Airgram A-503: Will There Be a Putsch against Sukarno? 7 Februari 1966

=== [PDF page 1] === [Unreadable] INDO \ This d: eee iS document cone \, Pages. Copy...7 of Lad. con Secret. rroup 31 Powagrade each SEC STATE WASAINGTON 12 wres 27% autonatically éee’.anel cicd. Taro: CIVGPac FOR FSLAD, CAREDSRA, Lise, MEDS, £uV/B AYA Anotbassy Djskarta Fooruary 7, 15956 Prospects for @ Putsch in Djakarta SOMARY o President Sukerno end the nation’s tep leadership eppear to te engaged in little Folace games comploteiy divorced from the harsh ecenonie end political reslities of present day Indonesia. fae Atay leadership, by adding its voice to the chorus of preise to Sukarno and by muting 4ts attack oa Palece policies, now seems to have joined in. In many countries, peblic disgust at euch irresponsibility would lead to putsch atterpts. The traditional apathy ef the Indonesian masses argues agcinst any broadiy-based exd spontaneous uprising in Indonesia. Hore prone Co action are certain elements of the elite including political par-y ectivists, youth groups and exponeuts of regionalisa. Ties elepeats heve, however, demonstrated uswillingness to move without scoe Aruy guns behind then. While there are ermpathetic end ection-proae elements anong the second echelons cf the Army, the Septesber 20 Affeize has placed the Palace guard on slert and rendered the procpects of & Coloneis’ coup” unattractive. The chances for wroceting Sukarno thus appear to hinge principally on the ability of the youth, tes and lower military tanks to exort such pracarzes within the modercte camp 45 evontualiy to forca a czsnse of tactics upon the top Army leaderchip. Additional wicvs. cf econsic dotorioraticn and Felace procrastination coul ‘ore these pressures to the critical point. In the meantime, Palace goncs will continue. eeaueeted SECRET POL:PFCardner/ac 2/7/66 POLsBitaters DECLASSIFIED Secret Authority NNO) 672 89 === [PDF page 2] === erceet Page 2 A~SC3 Dickarta 1. Ceures fer Rovolt A. President Sukamo seems in many ways to be es divorced from tha current economic and political realities of Indonesia es was Louis IV from those of 18th Century France. As students demonstrated iu the streets against rising prices, Sukarno discoursed on the importance ef national menuments. The observation that women vere not frying stones on street corners was presented as proof that there is plenty to eat. Sukarao admitted publicly and with a chuckle that he kuows ncthing about economics end leaves that sort of thing to his advisors. He has not, however, left them the money. He tours the city weekly secking sites for new buildings and monuments and recently allocated $11 million for the construction of a grandiose building complex for CONE at the soment when his Government's default on foreign loans darkened the prospect for the import of rice and essential consumer goods. Finally, the complete transformation of the Indonesian political ecene through the destruction of the communist party has changed Sukarno's tone of voice but act his slogans for Baeekom unity. B. Sukarno has encured his isolation from life's grimmer realities by surrounding himself with a cabinet, parliamentarians, and even politicel party leaders who have long lost touch with the “electorate” and can no longer see past the intrigues and schemes of the Palace. Indicative of this situation is the fact that Nahdiatul Viema youth leaders felt it necessary to kidnap and threaten their party's Chairman to ensure that he stuck to the tough line edopted in party counciis. This leader subsequently came unstuck, however, and rejoined the merry-goround prepelied by the President’s smiles, reproaches, rewards and bribes. C. Mow wilitery leaders seem to have joined the Palace grmes. Apparently peravaded that a clash with the President would endenger their own and perhaps the nation’s future, Army leaders have muted their attacks on the Palace and have joined in the chorus of praise to the Great Leader. of the Revolution (Exbtel 2204). The suspicion arises that Arny leaders, who have fought all their political battles during the past decade within the confines of the Palace, have also lost touch with their "electorate." B. This airgram attempts to detensine vho may now be fed up with what is going on at the Palace aad whet they are likely to do about 2. Potential Rebels and Inhibiting Factors A. The Meseas. Although the absence of the usual cutlets for public opiaion makes it most difficult to measure popular support for Sukarno, there are signs in the attendance at public rallies, in === [PDF page 3] === .. SeoreT Page 3 A-503 Djaksrta the street and kerpung reaction to the President's radio addresses end in the circulation figures of the enti-Palace press that Sukarno’s prestige has declined. The magic aura of charisms and authority, which the Indonesians call kevtbawasn, can be lost through one important mistake. Sukarno demonstrated a clear lack of divine guidance in choosing the side of the PKI and the population has undoubtedly taken note. The Indonesian “masses" are unlikely now to rally in significant number to Sukarno's defense if he is threatened. On the other hend, they are culturally conditioned to accept adversity passively and are equally unlikely to rise Up spontaneously against Sukarno's misrule. If disgust at recent Palace games is to avoke any meaningful response, it must come from the intellectual elite, from the students, the political parties, tha Fegicnalists, and the second and third echelons of the military. B. The Political Parties. The top leaderchip of the major politicel parties has bean firmly snared in the tangle of Palace intrigue but the second echelon contains several influential leaders (the HU's Dehlea and Subchen, the Catholic Party's Kasims, the Protestant Party's Tambunan) who have the initiative and the following to act on their own. These political forces have been united in Subchan’s Action Command, now calied the Pantjasila Front. The Pantjasila Front hss spoken eut doldiy in ietee Saiasiaticr February 2 warned that a political settlexent involving "siepli{Cation" of the party structure could evoke "serious conssquences." In private conversations, however, Subchan and other moderate political leaders have spoken of the Army's accommodation te the Palace with disheartened resignation rather than defience. C. The Youth. The political parties ove most of the militancy they have mustered to their youth. Djakarta students during the past two months have amply demonstrated their disgust for the present regime through the Student Action Command (KAMI). KANT now unites an over= ' whelming majority of the youth activists ia the capital end probably io the provinces. The BU youth arn, Ancor, in particular, possesses both the nurbers and the militancy to constitute an effective paramilitary force. The students, hovever, probably shot their wad in the January street demonstrations. The limited success they attained in that operation was due to the cooperation they received from the Army. KAMI leadership at that time showed itself highly sensitive te the guidelines laid down by the Aray end it is highly unlikely that they would take to the streets (much less besiege the Palace) unless assured by the Arny that ite guns are behind then. D. The Regionalists. Worsening econcaic corditions as well as signe of a politi interregnum in Djakartea have umdoubtedly enlivened traditional centrifugal tendencies in the provinces. Recent remarks by SECRET === [PDF page 4] === SPCRET Page 4 A-503 Djakerta the Atjeh Military Commander drawing attention to his province’s eel fsufficiency in rice and calling for a more equitable distribution of oil revenues evoke memories of earlier complaints from the outer fringes of the mation. The decisive defeat of the 1958 rebellioa, however, loons over the head of every exponent of regioneliom and will argue against «a repeat of such adventures. More significant, the provinces are now firnly in the hands of the Army and loyalty to Djakarta has figured prominently in the choice of regional commanders. Any anti-regime activity in the provinces would most likely be a reflection of disaffection within the Armed Forces as a whole. t. The Genersis- Prospects for a Palace putsch thus inevitably hinge on the attit of the military. Wot all Generals agree vith Rasution's and Suharto's softness towards the Falece. Principal among the dissenters is Minister Attached to the Presidium Sukendre. Sukendro, hewever, controle no troops and is ective only as a political strategist. West Javea Commander Adjie's recent ban on a "Sukarno Front™ ia his province threw a new light on his relation to the regime and roused some hope among the Palace's opponents. Adjie‘s crack troops could, of course, play e@ determining role in any Djakarta power play and Adjie’s lead would probably be followed by other regional commanders, by his former subordinate South Sulavesi Coamander Solichin in particular and perhaps by Generals Mokogints and Subiren in Sumatra. The banning of the "Sukarno Front,” however, is entirely inedequate proof that Adjie'’s demonstrated loyalty to Sukarno is fading. ¥. The Colonels. To find determined Sukarno opponents among the military it is necessary to move furthar from the Palace, to the second echelons of the Aray. When Djakarta pundits discuss the possibility of a “Colonels* revolt" or a Kong Le-type coup, the name first moationed is thet of Colonel Sarwe Kdhie, the comeander of the Paraccemando Regiment (RPKAD) which spearheaded the cnti-PXI operations in Central Jeva and is mow present in strength in the capital. Serwo Rdhie gave his enthusiastic approval to student demoastrators at a time when his superiors were observing a discreet distance. Recently hie treops have been seen with the militantly enti-communist Moslem student organization HMI, end a street banner publicly proclaimed the alliance between the RPZAD and this previously untouchable "rightist" student group. A coup in the capital would, however, require a strong element of surprise which the September 30 Affair has obvieted. Sarwo Edhie is aware that the Palace Guard, the Air Foree Special Troops (PGT) and elements of the Marine Corps (EXO), all responsive to the President, ere on constant alert against such a move end, if unable to defeat it at the onset, could cause a lethal delay. === [PDF page 5] === SeceRT Page 5 A-503 Djakarte 3. Conclusions A. While isolated assassination attempts by suall groups of ansor youth or discontented military are always a possibility, it now seems unlikely that students, political parties, rogionaliste or second echelon Arny elements will move either individually or collectively to mount @ putech. B. Assuming Sukarno does not make a mistake and overplay his hand, the sole hope for e change in the Palace leadership seens to hinge on these forces building up such pressures within the moderate camp as to force MNasution and Suharto to reconsider their present tactics. Additional weeks of economic deterioration and Palace procrastination could perhaps bring these pressures to the critical point. In the meantime, the Palace games vill continse under the direction of President Sukarno. Edward &. Masters Counselor of Exbassy for Political Affeirs === [PDF page 6] === NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu