilin leader, Anibal Aranjo. (Both were members of the Fretilin Central Committee.) Aged about 40 years old at the time of his disappearance, Soares fought with the Portuguese army in Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea Bissau). A younger brother, Paulo, was still in the bush at the time of Soares’ disappearance. Neither Filomeno Alves nor Manecas Exposto was a leading figure in Fretilin. But, before the events of 1975, both had been known in Dili as members of a popular musical group, the Cinco do Oriente. Prior to the invasion, the two were students at the Lyceo in Dili and members of the Fretilin student organisation, UNETIM. They surrendered together in Maubisse in January 1979. They were taken to Dili and held in San Tai Ho prison. In April 1979, shortly after being released from San Tai Ho, they disappeared. Both would now be approximately 23 yers old. Both Filomeno Alves and Manecas Exposto had relatives in Fretilin. Alves’ mother, Maria Periera, was herself held in San Tai Ho for a period after the Indonesian invasion. His cousin, Marita Alves, surrendered in mid- 1978 and as of November 1979 was still in San Tai Ho prison. Manecas Exposto’s father, Manuel Cornelio Albino Exposto, who also fought with Fretilin, surrendered in June 1979 and was, as of November 1979, at conditional liberty after two short periods of detention. Manecas Exposto was also a cousin of former Fretilin President, Nicolau Lobato. Not all disappearances known to Amnesty International occurred in Dili after a period of detention. Some, including Sergeants Sarmento and Ribeiro, disappeared almost immediately after surrender. Others were permitted to return to their homes and disappeared some time later. Jo&o ‘Andrade Sarmento, a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, surrendered in Uato-Carabau with his wife and eight children in October or November 1978. He and his family were escorted on foot the 40 kilometres to their home town of Los Palos. There, Sarmento resumed work as a nurse. In June 1979, he was summoned by the Indonesian military authorities and is believed to have been executed. The most recent known case of a Fretilin member disappearing after surrender was that of Sergeant Joao Basco Soares who disappeared from Dili in November 1979 three months after surrender. AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: INDONESIA’S INVASION OF EAST TIMOR By Amold Kohen and John Taylor With a Foreword by Noam Chomsky Price: £1.75 plus postage (UK 25p; Europe 65p; overseas airmail £1.00; overseas seamail 20p) Order your copies NOW from: TAPOL, 8a Treport Street 2 TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 DISAPPEARANCES IN INDONESIA Wikana had been active in the Indonesian independence movement since pre-war days and after independence became a leader of the socialist youth organisation, Pesindo. At the time of the 1965 events he was a member of Parliament and the Provisional Consultative Assembly. He went to Peking in September 1965 to attend the 1 October celebrations but unlike some others in the delegation decided to return home after the October events. At the end of October, he was taken from his home by a group of men in Army uniform and driven away in an Army jeep. All efforts by his family to discover his whereabouts were unsuccessful and he was never heard of again. Kang Ing Gwan was a lawyer in Surabaya, East Java. He had frequently defended peasants on trial for taking part in unilateral actions to implement the land reform law. About a month after the October events, according to his wife, some men in Army uniform came to the house and ordered Kang to go with them for questioning. They gave him time to pack some clothes in a small bag before taking him away. Since then, nothing has been heard from him, nor have the many authorities approached given any information about what happened to him. Tan Soen Kung was on the West Java provincial committee of Baperki, an organisation mainly of ethnic Chinese Indonesian citizens. In late November 1965, some men in Army uniform came to his house in Bandung and took him away by Army jeep. Another Baperki official, Gouw Tiauw Liong, was also on the jeep. While still on the jeep, the two men were bound up; sacks were put over their heads and ropes tied round their necks. Assuming they were both dead, the men in the jeep threw them onto the road near the town of Garut. They were able to untie themselves and make their way to a nearby police station. They were then allowed to return home to Bandung. Soon afterwards, Gouw moved to Jakarta where he lived until his death in 1976 from asthma. But Tan Soen Kung reported to the military authorities in Bandung and was taken into “protective” custody and held at a detention centre in Jatiwaru, Bandung. Some time later he was ‘“‘di-bon” (taken on loan) to another place and never returned to Jatiwaru. His family never heard anything more about him. Soedjak, Liem Tjim Lay, Phoa Tjong Ho and Koo Yong Tjay all disappeared after being “di-bon” together from Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya. Soedjak was a member of the People’s Youth and was arrested in Surabaya in 1967. He was interrogated by a special team of interrogators from Jakarta, headed by the notorious Atjep. He was severely tortured. Later, he was transferred to Kalisosok Prison, and it was from there that he was subsequently taken away ‘‘on loan”, never to return. Liem Tjin Lay was a member of the Jakarta committee of Baperki. He too was arrested in Surabaya in 1967 and interrogated by Atjep’s team, then transferred to Kalisosok Prison, and afterwards taken away “on loan”, never to return. Phoa Tjong Ho was also from Jakarta, but he left Jakarta and went to Surabaya after the 1965 events. He had been employed by the Pembaruan Publishing Company which published progressive literature. He too was interrogated by Atjep’s team, transferred later to Kalisosok Prison, and later disappeared after being taken away “on loan”. The fourth man in the group, Koo Yong Tjay, was director of the /ndonesian Raya Printing Works which, in its later days, printed the Communist Party’s newspaper, Harian Rakjat. Like Phoa, he left Jakarta after the 1965 events and settled down in Surabaya. There, he was arrested in 1967, interrogated by Atjep’s men, then transferred to Kalisosok Prison, and disappeared after being taken away “on loan”. Other prisoners who were at Kalisosok Prison at the time report that these four men were all taken away together, and that nothing more was ever heard of them. Atjep is a name widely known to political prisoners in Indonesia. He was one of the most vicious interrogators, and supervised the most brutal forms of torture. Reports of people who died while being interrogated by Atjep and his men are legion. These people too must enter the list of the disappeared, if their names can be obtained. Tan Hwie Liong had a university education in the USA. After returning home, he worked for an organisation of kretek (clove) cigarette manufacturers in Malang, and later helped establish the Malang branch of Baperki’s university, Res Publica. He was arrested in 1966, and the last place of detention where he was known to be held was Lowokwaru Prison, Malang. His wife sent food and clothing to him there for several months, but one day the things she brought were turned back, and she was never able to discover what had happened to her husband. She made many enquiries at military offices but without success. Hasan Subekti was a teacher at a private school in Sukabumi. He was arrested in December 1965, released the next June, but re-arrested in December 1966 and transferred to the Bogor Military Resort (Korem) in December 1966. Thereafter, the family were only allowed to keep contact by letter. The last letter received from him was dated 26 February 1967. After that, letters and food parcels from his wife were refused as Korem officers told her he had. been moved elsewhere. The facts about the disappearance of Hasan Subekti came to light in a letter from one of his sons which was published by the Jakarta daily, Sinar Harapan on |1 January 1979 (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 32, February 1979). The son, Apriandani, described how his mother has visited military offices in many parts of the country but without success. “Where is our father being held or is he now dead? The problem is that mother is still convinced that he is alive...” wrote Apriandani. Trubus Sudarsono was a well-known sculptor. Several of his major works are on display in Jakarta streets. The TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 3 === [PDF page 18] === family lost touch with him shortly after his arrest in late 1965. He is known to have been held for a time at one of the main Jakarta prisons. Shortly afterwards, his wife was sent his watch and some clothing but was told nothing about what had happened to him. Since 1970, his two daughters have made extensive enquiries, even writing letters to prisoners on Buru to find out whether Trubus was there. In December 1979, they attended the final release ceremony, hoping against hope that they would find their father, but they were disappointed. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 38, March 1980.) Daulay Porkas was an employee of the Ministry of Labour and a trade union activist. He also worked part-time on the foreign affairs staff of SOBSI, the All-Indonesian Trade Union Federation. He was arrested shortly after the 1965 events. His last known place of detention was a prison in Bogor, West Java. His wife travelled frequently from Jakarta to take him food, but one day in 1967 she was told he had been moved. She began to search for him, but many months of enquiries proved fruitless, Ex-tapols believe that he was one of several hundred tapols who were taken from detention camps in Bogor in 1967 and shot dead in some isolated plantations in the districts of Subang and Sukabumi. Disappearances of PKI Leaders Four of the five top leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) disappeared after being taken into custody. The fifth, Sudisman, was the only one to be brought to trial in 1966. He received the death penalty and was executed in 1967. D.N. Aidit, Chairman of the PKI’s Central Committee, was arrested in a village near Solo, Central Java in November 1965. From there, it is reported that he was driven away in an armoured vehicle which drove in the direction of the Merapi-Merbabu mountain complex. While on the journey, interrogations are thought to have occurred. According to a report in a Japanese newspaper, Aidit was murdered soon after arriving at the Merapi- Merbabu complex. A number of defendants in subsequent political trials have asked for Aidit to appear as a defence witness but the courts have simply declared that he could not appear “for technical reasons’. There has never been any official confirmation or denial that Aidit was arrested. Njoto was a Second Deputy-Chairman of the Central Committee and a minister without portfolio in Sukarno’s last cabinet. According to Didi Soekardi, his personal secretary and chauffeur, on the day of his arrest, Njoto had just left the office of Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio after a cabinet meeting when his car was intercepted and ordered by an Army jeep to go to the Military Police headquarters, opposite Gambir Station. There, he was taken into the building, then driven by jeep to the Military Detention Centre in Jalan Budi Utomo, off Lapangan Banteng. People who were being held at the Centre at the time say that he was placed in an isolation cell, but remained there for only a few hours. He was then taken out “on loan” by a military police colonel, and was never heard of again. Sakirman, a member of the PKI’s politbureau, is reported to have been arrested in Solo, shortly after the 1965 events. Then, according to some reports, he was taken to Jakarta by train though he does not seem ever to have arrived in the capital. Some people say he attempted to escape while on the train and was shot dead. M. H. Lukman, the Party’s First Deputy-Chairman, was discovered while taking refuge in the home of a friend in Kebayoran, a suburb of Jakarta, towards the end of 1965S. Both he and the man with whom he was staying were taken out and never heard of again. It is widely believed that they were both shot dead. Continued from page 1 some countries many of the disappeared are now dead—and Amnesty International has no proof of this, the international community must insist that the government be held responsible for the fate of every disappeared person. The Working Group will initially work for a year and should be urged to place Indonesia and East Timor high on its agenda. We call upon our readers, especially those in Indonesia, to provide us with more names and details or to amend or correct the information we are publishing, so as to ensure that more complete dossiers can be prepared. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDONESIA February 1979 to March 1980: A Chronology The third of TAPOL’s annual chronologies is now out. Price: £1.50 plus postage (UK 20 pence; Europe 35 pence; Overseas 35 pence seamail, £1.25 airmail). Order your copy now from: TAPOL 8a Treport Street, A limited number of copies only available. 4 TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 TH NEW ORDER AND THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS* The following is taken from Chapter X of Annual Report of Fundamental Human Rights in Indonesia 1979, published by the Institute for Legal Aid, Jakarta. Please see the review of this Report in TAPOL Bulletin Vo 38, March 1980. This chapter was written by the lawyer, Yap Thiam Hien. It would be untruthful to say that the New Order is a respecter of law and human righst. To deny this would be untruthful. And untruthfulness would not serve anybody. Only truthfulness about oneself and about the things one values may lead to better times and conditions. However, truth is a sharp scalpel, it cuts deep and painfully. Lies, hypocrisy, arbitrariness, inhumanity shun truth, because they are children of untruth. No, the New Order is no respecter of law and human rights. On the contrary. Since its birth and through the cours of its life till the time of this writing, many infringements of the law and many violations of human rights have been committed. The truth of these facts glares from the pages of every newspaper: unlawful arrest, manhandling, even killing of suspects, torture, extortion, exploitation, abuse of power during pre-trial interrogations and hearings in courts, to mention just a few, are the order of the day. 1. The case of the G30S Tapols This is the most terrible violation of human rights ever perpetrated by Indonesians against fellow Indonesians, perhaps in the whole known history of the Indonesian people. It has shocked, numbed and terrified the country. The indiscriminate massacre of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians throughout the country in the weeks following the bloody murders of seven Army Generals, the subsequent mass arrest of men and women, their prolonged detention and maltreatment, the doubtful trial proceedings and severe sentences meted out, all these cumulated human rights violations are well known, widely published and condemned internationally. TAPOL’S NEW LIST OF SPONSORS With the change in TAPOL’s sub-heading to British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia, announced in TAPOL Bulletin No 38 (March 1980), we now have a new list of sponsors. Seventeen of our original sponsors consented to continue their sponsorship, and to these have been added another ten sponsors. The three sponsors who decided to resign are Lord Gardiner, Professor John A. Rex and Han Suyin. Lord Gardiner, now eighty years old, has decided to reduce his commitments, and also felt, with Professor Rex, that with the release of most of the prisoners, he had served his purpose. Han Suyin did not seem happy with our broader focus and said that, while she does not question our aims, TAPOL “‘is no longer a totally humanitarian concern”. We take this opportunity of thanking the three retiring Before the New Year of 1980 all surviving G30S political prisoners, except some scores belonging to the A-group who will be brought to trial, will be freed, thus official reports say. They have been detained and freed without trial. And in certain officials’ minds the G30S prisoners case seems to be then regarded as closed. Some Government spokesmen have been reported as having declared that the ground for the liquidation of the unhappy and protracted tapol issue has been: humanity! It could not have been more cynical, to say the least. One could ask: What about the humanity of lost years of their lives, of physical and mental sufferings, of broken and lost homes, jobs and careers, of lost love and friendship? What about morality, justice? Could this gigantic issue of inhumanity and injustice be closed just like that? Without consideration of any compensation whatsoever that still will never be able even to make good all the nightmarish experiences??? It would not to be be believed that a government of the people that has accepted the responsibility, by repeated declarations or by implication, to govern the people according to the Pancasila, would shrug off so lightly its responsibility towards a part of the people whom it has for years and years deliberately detained without trial, and then leave them to their own devices to scratch for their own living. Even the thought of it would be unbearable. Here lies a good opportunity for the government to make the necessary humanitarian and moral amendments. *The translation of the original Indonesian text was provided by the Institute for Legal Aid. Only minor spelling and punctuation mistakes have been corrected. sponsors for their valuable support and encouragement in the past. Our list of sponsors is now as follows: Glenda Jackson Russell Kerr, MP Alf Lomas, MEP Joan Maynard, MP Sybil Morrison The Rt. Rev. Bishop Dorothy M. Needham, FRS B. C. Butler Dr. Joseph Needham, FRS The Rt. Hon. The Lord FBA Caradon Stan Newens, MP Lawrence Daly Paul Rose Peggy Duff Alan Sapper Robert Edwards, MP Jim Slater Lady Fleming The Rev. The Lord Soper Altaf Gauhar Edward P. Thompson Stuart Holland, MP Jack Woddis Lindsay Anderson Hamza Alavi Dame Peggy Ashcroft Tony Benn, MP Roland Berger TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 === [PDF page 19] === FORCED REPATRIATION FOR REFUGEES In Australia the National Times reported (2 February 1980) that the new border treaty between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea has prompted the announcement in the Indonesian Embassy (Canberra) newsletter that Papua New Guinea will repatriate to Indonesian hands “more of the people who had fled from there (West Papua—ed.) for political or other reasons and stayed in PNG”. On this point the Embassy reasons “‘only a few of them could be called intellectuals, most were fellow travellers with no convictions of their own”. Amongst the refugees is Eliazer Bonay, a former governor of West Papua New Guinea. The recent change of government in Papua New Guinea gives no cause for hope that PNG will reverse its policy of appeasing Indonesia. The West Papuan community there is in some danger as the PNG government has often issued warnings about possible repatriation if they engage in any political activities. This includes publicising Indonesia’s offences against West Papuan people in WPNG. PNG’s complicity has been a sensitive domestic and diplomatic issue and the government has done its best to cover up the repatriation of refugees. A report about the repatriation of refugees from Papua New Guinea in 1978 has recently come to light. It raises serious issues about the protection of refugees in Papua New Guinea and the observance of international conventions. The report was made by a well-informed and reliable church source, but was unpublished for some time because of the attitude of the Papua New Guinea government towards anyone publishing such reports. It is fitting to quote the report here, although it is almost two years old because it is essential that the rights of future refugees be protected. In mid-1978 the informant who was based in the Vanimo area of Papua New Guinea, heard of 100 refugees who had fled to PNG following heavy Indonesian bombing raids along the border. it was believed that the refugees were villagers and not members of the Free Papua Movement. A senior PNG government official ordered the refugees to return, but they demanded political asylum, saying that they feared for their lives if they were sent back. “They feared the Indonesians. They were afraid that they would be burned by the bombing of their villages”. A few refused to return while the rest returned on foot. The next week 343 refugees crossed but they too were rounded up by the PNG Defence Force. The informant, along with other church workers, “demanded that they be put into quarantine. Against the government officials’ wishes, we set up a quarantine camp and during that time we were able to contact UN officials and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Robert Sampatkumar, actually visited the camp”. He interviewed the refugees and decided that they were genuine refugees and were not to be sent back. A week later another 355 refugees came across the border and a second quarantine camp was established. The UN supplied food. The PNG government seems to have ignored its responsibilities of providing the basic needs of the refugees. The in- A press ban imposed by Indonesia has effectively denied the world news of large-scale racialist repression by Indonesia in West Papua New Guinea (WPNG), known by Indonesia as Irian Jaya. The Melanesian population of WPNG is callously dismissed as “wildlife” by Indonesian officials, and villagers are forced to move from traditional lands and fishing grounds to make way for Indonesian transmigrants. In Indonesia’s attempts to quell the long-standing West Papuan resistance to integration with Indonesia, West Papuans are harassed, arrested, shot and bombed. The few reports that do reach the world outside WPNG are consistent in telling a tale of the vicious subjugation of a hostage population. A report compiled in December 1979 by a reliable source reveals that there are about 500 West Papuan prisoners in various prisons—140 in Jayapura, 50 in Manokwari, 150 in Biak and 125 in Serui. They were almost all detained illegally, without the arrest-warrant WEST PAPUA (surat penangkapan) required by Indonesian law. The military authorities give a “cultural” explanation for such breaches of the law and of human rights; i.e. that “marginal law” is in force in West Papua New Guinea. The majority of the prisoners have been imprisoned for defending their basic rights, including traditional land rights. A document prepared by one of the prisoners confirms a report in TAPOL Bulletin No. 38 about the death of Baldus Mofu, and adds that in Serui two men and a woman have died in prison recently, while a medical student, Leonard Rawayai died in the Jayapura military prison. Several prisoners have stated that prison food is inadequate, and is often rotten. Indonesian troops continue to stamp on any signs of social unrest. In March this year a village in the Unurum Guay area near Jayapura was burned down by Indonesian troops, and the entire population of 100 people was formant has informed the UNHCR that during the visit of Sampatkumar another 500 refugees in the Kamberatoro had been asking for two weeks to speak to the UN representative, but their requests had been blocked in Vanimo. A priest in the area became alarmed at the condition of the refugees and reported to the government official in the area that the refugees were dying of starvation. The message relayed back on the radio was, “They are to be given no food or medical help. Let the buggers die. They are to be sent back”’. In September 1978 the informant heard with surprise, a report on the National Broadcasting Commission (PNG) that the refugees had decided to return. A letter sent to the UNHCR states: I cannot believe that these people had voluntarily agreed to return. I was present when Mr Sampat Kumar asked some of the camp leaders whether they would return when the trouble was over. Their reply was that they would return to their land when the trouble was over, but only their land on the Papua New Guinea side of the border; they would not return to their villages on the West Irian side of the border. The answer to this question was incorrectly translated from Pidgin into English by the official translator, deleting the proviso that they would only return to their land on the PNG side of the border. I and several others fluent in Pidgin pointed out the incomplete translation, which was then corrected by the official. The 700 refugees were reported to have been escorted back to the border by PNG government officials. “When they neared the border, they saw an Indonesian platoon waiting for them”, states the report. The platoon was supposedly to escort the refugees back to their (razed) villages, but they did not believe this and broke away and fled into the bush. 6 TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 slaughtered. The informant believes that the PNG government sent the refugees back because there were fears that PNG officials might be taken as hostages by Indonesian troops if they supported the refugees. The West Papuans, however, had more reasons to fear, and the informant describes their terror: I have seen refugees being returned against their will. I have actually seen them being loaded into canoes and into planes at Vanimo. I have seen grown men crying like babies. They had an intense fear of being killed. I have been told by refugees coming over, of people being carted out to sea in canoes and dropped overboard in copra sacks; of people being forced to dig their own graves and being shot into them. I have seen people who have had their eyes torn out by the Indonesians. I have heard of people being beaten and sent back to their villages as examples. It is likely that refugees will continue to cross into PNG despite tightened border security since 1978. The PNG government still insists that the refugees are “border crossers”, “illegal immigrants” or ‘“‘opportunists”. In a letter to TAPOL dated 4 February 1980 Sampatkumar, Chief of South and South East Asia Regional Section of the UNHCR says: We have been assured by the PNG authorities not only of their full adherence to the sacrosanct nature of the principle of nonrefoulement but also of their full co-operation in ascertaining that genuine refugees from Irian Jaya would not be returned to Irian Jaya against their will. We are presently working out a mutually agreeable procedure in order to ensure the above. It is to be hoped that the observance of UN principles will not revolve upon the PNG. government’s definition of WEST PAPUAN LEADER DIES AFTER BEATING Baldus Mofu, the West Papuan freedom fighter whose death we reported in our last issue, is now known to have died as the result of injuries inflicted by a group of men who picked him up from his home, took him to an isolated spot and severely beat him. The West Papuan Observer (Volume 4/5, January- February 1980) reports that, according to new information, Baldus was arrested in May last year for continuing to support West Papua’s independence from Indonesia. He had had been arrested on a number of occasions previously. Then in October 1979, he was unexpectedly released though others held with him were not. The reason for his release appears to have been that his wife was known to be away from home for several weeks, attending her mother’s funeral in another part of the country; this left their home occupied only by small children and aged relatives. On the night of 7 December, two unknown men came and took Baldus away. Early next morning, he was returned home, covered with swellings and bruises. Within a few hours he was dead. The tortured body of Baldus Mofu (West Papuan Observer, Vol. 4/5, January-February 1980). TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 7 === [PDF page 20] === NOTES BY A BLIND MAN vy toiias e Rain is falling. I can hear the rain squelching through the gaps in our cracked roof, and dripping onto the wooden bench where we sleep. I can hear the drips, clearly and distinctly, but I cannot see the rain-drops or the overcast sky above because I am blind. Like my dark fate, my fellings are mixed and grim. Sometimes in this darkness, I feel anger, then sadness. Yet, strangely, I never despair, nor do I become confused by such confusion. The world has changed, yes, changed. I confidently anticipated that it would change and I struggled more than thirty years for change. I am blind. I would like to tell the story of my blindness but no-one seems to care. Is it that everyone knows why I am blind? Or is it that my blindness is of no consequence to anyone except my family and me? Can it be that my years of struggle from 1950-1965 when I fought for my rights and for the rights of my fellow aviation workers have come to nought? The fact is that I have been forgotten. The men in uniform said I was guilty, they said I had sinned because I was a trade union activist and that I would naturally have to pay for this, even with blindness. That’s why I went blind. I should consider myself lucky, they used to say, that they didn’t finish me off altogether like so many of my comrades in the regions. I don’t regret being blind but what I do regret is being powerless, that we became paralysed ourselves even before they paralysed us. What then was the use of that trade union? We failed to turn our revolutionary tradition into a,culture, and I went blind. Like many others from my native Bangkalan on the island of Madura, I used to be a sailor. Then I switched to aviation—not of my own choosing but through the efforts of a friend. Madura has boats, coastlines and bull-races and they all remain memories for me, stored away in my rich consciousness. I cannot enjoy the sight of the beautiful countryside where I was born any more. My recollections of the world’s great harbours remain as I saw them forty years ago, in the way my eyes recorded them. I shall take that vision with me to the grave even though a thousand and one changes have taken place. A friend who has been very good to me, who helped me all the time I was in prison and who still helps me now, says —goodness knows if he is right! —that with proper medical treatment and good healthy food every day, my sight could be restored. Yet, I am not completely blind. I can see things clearly in my heart. It is important for me to explain that blindness has made my heart see things more clearly. The sound of the handdriven sewing-machine that is as old as Indonesian independence, worn by age and use, grinding on with great difficulty. My wife’s fatigue as she sits there sewing, night and day, when there is work. When orders come, our stove burns, but when things are quiet, we have to pull our belts tighter. There is no alternative. I feel the struggle of this woman, armed with nothing but her sense of responsibility as wife and mother, fighting alone in the front-line of a merciless battle, the battle for life. I can see the profile of this Srikandi! clearly in my blindness. No, I’m not blind. A longing for the three children we had to send off to relatives in East Java often breaks through my paternal feelings, but I must suppress this. Better to suffer this longing than for our children to starve in our midst. I can only hope, within my heart, that our children will find a better path in life, but there are times when this hope wavers. Sometimes, when I meet friends in the street, they ask me where my house is. I don’t know how to reply. Do I really have a house? Not being a civil engineer, I don’t know what the definition of house is. But clearly, the place we use as a shelter could hardly be called a house. The walls are made of thin bamboo slats, patched in many places with bits of paper of many different colours. It measures only two-and-a-half metres by two-and-a-half metres and three of us live here. There’s no bathroom or lavatory, well or pipe-water. No kitchen. We cook, sleep and receive visitors in this one room, We have to go two hundred metres for a place to bath and to relieve ourselves. This adds to our sufferings when one of us falls ill. Yet these are the lesser of our worries. The worst thing of all is the anxiety which continually haunts us because ths “home” of ours is a squat, built on a pavément behind the Public (Moslem) Cemetery. There are plans to remove us, and if this actually happens, I shudder to think what will become of us. How will we be able to save anything? It is difficult to portray our constant anxieties and fears as we anticipate the catastrophe, see it coming closer and closer, driving us down a dead-end. Our hearts are always ill, at ease. How long can this last? Shall we have the strength to cope? I am blind so I can’t see the anxiety of my wife’s face. My only consolation is to listen to the news from a radio in a neighbouring house. Every day, when news bulletins are broadcast, I hear the world news—news about war and peace, about inflation and world recession, about modernisation in China, and—the thing that excites me most of all —about workers on strike, transport workers in France, post-office workers in Britain, causing chaos for the governments in power. The news of workers’ actions is like a tonic, a stimulant, making my heart beat faster, making my blood tingle, giving me warmth. I always say in my heart: victory to you, comrades! We shall certainly win because our cause is just and these are our rights! Keep up the struggle and unite, comrades. Your victories are my victories, too. I am blind and can’t lead strikes or demonstrations any more, but the nostalgia revives every time I hear news from abroad. My unfortunate fellowworkers here in Indonesia don’t yet have the chance to speak out for their rights. But never mind! History is not yet finished, nor will it be finished as long as the workers remain conscious and go on with the struggle. Workers’ solidarity is an invincible weapon! 1. Srikandi: A legendary figure in the Mahabarata epic tales. She was a skilled and courageous fighter. 8 TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 acon OVER REMISSION FOR CONVICTED POLITICAL PRISONERS Early this year, it was officially announced that all convicted political prisoners would enjoy the same remission rights as other convicted prisoners. Prior to a presidential instruction issued in November last year, remission was denied to all political prisoners as a matter of principle. Although the new regulation is said to be universally applicable, there is clear evidence that widespread anomalies are occurring, particularly outside Java where law authorities are injecting some very strange interpretations. In one prison outside Java where about 60 convicted prisoners are being held, numerous anomalies have been reported. In the first place, prisoners who appealed against their sentences are not being allowed remission until the appeal has been heard. This applies too in cases where the prosecutor has appealed against the sentence. Appeal courts in Indonesia are notoriously slow, and many appeals have been pending for years. It is understood that in Jakarta some prisoners were advised to withdraw their appeals in order to enjoy remission rights, but in this prison such “concessions” are not permitted. (The authorities insist that while an appeal is pending, the person in question is not yet a convicted person but remains a “political prisoner” and is not therefore entitled to remission.) This even applies in cases where the full sentence has already been served. Two cases are mentioned where the prosecutors appealed against sentence; the sentences expired in 1976 and 1978, yet the two men remain in prison because their prosecutors’ appeals are still pending. Further anomalies have arisen because some sentences allowed deduction for pre-trial detention while others did not. As a result, the convicted person ends up serving many more years than the court’s sentence. There is also confusion over the date from which sentences are calculated. The prison authorities insist that the sentence can only start Continued from page 8 When night falls and the news bulletins have ended, I lie here alone, without a mattress, on this hard wooden bench. I know it is night-time not because the sun’s rays have disappeared but because of the calmness that descends. I think back to those sombre days. And before | fall asleep, I tell myself: ‘“‘Never stop believing that tomorrow, a red sun will rise in the east, clear and warm. Be ready to welcome it!” Jakarta, 24 October, 1979. *Holla, an ex-tapol, was a leader of Serbaud, the Union of Aviation Workers. Editor’s note Last month, we received news that Holla’s home was demolished during demolitions of squatters’ houses carried out by the Jakarta Municipal Government. He, together with other ex-tapols whose families had built shacks in the same district of Jakarta, is now completely homeless. on the day when it was formally notified by the court of the sentence. In one case, the court delayed sending the notification for three years as a result of which the prisoner finds himself serving an extra three years! EX-TAPOLS SUBJECTED TO ARMY CHECK-UP Ex-tapols in the eastern sector of Jakarta were recently ordered to remain home for one day in order to enable Army and government officials to check-up on what they are doing. It is not known whether this sudden check-up took place in other parts of the capital or elsewhere in Indonesia, but TAPOL has obtained a copy of an “urgent” and ‘“‘secret’ cable sent by Major Firdaus Hasyim, commander of the East Jakarta Military Command, to all his subordinates on 18 April instructing them to ensure that all ex-tapols in their districts would remain in their homes from midnight till 3pm on Sunday, 20 April for purposes of this check-up. Local officials were ordered to visit every single ex-tapol, and to report their findings to local army, police and government offices. The instruction highlights once again the vulnerability of ex-tapols to sudden and unwarranted interference in their daily lives. The cable was sent out less than 36 hours before the check-up was to begin and must have caused great consternation among the ex-tapols in question. THREE DEMANDS FOR JUSTICE Have you responded yet to the letter sent to you with TAPOL Bulletin No 38? If not, please do so without delay. The article on this page shows how necessary it is to push for the immediate release of all convicted prisoners. PAPUAN POP GROUP AND ELDER STATESMAN SEEK POLITICAL ASYLUM A former chairman of the Regional Assembly in Irian Jaya (West Papua New Guinea) after its absorption into Indonesia and a well-known Papuan pop group are seeking political asylum in the Netherlands. The former chairman, Dirk S. Ayamiseba, and his son Andy, who is the leader of the pop group, The Black Brothers, arrived in the Netherlands in January, together with all the other members of the group plus their wives and children. They consist altogether of 22 people. After announcing their decision to seek political asylum, the group explained that they had been opposed to Indonesia’s absorption of their country for many years and had been planning to make a getaway for a very long time. The chance eventually came when The Black Brothers were invited to tour Papua New Guinea, and took their families with them, claiming that they intended to go to Manila for a holiday. Speaking at a press conference in Delft on 20 March, Andy Ayamiseba made a strong plea for international action to stop the killing of Papuans by Indonesian troops. TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 9 === [PDF page 21] === EAST TIMOR SELF-DETERMINATION SOUGHT IN US CONGRESS A bi-partisan group of 55 members of the US House of Representatives has tabled a resolution calling for selfdetermination for East Timor and unrestricted access to the territory. Introducing the resolution on 16 April 1980, Congressman Tom Harkin said that the sponsors “believe a strong gesture of congressional concern is needed about the continuing presence of Indonesian troops in East Timor, the restriction of international aid personnel, the restrictions on East Timorese emigration and continuing human rights violations on the island”’. The resolution reads as follows: A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should take certain actions with respect to East Timor. Whereas an estimated 100,000 East Timorese have died from starvation, disease and fighting resulting from the invasion and occupation of East Timor by the government of Indonesia; Whereas an estimated 400,000 East Timorese have been displaced from their homes; Whereas the majority of the East Timorese people have suffered from malnutrition and hunger; Whereas the government of Indonesia refuses to permit the free emigration of East Timorese people; Whereas the government of Indonesia has not allowed free access to East Timor by the United Nations, relief agencies, humanitarian organisations, journalists or church groups; Whereas the United Nations, the Interparliamentary Union and the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations have repeatedly condemned the government of Indonesia for its invasion and unilateral annexation of East Timor; and Whereas the people of East Timor have not been permitted to freely exercise their right of political self-determination: now, therefore, be it resolved, That the House of Representatives calls upon the President to immediately — 1) Increase humanitarian assistance to East Timor by providing to East Timor through non-governmental organisations, more food commodities, medical supplies and funds; 2) Encourage the government of Indonesia to allow the free emigration of those East Timorese wishing to leave the country and to allow international relief personnel and journalists free access to East Timor; 3) Establish a United States presence in East Timor to monitor the distribution of relief aid and the emigration of East Timorese; and 4) Encourage the government of Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor and to allow an internationally supervised election in which the East Timorese can freely exercise their right of self-determination. MORE EXECUTIONS REPORTED A letter from East Timor, dated 8 March 1980 and smuggled out to a Timorese priest in Lisbon has supplied more names of resistance fighters who have me been executed by Indonesian troops after surrendering. He writes: The majority of (resistance fighters) who came down from the mountains have now been eliminated. Concrete cases I know of are Lino da Costa and Jacolidos Reis, both of Ossu. They were dragged out at midnight before another group was also dragged out: Lito Gusmao, Panteleao Metan junior and his wife Alexandrina, Moises da Costa of Ossu with his wife Mariazinha Lobato, sister of Nicolau Lobato, ex-president of Fretilin. According to eye-witnesses, these last two were burnt to death with petrol at Viqueque. People about to be executed are told they have been summoned to Quelicai to study Indonesian. “They have executed many people in Quelicai. People’s hearts beat faster when Quelicai is mentioned because it represents terror and certain death”. The writer speaks of intensified resistance against the background of maltreatment and terror by Indonesian troops. “There is sporadic fighting in all areas... owing to mal-treatment...Many Timorese soldiers have left Indonesian ranks to join their compatriots in the bush”’. FAMILY REUNIONS CANCELLED In 1978 following long negotiation, Australia and Indonesia worked out a family reunion agreement involving some 600 East Timorese who were to rejoin family members in Australia where they had fled soon after the Indonesian invasion of December 1975. This number represents a shortlist which the Indonesian government cut back from 2,668 applicants. A group of 100 refugees arrived in Darwin in January 1979, and Indonesian and Australian officials said at the time that the remaining 500 would probably arrive in Australia under normal immigration laws some time in 1979. So far, less than half of the refugees have arrived, and those who have are all of Chinese descent. Since September 1979 even the ethnic Chinese have been prevented from leaving. Most have got to Jakarta but have not been granted exit permits. The agreement seems to have broken down completely, but Australian and Indonesian officials are reluctant to comment. Some Australian observers feel that the breakdown results from Indonesian annoyance at continuing criticism in Australia about Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. Indonesia is plainly reluctant to allow any more East Timorese to add to the shocking stories already circulating about Indonesian abuses. Sources: Star (Northern Territory, 27 March, 1980, Northern Territory News, 22 March 1980; The Australasian, March 1980). SUSPENDED TEACHERS HAVE WAITED 15 YEARS Many dozens of teachers in Central Lampung who were suspended from work in 1965 because they were members of the PGRI, the teachers’ union that was banned after the military came to power, are still now, fifteen years later, 10 TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 ee RIOTS Last April saw two serious anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia. In Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi), following the death of a woman employed by a Chinese store-keeper, crowds rampaged through the streets in two days of anti-Chinese riots. The woman died of kidney failure, but rumours of torture and sex murder by her employer flew around the city. As tension grew the Chinese community prepared for trouble and the riots erupted less than 48 hours after the death. Troops were apparently prepared for the rioters, but little effort was made at first to contain the rioters who numbered thousands. It is estimated that 1,123 houses and stores, 29 cars and 42 motor-bikes were damaged, worth Rp. 318 million (more than US $509.000). Later the South and Central Sulawesi army commander took charge and sealed the area off. Among the 170 arrested were eleven students and the campus was closed for several days. The Medan (North Sumatra) riots left one dead and involved fighting between rival gambling gangs, one of which included Chinese youths. Again students were involved in the racial tension which flared up. Around the campus of the University of North Sumatra, there were notices saying, “For the time being, Chinese are forbidden to enter the campus’. Dozens of students circled the city on motorbikes bearing signs that said ‘‘Exterminate Chinese gamblers”’. There was a third anti-Chinese incident in Java. In the impoverished area of Gunungdedel (near Tasikmalaya), graves in a Chinese cemetery were damaged on 4 April, just before the Chinese observance of the day of Ceng Beng (visiting the ancestors). Ceng Beng ceremonies had to proceed under civil defence guard.* The incidents are serious enough in themselves, but there is more than a hint that they are not isolated incidents, and could represent the prelude to a major onslaught against the Chinese population of some three million. The KOPKAMTIB executive officer in Ujung Pandang did not see the riots as being merely in sympathy with the deceased woman. He marked them as “aimed clearly at subversion and sabotage”. In the Far Eastern Economic Review (2 May, 1980) David Jenkins observes that the government is taking the disturbances very seriously: Since then, the government has put the clamps firmly on anything that might exacerbate antagonism in the field of Sana, an acronym distilled from the Indonesian words for ethnic groups, religion, races and inter-group activities. With feeling running high in some quarters, no one is taking any chances (emphasis added —ed.). This spells great danger for the Suharto government. Indonesia is very anxious now to restore diplomatic and direct trade relations with China. But it is likely that a number of groups who oppose Suharto see the advantages in uniting around the Chinese issue. The Chinese are a well-tried target as they have long been a pariah group towards which popular grievances have been directed by those in power. The signs are that opposition groups within the military realise that the Chinese issue could well supply the flashpoint that would provide the excuse for the imposition of a state of emergency. Suharto’s security apparatus KOPKAM- TIB would then become redundant and power would shift to those who command the state of emergency. If the upheaval were massive enough it would also cut off Suharto’s ties with his Chinese financiers, whose activities have caused trenchant criticism from the student movement. Suharto and his associates have funds salted away overseas against such a day of reckoning. Those who will not be able to escape unscathed are hundreds of thousands of ordinary Chinese whose sacrifice will probably be deemed a necessity by those who have much to gain in the toppling of the Suharto regime. *Sources: Tempo 19 April and 26 April 1980 and Far Eastern Economic Review 2 May 1980. Continued from page 10 awaiting a decision regarding their status. No fewer than 188 teachers were suspended at the time for PGRI membership, but their suspension order stipulated that pending a final decision, they were entitled to receive 50 per cent of their salaries. In fact, not only do they remain suspended but none of them has received a single cent in salary for the past fifteen years. Three of the teachers, representing forty of those affected, decided in desperation to visit Parliament in Jakarta to register their complaints and press for a speedy settlement. ““We’ve tried everything, and we’re at a loss to know what to do”, one of the teachers told the Jakarta daily, Suara Karya (18 March 1980), ‘so we decided to come to Parliament”. They pointed out that they had been screened in 1966 and cleared of involvement in PGRI and PKI activities, yet this had not led to their re-instatement. RENDRA DENIED PERMIT TO VISIT AUSTRALIA The well-known Indonesian poet and playwright, Rendra, has been refused an exit permit to visit Australia where he is due to undertake an extensive tour to speak at speciallyarranged seminars and to give lectures and poetry readings. The tour, which is scheduled to last from 2 June till 3 July, is organised by CARPA (Committee Against Repression in the Pacific and Asia). News of the Indonesian Government’s refusal to allow Rendra to travel abroad for this tour has led to many protests from Senators, academics and artists in Australia. Last year, Rendra made a very successful tour of several West European countries. TAPOL Bulletin No 39 May 1980 === [PDF page 22] === BOOK REVIEW Torben Retbgll (ed.), 1980, East Timor, Indonesia and the Western Democracies: A Collection of Documents. Copenhagen, International Workgroup for Indigenous Affairs. 138pp. . misrepresentation facilitates the pursuit of dangerous and harmful programs without the constraints that an informed public opinion might, and sometimes does impose.”” (Noam Chomsky.) Torben Retbgll has produced an important collection of documents. Important because they record both the ruthless massacre and subjugation of the East Timorese, and also how governments jockeying in the big power struggle, with security and arms sales as their over-riding concerns, have duped people into becoming the passive parties to a genocide. Even more disgraceful than the suppression of information, the governments of the United States, Britain Holland, France, Germany and Sweden have been supplying Indonesia with counter-insurgency aircraft, corvettes, helicopters, submarines and guns, all in the interests of socalled regional security. Jim Dunn’s careful interviews with some 200 refugees give a horrifying exposition of the cost of all this in terms of Timorese suffering, and his account is confirmed by letters from priests who were in East Timor. While a wide range of sources, including even some Indonesian officials, testify to the continuing resistance of the Timorese liberation movement, Fretilin, the Indonesian UN representative Purbo Sugiarto, stated in August 1978 that “order has been restored in the territory”. J. Herbert Burke is quoted as saying in the US Congress in July 1977 that the “relatively insignificant question of East Timor’ was a “catspaw of communist conspiracy, designed to embarrass and weaken the government of Indonesia...” Congressional hearings, he said, encourage the “remnants of Fretilin forces... to continue killing other Timorese.” And if the logic seems warped, and principle lacking here, perhaps the answer is supplied by the Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott who urged early in 1976 that Australia accept “the inevitability of East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia’. Why? “It is a choice between Wilsonian idealism or Kissingerian realism. The former is more proper and principled but the longer term national interest may well be served by the latter”. And we might well ask —whose national interest? With the publication of William Shawcross’ Sideshow, and Kissinger’s memoirs, it has now become better known that Kissingerian realism means that lying can be used to serve pragmatic ends. Woolcott is a fervent disciple. On 31 May 1976 the Canberra Times reveals that, A Ministerial statement was altered last year to conceal the fact that Australia knew Indonesian troops were active in East Timor, more than a month before the all-out Indonesian invasion of the territory on December 7. The Australian ambassador, Mr Dick Woolcott, advised that though Australia knew a lying in its insistence that Indonesian forces were not operating in the territory, it should not say so publicly. If it were revealed, says Woolcott, “we would invite a hurt and angry reaction”. Later, in 1976, the United States cautioned Australia about jeopardising its relations with Indonesia, “if Australian relations with Indonesia worsened it could hinder the US strategy for balancing Russia’s military might”’. The voting pattern in the United Nations presented in this collection shows how the US, Western Europe and Pacific countries have opted for the “realistic” stand— abstaining or voting with Indonesia on issues concerned with East Timor. The United States’ ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Moynihan, is quoted, “... the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried forward with no inconsiderable success.” Thanks to the laws of Kissingerian realism, we live today in the shades of a world whose leaders move in ruthlessness and duplicity. Their minions apply themselves to sophistry and apologetics. The breakdown of international law and the corrosion of principles now threatens us all, while the sacrifice of a population is considered a small price for a “security” that has made people live in fear of the next move the leaders will take in its name. Is this Alice in the 1980s, an Orwellian nightmare? It’s a true story and one that should be read. Obtain from: The International Secretariat of the IWGIA, Fiolstrade 10, DK-1171 Copenhagen K, Denmark. SUBSCRIPTIONS One year’s subscription (6 issues): UK and Europe: £4.50 To all subscribers outside the UK: Please make payments by a cheque drawn on a London bank, by mail payment order or by National Giro transfer. In case of cheques drawn on foreign banks, bank charges amounting to about £1.50 are deducted from the value of the cheque and represent a serious loss on the small denomination cheques received by TAPOL. If you cannot make payment by methods suggested above, please add the equivalent of £1.50 to the value of your cheque. Thank you. Please address all correspondence and enquiries to: TAPOL 8a Treport Street London SW18 2BP, UK Printed by Calvert’s North Star Press Ltd, 55 Mount Pleasant, London WC1X OAE (01-) 278 7177. === [PDF page 23] === ca msn seomaesaen ss: ase Reta ONTENIENTE British Campaign for the Defence TAPOL Bulletin No 38 1980 TAPOL Following the successes achieved so far by the international campaign for the release of Indonesian political prisoners, in which TAPOL has played a decisive role, TAPOL wishes to reaffirm that it will continue to focus attention on the general problems of political imprisonment and human rights abuses in Indonesia. Considering the many remaining problems confronting people victimised for alleged involvement in the October 1965 affair (G30S), TAPOL will campaign for: — a decree of abolition and amnesty, abolishing the G30S as an event regarding which individuals or groups can be victimised, persecuted or sentenced and therefore granting amnesty to everyone so treated; — the restoration of full civil rights for all released tapols; — the immediate release of all tapols who have been tried or who are awaiting trial. TAPOL will also campaign vigorously in support of workers, peasants, students and others whose political and legal rights are being abused, and it will oppose press censorship. It will do all it can to support the people of East Timor and West Irian Who face both abuse of their individual rights as well as their rights as peoples to the exercise of the principle of self-determination. In This Issue Ex-Tapol Receives UNICEF Award Citizenship: Weeding out the Chinese Heri Akhmadi on the Student Trials and Campus Normalisation What’s Going on in Kalimantan of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia March 1980 STATEMENT The main obstacles to the restoration of human rights in Indonesia are KOPKAMTIB! and the. anti-subversion laws. TAPOL will therefore campaign for the dissolution of KOP- KAMTIB and the repeal of the anti-subversion laws. In order to reflect TAPOL’s broader focus, the name of the campaign will henceforth be as follows: TAPOL: British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia. Note 1 KOPKAMTIB is the acronym which denotes the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. It was ‘temporarily’ set up after the 1965 ‘coup’, but still flourishes today. A prisoner from Buru is re-united with his family. Semarang, late 1979. === [PDF page 24] === The writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a tapol for over 14 years, returned home in December 1979 to an emotional welcome from his family. During the first nine years in prison, he was not allowed, like all other tapols, to write. But in 1974, after widespread international concern at the restrictions imposed upon him, special permission was granted, allowing him to write. He completed eight manuscripts, seven historical novels and a play, during his remaining five years on Buru. All had to be surrendered to KOPKAMTIB which indicated at the time of his release that they would not permit publication because the texts were “too political”. WHERE IS TRUBUS SUDARSONO?—HE DISAPPEARED Sri Sulistiantuti, Trubus’ daughter. In the midst of the joy that always marks the tapol release ceremonies as long-separated families are re-united, many tragedies occur. Families who have been trying to trace their loved ones for years have attended releases in the hope of finding their relative, only to be disappointed. One such case is the family of Trubus Sudarsono, a wellxnown sculptor and artist from Jogjakarta, Central Java. Several of his statues still adorn the streets of Jakarta. His two daughters who attended the final release ceremony in Jakarta on 20 December said that their father had disappeared soon after the events in October 1965."*Some people claimed that he had been shot dead during the massacres, and later his wife was sent his watch and clothing but given no explanation about his fate. “J do not believe my father is dead. I shall continue to believe he is alive till I get definite news about him’’, said one of his daughters, after watching the released prisoners leave (Tempo, 29 December, 1979). Her sister said: “I too want to know the whereabouts of my father. If he is still under arrest, where is he being held? If he is dead, where is his grave?” Ths sisters explained that they had been searching for their father since 1970. It was only then, after things became relatively quiet, that they found the courage to start making enquiries. They had enquired about him at many prisons, and had written to Buru for news, only to be told that he was not there. As the releases began, they had attended many release ceremonies in all parts of Java. The ceremony on 20 December was probably their last hope, but again they were disappointed. *From other sources, TAPOL has learnt that Trubus is known to have been in one the main Jakarta prisons TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 e EX-TAPOL RECEIVES UNICEF AWARD A writer named S. Hersri, a political prisoner for thirteen years without trial, including ten years at the labour camp on the island of Buru, has been granted an award by UNICEF for a study he wrote about the process of growing up for children of tapols held on the island. The award was well publicised in the Indonesian press, and Hersri who was released from Buru in December 1978 became the first extapol to be interviewed on Indonesian television. The study which is entitled: “Two Types Within a Single Fold: Aspects of Growing up in Buru’”’, was published last October in Prisma, the leading Indonesian journal of the social sciences. It provides a very detailed account of the mode of living and production of the four thousand or so native Ina Kabuki people of Buru who inhabit tiny, scattered clusters of houses in the areas immediately contiguous with the labour camp where the political prisoners were held. These people still live by hunting and shifting cultivation and, until the camp was set up, had had no contact at all with a money economy. The arrival of more than ten thousand political prisoners most of whom were from Java, who were immediately set to work to create what eventually became an advanced agricultural project, had a powerful impact on the lives of these native inhabitants. Hersri lists.the enormously complex infrastructure built by tapol labour which included 150 kilometres of road, an extensive drainage system with at least fifty kilometres of primary canals, the clearance of 3,326 hectares of land for the cultivation of rice and other crops, the construction of many bridges, reservoires, water locks, granneries, churches and mosques, as well as numerous storage sheds and workshops for activities related to the central agricultural pursuits of the tapols. The occupation of land which the native inhabitants had formerly used for shifting cultivation resulted in many changes in their habits, such as for instance their methods of collecting sago. The existence of the camp also brought them into sudden contact with money and led to a drastic upheaval in their material and spiritual values. The social, economic and cultural problems faced by the 203 tapols who were joined by their wives and children and who settled in the special unit named Savana Jaya are the central focus of the study.1 Economic pressures at the unit were very severe particularly during the first few years, because of the lack of adequate land and disastrous crop failures in the first two years after the families arrived. The close proximity of large groups of male prisoners who had been isolated for so many years from normal social relationships created pressures which some of these impoverished families could not withstand, and some of the homes in Savana Jaya became virtual brothels. The children at Savana Jaya were fully exposed to everything that happened among their elders because of the close-knit community that developed in the unit which was also grievously lacking contact with, and stimulation from the outside. Schooling was inadequate; older children wishing to continue to upper middle school were not able to get the necessary permission from the authorities to go to Ambon where the nearest school is situated. Indeed, the families were just as much restricted in their movements as the imprisoned fathers. The writer observes that the children pursued totally different interests from those associated with childhood in their places of origin; they were drawn from a very early age into foraging for food, and other such activities, and in some cases had to fend for themselves whentheir parents became disabled. In one family where the father was paralysed, the oldest son had to leave school and take care of his sisters after their mother died in childbirth. In addition to providing many moving insights into the problems faced by the communities that lived side by side within and around the Buru prison camp, Hersri has produced a remarkably comprehensive survey of the social and cultural life of the native inhabitants of the island. His study represents an important contribution to the ethnography of Indonesia, and is no small feat for a man who has spent so long in detention without access to any scientific material and deprived even of writing materials with which to record his extensive and detailed observations. Note 1 In December 1979, just over half the Savana Jaya families returned to Java. Eighty-nine families decided to remain there. The reasons for their choice are not known, although it is known that the Army insisted that all the families would have to pay for their journey home themselves. Branded! Identity cards issued to ex-tapols bear the initials ET. A military spokesman, speaking at the release ceremony for tapols in Semarang on 20 October 1980 actually implied that the special mark would ‘“‘make things easier” for tapols after their release! TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 === [PDF page 25] === CITIZENSHIP: WEEDING OUT THE CHINESE Amid fulsome praise from foreign journalists, notably in the Dutch press and the Far Eastern Economic Review, it has been reported that earlier this year President Suharto signed two citizenship regulations purporting to speed up naturalisation processes for approximately a million ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia who are still stateless or hold Chinese or Taiwanese citizenship. This followed an announcement in November last year by General Yoga Sugama, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, that plans are being made for the repatriation of about a million Chinese who have not acquired Indonesian nationality, and that special camps are being set up as staging places for them (See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 37, January 1980). Writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review (14 March 1980), David Jenkins describes the new regulations as a “policy about-face” and calls them “remarkably generous”: Under the new rulings, Jakarta is opening its doors and offering ctizenship to virtually all Chinese residents who seek it. Regulations have been streamlined and simplified, and a strict threemonth limit put on the time given to the bureaucracy to process any individual application. But a close inspection of the regulations shows them to be far less generous than Jenkins implies. Before examining the regulations in detail, it is necessary however to consider whether there has indeed been a “policy about-face”. Historically, there-has never been a truly consistent policy towards the Chinese as a whole and their position has always been undermined by political and economic uncertainty. Scapegoats for generations In the early colonial period, the Dutch used the Chinese to achieve their penetration of the Indies market. They became the middlemen, providing a useful buffer between Dutch exploiters and Indonesian exploited. At the same time, the Dutch were at pains to prevent them from becoming too influential in the export-oriented colonial economy. And the many Chinese who became labourers, peasants, small traders or small-holder producers of cash crops such as rubber remained poor, under-privileged and insecure. Since independence, the Chinese have repeatedly been victims of policies aimed at strengthening “native” (pribumi) Indonesians. The most serious of these policies was the regulation introduced in 1960, known as PP10, which prohibited Chinese from engaging in trade in all places below sub-district level, i.e. in all villages where so many had been handling commercial activities for generations. This regulation, introduced by Sukarno under strong Army pressure, was rigorously implemented particularly after 1965 when the Army came to power. At the same time, under the New Order, some Chinese financiers have found a comfortable niche (not unlike the situation in colonial times) where profits are exchanged for patronage and brokerage from those in power. Nonetheless, the position of even the wealthiest Chinese in this system remains insecure. Patronage crumbles when the patron loses power; when Jusuf Muda Dalam, Sukarno’s minister for central banking affairs, fell, his favoured clients fell with him. Patronage creates complex rivalries, so it is hardly surprising that the Chinese population as a whole has repeatedly been used as a scapegoat. Students complaining of the corrupt practices of the generals and their allies also attacked big Chinese financial interests, but small Chinese traders were the most vulnerable and the generals did not hesitate to turn public wrath on them, transforming the complaints into manifestations of racialism. Sometimes the attacks have taken an ideological form as when, shortly after 1965, Chinese traders and peasants in West Kalimantan were killed or rounded up into camps, or Chinese were driven from their homes in Aceh and deprived of their livelihoods, in the post-1965 hysteria against China for allegedly supporting Untung’s attempted ‘“‘coup”: Again in 1968, the Chinese became victims of a showdown between two elite corps, the marines (KKO) and the paracommandos (RPKAD) in Jakarta’s Chinese district of Glodek. In 19734, Chinese shopkeepers fared badly in what were ostensibly demonstrations against Japanese investments, but which were manipulated by differing interests within the military. One writer has described the scapegoat tactic as throwing “Chinese dust into the eyes’’! of those who complain about the general effects of New Order economic strategy and corruption. The 1980 Regulations Far from being “remarkably generous”, the regulations enacted by Suharto earlier this year are little more than window-dressing in the larger arena of realpolitik and trade considerations. Commentators generally agree that they are related to moves towards a restoration of diplomatic relations with China. A Chinese delegation will visit Indonesia shortly for the 25th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference and diplomatic relations will probably be discussed then. Vice-President Adam Malik has hinted that direct trade ties may be re-established which, despite denials by Trade Minister Radius Prawira, would clearly be in Indonesia’s interests since China now supplies 15-20% of its rice imports through Hong Kong and Singapore where traders reap huge benefits from this profitable transit trade. Indonesia has always insisted that diplomatic relations cannot be resumed before the status of the one million or so non-Indonesian citizens has been regularised, for it contends that these people could be used as a fifth column by China. The main reasons why so many Chinese have failed so far to acquire Indonesian citizenship is the hugely exorbitant levies, legal and illegal, and the complex bureaucratic tangles resulting from the many documents and signatures required before an application can be submitted. Naturalisation can cost as much as three million rupiahs and depends greatly on the greed and cussedness of tne particular 4 TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 @:..i:: with whom the applicant has to deal. The new regulations have done nothing to remove these difficulties. The first of the new regulations, Presidential Instruction No. 2, 1980 concerns the issuance of nationality certificates to those who already consider themselves to be Indonesian citizens. August 17 this year has been set as the deadline for completion of this. David Jenkins states that about 100,000 people require such certificates. It remains to be seen whether this number of cases can be dealt with in the time set and then, what will happen to those who fail to obtain certificates by the deadline. The second regulation, Presidential Decision No. 13, 1980 has been introduced “to speed up the handling of applications for citizenship” which is necessary in order to clarify and establish the status and legal guarantees for every inhabitant of Indonesia in the framework of ensuring national stability and strengthening national defence. Thus, the link with security considerations has been firmly established. The Decision lists no fewer than eleven documents required with an application: a birth certificate, an immigration certificate confirming residence in Indonesia, a certificate of notification, a good-conduct certificate from the police, a marriage certificate or in the case of nonmarried women proof of single status, a health certificate, proof that the naturalisation fee has been paid, proof that the applicant receives a regular income, proof that the applicant will hold no other nationality, proof that district court costs have been paid, and a passport photograph. The documents almost all entail lengthy and costly bureaucratic wrangles. The naturalisation fee is particularly onerous. A regulation passed in 1968 set the amount at between Rp 30,000 and Rp 100,000, and stipulated that the amount should not exceed a month’s income. But the wording is such as to be interpreted as meaning that the applicant must have a monthly income of at least Rp 30,000 which precludes a very large number of people. The new regulation stipulates that the applicant must have a regular income, but many Chinese will not be able to comply. Trading restrictions and the many harassments inflicted on the poorer ethnic Chinese have deprived them of jobs or regular livelihoods. This would affect the tens of thousands still living in refugee camps in North Sumatra and West Kalimantan, and many more besides. Possibly some ex-tapols of Chinese origin could also be facing this problem. According to some estimates, about one-half of the 850,000 ethnic Chinese who might be expected to apply for citizenship are prevented from doing so because of such income and financial requirements. Security Checks The regulation also stipulates that each application must be vetted by BAKIN, the state intelligence agency. In other words, a security check of every single applicant will be made. The chances of pressure, intimidation and corruption over this particular requirement are virtually limitless. Moreover no appeals procedure is provided in cases where BAKIN rejects an application. Besides signing an oath of loyalty, applicants will also be tested in their fluency of Indonesian and knowledge of Indonesian history! If the Indonesian authorities indeed wanted to be generous in their naturalisation policy and humanitarian towards Chinese who have lived in the country for generations, the most effective way would be to make provision for naturalisation free of charge. Only then would the major obstacles be removed for the hundreds of thousands who cannot afford the procedures as they now stand. Note 1 Adil Rakindo, ‘Chinese Scapegoat Politics in Suharto’s ‘New Order’”, pp. 125-139 in Malcolm Caldwell et al. Ten Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman Books, 1975, POLITICAL TERRORISM IN INDONESIA “Political terrorism is part of the ‘anything goes’ system so widespread in Indonesia, and is sometimes carried on on a mercenary basis (special operations). The methods include: having the houses of people disliked by the regime stoned; sending anonymous letters; intimidation with weapons or less direct means; organising hooligans and mafia-type groups to frighten people disliked by those in power; nighttime operations to plant leaflets on people’s doorsteps; sending transvestites in to cause chaos among demonstrators, and then arresting these transvestites, and demonstrators; hiring professional killers to commit murders with watertight alibis; hiring prostitutes to tail political notables; sending in apparent madmen or idiots to student meetings or any activity the regime distrusts; hiring ‘masseuses’ to hang around the lobbies of political conferences; installing bugs in meeting-rooms; infiltrating informants into ‘suspicious’ meetings of Islamic scholars; making amonia bombs to be exploded during dramatic performances critical of the government; hiring people to pretend to be reporters taking pictures; ordering military men to pose as rickshaw-drivers, roadside food-vendors, etc. in the context of ‘total intelligence From: Indonesia Dibawah Sepatu Lars (Indonesia Under the Jackboot), Defence plea of Mr Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, formerly caretaker chairman of Bandung Institute of Technology Students’ Union, during his trial which ended late last year. TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 === [PDF page 26] === HERI AKHMADI ON STUDENT TRIALS AND NORMALISATION (taken from Kampus, December 1979 as reprinted in Berita dan Analisa, December 1979) Slightly abridged translation. The following is taken from an interview given to Kampus, the journal of the Students Council of the Bandung Institute of Technology, by the ex-chairman of the Council who was one of the defendants in the student trials. His criticism of the regime’s philosophical justification for “campus normalisation” is of particular interest at a time when student actions to reject the policy are intensifying. Heri was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment earlier this year. Each of the student trials took place in similar circumstances —with a stifling atmosphere, tight security on visitors and other measures. Many of the student-defendants’ rights were violated, including the right to submit statements on the basic aspects of the cases which were concerned with the appalling state of the national leadership and its consequences for society. This had been the theme of the student actions. So there were tight restrictions on explanations of the principles and objectives of the student movement. The trials were conducted as if the defendants were petty thieves. During questioning, the judges tried, with the help of the prosecutors, to extract confessions from the defendants by asking leading questions, to ensure that the sentences when passed would appear to be justified. Besides seeking to establish the truth, the courts should also administer justice. This was not done. The defendants were interrupted as they spoke, they were not granted permission to call witnesses, and were not even allowed to explain the basic problems which had led to the trials being held. Newspapers were banned from reporting the trials. The 1979 student trials can indeed be said to have conformed with the scenario prepared by those in power—using the trials as a way to punish their opponents and to intimidate society. It was possible to do this because the judiciary is heavily dependent on those in power for the livelihood of its personnel, even of the judges. It is not yet in a position to regulate and pay the people involved. This is all in the hands of the government. It is now so bad that even the judges are required to join KORPRI (Civil Servants’ Corps of the Republic of Indonesia) and to belong to GOLKARI. In view of the restrictions, the defendants decided to put everything they had to say in the defence pleas, their thoughts, explanations and responses to the charges. It was as if they were exerting themselves to produce “monuments’ because this was their only chance to explain things to the public: what the student movement had sought to achieve and what it would continue to do in pursuit of its aspirations. But, alas, even the defence pleas could not escape censorship. My own plea, entitled Smash the Yoke of Oppression of the Indonesian People was banned from distribution, even when my trial was still in progress. Nevertheless, all of us from the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) had decided in consultation that we wanted to go before the courts and expose the brutalities committed by those in power, the arbitrary arrests, and the attempts made by the rulers to force their will on the students in 1978. And I think we have achieved this. Society now knows just how viciously the students were treated, just as common people are treated when for instance petty traders are forcibly removed from the streets. By means of the trials and the defence pleas, we were able to disseminate everything we know about the irregu- Jarities practised by the national leadership and about the nature of their development policy. The authoritarian, dictatorial system created in the Suharto regime protects the avarice of the rulers, their relatives and cronies who are enriching themselves and living lives of luxury. We showed how officials conspire with Chinese businessmen to exploit the people, how they conspire with foreign investors to plunder Indonesia’s natural resources, how socio-political forces have been paralysed to prevent them from interfering with the corrupt, illegal practices of those in power. The President—Suharto himself—is ultimately to blame for all this, for he not only fails to prevent such things from happening, but he even gives them his blessing and sets the example. A member of his family has been given the lucrative cloves monopoly which is earning him thousands of millions of rupiahs in profits and he also has forestry concessions and use-rights over plantation lands?. Others in his family have shown the way in conspiring with Chinese businessmen and foreign investors. The Berkeley mafia3 is entrenched in Senopati Square4 where it has produced an ultra-conservative, anti-people’s plan. The plan is liberal and capitalistic, using the free market as the chief mechanism in the economy. It only benefits businesses that have strong capital assets and advanced managerial techniques, that is to say, the Chinese businessmen and the foreign investors. Meanwhile, the people’s economy goes from bad to worse with each passing day. The Suharto regime has reached the point where it must use all means possible, including armed force, to stay in power and to safeguard the interests and the wealth of its cronies from the seething anger of the people which could explode at any moment and destroy them. The regime, stricken with fear and panic,.will use all possible means, the TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 ©}... and the most violent, to suppress poor and starving people who find themselves trapped by every single policy measure taken by those in power. The rulers have used violence and oppression in almost all parts of the country. On Normalisation of the Campuses The KNK and NKKS are instruments with which those in power can suppress voices that threaten the Suharto regime and endanger the wealth of its cronies (corrupt officials, Chinese businessmen and foreign investors). In the eyes of those in power, normalisation of the campuses will mean that all posts on the campus will become part of the bureaucracy, whereas the student movement will be eliminated. And in order to confuse us, they speak about it as a technostructural society, which is none other than authoritarianism and bureaucracy. There are two components in KNK: logic (penalaran)® and technostructure. Logic as part of normalisation-style education is aimed at creating analytical beings who will some day hold leading positions in the technostructural society. But is logic alone enough? No, certainly not! Logic alone turns scientists into nothing more than computers who consume data, process it and produce analyses that conform to the formulae already imbibed. If academic life is based on logic alone, our universities will revert to the era of rationalism which has already been abandoned. Rationalism means a tyranny of ideas, estranging the universities from real life. Rationalism produces lofty ideas and top-quality analysis that is quite inapplicable and irrelevant to the realities existing in society; analyses of this kind end up covered in dust in the archives. Progress in today’s world of science is characterised by the employment of scientific method that is based on experimental investigation as well as logic: this involves the collection of data, the quantification of data and so on. Academic freedom is the key to such a method, in particular the freedom to collect data. This is what our academic institutions lack: data has dried up because investigations are seriously hampered by complicated formalities to get the necessary permits. And the mass media too can only print the dregs left by the censors. With tight restrictions on the collection of data, especially in the social sciences, academic life will become very shallow indeed if it is only allowed to practise logic as envisaged within the concept of campus normalisation. That those in power intend to paralyse academic life as a force of dynamism in society and turn the universities into government departments responsible for churning out experts is abundantly clear from the function that has been designed for intellectuals in the technostructure. Intellec- Continued on page 16 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST ‘NORMALISATION’ Several hundred students, including representatives from 43 universities and colleges throughout the country, demonstrated at the Indonesian Parliament on 11 February in protest against the government’s policy of ‘campus normalisation’ and called for the dismissal of the Minister of Education, Daoed Yusuf. Student protest against this policy has been intensifying for a number of months. The policy would mean an end to democratic student councils and would prevent students from participating in any political activity. The demonstration outside Parliament took place as Members were voting on a proposal by the two non-government parties, the PPP (Moslem) and the PDI (Nationalist and Christian), that Parliament should exercise its right of enquiry to question the government about “normalisation”. MPs from the two parties were heavily outnumbered by members from the Army-backed GOLKAR party and the appointed members from the Armed Forces, and the motion was defeated. The defeat brings to an end a long campaign by students to press their grievances upon the government through legal and constitutional channels. Some of the demonstrators had tried to visit President Suharto but were prevented from doing so by heavily armed riot troops. They also failed to meet members of the Supreme Advisory Council. All major buildings and intersections in the centre of Jakarta were tightly guarded during the day. Helicopter Crash As the students were returning to the University of Indonesia campus in Jakarta, a police helicopter hovered so low over their convoy of trucks that the students below had to duck to avoid the powerful gusts of wind and heat. The helicopter went out of control and crashed within feet of the trucks, only narrowly avoiding what could have been a very serious accident in terms of human life. The demonstration came as the climax to a series of actions and demonstrations in Jakarta, Bandung and other cities. On one occasion, students were prevented from burning an effigy of the Education Minister, and on another occasion, in Ujung Pandang, the Minister was compelled to leave the university campus secretly and could not attend a luncheon held in his honour because of the large number of students demonstrating at major points throughout the campus. The students who gathered in Jakarta to attend the demonstration before Parliament on 11 February adopted a Student Proclamation reaffirming their determination to preserve democratic student council constitutions, and to resist all attempts to restrict their freedoms. They also adopted a series of demands, calling for the dismissal of the Education Minister, Daoed Yusuf, and urging the government to eliminate all forms of the misuse of power and to take measures to resolve the widespread social unrest in Indonesia. TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 === [PDF page 27] === The small population, rugged terrain and remote location of the island of Kalimantan have ensured that many of its secrets have been kept from the outside world. Yet a number of disquieting reports have indicated that the grab for rapid profits by timber companies and their Indonesian brokers and the government’s obsession with “‘security” have resulted in a pogrom, ethnocide or the deliberate destruction of a culture, forced resettlements, and widespread use of forced labour. At the same time Kalimantan itself has become threatened by the environmental devastation which has rendered many of the world’s former great forest areas unfit for human or animal habitation. The Philippines example of over-exploitation of forest areas is comparable and sobering, and directly relevant, because once the plunder of the Philippines forests was complete, the timber companies spread their relentless trail of destruction into Kalimantan. Kalimantan has become an exceptionally important source of revenue to the Indonesian government. Indonesia is now the world’s leading exporter of tropical hardwood logs; from April 1978 to April 1979 earnings were approximately $1 billion in timber exports. Since 1978 the price of Kalimantan meranti samarinda logs has almost doubled so that at least another year of windfall profits may be ... pogrom, ethnocide... forced resettlements, widespread use of forced labour,... environmental devastation... expected. Despite early temporary set-backs related to fluctuating market prices, the expansion of the Indonesian logging industry has been phenomenal. In 1966 the log output was 2.6 million cubic metres, while in 1979-80 it is targeted at 30 million cubic metres of which 18.5 million cubic metres are marked as log exports. Earnings are expected to be worth at least $1.6 billion, accounting for 13% of total exports and 50% of non-oil export earnings. The main customers are Japan, Taiwan and South Korea who together take nearly 90% of the log exports. Kalimantan timber provides the major part of these earnings. The breathless admiration which characterises many reports of the Kalimantan timber industry cannot conceal the far-reaching negative implications for several groups of people on the island. In different ways, but for the same reasons, Chinese settlers, the Dyak population and political prisoners have all become victims of a rapacious and ruthless exploitation of the forests which has pushed them from their agricultural lands and endangered the future of all who have to live on the island after the companies and their Indonesian allies have moved on. Finally the benefits to the Indonesian economy as a whole are at best shortterm and limited, and the Indonesian brokers, the Jakarta generals and local officials have proved unable to protect Indonesia’s longterm interests against the wiles of experienced multi-nationals, and for the most part have been content merely to take the profits while the going is good. ... Where plants, insects, animals and people have become “pests”... Wilful Destruction: Dubious Benefits The exceptional rapacity of the exploitation of Kalimantan’s timber may be judged by the amazing degree to which production targets have been exceeded: TABLE 1! Target Output Actual Output (million cubic metres) (million cubic metres) 1969-70 2, 4.6 1973-74 Sa 21.5 In 1971, 70% of all exported timber came from East Kalimantan alone. Generally Indonesian companies have taken large concessions in Kalimantan, but lacking the capital to exploit them, have invited foreign companies to provide the capital. The style of operation of the foreign companies is wellillustrated by the US giant company, Weyerhaeuser. For over a decade Weyerhaeuser extracted large profits from its Philippines holdings, and when the last stands of timber were exhausted, Weyerhaeuser obtained, through its first wholly-owned Indonesian subsidiary, P.T. Weyerhaeuser Indonesia, a concession of 250,000 hectares in December 1969. In June 1971 Weyerhaeuser acquired a 65% interest in P.T. International Timber Corporation Indonesia (ICTI). In this venture Weyerhaeuser’s partner is P.T. Indonesian Regional Development Agency, a subsidiary of P.T. Tri Usaha Bhakti, which is a private Department of Defencecontrolled holding company. In this particular transaction 73 of Indonesia’s top leaders were reportedly granted the concession by President Suharto himself in a bid to ensure their loyalty. In return for their 35% of the profits, and an initial pay-off by Weyerhaeuser of $3.5 million, the generals merely had to provide the licence for the concession. Initially Weyerhaeuser took out two insurance policies, mainly against political instability, for ICTI, but by late 1977, so confident was Weyerhaeuser in the security of the area, that the policies were cancelled. The lure of rapid returns and the generous terms of Suharto’s 1967 investment law caused a large inflow of applications from foreign companies. Dazzled at first by the opportunities for participating in the great rip-off, Indonesian officials welcomed the companies unreservedly, but the honeymoon was soon to pall. By late 1968 applications from Philippines companies were theoretically to be rejected, as with the exhaustion of the Philippines timber industry, it was rightly felt that Philippines investors were simply acting as brokers for Indonesian timber on the world market. Many infringements of regulations were noted and as early as 1969 a forestry seminar at the University of TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 Gajah Mada expressed concern at the fact that unregulated felling had caused a dangerous spread of alang-alang grass, the scourge resulting from indiscriminate destruction of ground cover, and which has devastated large areas of formerly productive land in Southeast Asia. Eventually those who had most to gain from the timber industry realised that the pace and voracity of the logging operations threatened their own interests. Timber was being exported at its lowest unprocessed value when many more profits could be made for Indonesian brokers if the timber were processed inside Indonesia. The foreign investors were indeed investing very little capital in comparison with their returns. Accordingly, in the pursuit of value added gains the Indonesian authorities now demanded that concessionaries must set up processing plants within three years of commencing felling, and that 60% of the logs must be processed within ten years. However the government has been unable to enforce these demands as the penalty clauses involve time-consuming legal processes and in fact the crux of the matter has been aptly summed_up in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies by K. G. Koehler2 who says, The arbitration procedures laid down in the contracts, furthermore, tend to be so time consuming that it is not likely that any disputes could be quickly settled. Under these circumstances, the crucial problem seems to be the criteria which determine the short-range behaviour of foreign investors in East Kalimantan. (Our emphasis—ed.) Meanwhile Indonesia’s imports of processed wood products have been rising steadily to a record value of $122 million in 1978. 60% of Indonesia’s paper supplies are imported, including its entire newsprint needs. Environmental Costs Timber companies operating in Kalimantan have been able to violate selective cutting agreements and then abandon their concessions once all the virgin forest has been cut down. Some, like Weyerhaeuser have opted to switch to monoculture plantation crops on the cut areas of their concessions. They have introduced fast-growing pines and eucalypts, thus destroying any chance of regeneration of the natural forest. This policy has serious implications for a natural habitat like that of Kalimantan. Kalimantan covers an area of 208,000 square miles, divided into four administrative areas, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. Of the 6 million inhabitants 2.5 million are Moslem Malays, over half a million are Chinese and the remainder are the autochthonous people, the Dyaks. The diversity of the jungle itself is immense with its many varieties of trees, flowering plants, animals and insects. Simulating the diversity of the jungle, the Dyaks practice swidden (or ‘“‘slashand-burn”’) agriculture, a delicately balanced but sucessful system in which root-crops, legumes, grains, vines and fruits may all be grown in the same area of cultivation. Forest cover is essential for the maintenance of the system in providing humus or a cover of nutrient material in the form of rotting vegetation, and a natural umbrella which protects the soil from being leached by excessive exposure to tropical rains. As long as this system operates a sufficiently long period of rotation or long fallow and short cultivation periods, with a low population density (around 45/square km.), the system is stable. The seizure of vast tracks of forest has limited the areas of land available to the swidden cultivators, or in many cases has forced them to move to less fertile areas where the swidden system becomes unviable. The obvious devastation of Kalimantan cannot be denied and it has suited the government to blame the Dyaks for it, claiming that the swidden system is primitive and destructive. Damage attributed to swidden agriculture is hard to believe when Kalimantan is so large and once so well forested with a very low population density. On the other hand the requirements of the timber companies, the denuding of the landscape and the substitution of monocultural crops, have created “pests” of Kalimantan’s plant, insect, animal and human populations. This fact has determined the fates of the Dyaks, the Chinese and the prisoner/transmigrants of Kalimantan. The Dyaks: Ethnocide Today the Dyaks and their culture are under severe attack as the government makes a concerted attempt to “civilise” them. Taking the government line of attack, David Jenkins of-the Far Eastern Economic Review (30 June 1978), writes that over the past 100 years the Dyaks have ‘“‘moved like locusts across a once-green landscape, practising a primitive slash-and-burn agriculture that has upset a finelybalanced eco-system”. Yet in his finely argued discussion of swidden agriculture in his famous study, Agricultural Involution, Clifford Geertz presents swidden agriculture as being very much in harmony with the natural environment. But David Jenkins argues that ecologically the Dyaks are “‘at the end of the road’. Can it really be that Geertz was wrong and that less than 3 million swidden cultivators were too many for the vast timbered areas of Kalimantan? Or was it the fault of the government and the timber concessionaries who pushed the Dyak cultivators into unviable areas? Part of the answer is in fact provided by David Jenkins himself. He observes that the Dyaks have found that certain areas of West Kalimantan have been designated as resettlement areas for Javanese transmigrants. In 1978-9 it was announced that almost 5,000 people would be moved into areas not far from the Kalimantan border with Sarawak. The government has in fact been somewhat defensive about the policy. The Javanese head of the provincial transmigration office is quoted by Jenkins as saying that the programme can only be beneficial to the Dyaks, who “will learn from the Javanese”. He added that the Dyaks can TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980? === [PDF page 28] === learn to cultivate rice in the lowland areas, confirming that they are to be moved from traditional areas of cultivation. He claimed too that the land taken over for the project was “not used” by the Dyaks. This completely ignores the long fallow periods which are allowed for the regeneration of the jungle in the swidden system. And if the land were not under fallow/regeneration, it is notoriously difficult for the untutored and the scornful to distinguish between the natural forest and areas actually under swidden cultivation, so well-tuned is the swidden eco-system to its wider environment. Several justifications have been used for the seizure of Dyak land. Part of the “‘civilising mission” has focussed on the Dyak longhouses, the heart of Dyak culture and community. The longhouses are impressive structures of up to 400 yards long and may contain up to 100 apartments, and they are the physical manifestation of a strong sense of community and of security in that community. Members of the government who have not seen fit to consult anthropologists any more than ecologists, have defined this embodiment of community as ‘““communism” and therefore the longhouses must be destroyed. Just as extreme and illinformed is the government view that the practice of housing so many people under one roof encourages promiscuity, loose morals and sexual orgies. David Jenkins quotes one well-informed observer as saying that the government is not exactly consistent in its claims about the Dyaks, In places where there has been a security threat (e.g. the border areas—ed.) they say the longhouses are based on the communist way of life...In places where there are no communists they say they are worried about the danger of fire and disease. It is perfectly clear that they just want to get rid of them.3 The destruction of Dyak culture or ethnocide is proceeding apace and no matter what the reasons given, the true reasons are very much murkier. There are now very few longhouses left in Kalimantan as they have been pulled down. There are several reports of government agents burning down longhouses, and shots have been fired into longhouses on more than one occasion. For all the stated concern about the alleged destruction caused by the Dyak way of life, there has not been a single instance where the government has attempted well-informed and _ wellintentioned agricultural work among the Dyaks. The only extension has been the steady encroachment of the timber companies and to a lesser extent of the transmigration settlements. One of the foremost concerns of foreign investors is with the security of their investment, and it is obvious that Jakarta generals and provincial officials have not allowed security considerations to stand in the way of short-term gains any more than ecological considerations have. In the early days of the New Order, coinciding with the beginning of the timber boom, West Kalimantan, especially the area bordering with Sarawak, was regarded as a serious security risk and it became essential for the government to clear out the pro-Sukarno guerrillas who had been operating in the Confrontation with Malaysia, as well as PKI — who also operated within the area. The government were able to use the Dyaks to solve this pressing security problem which involved the Chinese population of Kalimantan. Dealing with the Chinese: Pogrom and Forced Resettlement From the mid-18th century onwards many Hakka and Teochin Chinese migrated to West Kalimantan, initially attracted by work in the gold-fields. Their descendants remained as settlers, mainly engaged in small-scale cash crop farming and some wet rice agriculture. Many lived in the interior in harmony with the Dyak population. In late 1967 however, the government successfully incited the Dyaks to massacre the Chinese after its own attempts to round them up had failed. This strategy of ‘Peoples’ War” has been described by an Indonesian officer, We convinced the Dyaks that the Communists were their enemies. We mobilised some of them into a Civil Defence Corps and armed them with Lee Enfield rifles. They killed many guerrillas...We have only two battalions of our own to guard the border (about 1,300 kilometres). Do you think we could have driven out the guerrillas without Dyak help?4 Three thousand Chinese were killed in this exercise and some 50,000 fled to the coastal towns as refugees. Taking advantage of this the government then decreed that the resettlement camps for the Chinese refugees would be away from the coast and from the Sarawak border—in the interests of security. Many have been employed in clearing forest, and adding to the army’s gains, 150 ex-servicemen through an army housing scheme, have been given land “abandoned” by the Chinese in the kabupaten of Pontianak5. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that the Dyaks too should have their turn of falling foul of the government’s “security” requirements. The enforced confinement of a large number of Chinese... has simplified matters... The enforced confinement of a large number of Chinese in Kalimantan has simplified matters on subsequent sensitive occasions. For example, during the 1971 elections, the military commander of West Kalimantan ordered the Chinese not to travel, and also ordered his troops to shoot any “trouble-makers” on sight6. A recent report in Angkatan Bersenjata (7 May 1979) has added a little to the limited press coverage of the resettlement of Chinese in Kalimantan, mainly from the border districts. Now “special” districts have been prepared for them, and they will not be allowed to leave. Their numbers will be swollen by settlers from other districts, but it has not been specified whether these will be former tapols or not. The government then claims that it is not trying to isolate the Chinese, but is helping them to integrate with other transmigrants. It is perhaps telling that these areas have not been designated by the provincial transmigration authority, but by none other 10 TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 @: the provincial representative of KOPKAMTIB, indicaing that security considerations are paramount. It is also perhaps significant that this policy was discussed by the governor of West Kalimantan, Soejiman at the release ceremony for G30S detainees in Kalimantan on 27 April 1979: Prisoners/Transmigrants: A Captive Labour Force? In Tapol Bulletin No 34. (1979), fears were expressed that the government has been using a variety of means to force former tapols to “voluntarily” opt to remain as “transmigrants” in Kalimantan. Some of the resettlement camps, at least Amborawang and Pararapak, appear to be situated inside the forestry concessions of Inhutan and Barito Baru respectively, raising the possibility that these “settlers” are used as forced labour or to supply food and other services to the forestry camps and towns. Amborawang has been regarded by military authorities as the “beach-head” of development for East Kalimantan and a recent Tempo report (26 January 1980) reveals that there are now 127 families living in the Amborawang camp, but “only 96 families (42 of which are headed by former Armed Forces personnel) are living in houses’. The rest are forced to live in barracks despite a promise by Admiral Sudomo at the end of 1977 that within two years 500 houses would be built and no one would have to live in barracks. Influenced by this promise some tapols agreed to go to Amborawang only to find that the promised housing did not materialise. We are not allowed to go home, yet there are no facilities here. Tapol labour has certainly been used to build the houses which have been constructed so far. A former tapol, Kusdi, explained in the Tempo report that he had built several houses but had not yet been paid. He also indicated that former tapols are being held against their wills in the camp and stated that he wished to return to his family in the Pari district, But the Laksusda7 has asked us to remain here. We are not allowed to go home, yet there are no facilities here. Conditions in the camp are extremely difficult. Tools promised by the government have not materialised, the soil is poor and the tapols are forced to seek work as labourers outside the camp in order to subsist. Families in the Jilatan settlement in South Kalimantan are also experiencing hardship, but curiously they are very reticent about their obvious hardship. This might be explained by the fact that the “settlers” are former tapols and their families, and they are under the supervision of the local military command, or “‘under regional guidance” as KOPKAMTIB puts it. Yet the prisoners are theoretically released and subject to the same conditions as other transmigrants. Because of the transport difficulties and remoteness of Kalimantan, there is ample reason to fear that such reports represent only a fraction of widespread abuses. Obviously it is in the interests of the government to populate the “secure” areas of Kalimantan, as it has always been difficult to supply the labour and service requirements of the concessionaries. At first it was necessary to import labourers from the Philippines and Malaysia. It is also necessary that the labour force is subdued and easy to control so that there can be no redress against the notoriously exploitative working conditions in the concession areas. The dispossessed Dyaks and Chinese and the captive tapols (many of whom are Dyaks and Chinese) can supply this need. The immediate implications about the fates of these people are distressing enough, but the longterm effects of a reckless and rapacious plunder of the forests for those who remain long after the investors and their brokers depart, promise to be equally dire. Notes 1 These figures are taken from Ingrid Palmer 1978, The Indonesian Economy Since 1965, London, Frank Cass, p. 120. 2 K.G. Koehler, 1972, ‘Wood Processing in East Kalimantan: A Case Study of Industrialisation and Foreign Investment in Indonesia”, pp. 93-130, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VIII:3; November, p. 125. Quoted by David Jenkins, ““The Dyaks: Goodbye to All That”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 June 1978, p. 23. Quoted by Brian May 1978, The Indonesian Tragedy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 120. Marian W. Ward and R. Gerard Ward, 1974, ‘‘An Economic Survey of West Kalimantan”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, X:3, November, p. 28. Brian May, op. cit. 5 above, p. 266. Laksusda is the acronym which designates regional executive officers of KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order). AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: INDONESIA’S INVASION OF EAST TIMOR By Amold Kohen and John Taylor With a Foreword by Noam Chomsky 133 pages with pictures and maps. Chapters on: Decolonisation and Independence: Recolonisation and Resistance Indonesian Atrocities Complicity and Acquiescence The Right to Self-Determination Price: £1.75 plus postage (UK 25p; Europe 65p; overseas airmail £1.00; overseas seamail 20p) Order your copies NOW from: TAPOL, 8a Treport Street TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 === [PDF page 29] === BOOK REVIEW Annual Report on Fundamental Human Rights in Indonesia 1979, (ed.) T. Mulya Lubis and Fauzi Abdullah. Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Jakarta, 1979. The Legal Aid Institute has taken a valuable step forward with the publication of this, the first, of their annual reports on human rights in Indonesia. A legal aid institute could, if it wished, confine itself to the provision of legal counsel free of charge to those who cannot afford it. In Indonesia it has interpreted its brief much more broadly and is becoming the major forum for criticising abuses and pressing for changes in the law that would improve the rights of Indonesian citizens. This Annual Report also makes it clear that the Institute does not confine its understanding of human rights to political and legal rights but extends ‘it to include social, economic and cultural rights as well. It therefore includes chapters on a variety of topics: education, health, income, basic needs, employment opportunities, press freedom, participation in state affairs and the right to justice. But it acknowledges that its access to information about abuses is very limited indeed: If all would speak up, if all the information in the villages could be gathered, it would perhaps struck us dumbfounded (sic). We have to honestly admit that we don’t know much about what happened in remote corners of our country. Indonesia’s two provisional constitutions of 1949 and 1950 were far better on human rights than the 1945 Constitution, the one restored by President Sukarno in 1959 under pressure from the Army which was by then increasingly interfering in political affairs. In tracing the post-1965 New Order claims to restore the rule of law, which had been severely battered under Sukarno by the abandonment of the trias politicas principle, the Report suggests that “the New Order truly utilized the law as a legitimate means of power. If the law is non-existent, then it was immediately drawn up’. From the examples that follow this extraordinary statement, one can only assume that it is intended as an ironic comment on how laws have been used to perpetuate unlawful and unconstitutional institutions such as KOPKAMTIB, and to abrogate constitutionally-affirmed rights by means of the “simplification” of party political life. On some of the most crucial aspects of the way in which military rule was established in 1965, the Report is inconsistent in its adherence to human rights principles. When describing the immediate post-1965 period, it asserts that “we really found an atmosphere of political freedom, freedom to express opinion and freedom to associate”. Yet this was a period when dozens of organisations with a combined membership of many millions were banned, when hundreds of thousands were killed for their alleged political affiliations, and hundreds of thousands more thrown into prison, and when numerous newspapers were prohibited. But in a later chapter, the Report redeems itself by referring to the problem of the G30S/PKI political prisoners as the gravest violation against human rights ever done by the Indonesian people against its fellow nationals. The killing of thousands of people throughout the country in the weeks following the murder of seven Generals, mass arrest of men and women, detentions and protracted unfair treatment, dubious process of law and the widely known and publicised heavy sentences. The simplest explanation for this contradictory presentation of a single period is that the several chapters in the Report were written by different people, as indeed the editors say in their introduction. But more fundamentally, the ambiguity arises because the “PKI-spectre’’ has been so deeply established in Indonesia that even outspoken human rights advocates have ignored or skirted round this “gravest violation” of all, either because of the risks involved or because some of them still believe that PKI members or sympathisers got all they deserved, human rights or no. But the author of the chapter from which the latter quotation is taken is Mr Yap Thiam Hien, a man who has been unfailingly consistent in his adherence to human principles. The chapters on social, economic and cultural rights provide a great deal of useful information: figures on the high illiteracy rate among school-age children (41.3% in 1971, 40.3% in 1977), on the very low expenditure on health services (0.3% of GNP in 1979), and on the lack of basic hygienic facilities (safe water is available to only 6.1% of village dwellers). An important point too is made about the danger of human rights abuse in the implementation of the family planning programme which is being pushed at a time when child mortality is still very high, so that it could still be in the interest of parents to have more children than national population figures would seem to justify. The Report also contains a useful section on land problems and points out that 80% of the 1,200 complaints made by delegations who went to Parliament in 1979 were connected with land disputes. g All in all, the Report provides a useful and fairly comprehensive picture of life in Indonesia today and is valuable reading for anyone wishing to understand why there is so much social and political unrest in the country. It is very helpful indeed to have the document available in English though it must be said that the translation is not always very satisfactory and sometimes positively impedes an understanding of the text. CHRONOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN INDONESIA, 1979/1980 The third of TAPOL’s annual Chronologies is now in preparation. Price: (approx) £1.50 plus postage. Please send your orders to: TAPOL, 8a Treport Street, 12 TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 @AND DISPUTES JENGGAWAH PEASANTS ON TRIAL Seven peasants involved in the widely-reported land dispute with a state-owned tobacco plantation in Jenggawah, District of Jember, East Java last July, were suddenly summoned to court on 4th December to face a number of charges. (For a summary of this dispute, see TAPOL Bulletin No. 36, October 1979, p. 7). With only two days’ notification of the trial, the defendants’ lawyers could not be present. Despite protests from the peasants that the charges should not be read out till the lawyers were present, the first hearing proceeded as planned. The defendants’ demand that the next hearing should be postponed for a month was also turned down, and the hearing was fixed for only one week hence, giving virtually no opportunity to the lawyers to prepare their case. The peasants are being charged under the 1963 antisubversion law and several articles of the Criminal Code. They are accused of holding three meetings wihout permission, of organising the peasants who are involved in the dispute, of continuing to protest against the arrest of two peasants involved in the dispute. They are also charged with responsibility for the damage caused to two tobacco warehouses which were burnt down during the course of the dispute. Four of the defendants, who are not being held in, custody during the trial, travelled to Jakarta after the first hearing to submit a formal complaint to Parliament and to demand proper legal protection. They stressed that the peasants involved had been willing to accept the decision announced by the Governor of East Java which guaranteed that the size of land-holdings re-distributed to the peasants would not be limited to 0.3 hectares per family as the plantation had originally determined, but would allow families to obtain larger plots in accordance with the size of their family. After this decision has been published, nothing further happened, and the plantation appeared to have abandoned its plans to re-distribute the land. The peasants therefore went on cultivating the land as formerly. But suddenly, plantation officials appeared again, accusing them of working on land to which they were not entitled, and insisting once again that the originally proposed plan of redistribution of only 0.3 hectares would be fully implemented. Simultaneously with this, court proceedings were commenced. Why, the peasant-defendants asked the leaders of Parliament, was the Governor’s decision now being completely ignored? And why was it that they, who had agreed to accept the Governor’s decision, were now being charged in court whereas no action was being taken against the plantation officials who were ignoring this decision? ARRESTS IN NORTH SUMATRA * Eleven peasants were arrested in mid-January in the village of Paya Mabar, Deli Serdang District, North Sumatra after resisting attempts to force them off the land they till. The land in dispute had been grabbed from them in 1967 by members of the armed forces. A total of 46 peasants have been trying to re-possess the land. The arrests followed two incidents during which peasants who were working on the land were set upon and beaten up by gangs of men. In the first incident, police who accompanied the attackers stood by as the peasants were assaulted. In the second incident, six peasants under attack tried to defend themselves, but they were quickly outnumbered, and so tried to escape from their assailants. Soon afterwards the police appeared and arrested the six men, and then went to the homes of other peasants involved in the dispute and arrested them too. Kompas which reported this incident (25 January 1980) stated that the Police Chief of North Sumatra refused to answer any questions about these arrests. * A group of peasants in the village of Ujung Rambe, Bangun Purba District, North Sumatra were arrested in January after attempting to defend their rights to land they have been tilling since 1962. Soon after the arrests, forty women who were wives of the arrested men, some carrying babies, travelled to the District Chiefs office to protest about the arrests. They declared that they did not feel safe in the village and wanted to remain there for protection until their husbands were released and allowed to return home. They had all brought mats and bundles of clothes with them and staged a sitdown strike on the premises. Eventually they were persuaded to go home without any settlement of their complaint (Kompas, 17 January, 1980). ACEH TAPOLS There are about 126 political prisoners in Aceh, the most northerly province of Sumatra, says an Indonesian lawyer who has written to human rights activists in the Netherlands asking for support to help free these prisoners. A few are currently being tried, and some others have already been tried and sentenced, but the majority, who were arrested in 1977 and 1978, are being held without trial. The prisoners are accused of involvement in the Movement for an Independent Aceh. They include somé prominent figures in society. The lawyer also points out that many others were held for shorter periods of time, also without trial. In some cases, local leaders who had been detained were only released, he says, after promising to vote for GOLKAR, the military-backed party, at the elections held in July 1977. The conditions in which the prisoners are held are quite appalling, he says; food is very inadequate and there have been many cases of maltreatment. Aceh is a strongly Islamic region, and the PPP (the Moslem party) did well there at the 1977 elections. TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 13 === [PDF page 30] === GARUDA PILOTS DISMISSED At the end of January, the state-owned Garuda Airways was brought to a complete standstill by a walk-out of pilots in protest against the dismissal of four of their colleagues over a pay claim made last year. Over 130 pilots walked out and participated in a demonstration to Parliament demanding immediate re-instatement and a settlement of their pay dispute. The Army security command, KOPKAMTIB, intervened when chaos struck the main airports throughout the country, and set up a “crisis centre’. Whilst cynically asserting that no pilots would be dismissed over the issue, KOPKAMTIB Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sudomo, announced that all pilots employed by Garuda would be required to re-register for work and to give a written undertaking that they would not engage in strike action or in any way disrupt flights. KOPKAMTIB has repeatedly intervened in the dispute, claiming that “national security” and “economic development” are being put at risk. A lawyer, Mr Albert Hasibuan has pointed out (Kompas, 2 February 1980) that by accusing pilots of disturbing national development, Sudomo could now charge them with violating the anti-subversion laws of 1959 and 1963. “Don’t play around with such charges”, he warned, “for the penalties involved are extremely severe and include the death sentence”’. The conflict has been brewing since November last year when the pay claim was first submitted to the Garuda management. KORPRI, the association to which all state employees must belong, was brought in to find a solution, but since the managing-director of Garuda is also chairman of the KORPRI Garuda pranch, it is not surprising that KORPRI’s intervention proved fruitless. In fact all those who represented the pilots’ side in the negotiation team that was set up on the orders of KOPKAMTIB to work out a settlement have now been dismissed. They are among the four men dismissed in January and another five persons dismissed last December. The pilots who went to Parliament with their complaints were clearly afraid of possible repercussions from their demonstration. Many had even brought suitcases with them and announced their intention to remain in the Parliament building until the dispute had been solved; some also said that they expected to be arrested. As discussions were going on, the pilots refused to leave the building until some progress had been made and until assurances had been given that no arrests would be made after they had left the building. The chairman and deputy chairmen of Parliament, all of whom became very much involved and, according to some newspapers, quite agitated over the pilots’ sit-down action, eventually secured an assurance from the Jakarta military command that no arrests would be made, and it was only after this that the pilots agreed to disband and go home. A PETTY DESPOT’S ‘RECONSTRUCTION’ IN MEDAN As the result of an understandable mistake, a respected Medan journalist, Yus Rivai Harahap, has been made to spend several days in jail, and suffer public humiliation and physical distress at the hands of a despotic police officer. On 7 December 1979, Yus hired a red Yamaha motorbike and parked it outside the Kisaran District Office where he went inside to settle some business. When he came out someone had parked a similar motor-bike right next to the one he had hired, and Yus had difficulty identifying the one he had used. On finding that his key fitted one of them, he rode away without realising that he had the wrong one. Meanwhile the owner of the motor-bike, Ali Amran, emerged from the District Office and saw at once that a mistake had been made, and so took Yus’ hired machine to the police station. Later when Yus returned the motor-bike he was riding to Corporal Pakpahan, the owner, Pakpahan said he had returned the wrong motor-bike. However, Pakpahan quickly found his motor-bike at the police station and he and Ali Amran realising the mistake, exchanged the bikes without further ado. However Captain Bambang Susetyo of the police was not happy to let it rest at that, and decided to make a public spectacle of Yus. After he had spent four days in prison and had been refused permission to see his wife, Bambang had him manacled and made him walk five kilometres around Medan in the hot midday sun with bare feet on baking asphalt, encouraging a large audience, including journalists, to witness Yus’ discomfort. The walk was supposed to enable the reconstruction of the so-called crime and the police made Yus visit all his stops of 7 December. Several journalists were. upset by this treatment and asked Bambang why he did not conduct the ‘reconstruction’ by car, but Bambang claimed that there was no petrol. The journalists then offered to supply petrol, but were told angrily by Bambang that “it was not their business”’. Sinar Indonesia Baru the newspaper for which Yus works took a very critical position on the affair, and said that Bambang’s action was one of revenge as Sinar Indonesia Baru had often criticised the police for torturing prisoners and about the widespread gambling in Kisaran. Many other organisations protested including the Indonesian Journalists’ Association legal office in Medan, and seven youth organisations. The head of the North Sumatra Police District, Brigadier General Montolalu, has said that Bambang’s actions were imprudent and that action would be taken. Bambang is one of a few who may not have got away with despotic and arbitrary practices...But then, he is not a general... Source: Tempo 22 December 1979. 14 TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 @URISTS: ANOTHER INVASION OF THE ASMAT An advertisement placed in the Dutch monthly, Arts en Auto invites a group of fourteen Dutch people to participate in a safari to the Asmat area of West Irian so that they can wonder at the “primitive” practices of the Asmat people. The leader of this cynical expedition is a Dutch woman, Oedine Wittewaall, a former resident of sixteen years in West Irian. The cost of her expertise will be Dfl. The spectacle-seekers will not be disappointed for the Indonesian military has provided them with much to see which may be recorded as “primitive”. The thousands of West Papuans who have been forced out of towns have to practice a precarious subsistence agriculture in the bush and the jungle, in the least fertile areas which have been left after the transmigration programme. The hardship is‘compounded by the fact that the military authorities will not allow the West Papuan villagers to leave the immediate village area in districts which are regarded as insecure. This means that shifting cultivation cannot be practised effectively and nutritional levels must drop. No doubt the comparison between such a primitive and poor way of life will provide a comfortable contrast for Oedine’s intrepid companions, and they will return home with their slides, colourful stories and an enhanced appreciation of Dutch affluence. BRUTALITY ON BIAK Baldus Mofu Dies in Prison The West Papuan nationalist Baldus Mofu is reported to have died on 7 December 1979 as a result of ill-treatment received in Biak prison. He was arrested along with several others in July 1979 after making a speech on West Papua’s National Day on July Ist which commemmorates the Declaration of Independence made by the Free Papua Movement leader, Seth Rumkorem, on 1 July 1971. It is estimated that there are some 300 political prisoners on Biak island alone. They are held in dreadful conditions and are subject to torture. Source: West Papual Observer 4:2 and 4:4 Massacre on Biak A group of twelve men, women and children who had obtained permission to gather sago outside of their village in north Biak, were ruthlessly shot down last year by an Indonesian army patrol which was looking for Free Papua Movement (OPM) units. It appears that the patrol later checked and discovered that the villagers did have a valid MASSIVE FORCED RE-SETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR In its drive to force East Timorese people out of the mountain regions, the base for the protracted resistance to Indonesia’s invasion launched in December 1975, the Indonesian government has adopted a starvation policy. Saturation bombing combined with search-and-destroy missions and widespread defoliation has severely disrupted the traditional agricultural pursuits of the country’s mountain people. Villagers forced to be constantly on the move have been unable to plant or harvest their crops. The resultant grave food shortages and lack of medicines and clothing forced more than half the total population to come down into the lowland areas, the only parts of the country which the invading troops have been able to control physically. At least 300,0UU people, well over one-halt the total surviving population of East Timor, have now been herded into “resettlement villages”. The strategic role of this “resettlement” programme has been clearly described by Henry Kamm, in the New York Times (28 January 1980) who visited East Timor for one week. He writes: The Jakarta Government has prepared a resettlement program under which people are to be installed in larger groups than was the Timorese tradition. Villages are to be situated along the roads, where the inhabitants will be accessible to public services such as education and health. A specialist in Timorese agriculture said that the plan had been drawn largely for strategic reasons, placing the population where the Indonesian Army can control it. Strongly anti-Communist, he approves of the political objective of keeping the people out of the reach of Fretilin remnants. However, he said, Timor has never been more than barely able to feed its population. The people have produced their food by living in small groups and exploiting all the arable valleys of the rugged interior. The resettlement project, the specialist said, will make East Timor permanently dependent on food imports. nal permit, but by then it was too late as they were all dead. Their bodies were left to be discovered some time later by another villager who was on his way to do some gardening. The informant of West Papuan Observer was reluctant to identify the village in north Biak where the massacre occurred because of fear of reprisals. Biak is now the centre of renewed OPM activity, but it has always been an area of strong anti-colonial resistance. It has been reported that at the end of 1979 north and east Biak were subjected to heavy bombing attacks by Indonesia, probably indicating that attempts by patrols to end OPM activity had been unsuccessful. Source: West Papuan Observer, 4:3 and 4:4 TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 15 === [PDF page 31] === PRESS FREEDOM: ALI MURTOPO ELUCIDATES When in early December last year, KOPKAMTIB Commander, Admiral Sudomo warned newspapers in Indonesia against printing-.opinion’ “and told them they should stick to facts, Vice-President Adam Malik, himself a newsman in the old,days, could not let pass an opportunity of} reminding Sudomo that opinions were also facts, and there-: fore worthy of being reported, although to be on the safe. side, he added that newspapers should be cautious about publishing opinions that could “harm the national interest”. Continued from page 7° tuals will be nothing more than thought machines. As Kenneth Galbraith has said, technostructure which already exists in the advanced countries is simply a means for giant corporations to wield control over society. Rationalism and bureaucratism based on the technostructure idea take the shape of models and formulae which must all conform to the wishes of those in power. The universities must conform to the will of those in power, the students must conform to the will of those in power. This is what an authoritarian, dictatorial system of government means. So, KNK and NKK are the political means to undermine social and cultural life in order to justify the authoritarian regime in power in this country. The campaign being waged by ITB students to resist the enforcement of normalisation has now reached the point of no return. It is a struggle which is aimed not only at defending the students’ council and other democratic students’ organisations; it also pursues the broader objective of freeing academic life from the clutches of the dictators who want to control everything in Indonesia. It is not only the implementation of normalisation that is bad, but also the concept on which it is based. Thus the personification of normalisation is not Daud Jusuf,7 but the regime itself. Notes 1 GOLKAR is the party of the army, and KORPRI is the Civil Servants’ Corps which all government employees are required to join. KORPRI is one of the GOLKAR organisations. This is a reference to the President’s brother, Probosutejo, who owns the company P.T. Mercu Buana which is built on an official monopoly of clove exports. The Berkeley mafia refers to the techocrats in charge of Indonesia’s economy. They are so called as most were trained at Berkeley, California. Senopati Square is the address of the State Planning Office. KNK-—Konsep Normalisasi Kampys; NKK—Normalisasi Keluarga Kampus (Normalisation of the Campus Family). Penalaran means something reasonable or sensible, but the best word to use here would seem to be logic. Daud Jusuf is the Minister for Education who launched the normalisation policy and who is mainly responsible for its implementation in the universities. But, for a full clarification of what newspapers allowed to print and what they are not allowed to print, who better than the man actually in charge, the Minister of Information, General Ali Murtopo? We are indebted to Kompas (6 December 1980) for reporting his final judgement on this important question, as follows: Some opinions expressed by individuals have not been tested for their validity. These can be classified, he said, as opinions about opinions. He acknowledged that, for newspapers, these were facts, but taking into account the present conditions of Indonesian society and the educative role performed by the press, the reporting of such opinions cannot be considered as being educative. By reporting such opinions, newspapers would be publishing information that only blurs the issues...The way to judge whether an opinion about an opinion should be reported in the press is to decide whether it has moral value, whether it is in the national interest and whether it is worthy of being reported. ‘Tapol’ is an Indonesian contraction for ‘tahanan politik’ meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are ‘criminals’. SUBSCRIPTIONS One year’s subscription (6 issues): UK and Europe: £4:50 To all subscribers outside the UK: Please make payments by a cheque drawn on a London bank, by mail payment order or by National Giro transfer. In case of cheques drawn on foreign banks, bank charges amounting to about £1.50 are deducted from the value of the cheque and represent a serious loss on the small denomination cheques received by TAPOL. If you cannot make payment by methods suggested above, please add the equivalent of £1.50 to the value of your cheque. Thank you. Please address all correspondence and enquiries to: TAPOL 8a Treport Street London SW18 2BP, UK Printed by caverts North Star Press Ltd. TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 === [PDF page 32] === British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 Editorial CAMPAIGN AGAINST REPRESSION WILL CONTINUE With the official conclusion of KOPKAMTIB’s 3-year release programme, TAPOL is being asked whether it will continue to campaign. As a TAPOL representative told Tempo (29 December 1979), “TAPOL will continue to be active because it campaigns not on risoners but tor political views”. Many problems still remain: ALLO AAR LED DE I Tried Tapols and Those Awaiting Trial This issue is largely devoted to an interim analysis of the hundreds of political trials held since 1965. A major part of TAPOL’s work during the coming period will be devoted to completing this study which concerns not only the trials as such but also the role they have played in underpinning the military government’s claim to legitimacy. Comments on this analysis are welcome, as well as help in obtaining additional material. At the same time, we shall campaign for the release of all tried and A-category tapols. The 1965 Tapols Now that KOPKAMTIB claims there are no more B-category tapols, an independent assessment is essential. Nearly 200 ex-tapols, half with their families, are still on Bum; KOPKAMTIB claims they “‘opted” to remain. A thousand or so tapols or ex-tapols are in labour camps in Kalimantan, with others in Sulawesi; they too are said to be there “voluntarily”. As we were going to press, news was received that one Buru prisoner is now detained in Wirogunan Prison, Jogjakarta, in order to testify at a forthcomong trial. Just ‘Tapol’ is an Indonesian contraction for ‘tahanan politik’ meaning political prisoner. It is still widely 'used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are ‘criminals’. prior to the December releases, fears were expressed that some tapols would be mixed with people on criminal charges so they could not be identified. With KOPKAMTIB figures unreliable right up to the last (see page 18) there is no way of confirming that 33,094 were actually released, or indeed that this was the number of B-category tapols eligible for release. Complete Amnesty for All Released Tapols Ex-tapols released in the past few years face serious discrimination which obstructs their rehabilitation and efforts to make a living. Army officers often call upon society “to welcome them back” but this is hypocritical because it is the Army which officially excludes them from the public sector, the Armed Forces and “‘vital” industries. The Government must be pressed to issue an edict granting amnesty and abolition (amnesti dan abolisi) to everyone held in connection with the G30S/PKI affair. As a precedent, this was granted by the Sukarno Government to all those held for alleged involvement in regional rebellions in the late 1950s. Some government officials argue that the G30S/PKI is “different”? because it involves “ideology’’, but surely, this is all the more reason why complete amnesty must be granted! Amnesty and abolition means clearing the names of all those victimised, and formally deleting the ‘“G30S/PKI affair” as an issue for discrimination of any kind. It is essential for the complete restoration of civil rights to tens of thousands victimised for so long for political reasons. Other Political Prisoners Many student leaders have spent time in detention in the past few years; 36 were tried and all verdicts so far have been guilty, with sentences ranging from 9 months to two continued on page 20 === [PDF page 33] === Received from an ex-tapol On behalf of many friends here, I wish you a Happy New Year and new successes in 1980. Over the past 14 years or so, you have given us enormous support, political, moral and material, and have been able to force the military government — to halt the mass murder of Indonesian people, — to soften its inhuman attitude towards the Indonesian people, particularly towards political prisoners and their families, to release all C- and B-category political prisoners, and to allow us to survive though some of us have been crippled physically and mentally as a result of brutal tortures. Please accept our boundless thanks for this invaluable help. May God repay you for all you have done. Without your help it would not have been possible to achieve all this because dark forces and the military government here were intent upon our complete annihilation. A-category prisoners, those still awaiting trial, are still being held, as well as those who are serving sentences. In these trials, the charges are fabricated by those in power, and the verdicts and sentences are fixed before the court’s judgement is made without regard for the evidence and defence presented by the accused. We earnestly hope that you will help us by pressing the Indonesian Government to release them immediately. And we also need your help to alleviate the hardships of those who are ailing as a result of past torture. To mention but a few: ex-Colonel Abdul Latief is suffering from unhealed gunshot and bayonet wounds in both legs inflicted at the time of his arrest, and is serving a sentence in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta; former mayor of Magelang, Argo Ismoyo has asthma with complications and is serving a sentence in Wirogunan Prison, Jogjakarta; Widadgo, a former medical student at Gaja Mada University, is paralysed and dumb as a result of torture while at NEW YEAR’S GREETINGS TO ALL GOOD FRIENDS ABROAD! Wirogunan Prison, and is now being cared for by his grandmother in Kebumen, Central Java; Sugeng Maryono, formerly an activist, is paralysed and is now living in Ngawi, East Java; ex-Member of Parliament Hutomo Supardan is paralysed and is living in Bandung. In most cases, their families live in extreme hardship as a result of the political treatment they have experienced which makes it very difficult for them to care for these sick people. Besides all this, we are living today under a military dictatorship, with no real democracy or basic human rights. People can be arrested and detained by the government on any pretext, at any time. Working people get very low wages (some as low as Rp 100* a day) with no right to defend themselves; peasants are cheated of their land on numerous pretexts without being able to defend themselves; unemployment is rocketing and together with it, homelessness, crime and prostitution. Prices of essential goods are soaring and there is a continual decline in the already meagre real earnings of the people. Taxation and other levies are increasing. More and more children are failing to find places in the schools. Domestic production, expecially of basic necessities, is declining whilst those in power get richer and richer. Corruption is worsening. On the other hand, students, intellectuals and other well-meaning people are deprived the right to freely express their views. The Indonesian people are striving in many ways to bring about a system of democracy in which basic human rights and justice can be upheld. We urgently need your help—political, moral and material. Just as, in past years, your help has been effective in attaining its objective, so now we are convinced that the help we feel sure you will provide will be successful, and democracy, justice, humanitarianism and basic human rights will prevail in the end. Please accept our most fervent greetings. Indonesia, 31 December 1979. *$1.00 = Rp. 624. 3 - YEAR RELEASE PLAN ENDS On 20th December, 105 tapols were released in Jakarta and other towns bringing to a formal conclusion KOPKAMTIB’s three-year release programme during which, according to its commander, Admiral Sudomo, 33,094 B-Category tapols were freed (Tempo, 29 December, 1979). The final 105 tapols had had their releases delayed because, it was claimed, they were “‘unco-operative’’. KOPKAMTIB now asserts that there are no more G30S/ PKI prisoners being held, although it still admits to holding many hundreds of tried political prisoners as well as almost two dozen people awaiting trial (see figures below). It will now be necessary to undertake an independent assessment of the situation in Indonesia’s prisons, camps and military offices. Reports from contacts in various parts of the country should shortly be coming in. As TAPOL has reported in previous issues, there are many tapols or ex-tapols who are now in labour camps, allegedly as “voluntary transmigrants”, in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and possibly elsewhere. There are also 92 former tapols and their families continued on page 18 TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 INDONESIA’S POLITICAL TRIALS: ‘LEGAL’ DIMENSIONS OF A CONTINUING TRAGEDY 1,014 people have been tried in Indonesia on political charges since 1966. According to our records, nearly 50 per cent were given death sentences, life imprisonment or 20-year sentences. If our records which include nearly 400 verdicts correctly reflect the general pattern, there could be about 150 people under sentence of death (minus the unknown number already executed) and a similar number of people serving life. Indonesia’s political trials figure along with political trials in many other countries are show trials, totally unrelated to justice and the rule of law. All tried prisoners as well as those awaiting trial must be released immediately. We call on our readers to support this just demand by exerting pressure on the Indonesian Government. The following article, by Julie Southwood, summarises the preliminary results of TAPOL’s research into the trials. It is hoped that the study will lead to the preparation of a major work on politics and law in Indonesia. ... the state of Indonesia is based upon Law and not based upon mere power... (Elucidation, 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia) Fortunately the massacre of the communists did not lead to strong protests abroad. Our problem has never been the dead communists, but those who are still alive in our prisons and concentration camps. (A ‘member of the Indonesian Government’.)1 Indonesia seems to have shed a political problem of international significance with the release of what the Suharto government describes as “‘the remainder” of its B- Category prisoners at the end of 1979. These prisoners have been described officially as: those for whom strong indications exists (sic) that they played similar roles to those of the A-Category detainees, especially in the preparations for the attempted coup. Owing to an insufficient amount of evidence so far, they could not yet be brought to trial, but neither could they be set free precipitately without endangering national security and stability and their own safety2 The fact that there remains a group of prisoners who have been tried or who are awaiting trial has gone almost unremarked both inside and outside of Indonesia. The official description of these A-Category prisoners is: those who were clearly and directly involved as planners, leaders or executioners (sic) in the attempted coup, with sufficient evidence of their guilt so that their cases could be brought to the court of justice for trial3 Those who have been tried and sentenced are described as nadapols.* These prisoners are the victims of a massive state intervention in a legal system, and the implications go far beyond the suffering of a group of prisoners. This particular form of human rights violation represents a present and future threat to the basic rights of all Indonesian people. One of the most important spheres of opposition to the Suharto government today is focussed on the establishment of rule of law and the restoration of civil liberties. The call for operation of rule of law is of profound importance. There can be no doubt that the Indonesian state could no longer function in its present form were the rule of law to operate effectively. However, so far the government has been able to ensure in a variety of ways that the demands of the rule of law advocates have remained muted, and contained to issues which do not touch upon the issue of the A-Category prisoners and nadapols. The events which led to the imprisonment and trials of these people were the same events which led to the establishment of the Suharto government. The paradox that rule of law advocates have all but ignored the problem of a massive infringement of justice and its processes represented by these prisoners, begins to come clear when the relationship between law and state power in Indonesia is understood, and the hows and whys of this relationship starts unfolding when the political trials and their prologue are investigated. Recognising the dangers of the demands of the rule of law advocates who constitute an increasingly vocal, urban and predominantly middle-class opposition, President Suharto has repeatedly promised that his government would respect the rule of law. Yet the government does not depend on a legal system, but on its control of a strong, centralised apparatus of repression, of which the legal system has become a part. Contrary to accepted practice by oppressive military regimes, the Indonesian military has not found it necessary to abrogate the Constitution. Rather the government postures as the upholder of the Constitution, while at the same time violating it continuously, and justifying its excesses on the grounds of “national security”. Shortly after the 1965 ‘coup’ the formidable apparatus, KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) was set up for a ‘transitional period’ to deal with the ‘coup’ “without having to resort to a State of Emergency or to Martial Law”.5 Fourteen years later KOPKAMTIB still wields near-absolute powers of arrest and interrogation and may be regarded as the embodiment of martial law. In 1973 the MPR (Peoples’ Consultative Assembly) agreed (MPR Decision No. X/MPR/1973) To give mandate to the Presiden (sic)/Mandatory of the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly to take necessary steps in order to secure and to maintain the unity and integrity of the Nation and to prevent the re-occurrence of the threat of G30S/PKI® and other threats of subversion in safeguarding national development of the Pancasila Democracy? and the 1945 Constitution.8 TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 34] === Presidential Decision No. 9/1974 then entrusted KOPKAM- TIB to carry out this mandate, and a government publication? comments, Previous experiences of Indonesia in dealing with subversion, rebellions and the like, have taught Indonesia a lesson in how to cope with these problems and made her more convinced of the need to foresee subversion as a latent threat to its internal security and stability. The establishment of a body that specialises in preventing such problems, the KOPKAMTIB, is deemed to be the more effective way. While the existence of KOPKAMTIB continues to mock the legal system, no law reforms can be effective against its abu abuses. KOPKAMTIB has in recent years been responsible for the arrests and detention of former New Order supporters who have been outspoken in their demands for basic civil liberties. Amongst these arrests were those of Adnan Buyung Nasution, the head of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), and Mr Yap Thiam Hien, the defence lawyer, who were both detained without trial after student demonstrations in 1974. Since then many student critics of the regime have been detained, and some of them tried. Their trials also serve as examples of how a legal system may be pressed into the service of a repressive state, and not of justice. Yet to say that KOPKAMTIB and the legal system are on opposite sides of the spectrum would be misleading. The socalled legal system of the Indonesian state is organically bound up with the profoundly repressive functions of KOPKAMTIB, and it is only a small and courageous group within the legal system who have opposed its abuses. The Problem of Numbers What should be the simplest aspect of the situation of the A-Category prisoners and nadapols, ie. how many are involved, presents a problem. In their case, the government has been even less rigorous in its statements of their numbers than it has been in the case of the B-Category prisoners. This may be regarded as symptomatic of the absolute disdain with which the government regards the legal rights of its political detainees. At the end of 1978, General Yoga Sugama, the Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB made the extraordinary assertion that there was no date on the numbers of tried prisoners.10 Previously in 1975, Admiral Sudomo, then the KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, had said that “856 hard-core communists have been convicted of participation in the G30S”.11 Almost three years later, President Suharto in a state address on 11 March 1978 said that only 894 had been tried, while two months earlier the Department of Foreign Affairs said that 904 had been tried.12 On the occasion of the December 1979 B—Category releases Sudomo said that 1014 people had been tried.13 Whatever the case, the tried prisoners are excluded from all official figures about political prisoners as a whole. The number of convictions obtained in the trials approximates to the number of defendants because there have been virtually no acquittals and so the distinction between A-Category prisoners and nadapols is a specious one. The A-Category prisoners were already condemned by the Presidential Instruction 09/KOGAM/1966 which determined their status on the basis of “‘sufficient evidence of their guilt”’. Government figures of the number of A-Category prisoners awaiting trial are hardly more enlightening. In September 1971, it was acknowledged by General Sugih Arto, the Prosecutor General, that there were about 5,000 A-Category prisoners.14 In April 1979 several sources stated that the figure was 52 7, while in December 1979 the government stated that there were only 23 A-Category prisoners left.15 These figures in no way tally with the numbers of trials held, and no proper explanation has been offered for the drops in numbers, beyond some off-hand statements that some have been “downgraded”’ to B-Category. According to Tempo (29 December 1979), the most recent development is that following an Instruction by President Suharto to the Minister of Justice that G30S prisoners must be given retroactive remission, (which until now has been granted often to ordinary convicts, but only to one G30S prisoner—Mr Oei Tju Tat). 331 tapols are said to have received remission, of whom 118 have been released. Prologue to the Trials As already noted, the rule of law advocates in Indonesia have avoided articulating their case around the plight of tried prisoners, although there is substantial documentation from the trials which makes a searing indictment of the Indonesian legal system. For many people who campaign for legal reforms, the tapols (political prisoners) are tainted with the stigma of being communists or communist sympathisers and are simply beyond the pale, so that the desired legal norms do not apply to them. This fact gives some idea of the fear of communists, and of reprisals generated after the 1965 ‘coup’ and which has become a major political element, inextricably linked with the repression which is the cornerstone of Indonesian politics. The generation and maintenance of this fear was the final outcome of tensions which had developed from the early 1960s in an increasingly bitter polarisation of Indonesian politics. In 1957, coinciding with serious regional rebellions, President Sukarno replaced parliamentary democracy with martial law. In 1959 “Guided Democracy”’ was introduced, featuring an appointed legislature and a major increase in executive power. In this period from 1957, the Indonesian army which had played a decisive role in the independence struggle against the Dutch some ten years earlier, greatly expanded its influence in political and economic spheres, as some army officers became administrators, in many cases with few restrictions on their powers by the central government. At the same time the expansion of left-wing groups, especially the Indonesian Communist Party (henceforth PKI), provided a serious challenge to the military. Until October 1965, the leaders of the army and the PKI maintained a tense and uneasy equilibrium, precariously balanced by President Sukarno. The main areas of conflict were with the PKI’s criticism of the military’s management of the economy, and then in 1964-5 the PKI supported unilateral attempts by the peasantry to occupy land in a bid to enforce the greatly delayed implementation of the 1960 Land Reform Law. At a time when PKImilitary relations were strained to breaking point, the party TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 @....3 the establishment of a Fifth Force of armed peasants and workers to fight in the Confrontation with Malaysia. This later became a major issue in the political trials which followed the ‘coup’. The 30 September Movement, G30S, or the ‘coup’ of 1965 involved a number of middle ranking army officers, led by Lt-Col Untung, who were concerned about corruption, high living and disloyalty in the higher ranks of the army. The plotters claimed that they had planned to kidnap the army leaders and to bring them to account before the president. In preceding weeks rumours had circulated in Indonesia that a “Council of Generals” was planning a coup early in October and tensions were high. For reasons which are still debated, six generals and another officer who were kidnapped were then killed on the night of September 30th, some of them at the plotters’ headquarters at Halim Air Force base near Jakarta and others during their capture. At the time people from PKI-affiliated youth and women’s organisations were being trained at Halim as volunteers for the Confrontation with Malaysia. There are many accounts and interpretations of these eventsl6 and strong evidence has been presented which suggests that the coup was Suharto’s. A leading member of the G30S group, former- Colonel Latief stated during his trial that Suharto knew about the G30S movement before the ‘coup’ occurred, and that in making no attempt to stop it he was deeply implicated. He then committed acts of insubordination when he refused to allow General Pranoto who had been appointed by Sukarno as Caretaker Minister for Defence to report to the president, and refused to stop the slaughter and excesses in the regions, although Sukarno had ordered that bloodshed must stop.17 In the confused period following the ‘coup’ the army led by Suharto quickly gained control, and with the upper hand was able to eliminate systematically and thoroughly its main rival for power, the PKI, which at the same time became the scapegoat for the ‘coup’. Offering very little resistance, hundreds of thousands of PKI members and sympathisers, and many others with no PKI links, were horribly slaughtered in massacres which if not committed directly by the army were performed by intermediaries, often militant Muslim groups who were secure in their knowledge that they had unequivocal military backing. No assessment of contemporary Indonesian politics should overlook the scale of the killing. Amnesty International estimates, In the aftermath of the 1965 events, more than half a million were killed and about one million people arrested, interrogated and detained. 18 In a lingering atmosphere of fear, the completeness of the military’s victory in physically removing the PKI, and the subsequent campaign of vilification has prevented Indonesian human rights advocates from campaigning around abuses which began with the installation of the Suharto government and the annihilation of the PKI. Why Trials? Considering the ferocity and unrestrained nature of the massacres, it seems reasonable to ask why prisoners were tried at all. There is strong evidence that Aidit,19 Njoto20 and probably Lukman and Sakirman, all key PKI figures, were executed after they had been arrested. Certainly these people would have been able to reveal to the courts more than anyone else, the extent of the undoubted links between some PKI leaders and the G30S officers. Yet to remove the PKI from the political scene and to efface its memory would have only represented a partial victory for the army. The victory was made complete by the launching of a major propaganda campaign. Ideologically it has been necessary to prove that the PKI instigated the ‘coup’ and that it poses a continuing threat to the Indonesian people. It has thus been important to keep the memory of the PKI alive, and the trials have provided a way of doing so, repeating time and again the government doctrine of the ‘coup’, while at the same time legitimising the victimisation of the PKI. In practical terms, in order to pave the way for the army to assume power by way of the roles of protector of President Sukarno and the people, and as the restorer of security and order, it had to be shown that the PKI was a menace, bent on the overthrow of the legal government. Immediately after the coup there were many lurid fabrications in the mass media. Photos of the decomposed bodies of the dead generals, which had been three days in a well at Lubang Buaya in the Halim base, were widely circulated. It was claimed that the generals had been castrated and that their eyes had been gouged out by communist women at Lubang Buaya. Shortly afterwards the dead generals and the dead officer were declared Heroes of the Revolution. Although doctors’ postmortem reports discounted this story, the trials were used to propagate such theories and to force public opinion to accept them. The trials of individuals were in fact trials of the collective responsibility of the PKI so that the Indonesian people would never be able to protest or to question the victimisation and the terrible sacrifice of the PKI. In the first decree which was issued with Suharto’s signature the stories of the menace posed by the PKI were reinforced, while the fate of the PKI was sealed through “legal” means. This Decree No. 1/3/1066 which banned the PKI was of crucial importance subsequently, especially in its retroactive use, and so it is reproduced in full below: Considering 1. That lately, a return of underground activities by remnants of forces of the counter-revolutionary September 30 Movement/PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) have been increasingly felt, . That those underground activities take the form of the spreading of slander, instigations, rumours of divide and split, endeavouring to arm themselves, which have caused the return of insecurity and disorder amongst the People: . That those underground activities really constitute a danger to the running of the Revolution in general, and disturb the consummation of the present stage of the Revolution, especially in regard to finding a solution to economic difficulties and the crushing of the Necolim (sic) project of TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 35] === Malaysia. . That for the sake of keeping the consolidation, unity and integrity of the Indonesian progressive, revolutionary People and for the sake of the running of the Indonesian Revolution which is anti-feudalism, anti-capitalism, anti-Necolim (sic) and which is heading towards a prosperous society based on Panca Sila, an Indonesian Socialist Society, it is deemed necessary to take swift, precise and firm steps against the Partai Kommnis Indonesia (The Indonesian Communist Party). Taking into Consideration The results of interrogations and verdicts by the extraordinary Military Tribunal passed on leaders of the September 30 Movement/Partai Komunis Indonesia. In View of: The Order of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/Mandatory (sic) of the MPRS/Great Leader of the Revolution, on March 11, 1966. HAS RESOLVED Enacted: With firmly remaining on the basis of the Five Talismans of the Revolution, Firstly: To dissolve the Partai Komunis Indonesia, including all parts of the organisation from the central level up to the regions and all organisations of similar basis/patronised by it/affiliated to it. Secondly: Declare the Partai Komunis Indonesia an outlawed Organisation throughout the territory, under the authority of the Republic of Indonesia. Thirdly: This decree comes into effect from the day of its promulgation.21 A Propaganda Coup The defence lawyer in the first trial after the ‘coup’ that of the PKI leader, Njono, made it very clear that she was well aware of the propaganda value of the trials. The lawyer, Trees Sunito said, The extraordinary nature of this court22 does not give it the authority to depart from from the Law. What must be tried is a criminal case and not political opinions. What must be tried is an individual, not a (political) party. The notion of “‘collectieve schuld” (collective guilt—trans) is a primitive one which sometimes comes up as a retrogressive element in the world of modern law... we must hold firmly to individual responsibility for actions in accordance with the law in force, free from political evaluations... The inclination here and there towards the opinions of “many people”’ or the “feelings of the people throughout all corners of the country” is, in brief, what is often described as ‘openbare mening’ (public opinion—trans), In this age of mass media, “public opinion” is the opinion of those who control the mass media. And in this connection, I commend the politeness of the press—but I do not mean their onpartijdigheid (inpartiality— trans.) because the press has already clearly anticipated the decision of the judge in its publications—so just its politeness, 23 A classic illustration of what Trees Sunito refers to is in the following exchange from the trial of Colonel Sudiono.24 The prosecutor is questioning the witness, First Air Marshall Susanto: Pros: Whose actions undermined the good name of AURI (Indonesian Air Force)? Susanto: It was the result of PK] infiltration into AURI. r Pros: Who instigated the infiltration? Susanto: Amongst others, the accused Sudiono himself. Pros: How do you know this? Susanto: From the newspapers at the time of this Mahmillub (Extraordinary Military Tribunal), The feelings which the military thrust upon the Indonesian people are clearly outlined in a remarkable document entitled “Custodial Action Towards Fifteen Ministers”,25 Announcement of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 5, dated 18 March 1966, and signed by Suharto on behalf of President Sukarno. Only a week before, Suharto had wrested effective executive power from Sukarno with the signing of a document known as SUPER- SEMAR26 ‘by President Sukarno. This document: was later ratified to become known as an “Emergency Powers Act” and, .,.its executor was given broad powers to take whatever measures he may deem necessary in order to restore security and the rule of law in Indonesia, 27 In finding it necessary to arrest the ministers, who were all members of the (still in force) Sukarno’ government, Announcement No. 5; 18 March 1966 claimed to be protecting Sukarno and the “stability of the process of government”. The ministers were all supposedly connected with the “counter-revolutionary adventure”, the G30S, andthe document states that the authorities in response to, .,. the innermost feelings of the people as set forth in various ways and also which have been presented in written form which basically reflect a consensus of opinion, have been compelled to take custodial action, for the purposes of ensuring that the said ministers should not become the victims of the peoples’ uncontrollable anger, and of ensuring that the deep-felt demands of the people should not be disconnected with their good faith, AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: INDONESIA’S INVASION OF EAST TIMOR By Arnold Kohen and John Taylor With a Foreword by Noam Chomsky 133 pages with pictures and maps. Chapters on: Decolonisation and Independence: Recolonisation and Resistance Indonesian Atrocities Complicity and Acquiescence The Right to Self-Determination Price: £1.75 plus postage (UK 25p; Europe 65p; overseas airmail £1.00; overseas seamail 20p) Order your copies NOW from: TAPOL, 8a Treport Street TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 © cig: Sukarno The ensuing trials of Dr Subandrio, Jusuf Muda Dalam and Omar Dhani eased Suharto‘s assumption of power by discrediting Sukarno “by proxy”.29 In this way it was suggested that Sukarno had become an unfit president since he had been influenced unduly by incompetent and corrupt advisors. The three trials were particularly successful in agitating the public, especially the students, so that the threat of still more bloodshed could then be used to force Sukarno’s final capitulation, when he was forced publicly to implicate the PKI leaders in the ‘coup’ and ultimately to hand over complete power to Suharto. In the trial of Sukarno’s Foreign Minister, Subandrio in October 1966, Sukarno was attacked for his domestic reliance on the PKI and for his foreign policy which leant increasingly towards the Peoples’ Republic of China. Subandrio was charged under the colonial criminal code (henceforth KUHP) in connection with the crime of ‘economic subversion’.30 Under this rubric, it was alleged that he had given other people, including D.N. Aidit the “means, opportunity or information” to assist them to prepare a rebellion aimed at overthrowing the govermment. The ‘subversive’ acts which subsequently condemned Subandrio to death3! included some of his actions as Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and referred to his policy of buying arms from China, his advice to Sukarno to halt repayment of debts to the Soviet Union, and his encouragement of Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations. Additionally it was alleged that he had spread rumours in order to incite people against the army, that he had foreknowledge of the coup, but had not tried to prevent it. The second charge stated that after the ‘coup’ he had tried to undermine the authority of the state. Although the “state” was still headed by Sukarno at the time, this is clearly a reference to the “state” which Suharto was rapidly pulling under his own control. Subandrio was accused of trying to minimise the significance of the ‘coup’ and of organising demonstrations in support of President Sukarno (who after all was still head of state) or in other words, opposed to those in support of Suharto. These charges were made under the Anti-Subversion Law, based on Presidential Decree 11/1963 which carries the death penalty. The definition of ‘whose state?” was an issue which arose time and again in later trials. For example in the trial of Marsudi, the defence insisted that the charges were groundless because President Sukarno had never said that efforts had been made to undermine his state. Again, a former cabinet minister in the Sukarno government, Mr Oei Tju Tat stated in his defence plea on 3 March 1976 that he had always been known as a close ally of Sukarno, Who then would not be astonished and at the same time amused to hear that I, reputedly as a fellow-traveller of Sukarno, am accused of subversion against the Sukarno government of which I myself was a member! Is the purpose here to discredit Sukarno of whom I was a follower? This too is quite absurd. A month before the Subandrio trial, Jusuf Muda Dalam, the former minister for Central Banking Affairs was also sentenced to death on charges of subversion, corruption, illegally importing arms, raising financial support for Sukarno, and it was also mentioned that he had six wives, two more than allowed by Islamic law. He died in prison in 1976 before the death sentence was executed. The trial of Omar Dhani the former Air Force Commander was clearly less concerned with establishing his personal involvement in G30S than with attempting to indict Sukarno. It was repeatedly suggested during the trial that Sukarno had known about the G30S, but that he had made no attempt to arrest its leaders. The Dhani trial may be seen as the beginning of the final stage of Sukarno’s downfall, It compromised military supporters of Sukarno, prompted vocal demands from army-backed student groups for Sukarno’s dismissal and trial, while the national associations of judges and lawyers in a joint statement entitled “Declaration of Justice and Truth” and signed by the chairmen of both organisations, condemned Sukarno for his alleged support of G30S.33 Harold Crouch observes that one of the two signatories was Mashuri, Suharto’s former next-door neighbour and close political advisor.34 The Army Theory of the ‘Coup’ These three trials fulfilled specific propaganda functions while the remainder of the trials have served to promote the army theory of the ‘coup’ which has been presented trenchantly in the indictments, as well as by judges, prosecutors, witnesses and in government publications. In summary the army theory rests on the following dogma: * that the PKI had a long history of treachery towards the Republic, that in 1965 army units under the influence of the PKI were incited to embark on actions which again imperilled the Republic that PKI cadres and members of mass organisations tortured and killed six generals and one other officer, that these actions were part of a PKI-orchestrated coup @’etat in which a Revolutionary Council was formed and announced as a counter-government, that the PKI had been preparing for this coup by infiltrating the armed forces, the public service and the entire society so that its coup attempt would be coordinated throughout Indonesia, that the PKI tried to deny its role in the coup and to shift the blame by claiming that the G30S was an internal army affair, that the Sukarno government in hesitating over what action to take caused a breakdown in law and order, which was then exploited by the PKI, causing more unrest in the regions. A Major Theorist Nowhere was this theory expounded more clearly than in the trial of the mysterious ‘Sjam’ or Kamaruzzaman. Not only was it stated in the indictments, in the prosecutor’s and judge’s remarks, but also by the accused himself who was exceptionally willing to discuss his role in the affair, and through this, the guilt of the PKI. Although sentenced to death, Sjam today is alive and well and reportedly has great freedom of action. He has always been a favoured TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 7 === [PDF page 36] === witness in G30S trials. Sjam has insisted that the so-called Biro Chusus (Special Bureau) headed by him, had formal status within the PKI as the body forming links between the PKI and the armed forces. Some surviving PKI members have professed themselves bewildered by the revelations of the existence of this very important PKI figure and his Special Bureau, which seemingly was very special and secret indeed. With Sjam and the Special Bureau being the only known link between the armed forces and the PKI, Sjam’s roles as witness and accused have been pivotal in the trial propaganda. The Dutch writer, Coen Holtzappel quotes a “reliable source”’ as saying, Untung who hever trusted Sjam, had attempted several times to make enquiries about his alleged contacts with the PKI Chairman. Sjam however succeeded in preventing any direct contact between other members of the Movement and Aidit. Sjam obligingly ‘confirmed’ that Aidit had been alarmed by Sukarno’s sudden illness in August 1965 and had feared that the armed forces would take advantage of his sudden death or incapacitation by organising a coup. Sjam has alleged that in an attempt to pre-empt this, Aidit ordered him to mobilise supporters in the armed forces to take action against the army leadership. Executive Management of the Trials the government would not have been able to present its case so forcefully had it not been able to control the courts to a considerable degree. In fact the evolution of the Indonesian legal system since colonial times has allowed the executive to rein in the courts under its own jurisdiction. There has in fact been a long struggle in Indonesia in order to bring about basic legal and political change by allowing the judiciary more independence within the state structure and thus imposing limits on executive power.36 For centuries Indonesia has been a state where bureaucratic power is paramount because the bureaucracy has been the locus of political and economic power. Now the Indonesian bureaucracy may be considered as an armed one as for two decades the military has taken over more and more bureaucratic functions. This leaves a rather weakened middle class without a strong property base, whereas in Europe it was the clamouring of the propertied middle classes for an impartial judiciary to protect basic rights and contracts which led to the separation of powers held dear in the west. In Indonesia those who wish to see an independent judiciary tend to be rule of law and civil rights advocates who do not have the push of property tights behind them, and hence the main challenge they present to the New Order is a political one. In the short-lived period of Sukarno’s parliamentary democracy the separation of powers (trias politicas) was preserved, but in 1964 Sukarno dealt this a devastating blow with the promulgation of Law 19/1964. Article 19 of this law gave the president the power “In certain matters to intervene in the affairs of the judiciary”. Yet in the 1945 Constitution to which Indonesia returned by Presidential Decree of 5th July 1959, articles 24 and 25 state in their explanatory notes that the Judiciary acts as an ‘idesencaae power free from executive influence. Although many have argued that Law 19/1964 was unconstitutional, it remains in practice as the judiciary is still subjugated to the executive. The Ministry of Justice has executive control of the lower courts, and judges are civil servants. So too are the prosecutors while the advocates (defence lawyers) are something of political pariahs outside of the legal-administrative circles of authority. With the coincidence of political, legal and bureaucratic power, the loyalties of the judges might be expected to be with those in power. A predictable attitude was displayed during the trial of Asep Suryaman, when the prosecutor, J. F. Mambu said, ... the side representing the state must be respected... Wee the defence counsel merely represents the defendant alone. One defence lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution has shown compassion for the situation of the state-controlled judges, ... they cry in their hearts because they are forced to make decisions which conflict with their beliefs of the values of truth and justice.38 The effects of the questionable impartiality of Indonesian judges are even greater than suggested above as judges play a very active role in court processes. This issue has been raised in a recent debate in Indonesia centring about a proposed new bill, aimed at replacing the 130-yearold Revised Procedural Code (HIR-Herzien Inlandsch Reglement). The HIR allows for the active participation of the judge in examining the accused and witnesses. Tempo39 comments that for the defence lawyer, ... the real opponent is not the prosecutor but the judge—who controls the rules of the game. In many trials which followed the ‘coup’ the defendants were bullied and wearied by relentless questioning by the judges, and it was made clear that an ‘unco-operative’ attitude would be penalised. Early in his presidency, when Suharto made much of the claim that he would be the champion of rule of law and freedom of expression, lawyers and judges were greatly encouraged by these signs. In this atmosphere, pressures grew to rescind Law 19/1964 and some other disputed laws. The main issues involved in the demands were the independence of the judiciary and the powers of judicial review over legislation. The issue of judicial independence was a highly charged one as it made a fundamental challenge to the structure of state power. The government resisted, and Suharto ... insisted that as the executive was no longer interfering in the work of the courts, judicial independence was no longer really a problem.40 But during the debate, the former Minister for Justice, Oemar Seno Adji (now Chairperson of the Supreme Court), stated, ... that the judiciary was no less in need of control than the executive and that a rigid concept of separation of the powers TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 @ was less productive than one of institutional co-operation.41 Eventually when Law 14/1970, the Basic Law on the Judiciary was promulgated it reconfirmed the independence of the judiciary and in article 4 para 3 eliminated article 19 of Law 19/1964. The explanatory note for article 4 para 3 states: It should be made quite clear that in order that the courts may perform their function in the best possible way, that is to say, to pass down verdicts that are solely based upon truth, justice and honesty, it is not permissible for any pressure or influences to be exerted from outside which would render the judges unfree in passing down verdicts. That the provisions of Law 14/1970 are not enforced is clear in the following pages. The Law gives some guarantees to prisoners, for example the presumption of innocence (article 6), compensation for illegal arrest and prosecution (article 9), the right to counsel (article 35), but all these good intentions, including the independence of the judiciary cannot be enforced as the ancillary legislation for the implementation of Law 14/1970 has simply not been forthcoming. In fact it is difficult to see that Law 14/1970 can be treated even as a “statement of national intention”, as Damian and Hornick said in 1972.42 Nonetheless the authorities do seem to be making some statements about who is allowed to be in favour of trias politicas (separation of powers). Before pronouncing the death sentence in the case of Asep Suryaman, the judge noted that Asep’s defence lawyers had talked about trias politicas, but asserted that Asep, as a communist could not possibly be in favour of trias politicas.43 The trial of Asep perhaps best illustrates the difficulties of defence lawyers when they confront the courtroom. A long quotation follows from the eksepsi44 delivered by the defence lawyer, Mr Yap Thiam Hien during this trial on 5 July 1975. Asep was a PKI activist who was charged with subversion. In his defence Mr Yap made a courageous attack on the entire structure of laws and ‘legal’ practice which have been used to arrest and detain the G30S prisoners. In doing so he attacked state power itself and institutionalised legal corruption, knowingly running the risk of being arrested himself for contempt of court. He was also aware that his stand would not be widely publicised in Indonesia, and indeed this was borne out in the press reports of the trial in July-August 1975. He stated, May I invite you Honoured Chairman and respected members of the Court, to look objectively at the legal set-up in the New Order so that we may together try to draw the correct conclusions. What is the status of the Judiciary in the present legal set-up? To consider this matter in its proper proportions and dimensions, I would like to raise the following: 1. Article 11 of Law 14/1970 states: Organs entrusted to implement the law under paragraph 1, Article 10—the spheres of court operations—organisational, administrative and financial—fall within the competence of the respective government departments. In other words, with the exception of the Supreme Court, the Powers of the Judiciary fall within the competence of the Department of Justice organisationally, administratively and financially. The Department of Justice is the executive authority which regulates such matters as salaries, promotions and transfers etc. 2. Article 31 of Law 14/1970 stipulates that judges are appointed and dismissed by the President as Head of Government. 3. The Basic Law on Government Employees contains amongst other things, administrative sanctions against government employees, including judges, who deviate. (This can include transfer, postponment of a salary rise, or a reduction in salary or 4. Presidential Decision No. 82, 1971 regarding KORPRI (Civil Servant Corps of Republic of Indonesia—trans.) states that all officials of the Republic of Indonesia fall within one repository headed by the Minister for the Interior, that is to say, they are part of the Executive Authority. 5. SUPERSEMAR which has now been repealed as it has been replaced and raised to the level of an MPRS Decision45j(TAP No. IX/MPRS/1966). 6. MPRS, TAP No. XV/MPRS/1966 on the dissolution and prohibition of the Indonesian Communist Party and the teaching and dissemination of Marxism and Communism. 8. The resolve adopted by the military commanders of Java on 7 July 1967. 9. The extraordinary powers of the Attorney General, conferred on him by virtue of Law No. 15, 1969 (previously Presidential Decision No. 11, 1966). 10. Last but not least, Presidential Decision No. 19, 1969 regarding the formation of KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) as further revised in 1974. Mr Chairman and respected Members of the Court, All the MPRS Decisions, the laws, and Presidential Decisions mentioned above show on the one hand that organisationally, structurally, administratively and financially, the Powers of the Judiciary fall within the competence of the Executive Powers, and in fact incorporate sanctions against those who deviate. On the other hand there are regulations and laws that proclaim the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and organisations affiliated to it as being prohibited parties and organisations. These regulations incorporate instructions for the restoration of law and order from the instabilities resulting from PKI incidents, and issue instructions for the uprooting of all teaching or spreading of communism. Those who teach, study or spread Marxism- Communism are of course people. Now I am not an advocate or follower of Marxism-Communism, neither am I a sympathiser or fellow-traveller of communists. Nevertheless in my opinion, the order to uproot Marxist- Communists who are our fellow citizens also applies to the courts which have to apply the Law. It is indeed a fact that not a few Indonesian Communists have been uprooted either according to legal procedures, or without “due process of the law”. My question is: within the present legal set-up in which the Executive exerts such great influence over the Judiciary, is it possible in the case of persons charged with Marxism-Communism or with involvement in the 30th September 1965 affair, for the Judiciary to be able to, and to have the courage to carry out the trial freely, truthfully, justly and objectively and without prejudice as is required of them in the Constitution and Law No. 14/1970? In reply to Mr Yap’s statement, the Chairman of the panel TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 37] === of judges, Abdullah, said that he “promised to be honest in this case”.46 But he also cautioned the defence lawyer, saying that if the court was to presume the innocence of the defendant, then the defence should presume the impartiality of the court!47 The control of the Ministry of Justice over the court structure has been a recurring theme in another way as well. In many eksepsis, the manner in which state courts have been constituted has been disputed. It is argued that every state court must be set up according to the law, but pointed out that the Central Jakarta State Court is illegal as it was only set up on the basis of a Decision by the Ministry of Justice. The Military Courts Of the 366 cases of trials for which there is some information, 207 were tried in military courts. At least 28 of these were tried in the Mahmillub (Extraordinary Military Tribunal). The Mahmillub is aptly named for it does indeed have extraordinary powers. It has tried civilian as well as military cases, as the government has explained that the Mahmillub ... did not restrict itself to trying military personnel, for to do so would be to accept the ‘September 30 Movement’ as ‘an internal army affair’ whish (sic) had been the aim of the PKI.48 The Mahmillub was established by Presidential Decree No. 16 in 1963, but as far as can be determined, only two cases, those of Ibnu Hadjar and Dr Somoukil, both of whom were tried for armed rebellion, were tried in Sukarno’s time. In setting up the Mahmillub, Sukarno invoked Presidential Decision No. 226, 1963 which gave him the highest authority to take special measures against threats to security. The Decree stated that there were still threats to the Indonesian Revolution and that it was necessary to create a special court apparatus to deal with these threats quickly. Since the cases were concerned with security and defence, it was considered necessary to set up the Mahmillub within the framework of military courts. This court was domiciled in Jakarta but could sit outside the place of domicile. The President himself was to decide which cases would be tried in the Mahmillub (article 1), and would appoint the Presiding Judge, two or more member judges, one Oditur (Prosecutor) and a clerk (article 3). Other indications of the truly extraordinary and unconstitutional nature of this court are in: Article 6 (1) Before being announced and implemented, the Decision of the Tribunal must first be submitted to the Minister/ Commander of the Force who submitted the case upon which a verdict has been taken, in order to obtain approval for its implementation. Article 7 (1) Implementation of a verdict of the Tribunal which does not involve the death penalty shall not be delayed by an appeal for clemency. Article 7 (2) @ If a death sentence is passed, the implementation can only be carried out after the President has taken a decision concerning the matter of clemency in the case concerned. On December 1965, Suharto obtained the signature of Sukarno to Presidential Decision No. 370/1965. At the time he signed this document, Sukarno was already under considerable pressure. The Decision considered in Article 3 that ...the so-called ‘30th September Movement is a counterrevolutionary adventure, which was a threat to the Indonesian Revolution as it was nearing “‘its decisive stage”’. It was decided to use the Mahmillub to try those cases which needed to be “quickly resolved”,49 and the Decision determined To give authority to Major-General TNI Suharto, or some High Officer appointed by him: (a) to determine who among the persons referred to in the first article above shall be tried, (b) to act as Officer Submitting Cases in the above-mentioned cases, (c) to determine the composition of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal to prepare, examine and try the above-mentioned cases, In many eskepsis it was argued that the Mahmillub did not have the legal authority to try the cases, since it was not legally constituted. To give one example, the defence lawyer, Mr Yap Thiam Hien raised the following points at the trial of Dr Subandrio. He recalled that the 1945 Constitution stipulates that the powers and procedures of judicial bodies must be executed in accordance with the law (Law 19/1964, article 8 para 3). Like state courts, military courts in Indonesia are also regulated by law (Law 29/ 1954, article 35, para 2) and it is stipulated that the Military Supreme Court and the High Military Tribunal are second level courts, ie. that they must allow the right of appeal (Law 6/1950, article 9). This right is emphatically denied by the Mahmillub. The powers given to the Mahmillub to try G30S cases were given by way of a Presidential Decision, which legally should not conflict with existing laws or the constitution. Mr Yap also pointed out in the Subandrio trial that Presidential Decision No. 370/1965 conflicts with the Presidential Decree setting up the Mahmillub (which arguably is also invalid), which gave special powers to the President of the Republic of Indonesia to determine which cases shall be tried by the Mahmillub, but it clearly gives no authority to the President to delegate these powers. Yet in Presidential Decision 370/1965, sub 2, the President delegated his powers to decide who should determine which persons would be tried in the Mahmillub to General Suharto who then by way of Decision 1/KOPKAM/12, 1965, further delegated these powers to seven senior officials. High military courts (Mahmilti) are used to try those from the rank of major upwards and they serve major defence areas, that is larger than divisional commands. The TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 ©... Military Courts (Mahmildam) try those. below the rank of major and they represent a divisional command which covers an area equivalent to a province. The Regional Military Courts (Mahmilrem) also try those below the rank of major, and represent a sub-divisional command. In addition are the Air Force Courts (Mahmilau), the Navy Court (Mahmilal), the Marines Court (Mahmilmar) and the Police Court (Mahakda). Many civilians objected to being tried in military courts. Sudisman for example, raised the matter in his eksepsi and added that the military court could not be expected to be impartial and noted that there were discernible elements of revenge in military trials. Latief complained too that he was being tried as a civilian, in a military court (Mahmilti) although he had not received a notice of dismissal from the army.59 He also protested that the Prosecutor in his case was lower ranking than he. Again the counsel for another prisoner, ex-Brigadiet-General Sawarno from the Police Force, who was tried in the Mahmilti, stated that the court had no competence to try the defendant and that he should be tried in a police court. The civilian district courts (Pengadilan Negeri) are civil courts of the first resort. Appeal procedure is permitted and most convicted G30S prisoners have given notice of appeal, although appeal courts function extremely slowly. When appeals have been heard the higher court has either upheld or increased sentence. Under Indonesian Law, the prosecution may also appeal against sentence. Arrest and Detention All the political prisoners who have been brought to trial have been KOPKAMTIB detainees, although KOPKAM- TIB has no legal status as a detaining agency. Tempo>! has discussed this issue and the continuing powers of KOP- KAMTIB which detains people with or without trial on the basis of Presidential Decree 11/1963 on Anti-Subversion. In this case a person may be held for up to one year without trial, after which time it can be prolonged. Some effort has been made to regularise KOPKAMTIB powers of detention which in fact have now been decreed ‘judicial’. That KOPKAMTIB’s powers of arrest and detention are outside the judicial framework was recognised in 1977 in a Supreme Court Circular which acknowledged that there were two types of detention, the first described as “‘judicial or repressive’’ detention and the second exercised by KOP- KAMTIB being described as “for security and order’’. The Circular recommended that since KOPKAMTIB’s powers of detention were not judicial, the pre-trial period of detention should not be taken into account when the prisoners came to trial. The later move to declare KOPKAMTIB’s powers as ‘judicial’, although it has some merit in trying to assure that the pre-trial period will be deducted from final sentence, is ultimately retrogressive, for in fact judicial recognition is to be accorded to something which lies outside of the rule of law. On 27th November 1978 KOP- KAMTIB issued an instruction in which it declared itself to be the sole arbiter in determining the processes of arrest, detention and interrogation.52 The statement was issued in response to growing concern about the delayed implementation of Law 14/1970, the Basic Law on the Judiciary, and yet the Instruction seriously erodes the safeguards upheld in the Law. For example the Instruction states that instead of the accused having legal advice from the time of arrest, he or she may only take advantage of this before or after preliminary interrogation. During this interrogation a legal advisor is not allowed to be present, while any discussion between the prisoner and his/her legal advisor must be witnessed by the investigating official, and the prisoner is only allowed to discuss family matters and matters relating to arrest and detention. The case itself may not be discussed. While the 1970 Law states that legal advice for the prisoner is a right, the KOPKAMTIB Instruction merely states that the accused may obtain this advice. After the Instruction was issued KOPKAMTIB closed all discussion of the matter. In the trial of Asep Suryaman the defence lawyer, Mr Yap Thiam Hien, protested that the Prosecutor had not presented the court with valid detention documents. The Prosecutor justified this, saying that Asep had been arrested in 1965, but had then escaped and had not been re-arrested until 1971. He added that, if the defendant had been in prison for many years without documents, it was in order to safeguard the security of the state.53 Yap still insisted that documents validating the second arrest must be submitted, and in this case he was not merely quibbling over legal procedures, but was questioning the constitutional basis for Asep’s arrest, and indeed those of hundreds of thousands of others, and in fact was launching a direct attack on the continuing powers of KOPKAMTIB. The basis of KOPKAMTIB arrests and detention is usually affiliation or sympathy with the PKI which was dissolved and outlawed by Presidential Decree 1/3/1966 (later ratified as MPRS Ordinance XXV/MPRS/1966), which dissolved the PKI, declared it a forbidden party and forbade the dissemination of communist teachings. KOPKAMTIB has been using this Decree retroactively and thus illegally, but in any case the Decree and the Ordinance are in conflict with the 1945 Constitution which guarantees freedom of assembly, association and speech. Mr Yap recalled article 26 during the Asep Suryaman trial, but the court denounced this defence as a ... dangerous submission, as strengthening the communist cause and as not in accord with the code of ethics of the advocates’ profession.. 4 Furthermore Decree No. 1/3/1966 was not signed by Sukarno although he was still President. Suharto has simply assumed that SUPERSEMAR authorised him to issue instructions on the President’s behalf. The extremely unpredictable process of arrest by KOPKAMTIB has been described by an informed writer, Inevitably, in a situation where arrests are so arbitrarily set in motion, many people now being held as political detainees have no political past whatsoever, but have been victimised as relatives or friends of persons being sought by the army; they include people who have been unable to prove their identity to the arresting unit, who have been persecuted as a result of personal difficulties with neighbours or co-workers, or for a host of TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 11 === [PDF page 38] === equally futile reasons, 55 During KOPKAMTIB detention political prisoners have often been subjected to “preliminary interrogation’’. Following this they have been made to sign statements from the interrogation which have then been used as evidence in the trials. Other arrests were then made on the basis of these statements. Many witnesses testified in trials that torture, compulsion and trickery were used in order to extract their confessions. In his trial Njono complained of an atmosphere of “communist phobia” at his preliminary interrogationS6 while the witness Mohammad bin Jacub stated that he had been struck.57 A reliable source has described how he was interrogated while being made to listen to another prisoner screaming terribly while being subjected to electrical torture.58 Again Colonel Latief59 was interrogated while he was in an extremely poor physical condition. He had been very ill and semi-conscious for some time as he describes in his defence plea,60 but this did not interfere with the process of his questioning, and in fact on one occasion he was carried into interrogation on a stretcher. Latief had been stabbed and shot during his arrest. He also catalogues how others were subjected to torture during interrogation. One man had been handcuffed for a whole year, subjected to electrical torture and struck with heavy objects while unconscious until his whole body was covered with blood. He said that many people were subjected to psychological and physical torture and that many had become mad, blind or impotent. Some were chained and ... tortured with blows from heavy instruments, wooden chairs, plastic piping, whips with sharp lashes, and the tail of the pari fish (stingray—trans.)... fingers were squashed by table legs, nails were removed, fingers smashed and arms broken.61 At his own trial Sudisman commented wryly, The results of torture during preliminary interrogations on my Party comrades could be observed immediately they appeared as witnesses before the court. I don’t of course deny the statement of the doctor who announced that Mr Sardjono had an attack of the ‘flu’,62 Amnesty International also reports the widespread use of torture. In the years following 1965, torture was systematically used as an everyday occurrence in interrogation: Young girls below the age of thirteen, old men, people who were frail and ill, were not exempt from torture. It was used not only for interrogation, but also for punishment, and with sadistic intent. Cases of sexual assault on women and extreme cruelty were reported to Amnesty International. Deaths from torture were frequently reported up till the end of the 1960s. At the present time, Amnesty International receives reports of cases of torture under interrogation. The worst cases are those of military officers and men suspected of left-wing tendencies, who are tortured by their fellow-officers, The Air Force interrogation centre in Jakarta is particularly notorious for its use of brutal and prolonged torture. In the trial of Asep Suryaman, Mr Yap Thiam Hien as defence counsel asked a witness, Martosuwadi how his interrogation report had actually been drawn up. At this point the judge intervened and ordered the witness rio answer.64 Access to Defence Lawyers Although it is guaranteed by law, it is very difficult for prisoners to gain access to lawyers. The court reserves the right to veto a defence appointment and thus can and almost always does, delay the appointment of the defence until immediately before the trial, so that the defence has no time to prepare a case. To give two instances one defence lawyer was asked two days before a case and on the following day was taken to see the defendant, but was not allowed to see him alone. In this case the defendant had to write his defence plea in a cell which had no desk or chair, and although the lawyer requested better conditions for the defendant, and more writing paper, this was denied.65 Another lawyer has described how the defendant was given a copy of the charges against him only three days before the trial was due to commence, and it was only on the day the trial began that the defence counsel was allowed to meet the defendant, and then only in the presence of soldiers and police. The Prosecutor had ordered his subordinates to stay within earshot during this meeting. The defence counsel then only had three days after the charges were read to look up a myriad of laws and to prepare the case,66 The Laws In his defence plea, Sudisman summed up the legal irony of his situation when he objected to the use of colonial laws in his trial for subversion against the state of Indonesia67 As a communist and as a son of Indonesia, I feel ashamed that in the Dutch period before World War II, I was arrested by the Dutch colonial government for persdelict (offence against the press laws—trans.) and was charged with violating articles in Engelbrecht (the compendium of colonial law—trans.); that in the Dutch period after World War II, I was again arrested by the Dutch colonial government and charged with violating articles of Engelbrecht; and that after almost 22 years of Indonesian independence I am once again accused of violating articles of Engelbrecht...Frankly I cannot accept that the words des Konings can be read as “‘of the President” since we do not live in a Koningkrijk (Kingdom) but in the Republic of Indonesia which I love. I also cannot agree with thé words ‘ministeriale verantwoordelijkheid’ (ministerial responsibility), in this instance of the Dutch government being identified with the Cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia, because their spirit is utterly different. On the other hand if the Honourable Prosecutor is willing to equate the Staten-Generaal with the present MPRS which is not elected by the People, that is up to him, Several articles in the colonial Criminal Code, the KUHP, relating to participation in criminal acts (articles 55 and 56) crimes against state security (articles 106, 107, 108 and 110) and crimes against persons—or murder (article 340) have been used consistently in G30S cases. With the exception of article 340 which was only used for those considered directly responsible for the deaths of the generals, none of the articles carry the death penalty. In order to secure the death penalty, two anti-subversion laws, Penpres 12 TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 @.;; and Penpres 11/1963, have been used in conjunction with the KUHP articles. This practice of combining the KUHP with the all-embracing Anti-Subversion laws was strongly protested by Mr F. C. Tjam, the defence counsel in the trial of Supardjo, Suppose we decide on (KUHP) article 134 in connection with Penpres (Presidential Decision—trans.) No. 5/1959, especially article 2, then we are confronted with something which I am almost sure will not be accepted by the voice of the innermost soul of the Indonesian people. I read article 134, ‘Deliberate insult to the President or Vice-President is punishable with a sentence of as much as six years or a fine of 300 rupiah. This is in an artiele of the KUHP. But if used with article 2 of Penpres No. 5/1959, then the accused is suspected of giving a deliberate insult and might be sentenced to death. The first anti-subversion law, the Economic Subversion Decree or Penpres 5/1959, involves ‘‘an increase in the severity of sentence against criminal acts which endanger the provision of basic needs (food and clothing)”. In the broad definition of this decree, acts which endanger the “organising of the security of the people and of the state” and those which interfere with the anti-imperialist struggle, (with special reference to West Irian) are liable to the death penalty. In many of the G30S trials charges were made on the basis of the second decree, the Presidential Decree on Subversion, No. 11/1963, which also made subversion a capital offence. The decree only became law in 1969, but was used regardless before 1969. It has provided a farreaching and draconian measure to the Sukarno, and especially the Suharto governments as a means of suppressing all political opposition. Mr Yap Thiam Hien has described the act as a “rubber law”68 and elsewhere commented, You know, the Anti-Subversion act is so wide and its interpretation so broad that everybody can be affected. Some people even say that breathing is subversive. The application of these laws has made the job of the prosecution very easy as it has hardly been necessary to draw up a detailed case for the prosecution. Latief objected to the use of Penpres 5/1959 in his case, saying that it gave the prosecutor the punishment ‘in his pocket”. He also observes that the law was supposed to protect Sukarno and points out the irony of his case, saying that if the Prosecutor chose to prosecute him on the basis of Penpres 5/1959, then it meant that he sided with Sukarno in which case he should join Latief in prison. Or if Latief did break this law, then that is what Suharto did, and in this case Latief should be given a medal.70 Njono was tried under Penpres 5/1959. He had stated that in the undertaking of his duties at the time of the ‘coup’ he was to see that transport was not disrupted. Somehow the court turned this against him and thus proved that he was guilty of economic subversion. The reasoning went as follows,71 The accused could guess previously that the G30S would create economic difficulties, because the accused said previously amongst other things, that through the workers’ federation with whom he was connected, land and air traffic could continue as usual. Furthermore it was necessary to prove Njono guilty under the KUHP articles 107, 108 and 110 in order to obtain sentence on the basis of the economic subversion charge connected with them. The proof all depended on the decision setting up the Mahmillub for the G30S trials, which was signed by Sukarno and which denounced the G30S as a “counter-revolutionary adventure”. From here the Prosecutor was able to extrapolate The term counter-revolutionary is in essence a political term, not a legal term in the sense of juridical terminology, but the term is certainly a term which is used in the legal terminology of the revolution, the highest law of the people and the state which is in revolution. 72 In his eksepsi Sudisman’s counsel argues that the KUHP articles 107, 108 and 110 are centuries old and promulgated to protect the Dutch Indies government. He observes that there are no specific laws on “‘counter-revolutionary crimes” since Penpres 11/1963 and Penpres 5/1959 are unconstitutional and unlawful. He quotes a legal adage, Geen strafbaar feit zonder voorafgnande strafbepaling (nulla puna sina praevia lage punali) —or that there can be no offence without prior penal provision. In February 1975 four women who were leading members of women’s trade union and peasant sroups, were tried under the Anti-Subversion Act.73 Their ‘subversive’ activities included obtaining false identity cards, publishing and distributing illegal bulletius and providing assistance to the children of political prisoners. One of the women, Sulami, was also accused of having recruited women to go to Lubang Buaya to help with cooking and sewing, which proved to the prosecutor that she had known about the ‘coup’. The women received 20, 18, 15 and 15 years’ sentences. In another subversion case, two women and a man were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for circulating illegal pamphlets in West Kalimantan. The defence counsel argued that one of the accused Mariam binti Kadi was mentally abnormal and asked that she be examined by a psychiatrist. The judge rejected the request saying that his experience in court had shown that defendants were always trying to pervert the course of justice and would go as far as feigning disability in order to receive a lower sentence. The court, he said, was in a position to judge which of her statements were true and which were false.74 Mr Oei Tju Tat was charged under the anti-subversion act some ten years after his arrest. It was alleged that as a leading member of Partindo’> he had issued a statement that had claimed that the G30S was an ‘internal army affair’ and that with this statement Mr Oei had tried to undermine or destroy the government. It was shown conclusively in court that Mr Oei was not personally responsible for the statement, and that indeed he had protested against it. Nonetheless he was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment with deduction for the time already served. After the sentence had been handed down, the International Commission of Jurists commented TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 39] === The court’s attempted justification of this extraordinary judgement was that Mr Oei ‘did not react strongly enough, although protesting against the statement’. This shameful decision can be explained only by factors external to the trial itself, and as an eu to justify Mr Oei’s detention for almost ten years before trial. Rule of Law advocates who seek the revoking of the antisubversion laws run the risk of being branded as subversives themselves. A recent editorial in the army newspaper Berita Yudha77 stated that those who wish to secure basic human rights over the interests of the state aimed at “‘belittling the urgency of national security”. Many lesser crimes than this have been labelled ‘subversive’ and punished accordingly. Witnesses While the prosecution evidence given in the trials has been almost invariably flimsy, fabricated or coerced, witnesses a decharge (defence witnesses) have seldom been allowed to appear. Latief complained bitterly in his defence plea that he had been unable to call a single witness. His witnesses a decharge included President and Mrs Suharto, as well as foreign journalists who had interviewed Suharto about a meeting on the night of the ‘coup’ at which Latief had informed Suharto of the plans of middle-ranking army officers to bring the army leadership to account. Latief also wanted to call as a witness Pono, who seems to have been a key figure in the ‘coup’, but the court refused for “technical reasons”. Latief protested and said that other witnesses had been brought from Cipinang prison, where Pono was being held, and that there were no security reasons why he should not be brought, in fact no valid reason at all. The court insisted that written testimony signed by Pono was sufficient, but Latief observed that in 1972 he had testified at Pono’s trial and Pono had accepted his testimony as correct. Yet Pono’s written testimony presented at Latief’s trial was in conflict with Latief’s evidence given in 1972, and had in fact been drawn up in 1971, but not signed until 1973. As a last resort, Latief asked whether his 1972 testimony could be read out in court, but this too was refused.78 In one case where defence witnesses were ‘‘allowed’’, the cynicism of the court was apparent. During the trial of Iskander Subekti, Kompas reported,79 On the request of the accused, Iskander Subekti, the team of judges at the Jakarta State Court which is examining and trying the subversion case, yesterday, Thursday, agreed to produce Aidit and Sudisman as witnesses a decharge...The prosecutor in yesterday’s session said that he asked for one day to try and present them. As known, at the end of 1967, Sudisman was sentenced to death by the Mahmillub, while Aidit was reported as shot dead in a mop-up operation. Written evidence from witnesses has been commonly used. Often the evidence is a signed interrogation report, and many of the witnesses are themselves under sentence of death, and not knowing if or when it will be carried out. Following a train crash in Java, the railway workers Radi and Kirtam, were tried with committing sabotage in August 1975. In their trial, the most spurious written ‘defence’ evidence was accepted by the court as proving their guilt. Written testimonies were heard in the session from four witnesses a decharge. The four were PKI figures, Towidjari, Mustakim, Yatim and Asep Suryaman, alias Hamin. The evidence was used in an effort to reveal the disguised tactical and political connections with PKI, especially SBKA8! in connection with the collision in Telama. Witnesses Mustakim and Asep Suryaman spoke more about the PKI and its failed rebellion. Meanwhile the witness Towidjari stated that members of the PKI who were still railway workers were instructed to continue working illegally for the PKI in accordance with the position of SBKA as a mass organisation of the PKI. The most important target if necessary was to conduct sabotage and in its organisation there were implementing cadres. He said that the train accident appeared to be a tactic handed by Aidit to Djoko Sumbul who gave evidence in Solo on 18 October 1965. This case also demonstrates the important fact that when the defence counsel does not have proper access to witnesses, the court can so arrange the presentation of evidence as to severely damage the defence case. Exhibits There have been many cases of defence counsel rejecting barang bukti (exhibits) produced in the trials. But according to the HIR (Revised Procedural Code) the presiding judge has the ultimate discretion over evidence produced in court. During the trial of Njono photos of the supposedly mutilated bodies of the generals were shown to Njono and then submitted to the session as visum et repertum (visual evidence). The defence counsel then asked that the doctor’s post mortem report also be submitted, because it was known that this report had shown that the bodies were not mutilated as the government contended. The judge then said that this report was inadmissable and could not be submitted as evidence as Njono was not being charged with murder,82 In the trial of Asep Suryaman, the defence rejected the exhibits as unlawful evidence as they were not accompanied by a document of confiscation signed by the accused. Asep denied that the weapons and pamphlets on display were his,83 but to no avail. In the same case the prosecutor stated with regard to the presentation of witnesses and other procedures, that if all regulations were observed it would retard the processes of the hearings, thus prolonging the detention of the accused.84 Presumption of Innocence It is hardly surprising that one of the most important issues which has emerged in the trials, has been the consistent violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence of the defendant, which is guaranteed in article 8 of Law 14/1970. Procedural irregularities have added their weight to the massive propaganda campaign which has been so prejudicial in all the G30S trials. The best illustration of this practice comes from the trial of Asep Suryaman, where he and his defence counsel took an exceptionally courageous stand on the issue. According to article 289 of the HIR (Revised Procedural Code), 14 TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 @ After all the wintesses have been examined, the judges shall proceed with the examination of the accused, informing him/her of all the aggravating circumstances as a result of the investigations at the hearing. In other words the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the defendant who is accused of crimes in accordance with the indictment. It has become “customary” in Indonesia since 1950, according. to Asep’s judge, Mr T,M. Abdullah to open the case with the examination of the accused, and he then refused to commence with the witnesses. In order to protect his right of non-self-incrimination, Asep was advised by his defence counsel to insist upon the correct-procedure and to refuse to answer any..questions until all the witnesses were heard, This tactic is known as gerakan tutup mulut—“the closed mouth movement”. One of the judges then told the defendant that he was entitled not to speak if he so wished, but that he should be warned of. the possible consequences if he failed to answer. The defence counsel, Mr Yap then warned the judge that he was violating his judges’ oath in making this threat. Nonetheless the trial proceeded as ordained, as the judges decreed it was sufficient to read the reports of Asep’s pretrial interrogation as evidence. In cases where the violation of article 289 is protested by the defence counsel, the prosecution invariably claims successfully that the HIR is only meant to provide “‘guidelines” (pedoman). However as S.°Tasrif, the Chairman of the Bar Association of Indonesia (Peradin) points out, not only is article 8 of Law 14/1970 infringed, but also Law 1/1950 which states that the task of the Supreme Court is to ensure that justice is carried out in accordance with the law, no matter what has become “‘customary”’.85 The PKI Spectre The trials have served an important legitimating function for the New Order, both within Indonesia. and in other countries. The major. issue connected » with political imprisonment has been the plight of the prisoners detained without trial, while in the case of the others it has been seen that justice at least appeared to have been done. However the trials have played an even more important, in fact a critical role in Indonesia’s post 1965 politics: They have kept alive a spectre. While the obliteration of the PKI as a legal and popular party was complete it was necessary to give it life in another form, and so the PKI now lives on as a “communist threat” or as “communist subversion’, thus providing the basis of an impressive and multi-purpose apparatus of political control. The penalties associated with the. PKI are so well known that people will go to great lengths to avoid this stigma and the suffering it involves. Not only is the PKI-sanction effective as a central government policy, but it is used by individuals for their own gain, and thus accounts for the pervasiveness of its use. Army officers have reported that they have “defeated” imaginary ‘“‘advancing communist units” or “underground communists”.86 This language conceals the arrests and killing of innocent villagers and at the same time earns commendations and even promotions for over-zealous army officers. At all sorts of levels, the enforcement of government policy also depends on the PKI sanction. For-example women who’ refuse to participate in government birthcontrol programmes become ‘PKI-sympathisers”, - and workers who are. laid off without pay become. the same if they protest. Government officials who come to’ inform peasants that they must give up their land for some ‘government project, do not hesitate to use explicitly the PKIsanction. Peasants who protest at the meagre compensation handed out by. the government are instantly branded as PKI. On 25 July 1979, for example a number of peasants from Janggawah (Jember) East Java, were arrested after they had protested against the efforts of the State Tobacco Plantation No. 27 to plough up their crops.87 Following the incident, Major-General Witarmin, the Commander ‘of the East Java Military Command, who mobilised the troops which crushed the peasant demonstration asserted, ... there is ‘clearly collaboration between political party elements to utilise this case for their political interests. Besides this, we must be vigilant of the role of G30S/PKI elements who are also utilising this case in the interests of their strategy of struggle. The role of G30S/PKI elements is clear because an ex- BTI (the now banned Peasants’ Union—trans.) member who is required to report regularly was active in this incident, One of the. persons mobilising the masses. was also an ex-BTI/PKI person, and the region where it occurred was indeed a BTI/PKI stronghold in former days. The kind of mass action employed is clearly similar to that employed by the PKI during the old order.88 Some days later, Kompas which carried this report revealed the difficulties of the press in such cases, and unusually, did not mince words: It is necessary for us to be somewhat cautious when discussing the Jenggawah incident, especially following the official statement made by the Brawijaya (East Java) Military Command to the effect that BTI elements were involved. With this, we are, as it were, placed before a formidable and impregnable wall. Not missing a golden opportunity, foreign companies have also found out that recalcitrant workers can be controlled effectively with the PKI-sanction. Particularly vulnerable to this are former political prisoners, for example those who are working in what amounts to forced-labour camps in foreign-owned timber concessions in Kalimantan. Berita Yudha, the army daily, reported an incident where military intervention was used against P. T. Cidatin/Cita workers in Kalimantan. A security patrol had arrested a worker who had allegedly left his work-place in the forest, and the validity of the arrest was questioned by a workers’ representative as he worked near logging ponds. Berita Yudha claimed in the accounts90 that police security forces receive Rp 30,000 a month from the company. Although the timber workers had merely protested at arbitrary paramilitary intervention, they were accused by the manager of P. T. Cita Timber of being “PKI inspired”. Now that all the B-Category prisoners are said to have been released, the government has been quick to brand them as future scapegoats in the continuing wave of workers’ protests which now shakes Indonesia, and the PKI sanction will continue to be used against them: TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 40] === “The entire state apparatus must intensify vigilance in exercising supervision of the released B-Category G30S/PKI prisoners. Do not relax in preventing outlawed ex-PKI aspirations from infiltrating and from mobilising forces”, declared General Panggabean, Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and Security. He was speaking at a meeting of co-ordinating ministers chaired by President Suharto held at the end of June. Acting Information Minister, General Sudharmono, reporting this stern warning, said that it was directed not only at officials responsible for security and regional government affairs but also those in other sectors. He specifically mentioned the labour sector which “should not be utilised” pointing out that “past events should not be allowed to recur”.91 In its most violent manifestation since 1965, the use of the communist threat justified the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the subsequent massacre of at least 100,000 people. Without the “PKI menace” and the original foundation of the G30S/PKI theory, this justification could never have been effective. Although the justification has been regarded with some scepticism overseas, within Indonesia itself it has been remarkably effective in ensuring the ignorance of even senior officials and politicians about the New Order’s genocide in East Timor. Apart from the trials of well-known PKI leaders and sympathisers already discussed, there have been numerous and continuing trials conducted under the PKI rubric. In these “subversion” and “sabotage” are favourite charges. Reports of these trials tend to be bland and perfunctory, but they always include the charge and usually the sentence. Such trials help to keep the PKI spectre alive and to reinforce a theory which has served the New Order well for fourteen years. The foregoing account has one main sobering message. While there is good reason to rejoice about the releases of so many political prisoners, the rejoicing should not be unqualified, for the tragedy of G30S has by no means come to an end. Footnotes Quoted by Barbro Karabuda in “Letter from Indonesia”, Part I, pp. 43-46, Eastern Horizon, VIII:5, 1969. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1978. Indonesian Government Policy in Dealing with the G30S/PKI (The 30th September Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party) Detainees (henceforth Indonesian Government Policy...), pill: ibid. Nadapol is the acronym for narapidana politik or political cri minals. It is a term used for the convicted political prisoners. See Indonesian Government Policy..... op. cit. P. 16. The word ‘coup’ in this and subsequent sentences is deliberately placed in inverted commas as it is the belief of the writer that the G30S was not intended to overthrow Sukarno, and that in fact the real coup was Suharto’s in his acts of insubordination and his gradual acquisition of power using G30S as his vehicle. G30S/PKI is the contraction which firmly links the ‘coup’ with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It stands for Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia, or the 30 September Movement of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Panca Sila (Five Pillars) is the basis of the Indonesian state philosophy which was expounded by Sukarno in 1945. The five pillars are: Belief in One God, Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Democracy and Social Justice. With his Decree of 5 July 1959 Sukarno returned Indonesia to the 1945 Constitution, following a debate in the Coun Assembly which failed to agree on the Panca Sila. In this move he rescinded the 1950 (Parliamentary Democracy) Constitution and restored Indonesia to the presidential system. 9 See Indonesian Government Policy... op. cit. p. 16, 10 Suara Merdeka, 6 December 1978. 11 AFP dispatch, 30 June 1975, quoted by van der Kroef in “Indonesia’s Political Prisoners”, Pacific Affairs, p. 627, Winter 1976/ 71, pp. 625-647. 12 Indonesian Government Policy... op. cit. p. 30. 13 Simar Harapan, 10 Decemebr 1979. 14 Amnesty International 1977, Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report, Amnesty International Publications, p. 31. 15 Sinar Harapan, quoting Admiral Sudomo, 10 December 1979. 16 See for example official accounts in: a) Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismael Saleh, 1968, The Coup Attempt of the 30 September Movement in Indonesia, Pembimbing Masa, Jakarta. b) Indonesian Government Policy... op. cit. c) KOPKAMTIB, 1978, Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia G30S/PKI. This document was hurriedly produced in mid-1978, apparently in response to the Latief trial and contains quite a number of remarkable errors. Some alternative views are given by: i) Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, 1971, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1 Coup in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. ii) Harold Crouch, 1973 “Another Look at the Indonesian Coup”, in Indonesia No. 15 (April) pp. 1-21. iti) Coen Holtzappel, 1979, “The 30 September Movement: A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an Intelligence Operation”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 9:2. iv) W. F. Wertheim 1979, “Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 9:2. 17 Latief’s account of Suharto’s role may be found in the full text of his defence plea which has been published outside of Indonesia under the title Mengungkap Sejarah Yang Sebenarnya (Revealing the True History). A good summary of this document may be found in TAPOL Bulletin, No. 35, 1979, pp. 8-10 (Henceforth Latief Defence Plea). 18 Amnesty International, 1977, Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report, Amnesty International Publications, p. 23. 19 D. N. Aidit was the chairperson of the PKI politburo. Two short accounts of his death may be found in Harold Crouch, 1978, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, p. 161, and in Brian May, 1978 The Indonesian Tragedy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 108. 20 Njoto was the second vice-chairperson of the PKI and third in the party hierarchy. He was also Minister in charge of Land Reform and a senior aide of President Sukarno. There is a brief account of his death in Crouch 1978, op. cit. p. 161. 21 The word Necolim should read Nekolim and it is a Sukarno acronym for Neo-colonial forces. 22 The court in which Njono was tried was the Mahmillub— Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa—Extraordinary Military Tribunal. 23 G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub I (Perkara Njono), Pusat Pendidikan/Kehakiman AD, Jakarta, pp. 261-2 (henceforth Njono Trial). 24 Sinar Harapan, 7 September 1972. 25 The Ministers were: 1) Dr Subandrio; 2) Dr Chaerul Saleh; 3) Ir. Setiadi Reksoprodjo; 4) Sumardjo; 5) Oei Tju Tat S.H.; 6) Ir. Surachman; 7) Jusuf Muda Dalam; 8) Armunanto; 9) Sutomo Martopradoto; 10) Astrawinata S.J.; 11) Major- General TND Achmadi; 12) Drs Mohammad Achadi; 13) Lt. Col. Infantry Imam Sjafi-ie; 14) J. Tumakaka; 15) Maj.-Gen. TNI Sumarno. 26 SUPERSEMAR is the acronym for the Presidential Decision of 11 March 1966 in which President Sukarno was forced to confer special powers on Suharto as the head of KOPKAMTIB. 27 Indonesian Government Policy... op. cit. p. 21. 28 The signs of the “innermost feelings of the people” refer to student demonstrations which were orchestrated by Kemal Idris, Sarwo Edhie and Ali Murtopo, otherwise known as the New TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 eS. Radicals. Although demonstrations had been banned this group made it known to students that anti-Sukarno demonstrations would be welcome, and that they would have the backing of crack troops which had been moved into Jakarta. Following the deaths of two students in the demonstrations, feelings ran high and the political situation was one of grave crisis. In this atmosphere these generals were able to bring about the arrests of Subandrio and the other ministers. 29 Crouch 1978, op. cit. pp. 211-2. 30 The First Charge: Article 110 KUHP para 1 in connection with articles 107, 108, in connection with article 88 KUHP. The Second Charge: Article 107, para 1 and 2 KUHP. The Third Charge: Article 108, para 1 (1), para 2 KUHP. All articles mentioned in the three charges are in connection with article 2 of Penpres (Presidential Decision) 5/1959. 31 Subandrio’s death sentence was not carried out, and he is reported to be still alive in prison. 32 Quoted by Amnesty International, 1977, op. cit. p. 130. 33 Angkatan Bersendjata, quoted by Crouch 1978 op. cit. p. 212. 34 Crouch 1978, op. cit. p. 212. 35 Coen Holtzappel 1979, op. cit. p. 227. 36 An excellent account of this struggle may be found in Daniel Lev, 1978, “Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtsstaat”, Law and Society Review, 13:1 Fall, pp. 37-71. Kompas, 15 August 1975. Kompas, 27 October 1977. Tempo, 8 September, 1979. Lev 1978, op. cit. p. 53. ibid. p. 54. Eddy Damian and Robert N. Hornick 1972, ‘“‘Indonesia’s Formal Legal System: An introduction”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, No. 20, p. 511. Kompas, 29 August, 1975. The eksepsi or demurrer is a statement delivered by the defendant or the defence counsel which challenges the validity of the court trying the case or other legal aspects. 45 MPRS stands for Peoples’ Deliberative Assembly. The S stands for ‘Provisional’, 46 Kompas, 9 July, 1975. 47 Private communication from a person who was present at the trial. Nigroho Notosusanto and Ismael Saleh, 1967, op. cit. p. 89. 49 See article 1, Presidential Decision 370/1965. Latief Defence Plea, op. cit. p. 16. 51 Tempo, 8 November 1978. 52 Tempo, 23 December 1978 Kompas, 7 July 1975. 54 Private communication from a person who was present at the trial. 55 Carmel Budiardjo, 1974, ‘Political Imprisonment in Indonesia”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, April-August, p. 20. 56 Njono trial, op. cit. pp. 59 and 268. 57 Njono Trial, op. cit. p. 268. 58 Personal communication. 59 Latief as one of the G30S leaders was detained in prison under terrible conditions exacerbated by ill health and solitary confinement for ten years. He was finally tried in mid-1978. 60 Latief Defence Plea, op. cit. pp. 35-48. 61 Ibid. pp. 57-58. 62 Sudisman 1975 (trans. Ben Anderson) Analysis of Responsibility, Defence speech Before the Mahmillub, 21 July 1967, The Works Co-operative Ltd. p. 21. 63 Amnesty International 1977, op. cit. p. 76. 64 Kompas, 10 July 1975. 65 Private communication. 66 Private communication. 67 Sudisman 1975, op. cit. pp. 2-3. 68 In the trial of Asep Suryaman. 69 Ina television interview with Aag van den Heuvel, KRO Netherlands 23, September 1978 ‘Indonesia: Wealth Power and Justice” Reproduced in part by TAPOL Bulletin, No. 31, 1978, seep..11, 710 Latief Defence Plea, op. cit. pp. 134-5. 71 Njono Trial, op. cit. p. 21. 72 ibid. p. 234. 73 The women were Sulami and Sudjinah of Gerwani (Indonesian Women’s Movement), Sri Ambar of SOBSI (All Indonesia Trade Union Federation), and Suharti Harsono of BTI (Indonesian Peasants’ League). 74 Merdeka, 6 August 1975. 715 Partindo (Partai Indonesia—Indonesian Party) was a small nationalist splinter group which moved under PKI influence in the 1960s. 716 ICJ Review, 17 December 1976. Mr Oei was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment and was subsequently released after being granted one year’s remission. Until very recently, his was the only known case in which remission had been granted. 77 Berita Yudha, 22 May, 1979. 78 Latief Defence Plea, op. cit. p. 224. 79 Kompas, 1 December, 1972. 80 Kompas, 1 August, 1975. 81 SBKA—Union of Railway Workers. 82 Njono Trial, op. cit. p. 229. 83 Kompas, 17 July, 1975. 84 Kompas, 26 July, 1975. 85 Sinar Harapan, 10 July, 1975. 86 Brian May, 1978, op. cit. p. 204. 87 TAPOL Bulletin No. 36, p. 6. 88 Kompas, 4 August, 1979. 8% Kompas, 8 August, 1979. 90 Berita Yudha, 14 and 15 August, 1978. 91 Pelita, 28 June, 1979. REX MORTIMER The death of Rex Mortimer on New Year’s Eve from cancer has meant the loss of a dedicated scholar and of a man who was deeply concerned about oppression and exploitation. His work was directed towards understanding and confronting these evils, and the analysis of other philosophical and practical attempts to deal with them. Indonesia was a particularly important focus of his concern. Rex was the author of the very significant study, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (1974, Cornell University Press) and the contributing editor of Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia’s ‘Accelerated Modernisation’ (1973, Angus and Robertson). He also produced numerous, much-discussed articles and seminar papers. His work had a unique Rex Mortimer style, and was reflective, incisive, controversial and always stimulating. As a teacher he won the respect and aftection of students, some of whom he inspired with a lasting interest in Indonesia. Many former students will remember his remarkable ability to offer detailed and well-founded criticism, while never discouraging or belittling their efforts. Despite the pain and mental anguish Rex suffered in his last months, he bore his illness with incredible courage and with determination to complete as much of a formidable array of self-imposed tasks as possible, while also spending as much time as he could with his family, and writing to his friends. Many people will cherish the memory of a muchloved friend and of a dedicated man of great warmth and humour. We feel his loss greatly. TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 41] === continued from page 2 still living at the Savana Jaya unit on Buru island as well as 89 released tapols who are said to have ‘opted’ to remain there when the final batch of releases from Buru took place on 13 November last (Kompas, 22 November, 1979). The ‘“‘Unco-operative”’ 105 In addition to the general discriminatory restrictions imposed on all released tapols, the last 105 tapols to be teleased are required to report weekly to the military authorities and have been told that they will be under specially close surveillance. The group includes a number of well-known prisoners: the novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the poet Rivai Apin, woman’s activist Dr Tanti Aidit (widow of the murdered chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party), journalists Naibaho and Hasyim Rachman, as well as a number of workers, peasants, students, schoolpupils and government employees. Several official explanations of their “‘unco-operativeness” have been given. Brig- General Gunarso, Defence Ministry spokesman claimed that they had refused to sign loyalty oaths but this turned out to be untrue. General Yoga Sugama, KOPKAMTIB’s Chiefof-Staff then claimed that they “still strongly support the PKI’s right to exist even though it has been banned” (Kompas, 22 November 1979). Their eventual release came after it had been asserted that they would not be freed until they “changed their attitudes”. But when international concern was expressed over this back-tracking, it was decided to release them after all though they will be required to report weekly till “their attitudes change”. Their eventual release proves yet again that international pressure has played a decisive role at every stage. Discrepancies in Figures Continue In TAPOL Bulletin No. 35, it was shown that of the 12,146 tapols acknowledged by KOPKAMTIB at the end of 1978, only 9,562 were accounted for in the figures it gave in April 1979 when the release of 1,259 tapols left the total official figure at only 8,303. Discrepancy: 2,584 In TAPOL Bulletin No. 36, it was shown that the release of 4,000 in September left a further discrepancy of 149 tapols: May 1979 official figure 8,303 September releases 4,000 4,303 New official figures after September releases 4,154 Discrepancy: 149 The releases that have taken place in November and December, the closing stages of the release plan, continue to leave discrepancies: Sept 1979 official figure 4,154 November releases 1,874* 2,280 *89 of these releases remained on Buru. New official figure after @ November releases 2,211 Discrepancy: 69 December releases 2,045 166 New official figure after December releases 128 Discrepancy: 38 The remaining 128 were said to consist of the 105 “uncooperative” B-Category tapols who were released on 20 December, and 23 A-Category prisoners, awaiting trial. This leaves a total of 259 tapols unaccounted for since May last year or altogether 2,843 unaccounted for since the end of 1978. It is difficult to comprehend how KOPKAM- TIB figures, announced on each occasion with such authority and precision, have every time been proved wrong by their own subsequent figures. Statistically, there is every reason to doubt KOPKAMTIB’s claim that there are no more B-Category prisoners. Tried Prisoners and Those Awaiting Trial At the time of the first December releases, Admiral Sudomo announced (Sinar Harapan, 10 December 1979) that a total of 1,014 persons had been tried since 1966. Apparently there had been no acquittals for he went on to state that 262 persons had now completed their sentences while the remaining 752 were still serving sentences in prison. The number of A-category prisoners dropped: dramatically over the year, as the following official figures show: End of 1978 1,391 April 1979 527, May 475 November 41 December 23 It is not clear how many of these vanishing prisoners were tried (few trials were reported in the press during 1979) and how many were re-classified to B. The rate of reclassification has apparently been very high despite KOP- KAMTIB’s consistent claims that it had “sufficient evidence” to prove the guilt of these prisoners. Remissions A major change for tried tapols is the long-delayed decision to allow them remission. In November 1979, President Suharto is reported (Tempo, 29 December 1979) to have instructed the Minister of Justice to grant remissions to political prisoners in line with normal practice for other prisoners. Until then, only one tried prisoner had obtained remission, and then only after vigorous efforts by his family. The decision to grant remission comes too late to benefit a considerable number of prisoners who received sentences of relatively shorter duration and who served their sentences to the full. Tempo (5 January 1980) reports that 331 tried tapols have been granted remission. For 118, this meant immediate release; 20 people serving life sentences had their sentences reduced to twenty years. Tempo also reports that 18 TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 ©... of cases which had been sent to the courts for trial were withdrawn. These included the cases of Dr Tanti Aidit and D.P. Karim, journalist, both of whom were released in December. General Yoga Sugama is quoted by Tempo as saying that it was not certain that all the remaining 23 A-category prisoners would in fact be tried. “If it is thought”, says Tempo “that the sentence they will get is less than the period they have already spent in detention, then they will be released.” Assuming that it is correct to consider the 118 released as a result of remissions as being in addition to the 262 tried persons mentioned by Admiral Sudomo as having been released already, it means that 634 tapols are still serving sentences. PROTESTORS GREET SUHARTO During President Suharto’s State Visit to Britain last November, a number of demonstrations were held. The largest, in which about three hundred people took part, was held outside the Guildhall, as Suharto was being feted by London’s Lord Mayor. Press coverage of the demonstrations was good, far better indeed than the press coverage afforded to Suharto. A complete set of clippings is available for the price of £1.50 to pay for photocopying, plus postage. ‘TEMPO’ PUBLISHES LETTER FROM TAPOL Pickets outside Downing street. Kami (Tapol) Tidak Anti Translation Berhubung atribut ‘anti-lndonesia’ yang jungan Ratu, TEMPO 17 November), perlu kami jelaskan: bahwa yang ditentang TAPOL adalah sistem represi yang dijalankan Pememahasiswa serta lain-lain golongan yang berusaha memperjuangkan haknya. Jadi, TAPOL bahwa represi sepenuhnya bertentangan dengan kepribadian Indonesia. jungan Presiden Suharto ke Inggris. Organicratic Rights in the ASEAN Alliance, Liberation, the British Campaign for an Indepengai serikat buruh termasuk Transport & Geterbesar. union. JULIE SOUTHWOOD TAPOL wee 8A Treport Street SW18 2BP, London, United Kingdom. Tempo 29 December 1979 diberikan kepada TAPOL (Membalas Kun- We (TAPOL) Ate Not Anti In connection with the adjective ‘anti-Indonesian’ which was attributed to rintah Indonesia sekarang ini, baik terhadap | TAPOL (“Returning the Queen’s Visit”’, Tempo, 17 November 1979), we tahanan G30S/PKI maupun terhadap gerakan | should explain that what TAPOL is opposed to is the system of repression operated by the present Indonesian Government, both towards G30S/PKI sama sekali tidak bersikap anti-Indonesia. | prisoners as well as towards the student movement and other groups trying Bahkan sebaliknya — karena kami yakin| + defend their rights. Thus, TAPOL is in no way anti-Indonesian. In fact, the contrary is true, because we are convinced that repression is com- Perlu. dijelaskan pula, bukan hanya! pletely out of keeping with the Indonesian identity. os JAROE vane mensadakan plots seam ak nus It should also be explained that TAPOL was not the only organisation sasi yang ikut aktif berdemonstrasi meliputi| to protest during President Suharto’s visit to Britain. Organisations which antara lain: Conference on Basic and Demo-| took an active part in the demonstrations included: the Conference on Basic and Democratic Rights in the ASEAN Alliance, Liberation, the dent East Timor, the Campaign Against the| British Campaign for an Independent East Timor, the Campaign Against Arms Trade, Third World First, serta berba-| sp6 4rms Trade, Third World First, as well as various trade unions, cee neral Workers Union, yaitu SB Inggris yang| including the Transport and General Workers’ Union, Britain’s largest TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 42] === POLITICAL EXILES MAY RETURN BUT... The BBC Short waye Monitoring Bulletin reported on 3rd January 1980 that Aritara news agency reported General Yoga Sugama, Commander of the State Security Command and Chief of State Intelligence, as stating that all political fugitives who had left Indonesia after the attempted coup of 1965 were allowed to return but would be subject to “interrogation by the authorities”. Investigations would show whether they should be detained or ‘“‘acquitted”’ (sic). Many thousands of Indonesians are now living abroad as political refugees. One who did decide to return home in 1977, Brigadier-General Suharjo, was arrested immediately on his arrival in Jakarta. It was recently announced that he is soon to be tried; he is now listed as one of the 23 A-category tapols. continued from page 1 years. Furthermore, student unions are stepping up opposition to the government-imposed “normalisation” of the campuses, and renewed repression could occur any day; a number of students have already been suspended from their studies and two student leaders have died in suspiciously similar “accidents”’. Worker and peasant actions in defence of their basic rights are heavily repressed with the authorities frequently invoking the PKI spectre to justify imprisonment. As economic conditions deteriorate, such actions are certain to increase, with the likelihood of more victims. East Timor Massive and brutal repression continues against all who resist the takeover by Indonesia. The death toll is horrendous (some estimate it to be as much as half the population). Some of those captured are being held as political prisoners, though many are known to have been executed or to have died under torture. An estimate of the numbers being held in detention is virtually impossible because of the tight blockade. In addition, hundreds of thousands are being held against their will in “strategic camps’’, in conditions of widespread disease and starvation. These are all victims of Indonesian repression and can only be freed by strong international pressure. West Irian (West Papua) Here too, resistance to Indonesian rule is met with brutal repression, Whatever one may think of the West Papuan people’s demand for secession, they have a right to struggle for this demand, as Indonesians had a right to demand independence from the Dutch. An estimated 90,000 have been killed since the installation of Indonesian rule in 1963, and 1,500 are thought to be being held, the vast majority without trial. A campaign to stop this repression and to release these prisoners is long overdue. Dissolve KOPKAMTIB and End Repression The only way to end all forms of repression in Indonesia is to dissolve KOPKAMTIB, the Army’s special security command, which stands outside and above the law. @ until KOPKAMTIB ceases to exist and the rule of law is allowed to operate without interference from the Executive will it be possible to stop campaigning, in Indonesia as well as abroad. A MILLION CHINESE TO BE REPATRIATED Pians to repatriate one million Chinese from Indonesia wer were announced by General Yoga Sugama, Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB, at a meeting with the Defence and Foreign Affairs Commission of Parliament on 28th November, 1979 (Guardian Reuter, 29 November, 1979). The government would, he said “set aside specially designated areas for the non-Indonesian Chinese pending their repatriation”, and added that all Peking passport holders were in the process of being re-registered to determine their exact number, family status and employment. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (4 January, 1980) the decision applies to all “‘all ethnic Chinese who refuse to Indonesian citizenship” and would include repatriation not only to mainland China but also to Taiwan. General Sugama is reported to have told parliamentarians that the repatriation programme would be completed by 1984, the final year of Indonesia’s current five-year plan. Reports that all three million ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are required to re-register were published earlier in 1979. According to Henry Kamm (New York Times, 31 May, 1979), re-registration is costly and frustrating. a 29-page questionnaire must be completed, a $4 fee paid to “cover costs” and photocopies of birth, death, marriage and name-change certificates as well as identity cards and busi- Ei ey a a | SUBSCRIPTIONS One year’s subscription (6 issues): UK and Europe: £4.50 To all subscribers outside the UK: Please make payments by a cheque drawn on a London bank, by mail payment order or by National Giro transfer. In case of cheques drawn on foreign banks, bank charges amounting to about £1.50 are deducted from the value of the cheque and represent a serious loss on the small denomination cheques received by TAPOL. If you cannot make payment by methods suggested above, please add the equivalent of £1.50 to the value of your cheque. Thank you. Printed by Calverts North Star Press Ltd. Please address all correspondence and enquiries to: TAPOL 8a Treport Street London SW18 2BP, UK 20 TAPOL Bulletin No 37 January 1980 === [PDF page 43] === f t fC op Ve vere oe PF oan TEN > Eh) Z//21e0 He Rac vo anys [Unreadable] @; cc. ee MEMORANDUM FOR THE PILES December 12, 1979 BROM: POL = § J. Tatuge? SUBJECT: Visit with 'Tapols’ at Transmigration Center SUMMARY: Durning a visit November 19 with Tapols at the Moconelowe Transmigration Center, at the invitation of v ee eee fe - cre s a e c ! KOPKAMITIB, the seporting cfticer heard no allegations of % anyone having been forced to transmigrate, althoush there ‘were Ouher Candid complaints. One iinexpected weveletion i was that among the 30 Yapol heads-of-family, all ex-ABRI. were 14 not yet formally ''released,"’ although they had | been at the center for over 4 year. The Tapols and their famildes live in stark conditions, and the future of their settlement seems uncertain. END SUMMARY LOCATION: Ube Moconglowe Transmieration Center is located about 406 kilometers southeast of Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi), although the trip takes about an hour over: rough laterite road. The road is boardered with occasional derelict check-points, reminders of the Islemic rebellion which rocked the area,quelled only in 1965. At one mis-way | point is a manned chain barricr, m@intained, it was explained, HO prevent the enery ct trucks or other heavy vehicies | ' which might damage the road bed. The Genter per-ce was estimaced Co comprise an area Of about 300 sq. hectares and in addition to Yapols (ehis term, an | j acronym for tabanan poltik, On ‘political prisoners, is i used as a convenience to include both ex-prisoners and these [Unreadable] | not yet "formally" released) is populated with retired ABRI, ABRI in the two-year pre-retirement period, and ABRI on I active duty, although the Tapols are in e definable, | Ségregatea area. The ABRI escort officer, a Military Police |: Et. Colonel from Palembang named, Ichem Alam (essisted by i two Majors, ome @ Toreja, Ene other a Bueic) pointed out GDS 12/12/85 (ISOM, HARRIET W.) OR-P RICE ast Kava ti.. 3 : aa 6 ae 4 4 AR 1980 oT TR Fee ’ eo DESK OFFICER q RGIS (HY INDEX f{ PA lAction Taken === [PDF page 44] === vre UoNiwvi liv asichise leye aAxan Kee === [PDF page 45] === e CONFIDENTIAL a. The Tapols appeared relatively well dressed, no one at least was in tatters. Chickens were evident at only two of the houses, but there were no other animals except for dogs and cats. When I asked why there were no water < buffalo, one of the men said they were too expensive, as, { he said, were cows. ' “The Tapols now each own one hectare, but will be titled - with an additional hectare as soon as adjacent area is; * cleared of bamboo by a commercial company. RESTRICTIONS: According to Col. Idam, ecenfirmed generally ' by the men, there are no restrictions on the movements of ' the men, even those who were still technically “prisoners” ;: (with their ‘release’ dates expected to coincide with the; | next prisoner releases on December 8). They were free to | come and go as they like, and their land is alienable i (see below). Some of the wives Work as ménials in Ujung Pandang. As noted above, the MMMM was said to be i "on leave," and I was told that the owner of one unoccupied ' hut was on leave in Java |’ This terminology, of course, i conflicts with the no-restriction concept, but could be | i a semantic hangover from their military backgrounds. SCENARIO: The landrover which transported us diii ved, aba I | poUmce post (pikes) { where a modest luncheon was laid out f ‘ on a shaded, rocky, and breezy knoll, much the most atiractive | location in the area. Although there were about 10 police and some arms in evidence, Col. Idham explained that the i; post was normally manned by only two men, present to assist i the Tapols rather than keep them under surveillance. He Said, for example, if one of them Should have a medical emergency, the police vehicle would take thim to tne nospital im town. They could also hitch rides at the change of ' shifts. And if there were, although unlikely, any criminal | threat. the Apiken’ would Cake came of 1b: They are, he eontinued, "just like the police protection in any village” ' (althoueh MPs, rather than HANSLP). ' As we ate lunch the men began to gather in small groups at I xéspectiul distances. _ When we concluded, Col. Idham beckoned | t0 some of the groups, and a number of the men came to the \ === [PDF page 46] === ® CONF EDP TAL 4. table in easy manner and partook of the fruit and other jettovers. Two Of the Men we: fondling erpty pipes and / eagerly accepted tobacco which 1 offered. hone of them / were smoking, but a pack of cigarettes 1 produced was f gone in very Short OnGeu. { In an informal way the men, who had apparently been advised of my advent, gathered around and bepan a “rap” + session presenting complaints to Col Idham woo, 12 2 |. very easy manner assumed a ‘Bapak'' posture, seemingly: j. having good rapport with the men. The men were subdued, _ and respectful, but there was considerable good-naturec i kidding. One of them (said to be 55 but in appearance in his late 60s) was treated with considerable deference, Son by Col. ldhem, wic Sard "ENNNNE) «bad been a PKI. Weston and organises. ie aoeoaneaimy lice Et. ere) when I was only a cadet,'! Idham added, im a tone approaching | prideful respect. Complaints from the men centered around the lack Of Waren. | The men said they lacked even drinking water, and had £0 | Wale jemeae Alctarece co pee ae, aud that it was hard | work carrying it back. Idham was sympathetic, but offered mo solucions. When eley indicated a hill at a distance of about two kilometers as a water source, I suggested I had seen hill-people in Taiwan building water sluices from bamboo conducting at similar distances. The response was that they could not get permission or rights to traverse the land in between. One of the men, who emerged as a spokesman of sorts, asked that would Happen 16 emene wees 10 rain and their crops faved. Col. lidham reminded him that the one-year period of GOI responsibility for thier welfare had ended, but said he was sure something’ would be done. There were complaints that they had no fertilizer tc which Tdhan said thew could pee 2 covernment loan and purchase ee but the ‘spokesman’ Biceccted in ausaside —C me thet they had no secusity for Toane tdham sand of euey should. decide Go sel cieir tand, they ehoutd be sure to Seki it co Weriencs and mae tO Ghinese "He repeated thus remark several times throughout the discussion in seeming non-sequiturs. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 47] === CONFIDENTIAL a When one of the men complained that the local authorities were demanding of him an exhorbitant sum for the issuance of an identity care (Kartu Penduduk) | which he still did 4 not have, Col. Idham instructed one of the men to look: into. the matter. . Another man displayed a skin CONdGition, Said fo be Ehe i mesule Gt an Jaleray, | which was so xtreme as 5 resemble; §) leprosy “idham suseested that 45 “ey -Apei fe could go to i >) ehe Arny hospital in Ujung Pandang for treatement (the: : man later remarked to me that the suggestion was ri diculous: Ne said Ehat as an ex-Tapol he had no ex-ABRI rights, and that commercial treatment would be toc expensive). : I was accepted easily into the discussion, and as subtly! as possible repeated that there had been allegations that ' Tapols might have been forces to become transmigrees. | None would affirm this, and when I was briefly alone with i them later they denied having heard cf anyone being forced 1 to transmigrate. | After about an hour of this. during which some of the Tapols } apparently tired and wandered away without inhibition, I ( suggested to Idham that I would like to visit some of the Tapol's homes. He said "surely, why don't you just Go oft | alone amd i jal Wait here! Nonetheless one of tha majors tagged along. | EP wistted about six éstablichments, and observed the stark conditions mentioned above. Never having been in a "Desa," } e) : i had ine basis for comparison. I was invited to sit,. pl meet wives and children, but nowhere was I offered I betreshments, nor would 1 have expected any given the conditions. In one house a woman whose status remained c unexplained and who was much less friendly than others f£ had met was equipped with a small blackboard, teaching Arabic to a group of about eight small children COMP EDEN LAL, === [PDF page 48] === | CONFIDENTIAI. 6. After I had gone a considérable distance from the knoll I suggested to the Major that he return and get the ‘ landrover. I was thén alone with the Tapols, who had dwindled to about €ight, for apour = minutes. f The ''spokesman'’ was among them, and led off by saying it | i was unfair that they had been apprehended--(He in 1972) y eney were only, icarnyine oue Grdess sna had no role in: i any PKI activicies, He sand all jot tac Tapole present;. had been held in the military prison et Uiung Pandang; ‘and far from being forced, jumped at the chance to pet out i and become transmigrees. | ' When I mentioned the Buru Island dentention center, one |; Ob the Men sald those’ on Burushad @t “bar farm better | | Phan eenOSe Of US ini prison. iu puisom, he sald, they. | were frequently beaten, and with that several of them began revealing scars on legs and arms, allegedly: resulting from beatings. One of them said that as a result of beatings about the head scar tissue had | déveloped im his ears which had had been told threatens | him with permanent deafness unless he receives medical attention.: The general consensus was that while they are treated: | acceptapiy well at the Center, and enjoy good relations with their neighbors, they are worried that they will not. Survive if the drought continues and no help is forthcoming. | None of them made any direct pleas for assistance. | SIDELIGHTS: | (A) As we passed a military encampment on the way in from | the airport after arrival, EI noted that the flag was at half mast and asked Col. Idham the reason. He réplied | casually that there had been a ‘fire-fight" there the night before, vesulting in some death: P-had not heard that term (’tembak-menembak"') in so lone that my reaction was torask, aucreculcusly, (who Was the enemy." “The Col. replied, again casually, “ch, some of them got drunk and started shooting and four were killed.' === [PDF page 49] === alite noe; PEE. === [PDF page 50] === CONFIDENTIAL &. COMMENT: This was a disappointly limited sample of Tapols. The.fact that they were in various ereas of the country 4 when apprehenced, brought to a military prison in Ujung Pandang, and t} settled in a Center consisting i predcminently ort ABRI suggests a design to keep them } Within mitpeabye, cise kos: { > There are apparently no other Transmigration Centers in ' Southern Sulawesi. Col. Idham offered a visit to a Center ' in neighboring Central Sulawesi, but that would have | required a wait of two days for arrangements, which he I had not made in advance. | POL: Fi tatu -mp: ir : CLEARED: POL: HWIsom(draft) } ec: AME ap DEM bi POL-2. DAO ee EA/ IMBS I [Unreadable] === [PDF page 51] === British Campaign for the ceeemerpesastonscestianeee Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 Editorial SUHARTO TO VISIT BRITAIN! At a time when we in Britain and people elsewhere in the West are being constantly reminded of the atrocities committed in Kampuchea and the Central African Empire, it has been zynounced that General Suharto, Indonesia’s military ruler, will pay a State Visit to Britain from 13- 16 November next. Has it been forgotten that Suharto came to power by means of massacres which eliminated hundreds of thousands of people in little more than four months? Estimates range from half a million to one million killed; Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB’s chief, himself gave a figure of 540,000. Must we ignore the fact, hardly ever mentioned in the press, that Suharto’s army invaded East Timor in December 1975 and has waged aggressive war there ever since? The current estimate of deaths is 100,000—one-sixth of the population. A Catholic priest who recently left East Timor after spending three years with the resistance has spoken of regions where one-third of the population was wiped out. One-half of the population is now in concentration camps; there are forty prisons, 20,000 political prisoners, and torture and executions are a daily occurrence. And what of the murderous consequences of Suharto’s military campaign in West Irian where 90,000 are estimated to have died since 1963 in an attempt to quell a movement for freedom from Indonesia? From Irianese sources we hear that there are now 1,500 political prisoners. Undoubtedly, the publicity surrounding Suharto’s visit will speak glowingly of the release of tens of thousands of political prisoners in the past few years, as if this marks the end of Indonesia’s reputation as a human rights violator ‘Tapol’ is an Indonesian contraction for ‘tahanan politik’ meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are ‘criminals’. described by Amnesty International as being ‘without parallel’. We will not be told that these men and women were held without trial, most of them for over thirteen years, on the basis of nothing more than ‘indications’; that untold thousands died or disappeared in detention; that those lucky enough to survive are now returning home to face harsh discrimination in a society where, to quote the words of one detainee who recently returned from Buru, “fists are clenched agains: us”’. Why is the head of such a regime to be entertained in Buckingham Palace and toasted in the Guild Hall by a continued on page 10 From Smash the Yoke of Oppression of the Indonesian People, Defence Plea of Student Defendant, Heri Akmadi. === [PDF page 52] === 4,000 MORE RELEASED AS EX-TAPOL® Four thousand tapols, all of whom have been held for 13 years or more without trial, were released in September from the Buru island penal colony. They were formally released towards the end of the month and were transported to Java in two batches. The first 2,000 reached Surabaya on 24 September. The second 2,000 reached Java two weeks later and were formally ‘returned to society’ at a ceremony in Semarang, Central Java on 10th October. According to official figures, the total number of tapols following these releases from Buru now amounts to 4,154. The last figure given prior to this release of 4,000 was 8,303, the figure announced in April after the first 1979 releases took place. The two totals leave 149 tapols unaccounted for. No official clarification has been given regarding this discrepancy. For purposes of comparison, we give below the official breakdown by categories of the two figures: April 1979 September 1979 A Category 27, 475 B Category: on Buru island 5,920 1,915 elsewhere 1,598 23 Y Category 258 41 Total: 8,303 4,154 5 BURU PRISONERS DEAD SINCE APRIL? The two Buru figures show a discrepancy of five. The only possible explanation is that they died in the five months since the end of April, giving a mortality rate of one death a month. From contacts in Central Java, it is also learnt that one of the tapols who arrived in Surabaya on 24th September was critically ill. EX-TAPOLS FEAR ‘VOLUNTARY’ TRANSMIGRATION Extract from an article by Wiecher Hulst in Haagse Post, 21 July 1979. There are released political prisoners everywhere in Java; Many of them are unemployed, and it is also a question whether they are really free because their freedom of movement is restricted as a result of many limitations. There is also fear among them—fear of being re-arrested, and fear of being forced into ‘voluntary’ transmigration. I talked with an ex-political prisoner in a small town in East Java. He said: “There is no question of my being really free. If I want to go out of town, I must report to Koramil (Sub-district Military Command), both here as well as in the place where I go. Even if I could find employment in Jakarta, I would not be able to settle down there as I can only get a temporary resident permit. When I was released, I received an official letter which stated that I was ‘being released from provisional detention’, and so they can re- FORCED TO RE-REGISTER Reports are coming in of the compulsory re-registration of ex-tapols. They are being required to complete questionnaires, an example of which we reproduce (see box). We also reproduce the “‘secret”’ covering instruction sent out by the West Jakarta Kodim (District Military Command). The ex-tapols, including those released after serving sentences as well as the many thousands more who were never tried, are also required to submit five, and in some cases, ten recent passport photographs. This plus the travelling incurred has meant that in addition to the anxieties caused by the nature of the questions asked, the re-registration has been a financial burden especially for the vast number who have failed to find a job. One of our contacts reports that ex-tapols fear the link being made between their current livelihoods and the renewed emphasis on ‘‘transmigration’’. In East Java, where re-registration took place in April and May this year, the questionnaire included a question on “willingness to transmigrate”. (See also the extract from Wiecher Hulst’s article below) In West Jakarta, the re-registration took place in August, and all ex-tapols were required to appear in person at the district military command, even if they had already moved to another part of the country. In other parts of Jakarta, the ex-tapols were allowed to report to government offices in their neighbourhood, but were there confronted by a representative of the district military command, and required, in addition to completing the questionnaire, to answer such questions as: arrest me. “Recently, hundreds of ex-prisoners in this area were summoned by military intelligence in Surabaya. They were required to answer a questionnaire consisting of 78 questions. This was said to be a survey because no names were put on the questionnaires. But in my opinion, it is very simple to know who answered each questionnaire because everyone had to give their age, address and profession. I fear that these questionnaires are a first step towards forced transmigration because one of the questions asked was about whether the person had found work yet. “Tt is virtually impossible to find work. The government has said that non-involvement certificates are no longer necessary but this is nonsense. They are still required for so-called vital enterprises and for government service. And there are very many vital enterprises! They have so-called screening commissions consisting of military people to check up on whether a person’s political past is clean. So, just forget about finding work.” TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 —What things have you been doing in your kampung? How has the community received you back? What is the attitude towards you? —What are your views on the present situation? —What do you live on? —Are you willing to be transmigrated? Letter from 0503 (W. Jakarta) District Military Command Translation 1 Bearing in mind the importance of personal data for the needs of Census and in order to improve the existing administration of ex-G30S/PKI detainees. The person addressed above should immediately complete the accompanying form as a requirement and provide 10 (ten) recent passport photographs, 3 x4cms in size. These should be delivered in person to Kodim 0503, West Jakarta, not later than 31 August, 1979. 3 The above must be properly implemented. (The accompanying questionnaire consists of the following questions: ) Full name Date and place of birth Education Position in organisation prior to arrest Category* Employment prior to arrest Date of arrest Date of commencement of sentence served by ex-G30S/PKI napi (‘political convicts’) and length of sentence 9 Date of release 10 Employment since release 11 Present address 12 Names of members of family (wife and children) [Unreadable] Tapols returning home from Central Java September 1978 SAVANA JAYA: Rp11,600,00; THE COST OF FREEDOM Some of the tapol families now living at the Savana Jaya unit on Buru island are reportedly going to be allowed to leave for Java before the end of October. But they have had to pay heavily for this. According to reports just received, a group of about 500 ‘people from Savana Jaya were required to collect Rp 11,600,000 ($1.00 = Rp 615) as a condition for returning to Java. As they did not have anywhere near this amount of money, they were obliged to sell off virtually all their possessions—rice, animals, household goods and so on—at very low prices. This still left them about Rp 3,000,000 short, and they were compelled to turn to other tapols for help. It is totally unjust for KOPKAMTIB to have imposed such onerous terms on these families. No other tapols from Buru have been subjected to such conditions. The only possible explanation is that KOPKAMTIB was acting out of spite because these families refused to collaborate with government plans to ensure a ready-made work force for the transmigration project now being set up on Buru. Certainly, the effect has been to compel whole families to return to Java in a state of destitution, to face difficulties even more daunting than those confronted by tapols who return home to a wife and family or other relatives. It is disturbing to note too that the number of p- ‘sons expected to return from Savana Jaya is only five hundred. There are 207 tapols with families at the unit, and it is safe to assume that they would have on average two children each. The total population of the unit is probably nearly one thousand. See STOP PRESS on page 12 PRISON CONDITIONS WORSEN Reports have been received in the past-few months of a marked worsening of prison conditions where tapols are still being held. From Jakarta, it is reported that the shortage of food at Salemba Prison became so serious that two tapols asked for and were granted permission to request a special supply of rice from the Indonesian Council of Churches. The Council supplied two tons of rice. Tapols at Koblen Prison, Surabaya are also suffering food shortages because the recently-appointed commander, described as a ‘fanatical Moslem’ has introduced regulations for even stricter isolation than formerly. As a result, tapols’ families are not being permitted to supply food. From other sources we have heard that after the completion of releases this year, the Army plans to integrate all remaining tapols with criminal prisoners thus creating the impression that there are no more tapols. It is felt however that many tapols will still remain in the prisons, and not only A-category tapols awaiting trial. TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 === [PDF page 53] === CATHOLIC PRIEST CALLS FOR UN SANCTIONS ” About a third of the people I knew in Soiboda have died of hunger and exhaustion. The war itself caused few victims among the Timorese. This was stated by Father Leoneto Vieira do Rego, a Catholic priest who arrived in Lisbon earlier this year after spending three years with the people of East Timor resisting the Indonesian invasion. He had been in East Timor since’ 1950, and was teaching at a Seminary in Soiboda, a small town in the southem part of the country, when the Indonesian invasion was launched in December 1975. He is the first priest with direct experience of life in East Timor since the invasion to have spoken publicly, condemning Indonesia. Father do Rego told the Dutch newspaper Utrechts Nieuwsblad (20 August 1979) that the estimate that 15% of the population had died since the invasion was too low. The overall situation, he said, was far worse than in Soiboda where he himself knew of the high death toll of one third. Soiboda is situated in a fertile region where there has always been something to eat and where famine struck much later. In other regions, things were much worse, and people arrived at the camps looking like living skeletons. He said that things remained peaceful in Soiboda for the first six months after the invasion, but when Indonesian troops appeared, the whole town was evacuated. Conquests by Indonesian troops were only of geographical significance; the people were in the mountains protected by the Fretilin soldiers. Speaking about conditions in the mountains, he said that up to 1978, the people succeeded in preserving communal life, beyond the reach of the Indonesians. “There were hospitals, schools, markets, and enough food was grown.” But then, after 1977 when the Indonesians brought in more troops and military equipment, they tightened their encirclement, forcing the population onto the move. With food cultivation disrupted, famine quickly developed. ‘We manufactured anti-biotics and other tablets from local plants”, he said in an interview with Ost Timor Aktuell (No 13/14, August 1979) “using sago flour as the matrix’’. His own decision to leave the Fretilin-controlled areas was taken at the end of 1978 after his health deteriorated. In the end, people had to carry me and I became a burden. I am too old for such exertions... and asked for permission to surrender... so that I could return home to Portugal After surrendering, he spent 17 days in an Indonesian prison in Baucau where he saw Fretilin prisoners being badly treated. There was a great deal of torture and beating. “I think more people died in the Indonesian camps than as a result of the war. There was food only for the soldiers,” UN Sanctions Essential “The UN must impose sanctions against the Indonesian invasion”, Father Do Rego told Ost-Timor Aktuell, And in an interview with Jill Jolliffe (Guardian, London, 20 August 1979), he said that East Timor was under SEAST ‘TIMOR ... military occupation exactly as Europe was occupied by Nazi Germany... The East Timorese will never accept the occupation and I think the resistance will grow again. There is no area where Indonesian control is secure. 20,000 Tapols, Hundreds of Thousands in Camps According to recent information from East Timor, there are about 20,000 people now being held as political prisoners, while according to other information analysed by the Australian relief agency, ACFOA, hundreds of thousands of Timorese who were compelled to leave the mountain areas following saturation bombing by Indonesian forces have been herded into concentration camps. These are the camps to which Father do Rego refers in his interviews. For more information about these camps, please read TAPOL’s recent publication, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EAST TIMOR A report compiled by the Australian organisation, Action for World Development in September this year provides the following information: * The Indonesian Army now runs about forty prisons in East Timor. They include four prisons in Dili: the Military Police Prison, Vila Verde; the Intelligence Prison in Farol; the Army Prison in Colmera; and the Military Police Prison of Comarca, in Balide (the main gaol). There are three military prisons in each of the 12 administrative regions (Kabupaten): a military police prison, an Army prison and a PTP (?) prison. (Another source estimates that there are now about 20,000 political prisoners in East Timor.) A number of people are reported to have disappeared, included those who surrendered to the Indonesians under the Presidential Amnesty which expired on 31 December 1977. Details are available about persons who have been executed without trial. One entire family consisting of the parents and four children were executed because one of the daughters was the wife of the Fretilin leader, Rogerio Lobato. Anyone refusing to give up Portuguese nationality and accept Indonesian nationality is severely discriminated against. This includes: loss of work, imprisonment, the obligation to pay a residential tax and refusal of permission to travel. Civil servants in Dili who have been trying to leave East 4 TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 Timor with the help of the Red Cross were all due to be dismissed on 1st August. They fear very much for their lives. Said one person facing this predicament, in a letter dated 14th July 1979: The Indonesians do not look on us kindly. For a small thing you can be put in prison, if you don’t disappear altogether. Many people have already disappeared... AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: INDONESIA’S INVASION OF EAST TIMOR By Amold Kohen and John Taylor With a Foreword by Noam Chomsky 133 pages with pictures and maps. Chapters on: Decolonisation and Independence: Recolonisation and Resistance Indonesian Atrocities Complicity and Acquiescence The Right to Self-Determination Price: £1.75 plus postage (UK 25p; Europe 65p; overseas airmail £1.00; overseas seamail 20p) Order your copies NOW from: TAPOL, 8a Treport Street NON-BLOC CONFERENCE SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE The conference of non-aligned countries has once again upheld the right of the people of East Timor to exercise their right to self-determination. This was stated in the Final Declaration adopted in Havana in September this year. It declared too that East Timor was still under foreign domination The inclusion of East Timor in the Final Declaration represents a serious defeat for Indonesia which had lobbied hard since the time of the preparatory meeting of non-aligned foreign ministers in Colombo in June this year to Keep the question off the Conference agenda. Only seven of the 93 countries attending the Havana conference supported Indonesia. These included Indonesia’s closest allies, the four other countries of the ASEAN alliance: Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. After the decision had been adopted, Indonesia’s Vice- President Adam Malik left the Conference in protest. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja returned home to a barrage of criticism for what was seen as a major defeat for Indonesian diplomacy. Some politicians and newspapers used the incident to launch a more generalised “criticism on the “ineptitude” of Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs. But Adam Malik and Mochtar Kusumaatmaja took issue with their critics who, they claimed, knew nothing about the Conference procedures. The defeat, they alleged, had come about. because Cuba “played a dirty trick” by bringing up the question of East Timor quite unexpectedly even though it had been decided in Colombo to exclude it. (Tempo, 22 September, 1979.) More significantly, Tempo also quoted unnamed officials of the Foreign Department as claiming that their work was repeatedly being hampered because of ‘outside interference” from “another Department”. In what was clearly a reference to the Defence Department which is still in full control of the areas of East Timor now occupied by Indonesia, Tempo quoted one Foreign Department official as saying: The Department of Foreign Affairs would actually like to see East Timor opened up more so that the world can see the meaning of integration. But another department considers that the time has not yet come for this. This has been the card played by countries that do not like Indonesia. The row reflects the embarrassment caused to Indonesian representatives abroad by the inability of Indonesia’s security forces to allow foreign observers into East Timor even though they have repeatedly claimed that security has been “‘fully restored’. The revelation made in Tempo only confirms the many reports still being received that there is widespread resistance to Indonesia’s attempt to annex East Timor. deme nae 1,500 TAPOLS IN WEST IRIAN According to Irianese sources, there are as many as 1,500 political prisoners now being held in West Irian for allegedly supporting the Papuan independence movement, the OPM. Most of them are held in prisons in Jayapura and Biak. They include Gerrit Wayoi who, until his arrest in June this year, held a leading position in the OPM together with Jacob Prai, the OPM leader who sought sanctuary earlier this year in Papua New Guinea and has now been granted political asylum in Sweden. Wayoi is known to have been severely tortured during interrogation and it is feared that he died as a result of his injuries. Several others whose names have been received were arrested with Wayoi, whilst another three, also named, were arrested in 1976 after the appearance of a document known as the ‘Serui Declaration’. Most tapols in West Irian are subjected to torture. Some are known to have been shot before firing squads or have disappeared without trace. TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 === [PDF page 54] === SIRIA (North Tapanuli) North Sumatra Seventeen women were arrested and tortured by soldiers after demanding the release of two of their menfolk who had been arrested in connection with a movement to resist attempts by the local Forestry Department to take over their land. In statements to the press after their release, the men * and the women described how they had been beaten, kicked, slapped and subjected to electric torture in an attempt to force them to give up their land. One of the women who was four months pregnant had a miscarriage after falling on her backside several times as the chair on which she was ordered to sit was suddenly removed from under her. The men were tortured by immersion in water and other cruelties. The incident arose out of a conflict going back several years when the Forestry Department ordered the peasants to give up land used for the cultivation of coffee, for the purpose of ‘reclamation’ by means of re-forestation. The peasants cefused because their livelihoods would be severely affected and because, they argued, there was plenty of wasteland, overgrown with alang-alang, suitable for reclamation whereas there was no need to reclaim land that was being used productively. In an attempt to press their case, the peasants accepted the offer of a lawyer to act on their behalf, and raised Jamedan Siregar, one of the two brothers arrested in Siria-ria. 7 ny A eae a between them more than a million rupiahs for his fee. But far from protecting their interests, the lawyer concluded a deal which involved the complete surrender of their land. Continued on page 9 The past few months have seen a sharp increase in the number of land disputes, involving in some cases thousands of peasants. We describe below two of the more serious incidents widely reported in the Indonesian press. Some commentators believe that the conflicts have existed for many years; the difference now is that people are becoming more determined to defend their rights. Others, while not necessarily disagreeing with this, point out that there is renewed pressure from state-owned plantations to increase their output of cash crops by controlling more land, particuarly since the 50% devaluation last November which sharply raised profits accruing to enterprises producing goods for export. Some commentators have also pointed out that the spontaneous forms which peasant protest now take is the result of the elimination of political activity in. the villages which has deprived the peasants of the organisational means to protect their interests. Moreover, in 1966, shortly after the Army took over, a law introduced under Sukarno providing for the democratic election of lurah (village heads) was removed from the statute book by ministerial decision. As a result village government is now totally autocratic, further intensifying feelings of unrest in the countryside. Finally, some commentators have made the point that Major-General Witarmin’s charge that peasant protests have been engineered by the PKI has only added to the complexity of the problem. (See box.) “Tt is a general phenomenon these days that people everywhere are afraid of officials, just as journalists are afraid to write and I am afraid to speak too loudly.” Usep Ranuwijaya, Member of Parliament for the PDI (nationalist party), in Sinar Harapan, 30 July 1979. cc RRO OO OR Oe there is clearly collaboration between political party elements to utilise this case for their political interests. Besides this, we must be vigilant of the role of G30S/PKI elements who are also utilising this case in the interests of their strategy of struggle. The role of G30S/PKI elements is clear because an ex- BTI* member, who is required to report regularly, was active in this incident. One of the persons mobilising the masses was also an ex-BTI/PKI person, and the region where it occurred was indeed a BTI/PKI stronghold in former days. The kind of mass action employed is clearly similar to that employed by the PKI during the Old Order.” Major-General Witarmin, Commander of the East Java Military Command, in Kompas, 4 August 1979. (It was Major-General Witarmin who mobilised troops to quell the peasants on 25 July.) Fe RI RIO FOI RII FO Ab kk kk “Officials should not draw hasty conclusions that people’s unrest over land is being engineered by ex- BTI/PKI members before thorough investigations have been made. And, as far as possible, people’s representatives, including members of Parliament and the Regional People’s Assemblies should be involved in this. “If a verdict is passed that ex-PKI members are responsible, this can be harmful in two ways. (1) By making people whose land rights have been abused BUDIMAN S. HARTOYO Major-General Witarmin, who blamed the PKI and called out the ; troops. cult for former PKI detainees who have recently been released to restore themselves quickly into society. As a result of such allegations, society will certainly be afraid to receive them back properly.” Abdul Rachman Saleh, Public Relations Officer of the Legal Aid Bureau, in Kompas, 7 August 1979. CRP Peace eee ee ee ee ee os “Tt is necessary for us to be somewhat cautious when discussing the Jenggawah incident, especially following the official statement made by the Brawijaya (East Java) Military Command to the effect that BTI elements were invulved. With this, we are, as it were, placed before a formidable and impregnable wall.” Kompas, 8 August 1979. *BTI: Barisan Tani Indonesia, the nine-million strong peasants union banned together with the Communist Party and many other mass organisations after the military came to power. PEASANTS ARRESTERAAND TORTURED 00 tomer. coxso0 At least 35 peasants were drrested when six platoons of armed troops were used to quell a demonstration by thousands of peasants in the East Java sub-district of Jenggawah. Many more fled their homes to avoid arrest and brutalities; some remained in hiding for weeks. The demonstration occurred on 25 July in an attempt to prevent the police from entering their region to arrest two peasants. A month earlier, the peasants had halted efforts by State Tobacco Plantation No 27 to plough up their crops. Tractors had been brought in for this purpose on two occasions, once on 2 June at the village of Cangkring-Baru and then on 4 June at the village of Klontogan, both in Jenggawah. Feelings of anger intensified soon afterwards when two peasants were arrested and subjected to torture. This led to a demonstration demanding the release of the two men, the restoration of 3,500 hectares of land to the peasants and the dismissal of the village chief. The land in question had originally been concession land handed over to the plantation (then foreign-owned) but never cultivated by it. Early this century, plantation workers began to reclaim the land with the consent of the concessionaires and eventually came to treat it, with official approval, as their own. Labour ties with the plantation were eventually severed though the peasants were required to grow one crop of tobacco—which takes five months—every two years for sale to the plantation. For the rest of the time, they grew food crops for themselves, mainly rice. In 1971, the plantation, now state-owned, began moves to ‘regularise’ the land’s use in their own interest by limiting the tillers’ rights to it to five years and requiring them to supply, free, a ton of paddy every year. This was said to be a contribution towards development projects though the peasants saw no evidence of any development. Then in 1975, the peasants were ordered to double tobacco production by growing a crop every year. Moreover, only part of the price due was actually paid, the rest going to ‘development’. As resistance to these onerous terms grew, Plantation No 27 decided to settle the problem once and for all by carrying out, with official approval, a re-distribution of the 3,500 hectares of land in question. The amount of land tilled by the peasants would be drastically cut and the rest given over to plantation personnel and local government officials. As the peasants sought to reverse this arbitrary decision, clashes broke out between the original tillers and those newly granted rights to the land. When the former sought to defend their land, arrests were made, leading to renewed protests and clashes with troops sent to make the arrests. Kompas (8 August 1979) points out that tobacco from East Java sold at the Bremen (West Germany) auctions last year raised 32 million German marks. Eighty percent of this tobacco came from Jenggawah. (Sources: Tempo, 11 August and 18 August 1979; Kompas, 8 August 1979. TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 === [PDF page 55] === RAILWAYMEN’S LEADER ON TRIAL. Supardi, the chairman of the Railwaymen’s Union, SBKA, has been brought for trial at the Jakarta North/East District Court. The trial commenced in June this year. Supardi is being defended by a lawyer designated by the Legal Aid Bureau, LBH, who apparently was not present at the opening session of the trial (presumably because he had, not yet been appointed) because at the second hearing, the lawyer asked that the prosecutor’s Indictment be re-read, and then requested a two-week postpone to study the documents of the case. Supardi is being tried under the notorious Anti-Subversion Act of 1963 for activitiés prior to the 1965 events, as well as for continuing with political action after his union had been banned in 1965. One of the charges regarding the pre-1965 activities relates to a meeting of the Central Council of the All-Indonesian Trade Union Federation, SOBSI, which he attended some time in August or September 1965 at which “decisions were taken relating to the tense political situation in the country”’. VISIT TO SUKARNO’S TOMB CALLED OFF A Commemorative visit to the tomb of the late President Sukarno had to be called off at the last minute. When the group of 25 leading political figures and retired Army officers arrived at the recently-opened monument they were startled to see a notice announcing that it was closed to the public “for cleaning”. Yet, one of the members of the group told Tempo later (Tempo, 14 July 1979), “that same morning it was still open”. When another member tried to contact the Mayor of Blitar to obtain access to the tomb, he was told that the Mayor was “‘not available’’, General Sugih Arto, formerly Attorney-General, a member of the frustrated group, said: “Such methods leave me speechless’’. The date chosen for the visit, 5 July 1979, marked the twentieth anniversary of President Sukarno’s Decree restoring the 1945 Constitution. The visiting group had intended to hold an open forum at the tomb with a discussion on the question of promoting the aspirations of Indonesia’s first President. A charter drafted the previous evening was also to have been made public but the decision to close the tomb “‘for cleaning” meant that these plans had to be abandoned. Another person connected with the group, Dr Yusuf Ismail, said that the planned visit was ‘“an expression of feelings of unrest”. These feelings exist in ‘elitist’ circles, he said, because of the lack of freedom to express opinions. Tempo points out that although the 5 July 1959 Decree is of such historic importance, no other commemorations were planned anywhere in Indonesia. (Editor’s Note: The 1945 Constitution re-instated by Sukarno grants extensive powers to the Head of State, and has served the military well since Suharto came to power. Indeed, as Tempo points out, the idea of re-instating this Constitution originated with an official proposal to Sukarno made in August 1958 by the then Army Chief-of-Staff.) “STUDENTS ON TRIAL THE VERDICT SO FAR Heri Akhmadi: Chairman of the Students’ Union 4 Bandung Institute of Technology. Two years Maqdir Ismail: Student leader at the Islamic University, Jogjakarta. Two years Harun al Rasyid: Chairman of the Students’ Union of the Surabaya Institute of Technology. Two years Mohammad Sholeh: General Secretary of the Students’ Union of the Surabaya Institute of Technology. Eighteen months Ismail Ghozali: General Secretary of the Students’ Union of the Institute of Pedagogy, Malang. Shortly after being sentenced, Ghozali was killed in a road accident. Fifteen months Lala Mustafa: Chairman of the Students’ Union of the Islamic University, Bandung. Fifteen months Iskandar Chotib: Chairman of the Students’ Union of Pajajaran University, Bandung. One year A. Tarsono: Chairman of the Students’ Union of the Nusantara Islamic University, Bandung. Eleven months Drs A. R. Noor: Chairman of the Students’ Union of the Institute of Pedagogy, Bandung (1975-77). Eleven months Rosmel Djalil: A Jakarta student. Indra Tjahaya Kadi: A Jakarta student. Nine months Eight months Yoilas Rofli: Deputy-Chairman of the Student Council of Sriwijaya University, Palembang. Acquitted ITS NICE TO BE INFORMATION OFFICER “Information Minister Lt.-Gen. Ali Murtopo made the resounding statement to the local press that the inflation rate was now a ‘state secret’. One day later Minister of Trade and Cooperatives Radius Prawiro calmed the initial outcry against Murtopo’s gaff and put the January to August rise in the cost of living index at 19.3%.” (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 5, 1979, p. 89). ANNOUNCEMENT TO SUBSCRIBERS The next issue of TAPOL Bulletin will appear in January 1980, not December 1979. In future, TAPOL Bulletin will appear in the months of January, March, May, July, September and November. The change is being made to avoid publication in the months of August and December when holidays interfere with printing and other processes. TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 STUDENT JOURNALS BANNED e Rector of Gaja Mada University, Jogjakarta, has banned Gelora Mahasiswa, a fortnightly journal published by the Students’ Council. He took this decision after objecting strongly to a report carried in the journal about a heated debate between the Rector and the student leaders on thequestion of conforming with the governmentimposed ‘Normalisation’ of Campus Life. The students continue to resist ‘normalisation’. The Rector, Professor Sukadji Ranuwihardjo, was quoted in another paper as saying that Gelora had behaved in an ‘irresponsible’ manner. The paper’s editor Slamet Riyadi, retorted that Gelora “is an opposition newspaper, in particular regarding everything dishonest.” Another student paper not able to appear is Derap Another student paper not able to appear is Derap Mahasiswa, the journal of the Jogjakarta Institute of Pedagogy. The ban was imposed two years ago and has still not been lifted. (Tempo, 13 October, 1979.) Meanwhile in Bandung, 445 copies of Integritas, the joumal published by students of the Bandung Institute of Technology, were confiscated by the Bandung Public Prose- HASAN SYUKUR Heri Akhmadi, Chairman of the Students’ Council of the Bandung Institute of Technology, at a court hearing. <utor’s Office. The copies were part of the May 1979 issue, a special edition of the paper devoted to reports about the student trials. (Merdeka, 26 May 1979.) Continued from page 6 After attempts to contact the lawyer failed, the peasants had to resort to physical measures to keep forestry officials »off their land while they sought to have the deal revoked. Then two brothers from the village were arrested and accused of raising funds illegally to pay the lawyer. This was pure fabrication as the money had been raised collectively from voluntary contributions. Angered by the arrests, more than 200 women marched several miles to the military unit where the men had been taken, only to find they had been removed. After several fruitless attempts to locate the men, the women turned their wrath on the military office, destroying papers and furniture. When shots were fired into the air, they attacked the soldiers and seized a weapon. A few days later, after the women had returned home, soldiers came to arrest them and took them to a military post where they were tortured and maltreated. (Sources: Tempo, 11 and 18 August 1979; Merdeka, 11 August 1979.) (Tempo 22.9.79) TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 === [PDF page 56] === LEGAL COSMETIC SURGERY A long report in Tempo (8 September 1979) on the current debate among Indonesian lawyers about procedural law, reveals not only that the present Code discriminates in favour of the rich but also that its implementation is arbitrary. The debate, centres around a proposed new bill aimed at replacing the Code, known as the HIR (the Herzien Inlandsch Reglement). The HIR has been in force with only minor changes for the last 130 years. It is now 12 years since the military government first promised to introduce a new Code. Further delay would now appear to be no longer tenable because of mounting concern among lawyers about abuses in legal procedures. An attempt by the government last year to silence critics by placing the responsibility of regulating treatment of detainees on KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) only aroused more protest (see TAPOL Bulletins 31 and 32). Both President Suharto and Attorney-General Ali Said said recently that a new Code was ‘imminent’; according to Ali Said, it would come ‘after Lebaran’ (the end of Ramadhan) which fell this year in August. Increasingly lawyers are criticisng the HIR as ‘colonial’ and out of keeping with present-day conditions. But hardly any, in their public statements at least, have pointed out that even its vaguely-worded safeguards have been completely ignored in the case of the hundreds of thousands of tapols, held for many years without trial. This omission highlights the degree to which the military goverment has succeeded in forcing society to accept the guilt of the Communist Party and its sympathisers in the 1965 ‘coup’, even though this was done by means of show-trials in which the HIR was flagrantly violated. Lawyers, like everyone else, fear the consequences for their reform movement if they were to incorporate the injustices perpetrated against G30S tapols in their arguments in favour of change. The most trenchant criticisms by lawyers have been confined to general complaints about several aspects of procedure: Detention Preventative detention or detention for interrogation purposes is a common practice. Both police and prosecutors’ offices are able to order prolonged detention for purposes of ‘investigation’. In most cases the suspect is not informed what cfime (s)he is supposed to have committed, and families are usually denied access to those detained on suspicion. Legal Assistance Suspects have no legally defined right to demand the presence of a lawyer during interrogation before the trial, nor is the right of private consultation with a lawyer stipulated by law. Active Participation of the Judge The HIR allows for the active participation of the judge in examining the accused and witnesses. Tempo comments that for the defence lawyer “the real opponent is not the prosecutor but the judge—who controls the rules of the game”’. Such intervention played a significant part in the trials which followed the ‘coup’. In many cases the defendant was bullied and wearied by relentless questioning but it was made clear that an ‘uncooperative’ attitude would be penalised. More importantly such intervention is very significant, especially in political trials, as the judge as a state employee can hardly be impartial. The Order of Questioning in Court Although the HIR stipulates that the accused must be examined only after all the witnesses have appeared, in reality the accused is usually questioned first. This abuse has been widely and consistently protested by defence lawyers, but is upheld by judges on the grounds of ‘custom’ plus the argument that according to Emergency Law 1/1951 the HIR (procedural Code) is anyhow only a ‘guide’ to procedure. This explanation demonstrates the ease with which law may be cast aside when convenient. Compensation There is no provision for compensation claims following wrongful arrest and detention. This is perhaps hardly surprising in view of the fact that after the ‘coup’ some 600,000 people were unlawfully arrested on suspicion of ‘involvement’. This potential source of compensation claims alone suggests that the government is unlikely to contemplate such a reform. Continued from page 1 government that was so recently wringing its hands over the fate of Vietnam’s boat people? The reasons are not hard to find. Indonesia under military rule means good business for the multinationals with many attractive conditions to offer, including a cheap labour force denied the right to strike and deprived of democratic trade unions to defend its rights. Its Armed Forces, stung by its inability to win a quick victory over East Timor with a population of less than a million, is now undergoing massive modernisation which has already brought an order to British Aerospace of eight Hawk ground-attack aircraft, with the prospect of more orders to come. A State Visit is just the way to get these orders for weapons and to secure deals for business whilst helping boost the morale of a regime that is facing more and more unrest at home. We call upon our readers to protest against this visit in the strongest possible terms—to the Government, to Members of Parliament and to the press. 10 TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 From the letters column, 6" Harapan, 29 May 1979. ON-INVOLVEMENT CERTIFICATES FOR SCHOOL LEAVERS Seing the large number of people who have just left secondary school who still go to the police to apply for certificates of non-involvement in the G30S/PKI, many questions are being asked in society about whether these non-involvement certificates are still required for people wanting to continue with their education or to apply for jobs. The G30S/PKI event occurred in 1965, fourteen years ago. School pupils who completed their education this year were only five years old fourteen years ago, that is to say, they were too young to understand anything. I call upon the government or the competent authorities to make a clear statement on whether or not non-involvement certificates are required to continue schooling or to apply for jobs. This is (necessary) because money is collected by the police for the administrative costs of issuing noninvolvement certificates and it takes at least two days to obtain such a certificate. I express thanks to the authorities for their attention. Suryatmono, BC, HK East Jakarta. T SUTANTO kAW SEMINAR BANNED A training seminar for law students convened by the Legal Aid Bureau (LBH) in May had to be called off at the last minute because the Jakarta Police suddenly withdrew permission (Kompas, 22 May 1979). The permit had been granted in April, and the LBH had requested participants to bring a letter from their faculty deans for purposes of identification. But just two days before the Seminar was due to begin, when thirty participants had already arrived in Jakarta from all parts of Java and Bali, the police announced that the seminar could not be held unless those attending had letters of approval from their university rectors. This was out of the question, said LBH chairman, Adnan Buyung Nasution. Participants had come as individuals, not as representatives of their universities. ‘““And anyhow, we were told at very short notice, only two days in advance.” The Seminar was originally to have been held in Jogjakarta, but the regional police refused permission for it to be held there or anywhere else in Central Java. Buyung said the Seminar was part of LBH’s programme to encourage law students to take up work which would protect the interests of ordinary people. ‘‘They should not think only of working for big business but should also pay attention to the fate of people without means.” Listrik masuk desa, koran masuk desa, T.V. masuk desa Yang masih ditunggu: Uang masuk desa, keuntungan masuk desa dan keadilan masuk desa Electricity comes to the village, newspapers come to the village, TV comes to the village.... Still awaited: Money coming to the village, profits coming to the village, justice coming to the village. (Tempo 15 September 19 79) TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979 1] === [PDF page 57] === DEFENCE PLEA BAN ANGERS LAWYERS © A decision taken by the Attorney-General on 14 July to ban a book containing the defence plea of Her Akhmadi has been strongly condemned by lawyers in Jakarta. The book, bearing the same title as the defence plea, “Smash the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People”, was jointly published by the Legal Aid Bureau and the. Students’ Union of the Bandung Institute of Technology. Adnan Buyung Nasution who heads the Co-ordination Team for Student Defence said that the ban is a violation of basic juridical principles and a threat to the standing of the courts. It is, he said, “unprecedented in Indonesian legal history. No state based on law has ever made it impossible for a defence plea to be read by the general public.” Asked why the plea had been published in the form of a book, Mr Nasution said there had been a pressing need to do this as newpapers were not able to give adequate coverage partly because of lack of space but partly also because of a “system of making phone-calls” (by censorship officials, Ed) to prohibit the dissemination of certain news. The lawyers defending Heri Akhmadi sought a ruling from the court about the ban but after a delay of several days, the court refused to make a ruling as it considered that the question did not fall within its jurisdiction. (Kompas, 25 July 1979.) Haryono Tjitrosubono, a member of the Student Defence Co-ordinating Team said that the ban was improper because the contents of the books were identical with the words read out in court by the defendant. Even the cartoons—which the Attorney-General apparently used as grounds for the ban—were included in the plea document presented to court. Moreover, the cartoons were nothing more than a reflection of the points made in the plea. Yap Thiam Hien, another member of the Team, said that the ban was related to the question of the freedom of speech and the freedom to write. It shows how afraid the government is of criticism, and it could only intensify the feelings of unrest in society. If such actions were continued, this unrest could eventually explode, he said. Speaking before the court’s decision refusing to make a ruling, Mr Yap said that if the court failed to act, the Defence Team would take the Attorney-General to court over the ban. (Source: Sinar Harapan, 18 July 1979.) A te-print of the Defence Plea is available from the Dutch-Indonesia Committe, Minahasastr. 1, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. TAPOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian political prisoners and is a humanitarian organisation. It is not associated with any political groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is supported by individuals and organisations of many shades of opinion. SACKED FOR FORMING A UNION An employee of the American Club in Kebayoran, Jakart Mr Sovietno Yono Atmojo was sacked in contravention o labour regulations because he took the initiative to set up a branch of the Union of Trading, Banking and Insurance Companies at the Club. In response to this dismissal, 40 other employees, comprising about 65% of the work force, called a lightning one-day strike. The American Club is open exclusively to US businessmen in Indonesia. (Kompas, 14 May 1979.) STOP PRESS In a letter to the Far Eastern Economic Review (19 October 1979), Jusuf Wanandi of the Centre for Strategic Studies states that 115 of the 208 (not 207) ‘ex-tapols’ at the Savana Jaya unit returned to Java at the end of September and that another 93 ‘ex-tapols’ have opted to resettle in Savana Jaya, bringing the total number now there to 186. The 115 ex-tapols are presumably part of the group of 500 persons referred to in our main item about Savana Jaya on page 3. Jusuf Wanandi did not of course mention that these families had been required to pay Rp 11,600,000 to secure their freedom. But he does make the preposterous claim that the ex-tapols “who had made use of the option to resettle at Savana Jaya with their families... (had) in fact gone home earlier and subsequently returned with their families”. How can he possibly fabricate such nonsense when everyone knows that the wives and children who are or were at Savana Jaya went to Buru years ago to join their husbands at a time when there was no question about their ever being released or allowed to return to Java. etn | SUBSCRIPTIONS One year’s subscription (6 issues): UK and Europe: £4.50 To all subscribers outside the UK: Please make payments by a cheque drawn on a London bank, by mail payment order or by National Giro transfer. In case of cheques drawn on foreign banks, bank charges amounting to about £1.50 are deducted from the value of the cheque and represent a serious loss on the small denomination cheques received by TAPOL. If you cannot make payment by methods suggested above, please add the equivalent of £1.50 to the value of your cheque. Thank you. Please address all correspondence and enquiries to: TAPOL 8a Treport Street London SW18 2BP, UK TAPOL Bulletin No 36 October 1979