Indonesia, Bilateral relations: US [3] (FO 371/180337, 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === [Cover/decorative page: brown archival file folder cover (TNA) with file number, red label and green "CLOSED UNTIL" release sticker; no further text] === [PDF page 2] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 2 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT one: Qe ¥ ova tex ns ee Ne Kuomomos - Fuat Deerhary of he spe 38 ahem cies See xs —_ ANA Lan, Qelscne a OS Woskunsden LsoQ We Sant 9 yar eS Waste a Ge Deods Bromeh of We Dated Neh. _ 24- Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) MINUTES Wor Pee spe [Unreadable] fai fA a (Printing Instructions) 180337 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 3] === With the compliments of THE BRITISH EMBASSY (0.G. Forster) WASHINGTON, D.C. ast Po Bo kee Tia wa aon nat VOUtTN—iLas sla vepartvment, Foreign: === [PDF page 4] === » * ate ey od AUS +4 eUdllng [Unreadable] aon INET AN tty mse thes YU ALO We | laine wEALCO, Kawnd « ISL LOA AOL wave Viscald mwoeuus naant Sh tte UO VOMUCIL UL maw 2 sesuod LUGS Bd Wd ey [Unreadable] wnS aggress eect an © ool UsbmoUuMows. Ul, UL vile or a eps ani te Sian ae ee Victvname GBxxLeLovaleooc vo wool vuil Migctmaannnrn tle SUSUMU neal ~wanis BUVGL 2K YHNoawrtinisian pas UiCulal ~ ar l¢ PM Sane Cntnn ne Ve eH BL Oo YUL Le la ate oe wn ca eal PRHVASLU ASO s ILUVANLES CAPLaNati vlav bein ann y attamnt waa [Unreadable] JiPSctodr ) une time and NO atvvempt. Was =ARI RS SeCUULS apt mant JA VINELAVg WAAL aA VUidg Ve Ve === [PDF page 5] === r **nhan === [PDF page 6] === wrote |he a doles March 20, 1965. eee Sd ware BVO OWE as Ties Lense eh eaten ye | wR Vheawet wee Ga woe, WN LT Ces e wh BRAN EAD ee “Oot etude: Sue vad Steen va e aes Co alesat Shae a Perec La Pete tet iopere Gon ero aan y eee fe Re ke ee eee te ee Ree awmen EL ae ehee === [PDF page 7] === FRO Dated ioe We. Ak Received Mal.6. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) | (Maia Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) RESTRICT? D WW \OSARS | KG , QASVAD VOOR Ruseliens \s Qu surecun SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT SUBJECT: Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: ~ |38. MINUTES A). MR Cambrdan ( Dysitole) to Me Tove. (Seay) (075] LS ¢ qn Afucl I%6S~ CwAD Lie 3), t ADd < 8) Quan rofiou Weune Goble ( Geom Dyeacte ) Dy. aA es wrrol hd n~ ) === [PDF page 8] === d signing ave sounded iunist Johnson; yaper, had an Asian Journalists Association F condemnation. It concluded assage: “The attempt of the }.S. imperialism by proposing aceful solution* through squisites from any side’, Vietnamese people by the escala- LLCatvion OL ef AS peen -ASian Lan LECSt. an hte ac tt. nveers; Organisation for Solidarity) called on the Indonesian peop] wouthn Vie am 1Prececaom iL ve yoing on a report in € acular called on Aidit, the 1ina was ready to send Ln t+ one ANLLaALA, arch the === [PDF page 9] === on 40 March there Was an editorial ish language Indonesian Herald, under at [ iet Nam". It described L ne Russians, Chinese. Koreans, and wen ‘Under wo new developments are lixely to untold, tnese UlLS Ho a possible request from the Government call for Africa-Asian volunteers their defences against American attacks. possibility is that a call for such volunteer Will be initiated by another count L. Democratic Republic of Vietnar Organisation for Africa-Asian Solid had done precisely this thin LrLEenaLly greater suppor and there is no doubt abou the Indonesian government feel obliged f the etter Singap === [PDF page 10] === % # an British Embassy, (1075/65) ON Djakerta. *e ~—— 9 April, 1965. NX | 13 APR 1965 | PDA \SUAS KG @) Dee ek ( steps | My letter 1075/65 of March 31 about Indonesian reactions to events in Vietnam (where I see I inadvertently sent U.S. troops into Stanleyville; I meant planes!). 2. The past week has seen further and more widespread denunciations of America by various political groups and trade unions; and there has been more talk about "volunteers". For example, the Joint Secretariat of the Indonesian Peasants Organisation has said that “every single Indonesian peasant is ready to go to Vietnam in order to reinforce the struggle of the National Liberation Front"; and the staff organization of the Department of Social Affairs have told the North Vietnam Ambassador here that they are prepared to serve in Vietnam. 5. Aidit has sent a telegram to Ho Chi Minh to congratulate the North Vietnamese on shooting down fifty-seven American aircraft. 4 It is too early yet, as this bag closes, to let you have any Indonesian reaction to President Johnson's Baltimore speech. 5« It is notable however that there has been next to no comment on gas, napalm or bombs. The most we have had in this past week is a statement by Kartawinata, Speaker of the Gotong-Royong Parliament, to the effect that - and I quote from a translation in the vernacular Antara of 4 April - “in order to counter the barbarity of the United States which is arbitrarily committing aggression against Vietnam, it is essential to strengthen and organise solidarity among Afro-Asian nations". I think we can take it that this kid glove handling of the Vietnamese question is due to the presence of Bunker. 6. Sukarno did however receive the North Vietnamese Ambassador on 3 April and, according to Antara, had a talk with him for half-an-hour. The Ambassador told the press afterwards that he told Sukarno how pleased his Governemtn was at the way Indonesia was organising the celebrations for the anniversary of the First Afro-Asian Conference; and that he had already given Sukarno an account of the latest situation in Vietnam. Because of this, said the Ambassador, North Vietnam had not been able to decide yet who would come to Djakarta for the Bandung celebrations. An odd remark which I cannot explain. - I am sending a copy of this letter to Kuala Lumpur and Singepore, fee ae D. Tonkin, Esq., ——$—--~. South East Asia Department, (S. J. G. Cambridge) Foreign Office, London S.W.4. === [PDF page 11] === OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA, LONDON 11 INWARD TELEX MESSAGE LONDON CFOR EXTERNAL >) - 1992 ( t WASHINGTON — 1114 ITAT A {PLIp Bao KUALA LUMPUR = 660 AACA, FOLLOWING 1S REPETITION OF TELEGRAM NO.528 DATED 27TH APR,; [Unreadable] =RON ART rt mi Sere DJ AK Fay Ae ANMOCCCON CANIRODDA 2 SONC LOS [Unreadable] AVVUNORCGSCELY VANDCANA ye CUM DENTIAL. IN LOOKING AT THE M.P.R.S. RESOLUTION WE XHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO INTERPRET IT ONLY, OR PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS IN INDONESIA, LINKED AS IT WAS TO THE MALAYSIAN QUESTION AND IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE BUNKER VISIT DURING WHICH wairte ote SION wAON s.r HE DISCUSSIONS TO UN Co eTaATES THE i 2 TRIED HARD TO LIMIT THE VIlOvVUDS. VINO LU UN I ci DIAIES Dp e C= h M A'S PT iA & NiCYVW ADI = * A At? | Ho AIC T I POL C co ON MALAYSIA, IT WAD INEVITABLE TH iAT ALLCU NDER LINED OF MALAYSIA SHOULD BE CAUGHT UP IN SUCH A =SOLUTION. THE AMBASSADOR WHO WAS AT THE OPENING OF THE M.P.R.. ND TALKED TO VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVES THERE, FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT BO THE P.Kele AND THE P.N.1I. HAD A VERY STRON INFLUENCE ON THE JHOLE OF THE M.P.R.S.- PROCEEDINGS. ON E THE he THE AU Il Le THIS.ES IMAT THE DECREE MEANS. C FULL TEXT IS STILL NOT AVAIL& ABLE....17 THAT LIKELY TO BE TAKEN AGAINST ALL CUNDERLINE OI JETWEEN INDONESIA: A THE ASIAN -COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, INDONESIA'S [AIN EXTERNAL TARGET | STILL LIKELY TO BE THE AMERICANS AND TO Oo THAT WAY LONG | THE UNITE 1h tt ONTINUES WITH ITS >... FORCE sPOLICTE I] OUTH LETN ° IT 1S ALSO POSSIBLE THAT IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS, ET: Wik BEI INDONESIA'S O\ JIRECT INTEREST TO LET UTH VIENTMAN REPLACE MALAYSIA AS THE MAIN FOCUS FOR INDONESJAS KBMAMEASKRXTAX CRITICISM ¢ ’ AND ACTION AGAI ls THE ASSUMING THAT THE INDONESIA! ILL ANT TO I ALG IEI ITH A REAS ILE IMAGE AS WELL AS BEING IN A POSITION GRACEFULLY TO. ACCEPT THE L-AKEE La OF MALAYSIAN PRESE Bet: co EL eT WELL BE TO. INDONESIA'S ADVANTAGE TO HAVE A PERIOD OF QUIET OVER IALAYS I Ae IF SO SOUTH VIETNAM BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY ENTICING TARGET R THE P.KeI.- AND EVEN FOR SOME OF THOSE MORE, MODERATE ELEMENTS WHO ARE PREPARED PRIVATELY TO DOUBT THE WISDOM OF INDONESIA'S CONFRONTATION AGAINST MALAYSIA. FOR cs INTERESTS: £5) tO. BE APPL TE;AINST SOME COUNTRIES THA OTHERS, THE SELECTION OF TARGETS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS LIKELY TO BE RELATED AS MUCH TO A COUNTRY'S ATTITUDE OVER SOUTH VIETNAM AS OVER MALAYSIA. 4. CONCERNING SUKARNO'S 18TH APRIL STATEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC, THE AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THAT THIS IS ENTIRELY SUBANDRIO$ WORK. IT IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE NEEDLING TECHNIQUE SUBANDRIO HAS ADOPTED WITH THE AMBASSADOR IN THEIR RECENT INTERVIEWS AND SUBANDRIO'S APPARENT DESIRE TO MAKE THINGS A LITTLE UNCOMFORTABLE FOR US IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER iN VIN Wry w\/ it me wet HE WOULD, OF COURSE, KNOW OF OUR partT; yi ABOUT INDEPE! INCIDENTALLY, ALTHOUGH THIS IS THE FIRST TIME,TO OUR KNOWLEDGE TIIAT ARTY NTORNCC AnI DH — “AT CAMROCD UAC TA a — Ic on. HAT ANY INDONESIAN POLITICAL LEADER HAS TALKE } THE PACIFIC 1 in | tr T AT co AI ep ' TCM DA 9g ice TION > vita ~- DP hiele ~ vin imi: i tie el 2 VIN hi A ~ cA -t tne ' \ THI be I I I ESIA 0 \N HAVE RAI } i: t we g SpDAM TIMC TH TIME rie an ] (Vor o i PRU TIME iU bd Paden DURING i oxo - Tt Srer aor - =BAT I THE UNITED IONS. Wt WAVED NO WAY to orucePY I nic Tule «upltT T wort nm ee Herein TT UAV JE HAVE NO WAY Of CHECK I ig 1S BUT 1T yf LD: BE USEFUL. FO HAVE "i fh IH I ty YOI] CAN PROVIDE | THI AN) DAYINGY JGINY wrilunm IVU VAN FAUY Ivo UN im Ie, 5 AAA \ ITU ADD i c ‘hae Cr ris 199 ie pL_ieae Oov, 2 iff APRIL tu) rm siggguon: ty en Paty ae aree ENDS 29/1915AEST === [PDF page 12] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) CO; NPIL iN EAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT FROM SUBJECT: eS. Yeon. | GB omar Vo G Djgdeorto: tee Senso oxroumk of, We = &Uks ti dole No es 5 Dated em me = Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: Received Wel. k (Outward Action) MINUTES Spedtox a a rH Toso, PN OSLO OL (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action 4 (Main Indexed) completed) === [PDF page 13] === GONPIDENTIAL os ROM WASHINGTON TC OFF Gypher/ OTP FO/CRO/WH, DISTRIBUTION Sir P, Dean No, 935 D. 2157 9 April, 1965 9 April, 1965 | R, 2250 9 April, 1965 DMostuns PRIORITY gubiniecces” 3 CONFIDENTLAL Addressed te Foreign Office telegram No, 935 ef 9 April. Repeated fer information to:~- Djakarta Canberra Kuala Lumpur Wellington Singapore Manila | Bangkok ose? and Saving te:- Tekye ~~) Djakerta telegram No, 748{not to all): Bunker's visit te Indenesia, State Department have given us the follewing general account of the talks te date, 2. Before teday’s lunch, an aceount ef which ithe State Department have not yet received, Bunker had hed two talks with Sukarne, with Subandrie present en beth eccasiens, and two with Subandrio with Leimena, Saleh, Yani and Suwite present at one or the other, He eimed te have one more meeting with Sukarno early next week before leaving. He had alse seen a number of ether important Indonesians, 3. Bunker had explained that he was there at the request of the President whe had been concerned at the deterioration ef United States/Indenesian relations and wanted te hear the Indonesian’ view. On American aid pregraumes, he said that these had been designed te premote friendship but now seemed to provide irritants; ‘uséful cooperation new appeared difficult in view ef what seemed te be the efficial Indonesian attitude that the United States was the chief enemy. in the circumstances, all aid pregrammes were to cease unless the Indenesians wanted them te remain and were willing te supply the necessary suppert and pretection te them, Disagreement with Ampican internationel pelicy should net be allewed te damage bilateral relations, There was ne questien ef the sympathy ef the United States fer the aspirations ef the Indenesian people and their assistance te Indenesia after independence and ever West Irian illustrated this; the United States had always supperted legitimate independence movements, GONFIDENTIAL: === [PDF page 14] === GONPIDENTLAL PB issnington terecran No, 935 to Foreign orrice, Le The Indencsian reply was that they too desired good relations but could net ignere United States pelicy in the Cenge, Vietnam, Kerea, China, ete, The Indenesians seught throughout te fecus the discussions on Malaysia and fercefully expressed the view that United States aid te, and recegnition ef Malaysia belied the Americans prefessed neutrality in the quarrel, Ne imprevement ef United States/Indenesian relations was likely until the United States made seme gesture te preve that they were net eppesed te Indenesia on this issue, 5. In response te this, Bunker refused te engage in a substantive @iscussion en the Malaysia issue and said that United States recognition ef Malaysia was based on traditional criteria and that the United States would like te see a peaceful selutien en the basis ef any formula agreeable te beth sides, The United States was net directly invelved in the dispute but could be so under ANZUS, 6. In further discussions with Subandrie en United States aid, the assurances Bunker had asked fer were net forthcoming and it was agreed te withdraw the Peace Cerps gradually and witheut publicity, Bunker ‘had recommended that the existing university centacts sheuléd enly remain if there were strong public assurances ef suppert fmm beth Sukarne and Subanérie, 7. Nasutien had emphasised te Bunker the need te remeve the target presented by a tee ebvieus United States presence, He advised against any optimism and said that political develepments within Iindenesia must new run their course and that beth the United States and the Indenesian army should keep their heads dewn while the growing pelitical cenflicts sertea themselves out, Foreign Office pass Djakarta Ne, 12, Kuala Lumpur Ne, 18, Singapere Ne, 39, Manila Ne, 15, Bangkek No. 38, Canberra No, 33, Wellington Ne, 29 and Saving te Tekye Ne, 9, Z Repeated as requestea_/ === [PDF page 15] === Sep En Clair Mr, Rodgers No, 781 D. 04.50 10 April 1965 10 April 1965 R. 09.27 10 April 1965 FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE FO/CRO, DISTRIBUTION Addressed to Fore Office tele No 1 of 10 Repeated for information te: Kuala Lumpur Singapore and Saving to; Washington Bunker, Following from Antara. Sukarno and Bunker were guests at a luncheon held by United States Ambassador Jones 9 April. Sukarne when asked if he had discussed important things with Bunker in the course of their lunch party only cheerfully replied "We just have had a pleasant lunch", But he told reporters that his talk with Bunker would be resumed next Tuesday night. Asked hew about Indonesian/United States relations Sukarno remarked "Though there is always a bit ef differences relations are always good". Foreign Office pass Saving Washingten Ne. 221. [ Repeated as requested ‘| === [PDF page 16] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FORETGN OFFICE 08)..:or Mr, Redgers Ne. /94 De1120 13 April 1965 135 April 1965 R.13555 15 April 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No,79) of 13 April. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Singapere and Saving te: Washingten Bangkek Wellington Manila Canberra Tekye. Washingten telegram Ne.955: Bunker. We have been in touch with the American Embassy here, There is little te add. There will be one more meeting with Sukarne tenight (Tuesday); and pessibly a meeting with Subandrie toxerrow if the latter has returned frem Mecca by then, Bunker leaves en Thursday, 15 April. 2. The talks se far have preduced ne positive results, Nevere theless, the Americans here regard them as having been worthwhile, In particular, they think the Indenesians have been made to realize that the Americans ere net going te bail them out over Malaysia, The Americans have the impression: that the Indenesian line on Malaysia had been wellerehearsed beforehand, There was ne significant divergence ever this as between Sukarne, Subandrie, and the ether Ministers Bunker saw. All of them repeatedly made clear that a change (umspecified) in the United States attitude te Malaysia, was the key to an imprevement in relations between America and Indenesia, Bunker refused te be drawn en this and time and again breught the conversation back to bi-lateral relations, 3e Se far as these are concerned, the Americans see little hope fer imprevement. The only specific peint where pregress might be made ~ and which they are using te seme extent as a test case = is in the matter ef university contracts (United States teachers in Indenesia and Indenesian graduates engaged in advanced studies in America). Howard Jones attaches particular impertance to. the continuation ef this scheme; but the Embassy doubt whether they Will get the assurance mentiened in paragraph 6 ef the telegram under reference, 4. There has been ne detailed negetiatien yet on the communigqudéy Subandrie indicated a preference for separate cemmuniqués which ji (? grp omitted] be "coordinated". Rs compro, >” eemeral === [PDF page 17] === CONFI DENTIAL D tele Me te Fereign Office be In general we have the impression that this visit wiil enly Genfirm the Americans in believing that there is net much they can de new about indonesia. It is true that there have been public assurances of continued friendship - Sukarne was particularly warm te Bunker at the lunch on 9 April. But these remarks have been effset by the somewhat casual way in which Subandrie left fer Mecca in the middle of Bunker’s visit; and by the very deliberate anti-American remarks which Sukarne delivered during his [? grp omitted] in Bandung en 11 April - an eccasien at which Heward Jenes and Bunker were present. ‘The speech itself (my telegramsNes.791 and 792) was net as antie American as seme; but it was pointed eneugh. In any event with Sukarne new busy setting the scene for a triumphal series _ @f get-tegethers - the Bandung celebrations next week, Algiers and eventual conference - the commen theme ef which is anti- Imperialism and anti-Americay it is surely fruitless te leek for any change ef directien in Indenesia’s pelicy towards America, FPereign Office pass Saving te Washingten 227, Manila 20, Bangkek 25, Canberra 49, Wellingten 47 and Tekye 3,. === [PDF page 18] === @..... FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Mr, Redgers Ne, 795 D, 1156 13 April, 1965. 15 April, 1965, R, 1455 13 April, 1965. _ Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No, 795 of 135 April Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur Singapore and Saving te:~ Washington A DH 103/45]. (c) ' Bunker, Following from Antara (cf paragraph 5 of my telegram No, 79). Progressive Bandung students demonstrated before Elisworth Bunker, special envey of President Johnson, and American Ambassador Howard P, Jones, but security agencies immediately restored erder, Shouts of "go home Yankee" and "Destroy United States Imperialism", greeted Bunker and Jones when they left the provisional People’s Congress building Sunday afternoon sfter listening at President Sukarne’s address, The students also sang various revolutionary songs but there were no incidents as a result of the vigilance of the security agencies and the two American diplomats could safely return to their rooms at Hotel Homann, Later Bunker and Jones took seats in the Lobby ef Hetel Hemann near the street where the students were still hovering but there were no further incidents. Fereign Office pass Saving Washington No, 229, [Repeated as requested, ] === [PDF page 19] === ae FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Mr. Rodgers TE Apr 1965 ssed to Fere Office telezram No of A Repea or ormation to: Kuala Lumpur Singapore and Seving to: Washington. My telegram No, 794: Bunker. D.O442 14 April 1965 (2)R-0938 14 April 1965 LWA OWE WT Antara reports that Sukarne teld Press reporters last night after his meeting with Bunker that talks would be resumed this evening 14 April. United States/Indonesian relations were se impertant that discussions about them ceuld net be finished in enlycor or twe meetings, Sukarne said the telks had gene smoothly. Asked if they had reached any point of agreement yesterday evening he said ne, Foreign Office pass Seving te Yashingten No, 230. === [PDF page 20] === RECEIVED IN E ARCHIVES No. 48 12 APR 1965 | | CONFIDENTIAL This is just to record that Mr. Wood of the erican Embassy read out ‘to Mr. Peck and myself on the 9 April a telegram dated that day from Mr. Bunker in Djakarta giving an interim report on his conversations with Sukarno, Subandrio, Leimena, Saleh, Yani and Suwito. It seems that Bunker is due to leave Djakarta at the end of next week though his final talk with Sukarno may well be the lunch that he was due to give him today, 9 April. Sa oss [HT ( 26 It was a long report but the only points of real interest to us are that Bunker said he stressed his theme was entirely that of the deterioration in U.S-/Indonesia bilateral relations. He said the UeS.e were ready to close down eteht programmes which now seemed to be more a source of irritation than cooperation, unless the Indonesians really wanted them and were prepared to afford adequate protection. The only somewhat nauseating note in the Bunker telegram was that he reports himself as having assured the Indonesians that the U.S. had always sympathised with the aims and aspirations of the Indonesian revolution. The UeS. had always supported legitimate movements to end colonialisn. 36 The Indonesian reply to all this was that they appreciated this American point of view though they could not agree with American policy in various places (Congo, Vietnam, etc.). However, the main cause of the present bad state of relations was American support of Malaysia, e.g. the Tunku/Johnson communique, the recognition of Malaysia, etc. To this Bunker's reply was thet the U.S. did not of course createMalaysia, that they naturally recognised Malaysia on the basis of traditional criteria; that they were not directly involved in the problem but that as a result of their ANZUS commitment they could very well become so if the Situation deteriorated further. Le Bunker quoted Indonesian Army figures as recommending that peace corps activities should be closed down gradually and quietly so as to avoid giving the appearance of a P.K.I. victory. He also quoted a prominent unnamed Army figure as advising that the U.Se should remove for the time /veing CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 21] === CONFIDENTIAL being targets of which the P.K.I. could take advantage and that both the United States and the Indonesian Army should in general keep their heads down for the time being while internal & conditions worked themselves out. Bunker also quoted alternative advice he had received from other Indonesians to the effect that a U.S. pullout would discourage and undermine the "moderates" and so help the P.K.I. (A.A.GOLDS ) MR. HANB -TENISON boy ser Nan hang Frm al nv 43 (4 ime. Art Att, a Wr CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 22] === LLES Li L110 OW subandrio OF “eed ane E sire VE ca this. Lvoaday Gonesilan === [PDF page 23] === LOY tn av there o states 13; the LXCL acts IL rv done sian Vie tnai ne sian race ti! nited States is no xed accept bribes to hide its favourites that Hie’ OL solidarity towards anti-United States ae iali Indonesia, let the confrontation at the wrong will only render mor > dif ssor and the United or Jones's success f === [PDF page 24] === eee LG BOLT. 40 - oo moe eT. ellv Lo tt woo Our bre NOM Gree ves nob CaCls YeRSONn (OD fives fo OP ould olen. Ge CONErse We sec abliuc aonb bal bote aecount Praduncsoi.g corse me Gaolicutio: to tutu j Olns © === [PDF page 25] === Aaa. JA DS eG YLaLeS smilin becoming to react 1d that === [PDF page 26] === alaysia™. silence bec irds you, of can do ever blockade 1 ical fe af any reactio orf cours ites === [PDF page 27] === iukarno's attitude AULA ULAEV IDs === [PDF page 28] === (Security Grading—to be’ Up-graded2, 5 where Appropriate) CONFIDENTIA tut i PiWciN LIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ew “wet ib Sher ts * FROM ee hs SUBJECT: Ws \ Yon: QR wor Rsuwd Se Goal te We Rekds; ‘ ‘ ator ar x. Yus 9 slo. Centon pit wo dn Yen dD — No. \O1 &\GS ow Degas. ge: Dated OWL.0 Encloses Copy of: [Unreadable] \ oSIRa wok Une alaiticicas References and Relevant Papers: Received MINUTES c) Se Sn: WO od Qount Ken pot pa » 5 7 ONT (Printing Instructions) - ae (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) DAU 6 (Main Indexed) 1 BNO === [PDF page 29] === VvVite COTE oD CH NFIDENTTIS L With the compliments of THE BRITISH EMBASSY AT ft m 7 N.C.C. Trench “S.We a WASHINGTON, D.C. 10,.April, 1965 === [PDF page 30] === (1078/65) BRITISH EMBASSY, CONFIDENTIAL sini. 10 April, 1965 In our telegram No. 9 to the Foreign Office we gave a summary of Bunker's 22, £8 with the fndonesians up to his lunch with Sukarno on 9 April. 26 You may like to know that at the end of Bunker's visit to Indonesia, i.e. on the 1;th or 15th, the Americans may make a statement on their talks with the Indonesians about “confrontation”. The draft proposed by Bunker and Jones was to the effect that Bunker had reaffirmed United States policy towards the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. The U.S. Government regretted the existence of the dispute and hoped for a solution as soon as possible, to be achieved by the Asian powers amongst themselves and acceptable to all concerned. The United States vould support any solution which was acceptable to both the main parties. 3e The State Department had no objection to such wording except that they would change the word "dispute" to "problem" and the words “support” to “welcome". They proposed also to add a semtence to the effect that the United States continued to support the independence and territorial integrity of all South-East Asian nations, including Malaysia and Indonesia. he Marshall Green, who gave me the above information, told me that he thought Sukarno would be greatly put out by a statement on these lines, but he would just have to put up with it. It remains to be seen however whether the statement will eventually issue in the form that Washington have suggested, or whether either Bunker or Jones persuade them to cut out the last sentence, about indpendence and territorial integrity. 5e It is in any case still not clear whether the statement will in fact be made or, if so, in what forn. The inclination of the State Department would be to say nothing at all about "confrontation", but if Sukarno insisted they would hope that their piece could be included in a general A. Ae Golds, Esde, M.V.Oe,s Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, Fereign Office, London, 5.W.1 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 31] === CONFIDENTIAL general statement about Bunker's visit, as one item among many. They certainly would not like it to appear in isolation. 6. I am sending a copy of this to James Cable in the Foreign Office. (N.C.C. Trench) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 32] === Registry lo, * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) Secret * Restricted ROUTINE Open with priority | without _DEFERRED | Top Secret Draft. Security classification : Telegr yy eee [ af ay | btsthccas CONEIDENTLAL WASHINGTON And to:— Repeat to:— Kuala Lumpur |! Y (both immediate) U.S. Embassy have read us text of draft passage on "The problem of Indonesia and Malaysia" which might be included in communiqué to be issued on conclusion of Polad Singapore (Priority) Tie| Mr. Bunker's visit to Djakarta. As it stands, the draft passage is reasonably objective, En Clair. expresses hope for a peaceful outcome achieved through an Asian solution and reaffirms U.S. interest in continued stability and territorial Distribution:— Whitehati Copies to:— integrity of both Indonesia and Malaysia. as U.S. Embassy gave us to understand that State Department instructions to Bunker were to try to have no, repeat no, mention of Malaysia in communiqués but that he could agree to proposed wording if pressed but was not to make any further concession to Indonesian point of view. We said we would Na eae mention of Malaysia, but though we could not object to draft as it stood, we feared that if it was negotiable, it would inevitably be weakened in favour of Indonesia and thus be no longer acceptable to us. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 33] === 3- Please ensure that State Department understand our point of view and endeavour to have all mention of Malaysia excluded, reminding them that they informed us that the subject would not be raised by Bunker with Indonesians. If they insist on proposed wording, we would prefer phrase relating to "Asian solution" to read “a solution in the interests of the Asian countries concerned", === [PDF page 34] === & CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON Cypher/OTP FO/CRO/iH., DISTRIBUTION No. 2952 10 April 1965 D. 19:30 20 Aeris 1965 IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Vashington telegram No. 2952 of 10 april Repeated for information to: Djakarta immediate} Kuala Lumpur — — ) POLAD Singapore United States Embassy haveread us text of draft passage on "The problem of Indonesia and Malaysia" which might be included in communiqué to be issued on conclusion of Mr. Bunker's visit to Djekarta. As it stands the draft passage is reasonably objective, expresses hope for a peaceful outcome achieved through an Asian solution, and reaffirms United States interest in continued stability and territorial integrity of both Indonesia and Malaysia. 2, United States Embassy gave us to understand that State Department instructions to Bunker were to try to have no (repeat no) mention of Malaysia in communiqué; but that he could agree to proposed wording if pressed but was not to make any further concession to Indonesian point of view. We said we would prefer no mention of Nalaysia, but though we covld not object to draft as it stood, we feared that if it was negotiable, it would inevitably be weakened in favour of Indonesia and thus be no longer acceptable to us. 3, Please ensure that State Department understand our point of view and endeavour to have all mention of Malaysia excluded, reminding them that they informed us that the subject would not be raised by Bunker with Indonesians, If they insist on proposed wording, we would prefer phrase relating to "sian solution" to read "a solution in the interests of the Asian countries concerned", === [PDF page 35] === » CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir P. Dean Ne. 950 D. 2330 10 April 1965 10 Kpril 1965, R. 0146 11 April 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed _ to Foreign Office telegram Ne.950 of 10 April Repeated for informatien te: Djakarta., Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore. Your telegram No.2952: Possible Djakarta Communique, American Embassy in London have aceurately reported your views, which we have reinforced. State Department fully share your preference for Malaysia not (repeat not) to figure in a communique, but fear that Sukarne may insist, 2. There is still some doubt about the wording which weuld be used if Malaysia were mentioned in a communique, but we are pursuing this and have made point in final sentence of your telegram, Foreign Office pass Djakarta No.13, Kuala Lumpur No.19 and POLAD Singapere No.0. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 36] === °31d03d NVISANOCNI JO SNOILVYIldSVY ONY NOILNMIOASY NVYISSNOONI SHL SGYYMOL OILSHL [Unreadable] *SNOILVY13Y IWHALVTIIG JSVWYO OL GSLLIWYSd 3€@ LON GQINOHS SANSSI ATYOM JO SONVY AGvous V NO SZONRXSSSIC [Unreadable] *“VISANOGNI NI SLNAWHSI TEVLS3a -GNV TANNOSH3d SSLVLS GSLINN YOS GSAGLAONd NOIL -O03L0¥d ALYNGOSGVNI 4O GNV AWSNS -L °ON YSH SI SALVLS GSLINNA SAWKWV YD *dIHSYS0V371 NVISSNOGNI HLIM SNDSOTVIG YaSO1D V SAVH OL [Unreadable] SNILVYORYSLIG AO MAIA NI LJVHL LNO GSLNIOd SVYH YSaXNNG "¢ *ASSYEWA SSLVLS G3LINN SHL WOUS SAIZOIY NOA NOILYWYOINI LN3SWSTddNS AVYW HOIHM JO AYVYNWNS SNIMOTIOS ‘LYOdaY SIHL G¥3u ZAVH JM [Unreadable] NO YV¥4 OS NOISSIW YaYNNG JO SLINSAY LNOSY 391450 NSIZY¥Od XSUIVSSV TYNYSLXS SSIYG OL GSALONYLSNI NS33G MON 3AVH NOGNOT ONY NOLONIT19M *YYYSENVO NI SSISSVEWS SSLVLS G3LENN @i-L NOGNOT GaLVadau CNOLONITTSM GNY VLYVNVPO SSV¥d 3SId>) LEYORS LEZL L6LZ2°1 NOLONIHSVYM VYGWSLSNY WOYS rg TOVSSAW XATAL GUVMNI @ GNOT ‘VITVULSAY YOA WANOISSINWOO HDIH AHL AO FOLIO === [PDF page 37] === JONISSYd SALVLS GALINA SHL WOVLLY OL HOIHM HLIM JSVYHSART TNOIL -10GGV SNINIVS GNV AYOLOIAHVY SNIWIVTO WOYS IMd AHL LNSAR&d OL SZ¥ ATIVNAVYS GNV a Pa et ort ie, tes aaa Bhs: LIWYSd TIIM HOITHA AYM Y Ni SSWWYYDOUd SHL AO LYOddNS NVISZNOGNI SLVOIGNI GNY TSNNOSU3d NYOIYAWY SHL LOSLOYd ATYSd0Ud SNVI'SSNOOGNI SHL SSH INN "NO OD LONNYOD SSWWYYS0dd LOVYLNOD ALISUSAINN [Unreadable] *,sLNSWSATOAN!I LOSZYIG AZYOW OLN] SALVLS GALINA SHL SNIYS GINOD LNSWLIWNOD SNZNV SHL HONOHLTV,, QSNYSONOO ATLOSYHIG LON SI ATSSLI SSALVLS Galina SHL bE GANYAONOD ATEN PRK Leki PRA ONOD ATLOSYIG SAILYVYd SHL OL AISVSRSYSV SISVE ANY NO NOILN IOS WNASOVSd V 3AS OL AMIT GINOM SSALVLS GALINN SHL “VIYSLIYO TIWNOILIGQVYL JO SISVG SHL NO LI GSSINSOOSH LNG VISAVIVW 3LV34D LON GIG SS3LVLS GALINA SHL LVYHL INO GSLNIOd SVH 3H *“VISAVTIVW LNOSY NOISSNOSIG SAILNVLSSNS OLN] NMVYYC 3G OL GSNI71030 SVH YaXxNNG "e LVHL ONINDYV *¥VISAVIVW NO ATIAVSH Q3LVYLNSONOOD SAVH ‘@ HOIHM NO S3NSSI YAHLO SYOND!I LONNYO Lng SNOILVTSY WesEa 1g doo LNYM OOL ASHL LYHL G317d3u SAVH SNVISSNOGNI SHL '.< === [PDF page 38] === HHBOISSTLLVLIS GALINA 3HL OS 38 GInom 3SHNOD -ySsLLaG SHL *yISJNOGNI NI SLSSYSLNI ONV SINAWHSIIESVLSS SaLVLS GSLINA LoaLOdd OL IMd JHL LSNIVSV dN GNVLS OL SNIAVH AWHVY SHL 4O JONSNGASNOD V sy ggqoug uO Ggso1anraldd *daLV9OlTdWO0o 3g LON GINOHS NOILISOd JuY¥ SHL LVHL YSHLVY SVM MSIA SIH bea LVHL DSNISOdOYd LON SVM NOILASVN LVHL WIH HLIM NOI LYSYSANOD S,YaNNNG JO LYOd3y¥ GATIVLAG SHL WOUd HYVS19 SVA LI SISILNSGLINA SHL CW) Sei at a *“AYOLOIA Id VY SV GaaquVDSY [Unreadable] TIIM SONSS3¥d SALVLS GSLINN SJHL JO NOILONGAY V LYHL JOI1AQGV NVISSNOGNI YSHLO OL SYSSSH YSMNNG *SIHL LSNIVDV SV “LNO ATSASLI SLYOS LOI TANOO TWNYSLNI SHL STIHM NMOG SQVSH YISHL daay™ GINOHS SALVLS G3LINNA S3HL ONY AWYVY NVISSNOGNI SHL LYHL GNVY 3SHNOD YISHL NNY LSNW VISANOGNI NI SLNSWdOTSASG TIWNYSLNI LVHL SNIADYV ‘SYVSA OML OL SZNO LXS3N SHL YOd SNOILVYTSY NVISSNOGNI/S3LYLS GALINN LNoay WOUS GHAOWSY 3G GINOHS SSLVLS GALINA SHL AG GSGIAOY¥d SLASYVL SHL LYHL SNINDYVY SY SYHNDIA AWYV ABM V SSLONG say “9 Lg et ted s "WAHL LYOddNS.ATINSdO OI YGNVENS GNVY ON&VNSOS Jl GSNNILNOO 3g INO NVO SLOVYULNOD ALISYSAINA SHL LYHL GSLVLS SVH YSayNNG === [PDF page 39] === [Unreadable] *LHSITS SVM SIHL N3AS GNVY G3ANILNOD SNISZE@ 3O JONVHO ANY, GOOLS SGLVLS GSLINN S3HL NI SSWWYYDONd ONINIVUL G3LVYTSY GNY SLOVYHLNOD ALISUYSAINN SHL AINO *S3WWYYDOUd GIY LNVOISINDIS 3HL sO *SS300Ud JHL WONS AZYVLNVAGY MAN IMd FHL ANSO OL GYOM SIH daa¥ GINOM OLYGNYENS YSHLAHM N3IS 3@ OL GINIVWSY LI ‘NMVYGHLIM 3@ OL ATLNAYVdd¥ SduOD 30Vad JHL HLIM Cad *WOGONIY GALINA GNY VISWAYIVW JO WSIOILIYD GNY SGHOOOY VIINVN OL S3LVIS GSLINN AG SZONTNASA OITGNd AYaM CAAOGY € VHVd) ANSSI VISAVTVW OL NOILY794 [Unreadable] *SGNIW YISHL NI ATuvVa10 & Sssrsaen [Unreadable] LS3M 3HL NI GVH 3H SY VISAVTVW HLIM 3LNdSIG JHL NI YOLVIOSN SV LOV OL YSAYNNG G3NS¥ LON GVH SNVISSNOGNI 3HL CdD *VG3S HLIM MSIAYALNI N¥ JO LY¥Odg3u SIH SNILIVMY MON SVM LNSWLYYd3G A3VLS HSNOHLTY SSINVdWOD T10 GNVY YSGSNY SHL JO SWH1d04¥d SHL NI G3ATOANI ATSAILNVLSENS 3WOORE £34-QVH-SH-LVHE-34-V9-GNT-LONHOTSHSLNOaTE-S sonia ot ON+t fannie ca) SYNOD WIWITS NOO *“SNOILY1394 NVISANOGNI/SALVLS GaLINA JO NOILVYOIYSLS0 SHL JO 3SNVO LOOY aHL LON SVM 3NSSI VISAVTVW 3HL LYHL G3lTdh1 GVH NOILOSYN JO ALVWILSS SIH SVM SIHL LVH1 NV3W OL NANVL SVM S¥WaA OML OL 3NO LSV1 GINOM GO1uad LVYHL LVHL LNAWALVIS s,noruneit “LOITANOOD “IWNYSLNI SO GOIYSd: SHL SNIYNG YV3ddVSIG OL JONAS3Yd === [PDF page 40] === ee IDENTIA FROM WA GTON To F GN OFFICE hs DA loSc| Hs (s) Cypher/OTP FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir P. Dean - - No, 977 D, OO149 WU April 1965 13 April 1965 R, 03.11 WU, April 1965 PRIORITY NFI pies HF Addressed toe Foreign Office tele: No Repeated for information te; Djakarta Kuala Liwapur POLAD Singapere My telegram No. 950: Possible Djakarta Communiqué, Mr. Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary Far East, has teld us that it now leoks as though they will have te include a reference to Malaysia in the commumiqué, This would be wrapped up in a general statement about other matters and would read as fellews:- "President Sukarne teld Ambassador Bunker that Indenesia regards the Malaysia issue as being of the greatest importance and wishes te see it settled on the lines of the Manila and Tokye Agreements, Ambassador Bunker reaffirmed that the United States deeply regrets that the problem exists and hopes that a peaceful solution te it can be brought about by Asian Powers threugh any means acceptable te these cencerned", 2. Green hoped yeu would find this harmless, He theught that the Indenesians would be upset by the tacit refusal to subscribe te the Manila and Tokye Agreements, Foreign Office pass te Djakarta No. 15, Kuala Lumpur No, 21 and POLAD Singapore No.s3. [ Repeated as requested ] === [PDF page 41] === Registry a ae * Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should [Unreadable] Top Secret Secret EMERGENCY IMMEDIATE Confidential if Restricted ROUTINE Open Draft. Security classification wight Pe ay | Ke ote. (Date)... Wefan... And to:— Repeat to:— Your telegram no. 977 of April 13/7: KUALA JOUPUR proposed Djakarta communiqué. IMEQZATE (IMMEDAATE) WA Do you gather that the Americans have i im: (IMMEDIATE) lo hal consulted the Malaysians, either + Wash iggton POLAD SZINGAPORE | or 4m Kuala Lumpur about this communi qué? V M35\ f treet It would certainly be Cte a oi to do n-Clair SO. Cade Cypher Ze Subject to any views that the Malaysians or Lord Head may have, I should still prefer meat Lhionpl, Distribution:— no reference to Malaysia a if tre FO/CRO/WHI smepieens—eonsidentkhet some mention is inevitable, the proposed text seems harmless enoughe It would be marginally better if the Copies to:—: last line could be amended to read "acceptable to all those concerned" but I can foresee difficulties and would not want you to make an issue of this point. eas [Unreadable] CONFIDENT IAL === [PDF page 42] === FIDENTIAL I( WONT “a SHINGTON a aA -~ Y gton telegram information to Kuala lam? LHTOrMACLON-: GO a.Uc a LUMD {Both Sing Merlcans Nave wOu. ld mention is inevitable the propo It would be marginally better if > np nto t LCCC pb ible and === [PDF page 43] === CONFIDENTIAL —™ 43 * * FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP FO/CRO/WH eas DISTRIBUTION Sir P. Dean ee No, 991; 190. D, 0220 15 April, 1965. CONFIDENT FILCH ddressed to Foreign Office telegram No of Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur: Djakarta f i) POLAD Singapore \* W ete Your telegram No. 30,4: Djakarta Commmniqué. "a 1965 Mr, Rusk assured me this afternoon that Mr. Bunker’s terms of reference had been strictly confined to bilateral United States/ Indonesian problems and that it was only because the Indonesians had pressed him so very hard that some mention of Malaysia would be made in the communiqué, I replied that the text which the State Department had given us yesterday (my telegram No. 977) did not seem to us to be entirely satisfactory, but if nothing better could be obtained we would raise no objection. One of the American officials present said that the latest instructions to Mr. Bunker gave him authority to agree to a slightly more pro-Indonesian version of this text, I expressed disquiet at this and said that I hoped the Malaysiaas would be kept fully in the picture since this was very much their affair. 2, The State Department have now told us that the communiqué was issued today in Djakarta and that the only change from the wording in my telegram No, 977 was “through these or any other means" in the last sentence; they agreed that this made it slightly more attractive from the Indonesian point of view. 3. The Americans did not apparently consult the Malaysians beforehand sbout the wording, but are now giving them a full account of what transpired during Bunker's visit, emphasizing that he confined himself to bilateral matters, refused to be dram into a discussion on Malaysia, and that the wording of the commniqué accurately reflects all that was said by the Americans about confrontation, /., Mr. Rusk CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 44] === CONFIDENTIAL mn tele No 1 to For afte 1. Mr. Rusk also showed me an agency message to the effect that the Indonesians would welcome an initiative by the Japanese for a four- Power Asian conference to deal with the Malaysian/Indonesian dispute, Foreign Office pass Kuala Lumpur 22, Djakarta 16 and POLAD Singapore 42, [Not repeated to Djakarta pending Departmental decision. Repeated as requested to remaining posts.] CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 45] === .6 CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA REIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP FO/CRO 3 DISTRIBUTION Mr. Rodgers jos ASHES @ Hed) No,310 D. 1010 15 April, 1965 15 April, 1965 R. 1130 15 April, 1965 PRIORITY Addressed _te Fereign Office telegram Ne.ol10 ef 15 April, Repeated fer infermation te: Kuala Lumpur Singapere Washingten and Saving te: Tekye Manila Bangkek Canberra Wellingten My telegram Ne.791: Bunker. _ DH103 14S nly e The American Embassy have teld us ef the clesing stages ef Bunker's visit, The talks were taken up almest witolly with the terms of the cemmuniqué (my telegram Ne.808). 2, The meeting with Sukarne en 13 April was particularly sharp. The Americans first tried eut a draft cemmuniqué witheut any mentien ef Malaysia. Sukarne went threugh the ceiling. He made it clear that he wanted seme reference te Malaysia and tried hard te get American suppert fer his Maphilinde and Tekyo pesitien er at least seme coupling ef his name with "a desire fer'a peaceful settlement" er some such versien. Bunker weuld have nene ef this; and the twe sides decided te make one mere attempt te agree the fellewing evening. 3. This next meeting, en 1) April, was by centrast fairly amiable. Sukarne evidently realized that he ceuld net push the Americans any further and made ne mere difficulties in accepting the fermula fer Malaysia which has appeared in the communiqué. 4. The one pesitive peint in this fer the Americans is the agreement abeut technical assistance fer the universities. But they are keeping their fingers cressed: altheugh Sukarne’s assurances read well and positively, the Americams realize he ceuld renege temerrew because of "pressure frem my people". Fer the time being hewever, the Americans believe that the Deans ef the feur universities cencerned can take courage frem this clear statement of high level suppert fer the training pregramme (semething they have never had befere) and might thus be able te stand up te the Cemmunist pressure frem their faculties and students. CONFIDENTIAL / 5_ The statement === [PDF page 46] === a & CONFIDENTIAL Diakarta telegram Ne.810 te Foreign Office 5 The statement abeut the Peace Cerps leeks at first sight like a counter balance ef Sukarne's acquiescence in the wniversities' progremme, Press cerrespendents are already interpreting it in this way. This in fact is net se. The Americans had determined frem the eutset that the cerps weuld have te be withdrawn, if only fer the sake of their ewn safety. Many of them are in remote parts ef the ceuntry. If there had been ne cemminiqué the Americans had intended te make a unilateral declaration abeut withdrawal. As it is, the agreement on a gradual withdrawal might remeve seme of the heat on this questien and enable the 30 er se cerps members to leave witheut incident, “ 6. The outceme of the Bunker visit is more er less what the Embassy here expected, There is cei'tainly ne cause for joy; en the ether hand particularly in the references te future reviews "on a continuing basis" ef assistance pregrammes, the communiqré dees suggest that Sukarne certainly dees net wish te break entirely with America, This, the Americans think, may be salutary fer the extremists in the country, Nevertheless, the general feeling in the American Embassy is ene ef continuing pessimism abeut the future, This was sharply reinferced when net a single Indenesian turned up at the airpert te see Bunker eff, Foreign Office pass Washingten Ne.62 and Saving te Tekye, Manila, Bangkek, Canberra and Wellingten as my telegrams Nes.35, 21, 26, 51 and 49 respectively. === [PDF page 47] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) CU VriVciN | iAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT IND ‘ew? bt (ewiAA FRO SUBJECT: hie Selashease Getoe’-:. Caution Glaheals _Vitiso on No. \ou| 6S. Woes D \owa Woe Dated oak - S. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) MINUTES ( VS.W bx ek ul Sut D G hr Wy) bas, w al (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) === [PDF page 48] === artist Ee (1071/65) NS Yee 5 April, 1965 tw<.. JPL i De Jed) ~~ [Ss anus | There has been a great flurry of despatch-writing in this area for some time and if I have failed to participate it has not been through modesty but simply because of lack of time. (Why not deprive other Ambassadors of sufficient staff to ensure the abandonment of despatches and then you would be able to cut staff in London too?) ee Terence Garvey in his series of three has analysed & Situation beautifully, but just as we left the Americans out of Suez in 1956, so he now leaves them out of Vietnam. Even if he is right in wishing them out (perhaps I should say "contemplating their withdrawal without any perceptible pain"), he can surely not expect them to get out. Tt seems to me that if China is militarily weak, and if the Americans want to take advantage of that fact, they are using a@ common-sense approach which we ought to be very careful about arguing against. Je The general impression made in Indonesia by strong American actions and reactions in Vietnam is odd end perhaps significant. There has been no direct denuncia— tion of America by top people outside the Communist renks, even over gas. The pressure on Bunker is - on the surface - in no way over Vietnam but over Malaysia. I believe this to be a perversion by the top non-Communist brass. The real pressure is from the Communists and is over Vietnem: the evidence of the Communist press shows the cat coming out of the bag. My Australian colleague, whose views on Vietnam coincided for long with Terence Garvey's, has just written to canberra: -— "While I was at one stage really worried about the effect of American actions in North Vietnam on Asian opinion and on our long-term position in the /area., Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 49] === CONFIDENTIAL area, and still am to a great extent, it may well be that, once committed to this course of action, there can now be no turning back." The general drift here continues to be towards China. writes in the same despatch above "the growing influence of the Peking-orientated PKI. Since his National Day speech on August 17th last, Sukamo has done nothing, except to refrain from shooting or locking up those opposed to him, which allow one to draw any worthwhile distinctions between his internal or external political aims and those of the PKI, True, Sukarno would not, as yet anyway, accept the PKI's real views on the place or influence of religion in society, but his own acts have brought us to the point where the religious horse of the NASAKOM troika is fighting to maintain its political influence. I use the expression "real Views" because people like Aidit and Njoto profess to see a place for people of religious convintion not only in Indonesian society but in the PKI itself! In the foreseeable future, the PKI is not likely to challenge the religious rights of the Moslems, but what they want is to reduce the Moslem parties to the same political impotence as the Church of Hneland in Australia, As things now stand, the growth of PKI influence (with its concomitant increasing orientation of indonesia towards China) seems likely to increase while Sukarno remains in charge, and it follows that during this period the PKI will go all out to consolidate its position during Sukarno's lifetime." as Thus in effect Sham's conclusion is that nothin could be better calculated to smooth the vath for the PKI in Indmesia than the abandonment of Vietnam by the Americans. I am less interested than Shann in ideological distinctions as between Indonesians; for "smooth the path for the PKI" read instead "ensure the downfall of Malaysia". Further, 1 regard Americen bombing activities as likely to cause a healthy restraining effect on Indonesian leaders: we might imitate.... 6. I am copying this to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Peking, vashington, Saigon and Canberra, x fue (A. G. Gilchrist) CONF IDENT'T AL, === [PDF page 50] === CONFIDENT TAL P.S. You may like to know that Shann ends his despatch with typically Australian nostalgia thus:- "But I still hope that, if it be decently avoidable, we do not commit our own forces. It is a sometimes daunting fact that we must live here forever, and that others will not be forced by geography to do so. _I recall with sone nostalgia something Mr, Lester Pearson once said to me: "If I could find a tug big enough I would tow Canada off to another place". CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 51] === 51 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SRET & Guar H 103145/s0 / G [Unreadable] Mer. oe - Sens, the Anorrean Andbastader ie, me. 908 [tS 4G, Dyakarke. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Apnil (Outward Action) >. Kauleic. Sin BL Wen 29 [4 RPL Le (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) acaeen ; I OF NIST === [PDF page 52] === 1905/15/LG rsa Une Shann, arta. [Unreadable] A be IS hea 20 convers: Austra [Unreadable] a) fey Olitical Adviser manw 9 tralians here elated wh ich > | unker rece nh G1 stralian Ambassador his genui was off 1 throug! lia === [PDF page 53] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D W \OS\WS\S\. SUBJECT: Rees Bane Ov on OB oWimer2 spurl. Mental Goshusorvrdmod ef; \yeen One S04 Qumran, & SOD? Kaen a Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received mv wis\r\0g MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 54] === 7 BRITISH EMBASSY, UNCLASSIFIED é “~") DI AKARTA, 159/65 14 April, 1965 Dew he oom Z in Indon- The first reas comment/on President esia Johnson's Baltimore speech appeared yesterday in a long editorial in the Indonesian Herald. fp patosinss Ze It is not quite so intransigent as the sort of thing which has been coming out of Peking and Hanoi, but it is sour enough. Extracts are attached. 3- A long section of the editorial, which I am not copying to you, makes a laboured comparison between President Johnson's offer of aid to South East Asia and what happened in this country in 1948, when the United States urged Indonesia to settle with the Dutch whereupon they would receive considerable American financial help. "Already at that time Indonesia, under the same Bung Karno, told Washington to go to hell! Now, 17 years later, another President of the United States is repeating the same naive policies...... Indeed, if it has any permanent Significance at all, the Baltimore speech of President Johnson is positive manifestation of the mental backwardness of present day American leadership." 4. I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Washington. Mw Aw tbl. (S.J.G. Cambridge) D. Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Dept., FOREIGN OFFICE, Solace === [PDF page 55] === 1039/65 Extract from editorial from Indonesian Herald, 13 April. Johnson's Baltimore Address: The offer for a "negotiated settlement" was calculated to deceive world public opinion. Because this offer was balanced by continued American military adventures, thereby cancelling every chance for "discussions". The offer for a “massive” economic aid was calculated to remind other like-minded industrialised nations of the West that they better restrain themselves in criticizing American policies in Asia. Johnson wanted them to know that if America's policy succeeds in preserving Asia for the “free world", the other Western and pro-western capitalist countries can have a share in capital investment. The offer for Soviet participation is, of course, another shrewd - though crude - effort to remedy the earlier mistakes, namely to draw the Soviet Union from further rapproachment with the People's Republic of China. Canada's Paul Martin was doing the United States great service in polishing a bit the offer to the Soviet Union by adding that People's China may be invited to join in the international venture “at a later time". The idea of bringing the U.N. was a clear admission of the increasing unpopularity of the world body which Johnson hoped could be bolstered by a billion dollar idea. But why such a sudden love for the U.N.? The U.S. has always been lukewarm to the idea of canalizing massive economic development programs through the world body. Propaganda stunt, nothing more. === [PDF page 56] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 29 where Appropriate) D CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D ABSA Tae SUBJECT: s Q. e 3 Dey ws \usod pack i oun Lord rE Un Q s\8 edusn) [Unreadable] SA \ S oe Quel - hb - Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received - 1: (Outward Action) MINUTES 6) Geen. ON SS 8) Seek: Sadana NerolA yf (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action (Main Indexed) completed) | KA | i les [Unreadable] === [PDF page 57] === 57 [Handwritten minute in blue ink on a Foreign Office minute sheet, transcribed by eye; continuation from previous page] to Malaysia had committed them 'irrevocably' to the Malaysian side; Mr Bunker had refuted this by pointing out that the U.S. made credit sales to many other countries. Throughout the discussion of the passage on Malaysia in the SEATO Council communiqué, the U.S. Delegation showed great apprehension about Indonesian reactions & did not want to be associated with UK/Aust/NZ military support of Malaysia. They were in frequent communication with Washington and, I believe, with Mr Bunker himself, who as their Delegate to the O.A.S. is also involved in the Dominican Republic crisis. [initials] 5/5 [Printed form, right margin:] Number of copies........ Number of copies of enclosures........ === [PDF page 58] === RECEIVED IN; ARCHIVES No.48 DH | CONFIDENTIAL wh af], “. “5 British Embassy, eon barber A: Col bees Washington, D.C. (10342/65) ft Cyhe “a SA 26 April, 1965 ete 27/4 ow (ef Bunker has now completed the report on his mission to Indonesia and I called on him on Friday to hear about it. 2. I started by asking him how he viewed the present situation in Indonesia and the future prospects. Bunker said that the present situation was very bad and the P.XK.I. seemed to be making rapid progress. He could see little likelihood of any improvement in Indonesian relations with the United States or ourselves in the near future. Sukarno had given as ostensible reasons for the deterioration in U.S./Indonesian relations, in descending order of priority, American support for Malaysia, American policy in Vietnam, the Congo, etc., the American presence and bases in South- East Asia. All other Indonesian leaders had repeated this with variations. Bunker said that he did not believe this. In his view, even if the Americans were to change their attitude towards Malaysia, Vietnam, etc., there were far more fundamental factors militating against an improvement in relations; these were Sukarno's whole NEFO philosophy, his ambition to be a leader of the Afro-Asians, the P.K.I. ‘determination to push the U.S. out and Sukarno's mystical belief in his mission to provide the leadership of South-East Asia; he had told Bunker that there were now many sources of power in the world apart from Moscow and Washington and that one of them was Indonesia. On the other hand, Bunker continued, there still existed some friendly elements in Indonesia, such as the military, the Muslims and other opponents of the P.K.I., but none could really match the P Bek Sukarno was a Marxist at heart and Bunker was afraid that, because of the state of his health, he was now trying to speed up the progress towards a quasi-Communist state. D> As for confrontation, Sukarno had as good as admitted to Bunker that it was simply designed to provide an emotional stimulus to nationalism in Indonesia; he had told /Bunker E.H. Peck, Esq., C.M.G., Foreign Office, London, ” S.Wel CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 59] === panel and national entity were more important 1erging country than economic development. along with confrontaion, be cause of ould undoubtedly want to suffer a defea nor yet in our or the / j in Indonesia prefer to attior 2 ition ch ck ch DOr rs Oo 0 bch sb be BS receSe g strength of the subvers f£ the Army cent. Bunker sé ia) and the dange fr the p ing the arming of the aASaNnts, “which Bunker sho Le t inevitably would. As w long it would be bef the were in a ion to take over full p rer would not hazard w long Sukarno as anything we or the He did Lé continue work 1 a peacef settlement, that > K vy really interested 4. |.. 3 eK \ hay e Le d thou at «they in the worl if one looked like @e very little they with friend told Americans === [PDF page 60] === CONFIDENTIAL clear in this context that he thought that we no less than the Americans ought to keep our representation in Djakarta at the level of an Ambassador, rather than a Chargé 6% Other points we touched on were:- (i) Whether the Dutch could play any useful part in the future as a representative of the West. Bunker thought that they could and that they had made considerable progress in Indonesia and were not regarded as a threat by the Indonesians since they were primarily interested in commercial matters. (ii) The economic situation. Bunker said that although the economy was in a disastrous condition, he was struck by the extraordinary appearance of prosperity everywhere, cars, good crops, Clothes, etc. But he had formed the impression that there was no future for foreign ownership of assets in Indonesia; Saleh was now trying to work out some formula which would apply to all foreign companies and which would enable them to draw profits without owning anything; this seemed to Bunker to be the ultimate answer, (411i) Sukarno's health seemed good to Bunker, but people who had known him longer said that he was not in fact in good shape. (iv) Sukarno felt that he could control the P.K.I. and bend it to his will; Bunker was very doubtful how long he could continue to do this if the present trend towards the P.K.I. continued. If Sukarno died, Subandrio was at the moment the most likely successor and was using the P.K.I. as a base, since he had no other political base. But there would almost certainly be a showdown with the Army and Bunker was doubtful how long Subandrio would last. 7. Bunker agreed with my summary of his conclusions that there was nothing we could do except stick it out, maintain what contacts we could, remain as inconspicuous as possible and wait to see who won the race for the succession; there was very little either of us could do to influence the situation. 63 Throughout this talk Bunker was realistic, resigned and made no effort to paint an optimistic picture; there was a hint of criticism of Jones on one or two octasions, particularly in the praise he bestowed on Galbraith. He said that the above covered most of the points in his report and recommendations, but we will try to get a more precise account of these. 9. I am copying this letter to Rodgers in Djakarta, Bottomley in Kuala Lumpur, Adams in Singapore, Addis in Manila and Chanceries in Canberra and Wellingtg é PF PN === [PDF page 61] === FO/CRO AVE. DISTRIBUTION No. 175 Guidance 2a April, 1 965 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Bunker's Mission to Indonesia Din03 4S /52 (A) The recent visit of Mr. Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia passed off without startling incident. The joint communiqué spoke of divergent views on "a range of matters of foreign policy" but said that these differences "should not be allowed to affect unduly the gen ssh pattern of friendship". Mr. Bunker was careful not to endorse, even by implication, Sukarno's Malaysia policy and in ce of strong pressure from Sukarno would agree to nothing more than the phrase "the United States deeply regrets that the problem exists" in the com muniqué, This will have been all the more frustrating for Sukarno, since Mr. Bunker's claim to fame in Indmesian eyes is that he negotiated the — nt whereby the Netherlands ceded Vest Irian to Indonesia, and his name is inevitably linked with "appeasement". ia The United States programme of technical assistance to Indonesian universities is to continue for the time being, and now has the imprimatur of the joint communiqué. The Peace Corps is to be withdrawn, Mr. Bunker's visit thus tidied up some loose ends, and has no doubt helped to confirm the Americans in their generally pessimistic view of Indonesia':s present policies. Je The foregoing may be used in conversation with reliable contacts. f TT 0. and C.R.0. ibution, | CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 62] === UNCLASSIFIED 4 South East Asia Department, & FOREIGN OFFICE, SWials With the Compliments DOF CHANCERY (s. J. G. Cambridge) 21 April 1965 British Embassy, DJAKARTA === [PDF page 63] === Extracted from the Indonesian Herald, 16 April 1965 Editorial SEIZING UP THE SITUATION Ambassador Bunker has left Indonesia yesterday after a fortnight's stay in Djakarta. The result of this visit was an official document reflecting the present mood of Indonesia-United States relation, capped by a cautious desire to keep this relation going and, if possible, improved in the time to come. There is every reason for Indonesia to maintain a cautious attitude towards the United States despite the assurances given by Ambassador Bunker that the United States has the objective of attaining the freedom, welfare and security of all countries. This objective is a very praisworthy.one and should be welcomed by all concerned who has any dealing with the United States. But past history revealed that U.S. objective and U.S. action to pursue that objective are sometimes worlds apart; the one full with human ideas and ideals that call for the brotherhood of man, and the other studded with ignorance, prejudice and hate that kill the essence of the brotherhood of man. It takes two to do the Tari Lenso, the Lenso Dance. Indonesia will show that it can be an able partner to the U.S. in doing the Tari Lenso as long as the U.S. does not step on Indonesia's toes. === [PDF page 64] === FROM Oc Q li. » apron Dated Qyaaks SO | Encloses Copy of: Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded; where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT i IDONESIA | SUBJECT: G ereura ss onhsde the Ser On Vowta ) cao ee age whorls on Sh OS\S DANSHAD LO, Ralslrenss: \Ourtswd References and Relevant Papers: (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) Pe VO 4 ° eet MINUTES === [PDF page 65] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Mr, Redgers Ne. 915 B: 0550 30 April, 1965 30 April, 1965 DW w31RS[53.2, 9808 30 April, 1965 Addressed _te Fereign Vffice telegram Ne, 915 ef 50 April, Repeated fer infermatien te: Washingten Kuala Lumpur Singapere Antara 29 April reperts an interview between the Minister Njete, deputy leader ef the Indenesian Communist Party, and Sel Saunders ef the magazine United States News and Werld Repert. Gemmenting en the Indenesian/United States relatiens, Minister Njete said that these relatiens would net be breken eff if the United States withdrew all treeps, bases and fleet frem Seuth East Asia, particularly frem Viet Nam, Turning en the taking-ever ef fereign cempanies Njete said, what Indenesia mest eppesed was fereign imperialist investment, But the principle ef self-reliance epened up eppertunities fer whichever ceuntry te trade with Indenesia, as leng as it respected Indenesia's severeignty. Asked abeut foreign aid Minister Njete replied that Indenesia refused fereign aid which enly, er which exclusively, faveured ene side only, like American aid, Indenesia was prepared te accept aid which benefitted beth sides and which was based en equality, === [PDF page 66] === D SECRET SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT [Unreadable] Abe A Glohrt Mrclnes wean es a (Lojban) | Case of Rretonans ahih ated om org Bock | | |_Crol mfteo) eetear * Amercan apossel tn & a /020 | Asates, ore. ae Dated 5 a Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: A 4 193) AAS Received 4 si hee - 12 MAY j0¢ ZVIAT 400 (Outward Action) MINUTES 2 q < ti ae ee ee ee (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action Pes rah completed) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 67] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFF Cypher/OTP Sir A, Gilchrist No, 1020 D, 0945 11 May, 1965. 11 May, 1965. R. 1015 11 May, 1965. Addressed te Foreign Office telegram No, 1020 of 11 Repeated for information to:- Singapere Kuala Lumpur and Saving to:~ Washington The newspapers have given considerable publicity to the arrest of the Indonesian ship, Jehannes Latuharhari, on Long Beach, There are demands for retaliation, 2, The Naval Attaché has learnt from his United States Colleague that on 9 May the port autherities at Tandjong Priek, on orders from the Ministry of Sea Communications, set out to arrest the American vessel] President MeKinley, 3. The cupbeard was bare, the ship having sailed after dark on the previous evening, She had been “anchered off" for a week awaiting a berth, The departure appears to be illegal; the Indonesian authorities are anneyed and are uttering threats to ban all United States shipping from Tandjeng Prick, Fereign Office pass Washington 279 Saving. [Repeated as requested, ] DISTRIBUTED TO;- FeO. S.E.A.D. J M.I.D. News Dept. F.E, and P, Dept. SSSSS CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 68] === nett tien lca De ll i si ell nn ttt nn ee om 2, === [PDF page 69] === I:KARTS TO FOREIGN OFFIGE Cypher/OTP. ont. BEPLRIMENTL ’: es: UISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist. + D, 1006 13 May 1965: R 143% 13 May 1965 No, 1029 é mi: 13 May 1965 spire: iddressed to Foreign Office telegram No 1029:of 13 May Repeated for information to: Kuale Lumpur. Singapore Tokyo; and Saving to: Washington -UKMIS New York My immediately preceding telegram, | s. For "Trotskyites" and "Buremarstic capitelists"” we can; read "idem Malik and the Murba Party" and “The Right Wing technocrats and capitalists represented by Chairul. Seleh", 2c aanere are strong rumours thet Sukerno is under pressure to undo the measures he took in December against the anti-Communists, together very possibly with a more accommodating attitude towards Japanese mediation; and it is clear that “idit is now exerting counter-pressure), The reference letcr in his speech to the "expension of peasants’ actions against the vestiges of feudalism" is in fact a threat of agrarien unrest to which Sukarno is very 3. ind pressure for elections amounts likewise to a threat of unrest, A Foreign Office psss to Tokyo 64 snd Saving to Washington 282 and UKMIS New York 122,; DISTRIBUTED TO: ey S.E.4.D. Sat News Department; IRD. ‘ eEvre: === [PDF page 70] === | aba:: Pas Be a 70 | FROM: DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE - En Clair ay: DERARTMENTAL - ay ss DISTRIBUTION Sir 4. Gilchrist; res . No1028 a D. 0810 13 Hay, 2965: 13 May, 1965 j Ra 1135.25: May, 1905... > Addressed to Foreign Office telegra 10.1028 «f 13 May, Repeated fcr informtion to: Kuala Lumpur Singspore é Tckyo. and Saving to: — Washington U.K. Missicn New York Antara 13 May reports a speech by Coununist Party Cheirnan DN Aidit to the Fourth Plenum of the Communist Farty cf Indcnesia which - opened on 1] May.: Main peints were (a) -& Slashing attack cn Trotskyits described them as a geng of peliticel bandits end an ultra right force that was consciously anti Ccmaunist. Tretskyits were described as im conspirecy with buresucratic copitealists who used State power to undermine and manipulate State wealth,. Such pecple even went te the extent of raising the slogan ; ‘cf Sukarncism in en attempt to murder Sukarno and his teachings.: (b)..On the expansion cf peasants acticns against the vestiges cf feudalism in the ccuntryside Aidit explained that they had not yet cavered half the villages end the demands raised a by the peasants were still limited to requests for lower “ yrents or’a lerger shere cf the crop. Such actions were net calculnted to sweep aside the vestiges cf feudelism: 4 the Party's task was tc bring anti feudal rctions into - step with anti imperialist sections. 2. didit then went on to demand the speedy hclding of democratic elections fcr the people's consultative jssembly (ERS), the Gotong Roycng Feople's Legislative Assembly (DERGR). and the State Legislative Assemblies as an alternative "tc avcid expense". “idit reccmsended the holding of simultaneous electicns in ell the villages throughout the country with all political parties and groups nominating candidates. ‘ The number cf voters received by each party and group should be | added up and the resulting balence of votes should be used as the basis for renewing the MFRS, the DPRGR. and the State /ssemblies. 3 4 ier / Foreign Office ee === [PDF page 71] === : ae Cet ee Fc reign Office pass Saving Washington No.281 and U.K.Mission: New York No.123, i ee {Repeated as requested]. on: DISTRIBUT{D TO: e i FO: South East Lsia Department: J.M.I. Department News Department; Inform tion Fclicy Department ” Informtion Research Department === [PDF page 72] === ~~ JPN en TT kn Clair O/CRO/ WH ey es ee Gilchris 1102 2 April, Antara Gent indonesian === [PDF page 73] === \- bin D Sys Ente, “p- Srt sh Embassy, Djakarta. Ez y i. CONFIDENTIAL 42 May, 1965. RE. EIVED. IN ARCHIVES No.48 The reported detention in a United States port of an indonesian ship, the "Johannes Latuharhari" has roused predictable excitement here. The Communist Trade Union, SOBSI, has weighed in with a cable,to President Sukarno denouncing the "seizure" which it considered to be,American response to the take-over of American owned rubber plantations in Indonesia. According to SOBSI the take-over of United States estates was itself a retaliation against U.S. backing df Malaysia, particularly through the supply of armaments, and is an indication of solidarity with the Vietnamese in the face of U.S. aggression. According to SOBSI the Indonesian workers haW@unanimously decided to end the history of U.S. capital in Indonesia. The harbour and shipping trade union (SBPP) in its cable on this subject demanded the seizure of all U.S. vessels now in Indonesian harbours. Harbour and shipping workers were to seize the vessels and hand them over to the government. The Central Oil Workers Action Union called on the Government to seize in retaliation all American owned oil companies including Caltex, Stanvac and Panam and for good measure added in brackets "Shell also". 2. While objecting so violently to the detention of the ship the Indonesians apparently see no impropriety in announcing that eight British owned plantations in East Java were handed over by the Minister Attorney General Sutardhio to the Minister of Revenues, Hadji Mohammad Hassan, on 3 May. These plantations, consisting of British rubber and coffee estates and covering 6,000 hectares, were then handed by Mr. Hassan to the Minister of Plantations, Dr. Frans Seda. ‘The reference was to preperty owned by Francis Peak in the Bezuki area of East Java which was formerly put under the "supervision" of P.N. Dwikora. The Antara report of the Attorney General's remarks on this occasion credits him with using the word "confiscation" of those plantations which were in a different position from the U.S. properties which were only put under government management. The former British plantations, according to the Attorney General, were not only taken over by the Government but it shares were also confiscated. It remains to be seen whether, afiter the Latuharhari incident, the American properties will also suffer a sea change. 3. #$The Minister for Judicial Affairs, Astrawinata, described the seizure of the Johanns Latuharhari as "completely off course because there was no connection at all between the management (nationalisation) of Americanowned estates and the "Djakarta-Lloyd " Shipping Company as charged in the complaint". The complaint referred to is not published. According to the Justice Minister, if the report of the seizure is true, the U.S. Government acted wrongly, both morally and internationally, a westa give rise to other events which would harm still more relations between Indonesia and the United States. According to Astrawinata the relevant "International Private Law" in relation to confiscation with or without compensation, was well known (though not in Indonesia it seems,when it is they who are doing the seizing). I attach the full text of his remarks as published in Antara for the record. Le I am sending a copy of this letter to I.R.D. D. Tonkin, Esq. eae Ypnure Boer South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, CONFIDENT TAT, (M. J. T. McCann) === [PDF page 74] === Statement by Minister for Judicial Affairs A. Astrawinata ublished in Antara on 11. 196 The countries which maintained the principle of territorial rights also acknowledged confiscation by states nationalizing foreign property. And many countries also acknowledged such confiscation by other countries. He said that many international jurists and jurisprudence in many countries showed that nationalisation according to international laws was based on the three principles: the principle of territoriality, of a state's immunity and the act of state doctrine. Describing the "Underhill versus Hernandez" case in which an American citizen made a complaint against confiscation, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated the "Act of State doctrine", which was also acknowledged by Supreme justice Fuller. So Astrawinata pointed out thet according to general knowledge, a judge may not question nationalisation by a state within his territory. A foreign judge must respect the act of nationalisation of a state done within its own territory. This clearly proved that the seizure of the RI "Johannes Latuharhari" was completely wrong. === [PDF page 75] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded { 5 where Appropriate) view &§ Fed we i he oe SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT sate Gus Q. Kddhmal, Quwweeucsy nN ¥ ww) onl Dyobrorte bo He Pech.; - Sg tt a [Unreadable] Dated Mey \ Encloses Copy of: Received References and Relevant Papers: ae RO (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) | (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] === [PDF page 76] === AX oc" & eee (ake b \ See ee EMBASSY, (1901/65) RESTRICTED DJAKARTA. *2 11 May, 1965. The reduction in the American Embassy staff (diplomatic) is so far confined to three typists. But the Peace Corps has gone, MILTAG is down from 3 to 10 and AID is down from a The Embassy have started to raise funds for a farewell present for Howard Jones. This is a firmer indication than any we have had so far. (A. G. Gilchrist) EH. H. Peck, Esq., 0.M.G., Foreign Ort ice In fat ts ‘ . acu mM pant hag ) RESTRICTED === [PDF page 77] === FROM hie: A; Gdakeal, Dated Mor; ™~ Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) s\tv SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT | Encloses Copy of: SUBJECT: isk QB Q Sumur QOD RQ ii cee Waa skeet '\ D WW WORMS | 56. ( Gormax Wed oh Reference: . 47 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded rea where Appropriate) CONFIDENTIAL G cwumamn dard Sie Qa NOURI. CVA a; s and Relevant Papers: lots /fo MINUTES === [PDF page 78] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No.1162 D. 0846 29 May, 1965 29 May, 1965 R, 1032 29 May, 1965 DHIO3IhS SG Addressed te Foreign Office telegram Ne.1162 ef 29 May, Repeated for informatien te: POLAD Singapere Kuala Lumpur and Saving te: Washingten Antara reperts President Sukarno te have teld a meeting of Regienal Military Commanders, on 28 May, that Bill Palmer, former Head ef the American Motien Picture Asseciatien, Indenesia, (whe left the ceuntry seme months age) was an agent ef the C.I.A. He claimed that preef was found when youths stormed his bungalew near the Puntjak Pass and found C.I.A, decuments. Fereign Office pass Saving te Washingten Ne.505. DISTRIBUTED TO: FO: Seuth East Asia Department P.U.S.D. JeMeI. Department American Department CRO: Far East and Pacific Department === [PDF page 79] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher /OTP DEPARTMENTAL, DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No, 1280 D, 0130 13 June, 1965, 13 June, 1965, R, 0752 15 June, 1965. CONFIDENTIAL ee sie iD Bere ele, [Unreadable] Addressed to Fereign Office telegram No, 1280 of 15 June Repeated for information te:-/ Singapore ' Kuala Lumpur My telegrams Nos, 1157 and 1162: According te lecal correspondents, it is now being "revealed" that the key document found at Palmer's house bearing on the alleged assassination plot was a letter signed by mc, The letter is in Sukarne*’s possession and he is said to have shown it to various people, 2. It is also knewn that senior Army officers who heve seex the letter have refused to have anything te do with it, on the grounds that it is a crude and incompetent forgery. 5. Whether Sukarno knows it te be a forgery is another question, Quite possibly he does net. DISTRIBUTED TO:- S.E,A.D, P.U.S.D, J.M.I.D, American Dept, CRO, FEB, and P, Dept. SSSSS === [PDF page 80] === tot CONFIDENTIAL Ee eee ee ye FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE ¥S —ee ee A LGN OFFICE (, aH loses /s6 0) Cypher/ OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION LN SA ea terse matsenstiomoanetsmagoanen sir Ae Gilchrist No. 1369 22 June 1965 D: 0942 22 June 1965 CONFIDENTIAL R: 1100 22 June 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1369 of Hepeated for information to: Singapore Kuala Lumpur e2 June And Saving to: Yashing ton My Australian colleague, who spent three hours with sukarno last Saturday, reports him in excellent health and @ wost cheerful frame of mind, Ze Adam Malik told me last night that he thoucht he had convinced Sukarno of the absurdity of the forged "assassination" document with my name on it (my telegram Foreign lffice pass Washington No, 33), ~aving: DISTRIBUTED To: SebeAcDe JM.I.D. P.U.S.D. FE. & P. Dept. 25 Sin CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 81] === . 81 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded OQ. D where Appropriate! SECRET SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA ie ul losres/e7 FROM £. A. Gitechoisl eer Acer dig p Gat hoi, DEE Be alcuSing QD fakorla Ameria trol Bri/asn No. fF 73 Dated [4 + a 3 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) MINUTES yy wk Welann (bj aka/e) h Mt Tonku.- /08fosx - e/4 [Row 2] foss (mk. Lever (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) casemlebed) | (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] === [PDF page 82] === SECRET FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE a /o31us 5/57) Cypher/OTP DEPARTME NTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No, 12 D. 0900 1, June 1965 Li. June 1965 R. 0945 14 June 1965 IMMEDIATE SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1293 of 14 June. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Singapore My immediately preceding telegram. ~ Galbraith saw Subandrio this morning, who was full of accusations about America and Britain ganging up on Indonesia: for evidence, presence of United States warships in Singapore, documents found in spy Palmer’s house. ly 2. Galbraith says there is ground for believing tnas Soatares: accepts authenticity of documents (my telegram No, 1280). As for Subandrio, it is more difficult to say ~ he at any rate intends to use them. DISTRIBUTED TO; ADVANCE COPIES: FO. S.E.A.D. Private Secretary News Dept. Mr. Peck Hd of S.E.A.D. JsieUe FE. & Pe Dept. Ha of J.M.1.D. === [PDF page 83] === R prem 29). Ps opt le Cfovens === [PDF page 84] === NTH toa eb Tate. 2 dome. ae oot, wate date a A ee ee ee ee a ee LacnCHea a MIDE SSa30PR.. aor.; SE: Wi be. eo foo ee ayer Tn gsr Seta. wile LSM Ta yutGVET oo the cprival === [PDF page 85] === subver ii UY Whatever their se i 3 duri the revo 510 e SslTAnse t ae r —— aione is not ver 4: a * ae eS BoB rt ie tank be Cannot Move Witaocut née internal con LTLG a [Unreadable] 4 eC oc gS gg 7 LPLsc +NIS 18 ail === [PDF page 86] === FROM LA. bilehivk (Maketta ) No. MG! Dated 9 fy Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) Encloses Copy of: [Unreadable] (Security Grading—to be Up-graded ae where Appropriate) INDONESIA comberceol yorctl. ei gti Maal s hoteat agaccat V.8. protein a Yeo Nam, H 0314 5/58 SUBJECT: _ Eat aS References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 87] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FORRIGN OFFICE a En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir‘A. Gilchrist ' July 1965 D.0937 9 July 1965 R.1125 $ July 1965 Addressed _to Foreign office ee No. 1.81 of 9 July. Repeated for ormation to:- Kuala Lumpur Singapore A "Nasakom" procession of about 599 representatives of combined youth movements took place this morning (9 July) under the auspices of the National Front. A group of eight P.N.I. (Indonesian Nationalist Party) youths left the procession at the American Embassy where they were received by the United States Chargé d'Affaires and presented a protest against American policy in Viet Nam. ‘The whole occasion was orderly and peaceful. === [PDF page 88] === 1966 hh dbdvd (Myokatt) No 7 SE / Dated / q Jocks Received 19 poh, (Outward Action) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA eo lH 103145 /57 SUBJECT: Medline by th en ge. Focdbrntc a | foceth lore wecel ebvavoling lze SRAM Dice ~ Encloses elias of: References and Relevant Papers (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) a He | MINUTES === [PDF page 89] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist Dur us /$7F No, 1561 D. 0517 19 July, 1965 19 July, 1965 R. 1030 19 July, 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telesram No, 1561 of 19 July. Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur Singapore Washington Delhi Antara of 17 July reports a statement by the Board of the Indonesian Youth Council, P,P.I., of Djakarta demanding the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States, The P.P,I. also demanded that the twenty-one million Dwikora volunteers be armed and that American capital in Indonesia be confiscated. 2. Other parts of the statement protested against the demonstrations in front of the Indonesian Consulate in Bombay which represented a minority group in the Indian Government and supported the police actions against those who did not want to abide by President Sukarno's decision to stop the playing of Beatles’ records, Beatles' music weakened the spirit of the Indonesian revolution, DISTRIBUTED TO: S.H,A.D. JM.I.D. Information Policy Dept, Information Research Dept. News Dept. F.E. and Pacific Dept. Information Policy Dept. News Dept. === [PDF page 90] === 1965 ky Hr. babe No. 10342 f65 Dated G 1F fey Received eceiv aah, (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) pai (a \ Abe (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 9 0 D where Appropriate) CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D, 103145 Joo SUBJECT: ge 26 fel, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (A Dee Uh rout A149 === [PDF page 91] === CONFIDENTIAL [onto ne er ee corneas cence + | P | 4 | British Embassy, ae. WASHINGTON, 109 (10342/65) ee 19 July, 1965 Dos be | Bink <\wrets I understand from the State Department that Frank Galbraith saw Sukarno on 14 or 15 July to let him know that Marshall Green was due to arrive on 21 July and ask on what date he could present his credentials. Sukarno agreed to the 26th. ae Galbraith took the opportunity to protest to Sukarno against the newspaper campaign against Green, but he got the usual answer that this was an expression of the Indonesian peoples' opinion and could not be suppressed. I gathered from the State Department that it has in fact now subsided a good deal. 4 The State Department confirmed press reports that the Indonesians had again suspended plans for sending people to universities in the United States for postgraduate training. You will remember that this was originally called off by the Indonesians last year, but recently plans for sending limited numbers had again been made and eight or nine have even arrived in this country. Another twenty or so were due to come here in the near future but will not now do so and those already here will probably have to go home again without their training. 4. I was shown a copy of a telegram from Galbraith emphasising the remarkable amount of effort that was being put into the preparations for next year's proposed CONEFO, although I gathered that it was difficult to ascertain exactly how much progress was being made on the main buildings because the construction site was being treated as a restricted area. A high fence had been built round it and visitors had to be checked through the entrance and escorted during their stay at the site. od fa et E. Cable, Esq., South-East Asia Department,~ Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 92] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA UV ros 4 5fe1 oy SUBJECT wo ci: gy ae ren; No. J6 34 ae hha Pbclejfepinto. Dated a 7 JA Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received | 7 fucks (Outward Action) MINUTES 4) Marre lec Te ol ff 2¢ pes, (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action; Mg xe completed) (Main Indexed) ws i. ee. === [PDF page 93] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist DHo3s/ks [6/ No. 1634 D. 07.57 27 July, 1965 27 July, 1965 Re 11.24 27 July, 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1634 of 27 July, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur singapore fanila and Saving to: Washington A report in Antara claims that the United States has sent a company of its "special troops" to Saranggani Island in the Philippines, the island nearest to the Indonesian Archipelago. Indonesians living near the border have very often seen American warships approaching Indonesian waters. The lecal authorities recently confiscated a bundle of C.I.A. documents "reportedly containing calculated plans for C.I.A. penetration into Indonesia via the Sangri Telaud Islands": following the seizure of these documents the authorities have stepped up security and patrols. Foreign Office please pass Washington as telegram No. 358 Saving. www === [PDF page 94] === FROM MANILA TO FOREIGN OFFICE N\ 94 Mr. Addis Ne, 222 D. 0250 28 July, 1965 28 July, 1965 ~. Re 0255 28 July, 1965 A Mori4s|o/ Addressed te Fereign Office tele Ne. 222 ef 28 July, Repeated fer infermation te Djakarta ‘We Kuala Lumpur Singapere and Saving te Washingten; ADH jose EA) Djakarta telegram Ne. 1634. Secretary ef Defence yesterday denied presence ef United States treeps in Sarangani Island. He said "I am net aware ef any American treeps in that area. I am sure there are none. All I can say is that the Philippines is on the most friendly terms with Indonesia." Commenting on Antara’s claim that the Philippine plans fer a military base in Mindanae were part ef American plans against Indenesia, and that CIA decuments revealing these plans had been captured, Peralta said the base was "Purely fer Philippine defence and net meant fer aggressien anywhere". He added "I am net privy te CIA plans. Certainly I am net aware ef any American. plan against. Indenesia".. 2, “bepartment or Fer®ign Affairs have alse denied the repert. Fereign Office pass Djakarta 29, Singapere 71, Kuala Lumpur 47 and Saving tenWashingten 10. === [PDF page 95] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 9 = where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT } iS INDONESIA bh telelrest | Spatorta ) No. be24 Dated 26 fats Encloses Copy of: Received, (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) | a ain Indexed) BA Hd | yo & oy” === [PDF page 96] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE ET LT ED En Clair FO/CRO/TH. DISTRIBUTIO Sir A. Gilchrist Neo. 162) D. 07.16 27 July 1965 26 July 1965 Re 11.23 27 July 1965 FILCH Dress /¢2 A@aressed te Foreign Office telegram No. 162). ef 26 July Repeated for infermatien te: Kuala Lumpur Singapere and Saving te: Washingten Mr, Marshall Green, the new American Ambassader presented credentials te President Sukarne today. There were demonstrations by Cemmunist and Nationalist party groups eutside the palace, the United States Embassy and the American Ambassader’s residence. Marshall Green go home (er te hell) er we'll kick you eut. The police were out in ferce and the demenstrations were quite orderly. 26 Specimen comments in the lecal Press: (a) Wark Bhakti (Cemmunist). The new Ambassader is the executiener ef United States pelicy of intervention and aggression and ef giving aid te Malaysia. (») Bintang Timur (Cemmunist). Public epinion in Indenesia has rejected Green. This reflects our anger at the United States jeining Britain in preparing aggressien against Indenesia. (ec) Duta Masjarakat (Mesiem). lveryene knews that the United States has gene wreng ever Malaysia, Viet Nam, Conge, Deminica, But Green's appeintment has been accepted by the Indenesian Gevernment and diplomatic relations between the twe ceuntries still exist, se we cannet submit te the d@emand fer his rejectien. (a) Herald (Gevernment Paper). Indenesia has left ne doubt that as leng as the United States administration is pursuing its pelicy ef these whe are not with us are against === [PDF page 97] === @roria telegram Ne. 162) te Foreign Office us, Indenesia will centinue te eppese the United States as an Imperialist ceuntry. There is ne feeling ef hatred fron the Indenesian people te the American people. Relations between Americans and indenesians are fine, Indenesians are guick te react against any fereign pelicy which is directed against the Indenesian Trevelutien and its set sacred princhiles We cencede that Ambassader Green will net have an easy time here especially at this stage when United States - Indenesian relatiens appear te be at their lewest. Te quete his own words. I try te de what I can. Se let's give him a chance, Fereign Office pass Washingten Ne. 357 Saving. [ Repeated as requested ] === [PDF page 98] === (Security Gradinge—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA Opt; Cibcbit Oost bene by ee US Candle & GE | ion. Dated 3" se 4 July ~ Encloses Copy of: Be: a References and Relevant Papers: Received 3% Aug (Outward Action) MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action ee completed) | (Main Indexed) MY cya === [PDF page 99] === cd FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 1666 31 July, 1965 De 11.19 31 July, 1965 PRIGRITY Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1666 of 31 July, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Washington Singapore A mob estimated at one thousand stoned the United States Consulate in Medan yesterday, 30 July. Two thousand others were demonstrating in the strects. The United States Consul had previeusly called for pelice preteetion, But although a number of pelice were present at the Censulate they did not attempt te prevent the mob entering the Consular grounds. Damage te the Consulate, mostly breken windows, is estimated at half a million rupiahs. Ne one was hurt. 2e We understand that the meb had also planned to demonstrate eutsiée the British and Indian Consulates, but in the event these were left alone. GGCCG === [PDF page 100] === En Clair Sir A. Gilchrist lo. 1678 L = f° 08.29 35 August, 1965 3 August, 196 pues © 09.45 3 August, 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1678 of 3 August, Repeated for information te: Kuala Lumpur Singapore Washington DMN03 (4S My telegram Ne. 16662 dnti-Ame ican demonstration an Medan. Antara’s account of the incident includes the following:- "The demonstrators were received at the American Consulate with tear gas causing injuries to several of the demonstrators. In their anger the demonstrators hurled recks and anything within their reach". === [PDF page 101] === La¢ Pee ae yp AMeri car Chan Vis ALLIS now not stry of ITLPOW says that the Course Wnicn Was Wnicn we reportes Ane al though === [PDF page 102] === Restricted. What was intended to be a double demonstration, against the US and Indian Consulates, took place in Medan yesterday morning, July 30. 26 At 8 aem., the US and Indian Consuls received identical letters from the Frant Pemuda announcing that a demonstration would take place at the offices of each. The US Gonsul immediately sent letters to the Inter-Regional Police Comrander and the Police Ohief of Norta Sumatra requesting maximum protection, while his Vice-Consul also called on the latter. In the event, a thin line of lackadaisical police appeared to seal off the road to the US Consulate from the "circus" on which this Consulate is situated, while a further 30 were placed in the Consulate grounds, There were no police im the grounds of this Consulate. 36 The demonstration, some 2/3,000 strong, and carrying banners bearing slogans such as “Break off relations with the US" >» and "Get Out Green", began to assemble outside my Consulate at about 10 a.m. There was also a small number of banners with anti- Indian slogans. After an initial pause at the line of police, the demonstrators discovered that they could outflank this obstacle by going through gaps in a board fence surrounding a puilding lot at the corner. When some had gone through these, and emerged on the other side, the remainder pressed against the police line, and when they encountered no resistance, broke through. The police throughout were entirely passive. ?. Once in the Consulate grounds, the demonstrators proceeded for about ten minutes to throw stones at the windows. When I finally got to see Heavner, his office was still littered with glass. The mob also tore a gate off its hinges, and attempted, without success, to haul down the US flag. be At this time, I was on the first floor balcony of my house. I saw the demonstrators come at a run out of the US Consulate grounds, and make for my front main gate. I went cownstairs, and stood at the open door of the Library which, as you will remember, gives on to all the other offices of the Consulate. The demonstrators started shaking the railings, and a few came ‘into the compound. They were shoved out again, and forcefully haranguead by cheer leader/organisers wearing armbands, who also succeeded in closing the gates on them. At the same time, other demonstrators were throwing stones ( some of which landed near my feet; others, through fortunately open windows, in upstairs bedrooms} gibbering, brandishing fists, and hurling abuse. Finally, the organisgers got -them under control, and they moved off in the direction of the Indian Consulate, which was alsc under police guard. In fact, they never got there. I gather that the police ordered them to return to their headquarters; either the affair here, though‘unauthorised", was counted as one of the two demonstrations the FP were permitted that day, or the police thought they were getting out of hand. 6. At some stage, the police - probably inadvertently - used a small amount of tear gas, too small to have any major deterrent effect on the crowd, but @mough to produce a few casulaties requiring hospital treatmemt. The police themselves seem to have been confused by what happened. One officer asked Heavner if he had used tear gas, and when Heavner asked him if he was mad, went off scratching hig head. Gen. Mokoginta later confirmed to Heavner that the police had used tear gas, but the vernacular press this morning are alleging that Heayvner and his people used tear i on the deménstrators, whose intentions were entirely peaceful, and it wag @mly then that the stone- === [PDF page 103] === stone-throwing started. There are alse comments in the press about the “savagery” of the behaviour of the US officials. There is no refermce ‘to what happened here. Tn 5 Heavier has ef course sent in a letter of protest, and so have J, The US Embassy in Dyakarta are also ery dN ae’ protesting.. British Embassy, r ag Djakarta. RO TESS, (3. B, Wright ) 7%, === [PDF page 104] === WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1965 The Indonesian Herald Editorial! The Stoning And The Bombing Angry demonstrators in Medan had thrown stones at the building of the American consulate there. Damages to the building’s glass windows have been estimated at several hundred dollars’. Immediately, the spokesman of the State Department stated in a press statement that America was contemplating a,,strong protest” with the Indonesian government, We have gone on record times again that every act of violence is regrettable.-But even a patient and _hospitable nation like Indonesia cannot forever remain indifferent when America — in defiance of every more in civilized life — had been subjecting other nations to murderous bombifgs, We refer to the indiscriminate bombing of the areas in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. America has been using the term of "saturation bombing.” This means _ that American planes are bombing villages and towns without regard to loss of civilian life. America had shown no _ hesitation about levelling to the ground such institutions as hospitals, schools and other nonmilitary objects. The anger of our young demonstrators and in Medan had been provoked by these acts of cold cruelty. But even then, our young men did not resort to indiscriminate thro wing of stones. They addressed their anger to what to them stood as the symbol of American aggression in Vietnam: the consulate building. They did not molest American citizens, Because in their eyes, they were mere pious in the grand strategy of global aggression mapped out in the White House and in the Pentagon. In fact, even during this low ebb cf relations between Indonesia and the eggressor America, Indonesians still cherish their individual friendship with many an American staying in Indonesia and abroad. America’s hatred is total] as it is indiscriminate. America seems to hate the guerillas Whom they cannot lay their hand on as well as the innocent people who know not 1o defend themselves from the rains of death poured from American planes. Yes. we in Indonesia never hate a people or nation. We only hate any system perpetuated by a government which seeks to frustrate man’s urge to enjoy the five freedoms, including the freedom to be free. === [PDF page 105] === : fr rr _— tat F } [Unreadable] (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 1 {} 2 where Appropriate! SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT KITSA\AICC!H A’ INDONESIA ee... IU FROM. A Cbducl (yFaxaeea) vo. 34 (Sow) Dated aps ys by Received (Outward Action) fon Morsay fo (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) | (Main Indexed) al Vie 4 Graidot (hing + lankdr fea, tol alelr of bredelab ¢ A.* ie oe Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: | fla MINUTES === [PDF page 106] === INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM LLL LL ALLL, FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE By Bag FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No. 34 Saving R. 3 August 1965 28 July 1965 FILCH D103 145 / bY Addressed te Fereign Office telegram No Savin 28 July. Repeated for information Saving te: Singapore pHtosHS > Reais Lumpur oe Washington My telegram No. 162): Presentation of credentials by new United States Ambassador. The following is an extract from the speech which President Sukarno made at the presentation ceremony on % July. It constitutes a remarkable departure from the customary language which a Head ef States would use on such an eccasion. "You, Ambassader Green, have arrived here in Indenesia as the representative of the United States in a far frem ideal situation, in which the relations between the two nations are at their lew ebb. The Indonesian people want te be friends with all peeple in the werld en the basis of equality and pesitive cooperation towards the creation of a new world, ef whatever political conviction, whe does not know racial discrimination and eppression er exploitation, a world free from imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonalism. "What is new ‘happening 4n Vietnam in the North and in the Seuth dees not please the heart of the Indonesian people in their wish te foster friendship with the American people. The Vietnamese peeple are Asian people and cemrades in arms of Indonesiapin their national independence in the achievement ef a new world. They have now suffered for more than 10 years, net because they are guilty, but because they are forced into a situation in which they have te fight foreign intervention which prevent them from solving their own problems. And they have been forced inte a war they de not seek. I and President Macapagal have repeatedly called for an Asian selution te Asian Affairs by Asians themselves /without === [PDF page 107] === 107 Djakarta telegram Ne. 3, Saving to Foreign Office a as witheut eutside interference. Armed selution can never achieve its aims,.and will even bring humiliation and dishonour te the American peeple, and it will add te the feeling of hate the Vietnamese people will harbour against the American people fer generations te come. "As the mouthpiece of the Indonesian peeple I have the duty te express their wishes te you, as the new United States Ambassader in Indenesia, and will try te develep friendship between Indonesia and the United States. "One impertant thing I have te add here is the active aid the United States is giving te the neecelenialist British preject of Malaysia, which has disappeinted the peeple ef Indenesia as it aggravates Indenesian-United States relations. "The peeple ef Indonesia have determined te centinue the struggle ef cempleting the Indenesian revelution and the struggle te create a new werld, in which all friends are equal. I am convinced that these friends can be found alse in the United States. "T hepe this leng intreductien will make it easier for you te understand the ceuntry and people ef Indenesia among whom you are to werk. And I hepe that your understanding ef the Indonesian peeple will be reflected by the government which you represent." 2. Mr. Green's reply limited itself te speaking of the grave responsibility which Indonesia and the United States share for creating a werld erder in which each nation can develep its institutions in its own way. The Ambassador was confident that the twe countries could werk tegether in future; and it was enceuraging te know that President Sukarne shared these views. Mr. Green referred briefly te the Bunker cemmunique - with its mentien ef differences not being allewed unduly te affect the general pattern of friendship which had existed for so leng - and said that that represented fully American policy towards the Indonesian Gevernment. === [PDF page 108] === RESTRICTED JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DEPARTMENT, F.0e/CoReOe,y Downing Street, London, SeWele (DH «103145/64) August 1965- Apropos of Sukarno’s departure from the customary language on the occasion of the U.S. Ambassador's presentation of his credentials (your telegram No.3 saving) it may amuse you to know that there is, in fact, an American precedent for precisely this. When the new Czechoslovak Ambassador presented his credentials in Washington in 1950 Mr. Truman (or so I am informed) “bawled him out" over the Czech treatment of the UeS. Embassy in Prague - which hed just been arbitrarily reduced to 12! (RH. HANBURY=TENISON) James Murray, ESqe, ColsGe,y DJAKARTA. RESTRICTED === [PDF page 109] === GS61L ~~ Sf blk No. [/f ale 1093 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIAS Ds wsmel 5 ie Received 7 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) | att fe_| {vio fy ni SUBJECT Oe a al Auger sat es Coma ‘ foalage encloses Copy. Copy oa: 7 References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES Ad als 6) £68 Comlrdne fitrine) he Dfoki wiles uf | heise a wy do her TMI === [PDF page 110] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No, 1716 Sane / August 1965 yHrosis CS D. 0404 9 August 1965 PRIORITY | R. 0549 9 August 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1716 of 8 August. Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur Singapore and Saving to:- Washington Following is Antara’s account of the demonstration on 7 August against the United States Consulate in Surabaya. Begins. A 15,000 strong demonstration was staged in protest of United States aggressive actions in Asia, Africa and Latin America, The demonstration was under sponsorship of the Front Pemu and Front National of Surabaya. In a meeting with United States Consul McClean they expressed dissatisfaction over the arrival in Indonesia of United States new Ambassador Marshall Green. The demonstrators, composed of youths, workers, peasants and women, Called for the expulsion of Marshail Green since it is certain that Green will continue the United States dirty and hostile policy towards Indonesia. The demonstrators protested the use of tear gas to disperse demonstrators in Medan by United States Consulate officials. They protested the abuse of diplomatic immunity by American envoys to smuggle valuable Indonesian commodities to the United States. The demonstrators urged the United States to withdraw its troops from Viet Nam, and other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Eads. 2. First reports received by the United States Embassy here suggest that the demonstrators numbered about 5,000. Some of these who had climbed on the roof of the Consulate were injured when they fell off. The local police prevented access by the mob to the consular offices. 3. No (repeat no) reports that our own Consulate was attacked, Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 368. DISTRIBUTED TO:- at © Seobehs 7. JM.I.D. Information Research Dept. Information Policy Dept. News Dept. American Dept. C.R.O.F.E. & P. Dept. Information Policy Dept. News Dept. FFFFF === [PDF page 111] === 111 [Handwritten file slip, transcribed by eye] Enter [Unreadable] 8 Mr A. A. Golds[worthy?] Mr [Unreadable] [struck through in blue] Mr Marshall [ticks and lines in black and blue ink] === [PDF page 112] === gAVA MOB STONE U.S. CONSULATE From IAN WARD Sunday Telegraph Special Correspondent SINGAPORE, Saturday. - MOB of 10,000 jeering Indonesians today stoned the American Consulate in Surabaya, Eastern J ava, according to reports sfeaching Singapore tonight. — They rampaged arow the Consulate building, t ~ down and ceremoniously trampled on the American flag and daubed anti-American slogans on walls. This is the third and most violen mmunist-inspired demonsealgn since the newly-appointed Amefican Ambassador, Mr. Marshall Green, assumed office 17 days ago. Political observers have noted steadily deteriorating relations between America and Indonesia since Washington decided last year to cut all aid while Indonesia continued its military confrontation of Malaysia. — BREAK geet The _ pro-Pe Indonesian Communist party has been urging the Government to break diplomaticerelations with Washington over Vietnam. A week ago Pre t Soekarno publicly stated that e admired Cambodia's action in severing diplomatic ties with America. Western observers. feels, that President Soek,, needing some Startling anno’ Ment to set off his traditional pectaculare” Independence day” speee on Aug, 17, might well be prepared to meet the Communists on the issue. Should this happen, political experts believe Indonesia would then be almost irretrievably aligned with the Communist camp. Under such conditions Malaysian confrontation ~ d only become more intensiv === [PDF page 113] === BH DADO L 5 1716 we reported [Unreadable] VILG AME I 1 2 Ab. ssivv maa attarkred VWaS atvtlaCK Cad, Lads. ‘Nan RWTtmean t oe Se L ao LC a i UlilG Il vY 9 === [PDF page 114] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 1i 4 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Tim INDONESIA D; 03k Ce [Unreadable] (fauae at E, A hk Move 5 Dated he hig ¢ Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: CONFIDENTIAL 1 GUARD (Outward Action) C)W CCA euch fee MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Actio ican | om Indexed) Gi by 4, 0% === [PDF page 115] === /PT TOM 20 JT --IBusRy WOLT ure sde DT UT 4nq ‘JTesuTY JOT eyed "ssouTsng eTqeT eau pue i bem I ‘OULEYOOS 04 SMOTA Atl 105 “ent A \ peoaruTt AOA JO S® DUe 8TUO eq. AT LI" > ‘OE AU AO] Us 1 SCM Of [Unreadable] seas >490 : loDDe earns SCM se pepeled [Unreadable] ayy qywsnoy. ey === [PDF page 116] === hata extremely humiliating if he had been singing — ancing with the Bung in a large party the previous ing and then was alle sd upon to stand up at the: howl ing crowd could have a wssador looked like, times. Ae as ae LOLS tO ) spare copy in case you = ee ad interested, Nn is Deaths (A. G. Gilchrist) === [PDF page 117] === ¥ Khtgaam fF Manet’ 1 ‘ » @ err (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT | CONFIDENTIAL aed INDONESIA Dy lo3 in /[6P ae §; A CAL. Z (FeuaKh ) Dated Received 7. (34% Aug (Outward Action) fab fat ft ll ay a | Fbeadnio - nad # enpwve 05/Kimenin ele Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: iM, o17/t a iM Jey é MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) === [PDF page 118] === CONFIDENTIAL & FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP FO/CRO/WH, DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 1755 Dosis D. 1156 12 August, 1965 12 August, 1965 ~ R. 1508 12 August, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No. 1755 of 12 August, Repeated for information te: POLAD Singapore D.H.C. Singapore Kuala Lumpur Canberra Washington Wellington My United States colleague saw Subandrio this morning, this being his first official contact with him, Subanério was effusively friendly and spoke of the urgent need to improve United States/Indonesian relations. 2. Green is aware, as we are, that there is quite a possibility of anti-American demonstrations on 17 August and tried to secure guarantees against it, stressing that American patience was wearing very thin. Subandrio was so evasive that Green's fears were confirmed: the old Adam is to have another go with the brickbats before sweetness and light prevail. 3e On Malaysia Green was conscious, as with Chairul Saleh, of an attitude of caution. This stems not only from real factors | | | (like trade) but from the imaginary theory that the British knew (ol! ali about Singapore's secession and indeed planned it, so that ~ it may all turn out to be sone ghastly trap. dre On the other hand the Indonesians feel they have a golden opportunity, once they find the right way, to exploit it - victory, restoration of prestige, economic revival (thanks te the disappearance of the need for the ruinous confrontation policy). In this context Subandrio made a remark which Galbraith, whe was also present, took to be Significant: "We will need your help". "In manipulating the British" appeared to be the natural completion of the thought. Foreign Office pass Priority Canberra 62, Washington 102, Wellington 33, 44 [Repeated as requested. ] CONF IDENTIA === [PDF page 119] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 113 where Appropriate) x. NY TT SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT CONFIDENTIAL > (1965 | wont Dit tosnsies FROM f,-L — We Ca sb Gouener Aontege (Wt hem yl. f 9S. supe f Pik Ary Dated 37 f l ( Receive 3 dl,, / (Outward Action) Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES MA TS Se ee (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) === [PDF page 120] === [Unreadable] 120 CONFIDENTIAL Bult. Minutes Lord Walston had dinner with Governor Harriman last night and you may be interested to know that the latter expressed himself most vehemently on the question of U.S. support for the Indonesian Army. He said that it had been a grave mistake for the Conservative Government to have pressed the Americans so hard to break with Sukarno, because the latter had as a result been thrown into the arms of the Communists. Now the only possible hope of saving Indonesia from the Communists lay with the Army and it would be a pity if H.M.G. also put pressure on the U.6. to sever their remaining connections with them. This reaction was in fact provoked by Lord Walston raising the question of the supply of American communications equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. ‘omer (W.J. Adams) Mz E j 4 las ri 3 August, 1965. Mr. S Mr. Peck 1s by Calla has Gon. oF Wasl ug Cou oa a [Unreadable] Gulen (was Leal WeBEr fur, a tr Botds (<u) wf 8. % F ape ad, ha may Gry ty fl Hie ok Ang ps CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 121] === Rowvend drop (elle, guava. Thi D Concur ce kavd Walete. has Murti | en eneeblot (wit > Please see / alse === [PDF page 122] === ahs Lud ole Ed (1627) Minutes °° hy Golds tt. | Hog A wt Sly Cim nQe >). Ss Neuks: < pe 4 i. Cong apens bits a Catt has ‘Aecou wre_drol lin Gut POs a Lace. === [PDF page 123] === Confidential. Restmercd? Oper Draft. N.C.C. Trench, Esq, Washington. IN THIS MARGIN. From: JeE- Cable. Copy to: H.M. Ambassador, Djakarta. aa ixcetlet lettrn - CONFIDENTIAL FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. August, 1965. Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. when Governor Harriman met Lord Walston at a dinner-party on 2 August, the former expressed himself most vehemently on the question of United States support for the Indonesian Army. He said that it had been a grave mistake for the Conservative Government to have pressed the Americans so hard to break with Sukarno, because the latter had as a result been thrown into the arms of the Communists. Now the only possible hope of saving Indonesia from the Communists lay with the Army and it would be a pity if H.M.G. also put pressure on the United States to sever their remaining connexions with them. He was thinking in particular of the difficulties which we.were raising on the question of the supply of United States communications equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. ee Although you may consider it an unavailing effort to endeavour to change Governor Harriman's views, you may feel that there are similarly disposed members of the State Department to whom it might be worth on occasion rehearsing our attitude to this problem and explaining why, in our view, an assessment of the Indonesian scene, as Governor Harriman sees it, 36 is contrary to the facts. It has consistently been our view that the longer Sukarno remains in power, the greater the / influence === [PDF page 124] === CONFIDENTIAL influence of the Indonesian Communist Party would become. We have been particularly insistent that the late President Kennedy's description of Sukarno as a “bulwark against Communism" betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the man and his ambitions. It has suited Sukarno to increase the power and influence of the P.K.I. in Indonesia for his own motives and objectives. These are frankly not subject to United States influence and it is naive for any American to suppose that they are. If you have not already given the State Department a copy of Professor Cowan's memorandum "President Sukarno and Indonesian policy", you might now wish to d so and draw particular attention to paragraph 2 et_seq where the relation between Sukarno and the P.K.I. is dealt with at some length. 46 It is well known that Sukarno uses countries, as he uses individuals, without any thought or intention of being influenced by them and auitaaeebanis discards them when they have served their purpose. He used the United States in this way until the middle of 1964, thanks in large measure to Ambassador Jones at Djakarta and now that the United States no longer serves a useful end, they have become public enemy No. 1 in Indonesia. 4. As for the Indonesian Army, it’ hes—elwaye— been—sonething—of—a—ny-t+h—+o—regerd then asthe —Anmy's position as a ydaateu me 0 the Communists is essentially aa of self-interest. Expanded to some 4300,000 men in preparation for a military campaign against West Irian whic was never launched, Army leaders have been / reluctant IN THIS MARGIN. === [PDF page 125] === CONFIDENTIAL reluctant to abandon their power, their privileges and their status. Since early 1963 they have/secn serkere a: thre Pion —+.0--prctieto—sontrortet ron. United States move to increase the standing and political influence of the Army has been countered by Sukarno himself. Indeed, it is probable that American support for the Indonesian armed forces has been one of the principal reasons for Sukarno's determination to promote the P.K.I. cause. 5. It has also been a popular fallacy to refer in general terms to the position of the Indonesian Army as though it were a united and cohesive force. The opposite is in fact true. What Sukarno has most feared and what he has, with P.K.I. assistance, been able to. pre¥ent, has been the emergence of a coherent fighting force under centralised command. The Indonesian Army today, as it has been during the past ten years, is divided and weakened by internal factionalism. Individual Arny Commenders have their own ideas about how Indonesia should be run, which they put into practice in their own military districts. The prospects of eventual warlordism and seceSisionism in Indonesia in view of the present structure of the Indonesian armed forces must be rated relatively high. 6. Even if the Indonesian Army could claim to be a “bulwark against Communism" (which we deny), then this bulwark is sadly riddled with P.K.I. influence. In some units, P.K.I. penetration in the lower ranks is reported to amount to as much as 40%. Attempts are alse /veing. made === [PDF page 126] === CONFIDENTIAL being made /to indoctrinate the armed forces from the top. Individual Commanders are certainly resisting this pressure, though there are signs that they are prepared to compromise. Their motivads in compromising are purely selfish: with a desire to retain their influence and their privilegeswithout running the risk of arousing Sukarno's anger. [, dunt ‘A’ alfahed | Te For ease of reference, I enclose a copy of Professor Cowan's memorandum (LR 7/5 of 48 March), which you could pase to the State Department, as well as a copy of a further draft memorandum by Professor Cowan on "Likely |P Devebopments in Indonesia and the succession to President Sukarno", on which you might wish to draw orally. At the same time, you might wish to recount my own experienee, when lecturing at the Imperial Defence College early in 1963 when I was assured by an Indonesian Army Officefon the I.D.C. course that my assessment of the Indonesian political scene in the traditional terms of a balance of power between the PKI and the "“anti- Communist" Armed Forces was quite contrary to the facts: under Nasakom, the Army and the PKI were working in close harmony. It is certainly Sukarno's intention that they should do so and I think it more than likely that he will succeed. 8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Andrew Gilchrist at Djakarta. === [PDF page 127] === Insert A In short, although we certainly can hope that the Army may act as a check on the P.K.1.'s ambitions and may even, when Sukarno has gone and if he goes soon enough, feel obliged to confront the P.K.1., we cannot base our policies solely on this hope. We shall not go out of our way to inhibit the Army's ability to clean up Indonesia one day if it so chooses, but to argue, as Harriman seems to do, that the Americans should consciously nurse it with bribes for such a role, while it is being used as one of the instruments of Sukarno's confrontation policy, seems an act of blind faith. === [PDF page 128] === , abe F VOU No. LUF a4 Dated x 1 Received (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) [Unreadable] (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be cigs Re where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT bias Vy) JESIAR D H (03/45/72 SUBJECT: J lank Yd. prota f / es L WILLA Ai Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 129] === BRITISH HMBASSY, (1032/65) | mR DJAKARTA x te | SA 3104 [ee 8 September, 1965 There were demonstrations at the American Consulate in Surabaya yesterday, September 7. I understand from the American Embassy here that what happened was as follows. os fheir Consul was told by the local authorities that there would be a demonstration at 9 a.m. At 5 a.m. the Consulate building was surrounded by Youth Front demonstrators. Americans were at first refused admission to their offices, but were eventually allowed in. The demonstrators surrounded the building and kept it in a virtual state of siege until the small hours of this morning. Military police finally succeeded in packing them off home. There were no serious incidents, but there was some minor damage. - nature unspecified. Indonesian flags were run up On the Consular premises, but have now been taken down again by the police. The slogans were the usual collection - emphasis on "Close down the Consulate", 3 The Americans have no information over their Telex of any trouble at our Consulate; so I think we can assume that it was left alone. In part confirmation of this, I received this morning a letter written by the Consul yesterday which begins "I write this amidst a certain amount of turmoil - the Police have arrived in force as a precaution against possible demonstration. Personally I do not think they will come this way - they are busy at the American Consulate at present." Ym buf J. G. CAMBRIDGE ee ne ee eee Tonkin, Esq., South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, London S.W.1. === [PDF page 130] === 24 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) Co i 3 r i D ci NTIAK SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT q 965 ENBRINESIA Di (031%6/ 73 FROM A. G “lela l SUBIECT: (1) Lance, (pthaneea) c EA lock. Dated o Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 7 (Outward Action) === [PDF page 131] === tw —fo-bial tt «Sty eee Cy % oe BRITIG EMBASSY” ‘ex, ¢ ; 131 PERSONAL & C 8 September, 1965. Here is a rag bag of miscellaneous information mostly concerning the American Embassy. Ss We are reporting the troubles which the Americans are having with their Consulate in Surabaya. Marshall Green is distinctly worked up over this and also by the treatment he is being given by Subandrio and other Ministers in refusing to see him when he wants to make protests and discuss the situation - discourtesy of this kind can of course be extremely irritating and provoking, Oe One of Green's ideas, on which he asked my advice, was that if the situatio_in Surabaya makes it impossible for the American Consulate to function, the post should be closed and that retaliatory action should be taken by way of closing down the Indonesian Consulate at Sen Francisco. I said that I thought some retaliatory step would be very much in order but that there might well be escalation on the Indmesian side ending perhaps in a complete breach of relations so that careful preliminary thought was necessary (I am not sure that the State Department is enything like as willing as Green perhaps imagines to contemplate an early break). I added that in eny case the issue had not yet been finally posed, and that the demonstrations in Surabaya were no worse than what our Consul in Medan (McKay) had endured without having been driven from his post. I believe that part of Green's trouble is that his Consul in Medan is beginning to exhibit nervous systems, 4, Green has been worried for several days by reports passed to him by the State Department of preparations in South America for the reception in verious capitals of President Soekarno, who is alleged to be about to make a propaganda tour of that part of the world. Something is certainly in the wind but nothing apnears to be firm as yet. One report we have both had indicates that the President might make a trip to South America at the end of this month, with preliminary calls in Central Europe. z=; H. Peck, Es ° 9 C.M.G., Foreign Office, Yelliete PERCMAT, & CONETDENTT AT, === [PDF page 132] === PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL is Green, speculating on the reasons behind this trip, brings out the old diplomatic-—corps theory that Soekarno, when he wishes to make an important change of policy and personnel, habitually does so after a trip abroad. This is not an invariable procedure, but it might quite well happen this time. Any change would, of course, be a further turn to the left, and this is foreshadowed by the recent inclusim of "Aidit in top level restricted—circle discussion on foreign affairs (see my telegram No. 1882 of 8 September). 6. On Soekarno's present political attitude, Green showed me a report by an American female journalist who had just seen the pune twice in one day, first in the morning when he was cheerful and friendly end spoke in terms of praise and satisfaction about Marshall Green's appointment to Djakarta. In the evening she met Soekarno again at dinner with his Japanese wife, Madame Dewi, and found him in a black mood, Despite her protests he denounced the Americans with extreme vigour over their policy in Vietnam and Malaysia, and brought out accusations about the activities of American missionaries and C.I.A. agent Bill Palmer, plus a most unfounded scandal about an American Foreign Service Officer alleged to have exported batik cloth for his private benefit. The situation was not improved by constant complaints by Soekamo éabout the uneatable food provided for him, and it was with difficulty that the object of the evening was achieved, namely the taking of some shots of Soekarno for a television film for showing in America, ven here there was difficulty ; because Madame Dewi insisted on taking part in the filn, to Soekarno's evident displeasure; but he had to give | Way. +3 This episode with Dewi fits in with one or two others of the same nature which show that she is able to enforce her will on Soekarno in matters of this kind, but as I have already hinted I am afraid she may stick her neck out too far and have it chopped. 8. Soekarno on this end other contacts of which I have reports appeared to be in quite adequate health. I learn from the Austrian Ambassador that his Viennese doctor (Fellinger) is passing through Hong Kong today on return from a visit to Japan and has not been asked eee in Djakarta in order to see his distinguished patien 9. I am copying this letter to Alec Adams in Singapore and Antony Head in Kuala Lumpur. (A. G. GilchrYst) DERAANAT, & CONRTNENDTT AT, === [PDF page 133] === “tft [Unreadable] FROM Y LAKAK A No / 7 o 7 (Security Grading—to be Up- graded where Appropriate! SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Ae Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) fur bs IAIN AILESG A bi WWW INE S| SUBJECT: JE VAP Dols: man Ma at ‘D Encloses Copy of: References ‘and Relevant Pa apers: MINUTES === [PDF page 134] === % CONFIDENTIAL FROM DUAKARTA TO FOREIGN oFFIcs = Hl 0314 Jt Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 193/ D.1109 17 September 1965 17 September 1965 — R.131G 17 September 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed io Fereign Office telegram-No. 1937 _ ef 17_ September Repeated for information to: Singapore Kuala Lwapur and Saving to: Washington Bangkok United States - Indonesian Relations. Ynited 012tcs = eee In Letters to Mr. Peck I have expressed doubt whether the tough line advocated by Green in Djakarta was in fact supperted by the State Department. It is, and Green gave me the background to-day on instructions from Washington, so I shall summarise in case nothing has been said to our Embassy there:- (a) Ten days ago Rusk called in Palar and told him in effect that if the United States was compelled to close down ats consular and/er diplomatic posts in Indonesia through intolerable hostile demonstratiens, Indonesian representation in the United States would be cut down pari passu, even if that meant a breach eof relations.: (ob) On 13 September Green gave Subandrie the same message reading him the record ef the Washington interview. (c) Later, Green saw the Minister of Police on the same subject. | (d) The point was stressed throughout that the responsibility of the Indonesian Gevernment is established by prier incitement to the mob and by subsequent congratulation. 2s These moves coincided with the delivery of a very strong Note by the Thai Ambassador as doyen of the Diplematic Cerps, arising out of the sacking of the Indian Embassy (no referenes was made to the United States [gp. undec.]. Be I have reason to believe that the United States attitude CONFIDENTIAL /has made === [PDF page 135] === CONFIDENTIAL Diakarta telegram No. 1937 to Foreign Office coe has made some impression on Subandrio, but the Communists are undoubtedly aware ef the positien and it remains to be seen whether they will try te take advantage ef the American commitment, in erder to demenstrate/escalate them eut of Indonesia. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington 410 and Bangkok 52. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.0. S.H.A.D. JeM.I.D. American Dept. CRO. FE. & P.D. MMMM CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 136] === (Security Grading—to be Giinal where Appropriate) SECRET SEURE I INDONESIA DH Jo3 45 | ya eas) ze /G ‘rowig P_Dean |" U.S, hed for Sndononia + divtuassin (vbah gto) wit. Vr. William Bundy: assessment Attatien Ww Sudenesin » Mmeurtiene No. 664 AG OA 4 Violas Dated x 0 chober Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received Ig Orkober DH ios /'74 [6 Outward Action) Me) Oy AD Coa frre ges of (qf Oct ty ha iS s bol sel prbabl, ha eacbece tet we whe : vac ally dic adh“ oa set cvon (Referred to Legal Adviser) sas us wae Tk yey Tee ei) eee Pee EET no eeeeteeeeeenteeineeneiaamenaal bi ella Radha Yi bt el Med ered Real hear Mad alae ee ie een ieee === [PDF page 137] === SECRET Nes oe FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE Wa Sa ile ee eperes vr - DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir P,Dean ee ee D. 0106 19 October, 1965 18 October, 1965 R. 0305 19 October, 1965 19 OCT 19¢ if VOD PRIORITY SECRET “- Du sits | 7#; \ addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.266) ef 18 October Repeated for information to: Djakarta © POLAD Singapore ~ B.G.R.A.I. Singapore Kuala Lumpur Bangkek Toekye Canberra Wellingten Ottawa 4 6| 179 es Your telegram Ne,8102: Aid for Indenesia. The Minister spoke to Mr. William Bundy today. I had earlier in the morning speken to Mr. Rusk and te Mr. McGcerge Bundy. Mr.William Bundy said that the only United States aid under consideration at present for Indenesia was a limited quantity of rice about which the United States Government had not yet made up its mind and about which they would in any case wish te censult us before coming to a decision, He gave a categorical assurance that no other aid for Indonesia was under active consideration, and that in the circumstances of the quadripartite talks and our commen interest in the area, the United States Gevernment recognized they must censult us if they wanted te start on any new course of action, 2, Bundy made it clear that generally speaking the State Department thought it far toe soon to be able to assess with any Certainty what even the shert term eutceme of the last three weeks would be and that, until the pattern became clearer, they were not going te commit themselves to the generals. His personal assessment hewever was that there was unlikely te be a clear cut victery for one faction er another, or Sukarno, and that the see-saw between the Communists and the army would continue for some time with Sukarne attempting te held the balance, but with very much less power of effective decision ene way or another than three weeks age. 3. When I speke te Mr. Rusk he said that he would much appreciate it if we could give him any information on Indonesian attacks or raids against Malaysia as seon as they oceurred. He said that the Indenesians were in ne pesition "to afferd this sert of thing new", and he implied that the United States attitude towards /renéering === [PDF page 138] === | SECRET e Washington telegram No, 266) te Fereign Office. «Die rendering assistance of any sert toe Indenesia in the coming weeks would be conditional upon their behaving themselves, I hope if any such information becomes available that I can have it quickly to pass te the Americans. Foreign Office pass Djakarta 36,POLAD Singapore 83, B.G.R.A.I. Singapore 9, Kuala Lumpur 43, Bangkek 85, Tokyo 35, Canberra 7), and Wellington 57. DISTRIBUTED TO: ee keheDs JM.1I.D. Far Eastern Department Infermation Research Department JeoleP.G.D. News Department CRO. ‘Far East & Pacific Department === [PDF page 139] === *Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee (s)......ccccscsacsesersrsenseetessee Registry : priority without eo classtfication —if any Telegram to:— Address to Pras poco Nia ee Row. Aire die cal Ylrshi-rybon bras ha rg hem Ck ue 2664 [Unreadable] “Een Clair. eae € cet. cd & lokron ‘S Cl. Ln f a 5 X Cyphe pow 3 Distribution:— JO kel es air Bz (s) Fo ceva (4) Wel (3 pee === [PDF page 140] === OFFICE TO SINGAPORE (Offic Political Adviser to the Cemmander-in-Chief. Far East) En Clair No, 1965 19 October 1965 PRIORITY = ewe Adéressed to POLAD Singapore telegram No, 1965 of 19 October Repeated for information t; Washington Djakarta Washington telegram No, 266) fof 18 October: aid to Indonesia]: paragraph 3, Please act accordingly. === [PDF page 141] === Meg (fatoh) No. 97, fug, Dated 24 Noyemte/ Received 29 Maren AS. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) (Main Indexed) A Mc (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 1 4 1 I where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT LiL, CO! EN D, joss |4q supsect: Mlara repent > Lbendrté sayy prolmbia <tlag 4 Atak ren /jetadun sale thd wr BE eo aot ater 2 _ ’. Peace lferald Ath pete “aS -reeCync2, he 7 onglate _ sed, Oley: advord a Sela aa ~ eat re a ei/ppderisca fore 07 ae ALalen, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES Minette A) My Murex ( L lc | No JOH? 4 So [Vornte/ === [PDF page 142] === INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM OFFICE 14 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Murray No. 97 Saving R: 27 November 1965 24. November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 97 Saving of 24 November Repeated for information Saving to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore 8,H.C. Singapore Washington Canberra Wellington United States/Indonesian Relations. Antara 23 November reports Subandrio as saying that Indonesia was always ready to establish friendly and close relations with the United States, provided that the United States does not interfere in Indenesia’s "national affairs". 2 An editorial in the "Indonesian Herald" on 18 November suggested that the Americans now recognised that they had made some major mistakes in their policies in Asia. One of these was the belief that Indonesia was going Communist. “Some policy makers had criticised the State Department leadership for having fallen into the British trap called "Malaysia", the event which marked the turning point in the otherwise friendly relations between Indonesia and the United Szates". JolePeGeD. News Dept. GRO. FE. & P. Dept. News Dept. NNNNN === [PDF page 143] === 11) Beis FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE pi BH 103 ms (¥ (4) En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Murray No.268 D. 12.07 30 November 1965 30 November 1965 Re 14.00 30 November 1965 PRIORITY DE Bins) 4 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2618 of 30 November Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore and Saving to: Washington My telegram No. 97 Saving: Indonesian/American Relations. An editorial in the Indonesian Herald on 27 November Says that relations between these two countries have been very low for a long time. The two chief reasons for this are “American interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs" and "because of the problem of Malaysia in which America Cannot take a neutral attitude". If only America could keep out of the Indonesia/Malaysia dispute relations between Indonesia and America would be greatly improved. Indonesia is not asking for foreign aid or technical assistance as prerequisites for good relations only for “hands off". Foreign Office pass Saving Washington as 560. DISTRIBUTED TO:-= F.O. S.EA.D. J.M.I.D. I.R.D. J-I.P.G.D. News Dept American Dept C.R.O. F.E. & P. Dept News Dept VVVVV