Indonesia: Internal Political Situation, Attempted Coup against Sukarno [16] (FO 371/180325, 1965-1966)

=== [PDF page 1] === 180329 CLOSED UNTIL aye === [PDF page 2] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT J INDONESIA Dias Ar Mller (WK Maw) A Ny, Ae l oA pee. Aadlonaped. Atkial»,; yiiedealiecee” cong ticotne) « 7IO502 Dated / Secenber Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received.2 decesmbew Saag (Outward Action) t| Lb b A k MiNawd TE UAL eiVare arr, jo So ShTS. Head uy Cos works moe | ply S Soeden, (Printing Instructions) 180325 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Main Indexed) 24\ Ikx === [PDF page 3] === CONFIDENTIAL (20502) ee eee United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, PARIS. 1 December, 1965. DHIOIS Beav Cafle, Thank you for your letter (DH 1015/288) of 16 November about Indonesia. wee 2e There was some further discussion on Indonesia in the Political Committee on the 30th and I was able to take the opportunity of emphasising the international implications of the Indonesian situation, particularly as they affect confrontation, on the lines of your letter under reference. Be The German representative read from a report from Djakarta of about a week ago that the stalemate between the Army and the President continued. General Nasution had said on many occasions that he would deal once and for all with the Communists but had received no support from Sukarno, who seemed still to be capable of weakening the Generals' resolve. According to reliable sources, the Army leaders were now thinking in terms of persuading Sukarno to accept a new Vice President who had the confidence of the Army. But nothing was going ahead very fast since both Sukarno and the Army seemed to be adopting “wait and see" tactics - the Army apparently in the hope that Sukarno would suddenly disappear from the scene and Sukarno himself in the belief that anti-Communist feeling would subside of its own accord. Meanwhile, the economic problems were grave and in need of urgent attention. le The Dutch representative agreed generally with this assessment. Sukarno was clearly hesitating to commit himself to any faction. He was urging restraint and warning that anti-Communist actions could lead to a free-for-all. He clearly genuinely hoped that things would settle down; he might also be interestéd in keeping some Communist group alive for the sake of his cherished ideal of Nasakom. The Netherlands Ambassador in Djakarta believed, however, that Sukarno did not want to keep alive the PKI as such. But his main tactic was to retain as a trump card his ability to dissolve the PKI. There was little prospect of a quick solution, since neither Sukarno nor the Army had enough popular support on their own. /5-e I then Je E. Cable, Esqe, South East Asia Department, Foreign Office. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 4] === CONFIDENTIAL De I then said that we could not look at the situation in Indonesia purely in terms of an internal struggle. We were bound to look at it primarily in terms of the implications for the outside world and above all for the policy of confrontation. There was no sign that developments had changed that policy. I expanded this theme by drawing on points in your letter under reference and the first paragraph of Djakarta telegram No. 84 Saving of 11 November. 6. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chancery in Djakarta. | ave Cues i Mua (G. BE. Millard) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 5] === FOREIGN OFFICE, (@% 1015/65) LONDON, S.Wel CONFIDENTIAL 6 December, 1965 Many thanks for your letter No. 20502 of 1 December about the discussion of Indonesia in the Political Committee. We are glad you spoke as you did and you will since have seen from our telegram No. 9645 on the Quadripartite Talks in London how necessary it remains to keep on reminding the Americans that, so far as we are concerned, whether or not Indonesia stops confrontation is just as important as whether or not Indonesia pursues an anti- Communist line. (J.E. Cable) GE. Millard, Esq., C.M.G., C.V.0., U.K. Delegation to NATO, Paris. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 6] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 6 where Appropriate) J fecusy > ae si Ata SECRET ( 7//¢« 7 Dison FROM | SUBJECT: Ajran/yned peport Kellap, 4 troleoriate Sad Talepepl. boom, Thay 7 SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Dated $ oMwvenbat Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received J) ») ibe. (Outward Action) A) 47 GUA MeR gk ( Waitin ov) fo 0K. LAR | T+») J. YL 466. : Ae oe 3 (Referred to Legal Adviser) es (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 7] === Telegraph Corres nt ‘KUALA LUMPUR, Monday. Indonesian military authorities in Jakarta wer able today ‘o confirm a & that Mr. ees DOUB D. N_ Aidit, party leader, ha e Communist een killed. The report said troops had shotehim dead at his hide-out on nt Megapi, in Java, during th kend. === [PDF page 8] === With the compliments of THE BRITISH EMBASSY [Unreadable] WASHINGTON, D.C. 4 January, 1965 O.R. Blair, Esq., JM.I. Department, Foreign Office. === [PDF page 9] === PRO DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE === [PDF page 10] === BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 4 Janucsry, 1966 I have spent so much time wondering whether the following information is worth passing on to you that I think the best thing is simply to write it down without more ado. 26 The informetion in question is simply that one of my Japanese colleagues here told me some time ago that according to Japanese intelligence, which comes from an Indonesian Army source, the date of Aidit's arrest was 20 October and the date of his death “one or two days" later. He is said to have been shot after interrogation which revealed nothing of particular interest. 3. What interested me sbout this news was that the dete was about e month earlier than the (admittedly rather vague) impression I had gleaned from other reports of Aidit's death. Of course, if a mid October date alrendy figures in your calculations this letter is best disguarded; but if not the possibility that the Army had already interrogated and killed Aidit by the end of October may leave you with some interesting thoughts about developments in the earlier part of November. 4. I am sending a copy of thie letter to Robin Blair in deHMele De partme nt. (B. Te Gilmore) S.J.G. Cambridge, Eece, DJ AKARTA. === [PDF page 11] === Cutting dated : Aida | y Aidit ma sti ive HE Indonesian Ministe1 + Higher Education and § General Thajib, has said that D; N: Aidit; leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, may still be alive “There has been no officia! word of Aidit’s death,” General Thajib id, “despite newspaper reports that he had been shot.” The Indonesian said that military operatic against the Communists will tinue, according to the forces bulletin in Djakarta yesterday. But on Sunday, the Fo Minister, Dr; Subandrio, after a Cabinet meeting at Bogor, President Sukarno had said> that tthe aftermath of the coup could | not be overcome by “smashing one another.” === [PDF page 12] === ae i‘ nae Ba 3 Y SMuwey / aherte) Me ane No. / on /by- Dated 25//2 Received Q decen ha (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT SUBJECT: econ! / -cameneka, tela, Ge MMetkh wd Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 13] === S & a © BRITISH EMBASSY, = SECRET DJAKARTA.. 25 November, 1965. Xy he, Ze Duveis] 977 I attach a record of an interesting conversation which the Air Attache had yesterday with Colonel Shamim, the Pakistan Military Attaché, The Pakistanis of course take a somewhat special view of Indonesian affairs, but I do not think it would distort Shamim's perspective in reporting on the internal Situation - and he certainly has excellent contacts. Se The only comments which I have on the contents are: (a) We are not in a position to know much about the personal relations between Nasutim and Suharto; but if there is a coolness we shall no doubt hear about it shortly from elsewhere. The account of the line Soekarno took at the Bogor conference on 20 November seems to me entirely convincing. I am sure Soekarno has from the outset been trying to scare the generals with the enormity of the task that they have undertaken in coping with the P.K.I. In Djakarta it is difficult to decide how much violence is really taking place, and how much is propaganda by one side or the other. But sub-paragraph (¢) of the record is a reminder that politics in Indonesia is at present a pretty rough business, ae I am sending copies of this letter to Head in Kuala Lumpur and Adams in Singapore. (James Murray) E. H. Peck, Esq., C.M.G., Foreign Oifice, === [PDF page 14] === Conversation with the Pakistani M.A I had a long talk with Colonel Shamim, the Pakistani Military Attache, this morning. I have cultivated Shamim over the last 18 months or so and his information on affairs in Indonesia has been pretty good in the past. He told me, in brief:- (a) The situation in Central Java is far from under control by the Armed Forces, (b) Soekarno is said to be winning over Soeharto (as he did Yani) and there is a distinct coolness between Soeharto and Nasution as a result. I S " nis choice of 50e to as the new Army er Soeharto comes from Solo. Of men from here it is/tfat they think of three things mly; their birds, their women and themselves. Not the best of the Javanese in other words. (c) The conference at Bogor on Saturday was staged by Soekarno to try end pacify the Armed Forces. He told them that there were 500,000 armed Communists in Indonesia and pictured for them the results of a cempaign to exterminate all P.K.I. and sympathisers. How could the Armed Forces hope to kill all these people, and so on. Soekarno gave the conference no indication whatsoever of his intentions, whether he was going to ban the P.K.I. or not. (d) Nevertheless the hard core of the Army are determined that whatever happens Indonesia will not become Communist, even if it means a civil war in which thousands will be killed. The Armed Forces deeply | distrust the Chinese of whom they say only about.0% are loyal to Indonesia, (e) It is confidently expected that public opinion will<drive Soekarno to ban the P.K.I When this happens it will go underground and a reign of terror (murder, arson, kidnapping, etc.) will commence, (This is not the first time Shamim has expressed grave fears about this sort of thing happening soon. (f) Soebandrio is doomed and only Soekarno is protecting him now, but not for long. His removal from KOTI in the reshuffle is oe more blow fram which he will find it hard to recover, (g) P.K.I. men and women are being executed in very large numbers. Shamim says he knows the Chief Interrogator (he told me some really ghastly details not repeated here) who also takes part in executions. Apparently the victims, toughs whom no rehabilitation would ever change, are given a knife and invited to kill/ SECRET === [PDF page 15] === (Ge 8G tS 4 A SECRET kill themselves, Most refuse and are then told to turn round and are shot in the back, When Shamim asked how he could bring himself to take part in the executims he replied that if he (Shamim) had seen and heard what he had he would consider it a duty to exterminate what he called "less than animals". K. L. CHARNEY Group Captain c4th November, 1965 SECRET === [PDF page 16] === FROM ees: | oes: Gantry Yoke) A flr. Tonktr. Dated coven b¥- Received / 4 want (Outward Action) 83) In Gecdsrernl Poss %, £1) Cok Hoye ( H00(p//2)4)) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) amas (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D HM. lols | 398 SUBJECT: Loncoreinli nm fore fil, LUGS. “a bint Tou: cotonued prdshe rt hil ae 2 cltcree Lamas On JSehayne WA A Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES DA Arp > es ulc se === [PDF page 17] === BRITISH EMBASSY, CONFIDENT TAL DJAKARTA. eo November, 1965. Dear Debbi In our telegram of 22 November we reported General Adjie's decree banning the P.K.I. in West Java, Ae This move is a none-too-gently forcing of Soekarno's hand. If Nasution or Suharto or Mokoginta had acted in this way it would have fitted naturally into the course of events; but Adjie has for so ot been labelled as an ultra-loyalist — "my ‘President right or ae - and even (see ae tore No. ) as a rather half-hearted executiné sp army policies, that this action of his was COtal y unexpected. We do not know why he did it; nor whether Soekarno opposed the banning; nor whether he even knew about it beforehand, Adjie's remarks to the press, quoted in our telegram, do not throw much light on ‘this. 3 The banning of the P.K.I. in West Java has now been followed by one in the Moluccas, end it is reasonable to expect some of the other regional military commanders (Pepelradas) to follow suit. What these ae are doing in various regions contrasts strongly with what Soekerno has failed to do in Indonesia as a whole. Rus&@n Abdul Ghani rather yponvincingly told the ress the other day that these regional dissolutions of he P.K.I. were of course within at of the Pepelradas; but that President Soekarno "still viewed the issue in a global way and we should continue to ones t him with advice and to present him with the real acts", 4, Meenwhile, the pressures on Soekarno to act are being kept up. Apart from all the continuing arrests of P.K.I. members and purges of various organisa-— tions, we have this sort of thing: (a) Kartawinata, the Speaker of the Gotong Royong Parliament, has said that the absence of the P.K.I. wili not diminish Parliament's militancy. Quite the contrary. (b) Major General Umar, the oe of Djakarta, has forbidden all politice end mass organisations from g eet membership to ex-P.K.I. people. A similar political quarantine has been imposed on the P.K.I. in North Sulawasi. D. Tonkin, Esa., South Bast Asia Department, Foreign Office, S.W.1. CONFIDENT T AL === [PDF page 18] === (c) A mass rally in Bogor on 21 November passed resolutions hailing Adjie's move and calling on Soekarno to disband the P.K.I. Finally, here is anextract from the P.N.1. magazine “Ampera Review" (it is strong stuff in a country unused for so many years to criticism of its President):- "One military region after the other has declared against the further existence of the PKI and all its affiliated organisations, and also other parties and organisations involved in the movement. We unreservedly share the President's view. To take a hasty step in a matter so sensitive for the safety of the Revolution is anything but desirable and wise. But the people are angry and furious. The people demand action, they demand penalty to be given... now. This explains the various actims taken against the PKI and all other organisations involved, even before Bung Karno has started his endeavours to bring political solutim to the problem as he promised. This explains the dualism in the execution of instructions. The people are impatient because of their anger, and not because they wished to act ahead of their leader." Dis But it begins to look as if no-one reall expects Soekarno to take action. For instance, tne hristian Workers' Union have begun to collect signatures to a petition for the dissolutim of the P.K.I. and reckon to have finished the job by... Christmas. More significant - though it is only an isolated report - is a@ remark quoted in Antara by one of the KOTI generals to the effect that "the solution of the 30 September Movement" was now being conducted by KOTI. eretofore. it has always been part of the lip service paid Soekarno that it is he who would determine the solution. 6. This is not to say that Soekarno himself is wholly inactive; but it becomes progressively more difficult to discover what significance or effect his actions have. On 20 November he summoned a huge meeting at Bogor of the regional military commanders, They were called in from all parts of the country; and the occasion was built up beforehand as likely to be something/ CANT NANT TAT, === [PDF page 19] === something of major ees: Yet, so far as can be discovered, all that pened was that Soekarno made a rambling spee.ch about the dangers of a great nation destroying itself from within (with quotations from Toynbee). This Mém@was repeated the next day at a public ceremony in Djakarta. For the rest, Soekamo said that the 30 September Movement was to be condemned, (hessaid that before) and that he for one had never believed the rumours and insinuations about the existence of a military junta in Indonesia (a black mark there for Subandrio). Ts So the conclusion for this past week or so is - no real change; the generals (now seemingly joined by Adjie) continue with their steady demolitio of the PKI and are not bothering much about Soekarno, whose inactivity shows up more oddly with every day that passes. 8. I an sending a copy of this letter to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and UKREP Singapore, Washington, and TED. Wd Ww (S. J. G. Cambridge) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 20] === FROM J. pe “onbrctyt/y alate) No. ‘on/oo Dated as Vooen te Received 12 iclautite (Outward Action) §{) Mu Coodenouyl hi, 4 ze Wty, is ) Col. é. Masisth, Atsy/(2 )A)) 4; (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action > completed) (Main Indexed) i ih, (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D i lors /3.29 SUBJECT: TRanaerypls 7 ae 4 my renters f Swope segpecths Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: vo lang Init he RB, ge === [PDF page 21] === CONFIDENTIAL BRITI QT DAL tL Sid TH TAWADMA DJAT ART. 4 25 November 1965 it fois [324 | Des Neale, I enclose an interesting transcript of some of the Arny' s interrogations of captured members of the Ge tapu movement. It comes from a German source of course say to what extent it has been cooked by the Army to incriminate others; but we are inclined to bel is the genuine j story about presenting Sukarno with an ultimatum and a 2 fe } eS ee ain —_— ‘ Tn sweat a off if he refused to comply has b going the rounds for some time. Ze I am sending copies of th: Re ati IAT AT A wwpPp as, Kuala Lumpur, PO AD and Uhnar oilngap === [PDF page 22] === Translation from German Extract from Interrogation Record of former Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, Tjakrabirawa Regiment Question: You have just spoken about the "30 September Movement". What was the objective of this rebel movement? Untung: The short term objective of the 30 September Movement was the formation of the Supreme Revolutionary Council; the long term objective was the formation of a National Government under direction of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Que stion: You have just said that you intended toform a National Government under the direction of the Communists. According to your ideas what sort of composition would this Government have? In the long term the composition of this Government would have been along the following lines; all important ministries would have come into the hands of a Communists, or of a Communist sympathizer, or of a man who would act under Communist direction, What would have been the position of President Sukarno in the Government which you visualized? resident Sukarno was intended to continue in office as Head f State. Question: supposing that President Sukarno had not fallen into th your ideas? lJeclare himself willing to a Question: But what if he had not Untune: We had a plan to "neutralize" President Sukarno in the e vent f his not accepting our concept. Question: :. ‘ ma oc le. 4h r ha 2 14 Y SA meg: I mean it in the sense 7; 1G i lave ALSpose ad of him. /Quve stion: === [PDF page 23] === You have Communist National; v 11d have b [Unreadable] Communists. All the no minor matter, but an Mise ees i ae A LLU ust nave nad vy} waed a dt oa waar WoO Was @ < e unaecr=- success of yo the supreme powe be running the risk In other words army was not in 3 ¢ power you could not your ob jectiv: Yes I agree with you. === [PDF page 24] === Translation from German cece nonsense a Extract from Interrogation Record of former ne tienen lajor Bambane Su Oth Parachute Battalion Interrogation of 5 October 1965: Question: Bambang: It became clear from the answers which you gave in the interrogation of 4 October that the power-group embodying the 30 September Movement consisted of various political parties in the capital city, namely: the ZKPKI (Aidit), the left-wing of the PNI led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and PARTINDO. Can you produce any evidence that these three political parties were in support of the 30 September Movement? I can say something about this. The fact that the PKI inspired the 30 September Movement is in my Opinion definitely demonstrated by the fact that some 2,000 volunteers, all recruited from Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani, came not from Djakarta alone, but also from Bast, Central and West Java. I am aware that the two organizations mentioned above are front organizations of the PKI and that they were given military training and weapons by the air force in the area of Pongok Gede/Lubang Buaja near Djakarta. The statement that the PNI and PARTINDO political parties were in support of the 30 September Movement came to me from PA Sie and from my First Lieutenant Mgadimo and they heard this from Untung. Thus the only evidence I can cite is hearsay. If it is a matter of recording evidence known to me personally, I am not so sure. Interrogation of 9 October 1965: Question: Bambang: You told us at the last interrogation that President Sukarno would have been forced to ussue a decree in the name of the 50 September Movement and the Revolutionary Council. If President Sukarno had refused to do this, he would have been murdered. Do you by any chance know in what manner he would have been murdered, and who would have been entrusted with the execution of the murder? I heard something of this matter on 1 October at approximately 11.00 a.m., when I was at Halim Airfield Complex, not far from the place where President Sukarno was at that moment. I then saw and heard Colonel Latief urging General Supardjo in a very aggressive manner to force the President to make a personal announcement confirming his blessing on the 30 September Movement. I then saw for myself that General Supard jo yielded to this pressure and gave an affirmative answer. As to the eventuality that the President would refuse to /comply === [PDF page 25] === comply: Colonel Latief answered at that time, if the President refuses, the thing is quite simple. From the whole attitude of General Latief it was quite clear to me that his intention was to make an attack on the President's person. He also said: let's get going, bring a tape recorder along this minute to get the President's voice so that we can broadcast it this afternoon. I saw and heard Lieutenant Colonel Heru answer; I will bring the tape recorder at once. At the same time I heard Lieutenant Colonel Untung say that it was not necessary for the President to speak in his function as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; it would be enough for him to present himself as the Great Leader of the Revolution. From what I saw and heard with my own eyes and ears, I believe I can properly conclude that the possibility of the President's being murdered would have existed if he had not yielded to this threat. According to my interpretation the main figures in this affair were Colonel Latief, Brigadier General Supardjo and Lieutenant Colonel Untung. === [PDF page 26] === Translation from German Extract from the Interrogation Record of former First Lieutenant Ngamido, 530th Parachute Battalion Interrogation of 7 October 1965 Question: Were any preparations made for the coup before 30 September or were any plans already in existence? Ngamido: Yes. From approximately 20 September we had the order to listen continuously to Radio Djakarta broadcasts. When the announcement was made by Radio Indonesia that the Revolutionary Council had been formed, the action which had already been prepared in Madiun was to be executed in the various provinces. Interrogation of 12 October 1965 Question: As an officer of the Indonesian Army you had undertaken certain steps for the preparation and execution of the coup by your unit, and you had already carried out certain plans for the purpose of promoting success of the coup of 30 September. Were these actions in your opinion good or bad? Please try to give us an answer as to whether they were right or wrong? They were wrong, because I received my orders not from a military superior, but from the PKI organization. === [PDF page 27] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 2 6 where Appropriate) f ve amy SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT on ao? NESIA D. /0/ 5 /330 FROM SUBJECT: rol: ellata, r Wincaecs ital Ke Te re Pitas ed por Fn he Dated 25° Wa: Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received / Decombu- (Outward Action) 8.) fol Marvel (sed (lb) fe (Referred to Legal Adviser) copgie (Main Indexed) 13/12/66 \p-A" === [PDF page 28] === hoxyoath di (>) A + eu. aD Tm r “DAQAY BRIT Is 3H EM BASSY, ATr ATM DJ. ARAL TA. November, 1965 pramp rAmEer Pom ) niwo cLILULED Ah in | Dt (o1g/330 fovember 46VL lairmen of (chairma chairman of group III) » Suparto (chairman of group IV) s) Sunarso (chairman of group V) irman o akaarat” "eddre tents of information se group VII) tion) chairmanships used to be held by >xtent therefore tt re-organisation Lhe arme Or 5s at the CXL structure of KO TI has not headed by the Presidium (wi Subandric the Defe Minister (N [Unreadable] Service Chiefs. wever,, Goes look as if naking activities over an even wider field. € ing about the ing reorganisation. sho ould embrace political, social LSGey, AS1a VEpartvmMment, mathe J LNs dag Nmanv PaGulwe) === [PDF page 29] === FROM, SA FTG dis Cnety: Sa harté) @ y Vy Ao ahr No. (Of, 65 Dated IMece ne os Received 7) ccm hy (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) ceeciane (Main Indexed) y } Late i po (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 7 Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D. [O15 331 SUBJECT: Yproorttirent yr he 00 0) MbbAM Socretay k th vrewrdonleny Wk 4 5 dani b re oo 7 } V tot ie won yea Oy «F. fur Lib lo Sbanttrrs sill tiunmelr Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 30] === RESTRICTS Se ee Neck, Hi 1016 331 High Commissioner Drs. Logowo ren the job e@ Secretary to the for West Irian Affairs in place of a r-General Sut jipto. Logowo used to be dep Secretary. We do not yet know what significance this change nay have. Subandrio, of course, still rema Coordinator fbe has been gi Coordinato ct @ ok pe har 26 I am copying this to POLAD, Washington and Canberra. Cambri dge Manir4n Ta LONKIN, ioe » Department, South Hast pot VE NADRT PUREL ‘rICE, we th eo ° aT Aa RES TR LI CTE Ft ct === [PDF page 31] === FROM CT Aemdridye (y okanta) & LEA» Dated / Decomto- Received Y S sccombs (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) | (ain Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where/ A ppropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT NESIA D H. /O [5/332 SUBJECT $ Z b onfist cn x jen oO E in Lewy it li retoin Taam. ra f F a. x V A Zz f° th eMimpty Otte. Olrew of Lhe [ee nl: PKC Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 32] === With the cont of e orsfssa BRITISH EMBASSY DJAKARTA === [PDF page 33] === WF he he Sete ie nM ses\7 === [PDF page 34] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Fae SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT : pea: D. [015333 mene ae SUBJECT: | prapaed { slaki. «oncom Vkade Siherart 6.5.6. honbind, (q)-hanta) & ee ay yes ar Te eee On jrrercls on AWM Hi Loon { PO}. ay offieked OVE CUMWICL li vy, No. ioii/ty ‘ cen Dated 9 ‘S« Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: [Unreadable] Received _) im. 1016 60 G (Outward Action) IH rage’ =! ea 7 bey \Y (nh a A (Referred to Legal Adviser) seeeaet (Main Indexed) NA VSG Va lypex === [PDF page 35] === 2 Decer AMDASSS 1 December dor tl elegram she Australian within the ; happened. would ately fabrica going > proved either to take it seri the PKI and notaing delibe yan a full eae tative Assemnl 2@ «6fyf the place Usa held UxaA mo' Ss oceedings WwW conceivably ll been this : Wal bi nana, Major-General taer the session z yet more The meeting' ituation, Sit the Preside c n oa: Pipe Lor mean W amotvner 1 3 sng eS * LL LI lantvan Lim vember / wilh WOOL AGU 11a pani Manizit+ Gar AULIAILL, Ue » > Saat hase c a nem ean tT Usi JAanDL HOLA LA QALUNGCILU, MOADET A OW ORE iN, 3D.W-eds lie wOUTt C 7T PS Le oe Sod + around t. the ident. to budge yet aw the fortheoming Oth annimber, Subandrio as Sukarno afternoon Subandrio later he ted esident day would was session of Ly. This; is56 the rather more res this time.of the age" from the Presider it; s “ynolitical solution" which ricted year. to Antara recall, t. tha ve 8S a account u may o— StS (rou i is da ntinn tO a actL One Loe L and su nbmit te d to and their political While is aent discuss mai ( de A YPM VT Army it mentioned that January 1966 will be the dissolution of the in West affiliatec nander and its Coll PKI CO oe nd. the majority themselves S now === [PDF page 36] === the reaso goodwill Nasution need t bodies reeent) ~ CON tLy icer sai resident nesian He said not ta AI my A prnw ADMNY Ulla coun tries - Sukarno gainst th em Americans source who nN jeljijevee iO be LOV While it tne communists. [Unreadable] i eaily ALLOW LOU malroaa ey WMAnoOo GA LCture 158 communists Governn ital te Army O eri cers: ther ~m il may moving st Lf1G F4 other regi ana Sukarno aft fai io ling lose mnt Msi & 2 the adi 1 sid Cil t ii Lever JMpPatHnEe tic Srsonnet === [PDF page 37] === [Unreadable] ws WAY ee ote aw 49 che ale a Oe See VE ew a et Z "19 27 VU LLG MUU LL Uy ALIA [Unreadable] CC u a ad pe oa CA “ i de ade [Unreadable] Pid & Sb SLL VAlLCA VY bud ohn SrnttH 7 V art 4 _ ie C Se tds 7 VA ahe dd [Unreadable] Peat 4 Cs a Y VV AW © + Ns ok [Unreadable] a ’ O te a - oh [Unreadable] An e a * VA F ie Y — [Unreadable] Vk WHA we te VALS aS ke 7 i ae $. 'T oe [Unreadable] oe Wad Xj Vv Wid & & ob [Unreadable] sas cA UL at iJ VW.. [Unreadable] ‘a LNA SANS WO LOALL WO. 4a ” 4 ~ 4 — 4 wa % [Unreadable] a a ~~ ~ aad fer) r ’ [Unreadable] A ate WI oe ~~ L ~/ + ha A, et hh ~ [Unreadable] J dd ee ok CA Add WA \/ V¥ [Unreadable] ee a a oe ee \ * a ke ee le [Unreadable] ww 4 i ae ake WA - rin r 7 ’ Xt. WA AY ViLLw ro ler / [Unreadable] L— YU WwAw 2 ake idle allie wage [Unreadable] ~~ whe WS i + sa [Unreadable] iad he ok et J & w + & ae No ~ wk - ¥ [Unreadable] he ak 2 a id am a te Ne ke ake od e / === [PDF page 38] === Vw WL Fhe : ie & he tetas eT A oe abe AL = pS 4 mF uke ae —— i oho = at Abbe oe is aw ue o [Unreadable] Ad Vidnw eS Ss cm ob whe 4 LAL O19 GL. he » L 7 ais 7 [Unreadable] === [PDF page 39] === FROM hw Murrew ‘4 Yokota No. 2650 Dated 30 Navewbev- Received,o© Decemhey (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 8 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INRONESIA D N. JOrs /324 SUBJECT: (kez pet Sl pols i retina {- by Frens [Unreadable] ye ade, uM wurki 4 i Howler. kk [ er. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 40] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En clair DEPARTMENT AL DISTRIBUTION sas 3 ts D. 1308 30 Novenved i WAS 82 30 November, 1965, R. 1500 30 November, 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2650 of 30 November Repeated for informrtion to:— Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore Antara 30 Nevember publishes a long report about a statement made by Franz Seda Minister of Plantations and Chairman of the Catholic Party, to the Press, Following are main points; (1) The Indonesian Catholie Party has proposed to Sukarno the formation ef an inner Cabinet er an emergency Cabinet with the special task of solving present economic difficulties. It has also urged Sukarno to announce as Quickly as possible his political decision on the 30 September movement, (2) Political life in Indonesia needs to be reorganised, The starting point for this should be "the punishment and dissolution of the P.K.I. There should be deeper indoctrination about Pantjasila, So far political leaders had only echoed Sukarno's teachings but never come up with a “creative interpretation of them coupled to operational steps whieh could bring results", "They repeat again and again everything Bung Karno says until the people get fed=-up",. (3) The first principle of Pantjasila belief in God should be the main one and there should not be any compartmentation between the branches of Nasakem., “If it could be established that all political groups that have the right to exist propagate nationalism, religion and socialism alike, then there is no need any more to debate which group should represent socialism", thus there would be no need for a new creation such as neo-P,K,I, (ad) In reply to a question, Franz Seda said that Sukarno thought the Catholic Party's ideas were “very constructive", DISTRIBUTED TO:- === [PDF page 41] === 40 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA Ds 1015 [335 FROM M.Combridge, Djakatfe,) suBsecT: Futver Gexelopments conctming the fate of tHe PRI oo and Aidit, No. tout /65 Dated 9 December Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 14 December DH 1015 Las (Outward Action) AS.4 Consnwac( Hokuda) fe Mi taal 3 ae (Referred to Legal Adviser) ee (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 42] === BG Me see [Unreadable] Dr ITISH EMBL LSSY, DJAKARTA, 1011/65 fs Sere er es | 9 December, 1965 Sev Doe! [Unreadable] letter 1011/65 of 2 amt about the fate of the PKI. developments this 1 week have been as follows: 6 veer Major General Umar and Navy nodore Harjono, Area Commanders concerned, banned the PKI in Djakarta and the neis gibourina districts. The chief reason given was that the PKI had obviously “master-minded" the attempted coup. (This is advance on the other regional bans which were based on the ees that the local PKI chapters had already dissolved er The following day the PKI was banned in Central axinant an for the same reason. ne interesting remarks about the future course jere is The Herald report: "The Commander said there are three stages of operations to be performed before security is entirely restored. One. Mopping up operations carried out by the Armed Forces assisted by. the. people. This kind of 9ération has been and still is being performed. Remarkable progress has been made in this stage. Two.. “Djajawibawa" o erations: that is, the operations aimed at -estoring the authority of the government. During this stage of operations, emphasis is placed on searching the remnants of the counter-revolutionaries and firearms illegally distributed by them. We are now at the beginning of this stage, the Commander said, and théesekind of operations are scheduled to be carried on through the end of the year. Three. “Djajaaman" operations which represent the follow up of the first two stages, During this stage of operations, the Commander said, all eople are expected and urged to pay serious attention to the problems to be faced and work hard to restore complete pe: > J socialist community may soon be (c) Nasution has neo-PKI (see our Saving refused to be drawn about the final polit: ical solution. President, he has said, is still consi oe che matter, not for Nasution to pronounce [Unreadable] (d) fhe Catholic Party remains one of the staunchest opponents of the emergen (e) sukarno hi LO anned the PKI yet, and another lie can be chabice 9 to Subandr account se In ter under reference). 2 3 lasution Ds fonkin, me Riv iG === [PDF page 43] === asution has bout the Fighting now travelling governor rovounded a new inister Health has manifestation of necolim (h) The Deputy Mi ab sur dity - * 1 e BI U i S Antara reoort continues: ties between "Commenting on similari Gestapu, D Azil said basis ApOre, W ile basis. against et a4 Cxtverm been cha lace in ing this === [PDF page 44] === VECceMmnoey rsical" hws Villy © >COnomic 2G vVOalou NO acwall: Vic Latra Dannea). One ULLAL AvLLGCIIDLOAa === [PDF page 45] === [Unreadable] JAZVAINS 1 bi dL. 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WH - so 5 ~ \ UO L athe cA yy LU tJ 4 ke Vi Ww o\wrw Viki 2 We nm i wu ic [Unreadable] oF am \) Li i. db: of L Wi ws ib dk C ALA Nv Uw i be Wat aoa J 4% es, a ee he Vo CA U u L Wilwo om we [Unreadable] me \ wilt LC ed ) - nV LL V S L V LG: A VY a Wt CA ole ok. oe LL i i: VilNV [Unreadable] she dhe de WH bf CAM Lb: VN UL: LD \ NS bs aoe LN MA wie a WJ Line L ail = UW \ t. Gaels ot i J hn? Nu ok « ~ [Unreadable] >t UL Vil rm tJ VU wWiilLwm Luwe we J LVANS LLY RD che CA hows Ww VA cA i Wi ae See NS ww Loi. Willi @ [Unreadable] 2ilin Wo.s a bY VOL SL wm IJGCaAN 14 ¢ YU RNAS ALR vw VJ iliili ALL A W911 wy ok, ul ade iv [Unreadable] === [PDF page 49] === whe haba d U CA ‘ ote whee ohe aia A ae ole ake Ne === [PDF page 50] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Ftd heel Ss 6 CON! SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONCc- FROM Me. Cowbridge, Diaka 1 SUBJECT: New tr M. Toalkcin. 7 ma ON } 65 Dated 9 Decenbex Received |4. December Encloses Copy of: (Outward Action) [Unreadable] S¢) 4. posm cu (10H US 41H) ) ¥ 66 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) sp la D H 1015 [3356 sHuclwet of LOT! ond admcristrot te PERGHALOU LOM, References and Relevant Papers: S29 DH 1015 330 MINUTES Cons t& OA Foe d un’ === [PDF page 51] === BRITISH EMBASSY, DJAKARTA, 1011/65 0;,; 9 December, 1965 CONM IDEN TT ALY DH to 336 In my ee are of 25 November about the changes in KOTI I said there was probably more behind it than appeared at first Sight. There is; and this letter attempts to show what. In brief, what is involved is a bid by the military to take over the whole policy-making apparatus of the Government. I think they will succeed. Ze First the facts - though some of these are far from being established with any certainty. On 12 November Sukarno signed three decrees. They have not yet been published. (I have just got hold of a copy of the main one - from the Germans - but I'm afraid it will not be translated in time for this bag.) The first of these decrees sets out the structure of the new KOTI. At the top is the President himself, the Supreme Commander of KOTI, “assisted by" the Deputy Prime Ministers. Then come four Deputy Supreme Commanders. The first of these is described as Wakil Panglima Besar Umum - which might be translated as Deputy Supreme Commander for General Affairs - but it is not at all clear what he would concern himself with. The other three are more specifically defined as Deputy Supreme Commanders for Military, Economic and Social/Political Affairs respectively. Then comes the Chief of Staff, Suharto; his deputy, Muljono; and the rest of the KOTI staff. The decree does not nominate the four Deputy Supreme Commanders. The most’ favoured candidates - going by the frequency with which names are mentioned#in gossip round Djakarta - are the Sultan of Jogjakarta for the "General Affairs" post; Nasution for the military one; and (more doubtfully) Chairul Saleh and Leimena for the economic and political posts respectively, as a sort of bow to the old order. 46 The second decree nominated the officers of the KOTI Groups and Sections. Details of this are annexed to this letter. ue The third decree lists what are to be the twelve KOTI Executive Commands. They are as follows: Mandala Siaga (Joint Readiness) Command (KOLAGA) Defence Command (KOHAN) National Maritime Defence Command (KOHAN-MARNAS) Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KO OPS PEMULIHAN KAM/TIB) National Air Defence Scalia (KOHANUD-NAS ) Berdikari (Self Reliance) Command (KORI) Development Command (KOBANG) Socio Cultural Command (KOSOSBI iD) Command for Retooling the Revolutionary Apparatus National Associations Command (KOS ATN AS ) Intelligence Command (KOINTEL) Foreign Relations Command (KOHUBLU). [Unreadable] D. Tonkin, Esq., FOREIGN OFFICE, Sia. [Unreadable] Vit A === [PDF page 52] === Some of these - Mandala Siaga and KOTRAR, are old Commands. Others - like KORI, which replaces the former KOTOE and KOTARI and KOHUBLU - are new. > 5 You will see from this list of Executive Commands that every single aspect of government is covered, including foreign affairs; and this is, of course, the intention of the pee ae _ namely that KOTI, now almost an entirely military body, uld take over the government of Indonesia, de jure as well as s facto. 6. But a lot remains unclear. Particularly (a) what is the actual chain of command in KOTI; (b) how does the existing Dwikora government fit into the scheme? re As to (a), the impression we have is that Suharto will act directly under the President; and it is true that no real functions seem to have been given to the Deputy Commanders in Chief or indeed to the Deputy Prime Ministers. All the same, the decree differentiates between leadership (whene the Deputy Supreme Commanders “assist™ the President) and routine duties (where Suharto does the "sssisting"). This may only be legalistic wool. The important point is that the intention of the military (as Sjaaf, the admiral in charge of KOTI Group 2, made clear to the Australians last week) is that all p6licy decisions shoulda now be made in the KOTI staff and that the President should merely rubber stamp them. This, of course, represents a complete reversal of the old order where KOTI, although a body of considerable authority, served primarily as an executor of decisions which were the President's or the Presidium's. 8. question (b) above is really the nub of the matter. The decree says that the existing Compas paren 2S and departments of government Will carry on with their work and that the Cabinet Ministers will advise KOTI, and become “special” Staff members, where neceé ary. But again, the intention is that Ministers and Departments wae be obliged to carry out KOTI decisions. That places the civil government pretty squarely under the military. Yet it represents no more than is largely the case already: although sizeable areas of government have still not in practice been invested by the military - I am thinking particularly about foreigr re and the economy - the Army have in fact taken control in the regions. Sumatra is already all but a Military state within thie state; and the same goes, I expect, for the other regions of Indonesia - though our information about them is pretty sketchy. All that remains therefore is this blockage in the centre, this apparatus of civilian government which functions in the Djakarta ministries but whose writ only runs in the country at large with military blessing. No blessing, no writ. The Army cannot rid themselves of this encumbrance without openly defying Sukarno, so they have built a peradies structure of government which they may reasonably hope will gradually take ver the functions of the existing Dwikora cabinet. / 9. One === [PDF page 53] === One theory going the rounds is that the Dwikora Cabinet self Will perhaps not even be dissolved; it will just wither inanition. Another theory is based on rumours about Ages. (This is all really an extension of Yani's lugust.) Et is said that Sukarno (acting more or instruction) will shortly trim the Cabinet down 60 or so; do away with the distinction between minis- [Unreadable] minister/coordinators; appoint a cou a more deputy me Tpiedaters - Adam Malik and Womition erhaps; and relieve cisanaere of his fc reigy affairs por Se and pri > LG EO mere Diah, Sudjarwo (currently ambass “The Hague) or jain Adam Malik. (Djakarta can manufacture 25 such reports a day.) But I have not yet heard of a convincing explanation how even this smaller Cabinet - which presumably will consist of technicians rather than policy-makers - would co-exist with 12 Lxecutive Commands. S cte HH O29 HO O99 s and the enclosure to Kus ashington and I.R.D. pros ete (S.J.G. Cambridge} === [PDF page 54] === RYN Di TT: HOLL WORKRING GHROUUrSD The following are the functions of the seven groups names ol tneir cnairmen and first aeputy chairmen: Brig.Gen. Achmad Wiranatakusumah; ers VOLe JOH oUrAaAla [Unreadable] AULA Welle o jaar r-, Gen. Sadeli , Operations) ar p ‘ ~ iaeee i ny 3 whee =f <n / ANQAOKO Brig. Gen. Brotosewajo modore (Navy) Sujono 8s 2Clisan ousxstial VOLONCL oUuUlalso Drs. Sasono (police, WeONe Ne soerjo DUAL} YVLlSwoaalsoOlho acnmaad L1lrtvosudadiro Rameli KOTI were as follows: wudanario mGal Adi ACnNMadadl \LrOLLtiCal, MCONOMLC aha [Unreadable] WOC LAL / toy eaetior bal WOU ULUIL MavLOM ooCecusol vWo P-atLionNns yeEction Sections nchanged) remain in the new === [PDF page 55] === Sution Lor OMLC BiIhVa wot Will 10n tO ob D. Lonkin, === [PDF page 56] === BRITISH EMBASSY, DJAKARTA. — 23 December 1965 1011/65 DU Ioc/336( My letter 1013/65 Ze There was a meeting of this body on 16 December as a result of which a new and possibly important KOTI Committee has been set up to "formulate a settlement of the security situation" (as Antara puts it). Suharto is Chairman of this Committee, and its members are Leimena, Ruslan Abdul Ghani, Sutjipto (the Chief of Police) and Sumarno (the Minister of Home Affairs). The interesting and rather puzzling thing is that Nasution is not a member. 3% On 19 December this Committee reported to Sukarno. In consequence, Sukarno has issued instructions that those directly involved in the Gestapu should be brought immediately to trial by the special military tribunal (Mahbilub); that those found not to have been involved should be released immediately, "and given an opportunity to operate in their respective fields, contributing to the interests of the revolution"; and that people “responsible for lawless and inhuman activities should be brought to trial and, if necessary, sentenced to death". 4. The Presidential instructions about Mahbilub only endorse What Suharto has already laid down - see (b) in my letter 1011/65 of 16 December about the PKI. But Sukarno seems to have got a Quid-pro-quo of sorts in the instructions to clamp down on everyone who is disrupting law and order, whether they be communists or moslems. This, as you know, has been a constant theme recently in Sukarno's speeches. Similarly, the order about those found not guilty being allowed to go back to their jobs strikes me as being a crack at the anti-PKI ultras who have been opposed to just this. 5. I am copying this to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and BHC Singapore and I.R.D. Mv NW, fee: (S.J.G. Cambridge) D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, RESTRICTED === [PDF page 57] === 56 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded | } where Appropriate) CONFIL Ci Mb is SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 196 INDONESIA De 28/27 FROM fli Mitford, Mowila, to} SUBJECT: ~ SuipPuty A Waformortcon ” Passeal on from Chol o| Ma. Mustay - La Re fe Sqr pat. No. jor2& Dated % Decembex Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) Ah | HY) j (Referred to Legal Adviser) eacmeas (Main Indexed) 4 eet lo i gr v === [PDF page 58] === CONFIDENTIAL * Ct ‘ee 4X oY MANILA. 8 December, 1965. OY 13] NV Deel Doral, When Challis, the B.B.C. man in Singapore, visited me on 2 December, he gave me two snippets of news on Indonesia which may be worth passing on. Ze He said he had just interviewed Ushiba, the Japanese Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was a member of the Japanese Delegation to the Asian Development Bank Meeting of E.C.A.F.E. here in Manila, and the latter had told him the Japanese were ready to give further economic aid to Indonesia, perhaps at the end of January of next year, provided that the political situation in Indonesia seemed propitious (i.e. including a moderate and co-operative foreign policy). Challis asked Ushiba what he thought of Subandrio, and Ushibayreplied that he was a “nasty little man” whom he did not like. Be The second very minor snippet is that the local Indonesian representative of Antara in Manila, who has just come back from a visit to Djakarta, told Challis that he thought Subandrio had now managed to ensure his survival as Foreign Minister. he I am sending copies of this letter to Djakarta, to the High Commissions at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, to the Political Adviser's Office at Singapore and to the Chancery at Tokyo. Youn vf, edi (7.¢M". (L. M. Minford) D.F. Murray Esq., South-East Asia Department, Foreign Office, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 59] === 58 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ag a INDONESIA D N- 1015/23 , 4 A eee Ped SUBJECT: Exclang donvmnk predic d L, US. wd Yeonlrrha. A ‘ dh anwted 3 De wn Bas. cotke ee. “ 5.6. bended dal chaka Se Me te Dated 4 a) scorn References and Relevant Papers: Received ‘ a De comber ° (Outward Action) === [PDF page 60] === aos It has been interruptions. contributions Antere stil r Tas colleague them. i>! lorvg SSF. 9 December, 1965 ALE | [Unreadable] > amenas Tor the SKiIMmMp.i yr RA QSY is BASS BRITISH RTA ADL DJA :,: Ra ee oe an unsatisi actory dd [Unreadable] enciose tnese iian Our Aus however, that you Ure Na 1p n report on the round of arrested A aran american nat he h ich UiLe SECRET & PERSONAL === [PDF page 61] === hie J @ 2 bs; [Unreadable] _* 2 a Eh 4 aaa ii eas | a he api sa ee ao J _— b. dst 2 [Unreadable] poy >” S ~_ ae? he ) egg Rs | . ool ar x ST BOER ys y [Unreadable] [Unreadable] he a ~, ee [Unreadable] ia Set ees cary t ~¢ si PaaS wo ate I -. MM se === [PDF page 62] === aw « + RE RP a ee ain! _ of teewe ha aw === [PDF page 63] === [Unreadable] . B hake: ' United Sta | OUTGOING : APENBABSY DIAKARTA ' Charge: Classification Control: Date: LOO7A f ajo : 3. Gituation regarding Surackese ent other me: not clesr cryptes RDS EEE there womethéluse goed avi dems Amy fe now wevirg toward sore open confrontation with Mvkarve.; by vefectter bis erecaection of prominent Leftists. Bamon« appested acres Dj ckarta streets Leet Pridey demanding purge of Gastape adherents from cabinet and indicating there Nae been more than eanqh delay tn benming PEI. Frese salad some te have shifted imperceptibly te aore demanding tone. Mere. demonstration on Saturday alwo demanded that Gel Tice Tat pg PRT trom palulorsilal tent tas for sereaning GUE of Geetq@e Clerscts. In effect, Aroy seams to be telitog Quksrue iedirectiy but mech wore clearly then heretefere tha: a his time is romding oct to sccomecdate bimesl f te Arup oii! Co ead thet Ara will proceed with or wicheet bin, POL 22ias! pce POE Rotax tare /? Maree / ac Bevenber 29, 1965 REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY (S PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” FORM PS-413? secemr ~ \ === [PDF page 64] === . an374 OCOMYT DENTLAL ORPARTMINT OF STATE Guour 3 Sowagreds each 12 years; sot iO )0Cl:: «MEDAN, SURADAYA sutesatically declassi fied ——eeeenenceaeenneoeaNaeeannetie Smenbeacy MAMASTA December 7, 1065 Sbort Cizewite tn the Guided Ugmperecy Poves Grid i. intredmetion om) soma ry. The current power struggle between the Palace on one hand and the military and their moderate politions party silies on tne other hos wrought interesting cheages is the Guided Leweerecy govermental structure. Prom early 1999 tw Ceqeber 1, 1965 indonesian governuunt oxgems received their pever {roa one dyusse, President Sukerac, who was fond ef cresting new channels of eutlerity 6 frequent intervels lesving earlier channels to fade avey ath Aad. Goverausst organs, which under Guided Desccracy seeusd never Geotines © possess the durshility er indepeedence of institutions, have \ now takes O8 now lige as political parties and the Army seck to plug in te the power grid ond short circuit the Falace. Taio airgran attempts zi. $0 demupibe sone of the recent plays and counter-plays to gaia contre! 6f Ge gevermmental structure and the consequent changes these mancuvers awe brought about ia the etAucture itself.; &. Wie Mer Adminietretion versve the Civil Strusture. with « ertiast of sychephants responsive exly to orders fren the Palace end WAtS regional commnad choancle so onaried and clogged as to be incapatic of recghuse ection, the feu duys of Pulses silence after the September 30 StieGF Lett the civil strestere at both the wationsl and regional levels coupletely paral pred. The Avwy filled this veid im the provinces in & matter of hours tut, encortain of its oun ability to aperate independently of the President, moved ure coutiously is the capital. 4. im taking over the regions] goverment, the silitary ; OM? DENT Lat, PRs PRMGardner sds 12/6/68 R.J. mrtens === [PDF page 65] === i. brew éeblowed the tadonesian castem of iguoring the vrittes law. A conplianted Pepeiveda structure imvelviag less that martial lev bad been created by Ovestdentiel dseree fer just such eusrgency wsaditions. The Aruy, howerer, éuciaved a “State of War” involving full martial lew im Ajakarte and Central down ond applied the substence of sartial lew without the asne in other’ provinces. The Ujskarts Military Coumpndor peiutediy issued oréers as Regional Yer Aduiniotseter (Penguesg Perang Daerah - Peperda) rather thea Pepeiveds. When the President later repealed the State of Bar, he conti ged te insue auch the cane sort of oréers ac Pepolrede, en obvious aisaomer. BS. The wilitary stepped short of prociaiming a astionsl Tar Aésjatetvation. @ukarne, however, mist have feared such 8 development os ome ef his first steps after regeining bis veles was te disband twe formgetten evganizations which had served the Army on the eatiownl level during the mertial law exe of the Best Irian operstions. The Prosiéeat then bergen: theeugh speeches 2a: tecroos to renessert kinsslf as “iupreme Commander.” C. These sanouvers buve resulted ia the drny geining de fecto esatrol over regiensl govermmen: chile the Presidemt id left wits contested eontvel of the centrel exgens. The President's autherity at the center is vedmg challenged tarough e«tre-gevermmeental preseure levied by the Arny oud its polities] sllies, through attenpts te eepture certein civil orgens and though Giverting euthority from civil bedies ia the President‘’s heads to ae oMpnnize tiers,. 3. Bee Bisherte Pupel mde verses the Mintoter of Inferention. cae Avay tnetic which bes bed conmidemble suseece is the Djsharta Military + Coumaader’s effert to axiom! Kis Pepeius anc aon Pepelreda powers to cover * ie eontyel government opersticns es they affect the capital city. ‘The capital's inferastion ucdia neve bewn tae fecn) peint of this soatest. 4. i the epee of & wook following tho September 36 Alfniry, the: Rjokerte Papel reda sacmouded in j;niaiag esaplei4 ountrol of the press, withdrewing the Publication permit of Leftivt sovspapers, and licensing abe e&ti-Commeniet dailies. The Aray likewise established e rivel sews agenty to the Communist~oor' rolled Gevermmest agewey Antara end overtually tok ever Antara itself. The Amy scisilariy placed ite men in the top ~ positions centrelliag the eatieml] redie. B. The Pelace concentrated ite first efforts towards revitalizing ite Miaistry ef iaferuntion, which hed fallen inoperetive during the short legee of Presidential authority. Sxerting the fullest power of whieh be is === [PDF page 66] === a, bd ELTA 4 Fran Qyelae tic cogehhe, the President bas «we sucopeded ia bringing tw Biaistry ef En@evention te a point ot which it cam castest the silitary. ‘The Isfosesticon Minieter bee regained prot: Lisemeing autaority but aust share it to sue extent with the Djaverte Pupeireds. Se nes suycined tituler contrel of the wedte although the Avw bas let it be mown that it reteius @ vets over programming. Pvees egonciss rommin ia ullitery bende. The ost reodlt is thet Gubasus bes nev es outlet for hiv views bet comet, oe ia the pect, wast out all eupposiag vrioss. 4. Serhiawent vereus the Expeutive. dust as the Minister of Infor etion wads swedy t push iaseugh evr presse regulations which aoul4 love po! the Pelece abeed in this field, the sederater called fer redafercements fra @ apet wnespested quericr, Puriiensut. Periiament’s cole ia Guided Demerecy wae @ voice cugpert fur the Sresidunt's policies threngh riagiag resolution. Bt wae alee cliewsd wo pecs legisiatice oa untters ef ae little inpertence 83 aot to warrant Prusiéuetial decrecs. With sear leftist pariiaseetertan euebudes and with « Gimirwen wie surprisingly turned oat to be less « sychepnent thea an euti- Commmaiet, Sarliemest sou shows cigne ef deralepim dete © different exiasl. it ia inct bes bed the courage to oll fer the venaing Of the PEX and 2 speedy politica! sulvtion, al though its semhers woop well ewese test they were therety crossing tee President, who hed eppoi nto them oll. Secentiy Casiress Aredji Martewieete indicated thet Perl iazent wuld taetle ase press lacgislation. The timing of this eancuncement iedico tod that such legislation woule challenge the Mimistsy of infovuntion’s decrees.) it vemsias te be seen, however, whether Parliament is in fact capable ef 2 ete te Onin kaawe. = ©. MU verees_ the Prociding. the sowt teteveetiag spy, petentisliy Be met Gesisive semewrvers iv the Palece-~Aray otruggle edeiad vtretion aave eemteved sroweé siiitsr, ivederr' offerte & seiup tee daprves: Qpevatiogs Cameand (20%:, sac to tram tore 4¢ imte the government's tap mel Mey~eashag only. ‘@. BOTL Su im fact possessed on tapecing euve of authority ia the pmerbupteswer So perted 2s.vkarae cts te prapagete BAB @ect Lapertirct tectagens tiroagh Ghis wedia. There decioions were, however, the President’ < fant te some eater: the © diy: Pyect@iue’s) amt the MOTI staff served oxly es eupceters. Brigadier Gensral a tjipte O83, as e eere BOTT section kond, hevover, made brilliant ees ef MUTI"s seputetion during the early days of | Oetuber By issuleg 4s series of doerete under the MITE eunl eimed at tho PEE amt Ste allies, ' CE TT TAL === [PDF page 67] === ae. i il bo ee hts, RertaTgAt os er s. Pexhaps stimieted by Sutsipte’s emuple, the Amy.vorked ening w ete ears oe eens comiticane eatsiowe tae. £0 Ante am Asay oogan, although sncrificiag Sutjipte in the CC PRPRSE. Tae Asay nepertediy vienslizes this steff as the astion’s top pebiap-enking vedy in social, ccomsmte end palitiont os well ao ailitary fiabée- oud aus hich woulé stend between the President amd the eduinistration, — with the Cabinet and ite Presidiva shanted to the side. Thds inteation wes gxqnees in Wwe cemversetions botwoss BUTI staf? mmhare ant Austmulios etiheere, on evsount of which is cumitted os on enelocare to this siveran. Other MOT officiale guve an Ancvices military rapresentstivessintler reports (iubtels 1683 wad 1661). Tuc President eoviewsly bad #iffe cou: wisheus which highhighted the Previdim's role in BITE. Tat these cumuy?* eedié not be vecinctied wes i2ieetweted by the fect thet the positions Gidottes for four EIT! Deputy Commenters.whieh were probably Sestine’ Ser Generel Gaention unt three of the Pelage’s key negetnen, worm left wnfilies. c. As BOER Chie! of Stet! Gegerel Subarte apparentiy felt no aces to cuait the appoiatecat of Beputy Commanders before setting te work. nis Pivot act une te issue © BUTE Genres cabling for the purge of Bepteuser 30 cleuents fres Coveruamt agensics. Chile secuptiag this ave, Suawen countered with s piey which would neutenlize its effect. a): qupetated thres Kinistors Attached te the Presidive including the erypw” Geemenict Ooi Tjee Tat to sereen purge vietine ant otherwise to edninistwr tae GOTI order. While this skismich ended tn a res, the Army severtheboxs setedns the initiative sad the Presicent cay be pressed to thick qumters for every KOT cove. 6. Boe Barthes verses the Sasionsh Prost. Guided Senpessey viswsitoes parties on sduiniutentive tools to mobilize the pesple in support of the igvernaeat. Their eotivities vere chamneled and csordimnted ty 5 Rational Yount exganteaticn end for the setive youth affiliates » Youth Preat, oe s@Seby ia leftist mewds. Several of the parties, however, pushed aside shat Pvqsidentially-sppetates Leaders and began to ect es partion shewic. a. Gne of the first neves by sederete pelitionl leaders was to establish substitutes for the Bettonsi and Youth Preste. A Coordi nating Body ter United Action to Crash the Ges tepu (Dedne Mgedionel Eyre ters fuk memes Gevters) sons Tne sucess” cat “Woemactice” Shem cot te work “wobilising the aneses” ead “ehanneling™ then eguhaet the PRX and imp Selec. ‘Youth ovgemizations banded inva sr Artion Wadon Of Stedents CGipcetumn Aket ebastews ~ KANE) with parallel tumats ons | COMPEDANIT IAs. i * Bw. === [PDF page 68] === “sykt Bae Bde) at oa TR TOR ML Fe ae + Rabe at DO ods Ba Os: hiss LRG et Bate === [PDF page 69] === 3rd December, FROM: Australian Embassy, DJ AKARTA. SAVINGRAM No, 61 SECRET ECONOMIC SAVINGRAM General Since our Economic Savingram No. 57 of 17th November, there hus veen greater interest shown by the various parts of the government structure in tackling the economic problen, the driving forces being the elimination of the PKI influence which had in the past prevented many possible schemes for reform (most notably the IMF proposals of 1963) from being put into practice, the fact that things have got so bad that the economic situation is shouting for priority attention and political jockeying for position. Some moves have been made, most notably the huge increases in petrol and kerosene prices. However these increases, plus increases in various utilities' charges, have combined with alreacy existing factors to push prices of most goods to even higher levels, and the black market exchange rate has continued to rise (Rp. 30,000 to the US$ on December 3rd, after reaching Rp. 39,000 on November 24th). These moves are encouraging insofar as they represent an attempt to break out of the former system of finance by subsidy and thus, in practice, by note issue. Ze The IMF scheme envisaged, but failed to produceg, large foreign-financed imports to meew demand and help revenues, through import duties. But such imports and eredits are not even in the offing at present. 3. All the present interest in economic measures and policy has, of course, a high political content. The anti-PKI coalition, which in fact had approved the increases in petrol and kerosene prices, is using them and other general price increases to urge a Cabinet reshuffle on the President (see below), while the Cabinet Presidium, notably Saleh, is also trying to strengthen its position by taking part in discussions on the situation, issuing deerees, appointing advisory groups, and so on. 4. The general atmosphere is of course not helped by the absence of a “political solution" from the /resident, and all kinds of rumours are current. One of the most persistent of these predicts a radical currency reform within the next week or two. Another, from various sources, anticipates the "political solution," combined with the sought-for Cabinet changes, within the next few days. === [PDF page 70] === Prices 5. Prices have resumed their headlong rise of September, as the following table of prices of basic commodities, in rupiahs, at an average Djakarta market shows:- August November 12 December 2 Top grade rice (litre) 475 1350 2800 Medium grade rice (litre) 410 1200 2300 Wheat flour (kg.) 1900 2200 3000 Dried fish (kg.) 1779 3000 4000 Sugar (kg.) 485 800 1200 Salt (brick) 118 150 250 Coconut oil (bottle) 950 2000 2000 Kerosene (litre) 150 175 350 Poplin (metre) 2700 6000 7500 10. Unbleached cotton (metre) 2250 4500 5000 11. Khaki drill (metre) 4750 11000 14000 6. It can be seen that fixing the kerosene price at Rp.150, the old free market price (formerly notionally Rp. 3 litre), has not brought the official and actual prices together. Our information on prices in other centres is deficient but some examples of rice prices can be given:- 17th November Medan Rp. 1650 per kilo 20th November Palembang. 20th November Surabaja yy Oe & ase 25th November Jogjakarta 7 OO ° # e 27th November Semarang " 2400 " ° Government Increases in Prices and Charges 1» It seems clear that a central decision has been taken to try and rationalise the operation of government enterprises by raising prices and charges to economic levels, with the aim of eliminating the subsidies that have been Major causes of the huge budgetary deficits of recent years. In the last fortnight passenger rail fares have gone up from one and a half to four times; railway freizht rates by approximately five times; Garuda fares by approximately five times; postal rates by approximately four times; and sea fares {peini) and Djakarta gas charges have also been increased. One can imagine the reaction these increases would have brought from the PKI had it still been functioning. 8. As it is, with the new anti-communist press, reactions to all these changes were very mted.. The increases in the prices of o11 and oil products, however, provoked a reaction that could not be so easily dampened down. 9. In a decree of 8th November, made public on 22nd November, the Minister for 0il and Gas Affairs, Major General Ibnu Sutowo declared Indonesia-wide increases in the prices of all oil products. The new prices, in rupiahs per litre, are:- petrol 250; kerosene 150; Aytur & Avigas 200; scolar oil 150; diesel oil 100; fuel o1l 100, Speaking the same day, Saleh said that the increases were mecessary if the oil companies were to continue producing; === [PDF page 71] === huge sums were being spent in subsidies; as things were profits went to middlemen and speculators; he realized. the imcreases would hurt the small mm, but they were the lesser of two evils. Sutowo later defended ths increases im the same terms, and on lst December “Business Hews," close to the Department of Trade, listed the aims of the increases as follews:— ending of subsidy withdrawal of funds from the publie creation of sources of finance for 1st Grade Regions (who retain Rp, 50 from every litre sold) encourage economy in the use of gasoline and end abuses in its distribution. However although calculations were produced, based on the share of petrol costs im costs of trans xt operations and the share of transport costs in food prices, to show that the oil price increases need not have too arastic an effect the immediate reaction has been a leap in prices, and considerable public criticiam has followed. The nain critics have been spokesmen for the N.U. Party and the Army and Armed Forces ene al and the burden of their complaints has been that e the motives behind the increases are understandable and good, their timing was psychologically most unsuitable, at a time when the people are still unsettled waiting for a political solutiom, and the economy in an over-excited state. The motives for this oriticiem appear te have been to try to bring on an early Presidential banning of the PKI; and to prepare the way for Cabinet changes. There were some early rumours that the increases were a ot ee move to discredit the Army. We discount se. Ibm Sutowo, Minister for 011 and Gas Affairs, was faced with a grave shortage of rupiah finance in his dealings with the foreign oil companies, and you may recall a remark of Saleh's to the Ambassador some tine that an imorease in prices was long overdue, but the rament “didn't have the guts to ao it." The present government may be much the same, but it doesn’t have the PKI breathing down its ll. Estimates of the revenue that will accrue to the eS. as a result of the price increases vary from « 400 to Rp. 680 billion. Moyes by the President and Presidium 12. The N.U. and Armed Forces are ae not going to have it all their own way in forcing Cabinet changes on economic issues. ‘The Presidium and President have had a number of meetings, at the conclusion of most of which they expressed proper concern for the plight of wage and salary earners, particularly these in ernment employ, and on 16th November Sukarno charged Presidium wit the necessary measures to control the situation. 13. Om 22nd November the President issued his decree 25 of 1965, on the government's Pinaneial and Eeonomic Policy for 1966 (translation of text ty aeney. The decree contains a lot of pious hopes, is nevertheless of interest. SE fees Gass ee ef we eka ct === [PDF page 72] === Main points:- (a) the government will exercise stringent financial economy; (b) banks are to extend credit on @ production feuarantee basis; (c) the government will control the import and export trade; imports on deferred payment, and the SPP system are both to be abolished; (ad) the government is to fix the prices of some goods; (e) wages/salaries are to be based om minimum physical requirements; civil servants are to receive an allowance of certain commodities; (f) government agencies are to use a system of Clearing accounts in their transactions between themselves. There is some background to points (b) (c) and (f) above in our Savingram No. 57. 14. These goals or expressions of hope were however announced in bare outline only, and the net result was to add to the general uncertainty, and spur local prices and the free market in foreign currency even higher. Promises were made that the Presidium would review the wages and Salary scales of civil servants and servicemen. However, these have not yet been Changed. An indication of the urgency of the situation is that when the Naval Officer now in charge of Tandjung Priok raised wharf labourers wages at the end of November to a basic Rp. 1250 per day he was making a 600% increase. The men now also receive meal and rice allowandes. 15. Instead of reviewing wages the President has taken the much more flamboyant step of decreeing a festival season (Lebaran, Christmas and Chinese New Year) bonus of Rp. 75,000 per person to all government employees, This is to be paid in December, together with the bonus of Rp. 30,000 per person decreed by the Presidium as a for all private enployers. This is goings to mean about Rp. 400 billion hitting the economy in one month, and in the absence of very large supplies of imported goods, of which there is at present no concrete sign, the effect on prices can be imagined - always assuming that the government can get hold of enough currency to pay the bonuses. This is highly doubtful. 16. On 25th November the Presidiun decreed into existence a oe Implement and Supervise the 1966 Economic Policy Decree.* Members are:- Chairman Saleh lst Deputy Dr. Suharto ne Minister.c 2nd Deputy Dr. Sumarno Finance Minister Coordinator) Members Drs. Surjadi (Minister for Budget Affairs) Arifin Harahan (former Minister for frade) Drs. Hoegeng (Minister for State Revenues) Notohami prodjo (Minister for Funds and Forces) Brig. Gen. Soerjo (Chairman, KOTI Finance Group). oord.) ary === [PDF page 73] === This is presumably Saleh's answer to a new Economic Emergency Cabinet, and it seems to have some high-handed actions in mind. For months the government has been trying to get businessmen to switch their capital from trading to investment in domestic industry, and has been trying, with little success, to work through a businessmen's associ::tion called Bamunas. In an edict of 22nd November, however, a private bank, the Private Development Bank, has been declared the sole bank for development undertakings; Notohamiprodjo, the President's fund-raiser, is to “guide” it, and it is obligatory on all private entrepreneurs, both national and foreign domestic, to hold shares or debentures in it. The Bank is to be under the control of the Presidium, and non-contributors will first have their operating permits cancelled, later have the businesses put under government control and expropriated. The move is typical of the crude pressure tactics that have become a feature of the government's relations with private business, but its motives are understandable in view of the government's acute shortage of funds. Rance 17. The financial position is strange. Saleh has said the 1965 deficit will be between Rp. 800 and 900 billion, and it will probably be higher, and the figure commonly used for money in circulation is now Rp. 1,500 billion. In spite of this, there is a chronic shortage of cash in the banks. At the same time rumours are rife of a coming financial coup by the government, kmocking off three noughts from existing currency in such a way as to prevent the currency hoarders from converting their holdings, and thus overcoming the results of excessive use of the printing press in the past. This rumour is linked with the alleged arrival of a C130, loaded with eet from Pakistan, where they were printed. You will in a better position to assess this, but we recall earlier reports of Indonesian currency notes of ordinary denominations being printed in Pakistan. ad Fo Cc 2 18. The President's decree on 1966 Financial/Sconomic Policy declared that import on deferred payment was to stop, and that the SPP system was ended. While the latter has not been satisfactory (our Savingram No. 57) the move to end it, without giving any indication of what is to replace it, Caused chaos and the black market foreign currency rate soared. Bank Negara Indonesia however quickly stated that the system would continue until its replacement was ready, and in fact liberalised terms on which "importers/exporters in possession of an import identification number" could buy SPPs to be available for use in one and two months' time. Sales are said to have reached US$20 million at a rate of 44, i.e. Rp. 220 billion. 19. Deferred payment is more puszling. An importer using the deferred payment system did, however, due to the particu- _ lar banking and foreign exchange regulations get a very cheap dollar in comparison with other forms of finance open to hin, and the government may have wanted to end this. The Ambassador's recent conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, however, makes it quite clear that the Indonesian Government has no intention of ending its own use of deferred payment terms wherever it can get them, and it may be that the government really wants to stop private importers taking slices of deferred payment credits extended by other countries on a basically governmental basis. The announcement Came as a shock even to senior Central Bank officials dealing with foreign exchange and payments matters, === [PDF page 74] === FROM S-SG. Sacto §.E-AD “(44 akere ) le Dated 9 dzcomly Received (& decemsse: (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where /A ppropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D, (015,339 SUBJECT: Exbrcel fm fulness. lhevatad * of GF decanter on frocks. [Unreadable] 7 ne Governmmerct UM-a- ve lrvlay SlH- of North fs, f hk alomanté: Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 75] === With the compliments of S.J.G,. Cambridge 9 December, 1965 BRITISH EMBASSY DJAKARTA === [PDF page 76] === Extract from THE INDONESIAN HERALD, 8 December 1965 UNITARY STATE OF NORTH KALIMANTAN Today, the Unitary State of North Kalimantan observes its third anniversary. Since its proclamation on 8 December, 1962, the Unitary State has carried the struggle against British neo-colonialism on all fronts. The military front is in a stalemate, but in the field of diplomacy, North Kalimantan has succeeded in winning important gains. The Unitary State has widened its diplomatic activities and has been participating in important international conferences held in the Africa-Asian world. The government of Indonesia, of late, has been under pressure from political parties to extend recognition to the Unitary State of North Kalimantan. The parties argued that it is only logical that as a follow up of Indonesia's consistent support for the cause of North Kalimantan freedom and independence, the government should extend early recognition of this State. The issue is all the more pressing because our support for the cause of North Kalimantan is one given as a matter of principle: the universal principle of our antinecolim philosophy and policy. As we see it, the present stand of the Indonesian government towards the Unitary State of North Kalimantan, cannot in any way be interpreted as lack of support for the cause of the people of North Kalimantan. Our support is as complete as it is irrevocable. Further, it must be noted that our stand vis a vis North Kalimantan is not exception. Indonesia also waited a good many years before extending recognition to the revolutionary government of Algiers, for instance! But prior to recognition we had extended every possible support to the cause of Algerian independence, If Indonesia has not yet recognized North Kalimantan today, if must be seen within the larger scope of finding an overall settlement to the problems which now beset Southeast Asia. Indonesia is of the conviction that recognition of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan is but one aspect of the overall problem which had produced this area which is Southeast Asia. As we pointed out in our editorial yesterday, Southeas Asia is now in the midst of a twilight. A thorough crystallization is in the offing in this area. In the light of these circumstances, a piecemeal approach to the problems which constitute part of the overall issue of security, peace and national independence in this region may prove to be unwise. It may lead to new complications. But in the meantime, the people of North Kalimantan can continue to count on the full and unwavering support of the Indonesian people. We are extending them our full support because we know that their struggle against British neo-coloniaj ism is an integral part of our universal struggle against all forms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. On their national day, we extend to the people of North Kalimantan our best wishes. We wish them God speed in their noble struggle! (Copied to: JMID, SEAD, Kuala Lumpur, POLAD & BHC Singapore) === [PDF page 77] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded v9 where Appropriate) INL iA SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT eee INGUIN SIA D... — 2K0 FROM SUBJECT: heat Sf: re mdical lio aswpet xs FO Buc Minera if ge \ relae sebpiol A e ha/ges oo” che towesint on alert couse CMR {ON Ken ) Se =p a; o AG uAL VG 4. atarlé fa Dated 14 \ ecurbe Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received > Drembe Cu CED Cn To Fry | (Outward Action) Ut ) Tel Ae. 2 Lo (> (Referred to Legal Adviser) i = ) ee fty bl. nau tr l. iemeneel (Main Indexed) ‘ noe 2. th: 1 allt hg» O| === [PDF page 78] === Number of copies Number of copies of enclosures === [PDF page 79] === Ed (1627) CONFIDENTIAL INCICPONCE ies ro Peg Oe ie Al telephoned this afternoon to ask the best thing to do; she had just read in the Evening Standard that her sister had been arrested in Djakarta. The sister is married to an Indonesian and her married name is is not sure whether she holds a British or an Indonesian passport, but feels that in any case she would keep in touch with the British Consul. According to the press report the charge is “involvement in pro-Communist attempts at a coup". intimated that this was absurd. I suggested that she first enquire of the Indonesian Embassy in London (in case her sister is an Indonesian citizen) and also send a cable to the Consul in Djakarta. She asked me to contact her, if we had any news,at her office rather than at home Since her parents would be upset. I asked Mr. Tonkin in South East Asia Department whether they had by chance had any news from Djakarta. He said he thought he had seen a report recently which gave the impression that there might be some foundation in such a charge and that we should have to proceed extremely warily. I realise that such reports do not normally come our way and I wonder whether it would not be simpler for South East Asia Department to deal with this case altogether? 13 December, 1965 Mr. Baker Ga EE ee, =. ase 2 eae Fe E.A 2 === [PDF page 80] === Minutes. INDONESIA ARRESTS: LONDONER | Britlskh woman who became | an Indonesian citizen.and + Worked at the Foreign | Ministry has been arrested | OR. charges of involvement; in the’ pro - Communist | attempted coup, the newspaper Mertju Suar (Light House) reported. It identified her as Londonborn Carmel Brickman, 40, whd married an Indonesian Government official. Mr. Suwondo Budiardjo, in Prague. | She was an economic adviser | to. Dr. Subandrio. the Foreign | Minister and first. Deputy. | Premier. The paper said she. was a member of the. now-banned Communist -Scientists’ Association. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the London School of Economics. bout sae SCord ancl ake jun fea] > See YbS lox (Ras port iss us_ol IQ New ey No +2trnuc, aio 4 FHC a he ook Ed (1626) === [PDF page 81] === om 9b | wo 404 earn er ror mole 4 modo hep vo omen pro dt ays Fr rill usdory 7h roy P| TDL key red > Fs yon My OF Se oa Pee 97) 2)? yor, yor tee pire wr Wey a Rsrsou-m9 moumopys ZH aren | Poys7y irre Reoryo “| cae empant, 2 sty b erm Fh | VAUIE === [PDF page 82] === balewg fortinr &Qrures oH thaet owh uot’. === [PDF page 83] === Ed (1627) Reference dbeudl Fy ghee ee a tien, 2 4 Dalal ee. Re. a7]$0 (ac? wafratunce) | Poy talagiaw enh w= Tol: S. oul: === [PDF page 84] === ole SEF Registry No. Eps oft. ene p ehould eo DER TMENT Ue s; Mi each areero(sy; lage I Date) a ee Security classification —if any (eodewOnd FF GAY oe stsigiccncs operate BT 7 i 7 ae SB pee Aa Se SCLC PPO AINO ics to anes inne s ANE SOs Wee nen Sad get NGS ee repeated for information LOT... Repeat to:— daGlust hatte © Saving to:— So Con. or qyets tke meaTtu ddowena. ‘Mweparer su kR as statag Tat Distribution:— Sopa (urenlAe SEAdD Suid olor News Copicgntite—e Racrpest” === [PDF page 85] === eee Us the aherTiune Coup - faut” tite ep enrol hares: 20) ge toes i ro second y fer Aattnt. AC cr, UC Genus Citagy Cat” gles (22 Ss oohe i Beetle: sk te. alte, 42916 Bred int yet aS a wfigi Wack 2 Lox) ake === [PDF page 86] === OUT TO DJAKARTA TEL NO 2424 OF 14 DEC CYPHER/OTP UNIT 6 BROWN IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. A REUTER REPORT DATELINED DJAKARTA 13 DECEMBER QUOTES THE INDONESIAN NEWSPAPER MERTJU SUAR AS STATING THAT MARRIED TO » AN INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, HAS BEEN ARneotty UN CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ABORTIVE COUP. MRS BRICKMAN'S LAST BRITISH PASSPORT WAS ISSUED IN NOVEMBER 1949 AT PRAGUE. AS THERE IS NO RECORD OF HER RENUNCIATION OF BRITISH NATIONALITY, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT SHE IS A DUAL NATIONAL. IS SHE REGISTERED WITH YOU AS A BRITISH SUBJECT? PLEASE TELEGRAPH ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY HAYE ABOUT HER PRESENT ee HER RELATIVES HAVE MADE ENQUIRIES AT THE FOREIGN OFF ICE. === [PDF page 87] === FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA es 5 CONFIDENTIAL Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION SEAD No. 22) 14 December, 1965 D. 1345 14 December, 1965 IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL A Reuter report datelined Djakarta 13 December quotes the Indonesian newspaper Mertju Suar as stating that. » married to |.. an Indonesian Government official, has been arrested on charges of involvement in the abortive coup. last British passport was issued in November 1949 at Prague. As there is no record of her renunciation of British nationality, it seems likely that she is a dual national. Is she registered with you as a British subject? Please telegraph any information you may have about her present whereabouts. Her relatives have made enquiries at the Foreign Office. DISTRIBUTED TO:- S.H.A.D. J.M.I-D. Consular Dept. News Dept. Passport Office CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 88] === ZCURITY CLASSIFICATION En Clair. Draft Telegram to:— ‘olcon. oe a KS (Date).. And to:— Repeat to:— Saving to:— Distribution: — SEAD Conse Suid Copies to:— (RSD * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should TOACI AUITORROULS) on cep oc sa. Ui cnc in open oes PRIORITY MARKINGS Security classification —if any [ Codewotd—if any iixicncca tec hein nceantogal AGGEESSCH 40 on Ke telegram NO oecccoccsscvioos === [PDF page 89] === — aan hy ecemper, ecember: === [PDF page 90] === COPS FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL) DISTRIB ION Bi DK Io Loe Mr. Murray LO, (A) No. 2740 D.0937 15 December 1965 15 December 1965 eo: R.1115 15 December 1965 IMMEDIATE ADH — CONFIDENTIAL Your telegram No. 22,2): Person named is not registered with us as a British subject. 2. We believe that her husband, was arrested some while ago because of his connexion with a Communist student movement; and that both he and his wife work in the D.F.Al 3. If you wish, Her Majesty's Consul could make informal enquiries of the Head of the Consular Section in the D.F.A., wao 1s a pleasant and cooperative person to deal with. The fact that relatives have been making enquiries about her would give us reasonable grounds for raising the matter with the Indonesians in accordance with chapter 7, paragraph 4 of S.F.I. DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES SENT Consular Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 91] === 88 oa 8 pi is QALY 2, Gor. aes (Wy? ett prhirk uy" CCYPHER/OTP FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE FROM seeceesoseesessceseseseeee TELEGRAM NUMBER 2740 DESP 0937 15/12 DATED 15 DECEMSER RECD 1115 15/12 IMMEDIATE CONFL YOUR TEL 2424 3: PERSON 34-595 #RASIATG 2050 Ju_an_o FAI TISH SUBJECT. 2e WE BELIEVE THAT HER HUSBAND, WAS ARRESTED SOME WHILE AGO BECAUSE OF HIS CONNEXION WITH A COMMUNIST STUDENTHOVE HIS CONNEXION-WITH-A-COMNUNIST-STUDEMT “MOVEMENTs AND THAT BOTH HE AND HIS » WIFE RK IN THE D F Ae Seoe IF YOU WISHY HM CORSUL COULD MAKE INFORMAL ENQUIRIES OF THE THE HEAD OF THE CONSULAR SECTION IN THE DFA, WHO 1S A PLEASANT AND COOPERATIVE PERSON TO DEAL WITHe THE FACT TWAT } RELATIVES HAVE BEEN HAYKING ENQUIRIES ABOUT HER WOULD GIVE US REASONABLE GROUNDS |; FOR RAISING THE MATRTER WITH THE INDONESTAKS IN necosaped AHA nee 2852-98e0424 7 PARA 4 OF SsSmte PSF: === [PDF page 92] === TOP Copy CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. M se Apeiad Dod, dit 106] u4g6) 5 14 December, 1965 3 17 December, 1965 No. 2/750 Ds 10.4 16 December, 1965 R,~tis> IMMEDIATE Nk lOolS [gqo CONFIDENTIAL Your telegram No. 242) [sic? my telegram No. 24/0]: H.M. Consul saw the Head of the Consular Section today. Ze Sukawati said that: had been employed by the Economic Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and had latterly been on Subandrio's personal staff. She was an active member of the H.S.I. (the Communist Scholars Movement) and had been "frozen" in accordance with instructions issued by the Supreme Operations Command (K.0.T.1I.) immediately after the attempted coup. Since then she had been reporting daily to the D.F.A. 3- He did not know, however, whether she had actually been arrested. But he said that whatever the legal position about her nationality (and of this he was not certain) he would make enquiries to discover where she was at present, when she was to be brought to trial (if this were the case) and when and if it would be possible for H.M. Consul to see her. 4e We received a telegram this morning from ] asking us to do our best on her behalf. I should be grateful if you would acknowledge receipt, and inform her of such of the above as you think necessary. DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES SENT. Consular Dept. SHAD. dete soe iL ee ba uuuuu CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 93] === IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED BRITISH EMBASSY (1611/65) DJAKARTA ba) DH 1°) x 3400 ) 24. December 1965 Dear Consular Department, Please refer to our telegram no. 2750 of 16 December about 2a The Consul spoke to Sukawati again yesterday, and was told that the Department of Foreign Affairs still had no knowledge of her whereabouts. They will now get in touch with the Army. 36 The Consul will see Sukawati again next week. Yours ever, Consular Dept., Foreign Office, === [PDF page 94] === [Unreadable] Draft. Telegram to:— Malcorla ALAN And to:— Repeat to:— Brr-Gteir Ce Coder Cypher— tb. rt Distribution:— rep Kintak a TD SEAD News. Copies to:— Comtis *Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should h add siabad AF reach addressee(s) | g i “TEHERGENGY a. INMTEDTATE oe —ERIORI TD Ye Despatched............. a. 63x SAT aaa with priority wynout DEF D ery eed ~ if any [Codeword—if any] PPE LO ES uae telegram No. repeated for INfOFMALION 10..0.ccccccvseterseievieiersneinee Ce eilipaten es fs ee 17150 E Ib mo] = dStre a forte “a g [Unreadable] Conantay. hey A Oyo yy === [PDF page 95] === FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION NO. 2520 40 December 1965 i. oso 30 December 1965 PRIORITY Your telegram No. 2750 [of 16 December: Is there any further news? DISTRIBUTED TO: Sc Behe Us Consular Dept. News Dept === [PDF page 96] === | RECEIVED IN ARCH“ LIne: ak Pill P ' [Unreadable] Draft. Security ee Telegram to:— —if any Salant Repeat to:— Cypher Distribution:— gamit Ge 12 SEAD SmId Conse te bgaanh latist poss (Oe,: News, Congclar Copies to:-— Ye ist. T0.*. Faz 79 Def News dekl~ Coro Cro “ Besl (89335) Wt. 47483/47 200m 3/64 Hw. === [PDF page 97] === (*«srnHher Cyt et J y AS ~. [Unreadable] Atl 2 ath in icy; 7 ne ee ee ee [Unreadable] we? NLR SL oe Aa ~ aa dh babe 2 ADELE PE EO 2. = —_ wT i a di wa J 4d & J [Unreadable] ~ Jd oh abe 4 ‘wv [Unreadable] ST CGMND TRTTtlraktrh DISTRIBU SU revi <T7 ~ iLL Daly Lt Fi [Unreadable] mr; INTO Th [Unreadable] Ll 4.‘ PWViisod Ui be hPa ES ee ~ o« et an De ee ae HOY PRE REET CORBI. we ee ee ben Bee [Unreadable] +. ii tds b &:.* rit Fhe Pa? Oe /:; eee Wee me ek ee peewee. eee whe oe ——————— [Unreadable] f Lie iv a ev nual ’ a H lols | SH Or Or’ A: a ’ J e [Unreadable] ‘ A i L L Ni Lid J wae a Lo LOULLY,,OTIL LDC; VO LIIUOU Uli Cc [Unreadable] [ sLLOLLULES me UnacrvuooK tO Lina Out [Unreadable] J. L hat i be i Loch a Wik V CA Ii uv V7 A. GA Ld ev ifly Vile [Unreadable] eh, LX de hf JL wD LALA i o>.) bik LBL = | [Unreadable] Ad ee ee i Liwd } ds i. nw WILLA wilt vy Vio A Ve de WwW b [Unreadable] / «© oe ee [Unreadable] rr’.: A. 4 oat [Unreadable] === [PDF page 98] === RESTRICTED ~, FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DJAKARTA Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION No. 56 10 January 1966 D. 1600 10 January 1966 PRIORITY RESTRICTED y dd. 1o1SB40 My telegram No. 2520: Two M.P.'s and Amnesty International are interested in her Please telegraph latest position. DISTRIBUTED TO: S.EA. Dept. JoM.I. Dept. News Dept. Consular Dept. RESTRICTED === [PDF page 99] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT this of Te 13 NAD nd ANE if* ty J N /OIS 3 HA / ‘ SUBJECT: Jyi/ paid cammink: " iy A qa [Unreadable] OW fl, Joop (7h Mage ) Vahey oot ay che bceer rn f reports nw [Unreadable] [teint fiat [4452 tnderrert/ sme vc by. [Unreadable] - f tp pea 6 seaier¥ inte 9 b odlcesscottt ny heeen we « Lins oY v re v No. 368 Dated 9 Secuntev. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received +7 decemba (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action (Mair completed) aij === [PDF page 100] === e ee ce FROM THE HAGUE TO FOREIGN OFFICE ‘sy a4 En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir. P. Garran D. 1615 9 December, 1965 No. 368 9 December, 1965 R. 1700 9 December, 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 368 of 9 December. Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore Djakarta Kuala Lumpur Dutch Press Comment on Indonesia. The Independent Hague newspaper "Haagsche Courant" in an editorial on 7 December discusses President Sukarno's present position. The paper does not think that the President is likely to be in a carefree frame of mind, seeing that his prestige has been undermined since 30 September and that his power as a dictator is waning. The "Haagsche Courant" refers to Sukarno's recent speech during the opening meeting of the Provisional Council for Popular Consultation, in which he described the Commnists who took part in the coup d'état as "rats who have to be caught and punished". "At present" says the paper, "the rats are fleeing in all directions. But rats multiply very rapidly. And there is no Pied Piper of Hamelin in Indonesia". Foreign Office please pass to POLAD Singapore, Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur ‘as my telegrams Nos. 18, 33 and 26. / Repeated as requested/ DISTRIBUTED TO: Western Dept. S.H.A.D. J M.I.D. JoleP sGcDe Likes News Dept. === [PDF page 101] === ¢ 42 ieenlliy. Gitling<te'hé Unc’ 47 D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D H 101§/34a [Unreadable] SUBJECT: lelifenra[, (ier “Syadart Jacy Mat f “/42, Le tag 2 ( a an ee ahs: gi., gt - Mh Cngf Cher method of cndbeclFinaleen. - Dated (5 decentbs Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 36 Secosaler (Outward Action) === [PDF page 102] === Bk toi [34% With the compliments of .G. Cambridge 15 December 1965 BRITISH EMBASSY DJAKARTA === [PDF page 103] === aa Ar ATM DJAKARTA DAILY the ee ee. Editorial from ee eee ee aTtT J ASTI: a sat Murder will out! days arter the mas: ajor General Soeharto, stan juaja, from the de his not allowing Evil un LNOPrEee pwns of to remain V wh a t mnunis 'Indonesia' erted creatures who their way of. life ot sii All réels must also our children ecently it was in the hearts for the to the they im mor al basely mater: rty only, possess enobled py the religion imparts. “Weltanschaung"™ an enemy which may smbered and these scur Vy the innocent souls toddler the basest ri oe pel mon Lat child roving instead utterly into 4 ethics which grow up With a ideology enemy, nutilated, dism: into an immc bidding nc mercy, murdered. What, and love of children's tion to to “love and God", in diametric: pillar of Pantjasila. minds, FNP WD ake diametrical op our school children your ean A Val misdeeds cOlden Horse” who sdiate iren that by Will obtain method alistic tp: gs, ed of a “Welts humaneness, they which be slandered, ral sadistic libe knowin one's President Soe country, osition MATL" 11 October, LG OF Tubang lighty for national tragedy, we now of the renegade eee and morfally abduction, mutilati nt to add to their medal, lowest conts the sexual yions of claws on passed the they Padas Y tnaewrtern childre ible rt ift raying to want: repare idolizing haung™ not wien morals the. child everyone of different abducted, have the child ready to do the not the meaning of fellowman. vali Oi a What 4i,y ed to intend and would calls They would tr tine the endeffect in admonition to your parents very first With cekarno' s Love to the / Oar toddlers' === [PDF page 104] === Our toddler's minds and souls at the "tender me of “Miss Teachers" of exactly the same ilk as the she-devils of Lubang Buaja, depraved women who can mutilation and murder to immorality in almost the breath. Knowing this what Indonesian worthy of the name is not seized with chills of stark horror? What Indonesian will not condemn creatures capable of befouling childrens" souls in this matter? What Indonesian will not curse the perverted masterminds behind this systematic rottening of the characters of the future hope of our Nation? Beware, such depraved minds are still among us!; the hidden and camouflaged henchmen, agents, apologists, sympathizers, fellow-travellers and soft-pedalists of the Gestapu-PKI who have paved its way until conditions were ripe for the lst of October. They are still embedded in the Institutes of the tist Pajtjasila Republic of Indonesia. They occupy high j 5S in our educational system. They are people who have so far embraced the Communist ideology, that they have been found worthy of a"Stalin"” prize. They are the people who want to eliminate religious teaching from our schools and exchange “religion” with “love for fellowman"”, yea verily that ‘love for fellowman" which manifests itself in gouging out his eyes, dismembering his limbs and private parts, cutting his throat and pulping in his skull. General Nasution has said recently that there is no olace for Communists in Indonesia a statement Which has the full support of the loyal Pantjasila People of Indonesia. No, there is no place yr them in this God fearing Nation Cast out this spawr Pv beiks7r and branch, tear down the walls of their ideological edifices, plough the salt into the sterile sands of their alien mental beachhead, let communism nevermore sojourn in this Nation. (Copied to S.E.A.D., I.R.D., Kuala Lumpur and POLAD Sing gapore ) === [PDF page 105] === gk Oe (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D ere Appropriate) CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 5 LJ VJ iJ 5 Oreo : JI VS INDONESIA D. /015/343 FROM SUBJECT: 77 ant<7<a/ ae lreactea! Sf ocKemes bfstcché f Nr Saas | a eee L Vuamay ( Yyaharta t) Le 6 Ieece:nte. Wt, bable No. (Wes Dated 9 Accent Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 1*¥ f peson bor IM. (our (Outward Action) t baller iM. Muwoy( Ichorls) cae eee Cobke { 4! ‘ (Referred to Legal Adviser) pcrectesath (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 106] === BRITISH Consultative Assembly the day before. course, based on Antara. We have 5+ Ary Y 4 is it Was re-proadacast rom naaLo since obtained from the American smbassy an idiomatic transis A lation of Dijakarta Tt is a fascinating document and I think you might like to read it in toto. A copy is enclosed. i do not know what effect hi petulant threats to resign are having on the eliberations of the Assembly; but the impression I derive n reading the text is that of an 1d man who is at present 43 everything rather too much for him. However, Sukarno air in aia macilience i} the nast and he ay ‘ as emarKka LE resilience in tne past - ana ne may, alas, pur, POLAD and BHC Singapore. === [PDF page 107] === CONFIDENTIAL INDONESIA I agree with H.M.Chargé d'Affaires at Djarkata that the full text of President Sukarno's speech of 6 December (enclosed with Mr. Murray's letter of 9 December) is well worth reading. 2, On the one hand it reveals more Cearly and convincingly than anything else I have yet seen, how far the President has lost his old grip and incisiveness. As Mr. Murray says, it is 1 speech of an old man, who is at present finding everything rather too much for him. On the other hand, nowever, wooly and uncharacteristic the phrasing of the speech may be, the sentiments are entirely typical of the Be@ident, not least in his repeated emphasis that everyting must be subordinated to fostering the unity of the nation by concentrating popular attention on foreign mistakes. 3% I have thanked Mr. Murray separately. Wy.di de Ib VL = EY Cable 13 December, 1965 PES awe, JMID, FORD, PUSD, (Mr. Goodenough) IRD. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 108] === SDP DV DPpNReMrrmn ori? mn Th TIN WO TAY aT SFrhBCH BY PRESIDENT ¢ SU JKARN 10. 1. Tab, ars ECIA L SESSION.ON MON if UN DAY CF Z The President refers familiarily to a number of cministers i course of this speech. Annexed at the end are some notes on these people are. / I don't clearly know "which leaders" session this is. I just hope this is the MPRS myself confronted by the MPRS don't know which } but those here j MPRS. here inetbad of in Bandung am relieved by Nekolin. Yesterday, I heard a report that within one hour, people in Hong Kong know what hour after someone is killed, or t 2 is a secret they know about it. This proves there are Nekolim news to the centres of Nekolin. But we know this Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Washington and London here, because we are their enemy. But anyway, in Hong Kong it was said that the MPRS session will in Djakarta in the Istana, not in Bandung, because the President to go to Bandung... So see say I ordered it held in Djakarta. only wishf ig, that the President only feels safe There is other wishful thinking concerning my life. WN me dead. Sometimes, if I have a special illness - if, for instance, have an infected toe - I call a special doctor, Dr. Schnever, who performs a little operation on my toes. But then Nekolim says: it is something serious. Once I j leave a reception because of my toe infection and Nekolim said: President Sukarno is almost completely paralysed. So, especially after 30th September Movement, I always take one to show how healthy I am, so the puppets here will not be happy. US News nd World report the biggest Wall Street publication wants me dead, but jeath depends on God's will. Concerning today, in Hong Kong several newspapers said afraid to go to Bandung because anti-Sukarno demonstrations oc i there. Now I am requested to give you material for the 10th session t] of the MPRS. The MPRS appointed me President for life. I am the Great Leader of the Revolution and the Mandate-holder of the MPRS, anadrdeiens to your decision, In this quelity I wish to tell you something. Frenkly, if you now believe that President Sukarno has not carried out this mandate properly because recently the President has neglected development projects... that he doesn't know how much these things cost, doesn't know what percent is completed... I admit it. I admit it. Here is your mandate, I not carried out the way you gave it to me. But since you named me of the Revolution, I have the right to give you a little explanation, in your opinion I have neglected some projects. Earlier, when Chairul Saleh came to pick me up, I said, indeed, recently I have not truly and properly carried out my tasks in the economic field as I should. But what is the reason. Because I, as President, as Great Leader of the Revolution, knew that my main duty was to safeguard th /safety === [PDF page 109] === sefety of the nation and the revolution. Other things are third, fourth, fifth, this is what people forget. The first thing is the safety of the nation. It was the Indonesian nation which created the Indonesiem state, and not the opposite. The Indonesian nation created the MPRS, the DPR-GR, the DPA, the Army, Air Force, Navy and police, it created you, you, you, you, you, you, all of you. This is what you all forget. So my main duty is to guard the nation. I know the result of this is some minor damage, and I will try to improve the situation. But there must be no damage to the nation. Hey, you political science experts, would there be a state without the nation? No! So recently I have concentrated my thoughts on saving the nation. © And according to my opinion, the epilogue of the 30th September Movement endangered the nation. In Bogor, I said, we have cake in the house being eaten by rats, but don't burn down the house for that reason. Then people came to me and said: Pak, these rats didn't just eat the cake. They chewed on the pillars of the house. Okay. So they did. But is that a reason to burn down thé whole house? Catch them, but don't destroy the house. I don't want to help burn down our house. For 40 years I have given my all to the Indonesian nation. Do you think I will let you destroy this house? You people say the plans of the MPRS are not noticed by the President, I admit it because my attention is focussed on the nation. We cannot have development without an Indonesian nation, and now the nation is in danger from jolts, while actually unity is the most important thing. Since my own words are not believed or trusted, I'll borrow the words of Abraham Lincoln, who said: A nation divided against itself cannot stand. But some MPRS leaders even asked me, after I said that: say, what does that mean, pak? Sujono, at Bogor gave the example of Viet-Nem as a house divided - but not against itself. Vietnamese in the north and the south are fighting to reunite their country. In Korea too, in Pyongyang, I met not only with North Koreans, but South Koreans came all the way to Pyongyang just to tell me that they will fight to reunite their country. They are the same people, only the leaders of the North and the South have a little argument. n 1956, when I went to Germany, and gave a speech at the University of Heidelberg. You German students here heard what I said. Your country is divided. What will you do? With tears in their eyes, they said they would fight to reunite their country. This is the meaning of Lincoln's statement. I, as Great Leader of Revolution, as the People's President, tell you that I will ban any party that inflames emotions. If the PNI inflames emotions, I will ban it. If Partindo inflames emotions, I will ban it. If IP-KI inflames emotions, I will ban it. If especially the PKI inflames emotions, I will ban it. If the PSI inflemes emotions, I will ban the PSI again. I will ban the PiWI, I will ban newspapers, I will arrest reporters, I'll throw out foreign reporters. I won't allow troubles. My responsibility for leadership is to God and to no one else. If the leaders of the MPRS are not happy with me.. sorry.. But I consider thet I did my job well and God will judge me. So I call for an account and discharge from the MPRS. If you approve.. Okay.. if you do not.. so what! You were the ones who appointed me President for life, Great Leader of the Revolution, Mandate-Holder of the MPRS. If you approve my leadership.. thanks.. until the end of my life, I'll carry out my responsibility to God. { If you don't approve, @kay, okay, if necessary, tell me that, and I'll resign. I'll go away. /All the === [PDF page 110] === newspapers say they're faithful to me, and then they y say to surrender all things to me, but then they attach They tell me what to do. Sarbinit How do you think I feel. I'll tell you how I fell. Turn these matters over to me unconditionally! If you forcefeed me, the people will not like it. Don't tell me what to do. I warn you. You, political scientists, what do you say? I don't want it. I tell you, I'll get out myself if you keep it up. early on October 1, before any of you were awake, when I went to Halim Air Force Base, what did I say? I said 4ir Force have a fight. I ordered that there be no fig Only reone from the RPKAD shot a buffalo tl I about ordered General ] fribuanal to try the people di: This is my first act. Now ition, forming revolution. 7 #7) owe ¥V 42 LW Uli she revolution, n real revolu peopie onary. The Indonesian revolution social fiel Anyone who defends L symptoms you must We can teach the revo oF oO D pu Hew September deed, 3, stupid, wrong. give the rem solution to me. /There are === [PDF page 111] === ‘tton’. as HuUubtUlls, a5 ow, to see our revolutionary enthusiasm of the 21 million volunteers SNE ia Saka ay it is beginning to return. so t] after September our confrontatior Don’t think, Nekolim,: w lalaysia exists. The MPRS must in ) a ora nt our acea4 4 aragrapn n Our £ against === [PDF page 112] === Sujono (Hadinoto) Minister, Second Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, leading member of PNI (Ali faction) leftwing nationalist - not communist. Sarbini (Martodihardjo) Major General - Minister for Veterans Affairs, strongly nationalist anti-comnunist formerly Army Commander E. Java. Stands high in the generals' estimation - very influential, courageous and straightforward. Walujo (Puspo judo) Major General - Minister, Deputy Chairman of MPRS, head of National Defence Institute. Political views not known - but not communist. Ipik Gandamana Minister for Village Developmen Formerly Home Minister. Demoted because of fr health PNI - Ali faction. Hartawan (Brigadier General) Minister for Road Development appointed May 1965 - a technician, not a politician. A loyal army man. rdjo (Sudjipto) - Inspector General of Police. Anti-communist, closely associated with General Nasution, highly respected and very influential, no liking for politics, dedicated to his work in the police force. (iirs.) Rusiah (Sardjono §.H.) Minister for Social Affairs. Nothing known about her. Mrs. jHarustiati (Subandrio) - need we say more? Sartono (S.H.) First Deputy Chairman of Supreme Advisory Council. PNI - Ali faction. Nationalist, anti-communist. Sudirman (General - deceased). Disliked } had too much revolutionary influence and form a Muslim state. The sideswipe at him revealing jealousy. Muljadi (Djojomartono) Minister Coordinator, Public Compartment. One of the leaders of the Muhammadiah group. Pro-Army. === [PDF page 113] === [Unreadable] ; FOREIGN OP ITOH, 5.%.1. ty 13 Deceaber, 1965 I was favcinated vy the text of President Sukarno's epesch forwarded unter cover of your Letter ao. 1014/65 of 9 Deceeten You were or are that this ese worth reac ang in Put for I buve seen no clearer nove convineing evidenée the : extent to whieh Sukarne has lost hie grip and his eld incisivence this would sheost oe eutto veuplaia shat pesyeteal inte why 4M the Conauni ste ke preaeturely? 2 Om the other handy it io equally interesting to note tha even Af nie Leggadry pooere of sapreveton sees 4 tave dessried hia, Sukerno’e basic dogma coaen ugh ag ot ck as ever: everything aust be subsrdinated to the ¢ause of aati unity on the nation ie sest — united ogeinst the foreign enemy. Even the reference to Sith: § unooneciously reyeallag for it ie thie belief whieh sufarne (Gad ‘many ether Ser eet k has alwaye hat in common with Hitler. aoe Nee romper that da at ee ape Schaent resigned beowuse Bitler would act tos nececcity for a paves " permit Germany's econcaie dation and thet Witler Gontemptuously to oae of his associates | that ooo like Sehaeht Te fsiled to realise ee ee pelt dynamtom was malataine’d economic problems always solve themeelven.s de i ghell look forward te further reports on Sukerno's state pea oa ami health, Oe ae the first piace oe tes — really shaken & Sukarno’ 2 rocuperative % You # prudently a ie et the en@ of para. 2 of your fetter: 4. I am sending ooplee of thie litter te the Ghanseries at Kuala Guapur ant Oagapore. (2. EB. Gablie) Mpsekareas’” ie oe === [PDF page 114] === WG Botley { Kuoloa lee nv ) % 5 Tour ( Ccicirermna ES Candbeden; d. rhode). No. 2 uh. 8/39; Received 20 )scorhey (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) eactaalb (Main Indexed) D where Appr¢priate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT C wy fe ; ~ AA Tm SIA ie i — INDONESL D HN. JOISK3 +4 SUBJECT: pnt nH torynakes botisen Je fi, Ond 4uirh cummed ( bruh keusey >), Pe nl, ‘iad anon Lam wa, WI. ay f 4 larol a pines wld ae nes brntn Gg evrele, re 7 c nvoWwemunt f: 761g — nN SY eel cov ‘pt c of- ‘ Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Sur dD or whl le ak ion Oc pana. ws S. Coulee W Spihee. TE Unease ck ey tnGen eee wilh has J 7 lay we ieee into ln Aone en. ‘ === [PDF page 115] === December, 1965, D. Tonkin, Esq. With the compliments of % $2, W. Bentley, SH lols 344 a HIGH CO! I MIS SION unan Shar ikat Polis alan Suleiman T TL. ‘UALA LUMPUR === [PDF page 116] === JONFIDENTT AL BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, POLICE CO-OPERATIVE BUILDING, 4 JALAN SULETMAN, KUALA LUMPUR. mse =} V/s |O December, 1965. Jack da Silva im the M,E.A. here was telling me yesterday of a conversation he had just had with a Dutch journalist recently returned from Jakarta called Bruikheusen (he was not sure about the spelling). Da Silva said he set a good deal of store by Bruikheusen's opinions on events in Indonesia since the time in Algiers earlier this year when the journalist had told him that before the end of 1965 there would be a showdown in Indonesia between the P.K.I. and the Army which the former could not possibly win. 2. In fact a good many of Bruikheusen's opinions as reported to me by da Silva struck me as being pretty wild, and I will not bother you with them now. He did, however, say three things to da Silva which may be worth recording just in case they fit in with anything you have heard yourself, They are:- (a) The Generals now have irrefutable evidence of Soekarno's involvement in the 30th September plot (according to da Silva, Bruikheusen was allowed to hear extracts from tape recorded confessions in the possession of the Army which pointed in this direction); They were therefore intending to remove him from power, at any rate to the extent of putting him under house arrest, not later than next month; They would do this, partly because of the evidence they now hold, and partly because they have a plan for alleviating Indonesia's critical shortage of foreign exchange which Soekarno could not possibly approve and which they intend to put into effect at the beginning of next year. Da Silva's understanding of Bruikhensen's explanation of this plan is that Adem Mallik would negotiate new agreements with the foreign oil companics on lines so satisfactory to them that they will produce against future production of oil sume of foreifn exchange large enough to cover the rice purchases which will by then be necessary. ie /3. It woulda S. G. J. Cambridge, Esq., British Embassy, Jakarta. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 117] === CONFIDENTIAL It would be interesting to know whether you or Max icCann have come across Bruikheusem and, if so, whether you share da Silva's high opinion of him, 4. I am sending copies of this letter to Peter Jenkins in the C.R.O., Derek Tonkin in the Poreign Office and Bob de Burlet in Polad’s Office in Singapore, r NWT 4 [Unreadable] Qo re) + 7 Hn 4 - Wwe We Ue Cambridge? 1.80 « 9 - 442 } wn British Embassy, Ts i] Jakarta, CONFIDENTIAL reece einen === [PDF page 118] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) erm pay SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT DNESIA D. (01 934i FROM SUBJECT: ffepord on nee tiny Ale, Mankell Grin (YS wo ( hokeda) eis n 4 ae Ae Mr More i \ | none limb nssatler a Yjeh ints) v7 Usclen, NMulth a. 43 hecembor’ Mr. Heck. / No. (Oiu4“s Dated (© decernba’ Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) fos (te frvdecergl) lL. tod ~~ Hie Akh oiracy Citi win CORDS “OM, wae{nh fore. fe mm ibn be, Kick rice (Printing Instructions) eee Ae SB.: decks Se ber a fntann cach o>, oa ae ait. complied) | (iain Indexed) n+ DSG [Unreadable] === [PDF page 119] === 16 December, Marshall Green, the U.S, Ambassador, has given count of a long and interesting meeting he had ialik on 13 December. Se Malik said that in their recent moves, including the re-organisation of KOTI, the Army's principal objective was to isolate the Presidium. He thought that they might heve soille success in this maneouvre, end said that if Soekarno refused to come into line, 1b would leave the Army with no alternetive but to dismiss the Dwik ra, Cabinet and a poeaeeey regulate Soekarno to the position of figurehe Malik thought that if faced ] ther choice ‘oekarnd Was sufficiently realis tic @ inevi vé ble nich in tt lis case would offer sat yamat + \- mo 4- lA QnN anaganraa stunity é G 1 ast OL Lr ling the appearallces nn hopes later of bel ie able to convert that ene ha} with. nature that he finds it difficu Tt to bear down enoueh on Soekarno,. Suharto has the courage t but is influenced by a soothsayer who advises h this is not the time for suc action! Malik would not ben the P.K.I., me oy political announcement would. would simply be banned region | 1 Eke en ah uch é = ee better. UC &D] sntly is Nasutlo was convineed that Indonesia, faced imports of food, clothing and spare proceed with 1 neasures designed LO - funds to unnece ssary con structi ee imports. Le we; recommen all construc for eign exci ange, enks, price fixing and Inting principles. Me y sympathetic to rag holding to the nario to stew in their own sale ecognized a clear-cut I respons- Hasut Lor proposed to take over 2conomic/ === [PDF page 120] === economic and political power step by step. According oO Malik, this typical Javanese approach would merely prolong end probaoly make more painful the transition to an urgently needed single-headed pragmatic government ready to follow moderate ‘comes stic and foreign policies. Requests for U.S. Assistance Asked how the U.S. Embassy should regard Is appeals and half-formed proposals for 0:5. Malik replied thet these were advanced in ases by well-mesening persons, in others by selfekere and opportunists. Any rice end textiles imports wou however be distributed in the current phase by Leimena in the name of Soekarno, with the result of prolonging the latter in power. It was better that the people should suffer somewhat longer in the interests of an adequately ene purge than leave Soekarno with sufficient power to staze & comeback. o In reply to Green's query, Malik confirmed that this was the way that Nasution and Suharto looked at the supply problem. Green commented that there were certain persons close to Nasution and Suharto who descri bed th lem as wanting U.S. assistance now. Malik remarked that the senerals might wish to know whether at some later stage they could count on oes Support. But for the present they realised that to receive wa assistance would be unwise politically. He added even covert assistance seemed out of the question. For e> kamnple, nnere had been talk of the U, Se backing sales of Thai rice on deferred payment; but the hand of the U.S. would inevitably show since Thailand was known to sell strictly for cash. In this connexion Malik forecast that Indonesia would only be able to get about 70,000 tons of additional Thai rice, which was far short of their 100,000 ton goal. Foreign Policy On the question of the direction = Indonesian policy, Malik was unequivoce ul, "it must go to right", Green said that wonile the U.S, » aid not ect Indonesia to submit an application to join SEATO they looked forward to a free and independent Indonesia pursuing moderate policies. Malik responded that this was whet he meant by "to the right", since Indonesia was too far to the left of where it should be. tx Asked how Indon esa, was to remove itself from the horns of the dilemma of confrontation, Malik made it clear that he favoured direct negotiations with Kuala Lumpur and Singapore as soon as the intemal Situation in Indonesia perm iitted. Green remarked that until last month. he had good reason to believe that the Army continued to be totally opposed to regularising relations/ NETDENTT AL === [PDF page 121] === relations with Singapore, being afraid of the Chinese end their economic domination of Indonesia. Yet Helmi had now confirmed thet the Army apparently supported Subéndrio end Suwito in the idea for talks with Singapore Whet was the explenation for the change? Malik said thet the generals had not civen the matter any real thought and he doubted whether anything would come of Subandrio's initiative. 8. As regards the communist bloc, Malik forecast that Indonesia would try to retain correct, but necessary cool relations with Peking He foresaw no shift in current relations with the Soviet Union, Although the Soviet Ambassador Was meking representations to the Indonesian Government about anti-communist activities, he felt this was half-hearted and for the record. The Russians have no respect for Soekarno. ‘They had close ties with the Air Force and the Navy, but it was the Army which called the tune so far as br road policy was concerned, and the Army did not want to get sucked into over—denendence on Moscow. Personalities 9. Malik was convinced thet Subandrio's days were numbered; he would probably be exiled. Chaireul Saleh was like sly,O retain “only his M.P.R.S. chairmensnip. He had been marke d down as en opportunist who had deserted his B.P.S. associates when the going got rough. He had not improve 4d his position with the mi itary when he and Ibnu Sutowo had suddenly put up petrol and kerosene prices. Malik thought that this move had been economically premature and politically dengerous. ) He dismissed Leimena, the third member of the Presidiun, with a contemptuous laugh, remarking that he might serve on as Soekarno's Grand C Saeberiain, Conclusion 10. Green tells me that throughout the conversation Malik spoke as someone who was convinced that he was about to play an importent role in the future of his country. He did not seem particularly depressed at the prospects of the difficulties which lay in the immediate future, arguing that they were necessary if the re-organisation of the government essential for the long term was to take place. aes I em sending copies of this letter to the Political Adviser to the C-in-C Far East, singapore Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Washingto, Canberra and Wellir ne ‘ton. em aS, (James Murray COMETNONTT. AT, === [PDF page 122] === Mo Mewrwy (dy eterts) No. 276/ Dated (9 Aecenrb Received 23 Leceyrher (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) ji ‘S ee 2s Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT TAA ih roils ‘i: ae HIN VWZINCOIA a (Oly 37 ‘a tes ae;: SUBJECT: /pcdcelint Sochamo 5 adores 4 Prdmitta, Ufonenh ies, ‘ fo eae 4 fi ara boxe Chin. At 9ev “ ret Len fier lever ey A Aho ve S Af? 4 ANacweel [Unreadable] Jakk aly dfpete hi, cat la; a. WVasathour chely, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 123] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE eee En Clair, FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUDIONT#; ss ‘Mr. Murray Ot oS /s7 *F No. 2761 D. 0513 19 December, [1965 18 December, 1965 R. 0901 19 December,/1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2761 of 18 December, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Polad Singapore B.H.C. Singapore President Sukarno yesterday addressed the Indonesian Women's Association. He placed particular emphasis on the dangers of the Indonesian revolution being diverted to the right. He said that the military tribunal, which had been set up to try those involved in the 30 September coup, would also try "retrogressive elements". "If necessary they will be shot". 2. Chairul Saleh, third Deputy Prime Minister, who spoke beforehand urged Indonesians not to pressurize the President into announcing a "political settlement" of the 30 September movement. He called for Nasakom unity. === [PDF page 124] === FROM Mi Muwroy | (3) todo No. 214 Dated 22 » Lew che Received aT Detour (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action . laé completed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded i fe 4 where Appropriate) y+. 101 Sy WY SUBJECT: Unter tp. ot: Jeckame? aed ai ee “ a a5 Castek Bia lobar 7 Met): ‘Worankowm Onell condemns ie. 46 Grol he thd. c / fol h Ga he a C srcler WN (es laze Owed PKI. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES Gtsfote | GESTAPO wert.’ a Shalt” watt bAoble dato, aw” Culcaruo === [PDF page 125] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En clair “DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Murray No, 2791. Desp: 0756 22 December, 1965 22 December, 1965 ~ Reed: 1010 22 December, 1965 Addressed to FO, tet. No. 2791 of 22 December, Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and BHC Singapore and Saving to Washington, Canberra, Weliingten and Manila, "Antara" reports a speech made by President Sukarno on December 21. He said that those who were involved in Gestok should be tried, punished and, if necessary, shot. (Gestok is short fe: "October 1 Movement" and is an acronym the President has started to use latterly. Others continue to ' or Gestap@). Sukarno refer to the “September 30 Movement’ "noted that in the Gestok there had been a tendency to condemn the "KOM". part of Nasakom" and stressed that Nas&kom was still an outstanding requirement, 1,000 gods could not kill or degtroy the idea of Nasakom, which Sukarno had prepounded when he was 25 and "whieh I will adhere to firmly until I enter my grdve". Gestok, he seid, was born of an excess of "KOM" and should therefore be destroyed, just as the Permesta rebellion (an excess of "NAS" or nationalism) and the Darul Islam rebellion (an excess of "A" or religion) had both beén destroyed. 2% The same “Antara” reports statements by General Suharto and ea leader of the Catholic party, both of whom speak of the need to "extirpate” the Gestap& and the PKI. Goemadi, of the Catholic Party, added "people who are afraid or hesitant in crushing the PKI are the ones who are really suffering from Communist. phobia, if not. to say that they are pro-PKI". DISTRIBUTED TO: F,E, Department ote F.E.P === [PDF page 126] === ean" ses BRITISH EMBASSY, WATS DJAKARTA. 1011/65 il 23 December, 1965 ‘CONFIDENTIAL Der! ez bw ‘soi 1015 ue (0) We sent you a telegram-yesterday - No. 2791 - reporting a speech made by Sukarno on 21 December where he came out more strongly than ever before in favour of the retention of NASAKOM. C45 - 2. You should also see the following extract from the “Indonesian Herald" report of his speech which did not appear in the Antara version on which our telegram was based. “President Sukarno began his speech by explaining the necessity of NASAKOM. According to the President, NAS, A, and KOM are objective realities within the Indonesian society. The President explained that NAS is an objective reality because a nation that has been exploited and trampled on for 350 years will positively and surely adhere to a NAS ideology. In the same vein, a nation that for 350 years was not allowed to worship its own religion must adhere to the A ideology. Likewise, the KOM ideology is an objective reality because ‘our nation for 350 years knew only poverty and hardships. Out of this poverty and hardships grew our ideals to build a just and prosperous society and to do away with all forms of exploitation. Therefore, can you doubt that KOM as an ideology is an objective reality in our society?'"™. The following day, 22 December, in a speech to mark Mothers' Sukarno was even more explicit in whitewashing the PKI. is from the Antara report: “Referring to Indonesia's national struggle President Sukarno reiterated that one of the biggest shares in this struggle was contributed by the PKI, which did not mean that elements of the party who committed the Gestapu should not be condemned and punished. However, not the KOM part of NASAKOM should be punished for the abortive coup. The President said that scores of PKI leaders had been exiled to Digul in West Irian and many others thrown in jails for their part in the independence struggle during Dutch colonial rule. He repeated that he did not mean that the elements involved in the Gestapu should not be punished. Gestapu must be punished, not the KOM of NASAKOM unity.” ue Earlier in this speech Sukarno had spoken of all women, whatever their political beliefs, having the same feelings of “love and motherhood". "Even in the hearts of the Gerwani PKI affiliated women's organisation these feelings were cherished" (Antara). There is no doubt that many Indonesians hearing or / reading D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 127] === CONFIDENTIAL reading these words will recall how those same women got to work on the generals with their penknives and razorblades. It is not a remark likely to enhance the Bung's image. 5-6 Then again, in a speech on 19 December, Sukarno said how shocked he had been that the bodies of recently murdered members of the PKI should have been left unburied. This was contrary to the tenets of Islam. One thinks of that shabby pit at Halim. 6. It is true that Sukarno's repeated calls for national unity do get a certain amount of support from other quarters. But his attempted rescue operations of NASAKOM and even the PKI itself - as evinced in these public speeches - begin to look more and more quixotic as the days go by and as the barrage of demands for total dissolution of the PKI continues unabated. te One other point. In our telegram under reference we drew your attention to this word GESTOK (short for the October 1 Movement) which Sukarno seems to have begun to use in place of GESTAPU (September 30 Movement). The events of 1 October included, of course, the counter-coup; and it is tempting to think that anyone (like Sukarno) who talks about dealing with the GESTOK movement might have in mind the need not only to bring to heel the perpetrators of the coup, but also to curb the excesses of the counter-coup. The fact that Suharto and just about everyone else continue to use the expression GESTAPU fits in with this somewhat fanciful theory. Radio Malaysia and others, please copy? Perhaps not yet! However, to keep the record straight I had better reveal that, so far as we know, the only reason Sukarno is using this expression is that he resents subscribing to a fashion which he himself did not invent. Someone else thought of GESTAPU: GESTOK is a Presidential creation. 8. I am copying this to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and BHC Singapore and Washington. Wi ww === [PDF page 128] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROM SUBJECT: Jummnary of me onl ang - FHL rnered te J 4. hambodgi A by ahertG) 7 eet a / iy Fis te h/t Inn “hd ontsta, No. /o/468 Dated 23 C2comto/ Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received $2 Jeamhe sh SHS. (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) emits (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] V »q\I\b% === [PDF page 129] === BRITISH EMBASSY UNCLASSIFIED (1011/65) DJAKARTA 23 December 1965 My letter 1011/65 of December 16. Here is another round- _ up of anti-PKI moves: (a) The PKI and its affiliates have been dissolved in South Kalimantan and in Atjeh. The local military commander in the latter area said that no new organisation which hed even a whiff of communism about it would be allowed. This brings the total number of regions where the PKI has been banned to nine. A recap of the others: West Java, the Moluccas, South and Southeast Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, Jakarta Raya and environs, Central Kalimantan, South Sumatra (including Djambi and Lampung). (b) There has been a huge purge of teachers in East Java - over 5,/00 of them. (c) Some 2,500 are reported to be under arrest in Banjuwangi in East Java; and 10,573 in West Java - 9,881 communists and the rest government officials. (a) A group of people arrested in the Kulonprogo region of Jogjakarta have confessed that Aidit promised them 25 billion rupiahs if they carried out a massacre programme involving the poisoning of some 1,250 people, and the drowning of 900 others. (The report is not very clear whether the wretched 900 would be poisoned before they were thrown into the Progo river) (e) Meanwhile, there have been plenty of speeches, resolutions, etc., warning against a recurrence of the Gestapu or a revival of the PKI. Most notable of these have been: (i) Mokoginta on December 16: "We will be condemned by our children if the counterrevolutionary Gestapu were to occur again. In order to prevent that the PKI must be buried as deep as possible so that it cannot rise again from its grave to haunt the people. But just burying the PKI is simple: it takes only 5 minutes to type, 3 seconds /to sign D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Dept., Foreign Office, === [PDF page 130] === to sign and a % second to put a stamp on it. So let us dig the hole deep enough to bury it completely and make sure that it will not rise again". (ii) Major-General Adjie on December 19: "If we are not vigilant or if we allow ourselves to relax, then this epilogue of the Gestapu/PKI counter-revolutionary movement will turn into a prologue for a second Gestapu". I am copying this letter to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and BHC Singapore and I.R.D. ogee (S.J.G. Cambridge) === [PDF page 131] === Pe pre tae A My Mpeg ( Syeharla ) No. //0 oq Dated 33 Rizwan ds Received ‘¢ D cémrile (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ~, Tre ad on a [Unreadable] & et 8 wes BY SUBJECT: Muammar - Wat secon’ anki - VA meyed n SN ena Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES 28 === [PDF page 132] === INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM AM pe c2 FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN one tbse "6/350 By Bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr Murray No. 110 Saving R. 29 December 1965 24 December 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 110 »aving of 23 December Repeated for information Saving to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore Washington BHC Singapore From Antara, 23 December. "President Sukarno has approved the immediate formation of a Nefo Solidarity Movement (Gesonef), which will be charged with mobilizing public opinion in promoting the spirit of solidarity between all progressive-revolutionary forces in Indonesia and the entire world". This body ts also designed to strengthen the antinecolim struggle and to creata promising national and international atmosphere for‘polding w¢onference of new emerging forces (Conefo) «....iWitesy-as.Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, is the member:of’ thé;committee-charged with the-formation of Gesonef. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O. S.E.A.D. JeM.1.D. Selek sede News Dept. C;R.0.,° Mie & PDs News Dept. === [PDF page 133] === FROM 3 “ TH. Canslordgy/ Y Herds) A Yr Ze No. 1004/6" Dated 93 htente Received 37 Az corn td (Outward Action) 130 (Security Grading—to be’ Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT D080 k _ / j 5 ois ae SUBJECT: Le oy [rane Kucad ten “ aherté da Cees i ae ee teu MAY few tJe fe nec’ A Cte Jay Mea« ss Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: SKS qt 2 mee === [PDF page 134] === BRITISH EMBASSY UNCLASSIFIED (101165) DJAKARTA 23 December 1965 You may care to see these two articles by Frans Lucas from the English language Djakarta Daily Mail, now rechristened the “Armed Forces Daily Mail". They are the most hard-hitting anti-communist stuff I have seen published in this country so far. Zs The Stalin prize winner referred to is, of course, Pri jone the Minister Co-ordinator of Education. 3e I am copying this letter and the enclosures to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and BHC Singapore. Vis ENAN (S.J.G. Cambridge) D. Tonkin, Esq-, South East Asia Dept., Foreign Office, === [PDF page 135] === @oniay, December 20, 1965 NEVER AGAIN By: Frans A. Lucas The President/Great Leader of the Revolution/Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Bung Karno, is his Bogor Palace message of Saturday, December 11, 1965, to the Golongan Karyawen (Functional Workers Group) after attending a conference of the Functional Groups Joint Secretariat in the National Front, stated in no uncertain terms that he " goes all out against the Gestapu". In his decision no. 370 of December 4, 1965, the Chief Executive empowered Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves" Command, concurrently Commander of Operations for settling the internal security problem resulting from the "September 30 Movement", Major Gen. Soeharto, to name the kingpins of the Gestapu and to drag them by their short hairs in front of the Military Tribunal Extraordinary. Now, the progressive revolutionary, Pantjasilaist, Indonesian nation naturally rejoices in these pronunciamentos. For considering the fact ¢hat we now live 25 months after the Lubang Buaja devil's sabbath, the above-mentioned sentiment and decision definitely camstitute a step in the right direction. A Far Cry But only a little step. For it is still a far cry from the real goal the Indonesian people have had in mind. Which is actually: the total abolition, disbandment, dissolution and outlawing of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and its fronts, covers, mantle organizations and affiliations, and in such a manner that the PKI and its appendages, Cloaked or uncloaked, either in the present form or style, or in a disguised or neo-style, shall NEVER, NEVER AGAIN deal the Indonesian state and nation that tradition-based and dedication borne treacherous stab in the back, at the very moment when the state and nation are about to plant one foot on the pinnacle of the revolution's success. In their eleventh hour of need, when the Indonesian Armed Forces were faced with the difficult task of rolling back this PKI tide of treachery and atrocities, the Indonesian populace promptly rallied to the former's air, and since then gave unstintingly of their support in time, effort, and material after having paid for it in blood, sweat and tears. Never Again In empathy of the people's sufferings, and in appreciation of its unremitting cooperation and undying loyalty, Minister Coordinator for Defence Security, Chief of Staff or the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Abdul Haris Nasution, has taken upon himself to champion the cause of the Pantjasilaist, progressive-revolutionary, Indonesian nation. As spokesman of the troubled and long-suffering nation, General Nasution, in Surabaya, on Tuesday, December 7 1965, in a special interview to pressmen when attending the 6th Year commemoration of the Armada Command, said, “Never again shall we allow the neo-PKI/neo-Gestapy to arise! The PKI and its dastardly influence have to be uprooted not only once end for all, but also in the socio-economic, and politico-military fields." /and never === [PDF page 136] === An d never have truer words been said since that fateful October 1, 1965, which is indelibly etched in our minds in acids of blood and shame. The whole Indonesian nation mw looks up to General Nasution + make good his words and expectantly looks askance at the Indonesian Government - with its never-ending multi-complex problems - in how far and in what fashion it will support General Nasution to implement his people's goals and aims. Will it gladly grasp the proffered hand? Will it, like the Indonesian nation, back Nasution up to the hilt, unstintingly and unremittingly? Or have the government and the nation now divergent aims and goals? For it takes no wizardry in logic to expect that anyone, confronted with multi-complex tasks and problems, would leap at the chance and eagerly grasp any qualified, helping hand that presents itself so gratuitously. Neither does it take special mental acrobatics to understand, that the next step would properly have been, to give such a gratuitously helper all the powers and facilities he needs. Waiting and..... Judging! The Indonesian nation, of whom is said publicly by National Front Secretary General Marzoeki Rachman in his briefing to the Central Java Board of the NU (Moslem Scholars Party) on December 8, 1965, that it has honed its political awareness to a sharp pitch, is now waiting and - judging! We are all agreed that the formation of a Military Tribunal Extreordinary for prosecuting the Gestapy is a step ahead in the right direction. But, let us be blunt about it. It is just a short step, by all counts. For the Gestapu constitutes only a band or mobs of criminals who had wallowed in orgies of crime and immorality. They are merely the pawns, the subordinates, the executors, and often even just the dupes - merely to carry out what they have been ordered to do. And, as we have read from past accounts, in most cases, these misguided persons have more often than not been deceived into a situation from where backtracking is no longer possible, on pain of assault and battery, if not instant death itself, once they reached thelocation and the mood for the miseen-scene of the PKI black mass, it might have escaped the notice of some that around Luband Buaja the corpse of a nondescript young man was also unearthed. This unknown might very well have had to serve as an “example” for exacting instant obedience. In other words, more often than not, the Gestapuist themselves are both victims and criminal accomplices - just as the Nazi wardens of their higher-ups. This reasoning also applies to the Gewani, the People's Youth, and an odd 28 other now prohibited front organizations. But, like the Nazi death-camp wardens, they, too, cannot escape due administration of justice. But those to whom should unhesitatingly be meted out the ultimate in punishment, are the higher-ups, the auctors intellectualis, the masterminds, the devil's brood - i.e. the PKI and its cerebral brethern!« /To para- === [PDF page 137] === To para-phrase General Nasution'’s words, none of them shall escape his deserts! And for this, the first real step in the right direction is a nation-wide, a cross country, an outlawing of the PKI - in its present form as well as in its future disguised or neo-form - and its devil's brood. We are only too perfectly aware that right now these inveterate miscreants are scurrying for mver and finding refuge in certain political parties, mass and student organizations. But this prerogative for the nation-wide declaration of dissolution and outlawing of the PKI is not in the hands of General Nasution himself. But the Indonesian progressive-revolutionary people are confident that in mother two months perhaps, this official pronunciamento from the right quarters will be forthcoming. And here we land in the area of having to determine: “Who are the masterminds? Who exactly are the PKI? Where are they?". Where and Who Are They Let us begin with the last question. Where are they? If they are not on the run or already studying practical metallurgy from behind prison bars, they are underground or - insensitive government or adninistrative nerve spots, where at any time they can throw the social structure sinews out of kilter. Since the first and second mentioned present no urgent problem to us any longer, the lest mentioned now deserves our special attention. Who are these red or pink feathered birds? If they are not overt PKI members, like Lukman, safely (77) lodged in the Cabinet as Minister, they are the apologists, the soft-pedalists, the smokescreen artists, the vanishing act performers, the economic saboteurs-cum people's sufferings, multipliers again safely (??7) embedded in pockets of the administration. (To be continued) === [PDF page 138] === NEVER AGAIN By Frans A. Lucas They are such characters, like the Stalin prize-winner professor, who once advocated the abolition of teaching religion in schools. What manner of man is he? A friend, who has had the occasion to know this professor from eyeball-to-eyeball distance, once described him to the writer. This educator has one prized feature, aside from his cherished Staelin prize. That among the odd 105 million Indonesians, he and he alone has been endowed with grey cells in his cranium. The rest of the 105 million Indonesians minus one blithely walks around with sawdust under their hairline. Granted this dialecticmaterialistic blessing what this professor has got inside his skull must be potent stuff, indeed. For the miasmic fumes percolating down his nostrils makes him so heady twenty four hours a day that on a given occasion he fell all over himself to plea for the "speedy release of the innocents" amont the “September 30 Movement" votaries while falling to stumble all over himself to say a few kind words for the Lubang Buaja and other Lubangs Buaja victims all over Java and for their berefts. Clearly, we cen do without this brilliant professor as we can without amoeba dysentery. On the principle of first things first, what we have to do with this educational luminary, is to eject him from his post and pack him off - hugging his Stalin prize - to safer quarters where he can't further pollute the minds of impressionable youths. The tragic thing is there are many of his ilk, safely (2?) lodged and embedded in pockets of the administration and of the cabinet from where they can continue dealing below-the-belt blows to the Indonesian body politic. All and each one of them - and the nation knows who and where they are - have to be patiently dislodged from their respective safety perches, then rejected, cast out, and ostracized by the Indonesian nation and community for all time! Who They Are And here we have tackled the questions: who are the masterminds, the PKI? They are all the promotors, the protectors, the apologists, the soft-pedalists, and smoke-screen artists, the vanishing act performers, the ecmomic saboteurs, who either as overt and covert members of the PKI or affiliate organizations, or in fellow-feeling have promoted the PKI cause to make it possible for the PKI to deliver that nation-shattering, political chaos inducing, economic disintegrating, and Indonesian revolution-sapping, blow Indonesia finds itself reeling from. We have all grown accustomed to such tentative "September 30 Movememt" labelling as: "innocents", and "good" or “bad" commies. Once at it, let us now also add the species "known" and “unknown” commies. It takes little effort for us to remember that during the "epilogue" of the 1948 Madium treachery, the names of Moeso, Alimin, Amir Sjarifoeddin (a secret commie who later, when firmly in the saddle, revealed his PKI membership). Setiadjit, Soeripno, etc., were then on everybody's lips, and when we think of these names, we recall the government officials, the religious leaders and followers, the political preminents, as well as the innocent men, women and children who were also butchered by the PKI, mutilated, then dumped into wells and mass graves. But now note this! === [PDF page 139] === During those Madiun epilogue days, such names as the formidable "Eminent Son" Aidit, Njoto, Lukman, Njono, etc., were unheard of. They were the "unknowns", the "innocents", the “peace” commies of the Mediun epilogue days, who now 17 years later turn out to be the master minds, the planners, the auctors intellectualis, the engineers of the “September 30 Movement" of the short-lived October 1, 1965, power grab of the Java wide Lubangs Buaja butcher orgies. By the very nature of the PKI/neo-PKI doctrines, tenets and rabid dedication, the "unknown", the "innocents", the "good" commie of the 1965 Lubang || Buaja days will be the master planners, the braintrust, the auctors intellectualis, the engineers of the next powergrab with a fresh crop of butcher artists doing their bidding ata tu ture Kidnap Hole. Stop Horsing Around Plainly, the time has arrived for all of us to stop horsing around. In the Madiun epilogue days nothing was done about the PKI nor against the "unknown", “innocent", "good" comaies since they promptly joined the revolutionary fight against the subsequent Dutch "police action". Through that tactic they won a fresh lease of life. But nOt this time. For this time, on the strength of the above train of logic, we should from now on carefully earmark any past and future premotors, engineers, protectors, apologists, soft-pedalists, smoke-screen artists, vanishing act performers, and economic saboteurs or wilful people's sufferings multipliers for a stretch of compulsory metallurgical study in prisons. Don't misunderstnad us. Like Moslem Egypt, we have nothing against commies. In fact, we love them - as long as they stick to their own knitting within their own borders! And not try to slip in the knitting needle underneath our scapulas. And as long as they contribute to the upswing of our GNP through accepted channels and practices of good international fellowship. Too much But to expect the Indonesian people, after this second experience to keep closing their eyes and exposing their backs to the commies among their midst, is asking too much of the proven and time-honoured Indonesian tolerance, acceptance on face-value and kindheartedness. Like Minister Co-ordinator/Chief of staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Abdul Haris Nasution, we, the progressive-revolutionary, Pant jasilaist Indonesian nation, have been saying for the past 24 months: "Never againt” But with this difference. Perhaps the French, with their apt sayings, have hit the nail right on the head, with their expression, "Even the most beautiful girl in the world can only give what she has". So can General Nasution only do the things that are within his prerogatives. But the general - ably assisted by such sterling nation builders like the Martadinatas, the Sutjipto Judedihardjos, the Soehartos, the Ibrahim Adjies, the Umar Wirahadikusumahs, the Soegandhis, the Mokogintas the Sarwo Edhies, and scores of others, of whom the nation can never be proud enough - can assuredly do more, if not pull out this nasty PKI/neo-PKI thorn in the side for all time to come, provided the government extends to General Nasution the necessary empowering or facilitating hand. /and here's === [PDF page 140] === And here's the other side of this same coin of difference. We, the progressive-revolutionary, Pantjasilaist, Indonesian nation, will only be too glad to continue giving the Indonesian Armed Forces the needed unstinted support for winding up this nasty business. The Indonesian progressive-revolutionary, Pantjasilasit nation of whom Minister Co-ordinator Idham Chalid says it's angrier with the "Gestapu" and hence also with the PKI than with the current cutthroat prices, is waiting: An odd 105 million pair of eyes - ungourged so far - are now watching, gauging and weighing! Will General Nasution and the Indonesian people ever see this magic formula implemented? The magic formula, which if carried out to its undeviating and logical extreme, can only bring forth all that is good for country and nation? Which magic formula is contained in just these two words: "Never again!" === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 22] --- Question: Supposing that President Sukarno had not fallen in with your ideas? [Unreadable] declare himself willing to [Unreadable] Question: But what if he had not [Unreadable]? Untung: We had a plan to "neutralize" President Sukarno in the event of his not accepting our concept. Question: [Unreadable] [Unreadable] I mean it in the sense [Unreadable] of him. Question: [Unreadable] === [PDF page 23] === You have [Unreadable] Communist National [Unreadable] would have b[een] [Unreadable] Communists. All the [Unreadable] no minor matter, but an [Unreadable] must have [Unreadable] who was a [Unreadable] success of [Unreadable] the supreme power [Unreadable] be running the risk [Unreadable] In other words, the army was not in [Unreadable] power, you could not [Unreadable] your objective. Yes, I agree with you. === [PDF page 24] === Translation from German [Unreadable] Extract from Interrogation Record of former Major Bambang Supeno, 530th Parachute Battalion Interrogation of 5 October 1965: Question: It became clear from the answers which you gave in the interrogation of 4 October that the power-group embodying the 30 September Movement consisted of various political parties in the capital city, namely: the CC PKI (Aidit), the left-wing of the PNI led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and PARTINDO. Can you produce any evidence that these three political parties were in support of the 30 September Movement? Bambang: I can say something about this. The fact that the PKI inspired the 30 September Movement is in my opinion definitely demonstrated by the fact that some 2,000 volunteers, all recruited from Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani, came not from Djakarta alone, but also from East, Central and West Java. I am aware that the two organizations mentioned above are front organizations of the PKI and that they were given military training and weapons by the air force in the area of Pondok Gede/Lubang Buaja near Djakarta. The statement that the PNI and PARTINDO political parties were in support of the 30 September Movement came to me from PA Sie and from my First Lieutenant Ngadimo and they heard this from Untung. Thus the only evidence I can cite is hearsay. If it is a matter of recording evidence known to me personally, I am not so sure. Interrogation of 9 October 1965: Question: You told us at the last interrogation that President Sukarno would have been forced to issue a decree in the name of the 30 September Movement and the Revolutionary Council. If President Sukarno had refused to do this, he would have been murdered. Do you by any chance know in what manner he would have been murdered, and who would have been entrusted with the execution of the murder? Bambang: I heard something of this matter on 1 October at approximately 11.00 a.m., when I was at Halim Airfield Complex, not far from the place where President Sukarno was at that moment. I then saw and heard Colonel Latief urging General Supardjo in a very aggressive manner to force the President to make a personal announcement confirming his blessing on the 30 September Movement. I then saw for myself that General Supardjo yielded to this pressure and gave an affirmative answer. --- [page 110] --- [Unreadable] revolutionary. The Indonesian revolution [Unreadable] social [Unreadable] Anyone who defends [Unreadable] symptoms [Unreadable] you must [Unreadable] We can teach [Unreadable] the revo[lution] [Unreadable] September deed, [Unreadable] stupid, wrong. [Unreadable] give the rem[edy] [Unreadable] solution to me. [Unreadable] There are [Unreadable] === [PDF page 111] === [Unreadable] to see our revolutionary [Unreadable] enthusiasm of the 21 million volunteers [Unreadable] it is beginning to return. [Unreadable] after September our confrontation [Unreadable] Don't think, Nekolim, [Unreadable] Malaysia exists. The MPRS must [Unreadable] our [Unreadable] against [Unreadable] === [PDF page 112] === Sujono (Hadinoto) -- Minister, Second Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, leading member of PNI (Ali faction), leftwing nationalist - not communist. Sarbini (Martodihardjo) -- Major General - Minister for Veterans Affairs, strongly nationalist, anti-communist, formerly Army Commander E. Java. Stands high in the generals' estimation - very influential, courageous and straightforward. Walujo (Puspojudo) -- Major General - Minister, Deputy Chairman of MPRS, head of National Defence Institute. Political views not known - but not communist. Ipik Gandamana -- Minister for Village Development. Formerly Home Minister. Demoted because of ill health. PNI - Ali faction. Hartawan (Brigadier General) -- Minister for Road Development, appointed May 1965 - a technician, not a politician. A loyal army man. [Unreadable]rdjo (Sudjipto) -- Inspector General of Police. Anti-communist, closely associated with General Nasution, highly respected and very influential, no liking for politics, dedicated to his work in the police force. (Mrs.) Rusiah (Sardjono S.H.) -- Minister for Social Affairs. Nothing known about her. Mrs. Hurustiati (Subandrio) -- need we say more? Sartono (S.H.) -- First Deputy Chairman of Supreme Advisory Council. PNI - Ali faction. Nationalist, anti-communist. Sudirman (General - deceased). Disliked [Unreadable] had too much revolutionary influence [Unreadable] form a Muslim state. The sideswipe at him revealing jealousy. Muljadi (Djojomartono) -- Minister Coordinator, Public Compartment. One of the leaders of the Muhammadiyah group. Pro-Army. === [PDF page 113] === [Unreadable] FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1 13 December, 1965 I was fascinated by the text of President Sukarno's speech forwarded under cover of your letter No. 1014/65 of 9 December. You were right to say that it was worth reading in full, for I have seen no clearer or more convincing evidence of the extent to which Sukarno has lost his grip and his old incisiveness [Unreadable] why did the Communists [Unreadable] prematurely? 2. On the other hand, it is equally interesting to note that even if his [Unreadable] powers of expression seem to have deserted him, Sukarno's basic dogma comes through as strong as ever: everything must be subordinated to the cause of national unity - the nation is [Unreadable] united against the foreign enemy. Even the reference to [Unreadable] is unconsciously revealing, for it is this belief which Sukarno (and many other [Unreadable]) has always had in common with Hitler. [Unreadable] Schacht resigned because Hitler would not [Unreadable] the necessity for a [Unreadable] permit Germany's economic [Unreadable] and that Hitler [said] contemptuously to one of his associates [Unreadable] that people like Schacht [Unreadable] failed to realise [Unreadable] dynamism was maintained, economic problems always solve themselves. [Unreadable] 3. I shall look forward to further reports on Sukarno's state of health [Unreadable] in the first place [Unreadable] really shaken [Unreadable] Sukarno's recuperative [Unreadable] You [prudently] [Unreadable] at the end of para. 2 of your letter: --- [page 126] --- [...] and KOM are objective realities within the Indonesian society. The President explained that NAS is an objective reality because a nation that has been exploited and trampled on for 350 years will positively and surely adhere to a NAS ideology. In the same vein, a nation that for 350 years was not allowed to worship its own religion must adhere to the A ideology. Likewise, the KOM ideology is an objective reality because "our nation for 350 years knew only poverty and hardships. Out of this poverty and hardships grew our ideals to build a just and prosperous society and to do away with all forms of exploitation. Therefore, can you doubt that KOM as an ideology is an objective reality in our society?" The following day, 22 December, in a speech to mark Mothers' [Day], Sukarno was even more explicit in whitewashing the PKI. [Here] is from the Antara report: "Referring to Indonesia's national struggle President Sukarno reiterated that one of the biggest shares in this struggle was contributed by the PKI, which did not mean that elements of the party who committed the Gestapu should not be condemned and punished. However, not the KOM part of NASAKOM should be punished for the abortive coup. The President said that scores of PKI leaders had been exiled to Digul in West Irian and many others thrown in jails for their part in the independence struggle during Dutch colonial rule. He repeated that he did not mean that the elements involved in the Gestapu should not be punished. Gestapu must be punished, not the KOM of NASAKOM unity." Earlier in this speech Sukarno had spoken of all women, whatever their political beliefs, having the same feelings of "love and motherhood". "Even in the hearts of the Gerwani [the] PKI affiliated women's organisation these feelings were cherished" (Antara). There is no doubt that many Indonesians hearing or reading D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 127] === CONFIDENTIAL these words will recall how those same women got to work on the generals with their penknives and razorblades. It is not a remark likely to enhance the Bung's image. 5. Then again, in a speech on 19 December, Sukarno said how shocked he had been that the bodies of recently murdered members of the PKI should have been left unburied. This was contrary to the tenets of Islam. One thinks of that shabby pit at Halim. 6. It is true that Sukarno's repeated calls for national unity do get a certain amount of support from other quarters. But his attempted rescue operations of NASAKOM and even the PKI itself - as evinced in these public speeches - begin to look more and more quixotic as the days go by and as the barrage of demands for total dissolution of the PKI continues unabated. 7. One other point. In our telegram under reference we drew your attention to this word GESTOK (short for the October 1 Movement) which Sukarno seems to have begun to use in place of GESTAPU (September 30 Movement). The events of 1 October included, of course, the counter-coup; and it is tempting to think that anyone (like Sukarno) who talks about dealing with the GESTOK movement might have in mind the need not only to bring to heel the perpetrators of the coup, but also to curb the excesses of the counter-coup. The fact that Suharto and just about everyone else continue to use the expression GESTAPU fits in with this somewhat fanciful theory. Radio Malaysia and others, please copy? Perhaps not yet! However, to keep the record straight