Komunisme dan Partai Komunis Indonesia, despatch Januari 1961 (Indonesia political affairs: communism and the PKI)

PDF: 01 Primary Sources/1.6 US, British and Dutch Government Records/US State Department Central Files (ProQuest History Vault)/US State Department Central Files (1961-01) - Indonesia political affairs communism and Communist Party of Indonesia [ProQuest 3041683180].pdf Text from the PDF text layer; pages marked "re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026" were re-OCR’d with Tesseract because the text layer scored Poor. OCR errors remain. === [PDF page 1] === Air Pouch CONFIDENTIAL DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE PRIORITY (Secutiy Claiicaion) FOREIGN SERVICE DESPAT 7 I FROM Amembassy DJAKARTA 14_ TO Tlln~snn~n> i 4 ~rt:' rcsr1N ~i.January 11,9 196 TO r.-I JAN 01961 REF ACTION DEPT. SUBJECT: Factors for the Growth o fCommunist If uonoin Indonesia The following despatch is compiled from otosiprovided by FSO William N. Harbon prior to his departure from the post i_ August 1960. During his tour of duty at the Embassy, Mr. Harben specialized:1E the coverage of Communist activities and tho opinions presented below represent his conclusions -drawn - from over two years of close observation of the problem. (0 03 Summary) 1 I. Growth and Strength of the Communists 2 II. Communist Advantages in Political Warfare 4 A. Superior Organization and Discipline 4 r B. A Comparison of Communist and Anti-Communist 5 Intelligence Activities C. Subsidization of Communist Activities 6 D. Wide Soope of Communist Propaganda, Full Use of Issues 8 E. Multiplicity of Mass and Front Organizations 10 0) F. Coordinated Use of an International Crypto- 12 Communist Press G. The Communists Have a Definite Program v 13 H. The Communists Are Active in Community Improvements 113 I. Mysticism and Fatalism of Many Non-Communists O;-13 J. Susceptibility of Javanese Traditions to Communis- t14 Manipulation K. Free Enterprise Synonymous with Chinese Enterpri' 14 III. Conclusion 15 Summary The Communists have been steadily;gaining in Indonesia in numerical 0 strength and are probably now the largest party:.in the country. They wage > a heavily subsidized vigorous agitation along the whole range of international> and domestic issues against disunited opponents who limit their agitation to only a few sectors. The Communistas.. ve erected mass and front organizations with which they may apply pressure to all Abtiofih of the population and through which Bloc embassies may indirectly advance Russian goals in ways improper for diplomatic missions. These organizations are supplemented by aeorypto-communist press coordinated with thilparty press and the foreign rypto-communist press in a way which has no parallel in the non-Communist REPORTER ACTION COPY - DEPARTMENT OF STATE me with an endorsement of action taken. The action ocIce must return this permanent record copy to DC/R === [PDF page 2] === Page 2 of CONFIDENTIAL Encl. No (Clarficalion) Desp. No 51Aideologically press. The Communists are the only party with a definite,local level by intelligible program. They gain further prestige on the in contrast with the vigorous unilateral activity in local improvements, parties. Many anti-Communists torpor of the government and non-Communist ancient are dogged by defeatism and fear of the Communists. Furthermore, to Communist Javanese traditions of primitive socialism are susceptible with colonialism exploitation and free enterprise is tainted by associationand industry, and and the hated Chinese who until recently dominated trade some of whom served as agents of the Dutch Colonial Administration. I. Growth and Strength of the Communists It is generally recognized that the Communist Party has grown when it steadily, as indicated as late as the 1957 local elections of most obtained 25.6 per cent of the vote on Java. In the opinion would surely competent observers, if elections were hold, the Partyeven conceivable be shown to be the largest party of Indonesia. It is that the anti-Communists might even suddenly face a do factor pro- Communist majority as the result of national elections. At the last Congress of the Party, the PKI claimed about in late 1,500,000 members and candidates, as compared to 126,671 GAS reports have stated that the strength is actually higher. 1952. party is There is some evidence to confirm the conclusion that the increments to its strength. An Bnbassy Moscow now trying to conceal lecturer airgram dated March 19, 1960, reports a Russian political unpublicized as telling an educated audience of a public but otherwise had requested the mooting that the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) lost Russian Party not to advertise Indonesian Communist strength, bourgeoisie" of Indonesia be frightened. The question the "national of national elections, which have been twice postponed, ostensibly promised for 1962, due to lack of control over rebol areas, and now by Sukarno. lies in the hands of this "national bourgeoisie," headed belief If the "national bourgoois" parties can be lulled into the they can achieve gains at the expense of the PKI, elections that might be held. the Although a few anti-Communists are overly confident on election outlook, as exemplified by the strongly anti-Communist elections Suraba a Suara Rakiat which several months ago espoused the PIKI would shrink, others are more realistic. in the belief that underestimating The socialist Podoman on April 13, 1960, warned against underestimated the PKI, and stated that it was clear that the President CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 3] === CON1FIDENTIAL End. No. (Classifcation) Dcsp. No. k 514 it, as was shown by his talks with Communist chief Aidit and i other party leaders in Tampaksiring, Bali, which resulted in the appointment of a larger number of Communists to the new parliament. Anwar Harjono, spokesman of the Masjumi faction in the old parliament wrote in Abadi on April 22 that elections would increase PKI power and end democracy in Indonesia. The Communist Party, therefore, constantly urges an early election in its press, but is careful not to frighten people by claiming that it would win a majority. For example, Communist Party chairman.: Aidit told New York Times correspondent Bernard Kalb that the PKI would win "at least 10,000,000 votes" in an election - considerably less than half. the number of votes cast in the 1955 general election (almost 38,000,000). Location of Growth. Of greater importance, perhaps, is the place where growth has taken place. For the PKI to gain by cajolery the votes of millions of anky ignorant peasants, while successful in a mere head-counting election of the U.S. type, would be of little help in the "revolutionary situation" which PKI leaders believe impends - a situation in which their opposition is not likely to submit to eclipse through a free election. Many of the adherents of the PKI would desert under revolutionary circumstances, particularly practicing Moslems. Aidit's class breakdown of the country shows typical doctrinaire reasoning. He attempts to prove the existence of a "proletariat" of sufficient size to fit the Leninist-Stalinist formula for successful revolution. He adds up "500,000 industrial workers," "3,500,000 agricultural and forestry proletariat" and "2,000,000" in handicrafts and small industry to arrive at a "proletariat" comprising 25 per cent of the population. (In fact, many such people are either part-time farmers, or recently transplanted from the farm, and would more accurately be called "peasants" in the Marxist lexicon.) The figures for mass organizations are padded by the overlap between these groups. This is true of the cadres as well - a single Communist will usually hold down a job as chairman of the Pemuda Rak at or B.T.I. as well, and his wife will be chairman of the local GERVWANI, under his close supervision. One often sees the signs of all these organizations nailed up on the same small cottage. Despite the overlap, however, the membership of the Communist "mass organizations" is formidable, considerably larger than those of their opponents, and judging by various incidents, under better control and discipline. On the other hand, Communist influence among students, so useful to them in other countries, remains weak. Although their influence in the Army is a matter of debate, CAS and other reports I CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 4] === Page A4 of COiTFIDEITTIAL Encl. No. _2x.14 (Claifcation) Desp. No. From suggest that with the possible exception of certain units in Central Java, whose officers are believed to be Communist, the Party is weak in the Army and would certainly command only a minority of its strength. to some extent The Party has been hurt/among intellectuals and officials by its defense of the Chinese trading and shopkeeping class. Local Party leaders refused to advertise the Party's unpopular stand on this issue, however, and the effect did not really penetrate into the mass support, which is only dimly aware of national issues. II. Communist Advantages in Political Warfare A. Sunerior Organization and Discioline The Communist Party, unlike the other political parties, is a disciplined organization. Of the various political forces in Indonesia, only the Communist Party and the Armed Forces can be reasonably sure of the strength, disposition, and reliability of thp i own respective forces. Both organizations are "occidental" in /&. tSe history of each recapitulates the advance of Western organizational systems against Indonesian mysticism, indiscipline, and centrifugal tendencies. As a consequence, these two forces alone have survived political turmoil, and are the only worthy opponents of each other left in the field. The Communist Party operates on the basis of a written constitution far more precise than that of the country itself, and each of its component organizations possesses its constitution, carefully written and circulated, each meshing with the other and all giving the maximum power to the largely European trained collegium of leaders. These constitutions amount to systems of rules binding upon the membership. The Communist Party enjoys a political advantage over the Army; the Party receives continuous direction and support from its powerful foreign friends as well as training for its key members, whereas the Army is largely on its own, on a day-to-day basis, and is not trained for a political task in any case. Precise instructions are given party members. The Party's internal organ Kehidupan Partai, distributed to the membership and not available to the general public, contains clear criticism and advice on party work. Such articles as "How to Approach Women of the Upper Class" illustrate the detail of the instructions and their practical nature. No other party has anything comparable. I CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 5] === COUFIDFTIAL End. No ssi/ ctu n ) D csp. No.r t a (-rom Djakarta The Party maintains a variety of schools for the education of adherents, members- and leaders. The Universitas Rakjat (People's University), with branches in most major towns, masquerades as harmless adult education and gives lower level members and pro-Communists in front groups a cursory Marxist education, with attention to history, languages, and economics. For Party members, the Party maintains tho more intensive Party schools, most of which are at present operated secretly. The indoctrination is intense, and the student is expected to and usually does emerge able to give the Marxist-Leninist answer to. any question thrown at him. For example,'SARDJU, the Assistant Secretary of the Sleman Section Committee, when interviewed by the Reporting officer in November 1959, proved thoroughly indoctrinated and could respond to any probe with the same answer which would be given by a trained Communist in any country. The reporting officer has not met any member of a non-Communist party who showed such conviction or who could display such a firm ideology. The courses given to the elite are not easy Lower level workers for mass organizations, such as Pemuda Rakat, are given mimeographed courses, which they are expected to memorize. B. A Comarison of Communist and Anti-Communist Intelligence Activities Anti-Communists are usually depressed and inclined to inaction because of their awareness of Communist foreknowledge of their plans. On the basis of CAS reports, it is estimated that the Communists have some 200 secret Party members concealed in other parties and in government bureaus. So far as the reporting officer has been able to determine, none of the othor'parties have made similar penetrations into the Communist Party, and they are generally ignorant of the Communists' impending moves. This is partly because Communists maintain elaborate secrecy and disseminate misinformation about themselves. The police do have some agents with the Party and have produced some interesting and astute reports of Communist activity. The Army seems to have developed sufficient informants to enable it to pounce in several cases on Communist secret meetings and arrest the participants. However, the Communists may have penetrated the Army command in Djakarta as demonstrated by CAS reports that they had foreknowledge of the Tandjung Priok barter CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 6] === Page6 of CON FIDiTmTIAL j Encl. No.____ (Clasicaion)Desp. No.54 From_ Djakarta scandal and that they seem to have boon able to filch an Army report of the interrogation of gunrunner Frank Starr. Several Politburo members also succeeded, perhaps through advanced warning, in evading initial efforts to arrest them during the period Juno 16-20. :. Subsidization of Communist Activities Foreign direct financial subsidies arc well concealed, but no one who has seen the plethora of newspapers, pamphlets, exhibits, conferences, and fairs of the Communist Party, exceeding those of all their "rich landlord" and "bourgeois" opponent, put together, can doubt the existence of foreign subsidy on a scale far excooding that available to their enemies. The following is a list of Communist Party newspapers and periodicals which have thus far come to the attention of the roporting officer.- It is probably incomplete, since it does not include some publications circulated in the outer islancb only. TIarian Rakjat (daily) organ of the Party - claimed circulation: 55,000 Harian Rakjat Snort and Film (weekly) intang Morah (monthly) magazine PKI Dan Perwakilan (monthly) magazine; devoted to the activities of Communist members of national and local legislatures. Imu, arxis (quarterly) theoretical journal M'arxist Scionco (quarterly) english language version of Ilmu Marxis Review of Indonesia (monthly) English language - imbar IComunis (quarterly) Kehidupan Partai (monthly) internally circulated magazine of instructions, guides, and criticism Suara Ibukota (irregular) Djakarta only. Used as a party organ when Iarian Rakjat was banned in July 1960. Suara Tani (monthly) organ of the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) the Communiots' peasant front organization *Valid as of August 1960. lCONFIDENTIALJ === [PDF page 7] === Page 7 __of COrFIDEIiTIAL Enc.No. From Djakarta Zaman Baru (monthly) newspaper; organ of Lombaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, the Communist artists-and writers' front Hartini (monthly) magazine; do facto organ of Gorwani, the Communist womon's organization iajang Purwa (monthly) magazine; devoted to the Wajangr folk theater Ekonomi and J.Masjarakat (quarterly) articles on economic problems Universitas magazine (irregular periodicity); organ of the Concenstrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, the Communist student organization Bondera Buruh (monthly); organ of SOBSI, the Communist labor federation Buletin BTI. Biau magazine (periodicity unknown); organ of the Barisan Tani Indonesia in Riau Tani Bordjuang (periodicity unknown); organ of the B.T.I. in South Sumatra Bulletin PKI Djawa Timur (small newspaper); organ of the Provincial Committee of the Party for East Java In addition the Party publishes floods of books, booklets, pamphlets, translations of foreign Communist materials, Indonesian Communist tendentious "belles lettres," etc. Russia and China supply large quantities of literature, most of it political, to Communist and non-Communist outlets in the country. Many of these are well known Communist works in guerrilla tactics or underground organizations. Some of the subsidies are overt. The International Union of Students (IUS) reported in its own organ that it donated an entire printing press to Universitas, On January 12, 1960, Antara reported that Hungary had donated 800,000 badges to the Communistcontrolled SOBSI trade union federation, and a government security official told the reporting officer that they were to be sold to SOBSI activists for Rp 10 each. The domestic Chinese community is commonly named as a heavy source of funds for the Party. Indonesian government agencies suspect the operations of the Bank of China, but nothing has been LL CONFIDENTI DECLASSIFIED AuthorityJNkN BUyJNARA Date === [PDF page 8] === COIFIDENTIAL Encl. No - (Clausfcaion) I e'p. No. :,,n,__ Djakarta proved as yet. Performances by cultural groups for Bloc countries, to which admission is charged, may also provide a source of funds for thc PKI. is that they The endless complaint of the anti-Communists interminable stream cannot match the funds of the Communists. An financial assistance of politically active anti-Communists request from the 1bassy. Java who admitted An anti-Communist religious leader in Central World Embassy receiving a little covert help from another Free officer that the bitterly expressed the opinion to the reporting they spend Americans would lose their battle in Indonesia because agencies political purposes, while foreign Communist no money for in the form of typewriters, printing give unstinting assistance buildings, and presses, mimeograph machines, books, paper, films, dollars from the even automobiles. "It is easier to get a million dollars for a Americans to build a cement plant than a hundred machine," he said. Embassy Despatch No. 39 dated July 18, mimeograph political advantage of the 1960, CONFIDENTIAL, describes the great island of Timor by virtue of the fact that they own Communists on the on the island. the only privately-owned mimeograph machine who usually While the non-Communist parties rely on volunteers, other jobs as well, the Communists and their mass organihold down Pemuda Bakiat zations employ many full-time workers. The head of the that he had scholar (People's Youth) for Jogjakarta told a British Djogja. At Special Autonomous Area of five full-time workers in the about five per cent of the same time he deplored the fact that only Rak at branches ever the dues supposed to be collected by Pemuda reached his headquarters. The five full-time workers must, therefore, obtained from above. The Communist Party internal Life) also complained in organ Kehidupan Partai (Party dues regularly that 6nly a minority of the members paid their Indonesia) and of (which is not surprising in poverty-stricken little was forwarded to provincial and national headthis very by these admissions dues are not the primary quarters. Therefore, source of Communist support. of Issues D. Wide Scope of Communist Propaganda, Full Use "We do not and cannot know which spark of the all innumerable sparks that are flying about in countries...will kindle the conflagration, and the sense of specially rousing the masses, we must, therefore, with the aid of our new Communist principles set to work to stir up all, even the oldest, mustiest, and seemingly hopeless Vol. X, issues..." -Lenin, Selected Works, 1943 ed. pp. 142-143. C ONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED authorityJ- === [PDF page 9] === CONFIDENTIAL Encd. No (Classi/cation) Desp. No.5 4 - From_..Dacta In the opinion of the reporting officer tho Communist propaganda method has boon demonstrably more effective than the anti-Communist, Free World method. As Lenin implied, not all tho issues seized upon by the Communists for exploitation are expected actually to arouse the public. Nevertheless, the Communists make an attempt to exploit very conceivable occurrence or statement or situation to propaganda advantage. Those issues exploited most successfully by the PKI include: West Irian - As he nbassy has frequently reported this aspect of the problem, t8%oly be stated that the Dutch retention of West Irian, under current conditions, provides a valuable vehicle for Communist political activity virtually immune from government interference. In addition to the West Irian'issue, the Communists, despite Russian rule of Uzbeks and Turkmon, enjoy by default a monopoly of the issue of liberation of colonies. They also exploit to the fullest the corollary issue of racial discrimination, the existence of which in the U.S. and other Free World countries they advertise among their adherents in such brochures as Soal-SoalRasialisme, by J.B. Ave, part of a course in their Universitas Rakiat. Foreign concessions in Indonesia are a favorite target of Communist propaganda and their existence is used to support the Communist claim that the SEATO powers have a mercenary aim in Indonesia. Even Sukarno has defined "colonialism" as thesending abroad of profits gained in Indonesia. Therefore, in the eyes of most Indonesians interested in the matter, such concessions are exploitive. Even Indonesian anti-Communists will not publicly support such concessions; though wiser heads, who know the value of foreign enterprises, hold off expropriation despite the incessant Communist-demands. Of the latter the most recent example is a demand that, unless the Americans can be proved to have prevented the utilization of their arms by the Dutch in West Irian, the government should seize U. S. assets in Indonesia (PKI statement of July 8, 1960). By comparison with the alleged rapacity of the Western powers the Russians have gained considerable prestige with their aid projects. They fully exploited Khrushchev's visit to advertise these projects, thus overcoming the Indonesian tendency to muffle the news of the foreign origin of improvements. There have been some misgivings about the obviously uneconomic nature of the Asian Games stadium, but there is little doubt that when it finally stands the people are likely to be glad, proud and grateful. CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED Authority 1 Dt1j/ === [PDF page 10] === Page _10.of CONiFID TIALEncl. No. (Clauifcwaion) DcspNo._5 I~o -Djakarta The Communists know their enemies and identify them as the "merican imperialists," who are alleged to control and direct the activities of all other enemies not of American nationality. For example: "...before the world of independence, the world of democracy, the world of peace at present stands the problem of American imperialism as the common enemy, the most criminal enemy of all of the peoples throughout the whole world. "American imperialism is the obstacle standing in the way of all progress, it is the creator of troubles and disorders everywhere." (Statement of the Communist Party of Indonesia, July 8, 1960.) E. Multiplicity of Mass and Front Organizations Stalin set groat store by "transmission bolt" organizations through which the party might control all of society. In Indonesia the Communist Party has many strong ones while the anti-Communists' "transmission belts" are few and weak. Labor Unions: The SOBSI labor union federation comprises the groat majority of Indonesian organized labor and is under the direct control of the- Communist Party. It is estimated to comprise from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 members, though it claims far more. The opposition unions hold their own partly by virtue of a government decree providing for compulsory "arbitration" of labor disputes, a system forbidding strikes (SOBSI's strong point) and thereby endowing the other trade unions With a prestige disproportionate to their numbers. SOBSI is also used as a vehicle for the Communist education of labor and for the harnessing of workers to Communist purposes. (See Embassy Despatch 160, August 25, 1959.) Women: Gerwani, the Communist women's organization has boon used to carry out demonstrations against higher prices, protests against U. S. bomb testing, etc. It is affiliated with the W.I.D.F. (Women's International Democratic Federation) which enables it to provide prominent Gerwani members with the junkets abroad they all dearly love to make. The non-Communist women's organizations are relatively weak, partly because the non- Communists are mostly Moslems, who disapprove of political activity by women. Its membership was given as 671,342 at its Congress in December 1957. Peasants: The Barisan Tani Indonesia is the largest and most powerful peasants' organization, and has incited the peasants to seizure of lands of estates and "big landowners" (a very relative term in Indonesia). L CONFIDENTIALL I === [PDF page 11] === From--_Djakarta Youth:- Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth). This organization numbers 800;000, and acts as an arm of the Party, particularly in small towns, and as a training ground for future party cadres. The COMI (Consentrasi Gorakan Mehasiswa Indonesia), while comprising a as a minority of students, -is more effective on the political stage source of resolutions, demonstrations, and agitation. The Indonesian Peace Committee: While not a mass organization, this group has been very successful and has achieved almost quasiofficial status. It even obtains subsidies in the form of paper, printing services and special privileges from the Ministry of Information and the Minstry of Education. Only open hostility by the Army and the Moslem-parties prevented its National Conference for Peace in November 1959, from being an official national celebration. Art and Culture: The Communist front Lombaga Kebudaiaan Rakjat (LECRATdoinates the field of painting (except for the Balinese genre) and literature. It recently "spun off" a literary suborganization, Lembaga Sastra Indonesia, which comprises writers only. With the usual funds of obscure origin, LEKRA is able to publish the works of its members and thus exerts a pull to the left on all writers who wish to be published.- It also exerts groat influence among film actors and actresses, but the Indonesian film industry is far too weak to be of much influence. About three quarters of the better known artists on Java are members, including Indonesia's greatest painter, Affandi, and writer, Pramudya Ananta Tur. Asian-African Solidarity Committee: The Communists have a con- ABBAS trolling voice in this left-wing Moslem group through Siradjuddin and his family. Abbas is in turn their principal line to Moslem religious leaders and also a pillar of the Peace Committee. Veterans: The Veterans' Legion had fallen under considerable Communist influence until its forced absorption by the Army,'but and its local chapters are still heavily staffed with Communists, sponsor its headquarters is still sufficiently Communist for it to Ainst and house another Communist front, the Front of the Masses Foreign Intervention (Gerakan Massa Melawan Intervensi Asing). Friendship Societies. The Russian, Chinese, and satellite embassies, in cooperation with the Communist Party, maintain"friendship which societies" ostensibly staffed entirely by Indonesians, through these embassies engage in propaganda activities which would be improper if conducted by the embassy itself. The Indonesian-Soviet Friendship Society, for example, mails out NewTimes, a periodical of the USSR government. These societies also provide a convenient cover for staffs meetings between Indonesian officials and politicians and the of the Russian and Chinese Embassies (the other Bloc missions are CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED Vdb /cIL 4AuthorityJA11L === [PDF page 12] === page__ 12-a CONFIDENTIAL Encl. N.- (Class ifcation) DeP. No. 514 From Djakarta loss significant). In a country highly suspicious of foreigners, the difference between "I attended a celebration of the Indonesian- Soviet Friendship Association" and "I visited the Soviet!hnbassy" is vast and permits greater access by the Bloc anbassy staffs to Indonesian society. Those friendship societies, which are simply sections of the corresponding embassies, carry on public propaganda on controversial issues in which an embassy might not properly interest itself. The most recent addition is a Cuban-Indonesian Friendship Society (Embassy Despatch-69, July 26, 1960). The more loftist-of the two large news agencies, Antara, reports all their activities, as did the frankly Communist Indonesian National Press Service before it was restrained. The effect of this system of channeled organizations is to exert a constant pressure on the public and in the totality of their myriad resolutions, celebrations, statements, cultural evenings, congratulations and presentations, to crowd a large segment of non- Communist activity off the narrow public stage. The enclosed chart of the interrelationships of the larger Communist-controlled international and Indonesian organizations and Communist Bloc governmental agencies is presented with the caveat that it is based on presumption, the press, some personal observation and deduction from facts in a minority of cases. whilee Free World nbasios are also affiliated with friendship societies, they openly sponsor them and the result is that their emphasis is on teaching of the languages of the country concerned and occasional innocuous exhibits, rather than propaganda. F. Coordinated Use of an International Crypto-Communist Press The Communists control a series of newspapers which are ostensibly non-Communist but which they use for sensational reports, anti-American and otherwise, in such a way that government bans for such reports almost never deprive the Party of some press outlet. Thccellont use is made of connections with foreign crypto-communist news sources, so that an article which might be too risky for an Indonesian paper to publish on its own responsibility appears in a neighboring country and is then "quoted" by the Indonesian party and crypto-party press. The fabricated account of a conversation between General Nasution and Admiral Felt in early 1959, which first appeared in Blitz is a case in point. The dexterity with which the press is used both on the national and the international level bespeaks the direction of an organization with excellent international communications and direct access to foreign crypto-communist organs. DECLASSIFIED 11ljn NAuthority C $.NARA Dat 4 === [PDF page 13] === COiFIDHiTIAL Enc.N. N. (Claafcaton) Iesp. No al rta From... akrt G. The CommunistsfHave a Definite Proram Hion-Communist Indonesians agree that the Communists have great appeal because they arc the only Party which claims to have a definite program and which indoctrinates its agitators with the contents of the program and circulates them in published form. The national program is rather general in scope, but the programs for cities and provinces, also published, are quite specific and could not fail to attract some supporters' from among non-Communists. The program for Djokdja (Jogjakarta), for instance, includes ouch pithy proposals as a decrease in rent for retailers in the Krangan Market, a decrease in marriage expenses and establishment of a "democratic" body for solving divorce cases, and prohibition of the circulation of pornographic literature. 11. The Communists Are Active in Community Improvements Harian Rakjat often contains boasts by the Communists of thoir-work in community-improvements such as the building of roads, bridges, ditches, and even an enumeration of the number of rats killed in anti-rat campaigns. This activity compares favorably with the lethargy common among government officials and the other political parties. The Communists are able also to exploit'these activities with'a more vigorous and imaginitive propaganda, such as, for example, having its loaders work for a day in the mud with shovels amid much fanfare, boasting and photography, while the Party's painters immortalized the event with a large painting exhibited in the Wima Nusantara Club in Djakarta. The disdain for manual labor on the part of the literate classes in Indonesia would make such stunts distasteful to most anti-Communists. I. Mysticism and Fatalism of Many Non-Communists Mystical beliefs pervade the entire Indonesian people, including the educated class. Embassy Dospatch 20 dated July 11, 1960, discusses the influence of such mysticism on politics. In general the Communists, relying on more pragmatic scriptures from abroad, are loss prone to these beliefs than the members of other parties. Many Javanese regard the political course of the nation and its salvation as fore-ordained and discernible in ancient prophecies, and are therefore disinclined to take a serious view of the Communist threat. A part of the Moslem anti-Communist segment is sunk in a kind of religious torpor, where political moves are subjected to scrutiny to ensure that they conform to the Koran. Here too, there is a tendency to await divine intercession rather than to act. L CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 14] === -I Page.h_ 4 of CONFIDINTIAL ~ Encl. N'o. (Classificatnon) Desp. No 514 JFrom__Djalarta Mohammed Room, of the Masjumi, related to tho reporting officer that a prominent adherent of the Party told him that he said 10,000 "Allahs" for the success of the Party'in the elections. "10,000 rupiahs would have been more welcome," said Room. J. Susceptibility of Javanese Traditions to Communist Manipulation The social structure of tho peoples of Indonesia, and particularly of Java, and certain traditions, favor the superimposition of socialism. Russian Communism admittedly bases itself on the primitive economic relationships of backward tribal societies (viz: the works of Lewis Morgan cited by ETgols in his Die Ursprung der Familie, dezPrivateigentums und des Staats). Indonesian socialists believe, as Russian socialists once believed, that the imposition of "socialism" upon their already semi-socialist rural society is a natural dovelopment,'that the "capitalist" stage, once considered by Marx as prerequisite, may be skipped or at least shortened to a mere episode. The Communists may, therefore, more easily represent their doctrine as conforming to "ancient national tradition," as opposed to private enterprise, which is foreign and almost incomprehensible in its essence except to the hated Chinese). An example of the currency of this approach is an alleged statement by President Sukarno (quoted by the Communist news agency INPS on July 13, 1960) who "stressed that socialism was no new thing for the Indonesians. He said that-socialism was known to the Indonesians thousands of years ago, as was proved by the introductory remarks of the waiang puppet play performer, which always contained political, social and economic ideals." Ruslan ABDULQANI, chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, cited SOET'ARNO, HARDJOTJARITO, and GITOSEWOKO, the wa ang puppeteers, as defenders of "utopian socialism" but distinguished them from the'exponents of "scientific socialism" as described by Marx and Engels. K. Free ]3terprise Synonymous with Chinese aterprise The Javanese and most of the other peoples of the archipelago have little or no tradition of free enterprise and trading and the main economic ideology professed by the United States, therefore, meets an immediate obstacle in Indonesia. Manufacturing and distribution (not including peasant handicrafts and street vending) have, with the exception of some participation by Sumatrans in commerce, been conducted by foreigners, chiefly Chinese. A free enterprise system would tend, as it did in the past, to lead to the almost total control of the economy by a foreign minority. Regardless of the economic advantages of such a situation it would be unrealistic to suppose that the Indonesian people would tolerate CONFIDENTIAL 7 DECLASSIFIED AuthorityAN Id9 ByUWNARA Date === [PDF page 15] === Page_ 15 of [Unreadable] (Clasusidcathn) From~ ---- Djakartaway ethnic Indonesians believe that "socialism" is the only con- i what they in which they can control the economy and extract So far as sider a fair share of the profits for themselves. most influential concerned the Communist Party is the Indonesia is vague slogans and repository of socialist doctrine since Sukarno's never defined. of socialism are almost "conceptions" in the field of the only The PKI, therefore, appears to be the main protagonist structure politically adaptable to Indonesia. kind of economic III. Conclusion of Communist It would be rash to assume that the history and advantages projects into the future. The political successes so rapidly that all situation in Indonesia appears to be evolving coping with it. The at an equal disadvantage in groups are placed of Sukarno and development of'state socialism under the leadership promises progressively his associates, and thus far backed by the Army, to restrict the freedom of action of all parties. enfeebled, and The other parties are, at least for the present by the trend is, therefore, the PKI, which the party most affected by its public attack on has the most to lose. Its concern was shown and against the July 8, 1960, against many members of the Cabinet of its two most Cabinet's program, which led to temporary suspension newspapers and the temporary detention and interrogation of powerful situation" of which the the PKI politburo. In the "revolutionary speak, the PKI even finds its size unwieldy. Communists increasingly it is much less With the government controlling most communications scattered throughout capable of simultaneous use of its vast forces the country. (particularly By the actions and the statements of the-PKI that the Communists that of July 8, 1960) it is apparent, however, whether Sukarno is are increasingly'uneasy trying to ascertain Kerensky, an unwitting instrument for Communist victory, another and relegate the or a Tito, who will construct a Titoist state gestures and to limbo. The continued friendly Russian lackeys in the midst of progressively statements of the President the Communists in adverse political schemes of the regime place nestling a tantalizing dilemma. One thinks of Sukarno as' a oat, stealing to the milky breath of a sleeping PKI baby, slowly close PKI is the cat. its oxygen; on the other hand perhaps the CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED Authority By_ NARA Date === [PDF page 16] === 16. of . Page i CONFIDENTIAL =| Ene, N - From____Djakerta _ For the Ambassador! | Were thl, Busta Rolland H. Bushner is Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs Enclosuros: 1. Chart of Prosumed Interrelationships of Communist Front Groups in Indonosia db. Explanation of Abbroviations 2 [- conprpmvrran DECLASSIFIED [Unreadable] y_NWNARA Date.4104 [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 17] === {nese i inoer. “CONFIDENTIAL Public Rolatians: - tri Red Chins t anepian @adort ugh. Social contacts hgitadion —. Low: culture? itry to. squat | n@y reduce for i¢ BEST AVAILABLE Every Technical Effort Has Been Made To Ensure Legibility DECLASSIFIED [re-OCR’d Oct 18 2026: tesseract 200 dpi, replaces text-layer text for this page] === [PDF page 18] === Page of CONFIDENTIAL Encl. No. (Classification) Desp. No. k2 514 From Diakarta Explanation of Abbreviations CC CPSU - Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union KGB - Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Intelligence) IUS - International Union of Students WFTU - World Federation of Trade Unions WIDF - Women's International Democratic Federation WPC - World Peace Committee IPPI - Ikatan Pomuda Peladjar Indonesia CCMI - Consentrasi Gerakan Uahasiswa Indonesia GERWAUI - Gerakan Wanita Indonesia IPC - Indonesian Peace Committee PPDI - Persatuan Bamong Pradja Indonesia PR - Pemuda Rakjat BTI - Barisan Tani Indonesia LEKRA - Lombaga Kebudajaan Rakjat UNRA - Universitas Rakjat CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED Authority Dat 0 yii NARA Date === [PDF page 19] === DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE Air Pouch CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY (Secutily Clafi lii on) FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATf H42 )(11, - 70 0-00/ FROM A miassy DJAKATA to:4 DESP.NO. OF. WOSTATIOWI1INNTOJ January 23, 9 61 TO: Tti nli'A^ICTMI;i DATE REF:JA-1D SUDJECT: Views on the Position of the P At the Recent Moscow Meeting.o Several accounts of the position o 'he Indonesian Communist Party at the w recently concluded Moscow meeting of communist parties of the world have been made available to the Department through various channels. Most recently, on January 21, 1961, the reporting officer was informed by Mr. Aboe Bakar Loebis, o head of the Research Bureau of the Indonesian Foreign Department and former First. Secretary of the Indonesi.an inmbassy at Bonn, that the PKI completely supported the Chinese position at Moscow. Mr. Loebis offered none other than the Chairman. of the PKI, Aidit, as the source for this information, stating that Aidit personally 1 informed him of this in response to his questioning of the communist leader on the subject. According to Loebis, Aidit further volunteered that when Lukmnan, Deputy Chairman of the PKI and the party's representative at the Moscow meeting, G returned to Indonesia, he intended to question Lukman as to the reason for his course of action. Loebis inferred from this last Aidit remark that the Chairman was displeased with Lukman's performance at Moscow and advanced the view that as Aidit owed his position as head of the party to Moscow's past action in elevating him to such a status, Aidit was completely loyal to the Soviet viewpoint. Loebis claimed he had subsequently questioned Lukman following his return as to why he had supported the Chinese position at Moscow. This was denied by 0 Lukman who affirmed that he had neither supported a R issian nor a Chinese position -D but rather one aimed at advancing the ideals of Communism. Loebis further claimed -D that he had raised the question with Lukman as to whether he had acted contrary to the wishes of Aidit, but that Lukman evaded a direct response to this last query. COMIENT: There is no way, of course, to check the accuracy of the statements made to the reporting officer by Fir.Loebis. It does seem rather surprising that Aidit would directly and freely communicate to Loebis, a well-known PSI sympathizer the internal matters of the PKI and the implied existence of 1 split in the party position. However, the Loebis account does correspond Lw standing rumors covering the existence of differing views between Aidi-eandim' ikmanas to whether 'C, Moscow or Peiping is to be regarded as the fountainhead for the local party. The question as to whether the remarks of Loebis merely reflect this rumor or actually confirm its validity will have to await the presen o furt1ee tdence. Dept Pass To: For the Ambas: REPORTER .A TTO A nmlfTATT AMID QT A TL' ACTION COPY - DEPARTMENT OF STATE f/1/ The action omce mut return this permanent record copy to Dc/i niles with an endorsement or action taken.