Kabel LBJ National Security File: kudeta militer Indonesia, Oktober-November 1965 (Indonesia military coups, A-300 'The September 30 Affair')

PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.6 US, British and Dutch Government Records/US State Department Central Files (ProQuest History Vault)/LBJ National Security File (1965-10 to 1965-11) - Indonesia military coups [ProQuest 3035071500].pdf Text from the PDF text layer; pages marked "re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026" were re-OCR’d with Tesseract because the text layer scored Poor. OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === NSF Country File Indonesia Volume V, Cables, 10/65-11/65 === [PDF page 2] === ety enryrneimeg o T 1 Seemann aa eM oe | om “¥ po. -: Tt | OUTGOING TELEGRAM Depattment of State 06 870° INDICATE; ( couect Diowasct 10 —SECRET— [Unreadable] ee ACTION, AMEMBaSSY DJAKARTA J4/7fErIA Te “ co Or Pos Pee TN EMO PST Too + ere OL L. We tsk ine i aprosciing when may bo desire to gv A some indication to the military of our attitudes toward recent and current, Gevelopments. _Waile we © mig. co ak do this 1 taking advantage ot request for are reserved for three ever — ae We are not at all clear as to who 1s calling the shots within the military. As examples: although it appears to be Nasution, Suharto seems to be taking a stronger line vis-a-vis _ Sukarno. We do not Imow who else is playing what role, ox whit ne degree of unity existe among the miliary Leaders, oF what their i strength is. EEE ee aE >. We have no ral Inowlodge ofthe miltary plant ead oe intentions or what debates are going fn the imer ¢ circle, without which it s possible fo ime an aesessrnent SePUE ay PE ARERR TO ON pote aE tee Drafted by:. ae coe “Tolearabhe wane and S Clearances FE: WPBundy (8 pin 2 AP Ce “REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS.” 7. A Mr. shop = PROHIBITED “UNLESS. "UNCLA pore: mae DS-322 cee ate ba a abt oe a ad Tat - erm eer eTTe Ao RENEE oS [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 3] === Page 2_of telegram to Djakarta c. W are not even certain tbat really spealdrig for him, or has taken initiative onhis own. 2. Under these circumstances we think it would be best to imove cautiously. 3. Lilemmaa is that (a) we do not RPT not wish to give army Impression that we are trying to inject ourselves into Indo internal situation, or that we wish to chaniuel axiy's actions for our -- as opposed to Indo's -- benefit, or that we encouraging action against Sukarno or, in fact, anyone except PKI. On other dard, (b) if army's willingness to follow through against PKI isuin any way contingent I' on or subject to influence by US, we do not wish miss opportunity consider US action. As noted 1 c above, we not sure whether Indos making typically over-subtle approach via 3.W 4. WitI ri.spect to question re our assessment of situation, suggest you respond on following lines: We are, as always, sympathetic to army's des re eliminate communist influence, but difficult for us to assess current situation since we do not have clear picture of military aims and plans. Realize situation Lst moving, but would be bat helpful if we could be given indication to army's assessment and Intentions. 5. Purpose of throwing ball back to c-,to see how forthcoming he is prepared to be vi th us. 6. Request your comcnts. L GP-1- IM === [PDF page 4] === DEPARTMENT OF STATE .2>,ASe, FrOY RM USE ONLY ARA CUR lip/ FENI A-306 29 GROUP 2 -EXMPTCA TOR COPY NO10 [Unreadable] S1ERI ES8 PA S1TS), DOD, TF0O: CINCPAC FOR POLAD; EMBASSY CANBERRA, AEBASSY EIALA LUHUR, PSO AID AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSY MANILA, AMCONSUL MEDAN, AMCONSUL SINGAPORE, AMCONSUL SURABAYA, A EMBASSY TOKYO, AMEMBASSY. WELLINGTON, (MANILA FOR FELG/RSO), HONG KONG, PARIS me. FROM: Amembassy DJAKARTA DATE: October 22, 1965 SUBJECT: The September 30 Affat Lr TR XMS I AIR REF Embtel 1184(Transmittl Lng Summary) E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 CIA as0a Introduction By 13 1. The history and interpretation of the attempted coup in Indonesia which has become known as.the September 30 Affair will probably be the subject of study and speculation for years to come. The present paper is designed to present within the short perspective of only three weeks, the story of this extraordinary Affair in the light of the Embassy's best current information, while the recollection of it is fresh and its effects are critical though not fully clear factors in current political life. 2. As the world now knows, the coup struck in the early morning hours of October 1 with raids on the homes of seven members of the Army's general staff in Djakarta, six of whom were murdered. One, Chief of'Staff of the Armed Forces General Nasution, escaped, and together with his deputy General Suharto managed during the following critical day to recapture the city and turn the tide. Instigator of the coup, insofar as the public was told, was an obscure officer in the President's palace guard, Colonel Untung, who announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council to govern the country and save the President from alleged usurpation of authority by a "Generals Council." ak- 3. As the story unwinds facts become tangled and, as is evident in the attached paper, there are important gaps in confirmed information. 93 Many questions are unanswered, including the extent of participation of the Indonesian Air Force in the coup, the complicity of such an influential member of the government as Subandrio and the full.influence and roles of the PKI and the Chinese Communists. 'Over all, perhaps forming the biggest question mark of all, is the role of President Sukarno in the whole Affair. FOR DEPT. USE ONLY DS -323 In [:jOut Urafted W: Lonents and Liaseshcanon Approved by: Political Section POL:EEMasters DA-CoA.he === [PDF page 5] === Frum Djakarta 4. The present paper takes a look at the background of the Affair, traces what is knoi of its facts, and offers considered speculation concerning some of the gaps mentioned above and the prospects for the future now offered by the amazing events which will continue to be felt and assessed for a long time to come. -486RiiP-- === [PDF page 6] === Page 3, A-300 From Dj akarta THE SEPTEMBER 30 AFFAIR Contents Section 1. Background Attack on the Moderates Growing Political Tensions The Post-Takari Revolutionary Offensive Section 2 - What Really Happened: A Summary The Attack The New Order The Retreat The Troops The Field Commanders The Generals and the Strategists The Plot What Went Wrong Section 3 - Role of the PKI The PRI Before the September 30 Affair Indications of PKI Involvement Some Evidence Against PI Instigation of the Coup Conclusions Section 4 - Role of Sukarn6 Theoretical Background The Bare Facts of Sukarno's Actions Other Circumstantial Evidence Reservations Section 5 - What Might Have Been Successful Elimination of Senior Generals Capture of Army Leadership Alive, Without Executions Section 6 - Future Prospects The Army The PKI The Army v% the PKI Conclusions -seeET- === [PDF page 7] === A-300, Djakarta Page 4 1. BACKGROUND Attack on the Moderates, 1964-65 a. Aware of his declining health and afraid that gradual evolution in Indonesia would not permit the accomplishment- of his grand design, the establishment of a communist totalitarian state controlled by the PKI after his death, President Sukarno over the past year has speeded up the process of neutralizing or liquidating all independent power centers obstructing achievement of this goal. As these centers were removed or reduced, the PKI moved quickly and deftly to control them, within the context of a vicious anti-American campaign.designed to sow war psychosis under the threat of a "foreign enemy.." Assisting the PKI and Sukarno in this task was the Indonesian Air Force, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, and a host of communist'sympathizers, as well as an increasing number of opportunists who climbed on the bandwagon with alacrity once it got rolling. b. The process of eradicating opposition proceeded by stages, directed by Sukarno and implemented vigorously by the PKI. After rumors became current in the fall of 1964 that Sukarno was suffering increasing disability from his kidney disorder, a movement supported behind the scenes by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chairul Saleh began a major polemic with the PKI. Known as the "Body to Support Sukarndsm," or BPS, the movement's major public leader was Minister of Trade Adam Malik. Although Murba Party involvement was obvious, at the beginning, the BPS was treated purely as an association of non-communist newspapers attempting to "preserve the true teachings of Bung Karno." c. Upon Sukarno's return from overseas in the late fall, he banned the BPS, setting off a domino-game of subsequent bannings and purges each of which strengthened the status and power of the PKI. On January 8, after withdrawing from the United Nations, Sukarno banned*the Murba Party. On February 24, following a dramatically heightening anti-American.,campaign in Djakarta, Sukarno ordered the === [PDF page 8] === A-300, Djakarta Page 5 closing of the newspapers which had supported the BPS, which he characterized as a CIA plot to "kill Sukarnoism and Sukarno." The bans on these newspapers enabled the PKI to complete its hold on the informational field, and crypto-communists rapidly took- over the direction of the.Indonesian Writers Association, Antara, the Publishers Guild, and other- communications media. A few days after these papers were banned, Sukarno ordered the retooling of the '45 Generation,.another Saleh political vehicle which also, however, had widespread connections among government and military officials. 1;d. In April, a largely PKI governing board was installed in the '45 Generation organization, and by the summer, Murba-ites Saleh and Adam Malik, had effectively been "re-tooled" by losing.control of most of their operational governmental responsibilities. Saleh himself had made a bad mistake by disavowing his membership in Murba and by allowing PKL Chief Aidit to accuse him of spreading a "PKI false document"- without rejoinder. In September, Sukarno announced that-the '45 Generation was completely under his control,,and Saleh publicly begged him far forgiveness. The emasculation of Saleh was complete. Growing Political. Tensions a. Following the banning- of- the BPS press, what had been a steady attack.on the banned Masjumi's HMI youth group was stepped-up strikingly in the now-communist ccntrolled press.. This campaign among other things appeared to have the effect ofpartially solidifying resistance to the PKI in the Moslem community in general. The PWI Congress in Malang March.7was broken up by a large group of Moslem students, and following the Afro- Asian Islamic Conference later in the. month, all major Moslem parties except. the PKI-controlled Perti issued a joint statement which in effect declared that an attack on one Moslem group would be.considered an attack on the religion. A pro-HMI.demonstration was held at Kotrar and the NU attacked Antara for.-being "one-sided." Concurrently, throughout Java and particularly in East Java, a burgeoning === [PDF page 9] === -SGQEWW A-300, Djakarta Page 6 series of incidents between Moslem and pro-PKI peasants, deriving from energetic efforts to implement land reform laws, heightened tensions between the two groups, By July, a number of new Moslem newspapers had appeared in Djakarta which, although initially treading gingerly on PKZ toes, gave promise of eventually3mplacing the BPS papers in attacking the.PKI b. Faced with this resistance--which would remain ineffectual in Djakarta as long as its leadership remained weak at the top--Sukarno decided to neutralize the Moslems, while he concentrated his forces for the attack on the two most important citadels of anti-PKI power--the PNI right-wing and the Army leadership. In a series of Kotrar decisions, the HMI was placed under the supervision of Subandrio, who incidentally thereby increased his own power position by giving the impression of having Moslem support. In effect the Moslem-PKI issue had been dampened by September, and peasant incidents apparently stopped completely, although there were still reports of high tensions between the two groups in Surabaja.. c. Although over the past several years, Sukarno has been working to convert the PNI into a virtual mirror. of the PKI in terms of espousal of pro-communist positions and attitudes, in March of 1965 the tempo was stepped up to the point where it was obvious that purges were soon to occur. Although the PNI had gone along with the pro-communist orientation of the GOI, there was considerable footdragging on the part of a small group of moderates in the leadership, identified nationally with First Chairman Hardi, and specifically in Central Java, the main base of PNI support, with anti-communist Central Java Chairman Hadisubeno. Opposing this group of moderates was the crypto-communist PNI Secretary General, Surachman, assisted by opportunistic Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo and several central board members, as well as PKI agents and sympathizers planted within the party at all levels and in most regions. d. On March 25 and 26, Sukarno addressing an extraordinary PNI meeting in Djakarta pointed out that "recent === [PDF page 10] === -- ST A-300, Djakarta Page 7 events" had cleared the road into the socialist stage of the Indonesian revolution--i.e. the situation wherein all independent centers of power have been exterminated and totalitarian controls can be applied without fear of resistance--and called unequivocally for the ouster of "false Marhaenists" from the PNI. These elements he identified implicitly as anti-communists. e. On May 4, the first "false Marhaenist" was ousted. A special meeting of the PNI central board removed Hadisubeno from control of the Central Java PNI. In an effort to sweeten this pill, Mrs. Hardi was named by Sukarno as a Deputy Minister of Basic Education and Culture, but the moderate leadership was not placated. Hardi and his followers rejected Hadisubeno's ouster, and reportedly issued a letter ordering Hadisubeno to retain his position until the convening of a party congress. Surachman and others continued the pressure against the right-wing, however, and at the PNI anniversary celebration on July 26, Sukarno again called for the ouster of false Marhaenists. About ten days later, a specially-convened meeting of the PNI leadership council officially purged Hardi and his followers from the party, and gradually thereafter replaced them with either pro-communists or communist sympathizers. The PNI had collapsed as a political force without a chance of resisting Sukarno. f. The Army began to generate a stiffening to the continuing Sukarno-PKI thrustin January, when Yani appointed a "brain trust" to advise the Army on Doliti al Some matters. Among the members of this brain trust were/te Generals later slain on the morning of October 1. A few weeks before the anning of the BPS newspapers, the Army secured control/oone of them, Berita Indonesia, which it reissued as Berita Yudha (War News). When the BPS Merdeka was banned, the Army reopened it as Angkatan Bersendjata (Armed Forces) with names of Nasution and the four military Chiefs of Staff on the masthead. Also, early in the year, two important events took place; the killing of the Sulawesi rebel Kahar Muzakhar, permitting return of === [PDF page 11] === Page 8 Siliwangi division troops to West Java, and Yani's success in removing the leftist CO of East Kalimantan, General Suharjo, from his post. g. In late January, one direction of the thrust against the Army was revealed when Aidit announced that he had requested Sukarno to arm peasants and workers in order to fight against Nekolim. Although this proposal was publicly rejected by Sukarno, only a month later Yani ordered Sumatran Regional CO Mokoginta to begin arming oneY company of peasants and workers in each military district. Mokoginta was to ensure that the arms, however, remained firmly,in Army control. h. Following the BPS newspaper bannings in Djakarta, the communist-led PWI attempted to have a number of provincial BPS papers closed. West Java CO Adjie, however, wasable to protect the BPS paper in Bandung. This success may have encouraged the Army to relax temporarily, and in April Sukarno himself began the process of crushing the Army. Calling a special meeting of Military Commanders, Sukarno ordered the Army to get into step with the revolution and completely revise its defense doctrine to be directed against Nekolim rather than against Communist China. Army officers were deeply concerned at these changes, which they believed opened the way for disintegration of the Army's anti-comumnist posture. Concurrently, it became increasingly apparent during-these months that Omar Dani, Chief of the Air Force, had sold out to the PKI and was actively assisting its advance. Although the Army held a series of conferences to "turn the wheel toward the left" as Sukarno demanded, Yani himself and a number of senior Army officers--many of whom were in the. "brain trust"--quietly formed.a "Generals' Council" to provide political guidance. i. In early May, Sukarno ordered that the newly created National Defense Institute be effectively placed under civilian control and that its course have a high === [PDF page 12] === [Unreadable] Page 9 pro-communist content. A few days later, Aidit proposed that Nasakom councils be formed to advise the Military Commanders from the top echelon down to the military districts. A PKI functionary later revealed that what the PKI desired by this proposal was the institution of a political commissar system, similar to that of Communist China. Sukarno himself then cited the example of Communist China and proposed the creation of a "Fifth Force" of volunteers in order to implement the Army's new anti-Nekolim defense doctrine. Both Yani and Nasution squirmed on thishook but succeeded in avoiding formation of the Fifth Force. Seizing on the killing of a warrant officer by PKI peasants in North Sumatra, Yani attempted to display Army resistance to the Fifth Force plan. By September, it appeared that although the Army had been forced to mouth support for Sukarno's pro-communist attempts to crush it, it was still largely integrally sound and had successfully resisted implementation of the two main proposals which would have destroyed it as a political as well as an anti-communist force. The Post-Takari Revolutionary Offensive a. As of early August, Sukarno's balance sheet of his success showed a mixed picture. On the one hand, he had crushed the Saleh forces and removed the anticommunist strength in the PNI. He had circumvented and neutralized the Moslems, making it possible to crush them at a later date. But the Army had faltered and then, apparently held. At this point, on August 3 and 9, Sukarno suffered two apparent physical seizures of unknown origin, and conveniently went into hibernation to prepare his August 17 speech. b. In his August 17 "Takari" speech, Sukarno made it clear that the "revolutionary offensive" was to be heightened in all fields in the near future, and particularly against the Army. 'After warmly praising the countries of Eastern Europe for having established "People's Democracies" after World War II, he listed Indonesia along with North Viet-Nam and Communist China as the logical === [PDF page 13] === A-300, Djakarta Page 10 allies of Indonesia, which had also "liberated" themselves in the same period. He called for the creation of a Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis as a fulfillment of the demands of history. C. A few passages later, Sukarno warned that he had always maintained that the class struggle had to give way to the national- struggle. Now, he said, "I warn corruptors that if they continue their operations, the people will burn them up." Two paragraphs later, Sukarno continued, "Even tnough you were Generals from the Peta*, who boast of your revolutionary services, if now you try to upset the Nasakom offensive, you are reactionary forces" Finally, Sukarno expressed his annoyance at Army resistance to the Fifth Force concept, saying in part: '"Every time I suggest something, there is always a reaction...in this case, they accuse me of copying others. But our Constitution gives every citizen the right to defend the nation. After studying this matter further, I as supreme Commander will make the decision." His mention of the accusation of copying others referred to the thinly-veiled remarks in the Army newspapers linking his proposal to Communist China's militia system--and in fact, Sukarno originally stated that Chou En-lai had suggested the Fifth Force system. A further warning to the Army came in a speech on September 1, when he told Yani (by name) to straighten things out, or risk being "left behind by the people" if he, Sukarno, invoked nis charismatic powers. d. Building on the Takari attacks on economic corruptors, who are called "capitalist bureaucrats" in Local terminology ana are identified with Army officers' holding positions in Government and-state enterprises, as;9ll as with the remnants of Saleh's empire, the PKI began a massive shrieking campaign of invective and abuse against *The Peta was a self-defense force of Indonesians organized during the Japanese occupation. The "Peta Group" in the Army included Generals Yani, Suharto, Parman, and other members of the "brain trust" and the "Generals' Council." === [PDF page 14] === E_ P 1- A-300, Djakarta Page 11 these elements. Toward the end of September, the point had been reached that a Chicom-influenced paper directed the "people" to drag such elements out of their offices and shoot them in the street. Concurrently, pressure was stepped up on the former members of the BPS, who were hauled successively into police headquarters for questioning. The Police Commander of Djakarta indicated that any of the expelled PNI elements who attempted political activities would be jailed, and the PKI again stepped up its attacks on the HMI. Pressures were accelerated - across the board against non-communist elements until the Indonesian informational environment reached a fever pitch of pro-communism hitherto unmatched even in Indonesia. e. This was the frenetic picture within the political arena on the eve of September 30. In somewhat less rarified atmosphere there was the general. continuing economic deterioration which plagued the lives of the 1 'people at all levels. This was reflected in the skyrocketing price of rice which soared to unprecedented heights during September. The situation affected the staple food supply of practically every Indonesian, and was the standard topic of conversation in every market place and kampong. It was exploited by various PKI front organizations, which carried loud protests to the doors of the Minister of Trade, and in Surabaya even invaded the Governor's dining room and upset the food-on the table. These inspired mob actions represented manipulation by a small well-disciplined minority, dedicated to the early attainment of the socialist state and viewing attacks on the economic corruptors, whom the President/Great Leader of the Revolution had condemned, as a part of the psychological preparation. === [PDF page 15] === A-300, Djakarta Page 12 2. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED A Court of Inquiry. It is unlikely that we shall ever know the full facts of the September 30 affair. The maxim "the truth will out" has never had much validity in Indonesia, where the final and official account of important political crises describes not past events but subsequent political accommodation tothew events. As Sukarno works towards a "political solution" for the September 30 affair, the process of obfuscation will speed up. It is, thus, perhaps not too early for the Embassy to hold its own court of inquiry. This inquiry will move from the known to the suspected, describing first the attack itself, the new order proposed by the Movement in its Decree and Decisions, and the retreat as documented principally in news reports. It will then attempt to sort out the cast of characters, first identifying the Movement's troops and its field commanders, and then ferreting out the generals and hidden strategists behind the affair. From this evidence, some speculation will be advanced on the nature of the original plot and the reason it failed. The Attack. The September 30 Movement's attack in the early morning of October 1-possessed aspects of both a standard coup d'etat and a simple act of terror. In the space of approximately five hours organized Army units seized those key points which are normally targets of coup attempts while several small bands of terrorists attempted to kidnap the top Army command. Although not a complete success, the maneuver came dangerously close to obtaining all of its first objectives, suggesting that it had benefited from reasonably expert planning and coordination. a. Something less than three battalions of Army troops began to move at 2 a.m. By 4 a.m. they had sealed off the palace and assumed positions around Merdeka Square on which the palace, the Embassy and one of the city's largest railway stations face. Other units quickly took over the telegraph office, the telecommunications building and perhaps the National Bank, from which several billions of rupiah were reportedly taken. === [PDF page 16] === Page 13 b. Many other key objectives were obtained largely through the use of "inside men." The railway lines into the city were blocked by communist rail workers. Telephone exchanges in all key suburbs were shut down between 3:40 and 4:30 a.m., by their communist attendants, members of the SOBSI affiliate P.N. Postel (later suspended for this act). In one case, at least, the telephone workers received help from armed men in uniform. c. The attacks on the Generals' homes occurred between 3:30 and 5:00 a.m. by several teams (perhaps one per house). Reportedly the first to be hit was General. Soetojo. After his door was battered down, he was pulled from the house and taken away in a jeep. (Some sources have emphasized that Soetojo was not important in the Army hierarchy, but was killed because he signed the order to execute the principal communist leaders in the Madiun - rebellion in 1948.) General Yani's guards exchanged shois with his attackers. The Army Chief of Staff was wounded as he attempted to escape and then carried away. General suprapto went with his assailants without a struggle apparently under the impression that they possessed a genuine order for his arrest from those in authority. General Pandjaitan apparently fired on his attackers but in the exchange of fire he was killed and his nephew mortally wounded. General Harjono was shot, wounded and carried away at 4 a.m. General Parman was kidnapped half an hour later and carried away in a truck. d. The terrorists also, fortunately, had their failures. Nasution's attackers pretended to be summoning him to the President. Profiting from the attackers' mistake as to his identity, Nasation managed to jump over a garden wall and, despite an injury to his foot or leg, succeeded in reaching the home of an Army officer who carried him immediately to a "safe place," perhaps in Bogor. His aide, Lieutenant Pierre Tendean was, however, captured and Nasution's six-year old daughter fatally wounded. General Suharto, who was later to command the === [PDF page 17] === Page 14 forces suppressing the Movement, was at a local hospital visiting his sick daughter and his would-be attackers were unable to learn his-whereabouts from his household. There are unconfirmed reports that Minister of Veterans Affairs General Sadini, and Geherals 'Moersjid and Taswin were also terror targets- but received prior warning and were able to escape. Police Minister Sutjipto's.house was reportedly visited.by armed civili s.but emena he was out of town. Second Deputy Prime Ministerwas apparently (and unaccountably) the only civilian on the Movement's first death list. His guards managed to beat the attackers off after losing one police officer. e. The Generals and Nasution's aide were taken to Lubang Buaja on the grounds of Halim Air Force Base where they were reportedctaunted and humiliated by members of the PKI women's organization Gerwani, then tortured and put to death. The bodies were dumped into a 12 meter deep well and covered with trash and earth. They were not discovered until the night of October 3. Although it is conceivable that the Generals were killed only after it had become clear that the September 30 Movement had failed, the facts seem to point to a preconceived assassination plot. (See Section 3) f. The Embassy has as yet only fragmentary accounts of what occurred in the provinces at the time of the September 30 affair. With the possible exception of Central Java, however, there appears to have been no closely coordinated action in the regions. In Jogjakarta, the Movement's troops as of October 2 were known to have been in possession of the radio station, post office, bank and other centers although it is not known when they moved into these positions. Three Diponegoro officers were reported abducted by these troops and at least two were later killed. Their bodies were not discovered until October 19. (During the day of October 4, however, the Movement's troops were expelled from Jogja). In Semarang, Madiun and perhaps smaller Central Java areas the Movements forces appeared to have held some points for a time, but none were in rebel hands for more than two days. Diponegoro Division headquarters in Semarang remained in the hands of its commander who chose Suharto's side when the Movement's chips were down. === [PDF page 18] === Page 1$ The New Order. If it is difficult to distinguish whether the September 30 Movement's attack constituted a coup d'etat or a simple act of terrorism and revenge within the Army, the radio announcements during October 1 on the nature of the Movement only served to highlight these contradictory attributes. a. The Movement's first words were a terse 7 a.m. radio announcement claiming that the September 30 Movement under Lieutenant Colonel Untung had saved the President from a coup planned by a CIA-sponsored Council of Generals to come off during the Army anniversary celebrations beginning October 5. This and a more lengthy 10 a.m. announcement noted that the Movement was totally within the Army and directed against the Generals who were announced as having, been arrested. b. Although the morning radio announcements had mentioned the formation of a Revolutionary Council, it was only with the reading of the Movement's Decree Number One at 2 p.m. that it became clear that this Council was to replace Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet, which was placed in "demissionary status." c. The Revolutionary Council as outlined in the Movement's Decision Number One issued immediately after its sole Decree was anything but an internal Army affair. Its membership of 45 included a wide range of prominent figures, most of whom were quite clearly never connected with the insurgents and whose inclusion was a rather obvious attempt to curry support. (The Council's membership was transmitted by Embtel 796.) The list, however, had an overall leftist cast. At any rate, the Council's make-up seemed to be of little importance since all authority under Decree Number One was relegated to the Presidium which was allegedly identical with the September 30 Movement's top command and included Untung as its Chairman. The Revolutionary Council was never convened. === [PDF page 19] === A-300, Djakarta Page lb d. Decree Number One also included an appeal for the formation of Revolutionary Councils at the provincial, district (Kabupaten) and sub-district levels, thus indicating that the entire structure of the national government was to be replaced. (A Jogjakarta Revolutionary Council apparently ruled for three or four days and it is possible that other Revolutionary Councils were formed in smaller Central Java-localities. There was even a Djakarta newspaper report that an "Indonesian People's Republic" had been proclaimed in Central Java.. Although there is a report of the formation of a Revolutionary Council in a North Sumatra District even before Untung's first announcement, it would appear that the September 30 Movement appeal for a new revolutionary structure drew little response outside Djakarta and Central Java.) e. Dramatic changes were also envisaged for the Armed Forces. Untung appealed to enlisted men to rise up against Generals and other officers living luxuriously on the suffering of their troops, and with his Decision Number Two he wiped out ranks above Lieutenant Colonel, promoted all enlisted ranks one grade, and raised the ranks of the Movement's enlisted personnel two grades. The Retreat. The September 30 Movement had scarcely installed itself in the capital city when it began to retreat. a. General Suharto started to assemble his troops around 10 a.m. but even before they moved, Untung's support began to melt. At least two companies of the Movement's troops, who were perhaps at first unaware of whose cause they were serving, defected by early afternoon before contact with opposing forces. Many of these East and Central Java troops apparently were misled as to the nature of the operation in which they were participating. Minister of Veterans General Sarbini, who had once served in the Diponegoro command, was able to talk at least one company of his former troops into defecting while General Basuki Rachmat, East Java Commander, also reportedly brought some of his men back to the fold. === [PDF page 20] === A-300, Djakarta Page 11 b. At sunset troops from Suharto's Strategic Command moved into the center of the city, capturing the radio station and telecommunications center at 7 p.m... A Cavalry Battalion from General Adjie's Siliwangi Division arrived in Djakarta during the evening and secured the National Bank and other points. By.midnight, the Movement's military commanders and most of their remaining troops had retreated to Halim Air Base. Colonel Untung and Omar Dani accompanied by probably no more than one company from the palace guard flew to the Hiswahjudi Air Base near Madiun around 3:30 a.m. October 2. c. Strategic Command "Raiders" moved into Halim Air Base at 4 p.m. on October 2 meeting no resistance from its Air Force defenders, who, according to press reports, were ordered by Air Vice Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang not to resist. d. After a week's clean-up campaign, the Suharto forces captured Colonel Latif of the Djakarta Command (KODAM V) and 86 Tjakrabirawa troops in the Jogjakarta area on October 9. Untung, himself, was captured alive on October 11 near Tegal, Central Java, when civil defense troops spotted him on a bus. By this time, 90% of the Movement's forces had been put out of action, according to Army claims. While this would appear to be true as regards the regular troops definitely committed to Untung, many paramilitary units remained at large (which were perhaps never subject to Untung's direct command but working with him) in the Djakarta area and other parts of Java and Sumatra. The Troops. The September 30 Movement's field forces were a motley group composed of Army units from three separate regional commands, Air Force elements. and paramilitary forces formed from communist cadres. The force appeared to be divided into three broad groups with separate functions: the Army troops secured the palace and certain key points, the Air Force provided passive defense of the Halim Air Base, and the paramilitary units probably participated in sabotage and terror but perhaps had a much more extensive role in later, unplayed acts of the affair. === [PDF page 21] === -Wanner, A-300, Djakarta Page 18 -, Untunj itad three Armny mattal.ions at his disposal in Djakarta, tfe 530th Battalion from the Brawidjaja Division in East Java, the 454th Battalion from the Diponegoro Division in Central.aJava, which' Untung had commanded some XMER months earlier, and Untung's own First Battalion from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Palace Guards. The Tjakrabirawa Battalion was the inner core of Untung's forces and may have furnished the majority of the Generals' kidnappers, most of whom were in Tjakra uniforms. The Brawidjaja and Diponegoro units, which had come to Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day ceremonies scheduled for October 5, were used primarily to secure the palace and some nearby key points and, according to newspaper reports, may also have provided defense for the Ralim Airport on the second and third days of the affair. b. The Movement's paramilitary forces apparently consisted of members of the PKI, the Pemuda Rakjat and even of the PKI women's arm Gerwani grouped in Special. Security Force (TIX) units. During the month of September approximately 2,700 communists, t.- J were given a 7-day training course conducted by the Air Force within the Halim Air Base perimeter near the area which was later to become one of the September 30 Movent's strongholds and the burial ground for the Generals. jfthese cadres were called in on September 29. A few hours prior to the attack they were reportedly provided olive green field uniforms and weapons from Air Force stock at Halim Air Base and in the city. The Army now claims to have confessions and other proof that the TIK units participated in the capture and murder of the Generals. The TIK units were apparently. also given other tasks in the days following the coup. A group of some 35 TIK elements reportedly was captured near the Hotel Indonesia and the telegraph office on October 2 in what might have been an effort to retake the telegraph office. Three TIK men also reportedly engaged in sniper fire from an upper floor of Djakarta's principal hotel during this operation. The Army announced on October 18 that 1,334 of those participating in the September 30 === [PDF page 22] === A-300, Djaikarta Page 19 Movement had been arrested. The majority of these were probably TIK elements. There would appear to be many more TIK units at large, and the Army so indicated in its press announcement. c. The Air Force's Special Action Troops (PGT) seemed to have been purposely kept in the background. Thyprovided security for the Halim Air Base during the first part of the coup. One PGT company also assisted the Tjakrabirawa in protecting the President. There appears to have been at least one small clash between the PGT and Suhkrto's forces near Halim Air Base during which three Air Force men were captured. d. The number of September 30 Movement troops in Central Java is very difficult to estimate as many units purposely did not indicate a clear commitment one way or the other. A field grade Army officer estimated on October 3 that three regimental areas, Tegal, Pekalongan and Jogjakarta were sympathetic to the rebels. === [PDF page 23] === A-300, Djakarta Page 20 The Field Commanciers. The anonymity of the September 30 Movement's leadership is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that several prominent Indonesians were convinced during the first days of the coup that Untung (which means lucky in Indonesian) was a fictitious name. Although there is now definite proof that Untung exists in flesh and blood, little other information has been offered either by the press or private sources to dispel the anonymity of the Movement's field commanders. a. Untung, according to a biography printed in the official Army newspaper, attended an officers' course in Bandung in 1959, subsequently served in West Sumatra as a lieutenant during the PRRI rebellion, in Central Java'as a battalion commander, and in West Irian during the anti- Dutch campaign there. He did not, as previously reported, study in the United States. Minister of Veterans/ sHIt Sarbini in a private conversation stated that Untung's military history goes back fifteen years beyond that printed in the Army journal and that when serving under him in 1945, Untung had displayed definite communist sympathies. Sources too numerous to be ignored have maintained that Untung also fought in the 1943 Madiun rebellion on the communist side. YdUntung's * Madiun record was broughtto the President's attention when Untung was first proposed for the Palace Guard but the President permitted his appointment as Commander of the First Tjakrabirawa Battalion in late 1963. Untung is reported to be a tough soldier, not overly bright, and devoured w. indignation over the corruption of immoral living of/General officers. He was, in short, a perfect communist candidate for the role of an Indonesian Kong Lea - b. Much less is known about the other members of the Movement's top leadership. Brigadier General Supardjo was Commander of the Fourth Combat Command in Pontianak, Kalimantan, at the time of the affair. He is still at large, and, according to Military Attache sources, is the Army's.most wanted man at the present time. Lieutenant Colonel Heru was Assistant Directrof Air Force Intelligence and previously === [PDF page 24] === A-300, Djakarta Page 21 speriLta year in Air Force intelligence schools in Texas. His actual participation in the Movement is still in doubt. He has not been discharged from the Air Force and there are no reports of his being arrested. * Navy Colonel Sunardi was an administrative assistant in the Navy Minister's office and formerly commander of a destroyer. His Navy colleagues describe him as a radical who got in bad company. He is now under arrest and reportedly has been relatively cooperative under interrogation. He also was erroneously reported as having studied in the United States. However, the career of Police Lieutenant Colonel Anwas, Chief of Staff of the.Djakarta Police on September 30, was in large part sponsored by the United States. He studied under American auspices for a year in the Philippines and on two separate occasions in the United States. Although he was first publicly absolved from complicity in the Movement by his police superiors, he is now believed to be under arrest. Only a few weeks before the coup attempt Anwas had been transferred from duties connected with, among other things, security of foreign missions in Djakarta to a post as one of Subandrio's aides. c. Two of the Movement's commanders most mentioned.in the press, Colonel Latif and Colonel Suherman, were not listed among its top leaders but were name as ordinary members of the Revolutionary Council. Latif, formerly commander of the Second Regiment of the Djakarta military command, was shot in the left knee upon capture and has reportedly resisted interrogation. Colonel Suherman, who was intelligence officer for the Central Java military command, apparently was and perhaps still is in command of the Movement' forces in the Jogjakarta area. The Generals and the Strategists. The Kong Le-like disguise assumed by the September 30 Movement failed to hide ne hiich-level strategists behind it. The principal defendants in this case are not the field grade officers commanding the;A.iverentbutD. N. Aidit and the Indonesian Communist Party, ano Omar Lani and the Indonesian Air Force. Communist C-ina ±iso stands accused and Subanorio and Sukarno must take the stand, although the case against tnem is less clear. a. Omar Dani was in this affair up to his neck. The air Force training and arming of the TIK paramilitary cadres, tile use of Halim Air Base as command center, escape route and *11e was arrested after this was written, and has now been disc&,arge1. === [PDF page 25] === A-300, Djakarta Page 2.2 Cevctery, the "se of Air Force plants not only to ferry Untuny and *his troops to Central Java but also reportedly to bring General Supardjo from Kalimantan to Djakarta on the eve of the affair, and Dani's own flight to Central Java with Untung provide enough circumstantial evidence to hang Dani. There are in addition unconfirmed reports that he moved his family to Central Java on September 29 and that he held an. urgent meeting of his principal aides a few hours before the Movement began its march. -To.top it all off, Dani issued a statement a few hours after the Movement had made its attack claiming that it had safeguarded the Indonesian revolution from a subversive plot. This statement was later (but too late) corrected to describe the Movement as an internal Army affair in which the Air Force had no intention of interfering. - Another unconfirmed report put Dani's family in Sukarno's Bogor palace as of only a few days before this is written. This again would point the finger at President Sukarno. b. It is not yet clear how far the Air Force was involved as a whole. Other Air Force officers under interrogation have indicated that the training, arming and services offered the Movement's troops was a closely held and well cloaked operation involving only a few Air Force figures. c. The circumstanial evidence against the PKI is.likewise sufficient for conviction. Communist youth do not undertaken kidnappings and killings and communist union members do not block railways and close telephone exchanges without the knowledge of the Central Committee. Djakarta newspapers have made much of a speech by PRI Central Committeeman Anwar Sanusi on the eve of the September 30 affair in which he said that Djakarta was about to give birth to a new Nasakoim political force and everything had been readied for the event. It is doubtful whether a large section of the PKI apparatus knew of the plot but party members in the provinces appeared to have responded quickly to the Movement once it was announced, according to newspaper reports. d. D. N. Aidit's personal actions during the affair followed a strikingly similar course to those of Onar oani. After the PRI organ Harian Rakiat of Pctober 2 === [PDF page 26] === A-300, Djakarta Page 23 had extolled the "correctness of the action.taken.by the September 30 Movement," -Aidit issued a letter-to a surabaja newspaper treating the matter as an internal Army affair. (This letter was first printed undated on October 6 and then amended to show an October 2 date in a transparent attempt to absolve Aidit from the Harian Rakiat pronouncement. The PHI Politburo, meanwhile issued a statement on October 5 also treating the Movement as an internal Army matter.) Aidit, like Dani, also turned up in Central Java although there is inconclusive evidence to prove that he accompanied XY Dani and Untung from Halim to Iswahjudi Air Base near Madiun. (See-Section 3 for a more detailed wrap-up of PHI involvement in the September 30 Movement.)) e. The Army leadership is now building a good case against the Chinese People's Republic based generally on traditional anti-Chinese feeling, and specifically on the discovery of Chinese arms in the hands of PKI paramilitary elements and in Chinese shipments disguised as construction materials for the Djakarta Conefo complex. The Chinese have not helped their defense by resolutely refusing to fly their flag at half mast for the dead Generals,a most unwise'mani - festation of solidarity with. defeated revolutionaries whic cannot be excused, as Sukarno suggested, by feigned ignora of the national mourning. f. The case against Subandrio is more difficult to substantiate. There can be little doubt that his Centl Intelligence Board provided the stories of a "Generals Council" on which the Movement justified its action, but the President's testimony would be necessary to make this stick. Army officers privately and a newspaper publicly have drawn attention to the unusual number of Indonesian officials absent from Djakarta on September 30. A 45member delegation from the People's Provisional Consultative Assembly including Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul - Saleh, PNI Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Army Major General Wilujo Puspojudo, a National Defense Institute group of 50, no less than three economic teams including twoof Indonesia's strongest anti-communist military leaders === [PDF page 27] === vt;t A-300, Djakarta -. Page 24 Generals Sukendro and Jusuf Amir, and a group of 57 senior Air Force pilots who openly harbored anti-PKI feelings left for China during the month of September. Subandrio would, of course, have been the most likely person to snare so many Chicom invitations at one time. The First Deputy Prime Minister, himself, was on tour in Sumatra with 11 other ministers. The Army claims to have intercepted an October 2 cable to Subandrio in Medan, which read "objective n6t achieved, return home immediately,". but this may well have been a forgery.. It is fairly well substantiated, however, that a Jetstar was sent from Halim Air Base, while it was still in the Movement's hands, to Sumatra to pick up Subandrio. g. The President's role in the September 30 Movement may be a puzzle for historians in years to come but' that he had a role is now widely accepted (although got,.publicly expressed) by most Indonesians., There can be no doubt that Sukarno was thoroughly briefed on the alleged plot of the "Generals Council" and that he was a susceptible subject for such talk. Some Indonesians have spoken (in whispers) of the President's speech to a communist student group on September 29 in which he talked of "those who were Generals but who now are defenders of counterrevolutionary elements and whom we must crush.." While it would be unwise to take these words, which are similar to those he spoke on August 17, as an indication that Sukarno was privy to the plot against the generals, they are, however, a good clue as to his general frame of mind. h. Much attention has been placed on Sukarno's actions during September 30 and October 1 which are regarded as indications of his position vis-a-vis the- September 30 affair. So much so, in fact, that the palace felt compelled to publish an explanation (or as one Indonesian official suggested, an over-explanation) of his exact movements during the crucial hours. While there can be no doubt that Sukarno was in the hands of members of the September 30 Movement, that he voluntarily accompanied them (or preceded them) to their Halim Air Base center and escape route but that he did not (or refused to) accompany them to Central Java, these movements, however, do not in themselves prove Presidential complicity in the plot. === [PDF page 28] === A-30, Djakarta page 25 i. Much more suspect are Sukarno's actions after the September 30 affair. His first move was to name a weak and reportedly somewhat leftist General. Pranoto Reksosamudera as Acting Army Chief of Staff although General Suharto was clearly in actual command of tie Army. He then proferred his personal protection to those most suspected of staging the uprising. He called Omar Dani to his side froinCentral Java and summoned Subandrio back from Sumatra. he released three Air Force Vice Marshals arrested by the Army on suspicion of complicity in the Movement. He perhaps harbored PKI First and Second Deputy Chairmen Lukman and Njoto in his Bogor palace and has made every effort to redeem their bankrupt party. Although he eventually disapproved the Revolutionary Council he took a noticeably long time to do so. Such a clear display of favoritism, cannot. be attributed solely to a desire to preserve national unity. (For a more detailed account and interpretation of Sukarno's role in the affair, see Section 4.) The Plot. Tile action and the cast of the September 30 drama suggests that the plot dad been conceived at a high level,, probably by the PKZ leaders, Omar Dani and perhaps Subandrio. One can speculate that there were three levels of comprehension of this plot; that is, that Sukarno on one hand and Untung and his lieutenants on the other hand, although both deeply engaged in the plot had a different conception of what was going to happen than did the original. plotters. Following is an imaginary reconstruction of what forethought might have taken place. While it is, of course,' unlikely events occurred exactly as depicted, it is believed that this exposition gives an approximate picture of the principals' relations to each other and to the crime. a. PKI leaders, Omar Lani, and Subandrio, aware that tne Army leadership was in a commanding position to seize power upon Sukarno's-death, began a systematic campaign to destroy their main opponent. Even with the President's cooperation, however, they realized that a gradual strangulation of the-Army leadership might not be fast enough and that a decisive stroke was necessary while Sukarno was around to drive it come. Perhaps afraid tnat the Army planned a preemptive coup during the Armed Forces === [PDF page 29] === A-300, Djakarta Page 26 Day ceremonies# or more likely simply fearful that a show of strength by the Armed Forces at that time would prolong the military's ascendancy, the plotters precipitatively advanced their stroke to the week preceding Armed Forces Day. b. By confiding the action to the Untung group, the plotters may have hoped to preserve two options: (i) The country, with the crushing inflation and the pressure built up against corruption and high living by "capitalist bureaucrats" might well lend itself to a Kong Le-type coup, the plotters may have argued. And Sukarno, himself, might be counted on to give it his blessings once success was assured. If Untung were indeed successful in setting up a "Revolutionary Council Government," the PKI and its principal allies could in short order gain control of it. There was thus the option of a total (excepting sukarno) coup. (ii) If, however, the Untung group did not succeed in setting up a "Revolutionary Council Government" it still had an excellent chance of accomplishing its most immediate objective,, the murder of the Generals and that was a boon in itself. The plotters could then disavow Untung as an Army "internal matter" and look to Sukarno for protection. c. For Untung, the plot had only one option, the establishment of a new revolutionary government of the proletariat, under Sukarno's eventual aegis. Although he must have expressed some general wish for such a master stroke, which led him to be chosen as its instrument, it is unlikely that he had any real role in the hatching of" the scheme. Untung and his lieutenants were probably promised sufficient military forces to give the coup a good chance of success. In event of failure, he was perhaps promised an escape route to Central Java and the PKI's full commitment to a prolonged insurgency. Untung was in short a dupe. d. Sukarno probably had only a vague comprehension of the September 30 plot. Had-66ofe details been offered he probably would have refused to hear them. In all such decisive action he has preferred to take a detached position which would allow him the greatest === [PDF page 30] === A-300, Djakarta Page 27 possible maneuverability. (It is well to remember at this time, that Sukarno even had to be forced to sign the 1945 Declaration of Independence.) One can. imagine that Sukarno nodded in agreement when Dani, Subandrio and others told him of the Generals' nefarious scheme and when they proposed that something be done about it before October 5, he perhaps refused to hear more, leaving the rest to his trusted lieutenants. (A stronger view of the President's involvement is argued in Section 4.) What Went Wrong. The plot perhaps failed because it climaxed somewhere between the two options. Untung.gained control of the capital city and the radio station and there was during these first moments no sign of organized: resistance. The coup conceivably needed only the added push that the Air Force and the PKI could give it with * their announcement of support. Dani and Aidit then threw. their cards on the table, but before they could get Sukarno to declare his hand, resistance had developed and the President, perhaps with genuine alarm, learned of the murder of the Generals. Instead of giving his blessing to the Movement and proceeding to Central Java with Dani and Untung, Sukarno went home to Bogor. Dani and Aidit then attempted, too late, to withdraw to the first option. The President's delay and open association with the plotters had in the meantime limited his ability to offer the immediate protection which the plotters now had more need of than they had first speculated. A partially successful plot thus turned quickly into a nightmare of a defeat. === [PDF page 31] === A-300, Djakarta Page 28 3. TE PROBABLE ROLE OF THE PRI IN THE SEPTEMBER 30 AFFAIR Evidence of PKI involvement in the September 30 Movement is extensive although the PKI was only one of several elements that joined the action. It is Army strategy to make the PKI the principal scapegoat for the affair as President Sukarno, who appears/E61Rave been guilty, may be white-washed for reasons of state policy if he is not too uncooperative. a. The PKI Before the September 30 Affair (i) Since 1952, the PKI has pursued a united front strategy in which adventurist tactics have been eschewed. It is true that the PKI leadership has publicly proclaimed an increasingly revolutionary situation but it did not equate this, at least until quite recently, with the proposition that a violent overthrow of the government was necessary. The PKI has felt, rather, that its position within the government was constantly improving and that its enemies were being gradually reduced by non-violent action. Its prospects were improving at an even more rapid pace in recent months, in fact, with such acts as the purge of the PNI and the permanent ban of Murba. There was considerable reason to believe that a full Nasakom cabinet was imminent and that Aidit would enter the Cabinet Presidium. (ii) The PKI stressed that the country was still in the "national-democratic stage" and the dominant trend of thought, at least until recently, was that the transition to the "socialist stage" would be gradual and peaceful. As recently as during the PKI Central Committee plenum in May, 1955, Aidit displayed his usual cautious approach toward the use of violence by criticizing some local PKI branches for pushing unilateral land reform actions too hard where the ground was not sufficiently prepared. Aidit said that strong unilateral action should be taken only in locations where the P1I had an obvious just issue that would attract mass support and where the PKI could attract a large measure of sympathy from other groups. This cautious approach locally was fully in accord with the national strategy. === [PDF page 32] === Pase 2b. Indications of PKI Involvement Nevertheless, the PKI did become concerned about a possible threat o~' eL'ition in mid-September. the PHI began taking)*3 ch security measures as destrue ion or hiding of documents, movement of PRI leaders from house to house, preparations to go underground on sudden notice, increased paramilitary training of selected cadres, etc. However, these measures could be interpreted as being of a precautionary or defensive nature as if the PKI saw an increased possibility of an Army coup or of the early death of President Sukarno. reports have demon- LI L^k strated some -7I paramilitary involvement in the September 30 Movement. There is good reason to believe that Colonel Untung himself was a PKI member or at least a sympathizer and a veteran of the Madiun rebellion in 1948. PKI-affiliated railroad workers sought to block the arrival of Army forces from West Java. PKI-affiliated communications workers helped to take over communications facilities in Djakarta during the Untung "coup." There are reports that some members of the goon squads that seized and killed the top generals were PKI and that the generals were killed at a PKI paramilitary training center adjacent to the Halim Air Base. There is also the circumstantial evidence of the obvious sympathy for the September 30 Movement shown in Harian Rakjat and other pro-communist papers on the morning of October 2. These papers appeared after Suharto's recapture of Djakarta and the apparent failure of the Untung coup but they may have been prepared earlier. (A local anti-communist publisher told the reporting officer that Harian Rakiat normally goes to press about midnight and is printed during the early morning. Thus, if normal practice had been followed, it would not have begun to publish until some four hours after recapture of the capital by Suharto.) === [PDF page 33] === aggq) A-300, Djakarta Page 30 There is also the apparent flight of Aidit with Untung to Central Java. Aidit's movements are by no means as clear as Sukarno's, however. We do not yet know for sure that he was with Sukarno, Untung and Dani at the palace on the morning of October 1 or when he went to - Halim if, indeed, he did go there. While several reports mention him as being on the plane with Untung and Dani to Jogjakarta, his role is much more shadowy than that of Dani, for example. The leftist complexion of Untung's "Revolutionary Council" is another indication of PRI involvement, particularly since most of the non-communist names were apparently included as a cover and did not reflect the consent of the. people concerned. According to FND 8123, Untung's Revolutionary Council list included persons who were really involved in the coup, persons believed to have grudges against the captured Army leaders but who were not consulted in advance, and some additional names to create confusion. This report seems to be borne out by the nature of the list itself. c. Some Evidence Against PKI Instigation of the Coup .reports received early in the "coup HIMF Indicated that the timing and nature of the action were not of the party's choosing: r. although the PKI felt it would have to supportL e-lo tember 30 Movement. Earian Rakiat, although it supported Untung for allegedly preventing a generals' coup, also tried from the beginning to depict the affair as an internal armed forces matter. The PI as such never came out into the open, never attempted to use its mass strength and never appealed to its sympathizers or to the people at large to rise against a threatened Army coup. It is indeed difficult to understand why the PKI should decide to rely on organizations outside its own command structure and which were not numerous 127 i while failing to employ its own === [PDF page 34] === -300, Djakarta Page 31 orjan-izatio1 L in d irecLV. (on thie otier hand, much the samc tuing can be said of Mladiun where the PKI rebellion was also initiated by pro-PKI Army units.) d. Conclusions While some of the fact'are- sii too unclear to determine with any exactitide' PKImotives and the exact extent of the PrI role in planningr he September 30 affair, there is no question of PKl involvemenIE- init. There is considerable"idene that Sukarno hiiaself was involved although how'fr akarno actually coammitted himself to the PKI, Untung, Dani"and the others is not certain. If Sukarno was a pime'mover of the plot, the PKI would have probably'eltitslf peled to go along with him even if this edurseof action -seemed somewhat aGventurous. On th. other handz the PI itself was undoubtedly under the same 'pressures as Sukarno to "enter the socialist stage" before'Sukarno' death 'or incapacita- 1tioii--that is to achieve an institutihalization of communism and the elimination of- a hoJtle_rmy 'leadership that could turn on the PI whe'S no longer present to protect the Party. TIf the P teared an iimmainent Army coup, and there is some evidence to think it did, this would be another factorn&hing to precipitate a desperate PKI gamble to eliminate"'theimy leadership and "enter tne socialist stage"..sooner -rather than later. The PKI then was probably in 'a state"of willingness to cooperate in a plot to eliminate'the topAry leadership. A key question is whether- the^PRI and probably otaer elements such as Subandri.o andanidecided to act on their own and get Sukarno to j6inthemiiI laier, believing talat his basic political outlook waauch thit he would be pleased by such a development, or whether the plot was:aore the responsibility of Sukaino himself and the PKI was arawn into it. While there is-strongeircumstantial evidence === [PDF page 35] === A-300, Djakarta Page 32 (sco-Section 5) to support the second view, even if it is true, the evidence will probably be obscured both by Sukarno himself and by the Army and other non-communist elements that feel they need Sukarn6-a a symbol of national unity. If indeed Sakarno himself*was involved in a cold-blooded decision to eliminate the Army leadership, a decision that was probably worked out in cooperation with the PKI and other top Sukarno supporters such as Subandrio and Dani, a general and perhaps tentative decision to "do something" against the generals may have been taken as far back as mid-summer when the Army showed it would not agree to the Fifth Armed'Force 'and Nasakom advisory councils. A more specific commitment c6uld have come any time later and it may be thatithe concept of violent action grew gradually while fearsof an Army coup or Sukarno's death grew simultaneously until a climate of thought was reached in mid or late 'eptember where a plan was worked out that had been long in conception but was hurried in its details. Perhaps the details had not even been fully worked out when the atmosphere/Scalation gave rise to a hasty decision. -. Another key question is the timing of the decision to affect the coup and the timing of the PKI decision to act, if the latter was supplemental to the former. PKI arms acquisitions, PKI military training, which'seems to have been carried out on a crash basis, and other PKI emergency moves, all of which were concentrated in a relatively short period of a few weeks before October 1, may show that the decision to act was taken in early September. These acts may also have been a reaction-to fear of a "Generals' plot" or to a probable early demise of the President. In either case, the PKI decision to participate seems to have been a hurried one. === [PDF page 36] === A-300, flja!cnrta Pale. 33 4. The Role of Sukarno in the September 30 Affair Many knowledgeable Indonesians and most foreign diplomats in Djakarta believe that President Sukarno was involved in the September 30 Movement althof t universal agreement on the extent of his involvement.. Confession by the deputy of Colonel Latif, U31 dL one of the 1 egbel"commanders, which is said to fully implicate Sukarno an eports from Army sources and from an official of the PKI etariat(Rardojo which indicate Sukarno complicity in the September 30 plot. There were also reports that Untung implicated Sukarno although later reports say the contrary, possibly because of Army willingness to protect Sukarno's reputation in exchange for a quid Z quo. There is in addition a mass of circumstantial evidence and plain logic that points to Sukarno's involvement and possibly/tvenconception and direction of the plot. This eton will primarily be concerned with this circumstantial evidence. a. Theoretical Background (i) First, there is the record of Sukarno's close cooperation with the PKI merging in recent months into a virtual public identification with the PKI. Sukarno had publicly announced in March that Indonesia "had almost completed the National-Democratic stage and was now entering the Socialist stage" of the Indonesian revolution. Sukarno repeated this assertion at the MPRS session in April and on several occasions thereafter. The PI. intimated that Sukarno was being premature and emphasized that Indonesia was still in the National-Democratic stage and would remain so until certain objective conditions were fulfilled including a Nasakom Cabinet, completion of land reform and nationalization of all foreign enterprises. Sukarno did not quarrel with these conditions and, in May, also emphasized that Indonesta was still in the National-Democratic stage. He did not say again that Indonesia was "entering the socialist stage" until a week or so before the October 1 "coup" attempt. Did this indicate a renewal of his determination to bring about soon the elimination of all important opposition to totalitarian control? (ii) After Sukarno first began his emphasis on "entering the Socialist stage" last March, he launched two practical campaigns for the political liquidation of moderate elements that appeared at the time to be closely associated with the theoretical concept of entry into the Socialist stage. The first of these was the great purge of the PNI which resulted in the ouster of moderate elements in a campaign that lasted from March to August (although mopping-up actions were continuing thereafter). The second line of Sukarno's political offensive was aimed at the Army leadership. A more important target, it was far less susceptible to attack, however. (iii) Sukarno first demanded a reorientation of the Army's thinking (a "sharp turn of the -heel" as Sukarno put it) which would include renunciation of the Army idea that Indonesia's potential enemy lay to the === [PDF page 37] === A-300, Djakarta Page 34 North (China) and realization that Indonesia and Communist China were allies against Neholim, headed by the United States. Internally, the Army was also to stress Marxism in its indoctrination. Aidit, with the apparent support of Sukarno, soon demanded "Nasalcom advisory councils" which the Army correctly interpreted as a euphemism for a nascent system of political commissars. Aidit also called for arming the workers and peasants and Sukarno followed with the concept of a "fifth armed force" which was only a slight variation on the Aidit theme. The Army gave way to some degree but not to the point of relinquishing power over its own destiny as Sukarno and the PKI desired. (iv) The Army agreed in some areas to arm workers and peasants but tried to do so in a manner that would minimize PKI benefit. The Fifth Armed Force and Nasakom Advisory Council ideas were,'not expressly rejected but there was rather a recasting of these ideas by the Army in its counterproposals which would redound to Army rather than PRI benefit. The President referred to such activity as foot-dragging (plintat-plintut). Furthermore, the Sukarno-PKI offensive frightened the Army into forming a Generals Council to map political strategy. (v) In the face of Army recalcitrance and an increasing belief in a short life expectancy, Sukarno probably had come to the conclusion that some form of strong, decisive action was necessary if he were to succeed in his announced design to "enter the Socialist stage," which required the elimination of any independent political power on the part of the Army. (vi) At the PIf anniversary celebration, Sukarno began to take up a new but related theme. He praised, to a PNI audience, not the past of the PNI but rather the unsuccessful PKI revolt of 1926. He claimed that he had founded the PHI in 1927 to carry on in a new form the armed struggle against the Dutch and he execriated those who had advocated a policy of gradualism and conciliation. He repeated this theme in a number of speeches thereafter although these remarks did not receive much publicity On one occasion, he referred to five generations of Indonesian revolutionaries from (1) the Sarekat Islam through (2) the 1926 PKI, (3) the Algemene Studie Club and (4) the '45 Generation to (5) the present generation. He then asserted that he himself belonged to the second generation based on the 1926 -KI. Hie attacked the third generation as collaborators and revisionists. (vii) This public identification with the violent revolutionary tactics of the 1926 PKI revolt seems to show in retrospect that Sukarno himself 1 ac become convinced of the need for a violent transition from the National Democratic to the socialist Stage. This hypothesis is reinforced by other staterents. In his August 17 or "Takari" speech, Sukarno said that class arfare had not yet taken Iace in Indonesia but warned that it might if corruption and ostentations living by the rich (capitalist bureaucrats) continued. In Indonesia, "capitalist bureaucrat" is a PKI label applied === [PDF page 38] === tA-300, Djakarta Page 35 particularlyy to the bureaucratic machine built by Chairul Salcih in the ecoinomic Departments (ministries) and to the managers of state enterprises off whom a large proportion are Army officers. (viii) Sukarno's thinking also seems to be shown in a speech to the CGII Congress on Septerber 29. As quoted by Harian Rakiat of October 1 (and it has been confirmed that he actualV said this) Sukarno stated that "Earlier there were persons who were revolutionary but now they have become counterrevolutionary. And as explained in Takari, there also were loyal generals but now they have become protectors of counterrevolutionary elements. These we must crush." Even by itself this sounds like an allusion to planned violent action against the Army leadership. b. The Bare Facts of Sukarno's actions (i) Although much has not come out publicly on the September 30 affair, Sukarno's own actions and statements show a desire to protect the 'KI and initially even the Untung group itself. They are peculiar to say the least. (ii) Sukarno appointed General Pranoto-Reksosamodra--generally.considered to be sympathetic to the PKI or at least malleable--to take temporary command of the Army under Sukarno himself. Furthermore, this order was dated October 1 and oas printed in Harian Rakiat, the PKI paper, on October 2 and was absent from other newspapers. It is also known that, after Sukarno went to Bogor on October 2, he favored Pranoto over Suharto indicating that his appointment or attempted appointment of Pranoto was not made under duress from the Untung group. (iii) Sukarno publicly showed no appreciation for General Suharto's efforts to put down the Untung "coup" and has tended in fact to shun and downgrade Suharto. (His subsequent appointment of Suharto as Army commander was made only when the Army refused to accept anyone else.) He has shown no real public remorse for the murders of the generals. He has defended the Air Force role. He has indicated that his own movement to Halim Air Base was voluntary and that it was done in order to be prepared for flight if necessary. In other words he has implied thac there was a generals' plot and that the Tjakrabirawa was merely protecting him. He has thus attempted to leave the door open to expand on such charges if and when he regains control of the situation. c. Other Circumstantial Evidence (i) A third chain of circumstantial evidence lies in the absurdity of any plot of this kind that did not involve Sukarno. It is not reasonable to believe that the PKI, which had been doing so well riding Sukarno's coattails, would attempt to seize power through such a plot if it did not have the approval of Sukarno. It is unreasonable to suppose that the PKI, if it === [PDF page 39] === A,,-300, Djas~nrtza Page 36 did decide to seize power on its own, would fail to employ the classic weapons of communist revolutionary action and would rely on a small group of men rather than employing the Party's mass bulk. It is also difficult to believe that the PKI would give so much control to groups not in its chain of command such as the Air Force and the Tjakrabirawa. (ii) Some apologists for Sukarno argue that Aidit insulted Sukarno at the CGMI Congress on September 29 and Sukarno then became angry at the PKIforcing the latter to move. This explanation has been given by Ganis Harsono, the Foreign Department press spokesman, to foreign journalists for example. A recheck of the speeches that evening shows this not to be the case, however. Sukarno actually followed Aidit's speech with a speech that was very friendly to the CGMI in which he even hinted at a future ban of the HMI although he held back from actually doing so. (iii) It is also difficult to imagine an unknown minor officer like Untung seriously hoping to achieve power over a nation of more than 100,000,000 with a large standing Army and large military forces intact and far removed in other islands,through employment of a handful of men at the center. And it is hard to see how the Air Force could expect to be an effective instrument for a coup as air power is unsuited to this kind of use and, in fact, was not actually employed as such. (iv) The circumstances then point toward a plan of limited action for limited objective--not a seizure of power but rather the liquidation of a particular group, the top leadership of the Army. Fortunately, some key officers escaped and one, Suharto, was prepared to fight and had the troops to do so. If the plot had not been bungled in the execution, it appears that the stage had been set to pretend a narrow escape from a generals' coup. Sukarno then would have been free to step back on the stage and the last obstach to "the socialist stage" or unrestricted commitment to a communist Indonesia would have been cleared. d. Reservations (i) There are still questions to be answered, of course, that may alter this possible explanation. Why did Untung's second statement reduce all officers to Lieutenant Colonel and substitute a "Revolutionary Council" for Sukarno? Had Sukarno backed out when execution of the plot was badly handled? Was Untung left holding the bag and decided to grab power for himself if he were to take the main risks? Or wre these red herrings designed to obscure Sukarno's role when it became questionable whether the plot would succeed? Is there also a possibility, however remote, that the PKI, Subandrio and Dani proceeded on their own in the hope that Sukarno would follow along if they were successful? This latter possibility is conceivable but seems unlikely when one recalls the overwhelming e::tent to which Sukarno involves himself in political intrigue. This man is a wily, suspicious political === [PDF page 40] === A-300, Djazkarta- Page 37 tactician of the first order and it is almost impossible to imagine him appearing at the palace for several hours on the morning of October 1, then being at Halim in the very center of activity and not understanding the. situation. (ii) The case is not complete but the circumstantial evidence above indicates that Sukarno may be guilty of being the chief architect or at least the central figure of the September 30 Movement. The odds seem overwhelningly that, at the very least, he knew what was afoot and had given his tacit blessing to those who were actually executing the maneuver. === [PDF page 41] === A-300, Djakarta Page 38 5. What Might Have Been a. Successful Elimination of Senior Generals (i) In its pro-dawn capture and elimination of six key Army generals, the 30 September movement came close to eliminating entirely the group of Army leaders most able by position and temperament to mobilize effective counter-action. At least four additional officers are reliably reported to have been on the purge list. Nasution escaped by a hair. Major General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD, and Major General Mursjid, Army Deputy I for Operations were either warned in time to leave their homes or were already out. Brig. General Sukendro, Secretary General of NTOER and Minister attached to the Presidium, was in Peking and while thus physically safe he was also effectively removed from the possibility of prompt reaction. (ii) If the elimination raids had been successful in snaring Nasution, Mursjid and Suharto in addition to the others, as planned, timely response by organized military force would have been highly problematical. The possibility of such a response would have centered around four figures: 1) Major General Djamin Gintings, Operations Officer; 2) Major General Umar Wirahadikusuma, Djakarta area 3) Major General Basuki Rachmat, East Java Commander (KODAM VIII), who was temporarily in Djakarta; and 4) Major General Adjie, West Java Commander (KODAM VI), based in Bandung. (iii) It is noteworthy that it was apparently not these four, but the three officers slated for elimination (Suharto, ursjid and Nasution), who did mobilize action on October 1. Without them, would the political urgency of the situation have presented itself with sufficient clarity to the remaining officers in time? Probably not. Adjie would have been prepared to act firmly, but it is unlikely that at his distance he would have been sure enough of the true situation in time. It was Djakarta-based troops which reasserted local control October 1. Only later did Siliwangi Division elements move in to assist. (iv) The success of an effort such as that staged in Untung's name would depend heavily upon prolonging the period before the situation became clear enough for reaction to be mobilized. If the purge had been wholly successful, it is likely that Untung would have been able to hold === [PDF page 42] === A-300, Djakarta "SEGRET Page 39 Djakarta October 1. His control over communication media would have inhibited a prompt response from Adjie in Bandung. By October 2, if Untung's forces had still presented the impression of success, additional elements would probably have gravitated to their side and the political momentum would have begun to gain real force. At this stage, Sukarno might well have come out openly on behalf of the "revolutionary council and the opportunity for remaining Army leaders to coalesce their scattered echelons and plan effective stopping action would have been largely lost. Under these circumstances, the brutal murder of the generals would probably have been revealed only later, under circumstances in which the emphasis could be placed on the threat that this was what happened to "enemies of the revolution", who "plot against the President." With the Sukarno-PKI bandwagon then in high gear, the intimidation factor of the murder revelations would have overbalanced their stimulation to effective counteraction. (v) In assessing the nearness of Untung's success, it is necessary also to take into account the major reduction in Army troops available on Java to maintain security. Over a period of time, major elements of the Java Army commands have been moved to the "front-linet areas in Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi in support of confrontation. This had been a cause of concern to the senior Army leadership, which before the coup attempt had been attempting to get some of these troops back to Java. Certainly this reduction in forces available provided an unusually favorable opportunity for the type of action which was attempted and would have made subsequent terrorism by PKI mass action groups much more effective. General Umar had only two of his usual three battalions under his command in the Djakarta area. Almost all of the Siliwangi Division's infantry had been sent elsewhere. Thus only a few additional key battalion unit. defections to Untung could have made a major difference in the Djakarta area. With momentum established, these could have easily been forthcoming, perhaps from the Tjakrabirawa or infiltrated elements of the Diponegoro Division, in the city for Armed Forces Day, if not from YDDAM V itself. Even now, Djakarta is guarded primarily by raider, paratroop, and armored elements of the Siliwangi Division, there being no infantry to spare. (vi) The odds therefore are that only the ability to nip Untung's momentum in the bud beginning October 1 prevented the development of an almost irreversible victory for the PKI and Sukarno which would have tipped the Indonesian political balance drastically and probably definitively toward an avowed communist state, and at the least would have permanently === [PDF page 43] === --Sagasy- A-300, Djakarta Page 40 emasculated the Army as a united opposition political force. Without men such as Suharto and Nasution still alive in Djakarta, men who commanded prestige and loyalty and who at the same time quickly grasped the stakes of the game and the necessity to move quickly, it must be questioned whether the response would have come promptly enough. b. Capture of Army Leadership Alive, Without Executions. (i) If the Army leadership had merely been seized and not executed, the entire episode would have taken on a different character. In such circumstances, the necessity for an accompanying armed seizure of Djakarta in the name of the "revolutionary council" would not seem to be necessary, thus this possibility is somewhat more theoretical than that under "a" above. (ii) The logical course of action would have been to denounce the Generals for plotting against Sukarno. With Sukarno's participation in this denunciation and denigration, the prestige of the Army would be seriously damaged; a majority of other officers would in most likelihood try to exonerate themselves personally through effusive pledges of support to the Great Leader of the Revolution. While some would have serious doubts that such a plot ever existed, it would not be politically safe to suggest this. (iii) Such a course of action would thus emasculate the Army leadership and appear to pave the way for acceptance of the PKI/Sukarno pressure to install political commissars within the Army command structure, ostensibly to prevent any further "counterrevolutionary" plotting. It would have dangers, however. Sukarno would have to be completely and irrevocably committed in advance and not subject to later persuasion by the captured generals. The detention of the generals would be a continuing problem. As long as they were alive they would be a potential nucleuscf opposition to the march of the revolution. Their families and their military colleagues would still have influence and power. An assisted escape, followed by attempts to mobilize Army elements or external opposition would continue to be possible. (iv) In conclusion, to have settled for capture and denigration of Army leaders with Sukarno's collaboration would have entailed considerably fewer immediate risks of counteraction and would have been almost equally effective in emasculating the Army as a political force. However, it would have had some long-term instabilities and would not have clearly shaken-up the status quo and provided a clean unimpeded impetus toward the "socialist state" which Sukarno has repeatedly indicated as a goal. === [PDF page 44] === A-300, Djakarta Pacg fl (v) That the easier course was not taken may have been due to a combination of factors. Among these may have beenis PRI fear that at some point Sukarno would weaken in his opposition to the generals' group, the inherent tendency to violent action inherent in communist doctrine and propaganda, and the desire of all concerned to shift the spectrum dramatically and irrevocably toward the far left. One other important factor is not to be discounted, however. The peaceful capture of the Army leadership would have required Sukarno's own prompt denunciation of them and their "plot" to generate the necessary momentum against the Army as an institution. The more violent course of force enabled Sukarno to hold back his own overt commitment somewhat longer and thus avoid exposing himself prematurely as a partisan of a cause which might fail. Since any plan might fail, the course which allowed the safety factor of delayed commitment may have been much more attractive. It had the advantage not only of preserving the President's own position, but also of strengthening the effectiveness of his future influence in removing the worst effects of defeat for the PRI and the Air Force leadership. === [PDF page 45] === .- 300, Djakarta i(e'42 6. Future Prospects a. The future development of the situation will depend importantly on the Army's will and skill for united political action, Sukarno's ability to outmaneuver the Army (without bringing on a clear showdown in which Army power would be effectively wielded), and the PKI estimate of its chances for renewed political respectability. b. In the short run (i.e. up to about two months hence), three alternative courses are open: (i) the Army and Sukarno continue to parry for position and concessions, with one or the other succeeding in welding a position of structural strength for the future; (ii) an open Army versus PRI clash occurs involving guerrilla fighting, sabotage and virtual civil war; or (iii) a direct Army initiative is taken to circumscribe Sukarno's power and retain him only as a national figurehead. c. These developments will in their turn probably lead to one of the following three results which should be apparent in their major outline within six months: (i) Sukarno ascendency and progress toward renewed communist domination of the political scene; (ii) a condition of insurgency and anarchy with the PRI in rebellion; or (iii) Army control of the government, possibly through an Army junta, but more likely through hand-picked civilian leaders. The Army a. A key factor in assessing these possibilities is the political will and cohesion of the Army. Sukarno's own broad strategy is clear. He will try to whittle away Army initiative through apparent concessions, probably even to the extent of banning the present PKI. In so doing, however, he will try to reassert the preeminence of his own position and stop the anti-communist attacks short of long-term structural damage to the far left in Indonesia. b. The P1l has three alternatives: (i) rebuild its domination under the protecting wing of the President's influence, probably under an ostensibly new aegis; (ii) go underground and slowly begin the process of rebuilding the party; or (iii) go into active guerrilla opposition from prepared redoubts while using mass organizations to disrupt theeconomy and urban life as well as terrorize anti-communist elements. In the short run, however, the PRI has lost the initiative. Which of the three choices open to it is taken tz depends first of all on what the Army does and the success of Sukarno's tactics. Let us first look at the Army. c. The Army leadership has been emotionally aroused by the terroristic decimation of its ranks. If the Army is to act as a positive political force beyond the immediate present, it must capitalize on the present momentum and sense of outrage. Such a clear opportunity is not- === [PDF page 46] === A-300, Djakarta 1.1.':ely to be o'Corcd again whilc the present: Arly leaders still lead. The Indonesian Army has always lacked the strength of a monolithic organization, however, and has lacked cohesion or unity of political action. During the years of Yani command, the territorial nature of the Army was reduced in significance and greater centralization effected, but the Army still offers something less than a smoothly unified force which its commanders can depend upon to stand behind them no matter what the situation. d. Never before has the Army been willing to force through its policies in the face of strong Presidential opposition. Nasution himself has in the past been identified with a policy of military subordination to the President's will. Now, much of the politically oriented leadership of the Army is gone. The group left lacks depth of numbers. Many middle grade officers and most in the lower ranks represent a more professionally oriented post-revolution group which views the military as properly subordinate to the President and the political scheme of things, in contrast with the older officers who won their spurs in the revolution and have always felt the Army has a role to play in determining the political order of things. e. These factors, plus recent events, indicate that it may be difficult for the Army leadership to combine for clear and effective longrange political goals and that it is even less likely that they could directly challenge Sukarno's power and prevent fragmentation of their command while doing so. Sukarno's skill in looking beyond immediate command relationships and concessions of form to problems of political power cannot be underestimated. f. The Army has moved swiftly in the first half of October to crack down on the PKI and has encouraged non-communist political groups to carry the torch further in wrecking the facilities of PKI organizations and demanding the PKI's dissolution. In a challenge such as this--a clash with the PKI as the physical adversary--Army capabilities are most effective. The political aspects are simplified. The task reduces to the physical crushing of an opponent. On the present basis, however, the campaign may be already close to tapering off as Sukarno reasserts political preeminence and calls the Army to heel. From the Army's point of view, perhaps the most favorable development at present (short of Sukarna'sdemise would be for the PKI to go into open rebellion or guerrilla warfare.j/a Army sources speaks with ill-disguised anticipation: mnenceo0 u a development. The clash would enable the Army to continue to ride the wave of its present preeminence. A state of war could be declared throughout the country, instead of just in Djakarta as at present. Issues would be reduced to black and white, and the political maneuvering which the Army understandably fears, would have to take a back seat to the military prosecution of a campaign which, if successful, would reduce counist organized strength and prestige virtually to the post-Madiun period and leave the Army as the undisputed power in the country. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the === [PDF page 47] === violence,L Army and Army-inspired actions against the PI in the second week of October may have been partly pursued in the hope that a violent PKI reaction could be provoked and thus settle the entire question without further talk. Now is the ideal time in some ways for the Army to be committed to a struggle to the death with the PKI. The Army starts with its elements purged and strengthened and with a record of having saved the country in the nick of time; whereas the party starts with part of its organization and communications shattered and with the onus of one ill-conceived adventure freshly laid at its door. The PKI a. Will the PRI shift to active insurgency? It may, but probably only if it concludes that Sukarno has been and will continue to be unsuccessful in reestablishing sufficient control to offer protection from continued systematic harassment of the party. Another alternative is for the party quietly to submerge underground to lick its wounds and begin the long process of rebuilding sufficient strength in secret to challenge once more the course of Indonesian political development. However, the sense of imminent success which has been developed in the party followers in recent years calls for more forthright action. The party's gospel of violence, combined with its unwieldy size and the difficulty of maintaining discipline for a long, slow and undramatic recovery after the major successes of recent years would seem to make such a choice unlikely. b. Furthermore, the party still must be considered as having the capacity for insurgency of sufficient magnitude at least to cause serious security problems and bring on economic crisis. Contingency planning for such activity is known to exist. Redoubts have been prepared. Infiltration and PKI control in unions and other mass organizations offer adequate tools for paralyzing the economy and estimates of the number of weapons in the hands of P1l cadres have constantly grown as more information has become available. Only an insignificant fraction of these weapons have yet been recovered. Thus insurgency may be the second alternative for the PRI if it is pressed, but the time to decide would appear to be short. The Army is acutely aware of the present shortage of troops on Java and is moving rapidly to bring home additional units from "the border areas." By mid-November, the Army will probably be much better prepared to contain an insurgency situation. The optimum outcome for the PKI is still Sukarno's protection for its overt legal recuperation and open participation on the Indonesian political scene. === [PDF page 48] === lhutw --A-300, Djakarta Page 45 The Army vs. the PRI a. If, therefore, the Army's clearest road to power is through a direct confrontation with the PLi at such time as the party is reeling, and a prevention thereby of a return to the fuzzy concepts behind which the PKI can again hide its inimical face, then the September 30 Movement may actually have triggered the Army prematurely into attacking the PKI. If Sukarno had already died, or had died in the midst of the 30 September events, the emotional trigger of Army retaliation against the communists would proceed to a fairly definitive conclusion. But the Great Leader of the Revolution is not dead. The present wave of anti-PKI activity has given the PKI a serious setback, but it is not dead either. With the President's restraining hand felt increasingly strongly, the Army campaign can grind to a near halt. If then the President is later able to shunt aside those few remaining Army figures wiho have shown themselves most able to wield political-military command and act firmly against the communists, it will be the PKI which can laugh last. The "new" Army would then probably be less quick to assert political leadership in the post-Sukarno era and to defy communist policies and organization. b. The best odds are, therefore, that if Sukarno lives, he will be the single most important political figure. The Army will maintain some gains, at least temporarily, and Sukarno will not again acquire completely unfettered power. The PRI will have to be purified sybolically in some form, either through holding only certain leaders culpable, reorganizing under a new name, or formation of what Sukarno calls a single "Pioneer Party" including aE "progressive revolutionary elements" of the present parties, which would -thea cease to exist. By any.cf these means the communists could again rise to Spos~iticn of political influence. However, events of early October will leave c'eep. scars. "Djakerta" can now become another rallying cry in addition to "Hadiun" and the conuenists -an probably be kept on the defensive for a lons time. c. If Sukano soAald die within- the next six months, any reassertion of cor.nunist strength would appear to be easily reversible. The Army would still in tlat s-an o. _ time be able to retain some gains forged in the present tzisis, and the memories ill still be fresh. Thus the prospect for clear Army confrontation of the zonunists in the event of a Sukarno demise is considerably greater than it was before, at least in the short run. === [PDF page 49] === A-300, Djakarta Page 46 ConehIunions a. The PRI has received a serious setback to its prestige and structure. The task of rebuilding will be a long one, but with Sukarno's support, the party can return to a position of political importance if the Army permits this to happen. b. Direct Army action against Sukarno now seems unlikely. It appears that the Army believes it needs Sukarno as a symbol of unity and will not attempt publicly to link him with the September 30 Movement. c. The President will not, for the foreseeable future, regain the degree of power and prestige which was his before September 30 but he will probably again be the single most important figure. d. While the degree to.which the Army will stand up to Sukarno cannot be predicted with any certainty, odds are that the Army will exercise a far greater restraining influence on Sukarno than before September 30. e. Sukarno will probably be successful in restoring communist legitimacy in some form, perhpas as one pillar of a united party. f. The communist capability for insurgency which could cause serious difficulty is still significant, but will probably not be resorted to except in extremis. g. The Army would be most effective in a direct power confrontation with the PKI, despite the chaos which this could cause. h. If Sukarno dies in the near future, recent events will assist the Army in taking over effective control and moving against the PK. i. The immediate future is a critical time for non-communist political forces. They must move quickly and effectively into the organizational vacuums throughout the bureaucracy left by the PRI's disordered retreat, and establish a precedent of non-communist policy direction. J. Some changes of emphasis are likely in the foreign policy field, at least unless Sukarno regains absolute control. The Army will attempt to downgrade Indonesia's de facto alliance with Peking. Anti-western themes will continue, though new ones will not be created so facilely by an Army-influenced government. Confrontation against Malaysia will also continue, but new military adventures in implementation of confrontation are extremely unlikely for the time being. Military forces and energies will be directed primarily to the domestic situation. Indonesia may devote less of its energies to anti-western international conferences, particularly if Djakarta's relations with Peking worsen and Communist China becomes less willing to finance and support Indonesia's adventurism. For the as dor: Edward E. Masters Counselor of Embassy for litical Affairs === [PDF page 50] === [Unreadable] Action NINNVV MJB528JBA488 Info IRR RUEHCR DE RUMJBT 1066A 2960705 ZNY SSSSS R 230545Z 11.41 VMI AMEMBASSY UJAKART TO SECSTATE W i 64 I STATE GRNC LIM)I0S f (unles.i j~ssible, insert J te or event 1. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT, EVEN ASSUMING -A ±ui -N--inumi .CURRENT -OLITICAL TRENDS AND GROWTH OF AN ANTI-COMMUNIST rOSTURE BY EFFECTIVE GOI AUTHORITIES, THE LIKELIHOOD.OF AN OFFICIAL PUBLIC INDONESIAJ REQUEST FOR AID OR OF UNITED STATES GOVT FAVORABLE RESPONSE THERETO OR OF US VOLUNTARY OFFER OF AID, DOES NOT RPT NOT SEEM TO BE PRESENTLY IN THE CARDS. ANY OF THESE ACTIONS WOULD PROBABLY EVOKE UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL REACTIONS EITHER IN INDONESIA OR IN THE UNITED STATES. AND YET EMBASSY IS RECEIVING DAILY AND INCREASINGLY, INFORMAL APPROACHES. PAGE TWO RUMJBT 1066A DESIGNED TO ELICIT US ASSISTANCE. MANY OF THESE APPROACHES ARE ALLEGEDLY MADE ON BEHALF OF NASUT -SUHARTO ARMY LEADERSHIP FOLLOWING PARAS SUMMARIZE'TYPES OF ASSISTANCE THAT MIGHT BE - DESIREABLE IN DAYS AHEAD. 2. OVERT HELP WHICH MIGHT BE POLIT. ICALLY SAFE WOULD BE:. A. INCREASED VOLUNTARY AGENCY FOOD SHIPMENTS UNDER. PL 480 TITLE III, WHICH CAN BE CONDUCTED T HROUGH EXISTING NON- GOVERNMENT CHANNELS (EMBTEL 990): B. EXTENSION EXPORT CdIT INSURANCEE TO AMERICAN EXPORTS TO INDONESIA (SEE SEPTEL): C. IF REQUESTED BY-PROPER IND)ONESI AN AUTHORITIES, RESUMPTION - TrAINING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY?ERS ONNEL IN US: D. ROUTINE HANDLING OF INiDONESIAN TRADE INQUIRIES FOR COMM- ERCIAL BASIS RICE IMP3aTS. EXA"IPLE OF THIS IS REQUEST CON- VEYED LAST THURSDAY TO BOTH AUSTRAL IAN TRADE COMMISSIONER AND THIS EMBASSY FOR 80,00- TONS RICE 0 N COMMERCIAL BASIS WITH BEST POSSIBLE PAYMENT TERMS AND NOV EMBER RPT NOVEMBER DELIVERY. SANITiZED Authority STATE letter,MAYj j 979 C uniopnyS" B4ibrarpOn-Libria === [PDF page 51] === ft2- 1164, OCTOBER 23, FROM DJAKARTA CASH PAYMENT WAS INDICATED AS POSSIBLE AT LEAST FOR PORTION OF THE 80,000 TONS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEAR THAT GOI RPT GOI (INCLUDING PALACE, ARMY, DEPT OF FONAFFAIRS). I- PAGE THREE RUMJBT 1066A et'FiREPARED TO GO BACK 0" SUKARNO'S EMBARGO AGAINST RICE IMPORTS. ANNOUNCED AUGUST 17, 1964. S. SMALL AaOU TS OF CAREFULLY PLACED ASSISTANCE GIVEN WITHOUT .UBLICITY 'TO STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF THOSE WE MT TO SEE WIN IN CURRENT MORTAL STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL eOWEr. WHERE SUCH ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE VITAL IN THAT SrRUGGLE WE PROBABLY SHULD'BE READY TO GIVE SUCH ASSISTANCE PR OPTLY BUT IF AND ONLY IF IN GIVING IT WE WILL NOT BE WEAK- ENING THE ARMY POLITICALLY. 4. BETWEEN THE AREAS 'SKETCHED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ABOVE, THERE IS A THIRD ZONE OF USG ACTIVITY WHICH COULD BE USEFULLY APPLIED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY WELL EMERGE IN INDONESIA. WE ARE RECEIVING NUMBEROUS UNOFFICIAL INTERMEDIARY-TYPE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN SUPPLYING FOODSTUFFS, ESPECIALLY RICE. THERE HAS BEEN NO RPT NO OFFICIAL REQUEST SO FAR,. .NDO:NESIAN ARMY APPEARS TO E ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THESE INGfTRIES, APPARENTLY MOTIVATED [Unreadable] BY WISH TO SUBSIDIZE MARKET PRICE OF RICE AND THEREBY IMPROVE ITS POLITICAL STJIENGTH WITH GENERAL?3PULACE OR TO RETAIN LOYALTY ITS OWN MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH ARMY HAS PRESENTED THESE INQUIRIES THiOUGH ALMOST BEWILDERING VARIETY OF INTERMEDIARIES. 5. WERE EMBASSY TO BE REQUESTED BY AUTHENTIC GOI REPRESEN- TATIVE FOR DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIAN ARMY, WHICH PROBABLY WOULD. BE IN FOOD LINE, AND WERE WE SATISFIED THAT ARMY HAD EFFECTIVE, POLITICALLY SOUND MEANS,.OR USING THIS ASSISTANCE, A ONIE-SHOT SECRET USG CONTRIBUTION, MIGHT BE CONSIDERED, I SUGGEST Copy, Lyndon.nn sesJhsonY Libra === [PDF page 52] === 1164, OCTOBER 23, FROM DJAKARTA PAGE FIVE URUMJT 1066A. AEPARTLTMENT NOW EXPLORE AVAILABILITY FUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR P OMPT REPLY ANY SUIQG REQUEST AND ALSO.. EXPLORE HOW THIS OfRATION COULD BE DONE WE WOULD WANT TO AVb, OF COURsE, ANY ASSISTANCE TO ARM~YWHICH WOULD MAKE IT SOFT.OR EXPOSE IT TO OYULAR ACCUSATION OF BEING PRIVILEGED CLASS. ii 6. AIRGRAM FOLLOWS WHICH SETS FORTH OUR THOUGHTS REGARDING INADVISABILITY ANY RESUMPTION OVERT, LARGE SCALE USG ECONO'IIC ASSISTANCE TO INONESIA. QUESTION OF POSSIBLE RE-ENTRY. INDONESIA INTO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND POTENTIAL PARTICIPATION REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR LONG .TERM INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT IS PREMATURE AT THIS MOMENT BUT WE ARE KEEPING IT IN MIND IN OUR INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS. FlEARWHILE EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING CURRENT STATUS DEeARTMIENT'S CONTINGENCY PLANNING INDONESIAN FOOD SITUATION IN LIGHT FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS. GP-2. GREEN Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Liabrary -'. C' 75 - Lyndo. Baines Jono Lira === [PDF page 53] === INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State 1 Adn ., 03 2 4 03228 [Unreadable] 00 R UE HCR DE RUMJBT. 7"3A 3081240 ZNY SSSSS FM aEMBSSYDJAKAR -______'~4 [Unreadable] INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK ORITY 114 STATE' GR NC 1 F. NOV 419,65 12356, Se*.14. E DE.0. REF: ENSTELS, 12885, NRA, Dt DEPTEL 562 AtD5 64; 1..1 AM ICUMPLETELY 'SATISFIED AS TO GENERAL SJKENDRO'S CREDENTIAt, AS SPOKESMEN. FOR NASUTION-SUHARTO ON AID 14'TTERS. JHIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.DURING PAST DAY IN CONVERSATIONS tCOIQ.T..ETHEL iHAS' HAD WITH NASUT ION' S AIDE AND- ' G* DCM'S CONVER SAT1ION1EMBTEL 1326) WITH HIGH RANKING OFFli&' ON NASUT IONS'S rSAFF. IT IS ALSO SUBSTANTIATED BY ALL WE KNOW OF CLOSE RELATIONSHIP i BETWEEN SUKENDRO- UiARTONASUT10N. 3. ARMY IS DOING 9 FIRST CLASS JOB HERE OF MOVING AGAINST COMMUNISS, AND BY ALL CURRENT INDICATJWS ISeTHE EMERGING )AUfT. IN INDONESIA. WE WILL BE.DDING.ALL WE CAN TO LEARN MORE ABUT POSITVE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES OF NEW LEADERS AND WILL BE -SEEKING THROUGH SUCH DISCREET CHANNELS AS ARE AVAILABLE TO US TO INJECT OUR VIEWS AND SUGGEST IONS.INTO'THEIR THINGKING. OBVIOUSLY THI9 NEW AUTHORITY HAS SHORTCOMINGS'AND OBVIOUSLY IT ;HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FOCUSON WHOLE COMPLEX O ITJORISSUES BECA.UgE IAT ENGAGED IN A LIFE AND -DEATH STRUGGLE WITH BOTH "THE.CoN4UNjSTZAND-WIT ItT HE..AFFILIATED SUKARNO GROUP.THAT INCLUDES SUSA NDR10, MUCH OF THE 1 P TINDO, AND.A HOST OF... 4?44 === [PDF page 54] === -2-1333, November 4, from: Djakarta *MINISTERS AND OTHER KEY OFFICIALS WHO HAVE RISENIN THE HIERARCHy DUE TO THEIR SUBSERVIENCE AND OBEISANCE TO SUKARNO. THE NEW AUTHORITY, IF IT IS TO SUCCEED AT ALL, WILL FIRST HAVE TO CLEAN OUT THIS AUGEAN STABLE. THIS MAY TAKE SOME TIME. IT WILL ALSO TAKE SOME DOING. -IN THE ?AGE TIMEE RUMJBT 173A~meR9t IMMEDIATE OFFING THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF PACIFYING AND. ESTABLISHING A FIRM CONTTROL OVER COMMUNIST REDOUBT AREAS, PART ICULARLY IN CENTRAL JAVA, AND OF COMBATTINGPKI SABOTAGE AND TERROR* THERE IS LIKELY TO BE BLOODSHED INVOLVING MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIAN YOUTH GROUPS, AS WELL AS MILITARY AND OTHERS. NEED FOR MEDICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE LIKELY.TO BE VERY REAL AND URGENT.. * IT-IS AGAINSTTHIS BACKGROUND -THATI.BELIEVE RESHOULD GIVE SYaPATHETIC RESPONSE TC SUKENDRO'S REQUESTVFOR MEDICINES. THIS IS PRECISELY KIND OF ITEM WITH WHICH WE CAN SYMBOLIZE TO NEW AUTHORITY OUR DESIRE TO HELP. IT IS -A ONE SHOT OPERATION INVOLVING RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNT OF MONEY. IT IS CLEARLY DEFENSIBLE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. IT COULD HELP ESTABLISH BASIS FOR ABETTER,.WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH KEY INDONESIAN OFFICIALS, ANL HELP DISPEL AT LEAST SOME OF SUSPICIONS AND HOSTILITY PRODUCED BY YEARS OF SUKARNO-SUBANDRIO-PKI PROPAGANDA. - 5. OUR INDONESIAN MILITARY. CONTACTS HAVE BEEN SAYING TO US OVER PAST MONTH NOT TO COME TO THEN TO DISCUSS -AID; THAT WHEN THE MOMENT CAMETHEY WULD GIVE US THEIR SPECIFIC PAGE FOUR RUMJBT 173 REQUEST AS TO HOW WE'COULD BE OF GREATEST HELP. THIS' THEY HAVE NOW DONE, AND I RECOMMEND THAT WE RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY AND SOONEST TO SUKENDRO-RE APPEAL: FOR MEDICINES. GREE *As received, will be served upon request. Advance copy to S/S-0 at 7:47 a.m. 11/4/65 - Passed to White House at 8:05 a.m. 11/4/65