The Construction of History under Indonesia's New Order: The Lubang Buaya Official Narrative (PhD diss., Wisconsin, 2009)

=== [PDF page 1] === The Construction of History under Indonesia's New Order: The Making of the Lubang Buaya official Narrative Yosef M. Djakababa A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History) at the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON 2009 === [PDF page 2] === UMI Number: 3400006 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMT Dissertation Publishing UMI 3400006 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. uest ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 === [PDF page 3] === A dissertation entitled 'The Construction of History Under Indonesia's New Order: The Making of the Lubang Buaya Official Narrative" submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Yosef M. Djakababa Date of Final Oral Examination: A u g u s t 24, 2009 Month & Year Degree to be awarded: D e c e m b e r 2009 May August Approval^Signatures of Dissertation Committee Signature, Dean of Graduate School Af&^n C&LjaUcd&L JflU === [PDF page 4] === © Copyright by Yosef M.Djakababa All Rights Reserved === [PDF page 5] === Table of Contents Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface p.iii p.ix Chapter I: Introduction -Introduction -Research methodology and approach for this study p.13 Chapter II: The Historical and Political context of the Event p.18 -The "Madiun affair", 1948 -The revival of the PKI and the 1955 election -The rebellion in the regions -The fiery revolutionary atmosphere -Dwikora and the Konfrontasi - Indonesian social life in the early 1960's -The domination of Sukarno and the building of his cult of personality -Condemning the West -The Catholic group before October 1965 -The communist group before October 1965 -The "isyu" of Dewan Jendral p.20 p.27 p.33 p.45 p.48 p.51 p.59 p.62 p.69 p.78 p.81 Chapter III: October 1st, 1965: a chaotic, confusing and cautious day p.87 -Chaotic and confusing -Cautious -FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Services) -Confusion in American major newspapers -The local newspapers -Chapter conclusion p.87 p.94 p.102 p.105 p.109 p.114 Chapter IV: The purging and the emergence of the initial official version of the events of September 30th p.119 === [PDF page 6] === -The initial version of the Lubang Buoya grand narrative: A short overview -The initial state policy of purging -Implementation of the purging policy -Personal accounts from former political prisoners -Accounts from the interrogator -The interrogations -Conclusion p.121 p.127 p.137 p.139 p.148 p.150 p.156 Chapter V: Revisiting the Mahmillub -The trial ofNjono -The trial of Lieutenant Colonel Untung Samsuri -ThetrialofDr.Subandrio -The trial of Brigadier General Supardjo -Punishments of the four "star" defendants p.160 p.170 p.196 p.209 p.239 p.273 Chapter VI: Symbolizing the "triumphant reality" -Monument -Commemoration day -Docu-drama -Conclusion p.278 p.280 p.290 p.294 p.310 Chapter VII: Conclusion: from legitimacy to triumph p.312 Bibliography p.323 === [PDF page 7] === iii Acknowledgements In making this dissertation up to its current form I had taken very long journey and affected me both intellectually and emotionally. My thank you first of all, is to God almighty for His guidance and protection, throughout this long process. From envisioning the idea, researching, writing and finally editing, I had been fortunate enough to meet many wonderful people who not helped me in many different ways, but also showed the importance and relevance of this project to contemporary Indonesia. My sincere gratitude for all of my committee members especially my major advisor Professor Alfred W.McCoy, who taught me the importance of having good prose and strong analysis in writing history, I feel honored and indebted in having the opportunity of learning and working with one of the most distinguished scholar in Southeast Asian History. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Professor Thongchai Winichakul, whom I admired for his excellent input and ability to think critically beyond the ordinary, Professor Kenneth M.George, sharp criticism and valuable inputs on the dissertation would be very beneficial to shape this project into something beyond a dissertation. Professor R. Anderson Sutton, for his valuable inputs, knowledge and broad expertise on Indonesian political culture that contributed to the impact of the official narrative. Professor Ellen M.Rafferty, not only her extensive expertise on Indonesian literatures and culture had been indispensable to my work, but I also thankful to her for giving me the opportunity to be part of the Indonesian language program as a teacher in === [PDF page 8] === the Department of Language and Cultures of Asia during my graduate career at UWMadison. Finishing my graduate career and dissertation at the University of WisconsinMadison will not be possible without the generous support from its The Center for Southeast Asian Studies. As I climbed the scale of my long graduate career from a graduate students at the Center for the MA program then continuing to the History Department Ph.D program, throughout the years, the Center have provided me not only with generous financial support as an PA, RA, TA and research fellowship, but they also have given me a very warm place which I would always feel at home. I am indebted to Dr.Michael Cullinane, the Center Associate Director, who with his continuous wit and intelligence had become the person that I could always consult, discuss and seeking advice about many matters. He also gave me the opportunity to be his TA in the history 244 class, in which I gained valuable experience both as a teacher, student and historian. My special thanks also for Mary Jo Wilson, whom I had the great opportunity to work with her as Project Assistant for the SEAS SI program. A heart felt thanks also goes for Larry Ashmun the Southeast Asian Librarian at the UW Memorial Library, who assisted me in obtaining important Mahmillub court records, documents, and many books for writing this dissertation. The helpful and friendly staffs at Cornell University Kroch Library Division of Rare Manuscript Collections also deserve thanks for making my research comfortable and productive. === [PDF page 9] === I thank the UW-Madison Department of History for awarding me the international and domestic travel award that partially funded me to do my research in Indonesia and at Cornell University in Ithaca, NY. Through the History Department I also have the honor to be awarded the Genevieve Gorst Herfurth dissertation fellowship that helped me in my write up period. Many thanks for Leslie Abadie and her predecessor James Schlender jr. the graduate coordinator at the Department who has been a great help assisting me going through the maze of campus and department bureaucracies. During my long years living in small but beautiful Madison,WII am fortunate to enjoy the company of great group of colleagues, students and graduate students alike coming from diverse background disciplines whom some of them preceded me in finishing their study and become my good friends; Ruth Dellobet, Sinae Hyun, Erick M.Danzer, Kate Tillery Danzer, Kendra Smith-Howard, Eunsook Jung, James B.Hoesterey, Prajak Kongkirati, Thanapol Limapichart, Cleo Calimbahin, Erlin and Mark Barnard, Kannikar Elbow, Sidhorn Sangdhanoo, Nguyen Thi Thuy Anh, Jennifer Munger, Cecilia M.Adao-Gonzales in Chicago. Special thanks for William Redfern from University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, for the sincere friendship and all the long discussion about many aspects of Indonesian history. Many thanks also goes for my fellow Indonesian friends whom from many years the community had helped me in many ways coping with home sickness through many gatherings that involved laughter, discussion about our hope and concern on Indonesia, over good Indonesian home cooking; E.Arti Wulandari, Laras Sekarasih, Melisa Tjong, === [PDF page 10] === Steve and Sakti Laronga, Fadjar Thufail, Atka Savitri, Nyak Ina Raseuki (mbak Ubiet), Mas Nirwan Dewanto, Mas Renus Suntaredja, Mbak Listya Sari Diyah, Dadit G.Hidayat and family, Renato Yapaulo, Barry Prawira, and the Indonesian Catholic Students Association in Madison. Special thanks for Jolanda M.Pandin who has supported me for years with patience, prayers and perseverance in the process of finishing my dissertation despite my personal predicament, I will be forever indebted to her. While doing research in Indonesia, I am grateful to be supported and inspired by fellow UW alumnae Dr. Francisia Seda (Kak Ery), whom has been like a sister and a mentor for me in many ways since my undergraduate years to the present. My gratitude and respect also goes to her parents and sibling Oom Frans, Tante Jo and Nessa who had helped me in numerous ways including providing me with interview contacts. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to countless friends in Jakarta who helped me to balance my life especially; Ditto Wahid, Dian M.Fallahati, Lala Amiroeddin, Indra Gunadi, Jerry Widjojo, and Ade Purnama. Special thanks for Florentia Yuniferti, who not only have been a dearest friend for years, but most importantly had given me the means to obtain many contacts and information pertinent to my dissertation through her wide network in Jakarta. My sincere thanks for my research assistant Mayahadi Saputro who not only tirelessly, but also timely transcribed all interviews into a comprehensible text. My deepest appreciation to all my informants who were willing to share their thoughts, ideas and personal stories that helped me grasp the essence and importance of writing histories related to the so-called "1965 Indonesia." Their humanity are reflected === [PDF page 11] === vii in their stories had given me deeper appreciation and understanding about the tragic event that my country has suffered. Special thanks to Mr.Djoko Sri Muljono, who shared the same passion of telling and trying to understand the story about 1965 tragedy and have assisted me in obtaining invaluable information through his contacts. A very special thanks for Amelia Liwe, who has supported me in countless ways and experiencing my many ups and downs throughout the writing process. I highly value your sincere friendship, love and trust, through all the discussions and everything that we have been through together which certainly have added bright in my heart. To my family especially my sisters Marian D.Broder and Maria Nelden Djakababa, I know at times it is difficult for me to explain the nature and my personal struggle that I faced in finishing this project. Many misunderstanding and sometimes hard feelings had happened between us, but yet, despite our differences we always come out strong united with love as one family. I never doubt your love and support for me through all the years of seemingly uncertain graduate student to finally finish the study and became the first PhD (Nelden, you will be next!) in the family. The love that both of you expressed in countless ways has been the constant reminder for me about the importance to have a family, I am lucky to have both you as my sisters. For my brother in law and my nephew Clifford Broder and William A.Broder your presence in the family has been precious and made my life more colorful and beautiful. For both my late parents, Papa, Cornelius Malo Djakababa and Mama, Maria Eden Dalisay Djakababa, nothing can replace your unconditional love to all your children === [PDF page 12] === viii and my only regret is that you are not here with me to witness the process and the completion of this dissertation. I am truly blessed to have both of you as my wonderful parents whom your constant prayers had helped me succeed in my life journey and beyond. All mistakes, errors and interpretation in this dissertation are all my responsibility. === [PDF page 13] === Preface Growing up in Indonesia, I experienced first hand the implementation of the New Order's intricate commemorations for the Lubang Buaya killings. From the weekly flag ceremonies at school and the national holidays, it did not take long for me to realize that this was supposed to be the most important event in Indonesia's modern history. Indeed, the Sanctity of Pancasila Day (Hair Kesaktian Pancasila) was considered to be the most compelling and important of all Indonesian national holidays. I was only eleven years old and a student at the Tarakanita Primary School, a Catholic school in Jakarta, when I joined the audition as part of the fifth and sixth graders to win a place in the City of Jakarta Children's Orchestra. This orchestra had the unique honor of performing a musical interlude, playing patriotic songs on the flute recorder and pianika in front of President Soeharto at Lubang Buaya monument on October 1st during the annual commemoration for the Sanctity of Pancasila Day. In previous years, both my older sisters selected for this honor and I had watched them on national television during the live broadcast of the Lubang Buaya ceremony. Usually, after the flag ceremony was over, Soeharto would walk with his entourage, approaching the stand where the Children's Orchestra played. He would smile and wave at the children who were playing the patriotic music. I became envious and very much wanted to be part of that orchestra. Therefore, for this year's commemoration, I eagerly signed up for an audition. I practiced the patriotic songs with my flute recorder and felt confident that I could win the honor of performing at Lubang Buaya. Unfortunately, I did === [PDF page 14] === not make the cut and was never selected since my music teacher thought that I was not good enough at playing music. I became very disappointed, even upset with myself, while feeling an uncontrollable sense of envy seeing my elder sister again on TV, playing music in front of Soeharto and watching the president smile and wave at the group. Through these experiences, October 1st was always a special day for me, with strong, mingled memories of family pride and personal failure. As I grew older, I found that I could not escape the story of those bloody events at Lubang Buaya. I remember that I watched the propaganda movie Pengkhianatan G. 3O.S/PKI about those killings every year on national TV—required viewing for every Indonesian school child on the eve of October 1st, the Sanctity of Pancasila Day. It was not because of the content, since I did not really care about all those confusing intrigues. Like any teen-aged boy, I liked the action and shooting scenes in the movie. In fact, I always liked watching any movie, both domestic and foreign, especially if full of action and based on historical events. When I began my graduate career in the University of Wisconsin-Madison, I maintained my interest in the G.30.S/PKI incident. But I wanted to move beyond the typical discourse about the so-called events of "1965" Indonesia. Most of the time, the discussions of events at Lubang Buaya were about trying to figure out who was the mastermind. For decades, both scholars and ordinary observers have speculated and created a number of conspiracy theories, trying to figure out what happened on that day === [PDF page 15] === and who was actually responsible. All of this attention diverted scholars from other aspects of the event which were simply ignored or forgotten. In this dissertation I am trying to trace how the official story of Lubang Buaya began, and how this grand narrative influenced the way most Indonesians perceive this seminal event. There is probably no single truth, no definitive history about who was behind the killings. But it is possible to trace the history of how the official story was constructed, presented, and promulgated. Conducting research about this topic in Jakarta proved a challenge. After the triumph of Reformasi in 1998, the situation made it possible to do research on these sensitive events back in 1965. As I was trying to figure out which direction the research should take, I decided to begin by conducting interview with someone whom I knew from a close relative—Mr. Yosef Syukur, a former Jaksa or public prosecutor on the remote island of Flores whose experiences are discussed in Chapter IV. During our fourhour interview, he recalled his experiences as the head of the investigation team in the months following the killings at Lubang Buaya. In an unusually calm manner, almost devoid of emotion, he described the brutality of the systematic purging in the Ende and Manggarai area on Flores Island. He told me his of refusal to sign any prisoner release form whenever the military or an anti-communist youth group wanted to "take" a prisoner. His defiance made him to suffer disturbing consequences. After his refusal, there were times when the military would come to his house at 3:00 a.m. and force him to witness the brutal executions of the PKI or alleged PKI sympathizers. He described in === [PDF page 16] === xii detail the executions he witnessed, mobs using machetes to hack the suspects into pieces before finally dropping them into a hole. In our interview, Mr. Yosef Syukur also told me about one particularly disturbing public execution of an accused named John Dimu, who was a Pemuda Rakyat figure allegedly present at Lubang Buaya and a witness to the killings of the generals. His execution was held in an open field before a large crowd. Mr. Syukur described how John Dimu was tied to a wooden cross, ready to be burned to death. Yosef Syukur said: "It was at that time I realized how strong a human body can be. As the flames began to engulf him, the man saw me, and yelled, 'I am innocent.' He was able to pull and break the wire that held him." His body then exploded. Yosef Syukur said until this very day he could still remember the smell and the sound of burning human flesh. After this first interview, I was shocked and did not do another interview for more than a year. This intellectual and emotional journey had been part and result of my dissertation. === [PDF page 17] === Chapter I: Introduction On the afternoon of October 3, 2004,1 was among the sizable crowd that gathered at the office of Kontras1 a human rights organization in downtown Jakarta. People came from every background, but most were activists, attending a book launching by one of the key figures of the Thirtieth September Movement back in 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmodjo. Although his formal position then was assistant director for intelligence in the Indonesian air force, he was one of the vice commanders for the thirtieth September movement and member of the revolutionary council announced by Lieutenant Colonel Untung in the morning of October 1, 1965. After entering the room, Heru Atmodjo sat at the front table facing rows of empty chairs. The crowd then entered and immediately tried to find available seats. Once all the chairs were full, the master of ceremonies (MC) welcomed the audience introduced Heru Atmodjo, signaling the start of the launching of his book, "Gerakan 30 September 1965: Kesaksian Letkol (Pnb) Heru Atmodjo or "Thirtieth September Movement 1965: The Eyewitness account of Lieutenant Colonel (Pilot) Heru Atmodjo." Among the audience attending the event was the former commander of the Indonesian Air Force in 1965, Air Marshall Omar Dani, who himself had suffered long years of imprisonment under the New Order regime. Kontras stands for: Komisi untuk orang hilang dan korban tindak kekerasan or The commission for the "disappeared and victims" of violence is a NGO pioneered by Indonesian human rights activist, the most prominent of all was the late Munir, who was poisoned aboard Garuda airplane while on his way to the Netherlands for study. === [PDF page 18] === As the MC finished his brief introduction, the audience clapped and waited patiently for Heru Atmodjo old but still looking quite healthy for a man well into his seventies, to make some remarks about his life and his book. After slowly adjusting the microphone, his firm, loud voice filled the room as Heru Atmodjo said: "I want to clarify that I am not a communist, nor member of the PKI. I am only a loyal supporter and admirer of Bung Karno." From this defiant introduction, it is evident that most people in Indonesia still perceive Indonesian Communist party as the mastermind behind killings of the six leading Generals at Lubang Buaya. Many still see the Thirtieth September movement, which was clearly responsible for these killings, as a PKI vehicle for overthrowing the government of Indonesia and turning the country into a communist state. It was compelling that, as a person involved with the Thirtieth September Movement almost forty years before, Heru Atmodjo immediately distanced himself from accusations that he might have been a member of or sympathizer with the communist party. On one hand, by his personal statement, Heru Atmodjo had acknowledged the Indonesian public's belief that the PKI was the mastermind of the Lubang Buaya killings and the architect of the Thirtieth September Movement. On the other hand, Heru Atmodjo wanted to distance himself from this common perception which originated from the methodical construction of an official narrative about events at Lubang Buaya by General Soeharto's New Order regime. === [PDF page 19] === Heru Atmodjo's refusal to acknowledge the PKI as the mastermind of this event reflected a continuous debate about the so-called 1965 discourse in Indonesia. Despite a dominant official narrative that blamed the PKI, Heru wanted to use this opportunity to present his reasons for joining the Thirtieth September movement, portraying himself as someone who wanted to protect President Sukarno from a coup attempt by the Council of generals (COG). Simply put, he wanted to show the complex nature of the event from his perspective. Alternative voices such as this about an event that happened more than forty years ago are an important addition to the considerable scholarship on the so-called 1965 Indonesia discourse. His story was an attempt to balance the New Order's official narrative about the Thirtieth September movement, which blamed the PKI, with alternative narratives that despite their recent resurgence, have still been unable to dismantle the dominant interpretation about this important period. This study aims to explore the reasons why these alternative views still falter in the face of a dominate narrative from a long-discredited regime. Hence, there is a clear need for a study about the creation of this New Order narrative to understand the reasons for its persistence. To understand the persistence of this official narrative, Hayden White's model of historical representation is beneficial. He argues that historical conceptualization or representation "does not depend upon the nature of the 'data' they used to support their generalizations [or] theories they invoke to explain them." Instead he claims, effective narration "depends rather upon the consistency, coherence, and illuminative power of === [PDF page 20] === their respective visions of the historical field." From this perspective, data turned up by new research cannot easily refute or overturn established narratives as "their status as models of historical narration and conceptualization depends, ultimately, on the preconceptual and specifically poetic nature of their perspectives on history and its processes."3 In the case of the official narrative of events at Lubang Buaya, the pre-conceptual idea of overall communist culpability was already embedded in its construction and later manifestation. Not only was the narrative built from other accounts that supported the official narrative, but, most importantly, those who were involved in creating the narrative were stars in the political constellation and had strong interest to claim "the truth" to maintain their hold on power. During the New Order, the existence of alternative narratives in Indonesia about the so-called "1965 events" that contradicted the official narrative were considered not only subversive but extremely dangerous. Foreign publications such as Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey's famous Cornell Paper or John Hughes's Indonesian Upheaval were banned and those who possessed copies could only read and circulate them clandestinely. Moreover, the New Order's bloody "burning the archives"4 of memory by literally purging hundred of thousands of people through arrest, mass murder, and endless incarceration helped silence these alternative interpretations and concealed Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).p.4 Ibid. Special thanks for Prof.Kenneth M.George for introducing me with this term === [PDF page 21] === many stories about tragic events across Indonesia in the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya killings. Despite the massive purging and silencing, alternative views about these tragic events absent in the official narrative would never totally disappear, remaining in the minds of many individuals who witnessed and survived the purging. The main task of the official narrative was to simplify complexity, ignore the other tragic events that happened afterwards, and transform the confusing events of Lubang Buaya into a clear, definitive narrative. Through the power of the New Order regime, this official narrative would, in the decades following its initial articulation, become concretized in a massive, marbled monument and animate the entire nation through annual rituals embodied in the film and the October 1st commemoration day. This dissertation is, therefore, a study of the origins and construction of the New Order official narrative about the Lubang Buaya killings over a period of 30 years. Through trials, films, monuments, and commemorations, the regime instilled the deeply held popular belief that the Lubang Buaya killings were instigated by the Thirtieth September Movement and its creator, the PKI. The propagation of this official narrative of the coup attempt was first and fundamentally an instrument for fostering and maintaining regime legitimacy. But this narrative also evolved into a means for the regime to stage its triumph over communism, while at the same time glorifying president Soeharto's role in leading the anti-communist purge. === [PDF page 22] === From the beginning Soeharto's heavy involvement in constructing, disseminating, and maintaining the official narrative was central facet of its formation. His commitment to establishing the narrative was unmistakable as he personally ordered the construction of the commemorative Monumen Pancasila Sakti (sacred Pancasila monument), authorized the annual day of remembrance as a national holiday, and, above all, controlled the Special Military Tribune (SMT) for alleged communist conspirators where he served, through surrogates, as prosecutor, judge, and executioner. Indeed, the New Order regime deployed formidable resources of an authoritarian state, backed by a powerful military, to simultaneously construct a master anti-communist narrative of these events and suppress compelling interpretations, whether by domestic dissidents or foreign scholars. To better understand the construction of this official narrative, several questions need to be addressed. First, how did the New Order regime manipulate the memory of Lubang Buoya and make it the major tenet for the regime's legitimacy and triumphal display? Second, what were the reasons behind the New Order's efforts to insert the Lubang Buaya narrative into the established historiography of Indonesia? Third, how did the official narrative gain wide public acceptance in the years following its initial construction? The killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya resulted from the actions of the Thirtieth September Movement on October 1, 1965. Since then, the event has become the source of controversy and endless debates among scholars and public alike. Many studies === [PDF page 23] === have been done to explain what actually happened on that day. Many theories exist about the origins of Thirtieth September Movement and the possible masterminds behind the abduction and killing of the generals. From all possible theories, one can draw up a list of suspects as possible masterminds which includes: the PKI, Major General Soeharto, President Sukarno, the CIA, and the People's Republic of China. Each of these suspects has its own advocates who present compelling arguments in trying to convince others why their theory is the most valid. The persistence of these widely divergent interpretations arises, at base, from the vague, even confusing nature of the event itself which produced wide-ranging reactions from many parties in response to the confusion. However, often times these studies seem to be based on an unexamined assumption that there was a particular mastermind behind this debacle. This dissertation argues, after examining the origins and nature of the event, that it extremely difficult to find a single convincing explanation. This argument becomes clear when we examine the multifaceted dynamics that drove the Thirtieth September Movement's decisions and actions on October 1, 1965. It is time, in my opinion, to acknowledge that any attempt to pursue a single truth that explains the whole event can no longer be attempted without admitting that a reasonable doubt remains and will always remain. There were too many players and interests involved in the events that resulted into the killing of the generals and the mass murder of hundreds thousands people in months after the coup, and too much confusion, for any single, simple explanation. === [PDF page 24] === However, we still need to acknowledge that certain facts about the event were quite clear, such as the abduction and killings of the generals, Major General Soeharto's swift action in crushing of the Thirtieth September movement, and the bloody mass killings that followed paving the way for Soeharto's ascent to power. Foreign powers, Britain and the United States, involved through respective intelligence agencies in their manipulation of these events and their perception in Indonesia. These facts are fundamental. The scholarly literature on the Indonesian "tragedy" of 1965 is vast. Since the events unfolded in late September and early October 1965, there are ample materials available, whether scholarly or non-scholarly. Despite the sheer amount of documentation and long scholarship onl965 Indonesian tragedy, the literature can be divided into some manageable categories. The first involves those that focus on trying to identify the mastermind behind the abduction and killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya. Many works fall into this particular group, but for the moment I will only mention just a few. The work by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1966 coup in Indonesia is the most prominent since it gives arguably the most comprehensive analysis about the Lubang Buaya affair. Famously known as the "Cornell paper" and prepared in 1966, the Anderson and McVey analysis remains, even now, the best known alternative view about the event. Another work that fits this category was W.F.Wertheim's Whose plot? New light on the 1965 Events, published in a 1979 issue of the Journal of Contemporary Asia. In === [PDF page 25] === his analysis, he argues that there were key figures inside the military that successfully provoked the PKI to launch the Thirtieth September Movement, thus explaining the success of the Indonesian military in getting rid of the communists. In other literature President Sukarno is often implicated as the mastermind of the attempted coup. For example, Antonie Dake's, The Sukarno Files (2006) and Helen Louise Hunter's, Sukarno and the Indonesian coup: The untold story (re-published in 2007) both blame President Sukarno as the person who orchestrated the coup attempt as a means to eliminate the anticommunist army and move the country further to the left. The most recent attempt to discover the mastermind is John Roosa's Pretext to Mass Murder: The Thirtieth September Movement andSoeharto 's coup d'etat in Indonesia (2006). In this book, Roosa's argues that Soeharto used the failed coup, which was launched by key elements of the communist leadership as a pretext for mass killings and the expropriation of President Sukarno's authority. Though controversial, Roosa's argument is sound, and provides a fresh analysis of the event. The works mentioned above are only a fraction of the vast literature dedicated solely finding the mastermind behind the killings at Lubang Buaya. Although, many of these available studies offer compelling analysis, some also contain flawed arguments and sometimes improbable analysis. However, in varying degrees, all of them contribute to the understanding of a traumatic event that changed the course of the world's fourth largest nation. === [PDF page 26] === 10 The second category of literature examines the mass killings in the aftermath of the failed coup. Within this category Robert Cribb's edited volume, The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (1990) is still considered the seminal work. Geoffrey Robinson's The Dark Side of Paradise: Political violence in Bali (1995) examines the mass killings from a regional perspective in Bali. Similarly, Hermawan Sulistyo's Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu ( Hammer and Sickle in the Cane Fields, 2000) studied the mass killings and their effects in Jombang and Kediri, Eastern Java. The third category is biographical work about and memoirs of former political prisoners, many of which came out after the fall of Soeharto and his New Order regime in 1998. In this era of freedom of speech, many of these former political prisoners began publishing their accounts, including: Omar Dhani, the former Air Force Chief of staff, Colonel Abdul Latief, one of the leaders of the Thirtieth September Movement, and, as noted above, Heru Atmodjo, a member of the Thirtieth September Movement. These important figures began writing and publishing their memoirs or court pledooi (defense) after being unable to do so for so many years. Prominent writers such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer have also published accounts of this period. In his semi autobiography Mute Soliloquy, he described his experiences while he was incarcerated at the Buru island penal colony. Other writers such as Hersri Setiawan and Putu Oka Sukanta have published biographies, poems, and other literary works related to their experience of incarceration by the New Order. Hilmar Farid, John Roosa and others edited a book that examines the 1965 event and related experiences by === [PDF page 27] === 11 drawing on the rich, untapped oral history to publish an anthology titled, Tahun-tahun yang takpernah berakhir: memahami pengalaman korban 65: esai-esai sejarah lisan or "Years that never ends: understanding the experiences of the victims of 65: essays on oral history." The next category of literature on 1965 in Indonesia focusing on reconciliation is exemplified by Budiawan's book Mematahkah pewarisan ingatan: wacana anti-komunis dan politik rekonsiliasi pasca-Soeharto or "Breaking the legacy of memory: the anticommunist discourse and politics of reconciliation in post-Soeharto" which traces the origins of the anti-communist discourse and possible reconciliation in Indonesian society. Another book in this category is Kunang-kunang kebenaran di langit malam, or "The fireflies of truth in the evening sky," written collectively by the families of the generals slain at Lubang Buaya as a reaction to some false information publicly circulating about the killings. Moreover, the book also discusses the vision of reconciliation between the so called victims (the PKI members) and victors (the families of the slain generals), as the book concludes that both parties were in fact victims. Another important scholarly work that defies easy categorization is Katherine McGregor's History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past. In this book, McGregor examines the prevalent militaristic theme within Indonesian history, especially during the New Order period. She also examines the role of the army historical center in developing museums and historical narratives of the nation's struggle. === [PDF page 28] === 12 Her work offers insights to how the military mindset is manifest in many forms, through monuments, films, books, and historical re-enactments. As briefly mentioned earlier, most studies about the Lubang Buaya killings and Thirtieth September Movement have spent too much energy in endless debate about the mastermind without admitting that the event itself was, by its nature, vague and unclear. One of the consequences of this particular mindset was that for years there was no single satisfying theory that could provide an undisputed explanation about what had happened. The debate over this issue will never end as many leading scholars overlook other compelling aspects from the 1965 tragedy. Among all the literature mentioned above about the 1965 strategy, there is no single study that traces the origins and construction of the New Order's official narrative of the Lubang Buaya affair. Despite its evident prominence, strong message, and extraordinary influence over Indonesian perception of the event, this dissertation is the first attempt to trace and understand the genesis and the construction of this official narrative. From these murky beginnings, we see how one particular interpretation would emerge to dominate as the most accepted explanation of the event. This narrative by the New Order regime, in essence, blamed the PKI as the mastermind of the abduction and killings of the generals. The importance of understanding the origins and driving force behind these massive efforts to construct an official narrative allows a clearer understanding of how a military regime established this account to serve its needs in seizing and holding power. === [PDF page 29] === 13 This particular case study will show the extraordinary effectiveness of the official narrative, as seen in its persistence since the regime's collapse in 1998. Despite its evident complicity in the event, the New Order would ignore that facet in its pursuit of establishing a simple narrative of good versus evil that is convincing and easy to grasp. At the same time, this narrative was reproduced with a particular goal in mind: elimination of the army's political enemy, the communists. This study will show how this particular New Order created narrative would emerge, as a convincing, definitive history, using devices that not only presented this narrative, but also ensured its lasting preservation. Research methodology and approach for this study The New Order's sedulous construction of collective memory about the events of October 1st is an extreme example of a more universal phenomenon. In his essay, "Between Memory and History: Les lieux de Memoire," Pierre Nora analyzes the creation of so-called sites of memory through commemorations, rituals, monuments, and symbols. Nora also addresses the concepts of 'memory' and 'history,' juxtaposing them as fundamentally opposite, with memory as an actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present, while history is a representation of the past.5 Over time, Nora adds, history replaces true memory, as sites of memory are constructed and created to induce a constructed past. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Memoire" Representations 26 (1989).p.8 === [PDF page 30] === 14 Following Nora, differentiating between history and memory adds analytical depth to the descriptions of the official narrative's construction in this dissertation. These two aspects are fundamentally different and never meant to be treated as the same thing since "historical analysis relies on critique, explanation, and evaluation of sources following the rules of accepted scholarship. On the other hand, memory despite having some critical functions, its nature is more often physical, emotive, pious and affirmative."6 If we accept this distinction between history and memory then, as we will see in the chapters that follow, the New Order clearly invested formidable resources of state power in using history and its artifacts to induce a collective memory that has shaped how events at Lubang Buaya have been perceived by the Indonesian public. The data and documentation that form the argument for this dissertation follow the conventional method for a historian's work, which entails relying mostly on primary sources. Government documents, official trial records, and also newspaper reports provide the bulk of the data used in writing, analyzing, and tracing the construction of the New Order's anti-communist narrative. Furthermore, by recognizing that primary sources are not enough to give a clear understanding of a topic, another method was deployed by eliciting information from interviews with several relevant informants. Hence, oral history complements the usual historian's reliance on documentary sources. In getting the interviews I have to rely on intricate personal contact and careful negotiation before the individuals agreed to be Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2000).p8-9 === [PDF page 31] === 15 interview. The process itself could be fast, but sometimes it requires a lot of patience and perseverance on my behalf whenever I tried to elicit specific information. Interviews were done with a number of people from different backgrounds, including former government officials, former student activists, former political prisoners, artists and families of the slain generals. Their life experiences, comments, and opinions provide rich, even invaluable information for understanding the context of that time. Weaving these vast amounts of data into a coherent narrative was a challenge. However, there is something that I, and perhaps most historians felt was necessary in writing a historical narrative: establishing the context of the event. In Chapter II and, to a lesser extent, in each of the following chapters, I devote considerable attention to recovering the background that led to the killings at Lubang Buaya. I think it is crucial to establish the historical context before we delve into events that we want to discuss, since it will provide us a deeper understanding. I believe, moreover, that it will be more difficult for us to understand the logic of the regime's construction of the official narrative without establishing some historical context, explaining, if you will, the raw materials and motivation for the fabrication of the official history. Moreover, Chapter II also contains new information about the Catholic groups that, though small in number, played a crucial role in the struggle against the communist party during the mid 1960s, especially in the aftermath of Lubang Buaya. Their role during the transition from Sukarno to Soeharto could be a dissertation topic in itself. === [PDF page 32] === 16 In Chapter III, the analysis shifts to focus on accounts of what happened on the day when these events began to unfold. As described in Chapter III, October 1, 1965 was a chaotic, confusing day, requiring an extended discussion to show the dynamics of that particular day. Drawing from multiple sources, there was much speculation and confusion among different groups and individuals that experienced it. This chapter again aims to show that the events of October 1, 1965 were from the very beginning unclear, vague, and even mysterious. Therefore, confusion could not be avoided, producing a variety views about the event and its causation that will continue to be source of debate for years to come. Chapter III also shows how the initial confusion created an opening for a particular official narrative that would come to dominate the perception of these events, as described in the following chapters. Chapter IV describes the official narrative's early evolution through the systematic purging of the communists and other enemies of the New Order. This chapter also discusses the beginning of the exaltation of the nation's ideology, Pancasila, and describes how it was appropriated to serve as part of the legitimization for the official narrative. Description of the systematic purge and its mechanisms are important since, I would argue, they contributed to the formation of public perception about the PKI's guilt felt at every level of Indonesian society. Chapter V examines an important but often ignored aspect of the tragedy, the Mahmillub or the Special Military Tribune. Through heavy media coverage, the public trial of prominent communist and coup leaders was part of the new regime's effort to === [PDF page 33] === 17 show the people that the pursuit of justice was being respected. For years, scholars have labeled these proceedings simply as "show trial." Through this negative, even dismissive labeling, there is almost no study of the SMT other than that done by the activist TAPOL bulletin which described the trials from a human rights and judicial perspective, ignoring their larger political ramifications. After close study of the trial transcripts and press coverage, this chapter reveals that the SMT served as much more than a mere "show trial." A careful reading of the court documents indicates that the SMT had larger political ramifications as a public arena for contestation among competing narratives of the Lubang Buaya killings. Not only did SMT become the battleground for conflicting narratives, but it also served as a stage for the legitimating the New Order regime, displaying its triumph over the defeated enemy. Chapter VI examines the background of the ideas behind the representation of the regime's triumph in the form of a monument, an annual commemoration day, and the film project Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI, ("The treachery of the Thirtieth September Movement/PKI.). This chapter draws from wealth of sources related to the making of these symbols, showing how they concretized the regime's official narrative of Lubang Buaya. Finally, Chapter VII concludes this study by explaining the consequences of the official narrative and its contribution to a myth making that has dominated the nation's perception of these events for years after its principal creator was gone. === [PDF page 34] === 18 Chapter II: The Historical and Political Context of the Event "We are assured, that the most important thing that we have to learn from history is the PROLOOG (prelude). We have to learn the Proloog from the "G-30-S" -Drs. Nugroho Notosusanto, 27 December 1965Indeed it is crucial to understand the proloog or the prelude to an important historical event before making any attempt to analyze the event itself. Dr. Nugroho Notosusanto, the head of the Center of Military history and also the chief historian of the New Order regime expressed the importance of understanding the. proloog to understand the G-30-S (Thirtieth September Movement). Nugroho's interpretation in representing the history of Lubang Buaya affair and the related Thirtieth September Movement caused endless debates and challenges from many. This includes his interpretation of the proloog of the G-30-S movement itself. Nonetheless, the description of the background situation, or as Nugroho called it as the proloog, is equally important to the event itself. The purpose of having a lengthy and detailed proloog is not only to establish context, but to find a general understanding of this historical context, thus putting ourselves in a position that hopefully to be more objective in analyzing the impending transformative event in Indonesian history. To gain a wider understanding of this prologue, the first part of this chapter will discuss the Madiun affair, the PKI revival, regional rebellions, and the revolutionary situation during the Trikora and Dwikora campaigns. The discussion will reveal the ongoing conflicts among competing powers that would finally lead to the ascendancy of three competing powers in the mid 1960s— President Sukarno, the PKI (Communist === [PDF page 35] === 19 party), and the Army. The second part of this chapter demonstrates how daily Indonesian social life cannot escape the consequences of this heated political atmosphere. While it is quite telling to see how the revolutionary rhetoric influenced the society, this part will also gave us insights into Sukarno's public persona. Moreover, this section also aims to explain how a revolutionary situation was carefully maintained throughout the latter part of Sukarno's presidency. Hence, to discern earlier political and social conditions it would help us to grasp the turning point that happened as a result of the killings at Lubang Buaya. The third part of this chapter provides critical component to the overall narrative by focusing on comparing and contrasting the experiences from both the communist and the Catholic groups during the turbulent time prior to Lubang Buaya. Not only does this section provide us with a clearer picture of the tense situation at that time, but, most importantly, it also gives us an opportunity to explore the Catholic group, an important and well known anti-communist element rarely discussed in the study of "1965." Moreover, the discussions on the wild rumors that circulated at that time are also critical in helping us realize that the political atmosphere was full with tensions. With solid understanding of this background, we can gain insights about the origins of conflict among the major players in the Indonesian politics. Furthermore, we can also see in later chapters how these ongoing conflicts would continue to resonate in the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya killings, with the destruction of the PKI and the ascendancy of the Soeharto's New Order regime. === [PDF page 36] === 20 The Madiun Affair, 1948 In the later years, the Madiun affair of 1948 would become important as one of the major reasons for PKI opponents to discredit the party. Furthermore, the Madiun affair would be mentioned repeatedly in the New Order anticommunist narratives. In 1948, the newly established Republic of Indonesia was still going through the period of "physical revolution."1 The Dutch were in the process in trying to return and reclaim their former colony. In January, the United States mediated a treaty between the Dutch and the Indonesian republic, known as the Renville agreement, which forced the Republican Army to move their military units out of the Dutch controlled area in West Java into the Republican area of Central and East Java. Some of these units, notably the crack Siliwangi division commanded by Col. A.H. Nasution from West Java, were stationed in Solo and Yogyakarta area in Central Java. The arrival of these 'guest' units in that area caused tensions with some of the 'home' units and the local 'laskars.' Other issue that added to the tensions was the Hatta3 government policy of Re-ra (Reconstruction and rationalization) of the military.4 The Re-Ra policy aimed to reorganize and restructure the number of republican military It is not clear why and when the term Revolusi Fisik or physical revolution emerge in the Indonesian historiography whenever someone refers to the period of 1945-1949. It is caused perhaps from the strong military (esp. Army) influence in the writing of the Indonesian history. The word Laskar means local paramilitary groups. During the revolution there were many Laskars unit formed. These groups were usually formed based on their ideologies. Some are religious based (Laskar Hizbullah), Nationalists (Barisan Banteng), socialist and communists (Laskar Pesindo).For further study about Laskar units, see Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian first vice president. It was him and Sukarno who proclaimed the Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. Both him and Sukarno are considered to be the founding fathers of Indonesia. on Re-Ra policy see Kahin nationalism and rev and Himawan Soetanto Rebut kembali Madiun and also perhaps Soe Hok Gie orang-orang di persimpangan kirijalan) === [PDF page 37] === 21 units in their dispositions. With this Re-Ra policy the Hatta government planned to disband several units, including the several under-strength infantry brigades and laskars. Some of these units were planned for integration into other different units. The goal of the Re-Ra policy was to streamline the Republican military force and turn it into a more professional, better armed, and more efficient force, especially when fighting the Dutch. Other reasons for this policy were the inability of the Republican government to bear the cost in maintaining large armed forces. Moreover, the area that the Republic controlled was significantly smaller after the Renville agreement compared to that held before the treaty.5 The implementation of Hatta's Re-Ra policy greatly affected some units that were affiliated with the communists and radical socialist groups. Many of these communist or radical socialist units such as the Pesindo's laskar units were scheduled to be disbanded or incorporated into other units. The PKI leadership clearly opposed to the reconstruction policy since it would seriously undermine their military strength. Therefore, when the Siliwangi units came into the area where many of these communists and radical socialists units were located, tensions immediately arose between them. Adding to these tensions were the physical and material conditions of the troops. Bung Tomo, pointed out how the units who were under the control of Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin, and left leaning Major General Djoko Sujono were better fed and equipped in Himawan Soetanto, Perintah Presiden Soekarno, "Rebut Kembali Madiun..": Siliwangi Menumpas Pemberontakan Pki/Moeso 1948 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994). === [PDF page 38] === 22 comparison to the non-communist/non-leftist units.6 The Madiun affair occurred as tensions between these armed units was mounting while the Dutch continued to pose threat to the Republican forces. Musso a senior member of the PKI who just recently returned from exile in Russia, resumed the leadership of the PKI and, along with Amir Sjarifuddin, created the People's Democratic Front (FDR, Forum Demokrasi Rakjat7. The FDR's goal was to promote national unity front in fighting the Dutch. The FDR invited Masjumi, a major Muslim political party and PNI, the Nationalist party to a joint conference in building national unity, but both parties rejected the idea of forming an alliance or a united front with the communists. The reason for the rejection was because both the PNI and Masjumi felt PKI-FDR could not be trusted.8 As Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin toured the island of Java to gather support for the FDR and Sutomo, "Mengetahui Politik Pki Dalam Angkatan Bersendjata," in Sesudah Madiun Dan Gestapu, Lantas Apa? (Djakarta: Penerbit Balapan, 1966). p.10 Bung Tomo or Brother Tomo is the nickname for Sutomo. He is an ardent nationalist and became famous for his fiery revolutionary radio speeches during the event of the battle of Surabaya on November 10th 1945. His voice and picture became the most recognizable symbols of the republican struggle against the Dutch during that period. During his time in the active military service throughout the revolutionary period, He was appointed as the coordinating officer between the Army, Navy and Air Force. He was also a member of the combined joint forces staff Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin the Indonesian former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. He signed the Renville agreement in January 1948. The Japanese almost executed him during the occupation but Sukarno and Hatta intervened and he avoided the execution. He was thought as a nationalist before the outbreak of the Madiun affair and not long after the event in Madiun erupted he suddenly announced that he had been a communist since 1935 (See Soe Hok Gie Orang-orang di persimpangan kirijalan for detailed debates about this particular issue). Along with Musso, Amir was also one of the leaders in the Madiun affair. Maj. General Djoko Sujono he was also the member of the Joint war forces staff. He was a PKI follower and was the same side with Mr.Amir Sjarifuddin. Musso was a senior member of PKI who was in exile since 1935 in Russia. More about Musso see Kahin Nationalism and rev and Soe Hok Gie Orang-orang di persimpangan kiri Jalan George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2003, Reprint, originally published 1952).p.286 === [PDF page 39] === 23 the united front causes, they also increased their attack on Hatta's government policy. At the same time, the tensions between the Siliwangi units and the pro-PKI units grew until they erupted in a series of kidnappings, killings, and skirmishes in the city of Solo.9 While Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin were on a speaking tour in Purwodadi, tensions mounted in Solo, leading to major confrontation between the Siliwangi units and the units loyal to the FDR. Some of these pro-PKI units received direct orders to demobilize, but they refused. Major fighting erupted in Solo between Siliwangi and the pro-PKI units who defied a direct government order for demobilization. As a result, the top officers of the PKI ended up with two choices: 1) to submit to the government's and thereby give up their own personal positions of power as well as a major source of the revolutionary military potential of the new PKI, or; 2) to take the initiative by themselves and embark upon the revolutionary immediate positions and the prospects for a PKI revolution.10 It was the second option that Djoko Sujono, Soemarsono, Dahlan and other top PKI officers chose. As the leaders of those rebellious units, they decided to declare their immediate revolutionary intentions, and took over local authority in Madiun from the Republican group. While still out of town, Musso heard about the military officer's declaration and formation of the revolutionary movement in Madiun. He also heard about the major fighting in Solo between the Siliwangi and the units loyal to PKI. Having a chaotic situation on his hand with potentially disastrous results, Musso 'Detailed descriptions on the city of Solo incidents can be found in Soe Hok Gie Orang-orang di persimpangan kirijalan, Kahin Nationalism and revolution Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesiap.290 === [PDF page 40] === 24 faced a fait a compli. Musso and Amir returned immediately to Madiun to observe the situation at hand and to consult their military officers. Nonetheless, there was huge doubt in their minds about how to progress to the next step, especially since the revolution had started prematurely in contravention of Musso and Amir's prior plans. However, Musso's doubts quickly diminished and instead he became more confident as he entered the Madiun regency to see all the red communist flags waving along the road.11 Soemarsono and the rest of the Pro-PKI officers then briefed Musso about the current situation, explaining the FDR take-over in Madiun and several surrounding regencies. Since the FDR had achieved considerable success in seizing the government in Madiun, several military units also declared their intention to join the FDR-PKI revolutionary path. After listening to the report, Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin really did not have much choice other than joining the revolution. Soemarsono, acting as military governor for the FDR-PKI, saw Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin's decision as a signal for him to continue the 'cleaning up' process of those who were seen as threat to their movement.12 By September 18, 1948, FDR-PKI had succeeded in occupying Madiun, Ponorogo, Trenggalek, Pacitan, Purwantoro, Wonogiri, Sukoharjo, Ngawi, Cepu and many other East Java cities. The 'cleaning up' process directed at the government and military apparatus in those areas was brutal marked by mass killings. "Soetanto, Perintah Presiden Soekarno, "Rebut Kembali Madiun..": Siliwangi Menumpas Pemberontakan Pki/Moeso 1948. p. 146 Ibidp.l47 === [PDF page 41] === 25 In his book Orang-orang di Persimpangan Kiri Jalanu or "The people on the left side of the intersection," Soe Hok Gie cited a youth who described the situation in Madiun at the time of the PKI take over: Everywhere and on the street alleys are full with youth wearing dark colored clothing, some also wears red handkerchief on their neck with placates and posters. There are announcements underneath with signs and stamps: NATIONAL FRONT GOVERNMENT. With the occurrence of these announcements, I then understand that the city of Madiun which was under the GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA is now turned into NATIONAL FRONT GOVERNMENT, then the people murmuring and said "The city of Madiun has fallen to the hands of the FDR"; there are those who said "Last night the PKI has taken over the state power."14 After hearing about the rebellion and the hostile take-over in Madiun, President Sukarno went to the radio and delivered his famous speech urging the people: "Follow Musso and his PKI where he will bring down the goals of independence Indonesia into failure, or to follow Sukarno and Hatta, which, in God willing with the help of God almighty, will lead our Republic of Indonesia that is free and not subjected to any country whatsoever."15 The Hatta government moved swiftly in dealing with the rebellion. Brigades from Orang-orang di persimpangan kirijalan the translation in English is: The people who stood on the left side of the road. 14 Soe Hok Gie, Orang-Orang Di Persimpangan KiriJalan (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1997).p.235 Original text: "Setelah di pelosok-pelosok dan lorong-lorong jalan penuh dengan para pemuda yang berpakaian kehitam-hitaman dengans ebagian ada yang memakai sapu tangan merah di lehernya plakat dan poster-poster. Demikian pula pengumuman-pengumuman yang dibawahnya dengan tanda dan stempel: PEMERINTAH FRON NASIONAL. Dengan adanya pengumuman-pengumuman ini barulah saya mengerti bahwa kota Madiun yang tadinya berbentuk PEMERINTAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA akhirnya menjadi PEMERINTAH FRON NASIONAL, sehingga orang sambil berbisik-bisik mengatakan:kota Madiun telah jatuh ke tangan FDR"; ada lagi yang mengatakan "PKI semalam merebut kekuasaan negara." 15 See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.p.293, Gie, Orang-Orang Di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan.p.239, Soetanto, Perintah Presiden Soekarno, "Rebut Kembali Madiun.. ": Siliwangi Menumpas === [PDF page 42] === 26 Siliwangi division, along with several anti communist laskar's units were immediately dispatched to the communist-controlled area, and these units soon began closing in on Madiun. The government forces quickly overwhelmed the forces and followers of the FDR-PKI. Within days, many cities, areas, regencies and towns that had previously been under the PKI control were back into the hand of the Republic. Frans Seda, a former guerilla student soldier during the revolutionary period, said that when the people listened to Sukarno's speech on the radio, they reacted as if it were a direct command from the president to destroy the communists. "For the people, that was a command. Bung Karno asked the people to choose, Sukarno-Hatta or PKI-Musso? Musso PKI...they are gone, in one night they are gone." The Siliwangi Division and other pro-republican forces quickly re-occupied Madiun. These forces would conduct mopping up operation, destroying the remnants of the pro-PKI units. As a result of this operation, Musso was shot dead after refusing to surrender while Amir Sjarifuddin, along with several top PKI-FDR leaders, was later captured and hastily executed without trial. Both sides committed atrocities during the Madiun affair. Most importantly, the affair had left unwavering distrust in the hearts of both the anti-communist and communist groups. The reason for this hatred can perhaps be attributed to the situation when the Madiun affair occurred. At that time, the young republic was still under 16 Frans Seda, December, 6 2005. Original: "Bagi rakyat itu komando, pada Bung Karno rakyat boleh pilih, Sukarno-Hatta atau PKI-Musso? Musso PKI... Wah habis, satu malam habis. " === [PDF page 43] === 27 constant threat from possible Dutch military offensive which would indeed occur in December 1948. Thus, the existence of a movement that threatened the young republic from within was seen as ultimate betrayal of the sacred revolution and unacceptable threat to the independence of the Republic. In different occasions of court appearances and before the parliament in 1955 and 1957, DN Aidit, the PKI chairman, accused Hatta, Natsir, and Sukiman as the men who were responsible for all the killings in Madiun. He claimed that the FDR was provoked into action and never declared the formation of an Indonesian Soviet government despite Republican claims to the contrary. The Madiun affair was the first bloody confrontation between the army and the communists. The atrocities committed by both sides and the situation when the Madiun affair happened increased the mutual feeling of hatred and distrust between the two groups. By contrast, the communists thought they had been deliberately provoked to fall into the Western imperialist agenda. As we will see, the idea of Western provocation of the communists will again reappear in the event known as the Gestapu affair or the Lubang Buaya killings. The revival of the PKI and the 1955 election The failure of the PKI rebellion in Madiun and the execution of most of its ringleaders forced the remnants of the party leadership to go underground or flee abroad. 17 D.N.Aidit, Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun. Pembelaan D.N.Aidit Dimuka Pengadilan Negeri Djakarta, Tgl 24 Februari 1955, 4 with attachment ed. (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964). === [PDF page 44] === 28 After Musso was killed while refusing to surrender, his body was taken to Ponorogo where it was displayed to the public and finally burned.18 As for Amir Sjarifudin, he was captured along with several others of the PKI leadership. According to Soe Hok Gie not long after his arrest, the Army executed him. Soe Hoek Gie wrote about this execution with sense of irony suffused in a somewhat admiring tone: The execution begins. They are Amir Sjarifudin, former minister of defense/prime minister, member of the PKI CC Politburo. He started his career in the second congress that created the youth pledge, he became the follower of Sukarno in Partindo and finally led Gerindo. During the Japanese period, he was imprisoned for his involvement in the underground movement. A Moslem who converted into Christianity and for those who knew him close, will always have the memory of him as a good and warm man, a fast thinker, sometimes brilliant, only second to Bung Karno in His oratorical skill, a fighter and a persistent worker who does not think about himself. Soe Hok Gie's descriptions of Amir portrayed him as a brilliant man whose life ended tragically. The forces who executed him shared his goal of independence. Differences in ideologies had led to bitter rivalry and turned these former comrades into Gie, Orang-Orang Di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan.p.259 'ibid p.265 Original in Indonesian: Pelaksanaan hukuman mati dimulai. Mereka adalah Amir Sjarifudin.bekas menteri pertahanan/perdana menteri anggota Politbiro CC PKI.la memulai kariernya dalam kongres II Oktober 1928 yang mencetuskan Sumpah Pemuda, kemudian menjadi pengikut Sukarno dalam Partindo dan akhirnya memimpin Gerindo. Di zaman Jepang dipenjarakan karena ikut gerakan bawah tanah. Seorang Islam yang menjadi Kristen dan bagi mereka yang pernah mengenalnya dari dekat, akan tetap memelihara kenang-kenangan kepada seorang manusia yang baik dan peramah,seorang pemikir yang cepat kadang-kadang brilian, seorang orator yang dalam keulungan berpidato hanya kalah oleh Bung Karno, seorang pejuang dan pekerja yang tabah dan tidak memikirkan dirinya sendiri. === [PDF page 45] === mortal enemies. The feeling of betrayal and treachery would continue to haunt the future relationship of the army and the PKI. Both sides would never trust each other. After the collapse of the Madiun affair, the communist party organization was in disarray. Aidit and Lukman went abroad and were said to have spent several years in Vietnam. They would not return until early 1950s. Within Indonesia, the power of the PKI was weakened and its leaders were forced to go into hiding, dispersed into smaller groups. After the round table conference in December 1949, Indonesia was finally recognized as an independent nation. The Dutch left the country and formally turned over the administration to Sukarno and Hatta. It was a glorious day for Indonesia. As the situation in Indonesia calmed, Aidit and Lukman returned to Indonesia quietly and began to work to revive the party. Their first act was to take over the leadership of the party from old PKI figures such as Alimin and Tan Ling Djie, and transform it into a better organized entity. After the party central committee meeting, the new politburo was announced in January 7, 1951. Aidit along with Lukman, Sudisman, Njoto and the older Alimin were now the new members of PKI politburo. Learning from the Madiun affair's mistakes, Aidit felt the importance of having a strong mass base. He planned to increase the party membership to achieve this goal. However, in 1951 the PKI suffered a slight setback when the government under the leadership of Premier Sukiman began arresting thousands of communist members and 20 Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley, CA: University of California press, 1964).p.25 === [PDF page 46] === 30 sympathizers on the suspicion that they were preparing to launch a coup. The accusation was later proven unfounded and none of those arrested was ever put on trial. Not long after they were all released. The events of 1951 further convinced Aidit and the rest of the PKI leadership that it was imperative to have a strong mass-base organization. Not only did the party need big numbers but, most importantly, they must be highly disciplined and heavily indoctrinated. In Aidit's eyes, having a strong, highly disciplined mass membership was the only way to counter a future attack from the rightist opponents. Furthermore, with a strong mass base party, the PKI would be able to influence political developments in Indonesia.21 Immediately, a campaign was launched in late 1951 to increase PKI membership from 7,910 to 100,000 members. Aidit and the PKI leadership began rebuilding the party by creating a united front that consisted mostly of the three most revolutionary groups ~ the proletarian, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie. The party also emphasized the importance of building relationships with other non-communist groups to gain their cooperation, trust, and tolerance. To achieve that relationship with the other groups, the party must always put national interest above its own interest. As Aidit put it: Only by subordinating the class and Party interest to the national interest, which is the interest of the whole revolutionary people, and by defending the class and Party interest in a limit conscious manner, can our cooperation with the other classes and groups be profitable and can cooperation be achieved. The membership drive succeeded in increasing the party membership. Moreover, the 21 Ibid.p.58 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 22 === [PDF page 47] === 31 drive also extended beyond the traditional PKI support bases on the islands of Java and Sumatra, expanding to the Moluccas, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Nusa Tenggara. However, the bulk of the membership was still concentrated on the islands of Java and Sumatra. During the nation's first election in 1955, the result of the party's massive recruiting efforts bore fruit. The PKI managed to get more than six million votes, or around 16.4% of the total ballots, making it the fourth largest party in Indonesia after PNI (Nationalist), Masyumi (modernist Islam), and NU (traditional Islam). The success of PKI in increasing its membership and getting votes in the election was the result of its successful strategies for attracting broad support from the poorer sections of the society. Furthermore, the party implemented strict recruitment to ensure the quality of its cadres. Hindley listed the four stages of the memberships: preparation, watching over the recruit, caution, and investigation. Education was also an important aspect in the party building. The party worked hard to eradicate illiteracy while simultaneously increasing party publications. Harian Rakjat, the PKI official newspaper, experienced a sharp increase in circulation. Classical works such as the Communist Manifesto, and Lenin's Left-wing Communism were translated into Indonesian, and the party cadres were also encouraged to read them. Under Aidit's leadership, the party succeeded in maintaining solidarity, a quality that was lacking in other political parties which were still driven by political factions and 24 25 Ibid.p.87 Ibid.p.91 === [PDF page 48] === 32 internal maneuvering. The PKI's ability in providing means for advancing and distributing rewards to the loyal party workers further ensured their loyalty and discipline. The party not only provided the means for status advancement, but it also managed to attract loyal recruits by defending them against hostile or potentially hostile outside forces such as the landlords, employers, village heads, and government officials. Moreover, the party also provided generous assistance to its members during the times of need such as birth, illness, or death. When cadres traveled away, their families were well looked after. Furthermore, the party also provided education to fight illiteracy, organized 97 sports clubs, and established kindergartens and cooperatives. As a result, PKI-inspired organizations impressed many communities with their activities. Another important factor that stimulated the rapid growth of PKI was the strong cultural tradition of authoritarian leadership, especially in Javanese society. The bulk of the PKI membership was in Java, and within Javanese culture one does not openly disagree with one's superiors. At most, people would just quietly disagree and disregard the order or instruction from a superior. This local tradition can easily lead into uncritical obedience to leaders of any organization, as long they were recognized as social 28 superiors. By second half of 1962, the PKI membership had passed the two million mark and, if we include the affiliated mass organizations, the number was a whooping 12 lbid.p.102 'lbid.p.103 === [PDF page 49] === 33 million. With large membership, the PKI became the largest communist party outside China and the Soviet Union. The rebellion in the regions The political situation in the 1950s was considered quite turbulent. As the regions of Sumatra and Sulawesi rebelled against the central government, the country was at the brink of disintegration. The rebellion in Sumatra was known as the PRRI (Indonesian republic revolutionary government) which active especially in Western part of the island. Along with another rebellion in Sulawesi, especially the northern region where the Permesta (Charter of Inclusive Struggle) was established, these revolts represented a serious threat to Indonesia's national unity. Both PRRI and Permesta movements came into existence challenging the central government's policy towards the regions. However, in its later phases, the movement began to adopt the anti-communist overtones, mostly as an effort to appeal for foreign support, particularly the United States. Although most of the supporters and leaders of these two movements were staunchly anti-communist, it would be misleading to view the main objective of these rebellions as an effort to curb the increasing influence of the PKI.31 In late 1950's, there were many reasons for the regions' discontent towards the central government. Notably, many felt that the government had failed to fulfill the ideals 29 Ibid,p.99,p.l03 PERMESTA:Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam 31 As Indonesian historian J.Leirissa did in his book: PRRI Permesta: Strategi membangun Indonesia tanpa komunis. Or PRRI Permesta: The strategy to build Indonesia without communism. 30 === [PDF page 50] === 34 of the 1945 proclamation of independence and its aftermath of bloody struggle, the revolutionary war of 1945-1949. The ideal of the revolution was to build a just and prosperous society, free from any kind of domination. As the central government began to consolidate its control over the regions through economic policies and the restructuring of the military, the people in those regions began to feel betrayed by the central government. Not only had Jakarta failed to fulfill their needs, but the regions felt that their own autonomy over local affairs had been steadily decreased by central government policies. Prominent individuals from both the regions and the center had fought together against the Dutch to establish and defend the new Republic. These individuals were all loyal to the idea of a united Indonesian nation. However, regional leaders strongly felt that they had fought hard and sacrificed no less than leaders from the central government to achieve the republic. In their opinion, the government should therefore give them more autonomy in governing their own region. The economic disparities between Java and the so-called outer islands were vast. Consequently, the central government wanted to control the massive natural resources that the outer islands had by implementing policies that curtailed the economic autonomy of resource-rich regions. Moreover, the local military commanders controlled many of these regional business enterprises. These commanders transformed themselves into businessman as a means to establish their own independent financial resources, since they 32 For the background of the PRRI-PERMESTA rebellion, Barbara Harvey's book Permesta: Haifa Rebellion, Audrey and George Kahin, Subversion as a Foreign policy and Audrey Kahin's book, Rebellion without Integration provides excellent sources and background of the events. === [PDF page 51] === 35 felt the central government have abandoned and ignored the fate and welfare of the soldiers that fought and died for the nation during the revolutionary war. Many of these commanders turned to smuggling activities since they did not receive sufficient funds from the central government to maintain their equipment and conduct military operations.33 On the other hand, the central government was having problems not only financially but also in maintaining stability. Between the years 1950 to 1957, the government suffered from series of cabinets changes. The instability of the government, the divisions within the cabinet, and conflicts among the peoples' representatives caused the ineffectiveness of the government. Moreover, the government was also fighting several other rebellions such as the Darul Islam movement in West Java and the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion in Sulawesi. The challenges from these rebels diverted the government from development of the regions. The first election in 1955 had brought hope to the people of Indonesia that they can finally achieve some kind of stability. However, the result was the opposite. The election brought no clear majority for a single political party in the parliament that guarantee the formation of a stabile government. Thus it forced the establishment of yet another coalition based cabinet. The composition of the four top parties in the election also caused problems in determining power sharing in the cabinet. The majority of the voters and constituents of the top four parties (with the exception of Masjumi), PNI (Nationalist), NU(Conservative 33 Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1977).p.ll === [PDF page 52] === 36 Islamic party), Masjumi (modernist Islamic party),PKI (Indonesian Communist party) all came from Java and more than half of the population of Indonesia is ethnic Javanese.34 Therefore the majority of the seats in the government were held by Javanese and automatically the government policies that were made would be more beneficial to the Javanese dominated central government rather than for those who lived in the regions. However, the non-Javanese inhabited larger areas and controlled most of the natural resources. As Harvey put it "The distribution of party support along regional lines made clear to the people of the outer islands that they were a permanent minority in a system where representation was based on population." Adding to this already adverse situation were the policies of the central Army command in curbing the rise of warlords in the regions. Many local military commanders were involved in smuggling and business enterprises. It was widely known that in Sulawesi, for example, prominent army commanders involved in the copra trade export while in Sumatra the commanders smuggled rubber. Colonel Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff, began implementing policy of rotating regional military commanders to other areas. The purpose for this rotation policy was to prevent a commander for holding his position too long so he would not have time developing his business enterprises or cultivating loyal followers. The consequences of this rotation policy have made the commanders in the regions increasingly feeling resentment to the Army central command. They saw this policy instead as means for the 34 See M.C. Ricklefs A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300 Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion.p.5 36 For more information about this see Harvey Permesta half rebellion and Kahin Rebellion to integration 35 === [PDF page 53] === 37 central government to control them. Furthermore, heavy politicking among political parties within the konstituante or parliamentary democracy system had prompted a series of cabinet changes which resulted to political instability. The instability even made the Dwi-Tunggal, Sukarno and Hatta publicly criticized the parliamentary democracy system. Sukarno criticized the political parties as only serving the personal interests of their leaders, describing their proliferation as a "disease."37 As well as Sukarno, Hatta also accused the political parties of only promoting their own interests, at the expense of the people and he blamed them for the current disorder. With the consistent ineffectiveness of the parliamentary democracy and the mounting tensions between the center and the regions, in October 1956 President Sukarno began institutionalizing his concept of "guided democracy". But it was not until February 21, 1957 when he finally detailed his concept for the public in what he called Konsepsi which had two major elements: first, the cabinet members will drawn from of the four major political parties (PNI, Masjumi, NU and PKI) which got the most votes in the 1955 elections. Second, a National council (Dewan NasionaJ) will be created and its members will consist of functional groups and representatives from the regions.39 The declaration of Sukarno's konsepsi received strong opposition from the anticommunist groups who refused to give the PKI cabinet seats. Their reasons for rejecting Sukarno's Konsepsi are exemplified in a statement given during the PERMESTA's 37 Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion, p. 13-14 Ibid. p. 13 39 Ibid.p.l5 38 === [PDF page 54] === 38 political rally on March 10, 1957 at Makassar's Karebosi square: We oppose the inclusion of those who are antireligious in the government...Moslems are not permitted by their God to sit at the same table with people whose principle it is that religion is the opiate of the people.40 The issue of the PKI/communist as anti-religious became a prominent theme for years that persisted for to come among the anti-communist groups and it will especially effective during the communists purge in 1965-1967. With domestic politics leaning towards the left, the United States showed increasing determination to find any means in curbing the communist influences in Indonesia. One of the options for the United States government to fight the 'red scare' in Indonesia was through covert operations. There are several reasons why the United States pursued this measure. First, the officials within the Eisenhower administration were skeptical about the ability of the newly independent former colony to govern themselves sensibly, meaning in accordance to the U.S. interests. Second, the neutralist/non-bloc policy that Indonesia adopted when it hosted the first Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955 policy was by the Eisenhower administration, regarded as "politically naive and likely only to benefit the Sino-Soviet bloc." Third, Eisenhower wanted to prevent another episode of'loss of China' to communist control in Southeast Asia. Washington was willing to see "countries temporarily break up into racial and geographic units," which could provide base for fighting the communist power in other parts of the Ibid, p.53 === [PDF page 55] === 39 territory41 However, it was not Sukarno Konsepsi policy which brought the PKI into the government, nor the non-bloc declaration of Indonesia, but the results of the 1957 local elections that convinced Washington that Indonesia is going to the left. In these elections, the PKI emerged as the only party to increase its support since the 1955 elections, gaining first place in Central Java and second in Greater Jakarta, East Java, and West Java.42 The United States then learned about the regional resentments towards Sukarno and the central government, especially in West Sumatra and Northern Sulawesi. Washington also learned that there were prominent military commanders who, along with some prominent civilian leaders, increasingly disliked the way Sukarno was leaning to the left. The United States decided to help these dissident colonels by supplying them with weapons, ammunition, and personnel who were actively involved in assisting the PRRI and Permesta movement.43 As tension grew and a series of peaceful negotiations failed, one of the PRRI leaders, Colonel Ahmad Husein delivered an ultimatum to the central government on February 10 1958, titled "Struggle Charter: to Save The State," this ultimatum in essence, accused President Sukarno and the communists of leading Indonesia toward disaster. Moreover, Sukarno's Konsepsi of guided democracy was seen in the document, as 'a cloak for giving the Communist power in the central government.' 4 Sukarno was also 41 Audrey R.Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle and London: University of Washington press, 1995). 42 Ibid.p.69 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.p.l38 === [PDF page 56] === 40 accused of not attempting to understand the underlying grievances of the regional movements and instead simply wanting to suppress them by force.45 As the PRRI declared in their ultimatum, the Permesta movement in Manado also announced that they were joining the rebellion against the central government. Aware of the existence of foreign involvement in the rebellion, the Indonesian military under Colonel Nasution decided to move swiftly against the rebels. To prevent the United States from landing their troops which were already on high alert in Singapore, Nasution moved swiftly to prevent the U.S. from using its troop deployment to protect American lives and U.S. properties (the oil fields in Riau and elsewhere). The central government carried out a surprise military offensive that caught the rebels and the United States off guard. Within several hours after the government troops landed at Pekanbaru Airport, all foreigners and most of the oil fields had been secured. By immediately achieving those important main objectives, Nasution not only succeeded in denying the United States any pretext for sending troops to Indonesia but he also managed to force the rebel forces onto the defensive.46 After the government's success of the initial military phase, the PRRI rebels never mounted successful offensive or counterattack against government troops, forcing them to conduct a guerilla war that continued until early 1960s when the movement would be reduced to smaller units from disagreements among its leadership and dwindling supplies from the U.S. Not long after the PRRI rebels in Sumatra had been put on defensive, the central 45 For more complete information on the PRRI ultimatum see George and Audrey Kahin Book, Subversion as a Foreign policy 46 See George and Audrey Kahin book for detailed information on the government operation against PRRI. === [PDF page 57] === 41 government then turned its attention suppressing the Permesta rebels in North Sulawesi. The fighting against Permesta was longer, with more casualties on both sides, since Permesta had their own Air force (the AUREV47) and the terrain in Sulawesi was more difficult. Moreover, the Permesta had better access of supplies through its easier logistics chain. Many weapons, ammunitions, materials and foreign pilots supplied through the Philippines and Taiwan to Manado in North Sulawesi. In the beginning, the AUREV had air superiority over AURI (Indonesian Air Force) and was able to conduct several bombing missions against Ambon, Kalimantan, and other cities. However, the Permesta air superiority did not last long, since the government air force successfully bombed Manado and destroyed many of the AUREV planes on ground. The turning point came when the United States reversed its policy of supporting the rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The change of U.S. policy means that the rebels would not receive any supplies or at least the levels would significantly decrease. The reversal occurred after the humiliating capture of Allen Pope, a U.S. citizen and Navy pilot, whose plane was shot down when doing bombing mission on Ambon. After his capture, United States was suddenly in a difficult situation. As Harvey put it: "The embarrassment over Pope's capture, combined with the disillusionment over the rapid collapse of the rebel army in Sumatra, created a situation in which John Foster Dulles's hope of granting belligerent status to the PRRI became not only ridiculous, but AUREV-.Angkatan Udara Revolusioner or the revolutionary Airforce === [PDF page 58] === 42 impossible." The turnaround in American policy would solidify the effort by the new U.S.Ambassador, Howard P Jones, who found that Colonel Nasution, the Indonesian Armed forces chief of staff, was "as much as anti communist as the rebels he was fighting, but only would turn his attention to the PKI after he disposed the immediate threat from the rebels."49 As a result, on April 15 Jones advised the State Department to "place our bets squarely on the Indonesian Army".50 The turnaround of U.S. policy proved fatal for the rebels since they stopped receiving supplies and munitions. As a result, their numbers began to dwindle and they were reduced into small guerilla groups operating in several pockets of resistance in the vast area of Sumatra and Sulawesi. In addition to the diminishing supplies, the rebels also suffered from the constant harassment of central government troops. But the most critical factor that would lead to the end of the rebellion was the fatal split among the leaders of the rebellion, particularly among Permesta leadership.51 By early 1960s both PRRI and Permesta rebellion had been completely suppressed, as most, if not all of its leaders had either surrender or captured by the central government. To subdued the rebels, in Sumatra the government deployed around 6,000 youth as part of a paramilitary group that was called People's Youth Organization or Organisasi Pemuda Rakjat its members drawn mostly from young communist party Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion.y. 109 Ibid. Ibid. 'lbid.p.122 === [PDF page 59] === 43 members.5 The deployment of the leftist youth paramilitary in Sumatra and the central government appointment of PKI and leftist Murba party members to fill administrative positions down to the village level throughout West Sumatra prompted the PRRI prime minister, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, to proclaim in mid February 1959 that "Sukarno regime is moving toward a communist regime, particularly in Central Sumatra."53 The failed PRRI and Permesta rebellion boosted PKI popularity domestically since they had correctly charged before other parties the United States with supporting the rebels.54 With the PKI sustaining the protest against the United States, it gained credibility through the widespread eruption of national patriotism that followed the uncovering of the U.S. involvement in Indonesia's domestic affairs. However, the increasing popularity of PKI did not automatically make the party more involved in the government. Sukarno's presidential decree on July 5, 1959, declaring the return to the 1945 constitution and dismantling the parliamentary system, effectively closed the PKFs only legal road to power through parliamentary system.55 Prior to the 1959 presidential decree, the PKI already experienced an initial barrier on their road to power when, on September 22, 1958, the Djuanda government announced the postponement of the 1959 national elections.56 The delay of the national election caused the patriotic momentum that PKI had painstakingly built to simply 52 Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia.p.200 Ibid.p.201 54 Ibid.p.l94 55 Ibid.p.211 56 Ibid.p.l94 53 === [PDF page 60] === 44 dissipate.57 Nevertheless, the failed PRRI and Permesta rebellion had caused dramatic changes in the composition of Indonesian political power. The rebellion had significantly strengthened the army, the Presidency, and the PKI. The central army leadership enjoyed active political role while at the same time 'their cohesiveness and discipline had been increased and its public image brightened by the virtue of perception that it had faced down the might of the United States.'58 President Sukarno's position became stronger as he eliminated the parliamentary system. He increasingly centralized authority at the expense of local autonomy. More importantly, his stature as a political leader grew and he was seen as a symbol of national self-respect. After leading his people to independence from the Dutch, he again succeeded in resisting another Western country, the United States. Moreover, this success strengthened Sukarno's standing in the world as a prominent anti-colonialist figure.59 Sukarno enlarged the PKI role after Hatta's resignation, shutting down the Masjumi party because of the alleged involvement of its members in the regional rebellion.60 The PKI influence not only grew in the center but after the rebellion their influence also flourished in the former rebellious regions.61 As Sukarno suspended many political parties and the power of the Army increased, he needed the PKI more than ever to balance the growing power of the Army. After the failure of PRRI and Permesta Ibid.p.218 [bid. Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion.^.150 Ibid.p.151 === [PDF page 61] === 45 rebellions, the political spectrum of Indonesia had completely changed. As Kahin put it: With a much less pluralistic political spectrum than before, the country was left with a tense and brittle tripolarization of just three major political forces, each now stronger than before—the Army, the Communist party and Sukarno. That was a formula for neither effective government nor political stability. Indeed, it incorporated the necessary ingredients for a major political explosion.62 The major political explosion that Kahin described eventually happened in October 1965. However, as we examine the background period we needed to understand the larger political context and the social life of the Indonesian people. At the outset, Sukarno would continue to influence the fiery revolutionary situation, using the Irian Jaya/Irian Barat campaign and the Konfrontasi against the newly established state of Malaysia. The fiery revolutionary atmosphere In the early 1960s the issue of West Irian was one of the stumbling blocks in the diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The transfer of authority at this eastern-most region of the Indonesian archipelago should have been resolved within a year after the Round Table Conference in 1949. But, until early 1960s, after series of failed negotiations between the two governments, the West Irian issue had not yet been resolved. After his success in handling the foreign-backed regional rebellions, Sukarno enjoyed an unprecedented legitimacy and popular support. He felt that to preserve the Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia.p.220 === [PDF page 62] === 46 unity of the new nation it was important to continue the momentum of a revolutionary spirit against Western imperialism. Sukarno was well aware of his leadership capabilities and wanted to use the Irian campaign for what M.C. Ricklefs called "a means of galvanizing Indonesia into the mass momentum that he felt to be essential to ongoing revolution and for which his leadership talents were uniquely suited"63 As tensions mounted between Netherlands and Indonesia, Sukarno declared TRIKORA64 on December 18, 1961. At a mass gathering, Sukarno unleashed his quintessential^ fervid oratorical style as he explained the meaning of TRIKORA: What are the Three commands of the people, my brothers? Tri means three, Kocommand, Ra-People; and indeed in my Three commands of the people I have explained that this is People's command, not the command of the Supreme command, not the command of President Sukarno to his people, not the command of the Great Leader of the Revolution, but in reality the people's command to the people, where it portray the Indonesian people's spirit to free West Irian from the grip of imperialist.65 Sukarno claimed TRIKORA to be the command of the people. As he explained M.C.Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300 (London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1993). TRIKORA=Tri Komando Rakyat or the Three Commands of the People 65 Sukarno, Genap Setahun Trikora Dan Dekrit Penghapusan Sob: Amanat Presiden Sukarno Pada Rapat Raksasa Peringatan Ulangtahun Pertama Trikora DiSurabaja, Tanggal 19 Desember 1962, Penerbitan Chusus (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I, 1963). p.5-6 Original text: Apa Trikomando Rakjat, saudara-saudara? Tri artinya tiga, Ko-komando, ra-rakjat; dan memang didalam pidato Trikomando Rakjat itu saja djelaskan bahwa ini adalah Komando Rakjat, bukan komando Panglima Tertinggi, bukan komando Presiden Sukarno kepada rakjat, bukan komando Pemimpin Besar Revolusi kepada rakjat, tetapi sebenarnja komando rakjat kepada rakjat, menggambarkan semangatnja rakjat Indonesia untuk membebaskan Irian Barat daripada tjengkeraman imperialis. 64 Original text: pertama ialah:Gagalkan "negara Papua", djika ada sesuatu usaha untuk mendirikan "negara papua" di Irian barat gagalkan usaha itu, adalah komando jang pertama. Nomor dua apa, saudara-saudara? Pantjangkan bendera Sang Merah Putih di wilajah Irian Barat, kibarkan bendera kita jang kita tjintai itu diangkasa Irian Barat, djangan sampai bendera Merah Putih hanja berkibar didaerah Indonesia jang lain Nomor tiga, siap-siagalah, hai rakjat Indonesia dari Sabang sampai Merauke, untuk mendjalankan mobilisasi umum. === [PDF page 63] === 47 further the objective of the TRIKORA, he again used his fiery style of rhetoric: first: block the "Papua nation", if there is an attempt to establish the "Papua nation" in West Irian, block that attempt, this is the first command. What is number two, brothers? Stake our beloved flag on West Irian sky; do not let the Red and White flag only waves in other regions of Indonesia. Number three, be ready and vigilant, people of Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke, to implement general mobilization.66 The responses from the people and all the political groups were immensely enthusiastic. Consequently, the PKI saw the Irian campaign as a good opportunity to boost its national image in politics.67 On the other hand, the Army also saw the opportunity to maintain its position in politics. Under the leadership of Major General Soeharto, Indonesia launched a military operation code named, "Mandala." Although the military operation suffered many setbacks, it was enough to force the recognition of the West Irian matters by the United Nations. Finally, on August 15, 1962 the Dutch agreed to transfer the authority of West Irian to an interim UN commission on October 1, 1962 which, in turn, transferred authority to Indonesia on May 1, 1963.68 However, the success of the Irian campaign brought greater anxieties to the three major political players in the Indonesian politics— the army, PKI, and Sukarno. The army feared that the martial law that had been in effect since the regional rebellions would immediately be lifted. The result could lead to decreased military power in domestic politics, especially a major cut in the military budget. 66 Ibid, p.6 M.C.Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300.^.210 68 Ibid.p.271 67 === [PDF page 64] === 48 On the other hand, as the political situation became calmer, the PKI grew concerned that it could not capitalize on chances to grow its membership and increase its influence in domestic politics. The nation was no longer engulfed in an intense revolutionary atmosphere after the end of Irian campaign. For Sukarno this situation could lead to the end of mass emotionalism and upset his return to revolutionary politics.69 However, as it turned out, Indonesia would not wait long to continue its revolutionary path. The sudden creation of the new state of Malaysia immediately brought Indonesia back to the fiery revolutionary situation that engulfed almost every aspect of social life. Dwikora and the Konfrontasi After two years of constant negotiations and inflammatory exchanges of rhetoric between Sukarno of Indonesia and Tungku Abdul Rachman of Malaya, on September 16, 1963 the new Federation of Malaysia was finally established. In Sukarno's eyes, Malaysia was a Neo-colonialism project, created by the British and thus threatening the 70 Indonesian Revolution. Moreover, for Indonesia there were concerns about a continuing 71 British presence in the region since their military bases would remain. The Malaysia issue provided the perfect opportunity for Sukarno to promote anti- 69 Ibid.p.271-272 Sukarno, Politik Kita Adalah Politik Konfrontasi!:Amanat Presiden Sukarno Pada Rapat Raksasa Front Nasional "Mengganjang Malaysia" Di Is tana Olahraga Gelora Bung Karno, Senajan, Pada Tanggal 27 Djuli 1963, Penerbitan Chusus (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, 1963).p.4 71 M.C.Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300.^.212 70 === [PDF page 65] === 49 imperialism, especially as he perceived himself as ardent nationalist and the foremost champion of anti-colonialism. More importantly, the Malaysia problem gave him a great opportunity to continue fueling the revolutionary spirit that he wanted to maintain in Indonesia. Therefore, to avert the creation of Malaysia and check neo-imperialism, Sukarno declared that victory could be achieved through diplomacy, popular mobilization, and, most importantly "Konfrontasi" (confrontation) in every field.72 As always, Sukarno expressed his ideas with eloquent, patriotic oratory saying, "the essence from every essence is konfrontasi. Since in our present world, brothers, we cannot defeat, subdue, any wish of the imperialist side only by speaking sweetly. That is not possible!"73 Fueled by Sukarno's fiery speeches, thousands of people poured into the streets of Jakarta demonstrating against Malaysia. These demonstrators were mostly from the leftleaning mass organizations and PKI members. In one of the biggest demonstrations, the masses managed to burn down the British embassy building along with twenty-one staff houses.74 As the political situation continued to deteriorate, Sukarno declared the battle cry of "Ganjang Malaysia." 72 Along with this increasingly popular battle cry, the word Sukarno, Politik Kita Adalah PolitikKonfrontasi!.AmanatPresiden Sukarno Pada Rapat Raksasa Front Nasional "Mengganjang Malaysia" Di Istana Olahraga Gelora Bung Karno, Senajan, Pada Tanggal 27 Djuli 1963.pA Ibid. Original text: Pokok dari segala pokok jalah konfrontasi. Sebab di dalam dunia sekarang ini, Saudara-saudara, tidak bisa kita mengalahkan, menundukkan sesuatu kehendak daripada pihak imperialis hanja bitjara manis-manisan sadja. Tidak bisa! 74 M.C.Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300.p.273 75 Ganjang Malaysia (Ganyang Malaysia) has been mistakenly translated in many books as "Crush Malaysia" or "gobble Malaysia raw" (as it was written in M.C.Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia). In fact, Sukarno gave his own definition of what is "Ganjang" in his speech in front of the National front === [PDF page 66] === 50 "Nekolim" for Neo colonialism, "Kontra revolusi" for contra revolutionary, "Revolusi" for Revolution were some of the most popular terms that dominated the Indonesian public, political, and social rhetoric in the 1960s. Following the success of the TRIKORA, on May 3, 1964 Sukarno declared DWIKORA (Dwi Komando Rakjat) or the dual command of the people to engage the Malaysia problem. The aim of DWIKORA was to comply with the volunteer action command, which are: "a. intensify the tenacity of the Indonesian Revolution; b. assist the revolutionary struggle of the people in Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Serawak and Brunei to liquidate the puppet state of "Malaysia"76 The declaration of DWIKORA and "Ganjang Malaysia" campaign prompted the people into general mobilization by signing themselves up as 'volunteers' for the fight against "nekolim" and to protect the "Indonesian Revolution." The increasing tensions and revolutionary atmosphere would continue to dominate the political and social life of Indonesia in the mid 1960s. While the political situation continued to reach its boiling point, the economy also began to suffer. The poor economic conditions added into the overall crisis the country faced at that time. As the "Konfrontasi" reached its full swing and became the highest priority for Sukarno, the military also looked forward to increase their budget, while the PKI continued to take the groups on 27 July 1963. In that speech he said, "kalau ngganjang itu dimakan kemudian ditelan" which translated as: Ganjang is to eat and then to swallow it. 76 Sukarno, "Dwikomando Rakjat Untuk Mengganjang "Malaysia"," in Gelora Konfrontasi Mengganjang "Malaysia" (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1964).p.388 Original text: "Komando Aksi Sukarelawan: a. Perhebat Ketahanan Revolusi Indonesia; b. Bantu perdjuangan Revolusioner Rakjat-Rakjat Malaya, Singapura, Sabah, Serawak dan Brunei untuk membubarkan negara Boneka "Malaysia === [PDF page 67] === 51 lead in mass agitations. Sukarno once again succeeded in driving the people's revolutionary spirit onward.77 Nonetheless, by the end of 1964 and mid 1965, everybody knew that the "Konfrontasi" policy had reached a stalemate, while the relationships between PKI, army, and Sukarno were becoming more restless. The PKI made things worst by launching the "unilateral action" campaign in 1963 in an effort to implement the land reform laws of 1959-1960.78 The PKI "Unilateral action" brought them into direct conflict with the religious groups, landlords, army managers and other anti-communist groups. In Indonesian daily social life there were also shifts in norms. Moreover, there were also clashes between the so called "revolutionary culture," and those considered as proponents of a "contra-revolutionary culture." The following section will discuss these aspects to gain a better understanding of the social context and the mood of the society at that time. Indonesian social life in the early 1960s Reflecting the temper of these troubled times, Effendi S. Sudarga published the following poem in the poetry section of Warta Peladjar newspaper in March 1965: Datang Buat Pergi: -Kami jang pulang ini hari ibunda daririmbadjalang di kaltara bukan apa apa kami datang pamit buat semua karena datang kami adalah pergi lagi peluklah biar dalam bunda M.C.Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300.p.273 Ibid.p.274 === [PDF page 68] === 52 sementara pelor masih mendekam diudjung senapan dan djangan tangisi karena kata bung karno: Tak ada kemenangan tanpa perdjuangan kami pergi lagi karena rindu kami pada perdamaian dan kemerdekaan kami pergi lagi bawa pandji pandji revolusi kemanusiaan nanti kami datang diudjung subuh bawa tjerita bahwa hari itu nekolim telah runtuh Translation: Return to leave: -We who returned today, mother from the wilderness of Northern Kalimantan it is not because of anything We came to say goodbye to all Because our return meant leaving again please embrace deeply mother while bullets are still cower at the tip of the rifle and please do not weep because Bung Karno said: There is no victory without struggle we leave again as we yearn for peace and freedom we leave again bringing the banners of the humanity revolution we will return at the edge of dawn bringing story on the day nekolim collapse This poem is an example of the mood in Indonesian society at the time of "Konfrontasi." These intense feelings would later provide the backdrop for the imminent clash between the PKI and the army. Furthermore, the general feeling and mood of the time can perhaps explain the brutality of the mass killings that happened after the Lubang Buaya affair. The mass killings would lead into the demise of Indonesian communist Effendi S. Sudarga, "Datang Buat Pergi," Warta Peladjar:Penjebar Doktrin Revolusi Pantjasila, Second week of March 1965. === [PDF page 69] === 53 party and the beginning of the New Order regime. Effendi Sudarga's poem gives us a glimpse of how "konfrontasi" was considered a patriotic duty and honor for those who served. The goals of fighting were not only to sustain humanity, peace, and freedom but, most importantly, to destroy nekolim. Huge sacrifice was required to succeed in this struggle. Promoting patriotic themes to the nation served dual purpose: first, to gather popular support for the "konfrontasi" campaign and, second, to down play the country's economic hardship. By emphasizing the need to sacrifice for the greater good of peace and freedom, the patriotic themes embedded in this rhetoric also hoped to inspire people in enduring the hard struggle. The economic difficulties did not, however, deter Sukarno from promoting his patriotic message. Instead of making major efforts to resolve economic problems, Sukarno committed unprecedented energy to the anti-imperialist campaign. To convince people that they could be independent of the evil influence of nekolim, Sukarno promoted the campaign by composing and reciting of poetry, such as one titled Pantun Revolusi (Revolution poem) which would later become a popular revolutionary song. This poem revealed Sukarno's patriotic and revolutionary aspirations for the Indonesian people: Pantun Revolusi: I. Siapa bilang aku ini orang Blitar Aku ini orang Prambanan Siapa bilang rakjat Indonesia lapar Rakjat Indonesia Tjukup makanan II. Siapa bilang aku ini orang Blitar Aku ini orang dari Prambanan. === [PDF page 70] === 54 Siapa bilang revolusi Indonesia akan gagal atau bubar Revolusi kita sekarang didukung wartawan III. Siapa bilang saja orang Blitar Saja ini orang Begelen Siapa bilang rakjat lapar Indonesia sekarang punja padi Marhaen80 Translation: Revolution Poem: Who said I am from Blitar I am from Prambanan Who said Indonesian people are hungry Indonesian people have plenty of food Who said I am from Blitar I am from Prambanan Who said Indonesian Revolution will fail or dissolved Our Revolution is now supported by the journalists III. Who said I am from Blitar I am from Begelen Who said the people are hungry Now Indonesia has Marhaen8' rice. The poem or song not only helped in creating the revolutionary atmosphere but more importantly, to sustain it. In addition to songs and poems, the newspapers were filled with patriotic themes, news and, speeches. Although, it was generally agreed that Sukarno was not the only one who promoted these patriotic and revolutionary themes, one could argue that he Sukarno Bung Karno, "Bung Karno Bapak Marhaenisme:Pantun Revolusi," Warta Peladjar, Fifth week of March 1965. 81 Marhaen: a term invented by Sukarno in classifying the common (poor) people of Indonesia. Marhaen is not the same with the "proletarian" group, since from his definition marhaen are the common people who are still poor but they still own some properties and have tools as their means of production (hoe, water buffalo, small piece of land developed for agriculture). === [PDF page 71] === 55 popularized most of this patriotic political rhetoric. One example from "the note from the editor" sections clearly expressed his/her opinion on a Sumpah Pemuda or youth pledge national day commemoration. The contents of this newspaper editorial were consistent with the dominant political mood during that time period. In an issue of a weekly newspaper, Warta Peladjar, on October 28,1964 on the editor urged readers to regard the remembrance not only "through general meetings and commemorations, but instead it should also be use to thicken the willpower and beliefs of the Sumpah Pemuda soul to mobilize the progressiverevolutionary powers in destroying Malaysia, the Nekolim project."83 Mass organizations also filled the newspapers with political statement of support for the "Konfrontasi" policy. One example of this support could be seen in a statement released by LPKB (Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa), or the institute for sustaining the nation's unity, one of many mass organizations in Indonesia. The contents of this statement claimed that every Indonesian who considered themselves to be progressiverevolutionary should solidly support Bung Karno/the president/the great leader of the revolution/and the ABRI commander-in-chief to increase total confrontation against the racist politics of the puppet Malaysia.84 In addition to political statements and rhetoric, this newspaper also often 82 Sumpah Pemuda day or the "youth pledge" day. It is commemorate annually every October 28. The Sumpah Pemuda day is the day when Indonesian commemorated the event of October 28, 1928 when the 2nd youth congress was held. In this congress, the youth groups of Indonesia pledges to have a one nation, Indonesia, one language, Indonesian and one motherland, Indonesia. The Sumpah Pemuda day was deemed to be significant since it marked the beginning of the united nationalistic struggle against the Dutch by the Pemuda or youth. 83 No Reporter, "Tadjuk Rencana: Menjambut Hari Sumpah Pemuda," Warta Peladjar, 28 October 1964. 84 No Reporter, "Tingkatkan Terus: Persatuan Nasional Progresip-Revolusioner Berporos Nasakom," Warta Peladjar, 2nd week of January 1965. === [PDF page 72] === contained articles that warned the people, especially students, to increase their awareness of rumors and gossip. One article emphasized that students were the perfect target for these "foreign subversives" to spread rumors among students and community since, if they succeeded, these students could end up poisoning our educational world.85 The same article then went on to give details of the nature and type of rumors, providing examples of "rumors of conflict between one government figure with another and linking our prominent figures with certain women and with other more shrewd ways." The article then elaborated on the goals of the contra-revolution groups in spreading these rumors, saying they "hoped to create split between the people and their leaders so it will weaken the steadfastness of the revolution while the revolution is currently experiencing the high tide, especially within the context of ganjang Malaysia."87 Describing the devious ways that rumors spread, the article mentioned that most of the time they would initially happen through seemingly innocent conversations. After that, the poisonous rumors could easily spread to the public and ultimately could weaken the revolution. Therefore, the writer of the article warned, students should be aware of how dangerous the "whispering campaign" that the enemy of the revolution had launched and it was the responsibility of each and every one of us to crush {Ganjang) these rumors. 85 No Reporter, "Awas! Kaum Contra Revolusi Sebarkan Desas Desus!:Peladjar Harus Tetap Waspada!," Warta Peladjar, First week of May 1964. 86 Ibid.p. 1 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.p.2 === [PDF page 73] === 57 Another newspaper article used a similar message to increase awareness of the public. The article urged the people to be alert of the "enemies of the revolution" that could cause disturbance, to aggravate the revolution by doing provocation.89 Another article specifically warned the youth to remain alert since they were prone to provocation, declaring there were already many examples of how these youths "unconsciously fallen into their influence and could be directed to do activities that can harm the Indonesian revolution."90 Emphasizing the devious nature of the provocation, the article further explained how someone unconsciously be under their influence to conduct their planned contra-revolutionary activities. With the current problems in the Indonesian economy, rumors could make someone willing to destroy his or her own country.91 Therefore, the article suggested, it was extremely important to increase our awareness and "not let anyone from anywhere to manipulate us to harm our revolution!"92 In addition to the samples previously mentioned, government officials also released statements that urged people to remain vigilant and to know who were their friends and enemies. One example of such statements came from Mrs. Artati MarzukiSudirdjo, the minister of Education and Culture: It is necessary for students to know who are their enemies and friends in revolution and be certain on the goals of our revolution. Only in that way the students can be really becoming the true cadres of revolution, becoming the ultimate patriot as we would hope for. 89 Partomo S.H., "Hai Pemuda-Pemudi Hati21ah Terhadap Hasutan," Warta Peladjar, 4th week of March year 1 1964. 90 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 No Reporter, "Jm. Ibu Nj. Artati Marzuki-Sudirdjo: Peladjar.Perlu Kenal Kawan & Lawan Revolusi. Pupuk Kepertjajaan "Tjita2 Revolusi Pasti Berhasil"," Warta Peladjar, 2nd week of January 1965. Original text: Perlu sekali para peladjar mengenal siapa lawan dan kawan Revolusi dan mejakini tudjuan2 === [PDF page 74] === 58 From Marzuki-Sudirdjo's statement, we could sense the importance of distinguishing enemies among friends to achieve the goals of the revolution as a true patriot. By examining several newspaper articles, we can perhaps have better understanding of the political atmosphere at that time. The publication of these kinds of articles added fuel into the already heated political atmosphere. Consequently, many people were exposed to this rhetoric. As a result, many people wanted to express their patriotism so they could be viewed as true patriots. Some expressed their patriotism by signing up as a volunteer leaving for North Kalimantan to fight. Others showed their support by attending mass rallies and holding big banners containing harsh words and sentences cursing the contra-revolutionary group and nekolim. There were those who joined the leftist groups which were considered the most politically active. Under the direction of their leaders, these groups mobilized many people to hold demonstrations against those whom in their view were contrarevolutionary. It was also a common knowledge that the leftist groups organized most of the anti-western, mti-nekolim and pro "Konfrontasi" demonstrations. No matter how intense and dominant the patriotic themes and propaganda that appeared in the newspapers, it was President Sukarno who dominated the political scene. The following section will examine his growing personality cult in the Indonesian politics prior to the outbreak of Lubang Buaya episode. revolusi kita.Hanjalah dengan demikian para peladjar benar2 akan dapat mendjadi kader2 revolusi, mendjadi patriot2 paripurna jang kita harapkan. === [PDF page 75] === 59 The domination of Sukarno and the building of his cult of personality It was widely known that Sukarno has great oratorical skills. Through the combination of his oratorical skills and personal charisma as a nationalist leader during the colonial time, he induced the Japanese to recruit him as their propaganda mouthpiece, making him extremely well known to the public. His popularity helped his later rise to become the most prominent leader of the Indonesian people. Sukarno often expressed patriotic messages to the masses, using his astonishing oratorical ability. Always claiming himself as a true nationalist and anti-colonial figure, he would conduct many Rapat Raksasa, or giant meeting in which tens of thousands of people would gather in a field or stadium to listen to his speeches. During these giant meetings, in his speeches often mix many languages, including Indonesian, local languages (Javanese), and foreign languages (Dutch, German, English, French, and some Italian.) Moreover, Sukarno was a master when it came to putting the correct intonation in specific words and sentences to elucidate his points. As the late Mr. Jusuf Ronodipuro, Sukarno's friend and former press officer recalled: "Fa, the way he made the speech..wah..People are amazed listening to his speech. He was able to dramatized the situation. Amazing. People nowadays cannot imagine his speech." 4 It was indeed his sometimes ferocious but eloquent style of speech that helped Sukarno capture the public imagination. On the other hand, his lurid, overly direct, and 94 Jusuf Ronodipuro, 2006. November 29,. Original text: Ya tapi cara pidatonya wah.. Orang-orang terpukau dengar dia pidato. Dia bisa dramatized itu, situation. Luar biasa. Orang yang sekarang ya nggak bisa bayangkan itu pidato === [PDF page 76] === 60 intimidating manner made him infamous abroad. At one occasion, Sukarno's chief opponent, Tengku Abdul Rachman of Malaysia, called him as "Hitler from Indonesia"95 In one of his Rapat Raksasa, Sukarno used the opportunity to answer Tengku Abdul Rachman's accusation, calling him a liar and strongly denying his allegation. Sukarno stressed the point that, unlike Hitler, he was not the type of leader who imposed his personal will to his people, as in fact he was only doing his duty as the Penjambung lidah rakjat Indonesia96 Sukarno's barked back at Tengku Abdul Rachman saying:"You know why? Because Sukarno has his ear to the ground and listens to his people's cry. His talent lies in the fact that he uncannily interprets THEIR will and puts into words THEIR feelings."97 On his 63rd birthday on June 6, 1964, the weekly newspaper Warta Peladjar had a big congratulatory headline acknowledging him as he "who was born at the dawn. A 20th century world figure."98 Within this same article the editor stated, Sukarno would always put forward the interests of the people rather than his personal interests. Moreover, the article pointed out a key aspect of Sukarno's teaching. He always persistently fought Sukarno, "Dwikomando Rakjat Untuk Mengganjang "Malaysia"."p.368 Ibid. Penjambung lidah rakjat Indonesia or in the new spelling Penyambung lidah rakyat Indonesia. The literal meaning of this term is "the connector of the Indonesian people tongue". Perhaps the more appropriate English translation although there is probably none, would be "The person who convey/communicate the will/ words/ of the people" Sukarno often refer/claimed himself this title that he is indeed that person. What he said and his will, he claimed to be the exactly the same of what the people wanted. However, in this case the penjambung lidah rakjat cannot be translated as the "people's spoke person" since it does not have the same nuances or meaning as the original phrase. 97 Cindy Adams, Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill company, INC, 1965).p.303 98 No Reporter, "Enam Djuni Satu Sembilan Enam Empat: Bung Karno 63 Tahun. Dilahirkan Dikala Fadjar Menyingsing. Tokoh Dunia Abad Ke Xx," Warta Peladjar. Penjebar Doktrin Revolusi Pantjasila, 2nd Week June 1964 1964. 96 === [PDF page 77] === 61 to achieve "unity".99 The idea of unity was always Sukarno's main priority. Ever since he was young and long before he formulated the concept of Pantjasila or Pancasila, a concept that later became the principle of the Indonesian state, contemplated the idealized concept of unity by combining all the major world's streams or concepts. Sukarno later declared his conception of NASAKOM100 which stands for nationalism, religion, and communism. He created this concept to accommodate and maintain the unity of the so called key "streams" or groups in Indonesia. Although he acknowledged those three groups as the most important groups in Indonesian politics, in reality the three factions that dominated Indonesian politics between 1963 and 1965 ~ the Army, the PKI, and Sukarno himself. To preserve national unity, Sukarno believed it was important for Indonesians to have self-confidence and remove themselves from the feeling of inferiority. In short, Sukarno wanted to make Indonesians to be proud of themselves and to feel equal with other nations. One way to achieve the sense of pride was through the development of many material symbols within the nation. Sukarno worked hard to create and build these symbols as he deemed them to be extremely important: Man does not live by bread alone. Although Djakarta's alleys are muddy and we lack roads, I have erected a brick and glass apartment building, a cloverleaf bridge, and our superhighway, the Djakarta Bypass, and I renamed the streets after our heroes: Djalan Diponegoro, Djalan Thamrin, Djalan Tjokraminoto. I consider money for material symbols well spent. I must make Indonesians proud of "Ibid. IOO NASAKOM: Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme. On the other hand, J.D.Legge in his book Sukarno: a Political biography argues that Sukarno, wanted to contain and hold these three streams in balance rather than to unite them. See page.392 === [PDF page 78] === 62 themselves. They have cringed too long.101 His unwavering attitude of imposing self-confidence, nationalism, anti-imperialism, and national pride was often viewed abroad, especially in the West, as an attitude that created a "problem". Accordingly, in the eyes of the Western countries Sukarno often regarded as a "trouble maker." The exaltation of Sukarno's personality cult was reflected in his long official title which was: Paduka Jang Mulia, Presiden Republik Indonesia, Perdana Menteri, Panglima Tertinggi ABRI, Pemimpin Besar Revolusi, Mandataris MPRS Dr. Ir.Sukarno. Sukarno viewed himself as the most important unifying factor in Indonesia. With this kind of attitude, he helped to sustain and reinforce his personality cult. Although the political situation at that time was increasingly tense, Sukarno believed it was up to him and only him to preserve the nation's unity. He expressed this thought to Cindy Adams, his autobiographer: Indonesia must overcome self-consciousness and inferiority. She needs confidence. That I must give her before I'm taken away. Today Sukarno alone is the cohesive factor in Indonesia. After I'm gone the only cement to hold the islands together will be their national pride.103 Despite his absolute domination over political life, the great Sukarno could not prevent the imminent collision between the army and PKI. Condemning the West 101 Adams, Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams.p.293 Translation: His Highness, The President of the Republic of Indonesia, The Prime Minister, The ABRI (Indonesian armed forces) chief of staff, The Great leader of revolution, The holder of the mandate from the MPRS, Dr. Ir Sukarno. 103 Adams, Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams.p,.293 102 === [PDF page 79] === 63 During the years 1963 to 1965 when political tensions were at their height, public condemnation against anything that sounded and looked "Western" was increasingly prevalent. One of the most prominent campaigns against the West was the "Anti Beatles" movement or popularly known as the anti "ngak...ngik...ngok" music movement. Ngak..ngik...ngok was a term to describe the Rock and Roll music, such as the Beatles. This type of music was loud and noisy, and those who listened to it were mostly young people who often jumped around in unruly manner to express their "freedom." Hence, this kind of music was considered to be unacceptable because it did not reflect Indonesian's "Eastern" culture and behavior. An article in Warta Peladjar of May 1965 illustrates some of the reasons why the Beatles should be banned in Indonesia. Even in Great Britain, the paper said, many parents dislike the Beatles because it was becoming too expensive to support their children since the Beatles fan clubs required them to change outfits every week following the current Beatles fashion. While in Africa, the article claimed, youngsters were prohibited to have "the Beatles" hairstyle, and if they dared to have it they would be arrested. In conclusion, the article affirmed, "therefore it was sensible for the President/ the great leader of Indonesian revolution, Bung Karno to ban all activities and influences of the Beatles to enter our mother land. Since whatever it may be, the way and attitude of the Beatles was unacceptable to our nation Eastern soul."104 At that time, it was also important for anyone to be ever vigilant against "Western Culture." Popular Western dances were seen as one possible infiltration point for Western 104 No Reporter, "The Beatles Ditantang Dimana-Mana," Warta Peladjar, First week of May 1965. === [PDF page 80] === 64 culture. One newspaper article mentioned the danger of dancing the "Twist," arguing that this dance could be used as means for imperialists to infiltrate our society to spread their influence by making the youth 'drunk,' thus forgetting everything else. Hence, "this situation can endanger our revolution as it can also reduce our own consciousness about the meaning of our own personality as a nation that was going through a revolution."105 Nonetheless, there were also those who dared to disobey the anti-Beatles and ngak...ngik..ngok music campaign. One example was the Koes brothers music group or Koes Bersaudara, they experienced it the hard way. These five brothers; Yon, Yok, Nomo, Tony and Murry were put behind bars for performing the Beatles and other music which, according to Sukarno, belonged to the ngak..ngik...ngok category. One media report described the Koes Brothers concert in West Java as they were "playing their jumping around music, without paying attention to the efforts of the local people who prioritized character to stop sickening liberal behavior."105 The news report then elaborated its point by stating: In comparison with their first visit, the Koes Brothers with their embellished way has raped the suggestion of the Great Leader of Revolution Bung Karno to abandon the habit of the ngak.ngik.ngok songs which are absolutely unsuited in the glorious revolution of the Indonesian nation.107 Furthermore, the article continued its harsh criticism of the Koes brother's performance 105 Thamrin Sarim, "Pemuda & Tari Pergaulan Dim Revolusi," Warta Peladjar, 2nd week of May 1964. Antara, "Koes Bersaudara Membangkang Terhadap Larangan Presiden," (Djakarta: 1965).p.l33 107 Ibid. Original text:..dibandingkan dengan kedatangannja jang pertama kali oleh band "Koes bersaudara" tsb dengan tjara lebih memperkosa andjuran Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Bung Karno untuk meninggalkan kebiasaan lagu2 ngak..ngik...ngok, jang tidak sesuai sama-sekali dalam begeloranja revolusi bangsa Indonesia. 106 === [PDF page 81] === 65 and described them as "showing their preposterous performance as they moved violently like an unleashed monkey with indistinguishable sounds."108 Despite suffering from threats and prosecution in the media, the Koes brothers continued to perform their music until finally they were questioned by the authorities after a performance at the Kemajoran airport in Jakarta. During the questioning, Aruan S.H., the head of the social politic sections of the Jakarta district attorney office, asked the Koes brothers why they continued to play the ngak..ngik..ngok music. The Koes brothers replied that they thought it was acceptable to play that kind of music at the airport, since they considered the airport and its restaurant to be part of an international establishment.109 But, Aruan S.H. retorted saying that "not an inch of Indonesian soil can be use to play the ngak... ngik... ngok music. Even in prison it is not allowed to played songs that can jeopardize the revolution."110 The authorities did not immediately arrest the Koes Brothers. In fact they were released with a strong warning. However, following another incident they were later arrested on subversion charge. The day before their arrest, Koes brothers performed in a residence of a certain Colonel. In that particular occasion, an official from the U.S. Embassy also attended the gathering. During the party, the Pemuda Rakjat a communist leaning youth group attacked the house by throwing stones at the colonel's house. The Pemuda Rakjat said that from inside the house they heard Beatles music. In their opinion, Sjaiful Nawas, "Beatles & Sebangsanja Diganjang.:Petugas 2 Band Populer Boleh Pilih Drama, LensoDjoget-Krontjong-Fox Trot-Chacha-Mambo-Beguine-Rumba Atau Walsa," Warta Peladjar, 23 May 1965.p.3 === [PDF page 82] === 66 that type of music symbolized the Western way of life that they claimed to fight. Tony, one of the Koes brothers, went out to speak to the crowd, promising the angry mob that they would stop playing the Beatles music. The mob then left the premises peacefully, but the following day the Koes brothers were arrested on subversion charges.111 They remained in prison until after the Lubang Buaya incident. The Koes brother's case was just one example of the extensive anti-Western sentiment in Indonesia. The harassment was not only aimed at Western rock and roll music, but also at the United States Peace Corps volunteers who often suffered the fate of being suspected as an arm of the CIA. Some newspaper headlines reported this suspicion, thereby increasing the already volatile situation against the West. The newspaper described the Peace Corps volunteers as being "skillful in making friends and speaking with the people, criticizing colonialism and praising the American freedom." Furthermore, the newspaper article also mentioned that the Peace Corps not only received political war and ideological training, but they also received military training. Therefore, the Peace Corps should be identified as the "War Corps". Hence, to face the situation the newspaper suggested it was important for everyone to remain vigilant and to increase awareness against the danger of Peace Corps. Especially for the students, they needed to always on guard because they were the ones who were most vulnerable and most likely infiltrated by the Peace Corps, who apparently 111 Yon Koeswoyo, Panggung Kehidupan (Jakarta: Candra Awe Selaras, 2005).p.49 No Reporter, "Tjara "Peace Corps" Bekerdja Dengan Taktik: Kuda Troja Versi Baru. Pemuda & Mahasiswa as Djadi Korban Ambisi. Peace Corps Adalah Perisai Terdepan Dari Cia," Warta Peladjar, 30 May 1965. 112 === [PDF page 83] === 67 using the new version of the Trojan horse tactics.1 4 The most active proponents of the Anti-Western campaign against Great Britain and the United States the leftist cum communist youth groups, notably the Pemuda Rakjat. In 1964, the Pemuda Rakjat delivered a report to the daily council, in their third national council, provocatively titled Dengan satu tangan pegang bedil dan tangan lainnja pegang patjul: ganjang terus neo-kolonialisme, setan2 desa dan revisionisme or "With one hand holding a rifle and the other holding hoe: always crush the neocolonialism, the village devils and revisionists." This report described how they handled the Peace Corps volunteers by "lifting them up on the shoulder and brought them to the train station, politely asking them to leave and return to their country."115 Pemuda Rakjat also organized the movement to boycott American movies in many cities in Indonesia with the help of youth front and the people's film council. For example, the Pemuda Rakjat demanded the deportation of Bill Palmer116, the president of AMPAI (Association of Motion Pictures and Arts Importers) not only because he was the "king of the American film monopoly but because he is also the buyer of brown-skin slaves."117 The Pemuda Rakjat and other left leaning groups did not fail to overlook the United States Information Services (USIS), as one of their demonstration targets. On Pemuda Rakjat, Dengan Satu Tangan Pegang Bedil Dan Tangan Lainnja Pegang Patjul: Ganjang Term Neo-Kolonialisme, Setanl Desa Dan Revisionisme (Djakarta: Generasi Baru, 1964).p.l2 116 The name Bill Palmer will later on re-emerge within months prior to the 30th September affair, where the youth groups who rampaged his villa in Puncak, a resort area in West Java, allegedly found the what would be known as the Gilchrist document, a document that was presented to Sukarno as a "proof of the Western countries (namely The British and the Untied States) collaborating with elements within the Indonesian Army. ' Rakjat, Dengan Satu Tangan Pegang Bedil Dan Tangan Lainnja Pegang Patjul: Ganjang Terus NeoKolonialisme, Setan2 Desa Dan Revisionisme.p. 13 === [PDF page 84] === 68 September 14, 1965 at a sponsored public meeting of youth and students in Djakarta, thousands of youth and students demanded that USIS shut down their activities in Indonesia within the next 76 hours.118 In giving the reasons for their ultimatum the youth and students said they believed that "USIS and the cultural office are the source of contra-revolutionary activities in Indonesia."119 Even Dr.Subandrio ~ the head of the National intelligence body, the first deputy prime-minister and Foreign Minister ~ supported the closure of USIS, by saying at a public gathering that: "As of this second, the American sponsored USIS will no longer poison the minds of all of you, my brothers. With that USIS will be closed."120 As Subandrio uttered those words, the crowd roared in jubilation and spontaneously sang the song "Watch out America and British." The extensive anti- West sentiment bolstered the belief of many people abroad that Indonesia was turning increasingly to the left. Indeed, PKI was conducting unilateral action to enforce the agrarian law (UUP A) and advocated the creation of the fifth force which made the military, especially the army, extremely wary. In addition, President 111 Sukarno formally declared his NASAKOM concept as he attempted to maintain control of the political groups in Indonesia. The global cold war context added to the tensions between Indonesia and other Western countries. Which were simultaneously reflected in the domestic political 118 No Reporter, "As Supaja Tutup Kantor Usis: Dan Menghentikan Kegiatannja Di Indonesia," Warta Peladjar, Year 1 third week of September 1965. 119 Ibid. 120 Antara, "Usis Ditutup Diseluruh Indonesia Karena Ratjuni Pikiran Rakjat," (Djakarta: 1965). 121 NASAKOM:Nasionalis, Agama dan Komunis or Nationalist, Religion and Communist === [PDF page 85] === 69 situation, where communist and anti-communist sides continued to harass each other. Until late September 1965, the communists still held the upper hand and kept the anticommunist groups on the defensive. But soon the situation would change dramatically beyond any imagination. The Catholic Group before October 1965 In this section we will examine political and social context of 1960's Indonesia by looking at the experiences of several individuals representing the Catholic and communist groups. The Catholic group merits closer examination since they have often been overlooked in the scholarship of the 1965 event. Though small in numbers, the Catholics, nonetheless played a vital role in the anti-communist purges that preceded the establishment of General Soeharto's New Order regime. In this section, I will also focus on the situation in the period prior to the outbreak oiLubang Buaya. Later, in the different parts of this dissertation, I will examine the Catholic role in detail. Information on this section is drawn mainly from interviews with prominent leaders of the Catholic group: including Frans Seda, who was the chairman of Partai Katolik (Catholic Party) and also minister of plantations in the Dwikora cabinet; Harry Tjan Silalahi, former secretary general of the Catholic Party; and Cosmas Batubara, the chairman of PMKRI, the Catholic Student organization. Cosmas would later became the leader of KAMI (the United Students action of Indonesia), a student group prominent during the 1965-1966 in the student demonstrations against the PKI and Sukarno. In a private conversation with Frans Seda, Bung Karno (BK) expressed his === [PDF page 86] === 70 distrustful feeling towards the military. "He (Sukarno) told me," said Frans Seda, "he only trusted the military as much as 25 percent."122 Most likely, the reason for Sukarno's distrustful feelings derived from the incident of October 17, 1952 when military units under the command of Colonel Nasution went to the palace with tanks demanding Sukarno and the civilian government stop interfering with the internal military issues. On the other hand, at a National Congress of Engineers in 1964, General Ahmad Yani, the army chief of staff who was later killed in the Lubang Buaya incident, announced the military stance towards Sukarno: "If Bung Karno wanted to be a life long president that is also OK, if he wanted to become the great leader of revolution that is OK, but if he wanted to incorporate the PKI in the government, he will then have to face the military."123 From the statements of both Sukarno and General Ahmad Yani it was clear that there were growing tensions between the army, Sukarno, and the PKI. Officially and in public, Sukarno, as the president, was supposed to stand above all groups. However, Sukarno personally preferred the PKI.124 With political tensions heightened, the PKI and its mass organizations continued to dominate almost every level of Indonesian politics since they seemed to receive support from Sukarno. In many cases, moreover, the public perceived the PKI as the defender of the people through its involvement in Sukarno's policies such as Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and communism), Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and the anti 122 123 Seda. Ibid. === [PDF page 87] === 71 Nekolim campaign. Furthermore, PKI was also active in the fight to implement the 1962 agrarian law by doing what it called aksi sepihak or unilateral action. All anti-communist groups rejected Sukarno's Nasakomisasi or Nasakomization policy. However, their rejection could not be expressed openly as Sukarno was so powerful. Harry Tjan Silalahi, the secretary general of the Catholic Party, explained how they opposed Sukarno: "When Sukarno said, 'Nasakom must unite', we would say, 'No', 'Nasakom is my soul'. Thus, the idea was to manipulate because we did not dare to oppose him (Sukarno) openly since he was so strong, so charismatic, so,..(we) try to manipulate."126 The application of Nasakom concept also affected the dynamics of campus student organizations. As the leader of PMKRI, the Indonesian Catholic Students organization, Cosmas Batubara described the situation: "All students were expected to support Nasakom politics. If there was organization that opposes it, they would be seen as contra-revolutionary."1 Cosmas added, "Vro-Nasakom is the jargon at that time, and if you are against it then you are contra revolution. If you are contra revolution, you are also deemed to be contra the great leader of the revolution (Sukarno)." In the public, the language used was "leftist" or revolutionary. Anti-western Issues dominated the propaganda. The public widespread popularity of the anti Western and left- leaning political jargon often led to physical intimidation between those who were pro-and anti-communist. As Frans Seda described it: "Even if someone is out on the 125 Ibid. Harry Tjan Silalahi, December 22, 2005. 127 Cosmas Batubara, January 9, 2006. 128 Ibid. 126 === [PDF page 88] === 72 street and not considered him or herself as socialist (leftist), then they could be labeled as traitor."129 In Jakarta a "poster and graffiti" war was fought on a daily basis. For example; in front of the PII {Pelajar Islam Indonesia) or the Islamic Student of Indonesia headquarters, there was graffiti saying: "Communisto phobi is contra-revolution." Then in other parts of the city there was a different graffiti saying, "Atheist people are not welcome in Indonesia."130 Tearing down opponent's posters and banners was also common practice, and it usually took place in the evening. On campuses, students from both pro-and anticommunist organizations tore up each others leaflets. Almost everyday between 1963 and 1965, there were demonstrations on the streets of Jakarta, Central Java, and East Java, heightening the already tense political atmosphere. The tensions could be felt from the grass roots up to the national level. Attacking their rivals, marching bands from both communist and anti-communist groups paraded the streets as a show of force. Even prominent political figures like Chairul Saleh, one of Sukarno's vice premiers, punched Aidit, the PKI chairman. Many university rectors and provincial governors with military backgrounds began deploying their influence with the students to counter the communist demonstrations. On the other hand, the communist groups would not only have students demonstrating on their side but they would also mobilize masses of peasants and laborers. There were also numerous "public meetings" to garner public attention about 129 Seda. Batubara. 131 Ibid. Silalahi. 132 Silalahi. 130 === [PDF page 89] === 73 current national politics. On every August 17th the Indonesian independence day, commemoration, thousands of people representing many mass organizations from both political spectrums gathered in fields displaying banners in front of the place where Sukarno was scheduled to make his annual speech—showing Sukarno which groups were attending his speech. Both daily rallies and newspapers helped to amplify this tension. The midnight radio program transmitted directly from the People's Republic of China in the Indonesian language could also be heard urging the Indonesian people to destroy feudalism, capitalism, and bureaucrat capitalists.134 Significantly, the radio broadcasts were similar to the themes that PKI promoted in public. Rumors and gossip also circulated widely adding to the tension and uncertainty. Frans Seda spoke specifically about the widely circulated rumors of a "PKI five year plan" to have a national revolution in 1964 that would keep Sukarno as president until 1969 when he would later be toppled. It was Adam Malik, the coordinating minister of trade, who spread the information about the "PKI five year plan." Consequently, Sukarno political allies lined up with him. When Seda spoke to Sukarno about PKI intentions in its five year plan, Sukarno's response was similar to General Ahmad Yani; "PKI, leave it to me."136 Sukarno elaborated saying: "Pak Frans, I know. The people dislike them (PKI), they depends on me, on Bung Karno." Seda answered, "Yes, but Bung Karno do not 133 Batubara. Seda. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 134 === [PDF page 90] === 74 forget that they (PKI) have power from abroad." What Frans Seda meant was the PKI has strong support from the People's Republic of China. To summarize the situation at that time, Cosmas Batubara described the fear of communism within the ranks of the Catholic group: For example there was the mass intention. At the Cathedral, let us pray for the Catholics who are living behind the iron curtain so they can be free to practice their religion. Can you imagine if every week you are listening to that kind of mass intention, that is just the same as to educate you to confront....Moreover, everyday you see red flags flying at the Banteng field138 right over there... So what we were dealing was, as if there is this wide open lion's mouth right in front of us and we will be devoured at any moment. It was like that..ah..that was the analogy to described the feeling of us, the young (Catholic) people at that time. From the description of these prominent Catholic leaders, we can imagine their fear of the communist threat. For them the danger was very real and they felt the increasing pressure to heighten their awareness of the possible moves by their opponents. The Catholic group quickly realized that to fight the increasing pressure from the communist groups it was not enough to be well-organized. In comparison with the communist groups, the number of people within the Catholic ranks was small. So they decided to develop cooperation with other anti-communist groups, choosing to cooperate Banteng field: is a name of an open field located in central Jakarta that was often used for political rallies. The Jakarta Cathedral church location is right in front of that field. 139 Batubara. Original text: Misalnya ujud misa. Di Katedral, marilah kita berdoa untuk orang-orang Katolik yang berada dibelakang tirai besi agar mereka bebas melakukan ibadahnya. Bayangin, kalo tiap minggu you mendengar ujud misa seperti itu, itu kan sama dengan mendidik J/OM menghadapi...Apalagi sehari-hari liat disini bendera merah berdiri di lapangan Banteng, di sana-sana.. Jadi kita sudah dihadapkan kepada seperti ada singa mulut menganga sewaktu-waktu kita akan dimakan. Gitu..ah..itu kira-kira peribahasanya kalau mau menggambarkan bagaimana perasaan kami orang-orang muda waktu itu === [PDF page 91] === 75 with the military and Islamic groups, especially the NU. In recognizing this need, the Catholic youth group (Pemuda Katolik) joined the army sponsored BKS-PM. The Badan Kerja sama Pemuda-Militer, or the cooperating body of youth and military, was part of a mobilization force to counter the communist youth who received military training from the Air Force. The official reason for the training was to support Sukarno's Ganjang Malaysia or Konfrontasi campaign, although in reality its purpose was to balance the communist strength. Within the labor groups, there were also what was known as the BKS BuruhMiliter or BKS Labor-military. The main purpose of the BKS-BuMil was to find strategies to prevent SOBSI, the PKI labor organization, to take control of companies.141 The Catholic group was not the only group that participated in the BKS's, and many other non-communist groups also joined the many its organizations. Within the Catholic student ranks the PMKRI also established regular contacts with the HMI, the Muslim Student Association. Furthermore, PMKRI also maintained regular contacts with the military, especially the Army. One example of how this cooperation worked was when the Catholic groups received information from their grassroots cadres about the military training of the communist youth. They then passed this information to General Nasution who was the coordinating minister of defense and security and also a well-known anti-communist general. After receiving that information, Nasution assured the Catholic groups that they did not need too worry about the communists, if they wanted to fight using arms, since the armed forces were ready to 140 Silalahi. === [PDF page 92] === 76 destroy them.14 Regular contacts were maintained not only with high-ranking army officers such as Nasution, but there were also contacts at the regional level between the local army commanders and the Catholic groups.14 Why did the Catholic group choose to cooperate with the army? According to Cosmas Batubara, the reason was self-evident: "From all components of the nations, one that we (the Catholic) thought to be politically conscious to challenge the communist was the army. Therefore, we cooperate with the army by...making contacts."144 On the national political stage, President Sukarno announced his conception of "four feet cabinet" which was a realization of his Nasakom idea to incorporate the PKI into the government. This idea of "four feet cabinet", or in Indonesian, Kabinet kaki empat, was strongly rejected by the anti-communist groups. One of the social forces that strongly opposed this idea was the Catholic party. Then led by IJ Kasimo who later formed the Democracy League with the NU (Islam), PSI (Socialist), IPKI (Nationalist), and Parkindo (Christian) to counter Sukarno's "four feet cabinet" concept.145 The ultimate goal of democracy league was to demonstrate opposition to Sukarno's Nasakom and his guided democracy since, according to the Democracy League, the PKI had already influenced Sukarno's policies.146 Nonetheless, the Democracy League failed to challenge Nasakom because Sukarno was determined to fulfill this political objective.147 In the realm of mass media, the army supported the Catholic group which 142 Batubara. Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Silalahi. 146 Seda. 147 Silalahi. 143 === [PDF page 93] === 77 published their own newspaper to balance the extensive communist press—a policy which culminated in the birth of the Kompas daily newspaper. Frans Seda described the process that led to the founding of Kompas: Yes, Yani (General Ahmad Yani) telephoned me, he said,' How come the Catholics have not started a newspaper?' I said the only group that people can still trust is the Catholic group. Then at that time we begin with 3(Three) initiatives. Sugiyopranoto (The Archbishop of Semarang) in Semarang also initiate (supportive). The Catholic Party also created initiative, and then Ojong with Nabur, with Jacob Oetama also begin their initiatives. I joined them, I called them up. We took care of everything but they will be the one who will manage it. Then there was Sugiyopranoto, then Kompas was born. Initially the name was Bentara Rakyat. After I reported it to Bung Karno, Bung Karno summoned me, "Hey can I suggest a name?." Of course, sir." "Kompas. " 148 Until today, the Kompas daily newspaper remains the premier daily newspaper in Indonesia, with widest circulation and largest numbers of subscribers. In sum, the Catholic group did everything possible to survive the seemingly imminent communist onslaught. In the view of Cosmas Batubara, the leader of PMKRI, the Catholic groups and other anti-communist groups felt, "as if we were facing a wide open lion's mouth that is ready to devour us at any moment." 148 Seda. Original text: Ya Yani telepon saya dia bilang "Kenapa katolik tidak mulai dengan Koran?" Saya bilang satu2nya golongan yg org masih percaya di Indonesia ini ya golongan Katolik. Terus kita mulai 3 inisiatif waktu itu Sugiyopranoto di Semarang juga inisiatif, Partai katolik bikin inisiatif, Lalu Ojong sama, Nabur, sama Jacob Oetama mereka juga inisiatif. Saya bergabung dengan mereka, saya panggil mereka, kita yang urus semua mereka yang me manage. Lalu Sugiyopranoto, jadilah Kompas. Tadi namanya Bentara Rakyat. Usai lapor sama Bung Karno, Bung Karno panggil saya "He, boleh saya kasih nama?". Boleh deh pak". "Kompas". === [PDF page 94] === 78 The Communist Group before October 1965 It was widely known that most members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, were physically wiped out during the great massacre that followed the failure of the Thirtieth September Movement. Those who were not killed were imprisoned usually without any trial, or sent into exile in labor camps on the remote Bum Island in the Moluccas. After spending on average thirteen years in captivity, these surviving PKI members were released and returned to the society under heavy military surveillance. They faced extreme difficulty in finding jobs or living in a society that had rejected them. In trying to find a more balanced view of the social and political situation prior to the Lubang Buaya incident, it is deemed crucial to learn something from communist perspective on the situation at that time. In this section the information is drawn from interviews with three surviving former communist party members notably: Mr.Oey Hay Djoen, who was a parliament member in 1965 representing the PKI in the DPRGR (the Mutual cooperation parliament); Mr.Surya Atmadja, who was one of the PKI founders in Bogor, West Java and in 1965 held the position of First Secretary of CDB Banten149 (Provincial Level); and finally, Mr. Margondo who in 1965 held a position as a member of Comite Seksi of the PKI at the township level in Southern Jakarta. As previously described, some of PKI's main activities included enforcing the 1962 agrarian law via unilateral action, nationalization of foreign companies, and an 149 CDB=Comite Daerah Besar or the larger area committee. It is a provincial level hierarchy of the PKI. === [PDF page 95] === 79 active anti-Western campaign. Those activities were not only well organized, but in many cases they received strong support from the peasant and laboring population. Mr.Surya Atmadja organized the PKI on many places in West Java such as, Sawangan, Gunung Sindur, Parung and others. Utilizing its peasant mass organization, the BTI, the party stood in forefront of land and plantation seizures.150 The membership of the BTI rapidly increased and they continued to take over lands in the face of resistance from the landowners. Surya Atmadja claimed that the BTI/PKI were able to fight off the landowners since the BTI was really strong, and managed to increase its membership and spread its influence in many other areas in West Java such as Bogor.151 The PKI sponsored the labor movement which actively fought for better wages and demonstrated against foreign investors. As a result, the PKI's reputation was positive among the common people and it continued to gain popular support. Surya Atmadja even went further by claiming: "In the villages where the BTI is active, there no onewasantiPKI." 153 When asked further about the reason for this lack of opposition, Surya Atmadja responded: "PKI wanted that all natural wealth should be state controlled, and to be utilized for the greater good of the people. I said, 'that is exactly compatible with the Islamic teaching as it was clearly mentioned in Al-Quran,' 'He was the one who created all of this for all of you, everything from within the earth.' That passage came directly 150 Surya Atmadja, March 12, 2006. Ibid. 152 Margondo, February 23, 2006. 153 Atmadja. 151 === [PDF page 96] === 80 from the Al-Quran."154 In recruiting new members, Surya Atmadja explained that when he was in Banten he spoke out against the accusation that PKI was anti-religious. To highlight his point, he again quoted a passage from the Al-Quran, the Al-Ma'un letter, which states: "Do you know who falsify religion? It was those who abandoned the orphans, those who abandoned the poor'. The PKI was not like that. "I55 Using a combination of aggressiveness in taking over land and Islamic teachings, the PKI succeeded in recruiting new members and in gaining considerable support from the poor peasants. In a slightly different manner, Oey Hay Djoen admitted his interest in joining the PKI. Before he became active in politics, Oey Hay Djoen was a businessman until the PKI asked whether they could put his name on their list as a PKI representative in the parliament representing someone from a non-party background. When Oey Hay Djoen asked about the requirements for joining, the PKI people said there were none. In fact, the PKI delegation further asked him: "What are the desires of national business?" The purpose of this question was for the PKI to know the needs of the business people, so they could include it into the party agenda. It was a very effective way of recruiting as Oey Hay Djoen explained: It was really very brilliant. So, they approached artists with the same question. What are the needs of artists? What are the needs of the labor? The youth, science (Scientist), athletes. Ya, all of them. From all fields they requested them to become candidates for the PKI list and non party people. And you enter when you were elected, there were no requirements. So there was no requirement to pay fees, or to become member of the PKI, or to join the PKI Fraction. There is nothing 154 155 Ibid. Ibid. === [PDF page 97] === 81 like that whatsoever. Ahh, so people became interested right?156 The aggressiveness and sometimes militant ways of the PKI, along with the combination of manipulating Islamic teaching while at the same time giving opportunity for many professions to voice their concerns as part of the political agenda of the party, helped boost the popularity of the PKI in the period prior to the Lubang Buaya affair. In the next subsection the discussion will focus on the rumors about the existence of the dewanjendral or the Council of Generals (COG), and how deeply it affected the PKI rank and file, with fatal consequences in the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya affair. The «Isyun of Dewan Jendral1S7 Margondo commented on how he thought the rumors about the existence of the council of generals that wanted to carry out coup were deliberately spread, saying: "The information about the existence of the Dewan Jendral (Council of Generals) was widely known, meaning it was spread out as rumors prior to the incident itself. I heard (about) G.30.S, council of generals and I did not expect PKI was involved. And in reality PKI was not involved."158 Prior to the Lubang Buaya affair, Surya Atmadja also admitted hearing the rumors about the council of generals that wanted to take over the government 156 Oey Hay Djoen, March 19, 2006. Original text: Ini hebatnya sebetulnya. Jadi seniman juga didatengin dengan pertanyaan begitu. Apa yang diperlukan oleh seniman? Apa yang diinginkan oleh seniman? Apa yang diinginkan oleh kaum buruh, oleh pemuda, oleh eeh.. Ilmu pengetahuan, oleh olahragawan. Ya. Itu semua itu. Semua bidang itu ada yang diminta untuk menjadi calon daftar PKI dan orang tak berpartai. Dan masuknya ke situ kalo sudah terpilih, itu sama sekali tidak ada syarat. Jadi tidak ada syarat hams bayar iuran, atau harus menjadi anggota PKI, atau masuk Fraksi PKI, itu sama sekali nggak ada. Ahh, jadi orang jadi tertarik kan? 157 /syw=rumor 158 Margondo. === [PDF page 98] === 82 through a coup d' etat.159 Interestingly, Oey Hay Djoen had a somewhat different opinion upon hearing the rumors about the council of generals. He agreed that, yes, at that time the situation was very tense. On almost a daily basis there were demonstrations to crush the "Kabir " or the capitalist bureaucrats, drawing many parts of the society such as, youths and housewives, to the Banteng field. When asked about the rumors concerning the council of generals, Oey Hay Djoen said, what he heard it did exist and it was considered a part of "Kabir," hence it also needed to be disbanded. Initially, Djoen continued, he heard no information about the format of the council, let alone whether the council was planning a coup. At that time, all he knew about the council of generals was they needed to be ganyang or crushed since they were anti-Sukarno.160 Only later would the rumors evolve into a description of the council of generals as a group who wanted to take over the government during the Armed-forces Day on October 5. What made the rumor on the council of generals so compelling was that the top PKI politburo leadership had heard the rumor approximately six to eight months prior to the Lubang Buoya affair.1 ' Oey Hay Djoen, then a member of parliament representing the PKI, recalled the moment during one of the regular PKI parliamentary fraction meetings when chairman, D.N. Aidit said that he had met the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengkubuwono IX, and the Sultan advised him of the existence of the council of 159 Atmadja. Djoen. 161 Ibid. 160 === [PDF page 99] === 83 generals.162 After the failure of the Thirtieth September movement between October 3 and 4, 1965, Nyoto, one of the PKI politburo members told Oey Hay Djoen to find the Sultan and to ask him in person what he meant at that time when he had mentioned the council of generals some six to eight months earlier. But not long after the Lubang Buaya affair, many prominent government officials, including the Sultan, suddenly became incommunicado. The rumor about the existence of the council of generals was not the only one circulating widely among the PKI ranks. But certainly it was the most renowned. The impact of these wild rumors on the PKI organization was significant. As Oey Hay Djoen commented: "Around three or four years prior to 1965 within the PKI party many strange things happened, as I recall during those parliament fraction meeting all that we ever talked about was isyu (rumors)."1 4 He added: Yes, in fact it was only isyu, because the political situation always portrayed in this way. Bandrio is doing this, this and this. Nasution, this, this, this. Sukarno, this, this, this. So it was all isyu. These isyus' then were analyzed. You can imagine if what we analyzed are only isyus' and we transform these isyus' into steps and made decisions based on what we talked about on the isyu.165 As Oey hay Djoen points out, the PKI were prone to rumors. Hence, its enemies could easily manipulate the party's decisions. 162 Ibid. Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 163 === [PDF page 100] === 84 Rumors and gossip in an uncertain political situation are not unique to Indonesia. However, in this particular case there were different rumors within different political groups. In the Catholic group, there were rumors about the "PKI five year plan" that were circulating. However, this rumor seems only limited to certain people in the government and was not as widespread as were the rumor about the council of generals. Within the PKI ranks, the rumors about the existence of the council of generals were so well known that the party took crucial political steps based on that rumor. In this sense, the information was no longer seen as rumor, but became a fact. As Luise White stated in her book, Speaking with Vampires: rumor and history in Africa: "Indeed, the more widespread and widely told a rumor was, the more it had to conform to the laws of plausibility."166 To understand how a rumor operates within this particular context, one must see how a rumor, especially a political rumor, becomes convincing. First, how was the rumor was received? Second, once received, how was it categorized in terms of its credibility and significance? Third, how accurate was the way the rumor was transmitted. Is it through informal channels? Meaning was it communicated through casual chatter, serious conversation, formal meeting, an eye-witness account, or from a printed material? We can, therefore, conclude that there are several conditions that can make a rumor "real" and convincing. First, the information must come from a source that is considered to be reliable, thus adding to the credibility of the information. Second, the intensity of the rumors' spread amidst a condition of uncertainty without someone to Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). p.56 === [PDF page 101] === 85 confirm or deny it helped the rumor to be even more believable. Third, in a society with strong oral tradition, rumors tend to spread faster. Finally, in a society with fervent beliefs in supernatural powers, people tend to be more accepting of rumors and conspiracy theories. In the case of this rumor about the existence of the council of generals, all the conditions mentioned above were fulfilled, thus making the rumor credible. Indeed, Sukarno tried to check its accuracy by summoning General Ahmad Yani who denied the existence of the council. But his denial did not extinguish the rumor, which became even more rampant among the public. The reason for this acceptance was perhaps caused by the existence of a supporting document called the "Gilchrist Document" which mentioned the existence of the COG.167 On the other hand, the rumor about the PKI "five year plan" did not spread since President Sukarno took the precaution of enlisting Adam Malik in an effort to squelch the news. There are two possibilities to explain this discrepancy. As Hay Djoen mentioned, the PKI already firmly believed the rumor and had already accepted it as fact. Complying with the first condition mentioned above, the source of the rumor was highly credible: no less than the Sultan of Yogyakarta himself. Moreover, the political situation in Indonesia during the years prior to the Lubang Buaya affair was already rife with explosive rumors, radical revolutionary propaganda, and political violence that contributed to heightened tensions. Within this situation, it was extremely difficult to confirm which rumors were true 167 Further discussion on the authenticity of the so called "Gilchrist Document" is available on chapter four of his dissertation on Dr.Subandrio's trial accounts. === [PDF page 102] === 86 and which were not. Moreover, some of the clashes between the communists and anticommunists can be truly felt by common people and were particularly in places where both groups had a considerable number of followers. Within this context, one can imagine that both the Catholic and communist groups were very suspicious of each other. The Catholic group's, main concern was for their survival, while the Communist party enjoyed a high degree of support reflected in their aggressive acts and active recruitment. The PKI saw in this period an opportunity to become the dominant political power in Indonesia. By looking closely at experience of these opposing groups, it is clear that the Indonesian political situation in the late 1965 was chaotic, tense, and ideologically divided. Moreover, there was also a full-blown political power struggle between the major political players— Sukarno, the army, and the PKI. Since they were small in number, the Catholic group sided with the military in this power struggle and maneuvered strategically in helping the military curb the communist influence. Although enjoying wide support, the communist group had to deal with convincing rumors that later would proven to be disastrous for them. Furthermore, the PKI was so dominant at all levels of Indonesian politics that they were prone to being infiltrated and manipulated by its enemies. === [PDF page 103] === 87 Chapter HI: October 1st, 1965: A Chaotic, Confusing Day One would not expect that one of the most crucial day in Indonesian history would simply begins with a morning Radio broadcast from RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia). The 30th September movement had taken over this radio station and used to make several announcements. This chapter aims to show the origins of an official narrative that would begin from confusing, chaotic, and even mysterious circumstances, creating controversy that would continue for many years. A combination of sources ranging from personal narrations of former PKI members and anti-PKI forces represented by the little-known Catholic groups, plus newspaper accounts from domestic and the United States including the FBIS transcripts, will add further to an understanding of the complexity and confusion on October 1, 1965. The reactions from these personal narratives of what unfolded on that day reflect individual political affiliations at that time. Their narratives offer invaluable insights on the nature of the event and also illustrate the origins of the Lubang Buaya narrative. Chaotic and confusing "I was confused," said Margondo, a member of South Jakarta PKI CS (Comite Seksi), when he heard the Lieutenant Colonel Untung's infamous announcement about the Thirtieth September movement on the morning of October 1, 1965. To find more information about what was going on he traveled to Jakarta on October 4, 1965 from his === [PDF page 104] === 88 office in Cilegon, Banten where he held the position of Third Vice Chairman of the SBBT (Serikat Buruh Badja Trikora), the Trikora steel mill labor organization.1 In Jakarta, Margondo went directly to the Comite Central office of the PKI. There he was told that the Thirtieth September Movement was an internal Army conflict. However, it is important to note that prior hearing Untung's statement he was already aware of the information about the existence of the council of generals. On the same day, he returned to Cilegon where at 9:15 that same evening, a Jeep full of police officers arrived at his house with an order to arrest him. Little did he know that his arrest that evening was the beginning of fourteen years of incarceration under the New Order regime without any trial. Even later after the deaths of the generals were already known in public, Margondo did not feel any guilt nor the need to flee: "I did not do anything, why should I be afraid? I don't think I was involved, I felt that I don't know. All felt normal. On the fourth of October I went there (to CC office) and there was no order to flee or to resist. So it meant there was no involvement (of the PKI)."3 Almost similar circumstances happened to Mr. Surya Atmadja, the first Secretary of the Banten CDB-PKI {Comite Daerah Besar or a provincial level of PKI). As he listened to Lieutenant Colonel Untung's announcement on the radio about the success of the Thirtieth September Movement in crushing the council of generals, he could not help Badja Trikora was the name for the Krakatau Steel. A steel mill located in Cilegon, Banten West Java. Margondo, February 23, 2006. Ibid. === [PDF page 105] === 89 feeling relieved. Prior to that announcement he already heard the rumors about the existence of a council that planned to take power from Sukarno (see chapter II).4 As with Margondo, Mr.Surya Atmadja also traveled to the PKI CC office in Jakarta in an effort to find more information. Once there, he was told the same information as Margondo about the nature of the event as an internal army conflict. Mr. Surya Atmadja confirmed Margondo's assertion that there was no instruction from the CC-PKI leadership to have their cadre to do anything other than to wait for statement from President Sukarno. By October 5, 1965 Surya Atmadja began hearing news about the mass detention of PKI members. Moreover, he also heard news from the radio that accused PKI of being a contra-revolutionary group. He immediately realized that the situation had become dangerous to him, so he decided to flee into hiding in Pandeglang, Banten. The reason he fled to Pandeglang was because it was nearby, and he also thought that Pandeglang would be a safe place for him, since the police, Military Police and the Military district commander of that area were all "good."5 After several days moving from one place to another within the city of Pandeglang, Mr. Surya Atmadja was finally captured on October 29, the same day he had planned on fleeing to Jakarta. He was immediately brought to the military district Surya Atmadja, March 12, 2006. Ibid. === [PDF page 106] === 90 headquarters where the military began interrogating and torturing him. He was not to be released until 1978.6 The experience of Mr. Setiadi Reksoprodjo was also compelling. As a minister of electricity in Sukarno's Dwikora cabinet and an active member in the leftist movement during the revolutionary period, he felt strange as he listened to the 30th September radio broadcast, especially Untung's statement that he had cancelled all ranks above lieutenant colonel. Furthermore, he wondered about the position of the president throughout the unfolding affair.7 Despite the relatively calm situation of that day, the overall atmosphere was still pretty uncertain which made Mr. Setiadi feel it necessary to take precaution not to stay in his house in the evening of October 2. He described the situation at that time as, "not tense instead it was confusing. We don't know what happened."8 But since the radio announcement was made by Untung, a military officer, Setiadi thought the whole situation must have something to do with the military itself and he wanted to stay out of it. Mr. Setiadi obviously did not expect that he would later be arrested in March 1966, and without any charges or trial, he would spend the next twelve years in prison for his alleged role in the Thirtieth September Movement. The experience of Mr. Moeljadi SH is unique, for at that time he was working for the Trikora Steel Mill in Cilegon Banten. When he heard Untung's radio broadcast, he Ibid. Setiadi Reksoprodjo, February 16, 2006. Ibid. === [PDF page 107] === 91 was on an assignment of picking up the minister of domestic affairs at Merak port since the minister was arriving from Lampung, Sumatra. Moeljadi was not surprised at all by the news about the thwarted coup attempt by the council of generals, since the rumors about the council of Generals coup attempt have been widely known prior to October 1, 1965. He talked about the news with his friend from work and he told them that he had heard about the rumors about council of generals before, so Untung's radio announcement came as no surprise.9 Little did he know that as a result of that morning's conversation he would be arrested the following day, October 2, 1965 on suspicion of having prior knowledge about the Thirtieth September Movement and not reporting it to the authorities. Mr. Djoko Sri Muljono, a metallurgist who graduated from a university in Moscow and a member of the Trikora Steel Mill labor union in Cilegon, became utterly confused upon hearing the news about the Thirtieth September Movement from the television and radio broadcasts. "At that time there was some kind of commotion since every one in Cilegon was talking about G30S (Thirtieth September Movement). It was shocking for common people to hear how six generals can be abducted (later on killed) at the same time?! How could that possibly happen?"10 Amidst all the confusion from the news, Mr. Muljono wondered how come the situation could be brought under control in such a swift manner. In the morning, he heard about Untung's announcement of the Thirtieth September movement. That same evening Moeljadi, March 3, 2006. Djoko Sri Muljono, February 14, 2006. 10 === [PDF page 108] === 92 he heard General Soeharto's announcement about how he had crushed the movement. "How come it was all way too easy," he asked, "within one day it was all over, no blood was shed (he thought at that time), there was no battle. It was indeed a little bit strange."11 He further asserted that he was not suspicious about any groups that could have been orchestrating the incident. However, on October 11, 1965 a group of people ransacked Mr. Muljono's office. Because of this incident, he was forced to stay at home. By this time, moreover, the news of PKI being the mastermind behind the abduction and killing of the generals was already well known. Even though, Mr. Muljono had never been a member of PKI, not long after the destruction of his office the military arrested him for suspicion of his involvement with the Thirtieth September Movement. As with the others, there was never any formal charge made against him. Before being sent to Bum Island, he was first sent to Serang and then to the island prison of Nusakambangan. Mr. Muljono was finally released in December 1978. The experience of Mr. Oey Hay Djoen, a high level PKI official and a member of the people's representatives, was in contrast with the others that have been mentioned above. On that evening of October 1, 1965 Mr.Djoen attended a reception held at the embassy of the People's Republic of China. There, he met many embassy people from foreign countries. These people approached him and congratulated him for the success of the Thirtieth September movement. "So people were congratulating me. Although later on we will eventually become aware about the escape of Nasution. But at that time we 11 12 Ibid. Oey Hay Djoen, March 19, 2006. === [PDF page 109] === 93 were still in euphoria, as if we just achieved victory. Nobody realized it was actually a sign that we actually don't know anything about it. It was just remarkable...remarkable," saidMr.Djoen.13 Unfortunately, Mr Djoen did not elaborate on the reasons why people congratulated him. My personal assumption is that since at that time it was already well known that the PKI and the Army were in conflict, so the news on the defeat of the council of generals by the Thirtieth September Movement would be seen as good news for the PKI. However, after all the guests went home the military came and tried to arrest him. But Mr. Djoen avoided being jailed because he told the military commander that as a parliament member they need to have special permission. That evening, October 21, he was not thrown into jail instead he was taken to custody in the office of the military district.14 Little did he know that he would spend 14 years in prison without any trial, including ten years at the Bum Island penal colony. In this section we have examined the accounts from the people who were arrested for their alleged involvement with the Thirtieth September Movement because they were members of PKI, had a leftist background or simply because they had heard the rumors prior to the incident, but not report them to the authorities. Most of them felt confused and had little or no idea of what actually happened on October 1. Their experience resonates with the confusion and chaotic situation at that 13 Ibid. === [PDF page 110] === 94 time when the top army leadership suddenly vanished and there was brief moment of uncertainty about what would happen next. In the next section we will examine the experiences from the anti-communist opposition, particularly from the Catholic groups. Their experience will shed the light on how Untung's radio broadcast not only sowed confusion and uncertainty but, most importantly, caused others to be cautious. Cautious For Captain Ben Mboi following the political situation was not something new. While still a medical student at the University of Indonesia, where he was active in the Indonesian Catholic Student Union (PMKRI), he observed the growth and threats from the emerging communist party. In 1965, as a doctor and also an active-duty officer in the Indonesian army, Captain Ben Mboi heard many rumors about the impending communist threat. On September 25, 1965, Captain Ben Mboi received information from Lim Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi), a Secretary General for the General Secretariat from Advisory Council, about a suspected PKI military build up outside the Air Force Halim Air Base. He received this information while in the passenger waiting room at the Kemayoran Airport in Jakarta where Bian Kie shared this information. At that time Captain Mboi was on his way to return to Ende, Flores where he worked as the head of a military hospital. Bian Kie told him that the army top brass was already aware of the military build up and there was no doubt that the president already knew about it too. Ben Mboi felt assured === [PDF page 111] === 95 that steps have been taken in dealing with the information. However, he felt a bit alarmed when, before they were parted, Bian Kie said: "If you hear anything that is not normal in the next several days, it is most likely resulted from this."15 Then on October 1, 1965, while waiting for the ship to leave Surabaya en route to Ende, Flores, Captain Ben Mboi listened to Untung's announcement about the Thirtieth September Movement. At that moment, Ben Mboi remembered what Bian Kie had told him back in Jakarta. This must be what he meant, Ben Mboi thought. After he arrived in Ende, most people had not heard about the Lubang Buaya let alone the Thirtieth September Movement. Limited telecommunication and transportation infrastructure at that time has delayed the news in a remote town like Ende. However, things would not stay calm for too long. After the remains of the missing generals were found then buried on October 5, in Ende a security organization began to form for the mass detention of PKI people and those who were accused of any involvement with the 30 September Movement. Soon after, Captain Ben Mboi was ordered to arrest a local PKI leader. The massive anti-communist campaign and purge had begun. Meanwhile back in Jakarta, Mr. Harry Tjan Silalahi, the secretary general of the Catholic Party, October 1, 1965 began like any regular day until when he was about to enter his office in Merdeka Timur Street, the vicinity of the Merdeka Square in downtown Jakarta. His staff had brought a radio transistor and informed Harry Tjan about 15 Ben Mboi, January 20, 2006. === [PDF page 112] === 96 the news of Untung's statement, so they both listened to the announcement and immediately concluded that a coup had just happened.17 He decided to go to Margasiswa, the headquarters of the Indonesian Catholic Students Association. There, he began to gather and consolidate all of his aides while monitoring the situation. Then at 9:00 a.m. they listened to the second radio announcement which mentioned that a group of generals had tried to take power from Bung Karno, but the presidential guards, the Cakrabirawa, was able to thwart the attempt. Nonetheless, Mr.Silalahi and his aides continued feeling cautious and still uncertain about what had actually happened, since they have not heard any statement from the President. Finally, around 1:00 p.m. another radio broadcast announced the formation of Revolutionary Council and the suspension of the Dwikora cabinet by the Thirtieth September Movement. After hearing the broadcast Mr.Silalahi was even more certain that in fact the Thirtieth September Movement was indeed a communist coup d' etat: What are the rights of the Revolutionary council? Bung Karno's name was never mentioned. We were already doubtful and we were becoming more suspicious when in the Revolutionary Council there was not a single Catholic figure. Everyone else is there; Protestant, even Balinese Hindu and others....So we were certain this must be the work of the communist because they are the one who dislike us the most. Harry Tjan Silalahi, December 22, 2005. === [PDF page 113] === 97 Mr. Silalahi ordered Lim Bian Kie, the Secretariat General of the General Secretary from DPA (the Advisory Council) to go to the palace, since his office is nearby, to find the whereabouts of Bung Karno and figure out what actually had happened. Not long afterwards there were news about the abduction attempt of General Nasution, the shooting of General Yani, and abduction of other generals, but no one else could confirm or deny any of the news at that time. While hearing all these rumors, Mr. Silalahi became very concerned about Bian Kie's safety, since it was possible that the Thirtieth September Movement had taken over the palace, and Bian Kie could have been taken hostage. It turned out Bian Kie went directly home after failing to meet anyone at the palace. Only later at 4:00 p.m. would he return to Margasiswa.19 At 5:00 p.m. Subhan, a prominent HMI (Islamic Student Union) leader, along with other HMI notables, came to Margasiswa for a meeting with the PMKRI (Indonesian Catholic Students Association) discussing the current situation and deciding what steps they should take. Finally at 7:00 p.m. they listened to General Soeharto's radio broadcast announcing that he had taken control of the situation and declaring that the Thirtieth September Movement was kontra-revolusi. That moment was the first time that many heard about General Soeharto. But the radio broadcast did more than give them assurances; it was also a confirmation that the group still had friends within the Army. Upon hearing Soeharto's radio broadcast, Mr. Silalahi began to organize actions between 19 Ibid. === [PDF page 114] === 98 the Catholic group and other anti-communist groups, with the PMKRI leading the opposition in the fight against the PKI. For Mr. Harry Tjan Silalahi, there was never any doubt in his mind that the PKI had orchestrated the Thirtieth September Movement. If Mr.Harry Tjan and others were confused and cautious upon hearing the news, for Mr.Cosmas Batubara, the chairman of PMKRI, the Indonesian Student Catholic association, initially felt the situation on October 1, was very distressing. Upon hearing the news about the abduction and the killings of the generals, he was certain that he would be the next target. His reason to be concerned was valid since the PMKRI was known to be anti-communist in their political platform. That evening, he felt too nervous to sleep at Margasiswa (PMKRI headquarters) on Sam Ratulangi Street so he decided to move from one place to another as a safety precaution. He would continue this habit every evening until March 11,1966, when the PKI was officially banned. Both Harry Tjan Silalahi and Cosmas Batubara were certain that the Indonesian communist party was behind the Thirtieth September Movement and the formation of the Revolutionary Council. Their first act was to secure all the documents pertaining to the anti-communist opposition and relocate Mr.Kasimo, a well known Catholic political figure, to a safer place to protect him from any possible danger.21 Nonetheless, after further monitoring the situation and seeing that General Soeharto continued to assert control over the nation, Mr.Cosmas and his anti-communist group became emboldened to organize anti-communist activities. 20 21 Cosmas Batubara, January 9, 2006. Ibid. === [PDF page 115] === 99 Consequently, the PMKRI headquarters at Sam Ratulangi Street became the headquarters not only for PMKRI but also for other groups that joined the unified action against communist movement, including Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as the anti-communists coalition was known as the KAP GESTAPU. As the alliance within the anti-communist groups became stronger, on October 25, 1966, they established the first secretariat of the KAMI (The Indonesian United Student Action), under a joint leadership from various known anti-communist organizations including: Muhammad Zamroni of the Indonesian Islamic Students association (PMII), Cosmas Batubara of the PMKRI, Ellyas who represented local students, Mr. David Napitupulu from the Pancasila students, and a representative of the HMI (Islamic student association) who became the secretary general of the KAMI.23 This latter group would play important role later on in organizing demonstration against Sukarno and the PKI. The experience of Mr.Frans Seda, the minister of plantation at that time was also revealing. From September 21 Frans Seda with fifteen other cabinet members were asked by Dr.Subandrio, the first vice premier, to tour the island of Sumatra. Subandrio at that time was also the Foreign Minister and head of the BPI.24 Many believed at that time that Dr.Subandrio was one of the most powerful men in Indonesia along with Sukarno and D.N.Aidit the head of the PKI. 22 KAP GESTAP\J=Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan September Tiga Puluh or the United Act to Crush the Thirtieth September Movement 23 Batubara. 24 BPI (Badan Pusat Intelijeri) or the Central Intelligence Body === [PDF page 116] === The trip began in Lampung, then to Bengkulu, and from there to Padang, West Sumatra on September 28. On that day, Mr. Frans Seda felt the increasing discord among the group of cabinet ministers. Initially, he felt that all the ministers can be close to Subandrio. But from his observation not everyone was allowed near him, and those who had access were all PKI ministers.25 Consequently, Frans Seda and the others were told to find a place apart from the group to spend the evening, so he sought accommodation at the plantation house. The group then went to Medan, North Sumatra and when they arrived there, they heard from the local leader of the National front {Front Nasional) about the attempted murder on General Nasution the previous evening. All contact with Jakarta was currently cut off, but Frans Seda then used his influence in the plantations system to find out the situation in Jakarta. He called his wife at home but she was nowhere to be found. Bung Karno's whereabouts was also unclear. Judging by the seriousness of the situation, Frans Seda requested help from the military command in North Sumatra, General Mokoginta, to escort him and the rest of the group to Aceh.26 It was during this time Subandrio spoke for the first time about the hostility between the PKI and the military. When they were in Aceh, someone asked "what is the revolutionary council about?" Subandrio then summoned one of his staff from the local BPI, who happened to be a police officer, and asked him to give him the copy of Untung's radio broadcast. The staff handed him the piece of paper from his pocket, 25 Frans Seda, December, 6 2005. === [PDF page 117] === 101 Subandrio then opened it and then folded it back. Frans Seda asked to look at that piece of paper, and he noticed the paper looked as if it had been in that person's pocket for a week, since the writing did not look recent. Seda speculated that the announcement of the revolutionary council was planned well ahead of these events. Since there was still no contact with Jakarta, Frans Seda spent that evening at a plantation house wondering what was the intention of Subandrio in having him and fifteen other cabinet ministers travel to Sumatra? He realized that during those crucial hours between September 30 and October 1, high level government officials were all absent from Jakarta. Bung Karno went to Bogor along with Leimena, the third Vice Premier. Chairul Saleh, the second Vice Premier was in the People's Republic of China. Subandrio was in Sumatra. Hence, Jakarta was empty. Frans Seda suspected that Subandrio had prearranged all of this to make sure that there were no high ranking government officials in Jakarta when the Gestapu or the Lubang Buaya affair happened. The previous personal narratives have given us insights and feel about the confusion and uncertainty of October 1. These narratives clearly illustrate the nature of the day as not only confusing for many, but for others the uncertainty and confusion brought fears about their own survival. Drawing on their experiences, in the following section we will examine the narratives of what happened on October 1, focusing on Washington's perspective. It was known at the time that United States, along with other Western anti-communist country put special attention to Indonesia since for years there 27 28 Ibid. Ibid. === [PDF page 118] === were fear that the country might follow the path of China and the Soviet Union. The United States perspective will be drawn from the State Department's FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Services) program and major newspapers such as The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times. FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Services) The U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) branch of the U.S. State Department, compiles English translations of every radio broadcast from many foreign countries. Although FBIS is run by the State Department, it was known that the CIA had major control over its operation. Obtaining the FBIS data for Radio Republic Indonesia (RRI)'s broadcasts were important, since FBIS supposed to record all the broadcasts including the crucial period of late September to early October 1965. However from a careful examination of their record it was revealed that there is a gap in the otherwise complete FBIS records for the crucial period from October 1 to October 3, 1965. The missing FBIS record on that particular date is indeed inexplicable, even mysterious. As it is well known, the 30th September Movement occupied RRI (Radio Republic Indonesia) on the morning of October 1, 1965. The rebels went on air four times during the day, between 7:15 a.m. until 2:10 p.m, and did not relinquish their control over the radio station until around 6:00 p.m. when the Jakarta military chief, Major General Umar === [PDF page 119] === Wirahadikusumah, under direct orders from General Soeharto, gave an ultimatum to the rebels to leave the RRI compound before 7:00 p.m. or they would be dealt with force.29 FBIS resumed its reports on the RRI broadcast on October 4. While that report includes the October 1 and October 2 statements from General Soeharto and President Sukarno, the report had no record of Lieutenant Colonel Untung's statement or radio broadcasts announcing the 30Th September movement and the formation of the revolutionary council. In the FBIS record, both Sukarno's and Soeharto's statements on October 1 and 2, 1965 were the same as the one that was published in the army's newspapers, Harian Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudha. However, in the FBIS report on October 5, 1965 there is an interesting material that were not available in any of the army's newspapers published on that same day. FBIS quoted an English broadcast from Singapore which reported that, "the Indonesian Air Force has air dropped Peking supplied arms to pro-communists in the rural districts." Another report stated that, "communist guerilla bands are reported to have spread out along the main roads between Djakarta, Bogor, and Bandung where they are conducting military activities." Other reports from FBIS stated; "the tension in Central Java is mounting as military units of the Indonesian Communist Party and the rebel troops under Lieutenant Colonel Untung are heading for the region to make a stand against possible Ibid, Anderson and McVey, p. 41. FBIS no. 192 5 October 1965. p. RRR 2. === [PDF page 120] === army onslaught. A Siliwangi Division of the army was also reported to be moving towards the same direction to meet the rebels."31 The FBIS reports of an apparent civil war are dubious. As we know from many studies about the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya killings, what happened was not a civil war. In the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya affair, the purging process was mostly a onesided slaughter of hundreds thousands of alleged communist members and sympathizers by the military-backed Muslim and other anti-communist youth groups. It was possible that the Singapore radio news that the FBIS reported was part of a secret operation by the IRD (Information Research Development) office at the British Far East Command in Phoenix Park, Singapore. The person who was in charge of IRD was Norman Reddaway. According to Roland Challis, a former BBC Southeast Asia correspondent, Norman Reddaway "was one of the foreign office's most senior and experienced information and propaganda specialists, fresh from four years in charge of information in the Middle East and an expert in military intelligence." Moreover, Roland Challis says, "the IRD patent strategy was to target the Indonesian Communist Party, to tar Sukarno with the communist brush and provide documentary supports for General Soeharto's interpretation of the military putsch on 1 October."34 When we look into these facts and reports, it is clear that FBIS became 31 Ibid. Shadow Play, a documentary by Chris Hilton, mentioned this fact. Although there were reports of clashes between the Muslim youth groups and the communist youth groups, however, most of the time the communists did not fought back as much as they would have wanted to. John Hughes, Indonesian Upheavals, had several detailed accounts about the systematic slaughter of the communist. 33 Roland Challis, Shadow of a Revolution: Indonesia and the Generals.200\,p. 95. 34 Ibid, p. 99. 32 === [PDF page 121] === 105 another tool for anti-communist propaganda and subsequently one of the factors that supported the initial construction of the regime's official history of the event. The report from the major newspapers in the United States also showed the confusion and speculation of what happened in Indonesia on October 1, 1965. In the following section we will examine the initial reports and analysis of the print media. Confusion in American Major Newspapers "Indonesia Says Plot to Depose Sukarno is Foiled by Army Chief; Power Fight Believed Continuing," wrote the New York Times headline on October 2, 1965. In the supplementary section of the same edition the title was even more evident, "Indonesia Picture Unclear." Again in the supplementary section another article titled "Washington Awaits Clarification of Indonesian Situation." This article reflected the initial news of what would be known later as the Gestapu or the Lubang Buaya affair to the world. From the titles alone we can see the tremendous uncertainty of the situation at that time. As the situation beginning to unravel, the uncertainty and confusion on the first day corresponds to the personal narratives illustrated in the beginning sections of this chapter. Initially, no one knew what exactly happened, as problem in telecommunications hindered the flow and accuracy of information. The information that came through was mostly rumors and could not be confirmed. Hence, the statement made by the U.S. State 35 Seth S. King, "Indonesia Says Plot to Depose Sukarno Is Foiled by Army Chief; Power Fight Believed Continuing," The New York Times, October 2, 1965 1965. 36 Tom Wicker, "Indonesia Picture Unclear," The New York Times, October 2, 1965 1965. 37 Jack Raymond, "Washington Awaits Clarification of Indonesian Situation," The New York Times, October 2, 1965 1965. === [PDF page 122] === 106 Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey is correct as the New York Times quoted him describing the situation in Indonesia to be, "extremely fluid, even confused."38 Interestingly, the New York Times did not mention any direct involvement of the communists in the revolt, nor did they totally disregard them. Instead, the Times carefully stated the possibility of any communist connection by saying "Reds Role Uncertain."39 Nonetheless, the Times discussed a possible split between Dr. Subandrio, the deputy premier and Indonesian foreign minister, and President Sukarno, since Subandrio was mentioned in Untung's Radio broadcast as one of the member of Revolutionary council. The Chicago Tribune has slightly different assertions in its initial reports from Indonesia. Although, their first page quoted General Soeharto's radio announcement of his action after he reoccupied the radio station and announced the temporary take over of the Army leadership. In page three, Tribune published a profile of General Nasution with the title," Coup Crasher Hated by Reds."40 The article contradicted its own headline by crediting Nasution, not Soeharto, as the one who crushed the Thirtieth September Movement. As the news coming from Indonesia was still unclear, it was interesting to see that the Tribune decided to go ahead by publishing the profile of General Nasution, a well known anti-communist general. In reality, however, it was General Soeharto who took control of the situation that day. King, "Rebel Captured. Radio Says Nasution Saved Regime-Some Clashes Reported." Ibid. The Associated Press, "Coup Crusher Hated by Reds," Chicago Tribune, October 2, 1965 1965. === [PDF page 123] === 107 In response to the allegations made by the Revolutionary Council about the United States involvement, the Tribune published the State Department's statement of the official U.S. denial of any CIA involvement in the Indonesian upheaval on page N3. 41 Moreover, the same article also hinted on the possibility of the coup link with the communist China. In contrast with the New York Times, the Tribune clearly mentioned the coup as "a communist-inspired attempt to overthrow President Sukarno." While the Times tend not to be direct.42 Although, at this point there was no clear indication about who was behind the coup, the Tribune mentioned about the Indonesian Air Force supporting the rebels. They also mentioned the fact that the Air Force had Russian-made jet fighters.43 The Los Angeles Times edition on October 2, 1965 also cited the confusion and reflected the 'wait and see' approach of the U.S. government concerning the situation in Indonesia.44 Nonetheless, in its headlines, the Times used a provocative title, "War in Jakarta."45 Besides mentioning the coup attempt, Times did not directly blame the communists as responsible for the coup. Instead, they carefully stated the possible scenario of communist take-over to be what their "sources in Washington felt."46 As the Tribune also reported, the Times mentioned the possible Air Force involvement by claiming "that the Air Force Commander Omar Dhani was one of the first to join 41 Russell Freeburg, "U.S. Denies Cia Involvement in Indonesia," Chicago Tribune, October 2, 1965 1965. Tribune Wire Services, "Hear Indonesia Revolt Smashed," Chicago Tribune, October 2, 1965 1965. 43 Ibid. 44 Richard Reston, "U.S. Unable to Evaluate Cloudy Indonesia Crisis," Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1965 1965. 45 LA Times, "War in Jakarta," Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1965 1965. 46 Reston, "U.S. Unable to Evaluate Cloudy Indonesia Crisis." 42 === [PDF page 124] === 108 Untung's rebels," and hinted at possible communist complicity by adding, "Army announcement made no mention of the Air Force or the role of its Russian-made jet fighters in the military power plays."48 The reference to the 'Russian-made' jet fighters by both the Tribune and Times clearly suggests that there was a communist connection to the coup. Like the New York Times, the LA Times also brought up the possible role of Dr. Subandrio in the crisis. The LA Times carefully stated that: "there are some indications, not yet confirmed, that Subandrio may have taken an extensive hand in possible moves to seize political control of Indonesia."49 Nonetheless, the initial report from the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times all agreed on the general facts about what happened on October 1, 1965 in Indonesia. They all agreed that there were abductions of top Indonesian Army Generals, Sukarno's position and his whereabouts were still uncertain, and a power struggle between the groups was imminent. In addition, the three newspapers also agreed that the crisis was, in fact, a coup and the over all situation was still uncertain. Since more development was still expected to come in the following days, the U.S. government was still continue waiting to evaluate the situation before stating its official position. Times, "Martial Law Called after Coup Failure." Ibid. Reston, "U.S. Unable to Evaluate Cloudy Indonesia Crisis." === [PDF page 125] === 109 The following section will examine the initial narratives as it was reported in the local newspapers dominated by the army publications since the military banned other publication, immediately implementing tight control over information. The local newspapers When the Gestapu or Lubang Buaya affair erupted, the Jakarta Army command under the command of Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah immediately announced a letter of order number 01 Drt/10/1965 that forbid any printing place and publishing office to publish anything without the permission from the Jakarta military command. The letter of order also mentioned that beginning October 1, 1965 at 18:00 hour only the Army/military newspaper the Berita Yudha (BY) and Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (HAB) were allowed to continue its publication. The same letter also mentioned the need to "physically secure" the printing office of those two newspapers in order to ensure smooth operation.50 According to Anderson and McVey in their famous Cornell Paper, the order was signed at 6:00 p.m. - exactly at the same time when the rebels went off the air from the RRI (Radio Republic Indonesia).51 Anderson and McVey felt that it was likely at the same time the office and printing plant of the PKI's newspaper, Harian Rakjat, were also already occupied by the government troops. 50 Harian AB, "Surat Perintah," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, October 2, 1965 1965. RRI: Radio Republik Indonesia. 52 Ibid, Anderson and McVey, p. 132. 51 === [PDF page 126] === 110 As direct consequence of this order, the military had established effective control over all media and information outlets, a crucial move in claiming the "truth" about what happened. However, for some reason still unclear, Harian Rakjat was still able to publish on October 2, 1965 with an editorial clearly indicating PKI support for the 30th September Movement and the crushing of the counter-revolutionary Council of Generals. The publication of the October 2, issue of Harian Rakjat aroused suspicions that the editorial was written by the military as a deliberate act to discredit the PKI.53 On the other hand, the October 2, 1965 headline of the HAB condemned the Gerakan 30 September or the Thirtieth September Movement, and declared them contrarevolutionary.54 Furthermore, in the same edition there was also report on the abduction of the generals, mentioning that the Thirtieth September Movement had forcefully used the radio station and other Jakarta central telecommunication services to take state power while using the cover of "saving" the head of states, the great leader of revolution, Bung Karno. The HAB headlines also announced that the ABRI (military) have successfully crushed the Thirtieth September Movement which had used a fake motive of crushing the non-existent council of generals in order to legitimate their movement. Detailed analysis regarding why the Harian Rakjat was able to publish the day after the press ban can be found in Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, Preliminary Analysis of The October 1 1965 Coup in Indonesia. 54 Harian AB, ""Gerakan 30 September" (Kontrarevolusi)," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, October 2, 1965 1965. === [PDF page 127] === Ill Additionally, the HAB 's editorial of October 2, 1965 condemned the 30 September Movement, and labeled it as a movement inspired by Neo Colonialism (NEKOLIM), popular Sukarno rhetoric at that time.56 What is more telling from the October 2 HAB publication was the report about the Studio RRI-Pusat sdh diamankanavticle. In this particular article we clearly see the signs of confusion about the situation, as the HAB reporter wrote that: "Indonesian Revolutionary council was in fact controlled by contra-revolutionary figures and which are actually the CIA lackeys and hungry for power."58 As we know, the Untung's radio broadcast clearly blamed the CIA as the main supporter of the Council of Generals, whereas in the HAB headline Untung's Revolutionary Council was also labeled as a CIA-supported organization. Hence, from both opposing sides there was unproven accusation about CIA involvement in the upheaval. The reason in pointing out CIA involvement on both opposing sides perhaps stems from the experiences in the late 1950s when the CIA involvement was obvious in the PRRI/Permesta regional rebellion. The memory of those rebellions was still fresh in the mind of many people, especially within the military. Thus, in making an accusation about any CIA involvement it was considered plausible although it was unverified. It was also important to note that in the October 2, edition of HAB there was not yet a direct accusation of the military towards the Indonesian communist party (PKI) as 56 Ibid, Haricm Angkatan Bersendjata, 2 Oktober 1965, p. 1 Studio RRI-Pusat sdh diamankcm=7he central Indonesian Radio Station has been secured 58 Harian AB, "Studio Rri-Pusat Sdh Diamankan," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, October 2, 1965 1965. 57 === [PDF page 128] === 112 the one orchestrating the Thirtieth September Movement. The reason for this was perhaps the military, especially the army, wanted to play safe while still assessing their own strength in the imminent power struggle. At this point, they have not recovered the bodies of the generals and President Sukarno's position on this matter was still unclear. The Berita Yudha (BY) headline on October 2,1965 clearly declared those involved in the 30th September movement were indeed contra Revolutionary.59 BY also included the announcement from the PUSPEN AD, the Army information center, on the nature of the 30l September movement. The announcement detailed point by point about what happened on October 1, 1965. The information in this announcement alleged the existence of the 30th September Movement, the abduction of six high ranking Army officers with their names, the taking over of the RRI (Radio Republic Indonesia), President Sukarno and General Nasution were safe and in good health, the Army leadership was now under the temporary command of Major General Soeharto, and the overall situation was under control and the public was urged to stay calm and continue their daily chores while security measures being applied.60 Another article listed the three important announcements from Major General Soeharto regarding Thirtieth September movement. First, he stated that there was a mutual understanding between the Army, Navy and the Police Force in crushing the contra-revolutionary, the 30th September movement. Second, with the announcement of 59 Berita Yudha, "Orang2 'Gerakan 30 September' Adalah Kontra Revolusioner," Berita Yudha, October 2, 1965 1965. 60 Berita Yudha, "Pimpinan Adri Sementara Dipegang Maj. Djen. Soeharto," Berita Yudha, October 2, 1965 1965. === [PDF page 129] === 113 the establishment of a Revolutionary Council and the decommissioning of the Dwikora cabinet it was clear that the 30th September movement had attempted a coup against the Great Leader of Revolution, his majesty the president and ABRI chief of staff, Sukarno, since the movement also abducted several high ranking Army officers. Third, the public was urged to remain calm and stay vigilant.61 Most importantly, in the Soeharto's statement there was no mention of any cooperation from the Air Force, which indicated Soeharto's strong suspicion on the alleged involvement of the Air Force in the 30l September movement. Moreover, BY also announced the denial of Maj.General Umar Wirahadikusumah, Major General Basuki Rachmat, Brigadier General Amir Machmud, Brigadier General Ryacudu, Brigadier General Solichin and Brigadier General Andi Rifai about the listing of their names as members of the Revolutionary Council. All of them claimed the announcement fit*) was a big lie and they had nothing to do with the Revolutionary Council. Similar with the news from HAB, BY also announced the order of military curfew implementation in Jakarta along with the news on the RRI finally recaptured from the hands of the 30th September movement. Interestingly, BY also reported about General Soeharto dishonorably discharged three Army officers who were directly involved in the 30th September Movement including Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Brigadier General Supardjo, and Colonel Suherman of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. 61 Yudha, "Orang2 'Gerakan 30 September' Adalah Kontra Revolusioner." Berita Yudha, "Pengumuman," Berita Yudha, October 2 1965 1965. 63 Berita Yudha, "Dipetjat Dgn. Tidak Hormat," Berita Yudha, October 2, 1965 1965. 62 === [PDF page 130] === 114 Following the lead of HAB, BY also did not mention nor state any accusation about the Indonesian communist party (PKI) for their involvement in the coup attempt. Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (HAB) and Berita Yudha (BY) would become the mouth piece of the Army in the later campaign against the PKI. In the coming weeks, both newspapers would play an integral part in spreading the news of PKI treachery and brutality to the public. Some would attribute the brutal killings that happened after the Lubang Buaya affair to the effective campaigning of these two Army-sponsored newspapers. However, that claim is still questionable when we look at the circulation of both newspapers. There was no evidence that these two newspapers have wide circulations, especially outside of Java where many killings also happened. A further study of the effectiveness the anti communist campaign through BY and HAB is still needed. Conclusion In this chapter we have explored the beginning of the Lubang Buaya narrative from many sources and points of view. In the first part we examined how the narrative originated by looking at personal recollections of those people who would later be incarcerated for their alleged involvement in the 30l September Movement. In the second part of these personal narratives, the story stems from personal recollections of those who belonged to the anti-communist groups, while the third part deals with the analysis of === [PDF page 131] === 115 how the media—notably the FBIS, U.S. and local newspapers—presented the initial reports oiLubang Buaya killings to the public. From the three groups, excluding FBIS, we can see similarity of the origins for the source of their narratives which was the Untung's radio broadcasts on the morning of October 1, 1965. From these same sources we can see obvious differences in interpretation of that radio broadcast. All groups shared period of confusion, but those who belonged to the anti-communist group tended to strongly condemn the 30th September Movement, judging by their statements in Berita Yudha and Harian Angkatan Bersendjata articles. Nonetheless, both the Catholic group and the BY and HAB newspapers, took a more cautious position in the beginning by not directly blaming the PKI. FBIS is interesting because it ignored Untung's radio announcement. Instead, their narrative point of departure about the event was General Soeharto's and President Sukarno's radio broadcasts after the 30th September Movement had been crushed. The reasons why FBIS failed to record Untung's radio statement is still unknown and in certain degree can spur endless debates about conspiracies which are not the focus of this study. The different presentations of U.S. leading newspapers in their initial reporting about the event were also telling. The New York Times tend to be especially cautious and reflected the general tone of the U.S. government position, as it was evident in the State Department's statement. The LA Times and especially Chicago Tribune blamed the === [PDF page 132] === 116 communists, as it was clearly seen in their report when they described the coup as, "a communist-inspired attempt to overthrow President Sukarno." It was indeed a very strong statement from major U.S. newspapers, amidst all the confusion that was still happening in Indonesia at that time. On the other hand, in initial reports of the incident, the local army newspaper the Harian Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudha offered an immediate, strong condemnation of the 30 September Movement and went further by labeling them not only contra-revolutionary but the work of "CIA lackeys." Despite strong condemnation by the military towards the 30Th September Movement, on the first day there was not a single statement that openly accused the communists of the responsibility of the killings of the generals. This was in contrast with some of the foreign newspapers that openly blamed the communists as the culprit. As seen in the news reports and personal recollections on the beginning of the Lubang Buaya narrative, one can conclude that October 1, 1965 was a confusing, chaotic, and cautious day. It was from this confusion that the narrative of Lubang Buaya came into being. Moreover, from the very beginning there were no general agreement on the interpretations of the event. As days, months, and years passed, eventually one version emerged and later dominated the others, silencing other voices and interpretations as they were forbidden to appear. The initial report of what happened on that fateful day discloses more than the confusing and chaotic nature of the narratives. Most importantly, it also reveals how === [PDF page 133] === 117 uncertainty can easily be manipulated and exploited for the benefits of a particular party, in this case for the benefit of General Soeharto and the anti-communist groups. Given the already heated political atmosphere, it was extremely difficult to bridge the differences in interpretations to find any common ground among the contested parties. The power struggle not only as an attempt of getting rid opponents (sometimes physically), but also a struggle about getting a bigger prize of winning the rights to tell the story about what actually happened. Furthermore, it was also a fight to legitimate one's position and actions against the others. Unfortunately, in the study of the Lubang Buoya killing, the debate on the interpretation of what actually happened on that day still continues. Although now more evidence had come out, and scholars continue to ask who did it? All come with their own series of conclusions, but they often overlook the very nature of the events which were chaotic and confusing. This nature had contributed significantly to a lasting legacy for the competing historical representations. Perhaps, trying to understand the Lubang Buaya affair does not necessarily require a simple and clear explanation because by nature there is none. This chapter does not attempt to establish a definitive account of the event by looking at the initial narratives of the Lubang Buaya affair. It merely provides a point of departure for the development of the dominant New Order narrative about the event. As we continue tracing the development and construction of the New Order narrative about the Lubang Buaya killings, we can see that even that effort was not uniform. The story === [PDF page 134] === 118 would continue to be debated and changed depending on the current social and political context. Despite the fact many studies had tried to explain the Lubang Buaya killings, the available narratives have ironically perpetuated the legacy of the initial narratives of the event, without any consensus in the first place. Sadly, the non-existence of any agreement on the events in the Indonesian history will remain a distinctive characteristic of the writing of historical events under the New Order regime. The Lubang Buaya killings only represent one of many other unclear and unresolved events in Indonesia. While Indonesians continue to pursue explanations of those events, in trying to understand and to achieve closure, important events such as, mysterious killings, Tanjung Priok riots, Aceh military operation, East Timor occupation, and the May 1998 riots are also unresolved. As a result of the confusion, there will be endless debates about how to write many aspects of Indonesian history under the New Order. === [PDF page 135] === 119 Chapter IV: The purging and the Emergence of the Initial Official Version of the Events of September 30th. The anti communist purge in Indonesia became one of the largest, if not the largest instances, of mass political executions since the end of World War II. According to Amnesty International, between 500,000 and one million people were killed following the abortive 1965 coup. Furthermore, more than one million people were detained for their involvement with the PKI not long after the Lubang Buaya affair. From that number, several hundred of thousand would be held without trial for up to 14 years.1 General Nasution's remarks in front of soldiers and employees of the Armed forces staff on October 25, 1965 clearly summarized the intention of a purging process aimed mostly at the members of PKI or those who had even a remote connection to the party: It is clear who the enemies are within. It is clear because in every institutions, also within SAB (StafAngkatan Bersendjata or The Armed Forces Staff), the cleaning and regulating process are ongoing. Elements of adventurer or its supporters were swept out everywhere and everywhere the people swept them spontaneously and hunt them.2 However, it is important to note that the PKI was still a legal political party until General Soeharto banned it on March 12, 1966, using the March 11, 1966 order as his source of legitimacy. Therefore, General Nasution's orders on October 25, 1965 about the purging process happened before the banning of the PKI became official. Even before Amnesty International, Power and Impunity: Human Rights under the New Order (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1994). P.4-6 Jenderal TNI Dr. A.H. Nasution, "Jelas Siapa Kawan Dan Siapa Lawan. Mas Siapa Musuh Dalam Selimut: Amanat Menko-Hankam/Kasab Jenderal Tni Dr. A.H. Nasution Di Depan Para Prajurit Dan Karyawan Sab & Mpr (Tanggal 25-10-1965)," in Dokumen Terpilih Sekitar Pemberontakan G.30.S/Pki, ed. Alex Dinuth (Jakarta: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1993).p.l03 === [PDF page 136] === the official banning, local military commands in many areas of Indonesia declared the PKI an illegal party in their regions. In Northern Sulawesi and several other regions, the local PKI branches responded to the pressure deciding to disband themselves and their members immediately joined the local anti "30th September youth group."3 Incorporation of the "people" in the purging process became a recurring theme in the construction and representation of the Lubang Buoya narrative. In his remarks, General Nasution credited the purging process to the so-called people and downplayed the role of the military. Nonetheless, as this chapter will show, the facts were otherwise. The military role in the systematic purge was clearly prominent since they were the ones who gave the orders to implement the purging. These directives contain detailed instructions for the categorization, methods, and organization of the purging process. Apart from analyzing the initial mechanism of the official purges, this chapter will also compare the official state purging policies with their actual implementation. This analysis will also juxtapose these state policies with the origins of the official narrative of the Lubang Buaya affair. In other words, the creation of the official narrative and the initial purging policy complemented the anti-communist propaganda in the media. In my view, the initial formation of official narrative, or to be more precise, the immediate claim of the "truth," was a compelling pretext for the establishment of the official purging policy. While the military-sponsored purging process is conveniently missing in the initial formation of the official narrative, the purge was described as a Staff Angkatan bersendjata Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersendjata, 40 Hari Kegagalan "G.30.S", vol. 1, SeriMonografiNo. 1 (Djakarta: Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965).p.l24 === [PDF page 137] === 121 spontaneous outburst of anger of the people against the 30th September movement and the PKI. There was no mention of any instigation by the military against the PKI in the official narrative, as all the credits went to the people. Both initial official narrative and official state purging policy played important roles in disseminating the official version oiLubang Buoya affair. On the other hand, the enforcement of the purging policy also helped to disseminate the official version as it clearly established the guilty parties through its categorization of those who were to be arrested. Furthermore, the implementation of the purging policy also helped to instill fear in the society as many investigation teams were being set up everywhere to process and question thousands of people suspected of involvement with the 30th September movement and the PKI. The initial version of the Lubang Buaya official narrative: A short overview The first official version published in December 1965 by the Armed Forces Historical Center headed by the controversial New Order historian, Drs.Nugroho Notosusanto.4 The first edition of this book detailed 40 days of the failure of the 30th September Movement, covering from the event itself on October 1 up to the National Heroes day, November 10. Hence the title is 40 Hari Kegagalan "G.30.S" lOktober-10 November 1965, or "the 40 days failure of the G.30.S (an abbreviation for the Thirtieth September Movement) 1 October-10 November 1965." In her book History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past, Katharine McGregor asserts A detailed information and analysis of Drs.Nugroho Notosusanto work/legacy can be found in Katharine E. McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007). === [PDF page 138] === 122 that the publication of this initial version of the coup was significant because it "consolidated Army propaganda about the coup and provided a linear account detailing the Communist Party's complicity."5 However, what is more important about this book was its legacy, because it formed "the basis of the official New Order version of the coup for the next three decades."6 In the introduction, Nugroho wrote the purpose in publishing this early version of the coup, stressing the importance of the failure to learn about what had happened in Madiun in 1948. He argued that failure had caused people to be caught off guard when the coup attempt in October 1st, 1965 happened.7 He further acknowledged that given the rush to publish the book, this initial version should be treated as a "first draft," while he hoped that, in the near future, a more complete revision will be available. Another interesting aspect about this initial version is that Nugroho explicitly mentioned the aim of targeting readers who do not come from the high official levels. His aim was to inform regular people, laborers who are working at factories, workshops, ports, and plantations. In addition, he also wanted the publication to be read by peasants in the villages, soldiers at the front, the employees in their offices, and students at every educational level.9 The author divides the book into five sections, titled to explain its purpose— such as the introduction, the implementation, the failure, the shrinking of a triangle, and being Ibid.p.109 Ibid. Bersendjata, 40 Hari Kegagalan "G,30.S".p.3 Ibid, p.4 Ibid. === [PDF page 139] === destroyed everywhere. In the introduction, or Pendahuluan, he details the country's overall situation prior to the outbreak of the coup. Within this section, moreover, the book illustrates the preparation of the G.30.S under the strict guidance of the PKI, establishing the party's complicity in the 30th September Movement. The author cites the confession of Lt.Colonel Untung at his trial, and interprets the headlines in the communist-affiliated newspapers using this "evidence" to establish the basis for PKI involvement in the attempted coup. ° In the next section, the implementation (Pelaksanaan),the author detailed each of the G.30.S missions in abducting the generals and also events at the Lubang Buaya and Halim Air Force base. Following the implementation section is what the author called as the "failure section" {kegagalan) that illustrates the collapse of the 30th September Movement, documented by a systematic categorization of which groups were loyal (tegas), in between (plin-plan), and stone-headed (kepala batu).11 Clearly, the author questions the loyalty of the groups that fall into the "in between" and "stone headed", as the book critically dissects each of the public statements by these groups. In the definition of those categories, the book gives a strong indication that if a group released a statement declaring that the G.30.S movement was an internal Army conflict then that particular group would belong to the stone-headed category. The group that belonged to this category was, without a doubt, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and all of its mass organizations: including, all armed contra-revolutionary groups, the Pemuda Rakjat, Gerwani, Tjakrabirawa (the presidential guard unit), 10 Ibid.p.llandp.l7 " Ibid.p.68-82 === [PDF page 140] === PGT/AURI (the Air Force quick response unit), and Battalion 454 of the Diponegoro Division, which as described in the book fled in disarray.12 If a group claimed that they knew nothing or revised their earlier statement from supporting to condemning the movement, then it would fall into the "in between" category and will immediately be under suspicion of supporting the G.30.S. The groups that belonged to this plin-plan or the "in between" category, were, among others, the Air Force, PNI, and Partindo.13 The fourth section of the book titled Berkerutnja Suatu Segitiga or the shrinking triangle, meaning the locations of the military operations against the remnants of the 30th September movement in central Java. Alternatively, one could interpret the title as the shrinking of the three dominant powers in Indonesia at that time, the Army, PKI, and President Sukarno. One description of what happened in this triangle focuses on the events along the Semarang-Solo-Jogjakarta triangle, detailing how ordinary people supported the Army in crushing (or mengganjang ) the remnants of the 30th September movement. Documenting these descriptions were pictures of captured weapons, propaganda leaflets, and victims killed as a result of the inhumane acts of the G.30.S.14 The book describes the situation in these areas as extremely dangerous since the G.30.S practiced indiscriminate killings of innocent people. But thanks to the cooperation with the people, the Army was able to wipe out the G.30.S dissidents whenever they tried to form an organized resistance. 12 Ibid.p.77 Ibid.p73-76 14 Ibid. p98-101 13 === [PDF page 141] === The final section of the book titled Diganjang dimana-mana, or being destroyed everywhere, describes how the PKI G.30.S and their supporters were being crushed in areas outside of Java. Again, we can see the recurring theme of emphasizing on the "good cooperation between the Army (ABRI) and the people."15 Included in this section are accounts of many local PKI branches who declared they were dissolving and disassociating themselves from the PKI by joining other groups who were anti G.30.S. One example was in North Sulawesi where thousands of PKI members and its mass organizations went in flocks to report themselves to the Markas Komando Pemuda Anti "Gerakan 30 September " Sulawesi Utara, or the Headquarters for the Youth Command of Anti 30th September Movement.16 The description of the "danger" and fighting in Central and East Java made the already tense situation seem increasingly volatile. In a sense, outlining the ongoing communist peril in these areas gave the military justification to implement the official policy to purge but, even in these detailed descriptions of "good cooperation" between the military and the people in wiping out the G.30.S, there was not any mention of the official purge policy itself. Hence, the official policy of purging was absent from the New Order's official narrative of this critical period in its history. On the other hand, the descriptions of the spontaneous outburst of anger by people against the PKI were prominently featured in this initial official narrative. 15 Ibid.p.ll2 Ibid.p.l24 === [PDF page 142] === Interestingly, at the end of the book the author tried to answer the question of why the G.30.S failed, finding his answer in "THE HANDS OF GOD."17 By giving credit to God, the communists were portrayed as God-less people, thus explaining their inhumane nature. Since the communists had been slaughtered, the hand of God must have played role in it. In the conclusion, the author returns once again to the comparison between the G.30.S and the Madiun affair. The author concluded that "we have to be responsible to the Indonesian revolution, to the people and to our sons and our descendants as we are all the upholder of the Pantjasila or the Indonesian five basic principles since it has become the character of Indonesia that has it roots from two thousand years old of culture."18 Thus, the conclusion of this early edition of the official narrative about Lubang Buoya affair already emphasized the Pantjasila exaltation that will appear constantly in later official narratives ofLubang Buoya. As we examine the initial formation of the Lubang Buaya official narrative that would later lead into a massive propaganda project of the new regime, it is also important to examine the origins of the state-sponsored purging policy which occurred at the same time as this initial articulation of the official version for the Lubang Buaya killings. The state policy to purge and eradicate the communist/leftist elements in all aspects of the society has not yet been thoroughly studied, thus, next section is an attempt to trace the origin of the policy and uncover official complicity in implementing this policy. Ibid.p.126 === [PDF page 143] === The initial state policy of purging On November 15, 1965, in the introduction to Instruction Letter No.22/KOTI/1965, Major General Soeharto, speaking under presidential instructions and as highest commander of the Indonesian Armed forces, described the purpose of the purging policy: This instruction is a guideline to direct the activities in order to regulate/purge civilian personnel from compartments, departments and bodies and other bodies within the government apparatus from oknum219 and elements of the contrarevolutionary movement that called themselves "30th September Movement", including within this are the activities that preceeded and continuing activities, achieving correctness and balance between the effort and purpose with possible maximum useful results."20 As this text indicates, the description of the purpose of purging was unclear, especially when it mentioned "achieving correctness and balance between efforts and purpose with possible maximum useful results." Nobody really knew what exactly that phrase meant since the goal was vaguely defined as achieving "correctness and balance" and "maximum useful results." I would argue that this vagueness in the purging instructions was intentional to make the process flexible enough to implicate anyone in the 30th September Movement or the PKI. Before the Instruction letter No.22/KOTI/1965 was issued, there were other documents related to this purging process. The first one was Decision Letter (Surat Keputusan) Number Kep-1146/10/1965 released on October 10, 1965 and signed by the Oknum: there is no English translation that can suit this term. In slightly different context it could mean "rogue". However, the loose explanation of what oknum means is someone or some group who is/are consider to be the "bad" or not quite fitting element in a group. 20 Instruksi Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia Komando Operasi Tertinggi. No.22/Koti/1965, (15 November 1965). === [PDF page 144] === 128 minister of the army, Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro, regulating the purging of remnants and sympathizers of the September 30th Movement within military ranks. According to this letter, those involved in this counter-revolutionary movement were to be immediately deactivated or temporarily discharged while these matters were dealt with by military justice.21 Although Letter Number Kep-1146/10/1965 was the first to deal with purging, punishments were not severe and there was no categorization of prisoners which would become crucial in later official policies. Nonetheless, this Kep-1146/10/1965—released simultaneously with another instruction in a radiogram from the Supreme Operational Command (KOTI) which encompassed all commands within the Armed Forcescontained more specific tasks. Most significantly, however, the KOTI Radiogram Number T-0265/G-5/1965 of October 10, 1965 was the first known order to every military branch to form investigative teams for the purging of the counter-revolutionary movement. The radiogram mentioned the matters that needed to be regulated immediately, such as formation of a coordinated investigative team at the center and in the regions. It also recognized the chief of KOSTRAD, the Army reserve command under Major General Soeharto, as the unit responsible for the restoration of security after the adventurism of the 30th September Movement. Moreover, KOSTRAD was given full authority to appoint members of the investigative team which should include intelligence, military prosecutors, and the district 21 Surat Keputusan Nomer:Kep-l 146/10/1965, (10 October 1965). Radiogram T-0265/G-5/1965 Tentang Pembentukan Team-Team Pemeriksa Pusat Dan Daerah, (10 October 1965). 22 === [PDF page 145] === attorney's office. In addition, all information collected from the questioning of the detainees would be used to eradicate the 30l September Movement. This central investigation team was ultimately responsible to the KOSTRAD chief as the commander for the restoration of security. From the content of this radiogram, it was clear that the Army reserve command (KOSTRAD) under General Soeharto had the ultimate authority to implement the purging. The formation of investigative teams in the center and regions directly responsible to KOSTRAD was crucial to this control, not too mention that the KOSTRAD chief Soeharto also had the authority to appoint the members of these same investigative teams. By consolidating all control under his direct command, General Soeharto established a well-organized, hierarchy fully committed to the eradication of the communists from Indonesian society. Following the release of KOTI Radiogram Number T-0265/G-5/1965, KOTI released another on October 12, 1965, Number T-0269/G.5/1965, addressing all cabinet ministers, Pepelrada, coordinating ministers, KOTI command officials, and PantjaTunggal throughout Indonesia. The radiogram instructed officials to temporarily discharge the civil servants who had unexplained absences starting from September 30 1965. Moreover, the radiogram also instructed all departments and government bodies to conduct a daily roll call. According to the radiogram, the purpose for taking this measure was as a continuation of operations to eradicate the remnants of the September 30 Movement. 23 Radiogram T-0269/G.5/1965 Tentang Pemberhentian Sementara Pegawai Negeri Yang Mulai Tanggal 30 September 1965 Tidak Masuk Kerja, (12 October 1965). === [PDF page 146] === 130 As indicated in Radiogram T-0269/G.5/1965, the first official reason used to implicate someone in the September 30th Movement and the PKI was simply because the individual had an unexplained absence on that date. At this time, the categorization of people to purge was not yet established. Guilt was determined by whether or not one showed up at the office—a frivolous basis for what would become one of the largest massacres of the twentieth century. As the military seemed to prepare themselves to wipe out those who were suspected of involvement in the September 30th Movement, the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium ~ whose members were known loyalists of President Sukarno such as, Dr. J. Leimena, Chairul Saleh, and Dr. Subandrio — released their own directives in an effort to balance the military dominance of the purging process. As a result this effort, the Instruction of the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium No:47a/D/Instr/1965 was released on October 20, 1965. On the same day, the group also issued the Instruction of the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium No:48a/D/Instr/1965. In essence, the first instructions, No:47a/D/Instr/1965 from the Cabinet regulated the establishment of special teams within each ministerial department to secure state assets. According to these instructions, the members of this team were to come from the civil defense and in prominent figures mass organizations, who obeyed President Sukarno. The letter also instructed the departments to remain vigilant against any subversion or sabotage.24 The second letter, No:48a/D/Instr/1965 by the Dwikora cabinet, was addressed to all coordinating and cabinet ministers, and included more detailed instructions, providing 24 Instruksi Presidium Kabinet Dwikora Ri No:47a/D/lnstr/1965, (20 October 1965). === [PDF page 147] === 131 that all members of mass organizations within each department had to declare their position on Sukarno's teachings. While waiting for political directives from the president, all mass organizations within the government involved with the 30th September movement had to temporarily stop all activities. The letter also gave instructions to dishonorably discharge those rogue officials, or Oknum, who were clearly involved with G.30.S.25 Both letters also required the departments to carry out instructions immediately and report back to the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium. By emphasizing total obedience to Sukarno and his teachings, these Dwikora Cabinet letters represented loyalist efforts to help the president retain his waning powers. The letters were an indication of the subtle power struggle between the military under Major General Soeharto and President Sukarno that would last for some months after the Lubang Buaya killings. However, the military soon struck again by issuing another letter of instruction, No: INS-1015/1965, from the Ministry of Defense and chief of staff of the Armed Forces, General A.H.Nasution. This particular letter was significant since it was the first in a series that gave detailed classifications for the type of individuals that were to be immediately purged or "secured" for their involvement with the 30th September Movement. These criteria were defined as follows: A. Those who are clearly involved: 1. In planning or knew about the plan of the counter- revolution, but did not report it to the authorities. 25 Instruksi Presidium Kabinet Dwikora Ri No:48a/D/Instr/1965, (20 October 1965). Instruksi Menko Kompartimen Pertahanan/Keamanan/Kepala Staf Angkatcm Bersendjata No: Ins1015/1965, (12 November 1965). 26 === [PDF page 148] === 132 2. Aware of the goals of the movement, implements activities in order to assist the actualization of the movement. B. Clearly involved indirectly: After finding out the contra-revolutionary movement the person/group showed attitudes, either in their acts or in expression, that showed agreement with the counter- revolutionary movement. C. Indications for those who can be presumed to be directly or indirectly involved: 1. Became a regular active member or officer in an organization that is directly involved with PKI and its mass organizations and other mass organizations that have relationship with PKI or its mass organizations, with no attempt to condemn the counter-revolutionary movement, but does not belong to the A and B classifications. 2. According to the previously known antecedents have some involvement in the "Madiun Affair" or the counter- revolutionary movement but did not condemn it. 3. Being a regular member not active in the organizations mentioned in number 1.27 This letter of instruction was the first of its kind that clearly mentioned the PKI as solely responsible for the 30th September Movement. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the PKI would not be officially outlawed until March 12, 1966, although by November when this instruction letter was sent out the party had already been subject to negative propaganda about the Lubang Buaya affair. Even though, that the PKI had been earlier accused as the culprit in the killings does not lessen the significance of the instruction letter No: INS-1015/1965. The mere existence of this type of official instruction did lent official weight to such suspicions far beyond mere accusations of PKI involvement in the press. The classification of prisoners for purging purposes, as illustrated in this instruction letter, became the standard template for many subsequent policies for several 27 Ibid. === [PDF page 149] === 133 years. However, the scope of Instruction Letter Number No: INS-1015/1965 included only those who were members of the armed forces — the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. The letter did not cover other governmental departments or other civilian organizations. What made this letter so compelling was not only its detailed classification of those individuals who needed to be purged but, most importantly, the recommended retribution for those who were considered part of the September 30th Movement. These instructions also regulated the procedure for the establishment of the investigative team and its operating structure within government departments. Consequently, this letter aimed to coordinate the establishment of the various inspection teams while providing for further surveillance and punishments during the cleansing process within the Armed Forces.28 Three days after the release of these instructions, General Soeharto — in his capacity as KOTI chief of staff, and, representative of the president and supreme commander of the Armed Forces — released another letter of instruction, No. 22/KOTI/1965. The content of this letter was almost exactly the same as the instructions previously released by General Nasution in No: INS-1015/1965. The major difference between the two orders was the jurisdiction and operational targets. Soeharto's No. 22/K.OTI/1965 had significantly wider targets since its aim was to purge all civilian personnel from the entire government apparatus, while Nasution's letter, No: INS1015/1965, only regulated civilian and military personnel within the Armed Forces 28 Ibid. === [PDF page 150] === 134 departments. With this latter letter of instruction, the military-sponsored purges of communist individuals and groups had entered a more advanced stage. Through the release of these official military orders, there was an obvious overlap with the other instructions, especially with the letters released by the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium. As a result, it was inevitable that some parties would question the validity of the instructions released by the Dwikora cabinet discussed earlier in this section. These two letters (No:47a/D/Instr/1965 and No:48a/D/Instr/1965) did not explicitly blame the PKI as the mastermind of the Lubang Buaya affair, although both supported the purging of elements identified with the September 30th Movement. Furthermore, these two letters did not provide details for classifications of targeted individuals and groups, in contrast to instructions from the military with clearly defined categories. Instead, these two letters were concerned about maintaining the loyalty of the investigation team to President Sukarno. From this information alone, we can see there were some substantial disagreements within the state apparatus about dealing with those deemed responsible for the Lubang Buaya killings or the G.30.S affair. The fact that the military released two detailed, precisely delineated letters for purging only showed how the military distrusted the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium's letters. The dispute between Sukarno and the military was becoming more evident, especially after the military began their scheme of using General Soeharto's KOTI instructions, as the sole basis for the purging in all governmental departments. 29 Dasar Dasar Kebidjaksanaan Penerbitan/Pembersihan Personil Sipil Dari Kompartimen2, Departemen2 Dan Badan2 Lainnja Dalam Aparatur Pemerintah. === [PDF page 151] === 135 The tensions between President Sukarno and the military were obvious during the president's speech at the meeting with KOTI officials on November 20, 1965. President Sukarno addressed his concerns about KOTI purging activities, telling the audience that his own minister of education, Mrs. Artati, had come up to see him almost in tears as she reported that all of her assistants had been forced to "deactivate" by KOTI, including those individuals that President Sukarno had known for years to be personally loyal. These individuals "deactivated" were described by Sukarno as "progressive revolutionary nationalists" not members of the PKI. President Sukarno expressed his deep concern about this matter, saying: In resolving this problem my brothers, we have to really understand which are Gestapu, which are not. Do not act because Gestapu has PKI people in it then everyone who are progressive revolutionary are dangerous. Nah, that is a mistake, brother, a mistake."31 At the same meeting, President Sukarno also addressed the issue of overlapping authority from the letters of the Dwikora Cabinet (No:47a/D/Instr/1965 and No:48a/D/Instr/1965) and those released by KOTI (No. 22/KOTI/1965). He asserted that, based on the last KOTI meeting, it was already agreed that the Dwikora Cabinet would deal with the government's civilian employees with the exception of those who are working in defense and security (Hankam). Those individuals from the defense and security departments would be the responsibility of the military. Sukarno further stated that "he hoped that all Armed Forces members and its officers would comprehend this 30 Soekarno, "Pidato Presiden/Pangti Abri/Pbr Pada Sidang Koti Di Istana Bogor Tanggal 20 Nopember 1965.," in Rangkaian Pidato Dan Pernjataan2 Resmi Disekitar Peristiwa "Gerakan 30 September" (Jakarta: Seksi Penerangan KOTI, 1965).p.l6 31 Ibid. === [PDF page 152] === 136 matter, so our nation would not becoming something like what it is. Since recently everyone are splitting and hostile towards each other." Concerned about this overlapping authority, President Sukarno asked General Soeharto as the chief of staff of KOTI, to explain the matter before the cabinet at the meeting on November 20, 1965. General Soeharto, asserted that both the KOTI directives and the Dwikora Presidium instructions were essentially the same in its "soul." He further suggested that there was "no harm for the Armed Forces and Police to be the tool for the presidium in addition to the attorney general office, to help out the teams that would implement their tasks in given departments." At the end of the meeting Soeharto concluded: "So now it should be clear and no doubt about the implementation of the Presidium instruction and KOTI directives, since the soul of both regulations are the same. The responsibility, however, would still in the hand of the presidium with the instruction, and using the guidelines to the aforementioned instruction."33 If we look carefully at Soeharto's explanation that "responsibility, would be still in the hand of the presidium," Soeharto had in fact out-maneuvered Sukarno and his Dwikora cabinet loyalists by attributing the responsibility for his own purging policy to the Dwikora Presidium. Although, Soeharto repeatedly underscored the similarity in the "soul" of the letters of instruction and did not discuss their contents, which were in fact very different, he succeeded in implementing a purging policy followed the military's Major General Soeharto, "Penjelasan Kas Koti Maj. Djen. Soeharto Mengenai Instruksi Koti No.22, Tentang Dasar2 Kebijaksanaan Penertiban/Pembersihan Personil Sipil Dari Kompartimen2, Departemen2 Dan Badan2 Lainnja Dalam Aparatur Pemerintah," in Rangkaian Pidato Dan Pernjataan2 Resmi Disekitar Peristiwa "Gerakcm 30 September" (Jakarta: Seksi Penerangan KOTI, 1965).p22-23 === [PDF page 153] === 137 procedure rather than those of the Dwikora presidium. He cleverly avoided taking the responsibility of his actions by acknowledging the ultimate authority of the Dwikora Presidium. From Soeharto's seemingly vague explanation, he was being tactful in not directly challenging Sukarno's authority. Even as he emphasized the similarity in the two sets of instructions, he was simultaneously suggesting the participation of the Armed Forces and Police in other department investigative teams. As we will see later in this chapter, the military clearly dominated the investigation and classification process, not only for targeted PKI members but also for President Sukarno's loyal followers. Implementation of the purging policy In response to the ongoing mass killings, President Sukarno summoned his cabinet members and also the military officials from KOTI, the Supreme Operational Command. In this meeting on November 20, 1965 he expressed his concerns saying: "Never in the history of Indonesian Revolution, to be clear, never like right now, are the people hostile to each other. Ook niet in de Madiun affair, even not during Madiun affair."34 Sukarno's reference on the Madiun affair ironically resonated with what the Army leadership has been emphasizing about the nature of the September 30th Movement as another episode of PKI treachery. Soekarno, "Pidato Presiden/Pangti Abri/Pbr Pada Sidang Koti Di Istana Bogor Tanggal 20 Nopember 1965.." === [PDF page 154] === 138 According to Amnesty International, between 500,000 to one million Indonesians lost their lives in less than one year. Although the PKI would not be declared illegal until March 12, 1966, mass arrests and killings had started not long after the September 30l Movement's failure in early October 1965, and still showed no sign of stopping by November as the political momentum shifted toward the military and General Soeharto. Even so, Soeharto carefully calculated his political moves since Sukarno still had many loyal followers within the military and the government. In the previous sections, we have examined the formation and the content of the early official narrative of the Lubang Buaya affair and the implementation of the military purges policy. We saw the sequence of how the initial policy of purging came into being, noting, how opposing political factions of Sukarno loyalists in the Dwikora cabinet presidium went head-to-head with the military over the implementation of the policy. Finally, we saw how Soeharto cleverly out-maneuvered his opponents by manipulating the situation and maintaining the pressure to get rid of both the communists and Sukarno loyalists. In this section, we will examine the actual implementation of the purging policy by drawing the information from those who were incarcerated in the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya affair. By looking at their personal experiences, we can compare the formal policy and the actual implementation. From there, we hope to make a convincing argument that, aside from what the regime wanted the public to believe, the combination International, Power and Impunity: Human Rights under the New Order.p. 16 === [PDF page 155] === 139 of written policy and the actual implementation helped to strengthen the regime's official narrative of the Lubang Buaya affair. We can then try to answer why the actual experiences of those who were purged are missing from the official narrative of these events. The absence of these accounts from the official account served to strengthen the justification for the military's actions. Midst these mass killings, it was important to disseminate an official narrative as soon as possible, so the public would accept the slaughter as justifiable retribution for the PKI betrayal of the Indonesian nation. Personal accounts from former political prisoners: Among the million people arrested the months after the Lubang Buaya affair, hundreds of thousands would remain incarcerated for up to 14 years without any official charges or trial.36 Many of those arrested never learned what exactly were the reasons for their being labeled dangerous to the society, since the full story about 30th September Movement and the killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya was never revealed. Arrest and incarceration came swiftly to most of these former political prisoners. Some were immediately arrested, but there were also those who were not detained for several years after the Lubang Buaya killings. For Moeljadi SH, an employee at the Trikora steel mill in Banten, the purging process happened extremely fast. He was arrested on October 2, 1965, the second day after Lubang Buaya killings. Moeljadi was accused of having prior knowledge of the Council of Generals' plan to take over the 36 Ibid.p.6 === [PDF page 156] === government, but the real reason for his arrest was because of his failure to report that information to the authorities. In his defense, Moeljadi asserted that this information was based on the rumors that had been circulating widely prior to Untung's announcement on the radio. In effect, Moeljadi gave a kind of information that in Indonesia was considered rahasia umum or "public secret." During his interrogation, the investigator asked him about the source of the information, but Moeljadi insisted that he heard the news only as a rumor. Unlike many of his friends, Moeljadi was never tortured throughout his interrogation by the military. From the previous sections we also learned about the instructions from the Dwikora cabinet presidium on the establishment of independent investigation teams within governmental departments, with membership from pro-Sukarno figures within each department. However, from my findings, confirmed by other sources, almost all interrogations that happened during the 'clean up' process were under strict military supervision. In the case of Mr.Moeljadi SH, the military interrogated him in the district command office, specifically in his own cell.39 Although he was lucky not to be tortured, he admitted that he could not stand seeing other prisoners being tortured for weeks.4 During his interrogation, Moeljadi was pressured with questions about his involvement in 37 Moeljadi, March 3, 2006. See: Ayu Ratih & Hilmar Farid John Roosa, ed., Tahun Yang Tak Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65: Esai-Esai Sejarah Lisan, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM) bekerja sama dengan Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan [dan] Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia, 2004). 39 Moeljadi. 38 === [PDF page 157] === any organization, whether he was currently or formerly a member of any organization back in college, or whether he has any connections with the "event" at Lubang Buaya41 At the end, formal charges were never laid against Moeljadi nor did he ever face any trial to answer the military's accusation of his alleged involvement with the 30l September Movement. Nonetheless, Moeljadi spent a total 13 years in prison as a the "B" category prisoner that is, those who were "clearly involved indirectly and showed agreement with the contra-revolutionary movement." Given the nature of his arrest and incarceration, Mr.Moeljadi's experience was parallel to thousands of others who shared similar or even worse experiences. In this heated atmosphere, an individual could be arrested and imprisoned for merely hearing a widely circulated rumor and not reporting it to the authorities. By contrast, the experience of Mr. Surya Atmadja, the first secretary of CDB PKI Banten, was much less unfortunate. In the beginning, he managed to hide for several weeks until finally captured on October 29, 1965. Mr. Surya Atmadja was not only an active member of PKI, but he was also someone who had an official position in the organization. After his arrest, he was taken directly to the military district command headquarters where a certain Captain Chasman from Cirebon, along with his right hand man Lieutenant Jazuli, tortured Mr. Surya Atmadja repeatedly.42 Under torture, Mr. Surya Atmadja was forced to admit that the PKI was solely responsible for mounting a rebellion to take over the government. 41 42 Ibid. Surya Atmadja, March 12, 2006. === [PDF page 158] === As he kept on denying the accusations, the beating became even more severe until, at times, Mr.Surya Atmadja would lose consciousness, sometimes for two to three days.43 After he regained consciousness, a member of military police interrogated him again. The purpose of the interrogation was not to determine whether he was guilty or not, but to extract a "favorable" confession and information, about communist party members. In this context, "favorable," of course, meant information, along the lines that the PKI was responsible for the killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya. This "favorable" information would be used as evidence in court that PKI as an organization not only planned but also launched a coup by using the September 30th Movement as its cover. In a sense, the purpose for this interrogation was consistent with the radiogram No. T-0265/G-5/1965 from KOTI chief of staff instructing the military, especially the Army, to "conduct questioning of all prisoners/detainees, to find all materials that are needed to exterminate the adventurism of 30th September Movement gang."44 Mr. Surya Atmadja was placed into the "A" category which, according to the official definition, was for those who were clearly involved in planning or who knew about the plan but did not report it to the authorities. Moreover, those who belonged to category A were thought to be fully knowledgeable about the goals of the movement and actively implicated in its actualization.45 Mr.Surya Atmadja stayed in prison until 1978 without ever facing official charges for his alleged involvement in the coup. Radiogram T-0265/G-5/1965 Tentang Pembentukan Team-Team Pemeriksa Pusat Dan Daerah. Dasar Dasar Kebidjaksanaan Penerbitan/Pembersihan Personil Sipil Dari Kompartimen2, Departemen2 Dan Badan2 Lainnja Dalam Aparatur Pemerintah. 45 === [PDF page 159] === 143 Another of those detained, Mr. Djoko Sri Muljono -- a Soviet-educated metallurgist and member of the Trikora Steel mill labor union in Cilegon — learned that on October 2 and October 3 that the authorities had already arrested the officers of his union for their alleged involvement in the September 30th Movement. Mr. Muljono found that odd since he felt that the authorities were "kelewat rajin " or too diligent in doing their job in the early days after Lubang Buoya, since there was still no official certainty as to who was behind the September 30th Movement and the killing of the generals at Lubang Buaya.46 Based on this fact alone, he concluded that his arrest has been planned well ahead of these events. Finally, on October 11, 1965 after an organized demonstration ransacked his office, Mr.Muljono was arrested and taken to the military district headquarters. During the interrogation, the investigator asked him whether he knew anything about the September 30th Movement and whether he involved in any way. Mr.Muljono answered that he knew nothing. Like thousands of other prisoners, Mr.Muljono was never charged formally, let alone put on trial. In the beginning, the military categorized him as type C prisoner, although he himself never received any formal notification about his classification. According to the official definition, category "C" was an active member, officer, or administrator in an organization that was directly involved with the PKI and its mass organizations, but did not belong to either the A or B classifications.47 46 Djoko Sri Muljono, February 14, 2006. Dasar Dasar Kebidjaksanaan Penerbitan/Pembersihan Personil Sipil Dari Kompartimenl, Departemen2 Dan Badan2 Lainnja Dalam Aparatur Pemerintah. 47 === [PDF page 160] === 144 Furthermore, those who belonged into "C" category, had been involved in the "Madiun Affair" and, after the counter- revolutionary movement occurred, did not assertively condemn it. Although Mr.Muljono was not a PKI member, he was a member of the Trikora Steel Mill labor union, an organization that was thought to have an affiliation with the PKI labor union, the SOBSI. Consequently, in 1968 Mr.Muljono was "upgraded" to category "B." During this period, Attorney General Sugiarto made an announcement that those prisoners who had at least a bachelor's degree automatically belonged to the "B" category. In 1971, after moving from one prison to another on Java and working in several road construction projects for the military, Mr.Muljono was sent to the penal colony at Buru island, where he remained until his release in December 1978. Another detainee, Mr.Oey Hay Djoen, a member of parliament for the PKI, was arrested by the military on October 21, 1965. During the interrogation, the military police repeatedly questioned him about what he knew of the September 30th Movement. Like many others who were arrested, Mr.Djoen insisted that he knew nothing.49 However, he recalled that there were not too many questions relating to the September 30th Movement. Instead the interrogator's questions were mostly about his religion, personal beliefs, and the military's attempt to extort property from him.50 A chief prosecutor named Sujono also asked him about the Mercedes Benz as his official car as a member of the Muljono. Oey Hay Djoen, March 19, 2006. Ibid. === [PDF page 161] === 145 parliament. Mr.Djoen answered that he received as a parliamentarian, only a small Mazda car.51 The prosecutor did not believe that Mr.Djoen did not have a Mercedes Benz but admitted during the interrogation that they already confiscated his Mazda car. However, the prosecutors continued trying to extort Mr.Djoen by asking him to write his family to replace the tires of the car, in exchange for some "favors" that they were willing to give him. Mr.Djoen refused to cooperate, and as a result he was spat upon. Mr.Djoen spent four years in Salemba prison in Jakarta before being moved to Buru Island as part of the first wave of prisoners. "I was sent to Buru Island using the number 001, so I was considered as the State enemy number 1, even Pram's (Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the famous writer) number was 007." Mr.Djoen stayed on Buru for ten years. Like with most other prisoners, he never received any formal charges nor did he see his official letter of his arrest, let alone face trial. He was told back then that he belonged to the "B" category, but there was never any formal indication. Citing "not enough evidence," the government later released Mr.Djoen in 1979 after he had spent a total of 14 years in 54 prison. There were also many who were not immediately detained. Such was the case of Mr. Andai Rahma. He was a regular clerk who had been active only in some youth organizations when he was still at school, Mr. Andai Rahma never went into hiding. He was leading a normal life until his supposedly tarnished past caught up with him. After 51 Ibid. Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 52 === [PDF page 162] === 146 working peacefully for almost three years and never thinking about any possible link that he might have with the September 30th Movement let alone the PKI, the military arrested him in 1968 for his alleged involvement with the movement. It turned out that the reasons for his detention was his high school and college activities in Bandung. Where he was an active member of IPPI (Jkatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia) or the Indonesian Youth and Students Union, an organization that later became pro PKI. After graduating from college in January 1965 and leaving the IPPI organization to find a job, he was technically no longer a member of the supposedly illegal organization when he was arrested in 1968. Nonetheless, the military still detained him. Before he was imprisoned Mr. Rahma had already heard rumors about people talking about him keeping eye-gouging equipment and knives in his house.55 It is important to note, after the failure of the September 30th Movement and the unraveling of events at Lubang Buaya, stories about how the generals were tortured and how the PKI members gouged the eyes of the generals were widely circulated. So spreading rumors about someone owning an eye-gouging device was, to say the least, detrimental. After his arrest, the military questioned Mr.Rahma about the 30th September Movement and PKI. Like the others, he claimed that he did not know anything. Nonetheless, he was designated a category "B" prisoner, sent to Buru Island, and not be released until 1979. He was never formally charged, nor did he face any form of trial. At the upper echelon of these detainees, Mr. Setiadi Reksoprodjo, a member of the Dwikora Cabinet as minister of electricity, was detained on March 18, 1966, exactly 55 Andai Rahma, February 16, 2006. === [PDF page 163] === seven days after President Sukarno released the infamous March 11,1966 letter of order (Supersemar) authorizing General Soeharto to take any necessary steps to guarantee the safety of the nation and revolution. The official letter of arrest for Mr. Setiadi Reksoprodjo, came in the form of Announcement Number 5 which dealt with the "safety of the ministers." On behalf of President Sukarno, General Soeharto announced in this Letter Number 5 that "among the ministers in the cabinet, there were those who became the target of the people as they saw indication of their involvement with the 30th September Movement. Or at least there were doubts about their intention in helping the President/Great leader of Revolution/MPRS mandate."56 The letter also mentioned about the fact that the military "reluctantly thinks that safety precautions are needed, in order to prevent those ministers to become the target of uncontrolled people's anger."57 The extravagant display of concern was in fact a pretext to arrest those ministers who were loyal to Sukarno, despite mention of the ministers, "safety," most arrested without any official charges. Mr.Setiadi Reksoprodjo was thus one of the ministers being "put into safe keeping." The ministers were detained in the Senayan athletic complex in southern Jakarta for a week before being taken to the Military Prison House (RTM), with the exception of Brigadier General Soemarno. Mr.Setiadi did not receive his formal letter of detention until a year later. Throughout his time in prison, he never received any official charges. "They even treated 56 Soeharto, "Pengumuman Nomor:5 Tentang Pengamanan Menteri-Menteri," in Salinan Dokumen Terpilih Sekitar Pemberontakan G.30.S/Pki, ed. Alex Dinuth (Jakarta: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1993). 57 Ibid. 58 Setiadi Reksoprodjo, February 16, 2006. === [PDF page 164] === the ministers like that, let alone how they treated the others," said Mr.Setiadi. "So there was no way to find out how long we will be detained."59 He remained in prison for twelve years without trial. Accounts from the interrogator In trying to understand the reasoning behind the detention of hundreds of thousands people in the aftermath of the failed September 30th Movement, General Kemal Idris, a prominent anti-communist general and commander one of the most active Army unit during the purging of the PKI remnants, commented in his biography: "There are those who became victim because of being wrongly accused, or during the investigation it was found out that they did not have any involvement. But it is better to proceed in safety first manner." 60 From his statement, General Idris gave a clear illustration of the military methods in the "cleaning up" process. Indiscriminate arrests happened even to those who only had remote connection with PKI. To understand the logic behind the purge we also should look at it from the point of view of those who were involved in the process, particularly those who conducted the interrogations. Mr. Yosef Syukur was one of those people. Prior to the outbreak of the Lubang Buaya affair in Jakarta, Mr. Syukur held a position of public prosecutor (Jaksa) in the city of Ende, Flores Island in East Nusa Tenggara Province. Although the situation during the aftermath of the Lubang Buaya affair in Java (etal) Rosihan Anwar, Kemal Idris: Bertarung Dalam Revolusi (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996).p.l95 === [PDF page 165] === and Bali has been well covered in the literature, the situation in more remote places such as Flores and Eastern Nusa Tenggara islands have not been studied, with the possible exception of work by two Australian academics, Paul Webb and Steven Farram.61 During the purging or "clean up" period, Mr. Syukur was the head of the G.30.S investigation team in Ende. He was appointed to that position in 1967 since he was already a well-known anti-communist figure in the prosecutor's (Kejaksaan) office. His reputation as a staunch anti-communist stemmed from events on August 16, 1965 when members of SOBSI, the PKI affiliated labor organization, along with members of the Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani, came en masse to the public prosecutor's office in Ende. They were demonstrating on behalf of the people, against the investigation by the prosecutor's office into forest land that was illegally converted to agricultural use by the PKI. During the demonstrations a brawl erupted between the PKI masses and security personnel. Mr. Syukur was involved in the brawl and as a result he was suspended from his position. In late 1967, he was finally restored to his old position, as his superior concluded that he was justified in his actions, since he was fighting to defend the prosecutor's office from attack by the PKI and its mass organizations. Not long after he resumed his old position, Mr.Syukur was appointed as the head of the G.30.S investigation team with the jurisdiction encompassing the city of Ende and Manggarai District. 61 See Paul Webb's article "The Sickle and Cross: Christian and Communist in Bali, Flores, Sumba and Timor, 1965-1967" in the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol:XVII issue: 1, March 1986 and Steven Farram'a article "Revolution, Religion and Magic The PKI in West Timor, 1924-1966" in the Journal Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde volume 158, 2002 === [PDF page 166] === 150 The investigation team that Mr. Syukur headed consisted of fifteen people, three civilians and the rest Military Police and other regular military personnel. With the military dominating the investigation team, one can conclude that the armed forces had the greatest interest in doing the purging. The establishment of the G.30.S investigation team seems to have followed instructions that came from the central government and military command in Jakarta. As we have seen in the earlier sections of this chapter, there were several types of official instructions dealing with the purging. It is important to note that, although there were many letters which sometimes caused overlapping implementation or enforcement, the issuance of those letters showed the importance that the government attached to ridding the influence of September 30th Movement and the PKI from the society. Mr. Syukur was but one among many who were involved in the purging process since there were hundreds or even thousands of other investigative teams set up throughout Indonesia. His personal account will hopefully shed some light on the nature of the work done by the interrogation and investigation teams which were an important aspect of the political situation during that turbulent time. The interrogations "Nah, there was no official instructions that they have to be killed," said Yosef Syukur about what happened to the prisoners. "Yes, there was no instruction like that. But, in Yosef Syukur, December 23, 2004. === [PDF page 167] === 151 reality, after I questioned them, five of them whom I believe the most active would disappear."63 Through such procedures, between 1965 and 1967 up to a million Indonesians died in a massive anti-communist purge following the failed coup attempt of October 1, 1965.64 The exact number killed will probably remain unknown because of the difficulty of getting accurate information. Along with the mass killings, moreover, there were hundreds of thousands people arrested for their alleged involvement in the coup or for their membership in the PKI. People arrested came from various backgrounds, ranging from those who formerly had high positions in the government to illiterate peasants in remote villages who happened to sign up to become a member of BTI, a PKI affiliated mass organization, just to get some agricultural assistance. Only small number of these Tapoh or political prisoners ever saw trial before the special military tribunal established to deal with September 30th Movement. The rest of these Tapol were sent to remote Buru Island in the Moluccas where the government established a penal colony. Some were incarcerated in prisons throughout Indonesia and were subjected a mandatory indoctrination program before they were returned to society.66 But, before the Tapol were killed, incarcerated, or sent to Buru island, they were first arrested and interrogated by the special investigation teams in the region where they International, Power and Impunity: Human Rights under the New Order. Ibid. 66 Direktorat Jenderal Sosial Politik, Buku Saku Nomor: 200/1263 Bagi Pelaksana Pembinaan Dan Pengawasan Bekas Tahanan Dan Bekas Narapidana G.30.S/Pki, Nomor: 200/1263 ed. (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Sosial Politik, Departemen Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia, 1989).p.49 65 === [PDF page 168] === 152 were first detained. Usually the interrogation occurred in the military district headquarters or Kodim where the interrogation was often accompanied by physical torture. Although the instructions for establishment of these investigative teams came out as early as mid October 1965, their actual implementation varied by region. For example, in the regency of Ende on the Flores island, the team was not formed and fully operational until 1967.67 The process came as a surprise for many people since many were arrested indiscriminately, perhaps in compliance with the instructions of General Kemal Idris, a prominent anti-communist general, to proceed in a "safety first" manner, i.e. arrest first and interrogate later. As the head of the investigation team in Ende, Mr. Yosef Syukur divulged that at one time he had to deal with around 120 people in one day and the interrogations of an individual detainee could go on for several days and nights. From those 120 people, he estimated only twenty percent of them were members of PKI or any PKI-affiliated mass organization, while the remaining eighty percent were just common people who had no idea at all about the PKI or the September 30th Movement.69 If I asked the people, what is PKI? (they would answer) Christian Party of Indonesia, Catholic Party of Indonesia. Loh,why did you join the PKI? Their motivation to join the PKI so they could be exempt from hard labor, if there are something going on the PKI will defend them and the PKI took care of them. That was their only motivation. Do you know if PKI is the Communist Party? [they would answer] No. Syukur. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. === [PDF page 169] === 153 From Mr. Syukur's description, it is clear that almost all people he questioned were in fact innocent. As a public prosecutor, Mr. Syukur was the nominal head of the investigation team. But in reality it was the military who clearly ran the show. Throughout the interrogation process, members of the military often came to the barracks where the prisoners were temporarily held and asked Mr. Syukur's permission to bring them out of the cell for further "questioning." Although Mr. Syukur feared the repercussions from the military if he disobeyed, he managed to avoid signing any of the authorizations to release the prisoners, just letting the military take the prisoners without his signature. He knew somehow that the prisoner would be killed.71 In our interview, Mr. Syukur insisted that it was the anti-communist mass organizations that killed most of the prisoners, albeit with strong encouragement from the military. "The point is, the BAP [interrogation reports] are useless" said Mr. Syukur, commenting on the interrogation procedure. He further admitted that the interrogation process was merely a formality. The questioning was not done to determine whether a person was guilty or innocent, but instead to find a reason to get rid of the prisoner. The fact that a person was arrested had already determined that he or she was guilty. There was no effort to find the truth, and the truth was simply ignored during the interrogation. From the accounts of the former political prisoners, we have learned that the interrogators insisted on establishing the connection between PKI and September 30th Movement regardless of the detainee's answers. Everything was already pre-determined. The interrogation process was aimed only at finding further incriminating evidence of a === [PDF page 170] === 154 person's involvement with the 30th September Movement, no matter how remote the connection might be. Moreover, under continuous physical and mental torture, prisoners often admitted whatever the interrogator wanted to hear. Furthermore, as we have seen above, the instructions for purging clearly suggested that all members of PKI were suspects and had a certain degree of involvement with the September 30th Movement, regardless of whether they had any connection or not. In describing his personal convictions as the head of the investigative team Mr. Syukur said: "My personal stance is why would these people be punished if they are innocent? What did they do wrong? Why? That is one [reason]. Second they [the military] were angry at me because I never signed any of the prisoner release forms." 72 Consequently, the military became suspicious of him and one evening forced him to attend one of the executions just to make sure that he witnessed what happened to the prisoners. I did not want to go, but then they took me and I witnessed the killings for the first time. They picked me up around 3:00 a.m. in the morning. Three military people came, picked me up, and brought me there. I was shocked, I saw people executed, cut in pieces using machetes. For one week I cannot eat rice and meat. 73 There was also a public execution that Mr.Syukur attended. It was the execution of John Dimu, who was a known Pemuda Rakyat figure. He was allegedly at Lubang Buaya and witnessed the killings of the general. His execution was announced publicly and held in an open field to be witnessed by the public at large. Mr. Syukur described how John Dimu was tied to a wooden cross as he was being prepared to be burned to death, "It was 72 73 Ibid. Ibid. === [PDF page 171] === 155 at that time I realized how strong a human body was. As the flame began engulfed him, the man saw me, and yelled, 'I am innocent', he was able to pull and break the wire that held him," said Mr. Syukur. John Dimu's body then exploded, until this very day he could still remember the smell and the sound of burning human flesh.74 Mr. Syukur's account suggests that not only that the military ran the whole purging process, but they were suspicious of any act of defiance regardless of the position of the person under suspicion. Military dominance was in accordance with the official instructions for purging which specified that all the investigative teams were to get some "assistance" from the military. In reality, the military did not merely provide assistance, but instead played a major role in the arrest, interrogation, and ultimate determination of who was to be jailed or killed. The civilian personnel in the investigative teams worked under close military supervision and they often, as in the case with Mr. Syukur, struggled deeply with their role. Consequently, their personal struggles, as reflected in their actions, were sometimes interpreted as sympathetic to the prisoners. As we have seen in the case of Mr. Syukur, the military could easily become suspicious and, in his case, they forced him to witness the killings first hand, as if to implicate him fully on the process of anti-communist extermination. 74 Ibid. === [PDF page 172] === 156 Conclusion During the months following the killings of the generals at Lubang Buoya, a series of critical activities took place in conjunction with that event. As the situation became tense and the military worked through the media to encourage cooperation with the anti-communist groups, the armed forces felt it was necessary to publish an official version of the event. Consequently, only forty days after the events the Armed Forces History Center published the first official narrative as an initial effort to present the "truth" about Lubang Buaya killings to the public. By quickly releasing the first official account of the event and its immediate aftermath, the military managed to gain upper hand in the propaganda struggle, and mobilized public support to crush the PKI. The military's first version of the event, credited the crushing the September 30th Movement and the PKI to the public through what the military described as "spontaneous public outrage." In these early narratives, the armed forces almost always seemed to be taking a supporting role, while the people were doing the actual crushing of the communists. About the same time that the first official version of Lubang Buaya was circulated, an official policy of purging was also developed in a series of instructions released either by the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium or the military supreme command (KOTI). As noted above, the release of these initial letters from two different sources revealed the power struggle between President Sukarno's loyalists in the Dwikora cabinet presidium and General Soeharto. Sukarno questioned the legitimacy of the official === [PDF page 173] === 157 purging orders from the military, but Soeharto managed to out maneuver Sukarno and the Dwikora cabinet presidium. Interestingly, the first official published version of these events mentioned nothing about the official purging policy. In reality, however, the official policy included a detailed categorization of who were to be purged for their alleged involvement in September 30th Movement. Furthermore, the policy also regulated the formation of investigative teams from the center down to the regional level and urged these teams to seek military assistance whenever necessary. The rapid dissemination of the official version of these events served, I would argue, to accelerate the mobilization of the anticommunist groups. In addition to the intense anti-communist propaganda in the media, the establishment of investigative teams throughout Indonesia and the actual detention of up to a million people helped shape the public opinion and build support for the eradication of the PKI. The fact there many investigative teams were established, even down to the remote regional areas instilled fear of communism among the public, which in turn encouraged the physical destruction of the PKI. Accounts from former political prisoners and a chief interrogator in one of the investigative teams reflected the actual implementation of the official purging policy. The accounts from those who experienced the purging first hand have provided valuable insights into how the military dominated the process while simultaneously downplaying their own role in the official version of these events. From the newspapers published in the months after Lubang Buaya, we can see the deliberate one-sided anti-communist propaganda engineered by the military. The === [PDF page 174] === 158 effectiveness of this propaganda in using mass media during the turbulent period of 19651966 still needs further research. However, from what has been described above, I would argue that the mass media was not solely responsible for dissemination of the military's version of events in the aftermath of September 30th. The implementation of the official purging policy, although missing from the initial published version of Lubang Buaya, was the creation of the many investigative teams which, along with the aggressive arrests and killings, solidified public acceptance of the PKFs guilt. News of people being arrested by the military and eventually killed circulated widely and quickly in a society where oral culture is more prominent than written. Moreover, the sheer number of people being purged and arrested made it difficult for people to avoid learning about the reality of military control over this process, even though the newspapers and the official military version described the situation as "civil war" or "resistance from PKI members" that resulted in many casualties. Thousands were deeply affected by the indiscriminate purging, as friends, neighbors, and family members were taken away and never seen again. All of these occurrences would have had a lasting impact on millions of people who had direct or even indirect relations with the persons purged or those who had some connection to the perpetrators of the purges and liquidation. As the anti-communist purging and propaganda continued to spread, both the former Tapol and interrogators acknowledged to a certain degree, during the process of interrogation, the version of these events that the military promoted. To make this point clearer, Mr. Djoko Sri Muljono, a former political prisoner, offered one possible === [PDF page 175] === 159 explanation about why many PKI sympathizers did not resist the purges. He asserted that the widespread stories of the generals' mutilation— their eyes gouged, bodies mutilated— made the PKI members and sympathizers feel responsible for what happened to the generals. They simply accepted these facts and their fate when they were being purged, punished, or jailed for they assumed they were somehow implicated in the PKI's atrocities.75 The effectiveness of the anti communist propaganda in the media was not the only factor that contributed to the crushing of the communists after the failure of the September 30th Movement. The systematic process of purging somehow implicated many people, whether or not they actually had direct connection with the actual purging. Furthermore, the initial media claims and then the official version of who was responsible for the killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya also helped in securing support from the population to crush the communists. As the process of purging and the official narrative pervaded the society almost simultaneously, it sometimes led to PKI supporters acknowledging the official narrative as much the former Tapol described it. The combination of these factors and the rampant media propaganda all contributed to a convincing self-sustaining anti-communist campaign that laid the foundation for further anti-communist mobilization that the Soeharto military regime successfully used to consolidate its power. Muljono. === [PDF page 176] === Chapter V: Revisiting the Mahmillub The Mahmillub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa), or the Special Military Tribunal (SMT), was established to try those involved in the failed Thirtieth September Movement of October 1965. While thousands of people were arrested and many more were killed during the great communist purge throughout Indonesia, a relatively small number of people were put on trial before the SMT. Nonetheless, this tribunal provided the emerging New Order regime with the legal and symbolic means for resolving the Thirtieth September affair. As explained by Colonel Kanter, the head of the Educational Center for the Army Judges, the SMT was important for "examining and putting into court the leaders and the planners of the G.30.S." He added that: "the High court has proven once again that the people of Indonesia held high the supremacy of law. It is also shows that the Republic of Indonesia is a country that has law based on Pantjasila which has the obligation to uphold justice and truth."' The principal promoter of SMT was Major General Soeharto who at that time was the army chief of staff and the head of the KOPKAMTIB, or the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, a powerful body with responsibility for purging the country of any communist members or anyone else who was viewed as anti-government. The KOPKAMTIB had extra-judicial power to do anything necessary in the name of "restoring order," including arresting anyone suspected of being dangerous or having even a remote connection to the PKI. ' EJ Kanter, "Kata Pengantar," in G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub I (Perkara Njono) (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman AD, 1966).p.VI === [PDF page 177] === Major General Soeharto, armed with the broad powers of KOPKAMTIB and a mandate from the besieged President Sukarno, began to organize the Special Military Tribune (SMT), delegating the legal proceedings to its military judges. However, he himself held the full authority in determining the individuals to be put on trial, who would be the judges, the type of sentence given, and, finally, approval of all verdicts. In short, Soeharto played the role of police, prosecutor, and judge. In his opening speech on January 27, 1966 when he handed the first and second trial cases for Njono and Untung to the SMT team of judges, Soeharto claimed that the tribunal's goal was to follow the tradition of the Indonesian National Soldiers (TNI): "The TNI must be able to show to the people the truth that they defended. I hope that MAHMILLUB (SMT) can do its duty as good as possible and to show their firm actions that are based on law towards the treachery that wanted to destroy the nation, especially the TNI."2 The duration of the SMT was protracted in terms of both the court process and the implementation of the sentences. The SMT began on February 14, 1966 with the trial of Njono, a PKI politburo member, and was followed by Untung Samsuri, the leader of the Thirtieth September Movement. There was no exact information on when the final SMT sessions were held although we can make a good guess that it ran until 1977 when the last of the G.30.S related trials were finished. So a reasonable estimate is that the SMT ran for eleven years, from 1966 to 1977. The exact number of people tried in the SMT was also unclear. According to Julie Southwood's article in the Tapol Bulletin, there Soeharto, "Amanat J.M. Men/Pangad Pada Penjerahan Perkara G-30-S A.N. Njono Dan Untung Pada Tanggal 29 Djanuari 1966," in G.30.SDihadapan Mahmillub (Perkara Njono) (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan KehakimanAD, 1966).p.X TAPOL, "Six Longterm Tapols Executed," TAPOL Bulletin, no. No.98 (1990).p.3 === [PDF page 178] === 162 were a total of 366 political trials of which 207 were military trials and 28 fell under the responsibility of the SMT.4 However, in recently published book by Aco Manafe on the TEPERPU (The Investigation Team for SMT) the numbers were slightly higher since, he claimed, there were 38 accused tried before the SMT.5 Although the SMT process ended sometime in 1977, the execution of the death sentences could be delayed for years. There are also cases where the verdict was reduced, as in the case of former Air Marshall Omar Dhani and former Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio. In both cases, the SMT handed them death sentences, but several years later the sentence was reduced into life imprisonment. From the data above, we can see the number of people tried by the SMT was small in comparison to the total number of political trials which, according to Julie Southwood of Tapol was as high as 1,014.6 However, the SMT only dealt with prominent figures (Tokoh) which ensured strong public exposure for these proceedings. Other trials were relegated to the regional military courts for the non-prominent military personnel and the district courts for the ordinary civilians. These courts operated more discreetly in comparison to the high profile, highly publicized Mahmillub (SMT).7 The treatment of the prisoners in the lower courts can only described as inhuman. Not only did not receive as much attention as the SMT trial, but around half of them Julie Southwood, "Indonesia's Political Trials: 'Legal' Dimensions of a Continuing Tragedy," TAPOL Bulletin, no. No. 37 (1980).p.3 Aco Manafe, Teperpu: Reveals Pki's Betrayal in 1965 and the Trial of the Perpetrators (Jakarta: PT.Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2008). Southwood, "Indonesia's Political Trials: 'Legal' Dimensions of a Continuing Tragedy."p.3 Departemen Angkatan Darat Inspektorat Kehakiman, Himpunan Penetapan-Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia Dan Peraturan-Peraturan Lainnja Untuk Pedoman Penjelesaian Dalam Bidang Justisionil Peristiwa "Gerakan 30 September" (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, December 1965).p.91 (chart) === [PDF page 179] === received the death sentence. And appeals and executions sometimes did not occur until they had been in prison for 18 to 20 years. There was credible information that the execution of G.30.S related prisoners was still happening in the early 1990s. In solving the legal problems of those accused of involvement with the failed coup attempt the New Order regime implemented several types of political trials. However, this chapter will only deal with the SMT, examining its origins, detailing several prominent cases, and analyzing its repercussions for the overall construction of the official Lubang Buaya narrative. According to Amnesty International citing Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, the military arrested around 600,000 people in relation to the failed coup attempt. That total would drop significantly in later years as many were released after extensive interrogation. In 1975, the government claimed there were only 20,000 prisoners left from the three prisoner categories described in the previous chapter. 9 By early 1977, the government claimed that they have put around 800 prisoners on trial or, about half of the total for category "A" prisoners which was the government said was 1,745.10 Although, the SMT ran until 1977, it is clear that other court proceedings were taking place throughout Indonesia and the government had decided to try only Category A, prisoners before the SMT.11 TAPOL, "Six Longterm Tapols Executed."p.l Amnesty International, "Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report," (London: Amnesty International, 1977). p.45 10 Ibid.p.31 11 Ibid. === [PDF page 180] === The Mahmillub/SMT had its origins in Presidential Decree No. 16 issued in 1963 (Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 16 Tahun 1963). Back then President Sukarno had signed this decree to establish a judicial process for those involved in the many armed rebellions that had occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s. The decree not only declared the establishment of the SMT but also detailed the procedures, and structure of the tribunal. According to Presidential Decree No. 16/ Year 1963, the Special Tribunal must have one military presiding judge responsible for overseeing the proceedings as well as two or more judges to serve as members. Usually the member judges represented all the branches of the military — the army, navy, air force, and police. In addition, the court was also required to have one military prosecutor (Oditur) and one court stenographer. At a minimum, all members of the SMT must have middle-echelon military ranks, and both judge and prosecutor must have law degrees. The president had the authority to appoint the judges and officials for the SMT upon the advice at the minister or commander of a particular military branch, army, navy, air force and police. The defendant had the right to have one or more defense attorney or legal advisors. If the defendant did not choose attorney then the presiding judge would appoint one or more attorneys to assist the defense. It is also important to note that the SMT accepted both written and oral statements from witnesses since both were deemed to carry the same weight. 12 It is also essential to point out that in specific SMT cases, the Kehakiman, Himpunan Penetapan-Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia Dan Peraturan-Peraturan Lainnja Untuk Pedoman Penjelesaian Dalam Bidang Justisionil Peristiwa "Gerakan 30 September", p. 176 13 Ibid.p. 177. === [PDF page 181] === 165 court accepted all the written statements from the preliminary investigation (BAP) of both witnesses and defendants, treating them as valid court evidence even though those statements were extracted under extreme pressure, usually physical by the investigator or interrogator. Moreover, Article 6 of Presidential Decree number 16/ Year 1963, specifically mentioned that before any verdict can be announced to the public, it must be approved by the official in charge of convening the case (Pejabat Penyerah Perkara). In the SMT of 1965, that official was Major General Soeharto. According to the renowned New Order military historian Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, President Sukarno delayed the re-activation of the SMT despite heavy pressure from General Nasution. The president's delaying action, according to Nugroho, caused Indonesian people, seeing justice neglected, to act as judges, resulting in the mass killings in Central, East Java, and other parts of the archipelago.14 Obviously, this assessment is questionable. To blame President Sukarno for the mass killings while the perpetrators were military backed anti-communist groups seems frankly illogical, even nonsensical. Nugroho's statement should best be seen as a way of discrediting President Sukarno's authority. Nugroho expressed his interpretation of President Sukarno's delaying action in a book written in English for a foreign audience about the official Army account of the September 30th Movement, reflecting Sukarno's rapidly decreasing authority at the time of the book's publication. The anti-communist military group under the leadership of General Nasution and General Soeharto continued to press President Sukarno to re-activate the SMT. They 14 Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement in Indonesia (Djakarta: P.T. Pembimbing Massa, 1968).p.88 === [PDF page 182] === 166 finally succeeded on December 4, 1965 just two months after that fateful day of October 1, when Sukarno signed Presidential Decree Number 370/ Year 1965. This decree not only re-activated the SMT, but it also appointed Major General Soeharto, the minister of the army, as the official in charge of convening the cases, giving him unprecedented authority to: determine the individuals who would be tried; acting as the official incharge for convening the cases; and design the formation of the tribunal authority to organize, investigate, and pass sentence.15 The procedures for the SMT in 1965 were slightly different from those for original tribunal in 1963. While the original SMT procedures required at least four judges including the presiding judge, the re-activated SMT in 1965 was to have only one presiding judge plus his substitute and seven other members from the four branches of the armed forces.16 The legal process needed to be completed quickly so the SMT scheduled sessions for both day and night. A team of assistants was formed to assist the judges and the defense by providing support staff both inside and outside the court room to ensure swift trials. A typical SMT proceeding would follow a carefully prescribes order. After the defendant entered the court, he or she needed to identify him or herself before the court. Then the military prosecutor, the Oditur, would read the charges. After the prosecutor finished reading the charges, the defense attorney would have the right to present objections or eksepsi to any legal issues regarding the SMT proceedings. The prosecutor 15 Kehakiman, Himpunan Penetapan-Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia Dan Peraturan-Peraturan Lainnja Untuk Pedoman Penjelesaian Dalam Bidang Justisionil Peristiwa "Gerakan 30 September", p.84 16 Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement in Indonesia.p.95 === [PDF page 183] === 167 would answer the defense objections and the presiding judge would decide whether to grant the objection. Typically, the objection was dismissed since the government was determined that the SMT would go forward. Following this process, the cross examination of the defendant and witnesses could begin. The judges, prosecutor, and defense attorney took turns in questioning both the defendant and the witnesses. After the questioning was over, the prosecutor would read the requisitoir, or the type of punishment that the prosecutor had requested for the defendant. The defendant and the defense attorney would then have the chance to give their own pledooi or defense. Once all these processes were completed, the SMT's presiding judge would confer with other judges before announcing the verdict and sentence to the public. Prior to sentencing, the presiding judge must seek approval from the minister of the army who was also the convening authority for the case. After sentencing, the defendant had fourteen days to ask the president for pardon.17 With the re-activation of SMT, General Soeharto and his subordinates began to set up the first trial. They decided that Njono, a PKI leader arrested on October 3, 1965, would be the first person tried before the SMT. As for Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the commander of the September 30th Movement, his trial was planned to follow Njono's case. It was not clear why Njono went ahead of Untung, and we can only assume that this particular arrangement was an effort by Soeharto and the anti-communist group to immediately fix the blame on the PKI, as the sole mastermind of the September 30th Movement. 17 Ibid.p.95-102 === [PDF page 184] === 168 Hence, for many Indonesians of that day the SMT was more a public "show trial" rather than a real trial fully committed to upholding justice and finding the truth. Although the SMT carried those negative perceptions then and now, it is still important to understand the proceedings in their entirety to gain insight into the mindset of the anticommunist regime. As we explore these trials, we might consider several questions that could help us understand the nature of the SMT: Why was it important for the military to go through this effort to publicize these particular SMT proceedings? In what ways did these trials contribute to the extensive anti-communist campaigns and, within the emerging military regime, a myth about of the triumph of the good over evil? How did the SMT help in laying the foundations for the official narrative of these events? In reality, the SMT were something more than simple show trials to solidify the legitimacy of the new regime. The tribunal was also a place where defendants, judges, and prosecutor debated a complex event that, even decades later, is still shrouded in mystery while the public was at the same time observing and learning. As a result, these trials provided a more complex and compelling dimension that goes far beyond the formal proceedings. The trials became a spectacle that provided the anti-communist military with a public arena to vilify their enemy, the PKI, while at the same time undermining the authority of President Sukarno and, over the long run, consolidating the legitimacy of the emerging military regime. Moreover, in this period of uncertainty about the events at lubang buaya these trials played uniquely significant role in placing an International, "Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report." p. 45. === [PDF page 185] === 169 authoritative imprimatur of truth upon the military regimes official narrative that extracted order from confusion and served to silence competing versions. Despite many criticisms of the SMT's claims about pursuing the "truth," from a careful reading of the proceedings it seems that there was a serious effort on the part of the trial participants to figure out what exactly happened at lubang buaya and hence to unravel the "truth." However, what was presented to the public through the media often times did not adequately describe this dimension of the process. Ultimately, however, these trials were never meant to uphold justice even though some important revelations emerged from their proceedings. Furthermore, SMT served the New Order regime as a "triumph," a ritual akin to what the ancient Romans did to defeated enemies, providing an arena for the victors to scorn their defeated enemies. Ultimately, the SMT became a symbolic space for establishing the military regime's authority and glory over the conquered. To explore both the factual and symbolic aspects of the SMT, this chapter will focus on some of the four notable Mahmillub/SMT trials, examining the court proceedings, regulations, decrees, and findings about each of these SMT's "star" figures—notably, Njono, a member of PKI Politburo and Central Committee (CC); Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the commander of the 30th September movement; Dr.Subandrio, foreign minister and also the first vice premier in the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium; and Brigadier General Supardjo, the highest ranking military officer involved in the 30th September Movement. === [PDF page 186] === The trial of Njono The first of the accused communists put on trial in 1965 was Njono bin Sastroredjo alias Tugimin alias Rukma then 40 years old. He had joined PKI in 1945 and was active in the BBI {Barisan Buruh Indonesia), the predecessor of SOB SI, Serikat Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, the PKI affiliated labor union. At SOBSI, he became the secretary and then later on promoted to chairman for the Greater Jakarta area. He would later be appointed first secretary of the Committee for Greater Djakarta (CDR) and member of the PKI Politburo of the Central Committee. In addition to his high position within PKI, Njono also represented the PKI in the DPRGR parliament. In sum, he was one of the highest leaders of the party although he did not belong to the top echelon of PKI leadership whose members were Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sakirman, and Sudisman. The SMT began the proceedings for Njono on Valentine's day, February 14, 1966, at 9:00 a.m. in the Dutch-style BAPPENAS (The Body for Planning and National Development) building, a former Theosophy headquarters and a popular meeting place during the Dutch colonial period. The proceedings were open to public and covered by various media, particularly Jakarta's daily newspaper. It is possible to reconstruct the proceedings in some detail from the official court records and various media reports of the trial sessions. It is important to note that the media often exaggerated many aspects of the trial, particularly when focusing on the mannerisms of the defendants. The media portrayal of this defendant is important because it helped to shape the public perception of the case in general and the defendant's === [PDF page 187] === 171 personality in particular. Given the tense political situation at the time of the trial, with rampant anti-communist purges and arrests ongoing throughout the country, negative media portrayals of the accused helped the public to take sides against the PKI while at the same time bolstering the image of the anti-communist military as just and fair. One day before Njono's trial, Lieutenant General Soeharto, in his capacity as army minister, commander, and KOTI chief of staff, aired his statement about SMT through the government radio and television, assuring the nation that the proceedings will follow "just and legal" procedures. Moreover, he also claimed that the SMT was evidence of "a victory of the Pancasila morality over the contra revolutionary morality."19 He reiterated the significance of the SMT in finding justice for the victims of the 30th September Movement. In Soeharto's opinion, the PKI and 30th September Movement committed three types of crimes: a criminal act, a political crime, and a crime against the morality of Pantjasila. It was in this particular speech that the rhetoric "crime against Pantjasila morality" in relation to the 30l September affair was used for the first time. Over the next 30 years, it would become one of the recurring themes in the New Order's official narrative of the 1965 upheaval. On Sunday February 13, 1966, one day before the trial, there was a bustle of activity at the Army Information Center at number 5, Veteran Street, Jakarta. Around a hundred journalists representing various domestic print media gathered, waiting to receive the official entrance pass needed to cover the trial. Commotion erupted after an Army official appeared and announced the names of journalists selected to receive the 19 20 FBIS, "Suharto Speaks on Gestapu Trial Sessions," (Djakarta: 14 February 1966).p. RRR5 Ibid.p. RRR6 === [PDF page 188] === 172 pass. Many looked disappointed as the official announced that there were only 31 passes available for around 110 people who had registered. No female journalists were allowed to cover the trial. Around the BAPPENAS building the preparations for the trial were even more obvious. The streets were empty and the security seemed eager to make its presence felt. Countless vehicles entered and exited the building, unloading materials needed for the trial's start the next morning. All of the activities seemed to indicate that, after months of political tensions and uncertainty, the fate of the political prisoners charged with involvement in the 30 September Movement would finally be resolved. At around 8:00 a.m. on the day of the trial, February 14, 1966, all invited guests began entering the building, including ministers from the Dwikora Cabinet, a number of middle and high ranking military officers, and journalists permitted to cover the trial. Although not many people were allowed in the building, the public could follow the proceedings by listening to a radio broadcast or a loudspeaker installed outside the building. As the trial was set to commence, the security guards denied entrance to a group of foreign journalists, and escorted them from the premises along with other unauthorized people.22 Shortly before the start of the SMT, two military police, one from the Army and the other from the Navy, escorted the defendant Njono into the court room. All eyes followed as he slowly entered the room, smiling a bit, with crew-cut hair-style, thin 21 Harris MudaNasution, Hukum Mali UntungNjono Mahmillub Ke l.Pengadilan Gembong2 Gestapu-Pki (Djakarta: Firma Harris, 1966). P.5 22 Ibid, p.6 === [PDF page 189] === 173 moustache, and a whisky goatee. He was wearing a light blue, short-sleeved shirt, grey pants, and sandals. As he stood before of the judicial panel, the presiding judge sat directly in front of Njono in a slightly elevated chair behind a long table. On both left and right of there were two red and white flags, Indonesian's national flag. On the wall behind the judge's table, was the Indonesian coat of arms, the Garuda bird with Pancasila symbol. Slightly below the Garuda hung a picture of President Sukarno, the great leader of Revolution. Behind Njono there were several tables occupied by his defense attorney, Mrs. Trees Sunito SH, and, on the other side of the central aisle, another table for the Oditur or military prosecutor, Lt.Col CKH Datoek Moelja SH. At 9:07 am the presiding judge, Lt.Col. CHK AH Said, officially announced the start of the SMT proceedings. The presiding judge then made some preliminary inquiries such as the defendant's name, aliases, age, place of birth, and religious status. With both hands behind his back, eyes blinking and standing motionless, Njono responded to the court's preliminary inquiry, admitting that he did not have any religion. In their coverage the military newspapers, Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (HAB) and Berita Yudha (BY), offered detailed descriptions to accompany their pictures of the defendant. The military newspapers described Njono's gestures while he was listening to the charges as follows: "The defendant, seated arrogantly and blinking his eyes continuously while his hand repeatedly stroked his goatee, declared that those allegations are incorrect."24 The military newspaper's report detailed the body gestures of the defendant— whether he was 23 24 Ibid. p. 15 Ibid.p.20 === [PDF page 190] === 174 blinking, stroking his goatee, or seated "arrogantly"~with the intention of conveying a negative image of the defendant. The prosecutor (Oditur) charged Njono with three different crimes. First, sometime in August 1965, the defendant along with his colleagues from the PKI leadership—including, among others, D.N. Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sudisman, Sakirman, Anwar Sanusi, Rewang, and Suwandi— conspired to overthrow the legitimate government of the Indonesian Republic and to stage an armed revolt against the authority of that government. Second, in September 1965, the defendant, as member of PKI Central Committee and First Secretary of the Djakarta Raya branch of the PKI, played a part in the conspiracy to overthrow the legal government. Third, the defendant, at times and places referred to earlier, organized an armed revolt against the Indonesian government's authority. In addition to the three specific allegations, the prosecutor also charged that the defendant's actions caused severe economic problems and disrupted the government's program for providing food and clothing vital to the nation's safety and its struggle against Nekolim (Neo-Colonialism). After the prosecutor finished reading the allegations, Njono's defense attorney, Mrs. Trees Sunito, immediately objected to the proceedings. In her eksepsi she argued that SMT was, in fact, legally harming the defendant as there was already another law, Number 19 of Year 1964, that enabled the defendant to be tried in a two-phase court Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono," (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, 1966).p. 19-21 26 Ibid.p.22. === [PDF page 191] === instead of a one-phase proceedings in the SMT. Furthermore, the defense questioned the legal status of SMT in trying the defendant. The prosecutor responded to the defense attorney's objection by claiming that the creation of the SMT by presidential decree was legal and in accordance with other established laws and regulations. Moreover, the goal in creating the SMT was to resolve judicially the problems that the nation had experienced during the revolution which, the prosecutor argued, was exactly the situation that the nation was currently facing. The SMT was, moreover, designed to resolve special cases expeditiously. In sum, the prosecutor claimed that the SMT had a strong legal basis to settle charges arising from the 30th September Movement.28 After hearing the explanation from both the defense and the prosecutor, the presiding judge suspended the court for ten minutes to decide how to proceed. The Army newspapers Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (HAB) and Berita Yudha (BY) described the mannerisms of the defendant as follows: "During the break, the defendant was repeatedly looking at the public and once in a while smiling. He spoke twice with the defense attorney as he arrogantly remained seated in the chair while his attorney stood by." Speaking to people standing while remaining seated, is considered by many Indonesians to be extremely impolite. The media said pointedly Njono, "arrogantly remained seated," clearly attempting to encourage public antagonism towards the defendant. Throughout Ibid.p.26 Ibid.p.26-27 Nasution, Hukum Mali UntungNjono Mahmillub Ke LPengadilan Gembong2 Gestapu-Pki.p.\9 === [PDF page 192] === the trial process there would be many similar examples of the media's prejudicial portrayal of the defendant. After the ten-minute break, the judges rejected the defense objection on the grounds that the SMT could complete the trial process in expeditious manner without disregarding the principles of justice. The law was being fully maintained and the rights of the defendant were protected. Furthermore, the court also pointed out that the president had the authority to conduct special actions in the event of national emergency and to secure the goals of Indonesian revolution by using available laws. Hence, according to the judges, the SMT proceeding was legal and in accordance with established laws and regulations. Several issues became major themes in the cross-examination of the defendant and witnesses, particularly, whether the SMT was trying to prove the existence of the Council of Generals (COG) and establish a direct link between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the 30th September Movement. As Njono began giving his testimony, a military newspaper described him as "looking arrogant and when he is making the explanation, he often times smirking and giving twisted information." Instead of reporting the information he was giving to the SMT, the media again choose to give derogatory descriptions of Njono's mannerisms. From the beginning of the direct examination, the defense revealed that Njono and the PKI leadership had always believed absolutely in the existence of the COG. In 30 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.27-28 Nasution, Hukum Mati UntungNjono Mahmillub Ke V.Pengadilan Gembong2 Gestapu-Pki.p.20 32 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.34 31 === [PDF page 193] === 177 every internal PKI meeting, Njono admitted, no one ever questioned Chairman Aidit about the accuracy of the information regarding the existence of the COG and its planned coup. All of them accepted that information as truth. Njono's statement in this regard provided the prosecutor an opening to question him about the PKI's motive for believing in the existence of the COG. Until the trial ended, neither prosecutor nor the defense could convincingly prove the COG's existence or nonexistence. According to Njono, sometime in late August 1965 the PKI leadership held several special meetings led by Chairman Aidit. All members of the PKI politburo plus two other candidates for the politburo position attended to discuss three important topics: first, information about the deteriorating health of the president: second, information on the Council of Generals' planned coup; and, last, initiatives from a group of officers who wanted to preempt the COG coup.33 According to Njono there was a thorough discussion of these three issues several times in September 1965. In one of these follow-up meetings, the PKI decided to take the following steps: first, the party would report to the president on the imminent danger of the COG in the hope that he would take necessary steps to preempt its plans; second, it will wait for the president's response; and, third, the politburo would inform the membership internally about the imminent danger of the COG coup.34 These decisions, according to Njono, became the policy of the PKI in dealing with a possible COG coup. Njono admitted that he had helped organize several thousand PKI volunteers to back up the movement and arranged for them to be sent to Lubang Buaja where they 33 34 Ibid.p.33 Ibid.p.40 === [PDF page 194] === 178 were scheduled to receive military training. Njono's action in arranging volunteers to help at Lubang Buaja contradicted Politburo directives which were to wait for the president's response. Njono claimed that he acted on his own initiative to help the movement. With this admission, Njono changed his signed statement made during the preliminary investigation (BAP) when he had acknowledged the role of the PKI in helping the 30th September Movement. In the SMT, however, Njono, now withdrew his signed statement because he claimed that the situation during his interrogation was full of "Communisto phobi" sentiment. He further elaborated about what he meant by "Communisto phobi", saying that at the time of the preliminary investigation both the situation and the interrogator were full of "spirit of slander and only pursuing information that could lead to the PKI as the instigator."36 Njono further explained that during an interrogation on November 22 his inquisitor told him that he would face some kind of "soul test." Njono asked the interrogator what he meant, and later learned what a "soul test" meant — beating.37 Njono continued to explain that he had in fact witnessed many beatings during the interrogation process. Hence, he felt it is important to take that threat into account when he agreed to sign the initial statement since he was aware that, in event of trial, he would have the opportunity to change the information from the preliminary interrogation. However, the afternoon newspaper Sinar Harapart (SH) criticized Njono for giving "circuitous responses and denying his initial statement, but later on admitting on 35 Ibid.p.59 Ibid. 37 Ibid.p.60 36 === [PDF page 195] === 179 some facts that he can no longer deny." On Njono's admission about acting contrary to the Politburo decision, SH wrote: "On his effort to wash the hands of the PKI Politburo, Njono decided not to wait for the president's decision and he admitted later on after the failure of G30S that Aidit's decision from the August 28th meeting was in fact correct."39 In this sense, SH interpreted Njono's action as an effort to protect the PKI. On Njono's assertion about his "Communisto phobi" experience, SH did not report the full meaning as disclosed in the court transcript. On the contrary, the media reported that "Njono answered the questions with calm voice and did not show any anxiety although he had complained about going through 'mental pressure' in interrogation during his detention."40 The SH description of Njono being calm despite his claim of experiencing 'mental pressure' somehow served to negate his assertion about experiencing some pressure, thus creating the public perception of him as a liar. Although Njono was well within his rights to change his preliminary statement as a result of the "Communist phobi" situation, the prosecutor nonetheless felt that he was trying to falsify his statement. The court transcription showed that the prosecutor called Njono a "good liar" because he was changing his initial signed statement regarding PKI involvement.41 Significantly, SH reported inaccurately that the prosecutor had called Njono a "big liar."42 There was, therefore, a marked a stark contrast between what Reporter, "Mahmillub Mulai: Njono Berusaha Keras Menjangkal Tanggung Djawab Pki Dalam G-30-S," Sinar Harapan, February 14 1966.p.l 39 Ibid.p.l 40 Ibid.p.l 41 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.66 Note: "Good liar"=Pembohongyang bait 42 Reporter, "Mahmillub Mulai: Njono Berusaha Keras Menjangkal Tanggung Djawab Pki Dalam G-30S."p.l Note: "Big \iar"=Pembohong Besar === [PDF page 196] === 180 actually recorded in the official court transcription and what the media presented to the public, with the media using stronger words and of sensationalizing the news. Nonetheless, the fact that Njono dared to state before the SMT that he felt threatened during the preliminary investigation is significant. Although, the SMT proceeding was open to the public and people could listen to Njono said there was still some effort made to allow the defendant to present his story. In contrast to the common perception that the SMT proceedings were in fact staged—the view of Amnesty International and scholars like John Roosa who has called the SMT as "show trial"-- the cross examination showed that military prosecutors and judges were willing to listen and record all that Njono said in relation to the case. Several witnesses testified during Njono's trial including Peris Pardede, an active member of the PKI and a candidate for a Politburo position. In his testimony, Peris confirmed a late August discussion with Aidit about the existence of the COG and the possibility of another group of "officers with progressive thinking" pre-empting the COG coup attempt. As Njono had done, Peris also admitted that he had never questioned Aidit about the existence of the COG since the information, it was said at this meeting, came from a credible source—i.e., Brigadier General Sutarto, the Chief of Staff of the BPI (Biro Pusat Intelijen or Central Bureau of Intelligence), an intelligence bureau headed by Dr.Subandrio, the first vice premier and Indonesians foreign minister.4 In his testimony, Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: PerkaraNjono."p.l33 === [PDF page 197] === 181 Peris also disclosed that he had first heard the about the existence of the COG in June 1965.44 Overall, the nature of the SMT examination was balanced and thorough with members of the court trying to reconstruct the events, listening closely, and questioning the defendant and witnesses. There was an atmosphere of cooperation among the judges, presiding judge, the defendant, witnesses, and the prosecutor, although there were times when the presiding judge displayed a disrespectful manner toward some witnesses. For example, Achmad Muhammad bin Jacub, a former secretary for the PKI sub-section level, was giving testimony when the presiding judge, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Said, ridiculed his assertion that his religion was Islam. Seemingly doubting him, Ali Said asked him: "Are you a real Muslim or just claiming to be Muslim? Can you read the Syahadat?" To which the witness answered, "Yes." Ali Said then demanded, "Let us see it!" The witness complied and immediately recited the Syahadat.45 In any judicial context, the head judge's skeptical attitude about a person's religious belief would be inappropriate. His rudeness probably derived from a popular belief that PKI members did not adhere to any religion. After finishing the cross examination of all witnesses and the defendant in three days, the SMT was ready to move to the next step. On Thursday, February 17 at 7:00 p.m. the court commenced its sixth session with the reading of the requisitoir, requiring the OcfrYur/Prosecutor to repeat the allegations and present his request for punishment of the defendant by the SMT. The reading of Requisitoir attracted many prominent officials 44 45 Ibid.p.l43 Ibid.p.l58 === [PDF page 198] === 182 to the session, including Lieutenant General Soeharto and his wife, Coordinating Minister Wirjono Prodjodikoro, and Minister of Justice Astrawinata.46 The main points of the prosecutor were as follows: that the president in presidential Decree Number 370, had in fact labeled the 30th September movement as a "contra-revolutionary" movement.47 The prosecutor insisted on using the preliminary investigation report (BAP) which clearly incriminated the PKI in the 30l September Movement despite Njono's objection that it was incorrect due to the "Communisto Phobi" condition during his preliminary investigation. The prosecutor claimed that Njono was changing his statement in an attempt to save his party, the PKI. Using that reason, the prosecutor called Njono "dishonest and faltering, while at the same time giving bad impression of the obvious PKI involvement." Regarding the issue of COG, the prosecutor accused Njono and the PKI of creating a political myth about the COG's existence. The PKI, according to the prosecutor, deliberately created the "Nasakom phobi" and "Communisto phobi" illusions so they can convince their followers to take action against the accused generals. In so doing, the PKI would have valid reasons for creating an antithesis of the COG, in the form of the Revolutionary Council.49 Furthermore, the prosecutor accused the defendant of being uncooperative in providing information to the court since he often gave twisted answers in response to questions. The prosecutor rejected the reasons why the defendant withdrew his 46 Nasution, Hukum Mati Untung Njono Mahmillub Ke LPengadilan Gembongl Gestapu-Pki.p.59 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.234 48 Ibid.p.236 49 Ibid.p.237 47 === [PDF page 199] === 183 preliminary statement because of so-called "Communisto phobi," arguing instead that it was the PKI which was "TNI-Army-phobi." In proving this point, the prosecutor reminded the people that they should not forget the fact that it was the Army that destroyed PKI at Madiun back in 1948. He also mentioned that the TNI was not only the child of the Indonesian revolution but also its eldest child. Furthermore, the TNI had since become the tool for the revolution after the declaration of the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959.50 Therefore, the prosecutor's contended that the defendant has committed three types of crimes: first, a crime against the nation (trying to overthrow the legal government); second, against the revolution by acting in a counter-revolutionary, manner betraying the teachings of our beloved president, the great leader of revolution Bung Karno: and third, against the mental foundation of the revolution, the nation's ideology Pancasila51 For all these treacherous crimes, the prosecutor asked the SMT to give the defendant death sentence. Upon hearing the prosecutor demand a death sentence, the military newspapers HAB and BY described Njono's reaction: The defendant Njono stood erect facing the Oditur as he gulped his saliva. While the audience did not show any signs of surprise in hearing the prosecutor penalty, Njono remained looking tense and pale, the back of his shirt a bit wet from sweat. All the audience waited for what will happen next. The presiding judge asked the defendant whether he understood the charges to which the defendant replied in a trembling voice, "I am requesting to make my own defense with the help of my defense attorney."52 50 Ibid.p.238 Ibid.p.259 52 Nasution, Hukum Mali Untimg Njono Mahmillub Ke LPengadilan Gembong2 Gestapu-Pki.p.62 51 === [PDF page 200] === 184 The court granted Njono and his defense attorney 31 hours to complete their Pledooi or defense. The SMT was scheduled to resume again on Saturday, February 19, 1966 at 8:00 The next session of SMT began as scheduled on that Saturday with the defense attorney, Mrs. Threes Sunijo, presenting the pledooi defense for the defendant. Before she began reading the defense, she expressed her gratitude for the impartiality of the judges throughout the examining process. Despite strong accusations from the prosecutor and overwhelming resentment from the public against Njono in particular and the PKI in general, Mrs. Threes Sunijo gave an excellent defense, challenging many of the prosecutor's arguments. She demonstrated her professionalism in presenting a slightly shorter defense in comparison with the prosecutor's long requisitoir, nonetheless managing to make it sharp and eloquent. Mrs.Sunijo immediately began by slamming the prosecutor for politicizing the trial, reminding everyone that in a court of law one should base everything on the law in order to pursue justice. She again reminded the court that the main reason for putting a person on trial was because that particular person was suspected of criminal acts, not because of the person's political opinion or affiliations. She stated pointedly that: "It is the individual who is on trial not the political party."54 She then criticized the prosecutor for repeatedly citing what he called the "uncontrollable people's anger" as reflected in the media, since the press had incessantly condemned the defendant, while the prosecutor Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: PerkaraNjono."p.261 Ibid.p.261 === [PDF page 201] === 185 used these attacks as justification. In a court of law, said Mrs.Sunijo, everything should be based on the law and only the law. Regarding the issue of the COG existence, Mrs. Sunijo argued that it does not matter if the COG was real or not. What mattered was that the defendant believed that it actually existed, leading him to take precautionary steps against the COG. Nobody, she added, can prove or provide any evidence about the COG, whether it was a reality or only a myth created by Njono and PKI as the prosecutor had claimed. On this point, she stated that the prosecution had no grounds to prove its accusation that the defendant and the PKI had created the COG myth.56 Moreover, Mrs.Sunijo continued, Njono and the witness Paris Pardede claimed that Aidit received the information about the COG and its planned coup from a prominent, credible, and reliable source, the Chief of Staff of the BPI, Police Brigadier General Soetarto. So it was very difficult for anyone not to believe the information. As for the accusation about a political party using the military officers in the 30th September Movement, Mrs. Sunijo disputed that argument since she claimed that it was only remotely possible that a group of military officers would blindly follow the indoctrination from a political party. She also rejected the prosecutor's charges that the purpose of the Revolutionary Council was to overthrow the government, pointing out that the council claimed to continue all of the existing government programs, including Sukarno's Panca Azimat Ibid.p.262 Ibid.p.266 Ibid.p.267 === [PDF page 202] === 186 revolusi, foreign policies, and MPRS decrees, including the one on making President Sukarno a president for life.58 Those acts, in her opinion, certainly did not constitute an action aimed at overthrowing a legal government. On the prosecutor's charge that the defendant was uncooperative in giving information and changing the information from that initially given, Mrs. Sunijo criticized the prosecution, pointing out that the defendant was in fact cooperative in all his testimony. Instead, she thought that perhaps the prosecutor rejected the defendant's testimony since it does not go along with all the propaganda in the media and the prosecutor's own perception of the truth.59 Most importantly, she pointed out that the defendant was under extreme duress of what he called "Communisto phobi" when he made his signed testimony in the preliminary investigation. The situation made the defendant afraid that something can happen to him if he did not obey the wishes of the interrogator. One of the witnesses in the trial, Achmad bin Jacub, admitted that his captors physically abused him during the preliminary investigation to force him to sign a statement incriminating the PKI as the instigator of the 30th September Movement. Indeed she added that particular opinion came from the interrogator and Achmad only signed it to avoid further beatings.60 In regards of the allegations that the defendant's actions in supporting GESTOK61 had caused severe economic problems and disrupted government food programs, Mrs. 58 Ibid.p.264 Ibid.p.267 60 Ibid.p.268 61 GESTOK or Gerakan Satu Oktober or the First of October movement. Instead using the derogatory term Gestapu or G30S to refer to the 30th September movement, President Sukarno invented and used the term GESTOK as it was deem to be more neutral. 59 === [PDF page 203] === 187 Sunijo asserted that there was no cause and effect between those two factors. Their relationship cannot be proven scientifically and it was thus unfair to attribute those problems to the defendant, considering that the country had experienced economic hardships for years. Mrs. Sunijo ended her defense by stating the defendant was not guilty and requesting that he be released from all charges. After the defense plea, the defendant Njono also presented his own pledooi or defense. Like both the prosecutor and his own defense attorney, Njono began by establishing his undying loyalty to the Great Leader of Revolution, President Sukarno, reading lyrics from a song he had composed in prison titled Barisan Sukarno or "Marching for Sukarno." 3 Njono claimed the song was his way of showing how Sukarno's revolutionary teachings inspired his defense statement before this court. In the most controversial part of his defense, Njono insisted on his belief about the existence of the COG. He claimed that COG existed for the following reasons: first, the information came from a very credible source, not only from BPI but also from sources in the attorney general's office and the army chief of staff. Second, the nature of the information was very detailed with dates, locations, and time of COG meetings, naming those who attended and the issues discussed. With such detailed and clear information from credible sources, how could one perceive it as false?64 Njono then provided detailed information about the planned composition of the military junta if the COG coup had succeeded. According to his information, General Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.272 Ibid, p.274 Ibid.p.276 === [PDF page 204] === 188 Nasution was the designated prime minister with General Yani as his second in command and armed forces chief of staff. The COG list that he had obtained had the names of the other generals slain at Lubang Buaya, along with their intended positions in the government if the coup had succeeded. Njono denied the prosecutor's accusation that the PKI had created the COG myth and questioned the prosecutor's evidence of its nonexistence by citing the Oudang Committee.65 Njono again clarified that the expanded PKI Politburo meeting in late August 1965 was called to discuss plans to obstruct the COG's planned coup, not to discuss how to fabricate slander to assist creation of the 30th September Movement.66 As for the civilian volunteers he helped to organize at Lubang Buaya, Njono asserted that he only complied with the request of the military officers at Lubang Buaya, not because the PKI leadership instructed him to do so.67 In concluding his defense, Njono rejected all the prosecutor's charges along with the death penalty that the prosecutor was seeking from the SMT. He deemed those charges and penalty to be unjust considering there was major disagreement between him and the prosecutor about the existence of the COG. Njono himself maintained his firm belief that the COG existed and insisted that he did not plan to overthrow the government. He also uttered his desire that the president should seek a political solution regarding this problem, and expressed the hope that the SMT would consider the political 63 Oudang Committee: It is a TNI but Army sponsored committee headed by Police General Oudang which released a public statement claiming that the COG never existed in any Armed Forces branch. The statement signed by Generals from all branches of the military, (check on this) 66 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.279 67 Ibid.p.280 === [PDF page 205] === 189 solution before giving out sentences, especially at this moment when there was an effort to take the lives of the PKI leadership.68 Despite strong defense from Mrs. Threes Sunijo and Njono, the prosecution did not falter. Instead the prosecutor responded with a Replik or reply which, in essence, dismissed Mrs. Sunijo's arguments, especially her account of the defendant feeling threatened by "Communisto phobi" feeling. The prosecutor could not accept that argument since the "communisto phobi" does not constitute a situation that belonged to the category of psychological or physical pressure (psyche-dwang) as required under the law. Therefore, he insisted that this reason is not valid and cannot be used. The prosecutor reiterated that the defendant used that reasoning in an effort to save his own political party. Hence, the prosecutor insisted on continuing to use the preliminary investigation as valid evidence, adding that the other witnesses had not changed their 70 earlier testimony from the BAP. In response to the defendant's defense statement, the prosecutor simply ignored it and considered the overall defense Pledooi as mere 71 "agitation and slander." On Monday, February 21, 1966, the ninth session of the SMT and just two days after both the defense and the prosecutor had presented their summations and reply (Replik), the presiding judge, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Said, was ready to sentence the 68 Ibid.p.282 Ibid.p.283 70 Although one of the witness Achmad Bin Jacub admitted that he was physically abused, in the SMT cross examination process he never withdraw his earlier testimony from the Preliminary investigation (BAP) which also said that PKI is behind the G30S, thus making Njono's position difficult when he tried to withdraw his own earlier statement. 71 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.284. 69 === [PDF page 206] === defendant Njono. From 7:00 p.m., spectators filled the court room for proceedings scheduled an hour later at 8:00 pm. Exactly on time, the presiding judge entered the court room. As he removed his military hat, it was obvious that he just shaved. Many news cameramen were standing by to photograph the presiding judge as he was prepared to read the sentence. The judge opened by stating that the court had decided to use the signed statement from the preliminary investigation (BAP) and rejected Njono's request to set aside his statement in favor of information from the SMT examination. According to the presiding judge, the grounds for the court's rejection was, that none of the other witnesses had retracted their statements and Njono did not object to any of these witnesses' statements during the SMT proceedings.73 Furthermore, the court concluded that Chairman Aidit's opinions presented in court were the consonant with party's decision. Hence of all Aidit's reputed comments simply reflected the party's decision. In effect, the SMT concluded that Aidit dominated the PKI's decision-making process. The grounds for this conclusion came from Peris Pardede's testimony that he heard from Sudisman, another PKI politburo member that Aidit was planning to pre-empt the COG before it was able to move, although the move was not yet decided by the party. The SMT court then argued that whatever Aidit's decision was it must be similar with the overall party decision.74 It is important to note here that the SMT did not have any definitive proof about Aidit's decision. The SMT 72 Nasution, Hukum Mati UntungNjono Mahmillub Ke l.Pengadilan Gembongl Gestapu-Pki.p.S4 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Njono."p.295 74 Ibid.p.302 73 === [PDF page 207] === 191 court based this finding on Peris Pardede's uncorroborated testimony which tried to establish the connection between the PKI leadership and the 30th September movementsomething that the SMT wanted to establish from the beginning. In its verdict, the SMT court stated that whether or not COG existed was in fact unimportant. In reality, of course, the court clearly felt that the COG did not exist. Even if it did exist, the defendant had no right to conduct a coup d'etat in collaboration with the September 30th Movement, thus playing judge for the entire nation by overthrowing Bung Karno, disbanding the Dwikora Cabinet, and creating the Revolutionary Council. After reviewing all the evidence, the result of the examination, and preliminary investigation, the court concluded that the defendant, along with the September 30th Movement, was guilty of three types of crimes, common criminal, crime with political means, and crime against Pancasila morality, that is the belief in one Supreme God. The presiding judge then detailed each one of these criminal categories. In explaining the heavily contested issue of the COG's existence, the judge referred to the Oudang committee's statement of January 10, 1966. That statement, signed under oath by the entire committee, which consisted of high-ranking officers from all branches of the 77 military, had concluded: "There is no Council of Generals." The SMT court accepted the Oudang Committee's statement as valid evidence, effectively dismissing the existence of the COG and conflicting Njono's repeated claims before the court. Ibid.p.325 Ibid.p.325-326 Ibid.p.326 === [PDF page 208] === 192 Thus, the two major goals of the SMT court had been achieved, notably to prove the non-existence of the COG and to establish a direct connection between PKI and the 30 September Movement. Despite strong opposition from the defense and the eloquent counter-arguments in the defense statement Pledooi, they all proved useless in the end. In addition to the prosecutor's initial charges, the SMT sentence also found the defendant guilty of the crime against Pancasila morality. Significantly, this category of crimes against Pancasila had not been included in the initial charges. Nonetheless, in the SMT sentencing, the presiding judge detailed all of the defendant's crimes on each of the principle or Sila within the five principles of the Pancasila. For betraying the first Sila, which is "Belief in One of Supreme God," the court explained that the defendant's actions had in fact "contradicted the decency and righteousness that has become the essence of life and the livelihood of the people and the Indonesian nation as it also shows the losts of faith of the perpetrators." Some of the presiding judge explanation for the defendant's crime against Pancasila morality was essentially emotional, ranging far from the rubric of Indonesian law. For example, in betraying the second Sila of the Pancasila, the humanity principle, the court described the defendant's crime as an "action in perceiving human life like grass that grew the side of the street where they can slash as they like." Also, the court added, the defendant engaged in other terrorist acts which if the government did not take 70 immediate action, could easily spread into "kontra-terror " or counter-terror acts. Ibid.p.328 Ibid.p.328 === [PDF page 209] === In this explanation of the defendant's "crime against Pancasila morality," it was immediately clear that the SMT court acknowledged the mass violence and killings that were ongoing at the time of Njono's trial. But instead admitting of the army's participation in the mass violence, the SMT blamed the defendants while at the same time crediting the government for preventing the spread of these heinous "kontra-terror" acts. In other parts of the long verdict, the SMT court also concluded that the defendant's actions had shaken the very foundations of the society by creating: (a) uncontrollable prices of food and clothing; (b) the feeling of suspicion among Indonesian people; and finally (c) the atmosphere of fear as the result of the dreadful atrocities of the 30th September Movement that had surpassed the bounds of humanity.80 After two hours summarizing the SMT process, and describing all of the "crimes" and "betrayals" of the defendant, the presiding judge finally arrived at the end of the verdict. He declared the defendant guilty on three accounts: first, conspiring to revolt with the intention of overthrowing the legal government of the Republic of Indonesia; second, leading and organizing a rebellion with the intention of overthrowing the legal government of the Republic of Indonesia and, third, leading and organizing an armed rebellion against the authority of the Republic of Indonesia. For the aforementioned crimes, on February 21, 1966, just eight days after the start of the SMT proceedings the SMT court sentenced Njono to death. Although the three crimes listed at the end of the verdict are similar to the prosecutor's charges, the elaboration of the defendant's "crimes" and "betrayals," 80 81 Ibid.p.331 Ibid.p.334 === [PDF page 210] === 194 especially the crimes against Pancasila morality, was something that the prosecutor had never mentioned. Significantly, the first mention of the G.30.S movement as a crime against Pancasila morality came in the speech by General Soeharto when he addressed the nation on radio and television just one day before the SMT proceedings began. The theme Pancasila morality was crucial to the development of the New Order's official historical narrative for the Lubang Buaya affair. The focus on Pancasila was not only found in the SMT, but also in the name of the commemoration for day the event. Throughout the 30 years of the New Order, the Pancasila sanctity day (Hari Kesaktian Pancasila) was always celebrated every October 1 st. Even the monument at Lubang Buaya was named the Sanctity of Pancasila monument (Monumen Pancasila Sakti). Almost everything related with the formation of the Lubang Buaya's official narrative been constructed around the premise that the PKI had betrayed Pancasila. As we will see later on the examination of other prominent trials, every SMT trial would have slightly different dynamics. However, Njono's trial was significant because it helped to set the tone for the later trials. Since Njono was the first person brought before the SMT in relation with the 30th September coup attempt, the defense, judges, and prosecutor were all competing to establish their own versions of the "truth" about the event. Despite insurmountable odds in Njono's case, both the defendant and the defense attorney managed to present strong arguments. In the end, however, that defense was useless since, from the outset, it was not the intention of the SMT to find the "truth" or uphold justice. The court had other goals which were to establish a strong PKI connection with the 30l September movement and === [PDF page 211] === to deny the existence of the COG by claiming that it was a mere creation of the PKI. In achieving these goals, it was necessary to attribute crimes against Pancasila to the defendant. Njono's SMT proceedings, along with other SMT public trials, became the place where the military created a triumph to scorn the defeated. In this sense the military's victory was concealed within SMT's claim of achieving the "supremacy of law." The public humiliation of the defeated was shown by the prosecutor's often absurd charges (i.e, attributing the mass killings and economic problems) and condescending acts, as well as the presiding judge's denunciation of the defendant as a "good liar," insulting the witness by asking him to recite the Islamic Syahadat, and accusing the defendant of committing the ultimate crime against Pancasila morality. All of the humiliating acts mentioned above influenced the media as reporters readily reproduced, elaborated, and even exaggerated these accusations in their news reports about the trial. Hence, the media helped in widening the audience for the military's triumph and bolstering support for the new regime while at the same time increasing hatred towards the PKI and its sympathizers. In this sense, it was understandable why the SMT has so long been labeled "show trial." However, from the analysis above, it seems that the SMT proceeding was not only a "show" for a simple triumph. The SMT proceedings also involved a rather compelling process of two sides contesting the truth in open court. The relatively objective process of examination and openness of the SMT sessions, which even the defense attorney === [PDF page 212] === 196 acknowledged, also made the process more legitimate in the public eye despite obvious flaws in its final charges and verdict. On the other hand, the defendant and the defense attorney used the SMT for public display of defiance, especially in their defense pledooi by pointing out the weaknesses of the prosecutor's arguments, criticizing the military and the anti-communist groups for politicizing the SMT, and providing an alternative "version" about what happened on October 1, 1965. Nonetheless, in the end the most important outcome of the SMT was to help form the foundation for the recurring themes in the Lubang Buaya affair's official narrative, showing that the PKI was the sole mastermind of these murders and was guilty of crimes against Pancasila, while portraying the military as the eldest child of the revolution and a victim, innocent of any plot to form the COG which was simply a self-serving fabrication of the PKI. The Trial of Lieutenant Colonel Untung Samsuri: On February 23, two days after the SMT sentencing of Njono, the same court began the proceedings to try former Lieutenant Colonel Untung bin Samsuri, the head of the 30th September Movement. Untung had been arrested on October 13, 1965 near Tegal in Central Java while he was on the run. The news of his arrest made headlines in the Berita Yudha newspaper October 14, showing a picture of Untung handcuffed and held by several military men. The description of his arrest was detailed in a paragraph printed underneath the picture: === [PDF page 213] === 197 This is the face of the terror figure of the contra-revolutionary Thirtieth September Movement, Former Lt.Col.Untung was being heavily guarded by the ABRI members after his capture as he was immediately handcuffed. This terror figure is wearing a drill uniform as he was escaping to his birth place at Tegal, Central Java, where he used a fake name Bambang to avoid investigation. His fake ID card mentioned that his address is at Rawabangka Jatinegara. His face was beat up and his left eye is slightly bluish after he hit a telephone pool as he was escaping and jumping from the "Mudjur" bus that was going to Semarang. The civil defense and the locals arrested him after a bus passenger yelled "pick pocket, pick pocket....pick pocket" even before identifying him. He was immediately arrested, beaten up and experienced the same fate that is typical for pick pocket as he received the beating from the people.82 Lieutenant Colonel Untung Samsuri - a brilliant soldier, the hero of the Irian campaign, battalion commander of the elite Cakrabirawa Presidential Guard and decorated by President Sukarno himself for his bravery in combat—had been reduced to a common thief in the media because of his involvement in the Thirtieth September Movement. At the time of his arrest on October 13, Untung was no longer an active-duty Army officer since he had been dishonorably discharged on September 30, 1965. For his role in the movement, the military prosecutor charged Untung on three counts: organizing an armed rebellion, overthrowing the government by claiming formation of a revolutionary council on the radio, and disbanding the current Dwikora cabinet. Furthermore, the prosecutor also charged him with organizing an armed rebellion that included abduction of several high-ranking army generals and occupying several important communication centers which resulted in the disruption of the government's 82 Berita Yudha, "Photo Caption," Berita Yudha, 14 October 1965 1965.p.l Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Untung," (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, 1966).p.3 83 === [PDF page 214] === 198 communications. In addition, Untung was charged with conspiracy by attending secret meetings with vicious intention of conducting an armed rebellion against the government of Indonesia. Finally, Untung was also accused of not only organizing an armed movement but also encouraging others to join his movement through deception, resulting in the abduction and death of the generals. For all the aforementioned charges, the prosecutor demanded that the judge sentence Untung to death. The SMT then moved into the examination process. During his trial, twenty-two witnesses gave testimony before the court. In contrast to Njono's examination that explored the existence of the COG, Untung trials focused on the origins and planning of the 30th September Movement. In this process, moreover, the prosecutor had particular interest in Untung's action announcing the creation of the revolutionary council which had replaced the Dwikora cabinet. In response to all charges, Untung claimed that his motive was not to overthrow the government, although he admitted responsibility for all the September 30th troop movements, including the abduction of the generals. After the prosecutor asked him, if he was the one giving orders, he answered: "I gave that order." but, when asked whether he ordered the killing of the generals, Untung simply said: "I am responsible for that." The importance of Untung's answer on this matter was that he differentiated between giving an order and claiming responsibility. Perhaps, Untung never ordered the generals to be killed, only abducted. But since he was the commander of the movement, he was forced to take responsibility for all its actions. 84 85 Ibid.p.lO Ibid.p.59 === [PDF page 215] === 199 During the examination process, it was also revealed that the September 30th Movement's conspiracy was not only limited to Jakarta but it had already planned to operate in the regions. The testimony of Lieutenant Ngadimo from East Java reinforced the sense of how widespread the movement was, as he admitted receiving instructions to form a revolutionary council in East Java upon hearing the radio announcement from Jakarta. His testimony was significant for the prosecution's effort to establish a strong case for the magnitude of the conspiracy in planning the overthrow of the government. Although the prosecutor and judges attempted to figure out the details of the planning process and the scale of the September 30th Movement, Untung and his defense attorney, Gumulja SH, wanted to shift the focus to the existence of the COG. They requested that another witness, Major Rudhito Kusnadi Herukusumo, a middle-ranking officer of the SUAD (general staff of the army) give testimony on their behalf, a request that the court granted. Major Rudhito testified that he himself had listened to an alleged recording of the COG meeting on September 21, 1965 at the Military Law Academy. At that meeting, according to Major Rudhito, the COG agreed on the structure of the military cabinet if their plan for overthrowing the government succeeded. He claimed that the recording contained the voice of the late General Parman, one of the generals slain at Lubang Buaya, announcing the list of names and their positions in the future cabinet. Major Rudhito claimed that a copy of the tape had been given to the president through General Supardjo, who was still at large during Untung's trial, along with 86 87 Ibid.p.l25-128 Ibid.p.171 === [PDF page 216] === 200 another proof of documentation in the form of an overseas check intended for the COG members. The amount of the check was 150 millions Rupiah, equal to US$15,000 for each member of the COG. The testimony of Major Rudhito was again an effort by Untung's defense to prove that the COG in fact existed, and there was as well a foreign hand involved in overthrowing the government. The importance of establishing this fact for Untung was similar to Njono: to justify their actions as patriotic duty to protect the president against a foreign-backed COG coup. If Untung and his defense had been able to establish this motivation, they might have had an opportunity to prove that his involvement with the September 30th Movement was justifiable. After finishing the examination process, the SMT moved to the requisitoir, prosecutor's request for penalty, and the Pledooi statement from both the defendant and his attorney. The reading of the requisitoir began on March 1, 1966, just one week after Untung's SMT proceeding had begun. In his Requisitoir, the prosecutor repeated all the charges and used the opportunity to deny the existence of the COG again declaring it a PKI fabrication. As he continued slamming the defendant, the prosecutor reminded everyone about the parallels between the September 30th Movement and the Madiun affair, since the Indonesian nation was also facing foreign threats when the PKI suddenly rebelled back in 1948.89 The prosecutor continued his requisitoir by thanking God for his protection of the Indonesian people as the nation had escaped a huge catastrophe from Lt.Colonel Untung's betrayal of the Pancasila and all the teachings of the president. He continued 88 89 Ibid.p.l71 Ibid. p. 199 === [PDF page 217] === 201 saying that the defendant's action in murdering the generals at Lubang Buoya was a clear violation of the "Belief in one Supreme God" and the "Humanity" principles of Pancasila. Again, the crime to betraying Pancasila was repeated over and over against all the September 30th Movement defendants. Toward the end of this phase in the proceedings, the prosecutor showed some "evidence" that the defendant had already been "recruited" and "trained" by the PKI since the 1950s. The evidence came in the form of acknowledgement that Untung knew some of the prominent PKI leaders. Given the well-proven consequences of the defendant's actions, the prosecutor demanded that Untung be given the death sentence for in betraying the country and Pancasila.91 The court then went into recess until March 4 when the reading of Pledooi from both the defendant and defense was scheduled. During the reading of the Pledooi on March 4, 1966, Untung and his attorney, Mr.Gumulja SH, devised a plan to separate the key arguments for the defense. Untung would insist on convincing proof of the COG's existence as both cause and justification for his action to pre-empt its coup plan. On the other hand, Gumulja would emphasize on the foreign involvement in the September 30th movement and its aftermath. The reading of the Pledooi went according to plan, as Untung again rejected all the charges and emphasized Major Rudhito's testimony about the existence of the COG as the basis for his actions with the September 30* Movement. He again acknowledged his responsibility for the abductions and for all the lives lost during the event. He also used the opportunity to not only reject the prosecutor's attempt to attribute economic 90 91 Ibid. Ibid, p.204 === [PDF page 218] === 202 problems and the chaotic aftermath to the movement, but also blame it for the problems in the indiscriminate military clean-up when many lives were lost.92 While the prosecutor used the Madiun affair in 1948 to make his point about communist treason, Untung cited the October 17, 1952 incident, when a group of soldiers took matters with their own hands. In 1952 the soldiers were not punished for their obvious coup attempt providing a parallel with his present pre-empt a planned COG coup which, in his view, clearly threatened the president's authority.93 At the end of his pledooi, Untung refused to be labeled as someone whom the PKI had "groomed" for years. He reminded the court that he fought during both the revolution and the Irian campaign, and had been decorated by the president for his brave actions on the battlefield. Untung's defense attorney Mr.Gumulja SH, took a slightly different approach to his defense. Instead of focusing on the existence of COG, he reminded the audience, especially the court, that the president urged them to read several books on foreign intervention in other countries. Gumulja attempted to make a case that a foreign party was indeed involved in the 1965 affair. 4 Hence, he claimed that October 1, 1965 was not only a domestic problem but also had international implications. Mr.Gumulja's then pointed out that, throughout history, many court decisions did not reflect justice but instead it reflected the desires of those who held power. He then cautioned the court that those in power, who had declared their absolute loyalty to the Ibid.p.218 Ibid, p.219 Ibid, p.222 === [PDF page 219] === 203 president, were also known to have disobeyed the president's orders. Using this argument, Gumulja's questioned the SMT's objectivity asking whether they had followed the president's directives or followed those who opposed Sukarno's politics. In delivering his criticism of the SMT, Gumulja was careful not to make his attack too obvious. After he questioned the loyalty of the SMT, he quickly expressed his absolute certainty that all members of the court, including the prosecutor, have supported the president's directives to find the truth and uphold justice.95 He further reminded the court of specific presidential directives about not being influenced by outside powers. He pointed to the reality of the media which had acted one hundred percent against the president's directives in their reporting of the SMT proceedings. The media, she said, had demonstrated their strong partiality against the defendant even before the court reached any decision. Here, Mr. Gumulja warned the SMT not to be swayed by public opinion since President Sukarno's supporters were still numerous and any action against them meant a further weakening of democracy and the anti-imperialist movement which could facilitate foreign infiltration.96 Mr. Gumulja concluded that the SMT had to recognize that the September 30th movement happened because there were groups that wanted to overthrow the president. That force, he warned, still continued its efforts up to the present and wanted to change the direction of the revolution from "left" to "right." He hoped the SMT would acknowledge the damage that the September 30l Movement eradication process had done to the revolution by destroying the humanity and good reputation of the Indonesian 95 96 Ibid.p.224 Ibid, p.224-225 === [PDF page 220] === 204 nation. These actions had caused cruel mass killings of hundreds of thousands of people, from children to leaders. Furthermore, the hundreds of thousands more who were detained had suffered torture beyond the limits of humanity. The defense did not agree with the harsh manner of the government's handling of the case against the September 30 Movement. In the past, the government had lightly punished those who were clearly involved in a rebellion with obvious foreign support, such as the PRRI/PERMESTA movement, RMS (South Moluccan Republic), and Darul Islam/ TIL Mr.Gumulja then argued against each of the prosecution's charges and reiterated that the Untung's motivation was to protect the president from an imminent COG coup. Untung never ordered the killing, the attorney argued, despite the defendant's admission of his guilt in abducting the generals. Nonetheless, as the commander of the movement, Untung claimed full responsibility for the lives lost throughout the coup. Therefore, the defense rejected the death sentence requested by the prosecutor, arguing that Untung's action was intended to save the president. Before concluding his Pledooi, Mr.Gumulja proposed several suggestions that the SMT should consider, including: first, the September 30th Movement was an international and domestic issue with foreign involvement, so the defense had to have clear view of what led into the event; second, that a political settlement should be reached before seeking a judicial solution; third, president had acknowledged that the events of October 1 were unresolved and unclear hence the effort to solve the problem through the courts now was useless; fourth, the defense requested the SMT presiding judge to take 97 98 Ibid, p.225 Ibid, p.227 === [PDF page 221] === 205 actions against the ongoing mass killings in Central Java, East Java, Bali, Medan, and other places since the killings no longer involved common people but also prominent figures in the government, and; five, due to the unclear nature of events, SMT should not be in a position to give any sentence, therefore let the president find a political settlement." As expected, the prosecutor rejected the defense claims, especially regarding the existence of COG. As in Njono's case, the prosecutor, referred to the Oudang Committee's Statement that the COG never existed. Following this rebuttal by the prosecutor, the SMT session was adjourned and scheduled to resume on March 7, for the verdict. The reading of the verdict scheduled at 7:00 p.m. on March 7, 1966. The court room was already full of people from invited guests to journalists. One of the spectators was the sister of the late Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, a victim of the Lubang Buaya killings. As the proceedings were about to open, a swarm of photographers took pictures of the presiding judge, defendant, and the prosecutors from every possible angle. Flash bulbs from their cameras filled the court room as the presiding judge readied himself to read the ninety- page verdict.100 The court asked Untung to stand while the verdict was read. Due however, to the long and detailed document, the court permitted him to sit down after half an hour. Toward the end of the reading, three and a half hours later, the court asked Untung to 99 Ibid.p.242 Reporter, "Lensa Sidang Mahmillub: Hanja Tuhan Jang Tahu Mengapa Air-Mata Untung Belinang2," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 8 March 1966 1966. 100 === [PDF page 222] === 206 stand again and listen to the verdict. The extremely long verdict consisted of a summary of the charges and the result of the examination from all twenty-two witnesses who had appeared in Untung's case. The content repeated many of the arguments and counter arguments from the prosecutor, defense, and judges. In essence, the SMT court rejected all of the defense objections while again asserting that the defendant had not objected to his own statement from the preliminary investigation (BAP).101 As in Njono's verdict, the SMT found that Untung had committed three types of crimes: criminal, political, and moral, that is violating Pancasila morality. Again, the prosecutor detailed Untung's crimes against Pancasila by: first, offending the belief in one Supreme God principle by actions that clearly contradicted the morality provided in a religion; second, violating humanity: by actions such as conducting terror activities that treated human lives like a wild animal that was hunted and killed easily; third, damaging Indonesian nationalism by breaking the unity of the NASAKOM, a teaching from the president himself; fourth, degrading democracy by secreting the movement from the nationalist and religious groups, thus ignoring the law and ethics of the NASAKOM; and finally, damaging social justice by offending the spirit of mutual cooperation or gotong royong, that was deeply embedded among the people of Indonesia.103 In addition to these crimes against Pancasila morality, the SMT ruled that Untung had damaged the military and the TNI's personality. As the reading of the verdict drew closer, the presiding judge asked Untung to stand while the audience in the room also regained their sense of 101 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Untung."p.271 Ibid, p.306 103 Ibid, p.311-312 102 === [PDF page 223] === 207 excitements after several hours fighting boredom from the detailed, tedious, and often repetitious verdict. The SMT court found Untung guilty on the following charges: (a) Defendant is guilty of conducting rebellion with intention to overthrow the legitimate government of Indonesia (b) Conducting armed rebellion against the legitimate government of Indonesia; (c) Evil conspiracy for conducting rebellion with the intention of overthrow the legitimate government of Republic of Indonesia by rebelling and attacking, the established authority in Indonesia; (d) Deliberately making other people to commit murder by giving false information and opportunity.' Therefore, the court sentenced the defendant to death. The audience, who sat in the back, clapped their hands after hearing the death sentence, whether from jubilation or simple relief from boredom. Unlike Njono who managed to smile after receiving his death sentence, Untung clearly looked dejected. When the judge asked him if he would ask for clemency from the president, Untung struggled as he looked down and finally responded that he would think about it. The judge then pounded the gavel three times signaling the end of the proceeding, and within seconds hundreds of camera flash bulbs began taking Untung's picture. Under the intense light of the cameras, one could see tears falling from Untung's eyes. The army newspaper Harian Angkatan Bersendjata commented on Untung's tears saying, "Hanja Tuhan lahjang mengetahuinja, " or "Only God knows."105 Within days after the sentence, Untung decided not to ask for clemency as he thought that it would suggest that admission of guilt. Instead, he rejected the SMT verdict, repeated the same objections that he presented to the court, and agreed that the 104 Ibid.p.317 Reporter, "Lensa Sidang Mahmillub: Hanja Tuhan Jang Tahu Mengapa Air-Mata Untung Belinang2."p.3 105 === [PDF page 224] === 208 president's should use his own judgment in deciding this matter. In response to his statement, the SMT stood by their death sentence, but now cited an additional reason: the defendant never admitted his guilt for all the wrong doing.106 In both the Untung and Njono cases we can see there were some recurring themes presented by the prosecutor, defense, and judges. The goal for the Untung's SMT court was to establish acts of conspiracy between PKI and the September 30th Movement by focusing on the movement's action in disbanding the cabinet as well as, the long-time relations between Untung and the PKI. Interestingly, the SMT and the prosecutor did not really press the fact that the movement had abducted and killed the generals. Although they pressured Untung to admit that the abduction and the killings were done on his orders, the focus of the court was clearly on the larger conspiracy and the crimes against Pancasila morality. The defense countered by trying to establish that there were external influences in the whole debacle, hence the SMT could not act without acknowledging that fact. The defense also questioned the court's fairness reminding them to stay loyal to the president. Untung's SMT proceeding, showed how the court's dynamics could, to some degree be portrayed as an intense struggle between the anti-communist military and President Sukarno's loyalists. The intensity of this conflict became clearer when Dr. Subandrio—the deputy premier number one, foreign minister and the head of the BPI (the Central Intelligence Body) -came before the court on October 1, 1966. Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Untung."p.358 === [PDF page 225] === 209 The Trial of Dr.Subandrio Subandrio's SMT trial was clearly one of the most controversial and widely anticipated. As the first deputy premier, foreign minister, and head of the powerful Central Intelligence Body (BPI), Subandrio was considered the second most powerful man in Indonesia after President Sukarno. Although reputed to be the president's anointed successor, Subandrio had a weakness that prevented him from capitalizing on 1 07 this claim: he did not have a strong political base. After the outbreak of the September 30th affair, Subandrio increasingly came under strong public scrutiny for his alleged involvement with the failed coup attempt. Under the name Angkatan 1966, or the generation of 1966, the students intensified their protests against Subandrio by writing wall graffiti in many cities during this tumultuous period. It was common to see slogans such as; "Bandrio Pengkhianat" (Bandrio the traitor), "Durno Peking, " (Subandrio, as the lackey of China), "Andjing Peking" (Peking's dog), and "Gantung Durno " (Hang Durno.) Significantly, the word "Durno" was derived from a Javanese wayang character who is a shrewd, smart, sycophant, willing to do anything to achieve his ambitions. As a known Sukarno loyalist, Subandrio was caught in the intense power struggle between the anti-communist, anti-Sukarno group and pro-Sukarno faction. Despite strong demands from the public to put the president on trial for his alleged involvement in the 30 September Movement, Sukarno still had such strong support from the masses that military regime did not dare to challenge him openly. 107 108 Napoleon G.Rama, "After Sukarno-Who?," Philippine Free Press, September 26, 1964 1964.p.7 Redaksi Analisa, Kisah DanNasib Hadji Dr.Subandrio (Djakarta: CV Analisa, 1966).p.27 === [PDF page 226] === 210 To pressure Sukarno, the military targeted his known supporters and loyalists such as Subandrio and Chairul Saleh, the second deputy vice premier. Unlike Subandrio, Chairul Saleh was never put on trial. He was simply sent to prison and soon died there. After this outburst of public outrage, Subandrio was detained on April 18, 1966 and scheduled for trial on October 1, at 8:00 p.m. Subandrio's trial date and time was not coincidental, since it was carefully planned to start exactly one year after the fateful day of October 1, 1965. The 8:00 p.m. trial time was also chosen since it was exactly the same time, in the previous year, when General Soeharto made his historic radio announcement after he defeated the 30th September movement in Jakarta and "reclaimed the Republic from the filthy hands of the communist adventurers."109 This timing was a symbolic act to show people how justice would be upheld, making yet another strong statement about how General Soeharto was asserting his authority over the SMT proceedings. The announcement of the trial sparked strong interest from the public and media. On the September 30, 1966, the army newspaper, Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (HAB), reported that the military had to draw lots to decide who among the two hundred journalists registered would obtain permission to cover the trial since the court only held thirty-five seats for journalists.110 The magnitude of the trial was further illustrated by the October 1 edition of HAB which reported that more than five thousand people registered Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Presiden Sudah Petjat Subandrio Dari Segala Djabatan Dan Pangkat," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 1 October 1966 1966.p.l 110 Harian Angkatan Besendjata, "Wartawan2 Diundi Utk Cover Durno," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 30 September 1966 1966.p.l === [PDF page 227] === 211 to attend the trial in a court room with a seating capacity of only for four hundred. This popular response was indeed a surprise for "Durno," HAB exclaimed.111 Lieutenant Colonel Ali Said, the presiding judge for Njono's prosecution returned in the same role at Subandrio's trial. The SMT assigned the hard-hitting Lieutenant Colonel Durmawel Ahmad as the military prosecutor, or Oditur. The court also assigned two civilian lawyers to serve in Subandrio's defense team, the renowned human rights lawyer Mr. Yap Thiam Hi en SH and Mr. Subagio Djojopranoto SH. Under heavy security, Dr.Subandrio was brought to the court room at the Bappenas building, the favored location for high-profile SMT trials. As Subandrio emerged from the armored vehicle that brought him to the court, hundreds of foreign and domestic photo journalists scrambled to take pictures of the second most powerful man in Indonesia. Carrying a folder in one hand, Subandrio wore a loose grey suit, light blue tie and black shoes. Before officially opening the proceedings, presiding judge Lieutenant Colonel Ali Said delivered a speech affirming that the SMT for Dr.Subandrio was not a "payback arena" but instead was a place "with all the sacredness of the heart and God-fearing willingness to find the truth, and justice that were demanded by the conscience of the Indonesian people following the nation's law and sense of justice." After the court confirmed the identity of Subandrio, the proceedings continued with a reading of the charges by the prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel Durmawel Ahmad. Before reading the 111 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, ""Surprise" Buat Durno," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 1 October 1966 1966.p.l 112 Analisa, Kisah Dan Nasib Hadji Dr.Subandrio.p.41 Ibid. === [PDF page 228] === 212 charges, Durmawel, repeated the presiding judge's claim that the SMT was not seeking revenge but was convened to find truth and uphold justice. The charges for Subandrio were divided into two major indictments. The first charges that despite his many high positions in the government, he willingly gave PKI figures such as Aidit and, a known member of the September 30th Movement Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmodjo, information for the armed rebellion's attempt to overthrow the legitimate government.114 The second charge accused Subandrio of several activities that disturbed the authority of the legitimate government, spreading hatred, division, conflict, and, chaos as well as economic destruction, turbulence, and restlessness among the people.115 Following the indictment, the prosecutor detailed all Subandrio's activities that belonged to the category of providing the opportunity for an armed rebellion. Specifically, he charged that when Subandrio was the head of BPI (Central Intelligence Body) he did not check the validity of the information from Police Brigadier General Sutarto, a BPI staffer, on the existence of the COG within the Army. He was also accused of discussing the condition of the president's health with doctors from PRC and summoning DN Aidit to return home from Peking. Furthermore, Subandrio was also accused of spreading the information about COG from the so-called "Gilchrist document"116 without checking the validity of the information. Moreover, the court 114 Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Subandrio," (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan darat, 1966).p.23 115 Ibid.p.25 116 The controversy over the existence of the so called "Gilchrist document" captured the imagination of many and became one of the major damning factors for Dr.Subandrio in his trial. However, in 1972 a book, === [PDF page 229] === 213 accused him for holding a meeting with PKI leadership in August 1965 to discuss the issue of the deteriorating health of the president. After the outbreak of the September 30th Movement, the defendant had reportedly delivered some fiery speeches that incited hatred among the people, allegedly saying that "terror should be fought with terror."117 To establish these charges, the prosecutor requested authority to summon twenty nine witnesses for Dr. Subandrio's trial. After outlining the charges, it was the defense attorney's turn to deliver their eksepsi or objection to the SMT. Mr. Subagio Djojopranoto delivered the objection from the political point of view while Mr. Yap Thiam Hien focused on the legal perspectives of the proceeding. In essence, both defense attorneys objected to the legality of the SMT in trying Dr.Subandrio, claiming that all courts, including SMT, had to be based on the established law not merely a letter of instruction from the president (No.370/Year 1965). Moreover, the defense argued that the president had not formally discharged The Deception Game by Ladislav Bittman, a former intelligence officer for the Czechoslovak Republic who defected to the west, admitted that the "Gilchrist Document" was a fake and was created as part of the joint operation of disinformation from the Czechoslovak and Russian intelligence services. The purpose of the disinformation was to increase anti-Western sentiment, especially anti British and anti-United States, in Indonesia. Bittman claimed the disinformation was effective since Dr.Subandrio used the document to accuse United States and Great Britain of planning an attack on Indonesia. As consequence of the accusations anti-West activities increased and became more aggressive. It also led into the closing of the USIS (United States Information Service), banning the U.S. Peace Corps, and boycotting of all movies from the United States. However, what made the document more compelling was the absence of the infamous phrase "Our local Army friends" in the original letter quoted in Bittman's book (see p 120, The Deception Game by Ladislav Bittman). That particular phrase was critical and became major point of contestation for both Subandrio and for the military regime since the former used it as an indication of the existence of the Council of Generals, while the latter would cite that phrase as evidence of the slander that Dr.Subandrio and the PKI had used to discredit the Army in their preparation for the Thirtieth September Movement. (See appendices for Bittman extract and Subandrio copy) 117 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Subandrio."p.27 === [PDF page 230] === 214 Dr.Subandrio from all his positions, including his honorary rank as an air marshal in the air force. Therefore, legally he could not be put on trial.118 In response to the defense objections, the prosecutor argued that the SMT had sufficient legal basis to try Dr.Subandrio since the parliament (MPRS), in Decree Number XIX Year 1966, had declared that all previous laws within the review period still valid. Therefore, presidential Instruction Number 16 Year 1963 about the establishment of SMT was still binding.119 To rebut the claim that Dr.Subandrio still held the honorary rank as an air force marshal, the prosecutor referred to a letter dated September 30, 1966 No.60 that came only one day before the trial from the president in his capacity as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces temporarily suspending Dr. Subandrio's military rank, automatically making him a civilian.120 The court then went into recess to resume the following day at 10:00 a.m. thereby allowing ample time for the presiding judge to discuss both the defense objections and the prosecutor's response to those objections in consultation with other SMT judges. The following day, the SMT resumed its session at 10:00 am with the presiding judge announcing his rejection of the defense objection/Eksepsi and acceptance of the prosecutor/Oc/zYwr 's counter arguments. He then ordered the court to proceed with the examination of the defendant. The first issue the prosecutor brought forward in the examination process was on the controversy over the "Gilchrist document." The major point of contention here was the reference to the "our local Army Friends," a phrase that Ibid.p.40-43 Ibid.p.49-50 === [PDF page 231] === 215 Sir Andrew Gilchrist had allegedly written in the letter. The prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad wanted to establish that the Gilchrist document was mere slander, an attempt by the PKI and Subandrio to spread lies that the army and its COG had forged an alliance with the United States and Great Britain. Subandrio claimed that an anonymous person had delivered the copy of the document to his house, along with a letter claiming that it had been found in the villa of Bill Palmer, an American director of the AMPAI (American Motion Picture Association in Indonesia) when leftist youth group had ransacked his villa.121 The prosecutor questioned Subandrio about the authenticity of the document, and he answered that he was confident that the letter was genuine after one of his subordinates from BPI verified its authenticity.122 It was known that the defendant had made several copies that he brought to the president, prompting Sukarno to summon all of the armed forces commanders for a meeting in the palace to discuss the authenticity of the document. According to the written statement from the late Navy Admiral Martadinata who attended the meeting, the president asked the late General Ahmad Yani about the existence of COG and whether the meaning of "Our local Army friends" in the Gilchrist document in fact referred to the COG. General Yani had assured the president that there was nothing like the COG that the Gilchrist had described. If any such council existed within the army leadership, Ibid.p.71 Ibid. Analisa, Kisah Dan Nasib Hadji Dr.Subandrio.p.54 === [PDF page 232] === 216 Yani had assured the president, the council's only task was to discuss the promotion process for officers within the army hierarchy.124 The examination between the prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad and Dr. Subandrio did not go smoothly, as the defendant often gave long-winded answers to simple questions. For example, when the prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad wanted the defendant to admit that he was indeed the highest intelligence authority with direct access to the president, there was the following exchange: P (Prosecutor): I am asking you now who is the highest intelligence official in Indonesia? D (Defendant): I am not the head of Indonesian Intelligence, I am the head of the BPI (Central Body of Intelligence). P: Central Body of Intelligence of Indonesia, are there any more organizations above it? D: No, but this body is not above another intelligence body. P: If I say it [BPI] coordinates, don't you think it is above those who are being coordinated? Don't you think?! D: It does not mean, (cut) P: I am asking you, does it mean it is above those who are being coordinated? D: Yes, I am not above another intelligence body. P: Who can go directly to the Head of State? Which head of intelligence? D: The Attorney General can go directly to the President. P: No, I am asking intelligence. Intelligence is not the Attorney General! The Attorney General first or the Minister. Now who is the head of intelligence in Indonesia who can go directly to the President? D: The head of intelligence of each of the Armed Forces. P: No, that is not possible. Each head of the Armed Forces intelligence must go through their own respective commanders. That is why they are known as intelligence from the Armed Forces. But the state intelligence is the BPI. D: I don't understand. P: I think you quite understand the nature of an organizational/hierarchy. D: I did not mean to say that BPI sat above other intelligence, so those that are from the Police,... Manafe, Teperpu: Reveals Pki's Betrayal in 1965 and the Trial of the Perpetrators..p.75 === [PDF page 233] === 217 P: Now I am asking you who is the head of intelligence within the Indonesian State that are directly under the President? D: Well, it is the BPI. P: The BPI, who is the head? D: The head of BPI. P: Who is the head of BPI? D:Iam. 125 The prosecutor then continued to ask series of questions of the defendant to show the court the negative consequences for the army of his release of the "Gilchrist document" to the public. Anticipating meandering answers from the defendant, the prosecutor asked whether the document's reference to "our local Army friends" was actually a reference to the Army COG. To this, the defendant answered that the reference did not necessary imply the Indonesian Army but it referred to some vigilante groups in Sulawesi that were known to have received arms from the British.126 Subandrio's indirect and twisted answers greatly annoyed the prosecutor, encouraging him to bombard the defendant with more questions related to the Gilchrist document, demanding to know which part of the document convinced him that it was authentic? Why did he make many copies of the documents? Why did he announce the existence of the Gilchrist document abroad? Had this kind of strategy been used before? Did he know the main task of the intelligence service? To answer these questions, Subandrio either gave unclear answers or simply answered, "I don't know." Subandrio's responses in the SMT were reported in one headline of the HAB, Subandrio Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Subandrio."p.93 Ibid.p.82 Ibid, p.92-125 === [PDF page 234] === 218 Tak Berdaja Tangkis Tuduhan.2: Selalu Djawab "Tak Tahu, " or "Subandrio Defenseless in Fending off the Accusations: As he Always Responded: I Don't Know."128 The media, especially the newspapers, were subjective in their reporting of this SMT trial. Throughout Subandrio's proceedings, the media intentionally discredited the defendant even before the court had reached verdict. The army newspaper HAB commented for example: "In answering the questions from the judge and the prosecutor, the defendant utilized his cunning diplomatic skills in an effort to avoid responsibility throughout his adventure for the preparation of the Gestapu coup. The defendant acted stupidly in his attempt to conceal his secret role in abusing his strategic positions in the interest of the PKI." Such an atmosphere was prejudicial to the defendant, hence it was difficult to have a fair trial. There might however, be reasons why a politician known as smart, ambitious, and influential portrayed himself in the court as indecisive, vague, and uncooperative in answering questions. Acting stupid in the SMT was perhaps part of the defendant's strategy to undermine the authority of the tribunal in front of the public. Despite the long, unproductive examination, the prosecutor maintained his relentless attack on Dr. Subandrio by highlighting the fact that he held many important positions in government and could have played important role in assisting the coup movement. This was crucial since the prosecutor wanted to show the court and the public on how influential Dr. Subandrio was and how he was able to influence others to fulfill 128 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Subandrio Tak Berdaja Tangkis Tuduhan2: Selalu Djawab "Tak Tahu"," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 3 October 1966 1966.p.l 129 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Urapsari Mahmillub," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 4 October 1966 1966.p.2 === [PDF page 235] === 219 his own ambitions. However, Mr. Yap Thiam Hien, the defense attorney, managed to counter the prosecutor's effort by arguing that despite the defendant's many important positions, his authority was not absolute in respect to other government officials.130 The prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad then used a different strategy to attack the defendant. He presented one of the defendant's speeches as an act of slander and instigating hatred among the public, citing Dr. Subandrio's speech before a youth group accusing Indonesian newspapers of being funded by the CIA. In the SMT, Dr. Subandrio admitted that he might have engaged in slander since he did not have any concrete evidence for his accusation. He simply admitting making the accusation because, he was emotional. The prosecutor then pressed further, pointing out the consequences of Subandrio making the false accusations, not only making all the newspapers angry at him but also increasing public anxiety. In rebuttal Dr. Subandrio argued that, his comment made the newspapers more careful and vigilant so the CIA would not infiltrate them. Despite the defendant's twisted answers, the prosecutor was not deterred from continuing his attack, Durmawel requested that the court play a recording of the defendant's speech in front of a youth organization (GSNI), urging the youth to "fight terror with terror." The prosecutor wanted to use this evidence as proof that Subandrio had in fact instigated violence among masses. Then followed a long argument between the prosecutor and defendant about whether terror could be fought with terror: P (Prosecutor): In front of the students that are members of The National Student Movement of Indonesia (GSNI), you gave a speech urging to fight terror with terror. Is it possible to destroy terror by creating another terror? 130 131 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Subandrio."p.l32-135 Ibid.p.277-278 === [PDF page 236] === 220 D (Defendant): No, that was only meant to frighten, it was not for creating (terror) but only to frighten someone, then a terror can be done. P: If there is a terror then another terror will appear, is that the way to reduce terror? D: No, what I said is only to frighten. P: What do you mean to frighten? What kind of terror you are saying? D: No, it is only to deter terror that they will be faced with a contra-terror; it is a warning for those who want to hit someone, that they will be hit back, so at times before hitting someone, one has to think carefully before doing it. P: So what if it really happens? D: Well, if that happens then perhaps it [terror] will be reduced. P: What if it would really happen, it is not about whether it will reduce [the terror], what will happen instead if there is a terror over here and terror over there, students from GSNI will end up destroying other students? So what do you think would happen? D: Yes, yes, most likely the terror will never happen. P: It already happens! You said most likely it will not happen but what should we do if it does happen? D: Then if it does happen, it is possible to have some victims. P: There will be victims? D: Yes, but only if the terror continues, then there will be victims. P: Do you think it is appropriate that you, as a head of the government, urging people to eradicate terror with terror? Do you think that is appropriate? D: No, only when it is to warn that the terror will be faced with contra terror.132 This debate continued without reaching any clear conclusion. Although both sides were debating on something seemingly trivial, we must recall that this trial was taking place midst the terror of the anti-communist massacres sweeping Java and Bali. Both the defendant and the prosecutor went back and forth arguing about whether a terror acts had to be countered by another terror. The point of the debate for the prosecutor was that he wanted to make a strong case that the defendant had instigated violence. Clearly aware of the seriousness of this charge, the defendant was obviously fencing around the debate to Ibid.p.286 === [PDF page 237] === make the discussion seem fruitless and confusing, undermining the authority of the SMT and avoiding any culpability for the recent slaughter. Over the next few days, the SMT moved to questioning the twenty witnesses summoned for Subandrio's trial. Most gave damning information about the defendant. One of these witnesses was Police Brigadier General Sutarto, BPI Chief of staff, who claimed that the first time he heard about the existence of COG was from a man named Hardjowisastro who was a member of PKI parliamentary delegation. Moreover, Sutarto also claimed that he heard information from a man named Sjarifudin Tandjung who worked for the Tjakrabirawa (Presidential Palace guard). Sutarto stated that he reported all this information about the COG coup plan to Subandrio.134 This information from Sutarto gave the prosecutor the needed evidence of the PKI complicity in the failed coup attempt while at the same time providing negative testimony about Subandrio since he had the information before hand but did not do anything decisive with it. Regarding the authenticity of the "Gilchrist document," Sutarto claimed that he authenticated the letter based on the material of the paper but not its content. Sutarto then reported this fact to Subandrio who never ordered him to investigate further to authenticate the document, instead asking him to make several copies.135 Sutarto's testimony weighed heavily against Subandrio since it confirmed that information about the COG originated from a PKI member and the authenticity of the "Gilchrist document" was never fully proven since Subandrio since failed to order a full 133 Ibid. 326 Ibid. 135 Ibid.p.329 134 === [PDF page 238] === 222 investigation. Instead he made more copies of the document and spread the unconfirmed news of COG coup plan abroad and to the president. This testimony fell perfectly into the prosecution's case that Subandrio had given the PKI opportunity to exploit the information to its advantage. Under certain circumstances in this trial, the SMT allowed written testimony in response to prosecutors or defense counselors' questions. In this case, the most important written evidence was Sukarno's testimony. Some believed that the trial of Subandrio was an attempt to discredit President Sukarno making this SMT a battleground between the Sukarno loyalists and the military group under General Soeharto. Given the extremely volatile situation in the country, it was impossible to bring President Sukarno to the SMT. He still commanded the loyalty of the masses and strong support within the armed forces. The least the army could do was to detain all of the ministers and government officials that were known to have a leftist tendencies and strong loyalty to Sukarno. Among Sukarno's loyal supporters Subandrio was the most famous and most powerful. Putting him on trial thus required careful planning by the army. In his recently published book, Teperpu: Reveal PKI's Betrayal in 1965 and the trial of the Perpetrators, Aco Manafe described the Army's plan to investigate Sukarno during Subandrio's SMT trial. According to a former member of the Investigation team {Teperpu), General Tahir, Lieutenant Colonel Durmawel Ahmad, the Army prosecutor in === [PDF page 239] === 223 the Subandrio SMT case, suggested calling President Sukarno as a witness so "we can investigate Bung Karno indirectly." Although they did not summon the president, the prosecutors submitted several questions and the president gave a written response. The president's testimony, addressed to the Investigation team and dated September 16, 1966, was read aloud in the Subandrio's SMT trial, confirming that Sukarno had heard the rumor about the existence of COG sometime early September 1965. The president then asked the late army chief of staff General Ahmad Yani about this matter and he personally assured the president that everything was under control.137 In his written testimony, the president also acknowledged that he was never informed about any military training of the communist party members at Lubang Buaya. Furthermore, he claimed that he never received any information regarding the COG's planned coup from Subandrio or from anyone else. For him the September 30th Movement's coup attempt came as a complete surprise (Overrompeling).m This statement weakened Subandrio's position since, as the head of BPI or Intelligence it was his responsibility to report any suspicious activities to the president. Although Sukarno did not appear in person, having him as a witness increased the credibility and authority of the SMT court, an effective rebuttal to the skepticism of the defense attorneys. Even though many saw the SMT as a "show trial," the Subandrio process had made the SMT the arena for an increasingly uneven power struggle between 136 Manafe, Teperpu: Reveals Pki's Betrayal in 1965 and the Trial of the Perpetrators, p. 125-126 Darat, "G.30.S Di Hadapan Mahmillub: Perkara Subandrio."p.l84 138 Ibid.p.l85 137 === [PDF page 240] === 224 the anti-communist under General Soeharto versus the PKI and Sukarno loyalists. The strategy that Subandrio used during the cross-examination was clearly a departure from that of Untung and Njono who had cooperated with the court, providing clear answers while remaining openly defiant of the charges. After testimony from almost thirty witnesses, including the written evidence from President Sukarno and others such as well-known PKI figures: Karel Supit and Peris Pardede, the examination was finally over and the SMT moved to the reading of the Requisitoir by the prosecutor on October 13, 1966. After reiterating the charges and summarizing the results of the examination process, the prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad remained solidly behind the charges and requested that SMT give the defendant the death sentence. He also asked that the government dishonorably discharge the defendant from all the official positions he had held. Furthermore, the prosecutor also asked the court to confiscate $500,000 that was allegedly illegally used to fund the BPI.139 The court went into recess and was scheduled to resume on October 17, 1966 to hear the Pledooi or defense statement from the defendant and his attorneys. The reading of the Pledooi began on October 17 at 8:00 a.m. with the defendant presenting his statement before the court, mostly an explanation of his actions as the head of BPI, foreign minister, and deputy vice premier I. In response to the accusations that he did not report the information about a possible PKI coup to the president on September 19, 1965, Subandrio argued that protocol prevented him from reporting it since the proper 139 Let. Kol. C.K.H. Ali Said S.H. and Let.Kol. C.K.H. Durmawel Ahmad S.H., Sangkur Adil Pengupas Fitnah Khianat: Proses H. Dr. Subandrio Di Depart Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Djakarta: Ethika, 1967).p.l50 === [PDF page 241] === 225 procedures was to relay any important information to armed forces intelligence. In effect, the BPI was not allowed to conduct any independent investigation or assessment.140 He further explained that he was required to report reliable and complete information to the president. Since he did not want to deliver incomplete or, even worse, faulty information, he decided not to report the rumor about the COG. In the same statement, the defendant also expressed his objections to the way the prosecutor and media portrayed his personality as the slimy, cunning wayang character Durno, the Haji from Peking, or an advocate of the Machiavellian principle of Het doel heiligt de middelen ("the end justify the means.")141 Regarding the spreading of the so called "Gilchrist document," the defendant said that he purposely brought the issue to the president since he was afraid that the letter was in fact a clarification plans by Great Britain and the United States for a joint attack on Indonesia. The president summoned all of the armed forces commanders and received assurances that General Ahmad Yani, the army chief of staff that the phrase "our local Army friends" in the document did not mean there was a COG within the Army. Yani agreed it should be interpreted to mean existing British support for armed groups such as the one led by Andi Sele in South Sulawesi. The same meeting also decided that the defendant would announce the existence of the "Gilchrist document" to the international community at the second Asian-African conference in Algiers. This announcement to an international audience aimed to serve three purposes: first, to raise the international community's awareness of the existence of 140 141 Ibid.p.l64 Ibid.p.176-177 === [PDF page 242] === 226 the document; second, to thwart possible British attacks on Indonesia; and third, to prevent Malaysia from becoming the participant in the Second Asia and Africa conference in Algiers.'42 The conference of course, never happened since there was a sudden change of government at Algieria. Nonetheless, the copy of the "Gilchrist document" was distributed during Subandrio's subsequent trip to twelve countries. As for the official announcement of the document in Cairo, Subandrio said it was done following the advice from President Nasser to serve the purpose summarized above. After the defendant returned from Cairo, no one discussed the document. So, the defendant argued, if the wording "our local Army friends" still had a negative meaning for the military, that problem could have been easily addressed, for example by having General Yani give press conference. As far as the defendant was concerned, there was no longer any problem.143 The rumor of COG never spread publicly through newspapers or radio prior to the G.30.S, so it was, the defendant insisted, limited to certain groups. Even one of the BPI staff, Basuki, never heard about it. However, the defendant admitted that it was possible for people in outlying the regions to have heard about the rumor and perhaps have a different interpretation about the nature of this information.144 Hence the defendant concluded that the announcement of the "Gilchrist document" had, in fact achieved four purposes: first, to prevent Great Britain's imminent attack on Indonesia; second, to prevent Malaysia from joining the second Asian African conference; third, to reduce the Ibid.p.190 Ibid.p.191 Ibid.p.192 === [PDF page 243] === 227 truth on the rumors about COG planned coup; fourth, and, finally to reduce the spread of the rumors about COG's plans to stage a coup.145 The defendant continued the explanation of his TURBA ("going below") activities on the day of the attempted coup, October 1, 1965, emphasizing the reasons why the PKI never liked his policies—especially his foreign policy. In essence, Dr.Subandrio rejected all the charges of communist collaboration, insisting that he had he tried to distance himself from the PKI. The HAB newspaper did not waste any time in publishing a negative portrayal of the defendant. In its October 18, 1966 headline about the defendant reading his defense (Pledooi) statement, the HAB article gave a negative impression of his attitude before the SMT, with a headline reading, Bandrio Tjoba bela diri dgn Ter-isak2 or, "Bandrio (Subandrio), Sobbing, While Trying to Defend Himself." The article described him as "reading his defense statement with a touching tone, miserable and sobbing a little bit." This derogatory public portrayal of a politician who had once been the second most powerful man in Indonesia reinforced the role of the SMT as a platform for the military to stage its triumph over a defeated enemy. In this case, Dr. Subandrio, the powerful Durno of guided democracy, was helplessly sobbing as he begged for mercy from the SMT, indicating the passing of an old order and the ascent of the new. After the defendant finished reading his pledooi, the defense attorney, Mr. Subagio Djojopranoto, read his statement on behalf of the defendant. In the eksepsi part l45 Ibid.p.l93 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Bandrio Tjoba Bela Diri Dgn Ter-Isak2," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 18 October 1966 1966.p.l 146 === [PDF page 244] === 228 of the SMT, Subagio was responsible for the political dimension of the defense while Mr. Yap Thiam Hien handled the judicial aspect. Subagio began his defense by objecting to the biased attitude of the prosecutor who, in his opinion, had already found the defendant guilty even before the court had reached its decision.147 To refute the prosecutor's accusation that the defendant had given unclear and evasive responses, Mr. Subagio reminded the court that the defendant was a politician and the prosecutor and the judges were officers of the law. Thus, there was miscommunication that Subagio summarized saying, "We don't talk with the same language."148 Subagio then argued that the charges that the defendant was responsible for causing disruptions to the government's distribution of food and clothing, the security of the nation, to the struggle against economic imperialism in West Irian were totally unfounded.14 Even if all the charges were proven, the prosecutor's request for death sentence was too harsh. At most, Subagio argued, the sentence should be life imprisonment.150 Moreover, Mr. Subagio also expressed his astonishment at why, prior to the outbreak of the G.30.S, when the defendant still held all the powerful government positions, no one dared to criticize him, let alone presuming to put the defendant on trial. After a number of street demonstrations, or so-called student street parliaments, criticism S.H., Sangkur Adil Pengupas Fitnah Khianat: Proses H. Dr. Subandrio Di Depart Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa.p.224 148 Ibid.p.230 149 Ibid.p.232 === [PDF page 245] === 229 of the defendant was sharp. Hence, Mr. Subagio argued, it was politics alone that had brought the defendant before the SMT.151 Towards the end of his defense statement, Subagio repeated his objections, echoing the statement made by General Soeharto when he bestowed Subandrio's case on the SMT, hoping that the tribunal would work, not for of retribution, but to uphold justice and to seek truth. He concluded the defense statement by enumerating all services the defendant had done to the nation listing his illustrious achievements from medical doctor to prominent politician. The second defense attorney, Mr.Yap Thiam Hien, began his statement by praising the fairness of the SMT process. However, he reminded the court that his acknowledgment of the SMT process did not automatically mean agreement with the interactions between the judges, prosecutor, and himself as defense attorney. He hoped that the SMT process would follow the "rule of law" not "the law of the rulers."153 Mr. Yap also expressed his regret that the defendant had been treated unfairly in public, criminalized before proven guilty by the court. Regarding the charges of instigating hatred in front of the GSNI youth forum by urging the masses "to fight terror with terror," the defense called that accusation exaggerated. Even before the defendant made that speech, tensions between youth groups such as GSNI and KAMI/KAPPI organization already existed. So the charges of Ibid.p.240 Ibid.p.244 Ibid.p.252 === [PDF page 246] === 230 instigating hatred and terror were doubtful.154 As for the defendant's comments that the press was CIA-funded, the defense felt that it was common for public officials to suffer a "slip of the tongue" in their statements, something that could be easily rectified and did not qualify as instigating hatred among the people.155 Regarding the "Gilchrist document," the defense argued that at beginning of this affair when the chief of staff and the president had discussed the document, the late Ahmad Yani never protested the inference that "our local Army friends" might mean the COG. Moreover, the defendant never announced the existence of the "Gilchrist document" at home and none of the nation's newspapers ever cited it. As for the authenticity of the document, that was a different matter. Most importantly, the defense argued that document was useful as a political tool to prevent the Nekolim powers, Great Britain and the United States, from reaching their goals.156 Mr. Yap questioned the prosecutor about the "Gilchrist document," in particular the phrase, "our local Army friends." He argued that the meaning did not necessarily mean "Army friends" which indicated the military per se. The phrase could also mean the i en "friends of the Army," which could refer to others beyond the military. Before closing his statement, Mr Yap reiterated the biblical story about a mob that wanted to execute a woman who had committed adultery. The mob then asked the teacher Jesus what he would do in this situation, and Jesus said, "Who among you who are not sinners may cast the first stone at this woman." The mob immediately dispersed 154 Ibid.p.264 Ibid. 156 Ibid.p.268 155 === [PDF page 247] === 231 since among them there were those who had committed adultery with the same woman. In essence, Mr. Yap Thiam Hien wanted to show the court that no one was truly innocent. As he ended his defense statement, he requested that the court to show justice to the defendant who was not only recipient of many prestigious medals, honorary degrees, and high positions, but because he too was a child of God.158 The following day, the SMT resumed and allowed the prosecutor to respond to the defense (replik). In his opening statement, the prosecutor did not waste time commenting on the dramatic efforts of the defendant and his defense attorney: "The defendant poetically recited his defense and the defense used the tone of a preacher who spoke in front of his flock. A good method to make the court feel touched. Unfortunately, it was not enough to convince all of us."159 The prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad, continued his speech with barrage of words demeaning the defendant who, used his defense to explain his tasks as deputy premier, head of the Intelligence body, and other positions in a disrespectful way. It was precisely this kind of attitude, the prosecutor stated that the defendant had been operating with all this time, showing his real character, the Durno character a person without any shame.160 The prosecutor denied the defense attorney's objections that the prosecutor had treated the defendant as if he were already proven guilty while the proceedings were still ongoing. The prosecutor argued that what he did in the examination process was simply to ask questions and gather information, not to undermine the defendant's rights. The Ibid.p.278 Ibid.p.280 Ibid.p.283 === [PDF page 248] === 232 prosecutor claimed that his method of gathering information was based on the knowledge of the judges, the information from the defendant, the witnesses, and experts as well as documents. Hence the defense's accusations, the prosecutor argued, were unfounded. Durmawel Ahmad ended his replik to Mr.Subagio Djojopranoto's defense with the assertion that the defendant was the architect of the old order which had no place in the New Order. Moreover, the prosecutor claimed that the defendant still adhered to the cult of personality worship. In response to Mr.Yap Thiam Hien's defense statement, the prosecutor opined that the defense was too naive to think that the defendant's speech to the youth group did not constitute an instigation of hatred. The prosecutor expressed his dismay at the defense's assertion on this matter and reminded Mr.Yap Thim Hien about the fighting that happened right after the defendant's speech. In the prosecutor's opinion, the defense was irresponsible not to see the connection between this fiery speech and subsequent events.162 On the assertion that the defendant speeches were as merely "a slip of tongue," the prosecutor expressed his disbelief. In reality, he insisted, the defendant's statement about CIA-funded newspapers had caused great anxiety among the public. People began to wonder which newspaper was really funded by the CIA. Although the defendant later corrected his statement his initial attitude expressed his true character. Ibid.p.289 Ibid.p.297 Ibid.p.298 === [PDF page 249] === The SMT moved to the next stage with the defense attorneys giving their responses to the prosecutor's assertions. Both defense attorneys gave short responses which, in essence, disagreed with many of the prosecutor's points. According to court rules, their objection would be considered by the judges before they reached a verdict. The court then went into recess and was scheduled to resume on October 25, 1966 at 8:00 p.m. to decide the fate of the defendant. On the day of the verdict, the SMT for Dr.Subandrio began its seventeenth and final session. From 5:00 p.m. heavy rain had poured down on the city of Jakarta for three hours and did not stop until the SMT session began at 8:00 p.m. A publication from a called "Analisa" interpreted this natural phenomenon as "God's feelings on Subandrio's treachery who is about to receive his verdict. The heavy downpour along with the thunderous roar of lightning was a sign of God's anger toward Subandrio who betrayed his own nation. As for the gentle moon that appeared and radiated its glimmer that came after the rain, it was a sign of the gentleness of life that the Indonesian people will encounter after the SMT gives a just verdict in accordance with truth and justice as yearned for by God."164 The presiding judge, Lieutenant Colonel CKH, AH Said SH, began the proceeding right on schedule, instructing the defendant to stand before the court as he began reading the verdict. Realizing the extreme length of the statement, which consisted of a detailed summary of the entire SMT proceeding, he instructed the defendant to sit down. Towards the end when the verdict was about to be read, he asked him to stand again. 164 Analisa, Kisah Dan Nasib Hadji Dr.Subandrio.p.174 === [PDF page 250] === 234 After reviewing all the testimony, evidence, and statements from the defendant and witnesses, the SMT court found that the defendant's action had "touched all the hearts and feelings of the people in the form of a crime that contradicted the Pancasila philosophy of politics, economy, social culture, and military."165 Then came a long and elaborately detailed description of the defendant's crimes against each of the principles of Pancasila. As at Njono and Untung's trial, the SMT for Dr.Subandrio found that the defendant had betrayed Indonesian's most sacred philosophy, Pancasila. However, in Dr. Subandrio's case, the SMT seemed to focus its most relentless attack on what the prosecutor claimed to be the defendant's philosophy of het doel heiligt de middelen ("the ends justifies the means"). As an illustration of the defendant's crimes against Pancasila's first principle, the court found evidence of a violation of the "Belief in one Supreme God." As someone who follows het doel heiligt de middelen philosophy the defendant clearly contradicted the "Belief in one Supreme God." 166 As for violating the second principle, on humanity, the sentence clearly suggested, once again, that the defendant followed the het doel heiligt de middelen. In a nation struggling to eradicate the remnants of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, the use of the aforementioned philosophy would clearly hamper peaceful coexistence. The third principle of Pancasila about nationalism was also contradicted by the defendant's het doel heiligt de middelen philosophy. The core of nationalism, unity, 165 S.H., Sangkur Adil Pengupas Fitnah Khianat: Proses H. Dr. Subandho Di Depart Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa.pA3$ 166 Ibid.p.438-439 === [PDF page 251] === 235 could not be achieved if there were many conflicts, between groups that arose from a personal lust for power derived from the defendant's philosophy. The court argued that the fourth principle which acknowledged of human rights and individual freedom was clearly violated by the defendant's philosophy of het doel heiligt de middelen.169 Finally, on the violation of the fifth principle of social justice, the het doel heiligt de middelen philosophy that the defendant advocated inevitably contradicted this goal of achieving a just and prosperous society.170 The description of the defendant's crimes against Pancasila were in fact, much longer than the description above, the explanation of these so-called "crimes," the prosecutor continued the discussion of Pancasila as "God-sent-inspiration," which contained values of morality and religion.171 The prosecutions reference to Pancasila and religious values was a deadly combination as it strengthened the already widespread concept of the "good versus evil"—that is, those who were religious against those who had no religion, the communist group. By merging the values of religion with the sacred state philosophy Pancasila, the SMT had created powerful legal tool to eradicate the god-less communists from Indonesia forever. In using its legal status and authority to advance these already powerful combinations, the SMT became even more powerful. Finally, after almost three and a half hours, the judges reading reached the final verdict. At 11:27 p.m. sharp, the presiding judge, Lieutenant Colonel CKH Ali Said SH, 168 Ibid. Ibid.p.440 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 169 === [PDF page 252] === with firm and confident voice read the decision of the SMT. The court found the defendant, Hadji Dr. Subandrio, fifty-two years old, born in Kepandjen, Malang East Java, guilty of the following charges: (1) assisting other people in preparing a rebellion with the purpose of overthrowing the legal government, while the defendant knew that his criminal acts would disrupt the government programs; and (2) committing acts that undermined the authority of the legitimate state by spreading hatred, division, conflict, discord, and turmoil, including economic distress among the population with the purpose of hampering the efforts of restoring order following the G.30.S and lessening the meaning of this movement as a counter revolutionary act. For these crimes, the SMT sentenced the defendant to death.172 In addition, the SMT also revoked all the defendant's honorary medals from the government. All expenses incurred during the proceedings shall, the court ruled, be the responsibility of the government. As soon as the death sentence was given, the spectators wanted to see how the prisoner would react. To their surprise, the defendant did not show any meaningful expression comparable to his emotions during the reading of his defense statement. Only slight perspiration was visible on his forehead, the only clue about his feelings upon receiving a death sentence. The reporter from "Analisa" described Dr. Subandrio's mental condition as "sadness upon hearing the death sentence." As the prisoner was escorted out the courtroom, camera flash bulbs popped from photographers who took pictures incessantly. Dr. Subandrio looked a bit pale and restless. Before he was taken out from the court room, the presiding judge asked the 172 173 Analisa, Kisah Dan Nasib Hadji Dr.Subandrio.p.46l Ibid.p.l72 === [PDF page 253] === 237 prisoner whether he wanted to ask for pardon or clemency (Grasi) from the president. Dr. Subandrio's response was almost unheard as his voice was very faint. He said that he wanted to use his rights to ask for pardon or clemency and the presiding judge acknowledged the request and granted thirty days for him to make the request. Before he left the court room, Dr.Subandrio stopped at the prosecutor's desk and made a request to see his wife for the last time. The prosecutor Durmawel Ahmad responded by saying, "We will find the proper time for it."174 Dr.Subandrio said "good bye" to the prosecutor and right after that the two military police escorted the handcuffed Dr.Subandrio out of the court room. 175 The sentencing of Dr.Subandrio received warm response from the minister and army chief of staff General Soeharto who expressed his highest gratitude to the SMT team of judges and prosecutor for a task well done in upholding justice and truth.176 As a token of his gratitude, General Soeharto honored the SMT team members with certificate of appreciation for their integrity in concluding the difficult task and thus fulfilling their responsibility of upholding justice in front of God almighty.177 As in Njono and Untung's cases, General Soeharto played important role in the trial of Dr. Subandrio, as he was responsible for deciding who was to be put on trial in the SMT cases. Moreover, he had to approve the verdict for the defendant. In effect, the SMT proceeding was General Soeharto's responsibility. By having such an extraordinary Ibid.p.l75 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Urap Sari Mamillub: Durno Minta Bertemu Terachir Dg Istrinja," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 27 October 1966 1966.p.2 176 Analisa, Kisah Dan Nasib Hadji Dr.Subandrio.p. 186 l77 Ibid.p.l87 175 === [PDF page 254] === 238 authority over cases related to the failed G.30.S, General Soeharto had free hand to condemn not only those who had direct connection to G.30.S, but also those whom he saw as enemies of his emerging anti-communist regime. Prominent figures like Dr. Subandrio were seen as someone who did not have direct relations with the G.30.S, but were definitely a political threat. General Soeharto put him on trial as a well-known Sukarno loyalist, thus indirectly attacking President Sukarno and slowly usurping his power. On the other hand, Dr. Subandrio was seen as the representatives of the old order regime as the military promoted the dichotomized differences between the "Old Order" and the "New Order." Subandrio's attitude was portrayed by the media and the prosecutor as uncooperative, indecisive, and often pretentious. These negative traits became symbols of the general character of the so-called "Old Order." The purpose of the SMT was clear from the very beginning. Above all, it was an arena for staging the triumph of the emerging anti-communist military regime, generating support from the population and strengthening the legitimacy of the "New Order" while simultaneously ignoring the ongoing mass arrests and killings. The SMT helped created a narrative of the army's triumph over the aggressive threats of the God-less communist, using the sacred concept of Pancasila as a vehicle to gain effective support in defeating the treacherous, communists. The SMT proceedings reflected the power struggle between the emerging "New Order" against the "Old Order." Despite its claims of objectivity, the proceedings clearly showed that the SMT cannot escape the subjectivity of external influences. The so-called === [PDF page 255] === 239 "New Order" was slowly gaining ground in the power struggle and relentlessly eradicating the "Old Order," symbolized by President Sukarno. This struggle can be seen clearly during the SMT trial of former Brigadier General Supardjo, who was accused of serving as the second in command in the G.30.S movement. As we will see in the next section, his trial coincided with the increasing public pressure to unravel any connection between the G.30.S, PKI, and president Sukarno. The Trial of Brigadier General Mustafa Sjarif Supardjo "Incredible outcome from Operation 'Kalong', "proclaimed the jubilant headline of the army newspaper Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (HAB) on Monday January 16, 1967, "Former General Supardjo & Anwar Sanusi Captured Alive."178 After more than a year on the run, Supardjo's arrest coincided with the eve of the biggest Muslim holiday Idul Fitri or Lebaran, the end of the fasting month. The other captive, Anwar Sanusi, was a member of PKI Central Committee and he also been on the run since the collapse of the Thirtieth September Movement. As if to enforce the religious feeling, Brigadier General Sugandhi, the General Staff of Security and Defense affirmed that: "God has given Lebaran gifts to the whole Indonesian people with the arrest of Gestapu/PKI figures ex General Supardjo and Anwar Sanusi."179 Even though the former General Supardjo was arrested on the January 12, the announcement did not appear in the newspaper until four days later. On the day of his 178 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Hasil Gemilang "Operasi Kalong": Ex Brigdjen Supardjo & Anwar Sanusi Ditangkap Hidup2," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 16 Djanuari 1967 1967.p. 1 179 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Supardjo & Anwar Sanusi Hadiah Lebaran Dari Jme," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 20 Djanuary 1967 1967.p.l === [PDF page 256] === 240 arrest, however, the 7:00 pm radio news and 8:00 pm television news made the announcement to the public.180 On January 16, 1967 a HAB editorial described Supardjo as someone who "is slippery like an eel, and for some people he was almost mythical and considered to posses magical ability of 'invincibility', since so many times he managed to escape from state apparatus ambushes that were trying to capture him. Finally, he was captured through the Operation Kalong. "181 His arrest took place at the time when the national political situation was increasingly hostile to President Sukarno Several months before Supardjo's arrest on June 22, 1966, under the intense pressure from the public and Soeharto's New Order regime, president Sukarno finally agreed to deliver his accountability speech titled "Nawaksara." The speech was meant as the president's personal, statement of responsibility in relation to the G.30.S event. Sukarno refused to use the name G.30.S in referring to the September movement, instead calling it "Gestok," Gerakan Satu Oktober, or the October 1 movement. After the reading of Nawaksara, the parliament requested that the president provide more information regarding his alleged involvement with the 30l September Movement. And for that purpose Sukarno prepared another speech, which he called the supplementary for "Nawaksara.'XPe/ercg&ap Nawaksara). Supardjo's arrest happened merely two days after the president completed the reading of this supplementary section in front of the parliament on January 10, 1967. In this section, the president repeated his claim that the Thirtieth September Movement happened because: the PKI leaders were 180 M.Nurdin A.S., Supardjo Direnggut Kalong (P.T.Varia, 1967).p.l7 Editorial, "Tertangkapnja "Mr.Goed" Dan "Mr.Hamil Tua"," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 16 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.l 181 === [PDF page 257] === 241 twisted (Keblinger), there was subversion from Nekolim, and the existence of certain "bad" individuals. Amidst the intense public debate over the content of the supplementary speech, General Supardjo was arrested. The HAB editorial on January 16, 1967 expressed the hope that his arrest would clarify some information about G.30.S and "the good name and the authority of the president, plus other things that still remained as question marks that could be clarified so he [the president] would not suffer continuous public attack."182 Immediately after his arrest people began speculating when Supardjo would be put on trial. On January 18, the HAB newspaper stressed the importance of Supardjo's trial to help "clarify the 'fog' at Halim"— referring to the controversial event on October 1, 1965 at the Halim Perdana Kusuma Air Force base when Supardjo reported to President Sukarno about the movement. The meeting between the president and Supardjo at Halim had become the source of considerable controversy, since the information circulating had been contradictory, especially regarding the president's reaction. One version described how the president gently tapped the shoulder of Supardjo and said in Dutch, "Goed...goed" upon hearing his report about the abduction of the Generals— as if giving his approval to their removal. Publicly, the President denied that accusation and claimed that his reaction to what happened on October 1 was a "complete overrompelling, " or a complete surprise.184 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Ex Brigdjen Supardjo Akan Segera Di Mahmillubkan," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 18 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.l 184 === [PDF page 258] === 242 While waiting for Supardjo's trial date, public anxiety about the president's involvement was fed through the many accusations in the newspapers. Some groups, such as the Islamic leaders from West Java, publicly announced their demand for putting President Sukarno on trial. Other articles mentioned that a number of people felt that Bung Karno had indeed had a strong involvement with the Gestapu/PKI.186 The newspapers were full of these serious allegations about the possibility of the president's involvement therefore the situation demanded a convincing explanation to muffle the growing public restlessness. Amidst this political background, the trial of Supardjo began on February 23, 1967. Weeks before the trial begun, the newspapers published almost daily reports about Supardjo's interrogation and investigation. Ostensibly the truth this information in the newspapers was actually 'passed' by the appropriate authorities for publication. The news of Supardjo's supposed 'confession,' for example, was doubtful since these accounts supported the Army's version that the PKI was behind the failed coup attempt. For example, the Sinar Harapan newspaper claimed that Supardjo confessed to the investigative team that he had been receiving information about Council Of Generals (COG) from his PKI 'handlers' since early 1965.187 In relation to Sukarno's reaction hearing the report at Halim Airport, the newspaper cited Supardjo's confession, saying he had admitted that the president not 185 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Ulama2 Djabar: Adili Ir.Sukarno," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 27 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.l 186 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Rakjat Banyak Berpendapat: Bung Karno Terlibat Gestapu/Pki," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 27 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.l 187 Sinar Harapan, "Pengakuan Supardjo: Info "Dd" Dari Pki," Sinar Harapan, 24 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.2 === [PDF page 259] === 243 only tapped his shoulder but also embraced him.188 Other headlines suggested that Sukarno questioned Supardjo about why the movement (G.30.S) had failed to kill General Nasution. Citing official claims, the newspaper headlines also attacked Supardjo's personaly, for example, "Supardjo Confessed That He Cajoled The President Because He Wanted To Advance In His Career."190 It was obvious that public opinion was being manipulated against Supardjo long before the trial began. After more than a month of continuous interrogation, the first session of Supardjo's SMT trial finally commenced on February 23, 1967 at the BAPPENAS building— the same place where Njono, Untung and Subandrio had been tried. As in the previous SMT trials, Supardjo's proceedings attracted the interest of many domestic and foreign journalists. Indeed, no less than one hundred fifty journalists attended.191 On February 14, ten days before the trial, General Soeharto, in his capacity as the minister of the army had bestowed the Supardjo trial documents on the assigned SMT team. This team was headed by Lieutenant Colonel CKH Soegiri SH who would also serve as the presiding judge. The military prosecutor (Oditur) was Lieutenant Colonel CKH Soebari SH.192 Once again, General Soeharto repeated his ritualized speech for this occasion requesting the Supardjo team to "uphold the personality and authority of the SMT as the defender of justice and truth which can be accountable to the law and 188 Bersendjata, "Ex Brigdjen Supardjo Akan Segera Di Mahmillubkan."p.l Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Dari Pengakuan Supardjo: Bung Karno Tanja: "Kenapa Gagal Bunuh DjenNas."" Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 23 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.l 190 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Supardjo M'ngaku Mendjilat Presiden Karena Ingin Madju Dim Cariernja," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 21 Djanuari 1967 1967.p.1 191 A.S., Supardjo Direnggut Kalong.p.60 192 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Menpangad/Pangkopkam Djenderal Soeharto: Mahmillub Pembela Kedilan & Kebenaran. Berkasp Perkara Ex Brigdjen Supardjo Diserhakan Kepada Team Mahmillub," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 15 Februari 1967 1967.p.l 189 === [PDF page 260] === 244 constitution, to the people in general, but most importantly to God almighty."193 On this occasion, Soeharto also reminded the SMT team about the unique nature of the trial since its impact was heavier than previous cases, politically and psychologically.194 As defense attorney, the SMT assigned Mr. Soetardji SH and Mr. Fredericus Christopher Tjiam SH who preferred to be addressed as legal advisor.195 Amidst all preparation for the Supardjo SMT trial, the nation was also undergoing a major transition. On the first day of Supardjo's trial, it was announced that, as of February 20, 1967, President Sukarno had relinquished all executive authority to General Soeharto. In a signed letter, the president claimed that his action of relinquishing executive power to Soeharto was in accordance with Parliament Decision Number XV/MPRS/ of 1966 and the 1945 constitution. With that announcement, Sukarno effectively ended his presidency. A special session of parliament was, however, still needed to formalize the transfer of power.1 6 With President Sukarno's ouster, Supardjo's SMT trial took a slightly different turn. For months, many groups had wanted Sukarno to appear before the court as a defendant, or at least as one of the witnesses in the Supardjo case. Since, Sukarno had submitted written testimony in the SMT for Subandrio, many people expected him to testify in Supardjo's trial. However, on February 22, 1967, one day before the beginning of this latter trial, Lieutenant Colonel Datuk Mulia SH, the spokesman for SMT, 193 Ibid. Ibid. 195 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Supardjo Hari Ini Ke Mahmillub: 3 Tokoh Penting Djadi Saksi Diantara 32 Orang," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 23 Februari 1967 1967.p.l 196 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Mulai Tanggal 20 Pebruari 1967: Pres. Sukarno Serahkan Kekuasaan Kepada Djendral Suharto," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 23 Februari 1967 1967.p.1 194 === [PDF page 261] === 245 announced that Sukarno would not be asked to testify in this case since there were already thirty-two witnesses.197 In response to those who were disappointed, Datuk Mulia claimed the reason was purely legal. He then added that even if Sukarno testified the result would probably benefit Sukarno's supporters and not be what the general public 198 expected. The first day of trial began on scheduled at 9:00 a.m., starting with the usual procedure of identifying the defendant, and followed by the reading of the charges. Inside the court room, hundreds of people—journalists, prominent figures such as the chief of the Supreme Court Mr. Agung Suprijadi SH and the minister of justice Prof. Umar Seno Adji SH, as well as several foreign military attaches—packed the court room to witness the first session.199 Outside the building, thousands of people listened to the proceedings through the loudspeakers while the nation followed the news on Radio Republic Indonesia and state-run television TVRI. As usual, security was tight with the four branches of the Armed Forces providing several layers of protection in a two-hundred meter radius around the building.200 As swarm of photographers surrounded him to take pictures, Supardjo entered the court room looking calm and smiling at the audience. He wore a light blue shirt with a grey drill pants and shiny brown shoes. Tall and large framed, Supardjo stood before the 197 Sinar Harapan, "Mahmillub Perkara Supardjo Kamis Mulai Bersidang: Tidak Perlu Kesaksian Presiden Sukarno," Sinar Harapan, 22 Februari 1967 1967.p.l 198 Sinar Harapan, "Tidak Diperlukannja Kesaksian Presiden: Pertimbangan Hukum Se-Mata2," Sinar Harapan, 23 February 1967 1967.p.l 199 A.S., Supardjo Direnggut Kalong.p.6\ 200 Ibid.p.63 === [PDF page 262] === 246 judges listening as the prosecutor lieutenant colonel Soebari SH read the charges.201 First, the defendant between August and October 1965— along with Sjam (PKI Special bureau chief), Omar Dani, former minister of the Air Force, Latief former infantry colonel, Untung former infantry lieutenant colonel, Sujono, former Air Force major— conspired to foment an armed rebellion against Indonesian authorities, rebel with the intention of overthrowing the government, and using illegitimate methods to change the form of the government.202 Second, between August and October 1965, the defendant—along with the parties named above— acted as the leader or raised arms against the authority of the state of Indonesia using an armed organization named "Divisi Ampera/Ampera Division." Along these conspirators the defendant went to Lubang Buaya to check on final troop preparations along with Untung, Sujono, Sjam, Pono, and another former captain for the G.30.S; and, then, the defendant witnessed the departure of the troops from Lubang Buaya to their respective targets.203 Third, on October 1, 1965 the defendant in Jakarta, whether alone or with other people such as Sjam, Pono, Untung, Latief, Sujono, and Heru Atmodjo, acted as the organizer of a rebellion with the intention of overthrowing the legitimate Republic of Indonesia by creating the revolutionary council and disbanding the Dwikora cabinet, but failed due to forces beyond the defendant's control.204 Fourth and finally, between 201 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Tuduhan Oditur: 2 Kategori Kesalahan Ex Brigdjen Supardjo," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 24 Februari 1967 1967.p.l 202 Perkara M.S.Supardjo V.l, 1 (1967).p.l65 203 Ibid.p.l68 204 Ibid.p. 169 === [PDF page 263] === 247 October 2, 1965 to January 12,1967 the defendant undertook a series of acts that endangered the state's authority, administration, and legitimacy, and thus spread hatred, division, tension, chaos, instability and restlessness among the population.205 After the prosecutor finished reading these long, detailed charges, Supardjo's legal advisor, Mr. FC Tjiam, expressed his objection/Eksepsi. He mostly objected to the law that the prosecutor used to charge the defendant. None of the laws, he argued, had any legal basis in the constitution or other more established laws, since in any court of law those particular criteria had to be fulfilled. Hence, FC Tjiam requested that the SMT cancel all charges.206 Supardjo also expressed his own Eksepsi in which he requested the government and the president to review the validity of the formation of the SMT. He requested that the court be totally revamped as there had, he argued, been two major parties fighting each other—the COG, which planned to overthrow the government, and the Thirtieth September Movement. Furthermore, Supardjo expressed his approval of punishing those who had been involved with killings of the generals. But he also questioned the status of the military leaders who, he said, were responsible for the deaths of more than 500,000 innocent people.207 The prosecutor then responded to Supardjo's legal advisors, in essence rejecting their claims regarding the irregularity of the SMT. The prosecutor argued that all the laws used in the SMT proceedings followed the constitution and referred to some arguments based on those laws. Therefore, the prosecutor requested the SMT presiding judge to 205 Ibid.p.115 Ibid.p.l24 207 A.S., Supardjo Direnggut Kalong.p.69 206 === [PDF page 264] === reject the objections from the defendant's legal advisors. In response, the SMT judges concluded that their court did not violate any law, and it should proceed with the 90S examination of the defendant and witnesses. The presiding judge also dismissed the defendant's objections and deemed it unsuitable for an eksepsi, ruling it a self-serving effort from the defendant.209 The court then recessed and scheduled the examination of the defendant for the following day. The next day, the court commenced its examination process. Before the questioning began, the defendant claimed that there were many discrepancies in the preliminary investigation report (BAP) and asked to present a different one to the SMT. 910 As in the previous trials, the first major issue was again the existence of COG. Supardjo claimed that he first heard about the COG in March 1965 from Colonel Latief, then from Sjam, and later from General Yani himself. The information from Colonel Latief was only about the existence of a COG within the Army to oppose certain government decisions. On this same occasion, the defendant disclosed some Army activities in challenging or contradicting official government policy. It was well known that the Army, in particular, was dragging its feet in konfrontasi. As one of the field commanders stationed in the front for the konfrontasi against Malaysia, the defendant claimed that often times he did not have total control of the units that were supposed to be under his 208 PerkaraM.S.Supardjo K/.p.l34 A.S., Supardjo Direnggut Kalong.p.70 210 Perkara M.S. Supardjo V.2, 2 (1967).p. 20 211 Ibid. 209 === [PDF page 265] === 249 command. As the result, he was convinced that the COG did exist and its function was not only limited as an advisory body. Most importantly, the council also did analysis of the nation's politics. He further explained that he was certain that the COG was different from the Wandjakti council, since that particular body was only responsible for discussing command changes within the Army organization. The examination became heated as Supardjo expressed his discontent with the prosecutor's claims based on the interrogation report (BAP.) In this document, the defendant allegedly admitted that he had been a member of the Thirtieth September Movement. Supardjo insisted that he never made that admission. When the judge challenged this statement by showing Supardjo's signature on the BAP, Supardjo claimed that during the interrogation the situation was unfavorable to him so he just signed whatever the interrogator gave him during questioning sometimes ran from 7:30 p.m. until 5:00 a.m.214 Listening to the defendant's claims, the prosecutor could not control its agitation. With an angry tone, he scolded the defendant, saying that he should at least be fair because during the interrogation, the prosecutor and the defendant had often debated the content of the BAP..The defendant, he insisted, should have mentioned things that he wanted to change in the report before signing it.215 Furthermore, the presiding judge asked the defendant if he had been given a chance to review the interrogation report before signing it, to which the defendant 212 Ibid.p23-24 Ibid, p.41 214 Ibid.p.50-51 215 Sinar Harapan, "Dari Sidang Ke-2 Mahmillub Supardjo: Tertuduh Melakukan "Perang Kata" Dengan Oditur," Sinar Harapan, 24 Februari 1967 1967.p.l 213 === [PDF page 266] === 250 answered, "Yes." The presiding judge then found the defendant's objections to the BAP groundless and decided to use this report as part of the evidence.216 The defendant continued to argue that, throughout the interrogation period, the situation was never favorable to him, including the time when he was reviewing the BAP. Since he did not want to have more trouble with the prosecutor cum interrogator, he had decided to just sign the report. Supardjo's response made both the prosecutor and the presiding judge feel that he was deliberately giving twisted answers and trying to make the examination process difficult. As a result, the prosecutor often lost his temper and both the defendant and the prosecutor repeatedly interrupted each other. At one point, the prosecutor became angry and reprimanded the defendant by saying: "I demand the defendant to act as a former general, as what I am seeing now he has nothing left of it."218 As if that were not enough in reprimanding the defendant, the prosecutor continued to demean the defendant's character, saying: "It was announced earlier that the defendant last position/work was the vice chairman of the Revolutionary Council and member of the G.30.S. However, it is 91Q more appropriate to mention that the defendant's last position was a fugitive. The insults and sarcasm of the prosecutor toward the defendant became even more prevalent in the discussion of the slain generals: O (Oditur): When did you [defendant] get your promotion as general? D (Defendant): Year 1965. O: August? 216 Perkara M.S. Supardjo K2.p.50-51 Ibid. 218 Ibid.p.53 217 === [PDF page 267] === 251 D: Yes, that is correct. O: So in August you received your promotion as general and in October you murdered generals right?220 The examination process then shifted from discussing the COG to the events of October 1st and 2nd. Both the judges and the prosecutor wanted to know as much detail as possible about what had happened on that day and the specific role of the defendant in those events. In some instances, the judge asked the defendant a specific question about the president's reaction upon hearing the report from the defendant, especially about General Nasution's escape. "What was the facial expression of the president at that time?" the judge asked. To which the defendant answered, "Very calm." The judge continued, "Did he show regret?" Supardjo answered, "Just usual, calm and onderzoeken vraag" [examining the question]. These types of questions were obviously aimed to discredit President Sukarno, especially considering that he no longer held executive power, although, as stated above the parliament still needed to officially remove him. The judges and prosecutor also wanted to know about the president's reaction upon learning of the abduction of the generals. One question from the judge asked specifically whether or not the president said upon learning the fate of the generals, "In een revolutie kan zo iets gebeuren," or "In a revolution that such things often happened." In response to this query, the defendant answered indirectly, and explained that the president was also asking him questions about the situation, stating that Nekolim (Neo Colonialism and Imperialism) would benefit from this situation. After that, the president 220 221 Ibid.p.56 Ibid.p.93 === [PDF page 268] === 252 asked the defendant if he could stop the movement. So, in essence, the defendant felt that the president's remark was referring to the benefit that Nekolim could draw from the incident. So, if one were looking only at that particular statement, then it was possible that people could easily misunderstand the president's intention.222 The defendant seemed to defend President Sukarno from the attempts of both prosecutor and the judge to establish strong connection between the president and the Thirtieth September Movement. Although the president was spared from giving his testimony, he was, nonetheless, incriminated indirectly during Supardjo's examination. The testimony from the thirty-two witnesses mostly focused on Supardjo's role in these events, but they also tried to figure out what happened on that day. Testimony from the president's adjutants and escort were heard during the examination period. However, none of the testimonies, especially from key figures such as Lieutenant Colonel Untung, could provide any certainty, about the defendant's involvement in the movement. Untung claimed that he never knew nor met with Supardjo before September 29, 1965, just two days before the movement began. He asserted that on September 19, Sjam, the man from the PKI Special Bureau, mentioned a general who would lend his support to the movement without giving any name.223 The testimony from other prominent figures such as Brigadier General Sabur, the former commander of the Tjakrabirawa presidential guard, also did not provide conclusive evidence of the defendant's involvement. Sabur, who was present at the Halim Air Force Base with President Sukarno, witnessed the defendant delivering his report 222 223 Ibid.p.95 Ibid.p.288 === [PDF page 269] === 253 about the situation. Furthermore, Sabur denied seeing the president sympathetically tapping the defendant's shoulder, let alone embracing him during the meeting, as was now widely believed by the public.224 Regarding any PKI relations with the defendant, the SMT summoned Sudisman, the lone PKI politburo member who had survived the killings to give evidence. In his testimony, Sudisman claimed he knew the defendant when he was in hiding after the failed Thirtieth September Movement. During their meeting, Sudisman admitted that both of them discussed the reasons for the failure of the movement, with the defendant providing a critique and analysis.225 Supardjo denied any involvement in or relations with the PKI, even though he admitted that he had known Sjam, the secretive PKI Special Bureau member, since 1956. However, Supardjo claimed that for years he never had any contact with Sjam, who claimed in their conversations that he only belonged to some leftist groups. Only after he heard about the COG from Colonel Latief in March 1965, did he resume contact with Sjam. He continued his denial of any relation with the PKI and disputed the meeting with Sudisman, claiming that he did not know who Sudisman was since he was not using his real name.227 However, one witness did provide damning evidence of Supardjo's connection with the Thirtieth September Movement and the PKI. Former Air Force major Sujono, also known as Mr. Djojo, the commander of the Halim Air Force base, testified that he 224 Ibid.p.413 Ibid.p520-521 226 Ibid.p.39 227 Ibid.p.531 225 === [PDF page 270] === had met Supardjo on September 30, 1965 at around 10:00 p.m.— only hours before the movement began, at the PENAS building where the movement CENKO or central command, was located. Sujono claimed that Supardjo ordered him to pick up the PKI chairman D.N. Aidit and bring him to Halim Air Force base.228 When the prosecutor asked if he was sure that it was indeed Supardjo who had given the order to pick up Aidit, Sujono stated: "There was no mistake. Although I had not met him for ten years, only [hearing] his name, it appeared that his fresh face was still the same since I first knew him in Subang." Furthermore, Sujono asserted that after the movement collapsed and its troops were on the run, Supardjo ordered him to escort D.N. Aidit to the airplane that would take him to Yogyakarta.230 Sujono's testimony gave compelling evidence that the prosecutor needed about the nature of Supardjo's involvement in the Thirtieth September Movement. After listening to Sujono's testimony, Supardjo was clearly not pleased. When the presiding judge asked him if there was anything from this witness's testimony that he wished to deny, Supardjo angrily exclaimed: "I think we have been presented with an ill [mentally unstable] person." The presiding judge immediately reprimanded Supardjo and declared that it was not up to defendant to decide if someone was ill or not. He asked him once again if there was anything he wished to deny from the witness's testimony, to which Supardjo answered angrily, "All of them."232 228 Ibid.p.320 Ibid.p.326 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid.p.327 229 === [PDF page 271] === In relation to Sujono's mental condition, court records reveal that there was a letter from the head of the psychiatry department at the Army Hospital, responding to a request from an officer of the central investigation. This letter was labeled "secret" and dated March 1, 1967, not long after Sujono's court appearance, and contained the results of psychiatric tests at the Army hospital in which the physician had declared that former Air Force major Sujono did not have any mental illness and could be held responsible for all his actions. This letter indicates that the SMT used a psychiatric examination as an evidence to discredit any defense reservations about a key prosecutor's witness, although nobody was able to establish if the test was real or fabricated. Sujono's testimony incriminated the defendant, even though it contradicted other witnesses. There were also other accounts, mostly from minor figures in the Thirtieth September Movement that also incriminated the defendant. Before the SMT those accounts from minor figures were given more weight than those from major figures. From the conduct of this case and close reading of the trial transcript, it was clear that there was no conclusive evidence of the defendant's involvement or lack of involvement in the movement, which made it difficult to prove any of the charges. Nevertheless, the prosecutor relentlessly argued otherwise, reflecting the overall nature of the SMT where the final verdict was pre-ordained. Although, as mentioned earlier, the trial process itself was often quite compelling because of the different interpersonal dynamics and political contexts in each of the major cases. === [PDF page 272] === After examining the defendant for more than a week, and listening to many witnesses, the SMT was ready to move to the next step, the prosecutor's presentation of the Requisitoir, or the official request for punishment of the defendant. This reading was set for the thirteenth session of the SMT, on March 3, 1967 at 9:00 p.m., allowing ample time for the prosecutor to draft the document. The thirteenth session of the SMT started as scheduled with the reading of the thirty-four page requisitoir. From the outset, the prosecutor affirmed the danger of the defendant represented to the Pancasila philosophy, the 1945 constitution, and the nation's overall character.234 He described the defendant as the product of a systematic political training for destroying his friends and his superiors from within, waiting to act when the PKI gave a green light through its operative Sjam.235 The prosecutor continued his relentless attack on the defendant, accusing him of being part to a larger PKI conspiracy to destroy the party's enemies by promoting the NASAKOM policy, destroying the NEKOLIM, spreading copies of fake documents, acting in a counter revolutionary manner and accusing others of being CIA agents. He added that all those incidents occurred with the cooperation with Subandrio's BPI. asserted that Sjam had convinced the defendant to use, what the prosecutor's would call "Aidit's style agitation methods", to spread the information about the COG plot couprumors that required the help of "forward thinking officers" to counter. In essence, the Ibid.p.135 Ibid.p.136 Ibid.p.137 === [PDF page 273] === 257 prosecutor argued that "this movement [G.30.S] aimed to destroy an imagined coup, in order to embark on the real coup." To reinforce the guilt of the PKI, the prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel CKH Soebari SH, exclaimed with thundering voice: "Perhaps the public does not know who Sjam and Pono [PKI Special bureau chiefs] are, but there were around, 3000 PKI volunteers who were militarily trained and deployed since September 28, 1965 at Lubang Buaya. In the evening prior to the October 1, 1965, thousands of these volunteers had been dancing the dance of joy, the death dance. How could PKI hide this?"238 He further asserted that without the support of people like the defendant, Untung and Sujono, whom he labeled as "loyal members of the PKI special bureau," the party would not have been able to go ahead with its coup plan. The party depended on these indoctrinated military members as they alone had the skills to help the PKI achieve its goal of overthrowing the government. Furthermore, he continued, the defendant's attitude in court, repeatedly changing his stories, reflected the characteristics typical of someone who followed the teaching of the PKI.239 Finally, the prosecutor reiterated the charges against the defendant which were: first, plotting to conduct a rebellion with the intention of overthrowing the government, entailing the following actions: (a) joining the movement, (b) offering his own troops from West Kalimantan if needed, (c) requesting to be notified and summoned to Jakarta when the movement was about to happen, and (d) acting as the head of a movement Ibid.p.138 Ibid.p.139 Ibid.p. 141-145 === [PDF page 274] === 258 delegation to meet with President Sukarno.240 Second, the defendant, alone or with other people, acted as the leader of an armed rebellion against the legitimate government. Third, the defendant, alone or with other people, acted as the organizer of a movement with the intention of overthrowing the legitimate government. The action of the defendant in the G.30.S, the prosecutor continued, had crippled the country's economic potential since he created conflict that reduced the ability to produce food, causing rampant stockpiling of merchandise and problems of price stability disturbed the entire economy. In the field of security, the movement caused restlessness and distrust between groups, leading people to attack and kill each other. In the ongoing struggle against imperialism, the nation's potential security was reduced. Finally, the G.30.S undermined the authority of the legitimate government, spreading feelings of hatred, division, tension, chaos, disturbance, and restlessness among the population.241 Before ending the requisitoir, the prosecutor listed the factors he considered as weighing against the defendant, claiming that he gave difficult and meandering answers throughout the proceedings. Moreover, the defendant often displayed an arrogant attitude toward court, which had caused the presiding judge to reprimand him. Finally, the defendant never showed remorse for any of his actions. Offering even more damaging accusations, the prosecutor declared the defendant had not abided by the Sapta Marga (Soldier's Oath) which ultimately led him into ruining military discipline and betraying his superiors for his personal political goal, turning peaceful Indonesia into a communist nation. The prosecutor continued, 240 241 Ibid.p.l46 Ibid.p.148-158 === [PDF page 275] === 259 condemning the defendant's efforts as contradicting Pancasila philosophy. In fact, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's actions trampled upon the radiance of Pancasila by utilizing a primal law from the ancient times that made it acceptable for a son to eat his own father. For all these crimes, the prosecutor requested that the court hand down a verdict of guilty punishable by death, revoke all his rights as the member of the armed forces, and strip him of all medals. Other evidence produced in the court should, he said, be handed over to the state. After reading for around ninety minutes, the prosecutor finally finished the thirty-four page requisitoir. The SMT was then suspended and scheduled to resume again on Monday, March 6, 1967. After listening to the prosecutor's request for the death penalty, the fourteenth session of Supardjo's SMT began with the defendant reading his defense oxpledooi. From the outset, the defendant claimed he would be telling the truth—both in his defense and for the sake of history and the people of Indonesia. He promised to give truthful information, as many people had urged him to do, including Lieutenant Colonel Ali Said SH, the presiding judge in Subandrio's case. However, he reminded the audience that the matters that he was about to disclose were very hard and the public should use their own judgment. In response to these suggestions, the defendant had agreed to read a defense entitled in Dutch "Waarheid is Hard" or "The truth is very hard"243 In his pledooi, Supardjo cited evidence from Untung who had testified that Supardjo had not been a member of the G.30.S. According to Untung, Supardjo not only rejected the creation of the Revolutionary Council but he also never discussed it. 242 243 Ibid.p.l63-166 Ibid.p.l67 === [PDF page 276] === 260 Supardjo never saw the troops departing from Lubang Buaya, and Untung had confirmed that he did not know anything about the arrested generals. Supardjo went to the palace, not as a delegation to represent Untung, but on his own initiative to explain the situation to the president. Furthermore, according to Untung, the defendant never discussed getting rid of the ministers. The idea of creating the revolutionary council came solely from Sjam and was never discussed with the defendant.244 Supardjo rejected all the charges against him. He also argued that the collapse of the Thirtieth September Movement was not because of General Soeharto and Nasution's swift action, but he instead attributed it to obedience to the president's instructions to stop the movement. By contrast, the defendant argued, it was Soeharto and Nasution who acted illegally by not following commands since it was clear that the president had ordered a stop to any troop movements. 45 He continued his defense by saying that the charge of joining an evil conspiracy against the legitimate government did not made any sense. For on that fateful day he did the following: (1) helping to draft the announcement about the president's safety; (2) delivering a written order from the president to the commander of G.30.S, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, ordering him to stop the movement; and (3) giving suggestions as requested by the president.246 By contrast, Supardjo showed that actions by General Soeharto and Nasution challenged a direct order from the commander in chief, the president. Both generals were then stationed at the Kostrad headquarters where they implemented several illegal Ibid.p.172-173 Ibid.p.184-185 Ibid.. 193 === [PDF page 277] === measures—notably not allowing General Pranoto Reksosamudra, whom the president had appointed as caretaker for Army, and General Umar, ccommander of Jakarta Army unit, to see Sukarno. Instead, both General Soeharto and General Nasution decided that Soeharto should take the initiative assuming command over the Army, disregarding the president's wishes. The president had given explicit orders that: (a) the Army would be temporarily under the direct command of the supreme commander, the president; (b) the task for the Army as caretaker was to supervise day to day operations on a temporary basis and; (c) to stop any military movement. This decision was based on the meeting with three service 947 commanders and was legally signed by the president. The Navy chief of Staff, Admiral Martadinata, acted as courier in delivering the president's order to Soeharto and Nasution at Kostrad. Upon receiving the order, General Nasution said to Admiral Martadinata: "Why does one go snooping around with Armed Forces business? We do not have to do it together. Military problems are military business, political problems are politics. We deal with the issue of military tactics. Regarding politics, leave it to the president." After disclosing these facts, the defendant asked the SMT court: "Who is now planning and conducting an evil conspiracy? Was it 94R me or Soeharto and Nasution?" After sharply criticizing General Soeharto and Nasution for disobeying direct orders from the supreme commander, the president, Supardjo then turned to questioning how he was arbitrarily relieved from command and his rank as a general. In his opinion, 247 248 Ibid.p.l94 Ibid.p.l94-195 === [PDF page 278] === 262 the authority to relieve a general should come directly from the president. But on October 2 the president still wrote an order to the defendant. In Supardjo's opinion, KOSTRAD had formed its own "government" outside the legitimate authority of the Indonesian Republic.249 Supardjo boldly showed the court and public his version of events, and revealing many discrepancies about what happened on that day. Before the court, he managed to disclose crucial information about actions by General Soeharto and Nasution that defied the president's orders. He even hinted at the possibility of the coup being done by Soeharto and Nasution, instead by himself or the Thirtieth September Movement. In essence, he managed to give a conflicting version of the event. Given the changing external political context, however, Supardjo's efforts were in vain. Hispledooi were seen instead as his way of inciting distrust between Sukarno and Soeharto, as well as accusing Nasution rather than a chance to unravel the mystery about what exactly had happened on that day. The defendant pointed out that he felt he did not have any other choice but to follow the SMT regulation, even though the regulations clearly originated from those generals in KOSTRAD (referring to Soeharto and Nasution). He also questioned the mass arrest of countless officers, ordinary people, and ministers which caused further tension, chaos, feelings of hatred, division, and disturbance among the population following the failed movement. He criticized the prosecutor whom he said had taken the strategy of "0m een hond te slaan vind men alleen een stoK' or "To hit a dog one should 249 250 Ibid.p.l97 Ibid.p.l98 === [PDF page 279] === 263 use whatever means necessary." The prosecutor was, in his view, accusing the defendant of being a PKI member, since at present that could be used to prosecute anyone to death.251 Despite his strong defense statement and disclosure of important information, Supardjo's attempt to make his case compelling had failed. As the external political factors shifted dramatically against him, Supardjo's trial had shown different dynamics in comparison with previous SMT cases. In other trials there were still attempt from both sides to figure out what actually happened, and the official narrative of the event had not yet been set. By the time of Supardjo's SMT trial, the narrative of the event had almost reached the final form that would be reproduced for many years. The Supardjo pledooi received little or no attention in the scholarship about 1965 in Indonesia. On the other hand, his own allegedly written critique about the failure of the movement, called "the Supardjo document", has recently become a major focus of several scholarly works on the Thirtieth September Movement in Indonesia. John Roosa's book, Pretext for Mass Murder conducted an extensive analysis of this so called "Supardjo document." Despite strong interest in that particular document, no one has analyzed Supardjo's own defense statement which offers details, from himself and witness, beyond those in the document. The lack of interest in the SMT's pledooi can be attributed perhaps to the general scholarly disregard of the SMT proceedings. Many academics and activists, notably Amnesty International, have labeled the tribunal as a "show trial." Because of this impression, the proceedings have never received the attention they deserved. This chapter 251 Ibid.p.203 === [PDF page 280] === 264 has claimed from the outset that the SMT was not merely a show trial, but instead it was a battle ground for the creation of an official narrative of the event placing the imprimatur of judicial truth upon the regime's version. In addition the tribunal was also the place where anti-communist regime demonstrated its triumph over the PKI and its supporting elements, the "old order." For these reasons, it is crucial to carefully analyze Supardjo's defense, since it reveals much about the political context at the time of his trial. Supardjo's trial happened when President Sukarno was already losing his executive power to the emerging military regime under General Soeharto. In a letter dated February 20, 1967, Sukarno relinquished executive power to General Soeharto. Hence, his removal has made the position of Supardjo, a known Sukarno loyalist, no longer tenable in court. Given this political context, there was good reason to believe that Supardjo would disclose information that was as true as possible, in an effort not only to save himself since that was no longer an option, but to discredit those who had seized power from Sukarno, namely generals Nasution and Soeharto. Supardjo's legal counsel, FC Tjiam, questioned the charges against the defendant of leading an armed rebellion "against the legitimate government of Indonesia." The defense questioned the prosecutor's definition of "the legitimate government of Indonesia," since the abduction and killings happened to several army generals. If the prosecutor thought that generals were the "legitimate government of Indonesia," how could he explain the position of the president, Navy commander, Air Force commander, === [PDF page 281] === 265 Police commander, vice premier no.3 which on that day were still considered the legitimate government. In conclusion, Tjiam argued that the prosecutor could not prove the charges and he requested the release of the defendant. Towards the end of the defense statement, Tjiam, as if wanted to implicate the military regime in the nature of the SMT proceedings, ended his defense by citing Abraham Lincoln's remarks saying "You can fool some of the people all the time, and all the people some of the time, but you cannot fool of the people all the time. There is only one way you can do that you must all so fool yourself."253 After series of responses from both the prosecutor and defendant debating some points from their respective pledooi, the prosecutor declared it was a waste of time to continue the debate. The prosecutor's attitudes and his response to the.pledooi were clearly demeaning to the defendant. Judging from the prosecutor's own replik or reply, it was very clear that no matter how good the defense argument might be, no matter how compelling and solid it might be, the prosecutor would simply ignored it and would offer only pro forma responses.254 The reasons for this harsh attitude can perhaps be attributed to the overall political situation that was already working heavily against the defendant. Hence, there was no need to address the legal issues seriously, even though they were before the court. Ibid.p.225-226 Ibid.p.236 Ibid.p.232 === [PDF page 282] === 266 As was mentioned above, the SMT proceedings were open to public. Moreover, reporting on the proceedings captured headlines in major newspapers, and even the radio network had live coverage from the court. The public could, therefore, follow closely what the prosecutor, defendant, witnesses and the defense discussed in Supardjo's trial. As was described above, the defendant, his defense, and some of the witnesses gave sound arguments, perhaps even disclosing information that previously unknown and even contrary to what the public knew. After finishing the debate on the defense's statement, the SMT moved to final sentencing scheduled for March 12, 1967, a little over a year after President Sukarno gave General Soeharto the infamous Supersemar letter, which symbolized the beginning of the end for the president. The sentencing of Supardjo also occurred at the same time as the parliamentary session (MPRS) for the official inauguration of General Soeharto as an acting president of Indonesia. In essence, these two events marked the end of Sukarno's era and the launching of Soeharto's ascent to power. In this context, the sentencing of Supardjo thus became a symbolic "act of justice" against the defeated Old Order. The sixteenth session of the SMT for Supardjo commenced at 8:00 pm with the pounding of the gavel after the defendant had been escorted into the court room. The presiding judge, Lieutenant Colonel Soegiri SH, began reading the 101 pages of the sentence at 8:15 p.m. sharp. The document summarized the whole trial proceeding, describing the witnesses, defendant, and defense accounts. Before giving the final verdict, the presiding judge repeated the charges that: first, the defendant conducted an evil conspiracy to overthrow the legitimate government, === [PDF page 283] === 267 proven from all the meetings the defendant attended in relation with the G.30.S. Second, the defendant was an organizer of a movement that staged a rebellion. Third, the defendant was the leader of a rebellion with the intention to overthrow the government. Fourth, the defendant undertook series of activities that, as he was fully aware, could lead to the disruption of the authority of the legitimate government.255 The SMT court expressed their regret about the defendant's decision to trust Sjam, the PKI Special Bureau chief, as a reliable source of information about the COG rather than believing the late General Ahmad Yani's explanation that the COG existed only as an advisory body (Advis Lichaam). This choice was proven to be a fateful decision for Supardjo, leading the court to view him as someone loyal to the PKI. Furthermore, the SMT believed that the G.30.S/PKI caused harm to many innocent victims, inflicted losses, and destroyed the values of life, whether those values were based on political, economic, socio-cultural or military principles.257 It is important to note that in Supardjo's case, that there was a shift in attribution of blame. In previous SMTs, the blame was mostly focused on the defendant being influenced by PKI. However, in Supardjo's case, the blame was now focused more directly on the G.30.S/PKI rather than on the defendant himself. In previous SMTs, for example, the defendant was always accused of committing crimes against Pancasila morality. In sentencing Supardjo, however, the crimes against Pancasila were not the accussed's alone but were shifted to the Thirtieth September 255 Perkara M.S. Supardjo V.2.p. 61-78 Ibid.p.89 257 Ibid. 256 === [PDF page 284] === 268 Movement (G.30.S/PKI). This shift was particularly evident in the sentence's description of the crime against each of the Pancasila 's principles: "(1.) The G.30.S/PKI of which the defendant was a member, abducted and murdered the finest children of revolution in a way that was beyond humanity, barbaric, and cruel, which could only be done by someone who did not believe in God or had lost their faith in humanity. It was difficult to understand and accept that those cruelties were done by an Indonesian who held high the values of life based on 'Belief in one Supreme God' and 'Humanity' or the first and second principles of Pancasila.'" The sentencing went on to elaborate crimes against the other Pancasila principles: "(2.) G.30.S/PKI caused divisions and destroyed the unity of the Indonesian people, which has been constructed to achieve the goal of Indonesian revolution [contradicting the Third Principle, Indonesian unity]. (3.) G.30.S/PKI utilized armed struggle, whereas Pancasila utilized democracy, discussion, and tolerance to achieve consensus [contradicting the fourth principle, democracy]. (4.)G.30.S/PKI wanted to change the government from the Indonesian revolution which is just and proper under Pancasila into a communistic one, [contradicting the fifth principle, social justice.]" From this and previous sentences, we can see the shift from condemning the defendant for violating Pancasila to condemnation of the G.30.S/PKI. The shift reflected the prevailing political context with the ascent of General Soeharto to power, and the simultaneous defeat of Sukarno and Supardjo as leaders of the "Old Order." The SMT Ibid, p.91-92 Ibid.p.92 === [PDF page 285] === 269 had become not only a battle ground for competing narratives, but it was also becoming a strong symbol of how justice would be served in "New Order" Indonesia. After reading the sentence for almost four hours, the SMT found Supardjo, a forty-four year old former brigadier general, to be guilty for the following charges: la. Conducting evil conspiracy to rebel. lb. Evil conspiracy for rebellion with the intention to overthrow the legitimate government. 2. Acted as the leader and organizer of the rebellion. 3. Acted as the leader and organizer with the intention to overthrow the government by doing those activities mentioned in charges no.2 and no.3, acts that have disrupted government programs. 4. The defendant has done series of activities which he knew can undermine the authority of a legitimate government. Because of the aforementioned crimes the SMT sentences the defendant as follows: Death penalty and dishonorable discharge from the Armed forces. The presiding judge then pounded his gavel as a sign that the verdict had been decided and officially given to the defendant. Following that, he asked the defendant whether he wanted to request pardon from the president, to which Supardjo replied with a hesitant voice: "I will think about it, sir."261 M.Nurdin A.S., a journalist from ANTARA news agency who followed the proceeding from the beginning to the end, wrote in his book describing the atmosphere as Supardjo was taken out of the court room: "The Just queen", a title given to Supardjo by the Presiding Judge arrived outside of the court room in front of the upper level room at the BAPPENAS building. ABRI [Military] officers immediately welcomed him with handcuffs. The handcuffs for Supardjo were not just ordinary handcuffs, but the type like in the movie "Hercules."262 Ibid.p.100 A.S., Supardjo Direnggut Kalong.p.85 Ibid. === [PDF page 286] === 270 In his widely published pocket book on Supardjo's SMT trial, M.Nurdin A.S. described a defeated enemy who was now ridiculed by the label, "Just queen." At the same time, the enemy was also portrayed him as someone who was strong, even mighty, since only the chains used for Hercules was considered strong enough to restrain the defendant. More disturbingly, this description also implied that the enemy was still strong and will always be dangerous. The "New Order" achievement in defeating this strong elusive enemy deserved, by implication, to be celebrated, while the enemy should constantly be feared. We can see from the previous illustration that there was, in comparison with the early SMTs an obvious shift in focus by specifically targeting the movement and PKI. However, the overall purpose of the SMT remains consistent since it remained an arena for the triumph of emerging military regime. The SMT became means for the regime to generate support from the population, strengthening thereby the legitimacy of the emerging "New Order." Consequently, the indifference of the prosecutor and judges to convincing evidence or crucial information, unacceptable in a normal court, became routine for the SMT without losing legitimacy authority. The uncommon nature of the SMT can be explained in several ways. The external political situation played important role in determining the dynamics of its proceedings. In the case of Supardjo, his trial occurred at the same time as the impeachment process of President Sukarno and the political ascent of generals Soeharto and Nasution. Moreover, the arrest, killings, and purging of the suspected communists were widespread and effective, instilling fear among the public === [PDF page 287] === and discouraging any criticism of the judicial process. Although the media covered the SMT extensively, the tone of the news was never impartial. The media did not simply condemn the defendant as guilty before the verdict, but the reportage also included fabricated but convincing reasons why Supardjo's often sound arguments reflected his strong PKI training. For example, on March 12, 1967, the day Supardjo's sentencing was scheduled to be announced, HAB headlines bannered an article explaining the reasons why Supardjo was cooperative with the investigation, and why his rebuttal of the accusations before the court seemed often so strong. The article identified key PKI strategies when faced with interrogation and enduring captivity called the "GTM and three B's." The "GTM," Gerakan Tutup Mulut or shutting the mouth movement, was a strategy of PKI members for not disclosing any information during interrogation, whereas three B's stands for Bui (prison), Buang (Exile) and Bunuh (execution). It was expected, the press explained, that all PKI members be ready to implement GTM, be prepared to endure the "three B's," and were forbidden to admit guilt or wrongdoing for any of their actions. Hence, the article concluded that "it is not surprising to see Supardjo always being cooperative when he responded to the questions from the prosecutor and judges, since he was always trying to exploit his answers in such a way, even when his arguments were weak. And often his responses and questions to the witnesses were direct in nature. The media concluded that, Bui, Buang and Bunuh were not problems for PKI cadre to endure."264 From this 263 Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, "Supardjo Kader P.K.I. Militan?: Semua Bantahan Jang Diutjapkan Dalam Mahmillub Suatu Alasan Jg Kuat," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 12 Maret 1967 1967.p.l 264 Ibid. === [PDF page 288] === 272 explanation of Supardjo's seemingly polished performance in court, the newspaper said, simply a part of the PKI's strategy. Thus, did not matter whether if one disclosed important information or gave solid arguments against the charges since both were proof, not of innocence, but of communist doctrine. One crucial aspect for the SMT was to maintain the aura of strong credibility among the public, not appear to be a "show trial" as many have suggested. All defendants tried in the major SMT proceedings failed to provide any evidence beyond a reasonable doubt about the existence of the Council of Generals. This failure was critical since all defendants—Njono, Untung, Subandrio and Supardjo—claimed to have acted based on their strong belief in the existence of the COG and its plans to overthrow the government in a coup d'etat allegedly planned for October 5, 1965. The failure to give convincing, conclusive evidence about the existence of the COG in the court created bad precedent for all the defendants, since their assertions were easily be dismissed as a pure rumor or isyu. It was precisely this particular piece of evidence that the military prosecutors/WzYwry seized upon when launching their relentless attacks on the defendants since none of them could even defend their claims about the existence of COG. In their legal proceedings, the narrative about the existence of the COG ultimately became a "PKI created lie." Branding the COG as a PKI lie became an effective weapon against all the defendants and the PKI in general. At the same time, the heavily publicized SMTs ignored the thousands of mass arrests and killings that were still on going. Within the court there were frequent debates === [PDF page 289] === 273 over the "truth" about the abduction and murder of six top Army officers and one first officer. As the external political developments turned increasingly against the defendants, the SMT became an arena for establishing the legitimacy of the new government and helped solidify the narrative of Army triumph over the threat of Godless communism. This official narrative was effective since it utilized the sacred concept of Pancasila as the vehicle to gain legitimacy in defeating the communists. Punishment of the Four "Star" Defendants In marked contrast to the heavy publicity that accompanied their show trials before the SMT, the four star convicts left the courtroom for the silence of their cells and, in three of four cases, secret executions. If the speed and sensation of the trials were necessary to establish the regime's legitimacy in 1966, two years later Soeharto was so entrenched by the communist slaughters and Sukarno's eclipse that silence surrounding their executions somehow added to his aura of power. Death delayed for political prisoners from the 1965 upheaval was common, and there were even cases where prisoners waited for more than ten years before they were finally executed. The execution of Lieutenant Colonel Untung, leader of the G. 30 S. Movement, occurred sometimes at the end of 1966. The only detailed information about his death came from Dr.Subandrio, who stayed in the Cimahi Bandung prison with Untung. During their time together, Untung told Dr. Subandrio that General Soeharto would never betray him, since he felt that Soeharto was his friend and knew about the G.30.S plan well ahead === [PDF page 290] === 274 of time. According to Untung, Soeharto even offered troops to assist the movement. his memoirs, Dr. Subandrio wrote that he became close to Untung, especially as his execution approached. Informed about his impending death, Untung plunged into despair, expressing disbelief that Soeharto would ever do that to him. In his panic, Untung failed to make a last request, although it was a common procedure for someone who is facing a death sentence. Subandrio recalled that Untung was scheduled to be executed on Tuesday and he himself on Saturday of the same week.266 We faced each other, both wearing prison uniforms but our feelings were erratic. Untung will soon be executed, and I was scheduled four days later. The guards and soldiers with sinister faces were alert and observed us from a distance. They seemed to understand the situation and gave an opportunity for Untung to bid farewell: "Mr. Ban [Subandrio], Goodbye. Do not be sad. In four days we will be seeing each other again" said Untung, as he pointed his finger upward. Untung said his parting words with trembling voice and a gleam in his eyes. That brave soldier did not weep, but I knew he was in extreme panic. He never thought Soeharto would betray him.2 7 When it grew dark, Subandrio watched as Untung was taken from his cell under heavy security escort and walked towards the gate of Cimahi prison. He later heard that Untung was executed in a village at the outskirts of the city of Bandung. Even today, the location of his remains is still unknown. Watching Untung walk to his death, Subandrio thought that he had just four more days before he suffered the same fate. Suddenly, without explanation, his sentence was changed from death to life imprisonment. He later found out from another source that the reason for this reprieve was cable from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and the President Dr. H. Soebandrio, Kesaksianku Tentang G.30.S (Jakarta: 2000).p.l 13 Ibid.p.112 === [PDF page 291] === 275 of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, appealing to Soeharto for clemency. According to Subandrio, the cables from those two leaders read something like: "Please do not execute Subandrio, as I know he did not have any involvement with G.30.S." Subandrio thought the reason for their appeal was his closeness to both during his time as Indonesian ambassador to Great Britain and Indonesia's foreign minister. In doing his duty as a diplomat, he had the opportunity to build good relations with many important leaders. "I was just doing my duty for my country," Subandrio recalled, "and duty requires me to attend many of those ceremonial events." Dr. Subandrio survived and was eventually released from prison on August 16, 1995. The communist official Njono was the next to die. In marked contrast to the rushed court procedure, his execution did not happen until October 1968. The execution was not announced publicly and even today, over 40 years later, the exact time and date of his death is still unknown. As for General Supardjo, he had to wait until May 1970 for his execution. In an interview with the Tempo magazine in 2005, one of his children described that unforgettable day: On the day of Dad's execution on 16 May 1970, Dad asked all his children [all 12] and his wife to gather at the Budi Utomo military prison. At that time Dad was not allowed to meet and pay respect to his mother. Two hours felt like a blitz. Dad then asked us to grasp and crush an apple—which was part of his last meal before execution. Then Dad divided the apple that he bit among each of his children and asked them to crush it. "If you consist of small parts, you will be destroyed easily, but if you are united, perhaps you might be destroyed, but it will 268 Ibid.p.ll4 Ibid.p.l21 270 Guy J.Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1969).p.50 269 === [PDF page 292] === 276 require a bigger force to do it. Get a good education, make small and good family, do not get involved in politics, just be a spectator." That was Dad's final advice. That final moment can still be imagined clearly. "I saw Dad walk to the execution place. He wore a white sport shirt which he said can also be used for kafan.27'Dad was very calm when he walked towards the field as he sang the Indonesia Raya [the Indonesian national anthem]."272 The descriptions on the last moments before the execution of Untung and Supardjo were both touching and ironic. Throughout their trial proceedings, the media and the prosecutor relentlessly besmirched the defendants by portraying them as ruthless, inhuman, and treacherous. Yet, behind these public descriptions we can see a human, sad, and most tragic picture of individuals who were led to believe that they were doing something right and patriotic. Complex circumstances and politics often blurred their sense of duty. They yearned to be part of something good and meaningful, but because of their actions or political affiliations, they were labeled instead as traitors worthy of being eradicated and forgotten. Nonetheless, the pain and suffering of thousands other nameless families who experienced similarly tragic fates cannot easily be forgotten. They live on in the form of thousands who remember those who were brave enough to confront the nation's tragic past and are working to make sure the so-called 1965 tragedy would never happen again. In the following chapter, we will continue to explore the implementation of themes of continuing PKI threats to the livelihood of the nation. These themes would be 271 Kafcm= a type of a special cloth used by Muslims to cover deceased person. Evieta Fadjar Bina Bektiati, Nurdin Kalim et.al, "Liputan Khusus G30s: Potret-Potret Keluarga Retak," Tempo Majalah Berita Minggucm, 3-9 October 2005.p. 120 272 === [PDF page 293] === 277 repeated continuously throughout the New Order period. The rhetoric of "beware of the latent danger of communism" would recur in many forms, including the monument, the commemoration day and, most powerful of all, a propaganda film. The next chapter will examine these ongoing manifestations of the regimes' anti-communism in legitimating an official narrative that was articulated so forcefully through these SMT prosecutions and subsequent executions. === [PDF page 294] === Chapter VI: Symbolizing the "Triumphant Reality" The killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya had profound consequences, producing dramatic changes in the course of modern Indonesian history. The leaders of the New Order regime used that event not only to mourn the deaths of the army officers, but they elaborated its significance as the triumph of Pancasila over communism. Despite the regime's claims that the killings were an effort to destroy Pancasila, this representation of the event was used, above all, to show the personal triumph of General Soeharto. The previous chapter examined how General Soeharto staged a triumph over communism through the SMT tribunal where he played a central role as police, prosecutor, and judge, thus determining the fate of all the defendants. Moreover, Soeharto also wanted to ensure that his role in the purge and his heroism in saving the nation from the communists were remembered. In doing so, Soeharto used the nation's Pancasila ideology as facade for his self-aggrandizing portrayal, especially in the Pancasila Sakti monument and the film Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI, "The rebellion of G.30.S/PKI." This chapter examines the process of displaying the "triumphant reality" as the emerging New Order launched these projects to preserve the Lubang Buaya story, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the state. The description of the origins of these ideas focuses on three of the most prominent vehicles that the New Order used—the monument Pancasila Sakti, the annual commemoration day of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, === [PDF page 295] === 279 and the most powerful symbol of all, the movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI. This chapter focuses on only these three vehicles since they have some compelling inter-connections. The main focus of this chapter is on the early stage of this symbolizing process. It is important to look at the origins that drove the creation of this larger project. Some recent studies on this topic, such as the one by Katharine McGregor, focus on the military ideology embedded within the commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, the Pancasila Sakti monument, and the movie. Her study provides insight into how, through the long years of the New Order, these three triumphal media shifted their purpose. However, her study did not fully explain the origins and mindset that inspired the creation of these symbols in ways that would assure the perpetuation of this underlying idea for future generations. Examining the origins of these symbols will allow us a clearer understanding of the early development of the regime's official Lubang Buaya narrative. To help us understand the importance of these symbols, there are several questions that need to be asked. First, what was the major driving force behind the inception of these representations? Second, why was the New Order regime willing to invest great efforts in such a grandiose project just to preserve its own interpretation of Lubang Buaya affair? Third, why did the regime specifically choose Pancasila as the main theme for the project? Fourth, why did the message of triumph and sacredness need to be disseminated using the aforementioned media? Finally, did Soeharto use these symbols as an outlet and opportunity for boosting his personal image? In answering these === [PDF page 296] === questions we have to explore the political context at the time when each of these triumphal symbols was being produced. For months after the failure of the G.30.S movement, the nation's social and political situation was in turmoil. At the top level of government, the anti-communist factions under general Soeharto and Nasution were constantly competing for power with President Sukarno, as the latter wanted to protect the PKI and his other loyalist groups in a high-level game of political maneuver. At the same time, the military, supported by citizen anti-communist groups, had carried out widespread purging marked by rampant killings and random arrests of PKI members and their alleged supporters. Monument Amidst this tense situation, the military immediately took the initiative to preserve the location where the bodies of the generals had been found at Lubang Buaya, quickly making plans to build a monument for "the heroes of the revolution." On December 2, 1965, Soeharto released order No. Prin-517/12/1965 to the director of the Army engineers (Zeni) to build the monument at Lubang Buaya without mentioning the PKI, the letter stated that the purpose was to build a monument, "that can reflect the memories of the fallen revolutionary heroes whose names are mentioned as they became victims of the so called G.30.S affair in this historic location."1 The absence of any mention of the PKI in this initial order could be attributed to the national political situation when the letter was issued. Even though the arrests and Surat Perintah No. Prin- 517/12/1965 Menteri Panglima Angkatan Darat, (2 December 1965). === [PDF page 297] === mass killings were ongoing, the Army was still cautious about openly blaming the PKI for the murders at Lubang Buaya since the power struggle between Sukarno and the anticommunist generals had not reached definitive resolution. The letter ordered the Army engineers to acquire the two hectares of land where the bodies were found and to make plans for designing a monument,—specifically, to prepare the budget, contact all related military and civilian institutions to obtain permission and assistance, and report directly to the minister of the army. The army engineers immediately worked out a detailed plan and concept for the monument. Two artists— Mr. Sandjojo, who himself was an army officer and Mr. Saptoto, a civilian art instructor from ASRI, the Indonesian Academy of Arts in Solowere responsible for designing the monument's symbols. They came up with a design which involved building a small gazebo with intricate symbols on top of the death well where the bodies of the generals had been found. Another part of the monument entailed construction of seven giant-sized statues of the slain heroes of the revolution in various poses. The design was forwarded to the minister of the army, General Soeharto, who gave his approval on April 28, 1966. A scaled replica of the complex was made and, based on that replica the design received its final approval from General Soeharto himself on June 23, 1966 in the form of order letter No.PRIN-232/6/Tahun 1966.4 In contrast with the previous letter, this order No.PRIN-232/6/Tahun 1966, specifically blamed the PKI. It stated clearly that the purpose of building the monument Ibid. Major General Dr.Soedjono, Monumen Pancasila Cakti (Jakarta: Proyek Monumen Pancasila Cakti, 1975).p.354 Ibid. === [PDF page 298] === 282 was "to respect the heroes of revolution who were slain as a result of the action from a contra-revolutionary movement GESTAPU/PKI on the October 1965."5 The mention of the PKI in the second letter could be explained by the changing political situation at the time that order was issued. By June 1966, the PKI had been officially banned. The official banning of the PKI had actually happened earlier on March 11 when General Soeharto acting under the authority of President Sukarno, announced the proscription by citing the controversial SUPERSEMAR letter. The existence of this letter is still shrouded with mystery since the original document was lost, sparking controversy about its existence. In June 1966, the political tide was thus turning slowly against President Sukarno, as he increasingly lost his grip on power and at the same time faced daily street protests. Students and other groups demanded that he be tried in the SMT. The media also showed full support for the anti-communist military groups, disseminating information that exalted the heroes of revolution and the sacredness of Pancasila ideology. Almost immediately, the location where the bodies of the generals had been found became a sacred pilgrimage ground for those who wanted to meditate upon the good deeds of the fallen heroes. The media reported certain "strange" supernatural phenomena at Lubang Buaya which increased the location's sacral quality. For example, there was the strange occurrence of a durian tree that suddenly grew only two meters on the southern side of the death well where the remains of the generals had been found. What made it strange Swat Perintah No. Prin-232/6/Tahun 1966 Menteri Panglima Angkatan Darat, (23 June 1966). === [PDF page 299] === was not the durian tree per se, but the extraordinary number of fruit the tree produced— exactly seven, with one of clearly the largest, five of medium size, and one smaller than the others.6 According to Sinar Harapart newspaper, every day one of the durian fruit would ripen and fall to the ground. These durian fruits were collected, the report continued, and its seed used to plant more trees, while the other durian fruits were to be donated to the widows of the slain heroes of the revolution. The people who lived near the area named the fruit "Durian's heroes." The fact that the number was exactly seven durian, complete with particular sizes (one big, five medium and one small), could be seen as representation of the victims by status and rank—General Ahmad Yani (biggest durian), the other five generals (medium size), and Lieutenant Pierre Tendean (smallest). Once the fruit ripened, each of them fell to the ground on a daily basis. This fact could easily "create a certain association," said an officer from the human relations office for the Military Police.7 As absurd as it might seem in retrospect, the parable of durian contributed to the mystique of the Lubang Buaya discourse. This particular incident had a powerful effect in convincing the public about the portrayal of the event. Therefore, the commemoration day of Har i Kesaktian Pancasila, or the sacred day of Pancasila, fit perfectly with the image of the site as sakti or having supernatural power. Reporter, "Durian 'Pahlawan Revolusi': Kegandjilan Di Sumur Lubang Buaja," Sinar Harapan, 9 February 1966 1966.p.2 Ibid. === [PDF page 300] === 284 After five years of construction, the monument Pancasila Sakti, or the sacredness of Pancasila monument, at Lubang Buaya was finally finished in 1972. When it was officially opened, the monument became the ultimate symbol of the army's legitimacy as the savior and protector of the nation from communists. Most importantly, the monument became a place for the exaltation of General Soeharto as the leader of the army who saved the nation. The name of the monument complex would later be changed from the Monumen Pahlawan Revolusi, or the Monument of the Heroes of the Revolution, to the Monumen Pancasila Sakti, Lubang Buaya, Jakarta, or the Monument of the Sacred Day of Pancasila, Lubang Buaya Jakarta. The total area of the monument complex was approximately fourteen hectares, and was divided into two major sections. The first section was the outer area, consisting of a gate, a parking lot, and a museum building that housed the historical artifacts, pictures, a cinema for showing a documentary film, and restrooms. The second section, or the main area consisted of the "Sapta Marga" ceremony field, the death well, and the central zone with seven oversized bronze statues of the murdered officers, standing above a carved mural that depicts the New Order's interpretation of the event.10 The logic for building a monument was to instill an idea that it could play a central role in the regime's ideology." Historicist architects constructed buildings that would accurately reflect what they thought to be the distinctive style of a past period," Dr.Soedjono, Monumen Pancasila Cakti.p363 For further detailed description of the monument and museum see chapter three of: Katharine E. McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007). 10 Dr.Soedjono, Monumen Pancasila Cakti.p.369 === [PDF page 301] === 285 noted the historian Rudy Koshar. "The point was not to give the architect room for individual creation or genius, but to work within an accepted historical genre, and thereby to express an ideology that had broader social purpose." The Pancasila Sakti Monument exhibits all of these features. The army's architects and engineers designed the monument with many symbolic features that served to express an ideology within the accepted norms of past historical genre. The incorporation of local norms and beliefs, blended with unbounded loyalty to the nation's struggle, was reflected clearly in the monument. Furthermore, the emphasis on Pancasila ideology as the Indonesian way of life and the army under Soeharto as the savior of the Indonesian nation were juxtaposed with the classic idea of unbounded and continuous struggle for the nation that was an ideological legacy from the revolutionary period. The whole complex is laden with symbolic features. The distance from the flagpole at the Sapta Marga field to the location of the death well was exactly 45 meters 19 and the height of the flagpole was seven meters. The number 45 symbolized the year 1945 when Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the Dutch and the number seven symbolized the seven murdered heroes of the revolution. The death well was housed in a little open gazebo with a "Joglo" shaped roof, the traditional shape from Java. The depth of the death well was 12 meters and its diameter was 75 centimeter wide. The four staircases on the death well gazebo represented the four branches of the armed forces: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police. On both 11 Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).p.58 12 Dr.Soedjono, Monumen Pancasila Cakti.p.373 === [PDF page 302] === 286 sides of the gazebo, there were two statues of the Makara, a fish-like guardian figure usually found at the gates of ancient temples in Indonesia.13 The Makaras on the deathwell gazebo had specific symbolic characteristics: the number of fins on each side was 30, and the neck had nine fins, the body sixty-five, and the back seven. The numbers symbolized the date when the Lubang Buaya killings took place, 30-9-65 or 30 September 1965, and the number of victims, seven.14 Each of the gazebo's four columns had carved symbols: the tongue of fire, which symbolized the fighting spirit; seven bended Keris, the traditional weapon of Java and other areas of the archipelago, symbolizing the fighting spirit of the seven slain heroes of the revolution who never succumbed to the enemy despite torture; a flower, which symbolizes the flower of the nation; and the Garuda bird evoking the notion of splendor and glory.15 The intended meaning of the whole carving was to express the flaming spirit of struggle for the seven heroes of the revolution who would always be thus remembered by visitors. The officers' sacrifice was to be viewed as an example of how the heroic officers gave their lives like fallen flowers to defend Pancasila, the symbol of Indonesian's splendor.16 On the side of the well inside the gazebo there was a marble rock with a "written statement" by the fighters of Pancasila reading: "Our goal of struggle to uphold the purity of Pancasila is impossible to be broken, only by burying us in this well, Lubang 13 Ibid.p.375 Ibid. 15 Ibid.p.376 14 === [PDF page 303] === 287 17 Buaya, October 1, 1965" Again, defending Pancasila was seen as the reason for the death of these officers, and nowhere was there any mention of the intricate political and social conditions that led to the killings. Visitors were presented with a simplified narrative of good versus evil, with the best sons of the nation slain during a struggle against the evil of communism. Armed with supernatural power (kesaktian) of the nation's ideology Pancasila and led by the great General Soeharto, the "good" side ultimately triumphed over the communists. On the north of the gazebo, there were seven gigantic bronze statues depicting each of the seven slain heroes of the revolution. The statues stood facing the death-well gazebo with the statue of General Ahmad Yani placed in the middle with his hand pointing accusingly towards the well, while his six colleagues stood in a military postures on both sides, all wearing formal military attire. Looming behind the statues was a seventeen meter high white marble wall with an enormous Garuda Pancasila bird, the coat of arms of the country, over-shadowing the statues with wings fully extended. The shape of the wall was trapezoidal and stood above a seventeen meter by seventeen meter base with seven steps. Like all previous measurements in the monument, number 17 symbolized August 17, while the seven steps symbolized the Sapta Marga, seven points of the soldier's oath.19 Beneath the statue, there was a detailed bas relief mural depicting the treacherous nature of PKI, from their first rebellion in 1948 at Madiun through the Lubang Buaya 17 Ibid.p.377 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 18 === [PDF page 304] === 288 killings in 1965 and their aftermath. Saskia Wieringa, a scholar who studied the depiction of sexual metaphors by the New Order, described the mural from gender point of view: The central part of the mural is devoted to the events at Lubang Buaya. The generals are being clubbed and thrown into the well. They are surrounded by representations of women. To the left three women are standing. One of them is dressed in a very sexual way and argues defiantly with a man. Both of them are ugly. Beside her two dancing women are arranged, one of whom bears a wreath of flowers (representing the so-called "dance of the fragrant flowers"). Above the well one woman is portrayed, leaning against a tree. She is clad in uniform trousers and a blouse which clearly reveals her full breasts. A knife hangs on her belt. Her posture again is defiant. From Saskia's description, these Gerwani communist women at Lubang Buaya were portrayed as immoral sexual objects. Thus, the Gerwani indicated the lack of selfrespect among the communist women, traits that run counter to the popular perception of Indonesian women as highly moral, self respecting, and properly mother-like in their comportment. Continuing her analyses, Saskia elaborates other significant factors of the monument: To the right the scene is dominated by the overpowering figure of General Soeharto. Under his left arm two women are standing, heads down, attitude, demure, one of them carrying a baby. The figure of General Soeharto has intervened and turned those defiant, seductive, dangerous and castrating women into the very symbols of obedience and motherhood. The last scene shows the allpowerful General-President Soeharto in front of what is presumably a courtroom. The absolute military and legal power is his.21 In this second part of her description, Saskia described the image of General Soeharto as a dominant figure in promoting the popular perception of Indonesian women. Saskia Wieringa, "Sexual Metaphors in the Change from Soekarno's Old Order to Soeharto's New Order in Indonesia," RIMA, Summer 1998. p. 164 21 Ibid. === [PDF page 305] === 289 The image of the SMT tribunal was also depicted in the bas relief, showing Soeharto as playing a major role which, in fact, corresponded to the actual staging of the tribunal as a triumph for the regime. Here we again see the major themes of the Lubang Buaya Monument—the Indonesian army as the protector of the nation with General Soeharto as its leader, the bad communists perpetrating sadistic acts, and the army's heroic role in defending Pancasila. In an interview, Mrs.Nani Nurrachman, the daughter of Major General Sutojo Siswomihardjo, one of the slain generals, expressed her reservations about the overall design and representation of the event in the monument, "I was very disappointed to see how the place was transformed into something very nice." She explained: "For me, as a remembrance, the place should have been left as it was so people will know how it really was." She added that the monument should have been kept as an example, as at Toul Sleng in Cambodia or Auschwitz where the torture equipment and the location were preserved intact, perhaps only adding some fences to make it more organized. Otherwise everything should have been left untouched. At the Lubang Buaya monument, Mrs.Nurrachman felt there were some conflicting themes, with the museum showing the gruesome pictures of the general's bodies not long after they were exhumed while the monument focused on PKI brutality. But, in a jarring, contrasting note, all the buildings, statues and even the death well were neatly renovated and layered with symbols that was made them far nicer than the original conditions. There was thus a sharp contrast between === [PDF page 306] === 290 the brutal way the generals were killed and this appealing presentation, which in her opinion could make people confused about what exactly happened.22 Commemoration Day The goals of preserving the New Order's interpretation oiLubang Buaya affair would not be complete without having a special day dedicated for remembrance. As plans for building the monument at Lubang Buaya were being conceived, General Soeharto, in his capacity as minister of the Army, declared on September 17, 1966 that every October 1st should be commemorated as the Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, or the sacred day of Pancasila. In that order, Letter No: Kep-977/9/1966, Soeharto explained that the aim of the commemoration was: 1. To foster continuous awareness and fighting spirit against the threats of KONTREV (Kontra-Revolusi), especially against the PKI treachery that has already happened twice. 2. For broadening and instilling beliefs of truth and superiority of Pancasila as the "WAY OF LIFE" of the Indonesian people, it is necessary to demonstrate a commitment to continue safeguarding and defending Pancasila with perseverance. Therefore, it is necessary to always remind all people of Indonesia about the 30 September 1965 affair as an event that should never happen again.23 The order required that all rank-and-files of the Army should commemorate October 1 and to encourage other branches of the armed forces, along with the civilian masses, to join in the remembrance. The order also gave further explanations about the reasons for having the Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, above explaining the many ordeals that the nation faced from the 1945 revolution through the present time. The Hari Kesaktian 22 23 Nani Nurrachman, June 5, 2006. Surat Keputusan Nomer: Kep-977/9/1966 Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat, (17 September 1966). === [PDF page 307] === Pancasila emphasized that the cause of these ordeals was the "foreign ideology that wanted to destroy Pancasila by forcing another ideology on the people of Indonesia, which resulted into the outbreak of the G.30.S/PKI affair on 30 September 1965 and 1 October 1965."24 As previously noted, the first official letter only specified that the Army should lead the commemoration. Later it was thought that it would be necessary to expand the nature of the commemoration beyond the army to encompass the Indonesian people. With that idea in mind, on September 27, 1967, Soeharto in his capacity as acting president, issued another letter, Number 153 Year 1967, declaring October 1 as the Hari Kesaktian Pancasila to be observed by all the people of Indonesia. Soeharto explained the reasoning behind the issuance of the letter, arguing that October 1 had "special character and features of a day that able to instill and strengthen certainty in the truth and kesaktian of Pancasila, as the way of life which could unite the entire Indonesian state, nation and its people." For the next 30 years, every Indonesian citizen would be required to commemorate October 1 as the sacred day for the triumph of Pancasila over communism. On that day, every house, office, and school was required to fly the national flag at half-mast as a gesture of respect for the slain army officers at Lubang Buaya. On the first anniversary of the event in 1966, General Soeharto, as the minister of the Army, gave a nationally broadcast speech over the radio and television highlighting the cruel nature of the PKI: 24 Ibid. Sural Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 153 Thn. 1967 Tentang Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, (27 September 1967). 25 === [PDF page 308] === 292 However, human beings who followed the teaching that was hostile to our teaching, human beings who had different norms of civilization about human rights and humanity as proven by the Indonesian Communist Party were more dangerous, more cruel, and more vicious than wild beasts. But, God is just and compassionate. Soeharto used the opportunity to assert the superiority of Pancasila philosophy, claiming that the PKI's attack had actually confirmed Pancasila's quality as an endless source for spiritual, moral, and physical well being. Moreover, the tragedy at Lubang Buaya helped promote Pancasila as superior in facing struggle and conflict. Therefore God would always save Pancasila from the efforts of another ideology that wanted to destroy it.28 By repeatedly referring to God as the protector of Pancasila, Soeharto had in fact enhanced the idea of kesaktian, or the supreme power of Pancasila. Declaring God to be on the same side as Pancasila was especially effective in the long-term struggle to eradicate the evil of God-less communism. At the end of his speech, Soeharto, as if wanting to make sure that his message was clear, emphasized who was currently in charge. Citing the late General Soedirman, the revolutionary hero and the father of the armed forces, Soeharto said: "The only national possession of the Republic of Indonesia that still intact and never changes regardless facing various problems and alteration is the TNI [Indonesian National Army]."29 Soeharto's message was unmistakably powerful for most people. Amidst the chaotic situation, he assured the people that the TNI was solid, strong, and ready to face 27 Reporter, "Djendral Soeharto: Pki Lebih Buas Daripada Binatang," Harian Angkatan Bersendjata, 1 October 1966.p.l 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.p.2 === [PDF page 309] === 293 any challenge. On the other hand, he purposely ignored the fact that the main actors in the Thirtieth September Movement and those who were responsible for the murder of the army generals all came from the armed forces. He also conveniently disregarded all of the nation's past rebellions such as the Darul Islam, PRR1/PERMESTA, and Kahar Muzakar, which were all instigated by members of the Armed Forces, the TNI. Despite the obvious TNI involvement in the Thirtieth September movement, Soeharto wanted to show the public that the military was solid in the struggle against the PKI. By declaring a day for commemoration and constructing a monument to cement this interpretation, General Soeharto was assuring that the legacy of fighting the communists and his own actions in crushing them would be remembered by future generations. Hence, for him it was crucial to seize the opportunity for preserving this narrative, using the annual commemoration day and monument as the symbols for his regime's triumph. Strong images were needed to consolidate his new regime's legitimacy. Realizing that using his personality and the army alone to preserve the official narrative would not be sufficient. Soeharto decided to use Pancasila, the state ideology conceptualized by his rival Sukarno, as the persuasive vehicle for preserving his version of these events. This was nothing less than a brilliant move since by appropriating such established concept, he re-invented the most recognized symbol of the nation, coop-ting it in the service of his regime and its leader. Rather than disregarding his rival's idea, he promoted Pancasila by exalting its image to new heights as possessing supernatural (Sakti) traits. === [PDF page 310] === 294 Docu-drama The annual commemoration and visits to the Pancasila Sakti monument were dutifully done by Soeharto throughout his years in power. However, the representation of the regime's interpretation of the event, as reflected in the monument and commemoration day, seemed insufficient on their own to convince the public about what actually happened on that controversial day in October 1965. The government decided to make a full-length feature film that would tell the story based on the regime's interpretation of the event. The production and release of the epic movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI,30 or the treachery of the Thirtieth September Movement/PKI, in 1984 defined the quintessential character of the New Order regime and would leave longlasting legacy, even after the regime collapsed in 1998. One would ask why it took Soeharto almost twenty years to finally make a movie about the events of October 1, 1965. Most likely, the turbulent domestic political situation in Indonesia during late 1970s and early 1980s precluded an earlier production. During this time, Soeharto had relatively strong political position after consolidating his government by subordinating the military and creating a seemingly democratic system that held elections every five years. By the 1980s, the SMT trials for the political prisoners were over and some had already been executed, while many others were still 30 The movie was known/called by several different names. The most famous one is Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI (The treachery of the G.30.S/PKI). However, in the original movie itself the title showed was Pengkhianatan G.30.S (Rebellion of the G.30.S) without the suffix "PKI" which I found it odd since the movie was commissioned by the New Order government. However, the movie also often called Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI. In referring to the movie I opted to use the combination of the original title with the word Pengkhianatan and using G.30.S/PKI since most people would always identify the event and the movie as G.30.S/PKI with the suffix "PKI". === [PDF page 311] === 295 awaiting their uncertain fate inside the New Order's prisons. Also the government already made preparations for release of thousands of political prisoners (TAPOL) from Bum Island who had been arrested in connection with the 1965 upheaval. As Soeharto consolidated his power, removing enemies and dealing with many challenges, he became increasingly dominant in Indonesian political life. However, his dominance did not mean that the New Order regime was without any serious opposition. Several large student demonstrations occurred in 1974 and 1978 against the regime, almost destabilizing the country. But the military, especially the army, quickly suppressed those demonstrations with an iron fist. In late 1970s and early 1980s, especially between 1980 and 1984, the rise of the radical Islamic movement repeatedly challenged the regime through active recruitment that would lead to series of terrorist acts, notably by a group called Komando Jihad. This group hijacked a Garuda airplane in Bangkok, led an attack on a police station, and was responsible for series of bombings that blasted the Borobudur temple in central Java and a bank in Jakarta owned by a Chinese businessman allied with President Soeharto. As the country continued to thrive economically, those who challenged the government were dealt with severely. Feeling the needed for other affirmation of his power, Soeharto saw the film as an instrument to revamp his image as the savior of the nation. Amidst the threats from radical Islamic groups in late 1983 and 1984, the idea of a movie on the PKI's treachery moved forward as a major effort by the New Order. === [PDF page 312] === 296 The movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI was first released to public on September 28, 1984, three days before the nineteenth anniversary of the killings at Lubang Buaya31 The movie immediately gained immense attention from both public curiosity and an official policy that required all students from primary to college level to see the movie. From its first release in 1984 until Soeharto's New Order regime collapsed in 1998, every September 30, all television stations were required to show this four-hour film as part of the commemoration of the killings at Lubang Buaya. In contrast to the commemoration day and the monument, the movie offered a shift in the focus for the event's representation. The Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the Monumen Pancasila Sakti highlighted the quality of sakti, or the sacred and supernatural aspects of the Pancasila. Until 1984, these triumphal symbols had been used for years as the facade for boosting the image of General Soeharto. The movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI, on the other hand, shifted focus from the Sakti aspect of Pancasila to the heroism of General Soeharto as the savior of the nation from the, brutal communists. At the time of its release, a short review appeared on Kompas newspaper describing the film: Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI: A reconstruction of the bloody event on the eve of 30 September 1965. The event was orchestrated by the PKI, and carried on using slander, abduction, and murder of seven high ranking ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces] officers. The anatomy of the coup was portrayed as detailed as possible, but the event shown as black and white. Moreover, the chosen historical period felt inert and stood alone. This short review above was based on slightly longer review published more than a year before in the same newspaper. In that published review titled "Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI 31 32 Reporter, "Pengkhianatan G.30.S/Pki," Harian umum Kompas, 28 September 1984 1984.p.l0 Reporter, "Film: Pengkhianatan G.30.S/Pki," Harian umum Kompas, 29 September 1984. === [PDF page 313] === 297 Sebuah dokumenter yang menyimpan dendam or the treachery of G.30.S/PKI: a documentary that holds vengeance," the reviewer, Marselli, criticized the approach of director Arifin C. Noer in presenting the controversial bloody events in the film without examining any social dimensions, for not exploring a historical problem with historical methods. Marselli went even further by highlighting the fact that Arifin C. Noer failed to explore the political events in which the coup had its origins. Instead, he said, "the movie showed fighting between soldiers, the communist soldiers, and the ABRI soldiers. And after the appearance of Major General Soeharto right in the middle of the film, he immediately began taking care of the situation, creating an impression that the military was running the show in Indonesia."34 Marselli's critical assessment gave an unconventional reading of the film that was perhaps unintentional. Nonetheless, his critique was correct although he did not dare to mention the obvious: it was not only the military that was running the show, but one soldier, General Soeharto. Moreover, the portrayal of the characters was excessively black and white. The communists and military conspirators were shown as secretive, ruthless, and suspicious, even towards each other. They always seemed nervous, glancing at each other deceitfully—an attribute reinforced by heavy smoking, deep-toned voices, and drinking dark steaming coffee. In sum these strong images suggested treachery. Contrasting images appeared as the movie began visiting the residence of the generals who were about to become the victims of the heinous plot. Showing the generals Marselli, "Film Pengkhianatan G.30.S/Pki: Sebuah Dokumenter Yang Menyimpan Dendam," Harian umum Kompas, 15 Juli 1984. === [PDF page 314] === 298 as living a regular life with their family at their side, the camera shots projected images of fundamental decency, peace and harmony. Their tranquility was about to be destroyed by the Thirtieth September Movement.35 Furthermore, the portrayal of General Soeharto as a calm, decisive military officer in the face of imminent threat from the communists, suggests a man who was not only a hero, but the savior of the nation. In an interview, Jajang C.Noer, the wife of the late director Arifin C.Noer, who took part in the production of the film, asserted that it was never the intention of her late husband to portray the communists in that dark way contrasting them with the decent portrayal of the generals. According to Jajang, Arifin's reasoning was solely based on artistic considerations since that type of dark portrayal would look good on film, not done because they were communist per se. Furthermore, she claimed that Arifin C.Noer wanted to give the audience an impression of the event which, in his opinion, was shadowy, vague, and unclear.36 The early title for the movie Pengkhianatan G. 3O.S/PKI was Sejarah Orde Baru or "The history of the New Order" since the movie was meant to chronicle the birth of the General Soeharto's regime. During production however, the title changed to Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI. This probably happened because the movie was focused solely on the events of October 1, 1965. After the success of this movie, another was produced to tell the story about the controversial Supersemar letter entitled Djakarta 1966. This film was also assigned to Arifin C.Noer, with the goal of completing the McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past.p.99 Jajang C.Noer, December 19, 2006. === [PDF page 315] === 299 narrative of New Order regime from inception to victory. Though produced and shown, Djakarta 1966 never achieved the prominence of Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI. The idea of making a movie about one of the most controversial events in modern Indonesian history began its journey when Brigadier General G. Dwipayana, then the head of PFN Perusahaan Film Negara or the State Film Cooperation, approached Mr. Arifin C. Noer, a well known non-political film maker. He decided to offer Mr. Arifin C.Noer the project since, among the prominent Indonesian film makers at that time, he was considered to be the most acceptable choice. Initially, Mr. Arifin rejected the commission as he was preoccupied with another project. However, he later changed his mind after many of his closest friends— Goenawan Mohammad, Taufik Ismail, and Bur Rasuanto ~ persuaded him to take on the project, convincing him that making the movie would be important for the sake of educating the nation, so such a tragic event would never occur again. Jajang C.Noer explained her husband's rationale, saying: "For Mas Arifin the purpose was to educate the nation and not to create hatred or vengeance." 38 She claimed that her husband did not purposely want to vilify the PKI. Instead, he condemned the event itself by showing how that this kind of brutal killing could happen. As an artist and movie director, Arifin acknowledged In my personal interview with Ms.Jajang C.Noer, she confided with me her own personal theory about how the government decided in choosing her late husband as the director of the movie. She said that at that time there were three prominent Indonesian movie directors, they were Arifin c.Noer, Teguh Karya and Sjumandjaja. From those three names Arifin c.Noer was the most desirable and acceptable candidate since Teguh Karya has Chinese background and Sjumandjaja at one point in his life did some of his education in Moscow, Russia. Hence, it would be politically impossible at that time to ask someone who has any remote connection whatsoever with either one of the communist powers to make a movie about the crushing of communist backed rebellion. 38 C.Noer. === [PDF page 316] === 300 that the people who watched it could reach their own conclusion about the event which would in many cases, differ from what the film maker had intended. Most of the materials and information for the film script came from Prof. Nugroho Notosusanto, head of the Armed Forces Historical Center. The film scenario, however, was written by Arifin C.Noer himself. Throughout the process of researching, writing, casting, shooting, and editing, Arifin was given independence in almost every aspect of the production, including interpretation of the event and the overall vision for the movie. He received full cooperation from the armed forces which provided military personnel, equipment, and access to off-limits military installations. To make a film based on historical event, Mr.Arifm and his crew spent a year conducting research, trying to understand events that led to the abduction and killing of the generals on October 1, 1965. His team conducted long interviews with family members of the slain generals and anyone who witnessed the event, including Soeharto. Recalling her interview with Soeharto for the movie, Jajang C.Noer said that he was often annoyed at her detailed questions about his gestures, how he sat, where he sat, what color his pajamas, and myriad other details. The actor who played the Soeharto role's in the movie, Amoroso Katamsi, was even instructed to accompany the president for a day at his farm, TAPOS in West Java, to observe his way of speaking, walking, and gesturing. Interviews were also done with some of the PKI political prisoner such as Sjam Kamaruzamman, the head of PKI Special Bureau who at that time was still waiting for his death sentence to be carried out. However, the information from Sjam was not helpful === [PDF page 317] === 301 as he was unenthusiastic about assisting the film crew. Jajang C.Noer described her thoughts about Sjam when she and other film crew members interviewed him: He never gave any information, as though he was afraid. He never said what he thought about what happened. He never said that 'we were being slandered', he never said that, while most PKI people often claimed that they knew nothing about the event. Pak Sjam was in the politburo [special bureau]. He was the brain. But there was no information coming from him. Just the same, if we said yes then he said yes. If we said no, then he said no. It was very difficult obtaining information from him as he was only agreeing with whatever information we had. So was it like this pak? Yes, That's it...he did not...ever upgrade anything.40 Sjam's reluctance to cooperate with the film maker was understandable since he could not see any benefit in contradicting the approved New Order narrative that officially blamed the PKI. Even if he used that opportunity to clarify the party's position, he knew that most likely his version of the story would not appear in the movie. Furthermore, his unenthusiastic manner could also be viewed as a form of defiance. The casting process was also done with care. The film crew, however, found it challenging to find someone who could play President Sukarno. None of the leading actors were appropriate for that role. In the end, Arifin C.Noer chose Umar Kayam, a literary figure who did not resemble Sukarno at all, but had some charisma. For other roles, Arifin asked his crew to visit mosques and churches, finding new faces that could fill the parts needed for the movie.41 Interviews with the families of the slain generals were also as detailed as possible. Some of the family members had witnessed the abduction and murder of their beloved 41 Ibid. === [PDF page 318] === 302 fathers and could give detailed information. For example they provided descriptions of how the body was dragged out, showing the location where they were hiding while the shooting that happening inside the house. The film crew recognized the difficulty for the family members to re-enact what happened on that bloody night. Therefore, the crew did these interviews slowly while maintaining carefully asking detailed questions. One of the sons of a late general even disclosed his personal trauma. In the morning when his father was taken, the abductors opened fire inside the house and stray of bullets shattered his father's whiskey collection, causing the aroma to fill the house. Since then, he cannot stand the smell of whiskey since it reminds him of that dreadful night.42 As mentioned above, Arifin had considerable independence in making this epic film. His script only needed the approval of General Dwipayana before he could proceed shooting a scene. Other than that, the government and the military never directly interfered with the overall production of the film. Mr. Arifin had sufficient autonomy to reject one suggestion for a scene involving eye gouging of the generals by their communist tormentors. Not long after the bodies of the generals were recovered, it was widely believed that communist ill-treatment of the generals had been severe. The media often described the torture and mutilation, claiming that the eyes of the generals gouged out using a special tool that the communists had developed. Arifin did create the eye gouging scene, using goat eyes as his prop to make it more realistic. In the end, however, he decided not to include it in the film because he thought the scene was too gory. Furthermore, he === [PDF page 319] === personally had problems believing that the eye gouging had actually happened. But his foremost reason for excision was concern for the children who might be watching.43 Apart from this difficult scene, Arifin also faced other challenges in portraying the widely popular story about the Gerwani, the PKI women's group, torturing and sexually mutilating the generals. According to the Dutch scholar Saskia Wieringa who has studied the portrayal of the Gerwani at Lubang Buaya, the images of the women who took part in the torture was graphically represented in the Pancasila Sakti monument. In the movie itself, the scenes of Gerwani were not as lurid as in the monument or in accounts in the Army newspapers. The stories about female Gerwani member's dancing around the bonfire in a sexual orgy with their male communist counterparts was shown indirectly in the film. In the wayang kulit tradition where the dalang or the puppet master presents the story using shadow and gestures, the gerwani dancing and mutilations in the movie were obscured in shadows and quick but intense scenes of the communist masses, singing and smiling while jeering the hapless generals. The film also portrayed the members of Thirtieth September Movement singing the infamous genjer-genjer and PKI song Darah Rakyat (People's blood) while dancing around the bonfire. However, the songs in the film were obscured by background music as they were intentionally overwhelmed by the musical score. Jajang C.Noer explained that those songs was purposely made inaudible, as there were concerns that little children could easily memorize the songs after they saw the movie. It was something that the regime's === [PDF page 320] === 304 officials obviously wanted to prevent.44 The original score was composed by Embie C.Noer, the brother of the director, and his particularly ominous style of music increased the intensity of the torture scenes since it was combined with the dark lighting. However, the nakedness and mass sexual orgy often described in the months following the murders were absent from the movie. Jajang asserted that her husband did not believe the story about Gerwani brutality being circulated by the military. He did not believe that the women got drunk, tortured the generals, and performed the Harum Bunga (the fragrance flower) dance with sexual acts before killing the generals. Since the story of the Gerwani involvement in the torture at Lubang Buaya was so widespread, it was almost impossible not to include any of the Gerwani acts in the movie. So Arifin decided to make the scene as mild as he possibly could. For that purpose, he created one scene in the movie showing a female (supposed to be Gerwani member) who entered the hut where the generals were held. Her eyes gazed coldly as she took a razor from the thatch wall and slowly walked towards the bloodied and beaten general. As she showed the razor to the general, she said: "penderitaan itupedih jendral,.pedih!! sekarang coba rasakan sayatan silet inijuga pedihll Topi tidaksepedihpenderitaan rakyatll (To suffer is painful General, painful!! Now feel this pain from the razor cut, but it still not as painful as the suffering of the people!) she then sliced the general's face from the forehead down to the chin going 44 Ibid. === [PDF page 321] === 305 through the eye.45 Jajang C.Noer asserted that using the razor in the Gerwani torture scene was the mildest thing that they could put in the movie, in comparison with the widespread army propaganda that talked about the Gerwani's mutilations of the generals' genitals. But the most famous line of the movie did not come from the Gerwani. It came in a scene when one of the soldiers from the Thirtieth September Movement was interrogating the general, forcing him to sign a confession about the existence of the Council of Generals (COG). As the general kept silent and did not respond to the threat, the interrogator said memorably: "darah itu warnanya merah Jendral!! Seperti amarah " (The color of blood is red general! Just like anger!)46 Arifin C.Noer wrote this scene' and overtime, this particular line became the signature for the film. Despite his general independence in shooting the movie, there was one instance in which General Dwipayana, explicitly told Arifin not to include a particular scene. That scene showed Colonel Latief, one of the top leaders from the Thirtieth September Movement, going to the hospital and reporting to General Soeharto about the movement and its objectives in abducting the generals. This particular scene was initially included as part of the larger narrative of the event, but General Dwipayana explicitly asked Arifin to excise it as he deemed the scene to be "unimportant."47In another account, Soeharto acknowledged seeing Latief in the hospital, but then asserted that Latief was there to check on him or perhaps wanted to kill him. Intentionally omitting actions that indicated 45 Arifin C.Noer, "Pengkhianatan G.30.S/Pki," ed. Arifin C.Noer (Jakarta: Virgo Compact disc, 1985). Ibid. 47 C.Noer. 46 === [PDF page 322] === 306 General Soeharto's possible prior knowledge of the movement, showed the regime's determination in maintaining, a simplified partisan version of the event. From this perspective, it was important to present an organized, simplified storyline in the film to avoid confusion among the viewers. The movie was screened for the first time in front of limited audience during the Indonesian Movie Festival at Yogyakarta in July 1984. At that premier, the film was received enthusiastically by the audience who was willing to pay two thousand rupiah then considered quite expensive. The audience also stood for a long time in front of the ticket office to get seats. As the four-hour long movie began, the audience's enthusiasm became more noticeable. Drs. Bakdi Soemanto, chairman of Yogyakarta Arts Council who was in the audience, described the atmosphere inside the theater: The audience enthusiasm was quite fierce, when the actor Bram who played Lieutenant Colonel Untung appeared on the screen, every time the screening paused for a bit, the audience roared: 'Kill!'. I cannot imagine what would happen to mas Syubah Asa, the man who played Aidit, if he showed himself up in front of the audience and sat among the actors who were in the movie.48 The audience enthusiasm for the film was reflected in the number of people who watched in the weeks after it was officially opened on September 28, 1984. The movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI shattered all previous box office records in every city it played. In Jakarta alone, the number of viewers hit 300,000 in the three weeks after its release. In Semarang, during the same three weeks, the movie already made 170 million Rupiah equal to around $170,000. In Surabaya, the only movie that ever made more than 48 Bakdi Soemanto, "Melihat Film, Melihat Jalan Pikiran," Harian umum Kompas, 11 Agustus 1984.p.4-5 === [PDF page 323] === 100 million Rupiah (103 million) was the James Bond movie Octopussy, but its record was easily shattered by the 260,000 tickets that Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI sold to the public and students. Assuming that the price of the ticket was Rp.1000 per person, sales would easily reach beyond 200 million Rupiah. While Jajang affirmed that the cost of making the movie was around six hundred million rupiah (other sources claimed it was as high as one billion rupiah) these revenues were indeed astounding and the movie could well made more than one and half billion Rupiah only on the island of Java.49 Ticket scalpers, for a long time considered to be an extinct profession, suddenly re-emerged following the phenomenal success of the movie. In cities like Jakarta, ticket scalpers were seen roaming around movie theaters trying to sell tickets at a higher price. Furthermore, the traffic around the theater was packed with people seeing the film. Some of the reasons behind the phenomenal success of the film were expressed in the Kompas newspaper which did interviews with audience members. The people admitted that they felt the need to know about the truth about what had happened nineteen years ago in 1965. Among the audience there were also school teachers and students who were required to watch the movie, since some said it contained lessons about "the history of the nation's struggle."51 The phenomenal attendance could be attributed to the minister of education and culture, Prof. Dr. Nugroho Notosusanto, who required that all students from primary to college see the movie.52 The implementation of 49 JB.Kristanto, ""Pengkhianatan G.30.S" Pemecah Rekor Komersial," Harian umum Kompas, 21 Oktober 1984.p.6 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Nurrachman. === [PDF page 324] === this policy helped the movie win the Antemas award at the 1985 Indonesian Film Festival for category of highest gross and most spectators.53 Later on, it was decided that the movie would be shown annually on national television every September 30. The movie then became part of the official program from the public relations office of the Ministry of Education and Culture for the commemoration of the Hah Kesaktian Pancasila.54 Mrs.Nani Nurrachman, daughter of one of the slain generals, expressed her dismay at the government policy of requiring children of every ages and educational level to watch the annual showing of the film: First of all, children were not supposed to see that movie. I cannot believe it, especially after that instruction from the Minister of Education and Culture was released. My God! And then secondly, it was shown every year. It caused saturation effect which lead into belittling [of the tragedy], ah, that is typical, we already know that. In the end, the movie no longer has any meaning.55 As a psychologist, Mrs. Nurrachman concern was informed by her awareness of negative effect on children exposed to violence. She agreed that the event must be remembered, but questioned what and how it should be remembered. She criticized the movie for giving incomplete information on the background conditions that led to the killings. "What was the context at that time?" she asked. "How come two opposing power ended up facing each other, the PKI and TNI?" In addition to the lack of explanation about the political and economic context prior to the event, she further asserted that the movie also lacked any explanation about why those generals were abducted and eventually killed. 53 Tim Kompas, "Ffi 1985 Ditutup: Wajah Lama Tetap Mendominasi," Harian umum Kompas, 11 Agustus 1985.p.l2 54 Mudjito kepala bagian humas dan Lembaga negara Seksi Penerangan dan Dokumentasi Panitia Hapsak Pancasila 1985, "Pengkhianatan G.30.S Pki," Harian umum Kompas, 28 September 1985.p.4 55 Nurrachman. === [PDF page 325] === 309 "Why take these generals?" she asked, "Pak Yard and his deputies were taken, but my father was not his deputy, he was the director of the Army Judicial Affairs. Why was he taken? What was the difference between him with, say the director of equipment or director of personnel? Or with other directors who were in the same level with him, so there must be something in my father." Clearly, the movie lacked depth and was blatantly one-sided. Mrs.Nurrachman affirmed that not only did the movie present only one perspective, but it also only had one focus: General Soeharto.56 The annual policy of the movie would last until 1997. In May 1998 Soeharto's New Order regime collapsed, and along with it went the tradition of showing the movie every September 30th. In comparison with the commemoration and monument, the movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI was the most powerful of the triumphal symbols. It was shown repeatedly for years and contained unforgettably strong images. Despite the movie's shortcomings in explaining what actually happened, it had achieved its goal as the best vehicle for promoting fear against communism and, most importantly, promoting General Soeharto's heroism in facing the threat of communist evil. Most people saw the movie more than twice and retained strong memories of its violent images. In al999 survey, Tempo magazine found that 97 percent of their respondents had seen Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI. Among that number, around 60 percent saw the movie more than three times. Furthermore, around 72 percent of respondents depended on the movie as their major source of information about what had happened on 56 Ibid. === [PDF page 326] === 310 October 1,1965. A survey done by Kompas newspaper and published on September 30, 2002, revealed that 77 percent of respondents perceived being a communist as identical with sadistic, atheist, and immoral attitudes. Moreover, more than half of the respondents agreed that communist was identical to murderer.58 Conclusion The three triumphal symbols of the New Order regime had strong connections with each other as they were all designed to serve the purpose of preserving long-term memory of the killings at Lubang Buaya. In all of these prominent symbols there was certain degree of shared purpose and substance in forming the narrative. Nonetheless, there were differences in the trajectory of these symbols. All came from the same source, the killings of the generals. Yet in different ways each of these symbols obscured the actual victims of the event, the six slain Army generals and one first officer. Within the context of the establishing the monument and commemoration day, the actual victims at Lubang Buaya were submerged, almost lost by the exaltation of Pancasila ideology to a supernatural level. The emphasis on the kesaktian in both the commemoration day and monument could clearly be seen in the way that both bear the word kesaktian in their names. This fact obscured the actual victims at Lubang Buaya obscure since they lost their individual importance and were overwhelmed by the idea of the sacredness of Pancasila and heroism of General Soeharto. In the commemoration day 57 Wicaksono, "Komunisme Masih Menakutkan," Majalah Tempo, 3 Oktober 1999.p.42 Reporter, "Jajak Pendapat Kompas: Ketakutan Yang Tak Kunjung Pudar," Harian Umum Kompas, 30 September 2002. 58 === [PDF page 327] === 311 and monument's representation even Soeharto's heroism was somewhat obscured by the symbolic uses of Pancasila as its main facade. However, in the movie Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKIPancasila functions as the mere backdrop for Soeharto's personal heroism. Thus, the movie proved more direct in serving the political needs of showing Soeharto's heroism. Mrs.Nurrachman noted this problematic facet of the film when she said that it clearly lacked substance in explaining the context that led to the killings at Lubang Buaya. The absence of any explanation showed how the regime felt that it was inconsequential to explain that historical process since it was better to present the event in black-and-white terms to boost the image of General Soeharto. To maintain a lasting narrative the story had to be made as simple as possible, with good beating bad, virtue defeating evil. Any complication that might affect the narrative flow was purposely ignored since it did not support the promotion of Soeharto as the hero. However, the exaltation of Soeharto's image in these triumphal symbols failed to achieve the eternal status the regime hoped to promote. Instead, the most lasting consequence from these triumphal symbols was not the love of a leader but the everlasting hatred of the communists and communism. In fact, these triumphal symbols would ultimately be tarnished by Soeharto's own corruption, benefiting himself, his family, and his cronies. Nevertheless, the commemoration day, monument, and the movie have become part of his regime's legacy and part of the burden the nation has to bear in dealing with its violent past. === [PDF page 328] === 312 Chapter VII: Conclusion: From Legitimacy to Triumph This study has examined the emergence of the New Order's official narrative of the Lubang Buaya, killings, focusing above all, on the origins of this story. Despite the unclear nature of the event, which has for years sparked controversy among both foreign and domestic scholars, several fundamental facts seemed certain. To summarize, the killings of the top Indonesian army leadership at Lubang Buaya on October 1, 1965 triggered a process that led to President Sukarno's downfall, the killing of around 500,000 alleged communist supporters, and the emergence of General Soeharto's New Order regime that would hold power for the next thirty-two years. In his landmark treatise, Pierre Nora addresses the differences between the memory and history, arguing that memory is a natural phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present, while history is a malleable representation of the past.1 Through close study of the artifacts of history, I have argued that the New Order's construction of the Lubang Buaya official narrative used symbolic material such as monuments and film, as well as the special military tribune and purging policy, to manipulate history so successfully that it shaped the country's collective memory of these events. At multiple levels, Indonesia's traumatic past resonates with Nora's argument that the purpose of the so-called sites of memory, in this case the Lubang Buaya monument, is to facilitate such manipulation of memory. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Memoire," Representations 26 (1989).p.8 === [PDF page 329] === 313 This conceptual frame prepares us for a more focused question: what kind of narrative has been chosen for representation in the official, constructed memory? The chapters in this dissertation have demonstrated the process, themes, and, to a lesser extent, the impact of this historical narrative. With a striking consistency, a particular narrative was embedded within the state's efforts at making certain artifacts, thereby inducing a version of history that would influence Indonesian public perspectives on the Lubang buaya killings—and do this so successfully that it would shape perception of the 1965 tragedy for years to come. The New Order's official narrative did not rely on a critique, explication, or evaluation of sources that followed the accepted rules of historical scholarship. Instead the narrative pursues an immediate claim of "truth" using pre-established themes of Pancasila ideology and a discourse about Godless communism. Hence, these themes strengthened a version of history which proved to be emotive, pious, and affirmative in the forming the symbols of lasting collective memory. In analyzing the New Order's official narrative Lubang Buaya, it is important to recall the regime's version of the events. According to the New Order's official account in the government publication the Thirtieth September Movement the rebellion was the culmination of PKI's treacherous plot to take over the state which they had been planning since their revival in the 1950s.3 The army was especially targeted since they were the Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2000).p8-9 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30 September Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, Dan Penumpasannya (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1994).p.l69 === [PDF page 330] === 314 most aware of the PKI's political manipulation in trying to get rid of the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 constitution. The army leadership was always firm in their opposition to the PKI's attempts to fulfill these goals. For all those reasons, the PKI saw the army as their main obstacle in achieving power and, as a result, the party used the Thirtieth September Movement as means to destroy the military leadership.4 However, as this dissertation demonstrates, the actual nature of the event was far from the simplified story of good versus evil prevalent in the official narrative. In fact, the nature of the event and thus the story's origins were full of uncertainty, controversy, and even mystery. Nonetheless, a dominant narrative emerged from this complex situation that was intentionally constructed and then maintained first, to serve Soeharto in claiming legitimacy, later to facilitate his regime's sense of triumph and, finally to insert the narrative in to the history of the nation's journey. At the outset, this study posed three questions related to the emergence of the official narrative of Lubang Buaya: first, in what way did the New Order regime initially construct the memory of Lubang Buaya, thereby making it one of the major tenets for the regime's legitimacy and triumphal display? Second, how and why did the New Order made a serious attempt to insert the Lubang Buaya narrative into the established historiography of Indonesia? Third, do the origins and initial construction of this narrative indicate how this official history gained acceptance? Ibid. === [PDF page 331] === 315 In response to the first and second questions on the creation, construction, and dissemination of this official narrative, the dissertation has demonstrated how, from its first months, this new regime found it important to immediately claim the "truth" about what happened at Lubang Buaya. Amidst all the uncertainty surrounding the event, the army leadership under Major General Soeharto made, without delay, plans for controlling the media, arresting people, and supporting mass killings of alleged communist sympathizers. The combination of effective black propaganda inside and outside the country and the purging actions helped instill fear in the population who cooperated with the military to eradicate the communists, whether through mass arrests or killings. The magnitude of the purging policies, illustrated in Chapter Four, shows how both the immediate claim of truth and the official purge complemented each other. In an important way, the tense situation and fear of repercussions from the military facilitated the dissemination of the official narrative. Furthermore, the establishment of Special Military Tribune, described at length in Chapter Five, also shows how the new military regime established both its legitimacy and the credibility of the narrative using judicial means. The SMT provided not only legitimacy but also strengthened its claim over the truth and provided a stage for the regime to celebrate its triumph. Most importantly, within the SMT organization, Soeharto played all the key roles in appointing the judges, selecting the defendants for trial, and also approving every sentence. === [PDF page 332] === 316 The construction of the Lubang Buaya monument at the exact location where the bodies of the slain generals were found, followed immediately by the official enactment of the commemoration day, helped spread the legitimacy of the regime. Chapter Six also discussed the process of making the controversial film the Pengkhianatan G.30.S/PKI, showing how the official narrative of Lubang Buaya evolved, no longer functioning merely to give legitimacy to the regime. Instead, this official history now served to portray the personal glorification of Soeharto while simultaneously cementing the fear of communism within Indonesian society—a fear which is still very much alive in present day Indonesia. The New Order's official narrative about the killings of the generals at Lubang Buaya, on October 1, 1965 fits perfectly within the larger historical narrative of the development of the Indonesian nation. As the nation also celebrates other important events in its recent history, the Lubang Buaya narrative became one of those key historical events that seem to fit quite logically within the linear narrative of an emerging nation. In modern Indonesian history, the starting point for the nation's narrative is the appearance of enlightenment ideas which was, and still is, symbolized by Hari Kebangkitan Nasional, or "National Awakening Day," celebrated every May 20 to commemorate the formation of the first indigenous modern organization, Boedi Oetomo, on May 20, 1908. The date was seen as the beginning for an indigenous organization with a modern outlook. === [PDF page 333] === 317 The next important day in the national historical calendar's October 28, the "Youth Pledge Day" Sumpah Pemuda, commemorating the commitment of Indonesian youth. During the Second Youth Congress back in 1928, many people gathered representing youth organizations from across the Dutch East Indies. There youth pledged to commit themselves, fighting the Dutch colonialism and entrusted their lives creating one nation Indonesia, one mother land Indonesia, and one language Indonesian. Following the Youth Pledge Day, the next important day in the linear calendar of Indonesian history is August 17, National Independence Day. It was on this day in 1945 Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia, marking the birth of Indonesian nation. As the young country continued to struggle in defending its independence, November 10 became the next day on the nation's linear history as remembrance for all the heroes who unselfishly gave their lives for freedom and sovereignty during the revolutionary period. November 10 is also known as Hart Pahlawan, National Heroes Day, commemorating the great battle of Surabaya on November 10, 1945 between the pemuda (youth) and British troops. When the pemuda refused to surrender a massive British bombardment was followed by a fierce battle in the city streets. Thus, the undying spirit of the fighting on November 10, 1945 symbolized the nation's commitment to independence. Juxtaposing chronology and calendar these important historical dates in Indonesian history showed the nation's unstoppable journey from birth to maturity— from === [PDF page 334] === 318 origins in the slender enlightenment ideal of independence, then Youth's commitment to unity, and finally the birth of the nation. Then came the killings at Lubang Buaya on October 1, 1965, reflecting the nation's external and internal challenges and fitting perfectly within its process of maturation. The killings at Lubang Buaya thus symbolized how the nation succeeded in handling this threat to grow into a more mature nation. Hence, the positioning of the Lubang Buaya official narrative in the larger context of the nation's historical journey shows how the narrative gained widespread popular acceptance. Integrating this event into the greater idea of the nation's journey from birth into maturity helps explain how the official narrative was sustained, along with the help of the other tools for historical construction described earlier in this dissertation. The major materials used in the construction of the official narrative utilized values that the Indonesians have long recognized— above all, the Pancasila ideology, especially the first principle, "belief in one supreme God." As seen throughout the chapters in this dissertation, the exploitation of these first principles was evident in the regime's media propaganda, the cross examination and sentencing of the SMT, and also in the symbols on the monument and the depiction in the film. This particular exploitation of Pancasila was effective in the purging process and assuring sustainability of the PKI guilt in a narrative that has lasted for a generation. For a diverse country obsessed with unity from its very beginnings, the saga of the nation's journey through the birth of ideas, the development of a sense of unity, physical birth, defeating external challenges, and finally facing internal challenges === [PDF page 335] === 319 enhanced nationalist sentiments. Through all these adversities, maintaining the nation's direction it was thought that it required a strong leader like Soeharto. Since this regime's collapsed in 1998, this version of history was implicitly challenged, showing the need to examine the repercussions of these historical representations in relation to the future development of the nation. With the collapse of the New Order regime, many alternatives interpretations of the Lubang Buaya event immediately challenged the official narrative. The challenges not only came from foreign scholars, but most interestingly also came from the individuals who joined and involved in the Thirtieth September Movement. As mentioned in the first chapter when figures like Hem Atmodjo, who was a member of the Thirtieth September Movement finally spoken and published a book containing his version about what happened and many others such as Colonel Abdul Latief and Air Marshall Omar Dhani who also published their experience, explaining their position as one of the historical actors in the event. Along with emerging accounts that contested the official narrative about the event, there were also accounts about the dark episode of the aftermath; on the mass killings, arrest and illegal incarceration. Not necessarily contesting with the official narrative, it helped completing the story on "1965 Indonesia" as it present the consequences of the aftermath was in fact lasting and damaging especially to those who went through it. === [PDF page 336] === The emergence of the alternative views and "missing" narrative to complete the narrative on "1965 Indonesia" has launched the process of competing narrative between the old official narrative and the emerging ones. These debates will likely continue for years, since the process of accepting and incorporating the alternative views over the official one would remain contested if there are still those who refused to acknowledge the existence of the other. We have seen how the New Order's official narrative of Lubang Buoya dominates this perspective on Indonesia. To have a more balanced view that reflects the actual complexity and military complicity in the event, there are now many new perspectives, many voices long silenced that can now be heard. One perspective comes from Ilham Aidit, son of D.N.Aidit, the PKI chairman whose life ended tragically after the collapse of the Thirtieth September Movement in 1965. Offering his personal view on how the Indonesian 1965 tragedy should be represented in history, Ilham said: "If we want to learn history, it is important if we learn beyond what happened on that particular day. The fact that there were massacre of hundreds of thousands people, that story need to be included in the textbook for primary or junior high schools." To this end, Ilham has proposed that the history of 1965 should be represented in five different episodes: first, the explanation of what happened on the particular day (October 1, 1965); second, the mass killings and the trials; third, the years of incarceration that people suffered in the aftermath; fourth, the story of the 14,000 people Ilham Aidit, June 17, 2006. === [PDF page 337] === who were sent to labor camps at Bum Island; and, finally, the years of discrimination that the former political prisoners suffered within Indonesian society. He added that the narrative should not fall into the trap of only analyzing the events that happened on October 1, 1965.6 On the other hand, Mrs.Nurrachman, a psychologist and also the daughter of the late Major General Soetojo Siswomihardjo, one of the slain generals at Lubang Buaya, has slightly different view from what Ilham has proposed. She has said that if we talked about a social event, especially something that had historical significance, we were not able to find one single factor or a linear series of factors, acts, and consequences.7 She continued, saying that although history did not stay the same, perhaps some of the substance could. However, their interpretations were quite different. She claimed that history could not go together with something that was multidimensional. Therefore, she suggested letting people follow whatever version or view they wanted to follow, whether the government's or other alternative views. However, all of these versions needed to be accessible for everyone. History cannot be decided but it can be enriched. But, she cautioned, before agreeing with any perspective, one should differentiate between scholarly studies and perspectives from ordinary person. Ibid. It was interesting that initially Ilham did not propose to include the background context that leads into the Lubang Buaya affair especially the PKI's sometimes violent unilateral action. However, after I asked him about whether the narratives of the PKI unilateral action should be included or not, he expressed his agreement that fact also should be included, but then he added that one should understand the reason behind the PKI unilateral action, many- landlords ignored the agriculture and land law enacted in 1963. Nani Nurrachman, June 5, 2006. Ibid. === [PDF page 338] === 322 The contrasting views of both Mr.Ilham Aidit and Mrs.Nani Nurrachman provide an interesting perspective on how the narrative of 1965 should be represented. The debates on how to represent one of the darkest episodes in Indonesian history continues until this day. Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, however there is another limited acceptance of these alternative views. The New Order's official narrative still prevails. Debunking such a strong official narrative that has been intensively promoted for years can be done gradually but sometimes also abruptly. Hence, the emergence of alternative views is important. Borrowing Mrs.Nurrachrnan's term, these alternative views are important to enrich history and complete the narrative. Ideally, history should not be used as means to establish legitimacy and to serve the triumph of an ephemeral regime as the New Order has done. In the case of Lubang Buaya 's official narrative, the focus was on instilling hatred of the communists, spiritual exaltation of the secular Pancasila ideology, and the glorification of an individual dictator. 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