Beijing May festivals highlight Communist 'peace' campaign in Asia (1952)

=== [PDF page 1] === DEPARTMENT OF STATE ukt~~~RPR ~ LIam ECO F D Report-,,7 iIntelligence No. 5917 Office of Intelligence Rese'rt"h CA-Il:2TT SECURITY INFORMATION Date: May 27, 1952 PEI-P'tING MAY FZSTIVALS HIGiLIGHT COMMUNIST "PACE" CAMPAIGN IN ASIA May Celebrations in Pei-p'ink During the present month Pei-p'ing is the scene of a series of Communist propaganda celebrations and meetings that rival in many respects the Moscow, International Economic Conference (IEC) of April. The meetings are reminiscent of those sponsored by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in Pei-p' ing in November-December 1949. They include, besides festivals in honor of iay Day, of the four "cultural giants" -- Victor Hugo, Leonardo Da Vinci, Nikolai Gogol, and Avicenna --,pnd of Chinese Youth, meetings, conferences, and inspection tours by trade union and "cultural" delegations from numerous countries.1 The series of May meetings is to be concluded on.May 28 with she convening of a reparatory meeting fora "Peace Conference of Asia and the Pacific Area." According to the Pei-p'ing radio, an invitation to this conference issued over the names of eleven Chinese "democratic Personages" headed. by Soong Ch'ing-ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and Kuo Mo-jo has brought response from "peace fighters" in twenty countries of Asia and the Pacific areas, For example, the May 1 celebration was attended, according to the Pei-p'ing radio by eighteen JFTU and trade union delegations, fourteen deviations to the IBC enroute home, and miscellaneous groes including a Korean People's Delegation and a Hungarian State People's ensemble. Several of the dclegationo have semiofficial status and contain non-Communists, most prominent of whom is MIne, Pandit, heading an Indian delegation. DECLASSIrILD h 1ffLA N1N T-IUIG EWC1RERR Q AN DAL VA - TEkEKQV iPWT ME=N tAt IP0Ll1C Y_ Final analysis of the material contained in this report was concluded on May 27, 19.52, by the Division oi. search for Far East. Copy No. -SECU INORMATIONi === [PDF page 2] === SECURITY IFORMAT ION including the Americas,l many of' whom will presumably attempt to restrictions attend the Ma 28 preparatory conference, governmental permitting. The Pei-p'ing radio has emphasized that the delegates attending these meetings andcolebrations represent "countries of different social systems....Land/ symbolize the desire on the part of the working class of various countries and the peace-loving people of all countries for peaceful cooperation." This idea is amplified by Pei-p'ing's statement that the Peace Conference is being called in response to the "proposal of a number of personages of India and other friendly nationss" 2.. New Propaganda Emphasi s The most noteworthy propaganda aspect of these mcetings has been the forceful restatement of the current Communist "peace" line, involving the "peaceful" domestic achievements and plans of the Pei-p'ing regime, the "sympathy" of the Chinese people for the struggle for "peace" of other peoples, the solidarityy" of the Communist bloc, and the efforts of Com:minist nations to promote "coexistence," international trade, and universal prosperity. While the propaganda associated with the May meetings contain no drastic departures from the cliches of previous similar occasions, the May Day slogans, speeches, and statements give strikingly that was so little emphasis to the theme of "armed struggle" prominent in the 194.9 meetings and subseoue.ntly. Unlike previous slogans, neither the Soviet nor the Chinese May Day slogans referred specifically to the "struggle" in Asia; instead slogans were directed at Japan and the "people of all nations" who oppose "imperialist aggression." The deemphasis of the "armed struggle theme was accented by the relatively uneventful Communist iIay Day observance in southeast Asia and by the absence of military display from the Pei-p' ing celebration. A basis for contrast with the militant 1949 meetings was provided by a report of Ernest Thornton, anAusti-alianCommunist trade union leader and a member of the three-man "Asian-Australasian Liaison Thornton Bureau" of the WFTU, established at the 1949 meetings. set forth the following conditions of the present "working class struggle" in Asia: The countries listed by Pei-p'ing are.Australia, the Mongolian Peoples Republic, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Burma, Indonesia, Colombia, Korea, India, Chile, Mexico, El Salvador, Ceylon, Japan, Vietnam, Laos, and the the US, Canada, Pakistan, Soviet Union. SECURITY INFORMAT ION === [PDF page 3] === n:TIJrflT! T SECURITY I:NFORG.TION "A condition for successful trade union action for a for the workers is the establishment and bettor life maintenance of peace in Asia and throughout the world." "A condition for normal trado union activity is the liberation of colonial and. semicolonial countries from opporession and xp.oitation by the foreign imperialists and their lack:eys; and so the 'FTU unhesitatingly takes its stand in support of the national liberation struggles of the peoples of colonial and somicolonial countries." "'We Lworker7 noed freedom to moot our ideas and experiences. each other and exchange Thornton's present "conditions'differ in content and tone from the "lines of action" laid down in Novcmber 1949 by Liu Shao-ch' i for the "Asian-Australasian Trade Union Conference" in Pei-p'ing: "The ar:ed struggles of the colonies and semicolonies in attacks to win national indepndence resisting iperialist are a mighty force in strengthening and defending world peac... "I think that our Trade Union Confercnce of Asian and Australasian Countries should support the wars of national liberation of these countries in resisting the attack of the imperialists and their lackeys. It is only after the victory of the war of national liberation and the driving out of the imperialists from the oppressed countries in Asia and Australasia that it will be possible to liberate the working class, to raise the workers living standard, to improve the working conditions and to secure the trade union rights in It is impossible to achieve fundamental these countries. bettercent of the workers livelihood under the conditions maintaining their colonial when the inperialists are still and sem:icolonial rule. To fight for national. independence democracy is therefore the suprc.nie task of the and working class in the colonial and semicolonial countries..." people's Comnimist Policies in Asia The differences betwen the current propaganda and that issued in 1949, examined in the light of other Commonist developments, suggest that the focus of Communist activity in Asia may be swinging from the naked and fo,'ceful acquisition of power by the Communists to a more disguised struggle to sten the advancing poower of anti"National liberation" is no longer defined Communist forces. exclusively as the direct creation of a Comnuni;t-controlled state, - CITILITTI S.7 CURITYIiNGiubMATIOT === [PDF page 4] === o9C:BI-rIrSECURITY INFOIMAATIOT but may in some instances involve the prior installation of a nonIn a number of countries -Communist regime unfriendly to the west. particularly India, Burma, and Indonesia -~ Communist activities appear to bo directed principally at orienting the governments of these countries away- from a pro-western alignment. Programs issued for the Indian, Japanese, and certain other Asian Communist parties contain little or no reference to the Communist techniques for seizing power. As evidenced recently in India, Burma, and Indonesia, Communist overtures for 'united fronts" have generally been oroadened to comprehend all possible anti-westorn, "neutralist," or, in some cases, non-governmental groups, bo they left socialists or oxtrome right wing elements. In some cases the "united front" The "progressive" and may even be predominantly non-Communist. "democratic" forces now comprise not nnly the Cormunists and proCommunists and the peasant-urban forces that were to provide their military support, but include all possible "patriotic" strata, anirnus against the west or against professions, and groups with a pro-western regime. Nocw Forms for Comunist Violence The apparent shift in Comunist propaganda line has been masked to soo extent by the Communist effort to conserve such may have T.ade or may be expected to make gains as "armed struggle" a continuity with previous policy in certain arcas, and to nintain For exa.ple, a Pcople's Daily by retaining some of the old slogans. May Day editorial pointed out that "the people's struggle in some colonial countries has already developed into open armed struggle, and regular people's forces and large-scaleo guerrilla forces have However, a recentl; noted tendency has been for been organized." the Communists to refer only to the "struggle" in Indochina, Malaya, and to a much lesser extent the Philippines, with almost no reference to other areas as was previously the c ase. The "poacOful" tonc of the Pei-p' ing celebrations see:.is to be contradicted also by the May Day violence in Japan, by Pei-p'ingts prompt "support" of that violence, by the threatening tone of Pei-p' ingts comrments on the JapaiCsC treaty, and by the exhortations However, for "struggle by force" broadca.st by Radio Free Japan. Communist propaganda directed at Japan stresses not only militancy and "struggle" but also the social and econoic grievances of broad classes of Japanose -- both workers and "bourgeois" business groups. The propaganda is directed at Japanese racial and nationalistic feelings and appeals to Japanese irredentist sentiment with regard The Connunist-inspired violence seems to be designed Okinawa. to supplement the propaganda by providing "evidence" of popular uprisings and governmental repression, by intimidating pro-western groups, and by accolorating the pelarization of left-wing political and labor elements that face the dilema of siding with the government SCRI4 BL+TIr SECURITY INFORhATION === [PDF page 5] === SECURITY INF01 AT ION ilitant Conanist policy in Japan, despite its or tho Comunists. overtones, seems to be ccnsonant with the new emphasis in Communist policy in Asia generally, both. in its definition of the "patriotic" segments of society whose fears.nd grievances it seeks to exploit, and in its limited initial objective of weakening the popular support of the government and if possible replacing it with a potentially ioro "neutralist" administration. Conclusion Pei -p' ing e::ergos from the 1952 May celebrations as the selfproclained defender of "peace" in As i"; and as a regime that is not Poi-p'ing seems to be afraid of the "aggressive".imerican plots. trying to accent this characterization by throwuing into sharp contrast the Chinese preoccupation with peace, production, and culture and the Western, and specifically am~crican, preoccupation with alleged atrocities and biological and atnirc war plots. Pei-p'ing seems to be similarly contrasting Corrtuni-t-sponsored "peace" with Western-planned aggressionn" in its o phases on violence in Japan, a country allied with the US, and on coexistenceo" and "friendship" in relation to countries like Burla, and India, which Pei-p'ing presumnably considers potentially neutral. Although the Pei-p' ing May propaganda is being issued at a tine when Con.n.unist groups in Burma and Indo;nesia are making overtures toward the n(.n-Comnunist governments for the form;ation of a "united frcnt" under certain conditions, there has been so far nc conclusive evidence that the new Connunist line is more than a Thore.is certainly no indication that the tactical maneuver. Comunists are willing to nake serious concessions to fur"thcr the "peace" novooents, that they are killing to abandon the policy of armed insurrection in those areas, particularly Indochina, where the policy seems to be furthcrinlg Conrunist Lbjectivcs, or that they he:rertheless, the May will permanently cschou~ violence in any area. celebrations in Pei-n' ing and the -sso cia',ted propaga.da and loal;oves in Asian c"unti'ios do ind' cae that the Con:unists arc aking serious efforts t: broaden their potenial support and, for the tido being, to neutralize or isolate the o.Lliics of the 7est in Asia. is possible that "arned struggle" ray becoe directed touard more limited ends and, in s'me areas, sub rdinated t., the 'p:.ace offensive." more definitive conclus in as tu whether this possible shift in the ConuIlist line represents merely a passing nanouver r the initiation of in the continuing Rst-'2!st strugg.c in Asia, See OIR I-1144, April 16,- 1952, SECBET/SECURITY IbOliI4ATIOIH. SECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 6] === SECURITY IiKIf01UTION a new strategy must await further Communist moves in certain critical areas: in Kcrea, where the Communists have stretched the concept of "armed struggle" almost to the point of global war; in the Philippines, where governmental action against the liuks may shortly force a change in basic strategy; in $urma, where Communist forces, while pr tected on their Chinese flank frou annihilation, may find the present noment propitious to follow up recent "united front" tornination of civil war in favor of a coalition against the Western and Chinese nationalist "eneny"; overtures with tho atte.ptod and in the Sinkiang-Tibet region, whore Comunist military expansion has brcught Communist troops to the borders of the Indian subcontinent. SECURITY Ii'UFORiAATION