LBJ National Security File: Indonesia, komunis dan politik dalam negeri, Oktober-November 1965 (Indonesia communist parties and internal politics)

=== [PDF page 1] === NATIONAL SECURITY FILES COUNTRY FILE = === [PDF page 2] === [Photograph: archival file folder photographed open; small label partly legible ("Memo's &..."); no other text] === [PDF page 3] === TeleconI0/4/65 t~fO/? === [PDF page 4] === FEESA:RPMyers-tJr:m ii rDafting Office and Oficer) DEPARTMENT OF STATE Approved by Vice Presid dtt'sS OOConversation LSY~6i Office - 10/19/65 t N onrsio DATE:August 26, 1965 1965 OCT 25 PM 5 21 TIME: 11:00 a.m. PLACE: The Vice Presidentb suBJECT: U.S.-Indonesian Relations Office The Vice President PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Lambertus Palar, Indonesian Embassy NIr. Chester Carter, Department of State, O/CPR Mr. H. Kent Goodspeed, Department of State, FE/SPA Mr. Robert P. Myers, Jr., Department of State, FE/SPA Mr. John E. Rielly, Vice President's Staff COPIES TO: FE-3 White House (cc) AmEmbassy CANBERRA EUR/BNA AmEmbassy DJAKARTA INR/OD "t KUALA LUMPUR Introduction Vice President Humphrey and Ambassador Palar held a cordial hour-long conversation on August 26, 1965, during which they discussed U.S.-Indonesian relations After exchanging pleasantries as fellow parliamentarians, Ambassador Palar, acting under instructions, embarked upon a lengthy analysis of the evolution of the existing system of government in Indonesia. Internal Situation The Ambassador explained that Indonesiatried Parliamentary democracy, but failed miserably because (1) the Indonesian electorate was not sufficiently educated and (2) the new leaders took advantage of their power in order to secure personal advantages. In view of this deplorable situation, Indonesia's outstanding need was, first and foremost, a stable government. Time being of the essence, he added, it is necessary to do "what the Russians are doing" (i.e., permit "the State to do the.job" rather than private individuals). The result is the new ideology, based upon Indonesian history and traditions. The Ambads4or claimed that he, himself, was skeptical at first, but that now he is impressed by Lthe fact that this system works. 3-61 Auth ty,D te' Byv g NRDtis1 OCT 2 === [PDF page 5] === Communism v. Nationalism Ambassador Palar scoringinhe funder; also spoke of communism in Indonesia, underscoring the fact that he was not a communist but adding that aa socialist he appreciated the good in communism. He said that the GOI was "not reluctant to crush the communists" (as they had in 1948). However, he stressed that communism is "here to stay" on a worldwide basis and that it also is going to remain in Indonesia. He said that the GOI faces the problem of integrating communism into the Indonesian society rather than having Indonesian society integrated into communism. He pointed out that the world is succeeding at integrating communism into its order (citing Russia as an example) and opined that Indonesia should be able to do the same at home.- In the long run, he predicted that nationalism will emerge stronger than communism in Indonesia. He stated that communism was therefore only a short term concern for the Indonesians. ("We act in terms of years and think in terms of decades" was one of his favored statements.) Self-Reliance and Self-Determination Most of all, according to Ambassador Palar, the Indonesians want "the freedom to be free". "We want to make our own mistakes and we are prepared to suffer for them", he said. Subsequently he extended this argument to cover U.S. policy towards Viet-Nam and Malaysia. It was his general opinion that the USG has failed to identify itself with nationalist movements throughout the world. U. S. Properties Ambassador Palar explained that the recent problems with foreign-owned property in Indonesia are the fault of the foreign owners. He alleged that foreign firms are tapping the national wealth of Indonesia since they know that in the next decade they will be forced to leave Indonesia. He stressed that the assumption of managerial rights by the GOI is "reasonable" from the GOI point of view since Indonesia has been "exploited before and we need it now Malaysia Malaysia, to Ambassador Palar, is "one thing that we just can't stand". H~e explained that Indonesia anA the Philippines looked forward to the establishment of a uSoutheast Asian Malaysia" and were in the process of establishing it when the British 'set up a "British Malaysia" instead, BHe stressed that in effect Indonesia is.confronting Great Britain and not the Malaysians. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 6] === rwW~-3-Wa L He said that Indonesia at first felt America's role was one of strict neutrality but thiat our <4 million; Loan to Malaysia ("dictated by American NATO policy") shattered that opinion. Indeed, he said, "U.S. NATO policy pushed us in the direction of the Chinese". He blamed this new alignment on simple power politics (i.e. Indonesia found itself isolated so it was forced to turn to the Chinese for assistance). He denied categorically, however, that an alliance of any sort was in effect between the Chinese and the GOI. The Ambassador said that U.S. support of Malaysia has caused tremendous disquiet in Indonesia especially "among the people". He said that although the Indonesians don't like violence it can't always be avoided in the provinces where distances and communications were such that effective control over uprisings was extremely difficult. He added that violence could be controlled in Djakarta where the Central Government is fully in control. United Nations Ambassador Palar said that he was responsible for both taking Indonesia into and out of the United Nations. He said that while the GOI is unhappy with the UN, it does not intend to wreck it. - Vice President's Reply - Vice President Humphrey thanked Ambassador Palar for his analysis. He said that sometimes prosperous societies do not understand the hopes and aspirations of the underdeveloped countries but underlined (while drawing a parallel to the racial situation in the U.S.) the fact that national leaders must always stress patience, understanding and forbearance in their dealin s with other nations. "Self respect must be put into practice, he said. Concern The Vice President voiced his deep concern over recent developments in Indonesia which he said have been characterized by increasing bitterness. He particularly regretted the fact that American property and personnel have been subjected to physical harassment. He referred directly to the Bunker communique and said that, although our governments might pursue different tacks in foreign policy, we should both, at least, strive to maintain normal relations between our two gpyernments. He stressed that the USG also believes in the freedomm to be f'reen and f'or this reason we were making such a firm commitment to the freedom of' South Viet-Nam. === [PDF page 7] === 30 September 1965 Thursday, 11; 59 BM EDT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT A flash cable in from American Embassy Djakarta states that the Radio Replubic Indonesia announced thatthe '30th of September Movement" had saved President Sukarno from a CIA coup involving the "Generals' Council." A decree issued under the name of one of the presidential bodyguards states. that the country would be administered under the "Indonesian Revolutionary Council" whose membership is to be announced today. The radio reports that a number of unnamed generals and politicians have been arrested. The radio states that the 30th of September Movement was organized to save the President whose health is in danger. However, the decree was not issued in his signature. Ambassador Green says that troops are in evidence throughout the city and have placed telecommunications facilities under their control. The embassy's external telephone connections were severed and an estimated 60 troops are in front of the embassy. Details on exactly what is happening are not yet available. White House Situation Room Briefing Officer 3 c~LIJ.~ .LVA.i&~, === [PDF page 8] === DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT RECEIVED McGEORGE C 9@c(, 1965 The White House FYI! OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 Benjamin H. Read 501-104 Executive Secretary UNITED STATES GOV RNMENT Memo re Indonesian Coup TO FE - Mr. Bundy DATE: October 1, 1965 ~ Attachment .FROM: SPA - Francis T. Underhil 2 DECLASSIFIED SUBJECT: Indonesian Coup Authority gAe e. [Unreadable] 1. The Dwikora Government of Indonesia has been overthrown and a group of young officers calling itself the "Thirtieth of September Movement" has installed a 40-man Revolutionary Council, led by Lt. Col. Untung. Untung is an officer of the Palace Guard. He has a military police background and was trained in the United States. He is unknown to the Embassy. 2. It is uncertain whether the takeover is a coup or a counter coup. Those in control claim to have thwarted a "Council of Generals" plan to take over the government on Armed Forces Day, October 5. 3. The city of Djakarta is calm and orderly. The military are in complete control. Troops of the Diponegoro Division (Central Java) are most in evidence. All normal communications between Djakarta and the outside world have been cut off. Nasution is reported under house arrest and troops surround General Yani's house. General Pandjaitan is reported shot. The Armed Forces Headquarters is quiet, and the Djakarta Command Headquarters is deserted. 4. Sukarno's whereabouts is unknown, although the. Revolutionary Council has stated that he is safe and in good health. None of the actions of the Revolutionary Council, however, are taken in his name. The sycophant honorifics are completely missing from the statements of the Council. Considering the way Sukarno has dominated the political scene for the last 20 years, this virtual ignoring of Sukarno strongly suggests that he is either dead or completely incapacitated. Untung, as a member of the Palace Guard, was in an ideal position to know if Sukarno had been suddenly stricken. 5. The === [PDF page 9] === 5. The proclamations issued by Colonel Untung ma ke the following major points: a. "Pending general elections" the Revolutionary Council will be the "source of all authority" in Indonesia. A 5-man council presidium will conduct the day-to-day business of the Council. The presidium is made up of Untung and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force and police. With the exception of the Brigadier General, all are relatively junior officers. b. A planned coup of a Council of Generals is used as the justification for the takeover and the Council of Generals is identified as a "subversive body sponsored by the CIA". c. Political parties, newspapers and periodicals may carry on but must answer to the Revolutionary Council. d. Indonesian foreign policy will continue unchanged. e. Civilian members of the Rqvolutionary Council will be given the military rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In"deference" to the Chairman of the Council, all ranks above Lieutenant Colonel have been terminated. COMMENT 6. It is difficult at this point to determine with any certainty the orientation of the Revolutionary Council. The major immediate uncertainty is the whereabouts and condition of Sukarno. Untung's takeover of the government rather than a mere suppression of the "generals' plot" and the public statements of the Council strongly suggest that Sukarno is either incapacitated or dead. 7. Pending further evaluation from the Embassy, the following appear to be the unfavorable indicators: a. PKI headquarters is operating as usual, and the Embassy is concerned by the apparent complacent attitude off the PKI to the takeover. b. There is a WDCS report that the PKI irregular forces were called to..duty on September 29. c.- The names off3dd Nasution, Yani and Malik are Cr missing from the list off members off the Revolutionary Council and may be under arrest. d. The === [PDF page 10] === -3d. The more leftist military commanders, Omar Dani and Martidanata, while presumably reduced to the rank of Lt. Colonel or equivalent, remain in charge of the Air Force and Navy respectively and are members of the Council but not the presidium. 8. Following are the favorable indicators: 444 a. The CIA is named as the sponsor %f the Gnerals Council, but there is a conspicuous absence of the attacks on the United States in the public statements of the Council thus far. b. While passing reference is made to them, there is also a singular absence of the anti-Western slogans and acronyms which have characterized Indonesian public statements over the past year and a half. The word NEKOLIM has thus far been used only once. The U.S. has not yet been mentioned by name. c. Subandrio and Liemena appear in the 9th and 10th spots on the list of the Revolutionary Council. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Ruslan Abdulganis Aidi,, Njoto and Lukman are also conspicuously missing. FE:SPA:FTUnderhill:iil === [PDF page 11] === October 1, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: US Citizens in Indonesia US Government Employees 158 Dependents 189 There are 13 of these people in Medan and 4 in Surabaya; the remainder are in Djakarta. Private US citizens 1, 729 808 of these are missionaries scattered throughout the islands -- 258 on New Guinea. 710 are oil company employees, 334 stationed in South Sumatra and 282 in Central Sumatra. There are 243 private citizes in Djakarta and 143 in Bandung. === [PDF page 12] === 1 Octooer 1965 Friday, 7:20 AM EDT DECLASSIFIED MWORANDUW FOR THE PRESIDENT Authority ffA.LLCf MD S01 ByA r -, NARS,, Date (Following is the text of a CIA situation report) A pover move vhich may have far-reaching implications is under way in Djakarta. A group which calls itself the "30 September Movement" claims to have forestalled a "Generals' coup" in ladonesia. A number of unnamed generals and politicians have been arrested, and the homes of Defense Minister General Nasution and Aray Commander General Yani are under guard. A decree issued on 1 October by Lt. Colonel Untung, Commander of the Presidential Bodyguard, stated that the government would be administered by an Indonesian Revolution Counil. According to the decree, the council will follow already established government policies, and council membership will be announced shortly. No mention has been made of any active role by Saearno. The government radio initially announced that the 30 September Movement was organized to "save President Sukarno whose health wea in danger." It later cemented that he was safe and continuess to carry out the leadership of the state." The 30 September group claims that the alleged Generals' plot was AAerican inspired. The US Embassy 's extenal telepone line was cut three hours before the Indonesian Radio announced tbathe "coup" had been thwarted. Troops are stationed at the Rabsasy. The immediate purpose of the 30 September Movement appears to be the elimination of any political ele by anti- maat 0 Ae elements and a change in Army leadership. Aeties against alilar way elements agpgreatly is also played outside Djaharta. The affair may als obe used to generate new Anti- American activity. It seems likely that Sakarno knev in a&wace of he avement and its intention. Pim a v'tin the whole a ir, h evr, in teripf timing ad detailed VpaIAog awy w; have beet inst e ta rider Subnd io ad Co unist Leatdr6 ho are cloes to hi and to sukatwo. 4f"04 === [PDF page 13] === -N~FO~IGNP-sM KY 777-v' === [PDF page 14] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM OCI No. 2329/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 2 October 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Indonesia - Major General Suharto 1. Major General Suharto, Acting Minister/Commander of the Army, assumed leadership of the Army on 1 October when he led a countercoup only hours after leaders of an earlier coup had proclaimed their move. He assumed army leadership in the absence of Army Commander Yani who had been wounded and kidnapped by the initial coup group. 2. Born 28 February 1921 in Jogjakarta, Central Java, Suharto was educated at Muhammadijah intermediate school. He worked as a credit bank clerk until 1940, when he became a recruit in Gombong,West Java, and attended the Infantry Cadre Training School, attaining the rank of sergeant. At the beginning of the Japanese occupation he joined the police, and later became a battalion commander in Peta, the Japanese sponsored Volunteer army. In 1945 he became commander of Batallion X in Jogjakarta, and then was appointed commander of Regiment IV. Later raised to the rank of lieutenant colonel, he was made a brigade commander in Jogjakarta, and in March 1949 he led a successful campaign against the Dutch in that city. 3. Suharto was assigned to the Celebes in 1950 as leader of the Garuda Mataram Brigade troops in putting down the rebel forces of Captain Andi Aziz, He was appointed chief of staff of Army Territory IV after his service as commander of Infantry Regiments 14 and 15. In 1956 he achieved the rank of colonel, concurrently with the commander of Army Territory IV, From 1959-1960 he attended the C-II course of the Army Staff and Command College in Bandua. He was made a Brigadier General in January 1960. He was appointed Commander of the First NO FOREIGN DISSEM SEeC*RC === [PDF page 15] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM Army General Reserve Corps in 1961 and concurrently served as First Deputy to the Chief of Staff. He was given the command of the Mandala Command, with the mission of the "liberation" of West New Guinea in January 1962, and received his present two-star rank at the same time. At that time he also served as Deputy Chief of Staff for East Indonesia, and on 10 April 1962 President Sukarno appointed him Military Governor of the East Indonesia Region. In May 1963 the Mandala Command was disbanded, following the political settlement on West Irian. Sukarno awarded SUharto the Dharma Star for his service as head of the Command. Suharto then became Commander of the - Strategic Reserve, the position he held until 1 October 1965. 4. Suharto is considered to be anti-Communist. In 1961 it was reported that Suharto was taking an active part in the army "steering committee" in efforts to map anti-Communist strategy. Also In 1961, Suharto was reported to have favored the atti-CommdnisteLeimena for President should anything happen to Sukarno. An unconfirmed report of 1962 indicated that, as Military Governor of the East Indonesia region (a position he held concurrently with the reserve command) Suharto was to screen Indonesians entering the West Irian area to frustrate the plans of some government officials who were reportedly hand-picking leftist oriented Indonesians to be sent to West Irian. NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 16] === Indonesian Working Group - Situation Report No. 6 1965 RoI GD DECS IC 5:00 a.m. - October 4, C .- 0. I', EXEMPTION CATEGO Y (Last Report 5:00 p.m. October 3 sB(), 2)(3) ) (irle I.,,I AUTO ATIC LY DE SSIFIED ONE 1.o (Ine s s i bl, e t 1ns6t eor e v e n t) The Army has apparently not yet reached a dec sion on t whether to maintain its drive for complete victory over the. PKI, now that Sukarno has reportedly told them that measures having to do with the leftists are his political decision while absolving the Air Force of involvement in what he terms the September 30 "incident". Sukarno has had no word of regret over the reported deaths of various moderate generals, appreciation of Suharto's support or of indictment of Untung's forces. Sukarno reportedly issued a warrant earlier for the arrest of Nasution and Yani while under the influence of Air Marshal Dani and Untung at Halim AFB. The military situation in the capital remains calm with the Army in control. II. Position of PKI Although Sukarno has not indicted the PKI for its public. support of Untung, the Chinese, in what appears to be an effort to get the Party "ofgthe hook" have sent a message to the President expressing Lin Shao-Chi's and Chou En-Lai's "cordial regards and heartfelt wishes." report has it tha9the PKI has withdrawn support from the September 30 Movementand is ready to dump anyone without the agility to extricate himself from the mess in which the communists now find themselves..This would presumably include Aidit - reportedly now. with Untung in Central Java - and 50 armed PKI members captured earlier. III. Whereabouts of Key Personalities .Subandrio is reported to be back in Djakarta while Nasution's hiding place remains unknown,. reports that Yani and other missing senior generals were rutalized-be ore their deaths. IV. Other There is a report that Muslim elements, IP-KI, and the Autority SANITIZED STATE letter__MAY 117 === [PDF page 17] === Catholic Party will demonstrate in Djakarta at 1000 October 4 (local time). If they receive encouragement when they arrive at Army headquarters, they plan to destroy the printing offices of Harian Rakjat, Warta Bhakti, and Bintang Timur. Anti-communist political groups are increasingly capitalizing on PKI involvement with Untung. Army is in control of mass media. V. Outlying Areas Surabaya and Medan are quiet with the military apparently still in control. The situation in Central Java is not yet resolved; there are reports that Untung forces still retain control of some areas of the province. Jx ~'~ Lyndon. Batnes- b~'J IhVn === [PDF page 18] === /NOFORN INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 8 5:00 a.m. - October 5, 1965 (Last report 5:00 p.m. October 4) DECLASSIFIED I. Generals' Funeral: Au The bodies of the six murdered army generals and the 1st lieutenant aide to General Nasution were given hero's funerals in impressive ceremonies in Djakarta today. II. Central Java Situation: The major central Javanese city of Djokjakarta appears to be again under the control of loyalist troops.. However, a radio statement by the former military commander of the area, General Sarbini, expressing the hope that the area "would soon be free from the hands of the adventures", suggests that there are still pockets of resistance in the 'area. III. Anti-"Sept. 30 Movement" Rally: The Djakarta press (now only two army papers), reported a rally of 27 parties and organizations which called for a banning of all parties and newspapers which had supported the Sept. 30 movement. The papers also carried gruesome pictures of the multilated bodies of the armygenerals. IV. Embassy Analysis (Djakarta Tel 852): In the,Embassy's judgment, none of the theories on the background of the "Sept. 30" coup entirely jibe with the facts as we now know them. While Sukarno and/or the PKI may not have been directly involved in the movement, it seems likely that they had some foreknowledge of its plans. The Soviet Ambassador feels that the PlKI as an organization was not in-F volved, but that many PKI members were. Air Force complicity is clear. The major question now is whether the army will capitalize on the feelings aroused by the death of its generals and move to a showdown with the PRI. Smag/NOFORN === [PDF page 19] === INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT O.9 5:00 p.m. - October 5, 1965 (Last report 5:00 a.m., October I. Generals ' Funeral:1 ( Vale" iert to o (anless f faibe,nsr ttooOr The Embassy reports that several Indonesian Armry officerattending the generals' funeral this morning told 'It is not over yet." Foreign Minister Subandrio served as chief mourner at the cemetery. In earlier ceremony at Army headquarters, Nasution pledged Armed Forcqs to "truth and justice" and declared that the struggle represented by "these heroes" would be-continued. Sukarno and Dani were not It Cabinet Meeting Called: Authority STATE letter MAY 1 1979 I egBy 'A NARSDae Sukarno has called for a plenary session'of the Cabinet to be held at the Bogor Palace at 10:00 a.m., October 7 (10:00 p.m. Washington time tonight). The announcement was issued I! rr through the State Secretariat (not through the Army). The I; Embassy believes that today and tomorrow will be important days for Sukarno in that he must restore a facade of civilian control of the country soon if he is to undercut the growing image that Suharto is running the country. III. Tachtical Situation: Bogor: The Embassy has a confirmed report that an inner ring of Untung's First Battalion of Palace Guard troops and an outer.ring of Air Force troops are protecting Sukarno and Dani in Bogor. This tends to confirm early reports received by the Embassy that troops of the Siliwangi Division who surround the palace have their guns trained inwards on the palace. I The Embassy has the.impression that Suharto's forces are allowed access to Sukarno for bargaining and tape recording. -01 Sukarno's statements but that:they do not control him. f"'IV. Embassy Recommendations: The Embassy has sent in what seems to be the first of a series of telegrams recomending courses of a ction (Djakarta 868 mur-% === [PDF page 20] === 868, October 5) which generally suggests that the United States avoid overt involvement in the power struggle but should indicate, our desire to a where we can The Embassy specifically suggests a stepped-up but discretinformational program. [Unreadable] Bait"e& johnson1Ib === [PDF page 21] === DECLASSIFIED AuthoritySl By &I-, NARS, Date..!! Tuesday, October 5, 1965 From American Embassy Djakarta IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEPTEMBER 30 AFFAIR IN INDONESIA 1. What Happened: Some observers believe Sukarno engineered the entire affair to eliminate Army opposition. Others see it as: A. A contingency plan by the Communists and their allies which went off half-cocked. B. An effort by Colonel Untung and his colleagues to "save" Sukarno from an alleged Army coup. C. A genianeattempt by Colonel Untung and a portion of the Air Force to unseat Sukarno. D. Or in case of a small minority, a Communist attempt to grab power from an ailing Sukarno. 2. None of these theories jibes entirely with the facts as they are now known. If Untung and his colleagues were acting to save Sukarno, why did they give impression they were ruling in their own right during short period they controlled Djakarta? If this was part of a contingency plan which was touched off prematurely, perhaps by false report of Sukarno's death, how can indications of the advance actions during the last few days of September be explained? If this was Foreign Minister Subandrio- Air*rshal Dani plot to take over (perhaps with. Communist Party support) yi they want to oust Siiktre who is their m',ain base of support? rotlowing ie one possib lity whicl seems to us to have merit: A. What later becam enwas the September 30 group almost ceriginy i4elod JDani, part of the Air For ce, Colonel Scherman of Dipeoiggro Diviasion arid Gnaung. The inclusion of Sukarno and or === [PDF page 22] === Communist Party leadership is not so certain although there is considerable evidence that both probably were involved in some way. Subandrio was probably aware of and, more likely, a supporter of the Group. B. September 30 coup probably concerned by the movement of Army troops to Djakarta for Armed Forces Day celebration on October 5 and by reports the Army might attempt to seize power that day. From various sources we have learned that Communist Party leaders recently have been taking extra precautions and that paramilitary training for Communist Party youth was being accelerated. Mounting economic difficulties and the recent campaign against "economic corrupters" may have given movement added impetus and convinced them they could now safely move against top Army leadership. C. There are reports that Dani was aware in advance that something was brewing. He reportedly summoned close aides to an urgent meeting the night of September 30 and others had heard him speak of impending difficulties shortly before that time. Also, the use of Halim Air Force Base would seem clearly to implicate him from outset. D. If this correct, "coup" probably had limited objective of eliminating top Army leadership (which it almost did). It could have been launched as a preventive action to counter a rumored Army coup or it might have been part of a broader plan to grab power on the demise of Sukarno which was touched off prematurely E. Whether Sukarno was involved is not known. He may have been or he may at least have given tacit approval if this was a preventive move. Certainly his recent statements show no regret over the slaughter of his top Army advisers. Some members of the Army believe his movements on October 1 indicate he was implicated. 4. Present situation: Whatever the background of events, the situation now is as follows: . The Army is in control, and it has important instruments of B3. Italso hais a cauise in the mhurder of six ttop leaders ifthe Arrmy chooses to use it,and ithast already begun to do so. === [PDF page 23] === C. Muslim groups and others (except Communists and their stooges) are lining up behind the Army. D. Communist Party has suffered a serious setback for its endorsement of, and perhaps participation in, discredited September 30 movement. E. The Army now has the opportunity to move against Communist Party if it acts quickly. Reported Army sweep through Communist areas of city yesterday did not take place. Momentum is now at peak with discovery of bodies of murdered Army leaders. In short, it's now or never. 5. Prospects: A. Sukarno is the key. From his brief radio announcements it seems that he wants to save the Communist Party and its Air Force allies, Without him the Army would almost certainly move. With him, there is reason for 'doubt. B. There Will almost certainly be a contest of wills between an Army which has great political power at the moment but which has long history of no;tr standing up to the President and a Sukarno who has been, weakened by seemingly having lost control of the situation during recent days. C. On balance, we believe Sukarno will retain office (if his health permits) but with his hold on the reins of power weakened. How much cannot be determined but he will have to make compromises, especially idi ttheaArmy. D. If Sukarno succeeds in his efforts to portray recent events as a "political problem" which he will handle, then there is a good chance he may be able eventually to return virtually to status qu -before September 30. E. However, thes Army must realize this. Despiteitshromns we believe odds are that the Army will act to pin blameforentves on Comavitnist Party anid its sallies. MVIch reigns in qpubt, but it seenis 4mp~st certy.in that the agoriy of riddin'g Indpnes'ta of the effects T Suk rno and "guided democracy" has began. It wouldbe an error, however, to assume the process will be~over ea sily or qutckly. GREEN I ylij === [PDF page 24] === aWmeer/NOFORN INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 10 5 a.m. - October 6, 1965 (Last report 5 p.m. October 5) DECLASSIFIED. Authority I. Army vs. PKI: Authority, 4zte The Army appears now to have determined to move vigorously against the PKI despite Sukarno's hands-off order of October 4. The next day according to reliable reports, Njono, Chief of the Djakarta PKI Committee and former head of SOBSI (PKI-led labor federation), was arrested by the Army along with several members of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerw-ent (respectively, PKI youth and women's auxiliaz'ies) and an undetermined number of lesser PKI officials. There is less reliable information that firing squads are being formed to execute captured PKI members. Depending on the outconexof Sukarno's cabinet meeting, now in progress, these actions are subject to reversal as the Bung struggles to re-exert control of the situation. The wife of the commander of the Jogjakarta military district, and their eight children were reportedly chopped to bits by Untung's forces when they briefly occupied Jogja. II. Security: Army remains in control of a quiet Djakarta. Muslim groups we 1 1athering at the National Front for what reportedly/be anti-PKI demonstrations. In central Java, Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Solo were in the hands of* troops loyal to Suharto. Surabaya and Medan are quiet. === [PDF page 25] === kee es aN, bar fas [wae vent Fad VS vers ae; er Oj GoM ay ae ae [Unreadable] wa’ Ben,; ‘ na Bh eS é LSE H CTT EE LIE OE BIE OIE EG AE BETES SS DF FRO RR TS i Te ae === [PDF page 26] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM OCI No. 2330/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 6 October 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Upheaval in Indonesia SUMMARY The Indonesian army, having countered what appears to have been a leftist coup on 1 October, is for the time being firmly in control of Indonesia'. It would like to use the opportunity to take strong steps against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and elements allied with it. It would 14 be reluctant to take decisive action, however, 36 without the approval of President Sukarno. Sukarno, in the interest of national unity and probably fearing the ascendency of the army, has asserted that the present situation is a political problem that requires a political settlement and that he wishes to settle it himself. He apparently hopes to conciliate the leftists and return the Communist Party to the favorable political position it enjoyed prior to the events of 1 October. ' NO FOREIGN DISSEM Si@RN [Unreadable] === [PDF page 27] === $0 FOREIGN DISSEM 1. Early on 1 October a group which called itself the "30 September Movement" kidnapped'six army generals,, including Army Commander Yani, and later murdered them. The movement was led by Lt. Col. Untung, a battalion commander in President Sukarno's bodyguard, the Tjakrabirawa regiment. In addition to Untung's own battalion (which was one of three in the regiment), the movement also appears to have included some elements of the air force and initially was openly supported by the Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani. Also reportedly involved were Communist-influenced army elements from Central Java and members of Pemuda Rakjat--the Communist youth organization, the party's special security force, and GERWANI--the Communist women's front group. 2. A message read over the Djakarta radio on the morning of 1 October claimed that Untung's action was supportedd by troops of other branches of the armed forces" and that the "30 September Movement" had acted to forestall an American-inspired "generals' coup." The message stated that President Sukarno and other targets of the "generals' coup" were under the protection of the movement. Shortly thereafter the 45 members of a leftist "Revolutionary Council" were announced. About half of the council's membership was composed of government officials, a few of whom were highlevel and none of whom at that time was maintaining an anti- or even strong non-Communist position. The council contained three members of the Ipdonesian Communist Party Central Committee. The rest were well-known fellow travellers or crypto-Communists. 3. By the early evening of 1 October Army General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), informed all military areas that in the absence of Army Commander General Yani, who had been kidnapped, he was assuming commandof the army. He was doing so with the understanding and. cooperation of the navy in order to destroy the "30 September Movyment." Two 'hours later Radio Indonesia announced that thearny controlled the situation, that th~e police bad also joined the army and navy to crush the "counterrevolutionary movement," and that President Sukarno and Defense Minister NO FOREIGN DISSEM SEG F. === [PDF page 28] === .. -61 RE T NO FOREIGN DISSEM General Nasution--the latter had been a target of Untung's group--were safe. 4. During the night of 1 October, Lt. Col. Untung apparently fled to Central Java where he apparently hoped to establish a position with pro- Communist elements in that province. Repeated broadcasts of President Sukarno's appeal for restoration of order and the strong pro-Sukarno, proarmy stance of both General Sabur--Untung's superior officer in the Tjakrabirawa regiment--and of General Surjosumpeno--army commander in Central Java-- appear to have cut away much of Untung's following. Reports are confused, however, as to his present support. They range from a mere 110 troops to several battalions. There are no present plans to send additional troops into Central Java to deal with him; loyal troops already stationed in that province are deemed sufficient to cope with the situation. 5. On 4 October Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani, who had already been absolved of complicity in the "30 September Movement" by Sukarno, by implication denied any connection with the movement. In a special broadcast he thanked Sukarno "for trust in the air force" and said appropriate action would be taken against any air force personnel involved in the movement. 6. Meanwhile President Sukarno had been maneuvering to reaffirm his own control of the situation. On 2 October he summoned all military commanders and Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena to a meeting "to settle the 30 September incident immediately." (First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio was in North Sumatra but has since returned and is with Sukarno in Bogor; Third Deputy Prime- Minister Chaerul Saleh is en route home 'from Communist China.) Sukarno subsequently broadcast to the nation that he had assumed personal command of the army, that he had appointed General Pranoto, an army headquarters staff officer, administrative head of the army and had deputized General Suharto "to implement the restoration of security." A statement by Suharto which followed that of Sukarno affirmed the changes made by the president. A 3 October NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 29] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM broadcast by the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) described Pranoto only as "assisting the president." 7. Suharto, long regarded as apolitical and possibly an opportunist, emerges in the present situation as a strong military leader and apparently a firm anti-Communist. Pranoto, on the other hand, does not belong to the group of officers who looked to Yani and Nasution for leadership and obviously is viewed with some disfavor by Suharto and his colleagues. Sukarno is said to have elevated Pranoto during the present crisis as a means of conciliating and protecting the left, and it would seem that he also did it as a means of imposing disunity upon the army. Appraisals of Pranoto range from passive and soft on the Communists to actively pro-Communist. He has served in Central Java, a Communist stronghold, as a battalion commander and later as the territorial commander; he is reputed during those years to have done nothing to obstruct Communist growth there. Available information, most of it from pro-Suharto sources, has not mentioned any action taken by Pranoto in his present capacity. 8. The US Embassy in Djakarta has a confirmed report that Sukarno's palace guards and air force troops are protecting Sukarno and Dani in Bogor. Reportedly, Suharto's troops have their guns trained toward the palace. The US Embassy now believes that Suharto's forces are allowed access to Sukarno for bargaining and tape recording Sukarno's statements but they do not control him. 9. Sukarno has rejected army suggestions for firm measures against leaders of the "30 September Movement" and the Communist Party. On 4 October he told the army generals that the situation basically involves political issues, that tranquillity and order are needed for a solution, and that the generals should "leave the political settlement to me." Army officers, initially jubilant at the prospect of cracking down on the Communists, were reported depressed after their meetings with Sukarno. 10, Apparently a few hours prior to this 4 October meeting between Sukarno and the generals and apparently also under the emotion of having just viewed NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 30] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM the exhuming of the murdered generals, Suharto made an unusual public statement which strongly implied both doubt and criticism of the president and accused the air force and the Communists of complicity in the "30 September Movement." He stated that the bodies had been found in a well within the jurisdiction of the Halim Air Force Base near Djakarta. He said that an area near the well had been used as an air force training center for volunteers from Pemuda Rakjat (the Communist youth organization) and GERWANI (the Communist women's organization). He went on that "based on these facts, it is possible that there is truth in the statement of our beloved father, Presidebt, Supreme Commander, Great Leader of the Revolution, that the air force is not involved in the affair. But it is impossible that there is no connection with this affair among elements of the air force." Suharto said he conveyed the sentiments of "patri'ots who are members of the army" that "air force patriots will purge such members (of the air force) who are involved in this adventure." 11. A few hours later, General Sabur in his capacity as Secretary General of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) broadcast an account of Sukarno's 4 October admonitions-to the generals, combat commanders, and all commanders of the armed services. According to Sabur, Sukarno had ordered those present, and inferentially all Indonesians, not to permit themselves to be "set off against each other" since this would "harm our struggle and weaken our potential." Sabur said settlement of the 30 September incident would be handled personally and soon by the president. He quoted Sukarno as warning military leaders "not to fall into the trap of (garble--probably imperialist or neocolonialist) tactics in view of theirlatest activities for weakening us from inside as a prelude for their attacks against us." He specifically ordered combat commanders to "realize the danger of intrigue of our adversaries," to "remain vigilant and continuously enhafice unity." Sukarno did manage to say that those who fell victim to the "30*Septemher Movement" were heroes of the revolution, and he ~. f invited prayer for their souls, 12. The Indoneside Communist Party (PKI), after indicating its suppotof the "30 September NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 31] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM Movement" through its official newspaper Harian Rakjat, has now largely lapsed into silence. ommunist Part* leaders apparently are in seclusion or actual hiding. According to a clandestine source, party policy is to disavow the "30 September Movement." Party members caught *ith arms or found in other ways to be supporting the rebellion will be regarded by the PKI as misguided adventurers. 13. The leftist press in Medan, North Sumatra, has continued to publish, and probably is setting the line the party plans to take when its leaders emerge again. The pro-party press in Medan expresses a hope for increased solidarity between the army and the people "particularly in settling the 30 September affair strictly along 1ines set out by President Sukarno." 14. Many questions remain unanswered about the "30 September Movement." Most revolve around Sukarno. Did Sukarno have prior knowledge of the "30 September Movement" and its intentions? Was he taken into protective custody by members of the movement or did he, as he publicly announced, visit Halim Air Force Base--the headquarters of Air Force Chief of Staff Dani and probably the headquarters of the 30 September group--of his own will on 1 October because he thought it wise to be near an airplane? Or was his presence there an indication that he, like the air force and the Communist Party, openly and briefly endorsed the movement? Or was this part of the escape route, reportedly engineered by Gener4l Sabur, to get Sukarno out of Djakarta to Bogor? Did Sukarno's appearance of illness during an address on the evening of 30 September motivate the events of 1 October --events which seem to have been previously but perhaps incompletely planned? 15. Other questions pertain to Lt. Col. Untung and Communist Party leaders. Most reports claim or assume tbAt Untung was merely a dupe; according to one source, he is a strict Moslem who was outraged by the high living and corrupt practices of highranking army officers, If he was only a tool and a front man--and this seems plausible--who did the actual planning? Or did several plans by various elements become entangled, with one being used to justify another? NO FOREIGN DISSEM S~eOR T === [PDF page 32] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM 16. It has been reliably reported that the Communist Party in August had reviewed-contingency plans which would be put into effect if Suijarno died within the next few days or weeks. These apparently involved the seclusion of top Communist leaders and moves to protect Communist assets by members of the Communist youth front and the party's special security force. There is at least one report that Sukaeno had agreed to the arrest--by whom was not reported--of the anti- Communist generals but that he did not knOw of plans to kill them and, had he known, would not have approved them. A high-ranking army source (one of Sukarno's physicians and a key figure in army communications), who has occasionally been candid about, internal matters, stated on 3 October that among Untung's sponsors were armed Communist cadres who had been armed and uniformed. He said Untung's troops had been among those who had gone to the generals' houses but that it was not clear who' had done the firing--&mpying,;th&t uniformed Communists had also been part of the group. 17. A plausible view of the immediate background of the "30 September Movement" is that Sukarno, Subandrio, and perhaps Communist leaders close to them had considered the arrest of certain army generals. Sukarno and Subandrio have repeatedly and publicly, warned the armed forces in recent months that individual leaders must cooperate with the "revolution" or be "left behind." More recently they have even implied some sort of action against them. With the knowledge of this possibility, militant Communist cadres both inside and outside of the air force (and it seems well-established that such were involved) may have used it to justify action against the generals to Untuag, and may have played also upon his resentment of high living among the brass. Young militants are known to be chafing against the peaceful united front tactics espoused by top Communist leaders and the latter's strong support of Sukarno. The timing of their action could have been influenced by reports on Sukarno's illness on the night of 30 September and by partial or garbled knowledge of Communist contingency plans in the event of Sukarno's death. The militants--probably impetuous, zealous, and none too clear in their thinking7-would have assumed that the swiftness and decisiveness of their NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 33] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM actions--the death of the generals and the formation of a new government--would force Sukarno and thereby the rest of Indonesia to fall in behind them. 18. Despite Harian Rakjat's brief espousal of the movement it does not seem likely that party chairman Aidit would have approved the murder of the generals or even the change of government. The Indonesian situation, both foreign and domestic,.was highly favorable to the Communists and--barring Sukarno's immediate death--showed every sign of becoming progressively more so. Possibly a few militant members of the Central Committee approved the plan; future internal party developments may so indicate. The motivation of Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani remains an open question. He has assumed an increasingly leftist position during the past year. 19. With the army's counteraction and Sukarno's subsequent moves, many of the questions pertaining to the promotion of the "30 September Movement" become almost academic. The principal point now is whether the army will go along withiSukarno in papering over tthe situation and returning to the political status quo prior to the events of 1 October. 20. The previous record of the army seems to indicate, that despite frustration and rage over the murders of six highly regarded generals, most officers will continue to support Sukarno. Although there is considerable individual and collective doubt among the officer corps as to the wisdom of Sukarno's policies, there is also enormous reluctance to oppose him. Sukarno has so presented his position that any specific action against the Communists would be considered an azkti- Sukarno act. It now appears that only if Untung can develop a following in Central Java and renew armed action--and at the -adment this does not appear to be a strong possibility--would Sukarno tolerate a significant move against him and his allies. 21. In the aftermath of the,"30 September Movement'," however, the army temporarily will retain a political ascendency. This is based in the martial law sti obtaining in Djakarta, in the army's physical control of most of the country, and in the present policy of secluslton being followed by Communist leaders. NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 34] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM 22. Should Sukarno move too rapidly in favor of the left during this period, he could cause a sharpening of feeling between himself and most army leaders. This could promote a stronger public and political anti-Communist stand by the army than it has maintained in the past year and weaken the political position of the party. Such a development, however, is highly speculative. 23. Sukarno's health continues to be a major factor in determining the course of events. The army is far more likely to act decisively if the president dies or is disabled than if he remains reasonably vigorous. Sukarno's continued seclusion is not necessarily an indication that his health has further deteriorated; he will probably defer a public appearance until he feels that it is to his political advantage. Meanwhile he apparently is holding frequent meetings with various military and civilian officials. NO FOREIGN DISSEM 9 E**Rw 001*T* I" === [PDF page 35] === SWEM/NOFORN INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 11 5:00 p.m. - October 7, 1965 (Last report 5:00 a.m. October 6, 1965) DECLASSILFIED Authority I. Security Situation: TARSDate Forces loyal to Suharto appear to have control throughout the country. Some small armed elements remain loyal to Utung in the Madiun, East Java area. In Djakarta the army has made several sweeps in slum sections, and have seized documents reportedly proving PKI participation in September 30 Movement. II. Subandrio Claims CIA at Fault: According to an Australian source Foreign Minister Subandrio is advancing the claim that the "30 September Movement" was a CIA plot to sow confusion in preparation for a CIA attack from Singapore. Subandrio apparently presented this line at the October 6 cabinet meeting and that Sukarno supported this view. III. Situation in Surabaya East Java Vice Governor Satryo and Surabaya Mayor Murachman, both PKI membershave gone into hiding, and several SOBSI (Communist Labor Front) leaders have lost their positions in Indonesian companies. Moslem elements have put up anti-PKI signs throughout the city, including some on the walls of the Soviet Consulate. IV. Sino-Indonesian Communique Joint communique signed irq Peiping at the conclusion of the Chaerul Saleh visit notable for making no mention of the internal Indonesian situation over the past week. It may have been held for several days before release in order to allow the situation to further clarify itself. === [PDF page 36] === V. Possibility of Moslem-PKI Clash Embassy Djakarta notes that Moslem feeling against the Communists in Djakarta is running high and could lead to an outbreak of violence between the two groups. SIS/ NOFORN === [PDF page 37] === ST/NOFORN '9 INDONESIA WORKING GROUP - Situation Report No. 12 5:00 a.m. - October 7, 1965 DECLASSIFIED (Last report - 5:00 p.m. October 6) AuthoritylTATE( C'f" BY M 6 NARS, Date_' I. Security Situation Returning to Normal Djakarta remains peaceful and under the control of Generaln Suharto's forces. International air service is returning to normal, within the limitation of the curfew, with KLM, Jal, ar Garuda resuming regular flight. II. Sukarno Makes Public Appearance Sukarno bantered with western newsmen at the Bogor palacea immediately before yesterday's cabinet meeting. He appeared normal and fit. A German doctor who saw him socially on October 5 for 30 minutes also told the Embassy that the Presi -o dent appeared to be in good health. III. PNI Disavowal of 30 September Movement An official statement of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) denounced the 30 September Movement as counterrevolutionary and a coup against the President. IV. Communist Newspaper Banning The Minister of Information announced that all papers which had supported the September 30 Movembnt were banned. NOFORN === [PDF page 38] === DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON McGEORE LUi (' OFFICE %50CT 9 AM i11 56 October 8, 1965 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Washington Post Article by Ambassador Jones Retired Ambassador Howard Jones has written an article on Indonesia which will appear in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post. Our Indonesia specialists have seen the text and consider it innocuous. ,4y Benjamin H. Read T7 Executive Secretary LIMITED OFFICIAL USE === [PDF page 39] === Mac/w~7 Y~dclewV SWERt/NOFORN Indonesian Working Group -.Situation Report Nc4%1 5:00 a.m. - October 9, 1965 (Last report 5:00 p.m., October 8, 1965) DECLASSlFIED I. Embassy.Assessment - First Week: Authority T ( C' I4l4(( ByNARS, Date d, Commenting on developments in the first week since the --- 7- 11 October 1 pre-dawn coup, the Embassy says it is now increasingly clear that the PKI and Air Force leadership were implicated in and Sukarno himself was probably at least aware of the actions planned by the 30 September Movement. The situation is still fluid, but the Embassy sees the following encouraging developments: a. The PKI is now on the run for the first time in many years, with Aidit hiding, the party organization, disrupted and documents dispersed, and its headquarters burned. b. Virtually all Muslim and Christian organizations, including the PNI, have rallied behind the Army, and moderate groups in other organizations are contesting with crypto- Communists and opportunists for control. c. The Army has kept up the momentum of its drive against the PKI, arresting several thousand PKI activists and recovering many, but far from all, of the weapons distributed to PKI troops. d. The Army controls the information media, which, with few exceptions (notably the Foreign Office's Indonesian Herald) is taking an effective stand in its domestic coverage against the 30 September Movement and its supporters (PKI). On the negative side, Subandrio's statement following the October 6 cabinet meeting indicates that Sukarno is still f sticking to a stand which gives him freedom to defend the PKI and, if he thinks he can get away with it, to disavow the Army. Additionally, the largest Muslim group (NU).lacks SBAT/NOFORN tP"flLIV === [PDF page 40] === seaT/NOFORN -2effective leadership and the PKI underground network remains in existence. The Army now has a definite edge, and the Embassy believes that if the Army leaders realize that this is the moment of truth and have the determination to stand up to Sukarno, they can win, particularly if they find evidence implicating Sukarno in the 30 September affairs. The Army now shows no intention, however, of openly ditching Sukarno and may feel it necessary to use his name for some time. The Embassy believes that, even if the Army loses momentum and power is allowed to slip back to Sukarno, Sukarno, with his tarnished image, can never rule as he once did. II. Embassy Contact with Military The Embassy has sent a message to certain Army leaders advising them that we are proceding with 4 phased removal of American official dependents but that this does not reflect on the excellent protection which the Army and police have provided. III. Army May Ask for Rice: An Army contact has told the Embassy that Army leaders are discussing the possibility of the United States arranging for rice imports through a third country so that the Army could distribute it, which would lower current rice prices. No request has yet been received. IV. Army Actions: The Embassy has confirmation that Army leaders are encouraging religious groups to take political action which the Army will support and that such action will increase in the next two or three days. The Army, meanwhile, is staying in the background politically. V. Locations of Individuals: Sukarno, Dani and Subandrio remain in.the palace in /NOFORN Ygw === [PDF page 41] === WNOFORN Bogor for their own security. Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh has returned from Peking and is being either held or protected (uncertain which) by the Army. General Sukendro, Minis ter of the Supreme Operations Command, is also back from Peking and is working with the Army. NOFORN === [PDF page 42] === SeiBeNOVORN' INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 34 5:00 a.m. - October 19, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 p.m. October 18) I. General Situation in Indonesia remains relatively unchanged since the last SITREP with attention focused on internal political matters rather than on the "Anti-Foreign Bases Conference."DEbj II. Chicoms Protest "Attack": By A'e-NARS, DateAj' Radio Peking has complained bitterly about the alleged "atrocities" and "gross violations" committed by the Indonesian Army at the Chinese Embassy on October 16. Reportedly the Chicans have sent a strongly worded note to the Indonesian Foreign Office calling for a) an apology b) compensation c) an end to persecution of communists and deplored d) the rise of anti-Chinese feelings. * The Indonesians have yet to react to this alleged in- 14, cident. Our Embassy reports that the Foreign Office either "does not know the basis for the Chicom charges or are not talking". It is further reported that the Chicoms are evacuating their dependents from Indonesia. NOTE: The Indonesian Working Group will continue to prepare daily 5:00 a.m. situation reports but will submit p.m. reports only when the day's traffic so dictates. NOFORN ~A~il === [PDF page 43] === INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 28 5:00 a.m. October 16, 1965 (Last report 5:00 a.m. October 15, 1965) DECLASSIFIED I. General Situation: Authority yes 90 By_&0 NARS, DateI ' 1 The focus of events in Indonesia is apparantly shifting from the "streets to political maneuvering between the Army and Sukarno." An October 15 public statement, issued after the second cabinet meeting to be held since the coup, said the meeting was held to "formulate a new political basis" in the wake of the "30th September movement." Calm has returned to Djakarta as reportedlythe Army has warned the Moslems to "slow down". The Embassy suggests that the attack and burning of the Peking-oriented Res, Publica University on the 14th may have been the climax of local demonstrations and attacks on PKI offices and institutions. II. Sukarno Implicated? A Western ambassador in Djakarta has received information that interrogation of Col. Untung has implicated President Sukarno. Sukarno is said to be aware of this situation and for this reason is "lying.low." III. Adit Captured? There are'unconfirmed reports that PKI Chairman Aidit was captured alive on October 14 in the Djogjakarta area. SOSNOFORN === [PDF page 44] === INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 32 5:00 a.m. - October 18, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 p.m. October 17) 1 DECLASSIFIED Authority 4 ff'O# 79 I. General Situation: By &e. NARS, Date Djakarta passed a quiet Sunday enlivened only by massive security precautions surrounding Sukarno's appearance at the KIAPMA opening. There were no known burnings or demonstrations, and Army-Police sweeps through the villages are apparently no longer occurring. Anti-communist street signs are still appearing, some of which warn against the appearance of a "neo-PKI." Anti-PKI activity appears to be expanding outside Djakarta. II. Political Maneuvering: The Embassy reports that the situation seems to be moving toward a "political settlement" which will do little 'more than paper over the deep cracks which have appeared in the nations leadership. The Embassy believes that many basic issues will remain unresolved. Prolonged maneuvering is likely and, whatever the outcome, the Sukarno image and leadership will never be quite the same. The two power centers, Sukarno and the Army, each need the other, and there seems little likelihood of any series Army move to dump Sukarno. Army sources are now playing cwn any indications of Sukarno's involvement in the 30 September affair. The basic framework of Indonesia's domestic ideology will be retained, but there will probably be changes of emphasis. No dramatic changes in foreign policy are likely. It appears likely that a partial deal between the Army j and Sukarno has already been reached while other matters are still under negotiation. The Embassy points out, however, that working out the details will be a serious problem, as will probable differences of interpretation between Sukarno and the Army on points already accepted. In both cases, future infighting will probably determine the final outcome. Lme iQroroai. === [PDF page 45] === mGET/ NOFORN III. Chinese Charge Embassy Raided: Peking radio broadcast the text of a note which the Chicom Foreign Ministry has sent to the Indonesian Embassy in Peking, charging that Indonesian troops attacked and searched the office of.the Commercial Counselor at the Chicom Embassy in Djakarta on the evening of October 16. During the 90 minute invasion, the troops allegedly struck a Commercial Attachd and searched for documents. The note demands an apology, punishment for the "culprits and their instigators", and a guarantee against similar incidents in the future. There is no confirmation from any source in Djakarta, but the Embassy has a report from the Yugoslav Embassy that the Chicoms are pulling their dependents out of Djakarta. S~~#NOFORN === [PDF page 46] === INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 36 5:00 a.m. - October 21, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 a.m. October 20) SANITIZED Authority STATE letter rMAY 1979 -I. General Situation: By J2 NARS, Date '-R- 7 Rumors and speculation continue regarding what the PKI tactics are now likely to be. While Army leaders suspect a program of regrouping and terror, they are not sure. Our Embassy considers that Central Java is obviously the area to watch for PKI counter-action, as possible conflict shapes* II. Communist Allegiance - A Straw in the Wind: According to an Antara report-of Oct-21 date-lined Bandung, the sectional committee members of the PKI and its affiliates, in the presence of the Commandant, "Bupati" (Mayor), and the people of the Madjalengka area, declared themselves out of the PKI and announced dissolution of the Party branches. They "renewed" allegiance to the President and expressed readiness to help establish Indonesian socialism. III. Whereabouts of Aidit, PKI Leader: -nd.onesian Communist Party Chie, D.N. Aidit, was arrested'in Central Javaon the 15th or 16th of Oct and brought by the Army to Djakarta. He is now being held at KOSTRAD (Strategic Command) Headquarters in that city. Rumors of his arrest have circulated but have not been commented on by the Army, which is prepared to deny the story to President Sukarno if questioned directly. The Army desires to avoid a confrontation with Sukarno on this issue. IV. Evacuation of U.S. Government Dependents: Our Embassy reports that evacuation of 152 U.S. Governmnent dependents from Djakarta and Surabaya has been completed. CASSIFIEDb -/ 9 SCHEDlJL O0 0.0. 1IN EAXEMPLT IOONTG RY;: 4 AU CAlLY DECLA FIED ON C ' lyndon. Bai. esJolmsio I itr === [PDF page 47] === The operation took 14 days with 10 commercial flights and one ship utilized. The only remaining U.S. Government dependents in Indonesia scheduled for evacuation are 8 at Medan, all of whom, because of lack of shipping at Belawan, will probably be evacuated through Djakarta in next few days. [Unreadable] s~o~fi === [PDF page 48] === 99MNI/NOFORN- INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 38 5:00 a.m. - October 22, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 p.m., October 21) -- DECLASSIFIED I. General Situation: [Unreadable] No new evidence emerged overnight to add to that already on hand pointing to PKI plans for armed resistance in Central Java and North Sumatra communist strongholds. This appears to remain the most troubling immediate prospect, but exact or even approximate strength of armed communist dissidents reportedly collecting in these areas remains unknown. Army is finding itself spread thin, and fears regarding exposure on the Borneo border areas inhibit transfer of TNI reinforcements where they are most needed. The Army continues to uncover new caches of Chinese communist arms; the latest arsenal having been found in a Djakarta bank vault. Meanwhile, according to press despatches, the Army: (1) issued a ban on the PKI in Jogjakarta, in addition to that already imposed in Djakarta; (2) was authorized to form "vigilante teams" to guard against rebels and "those opposed to the revolution." II. The Bandwagon: In an effort to neutralize strong Army support for the moderate wing of the PNI, veteran opportunist Ali Sastroamidjojo, general chairman of the "regular" (lately fellow-travelling) PNI, has issued a statement calling for firm action against the PKI for its part in the September 30 Movement. f The minor Muslim party, Perti, has expelled its leftist leader Siradjuddin Abbas. The press reports further recantations, with mass resignations in North Sumatra from various P1RI auxiliaries. These skin sheddings could stem either from a simple desire to be see~NOorn === [PDF page 49] === i/NOFORN -2on the winning side or a device for survival ordered by the PKI. III. Economic: According to a message we are passing for Stanvac, the Indonesian Government, despite political developments favorable to us, apparently remains determined to acquire the Stanvac refinery and producing fields in South Sumatra -- and threatens nationalization if the GOI's financial proposals are not accepted. S9eMW/NOFORN === [PDF page 50] === SBOW~NOPORN INDONESIA WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 40 5:00 a.m. - October 25, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 a.m., October 24) J DECLASSIFIED I. Encouraging Developments: Authority$?WA 74 By A rP,__ NARs', Date According to information obtained from an aide of General Nasution (items A & C) and the Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia (item B): A. Nasution has refused to attend any meetings, including cabinet and KOTI meetings, where Subandrio is present. Nasution is said to have established an improved working relationship with Sukarno, but also appears to be making every effort to absolve Sukarno from any guilt of involvement in the 30th September Movement. Each man seems to feel that he needs the other. B. Subandrio's role, in light of Nasutions improved position,,appears confused and weakened. The military, perhaps in an attempt to reverse their "greatest single error" (i.e. to have permitted Subandrio to return to Sukarno's side), is said to have intervened to prevent Subandrio from leaving to attend the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Algiers. General Suharto and Police Minister Sutjipto have reportedly urged Sukarno to drop Subandrio as Foreign Minister and Subandrio is presently said to be under "virtual detention." C. Colonel Marsudi's appointment as Chief of Intelligence, which has been bitterly opposed by the Army because of Marsudi's connections to Subandrio and the BPI, is apparently being cancelled. Moreover, Nasutionis assiduously looking for BPI chief General Sutarto, who has "disappeared." II. Sukarno Postponing Trip?? Reflecting the counter tide of recent developments, Sukarno has announced that he is postponing his decision to travel abroad. The Embassy feels that this decision will sensNFRN === [PDF page 51] === 984M/N0FORN -2now depend on whether or not the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Algiers recommends proceeding with Bandung II. Should Sukarno decide not to leave Indonesia the military will have scored a most significant victory. 4,nrl seNOF0orom === [PDF page 52] === INDONESIAN WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 42 5:00 a.m. - October 27, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 a.m. - October 26, 1965) - DECLASSIFIED I. GENERAL SITUATION: By1, NARS, There has been little change in the general situation in Indonesia since the last SITREP. Our Embassy has received confirmation that the Army has prevented Foreign Minister Subandrio from departing for Algiers AA Conference and is moving in a determined manner to have him removed from office. Reports continue to filter in of increased insecurity and mounting bloodshed in Central Java, particularly around the Solo, Semarang and Jogjakarta areas. However, these reports are still unconfirmed but are indication that something is going on. It is still unclear whether (a) the PKI is moving into a stage of terrorism and sabotage; (b)PKI cadres are merely reacting uncoordinatedly to the pressures being brought to bear upon them; or (c) the Army is purposely moving to wipe out: questionable elements in order to gain control over these questionable areas. II. General Nasution vis-a-vis President Sukarno: Our Military Attachd reports that it appears that General Nasution is beginning to have a working relationship with President Sukarno. It seems that the Army has been furnishing the President on a day-to-day basis with a good deal of information regarding Foreign Minister Subandrio's complicity in the 30th of September coup effort and that Sukarno is now beginning to have doubts about his principal Lieutenant. Nevertheless, Nasution and Suharto are alive to the danger that they could be out-maneuvered by Sukarno but they are, however, prepared to work with him. === [PDF page 53] === INDONESIA WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 43 5:00 a.m. - October 28, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 a.m. - October 27, 1965) I. General Situation: The Army has declared a state of war (martial law) in Central.Java. The announcement also noted that the communists have killed 178 people in Central and East Java since October 1. PKI armed attacks on police stations in three Central Java cfdies on October 25. The Japanese Embassy has been asked to evacuate several of its nationals working in the area. The Army is not overly alarmed and considers these attacks as attempts to feel out Army strength. II. Sukarno: Sukarno continued his efforts to salvage his position. He spent most of yesterday -.n. zeeting with the leaders of seven major parties, excluding. t:he- PKI. He warned of threats from NEKOLIM, the CIA etc. and appealed for unity. He also! defended Subandrio. Afternteeting with the Chicom ambassador, he reaffirmed the Djakarta - Asian Communist axis and friendship for the Chicoms. III. Subandrio and Dani: Subandrio seems to be losing ground. He was forced to issue a clumsy denial of his charge that the CIA was backing anti-PKI newspapers, and apparently he will not go to Algiers. Dani has been escorted back to Djakarta in Army custody. IV. Saito Recommends Aid: CLASSIFIED BY EXEMPT FROM.ENERA DECLASS ICATION SCrHEDUtLE F E.%C.Is,XEMPTION CCATECORY: Authority STATE letter MAY:1 1979 AU TIC L (DECASIe ONomt) === [PDF page 54] === o 18 - -,FNM === [PDF page 55] === INDONESIA WORKING GROUP -'SITUATION REPORT NO. 44 5:00 a.m. -Octol1r 29 1965 (Last previous report 5:00'a.m. October 28, 1965) 1 DECLASSIFIED I. General Situation: Authority TKAteJ 4'? By~1Yfj~r_1NARS, DateT.MLI Tension continues to rise in East and Central Java and Djakarta as evidence mounts in these areas that the PKI feels it must violently confront the Army now in the absence of a Sukarnowdictated political solution. The Army continues to I roll oMn over the President's protests, although both East and West Java commanders have yet to move with complete vigor owing to military caution of the former and the latter's ~7i tangled loyalties. A country team assessment concludes that for the first time in years there is a real chance for a national political awakening and an effective move back from the verge of full communist control. While Indonesia is probably heading for a period of chaos induced by PKI militancy the balance seems on the Army's side with a good chance of significant permanent recasting of concepts in the long run. II. 'China Hardening attitudes toward Peking by the GOI, functioning apart from the Palace, may-be f recast in a report from Medan that the Government has issued order halting all Indonesian exports to Communist Chinaa * At rgo already loaded was order discharged before 'ih 1 Deli cleared to leav ort. NIT' RAMUqVdOFORN 1, === [PDF page 56] === CIA/RR CB 65-65 October 1965 Authority 6/- BY A t, NARS, Da INTELLIGENCE BRIEF INDONESIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports SANITIZED COPY === [PDF page 57] === INDONESIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE The changes in the political balance of power following the 30 September coup in Indonesia do not alter the country's economic problems, but they may offer opportunities for renewed economic assistance from the West. The shifting fortunes of the Army and the PKI are not expected to change either the intense nationalism of the government or Sukarno's presentation of the United States as a symbol of NECOLIM (neo-colonialists, colonialists, imperialists). Thus the emerging Indonesian government probably will not find it expedient to effect an abrupt change in its posture toward the United States. It may be possible, however, for the United States to provide assistance* indirectly and to influence the assistance provided by other nations. This assistance could be directed at maintaining and improving living conditions in order to mitigate developing discontent, especially in urban areas, which could undermine government stability. In addition, spare parts and repair facilities for trucks and for the inter-island merchant fleet; rice, cotton, coal, kerosine, and lubricating oils; and road construction aid would all be of short-run assistance. 1. Spare Parts and Technical Assistance for Transportation Economic assistance in the form of spare parts and technical assistance for the Indonesian transportation system would improve domestic distribution facilities and thus insure a more efficient use of available resources. Although there have been recent imports of trucks and rolling stock from the US, West Germany, Japan, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, the existing vehicle stock has been so badly maintained that investments in repair facilities and spare parts would have been more productive. The road system is badly in need of repair, and trucks and buses are operating at less than 50 percent of capacity. The US aid program to Indonesia was terminated in mid-FY 1965. During FY 1965, $3. 8 million in existing economic aid grants and loans was withdrawn. The PL-480 program amounted to $5.7 million in grants shipped under Title II and Title III. These shipments included dry milk, bulgar wheat, corn, and fats and oils. Military assistance, primarily training, totaled $5. 0 million. No new aid was extended for FY 1966 but some programs -- educational exchanges and a harbor rehabilitation contract -- are continuing with funds still in the pipeline. === [PDF page 58] === SANITIZED Sy - NARS, Date__'/f_ almost 60 percent of the Indonesian merchant fleet is idle, because of a lack of spare parts, port congestion, and the low operating efficiency of ports. The air transport system, on the other hand, is relatively efficient. Moreover, certain forms of aid to the air transport system (for example, meeting Indonesia' s request for C-130 spares) would have the disadvantage of supporting the confrontation policy against Malaysia. Assistance could be provided to certain other elements of the Indonesian transport system, however, without giving material aid to confrontation. US equipment was introduced into Indonesia to rehabilitate the transportation system following the Japanese occupation, and thus spare parts for US-manufactured equipment could be used. Western technicians could also direct repair work on roads and rail facilities to make the transport system more efficient. 2. Rice A severe rice shortage in Indonesia would create serious political problems for any new government. The seasonal shortage that usually occurs between December and March did not materialize in 1964, because rice imports were available for immediate distribution to rice-deficit areas. This year, however, imports were sharply cut back in line with Sukarno's August 1964 edict that Indonesia import no more rice. During 1965, Indonesia imported only 150, 000 metric tons (mt), compared with annual imports of more than a million tons during recent years. As a result of a record rice harvest of 10. 4 million mt this year, Indonesia should have sufficient rice available if it were not for internal distribution problems, which are likely to create localized shortages. The difficulties posed by malfunctioning of the distribution system have been highlighted during the recent political upheaval. Between 30 September and 6 October the price of rice in Medan rose by more than 100 percent. Localized shortages could be eased by US rice shipments.* Some rice could probably be procured from Thailand, but most other countries that The US government maintains no stockpiles of rice, and most domestic production is sold commercially. Most surplus rice is now shipped to Vietnam, and Indonesia would have to take precedence over Vietnam to obtain rice under PL-480 programs. Vietnam has commitments for 150, 000 to 200, 000 mt for calendar year 1965, and for 1966 the commitment may reach as high as 400, 000 mt. === [PDF page 59] === are traditionally major sources of Indonesia's rice imports have no surplus stocks available at the present time. Although other foodstuffs could be shipped, substitute grains are considered inferior to rice, for which the Indonesians have a marked preference. 3. Petroleum Although Indonesia produces and refines a large volume of petroleum, there is a perennial shortfall problem, requiring Indonesia to import various petroleum products. Kerosine, an important consumers' good used for heating, cooking, and illumination, has been in chronic short supply. While it is doubtful if kerosine is imported to meet consumer demands, additional supplies could be utilized if available. Indonesia is dependent on imports for much of its supply of lubricating oils. Other shortages of petroleum products are likely to develop now that the Indonesian government has taken over the internal distribution and marketing of all petroleum products. A recent report noted that the Kemajoran Airport at Djarkarta was without jet fuel for three days because of internal distribution problems. 4. Cotton and Spare Parts for Textile Machinery Indonesia could also use raw cotton and spare parts to rehabilitate its textile production facilities and thus reduce its need to import textiles. Domestic spinning capacity has increased during the past two years, but actual production has declined. 5. Coal The government-owned railroad has been beset by coal shortages, created in part by the declining output of Indonesia's coal mines and in part by the inefficiency of local transportation facilities. The railroad company estimates its monthly requirements at 35, 000 mt whereas the coal board will provide only 25, 000 mt. This shortage is likely to reduce the operating efficiency of the railroad, still further aggravating distribution problems. SANITIZED [Unreadable] === [PDF page 60] === wR fee ea MEMORANDUM FOR: Mrs MeGeorge Bundy <— You will recall that you asked me several: days ago to have written a reconstruction of the events preceding and subsequent to the 1 October abortive coup in Indonesia. I hope this is what you want. If not, please let me know. ‘ Ric! Helms Attachment- 1 @CI-23):2/65 - Indonesia's 30 September Movement 28 Oct. 1965 , FORM NO. iol REPLACES FORM 10-101 A 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. a Ls CRETE TEETER, BTR ELE ET SOU ENTS UE TREES SORTS AE AIT aT FES TLIO GIES EET [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 61] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM OCI No. 2342/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 28 October 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Indonesia's 30 September Movement 1. The 1 October abortive coup in Djakarta-- usually referred to as the "30 September movement" --seems to have involved both in its buildup and overthrow most of the major elements and issues of the national political scene. Its immediate purpose was to destroy army leadership and presumably to redirect the army's political thrust. Beyond these, t4 the precise motivation of Lt. Col. Untung, the hitherto obscure officer in Sukarno's palace guard who led the coup, remains unclear. This is also true of Vice Marshal Dani, the air force chief of staff, a major force behind Untung and the only high ranking military officer to support him openly during his brief hour of success. Elements of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were involved, but the role of theparty leadership remains obscure. 2. The political situation in Indonesia has been and remains exceedingly complex, and many questions concerning the coup cannot yet be answered. In this memorandum we attempt to untangle the various threads. We deal first with the political situation underlying the coup, next with the facts of the coup and countercoup, and then with what we know of the role of the various plotting elements. We then discuss the army's interpretation of what happened, and finally present our own conclusions. NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 62] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM Background 3. The essential elements in the Indonesian political situation prior to the coup of 1 October were as follows: a. Sukarno, while continuing to dominate the political scene, had progressively adopted policies almost indistinguishable from the immediate aims of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). b. The PKI, under Chairman D. N. Aidit, was working to consolidate itg strength and ii the.course of 1965 had made some progress in equipping and training military elements. c. The army, the only remaining counter to the PKI, had lost much of its once considerable political leverage. d. First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio for years had opposed the.army's political role, and had recently moved much closer to the Communist line. He obviously hoped to succeed Sukarno. e. Sukarno's health was apparently failing, and the prospect of his death had produced a heightening of political tension. The PKI and the army had each prepared contingency plans to do in the other should he leave the scene. Developments Prior to the Coup 4. During the last six months Sukarno had increased his pressure on the army to reorient its strategic policy and domestic political orientation. This pressure progressively increased, and during September statements by both Sukarno and Subandrio were markedly hostile to the army. In a speech on 29 September to a Communist youth conference, Sukarno referred to former "loyal generals"' who had become "protectors of counterrevolutionary elements" and who must be "crushed." 5. In September the Indonesian Central Intelligence Bureau (BPI), which is controlled by Subandrio, circulated reports that army generals were plotting action against Sukarno and were collaborating with the American CIA. A somewhat.similar story NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 63] === SEtE T NO FOREIGN DISSEM was being circulated at local levels of the Communist Party. Sukarno queried General Yani about the alleged coup planning reported by the BPI. Yani denied these reports and believed that his explanation had satisfied the president. 6. Army intelligence informed General Yani on 14 September that it believed "something was going to happen." It based its estimate on a detailed report of Communist activities. The report covered the military training of Communist cadres by air force personnel at a site close to Halim Air Force Base, a few miles south of Djakarta, where air force headquarters were located, and gave a list of senior army officers who were to be assassinated. Army intelligence chief Parman was reluctant to accept the judgment of his staff but did take the report to Yani. Yani subsequently informed Sukarno, and the army staff took desultory steps to protect the listed generals. 7. Sukarno was reported ill several times in August and September. Palace efforts to suppress information about his health only added to the general tension and tended to produce more rumors. In mid-August, a story was circulating within the PKI that Sukarno's Chinese doctors had predicted that the president soon would either die or become mentally incapacitated. Sukarno was reported ill in the early evening of 30 September. The Coup 8. In pre-dawn raids on 1 October, elements of the palace guard assisted by members of the Communist youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat, kidnapped six army generals including army commander Yani and later killed them. They barely missed capturing General Nasution, the Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and kidnapped his aide instead. A few hours after the raids, Lt. Col. Untung announced by radio that he had foiled a "generals' coup" and was establishing a "Revolutionary Council." He said President Sukarno was safe. Still later, he announced the names of the 45-member council which included three members of the PKI Central Committee and a number of pro-Communists. No FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 64] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM 9. Untung had the support and assistance of two army battalions--454 from Central Java and 530 from East Java--and that of Brig. Gen. Supardjo, a Communist officer assigned in Borneo who had returned to Java prior to the coup. The 1 October evening edition of a crypto-Communist newspaper Warta Bhakti carried an announcement by Marshal Dani thatVthe air force supported the 30 September movement. The PKI daily newspaper Harian Rakjat and the pro-Communist Bintang Timur supported the movement in their morning editions of 2 October. 10. The coup group had prearranged with elements in Central Java, the area of greatest Communist strength, to seize army officers there and set up local revolutionary councils. Their principal armed strength was in and around Jogjakarta and Semarang. There also appears to have been preknowledge of the coup among Communist elements in North Sumatra. 11. In a counter move, Maj. Gen. Suharto, head of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD) regained control of Djakarta's communications media by early evening of 1 October. With the assistance of units of the West Java Division and his own KOSTRAD troops, hesecured4Djakarta for the army the following day. In Central Java, after some skirmishing, mostly at Jogjakarta, the army secured both that city and Semarang by 5 October. 12. The mutilated bodies of the generals and Nasution's aide were found on 4 October within the jurisdiction of Halim Air Force Base near an area where Communist youth and women volunteers had received military training. The funeral was held on 5 October; the cortege, with obvious intent, was not routed along main thoroughfares but woundlits way with an impressive display of military strength through heavily populated parts of the city. 13. Lt. Col. Untung was captured alive in Tegal, Central Java, on 11 October. He was taken to Djakarta for interrogation and is still there. Most of his own men from the presidential guard have surrendered; six of them are said to be still at large. Army battalions 454 and 530 have been absolved as units from complicity in the coup attempt, NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 65] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM but individual officers and men have been arrested or dishonorably discharged. Several officers suspected of involvement are still missing, and Brig. Gen. Supardjo has not been captured. 14. Under army pressure as the result of his evident involvement, Marshal Dani was sent out of the country on 19 October on a minor but apparently extended purchasing mission. He is now reported to have returned from Bangkok under escort and to be in army hands in Djakarta. The air force is conducting its own intra-service investigation of the plot and has discharged several officers. Sukarno's Role 15. The president's whereabouts during the first 24 hours of the coup attempt have been largely reconstructed, although there are several versions of his actions and the degree of his involvement. 16. Sukarno spent at least part of the night of 30 September in'Djakarta at the home of his third wife, Madame Dewi. Sometime during the night or early morning of 1 October he went to Halim Air Force Base where he apparently talked with Marshal Dani. According to some versions he also met Lt. Col. Untung at Halim, and a few versions place Communist Party chairman Aidit there. At any rate, Sukarno was kept informed of events in Djakarta. Apparently he hesitated to endorse the 30 September movement and, after learning that Gen. Suharto had largely regained control of Djakarta, refused to cooperate with coup elements and drove to his palace at Bogor some 40 miles away. 17. From Bogor on 2 October he broadcast two statements: one urged people to be calm and assured them that he was well; the other asserted that the air force was not involved in the 30 September movement. Two weeks later, he admitted publicly that elements of the air force, the palace guard, and the Communist Party were involved. 18. Sukarno returned to Djakarta on 9 October. He is maneuvering to reassert himself, to undermine the army and return the situation to the status quo ante. In order to preserve the Communist Party in NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 66] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM some form, there are indications that he is willing to sacrifice Aidit and reconstitute the party under other leadership. Role of Subandrio and Dani 19. Subandrio was traveling in the provinces of Atjeh and North Sumatra in late September. He has stated that he was in the company of a high ranking army officer on 1 October when he heard news of the coup attempt. The army considered taking steps against him immediately but desisted, apparently feeling that it lacked sufficient evidence against him. He returned to Djakarta on 3 October and joined Sukarno at Bogor. 20. Dani apparently was in and around Djakarta and Halim on 30 September. According to some versions, he accompanied Sukarno to Halim; according to others he met the president there and tried to persuade him to support the coup. Later in the day he issued an announcement which was carried in an evening newspaper that the air force supported the coup. When word reached Halim that the army had launched a successful counter-move, and Sukarno went to Bogor, Dani apparently flew to Central Java. He subsequently returned and joined Sukarno at Bogor, He was with Sukarno at the Bogor palace when the president held his first post-30 September cabinet meeting on 6 October. The PKI's Role 21. Information is sketchy as to the involvement and reaction of Communist leaders. In mid- September the party began taking vigorous security measures but whether it was itself preparing for a coup attempt or for defensive or preemptive action against an army move is not known. Communist elements that had been trained by the air force apparently were called up on the night of 29 September, and the air force supplied them with weapons and uniforms. PKI transportation and communications unions assisted the movement on 1 October by cutting communications in and out of Djakarta. According to a clandestine source, the party's Central Committee decided to give Untung military support only after hearing his radio announcement on 1 October. According to this source, NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 67] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM Communist leaders believed the army was about to take action against the party in any case. After the party newspaper endorsed Untung on 2 October, the Central Committee announced on 5 October that it believed the 30 September movement was an internal army matter and that the party had not participated. The Central Committee has made no official statement since then. 22. Aidit apparently fled to Central Java on 1 October. He is reported to have been arrested by the army but to be under secret detention lest Sukarno take steps to protect him. First and second deputy chairmen Lukman and Njoto apparently are under army surveillance and their movement seems to be restricted. Lukman's whereabouts on 1 October are not known; Njoto was with Subandrio in North Sumatra. The Army's Version 23. The army is conducting extensive investigations to gather evidence on persons and groups involved in the movement and is trying to reconstruct the entire plot. Army leaders believe that Sukarno chose Untung to lead a "young Turks" revolt within the army. These younger officers were to arrest the senior generals. Sukarno would act as arbiter, replacing those generals he believed most dangerous and keeping others in jail or in office on his sufferance. He did not expect them to be murdered. According to some army sources, Untung himself is a Communist; according to others, he was in touch with Communist officers, including Gen. Supardjo, who in turn assigned a role to Pemuda Rakjat. The army has deliberately refrained, however, from implicating Sukarno in the plot. 24. The army believes that both Subandrio and Dani knew of the plot. It claims to have intercepted a 2 October message from Dani to Subandrio, who was then in North Sumatra, telling him that the coup attempt had failed. Army sources report that Untung and Latif, another officer involved in the coup, have both stated during interrogation that Subandrio was involved. 25. The army has evidence that for several months prior to the coup Communist China had been NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 68] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM shipping arms into Indonesia for use by the Communists. According to army reports, these arms have entered the country at the port of Djakarta disguised as construction material or have been smuggled into other Javanesfe ports. Many of"th4 weapons which the army has seized in recent sweeps are of Chinese origin; none of the weapons are types known to be used by the Indonesian army. One army intelligence officer did state, however, that the air force is believed to have some small arms of Chinese origin. 26. The new army commander, General Suharto, has authorized regional commanders to ban the activities of the PKI and its affiliated groups. So far ten of the 17 commanders have done so. Armed with evidence of Communist involvement, the army hopes to persuade Sukarno to ban the party. In the absence of such a ban, the army has encouraged anti-Communist activities by political parties and their affiliated groups. Within the terms of its investigation of the coup attempt and its search for arms it has made extensive sweeps in the Djakarta area and less extensive ones in the provinces, which have resulted in the arrest or surveillance of large numbers of Communists. Conclusions and Speculations 27. All major elements in Indonesia in late September appear to have beenuneasily anticipating some kind of major action from some direction. All had plans in hand or were making plans. 28. In the atmosphere of leftist totalitarianism that prevailed on 30 September, the time seemed ripe for Sukarno to order the midnight arrests of the army's leading generals, and he possibly had arranged this. 29. At this point, however, other plans or contingency plans may have entered the picture. In view of Sukarno's health and the report of an upcoming "generals' coup," and perhaps some persons' knowledge or partial knowledge of Sukarno's orders, the original limited action perhaps intended by Sukarno was broadened into the extreme action that took place. The kidnapping and murder of the generals was carried out by men from Untung's battalion of the palace NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 69] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM guard and by uniformed members of Pemuda Rakjat, the PKI youth organization. Precisely who instructed them, however, is not known. 30. For example, a major question appears to be whether Subandrio and Dani had developed a plan larger than Sukarno's and to what extent such a plan involved PKI leadership. Available evidence seems to indicate, however, that the PKI Central Committee made a hurried decision to support Untung and presumably to implement some of its contingency plans. 31. It is possible that Subandrio and Dani developed a plan exploiting Sukarno's orders and utilizing militant elements of the Communist Party. Party militants have long chafed against the peaceful united, front:tactics espoused by Aidit. There are militants on the Central Committee who reportedly include the party's second deputy chairman Njoto. In addition to being a Communist official Njoto is also a cabinet minister who works closely with Subandrio. Pemuda Rakjat as an organization is inclined to a militant role, and individual members could have been involved in the 30 September movement without official permission or perhaps with permission of specific members of the Central Committee. Perhaps one purpose of one group involved in the plot was to get rid of Aidit. 32. The attempted coup nearly succeeded in its intention of wiping out top-army leadership. General Nasution escaped only by good fortune and the resourcefulness of his aide; General Suharto apparently escaped because the plotters were misinformed as to his whereabouts. Without Suharto, the army might not have rallied as rapidly as it did; without Nasution, it.might not have developed its present strategy. 33. With the failure of the coup the army at least temporarily has the political advantage. Sukarno, Subandrio, Dani, and the PKI are on the defensive. Neither Sukarno nor the army wants civil war or serious internal disturbances. Each appears fearful of provoking it if it presses the other too far. NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 70] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM 34. Possibly the decision rests with the PKI. The PKI, although in disarray, retains most of its I underground structure and could muster impressive strength in Central and East Java and North Sumatra. If Sukarno ultimately fails to protect the PKI, the militants would certainly win ascendency within the party and would be likely to order action which could cause prolonged unrest. 44 -10- NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 71] === PH IL4 uth Chino Sea BRUN Celebes See PACIFIC OCEAN -,GAPORE BORNEO CELEBES - WEST IRIAN Merak UESE TIMOR Arolwoa Sea -IMOR Bandung UA4STRALIAI 49475 Smrn a aCommunist activity NO FOREIGN DISSEM 'Malang === [PDF page 72] === NOFORN INDONESIA WORKING GROUP - SITUATION REPORT NO. 47 5:00 a.m. - November 1, 1965 (Last previous report 5:00 a.m. - October 31, 1965) DECLASSIFIED I. General Situation: Authority Si!. f,? By~- NARS, Datev * There has been little change in the general security situation. Fierce fighting is continuing in Central Java area, * where armed Communists are reported to have won control of.two areas near Jogjakarta - Jatimo and Manisrenggo. Third Deputy Premier Chaerul Saleh described the fighting as civil war. II. Political Developments: I The Indonesian Workers Party has joined the Islamic Party (NU) in demanding the ejection of First Deputy Premier Subandrio from the Cabinet. Meanwhile, former Air Force Chief, Marshal Dani, who was sent from Indoneia on a purchasing mission because of his involvement in the September 30 coup, arrived in Amsterdam on October 30. The Army now claims it has evidence that General Pranoto, who was Sukarno's choice as "Administrative Head" of the Army following the coup attempt and is now under Palace protection, was also involved in the "September 30 Movement." III. The CHICOMS Speak Again: On October 31 a Peking NCNA International Service broad- 4 cast claimed that US imperialists and Khrushchev and Tito revisionists were the instigators and active supporters of a right-wing plot to crush the Communist Party and other progressive forces who participated in the "September 30 Movement." According to Peking, thePKI is being subjected to ferocious persecution because it is a party maintaining the just Marxist- Leninist position. SBhii/NOF ORN === [PDF page 73] === INDONESIA WORKING GROUP SITUATION REPORT NO. 48 5:00 a.m. November 2, 1965 L.c previous report 5:00 a.m. - November 1, 1965) DECLASSIFIED I. Security Situation:A Attention continues to be riveted on Central Java where the Army is moving to meet Communist opposition. Sukarno, who has?reviously been reluctant to take note of Communist agitation, has issued a statement confirming the declaration of a "state of war" by the Central Java Military Command. One reliable military source says that the Army feels that the Communists are not in a position to wage a serious gpe-rilla campaign and that the Army is primarily concerned over basic social and economic problems that could contribute to the growth of Communist strength. One present problem involves the employment of large numbers of people who have clst their jobs due to their Communist connections. I. Anti-Chicom/PKI Demo in Medan: In what our Consulate in Medan has described as "probably the most impressive demonstration seen in Medan", on November 2 an estimated crowd of 100,000 converged' on the Chicom Consulate carrying placards attacking the PKI and condemning Chicom support of the 30th September Movement. After presenting a protest petition to the Chicom Consul, the crowd tore down and destroyed the Chicom flag as well as the Consular shield. Simultaneous demonstrations were held against North Sumatran leftist governor, Army General Ulung Sitepu. Signs condemning Subandrio as an opportunist and demanding his ouster were in evidence, as was one placard which read "CIA- Chinese Intervention Agency." III. Rumors of PRI Intentions: The Embassy continues to receive reports that the PKI1 .CE.E NOF ORN === [PDF page 74] === eLW plans to start terrorist dissidence in North Sumatra culminating in a general uprising on 10 November (Hero's Day). The Embassy states that the, rumors are so widespread that the tendency is not to disc,ut them as a psych-warfare campaign to justify continuation of strong anti-PKI action by the Army. Recent PKI attacks on villages and plantations would seem to indicate that PKI intends to fight back in some organized form, although it is still not possible to confirm or deny the rumors of an intended uprising. The whereabouts and fate of PKI Chief Aidit are still N unknown. However recent reports indicate that he has not been captured as was earlier reported. 998~h/NOF ORN === [PDF page 75] === aan Soy gs tery eer se Reatard ay Na al BS LY, wa S met. Zee ete ge OF EN Sage cca nrytes atone ay gle teem ymae cee oe Le: oh L ewe a FN AO Pe F Bot pe ee ape n in eo, or BE [Unreadable] so esta ee S ° x Zz he oe Con BB rp [Unreadable] tug wr“g, | tee Bee sg ote f aey eee oS pe Le aN Bye Tras F. a ye hhX SE a TR et Lerman yee ALR ETI SPINAL BS EIS BOR ETE T IG PGT RS Cot SSE LOT SE IE oe tee ah TR yD === [PDF page 76] === NO FOREAdN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE OiiY OCI No. 2940/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 8 November 1985 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM General Suharto of Indonesia Summary 1. Major General Suharto, appointed Commander of the Indonesian Army on 16 October 1965, is the army's pivotal military and political figure and an effective anti-Communist. His assignment as regional commander in Central Java in 1956 apparently sharpened his awareness of Communist strength in that area and of party growth in general. As head of the West Irian or Mandala Command in 1962, he oversaw a large and remarkably efficient build-up and subsequent dispersal of troops in Indonesia's eastern islands. 2. Suharto was serving in Djakarta as head of the Strategic Army Command when the abortive coup occurred on 1 October. The failure of the plotters to eliminate Suharto along with the rest-of the senior generals made it possible for him to move decisively against them. This action in turn won him the command of the army over Suharto's opposition. Suharto is close to General Nasution, Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Suharto's Career 3. Suharto was born in Jogjakarta, Central Java, on 28 February 1921. His family was apparently strongly Moslem but liberal in outlook. 4. He was clerking at a bank in 1940 when the Dutch recruited him for the Infantry Cadre Training School in West Java, where he attained, the rank of sergeant. During the Japanese occupation he first served in the police and later became a battalion commander in Peta, the Japanese-sponsored volunteer army. He fought against NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY === [PDF page 77] === NO FOkAlGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE vNLY the Dutch during the revolution and advanced from battalion to regimental to brigade commander. Suharto participated in the repression of the Communist rebellion at Madiun, East Java, in September 1948. 5. In 1950 he suppressed a short-lived rebellion against the new Indonesian nation in Celebes, and by 1956 was regional commander in Central Java. He attended the Indonesian Army Staff and Command.College in 1959-1960 and was promoted to brigadier general. In 1961 he was appointed concurrently Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and Commander of the First Army General Reserve Corps. From the time he assumed command of Central Java, he appears to have been increasingly concerned over Communist strength among both military and civilian elements in that area. In 1961 he is said to have played an active role in an army "steering committee" which was attempting to map anti- Communist strategy. 6. In 1962 he was appointed to head the West Irian, or Mandala, command, part of Indonesia's effort to wrest West Irian from the Netherlands through a combination of force and diplomacy. The Mandala Command under Suharto oversaw a large, rapid, and remarkably efficient build-up of troops in Indonesia's eastern islands from January through August 1962, when Indonesia signed a treaty with the Netherlands settling the West Irian issue. Following this settlement, Suharto apparently tried to screen out leftists from among the Indonesians entering West Irian. In May 1963 when Indonesia assumed sole administration of West Irian, the Mandala Command was dissolved. Some of the units were assigned to the new Strategic Army Command (KOSTRAD), and General Suharto was appointed its chief. 7. Suharto is regarded as a strong, efficient and decisive officer. He lives modestly, is reputed to be incorruptible, and is noted for his smart appearance. Over the years he has been described as wanting his own way, as resenting political interference and as being somewhat dogmatic. His behavior on 1 October and since seems to confirm his reputation for skill and determination. During the first week following the coup, he appears to have been capable of thrusting aside the "Sukarno mystique" which has hitherto hampered independent action by all elements NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY === [PDF page 78] === NO FOh.LIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE oALY in Indonesia. He may have influenced some of his fellow officers to do the same. Role During the Coup and Countercoup 8. Suharto was serving as KOSTRAD commander on 1 October 1965 when he learned of the coup attempt and the kidnapping of the six army generals, including Army Commander General Yani. In the absence of Yani, Suharto appointed himself temporary army commander and used primarily his own KOSTRAD troops to regain control of communications in Djakarta. The following day, with the assistance of units from the West Java division, he secured the city for the army. 9. On 3 OC.Yober President Sukarno instituted a divided army command, temporarily appointing the leftist General Pranoto, a headquarters officer, as administrative head of the army. General Suharto was designated "to implement the restoration of security." Suharto publicly affirmed the President's arrangements. 10. On 4 October, following the exhuming of the murdered generals, Suharto made a public statement strongly implying criticism of Sukarno and accusing elements of the air force and the Communists of complicity in the abortive coup. 11. When Sukarno instructed army leaders to nominate three candidates for the position of army commander, the leaders decided to submit only one name, Suharto's. Sukarno acceded, apparently with some displeasure, since he is said to regard Suharto as too dogmatic, calling him "too anti-Communist and too anti-air force." He installed Suharto as commander of the army on 16 October, Post-coup Role 12. At first Suharto appeared uncertain as to how far he should accede to President Sukarno's wish not to take strong action against coup elements. During the first post-coup days, army leaders spoke chiefly in terms of investigating elements that were involved in the "30 September movement" and instituted an intensive search for arms, particularly in the Djakarta area. Under these terms, the army arrested NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY === [PDF page 79] === NO FC. JIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE LY and interrogated Communists, building its case against the party while relying principally on civilian organizations to speak openly against the party. 13. In more recent days, Suharto and other army leaders, although continuing to pay lip service to Sukarno's efforts to arrange a political settlement, have in practice ignored them and have expanded their anti-Communist campaign, In a speech on 30 October Suharto declared that the army would "unreservedly" respect Sukarno's decision on a political solution. He also stated, however, that the PKI was the "director or stage manager" of the coup attempt. This was the army's first public statement directly accusing the party of masterminding the coup. Regardless of whether the army really believes that the PKI was solely responsible, it is presenting this as its case and is acting accordingly. Suharto's Present Position 14. Suharto thus has emerged as the army's pivotal military and political figure and as an effective anti-Communist. This impression of his strong position is reinforced by recent comments to an American Embassy official by a knowledgeable and reliable Indonesian headquarters staff officer. According to this officer, it is Suharto who deals personally with President Sukarno. He is said to conceive his own strategy. The source also stated that "we are saving Nasution for later." The Embassy commented that it had earlier appeared that, although Suharto was a strong and decisive officer, Nasution was playing the major role in devising army strategy. 15. The source of this information may have wished to make very clear to the United States that Suharto is a strong man in his own right and not merely,a disciple of Nasution. Appearances are that Suharto and Nasution continue to work closely together, and that-Nasution contributes substantially to army strategy. It is politically essential, however, that the army present to Sukarno a single figure with whom he must deal lest he attempt to exploit K other officers and cultivate disunity. This is one of NO FOREIGN DISSENBACKGROUN~hD USE ONLY === [PDF page 80] === NO FL JIGN DISSEN/BACKGROUND USE ALY I Suharto's functions as Commander of the Army, but it does not mean that' he is 'acting unilaterally or without advice. As recently as 25 October, it was Nasution who announced on Djakarta Radio the actions which the army had pressed Sukarno to take. The comment on "saving Nasution for later" suggests that army strategy involves a plan to make Nasution a candidate for president in the post-Sukarno era. NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY === [PDF page 81] === LBJ LIBRARY Mandatory Revre 195 NOV 4 AJ 9 'da Case # NLJ Document # j 3 November 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR: SUBJECT Enclosed is an Intelligence Information Special Report which I believe merits your personal attention. It is being given particularly restricted distribution because of KeTd in abeyance in anticipation that e acquire fuller, releasable information successful. FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS: SANITIZED :uthoity Amar T'q Co lpy '41 WWI === [PDF page 82] === 4Alt ILA- I A4 AK === [PDF page 83] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND OCI No. 3041/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 12 November 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Indonesian Army: Objectives andProblems Summary 1. The Indonesian Army is currently engaged in a largely political effort against President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Its immediate objective is the destruction of the PKI as an effective political and military force. In this, it is opposed by Sukarno, who seeks to preserve the party in some form. The army is also uncertain about PKI potential and its future tactics. 2. The army's longer range objectives are the continuation of the task of nation-.building, the preservation of Indonesia as a united nation, and its development as a strong one. Army leaders seek to maintain themselves in a major political role. In so doing, they must contend in the future not only with Sukarno but probably with rejuvenated political parties and individuals whose past record has been chiefly one of jockeying for power and whose ambitions will be readily exploitable by Sukarno. The army is also concerned about Indonesia's endemic economic problems and their possible exploitation by Communist elements. EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 84] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND Background 3. The present army leadership believes the army has a political mission of guiding and shaping the Indonesian state during these still formative years. These officers participated in the creation of an independent Indonesia 20 years ago and consider themselves more dedicated and equally, if not better, equipped than their civilian counterparts to guide the nation. They fought against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949 and suppressed a Communist rebellion in September 1948 even before the fight against the Dutch was won. 4. In the past the military have had little patience with the non-Communist political parties which, during the period of parliamentary democracy, spent their energy in jockeying for power. They view the PKI--which has been the best organized and most vigorous political party--primarily as a political rival in the task of molding and controlling Indonesia. Secondarily, some of the army leaders view Communism as an ideology which is essentially evil, totalitarian, and alien to the Indonesian way of life. 5. During the years since independence the army has been constantly busy somewhere in the archipelago suppressing dissidence motivated by separatism, regionalism, fanatic Mohammedanism, or Communism. This experience has further contributed to the political awareness of the army's "revolutionary generation." Objectives 6. The army wants Sukarno to ban the PKI and its affiliated organizations. Such action would remove the party from the legitimate political scene and permit the army to prosecute underground PKI activity. It would give the army months and perhaps years to establish a non-Communist political atmosphere in Indonesia in which organized Communism would be less likely to flourish. EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 85] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA,AND NEW ZEALAND 7. The army apparently also hopes to attack basic economic problems which the party, even from underground, could exploit. These include overpopulation, underproductior4, unemployment, and basic development needs including land conservation and improved transportation and communication. 8. The army wants to keep President Sukarno as the head of state. It needs a national symbol which serves to unite the sprawling archipelago and through which the army can proceed with its own program. Indonesian nationhood may still be too tenuous for this purpose. Sukarno is the only individual in Indonesia. who lends himself to this need. 9. The army, like Sukarno, wants a strong and united Indonesia. If the continued use of expansionist and anti- Western slogans, coined by Sukarno, seems to help hold the country together, the army will not hesitate to use them. In fact, army leaders are urging continued resistance to NEKOLIM (Sukarno's acronym for neocolonialism, colonialism, and imperialism) as part of a "united Indonesia" effort. This strategy also serves to prevent the total alienation of Sukarno from the army. 10. For the same reason the anti-Malaysia campaign will continue. Military activity against Malaysia persists both along the Borneo border and from small staging areas in islands off Singapore. The scope of this activity is very limited, however, and the pace is leisurely. The Malaysian campaign also serves to absorb to some extent army battalions of questionable loyalty which are being sent to Sumatra and Borneo simply to get them out of Java. 11. The army wants to retain an effective political role, although its leaders have consistently expressed a distaste for military dictatorship. During the past several years Sukarno had largely succeeded in reducing the army from a major political factor to the military arm of the executive. Army leaders realized during these years that in order to retain any effectiveness at all, they had to conform increasingly to the leftist totalitarianism that Sukarno was imposing upon the nation. This state of affairs developed because the.army felt it had no politically acceptable reason for resisting Sukarno and had been outmaneuvered by him. EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIAAND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 86] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM, EXCEPT UK',CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW -ZEALAND 12. In the present atmosphere, the army believes it has ample justification to resist the President and to oppose the Communists. It hopes that in this atmosphere it can develop enough party and public support to sustain its confrontation of Sukarno. Its ultimate but frail hope is that Sukarno will be sufficiently impressed with the public support given the army that he will genuinely align himself with the army and against the Communists. The Army and Sukarno 13. The problem of Sukarno arises first from the President's political skill and second from the army's occasionally faltering confidence in its ability to maneuver against him, 14. Sukarno wants to reassert himself as the paramount national authority. He seeks national unity and the avoidance of polarization. He is not disturbed by the existence of a vigorous Communist party so long as it does not challenge his authority or threaten Indonesian unity. In fact, because he is anti-West and a Marxist he believes he has established considerable rapport with the PKI. Finally, he is aware of his poor health and wants to ensure the continuation of a united Indonesia. Before 1 October it appeared that in his eyes the PKI was better qualified to maintain a united nation than was the army. Since then, Sukarno has maneuvered tore-es.tablish the Communists as an effective, respectable party. 15. Sukarno is in a political corner, but the game is not over. If he lives, his strategy will probably be to prolong the maneuvering as long as possible, while waiting for the army's anti-Communist campaign to lose momentum or for the army to become embroiled in political or economic difficulties which he can exploit, EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND .NO FOREIGN DISSEM' === [PDF page 87] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 16. The officer corps in the past has been divided in its attitude toward Sukarno. Some officers are primarily loyal to him rather than to army leadership. The same would certainly be true of the ranks, particularly if Sukarno should make a personal appeal to the country over the heads of the army leaders. 17. Further, there are field officers who believe the army should not be concerned with politics and who resent other officers who pursue political or economic interests. Many of the younger officers who have had only professional army training are critical and almost contemptuous of the "revolutionary generation" with its early civilian background and its practical, rather than formal, training. 18. The army leaders, however, have so far displayed a courage and political skill hitherto lacking in their dealing with the President. The murder and mutilation of six generals, Sukarno's lack of remorse over their death, and the belief of many officers that the President was at least partially involved in the plot have greatly stiffened the army leaders' resolve to resist Sukarno. In their own minds they have been able to thrust aside the "Sukarno mystique." 19. Nevertheless, army leaders are still nagged by the fear that the master politician will outmaneuver them and the conviction that the President's charisma is such that they dare not move precipi-. tously against him. At least twice during the past six weeks they have seemed to falter but then have rallied and continued to press their campaign. The first instance occurred during the early days of October when Sukarno personallyrefused to press an anti-Communist campaign. The second came later in the month when army leaders realized that Sukarno would resist their efforts to downgrade Subandrio, the first deputy prime minister and concurrently foreign minister. Subandrio is a major target of army leaders; they know that he tries to prejudice Sukarno against the army, and they believe Subandrio was involved in the abortive coup. EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 88] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 20. As the urgency of the postcoup situation dissipates, Sukarno's own maneuvering will probably intensify. Strains are likely to develop within the army and may weaken its political effort. The Army and the Communist Party 21. The army does not know the extent of the Communist underground apparatus, although it assumes that PKI covert strength is impressive. 22. Army leaders were aware for years of Communist infiltration of the army. They knew, for example, that up to one--third of the battalions in Central Java were of dubious loyalty. Although the "30 September Movement" has given the leadership an opportunity to investigate and weed out at least some undesirable elements, they apparently are discovering in some instances that infiltration was greater than they had believed. 23. For example, the army always maintained that infiltration had succeeded chiefly among the enlisted men and the NCOs and was limited among the officers. However, an investigation of one dubious battalion--transferred to Sumatra as a safety measure--indicated that 40 percent of the officers but only ten percent of the men were Communists. An arrested junior officer who has been cooperative under interrogation claims that in "almost every battalion" in Central Java, there are five to seven "commissar" officers who have conducted regular briefings and indoctrinations, presumably on Communist tactics. The army is returning to Java loyal units that have been serving in Sumatra and Celebes and sending infected battalions to Sumatra and Borneo. EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 89] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 24. The army is uncertain about future Communist tactics. A Sumatran staff officer recently said army intelligence did not believe the PKI could mount a serious uprising, but immediately added that "anything could happen." He further speculated that "the worst the Communist could do" would be to conduct regional guerrilla warfare. 25. The army does not want civil war. Limited insurgency, however, might help the army politically since it could be used to justify regional or national emergency measures. 26. The situation is particularly uneasy in Central Java where the classic guerrilla situation --control of the cities by the army, control of the countryside by the Communists--could easily develop. In a limited area it has already done so. Communist elements appear to be concentrating their attack on loyal Moslems with the aim of preventing their cooperation with the army. For the near future, the outlook is for limited but sustained terrorism in Central Java and occasional terrorism in East Java, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra. 27. Army officers are beginning to speculate as to the effect the destruction of the party would have on' Indonesian society. The party claimed three million members and a following of up to 15 million or more in front groups. Although many of these persons were probably less than dedicated, they had presumably joined the party or its affiliates to satisfy some need. One army officer: has spoken of the "vacuum in the social forces" which would be caused by party proscription. The dedicated Communists, of course, will go underground. The Army and the Political Parties 28. Despite its misgivings about political parties, the army probably at some point will turn to civilian leaders for assistance. In the meantime.it has encouraged civilian organizations to articulate anti- Communist sentiment and to take action against individual Communists and Communistassets., EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA', 'AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISS === [PDF page 90] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 29. So far the army has kept the parties well in line. When and if parties or individual politicians develop any leverage, the maneuvering is likely to begin. Non-Communist politicians in Indonesia have never shown any aptitude for cooperation with each other, and it is unlikely that they will develop any. If there is to be cooperation, it must be imposed upon them--as Sukarno has done for the past several years and as the army may try to do. The problem will be more difficult for the army, however, even if it develops some central clearing house for political coordination, than it has been for Sukarno. Basic Problems 30. Indonesia is beset with basic economic problems. Sukarno has largely avoided dealing with them, and in this evasion he has generally had the support of the Communist Party. Sukarno and the party have urged the people to endure shortages and hardship in the interest of the unfinished revolution. One of the purposes served by the West Irian and Malaysian campaigns has been the diversion of popular attention from economic difficulties. 31. The most fundamental problem in Indonesia is the rapidly growing population and the unavailability of land. The population of approximately 105 million is increasing at the rate of 3 percent a year. Forty percent of the population is under the age of 14. The large areas of vacant land in Indonesia--mostly in Sumatra and Borneo--are not suitable for settlement. The soil in these areas is thin and even with fertilizer is productive for only a few years. Some of Java's amazingly fertile soil has been lost as the result of improper techniques and consequent erosion and flooding. 32. In Java and Madura, 65 percent of Indonesia's population occupies 7 percent of the nation's land area. East and Central Java are the most densely populated areas of the world, with some districts averaging over 1,500 people per square mile. Although 70 percent of the population lives directly on the K land, an increasing element of the population is EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 91] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND landless. The majority of land holdings are about one acre each. 33. In the export sector, underproduction has been a problem for years. Lack of production in turn makes for limited exports, limited foreign exchange, and limited imports of consumer goods and material for Indonesia's few industries. Inflation has been mounting for years and at present is at a new high, 34. Transportation and communication facilities are inadequate. Shortages caused by defective distribution facilities add to inflationary pressures. 35. Remedial measarescavailable for Indonesia's many and basic difficulties are few. Should the army become a target of popular dissatisfaction, it would be in real trouble. Outlook 36. The outlook appears to be one of prolonged maneuvering between Sukarno and the army and of watchful waiting and some terrorism by the Communists. 37. The army has taken the position that it is anti-PKI but not anti-Communist. This seems to in" volve some Javanese subtlety that the spirit of Communism can be involved in an activity without the Communist presence--a theme used at one time by Sukarno. Apparently the army hopes to develop a point of view which will be acceptable to the Prestdent and to the vast numbers who have followed the PKI. 38. Although Communist and Moslem militants may long for a civil war, most elements--certainly Sukarno, the army, part of the Communist leadership, and the Indonesian public--fervently wish to avoid it. It it can be avoided, it seems likely that some kind of political umbrella will be assembled in due course. It will try to satisfy at least partially the three strains in Indonesian politics and society which have been apparent since the very beginning of the Indonesian nationalist movement--nationalism, Mohammedanism, and Marxism. EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND NO FOREIGN DISSEM === [PDF page 92] === Sn econ G1 FE PEPE RET creel er RETR no ee INDIAN OCEAN Java Sea a KARTA d ye ta’ 4 o Sm A fowea Bogor ® Tyrebon 9 Bandung Semarang Surab esolo aoue Jogjakarta wow Ge St erent ge EIT MOR PACIFIC OCEAN S ete = GUESE TIMOR Aratura Sea USTRALIA,/ Avr SAG Be - ae ae et eee __ 7. men cw pee a nether mere a ee en a te Sage ro ee one ATES SO ap net te ms re = ore 7 ciao 2 z ss. aed [Unreadable] === [PDF page 93] === ~ wet Be id rr ne ee a: Cs See a LE “a. 5 oS Pee a oh pg ties ar too al Bars | 5. DE oe BS. 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BD ee Se Be Np gd Mt ae OE PT ng ae ENE Deeg Ma AS ae eglosiification fi he} I Rare ae at eg tee, pee Ne ye oS Seo Re nb ee js ES ho: e a TBS tel Ue Sr ah ge ay Oa ag os “EE BE BE S|. as areca eae ayetg C8 e SY BET St ut 7 ae nalts danish Bie St re 1 Prat be ee S| ite Meisel Bee BE we; ~~~» =n nena SES En we ee <a I [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 94] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM No. 2395/65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports' 17 November 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Rice Situation in Indonesia Introduction 1. The Indonesian Army apparently is increasingly concerned about ensuring adequate supplies of rice to the deficit areas and maintaining low prices for rice. During the period immediately following the 30 September coup attempt rice prices soared. The price of rice in Djakarta rose from '310 rupiahs per liter on 2 September to 1,400 rupiahs per liter on 7 October. To offset these price increases, rice was released from local storage facilities, and a purchasing mission has been sent abroad to obtain additional rice imports. Brigadier General Sukendro has reportedly signed a contract with Thailand for the purchase of an additional 70,000 tons, and additional purchases are likely. Unless sufficient rice supplies are maintained, the resulting economic distress could cause severe problems for the army in its efforts to consolidate support. Rice Marketing 2. Rice marketing in Indonesia is largely controlled by the government and most rice not retained by the farmer for his own use is sold to the governmentwith little passing through private trading channels. Government trading activities are designed not only to.stabilize rice prices and to ensure that adequate supplies are NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM === [PDF page 95] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM available throughout the country, but also to provide rice'rations for the armed forces, government employees, and certain other groups. Since September 1964 the government has competed directly with private traders buying rice at the prevailing local market price. Rice not sold to the government is sold to private merchants, mainly Chinese, to be processed and stored for distribution during periods of high prices. The government has attempted to control this trade by setting limits on the volume of rice that can be stored and transported by private merchants. The government, however, has not been notably effective in controlling the rice market, and rice prices continue to fluctuate in response not only to seasonal shortages but also to the political situation. Government Rationing System 3. On 1 September 1964 the Indonesian Government, which had been supplying rice to virtually all government employees, the armed forces, and certain other groups in case of need, reduced its rice rationing commitments. The government began to substitute corn for part of the normal rice ration and reduced the number of people eligible to recive rations in kind. This number was reduced agAin in June and in September of 1965, so that now only members of the armed forces will continue to receive rice rations throughout the country. Families of armed forces members and civilian employees of the armed forces will receive rice rations only in rice deficit areas. As a result of these reductions, the government's commitments have been reduced from 1.5 mili lion metrid'tons annually t6 540,.000 tonsAninually. Supply Situation 4. Indonesia should have adequate supplies of rice to meet its current domestic consumption requirements. This year's crop is now estimated at 9.0-9.5 million metric tons of milled rice, somewhat lower than the 10.4 million metric tons estimated in July. Nonetheless this is considerably above the 1964 harvest of 8.5 million metric tons. During early 1965, NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM === [PDF page 96] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM rice import contracts were signed with Burma and Thailand for the purchase of 150,000 metric tons, and additional contracts are being secured by thegovernment purchasing missions that are now visiting leading rice exporting countries. Internal Distribution Problems 5. While aggregate supplies appear sufficient to meet domestic requirements, localized shortages are likely to develop because of internal transportation problems. In previous years, imported V rice could be shipped directly to deficit areas, most of which were port cities or adjacent areas. Now with the cut in imports,rice will have to be shipped from domestic surplus areas to deficit areas. The principal rice surplus areas are East and Central Java, two of the most important centers of Communist strength. In these areas, the PKI could probably create additional problems for the army by disrupting the flow of rice. Even without PKI harassment the domestic transport problems are substantial. Rice seems to move fairly easily between producing areas and cities, but problems arise when rice must be moved between cities and between islands, using local rail and interisland transport facilities. Both the land and sea transport systems are inadequate, probably operating at only 50 percent of capacity because of inefficient management and the shortage of spare parts to make needed repairs. Ships are not available when planned for and often arrive behind schedule, hindering government attempts to maintain domestic supplies. The main deficit areas are generally the outlying provinces of Riau, Djambi, East and West Kalimantan, North and Central Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara,and Bankga-Billiton plus the province of Djakarta Raya on the main island of Java. (See map) Sources of Supply 6. The Indonesia Government should be able to secure limited additional rice imports to meet the localized shortages which are expected to occur between December and March, prior to the main harvest. Thailand, Taiwan, Brazil, and South Korea NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM === [PDF page 97] === NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM reportedly have supplies available, but other countries that are normally important rice suppliers have no surplus stocks available at the present time. The Burmese Government has reported that all available exports from the 1965 crop have been consigned, and most surplus US rice has already been committed to Vietnam. NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM === [PDF page 98] === [Unreadable] === [PDF page 99] === 041-- j DECLASSIFIED (J(J Authority 407E n,.4 IE, NARS, Date TELECONFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND AMERICAN EMBASSY DJAKARTA ON October 2, 1965 t4teM alt === [PDF page 100] === I A jI DATE: 02/0525Z PARTICIPANTS AMBASSADOR BERGER MR* CUTHELL SUBJECT:INDONESIAN CRISIS CLASSIFICATION:SECRET 777 ~ [Unreadable] Altj === [PDF page 101] === 02/05,31 Z * AMBASSADOR GREEN MINISTER COUNSELOR GALBRAITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR MASTERS DEFENSE ATTACHE COL. ETHEL SUBJECT: INDONESIAN CRISIS CLASSIFICATION:SECRET III N-"wq === [PDF page 102] === 711 SECSTATE ITEM 1 02/0530Z ACTING SECRETARY REQUESTS YOU SUPPLY ON THIS TELECON ANSWERS FOLLOWING QUESQTIOS Alp A) WHAT IS CURRENT SITUATION? LAST SITREPI RECEIVED HERE IS NO. 4. B) IS: IT CLEAR WHO IS IN ASCENDENCY? C) WHAIT IS CURRENT STATUS OF PRES. SUKARNO? IF UNKNOWN, WHAT IS YOUR ESTIMATEE? D) WHA T IS SITUATION REGARDING PKI? IS PKII HQ OPEN AND ACTIVE IN DJAKARTA? MEDAN? SURABAYA? END ITEI mI's === [PDF page 103] === DJAKARTA ITEM 02/0642Z TRANSMISSION SITREP 5 (EMBTEL 807) DELAYED BECAUSE OF THIS TELECON BUT. SHOULD.BE IN DEPT SOON. SITREP 6 TYPED AND READY FOR TRANSMISSION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELECON. FOLLOWING ARE BRIEF REPLIES ACTING SECRETARY'S QUESTIONS WHICH REPORTED IN DETAIL THESE SITREPS. A) DJAKARTA NOW QUIET WITH MILITARY MUCH IN EVIDENCE. MARINES AND ARMY FORCES UNDER SUHARTO RETAIN CONTROL KEY POINTS. UNTUNG FORCES MADE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT THIS MORNING REGAIN CONTROL TELEGRAPH STATION BUT QUICKLY DEFEATED WITH LIMITED GUN FIRING. AT LEAST THREE BATTALIONS SILIWANGI TROOPS IN CITY. WE ESTIMATE UNTUNG FORCES NOT RPT NOT SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT THOUGH THEY APPARENTLY CAPABLE OF CAUSING SMALL SCALE TROUBLE. AIR FORCE INTENTIONS UNCERTAIN BUT WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORT ARMY CONTROLS ENTRANCE HALIA AFB AND ANTI AIRCRAFT GUNS MUCH IN EVIDENCE AROUND CITY AS PREVENTIVE MEASURE. B) BELIEVE ARMY UNDER GENERAL SUHARTO IN ASCENDENCY. DESPITE FACT DECREE PUBLISHED IN COMMUNIST PRESS IN NAME SUl'ARNO, APPOINTS.LEFTIST GENERAL PRANOTO AS ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF, SUHARTO RETAINS CONTROL AND IS APPARENTLY RECEIVING GOOD SUPPORT FROM NAVY AND POLICE. C) STATUS SUKARNO UNKNOWN. APPEARS ALMOST $ CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT AT MOMENT HE NOT RPT NOT SUPPORTING ARMY GROUP. OTHERWISE IT LIKELY HE WOULD MAKE PERSONAL APPEAL TO POPuLATION TO CRUSH UNTUNG. WE BELIEVE ODDS ARE (IN THIS ORDER) THAT (1) HE DEAD INCAPACITATED OR IN-CUSTODY MAEA ' (2) HE WAITING UNTIL DUST SETTLES BEFORE HE COMES OUT IN OPEN, AND (3) HE MASTERMINEDED WHOLE AFFAIR IN MOVE DISCREDIT AND REPLACE TOP ARMY LEADERSHIP. IF LATTER K AI IS CASE, THIS COULD BOOMERANG AND WE CONSIDER HIGHLY DOUBTFUL. === [PDF page 104] === D) AT LAST REPORT PKI HEADQUARTERS OPEN BUT NOT RPT NOT ACTIVE. WE HAVE RELIABLE EVIDENCE PKI MAKING DEFENSIVE MILITARY PREPARATIONS AGAINST ARMY BUT HAS TAKEN NO OVERT MEASURES THUS FAR. ITS PAPER HARIAN RAKJAT HAS, HOWEVER, ENDORSED SEPT 30 MOVEMENT. PARTY'S CAPACITY TO ACT SOMEWHAT RESTRICTED BY LOSS SEVERAL, OF ITS NATURAL ALLIES SUCH AS PNI AND LEFTIST JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION WHICH HAVE VIRTUALLY DISAVOWED SEPT 30 MOVEMENT. WE BELIEVE PKI WILL FIGHT IN EVENT DIRECT ARMY REPRESSION. IT WILL ALSO FIGHT IF IT CAN FIND ADEQUATE SUPPORT TO GIVE IT CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, WHILE FIRM EVIDENCE LACKING, ODDS ARE PKI WILL LIE LOW IF ARMY AND ITS SUPPORTERS REAAIN UNIFIED AND DO NOT UNDERTAKE OPEN SUPRESSION PKI. IF ARMY AND ITS ALLIES REMAIN STRONG, PKI WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT SAVE ITS STRENGTH FOR LATER POLITICAL STRUGGLE. SITUATION MEDAN AND SURABAYA REMAINS AS DESCRIBED EMBTEL 801. SECURITY SITUATION QUIET AND LEADERS IN STATE OF WATCHFUL WAITING END ITEM I === [PDF page 105] === SECSTAT E ITEM 2 02/0531Z EVACUAT ION..9 WE ARE IN RECEIPT YOUR 805. ACTING SECRETARY WANTS YOU TO KNOW THAT ANY AND ALL DOUBTS RE EVACUATION SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON SIDE OF PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES. HE BELIEVES THAT IN SPITE OF OBVIOUS HARDSHIPS ON PEOPLE CONCERNED EARLY ACTION ON EVACUATION, INTEREST. END ITEM 2. 42~, [Unreadable] [Unreadable] [Unreadable] .19 U 4'. Se..~4 t I 9 9 === [PDF page 106] === DJAKARTA ITEM 2 02/0710Z 1) RE ACTING SECRETARY'S MESSAGE ON EVACUATION OF AMERICANS, WE FEEL PROTECTION HERE ADEQUATE AND BEST SAFE-GUARDED AT THIS TIME BY AMERICANS REMAINING IN HOMES AND THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO TRY TO PROCEED TO AIRPORT IN ANY SORT OF SUDDEN EVACUATION. MOREOVER, VERY PROCESS OF TRYING TO GET AMERICANS OUT ON CRASH PROGRAM MIGHT STIR AIRPORT WORKERS OR INVITE OTHER DIFFICULTIES. THERE IS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF GETTING OUR PEOPLE THROUGH ROAD BLOCKS. I HAVE CONSULTED OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRY COLLEAGUES WHO ARE OF SAME OPINION. WHAT WE NEED TO DO NOW IS TO BE AS INCONSPICUOUS AS POSSIBLE. ANY CONCERTED EVACUATION MOVE WOULD BE OPPOSITE. 2. TIGHT MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN IMPOSED HERE WHICH IN ONE WAY ENHANCES PROTECTION OF OUR PEOPLE PROVIDING THEY ABIDE STRICTLY BY REGULATIONS. 3) THERE HAS BEEN NO RPT NO SIGN OF ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING AND NO RPT NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER THAT WE ARE TARGET OF ANY CONTENDING FACTIONS. 4) PRINCIPAL DANGER IS ONE OF BEING CAUGHT IN CROSS-FIRE SHOULD CLASHES OCCUR. WE ARE TAKING METICULOUS PRECAUTIONS TO KEEP OUR PEOPLE AWAY FROM AREAS WHERE SUCH EXCHANGES MIGHT OCCUR. 5) THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE BRIEF EXCHANGE OF FIRE TODAY AS REPORTED IN EMBTEL 807 (SITREP 5). OUR FEELING IS THAT CONTENDING FACTIONS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO AVOID SHOOTING ALTHOUGH TH2RE MUST BE STRONG FEELINGS AROUSED BY ACTIONS AGAINST GENERALS YESTERDAY. 6) SILIWANGI AND OTHER RELIABLE ARMED FORCES INCLUDING MARINES AND MOBRIS ARE HEAVILY DEPLOYED AROUND CITY AND CITY IS QUIET ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY ROAD BLOCKS MAKING MOVEMENT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. === [PDF page 107] === [Unreadable] 7) WE REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE POWER STRUGGLE MAY GO ON FOR SOMETIME AND THE SITUATION COULD WORSEN AS FAR AS PROSPECTS FOR SAFETY OUR PEOPLE. ACCORDINGLY ADVISABILITY OF STAGING OUR DEPENDENTS OUT BY NORMAL COMMERCIAL CARRIERS IS PROBLEM UNDER IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION. WILL WIRE RECOMMENDATIONS THIS POINT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. 8) MEANWHILE, WE WILL OF COURSE EXPEDITE TRAVEL OF ANY DEPENDENTS OR OTHERS WHO WANT TO LEAVE. 9) WE NOTE THAT WIRELESS FILE PRESS OFFICER MCCLOSKEY SAID THAT "THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1300 PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE DJAKARTA AREA." IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS REFERS TO 19 DJAKARTA CONSULAR AREA WHICH INCLUDES K JAVA AND SOUTHERN SUMATRA. IN DJAKARTA THERE ARE ONLY 243 REGISTERED AMERICANS. END DJAKARTA ITEM 2 === [PDF page 108] === SEOCSTATE ITEM 4 02/0725Z RE YOUR ITEM 2 PARA 7 YOU HAVE AUTHORITY MOVE DEPENDENTS OUT. YOU SHOULD START DOING SO THROUGNi COMMERCIAL CHANNELS AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT. END ITEM 4. 99 === [PDF page 109] === 1, SECSTATE ITEM 5 02/0740Z NEW SUBJECT - OWING INTEREST HERE AND IN ABSENCE NORMAL PRESS FILING FROM DJAKARTA, REQUEST YOU REPORT ONCE OR MORE DAILY ON STATUS AND SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS INSOFAR AS SITUATION KNOWN TO YOU, EVEN IF REPORTS NEGAT,*VE. IF YOU HAVE NOTHING ELSE, MANY THANKS AND GOOD LUCK. END ITEM 5. === [PDF page 110] === PNNNN9 DJAKARTA ITEM 3 02/0722Z CONSIDER SUGGESTION DEPARTMENT'S ITEM 3 EXCELLENT. WE FOLLOWING UP THROUGH APPROPRIATE,CHANNELS. END ITEM 3. === [PDF page 111] === SECSTATE ITEM 3 020712Z NEW SUBJECT - IF YOU BELIEVE USEFUL, YOU MAY INFORM NASUTION (OR MRS. NASUTION) THAT IF THEY WISH WE READY DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO HELP WITH TREATMENT THEIR WOUNDED CHILD, INCLUDING TREATMENT CONUS OR ELSEWHERE, AND NECESSARY TRANSPORTATION. END ITEM 3. IfII === [PDF page 112] === DJAKARTA ITEM 4 02/0800Z RE YOUR ITEM 5, WILL PROVIDE REQUESTED REPORT ON REGULAR BASIS. NOTHING ELSE. MANY THANKS AND HOPE YOU CATCH UP ON YOUR SLEEP. END ITEM 4