The 30 September Movement: A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an Intelligence Operation?

=== [PDF page 1] === The 30 September Movement: A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an Intelligence Operation? Holtzappel, Coen Journal of Contemporary Asia; Jan 1, 1979; 9, 2; ProQuest pg. 216 216 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA The 30 September Movement: A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an Intelligence Operation?’ Coen Holtzappel Introduction The Purge of the Army Staff In the early morning of 1 October 1965, on the orders of a commander of President Sukarno’s Palace Guard, Lieut. Colonel Untung, and a commander of the Army’s Jakarta region, Colonel Latief, six top generals of the Army were seized in their houses and taken to Halim air base near Jakarta. The generals were: 1. Lieut. General Yani, Army Commander, and Minister; 2. Maj. General Suprapto, Second Deputy Commander of the Army, specially charged with administration; 3. Maj. General Harjono, Third Deputy Commander, in charge of financial management and ‘public relations’;. 4. Maj. General S. Parman, First Assistant of the Army Commander, in charge of intelligence work; 5. Brig. General D,I. Pandjaitan, Fourth Assistant of the Army Commander, in charge of logistics; 6. Brig. General Sotojo Siswomihardjo, Prosecutor General of the Army. A seventh general who was also hunted by the kidnappers, managed to escape. This was the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Lieut. General Nasution. Later it became known that all the six abducted generals were killed that morning, three during their capture in their own houses and the other three at Halim air base. It was remarkable from the beginning that the First Deputy Army Commander, Maj. General Suharto, at present President of the Republic, had never been on the kidnappers’ list. It is also remarkable that Brig. General Sukendro who was connected with Army Intelligence and was in charge of security and intelligence problems in the Presidium of the Cabinet, was taken from the list at the last moment. The Kidnapping and the Parties Involved The kidnapping was carried out by a company of special guardsmen of the Cakrabirawa (Palace Guard) Regiment. Two platoons of the First Infantry Brigade of the military district Jakarta and a unit of the Paratroop Brigade of that territory also participated in the abduction of the generals. A number of Air Force lorries Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 2] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 217 eee and buses as well as Army, Navy and Air Force hand weapons were used. The kidnapping was tactically supported by two battalions of commando troops from Central and East Java. These troops had been transferred to Jakarta in connection with the commemoration of Armed Forces Day planned for 5 October. A company of guard troops at Halim air base also gave tactical support. In addition, according to the operations plan of the Movement, a number of civilian guardsmen, the majority stemming from communist mass organizations, were to join in the action. These men got their training earlier in September at Halim air base from an Air Force training team under the command of the commander of the guard troops of that base, Major Sujono. However, these units were virtually left unused during the operations of 1 October. In fact it later appeared that they were asked that day by the District Committee of the Communist Party in Jakarta to keep themselves available in case party buildings in the city should be attacked by troops of the arrested generals or by demonstrators of hostile political organizations. However, they were not mobilized as the expected attacks did not take place and the necessary logistics failed. The Broadcasts of the 30 September Movement During the morning of 1 October, the abductors issued some information and declarations about the operations and aims of the Movement through the radio broadcasting station of Radio Jakarta. At 07.00 hrs a communiqué was issued concerning an action taken by Lieut. Colonel Untung, commander of the Cakrabirawa Presidential Guard, against the Army leadership in order to safeguard the President from a suspected action against him and the State. In that connection the public was told that a number of leading generals had been arrested. They were said to be the leaders of a Council of Generals who were planning to launch a coup d’état on Armed Forces Day, i.e. 5 October. Untung’s action was called the 30 September Movement and the public was informed that it was supported by officers and troops from all the Armed Forces. Later in the morning a declaration was disseminated which stated that the arrest of the generals was to be followed by the formation of a National Revolutionary Council, soon to be complemented by the establishment of provincial branches. The Council would organize general elections which would result into the formation of a national cabinet in which all the main political currents of the nation would be united, including the Indonesian Communist Party. Meanwhile the existing Cabinet would continue carrying out its routine administration as long as this did not produce political consequences contrary to the plans of the Council. In the period of this outgoing Cabinet the members of the Council of Generals and their sympathizers would be purged from the civilian and military government apparatus. That declaration was later followed by a declaration about the composition of the Revolutionary Council and by one on military ranks in the armed forces after the purge. The exact time of these broadcasts is still not known, due to the many contradictory statements. But they must be located between 11.00 hrs and 13.30 hrs on 1 October. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 3] === 218 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA Halim After receiving the report about the arrest of the generals, Untung left for Halim air base and arrived there between 08.00 hrs and 09.00 hrs. He spent the rest of the day in the house of the driver of the commander of the Air Base guard troops, Sergeant Sujatno. That house was one of the two headquarters of the Movement. He met Sjam there, one of the main leaders of the Movement and the supposed representative of Aidit, the chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Later on Brigadier General Supardjo, commander of the Kalimantan Combat Command which was vital in the “Malaysia Confrontation’, also arrived. Supardjo had failed to meet President Sukarno in his Jakarta palace and subsequently returned to the Movement’s headquarters. He was accompanied by Lieut. Colonel Heru Atmodjo, Deputy-Director of the Special Operations Branch of the Air Force Intelligence Service. Both were members of the Presidium of the 30 September Movement and deputies of its Chairman, Untung. In the course of the morning President Sukarno was taken from the home of one of his wives and taken to Halim. There he met Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani, Commander of the Air Force, who had happened io be there since the previous evening. Later Brig. General Sabur, commander of the Cakarabirawa regiment, joined the President at the air base coming from the presidential palace in Bogor. At about 11.00 hrs Supardjo and Heru Atmodjo met the President to report to him about the generals’ arrest and their alleged plans for a coup d’état on Armed Forces Day. He received their report without any sign of approval or disapproval and subsequently ordered a halt to the operations in order to prevent any further bloodshed as General Sabur had reported that traces of blood had been found in the house of Lieut. General Yani. Supardjo promised to transmit the order to Untung. General Sabur ordered his chief of staff Colonel Marokesh, who was at that time at the presidential palace in Jakarta, to broadcast on behalf of President Sukarno the news that the President was alive, healthy and safe, and that he still had the political control of the state and the country firmly in his hands. These orders were executed after the meeting with the President. The broadcast of the presidential statement and the Movement’s declarations about the Revolutionary Council took place within a short time of each other. It was the co-occurrence of two different types of messages that presumably caused great confusion among the public about the real situation of the Head of State and the political status of the Movement at the time. Also in Central Java, through the radio station in Semarang, declarations concerning the 30 September Movement were issued on behalf of its regional Presidium. Further information was disseminated concerning the establishment of a branch of the Revolutionary Council in that province. Chairman of that Council was said to be Colonel Suherman, head of the Army Intelligence Service in the region. Later on much confusion appeared to exist among analysts of the Movement about the alleged presence of the chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party at Halim during the operations of 1 October. It seems more or less certain that he left Halim air base later that day, on an Air Force plane, in order to flee from the course of events to Central Java. There is however no evidence at all that he played any active or intentional role in the operations during that day. He did not Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 4] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 219 meet the President or anyone of his party, nor was he in contact with the Presidium of the Movement or its operational commanders. In the course of the afternoon, Major General Suharto, as the First Deputy Commander of the Army, succeeded in restoring military control in the capital. In this he was assisted by Lieut. General Nasution who had joined him after his escape, and Brig. General Basuki Rachmat, Military Governor of East Java, who happened to be in Jakarta. The battalion from East Java which originally supported the 30 September Movement, surrendered and was subsequently placed under the command of Suharto. The battalion from Central Java retreated to Halim. These were supported by units from the military command of West Java. After a desultory exchange of fire and further negotiations between Air Commodore Dewanto and the commanding officer of the attacking troops, Colonel Sarwo Edhie, Halim was occupied. The President had in the meantime departed to his palace at Bogor. He had been advised to do so by his Deputy Prime Minister Leimena who later on 1 October also joined the President’s company on Halim. The leaders of the 30 September Movement spread in all directions and the ‘rebel’ troops at Halim were disarmed. In Central Java a similar development took place. The Epilogue The epilogue of the Movement has become well known. All active members of the Movement were brought to trial and, except Latief, sentenced to death. Only the sentences against Untung, Sujono and Supardjo were carried out. President Sukarno was overthrown. The PKI and its mass organizations were banned. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in casualties or during their ‘interrogation’ in connection with their real or alleged membership of those organizations. Hundreds of thousands of others were incarcerated for years, without any form of trial, accused of the same crimes. Aidit, the Chairman of the PKI, was shot down by soldiers in Central Java in October 1965, as was Untung’s subordinate First Lieutenant Dul Arif. The PKI was accused and found guilty of having plotted and supported the 30 Spetember Movement. The President did not succeed in clearing himself sufficiently of accusations of joint responsibility or complicity. The question remains: was the Army right to deny its responsibility for the dreadful things that happened during the epilogue of the Movement and instead to put the blame on the PKI for their supposed part in the 30 September Movement? Some Questions Concerning the Real Sequence of Events The real sequence of events and the real motives behind the 30 September Movement have up to now been surrounded by questions, uncertainties, vagueness and lies. Was the Movement a real coup d’état as stated by the judges in the trials as well as by one of the main leaders of the Movement, i.e. Sjam alias Kamaruzaman? Or was it a movement of worried officers attempting to restore military discipline, acting against a number of disloyal senior officers in key positions in order to thwart their plans for an alleged coup against President Sukarno and the existing political order, as was always asserted by the official leader of the Movement, Untung? Or Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 5] === 220 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA was it something else? Were the PKI and its mass organizations really and intentionally involved in the kidnapping and murder of the generals as the Indonesian Army Information Service led both the press and the public to believe from the very beginning? Or, had the communists fallen into a cleverly constructed trap, as could be surmised froma number of trial documents? What was the role of President Sukarno in all this? Was the plan which Untung and Latief had organized prompted by agents from an intelligence service of the Armed Forces with the intention of eliminating the PKI so that the army could regain complete control — a plot similar to that of the “Reichstag” fire affair in Germany in 1933? The trial documents again seem to provide some basis for this hypothesis. Or was it indeed the so-called Special Bureau for Secret Operations of the PKI which had enticed them to action, as the alleged head of that bureau, the already mentioned Sjam, had always maintained? What was the role of Maj. General Suharto in all this? It isnot my purpose in this article to analyse all the trial documents in a thorough and minute way in order to answer the questions posed above. This would be impossible within the context of this article; nor to produce yet another brand-new ‘theory’ concerning the 30 September Movement, although the verbatim records of the trial proceedings strongly point in the direction of some new hypotheses. Instead I shall limit myself to the presentation of some data from the documents of the trials of Untung and a member of the PKI Central Committee, Njono, which up to now have apparently failed to attract the attention of the specialists in the field. Analysis of these materials, will show the image of the 30 September Movement as a Movement of worried and politically motivated officers in a different light. It will also allow the precise role of the PKI to be evaluated. Attention will be drawn to the role of some intelligence services in both the Movement itself and also in its prologue. On the basis of this analysis some assumptions will be put forward concerning the possibly strategic impact of the Movement in the epilogue between October 1965 and March 1966. The Official Aims and the Facts Reconsidered The official aims of the 30 September Movement can be read from the declarations broadcast during 1 October 1965. The main points were given in the introduction to this article. They can be divided into a minor military part: the arrest of the generals and the safeguarding of the President; and a major political part: their purge from the national leadership and the formation along constitutional lines of a new cabinet on a national basis, including the Communist Party.2, The Movement had to make clear to the public that it was not an ordinary coup attempt or just a plain internal Army intrigue against its leaders. The Movement clearly aimed at being conceived by the people as a national front movement that was accepted by or at least acceptable to both the President and the political parties. It is precisely this aspect of the Movement’s aims that enables us to evaluate its operations before and on 1 October in a more detailed way than has usually been done in the existing literature. The political goals of the Movement’s leadership could not be achieved Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 6] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 221 without careful preparation of the political platform on which the Movement and its aims had to stand during their formation in August and September 1965. Given the explosive political situation in Indonesia in those days, a purge of the army leadership could not possibly contribute to the kind of broad political movement aimed at by its leaders unless certain conditions could be met: the smooth performance of the generals’ arrest; the armed guarantee of their safety; their decent transfer to the President and state agencies concerned; and the reliable proof of their guilt in court. As will be shown in the following sections none of these conditions for the fulfilment of the Movement’s political aims was actually satisfied. The necessary political preparations for the start of the Movement on 1 October failed utterly, as was shown by the complete ignorance of the people enlisted by the leaders of the Movement in its First Declaration about their membership of the so-called Revolutionary Council. Although the Movement was more or less a public secret in Jakarta in the period from mid-August until 1 October and several party leaders discussed its existence during that period within their own circles as well as among each other, there is absolutely no evidence that the discussion aimed at or resulted in the national political platform that the Movement said it wanted. The arrest of the generals did not run smoothly and resulted in the death of three and the escape of another. One of the leaders of the Movement ordered the killing of the three surviving generals, which order was executed. The leaders of the Movement did not succeed during its preparations in collecting any concrete final evidence of the guilt of the generals on any of the charges against them.? The President distanced himself from the Movement, both on 1 October and later on. In fact the Movement forced the Republic and its President, as well as persons, groups and authorities loyal to him, into the greatest internal crisis ever met. The question is thus: What exactly is the connection between the official aims of the Movement on the one hand and its real actions and their consequences on the other hand? I will try to answer this question with the help of a closer analysis of the operational plans of the Movement on 1 October 1965 and also of the actual course of events on that day. The Operational Plans and Personnel In order to carry out the aims of the Movement, three task forces were established during the period of preparations between 14 August and 30 September 1965. These forces would execute the necessary military and political operations. All operations were to be masterminded by a Central Command (SENKO) which also co-ordinated all military and political powers and responsibilities.* The Pasopati Task Force The first task force was called Pasopati. It was commanded by Lieut. Dul Arif of the Cakrabirawa Regiment, a subordinate of Untung. This group’s task was to arrest the Generals and take them to Halim air base. Its headquarters lay in the building of the national bureau for aerial cartography, the so-called PENAS. These headquarters were also known as SENKO I.° According to the documents the Pasopati group Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 7] === 222 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA consisted of soldiers of Untung’s battalion in the Cakrabirawa, complemented by two platoons of the First Infantry Brigade of the Military District Jakarta and a unit of the Paratroop Brigade of that territory. It is remarkable that the Cakrabirawa soldiers who acted as witnesses in the Untung trial declared under oath not to have known Untung before the start of the Movement on 1 October. They appeared as witnesses in the Untung trial because they were involved with General Yani’s murder. It is strange that they did not know Untung because they were actually junior officers of Untung’s battalion. Junior officers on active service who declare not to have known their battalion commander before the start of a certain operation under his command are either liars or do not actually belong to the battalion in question. Lies of this sort were quite unnecessary because denial of their acquaintanceship with Untung would only draw public attention to them. Since these men seemed to be quite rational, to judge from their answers in court, we must conclude that they had been incorporated into the battalion at the last moment, and therefore did not know Untung. We may even suppose that they did not originate from the Cakrabirawa regiment at all, because Untung was a well-known and respected military figure both within and outside the regiment.® It is also note-worthy that one of the soldiers who was involved in the abduction claimed in court to have been given the badges of rank of a captain before going to arrest the generals.’ This was done in order not to upset the generals, who would otherwise have been arrested by officers who they would consider too low in rank.® His actual rank appears to have been that of sergeant. This rather odd episode suggests the use of outsiders who are given suitable disguises to do a dirty job. During his trial Untung repeatedly and emphatically denied that either he or his subordinate, Dul Arif, had given the order to kill the three generals or any other generals.? On the other hand, the commander of the second task group, Major Sujono of the Air Force, and a member of third task group, First Lieut. Ngadimo of the Intelligence Service of the battalion from East Java, asserted that Arif had issued such an order.!° There are therefore two possibilities; either Untung lied and the order was given, or Sujono and Ngadimo lied and the death of the generals was the work of hired killers who were given the explicit task of acting contrary to the official orders issued by the group commander. If the latter is the case both men presumably lied deliberately as they were implicated in the plot. During his trial Untung gave the impression of being rather clumsily honest and therefore the second explanation seems most likely. The Pringgodani Task Force The second task force, called Pringgodani, had its headquarters at Halim air base. This was given the name SENKO II.!! Unlike SENKO I, which had only the status of a municipal building hired by the Air Force, SENKO II was under the territorial authority of the Air Force. It may therefore be concluded that the Air Force gave refuge to the Movement by offering it the space and the facilities to establish its headquarters. The commander of the Pringgodani task force was Major Sujono, normally the commander of the troops responsible for guarding the Halim air base.!? He had Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 8] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 223 eee been introduced to Untung by Dul Arif before the first meeting of the Movement on 14 August at the house of Wahjudi, one of Latief’s subordinates.!? Sujono’s Deputy was Maj. Gathut Sukresno, member of the political and social economic bureau (POLEKSOS) of the intelligence service of the Ministry of Air Force Affairs. Gathut was, in this connection, also in charge of organizing political courses for Air Force officers.'* Gathut was introduced to the Movement rather late in September. Two other and very influential members of the Task Force were Sjam (alias Sugito, alias Kamaruzaman) and Pono (alias Bono, alias Walujo). They were introduced to the Movement by Sujono during the first meeting. He presented them as personal representatives of the PKI chairman Aidit. In the Sjam trial both men were “identified” as intelligence agents of the PKI Special Bureau. It is important to observe that according to the testimonies in the Untung trial none of the originally participating Army officers seem to have known Sjam or Bono before they, the officers, met each other for the first time. Neither is there any indication that Sjam or Bono were known among members of the PKI Central Committee or in the circles of leaders of other big political parties. Sujono however appeared to have known both men already from the first meeting on (see Untung’s defence in Untung trial, p.213). The Tasks One of the tasks of the Pringgodani task force was to take over the arrested generals at Halim from the Pasopati task force and keep them in a safe place until they could be brought to the President. This plan went astray. In the first place because at the time of transfer three generals were already dead. Secondly, because Sujono subsequently ordered Gathut to kill the remaining generals. Gathut did not himself commit the murders; he transmitted Sujono’s order to sergeant-major Marsudi, a subordinate of Sujono. Marsudi finished the ‘job’. Gathut’s statements concerning this affair lead us to the conclusion that probably no members of the Halim ‘rained civic guard troops were present at the execution.'® This is contrary to the prosector-general’s point of view stated during the Untung trial. He based himself on Gathut’s statements and came to the conclusion that members of mass organizations affiliated with the PKI had carried out the execution of the generals at Halim.'° This is, of course, the story that the Army Information Service read to the press and other media almost immediately after 1 October. It is also an interesting fact that in his testimony during the Untung trial, Sujono made the suggestion that members of the communist mass organizations had voluntarily joined the 30 September Movement and participated in its operations, although some of his other statements suggest that they were no (official) communist civic guard trainees at Halim on 1 October.'? He presumably intended to mislead the court. It was Sujono himself who gave the orders to kill the three remaining generals, while his subordinate Marsudi finally carried out the order. Gathut could distance himself from the execution because he officially belonged to a different branch of the Air Force. This does now however detract from his personal responsibility for the execution. What can be concluded with certainty from the foregoing information is that Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 9] === 224 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA Sujono, Gathut and Marsudi not only failed to carry out the official tasks of the Pringgodani task force, but deliberately acted contrary to them. Pringgodani’s Protection of Political Leaders A second important task of the Pringgodani task force was to protect leading politicians at Halim against possible attacks from the Council of Generals. These politicians were: (1) President Sukarno, (2) Aidit, Chairman of the PKI and Cabinet Minister without Portfolio, (3) Njoto, member of the PKI Central Committee and Cabinet Minister without Portfolio, (4) Ali Sastroamidjojo, chairman of the nationalist PNI, and (5) Subandrio, Minister for Foreign Affairs. This task meant that the Pringgodani group were directly involved with national politics. They were responsible for the protection of a group of left-wing politicians, dominated by the PKI, which had to be brought together with the President. The suggestion could then easily be made that the political initiative in the formation of the planned cabinet lay with the PKI. However, the Pringgodani group did not succeed in finishing that task. President Sukarno came despite the group’s efforts at Halim. As far as Aidit is concerned there is no certainty that he was at Halim during the operations of 1 October. Even if we could be sure that he was there at the time, there is absolutely no evidence that he played a role in the operations. He maintained no contact with the President or his party that day, nor was he contacted. The same can be said in regard to his eventual contacts with the Presidium or the Central Command of the Movement. In his testimony during the Untung trial, Sujono’s driver Sujatno stated that on 1 October Sujono ordered him to take a closed envelope to a man who, as Sujono later explained, had been Aidit.'® This is the only shred of evidence there is concerning an alleged contact between the Pringgodani group and Aidit at Halim on that day. In later trials as well as in Untung’s trial, only Sjam, alias Kamaruzaman, one of the main political experts of the Movement, attempted to show proof of Aidit’s part in the Movement. However, there was no testimony that the Pringgodani group brought Aidit to Halim, whether in order to join the President’s party, or in order to lead the Movement, or to keep in close contact with it. Some stories which circulated during the trials against Sjam and Omar Dhani indicate that during the afternoon or the evening of 1 October Aidit had been offered an Air Force plane by Omar Dhani and was subsequently flown to Jogyakarta. Although these stories do not seem implausible and since Sjam was certainly a member of the Pringgodani group, they do not prove anything about that group’s special security efforts to protect a small group of important left-wing politicians at Halim that day. While Aidit was flown to Jogyakarta, the President was brought to his palace in Bogor. Deputy Army Commander Maj. General Suharto had warned the Air Force leaders that Halim would come under attack by his troops next morning. No members of the Movement however were involved in the President’s transport. It is certain that Subandrio and Njoto were in Sumatra on 1 October. Their stay there had nothing all to do with the Movement’s plans. Ali Sastroamidjojo, chairman of the PNI, was in Jakarta at the time. No efforts.at all were made to_ bring him under Pringgodani’s protection. It may be concluded that, first, the Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 10] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 225 Pringgodani group did not accomplish its main protective task at all; secondly, that the group was not even physically in a position to do so, as far as Subandrio and Njoto were concerned; and thirdly, that the group apparently failed to establish contact with the politicians in order to bring them under protection, and probably even made no effort at all to make such contact. Pringgodani the Great Pretender: Cabinet Formation or Fake This brings us to a separate aspect of the security task of the Pringgodani group with regard to leading left-wing politicians, i.e. to clear the ground for the formation of a national cabinet and to establish the necessary political and institutional ties with the political parties and mass organizations involved. During the Untung trial only marginal contacts with communist organizations were mentioned. The main part of these contacts had been concerned with the training of groups of civilian guards who were to complement the lack of personnel among the regular guard troops of the Air Force. The project had been in action since July 1965 and was started by Maj. Sujono at Halim. The shortage of personnel was caused by the Malaysia Confrontation which necessitated sending Air Force personnel to the Outer Islands. The training scheme organized by Sujono was approved by the leaders of the Air Force.’ Sujono stated in his testimony during the Untung trial that as far as the training was concerned there had also been contacts with the PNI, Partindo, Perti and NU.”° This was understandable as the Air Force leadership had explicitly stipulated that the training of civilian guard troops had to involve all the political parties and organizations in Indonesia.2 However, Untung emphasized that Sjam had only ever wanted communist organizations to be involved with the Movement. He deliberately avoided involving other political parties.?? Of course there had been extensive negotiations between Sujono and the leaders of the communist organizations involved about the payment and logistics of the training on Halim. As these organizations appeared to have no funds available at the time to pay for training courses, Sujono paid and organized everything for them.” Njono, who was secretary of the Jakarta district committee of the PKI at the time and member of the Politbureau of that party, made it clear during his trial that he alone was responsible for the deal concerned. Fearing attacks on PKI buildings and PKI personnel by troops of the Council of Generals and demonstrators of hostile political parties and organizations during 1 October and after, he had acted to mobilize those trainees to protect the party in Jakarta.”* Apparently Sujono had thoroughly informed him about the alleged plans of the generals and the efforts of the Movement to counter them. There is no evidence at all that Njono informed the Central Committee of his party, or chairman Aidit, about his defensive action. On the contrary! When Sudisman, member of the Central Committee, discovered earlier in September that only members of communist mass organizations were trained at Halim, he rebuked Njono for his carelessness. On 21 September Commodore Dewanto, who had the final responsibility for the training courses at Halim, heard about Sujono’s communist trainees, ordered the training course to stop and sent all the trainees home.” A new course including all Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 11] === 226 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA the political parties was to start on 1 October.?” From this we may conclude that at least the negotiations between Sujono and the communist organizations did not involve the Central Committee of the PKI, or its chairman Aidit and moreover had nothing to do with the official political plans of the Movement, i.e. the formation of a new Cabinet. Alleged Discussions between the PKI and the Movement There had been rumours for quite some time concerning an alleged conspiracy of some Army commanders against the President and the existing political order. These rumours were being spread immediately after the Gilchrist document became public at the end of May.”® However this had been no reason for Aidit to raise the question with the Central Committee of the PKI. It was not until August, that Aidit, returning from abroad, heard about the President’s serious illness. When he also heard about the plans some Army generals had to exploit that illness to their own political advantage, and when moreover he was informed of the efforts of some loyal junior Army officers to counter these plans, he became alarmed. During the last ten days of August he devoted three Politbureau sessions to discussing the rumours.” As far as the testimonies of the Njono trial indicate, the Politbureau advised the Central Committee to avoid any confrontation and simply await further developments. The President and some political friends outside the party had to be informed of what the party had heard and the stand it had taken. The district committees of the party had to be informed about the generals’ plans, the President’s illness and the Politbureau’s advice. Moreover it was decided not to inform them about the planned action of the loyal junior Army officers! No contacts were to be established with these officers.*° It seems however that Aidit and perhaps some other members of the Central Committee were personally very much alarmed about the rumours and the serious risks they pointed to.*! In this connection it is conceivable that he made some further personal inquiries about the situation among some Army acquaintances. This could explain why he met Maj. General Pranoto Reksosamudra of the Army staff in September to discuss the rumours concerning the Council of Generals and the President’s illness.°? Sjam’s Intermediation It is doubtful however whether the discussion with Pranoto took place at the home of or in the presence of Sjam, as Pranoto is said to have stated during the trial of Pono (alias Bono). Bono was one of Sjam’s assistants in the Pringgodani group. It seems unlikely that a politically influential man like Aidit needed any intermediation by obscure people like Sjam to seek an opportunity to discuss political matters with an acquainted Army general. Although it is true that the political climate in Jakarta at the time made such contacts difficult, it must nevertheless have been possible to arrange something without the need of secret meetings. However no further Politbureau sessions followed the discussion, nor were there any further sessions of the Central Committee. So it must be concluded from the available evidence that no regular political Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 12] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 227 contacts developed during August and September 1965 between the party leaders and members or leaders of the 30 September Movement. Were There any Secret Contacts? It is of course conceivable that some contacts between Aidit and the Movement developed in secret. But such a development seems rather unlikely if we keep in mind the rather blunt overtness with which he implemented and executed the party’s policies on such problems as land reform and the political control of members of the Armed Forces in parliament. After 1957 the PKI followed a course of self-confident, open, fair play, because the leaders felt themselves to be backed by the President. So the style of intrigue which, according to Sjam’s suggestions made during his trial, was adopted by Aidit during August and September, would have been remarkably different from his usual political habits. It would have been much more like a trotskyist plot, than the style exhibited since 1957 by the maoist mass movements of the Party. It is however a fact that after the disastrous and stupid adventures of the Musso group during the Madium affaire in 1948, the party was considered disloyal, treacherous and conspiratorial. This reputation made it possible to blame the party whenever it was thought useful by people or groups that had something to hide. During the trials of the leaders of the Movement, Aidit was already dead and could not defend himself against the accusations made against him or his party. So the suspicion of a PKI complot or a plot begun by Aidit against the Army leaders could be kept alive. Conclusion One The available evidence is amply sufficient to allow the conclusion that neither the PKI as such, nor its chairman Aidit, ever developed any political deal with the Movement, or with members or leaders of it. We may therefore conclude that the Pringgodani group developed no contacts with communist organizations other than those which were needed with regard to the Halim Training Scheme. Nevertheless the PKI got the blame for being the initiator of the 30 September Movement. It was the political activities of the Pringgodani group, and especially of its commander Sujono and its political expert Sjam, which were finally responsible for placing that blame. Untung’s Attempt to check Sjam’s Identity During the Untung trial Untung and Sujono repeatedly mentioned secret meetings between Aidit and Sjam of which it was said that Sjam arranged them in order to inform Aidit about the progress of the Movement and to prepare further instructions. Untung, who never trusted Sjam, had attempted several times to make enquiries about his alleged contacts with the PKI chairman. Sjam however succeeded in preventing any direct contact between other members of the Movement and Aidit.2? This is of course a very odd situation and raises the question why Untung or Latief did not press any further to get in touch with Aidit. As the security of the President and some important left-wing party leaders as well as a cabinet formation were at stake, it had to be the Movement’s leaders’ duty to arrange direct contacts Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 13] === 228 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA with Aidit, supposing of course that the latter was willing to support them. The fact that Untung took no action at all makes it conceivable that considerations of internal tactics made him suspend his enquiries. He thought it probably wiser not to challenge Sjam’s authority in the Movement, as he needed him to accomplish his own aims. The loss of the Air Force contacts, in which Sjam was a very important link, would have disrupted his action seriously because of the indispensable logistical services they had to offer. He therefore repressed his suspicions and waited until the generals were transferred to the President. After that he expected President Sukarno to stop the Movement and take things into his own hands.™ Sjam however, probably aware of Untung’s dependence on the Air Force logistics, pressed further and gradually manipulated Untung into a position in which he was no longer able to oppose him. Sjam and the Special Bureau of the PKI There is no concrete and independent evidence at all that Sjam’s secret meetings with Aidit actually did take place. Only Sjam himself reported them during his trial, since Aidit had been killed in October 1965 and the members of the party’s Central Committee did not appear to know about his relation with their chairman. Sjam himself explained this odd fact later during his trial by stating that it was due to the secret character of the relationship. According to his statements he would have been Aidit’s personal assistant on ‘intelligence’ matters and head of his Special Bureau for Secret Political Operations. This situation was the reason why the Central Committee did not know anything about Sjam’s activities. It is noteworthy that the party had an expert who was officially in charge of intelligence matters and was known by the Central Committee. This man was tortured during his interrogation, defected and was later involved with the torture of people who were suspected of involvement with the Movement.*> This made him useless as a witness. The only two witnesses who could have testified against Sjam’s alleged role as Aidit’s personal assistant were no longer a threat to him. Conclusion Two Looking back at the arguments developed so far, it may be concluded that there is no concrete and independent evidence for the existence of secret relations between Aidit and the Movement. Moreover all witnesses who might have produced evidence against their existence were eliminated. Untung’s inquiries about them were blocked by Sjam. Finally there is the party’s decision not to make contact with the Movement. It is therefore possible to form the hypothesis that Pringgodani’s efforts in connection with an eventual cabinet formation were fake, and were actually intended to compromise Aidit and the PKI in a very devious way. At the same time the argument so far indicates that the Pringgodani task force was a primary power centre in the Movement which could afford to deviate at will from its own official aims. Because of the essential role played in it by Sjam and Sujono, it may be important to take a closer look at their daily work and their official functions as far as these can be reconstucted from the available documents of the Untung trial. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 14] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 229 A Closer Look at the Composition of the Pringgodani Task Force The core of the Pringgodani Task Force probably existed already from the start of the training of the Civilian Guard troops at Halim in June 1965. During his trial Untung indicated that Sujono and Sjam already appeared to know each other quite well when the leaders of the Movement met each other for the first time at the house of Capital Wahjundi on 14 August. Actually it was Sujono who introduced Sjam and Bono to the Army officers at the meeting. Earlier in August Sujono himself was brought into contact with Untung by Dul Arif. The main daily activities of Sujono, Sjam, Bono and Gathut Sukresno appear to have consisted of training communist youth and labourers on Halim. Actually these men seem to have formed a training team. As the team worked on Air Force territory in an Air Force training programme it is logical to suppose that most of them were Air Force officers. Sujono and Gathut were certainly Air Force officers. Sjam and Bono were introduced from the beginning as Aidit’s personal representatives. However in his witness account during the Untung trial Sujono stated that he had originally supposed Sjam to be an officer, but later understood he was a communist.** It was of course possible to be both, but we have already shown that Sjam was probably not Aidit’s personal representative. He probably was not a communist at all. Sujono’s statement is typical of all his statements during the Untung trial, combining interrogative statements with answers to the court’s questions. What he said of Sjam being a communist was undoubtedly information wanted by the court. Repeatedly the judges in the Untung trial asked the witnesses about Sjam and repeatedly they got the stereotyped answer that he was a communist and a personal representative of Aidit. It was information which had to be imprinted on the memories of the public and the witnesses. What Sujono told the court about Sjam being an officer was probably true. Indeed it is rather difficult to understand what reasons there could have been to include civilians in plain military training courses. In particular the inclusion of high ranking PKI officials in such elementary training courses as were run at Halim would have been a clear example of overacting. Moreover such an inclusion was officially forbidden. As the training programme in general was within the sole competence of the Air Force and was approved by Commodore Dewanto himself, he undoubtedly also knew the identity of the training team and approved of it. It is very difficult to conceive that a senior officer would have violated the rules in such a serious and overt way as is supposed if it is accepted as true that Sjam was Aidit’s representative and Dewanto deliberately included him in the training team. So Sjam probably was an Air Force officer and member of the Air Force training team at Halim. The same arguments can be used with regard to Bono’s identity. Sujono’s testimony however also makes clear that Sjam and Bono were probably not commanding officers but belonged to an indoctrination team which was intended to complement Sujono’s military training with a political one. Earlier in 1965 the PKI had suddenly made public its support of General Nasution’s old idea of establishing a Civilian Guard. Of course the leaders of the Armed Forces demanded that the training and operations of the troops and commanders concerned should fall under their authority. The PKI supported the demand on condition that the Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 15] === 230 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA military training scheme should be completed by a political one. The Armed Forces’ demand was met in Presidential Decree No.5, but the PKI’s demand remained unsettled. This became a major political issue which very much alarmed the Army leaders who were mostly anti-PKI. By indirectly obstructing the progress of the implementation of such programmes they tried to gain time to be able to find a constructive way out of the problem. When Commodore Dewanto approved of the Air Force training programme in July, they became very angry.?” It was known that Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani sympathised with the PKI demand and the Army leaders probably feared that through the Air Force training programme the PKI demand would be implemented without their control. Nothing is known about discussions between the Army and the Air Force leaders concerning this issue. But it is conceivable that such discussions took place and that a provisional solution was agreed. The fact that the Pringgodani’s ‘liaison’ officer Gathut Sukresno belonged to the indoctrination team of the Bureau for Political and Socio-Economic Affairs (POLEKSOS) of the Air Force Intelligence Service is very suggestive in this connection. If it became clear to the Army leaders that the inclusion of political courses in the Air Force training programme were unavoidable, it would have been a clever move to suggest that the political component of the programme should become the responsibility of the Intelligence Service/POLEKSOS. The POLEKSOS bureaux were already participating in the implementation of the courses for political cadres organized by the KOTRAR for officers of the Armed Forces.* It is rather attractive in this connection to consider the possibility that Brig. General Sukendro of the Army Intelligence Service and adviser on intelligence matters in the presidium of the Presidential Cabinet played a role in such a solution. He was the right man in the right place to act as a Presidential arbiter in the conflict about the PKI demand. Such a role would also satisfactorily explain why Sukendro was scrapped from the Movement’s list of the generals who were to be arrested: he made it possible to play the intelligence game which was organized with regard to the Air Force training programme. That his name was not scrapped until about 29 September, could mean that his personal attitude towards the game was not clear until that time. The Air Force Special Operations Branch It seems quite plausible by now that if Sjam and Bono belonged to the indoctrination team which participated in the Air Force training courses for Civilian Guards at Halim, they would also have belonged to the Air Force Intelligence Service. The Untung trial shows that their indoctrination work in the Movement covered four different fields of activity: (a) the indoctrination of Civilian Guards, (b) the political coaching of the Army officers in the Movement, (c) the persuasion of the communist leaders, who were involved in the Air Force training programme, to — support the Movement’s official cause, and (d) the communication of false and compromising information about the Movement to the public. The last three types of activities clearly transgress the normal job of indoctrination. They point much more to the work of experts of a Special Operations branch of an Intelligence Service specializing in counter-intelligence. We do not know if the Air Force Intel- Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 16] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 231 eee ligence Service actually was specialized in counter-intelligence operations, but it had a Special Operations Branch which actively participated in the Movement, Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmodjo, Vice-Director of that branch, acted as member of the Movement’s Presidium on 1 October and accompanied Brig. General Supardjo to the President’s headquarters at Halim. Before then he was regularly informed by Sujono about the progress and the logistical needs of the Movement. It was Heru for example who offered the weapons, the lorries and the money to the Movement. During the Njono trial Sujono admitted that Heru had been his ‘boss’ during the Movement and before.*? So there was undeniably a direct connection between the Air Force Special Operations Branch and the Pringgodani Task Force. Sjam’s and Bono’s special skills in indoctrination work made them apt to be a part of this connection. This conclusion makes it possible to reconstruct in general what happened with the Pringgodani Task Force after the first contacts with Untung and Latief were established in August 1965: the Air Force Training and Indoctrination Team at Halim was placed under the authority of the Air Force Special Operations Branch and subsequently started its compromising activities. Conclusion Three The Pringgodani Task Force killed three of the kidnapped Army generals at the Halim Air Force Base and probably also ordered the murder of the other three generals. By these acts they compromised Untung’s operation as well as the whole 30 September Movement. Indirectly the President was also compromised. The Pringgodani also deliberately and with considerable skill compromised Aidit and the PKI. The Task Force consisted of the Training and Indoctrination Team of the Air Force Intelligence Service and probably included some experts of its Special Operations Branch. Their whole operation stood under the authority of that Branch. The Bimasakti Task Force Like the Pringgodani Task Force, and probably the Pasopati Task Force, Bimasakti also consisted of two parts. The first part consisted of two battalions of commando troops from East and Central Java, plus some other smaller units. It was under the command of Colonel Latief.“° The second part consisted of a radio broadcasting team headed by Latief’s Deputy in the Movement, Captain Suradi of the Intelligence Service of Latief’s Brigade.*! Liaison officer between the troops and the team was First Lieutenant Ngadimo of the Intelligence Service of the East Javanese battalion. Liaison officer between the team and Pringgodani was First Lieutenant Sutarno of Sujono’s regiment Special Air Force Guard Troops at Halim.” The team’s headquarters were at Radio Jakarta. The troops’ Headquarters weie' at SENKO I.*° So it may be concluded that SENKO I was the central communication station between ‘the field’ and Halim or SENKO II, and it also was Pasopati’s Headquarters. The Tasks Bimasakti had four tasks. Two of them were taken care of by the troops under Latief, i.e.; Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 17] === 232 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA eee — to give tactical support when the generals were arrested as well as to seal off and guard the Presidential Palace from the Menteng Quarter, where the arrested generals lived, and the communication centres occupied by the troops: — to establish an absolute telephone silence by the occupation of the buildings of the Central Telephone Service, and to control the radio station of Radio Jakarta. The other two were performed by the team under Suradi, ie.: ~ to broadcast the messages of the Movement; — to co-ordinate the operations of the communist Civilian Guards in Jakarta. In order to be able to perform the first two tasks smoothly, Bimasakti obtained the help of two battalions of commando troops from Central and East Java. Those units were sent to Jakarta in connection with the commemoration of Armed Forces Day on 5 October. The transport for the troops met with some technical problems and arrived too late in Jakarta to be able to participate in the execution of the original plan of the Movement. Actually, most of the troops and their equipment arrived not earlier than 30 September, while the original plan was to start on the 29th. The operations were therefore postponed until 1 October.*® This turned out to be no great disaster. The Commander of the Defilé on Armed Forces Day, Brig. General Sukirno of the Third Brigade Paratroops of the Military District Jakarta, had several plans in mind and felt himself seriously hampered by the delay of the two battalions. As soon as they arrived he ordered a rehearsal for 1 October, to take place in Senayan early in the morning. When he arrived there to get things started, he found two battalions missing. Later that day he was informed that the missing units had been taken to Merdeka Square in the centre of the city.*7 It seems that Latief, who was Commander of the Bismasakti Task Force, was responsible for that shift. Untung however had made it possible by means of his close friendship with the Commander of the Central Javanese battalion, who in his turn appeared to be a close friend of the Commander of the East Javanese battalion. Untung’s friendship with the Commander of the Central Javanese battalion can be explained from the fact that Untung himself had been Commander of that battalion before he received his appointment in Jakarta. The new Commander was his former Deputy. All Army officers just mentioned were loyal to the President. The Disconnection of the Presidential Circuit The two battalions were instructed to bar the ways to and from the Presidential Palace, the Menteng Quarter where the generals lived, and the buildings of Radio Jakarta as well as those of the telephone service. These buildings were occupied by the troops. Untung admitted during his trial that he had never given an order to occupy those buildings. So it may be concluded that probably Pringgodani issued that order so as to be sure that all the necessary messages were broadcast and all other messages were blocked. The occupation of the telephone service buildings was meant to guarantee an absolute telephone blockade. However, the Presidential Palace possessed a radio transmitter as did the headquarters of the Army and KOSTRAD* and the Ministry of Defence. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 18] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 233 It may therefore be concluded that only Menteng and the Presidential Palace were completely isolated from each other. The Palace probably could still be contacted by shortwave radio transmitters and vice versa. Medium wave contact was probably impossible, which made it also impossible to transmit radio broadcasts to the public. The fact that the Presidential Palace was cut off by the commando troops meant that it could not be the Presidential Headquarters that day. The President, who happened to be in the house of one of his wives when the Movement started its operations, was brought directly to the Halim Air Base. Since unidentified troops were observed near the Palace, the President’s companions thought it would be better to take him to Halim, from where he could easily be taken to safer places. Because of the telephone blockades, telephone communications with him were impossible. The radio transmitter at Halim Air Base, which was actually in good shape and may be supposed to have been strong enough to reach Jakarta, was for unknown reasons not used to contact the Army Headquarters or KOSTRAD. Contact with the Presidential Palace in Jakarta was however established.*? In fact the President made use of couriers as also did the Movement.*° History tells us what happened to Sukarno’s couriers: Suharto refused to execute the orders they brought him. According to the broadcasts of Radio Jakarta he believed the President to be still under the Movement’s control when they reached him,®! which in fact he was. Although he arrived at Halim and left it of his.own accord, he was technically speaking under the Movement’s control during his stay at Halim. The Presidential message which was broadcast between 11.00 hrs and 12.00 hrs by Radio Jakarta took place under the authority of Suradi. As is already known the message informed the public that Sukarno was still in charge of his full power as Head of the State. Between half an hour and an hour later a message was read on behalf of the Movement’s Presidium in which it was said that all State power was to come under the authority of the Revolutionary Council. Although the President had ordered Untung to stop the Movement’s operations after having received Brig. General Supardjo’s report concerning the generals’ arrest, Bimasakti apparently continued to do its task. It means that Untung failed to have his orders obeyed, just as he had failed earlier that day to safeguard the generals’ lives. This fact may be explained by the fact that Untung probably had no authority over Suradi either because he fell under the command of Latief or because he was placed under the general command of Heru Atmodjo. Whatever the case, the sequence of the Presidential and the Movement’s messages caused considerable confusion among the public and isolated Sukarno even more from both the public and his Army Commanders in Jakarta. Moreover the available evidence points to the conclusion that the President did not possess a radio receiver. Supardjo did not report the generals’ deaths to him, although the Commander of the Cakrabirawa Regiment, Brig. General Sabur, who joined the President’s company in the course of the morning, reported that traces of blood had been found in the house of the kidnapped Lieut. General Yani. Lack of information, psychological uncertainity, lack of technical communication and complete dependence on the Movement’s radio lines, hampered the President in employing his political powers. Again it was Pringgodani which dominated the scene. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 19] === 234 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA Sjam made texts of the Movement’s messages which were disseminated after the Presidential message, and had them sent to Suradi before Supardjo met the President. After Untung received the Presidential orders, neither Sjam nor Sujono made any effort to stop them being broadcast. On the contrary, Sujono did send Suradi a letter, which probably contained the order to repeat the broadcast at 14.00 hrs and subsequently leave the palace and retreat to Halim’? Untung denied having given such an order.®> The messages were repeated at 14.00 hrs and afterwards Suradi left the Radio Jakarta buildings and went to Halim.™ The Presidential and the Movement’s messages moreover compromised the President. He was put into an even more awkward position when it was discovered that he had been staying at a place in Halim which was not far from the place where three of the generals were murdered. It made it impossible for him to intervene effectively in the Movement’s political epilogue. The Communist Civilian Guards After Njono had been rebuked by Sudisman, and Commodore Dewanto had ordered the trainees to be sent home on 21 September, Njono operated more carefully than before. We do not know precisely what happened, but it is conceivable that for some time he was inclined to cut off contacts with the Movement. Sujono introduced Suradi and asked him to take care of further negotiations with the communist mass organizations and the PKI District Committee.* Sujono, who probably thought that the contacts were about to fail (which would have been disastrous to the whole Movement), tried a gamble in order to maintain the contacts. He proposed the formation of a Sectional Command containing the sectional sub-committees of the PKI District Committee in Jakarta.*® Suradi was appointed as its Commander, while Pringgodani would take care of the Command’s logistics. Its operations would be integrated with those of the general territorial command of the Movement in Jakarta under the authority of Colonel Latief. It may be concluded that Sujono deliberately misled Njono about the fact that Dewanto’s orders precluded the trainees, who were sent home from Halim, to stay under military discipline. Actually, Surado was not in a position to mobilize and commit them, as Sujono repeatedly explained to the Court during the Untung trial and the Njono trial.*” However, the PKI Sectional Command was provided with money, uniforms and small hand-weapons, as ordered by Heru Atmodjo.** On 1 October they were instructed by the PKI District Committee to ‘stand by’, but Suradi did not commit them. Actually, they were not put into action at all that day. Sujono nevertheless succeeded in compromising the PKI District Committee because of their undeniable involvement in the Movement. It is difficult to conceive why Njono went on with his negotiations with Sujono after he had been rebuked by Sudisman for doing so. The answer may be that many high PKI officials felt themselves seriously threatened by the rumours about the plans of the Council of Generals, a situation which was skilfully exploited by Sujono. Probably some active and loyal communists felt themselves forced into active resistance or defence against hostile groups, while the Central Committee Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 20] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 235 hesitated to take the measures which the activists considered to be necessary. The way this difference was structured along hierarchical party lines indicates the main weakness of the PKI organization in 1965. The loyalties of the Central Committee to the President ran contrary to the material and political interests of the District Committees. It was there that Pringgodani’s efforts to compromise the District Committee cut into the party hierarchy. It was a similar problem and a similar approach which enabled Pringgodani to compromise Untung and Latief, as far as the position of their Command in Jakarta was concerned. Suradi was still further responsible for compromising the communist mass organizations. When Dewanto sent the trainees home from Halim, no communists were officially present at Halim before 1 October. It was essential to Pringgodani’s real aims that there should be communists at Halim when the generals were murdered and so Suradi was asked to supply some new people. Whether he really did so is still uncertain. Sujono said during his testimony that Suradi brought him about eight hundred young people from the Hotel Indonesia, the Railway Service and the Post and Telegraph Service. Sujono stated that most of them were not communists, but people who knew virtually nothing about politics. It is rather unlikely that such a large group would have been transported to Halim, because it would attract far too much attention and official papers were necessary to use the lorries etc. Moreover transport would have been illegal as Dewanto’s order implied that no new trainees were to be received at Halim before 1 October. It is very difficult to get an impression of how many ‘trainees’ were present at Halim at the time of the murder. During his witness account Gathut Sukresno mentioned only one civilian present at the execution of the generals. The man was called Jan and was identified as a member of the Pemuda Rakjat.©° However, when asked explicitly about the murder he admitted that he had not seen whether other members of communist mass organizations had been present. He said he supposed that they were present because he remembered having heard shouts during the shooting.®! As a consequence the Prosecutor-General concluded that members of those organizations had committed the murder. The argument concerning Suradi’s role so far indicates that there was a rather strong tie between Sujono and Suradi, and between Pringgodani and Bimasakti. Both Task Forces contained intelligence teams which worked together to compromise the PKI and its mass organizations, as well on other strategic tasks. So it may be concluded that both teams formed one operational intelligence line within the Movement. The evidence also indicates the co-operation between the Air Force and the Intelligence Service of the First Infantry Brigade, of which Suradi was a member. Some Differences of Opinion within the Movement The political messages of the Movement which were disseminated on 1 October do not indicate with any certainty the role of the President in the political epilogoue. However from Untung’s testimony it becomes very clear that to him at least the political epilogue had to be within the President’s corapetence and not that of the Revolutionary Council. Although the issue of the epilogue seems also to have been discussed earlier in September it was not before the last two days of that month Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 21] === 236 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA that Sjam showed his resolution to establish a Revolutionary Council even if the President were to oppose the idea.™ Sujono’s testimony shows that there were probably heavy outbursts of the growing tensions and differences of opinion in those days. Untung became very worried and probably considered stopping the whole thing. However he was very busy with his daily task as Commander of the Presidential Guard and so lost control of Sjam’s and Sujono’s activities.6* He probably considered a gamble worthwhile and put complete trust in Dul Arif and his troops, convinced as he was that the coup d ‘état of the Council of Generals was bound to start on 5 October unless he did something to prevent it. He decided to rely on his own authority and the skill of his troops, and to push things through. He finally saw the Movement as his own affair. It was presented as such during the broadcast of the first communiqué about the generals’ arrest which took place at 07.10 hrs on 1 October.™ It is still not known why he also signed the texts which Sjam presented to him during that day. It may have been part of his gamble which was based on the assumptions that if his troops did their job smoothly the President would support his action. Both assumptions were falsified by the course of events that day. His opportunism turned against him and he lost his gamble. SENKO and the Presidium From a military point of view the 30 September Movement was a combined operation of troops and experts of the Air Force and the Army. Combined operations of different sections of the Armed Forces always cause difficulties concerning the ultimate command. In the case of the Movement however things were even more difficult. This was mainly due to the fact that the participating officers did not operate under a combined command on national level but had to work within their own limited competence. Technically speaking the members of both SENKO Headquarters, Untung, Latief and Sujono, bore equal and only limited authority and responsibility. Each of them could only operate with his own troops. None of them had the authority to command the troops of the others, nor had one of them the right to command his companion officer. Therefore SENKO was, from a technical military point of view, not an integral supreme command, but more an ad hoc collective of officers who shared some interests. Untung was not the formal Supreme Commander of the Movement although the collective had appointed him to that effect. Actually the initiative and the logistics lay in the hands of Sujono and his Pringgodani Task Force, because they offered the Movement its headquarters, the money, the lorries, the weapons, the food and the communication lines. Therefore the Movement was largely an Air Force affair and not an Army affair. The argument so far also indicates that it was the Air Force Intelligence combined with some very well camouflaged Army Intelligence that was the main drive behind the Movement. The participating intelligence teams found their supreme command in the Presidium of the Movement, which consisted of Untung as its chairman, Latief as Deputy, Brig. General Supardjo as Untung’s first Deputy and Lieut. Colonel Heru Atmodjo as his second Deputy. Two more officers were mentioned as members of the Presidium but played no role at all. The only member Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 22] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 237 of the Presidium who could actually command the intelligence teams was Heru. The other members were without any authority. Untung’s chairmanship was thus a fake. The Presidium appeared, even more than SENKO, to be a collective without any collective function. The Presidium was needed to enable Heru to employ his command with regard to the operations of the intelligence teams. Who Were the Real Movers, Who Were the Men at the Top? It is perhaps difficult to understand why Heru, who was an Air Force officer, decided to carry the responsibility for an operation which ultimately had such disastrous consequences for the nation as a whole, and tured out to be fata! to his own Supreme Commander, Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani. Omar Dhani was finally sentenced to death and executed. It is quite widely known that Intelligence Services are in general rather autonomous branches of the Armed Forces, covered by a far reaching freedom of legal and judicial control. Its officers and agents are in effect ‘legitimate out-laws’ and they frequently behave as such. The question is however what personal or political interest could Heru have had with regard to the epilogue of the Movement. Probably none at all. He just did a job for which he was hired. Could Maj. General Suharto have been the man who hired him? It seems unlikely. The murdered generals and Suharto belonged to a circle of top ranking officers who were all opposed to the PKI and the growing cooperation of the President with that party. Suharto and his companions on the one hand and the murdered generals on the other differed only in regard to the ways and means by which both factors had to be eliminated from society or put under effective control. Yani preferred the indirect way of infiltrating the PKI and the President’s circle and ‘putsching’ from the inside. Suharto and his companions, among whom were such officers as Kemal Idris, Sarwo Edhi, and Panggabean, preferred direct forceful confrontation. This difference in tactics however is absolutely insufficient to suppose that Suharto or any of his more radically minded companion officers considered or even ordered the murders.® The men or the people who ordered the murders and the political compromising of the PKI and the President have to be found in some of the Intelligence Services, probably in the Army Intelligence Service. It is significant in this connection that an officer of General Nasution’s General Staff, referred during his testimony a charge in the Untung trial to research carried out by the sixth division of that Staff with regard to men who spread the rumours about the Council of Generals. In that connection the name of a Colonel Supardjo was mentioned. He appeared to have been a close assistant to Brig. General Sukendro of the Army Intelligence Service at the time and a former assistant of Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who organized an Army Putsch against the President in 1956.°’ In 1965 Colonel Supardjo was Yani’s secretary in the KOTRAR and played a role in the organization of the officers’ indoctrination courses. He also happened to have been a member of the Antara Press Agency control commission. Moreover he worked at or with the code division of the Ministry of Defence. So he was in an excellent position to spread rumours via various public and internal Army channels. There is some chance that Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 23] === 238 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA eee he belonged, together with Brig. General Sukendro, to the circle of men who decided on the murder of the generals and the compromising of the PKI. It is conceivable however that those men received help from another circle of ‘outlaws’. Forbidden political parties had excellent ground for ‘putsch-efforts’. The Trotsykist MURBA party had been banned in September 1965. For a long time that party had been a close political partner of the Army in the Cabinet and functioned as a buffer against the growth of the PKI influence in it. When MURBA was banned and dissolved as an active party it promptly dived into the political underground of the Jakarta scene and became active as a disseminator of rumours and unrest. Colonel Supardjo for example was a close friend of the last MURBA chairman. It is precisely in the personal networks of intelligence officers and former members of forbidden political parties that we find the fertile ground for such immoral acts as Heru was hired for. We do not actually know who gave the orders. We know some names, the people behind them and their characteristics. We may suppose that some of those characteristics would also be found in the people who were ultimately responsible and gave the orders. Perhaps we might even finally be able to identify a small circle of which the men who gave the orders were members. More important however is that the available evidence of the Untung and Njono trials enables us to explode the myth of the PKI-putsch and place those actors in the drama who were directly responsible in a more plausible perspective. Moreover it opens up some new perspectives on the study of the role of Intelligence Services in the Indonesian Republic and its struggle for development and independence, References Crouch, H. The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 1978. Gunawan, Basuki. Kudeta Staatsgreep in Djakarta, Boompaperback, 1968. Perkara Njono (Njomo Trial), publication of the Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat (AHM — PTHM); P.T. Pembimbing Masa, Djakarta, first edition, 1966. Perkara Untung (Untung Trial), Publication of the Pusat Pendidizan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat (AHM — PTHM); P.T. Pembimbing Masa, Djakarta, first edition, 1966. Footnotes 1. I should like to thank Prof W.F. Wertheim for his continuous encouragement and help during my study of the 30 September Movement. Thanks go also to Dr Oey Hong Lee and Dra B. Brouwer-van Vessem who helped me with the translation into English. The final responsibility for the English text I bear myself of course. Some Indonesian friends could be mentioned who helped me considerably with their comments on earlier drafts. However, I think it would be better not to do so. I thank them here, the silent minority, living in exile and hoping and waiting for a better future. Something should also be said about my choice of only two trials as subjects for my study, i.e. the Untung and the Njono trials. My main reasons for selecting those trials were: (a) They concentrate more on the details of the preparations and the operations of the 30 September Movement than the following trials; (b) The official documents show a degree of “‘trial management” which is nonetheless still full of surprises and uncontrolled events, whereas the later trials, especially Sjam’s, show a rather strict theatrical staging; (c) The documents contain much information which has not been used until now and contain some unpublished interesting facts concerning the way the PKI was compromised. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 24] === THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT 239 Nab wy 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 29. 30. 28. It is interesting to observe how little attention has been paid until now to the 30 September Movement as a serious political enterprise of some officers of the Indonesian Armed Forces. The key to the interpretation of the facts of the Movement and its epilogue appears to lie in the Movement’s military and political organization as well as in its personal composition. For a thorough study of the facts and phenomena we need a close and careful study of the texts of the trial documents. This article tries.to give a new start to such a study. I hope it will be followed soon by others. Text Dekrit No.I, Untung Trial, pp.4-7. Untung in Untung Trial, p.36. Ibid., pp.38-39., Ibid., p.45. As Commander of the Presidential! Guard, i.e. the First Battalion of the Cakrabirawa Regiment, Untung was a key person in the Presidential entourage. He was in charge of the President’s safety and military ceremonial during public appearances. So he was a publicly well known person. President Sukarno, who seriously feared for attempts on his life had given Untung far-reaching instructions. During his inauguration as Commander for example, the President asked him not to consider the consequences of the measures he considered necessary to fulfil his duty (see Gomeljo’s defence of Untung during the Untung Trial, p.238). As a consequence Untung stayed in Sukarno’s vicinity most of the time and concerned himself intensively together with the members of his battalion, with the security for the President’s public life. It may be concluded from this that it was impossible for officers of Untung’s battalion not to know their Commander, as some of “his” officers stated during their witness account during the Untung trial (see witness accounts Raswad and Gijadi during Untung trial, pp.134 and 138). Raswad in Untung trial, p.135. Ibid. Untung in Untung trial, pp.131, 211-213; although Untung denies having ordered the murder, he explicitly takes the responsibility for it. This is a strong indication for the truth of his testimony. Ngadimo in Untung trial, p.123; also Gathut Sukresno in Untung trial, p.68. Untung in Untung trial, p.45. See the charge against Untung on p.19 of the Untung trial; see also the list of the witnesses a charge on the same page. Untung’s defence in Untung trial, p.220. See the list of the witnesses a charge of the Untung trial, p.330. Gathut Sukresno in Untung trial, pp.68-69. Prosecutor-General in Untung trial, pp.185 and 191. Sujono in Njono trial, p.224; Njono in Njono trial, p.56. Sujatno in Untung trial, p.153. Sri Muljono Herlambang in Omar Dhani trial, part Ill, p.489, according to Crouch (1978); Sujono in Untung trial, p.106. Sujono in Untung trial, p.117. Ibid., p.114. Untung in Untung trial, p.54 and 57. Prajitno bin Karnen in Njono trial, pp.184-185. Njono in Njono trial, p.119. Ibid., pp.65 and 102. Crouch (1978), p.92; Sujono in Untung trial, p.114. Crouch (1978), p.92; Sujono, p.114. The Gilchrist document was the draft of a secret telegram from the British ambassador in Jakarta to the Foreign Officein London. It concerned the expected visit of the American Presidential envoy Harold Bunker to Jakarta and a combined secret British/American action which was said to be planned in close co-operation with some Indonesian Army friends. The draft was dated 24 March 1965. Njono in Njono trial, p.32. Njono in Njono trial, pp.37, 40 and 47. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia === [PDF page 25] === 240 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 31. Peris Pardede indicated the existence of a difference of opinion between Aidit and some other members of the Central Committee of the PKI, among whom Lukman, concerning the ways and means by which the plans of the Council of Generals were to be countered (see Njono trial, pp.134-135). Aidit would have preferred to support the officers of the Movement, while other colleagues of the CC preferred to follow the advice of the Politbureau. 32. See note 67 on p.129 of Crouch (1978). 33. Personal communication from a reliable source. The evidence of the Untung trial proves that indeed such contacts were not established. 34. Untung in Untung trial, p.63. 35. Personal communication; his name was Sampir, husband of Suharti. She was at the time the Deputy Chairman of the Gerwani. 36. Sujono in Untung trial, p.98. In the Njono trial Sujono stated that Sjam was an Army officer. 37. Crouch (1978), chapter III. 38. Sujono in Njono trial, p.214; he explained that all the trainers were from the Kader Nasakom courses organized by the KOTRAR. One of the companians of Gathut Sukresno in the training programme for the Civilian Guards on Halim appears to have been Major Kartono of the Air Force who worked for the Ministry of Justice. He played no role in the Movement. KOTRAR = Komando Tertinggi Retooling Alat-alat Revolusi, i.e. the Supreme Command for the Reform of the State Apparatus. 39. Sujono in Untung trial, pp.110, 114-115; Sujono in Njono trial, p.218. Sujono calls Heru his “‘atasan”’; Gathut in Untung trial, pp.70-71. 40. Suradi in Untung trial, p.83. 41. = Ibid., pp.82-85. 42. This may be concluded from Suradi’s statement concerning Sutarno’s activities during 1 October on p.86. 43. Latief had his Headquarters at SENKO I. 44. Negadimo in Untung trial, p.129. 45. Suradiin Untung trial, pp.83-89. 46. Untung in Untung trial, p.56. 47. Personal communication. 48. KOSTRAD = Komando Tjadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, i.e. the Command of the National Strategic Reserve, a mainly logistic Command. It possessed its own Intelligence Service, active in counter-espionage against Malaysia during the Malaysia Confrontation. Head of the Service was Yoga Sugama. His pezsonal assistant at the time was Ali Murtopo. Maj. General Suharto was KOSTRAD’s Commander at the time. 49. Gunawan (1968), p.165. 50. In the Untung trial only communications by courier and letter are mentioned. Sl. Gunawan (1968), pp.165 and 180. 52. Untung in Untung trial, p.44; Sujatno in Untung trial pp.151-152; Suradi in Untung trial, p.86. 53. See Untung’s defence in Untung trial, p.214. 534. Suradi in Untung trial, pp.86-87. 55. Ibid., p.82. 56. Njono in Njono trial, pp.83-108. 57. Sujono in Untung trial, p.92. 58. Gathut in Untung trial, pp.70-71. 59. Sujono in Unkung trial, p.114. 60. Gathut Sukresno in Untung trial, p.69. 61. Ibid. 62. Sujono in Untung trial, p.112; Sujono in Njono trial, p.211. 63. Sujono in Untung trial, pp.93-94. 64. Suradi in Untung trial, pp.86-87; Anwar Rachman in Untung trial, p.119. 65. Crouch (1978), chapter III. 66. Rudhito in Untung trial, pp.164-167. 67. Personal communication. Copyright (c) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Journal of Contemporary Asia