Airgram A-373: Joint Weeka no. 46, 7 Desember 1965

=== [PDF page 1] === This. doct.: cs 5 of 6 pages. Secret Cop;.«4..... of..@opics. Serics....... A-373 SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE GROUP 2 ~- SXEMPT : BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, MEDAN, MEW DELNZE, RAMGOOH, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOXYO, CINCPAC, CUNCUSARPAC, COMTDC, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMMAPHIL, CINCPACAF, 13th AP Manila, Cdr. US Nav, Forces Marianas; Cdr. Sth AS, Fuchu, AS, Japan; Co. 500th Intc. Grp. Amenbassy DJAKARTA December 7, 1965 JOINT WEREA MO. 46 This Weeka Covers the Period Hovember 25 to December 3, 1965 Arny-Sukarno Struggle Death of Aidit and Arrests of Commmists Relations with China: Confrontation in the News Bhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned: Cie 8 | === [PDF page 2] === SECRET Poge 2; A-373 From Djakarta POLITICAL 1. Axymy-Sukarno Struggte (SECRET) The struggle for power between Sukarno and Military leaders entered a quiet phase this week, with little political maneuvering evident at the surface, The Army concentrated on strengtheniag its position in the Supreme Cperations Command (KOT) which began to extend its authority in the £914 of the econony. The situation in the press was relatively quiet, a6 Minister of Inforvation Achmadi's new press reguietious went into effect and were chserved by all papers except the split FHE journals. Omar Dani was finelly replaced as head of the Air Force by his pro-Comminist deputy Sri Muljono Herlawbang, a move taken without the concurrence of the Arny which is said to have angered Kasution. Several ministerial pro-Commnists were reportedly placed under city arrest during the week, By tho end of the week, Sukarno had called a session of the MPRS, theoreticaliy Endonesia'’s highest ranking policy-meking body, for December 6; however, it was indicated that he would not deliver his “political solution” to the September 30 Affair at this meoting. 2. Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists (CONFIDENTIAL) a. Information received from a number of high-ranking and weli~- placed sources indicate that PEI leader D.N. Aidit was captured in Central Java on November 21 and killed after “resisting interrogation” or “attempting to escape." The Indormesian press has also subsequently carried reports to this effect. ‘here is somo evidence that Aidit may have been captured as early as mid-October and been under secret interrogation in Bandung and that Arny reports of his subsequent presenco in Central Java were intended to mislead Sukarno. In any event the recent reports indicate that Aidit is almost certainly dead now, whoever he may have heen captured. b. The Babassy has aleo recoived several reports from woll~placed sources that PKI First Deputy Chairmen Iakman and the pro~Comunist Governor of Korth Sumatra, Sitepu, have been arrested aud are in prison. After a flurry of rumors that Njoto, the PRE Second Deputy Casirmen and a Sukarno protege, had been arrested, more recont reports indicate that he was not and that he may still be under Presidential protection. (On the other hand, the later reports may be Army~inspired fabrications designed to prevent Sukarno from acting effectively to sccurs Njoto's release if the latter is . There aro also reports from weli-placed and reliable sources that = nusber of prominent crypto-Commumists have been placed under house arrest.including the (left-wing) PN1 Secretary General, Surachman, end the === [PDF page 3] === SECRET Page 3; A~373 From Dijakarta Minister of Contral Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalian, c. The Arny’s willingness to arrest PEE leaders under Sukarno's personal protection and to restrict to house arrest cerypte-Communist cabinet ministers weakens Sukarno further and shows an Aray detormination te challenge him more directly than heretofore. Reports froa various sources indicate that most of the PEZ Politburo have been captured by now although the solidity of our information varies from case to case and no information has been heard et all concerning one Politburo member (Rewang). The countdown now reads: Aidit - believed dead, Lukman ~ bolicved to be in prison; Hjoto - status unclear but may be arrested, Sudieman - believed in prison, Sakisman - belicved in prison, Adjitorop - in Peking since duly, 1864, Mjono ~ definitely in prison, Rewang ~ unknown. The whereabouts of two Politburo candidate mombers and most Central Committee members are not known but it is likely that most were arrested and/or killed by the Arny. A few are known to be in hiding. d. 4s for lower level repreagsion of the PEI, Deputy Foreign Minister Guwito told the DCH that there aro now 34,000 PKI prisoners in Java alone. The slow extension of provincial bans continued as the PRI was Gissolved in West Kalimantan, the Karo Batak area of North Sumatra and in the Jogjakarta Special Area. S. Relations with China (CONFIDENTIAL) ‘The recently uncertain course of Sino-Indonesian relations took ‘or the worse again this week. Liquid assets of Chinese~origin: 3 Ol ‘Indonesia wexs confiscated in several provinces, and Minister Ag: ae Sudjarwo announced that regional military commanders would a] ce miiis and textile enterprises ewned by members of the J socdation Baperki. Perhaps in retaliation for these ic repression, WeNA announced December ¢ that ding trade relations with Indonesia. The Chinese ; re protests to Dr. Subandrio, who maintained ere in the process of “normalizing.” This === [PDF page 4] === SECRET Page 4; A-373 From Djakarta the Foreign Ministry~controlled Indonesian Herald this week single handedly campaigned to condemn alleged British atrocities against guerrilla fighters in North Borneo. For three days the Herald printed atrocity pictures and stories, but the vernacular press continued its preoccupation with domestic events and has not picked up the theme. b. In what may be a further effort to stimulate attention on foreign affrirs, several claims of Indonesian victories along the border have also appeared in the press. Subandrio once more hinted ct “negotiations” on December 1 when he commented to the press that Indonesia would not reject an opportunity to exchange ideas with the British concerning Malaysia. Subandrio also claimed that with the elimination of the PKI Indonesia was now free to pursue confrontation more vigorously. c. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): The atrocity stories seem mostly deigned to make the continuing atrocities committed against rival political factions within Indonesia following the abortive September 30 coup seem less ‘veprehensible, by pointing the finger at alleged barberity elsewhere. The slightly increased press attention in general say also be partly related to the December 6 anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1961 by the Indonesian puppet government of the “Unitary State of North Kalimantan.” No significant increase in physical confrontation appears in the cards, however, and, except for the Palace and Subandrio, most Indonesian leaders now seem inclined to work toward the eventual dismantlement of confrontation. 5. Rhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned (UNCLASSIFIED) a. Qn November 26, the Indonesian rubber-stamp Parliament (DPRGR) “unnnimously“iesued a statement condemning Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence and accusing the British of having manipulated this result. Accepting tle resolution on behalf of the Government, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that it was the Government's conclusion that Britain had Plotted with Smith to achieve the independence of the racialist Rhodesian regime end announced that Indonesia would extend no recognition to Smith but would extend recognition to "Zimbabwe" if African political leaders declared independence. b. COMMENT (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE): Editorial and other comment on Rhodesian developments bas been relatively sparse, reflecting the major preoccupation of both the press and the politicians at present with domestic Indonesian political developments. Such statements as have been === [PDF page 5] === SRCRET Page 5; A~373 From Djakarta issued, however, have made an effort to blame Britain for the situation, consonant with the Indonesian stereotype of the British as, at best, “nec-colonialists”. Unlike many AA countries, Indonesia has announced no sanctions or trade restrictions with Rhodesis and it seems likely that for the time being Indonesian involvement in this African issue will be uinimal. Should internal Indonesien politics stabilize while Bhodesia still survives under 2 minority white goverument, however, Indonesia may yot attempt to assume a position of demogogic leadership over this issue in line with her self-image. 6. U.S. Relations (SECRET) a. Appearance of Sukarno's sutobiography. 4. During the week US-Indonesian relations seemed te find their most conspicuous expression through the publication and sttendant publicity of the sutobiography of Sukarno as toid to the American uriter, Mrs. Cindy Adams. Especially conspicuous and flamboyant was the treatment given the subject by the Foreign Department's Indonesian Herald which lauded the book and felt that here at lest was an American who understood Sukarno and Indonesia. The paper printed accounts of cockteil parties sponsored by Ambassador Felar to mark the publication of the book and in general established the full approval of Subandrio‘s Foreign Departament. tor the project. ii. The Indonesian-language press on the other hand paid 2Attle heed to the Book. It's publication was conservatively noted but without excessive coment. 241. COMMENT: We understand directly from Mra. Ganis Harsono, wife of the Second Deputy Foreign Minister, that not only she and her husband but also both Subandrios have read and were delighted with the book. Sukarno has not been hoard from publicly on the subject. b. Official Calis oceasion (the latter in the course of making farewells) to call on several cabinet ministers. This marks what may be the opening of « possibility of dialogue between responsible officials of the two governucnts, - a possibility which did not exist during the past several woeks in the wake of Gestapu. === [PDF page 6] === 43] that From Djakarta c. Indonesian Approaches Prom an increasing number of Indonesians we are receiving approaches, not yet worked cut in deteii and often quite vague in expression, for economic assistance. Both civilian and military elements foresee coming crises in January-February before the new rice harvest will be reaped and the Lobaran holiday will increese demand. The 08 posture is to listen while keeping the door open for possible future consideration when circumstances warrant. PSYCHO FECAL Negative. MILITARY fegutive. For the Anbnesstior: ff Pager Se. fisted Ph! Robart J. Martens First Secretary of Bubassy === [PDF page 7] === NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu