FO 371/180317: Indonesia, Internal political situation, Attempted coup against Sukarno [8] (Oct 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === qtr ett 180317 CLOSED UNTIL === [PDF page 2] === (Security Gradine—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT DH ois /i«s Te asittsnanstiniahiaicg: oa SUBJECT: Macraze o~n othicHen 0 i. k ee tn On Encloses Copy of: ekarences and Relevant Papers: Received Ott, (Outward Action) MINUTES __( Qoo- ‘od (Ei hee 2 (Printing Instructions) 180317 | (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action (Main Indexed) completed) === [PDF page 3] === CONFIDENTIAL ® FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No. 2006 D. 1206 2 October 1965 2 October 1965 R. 1254 2 October 1965 IMMEDIATE N ENTIA 1061S CONFIDENTIAL Niktaas/ Jer Addressed to The Hague telegram No. of 2 October Repeated for information te: Foreign Office Grateful if you would pass the following message urgently te the Netherlands Foreign Office from the Netherlands Ambassador, Djakarta. Text begins:- Situation confusing. Breakdown of interior and exterior communications. Djakarta town quiet with some military movements. As far as is knom Netherlands Gommunity sound and safe. Ends. Foreign Office please pass Immediate to The Hague. DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES: S.E.A.D. Private Secretary F.E.D. P.U.S. Communications Dept. Lord Hood News Department Head of S.E.A.D. Head of Communications Dept. Resident Clerk === [PDF page 4] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Gypher/OTP FO/CRO/WE DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Ne, 2007 D. 1152 2 Octeber, 1965. 2 Octeber, 1965, R. 1252 2 October, 1965. Oy a Lut (A) E i MMEDT ATS CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to The Hague telegram No, 34 ef 2 Octeber Repeated for information to:- Fereign Office Please pass follewing from Netherlands Embassy to Netherlands Fereign Office, Situation at 1400 hours 2 October after outbreak "30 September movement" unclear, 2. Reperts of evening 1 Octeber that “movement” suppressed end legal authority restored by Majer-General Suharto, one of Yani's adjuncts seem premature, 5. Central Java, notably Diponegore division, elements Presidential Guard, and Air Ferce seem favourably disposed te "movement", Suppesal Army units in Djakarta divided. Contradictery Antara repert on appointment of a supreme commander other than | Swharte by President adds to confusion, 4, Mere serious-seems complete absence of any authority at this moment, Dwikera Cabinet seems non-existent which, with discord in the Army, causes fear of civil war or at any rate Complste chaes, Only Sukarno might be capable of saving situation, His silence ceuses fear for his health and safety not excluding possibility ef death, Some Western colleagues - I om inclined to agree - however consider it more probable that President is alive, He might sit on the fence awaiting develepments in typical Javanese fashion, 5. Accordingly dangerous situation equally to be feared as Indon- ¢sian compromise re-establishing status que without giving solutions, Ominous P.K.T. initiative supperting "30 September" apparently premoting discord in Army, None of Commnist leaders present at poorly attended 1 Octeber Chinese reception, FASSEEBR°%, TBs sens, mediate, CRO, Feed aot Foe pat P. Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 5] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate! CONEIDENTIAL @ SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Set NA ENE bet bent VIAL 1935 | soc | Dei015/1.' rrom {.) A Lebel o SUBJECT: bee pg net Ma rehash flor", got | Topo s~- Cukecwnda thik, Neutome No. QOoT. forty ayhtul, F oe;: oe fom: Dated a. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: sia pepianniniemsieiauntiniieniguial Jageee Received © Beto (Outward Action) bee '(F IQ,: or Soe | ete aa ; MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action a a completed) (Main Indexed) | As bo fer Lage === [PDF page 6] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist Ne, 2009 D. 1235 2 Octeber, 1965, 2 October, 1965. R. 1358 2 October, 1965. PRIORITY. CONFIDENTIAL Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No, 2009 ef 2 Octeber Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur Wellington Singapore Canberra OA repay. POLAD Singapore Ottawa sé */ Washington Si wis My telegrams Nes. 1999-2001: Indonesian Coup. It is increasingly clear that the military faction now in process of asserting its power represents the Conservative Army's Generals, with Suharto in operational charge and Nasution supporting in the wings, 2. Whether the Commnists masterminded the original Palace guard plot, or whether they merely sought to take advantage of it afterwards, the present impression is that they have failed badly and have gone underground, They have stirred up a revolt in central Java and they are still able to maintain some degree of street warfare in Djakarta; but their prospects of gaining control now seem slight. 3. In order to establish the legitimate nature of their claim to take charge of the Government, the General's party led by Suharto is compelled to assert loyalty to existing legal authority as represented by President Sukarno, It is not thought that in doing se they intend to allew the President any real power or to keep his position fer long. (Information from Japanese Ambassador.) 4. According to what the Japanese Ambassador rates as very reliable information, Suharto is determined to exclude Omar Dani (main confrontation Commander on military side) and Subandrio (main confrontation Manager on political side) frem effice. He may even imprison or shoot then, 5. We will report what news appears in the Press and assume you will contime to receive full monitoring of Indonesian broadcasts, Foreign Office please pass Washington 119, Canberra 80, Wellington 46, Ottawa 11. [Repeated as requested, ] SSSSS CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 7] === ONFIDENTIAL % FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/ OTP Sir A. Gilchrist FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION No, 2014 BP. 1650 2 Octeber 1965 2 Ooteber 1965 R. 1857 2 OCcteber 1965 iddressed te Fereign Office telegram No, 20 ef 2 @cteber Repeated fer information te: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapere POLAD Singapere Washingten Wellingten Canberra Ottawa CONFIDENTIAL My immediately preceding telegram: Indenesia, 0165 This fits in quite well with my telegram Ne. 2009, re 26 It leeks as theugh Sukarne was reused te action by steries about the alleged Generals* coup and then had second thoughts heping, as on previeus eccasions,te let events werk fer him by assuming a passive attitude, But this time he has not been allewed te revert to an active rele - se far, anyhew - and the generals, se slew and reluctant te move against Sukerne, have been geaded inte whet leeks like victery. 3e iI heard the army firing after Omar Dani and am serry they missed. I cannet understand Nasutien's invitation te him te attend a Cabinet meeting, uniess it is a fere-warning of seme ghastly menifestatien ef Musjiwarah [sic] which will even pring Subandrie back just when we theught he was sunk = Ged ferbid.- But nete that ugly “if any" in(f). FPereign Office pass Washingten 121, Canberra 82, Wellingten 48, Ottawa 13. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 8] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Hp, Clair FO/CRO, DISTRIBUTION * A, Gilchrist No, 201 D. 0707 3 October, 1965. 3 October, 1965. R, 0913 3 October, 1965. PRIORITY Addressed _ to Fereign Office telegram No, 2018 of 3 October Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur Canberra Singapore Wellington dy 015g _ POLAD Singapore Ottawa Se Washington My telegram No. 201,. pw) BH ser nas) With Antara out of action and surrounded by troops, the following is the best we can do to set out sequence of events, 2. On Saturday evening Sukarne presided over a Koti meeting at Beger, Those present were Nasutien (Defence), Martadinata (Navy), Omar Dani (Air), Sudjipte (Police) and Leimena (second Vice-Premier), 5. At midnight Brigadier Saour, Commander of President's bodyguard (i.e, UNTUF’s senior officer but not associated with him) read a statement ef which the following are the main points: (a) A Koti meeting had been held, (b) The President was in personal control of the armed forces. (c) The President had ordered an investigation into the political forces behind the 30 September coup, (d) The appointment of General Pranote Reksesamedra to handle the day to day business of the army was confirmed, (e) The legality and correctness of all Suharto's actions were confirmed, (f) Suharte was appointed to restore law and order, 4. later, Sukarno made a very short speech in which he endorsed the points in the preceding paragraph but also found time to call on the people to stand firm behind the Dwikora (crush Malaysia) Cabinet and resist the NECOLIM, He expressed warm thanks to Suharto for his actions. 5. There follewed two statements en behalf of the Air Ferce: First the original statement by Omar Dani asseciating himself in effect with the coup; /Second one === [PDF page 9] === Dijakarta telegram No, 2018 to Fereign Office othe Second one "correcting" the first and lining Omar Dani up with he other commanders of the armed forces, 6. Finally Suharto himself spoke briefly, endorsing Sukarno's Statement and confirming that the President was in full command of the armed services, SSSSS === [PDF page 10] === UONFLIUVENTI AL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE [Unreadable] Sir Ae Gilchrist Ne. 2019 De 1644 3 Octeber,, 1965 3 Octeber, 1965 Re 1934 3 October;. 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL en wr fuer lt) Addressed te Fereign Office telegram Ne. 2019 ef 3 October. Repeated fer infermatien te: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapere Singapere Washingten DI toy Canberra Wellingten ‘eG Ottawa My telegram Ne. 2014 - Indenesia. These statements are new suspect. There are indicatiens that ne such cabinet meeting teek place, that Omar Dani was net present, that his seeend "cerrecting" statement was a gambit against the Air Ferce by the army leaders; and it is new said Omar Dani has jeined the rebels in Central Java. It is alse theught that Nasutien has net left the Kestrad H.Q. during the last three days. 26 A repert received frem a friendly Embassy says that at the real Beder meeting, Seekarne himself was firmly in centrel. Suharte was present and asked fer autherity te act against the PKI. Seekarne said this was a pelitical matter quite beyend Suharte's cempetence. If this is true it weuld indicate that the President is wriggling hard against the men whe are suppesed te have saved him, and is trying te re-establish his eld balancing pesitien. 36 The ether arm ef the balance, hewever, is net clearly visible at the mement, except in se far as it is represented by the treuble in Central Javae The Cemmunist leaders have been reperted at a seaside resert near Sukabumg and there is nething te be seen as yet in Djakarta te cenfirm reperts ef large scale issues ef arms te Cemmunist cadres; ner have any strikes been called. The pepulatien ef Djakarta remains calm, theugh apprehensive. The pelice are en nermal duty, the traffic is thin, prices are high (but peeple are paying them); and if the heavy ferees new in the capital censist ef twe military factiens cenfrenting each ether, my Attachés are net _ Capable ef distinguishing between them. The enly new actien teday “> has been against Antare's head effice, presumably it is being purged. de Thus, the preceding paragraph weuld be censistent with the /theery CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 11] === CONFIDENTIAL 4 ' Diakarta telegram Ne. 2019 te Fereign Office theery that even if the radie reperts are, te seme extent, fabricatiens, they are nevertheless the eutput ef a well established military cemmander whe has sufficient centrel ef Seekarne te be able te dictate what he says, and whe is using Seekarne te give himself legal cever in a struggle against subversien and rebellien. be Certainly the Generals have geed reasen te wish te take a firm line. Nasutien’s daughter is new reperted te have died ef her weunds, and it is new regarded as certain that Yani{ sic] was among the six generals murdered en Thursday night - his bedy is said te hae been mutilated. 6. My telegram Ne. 2021 centains an acceunt ef the ceup as given te twe "Paris Match" cerrespendents teday by Celenel Abu Jamal, Deputy Cemmander ef the Djakarta military district, fermerly Military Attaché in Paris. It dees net settle the questien whether Suharte er Seekarne is in charge, but it prevides useful backgreund in the sense ef being the efficial Suharte line. The cerrespendents saw a line ef Untung'’s men ceming in as priseners. As fer Jamal's view ef the situatien in Central Java, an American, whe has just driven te Djakarta frem Seurabaya threugh many read blecks, reperts streng pre-Untung feeling in that area. Fereign Office pass Washingtem 123, Wellingten 51, Canberra 61, Ottawa 15. === [PDF page 12] === % FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair Sir Ae Gilchrist ‘ No.2021 De 14.15 3 ee 1965 3° Octeber 1965 Re 8909 2 Ooteber IEF 10 of 144() PRIORITY Aadaressed toe Forei office telegram Ne 2021 of 3 October Repeated for infermstion to: Kuala Lumpur Canberrs POLAD Singapore Wellington yv BGRAI Singapore Ottawa Washington lope Follewing is repert referred to in my telegram Nos 20 e7. Infermant stated that Untung was @ military adventurers. His forces had never been large, apart ef the Palace Guard, some elements well dispesed te him whe had come down from Jogjakarta fer the 5 October celebrations, a few efficers in Djakarta whe had failed to bring their units with them put had enrelied some yolunteers. These yolunteers had been given arms, including heavy armS» They had, however, been easily evercome and the arms recovered, The clash near the Hetel Indenesia on 1 Octeber had been between regular treeps and these volunteers. 29, The generals had reasserted their authority in Djakarta by mideday Friday, and all Untung’s men in Djakarta had new peen reunded Up. Untung himself was in flight, but would soon be taken although he might make @ fight & ite 3, Nasution had escaped the kidnapping and had made his way to Kestrad, where he had been since. He had decided that it was inappropriate fer him, as Minister, te take eperatienal cemmand, and the senier officers present in Djakarta had elected Suharte whe was, in fact, the mest senior, to take command. ‘The fate of Jani and the ether kidnapped generals was & secret, (this may mean that they are: knewn te be dead, but that it head been decided not te.divulge this in order net to excite the army) « Jeo === [PDF page 13] === am Ni 21 to Fore Of * 4.0 Sukarno had spent the night of Thursday/Friday with Medame Dewi in Djakarta. On Friday morning he had been taken by members of the palace guard, who are neither pro - nor anti - Untung to Bogor, where he had remained since, 5. In the course of Friday, the generals had obtained the support of the political parties. They had also received the support of the other armed forces, Informant refused to be drawn about Omar Dani and the air force, The long list of members of the Revolutionary Council, published by Untung, had been intended to cause confusion, and had had some success outside Djakarta, 6. Informant said not much was known of what had gone on in Central and East Javea, They had, however, received a message from Jogjakarta early this morning to the effect that all forces in the region had now rallied to General Suharto, 7. Asked about support for Untung's movement from outside Indonesia, informant said that a certain power might have helped the rebels, === [PDF page 14] === CONFIDENTIAL TA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Ome oTP Sir A, Gilchrist FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION 12 2015 D. 1618 2 October 1965 @ October 1965 R. 1754 2 October 1965 Repeated fer information te: BGRAI Singapere POLAD Singapere Att Kuala Lumpur Washington OS /t4 9 ’ Canberra Wellingten Ottawa My telegram Ne, 2009: Indonesia Coup fhe follewing is an account ef the erigins and present pesition frem a well informed quarter:- a) Sukarne, under heavy pressure from Aidit and Omar Dani, was te have denounced the Generals during his speech on Thursday evening 50 September te anticipate an anti-PKI putsch by the Generals abeut 5-6 Octeber, Sukarne vacillated, did net speak as expected and, after his return te the palace was "persuaded" to ge with Omar Dani te Halim Air Base at [gps, undee.], where he was held, but refuses to issue any decree against the Generals, Omar Dani and Colonel Untung went ahead without him and preclaimed the Revolutienary Ceuncil, On Priday morning they summoned Mertadinata, whe went te Halim in his helicepter te discuss the situatien, in view ef impending army counter moves under Suharte, Martadinata had nething pesitive te recemmend, but agreed te talk te the Arny. The situation remained uncertain all Friday, By 8 p.m, on Friday the Kiyang battalicn of the Siliwangi Divisien arriver at Halim Air Base and invested it under command ef @ Lieutenant (General Adjie apparently is still away and Celenel Selichin may have been in everall command ef this eperatien). They took Sukarne back te his palace in Begor on Priday night, Untung made his escape and Omer Dani is believed te have flewn eff in a T.V.14 at about 2,50 a.m, teday, when there was heavy A.A, fire. Nasution has summoned a meeting eof Keti (War Cabinét se te speak) fer tenight 2 Octeber with Omar Dani, Martadinata and Sutjipte (pelice commander) at Beger, Nasutien Slightly weunded has been with Suharte at [gp.undec] H.Q. near the Shell building. GONPIDENTIAL /e) Subandrie === [PDF page 15] === @ = telegram Ne, 2013 to Fereign Office ¢) Subendrie made a telephone call from Medan te Suharte to ask about returning to Djakarta but Suharte has net yet autherised this. f) action, if any, te be taken against PKI in this matter is still being considered, See my immediately fellowing telegraz. Pereign Office please pass Washingten 120, Wellingten 47, Canberra 81, Ottawa 12, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 16] === SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ER LDUT LON Sir A. Gilchrist D. 1421 2 Octeber, 1965 No. 2012 R. 1507 2 October, 1965 2 October, 1965 PRIORITY SECRET Lip, é Addressed to Roreign 0 fice telegram No. 2012 of 2 Octeber Repeated for information to:- POLAD Singapore My immediately fell ing telegram contains information obtained from an Indonesian Naval Officer in direct Personal contact with Martadinata and I believe it te be reliable se far as his field of view extends, Please de not disclose source, DISTRIBUTED TO S.E.A.D. JoM.I.D. Defence Dept === [PDF page 17] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE kn Clair F WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist lio. 20.6 5 October 1965 - iT ORITY D: 1214 5 October 1965 R: 2000 5 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2016 of 5 October kepeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore And Saving to: SH iy, Washington Canberra 3 jellington Ottawa My telegram No. 2018: Attempted Coup. A second meeting took place at Bogor on 4 October. Sabur's report of it &s given on Radio indonesia, says that Subandrio, leimena and " Heads of Armed Forces" were present. It was decided that the President would be personaily responsible for 30 September affair". 2e There is to be a meeting of the Cabinet at Bogor tomorrow, 6 October. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington NOe 422, Wellington No. 82, Canberra No. 90, Ottawa No. 6; === [PDF page 18] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE @*: Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilehrist D. 0747 6 October, 1965 No. 20 R. 0900 6 October, 1965 6 October, 1965 DMMEDIATE >) bép 10° tfxa(p). Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2053 of 6 October Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur, POLAD Singapore, BGRAI Singapore, Washington, Canberra, Wellington umcliyg and Ottawa. My telegram No. 2046 = Attempted Coup. According to reliable Western Press correspondents (a) Sukarno was in fine form at this mean s Cabinet meeting in Bogor (b) Njoto and Lukman (Nos 1 and 2 in the Indonesian Gommnist party) were present. 2, The @rrespondents actually spoke to Sukarno, ADVANCE COPIES Private Secretary Sir B. Burrows Mr Peck Sir J. Nicholls Head of S.E.A.D. Head of News Dept === [PDF page 19] === 19 [Handwritten in red ink on a blue file slip:] No slip attached from CB === [PDF page 20] === log Lud Registry | Top-Seere= Seeret> / Confidential | asreme: awe Draft. na cae 1% be oe (Date) Yo Bcm And to if Repeat to:— Frr-Ctarr. Cette Cypher Distribution:— SEkD Thi Dd ‘AD News Copies to:— IRD aren aang PRIORITY ROGFINE ith priority ithout Security vert —if any [Codeword—if any] Address to Sukahuo s Speer, Ov ther schong Oneeg. Did—Sotcorn Vo Hie ny so Sp Teubor Trt uw he wae Cok, Ul oe whl Lakug big peer, al Tak de was tevusd mo [ucjent (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 === [PDF page 21] === u (eX ous u dt Sukarno say ang tC ng 5 Sul oCance rol what war te orasion fe Gavi LM Lie Dp, & lifomol, Fcre bby Nou DW ‘ === [PDF page 22] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL No. 1812 8 October, PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Your telegram No. 2013 [of 2 October], sub-paragraph (a). Sukarno's speech on Thursday evening, 30 September. Is there any truth in Press reports that he was taken ill while making his speech and that he was revived with injections? Did Sukarno say anything of substance and what was the occasion? DISTRIBUTED TO:- S.E.A.D. JM.1I.D. I.R.D. LePeDs JeR.D. News Dept. SSSSS === [PDF page 23] === oat (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) ew 1; IMENTAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROM J. hAhhint, | SUBJECT: No. Qoro Dated QF Qetoboa, Received Lk Ueket ov (Outward Action) én /xs-> Cf <e pe) Leste (Printing Instructions) Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action Main Indexed) MINUTES === [PDF page 24] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJ TA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/ OTP Sir A, Gilchrist FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION No. 2010 2 Gcteber 1965 D. 1355 2 Octeber 1965 R. 1610 2 Octeber 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Repeated fer infermatien te: LAD Singapere Bangkek Manila My immediately preeeding telegram (net te Bangkek and Manila): Indonesian Ceup. My American celleague is under pressure frem Washingten te evacuate staff and cemmunity dependents. He is in twe minds abeut Pre. This may be a good time befere things get werse; Cen. But things are net really bad eneugh te justify evacuatien now, and the Indenesians (whe have fergetten the existence ef foreigners fer 48 hours) may turn against the Americans if they Graw attentien te themselves in this way. 26 I see ne need te evacuate eur ewn Embassy staff, male er female. Our dependents are feur wives, whe are very willing te stay. As regards the very small British cemmunity, ne actien needed at present except te advise them te keep eff the streets and ebserve the curfew, Se My Japanese celleague is acting as in paragraph 2. 4h. Beeause ef the break down of cemmunicatiens, we cannet be in teuch with the Censulates in Surabaya and Medan; but there have been no reperts ef diserders in these twe tewns, === [PDF page 25] === Registry cot Date eset Mite GW T.) telegranmy should reach airesseh(s) ERS knee sy ‘ <- ce Top Secret bere IMMEDIATE $§ Confidential PRIORITY Restricted 3 Secret with Open ———-priority DEFERRED Draft. Security classification [Unreadable] [Codeword—if any] Address to (Date) bury 65- : telegram No. And to:— “7 Repeat to:— POLAp/ Singap 118 En Clair. Code Cypher Distribution:— F.0./C.R.0./ Copies to:— (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw === [PDF page 26] === og CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN -OF FICE TO-DJAKARTA [Unreadable] No, 1757 D. 14.37 4 October, 1965 k October, 1965 IRTLY CONF DISTAL Addressed to Dijskarta a_telegram Ho, 1757 of 2 eobers POLAD Singapere, Your telegram No, 2010 [of 2 Octeber]: Disturbances in Indonesia, © agree with you that there is ne need te cmsider evacuation et present and are content te leave it te you te advise us if the situation changes, 2. We are most grateful for your full and useful reporting, Best wishes te yourself, your steff and their families in this trying Ssituatia, Guu === [PDF page 27] === ronle a ny aed Ls A St atret 20M No Qos G6 Dated 3 at SO Received & QtA_ (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) SOUTH-EAST HNL i VES] SUBJECT: Encloses Copy of: ASIA DE (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate (PARTMENT “DH 0tsIis: References and Relevant Papers: (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Ae iafe | 5 (Main Indexed) MINUTES === [PDF page 28] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE it iyc/ Ea Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Ne. 2016 3 October 1965 D. 0325 3 Octeber 1965 R. 0850 3 October 1965 IMMEDIATE ddressed te Forei ce tele No 6 of teber. Repeated for ormation te: pere. The B.B.C.‘s account of conditions in Djakarta as given in radio newsreel at 14152 on 2 Octeber was so highly coloured that staff relatives in England may be alarmed and inclined te telephene the office, certainly there are quite a let ef treeps on view but they all seem cheerful and well-disposed, ne member of my staff has yet seen a dead bedy in the streets, there are none. 2. Danger te security may arise from present very serious interruption ef rice supplies which if continued thr military tension might lead te rieting. But the Gevernor of Djakaréa 2 ey 2 -_ man, has remained at his pest throughout and is deing his best. 3. The 12-hour curfew and the dead telephones greatly reduce our mobility te obtain and repert hot news. VANCE COPIES Head ef S.E.A.D. Head of J.M.I.D. Head ef Personnel Dept. Resident Clerk Head ef I.P.Dept. Head ef News Dept. === [PDF page 29] === 29 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 2 where Appropriafe) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROM £2 (li, Meuut | SUBJECT: bey Sear ° ie sccm Fotis: ap Ofna Mintes, é & 2 { es cas OArke, Z ee Dated ( (Ceebas Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received thstfas (Outward Action) “o Vo gre dee MINUTES eo eX (Referred to Legal Adviser) olan (Main Indexed) Profs qa === [PDF page 30] === Ayu uc fs 30 oe e WV submer7 a dagger Qrvdane Cake grou ou idomrna. Thi D Coocr. 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O} O ee > Bot wt 2 Kor Sear GC [Unreadable] t) rf) bp aN cy Cu ~ pie S te rt S, Gg +»! gs et +: O Sy c = oe «= [Unreadable] 4 “4 ‘oH 42 H q) >) opt > ct QO [Unreadable] === [PDF page 33] === Annee ae pee iD rN FOR LGN etn OE C mT --34 Gia Ts is Lin: << _ eee ee TT 49 We Tele grap Ueie Mis amen asa ee ankara pier Hong Kong Bonn Cai Canberra Wellington Djakarta Mew Delhi TO Katmandu Karachi Manila Kuala Lumpur BGR..I Singapore Saigon POL:D Singapor Brunei TFB i aa Khartoum Fat Oe Uttawa Col Lombo surviving control === [PDF page 34] === Djakarta, tatements calling for an end staten Sukarno to and appointing Gene Suharto satore order, is still confused and incertain, but most of the Army, pome a ind one sian ohn (although the par ewspaper initially supporte Untung). that Untung and his military c fenturers who may well have the Communists, but that the without direct munist partici- Generals who now their authority succeed j nsolidating orces and in ir ascendancy the dominant cont continuing In private a ov ernne === [PDF page 35] === Cypher/OTP and By Bag FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMON. EALTH RELATIONS OFF wee ee By Telegraph: UKMis New York (and Itmediate for Secretary of State) Ankara Peking Bonn Rangoon The Hague Saigon Paris POLAD Singapore Rome Tokyo Moscow POLAD Hong Kong B,I.S. New York Canber Beirut Vellington Tehran New Delhi Algiers Karachi Cairo Kuala Lumpur Bangkok B.G.R.A.I,. Singapore Dijakarta Kuching Katmandu oesselton Manila Brunei (Personal) {411 Priority] Athens Addis Ababa Brussels Ottawa Stockholn Colombo Mexico City £ccra POMEC (Aden) Dar es Salaan Lagos F,0./C,R.0,/H DISTRIBULION D. 20,55 6 October, 1965 Guidance No, in Jndonesia tiil at his palace at Rogor near D jakarta, he army Generals who escaped assassination on the night of 30 September are wvilling permit him to return to cere a where he would have airsct aucess to the Indonesian Press and Radio. ion (Defence Minister) and Suharto, who has been /appointed === [PDF page 36] === ATT TTATITIT CONF IDENTTAL Vit tat ta FO, and C,R.O, Guidance No. 399 appointed by Sukarno to restore security, are firmly in control of Djakarta, antara the official Indonesian news agency, which was under strong Communist influencé, and the Communist Party newspaper Harjan Rakjat have been closed dom, Four of Indonesia's nine political parties have publicly called for the banning of the Communist Party and Communist Front Organisations, 2, The Army Generals are no doubt incensed at the assassination of their colleagues and are building up as much popular support as they can both within the Army and outside, by propaganda and demonstrations, A State military funeral has been given for the murdered Generals and Sukarno has paid his first tribute to them as "Heroes of the Revolution". Sukarno's position has however been seriously compromised by his statement on 3 October that he went voluntarily to the rebel-held Air Base at Halim near Djakarta on 1 October, It was in a well at Halim Air Base that the mutilated corpses were later recovered when the Base was captured by srmy units, 53. The situation outside Djakarta is still obscure. There are reports of rebel units, with PKI support, gathering in Central Java and clashes have been reported between loyal troops md rebels, The loyalties of lower and middle rank Army officers are difficult to judge, The revolt at the naval base at Surabaya last February was due partly to personal grievances, partly to political discontent, A similar situation is thought to exist in some measure in the Army, aS for the other ranks, though they may be considerably more penetrated by the PKI., they may be expected to obey orders initially. 4. The crucial question still remains whether the Generals will pluck up enough courage to take decisive action against the PKI, if necessary disobeying Sukarno who is exerting every charm and pressure to preserve national unity, To-day's Cabinet meeting at Bogor may provide some indication of the ability of the Generals to influence Sukarno, The news that Sukarno is holding a press conference at the same time suggests however that he may be regaining his personal ascendancy, 5, The above is primarily for your backgroud information, You should continue to be guided by the instructions in the last paragraph of Guidance wae: re CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 37] === York Gul ’ Won LLU ii’e ™T C\NT iufit LLON oR as [In ncea1a ponn TY rt nome F538 wet E61TuUt Cairo Katmandu Stockho renn« CQUUd mins LvUU 402 7 4065 UGtODET, i AVS wid UKaTno iiwUs and ole she J LIV ii the inaones October as DY 49 pice PIC aALS { TNE thira in Omer Vilat aT ND? TNT LUPuN iJ —— ee ee si44 OFFICE TO CERTAIN ymr mm ail ader secn resen- NOW or Yrep ran MAd. Ly Aihanc WUC condemned "40th so urged had ed the had /the Viswv conter aiding === [PDF page 38] === AANGETDEAMT AT UV INE + LU ihiN J PLA ee ee rom ialism, Col would be 5 c a rin wor ees -Colon [Unreadable] LLU & ul LOVV aA Od [Unreadable] . cat ~ Pie ee a was pr mari ly anx1lous + )ha7 nnaAaceniri ry oh thus preserving n meeting is now indepe known, 1 ‘ ma a A Cw Lo irmy, althouch they TL LLY 9 ati tno ugi vii) [Unreadable] OW Oiln;0 ’ maintal lama Fron Ole oa7 [Unreadable] spendent position. In particular, they are and demonstrations, to 4 Uvs wb making S10 & ai a ~~ Q cy ‘ta on o October, Nrac ntancr. ot ant a + presenting most ant i-Commn bald organisations of the PKI, launchi ing the evidence enerals are r strong cher the capaci \ATTO GWU Y with £ CONAN - ULs nn wVilo LOn === [PDF page 39] === No. (oufles Dated at. iP { Received 5 Abt, (Outward Action) 39 D where App riate) ee re See d vl [) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT — q E [Unreadable] SUBJECT: tL References and Relevant Papers: ‘aT ae -[ 133 === [PDF page 40] === Dp b- S in ¢ Mm ct QO Was one peo} le with were ul CLNeMSeLy derived a support OmisSation +urT oO Oy pe tween VWOlD DE Wlit volution among RESTRICTED === [PDF page 41] === ation's Minis jlonti: QenbveLlars ist Par Vol USil 27) === [PDF page 42] === 5 7; ): 17 HVLC One oO Wwilllicie Lbilit;; ritish to clear INnStaLlatilonse gir de ke nn Ein any yendcent Countr sserv choices. necolim and nat arm #4 nite e 1 Snc continue Symod011 Zing wARA|e 14 cw l ac y oras as Weii as rove itselI to de a 4nadone sia: pe Watcouin [Unreadable] Lorvoacomineg egotlations very CiOselye === [PDF page 43] === Editorial fro cent WULUUCII LS === [PDF page 44] === —--* CL, Tort No. (dccfex Dated 94 Aeptr ty Received — Gtk (Outward Action) 44 (Security eae ae be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Di i0isliss SUBJECT: Reermnssins OLE Aero ating HT ‘o sep el ass Se as pe AT Ankh Htffe, te,, Nett Robes he eyeleenins Adtyeclitien ef CRA poke. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: —firz ~(132 -(1249 === [PDF page 45] === _ o+< ~~ a a be ow bk ee 4 ef ns a; 2 oo.: os [Unreadable] / a mm 2 - SO es ¢ - A Peres [Unreadable] === [PDF page 46] === mond Rien, S) pokate Received S Qutsh., (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) >| ie dale D SECRET SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT DHlorslise SUBJECT: Mataitsicnce (Pe) fatcnifatinn 2 Aetiing mrerina Onna HMoferal of otheo Go-nraly 2. tr de fis of Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers MINUTES === [PDF page 47] === ~e CONFIDENTIAL ft ja for FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2026 . October 1965 4 October 1965 1 October 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office tele No. 2026 of tober. epea or ormation to: a BGRAT Singapore Wellington POLAD Singapore Ottawa Washington Attempted Coup. It is still difficult to determine the degree of La eee ge of the P.K.I. (Commnist) leaders in the Untung Movement and kidnapping (and almost certainly mrder) of the other Generals. (It is possible that our ignorance on this is shared by many of the Indonesian participants in the present crisis). The main evidence against the Communists is a front page article in their newspaper Herian Rakjat of 2 October commending Untung’s action to safeguard the President of the Republic of Indonesia from a oat by the Committee of Generals; end cartoons in the same edition showing Generals being firmly dealt with by the 30 September Movement and depicting American involvement in the elleged Generals’ coup. 2. Suhartp end the military establishment in Djakarta are busy trying to pin full responsibility on the P.K.I. Today's edition of one of the only two newspapers at present allowed, and both under Army control, carries on its front page, without comment, photographs of the six Generals believed to have been murdered - anid insignificant juxtaposition below them a re tion of the offending extracts from Harian Rak Rajkat (and also of an item in similar terms from Warta Bhakti of 1 October). Foreign Office please pass to Washington 126, Canberra 86, Ottawa 17 and Wellington 53. === [PDF page 48] === Cypher/OorP SHORET eee ee PROM DJAKARTA “TO-FOREIGN Sir A, Gilchrist Wo. 203) D, 10.46 & October, 1965 k October, 1965 R. 13.53 4 October, 1965 ai ED TAL Is Addressed _to HQ FEAF Singapore (POLAD please; pass) teleszram lio, Ak “1002 of 4 October, Repeated for information to: MOD (Air) Foreign Office FEAF for CIO, MOD (Air) for DI 2 from Air Attaché Djakarta, Subject coup. Difficult at this stage to assess extent AURI involvement 30 September affair, where loyalties now lie or current operational effectiveness, This is an initial attempt, 2, Clear that Qmar Dani was one of ring-leaders and there are even reports that AURI PGI troops were involved in the kidnapping and/or murder of generals at Halim, There is no doubt that Yeni and others were murdered, as fumeral has been announced for tomorrow, 3, Omer Deni initially annomced support for Lt, Col, tntung. This was retracted following day by Kommodor Andoko (presumably temporary AURT C,~in-C,) and this demial confirmed in President's second. short radio announcement of this moming. But this may be gambit to prevent its disintegration and isolation from other services, 4. Four C 130 are reported to have left Halim for Djakarta middey 2 October carrying Gnar Dani, Untung, Heru, plus supporters end families, Probable that sympathizers, like Wattimena, Dewanto, Sufono (of PGT not AURI Int, as reported in my AA 1001) and others may e@lso have taken opportunity to get out of Djakarte, 5, Bvident, therefore (if my information is correct), that AURI split dow middle and in disarray, strug le for jobs said to be going on between Makki, Sri, Muljono, Suharnoko and Andoko, all thought to be enti-Commmist, AURI activity over Dgakarta ceased three days ago and I would say that as an operational force it must for the time being be considered ineffective, /6, Little S DORET === [PDF page 49] === 2031 to Foreign Office 6, Little activity at Kemajoran this moming, Three Af vehicles surround control tower but no new AA defences visible, Aireraft sighted inelude two naval Ii, 28 (502, 507) plus three AURT Dakotas and solitary B25, AURI dispersal contains two TU 16 and number of Migs type unidentified, probably 17, (- Ambassador requests political distribution through Foreign Office, Foreign Office please pass MOD (Air), [Transmitted to MOD), ADVANCE COPIS: FiO. Private Secretary P.US. ir, Peek Head of S.E.A.D, Head of P,U.S.D, Head of IRD, Head of News Dept, Cah eOe Head of Far Rast and Pacific Dept. Head of J,M.I.D, === [PDF page 50] === FO/CRO/WH_ DISTRIBUTION d) H ors Djakarta telegram No.2051 ef 4 October to Foreign Office. Coup d’état in Indonesia Paragraph 4 line 1: for "Djakarta" please read "Jogjakarta". Communications Department 6 October, 1965 === [PDF page 51] === CONFIDENTIAL ®» FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/ OTP hy 10 PA - ] g) Sir A, Gilehrist FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION lo, 2032 h October 1965 D. 1437 4 October 1965 R. 1856 October 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL essed to For 0 tele No, 20 of October Repeated for information to: ‘Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore by 101% [ st POLAD Singapere Washington > hee My telegram No. 2026; Attempted coup. Wellington Ottawa Canberra The follewing pictures might fit the facts but please remember how shert we are of reliable facts:- (i) Sukarne is at Bogor, pretected by his personal bodyguard (Tjakra Birawa), more or less a private army, These in turn are surreunded by a cerden ef Suharte's treeps, (ii) He is trying for personal and perhaps patrietiec reasons te paper ever the cracks and te re-establish the pelitiecal unity ef Indonesia, (iii) Te de this he must inhibit the army's revenge-motive and rehabilitate first the air force and second the P.K.i. There are indications that he is trying te de just that. (iv) The army (in the form of Nasutien and Suharte) [gp. undec. tnew] firmly established in Djakarta. (v) Maintaining the curfew and the telephone black-out, they are engaged in smoking out the Communists, particularly armed enes, and in mobilizing suppert fer themselves by demonstrations and prepaganda such as the big funeral fer Yani and the ether Generals. They are finding out how far their writ runs in other parts ef Indonesia, Se far they have been able te ensure enough ceeperatien »- from the President in the way ef public statements, etc., te give them full legal and constitutional cever. (NB. Sukarne's second statement was even nore grudging than his first and had ne kind werds fer the army.) /(viii) The Generals CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 52] === CONFIDENTIAL Djakarta telegram Ne, 2032 to Foreign Office (viii) The Generals are se incensed against the murderers of their friends that, at any rate fer the present, they are full ef ambition to destrey the influence cf the P.K.I. (ix) Sheuld Sukarne play them false, they have a large detachment ef tanks en the outskirts ef Djakarta which ceuld reach Beger in four hours and everawe the bedyguard or kneck it te pieces; and in the meantime they prevent Sukarne frem having access te the publicity-making machinery in the capital. 26 It is well knewn that Sukarne can charm a bird out of a tree; and many well-qualified pelitical observers in Djakarta think he will again dedge the army. My present view is against that ef the said observers and gees aleng rather with that ef Marshall Green, namely, that the unprecedented brutality ef the P.K.I. will preve a decisive tactic in ensuring army deminatien ef Indonesian politics for seme time te cone, De The precess of asserting this demination may be difficult and prolonged, and during this time we may hope te see Indenesia'’s influence in werld affairs much reduced, he See my immediately follewing telegran. Pereign Office please pass Reutine Washingten 127, Wellingten 5, Ottawa 19, Canberra 87. === [PDF page 53] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP Sir A.Gilchrist D. 1318 4 October, 1965 R. 1710 4 October, 1965 by ba 16-57 1s6() CONFIDENTIAL Adaressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2033 of 4 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur ‘Wellington Singapore Canberra P.O.L.A.D. Singapore Ottawa Washington Pk es 4, My immediately preceding telegram: Attempted Coup. In conversation with a member of the Diplomatic Corps this morning, Hatta drew a parallel between the present events and the Madium uprising of 19,8, He said that what was required was the same in both cases; ruthless and immediate suppression of the Communists, He thought that on this occasion, howeyer, the army had unfortumately left it too late; they had given the Commmists time to make their dispositions. He was despondent about the likely course of events in Eastern Java. He said that the Diponegoro Division, which was likely to play a key TOle there, had a very high proportion of registered Commmnists in the ranks. Foreign Office please pass Washington 128, Wellington 55, Ottawa 20, Canberra 87, === [PDF page 54] === 7 FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICS kn Clair ) | # Clad BD eranth csp) Ful wid Lid 4 Se 2 Ua AUN A. Gilchrist J De 10.31 Re 18.37 5 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram Nose 2042 of 5 October Repeated for information to; Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore and Saving to: Washington Wellington cu fs [15 Canberra Ottawa My telegram No. 2032: Attempted Coup. The following is a summary of a report in “Berita Yudha" 5 October of a statement by Major-General Suharto. Those of us who saw the bodies of the murdered generals dug up can bear witness to the cruelty of the atrocities perpetrated by the barbarous adventurers of the so-called "September 30 Movement", It was evident from the state in which the seven bodies were found =< six generals and a first officer = that they had been tortured, The corpses were recovered from a well at the training centre of the A.U.ReIe Halim Air Base for men and women volunteers. These volunteers came from the Pemuda Rakjat (the Communist Youth Organization) and Gerwani (the Communist Women’s Movement). Given these facts it is pessible that our beloved President may be right when he says that A.U.Rele was not involved, but it is incongeivable that elements of A.U.Rel« were not involved in this massacre. If this is so, those members of A.U.R.I. who are true patriots should purge the others who were involved. Foreign Office please pass Saving Washington No. 419, Canberra No, 87, Wellington No. 79 and Ottawa No. 3. [Repeated as requested ] VVVVV === [PDF page 55] === FROM DJAKART& TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair f FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Ne. 20), D. 1159 5 Octeber 1965 5 October 1965 fou! Dale Ire z) R. 2005 5 Octeber 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram Neo. 201) ef 5 Octeber. Repeated fer information te; Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapere Bers and Saving te: Washington Canberra — Wellingten Ottawa My telegram Ne. 2032: Attempted Coup. Fellowing is text ef anneuncement by Sukarne during night of 3/1, Octeber. "The accusatiens against the Air Ferce being invelved in the se-called 30 September Movement are false. My departure te Halim Air Base en 1 Octeber was accerding te my own wishes, since I censidered it safest te be near aircraft which ceuléd take me te anether place if semething undesired happened. We have te remain vigilant, and prevent the Air Ferce and the Army taking actien against each ether. Only the Necelim ferces would prefit frem this. I erder all members ef the armed ferees and the peeple te remain united". Fereign Office please pass Saving te Washingten 421, Canberra 89, Wellingten 80 and Ottawa 5. === [PDF page 56] === AMENDMENT SLIP FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION 1 Office. Paragraph 4 line 1: for “Djakarta" please read “Jogjak: Communications De artnent 6 October, 1965 === [PDF page 57] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate! : SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT IIJOO)| INDONESIA | DH iOistTis. FROM ¢. A A hob, | SUBJECT: ie Bens Dated, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received Uh cb hs (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Pei Oo (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 58] === € FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE in Clair WHe DISTRIBUTION Sir Ae Gilchrist NOe 2025; De 06.47 4 October 1965 § October 1965 PtH 1olS/ rs |. Re 14.23 4 October 1965 PRIORITY Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2025 of 4 October Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore Kuala Lumpur Washington Invitations to attend the Indonesian Armed Forces Day celebrations on 5 and 6 October have been delivered to Embassies this morning, Monday. A large-scale ‘rehearsal is now gOing on. The invitations are in the name of Nasution. The one for 6 October (naval demonstration) say the President will be present, the one for the big parade on 5 October dees not mention hin. === [PDF page 59] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION a) ae Sir A. Gilchrist P Dfe 100 57 s2(4) Neo. 2030 D. 09.13 4& October, 1965 4 October, 1965 R. 15.42 & October, 1965 PRIORITY Ditters / ji Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2030 of 4 October, Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore Kuala Lumpur Washington My telegram No. 2025, The celebrations are not (repeat not) now going to be held. A State funeral for the murdered generals will be substituted, their bodies having now been discovered, Diplomats are not being invited. === [PDF page 60] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist D. 1603 5 October 1965 No. 2048 5 October 1965 R. 2125 5 October 1965 PRIORITY | et 10087157 ( 6). et ne ere Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 2038 of 5 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore OH io 1¢ ify BGRAI Singapore Washington 4 Wellington Canberra Ottawa My telegram No. 2030: Murdered Generals. Together with a handful of Western Ambassadors (French, American, Japanese, Belgian) I attended today the funeral rites of the dead Generals. The ceremonies (though appallingly slow) were simple and dignified, the final speeches consisting only of recitals of the careers of the dead, plus Muslim prayers. Only one volley is fired here at military funerals. 2. Nasution appeared at the prehiminary lying-in-state (I was not myself present at this but the Attachés were), he walked with sticks, in obvious pain and subject to great emotion. Suharto seemed more interested in ensuring the efficiency and security of the parade than in playing e prominent public part. 3. At the main funeral, the one and only person visible in Air Force uniform was Subandrio, a few others were seen earlier. We had been told he would make a speech, but he sefd only a few formal words, and his role seemed equivocal, He did not mix with the diplomats, nor did Suwito, who was the only representative of the Foreign Ministry other than the Protocol people, The latter were supported by Sukarno’s senior Palace Aidé who denied knowledge of Sukarno's whereabouts, 4. There was quite a sprinkling of senior Naval Officers, including Sjaaf but Martadinata was not present. Of senior political fisures, only Roeslan Abdulgani seemed to be given some degree of prominénce, no others were seen except the veteran Minister General Sarbini, who is said to be a Loyalist from Central Java. 5. Madame Yani was present, Madame Subandrio also. Madame Parman is in a state of collapse.: === [PDF page 61] === Dezarte telegram No, 2018 to Foreign Office 6. The entire town was covered with flags at half mast for the Generals, so that one could scarcely imagine any Communists remaining active anywhere. (but there are, and the police, who have worked admirably with the Governor throughout, know they have a big problem on their hands still). All the Youth Organizations which took part in the order of the funeral chanted “Ganyang PKI", and this was being taken up enthusiastically all along the streets through which they marched, === [PDF page 62] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Moe 2055 De. 11.51 6 October, 1965 6 October, 1965 Re 15.30 6 October, 1965 PRIORITY po) BH 1015/18 «) CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to MOD Army telegram No. 0607352 of 6 October. Repeated for information to FARELF Singapore (M.0.D. Army please pass). From MilAt for FAP, Sitrep. [ 2 I correct mine for 5 October, The six generals were accorded a State funeral. All were promoted one rank pesthumeusly _ and were made heroes. Russian and Chinese attachés were not seen. Tanks of 8 Cavalry Battalion, which had been deployed en approaches to Djakarta, were moved yesterday at 16.00 hours. There was no urgency about their moves and I conclude armour is being stood down and probably being held more concentrated. Infantry in small parties have [sic] taken in some places. There are ne reports of any armour leaving Djakarta. Saracens of / Cavalry Battalion are deployed around Medan Merdeka, In search operations around Djakarta, the Army are said to have recovered some arms previously acquired by youth organizations illegally. In the capital it seems that the Army is moving cautiously and deliberately. Army hewspapers, which are the only ones allowed at present, have fully exploited those Communist papers which on 2 October came out in support of the 30 September affair. it is very difficult to get anything out of Army officers, / liaison CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 63] === CONFIDENTIAL Diakarta telegram N 20 to Foreign Office Liaison staff are seldom in their offices and curfew prevents social contact. General Atjie is at Bandung occupied with maintaining law and order in West Java. it is believed that his troops provide an outer ring round the palace at Bogor. I will not send customary weekly newsletter to-day, as it will be out of date on arrival and will be repetition of what has already been sent to Foreign Office, Polad and MOD. Foreign Office pass MOD Army. [Transmitted to MOD for action and repetition]. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 64] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] FROM {., A Ry Lehre, SUBJECT: Me. q fp Areqewmessten Let 0 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) £07, aa 4 (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 65] === TOP COPY FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION geet ce HH 'ois/is’ Sir A. Gilchrist fs No. 2028 D. 1247 4 October, 1965. 4 October, 1965. R. 1735 4 October, 1965. PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Ottawa telegram No. 18 of 4 October Repeated for information to:- Foreign Office Please pass following from Canadian Ambassador, Djakarta, to External Ottawa. Begins: To avoid burdening other people's communications in absence of normal channels, I am limiting telegrams to matters of purely Canadian concern. From Press and broadcast reports (on the whole well balanced) and from British telegrams which I understand you are seeing, you will know that Djakarta is relatively quiet. However, some foreign broadcasts which I have heard may have created undue alarm about state of war, sporadic firing, troop movements and dusk to dawn curfew. All these are true enough but the normal life of the city goes on during the day. Firing is only occasional and, apart from the irritation of the curfew, our one real problem is lack of telephone and telegraph. This means we can have no (repeat no) word of Canadians outside Djakarta but we have no (repeat no) reason to believe they are in any difficulty. All Canadians in Djakarta (mostly Embassy staff) are safe and well. There is no (repeat no) anti foreign element in the present confusion and we, like all diplomatic missions, are carrying on undisturbed. Ends. Foreign Office pass Ottawa. [Repeated to External Ottawa. ] DISTRIBUTED TO:- S.E.A.D. News Dept. C.R.O. Atlantic Dept. News Dept. SSSSS === [PDF page 66] === DHiolsli eo Mirek ee petgny e fo bthere mt ely fe oan od t fartefet, +~ otenykhd orf: Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: FROM 4.3 A heh chnaee, SUBJECT: (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action 7 (Main Indexed) completed) === [PDF page 67] === ‘S FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Ne. 2043 D. 10,50 5 Octeber, 1965 5 Octeber, 1965 R, 18,41 5 Octeber, 1965 HY wis] feo PRIORITY Addressed te Fereign Office tele Repeated fer infermatien te: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapere BH isis POLAD Singapere and Saving te: Washingten Wellingten Canberra Ottawa My telegram Ne, 2032: Attempted Ceup. There was a demenstratien in Djakarta yesterday by members ef varieus Meslem yeuth greups (including the HMI, which has recently been under attack by the Cemmunists) and alse representatives ef feur ef the pelitical parties - the (Meslem) Naudhatul Ulama, the Cathelic party, the United Islam Indenesian Party(PSIE) and IPKI (a small army-backed party). Afterwards a delegatien presented a statement te General Seeharte. The fellewing are the main peints. (a) We centime te stand unreservedly behind President Sukarne and are ready te help the Gevernment, "which in this case means Sukarne", in reeting eut the September 30 Mevement. (b) We urge Sukarne te ban er disselve parties which "master-minded, supperted, assisted er sympathized with the September 30 Mevement". (the statement lists the PKI and Cemmunist Frent erganizatiens), te ban Cemmunist newspapers, te cenfiscate the preperty ef the peeple cencerned in the attempted ceup. The President is alse called upen. te purge the Cabinet and State institutiens (including Antara) ef elements invelved in er in sympathy with the September 350 Mevement. Fereign Office please pass Saving te Washingten 420, Canberra 88, Wellingten 79, Ottawa 4. === [PDF page 68] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Bn Clair FO/CRO DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist ctober 1965 D. 0801 6 October 1965 Duioieo (4) R. 1417 6 October 1965 eee to Foreign Office pe No, 2054 of 6 October. Repeated for ormation to:- pur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore and Saving to:- wedi ) Ottawa My telegram No, 2013: Attempted Coup. Nahdlatul Ulama, the chief Islamic political party, has issued a statement today which requests President Sukarno immediately to dissolve the Indonesian Communist Party and affiliated organizations and to ban the publication of P.K.I. newspapers. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 423, Canberra 91, Wellington 83 and Ottawa 7. === [PDF page 69] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE F.0 R.O DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Ne, 2061 6 October 1965 D. 1407 7 Octeber 1965 R. 1410 7 Octeber 1965 [Unreadable] PRIORITY Addressed te Fereign Office telegram No, 2061 of 6 Octeber Repeated fer information te: Kuala Lumpur, B.G.R.A.I. Singapore, POLAD Singapere, Washingten, Canberra, Wellington, Ottawa, My telegram No. 2054: Attempted Coup. Fellewing are extracts from editorials in army newspapers 6 October. Berita Yudha. Was the September 30 movement really the invention ef Untung himself or was it master-minded by others,either Indonesian or foreign? Did the September 50 counter-revolutionary adventurers rely solely on their own strength or did they mve the suppert, both in real terms and morally, of ethers, cither Indonesian of foreign? In order to know whe our friends are ana whe our enimies, we hope that” the Gevernment and the Indenesian public will, gi¥* these two questions their full attention. Angkatang Bersenejata. it is the duty ef the whole people te exterminate the September 30 movement in its entirety as well as those whe mater-minded it. It is clear whe these were. Read the 2 October e@itorial of Harian Rakjat, the efficial ergan of the PKI. It said "we are firmly convinced ef the correctness of the action taken by the September 30 movement. The suppert and the feeling of the people is certainly on the side ef te movement". Then again, the murder of the Generals was carried out by velunteers from the Communist youth and the Commmist wemen’s erganisations (Gerwani) se it is hardly surprising that Harian Rakjat spesks up for the September 50 movement. We await a decision by the Government to declare the PKI, Perma Rakjat and Germai illegal erganizations. Fereign Office please pass Saving to esha No, 421, Canberra Ho. 92, Weklington Ne. 8, and Ottawa Ne. &. === [PDF page 70] === e At Pale No. (-750a6- Dated Received GC AetkAa, (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Encloses Copy of: SUBJECT: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 71] === bjeé - ria TIO 7 eas : 75% ‘en? o bm ' alte (& oa ros Pai % . 23 [Unreadable] te te “s [Unreadable] > dL. ome [Unreadable] ae wo iJ ot Toy = a ten 4a £24 *ris SLA [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] oi & 2 <=. 7 7 ew [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ‘ 7 > fed te aes - - 66 [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] we. > We [Unreadable] [Unreadable] === [PDF page 72] === sncem peo Oe ad x? oh ah 42> «> ery sed east Sof F Wit 2 ‘ agit) fe fate rr ry Wa e Joe » ole Phase === [PDF page 73] === ~ parma seamen - ee SS : i. Pe ; rie 7. -. rt em = /~ 7 yy.f ¢ t . = = om sek a me OD Se ws + Oo cai |. Y “> 3D 6) Ma a#Tr ww <a pa VA c ted pi a UO ieee io 7 > t im o, 7 _ ry N25 (on © [Unreadable] co Pc “ 2“ i: 2 e "ny [Unreadable] ast where senior e [Unreadable] tre ms; -: [Unreadable] [Unreadable] . kab wiz w J de te aS CS OS om [Unreadable] Pow: 22 [Unreadable] wre < w Eres woe OS ener “te e&> AO 7 Ty wri oun Bue fen wale [Unreadable] —<_ 7 ‘Sto? @ tA fA we 3.. [Unreadable] vid, 7. VS ED rf ™ + “yay 546.4 7 Se + Ne? wml See S ow ~<co ©: [Unreadable] [Unreadable] _ y ae ~ mm foor. om [Unreadable] 4 ~~ > 42 Wy’. rs < aro [Unreadable] vs) 4 Ne Siar. » oa 8 ' [Unreadable], > iy ~~ eee YS oe SF | a [Unreadable] ~ TF cy TPN TD 4 on 624 WW FF week 6 «= WV aX [Unreadable] rT ¢ [ ‘say per) a Ms i ~,* Rein es Wok SS ct we NW o > < [Unreadable] 7 7 > ar a 2 ~ a wm. [Unreadable] > » Yuq be au We 4 Steet & [Unreadable] oA y% L Se _ | ets os [Unreadable] >» =) oe WW aoa J > owl > ~~ ae Ye [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 7 8 ches wee ~ en an $30. we ‘er ods <4 ote al « em e+ wee "i+" ane aa f === [PDF page 74] === fated Ind === [PDF page 75] === ———s THE. STATEMENT OF AURT IN°SUPPORT ‘OF PARTY MOVEMENT SHOULD NOT ° - %9 "WAVE BEEN ISSUED WHEN IT WAS. t > WAS, ACCORDING TO WISNU MEANT TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN SUPPORT OF THE COUNTER COUP AND NOT UNTUNG. AS WISNU SAYS THAT UNTUNG IS NOW IN PJOGJAKARTA, pRSUMABLY, GOING BY AUR] AIRCRAFT, 1 FIND ALL. THIS VERY HARD TO TAKE REGARDLESS BUT WISNU DOES HAVE SONE INFORMATION WHICH COULD, BE INTERESTING. “HE SAYS THAT OMAR DANI, NOW IN BOGOR WITH SOEKARNO, 1S RIGHT | BEHIND SUHARTO.: MOREOVER SUBANDRIO, BROUGHT BACK BY AURI. FROM SUMATRA AND MARTADINATA ARE ALSO THERE. NO DOUBT THIS IS ALL PART OF A DESPERATE GAME OF MUSICAL CHAIRS TO RE ESTABLISH THE. STATUS QUO.: - WISNU. SAYS THAT -CCORRUPT GROUP) HAS DISAPPEARED COMPLETELY. ‘ WISNU ALSO TOLD JACKSON THAT HE BELIEVES, JANI TO BE DEAD. ACCORDING TO HIM NASUTION'S DAUGHTER DIED THIS MORNING. SHANN. (CFM 2870 853 5370 1394 1149 1162 WISNU O C HALIM AURI TJAK RABIRAWA UNTUNG JOGJAKARTA.OMAR DANI BOGOR SUHARTO MARTADINATA JACKSON NASUTIONS) ENDS; 7 \ XSCARCOYVZO- === [PDF page 76] === OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA, INWARD TELEX MESSAC [Unreadable] === [PDF page 77] === Pi 3S) #BRE AB ING: FQRUNTTY § He DERENDED- TAB. AIR FORCE /AQM@pNSa RG.. a Gee SL. BCI bY eN TREC UP; - WP ORME R ONDE ES aS OUN YY ORS REE APE ALY i CHR Ls 7 Se a ette y, — Bing ah a + +7;. er z ‘o 4 > ti alia alte VNbdER RE BEL ap elena peters poblebemalinads — te ee Se ited, wantin SINCE THE COUP, THERE: WERE PUBLTEC “DEMONS TRATIONS AGAINST THE, Pit ih I LA NIA ART A ee === [PDF page 78] === INTENT:..ON, RESTOR ING. THE. STATUS: QUO, ANTE..WL UN Dead in OF POWER WHICH TREOARMY HAS ACCIDENTALLY OBTAINED: mts === [PDF page 79] === : on ty tar i ER cee fae 1: i A t + : j 7 +3 iL. D marie EES ed sual BHANT SUNCE THES 2ND OCTOBER. ::. Lis il PETAL rid: [Unreadable] === [PDF page 80] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D H | 0 | S|] b a Dated Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received G Abn (Outward Action) oe) BI & CL.4 Uh WA AUK Del. Wre few, 6! Sovrg Af “o === [PDF page 81] === CONFIDENTIAL: * Date’ and time (G,M.T,) #telegram should reach addrgssegts) _¢. é EMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUFTRE Security eae —if any [Codeword—if any] Address to (Date). t Oe And to:— telegram Nog xvxcxcvvecenereremenernrnose (MAE) ans saiesinnchiinihinnncete wecevecseseceesenssescscscsossosesooseeosooeoeonseseseneeeeneeeeeeseeseeeeeeeseseeensseeeneseeeeesseeseeeee Sas peri repeated for information 0-9 t= 4 Repeat|to:— On the night of 30 September an attempted coup d'etat took place under the ostensible leadership of a hitherto unknown Lt. Col. Untung, a battalion commander of the Presidential Guard. The stated object was to forestall an intended Gobel coup d'etat to be directed against President seca Sukarno by various senior Generals. Distribution:— 2 og Certain Army Generals ha eeu to prevent 7 ane ‘ Ce * +hreatend. SEAD Yd D the chaos ollow (AD News Sukarno's death or incapacity, The—indonesten Lid Copies to oo FoAD Omm 0 S Po V P ora ¥ directed_against—him, Mut tpove—ie—ne—ev idence VANS of—eny—intention—by—the—aArmy to take eerty Roche, action mean ken or Bo against s aan e theAP.K.I paerseras to one report, adit, P.K.1. Chairman and Omar Dhani, g left-wing Air Force Ghitef, had been putting heavy pressure (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw. === [PDF page 82] === CONFIDENTIAL ‘on Sukarno to denounce the Generals and Sukarno haé promised to wo so during a speech on 30 September, bap, In the event, he vaccilated and did not speak as expected. Omar Dhani and Untung nonetheless decided to go ahead with tWie coup, using some of the Palace Guard and other Army units; initially they succeeded in rounding up at least six of the Generals, all of whom were killed, including Lt. General Yani, the Army Chief. Nasution, the Minister of Defence escap\ed, though his six-year old daughter was killed. Other Army units under General Suharto reacted and the coup @uickly)) collapsedpmwitu. bouts. 36 The P.K.I. were apparently hoping that Sukarno would lend his name to the elimination of the anti-Communist Generals. In the event, they took no osE€ = action although the Party newspaper Harjan Rakjak has twice commented favourably on the coup. The P.K.I. leaders seem to have gone into hiding outside Djakarta. Is is possible that, once they realised that Sukarno was not going to take the responsibility for action against the Generals, they considered it more prudent to await developments. 4. Sukarno seems to have spent the day of 1 October at the Halim air base near Djakarta, with the Air Force,whom he must have known to be favourable to the coup. By evening Halim had been taken over by the Army HHH who took Sukarne to Bogor Palace, 20 miles outside Djakarta. On 2 October, Sukarno seems to have begun to resume control. In the evening he called a meeting of Service leaders, including - ply) Omar Dhani, Air Force Chief, who had been favourable towards the coup. NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN === [PDF page 83] === CONFIDENTIAL On 3 October he appealed publicly for unity in the Armed Forces in order to prevent "the playing off between Air Force and the Army so that NExocim and the other side will benefit from it". 5. The Army appeareé to be in control throughout Indonesia, except perhaps for Central Java where there is still some fighting. 6. The crucial question now is whether the Army leaders will be prepared to accept Sukarno's renewed supremacy or whether they will pluck up courage to make an attempt to deal with the P.K.I., if necessary disobeying Sukarno. On the one hand, they mUst calculate that, if they remain inactive, they run a grave risk of suffering the same faté as the Generals already killed in the coup, and of letting the P.K.I. come to power by default. On the other hand, they have never yet gone against Sukarno and they know that to deal with the P.K.I. would be no easy task. Furthermore, the recently increasing deterioration in economic conditions, particularly amnng the urban poor, is creating a situation from which the P.K.I. is likely to profit. [7: is important to avoid any/comment implying British support for any/of the contending factions, all of whom fave committed themselves ation and Indonesia's anti-Western policy/ In private conversation with reliable offigials of friendly governments, === [PDF page 84] === ial F > BY'4,74) Ht yf) eae Meu, by Siw Uravoenl. lsat === [PDF page 85] === 1UP COPY DELEGATION TO NATO PARIS 5 October 1965 mpted coup d'etat a hitherto of the to forestall an President Sukarno made plans to leath or incapacity, sven against the <arno was still in I. Chairman and sn putting heavy ukarno In the Omar Dhani with the coup, using lits; initially they Generals, all of the Army Chief. though his six-year under General lapsed within hours. hat Sukarno would munist Generals. the Party avourably on the into hiding outside lised that Sukarno >tion Feat the wai evelopmen ts. Sukarno seems === [PDF page 86] === \wen? tid Vid abe, [Unreadable] : ay ae nia 7 = SOP HA OY, eH 4 -~ U. ee AL} Vo j | e }: % ¢ --4 ond -—4 - [Unreadable] ¢) -_ a. ae A oe & OO ob. » 2 Ob 1 ~- 7 J i: i.. “ys 5 a”: 7 an -4 a [Unreadable] bo 6S H > aaa [Unreadable] [Unreadable] === [PDF page 87] === CONFIDENTIAL * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) Despatched evi: o Security pursed CONFIDENTIAL Telegram to:— —if any aid UKDEL SATO Date) cocsme 5S cf— i i ’ — telegram NO. ove o° aS pnt e): tonal Zhe Dhak s And to:— repeated for information to... WASHINGT.ON..(Sav.ing) ee eeeeeeeeecerereeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee esse ee eee rere ee eee ee SESE ee eee eSeOE TOSSES Se OECeSeeeees Ee ee eee® sofia tor. ot For Marsden 6éd@titen. INDONESIA. WASHINGTON G2UNd We had concluded pententex Ane the crucial question in Indones¥a f& whether the remaining Generals would pluck up their courage to make an attempt to deal with the PKI, if En Clair. necessary disobeying aaenes There are ce indications that they mayj/do so. The Generals, who are reported to be bitterly disappointed Distribution:-— with Sukarno's refusal on 2 October to permit Row. lual Ar them to take action against the PKI, seem to be SAD Ibid so incensed with the assassination of their UOT dD Nw colleagues that it is likely to be touch and FoAD go whether they take action on their own initiative. in Sukarno himself is still at Bogor, where he is protected by the Presidential Guard with Suharto's troops round them. Sukarno has made no publke statement or appearance since 3 October and it is reasonable to assume that the Generals are not permitting him to have direct access to the Indonesian press and radio. cg9335) wi. 47483/47 2000 3/6 Bw. /The === [PDF page 88] === CONFIDENTI AL The Generals probably now believe that Sukarno was himself privy to the 30 September coup. Sukarno declared in his recorded broadcast of 3 October that he went to Halim Air Base on his own initiative on 1 October, when the Base was in rebel Air ee Terre and it was at Halim on 1 October that tee “Genarals were ete roku ), according to a statement by Suharto on 4 October. Suharto also stated that the well in which their bodies were found was in an Air Force Training Centre for young Communist volunteers and he declared that "it is impossible that there is no connection with this affair among elements of the Air Force”. This statement contradicts Sukarno's statement of 3 caer that “the change against § Wdononan. Ace sss CP iavervenest in the so-called 30 September incident is not true". 3. Nasution and Suharto are firmly established jn Djakarta, where they:are mobilising support by demonstrations and propaganda, including a State military funeral for the murdered Generals today at which Subandrio represented Sukarno. The Communist infiltrated official news agency Antara has been closed down and only two newspapeys, both under Army control, have been allowed to appaar. 4. The situation outside Djakarta is still obse There are reports of rebel units, with PKI support gathering in Central Java and clashes between loyal troops and rebels have been reported from Jogdjakartgand Semarang. 5 The loyalties of lower and middle rank officars are difficult to judge. On the one hand, they may harbour certain personal grievances against their senior officers over such matters as lack of promotion opportunities and the comparative luxury enjoyed by the Gdnerals. On the other /nand, NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN === [PDF page 89] === CONFIDENTIAL hand, they are probably shocked by the assassinations and are unlikely to go against Sukarno's appeal for unity among all members of the Armed Forces. Though they may be considerably more penetrated by the PKI, the other ranks may be expected to wey orders initially. 6. A division of loyalties has however undoubtedly appeared in the Air Force, and Omar Dhani's complicity in the attempted coup. is now certain. There are reports that Omar eee Ace Touce Chay? Dhanij fled Djakarta on 2 October with Untung and their supporters and families 44% by au. “ caljOLetkcrafin Air Force Officers who are thought to support Suharto may be squabbling among themselves for the best posts. Air Force activkty over Djakarta ceased three days ago and as an operational force it must at present be considered ineffective. Dubtotd & Sane 4 TMI DoD oer eur Dap J:R.D | FT DD: CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 90] === CONFIDENTIAL p- FOREIGN OFFICE TO UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO NATO PARIS Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL and By Bag DISTRIBUTION No, 1556 5 October, 1965, D. 2100 5 October, 1965. IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL ddressed to UKDEL NATO telegram Ne 6 ef 5 Octeber Repeated for infermatien Saving te:- Washington Ne, 421) For Marsden, Indonesia. We had concluded yesterday that the crucial question in Indenesia was whether the remaining Generals weuld pluck up their courage te make an attempt te deal with the PKI, if necessary disebeying Sukarne, There are indications that they may now de se, The Generals, whe are reperted to be bitterly disappointed with Sukarne'’s refusal en 2 October te permit them te take action against the PKI, seem te be se incensed with the assassinatien ef their ecelleagues that it is likely te be touch and go whether they take action on their own initiative, 2. # Sukarne himself is still at Beger, where he is pretected by the Presidential Guard with Suharte'’s treeps reund them, Sukarne has made ne public statement er appearance since 3 Octeber and it is reasonable te assume that the Generals are not permitting him te have direct access te the Indenesian Press and radie, The Generals prebably new believe that Sukarne was himself privy te the 30 September Goup. Sukarne declared in his recerded breadcast ef 3 Octeber that he went te Halim Air Base en his own initiative on 1 Octeber, when the Base was in rebel Air Ferce hands, and it was at Halim en 1 Octeber that certain Generals were taken (dead er alive), according te a statement by Suharte en 4 Octeber., Suharte alse stated that the well in which their bedies were found was in an Air Feree Training Centre fer young Cemmnist velunteers and he declared that "it is impessible that there is ne cennexien with this affair ameng elements of the Air Ferce", This statement centradicts Sukarne’s statement eof 3 Octeber that “the charge against the Indenesian Air Ferce ef invelivement in the se-called 50 September incident is net true", 3. #WNasutien and Suharte are firmly established in Djakarta, where they are mebilizing suppert by demenstratiens and prepaganda, /including CONFIDENT IAL === [PDF page 91] === SECRET Fereign Office tele Ne, 1556 te UKDEL NA including a State military funeral for the mrdered Generals teday at which Subandrie represented Sukarne, The Communist infiltrated efficial news agency Antara has been clesed dewn and enly twe newspapers, beth under Army centrel, have been allewed te appeer, 4, The situation eutside Djakarta is still ebscure, There are réperts ef rebel units, with PKI suppert, gathering in Central Java and Clashes between loyal treeps and rebels have been reperted from Jogdjakert and Semarang, 5. The leyalties ef lewer and middle rank efficers are difficult to judge. On the ene hand, they may harbeur certain personal grievances against their senier efficers ever such matters as lack of prometion eppertunities and the compsrative lumry enjeyed by the Generals, On the ether hand, they are prebably shecked by the assassinations and are unlikely te go against Sukarne’s appeal fer unity ameng all members of the Armed Ferces, Theugh they may be Considerably mere penetrated by the PKI, the other ranks may be expected te ebey erders initially. 6. A divisien ef leyalties has however undeubtedly appeared in the Air Ferce, and Omar Dhani*s cemplicity in the attempted ceup is new certain, There are reperts that Omar Dhani (Minister/Air Ferce Chief) fled Djakarta on 2 Octeber with Untung and their supperters and families by air, Air Ferce Officers whe are theught te suppert Suharte may be squabbling among themselves fer the best pests, Air Feree activity ever Djakarta ceased three days ago and as an eperatienel ferce it mst at present be censidered ineffective, DISTRIBUTED TO:~ 5, H,A,D, J,M.I.B, W.0.C,B, News Bept, I,R.B, J.R.D, LPB, === [PDF page 92] === CONFIDENTIAL e BY BaG FROM UNITED KINGDUM PERMANENT DELEGATION TO Nu TO PaRIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE SIR E. SHUCKBURGH — 0 No. 61 Savi ¢ Octcber, 1965 OUNFIDENTIAL R. $10. 65 Addressed to Foreisn Office telegram No, 61 Saving of (October, 1965 Repeated for information Saving to Washington No. 97 Tne Hague No. 71 Bonn No, 83 bit ous (4 Dui efe No. 208 Your telegram No. 1556 Zof 5 uétober_/ In the Council on 6 October Dr. Boon (Netherlands) gave an assessment of developments in Indonesia which agreed substantially with our own. He said that the: Netherlands government had little information about the situation in the Outlying islands but that provided Java was brought under control these should not present a serious problem. It was unlike ly that the Communist Party had instigated: the attempted coup. Reports of Sukarno's rapidly failing health appeared to have triggered off a rebellion organised independently by Colonel Untung. Though the Communist Party mig tnt have bcen associated previously with some of ‘those responsible for the coup, it scemed that it had) been placed in a difficult position by their decision to rebe? and had decided to kecp aloof and even to go into hiding until the situation settled down. Sukarno himself was / probably ~“CUONFEDENT IAL === [PDF page 93] === CONFIDENTIAL probably keeping quiet on purpose, both because of his bad hoalth and because he wanted to wait and sce who would come out on top. It was hard to know how much effective freedom he had. a Le Looking ahead Dr. Boon said that though -the army leaders wore now rounding up Communist. clements they could not affcrd to be too anti-Communist, not least. because they depended for all their military. equipment on the Russians and Chinese. (Dr. Boon added that it was impossible for them to turn to the West for such supplies since Westcrn arms dcliveries had been cut off on account of confrontation). Goncral Suharto had bucn previously reenonsible for eliminating Communist élemcnts from thc army both as a Commander against the Netherlands in New Guinea and of the campaign against Malaysia. But boing anti-Communist did not mean that the new lcadcrs were pro-Yostern. The prestige of Sukarno and the Communists had diminished and that that of the army had increased, Though it was unlikely that there would be any major changes in thu Indonesians' foreign policy, they might, because of intcrnal pressures, be now a little casier to deal with. De I expressed broad agreement with Dr, Boon drawing on your telegram undcr reference and your telegrams No, lool, 1556 and 398 Guidance. I said that there was some likelihood that the Generals, belicving Sukarno to have been privy to the coup, might now take action on their own initiative against whe 7.K.1. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 94] === CONFIDENTIAL 4, Grewe (Germany) then read out a report from Djakarta of 27 Septerscr which illustrated the eccentricities of Indonesian foreign policy and the instability of Sukarno's regime, Farley (United States) followed by saying his information agreed broadly with Dr. Boon's assessment: the one point of somes difference was on the future prospects for the army leadcrs. The State Department thought that it might be very difficult for theses to follow a moderate line, or for Sukarno tc restore the previous unsasy balance between the army and the Communists. He agreed with mo that the Generals might have already decided to strike out against their opponents, === [PDF page 95] === 99 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT: eth SUBJECT: Encakenyst of nyfernohinn tit G9. om eaten. Dated 5 Q.ts., Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received D Getebs2 (Outward Action) f) ba, Oph. Vekanohe {t———~ Ponca. 2 | (Referred to Legal Adviser) saan (Main Indexed) f, | Waites [Unreadable] === [PDF page 96] === arr A V/s aytmon === [PDF page 97] === “mer mr pe ‘oe secadoUu ATSNOTAQGO Raut *ou.rTeyNS 1NOULTM peeye Oo UY _rrTA ~. Tt S77 TF Ad ro - { + oe; os L J oD Ut EO 37 Ay >7O1LSSL 4 UCIT COA U L OU S WL OtA Ul Oo Uy yOoUY v4 “yw eu iV L L i+ a iS a nae sipient: ti TY TABS TOATTIN ATTN A ONM : " ) f; | Lf OUd; Li ACU 07 4 oe “I Liv [Unreadable] ITeWN f arTor 1 kta on A rm 3u Saxs sib go of OULeING spensasad O AAD OF AUMG GY4Y OUb+VS ~ “a: L a L [Unreadable] Lo WUC XH JOU WM Wt aie [Unreadable] / = L, Ce oe >... oa LA L i LAV [Unreadable] be i + wale [Unreadable] : ’ d& 2 A O i. ote J)./ - V/ t4 A a & VACA. Us tA /VA LSA nf Ade WS jaa oJ +t dl i-j awrTsS AT OTIATS TN STIOUS ) A ) O.Tes JAB o vi; ‘ } sUO LiLowtwtLo LA ULO WwW » JAG SC Ys.0 [Unreadable] === [PDF page 98] === CONFIDENTIAL FOREIGN OFFICEM S,W.1. 7 Oetober, 1965. Thank you for your letter of 5 October to Donald Murray; who is on leave, about the channels of information and intekligence on the Indonesiassituation. +he American Embassy in London are giving us a good sefvice both on the intelligence and diplomatic nets and i accordingly agree with you that you need add to this information only what you think may not have reachedus throuth the American Embassy in London. 2, If anything, I think the Americans have had squicker intelligence information about the background to the 30 September coup than we could be expected to have and were accordingly somé hours ahead of; us in their initial assessments.. But I feel we have now probably caught up with them. We do however have reservations about their information, particularly reports that the more conservative elements in the army may be planning to have a crack at the PKI and we are very sanguine about the chances that the army will do anything atainst Sukarno's wishes. By the time you receive this letter, we shall probably know the answer. Sy I am sending a copy of this letter to Cambridge in Djakarta. (D. Tonkin) B. fT. Gilmore, Esq:, Washington. === [PDF page 99] === 99 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where eae I9Uu woos —« | PMH (OI S/ leq FROM /_, bemebreete ae 4 hy RS ES No. 16 fer Dated 30 dpe _be Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) inne (Main Indexed) A Ui Lg ts === [PDF page 100] === [Unreadable] wt ww: Ji 3 « — he ‘ ce & — oo we eo Cew 2 — —/ Date ' A he.f LAL:.) ~ VV aed [Unreadable] : 7 i. WMLAL oO e sei A LL \/ yw vi iS J wi oe im VAD © Ji a Lick L [Unreadable] . et Ge te CA A./ 4 4 - vw Ae > & JU 7 ok eS - ~~ ’ j «. & LA bd Gh alee ols VY A X ’ VU a [Unreadable] [Unreadable] / 2 4 Lame ©. ~~ » © * Ww we Cun Vd 4 m» Sore wk WV A aie ~~ UO 7 1 ce.. iy a [Unreadable] ohe me or Ne Nr Ww Ve Mie: _ 2 — ~ am ' — a ee: \ a wad & [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ahe oe v 7; Vv. sc e we A YL LAC he © if ‘ ae ¥ A ache vA VV ata LLG Li ey bathe Bl “| °: 24 - ' -. rate s 4 ae [Unreadable] ake hed 0D Wi ake V a VW @ nw ~ 7 - i alte Ae ee De eM oe —:: Aa ~~ ote A. 7 vv YA [Unreadable] ’ a i y ate & he de o ~ d ey ade at ee WA ae UUUAL 7 7 nf — oe ea wid +i Cow [Unreadable] :: 4 ie, ca ic 7, 7:; “: _v or 4 Viiv Vai oS ake et Chale cle UD BD abe 6S abe Se J Y va am Wd 7 LAL A iid? a2 Cw ake Nw ~te Lit’ VY — he we vw [Unreadable] ° oN Wie. i? a / hue LA es Vv Ah. A ACh hte WS: - abe he + a be ot he = nde de we ted WS ~~} [Unreadable] :: a ~*~ ot ee ake V J aa wid ut WLI VAL Ade tJ LY ~?: VV - ~ We ‘a oe ‘7 ~ bed [Unreadable] MN c: 7 Ay*c 5 2 it (A oR,rO « TO. [Unreadable] . w+ - ~~ So -. adh / - wr wi. 7 Vote ¥ er 87 4. ee NA = be? V4. Lae 2S a Chk WA se he +f CA [Unreadable] ihe — wW ALi yCeaD A Dok he shod Viiv wo v de Ww LAR OO ake wt he./ J. CA 2k LULVILs wd [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Ww » ak WLS wW < Visi 7 Vs ‘ - ok bs Cod abel J. ° a2 Cane & Lbs Z v5 Lid Ve hs ee ' \ o [Unreadable] . / tobe: ~/ ~ = we WL ES aD ed. J ee athe a & am Co ae haere IF § Vs Cee UWS Cat 2 [Unreadable] Wet « Te Wwiaii. J LL Tid / \ Oe Oe 8 Or Se 8 eee bedded oe dete WI oe edd — orwm er ee ee eee me === [PDF page 101] === (Security Gradine—to be Up-graded 1 U r where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Fa as DHlois|ies FROM £4 4. Aawtve | SUBJECT: Memeo No wo T z Dated References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) fede} dd (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 102] === STRICTED FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/oTP F.0./C.R.0./7HITEHALL DISTRIBUTION - Sir G, Harrisen ‘s Ne, 2095 5-Octeber 1965 B. 1720 5 Octeber 1965 R. 1823 5 Octeber 1965 RESTRICTED &ddressed te Fercign Office telegram Ne, 2095 ef 5 Octeber Rpeated fer infermation te: Djakarta, POLAD Singapere, Kuala lumpur, Washingtera, Peking. enesia Since the evening ef 2 Octeber, the Central Seviet Press has published daily factual reund-ups on the situation in Indenesia cempesed ef brief excerpts frem Western New Agency reperts. 2. The first indication te Seviet readers of th political complexion ef the attempted coup was given in Pravda's round-up teday, which quoted U.P. as reperting that "the Indenesian Army Command has cilosed the ergan ef he Cemmnist Party ef Indonesia, the newspaper Harian Rakyat. The same reund-up ingluded the first resumption ef Tass reperts direct from Djakarta, which stated that the only newspapers te appear on 4 Octeber were these published “py military circles" and that the Army, acting inthe name of Sukarne, exercised the enly real autherity in the capital. 3. There has been neo Seviet comment. Fereign Office please pass Djakarta Ne. 5, POLAD Singapere Ne. 5, Kuala Lumpur Ne, 9, Yashingten Ne. 310 and Peking Ne. 2). [Repeated Saving te Washingtem and te ether pests as requested] === [PDF page 103] === Greer Neos (o LY: pu tle sh sfah | Moscow tebe rram No. 2055 of 5 October 4d f recent events in Indonesi scribed ress Cain bine’ of a 2e The pattern of daily factual round=ups inthe central press culled mainly from Western sources, has been maintained. Izvestiya’ S round-up of 6 October noted that the Communist organ, Harian Rakj iat, was not among the Indonesian newspapers which had been permitted to resume public ation; and a Tass item in Pravda of 7 October reported from Djakarta that a statement by the Nahdatul Ulama Party had called for the ba inning of the P.K.I. and other organisations which, according to the Statement "had co-operated with those who call themselves the "30th of September movement'", Pravda of 8 October, however, reproduced in full the P.K.I*s statement of 6 October express-= ing Pull support for Sukarno and dissociating the Party from the *Septembrists* 36 There has still been no comment in the Soviet press on the attempted coup. Le I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Djakarta, Peking and Washington and to the Office of the Political Adviser, Singapore. Yours tues, Sinan Goldy (B.G. Cartledge) D. Tonkin, Esq., South-East Asia Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.l. RESTRICTED === [PDF page 104] === [Unreadable] ipa" 2) oe, BRITISH EMBASSY, (202U1i/15/10) pes /.| MOSCOW. RESTRIGTED 15 October, 1965. —_.) baa ae Lear Tor bc| SK tos <(b) DW rangi, Would you please refer to Cartledge's letter 1024/8/10 to you about Soviet comment on events in Indonesia. The Soviet press continues to carry daily reports, mostly derived from foreign press agencies, on the situation. However, apart from the message to Sukarno (our telegrams Nos. 2139 and 2140), there has been no Soviet comment published gt all - although agood deal of reading between the lines is of course possible.; |S Nabinand 26 No attempt has been made to disguise the fact that it i the Communists who are now under attack in Indonesia. Izvestiya of October 13 reported that the homes of two Vice- Presidents of the Indonesian Communist Party had been looted. Pravda of October 15 stated that "Pogroms are continuing in Djakarta against the offices of various progressive organisations and the homes of progressive leaders". Be Communist involvement in the events of September 30 has not yet however been admitted in so many words (though the PKI statement of October 6 was published in Pravda) and the physical attacks on the property of progressive organisations have been attributed to irresponsible right wing religious fanatics and youth organisations. However this obfuscation has never been put over very convincingly - it will not have fooled many intelligent Soviet citizens - and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, since Sukarno, as witnessed by both the Soviet Government and the Soviet press, is regaining control and the anti-Communist campaign is continuing. Thus Izvestiya of October 14 said that the local authorities, the army and political and social organisations were all supporting Sukarno while Pravda of October 15 stated that round ups were taking place in Djakarta, “especially in working class districts, of all who had or could have had, in the opinion of the military authorities, any connection with the attempted coup of September 30". Similarly Izvestiya of October 13 refers to the "“anti=Communist campaign being carried on by the radio and press of Makarta, which are controlled by the army". Although they will probably attempt to avoid committing themselves for as long as possible, Soviet fence sitting is beginning to look increasingly uncomfortable. 4e I am sending copies of this letter to Djakarta, POLAD Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Washington and Peking. Vind trey, Pig stexanaer) AY 1asShad ly D. Tonkin, Esqe, v South East Asia Department, Mv dh. a J (ic Foreign Office, London, S.Wele RESTRICTED (A eI). === [PDF page 105] === 105 (Security Gradinge—to be Up-graded PD where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 1965 | wow | Dios ice FROM A - | SUBJECT: Oyetorts |: Sik. KM ad MAM r249t No 2 OSS A antl eens wr aastinait vanity bey echoes Dated G Lbb~a | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received ) Ohh (Outward Action) ciuateie droy Rligran Propowol. he Ghopbonsl (soho - Copnrun COM pars Shen Cantus. (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) Action, completed) (Main Indexed) ABR (a [es aN | News apt”. | cae Me tpn oe burl tad ey spehan Le Me, Voiset (Gomns, But.) abel! DP yathaole A 2060, and A 0s heeled tS etl eee 7 bide hela AP Saft bo kane G ela === [PDF page 106] === cs. a2 | o oe ; » ens 2 ! |: aes Sah ae i a Ds psnseninetieeniainsnerssasiniiglabialnieeeniielinn ci TS ee eee ON we ke I ol aes alana | ae se ae a oe tS ee eee ee === [PDF page 107] === & FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair Sir A.Gilehrist No.2058 6 October, 1965 FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION D. 15.10 6 October, 1965 R. 16.09 6 October, 1965 PRIORITY Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2058 ef 6 Octo Repeated fer information to: Kuala Lumpur B.G.R.A,I. Singapere POLAD Singapere Vashingten Wellington Mig, Canberra aes Ottawa. My telegram No.2055: Attempted Coup. The Cabinet met for three-and-a-half hours teday. All Ministers are said te have been there except these in Peking fer the Chinese celebrations. WNasution, who is still incapacitated, Aidit, whese whereabouts are still a mystery, and ef course the murdered Yani. It is believed that Omar Dani was there as well as the two P.K.I. members I mentioned in my telegram under reference. 2. After the meeting Subandrie gave a Press conference. He said that the Presidents "analysis" of the coup was that this sert of thing was an inevitable incident in the course ef a revolution like Indenesia’s. Subandrie went on to say that Indonesia was still struggling against the imperialists, and that it was therefere necessary te maintain national unity. He reported that all political parties - nationalist, religious, and Communist - as well as the military, were leyal te the President. They were all new obliged te create a calm atmosphere on Indonesia. He said that the President viewed the 30 September coup as a pelitical preblen, In reply te a question Subandrie said the President did net condone either the murders er the creation ef Untung’s Revolutionary Geuncil. Asked if Subandrie had agreed to the appearance éf his ewn mame on Untung’s list ef the Revelutienary Ceuncil, Subandric said ne. Finally, he reperted that all was calm in Central Java. /3. Prier === [PDF page 108] === Djakarta telegram Ne.2058 toe Fereign Office - Prier te this the Central Committee ef the P.K.I. had issued a statement (unsigned) se it is net knewn te what extent Aidit persenally subscribes. This they presented te the Gevernment fer teday’s Cabinet meeting. The statement @xpresses "full suppert" fer the President’s message (presumably the ene calling fer national unity), and declares that the 30 September ceup is "an internal preblem ef the army", and the P.K.I. dees net prepese te interfere in any way. The members ef the P.K.I. whe were included in Untung’s Revolutionary Ceuncil were net netified ef this fact beferehand and had net appreved it. The statement ends with a ¢all fer a continuation ef Indenesia's Nasaken, Dwikera (crush Malaysia) and anti-Necelim pelicies. Subandrie, when questioned abeut. the respensibility ef the Cemmunists fer murders, etc, kept referring back te his statement and te the President's view that it was all a pelitical matter. 4. See my immediately fellewing telegran. === [PDF page 109] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir A, Gilchrist No, 2059 D, 1550 6 October, 1965 6 October, 1965 R. 1721 6 October, 1965 PRIORITY | CONFIDENTIAL Pid ote 10757064). Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 2059 of 6 October, Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore Wellington POLAD Singapore 1 % Canberra Washington; Ottawa My immediately preceding telegram: Coup, This was put together with the aid of Reuter's correspondent and his tape-recorder, 2. He confirms cheerful, jaunty, healthy appearance of Soekarno, (A different informant, reliable, reports Soekarno as jesting over Yani's death.) 5. Subandrio was his usual self, deft in avoiding awkward questions, An important one which he did not avoid was whether correspondents might now be allowed to send cables, He told them to refer to the military authorities in Djakarta, which indicates that he has as yet no control there, 4. The absence of the military and the presenge of the Communists is noteworthy and looks ugly. But it is too early to write the army off: they may be unwilling either to participate in a Cabinet meeting with the Commnists or to confront them at one; and indeed none of their leading men, except Nasution, is technically qualified to attend a Cabinet. “But they have not to our knowledge relaxed their grip on Djakarta or on the publicity media here, nor do they appear willing to let Subandrio or Soekarno come to the capital. The trouble°is that the army, full of good anti-Communist ideas, lacks a political brain (Yani, Parman); Suharto does not seem to know what to do next, Nasution is thought to be (temporarily) a broken man, while Adjie in Bandung is not merely separated from /the CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 110] === CONFIDENTIAL Djakarta telepram No. 2059 to Foreign Office the Djakarta Generals by Bogor but by his well-known loyalty to the President. Foreign Office please pass Washington 132, Wellington 59, Ottawa 2), Canberra 92, [Repeated as requested. ] === [PDF page 111] === in Clair Sir 4, Giichrist We, 2068 FROM DJAKARTA To De. 10,30 7 October, 1965 ‘) 7 October, 1965 = ws] R,. 15,20 7 October, 1965 Shs foe Aucressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 2068 of 7 October, Repeated for information ‘to: Kuale Lumpur B,G,R.A,I, Singapore POLAD Singapore And Saving te; Canberra Wellington Washington Ottawa, iy telegram No, 2055: Cabinet Meeting, According te “Berite Yudha" 7 October Sukarno made a statement at the Cabinet meeting whieh ineluded the following points, (i) Condemnation of the barbarous murder of the Generals, (ii) Disappreval of the formation of intung's "Revolutionary Council", (111) Restoration of law and order was necessary before measures Gould be taken against "all groups participating in the September 50 affair", and in order to find a political solutia,. (iv) \We must keep our heads “especially in regard to the Ne@olim threat" whieh would make itself felt if Indonesia‘ revolution were in chaes, in the past, internecine squabbles had alwags been followed by Ne@olim attacks, The armed forces should work together harmoniously "to face the enemy in front of us"....c... The “Berita Yudha" artiele ends thus, "Finally, all Ministers said they would carry on with their work, united so as to strengthen the revolution, They looked to the President for a solution once order had been restored, At the meeting the President also announced that Qnar Dani had reported the arrest of a number of instructors of the PxI *yolunteers* at Halim who were assumed to have been involved in the September 30 affair", 5. \sic) The following are extracts from the paper’s gossip colum, “Subandrie looked quite exhausted when he came out cf the meeting. At the meal which followed he sat apart, Maybe his grandeur made other Ministers reluctant to eppreech him, Mnily Sudibjo, the National Front Minister, smiled and speke to him for a moment - from === [PDF page 112] === Diekarta telegram No, 2068 te Foreign Office a @istence of three metres, Omar Deni did not show his face, aithough he was present at the meeting, The Sultan of Jogjakarta looked quite ealm and walked out of the meeting with Adam Malik, Dr, Leimena was not So calm, But the most extracrdinary thing of all was the behaviour of Lukman who seemed wiable to hide his delight, and on the way to his car waved his hang with a broad smile on his face". 4- Angkertan Bersendjata', the other army newspaper being published, has this, "The murder of the seven herees of the revolution was barbarous, Rather like the Madium affair in 1948, wasn't it? Sentence the master-mind te death", Foreign Office pass Saving to Canberra No, 93, Wellingten No, &5, Washington Ne, 425 and Ottawa Ne, 5, Tua === [PDF page 113] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded, where Appropriate) Du tols|te7 Kea hig Nepali, PAD A fou Scouse ee ae Dated S~ Ahn Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: FROM pars fiolgan Armgafper Received S Qh. (Outward Action) Gy) 222 Podd datos 7 fj a (/833] f Gf MINUTES 4A St [Unreadable] 6) SINGAPORE, 6S! (add, Ptavakid 27 fide fo { (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) eR b age (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 114] === AdO) dol .@ FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East) Cypher/ OTP Mir. Adam DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 0.671 > Go tober, 1965 D. 11.30 5 October,1965 | OA 10/S716> IMMEDIATE Re 12.45 5 October,1965 SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.6/1 of 5 October, Repeated for information Immediate to: Djakarta (Foreign Office please pass) {" and Saving to: Kuala Lumpur ile N KS B.G.R.A.I. Singapore. telegram No.2514 to Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Lumpur telegram No.16605 to C.R.0. Confused though the situation in Indonesia may be, it seems clear that during the past few days the army have had an opportunity to break the power of the P.K.I. that will not recur. t is also becoming increasingly apparent that they may be letting this opportunity slip through their fingers as Sukarno attempts to exercise restraint and pressures for reconciliation develop. This view is confirmed and strengthened by Hatta's remarks in Djakarta telegram No.2033.—— 7 Zs t is not in our interests to see the P.K.I. recovering its influence and preparing itself for the day when it will be strong enough to seize power. I submit that we should not miss the present opportunity to use the situation to our advantage. I, of course, agree that we should not indicate support for any particular group in Indonesia but I recommend that we should have no hesitation in doing what we can surreptiously to blacken the P.K.I. in the yes of the army and the people of Indonesia. ae The C-in-C has addressed himself to the Chief of the Defence Staff on this subject. DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES: FO. J.M.1I.D. F.O. Private Secretary 5-HeA.D. P.U.S. FLED. Sir N.Pritchard ike Mr. Peck C.R.O. F.E. and P.Dept. Head of J.M.I.D. Head of S.E.A.D. === [PDF page 115] === i sreniee ni. fh bfsie pr ateseyy ALS POY ne gsttigg, gheply.or rsicrence, ae Cee My Bees OS FOr awav’sé (For use only in the Ministry of Defence) a oitsi “eo. Instructions on completing this form are in Office Instructions—MOD Manual 2 PRECEDENCE—ACTION | PRECEDENCE INFO | DATE Seer wee | MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS ae went | EFERRED FOR COMM, | PREFIX CENTRE USE i MOD UK 3R iain avansncbpmeatptlisimenie aieeeemenmesenipbadins BE To (Each addroce pn eee eel To (Each address to start on a new line) | *SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | (Messages referring to a classified me ee es es : must be classified Restricted or above) CINC FAR SECRET of the Defence Staff RIT/0508052/SBACOS 203 CRO. to KL. No 2514 4 We considered ference A at our Meeting yestg@rday; Spel pene rep ge ae ried e I sta giss arene innesigiaate case that reference B referred to our overt and short-term policy i ut that our efforts in other unattributable fields need not pe * ates © ees sent in the DISTR #5/8 'of ON (To include originator) _ rf FILE Sof 5 AUS (Pol) NUMBER Wo 4. DRAFTERS NAME. DEP | IN BLOCK a ee LETTERS DOC/ Vovly Li 9 Foreign Office (6) | DIV/DIR/BRANCH TELEPHONE BUILDING: NUMBER EXTENSION: | RELEASING OFFICER’S | SIGNATURE. NAME IN *Tick appropriate box BLOCK LETTERS This message to a classified message i | does not refer | RANK === [PDF page 116] === Confidential Restricted Open Telegram to:— IMMEDIATE Repeatfto:— XS33 64 BGRAI Singapore DJA! canes /} Ys En Clair. Code Cypher Distribution:— reed 5°F sEAD O he, i aa /pl16 Winunl, « Dehuwer apie e a 4 * Date and time (G.M,T.) telegram should (. of e 4 EMERGENCY * IMMEDIATE PRIORI ROUTINE with a priority without DEFERRED Security ae SECRET —if any [Codeword—if any] AAT E€SS 10.eovcessvecsisersnees POTAD... RAM GAD.OC.ceccccccsseesesenseenssne pelegtiite NO. csc ene (date) Your telegram No.671l. INDONESIAN DISTURBANCES CeReO. telegram No.2514 to Kuala Lumpur was intended to suggest to the Malaysians the public posture that we should all adopt during the current period of political confusion in Indonesia. The object was to avoid any immediate action which might help Sukarno rally a Government of national unity, including rehabilitated P.KeI. elements, in face of “external necolim threat. In addition we did tnd ens nan not want to distract sees ones by getting them engaged in fighting in Borneo, and so discourage them from the attempts which they now seem to be making to deal with the P.K.I. For these reasons we thought it important not to engage in activity which the Indonesians would obviously attribute to Malaysia or ourselves. Compare paragraph 2 of Kuala Lumpur telegram No.1665, and paragraph 5 of Djakarta telegram No.e2036. (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw. fal Ye JV 627 SECRET § fay fas === [PDF page 117] === SECR This is a short term policy until we see how the dust settles. Meanwhile we certainly do not exclude any unattributable propaganda or psywar activities which would contribute Weakening to er PeKele permanently.. We therefore agree enttirety with the recommendation in last sentence yur paragraph 2. Suitable propaganda themes might be: PeKelI. brutality in murdering Generals and Nasution' - daughter; Chinese wm perhetaliyarons Shap meats j interferences - P.KeIe subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign Communists end—sems—entyuents; fact that Aidit and other prominent Communists went Vutual ete hevwe=—ome to ground; ett+empts—te kidnap (Sukarno by Untung and P.Kel.; Ctce, Ctce We want to act quickly while the Indonesians are.still- off balance, but treatment will need tobe Subtle yea |:- (a) all activities should be se sue wnatt prtalte 5 (ob) British participation or co-operation | Should be carefully echesaleds we should cooperate as closely as possible with the Malaysians; material should preferably appear to originate from Pakistan or Philippines; overt Malaysian, and British, attitude hould be one of strict non-interference. Be Please let us know of any Suggestions you may have on these lines where we couid be . Reais Mile we wr alro helpful at this end. Yesahali-sete-be collehing ideas qe feelin furtier | conetdering/inmediste possibilities of this kinds 3 4 J beaks ea E E+ ey bie" Fa 2 6-£45 Fea) === [PDF page 118] === SECRET FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SINGAPORE (Office ef the Pelitical Adviser te the C-in-C Far East) Cypher /OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Ne. 18 6 Octeber 1965 D. 1835 6 Octeber 1965 AMMEDIATE SECRET FILCH Addressed te Singapere (Pelitical Adviser te the C-in-C Far East) telegram Ne, 1835 ef 6 Octeber. Repeated fer information Immediate te: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapere Djakarta Yeur telegram Ne. 671. Indenesian Disturbances C.R.0. telegram Ne. 251, te Kuala Lumpur was intended te suggest te the Malaysians the public pesture that we sheuld all adept during the current peried of pelitical cenfusien in Indenesia. The object was te aveid any immediate actien which might help Sukarne rally a Gevernment ef national unity, including rehabilitated P.K.I. elements, in face ef “external necelim threat". In additien we did net want to aistract the Indenesian Army by getting them engaged in fighting in Bernee, and se disceurage them frem the attempts which they new seem te be making to deal with the P.K.I. Fer these reasens we theught it impertant net te engage in activity which the Indenesians yeula obviously attribute te Malaysia er eurselves. Cempare paragraph 2 ef Kuala Lumpur telegrem Ne. 1665, and paragraph 5 ef Djakarta telegram Ne. 2036. 2, This is a shert term pelicy until we sce how the dust settles. Meanwhile we certainly de net exclude any unattributable prepaganda er psywar ectivities which would contribute te weakening the P.K.I. permanently. We therefere agree with the recemmendatien in last sentence your paragraph 2. Suitable prepaganda themes might be: P.K.I. brutality in murdering General's and Nasutien's daughter; Chinese interference in pertieular arms shipments; P.K.1. subverting Indenesia as agents ef fereign Cemmhists; fact that Aidit and ether preminent Communists went te greund; the virtual kignapping ef Sukarne by Untung ané P.K.1.; etc., etc. We want te act quickly while the Indenesiens are still eff balance, but treatment will neea te be subtle, ¢.g.:- Aa) all activities SECRET === [PDF page 119] === “e sor P.O, telegram Ne, 1835 te Si e (POLAD o Qe (a) all activities sheuld be strietly unattributable; (b) British participation er ceeperation sheuld be carefully cencealed; (c) we sheuld ceeperate as clesely as pessible with the Malaysians; (a) material shevld preferably appear te eriginate frem Pakistan er Philippines: (e) evert Malaysian, and British, attitude sheuld be one ef strict nen-interference. 3, Please let us knew ef any suggestions yeu may have on these lines where we could be helpful at this end. Meanwhile we are alse collecting ideas fer further immediate possibilities ef this kind. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O, 5S.E.A.D. IRD. CRO. J.M.I.D. === [PDF page 120] === CONFIDENTIAL + FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office ef the Pelitical Adviser te the C-in-C Far a a 5 pn} Des ero, ypher/OTP DEPARTMENT: ISTRIBU Mir, Adams Ne, 681 9 Octeber, 1965 DB: 0337 9 Octeber, 1965 R: 1030 9 Octeber, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed te Dijakarta telegram Ne, 279 ef 9 Octeber, Repeated fer infermatien te: Fereign Office Kuala Lumpur (Persenal fer Lerd Head) Persenal fer Sir Andrew Gilchrist from Cranage anise. Thank yeu fer your views in telegram Ne, 1286 which “oo most helpful. ~OnF# 2. Reference your paragraph 4 the scale of present activity in East Malaysia is very small amewnting te only active patrelling, which I would net wish te stop. AS regards prevecative naval patrels we have net been within the 12 mile limit since the ceup and de net intend te de se fer the moment, 3. We have made arrangements fer disitributien ef certain unattirbutable material based en the general guidance in F,.0, te POLAD telegram Ne, 1835 paragraph 2, Apert from this, paragraph 2(b) prevents\us infiltrating leaflets inte Kalimantan as we sheuld have liked te de, he I am indeed leeking forward te Reddaway"s arvvfit DISTRIBUTED TO: DH oy /'y SE. A.D. JeMe1.D.; F.E.Dept. FE. & Pac, Dept. Defence Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 121] === (Security Grading—tc where JEPARTMEN DHI0/ls/i68 SUBJE( OnAnr awoke | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) MINUTES we 179 -G. (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) (Main een === [PDF page 122] === ® carom TOP, COPY. FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFIGH 0C1 cr Cypher/OTP ups SRCTIOn DISTRIBUTION Sir P, Dean F 95346 | 1315 £ Octoher. 1965 lO. x £222 saa 4 ote: a Loder 2 19056 6 October, 1965. 217 October, 1965. CONFI DENTTI ous to Foreign Office 2_telegram No. 2536 of 6 October ad for information to:= Djakarta Wellington ‘uala Lumpur Canberra POLAD Singapore Ottawa Indonesia. In the course of conversation with a member of my staff, Cuthell (Director South West Pacific Affairs) showed signs of anxiety lest Her Majesty’ s Government might consider that recent developments in Indonesia could be successfully exploited - whether in propaganda or action was not clear, He said more than once, that Sukarno was clearly looking for some external issue on which to focus attention while he papered over the cracks, and he emphasized that it was in the Western interest to lie low. In the propaganda field, he said that Radio Malaysia had been doing excellently in this respect. He was assured that Her Majesty's Government were fully aware of the importance of not providing a target for Sukarno 2e Speaking of the future, he sai at had been considering how it might 1 ossible to help an anti- Communist, army-supported régime, > were to emerge in Djakarta. He indicated that the sort of help which the department had in mind would consist of material to kee} economy going and avert food shortages, not (repeat Asked how such support could be given without ‘let ting it appear. that the régime was under the influence of Necolim, he said that they would have to get the Japanese to play the leadi ng role. the State Department Foreign Office pass Canberra 69, Djakarta 29, Kuala Lumpur 36, POLAD Singapore 76, and Wellington 53. [Repeated as requested. ] === [PDF page 123] === where Appropriate “Dioishie FROM <j A Shh, SUBJECT: D hewes QD itmtz x Vprherts Darky Matt. teptem of | phn (> Meee (amg tls AAS anes pee um A095 Dated a: ay Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers; Received { Ateb_ (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) vie Indexed) 148 13 frofes [ hy 44 A\" === [PDF page 124] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Gy (01 Sir A. Gilchrist No, 2083 8 Octeber 1965 D. 0800 8 Octeber 1965 R. 1920 8 October 1965 PRIORITY Addressed to Fereign Ofice telegram No. 2083 of 8 October Repeated for information te: ; Kuala Lumpur, BGRAI Singapore, and Saving to Washington, Canberra, Wellingten, Ottawa. The Djakarta Daily Mail (English) resumed publication this morning, describing itself as an “authorised publication of the Armed Forces". It carries a banner headline "Captured alive, killers of Generals belong te Pemuda Rakjet/PKI. Excellent cooperation of Armead Forces and people". Three members of Pemida Rakjat, the PKI Youth Mevement, are named and are reported te have "confessed readily" that they were part of the gang whe kidnapped and killed the Generals. 2 Another report in the paper, headlined "Ganjang PKI. Gantung Aidit" (crusif the PKI, string-up Aidit), refers to type pamphlets and scribbled slogans which are now appearing all over Djakarta, and comm thus, "All this cam be considered as the manifestation of the great anger ef the people te accurse and avenge the barbarous killings of six Generals and one first Lieutenant committed by adventurers and terrorists belonging to the se-called September 30 Movement. Foreign Office pass Saving Washington Ne. 126, Wellingten Ne. 86, Canberra No, 91, Ottawa Ne, 10. eae === [PDF page 125] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE, v V BH IOI 17017 En clair FO/CRO/WH/ DISTRIBUTION - Sir A, Gilchrist No. 2097 D.0339 9 October 1965 8 October 1965 R.1020 9 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2097 of 8 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Mt tere ~~, BGRAI ewe Sal: POLAD Singapore nd Saving /to: Washington Wellington ey! Canberra Ottawa My telegram No. 2083: Developments in Indonesia. Following are further extracts from to-day's papers, 8 October: (i) Angkatang Bersendjata. Our greatest enemy, Necolim must not be allowed to think that we are weakened and so try to launch attacks. The armed forces, together with the people, are always vigilant and know who their real friends are, whether at home or abroad. (iii){sic] From the same paper (after referenees to various P.K.I. disclaimers) all this is nothing but an attempt by the P.K.I./A.1.D.1.T. to wash it's hands: of the.business. It is characteristic of P.K.1./A.1.D.1.T. to deny its sins against Sukarno, the revolution and the peopie. Howeven, righteousness and justice should be upheld. ‘i (ii) {sic] Duta Masjaraleat (Moslem newspaper) fron final statement based on facts, it is clea» that Permuda Rakjat and Sobsi were in possession of illegal weapons... let all Meslems stand firmly behind Sukarno in order to save the Republic: to fight against all forms of Necolim tyranny, and to help the armed forces in their sacred duty of crushing the September30 Movement and those who master-mina, (iv) Berita Yudha the Séptember’ 30 Movement wes merely the culmination of their (P.K.I. clearly implied) activities /andermining 4. thus === [PDF page 126] === & Djakarta telegram No. 2097 to Foreign office a oe undermining the Government over the past two years. (Then is mentioned a long list of incidents in which Communists were involved, ending with the Bandar Betsy affair and opposition to the recent Kotrar decision about the H.MeIe)« (v) Berita Yudha also reproduces, without comment, remarks by President Sukarno to 4 C.B.C. television correspondent last May, when he said that if the Cemmunists created disturbanees in Indonesia he would fight them. I was the man who fought against Communism when there was an insurrection in Madiun in 1928. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington 428, Wellington 88, Canberra 9, Ottawa 12. === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 53] --- In conversation with a member of the Diplomatic Corps this morning, Hatta drew a parallel between the present events and the Madiun uprising of 1948. He said that what was required was the same in both cases: ruthless and immediate suppression of the Communists. He thought that on this occasion, however, the army had unfortunately left it too late; they had given the Communists time to make their dispositions. He was despondent about the likely course of events in Eastern Java. He said that the Diponegoro Division, which was likely to play a key role there, had a very high proportion of registered Communists in the ranks. Foreign Office please pass Washington 128, Wellington 55, Ottawa 20, Canberra 87. === [PDF page 54] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair [Unreadable: handwritten annotations] A. Gilchrist D. 10.31 R. 18.37 5 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2042 of 5 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore and Saving to: Washington Wellington Canberra Ottawa My telegram No. 2032: Attempted Coup. The following is a summary of a report in "Berita Yudha" 5 October of a statement by Major-General Suharto. Those of us who saw the bodies of the murdered generals dug up can bear witness to the cruelty of the atrocities perpetrated by the barbarous adventurers of the so-called "September 30 Movement". It was evident from the state in which the seven bodies were found — six generals and a first officer — that they had been tortured. The corpses were recovered from a well at the training centre of the A.U.R.I. Halim Air Base for men and women volunteers. These volunteers came from the Pemuda Rakjat (the Communist Youth Organization) and Gerwani (the Communist Women's Movement). Given these facts it is possible that our beloved President may be right when he says that A.U.R.I. was not involved, but it is inconceivable that elements of A.U.R.I. were not involved in this massacre. If this is so, those members of A.U.R.I. who are true patriots should purge the others who were involved. Foreign Office please pass Saving Washington No. 419, Canberra No. 87, Wellington No. 79 and Ottawa No. 3. [Repeated as requested] === [PDF page 55] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 20[Unreadable], D. 1159 5 October 1965 5 October 1965 R. 2005 5 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 20[Unreadable] of 5 October. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Ottawa My telegram No. 2032: Attempted Coup. Following is text of announcement by Sukarno during night of 3/4 October. "The accusations against the Air Force being involved in the so-called 30 September Movement are false. My departure to Halim Air Base on 1 October was according to my own wishes, since I considered it safest to be near aircraft which could take me to another place if something undesired happened. We have to remain vigilant, and prevent the Air Force and the Army taking action against each other. Only the Nekolim forces would profit from this. I order all members of the armed forces and the people to remain united". --- [page 69] --- F.O. R.O. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2061 6 October 1965 D. 1407 7 October 1965 R. 1410 7 October 1965 [Unreadable] PRIORITY Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2061 of 6 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur, B.G.R.A.I. Singapore, POLAD Singapore, Washington, Canberra, Wellington, Ottawa, My telegram No. 2054: Attempted Coup. Following are extracts from editorials in army newspapers 6 October. Berita Yudha. Was the September 30 movement really the invention of Untung himself or was it master-minded by others, either Indonesian or foreign? Did the September 30 counter-revolutionary adventurers rely solely on their own strength or did they have the support, both in real terms and morally, of others, either Indonesian or foreign? In order to know who our friends are and who our enemies, we hope that the Government and the Indonesian public will give these two questions their full attention. Angkatan Bersenjata. It is the duty of the whole people to exterminate the September 30 movement in its entirety as well as those who master-minded it. It is clear who these were. Read the 2 October editorial of Harian Rakjat, the official organ of the PKI. It said "we are firmly convinced of the correctness of the action taken by the September 30 movement. The support and the feeling of the people is certainly on the side of the movement". Then again, the murder of the Generals was carried out by volunteers from the Communist youth and the Communist women's organisations (Gerwani) so it is hardly surprising that Harian Rakjat speaks up for the September 30 movement. We await a decision by the Government to declare the PKI, Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani illegal organizations. Foreign Office please pass Saving to [Unreadable] No. 421, Canberra No. 92, Wellington No. 8, and Ottawa No. 6. === [PDF page 70] === [Unreadable] No. [Unreadable] Dated Received (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Encloses Copy of: SUBJECT: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 71] === [Unreadable] === [PDF page 72] === [Unreadable] === [PDF page 73] === [Unreadable]