TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990

=== [PDF page 1] === Tapol bulletin no, 101, October 1990 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1990) Tapol bulletin no, 101, October 1990. Tapol bulletin (101). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1356-1154 The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26177/ === [PDF page 2] === The.Indonesia Human Rights Campaign TAPOL Bulletin No. 101 Pa.n:l\ens captu~ed in border raids Indonesian troops violate PNG territory On.A itgust 11-12, Indonesian troops raide(la West Papuan refugee camp in Papua New Guinea,killed five people, and captured several Papuans believed to be members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). Troops burned down this and other refugee camps, pro_m pting hundreds of Papuans, in fear for thejr lives, to t(Jke refuge at a PNG government post. The lives of West Papuans and Papua New Guineans are und~r threat from Indonesian attacks1 violating PNG's territorial integrity. A fe\i(,days after.t he attack on the Imnai refugee camp, in West Sepik province of PNG, the Indonesian authorities annoµnced the capture of eleven OPM suspects - avoiding any mention of where they were captured. The West Papuans, now in custody in Jayapura, are evidently the men who were captured in the Imnai refugee camp. The previous month, the Indonesian Trikora command am1ounced the arrest of OPM leader Mecky Salosa. He had been deported - in effect extradited - to West Papua on July 22, by the PNG. authorities. Now, with the capture of the.eleven, the military appears to.be taking PNG's Jaw into its own bands, by crossing the border and helping itself 1o OPM suspects. The attack was reported in a PNG newspaper, the Post Courier (16/8/90}. Quoting a "senior official", the Courier states that on August 11, there was a fierce mortar and gun battle between Illdonesian troops and OPM at Ok Bago, 1.5 km into PNG, after which Indonesian troops burned down Imnai camp and captured several OPM suspects. Men who escaped the c.lash said that several other camps had also been torched. Deaths and ~bductions along border Reports indicate 1hat Indonesian troops have killed at leas! 15 Papuaps during frequent border violations and clashes with OPM guerillas in the past.months. fn August, incur;sions beca111e an almost.daily occurrence. PNG civilians as well as West Papuan refugees have suffered gross abuse at the hands of t~e fndonesian troops. A chronology of the most serious incidents is given below: June 14, a West Papuan woman and her child living at Yapsei refugee camp were killed at point blank range by Indonesian soldie:rs. They had been attending their gardens at the time of the attack. [PNG Times 23/8/90] June 20, two West Papuan brothers also Jiving at the Yapsei campwere abducted by Uidcmesian. tr().o~: i(ine Was released on.condition he identify OPM •b.a ses in PNG; the whereabouts of his 17-year old brother are µnknown. [PNO Time~ 23/8/90] === [PDF page 3] === WEST-PAPUA June ~' PNG authorities say people 5 villages on the PNG side and from Batum village on Indonesian side have been streaming into Y apsei government station during tJ1e past week in fear of Indonesian forces. Provincial police chief says he has received a report from one of his men, saying OPM has killed 3 Indonesian troops. [Post Courier 20/6/90] June 24, Indonesian platoon attempts to invade Yapsei station, but PNG troops arrive in time to prevent an attack. Three puma helicoptei5 believed to be in use by fndonesian forces. [Post Courier 517/90] July 15, ten Indonesian soldiers walk in to Scotchio village, Bkm inside.PNG and hold.{\Vo w.on~en at gun-point telling them to lead the way to nearby villages. Ten others raid Popa village, llan west of Scotchio, destroying property and gardens.[PNG Times 1917190 & Post Courier 25/7/90] July 25, PNG deputy prime minister Ted Diro told parliament he was investigating reports that 7 Papua New Guineans had been captured by Indonesian troops in West Sepik province, taken across the border and shot dead. August 11/12, according to a "senior offic:ial", Indonesian troops killed 5 people, captured OPM suspects and burned down buildings at Imnai refugee camp. 650 refugees from camps flooded into Yapsei government station. More than 150 troops estimated in the area. [Post Courier 16/8/90) August 14, Indonesian troops reported to be massing on the border and many peopJe fleeing border villages, West Sepik.. premier calls for help from PNG government. August 22, reports of more Indonesian troops moving towards Okma and Oksil areas in West Sepik province [Post-Courier 23/8/90] President Suharto's new "concern" for human rights - see separate)tem]. A tpal \VOuld set a precedent for future extraditfons from PNG, placing the fate of West Papuan refugees now in Papua New Guinea in jeopardy from ~he PNG authorities as well as from attacks by Indonesian troops.. Similarly, the eleven captured m August, appear to be more valuable alive than dead to the Indonesian government who ·has' 'a nnounced that there is enough evidence agaidst fo bring them to trial. AH are ag;u~ed of involvement in killings at Arso 1ransmigration •· site and in the independe#cc flag-raising ceremony of December 1988. This way, the Indonesian government can present itself as a state which. is based on the rule of law, However ther.e is gr.~tve concern for their safoty for, lik~ Salosa, they have been subjected to "intense interrogation" which can only mean torture. PNG announces new moves against OPM It was not uptiJ August 14 that the Port Moresby govern.,. ment could bring itself to issue a protest to Indonesia. The letter protesting Indonesian troop incursions. over the previous three days, but saying nothing of the deaths, came from an administration beset \Vith itS, own probJcms and clearly reluctant to antagonise Indonesia. Appeasement rather 'than protest has been the PNG's government's policy of late, borne out by the extradition of Mecky Salosa, which was recently described by Foreign Minister Michael Somare as ''a start". 'And Iar outweighing the protest lo Indonesia has been the ·announcement of new moves to cooperate with Indonesia in wiping out the OPM. On 30 July, border discussions between the two governments were held in Jayapura where, it is thought, tbe fndonesians requested finner action by PNG against the OPM. Just over a fortnight late1, in what amounts to a green light for the worst kind of abu,s,e by both Indonesian and PNG troops, •Somare ao,np1mced ·that PNG defence · forces had. been sent to the border with orders 'to destroy rebeJ camps and attest; I:lrosccute and deport rebels found in PNG. The same action applied to "pennissive residents" known to be actively supporting the OPM cause. All border-crossers will be screened by government officials to sort out genuine refugees from illega1 border crossers, he sa~d. [PNG Tif,nes August 20~ 1990} A government patrol was duly sent:in to dose down the Yapsei refugee camp, bririg "genuine" refugees to the only camp which is offi-;cially recognised · at East Awin, and send tlmrest back to West Papua. PNG c!efence minister Ben Sabumei, said the new ·measures were part of coordin.aled plan with Indonesia. He.had.this to say of the QPM "I'd like to talk to thein and tell them they.arc fighting a battle they will never. win". [The Age, August 20, 1990) Mecky Salosa: deported or extradited? West Papuan refugees in PNG. Better alive than dead Fears for Meclcy Salosa, the OP M's.• comm!lnder for the Sorong-Manokwari region, are ·fueJJ~d by a report that. the representative from the recently established International Red Cross office in Jayapura has been refused penniSsion to visit him. Some 1eporfs claim he is dead, but the signs are that the authorities will attempt to satisfy international opinion by being seen to act in ~ accordance with "due process" in bringing Salosa to trial {aJl the more so, given Mecky Salosa's "deportation" would be more accurately dcs(;ibed as an ex:tradition, although there is no extradition, treaty between Jakait~ and Port Moresby. Salosa had se~ed a short. jail term in 'PNG for.illegal possession of ~m1s, ·and entry. The charge was diopped 'w heti it became clear he bad entered the country on ~~e invitation of PNG's security forces ' burtbr~e days Jitter, he was "deported" "Deport;;. atioi1" would mean· that Salosa committed a c.,-rime in PNG for which forcible repatriation was the punishment, but si.nce the charges w~re. d~oppcd, there was no apparent TA.PQL Bu.l letin No. 101, OgQber, 1990 === [PDF page 4] === justification for thiS.,Instead be was taken to the border and immediately taken into custody bf the Indo~~sians as;.a criminal - extradited:... probably on Indonesian Jecjuest, for WEST PAPtJA his OPM activities. Slavery Society called on the prime minister to use his good offices to secure Salosa's immediate release. In.a letter to Australian Fore_ign Minister Gareth Evans, the Australian West Papua Association asked the Australian government to seek an explanation of the deportation ·and its iiilplica..;: tions for other West Papuan OPM,supporters ]iving·in PNG. In PNG, the CathOlic Commission for Justice and Peace challenged the PNG government on the legality ofSalosa's deportation, pointed out that international solicitors in the PNG Foreign Affairs department had advised against deporting Salosa, and asked why the UN High Commission for Refugees was not involved in the discussion. International protest The extradition of.Mecky Sal9~51 a~9used a. s{on11.ofprotyst from international hu111an rights groups. OPM lieadqua'rtcfs sent a letter of protest · to PNG Pdme: Minister.. Rabbi Namaliu accusing PNG ·of.failing to ·honour ·hulnan rights and of breaking their p\\i]) law on political asylum; ·TAPOL wrote a strongly-worded letter to / the prime 'minister, accusing PNG of condemnigg M.{lcky Salosa '.'...to face certain maltreatment; punishment, oi>even death... " at the hands of the Indqnesians and holding the government responsible for any harm' that rp.ay befall Salosa. The Anti- 'The' 1965 massacres More·· on U~· embassy. collusion Kathy _Kadany'~ carefully researched article documen!ing us co11usio!l.in the massacres presided 'over.by.General Suharto in late;1965 arid early 1966 [see TAPOL Bulletin No..100, Augµst 1990] has been challenged in mariy quarters. Several Indonesian generals have poured scorn.on the idea, that Jhey needed help from a11yone fo tr.ack ·dpwn and diIIliriate hundreds of 'thousands of communists. ',. After keeping silent for more than'-two· monH~s, the New York Tim~$ [12)uly 1990] tried fodiScredit;Kadiin~'s claim, in articles in th~ Washington Post and other. US dailie~ in May this year, that senior US embaj>sy officials were,.· privy to.the activities of embassy offic.ial.RobeJt. Martens who gave some 5,000 names of communists. to the Indonesian 4rmy, and that they approved of this: at. a.time when the Jridoncsian ariny was e1igaged in a campaign ' mass ' extermination. franscripts of sectio,ns.of her,ipterv~ewS,.19 back tip her conclusions. [TAPOL also has a copy.] She fas placed a copy of her tape~. in. the National Security ·· Archives, foi ac_cess by the general public. [Tempo, 4· August 1990] Tapes. Declassified. cable traffic between the US · embassy and the Staie Department ·during the. months from 1 October 19(?5 shows how' the 'emba8sy aided and abetted the ariny's death squads. Aceoraing to an embassv cable to 'the State Department' on 4:November. 1965, "DCM [deputy chief of mission, Jack Lydm,an]made clear that embassy and USG generally sympathetie. with and ·admiring ' of what. ariny doing\ A collecti,? n. of some of the more ·revealing cable8 llY illill1D~ #{any ARE C lean US collusion · · There is. no chsptiting thi ' capacity of. Ji1donesiari, anny the. CIA) can hardly. have been affecte,d,µi11ch by the provision ·of some five thousand 'by the epibassy,': But IJ'S col)µs~qn is. Jhe point at issue.and J(adane has' provc.n,·this, beyond d~ubt. Hertransqipts sqow tb!lf the wa~ crucial to ~h.e. outcome. Her persistent iriter.view~g a1efo shqwed that the embassy was pre-occupied during the lasCquarter of 1965 with the killings and wanted to be certain that the PKI had been physically eliminated. Proof of US collusion does not rest only witli the Kadane names Village · yoice 12 Ju11e 1~90 === [PDF page 5] === has been circulated, along with a Memo, by Gabriel Kolko, historian and author of Confronting the Third World: US Foreign Policy 1945-1980. [Lengthy extracts from his chapter on Indonesia were published in TAPOL Bulletin No. 95, October 1989] Yet, the declassified cables are only part of the story; many cables from the post September 1965 period have not been declassified and as Kolko states in his Memo of 13 August 1990, All accounts of the US role in the period before September 30 suffer greatly from the fact that the relevant files covering US assessments and policy during July-September 1965 have been closed completely to researchers. I, and other researchers I have consulted, · know of no topic or period for the 1945-68 era that has been (reated in such a systematic fashion to conceal essential infonnation. There is, for example, no hint in the cables declassified so far of the covert operation the CIA was engag~d in, to which attention has been drawn on many occasions by former CIA agent, Ralph McGehee. The Embassy's 'who's who' of the PKI The following excerpts from Kadane's interview of Jack Lydman, deputy chief of the US embassy at the time) give some idea of the activities of US embassy personnel at a time when Suharto's death squads were annihilating th(! Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Talking t() Kadarie.on 14 May 1990, Lydman. m;1de no secret. of the embassy's support for the army's campaign.of extermination: Lydman:. But one thing.you do expect is that you're aware, particularly if you're the ambas5ador or bis deputy,.that you're aware of all the reporting that's going out of that embassy, because you're in charge of that embassy. Kadane:.I've had some long an~ very fruitful tajks with Bo\> [Martens] as well as others. He was the PKI expert par excellence, it seems to me [Lydman: Right!] of anyone maybe who ever lived. One of the things he told me he did was fill up many, many, many gaps in the biographical reporting of who was who in the PKL Lydman: Yes, I think he did. Kadane: And it appears also that Joe Lazarsky' (deputy CIA station chief at the embassy] and others h.ave said thaton occasion, the CIA added some of their information. [Lydmao: Yes.] Kadane: It was a sort of pooled effort. [Lydmao: Yeah.] Kadane: And the names bad been sent bac~ to Washington [L: Right.] because there had not really been a clear idea of who were the active members ofthe party. Lydman: l think this was true.and also that, you know, as this scene developed in Indonesia and undeveloped after the coup itself, a Jot of fresh information, new infonnation about personalities ·came l!P. that we probably hadn't been aware of before, because a lot. of these PKI people at regional level may in fac.t have been the new names... that we hadn't tracked before. ·And Bob did a major job in identifying these people. Kadane:. Some have gone so far as to say th~t he had identified the infrastructure of the PKI, that is to say, the PK! building ransacked in 1965. that than anybody. There is no >question about it, he did. Kadane: Going down to the regional and city organisations, SOBSI [the trade unions], Gerwani [the women's organisation]. Lydman: Oh yes, absolutel)'. WeU,. you must remember that the.re w~re three and a half million •member~ of PKI and its affiliated or&~nisations..That's. a lot of people.... It's amazing,. the job.that Bob a.nd all the. people he worked with did. Absolutely remarkabl.e... (A.) fantastic job. I don't know of ariy officer in a.time of ct.isis.who perform.ea.more brilliantly lhaJ1 Bob Martens. Kadane: Well, it 1Jll1led out to be useful, itseems, because one. of the things ~.e. told me was that these names were disseminated to KinrAdhyatman [aide to Adam Malik] [L: Yes.] who then gave them to Malik and Suharto's people so that' they had some way of identifying who these people were. Lydman: ram sure we helped.a great deal in this, th11t Bob Martens with his analytical mind, probably provided a great service. Kadaoe: In. addition to that, others have to1d me that names came back from Su~art.o from Muttopo who Was gathering..., Lydman: Well, Ali (Murtopo) of course was the intelligence chief -- I know of course that there were relations and networking going.on on that, but I can't remember how this one came out. I don't know for example Wh() WilS the principal.Fon1act with Ali, w,hethe, it \\'as WilfEtheJ [the. us ddem;e at1ache, now de~d] or somebody else. Kadane: Joe Lazarsky said he. met with him quite a bit. Lydm~n: I think Joe ~aybe ~id and. I think maybe Bob too. had direct relations with him, it's quite possible. I just can't remember it. Kadane: Well, Ali was the guy who.was in charge of gathering up in.~uharto's HQ •the names of people who had been caught or J<ille<f. {L: Yes.] And those names were then give~ back [L: Yeah.] I<> the einbaSsy and -- tbey committees -Lydman: I think he was pretty good at that. [K: Going down to the lower levels.] He probably did more to clarify TAPOL Bul1etin No. 101,. October 1990 === [PDF page 6] === able to check off those names against Bob's list. Lydman: I don't remember that exact sequence but it's quite plausible. I did not focus on that. l was not an expert on these (word unclear] at alJ ~r,id had no intention of trying to become.one. K.adane:' WC'JJ, Ed Masters [chief, poJitical section 'and~ third man in the ef:nbassy] has said that there was cooperation at the lop of the embassy in focusing 9n this or supervising the whole aCtivity [checking o:t;f the riaines of victims] [L: Oh, yes.] And · that you had discussed.i~ ·these names were given out.with the agreement of [L:.Oh; yes.] the top people of the embassy [L: Oh yes.] And that included you. · Lydman: Oh, absolutely. Oh, yes. all [Later, the New.York Times interviewed Lycbnan on thts damning exchange, quoted in Kadane's 4aic1e. He tried to tone down his remarks to Ka~ne,. saying th_(lt this response was "ab,solutely not wh,at I in(erided... I certqinly wasn't focus_ing on t.he impact". The Times saw this as:an example of Kadane's 'ambiguity'. Watching·_ the PKI being 'disman:tl~d'. After Lydman described how rcp0rting at t~e embassy w'as coordin<).Jed at dailt, early morning st,a ff ll1eetings,, the exchange went on:. Kad:Jne: So the bottom line., is this, it.seems to Bo.b Martens and his group. in the political sectio~ a:q9:_maybc soi:ne of the CIA people were able to:c- as· a result of)he names going out [L: Yeah.] and the ~<iI11es coming back in, were able to report that the organisatio11. qf.the PKI was being dismantled, over time. Was that right? Do you recall that? Lydman: Well, I don't recall tpat but I.think it'sperfectly plausible.... Of course, we knew · that, que to Bob's work. And a lot of other Inputs that were coming,.and things that we were learning from the Indonesians cons.tantly: We had an idea where the cracks were, and vie where.the fall-outs were, in the PKL We knew, for exampJC, 'when· the PKr ·a lmost collapsed in East Java. We knew when it collapsed in Central Java. Kadane: Oh, I see. That's fantastiC! Lydman: We knew when Aidit [PKf chairman] was killed and when Njoto [PKI second deputy chain11ari] was killed, We knew all of this. Kadane: But you're talking about the ma~norganisation [L: That's right. J when you say, 'It almost ·coJJapsed.' Lydman: Well, the regional strnctures collapsed. Kadane: And you knew when that happened. Lydman: Of course you did. WeJJ, you weren't entircJy sure that there weren't still some operating renmants,' 'iirit you knew that the main infrastructure had collapsed.... Now I don't know how much Bob could follow on what ·one could call - uh - casualty figurts and identifica.tions~,.t think that there was a Jot that he could get from the reports that were coming in. But whether you could completely document that process, I rather doubt that, because Jbf of these, sort of, local PKI colJapses ·w ere not that precisely identified as to who the precise casualties were. [K: The names of the individuals?] That1s right, these werenot that... Kadane: You might have, such. as, three Gerwani were arr~tcd and executed but you didn't know who the Gerwarii were. rs that what you mean by ·that?. Lydman: Well, that's possible. That's it. Certainly there were a lot of Gerwani who were elin1inated and nobody really knew ·who they were. They just disappeared ·off the kne.w screen. A lot of PKI did. But the names of the wel1-known people, I Jhinlc, Boq managed jo t~ack. Well, you talked to him, so he could tell you.whether or not he fo]t that he was tracking -Kadane: He said he experienced some frustrations. [L: I'm · sure he did.] But ·at the same time others the embassy have said that over time, -they were able to calculate that the infrastructure had been destroyed... Lydma9:. r think that that's true. [K:.It was.not imme~iate.J I think that that was true. But it took a long time. It took three or four months. Kadane: Yes, that's. righ( That's exactly what people 'have said. [L: They ~ouldn't do it right away.] Well, it took them a while get to. everybody. Lydman: That's right. Recording the slaughter A cable from th~ US emba~y to the State Department, on 14 November 1965, of ·whic~ only the first page has bee11 declassified,.includes an account of the killing.·.of,$bme 3,500' people in Kediri, Ea.s t Java.,. These are the. kin? of people who, as Lydman put it, "disappeared off the screen". 2. Slaughter at l(edi~i {Ea.$t Java]. American. missirmary froin Baptist Hospital Kediri told us that,3460(photocopy unclear, could be 3400) PK! activists were killed by Ansor [youth wing of the Musli_m Natihqtµl Ulama p{lrty] with probable assis(ance from Marhdenist. [nationalist party,. PNI] youths overperiod Nov 4 - Nov 9'. Accordin.g source, youth leaders had prepared list of victims. A/te{' seizing victim. concerned, they took /1.im.to riv.er bcmicy, w}Jere PIS! had allegedly prepared mass graves prior.Oct 1, · and,/;iif, his throat, Night of Nov.7, youth gro11ps came icf hospitql and took away man being treated fo~. throat cut., Hospital personneltried to save victim, but told if they would not rpt not allow him to.be taken q}.vay, he woulq be killed in front of hospital. source also stated:Saine slaughter took place at Pares, 30 kilometers northeast of Kediri; 300 communi.S(s. reported killed there. A. Armed forces did nothing to. stop slaughter amJ in fact appare~,tly colluded with anti;...PK! youths and perhaps Madiun -:f(ediri arla, reported. by source io hav,e)~een in Kediri at time and tq have told youths hy sure they-·cou{d find more than 3500 comprunists. in, Kediri if they.really lookea. Soedjono reportedly' relative one of six ffiuidered · generals and press has reported him as giving hard..:.line anti-PK! briefings various areas his jurisdiction. all TAPOL Bu11etin No. 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 7] === PQt1r1cs ·~ The de-Suharto-izati.on,.of Suharto: Drastic changes seem.to be QC<("'rring in.Jakarta. Suharto ~<; spe~ch on 16 August, advos~tz:11g democracy.and pluralism has f}Xcited politician,s academ,ics,. students.an,d. the press. It looks a~<> if.the helmsman of the Indonesian state has fired the opening shot towards a new era, an era of democracy. What lies b~hind these latest moves of the c~lining fox? During the 25 years of Suharto's rule, his style govemi:rig hi!S changed from 1ime to time whifo 'the personal ~l.des serving him have also changed. Suharto's most important asset as a dictator is his ability to switch policie~, adjust 1o new situations and anticipate the dangers 'fronr opponents, coup threats and so on. Suharto has eschewed rigidity, observing the changes around him and acting accordingly. Most dictators in recent history have fallen because of arrogance of power, This flaw 'human nature results in mental flabbiness, making the ruler Jess alert. Failing to anticipate economic and political developments, many dictators have been swept aside by history. But Suharto is ~iill on top, perhaps even stronger than ever. He has tume.d the Orde Baru regime from a military regime into a regime with a strong Suharto trademark. Fi;om a 1J1ilitary reghne toa Suharto regi!lle In 1965, at the beginning of the Orde Bgru;. Suharto 'needeaJJ th~ support he.could get to seize and consoJ.idate. power,. The common.t beme with other groups in the am1y was hatred for the Pl(l, ·. the Itidonesiah Communi~t Party. A. ti~tly knit group of officers served him briJfomtly while hi~ inain political rival, the PKI, was obliterated and his group enjoyed the supporfof the other generals. This kind of military junta did not last Jong. Already in 1968, civilian groups like the banned politieal parties, PSI and 1iJasyumi, soon.realised. they had been misused by tlje military.- The. same · thing happened with the students;. their so-called coalition with ABRI, the armed forces, turned out to be illusion. The gr9µp of generals.who became, kµown as the Orde Bane radisajs, like J;iharsono,>K~maJidris and Sarwo &!hie, were soon in conflict with Suharto who had no intention of going along with their proposal to overhaul the political structures; the destruction of the PKI and ·the unions was sufficient for the kind of law and order he wanted. Through years of setbacks and achievements, Suharto managed to get ·rid of every other group of gen:... erals. In 1974 another major clash occurred, this t4ue with, the high-profile General Soemitrci, the second most powerful man in ··the coun,try, Soemitro lost the battle, "was publicly humiliated and stripped · of all his positiOns. Recently, Soemitro emerged from obscurity to head the conservative wing of anny opposition to Suharto. Then in the late 1970s, a powerful new group of dissidentgeuerals emerged, kriown as FOSKO TNI, backed by General Widodo, the anny chief of staff. The FOSKO group was heterogeneous; though poweifuJ / as individtials, it did not stand a chance against the determined.a nd ruthless Suharto. The period of restructuring His infamous 1980 speeches in Pakanbaru and Cijantung officially ended co11solidation period of bis rule. All competing groups of officers were sidestepped and Suharto began the, Herculean task of overhauling the political and ideofogical structures. By 1985 1he formal political infra..:. structure of the country was fjnalised - all insti1uti6!1S and political entities were standardised, unified and Pancasila. ized. The three political parties bad to conform to the same set. of principles, along With.all trade unions, and wo:rrieri and youth organisations. Political restructuring proceeded relatively smoothly; criticism was suppressed by ttie new generation of officers under General Murdani. The.most difficult task now ' rcstrncturing ' the economy. the wak From an oil to. a non-oil economy Up to 1985 Itic:loriesia was a typical third world country, relying primarily o~. ~ts natural resources. As a major oil and gas producer, Indcmesia's n.ationa1 income relied.heavily on. thes9 two products, J'he 1985 slump in oil prices hit lndones,ia ~ard while efforts to ·develop. an economy with a broa~er base were nqt entirely successful. Suharto his team '. pf te,e,:lin.ocrats paved the way for.an export economy whi~h..' required a major over11aul of. the economy. The eco~omy.was,Jikea parasite, dependent on oil revenues arid foreign aid. In orqer;to bqost market;forces, many obstacles reguJat10ns. From 1987 on, deregulatory '· liberalisatioq i:ieas,}l:e.S, "7'ere introduced, followed by. a bqqm. For.Athe first }l.llle m Indonesian history, accumulatiqn of capital. occurred.on a large scale.,Bu.t.t he governil1ent's policy of e~ credit for.small tra<iers and businessmen.was,a.fia§CP and many smalJ vemui;es, collapsed. The present boom is very different; free range has been and The transformation o/Sulwrto: from military to "Civilian dictator. TAPOL,Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 8] === given to huge conglomerates which, together with a number of.new banks, have a stranglehold on the.ecsmomy. From a free-enterprise point of view, the Indonesian econOTI1Y is functioning well, even becoming.O,Velhe~te,d..·Haviqg.· got through.the re~cturing of ihe e9onomy, Suharto.has had to prepare himself for a new era. Let us call iUhe period of the benefactor. Suharto, the benefactor? A comparison is often made with South Korea 1s emergence as an industrial giant lt took.three dictators, Park;iChuhg Hee, the rigid law and order man (Suharto of thCseventies), Chun DoHwan, who streamlined the state apparatus 'fotthe take-off to ·industrialisation (Suharto of the eighties, restructuring the political institutiOns· and economy) and the enlightened dictator, Roh Tae Woo run11ing· a flourishing industrial nation (Suharto of the nineties,,reducing authhrifarian pressures by granting a few freedoms and trying to redistribuie wealth). What took Korea three · dictators •to accomplish, Suharto is detem1ined to: do single-handed Indonesia joins the ranks of industrial nations. A Jot has changed in the last 25 years~ A snapshot comparison of 1965 and 1990 wil1 reveal stark differences, particularly iii the economy. Suharto inherited an economy in tatters, with an inflation rate of 650%. Indonesia naw ·eiijoys eeo11omiC growth of around 7%. The Gulf crisis could boost growth even further though fnclonesia's present heavy reliance on tbc eAport of manufactured consumer goods couJd suffer badly from a Gulf-crisis induced world recession. Three years of economic boom have already brought drastic social changes in the big cities. Top corporate ma~agcrsaJld bankers appear weekly on/ the front Bages of glossy.magazines. The public is exhorted to · adll1ire the corporate supremos, a trend noticable during the days of the 'casino ecof1omy' eighties of the US and.the l]E;. TJle.-tr?.ditiq:naJ view that getting-rich-quick Wil-!S only for. criminals. ~nd corruptors is fading. Success stories.of 'people like Tanri Abeng and Prajogo Pangestu are part of the ·reality for middle class teenager8.,A.flood of white ·collar jobs with the new corporations has created a new:Class(.)~ profes::;iona1s. More tha"l 10,000 Indonesians are attending courses and classes in the US,.many in banking, business adm,inistratiqn and computer practice. A new middle.¢las::;, is em,crgin& with lifestyles similar to their couI}tetpatts in Tokyo, Ni::w York ot London. Four of.Suharto's chiklren have joined ~he. ranks... rri corporate tycoons. In:rnany important.business.deals, U-oiii centres, petrochemicals, plywood and the clove mo:qppoly, the Suharto kids, are up:front and always ip tlie news. But there is a dark side in.the story. The ·swift growth. of 1he conglomerates has.•. created a. deep cleavage iii, s9ciety. The gap be.tW:een rich and poor.has never _be,en gi:e~ter.;md growing of the. popr is obvious; ·the ne..v.consu1l1cr-m)nded m,i,dple class daily.P~~~de. their wealth jn the b;u$y;.stree}i).Qf.Ja~~a: The greed of 1h.e Suharto family i~.? ·m~tt~r ()f ~it~f.r resent..: ment cocktail parties in iakarta is. primarily about the wrong:. economic stratum, the 'm~<lgemerit class', a~lfto ' ta~e a stand independently of the e:xecutive and able t(j moveth.e economy forward or hold it back. The grip · uf the Fm{ family on the · e¢onomy is still relatively · tight· but tbe development of a· free enterpriSe capitalist ·society Will · · · · ·· Members of the elite club: Pa,ngesfu frayog0. with fbu Tien an~ her eldest daughter, Mbak Tutu(. create new relations betw~en the corporate class and the executive. The ·first filgns of 'corporate independence' em~rged when Suharto came up with his masterc..sttoke to ·mstruct "the major conglomerates to hand over 25% of their share.s to cooperatives. This gesture caught the headlines weeks, but the 31 tycoons SUIDillOned to Suharto's Tapos ranch were only prepared to offer 1 % of their shares. Interest in this gesture has faded and it is doubtful whether it has in for the end made Suharto more popular. T~'§!~<izji_~~ti?~< among TAPOTu\BuHetin 'No.'101, October 1990 === [PDF page 9] === POLITICS Political reform rt has been argued in several se~1i-t1ax;s.r_ecently ttiat new openings in.the economy should be accompanied by a political thaw. Economic democracy shmdd go hand in hand with political democracy. It could be argued thatat present, the government is less heavy-handed than.before. The PPP conference in 1989 was allowecj to choose its own board and chairman. A more recent example is the conflict within IKADIN (Indonesian Lawyers i\ssociation) ended in humiliating defeat for the group endorsed ·by ·the Minister of Justice, General Ismael.Saleh. The apparent tela,xation for the press is another indication. The most recent thaw came with the announcement by Home M.inister General Rudini and Coordinatmg Minister Admiral Sudomo that the press was permitted to mention the 'Group of 50' (now 58). This green light led several papers to give. front page headlines to members of the Group wpen they g~eeted General Dharsono, the country's best:--known dissident, when he was released from prison. It is arguable whether the new political openings · are really meant to last. It is undeniably true that Suharto is grad~ally losing his grip on sections of the a~cd forces and sections. of Golkar, the two pillars of his rule. The pre.sent political openings could wcJJ be the resu.lt ·of bickering at the top, but they do give more leeway for reforms. Some. argue that Suharto is still in control and is planning to make more economic and political openings. It is argued that in Suharto's cunning calculation, the current power pyramid could easily lead to his downfall, following in the footsteps of Nicolai Ceausescu and Samuel Doe. Suharto has probably been observing the low profile taken by General Chatichai Choonhavan of Thailand, where free ent~rprise has become the credo of the nation. But he is still far removed from Chatichai's posture and many doubt whether Suharto genuinely wants to pave the way to a more democratic society. The best way for him to preserve his empire, the wealth the Family acquired over the years, is. the de-Suhartoization of himself. The process of dismantling 'Suharto'.by Suharto means a gradual shift towards image change. But knowing his capacity for cunning, his is unlikely to ·allow the pro-democracy movement 10 push thmgs too fav,, Tinkering with human rights In his Proclamation Day speech on 16 August, President Suharto spoke about the need for more open dialogue. "There is no nee(i to fear differences of opinion'~ he said, arguing that with the state ideology, Pancasila, now firmly e$tabli§hed as the sole ideology, there was room for differences of opinion to emerge. He even spoke about the need "to promote human rights'~ adding that this should not be interpreted as referring t~ "the rights, of individuals which ignore the interests of society, the nation and the state". The mention of human rights has ~t commentators wondering whether the Suharto regime is aboµt to pursue a policy of openness, raising hopes that human rights abuses will now be on the political agenda. However~ recent developments do not encourage these hopes. Strike bail lifted? The first hint of some rights being restored came with an announcement from Manpower Minister Cosmos Batubara that a 1963 decree banning strikes bas been repeaJed. This led to press reports asserting that the ban on strikes has been lifted. Yet Batubara was quick to adc,l 1hat this did not mean that workers could now go on strike. He said Pancasila Industrial Relations have not been abaridoned., which means that disputes must be resolved · by consultation and consensus, not by strikes. [Kompas, 28 AU.gust 1990] The ·strike ban 'which Batubara lifted was contamed in presidential decision No 123 of 1963 outlawmg strikes at 'vital government projects'. Lifting the ban makes no difference since these projects have long been completed. A lawyer experienced in 1he operation of Indonesia's labour laws said the latest decision would make no difference to workers' rights. Syaniar Mahnida said that even though there is Dow DO Jaw or decree banning strikes, a 1957 Jaw still in force makes it virtually impossible for workers to go on strike. They are required by law to exp1am m Writmg to their employers and to the regional board for the resolution of labour disputes their reason for planning strike action; they must also confinrt tqat they have had negotiations. She said one-day strikes often occur but not all-out strikes in the meaning of the law. [Kompas, 31 August 1990],The decision to lift the 1963 ban is almost certainly the result of pressure from.the US where the AFL\CIO has for years argued that labour Jaws in Indonesia are an obstacle to continuing GSP [Generalised System. of Preferences] status for Indonesian goods. A government delegation was recently in Washington for di~C)Jssions with members of Congress. a?out workers' rights. As if to curry favour with world op~.1on and protect foreign trade, Batub.a ra claimed that revoking the 1963 ban is proofthat "Indonesia respects uni~ersal workers' rights". [Editor, 8.9.1990] Censorship relaxed? Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator for Politi~! and Security Affairs _recently said that from now on there will be no more inki;ig out o!. items in publicatio.n,s frqn1 ov~rseas. H~ admitted.that the prac:fice. only makys people cunous to find out what has been censored which can then TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 10] === be photocopied and circulated. Sudomo also promised an end to what bas become known as the 'telephone culture', the.system whereby officials from the 1nformation Department or the security forces phone editors with 'advipe'.i 9~ what no~ tp pupJ_i~h.. enthusiasm for gr~ater press freedom. For hl.m, the 'tek..::·' phone culture' (described by Tempo as "almost 100% effective"), is a form of "interaction" between the government (and th¥ pryss. "W.e pon'J ppctice. ~11sor_ship, ''. · he declared, adding,.'.' We don'tneed)t 11~ the press has Jeai:n9d to censor itself.. Press coverage of the·Sudomo.promise w,as. ~cepticaI'.Ppe weekly referrccl to Jaws and regulations >Vhich _proh.ibitrt,he publication of infonnat!on decnled ·. to b.e in con.flig wit~ anything considerecl a§> "disrupting p11blic order\ Jhe head of public relations at the Public Prosecutor's Office said a 'clearing house' of officials from BA.KI1'fu l1~4 BAfS. (the tion, examines what print material may Alld,i11ay,, n,91,:be "AsJong a,s the regulations.in force ha.Ye Jl()t been rppealed, censorship will continue," [Tenipo, LSeptembc,r]. 1y Pages 17 q,nd 18 of a mid:-August iS:Sue_p_ f 1J.w.§'c:on01nist With an arttcJe about Suharto's re1at_io.11s with. th~ ·n.e:w. arµ:iy commanders, had bqen torn out,;md a si111j.1ar item W9§ ren;ioved.from a recent issue of the Bong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review.. Unreported events. At least two recent incidents.have not been reported anywhete · in the Indonesian.press: They are: · * A.demonstration of dozens of young people outside the presidential palace on 17 August carrying banners calling for an end to the Suharto presidency, an end to nepotism and the introduction of democratic rights. TWO BOOKS ON 1965 BANNED Two weeks after Singgfu, 1U1c newly-appointed AttorneyGenera1 took office (following the sudden death of the previous incumbent), he announced that four more books have.been!Janned. Two· of the books.ar~ abo~tctJie eycnis of 1965 which. brought Suhano to power., Dale Scott, arguing that,Suha.rto wa~ responsible for tl1e so-: called. abortive coup of l October 1965. Dale,,Scott aJ§9 produced evidence that financial l~:S ~.et:w.ee.q m,ajqr. US companies like Lockllee9 an~ Jndonesia.'s former p,resid,e11t, Sukarno,:were switched-J o the Su.lla.rto. group s9111e. time before. the.October 1965 events, indicating th11t circle~ in the US were, promoting his. plans to sei,ze,; power. The artide, entitled "The United States. and.the Overthrow of Vol.58, No. 2; Summer,1985. The other banned 1965 book is 171e Devious Dalang, Sukarno and the So-calledU)itung,Putsch which contains the alleged verbatim rycord of the iJl!errogation of a former personal aide · ·the late Presi_d ent SU]{arno, Colonel Bambang S. Widjanarko, imp1i,cating ·s~amo in the October 1965 affair. The authenticity of the ve~batim record has long been challenged in. th6, Netlierla:n~, where the book was first · published. Colonel Widjanai:ko has also condemned the book as a fraud and has since published his own memoirs about his.periocl of.se~vic.e with Sukarno. The two other boqks outlawed are)ress dipping collections by Petrus Ba.rnbang SiS'J{oyo. }feboh Ayat-Ayat Setan covers the response,in the 1ndonesfan · press to Salman. Rushdie's Satanic Verses, while Geger Lampung dan Kaum Sempalan coJla~es pr~ss renorting' ontl-J~- f-ampung atrocity in February 1~S9'. Biswoyo bas publisheO. Il1any collections of press clippings ab9ut importan.t jncjden~~' all of which have been ba!lped. ' * A, pro-independence demonstration ifl,Dili on 4 September, at the end of a Catholic Mass. attended.· by · tens,,of thousands of people [see separate item]. ": Re-e~amining. Jbe ex-tapols... again! Two years before Indonesia next goes to the poJls, more investigation to detemline their fitness to take ·p~rl in ·the country's 'Festival of Democracy'. As we pointed out two issues " ago ' [TAPOL Bulletin · No.. 99 1• June ·. 1990],; the government.ari:i:louncemcnt,fo February.t hat<restrktions rori 'ex""PKI' enfranchisement,would be lifted was nothing more than a smoke-screen. All people classified as A, B or Cl; C2,and 9 wiff be investigated starting September Jhis year;. An idea ()f bow the system:will. work nation:"'"wide Jias.been giv.en,bY:Jhe level and the results will be. passed: up thrpµgh ·.th~,vwi.oqs commander is chair), tbe ·Millister of th~,Interior and tQe General El~.ctions and The fact that a 'PKI suspect' was permitted to vote in a preyfous.electiqn is. not taken. iµto} axount. ''If there are fudications that the" person has not' complied with the provisions, the fact tl1at she/he could vote last time round will.be re-considered," said, Bari Sugim:an,,social• and political affairs chief. at the dnterior Department., The national: and regional agencies..in charge. of re::-:streening 'PKI. suspects' include Ahe police ' forte,, -ther public While the new litsus regulation. places.ideological:control suspects' remains in the: hands of the·, anny.' s national stability 11gency~:_ What ·. it.,boils.down to is thahthe;general election;> have become the pretext for the sy~urity; f o:rj;C~ to carry oµt _fjye-yearly screening of anyQne susp~cteci qf J~Kl membership or sympathies dati.t1g ba<;:k. 25 years..i Source: Jawa fos 31.8.1990. and Surabaya Post,29.8.1990. Meanwhile, -simultaneously with 1he startof the screening of 'ex-PKI' in Ea~t Java, tbe./itsus.investig!'ltion oL: '.c:.:;...'.~~~ Continued on p.19 TAPOL:B ulfotinNo. · 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 11] === Campus life to be liberalised? A government attempt to · pacify sfudents · Who · have for years been shackled by a ban ·on democratically-elected student bodies has boomeranged. In August the gove:tnlllent announced a new regulation on studeiit senates, presenting this as a move allowing the existence of bodies "of the students, for the students and by the students". But the new policy has already been widely rejected. The regulation will replace 1he policy introduced in 1978, after student unrest, when the government enacted; ·it:> Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK);' outlawing political activities on · campus, banning the eXisterice of democratically-elected students councils and placing all student bodies under the control of the university administration. · The regulation provides for stu.dent senates to be s.et up ·at university level (at present they arc only pemut~ed at faculty level), composed of a variety of student ~od1es.,on campus. In effect, the senates will only coordrnate the activities and interests of disparate bodies and not · be representative at an. Moreover, the senates w~l.~till · be under the university administration, with respons1bil1ty for their activities in the ·hands of the red or. Rejected by students Already several representative meetings of students have condemned the new regulaiion as the old policy dressed up in new clothes. The first to·come out against the policy was the Communications Forum of Student Senates at the University · of ·fndonesia, Jakarta, which issued a statement signed by all but two, of the persons chairing the various faculty senates. [Kompas, 24.8.1990] A few days after the statement had beeh widely reported in the press, a 'correction' was circulated by the university, alleging that the statement was not legitimate because it had 'not been cleared with the rector. [Kompas, 27.8.1990) At Pajajaran University, Bandung, eleven senates also condemned tJ1e regulation for failing "1o accommodate (the principle of) student independence" and as "a government attempt at politica1 manipulation". {Kompas, 29.8.1990] Hariman Siregar, a 1978 student leader, called the new policy "irrelevant". It is not for government to regulate student organisations. "There is no need for · government interlerence. Students should be left to set up bodies as they wish." Harsh words also came from Koekeritsz (Ondos),. a student of the Bandung fnstitute of Technology who went on hunger-strike last year in protest against expulsions of many ITB students in August. "Students may ·elect members of these (new) senates yet supreme control is with the rector. So, what about the students' right to control things?" He saw the new move as proof that "the government is afraid of students becoming po.Jitical". [Kompas, 8.8.1990]* Move to Nusakembangan reversed At the beginning of September, eight students serving prison sentences in Bandung and Yogyakarta were secretly moved from their prisons late at night and transferred to the notorious Nusakembangan Prison IsJand in Central Java. News of the transfer aroused a storm,of pro1est. The prisoners in Bandung were removed so quickly that they had no time to take a change of clothing O! ' a toothbrush. Neither their lawyers nor their families knew anything about the move. Student colleagues iii Bandung quickly took solidarity action, demanding the return of the prisoners to Kebon Waru -Prison. The two Yogyakarta students were hand-cuffed for the transfer. The Bandung students are from the Bandung Institute.of Technology (ITB) and were sentenced to three years each for participating in a protest against a visit to their campus 10 by Interior Minister, General Rudini on 5 August 1989. [See TAPOL Bulletin No. 98, April 1990] Their sentences have now been upheld by the Supreme CourL The two from Yogyakarta, Barn bang Subomo and Bambang ·Isti Nugroho, are serving seven years and eight years for. possessing leftwing literature and being members of a study group. Their sentences have also been upheld by the 'appealcourts. News of• the transfer provoked such anarf reactions that a semor prison official at the Justice Department,,Baharuddin Lopa, ordered the immed.iate return of the students.· He said Nusakembangan is intended for convicted prisoners serving more than five years. In any case1 only so-called 'high security prisoners' are supposed to ·. be. sent ·to Nusakembangan, although as a deterrent, the government announced some time ago that people charged for corrup'"" TAPOL Bu11etin No. 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 12] === tion under the subversion Jaw would have to serve their sentences there. Located off the south coast of Central Java, Nusakembangan was used to hold thousands of ~ommunist suspects held without trial, after the 1965 crackdown. No offi~i~J ~xplana,tipI1 for t11.e mqve h.a~ \Jeep For.tl1<:;omi.ng though. th~ prison pffi¢ial in. charge 9f'the tr<.u)sfer from Bandung alleged that the six were involved in scuffles inside Kebon Waru Prison and were responsible for the destruction of prison.furniture.· According to our soUices,.Arnold Purba told fri9nds that he. caused '1:.fiflcas,in priscm, as.11 pr9test because prisoners WGre getting foqd ~·o.rth Rp. 900 ·a day, instead of the Rp. 1,350' allocated. An9ther possible expfanatiop is that at Kebon Waru,tliey maintained close Jinks with their student colleagues outside. According to one source, the transfer was ·a warning t9, stuq~pts outside, as opposition to 1he new government regulation on student senates gathers pace. More 1han a dozen students from. the, Cpordination Body of Jakarta Students, went to. Parliament to call on MPs to take action.to reverseJhe m~we. The retµrn of the prisoners is undoubtedly a. yictory; but the six in Bandung have not been returned to their original prison where visiting conditions were quite lax,.but have been split into two groups in separate prisons. The wqere~ STUDENT TR!ABS dock as well? · Another prosecution witness was Hasyim Rahman, a director of.Hasta Mitra, the cotµpf!ny which.publishes the works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. He denied 'ever meeting either Coki or B~mbang Subo_no, The rn.o~~. h~ co_uld ~ay abouts of the Yogyakarta students foHowing their return froU). Nusakembangan is not known. Who gave the· order? Although the transfer was quickly reversed, the incident has become a topic of great. speculation. Initia11y,,it was assumed that the Justice Minister, Ismail Saleh had secretly issued the.order. Lat~r, more. persistent rep0rt~ sµgges{ that the military command in · Bandung, under •. orders.from Bakorstanas in Jakarta, was behmd the move: Whatever the motive; a cover-up is now under way. A Justice Department official in Yogyakarta has claimed that. the decision to move the two Bambangs happened quite independently; it was 'pure coincidence 1 that it happened on..the. same night. Colleagues of the prisoners say that Bakorsumasda is responsible for issuing permits if the prisoners want to make short home visits. This means that.the army. most probably ordered their transfer but now refuses to say why. On 18 September, students in Jakarta made a second visit to Parliament demanding a full investigation. A trial.3bout;boo The trial of the Yogyakarta student activist, Bonar Tigor Naipospos, known to his friends as Coki, who faces charges of subversion, sho\Vs the prosecution ina!Jelligerent mood over the books he read, borrowed or Jent and the articles he used as topics for discussion in se.tnil!ars and study group meetings. There.is nothing else ofsubst?nce in the case. At an early hearing, tl1e judges ordered one of the defence lawyers, l C. Princen to withdraw from the defence team as he was registered as a lawyer only in Jakarta. The prosecution called as Wit.nesses coUeagµ~s of the accused in the Palagan Stuqy Group, induding 'the two Bambangs who are now servirig heavy sentence$ forsimilar 'crimes'. (Bambang Subono refused to testify because of illhealth.) Coki had no objection to m9st of this evidence. What for the accused is normal.i.nteJJectual activity is being dished up by the prosecution as a dangerous act of subversion. Sarne prosecution evidence has b,een pretty ineffectual. Take the writer anp essayist Emha AinunNajib, called by the prosecution. He spoke of discussions on several topics which the accused had a~tendeci. but he, Emh.a,.couJd not recollect much about hin1, ·He referred to discussion at the Hatta Foundation Library in Y ogyakarta on the topic of nationalism. "fn my opinion, what (the accused) said was nothing out of the ordinary; ·much like what the other Commenting on published articles used by the accused in discussion groups, G.vki asked, why, if he 'fY~ bying · accused for usiqg the articles, were the writers not in 1he a d talks was that he had 'answered an inquiry from. Bambang Subono.about books'. [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 21.8.1990]. Bonar Tigor Naipospo$ (rigft.t) ·with his rw> C01Jl_rade~,7 in arms, Bambang lsti Nugroho (left) and Bqmba7Jg.Subono. While no 'limit was ·placed on the number of prosecution witnesse~,.the ~omt would allow.only 5 out of '18 def~hce Witnesses to, appear~ Three 'w ere lecturers in political s~~ence at(}a,djah}~fa,da Uni~ersity who all testified that. the sfady gro'up discussions were useful as a way of broad,ening people's outlooks. One,.t he dean of the social and political sciences faculty, told the co;irt the accused.played an'active role in campus life and was above average as a student. One wonders what sentence the prosecution ·wn1 ~yinand, on the basis of such a flimsy case. TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 11 === [PDF page 13] === TJM()R UN resolution on·human rights For the second year. running, on 30 August, the UN Sub-Commission · on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of· Minorities adopted a · resolution on East Timor. · Noting an international situation "conducive to, dialogue and negotiations as the most adequate. mean~ of resolving local, national and inter-state disputes'~ ·considering "that the people of East T.tmor con:tim~e to be subjected tO grOSS Violations 0/ hum{ln rights I~ and regretting "restrictions imposed by the.local military authorities upon the activities ofspecialised non-governmental organisations'~ the Sub-Commission: 1. Welcomes and encourages the exercise by the Secretary-General of his good offices as mandated by General Assembly resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982 with a view to exploring the avenues for finding a comprehensive solution to the problem of East Timor.. 2. Requests the Indonesian authorities to facilitate. the access to the territory of international humanitarian and development organisations. 3. Appeals to all sides to exercise restraint and, guided by the spirit of dialogue and negotiations, to co-operate fully with the Secretary-Gyneral in the exercise of hj.s good offices with. a view · to findiJlg a · durabl_e settlement of.the conflict. East Timor remains an internationally unsolved problem. The occupation of East Timor has been condemned not only by the United Nations General Assembly Security Council but by many other international organisations. Human rights are daily violated: arbitrary imprisonment, deportation; forced resettlement, torture, summary executions, the absence of the right of association and of freedom of expression. The Final Declaration of the Dublin EEC Foreign Ministers meeting last February recalls again the "disquieting reports of human rights violations" in East Timar. The Socialist Interna1iona] condemns the continuing violation of human rights and the destructipn of the cultural identity of the people of East Timor. The Socialist Int'ernational supports the right of selfdeterminatiou of the people of East Timor. 4. Recommends to the Commission that it consider,. _at its forty-seventh sessfon, the situation pertaiJling to t.iuman rights and fundamental freedoms in East Timor and to this purpose asks the Secretariat to transmit to the Commission all the reliable information received. Point 4 contains the most important addition to previous UN resolutions. Readers who obtain any well-documented infonnation about human rights abuses in East Timor should send it to the UN Secretariat in Geneva, UN Office at Geneva, Palais des Nations, CH"-1211 Geneva, Switzerland. Despite fran(ic lobbying by Indonesian diplomats 'who attended the _session as observers, the Sub-Commission which is composed of 26 independent experts from.all pyer the wodd, adopted the resolution by 14 vote8 to 9, with J abstention, two votes more in favour than last year. The · breakdown of the voting is not known as the decision was adopted py secret ballot. Socialist International Resolution Jose Ramos Horta: The SociaJlst International Council Meeting, held in Cairo on 22-23 May this year, adopted the following resolution on East Timor: persistent East Tfmorese lobbyist at UN New Musical Cassette _East Timor:..... STILL FIGHTING by: Agio Pereira Available from TAPOL Prize £ 6.50 incl. p&p 12 TAPOL Bulletin No.- 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 14] === Testimony from refugees Several Timorese refugees, from Portugal and AustraHa,.wcre in G<;neva to give testimony at the lJN human rights subcommission. Among them was Eduardo da Costa who left.East Timor in June 't his year with the help of the fnternational Red Cross. From Melbourne, Emilia Pires, preside~t of t.he T:imorese Association of Victoria, was also present. Eduardo da Costa's e.xperiences since the Indonesian invasion have been bitter and painful:. * A') a soldier in the Portuguese army, he fled to the mountains when the invasion took place but was,captured, along with his parents and three sisters, in 1979. * His sisters were raped by Indonesian soldiers a~d he was. forced to serve the troops as a bearer and a spy. * On a visit to Ainaro in 1982, he saw twenty persons being killed, among them a close.friend whose widow.was later raped. Another friend's body was dragged round the town behind an army vehicle and later burnt. * Horrified by what he saw, he joined an. underground group but was caught in August 1983 along wHh about five hundred others. * After interrogation and torture in Bali, ail the captives were returned to a prison in Dili; two colleagues had died from the maltreatment which in~luded electric shocks, cigarette burns on the genitals.<md beatings. * On 2 March 1984, he was tried with 42 others. The trial was a · farce; the defendants were told to answer all questions only with one word, 'Yes'. He was sen.tenced to seven years and transferred to Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, to. serve the sentence there. * On 11 March 1988, he was.returned to a prison in Dili. On two occasions, 7 April and 8 June that year, for~ign journalists visited the prison. J;he first time, he was afraid to say anything because. the Gemtan journalist was surrounded by intelligence officers, yeteven ~o, he was later beaten. On the second occasion, he was removed from the prison to avoid meeting an Australian jouma}ist.. * After his reJease on n July 1988, he continued to witness gross violations and · his home was checked three times a week by troops. He was refused · pennission to •return home to Alas to visit his parents whom he had not seen for seven years. * In conclusion, he told the Sub-Commission that his village of Debu-Ain of about a thousand inhabitants, bas been completely destroyed; the survivors now live in new villages built according to the Indonesian army's orders. Why no sanctions against Jakarta? Emilia Pires spoke under the item concerning South Africa, commenting on a report about sanctions. She noted th,at sanctions had played a major role in forcing. the · white minority to rethink its policies. The:imposition of sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait was aJso essential It i.s only regrettable that in the past and in other circumstances, the major industrial powers did not take swift and effective measures that would have discouraged other aggressions.,. ·(T)he invasion and occupation of East · Timor, though condemned by the UN Security Cou.fJcil, were not followed by punitive measures that would have encouraged Indonesia to desist from further aggression. Indonesia under pressure For the first time ever, a human rights activist came toGeneva from Indonesia to condemn human rights violations at home. Jaka Gumilar is an activist from the forestry conservation hetwork, SKEPHI, and the new human rights organisation, INFIGHT. Besides speaking in Geneva, he was also interviewed by the media. We a1sc reproduce an interview he gave to Radio Netherlands programme, S11ara Maluku. .. rights but only on obedience and duty. The militq.risatiqn of society has resulted in rigidity · and authoritarianism, Speaking under the item agenda, on 'the realisation Of economic, social and cultural rig~ts', Gumilar said: producing a system that is bureg.ui:r(Uic, repressive ·and fascist. Basic human rights are vidiated through the enactftient of unjust laws restricting ·the right to o~gan,ise, the right.of. assembly, freedom of speech, and the right to decent social services. These rights are systematically violated by an apparatus of repression, with. laws that (!.tcfu4e pepple's[Jrticipation and benefit the ruling powers. A false consciousness has been created, based not on an a~areness of Referring in particular to the infringement of peopl~'.s collective and traditional rights, Gumilar said ·Javanes"e transmigrants' homes and cpffee plantations had been burnt down in Pulau Panggung, South Sumatra, peasants in Cibodas, West Java were defending their Iandfrom being converted into a golf-course, and similar struggles were taking TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 13 === [PDF page 15] === Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In concJusion) he said: HUMAN·-RIGHTS ·• This is what our rulers call DEMOKRASI PANCASILA.... This is a 'democracy' where exercising basic rights like freedorn ofjhought and free speech tands you in prison! Persecution of ex-tapols condemned Haji "Poni:ke" Princen, staunch defender of human rights in Indonesia. factory on their land, were tried. and given 6-mqnth sentences. In July this year, hundreds of peasants, most of them elderly women, were fired upon by 1roops when they tried to re-occupy land which was illegally seized 23 years ago. He also spoke about the violation of)and rights by the World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo dam and urged the sub-commission to study this case as part of a general study it has undertaken regarding human rights violations resulting from World Bank pra<;tices. Along with the victims of these abuses, human rights activists, many of them students, are intimidated, beaten and taken to court for defending the rights. of oppressed peasants. These included the six Bandung Institute of Technology students sentenced to three years earlier this year and to the two Bambangs in Yogyakarta now serving seven- and eight-year sentences for participating in study groups to discuss the rights protected in the Intemationp.l Another submission at the Sub~Commission drew attention ' to the violation of t11e civil rights of former, allegedly communist political prisoners. It was, said Jusfiq Hadjar; the fourth time this question has been raised \\-ith the UN in Geneva. Conditions for these victims had not improved; on the contrary, a new regulation issued in July this year [see separate ite.m on page 16] had fort?er bro~d~ned.the scope of these abuses. Said Hadjar, who. 1s an act1v1~t of t~e Netherlands-based Movement for Basic Human Rights m Indonesia: As thino-s now stand, one does not even have to be suspected of having been a member (or the ·relative of a member) of the PK! (banned since 1966) to be said now to be 'under its influence'. One does not need to have read a single line of Marx, Lenin, Gramsc~ Mao, Guevara, Castro or whoever, to be labelled a communist in Indonesia...All you need do is express criticism of the government to get the label and lose your rights. He toJd the Sub-commission that an Indonesian diplornaf present at 1he session had warned himself and the oth~r Indonesian present that if they "continue to support the EaSt Timorese cause, our passports will be withdrawn". Hadjar called on the Sub-Commission: 1. to rehabilitate unconditiona11y all those who are suspected as communists or suspected of being under alleged communist influence, and 2. to end the witch-hunt. Princen again prevented from attending Indonesia's foremost huinan rights adivist, HajiJ.C Princen was once again prevented from leaving Indonesia to attend · the 1990 session of the UN human rights subcommission.He had been accredited to attend by th~ Manila-based Regional Council for Human Rights in Southeast Asia. INFIGHT explained The following is Gumilar's interview on Suara Maluku: There are various human rights bodies in Indonesia, the Legal Aid Institute and others, working on human rights. What do you in Infight think aboutthem? · ·.· They have done far less recently than before; very little of<substance, to defend human rights. This is why we dedded to set up fnfight. Take for instance, INGI [International NGO Forum on Indone;sia] which was ~et up by 13Jarge NGOs. They.said they wanted to take a criticaJ look at IGG_I.aid to;ln9.Ppe&ia. But they h,a~~ never gone so far as raise human rights iss11~· They've held five annual meetings so.far but not on~e. have they discu~5-ed issues ljke political prisoner~, the rights of minority peoples, the Lampung Affair~ Tanjung Priok and East Timor. The Legal Aid Institute is well known as.an NGO that defends human rights. But I've not seen them defending PKI people, West Papua11s and others. ~s that tru.e? Some of these cases were defended by the fate Yap Thiam Hien. He took on these cases as defence lawyer, and did so quite 14 TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 16] === fearlessly. But such things haven't happening recently. I refer not only to people like communists but also to Muslim fundamentalists, · W~t Papuans, East Timor~se. ancl.so on. What is th~ composition of Infight? One component ~nsists of NGOs like the forestry ponse~y~tion organisation, SKEPHI, Princen'sJnstitute for the Defence of Human Rights, and others. Another consists of studeI,J.t and non-student activists in Bandung; Jakart~, Central and East Java, and now aJso in Bali. These pei>ple staunchly defend the human rights of many groups. The third component consists of basic groups, peasants and others in the countryside,:vhose land and other rights are being violated. The people we know best are Buyung Nasutioll and Mochtar Lubis. What do they think about Infight? I don't know but.what I do knq'o/ is that there is a lot of competition between NGOs, especially in Jakarta. Wbat I find strange is that they compete no.t about who can best defend human rights but about political interests, personal. interests and abo_ut money. Their behaviour is little better than the law of the jungle, They try to discredit groups we helped form, asserting that we have strong links with the Left in Europe. They say this everywhere, to discredit us. The effect is also to divert funds that might come our way. This is unfair and wrong. If we are supposed to be fighting for democracy, surely we should coope,rate with people of different outlooks. r dont know whether the people who originally set ING! up go along with all this:, Does Infight haYe an ideology of its own? We avoid this because. it.-w:ouJd narrow our ' appeal and close us off from other groups. We don't have a politiqal, line; our attitude in fighting for human rights must be open-minded and universal. We want to defend the rights of everyone, regardless of their beliefs, political convictfons or whatevyr. You are, I belieYe, the first Indonesian with an Indonesian passport to have spoken at a UN human rights commission in Geneva and attacked Indonesia. Do you think you will be able to return home? First, a correction.' I went to Geneva not to attack Indonesia. That's a negative approach. What I tried to do 'was to. give th.e facts. Whal we feel we mu.St do is speak out, speak theJruth and be prepared to take the consequences. If the government sees this as condemnation, so be it. I went to Geneva to talk about things that have actually happened. What did you talk.' about in Geneva? I spoke under Item 8 about Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. I spoke about traditiqqaJ rights and about the poHtical:rights of activists who have defended the rights of others. wha(do I mean by traditional rights? In Indonesia, there are various types of law related to the means of production of the peasants, in particular, land. There are variou~ kinds of tradjiio~al lav.r,, known in some places as ulayat; in other places they go by a different name. These laws perform a specific Junction, and ~hotjld qfully respected. Butthe government never takes such things into account. When it wants to take people's land, it just drives the occupants off and tells them to transmigrate. Often it gives compensatign far below the value of the land. Under traditional Jaw, t11ese people have a very strong legal case. Things qwned under tn1ditiona1 law are tumally owned collectively. There is also village land which is cultivated by village communes, not by individuals. What was the reaction in Geneva? Though they didn't say so explicitly, it was obvious that Indonesian embassy people.'(<'yre not at all happy with what I did..In discussions with me, they used arguments Which I candidly regard as tlµ"eats. But I stuck to the principle that what I 'o/as saying is true. I lrnow this means taking risks, but there's no struggle without ri§k,s· For instance.,.. this was before I had spoken - they apparently thought I would say something about East Timor, so they said: "You'd be!f~r not say anything aiJ()~t East Timor. It's a very sensitive question. If you talk about that, you run the risk of not being Able to return home." What are your hopes for the future? There is more space for demo.crntic activity in fodonesia today than before. ijo doubt this is primarily because?f international developments and also because of pressures from the outside. The Portugue§e ambassador in Geneva tol.d:me the US:has begun to press Indonesia to respect human rights. So we want to work much more energetically to bring about democratic change in Indonesia. I think the greater space internally and pressure from abroad means that our friends overseas who are concerned about democratic rights in fndonesia should take advantage of an this. SA)~ 1'1/UA;t SAYA Milli Ml!Dik. ' HA6iS fllWI' Pr 1<t71J< PAY4H 1 Jlliit l'l!fJAU!N(, f'5TANI f/IYAff,LllHl/NIV)/l "I'm going back to my home village. I've had enough of this terrible city life. Street hawkers are being squeezed out by conglomerates!" ''But 1 want to go to the city. A farmer's life is wretched. The land is grabbed. for all kirnls of projects.....! Pi.ldran Rakyat 11 May 1990 TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 15 === [PDF page 17] === New regulations have been adopted'by the military a~thorittes regardt:fg,the scre~~ing. anis~pervfst~h of alleged 'communist suspects'. The,xegulations now.affect not only persons alleged to have been involved in the 'G30S/PKI' or to have 'fallen.' under the influence'· of such people, but also people alleged to be involved 'in other']\irids ofactivztfes which conflict with.'fqncasi!ci, the Constitittion,the state arid the go~efnmel}t'.; The Indonesians deen:led to have been members or sympathisers of the PKI or the many mass organisations outlawed in 1965. Tl:~e regime alleges that the. PKI.w as responsible for the 3p. September 1965. Movement lafown. as t~e G30S.... H:ence,:by association, all these millions are deemed to have. been 'involved' (terlibat] in the G30S.. When making the new regulations pµblic, ~veraLseniorarmy officers strei,>syd that the authorities had -so far been able 'to track down 'only 2 million' (according to some ac.cou.nts, 'only 1.6 million') mass.organisations, so anothe,r 18 riilllion, must still b,e found. [Jakarta Post, 20 Jti1y 1990] regulations, said: confusion~ have now been sciappedand allsuspects will be investigated. 'case-by-case', regardless. 'o f thefr family connections; · * ·.A ~ne~. concept has been devised, namely 1under the check~d, for. ~heir keterlibatan. Cinvolvement') in the G30S!PKI) o~ 'tpeir keterpengaruhan; * Screening would no<J9nge! be called 'screening' (the English word. h(IS uptil now been usep) bu,t.would. be <;all,ed 'special investigatiOn' (peneliiian khusus), a!Jbreviated.·tp litsus; * 'Special il1vestigations' wo~ld now be conducted no~ by ~he security.agency (Kopkarr1tib in. the days · before · ~alwrstanas). but by •heads.ot goyei:nment departments anp other govern~entc<?ffices. All employees would b~) (lffeCt~,~' some 3.6 million people. in all. Departmental heads would also be responsible for screenh1g people within;their sphere of i~terest (lawyers in the case of.the Justice Departim:nt, teachers in. the c.ase... of the Education and Culture Department ~d SQ on).as as th~ relevant professio~a! bodies;. ,:wen , repealed, its dec,i~ion " regarding the ',classification. of communist suspects as A, ~ orQ c:aiegory still apply. ..T~e followin,~ Yxtr~cts a,re taken, from t]:i~ official English July 1990, on the occasion of a meeting of litsus officials from all government departments. The release is an General TT)' Sutrisno. - 1JJRI Commander Bakorstanai. diief (rzght). Casting the.net even wider some' The new regulations revise aspects of the anti-PKI persecution m~asures in force since Suharto came to power in 1965. General Try Sutrisno, chair of Bakorstana:s,: the Coordinating Body for Maintaining_National S1ability which is responsible.for. drafting and 'implementing the new elucidation of Presidential Decision No 16, 1990 of 17 April 1990 and contains an implementory instruction issued by Bakors1anas in July. It says that special investigation would be conducted would) · mclude studying 'different aspects of an individual's personal character, ·.· t!,i(lt is, his/~e_r life hislory, attitu,.de, activities, opinions diid.:the influence G30S!PKI has had on him/her. Should evidence be obtained.that indicdt'es G.30S!PKI involvement or influence, further steps will be 16 TAFOL Bulletin. No. 101, October,1990 === [PDF page 18] === arranged!Jy the relevant Bakorstanas-related units. Also, should the special investigation reveal indicators of any influence by any other kinds of activities which conflict with Pqncasila, the Constitution, the state and the government, sanctions will be applied as specified in the relevant laws and regulations.... Basically,, all humans are affected by those with whom they interact in their environment. For this reas<:m, a Special Review [litsus] of each civil servant will be undertaken to check for interaction with persons involved in the G30S/PKI incident and with ·. supporters of communism, as such interaction can influence a person's own attitude, opinions and way of thinking such that an overall negative influence is effected on his/her sense of loyalty and obedience to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, State and Government. Basically, any person who has at any time through speech, action or writing an attitude or belief, expressed favour for the one-time PK!, for participants in the G30S!PKI or for the political convictions and strategies of the PK! or the G30S/PKI incident can be 'said to be involved in the G30S!PKI. Alarm Although standard reaction in Indonesia to official pronouncements against communists is usually enthusiiistiC, the new regulation has alarmed many people. The chief of the Civil Service Administration Board wanted. to Jmow whether all the millions of civil servants would now have to be 're-screened'. The answer apparently is that screening will apply to job applicants and government employees about to be promoted. The three.parliamentary political groups fear.that the new regulation could act as a 'stonewa11' againstfreedom of thought. [They ignore the fact that the old one · did precisely that, for anyone suspected of leftwing views.] The weekly Editor warned that being related to excommunists or having oneself been involved during the G30S or during the 'epilogue' was no longer the only issue. People born after 1965 could now be suspect;' moreover, ·the 'epilogue' of the G30S now stretches to the present 1day. The weekly pressed Colonel Saleh, chief Bakorstanas officer for screening, to say what would happen about people who study Marxism. "They can Study it at a library for purposes of comparison. But afterwards we will check to see whether they have been influenced." What about Bambang Isti Nugroho, sentenced to 8 years for reading the. books of Pramoedya Ananta Toer? When he has served his sentence, will he then be considered 'dean'? "In legal terms, yes, but ideologically, no," said Saleh. Would this be for lifo? "Not necessarily, unlike people who have been classified as a B""" category prisoner [tens of thousands of political prisoners were given this classification after 1965, meaning that they were deemed to have been indirectly involved in the G30S but never 1ried for lack of evidence]. The B-category will stick with them whatever they do." Saleh said. the first stage of screening would be a 'cleararn:;e test' [English term used] followed by an interview. "In making. our assessment, we will not just consider whether the answers are right or wrong but discover why people answer as they do. If they say it's bec:ause of their father, we will have to find out more about the father. Maybe he was away from home from 1965 till 1970, so we will have.to investigate whether he ~as 'involved'. That's when we classify the person as have been 'influenced'. [Editor, 28 July) A young women, identified only as 'Sisha', told Editor 1hat her father had been classified as 'PKI'. "The new regulation makes no difference; I will still be classified as Group III [a ne,w expression; perhaps she meant C3), meaning you've been influenced by the G30S/PKI after the event (in the epilogue). Tnat's why I'm just a housewife and have no intention of becoming a civil servant." Couldn't she apply for a job in the private sector? "If company managers are afraid to take on people like me, f will never get a job." So 11ow does General Try Sutrisno explain it all? Asked by Editor how 'influence' can be measured, be said: ''No problem! There will be methods and criteria. If children at school ge1 poor marks, they don 't go up.... It's just a question of maintaining vigilance." What about a young fellow who reads and keeps communist books; would he be suspect? "This depends on whether he discusses it with others. We can't afford to be careless, so books like this will continue to be censored...." One organisation that is not bothered by the new regulation is the PWI (journalists' association). "We have been checking up on journalists like this for years aln~ady, with data from their editors," said PWI chair, MajorGeneral (retired) M Soegeng Widjaja. If a journalist has a PWI mem.bership card, her/his background is already clear. What about articles 'that have been influenced'? How would that be assessed? "By whether they cause public unrest", said Widjaja. The Journalists' Code obliges ~WI members to consider whether or not to publish · an item and the decision hinges on whether it could disturb people and whether it is true. Editorial chiefs cannot evade responsibility, he said. [Suara Karya, 28 July) Criticism Criticism has been voiced by the Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) chair, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, who.said that Bakorstanas had been given powers that belong only t9 the courts. The regulation is 'too flexible' and can result in charges of subversion against. people merely for being critical. The regulation should be reviewed, he said, along with ma!Jy other laws restricling p91Hical rights. Arief Budiman, a lecturer in socfology at Satya Wacana University, said not.lling has changed in essence;ol11y the wording is different. "Anyone cari be hit now. The criterion 'clean-envin:mment' was at.least specific; 'having been influenced by' is.very unclear." Rizal Mallarangeng, a lecturer at Gadjah ~ada University, was more blunt: "Our happiness has beenshort-lived. Nothing has changed. The new regulation merely reflects the continuing traull1.~:<\~out communism. It's this Jrn:ullia that preserves tbe,legitimacy of those in power,'' [Editor; ·28 July 1990.. "Not everyone niay ·study communism" The chief of the state indoctrination.agency, BP.... 7,_Oe~ojo Oesman believes that 1101 all iqembers of society may study Marxism-Leninism. It should only be studied in order to understanq it as something dangerou~», with >all its characteristics, but not as. <l 'teaching'. Ifs study. should be restricted to institutes of higher.learning and cei:tain other forums. He. would have no truck with the..idea that, with glasnost and perestroika, Marxism had basiCa11y changed.. Nor would he ~ ihat the chan_ges in 1he Soviet Union and Eastern Europe meant ·that Marxism is now b<mkrupt. Great vigilance was still requll'ed because the changes had not affected its ideological content, only its "ideo-praxis". TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 17 === [PDF page 19] === POLITICS._ Petition calls on Suharto,to retire in 1993 Dissident general released Two recent events} a Petition signed by 58 people, calling on Suh~rto not to stand for a sixth term~ and the release of Lieut. Gen. (retired) HR Dharsono after serving rn'or~ than five yea:,s on SU;bversion charges, are likely to -raise the temperature ofpolitical debate in lndpnesia in the pen9d leading to (he 1992 general e(ection and the.presid,ential election in 1993. They will undoubtedly affecUhe prospects of the pro-democracy movement which is now taking shape. The Petition signatories include ten of the original signatories of the Petition-of-SO statement which first criticised Suharto in 1980. All the 1980 signatories were black,liSfod and a total press ban was placed on their statenieJ,ltS. Now the group which goes by the. name, Petisi 50 has branches in several cities and can be see as being a politjcalparty.m embryo. Several members or associates }Ve!e tried following the Tanjung Priok massacre.i n September 1984, Il10~t of whom are still in pris91i Dharsono, who w~sreleased from prison on 16 September, was not a signatorf in 1980 but he drew close io the group and.was charged with subyersion because of his involvement in draftj.ng the.Group's White Paper published in the wake of the Tanjung Priok Affair. in its latest statement issued on 14 August, 'the Group says that "since President Suharto has held his position for five consecutive terms which will add up to a quarter pf a century in 1993, this should be considered more than enough, to pave the way for renewal efforts;. further, it should be stipulated that future presidents may.hold the post for no more thantwo terms". The statement calls.for a speedy e~d to all extra-constitutional emergency powers and:insists that all repre~~ptative bodies [the people's consultative assembly - MPR - and tµe national and reg~?nal legislative as~emblie~J should cpn~f$t only of members chosen at general elections [which,would · end the _presence of presidential appointees]. All la~s and regulations.which do. not.conform with basic human rights and the principle of people's. sovereignty should be replaced, it says. The 58 signatories includes academics, several retued anned forces officers, fonner politicaJ party leaders ~s. well as Ci few well-known human.,,rights adivists and _student leaders In prafae. of liber~l demQcracy Lieut.General (retired) Ali Sadikin, the leading exponent of the Petisi group, sp~aldng at the launch of the 14 August statement, caJJed fqr a close examination. of 1he political structure during the period of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia (1950 - 1959). That this was. a period of crisis W,as nothing unusual for a country ]earning · to 11m · an independent politkal system.. But the crisis situatiQn has been used to discredit the liberaJ multi-party system. Setting the tone for a campaign to press for. a p1uraJist political structure, Sadikin said that the problems that.arose led to the i1Il.pesition oLcentralised leadership. He challenged ·1he belief that nothing had bee.n achieved during Indonesia's.brief exper,i ence ofliberal dem.ocracy. Identifying this period. as one of frequent cabinet changes was l;leside the point. Countries in Europe (Italy, for instance) have had to cope with numerous cabinet changes but have m,a.r.iage_d to build very successful economies. Although 'Indonesia's C:onstituent Assembly was near to completing its worlc. in 1959, it was made to appear: asdf it had failed because of the unsatisfactory nature of the multiparty system. ·The ·fesponsibility for this. rests with. civilian and military groups. w!Jich pushed for the establishm~nt of Guided Democracy in July 1959 which lasted till 1965. Nasution's. conversion? D/iarsono (left) just before h4 release, wit Oesman.,a/ Hamidy, 76 years (ce,ntre) serving an 8~year sente11ce, and H.M. Sanusi 68 years, serving 2.0 years. Both were arrested and tried following the Tanjung Priok massacre. .Although Sad.i kin named.no names, the two m.en most responsible for foisting Guided Democracy on the coun1ty fa 1959 were President Sukarno ru1d General Nasution, then army chief- of-staff; •Yet, Nasution, now retired; is one ()f three senior figilres who drew up a document used as the basis for the Petition-of_;58's recent statement. The doci!~ ment, Bigned by Nasuiion, Mohamad Natsir; former M:isp·· umi (Muslim party).leader and H.M. SaniJSi Hatdjadirtatii~ ' fonrre~ly of the Nationalist Party {PNI) deals at some length with.the iniquities of the ptesent party system ~nd 'the composition ·•of:represent11tive bodies under·Suharto·. Only 40. per cent ·of MPru members, · the body whiclf formuJates state policy and elects the president, are eleded; 33 petce"nt 18 TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, Octo.ber ·1990 === [PDF page 20] === are presidential appointees and the remainder are chosen ex officio. The three men are highly critical of the present party system which allows the existence of only three parties, and the requirement that all election C<jildidates.. must be screened by the security ~pp~r?tUS. Many groupsjn. society are not represented at au. A)_though the idea is vot spelt out in' as many words, tbe document present arguments for the restoration of a multi-party system. This is a remarkal:He reversal for a man like Nasution whb, as anny leader in 1952, tried on 17 October of that year to force Sukarno to dissolve parliament and who, in 1959, put pressure on Sukarno fo dissolve the Constituent Assembly and adopt the 1945 Constitution · instead of the · draft Constitution which the.Assembly, · a body elected By universal franchise, had almost cmhpleted. Huge crow9.$ welcome Dh;;ttso,no. and othe.r:memb.ers of.the Petisi group, was outsJde Cipinang Prison to. welconH~. Dharsg110 on: his rele.ase.. Among the many banners unfurled, sorrie hailed hinl asJ'Indonesia's nen preside,nt". All other crow'd. gather~d. in Bandung outside his home. Among the welcoming crowd:>*'.ere students ftom Bandung representing the recently,.-formed Students Solidarity in Defence of Human rights. Some groups carried antigovernment banners which w.ere confisqat~d.by · security forces and one student was taken away for · qu~stioning. In an attempt to sabotage the welcome, the piison authorities order~d Dh~rsono.to leave the prison four ljqurs earlier than planned but he refused to c6mply: The Jakarta ·•milit<try ·..command had issued -'~!' warning against big street demonstrations to. welcome J:)h.arsono and called.on.the publ,ic 'not to politicise' the. 9~G<1sion. The wammg was given prc)minente in the,afln.ed forces newspaper, Angkaf(ln. Jjersenjata. Am1y leaders -ar~ well aware that Dharsono,. ·a former comm~n9er of •the Siliwangi Division, one of Indonesia's most "prestigious. military divisions, still enjoys the respect of many offtcers: Dharsono served 5 years a.Iid eight months of a.se.ven-year sentence, having bee!) given regular remission/ entitlement sentence was reduced pn · appeal ·to seven years. Dharsono and the pro-democracy 1.Jloyemenf Dharsono's conversion from repressive army commander to pro-democracy leader came about following his dismissal by Suharto because of a disagreement over the re-structuring of the poli1ical party system in the late 1960s. While Suharto wanted to retain the existing political parties (minus the PKI), 1reating thell1, in the Guided Demqcracy traditi~n. to a further dose of 'simplification' by forcing them to merge into two parties [!he PPP and the PDI], Dharsono favoured!he dismantlement of all the parties, to be replaced by a US-style two party system. Many other arm{ cs:m1;: ma.nders besides Dbarsono,, whoconfribtited sig11ifica!ftlY 1() the. bloody anti-left crackdown in 1965 whiyh!)rpught Suh<U'to to power, fell foul of th~ New.Order dicti;~orand joined the ranks what becamp. known as B:arisan Sa!dt Dharsono was one of four army c:ommanders.inJava who made up the core of anti-left am1ed militancy; their iioops helped Suharto gain control of Jak;i.rta on 1.0<;tober..J.965. and helped him crush the rebellio.us lJntung gr~up. at its base in Halim on the following day, Dharsono and other anny commanders like Sarwo Edhie (comman.der the PDL11!1Es _{-----:,•··· RPKAD red-beret command()s), 13rig.Genera1 Yasin, commander.of · the. E~st Java ·military command, Brig. GeJ"leral Amir Machmud; Jakarta military commander, and Brig. General Kemal Idris from Kostrad, the army's Strategic Reserve corps, aU sent out their troops to destroy the communist party and associated ·. mass organisations by· means of round-ups and mass killmgs. They soon became known as the Orde Baru Hard- Liners, pressing Suharto to take firm action against Sukarno(whfoh he, be:irig ·a mote subtle politician, refused to do). After losing his job as Siliwangi · commander, ·Dharsono was shunted off as ambassador to Bangkok and the:h Seotll; in the mid-1970s, he was appointed Secretary 'General of ASEAN but was filed for speakilig af a meeting of students during the 1978 student movement Later, he threw iri his · lot with the Petisi group. With the help of a powerfl.ll.team of lawyers, Jed by Adnan Buyung Nasution, he conducted a vigorous de,fence at his trial in 1985, attempting unsuccessfully to expose the provocations of the army which preceded the shooting down of many doiens of Muslim protest,ers in Tanjung Priok. The trial added considerably to his stanwng as a popular figure and a victim of New Order:inj us ti ce. With such antecedents, Dharsono enjoys much credibility in the army and could prove a formidable rival 'to Suharto were he to become the Petisi's alternative to Suharto's candidacy in the 1993 presidential election. Protest against arms sales On June 19, a number of concemed human rights organisations based in the, UK including TAPOL, wrote to British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, to protest againSt the new anus deals ·concltided between British companies and Indonesia [see TAPOL Bulletin No 99]. The letter argued that such weapons could only reinforce the capability of Indonesian forces and their dperations in West Papua.and East Timor...., insurgencies ad1llitted to exist by the British government. R.C. Cook of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded by first stating that the government's arms export policy is based on the right ·of other countries, as sovereign states, to protect.. their · indpendence {ignorh1g the fact that IndQnesia.uses such arms in its suppression of a territory that even the ·UK government does not officiaHy recognise as,a part ofc th.~ Idnonesian sovereign state], and then goes ori to make claim that "the government do not, and would not, allow the export of arms and equipment which. are likely t-0 be used against 1ne civilian population"" and that "this is a policy that applies wherever violation of human rights takes the place". Continued from page 9 governmen~ e:mployees was also started.,tA briefing session for litsus contrnllers in the province was. held by the regional miliW'y commander, Maj. Gen. R. target for these investigations includes job applicants, new. appointees, people holding certairi positions, andemployee5 who have not previously been ·screened, as.well as employees of some private enterprises. [Surabaya Post 28.8.1990] (See separate item for more about litsus.) TAPOL.Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 Hartorio." 1'tle 19 === [PDF page 21] === Dili Mass ends in protest For the third time in less than a year, ymu;ig East Tin;iorese have demonstrated.in favour · of indep~ndenqe, in Dili, ·~I1. the presence of outsiders. The. occasion this time wa~ an anniversary Mass attended by the Apostolic Nuncio froI11 Jakiuta. On 4 September, huncireds. of East Tin1orese unfurled banners saying, "Independence for East Timo~!'', "Lcmg Live Fretilin!",, "Long Live the Maubere Peop1e",,and "Long Live Xanana!" The demonstration.occurred at the e11d of a Catholic Mass in Lecideri, held to commemorate.. th~. 50t11 anniversary of the founding of the Dili Diocese. A numbe,r of senior officials were present, including Mgr Canalini, the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, Bishop Belo, head of the diocese, 'provincial'. governor Mario Carascalao and niany military and non~military officials. As. the Mass drew to a close at. 5.30 pm, the demonstrators began their action, with the Slf pp9rt of many people. among the more than 20,000 peJ;>ple attending Jh.e Mass. The demonstrators made a determined effort to press Mgr Canalini to make a statement clarifying the Vatican'~ stand on East Timor. [There are strong rumours in East Timor that the Vatican may shortly switch its position and. support Eas1 Timor's integration into Indonesia.] The, demonstration continued for about half an hour, during which time Governor Carascalao prevailed on the police not to ·make any arrests. When Canalini left the scene at about 6,00 pm, the demonstrators left in defiant mood. On their way home, scuffles broke out between demonstrators and Indonesians whom they encountered on the streets. When troops arrived to push the demonstrators back, they were ·. pelted with stones. In several places after getting home, the demonstrators continued their anti-Indonesia activities until late that night, attacking Indonesians in the vicinity and mocking them with "Kapan pulang?" ["When are you going home?"] Arrests The demonstration led to a crackdown. The first arrests occurred on 6 September, with more following on 10 and 13 September. Sources in Dili s~y that t.he situation. in Dili is very tense, with Indonesian spldiers in civilian clothing, roaming the streets wielding batons, iron bars and other implements, beating up people. Things were so bad by mid September that Timoresc were afraid to venture out after dark.* Wounded East Timorese stut;/.f!nts tended by Red Cr()s~ · nurses in the garden of Mgr.Belo. Parliamentary mission unlikely Preparations under way for several years for a Portuguese parliamentary mission to visit East Timor appear to have come to a halt. Until mid 1990, the Portuguese,govermµent was exuding confidence.that the visit would tcike pla.(:e this · year, agreement having been reached between. Portugal anci Indonesia about travel and protocol arrangements. ·Tile mission's visit to East Timor has for years been the only talking point in the negotiations between the two countries held in New York under the aegis of the UN Secretary General. Whatever Indonesian diplomats may' have been saying in New York however, it is now clear that the generals in 20 control on ·the ground have had no intention of allowing the. visit · to take. place. It was · reported, in July ·!}lat the Australian ambas.5ador, Philip Flood, was told duririg a vis.it to Dili, that the military anticipate that visit by Portuguese parliamentarians would lead to widespread "social ·unrest'', so they could not contemplate such an event taking pJace for two or three years. [Diario Noticias, 16.7.1990J Portuguese passivity criticised Five Portuguese solidarity groups 1. mcluding. the Commission for the Rights. of the ¥aub.e re People and Peace is Possible in East Timar are strongly critical of the TAPOL Bulletin No. 101, October 1990 === [PDF page 22] === Portuguese government for its passivity on East Timor. In a joint statement.i.Jl July, they said the planned visit of the parliamentary delegation to East Timor has been used to justify such passivity and lack of pol~Hcal will. They criticised the government in partictilarfor. inactivity on the Timor Gap Treaty and for not proceeding with proposals to convene an international parliamentary confere.nce on East Timor and paid tribute to the East Timorcse people Who have shown more and more courage in refusing to accept colonial occupation. [East Timor News No. 37, 8 August 1990] R~<;ent in<r!P:ynts in Dili,.cuJn1inating in the.de;i:n,onstrat~on on 4.September, show that despite repeated cn1ckdowns and dire threats from Minister of Defence, ·General Benny Ml,l!dani, in.a speech in. J:)ili. on 3 F~l>r~ary [see TAPOL Bulletin No.. 99, June 1990], EastTimorese are taking every opport11nity to demonstrate against the Indonesian occupation. Whatever the Portuguese authorities tlmught the visit would achieve, it. was awaited witJ1 great expecta1ion in East Timor as their demand for :.'elf-determination. UN.motives unclear Th.e 1fl1e aims of the visit weie thrown into confusion when Achmed Rafeuddin, UN,.Under Secretary-General with re~pons1bi1ity f()l' past 'Tim.or, told a. Japanes~ MP · on 8 August that if th~ parliamentary mission. took place, this would lead to the solution of the issue and the removal of EastT!P:1Pl' from the UN agenda. Takemura Yasukp met Acnmed ·Rafeuddin whiJe fu New York t.o speak at the. UN D~~9)1;misjit~on cOmmittee on tbe questfon of. East Timor. Sh~· ·'!J.~~~d.for: jhe meeting to. seek clarifi;g~tj~:m ~bout a report in the.Indonesian press claiming that UN SecretaryGener~, Peres de Cue11ar had written to President Suharto expr~ajngtbe hope."that East Timor would.soon q:ase to be anissue at the.wp~l(j o.rganisation". He also alJe~cdly "r~fe~red. to the vast improvenlerits in ipternational relatiop.s, ope~ing up. opportunitie~. for th.e remqval of East Timor fi".om tbe UN agenda,". f!akarta Post,. 26 July 1990] While ~feyq~iP descriqed this. report. as 'fndonesia's interpretation', his rp:mark about the. mission.seemed to COJJfil111 that this might also be tbe UN's interpretation. Li~~oil".on •. Kuwait and East Timor lt is difficult to believe that while the UN Se<::llrlty Council is p&Ssing. a stream of resolutions condemning ·Iraq's ann.exation of ~uwait, the General Assembly could at its se.ssiQn this.. year endorse Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Tim.or. In a statement on, 14 September, Portugal's Prime Minister, Dr Cavaco Silva, said Portugal would continue to campaign for futemational pressure on Indonesia, usfug the Gulf crisis to remind the world of its still unsettled dispute over East Timor. We have to go on putting pressure on the int~fnational community so thai the people of Timar can have some hope of being able to de~ide their own future. All our ambas~·adors have clear instructions on how to proceed in making t!ie connection between this violation of international law, of which the world is fully aware, and that other violation which it sometimes wants to forget. Murdani deplores annexation... of Kuwait! Of alJ Indonesian e;.overnment ministers, Gene{'al Benny Murdani,.?tJ:ir1ister for Defence aJ1d Security, the man m9st clo$ely identified with the, invasion and occupati9n Qf East Tfuior, has been most explicit towar9s Iraq. Asked in P;lrlfament why the government's policy on the Gulf.crisis was unclear, he disagreed and s!l.id that Indonesia officiaJly deplores "the ann,exation of a s.111.all country by a big on.e". Indonesian government policy towards Iraq is influenced by severa] considerations; steering a cqurse that will not alienate the · Muslim community, not.~dopting a position that will boomerang unfavourably on Indonesia's own forcible annexations of West Papua and East Tim()r, and weighing up the impact Qf oil price rises on ·the.Indonesian econoiµy. Th<;rc.is a split within the Muslim community; some Muslims sympathise with Saddam's expansionist nationalism, some are more sympathetic to Saudi ·. Arabia, while others reject the US occupation of Saudi Arabia, the site of.the most holy s~r;ipes.· of ~~lain. · Wi~h thousap~s voluntecrfug to fight for Iraq, the government ha.s warned that anyone taking up arms ina foreign co~ntry risks losing their Indonesian citizenship..The government has rejected a call from Saudi Arabia. to send troops to the Gulf, sayiJig thatlndonesian troops can only be deployed overseas at the requ~st of the United Nations. BEOOD ·ON THEIR BANNER Nationalist Struggles in the South Padfic EAST TIMOR :iTAll: ~IESi TQ.TlltC1' by D.AVIJ) ROBIE DEt'Ol.O.'llS.~TIO!"' COM.\IJTfEE London and New Jersey occasiooal reports no.13 Occasional Reports nml3 contains TAPOL's submission to the 1990 meetil).g of the UN De c. Q 1 on is a ti h n Committee. Price.. £1.00 a ·copy, including ·postage. Pluto PR$5 Australia 300 pages, Illustrated, J\$ •19.95 will be. reviewed in the.ne~t · TAJ>OL bulletin TA.POL·Bulletin·No. 101, October 1990 21 === [PDF page 23] === EASTTIMOR Indonesia slammed at UN Decolonisation Committee Twenty-two petitioners attending this yeaf~ session of the UN Decolonisation Committee on August 9 called for East Timor's right to self-determination to be exercised. A summary of som~. of these stateme1J,ts is given below. The remainder. will follow in the next issue. · Indonesia's continued occupation, exploitation and oppression of East Timar was the main theme of submissions by non-governmental organisations. Petitioners detected no improvement in,Indonesia's record of ~uman rights violations and no let u·p in the killing and torture of East T~orese. Many statements referred to. the Gadjah Mada University sociologists' report on 'ihe:situation in the cciuntry '· such an indictment of the 'occupation, that last minute "atte1Ilpts were ma:cJe to hush it up in Indonesia. To.illustrate the regime's attempt to crush the independence movement, many petitioners quoted · [rom: Defor~ce Minister General Benny Murdani's speech to ·officials fa Dill, while Bishop,BeJo's appeal to the UN for a ·referenfound continued support. [For details of the Gadjah Mada repop and,Murdani's speech see TAPqJ,,, Bulletir; Nos 99 and 100, June and August 1990.J The l]N's reaction to Iraq's invasion 9f Kuw,a it was compared with its failure to foJJow-up the Security Council's ·unanimous condemnation of the invasion bf East Timor in 1975. This year, for the first, time, an Indonesian national was among the East. Til1lorese~ Japimese, Canadiilli, Australian and European voices calling on the UN to expedite the decolonisation East Timor. dum One big concentration camp Alexander George, TAPOL, described how the same basic military oppression remained in East Timor a11d 1~o\\',recent Jose Luis Gutteres at UN East Timor. He appealed tD fodonesia, to stop··.further operations; FRETILIN is prepared to talk \Vith Indonesia without pre-conditiDns, and ready to participate. in a referendum or free election supervised · by the Ull[. He appealed ·. to multinationals noJ to exploit · East Tin19r'( oil until a political settlement had been achieved. changes, such as the promotion of tourism, were cosmetic: Parliamentarians.speak cmt for East Tim.()·F..•.. Eas.t Timorese refugees · au;iving, recently in Australia and Portugal confirmed that East Tiffi.or:was "one fag '''concen-, Several submissions were" made by members of Parlia.Jlleri:... tration camp". He described the · recent military build,:_up and outlined new.,,, forms.of resistance. by the,younger generation, to cope with fndonesia''s "hearts and minds" strategy. He.cast doupt on. clai.lll's by. f.ndonesia ihat, the TimTim had been disbanded. Gadjllh Mada findirigs were "one of the most searing indittment;:;_of Jndonesian rule in East Timar to d<!.te"; he commended · the report careful consideration by the Decolonisation Committee. for Jose Luis Gutt~r~~. FRETIUN, recalled how his movement had resisted the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. Afte,r 15 'years of terror, when approximately a third Of the population ·had died, fndonesian military forces still occupied the country. Over the past year, the youth of East Timor has been e.~c0.1Jfag~d by:_tp.e., victories pf J:ALIN'TIL the liberation army, and by changes in the international situation, to demonstrate peacefuJJy against the foreign occupation,.but the demonstrations were brutally S1:1JlPT~s~d by fndonesian troops. Sixty people were injured after demonstrations.when US Ambassador John Monjo.visited.,-. 22 tariaris for East Timor (PET). Yasuko Takemura, one of 87 PET members in the Japanese Diet, said the ~st. Timorese, ~s the llprimary party", should be included in UN tall~s. She drew ·attention to fudonesia's population control prograrxune in East Timoi, which "is forcibly carried out, in spite of the fact that onethird of the population there have died under the Indonesia!J occupation" and which Tin10rese women regard as "a form of genocide". Japanese, PET members regret Japan'~ invasion o.f East Timor in the 1940s so~ sh~,felt compelled to attend the UN on the anniversary of the ~ornbing of Nagasaki, when she would nonnallyhe attlie nation-wide prayer for peace, because "Iridonesfa.is >rep<;~ting ·thc samr sin as we committed in the past." Japan has.riot recognise9, the incorporation of East Timor into!nd6nesia. she said. All maps and globes in the Japanese Foreign Ministry havea line separating East Timor from Indones"ia, fhank.S io"the efforts of herself and others, Ray Funk, Canadian·. MP, asked. why, when East Tin1or's TAPOL Bulletin'No: 101;' 0ctobdr 1990 nations === [PDF page 24] === ''silently acquiesced" to Indonesia's occupation. Too few were aware of the plight of East Timor while economic and geopolitical considerations took precedence over the rights of the East Timorese. He referred to Canada's disappointing record as the third largest investor in Indonesia, and aHacked Western gqvemmen1s for being ''only too happy" to sell arms and loan money to Indonesia, wh~e 1here is little doubt that "these fun(Js and these weapons have assisted Inclouesia to maintain the military occupation of East Timor". Comparing East Tip:iorese,. a~d,n.ative Canadians,. both discrimiuateq against in a colonial relationship, he said 1hc "spirit of coloniaJism" live on so long as humanity continues to subordinaie human rights and conserving the environment to economic gain..· As a model. for talks to establish a mechanis,i'A ·whereby East Timorese freely express their will, he suggested the West Sahara negotiatio11s for UN sµpervis'iol} ofthe decision-makil)g process. Canadia1i PET members wi1J c011tribute to glbbal efforts 'for justice.iu East Tirrior ·"with renewed vigour", to reverse canada's,;hypocritical'' stance.,,, will. Portugal's ru]e of East Timor was over, but it had the duty to uphold the fundamental rights of East Timor's people. It firmly Qe1ieved th.;it East Timor.co~stituted one of the most!)erious challenges to t~e- ~applitation ofthe decolonisation principles of General Assembly. resolution 1514. Portugal would cooperate to achieve a settlement and in that spirit, he was participating iJl ta~ aimed at reachiug the terms of ref~rence for the visit of,a PortuIDiese Parliameµtary delegation to East Timoc. A.better. ~~~10sphere co,uld be created arthe talks if the respect for human rights and basic freedoms in East Timor showed signs of improvement, which see:ined not fo be the case~ The · Timof Gap Treaty was a serious breach of international 'Jaw in contempt of the UN and of the sovereign rights of the &st Timorese over their natural resources. Portugal reserved the right to resort to any legal means deemed appropiiate to uphold these rights; [To be continued next issueJ Laurie · i<'erguson, Australian Labour MP, said he was speaking iJ1 an ·unofficial capacity. He dwelt on the massive loss of population. If I.he populaiion J1ad grown by the. 2% of 1975, Whoh the population was 690,000, today's population should be moie than 9:jO,OOO; in fact there are less than 650;000 people -:- including outsiders - fa East Timm. ''In relative terms this is 1oss of population without equal in world 1roubfo sp()t$ siuce the end of World War If". East Timar has not prospered under Indonesia; tiie wealth is ·controlled by fooor1csians, nof East Timorese. He disagreed that East Timor was too small to be independent and· JI1cntfoned many smaller independent natfons. The agreement between Indonesia and Australia to exploit Tinior Gap oil has no provision to share revenues with East Timor. AS an, independent country, taking advantage of its resources, E;;tst Tu1for, could by now be of similar economic standing.Jo 'thy sl,ll~11.$f~\e:, o~ Brunei. Rqj Jose Santos SHva, '. Portuguese MP, said t~e aims of the 16-:-year old democracy. in Portugal -had n0J been entirely fulfilled. Portugal's African. colonies had exercised selfdetermination but the rights the East Timorese are stHJ being violated, their lives taken and. their future.curtailed. They refuse to give up.their identity, despite Indonesian atrocities. He said Portugal would remain bound by its responsibility.to safeguard East Timor's self-deterpiinat.ion. i>ortugal had wish to reoccupy East Timor, only to help 1he East Timorese freely detenninc their fuiure. Antonia Maria Pereira~ Portuguese. MP,,. ~~id. fraq 's invasion of Kuwait was a "carbon-copy 11 of-the Indonesian iuvasion. of East Timor, With both aggressors giving the same justifications: Tn 1975, the Security Council. haadopted.·a resolution ordering Indonesia to withdraw its troops, as it has done in the case of Kuwait. How could some countries look benevolently on the, [odone,siail action, but condeml) I~~q? Raul Fernando Souselo de Brito, Portuguese MP, con- ' demned the denial of self-dcterminati<m;md ·the violation of other human rights in East Timor. The }>orluguesefodonesian talkS 'under UN auspices were aimed at findiug a just 5oJutiori 1d"the pfoblem of East Timor. Rui Quartin-SantQs; for·the Portuguese government, said Portugal was ·not tryiqg to "put back the clock of history"; West Papuan ·Peoples Front at UN The Netherlands-based West Papuan Peopies Front spoke out against the Indonesiiin exploitation and colonisation of West Papua at both the UN Working Group: on Indigenous Peoples and at the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection oi Minorities in Geneva, July and August Representative Victor Kaisiepo focused on the pro~independe,nce dcmqn~~riition~ of Deqember 1989, after ~vhic;h eight Papu,ans were refused asylum in neighbouring PNG wl1en Indonesia, Australia. and PNG ''conspired to. deprive indigenou~ Papuans of th.eir right to safety"~ on cpntinuing military operations ag~i11st OPM al the PNG border; on the extradition of Mecky Salosa; on the colonial nature of Indonesian rule and transmigration; ' on thC environmentally destructive n~ture of so-called develop-- · ment projects eg. the Freeport copper mine and ·fogging on Yapen isfa.nd; and ·on·-the general problem of dispossession of tribal lands. The Front also attacked World Wide Fund• for Nature's park projects in West Papua for imposing restrictions on t11e traditional Ji.fe of. West Papuans. The Front called on the UN to acknowledge thc~t West Papuans havq l:n::en denied. thY,ir right t() self-d~termination and.to put forward demand for this. r~ght to, the Decolonisatiqn Committee; to investigate huJI1a~; rights abuses, pressure.t~e. Indonesian govemment to legislate against further immigration. into West Papua and. to prohibit t~e exploitation.of, natural resqurces until Papuans are in a position to determine their. national heritage.,... · TAPQL,Bulletin No, 101, October 1990 23 === [PDF page 25] === .A CEfI Loyalty enforced in Aceh The Indonesian government has staged a series of propaganda exercises inAceh, aimed at convinci17:g a restive and deeply dissatisfied population that they should remain loyal to the Indonesian Republic and assist Indonesian tro9ps in their efforts 'to crush the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). In recent months, tensions in Aceb have mounted; GAM supporters have killed more than 7o.. members the security forces, troops have shot civilians, transmigrants have abandoned their sites and work in northern Aceh's industrial zone is being held up as Javanese engirieers 'are too frightened to return to work. In Jilly, the governor announced that more troops would be sent in to tackle the unrest. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 100 for background.] Over the Jast two months, the authorities have tried coercing, pleading and bribing Acehnese to support. them. On August 5, 655 villagers from Seuneudon sub-district in North Aceh were brought by truck to Lhokseumawe, where they read out pledges of allegiance to the Republic and Pancasila state before miHtary and government officials; They were then made to parade · around the town, waving red and white Indonesian flags. Tneir villages were accused of harbouring GAM leaders. A siege of one of the villages in July reportedly ended in the arrest of GAM leaders. Other reports speak of "hundreds" of villagers, including two GAM commanders, voluntarily returning to "the lap of the tndoncsian motherland". They wrote confessions and accepted they would be punished under the ·Jaw if they broke their pledge of allegiance. Similar allegiance ceremonies have been held in at least two other sub-districts. The so-called surrenders are said to be in response to Governor of Aceh Ibrahim Hasan's appeal to GAM adherents to give themselves up peacefully and they will be "welcomed with open arms" by the government. little disturbance from anny deserters and "peace disturbing gangs" (GPK). Armed Forces chie.f-of~staff Edi Sudradjat went so far as to claim that the problems in Aceh were over. [Suara Merdeka, August 6, 1990], a claim QUt of step with the regional commanderrs announcement tbat. the armed forces would be able to wipe out the group by the end of the year. True, there have been fewer reports of GAM attacl<s,over the last two months, but this does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground. While domestic reporting.is largely confined to.official propaganda, the foreign press is less inhibited. Major business publications such as theFingncia! Times [August 2, 1990) have reported the army effort' in terms of "winning back 0 the support of the Acehnese people, and spoke of majority support for the GAM amqng, the local people. According to the Economist wpic;h.dou.bts the GAM will be finished by the end of the year,,''the.signs are that the activities of the Front [GAM] are incre~sing"* Note to subscribers: due to increasing printiµg and mailing costs we have been obliged to set new prices for our publications. Flying the flag In August, the Indonesian flag was used in another heavyhanded attempt to intimidate the population to pledge loyalty. In August, Governor Hasan instructed Acehiiese families and institutions to display the national flag outside their homes from August 4-10 though independence day is on the l 71h, warning that those who fail to do "shall not be regarded as republicans". [Jakarta Post August 6~ 1990] Aceh's ulamas [teachers of [slam] are among those targeted in the loyalty game. In August, regiment commander Colonel Muhammed Chan asked the ulamas to help ABRI and later, Abdurrahman Wahid, Chair of Nadhatul Ulama, offered to help bring the ulamas round · to the concept of Indonesian nationalism and Pancasik In East Aceh, the district head has offered to buy the loyalty of the population. At an allegiance-swearing ceremony in Langsa, he offered Rp 1 million {US $540) for every rebel weapon turned in. This is no small amount: as noted by the Economist [September 8, 1990] it amounts to a year's income for the average Acehnese. Everything under control? Most government spokesmen contiAue to play down to the serious situation in Aceh. After a one-day visit to the province, cooperatives minister Bustanil Arifin said only one village was not secure and that Aceh was suffering a Subscriptions Annual rates (six issues) (air only) £12.00 £12-.00 Individuals Institutions £18.00 £18.00 Girocbeques and Eurocheques are welcome. TAPOL's Giro Account No: 56 781 4009. Please, no US, Australian or Canadian personal cbeques to London. Australlan S!Jbscribers may pay in A$ to: TAPOL (Australia) PO Box 121, CUfton Hill, Vic. 3068 Rate for individuals: A$30.00 US subscribers may pay in US$ to: Indonesia.Publications, 7538 Newberry.Lane, Lanham-Seabrook, MD 20706 Rate for individuals: US$25.00 . Kindly state that the payment is for TAPOL and make cheques payable to 'Indonesia Publications'. AU other subscriptions and all correspondence to: 'l'APOL, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK Phone: (081) 771-2904 (081) 653-0322 Fax: === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 5] --- Lydman: But one thing you do expect is that you're aware, particularly if you're the ambassador or his deputy, that you're aware of all the reporting that's going out of that embassy, because you're in charge of that embassy. Kadane: I've had some long and very fruitful talks with Bob [Martens] as well as others. He was the PKI expert par excellence, it seems to me [Lydman: Right!] of anyone maybe who ever lived. One of the things he told me he did was fill up many, many, many gaps in the biographical reporting of who was who in the PKI. Lydman: Yes, I think he did. Kadane: And it appears also that Joe Lazarsky [deputy CIA station chief at the embassy] and others have said that on occasion, the CIA added some of their information. [Lydman: Yes.] Kadane: It was a sort of pooled effort. [Lydman: Yeah.] Kadane: And the names had been sent back to Washington [L: Right.] because there had not really been a clear idea of who were the active members of the party. Lydman: I think this was true, and also that, you know, as this scene developed in Indonesia and undeveloped after the coup itself, a lot of fresh information, new information about personalities came up that we probably hadn't been aware of before, because a lot of these PKI people at regional level may in fact have been the new names... that we hadn't tracked before. And Bob did a major job in identifying these people. Kadane: Some have gone so far as to say that he had identified the infrastructure of the PKI, that is to say, the PKI building ransacked in 1965. [Unreadable] that than anybody. There is no question about it, he did. Kadane: Going down to the regional and city organisations, SOBSI [the trade unions], Gerwani [the women's organisation]. Lydman: Oh yes, absolutely. Well, you must remember that there were three and a half million members of PKI and its affiliated organisations. That's a lot of people.... It's amazing, the job that Bob and all the people he worked with did. Absolutely remarkable... (A) fantastic job. I don't know of any officer in a time of crisis who performed more brilliantly than Bob Martens. Kadane: Well, it turned out to be useful, it seems, because one of the things he told me was that these names were disseminated to Kim Adhyatman [aide to Adam Malik] [L: Yes.] who then gave them to Malik and Suharto's people so that they had some way of identifying who these people were. Lydman: I am sure we helped a great deal in this, that Bob Martens with his analytical mind, probably provided a great service. Kadane: In addition to that, others have told me that names came back from Suharto, from Murtopo who was gathering... Lydman: Well, Ali [Murtopo] of course was the intelligence chief -- I know of course that there were relations and networking going on on that, but I can't remember how this one came out. I don't know for example who was the principal contact with Ali, whether it was [Unreadable] [the US defence attaché, now dead] or somebody else. Kadane: Joe Lazarsky said he met with him quite a bit. Lydman: I think Joe maybe did, and I think maybe Bob too had direct relations with him, it's quite possible. I just can't remember it. Kadane: Well, Ali was the guy who was in charge of gathering up in Suharto's HQ the names of people who had been caught or killed. [L: Yes.] And those names were then given back [L: Yeah.] to the embassy and -- they --- [page 6] --- Martens and his group in the political section and maybe some of the CIA people were able to -- as a result of the names going out [L: Yeah.] and the names coming back in, were able to report that the organisation of the PKI was being dismantled, over time. Was that right? Do you recall that? Lydman: Well, I don't recall that but I think it's perfectly plausible.... Of course, we knew that, due to Bob's work. And a lot of other inputs that were coming, and things that we were learning from the Indonesians constantly. We had an idea where the cracks were, and where the fall-outs were, in the PKI. We knew, for example, when the PKI almost collapsed in East Java. We knew when it collapsed in Central Java. Kadane: Oh, I see. That's fantastic! Lydman: We knew when Aidit [PKI chairman] was killed and when Njoto [PKI second deputy chairman] was killed. We knew all of this. Kadane: But you're talking about the main organisation [L: That's right.] when you say, 'It almost collapsed.' Lydman: Well, the regional structures collapsed. Kadane: And you knew when that happened. Lydman: Of course you did. Well, you weren't entirely sure that there weren't still some operating remnants, but you knew that the main infrastructure had collapsed.... Now I don't know how much Bob could follow on what one could call -- uh -- casualty figures and identifications. I think that there was a lot that he could get from the reports that were coming in. But whether you could completely document that process, I rather doubt that, because a lot of these, sort of, local PKI collapses were not that precisely identified as to who the precise casualties were. [K: The names of the individuals?] That's right, these were not that... Kadane: You might have, such as, three Gerwani were arrested and executed but you didn't know who the Gerwani were. Is that what you mean by that? Lydman: Well, that's possible. That's it. Certainly there were a lot of Gerwani who were eliminated and nobody really knew who they were. They just disappeared off the screen. A lot of PKI did. But the names of the well-known people, I think, Bob managed to track. Well, you talked to him, so he could tell you whether or not he felt that he was tracking -- Kadane: He said he experienced some frustrations. [L: I'm sure he did.] But at the same time others at the embassy have said that over time, they were able to calculate that the infrastructure had been destroyed... Lydman: I think that that's true. [K: It was not immediate.] I think that that was true. But it took a long time. It took three or four months. Kadane: Yes, that's right. That's exactly what people have said. [L: They couldn't do it right away.] Well, it took them a while to get to everybody. Lydman: That's right. Recording the slaughter A cable from the US embassy to the State Department, on 14 November 1965, of which only the first page has been declassified, includes an account of the killing of some 3,500 people in Kediri, East Java. These are the kind of people who, as Lydman put it, "disappeared off the screen". 2. Slaughter at Kediri [East Java]. American missionary from Baptist Hospital Kediri told us that 3460 (photocopy unclear, could be 3400) PKI activists were killed by Ansor [youth wing of the Muslim Nahdlatul Ulama party] with probable assistance from Marhaenist [nationalist party, PNI] youths over period Nov 4 - Nov 9. According source, youth leaders had prepared list of victims. After seizing victim concerned, they took him to river bank, where [Unreadable]