Indonesia, Internal political situation: Attempted coup against Sukarno [11] (FO 371/180320, Gilchrist despatch of 8 October 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === 180320 CLOSED UNTIL (A96 === [PDF page 2] === (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) 180320 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ESIA — y 1015/7214 wal wile 3 (ooue ry TA =I Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 3] === TOP Copy. ¢ "+. FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2233 D. 0950 18 October, 1965 18 October, 1965 R. 1250 18 October, 1965 Ny tos 214 Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No, 2233 of 18 October, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BERRI. singapore and Saving to; Washington Canberra Wellington Indonesian Internal Situation, Antara continues to report anti-PKI demonstrations in various parts of the country and the expulsion of PKI members of various organisations. 2. Suharto, the new army commander, issued his first order of the day on 16 October, which includes the following (a) strengthen unity between the army and other armed forces and also between the armed forces and the people, "in particular the progressive revolutionary people with the spirit of Nasokom". (b) carry on with the liquidation of the remnants of the September 30 movement. (c) ingrease readiness "in implementing Dwikora to crush the neo-colonialist project Malaysia". Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington No. 461, Canberra No. 112, Wellington No. 107. === [PDF page 4] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT LAin ry / JUY PINDONESIA D H [ Ol>/ (as FROM i AC; )-,| sussecr: / 3 [Unreadable] , ( LAA oe aL my Fed oUp “a (Wonw [Unreadable] y fe potiluaX § >Rurmokn q 4 fuk wobble). [Unreadable] Dated ¥/10 Encloses Copy of: 01/65) References and Relevant Papers: Received IVI6 (Outward Action) if}bak. bS- MSL [Unreadable] $ hae ut” tonus 4 Wer See pat : SutGr bYes UM" se es » Li ai ee, es, 10>, '@S IAD, News meet ad CRO. 1 hae Albeo pryranreodl And Gubyn'rol eepanatrl, rrr (Referred to Legal Adviser) ‘ lic, Secgatte Lee hu (ng Fowtt -Q ‘(Action 8 (Main — Co Pre ‘ [Unreadable] 1) re H-]- thaacaoler s account” d ee ets 4 \Ornrsr k === [PDF page 5] === Comuscdakie aleaunt & access, chore Us Cire oe “he Cael: Number of copies Number of copies th wtolaos ‘ te Higt- \ehvonaine ' Cok y of enclosures OSTONG 6 Adeelioe. Rather Ca. A Gril car's % hun’ —— ee a avressuet’, % meee “~ 4 4f. aulce Quol Co U went. Pay Kr Action. &: fe WETS we ar. en | ° Yeu, be 20 ‘29,4, ne Gye TAS (At i>]!; PIS —O beg === [PDF page 6] === 36283 (9370) A.O.St. Minutes “The (rrinb ec — wrest Jesprblid o 19 Ohober and om ad Vance cory of le Derpeht sehen ited + der. Gerbera, But ( would § TMD, sew Tee, Fascinating though this subject is, I am a little reluctant to send a letter all round our posts raising so many more speculations. I think it would be enough to thank Sir A. Gilchrist, to throw out a few speculations (I do not entirely accept Mr. Tonkin's ingenéous theory) and simply to let Sir A. Gilchrist know that, when he has time to make a reassessment, we shall be most interested to read it. (J. E. Cable) 1 November, 1965 === [PDF page 7] === Minutes Confer auto WO: tuhassader ot dak ante hac reponeol [Unreadable] 4 ke “x0 Sopfbucke ” coup uw be Secpact. No- %- 1 oad 9 Spy, prepaces for punting and deacon FOW Ro ie huCion elaine. Loam dealcog apeeney on Me Urtinel copy % (th eee act mM Se ules A bem at Be === [PDF page 8] === Ke ponling ony 6 1 Aken oth a wernia, Kat “f wll probb& be i. Broek” l cofanh Kuk Node be, we. “plik Seltncbad ~~ of Ue Yespabh can Herefor be reget Me Asics’ fr In Loewe . oe ee prereat thal gince Le Leyonlel wos will. Te widece { fl PK comploly proba responsibil ake === [PDF page 9] === === [PDF page 10] === ee CONFIDENTIAL THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT ——$— ee ee DH 1015/215 Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution INDONESIA 19 October, 1965 Section 1 R CIRLULAI iON ATTEMPTED COUP IN INDONESIA Sir Andrew Gilchrist to Mr. Stewart. (Received 19 October) SUMMARY The attempted coup on the Ist of October has had a catalytic effect on Indonesian politics. The struggle for power between the Communists and the armed forces is now out in the open. The President has lost his dominant position. (Paragraphs 1-3.) The coup itself. The murder of the generals. The establishment of an Indonesian Revolutionary Council. But the coup failed to gather momentum. (Paragraphs 4-9.) The counter-coup. Successfully accomplished in the Djakarta area by Suharto. Little resistance from the rebels. But fighting is still going on in Central Java. (Paragraphs 10-14.) President Soekarno’s movements during the coup and counter-coup were enigmatic. (Paragraph 15.) In the political skirmishing which followed, it looked at first as if the victorious generals would allow Soekarno to regain his old ascendancy. But the discovery of the mutilated bodies of their murdered colleagues, and evidence of PKI involvement in the coup, stiffened the army’s determination. Anti-PKI demonstrations were staged in Djakarta. Soekarno, helped by Subandrio, is trying to paper over the cracks; but is unlikely to succeed. (Paragraphs 16-23.) Omar Dani was almost certainly involved in the coup. Subandrio was absent; but given his record he cannot be entirely exonerated. (Paragraphs 24-26.) The PKI also were certainly involved, but it is not clear whether they initiated the coup. Probably not. There are rumours implicating the Chinese People’s Republic, but these do not amount to much. (Paragraphs 27-31.) Political developments in Indonesia over the past few months would have inclined President Soekarno himself to approve of measures to get rid of the army generals; and the evidence suggests that he might have been partially aware of the plot. (Paragraphs 30-33.) Both for the PKI and the army the showdown has come prematurely. It would be wrong to expect “confrontation” to diminish as a consequence of these events; but they may make it a shade easier to find a political settlement. (Paragraphs 33-37.) CONFIDENTIAL 20109—332 6150—38 === [PDF page 11] === CONFIDENTIAL _~DRAMATIS PERSONAE The coup Lieutenant-Colonel Untung Suropati, Bn. Cmd. in Presidential Guard Lieutenant-Colonel A. Latif, Cmd. 1 Bde. in KODAM V Brigadier-General Supardjo, Deputy to Asst. VI Civic Affairs, Army HQ AURI, the Indonesian Air Force Members of the Presidential Guard 454 Battalion, 3rd Parachute Brigade 530 Battalion, 3rd Parachute Brigade Pemuda Rakyat, the Communist Party’s Youth Group GERWANI, the Women’s Group SOBSI, the Communist Party’s chief trade union Communist Party’s The murdered Lieutenant-General A. Yani, and Commander of the Army Major-General R. Soeprapto, Deputy II (Management), Army HQ Major-General M. T. Hartono, Deputy III Inspector-General, Army HQ Major-General Siswondo Parman, Asst. I (Intelligence), Army HQ Major-General D. I. Pandjaitan, Asst. IV (Logistics), Army HQ Brigadier-General Soetojo Siswominhardjo, Inspector of Legal Affairs/ Judge Advocate, Army HQ Lieutenant P. Tendean, Nasution’s ADC Minister (No. 13. Confidential) Djakarta, Sir, 8 October, 1965. The events of the past week in Indonesia may come to be regarded as some of the most decisive in its history as an independent nation. Whatever may have been the motives and interests behind Lieutenant-Colonel Untung’s attempted coup—and these are still only matters for speculation—there is no doubt that the act itself is already bringing about fundamental changes in Indonesia. We have by no means yet seen all the consequences. It may be many months before the after-effects of the coup can be properly judged. 2. But already it is clear that the old struggle for power between the armed forces and the Communists, for years a constant factor in Indonesian politics, can never be fought in quite the same way again. Where before it had been a matter of The counter-coup General A. H. Nasution, Minister/ Co-ordinator for Defence and Security Major-General Suharto, Commander KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command) Major-General Adijie, KODAM VI, Bandung Major-General Umar Wira_ Hadikusomah, Commander KODAM V, Djakarta Major-General Pranojo Reksosamudro, Asst. III (Personnel), Army HQ Commander The chief suspects Air Marshal Omar Dani, Minister and Commander of the Air Force The PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party Aidit, Chairman of the PKI Lukman, No. 2 in the PKI Njoto, No. 3 in the PKI The Chinese People’s Republic Soekarno, President of Indonesia Others Subandrio, Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, Second Deputy Prime Minister Vice-Admiral Martadinata, Minister and Commander of the Navy Brigadier-General Sudjipto, Minister and Commander of the Police Palace manoeuvres to strike a balance, with the two sides pretending friendship and co-operation in public and working hard against each other in private and in secret, the struggle is now right out in the open. The President’s former role as arbiter, balance-seeker, manipulator, between these two rival forces must now be less preponderant. Some observers still add the almost inevitable reservation which must accompany any pronouncement about the politics of this bewildering country. There have been moments during the past week— when Soekarno received the generals at Bogor on the 2nd of October or when Subandrio gave his Press conference on the 6th of October—when in defiance of all reason it seemed that, even now, matters could revert again to where they were before: with Soekarno setting the pace; with the Communists creeping up to power behind the specious facade of NASAKOM; CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 12] === with the army alive to all the dangers, but politically supine, mesmerised and out-manoeuvred by the President. But I think we can discount this possibility: the line of blood drawn between the army and its opponents is too thick. As I write now, the posture of the three protagonists is: the PKI lying low; the President wriggling skilfully but still unable to gain the upper hand; the army more and more evincing a determination to deal with the Communists by direct action (arrests, executions, purgings) without taking overt political decisions, in the hope that the general effect will be the same in the end. 3. The course of events which constituted the coup and counter-coup can be briefly described—the more briefly if we exclude, as I intend to, the thousand and one reports and rumours which have buzzed round Djakarta during the past week. The coup 4. In the small hours of Friday, the Ist of October, troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung invested the Palace and took over key buildings in the city such as the telephone exchange and the wireless station. At the same time, a carefully co-ordinated strike was made against eight of the senior army generals. Thanks to being taken for his own servant, Nasution escaped, breaking an ankle on his way; | | Suharto was not at home, so he too escaped. Yani and five other generals were either killed outright or taken to the Halim air base a few miles outside Djakarta on the road to Bogor where they were tortured, murdered and mutilated. Their bodies were found three days later in a well nearby; it was not until that moment (this is an important point) that they were known for certain to be dead. 5. At seven o’clock on Friday morning a statement in Untung’s name _ was broadcast by Radio Indonesia and repeated throughout the day. It declared that the “September 30 Movement” had taken action to forestall a coup d’état by the generals, abetted by the American Central Intelligence Agency; that Untung himself would shortly issue his first decree establishing an Indonesian Revolutionary Council; and that this council would make no changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy. CONFIDENTIAL I 6. That afternoon Untung, in the name of the Revolutionary Council, dissolved the former Dwikora Cabinet and announced the names of the 45 members of the council. Untung, Chairman; Supardjo, a brigadiergeneral and said to be a Communist, Vice-Chairman. The three other Vice- Chairmen were named from the air force, the navy and the police—but all were of comparatively junior rank. Among the members of the council were Omar Dani, Sudjipto, Martadinata, Subandrio and Leimena—in that order. There was a sprinkling of Communists, but none of the PKI leaders was listed. Untung furthermore decreed that all officers outranking him were to be demoted to lieutenant-colonel; that other officers and NCO’s were to be promoted by one rank; and that NCO’s and other ranks who had helped in the coup were to be promoted by two ranks. It seemed an oddly futile gesture for a man who now held himself out to be master of the fifth largest nation on earth. 7. The planning and execution of the first few hours of Untung’s coup were bold and resolute. But there it stopped. One had the impression of a man who had no idea what to do next. In one of my earliest telegrams I reported the inert attitude of the rebel troops who, guarding a few key buildings, seemed to have no further tasks on hand. If one seizes a radio station, surely one should broadcast propaganda. The composition of the so-called Revolutionary Council was so bizarre that it could only have been the work of a political amateur. A number of people who had been named to serve on it subsequently denied that they had ever been consulted. For once it was quite easy to believe them. 8. A similar naivety appeared in the communiqué which was issued immediately after the coup. In particular, the hysterical condemnation of it of “‘ generals and officers who lust for power, ignore the wretched fate of their men, live in luxury at the latter’s expense, and humiliate women” had the mark of a man who was swayed more by grievances and personal jealousies than by anything else. This fits with what little is known of Untung—a brave but not very intelligent soldier who did well in the West Irian campaign, simple and austere in his personal life, a man genuinely sickened by corruption in high places. CONFIDENTIAL 6150—38 === [PDF page 13] === CONFIDENTIAL 9. Yet the mystery remains—was this Untung’s coup or someone else’s? There are four candidates to consider: Omar Dani, the PKI, China and—for nothing should surprise us in the labyrinths of Javanese politics—President Soekarno himself. I shall return to this later in my despatch. The counter-coup 10. The counter-coup was swift to follow. With Nasution incapacitated, Suharto (who was in any case the next in rank of generals left alive) took charge of the “loyalist” forces. By three o’clock on that Friday afternoon he had taken back the Palace. By five the radio station was in his hands. There was scarcely any resistance on the part of the rebels, most of whom were either demoralised at the manifest failure of the coup or just plain bewildered at what was going on. Suharto’s task was also made easier by the fact that the Central Java battalion which had taken part in the original seizure of the Palace had been later removed to Halim, while the replacement battalion, also from Central Java, was not well briefed and allowed itself to be harangued out of its positions. 11. Meanwhile troops were sent to take the Halim base. This they succeeded in doing without much difficulty the next day. It is believed that Untung himself, who was by that time in the base, escaped by aeroplane. His whereabouts are still unknown. 12. At nine o’clock that same evening Suharto made his first announcement over the wireless. It said that the army, navy and police—no mention of the air force—had agreed to exterminate the so-called “ September 30 Movement ” whose actions in replacing the Cabinet by a revolutionary council were branded as counter-revolutionary. 13. By the afternoon of Saturday, the 2nd October, more troops had been brought up and Suharto had Djakarta effectively under his control. The rebels put up little resistance, though there were a few isolated skirmishes. Our Assistant Administration Officer found himself in the middle of one during the morning and had to leave his car and take cover in a ditch. 14. Fighting also broke out in Central Java. Rebel troops under a Colonel Suherman were reported to be holding Jogjakarta and Semarang, but both these towns have now been brought back under control. Two companies of rebels have taken to the hills and fighting may still be going on. The rest of Java and the other islands have on the whole remained quiet, though there has been some agitation in North Sumatra. The aftermath 15. From this point on the character of the drama changes from military to political, the plot becomes murkier and President Soekarno returns to the centre of the stage. What he had been doing in the wings is still to some extent a mystery. A statement in his name was put out on the Friday (the Ist of October). It said he was in good health and still held the leadership of the State and the Revolution. But there was no compelling reason to believe it. He could be a prisoner, he could be dead; and Untung’s disregard of him, both in the Ist of October communiqué and in the establishment of the Revolutionary Council seemed significant. It was only later that we were able to piece together some, if not all, of Soekarno’s actions during the critical period of the coup and the counter-coup. He probably spent the Thursday night with Ibn Dewi, his Japanese wife. He is known to have been in the Palace between six and seven o’clock the next morning—i.e., after it had been occupied by Untung’s forces. Later that morning he went or was taken to Halim, escorted by Omar Dani. Soekarno later said that he had done this of his own free will so as to be able to make a quick getaway by air if necessary—an odd admission, but the statement was made in the context of whitewashing AURI and so must be treated with caution. On Friday afternoon he went to Bogor where he remained (in command of his own guard but observed by heavy regular army detachments) until his return to Djakarta on the 9th of October. But it was not until the small hours of Sunday morning when a recorded message in Soekarno’s own voice began to be broadcast repeatedy over Radio Indonesia that the world at large knew for certain that he was still President of Indonesia. 16. What remained in doubt was the extent to which the President was a free agent and in a position once again to control the affairs of his country. The power and the initiative rested with the victorious generals. But if they hesitated, if they allowed Soekarno to resume a dominant position, there would be little chance of effective action against the PKI. The earlier indications were that they did indeed hesitate. That same statement of Soekarno’s to which CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 14] === I referred above revealed that on Saturday the President had summoned the heads of the armed forces and a few others to Bogor; that he had resumed control of the army; and that while Suharto was to be responsible for restoring law and order, Pranoto (a weaker general more subject to Palace influence) would be the effective commander of the army. The statement neither thanked the generals for the actions they had taken against Untung, nor condemned the latter for what he had done. Reports have it that the generals were undecided beforehand whether to attend this meeting in Bogor or whether to ignore the President and take action directly against the PKI. It is to be remembered that the most politicallyminded generals were all dead and that Nasution with a broken ankle was thinking more of his dying daughter than anything else. It appears that arguments in favour of observing legal and constitutional forms prevailed. The generals obeyed the President’s summons. But they were no match for him in political finesse; they achieved nothing, and _ returned to Djakarta disillusioned and discouraged, overborne by Soekarno’s high-handed treatment of them. On Sunday morning it looked very much like a victory for the President. 17. At this point in the story a decisive event took place. The bodies of the other generals were discovered. That there had been some shootings on Friday was, of course, common knowledge; but up till then it was possible to believe that the generals who had been captured alive were merely being held prisoner somewhere in Java. Now it was known that they had been brutally murdered in cold blood. 18. What is more, there was clear evidence that elements of the AURI and of the PWI had been involved. The army shed their indecisions and took action. They began, discreetly, to round up Communists in Djakarta and elsewhere. An ultimatum was issued on the 3rd of October ordering those who had been issued with arms by the September 30 Movement (in fact by the AURI at Halim to Communist “ volunteers”) to surrender them within three days; Adjie from his Bandung headquarters made a thinly-veiled statement about the army’s patience having its limits; and Suharto announced plainly that the Communists and AURI were implicated in the murders. 19. Still Soekarno hedged. A_ second meeting with the generals took place the CONFIDENTIAL 5 next day, the 4th of October, at which the army laid before the President the evidence they had gathered about the murders. Yet the public announcement afterwards said only that the President had designated the generals “heroes of the revolution”; and that he personally would be responsible for “settling the September 30 affair”. There was no presidential condemnation of the murders. 20. Meanwhile in Djakarta anti-PKI and pro-army demonstrations were organised by various Moslem and Christian political parties and student groups. On Monday there were orderly processions and resolutions demanding the dissolution of the PKI and its affiliates. On Tuesday, the day of the generals’ funeral, the Djakarta mob were baying for Aidit’s blood: slogans were daubed on roads, hoardings, everywhere— Crush the PKI, String up Aidit. On Friday there were even larger demonstrations. The crowd marched to the PKI’s office and set it on fire. A couple of houses belonging to PKI leaders were burned. The staff of the Chinese Embassy, mindful no doubt of what their friends had done to us in 1963, had already abandoned their houses and withdrawn to the Embassy compound. 21. At first the army authorities in Djakarta gave the impression that they wanted to restrict these reactions to innocous demonstrations. But as the week went on and the generals realised more and more that they were getting absolutely nowhere with Soekarno, I think they came to the conclusion that more popular agitation against the Communists in the capital (under the aegis not of themselves but of the non-Communist political parties) would do no harm. Certainly the Press and the radio which since the 2nd of October had been entirely in army hands has kept up a steady supply of reports and articles pointing up the guilt of the PKI. 22. While these developments were in train in Djakarta. Soekarno summoned a meeting of the full Dwikora Cabinet in Bogor for the 6th of October. Njoto and Lukman, the second and third most senior members of the PKI, were present. So was Subandrio who had been away in Sumatra when the coup took place and had returned to Java and to Bogor on the 3rd of October. Nasution remained in Djakarta with his daughter, so that, with Yani dead, there was no army representation at all, though the leaders of the other services were there. It does not appear that there was any effective CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 15] === 6 CONFIDENTIAL discussion at all at this outsized meeting of the Cabinet. But afterwards Subandrio held a Press conference. It was as evasive a performance as ever he has given. He said that the President had condemned both the murders and the formation of the Revolutionary Council. He also said that the President viewed the coup itself as a political problem demanding a political solution which he, the President, would provide as soon as the situation in Indonesia had calmed down. Subandrio refused to be drawn when questioned about the responsibility of the Communists for the murders. Instead, he kept on harking back to the President’s assertion that the matter was a political one. This sort of thing was an inevitable incident in the course of a revolution like Indonesia’s. What was important was to maintain national unity in the face of imperialist threats; and, as regards this unity Subandrio gave it as his view that all the political parties whether nationalist, religious or Communist, and all the armed forces, were loyal to the President. 23. No one in Djakarta—neither the army, the Press, the (non-PKI) political parties, nor the vociferous youth organisations—has yet had the courage to speak out against this patently absurd claim that the country, Communists and all, are united under their beloved Bung. Probably they never will, so inured are these people to hypocrisy and cant..But Soekarno’s failure to make any condemnation, or criticism even, of the coup itself or of the people who murdered the generals, has not found such easy acceptance. I believe his prestige with his own people can never recover to anything like its former standing. Omar Dani and Subandrio 24. The evidence for associating Omar Dani and sections of the air force with the coup tests chiefly on four facts—that AURI were used to ferry the rebel troops on the night of the coup; that Halim air base was the centre of operations throughout and was where the generals’ bodies were found; that Omar Dani was close to the President most of the time; and that at 9.30 a.m. on the Friday morning of the coup Omar Dani issued an Order of the Day supporting the coup. It said that the revolution and its great leader (Soekarno) had been saved from CIA subversion and that dangerous elements in the army had been purged. The guilt by association here revealed is incontrovertible and a subsequent “ corrective ” statement fooled no one. 25. Additional and indirect evidence is provided by the general “ revolutionary ” character of the AURI, which distinguishes it from the other three services. This factor is even more pertinent in the case of its Commander, Omar Dani, who has never (until now perhaps) sought to disguise his approval of the PKI; is a close personal friend of Aidit’s; and has political ambitions of his own. He is also well thought of by the President; and one of the latter’s main concerns after the coup was to protect Omar Dani and the AURI from the army’s wrath. Admittedly, Soekarno’s motives here, as elsewhere, may have been an overriding determination to paper over the cracks and maintain that national unity without which his scope for playing the arbiter would be crippled and his position and power diminished. Omar Dani’s involvement in the plot is all of a piece with the PKI’s and even Soekarno’s own. I do not think he can possibly be exonerated though he may yet go unpunished. 26. Subandrio’s absence in Sumatra at the critical moment probably means that he cannot have participated directly in the ultimate and bloody decisions. On the other hand it is to be regarded as certain that he and his private “ secret service ” (BPI) took a leading part in building up in Soekarno’s mind those suspicions of the generals which were an essential basis for Soekarno’s initial countenance of the coup and for his present attitude to the army. The army knows in its heart, and indeed is said to have evidence, for the involvement of Subandrio with Omar Dani and Aidit at least to the degree indicated above. The PKI 27. The extent of PKI involvement is one to which no certain answer can yet be given. Some involvement is_ certain: members of the PKI’s youth and women’s groups took part in the murders and the 2nd of October (and as it transpired, terminal) edition of Harian Rakjat, the PKI newspaper, came out in clear support of the September 30 Movement. Agents of a political party as monolithic and disciplined as the PKI do not do this sort of thing unless they have had a firm directive from the top. It seems best to discount any theory which establishes the PKI as having plotted a major uprising or bid for power on the Ist of October, with Untung and his men in the position of their shock troops. The unreadiness of the PKI and the general CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 16] === CONFIDENTIAL A incompetence of the proceedings, to which reference has already been made, are far from characteristic of Communist plots. 28. The assumption then is that the Communists became aware of Untung’s plan at a rather late stage and decided to throw themselves behind it. Why? One explanation is that the Communists themselves had been plotting for just such an insurrection but with this difference, that it was to go into operation only on Soekarno’s death, to nip an army régime in the bud; nevertheless the Communist preparations, including the receipt and stockpiling of arms from China, were so far advanced and so well known that in crushing Untung, the army could and no doubt would crush the Communists too; and would be able to make an effective and perhaps mortal political case against them. So why not join Untung from the start? 29. And in judging the event afterwards, with its aura of ineptitude and failure, one is perhaps inclined to overlook the situation as it appeared to the PKI at the time. The coup came much nearer to full success than people are now inclined to admit. Look at the “ifs”. If Nasution had not been mistaken by Untung’s men for a servant, if Suharto had not been unexpectedly away from home, who would have organised the counter-coup? And when? If Soekarno had been forced (as it is said he could have been) to sign a proclamation against the Army on the Ist of October, and if his helicopter had taken him to Central Java instead of to Bogor, as Omar Dani is said to have urged, could the army, without the sanction of his name, have prevailed as in fact they did? (I myself believe that his decisive refusal to go to Central Java arose when he learnt of Nasution’s survival.) 30. I would say that for the PKI on the 30th of September it was a good gambler’s throw; and if one story I have (on fairly good authority) is correct, it was Aidit, the cruel and the ruthless, who was prepared to shake the box, while Lukman and Njoto took cover with the indecisive and safetyplaying President. The Chinese 31. Speculation about Chinese involvement can be dealt with briefly. It is rumoured that some of the arms discovered were Chinese; and that these were smuggled in with materials for the grandiose CONEFO building which is being erected with Chinese help. Reactions from Peking to the coup are also suspect and suggest prior knowledge—as does the well authenticated story that a journalist was told in Peking a while ago that the Chinese “had a surprise ” for the Indonesians on the Ist of October. I suspect that the extent of Chinese involvement was approximately the same as that of the PKI—fore-knowledge, some support, but no direct control. A serious deterioration in Peking/Djakarta relations is already obvious, and if this is maintained—by the continuing power of the army and the submergence of the PKI— then the following question will become important: is China politically sophisticated enough to imitate Cardinal Richelieu by giving support (particularly in the economic field) to a régime dominated by anti-imperialists who are also anti- Communists? The President 32. Finally, Soekarno. Bizarre as it may at first seem, it is not impossible that he both knew and approved of the coup beforehand. To explain this theory, it is necessary first to say a few words about the background. One starts from the premise that, with the trouble he has been having over the past year with his health, Soekarno now feels a sense of urgency if his dreams of establishing a Socialist Indonesia are to be realised in his lifetime. This year he had already made good progress towards his great objective. The Indonesian Nationalist Party had been effectively purged of its Right-wing elements, and the Murba Party had been banned. The greatest remaining obstacle was the army. So far from acquiescing, they had shown remarkable powers of resistance to the President’s pressure and blandishments. A move to introduce a system of political commissars had been frustrated; plans for the Fifth Force— essentially the creation of a Communist cadre within the armed forces—were getting nowhere;* and latterly, in August, the army had even been able to over-bear the President to such an extent that he agreed to set up an army controlled economic body, KOTARI, which in the pre-coup days anyhow seemed likely to have considerable powers indeed. The President’s persistent refusal to yield to Communist pressure for the suppression of * The last recorded remark of General Yani a few hours before his death was made to some inquisitive journalists: “ Don’t talk to me about the Fifth Force ”. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 17] === 8 CONFIDENTIAL the HMI (Muslim Student Association) was attributed to army influence. And then, on top of all came persistent roumours of an army plot—rumours invented to some extent, certainly fomented and exaggerated by the Communists and more tellingly by Omar Dani and Subandrio. Soekarno, excitable and apprehensive, could not have ignored them all. So what was to be done? If the generals could not be out-manoeuvred then they must be liquidated. 33. I find a measure of plausibility in this theory. Certainly the ease with which Soekarno moved in and out of the coup leaders’ company on that Friday does not argue for a man under duress. 34. But there are still too many loose ends. Why the Revolutionary Council if the purpose of the coup was merely to paralyze the army? It seems possible that Soekarno was only partially aware of the Untung plot, approved the broad purpose of it, but thought it wiser to eschew closer involvement. He may not have wished for murder, or he may have wished not to be aware of it in advance. I doubt if we shall ever know the truth. For my part I think Soekarno expected the generals to be brought before him more or less in chains at Halim by members of their own caste, a comedy which would have enabled him to purge the army at the instigation of the army itself. But he could not handle a tragedy. The summing up 35. This Embassy has _ constantly predicted that the army would not take action against the Soekarno régime or against the Communists during Soekarno’s lifetime. This has been proved true: the generals were forced into action on the Ist of October by the most extreme provocation that could possibly have been given them. 36. We also said that the Communists would not stage a coup of their own because they could manage very well without it, provided Soekarno lived long enough for their purposes. This prediction has stood in need of revision in recent weeks: the fits or seizures which Soekarno survived early in August led both sides, the army and the PKI, to make urgent preparations against his death, and these preparations reacted on each other like the reciprocal mobilisations of 1914. The PKI, I think, exaggerated in its own mind the readiness of the army to act and therefore resorted to hasty and nervous measures of its own, such as the clandestine import of small arms from China. From various conversations I had with Aidit from April onwards I have come to regard him as a man not quite normal in his mind (I mentioned the possibility of drugs at one stage), and—as already described—it looks as though it was Aidit who took the critical decisions, once Untung had applied his catalyst to the tense situation. 37. A third prediction made in our despatches was that an internal clash of the kind we are now experiencing was unlikely in itself to have any permanent beneficial effect on our position over confrontation: it would provide a pause, perhaps a lessening in the intensification of Indonesian operations against Malaysia, but there would be no abandonment or cessation of hostility such as would enable us to terminate or to diminish appreciably our heavy military commitment in support of what the Indonesians call “the British puppet-State of Malaysia ”. 38. As things stand now I see no reason to recede from this prediction: we can hope for a better outcome but we would be very wrong to expect it with confidence. However, I have underlined two words in the preceding paragraph, to convey the thought that there may possibly be ways of taking advantage of the present situation to work towards a political settlement. I do not pretend that this will be easy, or that any such political settlement will be very much to our taste; but if we wish to address our minds to the question, we are unlikely to find a better moment. 39. The present conditions under which we live and work are unusual and have not made it easy to put these interesting, important, confused and bloody events into an ideal despatch. Such explicative virtues as this one may possess should be attributed very largely to its main compiler and architect, the Head of Chancery, Mr. Cambridge. 40. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty’s Representatives at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, Ottawa, Bangkok, Peking and Moscow, and to the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Far East at Singapore. I have, &c. A. G. GILCHRIST. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 18] === The attempted coup on the ist of October has had a catalytic effect on Indmesian politics. The struggle for power between the Communists and the Armed Forces is now out in the open, The President has lost his dominant positim. (Paragraphs 1-3) The coup itself. The murder of the generals. The establishment of an Indonesian Revolutimary Council. But the coup failed to gather momentum. (Paragraphs 4-9) The counter coup. Successfully accomplished in the Djakarta area by Suharto. Little resistance from the rebels. But fighting is still going on in Central Java, (Paragraphs 10-14) President Soekamo's movements during the coup and counter coup were enigmatic. (Paragraph 15) In the political skirmishing which followed, it looked at first as if the victorious generals would allow Soekarno to regain his old ascendancy, But the discovery of the mutilated bodies of their murdered colleacues, and evidence of P.K.I. involvement in the coup stiffened the Army's determination. Anti-P.K.1, demonstrations were staged in Djakarta. Soekarno, helped by Subandrjio, is trying to paper over the cracks; but is unlikely to succeed. (Paragraphs 16-23) Omar Dani was almost certainly involved in the coup. Subandrio was absent: but given his record he cannot be entirely exonerated. (Paragraphs 24-26) The P.K.I. also were certainly involved, but it is not clear whether they initiated the coup. Probably not, There are rumours implicating the Chinese People's Republic, but these do not amount to much. (Paragraphs 27-31) Political developments in Indonesia over the past few months would have inclined President Soekarno himself to apnrove of measures to get rid of the Army generals; and the evidence saggects that he — have been partially aware of the plot. aragraphs 30-33 Both for the P.K.I. and the Army the showdown has come prematurely. It would be wrong to expect ‘confrontation to diminish as a consequence of these events; but they may make it a shade easier to find a political settlement, (Paragraphs 33-37) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 19] === The Coup Lt.Col. pies See Be, Oe. in je Depeeun ial Guard [Unreadable] Brig. Gen. “damidie’ oh ie Asst. VI Civic Affairs Army HO AURI, the Indonesian Air Force Members of the Presidential Guard 454 Battalion, 3rd Parachute Brigade 530 Battalion, 3rd near Brigade the Communi Youth Group Pemuda Rakyat, the Party's eT lan Geeaee éomunigt Par Party's ¥ 8 vonen 8 Ss ihe Murdered Lt.Gen. A, Yani, Minister and Commander Maj-Gen. i. Soeprapto, Dome tit inepector a t), Ara HO ee. Siszenge Parman, Asst. I ‘{ipeoin Army HQ “ay ol "zowiojesangenarass, hnspeetan are » snacto oe as" ! % ponder, Momiion'a A.D.C. Noguttion'e 6 year-old daughter tees General A. H. Nasution, net eae a =. Maj.Gen. Suharto, Commander TOSTRAD (Strategic “mie Melton, taee in, Commenter KES i Bard. rhwira Hadi iasosah, Commander V, Cen, 3 7. TIT (Pe 1 Maj.Cen. Pranojo Reksosemairo, Asst oe The Chief Suspects Air Marshal Guar Dani, Minister and Comsamier of the Air Force Aidit, Chairman of the P.K.I. Lokean, No. 2 in the PK... Hioto. No. 5 in the P.K.I. Chinese Others Subendrio, Foreign Minister cad First, Deputy Prine leimena, Secoxt Deputy Prime Minister Vice Ad@oiral. Minister ad Comonder of Brig.Gen. Sadjipto, Minister and Commander of Police === [PDF page 20] === BRITISH EMBASSY, No. 1s CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA. | 1011/65 8 October, 1965. De orf sir, The events of the past week in Indonesia may come to be regarded as some of the most decisive in its history as en independent nation. Whatever may have been the motives and interests behind Lieutenant Colonel Untung's attempted coup — and these are still only matters: for speculation - there is no doubt that the act itself is already bringing about fundamental changes in Indonesia, le have by no means yet seen all the consequences, It may be many months before the after-effects of the coyp can be properly judged. Soe But already it is clear that the old struggle for power between the ‘Armed Forces and_the Communists, for years 5 constant factor in Indonesian politics, can never be fought in quite the same way again. Where before it had been a matter of Palace manoeuvres to strike a balance, with the two sides pretending friendship and co-operation in public end working hard against each other in private and in secret, the struggle is now right out in the open, The President's former role as arbiter, balance-seeker, manipulator, between these two rival forces must now be less preponderant. 5oiie observers still add the almost inevitable reservation which must accompany any pronouncmenet about the polities of this bewildering country. There heve been moments duping the past week -— when Soekarno received the geneials at Bogor on the 2nd of October or when Subandrio gave his press conference on the 8th of October - when in defiance of all reason it seemed that, even now, matters could revert again to where they were before: with Soekarno setting the pace: with the Communists creeping up to nower behind the specious facade of NASAKOM: with the Army alive to all the dangers, but litically supine, mesmerised and out-manoeuvred by the resigent. But I think we can discount this Se ¢#he line of blood drawn between the Army and its opponents is too thick. As I write sow, the posture of the three protagonests is: the F.K.1[. tying low; the President wriggling skilfully but still unable to giin the upper hand: the Army more and more evincing a determinatim to deal with the Communists by direct action (arrests, executions, purgings) without taking overt political decisions, in the hope that the general effect will be the same in the end, The Right Honourable Michael Stewart, M.P., etc., etc., etc. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 21] === i The course of events-w ich constituted the coup and counter-coup can be briefly described - the more bricfly if we exclude, as I intend to, the thousand and one reports — rumours which have buzzed round Djakarta during the past we o The Coup 4, In the small hours of Friday, the Ist 7 October, troops under the comsand of Lieutenant Colonel Untung invested the Palace and took over key buildings in the city such as the telephone exchange and the wireless station, At the sane time, a carefully co-ordinated strike was made against. eight of the senior arry generals. Thanks to being taken for his own servant, N ion escaped, breaking an ankle on his way; but his six-year-old hter was shot, and died later after four days in a — conditim. Suharto was not at home, so he too escaped. Yani ami five other generals were either killed outright or taken to the Halim air base a few miles outside Djakarta on the road to Bogor where they were tortured, murdered and mutilated. Their bodies were found three days later in a well nearby; it was not until that moment (this is an important point that. they were known for certain to be dead.: 5. At seven o'clock that morning a statement in Untun name was broadcast by Radio Indonesia and repeated thro the day. It declared that the "September Movement" taken action to forestall a coup d'etat by the ganerais, abetted by the American Central Intelligence Agency; that Untune himself would shortly issue his first decree. establishing an Indonesian Revolutionary Council; and that this Council would make no changes in Indonesia's foreign policy. 6. That afternoon Untunp, in the name of the Revolutionary Council, dissolved the former Dwikora Cabinet and — announced the names of the forty five members of the Council. Un, Chairman; Su jo, a Napier eee ae said to be a Communist, Vice-Chai man. three other Vice-Chairmen were named from the Air Force, the Navy and the Police - but all were of comparatively junior rank. Among the members of the Council were Omar Dani, es. Martadinata, Subandrio and Leimena - in that order. re was a sprinkling of Communists, but none of the P.K.I. leaders was listed. Unt furthermore decreed that all officers outranking him were to be demoted to Lieutenant Colonel; that other officers and N.C.Q.'s were to be promoted by one rank: am tha ".C.0.'s and other ranks who had at ge in the cou be promoted by two ranks. It seemed an oddly fytile gesture for a man who now h31d himself out to be master of the fifth largest nation on earth. 7. The planning and execution of the first few hours of Untung's cat Se bold and resolute. But there it st -. One the impression of & man who had no idea Ter stort ti ade GE the roll Coope wie, Puardite or ine. Ops who ing a fow key buildings, seemed to have one tartar tboke oe Lane If ons seizes a radio station, suiely one siibaid bro: CONFIDANT TAL, === [PDF page 22] === aa &. The compositiar or the so-called Revoluti 1 was so bizarre that could only have been the w of & political amateur. A number of pe ee who had mane to serve on it subsequently denied that they hal ever been consulted. For once it was quite easy to believe then. 8. A similar naivety anreared in the canmunigue which was issued immediately after coup. » the hysterical condemnation of it of a and officers who lust. for power, ignore the wretched fate of their mn, live in luxury at the tors oxconas, end leeil ae —o Oe ee = 2 griev Ss and personal ——— than anythi This. fits with what, littie is k-owm of ~- a brave but not very intelli-~ gent soldier who did well in West Irian campaign, = an@ austere in his —— 1 life, & man genuinely sickene by corruption in high places. Yet the mystery remains - was this Untung's coup There are four candidates to consider: ina and - for nothing should rise 1 of Javanese politics - President S I shall return to this later in my eee. The Counter-Coup 10. The counter—coup was swift to follow. With Nasution incapacitated, Suharto (who was in any case the noxt in rank of the penerals left alive) took charge of the a alist" forces. three o'clock on that Friday afternnon taken back the Palace. By five the radio station was in his hands. There was scarcely my resistance on _ of the rebels, most of whom were either demoralised at the a eget fai lure of the coup or just Bg bewildered at what as poi Suharto's task was also made easier by the fact tha the Central Jews battalion which had taken part in the original seizure of the Palace hai been later ranoved to Halim, while the replacement battalion, also from Central Java, "was not well briefed and allowed itself to be harangued out of its positions. ll. Meanwhile ee were sent to take the Halim base. This 7 on succeeded in do without mich difficulty the next day. is believed that Untung himself, who was that time in the base, escaped by aeroplane. "His whe S are still unknown. a2. At nine o'clock that same evening Suharto made his first announcement over the wireless. It said that the ae ore and Police ~ no mentia St the Air Force - had xterminate the so-called " er 30 Moveme. w @ sctions in replacing the Cabinet eg BE council were b counter-revolutionary. 13. By the png hams of Sat., the 2nd of October, t arto had D 14./ === [PDF page 23] === 1 Fighting also b ramaty An Central Java, Rebel troops under a Colonel Suhe ere reported to be holding Jogjakarta and Semarang, but both these towns have now been brought back under control. Two companies of rebels have taken to the hills and fighting may still be going on. The rest of Java and the other islands have on the whole remained quiet, though there has been some agitation in North Sumatra, The Aftermath 12. From this point on the character of the drama changes from military to political, the plot becomes murkier and: President Soekarno returns to the centre of the Stage. What he had been doing in the wings is still to som extent a mystery. A statement in his name was put out on the “riday (the 1 st of October). It said he was in good health and still held the leadership of the State and theRevelutim. But there wes no compelling reason to believe it. He could be a prisoner, he could be dead; and Untung's disregard of him, doth in the lst of October communique and in:the establishment of the Revolutionary Council seemed significant. It was only later that we were able to niece together sane, if not all, of Soekarno's actions during the critical period ef the coup and the counter-coup. He probebly spent theThurgday night with Ibn Dewi, his Japanese wife. He is known to have been in the Palace between six and seven o'clock the next morning - i.e. after it had been occupied by Untung's forces. Later that morning he went or was taken to Halim, escorted by Omar Dani. Soekarno later said that he had done this of his own free will so as to be able to make a quick petaway by air if necessary - an odd admission, but the statement was made in the context of whitewashing AURI and so must be treated with caution. On Friday afternoon he went to Bogor where he remained (in command of his own guard but observed by heavy regular Army detachments) until his return to Djakarta on the 9th of October, But it was not until the small hours of Sunday moming when a recorded message in Soekarno's own voice bepan to -be broadcast repeatedly over Radio Indmesia that the world at large knew for certain that he was still President of Indonegia. 16, What remained in doubt was the extent to which the President was a free agent and in a position once again to control the affairs of his country. The power and the initiative rested with the victorious generals. But if they hesitated, if they allowed Soekarno to resume a dominant position, there would be little chance of effective action against the P.K.I. The earlier indications were that they did indeed hesitate. That same statement of Soekarno's to Which I referred above revealed that on Saturday the President had summoned the heads of the armed forces and a few others to Bogor; that he had resumed control of the Army: and that while Suharto was to be respmsible for restoring law and order, Pranoto (a weaker general more subject to Palace influence) would be the effective commander of the. Army. The statement neither thanked the penerals for the- aetims they had taken against Untung, nor condemned the latter for what he had done, Reports have it that the generals were undecided beforehand whether to attend this meeting in Bogor CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 24] === % and take action Seely agains rensiibered that the most pol itically-sinded rt were all dead and that Nasutio with a broken ankis Page than of else. It ae that argunen of anything of observing pw and constitutional forms prevailed. generals obeyed the President's summons. But the him in political finesse; they ach d to Djakarta disillusioned and discour y Soekarno's high-handed treatment of then. — a it looked very much like a victory for the At this point in the story a Sendaiee event, took The bodies of the other generals were ge gg That there had been some shootines m Friday was common knowledge: put tt till then it was Seseriae: to Believe that the enerals who been ce ed alive were merely ene held prisoner somewhere in Java, Now it was known that they had been brutally murdered in cold blood. What is mo there was clear evidence that clements of the AURI and of the P.KT. had been involved. The acti ee on. began, Wy. to round up Communists iiDjakarta and elsewhere. ultimatum was issued on the of October rae e.. who the er 30 Movement (in r them within as or: Sie Bandung headquarters uade a thinly veile ed statement about the Army's pes & heaving its limits: and Suharto amnounced plainly Communists and AURI were implicated in tho murders. 19. Still Soekarno hedged. A secamd meeting with the yg ome = co the next. day, the 4th of October, at which fore the President the evidence they "had eet <a the murders. Yet the public amouncement afterwards said only that the Presid had ——— the dead generals “heroes of the revolution": and that he peromally y would be responsible for “settling the September a * There was no Presidential caidematim of the 20. Meanwhile in Djakarta enti-P.K.1. demonstrations were a by various Mog ion and ond Che stiag.. aa aan 2 ar os re ons. deaanding me the et proces sol aohet iaan of the P K.1,. and its affiliates. » the of tho — oe the —- anita. ooh © were Grash. the F PKT I,, String Aidit. ay r dononsirations Tho crowd warched to tho P. Fig, ce se om 8. couple s o P.K.I. leaders were burned. The staff of the Chinese Ba mindful no doubt. of what, Uieir friends had done to Us = had already abamioned their houses and withdram to Rmabassy compound. 21./ CONP DSRELAL === [PDF page 25] === al. At first the Army-aithorities in Djakarta gave the impression that they wanted to restrict these reactions to innocuous demonst ms. But as the week went on and the generals realised more and more that Bown | were getting absolutely nowhere with Soekarno, I the y came to the conclusion that more popular agitation the Communists in the capital (under aegis not of thienselves but of the non-Communist = parties) would do no harm. Certainly the press and the radio which since the 2nd of October had been entirely in Army hands has nae up a steady supply of reports and articles pointing up guilt of the P.K.f. 22. While these developments were in train in Djakarta Soekarmo sumaoned a meeting of the full Dwikora Cabinet in r for the 6th of October. Njoto and Lulnan, the second third most senior members of the P.K.I., were present. So was Subandrio who had been away in Sumatra when the cou took place and had returned to Java and to r on the 3 of October. Nasution remained in Djakarta with his daughter, so that, with Yani deed, there was no Amy representation at all, though the leaders of the other Services were there. It does not appear that there was any effective discussion at all at this sized meeting of theCabinet. But afterwards Subandrio held a press conference. It was as evasive a a pnt y rete as ever he has given, He said that the President condemned both the murders and the formation of the Revolutionary Council. He also said that the President viewed the coup itself as a political ee demand & political solution which he, the President, would prov de as soon as the situation in Indmesia had calmed down. Subandirio refused to be drawn when questioned about the ag sor ge ago of the Commmists for the murders. Instead, he kept on back to the President's assertia that the matter was a political one. This sort of thing was an inevitable incident in the course of a revolution like Indonesia's. What was important was to maintain national unity in the face of imperialist threats; amd, as regards this unity Subandrio gave it as his view that all the political — whether nationalist, religious or commnist, and all armed forces, were loyal to the President. in Dijakarta - neither the go the press i No one the (non-P.K.I.) political parties, nor the vociferous you organisations - has yet had the courage to speak out against s patently absurd claim that the country, communists all, are united under their beloved _e- Probably they never will, so inured are these people sy end cant. Soskarno’s failure to make amy condemnation, or criticisa — itself or of the people who murdered the generals, has found such easy acceptance. I belicve his estige with his own people can never recover to anything ike its former standing. Omar Dani and Subandr io a. The evidence for associating Omar Dani and sections of the Air Force with the ston Ree 3 chiefly on four facts - that AURI were used to ferry rebel troops on the ni the coup; that Halim air base was the centre of operat throughout/ COPIDENTIAL === [PDF page 26] === j yenerals' bodies were found; Dani was close to President. most of the time; and that at 9.30 a.m. on the Friday moming of the coup Omar Dani issued an Order of the “— supporting the coup. It said that the Revolution md its great leader (Soe 0) had been saved from C.I.A. subversia and that erous elements in the Army had been rurged. The guilt by association here revealed is incontravertible ani a subsequent "corrective‘ statement fooled no one. 25. _ Additional and indirect evidence is peor ped SY the general “revolutionary” character of the AURI, which distinguishes it from the r three services. This factor is even more pertinent in the case of its Commander, Omar Dani, who has never (umtil now perhaps) sought to dispuise his approval of the P.K.I.; is a close personal friend of Aidit's: has political ambitions of his own. He is also well thought of by the President: ami one of the latter's main concerns after the coup was to protect Omar Dani and the AURI from the Army's wrath. Admittedly, Sookarno's motives hore, as elsewhere, may have been an over-riding determination to er over the cracks and maintain that natiaal unity without which his scope for play the arbiter would be crippled and his position and ## a ished, Omar Dani's involvement, in plot is all of a piece with the P.K.I.'s and even karno's own. I do not think he can possibly be exonerated, though he mey yet. go unpuni died. 26. Subandrio’s absence in Sumatra at the critical ably means that he cannot have partici moment prob Girectly in the ultimate and bi decisigns. the hand it is to be regarded as co n that. he and his “secret service” (B.P.I.) took a leading part in buil in Soekarno's mind those suspicions of the generals were an essential basis for Soekarno’s initial countenance of the attitude to the Army. The Army » id indeed is said to have evidenc, for the involvement of Subandrio with Omar Dani and Aidit at least to the degree indicated above. === [PDF page 27] === 28. The assumption then-is that the Commuists became aware of Untung's plen at a rather late stage and decided to throw themselves behind it. ‘hy? One explanetion is that the Communist. themselves had been plotting for just such an insurrection but with this difference, that it was to 90 into operation only on Soekarno's death, to nip an Army regime in e bud; nevertheless the Communist arations, including the receipt and stockpiling of arms m China, were so far advanced and so well that in crushing Untung, the / could and no doubt would crush the Commmists too; and would be able to make an effective and perhaps mortal political case against them. So why not join Untung from the start? 29. And in Judging the event afterwards, with its aura of ineptitude and failure, one is perhaps inclined to overlook the situation as it apyeared to the P.K.I. at the time. The came much nearer to full success than people are now inclined to admit. Look at the "ifs". If Nasutiao had not been mistaken by Untung's men for a servant, if Suharto had not been oe — home, who would have organised the counter coup? when? If Soekarno had been forced (as it is said could have been) to sign a proclamction ageinst the Army on the ist of October, and if his helicopter had taken him to Central Java instead of to Bogor, as Omar Dani is said to have urged, cawld the Army, without the Sanction of his name, have prevailed as in fact they did? (I myself believe that his decisive refusal to go to Central Java arose when he learnt of Nasution's survival.) I would say that for the P.K.I. on the 30th of if one sto 30. Se ber it was a good gambler's throw; and fair ood authority) is ote: it was Aidit, the ess, who was ee shake the box, Hjoto took cover with the indecisive and safety-playing President. The Chinsse ae Speculation about Chinese involvement can be dealt with briefly. It is rumoured that some of the arms discovered were Chinese: ami that these were led in with the materials for the grandiose CONEFO building which is being erected with Chinese help. Reactions from Peking to the coup &lso ct and sugeest prior knowledge - does the are as s cated story that a list was told in Pek é While ago that the Chinese tel 9 curries” for the ~~ Indonesians on the lst of October. Is ct that the extent of Chinose involvement was approximate ly same as that of the P.K.I. - fore-knowledge, some support, but no direct control. A serious deterioration in Peking/Djakarta relatiais is already obvious, and if this is maintained - by the contiming power of the Army and the submergence of the P.¥.I, = thon the following question will become important: litically sophisticated enough to imitate Cardinal Richlieu o giving support (particularly in the ecmomic field) to a regime Souhnek ot by anti-imperialists who are also anti-Communists? 32./ CONETDENTIAL === [PDF page 28] === The President ane Finally, Soekarno, Bizarre as it may at first seem, it is not imnossible that he both knew and approved of the coup beforehand. To explain tris theory, it is necesary first to say a few words about the background. One starts from the premise that, with the trouble he has been having over the past year with his health, Soekarno now feels a sense of urpency if his dreams of establishing a socialist Indonesia are to be realised in his lifetime. This year he had already made good progress towards his great objective. The Indonesian Nationalist Party had been effectively purged of its right-wing elements, and the Murba Party had been bamned. The.preatest remaining obstacle was the Amy. 50 far from acquiescing, they had shown remarkable powers of resistance to the President's pressure and blandigshments. A move to introduce a system of political commissars had been frustrated: plans for the Pifth Force - essentially the creation of a Communist cadre within the Armed Forces — were getting nowhere*; and latterly, in August, the Aymy had even been able to over-bear the President to such an extent that he agreed to set up an Army controlled economic body, KOTARI, which in the pre-coup days anyhow seemed likely to have considerable powers indeed. The President's pergistent refusal to yield to Communist pressure for the suppression of the H.M.I. (Muslim Student Association) was attributed to Army influence. And then, on top of all came persistent rumours of an Army plot - rumours invented to some extent, certainly fomented. and exaggerated by the Communists and more tellingly by Omar Dani and Subandrio. ‘Soekarno, excitable and anprehensive, could not have ignored them all. So whet was to be done? ff the generals could not be outmanoeuvred then they must be liquidated,; oe I find a measure of plausibility in thig theory. Certainly the case which Soekarno moved in and out of the coup leaders' company on that Friday does not argue for a man under duress, 34. But there arc still too meny loose ends, why the Revolutionary Council if the purpose of the a was merely to paralyze the Army? It seems possible that S5aekarno was only partially aware of the Untung plot, — the broad purpose of it, but thought it wiser to eschew closer involvement. He may not, have wished for murder, or he may have wished not to be aware of it in advance. _ I doubt if we shall ever know the truth. For my part I think ‘Sockarmmo expected the generals to be brought before him more or less in chains at Halim by members of their om caste, a, comedy which would have enabled him to purge the Army at the instigation of the Army itself. But he could not handle a tragedy. 35./ 3 “Pho last recorded renark of General Yani a few hours before his death was made to some inquisitive journalists: ‘Don't talk to me about the Fifth Force". === [PDF page 29] === would not tae 5 pt neat ot the Booker oa ie a ane O regime or the eee Paige Soekarno's lifetime, fis thy ony —— tru “om were forced into action on the ore —— October ‘by by st extreme vocation that could ssibly have been oven them, i 36. We also said that the Communists would not gor, A Coup of their own because they could manage Man f well wi it, provided Soekamo lived long enough for their purposos. This prediction has stood in need of fevision in recent wocks: fits or seizures which Sockarno survived early in August, the Army and the P.K.I., to make urgent sainst his deaht, and these preparatias reacted Sal mobilisations of 1914. The ink, in its own mind the readiness of the Army to act and refere resorted to hasty and nervous measures < a own, such as the clandestine import of small arms from C Fran various conversations I had with Aidit Sees Sarid Satande tee ca ard him as a man not quite normal in his mind (I mentioned the a ng fo og of Fin at one s Ps and - as alre described - it. looks as it was Aidit who took the critical decisions, once jor applied his catalyst to the tense situation. a. A third prediction made in our despatches was that an internal clash ca the wedge we are now experiencing was our poo mee have any permanent boneficial effect on tion over enttigkentes it would provide a & lessen in the intensificatim of Indmes oer ions against a. but there would be no abandonment or cessation of hostility such as would enable us to terninate or to wes ag faigg cows y our heavy mili commitment in Indonesians cali ‘the tish puppet-state of | canes 38. As things stand now I see no reason to recede fron this prediction: we ccn hopo for 3 a bo otter outcono. - but we would be very expect it with confidence. However, I have under] two words in the preceding move OF takin to ay the = t that tsi ati nto ork pol king connie: a ~ situatim WO olitical s tlement. that this that any such cutie 6 sett eos nal) be to our taste: but if we wish to address our minds question, we arc unlikely to find a better moment. e@eeese eeeoene sent comitims under which we live and work important.. ens in into an ideal deepaben” - S into an ide Lect er "ts Sep ain Obmedlar ane nitect,, vi arpe s nec er arc c Hoad of Geer Cube ambridge. CONFIDENTIAL, 40./ === [PDF page 30] === AO, I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Kuala Lumpur, Sinsapore, Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, /ellington, Ottawa, Bangkok, Peking and loscow, and to the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chicf Far East at Singapore. I have the honour to be, With the highest respect, clr, Your obedient Servant, CONFID "NTIAL === [PDF page 31] === LUG31 FUS / 946/14 RR/ HUPDL DE HUMSF R 1496252 a [Unreadable] TO /RR_-ASOLHY.--18314 GR, 29 MY DESPATCH NO 134 PSE MAKE FOLLG CORRECTION IN PARA 5 © FOR THAT MORNING READ ON FRIDAY MORNING « Gtb@HR+6F lA Ge, faa NNNN LXDLF Y f WCO [Unreadable] === [PDF page 32] === Se Wele November, 1965. Your fascinating Despateh No. 13 of 8 9 ser about the attempted coup in Indonesia wes at onee print general [Unreadable] circulation and has aroused the greatest interest and edmiretion throughout the Foreign Office and emnaneea an: ‘Reletions Office. @ are most grateful to you end to John Cembridge for producing such @ comprehensive analysis so quickly. We have also given a copy to the United States Embassy in London. Although many of — Jubsequent telegrans, to say nothing the innumerable reports r reaching us from other sources, have hrown fresh light on this or thet facet of an extremely obscure complex succession of events, I think the substance of your remains as valid as ever. ut it any be a Lone, time before ; convinesing answer can be found: why did the “SOth September incident” occur shen. and how it aia? Above ell, iy should the Communists, who are undeniably and deeply involved in Untung'’s putsch, decide to jeopardise all the power end influence they had elready gained Clumsily snatching at fe 7 effortlessly into their aaa &% & « omen « a ple thet seemed almost rip sugeest in your pateh the ND» 2 Commun aoe became nm late stege and decided to.aKe a chaneée on te: ‘guecess, obvio asly ea possible xplenet though we ere inclined thet the Communists may | eve » n privy to whet was going yvather longer then you sy est, Other povsible explenatio thet the Communist: genuinely bel eved in the "Generals ' sjot" (or thet the Chinese did end pushed the PKI into eetion against their better Jude ement ) or that the Communists, though they did not initiate Untung movement and may not heve decired it, supported him ae the best way £ protecting themselves against the counter revolution liable to follow the failure of any left-wing plot. They may heve thought that their backing would guarantee success, but that their ebstention would not be enough to protect them from the reprisals that wo id follow failure. If 80, events have 1 the extent of their miscaleulation, But the weakness of eory;, it see to me, is that the traditionel vattern of Veg nrove this t Sir Andrew Gilchris’ TITAWADT A Md AKRAM I Phe === [PDF page 33] === the coun a'étet in Indonesia hes been for setion to be taken by only a smell group, whose sympathisers sit back end await events before committing themselves, It seems somehow un-Indonesian and uncherseteristic of the PKI to have committed themselves st once 4 Personn&ly I have a weakness for the theory that Untung, the Communists, Omer Dani ete., ete., were all working hand in glove, but thet their coun a'étet was planned to take place only in the event of Sukearno’s death or incapacity. Nearly evéryone involved seems to have had excellent motives for wanting to forestell any edizure of power 1C wit === [PDF page 34] === 4 % CONFIDENTIAL the coup d'état in Indonesia has been for action to be taken by only @ small group, whose sympathisers sit back and await events before committing themselves. It seems somehow un-Indonesian and uncharacteristic of the PKI to have committed themselves at once so blatantly, so early and so ineffectually. 4e Personally I have a weakness for thé theory that Untung, the Communists, Omar Dani etc., etc. were all working hand in glove, but thet their coup d'étet was planned to take place enly in the event of Sukarno's death or incapacity. Nearly everyone involved seems to have had excellent motives for wanting to forestall any seizure of power by the Generals and, once the reins of power were seen to be slipping from Sukarno's hands, there would clearly heve been a period of confusion and uncertainty at which power might go to the first group to bid for it. Chuld it be, therefore, that this was the true plan, but that unforeseen circumstances caused a last minute decision to strike earlier than expected, before planning was thoroughly completed and while Sukarno was still alive and kicking? For instance, the conspiracy might have been discovered or Untung (whose key position in the Palace must have been invaluable) might have refused to wait any longer. Onthis assumption, failure would have been primarily due to a last minute change of plans, though I am not forgetting your shrewd analysis of how n@arly, even so, the attempt succeeded, De I dare say we may never know for certain exactly what happened, what was intended or what went wrong and I do not want to trouble you for an answer to any of these speculetions. But, once the dust has settled a little and you and John Cambridge have a little time to spare, we should be interested to have your reassessment, in the light of later evidence and of later developments, of the nature and origins of the “ineident" of 30 September. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 35] === [Unreadable] PRAM DTAKARTA TO RORRTAN OFPFTCR PRHUM VIJIARARLA LU E- Oi ti Ge UP P LUG ere weet Re eee ee ee Le ee err ee ee. ee A EE AEP ORE a TT Ry in NRDARTVMENTAT. DTSTRTRIITTON En Clair DPA LMAN DAL DLoimiDbULLUN PRO rereetrens are wees ee 8 er a ees es ee TP Sir A. Gilchrist | eee La fie LJ hae Whe ae & 1 ' / “OH wi lai: I aa ae a Bree AICS U « UOUC i UC LOD L toy 2 | [Unreadable] . rs her 71 40) 7 Nratnhe 4045 2¢ October 1965: em | tober 196 [Unreadable] Ps a oo: ot e a | ‘we; 4) [Unreadable] BRU SL mf RNS NA I i./ @ W @eil@ici@oalL © aD calls. Fd i Na VN Cb 5 » CALL INN @: uff + UL a FOSS PS TEE Te A nen oe Ne ee Sth pment peat i I 8 OL TEE RT ON A PO ET Ce A PS LO TT IT es 97 Octoher a ( UCLO DE! | +" ~ (> Ls +., Da- sf NSLS acs “rag 10 Lum 1177 ar a y ery, + 4" 7 ro” ';; r\ i } + at Li} Rev Ca L wiG! = wo) 5 LA UI J 2 j ~ Lat ale Be 7 i - = - ILC we Now pA yl LA [Unreadable] O y J\A6@ bed he J fie dl ele ot. Ls No? tad A uvidi [Unreadable] NO OV JCC bu. > DISTRIBUTED 7 Spereege Na eke ahhh c er seo ere mt. [Unreadable] or ea Be eae [Unreadable] === [PDF page 36] === OK as nequaea 36 CONFIDENTIAL FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO SINGAPORE (British Government Representative Ad Interim) Cypher/OTP & By Ferm DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION No. 801 | Al 25 October 1965 | D. 0535 26 October 1965 Addressed _to BGRAI’ Singapore telegram No. 801 of 25 October Repeated for information to: Djakarta Kuala Lumpur And Saving to: POLAD Singapore No. 548 Your telegram No. 550 [of 21 October]: Sir A. Gilchrist's despatch of 8 November. Oclobo No objection provided text ends with paragraph 54, and on assumption that Sir A. Gilchrist agrees. DISTRIBUTED TO: C.R.O. F.E. & Pacific Dept. J M.1I.D. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 37] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT NOK INES! & D. lot -/. VIO lio 2:. J / st NK. Ab. [dusts Ukkk, Vltin oh opttta kd” 2UW an xd ne. ( the 7) b Rh #. fenbeny. FROM a LAVIN. /mnm. No. jo2e Dated 4, 10 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 19/10 (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) cuaeleants (Main Indexed) | pagal === [PDF page 38] === ory OS LOL EVEL GD ious: Lo uneoro- umes oc sout eth & Tat abe MN ee eee a 1 eS ER aoe ae === [PDF page 39] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 § D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] fi S FROM TY codes (2K. SUBJECT: (): Jel. Navo, Posi) % R A. / fois ) fh. f- a oy 4; Ly. No. 20502 for. fens CSuUamunr 1 Re AVIMLIIMN 7Yfpralin yo Lh Dated /: /0 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) scant (Main Indexed) Ve i === [PDF page 40] === CONFIDENTIAL United Kingdom Delegation rn to NATO, Paris l16e. 20502 ed it oS 217 | There was further discussion on the situation in Indonesia in the Political Committee on 12 October and then in the Council the following day. 13 October, 1965. 2. In the Political Committee Van der Kun (Netherlands) said that Sukarno and his Cabinet were not in effective control of the country; there was still fighting in Central Java, though it was not clear whether the commander of the so-called "Diponegora" contingent was fighting for the Government or the rebels. Colonel Untung had been captured but Aidit's whereabouts were unknown. Generals Nasution and Suharto were pressing Sukarno hard for a thorough purge of the Communists. 3e The role played by the Air Force was still obscure. It was, however, fairly certain that the six generals had died at the hands of young Communists undergoing Air Force training. It also seemed probable that the Army Day celebrations had been called off because the present regime was afraid that the Air Force would use the occasion to bomb Djakarta. The real power now lay with Suharto, while General Nasution commanded the Army. These men were backed by a popular mood generally favourable to them in which Muslim and anti-Communist elements predominated. Sukarno himself was unlikely to be satisfied for long with a purely symbolic role but it would be almost impossible for him to revert to his balancing act. On the other hand the Army would find it very difficult to set up a regime on their own; the Communists were too big a force to do away with and if they were attacked too vigorously there might be civil war. As for foreign policy, any Indonesian Government was bound to entertain reasonably friendly relations with China. At the same time total abandonment of confrontation was likely to stimulate severe hostility from nationalist elements. 4h. In the Council Boon (the Netherlands Permanent Representative) added that there seemed to him to be two points of special interest - Sukarno's position and the attitude of the Russians. He said that the Dutch Ambassador in Djakarta thought it very /unlikely Hanbury-Tenison, Esq., Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, Foreign Office, London, 5.W.l. === [PDF page 41] === CONFIDENTIAL aD a unlikely that Sukarno had instigated the coup; it would have been entirely against his own interests. He had probably been caught unawares and was now doing the best he could to restore his position. As for the Russian attitude it was significant that after 10 days of silence Moscow had at last come out against the right wing Army leaders, urging Sukarno again to coordinate Indonesian forces against imperialism. If Moscow and Peking were both worried about the fate of the Communists, this would make things difficult for the Army, in view of their need for supplies. This might oblige them to come closer to Sukarno's line. De Schmidt-Dornedden (Germany) speaking in the Political Committee, thought that the Army leaders, who had for a long time been saying that they wanted to deal with the Communists, had failed to take advantage of the 30 September coup to do so. They were trying to win Sukarno over by moderate policies; but he refused to be wooed and still inclined to the Air Force. Meanwhile the Army, through its own information media, was stimulating anti-Communist sentiment especially by encouraging the luslims. He then read out a telegram of 10 October from Djakarta. On that day Sukarno had left Djakarta after his negotiations with the Army leaders had broken down. He was highly disturbed by the anti-Communist demonstrations and had demanded that they should stop. The Army leaders had not accepted this and seemed to have come to the conclusion that compromise with Sukarno was impossible. The German Enbassy had also had very confidential reports to the effect that they were now thinking of going ahead on their own and setting up a military/ civilian junta. 6. In the Council Harlan Cleveland's contribution (the United States Permanent Representative) consisted of a short State Department analysis of the attempted coup. First, Communist involvement and instigation had been established; Untung himself had P.K.I. backing. The army was now showing considerable determination in its drive against P.K.I. Communist groups. Sukarno was alive and active. Subandrio was trying to smooth things over but he carried little weight with the army. Cleveland ended by saying that United States posts around the world would point out that a major lesson from the 30 September coup was that the Communists were still ready to murder in an attempt to obtain power. Te I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries in The Hague, Washington, Bonn and Djakarta and the Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Singapore. tn CAAX. oe Eases (W. Marsden) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 42] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 4 @ D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D H 018 /2 1 FROM SS. 3.6 § Com brolge, SUBJECT: = £5t)o.c40 (om ALwopapfer otrout te (DIAKA & oy oe p. a dee Sot - 90 oer mrt G of tarwouth No. s04 Jeo Dated /3 a /O Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: /4 if 10 (Outward Action) Received Stim (Ce) ~ 2 toy fakyaredirias - ba Me tmeye. Ff am ad Bane Oe 2 com ay prepnta euro Comm Yue gporaerntad ol Tele. thy guuss oo WCorr Ae ediCere lok am (Referred to Legal Adviser) Uru Corn cca when Cale: completed) | (ain Indexed) AA he {VO t fé GAL === [PDF page 43] === i it ’ A tnd at he i. AL a he ff LJ ode ede & ie ile * 44 uA iL LL hobs earl Wh iLtAd [Unreadable] [Unreadable] io “sa tants a 2 os ee ie an CNS MOrTi.1! ~~ wide te Vv it ante ne © 0 L.A an: ys om VWs de CULL: a ry ry “ [Unreadable] [Unreadable] FAL s ~ 4 ode aD ' WO U a iis [Unreadable] . Aa no _ - ly i. 7 124 7 T 7 whe a het Sr OY c ' fia & Jae YUL: i/ de tee ee: [Unreadable] [Unreadable] —J Lad D he de es juan ws |} smoer DA - any wt abe sr. ry Wee Now “—e* a whe tas 1” 2 [Unreadable] a Wai wa + 1" ed ale === [PDF page 44] === COMMUNIQUE OF "30 SEPTEMBER HOVEMENT", JAKARTA, OCT. 1 (ANTARA).--; The "Movement of 30 ek, issued a communique today explaining latest GeveLonments talking place in the country. The statement said that on Thursday, Septenber 30,1965, a military movenent among the Army took place in Jakarta, the capital of the Republic of Indonesia which was aided by other units of the other branches of the Armed Forces. The "September 30 Movement" which was headed by Lieutenant-— Colonel Untung, commandant of the Tjakrabirawa Battalion, security guards of President Soekarno, was directed against generals who were members of what was called "Council or Generals", the communique said, A number of generals had been arrested and important communications means and some other: vital installations put under contr of the "September 30 Movement", while president Soekarno was safe under the protection of the "September 39 Movement", Also a number of pupviar leaders who woud have been the objeetive of the "Council of Generals" had been cilaced under the protection of the "September 30 Movement", the statement announced. The aznouncement said that the "Council of Generals" was a subversive movement sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which was very active lately particularly so when President Soekarno was gravely ill during the first week of last August, Their hope that President Soekarno would die because of his iliness was belied, In this connection, to achieve their designs the "Council of Generals" had organized a "show of force" on Arned Forces Day, this October 5 by deploying troops from East Java, Central Java and West Java to here. With the big concentratjon of military troops in Jakarta, the "Council of Generals" had planned a military coup d'etat before October 5,1965. To prevent this counter-revolutionary coup, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung was forced to organise the "September 30 Movement" which met with complete success,; According to information from Lieutenant-Colonel Untung Commandant of the September 30 Movement, the movement was solely a movement within the Army and directed against the "Council of Generals" which had harmed the good name of the Army and had bad intentions against te Republic:of Indonesia and President Sockarno, Lieutenant-Colcnel Untung, personally considered the movement aS imperativ: 25 a member of the Tjakrawirawe. Regiment which had the task io protect the safety of the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The Commandant of the September 30 Movement also said that steps already taken in Jakarta against the "Council of Generals" would be followed with similar action throughout Indonesia and directed against the agents and henchmen as well as sympathizers of the "Council of Generals in the regions, The leader of the September 30 Hovement also said that as follow-up measures, an ° "Indonesian Revolutionary Council" will be formed in the centre, with provincial revolutionary councils in the provinces, regencial revolutionary and ketjamatan and village revolutionary councils in the rural areae. 15.00/HO1/T1L3. (113) ca The =15 15 === [PDF page 45] === News se =1-19-1965e members of these revolutionary councils will be civilians military officers who unreservedly support the “September ‘owement", Political parties and popular oganisations, newspapers, magazines and the like would be permitted to carry on vieir activities ‘provided that within a certain eee init to be determined later, stated their loyalty to the Indonesian Revolutionar Council, vhe Indonesian Kevolutionary Godakst, which by the "September 30 Novement" would consistent "Pantja Azimat (five talismens) of the Revolutio: ado »ted by the Provisional People's Consultative the Gotong. Royong House of Representatives Advisory Council (DPA), the Commandant of ment" said, The Indonesian Revolutionary Council ‘would not Indonesia's foreign policy, which;jwas independent and against neo-colonialism, imperielisi and colonialisn jiuterest of preserving peace in Southeast sia and:% Policies in regard to‘the hoicing of the second Af Conierence in Algiers, the Conference of New nnierging convrontation agains t "alays 1 a" would not be altered. conference against foreign military bases (KLAPMA): and international activities which had been decided for Indonesia would be carried on’ as planned. Lieutenant-Colonel Untung as Commandant the Senvenid O liovement also appealed to the who Le indone n people to Coe preserving vigilance i assist the — “30 Moveme thout reserve to safeguard the Renublic of..from the designs of the "Council of Sétierals" and eas. S, and carry the Message of Suffering of. the People in the true sence tne word,: To officers, non-commissioned officers and ranks of the Army throughout the country, Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Untung appealed for firm determination and action to destroy all intluences of the "Council of Generals" anc its agents and too within the Army, The generals and officers who‘were lusting power, who ignored the poor fate of their men, and live in luxury and a spendrift life at their expense and humiliate and also waste government funds must be kicked out frou the and given equal sentence, The Army was not the property of the generals but the I of all the officers of the Army who are loral to the aspirations and goals of the Aucust, 1945 Revolution, To all units of forces which - v. did net telong to the Ariy Lieutenant-Colonel U expressed high ezztitude fer their assistance to the stens to cleanse tne £ray, and hoped that similar action would within the ranks of these forces concerned against the symr and agents ox Couneil of Generals", Soon Commancant Lt, Colonel Tatung would issue the ens on the Indonesian Revoluviconary Council which would | 1 Uh decrees,. oe ae was J und in Jakarta, Sepi Came: SU st i * tne September 30 Movement. repeatedly broadcast by RRI, Jakarta === [PDF page 46] === oteteain [Unreadable] 2. IS ohn *;: wv Pole ai J shod. bi Chils [Unreadable] : > ative A\S we @ oe & ¥- A ode 4 ek J [Unreadable] & \/7L ww wd 4 dake oe * he Jao LL: ve be ae ws POA ate a & ¢ [Unreadable] - ale ate Ws 7 o 7 | ‘:. a \ ei * Vv ' ’ wheod. de Circe eo} = [Unreadable] 4: -. de he Apelee p OANA. athe ws Ai. © ne | ’ VJ "ae VU [Unreadable] [Unreadable] : >. LAC LL et, [Unreadable] ° a Bed whe ake: LALA ohne & > bf. 2. oie - whe et LA nd 4 [Unreadable] ‘: woe Li \ NS LA ma * y [Unreadable] nw LAl oo ee ’ wii « [Unreadable] ake s/Liv/ \ + Cho} he 4/4) ~ s. abe de hw / [Unreadable] wc tO laa. r Q} [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 73if Oo TPT i TH °C? 7 27 {} }-; he VALS CH ULLO \~+-+ i vu ~ Ww iy Ler | 7:. ' age [Unreadable] ~@ Coe We he wl ~ WA VY POD ae FL CA f [Unreadable] > ee Li VAL Y / [Unreadable] [Unreadable] 7 ealie wee Sd de dececleen h abe a rs.« [Unreadable] [Unreadable] «esa: in hie ¥ 4 i one + - ~ * J [Unreadable] het LA, ~ ae he - Ls 7 / [Unreadable] JS Ly ake ead & dt. + as\4) IMULUL / [Unreadable] i a ee Coan ~-* Li L ye. Wie [Unreadable] “2 = a. ote w= eo Ae ech oe be 7 Asse \ a ss 4 4../ & be © we po = [Unreadable] atids 1 °. SACAsA Ue — -eretek 4 = [Unreadable] 4 GG i UO: [Unreadable] hed LA:: Wile / [Unreadable] 7 AL. Cok Ae odie \* / es »« ke: / [Unreadable] Ivy jtULLY nw LACH ULL [Unreadable] === [PDF page 47] === [Unreadable] CC sel; VI! IV woU UCU ey CLS iI’S OCGCcur st S - RG! Ww Wee WLI [Unreadable] Vere « als te “Nec; ‘na lan: MNHoAc31 A bk & 5S... 4 de \ 4 tC 2 / cw UL Vil Lh \s LA te hak a / a; ~7LA tk CL [Unreadable] J a2 Cede S LA Cr : } 4.7: 1 -] S ‘|: "tC 1 linn 5: -. = P —- ‘af Oo | Ori £21) ATS: ri nn i a L. w/ dai a C Ou D / Vl WY w/ ww ial we VA >roLLG L < Lek 7 4 J \AL; nt aleades © AG LU UL - [Unreadable] i it Ve wv J oe @ a4 VAL be a ViLw i. Jt Aedes CHS ok whi CA bh Ne ame btw hi Wa 4 a Ce V aed 7 LJ=a ons. “ sain wy anr -l- — ~ fam oy 4. Q C OUD: a 4A a: nora | ie & &£ CVeAVil mJ LAD CLS Al‘ Cad LUA. wii i.e © de he WSIS VIL 4 ~ Wi ToL A A WO [Unreadable] ed Ne? LAL 6 ode ole whe 02 Cc. Jo UL ae WA LLC Cal UL I YS V OLLI tiUdLVLICAL \U ve [Unreadable] LL UW VW A Se es AW vw vO AL ws we a Ne al villi 4 U os Ca © L 7 Cli, CArwbe 17 [Unreadable] + ~~ ws ~ ~~: cy °. rry? *) f - yi a ~- “3 oc 7 sy feii? fi ny Ld vilL& LL CLiVL vo FLO Cart \ Out ALLS COUT de IS an @a@ceceurscu ah [Unreadable] COUT veL PreVOLULLOCNaL LU Ue [Unreadable] " HO “vr, le 177 aAyararr year we} ] las Dee) Lv; \ Ss & we we bh abe 4 i te VC ~' VGA +e Ne ake te isto + CA? / Gil. [Unreadable] ‘Orwar U7 4- ve +17) "7 Aoyvrwry ¢ 7 e natriotic ‘ a WF VIC ‘ nf y iJ se wv JL: » « ah obo d+ Ls CA A whe LS 4 vv ik 7 i ~~ & ae SY Ve w ve [Unreadable] rae hf: oer; 8 6n Seinen “at > - a; eatr! « _ 1 _ de de dp i) de ake (Wake whe 2 U wet hs Vd CA ke oe ae ee ae | ', ss 4 i ©: 7s Vv ~ [Unreadable] SV ole vee VY a At 1 Vo Vv VlLlw O11 Wek. Ww WD —“~ WCAw — UL Wh wo [Unreadable] & oY } ahs b Web WL che C J ¥ al VY ' 7 1. VW A CULL. 4 VilWw wo A oe vi lé Ca Uk Wil - -. ’. bo i Zaf. A; a wn 4; adn 4.) aa«<re LIn we Ler yi La awn Ld Chek ee Ser ob i VLio ~~ bed NS vVes~alJ/wo Ls MOV ChiIGiL VV wiAa Vv & Uli A GVW. LULU wh ALA A. Cc ~ lec we > ~\/ lum wae @ tern ail ‘2e14 > 47 oo ee > ay 4:./ ” 7: o>; oC ry: ~ ry coa7 ae. ” a fr»: 7: 7 A. 2h a LA QO | a ' Li a e aed fy — wl ow Nw Sh ode Cok \& wok Vek aahe ws [Unreadable] J whee Yes wt A LLG 4 “CL Ls We 4. COAL LAL WO c LA CLI lv A wed vs i. alt CDabeate nossibilities." [Unreadable] === [PDF page 48] === 7, pyar 4 a « cr toelrarity € ecu bn e 3 vLascs or the Armed Pa gig aah verge CALA i Glico 1d weld === [PDF page 49] === ONO RRR VULU DEN statement of 1 October the people once ag good health and in control as leader [Unreadable] of the Indonesian revolution. October, I Second Deputy ps os senior cials concerned with the questions arising out of In order to settle this ediate restoration of an hiaw 4-145 & acnieve tnis the strugg orf Y~to~aay 7 r 2 LA reaenca NAYS ral Pranoto Reksosamodra, of Staff of the Army. called into doubt by ajor-General Suharto, === [PDF page 50] === INVUIN Ua UN DL PPL LN DU AIUNU EL AS NG eer eat eceaentesetareeeerasbernaensannovernen seit The accusations so-called "30 Sep lie ee et y aQeparcul LoULS === [PDF page 51] === FROM DJAKARTA No. 2237 Dated / a// O Received Q Ock, (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) _ | (Main Indexed) oe NF (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 5d where Appropriate); D CONFIDENTIAt SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D» 018 / 219 SUBJECT: Syborciic 5 Nawh corpus wth Aidit. oligar-owve Hror LAukmonr onroar Ny ote ane liviky wrth bm, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 52] === Cyphe r/OTP sir A. Gilchrist No. 2237 18 October, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL A AAraadcar 1COT Uo nou Repea te d for At 0600 hours locas! Several poste name with that of Aidit. eo iia a sek ae Ne nara Re taken ad own an Ne Teste Lukman and who, from the DISTRIBUTED TO:- [Unreadable] Ce MW LUE 4 hs Eas Y ITAL | DISTR IBUTION 74 No. 2237 of 18 October, POLAD Singapore m side-- streets upling his eets were already being Oct< eee that indonesian Minister, Subandrio. === [PDF page 53] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 5 3 D where Appropriate) eS ie e DENTIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT . ee 015/220 INDONESIA D. L015 Dated }e/1 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) Pith be ea and wat in Lig d Guuclaunce caitd Abel drdons ig > Gulee Weve Sent” vin Heddt He me fet fhe ne Wh e bd . i} houmedr. ( Them o No Lov) (Referred to Legal Adviser) === [PDF page 54] === Call by the French Ambassador on the Permanent Under-Secreta Indonesia Talking Points Although we may never know the full story pehind the 30th of September' coup, the involvement of the Indonesian Communist Party in Colonel Untung's adventure is now beyond en speculation that President Sukarno some foreknowledge of the plot. This would be wholly out of character for Sukarno before he was sure that he was on the winning . Now that Colonel Untung has been captured and rebel resistance mostly crushed, the Generals s hand; but President Sukarno, the Communists Force, though partially discredited, are not He, We still cannot guess who will eventually win. Sukarno, so long as he ke¢ 1is health, is the cleverest and most determined of the He al has the advantage that everyone else pretends to be loyal to him. 5. China may have lost many of her friends in Indonesia, but there is no reason yet to suppose that Russia has them, although the message of 10 October from the Soviet leaders to Sukarno seems to be a calculated effort in this direction. M of Indonesian Army's equipment is Soviet-made. o and all the other contestants, including 1s, continue to reiterate their hostility to the nation to continue confrontation. Whoever wins, therefore, Britain can expect little goodwill —. on a LTron /Background Notes CLAONMT Dien) TF A U ONE IDENT ITAL === [PDF page 55] === ion ifrontat an con equivoc 49 sia nas presentations TeD Der LChi Sep "30 oo the LiG especiall rontation. rds con === [PDF page 56] === 56 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) D SC Coc'T rae, Ter SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] rIOU INDONESIA D Hoey FROM Fo. MINUTE (4.<. SUBJECT: CoAVERSATION BETWEEW Lond WALS7OW MD THE SAMUEL ) NEMERLAWDS AMBALIADNR AGoUT tHE SurUATIEW iN (NDOMESIA., No. ee Dated (§ of oO Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received Q0/1/0 (Outward Action) MINUTES Wen (Referred to Legal Adviser) aun (Main Indexed) LiKe ve I A s\ 9 yee Wy? === [PDF page 57] === RESTRICTED 9 tS 57 Minutes. Lord Walston talked to the Netherlands Ambassador at lunch today about Indonesia. He found that the Netherlands assessment of the situation was very close to ours. a The Ambassador spoke with approval M4 101/oa about one of the Generals who might ie be helpful from the Western poin of view: he was General Adjie whom the Ambassador considered to be one of the most intelligent of the military commanders at present and also one of the strongest. Kida at (R.C. Samuel) 15 October, 1965. Lil Ed (1626) RESTRICTED === [PDF page 58] === (Security Grading—to SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] 4 “tarts HNL No. Flo Dated e fo Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received PH 10 IS / 1. is (Outward Action) of Kg ) ZO. 4 “a dance Al to [Unreadable] \ 4 K Uontltydin. to === [PDF page 59] === [Both Immediate] eae Katmandu Manila A, gery one Kong RBGRAI Singapore Kuching Jesseltc Brunei (Personal) ake === [PDF page 60] === 2, The Generals have succeeded in their immediate objective of srushing the revolt, although isolated pockets of resistance are reported from Central and East Java. The Generals ere now trying to deolish the political organisation of the PKI (Indonesian oekviient Party) and to eliminate its political influence. The appointment, possibly ageinst Sv ukearno's wishes, of the antiit 9 Communist General Suharto as Minister/Army Com a to replace she late General Yani, and the promulgation Se KOTI (Supreme Operaticns Command) on 15 Cstober of a Decree inne suspending activities by political parties involved in the coup (implying the PKI without saying so), indicate the extent to which Sukarno forced to abandon his patronage and protection of the the temporary replacement of ths compromised iander (Omar Dani) by Air Vice Marshal Th hatra hee Ade 2. die Ba he PKI have been disorganised by the spcée General’ campaigcn.against them, and msy have some surviving without mejor changes in leadership, 1 both Sukarno and the Generals continue dttanbiad on the allsged threat of Nekclim (neo~colonia’ colonialism and imperialism) as Indonesia's chief enemy. 5, Sino—~Indonesian relations have clearly been subject to heavy strain as a result of the abortive coup, Anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia is mounting and on 18 October the new China News eee an alleged attack on the Chinese Embassy at ie ly Sort LOUS above is primerly ° information, In discussing should make evidence oe 4 o4 ee leaders are contemplating === [PDF page 61] === Dit ieis a2. LTH RELATIONS OFFICE VWTAaAQ i 7} Videle bd KD « UNS 2 ee ae ec at TT) rm NT at. eae pOTTLgSEnouMl bing st TM LENT “AL oo ae ee 20 oe 196 DISTRIBUTION —eereenres ssed to ©.U. for overseas distribution] === [PDF page 62] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded v 2 D where ye SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT; INDONES! References and Relevant Papers: Received Lillo (Outward Action) “00 ah, M 4% Ped. Le cant (te ge) aise mtg Fe Sea Quen \\ AM es i SOS wey a [Unreadable] (> et are ea WWW, aE 2 bx Aas. <. eilgres A... (Referred to Legal Adviser) conchted) | (ain Indexed) === [PDF page 63] === Wika, Gre §3 Site, RK 20oS, CRO ~ 7 British High Commission, Dw VW. i er B { Karachi. 135 October, 1965. You must think it is about time we reported on reactions here to events in Indonesia since the attempted coup on 50 September, ee As one might have expected, the reaction has been one of great concern for Soekarno, both for his personal well being and for his continuing effective leadership of the State. It has also produced a spate of expressions of warm friendship for and solidarity with Indonesia and gratitude for her support in Pakistan's struggle against india. 5. News of the situation in Indonesia has appeared daily in the English press; most of it being based on Radio Jakarta reports. 4, Perhaps the best way of describing the reactions is by a diary of events as follows:- 2 October Message from President Ayub ("The people of Pakistan share with the people of Indonesia the tremendous sense of relief that the attempt to disturb the Indonesian solidarity has been thwarted. The entire nation joins me in our heartfelt gratitude to Allah the Merciful that he has preserved you to continue to lead Indonesia to greater glory. The prayers of all of us are with you",) 5 October Aduldory editorial in Dawn under heading: "Long live this great Asian". 4 October Message from Mr. Bhutto. o October Inside pages of the Imglish Press carried a long article on the Indonesian Forces to mark Armed Forces Day while frort pages carried an announcement ie x. Burns, Sd. ‘Oink Ma laysia/ Indonésia Department, Commonwealth relations Office, === [PDF page 64] === RESTRICTED by the Indonesian Embassy that local celebrations had had to be cancelled in view of "the present Situation", Top Pakistan Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence officials attended "Quran Khwani" for General Yani at the Indonesian Anbassador's residence. A delegation of the Pakistan/Indonesia Cultural Association called on the Indonesian Ambassador to express happiness over Soekarno's good health, 7 October The Karachi Municipal Corporation passed a resolution expressing relief that the coup had failed, 8 October Special prayers were held all over Pakistan for the long life of Sukarno and the solidarity of the Indonesian people, 9 October The Central Minister for Home and Kashmir Affairs unveiled a eoft x 1l0ft. portrait of Sukarno at a ceremony at the Rawalpindi Press Club arranged by the Pakistan-Indonesia Society. This gigantic portrait is to "adorn" a pedestal in the main street of Rawalpindi once occupied by a statue of Queen Victoria, 10 October A meeting in Karachi presided over by the Indonesian Ambassador paid joint homage to the Indonesian generals killed in the coup and to the Pakistan officers and men who died fighting India, The meeting was also reported to have been attended by Mr. A. K. Sumar, Chairman of the National Press Trust, and by Mir Abdul Aziz, described as a spokesman for the Kashmiris Revolutionary Council, 15_ October Adulatory editorial in "Morning News" under the heading "A Great Friend", am Sending copies of this letter to our Embassy in and to our High Commissions in Kuala Lumpur and [ts wre, Ma bad (W. A. WARD) === [PDF page 65] === No. Ap 0 Dated f y T Received 1/10 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) | (Main Indexed) Ay | i fa f ie A\ [Unreadable] SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] i Y Lé Yeo é NESIA SUBJECT: Encloses Copy of: (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) H /015, Ld 4YpL) pope re) References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 66] === Jor copy. * ee FROM HANOI TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair Mr. Ponsonby FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Ni WwiS/22¢ No. 220 19 October, 1965 D. 0420 20 October, 1965 AZ PRIORITY R. 2008 20 October, 1965 Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No. 440 of 19 October, Repeated for information to: Djakarta POLAD Singapore Kuala Lumpur Peking All Hanoi papers and VNA Bulletin carried following unattributed and undatelined report on 18 October. 2, After referring to "complicated events within Indonesian Army" and to President Sukarno's call for solidarity, report mentioned further "complicated events aimed at opposing PKI and other" patriotic and progressive organizations which, up to now had supported Sukarno's policies. 3. Report mentions destruction of "PKI offices and those of Progressive Trade Union Youth and Women's Organizations" and claimed that "in a frantic anti-Communist atmosphere, Right Wing elements had been clamouring for disbanding and banning PKI and discarding it from government and other organizations, set up on Nasa Kom principles". i. Report asserted that United States imperialists and their lackeys would attempt to whip-up movement against Communists and Progressive Forces, sow division among, and impair unity of Indonesian people, and to seek means to intervene in Indonesian situation in order to mislead the people in their struggle against imperialists and old and new Colonialisn. === [PDF page 67] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 68] === CONFIDENTIAL & FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP ¢ Dit to15] 225 Gan Sat Apter ass DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 10.2247 en 19 October, 1965 D. 11.48 19 October, 1965 PRIORITY R. 16.15 19 October, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2247 of 19 October, Repeated for information to; POLAD Singapore B.G.R.A.I. Singapore Kuala Lumpur Canberra Wellington and Saving to:; Tokyo Bangkok Washington Indonesia. I called by appointment this morning on Dr. Hatta, former Vice-President. Nothing of any urgency emerged from our conversation, but it was of considerable general interest and I have set out the main points in my immediately following telegram. Foreign Office please pass Canberra 105, Wellington 71 and Saving to Tokyo 67 and Washington 466. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.0. S.E.A.D. J M.I.D. F.E.D. I.R.D. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 69] === ® CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist OIS/P2F @) Ne. 2248 D. 1612 19 October, -1965 — 19 October 1965 R. 1507 20 October 1965 PRIORITY ro «a gy Addressed to Foreign Office telegram Noy 2248 ef 19 October Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapére § BGRAI Singapere Kuala Lum Canberra Wellingten and Saving te: Bangkek Washingten My immediately preeeding telegram - Hatta, I epened by saying that in talking te me Hatta would know he was talking te a British diplemat working fer his country; but that he should bear in mind that any divergence of interests, any hostility, had not been originated by us, that we were still anxious te re-establi our former friendship with Indonesia, that eur policy was appeasement in the best and pre-Munich sense of the word, I hoped that, with this as background, he as an elder statesman would give me a frank and helpful view of the situation. I shall summarise a discursive but most friendly interview under headings. 26 Sukarno The Army had no illusions but must unavoidably retain him as a symbel of unity and prestige. He would continually work against the army but his prestige hed irretrievably gone: the man in the street had had enough of him and a few days age in Bandung his ewn sen (Gutntur) had publiely torn up a photograph of his father and Aidit and stamped on it. 36 Subandrio The Aray hated him and were determined te winkle hin eut, They had proof ef his complicity in the 30 September eoup. he Aigit te had gressly over-estimated his pewer and the extent te whieh people were willing to risk their neeks for hiz. His erganisatien was faulty: the real P.K.I. armed-eell erganisation had been smashed by Hatta himself at the time ef Madiun and had never been reconstructed: talk ef arming the peasants and the workers was a poor substitute. Untung had been a pupil ef Mussee (killed at the time of Madiun) and was a stupid fellew-traveller if not a genuine Communist. The torture and mutilation pelicy was Aidit's, in line with the murder of village chiefs in Viet Nam, te create terror, 5. Tjskrabirawa At the present mement Sukarno‘'s private army was diminished and purged: the Air Foree section had been broken up at Halim, the Army seetion was suspect, the Police section aloné was now mounting guard in the Palace but was watehed from the outside by heavier units from the Siliwangi division of the reguiar Aray, CONFIDENTIAL /6. Commnists ~ === [PDF page 70] === CONFIDENTIAL telegram No to Forei Office aQe 6. Communists A serious move was still on foot supported by Sukarno and Subandrio to retain Nasakom with a genuine KOM element in the form of a purged and renewed P.K.I,. The Muslims were determined on no account to tolerate this: their line was that Sukarno could keep Nasakom as a political concept but without any kind of Communist party in suppert of it. Their agents were keeping clese track of Lukman and Njeto (Nos. 2 and 3 in the P.K.I.) who had gene from the Palace at Bogor te Subandrio’s residence and were now believed to be inside the Chinese Embassy. Meanwhile the Army were taking practical action so as to make the "soft-P.K.I." impossible, 7e Murba PT Their inheritance of the KOM element was not practicable, 8. Nasution He could not fill the need for a strong pelitieal figure, an active Prine Minister under a figurehead Sukarno who would need constant watching to keep him at that level. Rumours about the Sultan of Jogjakarta could be discounted. There was in fact an ugly gap. i asked Hatta if he could do the job himself, Physieally yes, he said, but it was no longer possible for him to work with Sukarno as part of a team: quite out of the question, And Sukarno while he lived was inevitable. 96 Relations with Chine Hatta began by saying that bridges would be built and cooperation maintained, I found however that he had not heard of the incident at the Chinese [gp. omitted?Embassy] and the violent Peking note: he regarded this as the best news he had heard for some time. A breach with the pro-Peking policy which had got indonesia on bad terms with all the world would be a splendid development. Om reflection, however, he wondered if the Chinese note was some tit-for-tat over the Indonesian pretest about the Chinese flagflying incident, 10, Confrontation I asked for his comments on the opinion of many of my diplomatic colleagues that despite the power shift in Djakarta confrontation would proceed, as being teo deeply ledged in the Indenesian mentality. Hatta said this contained a limited degree of truth but that it would be wrong to make it a leng-term working assumption, Fereign Office pass Canberra 106, Wellington 72 and Saving Tekye 68 and Washington 467, [Repeated as requested | DISTRIBUTED TO: F,0. S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D. F.E.D. I.R.D. +444 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 71] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded a el where Appropriate) S.E. ASIA TOP SECRET INDONESIA DH ois /axk/G a x = oo eo (: te Exriuorals and tae Pi. Aunpor mation, No. AAO from a V.S, Aourte. Paed Ql Ockeber _ Encloses Copy of: Received 4 72 O “(Outw ard Action) References and Relevant Papers: DH to2a/s3 MINUTES (Printing Instructions) 3 (Referred to Legal Adviser) conmleted) ' === [PDF page 72] === TOP SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION) A. Gilchrist ARCHIVES Ogteber, 1965 06 tober 1156965 NO- 2260 D. 1344 2 21 Oeteber, 1965 R. 1624 29 PRIORITY i Fn TOP SECRET driers fac, | Addressed to Forei Repeated for informatien te: POLAD Singapere and Washington Fellewing is from United States source in direct contact with Nasutien;: aepe's" Re ty er ee (a) Nasution is very annoyed at the President's attempt to demonstrate (successfull Yhis pewer by sending Sukendre inte exile (my telegram No. 2259). refers. (bo) The situation in Central Java is giving the generals serious concern. There is a kind of mass surging geing on, Muslims, Communists, peasants, nationalists, with blood eccasionally boiling over, (c) The generals profess te believe that the British have been dropping arms to PKI/Chinese groups in Central Java. (a) Lukman is in gaol. Nijete is attending the Kiapma, but under armed supervisien (confirmed). (e) Aidit is held by the Army who are keeping it quiet since knowledge might drive the PKI either te ground or to further action. 2. Point (c) seunds crazy but Green says the generals take it seriously and is reperting te this effect. For what it is worth, ene ef the banners at today's demonstration (my telegram No. 225)) read “crush the PKI, agents of the imperalists". patel: \ jOsFTS 2 ee Office please pass POLAD Singapore 1401 and Washingten 167. LRepeated as requested/ DISTRIBUTED TO: S.5,A, D. JeMeI.D. P,E.D. News Dept. TOP SECRET === [PDF page 73] === te @ SECRET c t FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/ OTP Sir A. Gilchrist Ne, 2269 21 Octeber 1965 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION eee VU SLON D. 1412 21 Octeber 1965 PRIORITY R. 1712 21 Octeber 1965 BECKE Db foyslag (4) déressed to PO apere telegram No, 1409 ef 21 October Repeated for infermation te: Foreign Office My telegram Ne. 1401 (2260 te Foreign Office). Grateful if you can ensure that telegrams quoting or implying this source get a very restricted distributien, The Americans display anxiety abeut this, Fereign Office please pass Prierity POLAD Singapere as 1409, DISTRIBUTED TO: FO. S.E.A.D. Jd.M.I.D. F.E.D,. Ralalis News Dept. === [PDF page 74] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 7 4 L where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONES!/ D A er FROMS;£. G@. MARRISoM | SUBJECT: Sour aeuopafst npote om cryreet (moscow) eibiaoks ame § AABVIILA No. 2188 Dated IY, oO Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 22/ 10 (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 75] === PROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE ae ve. Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir G. Harrisen No. 218 D. 1806 19 Octeber, 1965 T5 Ssteter, 1965 R. 1934 19 Octeber, 1965 Djakarta Waghingten Peking Kuala Lumpur Indenesia. dn loig/ 226 Izvestiya ef 16 Octeber published as part ef i weekly review ef werld events a summary ef events te date in Indonesia. 2e Main peints; Indenesia is in the midst of an acute internal political crisis which has attracted the attentien ef the world because of Indenesia's crucial rele in S.£, Asia, already the seene of many upheavals. This latter fact is feund to haye an effect on the development ef events in Indenesia as well as “on the character of the relationship ef various States of the world towards them" Be The coup ef 30 September was carried out by a battalion Commander in the Palace Guard, Untung, en the grounds that he was ferestalling a Right-wing coup planned for 5 October. Six preminent enerals were murdered. The rebels published a list of a "Reveluijenary Council", “In it, as later became clear, were included without their agreement many preminent mon, like Deputy Prime finisters Subandria and Leimena, the Commanders of the Air Ferce and the Navy, Vice Air Marshal -Uman Shani and Admiral Nartadinata. The representatives ef various parties, including the Communists, were named as members ef this Ceuncil", ie Leyal treeps crushed the coup, The rebel leaders were arrested er fled te the hills. However, matters did net end there. Making use ef the facts that various Communists were included in the membership ef the “Revelutienary Ceuncil" and that the paper "Harian Rakyat", the ergan of the Cemmunist party, net having gone into the matter deeply in the complicated circumstances of the first days after the attempted coup, wrete as theugh the people supperted the revolt, Reactionary elements have unleashed &@ massive campaign under the slegans of anti-Communism, "Fanatics have leeted the offices and homes of the leaders of pregressive parties. Demands have appeared fer the banning ef the Communist Party and ef ether pregressive organizations, arrests and even executions of their leaders are being carried eut. Events haye clearly got out ef the contrel ef the authorities, and ferces outside Indonesia are trying te exploit the fanaticism ef the crowds for their ewn ends," 5e President Sukarne has called for the preservation of Nasakem. This has had a restraining influence, “although it should be noted that the military autherities are not eppesing the raging vielence of the anti-Communist campaign" and this campaign is weakening Nasakem. The P,K,I, has stated that it was net involved in the revolt, which was a purely army affair. "It is obvious that outside Indenesia, as inside it, there are circles whem the balance of ferces within the National Frent embedying Nasakem does not suit. They alse are trying te use the events of 30 September as the eccasien fer an attempt to change the balance of forces in their favour," 6. “Anti-Cemmunism always was and remains: a weapon of imperialist reaction, used by it in its struggle against all pregressive forces." Te "The situation in Indonesia remains tense. In its exacerbatien are interested the imperialists and ether wero which hepe === [PDF page 76] === scow telegram Ne. 2185 to Ferei ffice to expleit the internal affairs ef the country in their ewn foreign pelicy machinatiens and ef the Indenesian peeple." Fereign Office please pass Washington 324 and Kuala Lumpur against the natienal interests 12. CRepeated as requested/ === [PDF page 77] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Karele JMSB | No. A KA €4/s5/1 Daed |S QO chebes Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: News commerterced Received i Ocbetes (Outward Action) [ARE 29hs (Main Indexed) } Nwy ni YY LaA | === [PDF page 78] === IS Och aber (HOTS she compliments) {of bi (ols 22 (TISH HIGH COMMISSION unan Sharikat Polis 4 Jalan Suleiman re + TTA TTT AUAIA L UMPUR === [PDF page 79] === [Unreadable] i. ve === [PDF page 80] === [Unreadable] ge * ag Meee oe on (2) = eee 4 Since then, the Army has arrested two of the leading ‘ | figures involved in the coup - Lieutenant Colonel Untung; and: Colonel Latif. There is little doubt that they will Cote help to fill some important gaps in this Communist; | pattern of tréachery. gO: | _* “As General Nasution said, the truth is bound to”: | prevail: But he also said that justice would prevail, - and that. too is beginning to happen.: | Throughout the country there are growing demands that Communism should be crushed to its roots. Hundreds | of Communists have been arrested, and those resisting: | arrest havé been shot. PKI offices and those of its affiliates have been attacked, ransacked and destroyed. |; A nation-wide campaign is now under way to purge all |: Communists from important public organisations. | Indonesia today is clearly a nation aroused, aroused by what it regards as Communist treachery. Many had accepted the PKI pledge of loyalty to Panchasila, Indonesia's state ideology. Those are the people who are now calling the.Communists Panchasila hypocrites and traitors.: This morning one and a half million people attended a rally in Medan and a tremer.dous roar went up from then, to hang aidit and.crush the XI and its satellites. Those demands were repeated at other rallies in other parts of the country; From all indications, it won't be- long before the demands 3re translated. into action. As General: Nasution sid last week: Jdustice shall prevail. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 81] === re eee ont es 81 Tes: a “>. RADIO: ALAYSIA, “ % 13/10/65 (2140 FURS, es ts 13/10/55 & 14/10/55 [Unreadable] “" In vlace of News Commentary we bring you tonight gn ae de editorial from the Beirut newsvoper, Tis.an =1-H21,: 5 The. huge stadium in Je'-rt= hes slw-ys been, used to | + shout Com unist Slo--ns in recent ti.es, But on Friday, Uctover 7th, the stadium was filled with half a million _. people holdin: an anti-Comamist rally and furiously shouting: "K4j1, %477, kill immediatelyt" Then they marched off and burned down the headquarters of. the second largest Comiunist Party in the world, the powerful PKI. The demonstrators, most of whom were from _ sAnsor, the Youth wing of the biggest Muslim political group,then paraded through the streets shouting "Down with Aidit" and "Dissolve PKI". If these youths were showing excessive excitement, they had good.reasons for doing so. It all started with the September coup led by Lieutenent Colonel Untung. © But contrived, without the slightest shade of doubt, by the PII end its affiliates such 9s Pemuds Rakyat, Gerwayn; and SOBSI. The coup has failed. An over-confident Sukarno has appealed for national unity, meaning to keep the PKI in spite of its conspiracy. And* the PKI,«in turn, has announced its support for this appeal, lying low for the time being to wait for further instructions from its master. But the damage is done, and it is not to be easily forgotten by the!iuslims in general, and the Indonesian Army in particular. Can they bury their memory with the mutilated bodies of the six Muslim generals - General Ahmad Yani, Arny Chief of Staff; General Suprapto, Deputy Chief of Staf*; General Parman; General Harjano, Inspector -General; General Pa,jaiton; and General Sutojo - who were dismembered,: cut to sm9ll bits and-throwm into a well, only to be found, reassembled as best as one could, and given a decent funeral on October 5th? mele ooaan === [PDF page 82] === Ree te tie, wee eee ee tina oe oe eee: Gh os dreamed Ouatbetnidan mie deete Doi g.endich for nia. ee ene Aenean “thi roueh™ Pitntou? reeeree thet or iets paestal anaes en CN ae RR Dal. NEN ge aOR OES pence cant rin GEE AT TE cage ine MN pc Pa agk ae ne Can a a ee © daigiler hea voom:eut dorm ty Commnise guntire 5. Buch ateootttes againet MooLine, stieh con only Be compared in brutelity with the Hosul aesvacre and the _ Kipkuk messacre, conducted by the Iraqi Ittihad AlSha'Ab - Comtunist Party in 1959, cannot but moke the blood boil in = + << © every Muslim heart, At the samé time, they open'every = =: Muslim eye to the dirty work which no Comunist lackey et eee “would hesitate to do whenever the master dictates. ee oe eee And who was ‘the moster ‘behind all this? © When Liu. a 2 os oe -* Shao-Chi and Chou En-Lai rushed their messages of ‘cordial | oe Dr “_\°. -pegards to Sukarno upon “hearing that he was safe ond | - > probably ogsin in control, they encouraged him to continue = ee Se ‘struggle against "Necolim", But they did not, oa see aon ‘apparently. out. of bad conscience, make ony mention of = = se i the coup, as if’ there had been none, much less one et: ea eis ‘> master-minded by them... hee os eT on a ae “But the Comunist Chinese Embassy flag flying 5 ee _. conspicuously alone at. full mast ‘during the week-long. oe ee mourning period, when 711 flags throughout Indonesia were oa Te - supposed to be hoisted at half mast, showed more clearly; ee ge ‘ tm than anything else the iack of respect of the Chinese pee Sos ~~... Communists for Muslim life and dignity. aus: . The Indonesian Army has checked the coup. The ais fas; —.. Muslims have mede* their indignation known. ~The big Y : question now is whether Sukarno and other political leaders: . of similar inclination have 4aken to heart a good lesson. oa: 4O* KH HOR OH, 2. - 2: ::: That was an editorial fren’ the Beirut newspaper, “=: .,. tissan Al-Hal. i:: eee oe === [PDF page 83] === a “sy [Unreadable] === [PDF page 84] === [Unreadable] s deo Ye === [PDF page 85] === 85 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) S.E. ASIA INDONESIA H o15/229/(G “mo hie A. Galtheot| U.S. onaommant of Glernal hifcation: re | Komanunist altompt fo form redowbls: . QA84 le ee a ee Dated adok 23 October Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 25 Octoter (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action - tie) Ont. (Main Indexed) BS Mo J is « === [PDF page 86] === ® SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE abit tare /G DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Cypher/OTP oar Ae Gilchrist D. 12.20 22 October 1965 He. 226% R. 13.48 22 October 1965 22 October 1965 PRIORITY SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 228) of 22 October Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore B.G.R.AsI. Singapore Kuala Lumpur Washington Canberra Wellington and Saving to: Bangkok I discussed the internal security situation with my United States colleague this morning, and I have asked him to have communicated to you through State Department a long assessment he is despatching, prepared from sources much more widespread and reliable than anything at my disposal. 26 In brief: the Army is in the short term in a difficult position. There appears good evidence for a Communist attempt to form two redoubts, one in Central Java in the Madium area and the other in Sumatra, which the army lacks force to dominate without recall of troops, e.g. from the Celebes (no mention of Kalimantan/Borneo); and this recall through transport difficulties is very slow process. P.K.I. penetration of the Army is proving more serious than had been expected. 3 The over-riding need for troops is in Java. Very reliable reports from Medan disclose following situation. Troops in considerable numbers are assembling at Medan for transfer to Java. The P.K.I. are assembling and stock-piling near Banderpulao. The Communist estate workers near Langkat (cannot /identify, SECRET === [PDF page 87] === te ® SECRET Djakarta telegram No. 228) to Foreign Office identify, spelling possibly wrong) have taken control of an appreciable area and the Army has no troops between Medan and Langkat and is helpless. An out-break of P.K.I. terror in Medan is feared. The Batak tribes are penetrated by P.K.I. te a considerable extent and the Governor of Medan is working with them. There are unconfirmed reports of trouble at the oil wells and refineries further south. 4. The interpretation offered from Medan and regarded in Djakarta as plausible is that the Medan Army Command intends to leave the whole area south of Kisaran temporarily to the P.K.eI., holding fast at Medan and controlling as wide an area as means permit. Foreign Office pass Washington No. 168, Canberra No. 109, Wellington No. 74 and Saving to Bangkok No. 63. {Repeated as requested ] DISTRIBUTED TO:- FO. S.EA.D. J.M.I.D. C.R.O. Defence Dept F.E. & Pe Dept === [PDF page 88] === B.E. ASIA 3 | INDONESIA From Avp A Crbebawk| suBsect: G Ul, f No. 2X55 Dated aA Ocksber Encloses Copy of: Received AS October (Outward Action) ee es ae ne re va ae (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) 88 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded; where Appropriate) TOP SECRET. | References and Relevant Papers: /3a96 MINUTES === [PDF page 89] === & & TOP SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DH lel S/aZe Cypher/ OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No, 2285 D. 1330 22 Octeber, 1965 22 October, 1965 R. 1505 22 Octeber, 1965 PRIORITY TOP _SEGRET Addressed to Fereign Office telegram No, 2285 of 22 October, Repeated for information te: POLAD Sin8®pere BGRAI Singapore Kuala Lumpur Washingten Canberra Wellingten and Saving to Bangkek aay suneaaster preceding telegram, My United States colleague and I agreed that it weuld be a very telling point in favour of the P.K.I. if Sukarno should join them, e.g. in Central Java. Green has a tep secret report recording a clash between Sukarno and the tep Generals over the benning in Djskarta of the P.K.I. and over other similar measures, The Generals stood completely firm, denounced Subandrie and played a tape-recording of Subandrie and Aidit while Sukarne screamed denunciations, Ze Green regards this as basically reliable, if perhaps heightened in colour; he feels that this kind of atmosphere ( though welcome as showing the Generals in a firm and favourable light) may drive Sukarno towards the P.K.I. Je Both Green and I have reports that Madame Dewi (whe is lying very low) says she has been threatened with death by Sukarne because of the anti-Chinese and anti-P.K.I. line she has been pressing on him, Fereign Office pass Washington No. 169, Canberra No. 110, Wellingten No. 75 and Saving to Bangkok No. 64, DISTRIBUTED TO:- F,0O, S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D, CoR,O, Defence Dept, P.E.P.D. TOP SECRET === [PDF page 90] === FROM Sa A. GcwRIST DIAKARTA No. 9259 Dated 2 6//o Received 23 fi 40 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] 46 46 D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] SUBJECT: Preae rpovte Mot.dar Sulsrottc anx abionol mw RRO ILE te verlots ceorntits,, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Di \\o32/14 MINUTES === [PDF page 91] === SP COPY. FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION MM to oOP/ Sir A. Gilchrist D. 1410 21 October 1965 R. 1638 21 October 1965 ‘eign Office telegram No. 2259 of 20 Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore suey a Ug apore sae BERAT Singapore and Saving to: Washington According to reports in the vernacular Press Major- General Sukendro has been sent abroad by President Soekarno on an economic mission (unspecified to an assortment of countries, Mexico, Japam, West Germany, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia are among them). Ze Sukendro has been closely connected with the new paper A.P.I. which has shown itself strongly anti-Subandrio. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 4/72. === [PDF page 92] === FROM Sir. A. GECHAIST DIAKARTA Dated 2.0/0 Received 2S [i o (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) Tio) i Q\Y GH Ib | R ae (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 92 where Appropriate) D SECRET SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA Du 1015 / 233 SUBJECT:; Report ~~ NUMMoOrY os Susrorodscte Austtolron = ohm Eel ol! A for inevr2scod ( Atsgtof Aurttolion Woop movin UM Nuwguancer), Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 93] === LEAT | Wii Tt NreTtranh [Unreadable] Posi Jy tuk 4 SS er ee pes] ae Wo Chk oe === [PDF page 94] === SECRET Diakarta telegram No. 2265 to Foreign Office 6. On the Chinese diplomatic incident, Subandrio admitted the Indonesians had "done something wrong" and would apologize. 7- Shann's final paragraph reads: "Subandrio does not look well.. The tic, which has always been noticeable when he is tired.or nervous, appears to have developed into some partial paralysis of his right eye, which works most oddly. I should, I think, report also that there is some rumour that Subandrio's movements are not all that free, and that he probably received me in his house because that is where the army likes him to stay." Foreign Office pass Canberra 108, Peking 57 and Saving to Washing ton 17h, Wellington 113 and Bangkok 62. DISTRIBUTED TO: Me e S.H.A F.E.D P.U.S J.1I.P I.R.D Defence Dept. === [PDF page 95] === 10€@c 4IGCQ FROM Tes A. Li nCorpsT C4 THe) No. 226¢ Dated 2; COteke Received 23 tsb (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action . completed) :. | 4 dio (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 95 where Appropriate) ONFI.L CO di. Pini & & 8S YD SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT NDONESi 2 H. fe/> SUBJECT: Lope « RK printer al ots Aye: ptem oer” (jones acsof? tte ttn Lie oo outa tenes Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 96] === TOP COPY he are -_ as cael SOE a A TESTS NOD BN ISM, BA a a pene 5 i (0. 7 ed ave oe neahmabieaerne nth RS GS A a ED a BGRAI Singavoz> Kuala Liuapur TF hs Lake === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 10] --- In the political skirmishing which followed, it looked at first as if the victorious generals would allow Soekarno to regain his old ascendancy. But the discovery of the mutilated bodies of their murdered colleagues, and evidence of PKI involvement in the coup, stiffened the army's determination. Anti-PKI demonstrations were staged in Djakarta. Soekarno, helped by Subandrio, is trying to paper over the cracks; but is unlikely to succeed. (Paragraphs 16-23.) Omar Dani was almost certainly involved in the coup. Subandrio was absent; but given his record he cannot be entirely exonerated. (Paragraphs 24-26.) The PKI also were certainly involved, but it is not clear whether they initiated the coup. Probably not. There are rumours implicating the Chinese People's Republic, but these do not amount to much. (Paragraphs 27-31.) Political developments in Indonesia over the past few months would have inclined President Soekarno himself to approve of measures to get rid of the army generals; and the evidence suggests that he might have been partially aware of the plot. (Paragraphs 30-33.) Both for the PKI and the army the showdown has come prematurely. It would be wrong to expect "confrontation" to diminish as a consequence of these events; but they may make it a shade easier to find a political settlement. (Paragraphs 33-37.) CONFIDENTIAL 20109—332 6150—38 === [PDF page 11] === CONFIDENTIAL DRAMATIS PERSONAE The coup Lieutenant-Colonel Untung Suropati, Bn. Cmd. in Presidential Guard Lieutenant-Colonel A. Latif, Cmd. 1 Bde. in KODAM V Brigadier-General Supardjo, Deputy to Asst. VI Civic Affairs, Army HQ AURI, the Indonesian Air Force Members of the Presidential Guard 454 Battalion, 3rd Parachute Brigade 530 Battalion, 3rd Parachute Brigade Pemuda Rakyat, the Communist Party's Youth Group GERWANI, the Communist Party's Women's Group SOBSI, the Communist Party's chief trade union The murdered Lieutenant-General A. Yani, Commander of the Army Major-General R. Soeprapto, Deputy II (Management), Army HQ Major-General M. T. Hartono, Deputy III Inspector-General, Army HQ Major-General Siswondo Parman, Asst. I (Intelligence), Army HQ Major-General D. I. Pandjaitan, Asst. IV (Logistics), Army HQ Brigadier-General Soetojo Siswominhardjo, Inspector of Legal Affairs/Judge Advocate, Army HQ Lieutenant P. Tendean, Nasution's ADC The counter-coup General A. H. Nasution, Minister/Co-ordinator for Defence and Security Major-General Suharto, Commander KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command) [fragment from adjacent column:] Minister (No. 13. Confidential) Djakarta, Sir, 8 October, 1965. The events of the past week in Indonesia may come to be regarded as some of the most decisive in its history as an independent nation. Whatever may have been the motives and interests behind Lieutenant-Colonel Untung's attempted coup—and these are still only matters for speculation—there is no doubt that the act itself is already bringing about fundamental changes in Indonesia. We have by no means yet seen all the consequences. It may be many months before the after-effects of the coup can be properly judged. 2. But already it is clear that the old struggle for power between the armed forces and the Communists, for years a constant factor in Indonesian politics, can never be fought in quite the same way again. Where before it had been a matter of