Indonesia's new governmental bodies (OIR report, October 1959)

PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.6 US, British and Dutch Government Records/US State Department Central Files (ProQuest History Vault)/OSS-State Department Intelligence (1959-10-13) - Indonesia's new governmental bodies [ProQuest 3042030147].pdf Text from the PDF text layer; pages marked "re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026" were re-OCR’d with Tesseract because the text layer scored Poor. OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === B/ -Copy No. Intelligence Report No. 8126 DEART'I~iTOFSTATE LIBRiyDVSO OE0 NEW GOVERNMENTAL BODIES LP. IVIL~I pIEAS BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, October 13, 1959 DECLASSIFIED CECI1ET'N000rt === [PDF page 2] === TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction............................................. 1 III. Provisional Supreme Advisory Council...................... 4 IV. National Planning Council................................ 5 V. Body for the Supervision of the Activities of the State Apparatus......................................... 6 VI. Conclusions.............................................. 8 APPENDIXES A. Chart of Cabinet........................................... 10 B. List of Cabinet Members with Identifying Biographical Information.......................................... 1 C. List of National Advisory Council Members Showing Holdovers from National Council and Number of Leftists.. 13 D. List of National Planning Council Members Showing Number of Leftists...................................... 15 === [PDF page 3] === Abstract President Sukarno has an excellent opportunity to put his concept of "guided democracy" into effect and thus enhance his role and importance. The 1945 Constitution, providing for a strong executive, has been readopted. He has assumed the Prime Ministership. He has also formed four new government bodies directly under his guidance: an enlarged Cabinet, the Advisory Council, the Planning Council, and the Supervisory Body. There is as yet no clear indication as to how he intends to exert his influence through the new bodies or which of these he will choose as his major instrument of government. The Cabinet has a complicated structure and is faced with inherent organizational problems. The Planning Council is assigned a seemingly impossible task, and the Supervisory Body, if used overzealously, could alienate Sukarno's remaining support in the bureaucracy. Sukarno's choice as the instrument to steer government policy probably will be the Advisory Council, of which he is Chairman and whose function is to submit to the Cabinet both solicited and unsolicited advice. This possibility is increased by Sukarno's reported decision to limit his regular participation in Cabinet affairs. With the Cabinet freed of responsibility to Parliament and with representatives of the anti-Sukarno Masjumi and Socialist parties excluded from all important government bodies, there is apparently no obstacle to his use of the Advisory Council to manipulate government policy. Although all the members of the newly created bodies, with the possible exception of the Sultan of Djogjakarta, have given Sukarno loyal support for the various causes he has advocated, Sukarno will very likely face some opposition from political party representatives within the Advisory Council who regard themselves as still responsible to their parties. They are expected to play a critical role when the Council meets in late October to consider modifying a decree on regional autonomy which the political parties have united in opposing. Since recommendations made by the Council require unanimous approval, these members could prevent action by the Council. Sukarno could, of course, disregard the advice of the new organs, including the Advisory Council, but this is unlikely. In the first place, he needs them to share responsibility for Indonesia's increasingly severe economic and political conditions. Moreover, by rejecting all counsel he could alienate some of his followers in the new bodies. Finally, Sukarno evidently believes that these organs are necessary to carry out his policy of "guided democracy" which has occupied his mind since the fall of 1956. It is probable therefore that he will make use of the new Councils to the extent that they will contribute toward the achievement of his aim. === [PDF page 4] === I. INTRODUCTION Four new governmental bodies were formed in Indonesia during July, and August 1959: the,new Cabinet, the. Provisional Supreme Advisory Supervision' Council, the National Planning Council, and the. Body for the- The first.two are. of the Activities of the Government Apparatus. specifically stipulated in the provisions of. the 1945 Constitution, 1959.. Since which was re-enacted by presidential decree on July 5, mid-1957 President Sukarno has often mentioned the creation of a Planning Council as an instrument for carrying out "guided democracy" which has used to enhance his power at the expense of the political parties. The Supervisory Body is a new device to serve as a "watchdog" body, Conwhich-was apparently conceived after the readoption of the 1945 stitution. Since independence Indonesia's major. political parties have devoted most of their efforts to obtain.and maintain power, giving The comparatively little attention to the nation's basic problems. President has blamed this political activity for-.all of the nation's ills and has been endeavoring in recent years to-substitute his personal rule for that of the political parties using the term "guided democracy." The readoption of the 1945 Constitution has given Sukarno.an it provides opportunity to put "guided democracy" into effect. because for a strong executive. The creation of the four.new government bodies through one or is apparently a move to concentrate;-his efforts on ruling new more of them. This paper will examine briefly the nature of the in.an effort to gauge their possible influence and imorganizations portance in the immediate future. II. THE CABINET The Cabinet., as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution, was:appointed of 36 by the President and is responsible only to him. It consists members under the President, who is concurrently Prime Minister, -and Ministers has 10 posts for Ministers, 24. for Vice Ministers, and-7 for of State 'ex-officio. Several officials are concurrently both Ministers. and Ministers of State ex-officio.or Ministers and Vice. Ministers. This large body is divided into an inner Cabinet and a full Cabinet. and a. 1. An organizational chart of the Cabinet,appears in Appendix A, list of Cabinet members with identifying biographical information Appendix B. === [PDF page 5] === The Ministers, only two of whom are heads of departments, comprise the inner Cabinet. All of its~ members with three exceptions supervise the working of two or more Vice Ministers.' The full Cabinet is made Up' of..the.inner Cabinet plus the'Vice Ministers and the Ministers ex-officio. Most of the Vice Ministers -are heads of-departments and a few'are entrusted with special functions. The Miisters ex-officio are high civilian and military officials., Their inclusion in the Cabinet was apparently based the co- .primarily on recognition of their rank and the need to assure ordination of the activities of non-ministerial organizations with-the policies of the 'government. The Cabinet is in general divided between the followers of Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Nasution and the President. According to Nasution's analysis of the Cabinet as reported by a high-ranking Indonesian Army officer, should differences arise between him and Sukarno, he would have the strongest voice among the Vice Ministers but not among the Ministers. Nasution considers that his supporters in 'the inner Cabinet are Djuanda, guprajogi, and Ipik Gandamana, while Leimena, Chairul Saleh, Muljadi Djojomartono, and Muhamad Yamin are followers of the President. Foreign Minister Subandrio's inclinations are unknown. Among the Vice Ministers the "Nasution group" consists of Hidajat, Sukanto, Sambas Atmadinata and Aziz Saleh who in turn have the backing of Maladi, Dipokusumo, Arifin Harahap, Abtulmutalib Danuningrat, Djatikusumo, Iskandar, and Satryo. Presidential followers are Notohamiprodjo, Ahem Erningpradja, Suharto, Sadjarwo, Prijono, Sudibjo, and Sudjono, while the positions of Achmadi and Wahib Wahab are not known. - There is ample evidence showing that the Army Chief of Staff wanted far more "Nasution men" in the Cabinet than he was able to obtain from the President. Several characteristics mark the composition of this Cabinet. First, it is unusually large and complicated in organization." Secondly,. most of its members have been followers of Sukarno, and appear'to have supported him in his various plans for reorganization of the government. Thirdly, it has a definite non-party- complexion and apparently has little direct party support. Only three of the 37-member Cabinet had belonged to the inner council of any political group, and two of these belonged to the minor Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) and IFKI (iengue of Supporters of Indonesian.Independence) _arties, while the third joined the Partai National Indonesia (PNI) in 1958, apparently. for opportunistic reasons. The non-party aspect of the Cabinet has been reinforced by the heavy infusion of army officers and career civil servants. On July 27 the government issued an order that all high-level government servants sever party ties, thus making it difficult for any Cabinet member to maintain an effective relationship with a political party. In the fourth place, seven (excluding Sukarno) of the ten members === [PDF page 6] === of. the inner Cabinet and seven of the 25. Vice Ministers are holdovers. frpm.the previous Cabinet. Finally,.the,..inclusion of Sudjono,. Prijono, and Sudibjo.means: that the partai Komunis Indonesia will continue to have: access to the Cabinet.... Indonesian observers, in viewing the multisegmented Cabinet, have expressed uncertainty whether leadership of-the. country is to be concentrated in tentiieri de diffused'anohg-dotne"tlirty-odd men. The lines ocontrol- of. the Ministers.over the. Vice. Ministers. are not yet established,,and perhaps in some cases cannot be because some. Ministers have, ben assigned too many tasks.. First Minister Djuanda, in addition.to:coordinating theday-to-day functioning of the.inner Cabinet, has been.. entrusted with the supervision of the. Ministry of Finance.. It is.-reported that -.he will, also supervise the. Ministries of Education and Mobilization of Peoples Potential..While Muljadi Djojomartonp, Minister for People's Welfare, and Chairul Saleh Minister for Development and Construction, each directly heads departments as Vice Ministers, they are als. assigned the 'supervision of two and- three other departments, respectively... Individual Indonesians.- and the Indonesian press have questioned the- competence and suitability for their positions of several Ministersand Vice Ministers. While the ability of Dr. Aziz Saleh is generally admired, many question his suitability for the Agriculture..portfolio- Several. Indonesian commentators, have criticized Mujadi:Djojomertono,. Minister.for.People 's Welfare, Dr. Suharto, Vice Minister for People's Industry, and. Vice Minister of Finance Notohamiprodjo for-lack of competence. -In -general, the large percentage..of holdovers-.from the-Djuanda Cabinet.gives little promise that the new Cabinet will be more effective. The elevation of Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Nasution, to Cabinet status as Minister of Security/Defense, gives. him some measure of direction over the chiefs of the other services. Nasution's new. authority threatens to aggravate existing differences -of views, between him and leftist-oriented-Air Force Chief of Staff Surjadarma.and increases the possibility of an open, dispute between the two services..On July 15 the Air Force issued a communique expressing.the hope that the leadership of the. armed forces would be placed s.olely..in the hands of-.the:Supreme Commander (Sukarno), and that the. Indonesian Air Force would be granted the 'fullest autonomy in drawing up its budget. Nasution replied by closing;thenewspapers which:carried the communique:: On July 21 the Ministry of Information issued an announcement stating that the suggestion. In'donesian Air Fo'rce fQrorgatiiztdfiardhkrge's in.the military by the.mad structure wouldbe discussedby the.Cabinet.- The announcement.further stated that Air Force Chief of Staff Suryadarma, under the rotation plan provided for in the Military Organic Act of 1954, would assume the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, replacing the Navy incumbent. The === [PDF page 7] === 0iheCabinet meeting are not known.21,-'However, since there has been resui.t s no further mid of the matter since July it seems probable that a compromsa'egreement was reached between Nasution and Suryadarma, with It is doubtful, however, whether thiscompromise Sukarno as the mediator. will constitute a final solution to the interservice problem. III. PROVISIONAL SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL are the The functions of the Provisional Supreme Advisory Council to subsame as those of its predecessor, the National Council, namely, mit to the Cabinet both solicited and unsolicited advice. The 1945 Conshall advise stitution states in Article 16: "The Supreme Advisory Council right to submit on questions submitted to it by the President and has the 1957 which estabproposals to the government." The emergency law of May lished the former National Council (Dewan Nasional) stipulated: "The and social National Council shall advise the government on basic national problems, both at the government's request and on its own initiative." There has been no explanation for terming the present body "Provisional." 'The Indonesian Government usually credited the National Council, which was in existence from July 1957 to July 1959, with having a large share in formulating the plans for major government actions during this period. It is probably more accurate to say that the Council's Chairman, President Sukarno, formulated these plans and the rest of the Council, with one exception, added little original thought. That exception was the Council's Vice Chairman, Ruslan Abdulgani, the intelligent, shrewd, and articulate Foreign Minister of the second Ali Cabinet and long the close confidant of -President Sukarno. Abdulgani had great influence on the President in making his decisions which was doubtlessly enhanced by Abdulgani's influence over the Council's members. the The members of the ~Supreme Advisory Council, as in the case of National Council, have been appointed by President Sukarno. Sukarno is the Chairman, Ruslan Abdulgani is Vice Chairman. Twelve of the remaining 44 members are holdovers from the 45-member National Council.. Like its predecessor, the bulk of its membership consists of representatives of the regions and-of "functional groups" (e.g. labor, youth, women). The National Council had 22 regional and 15 "functional" representatives, while its successor has 8 of the former and 24 of the latter. One of the demands of the outer islands has been to have a greater voice in the government. While few of the regional representatives on either the of members showing the number of leftists and i See Appendix C for list of holdovers from the former National Council. u=-4:ceo= === [PDF page 8] === new or old Council would be considered true '-spokesmen for regional interests by.the outer-island leaders, the. sharp reduction of their number on the.Advisory Council indicates that Sukarno has not made even-a token.gesturesof conciliation to these leaders. - The Advisory Council differsin one respect from its predecessor. Twelve leaders represent three of the four major political parties (the Muslim Masjumi is not represented) and five minor parties. On the old Council this third group was made up of high 'civilian and 'military officials. The. Provisional Supreme Advisory -Council includes 16 leftists, as did the National Council. -Six among them can be classified as non- Communist, and ten as probably subject to strong Communist influence or discipline. Four who represent political parties were evidently appointed in order to include political party representation. IV. NATIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL At the opening ceremony inaugurating the National Planning Council, President Sukarno charged the Council to draw up a blueprint within one year "to.mobilize, the people not only in the economic area but also in the social, cultural, and political spheres." Judging by Indonesia's past experience in planning, the chances for fulfilling this assignment seem slight. Since independence there has been a plethora of economicplans -and planning agencies, including at one time a Ministry for State Planning, with virtually no visible results. To Sukarno, mobilizing the people "in the social, cultural, and' political sphere" means molding Indonesian society into a cohesive body capable of achieving economic development similar to that which is taking place.in Communist China. Since his return from a visit to the Chinese mainland in 1956, both his public and private pronouncements have reflected an admiration for and a desire to emulate this economic progress. However, he has never spelled out what system should be adopted to achieve this progress, but has vaguely indicated that it should be done "in the Indonesian way." Muhamad Yamin, appointed by Sukarno as Chairman of the Planning..Council,. visited Communist China in 1958, but the Communists were not able to evoke from him any laudatory remarks on their system. It.is doubtful whether he would be willing, at least for the immediate future, to abandon democratic principles in favor of the harsh Chinese methods of achieving economic progress. 1. See Appendix D for list of members showing number of' leftists. === [PDF page 9] === The members of the National Planning Couricil were selected by a subcommittee of the former Djuanda Cabinet,. with-appointments, subject' to President- Sukarno 's approval. It- is composed of. a:.chairman, 3 vice. chairmen and 73 other members. The latter.group is made up of 22 representatives of the regions and 51 from the "functional group." The three.vice.chairmen-are experienced in the economic field, while Chairman Yamin is- an energetic man who appears to be dedicated:to his new'work. Hutasoit; former Secretary General of the.Ministry of Education, has been appointed Secretary General. In his previous position he was cooperative with American officials and encouraged the use of American educators.in Indonesia while evidently blocking the employment of Soviet bloc teachers. Hutasoit's appointment was met with all-out opposition by the Communists on the Council. However, when it-was-heard he was Sukarno's personal choice, the Communists were overwhelmingly outvoted by other members of the Council. Unfortunately utasoit apparently agreed to accept the position only temporarily, on the ground that he is an educator rather than a planner. His short tenure was seemingly confirmed in late August when the third Deputy Chairman of the Planning Council, -a PKI member, announced that Hutasoit would resign in October. Chairman Yamin has a history of- extreme nationalism which includes statements. claiming. Australian New Guinea, British orneb, and Portuguese Titor for Indonesia. He has also 'declared that the writing of history should have a social function, e.g., be altered for nationalistic purposes.. His close cooperation with the "Trotskyite" Tan Malaka during the revolution, and his reported suspicion of -Western motives have caused him to be considered a leftist. It is probable, however, that he' could more accurately be described as an ultra-nationalist. The First Vice Chairman of the Council, Ukar Bratakusumah, is a member of the PNI; Second Vice Chairman Suhardi is an army colonel, and Third Vice Chairman -Sakirman is a member of the Central Committee of the PKI. - Biographical information which is available for about 80 percent of the seventy-three "functional group" and regional representatives indicates that 15 are probably subject to strong Communist influence or discipline and that 5 are non-Communist leftists. The -large membership of the Council will make it difficult for it to function with any effectiveness. However, this disadvantage will probably be mitigated to an extent by its division into subcommittees. V. BODY FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF TE STATE APPARATUS .Sukarno's principal intent in creating the Body for the Supervision of the State Apparatus (BAPEKAN) was to attempt to rid the civil service corps of its prevailing corruption, nepotism, laziness, and cynicism. In discussing BAPEKAN in his August 17 address of this year he said: === [PDF page 10] === "It may not be allowed to' happen again... that people worldin' an, apparatus of the State at their ease' half asleep," or to put their own interests first, through corruption of time or corruption of money.. In Revolution thei'e is no place for such people" - The Supervisory 'cy.isin.essence a Presidential commission. Established by an emergency law of August 13, 1959, BAPEKAN is directly under the President, 'with its members appointed and dismissed by hiin and reporting directly to him. Its task is to ensure that all branches of the government operate efficiently and in conformance with the policies of the President and Supreme Commander. It is to receive complaints directly from the people and government functionaries on matters which obstruct the efficiency, productivity, or authority of the government and may submit recommendations to the President.- These recommendations are to be carried out through legal or administrative channels, at the discretion of. the President. "The authority of the commission reaches down to the lowest level of local government and covers "all enterprises, corporations, industries, and institutions which directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, are operated by the state." The law further stipulates that the authority of the supervisory body "applies to both the operation and personnel of these establishments, both civilian and military." Thus presumably the armed forces are under the scrutiny of BAPEKAN. It is doubtful whether any watchdog committee, no matter how empowered, can accomplish the necessary improvement in the Indonesian civil service. Tightened discipline may help to curb corruption among.the underpaid government'servants, demoralized by overlapping civil and military administration and by the vagaries of ever changing goirernment policies. However, they must be offered economic security and a clearly defined mission before they can be expected to achieve efficient performance. BAPEKAN would appear to offer neither. BAPEKAN consists of five members. T 'Sultan of Djogjakaita, Hamengku Buwono IX; is Chairman; the other 'neinbers are Samadikun, Arnold Mononutu, Army Lieutenant Colonel Sudirgo, and Semaun. The Sultan of Djogjakarta, often mentioned as a possible successor to Sukarno, is perhaps the most respected figure in Indonesia. He is known for his honesty, integrity, dedication, and administrative ability and is considered to be an anti-Communist. One of the principal original rebel demands was that he and former Vice President Hatta form dnd participate in a new Cabiiet. Since the outbreak of the rebellion he has refused to 'participate in the national government unless given real authority. He has evidently wished to avoid having his name and prestige associated with polici s with which he disagrees. No explanation has been given for his sudden surprising acceptance of this.new position. C:c~T/Nc'cfl:: === [PDF page 11] === -ERE/N9P9FN-- - The rebels have mace no public or private comment on the Sultan's. acceptance. of a position under the government they are: fighting. The most outstanding of the other members is.Samadikun, Governor of East Java and also member of the National Planning Council. He is a veteran and respected member of the.Pamong -Pradja corps (central government corps of civil servants for the administration of the local government). He is an avowed opponent of regional autonomy and for this reason is, probably unpopular outside of Java. Arnold Mononuto, a PNI member and a former ambassador to Communist China, has for the last few years occupied. a desk at the Foreign.Office but apparently with no function. He is considered to have little ability but has succeeded in ingratiating himself. with President Sukarno. Army Lieutenant Colonel Sudirgo is. an American-trained officer who has spent: the greater part.of his career in the Military Police. He is reputed to have developed rather complete dossiers of information on most prominent Indonesians. Semaun, one of the founders of the Indonesian Communist- Party and once a widely known revolutionary, appears now to be a befuddled and vague.-visionary. His appointment was undoubtedly prompted by the appeal, of his name as part of Indonesian revolutionary history. VI. CONCLUSIONS Through the creation of the four new government organs, Sukarno has enhanced his own role and importance. Moreover, all the, members of these bodies, with the possible exception of the independent-minded Sultan of Djogjakarta, possess a history of loyal support for the various causes advocated by President Sukarno.., Not a single member of the Masjumi or the PSI, which have opposed him in shis various plans forgoverning. Indonesia, is found in any of the neworganizations. However, unless Sukarno concentrates his efforts on.ruling through one of the new units, his energy is likely to be dissipated in the new government structure, which is more cumbersome than the one it replaced. The Cabinet is an obviously unwieldy body in which the lines of authority are confused and haphazard. Already the President has indicated that his regular participation in Cabinet affairs will be limited to presiding over the monthly plenary meetings, and it is reported that the Vice Ministers for the Mobilization of the People's Potential are now to be responsible to First Minister Djuanda instead of the President. The Planning Council appears to be equally cumbersome and is burdened with a task which would be difficult to carry out. Any effective use of BAPEKAN, of which Sukarno is not a member, also appears unlikely; its overzealous use would alienate Sukarno's remaining loyal following in the bureaucracy. Tiere is no conclusive evidence pointing to Sukarno's favoring any one of the new units as a means of manipulating government policy. However, his employment of the former National Council to assist him in formulating === [PDF page 12] === and gaining acceptance for his policies suggests that he may use the new Provisional Supreme Advisory Council as the principal instrument for steering the course of government. The present government organization under the 1945 Constitution would make his use of the Advisory Council somewhat easier than his attempted manipulations of the National Council. With Sukarno as Prime Minister and the Cabinet freed of responsibility to the Parliament, there will now be no obstacle to Cabinet acceptance of the advice of the Advisory Council. On the other hand, although there may be no institutional obstacle to Sukarno's manipulation of the Advisory Council, members of the Advisory Council who are also political party leaders may well, despite their past acceptance of Sukarno's leadership, resist their new roles as "rubber stamps." These political leaders have mass support and are skilled in political maneuvering. Five of the six subcommittees of the Council are under the chairmanship of these party representatives. Moreover, they are expected to play a critical role when the Council meets in late October to consider modifying a decree on regional autonomy which has met with the united opposition of the political parties. Ruslan Abdulgani, Vice Chairman of the Advisory Council, has attempted to minimize the importance of party representatives, and has indicated that they were included merely as a "sop" to the parties. General Nasution, referring to the fact that the Secretary General of the PKI headed one of the subcommittees, remarked that Sukarno's "political mastermind has devised this bit of machinery to give these people (the political parties) a chance to say what they want without any effect on government policy." He added that no position could be taken by the Advisory Council without the full agreement of its 46 members. If this is indeed the case, then the party representatives have at least in theory the power of preventing any action by the Council. In any event, if Sukarno and Abdulgani attempt to use the Council as a means of directing government policy, they will face some strong personalities who are responsible to their respective parties for their actions. President Sukarno, of course, could ignore the advice of the Advisory Council, as well as of the other bodies. This is unlikely, however. In a period when Indonesia is facing increasingly severe economic and political problems, it is doubtful whether Sukarno, who in the past has demonstrated little proclivity to assume responsibility, would wish to reject all counsel and shoulder alone the blame for worsening conditions. Moreover, by rejecting counsel he could alienate some of his followers in the new organs. Since the President in recent years has stressed the need for the Advisory and Planning Councils, he apparently considers them more than mere facades for masking his own power. The astute and influential Sultan of Djogjakarta probably would not have accepted the chairmanship of the Supervisory Body if he had believed his words would not receive attention. What is most important, Sukarno views the new bodies as necessary instruments to carry out his concept of "guided democracy," which he has been attempting to achieve since the fall of 1956. Under the circumstances, it is probable that he will utilize the counsel of the new organs insofar as it will help him to accomplish his aim. === [PDF page 13] === 10 —SEGRET— APPENDIX. PRESIDENT 1R, SUKARNO PRIME MINISTER 1 SUKARNO susrER oF mstenor riest wnsrER sansteR oF umosteR oF u su ste ao urasten FoR sunsreR FOR suusteR oF sTER of SECURITY/OEFENCE PRODUCTION INISTER OF FINANCE Foneicn misres 1 teow SPECIAL AFFAIRS PEOPLE's WELFARE striution eocweeopuent 11. Hedi Djuondo Liat Gen. a % r Prot Hod) Mall uemene a Sata ot i tithes, Col Semon 1 Had neds x Sitonsio ‘whtGerdonaro stata tect dione Desens Choral Sater wsrenor ‘weewmstenor ‘ie wonsien oF Wee seen Wee winaten oF vet umatenor Wee usten Fone mon coro fence mune scare str Edawonese ‘sooo aie tos a esr aa lo naoenrte cao St Te Abdte Chava Stn egumsten or ‘weemmsren oF = ‘Wee mntER OF Web nen or eto eure ste “tise meus mae eunararrans Toast De Sonate elon wanes Dedeitioeben Sete teipersene Wee weTEN oF Weewnstenor ‘ek wniCR oF ‘et winaten Pouce Weg samen oF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AIR COMMUNE ATION PEOPLE'S INDUSTRIES. ‘ndoneion Folie OR Arran: waledh coder i" {hiel Sonto Djelomertone et shand De Senatto 7 “yt steno Trek wae Seen etoameton Tebtaatons Tettanuewe vutiee comunity alee Sond Heke schatutr seieareent et cat 1 chase cearriea wonstens Folin Joie comer or stare ‘on oF stARF ‘ner oF stare mer or tHe state vr eenenat crass oF tH oer cna 0 THE rmne ana or rnc arr or tHe An Fone oute atone cone rae sons tbe Tite Vie namiar Vir oat r Fel fof) AlLNosation Mortodinata ‘Suryodort ‘Suter mardi ‘Mutomed Yarsin Rustas Abéulgoni 777) sane es ae camer area nee en semessmpterenen Cee ee ee et tt [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 14] === - 11- Appendix B LIST OF CABINET MEMBERS WITH IDENTIFYING.BIOGRAPHICAL INFOIATON [Unreadable] President Ir. Sukarno Ir. Hadj Djuanda - Non-party member and Prime Minister in 'previous Cabinet * Lieut...Gen. A.H. Nasution - Army' Chief of Staff Cdi. Suprajogi - Army officer on active duty * Prof. Hadj Muhamad Yamin - Ultra nationalist o Chairul Saleh - Non-Communist' leftist Dr. Subandrio - PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) member Dr. Johannes Leimena. - PARKINDO (Protestant Party) leader. o M1uljadi Djojomartono - Ex-member of the Nasjumi (Muslim Partr) Ipik Gandamana - Veteran civil servant and member of IPKI (League of Supporters of the Ind.ependence of Indonesia), a minor nationalist party founded by army and ex-army officers. II. Ministers of State Ex-officio Vice Admiral Martadinata - Navy Chief of Staff Vice Marshall Surydarma - Air Chief of Staff o Sukanto-- Chief of the State Police Gatot Tarunamihardja - Attorney General Ruslan Abdulgani - Vice Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council III. Vice Ministers Maj. Gen. Hidajat - Army officer on active duty Col. Sambas Atmadinata - Army officer on active duty Maj. Gen Djatikusumo - Army officer on active duty Col. Dr. Satryo - Army officer on active duty Lt. Col. Achmadi - Non-Communist and leftist and reserve army officer who recently went on active duty Col. Dr. Azis Saleh - Former career Army officer Maladi - High ranking career civil servant Dr. Sahardjo - High ranking career civil servant Dr. Abdulmutalib Danuningrat - High ranking career civil servant Dr. Arifin Harahap - High ranking career civil servant Col. Iskandar - Former career Air Corps officer Kiai Wahib Wahab - Member of NU (Muslim Teachers Party) Fattah Jasin - Member of NU (Muslim Teachers Party) Ahem Erningpradja - Member of the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) left wing === [PDF page 15] === Dr. Sadjarwo - Former membeiaiEChidirman of BTI (Communist-front peasant. organization). and recentlyj' e member - of the PNI- Central Coimmiitteh Rev. Rumambi - Member of the leftist Communist infiltrated party Partndo (Indonesian Party) Dr. Prijono - Possessor of long record as Communist fellow traveller Sudibjo P.,. ossessor of.record as- Communist. dupe Sudjono '-Member of Parliament elected on the PKI (Indonesian Communi stfarty) -slate. -~* It. Dipokusumo - Engineer-business manager Notohamiprodjo - Bsinessman and PNI (Indonesiah Nationalist Party) member Dr. Suharto - Presidentt a personal physician *- Also hods osition as Minister of State ex efficioo - Also holds position. as Vice Minister ~C~T/~OPO~T === [PDF page 16] === -13- Appendix C LIST OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS SHOWING HOLDOVERS FROM NATIONAL COUNCIL AD NUM~BR0F LEFTISTS o Chairman - Pre sident.-Sukarno o Vice Chairman - Ruslan Abdulgani I. Political Party Leaders Suwirjo - Chairman of Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) Manuaba - Secretary General of Indonesian Nationalist Party. Idham Chalid - President of the Moslem Teachers Party (NU).; Saifuddin Zuhri - Sgp etaiy General of the Moslem Teacherst. Party - a* D.N. Aidit - Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) *pk Njoto - 2nd Deputy Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party Arudji Kartawinata - Chairman of United Indonesian Moslem Party (PSII) Kiai Hadj Rusli Abdul Wahid - Chairman of the Administrative Board of the Greater Islamic Party (PERTI) *o Sukarni - Chairman of the.Indonesian Proletarian Party (Murba) * Asmara Hadi - Member Ceritral Board Indonesian Party (Partindo) A.M. Tambunan - Chairman of the.Indonesian Protestant Party (Parkindo) I.J. Kasimo - Chairman of the Indonesian Catholic Party II. Regional Representatives *o Iwa Kusumasumantri - West Java Dul Arnowo - East Java o Tjilik Riwut - Borneo Andi Pangerang Dang Rans - Celebes Ida Bagus Sutedja - Lesser Sundas *o Muhamad Padang - Moluccas *o Rumagesang - West Irian Lt. Col. Sjamaun Gaharu - Sumatra III. Functional Groups Asmu - Farmers Bambang Murtioso - Farmers ** Munir - Lab or Datuk - Labor Dasaad - National Businessmen * Adam Malik - 1945 Generation Maj. Gen. Gatot Subroto - Army - Air Commodore Abdurachmat - Air Force === [PDF page 17] === - 14- Police -Commissioner Jasin).- Police. - Kiai Hadj:.. Faried Mat Ruf. - Moslem Scholars.--.-.- Kiai Hadj..Rois Aam Wahab Chasbullah - Moslem Scholars Monseigneur Padmosaputro - Catholics Reverend Wenas - Protestants *o Ida Bagus Sugrira. -Balinese Hindu **o Sujono Atmo - Youth Emma Puradiredja - Women **o Armunanto. Press Professor Djokosutono -. Intelligentsia o Tumakaka - Citizens of Foreign.Descent - Siauw Giok Tjhan - Citizens of Foreign Descent Professor Uterecht- Citizens of Foreign Descent o - Indicates hbldover - - Indicates non-Communist leftist - Indicates subject to strong Communist influence or discipline === [PDF page 18] === Appendix D LIST OF NATIONAL PLANNING COUlUIL MEMBERS SHOWING NUmBER OF LEFTISTS Chairman - Muhamad.Yamin First Vice Chairman -, Ukar Bratakusumah Second Vice Chairman - Colonel Suhardi Third Vice Chairman - Sakirman I. Regional Representatives Samadikun - East Java Surojo - Central Java Sanusi Hardjadinata - West Java Subagio Hadinoto - Special Area of Djqgjakarta Supranoto - Djakarta Lt. Col. Hasan Kasim - South Sumatra Sam Sjamsuddin - West Sumatra Maj. R. A. Rachman --Djambi Tarip Abdullah Harahap -. North Sumatra Lt. Col. Hamzah - Atjeh Abdul Gafar Hanafiah - South Borneo Alfred Dengas Patianum - Central Borneo Sudarso - WestBorneo Hussien Jusuf - East Borneo Nani Wartabone - Celebes Baramuli - Celebes I Gusti Ketut Pudja - Bali * I.R. Lobo - West Lesser Sundas Prof. A. Johannes - East Lesser Sundas Prof. Siwabessy - Moluccas Silas Papare - West Irian II. Functional Groups 4*- Runturambi Labor and Government Employees Sutedjo Dirdjosubroto - Labor and Government Employees * Kobarsih - Labor and Govur mpent Employees Iskandar Wahono - Labor.and Government Employees 4* Fatur Hadi - Labor and Government Employees Sudjono - Farmers Lahmuddin - Farmers Dalimunthe - Farmer- * Dr. Adjidarmo Tjokrcnegoro - Farmers === [PDF page 19] === Gusti Muhamad Charidi Kusuma - Farmers Elkana Tobing - National Business en Muhamad Asnum - National Businessmen Rachman Tamin - National. Businessmen.... - Rufinus: Lumban. Tobing - National..Businesmen Lt. Col. Achmad Tirtosudiro - Security forces Lt. Col. Wilujo Puspojudo - Security forces Navy Major Josiah Sudarso - Security forces forces Air Force Lt. Col.' Nurtanio Pringgoadisurjo - Security Asst. Senior Police.Commissioner Abdulrahmnan Setjowibowo - Security forces Munasir - Veteran ** Supardi - Veteran Kiai Hadj Muslich - Moslem S-holar..- Kiai Hadj Iman Zarkasih - Moslem Scholar Reverend Urip Hartojo - Protestants Pastor Sumandar Aloysius - Catholics Dr. Ida Bagus Mantra - Balinese Hindus *e Wikana - 1945 generation ti Bambang Kaslan - 1945 generation Doctor Angka - 1945 generation * Semaun - Scientists-intelligentsia *e Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo - Scientists-intelligentsia Sudarisman Purwokusumo Scienti'sts-intelligentsia Prof. Djuned Pusponegoro - Scientists.intelligentsia Prof. Purwosudarmo - Scientists-intelligentsia Iman Pratikjo - Scientists-intelligentia Prof. Djokosutono - Sdientists-inteligefntsia -x- Prof. Tjan Tjoe Som - Scientists-intelligentsia ** Doctor Busono Wiwoho - Teachers-educators E. Subijadinata - Teachers-educators * S.K. Trimurti - Teachers-educators Sitor Situmorang - Artists F. Silaban - Artists ** Sukrisno - Press Adinegoro - Press Hikmatullah - Youth * Ruslan Widjajasastra - Youth e* Umi Sardjono - Women,Y Utami Suryadarma - Women Hurustiati Subandrio Women - Rusia Sarjono - Women * Dr. Tjo Sek Ien - Citizens of foreiindescent E. F. Wens -'Citizens or- foreign descent - * - Indicates non-Communist leftists - Indicates subject to strong Communist "influence or discipline State - RD, W&3h., D.C.