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Telegram 1626 to Secretary of State, Januari 1967

Cleaned OCR text (Fair (0.877); proof-reading: no (script-cleaned only)). Old Indonesian spelling has been converted to modern EYD. [Unreadable] marks text that could not be recovered.

Text

=== [PDF page 1] === WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 84 - Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State Box: 00299 Withhold Box:0 Withhold Folder:0 Document: 18 HMS REID: _ Entry: Series: State Department Lot Files Total Pages: 4 ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Document Date: 01-10-1967 Document Type: Telegram Special Media: File Number: In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. This document is being withheld under Section 3.3b of EO 13526 and/or NARA's discretionary withholdings outlined in 36 CFR 1256. NND: 37770 Withdrawn: 01-07-2005 by: RETRIEVAL #: 37770 00299 0 0 18 System DocID: 24096634 NO STATE OBJECTION TO DEGLASSIFICAT! BY_! ontegslig/> === [PDF page 2] === United States of America __ Fereiga Service of the OUTGOING aympasssy DJAKARTA quan ee mh!. ogee > my = Ah ane _ a I O So _SeCRET. to POL 15-1 SUKARN AMB Charge: Classification: Control: DJAKARTA 3143 A/DCM POL Date: Jan 9, 1967 ECON ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON DC 1626 1725 ens USI cont INFO: Amconsul MEDAN 450 CHRON; Amconsul SURABAYA 434 Amembassy SINGAPORE 180 a Amembassy Kuala Lumpur 198 Amembassy MANILA 292 Amembassy CANBERRA 141. CINCPAC 344 1, In talk with Political Counselor January 7 Maj. Gen. Sjarif Thajeb said Suharto is definitely committed to ousting Sukarno but will not be pushed and insists on doing things his slow and deliberate own/ way. Since attempts to persuade Suharto to move KaxE more rapidly have failed, Sjarif and other "hawks" are attempting to create situation which will force Suharto to act and thereby precipdtate final showdown. They believe this can be done by March. _ Next 2. weent/major event, according to Sjarif, will be Sukarno's report to MPES which other sources say now due tomorrow. Sjarif gaid statement wll criticize PKI role in Gestapu but will place real‘ blame on Nekolif and "its local Army friends" who "deceived PKI" and induced it to act as it did. Statement will by implication { yhtanatsmiater:e 1/9/67 CECE: han Sb idee BoP EA we’ SECRET* see ani Ye eee,: UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” REPRODUCTION EC IFIED Classification FROM THIS COPY 35 NOT AUTHORIZED annorp NEYS7Z20 saree fe hy prt cn be Ses» ett te os at narhe -Far Bart === [PDF page 3] === TESTI doi AN Tanita States ot amar OUTGOING SECRET 2. Charge: Classification Control: Date: also place blame for events of October 1, 1965, on Nasution. Sjarif said statement will not mention CIA by name, but "implication will be clear" that this is what is meant by use of term NekoliA. 3. Sjarif said statement will please no one and will certainly not rpt not be acceptable to Army. It will in fact be useful to "hawks" to heighten anti-Sukarno feeling and pave way for two major actions planned during next several weeks. First effort will be coordinated move to mobilize public opinion against Sukamo. (This apparently already underway - Djakarta 3120.) Second will be expansion in membership of Parliament (DPR) in order to make this body, and also MPRS which includes all DPR members, = manageable. 3 4. Parliament will convene January 23, Sjarif said, and will serve as "prosecutor" in move against Sukarno. Sjarif indicated he himself would spearhead attack, After airing Sukarno's misdeeds, Parliament will call for MPRS session to deal coup de grace. 5. MPRS is expected to meet in late February or early March SECRET DECLARE IFIED Classification FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED ©: Authority’ NI 'y47770 pe “By Pourt ahr the uadress, omit tee ort Bigg! ad pouch ta envelope waked “Fee rn a === [PDF page 4] === TEILIEGSEC ANIA unter tates ot knee OUTGOING SECRET 3. Charge: Classification Control: Date: at which time it will "suspend Sukarno" pending a full investigation of his regime. Sjarif was vague on what would follow suspension decree but he and "hawks" apparently hope this action by MPRS will euffice and will either induce Sukarno to retire gracefully or precipAtate military chowdown/eutsetx will forcefully remove him from office. Sjarif seemed to think latter was max more likely possibility and said bloodshed likely before problem solved. Sjarif, and also Abu Bakar Lubis in subsequent talk, said trip abroad by Sukarno “definitely out." Sukarno refuses to go voluntarily and Suharto and others prefer to deal with him within Indonesia rather than taking what they regard as undesirable step from standpoint of world public opinion of forcibly exiling president. 6. Timetable similar to that given by Sjarif Thajeb has been if outlined to us¢ by other knowledgeable sources. There no question but that this/ghat "hawks" hope to achieve but exact way scenario will unfold cannot be predicted at this time with any degree of certainty. Suharto is still calling shots and has not tipped his hand. Additional uncertainty is fact MPRS may prove difficult to control unless Suharto permits Army to exert UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” REPRODUCTION DEC LASHED, 9 70 bee Classification PROM THIS COPY we eT AuTNonuae Authority. === [PDF page 5] === TTRTLIEGSIG ANNA unte'siates ot ines O.UTGOING SECRET 4. Charge: Classification Control: Date: real pressure on members. 7. Qur guess is that Suharto definitely wants to remove or neutralize Sukarno but is committed to no firm timetable or exact method beyond fact he wants to stick to constitutional means and avoid bloodshed if possible. As a result he is resisting efforts to force him into what he regards as premature action but is taking no steps to prevent situation from ripening to point where more direct move against Sukarno may be feasible or in fact inevitable. When and if that happens Suharto will act as forcefully as he did in March 1966. 8. Following Lebaran holidays (Jan. 12 and 13) we will again be entering period of tension which likely to build for month or meme. Net effect will probably be to reduce Sukarno's position further but there no certainty now that this tense period any more likely to result in Sukarno's final ouster then those which preceded it. LYDMAN SECRET tems oo UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” REPROOUCTION AUTHORIZED i DECL IFIED Classification FROM THIS COPY 3S NOT j nano S27770 bee Pea” sitar ta ustrem, auih te swiel sumer,’ und pouch bn eonioge marea “Fer Bet === [PDF page 6] === NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu