CIA, 'Sukarno and the Communists' (Office of Current Intelligence, 23 October 1964)

PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.6 US, British and Dutch Government Records/US State Department Central Files (ProQuest History Vault)/CIA (1964-10-23) - CIA research records Indonesia Sukarno and the Communists (CIA Research Reports) [ProQuest 3031735766].pdf Text from the PDF text layer; pages marked "re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026" were re-OCR’d with Tesseract because the text layer scored Poor. OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === eae I ain a am RES Lorre cancer neceeeen ¢ 23 October 1964 SC No. O0642/64A_ Copy No. 2 SPECIAL REPORT SUSAR: NO AND THS COMMUNISTS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE Declassified by _ a SOGER7 slate te mn ~. SLC REP c your 1 asXy - ffs cutomatle op en praddii ge gsee Ov hian De vessyen ses ie pee err eee nT sioner pparremenyecra RR ERENE RES PEI See, worry peer ete teeta somrerrere ry sewers neh Lee 7 fe,. ° emaewos Yon é rh [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 2] === 23 October 1904 The relattonship between Suhtarno and the Indo-- nesian Communist Party (PKI) has been one of mutual it exploitation, Sukarno has used the party to help him preserve his own power, and the party has used Sukarno to increase its strength. In the process, 1 the once considerable gap in power and apparent d policy objectives between them has greatly dimin- j ished. The party continues to acknowledge Sukarno as the nation's supreme leader, and, under its i chairman, D. 11. Aidit, is following a policy of in- i filtrating the national governiment and consolidat- s ing the party's mass following. Sukarno, seeking to maintain his own preeminent position, to preserve national unity, and - to advance Indonesia internationally at the expense of the Weost, finds it totally inexpedient to challenge the PKI. His tactics, combined with Communist sLngle--mindedne s, seem likely ultimately to bring, Indonesia under Communist control. Eackground Through the years, Sukarno has the local point of t-eMnained The Indonesian Communist Indonesia; as he moves he takes Party has grown from a member- the national political structure ship of 12,000 in 1951 to a with him. Since independence claimed strength in 106.4 of was achieved in 1949, he has conthree million members. It is sistently shifted to the left. the largest Communist party out- In the Yost two years, this moveside the Communist countries ment has accelerated. and is the most powerful and eficient political organiza- Sukarno's attitude toward tion in Indonesia. The PIt's the PKI springs not only from rapid growth has been made pos- his own emotional bias toward sible by Sutarno's original Marxism but also from his need toleration and later encourae- for a strong mass organization ment of its activity in return to ensure popular acceptance of,.eye for its strong support of h ii his policies.. He seems to have and his authoritarian "guided repeatedly encouraged non-Comdemocracy"; by its successful. munist leftist-nationalist groups identification with Sukarno par- or individuals to organize pro- Sukarno mass movements, but these ticularly in eastern and central Java; and by its own good or- elements have lacked the drive, the to lent, and often the resources ganization, resourcefulness to, follow up the lead offered and hard work. Lyndon B. Johnson Library === [PDF page 3] === figures the party could prob- Ii, 9 i suppressed political opposLt ion ably muster 1lrom 10 to 12 mil- r.. munist direction. In 1963, the position was invariably anti-Com- four-year plan P1I( set up a. its suppression and the failure of non-Communist groups to come bership goal for 1967 at six leaving the field to the Commu- 20 million., ' larged its central committee The army is the only organization that retains a capa- from 35 to 50 members, apparently to cope with increased bility and an inclination to obt i, struct the Communists. During PKI membership and activity. the past two years, however, The PII is organized and growing in each of Indonesia's twenty-?"{ Sukarno has brought the army Its greatest executive control. Army leaders, moreover, are loyal and. of numbers and effective organinormally can be expected to fol- zation, lies in eastern and cenlow his directives. Local com- tral Java--areas of Indonesia's densest population--and in northii manders occasionally offer temporary obstruction to the PKI, ern Sumatra. but the national trend favors Party Strength Qualifications for party and party front membership ap- In addition to the party's parently are relatively low, and this partially accounts for own membership, the PKI's printhe large membership of the PKI cipal front groups and their front organizations. a rnd its eyyy/ i}}} r claimed membership are the Peas- In'a speech to the party conferant Frnnt (BTI)-..eight and a ence last July, chairman Aidit Labor half million; the Central cautioned that "a military unit Organization (SOBSI)--three and which has a big number of sola half million; People's Youth (Pemuda Rakj;t)--two million; diers but is not disciplined enough will certainly not be Women's Front (GERWANI)---almost able to defend t the enemy." He two million; and a cultural or- called for "iron-hard discipline" lion. Even with overlapping and loyalty within all Copy d3 oh-son Librar' [Unreadable] === [PDF page 4] === ple," which if allowed to drag The disagreement does not work and might develop into a effectiveness, and both points ficult to decide among the fac. posts. Aidit is the party's Settlement must be through "com- circles. The militant faction centers chiefly on the pace of been reached, under which Aidit party activity. Aidit seems tolerntes the openly pro-Peiping while Njoto givcs Aidit the lead political gains, strengthen its In domestic affairs because of 5 peasant base, and increase its his relationship with Sukarno. infLuence within the government membership may lead some PK1( strength of the militant faction, strength and induce them to ence of the party generally, take premature action. Other r!ke it likely that more milimembers of the politburo and tent tactics will emerge in the should use its already considerable strength to press its own Since 195L, the PKI has to be that although the party must continue to support Sukarno, greater representation in the it can extract significant con- cabinet. This would facilitate 1 cessions from him and need not. what PKI officials refer to as 1 taliation should come, the argu- [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] === [PDF page 5] === [Unreadable] 411'r"o Owl through its front organizations, The party's principal organizational target is the but its paramilitary capabili- e ties appear to be limited by peasantry, and the DTI is the party's largest and most active lack of arms. As a means of I. tacquiring military training and 'Vt front organization. At least of 70 percent of Indonesia's popu- at least a minimum supply ~x lation of 1i03 million is en- arms, members of the peasant gaged in subsistence agricul- and youth fronts and of the; ture. Peasant support of the large agricultural labor uniao q Indonesian revolution against have enlisted as village guards. the Dutch was a key factor in during periods of local security its success. With this example disturbances. They have also and that of the Chinese Commu- volunteered for military trainnists before it, the PKI sees ing during the struggle for western a sympathetic peasantry as a Noew Guinea, and now in the antistrategic requirement for the Malaysia campaign. success of its own struggle, whether by peaceful or by forceful means. Moreover, the peas- The Communist labor federant is regarded emotionally, tion, SOBSI, has long been the by both Communists and non-Com- largest labor organization in munists, as the symbol of In- Indonesia. It is less active donesia. The PKI's identifica- today, however, than it was ten tion with the peasantry could years ago, because the PKI has thus psychologically deter the almost abandoned activity among army from using force against wage earners to concentrate on the party. gaining peasantry allegiance. The PICK seems to recognize The PKI,to avoid conflict the possibility that--perhaps. with Sukarno and the army, has at Sukarno's death--it may have made no significant effort, howto resort to force either to ever, to exploit Indonesia's exdefend itself or to make a bid tonsive economic problems, which for power. The party appar- include periodic food shortages. ently does not feel that it is Instead, the party urges the now ready for confrontation people to increase production ', ', with the army, and it probably and to endure hardship in the hopes to avoid it entirely interests of the anti-Malaysia through "government integra- campaign. [Unreadable] The PKI, although it no the cabinet longer publicizes At' presumably also continues to try to infii- AE [Unreadable] trate the armed forces. The Since the cabinet resh ze party has considerable poten jLn late August, three of IndonesIa's 79 cabinet ministers tial for disruptive activity opy L1 Lvndoai B. Johnson Li brary-t === [PDF page 6] === [Unreadable] 11: are Communist Party members, and three others are pro--Communist. prosecution (this remains under the attorney general.) he does Of the three party members,.two control administration of the Aidit and first deputy party chairman Lukman--are ministers in name only and exert little influence through the cabinet relationship.per se. However, courts. Astrawinata took office in N~ovember1963 It soon became clerbthat he hoped to reorient Indonesia's Western-based legal the third Communist, Njoto, and system and to make law and the one of the pro.-Communlists, Oel courts subservient to political Tjoe Tat, are ministers attached Policy. Basing his approach on to the Indonesian Government Sukarno's dictum that the revolupresidium. tion is the true source of Indonesian lnw, Astrnwinlata 'says The presidium consists of that Judges must pronounce senthe three vice primeministers oences according to the "demands meets almost dailyand is chiefly of the aorpl" judges must know responsible for administering who are the friends and foes of the government. The relation-. the revolution before they can ship of Njoto and Oei to the poarform their tasks properly; presidium appears to give the and judges must be "cleansed" Communists access to the full i-othat only those who do not scope of government poLicy and.eviate from the revolution ocan opportunity to exert influ- cupy positions in the judiciary. ence on both formulation and A P efresher training conferimplementation. The two men judges in mid-Septemonce Sukaorno seeded to give his for moreover, are said to be spoe ber cifically, assigned to Subandrie, umn- personal sanction to Astrawinata's who is first vice minister, approach. ister of foreign affairs and foreign economic affairs, and-- Astrawinata has also pioin Sukarno's absence--acting, neered in the creation of "land president. Subandrio lacks any, reform" courts. Initially these political following either in or courts were advocated by the out of the government. He has Peasant Front as a means of protried during the past 18 months ceeding against landlords and to curry favor with the Pt1, government officials considered and the presidium arrangement to be thwarting the land reform makes him directly accessible Laws. at Sukarno approved Astrawiflata a to possible cormnist manipula- courts ton mid--August. tion. earlier had announced that they wouldd be staffed by "revolution- Of the other two pro-Commu- myry eAsanttS" In late Septem-:n nists--Justice Minister Astra- ber the minister of agrarian winata appears more insidious than affairs announced that the land Labor Minister Sutomo. Although 1 reform courts would open shortly 3 the minister of justice in In- with farmers as "member-judges." donesia is not involved in EeF. q Copy ,mmwpp;mv [Unreadable] === [PDF page 7] === The PKI almost certainly will is reported to be Communist conseek to use the courts to ad- trolled and most of the provinvance its interest in the coun- cial councils are under similar tryside through intiri-dation. influence. At the national level, the front serves in an Labor Minister Sutomo's advisory capacity and as an agittask may have been spelled out prop (agitation-propaganda) orfor him when Subandrio:told the ganization. SOBSI conference in September that the government soon will At the provincial level, "simplify" the pattern of Indo- the National Front has been innesian trade organization by tegrated into the government dissolving the "spiritless" administration. Local adminisunions exploited by the imperial- tration, until recently, was ists. Sutomo has challenged. based upon joint decislor of one non-Communist labor federa- the Pantja Tunggal, a five-man tion for membership in the ICFTU, and that federation is boy.composed of the governor, t talocal army commander, the considering withdrawal from the police chief, and representainternational organization. At tives of the attorney general's 4 a recent labor meeting in Java, office and of the National Sutomo reportedly encouraged Front. Although a new system unions to seize foreign enter- of provincial government was prises, cautioning, however, introduced in September, givthat the actions should not hurt ing most army territorial comproduction. manders executive authority, the Communists are not likely National Front to be contained to any signifiand Local -overnment cant degree. Njoto is one of several cabinet ministers ap- The National Front was in- pointed to coordinate central troduced by Sukarno in 19GO in and local affairs under the an effort to fuse all loyal po- new system. 4 litical elements into a single state party. It has become, instead, largely a tool of the The Communists are cam- Communist Party. paigning for the removal of non-Communist provincial and The National Front is ad- local officials and their reministered nationally by an placement by PKI members or executive council and is com- persons who would be susceptible posed of subordinate councils to Communist direction. In at the provincial, subprovincial, areas of PKI strength, there and villae levels. Eighty per- have been several instances of cent of the executive membership conspicuous success. Copy [Unreadable] . I.w"T'i. [Unreadable] son rF;vti. brary [Unreadable] === [PDF page 8] === Activity Outside the implementation of the land reform Laws and announced that land reform courts would be. Paralleling its support established to punish those who of the government since 1951, were thwarting implementation the I'!.' has engaged in probing of the law. tact,. intended to advance its strategic position and to test In mid-August a group, government reaction. Instances again apparently led by Commuof militancy have increased in nists, seized the USIS library number although not necessarily in Jogjakarta, central. Java. Alin intensity during the past though Subandrio promised the year. In September 1963 a library would be returned in a Communist-led mob gutted the week, no action has yet been British Embassy. In January taken. Postoffice employees, 1964 groups apparently led by controLled by a Communist 'union, 9 Communists seized the offices are refusing to disseminate a of British interests in Java USIS publication. and Sumatra; the government later took control of the prem- Repeated demonstrations ises. Sukarno probably would have occurred against both the have seized British interests UK and US consulates in Medan, eventually anyway, but the Com- northern Sumatra, and some violence munists evidently forced the ha taken place. Communist-led pace of these takeovers. unions have obstructed a Land exchange agreement in northern In May and June, the BTI Sumatra between the Goodyear conducted a series of unilateral Rubber Company and the governland seizures in eastern and cen- ment. Plantation personnel and tral Java. The seizures were installations of both Goodyear justified on the grounds that and US Rubber have been repentthe land reform and crop shar- edly harassed by demonstrations, ing laws were being violated by corrupt landlords. In mid-June, threats, and minor incidents. A concentrated effort is under acting president Leimena (Su- way to force P99pg q.gg $ $00* karno and Subandrio were in Tokyo) denounced these "unilateral actions," ordered regional nel to leave northern Sum tra. Since the institution of administrators to prevent fur- the new regional administrative.+ ther occurrences,and directed system, the protection of US inthat complaints be referred to terests, both government and the local Pantja Tunggal for private, has improved slightly. The principal area of anti- t 9 official settlement. In midfi 5 August, however, President Su- American expression is currently karno stated in his independence in northern Sumatra. day speech that the "unilateral i action" of farmers was understandable in view of the slow [Unreadable] Copy 6' l a Q. JOh nson Li brary [Unreadable] === [PDF page 9] === [Unreadable] Sukarnoa's 17 August Speech cial officials and party members to study the speech so that it may be used to "guide the Indonesian people in their activi- I speech on 17 August confirmed ties." I. left during the previous 18 months and charted a course Cabinet Reshuffle tives of the Communist Party. He left no doubt that intensi- Sukarno's 17 August speech i fied anti-Americanism would continue and that his long-range promised a cabinet reshuffle, 'Britain out of Southeast Asia. favorable to the Commaunists. 1 Such a change reportedly was in 7 prospect but at the eleventh phasized that the "retooling of cot;manders in Java reportedly reactionaries would be carried appealed directly to Sukarno to on at all levels without letup. retain Defense Minister General He reiterated his long-standing Nasution, long a target of the concept of NASAKOMt--the fusion PAT, Sukarno agreed, and apparof nationalist, religious, and ently decided to keep several 1 Communist elements in Indonesian other moderates who had been society and government--and said slated for removal..1 that whoever opposes NASAKOM op- 1 poses the Indonesian revolution. Sukarno endorsed the Communist It was this reshuffle on concept of two stages of revo- 27 August that brought Njoto lution, noting that the present and Sutomo into the cabinet. bourgeois democratic stage would General Nasution, although rebe succeeded in due course by a tained, has a considerably resocialist stage. duced role and is largely bypassed in terms of significant administrative and policymaking The PKI itimediately identi- cha ne1a. fied itself with Sukarno's speech and prepared to exploit it in;4 furthering it4 own program. Aidit Rumors are rculating that issued a speciAl statement on the August reshu le did not go 18 August welcoming the speech far enough, and that Stkarno will:t as "fully in line" with the make further changes when he restruggle of the Indonesian and turns home from his current tour. Southeast Asian peoples "at present." He instructed PKI provincopy 4 I [Unreadable] -MWmllkm, potm -,"wo-p === [PDF page 10] === Outlook Looking abroad, Sukarno sees the Communist countries not only as natural partners Sukarno's major foreign in anti-Westernism but apparpolicy goal is to rid Southeast ently as the ultimate predomi- Asia of Western influence. His nant force in Southeast Asia. 1 domestic predilection is toward He has moved toward Peiping, leftist totalitarianism. as Moscow has followed a policy 1 Party as the country's only ef- Sukarno is 64 years old, 1 ficient and dynamic organiza- but although suffering fro a i tion which not only gives him kidney complaint, remains eits own support but can organize markably active. If he lives and deliver mass support as a few more years, it is likely well. Sukarno can set out that he will eventually preside Z broad policy lines, but he needs over a modified Communist rea:source of ideas to attack gime. 1 munist ideas apparently have!1 become acceptable to him. The PKI still needs Sukarno to protect it while it * He has curbed army power it probably hopes he will sur- --which once served to balance vivo a few more years but no t1 and contaia Communist strength longer. Within that time, if --presumably because he be- present trends continue, PKI lieved the army, if permitted in filtration of national and i to keep a significant politi- local government and Communist cal influence, would restrict organization of the peasantry his own role and his policies. will have become so effective I" Moreover, he foresaw that army that at Sukarno's death the party obstruction of the Communists can make a bid for power with could lead to a polarization of good chances of success. Cmforces in Indonesia which could disrupt national unity. [Unreadable]