FO 371/181556 - Joint Malaysia-Indonesia, Propaganda [1] (1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === 181556 CLOSED UNTIL Pte === [PDF page 2] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department a J Ba A. SUBJECT: Vasradto AWNOCN.QASLAAKY sana AKO C v= m ate aww puree ~ CorunBer - Free Keg KAZ b> trv ort Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: iM Vesa (C4) Received i 4 7 [Unreadable] Dated te. Recle Kan. 42. MINUTES (Printing Instructions) 181556 (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action eompleted) (Main Indexed) WU k A aN === [PDF page 3] === IN THIS MARGIN. ale (87285) Hw. Registry RrCEIVED ARCH SECRET 4 dAN 902. Z, Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. Thank you for your letter (D/DS811/6/5/10/1h) of December 14, about possible Indonesian propaganda exploitation of crashed British MinistyYy of FROM Ee He Peck 26 We would be glad to fall in with the line of action you propose in your paragraph 4; welfare the practical difficulties involved in destroying completely all wrecks, and certainly we do not wish to divert military patrols from their proper role merely to frustrate Indonesian propagand@s@s But would it be possible to spell out your instructions to the C-in-C in rather more specific terms and notably by recapitulating the suggestions in paragraph 3(b) of my letter of November 4? Bare accident records would lack the impact of photographs such as I had envisaged. This is very much a counter-propaganda effort, and the truth will be judged not so much by technical details noted on the prescribed military form as by the impact (to use a PR word) on the news page. For this photographs are vitest wep Goons sl Antd wt adi rey be possible to arrange for these photographs to be not merely “available to the Ministry of Defence", but sent to the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office, and the U.K. Mission to New York, in each case cleared for publicity if the need should arise. === [PDF page 4] === SECRES FOREIGN OFPICE, 5.Wel. January 12, 1965 Thank you for your letter (D/DS11/6/5/10/14) of December 14, about possible Indonesian propaganda exploitation of crashed British aircraft. 26 We would ve glad to fall in with the line of action you propose in your paragraph 4; we fully realise the practical difficulties involved in destroying completely all wrecks, an@ certainly we do not wish to divert military patrols from their proper role merely to frustrate Indonesian propaganda. But would it be possible to spell out your instruetione to the C.-in-C. in rather move apecific terms and notably by recapitulating the suggestions in paragraph 3(b) of my letter of November 47 Bare accident records would lack the impact cf photographs such age I had envisaged. -hie is very much a counterpropaganda effort, and the truth will be judged not so much by technical details noted on the prescribed military foxmm as by the impact (to use ea PR word) on the news page. For this photographs are of great importance and should not be too difficult to obtain. De Will it be possible to arrange for these photographs to be not merely “available to the Minietry of Defence", but sent to the Minietry of Defence, the Foreign Office, and the U.K. Mission to New York, in each case cleared fox publicity if the need should arise, Pede Burlace, Esqe, D.S. li, Ministry of Defence, oc w SaWele === [PDF page 5] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department SEC R ET 1965 IM [Unreadable] 4 ‘ 2 4 nat? [Unreadable] Yor oe LAAT §=OLVY eA Kh ouneqge i0A4 caer MYO RK Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) Lr) My WUT L_ CAS e MINUTES Cc saan cor Nese -€ Wwhndass 6: lw Rew hee Vo. ee is bode stndied atlro WW \RS.: yy: wares. Vs ok “a i Baclecee’ S$ zach predlo.. \- “thes is nor A WAayor—: loth. rf Aa M1 specitie L Sie eee \ gro am bu koh, (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action? completed) (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] === [PDF page 6] === Number of copies OF enclosures. <2....55..6.3.6 Me === [PDF page 7] === Lil Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. yo ee a/ asp ese 14 4 Jo Ee FET a: ak Cait jf wn es [PrP rhionL === [PDF page 8] === === [PDF page 9] === From: F,. J. Burlace, Head of D.S.11, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE w/e y Main Building, Whitehall, Lonpon S.W.1 CL i | i, 1s fy Telephone: Wuitehall 7022, ext. 3107 is ye ahh y [Unreadable] Your reference; 14th January, 1965 RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.48 eos 19 JAN 1965; i), If you feel strongly about the additional measures to frustrate Indonesian propaganda about wrecked aircraft, mentioned in your letter of 1l2ti January, I will of course put the suggestions forward. But I wonder whether this whole issue has not been overtaken by events since you first wrote to us. Indonesia has announced its withdrawal from the United Nations. I suppose it will still find sponsors there, but will any of them lay themselves open to ridicule by tabling pitiful "evidence" of British aggression to Yen set against the mounting tale of Indonesian landings and the extensive evidence (much of it from Soekarno's own back mouth) of Indonesia's determination to crush Malaysia? It looks as though, before long, our people in Borneo will have their hands full dealing with attacks on a& larger scale than ever before; in dealing with them they may have to resort to operations which could leave the Indonesians with some real evidence of our activities in Kalimantan. Will phoney evidence derived from aircraft crashes in our own territory any longer be of value ‘en to the enemy? We would prefer not to add, however Leer slightly, to the burdens of the Borneo defenders unless it was Clear to us (and would be clear to them) that we were doing so for an important purpose. Would you be prepared to agree that, in the radically changed circumstances of today, we might safely leave the arrangements for dealing with wrecked aircraft unchanged? EB. H. Peck, ESQ., C.M.G., Foreign Office. === [PDF page 10] === CONFIDENTIAL JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DOWNING STREET, SeWet~ (Im 1673/c) January 29, 1965 Your letter D/DS11/6/5/10/14 of January 14 to Ted Peck has come to me, in view of the latter’s absence in Kuala Lumpur Peck saw it, however, just before he left and agrees that the position has to some extent changed since we first wrote and the risk of the Indonesians making any damaging propaganda out of helicopter pieces, is proportionally lesse We still think, however, that it would be a wise precaution to ask the Commander-in-Chief to lay down the further precautions listed in your letter of December 44, and at any rate wherever possible, to have photographs taken of the kind spelt out in our earlier letters» if we faced with a bit of embarrassing hardware some time or other =< if not in the United Nations (although this is by no means impossible) then somewhere else < photographs will be the only kind of counter-evidence with any real chance of making an impacts (Re He Hanbury-Tenison) Fe Je Burlace, ESge,» Head Of DeSe i4¢ Ministry of Defence, Main Buildings === [PDF page 11] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department ANIEIDEN C VS Ni iv EN IA IM oys/S SUBJECT: 7 TD rir, ef + raewhoth ey } <4 Mor os A, ACY AA LOC TVZALCL (mn Lece XL ly 4 Dated Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received MINUTES, Dy) Ree TO ort Fob u LA Cx ott, on Ase Fen “42 ede Clay is i q —=s Jags! oc. OM po) 12 Ref (Be i) A) M. Sede (Duthi) Goa Gb. 3 (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action eompleted) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 12] === $12. Sox Tee eee re Ur Aartt jo Or. 0), Ce1 i120 cb es f NG fe ( ec Scud [Unreadable] RUE oe de. ee [Unreadable] Re Co Arg pr ts AGES a(t) ~ CL ore ey lone aft doth of hn eae Rese ah, i re pole ei og, ie eee === [PDF page 13] === Minutes Wt. 43560/43 4/63 Ed. (53) === [PDF page 14] === ONF IDENTIAL ent telegram from anbury-Tenison suggesting material in Africa. ought to instruct our more active than hitherto. mean that Should depart from our pos is primarily for the Malaysians to make over African opinion. But there are, illustrates, certain lines our and the Z,omb ition as the of Indone own we whe aI put a that we ought available on On reflection Africar I do hat it the running Zomba Sian interests sia ertainments countries shoul d like to see g& raft telegram of === [PDF page 15] === jee ‘}¥ cq fre. Lies Us; ge ae PO Leg bbe a hr, ii. hy es oe — br pt.; bef j fa: on Re > ee el» a tea dx Sat fe F O\ex es | piesa e = DOA, Uy ‘ Sia Aas f A. Co ee a i od hi hatte, Fe + : (« ) Crd eve St tr. ve 12 es y Bete frye { ‘ He, Hf "= t ELt2. 4 he. / | Ke. 2° Pee a ey, 4 Ve ds Oe 5 es i ) Leesa 4 Lor a— a. ee A g k- oe OS: f So [Unreadable] Se OTe Arce Wer eas; Poca J A~ Ato ECL a, Cre “12 === [PDF page 16] === e CONFIDENT AL FROM ZOMBA TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir D. Cole No. 100 D. 12.43. 3 February, 1965 1 February, 1965 R. 13.28 3 February, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to C.R.0. telegram No. 100 of 1 Februcry, Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. When he saw me on Saturday Dr. Banda gave me in strictest secrecy copy of letter from President Sukarno conveyed to him last week by visiting Indonesian delegation under Madame Supenio. 2. This letter (text of which follows by Wednesday's bag) seeks to justi Indonesia's withdrawal from united Nations. It ar rgucs (a) Indonesia is not against Malaysia as such if supported by freely-expressed will of people; but does oppose Malaysia so long as it rcmains puppet State manipulated by Imperialist forces. Creation of present-day ilalaysia is comparable to coup in independent Congo by Tshombe, a stooge of the Imperialists. (b) Processes by which United Nations were consulted over Malaysia and then admitted Malaysia to Security Council were "trickeries and manoeuvres", (c) In circumstances it was against Indonesia's national interests and against larger interests of struggle against Imperialism and neo-Colonialism for Indonesia to remain in United ‘ations. (d) So far from Indonesia embarking on full-scale war in search of settlement “we have to draw conclusion that conccntration of so many British forces around Indonésia, unprecedented in time of peace may weli become preparation for open attack on Indonesia". This would certainly affect whole of Asia and might signal beginning of third world war. (e) It was to be hoped that Indonesia's withdrawal would lead to renewed i cieeesaie to overhaul mental and structural set-up of United “at4tons which was at present arena on which imperialist forces impossd their will. CO} NF IDENT IAL === [PDF page 17] === CONFIDENTIAL Zomba telegram No. 100 to Commonwealth Relations Office (f) "Withdrawal of Indonesia from United Nations will serve as Catalyst to strengthen solidarity among us, the new emerging forces (especially among the African Asian nations), in our bilateral réletionships as well as collectively. In this wey we hope that the integral reorganization of the United vations will be accelerated and in such a renovated aud rejuvenated United Nations Indonesia may find it possible eventually to resume its membership". 3. Banda said he had allowed Mrs. Supenio to do most of the talking. He had been gciuinely surprised by extremism of her views. She hed propounded thesis of ew forces against old, which seemed to him attempt to undermine non-alignment and marshal previously colonial territories on side of Communists against cst. His own view was that indonesia was now in pocket of Chinese. i. ° Banda then digressed into discourse on dauger of Chinese activities in Jfrica generally. Did I know they were planning to construct road right across 4frica from East to West, that Chinese Ambassador in Dar was in charge of all their East and Central African operations, etc. be Banda professed to agree warmly with my comment on completely spurious character of Sukarno's civision of world into new (progressive) and old. Following her silent revolution after second world war Britain, I said, was one of promincnt "new" countries of world, change in whose outlook had had incalculable effects on shape of previously colonial world. I also pointed out thet acuusation of build up of British troops was nonsense in view of cuermous strength of Indonesiau armed forces, and quoted figures in your telegram 61, Banda said he was well aware of this. Oe Banda referred contemptously to Nyerere's impending visit China. He was convinced that Nyerere had now lost all power independent action. C.R.O, please pass to Kuale Lumpur M13. DIStREBUTED TO:— C.R.O. Far East & Pac. Dept. F,0O. South East Asia Dept. J M.I.D. Information Research Dept. South Asia Dept. United ‘ations Dept. Ute. & ME. Dept. Information Policy Dept. GO (PIDEY LLAL === [PDF page 18] === RECEIVED iN | ARCHIVES Ric.¢ CONFIDENTIAL ~3 MAR 1965 Malaysisa/ Indonesia You recently asked that the Foreign Office should arrange for the contents of Commonwealth Relations Office telegram ‘No. 174 to Accra to be brought to the attention of the Foreign Office posts who received our telegram No. 36 Guidance of January 26. “Imp 7313 2. I am rather unhappy about this for the following reasons: (a) since we were asked to arrange for our posts to see your telegram only after it had been despatched to Commonwealth Relations posts, it was impossible for us to propose amendments to it; (b) in my experience, the issue of your telegran, correcting as it does our telegram No. 36 Guidance, will be likely in practice to lead to a certain amount of confusion in the minds of posts as to how far they should go in countering Indonesian propaganda. I am not suggesting that your telegram is not clear; itis admirably so, and is in general a useful development of our ideas on handling the problems posed by Indonesian propaganda. But telegrams guiding posts about information policy need to be simple and to avoid subtle distinctions which, with the passage of time, become blurred in the minds of their recipients. I fear that paragraph 2 of your telegram to Accra, which revises the line taken in our telegram No. 36 Guidance, will in practice lead many posts to write off the whole question of countering Indonesian propaganda as too complicated and confusing. (c) there is furthermore the point that your telegram to Accra is addressed to, and designed to deal with the needs of, posts in under-developed Commonwealth cantries. Our Guidance No. 36, on the contrary, was aimed at posts right across the spectrum (as you probably know, Foreign Office Guidance telegrams go by bag to many posts other than those listed as having recéived them by telegram) and in. sophisticated posts the resistance to British publicity on the Malaysian issue is not the problem it undoubtedly is in an under-developed country. Rome, for example, have told us that they can place any articles on "confrontation" we care to send them; (a) finally, do we really want to instruct our representatives abroad, even in under-developed countries, not to “attempt to state Malaysia's case" as you do at the end of paragraph 2 of your telegram? It is common ground between us that in attributable publicity (your last sentence) we must keep off the grass because of Malaysian susceptibilities and because they, not we, carry maximum conviction. But your telegram to Accra is designed primarily for use in conversation and as background. Surely it cannot be argued that in these circumstances our representatives should not attempt to state Malaysia's case. In practice I would have thought that we would want posts to state the Malaysian case just as we want them to state the case for the continuing integrity and independence of South Vietnam or any other country in a similar situation. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 19] === 36 I should, therefore, prefer not to issue your ~telegram No. 174 to Accra as a Guidance to Foreign Office posts. But if you feel that it is essential that we should, I should like to see paragraph 2 reworded as follows: "It is for the Malaysians themselves to tell their Afro-Asian colleagues whether or not they regard themselves as stooges; and where they do this vigorously we should leave them to make the running. But you should not hesitate to present, at your discretion, the arguments on which Malaysia's case against Indonesia is based. You will be able to judge where advocacy by you will be counterjzroductive; but, as far as oral arguments and non-attributable publicity are concerned, we should not let the Malaysian case go by default against the very powerful propaganda campaign which the Indonesians are waging." le I am sorry if I appear to be making heavy weather of this, but I do not want to confuse Foreign Office posts by the issue of contradictory guidance or of guidance which may lead them to feel that it is better to do nothing and so avoid putting a foot wrong. Moreover, we intended our telegram No. 36 Guidance (which was of course cleared via J.M.I.D. with the Commonwealth Relations Office) as a basis for action here as well as an instruction to posts abroad. (For example, a Factel which the C.0O.I. have just issued, having cleared it with us and with you, is based on the principles enunciated in it). be As far as mechanics are concerned, I hope that we shall soon see the establishment of a joint Commonwealth Relations Office/Foreign Office Guidance Section which will overcome the procedural difficulty which has given rise to this minute. But until this comes. into existence, I should be grateful if you would ensure that J.M.I.D. does not jump the gun by sending out circular telegrams to Commonwealth Relations Office posts which we will be expected to duplicate by issuing guidance to Foreign Office posts, without giving us in the Foreign Office Information Policy Department the chance to comment first. Uebel a (F.B. Richards) 16 February, 1965 Pas Mr. Golds (J.M.I.D.) Copy: Mr. Hutchings (C.R.0.) === [PDF page 20] === CONFIDENTIA iii ae much ce My own immediate worry was, courbes No.36 may be ce posts anywhere in the world to on valayeia’ s behalf If they effect will vag help the Indonesian Af "British puppet’ etc.) and at the same time ups hose Malaysians who are trying their best to present their own case effectively, who have specifically asked us not to queer their pitch and with whom I.R.D. have established good working relationships. 36 Mr. Peck and I were in Kuala Lumpur when Guidance No.36 / arrived and it wag certainly misunderstood there (see the 1M 1673/5 letter to me from Bottomley at Flag A below). lie The dangerof British advocacy of Malaysia's case back- Piring 185.01 course, greatest in the ex-colonial countries, both Commonwealth and foreign,(e.g. peat Mepee nee support which Malaysia enjoys from Messrs. Nasser,BenBella and Nkrumahy must, with all respect to the aeeeees of HM. Representatives in those places, be regarded as having been given in spite of Britain's association with Malaysia and not because of it) Nevertheless I entirely agree with you that these considérations do not apply in countries which are immune to the Afro/Asian mystique. And obviously HeM. Representatives everywhere muSt be encouraged to put official opinion straight when British policy and motives are being criticised or misrepresented. be As you imply it is extremely difficult to produce guidance which is equally valid for all posts on such a subject as this but I think that your redraft of paragraph 2 of C.R.O. telegram ~No.174 to Accra states pretty accurately our general requirements. I should, however, feel a littie easier about the risks of misinterpretation-in some places-if your redraft were somewhat further amended on the following lines:- "It is for the Malaysians themselves to tell their Afro-Asian colleagues whether or not they regard themselves as stooges; and where they do this vigorously we should leave them to make the running Since obvious British attempts to do the Malaysians' work for them are likely to backfire, particularly in Afro-Asian posts. You will be able to judge where advocacy by you will be counter-—productive or, if you have a Malaysian colleague, whether it would cause difficulties for him. However, it is important that Malaysia's case should not go by default against the powerful propaganda campaign which the Indonesians are waging. Therefore, whenever you judge it necessary you should not hesitate to present, in oral arguments and in non-attributable publicity, the facts on which that case is based. ml If you agree with this slight recasting, paragraph 3 of No.174 to Accra could then begin "In particular it is perfectly appropriate.....". CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 21] === CONFIDENTIAL 66 If you still have difficulties over this I should be glad to come down and discuss the problem with you at more length. I can assure you that the last thing J.M.I.D. wants to do is to cross wires and I share your hope that the establishment of ¢ new joint C.R.0./F.0. Guidance ma chinery will prevent this from happening in future. Fe I have not yet myself seen the C.0.I. Factel you mention in your paragraph 4 but so long as this is a statement of why Britain supports Malaysia I see no reason why it should cause any particular difficulties with the Malaysians. i? February 19 65. FeBe Richard tas ee Pye, han aT tered copy vy) Co, re. h from No 174 fev dapat. te FO. pom me Ged aerce No 64& | hare cette at cps ge CRD, prot. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 22] === Cypher/OTP and By Bag FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CERTAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES By Telegraph: Bonn Beirut The Hague Cairo Paris Bangkok UKDEL NATO Djakarta Vienna Manila UKMIS New York Saigon B.I.5. New York Singapore Washington Tokyo [All Priority] FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION No.36 Guidance 26 January 1965 D.1610 26 January 1965 PRIORITY In our information policy on "confrontation," we have hitherto emphasized the necessity of presenting the struggle as one between two Asian states and of keeping our own involvement as far as possible in the Peokenean 4 - cf. Information Policy Department's circular letter P552/13 of 19 June 1964. 2. Recent developments - the increase of Indonesian military and psycholcgical pressure upon Malaysia and our consequential, widelypublicised military build-up in the Far Hast - now make it essential that Her Majesty's Missions should be free to counter Indonesian propaganda, wherever it occurs, by any appropriate means. Where effective Malaysian representation exists, it may still be best to leave Malaysia to play the hand. But you should not feel inhibited from forceful presentation of the strength of Malaysia's case and of the reasons for British support for Malaysia, drawing at. your discretion on recent Guidance and on further material with which we hope to supply you. 3 The foregoing in no way detracts from our willingness to help the Malaysians with their own information effort. [Copies sent to C.0. and C.R.O. for overseas distribution] === [PDF page 23] === PRIORITY MARKINGS ‘ SECURITY MARKIN ——r——= DEPARTMENT STD a ae Emergency Top Secret tmmediate; DRAFT Secret Priority rou® TELEGRAM/S, AM Confidential -, Restricted Def&re: ee: In Confidence. (Delete whichever is inapplicable) Unclassified File Nos. tate Addressed Repeated: Distribution ‘and ae ___ further action im AG "(Insert appropriate priority marking) ( Insert aitieaneiil priority marking) JA\ \ee [Unreadable] Be 2 ' f pF s 4 Minister of State Cordero 3 | Roe A\ a Secretary of State Bo 243 ri at Vd (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) Kom kk 129 | G Ke Go eee. mi 40 Des - - Magra ercrepetn~ 3| File References (Insert security marking) alin Gap giek Q ‘\ Vb GK a Se ye | se in Telegraph Branch Despatched... Hrs. G.M.T. Hrs. Local Time === [PDF page 24] === 3 en all Guidance FO/CRO/Whi CONFIDENTIAL GUIDANCE Yalaysia ~ Indonesia Tn our information policy on confrontation, vo have hitherto emphasised the necessity of struggle as one between two Asian of keeping our own involvement as far 15 possible in the background - cf. I.P.D.'s circular letter P552/13 of June 19, 196k. 2. Recent develonments <- the increase of Baal Indonesian military and dayschologicel pressure upon Maleysia and our consequential, widely subliecised military build-up in the Far East - it essential that H.M, Missions should fo counter Indonesian propaganda, it oceurs, by any appropriate means. Where effective Melaysian representation exists, till be 883 *>to leave Malaysia to play the hand. But/you should not feel inhibited from forceful presentation of the strength of Maleysia's case and of the reasons for British support for Malaysia, drawing at your discretion on recent Guidance and on further material with which we hope to supply you. === [PDF page 25] === 3. Su s, foregoing in no wey detracts from our wil Ling. to help the Malsysians with their own information effort. === [PDF page 26] === CONFI DENTT AL FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE To OPTAWA CH@Ber/ore and By Bag FILES No, 150 D® 00320 © 26 January 1965 26 January 1965 CONFIDENTIAL iddressed to Ottawa telegram No 150 of 26 January 1965 ind to: Canberra No,219 New Delhi No,273 Karachi No,129 Colombo No, 90 Accra No.107 Dar-es-Salaam No,163 [All Priority] Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur [Priority] and Seving to: Wellington No.68 Kampala No,.37 Legos No.2, Nairobi No.1 Nicosia No.18 Zomba No.20 Freetown No.1/ Valletta No,15 Kingston No,14 Port of Spain No.13 Following is text of Foreign Office telegram No, 36 Guidance of 26 January Begins, Malaysia — Indonesia In our information policy on confrontation, we have hitherto emphasised the necessity of presenting the struggle as one between two £sian states end of keeping our own involvement as far as possible in the background - cf, I.P.D,'s circular letter P5)52/13 of 19 June 1962, 2. Recent developments - the increase of Indonesian military and psychological pressure upon Malaysia end our consequential, widely publicised military build-up in the Far East - now make it essentiel that der Majesty's Missions should be free to counter Indonesian propagenda, wherever it occurs, by any appropriate means Where effective Malaysian representation exists, it may still be best to leave Malaysia to pley the hand, But you should not feel inhibited from forceful presentation of the strength of Malaysia's case and of the reasons for British support for Malaysia, drawing at your discretion on recent Guidance and on further material with which we hope to supply you. 53. The foregoing in no way detracts from our willingness to help the Malaysians with their own information effort Ends TSTRIBULTED TO: hele, CON TAT OTR T AT UWUL Ps PUN tos === [PDF page 27] === FPrviwg * ae [Unreadable] g: a 7 x *. ee é FROM NEW DEIHI TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE En Clair ria LES Mr. Scott D. 10.05 3 Febrwry, 1965 R, 10.2) 3 February, 1965 No. 286A 3 February, 1965 Your telegram No. 273. Grateful for copy of circular letter referred to in paragraph 1, apparently not received here. eit, Mol % TOMI Byer e M 1673/31/49 \ RE eee DISTRIBUTED TO: J.M.1I.D. === [PDF page 28] === PRIORITY MARKINGS Jom ee eee re | DEPARTMENT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA SECURITY MARKINGS Emergency ) Top Secret Immediate DRAFT Secret Prierity Confidential Routine — TELEGRAM] SAMISIGRAMA Restricted Deferre In Confidence (Delete whichever is rs Unclassified - Repeated: Distibution onl a further action Lies ¢ ( lassie cae. Freer EQN - priority marking) ) Reet: | KUALA LUMPUR | Kamracn 20 Parly. U.S. of S. NAIC “ oa 7 | Savings | | 4 Minister of State x! Create Secretary of State Aucl. 7 aga | CAI fe/e Ke [au ie Wermicrouel | Wem Deut 9) SH {7 oe ‘ | (SPECIAL cTIC sy Keracil 33 SH | SALISpe! Nicosia th ° a eee CANBERRA 7 ome NT as Geusseny 37 SV eel neeeaaeceeed ih Vseuw 50. ea 1 FEB 49 Printing File | References CO NF IDENT IA i - - _FILCH] (l nant ndedt@iane security marking) F.O. Guidance No. 36. . MALAYSTA/INDONESTA Indones ianpropaganda against ourselves the Malaysians in Afro-Asian countries is concentrating on the following themes:- (a) Malaysia is a puppet state, set up by the United Kingdom against the wishes its inhabitants to perpetuate British imperialism in South East Asia; British reinforcements in South East Asia are unprecedented in peace-time and constitute a threat to Indonesia. 2e It is for the Malaysians themselves to tell /their For Use in Telegraph Branch pe oh ae: stig ot === [PDF page 29] === Copies to: PRIORITY MARKINGS Emergency Immediate Pricrity Routin Deferre File No. (Insert appropriate priority marking) W DELH Parly. U.S. of S. Minister of State Secretary of State (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) File \/ INDONESIA SECURITY MARKINGS RAFT ver is inapplicable) Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted In Confidence Unclassified Distribulion and further action Repeated (Insert appropriate priority marking) LUMPUR | Saving” KUALA AU Sas CANT Printing ere CONFIDENTIAL (Insert appropriate security marking) LAT AVATA MALAYSTA a eed, Indonesian~propaganda against ourselves oes > the Malaysians in Afro-Asian countries is concentrating on the following themes:- (a) Malaysia is a puppet state, set up by the United Kingdom against the wishes its inhabitants to perpetuate British Asia; imperialism in South East British reinforcements in South East Asia are unprecedented in peace-time constitute a threat to Indonesia. It is for the Malaysi themselves to /their For Use in Telegraph Branch Despatched............. €<ode/Cypher Hrs. G.M.T. Hrs. Local Time === [PDF page 30] === File References their Afro-Asian colleagues whether € not they regard themselves as stooges; and British advocacy of their case is only too likely to give the impression that they aree F.0O. Guidance telegram under reference must not therefore be interpreted aS meaning that British Missions should attempt to state casee They must continue f doing so, y in attributable publicity. Nevertheless it is perfectly appropriate and indeed necessary that tendentious criticism of Britain's part in the establishment of Malaysia should be refuted by us and wherever possible forestalled. Please therefore lose opportunity in conversation with members of the government to which xhey you are accredited, or with your diplomatic colleagues, of refuting lies of this kind. You should point out that although the methods former British colonies have achieved independence naturally differ in detail the process whereby Malaysia was involved the same complete transfer British sovereignty preceded by the kind of consultation and devolution authority as in the case of former British colonies which are independent states. The decision Sabah and Sarawak to join Malaysia was taken freely and voluntarily after the /most CONFIDENTIA 16295 ‘#'A e9/€ YOSL wrd—Elese IM (P¥B8ES3) ihe hai NIDSYVW SIHL NI === [PDF page 31] === DRAFT TELEGRAM/SAYVINIGRAM (CONTINUATION SHEET) File References sSParmen 2oCmwlols 2 Tin = ave in vpecemper +7970 e y the further, whoily procedure IN THIS MARGIN 6 A ae LLONasiy Lf dEciaca ois empon emphasise gaaeciating fe aeeievsilisg a i Banat on AlLSLO0 ee é — wnicn the 1. Vera towne /Malaysians ONP IDENT TAT, (01692) we 24558—P139 Som 10/52 V.8. Go 835 SIN bed ted 2 oe Cee ae ec === [PDF page 32] === DRAFT TELEGRAM/SAMISEGRAMA (CONTINUATION SHEET) File References CONFIDENTIAL Gutade inns. in the face of extreme & provocation from Indonesia, have invoked. We have recently had to send some modest reinforcements because the Indonesians have constantly increased the range and scope of their aggressio the whole 1,000 mile frontier in Borneo and air drop armed parties up to 100 strong on the Malaysian mainland. Indonesian militarily quite ineffective are in flagrant breach of Article.2 of the UeNe Charter and indéed of all accepted norms of international behaviour. In spite of the recent reinforcements Britistl and Malaysian forces are still heavily outnumbered (quantitatively) by the Indonesians whose armed forces number and whose build-up in Borneo the local Indonesian put at 30,000 regular troops. military posture - and hence wn —- is a strictly defensive one. carve idea that Britain is plotting to Burxz out a new empire for herself in South East Asia by attacking Indonesia is ridiculous. She only wants to see peace in the area. 6. If asked about the prospect of a negotiated settlement you should say that this is presumebey not a matter for Britai but for the two parties directly Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysi throughout made/absolutely clear JW ould === [PDF page 33] === ole DRAFT TELEGRAM/SAVINIGRAMA (CONTINUATION SHEET) File References CONFIDENTIAI VO LINE 2 oid would welcome a settlement provided naturally that it provides-fer the dence and territorial integrity of Malaysia. Certainly Britain mMs no [Unreadable] 2st whatsoever in standing in the way of such a settlement. The obstacle peaceful solution who still regards it as for negotiations tha to carry on hostile Malaysian territory. CONFIDENTIA (D1692) Wt 24558—P139 50m 10/52 V.B. Gp 835 === [PDF page 34] === CONFIDENTIAL Cypher/OTP By Bag No. 174 11 February, CCNFIDENTT AL RILCH Addressed_ And to: Lagos No. TG! el ae XT Freetown No, Dar es Salaam And Saving to: Karachi Nicosia Repeated for informati . GQarxring and saving Foreign Office Gui Malays prs) Indonesian } in Afro-Asian countries themes: - British reinforcem unprecedented to Indonesia. Delhi No. | Kingston No. On-Os provagands 7% TRA Lf 2 t SS ‘RICE TO ACCRA CRO/FO/WH. DISTRIBUTION 15.15 12 February, 1965 ii, February, 208 541 No. 99 Kampala Nairobi Zomba 23 ’ Spain No. 16 Kuala Lumpur Ottawa No. 95 No. 117 Wellington No. Salisbury No. Dublin! 50 Canberra 100 L lo ° hei 56 lance No. ia/Tndonesia A aginst ourselves and the Malaysians is concentrating on the following state, set up by the United f its inhabitants to Asia; Wishes of imperialism in South East 1ents in South East Asia are in peace-time and constitute a threat === [PDF page 35] === 0. telegram No. 174 to Accra, cia It is for the Malaysians themselves to tell their Afro—- WW Asian colleagues whether or net they regard themselves as stooges; and British advocacy of their case is only too likely to give the impression that they are, Foreign Office Guidance telegram under reference must not therefore be interpreted as meaning that British Missions should attempt to state Malaysia's case. They must continue to avoid any appearance of doing so, particularly in attributable publicity. 3. Nevertheless it is perfectly appropriate and indeed necessary that tendentious criticism of Britain's part in the establishment of Malaysia should be refuted by us and wherever possible forestalled. Please therefore lose no opportunity in conversation with members of the government to which you are accredited, or with your diplomatic colleagues, of refuting lies of this kind. You should point out that although the methods by which former British colonies have achieved independence naturally differ in detail, the process whereby Malaysia was set up involved the same complete transfer of British sovereignty preceded by the same kind of consultation and devolution of authority as in the case of all other former British colonies Which are now independent states. The decision of Sabah and Sarawak to join Malaysia was taken freely and voluntarily after the most scrupulous and elaborate process of consultation which culminated in the overwhelming endorsement of the Malaysia plan by the democratically elected legislatures of both states. There were general elections in Sabah in December 1962 and in Sarawak in June 1963. These were on a basis of full adult suffrage with secret ballot and in both cases resulted in the return of an _. majority of cee ia candidates after a strikingly high poll. All this was even followed by the further, wholly ee procedure of an independent, impartial investigation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The fact that Malaysia was not forced unon any participant in the Federation is additionally proved by the fact shat Brunei, though invited to join, decided not to do so. 4. If the existence of Malaysia is to be arbitrarily called in question by an expansionist neighbour, who is to say that any Afro-Asian country that was once a British colony or protectorate is entitled to the independence it now enjoys? CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 36] === 3 CONFIDE C.R.O. RO. telegram No. 1/4 to Accra 5 On the subject of reinforcements, you should exhasize that British forces in South East Asia are there at Malaysia's request and are assisting a fellow Commonwealth member to defend herself from attack, We have an obligation to do this under the terms of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement Which the Malaysians in the face of extreme provocation from Indonesia, have invoked. Ve have recently had to send some modest reinforcements because the Indonesians have constantly increased the range and scope of their aggression - first along the whole, 1,000 mile frontier in Borneo and latterly by sea landings and air drops of armed parties up to 100 strong on the Malaysian mainland. Indonesian actions, though militarily quite ineffective are in flagrant breach of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and indeed of all accepted norms of international behaviour. In spite of the recent reinforcements British and Malaysian forces are still heavily outnumbered (quantitatively) by the Indonesians whose armed forces number some 380,000 and whose build-up in Indonesian Borneo the local Indonesian radio, has put at 50,000 regular troops. Malaysia's military posture - and hence our own ~- is a strictly defensive one. The idea that Britain is plotting to carve out a new Sa oad for herself: in south East Asia by attacking Indonesia is ridiculous. She only wants to see peace in the area. 6. If asked about the vp you should say that this is n a matter for Britain but for the two parties directly concerned - Malaysia and Indonesia. The Malaysians have throughout made it absolutely clear that they would welcome a settlement provided naturally that it preserves the independence and territorial integrity of Malaysia. Certainly Britain has no interest whatsogver in standing in the way of such a settlement. The obstacle to a peaceful solution is Indonesia who still regards it as a precondition for negotiations that she be allowed to carry on hostile incursions into Malaysian territory. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 37] === By Bag SONFIDENTIAL M FOREIGN OFFICE TO CIRTAIN OF HER MAJESIY'S Se aemnnia 18 February, 1965} CONLVIDENTIAL Sesh My telegram No.36 Guidance of 26 January. ne ee ee Indonesian propaganda against ourselves and the Malaysians in 4Afro-Asian countries is concentrating on the following themes:- (a) Malaysia is a puppet State, set up by the United Kingdom against the wishes of its inhabitants to perpetuate British imperialism in South East Asia; (b) British reinforcements in South East Asia are unprecedented in peace-time and constitute a threat to Indonesia. 2. It is for the Malaysians themselves to tell their Afro-Asian colleagues whether or not they regard themselves as stooges; and when they do this vigourously we should leave them to make the running since obvious British attempts to do the Malaysians' vork for them are likely to backfire, particularly in Afro Asian posts. You will be able to judge where advocacy by you will bs counter-productive or, if vou have a lalaysian colleague, whether it 1culd cause difficultic for him. However, it is important that Malayria's case should not go by default against the powerful propaganda canpaign which the Indonesians are waging. Therefore, whenever you judge it necessary you should not hesitate to present, in oral arguments and in nonattributable publicity, the facts on which that case is based. 5e In particular it is perfectly appropriate and indeed necessary that tendentious criticism of Britain's part in the establishment of Malaysia should be refuted by us and wherever possible forestalled. Please therefore lose no opportunity in conversation with members of the Government to which you are accredited, or with your diplomatic colleagues, of refuting lies of this kind, You should point out that although the methods by which former British colonies have achieved independence naturally differ in detail, the precess whereby Malaysia was set up invclved the same complete transfer of British sovereignty preceded by the same kind of consultation and Gevolution of authority ss in the case of all other former British Colonies which are now independent States. ‘The decision of Sabah CONFIDENTIAL / and Sarawak === [PDF page 38] === CONFIDENT A Foreign Office telegram No.6) Guidance Scere and Sarawak to join Malaysia was taken freely and voluntarily after the most scrupulous and elaborate process of consultation which culminated in the overwhelining endorsement of the Malaysia plan by the democratically elected legislatures of both States, ‘There were general elections in Sabah in December 1962 and in Sarawak in June 1963. These were on a basis of full adult suffrage with t ballot and in both cases resulted in the return of an oversee majority of prc-ialaysia candidates sfter a strikingly high poll, All this was even followed by the further, wholly exceptional, procedure of an independent, impartial investigation by the Secretary General of the United Nations. The fact that Malaysia was not forced upon any participant in the Federation is additionally proved by the fact that Brunei, though invited to join, decided not to do so. 4., If the existence of Malaysia is to be arbitrarily called in question by an expansionist neighbour, who is to say that any Afro- Asian country that was once a British colony or protectorate is entitled to the independence it now enjoys? 5. On the subject of reinforcements, you should ee that British forces in South Hast Asia are there at lialaysia's request and are assisting a fellow Commonwealth member to defend herself from attack. ‘e have an obligation to do this under the terms of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement which the Malaysians, in the face of extreme provocation from Indonesia, have invoked. We have recently had to send some modest reinforcements because the Indonesians have constantly increased the range and scope of their aggression - first along the whole 1,000 mile frontier in Borneo and latterly by sea landings and air drops of armed parties up to 100 strong on the Maleysian mainland. Indonesian actions, though militarily quite ineffective are in flagrant breach of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and indeed of all accepted norms of international behaviour. In spite of the recent reinforcements British and Malaysian forces are still heavily outnumbered (quantitatively) by the Indonesians whose armed forces number some 380,000 and whose build-up in Indonesian Borneo the local Indonesian radio, has put at 30,000 regular troops. Malaysia's military posture - and hence our own - is a strictly defensive one. The idea that Britain is plotting to carve out a new empire for herself in South Hast Asia by attacking Indonesia is ridiculous. She only wants to see peace in the area. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 39] === CON FETT GATNT A CONF IDENTTAL oongciaseacescepaeauenscsee tae Beicn Office telegram No.64 Guidance If asked about the prospect cf a negotiated settlenent you should say that this is not a matter for Britain but for the two parties directly concerned - Malaysia and Indonesia. The Malaysians have throughout made it absolutely clear that they would welcome a settlement provided naturally that it preserves independence and territorial integrity of Malaysia. Certainly ain has no interest whatsoever in standing in the way of such settlement. The obstacle to a peaceful solution is Indonesia who still regards it as a pre-condition for negotiations that she be allowed to carry on hostile incursions into Malaysian territory. LCopies sent to Colonial Uffice for Overseas Distribution], CONFIDENTIAL sete === [PDF page 40] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN OFFICH TO CERTAIN OF H No, 94 Guidance 5 March, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL [Unreadable] My telegram No. 64 Guidence of 18 February. It has now been learned that there is no evidence to support the statement in paragraph 5 that an Indonesian radio station has claimed that there are 30,000 indonesian regular troops in Borneo, The figure cannot be confirmed otherwise, and it should accordingly not be used in future, [Copies sent to C.G. and C.R.O. fcr overscas distribution, ] === [PDF page 41] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department CO NF iD ENT LAL SUBJECT: Dated Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) Pat === [PDF page 42] === RECEIVED IN ARCHIVE 3 No. 48 ~2FEB 1965 A dia, CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Hanbyr¥—Tenison Ghazali, when he was here, particularly stressed, both to the Secretary of State and to myself, that in publicity about confrontation it was important, not only for Malaysian amour-propre but for international opinion generally, that the impression should be avoided that only the British were fighting the Indonesians. He asked us to bear this point in mind in any publicity arrangements we made. I am sure he is right - from our own point of view also. Could we therefore take the opportunity of our next Guidance to overseas posts to underline this point? It would be useful if posts could be given some supporting material about the Malaysian defence effort, and the C.R.O. Information Division might consult with the Malaysian High Commission about this and see what can be worked out. (N. ee 27.1.65. wha eck. an pes d\ Q~ exXEY es ie Mh, [v</ hurl [N dato. es elfpote eho conjoble. kid LNs dies Hie te Won olen IL. Ge wren Wav bak? tb oe = ek 5 SE Teadk aie Se (ees eats walotal Ss ormcnteid ) era [etun are Sick seicil o s / LL ol === [PDF page 43] === oe poor 5 IF W POY HLA? ap Chenglle | Dae = Seer === [PDF page 44] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) [Unreadable] Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department WING cme gn ig ee ary i It re. a ae { TAN Piz Dated Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received (Outward Action) [Unreadable] Dh) yey MINUTES 4 Ve 7 tb - 4° tf We (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action eompleted) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 45] === British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur. CONFIDENTIAL po) No48/ February 10th, 1965. When you were here for the Heads of Mission meeting I told you that I did not much like the look of Foreign Office Guidance No. 36 of 27th January about British publicity work on Malaysia-—Indonesia problems. You thought I was reading into it implications that were not really there. 2s I have since re-read it and discussed it with the High Commissioner, and he has agreed that I should write and ask for some further consideration to be given to this in London. 30 If you look at paragraph 2 I think you must agree that this Guidance runs slap across the line which the Malaysians have put to us very forcefully in the past (e.g. when John Pilcher was here nearly a year ago}, namely that we should not do the Malaysians' work for them, either in posts where they are themselves represented, or in posts where they are not. This line obviously applies with much less force to the less overt forms of publicity and counter-propaganda work. I realise that we cannot tie ourselves unthinkingly to the Malaysians' ideas, but at least we ought to consider what they are; and the implications of overriding them should be pondered, not blankly ignored. 4. The Malaysians' argument is that the moment we are seen to be doing their work for them we start to lend credence to the basic Indonesian assertion that the Malaysians are only British puppets. I think there is quite a lot in this argument - one often sees the process reflected in reports from various sources. In any case, the Malaysians feel strongly about it. Iz Nes! 5. Both because the Malaysian argument is probably ares! - at least within limits - and because (irrespective of its sere ak they feel so strongly about it, I hope that F.0O. Guidance No. will be applied in practice with considerable tact and discretion. If we had been consulted about it in advance (which I should have thought not a bad way to run a railroad), we should have made this point. As we were not, I can only ask that a follow-up should be issued to make it now. | RIT, fa Giveoks (J.R.A. Bottomley) A.A. Golds, Esq., M.V.O. Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, Commonwealth Relations Office, London i & === [PDF page 46] === CONFIDENTIAL JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONES DEPARTMENT a C.R.0./.F 0. (IM 1673/ ) = oe * DOWNING STREET, S.W.1. February 15, 1965 [Unreadable] Thank you for your letter of February 10 about Foreign Office Guidance Noe 36. Like you I re-read the telegram at the earliest opportunity and I agree thet it was only too likely that certain of our posts might put the wrong interpretation on ite Nevertheless, after talking to those concerned here, I can assure you we had no intention of changing the rule that our posts must not engage in attributable publicity on Malaysia's behalf. On the other hand, recent reports of the efforts of the Indonesian team led by Madame Supeni in Africa show that it is very necessary to ensure that the facts about Malaysia are properly understood by African Governments (eeg. by Kenyatta’s advisers). It is perfectly appropriate for our people, who have or should have a card of entry in such places, to put the British role in helping to ereate and defend Malaysia in a good perspective. 7 wire (3 2. We have already issued fresh guiddnce which you will by now have seen (C.R.O. telegram no. 174 to Accra which is being repeated in the guidance series to foreign posts). I hope you will agree that this states our requirements unambiguously and fully protects the point which you have made in your letter. Ze Incidentally we shall always welcome any suggestions for incorporation in future guidance telegrams from heres (A.A Golds) Je Re Aco Bottomley, ESQes KUALA LUMPUR. === [PDF page 47] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department WUNri VU ci N TIAL 7 O 6 5 | IM (eT-fe 3; SUBJECT: FROM NU Me t v0 ( ‘ curr) Bo My iS OF OF [Unreadable] Dated reek iS Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received « ¢b 47 | NY) 5. Retlomlen Kb. by. Ma Homlowy Tensor Ge) Ma Mamstcld farina bd Nester PR dad ty PE | a 24 oe t it Weert b [Unreadable] | ante & - UA le avin teb L. lc fone ue 2. re al ow cen? an ‘- ae set of unobhls cae tfru Bisa 37 Ssly:? (Printing Instructions) | fs (G pT" eA ) [Unreadable] Tisai, | (Referred to Legal Adviser) i KD K (Action af iE eompleted) (Main Indexed) Len mod KK Voltcr|| A AA Bond MPa nh;, de tie 4 NO Rertty, edn, D Ah on aks ae en === [PDF page 48] === ¢) PAA w NY 39h, ons o re OWA - Soller | > / sok wr Caw, bs CA ce a 1 ‘ 4 erly, Pas Number of copies 7 fete pha‘, Sue up 4 ke poh Adnsrnryh, of re: fort nae. 6%. Number of copies [> Witt === [PDF page 49] === With the compliments of HBR BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S /) EMBASSY J) An Grete hh t.A.Mansfield BRITISH EMBASSY PARIS R. Hanbury-Ten Joint fOr eA 1 LY === [PDF page 50] === RRTMNTAY PWRASSYV DAL Lon tiiDbA PARIS ; Ce Roy f, ‘ Mot = rovosal 7 4 me tie — ,; Pe DY Ae [Unreadable] ysian have money re sure +t! Ld I W l worth fission in 11a Lp 7 ient j } UGllY VL I wonder whether there ‘ical warfare. over oO yw ffective jour === [PDF page 51] === Registry Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. Restrigted. Oneill Draft. [etn Sues SRA. fh Lounle, Say ivf 3 1” Unb, 3 fis. R Horburn - Verum irr) === [PDF page 52] === === [PDF page 53] === CONFIDENTIAL JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DOWNING STREET, SeWete 47 March, 1965 (IM 1673/6) Please refer to Mansfield's letter to you (46732/5/65 of 15 February) about a proposal put forward by the Malaysian Embassy in Paris that certain French journalists should be invited to visit Malaysia. 2e You will also have seen Mansfield'’s letter to me on the same subject asking whether any U.Ke funds were available for psychological warfare which could be tapped to finance a scheme of this kind. 3e I should be grateful for your views on whether you consider this visit would be of sufficient importance to warrant any assistance on our parte It would seem that this is something which the Malaysians themselves should finance if they are keen enough on the ideae Have they in fact not already budgeted thie year for visits of this nature? ye I em sending a copy of this letter to Mansfield in Paris. (Re He Hanbury-Tenison) Je Re Aco Bottomley, Esqes KUALA LUMPUR. === [PDF page 54] === BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION Police Co-operative Building, 1 Suleiman Road RECEIVED Kuata Lumpur a as Federation of Malaya Please address any reply to Telephone: 81901 /6 30 APR 1965, P.O. Box 1030: ae Iw —_ Kuala Lumpur ef April, 1965. p eee and quote: 2 KI, 16/162/1 Your ee CONFIDENTIAL rela. I am sorry it has taken some time to reply to your letter IM 1673/6 of 17 March to Bottomley about Philip Mansfiel ld's idea of using U.K. funds to finance visits here by French: journalists. PRCHIVES No 42 ee Perhaps I should first deal with the question of whether the Malaysians themselves might sponsor such Visits. The Ministry of External Affairs have asked for money for this sort of thing and we understand they are likely to get some. But we feel it is for the Malaysians themselves to work out priorities for spending such funds and we do not honestly think French visitors are likely to come high on the list. As you know Mala; agi main task in the public relations ield she moment, especi ahead of the Algiers Afro-Asian conf ference » is to counter In fonestas efforts to blacken their name with r Afro-Asian stat I do not think they would feel able to "e either money or for they are gravely under-staffed, for. cultivation of wes Joumalists, useful though that would be resources were unlim: er S cte [Unreadable] Fh D' to ‘ Nor do I think we ought to try and persuade them to do so. It follows that any money we might be able to spare for visits here by foreign journalists would also, in our view, be better used in bringing Afro-Asians here. If I am right in reading between the lines of your letter a possibility that U.K. funds might be available for really important visits of this kind I hope you will consider quickly whether it should not be used over the next month or so in bringing here journalists from some of the countries likely to be most influential in deciding whether or not Malaysia gets in to the Algiers conference. Only if no good candidates from such countries were available, which I should have thought unlikely, would we feel similar visits from France or elsewhere in Western Europe worth spending our money on (unless it is more readily available than I judge to be likely!) ed I am sending a copy of this letter to Mansfield in Paris. 6rk x ae Ru le, Je (W. Bentley) R.H. Hanbury-Tenison, Esq. Joint Sites Toe sia Department, Commonwealth Relations Office, London S.W.1. === [PDF page 55] === Pf w BRITISH EMBASSY CONFIDENTIAL PARIS Sioa ed May. 1965 iN /i (1630/13/65) = pet tech = a AEE OTC A Please refer to Bill Bentley's letter 2 KL 16/162/1 of 27 April about the possibility of financing visits to Malaysia by French journalists. Ze I recognise that Malaysia's first task in the public relations field is to counter Indonesian efforts to blacken its name with other Afro-Asian states. it is indeed in this context tnat I would have thought visits by appropriate French journalists might be considered useful. As you know, leading French newspapers are read by influential people in Francophone African states, probably also in countries in South East Asia that were former French colonies. It might well be therefore that a few well-balanced articles in the French press, particularly well-known and respected papers like Le Monde and Le Figaro - would be a worthwhile adjunct to direct action in the Afro- Asian countries themselves. So I am copying this to Bill Bentley in Kuala Lumpur. Cleo te "Ber a Nm (P.R.A.Mansfield) R. Hanbury-Tenison Esq., Jointialaysis/Indones sda eee London S.W.1.. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 56] === 1965 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department ( pocket J No 466 Dated Ke, LAG Received (Outward Action) SUBJECT: Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: Vv, LR / (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) MINUTES === [PDF page 57] === ee SECRET Ue ore | FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE | 7FEB 196! | [Unreadable] Sir A,Gilchrist DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ioe 1965 D. 11.55 16 February, 1965 —_ R. 13.45 16 February, 1965 SECRET Addressed _to Kuala Lumpur telegram Unnumbered of 16 February, Repeated for information to: Singapore Foreign Office. You might like to let the Malaysians knew that their radio exploitation of prisoners (names, addresses, messages etc.) is paying dividends. I am reliably informed that a good many people, not necessarily those with captured relatives, take an increasing interest in these items. 2 I hope this will encourage Ghazali and his chaps to go further on the lines of attracting an audience by personalizing the appeal - I made Some suggestions to them a fortnight ago. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O0, South East Asia Dept. J M.I Dept. Far Eastern Dept. Information Policy Dept. Information Research Dept. C.R.O, Far East and Pacific Dept. Information Services Dept. Information Policy Dept. === [PDF page 58] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) 1965 wees FROM 44 \ re SUBJECT: " 1 WAAr One i Joy 7 Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department | fr C © N re I D EN TIAL jorbru L M\c2¥ co Encloses Copy of: (Outward Action) Me aie bee: (V a MINUTES Md L 4 pr wptrSq, (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action eompleted) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 59] === ‘sagnuryy === [PDF page 60] === Cobb Sl Minutes. $70 Copturel ee fe sha Snrdlanejun _ Te ee VinodatT fort om es lo ee Colfax + le eee, Ef we Whee went bspecy, At flu [vwe fh ek Gece ee wert de paw leve Che. eek oo ah CS Jes tot ae ee === [PDF page 61] === ; Minutes. es eee oe porte Tse OG =. mes wart Ae onenk — Secawln, eh tl, OE Oe a te escort (Om. RrhA Sis ie bees cotati a a o sion Stiad heen === [PDF page 62] === RPECEIY ih CONFIDENTIAL CHES | Registry 2p ee aes Insert Ss abiee Ng. & Top Secret. ing t ~ Secret. Confidential. |F.T.C. we Restricted. 46/2 Open. Draft. LETTER TO: A.C.S. Adams, We ee navel bye Esqes, CoMeGe,y with—intereest the mounting Indonesian casualty a suitable publicity CO Mirnsarcitan Political Adviser Aw Saaremaa a. the fact that the _tota captured or surrendered 5 nearing the ' thousand mark: FROM: AeA. Golds; fon Hmedoeg Bla <reeh toed, [Unreadable] a ae q 2. According to your telegram no. 92 of February 13, the Indonesian figure (excluding wounded), et already reached 900, as COPIED TO: ee Depot z ee ualty_- ‘Secat of 66, yd Ey reer JeReA.w Bottomley, wh Esqe, KUALA LUMPUR G.F. Rodgers, Esqe DJAKARTA. ae Ke Drinkhall, ESdey, I-ReDe Tunku #eould—_be—indt-eed to offer a prize to the unit or individual responsible for. Sinden. antutling a ts et oe the aotal to 1; ven ee ee 3: ¥ et ‘ Y Hvae Jim bottenie in Kuala Lumpur and -t-. 4 a ” Haase CALS, _ Ag are Tom Rodgers in | Djakartay am also tal ole passing a copy to John Drinkall in I.R.D. === [PDF page 63] === Registry Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. Ud eae 1A. Spd | sees ter (and a natin (- pe / Bice dey Coe fehaprow of hs f Wo “ es + Fe rs / J oped owen fr ( epetu dure weurtat ha eed, eee Cran par goad: TUAW ale fea} Jew a oUuN Cetrarll Tote df 66, of === [PDF page 64] === NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN. === [PDF page 65] === JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DEPARTMENT, CokeOe/Pe0- Downing Etreet, London, Selele 17 February 1965. When I was in Kuching recentiy people seemed to be somewhat concerned at the possible effect on morale of the stories put out by Radio Pontianek about fictitious engaements involving Indonesian successes and heavy British casualties. We have never done much to draw attention to the mounting Indonesien cesualty figures and wonder if suitable publicity should not be given to the fact that the total of Indonesian killed, captured or surrendered is now nearing the thousand marke Soke Wors 2e According to your telegram No.92 of 15 February, the Indonesien figure (excluding wounded) has already reached 900, as compared with a Malaysien/Sritish casualty totel of 66, ic@s a ratio of nearly 14 tol. These figures seen vorth publicising es evidence of (a) Indonesien aggression (b) their lack of success (c) the effectiveness of our om forces. 3e Would you see any objection to such publicity? If you agree that it would serve a USeful purpose how would you suggest it should be handled? Presumably since the casualties were all inflicted or incurred on Malaysia's behalf in Malaysia's war the Malaysians ought to initiate the publicity. Would it, for example, be a good idea to stimulate the Tunku to offer a prize to the unit or individuel responsible for bringing the Indonesian total to 1,000 (ineluding a prize to the ee concerned if he happens to be slive and not a COPnse} » ie I should be grateful for your comments and for those of Jim Bottomley in Kuala Lumpur and Tom Redgers in Djakarta to whom I am sending a copy of this letter. I am also passing a copy to John Drinkall in I.ReDe (AsAcGOLDS) AeCeSe Adams, malat ColleGey CoBeEo, Office of the Political Adviser, SINGAPOREs CONPIDENTIAL === [PDF page 66] === CONFIDENTIAL [Unreadable] Rectan 47) Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Far East, Phoenix Park, Singapore. 25 February 1965. a Ts is : Dear mu, \MAoly"S/e Thank you’for your letter of 17 heoutats about publicity for Indonesian casualties. I think that it would be useful to publicise these figures and that this should be=—deme be done by the Malaysians. As you point out, timing would be important and it would presumably not be advisable to do anything in the immediate future in case this could be construed as an attempt to torpedo the prospects of any peace talks that might be arranged, The best form of publicity might be in a speech by a Malaysian Minister. I am dubious about the idea of offering a@ prize since this might smack of sport and impair Malaysia's | image. We also want to bear in mind the point made by Andrew | Gilchrist when we all met in Singapore, namely to avoid anything \ which might ridicule the Indonesian Army whom we may want to cultivate at a later stage. Instead the Malaysians might stress that these figures showed the efficiency of the Security Forces and the successes which could be achieved when a country is defending itself on its home ground and with the full support of the local population. 2e Incidentally, while it might be better to include the wounded on both sides, we have no means of counting the Indonesian wounded who are generally recovered by their side, If we count the wounded on our side alone the casualty ratio as between Indonesia and Malaysia and her allies would drop but would still be very impressive and perhaps more convincing since there are bound to be enquiries about the number of wounded. 36 I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours. ee Sony, Cav aie (A.C.S. Adams) A.A. Golds, Esae, MeV.O-, Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, C.R.O./Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 67] === ie rey British Eubassy alee (1097/65) ra mates Djekarta. February 2h, 1965. \loslnnd rc a & Fa SCHIvE ~2 WAR 198 | op oe 1H AG 13/2 t’ >) Cine Sze consaeeensl Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter Iv 4044 of Fébruary 4% about giving publicity to Indonesian casualties during “confrontation". LA Lee 3/2 2, We here think that publicity is desirable. The news that nearly 4,000 Indonesians have been killed or captured cannot but have an effect in Indonesia if we can put it over. But we frankly don't like the idea of a prize connected with the killing of an Indonesian. It is the kind of publicity which could too easily be turned against the Malaysians, though it could perhaps have an admirable effect inside Malaysia. An alternative might be a commendation to the unit (and individual if practicable) who captured the Indonesian or group of Indonesians which took the total to the thousand mark. I imagine that it would be fairly easy to fudge the figures in such a way as to ensure that No. 4,000 was a capture and not a killing. It would also be nice if the unit concerned could be a Malaysian one’ 3e It seems to us that a double slant is wanted. For Melaysia (though this is not really our business) emphasis might be on the disparity between the Malaysian and Indonesian casualty rates, coupled with praise for the efficiency of the forces responsible and the population at large who provide them with information. For Indonesia (and the rest of the world) the line could be sorrow at these distressing figures and anger at the men responsible. The two lines are not incompatible. he I am sending copies of this letter to Adams in Singapore, Bottomley in Kuala Lumpur and Drinkall in I.R.D. eis (G. Fe Rodgers) A. A. Golds, Esq., Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1- P.S. The Ambassador asks me to remind you of the point he made in a telegram about the value of prisoner-publicity on Radio Malaysia. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 68] === British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur. 26 February, 1965. CONFIDENTIAL DA 135/37/1 REC EV: ARCHIV = hi AR iS6 Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter Il 1041/- of 17 February about ways to publicise the far greater number of Indonesians who have been killed or captured in the course of "confrontation" than of Malaysian or British casualties. 2. I agree with Rodgers (his letter of 24th February) that the particular suggestion made in paragraph 3 of your letter (a prize for the captor or killer of the thousandth Indonesian casualty) might have undesirable effects abroad. But, in any case, at the present moment, when we seem to be in a "talk" phase of the talk-fight-talk cycle, I do not think that this would be a desirable proposal to put to the Malaysians, 3. On the other hand, they could perfectly well make plain the facts of the situation by more normal publicity methods, under which head I include Rodgerst suggestions. But before taking action we will await Adams's views, both on the substance of the question and on how any proposal might best be put to the Malaysians. 4h. I am sending copies of this letter to Adams at Singapore, Rodgers in Djakarta and Drinkall in Information Research Department. (J.R.A. Bottomley) A.A. Golds, Esq., M.V.0O., Commonwealth Relations Office, London S.W.1. === [PDF page 69] === IN THIS MARGIN. tos ole Registry; \4 AGH | Top Secret. | Secret. | Confidential. | Restricted. | Open. Draft. LETTER From: A.A.GOLDS, ESQ., J »R.AsBOTTOMLEY, Esde, KUALA LUMPUR. Drafted by: F.T.COPELAND CONFIDENTIAL Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. Thank you for your letter (DA.135/37/1 of | 26 February 1965) about publicity for Indonesian casualties. You will since have seen the comments of Alec Adams as well as those of Tom Rodgers, all of which were very helpful. 26 I agree that we should not suggest to the Malaysians the idea of offering a prize in advance for bringing the total bag of Indonesian YP Bok casualties to 1,000' and prt might in any case now ig ee vines be better to wait till the mark is reached before they Meteystans actually Leyyen ejecta publicity. “However there seems to be general agreement that it would be a profitable exercise for the Malaysians to carry out. ver tHe e411 (ai apseccslbdleeet tM deen If as we must expect the attempted infiltrations into Western Malaysia continue, the right moment to congratulate the captors of the 1000th Indonesian soos Yikety—to be be with - fairly soon. Can we pth! to arrange ge that. sie if he may strictly be. 5 She 998th or 100lst) +e is alive and captured are the Malaysians, as Tom Rodgers suggests? 36 I agree with Alec Adams that we cannot and should not suppress the figures for wounded but Sur A, these Gould ve Lnown separately and attention /concentrated CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 70] === CONFIDENTIAL concentrated on the total genuine eliminations. The Malaysians shoulda make the point that while | we know the total figure of our own wounded, we | can only give a partial one for the Indonesians. be I am sending copies of this letter to Tom Rodgers in Djakarta and Alec Adams in Singapore = to John Drinkall in h. The naples ~ Defence here whem-we have oe consulted Jabouneg that the Commander-in-Chief's AAAL wT Staff in Singapore 8 ageesi.to this special pe ee ee eee ' such pabiiditspnient galvanise | ge IT the Indonesiantyto stage a major assault | grt P Aniy en, | Sie gis onl of ao up the casualty | pa ee pe. IN THIS MARGIN. ea? ee ee sgt 4 theketose-2—texve-1t—to-you-mats to pick an | opportune moment for putting the idea across | to the Sree a = hewever;—it—yowsionuld let M6 know if and when | the Malaysians propose to act so that dee piglt ee 1 supplementary action can be taken here. NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN eee = ceed on -s, sue CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 71] === IN THIS MARGIN. Confidential. Restricted, Qpen. Draft. letter from J»ReA.s BOTTOMLEY ESQ., B.H.C. 9 KUALA LUMPUR e03 Woleyerr 10? Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. Thank you for your letter (DA 135/37/1 of 26 February 1965) about publicity for Indonesian casualties. Qe ei I agree we should rnc de Aha I = wan ae) e idea of offering!prize: for bringing the totaA bag of Indonesian casualties to 1,000g eue/(there seems to be general agreement that/ it would be a profitable exercise for/ the Malaysians to ctreg ek seit Even the/latest unfortunate incident in which the Singapore Infantry Regiment was ambushed will not appreciably affect the casualty ratio. 36 owe i I am sending copies of this letter to Jim Rogers in Djakarta & Alec Adams in Singapore. “I am also passing a copy to John Drinkall in LeReDs pee” oe pectin ie ibs yl CONFIDENTIAL pid. === [PDF page 72] === ak a banted ds ud fh jak ff { a/b ie JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DEPARTUENT, CoReOe/PoOe, Downing Street, London, Sel¥ele (IM 1673/s.) ll March 1965. Thank you for your letter (DAsl35/37/1 of 26 February 1965) t publicity for Indonesian casualties. You will since have the comments of Alee Adame ae well as those of Tom Rodgers, i of which were very helpful. I agree that we should not suggest to the Walaysians the ef offering a prize in advance for bringing the total bag of Indonesian casualties te 1,000; and I think it might in any case now be better for the Melaysians to wait till the mark is reached before they ectually launched any special publicity. However there seems to be general agreement that it would be a profitable exercise for the Malaysians to carry out. If as we must expect the attempted infiltrations into Western Malaysia continue, the 1000th Indonesian try arrenge that the jushy con (oven, of be way otrtesiy ye sey the 300% oe is alive and captured by the Maleysiens, as Tom Rodgers suggests? 3e I agree with Alec Adams that we cannot and should not @upprees the figures for wounded but these could surely be shown tely end attention concentrated on the total genuine » The Malaysians could make the point that while we otel figure of our own wounded, we can only give «a partial one for the Indonesians. le The Ministry of Defence here have been consulted and agree on the assumption that the Conmander-in-Chief’s Staff in Singapore see no objection to thie special publicity, eegs on the grounds of the wisk that such publicity just possibly might galvanise the Indonesians into a major assault in the hepe Of evening we the casualty ratio. However, subject to any comments which Adams may have on this point we are content to leave it to him and you to pick en opportune moment for putting the idea scross to the Malaysiens. In doing so you will no doubt recommend the slant /suggested [Unreadable] EUALA LUMPUR. GORPIDENTIAL === [PDF page 73] === GONPIDENTIAL suggested in paragraph 5 of Tom Rodgers letter of 2h February and in the last sentence of paragraph 1 of Alec AG@ems' letter of 25 February. Please let us know if end when the Malaysians propose to act so thet the right kind of supplementery ection ean be teken heres Se I em sending copies of this letter to Tom Rodgers in ee and Alee Adams in Singapore and to John Drinkall in oReDe (AcAsGOLDS ) === [PDF page 74] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department CONF jes ‘ TIAL IM 46 / s/t SUBJECT: xO Mi Cascary (FPBlawcic Dif) Dated “2b.S Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: No. Pos 30/e45/1 (Outward Action) yy WU. Sept, LK. Ws, IL. fork fr Ite. Lyles 9% ccf WW, Wag ralrear fainictacl th. rik wed. a¢ha Cc) A’ bok, Levee. (cea)9 bI)SA-Bwia KL pr. PM Hewitt "23. ppt) Mw Moyo a wadad Ge. P. Mowe tren) Ue NY.) ¥o Mr y46\0n _A0 6B 40/65 Naucks oS é) Mr Meira Moywlou [ Pit J Spain fio Mee (alo 105 4S Mos 6 4: 3 ene, (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action eompleted) (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 75] === CONFIDENTIAL Zs Tes ptttnr semee MN buf as St hue /Lmenr by British High Commission, é Port of Spain, Trinidad. POS. 30/245/1 [Unreadable] We have been considering in the light of C.R.0. telegram No. 13 Saving our practice as regards passing on and publicizing int ormation regarding Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. 2e In the past we have taken any suitable opportunities to put the British Government s views to the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. For example we sent them the text of the statements made in-the Security Council by both the British and the Malaysian delegates in September last year. 3- On the other hand we have continued to hold the View, expressed in Davidson's letter POL 60/133/1_ of 2th March to Footman, that we should be careful to avoid giving the Trinidad authorities any reason to think that Malaysia. was too much of a British cause. (Our reservations on this sebre were recently reinforced by Dr. Williams' article in his Party's newspaper “The Nation" about which the High Commissioner wrote on the 13th January to Sykes. Dr. Williams writing about Federations, including Malaysia, said that they “were inspired by British interest and had collapsed or were collapsing because they were British inspired.") (26 Ow LWP 26/¢S// hs We would see less of this difficulty in approaches on Malaysia/ Indonesia being made by the British delegation to their Trinidadian ‘colleagues at the U.N. oS We have suggested this in the past - see Davidson's letter to Footman already mentioned - and we would be interested to know whether such approaches have been made and if so with what result. (Tenten's letter to Snoxall POL 60/133/1 of the 18th June also refers). C7 3) or re 750/ 30/7 Fe? B. 6. Lastly pro-Malaysia or anti/Indonesian speeches at the United Nations or elsewhere (especially from African, Indian or Asian delegates) or editorials from African, Indian or Asian newspapers, would carry much more weight here than anything from British, or other Western sources. If supplied with press cuttings of this kind we could get some of them into press hands here and thus reported locally. de I am sending a copy of this letter to Scott at New York. pre ae ney Sia (M. J. Moynihan ) D.M. Cleary, Esq., Atlart ic Department, - Commonwealth Relations Office, LONDON, S.W.1. CONFIDENT IAL === [PDF page 76] === IN THIS MARGIN. Lud (87285) Hw. ©. iry IM ZI10 xHop Secret, SteratX Confidential. Resttietéds Open. Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. CONFIDENT === [PDF page 77] === GONFIDENTIAL XXXXXALEX XXXX XXXXXX Moynihan, =a Please refer to M....... Maguihan'’s letter letter to to Dees. Cleery (POS 30/245/1 of 5 February Scott, Esq., ‘ United Nations, 1965) about Trinidad's practice of passing on New York and publishing information regarding Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. 26 Would it not be more appropriate for the Malaysian, rather than the British, delegation From A.A. Golds. at the United Nations to make the necessary approaches to their Trinidadian colleagues? Would you please confirm that they are in fact doing so. Information Research Department has noted to send suitable cuttings from the Afro-Asian Press to Trinidad as they become available. h. I am sending a copy of this letter to Me... Ploy rebar in Trinidad. I am also passing a copy Mr. Golds to John Drinkall in IRD. Mr. Cleary (a.a.) cat toP t& Ach Mr. elidiek Trinidad. Mr. Drinkxall (IRD) CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 78] === GONPIDENTIAL JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DEPARTMENT, PeOe/CeRe Oss Downing Street, London, SeWel. (Im 1673/10 ) 25 February 1965. Mertin Moynihan sent you a copy of his letter to Denis Cleary (P0S.30/245/1 of 5 February 1965) about the best way of ensuring that the facts about Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia get proper attention and make the right impact in Trinidad. 2e You will have noted his suggestion that the Trinidad representative in New York is a useful channel for this purpose, though we should heve thought that Ramani ought to be able to make some of the running there. Can you confirm that he is aware of the importance of doing this and so giving you something to follow up? Be Information Research Department has noted to send suitable cuttings from the Afro-Asian Press to Trinidad as they become available. lie I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Moynihan in Trinidad. I am also passing a copy to John Drinkall in 1I.R.D-. (AcAeGOLDS ) Toho Scott, ESqes MeVeOe,s United Nations, KEW YORK. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 79] === CONFIDENTIAL UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 3 March, 1965. (10682/90/65) ory tg data apt cho Dean Tomy February 25, about ensuring that the facts about Indonesiais confrontation of Malaysia get proper attention in Trinidad. ce You may have seen a reference in the record of the Commonwealth Meeting held in New York on February 4 (2212/3/65) to the fact that Ramani made a statement on the Malaysia/Indonesia dispute. Ramani spoke for over an hour and presented the Malaysian case with skill and in detail - perhaps too much detail, for the attention of his audience was inclined towwander before the end. Nevertheless, he made full use of this opportunity to get across the Malaysian point of view. >» We have, for our part, made sure that the Trinidadian Mission is in no doubt about the situation. Prompted by your letter, I asked Charles Archibald, Trinidad's Deputy Permanent Representative,yesterday evening whether he thought there was anything more we could do vis & vis his Mission, and whether they harboured any lingering uncertainties about Indonesia's attitude. He seemed to be amused by the thought that any member of the Trinidadian delegation eould have anything other than sympathy for Malaysia, and made it clear that we were preaching to the converted. 4. We cannot of murse answer for attitudes in Port of Spain but so far as New York is concerned I am confident that the Trinidadian Mission are entirely sound on this subject. Sy I am sending copies of this letter to Drinkall in the Foreign Office and Moynihan in Port of Spain. Golds, ESQ, M.V.0., 5 Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Dept., Foreign Office/C.R.0O. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 80] === CONFIDENTIAL British High Commission, REE Fouts Port of Spain, ARCHIVES! ral Trinidad. “SMAR i965 4 AGTBAC \ POS 30/245/1 i el, /; 1D ) 6 March, 1965. fiisneenemmeeeneneeenrecnl Ly worry, We were glad to see your letter IM 1673 of 25 February/ to New York. We have also now seen Scott's letter to you of % March and can confirm his reassuring comment on the presentation at the U.N. of the Malaysian case, 26 Jim Davidson lunched the other day with Dumas, who has recently returned from the Trinidad Embassy in Washington (Dumas' next job is to set up the Trinidad post at Addis Ababa). On Malaysia Dumas said that, (a) Malaysia's case was very effectively propagated by the Malaysian delegation at the U.N. (b) There was a strong undertow of sympathy for Malaysia over confrontation by Indonesia, although (ec) because of Malaysia's association with Britain, this sympathy was less openly shown than it otherwise would 36 I am sending a copy of this letter to Scott at New York and also Cleary, C.R.O. ten ws, ba artn. baa eedasan (mM. J. Moynihan ) A.A. Golds, Esq., M.V.0., Commonwealth Relations Office, LONDON, S.W.1.- CONFIDENT TAL === [PDF page 81] === IN THIS MARGIN. (87285) Hw. Registry STANLEY BUDD ESQ KUALA LUMPU CONFIDENTIAL Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate. JMID are concerned that should be adequately presented in Trinidad and I am enclosing copies of correspondences S (10682/90/65 of 3 March) from Scott in the NOU us. ited Stetes and (POS 30/245/1 of 6 March) Moynihan in Port of S ainfwhich you would prompted by a letter Golds to the United Nations lightened approach of the Trinidadian Mission is satisfactory, none the | less Moynihan has warned that we should be \ Taw ' ° Nae wy fet careful not to give the Trinidad, authori ties the impression that Malaysia is too much of a British cagvee-. He considers that favourable Afro-Asian comment will carry more weight in Trinidad than British overtures and we have promised to supply him with suitable material whenever we can, === [PDF page 82] === ¢ OREIGN OFFICE, $.¥.1. TM 1673/10 17 Mareh, 1965. When we have had to make several complaints of Malaysian lethargy in presenting their case it is pleasant to be able to record examples of successful persistence, I enclose copies of correspondence which shows that the Malaysians effort at the United Nations has been effective at least so far as Trinidad is eoncerned, (P. M. Hewitt) S. Ae Budd, ESGe, British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 83] === Registry Top Secretc SOIEK XXX YX Confidential. Restricied: a “regi i athe Rat 2 oynil A 3. xX se howe morte rs “ eo facie === [PDF page 84] === pV" Py f CONFIDENTIAL FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.l. (IM 2673/ io ) 9 April, 1965. Please refer to correspondence (IM 1673/ ” ) of 25 February from Tony Golds in Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department to Scott in the United Nations about the undertaking by Information Kesearch Department to supply you with material favourable to Maleysia from Afro-Asian sources. I enclose such material herewith, ei Important themes in Malaysian propaganda at the moment are the tour of the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak to African countries, and Malaysia's admission to the Second Afro-Asian Conference to be held in Algiers on 29 June. Relevant press comment about Razak's tour is included in the enciosed material and we will send you more as his tour proceeds. Razak is due to arrive back in Kuala Lumpur on 15 April. Se The round up of responses to the messages sent by Tunku Abdul Rahman to Asian and African Heads of State was supplied to us by the Malaysians and is for your background knowledge only since the Malaysians have marked it “Confidential”. he As you mentioned in earlier correspondence to Cleary in Atlantic Department of the C.R.O. it is essential in this propaganda campaign that we should remain in the background and let the Malaysians make the running. (Pp, M. Hewitt) Information Research Department. M. J. Moynihan, Esq., British High Commission, Port of Spain. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 85] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department 1965 FROM Mw Adams, buyep no. QO2 aed Mow dB Received Mowdn 24 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action ity SUBJECT: ink Diaiiets Ais ~— (ommenlt on proposal fo mop inclu Eleuk of a Rao Keww. ety | References and Relevant Papers: Encloses Copy of: MINUTES Sw Op WM- 2.09 Jowol 30 a Al Ma Adome aol, 30 lw) Hon) Kuo lo | wi Ow SFE * MS SEALS -3-GS DLAC. FE. Mad maSCHEOUL & 303-68 === [PDF page 86] === Zz SECRET \WS FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office of the Pelitical Adviser to Commander=in-Chief Far East) Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Adams No, 202 ——— | 28 March, 1965\ RECE.<-: 09,0, 28 March, 1965 a MF si err 10,02 28 March, 1965 SECRET PILCH, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 202 of 28 March, Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur- ape loom O Commander—in-Chief's signal Seaces 71 of 2805012 te Ministry of Defence: Cross Berder Psychological Operations in Borneo, Propesal by Directer ef Bernee Operations to drop leaflets en Indonesian side of border is unfortunetely timed, coming as it dees when Razak appears to be making progress during his African teur with task of representing Malaysia as an innecent Asian victim of aggression, If leaflets were dropped from the air, the Indenesians would have proof of a violation of their airspace, which we feel could have disproportionate effect on Razak's campaign. 2. It would, ef course, be possible to send leaflets over border by natives should you endorse Commander-in-Chief's reluctance to use aircraft which would have to be British, fer this operation, ‘The prisoner should alse be exploited by radie broadcasts which would reach a wider audience than leaflets, 53. in general, Malaysians seem te be missing opportunities fer supperting Razak's campaign because of reluctance to allow publicity for current Indenesian: infiltrations, In recent infiltrations into S.E. Johere, probably, the Malaysians fer eperational reasons, held up publicity fer a considerable time, A further thirty have been killed or captured at sea, with large quantities of arms, by the Royal. Navy. ‘These incidents would be convincing proef of Razak's case, and.wéy, /think SECRET === [PDF page 87] === SECRET 8 Singapore telegram No, 202 to Foreign Office a D- a think that their value as prepaganda far cutweighs the eperatienal advantage ef prolenged silence, The Malaysians appear te base their ideas on the experience of the emergency without giving enough attentien to the needs of wider publicity. k, lLerd Head may be able to persuade the Malaysians of paragraph 3 abeve as a heip te teking their minds eff the prepesal mentioned in Commander-in-Chief's signal under reference, 2s well as fer such intrinsic value as it may have, DISTRIBUTED TO: JM.1I.D. @ re) A TY D elistere I.R.D. U.N, Dept. News Dept. F.E, & Pacific Dept. === [PDF page 88] === SECRET : ee; FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (The Office ef the Political Adviser to the C-in-C War East) Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL I ION — DISTRIBUT No. 209 D. 0505 30 March, 1965 30 March, 1965 R. 1128 30 March, 1965 PRIORITY SECRET in 673 Ut ise, FILCH ji Addressed to — Office telegram No, 209 of 30 March Repeated for infermation 16;- Kuala Lumpur My telegram Ne,202; Cross-border phychelogical operations in Borneo, Malaysians have decided not te preceed with this eperation. DISTRIBUTED TO F.0, J.M.I.D, S.EeA.D. IRD. U.N.D. News Department SECRET === [PDF page 89] === of a Ef 4 ? FROM KUALA LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH dol ered aee 1c: Cypher /OTP RE: EP a | DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION RCI } Lord Head 30 March 1965 PRIORITY SECRET (FILCH] Addressed to Commonwealth Relations Office telegram No. 567 of 30 March Repeated Priority ROLAD Singapore D: 0425 30 March 1965 R: 1136 30 March 1965 POLAD telegram No. 202 to Fereign Office. There seem to be two points at issue. First leaflet dropping. I am not over-enthusiastic about this proposal at present tim end agree that if there were strong Indenesian reactions during Razak’s visit it might net be helpful, 2. Iwas away when last leaflet raid took place but understand there was little or neo Indonesian reaction. If Malaysians feel very strongly in favour of doing this I yould have thought that en balance possible adverse consequences hardly outweigh pessibility of frictiemwhich would follew firm line against preposed operation, 3. Sécond point regards paragraph 3 of POLAD*’s telegram No. 202 I agree that this is real problem which has always been a difficult one. Te strike requisite balance is net easy and I suggest it might be subject of discussion at seme meeting where interested parties could thrash it eut. Think it wuld be difficult te reach ad hec decision on certain specific operations without having full discussion on future policy. h. On immediate issue, Malaysian Ministry of Defence released over weekend story of recent operations in Johere and off S.E. Coast of Malaya. DISTRIBUTED TO: —.. Fee Ps Dept. NNNNN itor pepsi. Dept. SECRET === [PDF page 90] === SECRET te Pains Ce f). Cads 280501Z March C inc we 2 eiigidgaen Date: 28 3 65 MOD UK mers ©) | Recd: 09182 hes WARNING NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE PRIORITY TLL/SEACOS 71 For CDS. 1 DOBOPS has reported to NOC that captured Mobrig soldier (see TLL/270450Z/SEACOS 70 para 1a) has been extremely co-operative to the extent of producing in own randwriting message calling upon his comrades to surrender, Message continues "T have surrendered myself to Malaysian forces because I do not believe the lies I have been told about Malaysia and also because I do not wish to fight against other people". 26 Leaflet bearing this message and photograph has been produced, 36 DOBOPS has recommended to NOC that we should take full and early advantage of this material by dropping leaflets along 60 miles front in area opposite Second Division Sarawak to a depth of about five miles across border, he CAFS strongly supports this recommendation for which he is requesting approval of National Defence Council. be I have intervened pointing out that, whilst fram a purely military viewpoint, there would be advantage in carrying out this operation, my political advice is that it may be undesirable to ~ commit a deliberate and undeniable violation of Indonesian air space at a time when Tun Razak is carrying out a successful tour of Afro Asian countries, I have also suggested that there are other means of obtaining good exploitation of this soldier by less provocative means, e.g. by radio. : ey _— tm tgts | tr, 6. Please see Polad's telegram 202 of 28th March to Foreign Office, with which I agree, which deals with wider aspects of this question. 8. I should be grateful for early guidance, 2805012 Advance Copies to DOC (i) GSDO Duty Commander AFOR sent 2809342 /Distribution overleaf SECRET === [PDF page 91] === SIGNAL DISTRIBUTION - TLL PS/Sec of State cps (7) PS/Minister (Navy) CNS VCNS DCNS: ACNS CGR DN Plans (5) DNAP | PS/Minister (RAP) CAS VCAS AMP ACAS Pets ACAS (Pol D Air Plans D of D Plans (Air) D of Ops o Def anf 0) D of Ops (aT) SL/SBA (Air) AUS (AS) DCDS (P and L) (2) pra by ACDS (8) DOC/COSSEC (14) D of DP Seo DPS (42) DAPS Seo PPO/PAO Cttee DFP DGI (2) DNI DMI (3) ACAS: (I) DI 41 PUS DUS (Pol) DUS (Admin) AUS (Pol) AUS 3 AUS (¢ DS 11 (2) DS 12 DS 15 DPR Sec JIC, Cabinet Office (5) Mr Laskey, Cabinet Office JIR, Cabinet Office Room 9, Foreign Office (6) Maj Gen McNeill, cRO (3) CRLO Mr Higham, Colonial Office (6) BDS Washington (by bag) (4) === [PDF page 92] === RESTRICTED Category AC: 300537Z March Date: 30.3265 Recd: 07102 WARNING NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE PRIORITY TLL SEACOS 74 For CDS. Ref: TLL/SEACOS 71/DTG 280501Z. NOC have agreed that project is at present politically undesirable. 3005 37% GSDO DC ) Sent: 30/07282 AFOR ) JDG/24,7 RESTRICTED === [PDF page 93] === Ps/Spe of State cps (7) PSMinister (Navy) CNS VCNS DCNS ACNS CGRM DN Plans (5) DNAP DNTWP DNAW DNOT AUS (NS) PS/Minister (Army) ces (2) MO 1 Sec (6) DASD ASD 2 QMG Sec Q (Mov) Plans AUS (GS) PS/Minister (RAF) CAS VCAS AMP ACAS ome} ACAS (Pol D Air Plans D of D Plans (Air) D of “Ops e Def and 0) D of Ops (AT) DAP DASB (2) AFOR S4/SBA (Air) AUS (AS) Signal Distribution - TLL DCDS F and L) (2) ACDS (OR) ACDS (Ss) DOC/COSSEC (14) D of DP Sec DPS (12) DAPS Sec PPO/PAO Committee DFP DGI (2) DNI DMI (3) ACAS (I) DI 41 DI 864 (4) PUS and PUS (DS) DUS ee DUS (Admin) AUS (Pol) AUS a AUS (G DS 11 (2) DS 12 DS 15 DPR Sec JIC, Cabinet Office (5) Mr Laskey, Cabinet Office JIR, Cabinet Office Room 9, Foreign Office (6) Waj Gen McNeill, CRO (3) —— CRLO Mr Higham, Colonial Office (6) BDS Washington (by bag) (4) === [PDF page 94] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) TOP SECKE+ sag FROM fay Mowe meee” Wow Of nove 4amnst Tanna. (Stiga poe Usman, 6» Beppo info ao A means €| Lsreving Msralt 0 No. Jog feta rn «Cast ining Fido. Ri 2 Dated Moved, 30. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Mord. 31. (Outward Action) Received Me ) Joh Kao. hierar lors 74, de TOL Kioto Lwanpuw l\oo 84, tGy 2 MINUTES A) kovd Hond — Ktrola himiny S08 Mawel 30. CINCEE MoD EACOS 1¥ Loyd Hood Karate bw Se Winn® within (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) f w\yloy === [PDF page 95] === bid Wt. 43560/43 4/63 Ed. (53) S EMACSN 14 TOP SECRET Minutes Leaflet Dropping POLAD has proposed in his telegram noe 208 of 30 March that there is a case for carrying out at an appropriate moment another leaflet drop on the Indonesian infiltration bases in the Rhios and off the Sumatra coast on the lines of the joint British/Malaysian operation carried out on 2 November last year. The object of the exercise would be if possible to prevent further incursions or at least to reduce the morale of infiltrators. 26 The Commander-in-Chief is in favour of carrying out further leaflet drops when it is politically acceptable to do so, andhas sought authority (which the Ministry of Defence are giving him) to plan with the Malaysians for further leaflet raids. He understands that no raid could be carried out without prior authorisation both from London and Kuala Lumpur. 36 Lord Head has appememeiy told the Commander-in-Chief that he agrees in principle. Lhe Two specific leaflet operations have been proposed within the last fortnight. a) <A recommendation by DOBOPS to the Malaysian National Operations Committee that leaflets containing a message from a recently captured Indonesian soldier should be dropped over the Srawak border was turned down because of its possible adverse impact on Tun\Razak"s African tour. The Tunku has announced his intention of mounting an entirely RMAF leaflet drop on the Rhio bases probably on 11 April to mark the Hari Raya Haji Festival. The leaflets would contain a goodwill message from captured infiltrators and in the Tunku's view would demonstrate both Malaysia's ability to attack the bases and her magnanimity in dropping only goodwill messages. Neberher Lord Head ner-GEN6GFE is wc particularly enthusiastic about the proposal at (b) above, which js open to much the same objections of timing as the abandoned proposal at (a). However, it seems unlikely that the Tunku could be dksuaded,nor have we any means of stopping him. We box, prtan eked bp e mace Wel Dgebewte HO Chased 6. "iitie "Leaflet raid 1xet Noveiber provoked virtually no overt Indonesian reaction,although as POLAD has pointed out, there is reason to believe that the leaflets did have at least a temporary effect on the mor&le of the troops then in the bases. In view of this (7), we /might === [PDF page 96] === TOP. SECRET A jenites a CAAT VX wer ee “ might now nesommend the proposal for a further leaflet drop or drops provided timing and execution are kept under our own controland subject of course to the outcome of the Malaysian operation planned for 41 April (assuming the Tunku goes ahead with this). (K.F.X. Burns) 9 April, 1965 a: bch TOP SECRET === [PDF page 97] === ala Wt. 43560/43 4/63 Ed. (53) Minutes D) Ma Alam Sirowpe 237 put | €) MoD b Cmcee ose 8K te F) CiINcee bi Maly (Enos puk, l{ H) cinicee ty Mo) fenwos §2 Fowl \2. J) he. Rodgers K) CGavcFek ) SEAS 949, Nef iy x === [PDF page 98] === APORE 10 FO 0 7? c iser te the C-in-C Far East) eee [ RECEIVED 'N pepanvyeNTAL DISTRIBUTION ARCt ES ir, Adams | 31 MARIS Ne, 208 O46 30 March 1965 5 farch 1965 pet nc 1136 30 March 1965 TOP S&CRET War ef nerves against Indonesia. There has recently been a considerable mmber ef captures ef Indenesian regulars in Malaya end there are indicatiens that the tempe ef infiltretien may increase over the next few weeks. The Cemmander in Chief thinks that we should de what we can te prevent incursiens er te reduce the morale ef these whe de come, 2. One means ef deing this is te bring heme te the treeps in the infiltratien bases in the Rhie Islanfis end Sumetra the fate ef their predecessers. In additien te radios breadcasting, leaflet drepping is a useful meens of deing this. it will be recalled that a raid ef this type was carried eut ever certain bases on \M4044__ 2 Nevember 1964 by R.A.?. and Malaysian transpert aircraft. Ye have reason te believe that the leaflets were effective against the merale ef the treeps in the bases; evidence fer this will be sent threugh J.I.C, channels, Wewever by the ordinary change reund ef persennel es well as by the passage ef time this effect has wern eff, There eppears te be « case fer repeating the eperatien. aes 3. The timing weuld be important. ‘s peinted out in my telegram 1 AGT S(t the Cemmender in Chief is fully aware ef the need fer Cautien while Tun Razak is en his African teur. Leaflets weuld be mest effective if in additien te giving details ef prisoners and cesueltiecs they e te quete statements by disillusiened priseners. It might lise be desirable te link the drep with a particular Indenesian defeat. 4. The methed ef drepping weuld be, as last Nevember, by transport aircreft flying at nicht, with Malaysian participatien, and under Maleysian aegus. 5. If yeu, and Lerd Head agree in principle that operations ef this kind shenld be carried out at apprepriate times it weuld ef ceurse be necessary te appreach the alaysians, whe would have te be reminded that each eperatien weuld be subject te pelitical clearance in Lenden as well as in Kuala Lumpur. Subject te ' TOP SECRET Lord Head’s/ === [PDF page 99] === TOP SECRET Lerd Head's views it might be best for this appreach te be made by the Cemmander in Chief en the military net, Defence Pept. === [PDF page 100] === FROM KUALA LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE Prar, Cypher/OTP eS aa ee T FILES Mr. Bottomley - No. 568 é D. 1110 30 Mareh 1965 30 March 1965 7 (A) Re 1655 30 March 1965 TOP SECRET RILGH A ssed to C.R.0, tele Ne. 568 of March Repeated for information te: POLAD Singapore re ee { “J POLAD telegram No. 208 Foreign Offiee:War of Nerves Against Indonesia. Reference telegram arrived after High Commissioner had left for Bangkek. Unless you require his coments earlier, would prefer to await his return on 7 April. Alternatively, suggest you telegraph statement ef case to him at Bangkok with any preliminary views you would wish him to take account on in commenting. DISTRIBUTED TO:- CeR.O. Far East & Pacific Dept... .O. Information Research Dept. JM.1.D. ~-“ South East Asia Dept. === [PDF page 101] === TOP SECRET Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference. 0706002 From: C in C Far East Dates Recds WARNING NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TLL/SEACOS 78 for CDS IM \o 0 \i2\c, Refs Polad Telegram No. 208 to FO dated 30 Mar. 65, 1° ZI am in favour of carrying out such operations when it is politic acceptable to do so. I have to day heard that Lord Head who has beer also agrees. 26 In order to be ready to take immediate advantage of a Military su such as the current operations in East Johore, I would need authority with the Malaysians for further leaflet raids on the lines discussed in } I appreciate that political clearance from London and Kuala Lumpur would required before each raid. 30 A new development occurred at NDC yesterday when Tunku announced tha‘ he wished to drop leaflets on the Rhio Islands = "The same places as befor bearing a Hari Raya (Muslim Festival beginning Sunday 11 Apr.) message captured infiltrators. This, he said would show Malaysian ability tc Indonesian bases and her magnanimity in dropping only goodwill messages: oy Cc Ons # 3 2 a bia] U \. *- bh: 1 waluvaiaing touch with the planning, although Tunku made it that he wished this to be an entirely Malaysian operation, 0706002 Advance copies: DOC Duty Commander MO i Sec PS/CAS AFOR / Distribution overleaf -..> TOP SECRET === [PDF page 102] === SIGNAL DISTRIBUTION = TLL PS/Sec of State GDS. (7) PS/Minister (Navy) CNS VCNS DENS ACNS CGRM DN Plans (5) DNAP DNTWP DNAW DNOT AUS sy PS/Minister (Army) CGS (2) MO 1 See (6) DASD ASD 2 QMG Sec Q (Mov AUS (GS) PS/Minister (RAF) CAS VCAS AMP ACAS topa} ACAS (Pol) D Air Plans D of D Plans (Air) D of Ops (A Def ana 0) D of Ops (AT) DAP Plans DASB (2) AFOR 84/SBA (Air) AUS (AS) Dss DEDS. (P and L)(2) ACDS (OR) ACDS (S) DOC/COSSEC (44) D of DP Sec DPS (12) DAPS Sec PPO/PAO Cttee DFP DGI (2) beds (I)(2) DNI DMI (3) ACAS (I) DI 41 DI 868 (4) PUS DUS (Pol) DUS (Admin) AUS (Pol) AUS (M) AUS (G) 8 11 (2) DS 12 DS 15 DPR Sec JIC, Cabinet Office (5) Mr. Laskey, Cabinet Office JIR, Cabinet Office Room 9, Foreign Office (6) Maj. Gen. McNeill, cRO*(3) CRLO r Mr. Higham, Gologial Office (6) BDS Washington (by bag) (4) === [PDF page 103] === Registry Top Secret Seeret——— Confidential Restricted Open— Draft. Telegram to: pe stk 15 . Dake). My. And to:— ode Cypher Distribution:— ay and time (G.M.T.) telegram should / fee IMMEDIATE ser ROUTINE wit priority | ithout eax oe ag ‘ —if any === [PDF page 104] === === [PDF page 105] === TOP SECRET ‘ ONVEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE T L ee Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTI ‘He, 1075 D. 21350 7 April 1965 7 April 1965 IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET FILCH Addressed to Kuala Lum telegram No, 1075 of 7 Apri Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore Bottomley’s telegram No, 568 [of 30 March]: Leaflet Dropping. Mier a|re |e Grateful if in commenting on general proposition you would also let us have your views on specific proposal put forward by Tunku at N.D.C. on 6 April (C-in-C F.E.*s SEACOS 78 to M.O.D.), which prima facie would seem to involve danger of debasing this particular currency, Helpful also to know whether Tunku seriously intends to make it an entirely RMAF operation. DISTRIBUTED TO: C,R,0, J.M.I.D. Defence Department £0, S.E.AD. P.U.S.D. I.R.D. TOP SECRET === [PDF page 106] === TOP SECRET gx _- FROM KUALA LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE: Gypher/OTP RECEIVED IN ARTMENTAL DISTREBUTION ARCHIVES hic, 4 _ ST APRI965 | p> 7,0 8 April 1965 6 R, 0852 8 April 1965 8 April 1965 DDMEDIATE TOP SECRET [ FILCH] ddressed to C.R telecram No. 6 8 April 1965 Repeated for information to; C~-in-C F,E, POLAD Singapore Lord Head Your telegram No, 1075: Leaflet Dropping. \M1673 12 |c I cennot say I em madly enthusiastic sbout operation proposed by the Tunku on 6 April, but as it is to be all RMAF. and the Tumku's idea, I think we hed better let it go, Nor ami particularly worried about it debasing currency, which, in my opinion, has never been very herd, Maleysians will enjoy doing something on their own and Chief of Air Steff, West, is determined to use as far as possible all-Maylaysian crews. 2, Gein-C's advice has already been accepted; his staff will assist in briefing and will put all their resources at disposal of Malaysians, DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES: CRO, J.M.I.D. C,R,0, Private Secretary F.E. & P.D. Permanent Under Secretary Defence Department Sir N, Pritchard S.E,A.D. Mr, J.C, Morgan P.U.S.D. Head of J.M.I.D. IRD. Head of F.E, & P,D. Mr, Peck Head of S.E,AD. === [PDF page 107] === *Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should Registry = EMERGENCY ROUTINE with, Top Secret Pee Confidéntial Restricted priority Without DEFERRED. SS: aes if any [Codeword—tf any] Address to 7 And to:— Repeat to:— LITD ff En Clair. Code- Cypher Distribution:-— Pre tex Cok Copies to:— [Unreadable] (Shr WK addressee(s) === [PDF page 108] === viel b oR, g mM! n eee Ns fewer Asot. Q SEA y) Lud === [PDF page 109] === TOP_ SECRET a FROM COMMONWEALTH REL:TIONS OFFICE TO KUALA LUI or r/OTP No. 1100 Addressed to Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 1100 of 8 spril, epeated for information to POLAD Singapore Your telegram No, 635: [Leaflet Dropping. ] If Tunku persists in this idea, please ensure that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires Djakarta is warned as soon as possible, since Indonesians will no doubt ume this is a British "yrovocation" whatever the facts, IBUTED TO: elke leD te QO 5 T [Unreadable] + ote GW Le Y Defence Department an a Welte-lLele gt eielc Information Research Department === [PDF page 110] === Aap por ow FROM SINGAPORE TO -FOREIGN OFFICE | (Office-ef the Pelitical Adviser te the Commanderin-Chief, Far Hast) Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Wr, Adams? Ne, 237 ee 2 APR 120° DB. 1455 11 April, 1965. el rye tt April, 1965, G 11 April, 1965. Addressed te Diakarta telegram Ne, 105 of 13 April. Repeated for infermation to: Foreign Office and Kuela-Lumpur C.R,O, telegram Ne, 1100 te Kuale Lumpur (net te you). rc Malaysian Air Feree plan te carry eut leaflet raid ever mrt island bases used fer A operations during night 11-12 April. Leaflets will carry Hari Reya Heji greetings, probably with messages from priseners, 2, There is ne (repeat ne) British participation in this raid, DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES TO: FO. SEA, Rept, ES. PS. J.M.I. Dept, ‘-- $§ir G, Harrison P.U.S. Dept. Mr, Peck IR, Dept. Sir N. Pritchard CRO. FE. & P. Dept. TR OF EEA, BS, ---== Defence Dept, Head ef J.M.I, Dept. Head of P.U.S, Dept. Head of News Dept, €,R,9. Head of defence Dept, of FE, & P, dept, === [PDF page 111] === TOP SECRET Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference. RECEIVED IN LAI | “ 0917402 April IMIGT3lI21G MOD UK Date: 9.4.65. CINC Far East \ ewucrsinld © a 17422 UK Rep Kuala Lumpur ——mameneee WARNING NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE ROUTINE TLL 70413 COSSEA 38 From Acting Chief of the Defence Staff References: a. POLAD Telegram No. 208 to FO dated 30 Mar. b. TLL/0706002/SEACOS 78 We agree in principle with proposals along the lines of Reference 4. ou are therefore authorised to plan with the Malaysians for further leaflet ae in accordance with paragraph 2 of Reference b., on the clear underding that political approval from both here and KL will be required e each raid, a You should see CRO Telegram No. 1075 to KL and Lord Head's reply No. 635. 7 IMIGI 32 e 094 74.02 IMIGT3|(2| Ge J Fremantle DOPS MOD 6717 John Fremantle Cdr. for J H Lapsley Air Vice-Marshal /C irculation overleaf TOP SECRET === [PDF page 112] === PS/Sec of Stat PS/Minister (Navy) CNS VCNS DCNS ACNS CGRM DN Plans (5) DNAP DNIWP DNAW DNOT AUS tn) PS/Minister (Navy) cGs (2) MO 1 Sec (6) DASD ASD 2 QMG Sec Q (Mov) Plans AUS (GS) PS/Minister (RAF) CAS VCAS ACAS (Pol D Air Plans D of D Plans (Air) D of Ops (A Def and 0) D of Ops (AT) DAP DASB (2) AFOR SL/SBA (Air) AUS (AS) DCDS ie and L) (2) ACDS (OR) ACDS (Ss) DOC/COSSEC (14) D of DP Sec DPS (12) DAPS Sec PPO/PAO Cttee DFP DGI (2) DNI DMI (3) ACAS (I) DI 41 DI 864 (4) PUS DUS (Pol) DUS (Admin) AUS (Pol) AUS (M) AUS (G) DS 11 (2) DS 12 DS 15 DPR Sec JIC Cabinet Office (5) Mr, Laskey, Cabinet Office JIR, Cabinet Office Room 9, Foreign Office (6) Maj. Gen. McNeill, CRO (3) CRLO Mr. Higham, Colonial Office (6) BDS Washington (by bag) (4) === [PDF page 113] === TOP SECRET CENGEBry AC: no unclassified reply or referendelO545Z April Date: 11 4 65 Recd: 06122 MOD UK UK REP KL BDLS Canberra 13 APR 1965 BDLS Wellington eae [Unreadable] AUSTDEF Singapore WARNING NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TLL/SEACOS 80 For CDS. Malaysian leaflet drop by RMAF Herelds and Twin Pioneers is planned for 0100 local time 12 Apr. Targets are Berhala, Djemur, Base T (Rupat), Bengkalis, and Base Z (Berakit). ee BDLS inform Chairman COSAUST and CDS NZ. 3» POLAD is informing Djakarta at appropriate time, PS/Prime Minister PS/Sec of State CDS (7) PS/Minister (Navy) CNS VCNS DCNS ACNS CGRM DN Plans (5) DNAP DNTWP DNAW DNOT AUS (NS) AUS(0) (N) PS/Minister (Army) CGS (2) MO 1 Sec (6) DASD ASD 2 QMG Sec Q (Mov) Plans AUS (GS) PS/Minister (RAF) CAS VCAS AMP ACAS (Ops) ACAS (Pol) D Air Plans 1103452 D of D Plans (Air) D of Ops (A Def & 0) D of Ops (AT) DAP DASB (2) AFOR SL/SBA (Air) AUS (AS) DCDS (P and L) ACDS (OR) ACDS (S) DOC/COSSEC (14) D of DP Sec DPS (12) DAPS Sec PPO/PAO Cttee DFP DGI (2) DNI DMI (3) ACAS (TI) DI 41 Pus DUS (Pol) DUS (Admin) AUS (Pol) AUS (M) AUS (G) DS 11 (2) DS 12 TOP SECRET DS 15 DPR Sec JIC, Cabinet Office(5) Mr Laskey, Cabinet Office JIR, Cabinet Office Room 9, Foreign Office(6) Maj Gen McNeill, CRO (3) CRLO Mr Higham, Colonial Office BDS Washington (by bag) Mr Gilling, MOA === [PDF page 114] === TOP SECRET Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference. TOP SECRET === [PDF page 115] === tes 2 sas oe PS/Prime Minister DCDS (P ana L) (2) PS/S ec of Siste AGDS (OR) cps (7) acDs (Ss) cNs D of DP VoNs Sec DES (12) DCNS RAPS [Unreadable] CoRM: DFP DN Plans (5) per. (2) DNAP pens (I) (2) DNIWP DNI DNAW pM (3) Dyer a, T) aus (NS I DS 4/5 PUS ces (2) DUS (Pol) MO 4 Sec (6) DUS (Admin) DASD: AUS (Poi) 8D 2 AUS “ GME See AUS (G} Q (Ops) (2) PS 11 (2): Q bee) Plans DS te: AUS (G3) DS 15 ps 6 Seo JIC, Cabinet Office (5) * PS/Mintieter (RAF) Ve Laskey, Cabinet Office CAS SIR, Cabinet Office ‘ VCAS Room 9, Foreign Office (6) i AMP ¥e.§ Gen McNeill, GRO (3); ACAS (Ops CRLO AGAS {Pol Mr Fighem, Colonial Office (6) Wate Plans BUS Washington (by bag) (4) D of D Pisna (Air) Mr BW Glijing (MOA) [Unreadable] D of Ops (aT) Mee: pASB (2) f AFCE, 34/SBA (tix) Eai40/973 === [PDF page 116] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair e Wor |i2\q G) FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION Mr. Rodgers D. 03.40 LU, April 1965 ee 1965 R, 09.08 1, April 1965 Addressed te Fereign Office telegram Ne ef IL A Repeated fer information te: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapere The leaflet drep by Malaysian aircraft was reperted in Antara en 13 April under the headline "Vielatien ef Indenesian Air Space", === [PDF page 117] === TOP SECRET Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference. Porn. an oo FECL meee eM? aN 0806452 May LJ. REE \ ARCH CINCFE | > wah Date: 8 5 65 az i MOD UK Recd: 10522 i br 1673/15 a WARNING Ka NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE PRIORITY TLL/SEACOS 99 Reference COSSEA 38. 16 Malaysians are considering exploiting low morale of Indonesians at Pulau Bintan who tock part in landings SE Johore by three possible methods: a Leaflets b. Radio broadcast. c. Clandestine return of one or few selected prisoners after suitable indoctrination. 2. I have offered planning facilities for a. if this method is selected, and asked Malaysians to keep me informed. 0806452 Advance Copies to DOG (4) Duty Commander GSDO AFOR (RAF) at 0811002 /Distribution overleaf === [PDF page 118] === ps/Sec of State cps (7) CNS ee “VCNS DCNS ACNS CGRM DN Plans (5) DNAP DNTWP DNAW ‘ DNOT AUS (NS) pS/Minister (Army) CGS (2) MO 1 Sec (6) DASD ASD 2 QNG Sec Q (Mov) Plans AUS (GS) ps/iinister (RAF) CAS VC AS AMP ACAS (Ops) ACAS (Pol), D Air Plans D of D Plans (Air) D of Ops (A Def & 0) D of Ops (AT) DAP DASB (2) AFOR $.,/SBA.( Air) AUS (AS) DeDs (P and L) ACDS (OR) ACDS (Sigs) DOC/COSSEC (1%) D of DP Sec DPS (12) DAPS (2) Sec PPO/PAO Cttee DFP DGI (2) peDs (I) DNI DMI (3) ACAS (I) DI 41 PUS. os DUS (P & B) DUS (Pol) DUS (Admin) AUS (Pol) AUS (M DS 14 (2) DS 12 ‘DS 15 DPR Sec JIC, Cabinet Mr. Laskey, Cabine' JIR, Cabinet Office Room 9, Foreign orfice Maj. Gen. McNeill, CRO CRLO Mr. R.M.. Blaikley, Colonial Office (¢) BDS Washington (by bag) (4) === [PDF page 119] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded f M where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department | S E G RET A IM lc3\t3 eee SUBJECT: op oe Ny = » HPs ee ARABED BAG AS PAS Sven 99 ay aicik: Dated QA Crk \ oo Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received AA Hert (Outward Action) [Unreadable] MINUTES (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 120] === RECEIVED IN BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIO RCHIVES No, 48 Police Co-operative Building, 1 Suleiman Dade 9 APR 1965. Kuata Lumpur, 24 | Federation of Malaya Please address any reply to " Telephone: 81901/6 P.O. Box 1030 Kuala Lumpur and quote: DA 69/37/1 SECRET 22 April, 1965. Your eo: As you can imagine, in the sort of operational circumstances which exist here while Indonesian military confrontation goes on at its present level, there are perpetual differences of opinion between senior officers of the National Operations Committee on the one hand and both the overseas and the local press on the other on the handling of information about operational activities. The Security Forces very understandably would like to suppress all information about opérations while they are still being conducted so long as they have reason to believe that the denial of news to the Indonesians could help to bring them to the best possible conclusion. The press, on the other hand, become restive over delays in the release of information, particularly when the general public in the areas where operations are being pursued already know that something is afoot and the grapevine therefore starts working overtime. Ce Some of the Malaysian Security Force chiefs would seem to be guided in making up their minds on what should or should not be said very largely by their experiences during the Malayan Emergency. They do not appear fully to appreciate that Indonesian confrontation presents problems different in kind as well as in degree; that, for example, operations carried out by foreign infiltrators cannot be treated in the same way as terrorism by one's own nationals, and that the British and Commonwealth position here now requires very different handling from that of the days when Britain was the governing power. By contrast the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting are, naturally enough, disposed to sympathise with the press and have been quite unreceptive to recent suggestions from some of the National Operations Comnittee people that controls as great as formal censorship should be introduced. (On purely practical grounds, of course, such a proposition, in the absence of any suitable machinery, would present very considerable problems.) 36 After much to-ing and fro-ing what has now happened is that, under instructions from the National Operations Committee, a Note of Guidance has been circulated to the press by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting which, in-essence, urges on them a degree of voluntary censorship. They have been asked to agree to check every story before filing for correctness-and security with the appropriate authority. Their immediate response was to request the imposition of full censorship so that they could be spared the onus of determining in marginal cases what was and what was not a matter with security implications. This request got them nowhere and they are therefore now co-operating with the National Operations Committee as best they may. /4 A. A. Golds, Esq., M.V.0., Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, C.R.O/F.0., Downing Street, LONDON, S.W.1. SECRET === [PDF page 121] === To rationalise situation the National Operations ommittee » prompted by a paper submitted to them by Laughton etor of Public Relations on the Commander-in-Chief's st apore, have recently agreed that weekly press conferences shall be held both by the Public Relations Officer of a 1¢ Ministry of Defence in Kuala Lumpur and by Laughton in Singapore. These are to be conducted on a three tier principle; ie. ce itegorising information as unusable background, secondly usable but not able and thirdly usable and attributable. [The first twWo conferences were held in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore on 1 A our information is that the press thoucht well of them. they should go far a press requirements, arly those of the inte ational agencies. T) 1 40ney CO vy be supplemented, as anc “when the need arises, by i therefore, the mperature has wered and we can hope for better rela between the i se security authorities and the broad paey of the press here. only corm on the exchanges of the past w seks is that te i nprehensible that the National Operations Committee ., rk ae Say. my e e been unable hitherto to authorise the ean tenaetett n of ould have thought to be a fairly elementary exercise in ess relations - and, equally important, an essential exercise rms of the Malaysian "image" overseas. L iis ct 3 g bP sending COX vingapore; Hunt in Kuching end, on a personal basis, to Brunei. === [PDF page 122] === Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) ~via. Yh pesty t JEN LLA Neat et ENG het Cell NO ES FROM AN Xo Brg Ranta) No. BW uy Dated 3 Her.Q (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action i completed) | (Main Indexed) [Unreadable] Encloses Copy of: SUBJECT: References and Relevant Papers: PR loiwrro MINUTES === [PDF page 123] === cypher /OTP Redgers 28 April 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed t« fer information tepeated Her a Defence) ran fer an Indenesian e ‘teunspesple the fhis dees lonesians are TRIBUTED TO: ol. Dept. Uelle Dept. tao ter # ajesty ey were distributing CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJ FRUEM De PARTMENTAL, DIST R: 13,56 te Foreign Office tele Censul Medan reperts that misteek the one, and cellected 1055 2€ aircraft drepping AKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE RIBUTION IM(o13| ty pril-1965 28 April 1965 April i. of 28 Singapere the lecal HANSIP leaflets ever ind handed eut te many of we leaflets befere discovering that falaysian prepaganda. net [word emitted] much for & 4. aoe now literate. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 124] === x. 29 RR caret y ’ q a 2 \ o. a DE UMSF ’ hn << a 2 C4 te R 2992227-7 9 at gene et p FM“ASOLJO NO 186 ae. “ Ryo. BT Milinla 2 qi6rs|\4 [Unreadable] FILCH ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 9¢14 29//4 REPTD FOR INFO TO XG, bent trinn fede [Unreadable] ; ee oe 4emt- AND SINGAPORES MY TEL NO 894. PLEASE INSERT REFERENCE MY TEL NO 851. === [PDF page 125] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded IM where Appropriate) CONFIDENTIAL Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department 1965 papal stdin, EAdWG, — \OOOtNK dO an Iprusersn oa Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) Yt “KL. VStoO wD oon MINUTES Llp fit wt fe (Printing Instructions) Ww v AAs (Referred to Legal Adviser) === [PDF page 126] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO KUAL/ LUMPUR Cypher/ OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION No, 1310 30 April, 1965 D, 0852 1 May, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL FILCH Addressed to Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 1310 of 30 April. Repeated for information to:-— Djakarta POLAD Singapore Gold's letter IM, 1673/8 of 11 March, Indonesian Casualties “(Killed and Captured). According to our calculations the 1000 mark has already been reached, Do the Malaysians propose to launch special publicity to coincide with the capture or surrender of the next Indonesian soldier and if so what form will it take? Unless they have their own ideas onthe subject, you now may think it would be preferable to mark the occasion of the 1000th prisoner, when in due course he comes along, F.E. & P. Dept, S.E..D. L.RD. United Nations === [PDF page 127] === Registry Draft. Ruales huapyw NOt L3LO.. Distribution:— cal Copies to:— As M *Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should apeath Faddressée(9) ie ce eon, 3: +e ty ios te dD Gaeeumay £ ‘ [Unreadable] priority without oe ne —if any ey LunruR ind elegram| No, aa cS etal aaa! | ucr shy ce ee ae Nn get se rtm ons = ‘ repeated for information to.......... lotic 1M 1673/8 J HH. Plesk Dvdensiceu Core ut tins (bated ana) Cophucsd), ont aa at biden ber Aeend ~1 ta. (le /oco§ alk coeds hsor: De Che Melarprort: fae ttee te CRORE prtheK fo i daeoe orem ark, See Pe hr an Arras har of Che netel DD nrdewetrou Addicr ott if ov uhel™ joer geet ct". fare ) rae mark yews ead < === [PDF page 128] === NISYVW SIHL NI N3LLIVM 38 OL ONIHLON === [PDF page 129] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM KUALA LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE EIVED IN Cypher/OTP iE >CHIVES No.48 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr, King | 19MAY 1965 No. 869 (mrss D. 12.10 18 May, 1965 18 May, 196 R. 14,00 18 May, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to C.R.0. telegram No. 869 of 18 May, Repeated for information to: Djakarta iMib13}4¢ POLAD Singapore Your telegram No. 1310: Thousandth Indonesian, Malaysians have decided to wait for thousandth prisoner rather than marking thousandth casualty (which, as you point out, has already passed), We assume this will not be for some time yet. DISTRIBUTED TO: CRO. JM.I.D. Far East and Pacific Dept. SE.A.D. Information Research Dept. United Nations Dept. News Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 130] === FROM &7a Karr. Dated Received LK x~fe PFC Titik (Outward Action) AS) Wa Mhotcaray, Win. ol Dall. 5 Mo. (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) a, ri iv iti Milcta\tc [Unreadable] Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department SUBJECT: ore ae 7 PFpI CEL [Unreadable] Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: mib73/14 MINUTES === [PDF page 131] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM BJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/0TP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Redgers RR iotez. | 20. Ne, 851 BD. 0845 23 April, 1965 23 April, 1965 Re 1126 23 April, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 8% of 23 April. Repeated fer information to: Kuala Lumpur Singapere Leaflet Raid, The Consul in Medan reports that the leaflets dropped on the night of 11/12 April in Nerth Sumatra are now selling for up te 10,000 rps each in Medan - largely because a number ef the prisoners pictured are lecal boys, DISTRIBUTED TO: F.@. Seuth East Asia Dept. J.M.I. Dept Information Researeh Dept. C.R.O, Far East and Pacific Dept, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 132] === @ idioms ik ect intes td waa RECEIVED IN | &. FARCHIVES No #04 a ~4MAY 1965 repent etme neem] MLbi3| 16/4 Office of the Political Adviser — to the C.-in-C. Far Hast, Phoenix Park, 410921 Singapore 10. \ fa Nook Will you please refer to Djakarta telegram No. 851 to the Foreign Office:of 23 April about the recent Malaysian leaflet drop over the Rhio Islands, Ze We heard a similar story here a few days ago from an American Peace Corps worker who had just arrived in Singapore from Medan. He told us that the operation had been successful and that in spite of efforts by the police to confiscate the leaflets, they were now circulating surreptitiousiy in Medan where he had seen one himself, 36 The American added that Sumatra had been placed on a war footing and the Indonesians were in a jumpy state and had gone even to the extent of blacking out car headlights. Le I am sending copies of this letter to Bentley in Kuala Lumpur and Cambridge in Djakarta. VU Last | R. Hanbury-Tenison, ESq., (J.W.R. Shakespeare) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Dept. FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. === [PDF page 133] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded IM where Appropriate) e*, +. ey te 4 OWNriDiniiAb Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department AF LEM Nea SUBJECT: Ciprargs Ha _Auchouarroun Prose Qhesha Awiphy “Svdovaria Mares ond. “Wwdonond Teta, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) === [PDF page 134] === Fox [Unreadable] GROSVENOR 766| ZS 38 GROSVENOR SQUARE, on Pe 2 LONDON, WI. ur Ref. ek RE Your Ref. KEDUTAAN BESAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA r LA = ABR A rivevU IN 21 MAY 1965 se att Dear Mr.Bottomley, This Embassy produces "Indonesian News" fortnightly, and a monthly magazine "Indonesia Today". In case you have not seen these, I am enclosing a copy of each, partly to see whether you might find them useful in your work, and partly to draw our information services to your attention. If you would like to receive either or both of our publications, and will let me know, I will make sure that your name goes onto our mailing list. Of course, if you would like to discuss Indonesian affairs at any time, or think we might be able to help in some other way, we should be glad to have a chance to do whatever we can, Yours faithfully, Ay f si AL! x st ae i Attashe. ee Rt-Hoén Arthur Bottomley, M.P., Commonwealth Relations Secretary, House of Commons, S.W.I. === [PDF page 135] === tt! tote ts, i OU ee Leek 5 Eee: === [PDF page 136] === Ten years on IT IS EXACTLY ten years ago on the 18th April that the First Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. An impressive celebration, to which a large number of Asian and African Heads of State and Heads of Government are invited, has been organised in Djakarta and Bandung to mark the anniversary of this historic event. To assess the importance of the Conference one must look back on what has been achieved since Bandung, and on its imprint on the course of history. The Bandung Conference produced, among other things, the Ten Principles (Dasa Sila), constituting a declaration on the promotion of world peace and co-operation. Out of the Ten Principles and the other decisions taken in the economic, cultural and political fields during the Conference, has emerged the Spirit of Bandung, that spirit of cooperation and solidarity which has ever since marked the relationships between the countries of Asia and Africa. When the delegates met in Bandung they were most conscious of the heavy burden placed on their shoulders. In a world fraught with the danger of collision between ideological interests, between the forces of colonialism and anti-colonialism, the delegates, representing 29 countries in all, had the duty, in the words of President Sukarno, of injecting the voice of reason into world affairs. They had to mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. They were aware that, as representatives of more than half the human population of the world, they could do much to mobilise what President Sukarno called the “‘moral violence of nations in favour of peace’’. Ten years have passed since the delegates to that first conference outlined the destiny of Asia and Africa. More countries have now become independent and have taken their place beside the original Bandung powers. Still closer solidarity has been forged through the many conferences which have developed as offspring of Bandung. The Asian- African Students’ Conference, the A-A Women’s Conference in Colombo, the Peoples’ Solidarity Conference of Asia and Africa, the Conference of A-A Writers, the group of 75 in the recent Geneva Conference on Trade and Development which was largely made up of Asian and African States, the A-A Economic Seminar in Algiers, and the recently concluded Asian-African Islamic Conference, are a few of the examples of how the Spirit of Bandung has been translated into practice. There is no doubt that the First Afro-Asian Conference has had a great and profound impact on international developments. The voice of Asia and Africa can no longer be ignored in deciding issues of war and peace. But the issues that trouble mankind have not all been solved. Still one of the biggest, perhaps the biggest, issue that stands between peace and world turbulence is the alignment of forces which want to preserve the old order of domination and those which want to create a new order based on equality and mutual respect, without the exploitation of man by man or of nation by nation. The African and Asian nations, which share the common national experience of emergence from colonial domination, inevitably stand on the side of those who want to establish this new order. The Spirit of Bandung, unique of its kind, can further develop the sense of solidarity among Asian and African countries for the achievement of this aim. This is a challenge which can and should be met by Asian and African countries and peoples under the motto of “Onward, no retreat!’’. INDONESIA today Volume 2 April 1965 Published by Information Department, Indonesian Embassy, 38, Grosvenor Square, London, W.1 CONTENTS Ten Years On aes 2 President Sukarno: Opening Address to the First Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung... ied aS Bandung in Pictures we ee Kalimantan: The Sleeping Giant Le Ss 6 Coffee as aks ace, te Kartini a a ie ae Women’s Movements in Indonesia... ay Sere News in Brief <= aa AO Cover Picture: Basket work is practised all over Indonesia. These food covers and baskets are made from the dried leaves of the lontar palm, and the designs are common to Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Pishiiahits from at the opening ““SISTERS AND BROTHERS, how terrifically dynamic is our time! I recall that, several years ago, I had occasion to make a public analysis of colonialism, and that I then drew attention to what I called the ‘Lifeline of imperialism’. This line runs from the Straits of Gibraltar, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan. For most of that enormous distance, the territories on both sides of this life-line were colonies, the peoples were unfree, their futures mortgaged to an alien system. Along that lifeline, that main artery of imperialism, there was pumped the life-blood of colonialism. “And today in this hall are gathered together the leaders of those same peoples. They are no longer the victims of colonialism. They are no longer the tools of others and the playthings of forces they cannot influence. Today, you are representatives of free peoples, peoples of a different stature and standing in the world. “Yes, here has indeed been a ‘Sturm iiber Asien’-—and over Africa too. The last few years have seen enormous changes. Nations, States, have awoken from a sleep of centuries. The passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquillity has made place for struggle and activity. Irresistible forces have swept the two continents. Hurricanes of national awakening and reawakening have swept over the land, shaking it, changing it, changing it for the better. “We are of many different nations, we are of many different social backgrounds and cultural patterns. Our ways of life are different. Our national characters, or colours or motifs—call it what you will— are different. Our racial stock is different, and even the colour of our skin is different. But what does that matter? Mankind is united or divided by considerations other than these. Conflict comes not from variety of skins, nor from variety of religion, but from variety of desires. ‘All of us, I am certain, are united by the Speech of President Sukarno of the Asian-African Conference 18th April 1955 more important things than those which superficially divide us. We are united, for instance, by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common detestation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world. Are not these aims mentioned in the letter of invitation to which you responded? “T freely confess it—in these aims I am not disinterested or driven by purely impersonal motives. “How is it possible to be disinterested about colonialism? For us, colonialism is not something far and distant. We have known it in all its ruthlessness. We have seen the immense human wastage it causes, the poverty it causes, and the heritage it leaves behind when, eventually and reluctantly, it is driven out by the inevitable march of history. My people, and the peoples of many nations of Asia and Africa know these things, for we have experienced them. “We are often told, ‘Colonialism is dead’. Let us not be deceived or even soothed by that. I say to you, colonialism is not dead. How can we say it is dead, so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree. “And I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. Wherever, whenever, and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth. “Yes, there is diversity among us. Who denies it? “But what harm is in diversity, when there is unity in desire? This Conference is not to oppose each other, it is a conference of brotherhood. It is not an exclusive club either, not a bloc which seeks to oppose any other bloc. Rather it is a body of enlightened, tolerant opinion which seeks to impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun—to impress on the world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one’s individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth. “Tf this Conference succeeds in making the peoples of the East, whose representatives are gathered here, understand each other a little more, appreciate each other a little more, sympathise with each other’s problems a little more—if these things happen, then this Conference, of course, will have been worthwhile, whatever else it may achieve. I hope that it will give evidence of the fact that we Asian and African leaders understand that Asia and Africa can prosper only when they are united, and that even the safety of the World at large cannot be safeguarded without a united Asia-Africa. I hope that this Conference will give guidance to mankind, will point out to mankind the way which it must take to attain safety and peace. I hope that it will give evidence that Asia and Africa have been reborn, nay, that a New Asia and a New Africa have been born! “Let us not be bitter about the past, but let us keep our eyes firmly on the future. Let us remember that no blessing of God is so sweet as life and liberty. Let us remember that the stature of all mankind is diminished so long as nations or parts of nations are still unfree. Let us remember that the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of human degradation, his bonds of poverty—the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for too long stunted the development of humanity’s majority. “And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united.” === [PDF page 137] === (top left) The Preparatory Conference to organise the Afro-Asian Conference was held in Bogor in December, 1954. The Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan took part. The photo shows the opening of the mass meeting at the Ikada Stadium. (centre and bottom left) The delegates arrive for the Bandung Conference which opened on 18th April, 1955. From left to right: (1) Indian Prime Minister Nehru with Burmese Prime Minister U Nu; (2) Egyptian Premier Nasser; (3) Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai with (left) Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Sunario; (4) the Heads of the Sudanese and Liberian Delegations, Mr. Sayed Ismail El Azhari and Mr. Momolu Dukuly; and (5) Ceylon’s Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala. (top right) President Sukarno during the Conference. On his left, Indonesian Prime Minister Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, and on his right, Dr. Mohammad Hatta. (centre right) A view of the Conference in session. (bottom right) The Dwi Warna building in Bandung where the Conference took place. Members of the Joint Secretariat pose after the successful conclusion of the Conference. a ae ' je be 4 vt ee Pres pe. ree rae oes an; ry fh ” | ee m2, TN oy Wi i aes === [PDF page 138] === RS ZAI ZAINTEA IN LAND OF THE FUTURE KALIMANTAN, better known to many by the name given to it by European explorers—Borneo, perhaps derived from Brunei—is the world’s third largest island, and about two-thirds of it, south and east of the craggy Upper Kapuas and Iban mountain ranges, forms a part of Indonesia. The centre of the island is mountainous, and many of Kalimantan’s great rivers rise in their heights. Just outside Pontianak in the west the Equatorial Monument marks the line where the Equator runs, almost through the centre of the island. As might be expected, the climate is typically equatorial, hot and damp. Temperatures average between 78° and 86°F., and rainfall is as much as 150 inches a year. Much of the island is covered with thick and impenetrable jungle, through which the wide rivers, the Martapura, the Barito, the Kapuas, the Mahakam and many others, flow, forming Kalimantan’s “‘road system’’, It is possible to travel for days along these rivers and see only the occasional small village nestling on the river bank. The sampans and steamers, the small trading vessels and the government launches, make their way up and down these waterways, taking days to accomplish their journeys. This is the chief reason why the interior of Kalimantan has remained so inaccessible, and the peoples of the interior so isolated. Now, however, air transport is helping to break this age-long isolation. Of Indonesian Kalimantan’s 4 million inhabitants (in an area 44 times the size of Java, which has 63 million people), nearly 3 million live in the coastal areas, and it is here that the main development of this potentially rich island has taken place. Much of the land in this area is swampy and liable to flooding from the heavy rains which fall in the wet season and the torrents of water which the rivers carry down from the mountains to the sea. So much so, in fact, that the houses, even in the larger towns, are built on piles. The houses in Bandjarmasin, which is built on a river-formed island on the delta of the rivers Barito and Martapura, have also got walled gardens with special drains designed to carry the flood waters away, and, as in Venice, many of the thoroughfares are rivers and streams. The large-scale schemes for extending rice production in Kalimantan have to begin with the reclaiming of the marshes and the building of dykes and drainage systems to control the waters. There are great hopes that when this work has been done Kalimantan will become a major rice producing area for Indonesia. Already many thousands of acres of new paddy fields have been brought into cultivation. EARLY HISTORY Recorded history in Kalimantan can be traced back to 600 A.D. when travellers from China reported that the inhabitants had a close resemblance to the people of Champa—present-day Cambodia. A considerable amount of trade was carried on with China, and from the evidence available it is almost certain that in 1292 the island was invaded by Kublai Khan. In the 4th and 5th centuries the Indonesian Hindu King Mulawarman ruled in Kalimantan, and maintained close friendship with the Brahmans in India. It is also believed that about 1000 A.D. there was some migration of Indians to the island, bringing with them the Hindu religion, to judge by the ruins of statues to Hindu deities dating from about this period which can be found scattered throughout the island. The Islamic religion was brought to the island in the year 1620, when an Arabian married the daughter of the Sultan of Pasir. The followers of Islam are today found mostly in the coastal areas, where the peoples are mainly of Malay racial stock. THE DYAKS The name Borneo conjures up to many the picture of Dyaks and headhunters. Headhunting, however strange and exciting it may sound at a safe distance, is happily a thing of the past, and the Dyaks gain a livelihood from rice growing, catching fish, and gathering the products of the forest, resin, gums and rattan, for sale in the coastal areas. They number Light sampans are used as floating shops on Kalimantan’s rivers. All kinds of fruit and vegetables are being offered for sale here. about one million, divided into a number of clans. Formerly each clan dwelt in a single tribal longhouse, which could measure anything up to 300 yards in length. In reality, such a house is a series of separate rooms, linked by a common verandah running right along the front. Although many Dyaks are today Moslems or Christians, many adhere to the ancient Kahariangan faith of their forefathers. The word means “souls which live for ever”, and the religion has Hindu, Buddhist and Animist elements in it. The Supreme Being is Dewa Ranying Gohotaran Langit, but they also believe in spirits which dwell in the mountains, the hills, rivers, large stones and trees. Ceremonies are held in honour of the good spirits to express gratitude or to seek help, but others are held to appease the evil spirits. Religious and traditional elements are almost inextricably interwoven. For instance, according to traditional rules, three months must elapse from the birth of a child before it may be given a name, and on the occasion of the naming the gods are invited to witness the ceremony and bless the child. A complicated series of ceremonies relate to the death of a Dyak, and are not concluded until several years later at a very expensive feast, when the bones of the deceased are cleaned and placed in a new coffin, and at this ceremony the soul is believed to be carried finally to the abode of the dead. This young girl from Bandjarmasin in South Kalimantan is wearing the traditional costume of the region. Such traditions are still practised among the Dyaks, but they are being brought more and more into contact with the outside world. The children now all go to school, sometimes quite a distance from their jungle villages, except when the seasonal floods make the rivers and paths impassable. At these times they are taught the traditional lore and the arts and crafts of their people. There is tremendous enthusiasm for education amongst the Dyaks, and at the same time modern medical care and tools for agriculture are helping to improve the conditions of life. Some Dyaks are moving back to the coastlands, from where, it is believed, they were driven into the interior in former times by the immigrants from other islands of the archipelago. Certainly this tradition is kept alive in the folklore of the people. The vast jungles of Kalimantan, stretching for mile after mile, are only just beginning to be exploited on any scale for their timber, though there has long been a limited trade in jungle products such as gums, resins, rattan, sago and camphor. Sampit in South Kalimantan (west of Bandjarmasin) is the present centre of the timber industry. Here, since 1947, a largely-government-owned enterprise has been exploiting the Agathis and Meranti woods of the surrounding forests. Other areas are now being surveyed for possible exploitation. One of the chief factors necessary for successful develop- A small timber business in Kalimantan. The island’s vast resources of timber are now being surveyed for exploitation. ment is to find stands of timber of the same kind of tree in sufficient quantity. Another factor is the provision of roads and services needed for opening up the areas commercially. MINERAL WEALTH Kalimantan’s chief product has up to now been oil, from the fields around Balikpapan in the east and Tarakan in the north-east. Now new roads are being built to link the main towns of the coastal plains as a prelude to large-scale development of the area for agriculture, for forestry, for settlement and for mineral extraction. Small quantities of gold, silver, diamonds and coal are already mined, and deposits of iron exist in South Kalimantan, but no overall mineral survey has yet been possible. Nobody knows what hidden wealth the soil of Kalimantan possesses. Based on existing knowledge, however, an iron and steel plant has been planned for East Kalimantan, to use the local supplies of coal mined there, and scheduled to produce 250,000 tons of steel a year. South Kalimantan, too, is scheduled for industrial development. A hydro-electricity scheme on the Riau Kanan river will provide power for industry in the Bandjarmasin area, and will, in addition, provide flood control and irrigation over a wide area. The “sleeping giant” that has been Kalimantan for so many centuries is beginning to awake. === [PDF page 139] === A vIisiIT to one of Indonesia’s coffee estates during the main flowering period is a very beautiful sight indeed. Thousands of trees are in bloom, like a sea of white flowers on a bed of dark green leaves, and the air is filled with a strong, sweet scent. Coffee was first introduced into Indonesia as early as 1669, and it is grown at high altitudes—the best being produced between 3,000 and 6,000 feet. Of the many varieties grown, the main ones are Robusta, Arabica and Liberica. As the name implies, the first is the strongest plant and most resistant to disease, but Arabica is the most popular in Indonesia. The two are often mixed to produce a good blend for drinking. Most of our coffee is grown in East Java, but some also comes from Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The production from smallholders is approximately three times that from the estates. A total of 90,000 tons of coffee were produced in 1961, and of this, 65,000 tons were exported. The plant needs a warm, humid climate, preferably with sun for only part of the day. Because it is shallow-rooted, shade trees have to be planted and ground cover is also needed while the plants are young. Propagation is usually by seed, and the seedlings are after one year grafted on to the understems of plants of about 30 years old—two graftings to each plant. But it may also be transplanted by bending down the lower branches of a bush and burying them in the ground, where they will take root. In time the Ceo e® Coffee plants grow so thick that they appear almost to be growing wild. During the main flowering period the trees are left alone for natural pollination, for which a light breeze is needed. The plants come into full bearing when they are 5 years old, and after that the trees continue to yield profitably for an average of 25-30 years. Great care must be taken against disease. Apart from regular spraying with insecticides, the plants have to be swept with long brooms. They must also be topped to keep the height down to about 6 feet, for the convenience of the pickers. The work of picking the beans, which when ripe are bright red in colour and look like cherries, is done by women working in groups. They pick from early morning until noon, tossing the beans into large baskets. Then the beans are taken to the weighing station. Here the load is sorted, the black beans being picked out from the rest, and each group is paid for their morning’s work according to its weight. A lorry takes the crop to the factory, where the beans are first washed and the peel softened. A pulping machine then breaks open the outer skin and the inner seeds are then picked over by hand for defects and graded according to size. Fermentation in a jelly-like substance then takes place, after which the beans are washed and spread out to dry in a high temperature. The final hulling, polishing and sorting for colour is still done by hand. dark green leaves. young plants. taken to the factory. to be washed. (top left) The white scented flowers and the ripening beans against a background of (centre left) The young plants are grafted on to the old stems. (bottom left) The trees are regularly brushed to keep them free from disease. (top right) A view of a coffee estate, showing the line of shade trees planted to protect the (centre right) After the morning’s picking, the beans are sorted before they are weighed and (bottom right) The lorry empties the day’s harvest straight into the tanks where they are === [PDF page 140] === ON APRIL 21sT, in the year 1879, Raden Adjeng Kartini was born, the second daughter of the Bupati of Djepara in Central Java. In Indonesia the movement for the emancipation of women can be said to have begun with the work of this remarkable young woman, who is affectionately referred to as “Mother Kartini” by all Indonesian women. Yet, by any standards, the life of Kartini was a simple and uneventful one, tragically ending at the early age of 25. She was born a member of the nobility, and, more fortunate than many of her contemporaries, was among the first girls to attend a school of any kind when her parents allowed her to attend a Dutch primary school together with her brothers and two younger sisters. But at the age of twelve she had to submit to the prevailing Javanese custom, which ordained that girls should stay within the four walls of their home from the age of puberty until their marriage, to a man of their parents’ choosing. Thus shut off from the outside world, it was during this period that Kartini commenced her observations and became acutely aware of the under-privileged position of Javanese women. Having tasted the delights of education she had to satisfy her thirst for knowledge by reading any book she could lay her hands Her personal ideal was to learn enough to enable her to teach Indonesian girls so that they would be better prepared to perform their duties in the community. She believed that education was the answer to the evils she saw around her in the position of women and, indeed, of all her countrymen. Having seen so many miserable examples of forced marriages, Kartini was at first determined not to marry, but instead to give all her attention to the education of women and girls. Being of noble birth, she felt her movement more restricted than the ordinary village girl (who was freer in many respects because she had to help earn the family’s living), even when her father gave in to one of her wishes and allowed her to leave the strict confinement imposed on her by custom. She was sixteen then, and had in the 10 KARTINI meantime started a lively correspondence with a number of Dutch friends, some of whom held influential positions. She wanted desperately to go to Holland to train as a teacher, but her father would not consent to such an open flouting of public opinion. The relaxing of restrictions, however, enabled Kartini to learn more about conditions prevailing in Java at that time. The letters which she wrote to her friends during this period were full of ideas and of her indignation at the unhappy lot of the majority of her country-women. Through her letters and the books she read she came into contact with the outside world and was able to glean information about the condition of women in Holland and of women’s movements there. This threw conditions in Java into sharper relief. What Kartini learnt increased her resentment, and her conviction that education was the key to the situation. Through education women could become less dependent and through them the children of the coming generation could be educated, and the standards of the whole people could be raised. So, when, in deference to her parents’ wishes, she gave up the idea of going to Holland to study, she opened with her sister’s help a class for a small number of girls of noble family in her father’s house, as a small practical beginning to putting her ideas into practice. When in 1903 she married the Bupati of Rembang, who sympathised with her views, she was able to open a school in her own house. At that point in her life when she had actually begun to realise some of her ideals, Kartini died, after giving birth to a son. Her story, as it stands, might be that of many another woman of her period and social class. The difference, and it has proved a big difference, was her keen awareness of the unfavourable position she and her people were in, and her determination to do something to improve it. With the publication of her letters, the true significance of her life became clear. “From Darkness into Light”—that is the title under which those letters were published, and that is the significance of Kartini. She it was who began to point the way from darkness into light. Kartini had as her ultimate goal the uplifting and improvement of the educational standard of the whole people. Although in 1904 there were a few other women who had begun schools for girls, Kartini differed from them in recognising the need for women’s education as an integral part of the need for the improvement of the condition of the people. It is for this reason that she has been acclaimed as a figure of national importance. Already in 1901, seven years prior to the establishment of the first national movement in Indonesia (Budi Utomo), she wrote of her indignation that the Dutch colonisers had held back the progress and education of her people. Her thoughts and observations, expressed so clearly in her correspondence with friends, concerned themselves with problems and plans which afterwards were adopted in the building up of the nation— a nation that has grown out of the people she referred to in her letters as “my people”. On the subject of education Kartini realised and stressed the significance of having female teachers to encourage parents to send their daughters to school, and of educating not only the young but also the adults, to form the character so necessary for the building of the nation. She pointed out the need for providing more reading matter, and herself began to write down the stories she had been told as a child. Kartini’s life and thought can be viewed as a prelude to Indonesia’s national movement for independence. It is her ideals and ideas which have made her the pioneer of our women’s progress and have served as an inspiration in their emancipation. Women’s Movements in Indonesia RaDEN DEwI SartTIKA, from West Java, was one of the women who took up the work of Kartini, shortly after her tragically early death. Others from different regions, too, were becoming conscious of their position, and in 1912 an organisation called “Putri Mardika” was founded in Djakarta. The aim of the organisation was to improve children’s education, and particularly girls’ education. Other organisations soon followed. Some were independent bodies, others, such as the Women’s Section of the Muhammadijah, were part of men’s organisations. Not a few were formed with the aim of establishing schools for girls— to be called “‘Kartini Schools”—to implement Kartini’s ideas on the education of young girls. In Indonesia 90° of the people are Moslems, but there has never been, for instance, the institution of purdah. In the rural areas—and over nine-tenths of the population live in these rural areas—the women have always been on a footing of social equality with men. Besides their household work, the women work in the fields with the men, and in the village community they take part in the various gatherings, vote for council members and have an equal say in the government of village affairs. Only amongst the upper classes did there exist a distinction between the social status of men and women, the women being kept very much secluded. 1928 was an important year in the struggle for national independence, as well as being a landmark for the women’s movements. In December of that year several women’s organisations co-operated in convening the first Women’s Congress in Jogjakarta. To this Congress came representatives from 30 organisations, amongst which were Wanita Utomo (Noble Women), Putri Indonesia (Indonesian Women), Wanito Katolik (Catholic Women), Wanito Muljo (Noble Women), the women’s sections of the Muhammadijah, the Sarikat Islam Party, the Young Islam Society and Young Java, as well as the Women of Taman Siswa (National Educational Institute). Discussions during the Congress ranged over woman’s place in marriage, polygamy and co-education. As a result of the Congress, the Association of Indonesian Women (Perikatan Perempuan Indonesia) was formed, which later changed its title to the Association of Indonesian Women’s Organisations. December 22nd, the opening day of the Congress, is now celebrated annually as Mother’s Day in Indonesia. The aim of the Association of Women’s Organisations was to improve the position of women in society, particularly in marriage, family and social life, and to coordinate the work of the member organisations. It was non-political and secular. But certain of the women’s organisations in the 1930’s—in particular the Istri Indonesia and the Putri Budi Sedjati organisations—whilst still proclaiming themselves non-political, in fact took a stand against imperialism and colonialism. Three more women’s congresses were held before the 2nd World War, in 1935, 1938 and 1941. During the Japanese occupation there existed a Japanese Government-sponsored organisation for women called Fudjinkai. The work of this organisation was chiefly in the social field. After 1945 the Perwari (Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia) was formed. Annual congresses were held in the years following 1945. The concern of these congresses was primarily with the struggle for independence, and only secondarily with purely women’s affairs. During the fight for independence women played an important part. They were active in setting up public kitchens, in aiding and succouring refugees, and in making collections of clothing and medical supplies for the victims of the fighting. They even took part in the fighting, side by side with the men. They gave of their best for the national cause, sharing with the men all the hardships and difficulties of the times. Mrs. Supeni, who is now 3rd Deputy Foreign Minister. === [PDF page 141] === In 1950 the Kongres Wanita Indonesia was established as the federation of women’s organisations. The first secretary was Mrs. Maria Ulfah Santoso. The federation is based on the Pantja Sila (the 5 principles of State), on national independence, the rights of women as citizens and on world peace. It aims at achieving an equitable marriage law, at improving the health of the people, at setting up anti-illiteracy courses and at providing study funds for women. With the achievement of independence women gained complete equality with men before the law. In public life the position of women is unquestionably equal. Indonesian women work as teachers, nurses, doctors, social workers, lawyers, university lecturers, diplomats and cabinet ministers. In the present cabinet there are two women ministers, Mrs. Rusiah Sardjono and Mrs. Artati Marzuki, respectively Minister of Social Affairs and Minister of Basic Education and Culture. Many more women are to be found working in the civil service, often in positions of considerable importance. Partly because of the great lack of trained and qualified people with which Indonesia was faced upon independence, and because of their efforts in the struggle for independence, there has been no necessity for the women to fight for the right to enter the different professions. There is complete equality of pay and of opportunity. The Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of the people, and under its provisions the women of Indonesia have an equal right to vote and to stand for election. In the present Mutual Co-operation House of Representatives they have 18 seats out of 281, and in the People’s Consultative Congress 29 out of 616. Legislation governing the employment of women in the civil service and in industry and business was drawn up in 1948, and came into effect for the whole of the Republic of Indonesia in 1951. Married women are allowed 3 months maternity leave on full pay, provided they have held their post for at least a year and will be returning to work after the birth. This legislation also prohibits the employment of children under 14 years of age. The women’s organisations today, besides their concern with educational and social work, are still trying to improve woman’s legal position in marriage. The Government, upon the instigation of the 12 Indonesia’s delegation to the Afro-Asian Women’s Congress held in Colombo in February 1958. From left to right: Mrs. Hartini, Mrs. Trimurti, Mrs. Eljas Sutan Pangeran, Mrs. Maria Ulfah Santoso, Mrs. Sujono, Mrs. H. Subandrio, Mrs. K. Radjasah and Mrs. Nani Suwondo. women’s organisations, has been considering the introduction of a uniform marriage law since 1950. The establishment of such a law, however, has come up against the difficulty of the different religious laws and different customary laws prevailing in various parts of the country. Indonesian women are active in the international field in all matters of social concern. They send delegates to the international conferences, amongst others to the Afro-Asian Women’s Congresses in Colombo and Cairo, and many have studied abroad the social institutions and services of other countries. In education, too, they are very active, particularly in the education of small children and in the provision of kindergartens and play gardens. Nowadays, there are more than 50 women’s organisations affiliated to the Indonesian Women’s Congress. Some of the largest and most influential are Perwari, Wanita Demokrat, Gerwani, Wanita Katolik, Aisjah (Moslem Women’s Association), Wanita Universitas, Persatuan Istri Tentara Kartika Tjandrakirana (Army Wives’ Association), and Bhayangkari (Police Wives’ Association). The present chairman of the Indonesian Women’s Congress is Mrs. Dr. Hurustiati Subandrio. She herself holds a high position as Deputy Minister of Health, is a keen social worker, and one of Indonesia’s prominent women’s leaders today. The Indonesian Women’s Congress also maintains close co-operation with the Women’s Council in Britain. Despite equality in the fields of education, employment, politics and government, there is still some way to go before the position of women can be said to be on a footing of absolute equality in all spheres of life. Moreover, emancipation does not merely mean equality with men, but rather a situation where economic and social factors no longer hold back the woman from playing her full part in the life of the community and the nation. Hence, great efforts are being made by the women’s organisations of Indonesia, as well as by the Government, to bring education, knowledge and medical care to even the remotest village of the country, with the aim of bringing about a genuine improvement in the life and position of the Indonesian women. Saidjah and Adinda Part One We begin this month to serialise the story of Saidjah and Adinda, which ts taken from the novel ““Max Havelaar’’ by the 19th Century Dutch author Edward Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), an official of the Netherlands Indies who wrote under the name of Multatuli. The story takes place in the village of Badur in West Fava, and tells of the love between a village boy and girl. SAIDJAH’S FATHER had a buffalo, with which he ploughed his field. When this buffalo was taken away from him by the district chief at Parangkudjang he was very dejected, and did not speak a word for many days. The time for ploughing had come and he feared that if the ricefield was not cultivated in time the opportunity to sow would be lost, and that later there would be no rice to cut and none to keep in the rice-barn of the house. Saidjah’s father, then, was very uneasy. He feared that his wife would have no rice, nor Saidjah himself, who was still a child, nor his little brothers and sisters. And the district chief, too, would denounce him to the Dutch Assistant Resident if he was in arrears in the payment of his land-taxes, for this is punished by law. Saidjah’s father then took a kris, which was an inheritance from his father. The kris was not very handsome, but there were silver bands around the sheath, and at the end there was a silver plate. He sold this kris to a Chinese who lived in town, and came home with twenty-four guilders, for which amount he bought another buffalo. Saidjah, who was then about seven years old, soon made friends with the new buffalo. It is not without meaning that I say “made friends”’, for it is indeed touching to see how the buffalo is attached to the little boy who watches over him and feeds him. Of this attachment I shall very soon give an example. The large, strong animal bends its heavy head to the right, to the left, or downwards, just as the pressure of the child’s finger—which he knows and understands—directs. Such a friendship little Saidjah had soon been able to make with the newcomer, and it seemed as if the encouraging voice of the child gave still more strength to the heavy shoulders of the strong animal, when it tore open the stiff clay and traced its way in deep sharp furrows. The buffalo turned willingly, on reaching the end of the field, and did not lose an inch of ground when ploughing backwards the new furrow, which was ever near the old, as if the ricefield was a garden raked by a giant. Quite near were the ricefields of the father of Adinda (the father of the child that was to marry Saidjah); and when the little brothers of Adinda came to the limit of their fields just at the same time that the father of Saidjah was there with his plough, then the children called out merrily to each other, and each praised the strength and the docility of his buffalo. But I believe that the buffalo of Saidjah was the best of all, perhaps because its master knew better than anyone else how to speak to the animal, and buffaloes are very susceptible to kind words. Saidjah was nine and Adinda six when this buffalo too was taken from Saidjah’s father by the chief of the district of Parangkudjang. Saidjah’s father, who was very poor, sold to a Chinese two silver curtain hooks —an inheritance from his wife’s parents— for eighteen guilders, and for that money he bought a new buffalo. But Saidjah was very dejected. He knew from Adinda’s little brothers that his buffalo had been driven to the town, and he asked his father whether he had seen the animal when he was there to sell the curtain hooks. To this question Saidjah’s father had refused to give an answer. Therefore he feared that his buffalo had been slaughtered, like the other buffaloes which the district chief had taken from the people. And Saidjah wept much when he thought of this poor buffalo, which he had known for such a long time, and he could not eat for many days because his throat felt too narrow when he swallowed. The new buffalo soon got acquainted with Saidjah, and very soon obtained in his heart the same place as his predecessor. Too soon, perhaps, because the wax impressions of the heart are indeed very soon smooth to make room for other writing. However this may be, the new buffalo was not so strong as the former. True, the old yoke was too large for his neck, but the poor animal was willing, like his predecessor which had been slaughtered. And though Saidjah could boast no more of the strength of his buffalo when he met Adinda’s brothers at the boundaries, yet he maintained that no other surpassed his in willingness. And if the furrow was not so straight as before, or if lumps of earth had been turned but not cut, he willingly made this right as much as he could with his hoe. Moreover, no buffalo had such a peculiar whirl in the hair like this. The village priest himself had said that there was luck in the course of the hair-whirls on its shoulders. Once, when they were in the field, Saidjah called in vain to his buffalo to make haste. The animal did not move. Saidjah grew angry at this unusual stubborness, and could not refrain from scolding. He said “a-s-”. Everyone who has been in Indonesia will understand me, and he who does not, gains by it if I spare him the explanation of a coarse 13 === [PDF page 142] === expression. Yet Saidjah did not mean anything bad. He only said it because he had often heard it said by others when they were dissatisfied with their buffaloes. But it was useless; his buffalo did not move an inch. He shook his head, as if to throw off the yoke, the breath appeared out of his nostrils, he blew, he trembled, there was anguish in his blue eye, and his upper lip was curled upwards so that the gums were bare... “Fly! Fly!” Adinda’s brothers cried, “Fly, Saidjah! There is a tiger!” They all unyoked the buffaloes, and throwing themselves on their broad backs galloped away through ricefields, trenches, mud, brushwood, forest and alang-alang grass, along fields and roads, and when they tore panting and dripping with perspiration into the village of Badur, Saidjah was not with them. Saidjah’s buffalo, driven on by his own speed, raced a few paces past the spot where his little master had fallen and awaited death. Through his speed alone, and not of his own free will, the animal had gone further than Saidjah, for scarcely had it conquered the momentum that rules all matter even after the cause has ceased, than it turned, and placing its big body, supported by its big feet, like a roof over the child, and turned its horned head towards the tiger, which bounded forward... but for the last time. The buffalo caught him on his horns, and only lost some flesh which the tiger tore out of his neck. The tiger lay there with his belly torn open, and Saidjah was saved. Certainly there had been luck in the peculiar hair-whirls of the buffalo. When this buffalo had also been taken away from Saidjah’s father and I warned you, reader, that my story is monotonous. When this buffalo was slaughtered, Saidjah was just twelve, and Adinda was weaving sarongs and making batik figures on them. She had already learned to express thoughts in melancholy drawings on her material, because she had seen Saidjah very sad. Saidjah’s father was also sad, but his mother still more so, for she had cured the wound in the neck of the faithful animal which had brought her child home unhurt, after having thought, by the news of Adinda’s brothers, that he had been taken away by the tiger. As often as she saw this wound, she 14 thought how far the claws of the tiger, which had entered so deeply into the coarse flesh of the buffalo, would have penetrated into the tender body of her child. Every time she put fresh dressings on the wound she caressed the buffalo, and spoke kindly to him, so that the good, faithful animal might know how grateful a mother is. Afterwards, she hoped that the buffalo understood her, for then he must have understood why she wept when he was taken away to be slaughtered, and he would have known that it was not the mother of Saidjah who caused him to be slaughtered. Some days afterwards Saidjah’s father fled out of the country. He was much afraid of being punished for failing to pay his land-taxes, and he had no other inheritance to sell to enable him to buy a new buffalo, because his parents had always lived in Parangkudjang, and had therefore left him only a few things. The parents of his wife, too, had lived in the same district. However, he went on for some years after the loss of his last buffalo by working with hired animals for ploughing. But that is very ungrateful labour, and, moreover, it is sad for a person who has had buffaloes of his own. Saidjah’s mother died of grief. In a moment of dejection his father fled from the Bantam area to Bogor, in the hope of getting some job there. But he was punished with a beating, because he had left Lebak without an identification card, and he was brought back by the police to the village of Badur. There he was put in prison because he was supposed to be mad, which I can readily believe, and because it was feared that he would run amok in a moment of frenzy. But he was not long in prison, for he died soon afterwards. What became of the brothers and sisters of Saidjah I don’t know. The house in which they had lived at Badur was empty for some time, and soon fell down. The house was only built of bamboo and covered with atap of coconut leaves. A little dust and dirt covered the place where there had been much suffering. There are many such places in Lebak. Saidjah was already fifteen years of age when his father set out for Bogor. He did not accompany his father, because he had other plans in mind. He had been told that there were many gentlemen in Djakarta who drdVe in bendi or horse-drawn carts, and that it would be easy for him to get a job as bendi-boy. Generally a young person is chosen to become a bendi-boy; he has to sit in the carriage to keep the balance of this two-wheeled cart, which usually has too much weight behind. He would, they told him, gain much in that way if he behaved well. In three years he would, perhaps, be able to save enough money to buy two buffaloes. This was a smiling prospect for him. With the proud step of one who has conceived a grand idea, he, after his father’s flight, entered Adinda’s house and told her his plan. **Think of it”, he said. ““When I come back we shall be old enough to marry, and shall possess two buffaloes!” “Very well, Saidjah, I will gladly marry you when you return. I will spin and weave sarongs and scarfs, make some batiks, and be very diligent all the time.” “Oh, I believe you, Adinda, but— what if I should find you married?” “Saidjah, you know very well that I shall marry nobody but you; my father promised me to your father.” ‘And you yourself?” “T will marry you, you may be sure of that.” “When I come back, I will call from afar off.” “Who will hear you, if we are stamping rice in the village?” “That is true—but Adinda—oh, yes! This is better—wait for me near the djati wood, under the ketapang tree where you gave me the melati flower.” “But, Saidjah, how can I know when I am to go to the ketapang tree?” Saidjah thought for a moment, and said, “Count the moons. I shall stay away three times twelve moons, this moon not included. See, Adinda—at every new moon cut a notch in your rice-block. When you have cut three times twelve lines, I will be under the ketapang tree the next day. Do you promise to be there?” “Yes, Saidjah. I will be there under the ketapang tree near the djati wood when you come back.” Saidjah then tore off a piece of his head-cloth, which was very much worn, and gave the piece of linen to Adinda to keep as a pledge. Then he left her and the village of Badur. News in brief March 1965 On March | the U.N. office in Djakarta officially closed down, as did the Indonesian mission at the United Nations in New York, following the Republic’s decision in January to quit the organisation after “Malaysia” was elected to a seat on the Security Council. The new Ambassador to the Netherlands, Dr. Sudjarwo, arrived to take up his post on March 1. The outgoing Chargé d’Affaires, Dr. Moh. Sjarif, returned to Indonesia. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, made it clear that Indonesia would not withdraw any of her guerrillas from the border, but she was still prepared to enter into political negotiations with Kuala Lumpur over the “Malaysia” question. The Government wanted a peaceful solution, but, in negotiations towards that end, there should be no pre-conditions. Earlier in the month, President Sukarno visited Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, for the Conference on Indo-China, at the invitation of the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He received a great welcome from the delegates, and in his speech said that he had come “‘not only as a friend, but as a comrade-in-arms”, who would do his best to contribute in Asia to the framing of a new order of real—not “‘paper”—freedom. Indonesia fully supported the struggle of the Indo-Chinese peoples against the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The First Afro-Asian Islamic Conference was held in Djakarta. At the closing session on March 12 Dr. Sukarno appealed for continued unity among all Afro-Asian Moslems, whose “current re-awakening has a major significance in the world.”” Whatever happened in Asia, the problems there must be solved by Asians themselves, and consultations were always the best way to solve disputes, the President said. The Government cancelled all preparations for Indonesia’s participation in the second stage of the New York World’s Fair, in reply to the open U.S. support for the neo-colonialist project of “Malaysia”. Indonesia had her own pavilion—which was visited by many thousands of people—in the first stage of the fair which closed last October. The first plane of Garuda Indonesian Airways on the route Djakarta-Netherlands touched down at Schipol airport at Amsterdam on March 30. From now on, there will be twice-weekly flights with Garuda Convair jet 990’s. The flying time is approximately 17} hours. 15 === [PDF page 143] === After a hard day’s work in the paddy fields the oxen are given a cooling bath. Published by The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, London and printed by the Twentieth Century Press (1912) Ltd., 8-13 New Inn Street, London, E.C.2 === [PDF page 144] === ISSUED BY THE IN 4 LON DEPARTMENT Unity in Diversity Voi. AV Nos 3 May 1965 TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF BANDUNG CONFERENCE: Impressive celebration in Djakarta The 10th anniversary of the First Afro-Asian Conference — held in Bandung in 1955 - was celebrated in Djakarta and Bandung from April 18-24. A huge mass rally in the capital was attended by 150,000 people. The 110,000-capacity stadium at Senajan was packed, and an overflow crowd of tens of thousands were massed outside listening to the speeches coming over the loudspeakers. Delegates of nearly 4O Asian and African countries were seated around President Sukarno's box. The rally was opened by the Governor of Djakarta, who welcomed the visitors. He was followed by the Foreign Minister of Ghana, who said that at the time of the Bandung conference only three African states were independent, but now after ten years, there were 36 of them, all included in the Organisation of African Unity. The Africans were resolved to establish a continental African government as the best expression of their desires and sovereignty, He stressed that independence was the key to world peace. He announced that Ghana was ready to serve as host - in Accra - to the forthcoming Afro- Asian People's Solidarity Conference. Chinese and Cambodian statements The Chinese Premier, Mr Chou En-lai, flew in for the celebrations from Peking. At the airport, he said that after a lapse of ten years, the revolutionary spirit of the Indonesians was more alive than ever. “Asia and Africa belong to the peoples of Asia and Africa," he said. "We, and only we, are the masters of those two continents." In another statement, the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, denounced what he called "a coalition of forces in the West fired by imperialist ambitions, which seeks to recover lost colonial positions and has now adopted new and dangerous methods to reach its goals." He charged that, "operating according to a plan worked out in advance, these forces proceeded from 1955 not only to attempt to frustrate the principles laid down at Bandung, but also to undermine and render ineffectual the UN Charter." Dr Subandrio's return The Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca on April 16 to help in the preparations for the anniversary celebrations. He said he was looking forward to the Second AnA Conference to be held in Algiers in June. State banquet President Sukarno was host at a state banquet for the visiting === [PDF page 145] === isla tee delegations. Among the guests were Heads of State, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, two princesses, senior officers, and other officials of Asian-African States. PRESIDENT'S SPEECH: "Confrontation far from being an Indonesian monopoly" In his main address to the assembled Afro-Asian delegates in Djakarta, Dr Sukarno said that if the British withdrew from 'Malaysia', the Malayan and North Borneo peoples would certainly be able to elect their own governments by democratic procedures. The Koreans and Vietnamese would also be able to reunify their split countries if the Americans left. He said that "confrontation" was not an Indonesian monopoly. Every nation that genuinely wanted to see an end to colonialism had to wage confrontation. Cuba waged it, and so did Tanzania and Burma and many others in their different ways. The 'Sukarno- Macapagal doctrine" had proclaimed that Asian problems must be solved by Asians themselves. But by Asians was meant those Asians whose feet were firmly planted on their own soil and who worked for Asia's interests, not as agents of the West. He said the Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo last year had refused to allow Tshombe of the Congo to attend, because he was a "non-African African, just as Chiang Kai-Shek and Tunku Abdul Rahman are non-Asian Asians." On 'Malaysia', the President said the neo-colonialists had the effrontery to ask: "Why are landings being made in Malaya?" When volunteers went to Malaya to aid the independence struggle, a great commotion was made, but when ‘Malaysian and British regular troops violated Indonesian borders and penetrated into Kalimantan, they did this without the slightest sense of guilt. "Thirty years ago", he continued, "volunteers from all over the world fought to defend the republic of Spain. Why is it that volunteers can be organised to fight fascism, but not to fight neo— colonialism? "When in 1958 a rebellion broke out in my country, and I was taking steps to stamp it out, I thought of the words of Abraham Lincoln, who said that every national government had the right to: oppose rebellion. South Korea under Syngman Rhee organised volunteers in an abortive attempt to save the counter-revolution in Sumatra; Formosa (Taiwan ) and others came in; and the imperialists and their press regarded this as something quite hnormal'. But when North Korea offered to help Indonesia with her policy of confrontation, the same imperialists went into fits of frenzy. "Britain is now mobilising mercenary Gurkha troops to suppress North Borneo, and America is bringing in people from Formosa for its aggression in Vietnam. This is still considered quite 'normal'. But they run around in circles like a man with his whiskers on fire when volunteers are organised for Vietnam in Russia, China, Cuba and here," Dr Sukarno said Indonesia had helped the freedom battles of Tunisia and Algeria, and her troops had served with the UN in the Congo, and she was now aiding the Malayans and North Borneans. "We are always prepared to help, with weapons and personnel, the cause of defending independence. But for us, South Africa, Israel, the Federation of South Arabia and 'Malaysia' legally do not exist. They simply legally do not exist." "INDONESIA HAS NO MBSSAGE FOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT" Before flying to London recently for consultations at the Foreign Office, the UK Ambassador in Djakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, asked Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, whether he had a "message" for the British Government. Dr Subandrio told reporters that he had told Sir Andrew that Indonesia's attitude towards ‘Malaysia’ was clear enough and had often been repeated. He said the British Government had the choice of solving the dispute either on the basis of the Manila agreement or the Tokyo declaration, === [PDF page 146] === CZECH PROTEST AGAINST 'MALAYSIA' IN U.N. "Certain western powers compelled us to split a two-year term on the Security Council with Malaysia." This was stated by the Czechoslovak permanent representative to the UN, Mr Hajek, in a letter to the current President of the Se scurity, Council, Mr Usher of the Ivory Coast. He said that 'Malaysia's' seat whould by rights be occupied by a member of the socialist bloc. Mr Hajek said that when Czechoslovakia agreed to share her non-voting seat with Malaysia’ » She never intended to "legitimise" the latter's occupation of a seat pe raha by a well-known agreement, for the communist countries of eastern Europe. "Nor does our decision legitimise the policy of cold war and discrimination obstinately pursued by certain western powers, contrary to the Charter and in violation of the commitments undertaken by the big powers at the birth of this organisation." The western powers had supported the candidacy of 'Malaysia' as opposed to other countries, which had viewed its creation as contrary to "one of the main purposes of the UN, which is the Aigemnashet of the colonial system."" 'Malaysia' was formed as part of a British scheme to maintain a foothold in south-east Asia. ¢ In his letter, the Czech delegate also said that 'Malaysia's' candidature had been raised during oe elections to the Security Council only by certain powers of the western military group in order to prevent Czechoslovakia, a founder-member of the United Nations, from being elected. INDONESIAN DIPLOMACY IN AFRO-ASIA rial on Indonesia's responsibilities in Afro-sAsia, age 'Indonesian Herald' wrote: In a recent ed the English-la Lito ngu When Indonesia withdrew from the UN, we went on record a ices greater attention to reinforcing solidarity among the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, We said then that the highly experienced men accredited to the UN and the substantial amount of foreign exchange paid to the world organisation should now be used for building up existing relations or opening new avenues in these three vital areas. To-day the Foreign Department is doing precisely this, "The accent on Afro-asia and Latin America speaks of Indonesia's recognition of the fact that the future of the world will be decided in these three regions. No power, however strong or rich, can pursue an effective foreign policy unless assured of the voluntary and unpurchased support of these new countries." INDONESIAN DIPLOMAT'S LETTERS TO DUTCH PRESS The Dutch weekly ‘Elsevier Weekblad" recently carried a letter to the editor by Mr Wijarto, Counsellor for Press and Information at the Indonesian Embassy at The Hague. Mr Wijarto attacked an article by Martin Duyzing on Indon esia as "bad of its kind, not because it contained criticism of Indonesia and her rulers, but because it breathed a spirit of malevolence which the writer tried to conceal by inferior journalism." He pointed to the "maliciously wrong" translations of texts of peeches by President Sukarno, and denied Mr Duyzing's right to cakeisys Indonesia's "character traits" and her methods of nationbuilding. That was a question, Mr Wijarto said, for the Indonesians only, and had nothing to do with Mr Duyzing. The Republic was not afraid of criticism, and small-minded articles like this could do it no harm. The country would follow its own course, as it had always done, even if a hundred people like Mr Duyzing wrote in a hundred journals like 'Elsevier' === [PDF page 147] === a he In another letter, to ‘Algemeen Handelsblad', Mr Wijarto praised an article which "proves that this daily is keenly interested in Indonesia and her leaders," He said that his country - whether outsiders accepted it or not - had succeeded gaining a "unique place" in the world, not only because it had made no secret of the aim to set up its own system, but at the game time "lived up to that system." This caused much displeasure - if not outright fury - among those who saw Indonesia gaining stature in the world, and making progress in her efforts to get people to realise the "right proportions" of the present international situation. One of the consequences of her outspokenness and honesty was that all kinds of tendentious reports were spread about nee head of state and his colleagues, and the general running of the country. In short, Mr Wijarto said, the imperialists and their servants would much prefer a "tame and manageable" Indonesia, without her own system, remaining an impotent lackey to their ambitions. MIGRATION FROM JiVa In April, some 1,750 families migrated from the overcrowded Gunung Kidul area in Central Java to Seputih Matara and Bumiagung in South Sumatra. The Dept. of Transmigration announced that 5@ families were shipped to these resettlement areas every day via Djakarta, and then ferried over to Sumatra, The families are part of a large-scale transmigration programme for the population of Gunung Kidul which will number 16,000 families, or about 80,000 people, in the course of. this year. 'MALAYSIA'S' ECONOMY STRAINED The Central Bank in Kuala Lumpur has admitted in its annual report that the economy of 'Malaysia' has been considerably strained in the past year as a result of Indonesia's confrontation. The report said that an increasing amount of funds had to be devoted to expenditure on "defence and internal security." The overall deficit in the national budget had now increased to the of US $51 million in the country's balance of payments. CREDIT FROM CHINA: co-operation for achieving "self-reliance" The Foreign Economic Relations Directorate of the Indonesian Foreign Department disclosed recently that the economic discussions between Indonesia and China in Peking stressed the principle of selfreliance, There was ee Saeeesey ae on both sides regarding the principle of standing on one's own feet." Foundation for the implementation of economic co-operation had be@laid down during Vice-Premier Chen Yi's visit to Djakarta. With reference to the Chine credit, President Sukarno had instructed that it be used for, am ong other things, the construction of small cement plants in a re gion so that it would be not too dependent on other regions' building materials for development; also it should be used for importing, besides spare parts, basic raw materials such as yarn to supply already existing industries in order to ensure their normal production. The conditions for the repayment of the Chinese credit were "light," the announcement added. First instalment would be due ten years after the signing of the agreement. US#50m. would be spent on building up small industries and importing basic raw matorials only. === [PDF page 148] === Indications showed that Sino-Indonesian economic cooperation was now geared to make great progress. Floating dock completed A 15,000-ton floating dock has been completed at the free port of Sabang, on the tip of North Sumatré Other works completed were the salvaging of sunken ships an the construction of go-downs. The local maritime command announced that the salvaging was done entirely by Indonesian contractors, and the work turned out to be 50% cheaper compared with that done by foreign companies. Previously, salvaging was carried out by a Hong Kong firm in cooperation with the Indonesian Navy. The salvage company also assisted in assembling the floating dock. The la wo wrecks of ships sunk off North Sumatra during World War were salvaged at Sa id recently. One was a freighter Sale of Djakarta-Lloyd ship The former Djakarta-Lloyd cargo vessel 'Tjo okroaminoto", which caught fire in the docks at amsterdam last year, has been sold to a Greek shipping company. It will be repaired in a Greek shipyard and then re-sold to the highest bidder. Dutch-Indonesian trade The Dutch Foreign eee ee? Dr Luns, in a note to the First Chamber of Parliament at The Hague, stated that Holland's exports to Indonesia rose from 31.5 ga Ton guilders in 1963 to 43m. in 1964. Dutch imports from. the Republic during the same period rose considerably from 55.5m. guilders to 3AAm. Japan-Indonesia agreement revised pce agreement of the Japan-Indonesia Freight Conference wa igned recently by Indonesia and representatives of foreign shipping companies on the Indonesia-Japan route, such as the Tokyo Sampaku Maerks Line and China Navigation. They accepted Indonesia's demand that 40 per cent. of frcight to and from that country should be carried by its ships. Under the former conference, Indonesia's share was only 15 per cent. Djakarta-Lloyd, the State-owned shipping company, has become a member of the conference. wiNT_S opens new service via Djakarta Australia's overseas airline, QANTAS, has opened a new service Vienna with a stop-over at Djakarta. Boeing 707 jets on th "Kangaroo route" from Sydney to London now’ call at Vienna Fiction a weeke Every Wednesday, one 4ustrian flight passes through Djakarta, while the other ‘809°S via Manila and Hongkong. KARTINI DAY IN LONDON Kartini Day we slebrate n April 21 to honour the memory of Raden Adjeng Kartini 179-1004 who began the movement for the emancipation of women in Indo was commemorated in London by the women of the Indonesian commu at the en in Grosvenor Square, and the reception was att ‘dee r representatives ot local women's organisations, wives of MPS and ess and tural attachés, and representatives of newspapers and w Mrs Harun Saleh, wife of the Mi nister/Counsello r (E conomic) at the-embassy, explained, in her speech Kartini's stru tp and ideas us a women pioneer ¢ r aS mae estan erie es said = he "spirit of Bandiing® was also as Kartini's ideals === [PDF page 149] === the emancipation as seen by her projected, as it were, "on to a wide screen." If Kartini had been alive today, she would have seen Py the developments in Afro-Asia as a justification of the principles for which she fought. The celebration also included a performance of Indonesian dances. and songs, and an exhibition of arts and crafts. oonts..fromip. 2 (The Manila agreement, signed on July 31, 1963, by President Sukarno, President Macapagal of the Philippines, and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya, contains three main provisions: 1) that Indonesia and the Philippines will welcome the Federation of Malaysia, provided that the support of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority; 2) that foreign bases, temporary in nature, should not be allowed to be used to subvert the independence and integrity of the signatory powers; 3) that the three states should take initial steps towards the establishment of a Confederation of nations of Malay origin, under the name of Maphilindo, to achieve understanding and co-operation in dealing with problems of common interest. The Tokyo declaration, signed by the same three leaders in Tokyo on June 20, 1964, calls for the establishment of an Afro-Asian conciliation commission, to be composed of four members (each country will nominate one member of her choice, and these three members will jointly nominate a fourth) to make recommendations on the solution of the’ Malaysia problem. ) JOINT INDONESIAN-U.S. COMMU} TIQUE ON PRESENT RELATIONSHIP President karno has oe the United States that the issue betwee Indonesia and 'Malaysia' is of the greatest importance, and that he wishes to see it settled on the basis of the Manila and Tokyo eqreomente: hi stated in a joint statement issued by Indonesia and the U.S. on April 15 at the close of the visit of Mr Ellsworth Bunker, special envoy of President Johnson, to Djakarta to discuss the deterioration in relations between the two countries in recent months. Mr Bunker had had a series of talks with Dr Sukarno and the Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio. The communiqué said both Governments recognised that friendly ee itions between them were of major importance. Mr Bunker had ured Dr Sukarno that the U.S. was concerned with the freedom, welfare security of all countries. While it was true that ona range of foreign policy the views of both countries were divergent, sreed that such differences should not be allowed to affect daha. the ——- pattern of friendship which had existed for so many years between the statement said, wished to see the "Malaysia ettled on the bas the Manila and Tokyo agreements, Mr Bunker reaffirmed that the deeply regretted that this problem existed, anc ped that a peace solution could be brought about by Asian power At the same time, both recognised that these differences had produced certain tensions between Indonesia and America, and that, as a result, the programmes of assistance to Indonesia which the U.S. had undertaken in recent years should be reviewed and revised on a continuing basis, to be sure that they conformed to the desires of the two governments. Specifically, Mr Bunker informed Dr Sukarno that the U.S. would be willing to continue these programmes to certain Indonesian universities, and Dr Sukarno assured the envoy that this was welcomeé, and had the full support of his Government. === [PDF page 150] === WAr 4: ere Bee wat [Unreadable] : RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No "1 [pwn A {te Baas Approach from Indonesian Embass Press Attache An identical letter has been sent to Mr. Stewart. 2e Mre Sukarno is a personable and active member of the Indonesian Embassy (who says that "regrettably" he is no relation of the Bung) who has achieved some success in persuading some of the more gullible British journalists of the "my country always wrong" brigade to accept his wares. But the publications he purveys are essentially propaganda (e.g. “the neo-Colonists had the effrontary to ask: ‘why are landings being made in Malaya?''; "Britain is now mobilising mercenary Ghurka troops to suppress North Borneo"; "Tanku Abdul Rahman (is) a non-Asian Asian") and there is no reason to encourage him. I therefore recommend that a reply should go from this Department, acknowledging his offer and informing him that in future copies should be addressed to this Department. Be In the concluding paragraph of his letter Mr. Sukarno may be hinting that he is willing to undertake negotiations. (The Indonesian Chargé d‘Affaires in London is at present in Indonesia, and there have been indications that Mr. Sukarno would not be averse to extending his activities beyond mere information work). To show any sign of interest in this offer (if it is an offer) would merely excite latent Indonesian ideas that H.M.G. is casting around somewhat desperately for away out of the Malaysian problem. I therefore recommend that this paragraph be ignored. ue I attach a draft of the reply which it is suggested /this CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 151] === CONFIDENTIAL this Department might send to Mr. Sukarno. The Foreign Office concur. (A.A.GOLDS ) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department 18 May 1965. Refer K. S/¢ ¢ ie ae te ae Lhe. BS { Ane oC lc Oe, ath Apart Lf 5 fC: det yet Sh do hn pte eicaal, Z (Yo res CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 152] === CONFIDENTIAL APPROACH FROM INDONESIAN EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE An identical letter has been sent to Mr. Bottomley. 2e Mr. Sukarno is a personable and active member of the Indonesian Embassy (who says that "regrettably" he is no relation of the Bung) who has achieved some success in persuading some of the more gullible British journalists of the “my country always wrong" brigade to accept his wares. But the publication he purveys are essentially propaganda (e.g. "the neo-Colonists had the effrontary to ask: ‘why are landings being made in Malaya?'; "Britain J o oS is now mobilising mercenary Ghurka troops to suppress North Borneo"; "Tunku Abdul Rahman (is) a non-Asian Asian") and there is no reason to encourage him. I therefore recommend that a reply should go from this Department, acknowledging his offer and informing him that in future copies should be addressed to this Department. de In the concluding paragraph of his letter Mr. Sukarno may be hinting that he is willing to undertake negotiations. (The Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires in London is at present in Indonesia, and there have been indications that Mr. Sukarno would not be averse to extending his activities beyond mere information work). To show any sign of interest in this offer (if it is an offer) would merely excite latent Indonesian ideas that H.M.G. is casting around somewhat desperately for a way out of the Malaysian problem. I therefore recommend that this paragraph be ignored. I attach a draft of the reply which it is suggested /this CONFIDENT IAL === [PDF page 153] === this Department might send to Mr. Sukarno. South East News Departments concur. ot tha é mee (A.A.GOLDS Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department 18 May 1965. Asia and CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 154] === JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONESIA DEPARTMENT, Registry 3 F F gy f C e R a 0 /F. 0. No. (IM 1672/ Downing Street, London, S.W.1. Insert Telephone appropriate. Confidential. ReStricted. pen. WPNwh i Draft. LETTER In your letters/to Mr. Bottomley and Mr. Stewart, Aated May 1965, you Sukarno, kindly offered to supply copies of ss Attaché, - Embassy of the "Indonesiax News" and "Indonesia Today". Republic of oe _rndonesia, si I have Been asked to say that one co 38 Grosvenor Sq. / of edgech publication will be sufficient. Wovld you please address it to me. From: Mr. AeAeGolds. === [PDF page 155] === JOINT MALAYSIA/INDONFSIA DEPARTMENT, CoR.0./Pe00, Downing Street, London, SeWels (Im 1673/ ) 20 May 1965- In your letters to Mr. Bottomley and Mr. Stewart, dated May 1965, you kindly offered to supply copies of “tndonesian News" and “Indonesia Today". I have been asked to say that one copy of each publication will be sufficient. Would you please address it to me. Mr. Sukarno, Press Attaché, Embessy of the Republic of Indonesia, 38 Grosvenor Square, LONDON, Wels === [PDF page 156] === ] (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) ». Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department | CONFIDENTIAL TMterahe SUBJECT: No. dou. Dated “ CS AWQ Encloses Copy of: = | References and Relevant Panett: received \W Biamg ddd KK. ro VA | 19 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action sand “1g (Main Indexed) | [Unreadable] === [PDF page 157] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander~in-Chief Far East) Oem DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Adams Ne. 364 De 13213 9 June, 1965; IMic13/18 9 Jume, 1965 Re 14636 9 June, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL ddressed te Kuala r _telecram Ne. 179 of 9 June. Repeated fer infermatien te Fereign Office, Djakarta, Indenesian Prepaganda,. Yeu have ne deubt seen recent Statements by Indenesian leaders te the effect that the British are preparing te attack Indenesia before the Algiers cenference., Yeu will alse be ware that exercise “windy weather", invelving 3rd Commande Brigade twe Cemmande Carriers and ene Strike Carrier, plus ether ships, will shertly take place en the ceast of Trengganu. Treeps embark fer this en 11 June. 2. Infonesians May pessibly represent this exercise as preparation fer a landing in Indenesia, which they will claim te heve frightened eff by their vigilance. ‘This ceuld be ferestalled if Malaysians weuld take up Indenesian allegatiens that attacks are being planned en them, and give maximum publicity te statement thet eppesite is the truth, as Indenesia is even new making landings in West Malaysig, de If yeu agree, we suggest that yeu might put this line te Malaysians, DISTRIBUTED To SeBeAcD. J MeTeD. News Department I.R.D. I.P.D. CoReOe, PB. and P. Department HB/ CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 158] === oe i (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department ONF! tes IMeain yoy A FROM AN, Adour No. 504 Dated \\ NY wn tae $ =P Ake R Le: Qartkena DRIES Bok Sho DoRarnnk? Encloses Copy oh: | References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) -|18 e ner MINUTES Yu Je U ante had he We tt prediecearon, copied te Veo (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Main Indexed) bet” (Action === [PDF page 159] === FLAN Odour Surgalpors oe On TR Number of copies................. Number of copies | of enclosures === [PDF page 160] === Minutes. OM fins BO HREM cps eS No (1(% Arf i Werth pn flea Amt oO pate Ces Cho); a olen dang rom Curfecnr pak jakiy a Jaw cevncn hey dann Qos peferrd Lon KL Lhyenw Mo Lid ee \ ee rf. ays === [PDF page 161] === FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office of the Pelitical Adviser te Commander in Chief Far Zast) Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ir. Adams D. 05424 11 June, i965 Nee 369 R. 08.25 11 June, “1965 11 June, 1965 DMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL es WIT ah Addressed te Kuala Lumpur telegram Ne. 180 of 11 June, Repeated for information te Fereign Office Djakarta My telegram Ne. 179: Publicity. Straits: Times this merning carries stery from Antara that the recent landings in Jehere were by "Malaysian National Arny",. This could be first instalment of a build-up te discredit Malaysia at Algiers. We suggest that the Malaysians sheuld make urgent arrangements for the Press to see priseners and te be convinced that they are net Malaysians and if possible that seme eof them are Regulars whe were detailed fer this duty and did net volunteer (they will ne deubt be ready te cooperate in preving that they are Regulars in view ef their likely fate if they admit that they are net). Fer this te be effective it must be well laid on and dene soon, preferably tomerrew and certainly net later than Menday. Far Hast Command Public Relatiens are, ef course, ready to help in any way they can; they de net think they can achieve any results by putting this te their eppesite numbers in the Malaysian Ministry of Defence, whe will prebably be everruled by OPSCO, 26 Anether peint en which we are missing tricks is publicity abread. The Malaysians have a habit of putting embargees on steries ef all landings. When the embarge is lifted, the lecal Press carry the steries and altheugh Agency reperters may file them, the steries are suppressed at their headquarters as being tee eld, Because — === [PDF page 162] === CONFIDENTIAL Singapere telegram Ne. 369 te Fereign Office. s there is virtually ne publicity sutside Malaysia. 3. # We hepe that yeu can make seme impression en the Malaysians at the pelitical level on beth the abeve peints,. DISTRIBUTED TO:+ P.O, Seuth East Asia Dept. JeMI De News Dept. Inf. Res. Dept. inf. Pel. Dept. Co.R.O. FE. & Pace Dept. ADVANCE COPIES TO:-+ F.O. Private Secretary Pol eS « Mr. Peek Hd. ef Seuth East Ha. of Asia Dept. ToMeleDe Hd. ef News Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 163] === CONFIDENTIAL @ Boum, LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE Cypher /0T. ‘9: Bs. ee DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION eatin sieeanaeesaebensaennneensianoene scones Lerd Head 135.d0i4 1965 [Unreadable] 11 June, 1965 1 1505 11 June, 1965 %. 1500 11 June, 1965 a ool. a a st 4 sy J %. 4 X f PRIORITY ae? # Ob BEA e.g oem” YW CONFIDENTIAL 6 8 tw a U / Addressed to C,R,0, telegram No.1032 ef 11 June Repeated for information to: Polad Singapere - Djakarta — Ww \o13\10 Polad Singapore telegram Ne,180 te me: Publicity about 19 Indonesian Incursions. pTe Tt 3h We have taken up peint in paragraph 1 with M.E.A., link g it with related suggestion in Pelad Singapere’s telegram Ne,179 te ne. They were particularly impressed by danger that Antars*s "Malaysian Jatienal Army" stery might be part ef effert te have a "Free Malaysia" delegation accepted at Algiers, They prepese therefore suggesting te Ghazali that carly actien en lines Suggested by Pelad Should be recommended te Ministers, (Apparently Ghazali has already Called fer full details of prisoners taken in Western Malaysia during past week and their backgreunds), 2. Point in paragraph 2 ef Pelad's telegram No,180 is beth mere tricky and less urgent: it is in any case an eld preblem and we should like more time te Censider whether it can prefitably be re-epened here, DISTRIBUTED TO; Lea ----+--Par East & Pacific Dept., News Department tus 5S.E.A.D, JoM.I.D. News Department I.R.D, oe 1.P.D. er \e e (Ke tak CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 164] === CONFIDENTIAL iM % FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Gypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist Ne, 1269 BD. 0608 12 June, 1965, 12 June, 1965, R, 081.6 12 June, 1965, PRIORITY | CONFIDENTIAL rnttackhear Inver shi [Unreadable] Addressed to Singapere telegram Ne, 829 of 12 June————~ Repeated for information te:-” Kuala Lumpur Fereign Office (Bet! Your telegram te Kuala Lumpur Ne. 180, The news item yeu mentien has not appeared in the Englishlanguage Antara ner has eur everworked Press-reader spetted it in the vernaculars, We will track it dewn; but there is ne Sign as yet ef a big planned campaign. 2. I am of course all in favour of better expleitation ef the priseners by the Malaysians, DISTRIBUTED TO:- S.E,A.B, J.M.I.3, News Bept, I.R.D, I.P.B, CRO, F.E, and P, Dept. === [PDF page 165] === CONFIDENTIAL M A TO FOREIGN OFFIC. Cypher/OTP Sir A.Gilchrist 15 JUN 1965 10.1300 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sy LMiErs hia) L, June, 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1300 of 1. June, Repeated for information to; Singapore ~ Kuala Lumpur and Saving to: Washington. Kuala Iuapur telegram No.1032. IWAG i3\\ \ D. 03.38 15 June, 1965 R. 08.30 15 June,1965 We have noted reactions on Radio Malaysia. 26 Is not this still rather defensive stuff? Will it get on to the front pages of world newspapers which is where it is needed? 36 If the Tunku wants to make more aggressive use for propaganda purposes of his prisoners and get them into the news, the best way of drawing wide attention to their existence and of demonstrating their origin might be to send half a dozen of the very youngest to Bengkek to be handed over (with the utmost publicity) to the Indonesian Eabassy for repatriation to their mothers as a gesture of fatherly benevolence by a Ged fearing Muslim statesman., 4. Correction, The references at the beginning of my telegrams Nos, 129) and 1295 should be to this telegram. Poreign Office please pass Saving to Washington as my telegram No.521. DISTRIBUTED TO; F.0, S.E.A.D. J MID. News Dept. IRD. I.P.D. CRO, Far East and Pacific Dept. News Dept. 88888 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 166] === CONFIDENTIAL * FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilehrist No. 129 D. 0357 15 June, 1965 | 44. June, 1965 R. 0730 15 June, 1965!!! % Addressed to Foreign Office tele No. 1294 of June. Repeated for information to: Singapere Kuala Lumpur My telegram 829 to Singapere.— \ MUG i We have now traeked down the vernacular Antara repert, which was regrettably overlooked by our Press readers. A translation is given in my immediately following telegran. 2, Beyond its appearance in this bulletin we have no record of the item being reproduced anywhere else in the Press, vernacular or English; but we are unable to monitor the radio and it may have been highlighted on the Indonesian Overseas Services. We should like to know about this if the information is available, and I shall be grateful if we can also be told the result of the enquiry mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 1 ef Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 1052, INVETSA is g's Seyi DISTRIBUTED TO: ino nae aclegent. FO, J.M.I.D. <p ee South East Asia Dept. Information Research “7A Dept. Information Policy Dept. News Dept. C.R.0. F.E. and P. Dept. Information Policy Dept. News Dept. CONFIDEN TIAL === [PDF page 167] === CONFIDENTIAL |M FROM SINGAPORE T0 FOREIGN OFFICE ally (Office ef the Political Adviser to the C-in-C Far East) Cypher/ OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr, Adams D. 0356 15 June 1965 Nos 38) 15 June 1965 e734 R. 0745 15 June 1965 CONFIDENTIAL 16JUN Addressed to Kuala Lumpur Aelegram No, 189 of oa oe x Djakarta © Repeated for information tos” ereenarentenmdie: f FPoreign Office Your telegram No, 1032 to Commonwealth Relations Office. We realize that point made in paragraph 2 of our telegram No, 180 involves difficulties, C in C feels however that thought should be given, before the next landings, to possibility of handling relevant publicity in a more ageressive manner than the Malaysians have done hitherte. To achieve mention in world (as distinct from purely local) Press it weuld be necessary for Malaysians te release prempt news of a fresh Indonesian infiltration into W. Malaysia, They could limit the information in such a way as to safeguard security ef operations but any delay kills even a first rate story. 2e I hope therefore that you will feel able te reepen the question as seon as you deem the moment propitious, DISTRIBUTED TO: FO. J.M.I. Department S.E.A.D. I.R.D. U.N. Department CRO. F.E. & Pacific Department CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 168] === FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE (Office of the Political Adviser to the C-in-C, Far Bashy usta (4(F) En Clair DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Adams No. 3/4 D. 0537 Li. June 1965 Li, June 1965 R. 0828 14, June 1965 es 1M lo Fo Adaressea to Djakerta telegram No. Repeated for information to: /Foreign Office Pe Kuala Lumpur Your telegram No. 829 to me. Reuters carried this item. DISTRIBUTED TO; FLO, 5.B.AD. JMI.D. News Dept. LRRD» L.P.D. CoRoO. FE. & P. Dept. === [PDF page 169] === irl \&15 CONFIDENTIAL FROM KUALA LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH Cypher/OTP ARCH VES Me, 43 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Lord Head. 21JUi 1965 Ne, 1078 Imiershaly D. 07,50 18 June, 1965 16 June, 1965 R. 10.46 18 June, 1965 CONFIDENTTAL, Gi HON CO P Y Addressed to Polad Singapere telegram No, 350 ef 18 JUNC, Repeated for informetion te: C.R.0, Djakarte, Your telegram No, 189: Publicity about Indenesisn Operations In peried before and during Afro-Asian conference at Algiers we do not consider WValaysians would need persuading te release quickly details of any fresh landings in Western Malaysie \ riers" (er majer ineursions in Bexmnee), Press conference they arranged nes\" with Inspecter Titaley on 17 June at our sugzestion (your telegram No, 160 and -mytelégram Ne, 1032 te C.R.0.) shews they can act effectively on publicity when value is clear to then, ,in short tern, therefore, doubt if we need to reopen with then as matier ef policy question ef timing of release of such information, é- Before agreeing that prineiples on which they are currently orking (King’s letter DA69/37/1 of 22 April to Gelds) should be calied inte question feel that we should know rather more about international Press coverage ef recent Indonesian operations, ' partieularly compared with Antara stories put out over same period, It seems to us that British papers at least corried as full accounts as could be expected of what have been, after all, minor operations in publieity sense when compared with eurrent military activities in, say, Viet Nam, DISTRIBUTED TO; Far East and Pacific Dept, Jollel oD, LeF eDs News Dept, SoEeAD. ToRaD. IeP oD. CONFIDENTTAL, === [PDF page 170] === T1734 KS) EN CLAIR! FROM Niarote. ae ae Oe | AeA GES! Pi we eee: oatsn OF. 6 «OF ») JUNE REPEATED POLAD SINGAPORE 54 TO POL! AD SI! YGAPORE 1 CLEING ) YUM MD atre r j alatvVin-de il.Wal “< ACpDr MAT MMEWTS ON COVERAGE ASPECT === [PDF page 171] === AAA QyGerns CR okRarka) No \WSd Dated i Xy\; ly (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Cin. eI NTTAL Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department Received BAX Q ayTeLso ane \aCO Vs (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) set 0) bth se “i MAGI\at SUBJECT: é) SO Salers, Bypleanto. Was AS Was NAG Oy lobaroe Dsakea sta, Ve e3 G3 ws EW Kuno, Qoundorna &OG at uses, | Be art lee === [PDF page 172] === IMIGRI2 | DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir A, Gilchrist No, D, 08.21 7 July, 1965 7 July, 1965 R, 09.45 7 July, 1965 IMMEDIATE Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No, 1455 ef 7 July Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur Singapore Washington Fellowing is full text of a report which appeared in the vernacular Antara ef 6 July.once more’. concerning a secret letter of the imperialists. Gaire 6,7. A few days after President Sukarno and the party under Dr. Subandrio left Caire, the newspapers still cont inued carrying stories regarding the second Afre-Asian Cenference and particularly concerning Indonesia. The A] Ahram, an influential Cairo newspaper, on 5 July published a story by its reporter, Reda Khalifah, which among ethers revealed the pheteecepy of a secret letter sent by tix British Ambassader in Djakarta te a high-ranking efficial of the "Foreign Office" in Lenden regarding the wicked intentions of the British teward Indenesia, In this case the British received assistance frem the United States and her allies. In his colum Reda Khalifah ameng others said “for the first time Indenesia disclesed the decument concerning British plan te launch military attack after the second Afre Asian Conference and the british plen was supported by the United States." Reda Khalifsh added "Foreign Minister Subendrio before leaving Cairo said te me, that he intended te produce the decument at the second Afre Asian Conference in Algiers, but due te the pestpenement ef the conference it had been decided te publish it in Caire so that people and public epinien should know that the Indonesian attitude tewards Malaysia is purely defensive in character, and so that the public should knew the real purpose ef the British bases in Singapeore and Malaysia." He alse said in his article that besides this decument, accerding te Fercign Minister, anether secret decument concerning eperational matters which were to be carried out by the British and supperted by Washingten had been seized. // Tn his === [PDF page 173] === Diakarta telegram Ne, 1455 te Fercign Office, nQe In his interview with the Al Ahram reporter, Dr. Subandrie said that the British wicked plet weuld be carried mt after the Afre Asian Cenference in Algiers, that is in a fewmore days. Among the places from which the British weuld launch the attacks were Malayan territery clesest te Sumatra, Singapere, the largest British base in Asia, and places in British Kalimantan. Fellewing is the text ef the secret letter sent by the British Ambassader in Djakarta te an under Secretary at the Foreign Office in Lenden, Sir Hareld Caccia, dated 24 March. " I have discussed with the United States Ambassader Jones the issues centained in your letter Ne. 67785-65. In principle the United States Ambassader appreved our attitude, but he requested time te study certain peints". In respense te your question regarding the prebable influence ef the visit of Mr Bunker persenal envey of President Jehnsen, te Djakarta te discuss the imprevement of United States ~ Indonesian relations, the Ambassader said that ‘they did net see any possibility ef improving the situation and it weuld net cause any change in the plan but en the contrary, the visit ef President Jehnsen'’s personal envey weuld give us ample time te complete eur preparations, "Furthermore Ambassador Jones repeated the necessity fer new efferts te integrate our activities and in this context the United States Ambassader said that it would be advantageous fer us te confirm eur plans with eur military alliances in the region te ensure success.". I have premised te make the necessary preparations and I will give my views on this matter in due course. That was the secret letter written by the British Ambassader te the Foreign Office at Whitehall, Lenden, which was published by Al Ahram, Al] Ahram addea that during a mass rally in Djakarta some time age, President Sukarne speke ef seeret decumnts being seized dealing with military operations against Indenesia. He said then that if such eperatiens teek place, Indenesia as a valiant country would face and feil them, DISTRIBUTED TO: ADVANCE COPIES P.O. F,0. S.B.AD. P.S. We0.CeDe Mr Peck co 2 N,E. A.D. Head ef SE. AD, oe IRD. Head ef J.M.1.D.7 Se I.P.D. News Department 1965 I.P.D. News Department GGGG === [PDF page 174] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist ; D. 0845 7 July 1965 No. 1456 ow R. 112k 7 July 1965 7 July 1965 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL MAGIA] 4 My immediately preceding telegran. I have not repeated this to Caire since you may have had text from that post already, otherwise you may care to ask for them, since they will be rather more authentic. DISTRIBUTED TO; F.0. S.E.A.D. J MID. IPD. I.R.D. News Department N.E.AsD. WeO.C.De C.R.O. Defence Department CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 175] === g x; j eat’ - a Iau & CANFO 09-———UKREP——@RPS-439-——-091744 A [eowerskaf) PRIORITY PRIC | cs eae eee ee 80509 aars t wf ADDRESSED CRO\805 /REPEATED AMBSSDR’ DJAKARTA O42 yo MAMTA 2A = GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE TEXT OF DJAKARTA TELEGRAM 1455 TO F.0.. ‘IN ABSENCE OF THIS WE ARE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORT OF DJAKARTA TELS 1458 AND 1474 BOTH OF WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATED TO THIS POST _fCRO PLEASE PASS DOAKARTAD KTABER if (ao SENT AT A750/09ALP PRODROME LONDON RCD UP TO NO-9g 090950E8 === [PDF page 176] === DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist No.178 D. 0526 9 July 1965 9 July 1965 R. 0632 9 Jey 1965 Reported for information to: Kuala Lumpur binge pore Antara 8 July reperts a comment by Khm Dahlan, Uhairran of the Central Board ef the Nahdlatul Ulama (religious party), that if the documents of plans of aggression by the British against Indonesians and approved by the United States as alleged in the semieeificial Al Ahrem newspaper in Cairo were true, it was a must for all Muslims te face such a threat by a holy war (Djihad). as R.D. L.P.ds News Department CRO. FE. & Pod. IPD. News Department === [PDF page 177] === FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE S aeerae Sir A. Gilchrist lo, 3487 D. 1147 10 July, 1965. 10 July, 1965. R, 1510 10 July, 1965. Addressed _to Fereign Office telegram No, 1.87 ef 10 July Repeated for information te:- Kuala Lumpur Manila Singapore Bangkek Canberra Washington Wellingten ANSTE RA The vernacular news bulletin, Antara, of & July, reperts a statement by the General Chairman ef the Indonesian Islamic Students Association (RLL),/condeming the British/American secret decument (my telegram Ne, 1455) and pressing President Seckarne and his Gevernment to give a strong warning to the British and American Gevernments, if necessary, breaking off relations with the twe countries, DISTRIBUTED TQ:- S.E,A.D, J MID. I.R.D. I.P.D. News Dept. F.E. and P, Dept. I.P.D. News Dept. === [PDF page 178] === rR ry TV E rr [Unreadable] olga — ‘ PRINTER RE. EIVE } IN * Somer ARCHIVE. fee a6 U4 1985 ( cree sna al ~ — os. toe ee (NO GOPIES MADE ROUTINE 80945 SERVICE. be gears Clie tl [Unreadable] MYTEL NO 805. REQUEST EARLY REPLY. KIMBER PRODROME LONDON SENT AT 1905/13 LFD NIL NW TKS === [PDF page 179] === B i oe 7 Date “hi ‘dime ( Top Secret Secret Confidential: ROUTINE with Restricted oer priority without DEFERRED ey rape iia are cre —if any [Codeword—1f any] Address to telegram No. KLWASS Fepresetatonr Kinnlfak Ss 25 rept in "I Khaw” of S uty? 2. Yratefat for reply by Immediate teegenne. Cott DistR hor Bef N-£ 41> News 5 |W, Sn. 1-D [Unreadable] iE i-P-» === [PDF page 180] === NISYUVW SIHL NI N3LLIGVAA 3a OL ONIHLON === [PDF page 181] === fe RESTRICTED @ FROM FOREIGN OF Cypher/OTP and by Bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION No. 1360 9 July, 1965 D, 20.45 9 July, 1965 IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED Addressed to Cairo telcpram No. 1360 of 9 July. Repeated for information Saving to: Kuala Lumpur No. 15 Washington No. 2929 FOLAD Singapore No, 347 Djakarta telegram No, 1455 [of 7 July]. Is this antara report an accurate representation of Khalifah's report in "Al shram" of 5 July? 2. Grateful for reply by immediate telegram, DISTRIBUTED TO: N.B.A.D, SHAD. _ VM.I.D. W.O.C.D, LeRiel's Lot ais News Department C.R.O. V er @ Pade Lek ods News Department === [PDF page 182] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department SUBJECT: ,. ue Po DIAG nckade Aesuse Act SOHO Encloses Copy of: | References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) MINUTES Phe eiaas, [Rd werk the > knw whet aelem] Ay ra ee Dlebota feta proms fagy, > + Wrerkeunry fe Pl fromm 1283 4.45" Ahetl (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) | (Main Indexed) mol” Ly h ani === [PDF page 183] === & CONFIDENTIAL FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 1458 D. 1140 7 July 1965 7 July 1965 R. 1333 7 July 1965 PRIORITY UZ |M ler3}allMet3|ar CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1458 of 7 July Repeated for information to: Singapore Kuala Lumpur Washington /ANellingten Canberra and Saving tot Tokyo My telegram No, 1455. I wonder whether you would now consider some strong official reaction to this. 2. I have discussed the story with the United States Chargé d°affaires, We agree that there would be advantage in early denial and ridicule. Without denial such things are accepted by the public as truth (former Premier Ali Sastroamidjejo said to Galbraith the other day “but why have you [grp undec? teo] denied this story?"). It is true that the denial may not receive widespread circulation, but the grapevine circuit here is quite remarkable and can be manipulated. At the very [gp undéc] it seems worth making some sort of effort to undermine this prepaganda build-up. Since this is allegedly a British document it will be for us to take the lead, with the Americans weighing in later. 4. The present difficulties in the way of raising the matter » officially at this end are very considerable (Leimena has discours teously avoided seeing me for three weeks despite telephonic:and written requests for an interview), so that it might be best to begin by summoning the Indonesian Chargé in London and asking him to confirm the report that this stery had been launched by Subandrio in person; I need not suggest the comments to be made on the use of this sort of diplematic technique by a Foreign Minister. The texts of the telegrams and an indication of the dressing-dewn given to the Chargé might be communicated to the Press, together with some CONFIDENT IA C === [PDF page 184] === CONFIDENT Dijakarta tele No te Foreign Office background briefing en the use of palpably ferged documents from a highly incempetent seurce (the notepaper may be authentic - stolen - but the whole form, numbering and drafting ef the ferged letter are pitifully unlike the genuine article). Reference might emerge in the Press to our amazement at such a thing being done by Subandrie at a moment when his President's wife has just paid a mest happy and successful visit te England; any speculatien might arise on whether there is perhaps some disharmony with Sukarne and Subandrie with the latter teeing the Commnist line in the hope of getting Cemmunist suppert in the struggle te succeed his ailing master. 5. Thereafter, efferts should be made to beam te Indonesia by all available means (including Radie Australia) whatever emerges from the suggestions made in the preceding paragraph. 6. An inspired question in the Heuse might alse be considered. 7. I am informing the United States Chargé d‘Affaires ef the gist ef this telegram se that he can put Washington in the picture; he thinks they may wish te consult yeu. 8. What is behind this? My guess is that it is a prelude te further screwing-up of tensien en similar lines in anticipation of 17 August, Independence Day, the ebject being net te invelve Indonesia in a full-scale war but te create - with the aid of hetting-up ef para-military activities and perhaps seme naval er air incidents with us - an atmesphere ef crises leading (they hope) to world intervention and pressure on the New Guinea pattern which will, in effect, pluck Indenesia'’s chestnuts out ef the fire. Anether eb ject is te previde justification fer the Communist drive te arm the werkers and the peasants. Fereign Office pass Canberra 42, Washingten 79, Wellingten 16 and Saving Tekye 5.. DISTRIBUTED TO: F.O. S.E.A.D sae J M.1.D P.U.S.D IR ols I.P.D. News Department News Department CONFIDENT === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 140] --- RADEN DEWI SARTIKA, from West Java, was one of the women who took up the work of Kartini, shortly after her tragically early death. Others from different regions, too, were becoming conscious of their position, and in 1912 an organisation called "Putri Mardika" was founded in Djakarta. The aim of the organisation was to improve children's education, and particularly girls' education. Other organisations soon followed. Some were independent bodies, others, such as the Women's Section of the Muhammadijah, were part of men's organisations. Not a few were formed with the aim of establishing schools for girls — to be called "Kartini Schools" — to implement Kartini's ideas on the education of young girls. In Indonesia 90% of the people are Moslems, but there has never been, for instance, the institution of purdah. In the rural areas — and over nine-tenths of the population live in these rural areas — the women have always been on a footing of social equality with men. Besides their household work, the women work in the fields with the men, and in the village community they take part in the various gatherings, vote for council members and have an equal say in the government of village affairs. Only amongst the upper classes did there exist a distinction between the social status of men and women, the women being kept very much secluded. 1928 was an important year in the struggle for national independence, as well as being a landmark for the women's movements. In December of that year several women's organisations co-operated in convening the first Women's Congress in Jogjakarta. To this Congress came representatives from 30 organisations, amongst which were Wanita Utomo (Noble Women), Putri Indonesia (Indonesian Women), Wanito Katolik (Catholic Women), Wanito Muljo (Noble Women), the women's sections of the Muhammadijah, the Sarikat Islam Party, the Young Islam Society and Young Java, as well as the Women of Taman Siswa (National Educational Institute). Discussions during the Congress ranged over woman's place in marriage, polygamy and co-education. As a result of the Congress, the Association of Indonesian Women (Perikatan Perempuan Indonesia) was formed, which later changed its title to the Association of Indonesian Women's Organisations. December 22nd, the opening day of the Congress, is now celebrated annually as Mother's Day in Indonesia. The aim of the Association of Women's Organisations was to improve the position of women in society, particularly in marriage, family and social life, and to coordinate the work of the member organisations. It was non-political and secular. But certain of the women's organisations in the 1930's — in particular the Istri Indonesia and the Putri Budi Sedjati organisations — whilst still proclaiming themselves non-political, in fact took a stand against imperialism and colonialism. Three more women's congresses were held before the 2nd World War, in 1935, 1938 and 1941. During the Japanese occupation there existed a Japanese Government-sponsored organisation for women called Fudjinkai. The work of this organisation was chiefly in the social field. After 1945 the Perwari (Women's Association of the Republic of Indonesia) was formed. Annual congresses were held in the years following 1945. The concern of these congresses was primarily with the struggle for independence, and only secondarily with purely women's affairs. During the fight for independence women played an important part. They were active in setting up public kitchens, in aiding and succouring refugees, and in making collections of clothing and medical supplies for the victims of the fighting. They even took part in the fighting, side by side with the men. They gave of their best for the national cause, sharing with the men all the hardships and difficulties of the times. [Photo caption:] Mrs. Supeni, who is now 3rd Deputy Foreign Minister. === [PDF page 141] === In 1950 the Kongres Wanita Indonesia was established as the federation of women's organisations. The first secretary was Mrs. Maria Ulfah Santoso. The federation is based on the Pantja Sila (the 5 principles of State), on national independence, the rights of women as citizens and on world peace. It aims at achieving an equitable marriage law, at improving the health of the people, at setting up anti-illiteracy courses and at providing study funds for women. With the achievement of independence women gained complete equality with men before the law. In public life the position of women is unquestionably equal. Indonesian women work as teachers, nurses, doctors, social workers, lawyers, university lecturers, diplomats and cabinet ministers. In the present cabinet there are two women ministers, Mrs. Rusiah Sardjono and Mrs. Artati Marzuki, respectively Minister of Social Affairs and Minister of Basic Education and Culture. Many more women are to be found working in the civil service, often in positions of considerable importance. Partly because of the great lack of trained and qualified people with which Indonesia was faced upon independence, and because of their efforts in the struggle for independence, there has been no necessity for the women to fight for the right to enter the different professions. There is complete equality of pay and of opportunity. The Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of the people, and under its provisions the women of Indonesia have an equal right to vote and to stand for election. In the present Mutual Co-operation House of Representatives they have 18 seats out of 281, and in the People's Consultative Congress 29 out of 616. Legislation governing the employment of women in the civil service and in industry and business was drawn up in 1948, and came into effect for the whole of the Republic of Indonesia in 1951. Married women are allowed 3 months maternity leave on full pay, provided they have held their post for at least a year and will be returning to work after the birth. This legislation also prohibits the employment of children under 14 years of age. The women's organisations today, besides their concern with educational and social work, are still trying to improve woman's legal position in marriage. The Government, upon the instigation of the women's organisations, has been considering the introduction of a uniform marriage law since 1950. The establishment of such a law, however, has come up against the difficulty of the different religious laws and different customary laws prevailing in various parts of the country. [Photo caption:] Indonesia's delegation to the Afro-Asian Women's Congress held in Colombo in February 1958. From left to right: Mrs. Hartini, Mrs. Trimurti, Mrs. Eljas Sutan Pangeran, Mrs. Maria Ulfah Santoso, Mrs. Sujono, Mrs. H. Subandrio, Mrs. K. Radjasah and Mrs. Nani Suwondo. [Page number:] 12 Indonesian women are active in the international field in all matters of social concern. They send delegates to the international conferences, amongst others to the Afro-Asian Women's Congresses in Colombo and Cairo, and many have studied abroad the social institutions and services of other countries. In education, too, they are very active, particularly in the education of small children and in the provision of kindergartens and play gardens. Nowadays, there are more than 50 women's organisations affiliated to the Indonesian Women's Congress. Some of the largest and most influential are Perwari, Wanita Demokrat, Gerwani, Wanita Katolik, Aisjah (Moslem Women's Association), Wanita Universitas, Persatuan Istri Tentara Kartika Tjandrakirana (Army Wives' Association), and Bhayangkari (Police Wives' Association). The present chairman of the Indonesian Women's Congress is Mrs. Dr. Hurustiati Subandrio. She herself holds a high position as Deputy Minister of Health, is a keen social worker, and one of Indonesia's prominent women leaders today. The Indonesian Women's Congress also maintains close co-operation with the Women's Council in Britain. Despite equality in the fields of education, employment, politics and government, there is still some way to go before the position of women can be said to be on a footing of absolute equality in all spheres of life. Moreover, emancipation does not merely mean equality with men, but rather a situation where economic and social factors no longer hold back the woman from playing her full part in the life of the community and the nation. Hence, great efforts are being made by the women's organisations of Indonesia, as well as by the Government, to bring education, knowledge and medical care to even the remotest village of the country, with the aim of bringing about a genuine improvement in the life and position of the Indonesian women. [fragment from adjacent column:] Saidjah and Adinda Part One We begin this month to serialise the story of Saidjah and Adinda, which is taken from the novel "Max Havelaar" by the 19th Century Dutch author Edward Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), an official of the Netherlands Indies who wrote under the name of Multatuli. The story takes place in the village of Badur in West Java, and tells of the love between a village boy and girl.