TAPOL Bulletin No. 18, October 1976

=== [PDF page 1] === Tapol bulletin no, 18, October 1976 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1976) Tapol bulletin no, 18, October 1976. Tapol bulletin (18). pp. 1-8. ISSN 1356-1154 The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26412/ === [PDF page 2] === British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners Bulletin No. 18 October 1976 EDITORIAL And now as we go to press, we are receiving reports of a new wave of arrests. The arrest of five persons including four well-known nationalists of the Sukarno era may well presage a new incident in the whole matter of human rights abuse, as the military regime seeks to prove - as they did after the J _a nuary 1974 affair - that a new challenge to its survival has been made by such prestigious personalities as the country's former.Vice-President, the head of the Roman Catholic Church and the Chairman of the Indonesian Council of Churches. Eleven Years It is now eleven years since the first mass arrests of political prisoners took place in Indonesia. The past year has been an eventful one in our campaign. It.began with official pledges to release a large number of prisoners, and continued with the commencement of hearings on human rights in Indonesia before a US Congress Sub-committee. Then the release pledges came thick and fast, culminating with Admiral Sudomo's pledge in June this year to "try or release all remaining political prisoners by the end of 1978." Then, when the IGGI had made a firm commitment to provide Indonesia with $2,400 million in economic aid during the current year, and the International Labour Organisation had, on the strength of Sudomo's promise, refrained from blacklisting Indonesia for using political prisoners as forced labour, the tide began to turn. Not only have government spokesmen failed to reiterate their earlier pledges, but they now speak in a very different voice, seeking a convenient escape from them by stating that communist activity in neighbouring countries will "infallibly influence" the planned releases. As far as the prisoners are concerned, while some hundreds are known to have been released, at least three thousand more have been transported to permanent imprisonment on Buru Island and several thousand more arc being prepared to move. · While the actual number of releases is small; we are receiving information 9f many new arrests. On the one hand, members of established parties and in particular local Moslem leaders arc being held in connection with political activities connected with the 1977 general elections. While on the other hand, there arc reports of many soldiers being arrested. on charges of desertion for refu1ing to be sent to fight in East Timor. 'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authori,ties said ·that all the prisoners are 'criminals'. Events during the past year have shown convincingly how the Indonesian authorities have deliberately sought to create the impression with the international community that large-scale releases were under way in oraer to safeguard their mammoth foreign aid programme. The IGGI decision this year to supply Indonesia with a further $2,400 million reveals how heavily dependent Indonesia now is on foreign aid. Indonesia now has a foreign debt of over $I 7,000 million and within a year or two, as much as 20 percent of total foreign exchange earnings will have to be used up each year in servicing this debt. The most immediate task is to show to governments in the member states of the IGGI how the pledges to release were made largely for their ears and how these pledges are now being reneged to the detriment of the prisoners, so many of whom are now entering their twelfth year of detention. Indonesia: THE PRISON STATE TAPOL's pamphlet, fully revised. 20 pp, 4 pages of photographs. Still only 1Op. === [PDF page 3] === Release Pledges Reneged Release promises made on 11th June this year by Admiral Sudomo, Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB - that "the problems of Indonesia's political prisoners will be solved before the end of 19 7 8" and that "those who have not been tried by that time will be released" (De Telegraaf, 11th June, 1976) - have been reneged even sooner than we thought. It is clear from several official pronouncements made since July that there are in fact no prospects of a solution to the problem. In an interview on 24th July with Radio Australia (Sinar Harapan, 26th July, 1976), Sudomo did not refer to these plans at all and spoke only of the plans to release 2,5 00 tapols during the course of 1976. Then, on 16th August, President Suharto took a further step back, saying that investigations of B category cases would be accelerated after the holding of the general elections in May, 1977. He made this statement in his State Address to the Indonesian Parliament on the occasion of Indonesia's national independence day (17th August). To quote him in full: "The investigation of B category prisoners, whose cases are difficult and cannot be tried in court due to lack of evidence, will be accelerated after the holding of general elections next year." Ten days later, Sudomo, this time in an interview with the Jakarta daily, Kompas, provided himself with a foolproof excuse to renege even on the pledge to release 2,5 00 tapols during 1976. He said: "The plmned release of political prisoners in Indonesia will infallibly be influenced by the increasing communist activity in neighbouring countries" and that "the authorities will naturally take into account the flare-up of the communist disturbances around Indonesia in their plans for the release of detainees" (AFP, 27th August, 1976). ing it to visit our rehabilitation installations" (Prisons and camps being used for tapols are now called ''rehabilitation installations"). Admiral Sudomo's attack on Amnesty followed an earlier attack, couched in precisely the same terms, made by LieutGeneral Ali Murtopo, Deputy Chief of the security intelligence unit, BAKIN, and Chief of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. In fact, Ali Murtopo's attack was made at a press week in Jakarta and reported in Merdeka on 11th June, the very day on which Sudomo was reported in the Dutch press as extending an open invitation to Amnesty International to inspect the camps. Conflicting Statements on Buru Tapols Although Sudomo, in his interview with De Telegraaf on 11th June specifically included the tapols on Buro in the plans to release all tapols by the end of 19 78, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, in a statement three weeks later, on 30th June, to the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives, said quite the opposite. He said: "There are 34,000 in this (the B) category, including 10,000 on Buro Island. In the last couple of years, many have been released. The remainder, except those on Buro Island, will be released gradually. The government has established training centers to give them a chance to learn a trade. Those on Buro Island will be settled permanently." 1, 166 Released in August? WORKERS ARRESTED According to an official announcement from Jakarta on 18th August, 1,166 tapols have been released. The national news agency, Antara, did not make it clear· whether these releases had just occurred or whether the figure applied to released made during 1976, but a Reuters report indicated that the releases had been made in connection with the commemoration of national indepence day on 17th August. No independent confirmation of these releases has yet been received. Workers at a car assembly plant were arrested, dismissed or suspended after protesting that their monthly bonuses were being used for factory expansion. They had staged a movement to refuse their midday meal as a sign of protest. Altogether 112 workers were suspended and 21 dismissed. Some who were regarded as the "ring-leaders" were arrested by the local military command. Following the incident, a number of workers went to the Jakarta Legal Aid Bttreau to ask for help in restoring their good name. The company, Caya Motor, assembles Renault, Peugeot, Alfa Romeo and Daihatsu cars (Kompas, 22nd July, 1976). Amnesty Not Welcome After All A promise made by Sudomo in his June interview with De Telegraaf that prison camps would soon be open to inspection by Amnesty International has now been withdrawn. He said in his interview with Radio Australia at the end of July that "there are conditions that must be met by Amnesty lnternational in order to be allowed to visit places of detention in Indonesia, namely, it must refrain from adopting a hostile attitude, it must not incite and it must not distort the facts" (Sinar Harapan, 26th July). He continued as follows: "Arnnesty International has been infiltrated by and is being utilised by communist elements. These elements must be cleansed and the organization must be restored to its purpose of struggling for basic human rights, and only then shall we consider allow2 AIR FORCE OFFICERS ARRESTED Two Air Force officers, just graduated from the Armed Forces Academy, were arrested in July on suspicion of being "dedicated adherents of communism." Announcing these arrests, Air-Marshall Sugiti said that the arrests were part of the continuing activities to purge the Air Force of pro-communist elements. He said these two officers were long-standing members of the PKI and even after joining the Air Force, continued to be in contact with PKI leaders. He also said that another person, formerly a member of the banned CGMI (students organisation), had been apprehended. TAPOL Bulletin No. 18 October 1976 === [PDF page 4] === TRIALS Another Death Sentence An A~r Force officer was found guilty of murdering three generals m October, 1965 and sentenced to death in Jakarta on the basis of evidence from tapes and from witnesses who did not appear in person. Although the defence counsel insisted that such evidence was inadmissable, the court rejected these pleas and proceeded to pass verdict and sentence. The accused was Sergeant-Major Marsudi, arrested in October, 1965, but not brought to trial until June, 1976. The trial was given wide publicity in the press. When the documents of the case were formally handed over by the Air Force authorities which had undertaken pre-trial investigations to the Air Force Legal Division for trial proceedings to commence, the trial was described as "an important step towards cleansing the Arme.d Forces of pro.-co.m munist elements and towards implementing the Broad Pnnc1ples of State Policy established by the People's Consultative Assembly," (the highest legislative body). Obviously taking the results of the trial as a foregone conclusion, the Air Force Commander of Jakarta said on this occasion that this trial would ''p.r ovide lessons and experience regarding"the activities of a man who received ideological guidance from the communists" and would point to the need for "continually purging the Armed Forces of these elements." Sergeant-Major Marsudi was sentenced to death on 13th July this year by a Military/Air Force Tribunal on charges of conspiracy to rebel against the lawful government and the murder of four of the victims of the 1st October 1965 events. There were four charges in all. The charge of criminal conspiracy was based on his activities as an Air Force training in. structor at the Lubang Buaya training ground near Jakarta, the place used as the centre for the 1st October events and where the six kidnapped generals and one guard were taken and disposed of. His alleged involvement in a revolt against the lawful government - the second charge - was based on his alleged coll<1;boration since 19 51 with the PKI which he joined in 1965. The third charge was that he murdered three of the generals and the Army guard after they had been brought alive to Lubang Buaya. The fourth charge was subversion, a capital offence under the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law. Defence Challenge Validity of Indictment Sgt.-Major Marsudi, who appears to have been in a poor state of health during the hearings (he often complained of being too weak to continue and on one occasion, proceedings were suspended because of this) was defended by two lawyers selected for him by the Indonesian Bar Association, Peradin and appointed by the court. After the indictment ha,d been read, the defence lawyers argued that the trial should not proceed as it was unacceptable to charge a man with conspiracy and revolt against the lawful government because the head of that government, President Sukarno, had never once said that he considered that a revolt against his government had taken place. This rendered charges one, two and four invalid. Regarding his alleged participation in the murders, they argued that whatever he had done, he had been acting under orders from superior officers and could not be held responsible. The court should therefore reject the charges. The court turned down these arguments and proceeded to hear the case. Our reporting of the case is unavoidably incomplete as it is based on press reports which gave far more space to the prosecution's case than that of the defence. But from these reports, it is nevertheless clear that none of the witnesses who appeared in court testified that they had seen Marsudi shoot the generals. He himself strongly denied the charges, admitting only that he had, under orders, carried the victims; he alleged that the shots had been fired by ·m embers of the Cakrabirawa Palace Guards. The two witnesses, Suwardi and Saleh, who said they had seen him do the shooting, did not appear in person, "for technical reasons" according to the prosecution. When the defence lawyers protested that written evidence was unacceptable, the presiding judge replied that the court was under orders to complete the trial as quickly as possible, and he would therefore accept the evidence. The other evidence used to convict Marsudi of murder was a taped recording of his voice said to have been made at an earlier trial at which he appeared as a witness. On this occasion, he was said to have admitted to killing the generals. When the tapes were played in court, Marsudi is reported as having admitted that that was his.voice but still insisted that he was innocent; the press reports failed to mention how he explained this contradiction. The defence lawyers challenged the validity of tapes as evidence, but the prosecution countered by arguing that these laws did not apply in this case as Marsudi had been under oath when making the tapes. Training Not Secret One prosecution witness (all witnesses to appear were called by the prosecution. The defence asked for one witness only Major Suyono who had been in charge of training at Lubang Buaya. They were told he was "already in some unknown place," i.e., had been executed.) made the point that the training being given at Lubang Buaya had been officially organised by the Air Force. It was not secret or illegal, and various officials had inspected activities there. When pressed to name these officials, he said: "I've forgotten their names. If I were to make a mistake, this could lead to more arrests, and these people would then be interrogated and beaten up, poor fellows." During the concluding stage of the trial when the prosecutor was summing up, he argued, countering an f;!arlier argument from the defence lawyers which was not reported in the press, that the conspiracy charge against him was based on the fact that he had been shown to have collaborated with the PKI since 1951 and what he did could therefore not be separate from the movement undertaken as a whole by the PKI. Thus, argued the prosecution, it was not necessary to submit positive evidence regarding his complicity in the conspiracy, as such complicity could be carried out silently (secara dia_m-diam ). New Purges Under Way? After the conclusion of the trial, a senior official of the Air Force Legal Division, Colonel Harapan, said that the trial had provided "a great deal of new information" and that continuous investigations would be made of members of the Armed Forces, in particular of the Air Force, which may have been involved in the 1965 events. (Kompas, 15 July, 1976). He also announced that two further trials would shortly be held. The two accused will be Sergeant-Major Suwardi and Sergeant-Major Saleh, the two persons who gave testimony at Sergeant-Major Marsudi's trial but who did not appear in person "for technical reasons." The press reports depicted Marsudi as a pathetic figure and rep.orted that his defence plea, handwritten, had brought smiles to the faces of those watching the trial" and that he him himself was seen to be smiling as he left the courtroom after the death sentence had been passed. Indeed, it is not possible to expect a critical evaluation of the trial or a proper presentation of the defence, as it is wellkn_o~n that all press reporters are required to attend military bnefmgs after each hearing, at which time they are told which aspects to report and which to leave unreported. === [PDF page 5] === Political l111prisonment-seen from the inside When in 1975 the I11donesian government launched a battle on drugs ancl smuggling, some foreign tourists were among the arrested victims. Thus, prisons in Jakarta, Bali and Jogjakarta provided 'free lodging' for foreigners from France, Canada, Australia, Malaysia and other countries - and some Army generals and high officials were also targets of the operation. In this way, foreigners came into contact with the harsh conditions in Indonesia's prisons and with the conditions of the carefully-guarded political prisoners. ·The following is based on a compilation ·of testimonies · from some of th.eir contacts. For obvious reasons, names of prisons and persons have ·been omitted. The facts included cover the period up to July, 1976 Forced Labour As a result of world public pressure, the Indonesian government was forced to make some improvements in the treatment and speed up the process of settlement of its political prisoners. In 19 69, several thousand were released. These were prisoners of the C category, those merely suspected of having been in.sympathy with the 30th September Movement. But at the same time, in 1969 and 1970, tens of thousands of prisoners from various prison camps in Java were deported to Burn, an isolated island in eastern Indonesia. They were the B category, those not charged with any overt activity in support of the 30th September Movement, but being considered as members or sympathisers of the Indonesian Communist Party or its mass organisations, were regarded by the government as being potentially 'dangerous.' In Buro, they had to clear away wild forests and transform them into cultivatable land. They also had to build their own houses and make their own furniture. It meant they had to abandon their previous occupations and become farmers. From 1971 onwards, about seven thousand political prisoners from camps in Java were transferred to labour camps in Nusakembangan (off the south coast of Central Java) where they h3cd to work on rubber- plantations and ot-lier agricultural projects. In April, 1971; about 500 women political prisoners, also B cateogry, were transferred and concentrated in a women's labour camp in Plantungan, Central Java, At all these projects, the prisoners have been forced to work by the government, or more precisely, "their labour power is utilised" by the government though part of the fruits of their labour is used by the prisoners themselves. The projects are called Tefaat and Tefaatra, meaning "utilisation workshops" or "temporary utilisation workshops" which properly said, means "labour camps." In principle, the prisoners, as political detainees, should not be put to work, in particular as these prisoners after prolonged subjection to conditions of undernourishment and ill-health are really unfit for hard work. The govemrflent has the full responsibility to provide them with the necessary means for a decent living, including proper nourishment and adequate medical attention as well as suitaHe mental znd recreation:.il facilities. Any form of forced labour is a gross violation of the *This article reached T APOL in September. We are able in this issue to reproduce only a few slightly-abridged extracts with minor linguistic improvements. We hope to publish more extracts in future issues. Conventions of the International Labour Organisation and should be stopped immediately. These measures clearly show that the Indonesian government is not working seriously towards a final, overall statement. It is taking only halfway measures doing patchwork in order to delay a real settlement. Composition of the Prisoners From the point of view of their previous occupations, they are either from the Armed Forces (mainly the Army) or the civil service, or are from the common people - workers, peasants, etc. Before coming here (into the prisons) we were made to believe that the prisoners were all communists or fellow travellers, but this is only partly true. From various sources, it became clear that the term "political prisoner" here includes a wide variety of people from various political convictions and religious beliefs: Christians, Catholics, Moslems and Buddhists. Besides communists and their sympathisers, there are many nationalists, socialists, members of Moslem parties, freedom fighters and even people with no political inclination at all. In 1975, in various places of central and east Java, many Moslem priests and their followers were arrested, suspected of instigating the masses with their prc<l;chings w hich were regarded as detrimental to the present regime's policy, thus endangering law and order. Not to mention t:h.e numerous "miscaptures" that occurred duri~g sweeps and mopping-up operations. So, in short, political prisonerS!,in Indonesia today are those c~tizens suspected of having political views opposed to or jeopardising <the present iegime. All this jumble of people are huddled together in prison camps as political prisoners. In many camps, these various groupings are purposely not mixed together, perhaps to avoid HIDUP DI BUI Hidup di bui bagaikan burung Bangun pagi makan nasi jagung Tidur di ubin pikiran bingung Apadaya badanku terkurung · Terompet pagi kita harus bangun Makan di antri nasinya jagung Mau merokok rokoknya puntung Mau mandi tidak ada sabun Oh kawan dengar lagu ini Hidup di bui menyiksa diri jangan sampai kawan mengalami Badan hidup terasa mati. Apalagi penjara tangerang masuk gemuk pulang tinggal tulang karena kerja secara paksa Tua muda turun ke sawah. A prison in Central Java, Indonesia 29th March 1976 T APOL Bulletin No. n0 === [PDF page 6] === eventual frictions. But at other camps,. they are living side by side in one and the same camp, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and "peaceful coexistence." Food The food rations for the politic J prisoners are far more meagre than for the criminal prisoners. The convicts get three meals a day: 100 grams of boiled maize grains for breakfast, 150 grams of cooked maize-rize for lunch and 150 grams for supper. They get soya beans or salted fish alternatively and half an egg twice a week as well as cabbage soup. But the ration for the political prisoners is less than that. They get rations only twice a day: 150 grams of cooked maize rice each time. Besides a mug of cabbage soup, they Hever get any side dishes. Day after day, r10nth after month, year after year only a bowl of maize rice and cabbage soup. On very rare occasions, they get other vegetables instead of cabbage. They never get meat, fish, eggs or any other nutritional side dish. For drinking, they get only boiled water, just plain boiled water. No tea, coffee or milk; and also, no sugar. If one compared their rations with prices, they were worth only 25 rupiahs a day, perhaps even less... That is the equivalent of 6 US cents. This is really starvation food. In effect, it is a death sentence for tens of thousands of political prisoners in Indonesia, by means of a slow, irrevocable killing. People say that the central government allocates a larger amount of money for food rations, but what really matters is not the amount on paper but what they are concretely being given each day. It's hard to believe that the government is ignorant of this corruption, but up until now, no action has been taken. If corrnptbn is confined to mauipuiation of motor cars or other material objects, I wouldn't question it. But here, it concerns food rations for human beings in prison. Outside, by virtue of their freedoms, people have many options. But inside the prisons, the rigid regime places restrictions on any endeavour. Here, life is cut to the bone and there is no margin for error. The tiniest mistake is f<1.teful in its consequences. Corruption of the prisoners' food is a crime against humanity. It's equ3.l to homicide! State of Health Malnutrition takes a terrible toll. Malnutrition, especially protein deficiency, can be tolerated for several weeks, but after a year or two, general deterioration of the human body becomes apparent. And many of these political prisoners have been suffering malnutrition for more than ten y ears..No wonder they become an easy prey to all kinds of diseases: tuberculosis, beri-beri or kwakioshor, infections, dysentry, hypertension, arthritis, mental depression, etc., not to mention various minor bu\ very irritating diseases like toothaches, eye-ache, influenza. Since there wa~ virtually no medical attendance, they had to make shift with anything. There had been some medical and food attendance from the Christian Deaconry and the Catholic mission. Small packets of corn, soya-bean and milk proved to be of great value in ameliorating conditions. With hot water added, it served as a hot, nutritional cereal. For several years, the medical team of the Catholic mis~ion provided badly-needed medical treatment for the political prisoners in this camp. But unfortunately, all this valuable help was stopped last year. Small wonder that the death rate among the political prisoners has increased day by day, especially in the past twelve months. And every time a political prisoner dies, it weighs heavily upon the other inmates... Recent Arrests In the President's Decree of June, 1975 (see Tapol Bulletin No. 12, October, 1975, for more details of this decree), it was stipulated that those of the C category who, to date, were still a.ctiYe in government service would continue in their jobs. But contrary to this decree, there were many new arrests among the civil servants, and especially from the Armed Forces. Newly - arrived prisoners entering some camps during the past few months told us they had been in active service all this time and were capt11red only one month ago, straight from.their military barracks. And they assured us that more new arrivals were at the military-police headquarters. PRISON LIFE We prisoners live like birds in cages, Eating our morning ration of maize, We sleep on stone, our thoughts disordered. What can we do - the prisoners? We wake to the wail of the siren and queue for our feast of maize Who's for a fag? Its fag-ends only. A bath perhaps? Well, there's no soap. Friendly strangers listen to my song. Life in jail is hellish torment I hope you never have to suffer it. The body's a living tomb for a dead soul. In Tangerang Prison they suffer the most. The fat newcomers, forced to work, soon waste away to skin and bones. Young and old, all must work in the fields. A prison in Central Java, Indonesia 29th March 1976 Translated by TAPOL. 10. 18 October.1976 Tim or MANY ARRESTS IN WEST TIMOR Over a thousand people are reported to have been arrested in the western half of Timor for allegedly siding with Fretilia, which is now engaged in extensive military operations against Indonesian troops in the eastern half of the island. The reports come from former supporters of the UDT party, the pro-Portuguese party that was used by the Indonesian military to stage their integration of East Timor. These UDT supporters, many of whom are now disenchanted with the Indonesian military were among a group of 113 refugees who left Timor in July this year for Portugal. A group of 2 3 Portuguese soldiers who had been in custody for nearly a year following the Indonesian invasion of Dillia were also returned to Portugal. All these refugees and repatriates are under orders not to talk to the press. These reports of West Timorese support for Fretilin are consistent with earlier reports towards the end of 1975 that some Timorese members of the Indonesian army in Kupang (capital of West Timor) and several other people had been arrested on suspicion of supporting the independence movement in East Timor. === [PDF page 7] === The 1977 Elections and Political Freedoms • "I have had many reports from Youth Movement leaders now active in the Unity Party (Partai Pembangunan Persatuan, the fusion of Moslem parties) that they are summoned every morning by the local army officer (Dam Ramil) because they are party commissioners in their locality," said M. Zamroni, Parliament member for the PPP in a press conference on 26 May (Kompas, 28th May). Often, he said, party commissioners receive "orders to stay overnight" for one night or longer. As a result, many are reluctant to be publicly known as party commissioners. Referring to these practices as violations of the law Zam. rom said this made people feel like foreigners in their own land, like the majority of the Vietnamese people (the Buddhists) who were looked upon as ignoramuses and useless beings by the government and the American army. The people also feel resentful towards the government. • Disseminating rumours aimed at inciting the people and distorting the picture of conditions in the country are clearly acts of subversion, said Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff. He added that he would not hesitate to take stem action against individuals responsible for disseminating such rumours. He also said that he expected such activities to increase as the general elections draw near. Oakarta Home Service of Radio Republik Indonesia, 5th August, according to BBC Monitoring Service SWB, 7th August). • KOPKAMTIB regional branches have been ordered to monitor non-government radio broadcasts carrying religious preaching containing inciting material. These stations have been requested to inform KOPKAMTIB of anyone preaching in a fanatic3l way 3.Jlld disregarding KOPKAMTIB instructions. Qakarta RRI Home Service, 3rd August, according to BBC Monitoring SWB, 5th August). e "In the press and in various periodicals, I have been finding articles that have lost all basis and direction as part of a free and responsible press, articles that spread incitements, insinuations, speculations and sensationalism, articles based not on fact but on imagination and fiction, articles that distort the facts. I shall be forced, I repeat, forced, to take repressive action for purposes of prevention (Admiral Sudomo, KOPTAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, speaking at the 16th Session of the Press Council of Jogjakarta on 18th July, 1976, as reported in Suara Karya, 22nd July, 1976). • General Amir Machmud, Interior Affairs Minister said (21st April) that certain elements are known recently to have been trying to foil the forthcoming general elections and the New Order government... Their efforts include causing disturbances and inciting the people. He warned these "leaders" or elements with such criminal intentions to halt such activities which, he said, could only bring them total disaster. If they did not want to participate in the elections, that was their right, but they should not try to incite people into not participating because this was clearly in conflict with the national consensus set down in the Broad Lines of state policy. (A ngkatan Bersenjata, 22nd-April, 19 7 6). (This statement by General Amir Machmud was subsequently reiterated and confirmed by Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff and by Lieutenant-General Widodo, Commander of the All-Java Military Command). The weekly magazine, Tempo, reported (15th May) that PPP leaders considered that they were the targets of such warnings and according to Tempo, Sudomo had confirmed that the "elements" referred to were indeed from the political parties. • Some people, said to have used proselytising (preaching for the purpose of religious conversion) for political purposes, have been detained for periods of up to ten or fifteen days. This was announced by Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, speaking to press representatives in June (Berita Buana, 16th June, 1976). At the same time he said that KOPKAMTIB prohibits proselytising that has the character of inciting and that blackens the government or other groups. KOPKAMTIB does not prohibit proselytising as such but prohibits it when used for political purposes. He also reiterated that according to KOPKAMTIB regulations, the Police must be informed at least three days in advance of all proselytising meetings. This regulation has not been revoked, he stressed, nor has the regulation requiring Police permission for all gatherings of more than five persons. The above news items are typical of reports frequently appearing in the Indonesian press in the past few months and indicate that the Army is increasingly worried about the emergence of any form of political activity or criticism of government policy during the period leading up to the general elections scheduled for 2nd May, 19 7 7. While on the one hand hoping to use the general elections as proof o_f the "constitutionality" of the military government and to show that the military rules "with the consent of the majority," the Anny has been at great pains to restrict as far as possible the activities of the two remaining political parties permitted to participate in the elections, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the fusion of Moslem parties) and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the fusioD' of nationalist and Christian parties). === [PDF page 8] === Ex-Tapols to Buru? According to reports from various contacts in Jakarta, there are growing fears that tapols recently released may soon find themselves being transported to Buru for permanent detention there. It is widely believed among tapols' families that a major transfer of tapols to Buru is in preparation, and the rumours that ex-tapols could also be included indicates that there is a great sense of uncertainty and insecurity. 300 "C" Tapols Still in Salemba Another rep0rt states that the register of tapols at Salemba Prison in June, 1976, still included about 300 C category tapols, belying claims by the authorities that all these tapols have long since been released. These 300 persons are said to be tapols scheduled for release but who have no relatives with whom they are in contact and who could stand as guarantee for them. Hariman Allowed Home Hariman Siregar, the student leader found guilty for his role in the January, 19 7 4 demonstrations in Jakarta, has been allowed to return home "for humanitarian reasons" by the Supreme Court. The court's decision says that his "provisional detention" has been terminated. Nevertheless, his case is not yet received. Following a decision by the Jakarta Higher Court, on appeal, to cut his sentence from 6 years to 4Y2years, his lawyers decided to appeal again to the Supreme Court. This appeal is still pending. Conditions have been attached to the decision to allow Hariman to return home. They are: that he will not evade implementation of a provisional detention order, that he will not evade sentence that may be passed and that he will not seek to influence or obstruct the further investigation of his case. According to Tempo (21st August), his lawyers are somewhat puzzled by his present status. IGGI APPROVES 2,400 MILLION DOLLARS' CREDIT FOR 1976/77 The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia meeting held on 9-lOth June this year approved a total of no less than $2,400 million in credits to Indonesia for the forthcoming financial year. This amount is 20 percent higher than the amount approved for last year and brings the total aid channelled to Indonesia through the IGGI since its inception in 196 7 to $8,965 million. The 1976/77 total includes $450 million in bilateral aid from IGGI member countries, $670 million in aid from the · World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, $250 million from countries of the Middle East and East Europe*, and $1,000 in export credit loans and commercial loans for projects. The bilateral commitments include the following: Japan U.S.A. Netherlands W. Germany Australia Canada France Belgium New Zealand $133 M $ 99 M $ 45 M $ 38 M $ 38 M $ 33 M $ 33 M $ 10 M Soft Loans Soft Loans Soft Loans, Grants Soft Loans, Grants Grants Soft Loans Soft Loans Very Soft Loans Soft Loans Soft Loans Soft loan · conditions are much less stringent than loans available on the capital market. For instance, the Dutch loans are provided with a 30-year repayment period, an 8-year period of grace, and at 4 percent interest. *The countries of the Middle East and East Europe are not members of IGGI, but credit known to be forthcoming from these countries was, for the first time, included in the overall IGGI figure. continued from page 6 The Law on Political Parties and GOLKAR. adopted last year introduced severe limitations of the freedom of action of the parties. It limits party.activity to the kabupaten or district level thus prohibiting party activity in sub-district capitals and in the villages. For the lower administrative levels, it only permits the appointment of "commissioners." The Law restricts eligibility of members of parties to literate people with a certain level of education and gives full powers to the.President to dismiss party leaders who he considers are working against the interests of the State. In implementation of this law and of the Revised Law on General Elections, also adopted last year, there have been many instances where party freedoms have been further restricted. For instance, the Law on Political Parties empowers the President to suspend party leaderships, but the implementary regulation regarding these powers speaks of the President's powers to suspend parties. (Presidential Decision No. 9/1976). The question of adopting party symbols (used on the ballot slips) caused considerable dismay among the parties because the symbols they proposed were rejected by the State Election Committee as being too similar to symbols "sacred to the Panca Sila." Evetually, the Moslem symbol was accepted when PPP leaders insisted that it had been the result of spiritual revelation and that unrest among Moslem communities would be considerable if the symbol were changed. One implementary regulation enacted by the government this year specifically banned kabupaten branches of parties from holding meetings in lower-level administrative units, whereas this matter had been left somewhat ambiguous in the actual law. When party leaders protested that the implementary regulations were not in keeping with the Law, the Interior Minister, General Amir Machmud, gave verbal assurances that meetings in the lower units could be held but refused to change the implementary regulation, leaving the parties at the discretion of local commanders who can, of course, apply the regulation and ignore ministerial assurances. The months leading up to the general elections next May will certainly be a period when political freedoms will be more severely restrained and, as the above quotations show, party activists will find themselves increasingly at risk and subjected to interrogations, arrest, detention and dismissals in an effort to curb their activities and secure for GOLKAR an even greater "victory" than they achieved at the 1971 elections. TAPOL Bulletin No. 18, October 1976 === [PDF page 9] === T APoL Background and Information Series Number 2 August 1976 - 10p T APOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian political prisoners an.d is a humanitarian organisation. It is not associated with any political groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is supported by individuals and organisations of many shades of opinion. CIA ON 1965 EVENTS KOPKAMTIB repeatedly asserts that tens of thousands of tapols are being held because of their "direct or indirect involvement in the G30S ", and the military interprets the G30S as a coup attempt which aimed at "overthrowing the established government of the time". But it is interesting to note a very different interpretation coming from no less an authority than the US Central Intelligence Agency. A CIA Intelligence Report entitled Indonesia - 1965: The Coup that Backfired which was completed in December 1968 and has recently been de-classified, provides the following interpretation of the G30S (30th September Movement) of 1965: "It is technically correct to refer to the events in Indonesia as a 'coup' in the literal sense of the word, meaning 'a sudden, forceful stroke in politics'. To the extent that the word has been accepted in common usage to mean 'the sudden and forcible. overthrow of government' however, it may be misleading. For it now seems clear that the Indonesian coup was not a move to overthrow Sukarno and/or the established government of Indonesia. Essentially, it was a purge of the Army leadership, which was intended to bring about certain changes in the composition of the cabinet." In an article which' appeared in the T APOL-US Bulletin No. 5 Uune 15, 1976), Lenny Seigel has the following to say about the CIA Report: Indonesia: UNIONS BEHIND BARS 1b;wt British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners A new TAPOL pamphlet, the second in its Background and Information Series. Foreword by Jack Jones, Chairman of the International Department of the British Trade Union Congress. Articles on: Political Imprisonment Trade Unionism in Indonesia before and since 1965 Forced Labour in the Prison Camps Also: A list of imprisoned trade unionists Alist of British companies with investments in Indonesia. Plus four pages of photographs Price: Only lOp plus postage. A report prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1968 estimates a low level of participation even by PKI officials. The CIA report which holds the PKI head, Aidit, responsible for planning a coup, should not be considered an authoritative source on the events of September-October 1965. It is full of speculation as well as unsubstantiated reports. Nevertheless, it paints a picture of a conspiracy unknown to all but a tiny fraction of the PKI organisation. The CIA asserts that the PKI Politbureau decided in August, 1965 to let Aidit make preparations for, a coup. But the report adds: "Only a very few people in the Politbureau even knew of the existence of the Special Bureau" which the CIA said carried out the coup attempt. By the time of the alleged communist coup, the CIA concludes, "the Special Bureau had established a pattern of regular contact with perhaps a hundred or more military officers... " Most of these officers were not communists. In addition, the PKI allegedly involved 4,000 volunteers - armed youths - at the last moment. The CIA also claims that a handful of top party leaders were given coup-related tasks a few days before the coup. "Except for these top leaders, the PKI as an organisation was not informed about the coup ahead of time." Order your copies now-and help us ensure wide distribution of this important pamphlet among trade unionists. Notes to Readers SUBSCRIPTION RATES The new annual rates (six issues) are: .£2.50 (5..50 US dollars) UK and Europe Overseas .£3.00 (6.75 US dollars) TAPOL Bank Account No. 40987493, Wandsworth Common Branch, National Westminster Bank, 27 Bellevue Road, London S.w.17 7EF. AU foreign currency cheques should be endorsed on the reverse side with the words: As made payable to on the front. Please address all correspondence and subscriptions to: T APOL, 103 Tilehurst Road, Wandsworth Common, London S.W.18, United Kingdom. Jointly produced by IRAT Print and Design and J. 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