Indonesia, Internal political situation: Attempted coup against Sukarno [13] (FO 371/180322, 28 October-5 November 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === [Cover/decorative page: brown archival file folder cover (TNA) with file number, red label and green "CLOSED UNTIL" release sticker; no further text] === [PDF page 2] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT loUY INDONESIA D- 10/8/256 Ronse A GuLHex QaWaden)| sunsecr. Antota report on SukaMey marking with Ya leaden o| He 7 Poureot porta (excludeg =P. &!. No. 2367 Dated 248 Oct. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received j Ne. (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) 180322 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) is | V VY fA\“) === [PDF page 3] === prow paakarra 70 roman oreice ©=TOP Qopy’. En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2367 98 October 1965 D. 0940 28 October 1965 R. 0937 29 October 1965 DH (016/256 _ Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2367 of 28 October. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore and Saving to: Washington Wellington Canberra Peking Sukarno had a six-hour meeting yesterday with the leaders of seven political parties (all except the P.K.I. and Partindo). Following from Antara's report. Sukarno appealed for help in finding the best possible solution to the 30 September affair. The Party leaders had a responsibility to the Indonesian revolution. The attempted coup was a political affair and could not be justified. The Minister of Information told the Press after the meeting that Sukarno had made it very clear that all those involved should be punished - without exception. He had called again for calm and order so thet he couldobtain complete and objective facts and find a political settlement". He had regretted that there were people who, in their anger had forgotten the safety of the revolution. He had expressed sorrow at the 40 September affair, the more so because it was seriously harming the revolution. The Indonesian people should be vigilant because otherwise the revolution "will be broken up by the enemy". Sukarno had also warned 4¢ the Right, because the consequenc such a happening would be very big, even bigger than the di r caused by the 30 September movement. “If we can solve these problems in the best possible way that [sic] it would be not surprising if the recent events will turn out to be God's blessing in disguise". Sukarno said that Nasakom was the nucleus of Indonesia's revolution. "But in this context NAS did not mean the P.N.1. or Partindo, [? and] did not mean the NU, the Catholic Party or any special religious party, while KOMdid not mean the P.K.Il. or AIDIT. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 497, Canberra 132, Wellington 126 and Peking 15. === [PDF page 4] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded }; where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROMS}?. A. Quccoeiae (DaAkeverA) SUBJECT: Antara pet ok Sukatio'’s meetuag with seni No. £373 Dated 29 Oct. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received [ Nev. (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) | (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 5] === iS ap = Ooo China that countri understs and "at peop Subandrio 948 e Jogjakarta created na should also of her revolution" the confrontation pained without and === [PDF page 6] === (Security Grading—to be Uperadea 0 where Appropriate) D CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INID ON ey UNWVUNESIA Y 10/6 / 259 FROM 7:0. Gusdoug Tegtau | SUBJECT: Comment mm niivnotion wrx nclortsin beth CIAWMese + Lussion us, Posut or 4 (1; No. AG WO |o Dated 26 Oct. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 29 Oct, bu 1018 /2.22 (Outward Action) A) £0. Guroneicé (Gr No. KA { 21Y;, aia (Referred to Legal Adviser) eau (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 7] === Reference SY subesc a dealt dicho nen'a Qutdonte (eke grdu auid Concut. S. loulcu Rs fea knovs, Ylese are fant heper That pte hmay terface may be a Ale pommel. aye QitdQaes Cad prau Cub aol. Thi D ton. d. toulcn 22 eS u Aral, a plan) === [PDF page 8] === Cypher/OTP and by Bag, CONFIDENTIAL FROM FORSIGN OFFICE AND COMMONTDALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO CERTIN MISSIONS By Telegraph: Ankara The Hague U.K.Del Ni.TO Moscow U.K.Mis New York Washington POMEC Aden Tehran iilgiers ee Bangkok Djakarta Katmandu Manila Peking Rangoon ( 547) Saigon POL/.D Singapore Tokyo Hong Kong Ottawa Canberra Wellington New Delhi Karachi Colombo Kuala Lumpur Dar-es-Salaam BGRLI Singapore Kuching Jesselton Brunei (Personal) [411 Priority] Guidance No. 426_ 96 October, 1965 PRIORITY D. 0550 27 October, 1965 Guidance No. 416 [of 18 October] Indonesia The IndonesimComnunist Party is now effectively banned almost throughout Indonesia and the Army Generals are pressing Sukarno to ban it officially. Sukarno is resisting strongly. He continues, to the best of his ability, to pursue a different line from the Generals; the division of power between them remains uncertain; the situation throughout Indonesia is tiie confused and the eventual outcome of the present struggie for power still uncertain: 26 In commenting on recent event in Indonesia, China and the Soviet Union, while both supporting Sukarno's attempts to restore national unity, have taken significantly different lines. China has given implicit support to Col, Untung's coup and has attacked the Indonesian Generals for provoking an anti-Communist and antie« Chinese campaign. Soviet reporting describes Untung's coup as a rebellion, crushed by loyal troops, accuses ‘reactionary elements' of having unleashed an anti-Communist Gampaign and is critical of the Generals for encouraging these activities. CONFIDENTIAL /The === [PDF page 9] === CONFIDENTIAL Foreign Office and C.R.O. telegram Guidance No. 426 aun The Peking People's Daily has sharply criticised Soviet reporting for describing Untung and his supporters as rebels. Pravda has hinted by implication that individual pro-Peking Communists may have béen guilty of "putschism" in supporting the coup and has also implied that China (as well as the West) is seeking to benefit from Indonesia's difficulties. 5e Sino-Indonesian relations continue to deteriorate. Anti- Chinese incidents have been reported throughout Indonesia and the Chinese Embassy at Djakarta has protested against alleged illegal entry by Indonesian troops into Chinese diplomatic premises. At Algiers, Indonesia has opposed China's proposal to postpone the Afro-Asia Conference, due to begin on 5 November, 1 The above is primarily for your own information. In discussing events in Indonesia, you should continue to be guided by the instructions in paragraph 6 of Guidance under reference. [Copies sent to Colonial Office for overseas distribution] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 10] === po dM tis /as9 (9) CONFIDENTIAL By Bag FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS. FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Guidance No. the 29 November 1965 CONFIDENTTAL ee ae 5 Guidance No. 426 of 26 October: Indonesia. Relations between Sukarno and the Army Generals seem to have reached stalemate. Sukarno has still not given in to persistent demands to ban the Indonesian Communist Party, but the Generals and most of the political parties are still pressing for this step to be taken. Similarly Sukarno still issues orders and holds Cabinet meetings, but the Generals enjoy effective power and Ministers and Departments are loath to take action unless they are sure it is in accordance with Army wishes. 2. The Generals are coming increasingly to believe in Sukarno's complicity in Untung's abortive coup. However, to remove Sukarno, the very embodiment of the Indonesian "Revolution" for so many millions of Indonesians, might create more serious problems for the Generals than it would solve. Consequently Sukarno is likely to remain in office at least for the time being. But only Sukarno and such sycophants as his Foreign Minister, Subandrio, still express support for Nasakom (Sukarno's concept of the unity of nationalist, religious and Communist forces) and the continuance of Communism as an accepted political force in Indonesia. Despite his apparent isolation, however, Sukarno is still working energetically to regain his authority and prestige and, if his health holds out, the chances of his achieving some success still exist, even if they are diminishing. 3. Indonesia's relations with China have reached their lowest point for many years. Chinese trade and aid to Indonesia has now virtually ceased, but the Soviet Union seems to be maintaining supplies and is apparently anxious to keep all options open in its relations with Indonesia. . The above is primarily for your own information, but you may draw on this assessment in discussions with reliable contacts. You should also make the point that all factions in Indonesia continue to give public support to demands for the intensification /of confrontation CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 11] === CONFIDENTIAL Foreign Office and C.R.O. telegram’ Guidance No. 479 of confrontation against Malaysia. Similarly the Generals, although anti-Communist, and also anti-imperialist and staunch supporters of the Indonesian "Revolution". Small-scale military activity has continued in Sabah and Sarawak. [Copies passed to Colonial Office for Overseas Distribution]. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 12] === wo r/OTP and by Bag. | CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN CFFICE AND COMMONTEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE eee TO CERTAIN MISSIONS By Telegraph: inkara The Hague U.K.Del Ni.TO Moscow U.K.Mis New York Washington POMEC {iden Tehran ilgiers Bangkok. Djakarta Katmandu Manila «’ 2Peking Rangoon Saigon POLI.D Singapore Tokyo Hong Kong Ottawa. Canberra Wellington New Delhi Karachi Colombo Kuala Luiapur Dar-es-Salaam BGRLI Singapore Kuching Jesselton Brunei (Personal) [All Priority] Guidance No. 426_ 26 October, 1965 FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION PRIORITY D. 0550 27 October, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Guidance No. 416 [of 18 October] Indonesia The IndonesimComnunist Party is now effectively banned almost throughout Indonesia and the Army Generals are pressing Sukarno to ban it officially. Sukarno is resisting strongly. He continues, to the best cf his ability, to pursue a different line from the Generals; the division of power between them remains uncertain; the situation throughout Indonesia is still confused and the eventual outcome of the present struggle for power still uncertain: Ze In commenting on recent event in Indonesia, China and the Sovicst Union, while both supporting Sukarno's attempts to restore national unity, have taken significantly different lines. China has given implicit support to Col. Untung's coup and has attacked the Indonesian Generals for provoking an anti-Communist and anti- Chinese campaign. Soviet reporting describes Untung's coup as a rebellion, crushed by loyal troops, accuses ‘reactionary elements' of having unleashed an anti-Communist campaign and is critical of the Generals for encouraging these activities. CONFIDENTIAL /The === [PDF page 13] === CONFIDENTIAL Foreign Office and C.R.O. telegram Guidance No. 426_ ant Peat The Peking People's Daily has sharply criticised Soviet reporting for describing Untung and his supporters as rebels. Pravda has hinted by implication that individual pro-Peking Communists may have been guilty of "putschism" in supporting the coup and has also implied that China (as well as the West) is seeking to benefit from Indonesia's difficulties. 36 Sino-Indonesian relations continue to deteriorate. Anti- Chinese incidents have been reported throughout Indonesia and the Chinese Embassy at Djakarta has protested against alleged illegal entry by Indonesisn troops into Chinese diplomatic premises, At 4lgiers, Indonesia has opposed China's proposal to postpone the Afro-asia Conference, due to begin on 5 November, de The above is primarily for your own information, In discussing events in Indonesia, you should continue to be guided by the instructions in paragraph 6 of Guidance under reference. [Copies sent to Colonial Office for overseas distribution] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 14] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded j 4 D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT hi iO} IESIA D +{ 40! 5 hoo rrom/v.4, GicHan(DAWM) | supsecT: Antora report Army cowianolor state ws Medou. No. 2385 Dated 30 Oct. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received j NeoN, (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) bs alqlbb === [PDF page 15] === % FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE \ En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mi bois /a.0 Sir A, Gilchrist No. 2385 De. 0349 30 October 1965. 30 October 1965 Re 0808 30 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2385 of 30 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore North Sumatra Antara, 29 October, reports a statement by an Army Commander in Medan. The 30 September movement had planned "to sweep no less than 15,000 people in North Sumatra" if their coup had succeeded. After the people had ransacked the houses of PKI leaders "it was proved that they were the actual Capitalist bureaucrats, They were hiding millions of rupiahs in their rooms. I myself saw hundreds of tins of Delfia frying oil piled up in one of these PKI houses. They had been piling stocks, it appears, in preparation for the period of terror they had planned to launch in North Sumatra", DISTRIBUTED TO: FO. S.E.A.D. JM.I.D. J.1I.P.G.D. Je1lA.D. I.R.D. News Dept. === [PDF page 16] === FROM Git. A. Culchast No. 2S Dated SO Ber, Received | Nov. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) (Main Indexed) Roe haw ot hoe ip “QI AIO (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) [Unreadable] SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D H 1015/9, SUBJECT: Mularn Reproduction of Pokce wporta. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 17] === e FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE FROM DALAL) En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No. 2387 D. 0531 30 October 1965 30 October 1965 / Re. 1447 30 October 1965 MA 1015/7 wo! Addressed to Foreign Offige telegram No. 2387 of 30 October. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur: POLAD Singapore Following from Police reports, reproduced in Antara, 30 October. "ninety-two persons were detained in the area of Pesing. Several had already confessed to having actively participated in the murder of Generals. Some of them had helped carry the corpses, others had lowered them from the trucks, and others again had helped in covering the wall which contained the seven bodies." Documents seized from the detained persons had revealed a "black list" of 120 persons, complete with the names of their respective families. The captured people were members of already frozen organizations, among them Pemada Rekjat, BIT (Peasant Front) and Gerwani Women’s Organization, They had all received training at Lobang Buaje in waves and had received uniforms. “There were still several suspected people at loose in Pesing. Therefore, let us not slacken vigilance". === [PDF page 18] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 1 8 where Appropriate) SE. ASIA TOP SECRET, INDONESIA DH lols /262 huis [eee [Unreadable] Eo S hd eae No. ast Dated oe Ocks to Encloses Copy,.of: References and Relevant Papers: Received A f by lOSI{O /29 ast -[2b67 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Ac (Main Indexed) conptple Mii, Ws), RR Bel a7 4 ON I reed eee ei ‘ C7 Oe ee FM ind AP et Suivamoiwes, Se ee === [PDF page 19] === TOP SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE oie Du io] IG Cypher /OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2371 De 1402 28 October, 1965 28 October, 1965 Re 1007 29 October, 1965 PRIORITY TOP SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telesram No. 2371 of 28 October Repeated for erat ZF? POLAD Singapore Washington eDHers /3 SG 7oe 118/267 My teléerans Nose 2361, 2367 and 2370. My United States colleague understands from his secret military contact that the Generals are greatly disturbed by the tone and content of Sukarno's speech and statement. They had, up till now, hoped and believed that they would be able to carry out the domestie and foreign measures which the situation requires with some help from his authority and prestige, or at least without his opposition. After this speech, they feel they have to revise their views and that they will have to face the big decision = to proceed without Sukarno. 2e How they would do so, and how soon they will really grasp the nettle, remain to be seen. I think these are impatient reactions rather than eonsidered views: but they represent a trend, which the troubles in Central Java may accelerate. Foreign Office pass POLAD Singapore No. 182 and Washington No. 186, DISTRIBUTED TO: FO. SEAD. J Mel eDe FE. Dept. CoRO. Folie & Pe Dept, === [PDF page 20] === (Security Grading—to be Up-gtaded $0) where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT DONESIA DD» 1016 /263 FROM $y.A.GUuCHAIST SUBJECT: AWine pepo oo} Auppow' FX Setkorma frou No. 2339 Dated 30 OM Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received | Nov. (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) he? Ld try } VU (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 21] === Ne FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No, 2389 D.1140 30 October 1965 30 October 1965 Ak ois | 268 R.1620 30 October 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2389 of 30 October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur BGRAI Singapore POLAD Singapore and Saving to: Washington Wellington ABH tois/ 16> /f) Canberra My telegram No. 2367: Sukarno and the political parties. Antara 50 October reports that a reply from the political parties was presented to Sukarno yesterday by Frans Seda, Chairman of the Catholic Party. It takes the form of a declaration voicing support of the President, determination to help him solve the "50 September affair", firm resolve to prevent divergencies. between the parties, between them and the President, and between him and the armed forces. “Internal conflicts will only benefit Necolim". The solution of the 30 September affair is entrusted to the President. ‘§ 26 Frans Seda commented that the “clear facts" are the demands of the people for the dissolution of the P.K.I. and its affiliates. Another fact is the President's determination to settle the political issued raised by the affair. “In facing all the facts, the interests of the revolution should not be neglected, internally as well as externally. The main target of the Indonesian revolution is the smashing of Necolim". Foreign Office pass Saving Washington 502, Canberra 136, Wellington 132. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O. S.E.A.D. JoM.I.D. J.I.P.G.D. ITaReDe News Dept. News Dept. === [PDF page 22] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded é where Appropriate) [Unreadable] D CC: i ite ow &§ SS SF AL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA De 1015 (264 FROM.) A.Gilch-yrt SUBJECT: Duble His Um st f ieee Ni an ( pywnaere) eo AP one; No. 1338 Dated 2.6fre O%, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received / WN. (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 23] === Vannocgi we SALLY Lae CA JEU BOLL Lo === [PDF page 24] === Lun lea AND NUAAL ILO (Ve aioe WaALVOL i === [PDF page 25] === FromSa A. Gildhnitt, No. AS Ge Dated 30 Ot. Received | NO. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded oo where Appropriate) C tw a SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT IDONESIA D+ jor /265 SUBJECT: Ro peort rowan Vues Corset Wi Meta om conn dW ons Poa. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 26] === | = NOV 1965 I DH fois Co ailibiansads DISTRIBUTION D: 0408 30 October 1965 30 October 1965 2: 1100 30 October 1965 CONFIL ith Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2386 of kepeated for information SLAD Singapore Vice-Consvl in Medan reperts (October,[gp. undec.?25]) very active in the of lMiedan where the the hours of darknes: night, but so Sitive action, even is reported that a policeman was stabbed to death in phe same area <: > last weekend. News of areas qutside Medan is still not very clear and hiable to exaggeration, but generally,I would term it, for the time being as fairly quiet. There are strong rumours tha the Communists of the south are organising themselves in preparation of acampaign of terrorism, eventual control and a march on the north, through West Sumatra, where they expect active support. === [PDF page 27] === FROM 3.c.-W. BusriEce (Urk.cal. NATO, PARS) to. DF. MURRAY. No. 20502 Dated 6 Oct, Received {i We. (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) | (iain Indexed) L, alle | \eyl| SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT SUBJECT: Geno tDutch Slow. Encloses Copy of: (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) D.- 10/5 / 2.66 NPM) On Stuhr wn References and Relevant Papers: 27% === [PDF page 28] === 26 October, 4 H' lig Dew Mewes - There was a dteee discussion in the Political Committee to-day on internal developments in Indonesia. Schmidt-Dornedden (Germany) speaking from a report from the German Embassy in Djakarta, said that the Army were pursuing their anti-Communist, and especially anti-Chinese, policy even more vigorously than had been expected. Their main aims were to reduce the power of the os to undermine Subandrio's position and to remove lett -wing radicals from the Ministries in Djakarta. ikarno's own position seemed to be that of a puppet of the Army He 8s} oke loudly in public about the trtuamph of the revolution, but in fact his own public position was weakening. It now jaduat probable that he had been originally party to Untung's strike against the Army leaders but that Untung had doublecrossed him in omittin him from the revolutionary Council declared after the 30 September coup. Sukarno had then, had to put himself virtually at the mercy of the Army leaders. Van det Kun (Netherlands) said that he broadly agreed with these German conclusions, though he was not quite so convinced about Sukarno's complicity in the 30 September coup. The interesting question now was what would happen to the Indonesian Communists. He agreed that anti-Chinese feeling was now a strong current in the country. The Communist party might décide to sacrifice some of their links with China in order to enhance their respectibility; they might even change their name to improve their image. There was some evidence, mainly from discussions the Netherlands Ambassador in Djakarta had had with Soviet bloc Ambassadors, that the Russians thought that the present situation offered an opportunity for the Soviet Union to court the PKI and perhaps to take it under its wing. Van der Kun then added that he doubted that there would be any fundamental swing to the right in Indonesia or that the PKI wovld go over to the Soviet camp, since there was a strong tradition of an independent style of Communism in Indonesia which was neither Chinese mor Russian. Murray, Esq., South-East Asia Vepartment, Foreign | ae LON] oo Be Awake === [PDF page 29] === 36 I mentioned that in spite of these internal developments it still seemed too early to say whether confrontation would continue or not; so far there had been no end to incidents. Both clashes on the frontier and Indonesian infiltrations had continued. the nwrnesm y ot of this letter to Ihe Hague. iia 7 NY AN - Tr ia. fo SS om (J.C.W. Bushell) === [PDF page 30] === Sy gm, FROM Su A. Qiichait (pj akatta) No. 9 370 Dated 2S Oh. 1 Now. Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) [Unreadable] ona (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 2 () where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT | D 4/ (015 /267 NDONES] SUBJECT: Re Pork NN Jr ch re 1 OW Mex ol ot Sukornos aang wih polikieoh pow'y Lrowlin. Stodemut HrotMuras adt qo te dunt Suloondtr. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: DH sors / 2$5 MINUTES === [PDF page 31] === Top COpy En clair FO/CROAWH/DISTRIBULLION FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2370 NM tog [pg>| De 115 28 October 1965 28 October 1965: R.1057 29 October 1965 My telegram No. 2420: The Indonesian Herald's report of Sukarno's meeting with the political party leaders (my telegram No. 2367) has this. The President also disclosed that of late there were many Ambassadors asking him whether it was true that he was going to dismiss Subandrio and make Roeslan Abdulgani Foreign Minister. Sukarno affirmed that he was nov going to dismiss Subandrio but give him his blessing to go on instead. ano Foreign Office pass Saving Washington 498. MOM === [PDF page 32] === FROM Sur. 4. Guar? ( Djakatta) No. 2404. Dated / Nov. Received 2. Now: (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 3 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D ree SUBJECT: Anton prepo- of c rtortsusrt loy Brig - 92. Suyaum pure 4 mA wort Lor AA Corral d oven, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 33] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair: DEPARTMENTAL Sir A.Gilchrist ete ae: See D. 0800 1 Novenber, 1965 No. 2 Nt oss| 10% R. 0838 1 November, 1965 1 November, 1965 | Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 240) of 1 November Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur and POLAD Singapore and Saving to:=- Washington From a report in Antara 1 November, of a statement by Brig.Gen, Surjosumpeno, the military Commander of Central Java, Cols. Sukerman and Marjono of the 30 September Movement had tried to form a revolutionary council in Central Java. A state of war had been proclaimed there in order to restore order and security and clean up the remnants of the wounte?t-revolutionaries, The situation in Solo was becoming more serious day by day. Pemuda Rakjat Communist Youth gangs were kidnapping and killing people in a brutal and vicious way. The victims were mostly from the religious and Marhsenist P.N.I. groups. Necolim was laughing, It was Necolim who was gaining from ali this because confrontation against Malaysia was being hampered. 2. Antara also reports that several P.K.I. leaders have been captured in the Banjuwangi erea. The situation there was gradually returning to normal but security operations were continuing. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 507. DISTRIBUTED TO FO_ SeB.A.Ds JoM.I.D. IRD. JolePoGeDe JoleAcDe News Dept News Dept === [PDF page 34] === FROM Su A. Gilcwist No. 2392 Dated 2//aa p fap Received 2 y Now (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) a Nea (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 4 where Appropriate) D aoe SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT “summcr: Anton epart of treuillea cw Bde Nagler Ao! py, Ho Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 35] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Bn Clair | WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilehrist mists D. 0525 31 October 1965 31 Qétober 1965 = / u9 Re 0735 31 October 1965 Du ape Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2392 of 31_ October Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Following from Army sources quoted in Antara 31 October. (a) Troops of RPKAD (Army Para Commando Regiment) in the Solo region on 28 October captured 3.2 counter-revolutionary, September 30 Movement, individuals, who constituted the battle troops of the "September 30 Movement". They consisted of Pemuda Rakjat members who had previously attempted to launch an attack on Bojolali and Tjepogo, Eight more of them were killed when they tried to ambush armed forces members on a patrol at Teras. IMeanwhile, about 150 P.K.I. members have given themselves up to the armed forces at Delangu and Ketandan. The situation in the Bojolali region is still "precarious". Commmications between Bojolali and Musuk are still cut while the Djatimom and Manisrenggo regions were still under "control" of the counter-revolutionaries. The counterrevolutionaries had tried to attack the police post at Bojolali, but no casualty fell on the government's side except one police constable who was lightly injrred. Thirty Pemuda Rakjat involved in the counterrevolutionary “September 30 movement" have been captured by the armed forces in a raid in the Pondok Gede area near Lobang Buaja. In the raid the armed forces confiscated uniforms, firearms, some of them with the trade-mark "Tjung", a red, P.K.I. banner and three blocs of red an@ Noy green cloth. A grave filled with bodies of persons belonging to the religious group killed by elements of Pemuda Rakjat (Communist Youth) was found at /Prambanan, === [PDF page 36] === Diakarta telegram No. 2392 to Foreign Office Prambanan, near Jgjac Arta on 27 October, When people wanted to take out those bodies for a decent re-burial, they found that the place was guarded by armed Pemuda Rakjat elements. The people then alértéddnearby troops of the Indonesian Airforce. Upon arrival of the Airferce troops the Pemuda Rakjat elements showed resistance. Measures and action against the couter-revolutionary coup elements continue to be taken firmly by the armed forces and the people. Operations camducted so far were most satisfactory. Security troops had succeeded in isolating the coup elements from the people and their room for movement narrowed. Operation for destruction of the remants of the coup are being carried out fast. The gituation in the capital had been restored to normal although curfew hours had been maintained against eventualities. Firm, appropriate and wise regulations by Suharto were warmly welcomed by both the Government and the people. This made it possible to concentrate attention on the elimination of elements and groups which had deviated and helped the counter-revolutionary movement. This purge of elements and groups from Government agencies and institutions continued unabated. === [PDF page 37] === FROM Su A. Giduist, No. 2400 Dated 1 Nov Received 2 Nov. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) 74 (Main Indexed) | iad PAA (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 7 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT CONFID =: TIAL INDONESIA D H 10/15/270 SUBJECT: Report of Cov ok ior petweed Sy A. Gueluwi H ord Dh. SweandNo~ Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 38] === CONFIDENTIAL s FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP emNUy i300 Sir A.Gilchrist nas ‘Sat 0.521,00 DEPARTMENTAL, DISTRIBUTION bn lars a! 1 November, 1965 D. 10.22 1 November, 1965 PRIORITY R. 13.05 1 November, 1965 CONF IDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2100 of 1 November Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.G.R.A.I. Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Yellington Bangkok Indonesia. Dr. Subandrio asked me to call this morning 1 November. At the outset, and again at the close of our conversation, he went over several times in different languages a comment in friendly terms on your reference to Indonesia in your Press statement in Tokyo. The points he made were:- (a) The statement ("offer" he called it) was helpful and correct; (b) If it was sincere, then it could form a new point of departure; (c) He himself had never been an extremist, he had opposed and deplored the burning of the British Embassy, nothing would please him better than to settle the issues between us in a peaceful manner; Such a development would be to the benefit of Indonesia not merely in the field of international but of dohestic politics: it was most important to avoid in future the. over-stimulation of Indonesian public Gpinion which had ~ played an unfortunate part in recent events; /(e) However, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 39] === CONFIDENTIAL Dijakarta telegram No.200 to Foreign Office itn However, the internal political situation absorbed at present such a large part of the attention of the Indcenesian Government that the time was not yet ripe for pursuing the question (i.e., of a detente over Malaysia); but he Would keep in touch and raise the matter with me at an appropriate moment. 26 I made a general comment to the effect that nothing Could be more welcome, etc. Je I made a particular comment on (d), saying that some ten or a dozen times in the past year, including omce in the past week or two, the Indomesian public had been stimulated by warnings of an impending British attack or invasion (I refrained from saying that most of these warnings had come from Dr. Subandrio himself). I trusted that the non-arrival of the invasion would ensure the nonrecurrence of such reports. Subandrio nodded assent, but muttered something about "konfrontasi" not ending overnight. 4. In the course of a short conversation on other subjects, Subandrio said he was perfectly confident about his own position as Foreign Minister, he also asserted that the story about the torture and mutilation d& the dead Generals was lying propaganda - the President had a médical certificate from an Army surgeon proving that nothing of the sort had taken place. De Comment. I think Subandrio's main reason for wanting to see me was to be able to demonstrate by repor% in the newspapers that he is still dealing with foreign policy and foreign Ambassadors. There is also the distinct possibility that he has heard of my opening up a different lime to another source of authority (my telegram No.2383) and does not wish to be left behind. 6. The per with which Subandrio holds on is worth noting, I further. trying to assess his position and will comment M Iaay. [16-2 Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington, Canberra, Wellington and Bangkok as 506, 139, 135, 71 respectively. DISTRIBUTED TO: FO, Sof et Be CRO. F.E.and P.Dept. Jo1I.P.G.D. I.R.D. ——e CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 40] === [Unreadable] Brion a; Sy [ O UG. Bot of icy: Cone nhlkn, ™ steed | cre | === [PDF page 41] === 41 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT r D H 1016/2723 FROM H.3.. ABAS Ado SUBJECT: Report on prraevt sHA vot rn Wn Melon, ( Djakama) ca are, te Mbt. Peck. Es nas MAGULGIOA CVLIN aNd t. M4. doland; Spa. No. oor / 65 Dated 90 Oc Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received az: N OV. (Outward Action) $b) Cel: L. Mosel, Ho d(d/ 8b) A» Clewterengh puso Sy DL tu M See AM. Posty ( hs $.6G> Le Wey (Referred to Legal Adviser) saan (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] === [PDF page 42] === With the Compliments of HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S— AMBASSADOR === [PDF page 43] === JO118T STUY é4sede Wy ue eye, om O} SsuTyy OATT on Aem on y r &e. oo SIOTOT Ss alow *vaee dc c oe BOpT So OR tT Tor 20) ou OOS Td. Ouse sud "SOU. o TE et ef TI o | C}eLE Bd; 094° 9 MCI oui OF FE AC [Unreadable] UUEIO Ny re [Unreadable] *V IIVAVe’G ¢ 1 CT LT Me ASSVaia HS ILIME eet wes omen Loy uri Ci weiw S9/TOOT === [PDF page 44] === Mia 5 15th October, 1965, " fizdan re is little to report in the way of a general round-up, the normal passage of events being completely overshadowed by the ; The Governor, Brig-Cen Ulung Sitepu, has virtually Gisappeared from daily life; he is séldom seen and only attends his office when it is absolutely essential. His mansion is no longer guarded by military and there are no visual signs of life from the outeide; He is said te be living with relations out.of the town, but” &t is not expected that he will suffer anything other than a slight @isconfort, for he is a close relation to the President's second wife, who arranged his appointment, It is reliably-reported thet the President summoned Major-General Mokoginta to Djakarta for instructions, but the Geheral excused himself on the grounds that it was difficult to obtain a seat on the aircraft. This has generally met with approval and currently public opinion is against Java interfering with Sumatra affairs. There is some #peculation as to the where abouts of Brig.Gen Sobiran, cher of Staff in KOANDA; he has not been seen since the 2nd. I was told he is under arrest for his pro-Communist sumpathy, but that is surprising for I understood he leaned té ‘the right, . Major J, Saragih*of KODIN 020, SIANTAR, has been relieved of his post for his strong pre-Communist ideas, others are also sald to be effected, but TI have yet to heer their names, 0! On 12/10/65, a grand Moglim Prayer Meeting was held on ‘he MERDEKA field im Medan.’ It wag in honour of the departed Generale. At first the Consular: wwere invited, but on the morning of the 12th we were told the invitation was cancelled and requested to sign the condajenee books at KOANDA Headquarters. av ¥ m The meeting was stormy, with:a great desl] being said against the Communists fronts in Indonesia, but a long tirade against Imperialism and Necolim was delivered by Brig. Gen. Darjatmo, Commander of KODAM 11. He acoused us of being behind the plot and that we were more the culprits than anyone else, It received the full approval of the crowds, Gen, Darjatmo has never shown any love towards us, he is very leftist, and we may rest assured he will do his level best to make things impossible for us, thereby gaining fupther credit for hinself, Surprisingly, nothing was said ageinst the Chinese, even though they refused to lower their flag halfmast - were officially warned - they have been left very much on their own. There is no doubt in my mind that although there is this public reer re of the Indonesian Communist, the Generals, Government and people are as friendly as before with the outside Communists, and perhaps afraid of the Chinese. S.J. Cambridge, Esq;. British Embassy, DJAKARTA, === [PDF page 45] === After the meeting, PANTJASILA youth raided the SOBSI Headquarters, The building, a three Storey concrete Construction, was defended from the top floor by P.K.1., this enraged the attackers, who set fire to the building with barrels of kerosene, When the defenders tried four were killed with knives and blugeons. l nzy, over- The furniture in SOSI d the area with the P KI, and On 13th two go\downs containing raw rubber were to the ground, The buildi to an Indonesian the goods to a chinese, to be a further effort, but wh: doubt that the loss was extremely heavy, evening time that the fire burnt out. The Russian Consul appears calm and unruffled over the situatio hat when things die down their no bones to hide this) Dr. Subandrio, wil] soon hold the reigns again. The bulk of the Communist group have left Nedan area and it is said that the main party is concent rated by Lake Toba between BERASTAGI A second party of Communists are reported at RANTAUPARAPAT, in the affected areas Plantation Offices and factories are heavily guarded by troops. Communists have visited the plantations workers in an effort to stir up trouble but have met little success, the main outcome being that DWIKORA have at long last said they must improve the lot r, but are at a loss how to start, They would, I am assured, like to receive assistance from the Western world; America and Britain are naturally out, but West Germany would be acceptable, The Military have made an order restricting movement of more than five persons during the dusk to dawn period, but the only effect of been for éroups of youths (obviously Operating with liilitary sanction) to terrorise genuine inhabitants g0ing about their business, On the outskirts of Medan, during the hours of darkness, partly-uniformed heavily armed patrols of 3 ~ 4 men operate, There is little doubt they are members of the P.N.1. operating, if not under orders, at least with Army knowledge. Training of P.N.1. into Army units is also well under way, all civing very much of a civil war atmosphere, Sa, Cambridge, Esq,. British Embassy, DJAKARTA, === [PDF page 46] === ~3- 15th October, 1965, In ATJEM there has not been a great deal reported apart from the burning of two Chinese owned shops, and probably they were chosen because of the few Communi the area, The Achinese have @eclared that unless P.K.1. is banned they will break away from Indonesia, but now this has virtually taken Place I Suppose their honour is satisfied, Little hes been heard of happenings in West Sumatra and it appears quiet, In South Sumatra it ig alleged that troops been out in force, but for what Purpose, and the result, I have yet to find out, be playing a most unusual and is difficult to assess, From the National hey appear anti-Communist, but locally they adopt an air of pro-Communist but disassociated from the political Scene, Quite possibly this is a matter of mistrust by the men of their officers, re taking ave an air of being ed, it is the general Comes back, or ® armed bands aking plans to leave before, as they deseribe it, the situation is wel) out of hand, It is ve i O understand which way vents are likely to 6°, but one thing is obvious, that whatever happens NECOLIM is bound to be declared the devil behind it all, and now that these hooligans have had a taste of blood to much more vicious nd slogan shouting e 80und too pessimistic, out it¢ hat the present state of affairs unless is restored to some ions not far removed _ HJ "ey === [PDF page 47] === sere Ay (Security Grading—to be Up-graded = D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT D H 1015/274 FROM S)3.G. CAMB GE SUBJECT: Exhackds fon Wek Acdits Pri & be Nanrned, CDM ALTA) Nictos PA hk Ge veMan. Comment m SAuortimts $.€-A-.®. Dated ZT Oc. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received / MN ov. (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) fF ¥) VF === [PDF page 48] === South East Asia Dept., Foreign Office. With the compliments of (S.J.G. Cambridge) 27 October 1965 BRITISH EMBASSY DJAKARTA === [PDF page 49] === EXTRACTS FROM API (Gen. Sukendro's Newspaper) October 18 The Supreme Operations Command, which had been requested by Bung Karno to gather facts and suggestions to enable him to solve the political aspect, will also establish the PKI's role in the "S-30-M" and the October 1 coup. But there are funny ideas stating that Aidit's PKI will be banned and Njoto's PKI will exist. Though the idea is fantastic, it will develop if we do not eradicate it immediately. Radical revolutionaries cannot entertain such ideas, and fully believe that the PKI of Muso-Aidit-Njoto-Lukman should be dissolved, and the Lenin-type PKI teaching should not be allowed to flourish in the hearts of the Indonesian people. There is no party so disciplined and co-ordinated as the PKI. The PKI, as a Lenin-type party which in the Panchasila realm has a subversive attitude, should not be allowed to exist with a subterfuge that the pro-Peking group will be banned and the pro- Moscow one will continue to exist. If a party is allowed to be pro-Peking or pro-Moscow, and sometimes will be anti-Indonesia coinciding with Peking's or Moscow's attitude towards Indonesia’, then we are making a very reckless strategy. The parties in Indonesia, the Panchasila-type parties, must only be loyal to Bung Karno and Indonesia without any reserve, without the condition "as long as Bung Karno and Indonesia conduct a pro-Peking or pro- Moscow policy". Progressive revolutionaries should have a firm attitude: those against Panchasila are our enemies. And the PKI is against Panchasila; it is counter-revolutionery; its loyalty towards Indonesia is very doubtful; it is disliked by the Indonesian people; and it has conducted coups d'etat twice but failed. There is no place for Aidit's PKI or Njoto's for the PKI is Lenin-type and not a Panchesila-type party. October 22 It is impossible for the PKI to conform with the Nasakom sprit. The Pki can only have the "KOM" spirit and cannot honestly cooperate with the Nas and A groups. Panchasila and its extract, Nasakon, should not only form a practice of cooperation among Nationalist, Religious and Communist parties and groups but should become an idea, an ideological concept which should be adhered to and /practised === [PDF page 50] === practised by every Indonesian group and people. After the dissolution of the PKI there will be a NU Nasakom party, a PNI Nasakom party (after a purge), a Perti Nasakom party, a PSII Nasakom Party, a Catholic Nasakom party, a Christian Nasakom party, an IPKI Nasekom party and the Nasakomist armed forces. The Nasakom parties together with their mass organizations and the Nasakomist armed forces should forge an invincible revolutionary unity to crush the necolim and PKI, and, with the blessing of Bung Karno, destroy the PKI with all its mass organizations - in the belief that without the PKI everything will run smoothly, cooperation will be cordial, the atmosphere will be bright and there will be no controversy. And on the fertile soil, free from PKI's intrigues, the Nasakom parties and the Nasekomist armed forces led by Bung Karno will be able to build Indonesia anew which will become a blue-print of the new world, where there will be freedom to worship God, i.e. freedom to be freen. Copies sent to: South East Asia Dept. Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Information Research Dept. === [PDF page 51] === SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 1h She oS FROM. C dTAKARTAD No. DU Dated L/ Wey Emack Encloses Copy of: Received 3 NeyEm&eR. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action eo completed) (Main Indexed) te | Raat (Security Grading—to be Up-graded Sl where Appropriate); SUBJECT: Uénl-PACL mae x Aibasisa! continue! Calan neler a Gu A. Co nenes7 on Utrtced develop ments Carve hort /ndenesie- References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 52] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTVENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2418 0812. 2 November 1965 2 November 196! paens | ATS R. 1003 2 November 1965 Addressed Foreion Office telegram No. 2418 of 2 November Repeated oa information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore Washington Canberra Wellington Tndones ell nesia. Internal There has been t no et-up j anti-PKI moves throughout 1 ple is taken from this morning's nember of the Moslem Nu Party, said ' Sukarno to disband the PKI. Women's Congress, expel Gerwani, membership. Mrs. Subandrio is chairman of Kowani. (c) Effigies of Aidit and the Tunku burnt in Krawang. Demands to ban the PKI. (d) Eight members of the National Association of Private Businessmen (Bamunas) inactivated. e) Youth groups in Medan demanded the immediate dissolution of the PKI, and “also intensification of crushing Malaysia, to strengthen Latin American and Afro-Asian solidarity and to make a success of the second Afro-Asian conference and CONEFO. Also in Medan the local branch of the Indonesian journalists' association dismissed another twenty-six members. (f) Local branch of the PKI in the Tasikmalaja area still "carrying out terror and disturbances" although it had earlier officially dissolved itself. (g) Catholic Youths in Klaten, "recently the scene of disturbances by roaming bands’ urged by their leaders actively to help local security authorities. Similar instructions from ‘the Indonesian Student J Action Front to "all progressive revolutionary student org anizations in Central and East Java", this "in view of the viciou; killings carried out by elements of the PKI “and affiliated organization S against religious groups, particularly the Ansor" Moslem "and Catholic Youth organizations." (h) Purges in Menado and South Kalimantan. /(i) The Bast Java branch === [PDF page 53] === Nc 2.18 to Foreign Office The East lave inch of I (Indonesian Independence is the PKI. \ mun. rrested near Surabaya for distributing leafl pressing seats for Untung's Revolutiona i of Djakarta ordered all immediately to "inactivate" "frozen" political groups. South Sumatra instructed all gencies connected with the néad I es a t a those members of their organizations "who hav some tools o = PKI". This step was taken "in view of the fa tha + PKI elements still hold imt Welling; DISTE RIBU Cy Hi 4 ~M Cike0. === [PDF page 54] === En Clair FROM DJAKARTA TO FR EIGN OFFICE FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2426 D. 07.43 3 Nevember 1965 3 November 1965 Re 14.00 3 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegran Ne. 2).26 of 3 November Repeated for information te: Kuala Lumpur hy, POLAD Singapore pee s re | < Jay. (B.H.C.) Singapore fr DH (ers 97¢4) and Saving tex Washington Canberra Wellington My telegram Ne. D8: Internal Developments. From Antara. (a) Suk@rne has issued decrees legalizing states of war in the Djakarta and Jogjakarta areas, and in Central Java. (b) The Minister of Home Affairs has dismissed the Mayers of Surabaya, Tjirebon, Sole, Magelang and Salatiga and the Regents of Canjuwangi, Magelang, Ngawi, Tjirebon, Central Tapanuli, Bejelali, Karanganjar and Tjilatjap. (c) The Minister of the Maritime Department has dismissed 1,371 people from agencies up and down the country and banned the activities of various Communist port and fishing trade unions. (d) More incriminating documents have been found in Surabaya and Garut. In the latter,the euthorities seized a list "containing details of the names of designated victims, whe will de the killing, and at what time and by what means". If the 30 September Movement had lasted another five days, "hundreds of Government officials in the Garut regency would have been killed", (e) The P.K.I. and affiliated organizations have been banned in East Nusatenggara. (f) Fifty seven === [PDF page 55] === Djakarta telegram Ne. 2426 to Foreign Office (f) Fifty seven P.K.I. members of Parliament have been suspended. They include Luckman, Njete, Njone, Sudisman, Sakirman. (g) P.K.I. members have burnt down a sugar factory in East Java, and the Djakarta beer factory trade union, an affiliate ef SOBSI, has been dissolved. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington, Canberra, and Wellington as 510, 142 and 138. === [PDF page 56] === FROM da. A Clchrol djcke ta) No. 242% Dated 2 Woven@?’ Received 4 fovEmEKx (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) 5/1/65 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 56 where Appropriate) oi SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESI/ D H. 10/5,//ar6 suBIECT; A/eLminl 4y My fen. tener hal if narne Leas Akal alkimyzty Coty? (Jad pradtermin dees 4 (oT: Unlarg AMjpport” on Mant of “peek Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 57] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FORKIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTLON Sir A. Gilchrist Ho: 2i2h 7——\D. 0440 2 November 1965 2 November 1965 NH OI a7G R. 0852 2 November 1965 Addressed_to Foreign Office’ telegram No. 242) of 2 November. Repeated for information to: _Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BeHoC. Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Antara, 1 November, reported a statement by Major-General Umar, War Administrator of Djakarta, to the effect that after recent investigations it was now clear that the attempted coup had been master-minded by the P.K.[. This has now been followed up by a similar statement from Major-General Suharto himself. Following are extracts from it as given in Antara, 2 November: It was evident that the affair was not spontaneous but "the culmination of a series of well-prepared actions." "As in every place there are main actors, petty actors and a Director. Untung and his associates were the main actors, Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani the petty actors, while the facts, interrogations and important documents were pointed at the P.K.I. as being its Director or Stage Manager. "The P.K.el. had made the army their main target because they estimated that it was the army which constituted the main obstacle to their objective of seizing power in the State. The political settlement had been fully entrusted to the President and "we will obey without any reserve whatever he decides"." Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington, Canberra, and Wellington as 509, 141 and 137. DISTRIBUTED TO: FLO, SHAD. JeM.I.D. I.R.D. JoleP.GeD. News Dept. C.R.O. FE. & P.j Dept. News Dept. === [PDF page 58] === SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ote MiNi FROM SUBJECT: I y j AA WG alefrnt 4 Larté } i / 6 YUheyne f7 ‘oe No. 24 a7 Dated 3 slovem bo Encloses Copy of: Received 4,rvem by? (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] 5419! i pe (Security Grading—to be Up-graded o § where Appropriate) NESIA he (OI a77 Mine 1rd:- pemar he ty CWA A TLE 10t falsoAed G Ck prcdint A/a laak: A tel CAE: of thenwty7o., References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 59] === ToP copy °° e FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN Oi FICE oH ‘Org En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2427 D. 0850 3 November, 1965 4 November, 1965 Re 1431 3 November, 1965 Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No. 2427 of 5 November, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore From Antara, November 3, reporting some remarks by Chaerul Saleh Third Deputy Prime Minister. Sukarno was still not satisfied with the present situation. He hoped Ministers would really see to it that an atmosphere of calm and order was established. Ministers"should not be doubtful and afraid of their positions". They should carry out their duties "in the best possible manner even though this might endanger their lives". === [PDF page 60] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 6 0 where Appropriate) D H. 1015/9789 SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROM. ) \ SUBJECT: lin lara por ¢ 3 ae kKayté peporled he ha ve dJdac/ 4 a 4 Ye fr t of L her (la ee ° te es F on Ai Abel AUNT Asan f<epceer el HAR TOS CA, WLATErY ; an pt Girl SOTOLALS « toa bef te Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received + Uvert (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) [Unreadable] (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 61] === 61 FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE TOP COPY En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist “No. 24) De 0945 4 November, 1965 4. November, 1965 et OY Re 1954 4 November, 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2417 of 4. November. Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore and Saving to Washington Aidit. Antara reports Major-General Suharto, Army Minister, as saying on 4 November that Aidit had been frequently seen at Kartosura, Klaten and Bojolali, in Central Java. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington 513. [Repeated as requested. ] DISTRIBUTED TO: News Dept. F.E. and Pacific Dept. News Dept. === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 15] --- Antara, 29 October, reports a statement by an Army Commander in Medan. The 30 September movement had planned "to sweep no less than 15,000 people in North Sumatra" if their coup had succeeded. After the people had ransacked the houses of PKI leaders "it was proved that they were the actual Capitalist bureaucrats. They were hiding millions of rupiahs in their rooms. I myself saw hundreds of tins of Delfia frying oil piled up in one of these PKI houses. They had been piling stocks, it appears, in preparation for the period of terror they had planned to launch in North Sumatra". DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O. S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D. J.I.P.G.D. J.E.A.D. I.R.D. News Dept. === [PDF page 16] === FROM Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2[Unreadable] Dated 30 Oct. Received 1 Nov. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) [Unreadable: handwritten] (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA DH 1015/9 SUBJECT: [Unreadable: handwritten] Reproduction of Police reports. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 17] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2387 D. 0531 30 October 1965 R. 1447 30 October 1965 DH 1015/7 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2387 of 30 October. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Following from Police reports, reproduced in Antara, 30 October. "Ninety-two persons were detained in the area of Pesing. Several had already confessed to having actively participated in the murder of Generals. Some of them had helped carry the corpses, others had lowered them from the trucks, and others again had helped in covering the well which contained the seven bodies." Documents seized from the detained persons had revealed a "black list" of 120 persons, complete with the names of their respective families. The captured people were members of already frozen organizations, among them Pemuda Rakjat, BTI (Peasant Front) and Gerwani Women's Organization. They had all received training at Lubang Buaya in waves and had received uniforms. "There were still several suspected people at large in Pesing. Therefore, let us not slacken vigilance". === [PDF page 18] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SE. ASIA TOP SECRET INDONESIA DH 1015/[Unreadable] [Unreadable] No. [Unreadable] Dated [Unreadable] Oct. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received [Unreadable] (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) [Unreadable: handwritten minutes] === [PDF page 19] === TOP SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2371 D. 1402 28 October 1965 R. 1007 29 October 1965 PRIORITY TOP SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2371 of 28 October Repeated for information to: [Unreadable] POLAD Singapore Washington [Unreadable] My telegrams Nos. 2361, 2367 and 2370. My United States colleague understands from his secret military contact that the Generals are greatly disturbed by the tone and content of Sukarno's speech and statement. They had, up till now, hoped and believed that they would be able to carry out the domestic and foreign measures which the situation requires with some help from his authority and prestige, or at least without his opposition. After this speech, they feel they have to revise their views and that they will have to face the big decision — to proceed without Sukarno. --- [page 50] --- [...] will run smoothly, cooperation will be cordial, the atmosphere will be bright and there will be no controversy. And on the fertile soil, free from PKI's intrigues, the Nasakom parties and the Nasakomist armed forces led by Bung Karno will be able to build Indonesia anew, which will become a blue-print of the new world, where there will be freedom to worship God, i.e. freedom to be free. Copies sent to: South East Asia Dept. Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Information Research Dept. === [PDF page 51] === SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable: handwritten] FROM Djakarta No. [Unreadable] Dated 1[Unreadable] November Encloses Copy of: Received 3 November (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SUBJECT: [Unreadable: handwritten] Indonesia References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 52] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2418 D. 0812 2 November 1965 R. 1003 2 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2418 of 2 November Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BGRAI Singapore Washington Canberra Wellington Indonesia. Internal. There has been no let-up in anti-PKI moves throughout [Indonesia]. A sample is taken from this morning's [Antara]: [(a) Unreadable] member of the Moslem Nu[dlatul Ulama] Party said [...] Sukarno to disband the PKI. [(b) Unreadable] Women's Congress, expel Gerwani, [...] membership. Mrs. Subandrio is chairman of Kowani. (c) Effigies of Aidit and the Tunku burnt in Krawang. Demands to ban the PKI. (d) Eight members of the National Association of Private Businessmen (Bamunas) inactivated. (e) Youth groups in Medan demanded the immediate dissolution of the PKI, and "also intensification of crushing Malaysia, to strengthen Latin American and Afro-Asian solidarity and to make a success of the second Afro-Asian conference and CONEFO". Also in Medan the local branch of the Indonesian journalists' association dismissed another twenty-six members. (f) Local branch of the PKI in the Tasikmalaja area still "carrying out terror and disturbances" although it had earlier officially dissolved itself. (g) Catholic Youths in Klaten, "recently the scene of disturbances by roaming bands", urged by their leaders actively to help local security authorities. Similar instructions from the Indonesian Student Action Front to "all progressive revolutionary student organizations in Central and East Java", this "in view of the vicious killings carried out by elements of the PKI and affiliated organizations against religious groups, particularly the Ansor Moslem and Catholic Youth organizations". (h) Purges in Menado and South Kalimantan. (i) The East Java branch === [PDF page 53] === No. 2418 to Foreign Office The East Java branch of [Unreadable] (Indonesian Independence [Unreadable]) is the PKI. [Unreadable] arrested near Surabaya for distributing leaflets [Unreadable] pressing [Unreadable] for Untung's Revolutionary [Council]. --- [page 55] --- Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington, Canberra, and Wellington as 510, 142 and 138. === [PDF page 56] === FROM Sir A. Gilchrist (Djakarta) No. 242[Unreadable] Dated 2 November Received 4 November (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) 5/11/65 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA DH 1015/[Unreadable] SUBJECT: [Unreadable: handwritten minute] "[Unreadable] support" [Unreadable] Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 57] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 242[Unreadable] D. 0440 2 November 1965 R. 0852 2 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 242[Unreadable] of 2 November. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.G.R.A.I. Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Antara, 1 November, reported a statement by Major-General Umar, War Administrator of Djakarta, to the effect that after recent investigations it was now clear that the attempted coup had been master-minded by the P.K.I. This has now been followed up by a similar statement from Major-General Suharto himself. Following are extracts from it as given in Antara, 2 November: It was evident that the affair was not spontaneous but "the culmination of a series of well-prepared actions." "As in every play there are main actors, petty actors and a Director. Untung and his associates were the main actors, Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani the petty actors, while the facts, interrogations and important documents were pointed at the P.K.I. as being its Director or Stage Manager." "The P.K.I. had made the army their main target because they estimated that it was the army which constituted the main obstacle to their objective of seizing power in the State." The political settlement had been fully entrusted to the President and "we will obey without any reserve whatever he decides". Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington, Canberra, and Wellington as 509, 141 and 137. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O. S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D. I.R.D. J.I.P.G.D. News Dept. C.R.O. F.E. & P. Dept. News Dept. === [PDF page 58] === SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT MINUTES FROM [Unreadable] SUBJECT: [Unreadable: handwritten] No. 24[Unreadable] Dated 3 November Encloses Copy of: Received 4 November (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) INDONESIA DH 1015/[Unreadable] [Unreadable: handwritten minutes] References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 59] === TOP COPY FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 2427 D. 0850 3 November 1965 R. 1431 3 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2427 of 3 November. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore From Antara, November 3, reporting some remarks by Chaerul Saleh, Third Deputy Prime Minister.