Indonesia: Internal Political Situation, Attempted Coup against Sukarno [3] (FO 371/180312, 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === [Cover/decorative page: brown archival file folder cover (TNA) with file number, red label and green "CLOSED UNTIL" release sticker; no further text] === [PDF page 2] === where Appropriate) Bo SECRET SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEP: | ae ee Per Aer |. 965 | neoea [DA /oefea FROM ba vi Gleb | SN he 5 fatblast ae ee. alae oa Ls Ss Ss | ied a tn. E-H. Peek Sens Pi sss ten A over s ae | Ewroun ok Sock armo. (1012/5) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded Dated E chr a 2 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received [Janek 4 (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) 180312 (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) ny ee ee === [PDF page 3] === bulk, BRITISH EMBASSY, DJAKARTA. Fabruary 23, 1965. BS Ted, DH ois 42. | You may like to have a quick round up of the standing of the various senior Ministers and Generals who surround Soekarno. The enclosed notes are based on personal observation and also on discussions with one or two of my diplomatic colleagues. 2. I am sending copies to Lord Head, Alec Adams Tony Rundall, John Addis and Michael Stewart. 7 tees ee Vontomns fitentt ~ (A. G. Gilchrist) Foreign Ofrice, London, S.W. ae === [PDF page 4] === (1012/65) Subandrio: Riding high; as deferential as ever to Soekarmno, put increasingly masterful and confident where other people are concerned. If Soekarno goes off to Vienna, Subandrio is certain to be left in charge. CGhairul Saleh: He is being fondled and caressed by Soekamo in public (his wife also) and has recovered some of his normal arrogance and forcefulness of manner. But his behaviour when under pressure was not creditable; he fawned, and made obedient -speeches against the British, the Americans, the United Nations, even against the Murba. He talks readily to foreigners of rebuilding the right wing put his shakiness and confusion under fire may have weakened his position too much for him to regain undisputed leadership. Adam Malik: A stronger character than I had previously realised. Has behaved well in adversity, no speeches. The Communists appear to realise that he is tougher than Chairul Saleh and have been directing their fire on him. His economic base, on which power must ultimately depend, has been seriously weakened in two ways; by the arrest of Gutwirth and Cijfer and consequent effects on his family trading connexions; and by the removal by Subandrio of control over the foreign aspects of the Trade Ministry (this is where the dollars in Switzerland come from on which any leader here must depend - unless he can substitute bayonets, or Peking). Soekarno having cut him down to size is being very nice to him personally in public - for the time being. Nasution: Somewhat withdrawn, praying with customary assiduity. Often quite ignored by Soekarno in public, likewise by Subandrio. Maintains his reputation as an honest man and a trustworthy figure. Speaks freely one. Aidit when people visit him, and displays a calm, slightly bovine, assurance that Indonesia will not go: Coumunist while he is around. To all appearances, he still believes genuinely in confrontation. Yani: Doing nicely. ‘Soekarno sees a lot of him. After IT had talked to him at Lebaran about Aidit and what Aidit had said to me (I didn't put this in my re ort), he walked over to Soekarno, drew him aside and sat down with him - a considerable exhibition of familiarity and confidence. Does not love Subandrio but can work with him. Carries | out konfrontasi but is often cynical about it when in strict privacy. Behaves very agreeably to me personally. ore of a realist than Nasution; perhaps he could take over and hold the country together. /Aidit: === [PDF page 5] === and even sometimes to his friends. soekarno Il would say from personal observation does not appreciate his company; he treats him with distinction in public rather then with the badinage and familiarity accorded to Chairul Saleh, Omar Dhani, Sumarno and scores of others. Aidit gives the impression of being a commander-in-chief rather than an organiser, taking broad views and leaving matters of organisation and detail to_Lukman. He drinks more on occasion than any Indonesian I know, with the possible exception of Mme Subandrio; no doubt he learnt it in Moscow. I may be wrong about his being a drug addict, but he has very odd eyes and a strange wild look. Il would say a very ruthless man, not afraid of bloodshed. Aidit: Arrogant, bitter and domineering to his enemies === [PDF page 6] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT os ato FROM Ye Cambedge 1k LAMEROGE Fomnera ) f CR te fs L beds Shaieamn Some AY No. VUMO 10/4. / és [Unreadable] ~- 3 MAR 1965 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) CRomeser oka Seg. e — fk, Het, (a ls please be coped h 3 .; e. ke A, Kom pry ie hee. We 8 =annaS in a te ah het Se ee | (obey Lore (Printing Instructions) Mane Cop, be Hay Su (Referred to Legal Adviser) ‘oulen (Action j completed) | (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 7] === BRIT DJ AKARTA, 3 March, 1965 Dutoisfus The latest body to come “under fire from the communists here is the Indonesian Catholic Party. With the suppression of Murba, this is just about the most moderate and levelheaded political party left in the field. Frans Seda, the Minister for Estates, is a prominent member. + ener 2s The attack so far seems,on the surface, to be no more than sniping shots from the Left Wing members, but this is how these things start. Thus, for example, Bpintang Timur, the Partindo newspaper, had an item in its gossip column enquiring when the Catholic Party, “as a supporter of the: B.P.S.", was to be dissolved. 36 But the Catholics are fighting back. They issued a statement the other day which issued a warning against "attempts of prevarication, intimidation and pressure directed at religious groups and their leaders"; and it added that “such acts would hamper the creation of a pr ogressive— evolutionary unity". The statement also “welcomed efforts now being undertaken by friendly countries to seek a peaceful solution to the Malaysia issue, this development being a proof of the success of Dwikora"; and “expressed the conviction that as soon as adequate guarantees have been given for implementing the Vietnamese people' right of self-determination, the entire issue could be Solved justly". Finally, the statement came out strongly in support of the forthcoming Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, convinced that this would "contribute positively towards continuing the struggle against Necolim and the development of a God-believing world". ue None of this is robustly anti-communist certainly. But, mixed in with all the current Shibboleths (Necolin, etc.) there is a hint of independence and non-conforming here, quite a rarity these days. 5. I am copying this to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Washington. (MW had D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, GoW vis CONFI DENTIAL === [PDF page 8] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT | CONFIDEN: iAl [Unreadable] ism FS wed ie 1LJOU INDONESIA D H 10/5 bel FROM Me.5.1 4, Cambude SUBIECT: fe i f D wb it pe ae lL, Eslalis. Sukaias as Are g Auatih 5 sai} Sidi ik the: PAE No. (/4ba Dated {7 Aan 3 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: eceive Tar th oe 7 DH 1013/5 (Outward Action) DH / 02 Llp 5/16 Oeiorn GxKirorik Pe ees Gl eitiae MINUTES Qa stan fhe inticlen are Wor Ost Stes wil try bo oper bilatirar 12.0 of a.Cons Ahot th. 6taus 1 A elas as Provided fer is: pana - b They wertol do | the Cona repent”. pout. beter fe oman Wot” de [pete (Printing Instructions): Cor. has Cale p Ace. (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action i completed) | (Main Indexed) A oS b” === [PDF page 9] === ya > ths BRITISH EMBASSY, DHi01 5/4 saiisieidialipesibtasiiteniedadmmd 3 March, 1965 DJAKARTA, CONFI DEN TIAL Ne V\ eek, My letter, 1451/65 of 26 February, hazarded a guess that the Indonesian regime would not go quite so far.as to take over American rubber estates. I was proved spectacularly wrong before the day was over; our telegram No. 452. I should like to believe that this misjudgement is in itself an indication of how very far Sukarno is now allowing himself to be directed by Subandrio and the PKI. Be that as it may, I shall now nurse my wounded confidence for a while and stick to facts. Ze First, some documentation. I attach to this letter an extract from Antara which gives you the main points of the Government decision to implement the takeover, Second, I am sending you an extract from the editorial in Harian Rak jat, the PKI newspaper, of Fe ruary 27. Observe its arrogance: the PKI are riding high. 36 For a spot of local colour, here is a paragraph from a letter I have had from Edye, who is acting as Consul in Medan: “The American Consul, who was invited to meet the Ministers at the airport, came in for a little rough treatment on his way home, when stones were thrown at his car, smashing the rear window and the bodywork was kicked and knocked about. The Norwegian Honorary Consul also suffered similar treatment. It is thought perhaps his flaQ@ was mistaken for ours. I received no invitation to be presént." ue Edye also reports that Frans Seda told the Americans that he could not guarantee their safety on the estates unless the plantations were taken over. This little item of news has not been publicly reported. Other information which we have all oes to suggest that Seda's statement is Rubbish. lokaginta le think it was him - or may be other military commanders in the area), told the American Consul shortly before the events of last Friday that if the PKI tried to make trouble on the estates they would not get very far: the amy had matters completely under control. 5 One story which has been going the rounds in the past few days is that Subandrio went to Medan with no clear determination to move ahead with the takeover action: and it was only after he had reported back to Sukarno that the situation there was “untenable” that Sukarno agreed to the takeover. We can give little credit to this. It seems pretty clear that the whole thing had been agreed before Subandrio left for Medan, and we must assume that Sukarno's approval had been given. The only uncertainty is how reluctant that approval was. If, further evidence is needed to show that the whole move was carefully / thought D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. CONFI DENTI AL === [PDF page 10] === thought out beforehand, I think we have only to look at the considered drafting of the takeover decree, 6. The moral of all this - which we have already drawn in telegrams - is that Subandrio now seems able to set the pace exactly as he wishes and any restraints that Sukarno might once have been able to impose are no longer there. The question now is what item on the PKI's list of ob jectives will Subandrio engage in next - wrecking the summit? Taking over the oil companies? Having a final showdown with Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh? Te Meanwhile, Subandrio is unflagging in his efforts to make communism wholly respectable. One of the first things he did after returning from his victories in Medan was to make a speech to some police officers in Djakarta. He said that communism was very much a part of Indonesia's national identity. There had been a time when the KOM element of NAS@ABOM had been somewhat set aside since it was considered to be “imported”, something foreign. "But now,’ said Subandrio,"we have come to realise that the KOM element is not a monopoly of Aidit, but is the possession of the whole Indonesian people just as is the case with the nationalist and religious elements of NASS@RKOM elements. This Nasg@sedOnhnity is part of our national identity. It is unique and not to be found anywhere else in the world", 8. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Washington. <i, Nu, (S.J.G. Cambridge ASS tv Pn, 4 ce Lycdty aes. Ay 8 eH === [PDF page 11] === Extracted from Harian Rakjat of February 27, 1965 It is not only now that we are standing up to you U.S. and British imperialists. Wechave been winning the August 1945 revolution and we Indonesians have given you U.S. and British imperialists a sound thrashing. Now, it depends upon you gentlemen, whether you retreat and leave us alone to take care of our own independence, or whether we compel you to retreat. You gentlemen must know that you can no longer hope for your capital to be returned to you. You retreat; or we will force you to retreat and then you will lose everything. You may count the days till you kneel down before people who are engaged in their revolution. We express our highest appreciation to the North Sumatra labourers. The North Sumatra labourers must know that all patriotic forces support them. === [PDF page 12] === from "Antara" of 27 February, 1965 Jakarta, Feb. 27. The Presidium of the Indonesian "Dwikora" Cabinet made a decision here Friday placing all American-owned plantations in the country under the Indonesian Government's control without however diminishing the ownership of the American entrepreneur's. The decision was taken in consideration of the rising intensity of the Indonesian Revolution and in view of the Indonesian people's determination to realise the principle of standing on their own feet with due attention on the production, operation and the ownership of the U.S. entrepreneurs. The decision which was signed by First Deputy Premier/ Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio dated February 26 contains among other things the following points: Ds To place United States plantations in the country under the control of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, without diminishing the owmership of the American entrepreneurs in question. In the implementation of the management of said U.S. plantations the Indonesian Government is responsible for the smooth operation of the enterprises. To execute the task the Indonesian Government will appoint new manager/leadership of Indonesiam nationality assisted by a Supervisory Board of the Enterprises which will be responsible to Government. The owners of the enterprises are obligated to offer their assistance needed by the Government in the interest of production and smooth management of the enterprises. To supervise and help smoothen the operation of the enterprises and the stepping up of productions a Supervisory Board of the Enterprise comprising representatives of the "Panjatunggal", workers, peasants and experts will be set up immediately. The relation and responsibility of the Indonesian Government to the owners will be arranged in a bilateral agreement, and Other issues not affected by this regulation will be provided in other regulations. === [PDF page 13] === 1969 SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONES 1A 13 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) et ts | sussecr: Bi oie Anw \Talau Wad a mmaction 4 Gf tha! ke [Unreadable] Hakala No. 52 2 Dated [Tenet yi Received Mack Jo. (Outward Action) “a y j l f Hos oft \Tek Hahaha of. [arch Ir (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) eth wp Pol E Enclos es Copy of: Sn 7 Ly ate Ps MS t ” Refer ences an ad Relevant Papers: MINUTES NY afeanis No. 525 ¢ \Tanctk 9. === [PDF page 14] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE ®@ anciir FO/CRO DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 523 DHIONS/45 y, 0956 9 Mareh, 1965 9 Mareh, 1965 R. 1153 9 Mareh, 1965 Addressed _te Foreign Office telegram Ne. 523 ef 9 Mareh. Repeated fer infermation te: Kuala Lumpur Singapere and Saving te: Washingten Treuble in East Java. Fellewing is a summary ef reports in Antara 9 March: On 7 March im Malang there was a meeting ef the lecal chapter ef the P.W.I. (Indonesian Federation of Journalists - a Communist-deminated organization). Before it even began a hundred youths from the H.M.I., the Meslem students erganization, rushed in. One of them climbed the restrum and sheuted that the P.W.I, meeting was directed against the H.M.I. At first it leoked as if the thing could be settled peaceably "but suddenly hell breke leese with the yeuths sheuting Allah is Great and threwing bricks and chairs at the guests". Panic ensued and several wemen and children were trampled underfeet. "as the guests were frantically trying te run away". Security ferces fired warning shets but it teek seme time before order could be restored. Seven pesole were injured, feur ef them serieusly. @ther greups ef H.M.I. students destreyed the lecal P.K.1. effice and alse the lecal headquarters ef I.P.P.I. (the Indenesian Yeuth and Student Organization - the Cemmunistdominated rival te the H.M.I.). The Security Ferees were unable te prevent large-scale damage te these buildings, and were enly just able te prevent the destructien ef the lecal SOBSI trade unien effices. Subsequently, Karim, the General Chairman of the P.W.I. “whe was barely whisked te safety by the pelice" anneunced that fer the time being all P.W.1. celebrations threugheut East Java fer the erganization’s 19th Anniversary had been pestpened. I.P.P.1I. cancelled plans fer a meeting en 8 March,! P the === [PDF page 15] === Dijakarta telegram Ne. 523 te Fereign Office The atmesphere in Malang remains tense and armeured cars are en patrel. The Central beard ef the P.W.I, has sent a telegram te Seekarne calling for immediate steps against these respensible fer the disturbances "which might have been directed by subversive elements abroad". Fereign Office pass Saving te Washingten 169. [Repeated as requested, ] === [PDF page 16] === CONFIDENTIAL Cypher/orP [Unreadable] Sir A, Gilchrist Ne, 525 B. 11.25 9 March 1965 9 March 1965 R. 12.52 9 March 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL déressed to Fereign Office telecram Ne, 525 of March Repeated fer informatien te: Singapere Kuala Lumpur and Saving te: Washingten My telegram No, 523. 1 This incident is the best example sefar of an outbreak ef lawlessness and muréer in East Java which is causing serieus cencern te the Gevernment. The naval "mutiny" is a further Sign ef diserder in that arca, 2. The Communists (PKI) are invelved beth in the lawlessness and in the mutiny, It is new being generally whispered that Subandrie attempted te make use ef the Comnunist-penetrated lower ranks of the Navy te get rid of Admiral Martedinata and ether Right-Wing elements, The attempt has failed; it is believed that Army units in the Surabaya area supperted the senier Navy autherities, 5. AS regards the lawlessness here again the PKI,. whese land-referm activities have preveked the wealthier Muslims, Seem at the moment te be getting the worst ef it in a campaign ef assassination ef which the extent is enly gradually becoming knew in Djakarta, 4. I have a considerable respect fer the PKI, and these may be only early rounds, 5. Nevertheless, the Murba are shewing decided signs ef life teo (semi-underground), theugh they de not appear te ceeperate with the Muslims, 6. Perhaps the renewed strength ef the Muslims is the mest interesting facter in recent developments, As if te shew their /cenfidence, === [PDF page 17] === eo CONFIDENTIAL feggkarte telesran Ne, 525 te Fereign Office aQe cenfidence, they arranged a quite remarkable precessien and demonstration at the opening ef Seckarne’s current Afre~Asian - Islamic cenference at Bandung; my Muslim diplematic celleagues whe attended were much impressed, 7. All these developments (and they are supperted by rumours of treubles elsewhere) are a geod sign, but I am net yet prepared te say. significant, [gp. undec] influence they will have in the weakening ef cenfrentatien. I doubt if the effects will emerge fer seme little time yet. But the tendency is in the directien we have been hoping fer. Fereign Office pass Washingten Ne. 170 Saving. { Repeated as requested ] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 18] === *Date and time (G.M.T.) Se pe OOS reach addressee(s) Registry, H1015 Top Segret Confidential Restgiéted Draft. oa classification —if any Telegram to:— i © ALE. (Date)............ FO 5, And to:— ODI ME, | RD eee tags cee 1H h-DHS:- les Reis eet Sf re S| en ee Ve TAS Monc€ =f para 6. air. “Code Cypher aan Vora r a rent | [Unreadable] bapt aafine on Am TR La ‘ Confrence is haretepens | DisihibriED “i: Copies to:— S- M4. BF ' Ss. fA Witt VA LD 1-R-DdD (RO ONITAD NOT S, ea [Kfeeaatim Foie, Ch. GAR bashes ies === [PDF page 19] === CONFIDENTIAL a FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA Cypher/OTP No.&78 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 10 March, 1965 D. 14.32 10 March, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Djakarta telegram No.478 of 10 March, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Your telegram No.525 [ef 9 March]: paragraph 6. Grateful for a short repert on how the Islamic cenference is developing. DISTRIBUTED TO: FO. J M.I.Dept. S.E.A.Dept. IRD. United Nations Dept. Information Policy Dept. C.R.O. Far East and Pacific Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 20] === CONFIDENTIAL hy FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA Cypher/OTP No.78 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 10 March, 1965 D. 4.32 10 March, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL [Unreadable] —— Addressed _to Djakarta telegran No.4/8 of 10 March, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lunpur POLAD Singapore Your telegram No.525 [of 9 March]: paragraph 6. Grateful for a short report on how the Islamic conference is developing. UTED TO: J M.I.Dept. S.2,A4.Dept. Tehels United Nations Dept. Information Policy Dept. C.R.O. Far East end Pacific Dept. === [PDF page 21] === STUDENTS DJAKARTA; MARCH 8; REUTER --. POLICE CALLED UP THREE OQ CARS AND FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE 100 ANTI-. MMUNIST STUDENTS WHO BROKE UP A JOURNALISTS MEETING AND WRECKED THE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS AT MALANG; EASTERN JAVA; YESTERDAY; THE OFFICIAL ANTARA NEWS AGENCY REPORTED TODAYS SEVEN PEOPLE WERE REPORTED HURTS THE YOUTHS; WHO BELONGED TO THE MOSLEM STUDENTS ASSOCIATION; STORMED A BUILDING WHERE THE SESSION OF THE INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION WAS BEING HELDS THEY TOLD MEMBERS TO LEAVE AND SMASHED WINDOWS; TABL ea 4 CHAIRSZ ANTARA SAID THE GENERAL MANAGER OF THE ASSOCIAT ION§ECE'V™' MRé Ae ee SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE MAYOR'S HOUSE, ARCHIVI mio ase STUDENTS 2 DJAKARTA THE STUDENTS THEN WENT ON TO THE HEADQUAPTERS OF TIE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE LEFTIST ALL- INDONESIA STUDENTS FEDERATIONS BUT POLICE FOILED THEIR ATTEMPT TO ATTACK THE OFFICE OF THE COMMUNIST TRADE UNION FEDERATION IN THE CITPYS MALANG WAS QUIET AFTER THE INCIDENT AND POL ICE; PATROLLED THE STREETS IN ARMOURED CARS# IT WAS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN EASTERN JAVA AS INCE PRESIDENT SUKARNO BANNED THE ANTI-COMMUNIST MURBA PARTY IN JANUARYS THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN DEMANDING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MOSLEM STUDENTS ASSOCIATION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT HAS CONNECT ION WITH THE BANNED MASJUMI AND SOCIALIST PARTIES; REUTER PG #8 1603 === [PDF page 22] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DEP & DTT Ttyt 2 Jak LANs Sai Ni Ne.552 D.0818 11 Mareh 1965 ll March 1965 R.1150 11 March 1965 je p mois |psC Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.552 of 11 March. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Your telegram No.478.—_——___ DPHole"s ilgfe You will now have seen my telegram No.537 (net Singapore) and there is a full interim report in Cambridge's letter 1039/65 ef 10 March, to NKIN which has been sent in this morning's bag. If you wish we can telegraph a summary. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.0, JeileI.D. S,EsAsDs T.ReD. UeND. I.P.D. CRO. FE. & P.D. === [PDF page 23] === & CONFIDENTIAL FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO KUALA LUMPUR Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Ne. 5 } a D. U.407 10 March 1965 10 March 1965.. uaptoce | TLOGDIATE WA a io.s us CONFIDENTIAL os ea FILCH Adéressed te Kuala lum; telegram No ef 10 March Repeated for information te: Singapore Djakarta telegram Ne. 525 [of 9 March]: Disturbances in East Java. ere OE Malaysian propaganda would probably do well te lay eff this theme, which can usefully be exploited elsewhere, If the Malaysian Government is ferced te coment, they should ef course emphatically deny that they had any hand in these disturbances, DISTRIBUTED TO:~ F,9, South East Asia Dept J.M.ID. IRD. I.P.D. United Nations Dept CRO. F.E.P.D. === [PDF page 24] === *Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) 3 Ret 533 MMs Z O19 [4 Secr, nfidential Open Draft. Pe jay | —tf any Telegram to:— a RTA [Codeword—if any] Address to I a... REC. oe, COMM it ING (225 tac (date) Repeat to:— as ae En Clair. AManvckd ( uf LY 1 of Ht 5 —Code—> Chane ym » ar) sa) fit Copies to:— ae ) TA1D —" fae [Unreadable] === [PDF page 25] === HUMSF ASOLHY 1119902 ASOLHY PP ASOLJO ) TELEGRAPH.» === [PDF page 26] === 252 lof 11 [Unreadable] iv VU need to UU LU > ~~ ~ "TNT TTY TAT VINLIALbDULED LU: A UR ee ee - - Reman partment pouth-East Asia De JoMo1LDe === [PDF page 27] === 27 FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA En Clair FILES No. 469 [?] 11 March, 1965 D: 1900 11 March, 1965 PRIORITY Your telegram No. 552 [of 11 March]. Thank you. No need to telegraph. DISTRIBUTED TO: South-East Asia Department JJJJJ [Faint carbon copy; some characters uncertain] === [PDF page 28] === FROM 2 Carnteyicheo, bBo Meme me Ce abs he ta [Unreadable] Dated 1O Mock. Received ay lo ew (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action _ completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D Poi sd iG [Unreadable] \~ 2 ec \~_S \ Soe HN co To. c.: VU Onl CONFIDENTIA:! [Unreadable] K< ase SS WV SO UA anni ae C.K © BWA Cea Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES toe watg ole A Shy, FO ass hx 2, === [PDF page 29] === BRI DJAKARTA. 0 i CCEIVES eed ae: LE 1011 \ } RECEIVED §+ 110 March, 1965 Dew \ uel «| piers /e| Ieepaeeesneensnnees The most significant development on the home front in this past week has been the clash between thé commynists and the Moslems in East Java (our telegrams 523 and 525). Here are other instances of the same thing - less violent perhaps but further evidence of increasing dissension inside this country. (a) On March 6 the East Java chapter of SOBSI, the communist trade union, called on the Government to revoke the publication permits of a number of local papers which, it claimed, were supporting the BPS and other banned movements. This was followed by a demonstration in Surabaya by a number of Moslem organisations and supporters of the HMI, the Moslem Students Association. Two thousand of them (Antara's figure) broke into the local Press House to protest against the SOBSI petition. However, the latter seemed to have won their point by force majeure. On March 8 the vernacular Antara reported that the firm which prints the offending newspapers had closed down "because its workers were being threatened by HMI elements". It is a fair guess that the workers were called out by SOBSI. There has been a row over the appointment of a certain Dr. Natsir Said as acting rector of the Hasanuddin University in Makasar. GERMIMDO and the CGMI, acouple of left wing students’ organisations, have protested to Sukarno and to the Minister of Higher Education about this. They claim that Natsir is an executive member of SOKSI,"a member of the so-called economic dynasty,“ opposed to the concept of NASAKOM, a former member of the banned Masjumi party and an adherent of the Manikabu and BPS movements - a pretty exhaustive arraignment. A group of communist front cultural organisations in Bali Lekra, Lesbi, Lesbumi - has petitioned the local authorities to dismiss from the local National Front those who are or were members of Murba, SOKSI, the HMI and GMSOS (whatever that may be). The oil workers are fissiperating. The SBMSI, the PERBUM, the SBMM and the KB Minjak/Buruh Marhaenis (all Nationalist or left-wing) have announced that they will in future refuse to cooperate with the DPS-KBKI and the SERBUMIT/ GASBIINDO trade unions, who are accused of being supporters of the BPS; and they will seek to have these two unions expelled from KOBM, the umbrella organisation of the oil workers' trade unions. / (e) The General D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, === [PDF page 30] === CONFIDENTIAL The General Executive Board of IPPI (the Indonesian Youth Students Association) put out a statement on March 9 saying that it was high time that the HMI was declared a prohibited organisation “for being such an ardent supporter of the banned BPS and also after their recent terrorist actions in Hast Java and other places". Similar noises have been made by the Semarang chapter of the PPMI (the Federation of Indonesian Students Association) and a demonstration by a number of university students took place in Djakarta the other day. ee 2 So far, other than in attempts to restore law and order, the Government have not shown any Signs of moving against the HMI - they almost certainly would not while the Afro-Asian Islamic Conference in Bandung is in progress — but the pressures are building up. And not only from the communist wi es: ATE Sastroamidjojo, the PNI leader, said recently that the terrorist activities of the HMI in Malang could not be tolerated. The people he was addressing, a group of IPPI students undergoing an indoctrination course, subsequently adopted a resolution calling for the dissolution of the HMI. On March 9 a delegation from the Central Youth Front called on General Sutjipto, the Minister in Charge of Police, to protest about the Malang incident. According to Antara Sutjipto said that the action taken by the HMI was counter-revolutionary, and that the police would take firm steps against them. Bs I have not yet seen any comment by Aidit, or the official communist newspapers, on the Malang incident. The March 9 papers merely reported the incident factually. 4. The only other domestic development worth drawing your attention to is a new emphasis now being put on the NASAKOM idea. On March 5 - i.e. before Malang - Aidit told a delegation from West Sumatra that it was important to promote NASAKOM cooperation and unity so as to eliminate the BPS and counterrevolutionary dements on the country. The same delegation then Called on Sastroamidjojo who told them that, in his view, any government officiel who is opposed to NASAKOM or whose activities were of benefit to “the counter-revolutionary group" should be retooled. (It emerged from the reports of the delegation's call on Ali that the main purpose of their visit was to lobby for the removal of Sofjan Djened from his job of Deputy Governor of West Sumatra; the delegation claimed that he is anti-NASAKOM.) On 3 March Chairul Saleh also spoke of the importance of NASAKOM unity. But, of course, these people are each using the NASAKOM cliche for different purposes. Aidit to divide, Ali to enhance the PNI's image, and Chairul Saleh - I think we can give him credit for this much - to try and contain the rivalry between the Mosiems and the communists, as I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Washington. Mw, Aw (S.J.G. Cambridge) === [PDF page 31] === Grading—to be 1ere Appropriate) DEPARTMENT INDONESIA Pro ies 4 20 [- sw So aes, He DnrOUdeF O~ udslict a orca AC. L I~ WW><Ko (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 32] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE wW Clair FO/CRO, DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist Ne, 578 DB. 0510 13 March, 1965, 13 March, 1965, DH [0's] ‘L| R, 1211 13 Mareh, 1965, Addressed te Fercign Office telegram Ne, 570 ef 13 March Repeated for infermatien te:- Kuala Lumpur Singapere a) Minister in Charge of Pelice, General Sutjipte left Djakarta fer Surabaya en 1@ March, te get a first-hand repert en the Malang incident, This repert, accerding te Warta Bhakti, “will be the basis fer further pelice actien te be taken", ») i) Fellewing from Antara 11 March, “Subandrie expressed streng disappreval with the acts ef terrer allegedly staged by the H.M.I." (Islamic Students Asseciatien) "I den*t appreve ef such actien since it is net enly in vielatien ef pelitical but alse police laws", Subandrie replied te a question posed him after a meeting ef Ketrar (Supreme Command fer the Reteoling ef Revelutienary Apparetus) Wednesday neon, Dr, Subandrie said that the Ketrar meeting dealt with efferts fer the disselutien ef pre-RPS, organizations, including the act ef terrer perfermed at Malang, Sunday, by a band ef yeuths, Dr, Subandrie disclesed he had given directives te Ketrar efficials te review the H.M.I. erganizatien and these in Sympathy ef the outlawed B.P.S, The Fereign Minister said that within the near future, Ketrar units will make a prebe inte the preseace ef pre-B.P.S, organizations and elements in varieus areas in this ceuntry, ameng ether things Bali, Atjeh, Hast Java, Dr. Subandrie, referring back te the Malang incident, said such an action was net shecking, netably in a natien engaged in a revolution, He expressed hepe that the Gevernment will be in a pesition te evercone such a Ssituatien, ii) Fellewing from Antara, 12 March, Subandrie emphasized that every student erganizatien in general, and Meslem students in particular, will be allewed te exist as leng as they den’t eppese hinder the revelutien, Subandrie gave this warning when receiving a delegation ef the Central Executive Beard ef the Meslem Student Orgenization (P.M.I.) at a Ketrar (Supreme Command fer Reteeling of State Apparatuses) sessien Thursday afterneen, He peinted eut the Ketrar had never killed er hindered any movement which is réally revolutienary and pregressive in accerdance with the directives issued by the great leader ef the Indenesian revelutien, He warned /that subversive === [PDF page 33] === Diakarta telegram Ne @ to Ferei fice that subversive and centra-revelutienary elements were new indeed trying te use the Islam fer their aims te eppese Commnisn, Inéenesian revelutien ani President Sukarne, In this cennexien, he stressed every act ef terrer camnot be cendencd, ‘u¢ E.M.I, delegatien calied en the Ketrar sessien te clarify its standpeint in the light ef accusations that H.M.I.members were responsible for the attack against a P.W.I, mecting in Malang last Sumday, Dr, Subandrie, in cenclusien, said Islam Natienalism and Cemmnism should be able te grew in the seil ef Pantjasila and sheuld be able te develep and fill in each ether, The H.M.I, delegatien at the Ketrar sessien, meanwhile, assured that there weuld be no subversive and contra-revolutieonary elements er fugitives frem banned parties in the erganization. It said that, if such elements weuld turn out after all within the erganizatieon ef the H.M.I., the H.M.I, itself weuld net hesitate te kick eut these clements and weuld even demand the heaviest ef punishment against them, Ketrar spekesman, Waluje, teld the Press afterwards, during the Malang terrer seven people were repertedly injured four of themtheavilys The,attackers were” *’ reportedly H.M.I,. members, but this fact has been denied in Djakarta by the "Duta MaSsjarakat" daily on Thursday. c) A delegation ef the Central Beerd ef the H,M.I. cailed en the Seeretary-General ef the Natienal Frent en 9 Mareh "te express regret ever the incidents eccurring at several pisces in which members ef the H.M.I, were invelveé" (Antera 11 Mareh), @) Qn 10 March several hundreds ef youths representing twelve student organizatiens Called en Subandrie te deliver a reselutien calling fer the immediate disselutien ef the H.M.I, Earlier, they had been te see General Sudibje, Secretary-Gencral ef the Natienal Frent, He said, (Antara 11 March) "As seen from the political peint ef view, the terrer actien ceuld be interpreted as aiding acts launched by ceunter revelutienaries, Terrers ef late, ceulé net be fergiven, notably since Indenesia is carrying eut the Bwikera and helding the first Afre Asian Islamic cenference, The Natienal Frent has received erders frem the President te clean the frent ef pre- B.P.S. elements, Sudibje asked the H.M.I. veluntarily te freeze itself," Sulu Indenesia’s repert of the episede has Sudibje as Saying that the H.M.I had better disselve itself veluntarily, ¢) Fellewing frem Antara 11 March, Youths and students have urged the Secretary~General ef the Natienal Frent te evict the H.M.I. frem membership ef the Natienal Frent. The statement deplered the attitude ef the Secretary-General ef the Natienal Frent fer receiving a delegatien ef the H.M.I. en Tuesday, The statement further /declareé === [PDF page 34] === Diakaria telegram Ne, 570 te Perceign Office declared that the yeuth and students in the Sapital ceuld net accept the statement ef the Minister and Secretary-General ef the Natienal Frent, Sudibje, te the Central Beard ef the Hell.I., whe-ein the Minister suggested the latter te purify their subordinate agencies on till [sic] the branches. The twelve youths and student erganizations ceulé net appreve ef the actien ef the Minister and Secretary- General ef the National Frent,as the incidents were allegedly carefully planned and erganized by the General Beard of the HMI. === [PDF page 35] === FROM \ne. Camenites LOD Keer) B® me Tomkis No. jots/e¢ Dated 2 {Y lox Si Received lo MoxO (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 3 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ae D “JO is /48 SUBJECT: [Unreadable] Mfrowwt Worn b S Omrws {A ORB Oot >2 comol Ye por Fang aes NV\ nceete” Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 36] === 36 (1015/65) UNCLASSIFIED [Royal coat of arms] British Embassy, Djakarta. 12 March, 1965. [Stamp: RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 14, 16 MAR 1965, DH 1015/48] [Handwritten:] Dear Derek, Ganis Harsono, the Spokesman of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, has been appointed as Second Deputy Foreign Minister in place of Sudjarwo, who, as you know, has gone to The Hague as Indonesia's Ambassador. Ganis will still act as Spokesman. I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. [Handwritten:] Yours ever, [signature] (S. J. G. Cambridge) D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, London S.W.1. === [PDF page 37] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 i where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT References and Relevant Papers: Dei iors. (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 38] === butte BRITISH EMBASSY, DJAKARTA. 47 March, 1965. ee caer nrweretae OT UE A ME KET I RS Der Dow M, Please refer to my letter 1011/65 of March 10 about trouble and unrest inside Indonesia. 2. It is still not clear what is going to be the outcome of that incident in Malang on March 7 when Communists and Moslems came to blows. Over the past week the PKI have engaged in 4@ tremendous amount of acitivity - demonstrations, protest meetings, petitions - all directed at getting the Government to dissolve the HMI (the Moslem Students Association). Here are some examples of the sort of thing which has been going on: (a) There was a mass meeting of youth groups, augmented by peasants and women's organizations, in Djakarta on “arch 13. Speeches were made accusing the HMI of “damnable terrorist activities". (bo) The Marhaenist youth front (a PNI group but nowy more and more, making the same noises as the Cymmunists) resolved that - and I quote a@ version given in the vernacular Antara of March 13 - "the HMI should be punished and the lackeys of Necolim, which have now been cornered, should not be given another change". (c) Aidit, the PKI leader, in a message to the Indonesian Scholars Association reported in Antara on March 15, wrote that the Malang incident " was characteristic of the counter-revolutionaries who, in their desperation, always resort to acts of terror. The revolutionaries are now obliged to step up their vigilance". And in another speech reported in the vernacular Antara on March 12, Aidit said that the HMI should have been buried long ago, at the time of the dissolution of the Mas jumi. (ad) A delegation of the Central Committee of the PKI called on Subandrio on March 13 and handed over a statement which - I quote tara of March 15 - “condemns the terror action said to be committed by the HMI members.... and calls for the immediate dissolution of the HMI". (e) Another group of commumist-run youth movements: "The sins of the HMI are too many to be pardoned - they range from insulting Bung Karno and the Pantjasila to acts of terrorism". (f) Bintang Timur, the Partindo rag, on March 11 accused the United States of "financing terroristic and anti-Msakom movements in Indonesia". D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, London S.W.1. KES RicTED === [PDF page 39] === This is the first attempt to link the Americans directly with the HMI trouble. 3 The next, and wholly expected atep, was taken on March 13 when Subandrio j announced that KOTRAR (the Government's "re-tooling" organization which you will recall has already been charged with mopping up the earlier BPS movement ) had now "taken over" the Malang incident. An investigating team left for Kast Java straight away. It is headed by Sudibjo, the Minister in Charge of the National Front. Le At this point an interesting change came over Antara's reporting of events. Previously there had been no direct asservation that the HMI were involved. Such accusations were left to the Communists who, of course, made no bones about saying that the youths who broke up the PWI meeting were members of the HMI. By contrast, a statement issued in Malang shortly after the incident by all nine political parties, i.e. including Moslem and Christian parties, confined itself to denouncing the "terror" and calling on the local authorities to take immediate and firm action against those responsible - without saying that they were members of the HI. Reading between the lines it looked at one time as if the HMI were going to try to claim that none of their people were involved. Warta Bhakti, the Communist newspaper, dealt with this in an editorial on March 12, of which the following is a summary: "Subandrio's decision is a wise one. There are people in Malang who do not want outsiders to meddle in this affair. The takeover by KOTRAR will make it possible to institute firm action against those responsible for the riots. There is no need to say who they are. The fact that all the victims were on one side, while on the gide of the HMI there were no victims at all, clearly shows thet it was they who launched the attack. So, bearing in mind that people in East Java ( particularly in Surabaya) are now turning the facts upside down - especially in those newspapers whose publication the masses have demanded should be stopped because of their pro-BPS conduct - the sooner KOTRAR leaves to conduct an impartial investigation the better". And the next day Antara climbed off the fence, and its report referred roundly to “acts of terror committed by gangs of HI members". 5. That was a bit of a digression. The action so far taken by Subandrio and KOTRAR, to the accompaniment of relentless Communist pressures, might suggest that the HI is likely to suffer exactly the same fate as the BPS. However, things are not quite as clear cut as that. There was an interesting report in the March 13 edition of Berita Yaédha - the army newspaper which is the successor to the old Murba paper Berita Indonesia. It consisted of an announcement by the HMI to the effect that Subandrio had told the Central Board of the HMI that he was ready to be a patron of their National Conference due to be held in Djakarta at the beginning of May. "The Conference will be held in the framework of increasing the quality of the HMI as an instrument of the evolution.... and to intensify the struggle to crush Malaysia". It looks, therefore, as if the HMI might even yet obtain a certificate of respectability from Subandrio; and a corollary of this is that peopfe in Djekarta have been saying that the despatch of the KOTRAR team to Malang is merely a device to appease the PKI, and that it will recommend no condemnation of the HMI. But would Subandrio hold out in this way ageinst the PKI? Yes, I think,if he had estimated that the HMI was too strong and too powerfully connected to kill outright. (Yani's daughter is said to be a Third Deputy Chairman of the movement). | 6. Here, to round off this letter, is a summary of events elsewhere:- a) The purges continue. Four members of the Regional House of Representatives in Samarinda have been discharged because of their membership of the Murba Party; and the corresponding body in Medan is taking similar steps against two of its members. Re TRC TER /o) A group SEC ET === [PDF page 40] === [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 24 > @® aa. [Unreadable] [Unreadable] > -t.: 7 - 5 al CS C 4 . Pell c ry ™. 7 [Unreadable] wu J as.: ed 4 rt « f ‘ [Unreadable] r > 7 aan. ’ 7 [Unreadable] Ys ‘, a 4 WO O Hi er q [Unreadable] Q » © ‘OL + (re + co. m™~ 00 [Unreadable] id.;:. 7 = '. 7 cl pd my [Unreadable] :: rs 7 4 ) > ert +; io € 5 1) [Unreadable] [Unreadable] .. ‘cf ' fe 4 postal rh [Unreadable] ; 20 ' ie. x wet Ss oO 4 >. [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] === [PDF page 41] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 4i where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ESIA th) AA SUBJECT: A a Or eke Dux TOIT. N SOUND oil - - geen. ee | 2 Yasser - LK g KLoI. Ondd Cisn8 2D Ovens ha Ws Dated.23 ee Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received i tit ious /45 (Outward Action) [Unreadable] A Ne ee a MINUTES Grow Ws &) eo ale bee ay Od BS le cS Uk 91, Fo ph th Bu ~ hay | - av duh dha; 7 md Wes\6s Ohmh | Re > * R Gouden A Dd! Thh |hop [Unreadable] ) Xx Gomlmange.: Deore ( Wx ie (Printing Instructions) Se oak eee = (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action (Main Indexed) des compleied) === [PDF page 42] === D Tenhn Bo — he [Unreadable] S: é CLL a heh F: Yoreg uw Oftice With the Compliments | of taku Mr. A, Goodwill IDH lot S 50) Telephone: Ministry of Defence (DIS), Directorate of Economic Intelligence, WHItehall 8474 Metropole Buildings, Ext 677 (Scrambler) Northumberland Avenue, 654 (Normal) LONDON W.C.2 === [PDF page 43] === Le. 1% Lal &s% 7 ‘\Ae 23-8 zypew FOR Rit USE ONLY HAN OLING INDICATOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE..,, shea WH wi ca PG] 50 GROUP (Downgrade each matically decl ABALYSIS 2 JISTRIBUTION ie mr OH FROM: Amenbagsy DJAXARTA DATE: December SUBJECT: Backcrouncd on Increasins f Java and Bali REF — & Ses 2. Intreducticn; ee es Communist encouregenent of peisent “unilateral actions" to secure land rights and several violent cleshes between peasants and authorities on Java over land use have recently figured in Eabassay reporting (eece the Indremaju effair - A-3¢64; and the Fojoleli incident - hebkhS)}. Based on 2 recent field trip to Central and East Java end Bali by Dr. Daniel Lev, a Cornell University scholex of Indonesian affairs, and other data, this report attempts to give some background on current peassnt tensicns end the dircction they are tekinge Dr. Lev returned from his two-weer trip through Java and Bali convinced that as of early December land reform and land use had become the overriding ¢ political 1¢se Moreover, further violence appeare Over the land issue. Packeround of the Lend Disou For years the population pressure on agricultural land in Java and Bali has far excesced land availability, Overlaoping layers of rural society have continued to subsist off the land, however, through the traditional practice of farming land on shares, or share-croppinge In various regions the customary practice has been for a harvest division of 70 percent - 30.percent, or 60 percent - 40 percent between the lenc- | owners and share croppers respectively. Since arrangements usually i oe CONFIDENTIAL. FOR PT. USE ONLY === [PDF page 44] === CONFIDENTIAL, Page 2 of Aw LOS from Djakarta provided that the cost of seed hiliser, etc., were large’; borne out of the smaller percent2ge of produce receive coper, the landless farmer's lot was usually a > subsi one. However, a certain precarious security did exist except when major ercp failures or other disasters have virtually wiped cut whole es which had no margin to v Way mT withstand the shocke ‘s on Jave with the exception of tea and preservese* ifds e Nlandlords" nN YP Ho There are few large 1 rubber plantations and sta referred to in this discussi peasants who cwn both their hou hectares. According to @ rural University in Jogjekarta, this grovz and more with local civil servant class. As land pre group to let its small holdings out on shar than farm the: themsel they have increesingly moved into petty governnental or business positions in the nearby towns where their ties whe bureaucracy reinforce the security of their position in the vill, pele ¢ yy years merged more rd the ide profitable for this Sab! Into this situation wes introduced Indonesia's 1959 harvest sharing lav (UUPBH) and "Lend reform" legislation which is still only partially implemented. The UUPBH provides that all erep sharing arrangements must be on the besis of a 50-50 split of profit mer and sherecrepper after deduction of costs for seed, fe; Tne net effect of this division ise to considerably int the; tion of the landless sharecronper. The law also guarantees a farmer-owne Lgt o cultivate his own land, however, if he desirese While the rural landless, with the political support of the PXI's. peasant organization (Barisan Tani. Indonesia = "BTT"), heve been pressing for faster "implementation" of the UUrZHd and other land reform legisletion, a countervailing phenomenen has been occurring. Under the new crep sharing terms, the sm21l1 landowner is no longer finding it profitable to let his land out on shares and in large numbers these farmers are meking the decision to return to the farming of their own land, 2 right 2lso guaranteed by the law. In most cases this can be dene while still retaining their petty bourgecis positions in the towns so no real job openings are ereated by this shift. Typically, the farmer will farm his plot two days 2 week and work in tow five days. At harvest and planting time vacations will be taken to allow intensive application to the land. # Acverian Affairs Minister Hermanses told the Ambass2dor/late Novenber that there were only 100,000 hectares of land on all Java which would be subject to redistribution to the peasants under the basic. land reform law. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 45] === CONPIDENTIAT - Page 3 of 2from Djake A major and perhzps unforeseen resvl erce porticn of the Lande less rural poor ere losing their use righ w tine ere lef shifts to the already overcrowded cities, ‘ group for the most apparently xi] in plece in the rural areas. In increésing nunb less are becowing desperate as subsistence itself appears threatened. The dent seens to have been an almost classic exemple of this process, Bojolali inc wuerein. the to assert th we ~ « ~ ~ + 1 ~ ke maa =? am tam GET de one - andless share croppers, bolstered by tas dil, attempted by Torge . a thine & 3 oh > nF 99: oak pe ead: 5 + efr right to continue to till land which the owner had decided to o er gain hinself in view of his tment's previous insistence on a 4 Ton vision in accordance with the terms of the UUPBH. : s who oxned those whi been widening steadily during the pressures e@ have become acute, e2ch group is allies for support. The alread 7 and publicly com. the lot of the landless pezesar inst the "villege devils" end scple are reportedly turning to the champion. On the other side of the coin, the small lendowners, village elite, and civil servants are, according to Dr. Lev, flocking in droves to the Local NU and PHI party organizations as a political counter-weight to the PXI-supported landless who appear to threaten their ow tenuous security. (Despite its leftist orientation at the nationel level, the PI's rural chepters are still conceded to be very conservative). This is increasing the polarization process Not surprisingly, local officialdom has tended frequently to side with the lend- “mer as the representative of stable rurel society and according to some reports this bias has considerably worked against full implementation of some parts of the land reform.legislation. This alleged "foot dregging" by the bureaucrecy has been under heavy attack by the PKI at both national and local levelse Ir. Ley reports that tensions are particularly explosive on Pali, where an aggressive young PNI leadership is fighting back more directly against the PKI. He anticipates serious peasant troubles at least in Bali and probably in parts of Java unless some basic govermiental steps are taken promptly to alleviate the plight of the increasingly desperate, landless peasants. Dre Lev indicates that the Land Reform Court systen is not yet in operation in most areas end in his view is not likely to have much effect on the basic situation despite the additionel voice of the Bil on those bodies. At the national level the PKI has also nade it plain that it is pressing for full implementation of lend reform legislation and protection for the rights of the peasants. Anti-PxT parties heve largely limited themselves to denunciation of the BIT's "unilaterel acts" and attempting to utilize the issue in the current polemical press debate between the PAT anc the "Sukarnoist" groups. The "summit meeting" of leaders of the ten political parties with Sukarno and tne Cabinet CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 46] === Pre or Oo CONFIDENTS ‘7. el of An459 es Diakarte : December 13 appar ently atten: ted, with thi probler Me Coordinating iiinister for Agriculture anc Affairs Saajarvo, herarian Affairs iSnister Heraanses, Forestr Sudjarwo, and Home tiinister Sunarno 4 were all. the only Visible result of these discussions has been sertion that "ve will cnphesiz arrving out of consultat: m based on a cooperative and revoli nary nationel spiri to prob]. ems related to the carrying ont of the Lend refor: 1 an 2 cr This avtenpt to paper over the overt manifestations of a will contribute nothing to its actuel solution. For the Amb Edward §E, tiasters Counselor of Enbassy - for Political Affairs === [PDF page 47] === CONFIDENTIAL, cee) His Excellency, Minister of Agricultural and Agrarian Affairs, Dr. Sadjarwo, S.H. Dear Mr. Minister: gnment to youl want to ich I appreciate al] you I write this letter to you in a purely private capacity, The views expressed in it are entirely my own. In no way do they reflect other individuals or Organizations. For this reason, the responsibility for my acts of commission or Omission during my observations of your rural conditions is indeed mine only. - I want to assure you, however, that in Carrying out your assignment I have endeavored to look at the issues in the spirit of objectivity, understanding and great sympathy for what you have been trying to do these many years. - CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 48] === CONFIDENTIAL, Enc. # A aeo Djakarta Upon my arrival in Djakaria in early December, you were good enough to suggest that I undertake a number of field trips for. a first-hand examination of the current state of the land reform program. With this in mind, I spent some time in the country- Side of Java, Bali, and South Sumatra, In the course of our conversations, I tried to convey to you my impressions and findings, @S well as to indicate the urgent need to enharce acricultural productivity. Now that Iam about to take leave of your country, I take the liberty of this private letter to you io amplify the points I raised during our talks. Here end there Irefer to Bali and. South Sumatra, but for reasons well known to you, the emphasis in this letter is almost entirely on Java. In line with your assignment, I visited 2 number of villages in Wesi,. Central and East.Jdava, inBali_and in South Sumatra, I talked witha good many farmers in the villages and in the field, and I had the benefit of the observations of certral and local Officials involved in the reform program. I sasculd add that the cooperation of the officials left little to be Cesired; but for. this cooperation, the usefulness of the trip would not have been nearly as significant, Occasionally, the number of officials accompanying us seemed excessive, but it is not a cause for censure. I take this opportunity, therefore, to exoress to you and io the officials of Agraria, both in Djakarta and in the field, my gratitude for the very efficient arrangements connected with our work. Despite the many contacts with villages and villagers, my _ Sample was, of necessity, small in relation to the more than 20,000 villages Java and Bali comprise. The temptation to see one more village, and yet another village, in order to learn something more _about this or that aspect of the program was ever-present. but physical endurance and time limitations could not be disregarded. But whatever the reason, I realize thai on a look-and-see field trip of this kind some significant features of: the program have escaped my attention. I note this to stress that what I heve to say in the subsequent paragraphs is nota definitive picture of the land reform program three years after its commencement. Nevertheless, the observations in the course of the field trips form a pattern, which provides me with a fairly good idea as to the present state of land reform in Indonesia, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 49] === CONFIDENTIAL % Enc. #1 In setting forth my findings, Mr. Minister, I need hardly tell you that Iam motivated only by the desire to be of service to you in your deep concern about the welfare of the landless. From my happy _ association with you over the past three years I know that you expect irom me a frank expression of views, be they in agreement or disagreement with your own. Assuming that my comments are valid and that they shed light on so complicated a problem as land reform in your country, it is my hope that they may be of some use to you for the tasks that lie ahead. In brief, the purpose of the agrarian legislation euaaien by - your governmént is two-fold: (a) to provide a maximum number’ of landless with land of their own, _and (b) to create more reasonable else's land. Itis the sum total of these two basic proposito ons that constitutes the core of your land reform program, and it is from the point of view of these all-important intentions that I inquired into the program in the field. Your idea to proceed with my assignment now was indeed a timely one, because official after official has told me that in parts of Java the reform had been completed or was about to be completed, or that the reform as a whole will surely be completed in 1964. Under the circumstances, the questions that call for answers are these: what is the nature of the "completed" reform or what is it that will be completed in the current year? Who are the beneficiaries? How large is their number? How much land will they have receivedas a re-= sult of the enforcement of the program? What might be the effects of land redistribution of agricultural productivity? Finally, since the vast . majority of the cultivators remain share-croppers or tenants of owners! land, are the security of tenure provisions being engorced and are the -purdens of the tenants being | being lightened accordingly? %A number of other questions might b be raised, but the above will suffice for the purpose in mind. The e impression carried away from the trips is that, to date, the results of “the reform fall far short of anticipations implied by the ~ enacted legislation. The gaps are indeed wide between aim and fulfillment. Moreover, ifthe present trend is not reversed I believe that even the end of 1964 will witness little change in the results already discernable. Thinking back, and reflecting upon my field experience, I am of the opinion that what I referred to earlier as a "pattern" may very well evolve into the. definitive picture which an unbiased and thorough observer, with much more time at his mene is Foren to find a year from now. === [PDF page 50] === 3 A 848 ce Djakarta Permit me, Mr. Minister, to touch first on the land redistribution phase of the reform. Your legislation lays great stress, and rightly so, on the idea of shifting a large number of landless to an ownership base. In the long run this makes for the soundest possible economic, social and political arrangement in agriculture. Article 7 of the first Agrarian Law promulgated on september 24, 1¥00, “spells out the philosophy behind the idea, while the entire Law.0f December 29, 1960, with its maximum retention limits, provides all the important provisions -urder which @xtéss land cat be wade avail= ablefor redistribution and tenrtal conditions Tmproved.~ The significance of this legislation is ObVi0wS, “and, tor reasons I shall point Out elsewhere, the arguments in certain quarters that the maximum amount of land an owner can retain is too high need not be taken seriously. What is important at this juncture is whether the legislation. ij in its.present form is being carried out.. tributed”among thé “landléss."My note-book iS*réplete with references to ‘SUCH Cases in all Of the firee provinces of Java, as well as in Bali. It is quite apparent that the recipients are pleased with their plots, regardless of how small, while the non-recipients express the hope that their turn may come at alater date. In the case of J ava, and on the assumption that each new owner receives one-half a hectare, as of the end of 1963 the total number of families who benefited from the reform was approximately 128,000; if all the land earmarked for redistribuition is indeed so disposed of by the end of 1964, the number of recipients will be approximately 248,000. At first glance these figures are not small, but ~; if the very rough estimate of four to five million share-croppers in Java | is close to reality, then not more than six percent of these families | | i have received some land upon the completion of the program. Once in the field, it became clear that excess land is being disi Two sources tell this story: information provided at the provincial capitals and samples of the actual distribution of land in the villages. According to the first source, the total amount of land -- wet and dry -- available for distribution, estimated as of the end of December, 1963, is * This relates to land owned and rented out by resident peasant-pro-~ prietors with more than the permissible limit, absentee owners, "Hadjis, " and land of the nobility.” It doesn't take account of former estate lands already occupied by squatters.. so id CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 51] === CONFIDENTIAL, ALE Pecan) mae Djakarta as follows: West Java is thé redistribution leader with 28,000 hectares, or just a littlemoré than one” percent Of the total cultivated land; Céntrar / Java with 8,000 hectares already distributed, or a fraction of one percent of the total, considers its job completed; East Java with 6, 000 hectares distributed and a possible 22, 000 yet to go in the current year, would represent, when completed, another fraction of one percent of the total cultivated land, Bali, with the more readily available princely land, might ‘actually redistribute four rene: its total cultivated and. Such. is the overall picture as seen from the Capitals of thé provincesy” It doesn't take much Searching in the villages to comprehend the real meaning of these - Fairly large sections of the ~country have no lan nd where s Plots ranging from one~half heciar. ’ Bali. It has been reported to us that in Solo Residency of Central J ava, for instance, not one hectare of peasant excess land was available and villages with a total of 5 hectares of excess land were no rarity. Madiun Residency of East J ava, with 1151 villages and nearly 409, 000 hectares of cultivated wet and dry land, has Only an estimated 1,000 hectares for redistribution spread over 200-225 villages. So far, only part of the land has been divided, and it is worth noting that, but for the 520 hectares of one "Hadji," the excess land would have been that many hectares smaller. In Pekalongan Residency, comprising 544 villages, only 75 villages are involved in the reform, with a total excess land of less than 500 hectares distributed among more than 900 families. Clearly, these villages are among the better endowed Ones, for such entries in my note-book as 23° hectares divided among 126 families, or 27 hectares among 104 families, and soon, are quitecommon. It is not Surprising that with so many Villages not involved in this process, I encountered many farmers who [Unreadable] had not yet heard about the program. The understandable and very de- Sirable provision of thé reform €gislation to provide the new owners with two hectares of land doesn't accord with the reality of the Situation, Small though the volume of excess landis, tens of thousands of families are receiving land. Who are these recipients? The question is not easy to answer. Itis tempting to say that the farmer who cultivated -@ particular plot of land received that plot of land. In many instances this is surely the case, but probably not as a rule. At least one farmer ‘introduced a discordant note when he remarked at a public meeting that it was the relatives of the members of the village land commissions who were geiting the latid-—Onets tot prepared to say how true that statement Was, butitis evidently true that, withor without the support of the land === [PDF page 52] === CONFIDENTIAL wis! commissions, some excess land tends to gravitate into the hands of — relatives of the contributor of excess land. A case in Bali serves to ‘. highlight this. In our resence and in the.presence of 3.group of. " officials, a land éwner siated-that his four hectares of excess land went to his brothers~-in-law and nephews. An examination of tite foate OF ae a Sei certificate of ownership of the "néw' owners proved that -- much to.the surprise of the local Officials. : Such cases are in themselves no violations of the law -- so long @S such distributions find their way into the hands of relatives who Cultivated such lands as tenants, prior to the enactment of the legislation. One of the provisions states, for example, that "farmers who have been related to the owner for not more than two generations" have a prior claim to the redistributed land.’ More to the point is that the eight or twelve (not clear to me just how many) priorities and categories are too numerous and complicated to administer even for a well-intentioned village land commission. This alone can very well be a source of €vasion, although not necessarily deliberate evasion. A village land commission is presented with too many choices, made more difficult by the fact that the acreage to be redistributed in most cases is very small. And it is the latter factor, more than any other factor or combination of factors, that lies at the root of redistribution program difficulties. The ‘.. Same is true, asI shall presently point out, of the security of tenure part of the agrarian reform program. Even a brief familiarity with the work in the field leads one to the conclusion that regardless of how Small the distributed acreage, this part oz the program is the land reform program. Whether one talks with the _governor of a province and his assistants, or a Bupati and his co-workers, - the theme is always the same -- redistribution of excess land. An impression is thus crea: rt of the program, namely, the security of tenure p tance, At best, one hears ES occasionally a brief comment to the effect that written contracts, rent reduction and the variety of provisions that form this legislative enactment are difficult to enforce, Developments in the countryside reflect this attitude, but, for reason ear, the fault is not altogether MS that of the Officials. Itisa well-known fact that in conditions of overwaelming pressure on a limited acreage of rented land, enforcement of security of tenure provisions is notoriously difficult, The above statement, Mr. Minister, may give you the impression that the enforcement of this part of the program is largely a failure, Actually, we have encountered farmers with written agreements and in CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 53] === A (843 tie Djakarta ‘One Village, referred to by officials as a "pilot" village, we were told that 75 percent of the tenants work under written agreements. #SSuming that this is so and that the agreements have been entered in good faith on both sides, fully reflecting the provisions of the legisiation, the fact remains that the pilot village is the exception rather than the rule. In the vast majority of cases tenants have no written agreements; moreover, my inquiry into the subject leads me to the conclusion that the written agreements do not necessarily reflect the spirit of the legislation. When a tenant or landlordis asked about / tHewate of rent, the invariable reply is "50% of the crop." This f/f, "50 percent of the crop" is very important because it is the basic | provision of the law. But what, in reality, is this 50 per cent of the crop? I was not convinced that the 50 percent of the crop is what the tenant receives atter all the expenses are shared equally between owner end tenant. The picture in this regardis very mixed. The answers to questions on sharing are "yes" and "no", with emphasis on sharing the cost of fertilizer where suchis used. All else appears to be as of old. If one adds io this the fact that the total number of written egreements in all of Java and Bali is only 20, 000 out of a possible iew.million.of agreements, it is quite obvious that the provisions of the security of tenure legislation are being honored mostly in breach only. Such, in the main, Mr. Minister, are the observable results of the agrarian reform program as of the end of 1963. And not only "observable", for the official figures on land distribution and written agreements lend added support to my conclusions. What of the consequences of these developments? There are a number of them, and one worthy of the most serious consideration. I have in mind the fact that the land reform as it stands now is causing.a decline in the numberof tenants or sharecroppers and a corresponding increase in the number of agricultural . workers or coolies. The reason is not far to seek. Even though the reiorm tes afiectéd the owner-class very little, the same class knows that (2) the reform legislation exists and that (b) it can be so amended as to reduce the permissable retention to a lower figure. The owners’ know also that a tenant cultivating a given piece of land over a number oz years might claim occupancy right to that land and that cia ae a f: legislative enactment might sanction that. This explains the tendency i on the part of the owners in Java -- as elsewhere in somewhat similar === [PDF page 54] === CONSIDENTIAL Enc. # A 843 -7- aes _ Djakaria circumstances=~to proclaim themselves cult tivators, or rather menagers of the’Tand once +. rorked | by tenants. The latter become aSTICueurar i e jSPREES, GOSCEAGIN iding to the lowest rung of the agricultural ladder. As such, they have no possible claim to the land as tenants. _l repeat, Java and Bali are not unique in this respect; postwar Asia is ou of instances where legislation enacted to elevate the position of the nants economically and socially has had the very opposite eifect on the fortunes of many tenants. The sample gathered in the course of the trip through Java illustrating the above point is not large. Nevertheless, small though it is, it is relevant to the issue. An owner of five hectares in Linbongan ' Village of Central Java has no tenantsany longer.” Instead, he prefers to work his Iand with 25-agricultural Iaborérs; -nimber OF vinom are his former tenants. Other examples could’ be cited, all telling the ‘same story. While I am not prepared to say how widespread this movementis, itis in being, and, if unchecked, is likely to grow with the passage of time. It is quite clear that more agricultural workers and less tenants is not in the interest of the tenants, of the village community, and of any effort to raise acricultural production, The conceivable remedy, Mr. Minister, is additional legislation diving the tenants "occupancy'|.righis, thereby preventing the owner from removing him from the land;(unless for special cause) or shifting him from one plot of land to another at will. If such a measure is enacted and eniorced, the bargaining power of the owner would decline, that of the tenant rise, and the basis for the implementation of all the security of tenure provisions would be greatly strengthened. Experience of other countries demonstrates that owners oppose the “occupancy” right measure as much as they oppose the excess land provision. But despite this prospect, and precisely because of the threat of the wholesale replacement of tenants by coolies, the early enactment of the legislation discussed here and in the course of one of our talks is of the highest importance. The fact that this measure may not help the tenants already eliminated argues very strongly for the speediest protections of the remaining tenants. The inevitable consequence of what has been described in the preceeding paragraph and of the small acreage actually distributed and about to be distributed in 1964, is that the reform's anticipated changes in the social composition of the village constitutes another serious problem. CONFIDENTIAL ' === [PDF page 55] === CONFIDENTIAL Enc, # A 843 “f Djakarta _ This is far-reaching and significant, for where such changes have taken place, (particularly in Japan/and Taiwan, they have had immense psychological and economic significance. Writing to you about this, Mx. Minister, I need not go into any detailed explanations why this is SO. Suifice it to say that an owner of a piece of land of his owm or a tenant secure on his rented land are the best surety of an attitude which can, if properly utilized, determine the community's primary pattern of wants, consuption, production, investment, farm management, technological innovations, credit, marketing, and, above all, the best use of available resources. In the final analysis, what we mean bya good land reform is not so much the redistribution of landor security of tenure per se, but all of this as an incentive to move from a static condition to one in which the desire for economic and social self-improvement can express itself. More specifically, this is bound up with the question of agricultural productivity. To the extent that the reform, at best, leaves the social composition of the village unchanged, to that extent it will be more difficult to deal with the problem of raising agricultural production,, It takes a successful agrarian reform to bring that about. In this connection, Mr. Minister, I should like to point out that the significance oi the Japanese agrarian reform, for example, doesn't lie merely in the fact that so many tenants became owners of so much land. Its real. Significance lies in the fact that the shift from a bad tenancy system to an ownership system released all kinds of dormant energies inherent in a farmer who owns the land and wishes to make the most of it. The wellknown and tested proposition that a farmer who cultivates his own land or a tenant secure on his rented land "can turn sand into gold" is true in our own day as it was in the 17th century when this observation was first made. To be sure, even in Japan or Taiwan after the reforms, the attitude of the government towards farmers and farming had to undergo a decided and positive change in regard to price, credit and technical.. assistance policies of every type and description in order to make the agrarian reform meaningful, which is the attainment of agricultural rehabilitation in the widest sense. In saying this, it is not my intention ‘© minimize the redistribution of land factor or better tenurial conditions. On the contrary, they are the pre-conditions of dealing with a stagnating peasant economy. In the preceeding pages I indicated that the reform has fallen short ofits mark. What needs to be considered now are the "whys" of this State of affairs. I have already hinted at the causes and here I intend to spell them out in some detail, and with an eye of pointing out the one: cause that matters most. CONFINSNTTAL, === [PDF page 56] === CONFIDENTIAL — Enc, #1 ays A_ 843 =-Q~. eietas Djakarta It has happened time ~and-again that an agrarian law was so drawn that it precluded the realization of its well-intentioned purposes. I do not believe that this is true of the Indonesian legislation. One may find fault with this or that Provision relating to new rentals (on the high side), permissible lend retention (possibly high), and official land prices (too low), but considering the fact that the legislation had to reflect the political balance of forces on the one hand and socio-economic forces on the other, the legislation mirrors that Situation. I believe, therefore, that the principal agrarian reform provisions are about as good as the i d.have devised umstances. For the same Teason, as well as for a reason I shall mention subsequently, I do not take seriously the criticism that the retention limit is too high. And this is one of the major points upon which the legislative enactment may be questioned,: No maiter how it is no better than its en-. forcement.. The field tri i nable me to render a the agrarian reform is not nearly as good evidence to substatiate this, I don't have to call. your attention to the fact, Mr, Minister, that & good deal of success of the program depends upon the maximum acreage available for distribution. Yet, my experience in the field, supported by _ data in the possession of Agraria, leads me to the conclusion that in this i al administration has not done nearly well he downward revisions of all of the first reof the excess land earmarked for redistribution. - This is true of every Province. For West, Central and East Java the - first registration called for 57, 000; 22,000; and 56000 hectares of excess land, respectively; the second registration or estimate now officially accepted is 22, 000, 11,000, and 22, 000 hectares, respectively, "Estimates" are made to be revised, particularly in instances where the data on landownership are so lacking in precision as is the case in Indonesian peasant-proprietorship. Revisions, therefore, are not surprising. What puzzled one before visiting the countryside is that they were always revisions downward. The trip revealed that the first registration was probably correct and, if it erred, it was even then on the side of [Unreadable] === [PDF page 57] === . CONFIDENTIAL Enc, #1 A 843 -10- Djakarta underestimation, since an undetermined acreage which should have formed the pool of excess land had been divided up by the owners just prior to the enactment of legislation. Naturally, the local administrators cannot be held responsible for that act. Their responsibility for the second registration, for accepting it, is something else again. I say . this because there is evidence that the difference between the first and second registrations came as a result of further family subdivision of would-be excess land, after the enactment of reform legislation. In South Sumatra, for instance, checking the excess acreage registered by an owner is almost impossible; great distances and lack of transportation, if nothing else, preclude that. These conditions do not apply in Java. Besides, the records of the owners and the area that they own are being maintained fairly Satisfactorily in connection with the assessment and collection of land tax. It should have been possible to determine from these records the owners who hold land above the ceiling and the surplus land which was to have been acquired from them. Greater official care could have prevented the "disappearance" of some of this land. It is common knowledge in the field that the retention limit has been subject to much evasion. This could not have been done without the support of local officials, particularly the "lurah, " and including the local land commissions. It is one of the reasons, though not the most important one, why so very little of the land available for redistribution comes from the average resident owners with somewhat more than the permissible limit. The main source of the excess land are the absentee owners, nobility, and "Hadjis." For example, in Brelis Regency of Central J ava, _the 1,200 hectares. of excess land came from 1,071 owners, but a breakdown of the figures shows that 15 Owners of the type mentioned provided from 50 to 75 hectares each, or most of the excess land. The evasions y at a compulsory price which bears no relation to the "going" market price, However, this doesn't excuse the enforcers of the law in the field from seeing that the letter and the spirit of the law is carried out with maximum vigilance, The reference to the price of land as a cause of evasion calls for ‘elaboration. My noteook contains many items on two sets of land prices, Official and unofficial, the latter being the market price. In all cases the two diverge widely, namely, official Rp. 45,000 and unofficial Rp. 400, 000; Rp. 55,000 and Rp.. 600, 000, while in one case the market price was supposedly as high as two million as against the official of Rp. 65,000 per hectare. The built-in resistance tq the pricing system and to the parting === [PDF page 58] === .°> CONFIDENTIAL Ene. #1 | ees A Bm ' «li- as Ave tree, with the land, is indeed very great. I raise this question not in order.. to advocate a price that would suit the owner of the land. In the long run, @ tenant has to pay for the land and no tenant in Indonesia, or for that matter in any part of Asia, could possibly meet the burden of the market price of land. If he could meet that condition, there would be no point of instituting land reform programs. Hence reforms the world over with pricing schemes favoring the tenants, the burden is largely shouldered by the-owner. Viewed thus, the land price policy in Indonesia makes sense, but only if the difference between the official and unofficial prices is not wide enough so as to make the former con-. fiscatory.. My impression is that the latter is true, andthatit serves to explain, at least in a measure, one of the difficulties of enforcement. _ One of the readily observable facts in the course oi our trips was _ the little information available to the farmers about the basic provisions: of the agrarian reform program. Whether a village has excess land for.. redistribution or not, surely all of them should be involved in the security, ‘of tenure part of the program, and its highlights should be placed at the ~ disposal of the farmers. Laws tend to be complicated, and a graphic presentation of its A.B.C,'s in a manner that even an illiterate farmer. could grasp its essentials is an important part of the enforcement - process. This-should be a primary concern of the land reform - --commissions, but my impression is that this has not been the case. This. «type of education, which is normally part of an intended fundamental.',¢hange, is mainly conspicuous by its absence. en Part-and-parcel of the failure to provide useful information for the’: .: benefit of the tenants is the poor performance of the land commissions to. promote the security of tenure program. WhileI realize that such programs are difficult to carry out, the land commissions could have ~ done much better than the preparation of only 20,000 agreements, many of them of a dubious character. It is true that the lami distribution proceedures are complicated, but the acreage involved in most villages is ‘’ too small to keep a commission busily occupied throughout the year. Additionally, most of the Villages have no excess land to deal with, and. the land commissions could, if they so wished, devote their efforts to _ & more substantial attainment in creating better tenurial conditions, a problem affecting all villages of J ava, Bali and the rice pleins of South Sumatra. Part of the explanation is that in all our talks with officials end farmers, land reform stands for land redistribution above all despite the fact that the prevalence of tenancy in Java and Bali demands - that the means of living of the tenants and their employment be treated - with the utmost concern, ‘protecting them against the overwhelmingly = a Bays Neat fedencs Beare: gs rad iS: a atte, Sut ep “| 7 S200. CONFIDENTIAL Fe === [PDF page 59] === CONFIDENTIAL -11A4 Srong position of the land owners. This attitude on the part of the local administration, on top of the admittedly inherent di<si culties of bringing about better tenure conditions, exolains a good deal why this part of the land reform program has yielded pcor resulis. A few other items gathered in the field may be of some further interest to you, Mr. Minister. What Stands out is the slowness in the precedures of determining the amount of excess land; who is to get the © land; the issuing of the certificates of acquisition to the new owners; the large number of public organizations somehow involved in the program, and, consequently, the large volume of paver work. For example, the Chief of Agriculture Inspection, East Java, communicates @ tenant's acquisition of a plot of excess land to the following fifteen organizations: 1. The Minister of Agriculiure in Djakaria - The Central Land Reform Committees in Djakarta - The Committee on Supervision and Control over Implementation of Land Reform in Djakarta -Commiitee on Land Reform Firsi Level, East Java, Surabaja Land Reform Committee Second Level at the respective locations The relevant District Land Reform Committees - The relevant Governor, Resident, and Regent - Chief of Agricultural Control and Regional Agriculture - Chief of Inspection of Land Registration, Malang -. 10. Chief of Inspection of Land Registration, Surabaja. 11. Chief of the Office of Land Registration in Pasaruan 12, Executive Officer of Land Reform Gifts, Djakaria 13. Chief of Farmer's and Fisheries Cooperatives Bank, Pasaruan 14. Financial Inspection, Bogor 15. Office of Land Taxes, Malang. I leave to you to judge if this widespread proliferation of authority is a means to strengthen the cause of the reform. On the other hand, recalling a talk with a Chief of Agrarian Inspection of one of the provinces, the mere task of corimunicating with so many agencies is a difficult task, It seems to this observer that the immediate responsibilities of enforcing so difficult a program in the countryside call for the utmost concentration Qf effort and anything that tends to detract from the effort or disperse it, is not in the best interest of the program. CONFIDENTIAL,» === [PDF page 60] === CONFIDENTIAL Enc. #1 . A-843 -12- Djakarta No one in the field denies the validity of the most common complaint, namely, the great time-gap between assigning 2 piece oi excess land to a new owner and providing him with a certificate of ownership. <A year of waitingis not rare. The process is circular and cumbersome, and it goes something like this: the Village Land Reform Committee, District Regency, Provincial Inspection Agraria, Provincial Committee on Land Reform, First Level, then the "Bupati" with his alleged tendency to take much time to affix his - signature, then to the Village Land Reiorm Commiitee once again -- and to the would-be new owner. This is not to say that we have not seen farmers with the certificates of ownership; all that needs to be underscored here is that getting them is a major exercise and a slow one. - The Village Land Reform Committees, as nothing else, make the difference between implementation of what can be implemented and nonimplementation. As of now, Mr. Minister, they must be credited mostly with non-implemeniation, and the reason lies in the composition of a ‘committee made up of the village headman and two representatives of ‘national farm groups. These three, usuaily land cwmers, do not necessarily represent the interests of the share-croppers. The peasants themselves, for whom benefit the Government of Indonesia devised the reform, do not participate in its implementation. Itis imperative that they do play that role in the light of the foliowing main functions of a Committee: (1) determining the amount of excess land in each village and its suitability; (2) drafting the purchase plan and establishing the eligibility of purchasers; (3) deciding cases requiring unusual or special treatment and approving cases of exemption from the purchase provision, - -and (4) implementing the security of tenure provisions. All of these activities call for intimate knowledge of conditions relating to such basic matters as who owns what land, and who rents whose land. Only a Commitiee composed of a number of tenants and owners directly involved in the reform can deal with the relevant issues of implementation. But for a Commitiee to be effective, a number of preconditions are calledfor. They are as follows; (1) the tenants and the owners on a committee should be popularly elected by their re- . spective groups; (2) whatever the size of a Committee, and it can be as large as ten, the tenants must have a majority representation; and (3) if "(2)" is to have any meaning and not be submerged by fears of the CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 61] === CONFIDENTIAL Djakarta owner-group, the Committee must have the fullest backing of all the judicial and police resources of the Government. Barring that, there would be no point of creating a Committee with emphasis on the tenantry as the principal implementor of the reform. There may be another way, Mr. Minister, of dealing with enforcement, but I wish to underscore that the existing method is not working at all. The often-heard argument that illiterate and "ignorant" tenants cannot fulfill such functions has little validity; they know where their interests lie, and, with strong Government backing, they would defend them. Experience has shown that this can be the case; it has also demonstrated something else, namely, that the proper work of a land reform committee can give rise to an indisponsible type of adult education which no formal schooling can compete with. I refer to the likely emergence of a new leadership, tested on issues vitally affecting the village, and which is so badly needed to sustain any other major program of rural rehabilitation your Ministry is bound to undertake. As indicated earlier, in Bali the picture is somewhat brighter on the redistribution side, principally because of the proportionately greater prevalence of princely land within ready reach. From the point of view of security of tenure conditions, Bali doesn't differ from Java; the same difficulties prevail and for the same reasons already pointed out. _ South Sumatra, Mr. Minister, is indeed a special case, which you so well summed up during our first meeting in early December. You stated then that the problem in Sumatra is one, to qudte-yeu,—tof finding people to give landto." Brief though my stay in South Sumatra was, [ learned enougn to testify to the correctness of your remark. South Sumatra impressed me as an uncharted sea of land of all types and descriptions and of customs of ownership which have little in common with those of Java. The exception one finds is in the "sawah" plains around Metro, developed by the Javanese immigrants of three decades ago or more. There, as in Java, the holdings are of the order of two hectares, maximum, and much less, mostly one-half hectare in size. There, too, more than half of the land is cultivated by sharecroppers or agricultural laborers, and there is no sign of any application of the provisions to improve the conditions of the share-croppers. ~<GONFIDENTIAL ” === [PDF page 62] === CONFI DENTIA Enc. #1 A-843 [fo But in the main, the agricultural economy of South Sumatra is not based on wet paddy fields, but on the type of dry land of which there is an abundance, managed by the clans and subdivided among its members as the need arises. Redistribution of land in terms of the agrarian reforms as applied in Java barely enters into the picture.- For this reason, South Sumatra's reported 13,000 hectares of excess land (of an estimated million hectares of cultivated land) and 1,200 hectares supposedly al ready distributed do not reflect the potential of the region. However, this doesn't matter one way or another. The fact is that in conditions of great abundance of land and existing traditional method oz land subdivision by the clan, the land reform program can have little application in South Sumatra. In summary, it is clear that when we talk about reform, we mean reform in Java. Thatis where the pressure of a huge population on a limited acreage lies. The soft spots of the program in Java have been noted, and suffice it to say here that, taken together, they explain, ifin part only, why the program has not done well. With drive and determination on the part of the local administration, better results might have been attained both on the excess of land side and improved tenurial conditions. I speak of "better" results only rather than of the realization of the principal aims, for it seems to me that even a perfect administrative machine imbued with missionary zeal couldn't bring about all the farreaching aims of the enacted legislation. — The reason, or the "true cause" i is conclusion, lies in the all-important fact that there simply i for a significant land redistribution prog: true even if the maximum permissible ret alf. Furthermore, so long as the rural 1 continues to grow /jat the current rate, competing for a virtually fj { nine ) million hectares of cultivatedland, the attainment of better tenure Ts 4s: ee eee rt ts Lee Vat 4 hatch mn ate conditions is a very difficult tasx. In short, though a confirmed land reformer, I am of the opinion thai the real issue in Java (and Bali) is not land ei stribution on the . ° 7 7 eee ee ee, one hand, and a breakthrough in agricultural productivity on the other. There is nothing startling’ in this thought, Mr. Minister, and I have tried to point this out in’our talks. Although not all the important data on landownership and distribution are available, numerous and detailed village investigations, not to speak of my CONFI DFNT™ AL === [PDF page 63] === norront WG2VC.b Ua minute, asad “10Cr pace WU YOY, tw evr Mw ed Gea [Unreadable] Owes VG YO US IT} Ss thera prannnt WWsessO wstlaG Udluswwt Rit kaufen et 8 snr un Ge mC LESt ali C2i0L 4b adminictratinn nat Oued ddd Ow Ava la 4Ce MIAH MAYDA abs Kid Livi © mAlIVOIAY WV sles bOivisy Atarinnalne ar VVOEL VU Soily Vs ay» 211 jnocranschi o ys + ere all inescapadie WAL [Unreadable] auadis WAS GUULOUL Y oCLivuny LAtnictar ae} AVisdLL LOL y uric ATS py ltaes Gye se 4leur an eit bik eited) pire bt ones VAlis Gedy UULLOCS line j TAM,Y AAiMHtwitr) a4 ds dui YOUUL CU Uses Yr -*HO yvyaora *a PLAMA Par 444 BIO YoU SD WW CYL Ca. yet ety) S53 ye eCCor niet aseiltnwal hs Q4se. dVUibUL ai MUN. 40D Ge Pyne en rery ponent, «Landen a= [Unreadable] wii ps svi lye auUUl t [Unreadable] nothing that Jd dai diy WAGk iL Can Cdill 40 40 l === [PDF page 64] === [Unreadable] a wi a ones ~~ [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Yas ~ \ ’ Sli » on ’ Read hat A a « 7 s. 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San 4 é AJUUA VL ddswy a ie an UnaVvOlGavu.e IMcCaouwe’l ss mNHotr === [PDF page 67] === AON RIDENTT AT VCUNIFIUENLLIAL [Unreadable] c sntinr. + 9 7 yi ANG nwAry as+3 dtbw GAteClilidgii AVUVES 24d VLU oly oe t - neaseant 5 Cc meacira WH) x inerryr + / AIais GG MAT aouu. ¢ Ai y sahva = — — - ES ae erqgiertrigncesanen eeb-vus wad 1} mr y OtmN AT: Seon ty € Way JUL \ } e acnievin; es mIr PAnnmitr ” VVaIVise CULL Ua! peasantry, and of f the economy as a whole if lements which are so vital go together, for, in effect, ndent. nevitable question: t increasing agricultura Although I A Go not intend it; I leave the answer annie Be aie eee nt pe 1 at the Same [Unreadable] firicactric rinannonwa,r sc NH WSs ra 5 Nini S«e ‘y, as Ministries the worida UVCl, > TOL errintinne vn 4 A tn hy inkenes apiivilo VU L to do aad [Unreadable] ; +h Qe rt; TOU ann pf ati WIS generals L1aVU oVil GU Cllilidtic se ienA 1e28 fanm ul knowledad 4 abl sal fie FIRS ald a eile al ta OE }; cain edients Vi ABYULICULLUL GL 241 Jile [Unreadable] tem af r + peasant wr Va c nica tne Javanese iar mis © sXaMpie, your larmer imtn thair arvriri 4iitwv a 4 ~+ Adm aww AA AS anc ro 9c tH UTNat answers Q2ad W Wiiar implementation substitute for such or’ S value cannot be o1 estimated. Ars ptientcey e nant VUULLVALy OD ssVJb0 [Unreadable] Ah Gisdy L102 J L Aiiis aces ViCOo UVYis YUU LUC A YY 2A Omigant af un, lance Assh SV Yee OGiib YA YYUL 2Vais Miu immadiste concern ic AD aVAy 24244440 GeO CUUCClL I ip as + ingdica tho nart af wan, ~TTOYrNmant +h wt VOL Yi YUUL Gover adsse aid isthe: Fe es esl a -aa ton Oo at e€ condition of peasant < € a prime, nauonal viewed in this Lgnt, sega between e Government shoul eee budgetary supp wnoen you told me how sm as ior NPIDEN TAT [Unreadable] === [PDF page 68] === a ee nistr aVass ba wd >¥ Het by a Aik G@LELLUUS Ter ehhh dl [Unreadable] ment WOPK, irrigation arm:; uraming YY ments in Waging [Unreadable] + ~+ tha j arnigatinn af oa L WE DL, ws 10dgernmization of } = Arm co > dev yJelopment, 10+ WiLIAS rj ass UStYriz + “~ATTORN NON Government Wlal, + may ceem ite a ddia eCClii LO iy Ymc nrecented here hit w in terms presenied here, Dut my [Unreadable] mounat cimiiar nran WY 1440 WiLL Try) c ws dedi lat een A vebh Olid eas 4Vile« Minister, aia nce TO 2 WU ave PLuUVeS Jjvu + ODaDiy nro) ™ MaAVUViSisde orhim TQ mere Waisiiil Ju & sbsOd sole r + vy) WADLD Vi m5 Ann Apratir CONnS1iQeracvion. Vedi ennreea aft @ ODVYULLO UL AY ‘alabbhas WCC. 74577 + inn anfac NOD Wor) aS tine Kind Of aSSisStance yVu ex meé. a + Ww : tr wrth se VV wee Gai toalle reat encouradce re] J means enmoathing AAAS ALA SI dO UY ghting" for adsitii warm 44a VOL MS REZ nae h f +O GliliCult, Minister, Covet rea) ees a 44 40 ey eri VAYGCLS wii Imoctanre. tracted sci 0LGNU0 pe Vee GelrOu Wal, Wwsswd twee: a: rtIPFA or mu GiaibiUii™ Mibu aa economy, ann +) ee ae ea oe »+ Ti mom WabbssdsbssiUlibse 2° Gil nrincin - indeosa ps 44s asulCu 44S OULU 1 eat voty £ «the rso_uress 4 yes UV wr ay sm ADC wa exper ience Ceailn me that no Lad 4/4, WAC LLCLU cots "7 ae Crta oe wor 4 20 L And roan.” ~ See be Re ok GO overnment, Gis ctarting Wes biliyy sured a shi wd + +h45 ce ctarting r that basi wd cea whens LAs iy VvU Oint will be oor you. ks that lie ahead of as bas VV bbe u with that mu wieour Meat sai y VIEWS nror my WeUWlOiia mea alities as 1 Sneoume;red 1 them trued them, a they are as they - cs ae es analysis and suggestions your lliancr aa ess you how deeply tmnthnnt +o Ve aeesy al & Witi at Sahay Gs aA dad ai i nave and, Saal WU Iie, a rom me, TATOATIDOTAT JRIN LLL === [PDF page 69] === ane Vit. LON DON ee Ne A Crh Cra Lote f, >) 7 bn de ju hens aoky fre fv ar:: Js ty Ves (7 di VO & Lets Srl Cr fase yy) (pr: Te 1 € ‘ STete Des Lf A. phat x Dox —17- 2 May —2e {fe Mttins ¥ 7 Th eff ALL. bh. === [PDF page 70] === | Registry No. ye \o\S\So Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. bate eee Drakt. L defile 4 Y IN THIS MARGIN. RECEIVED IN | DIVISION === [PDF page 71] === NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN. === [PDF page 72] === NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN === [PDF page 73] === (DH 1015/50) The recent clashes between peasants and the in East Java have encourag agrarian problems in Indonesia, especially those the Land Reform programme. 2. In attempting have come across it is a conflict of doubt have read th for the Indonesian Au months in West, Centra study ring the current le jinsky perceived have in mind" it stands now or share-croppers and 2 of agricultural seek. piece of right to %t might sanction that. of the owners in Java ss circumstances - to pro managers of the land onc ro new 440 as is caus wor ownere over a 44nG Cae ed ooo othe land a nd Wid rye. a LNis ice 3. 1 recent on Java and Bali by br. of Indonesian affairs, the decline in the number basic and serious problem, "“occupaney rights" the allow his tenants traditional role. Dr > Lev profitab these fs [Unreadable] cuss we Un ler SaySy, 4e to WN APA Laers let his land are making state one es corr elain worked assessuent of the vaniel wonile ire- Ae tn 3.Wele 1965. FOREIGN OFFICE, 25 Mareh, authorities look at arising from us to take ao closer and South moa.tra aaieduiin. development. the Land Reform & manvet of tenants in the number 48 not far to ‘eu at ing c gi ven yada Claim occupancy 3 legislative enactment the tendeney on the part 2 what similar or rather Bali Land Refor serious iobu reason te 4 ere va a ex! plains Xv Wis her. in se lyes he +o, wy eiacaid cultivate anéea vee vnaems IS» increasing peasant tensions Cornell University scholar agreeing with Ladejinsky that tenants and share-croppers is a aces not the owner's fear of for refusing to continue in their sping terms,“ no longer finding it and in large numbers eturn to the farmin ueVv, oat srineips Crop the nev 7 out f of NPIDENTIAL === [PDF page 74] === CONFIDENTIAL of their own land, a right also guaranteed by the law.... A major and perhaps unforeseen result is that a large portion of the landless rule poor are losing their use rights on the land and for the first time are left almost completely without recourse for subsistence." 4. The curious feature is that neither Ladejinsky nor Lev put forward as a secondary factor the principal argument advanced by the other. I should have thought there was something to be said for both assessments, and that it is probably the landowners' fear that tenants or share-croppers may assert occupancy rights as well as the loss of profits which have induced the landowners to transform themselves into agricultural managers using hired labour. In individual cases, no doubt the one motive or the other is of leading importance, and for this reason it would seem misleading to place all ones eggs either in the basket of profitability or in that of occupancy rights. 5. If you can throw any light on this question, in particular in relation to the recent affairs like the Bojolali ineident, it would be most helpful. (D. Tonkin) === [PDF page 75] === BRITISH EMBASSY, DJAKARTA. 26 April, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL y nk f Fe. y da \ois\s0 G)) I am afraid I npr not been able to do much about your letter DH 1015/50 on 25 March about land problems in Indonesia. 2% No-one here that I have consulted (I mean Americans and Australians) has read the Ladejinsky report. This is hardly surprising: it was written confidentially for the Indonesians and they have not published it. Not have I read Lev; though I did run into him once in Jogjakarta. wy As for your question - which amounts to, “Are the landowners pushing the tenants off their land because it is more profitable to farm it themselves, or because they fear that the Government will sooner or later back up their tenants’ occupancy rights?" - I doubt if it would ever be possible, even with greater knowledge of the facts than I can possibly acquire sitting in Djakarta, to give a categorical answer. "“A bit of both" seems the obvious explanation. If it really is very important to have the question answered with any more accuracy than that (and I confess I cannot see how it would help us) I will try to do better for you when I return, refreshed, from my leave. (S.J.G. Cambridge) D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, DeWide CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 76] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) CONF SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT fon War c ounlirdse; ee Yyolkoxta G Wer WMhowkes olbstt XN onStuon FROM Chetan;; Ge gane \s Whe QY adusnan orn Emboay, Lois ine ok Us. MaadimNn Dated ark Moreh Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received TR, Dose (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 77] === Se ae report from Washington y diplomats in Indonesia. is not quite 1at About a month ago the artment of Foreign Affairs sent a circular Note all missions in Djakarts without discrim eee? I two weeks' notice to 1 given for journeys \ iimbassy lials iz Ja Medura and Bali: and four weeks for wie O sr parts of Indonesia Until we learn to the co: ary, i.e. by experience - we are going to assume that this does not apply to weekend jau to the towns and villages in the jal ta hi and, nor to official journeys between Consulates. i It is not yet clear what the Indonesian's motives are in this. The new regulations may conceivably be promoted by a concern for our urity. More likely, I think, we shall soon find tha a enee> by members of some of the more suspect mi here (us, for example) will be “escorted". We shall keep you in the picture. At present, there does not seem to be any case for interfering with journeys by the Indonesian diplomats in London - and I see that the State Department are taking this line, too. I am sending a copy of this letter to Washington. Wg VW (J.G.S. Camb Eat K === [PDF page 78] === Mor Tw. ye (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action (Main Indexed) completed) 3: wr“ OQ > Weert Ws Yok B BR aie: COMP z a: a NS DAIS Woun Qroskiumc 0 renee OKAONS offs blemsbe haan Teck e: eK, ow WINDS ies ~ === [PDF page 79] === FROM DIAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No, 677 D. 1053 26 Mareh, 1965, 26 -Mareh, 1965. R. 1222 26 Mereh, 1965. [Unreadable] Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 677 of 26 yareh. Repeated fer information te: Kuala Lumpur S ingapere And Saving te: Washingten Canberra Wellington, Three Indonesian academic: organisations (Hei,Isri and rersomi) have jointly urged the Indonesian Government te break off diplomatic relationship with Britain, Recognize North Kalimantan, and review the maintenance of diplomatic relations with America, Australia and New Zealand, Poreign Office please pass Canberra, Washington, Wellington as my Saving telegrams Nos: 44, 206 and 44 respectively, === [PDF page 80] === -to be Up-grade re Appropriate) [Unreadable] Quon S\ DASRBD Wor, eee Quam ows XX phir: FROM, » yosreven a ee SN & posh Gt ond enckicdked - Wes | td Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Wo. eh.. (Outward Action) ) a hee Wie. Contndag, Didtetn “6 Sake, OS ee (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) ~ | Kd vt re Wa. completed) 1. pot | ds ik [Unreadable] TMP. bd, === [PDF page 81] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 690 BD. 1203 29 March, 1965 29 Mareh, 1965 R. 1542 29 March, 1965 Addressed te Fereign Office telegram Ne, 690 ef 29 March. Repeated fer information te: Kuala Lumpur Singapere and Saving te: Washingten. An Indenesian army munitions factery and stere in Banung (said te be the largest in Java) caught fire and expleded over the week-end. A statement put eut by the Army Infermation Service en 27 March said that this was an accident and that six people were killed, 2. Please see my immediately fellewing telegram. Fereign Office pass Saving te Washingten 209. [Repeated as requested, ] === [PDF page 82] === CO ENTIAL FROM DJ A TO FORE Cypher/OTP Sir A. Gilchrist 29 rh 1965 ddressed Fo Office No. 691 © h repeated for raters to: moore neerat Singapore and Saving to: Washington My immediately preceding telegram; Explosion at Bandung. The Naval Attaché has learnt from a reliable source, present in Bandung at the time, that the explosions an on Friday afternoon, 26 March, and continued well into Saturday. It seems that no attempt was made to deal with the fire which broke out; but the entire erea was cordoned off and people living within two miles of the factory have been evacuated. Between 150 and 200 people were killed in the explosions, and three hospitals are filled with the wounded. 2. There is no evidence to suggest sabotage. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington No. 209. === [PDF page 83] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE 'FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No iL D. 1509 30 March, 1965, 30 March, 1965, R. 1707 30 March, 1965, pH 1019/9 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 70l of 30 March Repeated for information to:- Kusla Lumpur ‘Singapore My telegram No, 696: Bandung Explosion, No word of this in the Inglish language Antara yet. But the vernacular Antara 30 March reports that General Yani, Army Minister, has reported te Seekarno about the incident, and he told the Press afterwards that it was merely an accident which happened when workmen were sorting out ammmition mere than five years old to be thrown away, === [PDF page 84] === — | pwiors' ss ©) === [PDF page 85] === 6 a ae BRITISH EMBASSY,, DJAKARTA. oS: RESTRICT Week, y a __— prns/s3 My letter 1001/65 of 31 March ebout the explosion of the ammunition dump in Bandung. oe The Governor of West Java announced earlier this month that the casualties involved were: 2 killed 11 badly burned 15 slightly injured 1 missing ‘These figures bear little relation to those put out by the Army Information Service immediately after the explosion took place. 3- A report in the vernacular Antara yesterday said that as a result of the explosion 20 houses had been burned down, 25 had been demolished, 494 had suffered heavy damage and 343 slight damage. These figures may seem large, but I expect most of the houses were kampong shacks. It may also be worth mentioning that an Australian colleague of ours E we was in Bandung shortly after the explosion took place, lata had left Djakarta before news of it reached here. He not only saw no damage or dislocation in the city, but did not even hear any mention of the incident. This, taken with the official figures published, suggests that the thing did not amount to all that much. 4. I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. aie (S.J3.G. Cambridge) ae D. Tonkin, Esq., South Bast Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.le RESTRICTED === [PDF page 86] === ity Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) - KALTULA Woon. G oSconrk G hones Yy ose eee CO nse Daleks yerif clus duoc ols Ubrer, DOS Woualix oo Hho unLowndiote References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) 5 Lehasgoven_ Grom (Action | [Unreadable] completed) (Main ——— 2) N Gomimase, » SeomXe ts We Noir ‘S\ ees: 4 === [PDF page 87] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No, (06 BD, 11350 31 March, 1965, Dehoisl sy 31 March, 1965. Hols} sy. R, 1458 31 Mareh, 1965. - Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 706 of 31 March Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur Singapore Sukarno has announced the follewing Cabinet changes. (a) Chairul Saleh's portfolio Basic Industry and Mining has been divided inte three: (1) 011 and Gas, Chairvi Saleh. (2) Mining, Armunante, He is at present Ambassador te Czechoslovakia, a prominent member of Partindo and used to be editor of Bintang Ti Mur. (3) Basic Industries, Hadi Thajeb, He is a brother of Sjarif, the Minister of Higher Education, (b) Adam Malik, lately Minister of Internal Trade (Subandérie took ever the portfolie for Fereign Aid a few weeks ago) has been prometed to the rank of Minister Coerdinater of a newly created Compartment for “the implementation of the guided economy", His job as Minister of Internal Trade has been given te Brigadier General Yusuf who until recently was Acting Minister of Foreign Trade under Subandrie, (c) Partene, a Garuda official, replaces Iskandar as Minister of Air Commnications,. 2. Comment follows, === [PDF page 88] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir', Gilonist 9 /” ey Is (s) Ne, (07 D, 152) 31 March, 1965. 31.Marech, 1965. R,. 1652 31 March, 1965, ddressed te Fere Office telegram No Repeated for information te:- Kuala Lumpur Singapore According to the vernacular, Antara, in the course ef a speech to a meeting ef cooperatives on 30 March, Sukarne said that as indonesia had shifted course in the political field so it mst in the econemic field, This change will mean that as from next year private business interests in Indonesia will ne lenger be allewed te impert, enly te expert. DISTRIBUTED TO:- S.E.A.D, J.M.I.D. E.R,D, Rescarch Dept. News Dept. FE, and P, Dept. === [PDF page 89] === PROY DJ. A TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair = FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist //, *: No, 708 * \rs| Su. (8) D. 1531 31 March, 1965, 31 Mareh, 1965. R, 1655 31 March, 1965. Addressed te Foreign Office telegram No, 708 of 31 March Repeated for information te:- Kuala Lumpur Singapore My telegram No. 706: Cabinet Changes, Antara, this evening, reperts an explanation given by President Sukarne, of Adam Malik’s new appointment as Minister Co-ordinator fer the department for implementing a guided economy, It runs, "beginning this year Indonesia will change course in her economic policies," (See alse my telegram No. 707.) “For this purpese I need a new Minister and a new department which as of now has to arrange this change of course, Next year Indonesia will change the face of her economy which means another step forward towards Indenesian secialisn," === [PDF page 90] === CONFIDENTIAL 4 FROM DJAKARTA TO FORBIGN OFFICE Cypher/0OTP FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A.Gilchrist No.717 D. 07.20 1 April, 1965 1 April, 1965 R. 11.33 1 April,1965 CONFIDENTIAL Ih DH los \s i (<) Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.717 of 1 April, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Singapore My telegran No.706. -——hHypiIs [54 These Cabinet changes are {2 greup:omitted), of partiolar significance in themselves and leave the position virtually unchanged, 2. Of the two principal personalities involved, Chairul Saleh is deprived as a Minister of the less important (end profitable) sections ef his Ministry, but retains control ever oil; while at the same time he remains a Minis ter/co-ordinator and (one tier up again) a Deputy Prime Minister. 36 Adem Malik at the ministerial level leses the remnant ef his Trade Ministry (which was not worth much anyhow) but gets an honerific position in the rank of Minister/co-erdinator, where to all appearance he will have little influence. de Thus the changes have ne real political weight but can be represented as favouring: (a) the Right wing, since despite Communist pressure Saleh and Malik remain in the Geverment: (b) The Communists, who have get a Ministry fer Armunante, one of their people; (c) Subandrio, who now has the whole Trade Ministry under his control. be I do not know Partene, whe replaces the nice but ineffective Iskandar, but he is technically competent, having been a pilet with Garuda. Iskandar is te be found an Embassy: there have been some odd mutterings lately about filling the slet in Lendon, though ne names have been mentioned, 88888 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 91] === \ a oer DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS INWARD CABLEGRAM I.13389 9630 Rec'd: 1st April, 1965. NGHIPE Ge ate ee a 1703 Australian Embassy, DH re [54 (4) DJAKARTA. aa Sey RAG FROM: 414° CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE. ~~ i V Cabinet Changes. ; Rather unexpectedly and withou of preliminary rumours, Sukarno announce changes this monring. + ‘the traditional spate ad a number of Cabinet WRK 2. They are: (a2) Adam Malik to become’ Minister co-ordinating the implementation of Guided Economy. His present job as Minister - for Internal Trade goes to Brigadier General Achmad Jusuf. (b) the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining at presént run by Chaerul Saleh to be split into three. Firstly, a Ministry of Oil and Gas to remain a charge of Chaerul Saleh, secondly a Ministry of Mining under Armunato and’ thirdly a Ministry of © Basic Industry in charge of Hadi Thajeb. It seems that Chaerul Saleh also retains his other function as co-ordinating Minister of Development. (c) Iskandar, present Minister for Air Communications is dropped and is to become an Ambassador at a post still to be announced. He is replaced by Partono who is present Director of Garuda. REQ ww 3. In annouricing charges, Sukarno said new Department for implementation of Guided Economy was created in the framework of the charging course of the. economy and was the first step_ +owards Indonesian Socialism. He inferred that the new Ministry was.one which he regarded with great importance. He said that as from the ‘beginning of next year, imports would be put completely - under the control of ‘Government enterprise and that goods which could be produced in Indonesia would not be imported. 4. Armunato is a Communist who was previgusly Indonesian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and is currently editor of the ‘Communist newspaper "Bintang Timur". 5. - Hadi Thajeb is at the moment the Indonesian Ambassador to g.. He is the brother of Thajeb, the Minister for Higher Education and is axreasonable person. PUR YK 6. Achmad Jusuf, the new Minister for Internal Trade, is from the Foreign Office and was recently made deputy Minister ‘for Foreign Trade at the time Subandrio took this responsibility from Malik. He is a Subandrio man. Sree af === [PDF page 92] === DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS INWARD CABLEGRAM 13389 yr Although these changes continue the distressing trend of giving the P.K.I. and Subandriec. element a greater part ‘in the Government, the changes are not developments which we should’ regard with alarm. The Ministries which Armunato and Achmad’ have been given are not important ones and even although they put a P.K.I. and a Subandrio man into compartments run by Chaerul Saleh and Malik these two new ministers will be subordinate to -Saleh and Malik respectively. i. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that both Malik and Saleh, who have been public targets for sustained P.K.I. attacks are staying on in senior positions. Malik has probably ° gained ground, particularly if judged against the position to which he had been reduced when Subandrio took aver Foreign Trade a few weeks ago. In the industries promotions casé, the position is not quite so clear. He may have suffered a slight lessening of his © influence, but if so it is only marginal.; SAYS RSH SNON nan QOH SANS 3S SERVAN Naan 9. The removal of Iskanda is a sham, but he is being replaced by another technician. The nett political effect: should not be great. boa: f WANN SAA Shann, MIN. & DEPT E.A. MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE REE. + (% corrupt. group) -MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY e MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY. P.M'S DEPT ) 7 [Unreadable] KGW SSS fo SSN Sess [Unreadable] AMSP EA EAMEC E ICR PIO MT.ER PPO; BANGKOK. KUALA LUMPUR LONDON -MANILA NEW DELHI SINGAPORE. © TOKYO WASHINGTON WELLINGTON === [PDF page 93] === ® DEPARTMENT: OF ‘EXTERNAL AFFAIRS INWARD CABLEGRAM | IM Bie. ist, eahe't | ".- Let3701. AMY.: Mere FROM: Dated: 2nd April, 1965. ed, + 2030 | Australian Embassy, ~ Rectds 3rd April, 1965. . -DJAKARTA. | ' 0323 42h CONFIDENT UAL i Cabi Cha ° mes Further to my 41%... » ” < ta - While I would not wish:to change m assessment of the meaning;.of these changes in so far as Alam Malik is concerned, in which case I think it will be some time before we can make a dé¢finite’ judgment, there was an interesting turn of events yesterday which does, I think, substantially affect the position of Chaerul Saleh, as 26 suddenly installed the’ President director of: Permina, Indonesia's oil authority, General Ibnu Sutowo,.as Minister seconded.to the Presidium, in’charge of oil and gase, While announcement of the previous day, that Chaerul Saleh would remain Minister for oil and gas, presumably technically is still valid in. practice another Minister has been brought in with responsiblitites in, this field. What is more interesting is nature of the three people whom Saleh. will now presumably.be supertising. Sutowo (oil and gas) is nof, friend of Saleh at all and whatever Saleh may Say to the contrary, could not have been chosen by him, Thajeb (basic industries) is another man cordially disliked by Saleh. He was Ambassador. ‘ in Rome when Saleh visited Italy last year and Saleh felt he was not given proper treatment. On his return He attempted. to have Thajeb removed. Armunanto is a Communist and therefore ¢ must be presumed to join in present view of the Communist Party about Saleh. Chaerul. Saleh is;therefore,faced with the prospect of three people who dislike him operating in the core of his rs . basic responsiblities., It can,therefore, be said,I think, that Saleh has suffered more than a moderate setback, 30; This does not change my view,however, that it is significant that Sukarno has,in effect, said to P.K.Ie. that he ‘will not remove from office the two people, Saleh and Malik 'who have been the object of public P.K.1. attacks. 4 Rwkarno's method on this occasion have -been curious. in that. he has sweetened Saleh's pill by pretenfling in the first instance that he would continue with full responsibility for oil and gas, and then just as an afterthought suddenly and withaut any attendarit publicity introducing another figure into the Scene. There are 82 Ministers. 2/ soe © Z2Zmo—aa When installing some of the new Ministers, ‘Swkarno pe SMAAAAAAAAAAAAY SN === [PDF page 94] === ipoe [Unreadable] /~@ DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL-AFFAIRS INWARD CABLEGRAM IM ¥ I 013599 WOK PORN SSS FROM:;: } Dated: 1st April, 1965. Australian Embassy, = Rec'd: 2nd April, 19652 416 SECRET. he yee “ I do’not normally set much storé by the views of Tatiija, a Director of Caltex, and now not only an Indonesian. member of the Supervisory Board of the Company, but wearing the.. hat also of representative on the Board of the Minister of Labour. ~ However, some of the things he said to me today, 4re,,so ONG 41. his normal opportunistic character. that.they maybe worth setting down. era be SON RAS Bap (1) He feels ‘(and I agree) that after the Bandung ~ i cekbrations there may be a period of upheaval. of critical importance if the P.K.I. is not to carry all before it; yee mek! RRR (ii) Subandrio has dsked him if he does not intend to send his Australian wife home, Tahija claims that when he said that he did not. intend to do so, Subandrio charged at him and asked him whether he thought his sort of people were. still ™soing to win”. Tahija says that he told him he thought they were. He referred to Subandrio as a “bastard™. -. ASS ARS SEN -. (441) “I. saggested.to him that the whole history... of thé tragic development of Indonesian poJitics.was one of.-. substituted hope for action, on the assumption that such things could not happen here and that everything Would turn out all right. He agreed, but said that the time had now come for,™conclusion™ and not “theory™. -He said that there was now going to be “frightful clasY¥y and that both he and Subandrie would finish up “under the soil’ I doufst whether both’ (6 @ @ G) result would be. ee (av) I asked where focus of revolt against where ‘Indonesia was going might he, and suggested trigger point. of action _was, in Indonesia, interminably lost‘in indecision, He talked a totwof the PK.I. strength being only in Ujakarta, some of the big towns, and in Central Javas but gave every indication of agreeing with my suggestion by saying that. the problem was _how to attacke these centres of strength, and when. ee SSS SON SISA SAYS SNS YY 3 (v) He said that the crucial thing (and he could not be more right) was that any action “must appear to. be to rescue Sukarno" not “be directed against him”. I said that the P.K.Il. ’ had managed to identify itself so much with ‘popiiar state of °; philosophies that time for such a rescue operation might have passed. It would be terribly hard to “rescue™ him from something he was enjoying and which, indeed, he believed in. Tahija agreed with phis and to my suggestion that everything in the recent past reflects slow step back in the face of P.K.l. pressure. Sse Eos Qhe« === [PDF page 95] === 99 DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS INWARD CAB LEGRAM | (VI) He made something of the fact that the army was moving in. They had, he said, done so around the oil installations, and in offices of the companies in Djakarta, The | (@) Suharjo in Balik Papan had been “removed", and Mocha Ginta had been-told to. "shut up" in Sumatra and had done so. They need. Kosasih back, he said. I then asked him about Jani’‘and he said that he was “his right, and last hope for (@) ™. In my own view Jani is more than likely. to keel over in quite a light potitical breeze. (vii) He said that, there was "no chance" that the > H.M.I. might:be banned. I said that if it were there “would be only one conelusion to be drawn. place, or to attempt to have two bob each way on it and win a ‘paltry sixpence. The fact-is, however, that there is an unusual sense of real crisis. Two Indonesians last night (one a senior P.N.I..man, and one in the. Foreign Office) argued: happily for half. an hour or so with all cliches of Indonesia's multi-complex = - continiung revolution. And.when they finished one of ‘them whispered that he agreed with all I had said and the other told Parsons, after I had left, that he must tell the Ambassador "not to give up”. The vast majority of these people do really want to get back to sensible ways, and we must do all we, can to help them by not. (@ @ ) to follies.of leadership or by deserting them by turning our backs on them. i I have no idea what it must have féit like to be in Germany in 1934 or in Italy in 1923. In both countries the great majority of people probably hated what was going on around them, sick,were sucked, for personal and oftet’: family reasons, into an‘establishment that they dared: not stick. Then, as I believe to be the case now, there was not point (and in our.case now there. could be no point) in some military excursion. I guess this place is going very sour, but I hope \.'° we can preserve a position of offering reasonable advice (not: admonition) as to better course, and continuing with what I feel has been a sophisticated and sensible policy of not cutting off contact in a fit of ill-tempered rejeetton. ‘something to save these people. Le Whatever may be coming up in the lift, and. I suspect _ it may be something juicy, there is mo floubt that the people here from the very top, down to the vast pudding of unconsciousness’ that represents most of the people, are really worried where the hell they are going. They are talking again much more than they were, even if with furtive looks ‘at Indonesians wjthin earshot. If there happens to be no Indonesian the noise is ear splitting... f Shann. We just might do: MIN. & DEPT EA. | MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE P.M'S 5th April, 19656 [Unreadable] ‘INT UN PACAM’ AMSP EAMEC § ICR PIO PPO- BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA NEW DELHI NEW SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON WELLINGTON’ SEC. FAS(1 4) M DL SAM: I would not wish to expose an incredible naivete about this — fir === [PDF page 96] === 3 ae Drrtois] ©) | wale sid; In our telegrams Nos. 7/06 and 717 we reported anc nges in the Indonesian Cabinet. ‘There has been one ther an Sasa General Sutowo has been appointed mded to e Praesidium (thus making seven) and is also vcapaeies wailing of Oil and Gas 2e This is a further knock at Chaerul Sdeh. The attached copy of a telegram from Shann, which the Aj ibassador want ea you to see, brings out well the way Chaerul Saleh h now been hedged round wit subordinat ninisters wh on the fa PSs wd work in: velopn lent : elf. surprised however, by Shann been any doubts earlier that Sukarno was alik and Chaerul Saleh, this latest move to ’ Saleh's empire should have removed them. in the public Their line has j aS sage everybody Cabinet still has its weaknesse: man i’ which are serious of the existence of several individuals who carry o the ie entation of the Mani (Politic Manifesto) and the Dekon Economic Declaration) half-hearte ily and who are supposed to assist bl t Leader of the Revoluti in performing his c mplex duties ly they deviate from the proper course of their Se Some of them are even busy taking care of their not the country's economy. let was announced. This clearly sates that Py C “Su no has again "integrated himself" with the; niet series of actions all this at no struggl & i Fen: Of announced last night has the country' omy will none of" in! i === [PDF page 97] === [Unreadable] TAT wre wR A he a el o he === [PDF page 98] === ooo <eteens [Unreadable] co: wT y?« 4 Ee 4: 4 . ma V he. abe 5 ‘ tJ, hv, § CS Cc: = [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ; a. Cad [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Cae. === [PDF page 99] === M SUBJECT: Du -Q.- Kahohealt KoT RA [Unreadable] VK Yatomas bidende/, Oke. Ris Encloses Ci r Opy Te heh. Ss (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) (Main Indexed) | pit | === [PDF page 100] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO7CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 722: D. 0654. 2 April, 1965 2 April, 1965 DHto(S/SS R. 1020 2 April, 1965 Addressed te Foreign Office telegram Ne, 722 ef 2 April Repeated fer infermation te:- POLAD Singapore Kuala Lumpur Following from Antara of 1 April. The Supreme Command for Re-tooling of State Apparatus (Ketrar) in its decision Wednesday said that it will take steps te give indectrination to the General Beard of the H.M.I. (the Association of Islamic Students). The decision alse said that steps would be taken against the recent incidents committed by H.M.I. which violated the criminal code. The decision further said that it will curb the movements of the H.M.I. chapters in Malang and Jogjakarta. Deputy Chief of the Supreme Command fer Re-teoling ef State Apparatus Air Vice Marshall Wiriadinata, whe signed the decision, said that H.M.I. as mass organization on the whole constituted an instrument fer the struggle ef the Indenesian peeple and as such the H.M.I. gheuld be strengthened. for this reason Kotrar would review the investigation already conducted while further messures would be taken te maintain the necessary @ivil erder, The H.M,I. as an instrument of the revolution should be strengthened. === [PDF page 101] === \o Cecern NQanwov»Ger a5 bree \s wi.; =. f Ren Of fore ) Encloses Copy of: erences and Relevant Papers: WAS | SH, (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) rgqiIlbE === [PDF page 102] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir A, Gilchrist e No DHIo IS] S% D, O7L0 2 April, 1965, 2 April, 1965. R, 1202 2 April, 1965, Addressed Forei fice tele No 2A Repeated for information te:- Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapere _pimos |s¥ My telegram No, 706: Cabinet changes, Antara of 1 April announces following additional appointment, Major General Ibm Sutewo, President Directer of the Permina Indonesian 0i1 Company to be Minister of State to deal with oil and gas affairs, He will remain President of Permina, 2. Chaerul Saleh is reported as saying that Sutowo had been seconded to the Cabinet Praesidium with the special task of helping the Gevernment on oil and gas policies, He would have clese relations with Chaerul Saleh, === [PDF page 103] === 103 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) FROM. SUBJECT: Ne & do RW * bs F os Kursus Quote Oar Ourk_ A OIRO) ADK OY a eer | “ eh Om Ko WAN JD Wrtron QU. Wadton. Jated ray f > af ‘ Dated Ohunrrt References and Relevant Papers: Encloses Copy of: Received Wel A (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Main meh Les 4 (Action completed) wa\w\ GS ld === [PDF page 104] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP FO/CRO/WH, DISTRIBJTION Mr Redgers Ne, 765 D. 06.52 7 April, 1965 7 April, 1965 Diol sz R. 11.12 7 April, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Fersign Office telegram No, 765 ef 7 April. Repeated for information te: Singapere Kuala Lumpur and Saving te: Washington Rumours of unrest in Medan, Her Majesty's Censul in Medan reperts rumours in Medan that there may be anti-PKI disturbances in Medan in the immediate future. The Murba Party are said to be behing this. 2. There were, however, no signs ef disturbances when our courier left Medan late en @ April. Fereign Office pass Washingten as my telegram No, 221 Saving. === [PDF page 105] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 105 where Appropriate) FROM q%...Q. Gicheat, SS On or he Demumour > sedrenken has Oure_ ni mass» ak Xs Sos >OuD SD Ore Mady Gore > Aifonee No 132 Wha Onde Krotag. Jated Enck ’ f ' F \ Pp Dated Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action Mai > 4 completed) (Main Indexed) aa\\eS. === [PDF page 106] === & FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist 3 No, 738 R a D, 0655 3 April, 1965. 3 April, 1965. R, 1213 3 April, 1965. Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 738 of 3 April Repeated for information to:- Singapore; Kuala Lumpur My two immediately preceding telegrams, Following from Antara 3 April. DH lols sa. President Sukarno declared Friday night, that Indonesia's actual enemies and possible enemies do not come frem the North but that her enemies are clearly the neo Colonialists, Celenialists and Imperialists, The President was addressing participants of em army seminar, who had come to Boger Palace for the President's advice, prier te the seminar’s opening, The seminar will be held in Bandung from 5 April through 9 April and is expected to preduce a new dectrine or revelutionary struggle and the function ef the military in Indonesia‘s revolution, The President teld the seminar participants, whe included the Cemmanders~in-Chief of the four armed services that, whereas the nation had been reversing the revolutiorls course to its original track for a decade, the armed forces had not yet done so entirely, Therefore, the President said, the projected seminar will be of great importance, He expressed the hope that the seminar would succeed in formulating a defence policy and strategy that was suited to the fact that Indonesia's enemies will not “come from the Nerth" but that they are the nee Colenialists, Celonialists and imperialists, The President explained that reversing the course of the revolution did not mean a departure from the eriginal path, but a reversal ef the deviations in erder te return te the eriginal tracks ef the revolution, He said at the time ef these deviations the armed ferces adepted a defence policy that was actually net suitable for the original course ef the revolution but suitable only for the deviations from the revelution, “Hewever, we managed to reverse the course of the revelution, though in the meantime the armed ferces have not yet done se entirely, The scheduled seminar is, therefore, just the right thing we need" said the President and added he heped that it would result in a re-discevery and a cerrection ef the armed forces defence policy and strategy. === [PDF page 107] === 107 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROM © cum SUBJECT: “s mene » VeseWchimedA Sea e Delve is We Torun C cinta sits Ye Wosr Damas No. or (GS. Dated WMroucel. AYe- Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received On 2 A (Outward Action) MINUTES 8) S_Gonidgg Bytarte We Tekin ONS Tonk 8 8) We _ Gombadys, yerronte Ws Ws Voreuin WOnles. March, a ) fae KS k RD> Me Dy 2e/ - FoR Phi (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 108] === (4041/65) Ant Vv “y ra. { \ TANT At ONF IDENT iu Gem IR NO OSPR BE Dew Sonks ery ly letter 1011/65 of March 17 about internal unrest. The two chief developments during the past week in this row between the Moslems and the Communists have been a) <A closing of ranks among the Moslems to support the HMI (the Moslem Student Association which has come under attack by the PKI for their part in that incident in Malang). On “arch 18 a joint statement was*issued by the NU Moslem Scholars Party; the PSII party; the Muhammadijahg)jthe Djamijatul Waslijah (both Islamic social organisations); and Gasbindo;*Moslem trade union. After a lot of gup about national unity and crushing Malaysia the statement went on to say that - and I quote the Antara version - “every endeavour at undermining any Islamic group would be regarded as an endeavour at undermining the whole Islamic community and would therefore be countered with Islamic unity". This is an obvious warning to the PKI and their friends to desist from their campaign against the HMI. b) The Malang Pant ja Tunggal issued a statement the same day saying that the incident on March 7 "had been fermented by individuals who had received no instruction or essing from any mass organisation or political parties of the "Nasakom" (national, religious and coumunist) - in other words an exoneration of the HMI. The Pantja Tunggal also went on to say that any future reports about the incident which ran counter to their findings would be “unjustified and could only be launched by counter=-revolutionary and subversive elements who wanted deliberately to create confusion and to pit the national progressive forces of Nasakom one against the other". 2. KOTRAR itself, which was instructed to investigate the incident, has still to report; but it looks very much as if it will echo the Pantja Tunggal's verdict. On March 22 Subandrio told the press that he was “optimistic about the solution of this problem"; and that it was necessary to solve it "in the interests of national progressive unity in implementing the revolution, and not those of one group only". See again para 5 of my letter: I think we can take this outcome as a mark of the strength of the Moslems in this country, slothful and disorganised as they are when compared with the communists. 3- It is worth noting that PERTI, the most "communist" of the three Moslem political parties, did not join in that statement which I mentioned at (a) above. The reasons for this are spelt out in Warta Bhakti - a tainted source, admittedly, because being a Communist paper they would naturally wish to exploit this rift in the Moslem camp. Anyhow, the Chairman of PERTI, Siradjuddin Abbas, is reported there as having said that, although his party had taken part in the discussions leading up to the statement, they had not signed it because it had been prepared in a hurry, and because it was chiefly D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 109] === though indirectly) concerned with the Malang incident and the HMI. Well, of course it was: this is a feeble disclaimer - and it demonstrates how PERTI has been captured by the PKI. Le In spite of the a ering over of the incident by the Pantja Tunggal and the regime generally, the pack are still in fairly vociferous cry against the 6 J» £ J Ss HMI. Thus = a) Fourteen youth groups met in Djakarta on March 22 in front of the National Front headquarters (#iis in spite of Soekarno's recent ban on demonstrations - our telegram 634), set up an "Action Committee" for disbanding the HMI, and called for a countrywide intensification of the campaign against that body; b) The PPI, the Federation of Indonesian Students Associations, have deplored the attempts by the HMI to duck responsibility for the Malang incident; c) IPPI, another and more important student organisation, have been more thorough still. They sent a "fact finding team" of their own to Malang. Its report they say demonstrates that the HMI was a counterSrevolutionary organisation, an adherent to the BPS and the main tool of the CIA. The "terror" in Malang was pre-arranged by members of the HMI and the banned political parties, many of whom came from the Malang area. IPPI have announced that they have sent this report to Subandrio in his capacity as Deputy Chief of KOTRAR. be On a related front, Major General Achmadi, the Minister of Information, has banned some more newspapers and magazines (mostly Medan ones) for being supporters of the BPS; and a certain Major Soemardi, a member of the Central House of “epresentatives, has stated (according to the vernacular Antara) that"Nekolim, assissted by their henchmen, plamjto remove Soekarno by earmarking no less than five hundred million dollars for the BPS, but thanks to the vigilance of revolutionary progressive groups based on Nasakom these evil designs were foiled". 6. I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Washington. [ws WW vee (S. J. G. Cambridge) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 110] === , sake ke che a oe © 7 - 3 Lie [Unreadable] ' Ra ake SY AKL h @ [Unreadable] ° J id Aeode WA = 4 Lk ah et a wey Uw e Val i VOA UW). wis © * ~Y [Unreadable] 1) S: > a i*f jis! cs: he t,t) ii [Unreadable] [Unreadable] - é bs da i he CA ck & V,¥? ake ae oho.: 7. ws | ate WO., [Unreadable] : us +: a V a ri 2 oh LAA vAWile VOA UNI - Ls VY =” - 4 /, wf bb abe») CA -... [Unreadable] Lit 7. Vu. [Unreadable] Gea. oe,O LVL aAvUUUlLllLvL 1 L' 4~UValLliAL LU 4. rts. [Unreadable] ;;; a j vu: i CA J i Vw Vil we CA fhe CALS ahs J Pua Wvll Y CAL b SA. UY is <i wile dade i Ld iL. AS wt lls ale. [Unreadable] ' vi \ tt Nd »: me: Te le Nerd a wt L, de NA ws VA ae hb & Pode de 7 CAS he ate wd aso [Unreadable] . cc _ 7;. 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Achmadi said that the press was a very eirective tool ror * 2 7 ac a ~~ creating national unity. ut recently there had Deen signs [Unreadable] ratic ee 7 +e y ay] vv + co Or yeclaration not implemenvtc ODE - jb Was $e i oa 7 m:; et ee, ‘ be tt - i.. Ver mnanimna Serer rt L r tnt res¢é raily round. VS ae Oe ee _~ se ~- i — ae oe I [Unreadable] : ] ot, arc e Lac i WJ LIS Dla ul vu Ou Vv yas Cn V AN La La Calisc ua © ws Dd il bt, CAL id + LNA oh de SLA DS in: [Unreadable] e,;:; L P es —/ ae VA 2 GAS el eee Ne cate hee ie Li te ke oe ee [Unreadable] Lode [Unreadable] interesting wnat the AHL CvVLUCibiy +4ai- UO a L === [PDF page 111] === [Unreadable] ee Wewtet OL ok Lt hed dike ob i, [Unreadable] o|. W + am SA LSA Y a 4 ~ * ee - ma nt CL — cask ~ & VLA 1 Le — Wu ~ WV [Unreadable] : —- ‘he nw a wo ’ } Nee De whe im V¥ Nw LL.; Vil VU JU aks eho Co? 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Wl) no Tf:; dé ' SS igs icc: ' LU & Wwowow Vv Ae VV Wet eh VEL ee J — ks vu AV UVWN Ww J ML iN de tnd de de [Unreadable] LiVUUu - L.: LAL 7 * \ bad? ake — Vii LA a Vit VU de CAR YU / e LLL CA, [Unreadable] oy _ vv?: 1 cc’ 1 ™Ty 7 72 wh: 4 7 OT _ iS *]. b; if Ww “> » a. S74 RO WO yw L VV LU Ub Licid |) als Ss a» alae a,:;; 7 wee eas oo 7 se; : ware: rr r f - os i ~Sy om 9 ys: a. ss 17 N1y? . ode. 4 wt J de be CA we VU / Vii i ales WW Uo L LU - OA ae CA ee Kit Jecke hale s737H Co ry Ve CALL \A J Be dedd AWVUL SS oe === [PDF page 112] === about oslens preserve e contr r recent === [PDF page 113] === eS ts WS v pat? / )\ Beg) | CR { o¥tenera | Teds Hp ag & een FEE OD BRITISH EMBASSY, — UNCLASSIFIED | ed DJAKARTA. 1011/65 oe, one 9 April, 1965 bon rss (9] Please refer to my two’letters of 31 March about friction between Indonesian Moslems and Communists. (Inadvertantly they were given two different reference numbers, 1014/65 and 1011/65). 2, KOTRAhave now announced their decision about the Malang incident - and,as we expected, a it represents a compromise. HMI is not to be suppressed; but there will probably be a certain amount of “re-tooling”. Here is how the decision was reported in the vernacular Antara on 1 April: "In its decision taken Wednesday, the KOTRAR (Supreme Command for the Re-tooling of the Revolution's Apparatus) stated that actions would be taken against HMI members involved in incidents violating the police laws. It is also decided to impose a temporary curb on the activities of the Malang and Jogjakarta chapters of the HMI. The decision, signed by KOTRAR Deputy Chief of Staff Vice Air Marshal Wiriadinata, also asserts that the HMI as a mass organisation to a great extent serves as an instrument of struggle of the Indonesian people, wherefore in order to strengthen its position as such and as an instrument of the Revolution it is deemed necessary to make a further probe to ascertain how far adjustment has been carried out within the internal structure of the organisation (in compliance with the President's previous instruction). To continue with the trimming measures, the KOTRAR will undertake to indoctrinate HMI executives including those running the organisation's branches throughout Indonesia.” 3. There has been very little comment about this decision. It obviously cannot satisfy the PKI; but they dare not criticise it outright. 4. I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Ws ow (S.J.G. Cambridge) South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, D. Tonkin, Esq., L. dy === [PDF page 114] === FROM Wx Gombicdgt; Dyclrorks ts We Vow No. \o\\ GS. Dated Q pork Ws Received Ohh.S (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) | (Maia Indexed) S| he qa\*\S 114 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT SUBJECT: : Litols Oud & Mowpra Ld wih ast | Se olsts ts co Gon - Shh a Aeiebee | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 115] === [Unreadable] i DHI0 IS |co. Der Bak The attached report of a speech by Subandrio was published on 26 March. It is interesting on three counts - as reveal incompetence of state run enterprises; the way Subandric are foreign aifairs and foreign trade, not estates, more and r the functions and speech of a Prime Minister ("1 state enterprises"); and the way Subandrio is suffic sient]: his own strength and of the PKI's dependence on hin (it other way round) to propose a solution, namely ee ae to revert to private management, which must surely be Communists. I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, London §.W.1. CONFIDENT IAL ee ieee ee LY Ant a the portfolios ore assum losses by 1fident of the itery ul to the === [PDF page 116] === CNAME BAITED PET IRA wrTam STATE ENTERPRISES MUS‘ <eaeneepIUAEAa ENS ENLISEE TE URanenncaneaoeaet First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mr. Subandrio, warned state-owned and government-run enterprises that starting this year they may no longer suffer losses because otherwise the government would not hesitate to hand their operations over to private businessmen who could run them on behalf of the government. Dr. Subandrio was speaking to newsmen after an inspection tour of a number of state-owned enterprises and making some comparisons between the working methods at these companies and those of private business firms in Djakarta. A government or state-owned enterpriseris a people's enterprise. If that enterprise suffers losses it is the people who suffers the losses, he said. Starting this year state-owned or government run enterprises may not suffer any more losses. The government will not pay one single cent ir subsidies any more, if they do. "This year I won't hear any report ut losses suffereh by state enterprise," he declared.; Noting that there were among the state enterprises that had been su.'fering losses for 40 years on end Dr. Subandrio said that these companies had better improve things quickly before it was too late. “If they make no improvement then the government will not hesitate to hand over their operati ons to private businessmen who can run them on behalf of the governefitn". === [PDF page 117] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) 1 1 ” SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT BG Mb eri § Wc Gambrdise VeutSis DMO Wy ~~ ein SerXewrom Ko Lt Vx 2% ov Waar, Qardsom oWens d ee 4 of 7 = sous - ie: Xuse aie 2 O ( p a9 C - c r; No. Yor \@S Gk" Sa” Me ee Sabah Geol om Dated OhurE T Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) [Unreadable] my MINUTES Copy i- tho. yee fans Shi J ace sar sais ulo.s sap? t Daly ie. -_—* gre 7 iar 7 a ron fc 6 Qed [| Weo (Printing Instructions) Bl s° (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action 5 completed) (Main Indexed) ue | DIL [Unreadable] === [PDF page 118] === reported 1 when LO an é:: reason third explanation, and tne Letter - is set out in the attacnea tevolusi” ou Will see that t 4 ‘. antes es [Unreadable] make out that LE KEE €svr subversive network in which McKay, lately Vor a nC i at} ay ' iAU a lidilie copyin 1d Singa OeWetie === [PDF page 119] === has been used in a r ae anner in North Sumatra. Th who do not know youth are people who are stil ‘mentally arrive", conservative and reactionary. tht, the Oo} 3 ir a sexual scandal. 2d more seriously it an | elated to counter- 2 and subversive activities. Whe is more, when person concermed has, to some extent, en involved with icKay, British Consul at clearer. L} y Me Oo carry The possibility beco harmonious relations ex?! eople of Indonesia, ince Sondhi attitude ressive network thi