Communist campaign in Indonesia (OIR report, July 1956)

=== [PDF page 1] === opy_ Io 13 Intelligence Repoit/:LR REORD COPY 7299 DECLASSIFIED }).g..A RS.Date THE CUPREIT COIalENIST CAid'PAIGN IN INDONESIA DEPA.::NT OFST DEPARTMENT OF STATE UGAR DIVIION AUG 8 1uo6 Fi-rI COPY Office of Intelligence Research Prepared by Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe and Division of Research for Far East. July 17, 1956 === [PDF page 2] === SECRET This report is 1956. based on information available through June 27, ITEFTS TABLE OF CO Page The New Drive for Influence... State Visits Soviet Eoonomio-Tecinical Aid.. Economic Approaohes by Other Communist States Change in Propaganda Activities.... Role of the Indonesian Communist Party III. Factors Appendix: Influencing Indonesian Receptivity to Bloc Campaign. SECRME Bloo-Indonesian Relations in 1956, A Topical and === [PDF page 3] === SECRET Abstract The USSR has vigorously resumed its campaign, briefly suspended during the tenure of the anti-Communist Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet (August 1955 March 1956), to extend its ties with Indonesia. Immediately after the installation of the present government in April, bloc activity noticeably increased. The two main instruments of the new campaign are state visits and offers of economic-technical cooperation. President Sukarno has accepted invitations to Moscow, Peiping, Prague, and Belgrade; Prime Minister Ali is also going to the USSR. A Soviet offer of economic aid, made simultaneously with the initiation of exploratory talks concerning a Soviet-Indonesian trade agreement in early April, appears to Communist China, Yugoslavia, and several European have been accepted. satellites are now also actively engaged in extending economic relations with Indonesian On June 5 the cabinet decided to authorize rubber exports to Communist China. In view of improving economic relations and the showing of the national elections Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Indonesia's first in which it polled the fourth largest number of votes, Moscow may last fall, well consider Indonesia an ideal testing ground among underdeveloped countries for the new Communist tactic enunciated at the Twentieth Party Congress of Although attempting to achieve power through non-violent parliamentary means. excluded from the cabinets the PKI is continuing its "national-front" strategy., In the propaganda field the emphasis is on stepped-up official visits and the organization of protests against H-bomb tests and SEATO. The outcome of the bloc campaign to strengthen its influence in Indonesia will probably be determined largely by the trend of relations between the Soviet bloc and the free world, although local factors may act to impede ationalism and neutralism, which stimulated or to advance the campaign the initiation of relations with the bloc, may also limit their development. The impending renegotiation, at Indonesia's insistence, of current bilateral barter agreements with bloc countries to provide for multilateral trade with payment in convertible currencies may prevent these countries On the other hand, from gaining the position of favored trading partners. the ease of negotiating agreements with the bloc countries, Indonesia's need for aid, the bloc's willingness to support the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea, and an ingenuous receptivity on the part of some of the non-Comrunist political elite to current Soviet ideological legerdemain may operate to favor the bloc's extension of its ties with Indonesia. SECRET === [PDF page 4] === SECRET THE CURRET COMIUNJTBT CAIAIGN IN INDONESIA Shortly after the inauguration of the new Ali Sastroamidjojo government, the USSR and its allies resumed with vigor a campaign to extend their ties with Indonesia, which had slackened during the tenure of the shortlived (August 1955 - March 1956) anti-Communist government of Burhanuddin Harahap. The campaign has been given impetus by the favorable showing of general electhe Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the country's first tions, where it polled some 17 percent of the popular vote to become the fourth largest party. Although excluded from the. new Ali government, the. PKI apparently intends to. persist in its united national' -front policy. Tactics 'o exploit the domestio political situation were apparently worked, out in. Moscow and Peiping between December 1955 and May 1956 in conThese sultation with the.three key bloc representatives in Indonesia. representatives -- the Soviet Ambassador, the Communist Chinese Ambassador, and the Secretary General. of.the PKI -- were absent from Indonesia for much The Soviet Ambassador left on of.the period from December to June. December 16 and returned March 29; his Chinese colleague departed for Peiping,on February 3 and returned early in June;- the PKI ohief left for the USSR on January 3, remained in Moscow until mid-March, sojourned in Communist China (with a side. trip to North Korea) until May 29, and returned to Djakarta in early June. TFM 'i\TTI DRIVE FOR ITFLUENCE The difference between previous Communist efforts to strengthen Moscow's influence in Indonesia and the new drive lies in the fact that whereas past activities were aimed primarily at "the people" by shortcircuiting the central authorities, the current endeavors constitute an apparently coordinated effort to improve governmental relations between The two main instruments of the Djakarta and nearly all Communist capitals. new approach are state visits and offers of economic-technical cooperation, buttzressed by an intensified exploitation of opportunities presented by the existence of a strengthened PKI and its various front organizations, State Visits In rapid succession during April and May, Moscow, Peiping, and Prague extended invitations to representatives of the Indonesian Parliament and to President Sukarno (subsequent to an invitation by Secretary Dulles to visit the US) to visit the USSR, Communist China, and Czechoslovakia. The parliamentary delegation received bids on April 4 from Moscow, on April 30 from Peiping, and on May 23 from Prague; President Sukarno, on April 8, April 25, Sukarno has also accepted and during the last week of May, respectively, an invitation from Tito to visit Yugoslavia in September. In response to similar invitations from Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw, a smaller Indonesian SECRET === [PDF page 5] === SECRET legislative deputation, headed by Speaker Sartono and including representatives of the three main Moslem parties, visited Moscow (where it was., received by 'Bulganin and. Khrushohev between May 18 and IMay 25), Warsaw, and Prague, returning. to.Indones ia early in June. On May 24 Mayor Sudiro of Djakarta.left for.a three-week visit in Communist China, announcing that he would also make a trip to the Soviet Union upon President Sukarno's return home..On June 6. it was announced in Djakarta that Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo.had. also.accepted an. invitation from Bulganin to the. Soviet Unionoafter September. A parliamentary delegation of 20.or more will leave for.a-month's visit to Communist China on September 15, while another. large delegation will leave for a five-week visit to Poland, the USSR and. Czeohoslovakia on the same day. While no Soviet reoiprocity.for these visits has been indicated as yet, a trip by Pine Sun Yat-sen to Indonesia in July was announced on April 30, and on May 15 the Indones ian press made public a wish, expressed by ilao Tse-tung to a visiting delegation of Indonesian journalists during the first week of May, to vis it Indonesia "if the opportunity occurred," visit Soviet Eoonomic-Technical Aid Soviet.Ambassador D. A. Zhukov's announcement on April 10 that he had.. submitted an offer of economic aid to the Indonesian Government (described by him..in a May 2 press interview as "Soviet willingness to cooperate with Indonesia.'. in setting up power stations, fertilizer factories, refineries, aluminum, cement and other projects, and possibly an atomic reactor) was made simultaneously with the initiation of exploratory talks concerning. the conolusion of a Soviet-Indonesian trade agreement. According to an announcement of the Indonesian Foreign Office on May 31, "Indonesia i1s7 expected to establish direct trade relations with the Soviet Union0 It may-have been in anticipation of this impending move that an Indones ian commercial attache to Moscow was appointed in mid-April. Previous economic grant aid from the bloc to Indonesia.has been infinitesimal, consisting of gifts of machinery exhibited at Indonesian trade fairs, technical assistance, and the expenses of a few groups visiting the USSR, with a total value probably not exceeding 100,0COOO Trade with the USSR is at an inconsequential level, though more brisk with Czechoslovakia and Communist China, amunting, with the whole bloc, to 3.5 percent of exports and 6,7 percent of imports. On June 27 an Indonesian Foreign Ministry source reportedly stated that his government had officially accepted a Soviet Union offer of economic and technical aid which would probably equal the assistance now being received from the US and the Colombo Plan. As far as trade with the bloc is concerned, the government has been under pressure from smallholder and trading interests, who, worried by imminent US synthetic rubber self-sufficiency, have opposed continued Indonesian adherence to the 1950 UT embargo on the shipment of strategic goods SECRE === [PDF page 6] === j 77, "1!1 to Communist China. In deference to these interests, the Ali cabinet on June 5 followed Malaya's example (June 4) and decided to authorize the export to Communist China of natural rubber, which Indonesia had designated as strategic at the time it agreed to observe the embargo, . Economic Approaohes.:by Other Communist States Commnist 'China -and several European satellites are now aotively On May engaged in cementing closer--eoonomio relations with Indonesia. Czechoslovak-Indonesian industrial development credit agreement was signed in Djakarta, under the terms of which Czechoslovakia will provide capital goods and technical:assistance..under a line. of credit.(total unspecified), repayable at 4 percent interest over a period of five years, with individual 16 projects to be covered by subsidiary agreements. During April.Poland signed build five 19000-ton ships for, an Indonesian firm.in return a oont: atto fo:103000tons of copra (which, however, is ineffective in the absence of an--Indones ian-Polish barter' agreement)e Two weeks 'later East Germany made an.6ffer of trade and aid to Djakarta in a statement to the press; in. addition East Germany is installing a r7.9 million sugar mill there on a six-year credit. By the end of April Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, East German, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav participation in the forthcoming Surabaya Fair and On May 2 the cabinet Jogjakarta Exposition appeared fairly certain. approved the reception of an agricultural research mission from Communist China. Change in Propaganda Activities Current Communist-inspired propaganda in Indonesia emphasizes steppedup visits and the organization of protests against H-bomb tests and SEATO. Considerable stress is being placed also upon Moslem affinities between Indones ian vis itors in the Indonesia and the two senior Communist partners. USSR and CPR now include non-Communists and in some cases known antiCommunists, unlike the visitors of the two previous years, who consisted of frontist delegations of women, youth groups, trade unionists, railroad workers, and other "progressives," This year's guests include, in addition to government officials, businessmen, religious teachers, journalists and engineers, with special attention to representatives of Moslem interests. Speaker Sartono's entourage in the Soviet Union had an exclusively Moslem political character. Indonesian Moslems recently celebrated the Bairam festivities jointly with the China Islamic Association in Peiping, Sian, and Mukden, and made side trips to Sinkiang and Northeast China. SECRET === [PDF page 7] === SECRET -4Non-gqvernmentl -organizations, openly or clandestinely manipulated by Co. nunists, are.vociferously protesting "the American policy of trying to drag /Indonesia7 into the Manila Treaty," and the holding of thermonuclear tests in the P~aifio- The: efficacy of this approach is indicated by the fact that on April 21 the Indonesian parliament unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the testing and use of nuclear weapons THE ROLE OF THETINDONES IAN COMlUNIST PARTY From Moscow's, point of view the showing of the PKI in Indonesia's first nationwide election last-fall, when the party polled about 17 percent of the total vote and was. allocated 15 percent of the seats in the new parliament -an.accomplishment-.-surpassed only by the Nationalist Party (PNI), the Masjumi and the Nahdatul 'Ulama (NU) -- may have made Indonesia an ideal testing ground among underdeveloped.countries for the Communist tactic laid down at the Twentieth Party Congress of attaining power through nonviolent, parliamentary means The tolerant attitude toward the PKI displayed during the first Ali cabinet by some PNI leaders may be favorable to this approach. The young and vigorous PKI leadership, beholden to Moscow for ideological guidance but probably operating in a more intimate association with Peiping as far as practical politics' is concerned, has attempted with some success to identify itself with the dynamic nationalism and anti-colonialism of the PNI and has pursued a national front line since 1953~ In a recent interview with a Yugoslav journalist, summarized by the Belgrade radio on May 27, 'Secretary General D..N. Aidit disavowed "immediate socialist tasks" for the PKI and indicated that the party intended to continue to follow the national front line at least for the time being by declaring that the party's "present aims are national and democratic.., /To be attained7 within the framework of the broadest possible alliance of Indonesian national forces e" The PKI's good electoral showing in September-December is both an asset and a liability: an asset because it may qualify the party for eventual participation in the government; a liability, since it has already alarmed powerful conservative elements in the PNI, Masjumi and the NU to such an extent that, in spite of President Sukarno's wish for "unity," no Communist was included in the new eight-party coalition cabinet, The current attitude of the PKI toward the government is determined by this duality of potential political strength and temporary (from the Communist point of view) exclusion from governmental power. Secretary General Aidit congratulated Prime Minister Ali from Peiping upon the formation of his new cabinet; the leader of the PKI parliamentary faction, M. H. lukman, pledged Communist.support to the government on April 13. On the other hand, an official release of the party, issued on March 20, expressed disapproval of the new Ali cabinet on the grounds that it included the "reactionary" Mas jumi but excluded the anti-oolonial PKI. SECRET === [PDF page 8] === SECRET -5 III. FACTORS INFLUENCING INDOITESIAN RECEPTIVITY TO BLOC CAMPAIGN The outcome of the bloc campaign to strengthen its influence in Indonesia will probably be determined largely by the trend of developments in the struggle between the bloc and the free world.. To a lesser degree, however, various local factors will operate to impede or to advance blood efforts, Indonesia is likely to accept additional bloc offers of economic and technical aid, with the consequent development of somewhat closer economic relations with the bloc. Communist efforts to utilize these relations to develop closer political ties will, however, encounter the-obstacles of nationalism and neutralism, which, paradoxically, have stimulated the initiation of relations but at the same time may well limit their development, There are several additional.obstacles to the progress of the bloc's campaign in Indonesia, For the moment, it is unlikely that the PKI will be able to aid the campaign directly, since the government, unlike the first. Ali cabinet in the final months of its existence, is not dependent upon Communist support. In addition, powerful elements in the -PNI, Masjumi, and NI, alarmed at the showing of the PKI in the elections, are likely to continue to forestall any possible Communist attempts to participate in the government. This reaction of the other major parties to the outcome of the elections is underlined by a general movement of the PNI, Masjumi, and 1U toward ultranationalism as a means of undercutting the PKIT's current line. Indonesian dissatisfaction with barter agreements with the bloc may prevent the latter from gaining a position as a favored trading partner. Bloc dumping of Indonesian goods in competitive areas and the tendency for blood exports to exceed imports from., Indonesia has led. the Indonesian Government to seek to eliminate barter. Bloc countries have been notified that Indonesia wants to renegotiate current.bilateral agreements to provide for multilateral- trade, with payment in convertible currencies. Several factors are likely to work in favor of the bloc's extension of its ties with Indonesian The apparent ease of negotiating and the simplioity of agreements with the bloc countries are likely to prove attractive to the Indonesians. The Indonesian need for foreign aid which will support the five-year development plan now being drafted may also prove to be to the advantage of the bloc. The bloc's willingness to support the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea (West Irian) -- in contrast with opposition or neutrality -- may favorably dispose the Indonesian Government toward bloc overtures, In addition, there may be an ingenuous receptivity among some nonCommunist Indonesian political elite to Soviet ideological legerdemain, particularly in the present period. Lhen President Sukarno visits Moscow and Peiping at the end of the summer, it is likely that he will succeed in obtaining further diplomatic support for the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea. Western SECRET === [PDF page 9] === SECRET APPENDIX BLC-INDONESIAN RELATIONS IN 1956: A TOPICAL AUD CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX POLITICAL Diplomatic Activity Indonesian charge in Moscow, Darmanto, confers with Soviet Ambassador in The Hague while in the Netherlands. Early January: February 16 Indonesian charge in Moscow is received by First Deputy Foreign Minister V.- V. Kuznetsov. February 27 Consul General of Democratic Republic of Vietnam presents credentials. March Indonesian Admiral Subiakto visits Communist China. March 6 Molotov, on behalf of Soviet Government, congratulates Indonesia on unilateral abrogation of Netherlands-Indonesia Union. Larch 9 New Hungarian minister presents credentials. March 12 Yugoslavia announces March 29 Soviet Ambassador Zhukov returns to Djakarta from Moscow Had been absent since December 16, 1955. consultations. (CPR Ambassador had also left for Peiping early in February.) April 10 Supreme Soviet congratulates first elected Indonesian parliament. April 11 Chou En-lai telegraphs thanks to Prime Minister Ali for cooperation in "Kashmir Princess" airliner sabotage case at the time of the 1955 Bandung Conference. agrement to first Indonesian minister. Soviet Ambassador Zhukov calls on Acting Secretary General of the Foreign Office Subandrio. April 12 Soviet Ambassador Zhukov calls on Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani. SEC PET === [PDF page 10] === SECRET April 16 Prime Minister Ali,: intelegram to.Chou En-lai regarding "Kashmir.Princes s" ase, streses Zhukov. Prime Minister Ali receives Soviet Ambas'ador April 24 in Prague on Djakarta announces call by Indonesian charge IndoCzechoslovak Foreign Minister regarding opening of nesian Legation in Prague. April 25 May 2-8 May 7 Zhukov and CPR charge attend 32nd birthday s Soviet Ambassador for Sultan of Surakai-ta and pay courtesy call on diplomatic and Indones ian charge participate with oiher Kufow and commercial personnel in guided tour of Tsinan, Tsingtao in Shantung Province. celebration mayor of Surakarta. exchange Indonesian Foreign Ministry announces decision to diplomatic representatives with Poland. May 8 May 14 Zitek as Minister to t Prague announces appointment of Jan Indones ie.o B... Visits by Parliamentary and Municipal Delegations April 4 Indonesian parliament accepts Suprene Soviet invitation, with memdelegation to consist of approximately 20 parliamentary for bers representing four najor parties.. Visit scheduled September. April 9-19 delegation to CPR invitation to Indonesian parliamentary visit Communist China announced. April 30 May 8 May 14: May 23 parliamentary Supreme Soviet issues invitation to Indonesian delegation to visit USSR. Polish charge extends invitation to:Indonesian Parliamentary his European tour. Speaker Sartono to visit Poland during Sartono, accompanied by other parliamentary representatives, to invitaleaves for USSR and Czechoslovakia, in response industrial, agricultural, labor and educational tions to visit centers, delegation. s Czechoslovakia invites Indonesian parliamentary SECRET === [PDF page 11] === SECIO May 24 Mayor..Sudiro of. Djakarta leaves for. three-week vis it in Communist China; to visit USSR after President Sukarno's returns Bulganin:and Khrushchev receive Sartono mis sion. May 25 Sartono mission leaves Moscow for Warsaw, May 26 :Sartono mission arrives in Prague. Vis its by President Sukarno invitation to President April 8 Soviet Ambassador Zhukov announces Sukarno to visit USSR. April 10 President Sukarno.officially accepts invitation. April 25 Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani announces invitation from CPR; states acceptance in Mao Tse-tung to Sukarno to visit principle. May 3 EZNA in May 28 Belgrade radio announces slavia in September. Sukarno vis it at end of September. President Sukarno to visit Yugo- Indonesian Government announces President Sukarno to visit Czechoslovakia in September. May 30 June 6 Peiping announces Djakarta announces acceptance by Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo the USSR after september. of Bulganin invitation to visit Impending Vis its by CPR Leaders April 30 ay 15 hie Sun Yat-sen's visit to Indonesia in July is announced. Djakarta press announces that Mao Tse-tung told Indonesian week of journalists' delegation in Peiping during the first May that "he would be very pleased to visit Indonesia if the opportunity occurred." SECRET === [PDF page 12] === SECRET Official Indonesian Pronouncements April 30 Foreign Ministry spokesman Suwito endorses Soviet proposal to lift UN embargo on the shipment of strategic goods to Communist China. May 16 Indonesian Foreign Office circles declare that Indonesia "will positively bring up the embargo question before the forthcoming 2nd Asian-African Conference" and will do "its utmost to get the embargo lifted." Private business interests, worried by US synthetic rubber self-sufficiency, consider the situation under which Indonesia can't sell rubber to Conunist countries, including CPR, as "unbearable." June 5 s Cabinet decides to authorize rubber exports to Communist China. Indonesian Reactions ECONOMIC to the Soviet Economic Offer April 10 Soviet Ambassador Zhukov announces submission of aid offer to Indonesian Government. April 12 Djakarta press announces Soviet offer of economic and technical aid to Indonesia and Indonesian acceptance in principle. Mid-April Rusli Amran appointed Indonesian Commercial Attache in April 16 Prime Minister Ali announces in Parliament no objection to economic aid from any country provided that there are "no political or military strings attached." April 19 Ex-premier Burhanuddin harahap announces no objection on part of asjumi Party to Soviet economic aid provided that there are no strings attached. April-May Talm on Soviet-Indonesian trade agreement reported inqiry stage. May 2 Soviet Arbassador Zhukov in press interview states Soviet willingness to cooperate with Indonesia in setting up power stations, fertilizer factories, refineries, aluminum, cement and other projects, including atomic energy reactor. Moscow. === [PDF page 13] === SECRET May 11 10 - Djaharta radio summarizes a press' interview with Vice President Mohammed Hatta, stating regarding Soviet aid offer that. "Indonesia is ready to receive aid from any country economic development as long as the aid is not given with political or military strings attached." for May 17 s Sukarno, addressing a joint session of the US Congress, declares that Indonesia will accept economic assistance "from whatever quarter it may come," provided that its freedom remains unimpaired. Premier Ali at a press conference says that Indonesian Government "has not.yet taken any definite and concrete decision" about Soviet economic aid offer. May 31 June 27 a Indonesian Foreign Office source states that Indonesia has officially accepted USSR offer of aid to match US and Colombo plan ass istance. July Indonesian Foreign Office announces that Indonesia expects to establish direct trade relations with the Soviet Union. In response to a Soviet invitation, a party of Indonesian industrialists will visit the USSR to study heavy industry methods. Economic Activities of Other Communist States April 8- Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce delegation arrives in Djakarta. April 9 CPR delegate to International Chamber of Commerce on Asian and Far Eastern affairs gives party in Bandung. Czech and Hungarian observers attend. April 13 Djakarta announces Czechoslovak submittal of draft credit agreement. April-May : Polish April 24 s Polish trade commissioner in Djakarta announces order from the forth Celebes and Moluccas Coconut and Copra Board for five 1,000-ton ships from Polish shipyards in exchange for 10,000 tons of copra. April 27 oomercial mission in Djakarta. Djakarta (AIAP.A) announces intention to terminate existing trade and payments agreements and negotiate new ones with Hungary, aiuania, Czechoslovakia. East Ger-any, Yugoslavia, SECRET === [PDF page 14] === SECRET 11 - and Poland after reconsidering trade volumes payment. May 2 May 6 East German trade representative in Djakarta expresses GDR desire for new trade agreement with, and economic-technical aid on long-term credit to, Indonesia. Indonesia and Czechoslovakia sign capital goods export and technical assistance credit agreement. The terms for a line of credit are repayment in five years at 4 percent interest. No upper limit on the amount was specified. Details of specific projects are to be determined by subsidiary agreements. Exhibitions and Trade Fairs Chairman of Indonesian Central Exhibition Commission visits Rumania and East Germany; announces participation'in Surabaya Fair of Poland, East Germany, and Rumania, and possibly Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and USSR. January April 11 April 24 The USSR is reported an "almost definite participant" in the October Jogjakarta Exposition. Polish trade commissioner in Djakarta announces invitation to Indonesian delegates to attend Poznan exhibition. III. Cabinet approves CPR-agricultural research mission visit to Indonesia. May 16 and-systems COMlUNIST AID COE&UIIST :OLINATED-ACTIVITIES The Indonesian Commnist Party (P I) February 1 D. N. Aidit, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PKI, leaves for Moscow to attend the 20th Party Congress of CPSU. Remains in Moscow until mid-March, visits CPR and Leaves Pyongyang, where he attends Korean North Korea. Tiorkers t Party Congress, for Peiping on May 7; leaves for hcme on May 21; arrives in Djakarta on June 3. March 20 PI disapproves of the new Indonesian cabinet because includes Mas jumi, excludes PKI. === [PDF page 15] === SECRET April 13 M. H. Lukman, 12 - parliamentary spokesman for the PKI, supports the Ali Government. May 27 Belgrade radio summarizes Peiping interview with D. N. Aidit, who disavows "immediate socialist tasks" for PKI and declares: "our present aims are national and democratic, and we desire to achieve them within the framework of the broadest possible alliance of Indonesian national forces." June 3 D. N. Aidit, upon arrival in Djakarta, praises President Sukarno's accomplishments. in the US and states that Soviet eoonomio aid to underdeveloped countries is "not aimed at looking for new markets, as [fj the case with the aid from find The socialist nations capitalist countries... enough markets for their products among themselves." San Front Organization Activities March 5 Indonesian-Chinese Friendship Association. inaugurated. March 6 Indonesian--C7:echoslovak.Friendship lecture. April 7 s Moscow announces organization of Soviet-Indonesian cultural society. April 18 Indonesian-Chinese Friendship Association opens exhibition in Surabaya. April 19 Indonesian Peace Committee sends greetings to CPR Embassy. Djakarta, on first anniversary of Bandung Conference. Association sponsors public Unofficial Visits April 24 Nine-man Indonesian labor delegation leaves for 1 and 1/2 month visit in CPR with send-off from President Sukarno. April 30 Indonesian journalistsI delegation arrives in Peiping for Delegation leader is received by Mao Tse-tung. 10-day visit. May 1 Indonesian labor delegation present at Moscow and Peiping labor day celebrations. May 4 s Invited representatives of Indonesian Islamic parties leave Djakarta for Peiping to attend Islamic New Year celebrations. SECRET === [PDF page 16] === SECRET 13 - Between May 4-22 Chou En-lai receives Indonesian labor delegation. May 12-13 Indonesian Moslem delegation, guest of China Islamic Association, participates in Bairam festivities in Peiping, Siam, and Shenyang. : Cabinet extends tour of Indonesian labor delegation in CPR by two weeks so that it can visit industrial centers in May 16 Dairen and West China. May 19 Indonesian labor delegation leaves Changchun after a 10-day visit to Northeast China. May 23 Indonesian delegation to Peiping meeting of Woments International Democratic Federation returns to Djakarta. May 28 Djakarta radio announces arrival of. Indonesian Working Women s delegation in Moscow at the invitation of the AllUnion Council of Trade Unions. CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA Bloc Activities January 21 Pravda published interview with President Sukarno. Februar- 13 Soviet Embassy Djakarta.presents 950 scientific works to University of' Indones ia. April Soviet Embassy Djakarta reported planning large.-scale publishing and information campaign. April 4 Soviet sports exhibit opens in May 17 Indonesia. Djakarta announces Czechoslovak invitation.to Indonesian film produo.ers. to participate in 9th International Film Festival (July 12-29) in Karlovy Vary. May 23 Moscow 'radio commentary on Sukarno visit to US plays up alleged incompatibility between US and Indonesian polioies. May 27 Moscow radio refers to current talks with tourist firms in Indonesia (and elsewhere) concerning visits by Soviet tourists. SECRET === [PDF page 17] === SECRET 14- Indonesian Activities April 21 Indonesian Parliament unanimously adopts resolution opposing testing and use of nuclear weapons. April 25 Indonesian delegate to Council of Wlomen's International Democratio Federation meeting in Peiping attacks "American policy of trying to drag fndonesiaJ into the Manila Treaty." May 8 Representatives of Indonesian Teacherst Association, currently visiting CPR, are reported to have been instructed to find out how CPR Teaohers Association /!will go alone with the idea of holding an Afro-Asian teachers' conference. May 9 s TASS, Djakarta, announces letter from Communist-dominated central trade uriion'-Federation (SOBSI) to President Eisenhower, "insisting... that the nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific should be discontinuedo"Indonesian Peace Committee calls on the public to voice its opposition to nuclear tests to the US Government via the US Ambassador in Djakarta. May 13 t ANTARA reports.a protest by the Gerwani organization of Indonesian women against the continuation of US H-bomb tests in the Pacific. May 17 May 17 ::y 30 Djakarta radio announces that the Sarbupri, leftist estate workers union,-has sent cablegrams to President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden demanding abolition of the hydrogen bomb test explosions on Eniwetok and the The cables said Indonesian Christmas Islands in the Pacific. estate workers learned with anxiety abcut tests on the two Recalling the terrible consequences to Japanese islands. fishermen as a result-'of test explosions on BiMini two years ago, the union, claiming to speak on behalf of 500,000 members, urged that explosion be cancelled. laudaLeader of the Indonesian teachersI delegation makes tory comments over Peiping radio on conditions in the CPR. As ian-African students' conference opens in Bandung, with the participation of delegations frcm the CPR, North Korea, and North v ietnam. SEC? ET STATE---hASE.D.C.