TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988

=== [PDF page 1] === Tapol bulletin no, 90, December 1988 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1988) Tapol bulletin no, 90, December 1988. Tapol bulletin (90). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1356-1154 The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26201/ === [PDF page 2] === The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign December 1988 TAPOL Bulletin No. 90 Eucalyptus planting in West Papua threatens tribal people Tribal people in Merauke, West Papua face,a new threat from a foreign investment project for a huge eucalyptus plantation in Merauke, West Papua. The Indonesian Investment Board (BK PM) has apprwed the project, worth $653~8 million, which will finance eucalyptus planting and the construction of a pulp and paper factory. [Jakarta Post, 27 October] The investment is being made by the Scott Paper Company in Philadelphia, working in collaboration with P. T. Astra, Indonesia's second largest corporation, which has subsidiaries in alma;t every line of business frcm automobiles to timber concessions and agribusiness. The project, to be run by a venb.lre called P.T AstraScott Cellulosa, plans to use 200,000 hectares of land in Mera.ike which can only mean the dispossession of tribal lands at present t11e home of the Marind, Yei and Kanum people. A feasibility study for the project was carried out by the Canadian company, Lavalin International (we previously wrc:ngly identified Lavalin as a us company), together with the forestry department of Gajah Mada University in Jogjakarta. Ecological devastation The conversion of such a huge area of land into eucalyptus plantations will not only uproot tre present inhabitants, already badly affected by the expropriation of much of their land for transmigration sites. It will also wreak devastati<n by turning a region with a varied vegetation that provides tribal people with their proteins and hunting grounds, into a monccultural project, forcing prople to change their way of life. The present vegetation consists of sago palm, eucalyptus stands and otter plants which flourish in, and provide the moisture for, the swamps that are the source of three local rivers. If the natural vegetation is removed, the rivers could dry up, further aggravating the water sh:>rtage that has already caused such havoc for the existing transmigration sites. The existing vegetation has religious significance for the inhabitants. Moreover, it is feared that unwanted species woo.ld be removed with Dioxin, a chemical which has boon used by the rompany elsew re re. This is krown to cause leukemia, liver and lung diseases, birth defects and miscarriages in laboratory animals. Third World campaign against the eucalyptus The adverse social and ecologicc:tl impact of largescale eucalyptus planting is the focus of a campaign launched in September by the Third World Network in Malaysia. It highlights a number of hazards: excessive absorption of water inhibiting other plant growth, loss of nutrients in the soil, the spread of toxicity and the threatofdesertification. The Network's Urgent Action, based on grassroots p:rotest.s against eucalyptus planting in Thailand and India, is directed at the world Bank which, together with the UK's Overseas Development Administration, is funding eucalyptl.ls planting in many Please turn to page 8 East Timor 'Timer gap' oil share-out agreed Portugal condemns Indonesia at U N US members of Congress renew concern Child deaths in Dilli: call for inquiry Euro-Parliament's resolution West Papua Charges against missions bring replies Politics The Golkar Congress Kopkamtih gives way to Ba.korstanas Suharto's role in the G30S p. 13 p. 19 Human rights Re-registration of former prisooers p. 10 More executions p. 11 'Clean-self' and 'clean-environment' p. 14 Nazi-style snooping and the Muslim trials p. 17 International support for Pramoedya p. 22 Arrests and torture in the Moluccas p. 24 Books Pramoedya'a Rumah l<ac.a: An Essay p. 23 === [PDF page 3] === EASTDMOR 'Timor Gap' petroleum share-out agreed Canberra and Jakarta have reamed an interim agreement to set up a 'zone of cooperation' in the sea between Australia arrl East Timor, the so-called Timor Gap, which will enable petroleum companies in Australia and Indonesia to go ahead with exploration arrl exploitation of off-shore oil resexves thought to contain up to a billion barrels of oil. The interim agreement is the first contributioo towart:E improving:relabals between the two countries by Australia's new Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans. Pr:ior to his present job, Gareth Evans was the Minister for Resources and Energy. '£ he agreement prompted a rebuke from the Portuguese Government, describing it as "a blatant and serious breach of internaticnal law" because Indonesia's unilateral annexation of East Timar has not been recognised by the international community. Moreover, efforts are proceeding at the UN "with the aim of guaranteeing the Timorese people their leg:i,timate.tight to self-determination according to the UN Charter". The interim agreement has been welcomed by petroleum interests:in Australia who forecast that if the reserves are as bounteous as currently expected, they will "significantly slow down the decline in Australian petroleum reserves" [The Age, 6 September]. The agreement has been reached after nine years of negotiations. The eagerness of Australian oil companies to clear the way for exploiting the Timor 'Gap has been the primary factor in Canberra's decision, urrler both Liberal and Labour <pvemments, to recognise Indonesia's illegal annex:atioo of East Tim or. Agreed Seabed Boum:Jary AREA A MELVILLE ISLAND AREA B 200 NAUTICAL MILES FROM INOONESIA It is interim in narure because the two countries have not yet agreed on a permanent seabed boundary in the stretch of sea south of East Timor. The agreement divides the potentially-rich area into three zones. Zone A, the area thought most likely to contain oil, will be jointly worked, with a 50:50 share of the profits. Zone B will be governed by Australia, with 16 per cent of net revenuesgoingtoindonesia. Zone C will be <pvemed by Indonesia, with 10 per cent of company tax revenue passing to Australia. Portugal condemns Indonesia at UN In Portugal's strorgest denunciation yet at the United Natic:os, the Foreign Minister, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, speaking at the G01eral Assembly on 5 October, rejected Indonesia's occupation of East Timar and called for self-determination for its people.• "No circumstances whatsoever can legitimise the ruthless way in which repression was waged in the territory, with an:Intolerable prire in human lives and suffering". He regretted the flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination by a country which was equally subject to colonialism. "It is 13 years since the non-self-g01Terning territory of East Timar under Portuguese administration saw its pnxess of decolooisation interrupted and was invaded by a powerfQl neighbour." "Portugal <bes not reject its share in responsibility for the difficulties and troubles which affected that process in its beginnings, but we · cannot accept that such events legitimise the invasion _and occupation by Indonesia and the subsequent denial of the fundamental rights and freeoom of its people ~" In conclusion, he said: "East Timer is for us a moral, historical and legal responsibility. We cannot ignore ~drarnaof F.astTirnorunless we beoome accomplices of an intolerable policy of fait accompli, imposed by force." General Assembly again postpones resolution For the sixth year running, the General Assembly decided in October not to discuss a resolution on East Timor. The last time a resolution was tabled was in 1982 when the General Assembly agreed by 50 votes to 46 to ask the Secretary-General to "initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues fur achieving a oomprehensive settlement of the pr()blem". The stated reason for the postponement was that negotiatioos are un::ler way.at the UN between PorbJgal and IndonesU:i. regard:ing a possible visit to East Timor by a mission of parliamentarians from Portugal. Note tx:> readers Due to lack of space, we are unable to summarise more petitions to the UN Decolonisatioo Committee ill Augus~ We hope to continue the series in the next issue. TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 4] === Portuguese MPs visit Japan During a visit to Japan from l.8 to 25 September, a delegation of Portuguese parliamentarians warmly welcomed the Japanese Parliamentarian Forum on East Timar. The mission was readed by Maria Manuela Aguiar, Social Democrat, vice-chair of the Portuguese National Assembly. According to R ui Silva of too Democratic Renovation Partywroisa memberofthe Parliamentary Commissioo on East Timor, the delegation explained Portugal's position on East.Timorduringa meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sousuke Uno, and referred to the European Parliament's resolution on East Timar. The Foreign Minister made no comment arrl brought the visit to an end as soon as the East Timor issue was raised. Nevertheless, the visiting parliamentarians were impressed by the strongcx:immitmentamongJapanese MPs to East Timer's right to self-determination. During a meetirg' wfth women MPs, 'l'amako Nakanishi asked whether Portugal felt it had nothlng to do with the East Timor tra~dy since tlH~ Indonesian invt:ision occurred after East Timor' s declaraticn of indeperrlence. The Portuguese said that Portugal has a responsibility for both selfdetermination and human rights but would prefer not to actalooe; in particular, it wants the UN's cooperation. Two East Timorese1 Jooe Guterres from Lisbon and Jose GusmaJ from Darwin, weredoo tovisit Japan m November. Portu<jUese MPs during their visil:: to Japan The Free East Timar Coalition planned to organise public meetings for them in more than twenty places, from Hokkaicbto Okinawa. We hope to:report on their tr.ip in the next issue. US Congress members renew concern about E Timor -.1n 30 October, tie day before President Suharto paid a visit to East'rimor, it was anrounced in Washington that 47 OS Senators and.182 members of the House of Representatives joined in sending letters to Secretary of State, Ge::>rge Shultz, renewi.ng their concern about East Timor. '!'he signatories from the Senate included three-quarters of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Releasing the Senators' letter, David Durenberger, Republican Senator for Minnesota, said: "By sending this letter now, my colleagues and I want to ensure that the DPR members drafting their own petition The statements about East Tim or by 22 9 members of the us Congress has stung members of Incbnesia's parliarnen~ the DP R, into action. They are drafting a petition to the US congress. It will, acc...""Ording to an (urmamed> member, denounce the comments as "groundless and Obtained from false sources". Alleging that there are no more problems in r: ast Timor, the member regretted that the US Congress "still questicns something which no lcnger needs to bequestioood". He eq::ected 250 DPR members to sign the petition; he did not explain why all five hurrlred DP R members would not sign. [Jakarta Post, 16 November] East Timor tragerly receives increased attention, both from the Reagan Administration and its successor• The long agony of East 'l'imor continues. I hope this letter will remind the State Department of this fact." The letter expressed concern about th~ transfer of East Timorese prisoners to Jakarta, the torture of Timorese under interrogation and tt.e denial cf access to international human right.s organisations: "Freedom of express.ion for citizens of East Timer, including most Roman Catholic clergy, continues to be virtually nonexistalt." Calling for a negotiated end to the conflict, the Senators said: "We believe that the United States could help bring the parties involved in the East Timor conflict to the negotiating table to begin a process that could end this 13-year tragedy." The f.irst time Senator Durenberger sponsored a letter on East 'l'imor,.in 1982, he got the support of 16 Senators; now that number has almost trebled. Congressional concern could force Bush Administration tn act Releasing tte letter sigred by 182 House members, Tony Hall, Democrat for Ohio, said: "The growing concern in Congress is a clear sign that the next Administration will be forced to deal with the human rights problems TAPOL Bulletin No. 90. December 1988 === [PDF page 5] === EAST Tl MOR and continuing conflict in East 1'irnor." 'fhe letter said: "The continuing oonflict... has contributed, both directly and indirectly, to food shortages and health problems.•. We believe that the reports of persistent fighting and ongoing shortages of food and medical supplies in East Timor merit the concern of the US Congress...• We are cmcemed by the implication of Indonesian Defence Minister Bem\y Murdani's recentremarkthat EastTimor is mly 'open to selectedprople'. We seek efforts by the US Governmai.t to ensure both the rontinuation and expansion of access to East Timor by international humanitarian organisations." Like the Senators, the House members also advocate a negotiated end to the conflict and state that the US "srould work together withindmesia, Porwgal and other interested participants to help facilitate a peaceful and just soluticn to the conf lice'. commenting on the letters in an editonal entitled "East Tim or's human rights", the Boston Globe (1 November] said: "Raising an outcry about soviet human rights violations ••• takes less political fortitude than does insisting that a strategic <illy of Washington stop torturing and massacring victims of its dominaticn•••• While recognising the strategic ronsideratlons that mold us policy toward Incbnesiei, the lawmakers evince the political courage to demand an American human rights starrlard that wruld he the same for client dictatorships and communist regimes." ABC sacks employee for painting East Timor slogans A rnrrmt affairs presenter working for the Australian B roadcasti.rg Commission has been sacked for plastering her own hcuse with slogans calling for Indonesian troops to pull out of East 1'imor. 1'he presenter, Ilena Eldridge, lives next door to Jo5eph Halim, the Indonesian consul in Darwin, and decided to make a personal protest against his activities in the city. Justifying her dismissal, the ABC claimed that her actions "conflict with the public's perception of the ABC's integrity and impartiality". Eldridgehasdeferredher right to hold perscnal views and has criticised her former colleagues for failing to e,urne to her defence. ''ln a democracy, why can't anyone, anywhere, have private political views?" {Northern Territory News, 21 July 1988]. It was in Darwin last May that the cornmuruty of East Timorese refugees put on a play entitled, "Death.a t Balibo", aboot the murder of five television journalists by Indonesian troops in October 1975. When posters announcing the play were seen on display at the Press Club in the city, a group of Ind:mesian.TV journalists who were visiting the club suddenly decided to pull out of their tour of Australia because they felt "offended" by the posters. Suharto wary about visiting Australia During his first visit to Indonesia, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans renewed a standing invitation from Ilena Eldridge's hrnse. [Northern Territory News, 21 July] Prime Minister Bob Hawke for the Indonesian presiden~ General Suharto, to visit Australia. Not surprisingly, SUhartois not very enthusiastic but left it to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to explain that such a visit could only t.:lke place in the context of strengthening, and not disrupting, good bilateral relations (Jakarta Post~ 29 October]. As Jakarta well knows, any visiting Indonesian official is certain to be amfrcnted with denunciations of Irdonesian policy on a range of issues, · not least, its brutal annexation of East Timor, from Australian activists and in particular from Timorese rom munities in all the major cities. Recent abuses of human rights * Five girl sb.ldents at an agriculb.lral college in Natarbora, south-west of Dili, were raped and then murdered by Incbnesian soldiers on 16 Sept.ember, according to Aires da Almeida, an electrical engineer who is now a refugee in Australia. He said that the incidmt was reported to the authorities by the parents of the girls but no action was taken. [The Age, 31 October] * A Freti.linactivist who left East Tirnor with his wife in 1985 and has been living in Darwin ever since, has been informa:I trat 21 close relatives in East Timor have been imprisoned in an attempt to step his political activities abroad. Jose Gusrnao, who is a cousin of G usmao Xanana, the Fretilin leader aoo commander-in-chief of its military wing, F alintll, said that the Inoonesian authorities detained his 65-year-old mother, three sisters, a brother and a sister-in-law, and 15 cousins between the ages of 5 and 17 in August this year. He told the press that people who had visited EastTimor in July told him members of his family had been questioned about how he got out of the country. Later, he was told that the whale family had been:rounded up and was being held at security hea:lquarters in Dill. [The Age, 13 August 1988] The two children born to Jose and his wife Maria while they were on ihe run from the Indonesian army in East Tirnor both died. The first died a few h::1..lrs after birth and the seccnd died of malnutrition and malaria. T}iey were only able to leave East Timar after paying a $25,000 bribe although they had successfully applied to migrate to Australia. T APOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 6] === Attempt at mediation leads to arrest EAST TlMOR An Italian priest and two East Timorese are reported to have been arrested in July this year, after being involved in a move to mediate in talks with Fretilin leaders in the vicinity of Baucau. The three men are Father Eligio Locatteli, a tribal chief, Joaquim Guterres and a man idenillied only as Ernesto. They, along with a:f;ourth man, Alexio Ximenes, chair of the Baucau local assembly, were part of a team said to have bem attempting to set up talks between the Indonesian authorities and th,e Fretilin leadership. According to information made public by Darwin parliamentarian, Warren Soowden, an Indonesian red-beret platoon had been assigned to protect the group but in the event., they tried to capb.lre tie Fretilin team. When the Fretilin team arrived, there was an exchange of fire and the Fretilin negotiators were able to escape from the ambush. [ Northern Territory News, 26 Sey>tember) Ernesto and Guterres were then arrested and taken to Dili where they were subjected to torture under interrogation. Ximenes succeeded in taking refuge at the reside?nce of the Bishop in Dili, wh;ile the Italian priest was placed under house arres~ In J\l,lgus~ an Agence France Press journalist who visited East Timor hadrei:orted that the Catholic Church in East Timor had for some time been "negotiating the surrenqer" of the Fretilin guerrillas. Responding to this report., Fretilin's Information office·in Lisbon called the news of necptiations for the surrenderofthe guerrillas "groundless and absurd". The Timorese National Convergence (the alliance between Fretilin and the u DT) rejected the idea of the Catholic qlUrchplayinga mediating role in East Timor. It wants to see all efforts at a solution for East Timor being carried out by the UN Secretary-General, Peres de Cuellar. [ East Timor News, October 1988] child deaths in D ili: parliamentarians call for.inquiry East Timorese children British Aerospace college opened Collaboration between tie leading UK arms manufacturer, Briti.sh Aera>pace, an:1 the Indonesian military has been taken a step further by the opening of a technical college in Malang, Eq.stJava. Named too Army Institute of Tecmology, the college was constructed by British Aerospace ata cost of E3 million, in collaboration with the army's Artillery Weapons Centre. British Aen::sp:iee will prOllide eight senior members of staff, two of whorn will be on the management. 'l'he school is located within the oomplex of the Air Defence A:tti.llet:y Scrool, which is part of the Artillery Education Centre in K arangploso. [Kompas, 12 October]~ During the visit to Lisbon by three parliamentarians last June, several East Timorese refugees told the mission that many children had died mysteriously after going to hospital in Dill for treatment. The claims were mad::? p..iblic.in Australia by Tony Lamb, meofthe three members of the mission. who is a member of the Australian House of Representatives. The romplaint was tl:> have been raised during a parliamentary debate on human rights abuses in East Timor scheduled forOctd:>er, justbefore Foreign Minister Gareth Evans begana visittolrrlmesia. Tony Lamb, aloog with Warren Snowden, another parliamentarian who also voiced the same coocerns, agreed to pcstpone tre debate until after the visit. Tony Lamb, who is a pharmacist by profession, said that when he first heard the claims during meetings with refugees, he was sceptical and cross-examined the refugees about possible mistaken cbsages or deaths throughemern:ic diseases such as amoebic a:rse?.try. "T~ey were adamant it was deliberate poisoning, he said. He understood that the deaths, which reportedly ocrurre:'l at a rate of 15 to 20 a day for ooe period, had all ocrurred in one hospital, but East Timorese sources in Australia said the deaths occurred in two hospitals. Widespread use of Depo Provera challenged Tony Lamb also called for an inquiry into a report received from the Indonesian Family Planning Institute (BK KBN) that.57%of East Timorese women participating in the birth control programme are given the Depo Provera injection, a loog-term contraceptive with a variety of dangerous side-effects. [Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October] The informatioo fran Incbresia came in a reply sent by the BK KBN following enquiries from the International Planned Parenthood Federatim, after a meeting in 1986 wren an::ern was e<pressed about implernentatim of birth control in East Timor. The BK KB N reply containeostatistics for 1986 about the number of birth control personnel and public information activities in East Timer and gave rornparative figures for Irrlonesia as a whole. [E<lSt Timor News, Subject Memo No 4/1988] P.owever, the figures about contraceptive methods avoide:i making any comparisons, and showed that Depa Provera was being used on 57% of partj.clpants, the Pill 29% and IUD 10%. The Lisbon-based group, Peace is Possible.in East Tim::>r, has now discovered a rei:ort in D iad.o de Not:icias [November 1985] showing that contraceptive methods in Indmesia give the following breakdown: the Pill, 65%; IUD, 27%; injections, 5%. Peace is Possible comments: "This difference of 5% in Indonesia and 57% in East Timor intensifies suspicions and gives further credibility to the accusatioos of the practice of compulsory family planning in East Timor." [East Timor News, Monthly Memo no. 8/1988) TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 7] === EAST Tl MOR European Parliament's resolution on East Timor The following in the subst antive pdrt of the resolution on East (imor, adopted by the European Parliament at i t s plenary session on 16 September by 164 votes to 12, with 15 abstentions. The resolution followed intense lobbying by Jnaonesia to have the resolution defeated. The.result of the voting went virtually unreported in the Indonesian press. l. Corrlemns the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia and confirms the right of self-aetennination of the people of East Timor; 2. Defends the right of the pecple of East Timor to maintain, develop and affirm their cultural, linguistic and religious identity derived fran their own history, 3. Corrlemns the Indonesian policy of denying to iooependent foreign visitors the opportunity to examine freely conditions in the country and to investigate reports of human rights violations; 4. Calls on the Indonesian Government to carry out the promised opening-up of East Timor before the end of 1988. 5. Requests the Indonesian Government to allow intemational aid and human rights organisations to oome to East Timor and to give them complete f.rnedorn of movement. 6. Calls on the Indonesian Government to permit free movement within East Timar and to grant people the right to enter and leave the area; 7. C01.demns the continuing violatioo of human rights in East Timor by the Indonesian occupation forces and by paramilitary and civil organisations, under the control of t.he Indonesian authorities; 8. urges the Indonesian Government to corn ply with the international prwisions on human rights in East Tim or, 9. Calls rn tle Member States of the European Community to undertake political action with a view to securing a withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timar, as an essential precondition for ensuring respect for the fundamental rights of the people and for the exercise of their right of self-determination, including the right to indepe!rlence, ancl t.o support the efforts of the UN Secretary General aimed at achieving these objectives; 10. Calls on the UN Secretary General, in his efforts to firrl a solution, to consult not only with Portugal and Indonesia but also with the representatives of the people of East Timor, the 'Convergencia Nacionalista'; 11. Calls on all governments in the Community to halt the sale bf military equipment to In<bnesia until the illegal occupation of East Timor is brought to an end. 12. Requests the Council to take measures aimed at reaching an agreement of cease-fire and enabling a referendum to be held after a transitional period, to be defined by the interest:OO parties, with the people being allowed freedom of choice on the future of East Timor; 13. Expresses the wish that Portugal, as the 'administering power', under the provisions of internationai law and the Port1Jguese Constitution, should be allowed to play an active role fall.ing to it to guarantee the effective ex:ercise of the right of self-determ:inatioo bf the people of East Timar, and supports the efforts made by the Portuguese authorities in the directive (sic) of concrete and · viable, internationally accepted solutions; 14. Urges the Foreign Ministers meeting in European political CCX)peration t.o maintain a concerted diplomatic action in order to guarantee the exercise of the right of the pecple of East Timor to self-determination and to establish contact with all parties involved in the conflict, including representatives of the East Timor community, and to report to Parliament on the progress of its initiatives; 15. Calls on all the EEC instib..ttions to bear in mind the. present colonial situation in East Timer and the terms of this r~sol~tion, when considering relations between the EEC and the ASEAN countries. 16. Requests the Commission to take account of the situation in East Timor in its contacts with the Indonesian auth:>rities. Published by the Parliament.ary Human Rights Group. On order from TAPOL. Price, jncluding p&p: £2.00, UK and Europe, airmail, £2.SO. 17. Urges the Commission, in cooperation with the Portuguese authorities and international competent aid TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1968 === [PDF page 8] === organisations, to grant adequate and direct aid both in East T.imor and in the refugee camps in '.Portugal and Australia. 19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, UN organisatioos, the conference of noo-aligned nations, the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Australia. 18, Requests the Commission to give a progess report within six months. WEST PAPUA Charges against missions bring angry replies Cba.r~ by TheoCbre Frey, the Swiss pilot who fled from West Papua in April, tlat missionary air services are involved with InCbnesi.an repression in West Papua, have been hotly denied by mission leaders. Responding to let±erssentbyTAPOL readers and an open letter by Frey to the Pope, the missions argue that transporting Indonesian army personnel and cargo to remote communities does not aid Jakarta's military OCC\lpation of West Papua. The AMA reply comes in a letter from J.M. Verstegen, director of the rompany, while the reply to Frey's open letter to the:Pq:>e comes from H•.F.M. Munninghoff OFM, the Bishop of Jayqpura. Frey was a pilot with the Associated Mission Aviation, AM A, an organisation run by the four catholic dicx::eses in West Papua to supply their mission outposts. Before fleeing to Australia with his family, Frey amassed data which showed that, on many routes, at least half or more of the passengers and cargo carried by AM A were for the Indonesian government or military [see TAPOL bulletin, No. 89). Frey had observoo for himself the destructive impact of Indmesian rule on the people of West Papua, and became increasingly critical of the apparent complicity of the missions. Now, the director of AMA and the Bishop of Jayapura have acci:lsed Frey of lying about the role of the missions in West Papua. Alth:>ugh AMA doesn't usually differentiate military from civilian cargo in its statiStics, Verstegen says in a letter to a Bulletin reader that the proportioo of military cargo is very small. He says that for 1987, figures of the military share were rerorded. They amounted to 4,337 kilos in military personnel and cargo which accounted for only 0.33% of the total. The Bishop also gave a similar breakdown for January to May 1988, showing that AMA flights for the military and the police amounted to only 3 full charters plus 691 kilos and 6 passengers. AskedbyTAPOL tooommenton these figures, Frey said in response to the Bishop's letter: "Only in the Paniai region alone, I flew more than this in that time." He also disputed the AMA 1987 figures, saying that during 1987, AMA flights to Komopa, a small place near Danau Paniai, amounted in total to 34,484 kila>, of which only 18% was for the mission. Nearly 72%, or 24,828 kgs was for the governmen~ including the armed forces and the police. "I myself flew a lot of armed military people, rice for the military and all other things the military people need over there."!Frey's letter to TAPOL, 14 October 1988] Missions' role in West Papua AMA defends its role on the assumption that the much larger quantity of InCbnesian government passengers arrl cargo it carries contribute nothing to military repression in west Papua. This is far from the truth. Many civilian officials in Indonesia are former military officers, arrl routinely conduct business for the armed West Papua: The Obliteration of a People Published by: Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign Publication date: December 1988 160 pages including 7 pages of photos Price: £3.50, plus postage ISBN O 9506751 S 6 TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 9] === WEST PAPUA forces. Moreover, all levels of civilian administration a re closely linked to the equivalent level of the mili tary, and this is especially so in west Papra where civilian officials must allow for the security requirem ents of the army. Anyone on official business for the g01ernment.in West Papua is likely, directly or indirectly, to be on business for the military as well. I n resporrling tD Frey's criticisms, the missions have shown themselves tD be surprisingly naive about thei r role in West Papua. The past twenty years are replete with examples of the destructive impact of missions on isolatedtribalpeoples. West Papua is home to some of the most untouched and therefore vulnerable tribal pecples left in the worl d, and virtually all their contact with the outsi de world comes initially through the missions. Yet in their rep lies, AMA and the Bishop of Jayapura show no appreciation of tre responsibility the missions not to allow this special pa:>i,tion to be abused. Many of tie missionaries are uncbubtedly sinc:l:?reanddadicated prople who have brought worthwhile improvements to the lives of their West Papuan hosts, but this is not the case wi th rre Indonesian cpvernment. Inoonesian policy has brought untold misery to west Papuan communities through::mt tie country, from abuses and killings by soldiers to the expropriation of their land and the suppression of their traditicnal customs. In areas like the Asmat, 'opened up' by the missions but now overrun by Indonesian economic and military interests, tre welfare of the local pecpl e has declined at a horrifying rate. The racism and outright physic.al abuse of West Papuans by Indonesian officials has been noti::rl by many observers besides Theodore Frey, and the government is bent on forcing West Papua to bocome a docile Indonesian province through the obliteration of its indigenous culb.l re. always:ready to serve government and armed forces" Bishop uAMA None of this ought to be news to the missions, which have first-hand experience of Indonesia's treatment of its colony. It is extraordinary, then, that the Bishop of J.ayaJ?ura. should have ~ttacked Theodore Frey by stating rn his letter that AM A is ready, as far as it is able, to se~ the governmmt, the armed forces and the police, including replacing members of the armed forces and the police in tre interior." ["A HA - sejauh mampu - rela melaljd.ni Peme.rintah A 8 RI /Palisi, termasuk penggantian tugas anggota-a.nggot.a A 8 RI/Palisi di pos-pos pendalaman."] To date, the missions in West Papua have been subject to little international scrutiny while pilots in a position to know a great deal have chosen to keep silent for fear of losing their jobs. But now the missions have been stung by a pilot who stepped out of line and decided to expose AMA activities in support of the military rulers. Still worse, he is armed with a mass of figures to back his charges. If the missions wish to keep a better image than some of their South American• counterparts, they will need to do more than keep quiet about corrlitions in West Papua under Indcnesian rule in order to preserve their relations with the Indonesian government; and they will certainly 02ed to review their practice of brin:;Jing Indoo.esian cpvemment and military personnel into remote tribal commw1ities. If Indonesia is able to use tre infrastrucblre and trust built up by the missions in trese areas tD 'Incbnesianise', and thus de stroy the indigenous peop les, the missions will be no less r espons ible for the consequences. Theo and Martha Frey Mass arrests in West Papua According to news reaching TA POL just as this Bulletin was going to press, 145 peopl~ were arrested in September in Jayapura, the capital of West Papua. All those arrested are Papuans and consist mostly of civil servants and army and police personnel. In addition 10 students at Cendrawasih University.in Jayapura were 'kidnappe:l' by the security forces at the same time. This expression usually means that the victims were taken t.o an unkmwn destination and relatives have been unable tD ascertain their place of detention. All ten sb1dents originate from Sorong district in the western part of west Papua, known as Bird's Head. They are all said to be associates of Mecky Salc;ss.a., an OPM leader who is also from the Soron9 region. Continued from page 1 third world countries, under a programme mis-named 'social forestry'. The labourneedsoftheprojectin MeraUk.e may rely on the cheap lal:x:Jurof transmigrants whose sites have been so notoriously unsuccessful, or the importation of more Javanese, further marginalising the tribal people. Pulp factories are renown for the waste problems they cause, polluting local waterways or nearby coastal waters, depending on where the factory is sited. The Scott Paper Company is the world's largest producer of household paper products, primarily tissues and paper rowels, as well as industrial paper. It has 29 plants and mills in the US as well as manufactllring operations in seventeen other countries. In 1983, the company's sales amounted to $2,450 million. From sources in Indonesia, we have learnt that the felling. of eucalyptus trees has already begun in the area, urrler a concession held by PT Silvana Agung Lestn.ri. /\lthough these operations are illegal, they have the approval of the loca,l forestry bureau. TAPO~ recently wrote to Scott Paper in Philadelphia, express111g concern over the project. We plan to launch an action, along with other organisations, to halt this damaging project which wi ll devour the forests of Merauke and trample on the customary rights of the tribal owners of the land. TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1986 === [PDF page 10] === POLITICS The Golkar congress The na tional congre s s of Go1k.ar, the government part y which now claims a membership of 32 million Loo~ Pl~ce fn the fas t week of October. Many political observers expected a battle between the twma1or r~1 cuons but at the last moment, the conflict was defused Dy President Suharto who seems as dete1·m1n ea as ever to continue to rule Indonesia. A ~onth before the convention started, it was widely b~lieved ~t General Sudhannono, the newly appointed V.ice-P:res.ire.ntofthe Reµ:tblicand also General Chairman of Golkar since 1983, would be re-elected chairman. Sudharmono had made clear his wish to remain in the post, and President Suharto had given the green light, by stating that he had no objection to the vicepresidency and Golkar chairmanship being combined. But t-.hings moved very fast in September and October, in a way that proved fatal for the political career of Strlharmooo. Although a gereral himself, he l-as never led a military unit, having made his career in the bureaucracy. As State Secretary from 1983 to 1988, a position comparable to chief-of-staff of the White House, Sudharmonowascorrectly seen as Suharto' s main instrument in running the huge state apparatus, while Gereral Murdani, commarrling the troops, represented the other wing, the armed forces (ABRI). SudharmC110's ascendaocy as Vice-President last March was greeted withdismayandangerby the military and it was clear that se~ral groups intre army were ready to go to any lengths to prevent a further boost for the SUdharmoro grcup. It was Lieutenant-General Harsudiono Hartas, the powerful chief-of-staff for social and political affairs,. who played a leading part in bringing down &ldharmcno. Under his guidance, colonels and lieutenant-colonels were 'dropped' at provincic-il Golkar board elections, taking over as chairman or secretary in many places. By early October, it was clear that, l}ad Si.ldharmono pressed ahead with his bid for reelectirn1, he would have had a rough ride in the congress and would have faced difficulties later with many provincial boards. In the end President Suharto had no alternative but to ditch his loyal friend who had now become a very weak Link in his power game. Instead, the job went to an outsider, General Wahono. In l ate 1965, during the military takeover, Wahono was one of Suharto's close aides, as assistant for operations at Kostrad, the army strategic command which was used so effectively by Suharto to seize power. Aft.er a successful military career, Wahono moved into the bureaucracy, becoming director-general of the excise and t.ari.ffs directorate ard then amoassaror to Burma. He then became governor of East Java and in October this year, took over as Inspector-General for Development which handles the funding of so-called presidential projects, with an office in Bina Graha, the President's office. Although not a high flyer, Wahono probably realises that he was chosen by Suharto to bridge the gap between the field generals and the generals in the bureaucracy. In the event, Wahono's election went smoothly. Sudharmono officially stepped down and tre congress, in one voice, acclaimed warono as their new leader. The new and the old. General Wahono (left} and General Sudharmono. [Tempo, 15 October 1988] Sudharmono took over as chairman in 1983, there have officially been three components in Golkar, the A component (ABRJ), the B component (the bureaucracy, which mrens the civil servants' union, Korpri) and the G component (Golkar). The latter has always been the weakest, ronsistingasitdoes of civilians whose simple credo is: if you can't beat them (ie. the military) join them. The B oom,ponent, hea~d by Interior Minister: General (ret'd) Rudini., has always been top-heavy with military, and invariably takes the side of the A component Under Slrlharmono, strenuous attempts were made to strengthen the civilian component through so-called cadre-building. Golkar now claims to have nine million cadres whose main task is to mobilise the mass of people to vote for Golkar at elections. Up to the time of the 1988 congress, these cadres were under the oontrol of local, civilian Golkar functionaries. The oongress is very likely to lead to the phasing out ofthecoursemap~outby Sudharmono. The militarised leadership of many local boards will mean putting these ~adre~ unde7 military control and discipline. Army mtelltgence is well aware that with unemployment rife and social problems mounting, these cadres, if let loose, could encourage all kinds of demands and, wittingly or unw~ttingly, ignite social unrest. In charge of putting Golkar back where it belongs, in the lap of the army, is General Harsudiono Hartas. As chi.efof-staff for social. and political affairs, he is in charge of giving army officers civilian assignments. He has bren mOllingofficers into Golkar for several months acting like a shadow chairman gradually elbowin~ Sudharmono out. A new course for Golkar? After the structilral chanqes introduced when TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 11] === POLITICS Bulwark against the PKI Army spokesmen have been at pains to stress, in the past few months, that Golkar was set up in the early 1960s for the sole purpose of countering the PK I. The constant harping on this theme can only mean that many in army circles believe that Golkar, urrler Sudharmono, has been infiltrated by pro-PK! elements. Indeed, in the months p~theo::ngress, Golkar faced a number of damaging revelations with tie urearthing of alleged~ PKI members or sympathisers among the upper crust of functionaries. Effurts to discredit Golkar went so far as to include a chorus of charges about Sudharmono's own early flirtation with pro-communist organisations. The charge, made obliquely over and over again, that he was a 'pinko', referring apparently to a period in his youth when he was a member of the PKI's youth organisation Pesindo, became so persistent that he took the unprecedented step, shortly before the congress, of calling a press conference to deny this. Bereft.of his Golkar job, Sudharmooo, so recently seen as one of the regime1s most powerful figures, is now being compared to the former vice-president, retired general, Umar Wil:ahalikusumah, wh::>was never more than a deooration. In Jakarta, this is being called the 'Umarisation' of Sudharmono. Many Sudharmmo loyalists have also been removed from Golkar's central board, strengthening the A component, and reversing the trend which Sudharmono introduced, the so-called civilianisation of Golkar. The significance of Wahono' s appointment There a:veseveral conclusions that can be drawn from Wahooo'sappointmentas General Chairman. First, it is th::>ught likely that he will take over as vice-president during SUharto's next term, 1993-98, a formality that means replacing one Suharto loyalist by another. Neither S..ldharmrnonor Wah:no p::ssess any power base within the armed forces and have displayed no particular ambitions, other than serving Sunarto loyally. It appears that the option of using the vice-presidency as the steppingstone to the presidency has been put back lUltil ~e rext century, assuming Suharto lives that long and is not ousted in the meantime. At 63, waoono is older than Sudharmono and is an unlikely crown prince. Yet,, unnamed generals are now being quol:Erl as saying that., should Suharto be unable to complete his present term (call it the 'slip-in-t.hebathroom' scenario), wahoro will be the only acceptable replacement, not Sudharmono, even though he is, accon:ling to the Constitutioo, first in line. There are no signs at present that Suharto is preparing a yolil1ger man in the army as his successor. Like Franco in Spain and the Ceausescu dynasty in Romania, Suharto and his eJ<terrled family have become so intertwired with state eoonomic interests that when he steps down or dies, he will need to be sure that his successor protects the family's c...'O,tporate wealth. Developments following the ousting of Marcos and Chun Doo-hwan can only have reinforced Suharto's conviction thattheonlysafesuccessor would be romebody from his family. None of his three sons entered the army and are all successful businessmen. Only his sen-in-law, LieutenantColonel Prabowo, the son of Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, is following a military career. He is currently head of the private palace guard, and as such, is certainly being groomed by Suharto for more important things. He is in his late thirties, too young by E.a st Asian standarrls to be plunged into politics. If, as some people believe, Prabowo is the ch~en crown prince, it could be another ten years before positive moves in that directirn are taken, al ways assuming that nothing else happens in between. Re-registration of former political prisoners The Indonesian press continues to report the on-going re-registration of former political prisoners, with figures being published over and over again about the number of people in the different categories. Some of these reports suggest that Golkar and the armed forces are vying with each ether to warn local officials that they are not doing enough to control communist suspects. Parliamentarians who have visited the regions have criticised local administrations for their inadequacies in keeping tabs on ex-prisoners. The Golkar members of Commissicn II complained, for instance, that s,ooo mernbersofbanredor;ganisations reoorded in the district of Pati in 1977 were no longer recorded in 1982, and a sirnilarnumber"almostdisappeared'.in Boyolali. Another CX)mplaint was that former prisoners in Central Java were issuad travel passes witlx:>ut recording the destination. 10 Elsewhere, they were issued ider\tity q;i.l::IJ.s improperly. The MPs also reported.apathy amongp~le living in the neighbourhood of e:x:-prisoners,. particularly in the larger cities. There was lack of awareness of" the need to encourage people to control former political prisoners living in their mid$t. The armed forces grrup complained of w.eak s llJ?ervision of ex-prisooers in Jakarta as.a result of their "high degree of mobility'', their efforts to <;:over.their tracks and obtain new identity cards, while n~ighbourhood associations were insufficiently aware of the need to keep the ex-prismers ttn1er oontrol. (suara Pemba.ruan, 6 September] Reports like this reveal that there lias been no let-up in the campaign to keep up the pressure on ex-prisoners and anyone suspected of furmer communist sympathies.I,( TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 12] === EXECUTIONS More executions Two more prisoners who were sentenced to death twenty years acp for their involvement in the events of October 1965 have been executed. The executions took place near Jakarta on the night of 15 October. As with previous executions, there was no official announcement,. nor would the authorities confirm or deny reports tliat the executions had taken place. But after protests in Holland, the executions were reported in two Jakarta weeklies, Tempo and Editor. The two men are: Sukardjq sixty-one years old, and Gijadi Wignyosuharjo, sixty years old. Trey were bct:h members of the Cakrabi.rawa Pal.ace Guam at tl.e time of their arrest. Suk.ardjo was arrested on 5 October 1965. He was evenb.lally tried by the Jakarta Military Tribunal in March 1969 and found guilty of the murder of Major-General Pandjaitan, one of six generals kidnapped and murdered on 1 October 1965. Giyadi was arrebi:Edon4 October 1965 and sentenced in April 1968 for "having pulled the trigger" on General Yani on 1 October. They are the first to be executed of eight members of the PQ!ace Guard who were sentenced to death. Their executions place the lives of the other six men in extreme danger. EEC states call for no more · executions Thel2 member states of the European Community took joint action against the executions. Replying to a letter from TA.POL sent as soon as news of the executiooshad been rereived, the Foreign Office wrote: "We too were alarmed to hear about the executions of Sukardjo and Wignjosuhardjo. The Twelve countries of the £ l' have made anew demarche, voicing their deep regret and disappointment at the executions and appealing to the Indonesian authorities to abstain from further executions on humanitarian grounds." In Indonesia, the executions were condemned by H.J.C Princen, chair of the League for the Defence of Human Rights: "Executing a death sentence so long after the verdict is a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5 of which prohibits cruel, degrad.in:J and inhuman treatment. To live for so long in uncertainty is an exceptionally inhuman form of torture," he said. Amnestyinternaticnal has written to President Suharto deploring the executions and expressing concern for the safety of all those silll under sentence of death. Jakarta tries to explain The two executions took place two weeks before Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch Prime Minister, went on an official visit tb Indonesia. As a result of widespread protest in Hollandandofmanyquestions in Parliament,. Lubbers was forced to agree to protest aboot the executioos during his visit to Indonesia. The many judicial murders perpetrated by Jakarta in the past four years have aroused strong feelings:in Holland ever s:ince Mohamad Munir, the trade union lead=r, was executed in May 1985 after more than a decade witrout any etecutic:ns taking place. In 1980, the Dutch Foreign Minister, van der Klauw, was given an assurance by the Ind:uesian government tlut no further executions would take place. At the time, the lawyer Buyung Nasution warned against giving credence to any such assurance, as long as the death sentences. had not been rommulted. His words of caution have been rompletely vindicated. One view widely held in Holland is that Jakarta carried out the latest executions just before the Lubbers visit in order to show its contempt for mternational opinion. In any case, Suharto had every reasm to be sure that the Dutch government would not allow the politically-motivated murder of two men tD stand in the way of expanding Dutch commercial and investment interests in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it was tre campaign in the Netherlands that forced government leaders to speak publicly about the exeC'Utions. There were even attempts to make the long delay samd like an act of humanity, not a cruel act of eecuting men who had spent most of their adult lives in prison. In his meeting with Prime Minister Lubbers, President Suharto said tlat the two men had bem given a long time to live "in order to give them a chance to show an expression of regret. They were executed because they Left to right: Liem s.L., TAPOL, ti.S. Diredja, for Indonesian refugees, and W. Jurg, Dutch Indlnesia Cornmtttee, showing the list of death-sentence prisoners, at a press a:nference. [De waarheid, 27 Octnber 1988] TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 11 === [PDF page 13] === Committee and of its foreign affairs department. Arrested in February 1969 and sentenced in March 1971. EXECUTIONS did not regret their deE.'ds." (Jakarta Post, 1 November 1988] But Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had a different explanation. Acrording to him, the executions were delayed ba:::ause the appeals p:ri::x::roure is time-consuming and Indooesia does not have enough judges and court officials to hamle cases quickly. ''To describe this as a major human rights problem, to call it shocking (the word used publicly by Prime Minister Lubbers) and inhuman is a bit far-fetched. It is all the work of some so-called human rights NG Os, whipping up an antiIndooesia campaign." Asked whether it was not too much for~ men to have wait.ed more than twenty years on death row for their clemency plea to be answered, Alat.as said: ''It wasn't only the clemency plea. More evidence was needed from the men in other cases, some of them very far from Jakarta, in Medan, Bali and Sulawesi." [Interview on AVRO televisioJ'\. 2 November] As for the Indooesian ambassador in The Hague, he tried t.o put a brave face on it: "The <;PVemment behaved very humanely indeed by waiting twenty years be£ore carrying out the death sentence." [ Editor, 29 October} Two Muslims also executed? According to Amnesty International, two Muslim death sentence prisoner may also have been executed. One is Abdullah Uma~ 39 years old, who was given a life sentence in February 1985; the sentence was later changed to death, on appeal by the prosecutor. The other is BambangS.i.spoyo, also 39 years ol°* who was sentenced to death in June 1985. Amnesty believes that Abdullah Umar may have been 6'ecuted.in April this year arrl Bambang Sispoyo may have been executed in June or July. Both men were being held at Nusakembangan Prison Island, in Central Java. [AI document. ASA 21/17 /88] Regarding these two cases, the Foreign Office wrote in its letter to TA POL: "The Indonesians have not yet confirmed the executions of Abdullah Umar and Bambang Sispo:yo, althcugh it is generally believed that these did take plc.o:! abrut two months ago. We have asked our Embassy to seek further in.formation urgently." Eleven men still await their fate Following the deaths in prison during the past year of.Rasw ad and Suw andi, who had both been under sentence of death for many years, there remain eleven men under sentence of death, all of whom have been in prism for very many }'ears. Four were leading members of the Communist Party (PKI); six were members of the Cakrabiraw a Palace Guard and the seventh was in the air force. They are: *Asep SUryaman, 62, a member of the PKI's 'special bureau', alleged tn have been an intelligence unit which infiltrated the army. Arrested in September 1971 and sentenced in 1975. * SatarSuryantD, 57, Cakrabirawa. Arrested in October 1965 and sentenced in April 1971. * I Bungkus, 61, Cakrabhawa. Arrested in October 1965 and sentenced in July 1971. *!:W:oro, 60, Cakrab.irawa. Arrested in October 1965 and sentenced in October 1970. * Athanasllls Buarg, 49, Cakrabi:rawa. Arrested in October 1965 and sentenced in November 1969. * Simon Petrus Soleiman, 60, Cak.rabirawa. Arrested in October 1965 and sentenced in November 1969. * Norbertus Rohayan, 49, Cakrabirawa. Arrested in October 1965 and sentenced in November 1969. * Marsudi, 53, a sergeant-major in the air force. Date of arrest net. known, probably late 1965. Sentenced in 1976. Continued from page 24 in from Java. According to official figures, at least 40,000 transmigrants from Java were re-settled in the Moluccas from 1979 to 1985 but the figure is probably much higher. In May this year, Moluccan villagers were said to have been respcnsible for the deaths of nine Javanese transmigrants in Riring, Ceram, following a land dispute. Names of the detainees Several of those arrested are thought to be leaders of the old RMS movement. They are: Michel Watl:i.mena, 67, a funnerdiaitinanofthe RMS; Simon Werinussa, arrestedln Kariu, Haruku Island, as well as his two sons, Luis, a policeman, and Butje, a lawyer; Jolm Toumahq alleged vice-chairman of the RMS and secondary school teacher; and Ju,rn.is Pasanea, 60, who was sentenced to 14 years imprisooment inthel970s on RMS-related charges. Along with Pasanea, David Kaihenq. 58, and his t.wQ sons, Martin, 32, and Samuel,:28, were also arrested. one. of the detainees, Pieter Nassarany, 34, a secondary-school reaclerfrom Piruon Ceram Isl.a,rd, was apparently ou his way to Holland when arrested by the military police in Arnbon on 13 July. * Ruslan Wijayasastra, 71, a member of the P KI Central Committee and a leader of the Peasants' Union (BTI). Arrested in February 1969 and sentenced in April 1972. Suk~ 6 0, chair of the PK I's:youth organisation, Perni.rla Rakyatarrlon the PKI Central Committee. Arrested in July 1968 and sentenced in March 1971. * Iskarrlar Subekti., 67, a member of the PK! Central T APOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 14] === HUMAN RIGHTS Kopkamtib gives way to Bakorstanas Kopkamtib, the Operati01al Command for the Restoration of Seairicy and Order, the first creation of General Suharto as he rose to power in October 1965, has now been disbanded. The Command was set up to wipe out the InCbresian Communist Party which was a major social and political force at the time. over the years, it has served the Suharto regime as its key instrument to destroy political opponents. It has been used not only against alleged communist suspects and student activists, but also and increasingly in the past decade, against Muslim preachers and activists. The strucb.rre of Kopkamtib Kopkamtib was a target of government critics as an uncx:mstitutional body with unlimited powers to detain and arrest pa:>ple. Said at first to be 'temporary', it remained in existence for nearly a quarter of a century. Since 1965, there have been the following changes in the leadership of Kopkamtib's command structure: 2 October 1965 Commander, General Suharto March 1969 Commander, General Maradan Panggabean Depucy Commander, General Soemitro March 1971 Commander, General Soemitro Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Sudomo Early 1974 Commander, General Suharto Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Sudomo March 1978 Commander, Admiral Sudomo Chief-of-Staff, General Yoga Sugama (till 1980) Chief-of-Staff, General wijoyo Sujono, 1980-1983 March 1983 - September 1988 Commander, General Benny Murdani Suharto becomes commander again The military are still in control, under Bakorstanas, Kopkamtib's reincarnation. [Jakarta Post. 6 October] It never had an existence separate fran the army and its operations were carried out by the army's command structure. Army regicnal commanders bore the additional title of Laksusda, meaning 'special regional executive officer', who carried out the instructions of the Kopkamtih commarrler. The word Laksusda became part of the language of repression, referring both to the officer himself and his corps of agents swooping down on suspects from whichever part of the political spectrum currently being targetted. The new agency is called Bako:rstanas, short for Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional, or Coordination Board to Help Solidify National Stability. As the name suggests, it is a 'board' not a •oommand' with a 'chairman' instead of a 'commander'. But, to quote Admiral Sudomo, "the Board will be directly under the President. It will be I'()fl-structural, with the task of giving advice to the President." [Tempo, 12 November] What this means is that Suharto is now, again, the commander, as he was in the late 1960s and the mid 1970s. '!he permanent members of Board are the chiefs-of-staff of the army, navy and air force and the chief of police, the armed forces chief-of-st.aff for social and political affairs, the secretaries of the three ministercoordinators, and senior-ranking officials from the Attorney-General's Office and Bakin, the intelligence coordinatioo. board. The chairman of the Board is the armed forces commander-in-chief, General Try Sutrisno. The Board will be served by a secretariat which is composed of virtually the entire general staff of the armed forces. The c csmetic nature of the change is barely coocealed. It will have its offioe at armed forces headquarters and will be at the pinnacle of a network of regional boards called Bakorstanasda wrose com~itions will mirror the central board, with the additicn of military commanders and police chiefs at district and sub-district levels. The Bakorstanasda will be under the chairmanship of the regional military commanders. TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 13 === [PDF page 15] === HUMAN RIGHTS Bow Bakorst.anas will work Although the Boord and its secretariat are so topheavy with military personnel, G cneral 'I'ry Sutrisno declared, after the Board's first meeting: ''It is not a military organisation but a non-structural organisation". He also said that the Laksusda will cease to exist. However, this should not be taken as meaning that the army has relinquished its role as the security force. What has happened is that the additional layer of Kopkamti.b and Laksusda which exercise:i specia 1 powers vested in the army, has been removed; these special powers will now be vested directly in the hands of the anny witrout any intervening agency. Hence. Bakorstanas nee:is no command structllre of its own and can afford to describe itself as "non-structural". When asked whether the elimination of the Laksusda post function would mean officers in the regions losing some of their powers, General Sutrisno said: "Not at all. It is our noble (sic) intention to make sure th~t each institution arrl functionary should perform. ~el.r proper function. '!'he regional and. lo~l mill~ry comrnards are going to have their territorial functions enhanced." Regardingpowersofdetenti.onandarrest, he explained that criminal cases woold be left to the police and the public prosecutors to han:Ue. (This has indeed always been the position.) "But if the seeds of a case could lead to disrupt.ion of stability, then of course, other security forces will take charge." While he was not specific about who these other securicy forces were, he could ooly have meant the army. Asked who would handle the "latent communis~' danger until now handled by Kopkamtib or Laksusda, Sutrism said that "Bakorstanas will have special staff to deal with th:i.s. They will coordinate implementation of this task with government departments and the public, while within the armed forces, the territorial apparatus will deal with this as weu.•· Although Sutrisno said it would take time for regulations guiding the new system to be drafted, he made it clear that some Kopkamtib regulations would c..."Ontinue to be used. "Those that are relevant will remain in force; some will need their terminology to be amenood and those rn longer relevant will be revoked." The 'clean-self' and 'clean-environment' witch-hunt Admiral Sudomo, one-time commarrler of the security agency, Kopkamtib, and now Minister-Coordinator for Social and Political Affairs, has recently been trying hard to clear up what he considers to be widespread confusion over the applicability of the criteria now used to prevent people from seeking employment on the groun:ls of their own or their family's alleged involvement in the so-called 'coup attempt' of 1965 or for alleged membership of or association with the PKI, alleged to have master-minded the 'coup attempt'. For years now, as we have frequently reported, people ha~ been required tn attest not only to their own 'noninvolvemene or cleanliness, but also to prove that noone in their 'environment', that is to say, blood relatives and in-laws, was involved either. Hence the currency of the expressions 'bersih diri' or clean-self, and 'bersih lingkungau' or clean-environment. But the use of the 'bersih-lingkungan' criterion c.ame under fire from Interior Minist.er, General Rud.ini, following a spate of accusations levelled against people in positions withingovenunent or in Gollcar because of family ti.es with former prismers or communist suspects. He rornplaimrl of"unwarranted and unna:essary excesses". He disli.ke:i the term 'clean-environment' and said both terms had arisen from the public itself. At the heart of the present fuss is the fact that many aspiring Golkar functionaries are now discovering that 'unclean' persons in their family circles are becoming an obstacle to their ambitions. No-one questions the system of discrimination itself and the witch-hunting which it has eng:mdered. No-one has rome to the defence of the real victims, the ex-prismers and their close relatives who have for many years borne the political stigma of 'involvemene. Both Su<bmo and ROOini insist that there is m mention in any of tre regulations in force of the terms 'bersihdiri' and 'bersih-lingkungan'. Nevertheless, it is widely koown that 'bersih-diri' certificates known by the initials SKBD (Surat l(eterangan Bei:sih Oiri) and Surat K. et.erangan Bersih lingk.ungan certificates, known as SK BL, are required for people applying for many jobs. These certificates were also required of. all can:lidates nominated for the 1987 general elections. With the help of recent statements by Sudomo, it is now possible to e><amine the origins of this policy. The orig.ins of 'clean-environment' In a statementthat was widely reported in the press [see Kompas andJakartaPost9 September, for example], Su<'bmo explained tha~ up until 1980, discriminatory practices againsttheemploymentof ·~ta.pols' or, more T APOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 16] === broadly, 'ex-PKI' people, were based on a Kcpkamtib decree requiting all persons applying for jobs in the government sector or in 'vital' private enterprises to have 'non...involvementcertificates' confirming that they were not involved in tlY3 alleged 1965 'c.'Oup attempt' nor HUMAN RIGHTS tmse in government service or seeking jobs with the government, screening of the family background would continue to be tie same as for the armed forces although there wruldrow begreateremphasis on the person's own character. Each case would be oonsidered 01 its merits. This screening also applies to anyone presently working in, or applying for jobs in, state enterprises, anyone in the teaching profession, the political parties and Golkar (not clear whether he means functionaries or members as well), the press, puppeteers (dalang), village heads, legal aid bureaus and the clergy. 'l'o avoid unnecessai:y public recriminations, he asked members of the pub lie to report "suspicious or unusual" family ties of present or aspiring government employees to the authorities so that they could be "properly investigated". "Once a communist...." Tempo, 12 November 1988 were they (alleged) members of the now-banned PKI or associ9,ted organisations. Modificaticns in the 'non-involvement certificate' regulations wece introduced in 1975, and in 1976, a gcwemmmt regulation stipulated that only persons never:involved in movements in oppcsition to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitntion could become civil servants. According to a regulation introduced in January 1980, 'non-involvement certificates' were no longer required for persons who were under 12 years of age in 1965, it being recognised that they "were too young to know anything" at the time. These modifications "did not lessen the need to carry out 'mental and ideological' screening of anyone applying for jobs with the goveniment or in the 'vital' private sector," said suoomo. In June 1982, Kopkamtib issued an Implementary Insti;uction [Pet.unjuk Pelak sanaan] which stated that the screening of applicants for jobs in the state sector should "include an assessment of the applicant with regard to environment (lingkungan) concerning personal identity and family backgroW1d, including place of residence and social links". SUdomo has now speltoutin detail the nature ·of this family background assessmenb "This assessment includes, among others, the famillJ environment, siblings, dominant or ve'I:IJ influential relations influencing the person's outlook, behaviour and mental-ideological attitude as the result of family ties, feelings of gratitude, intimacy, similarity of aspirations and outlook, and so on. lncluded in dominant relations are: parents' t.ies with their children, parents-in-law's ties with their sons or daughters-inlaw1 grandparents with grandchildren whom they have brought up, uncles, aunts, older brothers oi; sistei;s who paid foi; t.he person's education, anyone who supported the person for a reasonably long period of time; wives with husbands and the reverse; the specific nature of the person's social surcoundjngs which may have colouced the persons's attitude. "This is what subsequenUy became popularllJ known as 'bersih-lingkungan' and 'bersih-diri', althougl1 these terms were not used in the 1982 document." Sudomo rec:ognised the need for these implementary instructions to be "revitalised', and has since promised that new regulations regarding 'bersih-diri' and •bersih-lingkungan' will soc:n be issued. For members of the armed forces, a totally 'clean' family background will continue to be unconditional, he said. But for A few weeks afrer making this statement, Sudomo denied that the modifications in the screening process which would roan be introduced meant that the government is "getting soft'' on communists. "Even though. they have spent time in prison, their ideology is unchanged." Naticnal vigilance. continues to be essential.... The governmenes attitude towards PKI remnants has never changed. "If they were involved, they were involved and there's an end to it!" The names of people involved in the PKI movement,. he said, would never be erased till their dying day. [Suara Ka:rya. 1 October] The press has meanwhile been full of reports about the on-going witch-hunt.. *Information Minister Harmoko bas been the most vociferous, saying on many occasions that no-one from the PKI n1aywork inthe press. "The government will act without hesitation, revoking the publishing licence of TAPOL Occasional Reports Series No. 1 Exchange of Messages with Fretilin commander, Gusmao Xanana With Lotd Avebw:y, chair, Parlla1nentary Human Rights G:r:a:ipatrl Carmel BOOiardjo, 'fAPOL Organising Secretary. No. 2 Joint statement by Unicn of Democratic TiJnorese and Fretilin,, March 1986 No. 3 Reactiats from Indooesia to Transmigration campaign Ind:mesi.an press clippings reacting to too campaign by Survival International and 1:Al'OL. No. 4 TA POL Statanent en East Timar In ttie UN Conunittre of 24, Auqust l 986 No. 5 The 1987 Indonesian Election in East Tirnor An analysis written by TAPOL. No. 6 Tl\POJ, StatanEtt.cn East Timar In tie UN Committee of 24, August 1987 No. 7 July 1987 St.atementon the Joint Decision of tl-e Chairman of the Supreme Court and M.ln.ister ot Justice. By lkadiI\. the Ihdon1>.sian Lawyers' AsSOciation. No. 8 World Bank maintains support fur Transmigration SUIVival Intemational and TA POL write to Wodd Bank, 22 January 1988. Copies from TJ\POL, BO pence a ccpy, including postage. TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 15 === [PDF page 17] === HUMAN RIGHTS any publication that ignores this warning." This applies both "to ~PKI as well as to their children" he said. [Tempo, 15 October) * Tempo itself was given a 'stem warning' because it published a letter from the lawyer, Oey Tjoe Tat. a former political prisoner. "Wittingly or unwittingly, it allowed its columns to be used to voice the opinion of a member of Baperki which is a banned organisaticn." * The Information Ministry announced that it had discovered 37 employees regarding whom there are indications of involvement in the 1965 events and the PKL while regarding arother 14 there were indications of an 'unclean-environment'. Some have been dismissed, and others shifted to other posts. (Kompas, 30 September] * Six teachers in Jakarta who were discovered to have been ex-prisooers, including one who was even a head teacher, have now been shifted to other jobs. [suara * The chairman of the trade union federation, the SPSI, Iman Sudarwo respcnded to worries that communists may have gained positicus in trade union branches lil the plantation sa::tor. He stressed that the 'cleanenvironment.' criterion is the top priority in selecting functionaries throughout the SPSI. [&Jara Pemba.rl.lfil'\ 21 September) * FollowingaVisittoa number of provinces, Commission I of Parliament reported that an unspecified number of ~mentemployees in Central Java have been dismissed for failing to have 'clean-environment' certificates 'e.x-PKI' people had managed, by concealing their identity, to penetrate an (unnam~ institute. When asked how many people were involved, he refus~ to give details. He said only that he was not worried about security risks as these people were urrler close watc~. "Our officers are always able to detect.their whereaboots" because "they have all been entered into a political organisation which makes it easy for us tD keep an eye on them." He refused to name the organisation. He also said that there are 58 A-category political prisoners still in prison in East Java. Besides, there are 4,291 B-category perSOls, 12,949 C-category persons and 426,916 persons required to report regularly to the authorities. Reporting requirements for some of the latter group have been lifted "but they continue to be under surveillance". [Jawa Pos, 7 October] * The West Java branch of the lawyers' organisation, Ikadin, fully supports a decision by the Hi?h Coort to revoke the licence to practice of an Ilcadin member, identified only as YLK, who was discovered to have been a former PKI member. As soon as Dcadin heard rumours aboot y LK, they sumrnorm him to strip him of membership, but he had already resigned. [ Pedoman Rakyat, 15 September] It has also been armounced th~t seve7a1 public prosa::utors have been dismissed after discoveru:ig that members of their family were formerly involved in the PKI. [Jawa Pos, 28 September] * Only 9,000 o..it of 175,000 government employees who were classified in 1974 as C2 and C3 suspects still remain in their jobs. Admiral Sudomo has often explained that, under a Kopkamtib regulation in 1975, persons in these categories were allowed to keep their jobs incivil service, with the proviso tha.t they did not hold 'strategic' positions, that they were under constant surveillance and that they would be replaced as soon as possible. Sudomo offered no explanation for the huge drcp in numbers except to say that "some have died, and so on". [Kompas, 9 September] * 616 ex-ta.pols from Java are now said to be living as transmigrants in various parts of South Sumatra. They were moved after "extremely careful selection" over the period from 1967 to 1987 (an apparent breach of the rule thatex-tapols are not allowed tD become transmigrants). Colonel Soemarsono, the chief of social and political affairs in the provlilce, said that for ·the past 20 years, they have shown no signs of suspicious or antiPancasila behaviour but any mOITes they make in or out of the sites where they live must be closely monitored. They should not be allowed to leave their village without the permission of the village head, and whenever they stay away from home, they must explain what they did while they were away. (Kompas, 1 November] ~ Political prisoo.ers before release were all required to pledge allegiance to the Pancasila. Here they are seen ata ceremony lil September 1978, in Semarang. Now, the autb:>rities make a mockery of their own rules. (SKBL). In Blitar, East Java, they discoV'ered that the children of ~prisoners are unwilling to go on to high school because they know they will not be able to get 'clean-self' or 'clean-environment' certificates (SKBD and s KB L) and therefore will not find work. [K edaulat.an Rakyat, 6 Septem~r) Indonesia Publications For subscriptions information on Indonesia News Service, and other publications regarding Indonesia, please write to: Indonesia Publications 7538 Newberry Lane, Lanham-Seabrook MD 20706 * In East Java, the military commander, Major-General S\.Igen:J SUbroto, told members of the same Commission that 16 Br:i.efing Bex>ks TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 U.S.A. === [PDF page 18] === Nazi-style snooping and the Muslim trials In the trial of Farid Madj.id, a teacher from Madura, identified in our last Bulletin only by his initials, the prosecutor has dem<mded a sentence of six years. The accused is cne of a group of seven persons all of whom are to be tried. They met weekly at a religious gathering (penga:jian) as Muhamaddiyah members. Farid Madjid, 42, is a teacher at a.r eligious Tsanaw iyah scrool, Pondok Pesantren Al Amien in Sumenep, on the island of Madura. He also gave lessons on the subject of Pancasila Morals. According to the prosecutor, H. Moch. Ali Sabtn, the group distributed leaflets in order to:influence the pub lie. One was entitled, "Wake up before it's too late" and included such statements as "Your government is heading tDwards dictatorial absolutism. The people are being forced. to accept the sole principle unconditiooally." (This is a reference to the Pancasila which must now be accepted as the mly belief for all social and political organisations.) The way Farid was arrested is typical Nazi-style snooping. As a teacher, he often made critical remarks about the gpvemment, saying it was worse than the Sukarno government, that many high officials were corrupt, and that members of parliament were appointed, not elected. Someone who atteooed his lessons reported these rema:rks tD the lo::::al military mit who gave him a tape-recorder to record Farid in class. These tapes led to his arrest., He wasqootedassay.ingthat Golkar people were nottD be trusted, that }:he PPP was hypocritical and that the third party, P DI, had the wrong ideology. He therefore urged people to.m t to vote for any of the parties and leave their voting papers blank. In c.uurt, Farid did not deny any of this. but did deny that it was subversive. ''I am not agajnst the Pancasila," he told the court. Amnesty adopts Farid Amnesty Internationp.l has decided to adopt Farid as a prisoner of conscienee and has called on the Inoonesian g::wernment to release him immediately and to investigate Far.id Madjid wilh his lawyer during the trial. [Editor, 3 September] allegations that one of the witnesses in his trial was tortured. This refers to the alleged leader of the group, Haji Sahlan Syakh who was reportedly beaten, kicked and then given electric shoe}cs while being interrogated by an intelligence officer of the local military command, in his capacity as Laksusda. Sahlan is said to have eventually agreed to accept the 'sole principle' even though he maintained that he had never rejected it in the first place. According to Amnesty, Sahlan and the other five men were releaserl in February this year but reports persist that the men will also be tried. Sources: Editnr, 13 August 1988, and AI document ASA 21/16/88. TAP()L's Muslim Trials book banned The book published by TAPOL last year, Indonesia, Muslims on Trial has been banned ·by the Attorney General. We only became aware of the barrfrom a clipping reporting that the head of the Pematang Siantar office of the Department of Educaticm referred to the ban and made public the names of five books, incltrling the TA POL title, which were banned from use in schools in the region. All schools were instructed to rep:>rt to the Attomey...General if they foondanyonepo;sessing, storing or using any of the banned books. According to the report, all five books are circulating in schools in the region. This comes as a surprise to us. As far as we krow, 01 ly a very limited number of copies have reached Indcnesia. It may well be, however, that photocopies are circulating. The other four banned books are: R:iiual Jahiliyah yanJ Ha.tam by H~ Alam Pikiran Kekeluargaan by Joes::>ef Ratman, Kembali Kepada Allah yang H.idup di Bumi, and Iman dan Amal by Surya. Source: Waspada, 1 September 1988.~ TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 17 === [PDF page 19] === POLITICS Pig-fat scare is subversive, says Sudomo A nationwide scare that some popular processed fcxxls rontain pig-fat or lard has caused turmoil among Muslims and forced leading companies to close down factories producing the suspect products. Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Cc.ordinator for Social and Political Affairs, has now pronounced this a case of subversion, alleging that "rightists or. leftists have tried to instigate Muslims into burning down factories producing the suspect foods, and disrupting political stability''. Since there have been r.o press reports about factories being burnt down, it must be assumed that the press was told not to report the incidents. The scare began irmocently enough with a scientific report by Dr Tri Susanto from the Food Technology Department of Brawijaya University, East Java, on the lard, alcoh::>l, shortening. and gelatine content of a number of brands. Alth::>ugh it was an internal sb.ldy, a section of the report was circulated with an additional page said to have been the work of a hitherto unkoown group called Muslim Al F allah Scholars. 'Iheeffectwas devastating. Several wen-known brarrls, including Dancow Milk, jointly produced by Nestle and Bimantara, a company owned by the Suharto family, and Indomie, a product of Liem Sioe Liong, a business associate of Suharto's, were severely hit. Companies have run frrot::-pa~ ads prcclaim:ing their products hal(ll and Suharto made a statement to calm people's fears. Now Harmoko, the Information Minister, and Admiral Sucbm~ have warned the press to refrain from reporting anything more about the issue. They allege that t;he 'pig-fat' scare could get out of hand and lead to racial riots against the Chinese community. Three dailies 'under investigation' Three dailes, Pelita, Berl.ta Buana and Jaw a Pos, have been given stern reprimands for publishing what are regarding as provocative reports about the 'pig-fat' issue and have been warned that their licences could be revoked if they repeat their mistakes. These are the papers that first published the story. Minister-Coordinator, Admiral Sudomo has also announced that the government has launched an investigation to discover why these papers started publishing the report. "We want to find out who manipulated the findings of Dr 'l'ri Susant:o's sb.ldy and who made it possible for this to be reported in the press." [Jakarta Post and Kompas, 16 November] ~ For the sake of uniformity Once again, read-scarves worn by Muslim girls at school have led to discriminatory measures against pupils. The head of SMAN-I, a senior high school in Bogor, West Java, sent a letter in August to the parents of 26 sch::>ol-girls, objecting to their daughters wearing headscarves at school. The head said that wearing headscarves conflicts with regulatioos from the Department of Education regarding the way children may dress at school, even tho\,lgh in every other respect they obeyed regulations regarding the wearing of sch::>ol uniform. As a result, 17 of the girls decided to conform and refrain from wearing their scarves at sch::>ol. Two decida:1 to leave the school. (This is as reported by Tempo. According to Jawa Pos, 6 October, all the 19 girls left the sch::>ol.) The other seven decided to fight the prohibit.ioo by b.lrning up at school wearing their scarves. The teachers exerted pressure by simply ignoring them and behaving as if they were not there. Althcugh they attended classes, they were given no homework, were not allowed to take part in practical activities am were prevented from taking examinations. S:ix of the girls have r.ow decided to file a civil suit, and have approached the Legal Aid Instib.lte (L BH) in J ak.arta for help. The case against the head-teacher, Ngatijo, is soon to be heard by the Bogor District Court. [ Tempq 22 October] Nursyahbani Kacasungkana, director of the Jakarta LBH, will fight the case, aloog with two other lawyers. 18 Four of the Muslim girls who have filed a suit against their head-teacher. (Tempo, 22 October 1988] In 1984 and 1985, the controversy over head-scarves resulted in a number of schools-girls in Jakarta and Bandung beinj moved from state to private scrools. But this is the first time it has been taken to court.* TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 20] === THE 1965 AFFAIR Suharto's role in the G30S Theevmtsof Octnber 1965 which brought General Suharto to power are today a matter ot consiqerable attention in Indonesia. Suharto's claim that the kidnap and murder of six army generals early on 1 October 1965, the so-called 'coup attempt', was inspired and engineered by the Indcnesian Communist Party (PI< J), is the most sacred of all New Order dogmas. There are signs however that Suharto's version is beqil1ning to wear thin. seem to be trying to reveal a 11 facts and significance surrrunding it. They are still comb:ing the depths to discover the unknown truth." [ Merdeka, 30 Sept.ember 1988, as reproduced in Indonesia News Service,. No 147, November l 988J The paper was severely reprimanded arrl the journalist who wrci:e the editorial was sacked. But the editorial tells us a lot about what pecple are discussing these days in Inc:bnesia behind closed doors. Suharto: ''I took power consti.tntionally The current politio:U shifts in Indonesia are closely linked to the succession, a matter of great importance t;o the leader of any dictatorial regime faced with the prospectt,hathis m.isoeeds may atlastcome under public scrutiny. In SuhartD's case, he needs not only to protect his fam.ily' s corporate fortune amassed by the abuse of state privilegei he also needs to preserve his role in history as the man who came to power not by violence but by constitutional means. In particular, he needs tn stifle growing suspicions in Ind:mesia that it was he who engineered the plot that decimated the army's general staff, leaving him the only powerful general in a position 1;o seize power from Sukarno. On 30 S€ptemberthis year, the Jakarta daily, Merdeka, published an editorial ent:itled "Re-tracing history" which indirectly quest;i.oned the official version. The editorial referred to the events of 23 years ago not as the G30S/PKI, the official acronym which inseparably links the '30 September Movement' (the G30S) to the PK I, but simply as the G30S. It said: "Reviewing the bac)<gramd, interactions, and consequences of the G 308, we find that there were complicated interactions and contradictions such that the. mind cannot easily digest them. Historians to this day are still searching and examining this big event that brought about dramatic, extroorclinary developments in the national scene. They SpeakingonS Oct:oPer, Armed Fo:rces Day, Suharto said the armed forces needed to review all their experiences before 1966 and ro oorrect them. "This is the background to the birth of the New Order which, from the start, we fought for by democratic and constib.lt:i.cnal means." He returned to the same theme a month later when he denied that the events leading to the c:bwnfall of Sukarno had been unconstitutional. "There wa~ no covert coup by the Inc:briesian army." Nor did the 11March1966 Instruction Ornown by t;he acronym, Supersemar) have anything -t o do with efforts to bring cbwn Sukarno. "The birth of this Instruction did not come about by force of arms, as if Bung K arno (the late president) was coerced into signing i~'. (For readers who are unfamUiar with this evmt, the Supersemar, by which Sukarno surrerrlered state power to Suharto, was a document placed before Sukarno for his signature by Generals Amir Machmud, Achrna:i Jusuf and Basuki Rachrnat, all close allies of Suharto. The generals Visited Sukarno in Bogor on the afternoon of 11 March 1966, just after he left a cabinet meeting at the President's Palace in great haste and flew by helicopter to his Bogor residence, on being informed fuat tre P~ was surrounded by heavily-armed unidentified troops. Sukarno rushed from the meeting in such a hurry that he ran in bare fee~ leaving his shoes under the table.) Suharto said that people abroad still harbour erronE:QJ.s ideas about the events of 11 March 1966. The source of such ideas is near at hand, right here at home, he said. "'!hey are being spread overseas.'' [ Te.mpq. 12November1988] Suharto also referred to the "Cornell Peper'', an early analysis of the 1965 events, published in 1971, which was written by two Cornell University Indcnesianists, Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey, which rejected the official claim of PK I's complicity. A Iiew White Book It was recently announced that a White Book on the events of 1965 is soon to be published by the State Secretariat. This will not be the first time the regime has published its version of the events that led to Suharto's. seizure of power. In the early 1970s, a book written by two generals, the late Nugroho Notcsusanto, a historian, and the laywer Ismael Saleh who is now sei:ving his secarl term as Minister of Justice, set out to prove thlt tie October 1965 events were engineered by T APOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 19 === [PDF page 21] === THE 1965 AFFAIR the PKI. Their main evidence was a 'confession' by Njcno, a rne:nberoftle PKI Polli:bureau, who was tried at the beginning of 1966, the first of many PKI leaders to be brc::ught to trial. Njono was sentenced to death and executed many years ago. But the authors had some difficulty with th.is evidence, not least because Njono retracted the 'ronfession' during his trial. In September 1986, several articles were published in Sinar HarapaJl. based on a lengthy interview of three men who playerl the key role in staging the political trials ba::k in the 1960s. The three men, who were then colonels and are now retired army generals, were: Ali Said, chairman of the Supreme Court, who in 1965 was on the staff of the army's legal department and who interrogated many PKI prisoners, including Njmo: Dunnawel Achmcrl, now a retired rusinessman but in 1965 also amemberoftheteam thatinrerrogated Njono, who claimErl to have stayed with Njono day and night in his cell in order to win his confidence; and Tahir, until Ocl:nberthisyearinsp::ctor-General for Development, who in 1965 was dep.tty chainnan of the Central Investigation Team in charge of interrogating PKI prisoners. The three men were at pains to prove that Njono's confession, which they extracted soon after Njono was in order to rebuff a statement Sukarro had recen.tly made describing the events of October 1965 as nothing r:io~~ than "a ripple in the mighty ocean of the revolution · Thereafter, Suharto began to use his special powers, whichheobt:aired from President Sukarno on 4 December 1965 to convoke the Extraordinary Military Tribunal which Njono arrl many other PK I leaders were tried and found guilty of complicity in the G This was ilia beginningoft:re process by which Suharto used the law-courts to prove his case against the PKI, as Ali Said, Tahir and Durrnawel stressed in the Sinar Harapan interview. These three generals, more than anyone else in th7 present-~y.leadership, were instrumental in helping Suharto in his efforts to make his seizure of power appear to be constitutional. Their 1986 interview can be seen as part of the preparation to re-write tha regime's official versioo of what happrned. It is no coincidence that the men who are neerled in this effort have remained close to Suharto. They are Su:lharmm(.4 who has been at Suharto's side e;ver sinre 1965, formerly his State Secreta.r y, arrl now VicePresident; Ali Said, chairman of the Supreme Court already for many years; Ismael Saleh, the Justice Minister, and Tahir until October this year InspectorGeneral for Developmmt; the Inp res office dealing with projects financed by a presidential fond, and located in Bina G raha, Suharto's official headquarters. tJefo::e The role of Kostrad General SUharto, flanked by his top generals, at the Armed Forces Day man::h-past (Jakarta Post, 6 October] arrested in October 1965, was authentic despite grave doubts expressed by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey, in their "Cornell Paper'', a document that continues b:) haunt SUharto to this very day. "Durmawel stressed that everything rested on Njono's hand-written ronfession. He, Ali said and Tahir were all convinced that the original confession, hand-written by Njono, disproved various theories abroad doubting the central role Of the PKI in the G30S/PKI revolt. 'We don 1t need to respond to all that,' Ali Said reiterated." {S.inar Harapan, 29 September 1986) However, the three men were not happy about the Nugroho-Saleh account, either. In a long footnote on the Njono confession, trn authors suggested that Njono was probably '\:lepressed' wren he was being interrogated and only came out of his state of depression during his trial in court. As the two interr~ators who had extracted the confession from Njono, Durrnawel and Ali Said described this footnote as "inaccurate' [Sinar Harapan, 30 September 1986]. They sent Nj:>no's confession as their evidence of PKI complicity to then Colonel, now General (ret'd) Sudharmooo, who was on the staff of the Supreme Operational Command (KOTJ).Sudharmono passed iton to Suharto and it was circulated to members of the cabinet 20 But what about the newromer to the presidential team, General Warono? A month before Warono was appointed General Chairman of Golkar, he replaced Tahir as Inspector-General for.Development. Whatever his qualifications fortbe.Golkar job, discussed elsewhere in this Bulletin, it socn;Hd not be forgotten that in 1965, Warono was assistant for operations of Kostrad, the army s Strategic Command, atthe time Suharto was rommar:de,r. It was as Kcstrad commanderthatSuharto was able to launch his assault on the troops which kidnappErl and rnut"dered the six generals on l October 1965 and install himself on the neXI:; day as army chief-of-staff, against the w:j.shes of Sukarno. As Suharto's operatiCJlS assistant, Wahono would be well informed about certain matters discussed in a documententltled 'The Role of President Suharto in the 30 September Movement" that has been circulating for several years in Indonesia. According w this cbcuntent, Suharto ordered three green-beret infantry battalions, Battalion 530from Madiun, BattaLion 454 from Semarang and Battalion 3~8 from Bandung, all of Kostrad's III/Paracommandos, to be in Jakarta on 28 September 1965, with full front line combat gear, that is to say, armed with ammunition, cu alert and ready to fight in combat. These tr()()ps were.inspected by Suharto, as Kostrad Commander, on the morning of 30 September, meaning, according to the document, that they were firmly under his command. (See the translation of the first part of this cbcument in Indonesia Reports, Politics Supplement, No 25, August 1988.J Less than 24 hours later, two of these battalions were out in the streets of Jakarta, ostensibly acting in support of the plotters woo organised the kidnap missions against the generals. Suharto has claimed that one of his major achievements in turning tre tide on l October 1965 was to have · persuaded these troops w abandon the rebel cause. Yet although the 'coup' leaders, LieutenantColoo.el Untung, Colonel Latief and Brigadier-General Supardjo, were expecting help from these trocps, their role proved to be ambiguous, to say the least. Anct:her of the articles published bySinar Harapan in September 1986 describes how these troops were placed round TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 22] === Merreka Square on the morning of 1 October but did ~to support rebel troops who had oc~pied the radio station on the west side of the square, when K ostrad forces moved to take control of the radio. '£his document, which gives details of the radiograms sent by Suharto, also refers to a number of doruments and articles that have revealed that the leading plotters were on close personal terms with Suharto, and regarded him as sympatlmic to their cause. They include several articles by the Dutch scholar, w.F. Wertheim, and the defen.c e plea by Colonel Latief at ·his trial in 1978. Indeed, as Latief confirmed in court, a couple of hours befure the kidnappers set out on their missions, at an::uoo midnight., he met Suharto at a hospital where the latter's son was under treatment, to i!lforrn hirt\ of the moves that would be t.aken against the generals who had been targetted for kidnapping. As operational assistant, Wahono would have ·krown all about SUharto' s role in arranging these unexplained troop deployments, at Suharto's behest. So now, he too takes his place under Suharto's wing, at a time when Suharto is about to launch his new definitive account of the events of 196 5. In his introduction to thE! translatim of the above docmnent, Indonesia Reports editor, John MacDougall wonders whether ''the current intra-regime conflict (is) really rather more about Silharto and his protection - or exposure - by his iongrerm allies''. We would add that this document may well be one of the sources "near at hand, right here at home", referred to recently hy Suharto, which he is now determined to rebuff. Another piece in the jigsaw of Suharto's current manoeuvres is the ex~ution during the past two years of five men woo, had they survived, might have one day revealed some of the facts Suharto has tried so hard to conceal. Sjam Kamaruzzaman, the key figure behind the G30S plot, a member of the P.KI's go-called special bureau and an intelligellce agent for the army, was executed in September 1986, along with Supono f1arsudijoyo and Muljoro also known as Bono and as Waluyq. bd:h membersofthesp:::cial bureau. Now rome the E!xerutioos in October this year of Giyadi and Sukardjo, poth members ofthekidnap teams who were found guilty of shooting two of the victims. To quote Indonesia Reports editor, John Macoougall again: "That the executims are occurring only in recent years after $0 long we attribute mainly to the gradtal drawing down of Suharto and his longtime collea9Ues in office and their aesire to avoid any µ:>ssilile contingency, such as strong jpternat.iDnal pressure, whereby trese p ri.Srners might be afforded sufficient freedom to present further narrative THIE 1965AEFAIR challenges to the original myths of the New Order." {Indonesia News Service, No 146, 26 October 1988] Another myth comes unstuck In October 1965, grisly reports we.re published in several Jakarta newspapers, with the two armed forces pa~rs, Argkatan Berserrjataand Betit.a Yudha taking the lead, alleging that the victims of the kidnap gangs, six generals and a soldier on guard at General Nasution's home, had been savagely and obscenely mutilated. It was claimed that their eyes had been gouged, the bodies cut with razors, arid their genitals slashed. This was said to be the work of members of Gerwani., the pro-PKI women's organisation. These reports were never challenged in the press as all newspapers that might have dared do so were closed down from 2 October. They helped to set alight a wave of anti-communist fervour throughout J:ndct1esia, inciting mobs who, alongside Suharto's troops, launched the massacres which left an estimated one million peep le dead by early 19 66. But the reports aloo had the effect of deflecting attention from the role of trocps in the action against the generals, by alleging that the victims were killed by mutilations inflicted on them by civilians. It was krown at the time that a team of doctprs had been instructed to carry out autopsies of the eorpses. These autcpsies were never published and have, until recently,.remained one of the unsolved mysteries of 1965. At the time, President Sukarno frequently admonished:Purnalists for their exaggerated account;:s, insisting that doctors who had inspected the bodies found no ev;i.denoe of the ghastly mutilation of eyes and genitiils. It is mw clear that it was not in Sulcarno's power to publish theautopsies since they were carried outonSubatto's instructions. They were never published because it was not in Suharto's interest to have the findings.made public. The mystery of the autopsies has row been oolved with the translation, by Ben Anderson, of the seven autopsies carried out on 4 and 5 October 1965 by doctors, ~g on instructions from Suharto. The autopsies were discqvered by Andersmquit.ebychaoce, while rummaging thrcugh tre records of one of the trials held by the Extraordinary Military Tribunal. The autopsies show, as 1\nder:son says, "with reasonable certainty that six 'of the victims died by gunfire (the case of Harjono, who died in his own oome, remcrins puzzling), and that if their bodies suffered ct.her violence, it was the result of clubbing with the butts of the guns that fired the fatal bullets, or of the damage likely to occur from a 36-foot fall down a stone-walled well." [See, "How Did the Generals Die?' in Indones.iq. No 43, April, 1987, Coqiell Southeast Asia Programme.J As for the claims about genitals being slashed, the autcpsies failed to discover any such thing. On the contrary, they reporte:l all the victims' penises to be intact, even say.Ing that four were circumcised and three were uncircumcised. As with many ot:rer dcx::uments, Andersoo' s introductn:ry remarks and translation, along with the original document, is now circulating in Indonesia, eJ<Ploding one of the most outrageous prcpaganda tricks used by the army to dismrt history, to conceal tie role of the army (ie. of Suharto himself) in the so-called G30S 'coup attempt', and to implicate the PKI. It is one of Indonesia's greatest tra~es that nearly a quarter of a cmtury on, the full story of what happened in October 1965 has not yet been told. But the T APOL Bulletin.Na. 90, December 1988 21 === [PDF page 23] === facts are closing in on Suharto, forcing him onto the defensive about his seizure of power, involving as it did one of the worst massacres of the twentieth century. The forthcoming White Paper will be an attempt to stem the growing tidal wave of truth which not only threatens to engulf SUharto himself as mastermind of the murders of General Yani and other members of the army general staff· it will also shatter Suharto's efforts to prove that' the New Order regime came to birth by constitutional means. " HUMAN RIGHTS. International support for Pramoedya The congressional Committee to Support Writers anc.1 Journalists has expressed its concern at the Indonesian Gmemmertes OO::isim to ban Rumah Kaea. the latest book published by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Stating in a letter to the Indonesian Charge d' Affaires in Washi.ngton that it understood the book had been banned because it is communist, the Committee said: "We regret this action which impedes the free(.brn to write in Indonesia, and respectfully urge that the auth::>rities review the decision. F reeoom to write and express ideas peacefully is a key to political stability in Inoonesia, as in the rest of the world." 'Ihe Ccngressimal Committee is a bi-partisan group of eleven Senators and sixty-one Members of the House of Representatives which was formetl to support freedom tD write around the world International PEN writes to Suharto Following the aooption of a resolution at its September ccnference protesting against restrictions on Prarnoedya Ananta Toer, the president of International PEN, F rarx::is King wrote to President Suharto regarding restrictions against the writer, his publishers and persons trying to sell his works. "Pramoedya Ananta Toer has earned himself an international reputation and is often hailed as Indonesia's finest writer. 'l'o all who have read Toer's thcught-provoldng work arrl thtt>ugh it come to krow more about Indonesian culture and history, it seems tragic that Indonesians themselves are unable to do likewise. Many people believe that far from being a 'subversive', Toer has in fact contributed richly to Indonesia's cultural heritage.... For these reas:ms we urge you tD lift all restrictions on Toer himself, to lift the harming orders on his books, to allow his publishers to operate freely, and to drop all charges against the two students, Bambang SUbono and Isti Nugroho." attempt' and was also a communist., was saved from being banned by a statement from State Secretary, MajorG ene ral Moerdiooo who declared that "we should show maturity in the discussion of history". Yes, but history is what Pramoedya' s quartet of books is all about. The paradox was not lost on the Attorney-General, Sukarton Marmosudjono, who was apparently havmg problems e><plaining tD the general public why he could be so generous to Soegiarso and so iron-fisted to Pramcedya. "OUrnetworkofprosecutors should not behave like robots when carrying out government policy," he said. "You should all read Soegiarso' s book to re lp you understand the philosophy of our law enforcement and to be able to explain to the public the reasons underlying the way we implement these powers, to explain, for example, why tlµ.S book is not banned but the books of Pramoedya are banned." [Java Pos, 12 OctDber} Pram's books 'selling freely' "The sale of books is flourishing. Pramoedya Ananta Toer's books are being sold illegally, but freely. There are no clear sanctions against the sellers or buyers. The &men Project minibus terminal (in Jakarta) with its nearby book kiosks is where transactions occur. There are a lot of security guards arourrl but they cnly keep an eye on tie buses and minibuses entering and leaving the terminal." 'l'his report appeared in the Jakarta daily, Jayakarta, (27 August] which has spearheaded the campaign against Pramoedya. "But merchants took a good look first at the prospective buyer before making a sale. 'Who knows, a person pretending b:> buy might be from Bakin' (State Intelligence Coordination Board)." Indonesia News Service, [No 138, 26 September] describes this as a 'sneaky' article whereby the paper wants the authorities to crack down on the merchants. Why not all books about history are harmed Only a few weeks after yet more books by Pramoedya were banna'i, the regime was plunged into a dispute over the pros and cons of harming a book about the late president., Sukarno. Cit is the irony of regimes like this that the only optiOn for dealing with a book with which it disagrees is to slap on a ban.) In the en:'l, the Sukarno book, Siapa Menabur Angin Akan Menuai Badal. (He Who sows the Wind Will Reap the Tempes~ by Soegiarso Sujono, alleging that the former president was himself involved in the 1965 'coup 22 Pramoedya Anant:a Toer, sitting in his garden, during a visit by one of his many foreign visitors. [Photo: Mary Durran] TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988 === [PDF page 24] === NEW BOOKS PraIDoedya's Rumah Kaea (The Glass House) An essay by Basuki Resobowo The last book in the quartet written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer while he was a prisoner on Buru island has now been published•.• and banned. A few copies have reached the outside world, like drops in the ocean, not enough to create a stonn, to cause heated discussion. I am one of the lucky ones to have a copy and I want to tell others about it. But I don't want to write a book review because I am very subja::tive about the book. I'd rather cal.l this an essay. The four historical novels Pramoedya wrote while exiled to Buru were published after he was let out (not freed). The first three books, This Earth of M.ankinO., A Child of All Nations, and Footsteps, were all banned soon after appearing in print. [As yet, only the first two have appeared in English translation.] This last book goes over the events covered in the fir&t th~. 'rhey were a trilogy of novels, while Rumah Kaea is more like a history of the Indonesian people's movementandthe growth ofnational consciousness. It's a pity Indonesians are not being allowed to read this book on Indonesian history. 'Primitive Pitllng' and 'Modern Pibmg' Pramoedyastarts by talking about people who reacted spontaneously to the brutalities and repression of the Dutch colonialists and the European and Chinese landlords. They acted without any organisation. One such persm was an activist in West Java, Si Pitung. The Dutch colonialists regarred unruly peq:>le like Pitung as primitive because they had no concept of organisation. This was the opinion of the General Secretariat {Algemeene SecretarieJ, the special section, whose task it was to inform and advise t:he Governor-General. R.M. Minke, the man who fourrled an organisation to guide this movement. the central figure in Pramoedya's quarter, is called the 'Modern Si Pitung'. Prop le like Si PitUng had been margi.nalised by society an9 became outcasts, infuriated by the conditions created by foreigners in positions of power. Wasn't theirs an intuitive sense of nai::ionhood? People like Si Pibmg were idolisa:l by thecominon poople who flocked to lenong theatres wqen plays about Si Pitung were performed. This forced the police bureau in Betawi (as Jakarta was then called) to setup a special department to prcduce lenong plays preaching loyalty b::l the allpowerful colonial government. I like the way Pramoedya uses Si Pi.tung as the symbol of res:i.stanoe to injusti<..--e, and later refers to Minke, the main character, as the Modern Si Pitung because he shaped this resistance into an organisation. Pramoedya is a great story-teller with a masterly control cf. language~ But sometimes, he gets so carried away by the story he is tellir'!g that. he takes three pages to say what could be said in half a page. rt reminds me of Emil Zola. The stories are long but the interest never flags. Pramoedya's fantasy is firmly.:ounded in the lives of people. He has no place for abstractions. He ~sn't make anything up. SEBUAH ROMAN SEJARAH PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER Rum ah K aca is the story of the special section of the Governor-General's office, whose job it is to monitor developments of the people's movement al)d the activities of its le~ders. Reports from all parts of the country are studied and analysed. In this way, it examines everything going on in the Dutch East Indies. It is if we are on the outside, looking into a glassmuse, hence the book's title. Having read this book which goes over the same groond as the first three,. I note thatthe three novels gave an account of the history of the Indonesianpeople's movement from 1911, the beginnings ofnatimal ronscimsness (when Sarekat Dagang Islam, or the Muslim Traders Leagoo tuma:l iutoSarekat Islam,.the Muslim League) up to the death of Minke in 1918. The story.in the first three books is not unlike the stories in many belle-lettres written in the Dutch colonial era, like Nyai Oasima and Melati van Agam. An Indonesian woman kept as a ooncubine by a Dutchman develops into a woman cf great ability and strength and eventually rebels against her life in a gilded cage. These are romantic, exotic stories but Pramoedya's literary skills are far more powerful and expressive than those belle-lettre writers. Things changed for the Dutch after 1918. They needed t.o educate Indonesians for a new era of colonial exploitation; so they began to apply their 'et:h:i,cal policy'. This included setting up the Volksraad (Peq:ile's Council) in 1919 which incluOOd six Indonesian collaborators from q>portnnistic organi.satioos like Budi Mulyo, a pseuoonym for Budi Utomo, and the Sarekat Islam. There is a passing reference to Semaoen who first emerg:'!das a leader at the 1919 national congress of the Sarekat Islam. S(:?maoen later became the leader of the leftwing movement. Pramoedya thrcucjlout writes only about what was g:>ing on; he makes no reference to Mane and Engels, not like Achdiat K. Mihardja1 s Atheist which repeatedly quotes Marx and Engels. It is very annoying to read that book; the story line is interrupted over and over again becausetheaut:tor warts to show how much he understands Mand.st treory. By contras~ Pramoedya confires himself to his characters and the problems that arise during their lifetime. TAPOL Bulletin Na. 90, December 1988 23 === [PDF page 25] === tostan<lfirm? Everyone whot:uzTls traitx>r will be struck Pramoedya's message Does he have a message to rorwey? Yes, indeed, because an artist is also a thinker. But P ramoedya does not use his thoughts to egg his readers on. He writes only about the difficulties of the struggle for emanicipatioo. One e.xample of the message he wants to convey is the irony of a man woo is trapped by the comfortable life he enjoys, having sold himself to the colonial gJVemment. This is an Menadorese called Pangemanann (with two n's!), who became a senior official in the spePal section of the Goven10r-General's office. In the end he was dismissed because his services as a spy were no longer needed. The comfortable life he had grown accustomed to collapsed arrl he was haunted by guilt for the crimes he oommitted against his own people. His life ended abruptly, drowned by his own sins. Is this not a beautiful message for Indonesians who are today fighting for a better life, a message for them down by their own sins. But I was net. happy with the ending. Pramoedya ends his book with a conventional climax, like Nyai Dasima and other books in the belle-lettre style which usually ended with the heroine rompalining about the injustices she suffered In Rumah Kaea. Nyai Sanikem provides the climax. In the closing scene, she is Madame Sanikem Le B<.u~ marriOO to a Frenchman, demanding retribution for all t11e sins against her adcpted son, R.M. Minke. The question for me is, why, for a regime so fond of banning books, was Achdiat's book, Atheis, full of quotations from Mane, never banned while Pramoedya's book which makes not a single reference to Marx and Engels was banned? Is it because Achdiat can get away with quoting Marx because he is not a oommwti.st, while Pramoedya stands accused, and has been punished as a commwti.st though he never quotes a single line from Marx? Evidently the official verdict is that anything written by Pramoedya is regarded as a 'latent danger'. Arrests and torture in the Moluccas Dozens of people were arrested in the Moluccas in June and July this year. The most oomplete list is contained in an Amnesty International document [ASA 21/14/88] which names s:ixteen men and refers also to mass arrests in several villages. Amnesty a loo reported the maltreatment of prisoners, which detainees' relatives heard about from Moluccan prison guards. The families were not permitted to visit the detainees. Two prironers, Midiel Wattimena and John SouisBat were beaten so severely on their knees that they were unable to walk. Another was said to have been beaten with a trucheon studded with nails while a prisoner named Dominggus Pattiwalapia had his nails pulled rot under interrogation. Some detainees were locked in a cell with a large snake. Amnesty fears that two detainess died as the result of beatings. They are Mr Patt::l.slllq who was arrested in Amboo in Ji.me, Cl'rl Mr Corp.tty, who was arrested in June by the police in K airab.I, Ceram. The first names of both men are not known. Background to the arrests Many Moluccans still cherish the idea of an irrlependentstate. Although the Republik Maluku Selatan $outhMoluo:::as Reµiblic) which was proclaimed in April 1950 was violmtly crusted by the Inoonesian army, there are frequent outbursts in favour of independence. Although information from the region is difficult to obtair\. occasional visits by Moluccans now living in the Netherlarrls has brrught to light a prevailing atmosphere of repression and discootent. Attempts to mark the anniversary of the proclamation of the RMS by raising the RMS flag have been the pretext for renewed waves of repressicn. This is koown to have happened in April 1986 when flag-raising ceremonies took place in several villages, Aboru and Wasoe on Ha.ruk.u Island, Ouw on Saparua Island and Hibl on Ambon Island. On that occasicn, protests were rep::>rted throogix:>ut the Moluccas in April and May 1986 and many people were arrested, tlx>ugh probably just for short periods of time. [AI 24 document, ASA 21/00/86]. The craving for independeoce has been further enhanced by a::cnornic and social developments. The Moluccas is one of the most neglected parts of Indonesia with little in the way of eccnomic progress. Like West Papua and East Timor, commerce is in the han::ls of outsiders while the leading civilian arrl military positions are kept in the hands of Javanese. There have been three earthquakes duting 1988, uprooting many people from their homes. The maincrq> is cloves whid1 has recently been severely hit by falling world prices. The only successful economic project is a plywood factory in Ceram which is run by Bob Hassan, one of Suharto's close business associates, whose timber and forestry interests can only be described as phenomenal. Yet the beneficiaries of this project in terms of employment:. are not local inhabitants but people brought Please turn to page 12 Subscriptions Annual rates Europe, (six issues) overseas, air Individuals £10.00 £10.00 Institutions £15.00 £15.00 Girocheques and eurocheques welcon1e. US cheques and all other cheques not drawn on a London bank must add £1.50 to cover bank charges. TAPOL's Giro account number is: 56 7814009 Rates for Australian subscribers (air): Individuals A$25.00 Institutions A$38.00 Australian subscribers may pay, at these rates, to: TAPOL (Australia) P.O. Box 229, Collingwood, Victoria 3066. Subscriptions and correspondence to: TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR4 8HW UK Tel: (01) 771 2904 TAPOL Bulletin No. 90, December 1988