Analysis of Communist propaganda in Indonesia (OIR 5714.7, 1952)

PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.6 US, British and Dutch Government Records/US State Department Central Files (ProQuest History Vault)/OSS-State Department Intelligence (1952-05-30) - Analysis of Communist propaganda in Indonesia [ProQuest 3042026281].pdf Text from the PDF text layer; pages marked "re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026" were re-OCR’d with Tesseract because the text layer scored Poor. OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === A- ~IIntelli oefCe Report-- DEPARTMENT OFSTATE 15y o 1952 CHINA 5 7/'/- CZECHRSEQG F EAST GERMANY INDIA IRAN ITALY JAPAN PAKISTAN SYRIA DECLAS SIFIED UNITED KINGDOM VW.790 WEST GERMANY F ON ARCH PREPARED BY: OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESE A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY- STHISISAN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT CPS Nl-II IN ATO---- COP INSECURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 2] === This report was prepared from information available through May 31, 1952 by the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page [Unreadable] A. Strategy of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)............. 1 C. Lines of Control: Relations With International Communism........ 4 [Unreadable] [Unreadable] Part V:. Evaluation of Effectiveness in Terms of Objectives........... 14 Appendix A: Cultural Exchange With Soviet Orbit................. 16 Appendix B: Publishing Programs....................... 19 Charts and Maps: Chart No. 2: Example of PKI Territorial Organization............ 7 Chart No. 3: Example of Functional Subdivisions of Party Committees..... 8 This report is distributed by OIR/IDR, telephone ext. 4148/4149. When it has outlived its usefulness, please return to OIR/IDR, Room 101, SA-1. '~rNF~nrn~rI [Unreadable] === [PDF page 3] === ABSTRACT The ultimate objective of the Stalinist oriented Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and therefore of its propaganda efforts, is the seizure of state power. Short-term objectives are progressive control over all possible groups in society and a weakening of legitimate governmental authority. At the present stage of "legal" rather than military action, the major Communist tactic is infiltration into the various specific sectors of Indonesian society, such as labor, peasants, or youth. The propaganda organization of the PKI cannot be separated from the general structure of the party itself. The entire organization (which claims a membership of 30,000), is geared to spreading the communist message. Thus the network of grass roots communist organizations in villages, mines, factories, offices, schools, etc., is continually engaged in a form of agitation-propaganda activity. The primary media for propaganda in these efforts is the human carrier -- the individual infected with communist doctrine. In their propaganda the Communists play upon four major psychological predispositions held in various degrees by most Indonesiansr (1) the desire for political and economic independence; (2) the Marxist preconceptions of most intellectuals; (3) anti-imperialist, anti-colonial sentiment; and (4) the disappointments and specific grievances inevitable in a poet-revolutionary period. Major PKI propaganda themes are essentially negative. Propaganda directed to specific groups emphasizes the special grievances of those groups. The basic theme employed for general consumption is5 criticism of the non-Communist nationalist leaders for the "failure of the revolution -- the failure to realize a post-revolutionary Utopia. An evaluation of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda comes essentially to the conclusion that while susceptibilities to Communist propaganda differ among the various strata of society, PKI success among all social strata, especially labor and peasantry, is contingent less upon purely verbal propaganda than upon the PKI's ability to organize these segments for political and economic pressure. However, the greatest threat to the security of Indonesia at present is not the PKI but the uncontrolled bands of armed dissidents, particularly those in West Java and the Celebes. Only in the unlikely event that the Communists themselves can build a strong armed force will they be in a position to realize their ultimate objective, the seizure of state power. Nevertheless, in a society where social dislocations are inevitable for Man years to come, the PKI can by no means be counted out as a danger to constituted authority. AntTT:4TTimTmT STt"FrTTiTftW AT mTruTTTtPATufA === [PDF page 4] === ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN INDONESIA OIR 5714.7 Part I ORGANIZATION AND MAJOR ACTIVITIES A. Strategy of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Although the PKI takes inspiration from Soviet pronouncements (with their emphasis on the role of urban workers), from the recent Indian Communist Party statement, and from the Chinese Communist program, at this time it appears to be following a pragmatic strategy which, to a considerable degree, is adjusted to Indonesian conditions and attempts to exploit dominant Indonesian attitudes, such as nationalism and anti-imperialism. The party remains in the stage of "legal" or "political" action within the existing political framework. Its main activities continue to be demonstrations, mass protests, strikes, parliamentary maneuvers, the infiltration of key public posts, and the sapping of governmental authority through covert activities including collusion with' lawless bands. Although communist strategy in Indonesia has not entered the stage followed by Chinese Communism in which rural areas are captured by armed force, secured, and maintained as bases of operation, of late the PKI has stepped-up its tactics of infiltration into, and collaboration with, dissident armed groups, and in some areas has created its own paramilitary forces, or at least has obtained control of armed bands. In any attempts at overt military moves, however, the PKI is at present and will probably remain handicapped by widespread popular antagonism toward Communist armed struggle induced by the memories among the Indonesian leaders and to be people of the abortive Madiun rebellion of 1948.1 Non-military moves as well tend increasingly circumscribed by an increasing awareness among Indonesian leaders of the dangers of internal- Communist subversion. B. The Organization of PKI Propaganda Activities from The propaganda organization of the Indonesian Communist Party cannot be separated the general structure of the party. For like all Communist parties, the PKI is engaged continuous propaganda activities at all levels of party organization. The constitution of the PKI sets forth the central organizational pattern for all of control Communist activities. This organization exhibits the conventional Communist lines from the Politburo down to mass organizations (See Chart No. 1). Nominally the Communist Party Congress is the body wherein ultimate authority resides, but actually the Politburo's control through the Central Committee is unchallenged. The receives all Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party (CCPKI) issues directives, and the suggestions made in lower echelons, and determines both the time of meeting CCPKI serves as the executive eligibility of Party Congress members. The secretariat of the arm of the Politburo, from whence daily directives come. The Central Committee at Djakarta supervises the total organization of the PKI. It the controls all provincial commissariats, which in turn have Central Committees to supervise other organizational divisions and their activities (See Chart No. 2). Sumatra, for example, has a is divided into three provinces -- North, Central and South Sumatra. Each of these Central Committee which is supervised from Djakarta. The control is so close that frequently sitting on the provincial Central the CCPKI in Djakarta will have one of its own members Committees. The provincial committees in turn exercise control over the Section Committees, Metropolitan Committees, District or Regency Committees and the Branch and Primary organizations, and once again the same individuals frequently fill various posts in the hierarchy. 1. A revolt by the PKI and elements of the armed forces against the Republic, which began leaders. September 16, 1948 and was finally ended in November by the capture of the rebel === [PDF page 5] === Grass-roots action at the base of the organizational pyramid is the task of the "primary organizations," found in each provincial breakdown, in conjunction with the various secre- - tariats shown in Chart No. 3. The specific organization is determined either by the place of residence of party members or their place of work -- such as village, mine, factory, plant, office, school, etc. Five or more members constitute a primary organization, and further functional divisions can be made if the membership is sufficiently large. The duty of the primary organizations, as stipulated by the constitution of the PKI, resembles closely the tasks of Soviet agitation-propaganda workers: (1) to propagandize and organize, (2) to study the feelings and aims of the masses and to report such -- i.e., to be barometers of public opinion, and (3) to study the people's ways and organize them to solve their problems. A further organizational breakdown, for purposes of infiltration into non-Communist organizations, are the "party fractions." They are formed by three or more-members who find themselves among groups of government workers, unionists, cooperatives, and all other mass organizations or within all national and local representative bodies. Intensive efforts are also made within the army, a key target, and in journalism. Some success in the latter realm seems to be indicated by the frequent use of Antara, semi-official Indonesian news agency, for Communist-tainted news releases, party directives, and even falsifications of news items. The organization described above has come into force since early 1951 in Java and Sumatra, which are at present the major areas of Communist activity. Little is known of the organizational progress in the eastern islands, including Borneo and the Celebes, but there are indications of increasing organizational activities in this area. An article in Bintang Merah No. 5, 1951, denotes some of the PKI expectations concerning local leaders bTyi criticism of the weaknesses of party activity on Sumatra in early 1951. The article complains of ineffective leadership in North Sumatra because it lacked theoretical knowledge, failed to circulate Bintang Merah sufficiently and lacked "roots among the masses," Central Sumatra was considered somewhat better because the members there had organized "cadre courses" at local levels. South Sumatra was criticized for poor organization and its organizers warned that they must learn the difference between mass organization and the Party -- i.e., that the disciplined Party elite must remain distinct from mass organizations for Party purposes. In a further comment, Bintang Merah, contrary to normal expectations, complained that wherever the struggle for a living Ts Trd, the party suffers because member activities are at a minimum and dues are often forgotten. PKI leadership may be divided into an "inner" and a "peripheral" leadership, both of which have undergone a rather thorough purge since the abortive Madiun revolt in September 1948. This has resulted in an increasingly cohesive PKI organisation which is penetrating the various strata of Indonesian society -- women, labor, peasants, youth and Indonesian Chinese. The principal leader of the Indonesian Communists is probably Samaun, one of the founders of the party in Java who was exiled in the nineteen twenties and is now believed to be directing party operations from Moscow. The principal covert Communist leaders within Indonesia are Setiadjit, former labor organizer, and Abdul Madjid. The overt "inner" leadership of the PKI consists of the following individuals, all members of the Politburo: Lukman (organization chairman) Key leaders of the PKI Aidit (Secretary General) Njoto Sudisman Djaetun Alimin === [PDF page 6] === Pardede ) Sumadi ) Agitation - Propaganda T. Alimin ) Sakirman ) Members of Parliament J. Mudadalam ) The responsibilities for agitation and propaganda are shared by Pardede who edits the chief PKI magazine, the bi-weekly Bintang Merah, Sumadi, a former teacher, who is in charge of activities among intellectuals, and T. Alimin who directs pamphleteering and the publication of manuals. The "peripheral" leadership under Politburo control directs the various "grass roots" activities of the PKI: 1. Labor. In the area of labor activity the main Communist leaders are: Werdojo (Member of Parliament), Tjugito, Erningpradja, Njono, and Suhardjo. These men insure PKI control over the Sentral Organisasie Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI - Central Organization of Workers of All Indonesia), the largest Indonesian trade union.federation. Labor is the primary target of Communist activity, and SOBSI's control over perhaps 1.5 million workers makes this federation an important source of economic, human, and financial strength. The close interrelation of SOBSI and PKI is well illustrated in various towns and cities of the Tapanuli area and the west coast of Sumatra where PKI committees, SOBSI union committees and union branch committees frequently are composed of almost the same members; this is also true in central Sumatra, where commissars for central Sumatra, Bachtaruddin, Suleiman and Zunizar are in charge of organizing both SOBSI unions and PKI members. 2. Youth. In the realm of youth organizations. the leading Communists are Wikana, Sumardi, and Francisa Fanggiday. Wikana has been active in the Communist dominated Pemuda Rakjat, formerly the Pesindo, or Socialist Youth organization. This organization has lent support to Communist efforts at infiltration among unemployed students and demobilized veterans, especially in east Java. A left-wing "competitor" whose position is not clear is Akoma (Angkatan Kommunis Muda - Young Communist League), led by Wikana's brother, Ibnu Parna. This personal relationship, as well as the uncertainty of the role of the nationalist-Communist Partai Murba, with whom Akoma is supposed to be affiliated, point to the obvious possibility of Pemuda Rakjat and Akoma collaboration -- either presently or in the future. 3. Women. The Communists, by use of the Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar (GERWIS - Indonesian Women's Movement) under the leadership of Mrs. Mudigdo, are actively competing with the larger nationalist women's organizations such as the Kongres Wanita Indonesia (KOWANI - Indonesian Women's Congress) for the loyalty of a potentially important sector of the Indonesian body politic. 4. Peasants. The Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI - Indonesian Farmers' Corps), led by S. Sardjono, in Central and East ava, and the Rukun Tani Indonesia (RTI - Indonesian Farmers' Society) in West Java have been the chief instruments of Communist contacts with the peasants. Through control of the leadership the Communists have been able to direct the policies and actions of these organizations. Control of the leadership is sufficient for PKI purposes, since the Communists simply exploit local grievances by offering the chance for organized resistance to the social changes so inevitable in the slow but constant process of "westernization."' Here we find the Communists, contrary to their usual preachings of economic dynamism, actually playing up to the conservatism and resistance to change exhibited by the Indonesian peasant when faced with governmental plans and programs. In July 1951 the BTI and RTI united to form the Front.Persatuan Tani (FPT - Farmers' Front) and extended their activities into Sumatra. Two leaders, Lukman and communist Aidit, both members of the CCPKI who reportedly studied agricultural organization, among other things, in China during the first half of 1950 were largely responsible for this reorg-aization. Thus, through the FPT, with an estimated membership of 500,000 and the SOBS.controlled estate unions federation, Sarbupri, which has perhaps 800,000 members, the.?KI has the strongest organization of agricultural workers in Indonesia. === [PDF page 7] === 5. Indonesian-born Chinese. Finally, the peripheral leadership of the PKI includes two Indonesian-born Chinese who are among the oldest and most reliable Stalinists in Indonesia, Tan Ling Djie and Siauw Giok Tjoan. They continue to lead the small group of Indonesian Chinese who were followers of the PKI even before the triumph of Communism in China. Also, while Chinese Communist activities in Indonesia are handled primarily by the Chinese Communist Party, liaison with Chinese Communism is ever present and funnelled through the Chinese Embassy via the Embassy's chief intelligence officer, CHUNG Ch'ing-fa. The Chinese activities concentrate primarily on Chinese youth, offering scholarships for study in Red China, promoting "cultural" delegations, and infiltrating Chinese schools in Indonesia. This been infiltration, under the auspices of the Overseas Chinese General Association (OCGA), has particularly successful and has placed the anti-Communist Chinese on the defensive. Latest intelligence also indicates an attempt to send Indonesian students to China for the specific purpose of training them for propaganda and agitation activities. C. Lines of Control: Relations With International Communism The only known direct Indonesian contact with the Soviet Union at present is through the person of Tass correspondent Vassili Usachev. Although the USSR has recognized Indonesia, there has been no exchange of diplomatic missions. Satellite representation is limited to a Czech Consul General who has recently reached Djakarta. There can be no doubt, however, that the PKI is clearly a Stalinist party maintaining contact with major Communist centers abroad, in particular Moscow, Peiping, Prague, and, outside the Communist orbit, with Communist elements in Amsterdam, Singapore, and Australia: PKI publications carry the writings of Stalin and Lenin as well as of Mao Tse Tung, Muso and Alimin; the Indonesian section of the "World Peace Congress" is headed by Tjoa Sik Ien, now resident in Prague; Communist youth activities are coordinated with the communist International Union of Students (IUS); the PKI sent a large delegation to the World Youth Festival in Berlin; and the Communistcontrolled SOBSI is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The PKI also maintains close liaison with the Netherlands Communist Party, with the Communistcontrolled organization of Indonesian students in Holland, the Perhimpunan Indonesia, as well as with the Indonesian seamen's union in the Netherlands. There have been a number of recent signs that the Malayan Communist Party maintains liaison with the PKI in Sumatra. Another report also claims PKI liaison with the Philippine Communist Party through members smuggled into Mindanao. However, extensive foreign contacts and evidences of foreign direction, especially Chinese, while a major source of PKI strength, is at the same time a serious weakness in a nation where the emotion of nationalism runs high and sensitivity to any foreign influences is great. D. Assessment of Communist Strength The PKI claims an organizational strength of 30,000. Its activities are financed by dues scaled to income, by illegal activities, by SOBSI dues, and possibly by the Chinese Embassy. The Indonesian Government's major security sweep last August, during which several thousand left-wingers were jailed, undoubtedly hurt the rapidly crystallizing PKI organization severely, but it by no means destroyed the Party as a dangerous element. Overt activities are now somewhat in abeyance and many of the leaders who avoided arrest have gone into but the hiding. SOBSI is beginning to lose some ground to non-Communist labor organizations, latter, lacking funds and effective leadership, remain definitely in the minority. The the Ministry of Information dangerous growth of Communist influence in the Labor Ministry and has been partly checked. Chinese Communist activities have definitely received a setback by the cooling of Indonesian relations with Peiping, the blunders of the Chinese Ambassador, the confiscation of Communist textbooks disparaging to the Indonesian Government, and the security sweeps -- events which led up to strong statements by President Sukarno against "those (alien) groups here which propagandize Communism and social revolution." (Hero's Day Speech, November 10, Surabaya). Anti-Communist activity among the Chinese has definitely === [PDF page 8] === business considerations, and news increased, a development due as much to events in Korea, Indonesian Government's measures. of "liquidations" in home provinces in China as to the prospect Youth of secondary school and college age, however, continue to be attracted by the severely checked; of trips and scholarships to China. Nevertheless, the Communists have been ability of the Indonesian authorities to act, a fact which stands as a tribute to the preventive action until a point near crisis. despite the typical Indonesian tendency to delay society where the.forces of The PKI's future is far less promising than a year ago; but in a society, nationalism and westernization are bearing slowly but increasingly on all strata of seldom the Communists will social dislocations are inevitable for many years to come, and lack issues and opportunities around which to build their organizational strength. CCN TLL 144 5GURITY INFORMATION === [PDF page 9] === SET EITE UUtIY INOlITION PARTY) Chart No. 1: ORGANIZATION OF THE PKI (INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLIT-BURO SECRETARIAT PROVINCIAL COMMISSARIATS For Provincial Organization (Chaired by CCPKI Rep.) See Chart No. 2 J SECTION CONGRESS, SECTION COMMITTEE, SECTION CONFER. METROPOLITAN COMMITTEE CONGRESSAND CONFERENCE REGENCY, TOWN OR SUBURB For Functional Breakdown COMMITTEE, CONGRESS AND CONF See Chart.No. 3 FACTORY, MINE, VILLAGE ETC.; PRIMARY ORGANIZE. SUBSECTIONS OF PRIMARY ORG. AND "PARTY FRACTIONS" RRCTflIGTBD ~ECLT~UT~. === [PDF page 10] === Chart No. 2: EXAMPLEOF PHI TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION NORTH SUMATRA CCPKI - DJAKARTA PROVINCIAL COMMISSARIATS CCPKI CCPKI CCPKI NORTH CENTRAL SOUTH MEDANJ COMMISSIONERS STAFF DISTRICT COMMITTEES DISTRICT COMMITTEES DISTRICT COMMITTEES KOTAMEDAN CENTRALTAPANULI LHOKSEUKON DELI SERDANG SOUTHTAPANULI LANGSA SIMELUNGGUN BRANCHCOMMITTEES TAKENGUN etc. etc. DELI SERDANG LANGKAT AS. LAB. BATU' KAR O PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS EECTRICTED SECURITY IEI'CIU~.T~~ === [PDF page 11] === Chart No. 3: EXAMPLEOF FUNCTIONAL SUBDIVISIONS OF PARTY COMMITTEES FROM REGENCYLEVELS ON UP PARTY COMMITTEE AGIT-PROP C ORGANIZATION FARMERS' STRUGGLE WORKERS' STRUGGLE YOUTH STRUGGLE ' WOMEN'S STRUGGLE WORLDPEACE I === [PDF page 12] === DtrnrIrnWrIAL ~fl~RIflIT~ INrZRISATIZN Part II COMMUNISTPROPAGANDAOBJECTIVES The ultimate objective of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), like that of all other Communist parties, is the seizure of state power. Short term objectives are progressive control over all possible groups in society and a weakening of legitimate governmental authority. These short term objectives and the total propaganda effort of the party are all viewed as means toward the acquisition of a monopoly of power. Infiltration into the various specific sectors of Indonesian society such as labor, youth, and women, as outlined in Part I, is the major Communist tactic in the present stage of "legal," rather than military, action. This infiltration has been particularly successful in the labor movement, now dominated by the PKI, and in the Ministries of Labor and Information. High priority is also assigned to convincing members of the armed forces of their "common bond" and common grievances with the peasants and laborers. This activity is aimed at encouraging disobedience, winning converts or at least "neutralizing" the armed forces in the event of an armed coup. The weight given to specific media or even to specific target groups cannot be accurately ascertained since propaganda is not a highly developed, semi-autonomous factor of Communist activity, but rather an integral, ever present aspect of Communist behavior that manifests itself in the everday actions of individual members, in party agitation, demonstrations and pronouncements. Thus the PKI's most important media.for the dissemination of propaganda is the "human carrier" -- the individual infected with Communist doctrine. Part III MAJOR PROPAGANDATHEMES The major themes of the Indonesian Communist Party tend to follow the methodology of "agitation" and "propaganda" as defined in an editorial in the official Indonesian Communist publication Bintang Merah (Red Star) on February 15, 1951: "To a Communist, agitation means the exposure of the evils, shortcomings and injustices which are continually seen and experienced by the people, with the intention of arousing the people to wipe out these evils and fight the injustices in society. To a Communist, propaganda means giving explanations which penetrate deeply the sources of the evils, shortcomings and injustices of society and thus to show that imperialism will inevitably destroy itself and be replaced by Communism." Perhaps the most direct consequence of the above definition for Communist propaganda and agitation in Indonesia is the negative emphasis given to PKI propaganda. While the Communists imply a Utopia should their program be accepted, their most vociferous and immediate concern is with agitation and propaganda against the alleged injustices of the existing order. A constant barrage of criticism of alleged "evils and shortcomings" of Indonesian society and the Republican Government forms the leit-motif of Communist propaganda. This is perhaps logical for the Party's present role of "legal" opposition and is furthermore designed to be most immediately effective in a society subject to the tensions and disappointed expectations which follow a revolutionary transfer of authority. A check-list of these Communist themes may be divided somewhat arbitrarily into two categories. The first are those statements and slogans which have general application, with no particular target group in mind. The second category includes those themes directed more specifically to the various groups in society. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 13] === A. Themes of General Applicability 1. The general theme most constantly reiterated by the PKI is that the non-Communist leaders of Indonesia are responsible for the alleged "failure of the revolution." President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta, Socialist leader Sjahrir and both the conservative and liberal factions of the asjumi (Moslem Party) have borne the brunt of vilification for their "failure" to realize. apost-revolutionary Utopia. Shifting from this charge to a positive. approach, the PKI emphasizes the need for a "National Unity Front" of all "progressive" parties and individuals in order to carry on the fight for the "true revolution." 2. The "failure of the revolution" is attributed in large part to the "lack of true independence." The PKI insists that Indonesia will not have "true" economic and political independence, which they consider a prerequisite for the material betterment of the "people," until the nationalist leaders abrogate unilaterally the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. (RTC) and confiscate foreign enterprises. This exhortation for "true independence" furthermore leads the PKI to urge that Indonesia follow a "truly independent foreign policy" that recognizes the present struggle between the "peace camp" and the "Imperialists," bases itself on strict "anti-colonialism" through support of Ho Chi Minh, the Malayan Communists, the Egyptians, Iranians, and other "colonial" peoples, and releases itself from all ties, such as MSA, which only "injure and degrade" Indonesian sovereignty. Great praise is bestowed upon the Soviet Union, and upon Mao Tsetung and the accomplishments of his "New China." 3. In domestic politics the "failure of the revolution" is said to express itself in a "lack of democracy" within the new state. The Communists denounce the mass arrests of August 1951 as an "undemocratic" action perpetrated with the aid of old coloniall" laws and call for a quick revision and replacement of all those laws that are a holdover from the days of Dutch authority. B. Themes Directed toward Specific Groups 1. Labor. Major propaganda themes to labor are just wages and employment guarantees instead F"undemocratic labor laws"; the prohibition of mass discharges; less taxation and less expenditure for "militaristic"purposes sponsored by the "Imperialists"; and greater attention to the laborer's welfare. These demands are reinforced by constant -- and frequently successful -- 80BSI instigated agitation and demands. 2. Farmers and Estate Laborers. Themes here arer divide and distribute land and accelerate nationalization of large private estates; provide credit, tools, fertilizer, etc., to the farmers. 3. Youth, Intellectuals, and the Native Middle Class. To this group the line is: mobilize the national resources for "prosperity"; a "just division" of the national product; mechanize agriculture; industrialize; "help the national bourgeoisie"; check the power of foreign enterprises; assure a living wage to civil servants; and provide for universial education, health, and welfare. 4. The Army. The themes directed at the army areas soldiers should recognize their common lotiththe "people"; the army must be "friendly to the people" and should serve them with a "spirit of devotion." All the media available to the Communists -- pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, demonstrations, Soviet Radio, etc., -- employ the above themes constantly and interchangeably. The emphasis on the various themes differs with the domestic political situation. Thus, the 1. The them of exploitation of the "people" by foreign enterprises in conjunction with the "comprador bourgeoisie" government is the theme most frequently broadcast by the Soviet Union to Indonesia. === [PDF page 14] === unshakeable popularity of President Sukarno turned the Communist barbs inward, with the result that slander of the President has diminished noticeably in recent months. The Government's show of force during the security action of the Sukiman cabinet in August 1951 also served soften Communist agitation. At present, denunciation of the Government has virtually ceased while the PKI attempts to woo the new Wilopo cabinet with positive offers of political support. Part IV FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA The Communists play upon four major psychological predispositions held by most Indonesians to put across their basic themes. They appeal tos (1) the desire of every Indonesian for political and economic independence; (2) the Marxist preconceptions held by most intellectuals; (3) anti-imperialist, anti-colonial sentiment; and (4) the disappointments period. and specific grievances which inevitably occur in an immediately post-revolutionary There are differences in the susceptibility or resistance to Communist propaganda and unamong the various target groups which1 bear closer examination as factors favorable favorable to PI propaganda activity. From the standpoint of the locus of political power in Indonesia, these targets may be denoted as three major socio-economic groups: the politically responsible "elite" -- officials, politicians, journalists, students, teachers, army leaders, etc.; (2) urban and estate labor; and (3) the peasantry. A. The "Elite" There are several predispositions held by a large number of this strata of more westernized, more educated and more politically conscious Indonesians which-tend to evoke out later sympathetic responses to certain Communist appeals. However, as will be pointed in this section, such predispositions are considerably tempered by other factors in the rather complex psychology of the elite such as their intense political individualism, strong nationalist sentiments, and the quiet but pervasive influence of Islam. "anti- The Communist call for a "truly independent foreign policy" which is basically These colonialist" strikes a ready response among all politically conscious Indonesians. and there is a Indonesians consider Ho Chi Minh as a leader of true Indochinese nationalism, The pronounced tendency to attribute 'sincerenationalist aspirations to the Malayan bandits. same holds true for Indonesian reactions to events in Iran, Egypt, and Tunisia. Communist criticisms and attacks on the West are supported 1W non-Communist opinion Indonesian to the extent that US policies disappoint Indonesian expectations or seem to threaten desires to avoid involvement in the cold war. There is also a certain amount of curiosity with on the part of these Indonesians to "see for themselves" the results of closer relations the the USSR, a curiosity that at the same time reflects a desire to counterbalance, for sake of the independent foreign policy, Indonesia's constant involvement with the US. This insistence on the "independent" attitude toward world affairs is further emphasized by the as eantireluctance of many non-Communist Indonesians to allow themselves to be characterized Communist" individuals. The hypersensitive desire for political and economic independence after centuries of colonial rule, when combined with the Marxist preconceptions held by most literate Indonesians, i.e., "capitalism = colonialism," provides a certain receptivity to Communist protestations put on against the influence of foreign-owned estates and enterprises. The Government is the defensive in the support of foreign investment as-a necessary part of Indonesian reconstruction and devel opment. Similarly, Communist attacks against the legal system.which remains from the days of Dutch rule elicit support from many non-Communists and are a constant source of embarrassment to the Government. each I. It would be unrealistic to credit the PI with a finely developed propaganda approach to segment of society, however. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 15] === give the Further, there is a tendency among the politically conscious Indonesians to Communists the benefit of the doubt and to consider them more or less as "misguided nationalists." This tendency, when combined with the disappointed hopes of a postto avoid revolutionary "golden age" and the natural desire among hard-pressed officials more amenable to criticism for the "failure of the revolution," tends to make such officials the effectiveness of the Communist suggestions or offers of support. This of course aids present "National Unity Front" campaign of the Communists. are Finally, the specific grievances to which the Communists direct their attacks real -- low wages for civil servants, difficulties of the "national bourgeoisie in competing with Chinese or foreign enterprises, rice allowance difficulties, low and irregular armytin schools, lower rubber and pay, lack of visible and dramatic economic.progress, crowded is shared in many quarters and prices, inflation, etc. Criticism of all these conditions lends considerable strength to the communist charges of "failure of the revolution.' political These predispositions within the Indonesian elite favor certain Communist propaganda and propaganda moves, but it is important to note that acceptance of Communist of important factors on certain issues does not necessarily increase PKI adherents. A number conscious Indonesians in past Communist behavior and in the psychology of the politically mitigate the above predispositions considerably. activities Foremost among the factors tending to make Indonesians wary of Communist Government at is the memory of the abortive armed Communist revolt against the Republican So damaging is this legacy in the Madiun and surrounding areas in September-November 1948. to blame the revolt on eyes of most nationalists that the PKI has made repeated attempts "imperialist provocation." A further Communist maneuver which has backfired is the vilification of popular nationalist leaders. Not only the attacked leaders but their many followers undoubtedly remember this when Communist propaganda now solicits their cooperation. The odium gf foreign Stalin, Lenin and control of the PKI, so evident from the prominent display of posters of condemnation of the PKI in the eyes of Mao in most PKI demonstrations, constitutes a severe a large the intensely nationalistic Indonesian "elite.' This undoubtedly neutralizes to extent the Communist claim that they are the 'true Nationalists." misdeeds Another important factor besides nationalism and the memory of Comunist PKI itself has had is the intense personal and political individualism of the "elite." The difficulty maintaining party discipline. Political criticism and argument is sharp and constant, with intra-party strife a common thing. In such a context it is difficult to believe that politically conscious Indonesians would subject themselves to any 'final authority." The effect of Islam on Indonesian political thought also dulls Communist propaganda as "antiand action. Islamic spokesmen in nationalist circles frequently denounce Comunism of the elite religious" and 'materialist." Islam also tempers the socialist preconceptions socialists somewhat, as may be most clearly seen in the existence of a group of "religious with Islamic within the Moslem Party (Masjumi) who attempt to reconcile socialist materialism group, and its spirituality. Furthermore,theAasjumi is Indonesia's largest political nationalist-leftist largely Conservative membership in general sefves to check more extreme tendencies. There is basically a strong non-Communist party structure in Indonesia which has so far denied the PKI the use of executive power to further its own ends.. Very real factors of international power relations also mitigate susceptibility it, they Communist propaganda. Although many responsible Indonesians will not publicly admit that their fortunes are tied to those of the West. There is do feel, in the last analysis, for the an underlying distrust of Communist China although it is mixed with admiration accomplishments of the "New China"; their economy is to a large extent dependent upon === [PDF page 16] === Western markets and Western assistance; in the event of war in the East the defense of the archipelago would rest in the hands of Western naval and air power; and not least of all, the Western education of many leaders, the presence of Western advisors, and the adoption of English as the "second language" to replace Dutch, all tend to exert p-o-Western pressures on the Indonesian "elite." B. Labor Communist success has been most conspicuous in the area of urban and agricultural labor. This is attributable not so much 'to the various propaganda slogans directed specifically to these groups as to the organizational efforts of the Communists and the consequent ability of the Comunist-dominated labor federation (SOBSI) to achieve greater success in enforcing its demands than any non-Communist labor organization. PKI activity with regard to labor perhaps illustrates most clearly the success of appeals to specific grievances combined with organized action against the causes of such grievances. The Indonesian laborer suffers from wages which lag behind price increases, from crowded and extremely poor housing and from rapidly fluctuating employment opportunities. SOBSI demands for the improvement of such conditions and its constant success in negotiations (despite frequently unreasonable demands), has done far more to gain adherents to Comunism than the more general propaganda line which pictures the PKI as the true leader of the working masses. Non-Communist unions and federations are having a difficult time competing with SOBSI. Not only is there a serious shortage of non-Communist leaders and organizers, but non- Communist unions frequently fail to realize better conditions for their members than SOBSI can provide.. Furthermore, the Labor Ministry has been infiltrated by Communist sympathizers to the point where thinly veiled official support has frequently been given to SOBSI activities. Thus the relatively apolitical laborer, who does not possess the variety of more sophisticated predispositions exhibited by the nationalist elite, becomes a favorable factor in Communist efforts to extend their power -- for the laborer views SOBSI as the champion of his specific grievances. Whatever Communist propaganda follows in the wake of successful labor agitation will naturally be quite acceptable to the worker, although it may not induce deep-seated convictions. C. Peasants The Communists, through leadership of peasant front organizations (Front Tani and Front Tani Indonesia) in Java and East Sumatra control the majority of the few organized peasant groups in Indonesia. Communist control in most areas extends also to the stronger of the organizations making up these fronts. As in the case of labor, the PKI has featured appeals to specific grievances rather than an espousal of Communist doctrine and has seized the initiative from slow-moving Government programs for alleviation of agrarian problems, particularly in Central Java and Eastern Sumatra. In Central Java over-population, perennial peasant indebtedness to private moneylenders, the development of a form of tenancy, and a growing landless class have attracted Communist attention. In East Sumatra the Communists have organized and encouraged the occupation of uncultivated areas of foreign-operated estates by squatters. Similar action to force redistribution of land has been urged by the 'Communists in Central Java. The PKI has also led the demand for effective measures of rural credit extension. fertilizer distribution, seed selection. etc. Yet when the Government does take action along these lines, including land distribution, the Communists disparage the official attempts and seek to destroy their effectiveness. The majority of Indonesian peasants, however, remain as yet unorganized and the villages still represent, to a large degree, a conservative force in Indonesian society. Islam and === [PDF page 17] === customary law and behavior (adat) remain strong conservative factors in the villages, and the Masjumi continues to be the mai political force among the peasants. If Government programs for literacy, health, agricultural improvement, opoperatives and especially resettlement of peasants from Java to the Outer Islands receive increasingly effective implementation, there will be little possibility that Communism will become a major force among the peasants. Should the Government fail, the situation in Central Java particularly could reach serious proportions. Part V EVALUA OF EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMSOF OBJECTIVES In terms of the ultimate objective of a seizure of state power, Communism in Indonesia has clearly not succeeded so far. As to the short-term objectives of challenging governmental authority and of infiltrating the various strata of society, PKI success, except for control of the labor movement, has been limited. The impossibility of making a realistic separation of propaganda from the daily activities of the PKI must here be reemphasized. The Indonesian Communists do not have a "scientific" highly developed propaganda apparatus, since they lack the authority of state. Their propaganda relies primarily on the "human carrier" method, with its concomitants of political and economic agitation, organization and mass. demonstrations. As seen in the evaluation of favorable and unfavorable factors above, Communist success among all strata, especially labor and peasantry, is contingent more upon the realities of organizational control and consequent victories through political and economic pressure than upon purely verbal propaganda. Whenever the Communists have posed an actual threat to the authority of the state, they have been severely checked. The first instance was the Madiun revolt, the second the security arrests of the Sukiman cabinet. This would seem to indicate that the strata which holds political power in Indonesia is awake to the dangers of subversion, no matter to what degree their spokesmen may at times echo Communist slogans. The Communists have achieved, and continue to achieve, limited successes through the receptivity of many Indonesians to their slogans. Thus they have effectively criticized the Government for the "failure of the revolution" as applied to specific situations in Indonesia such as the retention of Dutch laws, the RTC agreements, "undemocratic" arrests, "colonial" labor laws, etc. They have successfully played upon the nationalist distrust of the West, aided in great part by the seeming indifference of the Soviet Union, an "indifference" which has made many Indonesians curious and desirous of trying their hand at closer relations with the USSR as a balance to their constant involvement with the US. They have successfully exploited specific grievances and rallied the grieved to their organization, and they have captured relatively small but important grotips among youth, women and the semi-intellectuals. Yet, the larger part of the membership of Communist-controlled organizations, particularly in labor, probably consists of "sumner soldiers" rather than well-indoctrinated supporters. With the formation of the Wilopo cabinet in April 1952, the PKI, for the first time since 1948, offered to support the cabinet if certain of its demands were met. This maneuver is an attempt by the Communists to gain influence in a cabinet which was formed as a result of strong reactions in many quarters against the alleged overly pro-Western policies of its predecessor. The new cabinet thus begins with a mandate to reemphasize the "independent foreign policy" by such actions as renegotiation of the USA agreement, review of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and closer economic and political relations with the Soviet bloc. This of course presents an ideal climate for renewed Communist emphasis upon the "National Unity Front." However, an analysis of the declared program and personalities of the cabinet does not support Communist hopes that the cabinet can be readily manipulated by PKI pressure or persuasion. === [PDF page 18] === at present is not the PC but the The greatest threat to the security of Indonesia those in West Java end the Celebes. The uncontrolled bands of armed dissidents, particularly of late, but over-all control of these bands increasingly CImmunists have infiltrated these since the strongest dissident forces are forces by the PKI is neither imminent nor likely, Darul Islam movement. bontrolled by the violently anti-Communist clear that Communist effectiveness Basically, then, it is becoming increasingly government through propaganda or "legal" action will remain largely limited, so long as inthethe unlikely continues to strengthen its hold over the instruments of state power. Only armed force will they be in a position to event that the Communists can build a strong seizure of state power. realize their ultimate objective, the [Unreadable] === [PDF page 19] === APPENDIX A CULTURAL EXCHANGE WITH SOVIET ORBIT A. Soviet Union and European Satellites 1. Exchange in the Fields of Arts, Sciences, and Sports a. Exchange in visual arts with any member of Soviet orbit is unknown and probably non-existent. Indonesian, Hawaiian b. Mi'.ic same as above. Radio music is predominantly..r American. and probably non-existent. c. Ballet and other dance exchanges unknown non-existent. d. Exchange of Drama - unknown and probably materials. The presence ofin the New e. Literature reveals some flow of Soviet other Soviet writings also Eng~tsh Times, the novel Star in Eglish, andi was reported in din, Sumatra, in the spring of 1951. of a translating committee The PKI around March 1951 announced the formation executive staff is composed of Politburo members, with (Komisi Penterd emah) whose established to take charge of the actual R. jarifah as secretary. Subcommittees are State and Revolution, Onvhe Partlc etc. such as translation of books on Communist theory, publicationcaSiesltrtures In addition, Bintang Merah, the foremost Communist of the extent of penetration non-political Soviet literature is in almost every ssu, is insignificant. unknown, but it is likely that the amount nt The Indonesia Government UN, the US,.Western Europe and has chosen technical assistance from the Scandinavia. sciences is unknown, but is most likely g. The extent of exchange in the social popular in a land where capitalism and Marxist dialectic is negligible. The euted, bat it assumes a strongly indigenous and often confused cnalisible form among the non-Communist majority and is thoroughly mixed with both Islam and nationalism. non-existnt.orl h. The extent of exchange in sports is unknown and probably to enter the World and plan Indonesians entered the Asian Olympics in 1951 Olympics in 1956. 2. Exchange of Persons a. Indonesians to the Soviet Orbit to the Soviet Union The first report of a non-governmental Indonesian delegation in an account in Komtomol Pravda of November 18, 1951. This delegation was was received a rising youngfaoie f.tePIanws led by Willy Hariandja of SOBS, evidently who were previously at the Berlin Youth probably composed of eight or ten delegates in the Soviet Union for over a month, with Festival. The group appears to have stayed The amount of publicity, financing and the an apparently lengthy stay in Uzsbkistan the latter is believed negligible. Indonesian type of local reaction are unknown, buttravellers abroad should avoid returning "like Government leaders have stressed that parrots, with their pockets full of pamphlets." ZO1Um TI. r r ESII flWCWJLT1ig N === [PDF page 20] === Prague is the largest center of contact with the Soviet's European satellites, although Berlin and Warsaw had brief prominence during the World Youth Festival in August 1951. From 35 to 50 Chinese and Indonesians, led by Baharuddin, vice-chairman of Pemuda Rak;at, attended the festival. Those who had come from Indonesia were joined by delegations of Indonesian youths and students from Holland and Prague. From August 1 through the 19th, the Indonesians participated in the activities of the festival but their contacts were primarily with other Asian and Middle-Eastern delegations. contact with the Soviet Komsomol group seemingly was limited to brief meetings at the Berlin station and at a formal conference somewhat later. The Indonesians exhibited their national dances on the evening of August 7, attended various rallies and meetings, and were shown through east Berlin. Baharuddin on several occasions denounced the Indonesian Government as puppets of imperialism, perpetrators of "white terror," etc. After the Berlin festival, about eight Indonesians from The delegation attended an IUS (International Union of Students) conference in Warsaw. Five others remained in Prague where they will work in various capacities: Baharuddin With WFDY (World Federation of Democratic Iskandar Subekti Youth) Headquarters one or two years. Sudarno With IUS Headquarters for one year. Suwandi Willy Hariandja With WFTU Prague Headquarters Financing of the Berlin delegation and of those Indonesians in Prague appears to have been primarily through SOBSI, with probable assists from the WFDY and perhaps the Chinese Embassy. Reactions to the returned delegates, who praised the."cultural achievements" in eastern Berlin, seemingly were negligible. Any propaganda impact their return might have had was dulled by the security sweeps of August and September which had begun during the delegation stay in Berlin. b. Indonesian Students to the Soviet Orbit Students within the Soviet's European Orbit are concentrated in Prague. Eight such students, some with families, are known to have studied in Prague during 1951, probably financed by SOBSI and Czech contributions. They are: Haljani Rusli (female) - to return to Indonesia Rusli - political science, correspondent for Berita Indonesia, Djakarta Busono - psychology, contact man between Indonesians in Frague and Indonesian organizations Jahja Sumabratli - MD;liaison with IUS Gapur ) - economics, returned August 1951 Bintang) Winaya - pedagogy - returned Budhiardjo - economics c. Soviet and Satellite Visitors to Indonesia The number of Soviet visitors to Indonesia, and travellers from the European satellites is unknown, but it probably is relatively small. The only known Soviet citizen === [PDF page 21] === -18- Hisrr iv al, nvolving com ications in Indonesia today is Tass correspondent UsacheV. hc omne htIdnsa with hotel reservations, was noted by Indonesia a~ the Soviet Union. On March 5th, reporters should now be allowed to wander -freey about fvacek Czaroslav7, first Czech Consul-General, arrived in Djakarta. B. China from the high regard for the Indonesia's attitude toward Red China has declined accomplishments expressed in 194-50 to q present attitude perhaps best "New China's" Indonesians still have considerable characterized as polite but wary. Nevertheless many respect for the alleged progress and dynamism of the "New China." Such respect is in The Indonesian attitude some quarters mixed with fear of possible Chinese aggression. by a dislike and.distrust of the toward the "New China" is in all quarters tempered Indonesian Chinese which approaches open hostility. 1. 'Exchange in the Fields of Arts, Sciences, and Sports social science Exchange in visual arts, music, dance, drama, literature, science, and sports is unknown, and, with the possible exception of literature, probably negligible. schools are the primary channels for Communist Exchange of persons and the infiltration of Chinese activities, and since the Indonesians aredt h hns generally not susceptible to Chinesea mirity in Indonesia. overtures, these activities arhelargely itedg the hin 2. Exchange of Persons a. Indonesian Visitors to China to attend the October An attempt by Peiping to recruit five prominent Indonesians September. The Indonesian cabinet 1 celebrations in that city met with failure during accept escape, both official and personal) to the agreed "in principle" (a favorite Indonesian by the invitation, but of the five men invited China, only one, Tabrani, editor of Djakarta daily Pemandan, accepted. He subsequently led a "second-string" delegation of three or four me rs to Peiping and returned with rosy descriptions of the "New China." b. Students to China that the relatively large Students going to China are practically all Chinese, so direct bearing or innumber who go to China for university study probably have littlestudents exercise a vital fluence on indigenous Indonesian Comunism. That the returned would seem to be beyond Communist influence within the Chinese community in Indonesia doubt. c. Chinese Visitors to Indonesia Although there is a fairly constant flow of Chineseuponto and from Indonesia, the Indonesians is unknown. extent of Chinese visitors to Indonesia and their effect to issue entry permits to sixteen The Indonesian Government, however, last July refused Priok harbor on the grounds Chinese diplomatic officers sitting aboard ship in Tandjung was the governof a violation of diplomatic courtesy. The actual reason for the refusal the privilege of ment's unwillingness to allow sixteen additional Chinese propagandists Chinese Ambassador Wang's diplomatic immunity and free travel in Indonesia. In addition, especially since he wrote a book activities have not helped Indonesian-Chinese relations,as "petty bourgeois traitors" to denouncing President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta the revolution. TIfDILT === [PDF page 22] === -19- APPENDIX B PUBLISHING PROGRAMS 1. Press and Periodicals - Comunist-controlled a. The extent of Communist controlled press and periodical circulation is not definitely known. However, Sin Po, the most prominent Communist daily, has a circulation of perhaps 35,000, broken down i-io 15,000 for the Indonesian issue and about 20,000 for the Chinese. A very rough and generous estimate of total circulation of Communist papers throughout Indonesia would be 200,000, evenly divided between Indonesian and Chinese readers. The type of audience reached is unknown. b. The format and content of the majority of papers is unknown. The contents occasionally translated from various Communist papers are of course straight party line: American and Dutch "imperialism" is harped upon, and the general line is followed toward Korea, Indochina, Malaya, the Japanese Treaty, Red China, etc. Domestic affairs are treated more cautiously since the August security sweeps and subsequent arrests of Communist editors and journalists. c. News services used include Viet-Minh News Agency, New China News Agency, Aneta and Antara. The extent of local as against "canned" materials is unknown. d. Financing and publishing arrangements are generally unknown. One known Communist publishing house is the Life Press Publishing Company in Djakarta. Another is the Hwang Lung (Yellow Dragon) Publishing Company in Makassar. An important advantage for Communist publishing activities lies in the SOBSI control of Printing unions which makes it possible for the Communists to receive scarce printing paper either through thefts or union demands. Reliable sources also report instances of paper being received free via the Chinese Embassy and Malayan Chinese, who in turn receive it from Czechoslovakia. e. The character of the staff is unknown. 2. Press and Periodicals -- Communist Influenced No specific answer can be given to the question of Communist influence in the Indonesian press. Many newspapers throughout the islands, including known anti-Communist papers, at various times seem to follow the "line" completely. Most literate Indonesians have Marxist preconceptions in judging domestic and international affairs; many are extremely naive as to the facts and functions of international politics; and most are intensely nationalistic and suspicious of the motives of Western and former colonial powers. Thus anti-American and Marxist themes are not infrequent, but they by.no means prove the existence of Communist influence, a situation which makes any measurements impossible. There is reason, however, to suspect the reliability of the major Indonesian new agency Antara, particularly in its sources of international news. 3. Other Local Publications a. Books. Specific information is not known, but many inexpensive editions of Communist writings are available in bookstores throughout. Indonesia. b. Pamphlets -- specific information is not available, but they constitute a major and constant propaganda medium for all occasions. c. Graphics-- Unknown. === [PDF page 23] === h. Soviet Orbit Publications The total extent of these publications is unknown except for translation of Soviet works cited in Appendix A. These as far as can be determined are for circulation among the various levels of PKI leadership. Chinese Communist publishing activities are extensive. Particular effort is made to get Communist textbooks into Chinese schools. No overt Soviet or satellite information programs are known to be carried on in Indonesia. === [PDF page 24] === 21 - APPENDIX C MOTIONPICTURES A. Content of Soviet and Chinese Films Soviet and Chinese Communist films in Indonesia have been a very small part of Indonesian film consumption. For example, from April to June 1950, only twelve films out of 589 were from Communist sources, while the US alone contributed 395. But a stepup in film activity by the Communists is evident. A recent Soviet broadcast to Indonesia contrasted the purity of Soviet film to the theme of sex, murder and racial prejudices allegedly prominent in US films. The thinese Communists within Indonesia have attempted to instigate boycotts against US films. 1. Chief Themes. Story Lines and Topics Chief themes are Soviet or Chinese power, "wave of the future," and idyllic domestic conditions. A recent Chinese Embassy screening of a Chinese Army parade was reported to have impressed the invited Indonesian officers. Chinese newsreels stress the Korean "spirit," display US prisoners, and concentrate on tne results of "heartless bombing and strafing" by UNtroops. The following topics have reportedly been shown in Indonesia: a) Soviet: "Siege of Stalingrad," "A Day in the Soviet.Union," "The Long March," "Battle of Berlin;" b) Chinese: "Birth of New China," "Chinese Children," "White Haired Women." 2. Weakening of the Communist Line Not equipped to evaluate contents thoroughly, but propaganda must be indirect to pass the censors. Although no information is available on increase in tolerance for alternative ideologies, values, etc., in the themes of Communist films, the lack of regional specialization in Communist films at present could seem to make Communist films exhibited in Indonesia no different (with the qualification re censorship) from Communist films exhibited elsewhere. 3. Use of Deliberate Falsification Falsification is used when convenient. For example, pictures of the Russian- Japanese "war" of 1945 show only Soviet armies versus the Japanese and then a treaty signing between a Japanese and Russian only - a lie by convenient omission. B. Techniques of Presentation 1. Direct propaganda statements. detrimental to the free world are unlikely in view of strict Indonesian film censorship. Thus, more subtle and indirect themes are likely, with positive emphasis on Soviet or Chinese power, domestic happiness, prosperity, etc., and negative emphasis on Western bombing and the suffering of oriental peoples at war. 2. Mass scenes and background slogans are constantly used; the former is perhaps the key aspect of Communist films. 3. Direct "Communist hero" - "capitalist heel" films are unlikely to pass censorship with the possible exception of Chinese Embassy releases for Chinese schools. === [PDF page 25] === -22- 4. Family' life is not emphasized. Collective scenes in concerts, armies, factories,' etc., are primary. Homes, when shown in Soviet films, are pretty and wholesomely simple- -- "rose-covered cottages," etc. Relations with the state are of course ideal. Stalin is deified by means of angelic choir and idyllic scenes of nature surrounding him. The Embassy reports that the militaristic glorification of Mao in Chinese films is "resented" by literate Indonesian audiences, who are nevertheless impressed by Chinese military might. 5. Lip-Synchronization is now being rapidly developed by the Soviets for Southeast Asia. It is reportedly very good. Color films are excellent. Animation is as yet limited. 6. Technical quality is good. The pace is slow and themes are simple and repetitious. 7. Films in general are viewed by youth and government workers and 'by the literate Chinese Community. a) The Chinese Embassy has shown films to Indonesian military officers as a special audience. b) Non-literate audiences are quite small because they generally lack the price of admission. No mobile Communist units are known to exist. There is no evidence of films aimed at illiterates. c) Chinese films are of course. "regional," but their appeal is limited largely to the Chinese community. The Indonesians, skeptical toward any foreign films, regard them automatically as "propaganda." The Soviets have no regional topics for Southeast Asia as yet, but may well be cooperating with China now toward such a goal. The Soviets do throw sops to the Asians via multi-racial groupings, such as an Asian fighting beside the Russians, etc. C. Production and Distribution 1. Both commercial and Chinese Embassy distribution exists. No mobile units are known to exist. Censors recently expressed a desire for more Soviet film imports as a balance to overwhelming US imports. Private distributors like Soviet films 'because they are reportedly offered a larger percentage of the returns. 2. The Chinese Embassy is the only known sponsor of Communist Films. =he PKI is seemingly not active in the film area. 3. The degree of pamphleteering and discussion in conjunction with films is not well known. While Chinese Communist films in schools may involve much discussion,- any pamphleteering in public would be frowned upon by the police. 4. The popularity and unpopularity of Communist films is unknown. 5. Specific film data concerning production and the number of prints is unknown. However, Soviet and Chinese attention to this media is increasing. 6. Subject changes are unknown. 7. Films are mostly produced outside, in China, in the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. Film imports are unrestricted, subject to censorship. Indonesia's "independent foreign policy" seems to dictate that -in films the cold war cannot be brought to Indonesia by either side, and censorship is strict. Possibly, however, leftist leanings or preconceptions of the censors may put the US at a disadvantage in this process. === [PDF page 26] === More obvious "propaganda" films are brought in by pouch to the Chinese Embassy, and their showing is restricted to selected groups. Raw materials and technical help to local producers is another key method of infiltration, quite subtle and, despite present American film supremacy, potentially dangerous. D. Evaluation 1. The role of films in relation to total Communist propaganda is quite small. Main reasons seem to be neglect, US competition, censorship, and local lack of skill and materials. Nb coordinated effort with mass demonstrations is noted. 2. The slow pace and lack of love themes are two particular weaknesses. But all weaknesses of production and distribution are being worked on at this time with the aim of more effective film propaganda. === [PDF page 27] === -24- APPENDIX D RADIO 1. Soviet Programs broadcast in Indonesian to Indo- Seven hours a week of Soviet radio are normally Indonesia. Moninesia. Radio now serves as the major Soviet propaganda media for on the threat of Dutch-American "capitalists tored content reveals repeated commantaries "exploitation," American "inand monopolists" to the Indonesian people, Dutch-American pegging of such comments to specific issues, for example, the "US. fluence," and the as a danger to Indonesia. The amount of news, -cultural controlled" Japanese Peace Treaty The listening audience is unknown, but the programs and hidden propaganda is unknown. a million since the number of not more than total Indonesian radio audience is probably It may be assumed that the audience consists radio sets is between 100-150 thousand. and merchants (mostly Chinese-). primarily of students, government workers, 2. Other Communist Programs day to Southeast Asia of which only Chinese Communist radio beams fifty hours a each aay is in the Indonesian language. Other broadcasts are in English half an hour code, as well as voice transmissions in English, Chinese dialect, and various Southeast Asian languages. Vietminh broadcasts are in English or Chinese. Chinese and Vietminh propaganda themes to Southeast Asia, see IR-57 analysis of Soviet, audience for Chinese (Soviet Propaganda on Southeast Asia). The extent of the Indonesian broadcasts is unknown. 3. Local Communist Programs No local Communist stations exist. n. Local Radio - Communist Infouence No Communist influence is Indonesian radio is under governmental supervision. within the Ministry of information. are undoubtedly Communists noticeable, although there [Unreadable] === [PDF page 28] === APPENDIX E SPECIAL MEDIA Mass action and the targets of."human carrier" propaganda and other special media have been described in the first section of this report. Specific information concerning media, audience and reaction is in most. cases not available. Control and financing are functions of the PKI, with the SOBSI unions being the major contributors of both money and personnel. Public displays are highly organized and well-disciplined. May Day celebrations of 1951, for example, were held in Djakarta, Medan, Palembang, Bogor, Bandung and Surabaya. They were spectacles which enlisted almost every conceivable propaganda device: ranks of workers, slogans and banners, bands, flowers, mothers with babes beneath doves.of peace, children, songs, parades and speeches. Use of fellow-travellers involves exploitation of essentially the same Indonesian preconceptions of Marxism, nationalism, and mistrust of occidentals cited in Appendix B. These preconceptions lend themselves to Communist usage at times. A common history of nationalist struggle has left some tendency among Indonesian politicians to consider many Communists simply as "nationalists gone wrong." But the extent of fellow-travelling cannot be gauged. Organizational control is frequently just a question of Communist leadership over apolitical members. (See section II.of the main body of this report). Or again, non-Communist leftists and even conservative nationalists may at times fit Communist needs. The non-Communist Indonesian is not yet necessarily an anti-Communist. But it must be, repeated that responsible leaders seem fully aware of the Communist danger, and have several times acted decisively. SEGURITy INGR ~tTION RESTRICTEDB === [PDF page 29] === 11993 5 110 415) 120. 125, 130. 135 140, 95 Tal IS j ae | | Cire PH ay | Rocca SON Uae | \ | peel S | ean y MANGAS P A&A Ge IE | Eg a \ J “Udonesa) Treaty Limits of The Philippines i fasperceleaee aa O Cc iB A N Re ATORACOS & g I Medan SUNDS |S ae S SN "Ss ta tandute t wore [Unreadable] ae 2 Eastern boundary of oF ‘Maluku Province we ers eaeaninat puta \ Ne Nias) \ — ee HALMAHERA 0 Pakan 8576 *Tepingengs OD i [Unreadable] 2 I © pukittines’ TI as < Se: i 2 aus Padang. \ 5 = \ > is L am [Unreadable] LA — Bandiarmasin. &€ ) & Sa aN NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA 30 [Unreadable] . 7 il ee > mmsolck niteinn 2: eS iS i j lL A\ruuau 4 a ok \ oo a eee (etre ho Mae < tatus equal BANDA SEA JY We Pu & a prownce J 7 5) puta aN Vv 3 Re? [Unreadable] A Boxore Tirebon fe VI = aoe Pekalsngan~ Semarang os ° y \ urabo) A THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA-1951 SueeeV LL ymadiun | Se a L/min s: Kediri f Zp ® National Capital Se = g —-— International Boundary > Provincial Capital Siausienn Bones oe ee Provincial Boundary (approx.) * Major City or Municipality to a province 1 — SUMATERA UTARA VI — DJAWA TIMUR GS Av Rat Ate Fees eR steal See EDA 11 — SUMATERA TENGAH VIL — KALIMANTAN 111 — SUMATERA SELATAN VIL — SUNDA KETJIL & 1V — DJAWA BARAT SULAWESI V — DJAWA TENGAH MALUKU 0 2 400 140 115 120: 125 11993 8-51 [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 30] === DECLASSIFIED LR DEPARTMENT OF STATE Birjqivo'_ BEsC b ( -2,73RECOT SECURITY INFORMA ON 7S Date: July 1952 r NSEfNICES ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN INDONESIA AUG2 71952 . E COPY (A precis of IR5714.7) Office of Intellig n AS E-RETUR e tegy ae Indonosian Commnnist Party (PKI), although inspired by Soviet, Chinese, and Indian party pronouncements and programs, is essentially an indigenous strategy that attempts to exploit dominant Indonesian attitudes such as nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiment. Although the Party is still in the stage of "legal" or "political" action, there has been evidence of attempts to infiltrate and extend PKI control over some of the armed bands that today present the main security problem to the Indonesian Government. The propaganda organization of the PKI cannot be separated from the general structure of the party. That structure exhibits the conventional Soviet lines of control from the Politburo and Central Committee down to mass organizations. Ultimate control resides in a small group within the Central Committee (CCPKI) in Djakarta. Grassroots action at the base of the organizational pyramid is the task of the "primary organizations," in village, mine, factory, plant, office, school, etc. The duties of the primary organizations resemble closely the tasks of Soviet agitation-propaganda workers and are: (1) to propagandize and organize; (2) to study and report to the PKI leadership the feelings and aims of the masses; (3) to study the people's ways and to organize them for purposes of. agitation and propaganda. Most successful organizational activity has centered on Java and Sumatra. Little is known of PKI progress in the eastern islands, including Borneo and. the Celebes, but there are indications of increasing.organizational activity in this area. PKI leadership may be divided into "inner" and "peripheral" leaders. The "inner" leadership is the Politburo of the Djakarta CCPKI; the peripheral leadership consists of those members who direct PKI activities among specific groups such as labor, youth, women, peasants, and Indonesian-born Chinese. The PKI is definitely a Stalinist party and has extensive relations with international Communism. However, evidence of foreign direction, especially Chinese, while a major source of PKI strength, is Till S VSAK[h II [Unreadable] Final analysis of the material contained in this report was concluded on June 1, 1952 by the Division of Research for Far East. === [PDF page 31] === GNF-I-BBNTIk- SECURITY INFORMANT ION -2at the same 'time a serious weakness in *a nation where the emotion of nationalism runs high and sensitivity to any foreign influences is great. The PKI claims an organizational strength of 30,000. It also has gained control over Indonesia's largest labor federation, Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI) and has exerted leadership over various organizations of youth, women and peasants. Nevertheless, and despite an increase in organizational discipline and cohesiveness, the PI('s future seems less, promising than it did a year ago: (1) The Goyernment's increasing awareness of the dangers of Communist subversion was displayed in August 1951, when the PKI's rapidly crystallizing organization was severely checked by security actions, which resulted in the arrest of many thousands of left-wingers and party members. (2) SOBSI is beginning to lose some ground to non-Communist labor organizations. (3) The dangerous growth of Communist influence in the Ministries of Labor and Information has been partly checked. (4) Chinese Communist activities have definitely received a setback by the general cooling of Indonesia' s relations with Peiping. But in a society where social dislocations are inevitable for many years to come, the PKI can by no means be counted out as a danger to constituted authority. The ultimate objective of the PKI, and therefore of its propaganda efforts, is the 'seizure of state power. Short-term objectives are progressive control over all possible groups in society and a weakening of legitimate governmental authority. At the present stage of "legal" rather than military action, the major Communist tactic is infiltration into the various specific sectors of Indonesian society, such as labor, peasants, or youth. The weight given to specific media or to specific' target groups in the PKI's propaganda efforts cannot be accurately ascertained since propaganda is not a highly developed, semi-autonomous factor of Communist activity.. The most important medium for the dissemination of propaganda is the "human carrier" -- the individual infected with Communist doctrine. The major themes of PKI propaganda are essentially negative -- a constant barrage of criticisms of the alleged "evils and shortcomings" of Indonesian society and of the Republican Government in particular. A check-list of propaganda themes may be somewhat arbitrarily divided into those themes that have general application and those directed more specifically to the various groups in the 1. Central Organization of All Indonesian Laborers. === [PDF page 32] === GODENT ILL SECUR1T7IWOET ION society which the PKI seeks to influence. The basic theme generally employed is to charge the non-Communist nationalist leaders with the "failure of the revolution" -- the failure to realize a postrevolutionary Utopia. Propaganda directed to specific groups emphasizes the.special grievances which exist within these groups. The Communists play upon four major psychological predispositions held in various degrees by most Indonesians. They appeal to: (1) the desire for political and economic independence; (2) the Marxist preconceptions of most intellectuals; (3) anti-imperialist, anti-colonial sentiment; and (4) the disappointments and specific grievances inevitable in a post-revolutionary period. There are, however, a variety of susceptibilities and resistances within the various target groups at which Communist propaganda is aimed. Most complex is the reaction of the politically conscious "elite" which holds the above predispositions most strongly, yet has its susceptibilities to PKI overtures considerably tempered by other factors in its psychology such as an intense political individualism, strong nationalist sentiment, memories of Communist misdeeds, and the quiet but pervasive influence of Islam. In the cases of labor and peasantry, whose psychology is much less complex, Communist success may be attributed primarily to PKI ability to organize and agitate successfully to exploit the specific grievances held by these groups. An evaluation of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda comes essentially to the conclusion that PKI success among all social strata, especially labor and peasantry, is contingent more upon the realities of Party strength and its subsequent ability to exert political and economic pressures upon the government, than upon purely verbal propaganda. The greatest threat to the security of Indonesia at present is not the PKI, despite its success in infiltrating various sectors of society, but the uncontrolled bands of armed dissidents, particularly those in West Java and the Celebes. Only in the unlikely event that the Communists themselves can build a strong armed force will they be in a position to realize their ultimate objective, the seizure of state power. CT IDD IL SECURITY INFORMAT ION