Airgram A-673: Example of Anti-Chinese Propaganda (Angkatan Bersendjata, 1966)

=== [PDF page 1] === Enelosure 1 or iF A-666, Djakarta ‘CRY OF ETAPU Fer Ge e! ed the Murder the Seven (sic 2, eact jt Cicer Th sed to Su Arms and itions, etc. for 30,000 People. Based on facts, it can be told at present that the Gestapu/PKI eoup was engineered and arranged in Peking within the framework of the world revolution advocated by Peking, a8 a project which is given the highest priority by Chairman Mao, in order to create a commmnist world oriented to Peking. To consummate the Gestapu/PKI coup as a first step in the realization of Mao's own fine dream, he himself became its active erchitect and it was he himself who decided September 30, 1965, ae the date to launch the adventure, in order that the national day of the would-be Indonesian People's Republie of the Chinese would fall on October 1, the nmetienal day of the CPR. It was also he who ordered the massacre of the seven (sic) generals and all reactionary officere of the Armed Forces, in order to strike terror among the people, who finally would perret and surrender themselves to communism. How close was the contact between Aidit and his lord in Peking was witnessed by secret telegram reports sent by Aidit during earlier days of the coup, which totally failed, because it was crushed by the Armed Forces and the progressive, revolutionary people. Aidit visited the CPR for eight days, and during this time, he, among other things, held talks three times with Mao. They discussed profoundly the master-plan for the reconstruction of Indonesia in the future, Aidit suggested that the post of the President should be given to a man outside the party after the coup, even though Sukarno should also be removed, while Aidit himself would hold the real power in his eapacity as the Prime Minister. Mao Tse~tung, shaking his head, said: "Thies fe utterly impossible. Everything in this world should be given an appropriate title, so that it 1s pleasant to the ears. Things which are not pleasant to the ears cannot sueceed. You yourself must becoma the President. In thie way, all orders and decrees can be issued smoothly." Aidit eaid; "lut I am afraid that the Armed Forces will not obey. Thies will bring about difficulties." Mao Tse-tung said: “Don't be afraid. Act according to my views, and eliminste all reactionary senior officers euch as Wasution, Yani and UNCLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED Autoriy ND 67237 | [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 2] === UNCLASSIPIED Enclosure 1 A-666, Djakarta Page 2 Suharto in one stroke. The Armed Forces will then become like a dragon without a head. They will certainly yield to you.” Aidit said: "To eliminate all reactionary Armed Forces of ficers will likely mean the massacre against several hundreds of then.” Mao Tee-tung, laughing widely, said: "What do these several hundreds people mean? Upon arrival in North Shensi, I, in one stroke, slaughtered 20,000 cadres end soldiers of the [Vth Front Red Army. Consequently, there was no rebellion during hard years afterwards, and this wae brought about by massacring all people with shaky ideology.” Aidit, smiling, sald: “How can we afford such a lofty act of Chairman!": Mao Tse-tung, also smiling, said: "Though you have no oppore tunity to slaughter 20,000 people, you must at least murder ali reactionary generals, and you must do it impressively. The intention ie not only to take revenge against them, but also to strike terror in those who are still living, so that they dare not oppose commmisa." Aidit regard Mao's method too harsh. Nevertheless, because Mao Tse=tung illustrated everything ss simple, Aidit's self-confidence increased. After he left Mao, he went to visit Lo Jui Chiing to discuss the supply of arms with hin. Lo Jul Chiing said: "Don't worry. I have ordered the Department of General Armaments te start the dispatch of arms and supplies for 30,000 people. The arms will have arrived when you return to Djakarta.” After preparations were made with all parties concerned, Aidit flew back to Djakarta to draw up his plan. Because Aidit often went to the CPR, this visit drew no attention. It was so unreasonable, that Sukarno would suspect that his comrades in Peking would plot against his country and life. Toward the middle of September, 1965, after Aidit had had meetings several times with Untung and Dani, the way to initiate the coup was determined. It was Untung who must eliminate the generale by capturing them and murdering them one by ene, Aidit gave special instructions that the massacre should be correct and fantastic, because eccording to Chairman Mao, in this way the opponents will be intimidated. Dani was appointed to eliminate Sukarno, As soon es the coup started, Sukarno must be persuaded to go to the Halim Air Base, and he must be detained there. Whether he would be killed secretly or delivered to the people for his public trial depended on the situation. UNCLASSIFIED [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 3] === Enclosure 1 RCLASSIP Ep A=666, Djakarta Page 3 Several days afterwards, Untung suddenly saw Aidit. He said: "It is reported that the generals will likely not be in one place before Geptember 30, 1965. Is it possible to wait until the parade in the Army Day of October 5, 19657 So that nobody will escape.” Aidit said: “The first plan was to wait until Armed Forces Day. But in Peking, I agreed with Comrade Mao with regard to the time, namely the night of September 30, 1965. The next day, October 1, 1965, will be stipulated as the new National Day. Because the CPR's National Day also falls on this day, he regarded the date as absolute. Let me send him « telegram to discuss this matter with him.” He then sent @ secret telegram to Peking. Upon the receipt of the telegram at the Secretariat of the Communist Party in the CPR, Teng Hsiao Ping himself immediately took it to Mao Tse~tung, and asked for his reply. Shaking his head, Mao said: "Send iumediately a telegram to Aidit ae follows: ‘The time must not be altered no matter what cire cumstance; the action must be taken in the night of September 30.'" Teng Hsiso Ping said: "We are very far away from the action. Aidit is on the spot, and he sees the situation more clearly. [It is better to take his view." Moving his arms from side to side, Mao Tse-tung said: “This fie not a correct thing to utter. In every action, we must act, while the exact atmosphere is under way. Don't waver. If you can alter a date once, you may alter it for the second time. 2f you alter it for the third time, nothing will happen. Let me tell you. In my boyhood, I met ean old man in my village. During his youth, he was a well-known thief in Hsiengtan. He was skilled in digging a hole. He could make a hole. He could make a hole in any kind of wall, whether it was made of bricks or stone, and he could enter a house within the time it takes you to walk one hundred steps." Being impressed, Teng Hsiao Ping said: “How fast his hands are!" Mao Tse-tung said: ‘That man taught a4 great number of his pupils. He said that every pupil must make a hole, but he dared not enter the house, The teacher pushed him in, and in thie way he was forced to goin. If a pupil dares not enter for the firat time, he will never enter e house through a hole, and he will become an unuseful individual." Teng Meiso Ping laughed and said: "Thus, Chairman is persistent to push Aidit into the hole.” Mao Tse-tung said: "Indeed. I shall push him in vehemently, so that he can enter. After the failure of the PEE rebellion in [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 4] === Enclosure 1 : 5 Ao666, Djakarta Page 4 Madiun in 1948, Aidit replaced Sjarifuddin, an honorable party leader who was killed, Within these last 15 years, the strength of the Party has increased rapidly. The party has now three million members. Barring our own Party and that of the USSR, the PKE has the greatest number of members. But numbers do not mean real strength. One must have the experience of struggle. For example, the Japanese Commmist Party has not many members, but its recent performances surprised the world. The PEI is umable te do that." Smilingly, Teng Wsiao Ping said: The struggle of the Japanese Communist Party relies on our “special things." Without the special things we send and sold to finance their operations, the Japanese Comunist Party could never do anything.” Mao Tse-tung answared: “Nevertheless, the Japanese Commmist Party is alse capable. If there is enough money, it must be used appropriately. Well then. Send iumediately the telegram te Aidit. In other matters, I may yield to him, but in thie matter he must follow me. The time must be the night of September 30, 1965. This eannot be altered in whatever cireumstances." ANCKATAM BERSINDIATA, April 25-26, 1966. [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces earlier text for this page] === [PDF page 5] === NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu