Indonesia: Communist parties and internal politics (LBJ National Security Files, September 1964-February 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === [Photograph: archival file folder (LBJ Library, National Security File) photographed open on a table; folder label partly legible: "NATIONAL SECURITY FILES... Indonesia"] === [PDF page 2] === September 3, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT No need for more than a moment with Jones, unless you want to hear from our greatest Sukarno expert. Chief purpose is so the Indos will know he's seen you before he returns to Djakarta (Sukarno reportedly complained that he used to hear from Kennedy all the time, but hasn't had any direct word from you). The Indo-Malaysian affair is heating up. At UK urging, the Tunku is going to the SC for a condemrng resolution. We've promised our support. Auady sc We have enog 1 1 st Asia, so you might seek to cool Sukarno down via Jones: 1. He should impress on Sukarno that you cannot quite understand why the Indos have suddenly taken the tack they have. We've tried ever since Indonesia's independence in 1947 to be as helpful as we can. Indeed no country has done more. 2. Thus you were deeply disturbed by Sukarno's speech of August 17. He and other Indo leaders have told us for years that the ultimate threat to -Indonesia was from China. So it's doubly hard for us to grasp why, at the very time when we're carrying the whole burden of protecting Southeast Asia from the Chicoms, Sukarno should seem to embrace the Chicoms an4 declare war on the US. Surely you said nothing when the Tunku was here comparable to Sukarno's outburst. 3. We tried in every quiet way to explain to Sukarno that he'd lose our support if he decided to beat up Malaysia. You personally sent the Attorney General to help promote a peaceful solution. 4. You still hope for a peaceful settlement. It is better to talk than fight. You also are just as anxious to have good relations with a key country like Indonesia and a key leader like Sukarno as was President Kennedy. But Sukarno must realize where we stand in event Malaysia is attacked. Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Library === [PDF page 3] === ASSADOR HOWARD P. JONES Mr. Jones is in his seventh year as Ambassador to Indonesia, having been appointed in February 1958. Prior to his appointment he had served for some three years in the Department of State, first as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs and later as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. During the period 1954-55 he served as chief of the United States aid mission (FOA) to Indonesia. He has thus been directly concerned with Indonesian affairs for the past ten years and has come to occupy a unique position in the relationship between Indonesia and the United States. Ambassador Jones was born in Illinois in 1899. His varied career prior to World War II included a professorship of journalism at Columbia University, a number of executive positions with the State of New York (Civil Service Commissioner 1939-43, Deputy Comptroller 1943), and the executive directorship of the National Municipal League of New York. He enlisted in the Army in 1943, attained the rank of colonel and served overseas in the European Theater. He was with the occupation forces in 1945-47 as chief of the public finance branch, OMUS, Berlin. He left the Army in 1947 and joined the Foreign Service of the Department of State in 1948, serving first with HICOG in Berlin and, in 1951-54, as Counselor of the Embassy at Taipei. Ambassador Jones received the Department of State's meritorius service award in 1952 and the Department's Distinguished Honor Award in 1964. === [PDF page 4] === Ivwmwmw URGENTF DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON M-118 UNCLASSIFIED 1-7-48 September 3, 1964 M4MQRAIBDUM FCIR NR. 4cGEQRGE BUNSDY THE WHlITE HOUSE Subject: The President's Meeting with Ambassador Jones on September 3, 6:30 p.m. Enclosed is a biographic sketch of Ambassador Jones, for use in connection with his appointment with the President. We understand that Ambassador Jones last saw the President in mid-December 1963. 4 BenjaminH. Read I Executive Secretary Enclosure: Biographic Sketch UNCLASSIFIED === [PDF page 5] === September 15, 1964 Mr. McGeorge Bundy The White House Benjamin H. Read Executive Secretary Subject: Indonesia and the Tower Amendment The enclosed document, subject as above, was prepared at the request of Mr. Paul Pepplé@ in Mr. Jenkins’ office... -- SUB SYREN ae hak Se AMEE RRR RAS) SES SRA OTE RP OE PTET RS Oe BIE TS [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 6] === INDONTESIA AND THUE TO Rl AMENDMENT Our aid pro-ram in Indonesia 1 have been cut sharply since September 1963 and are now concentrated almost entirely on (a) training Indonesian civilians in the United States and at home in such badly needed skills as public administration, economics, finance, agriculture, medicine, etc.; (b) malaria eradication in Java, Bali and Madura; (c) training, advising and assisting the national police; and (d) training Indonesian service per-, sonnel in the United Statcs, Total AID and MAP assistance in FY 1965 will be in the range of S10-11 million, more than half of which will be for training. These programs will provide no tangible help for the Sukarno government, either in pur:suing its "confrontation" against Malaysia or.in meeting its immediate economic and financial problems. Because of this fact and the relatively small amount involved, this aid ves us very little leverage in pressing the Indonesian government toward greater moderation. It does, however, offer us a number of important benefits--long-range benefits in many cases but significant nonetheless: (1) The presence of our aid missions in Djakarta and elsewhere in the country gives us a physical and psychological presence in Indonesia, offoetting the Soviet and Chicom Dresence,encouraging the counters moderate forces (of which there are still many), and providing them with an alternative to full reliance on the Conmmunist country!es. (2) Through our military training program we are able to maintain the special.Linkfls we have built up over the past decade with the Indonesian army, links which have reinforced the army's anti-Communist poseure and have given us unique entree into the leadership of the country's strongest'politico-mi itary force. (3) Most important, our training programs--military and civilian--have enabled us to give a large portion of Indonesias future leadership aprolonged exposure to democratic institutions and the reality of American,1ife. Inevitably these people will inherit national power from the present, dwindling revolutionary generation; when they do, we can expect that the gaining and indoctrina.tion the&y have received at our hands wil.havegiven them a view of the world radically different from that held b theiroredecessors. If our aid to Indonedia were cut off by legislative action, we wpuld sacrifice these substantial benefits. Of even greater importance we would lose an essential flexibility in- Our === [PDF page 7] === o ealin-s with Indonesla, a flexibility which has enabled u2 over t pasttheyear to Zcle dowin our over-all aid to Indonesia to less than one-tenth its FY 1963 total (oxertin a gOod deal of moderating influence in Djakarta in the pr:- cess) while retaining rra-,r. of greatest benefit to us The advantageC s we de-1ive from'a Ca Ereflly ti-ed. adjustments in those programs would be g- one, and the loss would. seriously hurt our chances of steering Indonesia away from confrontation" and back toward- the center of the internatiLonal road. This task is a difflou1t and delicate one at best. If we are to-succeed, we need every weapon we can command. Quite apart from the further loss of our influence in Djakarta and the elimination of an essential diplomatic tool, we would also face the likelihood of an exolosive reaction from Sukarno and his govern roent if aid were terminated by legislative action. Sukarnos$vanity, prestige-hunger and sense of status are such that he would almost certainly feel cormelled to react defiantly against what he wou ld interpret as an open challenge on our part.. eI would be likely to consider the long-term consequences o retaliation, but would probably act--as he often has in th past-in haste and anger. The $520 million of American private investment in Indonesia, already under some pressure from Communist unions and extreme nationalists, would probably be among' his first targets, as would such facilities as USIS libraries. In the international field, his need to show the world that Indonesia cannot be "pushed around" would probably load him -o ever more open identification with the Asian Corunist countries. A chain of reaction and counteraction between Djakarta and Washington would be set in motion, which could well end with a complete break between Indonesia and the Free World and with Indonesia's ultimate absorptioninto the Soviet or Chicom bloc. Given Sukarno's recent course, this progression may be inevitable in any event. We are convinced, however, that there is still a range of opportunities open to us to,prevent it if we can Imake full and flexible use of the resources we now command. High among these resources is the discretionary use of-aid-as an instrument of"our national policy. PESPA: EClngraham hst .9-15-64 === [PDF page 8] === Djakarta, Indonesia, October 1, 1964. Dear Mr. Bundy: Many, many thanks for the photographs of my last visit with President Johnson. I appreciate these very much, indeed, and please convey to the President that the photograph he autographed will be among my most treasured mementos. With all good wishes. Sincerely yours, toward P. Jones - Ambassador McGeorge Bundy, Esquire, The White House, Washington, D. C. === [PDF page 9] === GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification === [PDF page 10] === 23 October 1964 SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS The relationship between Sulkarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has been one of mutual exploitation. Sukarno has used the party to help him preserve his own power, and the party has used Sukarno to increase its strength. In the process, the once considerable gap in power and apparent policy objectives between them has greatly diminished. The party continues to acknowledge Sukarno as the nation's supreme leader, and, under its chairman, D. N. Aidit, is following a policy of infiltrating the national government and consolidating the party's mass following. Sukarno, seeking to maintain his own preeminent position, to preserve national unity, and to advance Indonesia internationally at the expense of the West, finds it totally inexpedient to challenge the PKI. His tactics, combined with Communist single-mindedness, seem likely ultimately to bring Indonesia under Communist control. Background Through the years, Sukarno has remained the focal point of The Indonesian Communist Indonesia; as he moves he takes Party has grown from a member- the national political structure ship of 12,000 in 1951 to a with him. Since independence claimed strength in 1964 of was achieved in 1949, he has con-.three million members. It is sistently shifted to the left. the largest Communist party out- In the last two years, this moveside the Communist countries ment has accelerated. and is the most powerful and efficient political organiza- Sukarno's attitude toward tion in Indonesia. The PKI's the PKI springs not only from rapid growth has been made pos- his own emotional bias toward sible by Sukarno's original Marxism but also from his need toleration and later encourage- for a strong mass organization ment of its activity in return to ensure popular acceptance of for its strong support of him his policies. He seems to have and his authoritarian "guided repeatedly encouraged non-Comdemocracy"; by its successful munist leftist-nationalist groups identification with Sukarno par- or individuals to organize pro-- ticularly in eastern and central Sukarno mass movements, but these Java; and by its own good or- elements have lacked the drive, ganization, resourcefulness the talent,and often the resources and hard work. to follow up the lead offered === [PDF page 11] === them by the president. At the membership and exaggerated same time, Sukarno has largely figures the party could probsuppressed political opposition ably muster from 10 to 12 milto himself. Because this op- lion persons susceptible to Composition was invariably anti-Com- munist direction. In 1963, the Re munist as well as anti-Sukarno, PKI set up a four-year plan its suppression and the failure which established the party memof non-Communist groups to come bership goal for 1967 at six forward has had the effect of million and mass membership at leaving the field to the Commu- 20 million. nists. Last July the party en- The army is the only or- larged its central committee ganization that retains a capa- from 35 to 50 members, apparbility and an inclination to ob- ently to cope with increased struct the Communists. During PKI membership and activity. the past two years, however, The PKI is organized and grow- Sukarno has brought the army ing in each of Indonesia's twentymuch more closely under his five provinces. Its greatest executive control. Army lead- strength, however, in terms both ers, moreover, are loyal and of numbers and effective organinormally can be expected to fol- zation, lies in eastern and cenlow his directives. Local com- tral Java--areas of Indonesia's manders occasionally offer tem- densest population--and in northporary obstruction to the PKI, ern Sumatra. but the national trend favors the Communists. Party Difficulties Party Strength Qualifications for party and party front membership ap- In addition to the party's parently are relatively low, own membership, the PKI's principal front groups and their and this partially accounts for the large membership of the PKI claimed membership are the Peas- and its front organizations. ant Front (BTI)--eight and a In a speech to the party conferhalf million; the Central Labor ence last July, chairman Aidit Organization (SOBSI)--three and cautioned that "a military unit a half million; People's Youth which has a big number of sol- (Pemuda Rakjat)--two million; diers but is not disciplined Women's Front (GERWANI)--almost enough will certainly not be two million;and a cultural or- able to defeat the enemy." He ganization (LEKRA)--half a mil- called for "iron-hard discipline" lion. Even with overlapping and loyalty within all party units. === [PDF page 12] === He frankly described the ment runs,the party should still party's internal disagreements be more aggressive than it is. as a "struggle without princi- 4 ple," which if allowed to drag The disagreement does not on, would only hamper party appear to have impaired party work and might develop into a effectiveness, and both points "more critical issue" involving of view are now represented among 4 principles. He said it was dif- Communists who hold government ficult to decide among the fac- posts. Aidit is the party's tions because the comrades in- principal point of contact with volved were known to be loyal Sukarno, but Njoto is probably to the party and the revolution. more active within government Settlement must be through "com- circles. The militant faction promise, consultation and agree- which, logically, supports Peiment.... Each one has to give ping in the international Comand take." munist dispute, is reported to be larger than Aidit's group. The disagreement apparently A modus vivendi seems to have centers chiefly on the pace of been reached, under which Aidit party activity. Aidit seems tolerates the openly pro-Peiping to take a cautious approach, activities in the party in the believing that the PKI must con- international Communist movement solidate its membership and its while Njoto gives Aidit the lead political gains, strengthen its in domestic affairs because of peasant base, and increase its his relationship with Sukarno. influence within the government before taking large or rapid There seems little likelisteps. He apparently is con- hood of a split in the PKI under cerned that the party's large present circumstances. The membership may lead some PKI strength of the militant faction, officials to a false sense of however, and the growing influstrength and induce them to ence of the party generally, take premature action. Other make it likely that more milimembers of the politburo and tant tactics will emerge in the the central committee, led by near future. second deputy party chairman Njoto, believe that the party Present Party Strategy A should use its already considerable strength to press its own Since 1951, the PKI has program, and that Aidit's cau- concentrated on peaceful infiltion is a waste of time. The tration and the formation of a argument of this group seems united front. Its chief politito be that although the party cal demand is that it be given must continue to support Sukarno, greater representation in the it can extract significant con- cabinet. This would facilitate cessions from him and need not what PKI officials refer to as fear retaliation. Even if re- "integration in the government." taliation should come, the argu- JD~T === [PDF page 13] === The party's principal or- through its front organizations, ganizational target is the but its paramilitary capabilipeasantry, and the BTI is the ties appear to be limited by party's largest and most active lack of arms. As a means of front organization. At least acquiring military training and 70 percent of Indonesia's popu- at least a minimum supply of lation of 103 million is en- arms, members of the peasant gaged in subsistence agricul- and youth fronts and of the ture. Peasant support of the large agricultural labor union Indonesian revolution against have enlisted as village guards the Dutch was a key factor in during periods of local security its success. With this example disturbances. They have also and that of the Chinese Commu- volunteered for military trainnists before it, the PKI sees ing during the struggle for western a sympathetic peasantry as a New Guinea, and now in the antistrategic requirement for the Malaysia campaign. success of its own struggle, whether by peaceful or by forceful means. Moreover, the peas- The Communist labor federaant is regarded emotionally, tion, SOBSI, has long been the by both Communists and non-Com- largest labor organization in munists, as the symbol of In- Indonesia. It is less active donesia. The PKI's identifica- today, however, than it was ten tion with the peasantry could years ago, because the PKI has thus psychologically deter the almost abandoned activity among army from using force against wage earners to concentrate on the party. gaining peasantry allegiance. The PKI seems to recognize The PKIto avoid conflict the possibility that--perhaps with Sukarno and the army, has at Sukarno's death--it may have made no significant effort, howto resort to force either to ever, to exploit Indonesia's exdefend itself or to make a bid tensive economic problems, which for power. The party appar- include periodic food shortages. ently does not feel that it is Instead, the party urges the now ready for confrontation people to increase production with the army, and it probably and to endure hardship in the hopes to avoid it entirely interests of the anti-Malaysia through "government integra- campaign. tion." Party Accomplishments; The PKI, although it no the Cabinet longer publicizes it, presumably also continues to try to infiltrate the armed forces. The Since the cabinet reshuffle party has considerable poten- in late August, three of Indotial for disruptive activity nesia's 79 cabinet ministers === [PDF page 14] === are Communist Party members, and prosecution (this remains under three others are pro-Communist. the attorney general), he does Of the three party members, two control administration of the --Aidit and first deputy party courts. chairman Lukman--are ministers in name only and exert little Astrawinata took office in influence through the cabinet November 1963. It soon became relationship.per se. However, clear that he hoped to reorient the third Communist, Njoto, and Indonesia's Western-based legal one of the pro-Communists, Oei system and to make law and the Tjoe Tat, are ministers attached courts subservient to political to the Indonesian Government policy. Basing his approach on presidium. Sukarno's dictum that the revolution is the true source of In- The presidium consists of donesian law, Astrawinata says the three vice prime ministers, that judges must pronounce senmeets almost dailyand is chiefly tences according to the "demands responsible for administering of the people"; judges must know the government. The relation- who are the friends and foes of ship of Njoto and Oei to the the revolution before they can presidium appears to give the perform their tasks properly; Communists access to the full and judges must be "cleansed" scope of government policy and so that only those who do not an opportunity to exert influ- deviate from the revolution ocence on both formulation and cupy positions in the judiciary. implementation. The two men At a refresher training confermoreover, are said to be spe- ence for judges in mid-Septemcifically assigned to Subandrio, ber Sukarno seemed to give his who is first vice minister, min- personal sanction to Astrawinata's ister of foreign affairs and approach. foreign economic affairs, and-- in Sukarno's absence--acting Astrawinata has also piopresident. Subandrio lacks any neered in the creation of "land political following either in or reform" courts. Initially these out of the government. He has courts were advocated by the tried during the past 18 months Peasant Front as a means of proto curry favor with the PKI, ceeding against landlords and and the presidium arrangement government officials considered makes him directly accessible to be thwarting the land reform to possible Communist manipula- laws. Sukarno approved the tion. courts in mid-August. Astrawinata earlier had announced that they Of the other two pro-Commu- would be staffed by "revolutionnists--Justice Minister Astra- ary peasants." In late Septemwinata appears more insidious than ber the minister of agrarian Labor Minister Sutomo. Although affairs announced that the land the minister of justice in In- reform courts would open shortly donesia is not involved in with farmers as "member-judges." === [PDF page 15] === The PKI almost certainly will is reported to be Communist conseek to use the courts to ad- trolled and most of the provinvance its interest in the coun- cial councils are under similar tryside through intimidation. influence. At the national level, the front serves in an Labor Minister Sutomo's advisory capacity and as an agittask may have been spelled out prop (agitation-propaganda) orfor him when Subandrio told the ganization. SOBSI conference in September that the government soon will At the provincial level, "simplify" the pattern of Indo- the National Front has been innesian trade organization by tegrated into the government dissolving the "spiritless" administration. Local adminisunions exploited by the imperial- tration,until recently, was ists. Sutomo has challenged based upon joint decisions of one non-Communist labor federa- the Pantja Tunggal, a five-man tion for membership in the body composed of the governor, ICFTU, and that federation is the local army commander, the considering withdrawal from the police chief, and representainternational organization. At tives of the attorney general's a recent labor meeting in Java, office and of the National Sutomo reportedly encouraged Front. Although a new system unions to seize foreign enter- of provincial government was prises, cautioning, however, introduced in September, givthat the actions should not hurt ing most army territorial comproduction. manders executive authority, the Communists are not likely National Front to be contained to any signifiand Local Government cant degree. Njoto is one of several cabinet ministers ap- The National Front was in- pointed to coordinate central troduced by Sukarno in 1960 in and local affairs under the an effort to fuse all loyal po- new system. litical elements into a single state party. It has become instead, largely a tool of the The Communists are cam- Communist Party. paigning for the removal of non-Communist provincial and The National Front is ad- local officials and their reministered nationally by an placement by PKI members or executive council and is com- persons who would be susceptible posed of subordinate councils to Communist direction. In at the provincial, subprovincial, areas of PKI strength, there and village levels. Eighty per- have been several instances of cent of the executive membership conspicuous success. === [PDF page 16] === Activity Outside the implementation of the land re- Government form laws and announced that land reform courts would be Paralleling its support established to punish those who of the government since 1951, were thwarting implementation the PKI has engaged in probing of the law. tactics intended to advance its strategic position and to test In mid-August a group, government reaction. Instances again apparently led by Commuof militancy have increased in nists, seized the USIS library number although not necessarily in Jogjakarta, central Java. Alin intensity during the past though Subandrio promised the year. In September 1963 a library would be returned in a Communist-led mob gutted the week, no action has yet been 14' British Embassy. In January taken. Postoffice employees, 1964 groups apparently led by controlled by a Communist union, Communists seized the offices are refusing to disseminate a of British interests in Java USIS publication. and Sumatra; the government later took control of the prem- Repeated demonstrations ises. Sukarno probably would have occurred against both the have seized British interests UK and US consulates in Medan, eventually anyway, but the Com- northern Sumatra,and some violence munists evidently forced the has taken place. Communist-led pace of these takeovers. unions have obstructed a land exchange agreement in northern In May and June, the BTI Sumatra between the Goodyear conducted a series of unilateral Rubber Company and the governland seizures in eastern and cen- ment. Plantation personnel and tral Java. The seizures were installations of both Goodyear justified on the grounds that and US Rubber have been repeatthe land reform and crop shar- edly harassed by demonstrations, ing laws were being violated by threats, and minor incidents. corrupt landlords. In mid-June, A concentrated effort is under acting president Leimena (Su- way to force Peace Corps personkarno and Subandrio were in nel to leave northern Sumatra. Tokyo) denounced these "unilateral actions," ordered regional Since the institution of administrators to prevent fur- the new regional administrative ther occurrencesand directed system, the protection of US inthat complaints be referred to terests, both government and the local Pantja Tunggal for private, has improved slightly. official settlement. In mid- The principal area of anti- August, however, President Su- American expression is currently karno stated in his independence in northern Sumatra. day speech that the "unilateral action" of farmers was understandable in view of the slow === [PDF page 17] === i Sukarno's 17 August Speech Sukarno's independence day cial officials and party members to study the speech so that it may be used to "guide the Indonesian people in their activispeech on 17 August confirmed ties." his accelerated swing to the left during the previous 18 months and charted a course Cabinet Reshuffle close to the immediate objectives of the Communist Party. He left no doubt that intensi- Sukarno's 17 August speech fied anti-Americanism would con- promised a cabinet reshuffle, tinue and that his long-range and the tenor of the address intent was to get the US and seemed to promise a major change Britain out of Southeast Asia. favorable to the Communists. Such a change reportedly was in prospect but at the eleventh On domestic policy, he em- hour the three army territorial phasized that the "retooling of commanders in Java reportedly reactionaries would be carried appealed directly to Sukarno to on at all levels without letup. retain Defense Minister General He reiterated his long-standing Nasution, long a target of the concept of NASAKOM--the fusion PKI. Sukarno agreed, and apparof nationalist, religious, and ently decided to keep several Communist elements in Indonesian other moderates who had been society and government--and said slated for removal. that whoever opposes NASAKOM opposes the Indonesian revolution. Sukarno endorsed the Communist It was this reshuffle on concept of two stages of revo- 27 August that brought Njoto lution, noting that the present and Sutomo into the cabinet. bourgeois democratic stage would General Nasution, although rebe succeeded in due course by a tained, has a considerably resocialist stage. duced role and is largely bypassed in terms of significant administrative and policymaking The PKI immediately identi- channels. fied itself with Sukarno's speech and prepared to exploit it in furthering its own program. Aidit Rumors are circulating that tw issued a special statement on the August reshuffle did not go 18 August welcoming the speech far enough, and that Sukarno will as "fully in line" with the make further changes when he restruggle of the Indonesian and turns home from his current tour. Southeast Asian peoples "at present." He instructed PKI provinm=W vV-3as- === [PDF page 18] === Outlook Looking abroad, Sukarno sees the Communist countries not only as natural partners Sukarno's major foreign in anti-Westernism but apparpolicy goal is to rid Southeast ently as the ultimate predomi- Asia of Western influence. His nant force in Southeast Asia. domestic predilection is toward He has moved toward Peiping, leftist totalitarianism. as Moscow has followed a policy of relaxation toward the West. He sees the Communist Party as the country's only ef- Sukarno is 64 years old, ficient and dynamic organiza- but although suffering from a tion which not only gives him kidney complaint, remains reits own support but can organize markably active. If he lives and deliver mass support as a few more years, it is likely well. Sukarno can set out that he will eventually preside broad policy lines, but he needs over a modified Communist rea source of ideas to attack gime. specific problems. Many Communist ideas apparently have become acceptable to him. The PKI still needs Sukarno to protect it while it consolidates its gains, and He has curbed army power it probably hopes he will sur- --which once served to balance vive a few more years but no and contain Communist strength longer. Within that time, if --presumably because he be- present trends continue, PKI lieved the army, if permitted infiltration of national and to keep a significant politi- local government and Communist cal influence,would restrict organization of the peasantry his own role and his policies. will have become so effective Moreover, he foresawthat army that at Sukarno's death the party obstruction of the Communists can make a bid for power with could lead to a polarization of good chances of success. (SEforces in Indonesia which CRET) could disrupt national unity. === [PDF page 19] === Noven ber 5, 1964 DECLASSIFIED Mac - Author ty_ ~~ ~NAP2De4))AE Bill B. feels we've got to start rolling on a successor to Howard Jones, who's not in best of health, has been in Djakarta almost seven years, and is nibbling at offer to be head of East-West Center in Hawaii. Bill had hoped to tap Gale McGee (if defeated). Now he has no other candidate than Jake Beam. Jake's a good, solid guy but not man I'd chose to deal with Sukarno. Bill would like Wilson Wyatt, but we recall that the Oval, Room put the kdbosh on him. Is a rehearing possible? Wyatt would be great. I'm quite worried lest, on top of all the other anti-Bung gestures we're making these days, pulling out Howard would be wholly misconstrued by the Bung. Ergo, unless we can find a really good man quick, why not keep Jones there a few months longer while we search. Bill wants a quick reading on WH sentiment. What's your reaction? RWK === [PDF page 20] === November 19, 1964 Mac- FYI we've growing evidence that quite a domestic flap is brewing in Indonesia between PKI and anti-PKI groups, perhaps to a degree the start of jockeying for power in anticipation of Sukarno's demise. At any rate Jones argues eloquently (Djakarta 919 attached) that this is all the more reason for renewing our efforts to defuse Malaysia crisis, lest this be used by Subandrio and PKI (with or without Sukarno) as excuse for re-imposing unity. As you know, I've been badgering FE not to give up on efforts to buy time here. We have little to lose, and a lot to gain. But the FE experts seem tired of the game, and tend (probably with some reason) to discount Jones. They keep telling me we've tried all Jones remedies before, so why mount up again. However, I'm still playing devil's advocate (the last Sukarno-lover). Even at risk of some caustic response from Bill about my badgering, you might stick in a needle too. -DECLASSIFIED Authority C 'RW === [PDF page 21] === INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State Action DE RUNMJBT 679A 18/1145Z Info 0 181 13OZ ZE Ino FM AMEMBASSYDJAKARTAI TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC INFO RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALALUMPUR RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA >RUHPA/C INCPAC/ CAM P1*1 SM IT HHAVA! IIu~oiy 1~~ STATE [Unreadable] NSC S E C R E TACTION IMMEDIATE DEPrT 9 jINFO KUALALUMPUR 232 NR BANGKOK 148 CANBERRA 99 LONDON '165 MANILA 228 TOKYO 84 CINCPAC CI.A 239 FROM DJAKARTA NOVEMBER 18, 6:45 FM ASA CINCPAC FOR POLAD' DOD EMBTEL 913. RIMR IN ADDITION TO INTERNATIONAL DANGERS OF MALAYSIAN PROBLEM, IT IS NOW BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT THERE ARE ESENTIAL DOMESTIC REA69SONSUN THIS DISPUTE SHDBL, HMO mHLITARAENA T AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE REPORTED IN DETAIL DURING THE PAR CFN 919 232 148 99,165 228 84 239 18 6:45 913 NOV PAGE TWO RUMJBT 679A S E C R E T FEW WEEKS ON THE INTERNAL "POLEMIC" BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS.',THIS REPRESENTS THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE PKI I HAVE SEEN HERE. IT IS EFFECTIVE AND APPEARS RELATIVELY WELL ORGANIZED. WHILE THE MOVEMENT HAS DEFINITE LIMITS, IT INCLUDES SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS FROM THE PRESS, INTELLIGENTSIA,'YOUTH, LABOR, AND OTHER GROUPS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT IT HAS AT LEAST PCIT* ARMY BACKING(SEE EMBTEL 912 REPORTING MY CONVERSATION WITH GEN YANI). ACCORDING TO SOURCES I BELIEVE RELIABLE (REFTEL), SUBANDRIO AND THE PKI ARE CONCERNED BY THESE MODERATE EFFORTS AND HOPE TO USE THE MALAYSIAN DISPUTE- TO SMOTHER THEM. I BELIEVE THIS IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY AND ONE WHICH WOULD BE MOST ADVERSE FOR US INTERESTS IN' SEASIA. CONFRONTATION IS THE ONE.ISSUE ON'WHICH NON*COMMUNIST REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" === [PDF page 22] === -2-919, November 18, 7 PM from: Djakarta GROUPS ARE COMPLETELY UNABLE TO MAKE A FRONTAL'EFFORT TO CHANGE POLICY. THEY ARE MUCH TOO VULNERABLE FOR THAT. IF SETTLEMENT MALAYSIAN DISPUTE -NOT REACHED AND SUBANDRIO/PKI C iN HEATIN UP INE, PRESENT NON-COMMUNIST INITIATIVE WILL BE BURIED UNDER RALLYING CRY'OF NATIONAL UNtiTA nAii5s IMPERIALISTS. I WOULD NOT WISH TO' OVERSTATE CASEr BUT I CANNOT HELP FEELING US INITIATIVE WILL BE REQUIRED TO. -PREVENT THIS AND PROTECT OUR VITAL INTERESTS. ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH RAY ADD TO TIMELINESS OF US - CFIN NOW 912 NOT NOT CANNOT - PAGE THREE RUMJBT 679A SECRET INITIATIVE IS THAT SUKARNO HAS PLACED GREAT WEIGHT ON PRES JOHNSON'S RE-ELECTION AS IT EFFECTS INDONESIAN*AMERICAN RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH HE IS SOMEWHAT NAIVE IN ASSUMING THIS WILL CHANGE BASIC FACTORS WHICH HAVE LED TO STRAIN IN RELATIONS, IT DOES MEAN THAT IN THIS IMMEDIATE POST* ELECTION PERIOD SUKARNO IS VIEWING AMERICAN POLICY WITH A MORE OPEN MIND THAN FOR SOME TIME. INDO REACTION TO DATE TO US DEFENSE MISSION- IN XL AND 7TH FLEET-FLAGSHIP'S CALL AT MALAYSIAN PORTS HAS BEEN MILD. I BELIEVE THIS - MAY BE RELATED TO SUKARNO*S WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE-IN POST-. ELECTION PERIOD BUT IT'WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE IRRITATIONS SUCH AS THESE ERODE PRESENT TEMPORARY GOODWILL. CONFRONTATION ITSELF APPEARS BE AT' ANOTHER TURNING POINT IN WHICH NEXT FEW WEEKS COULD IMPORTANTLY AFFECT ITS FURTHER COURSE. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS A MOOD OF RELATIVE CAUTION AND EVEN CONCILIATION IN - BOTH CAPITALS. MODERATE VIEWS WITHIN GOM AS REPORTED IN KL*S-577 COULD PROVIDE OPENING FOR CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS.- I HAVE IMPRESSION SUKARNO REALLY DOES NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO NEXT ON CONFRONTATION PROBLEM AND IS RECEIVING CONFLICTING ADVICE. HOWEVER, I AM CONVINCED HE WOULD WELCOME-US- ' INITIATIVE TO BREAK BOTTLENECK. THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE STRONG GROUPS (NASUTION, YANI, SALEH,-MALIK, AND CFN 7TH NOT 577 NOT, PAGE FOUR RUMJBT 679A S E C R E T OTHERS) WHO WOULD URGE 'PRESIDENT TO SEIZE ANY SUCH OPENING. THUS FROM -DJAKARTA THERE SEEM TO BE-COMPELLING - DOMEATIC AS WELL AS"EXTERNAL REASONS FOR MOVING THIS- DISPUTE OFF DEAD CENTER. AS AGREED WITH AMBASSADORS === [PDF page 23] === -3-919, November 18, 7 PM from: Djakarta FBT1? GhiI4 uLI u cONTINUE TO BELIEVE OUR FIRST STEP SHOULD BE TO PLAY OUT THE PROSPECT OF BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN BRITISH AND INDOS. RECOMMEND WE IMMEDIATELY AND STRONGLY PRESS BRITISH TO IMPLEMENT THEIR EARLIER PLANS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH 601 AS OUTLINED - IN LONDON'S 2051. IF UK RESPONSIVE, PERHAPS AMBASSADOR BELL AND I COULD GREASE SKIDS IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS IN EFFORT INCREASE CHANCES FOR FRUITFUL TALKS. BILATERAL TALKS (OR TRILATERAL IF GOM PARTICIPATES) COULD AT LEAST GET DISPUTE INTO DISCUSSION STAGE AND HOPEFULLY MIGHT MOVE TOWARD AGREEMENT TO REFER DISPUTE TO SOME FACE-SAVING BODY SUCH AS PROPOSED 4-POWER AA COMMISSION. ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AACC'PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER AMERICAN INITIATIVES PERHAPS ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED EMBTEL 646. JAPANESE EMBOFF RECENTLY INFORMED US THAT HISAMB AND FONOFF BELIEVE TIME MAY BE NEARLY RIPE FOR SOME OUtSIDE MOVE TO IMPLEMENT AACC, AND THEY MOST ANXIOUS THAT PRESENT GOOD "OMENS FOR PROGRESS NOT BE WASTED. SOURCE SAID JAPANESE THINKING OVER CFN 2051 4 AA AACC 646 AACC NOT PAGE FIVE RUMJBT 679A SECRET PROBLEM OF HOW COMPOSITION OF AACC MIGHT BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE TO AVOID UNSEEN PITFALLS AND WERE TOYING WITH IDEA THAT ALL-ASIAN COMPOSITION ("NO FURTHER WEST THAN INDIA") COULD EXCLUDE SUCH UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS AS UAR AND ALGERIA.. THIS INDICATES JAPANESE MAY BE HELPFUL ALLY IN WORKING OUT COMPOSITION OF AACC WHEN TIME COMES. IN MEANTIME, WE MAY WISH TO KEEP GOJ - ADEQUATELY INFORMED SO THAT THEIR EFFORTS"DO NOT CONFLICT VITH BRITISH OR AMERICAN STEPS TO RESOLVE CRISIS. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE INITATE FOLLOWING STEPS IMMEDIATELY: (1) PROMPT EFFORTS TO CONVINCE BRITISH OF URGENT NECESSITY FOR MOVING TOWARD BILATERAL TALKS WITH 601. (2) ASSUMING UK REACTION FAVORABLE, DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPECTIVE GOVTS BY US AMBASSADORS IN DJAKARTA AND KL TO PAVE WAY FOR ME ANINGFUL TALKS AND CLEARLY INDICATE US SUPPORT FOR THIS INITIATIVE. === [PDF page 24] === -4-919, November 18, 7 PM from? Djakarta (3) EFFORTS WITH ALL PARTTX. CONCERNED TO MOVE ISSUE TOWARD AACC OR OTHER MECHANISM. (4) EFFORTS TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF 'OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY. JAPAN, THAILAND, AND POSSIBLY PHILIPPINES. GP-3. JONES CFNAACC UAR AACC 804 (1) (2) (3) AACC (4),GP* *As received, will be serviced upon request. Note: Advance copy to S/S'-O at 9:40 AM 11/18/-64 Passed to White House at 10:20 AM 11/18/64 14 === [PDF page 25] === [Unreadable] 2 December 1964 OCI No. 2c9/64 Copy No. DEOLASSIF1t INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM RALLYING OF ANTI-COMMUNIST FOWES IN INDONESIA rC AT OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Cidrrnt In eligehce GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AIRIL M, === [PDF page 26] === OCI No. 2057/64 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 2 December 1964 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Rallying of Anti-Communist Forces in Indonesia 1. For the first time in several years there are the faint stirrings of an anti-Communist movement in Indonesia. Provoked by increasing boldness on the part of the Indonesian Communist'Party (PKI) and by Sukarno's own increasing reliance on the party, several non-Communist figures have raised a new banner called "Sukarnoism." The movement is ostensibly dedicated to the defense of the President's almost mystical Five Principles (Pantjasila), but its main purpose appears to be that of combating PKI influence in the government and throughout the country. 2. It is too early to measure the movement's strength or effectiveness. While it reportedly has received indirect approval from Sukarno and appears to have enlisted important support, it could well collapse overnight if its strategy of winning the President's support should fail and Sukarno should move to suppress its growth. 3. The movement first came to light during Sukarno's absence on a foreign tour from 17 September to 5 November, when articles berating the PKI appeared in the Djakarta press. The PKI responded, of course, and a lively polemic followed for several weeks. However, during the week immediately preceding and the one immediately following Sukarno's return, the polemic subsided, almost as if the Sukarnoists feared retribution from the President. The only government move against the group, however, was the banning of a.single Sukarnoist newspaper soon after the President's return. In the absence of further repressive action, the group seems to === [PDF page 27] === have taken on new courage, and its leaders are trying to organize and expand the forces involved. 4. Minister of Trade Adam Malik leads the group, but Chaerul Saleh, third deputy prime minister and concurrently minister of development, is also deeply involved. Malik, who is a former Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Saleh are ideologicially attuned to the "right wing" of the Murba (Proletarian) Party, usually described as the national Communist party of Indonesia. With Indonesia having moved a considerable distance to the left under Sukarno, Malik and Saleh represent a "moderate" position, and their activities are arousing the hopeful interest of individuals who stand further to the right. The new group has advocated the spreading of Sukarnoism, i.e., the President's teachings, as a means of unifying the nation. Its spokesmen state that the campaign to crush Malaysia and to spread Sukarnoism are inseparable. Early in the press polemic, they attacked Communist Party chairman Aidit for a statement he allegedly made disavowing the need for Pantjasila, to which all recognized political parties are obliged to subscribe--"once the revolution is won." Although this particular line of attack has been abandoned, the Sukarnoists continue to warn against those who are not true "Pantjasilaists." 5. Malik told US Ambassador Jones on 19 November that his movement has the support of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the only large Moslem party which is still legal; the right wing of the National Party; and lower levels of the bureaucracy and political parties. Sukarnoist press elements have organized a "Body to Support Sukarnoism"; youth groups have organized a "Sukarnoist Student Movement"' and several non-Communist labor federations reportedly have banded together in an "undercover body" to support Sukarnoism. The labor groups feel they must keep their organization secret to avoid attack by the PKI. Malik feels that for the time being the movement must remain a loose coalition. 6. Whether the Sukarnoists have the extensive j support they claim cannot be verified. For the most part only the statements of Djakarta politicians are available. There is a large but disparate body of [Unreadable] === [PDF page 28] === non-Communist opinion in Indonesia, however, which would rally if given a safe opportunity. By early November in North Sumatra, at least, newspapers were cautiously echoing the new line from Djakarta. 7. Sukarno apparently is willing to see how the situation develops. According to Malik, a NU official on 18 November requested and received Sukarno's consent to "endorse non-Communist ideas" in a speaking tour of East and Central Java. Sukarno is said to have questioned the NU leader closely about the new movement's support, and the official reportedly told him that the NU is fully backing the new force. 8. Probably as a result of this meeting and reports about it, support for Sukarnoism during the next few days began to mushroom. Two military leaders--Minister for Defense General Nasution and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Martadinata--spoke openly in its behalf. Army leaders, initially sympathetic but circumspect toward the new movement, are now making statements which, while not specifically supporting it, obviously align them with the Sukarnoists. Minister of Information Achmadi, who earlier had opposed it, reportedly told Sukarnoist supporters in North Sumatra to ignore attacks and to spread the doctrine but to preserve national unity. Even First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who has tried to curry favor with the PKI for the past year and a half, reportedly received a Sukarnoist delegation, was "very friendly," and gave "valuable advice." Parliament, scheduled to open on 3 December, has postponed its next session until the second quarter of 1965. The change may have been arranged to avoid an early showdown between the PKI and the Sukarnoists. 9. The PKI, with its allies in the left wing of the National Party, for the time being is on the defensive. It has labeled Sukarnoism a disguise for "Communist phobia"--a favorite term of Sukarno's-- and has stressed that the anti-PKI campaign developed behind Sukarno's back while he was out of the country. It charges that Sukarnoism is an attempt to displace NASAKOM, Sukarno's term for the cooperation of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements. SAE*T* === [PDF page 29] === 10. Prospects of the Sukarnoists seem to depend largely on the President. Although he is opposed to divisive political tendencies, Sukarno is at the same time ever willing to find effective pro-Sukarno elements that can be used in his political balancing game. In view of his preoccupation with his own political position and his possible concern that the PKI is pushing too hard, the successful development of Sukarnoism may be of interest to him. He could be willing to overlook for a time the fact that there are elements within Sukarnoist ranks whom he distrusts and whom he has considered expelling from the recognized political scene. 11. A major factor in Sukarno's permissive attitude toward the new anti-PKI group may be his hope that he can use it in maneuvering to schedule new talks on the Malaysia issue, and he may even believe he can use it to get economic assistance from the West. 12. Sukarnoist spokesmen are urging the US Embassy to take steps to encourage UK-Indonesian or Indonesian-Malaysian talks. They state that unless the Malaysia issue is peacefully settled, the new non-Communist movement will be smothered in the continuing anti-Malaysia clamor, and efforts to remedy Indonesia's deteriorating economy will continue to be frustrated. Although Sukarnoist leaders have identified themselVes with the Malaysia confrontation, they seem to be trying to change its emphasis from a politico-military to a politicoeconomic one as a means of pressing national economic development. Although the Sukarnoists are not necessarily being directed by Sukarno to approach the Americans, their needs and strategy for the moment coincide with his. === [PDF page 30] === DECLASSIFIED Byt4 NARS, Date), ' Mac - december 14, 1964 Do you see these things normally? Jones may lean too far to one side, but I'd hesitate to flaunt his expertise as an observer of the Indo scene. We can have yet another war in SEA (Southeast Asia) if we want one, and I don't see much recent effort on our part to sidetrack it. None on UK's part either. Nor does it make sense to buy out just as a major struggle for power seems to be developing. RWK Att: Djakarta 1091, 12/10/64 === [PDF page 31] === )/IAA d ITH INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State T- O ANI 43 action FE 00 RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFDNDJ Irdfo 0 R 101155Z Z ST 374;10/1230Z 000 SS FM AMEMBASSYQDJAKARTA>, TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1964 D fPw,7OA 'INFO RUIJKL/AMEMBASSY KLUMPUR -SAYJaE EUR RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 10 RUHPA/CINCPAC. k K-K US IA BT NSC 'S E C R E T ACTIONIMMEDIATE DEPT(109V.USUN 19 INFO KLUJMPUR 295 LONDON 203 CANBERRA 112 CINCP 64MEDAN SURABAYA INR UNN fROM DJAKARTA DEC 10 655PM '. CIA NSA CINCPAC FOR POLAD DOD AD THERE IS MOUNTING EVIDENCE THAT DESPITE OVERT ANTI* AID AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND ATTACKS RMR ON USIS CENTERS HERE, REAL SMUYGI BELWEENJPI ODTERNOIST"P0 T CALGROUP -ND BETWEEN TO PROMOTE 'PEACEFIL,=IT. -m-1O LYI FTUOSEJHOPING TRYING TO THWAT IT IS IN THESE [Unreadable] CFN 1091 79 295 203179410 5 PAGE TWO RUMJBT 374A S E C R ET CONTEXTS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS APPEAR HAVE THEIR TRUE MEANING PKI WITH ITS PNI ALLIES HAS LAUNCHED MAJOR ATTACK ON SUKARNOIST MOVEMENT IN PAST FEW DAYS. HARIAN RAKJAT TODAY Fl"S ITSFRONT PAGE WITH DEMANDS TO DISSOLVE SUKARNOISM MOVEMENT TO EXCLUSION OF ANY MENTION OF CONGO OR ANTI*USIS CAMPAIGN. SEVERAL KNOWLEDGEABLE INDONESIANS HAVE STATED TO EMBOFFS THAT MAIN OBJECT OF PKI AT PRESENT IS TO BREAK BACK OF MODERATE POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO ITS ADVANCE. SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON USIS PRESENCE ARE MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAPON IN THIS CAMPAIGN AND PARALLEL CONTINUING UNILATERAL ACTS BY PKI PEASANT AFFILIATE (BTI) WHICH IS CHALLENGING AUTHORITY IN RURAL AREAS (EMBTEL 1064). IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT MAJOR I DEMONSTRATION IN SURABAJA YESTERDAY WHICH BROUGHT ARMY AND POLICE. INTO SEVERAL HOUR CLASH WITH DEMONSTRATORS (SURABAJA'S 26 TO DEPT) BEGAN OVER CLEARLY DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE AND ONLY WAS MOB'S FRUSTRATION TURNED "AGAINST USIS FACILITIES. WRIY Authority REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS F if -PROHIBITED. UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" By 1964 S, === [PDF page 32] === -9 n Qi 1 1 nMP*7'P [Unreadable] I DO NOT CONDONE PROVOCATIVE 'STATEMENTS BY SUKARNO AND OTHER GOI LEADERS CONDEMNING AMERICAN RESCUE MISSION IN CONGO WHICH ADDED FUEL TO DEMONSTRATORS'S FLAMES, BUT GIVEN SUKARNO OFN PKI PNIZVEIAN RAKJAT 106426 NOT PAGE THREE RUMJBT 374A S E C R ET SELF-IMAGE AS IMPORTANT LEADEkA)MWORLD IT INEVITABLE HE 'THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY FEEL REQUIRED TO ASSERT SUCH LEADERSHIP THROUGH DENUNCIATION OF WHITE "INTERVENTION"'IN CONGO AFTERI- SO MANY AFRICAN STATES CLOSE TO SCENE HAD ALREADY DENOUNCED US-BELGIAN ACTION. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT 801 TRYING TO STOP LAWLESS ACTION. POLICE HAVE GIVEN US CONSIDERABLE PROMPT PROTECTION THOUGH ALL THEIR EFFORTS NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS WE COULD WISH. EDIT IN FOREIGN MINISTRY INFLUENCED INDONESIAN HERALD TODAY (EMBTEL 1087) STRONGLY CONDEMNS ATTACKS ON FOREIGN PROPERTY AS USURPATION OF GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY FIELD. SUKARNO AND EVEN SUBANDRIO HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES TO INDICATE THAT DOOR IS STILL OPEN FOR NEGOTIATION OF MALAYSIA DISPUTE AND THAT DIRECT TALKS WITH UK WOULD BE WELCOMED. CAS REPORT WHICH I HAVE JUST SEEN ALSO STATES THAT SUPREME OPERATIONS COMMAND (KOTOE) HAS RECOMMENDED TO SUKARNO THAT WAY BE SOUGHT TO SOLVE MALAYSIA DISPUTE PEACEFULLY (FND 7353). DESPITE SERIES OF 'INDO HINTS, HOWEVER, WE HAVE 17ISTINCT -]UAA NOT INDONESIAN HERALD 1087 CAS KOTOE 7393 - PAGE FOUR RUMJBT 374ASECREIf IMPRESSION FROM GALBRAITH DISCUSSIONS INLONDON (LONDON*S 2671) AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS THAT MG NOT PREPARED PICK UP BALL AT THIS TIME AND DEFINITELY COOL'TO PROSPECT OF TALKS VITH GOI. GOI-INSPIRED PRESS STORY ABOUT IMPORTANCE OF SUBANDRIG MEETING WITH SEC RUSK AT UNGA gEMBTEL 1044), AND SUBANDRIO'S LATER REMARKS TO PRESS IN HOLLAND (THE HAGUE 419) TO EFFECT THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS MALAYSIA WANTED REACH UNDERSTANDINGAND HE INTENDED === [PDF page 33] === 1t91 nV rPMRE1R 10. 7 PM, FROM DJAKARTA INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES AT UN, INDICATE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH GOI VIEWS OPPORTUNITIES WHICH MAY BE PRESENT 'IN NEW YORKJ'TO EXPLORE COURSE FOR MALAYSIAN SETTLEMENT. 'THIS PROSPECT NOT UNKNOWN TO PKI AND VIOLENCE AGAINST USIS INSTALLATIONS AS WELL AS STEPPED-UP COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST MODERATES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WELL-TIMED TO ATTEMPT UNDERCUT ANY GOI EFFORTS AT CALM EXPLORATION OF MALAYSIA DISPUTE. IN THIS CONTEXT I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY BALL OR GOV, HARRIMAN TO RECEIVE OR CNo- $USAND TOT fLEIN NEW YORK. I DONOTBELIEVE IT WILL BE USEFUL AT SUCH MEETING TO BELABOR SUBANDRIO TOO HEAVILY OVER ATTACKS ON USIS. THESE OCCURERED AFTER .CFN 2671 NOT 1044 419 NOTNOT PAGE FIVE RUMJBT 374A S E C R E T HIS DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY CONSzEQUENTLY OUR REPRESENTATIIONS ON SUBJECT PROBABLY MOST EFFECTIVELY HANDLED HERE INDJAKARTA WITH SUKARNO. I AM INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT ATTACKS ON USIS HERE AREL_ l(YLYDIVERSIONARY TACTtUC' BY PKI TO INTERFERE WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN MAIN POLITICAL ARENA. TO EXTENT WE MAGNIFY INCIDENTS WE PLAY INTO SUCH TRAP AND PERHAPS FURTHER EXACERBATE US-INDO RELATIONS BESIDES. I SUGGEST MEETING ON OTHER HAND PROVIDES IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY FOR SECRETARY TO LISTEN TO SUBANDRIO ON NEXT STEP GPI ENVISAGES IN SOLVING MALAYSIA DISPUTE. WHETHER OR NOT SUBANDRIO DURING NEW YORK DISCUSSIONS FINDS OPENINGS EXIST FOR SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON DISPUTE A1Y INFLUENCE HEAVILY DIRECTION EVENTS TAKE HERE. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR LARGE-SCALE' INDO MILITARY ASSAULTSS ON KICHING OR SINGAPORE VIRTUALtY COMPLETE. THEREFORE, SITUATION SEEMS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOVEMENT' EITHER TOWARD PEACEFUL SOLUTION OR DELIBERATE ESCALATION. THUS FAR INDO,FEELERS DURING PAST TWO MONTHS HAVE RECEIVED RATHER SHORT SHRIFT. SUBANDRIO TRIP MAY BE ONE OF LAST PROBING EFFORTS TO OPEN AVENUE TO SETTLEMENT BEFORE IRREVOCABLE MILITARY DECISIONS TAKEN. === [PDF page 34] === -4- 1091, DECEMBER 10, 7 PM, FROM DJAKARTA RECEPTION WHICH SUBANDRIO GIVEN IN NEW YORK BY SEC 'AND AMB STEVENsON VILLBE CLOSELY Wv4CHED'BY SaKARO". I T6RP WECAN SIGNAL OUR INTEREST IN BEING HELPFUL "IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO PROMOTE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON MALAYSIA DISPUTE, WHILE PLAYING IN LOU KEY THOSE CURRENT IRRITANTS WHICH.MAR LATERAL US-INDO RELATIONS. JONES CFN GP*2 NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-0 AT 9:37 AM, 12/10/64. PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:35 AM, 12/10/64. === [PDF page 35] === NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 December 28, 1964 DECLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY By V, NARS, Date2'21L5 SUBJECT: Replacement for Howard Jones in Indonesia It seems to me that Sukarno's plea in Djakarta's 1183 requires a speedy Presidential response. I assume you may want to discuss this at the Ranch tomorrow. Here are two possible courses of action. A. If, as you suggested, the President is having second thoughts at letting Howard go, my own preference would be for us to be moderately forthcoming in the following manner: 1) The President should inform Sukarno, by letter, that he has checked with Jones and the East-West Center and has arranged a six-month delay in Jones' retirement. 2) He should express his deep concern over the state of U. S. - Indonesia relations and his hope that we can use Howard's final six months as a period in which to reverse the present deteriorating trend. Despite our desire for better relations, however, things simply cannot improve so long as the Indos pursue confrontation through raids against Malaysia. We cannot be helpful while aggression continues in any form; in the absence of aggression, we stand ready to be of assistance, etc. (Rationale. There is no point in ridding ourselves of an asset like Jones at a critical time in Indonesia's internal development when Sukarno may well disappear from the scene. Howard knows all the rival leaders; he is also one of the few non-Marxists who still has regular access to Sukarno, There is also no point in turning down Sukarno' s personal request at a time when we haven't yet found the ideal replacement.) B. If, in the President's judgment, Howard should still move out on schedule, I would urge that a speedy decision be reached on his successor -- and communicated through a conciliatory personal letter from the President in response to the present plea. === [PDF page 36] === I do not believe that Beam is the right man for the stormy period ahead. Ideally we need a man of warmth, vitality, and shrewd political sense, fast on his feet, with a personal tie to the President. The following names are the unrefined product of my Christmas ruminations: a) If we choose someone from inside the Service: Henry A. Byroade (now Ambassador to Burma). Byroade's assets are a West Point background, extensive service in the Far East, a stint as NEA assistant secretary, good political instincts, an engaging personality. He struck it off extremely well with Nasser in 1955-6 (too well for Foster Dulles, as you will recall). He has been sitting on his hands in Rangoon. He lacks the Presidential tie. b) If we choose an outsider: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. Abram Chayes Pierre Salinger Eugene V. Rostow (In two of these cases, Indonesia' s Islamic cast should be borne in mind; not an insuperable obstacle.) Jame homson, Jr. === [PDF page 37] === L~4a.ua-d -~ I 30 December 1964 01No. 2860/64 Authority CIAe) By.~LW~NARS, Date.#-2 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THlE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN INDONESIA DLRETORT]gQF-INTELLIGENCE [Unreadable] ficcudid fro~haufomatlc dwngradin andI 'drisiiction === [PDF page 38] === 81 OCI No. 2860/64 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 30 December 1964 43 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Succession Problem in Indonesia 1. Sukarno's ill health--resulting from a recurring and increasingly serious kidney ailment-- has aroused increasing concern over the question of succession to the presidency of Indonesia. Estimates of how long Sukarno has to live range from one to five years. To politically aware Indonesians --Communist and non-Communist--the presidential succession is now a major and perhaps the primary national political problem. Present constitutional provisions and government regulations do not provide any clear procedure for succession, and Sukarno has designated no individual to follow him. From now on, almost all Indonesian domestic political activity will be conducted with this problem in mind. The question is exceedingly complex, and we cannot project the course of events with any confidence. 2. The constitution provides that the vice president replace the president in the event of the latter's death, removal, or inability to exercise his duties. However, Indonesia has had no vice president since 1956, when the then vice president Hatta resigned, and no effort has been made to name one. The constitution further provides that the president and vice president be elected by the People's Congress by majority vote, that they hold office for a term of five years, and that they may be re-elected. But Sukarno has served as president continuously since 1945, and in 1963 was unanimously designated president for life by the People's Congress. The constitution is thus so atrophied, in this as in many other respects, that its procedures probably would be involved only to give a stamp of legitimacy to a successor who had already secured power by other means. === [PDF page 39] === 3. A government regulation promulgated in March 1960 attempted to deal with the subject of succession but left dangling or unanswered several significant questions. The regulation states that if there is no vice president (as is now the case) and the president dies or is unable to continue in his duties, the First Minister "shall perform the duties of the presidency until such time as there is a president." However, Sukarno last year replaced the First Minister position with three vice prime ministers. 4. The three vice prime ministers are Subandrio (concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs), Leimena (concurrently Minister of Distribution) and Chaerul Saleh (concurrently Minister for Development), designated First, Second and Third, respectively. If the 1960 regulation were invoked, presumably the presidential duties would fall to Subandrio, the First Vice Prime Minister. He has served several times as acting president when Sukarno has been out of the country. When both Sukarno and Subandrio have been away, responsibility has been given to Leimena. Since under the regulation he would perform these duties only "until such time as there is a president," the designation of Subandrio--or anyone else--would give that person the inside track, would not settle the succession and would in fact intensify maneuvering among the rival candidates. Moreover, the person designated under the regulation might well be reluctant to abandon "presidential duties" once he had assumed them. In any case, the 1960 regulation may have gone the same way as the constitution. During the past few months in conversations about the succession between Indonesian and American officials, the regulation has apparently not once been mentioned. 5a Constitutional procedures and regulations aside, the basic fact of life in regard to the succession is that only two major political organizations exist in Indonesia--the Communist Party (PKI) and the army. Immediately after Sukarno's death, the PKI probably would declare its support for a civiliansuccession. The army meanwhile would probably not counter directly but would try to install a civilian government which it could dominate. === [PDF page 40] === 6. The principal non-Communist civilian contenders for the office of president appear to be First Vice Prime Minister Subandrio and Third Vice Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, Neither has a large, organized political base and both would probably feel obliged to look beyond the political and bureaucratic cliques in Djakarta for support. Subandrio probably would turn to the Communist Party and its sometime political ally, the National Party. At least for the next two years, the Communists probably would be willing initially to work through Subandrio. Chaerul Saleh, who is anti-PKI but oriented to the Murba or "national communist" party, presumably would turn to the army. Although distrusted for years by the army, Saleh now is trying to ingratiate himself with army leaders and Djakarta staff officers, largely by giving them opportunities to make money. He may succeed in winning significant but not united army support and in any case would be considerably more acceptable to the army than Subandrio. 7. The army is said to have a plan which it will implement when Sukarno dies. References to it by army officers, however, seem both too vague and too pat to be credible. Chances are that over the years there have been plans but that these have been outmoded as the principals have been transferred out of Djakarta and as loyalties have changed and rivalries developed. It is unlikely that an explicit army plan exists, and initially the army probably would try to work with those civilians who put themselves forward. 8. Moreover, no civilian who might be the army's own candidate has yet appeared. From time to time, mention is made of former vice president Hatta or the Sultan of Jogjakarta, but neither seems likely. Hatta is ill, and for over ten years the Sultan has had only a peripheral role in national politics. Neither is adept at maneuver and neither seems likely, wittingly, to accept a figurehead position. A better possibility is Adam Malik, the Minister of Trade who figured in the recent, now suppressed non-Communist "Sukarnoist" movement. === [PDF page 41] === 9. If past performance is any gauge, efforts of army-supported civilian elements to achieve and maintain themselves in power would be characterized by intense and perhaps self-defeating jockeying for personal power. The non-Communists have shown little talent for working together but great capacity for intrigue, planning, and sheer talk. If a post-Sukarno civilian government should dissipate its energies in internal maneuver, the army might well move to replace it with military rule. 10. In such an event, however, the character of the military leadership does not seem predictable. The army, less united now than formerly, would have trouble deciding on a national leader. Most often mentioned are General Nasution, who is Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and General Yani, who is commander of the Army. Nasution, with no troops at his disposal, has less real power but probably considerably more respect than the increasingly corrupt Yani. 11. The Communist Party's chances of achieving power immediately or soon after Sukarno's death improve as Sukarno lives on. Should Sukarno die within one or two years, an initial army-supported civilian government is likely. If this government is headed by Subandrio, the Communists will have achieved great room for maneuver. Moreover, if Sukarno lives for four or five years, and if present domestic political trends continue, the Communists may be sufficiently entrenched to take power without any serious, open struggle. === [PDF page 42] === -INCOMING, TELEGRAM Department of State [Unreadable] [Unreadable] SS. RR AUEHCR 190) JAN 13 AM 12 44 Info DE RUMJBT 499A '13/0100Z R 130 307=FA DJAARTASH C)DECLASSIFIED K --SECS _TA TE WASHDC 003 .INFORUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR STATE GRNC Authority AVNARS, Date THE WHITE Houl WASHINGTON BTECR T ACTION DEPOT 1 INFO KUALA LUMPUR 366 FROM DJAXARTA JANUARY 13, 7:45 AM EXDIS REF: KL TEL 836 TO DEPARTMENT SENT DJAKARTA 285 b4L PROPOSAL REFTEL DESERVESCONSIDERAT ION AT SOME POINT BUT BELIEVE WOD BE INA PROPRIATEJET PJREENTTOMAKE SUCH- APPROACH TO INDONESIAN' ARMY. WE ARE NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT W.-VOWN * OVER -COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IS IMMINENT' SINCE, A NO GROUP INCLUDING.ARMY, APPEARS READY TO STAND -P FOR NON-COMMUNIST. OVER WE DO,NOT BELIEVE ARMY S HOLDING BACK OUT OF CONCERN THAT GOM AND COMMONWEALTH C -LC ite k dL MIGHT 'STRIKE IF 'ARMY BECAME INVOLVED IN INTERNAL FRACAS 7 ~ L441/\,WITH PKI. ARMY RELUCTANCE AT THIS-TIME SEEMS RATHER TO STEM FROM LACK OF UNITY WITHIN:ARMY IT-SELF AND HISTORIC RELUCTANCE OPPOSE POLICIES AND, ACTIONS WHICH FAVORED OR AT LEAST ACCEPTED BY SUKARNO. (691 IN SHORT O DOnQT: 1T'1'-E C.1f T~ TMOI TC STHATRECOMMENDED BY AMB BELL UNLESS WE CERTAINARMY WOLD TO OUR INITIATIVE. THIS RECEPTIVITY,NOW LACKING AND I WOULD FEAR 'AN-Y SUCH APPROACH AT THIS 'TIME WOULD REBOUND AS UNWARRANTED ATTEMPT INTERFERE INTERNALLY. I, AM ALSO OF OPINION.THAT THERE ARE OTHER THINGS WE CAN AND SHOULD TRY FIRST. THIS EMB IN NEAR FUTURE WILL BE RECOMMENDING' THESE AS APPROPRIATE. .AS.-PROPAGANDA PLOY AND BAIT WHICH MAY AT- SOME FUTURE TIME SEEM ATTRACTIVE TO INDONESIANS AND DRAW THEM 'TOWARD _NEGOTIATIONS IT MIGHT BE'WORTHCON.SIDERING SOME TYPE OF "NON-AGGRESSIONPACTW INVOLVING 'US, lUK,' AUSTRALIA,' THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA AND-INDONESIA, (VARIATION THIS IDEA WAS-OEPORTED cVER FAR EAST BROADCAST SERVICE JAN 11 REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS [Unreadable] .1.- PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" === [PDF page 43] === [Unreadable] -2- 1337, January 13, 7 a.m. from Djakarta AS HAVING BEEN PUT FORWARD BY AUSTRALIAN SPOKESMAN -- WHETHER GOVT OR PRIVATE UNCLEAR.) WHILE PROSPECTS MEANINGFUL PACT REMOTE, 'FLO.4TING OF THIS IDEA AS MEANS GET DISCUSSION STARTED,MIGHT AT SOME POINT BE MARRIED WITH AMB BELL'S PROPOSAL IF AND WHEN RECEPTIVITY SHOULD DEVELOP AMONG INDONESIAN ARMY. JONES- CFN GP-S. === [PDF page 44] === wN~AlA INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State RR RUEHCR Action: DE RUMJKL 104A 09/0620Z R 094A FM CA VSYKJLLMUR 5$AWJ' 27 Infoj INFO RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY DJAXA A STATE GRNC S E C R E T ACTION DEPTH DP4AKARTA 285 FROM KLUMPUR JAN 9, 1:30 PM, DECLASSIFIED A16B NARS Date, 'o ' IF SHOWDOWN OVER COMMUNIST IFLU.NCE IN I DO IfREALNENT AS APPEARS MAY BE CASE AND IF WE PREPARED TO ABANDON HOPE INFLUENCING SUKARNO, AND FURTHER, IF WE STILL BELIEVE ARMY BEST BET TO KEEP INDO OUT 'OF COMMUNIST.HANDS, WE MIGHT CONSIDER FOLLOWING: THAT ELEMENT INDO ARMY WHICH OPPOSED PKI MAY BE RELUCTANT ACT QUICKLY AND FIRMLY.AGAINST INTERNAL THREAT BECAUSE OF FEAR, WHETHER JUSTIFIED OR NOT, THAT GOM CFN 836 285'9 1:30 PKI NOT GOM,PAGE 2 RUMJKL 104A SEC ET AND COMMONWEALTH ALLIES WOULD STRIKE AT CRUCIAL MOMENT. SUCH 'FEAR, THOUGH UNJUSTIFIED, NEVERTHELESS COULD WORRY ILL- INFORMED ANTI-COMMUNIST INDO LEADERS. "IS THERE ANY WAY WE COULD:REACH(COPLETELY RELIABLE INDO (MILITARY.WITH ASSURANCES THAT GOM NDCOMMONWEALTH WOULD,REFRAIN FROM INTERFERENCE! AT, LEAST!UNLESS IT BECOMES APPARENT PKI GOING TO COME OUT,ON TO,? .OUR POLICY HAS DEPENDED ON!ARMY FOR SOME TIME. IF WE CAN 'GIVE THEM THIS KIND OF SHOTIN ARMLTHEY MIGHT HAVE MORE INCLINATION ACT. IF SUCH APPROACH SEEMS WORTH CONSIDERATION,WE WOULD OF COURSE FIRST HAVE SLL IT;,TOUK AND AUSSIES WE AWARE POSSIBILITY INDOI ECAME OUT ON-OPs I '"MY, MIGHT CONTINUE CONFRONTATI$ 'HOWEVERR THIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE 1TO PKI-LED CONFRONTATION AN WEOFFERABETTERCHANCEFOR SOME PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT PRoPosAL'THIS NATURE'WOULD Ot0K, OFCOUSE,''AND' SHOULD NOT BE CONTEMPLATED WITHOUT COMPL TE SUPPORT UK AND AUSSIES'. AGREEMENT OF THOSE CARRYNG REL R1E THIS SITUATION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. ,,GOM PKFI,UK-FP1( NOT NOT! jP uI POUTO FROM THIS COPY IS KtRODUCTION PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED" MwAmftulwAm WWAMOMANOAMN === [PDF page 45] === BY.iNARS, Date 'M'7f MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY January 16, 1965 SUBJECT: The Sukarno Problem Cooper and I had a lengthy session with Dave Cuthell of State Friday on possible actions we might take in response to Djakarta's 1358. State's preliminary view is that the situation is not quite as bad as Jones suggests; that it would be very risky to expend all our capital in a Presidential meeting with Sukarno outside the country (which would be used by Sukarno to push his self-image as the paramount leader of the Afro-Asian world); and that in any event such a meeting would treat only a symptom of the disease and not the disease its elf. Nonetheless, we are persuaded that a two-stage initiative might make good sense at this juncture: a brief trip by the Vice President to Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta sometime before mid-February (with Djakarta the focal point); and, if this first step brings any results,,a meeting between the President and Sukarno in Hawaii sometime in April or May. We believe that the situation does call for an early exercise in personal diplomacy, short of the Presidential level. If approved, a Humphrey visit should take place well before the Algiers conference, now scheduled for sometime in March--a conference at which Indonesia will certainly behave very badly. Judging by past experience, the Indos shape up rather well in anticipation of visits from our top brass. This might give us a respite during the period immediately before Humphrey's arrival; and if Humphrey gets anywhere with Sukarno, the visit might conceivably have some effect on the Indo performance in Algiers. If the Humphrey visit goes smoothly, the Ha ii meeting might possibly be focused on some such gimmick as Howar allation as Chancellor of the East-West Center. The Center has been a long-time interest of President Johnson; and it would be feasible to hold a special convocation for Jones' installation to which Jones t pal Sukarno could logically be invited. As a possible alternative to the Humphrey trip, we might also consider a first step of lower visibility and have Mike Forrestal test the climate in Djakarta. === [PDF page 46] === iblllW -2- As an alternative to the Hawaii meeting, we might consider a Presidential invitation to both Sukarno and the Tunku to come to Washington for talks -- along the lines of his invitation to Papandreou and Inonu last year. All this is very tentative and subject to a good deal more discussion at State. Cuthell is talking with your brother this weekend, and we hope to have a formal recommendation out of the Department by the middle of next week. James Ch on 1 Jr. === [PDF page 47] === CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 26 January 1965 SPEcIAL ImEORADUMi NO, 1 65 SUBJECT: Principal Problems and Prospects in Indonesia Authority CMA )*'I-T )I We are now faced not only with known and growing danger from Sukarno, but with the uncertainties of a possible Indonesia without Sukarno. If this ailing dictator should indeed die in the near future, his bequest to Indonesia would be international outlawry, economic near-chaos, and weakened resistance to Communist domination. Yet if Sukarno lives on for some time to come, the chances of the Communist Party (PRIa) to assume power will probably continue to improve. We do not believe that a Communist Indonesia is inwinent, or that Sukarno will initiate war. In our view, however, there is sufficient chance of such developments over the next year or two to warant eopecial US intelligence and planning attention. The beginnings of a scrxseble for succession to Sukarno a already evident. Should Sukarno leave the scene in the near future, we believe thet the initial struggle to replace him would be won by Army and non-Communist elements, though Commuists would continue to p.ly a important role. Such a government would probably continue to be anti-US, renophobic, and a threat to peace. Furthermore, unless the non-Co3mmunist leaders displayed more backbone, effectiveness., and unity than they have to date, the chances of eventual PMI dominance of Indonesia would quickly mount. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification === [PDF page 48] === For the near future, Sukarno will almost certainly continue his Confrontation policy. Re might sharply increase the level and intensity of Indonesian pressures against hlaysia, precipitating war with UK end Commonwealth forces; we believe it more likely, however, that be will continue present patterns of infiltration and occasionlmilitery probes, using large troop buildup and inflammatory threats essentially for diplomatic blackmail. Sukarno will probably take various rach actions to lessen his remaining ties with the West and to continue his dalliance with Peiping. He apparently believes that long-run trends are working to weaken US/Western influence in Southeast Asia, that this provides Indonesia with the opportunity for considerable profit, and that division of the spoils with Communist China is a problem which can be safely managed at some later date. If persisted in, these views will prove ill conceived and costly, susceptible of upset by UK/US force, Chinese Communist guile, and domestic deterioration. e POLITICAL EFFECTS OF SUKARO'S ILLNESS 1. The possibility of President Suklarno's death has introduced new uncertainty into Indonesian politics and foreign affairs. Sukarno's Viennese doctors believe that unless he undergoes surgery for removal of a kidney stone in the near future, he will die within a year or two -- possibly soon and suddenly. Even if he does submit to the operation, there is more than usual uncertainty as to his longevity and physical effectiveness, Sukarno now knows that only an operation will save him., and we feel it === [PDF page 49] === likely that he will undergo it, reluctantly but with speed and secrecy. 2. Even if Sukarno survives the surgeon' s knife, his political power may be diminished. This possibility has had a catalytic effect on political forces in Indonesia: maneuvering between the PKI and opposing factions has already intensified, each attempting to get Sukarno to appoint an acting President favorable to its own interests. Sukarno apparently believes that while he is in Vienna for the operation the group which opposes his choice will engage in divisive activities. He might therefore postpone the trip until the Jockeying for power has subsided. 3. In November, during Sukarno's absence from Indonesia, First Deputy Prime Minister Subondrio took the unprecedented action of publicly mentioning succession, stating that it must not be determined by force. He claims that he has since advised Sukarno to turn over most of the job of running the country to others -- a line which the PE" has also advanced -- and to play more of a "father" role. We doubt that Subandrio counseled so frankly, but it is clear that he is attempting to establish hincelf as heir apparent. While he still lacks any personal following or support among the military, his continued and close === [PDF page 50] === working relationship with Sukarno and his informal "alliance" with the FRI have sustained him in power. Subandrio' s position and authority have been enhanced by the continuing increase of PHI influence, and, most recently, by Sukarno's clampdown on the groups which had bravely, if tentatively, begun to espouse an anti-PF. movement styled "Svuanoirm. 4. Sukarno briefly allowed the moderates to continue their "offensive" in low key, but abruptly dissolved the movement in December. Subandrio and the Pl have since been actively exploiting this victory and have been challenging the principal non-Communist figures -- especially Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh -- on all fronts. Subandrio almost certainly had Sukarno's backing when he stated publicly, in early Januazy, that some "established comrades are now counterrevolutionary and must be left behind"; this speech probably presages a reshuffle of the cebinet in which PRI and pro-Communist nationalists will. exercise a stronger voice. Meanwhile a new danger is created by the PRI' s recent demand that arms be distributed to workers and peasants. It has already achieved a popular response which may persuade Sukarno to comply with it; if he does, the PKI will have achieved its greatest victory so far, and the military its greatest setback. === [PDF page 51] === II* IMPLICATIONS OF"8TfAFRNO' S DEATH 5. The St:rugge for Succession. We believe that if Sukarno should die in the near future, the most likely immediate successor government would be a non-Communist military/civilian group. It mlghat lack Sukarno's degree of chauvinism, but would probably follow most of his major policies. Its hold on power would be tenuous, however, and the real struggle for succession would only have begun. There would doubtless be considerable disorder and violence in the immediately following months, though this would probably stop short of full-scale rebellicns or a major fragmentation of Djakarta's authority in the outer islands. 6. The PlI would probably not initially be included in the successor government. Even so, the government wculd almost certainly have to acquiesce in a coatinuation of PRI influence and activity if for no reason other than that the PRI could initiate widespread disturbances which could cause the Army great difficulties. In certain circumstances -- such as a conspicuous increase of economic chaos and a breakdown in administrative machinery -- the PEI might soon make a bid for power by force. The MR has already penetrated deeply into Indonesian society, and it is possible that by the time the PRI is ready to assume power it will have gained such === [PDF page 52] === wide public support, and Amy leadership will have become so divided and ixresolute, that non-Communist forces would not have the will or ability to prevent such a takeover. Because of the increasing consonance of Sukarno's policies with theirs, we believe that the longer Sukarno lives, the greater the PEI'-s chances of gaining 2ower, legally or by force. T. Confrontation. Despite its overall lack of success to date, we believe that Sukarno intends to continue and in fact to intensify his Confrontation campaign, mixing militant threats and willingness to negotiate -- on Indonesian terms. He will almost certainly not abandon his objectives to dismember Malaysia, bring down the Pabman government, and eliminate Western influence in the Par East. We see no signs that Sukarno's judgment is impaired by his physical condition and consider his policy to be carefuUy contrived. It is possible that Sukeno's fear of impending death might lead him to accelerate Confrontatio; in the hope of dismembering Malaysia before he dies, but we incline to the view that Sukarno appreciates the risks of his Gonfrontation tactics and is not likely to miscalculate the situation and trigger full hostilities. 8. We do believe that the current reinforcements and redeployment of regular Indonesian troops along the Sar'awak border, === [PDF page 53] === a buildup which will almost double the number of total regular troops in Borneo by Mach, may presage future operations larger thsa heretofore attempted. If so, this will increase not only the risk, but the difficulties of logistic support. Current British reinforcements in the Far East should prove sufficient for the present to counter any new Indonesian military initiatives. 9. Indonesia and the USSR. Sukarno serves Soviet interests to the degree that he makes trouble for the US and UK and stirs up anti-Western sentiments in Asia and Africa. At the same time, the Soviet leaders are almost certainly concerned over Indonesia's increasing closeness to Communist China, the PEI's adherence to the CCP line, the dwindling of Moscow's influence in tkjakarta, and the danger that Sukarno'se recklessness might lead to a major war. Also, there must be some critical reviewing of past Soviet policy which has spent so much on Indonesia to win so little influence. The Soviet leaders probably consider, however, that they have no feasible alternative to continuing their aid policy in the hope of retaining such influence as the USSR still has. They will also continue to give political and propaganda support, Since 1956 Indonesia has drawn more than $800 million of Soviet aid., mostly military. === [PDF page 54] === which costs them little, to those' Indonesian acts and policies which they feel do not hern Soviet interest. 10. Indonesian relations with the Soviet Union have been deteriorating, and soame top Indonesians are concerned over what they consider decreased Soviet interest in their Confrontation policy and unnecessary delays in the im xlementation of existing arms agreements. The recent visits of Sukarno, Nasution, and Subandrio to Moscow do not appear to have gained any significant amounts of new military mateviel to sustain the anti-Malaysian campaign, though additional equipment is probably being purchased with credits formerly assigned to economic projects. Although the USSR apparently does not wholeheartedly support Confrontation along military lines, the Soviets have recently extended $200 million credit for purchase of military weapons and equipment, including aGr-21a, helicopters, IL-28s, and small transport aircraft. Also, they bave promised Indonesia additional SAMs and sufficient troop transport aircraft to lift a full division. Three MI-6 helicopters, largest in the world -- each capable of carrying 10 tons of cargo or 120 troops up to 250 nautical miles, were delivered to Indonesia in early December. It is not yet clear, however, whether these itemo are from new credits obtained by new === [PDF page 55] === military agreemaents, or merely to be drawn against funds from previous agreements. 11. Sukarno has been pleased by the attention the USSR has given him and, more imprtantly, by the great flow of major military equipment the U&SOR has provided Indonesia. Since the USSR is likely for some time to remain the only available source of jet fighters and bombers, submarines, or surface-to-air missiles, Sukarno will probably continue to show at least a modicum of consideration for Soviet interests. He will not feel beholden to Soviet interests, however, and will almost certainly continue to press the USSR for aid while preferring the company of Comunist China. 12. Indonesia and Comunist China. "he deterioration of Indonesia' s relations with the US and the USSR coincides with an improvement of its relations with the Commist Chinese. Although China has provided Indonesia with little material assistance, it has made Sukarno and the PKI eautely aware of its growing influence in southeast Asia. Several recent indications, includIng Foreign Minister Chen Yi' a trip to Djakarts in late November and Subandrio's current return visit reflect an increasing degree of cooperation between the two countries.* At the nonaligned conference in Cairo, === [PDF page 56] === Sukarno championed the Chinese line, and Sino-Indonesian strategr for the future Second Afro-Asian Conference is currently being closely coordinated. Before Inonetsia withirew from the GN, it appeared that lakarta was ready to give active support to the admission of Comnirdst Ch:na; Piping has since given all-out propag-anda backing to Indonesia.'s withdrawal. 13. Although Commiunist China apparently approved Indonesias's Confrontation policy, at least to the degree that it dio the US and UK, Chen Yi apparently disagrees with its implementation. Specifically, he supports Indonesia's military action in northern Borneo, but disagrees with the policy of military action against Malaya itself. This may explain why Indonesia has had difficulty in obtaining effective support for its operations in Malaya from Communist elements there which are oriented toward Commnist China, whereas it has had good support from Comnunist-o:iented Chinese elements in northern Borneo. We do not know, however, whether any Sino- Indonesian scheme exists for dividing their spheres of influence. In any event, we do not believe that the Communist Chinese will actively participate in the Indonetian-Malaysian theater, though they might seek quickly to take some advantage of a situation created by hostilities. === [PDF page 57] === Woo 14. Indonesia and the UN. Indonesian support for the UN bas progressively declined in the past few years and this trend has accelerated since the onset of Confrontation. Sukarno's att±- tude toward the UN is that it cannot be a really useful body until its structure is changed to reflect the "realities" of the present world: that is, to give more power to the "new emerging forces" and to reduce the power of the Western nations. In the absence of charter revisions, Indonesia has ignored the UN as much as possible, and has emphasized Afro-Asian conferences and other such forms as the main instruments of its foreign policy. Sukarno probably intends to create a Conference of Newly Merging Forces (CONEFO) -- most likely during the Second Afro-Azian Conference tentatively scheduled for May_- as a competing organization to the UN. However, there are no indications that other countries, with the exception of Communist China,, North Korea, North Vietna, and possibly Cambodia, are in any way interested in following Indonesia's lead. And despite Sukanao's repeated statements of complete withdrawal from the "imperialist" UN, he will doubtless seek to derive benefits from the largesse of certain UN-connected specialized agencies. === [PDF page 58] === 15. Indoneaand the US. US-Indonesian relations have reached their lowest ebb since 1958. There probably can be periods of slight improvement, but we believe tba-t there is little chance of significant rapprochement so long as Sukarno rules Indonesia, and probably for some time thereafter. The interests of the US eand of Sukarno now conflict in nearly every quarter. He is aaetly convinced that his leverage over us is much greater than oiurs over him, and that he can sccoringly proceed to chip away at the defenses of Malaysia and the UK, woo Peiping, and flout the interests of the US without fear of significant adverse consequences. He also seems to believe that the US has lost its position and power in Southeast Asia; that it is only a matter of time until the Communists win in South Vietnam, the Chinese Communists enter the UN, and China possesses nuclear weapons; that Indonesia is uniquely situated to profit from a lessening of US and other Western influence in the area; and that accommodation with China can serve the interests of Indonesia for the moment without imperiling its long-rm security. In effect, Sukarno appears to believe that he is controlling events, though the momentum and direction he has imparted to present trends are sweeping him along toward the eventual possibilities of war with === [PDF page 59] === the UK and US, dcmination by Communist China, or takeover of Indonesia by the PH0. FOR TE BOARD OF rIw ONA"L EIAES1: 8ErJMAN ENT Chairman === [PDF page 60] === DEPARTMEN. OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT sfiHem (Attachment) February 1, 1965 TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy The White House FROM: Benjamin H. Read V Executive Secretary Attached for the information and files of the White House is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shiina dated January 12, regarding Current Situation in Indonesia and Cambodia. Attachment: As stated. WEMB (Attachment) === [PDF page 61] === [Unreadable] DEPARTMENT OF STATE /-4 0 approved in S 2/1/65 Memorandum of Conversation DATE:, 1965 Room UBJECT: \Current Situation in Indonesia and Cambodia a.m. 'ARTICIPANTS: Ethusaburo Shiina, Foreign Minister of Japan Ryuj ' Takeuchi, Japanese Ambassador Takeo'ki, Secretary General of the Liberal ocratic Party Nobuhi c Ushiba, Deputy Vice M'iinister for F eign Affairs Takeshi asukawa, Director of American Bureau, Foreign inistry The Secretary Edwin 0. Reisbhauer, Ambassador to J K" William P. Buna Assistant Secret for Far Eastern Affairs;-Il Marshall Green, Jeputy Assistant S retary for Far Eastern Affairs Robert A. Fearey, D*rector for E t Asian Affairs Ambassador Duke, Ch f of Protol TA COPT' TO: 5/S FE CIA Amembassy ""T,0 Amembassy BANGKOK POLAD CIN9jPAC S/P 10 DOD/OSD Amembassy HNOM PENH Amembaspy SAIGON G INR/OD White House Ame assy DJAKARTA Ame basgVIE I GTON Secretary Rusk suggested at the group tae advantage f the time afforded by the President's private d cushion with Prim Minis ter Salo to discuss matters of common interest. Indonesia The Secretary s d he would be grateful for Forei1Minister Shiinats observations on Sul no's recent moves. The United Statias had been rather surprised by Indo esia's withdrawal from the United Nations, since the Indonesian Government could' have blocked Malaysia' s entry into the. Security Council simply by entering objection. Instead, it permitted Malaysia's e'ntry and the very ne.x day ann ced Indonesia's withdrawal. The Secretary said\edo not expect other neut st nations to follow Indonesia' s example. Cert i' the United Nations i d survive. He wondered, however, whether the Foreign "*nIster had any tho hts on what was going on in Sukarnors mind in this matter. SANITIZED Authority ddy 74 === [PDF page 62] === The Secretary said that we would be very concerned if Sukarno's action 4 shadowed more 'serious military operations against Malaysia. The British have strong forces in the area and are serious about their comnitints to ±alaysia. The sane. applies to Australia and New Zealand. Also /if Australian or New Zealand forces came under attack, the United States would become involved under the Anzus Treaty. So on the military siae Sukarno has no future. If he has military action in mind, he is due for dry serious trouble. Since Japan is one of the very few countries that seem to ave some sort of influence over Sukarno, did Mr. Shiina think that Japancould have useful influence in persuading Sukarno to ad6pt a more moderate course,/ The Secretryjs aid that we too had heard that the Murbawas t ssped becoming a Inoptyn. We related'this action to other moves Aver the last ten days which seeded to reflect growing influence of the PKI and pressures by the PKI to reduce/he position of elements referred to as "SukarnoistO. Saleh and Nasutionha,, apparently been privately supporting the anti-PKI "Sukarnoistsu.t Itappear at first that Sukarno tolerated or even encouraged this group. But now he seeking to break it up. We attribute growing influence to 'be PKI, stimula ed by Subandrio, who is looking to his own future and his ambition to succeed Sukarno if Sukarno's health fails. There seems to 'be an attempt by Sukafno to remove elements that might oppose him. He woid hope to have th suifport of the PKI. Copy === [PDF page 63] === The Secretary said that we had information some months ago when the Indonesian cabinet was reshuffled that an effort was made to have Nasutio removed 'as Defense Minister. Several regional army commanders approache Sukarno t'o urge him not to remove Nasution. We gather that some of these/ same elements in the Army might seek to restrain Government moves tha( would favor the PKI unduly. Moscow and Peiping are waging a contest/for influence in Indonesia. It must be disturbing to Moscow, after p'viding massive assistance to Indonesia, including $1 billion worth of Ailitary assistance, to see.the PKI push Indonesia toward Peiping. This is illustrated by the attitude the two capitals have taken tow Indonesia's withdrawal from the'United Nations. Cambodia The Secretary said that another problem having ajor psychological aspects is Cambodia. We have tried very hard, wit, little success, to establish some sort of rational dialogue with Pri ce Sihanouk. He feels the deepest suspicion toward u's, particularly b e cause of our friendly relations with Thailand and South Viet-Nam. e 'has gone very far toward breaking relations with the United States.The Secretary said he did not know whether Japan has-effective c'ontacts th Sihanouk. Perhaps Japanese diplomacy could accomplish things at, Phm Penh which U.S. diplomci unable to accomplish at the present time. ThSecretary said that.Japan might prove to be one of the"1east Free Torld ountries having a normal presence in Phnom Penh. The Japahxpse Government igh consider this situation. Its position in Phnom Penh might be'.comparable,o hat of the Dutch in Djakarta - the Dutch appeared to be moving toward more rmal relations with the Indonesian Government, while the rest of u ere unable,o establish such relations. Copy === [PDF page 64] === Secretary Rusk sail.that we believe the pr61blems between Cambodia and South Viet-ram and betweeniGarbodia and ThaiTand could be resolved if there could be quiet diplomatic discussions, The problems were not inherently insoluble, but Sihanouk's approach was so agitated and inflammatory that it made it very hard to work out ca0'.5ontacts that might be effective. There are prejudices going back a thousand -years, but the difficulties were not so basic that they could not beresolved. Copy === [PDF page 65] === DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON February 5 1965 Dear Mr. President: The Department has received a communication from the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Washington asking if this Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Lambertus Palar as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Lambertus Palar is enclosed. I believe that the appointment of Mr. Lambertus Palar as Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of the Republic of Indonesia of your approval. Faithfully yours, , Actin Secretary Enclosure: Biographic Sketch. The President, The White House. === [PDF page 66] === Mr. Lambertus Palar Newly Designated Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to the United States Mr. Lambertus Palar was born in Minehassa, North Celebes, in 1902. He went to the Netherlands in 1928, where he spent most of the next twenty years participating in politics and the trade union movement. During World War II he served with the Dutch underground. After the war he became a member of the Dutch Parliament in which capacity he served from 1945 until 1947, when he resigned in protest against Dutch military actions in Indonesia. He was then appointed Indonesia's Permanent Observer at the United Nations, serving in that capacity from 1947 to 1950 and as Permanent Representative from 1950 to 1953. He served as Ambassador to India from 1953 to 1956 and briefly as Special Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union in 1956. He headed the United Nations Directorate at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in 1956 and 1957. He was appointed Ambassador to Canada in 1957, serving concurrently as a member of Indonesia's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. In 1962 he was again appointed Indonesia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, a position he held until Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965. He is now winding up Indonesia's affairs at the United Nations. Mr. Palar speaks fluent English and Dutch. A member of the Christian (Protestant) minority in Indonesia, he is married to a Dutch woman. The couple has three children. === [PDF page 67] === February 6, 1965 "NIrinA THE SECRETARY OF STATE The President con~curs wvith your opinion and has requested that you Iinform the Governmeat of the Republic of Indonesia that the appointment of Mr. bambertus Palar as Ambassador woud. be agreeable to the Government of the United States. McGeorge Bundy cc: Office of the ChIIef o~f Protocol === [PDF page 68] === DECLASSIFIED February 8, 1965 Authority ' I invested a lunch at Ellsworth Bunker's request to talk him into taking on Djakarta. Maybe he's already signed on,but he didn't sound that way to me until I gave him a big pep talk, e. g. Djakarta was an even more important post than Saigon (for diplomacy at least) over the next few years. I told him I couldn't think of a more crucial spot or a better man for it. He told me he'd take the job if the President wanted him to, which suggests to me that a one minute LBJ phone call might be quite useful. New subject. I know you don't like post-mortems while the shooting is on, but we let this Jordan arms crisis (in turn only part of a major Arab-Israeli crisis in the offing) sneak up on us. As a result, we ended *up compressing into a few days a negotiating process which needed a:month. I kept telling the bloody Department to clue the Israelis. Only purpose of these sour grapes is to clue you that, having started late, we'd better shift into high gear now. The longer we wait before taking big decisions, the more the situation is going to get out of control. Now that tank deal and Jordan arms deal are near public property, we'd better start standing tall with Hussein, Eshkol, and Nasser and stop pushing the problem ahead of us. You have my ideas. RWK === [PDF page 69] === 1 ~ ~ ohs [Unreadable] So igon, iebruary 19, 196t OFICIAL-IFRMAL MC4 CVS3.-7 Dear Howard, I hope that by the time this reached Djakarts, both you and Mary alowill have retuned. First I want to tell you how deeply I appreciated your hospitality end your help during my visit. Second, I want to tell you how ah I missed you during the last few days espeeialWy at Bogor. You will have seen the cable reporting my talk with the hBng. Prank will have filled you in on the peculiar cietiatances. I have never had such a talk with the President before. We were both exhausted and we were alone virtually In the dark in that vast hall of the Palace. We conversed for about an hour. The Bung was gloo but restrained and very frank. Although I left depressed, I have since eae to think that I caught a glapse of the depth of this man 's understandable frustrations, In particuar, I am convinced that he would like to find a way out of his impasse with K. L. His difloulty 4s how to do it. I don't know what we can do at this juncture to help him. I rather think it is something he will have to work out for himself. I do have hope, however. IMy few talks in X. L. have convinced at that we are moving into a period mhere the ciremstanoes on both sides will favor some form of negotiation. The Tunku is more confident, and therefore more reasonable by far, than he was last year. To some extent be fiadseconfrontation politically useful,* but he is also aware that it increases his political dependence upon the British which is beginning to irk him - particularly in his relations with Singapore. The Honorable Roward P. JoneS* Amerian Abassador, Dhakarta. -~mew === [PDF page 70] === really wanted a detente. I coant estimate the mood of the population; but I would suspect that the mass of them do not particularly care one way or the other. In brief, I think 1anation was wrong when he said that the political climte in both K. L. and Djakerta did not favor talks. I would hope that the current feelers would lead to ra Tokyo meeting which would in turn lead to the appointment of a comission. This commission could talk and supervise direct talks for a very lon- time - dur 4 nrg which both sides might reduce their activities along the border. Incidentally, there was a possibly important item which I failed to report fron K. L. Ghazall made quite a point about getting Subandrio to say publicly that there were no longer any guerrillas to be withdrawn from North Kalimantan. I admitted that the Indos had said tia privately (Sukarno told me this hi 1elf); but he Instated at a pl statement would go a long way to setting the stage for talks. His rasoning apparently is that such a statement would remove the gun from the head of the Malaysians since it would in fact be a relinquishment of the Indonesian claim that there was a asucessful rebel movement in the two territories. Ghazalt La so mercurial that I do not know whether to take him serIously; but if it were possible to get Subandrlo or Jani to say that the question of withdrawal of guerrillas wea no longer an issue, you aight get a good response from On the question of U. S.-E4do relations I am not optimistic - at least in the short term. One of the prices we have to pay for our actions in Vietanm is a certain amnont of flak in Djakarta. These stations, I am convinced, have had a very salutary effect 4n confrontation in both Z. L. and Indonesia. But there to inevitably some adverse side-effet. Since, by the nature of things, we shall probably have to continue our preSSureS in Vietnam I think we will have to face a period ot tension while Sukarno tries to adjust to the situation. In a way it's a sae we didn't start sooner -i, e., before Sukarno got caught in his drift toward lianot and Peking. Therefore, I am inolind to believe that we anould reduce our presence temporarily. I realize that the P. K. I. will always find === [PDF page 71] === ~3urgews; out I don't think we should give them unneessary levers on our own public opinion. Thus, I would get the AVmissior ldown to _minimum and pull out our libraries. On the other hand, I do think that we should the Java portion of the telecommunications let the Ary have equipment we promised them. Not only would this tend to keep our lines clear to them; it would probably also help them in the event there were trouble with the P. K. I. on Java. Generally speaking, I would try to make our reduction and normal-appearing as possible - I would also try as quiet to maintain much flexibility in coming back in again when conditions as improve hopefully after a solution or abatement of the confrontation - problem. Well, many thanks again for all your kindness. My affectionate regards to Mary Lou - and to Frank and Martha. Best of luck to you. Sincerely, Michael V. Forrestal P. S. I am sending copies of this to Mae and Bill Bundy just to let them know I am not sound asleep out here, COPIES TO: - The Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. ) -The Honorable William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 72] === VWWI NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 February 19, 1965 DECLASSIFIED 9 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY NARS) Datel: *.16 SUBJECT: Indonesia Library Problem IIhave just learned that Carl Rowan is seeing the President late this afternoon (5:45 p.m.). Although Indonesia is. not expected to be on the agenda, I am concerned that Carl may raise this matter and push very strongly for a line of action on the USIS libraries which he has been urging on State (see attached memorandum to the Secretary). Carlts position strikes me as an over-reaction, and my view appears to be shared throughout FE. We are indeed close to the abyss with Indonesia, but there are certain factors that Carl disregards -- among them the fact that Howard Jones, who has been away during most of the unpleasantness, is returning this weekend and will go to Sukarno with the toughest message we have ever communicated to the Indos, as a result of the recent mob actions. I have seen this message in draft and have given the preliminary clearance but will double check it with you tomorrow. I should also note that we have just received word that the library in Medan has been reopened today and is back to normal operations. This leaves the Djakarta library in "temporary protective custody" plus facilities at Jogjakarta (closed last August, and probably to remain closed, since we have no consular personnel there) and Surabaya (closed in December). I am telling you this lest the President call you to ask your views on Carlts rather far-reaching proposals. I would strongly recommend that we hold off any such rash response until Jones and Sukarno have had a further confrontation. JamesC Thomson, Jr. Att. === [PDF page 73] === Mr. William Bundy DECLASSIFIED Authority TIM, INAG. UJIA 4 &434s By M, NARS, Datei* L. February 18. 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk Secretary of State SUBJECT: INDONESIA: Possible U. S. Courses of Action Anti-American activities in Indonesia, particularly those directed against USIS during the last six months. have created a situation that I can describe only as intolerable. I believe that American interests and our national dignity, not only in Indonesia but elsewhere, require that action now be taken to indicate that we will not allow such actions to continue unpenalized. I realize that our long-suffering patience in these matters has been due in large part to our desire to keep Indonesia out of the communist orbit at virtually any cost, but it seems obvious that the Indonesian government is abusing our patience to its advantage and thus our present predicament. What is happening to USIS in Indonesia is obviously part of the much larger picture of U. S. - Indonesian rettions. It is apparent that the Indonesian government has decided to apply to these relations its now well-established strategy of exerting a steadily-increasing pressure on the official and private interests of foreign countries with whose policies it does not agree with the expectation that it can force a change in those policies. At present, USIS has been singled out for special attention. We shall soon have nothing worthwhile left in the way of an information operation. The pressures now being brought to bear on American rubber estates in Sumatra indicate that these interests are next on the list. Just as in the case of the Dutch, beginning in 1957, and of the British, following the establishment of Malaysia in 1963, this trend will continue either until we make the desired concessions to the 001 or until nothing remains. === [PDF page 74] === While USIS is rapidly being deprived of its capacity for effective programming, it would be a serious mistake to close down any of our operations voluntarily. Such an action would be interpreted by both our enemies and friends as a retreat and as knuckling under to communist pressure. And since no significant differences appear to exist between the Government of Indonesia and the Partai Komrnmunis Indonesia insofar as immediate objectives are concerned, withdrawal on our part could only encourage further excesses against other Americar interest s on the part of the government. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that USIS apparently has no future in Indonesia under present conditions. I am pre# pared to sacrifice a part, or even all, of our operation there if the Department is willing to take strong and immediate action (1) to protest what has happened to date, and (2) to put our opponents everywhere on notice that such actions inevitably have a price tag attached to them. While superficially we appear to have little leverage with the Indonesian government, I am convinced that there are many courses of action open to us. The following come immediately to mind: 1. The top Indonesian representative available should be called in and bluntly informed that the activities which the Indonesian government has been tolerating, encouraging and even engaging in are contrary to established international and diplomatic custom and usage and that we do not intend to continue to suffer such treatment without retaliating. The press should be informed in advance that the Indonesians are being called in, and we should encourage as wide dissemination of the substance of our complaint as possible. 2. We should recall the U. S. Ambassador to Indonesia, making it clear publicly that we do not intend to replace him until we have had some satisfaction from the 001. 3. Whatever remains in the way of a U. S. economic assistance program in Indonesia, including training, the sulying of spare parts, civic action, malaria eradication, etc., should be terminated immediately, with -attendant wide publicity. 4. Although the Os information and cultural operation in this country is relatively small scale and hence cannot be equated with USIS in Indonesia, we should begin now to cut back certain of their activities === [PDF page 75] === While the purely information operation of the GOI in this country has thus far been sporadic and largely ineffectual, the greatest activity has taken place in New York, as a part of the Indonesian Mission to the U. N. Folowing Indonesia's decision to withdraw from the U. N. we thought for a time that the GOI was planning to move this activity to its consulate general in New York, a supposition which was supported by the transfer of responsibility for publishing the Mission's balletii, "News and Views, " to the consulate general. However, the Permanent Mission resumed issuance of the bulletin under its imprint at the end of January. This obviously cannot continue after March 1, the date on which Indonesia's connection with the U.N. terminates. We do not yet know whether the consulate general will pick up the bulletin, -or whether the embassy here will assume responsibility for its publication (as the consulate general information officer told one of our people would be the case). However, the embassy here has recently stepped up the issuance of its own information bulletin from a sporadic to a regular basis of once a week. Samples of Indonesian information output in this country are attached. We are'inclindd to believe that with the departure of the Indonesian U. N. Mission from New York, the 001 will probably attach greater importance to the remaining Indonesian presence there than has hitherto been the case, primarily because of New York's importance commercially and as the seat of the United Nations headquarters, with its sizeable number of Afro-Asian representatives. Therefore, the presence of the Indonesian Consulate General in New York suggests some other interesting possibilities for retaliation. If our information operation in Surabaya is closed down, we should ask the Indonesians to withdraw their information people from New York. If we deem it wise to close all USIS facilities in Indonesia and pull out our personnel, we should inform Indonesia that we are expelling all 1ndonesians engaged in informational, cultural, and other work of a nature done by USIA. This would include several Indonesians in Washington as well as some staff members in New York and San Francisco. Because of the attacks on our Consulate proper in Medan and the harassment of our Consul in Surabaya, we ought even explore the question of whether we wish to close down our Consulate as well as the U. S. Information Service in Surabaya and in turn ask the Indoniesians to close their entire New York operation. === [PDF page 76] === Olt I am fully aware that the recommendations that I have made are harsh, and tat sone would produce an augry reaction on the part of Sukarno. I believe that the only alternative is for us to continue taking abuse with the result that mob attacks will become the order of the day all around the world because government officials with grievance against us, or acting under communist pressure, will figure tat they can get away with it. Carl T. Rowan cc: Mr. George W. Ball Mr. William Bundy saw--