Indonesia, Internal political situation: Attempted coup against Sukarno [9] (FO 371/180318, October 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === [Cover/decorative page: brown archival file folder cover (TNA) with file number, red label and green "CLOSED UNTIL" release sticker; no further text] === [PDF page 2] === FROM J.) 4 BA ebeot Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) 180318 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) 4 It voles? PDS q 4 171be (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SUBJECT: at L p 4 5 8 ck CatatKa, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 3] === FROM DJ. TA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair Sir A. Gilchrist No 8 D. 1011 8 October 1965 8 October 1965 R. 2339 8 October 1965 FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION PRIORITY Repeated fer infermation to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapere Washington Canberra Wellington Ottawa Large demonstrations in Djakarta today by Moslem youth groups directed against the P.K.I. Aidits' office was set alight and half of it has been burnt down. The fire engine summoned to the scene was reperted to have been moving very slowly. It is alse reperted that some arms and radio transzitters have been discovered inside the building. === [PDF page 4] === NNNNN FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE nm Clair WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2133 ):; 0934 11 October 1965 11 Octeber 1965: 1514 11 October 1965 PRIORIT Addressed to Foreign Office telepram No. 21 of 11 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore And Saving to: 7 nots | Jashington My telegram No. 2084: ‘Anti-PKI Demonstration Following is a summary of a report in Berita Yudha 11 October. The anger of the people against the PKI and AidiXt resulted not only in the attack on the PKI H.Q. but also in the destruction of houses belonging to PKI leaders, including Aidit and Njone. In Njono*s house and that of another PKI leader, clothing was found stained with blood from bullet wounds. Also, important documents, including PKI membership cards, and a First Lieutenant's uniform. Aidit*s house was found to be full of luxury furniture of foreign nmakea television set, refrigerator, foreign mauufaciured beds, a stereo pick-up, foreign made prams and lavish décor. All this made the people the more angry because they were Able te see that Aidit"s accusations against the "capitalistsbureaucrats" were false. A money bex containing about ene billien rupiahs was also found. The armed forces, who had not expected these actions by the people, succeeded in preventing the violence from spreading further. The people‘s next target was to have been the house of Sitompul, the Secretary of the Djakarta Branch of the Indonesian Journalist$. Association, iuckily fer him the army came to the rescue-and ahs, the people disperse, so the house was saved. Foreign Office pass Saving Washington Ne, 13% [Repeated as requested]. x === [PDF page 5] === (Security Gradinge—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) & SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ONESIA et Pia bmn fs $a bps a ae Sgekate q Satka, Dated q Gotti, | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received ff QtAWX (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Ks Br) | at === [PDF page 6] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE ee En Clair FO/CRO DISTRIBUTION Sir As Gilchrist Nos 2103 De 0641 9 October, 1965 9 October, 1965 2. 0917 9 October, 1965 py 1045 fio 3 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2103 of 9 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapere Washington Canberra Wellington Ottawa IMMEDIATE President Sukarno returned to Djakarta this morning, 9 October. ADVANCE COPIES TO: Sir B. Burrows Head of S.E.A.D. Head of J.M.I.D. Head of News Dept. Head of F.E. & P.D. Resident Clerk === [PDF page 7] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) FROM 3:7 Aplichene, a BJECT: or Bote 2 Yo ose Dat, Soya of Nsceti.* No. WQIOG | ater Pena eG a ge ca ’ Dated q QRetebs | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received \( Vetepes (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 8] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE ia Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION | Sir A, Gilchrist im oll 1965 D: 0759 9 Octeber, 1965 R: 1532 9 October, 1905 \d@ressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2101 of/9 Oc Repeated for information te: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore Following is editorial in Djakarta Daily Mail 9 Octeber, under the headline "Beware of Necolim". Begins: As has always been the case, the Necolim’s mouthpieces are taking the greatest of interests in the happenings in Indonesia. They have been making “happy” comments on the "disunity" now prevailing in the country following the "30 September" affair. With. their ewn versions of tell tales, plus some thumbsuckings, they send eut throughout the world their views on the past and coming events in our Republic, Perhaps they have rubbed their hands with kind ef happiness and, perhaps they are expecting that the Republic of Indonesia would deviate fron the rails of the revolution, "leader" of the British puppet state ef "Malaysia" has even invited the Republic of Indonesia to ceas® her confrontation so as te work closely together with his country te exterminate Communism in this area... perhaps our Stand (fer that leader, at least) has not been made clear enough. True we are having troubles at heme caused by the accursed "30 September" affair, True the Indenesian Communists are invelved in causing the troubles... but then to cooperate with a Necelim "State" this the Republic ef Indonesia will never de, Let us ence again make our stand clear ~ notwithstanding the troubles at home - the "Ganjang Malaysia" is to go on until "Malaysia" has been cleaned of Necolims, Ends. DISTRIBUTED TO: F,0. S.E.A.D. sileleDe ews Dept. F.E. & P, Dept. === [PDF page 9] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded J where“A ppropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT neta | DH 015// 76 FROM ¢ 6 (Vie ements, | SUBJECT: bs FEAD- 9 3 Me CLE ERE le thlghie H Ties No. ~ Aeoclis Asrmrnts she fore Dated 6 CLtAa~s Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (| Ohetes (Outward Action) === [PDF page 10] === CONFIDENTIAL CABINET THURSDAY 7 OCTOBER 1965 INDONESIA St orsing | President Sukarno is still at his palace at Bogor near Djakarta and presided over a full Cabinet Meeting on 6 October, at which two leading Communists were present. 2. No details of this Meeting are yet available, but Sukarno is reported to have been in full health and it looks as if he may be reasserting some personal control over events. 3. If so, Sukarno will undoubtedly try to prevent any effective action by the Generals against the Communists. 4. Generals Nasution and Suharto are firmly in control of Djakarta, Where Communist newspapers have been banned. Indonesian Communist leaders and the majority of their supporters in the capital have gone to ground, but there has been fighting in Central Java. 5. The crucial question remains whether Army Generals, incensed at the assassination of their colleagues, will dare to disobey Sukarno and take action against the Communists whom they believe responsible. 6. There is nothing that we can do at this stage to influence events and it is still too soon to guess what the outcome will SOUTH EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 6 October, 1965 [Unreadable] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 11] === ote aoe: Dettintaitian Rein, Dated Encloses Copy of: Received \{ lst ha, (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) mune (Main Indexed) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 11 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) oOlUAK i j References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 12] === M' Weed {us E nlonry ) ee ail an Ne de ee jo pesca s pom hee Pi cccessjdteins Eby Darbar, upnling be [Unreadable] Od OVAL === [PDF page 13] === FA VL WS cng CTTDHRAY Mee aT FT eC CREATIVE Y ALSO rmITD iN LX Jivadh Urpoe nM LEDGE WUW EXI Cik) VOLVEMEN QErWwTrAnD HTN OnMsi its m aye 2Vi W caon UNU DJAKARTA DEPARTMENT FROM: === [PDF page 14] === AWA AIvwAD w ke VOA MLloonwv ini URN VUL VOU RFA mer a hse === [PDF page 15] === PONT i; LEN R Vs HT FR ra Si QP/h oOnYV °S POINT ALMOST aan? Mwe yg TeTt Vib vs DJAKARTA DEPARTMENT FROM === [PDF page 16] === Ch CRET Sis Sons IMPLICATIONS OF 308 SEPT AFFAIR 1. ‘WHAT HAPPENED: SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE SUKARNO ENGINEER ENTIRE AFFAIR TO ELIMINATE ARMY OPPOSITION. OTHERS SEE If (A)’ CONTINGENCY PLAN BY COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ALLIES‘ WHICK WENT OFF HALF-COCKED; (B) EFFORT. BY UNTUNG AND HIS COLLEAGUES -"SAVE” SUKARNO FROM ALLEGED ARMY COUP; (C) GENIUNE ATTEMPT BY UNTUNG AND PORTION OF AIR FORCE TO. UNSEAT SUKARNO; (D>) OR IN CA OF A SMALL MINORITY, A COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO. GRAB POWER FROM AN AILING SUKARNO. 2 SNOE OF THESE THERIES JIBES ENTIRELY WITH FACTS AS THEY ARE NOw KNOWN. IF UNTUNG AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE - ACTING TO SAVE SUKARNO, WHY DID THEY GIVE IMPRESSION THEY WERE RULING IN THIER OWN RIGHT DURING SHORT PERIOD THEY CONTROLLED DJAK4RTA? IF THIS PART OF CINTINGENCY PLAN WHICH TOUCHED OFF PREMATURELY, PERHAPS BY FALSE REPORT OF SUKARNO'S DEATH, HOW “CAN INDICATIONS OF ADVANCE ACTIONS. DURING LAST FEW. DAYS OF SEPT BE EXPLAINED? IF THIS WAS: SUBANDRIO-DANI PLOT TO TAKE OVER (PERHAPS WITH PKI SUPPOR?) WHY WOULD THEY WANT TO OUST SUKARNO WHO. IS THEIR MAIN Bast OF SUPPORT?. 3, WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED IS STILL OBSCURE.’ FOLLOWING IS ONE POSSIBILITY WHICH SEEMS TO US TO HAVE MERIT: A. WHAT LATER BECAME KNOWN AS 39 SEPT GROUP; ALMOST CERTAINLY,INCLUDED DANI, PART OF AIR FORCE, COL. SUHERMAN OF DIPONEGORO DIVISION AND UNTUNG. INCLUSION OF SUKARNO AND OR PKI LEADERSHIP NOT.SQ, CERTAIN ALTHOUGH THERE IS CONSIDER ABLE EVIDENCE THAT BOTH PROBABLY INVOLVED IN IN SOME WAY. SUBANDRIO WAS PROBABLY AWARE OF AND, MORE LIKELY, SUPPORTER OF GROUP. a 8B. S$ EP SEPT COUP PROBABLY CONCERNED -BY MOVEMENT ARMY TROOPS TO DJAKARTA FOR ARMED FORCES DAY CELEBRATION OCT 5 AND BY REPORTS ARMY MIGHT ATTEMPT SEIZE POWER THAT DAY. FROM VARIOUS SOURCES WE HAVE LEARNED THAT PKI LEADERS RECENTLY -TAKING EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AND THAT PRARAMILITYARY FROM: -DJAKARTA TO: DEPARTMENT === [PDF page 17] === MOUNTING ECONGHIG ONOMEC CORRUPTERS" CONVINCED THEM P ARMY: LEADERSHIP. IARE IN ADVANCE ORTEDLY SUMMONE CLOSE SURS fs 38 AND OTHERS IES SH 1ORTL Y ULD SEEM CLEARLY 14 ear ACTION TO COUNTER A AY COUP OR BEEN PART OF BRO R PLAN 7 &G POWER ON SUKARNO WHICH TOU E. WHETHER. Su Knees BEEN OR ne hae \T Si AVI h Cli APPROVAL IF THIS WAS E ERTAINLY HIS RECENT STATEMENTS SHOW n0 REG <T OVER SL AUG SHTER HIS TOP ARMY ADVISERS. SOME pi ER RMY BELIEVE, HIS MOVEMENTS ON OCT.1 INDICATE HE SITUATION: N NOw IS AS oe OF: ARMY IS IN CONTR HAS IMPORTAN MENTS OF POWER SUCH A g RADIO AND TV. IT ALSO HAS A CAUSE IN } ER OF SIX TOP EADERS IF ARMY CHOOSES TO USE IT, AND IT HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO DO'SO.: C. MUSLIM’ GROUPS AND OT HERS (EXCEPT COMMUNISTS AND THIE STOOGES) ARE LINING UP BEHIND ARMY.. D. PKI HAS SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR ITS ENDORSEMENT OF, AND PERHAPS PARTICIPATION IN, DISCREDITED ‘30. SEPT MOVEMENT. E, ARMY NOW HAS OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AGAINST PKI IF IT ACTS QUICKLY. REPORTED ARMY SWEEP THROUGH COMMUNIST AREAS OF CITY YESTERDAY ID NOT TAKE PLACE. MOMENTUM IS NOW AT PEAK.WITH DISCOVERY OF BODIES OF MURDERED ARMY LEADERS. IN SHORT,IOT’S NOW OR NEVER. 5. ‘PROSPECTS: A. SUKARNO IS THE KEY. FROM HIS BRIEF RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS IT SEEMS THAT HE WANTS TO SAVE THE PKI AN ITS AIR FORCE’ ALLIES. WITHOUT HIM TE ARMY WOULD, ALMOST CERTAINLY MOVE... WITH HIMAN THERE IS REASON FOR DOUBT. B. THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A CONTEST OF WILLS BETWEEN AN ARMY WHICH HAS GREAT POLITICAL POWER AT THE MOMENT BUT WHICH HAS LONG HISTORY OF NOT STANDING UP TO PRESIDENT AND A SUKARNO WHO HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY: SEEMINGLY HAVING LOST CONTROL OF SITUATION DURING RECEN™ C, ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE SUKARNO WILL’ RETAIN ' OFFICE CIF HIS HEALTH PERMITS) . BUT WITH HIS HOLD ON THE POWER WEAKENED. HOW MUCH CANNOT BE DETERMINED WILL HAVE TO MAKE COMPROMISES, ESPECIALLY WITH ARMY. © IF SUKARNO SUCCEEDS IN HIS EFFORTS TO PORTRAY EVENTS AS “POLITICAL PROBLEM” ‘WHICH HT WILL HANDLE, AGOOD CHANCE HE MAY BE ABLE EVENTUALLY TO RETURN. TO STATUS QUO BEFORE SEPT 30 ARMY MUST REALIZE THIS. DESPITE WE BELIEVE ODDS ARE. THAT. ARMY WILL ACT RECENT EVENTS ON PKI AND ITS ALLIES. BUT IT SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT INDONE SIf OF EFFECTS OF SUKARNO AND WOULD BE ERROR, HOWEVER, TO ASSUME EASILY OR QUICKLY. SECRET: === [PDF page 18] === avaY: { SOMBER AND CURIOUS THIS MORNING IN. DJAKE FOLLOWING REVELATION RECENT BRUTAL MURDERS. FLAGS AT HALF-MAST FORIESLAIN GENERALS. RADIO CARRYING FUNERAL GAMELAN AND DIRGE MUSIC PLUS MORE RESTRAINED NATIONAL SONGS AS CITY PREPARED FROM MEMORIAL SERVICE, -STREETS IN MENTENG AREA KMBASSY NEIGHBORHOOD) UNDE! GUARD WITH TANKS AND ARMORED CARS ON DUTY AT, HEAD OF ROA D TOWARD SENAJAN AND KEBAJORAN. TWO ARMY PAPE RS Se ee BERSENDJATA AND BERITA YUDHA) FRONT PAGE ACCOUNTS AND MACABRE PICTURES OF FATE YANI AND 6 OTHERS, PLUS PHOTO. INJURED GEN NASUTION LEANING ON CANE. ABSOLUTE SILENCE OF CITY OF THREE MILLION PEOPLE: AND ABNORMAL EMPTINESS OF STREETS UNDER DARK-TO-DAWN CURFEW SERVE IMPRESS EVER Y= BODY WITH FEELING OF TENSION. OCCASIONAL QUICK MOVEMENTS OF DARKENED JEEPS OR OTHER MILITARY VEHICLES FAINTLY ILLUNIMED IN HALF= MOONLIGHT REMIND EVERYONE THAT SOMETHING: IS GOING ON. tt IDICATIONS OF FEELING OF RELIEF AMONG NON- SUNIST FFICIALS AND DJAKARTA ELITE CAME IN ‘COURSE FF VISIT OCT 4 WITH MRS. DIAH, WIFE OF.-INDO THAILAND, WHO KAD JUST TALKED WITH MINISTERS SALEH AND ASKARI. WHILE MRS. DIAH, AND ACCOMPANY~ FRIEND (FORMER MEMBER BOARD INDO=AMERICA ASSN.), CONSTERNATION AT MURDER OF GENERALS, THEIR REVAILI NG MOOD. WAS HAPPY RELIEF AT CRISIS PASSED. RS. DI REMARKED PKI HAD BEEN REVE ALED BY ITS OWN RUTALITY AND VNOW WE ARE. FREE.” 2a OX REPORTED REACTIONS FROM KAMPONGS QVATIVE QUARTERS) VARY. E HAVE ONE STORY THAT “PEOPLE WEEPING NERALS" BUT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN TAILORED FOR EARS. ANOTHER REC OUNTS ONE’ PKI-COMINATED ‘AS ARMS AND FEARS ARMY SWEEP, ASST ARMA D FROM TRIP WEST, JAVA RURAL AREAS REPORTS HERE BELIEVE PKI HAS SAVED COUNTRY ARMY. FROM:. DJAKARTA TO: DEPARTMENT === [PDF page 19] === mee » mit foereseater === [PDF page 20] === 7s Ages: Same Curren y In inttdds 20 VPusrrk Go(a f Ins Ws qt the Compliments of 3 ¥ bes aa a OU at Telephone GROSVENOR SQUARE, LONDON, W.1, ENGLAND GROsvenor 9000 the American E SB Mesy) H ois/ === [PDF page 21] === TO: “DEPARTMENT FROM: DJAKARTA === [PDF page 22] === ved ak Wied yer wo MeL. Teo) OD ed Cn crmesmes) wep PTUI Ri TW a Ome x mS 02 ALS bed oO? [Unreadable] mde Sona TIN Tet wale > Cy b Tut a1 Oo eet? === [PDF page 23] === [Unreadable] .;.:. oe 3 7: » ie: 44 few 1 4 [Unreadable] [Unreadable] : ae te Ra het int & oe ft: ~ +s s #\: s ed Privy J (\ele a tii - a § bbw MAW LARS te bw dd [Unreadable] [Unreadable] . ~i iw aa 4 he ms / oJ det V at be ao 1b i ica Wivyd il [Unreadable] ’ J - /: « % is: RAANJ LL aw LY A Vi [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] === [PDF page 24] === FROM: DJAKARTA RROUGH DJA C-PNHDTIN: VN a VATOWN A WOW? Pore. | TUAT === [PDF page 25] === MWe xeipr =< ater tie ones Uv ea) [Unreadable] NVO}] DURING SEPT Y Pp Az AMM Noe Mir . Co oe CMH Mric sa2zwronr Ht 4 “OU vf » HOcMmMBame = Was Wie D> CABI rs SU YOu ‘GIVE mitt 4LSO CA PURGING Al ITS. EFFORT LD BE GKATA VEMENTV IN. 36 noc Ht<Jve AND RADIO ANNOU ORGA yy at Vee DE CE OF ESPONS ISsu DJAUARTA A A STA br dag TOA bie VS Ww Jed ME nit “uy THAT (WHICH H 99 Vik, WOOL prom MUDA roy AT AI IMY L VWVLUNG onl AAT 30 uM: Pw IW<M= mH tm © wm wro OC wawzMNPYPs > 4 C) 53 Mr O&O y ART Aane OUNCEM AS’ AL RAR WER neo 4¥. GUID he. be of “aid art 4 MEI 50° «Ci SUAAN TT art abe RL f we. fag Se LINES STATED LEADERSHIP: GANIZATION FOR EIGUHT NO TO.DI ASED REGULAR. === [PDF page 26] === *uvyT1I0gd SM U3d geatrs OL aadwti7 is “JO SNWA La¥eWW XNOVIG “ISNONV-GIW 3AOC8VY INBO ONY @Eld3S NVHL WSHSIK INSO Yad BOI TIILS MON JOIN ° ae WONS BOTY HLIM dIHS SO WATHY NILVWMOSdS ISNIVDV SONINUVM AWHVY OSNOYLS ONIMO11I0" LVHASWOS WATS NVGSW.NI S30T&d a oe ee ©O2zee aoowgnwe ONITVIWO SNVSOIS H VII *IXd HO ONINNY IM ¢ 100 G3avueVd CHLNOA ALUVd VPINVd VONWSd SLUYOdSY OSTIV NV ie Oe Hi oO IXd] Ss q INLSOd ASOLVITISNOD [Unreadable] NOISEO 38 OL SW3ES V NOTLONULSAG LY CaWIY 30 TOOL SVA INSK WN Q Q3ansst NS-TW IVHI mmo Oka ss 6. © 22 te 7 SI 3SuNOD [Unreadable] N3WWOD) aoe as GN YV NILVIS_ [Unreadable] SS ee =>hHnN Go wM rei © {1} O LOY.->r>tk.= [Unreadable] Cs ae ae a. Rei) <b Oreo ris oS »OMOc OS We 10 bao mOoOOo “AW uy AG dM G3NOId N3BA SVH CONOLN) [Unreadable] DYWI ONILSISSVY SADI10d OCNI (2) GNVY G3NNVD AVLINSINZANOT 1 IV G3INkVO 3d OL BNNILNOO GNI 3ZIG@VYSGISNOD Lanod oN fANVDVdONd LNOHLIA G3aTeyvo INSWALVIS GNY SWEIT NOTIN3SLLV auosag SV ‘GN IWNOTLYN Wi YBINT NO JANI OIava 1s *ROWNELIDS 40 aera tgeye SAY SI II (1) asnvoag *S3TIHA VY TIM ¥aN¥O¥d0ud NVOT SUSHIL SYSARMOH * NYNHST UNVH GY JEq N3AS a [Unreadable] Oe Ne O “MSA O. tx] 4 fF ea OMe qo>hre = tir) OW C SD ft Ce, <Ci+ GIO. mie === [PDF page 27] === TQ: DEPARTMENT FROM: DJAKARTA === [PDF page 28] === Oaoaahan ti) Ge wand awl ix) ts. Ona at ft) §-« qoc -e ere ss ee ee ‘ Lime eee OFF === [PDF page 29] === wert y EVENLE Momo Nec row ATOM TO ATT NU we === [PDF page 30] === ET LENGTH ING MESSAGE, BUT BELIEVE WILL BE USEFUL TO DEPT ADDRE ES TO HAVE FOLLOWING NSTRUCTION - EVENTS PAST FEW DAY THESE KNOWN FROM BEST LABLE SOURCES., ACTIVITY PRIOR SEPT UNUSUAL NUMBER HIGH OFFICIA4lL EFI KARTA BEFORE. SEIZURE TOP ARMY LEADERS MORN T. fs o - SEPT 21.5 -MPRS. GROUHS!. 45 HEADED pb! IRD DEPUTY PRIMIN HAERUL SALEH, PNI CHAIRMAN ALI SA ROAMIDJOUO,. i AND ARMY MAJOR GENERAL WILUJO OJUDO LEFT FOR CHINA. CTRIP ARRANGED SEVERAL’ MONTHS BEFORENA| D>. B. SEPT 27, NATIONAL DEFENSE INSTIT IP OF 59 HEADED BY REAR ADMIRAL SUBONO LEFT FOR CHIN | FIRST DEPUTY PRIM FOR TOUR OF SUMATR . HREE ECONOMIC TEAMS HE Y MIN KOTOE GEN SUKENDRO, MIN TRADE GEN JUSUF AND MIN. UDGET SURJADI ALSO LEFT DURING ; PKI CENTRAL COMMETTEE TOOK VARIOUS STEPS IN’ PRECEDING WEEK, APPARENTLY AS PRECAUTLONARY MEASURES FOR ARMY- SPONSORED COUP EXPECTED DURING ARMED FORCES DAY CELEBRATION. 4, ON SEPT 25 CENTRAL COMMITTEEMEN ORDERED TO AVOID THEIR HOMES AND TO SLEEP VN DIFFERENT HOUSES EVERY NIGHT. SEPT 26, SECRET INDO ARMY REPOR REPARE ‘R SEPT 30 AFFAIR) NOTED PKI PREPARI! R SOME EVENT FIVE TO: DEPARTMENT FROM: DJAKARTA === [PDF page 31] === SECRET PRESIDIUM OEI TJOE TAT iT -HIS LIE IN DANGER. COL UNTUNG (SUBSEQUENT! SADE! EPT 38 MOVEMENT) EDLY ADVISED PRESIDENT LAST WEEK OF SEPT THAT ARMY xS PLANNING COUP DURING ARM R.DAY, OCT 5. IDENT SUMMONE. ARMY CH IEF OF STAFF YANI AND ASKED FOR SIRY. CYANI EPORTE DLY HAD N RESPONDED. AT TIME OF SEPT 35 ATTACK ON ARMY LEADERSHII ENTS DURING NIGHT OMAR DANI SUMMONED CLOSE cox -IiW Qeihwnv I BASE AND AIR AKARTA OPENED OCT IST SUHARTO RERORTEDLY CHINA DURING OBMaKHS ZZamrpre REBEL FORCES CONSISTING OF RS A N OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD (TJAKRABIRAWA)’, 454 DIPONE TALION (CENTRAL JAVA) AND 536 BRAWIDJAJA BATTALION (EAST 4) REPORTEDLY STARTED MOVING AT @20@ OCT 1, TRANSPORTED BY AURI TRUCKS WITH COMMUNIST LABOR UNION GUIDES. ete. f ee Ma Lae Oe ee 7. PKI CADRES AT RAILROADS BLOCKED RAIL APPROACHES TO DJAKARTA. 8. ABOUT 8444, OCT 1, PKI oh 8 MEMBERS AND TROOPS OF SEPT 30 MOVEMENT INTE RRUPTED TELEPHON E IN DJAKARTA. 9, APPROXIMATELY 0406, MEMBERS OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD (PERHAPS — ACCOMPANIED BY UNIFORMED PKI CADRES, BUT THIS NOT CONFIRMED) BEGAN ENTERING HOMES OF PRINCIPAL ARMY GENERALS. A. BRIGADIER GENERAL PANDJAITAN SHOT AND KILLED WILE RESISTING CAPTURE. B. GENERA aLs HORJONO AND YANI WOUNDED AND LATER: DIED OR WERE KILLED AFTER TORTURE. |. C. GENERALS PARMAN, SUPRAPTO, SUTOJO AND LIEUTENANT AIDE TO GENERAL NASUTION CAPTURED AND LATER TORTURED AND KILLED. NERAL NASUTION ESCAPED FROM WIh DOW, OVER ROOF, ACROSS S TO. HOME OF ARMY OFFICER WHO CARRIED HIM TO’ SAFETY IN GOR. GENERAL NASUTION'S AIDE CAN ARMY LIEUTENANT) ILLED AND HIS 5 YEAR OLD er eee SERIOUSLY WOUNDED BY SHOT. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT RE EPORTEDLY WAS MADE TO SEIZE LEIMENA. WAS LATER CALLED TO PALACE AND- NEXT HEAGCD FROM AFTER SEPT AFFAIR SUPPRESSED. GENERALS MOERSJID, TASWIN AND SUHARTO (WHO LATER LED ANTI- 39 MOVEMENT FORCES ) REPORTEDLY WARNED BY ARMY COLLEAGUES AND PED BEFORE KIDNAP ATTEMPTS MADE. ot === [PDF page 32] === CLEAR ALTHOUGH APANESE WIFE, AT} b EARLY OCT: 1 REN YTLY PERMITTED CITY OR HARM. TO CRYPTO-COMMUNIST NEWSPAPERS PRINTED. NT BY AIR FORC F OMAR DANI WELCOMING COUP 1 THAT PRES HIP OF NATION, ED DECREE SETTING UP CIVIL AND MILITARY UNTUNG AND DANI F OCT 1 AND THEN - FLEW. TO SUMATRA TO PICK UP SUBANDRIO BUT AFTER SUHARTO HAD. ISSUE RDER THAT HE ASSUMIN HARGE OF ARMY, Pi IDENT ‘ISSUED ORDER STATING HE - LEADERSHIP OF ARMEI RCE NI APPOINTED GENERAL OSAMUDRA IN CHARGE OF DA ERATION OF ARMY 2- IN COMMUNIST NEW a VHHe “Vv Doman PRESIDENT, APPARENTLY AFTER SPEN G NIGHT AT HALIM AIR CAND ACCORDING SOME REPORT UFFERING HEART ATTACK), ITED TO BOGOR BY GENERAL SABUR MORNING OCT 2, LEIMENA IP ANYING, igh €27¢e a. P>rmoroot QnLp SSION OF MOVEMENT WcS 18. ARMY STRATEGIC COMMAND YANGI DIVISION, AND OTHER TROOPS UNDER GENERA HA} wee REPORTEDLY READY TO MOVE AT 1404 OCT 1 BUT UNSUR RESIDENT*’S WHEREABOUTS AND SAFETY AND ALLOWED PALACE GR( VACUATED TO HALIM AIR BASE, RENDERED. SJLARTO MMUNICATIONS BUILDING OFF AIR ABOUT TH ANNOUNCEMENT THAT N AND GENERAL SUHARTO 19. AT 1599, 539 BRAWIDJAJA FORCES BEGAN OPERATION AT RETAKEN AROUND 1982. RADION rT: 1896 AND RESUMED TRANSMISSION AT STRATEGIC COMMAND NOW CONT -LIN TEMPORARILY IN COMMAND OF é; moO Let | o os ete Ima ZQWH eo oe ee 26. SILIWANGI TROOPS MOVED INTO HALIM AIR BASE AT NOON OCT 2ND AND 454 DIPONEGORO BATTALION SURRENDERED; -CAIR BASE ALREADY EVACUATED BY UNTUNG, DANI AND PARTY AND THE PRESIDENT AND PARTY.) ATTEMPT BY SMALL GR OUP OF UNTUNG’S FORCES TO RETAKE TELE- RAPH OFFICE AT 1888 OCT 2 REPULSED. NASUTION JOINED SUHARTO IN DJAKARTA OCT 2... RADIO BEGAN TO BROADCAST SERIES OF STATEMENTS BY GOI SUPPORTING SUHARTO FORCES AND COMMANDS BY SUHARTO SEPT 30 MOVEMENT LEADERS AND JAVA TROOPS Ti RE REBEL COMMANDER TO RESTORE Si1 | OF memo OO Nwre === [PDF page 33] === PT 30 OcT AT 1663, TH SUKARNO IN B INDEPENDENT OF UNTY’ 4LSO BY ADMIRAL aes ADJIE (OF SILIWAN M OM4R DANI ISSUED _ SUPPORTING SEPT 27. mie RE a pecces AMI 28. DJAKARTA AUTHORITIE FORCE Ss" BY SEPT 30 GROUP ENTENCES WOULD BE METED 29. AT 2480, RADIO INDONE SIA DENYING A AND STATING HE WENT TO EAR TRANSPORTATION, CRY 3H. SUK ARNO AGAIN MET y ACCORDING ENERAL SABUR LEADERS EEPT 39 AFFAIR w CALM, ORDERLY ATMOSPHERE. PERSONALLY SETTLE IT. a1 NJ FOU 52. SUHARTO IN RADIO STA IENT REGARDING "PE ERHAPS CORRECT” BuT OFFICERS NOT INVOLVED, 53. MORNING OCTOBER I, I SLAIN GENERALS aRMY- CONTROLLED PRESS FEA AND. REMINDER OF MADIUN, OCT 3RD PRESIDENT Al Tf HALI Y OCT 4 BODIES OF SLAIN GEN ND NEAR HALIM AIR BASE NON- I NVOLVEME INCLUDING CORTE TABLISHING CONTACT D BY PALACE NG WHICH ATTENDED ANOTO, DANI AND CEKN "REOUN E ANNOUNCEMENT rte reve OOP UUM a JOINED PRESIDENT Quo FOR PRESIDENT*S. eae THAT ARMS ISSUED “T ETURNED WITHIN 72 HOURS OUT ° DELIVERED SECOND STATEMENT OVER FORCE INVOLVED IN 39 SEPT MOVEMENT AIR BASE ON OWN VOLITION. To BE \ENT, PRESIDENT TOLD.- WHICH REQUIRED ED HE WOULD ERALS AND NASUTION'S AIDE WHERE COMMUNIST CADRES TRAINED, NOTED THAT PRESIDENT’S STATE-= R FORCE IN SEPT 3g AFFAIR TO SAY SOME AIR FORCE E MILITARY FUNERAL HELD FOR THROUGH CITY STEETS, ‘OF- MUTILATED BODIES MPRESSIVE TURED PICTURES GUARDS,-— === [PDF page 34] === FROM DJAKARTA beth bj ct wad (6 6-baray) === [PDF page 35] === DAMTMININ LAVAM LVI UYU 27M rt Oz O re Compt nN SLANE i === [PDF page 36] === [Unreadable] v - * Pr Ye VS me i ae ee ’ ik ue: i f- aw SJ We WH LA iwi e & [Unreadable] : ‘. ia 4 - wi tr ae SS be kee ee A de | T ke ai.» ”: haw i ri ee: ‘i ~ wate ‘ > aw iw é. ~ or ee we MU 6 [Unreadable] _ or + iVUlg US ce des WS 1 J he LtviF ‘ J a. iJ s Wriw sa « ‘ wo bed PS hile iV WS A bo - [Unreadable] 6- ¥ - / ~~ 4 am WA =. 4 s.¥ er iv ok ~~ Ls &eew eee ~ + he ~ tive « — & \ ‘ s [Unreadable] rA wT TAS: eal a ~~ CAD T “see - a > =~ ~ ~~ eam ee ——. [Unreadable] ’ >a am ‘~« r _* 4, 4 7 ‘ tS) kw oe NA 7 ee \4 VG ame V dewt b / \ CV es te A he Ow \/ é hw. i oie 7 cas “Om 2 ett [Unreadable] ee ee oe *#iririwiis " [Unreadable] [Unreadable] — ~ he ‘ «: 6 és Qwhe @ a iV ‘ 88 de hee de: a 40 hea ’ a wewiltema 4 Sine VY A 14 nt 4 * be LD Ne NN he es Oe ‘ [Unreadable] — Y | YY = =» /i¥ 5 te 4b i\ ‘ -: am week em ee AY ae AOA ee oe em & £8 - i [Unreadable] VV we ee Wa meow & TP eS [Unreadable] . NOTA a the =}. liwed + YI mr bt ieer § Wi Lie © === [PDF page 37] === FROM: DJAKARTA TO: DEPARTMENT === [PDF page 38] === porc a) A(ihbiew LY ENG] | ARR A mw ot tee ava AIDE bs AIDE, LED* ve EFUFRFNTS LVENId.e === [PDF page 39] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) PONEIDENTIAT CONFIVEN TIAL SIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] ee a “Tet gees i jo hom tet co - of ereting re * Ber Peco - Cadena; Vo Yow? Dated = Qtehr | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 20 [Unreadable] ant MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) 4 {v0 ey: ALIN === [PDF page 40] === 1,061 | pHiorsd OD Cypher/OIP ~** -/UE DISTRIB IG sir A, Gilehrist; No. 2093 D. 16,30 8 October, 1965 8 October, 1965 R, 23,07 & October, 1965 PRIORTIY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to F tele @, 2 ef & Co Repeated for information to: Kuale Lumpur © BCRAI Singapere M ‘ POLAD Singapere 'S/i>o\ Bangkok And Saving fo: — Vashingten vanberra Wellingten Ottawa, My telegrams Nes, 2083 and 203... Anti PKI fervour is mounting in Djekarte, At first I was inelined te credit reports that the Army were privately urging restraint on the leaders of the various youth groups emeerned, I am new less inelined to believe this, It looks very much as if the agmy are now intent on making a riposte te President Sukarne's specious call for calm and order, ‘They wish to hammer the point home that it is futile to expect calm until the murderers of the generals have been breught to justice, 2, A parallel, but probably less effective, gambit is being played with regara te the PKI itself, The Army are continuing discreetly to round up PKI members, But these are mly small fry - the more prominent people like Lukmen and Njote are not oly at large, but even attend Cabinet meetings. In other words, such action as the dymy is taking falis a long way short of applying pressure on the President tewarés getting the PKI preseribed, ‘The generals seem to have decided that rather than making an overt move in this direction it would be better te ge& the political parties to bring pressure on Sukarne to deal with the PKI, ‘This is a particularly Javanese (and Army) methed ef appreach and confirms my view (see my telegram No. 2059) that the generals are reluctant te take, or incapable 6f taking, effective action in the political field in their om nane. Foreign Office pass Saving te Weshingten No, 427, Canberra Mey, Sioxito. 95, Ottawa No. 11 and Wellington No. 87. uuuua CGIFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 41] === amet (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 4 1 ———_— where Appropriate) Pp cCrnrar rr tad bee ed Ne He Bg” INDONESIA DH lors /1'79 paws/i7g /G met 8 eas ol we, Cibel oe SUBJECT: ees fer bos ont otal, Sane Lew. Aaet- No. Al34+ Dated {| Okvhot Encloses Copy of: Received 12 October > h be References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) | ae eS lagdr byt) Wea karta i422 am fulaacocder > tare Printing Instructions) “ jouths Li Mas (_ para GD MWe, (2 bane (Referred to Legal Adviser) Qu pat - gurpls Frrokion. Oue (Main Indexed) ol Wk Coutd also, {os CKO, Wn apt C ao of uo AY \n Ole HM tide. wo wri. Sukarno [»s! === [PDF page 42] === ay ve radead Fo Rey ~ouye wm vod Timp Ym (pe CQ TM YOM ' FwraB ny yt of wouenl pera ond ype ae Papen mepaeenn wy208” Gah Wy ro === [PDF page 43] === Ed (1627) Minutes TOP SECRET Djakarta telegram No.213\ raises rather wide issues, with which it is difficult to deal adequately in telegraphic exchanges. However it will help H.M. Ambassador to ha our views, and I have attempted which goes rather wider than Mr. Tenison's, to draw your comments. Sure that Sir N. Pritchard would wish to see before anything is sent off. (H.S.H.STANLEY) 14 October 1965 MR. BROWN MR. CABLE It is undeniable that a strong military regime in Indonesia would be preferable to a communist regime. However, a strong military regime which had not called off confrontation of Malaysia would be very awkward for us, possibly even worse than Sukarno's regime before the coup. If the Generals were successful on the internal front and S¢¥en ‘complete control of the country, they would have a free hand to pursue the aims of military conquest which were not achieved by Sukarno. If the Generals had achieved mastery with American aid and were still in receipt of American economic assistance the reaction in Malaysia and Singapore would be violently antagonistic towards the Americans. They have already in recent months come under attack in Malaysia for continuing to supply military equipment to the Indonesian armed forces and for having been supposedly niggardly in the military aid offered to Malaysia. In anti-American riots in Kuala Lumpur the U.S.1.S. Office was badly damaged. TOP SECRET === [PDF page 44] === If the Indonesian Generals continue the confrontation campaign while in receipt of American aid, the difficulties which we and the Malaysians have had over for instance, the supply of French helicopters to the Indonesians would pale into insignificance. Not only would the Malaysians,supported by their Commonwealt Allies, find themselves opposing the Indonesian armed forces backed by the Americans§ we and the Malaysians would be under pressure from the Americans and Australians to appease Indonesian aggression in order to restore peace to the region and to be accommodating to the Americans protéges in Djakarta. The potent is only restating what Sir A. Gilchrist says in his telegram No. 2134 of 11 October. I only do so because I think that your draft reply does not pay sufficient attention to the necessity of impressing on the Americans and Australians that their economic support of the Generals should be on the firm condition that confrontation is called off or is allowed to die away. Otherwise, if confrontation continues and we are opposed by an Indonesian Ayub Khan, or even an Indonesian Nasser, both military men, we may in five years' time look back with nostalgia on the days of Sukarno. (A. J. Brown) 15 October, 1965 #44 [Unreadable] 2 Pale cartid *, but To ompp™ fan bens === [PDF page 45] === Minutes. TOP SECRET & GUARD Although I agree generally with this draft, there are some aspects where I should like to alter the emphasis slightly or to inject different ideas, and I have accordingly taken the liberty of redrafting it, so as to bring out (in paragraph 1, in an addition to paragraph 3, in paragraph and in the last sentence of paragraph 5) the points to which I attach particular importance. 2 I now attach both drafts and would be happy to discuss further, if you would like to do so. (J.E. Cable) 15 October, 1965 === [PDF page 46] === TOP SECRET = GUARD FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DY 101s 179 - EL URE ICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL Sir A. Gilchrist DISTRIBUTION D. 1133 11 October, 1965 NO. 2134, R. 1708 11 October, 1965 1l October, 1965 PRIORITY TOP SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram NO. 2134 of 11 October Repeated for information to:- POLAD Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Washington and Bangkok, GUARD (ct a ee \ wield |!” Washington telegram No. 2536: Indonesia, Cuthell’s line is worth watching. Marshall Green has been unreasonably suspicious of our attitude and has only recently come to accept that we are not going to launch a counter-offensive from Singapore to stab the good Generals in the back. At the big funeral service last Tuesday he was much impressed by the fact that the citations read out showed that six of the seven dead Generals had attended eourses at Leavenworth, I said that six of them were also credited with medals for having fought against the British, The next day the occasional cheer for America by crowds passing the Embassy rang a big bell in American bosoms and the Americans have an urge to show their gratitude, 2. Is there a risk that before long we shall find the Americans lining themselves up behind that great Muslim gentleman Nasution? 5- Now, Nasution is quite a chap, Anyone in his right mind who knows both Nasution and the Tunku would certainly prefer to deal with the former, 4. Three points arise:= (a) Can we be sure at this stage that it is really Nasution who is going to be in charge? Shall we further his prospects by supporting him now? Would a strong military regime under Nasution be in British interests? /5e Let us 0 RET = GUARD === [PDF page 47] === TCP SECRET = GUARD jakarta telecram No, 213) to Foreicn Office ous e d« Let us leave the first two points aside, except to note that they both tell in favour of a cautious approach, 6. The outcome of the present tension in Indonesia is likely to be along one of the following lines:- (i) Soekarno back in the saddle, with much diminished domestic and international stature, carrying on with his relatively inefficient confrontation, his anti-e Western political warfare, and his Peking link, The army in control (whether with a puppet-Soekarno or with some other puppet such as Hatta), but seriously hampered in regard to external activities by domestic unrest of Communist origin and by the menace of economic breakdown, perhaps famine, (iii) The army in control, with massive economic support from America and/or Japan, able and Willing to play an effective role in external affairs, 7. Now apply 4(c) to paragraph 6, The short-term implications, for us in our pase of situations (i) and (41) would not be very different. There would be enough confrontation (or a standing threat of it) to tie us by the leg to our intolerably heavy commitment in South East Asia, (This is one way Of looking at it. The other way: we should be provided with an excellent excuse for retaining undisturbed possession of our valuable Singapore base, These really come to the same thing: different sides of the same coin.) 8 The implications of (iii) are rather different. We shall have the Americans back on their old hobby-horse: solid reliable Godfearing Indonesia opposing the best possible barrier-reef to the spread of Communism in South East Asia. 9e Is it likely that the Americans would make their aid to Indonesia conditional upon an abandonment of confrontation? This is where I came in three years ago, Would the Americans try any harder than they did then, and if they did, would they succeed? 10. We must wish at all costs to avoid a situation where we sit uncomfortably and expensively being shot at in Singapore while the Americans press us to yield to Nasution what we have denied © Soskarne /1l. I note from TOP SECRET = GUARD === [PDF page 48] === TOP SECRET - GUARD telegram Ne. 2134 te Fereign Office 11. I note from the Prime Minister's recent letter to Sir R. Menzies that in certain circumstances we were prepared to contemplate "a positive initiative designed te bring confrentation to an end", At the time this was written the initiative weuld have been directed and the (implied) great cencessiens made,te Seekarne. Are we ready to centemplate making them to Nasutien? Or de we regard Indenesia's present treubles as greund fer Standing firm? 12, The abeve theughts are intended te help yeu in cheosing a line ef pelicy and te indicate the dangers ef allewing the Americans, perhaps witheut full censideratien at top Washingten levels, te take action which will cheose ene for us. 13. I may add that my Australian colleague seems equally anxieus with the Americans te consolidate the pesition ef the Generals by meeting their main deficiencies - money and riee. The aim - te enable then te settle with the Cemmunists "enee and fer all". Fereign Office please pass Washingten 19, DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O. S.E.A.D. F.E.D. J.M.I.D. I.P.D. I.R.D. News Dept. TOP SECRET - GUARD === [PDF page 49] === HIS MARGIN Confidential Restricted Telegram toy— DJAKARPA Ne. 22 ore ae L390 And to:— Repeat to:— Routine #0: POL dingapore WELLIAGTON A ¥1% OTTAWA JUeF be En Clair. Code Cypher. Distribution:-— DEPARTMENTAL SEAD: F.ED. JMID: IPD: IRD: News Dept. C.R.0O. F.B. & P. Dept. Copies to:— Ministry of Defence Mr. Beyerley (6) arr VOU Goad Land time (G.M.T.) telegram should EMERGENCY )} IMMEDIATE PRIORITY | ROUTINE wit. priority | without | |DEFERRED TOP SECRET ¢/ptivtpt Security ard — if any [| Cadewot hs API iii accel laa Pale eae ‘ Address to telegram No. repeated for information io Bowtie f ania GAP OPT. BGRAI Singrogees. KUALA LUMPUR, WASHINGTON, BANGKOK. and Ottawa. Your telegram No. 2134. INDONESIA We agree that the developments envisaged in paragraph 6 of your telegram are possible, but wonder whether your conception of the first alternative (Sukarno back in the saddle) may not be over-optimistic. A revived Nasa {om Government would surely only be able to agree on confrontation and, because it -establish its: internal hal attention from economic troubles and internal rivalries, would badly need to re authority and distract might well wish to intensify confrontation. This could, therefore, be the worst possible outcome from our point of view, though we imagine we may well have to reckon with quite a prolonged period of confusion when we shall be uncertain what kind of Indonesian Government will finally emerge. 2. Our long term aim is a reasonably stable and viable Indonesia, with (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw non-aligned, /which === [PDF page 50] === which Malaysia and Singapore can live peacefully. Any tolerable approximation to this ideal requires an end to confrontatio ») other than by surrender, which would also enable us to make our contribution to the general stability of South-East Asia and the Far East, in full cooperation with our allies. This contribution, if we were relieved of our present commitment against Indonesia, might or might not include a military presence in Singapore. 36 However, as you will know from C.R.0O. telegram to Canberra No. 2522 and connected correspondence, we cannot yet lay down a firm programme and plan. We must take a short view, while seeking to handle the situation as it develops in a way consistent with our long term objectives. Nevertheless we realise the risk of the Americans being tempted to pursue immediate objectives which might conflict with _our long term wenieee cam NoZlo2d bd ar brane bows subject 4. We accept that there are dangers for us in the emergence of a well established military regime in Indonesia. But these dangers must be less than those in a viable and efficient Communist regime. However nationalistic the Generals may be and however much they are tempted (as all Indonesian leaders are likely to be) to unite Indonesia in a dramatic campaign against a foreign enemy, they will surely have to take account of popular discontent arising from the country's economic difficulties, shortage of rice etc. Whereas the Communists /could === [PDF page 51] === could count on aid from China and even the Soviet Union, the Generals might be forced, however reluctantly, to look elsewhere. At the very least, therefore, the Generals would surely be more inclined than any other Indonesian Government to consider moderating external policy in exchange for Western economic aid. Moreover, if they no longer had to worry about Communist views, they could consider appealing to Right Wing elements in Malaya on racialist and religious grounds. In the long run this might conceivably or to an understanding with Malaysia es; wu bahow came & an cud ou a batw ocsefotala ua, tere—eneb+tn e118 0 thd een—from tire Singapore pase without umaccep vavile politicai—disatvantaress 5. Therefore we must surely prefer an Army to a Communist regime. The half way house, some degree of chaos in Indonesia, perhaps extending to disintegration, also has its dangers. In any case it seems pretty clear that the Generals are going to need all the help they can get, and accept — being hopelessly tagged as pro-Western, if they are going to be able to gain ascendancy over the Communists. In the short run, and while the present confusion continues, we can hardly go wrongfbacking the Generals, without having any illusions that we shall thereby earn their undying gratitude. “e accept your point that the Americans and Australians m.y be more susceptible to such illusions, though we have seen no evidence of this fin === [PDF page 52] === in high levels in Washington or Canberra; put our proposal that we should all proceed in close consultation, which was accepted at the quadripartite talks, should enable us to keep our friends broadly in line with us. In the course of these continuing contacts we would be able to inject into American (and Australian) thinkfing the need to relate the scale of their support for the Generals to the latter's policy on confrontation. A direct pargain of American aid against the Generals ending confrontation would be excellent but may be impracticableot ce But the opposite danger - American support for Indonesian Generals confronting Malaysia and Singapore - should not be too difficult for us to alan avoid. We are ttt ott al ie telegram f or eo he POLAD please give BGRAI copies. "ieee oo CExp ey Nuw Noa 12 === [PDF page 53] === SVT ar TT) T CUT PROM i ORE Ti cypner/OrP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 110520 2: D. 1245 16 October 1965 15 October 1965: TOP. SEOQRE" FILCH Addressed to Djakarta telegram No, 1920 of 15 October. Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore Kuala Lumpur washington Bangkok Tokyo Canberra wellington Ottawa Your telegram No. 213. -NDONES LA Ae agree that the developments envisaged in paragraph 6 of our telegram are poss..ble, but wonder whether your conception of he first alternative (Sukarno back in the saddle) may not be overoptimistic. A revived Nasakom Government would surely only be able to agree on confrontation and, because it would badly need to reestablish its interns euthority and distract public attention from economic troubles and inte ek rivalries, ke well wish to intensify confrontation. This could, therefore, be the worst possible outcome from our point of view, though we imagine we may well have to reckon with quite a prolonged period of confusion when shail be uncertain what kind of Indonesian Government will 30 Our long term aim is a isonably non-aligned, stable and viable Indonesia, with which Mais and Singapore can live peacefully. <Any tolerable approximation to this ideal requires an end te confrontation, other than by surr; which would also enable us to make our contribution to a. "cle stabi South-East Sia and the Far East, in-full cooperati allies. This contribution, if we were relieved of ol commitment against Indonesia, might or might not include resence in Singapore. 3. However, as you will kaow from C.R.0. telegram to Canberr y aown No. 2522 and connected correspondence, we camnot yet ay firm programme and plan. We must take a short view, while seeking /+o handle 110.2. Me === [PDF page 54] === TOP SECRET Foreign Office telegram No. 1920 to Djakarta to handle the situation as it develops in a way consistent with our long term objectives. Nevertheless we realise the risk of the Americans being tempted to pursue immediate objectives which might conflict with cur long term views. See my telegram No. 8102 to Washingtou, de ie accept that there are dangers for us in the emergence of well sstablished military régime in Indonesia. But these dangers must be less than those in a viable and e2ficient Communist régime. However nationalistic the Generals may be and however much they are empted (as all Indonesian leaders are likely to be) to unite Indonesia in a dramatic campaign against a foreign enemy, they will surely have to take account of popular discontent arising from the country's economic difficulties, shortage of rice etc. whereas the Communists could count on aid from China and even the Soviet Union, the Generals might be forced, however reluctantly, to look elsewhe At the very least, therefore, the Generals would surely be more inclined than any other Indonesian Government to consider moderating external policy in-exchange for Western economic aid. Moreover, if they no longer had to worry about Communist views, they could consider appealing to Right Wing elements in Malaya on racialist and religious grounds. in the long run this might conceivably lead to an under—- standing with Malaysia whereby confrontation came to an end on a basis acceptable to us. 5. Therefore we must surely prefer an Army to a Communist régime. The halfway house, some degree of chaos in indonesia, perhaps extending to disintegration, also has its dangers. Jn any case it seems pretty clear that the Generals are going to need all the help they can get and accept without being hopelessly tageed as proestern, if they are going to be able to gain ascemdancy cver the Communists. In the short run, and while the present confusion contimues, we can hardly go wrong by tacitly backing the Generals, without having any illusions that we shall thereby earn their undying gratitude. We accept your point that the Americans ands \ustralians may be more susceptible to such illusions, though we have seen no evidence of this in high levels in Washington or Canberra; but our proposal that we should all proceed in close consultation, which was accepted at the quadripartite talks, should enabie us to keep our friends broadly in line with us. In the courge of these comtiming contacts we would be able to inject into American Cand Australian) thinking the need to rélate the scale of their s uoport for the /Generals TOP SECRET === [PDF page 55] === Generals to thé s policy on confrontation. 4 direct bargain of American aid against tne Generals ending confrontation would be sckiail but may be impracticable at this stage. But the opposite dauger - American support for Indonesian Generals confronting Malaysia and Singapore - should not be too difficult for us to avoid. 6. We are repeating your telegrams Nos. 2154 and 2191 as necessary POLAD please give BGRAI copies. [TRIBUTED TO; em S.HAD~ J MI. De FED. Jedel steve News Dept. === [PDF page 56] === THIS MARGIN Secret Confidential Restricted Open Draft. Telegram to; fo WASHINGTON Repeat to:— Routine 4 /p i A BANGKOK CAN ? WEL BR 879 TAA 9 Seer % a KG Code Cypher Distribution:-— DEPARTMENTAL SEAD: F.E.D. JMID: IPD: IRD: News Dept. C.R.O. Copies to:— Ministry |of Defehce Mr. Mobderley (6) * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) EMERGENCY. IMMEDIATE PRIORITY DEFERRED Security oT —if any [Codeword—if any] Pe ee WASHINGTON telegram No. repeated for information to BGRAI SINGAPORE. KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOKs Tokyo CANBERRA, WELLINGTON AND OTTAWA. Djakarta telegram No, 2191 and my telegram No. (9.20 to Djakarta: Indonesia We should like you to ask the State Department, at an appropriately high level, for their views on support to the Generals | snl ease material aid whether by rice supplies or in any other way. You should explain thinking in my telegram wo.(? /920 ) to Djakarta and say that while we agree that the Generals will need every possible encouragement against the Communists, we thle owe are worried test Indonesia skeutive herag strengthened while confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore continues. In the Quadripartite talks, and in Mr Ball's visit, the Americans urged us in the strongest terms to soldier on against Indonesia. We accordingly consider ourselves entitled to be consulted before the Americans enter into any arrangements for aid to Indonesia. (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw. tas To === [PDF page 57] === Fle axe AP ce you 2. To Canberra only. Cn VYRAA OTEK} < €¢_speakyo0n Similar lines to the “ustralians, tire—QuadripartTrte Tatks. === [PDF page 58] === = Wtn Rrh, ATI FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON a...:: EPARTMENTAL DiSTRIBUTION No. 8102 15 October 1! D. 1335 16 October 1965 Addressed to Washington telegram No. 8102 of 15 October, Repeated for information to: Djakarta POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore Kuala Lumpur Bangkok Tokyo Canberra Wellington Ottawa Djakarta telegram No, 2191 and my telegram No. 1920 to Djakarta: Indonesia We should like you to ask the State Department, at an appropriately high lsvel, for their views on support to the Generals, including material aid whether by rice supplies cr in any other way. You should explain thinking in my telegram No. (? 1920) to Djakarta and say that while we agree that the uwenerals will need every possible encouragement against the Communists, we are worried about Indonesia being strengthened while confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore contimes, In the Quadripartite talks, and in Mr. Ball's visit, the Americans urged us in the strongest terms to soldier cn against Indonesia. ‘ie accordingly consider ourselves entitled to be consulted before the Americans enter into any arrangements for aid to Indonesia. anberra only.] Please explain our views orally on similar the Australians. DISTRIBUTED TO: Jaatals MD ann ™m FOP SECRET === [PDF page 59] === ; —— a wt: 3 ee “n 3 a 3 =e pe ooh ae ee hata a aati (Security Grading—to be Up-graded aise a eee where Appropriate) 8.E. ASIA SECRET £ Givarp INDONESIA H (015 | 18 IG nom {1 A Gileheut SUBJECT: eC of CK 3S. (Lets i all Dated - OArter | Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: Received it O, (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Main Indexed) le yy whbs Hr Ee ssmieiseeemiaaal RM me mm mmm Om GG ET, TS AS A ST === [PDF page 60] === @eeesceceaecoececoeecooeouneee eeeovesooeoo ec eoeoeooecee ~ A Dr 4s WVvrAnve TNT IAT tre ty +7:: > ~“SANRONTCS PIIMOmeS “ONDE iO; ee ee [Unreadable] NYU NO £N AUN WLS YT) i ii oes Sat oa PPOMINENT ft DOPCONAL 7 & beh ee e avai a. ee eee eee) ee ee ~AMCLIIIN NI CAMONVYUIN OF WY GTA jrieta BRO me pr CE) bid Yim ACOIENVAL omens MODK THIS MUNN VIAL CUNT ee Meme PET nTy COOCAL AR LVLUNTEECREU Ine SNP TIN 2 ANCA SUDJIPTO VOLUNTI COT THINGS THE & . essd NGO a AWY WLoOUS wore ort ner sms bes ws b/ seers te earvIAnc TA ANAIVUYVO iV th v ta d === [PDF page 61] === 61 [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] ~ ] wlag i he te kee “i 9 «/ / te | a iviiheai === [PDF page 62] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) | SECRET 8.E. ASIA , ANOONREIRS 2 2 Di e1s/1ta/G FROM FO. (Vii OE Degre of rolel offerition to the (Vr. BAtroll) Cor jeston of -DANI ag Gren - SURTJOSUMPENO and Srey. Grey. SUPARDID. Dated xe D chabert Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: Received I! Ocketer (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) Som) "(Action | (Minin Indexed) Indexed) comp Mos Fale a oe ES = = 5 a 7 ae ae. eS 2 ee) eS eee we 1 ee le ee.) Se ee ke oe === [PDF page 63] === Reference...... THIS IS A COPY” THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 The Indonesian Generals are clearly the degree of the rebel opposition, particularly) to the support which it is getting from the mili their suppression of thé news that Dani has defected: continuation of the fiction that he is in Djakarta. Generals, the disaffected Diponegoro 26 secording to the als, But units in Gentral Java are being led by a Col. Suhirman. nothing has been heard about the Central Java Commander, Brig-Gen. Surjosumpeno, who according to a BMI cveport 1961 once belonged to the PKI, but "defected" some time previously. According to one view, he had become staunchly anti-comnunist, but according to another he may have remained.00ttéi member. His background is, at any rate, somewhat suspect and the fact that he has not been mentioned in the context ol the Gentral Java revolt may mean that it is of considerably greater proportions than the Generals are implying. October, 1965 Miss Gibs hem (a Tonk ) Ne Hees ir, Milman Mr. Kés » said Gh Wan ee SOEOR yr. @ 1k> Luci Ghort ong. ou (> Ofetar. Whoump od bn Ges SOP AR DSO —- Whe. Ws Yatone? Mood ‘axe: | th = als Code 18-75 === [PDF page 64] === We ner MVIA® hy [Unreadable] bus Hw Apr y len ft a/ Hin. Sernc® + tA Air LIA STA CLAY in 4 oS 0 cjcbew whic papers 2 te: Bing Ore S's dismissal, wade a spe a pars =} Say 1iAg Hrark lhe ars Snuce ee was ut tus Suk, Lut [Unreadable] "Nae Connmanding 5 a <f req g (2 Gar ) * (swe Ke 197 </ 2/4 3; Wre hare “er ed 2] hus Mw, and vere. ae Boe Begs Ee « s. Wsled away ae Big - Gen-s eh i de Ok ae ee bateart ' (DH tn last af Jue). He waenrtd ~ seer he Le. ra /ther bug ~ ranking hb have Litas fe cack etic. Co eee frvg sire) regunen’; ee Pu Jahier <f | Bandung). Burs lre aps lerng. Foe je iin ita A cian tadi shrres and ” Gopush” mmy sea soraJenl 9 Ae. “Tar hunr se Radio Ps. lncidently, a 3 Be Genre camed eee Conwunanter s+ tees si actwLer (swe is saith sha lena’ by hae Divisior aa Di poneg®"™ THIS IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 === [PDF page 65] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate! [Unreadable] Lo i NI 1A A DEPARTMENT DH1015// 33 rica: A ithe: | a BI am: [Unreadable] 0; heck A ibivatinn, ~~ Cel No. 20%S7 Cae Harts ewes off nen Be inva bays Dated Sw (Lek, FA Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Ritedicihesb hardin So ces oo Received (Outward Action) df) jumecls Kf Z MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 66] === ® CONFIDENTIAL ‘S$ FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2095 D. 16.02 8 October, 1965 § October, 1965 Re 23015 8 October, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Fore Office telesram No, 299! of 8 October. Repeated for information to: KYA POLAD Singapore Washington ie Kuala Lumpur My immediately preceding telegram: Internal Situation, The Police Liaison Officer commented that, in Djakarta, the Generals seemed to have the situation thoroughly in hand, but there was still much uncertainty about the rest of Java. 2. They had little information about what had gone on in Central Java. What was certain, was that one at least of the Battalion Commanders in Jogjakarta had initially declared for the "Movement" and that other Commanders had adopted a policy of wait and see. There had been little violénce, but much parleying. The Divisonal Commander had, however, sent a wireless message from Jogjakarta only this morning that the discussions were now over, and that his forces were*now all aligned with the Djakarta*Genévrals. 3 On Surabaya, the Liaison Officer seemed rather pessimistic. He said news had been received this morning that Government controlled enterprises had been taken over by SOBSI (the Communist trade union). Foreign Office please pass Routine Washington 138. [Repeated Saving to Washington] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 67] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE 8 Clair Ace FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist NOs 2115 D. 1556 10 October 1965 10 October 1965 bu) a / Re 1827 10 October 1965 Ft 7c 5-1 93g) Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 2115 of 10 October. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur DY 1p 1 7 BGRAI Singapore NL OF POLAD Singapore My telegram No. 2095: Internal Situation, Yesterday 9 October was quiet in Djakarta. Most local newspapers had front page spreads about the anti=PKI demonstrations on Friday. Half a million people were reported to have taken part representing 46 political and mass organisations mostly Moslem and other religious groups. One paper reported that the anti-PKI action "sprang from the spontaneous fury of the people" and implied that it had been taken out of the hands of the army. 2. Other items. Communist women volunteers are accused of having tortured the generals before they were murdered, Eighty-six members of the 30 September movement are reported to have been captured in Central Java on 7 October. Demands are made for a purge of Antara "that nest of counter revolutionaries" and of the Indonesian Journalists Association. 3. Confrontation and Necolim contime to be mentioned with standard epitaph. === [PDF page 68] === *Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should, Registry reach addressee(s) Po ei, ee: “6 8 as classification —tf any Telegram to:— 2 faheonha. Repeat to:— [Unreadable] En Clair. Cet ter N Col? J Di wrs/Ie3 €pher —_—_ ra oe oe [Unreadable] Corned maa disevtion, Yr Fe cn te Tate Sant 9 Ce lapro~ ASra€., Copies to:— ot JAn¢t8 icy ly, EAD The: RA [Unreadable] 12D SERo coe [Unreadable] NV be p” === [PDF page 69] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Hanes No GQ g Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Dated 9 tds 5! fo Received // Resto (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) (Main Indexed) 463i 5 === [PDF page 70] === FROM HANOI TO FOREIGN OFFICE sf » PH eis 7 Fu.. n clair FO/CRO/WH/ DISTRIBUTION Mr. Pensonby No. 425 D.0315 10 Octeber 1965 9. Oetober 1965 R.0O736 10 Octeber 1965 IMMEDIATE ‘ Addressed to Fereign Office telegram No. 428 of 9 Oetober Repeated for infermatien te: Djakarta Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Peking Three leading Hanei papers and V.N.A. bulletin te-day carried fellowing versien ef recent events in Indenesia. 2s During past few menths reactionary forces in Indonesia, encouraged by United States imperialists, had pletted coup d'état against President Sukarne and Indenesian Republican Régime. Cemplicated pelitical events eccurred in ranks of Indonesian army manifesting struggle between patriotic and pregressive forces and the reactionaries. 3» (After mentioning President Sukarno's call for unity at Begor en 6 October, news item drew attention te) United States imperialists espionage and psycholegical warfare organs seeking to whip up anti-Cemmunist campaign with aim eof interference in Indonesian internal affairs. 4. (News item which was attributed te) a news repert ended with assertion that Indenesian people (are resolutely struggling against the schemes of the imperialists and their lackeys te defend and develop their revelutionary gains). ADVANCE COPIES: ai GEF F.0 Sir B. Burrews 2. Head S.E.A.D. ek. Head J.M.I.D. Sir N. Pritchard ; Mr. Mergan Resident Clerk === [PDF page 71] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) ASIA DEPARTMENT Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Dated Received ” } ps MH QaAW | (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) AB Hralar (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 72] === & CONFIDENTIAL > FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP FO/CRO/WH/DISTRIBUTIO Sir A. Gilchrist No. 21171 D.1540 9 Octeber 1965 9 Oeteber 1965 R.1645 9 Oeteber 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Fereign Office telegram Ne. 2111 of 9 October Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore Washington Metordf _BGRAI Singapore Wellingten Kuala Lumpur Canberra My telegram No. 2103: Sukarne. The arrival of Sukarno in Djakarta leeks like a bad Sign, and yet the anti-Cemmunist activities ge marching on. I will reserve comment until we see whether and hew far Sukarne is a free agent. Fereign Office pass Washington, Wellingten and Canberra as 142, 62 and 96 respectively. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 73] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded ( 4 where Appropriate) TOP SECRET DH set IG Dated rr Okrber Encloses Copy,.of: | References and Relevant Papers: Received | Il Ockebser is = i 167 (Outward Action) bite M" wrarfiot’ 167) SC} [Unreadable] UAHUAT ff FT /\ tv nite) t- Cor Kon Aad { ae oor. S Cukclwiat ( VEC. rte yQy5 Secs" ) Vvnsa comm'd.\( Feb. to CINCFE No. Cossen 95) G 7 October. (Printing Instructions) 40 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action es ee Indexed) leted) Fa, Nal Ohi, S00 ae ©... CO 2 Vv) oe) 2 oe ww 1. I = ES Tan === [PDF page 74] === CRO. ee ee DISTRIBUTED TO: TOP COPY —_— ...O SECRET FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office of Political Adviser to Commander-~in-Chief iFar East) pu wis /ree Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Adams No. 678 De 1142 8 October, 1965 8 October, 1965 R. 1620 8 October, 1965 IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET Addressed_to Foreign Office telegram No. 6/78 of 8 October. Repeated for information to Djakarta Kuala Lumpur and Saving to BGRAI Singapore Your telegram No. 1835.— ~ * We have considered Gilchrist's suggestion in paragraph 4 of his telegram No. 1286-to me that we should get word to the generals that we shall not attack them whilst they are chasing the PKI. The C-in-C thinks that this has some merit and might ensure that the Army is not detracted from what we consider to be a necessary task. 2. I hope that you are urgently considering whether something of the kind can be done. Clearly to be effective any message should be delivered within the next day or two. Our views are that the message should be oral (and therefore deniable); delivered when the Naval Attaché sees Rear Admiral Martadinata, but Gilchrist may have a better way. ADVANCE COPIES: oO. Private Secretary S.E.A.D. J-M.I.D. Information Research Dept. Sir B. Burrows Mr. Peck F.E. and Pacific Dept. Hd. S.E.A.D === [PDF page 75] === *Date and time -(G.M.T.) telegram should Registry reach. addressee(s).........4-.---.2- 5 " g = Secret Confidential Draft. | Sacecialg eel —if any Telegram to:— repeated for information to..... Dj Lumpwr snd BGR Singapere Repeat to:— Yew ted wo 67§ Lt 0S | dial Vou YY KeroRa smfar, BG RAI S ngspurck —— os We MMA io thee bnaey war be = advantage vn fel’ mis 5 ob F Distribution:-— i D Lae ) Sir B. Burress nis kd:. ae do wir Wa method propesed vn rote Sea WX wrap ly epee A Wud 1 ws Jaa rund avbrwk Uniwuds vwelbdld Disthisstd To. ees 1 oo: [Unreadable] === [PDF page 76] === acs CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SINGAPORE (Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Far East) Cypher/OTP FILES No. 1871 8 October 1965 D.0039 9 October 1965 IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to POLAD Singapore telegram No. 18/71 of 8 October Repeated for information to: Djakarta BGRAI Singapore Kuala Lumpur Your telegram No. 678 [of 8 October]. We agree that there may well be advantage in passing message of this kind, but we do not like method proposed in last sentence of your paragraph 2. We are urgently considering means of using more roundabout channels. DISTRIBUTED TO: JoM.I.D. MMMMM CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 77] === TOP_ SECRET gg FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN 0 DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist w24 2010 D. 1529 9 Octeber, 1965, 9 Oetober, 1965. DH rsp ( - 1640 9 October, 1965, PRIORITY TOP SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 2110 of 8 October Repeated for informatien te:- POLAD Singapere Washington es Singapere telegrams to Djakarta No, 279 and to Foreign Office Ne. O76: Indonesia, 4 4 G ri D rors rs if you decide that semething can be done on the lines of paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 2094; I would propose to act as fellews, Using the newly established police line to the Generals, I would let the latter know that Grandy’s statement was intended to be helpful to them. At the same time I (or my representative) would pass a carefully phrased oral message about not biting the Generals on the rear for the present, The intermediary could take netes, I might er might net handle this myself but will see the policeman seen in any case te establish authenticity, If yeu like to telegraph a formula well and good but I can manage something Simple and general, 2, Maertadinata is believed to be living with his family inside naval H.Q. at Tandjung Priek, None of my Attachés can make contact with anybedy useful. So police contact best, Fereign Office please pass Priority Washingten 141, [Repeated as requested, ] DISTRIBUTED TO:- S,B.A.3. JM, I.D, IRD. P.U.S.D. === [PDF page 78] === Registry No * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should [Unreadable] Top Secret _ a" Sodret [EMERGENCY p * | ui Date) ns | JMMEDIA A entia. ’ PRIOR = iD rt espatched Restricted | ROUTINE par ith Open priority thout DEFERRED Draft. Security oe — if any Telegram to:— [Codeword—if any] Address to telegram NO. ——-cuctamintinnaniell (date) Repeat to:— En Clair. Code Cypher Distribution:— om TMA i AN (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw. === [PDF page 79] === E TO DJAKARTA Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION No. 1850 11 October 1965 D. 1548 11 October 1965 INMEDIATE TOP SECRET FILCH Addressed jakarta gram No. 1850 of 11 October Repeated ): POLAD * Singapore | Immediate | Kuala Lumpur [Immediate ] BGRAI Singapore [Immediate ] We are working on your ideas for both kinds of m essage to Generals, i.e. that we are frightened of them leeaicaveret) and that we will not bite them in the back (very covert) but we do not wish you to pass either. see my telegrams to POLAD No. 1871 and No.1873. os Will Kuala Lumpur or POLAD please show Peck all this correspondence, TOP SECRET === [PDF page 80] === asa DH lois] 6 ety TO FOREIGN OFF NUSSER 27106 OCTOBER 1965 r—Py OO GU UUWY WU UUUG VUUGWUVUUVUUUVUVUVUVUUVUUVUUUVUUUUUVUVUYVSY VVVUVNY OB ha [Unreadable] ERICAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT THEY HAVE FOR SUPPORT, WHICH APPEARS TO MEAN IN RST INSTANCE MONEYe ONE CONTACT PURPORTED TO REPRESENT oN sacJlEe THE ws - fio, ¥ FaSS WASHINGTON AS MYTEL/140. 4 Y/ -_ a J eo ff” fi ni AMERICINS ARE, BEING VERY CAUTIOUS!, === [PDF page 81] === TOP SECRET PROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE [Unreadable] DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Woe 215) D. 07634 12 October, 1965 12 October, 1965 Re 11.08 12 October, 1965 PRIORITY TOP SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 215) of 12 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore Washington Your telegram No. 1850. I realize that the present operation is of a very limited nature, and I am not arguing against your decision to use other channels, But I do want to sound a note of warning. The previous indonesian régime thought they could secure better results by dealing with us through unorthodox channels rather than with me, By and large, I think this particular tactic paid off better for the indonesians than it did for us. I should like, therefore, to suggest that, if and when we reach a point where genuine hegotiations with Indonesia are contemplated, then we should neither allow the Indonesians to side track you from using your representative in Djakarta nor should you yourself, by diverting business into other channels, prevent him from establishing those contacts and that influence which are unattainable by a man who has no business to handle. Foreign Office pass Washington 153, DISTRIBUTED TO: SeE.A.D. JoM.I.D. IRD. P.U.S Ds F.E.P.D. GGGG TOP SECRET === [PDF page 82] === MOD Form 3i > SIRESTFRIGFED: F use My ' istry © Defence) uct GALAGOR Ory AGE ne unclassified reply Qf fSlexepse nual 2 DATE—TIME GROUP | MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS fe LxiAx GR ropriate DOC Coss > IEC PAA /? Rte to a classified message does not refer These sections must be completed B&S Led 51-1576 === [PDF page 83] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT From £~; // 7 SUBJECT: bet. & THs --eHr; j Seer 7 Seiad 4 Jo ao Y Arr Dated SS Ud. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 4 u) ak: ar MmonD j2/r0 (Referred to Legal Adviser) aa (Main Indexed) /f VA AAV === [PDF page 84] === RW sen ba\' e Pe he BRITISH EMBASSY 1011/65 CONFIDENTIAL AKARTA, 5 October, 1965. So eee. \ ID F x j A HK (o; sfx 2 4 ‘ I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change in Indonesia; but it makes me sad to think that they have begun with the wrong people. rs Without feeling any great admiration for Yani as a olitical are T nevertheless got on well with him personally. wo years ago when I was in difficulties over the women and children in Balikpapan and no one would dare to help me, I went to Yani. The interview was correct end brief, and ended by Yani saying he would arrange things as I wanted. "Would you like to have it in writing?" "Not necessary - not when I am dealing with an officer and a gentleman." This pleased him, and thereafter we would generally hobnob briefly in a comer at official receptions, exchanging cynical remarks with considerable mutual satisfaction; he was also a reliable channel when I wanted to put in a word of warming about dangerous aspects of Rontrontast! end so on. He was said to be corrupt, but that was (I think) only because of his silly, stupid, greedy wife. a As for Parman, I regarded him as very agreeable indeed for en Indonesian. He knew his job thoroughly but never went beyond it into any degree of personal hostility or discourtesy. 4. I shall miss them both end regret that they Should have met such dirty deaths. I think I used the words cruel and ruthless in drawing a pen-picture of Aidit for you, the day after I first met him, and you can see I was not far wrong, (Oe __ I enclose a copy for my friend the Colonel in the Ministry of Defence, who knew Parman well. (A. G. Gilchrist) H,--F eck, sa.; CM. G., Foreign Office, Welle e CONFIDENT I AL === [PDF page 85] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT From da 4 Akehene, SUBJECT: Cin Ss fl C2 Lt, é; Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (2 Gclebhss (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Main Indexed) (Action completed) === [PDF page 86] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Vii En Clair FO/CRO/WH_ DISTRIBUTION a OH 5/198 Sir A. Gilchrist Nos 2125 D. 0635 11 October 1965 11 October 1965 R. 1420 11 October 1965 PRIORITY Addressed to Foreign Office telecram No. 2125 of 1L October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Singapore And Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Ottawa Following editorial, headed "Warning" in Djakarte Daily Mail, 11 October. “Our Government would do well to issue a warning to foreign elements not to meddle in our present day troubles. What will make the warning meaningful is the unity of the greater part of the people behind President Soekarno, Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces and Great Leader of the Revolution. Yord has been received that foreign elements are now fishing in our trouble waters, hoping that the anti- Communist (PKI) groupings would denounce Nasakom, and lure them to their side. True they won't get far, but still, our authorities should take precautionary steps against all kinds of foreign meddlings before these go too far. Our people shovld pay heed to President Soekarno's command to uphold our unity, because it is this unity which can contribute to the finding of a settlement of the so-call September 30 affair. We would like to add that the Indonesian people should have complete faith in President Soekarno, whose stand towards the so called September 30 affair has been made crystal clear". Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington 430, Canberra 96, Wellington 89 and Ottawa 13. 12 Ore AAAAA === [PDF page 87] === Herald and probabl} "he general 44UL GLU Gili VOL [Unreadable] VLOMmMUnN SI crificed ubandrio ane SCENT ali NUKAPNO, [Unreadable] MUU LS & ( Communist instructions \ Indonesion "4 hands and LLU LOU neon ny 4iUV CL VE. ay nmACc QOVULUGAULILOS Bawa ‘ ° “wr..99 2 2 cr Rore ie ee -: Forei ffi, Wellington 63. adie < Vahvoerra a === [PDF page 88] === (Security Gradinge—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Duro asia! FROM rs 4 Bhabha SUBJECT: [Unreadable] Dated re Celebs» | Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (2 Citehe, (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Bll. bfa (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 89] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No, 2149 D. 0507 12 October, 1965 12 October, 1965 R,.1210 12 October, 1965 PRIORITY AK lOS'/ sme Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 2149 of 12 October, Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur Singapore POLAD Singapore and Saving to Washington The following is an extract from an editorial in the Djakarta Daily Mail, 12 October; The PKI/Aidit is deeply involved, Obviously, if a political settlement is to be sought, it should be along the lines of what has been done before ~ i.e, political parties which are counter-revolutionary must be banned. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington as my telegram 43., [Repeated as requested, ] DISTRIBUTED TO: S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D. Information Research Dept, C.R.O. F.E. and Pacific Dept, === [PDF page 90] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT DHi015// 40 [Unreadable] SUBJECT: No. a) tS TA Dated 1) Cetas Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received lQ Aileto» (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Ap it|ro/s Pa L Aq be (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 91] === -TOP Cnp FROM DJAKARTA TO. FOREIGN OFFICE Vr LY En Clair her A. bien st FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION No. 2132 11 October, 1965 D. 0953 11 October, 1965 R. 1554 11 October, 1965 Addressed _ to Foreign Office telegram No. 2132 of 11 October, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore and Saving to: Washington DH toe Newspapers this morning report the following statemen by an army spokesman on 10 October, Indonesia Internal Situation. (a) The enemy potential which, on 1 October consisted of armed elements of about five battalions, was now 90 per cent paralyzed. Some had realized their mistake and returned to their own units. Others had surrendered or been captured with their arms. Members of the Communist Youth Organisation and others of a similar ilk were among those who had surrendered or been captured. (b) Colonel Latif, former Commander of the Djakarta Infantry Battalion that had taken part in the September 30 Movement, had been arrested and was now under investigation. He had been shot in both legs whilst trying to escape. (c) Eighty six rebels had been captured near Brebes in Central Java. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington No. 431. === [PDF page 92] === FROM (x, Prf-2-, Urenwr No. 3 3F Dated (j Qetebhos Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) oy it Mb te holos | 4 ql | (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 93 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Di lorss/i 4 SUBJECT: i Meine Hate va et Abani Emcherae. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES [Unreadable] e ft_ “Atle Leen Liga tearle |.) | /G } === [PDF page 93] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM VIENNA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Pilcher No, 335 D. 1819 11 October, 1965 11 October, 1965 R. 1940 11 October, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL ASH ors Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 335 of 11 October, Repeated for information to Djakerta, Secretary-General of Austrian Foreign Ministry tells me that he has been unable to establish communication with the Austrian Embassy in Djakarta for ten days being without diplomatic wireless facilities, Austrian Government would be most grateful if we could discover: (a). Whether Ambassador Hohenbuhl, who until 5 October was on leave in New Zealand, was able to return to his post, and (b) How members of the Embassy and if possible of Austrian Colony are faring. 2, Please repeat immediate to Djakarta if possible as Austrians are facing daily public questioning. Foreign Office pass Djsekarta 1. [Repeated as requested, | DISTRIBUTED TO: F.0. Central Dept. S.E.A.D. J M.I.D. D.S.A.0. Communications Dept. === [PDF page 94] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE [Od [Rta g es (#). ERE OT 8 ee = Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2176 DS Osteber 1965 D, 1032 13 October 1965 RL 1345 13 October 1965 K lots PRIORITY ddressed Vienna telegram No. 1 of 13 October. Repea or ormation to:- reign ce Your telegram No. 335 to the Foreign Office. Please tell your interlocutor that Ambassador Hohenbuehel has managed to get back to Djakarta and sent off a diplomatic bag on 10 October with KIM. ll Austrians are well. STRIBUTED TO:~ Dept. S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D. D,S.A.OQ.Commnications Dept. === [PDF page 95] === * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) Secre | Cpffidential | | PRIORITY | priority without DEFERRED Security re —if any [Codeword—if any] Address ied e ee telegram No. C tdetes sn (3Jug...n. Repeat to:— [Unreadable] oie oe Wauea: En Clair. Distribution:—; os Copies to:— (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw. === [PDF page 96] === PP HUMSF DE ASOLHY G 29/13 P 131400A FM ASOLHY TO PP ASOLJO GR 24 87813 ADDRESS TO DJAKARTA TELNO 1878 OF 13/10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO VIENNA.» VIENNA TELNO 1 TO DJAKARTAs PLEASE REPLY DIRECT TO VIENNA. SOSFA 131402A NNNN QSL 1303 GMC === [PDF page 97] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Dutoisli92 eb tact Daina meses of 72 het Ahey oA bo Qogideredietm a Rrlhs; Pre 2 =. fn a No. Q1C& Dated (2 Qetet-.24 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 13 Oetitey (Outward Action) MINUTES lel (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Ab te iol hos alt (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 98] === Sir A, Gilehrist Ay wifi. i 0. 216) D. 1312 12 Octeder 1965 12 Octeker 1965 Re. 1755 12 Octeber 1965 236 igm Office téleers Repeated fer infermatien te: Kuala laepur Singapere POLAD Singapere ané. Saving te: VWashingten Fellewing from editerial in teday’s Inéenesian Herald, 12 Octeber. Ours is a revelutien based en ew own natienal ideelogy, breaking ne deviatienism whether frem Right er Left. Foreign comueataters think that resent events may cause us te review the wisdex ef the Nasakex concept. This is either ignerance er wishful thinking. Naseker unity is vite] fer indwnesia in carrying evt its “life ané death struggle against Necelis encirelewent", he Twnku and Inche Senu believe that the attempted coup may seen epen the way $6 a settlement ef the Malaysia dispute. But, te them, ene is either pre~¥est er pre-Commmist. Fer them it is wmthinkable that a natien ean be firm and faithful te its own natienal cenvictiens, If nething else the atteupted ceup has mede crystal eleer the true nature ef the Indenesian revsiutien, Fercign Office pass Saving te Yashingten Ne.i38. === [PDF page 99] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 1 3 iE where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 2 esa | DHI0I511 73 FROM 4 4 Apbeh a, SUBJECT: fe fo Fofarse Qucheweater » ai Dy atente Autete oni Beaks leche forbs turceerer & fans Shee rme's Gorwey harry ie te Ce Aerearcel No. 2¢tCl. Dated (2 Qetat. Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: Received (3 @etobss (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) | (Main Indexed) AB oes] === [PDF page 100] === CONFIDENTIAL a) FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE (@eer/orp DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No. 2161 D. 1141 12 October 1965 12 October 1965 R. 1612 12 October 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Du wo Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2161 of 12 October. Répeated for information to: POLAD Singapore [Immediate] Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore Washington Wellington Canberra The following information is from my Japanese colleague, whe cites Madam Dewi as his source:- (a) General Nasution and his wife spent an hour with the President on Sunday, being consoled about their dead daughter. (This has now reached the Press). (bo) The President is considering the appointment of a successor to Yani. The two candidates are Suharto and Basuki Rachmat, Commander of Kodam.8, East Java. (c) Nasution will remain in the political background "since the President is not fully assured of his loyalty in all circumstances". 2. The Japanese ambassador believes that the army have now decided that they cannot manage without Sukarno, and that while retaining him they are compelled to allow him a fair degree of scope. He says that the President will be left both prestige and power in a field which will be very restricted by comparison with earlier days; but that just as the President suddenly broke his bonds ten years [17 gps undec.]. 3. The ambassador would not expect the present situation to have much effect on confrontation. 4. He had an interesting suggestion about possible acceptance of the increasingly vacant Kom Slot in Nasakom by a reborn Murba (originally Trotskyite). But the Murba are still lying very low indeed. 1560 === [PDF page 101] === & CONFIDENTIAL a wakarta telegram No. 2161 to Foreign Office 5. Comment on paragraph 2 above: Dewi and Saito naturally take an optimistic view of the President's prospects, but even allowing for this there is no doubt the old boy is working very hard indeed. On the other hand the army continues steadily with its destruction of the PKI, and Nasution may not yet be a back number. Foreign Office pass Washington 156, Wellington 66 and Canberra 99. [Note by Communications Department: A check and repeat of undecypherable groups has been requested]. ISTRIBUTED TO; F.0. S.E.A.D. J M.1.D. F.E.D. News Dept. I.P.D. I.R.D. C.R.O, F.E. & P. Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 102] === CONFIDENTIAL AMENDMENT SLIP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION At end of paragraph one for "[17 grps undec.] insert:- "ago by destroying the Masjumi,so he may perform the trick again." DISTRIBUTED TO: CONFIDENTIAL