Confronting the Past in Contemporary Indonesia: The Anticommunist Killings of 1965-66 and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama (McGregor, 2009)

=== [PDF page 1] === Critical Asian Studies ISSN: 1467-2715 (Print) 1472-6033 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rcra20 CONFRONTING THE PAST IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA The Anticommunist Killings of 1965–66 and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama E. Katharine McGregor To cite this article: E. Katharine McGregor (2009) CONFRONTING THE PAST IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA, Critical Asian Studies, 41:2, 195-224, DOI: 10.1080/14672710902809351 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710902809351 Published online: 27 May 2009. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 7652 View related articles Citing articles: 4 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcra20 === [PDF page 2] === Critical Asian Studies McGregor / Confronting the Past CONFRONTING THE PAST IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA The Anticommunist Killings of 1965–66 and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama Katharine E. McGregor ABSTRACT: The collapse of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of new democratic spaces hold the promise of an opportunity to redress instances of past violence. Confronting violent pasts is never an easy task, however, especially when different interest groups stand to lose from such a process. This article explores the role of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the 1965 killings and shifting views about this past within the NU today. It examines the dramatic move in 2000 of young members of the NU to confront this past and to try to improve relations between members of the NU and former leftists. The article focuses on the reasons for the emergence of Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat, Muslim Community for Social Advocacy), the nongovernmental organization behind this reconciliation effort, and on responses to its work. As Syarikat’s experience shows, combining the dual goals of societal peace and historical revision has not been an easy task. In its efforts to reinterpret the past, Syarikat is trying to accomplish two somewhat antagonistic objectives: (1) rebutting dominant versions of history and raising awareness about the suffering of former political prisoners, and (2) producing a version of the past that senior members of the NU can live with. Its decision to confront one of the most delicate topics in the history of the NU has had a mixed reception and these responses help us measure the extent of the NU’s commitment to reform and tolerance. Following the 30 September Movement against the top army leadership in 1965, the Indonesian military directed the killings of members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its affiliated organizations, of military men sym- ISSN 1467-2715 print/1472-6033 online / 02 / 000195–30 ©2009 BCAS, Inc. DOI: 10.1080/14672710902809351 === [PDF page 3] === Sulchan, a former member of Banser (pictured here in front of his mosque in Bangil, Indonesia, on 12 September 2008), said that the order to kill communists came through Islamic clerics within the NU. In a series of interviews with The Associated Press, Sulchan revealed details of his participation in some of the worst atrocities of the twentieth century, with up to half a million people killed in a U.S.-backed communist purge that swept dictator Suharto into power in 1965. See Deutsch 2008. (AP Photo/Trisnadi) pathetic to the PKI, and of Sukarno supporters. The violence spanned the archipelago, but was particularly intense in Java, Bali, and Sumatra, and resulted in approximately half a million deaths. The largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and the world, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, meaning awakening of the ulama, or religious scholars), supported this violence and some of its members also participated in the killings. For the duration of the military-dominated New Order regime (1966–98), there was little public expression of sympathy for the victims of this violence including hundreds of thousands of people who were imprisoned following the incident. Instead, in a tightly controlled political environment, the Indonesian government continued to warn of the dangers of communism. Members of the NU represented, and sometimes celebrated, their participation in this violence as service to the nation. Together with the Indonesian military they had a joint interest in defending the killings and sustaining the cornerstone of New Order ideology, anticommunism. A major reform and democratization movement driven by students, intellectuals, and activists — known as reformasi — began in the late 1990s and climaxed with the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. It was in this new era of democratic transition that some young members of the NU formed an organization named Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat, Santri Society for People’s Advocacy) aimed specifically at reexamining the NU’s role in the violence of 1965–66 and improving relations between members of the NU and former leftists. Syarikat launched a community-based program called “Reconciliation and Rehabilitation for Victims of 1965,” but its efforts were not universally 196 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 4] === welcomed. The dramatic difference in opinions within the NU on how to deal with this past in a new more democratic era makes the 1965–66 killings an interesting case study for examining how societies and more specifically religious communities deal with the legacies of violence in postauthoritarian contexts.1 This article begins by examining the NU’s support for and participation in the 1965–66 killings and the commemoration of this role in NU publications in the New Order period. I then turn to analyzing the significant reform movement within the NU that spurred the formation of Syarikat. One of the most difficult issues Syarikat has had to negotiate is how to marry the goals of societal peace and historical revision. Through an analysis of Syarikat’s history projects I probe the limits of historical revision as an aspect of reconciliation projects. Finally I reflect on responses to Syarikat’s decision to confront one of the most delicate topics in the history of the NU. Syarikat’s activities parallel those of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements in other countries to confront past injustices in the spirit of democratic reform and a new commitment to human rights. At the same time, however, they have faced specific challenges due to their institutional links and growing trend toward conservatism within Indonesian Islam and a backlash against liberal Islam, interpretations of Islam that seek to counter literalist versions of Islam. Background to the Violence and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama Early in the hours of 1 October 1965, members of an armed group calling itself the 30 September Movement (G30S) kidnapped and killed six army generals and one lieutenant general, dumping their corpses in an unused well at Lubang Buaya in East Jakarta. In the latest scholarly interpretation of the coup attempt, John Roosa argues that sections of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist Party of Indonesia), such as the Special Bureau led by Sjam Kamaruzzaman and directed by PKI chairman D.N. Aidit played a role in the coup plot, but institutionally the party was not involved.2 Some members of affiliated PKI these organizations such as the Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth) were reportedly on standby to mobilize for some kind of action, but they were unaware of the planned action against the military.3 Roosa titles his work Pretext for Mass Murder, arguing that the military, with Western backing, were looking for a pretext to crush the PKI. In the context of fears of the spread of communist influence worldwide and competition with the Soviet Union for spheres of influence, the United States was particularly concerned about President Sukarno’s increasing accommodation of the PKI. In the 1960s the Nahdlatul Ulama was an active political party and it was wary of the PKI. By 1964, President Sukarno sided with the PKI on all major domestic 1. There is very little research on the topic of Islamic communities and related projects of reconciliation. Abu-Nimer attributes this to an emphasis in Western scholarship in particular on the connections between Islam and violence. Abu-Nimer 2003, 185. 2. Roosa 2006, 203. 3. Ibid., 220. McGregor / Confronting the Past 197 === [PDF page 5] === issues including, for example, a decision against a merger of all political parties into one (which would have severely hurt the PKI) and support for the accelerated enforcement of the land reform programs.4 More militant members of the NU became increasingly discontented with the PKI and expressed alarm at the growth in party membership to an estimated 3 million in the early 1960s. In 1962, members of the NU’s youth wing, Ansor, responded by founding Banser (Barisan Serbaguna, Multipurpose Brigade), an armed wing, in preparation for confrontation with the PKI.5 Prior to the 1965 coup attempt, members of Banser had already clashed with members of the PKI-affiliated Indonesian Peasants’ Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI) in land reform actions especially in East Java.6 Following lags in government implementation of land reform based on the 1959 Crop Sharing Law and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law, the PKI called for peasants to begin to implement their own land reforms. In addition to antagonism over land reform, NU members who lived through the 1960s and some of their children continue to claim in interviews that they were mocked by the PKI in references to the kiai (Islamic religious leaders) as one of the seven village devils due to their land holdings. “Seven village devils” was a term the PKI used in its propaganda to denote forces deemed to be detrimental to the people’s interests. In addition NU members recall that members of LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, People’s Cultural Institute), the cultural wing of the PKI, frequently performed an insulting Javanese folk theater performance entitled Matinya Gusti Allah (The Death of God).8 These NU members also cite several larger incidents preceding the 1965 coup attempt as cases of PKI provocation. One example they offer is the Kanigoro episode of January 1965 in which members of the communist-affiliated youth group Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth) and the Indonesian Peasants’ Front attacked an Islamic service held in a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Kanigoro in the Blitar regency of East Java. Members of the People’s Youth disrupted the service led by a member of the banned Islamic party Masyumi and defiled the Qu’ran.9 When the 30 September 1965 coup attempt occurred, young NU militants urged the leadership to quickly back the Indonesian army in blaming the communists for the coup attempt and calling for a ban on the party.10 The NU was one of the first organizations after the coup attempt to stand openly against the communists, despite President Sukarno’s refusal to condemn those behind the 30 September Movement. In their official statement on 5 October 1965, the leaders of the NU Party in Jakarta stated that those involved in the coup attempt must be “quickly eliminated down to the roots to safeguard the path of the revo- 4. Hauswedell 1973, 129. 5. Fealy 1998, 312–15. 6. Ibid., 320–25. 7. See Mortimer 1972, 26–33, 48–55. 8. Author interviews with Kiai Abdullah Faqih, Tuban, 27 February 2008; Gus Maksum, Kediri, 29 February 2008; and Yusuf Hasyim’s family, Jombang, 29 February 2008. 9. Sulistyo 2000, 139–43. 10. Fealy 1998, 328–32. 198 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 6] === 11 lution.” In the statement they requested that President Sukarno and leaders of the military ban the PKI, the People’s Youth, Gerwani (Indonesian Women’s Movement), Sobsi (Indonesian Workers’ Union), and others who planned or participated in the 30 September Movement.12 From around Indonesia, branches of the NU and its affiliated organizations, Petanu (NU Farmers’ Union), Sarbumusi (Workers’ Union), Muslimat (NU’s women’s wing ), and Fatayat (the young women’s wing of the NU), all produced letters of support for the campaign to ban the Communist Party. On 30 October, Ansor instructed all members to heighten their vigilance and “help ABRI [the military] in any way they could to restore order, guard the unity of the nation and save the revolution.”13 The instruction also stated that in efforts to crush the 30 September Movement, members of Ansor should wait and only carry out the instructions from the NU coordinators who had already been assigned at the national level and who would be selected in the regions by leaders of the party.14 This last instruction alludes to the intention of the central Ansor leadership to coordinate this campaign closely. It is difficult to find direct instructions from the NU calling upon its members to assist the military by killing communists. The instructions were probably carefully worded, given that Sukarno, who was unwilling to blame the PKI for the coup attempt, was still president at the time. Yet there were some signs of direct endorsement from the NU for the violence. In correspondence with the Pekalongan branch of Ansor, for example, the NU Central Board thanked the Pekalongan branch for their report on efforts to crush the 30 September Movement.15 They also urged that if any NU men became victims of abduction or were “killed in the battle,” a report should be filed with their name, address, position in the organization, family details, and an explanation of how they died, such that appropriate merit would be bestowed upon them as a syahid (Islamic martyr).16 In January 1966 the NU leadership endorsed a booklet entitled Guidebook for Indoctrination to Eliminate the Thinking of PKI/Gestapu, in which the editor claimed it was a form of worship (ibadah) to crush the PKI and that “the PKI must be wiped out from the face of Indonesia and never given the chance to exist again.”17 In the months after the coup attempt, members of Banser mobilized, with varying degrees of military assistance and direction, and rounded up and killed members of leftist organizations. Several primary accounts detail the roles of NU members in this violence.18 Secondary analyses of the violence include the work of Fealy, who focuses on the NU’s role in backing and coordinating the vio- 11. Pernyataan pengurus besar Partai Nahdlatul Ulama berserat segenap ormas-ormasnja 1965. 12. Ibid. 13. Instruksi No 1/02/pp/1965 putjuk pimpinan G.P. Ansor 1965. 14. Ibid. 15. Ansor Tjabang Kopra Pekalongan 1965. 16. Ibid. 17. Hamba 1966, 11. 18. Primary accounts include Anonymous 1986, 135–49; Anonymous 1990, 169–76; Deutsch 2008; and Rochijat 1985, 43. McGregor / Confronting the Past 199 === [PDF page 7] === 19 lence, Young, who studies the combination of local and national influences, 20 including NU–PKI tensions in the killings in Kediri, East Java, and Sulistyo and Sudjatmoko, who describe the degree of military or civilian direction in the killings in Jombang, Kediri, and Magetan in East Java, and in Bali (concluding that local vigilantes instigated much of the killing in East Java).21 Hefner details the role of Banser in the Tengger Highlands in East Java, where Banser members came from the lowlands and worked together with the army to carry out purges of PKI members.22 Robinson also mentions in passing a minor role Banser 23 played in Bali, where the majority of the population are Hindus. The NU was not the only civilian organization that supported killings. The second largest Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, also provided rapid sup- 24 port for crushing the PKI, with some leaders declaring this a religious duty. The secretary general of the Catholic Party, Harry Tjan Silahi was a key founder of KAP-Gestapu (the Action Front to Crush the 30 September Movement). He helped mobilize youths from PMKRI (Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia) to join together with Ansor in the Action Front to attack the PKI headquarters in Jakarta.25 In the Eastern islands of Indonesia where communities were overwhelmingly Christian and Catholic, the army — with varying degrees of support from the local populations — killed many.26 Commenting on Bali, Robinson importantly notes that although religion was often used as justification for the killing, the military “actively shaped and encouraged a popular discourse of anti-communism based on exacting religious ideas and cultural analogies.”27 He claims that those who directed their members to participate in the violence were driven primarily by political, rather than religious, considerations. Organizations aligned to political parties that were not religiously aligned, such as the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party), also participated in the violence.28 Cribb argues the primary causes of the violence were military agency, local and social tensions, and extreme political and economic tension that encouraged scapegoating of the PKI and affiliated organizations. He stresses that military agency alone does not account for the scale of the violence.29 As the most intense period of killing was underway, General Suharto, who led the suppression of the 30 September Movement in the capital city of Jakarta, 19. Fealy 1998, 326–40. 20. Young 1990, 72–84. 21. For details on the killings in Jombang and Kediri, see Sulistyo 2000, 159–201. For details of the killings in Kediri, Magetan, and Bali, see Sudjatmiko 1992. 22. Hefner 1990, 212. 23. Robinson 1995, 300. 24. On Muhammadiyah, see Boland 1982, 145–46. 25. Mudatsir 1983, 65–68. 26. On the killings in West Timor, see Farram 2002, 39–45. On the killings in Flores, Sumba, and Timor, see Webb 1986, 94–112. 27. Robinson 1995, 279. On uses of ideas of Islam in this memory war, see McGregor (forthcoming). 28. On the role of PNI vigilantes in the violence, see Robinson 1995, 300, and, in contrast, how in some instances PNI members also became the victims of killings by Ansor, see Hefner 1990, 211. 29. Cribb 2002, 551–55. 200 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 8] === The Trisula monument in South Blitar, pictured here, “celebrates through statuary and inscriptions on the monument, the combined role of the people and the military in crushing the communists.” (Credit: Vannessa Hearman, Februrary 2008) began a slow process of taking over power from President Sukarno. He represented his role in crushing the communists as heroic and was quick to claim the military had saved the nation from communism. Together with a team of ideologues he began to depoliticize Indonesian politics commencing with the freezing of all parties, the consolidation of the government electoral vehicle, Golkar, and the formation of two alternative parties that the regime also controlled: the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party) and the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) formed out of the forced merger of preexisting political parties. Some NU militants who had moved quickly to back the army in crushing the communists expected to be rewarded in the new regime. Instead, NU members, who represent traditional Islam, were forced to merge with modernist Muslims in the sole Islamic party, the PPP. (Previously, the traditionalists and modernists had their own parties.) The NU party, the strongest Islamic party, was based largely on rural support from the heavily populated areas of East and Central Java. The Masyumi party, representing modernist Islam, drew its support from urban areas and was banned in l960 due to involvement in the Permesta rebellion.30 The New Order regime created the PPP in 1973 to provide a façade of democracy. The regime was also aware that based on historical clashes, the involvement of 30. The Permesta (Charter for Universal Struggle) rebellion was a regional rebellion led by military commanders demanding greater rights and autonomy for regional areas. McGregor / Confronting the Past 201 === [PDF page 9] === traditional and modernist Muslims in a single party would likely be a barrier to unity and thus reduce the prospect for a political challenge to the regime. Although elections were held every four years, through the “floating mass” doctrine,31 the government prohibited the establishment of political branches of either the PPP or the PDI at the village level. The NU was further marginalized by discrimination against those with NU backgrounds for military and civil service positions and the discontinuation of the practice of awarding the position of Minister of Religion to an NU man.32 Thus, space for political Islam for the first two and half decades of the regime was very limited. For the duration of the New Order regime, the 1965 killings were to some degree celebrated both by the military and also by some within the NU. The Trisula monument in South Blitar, for example, celebrates, through statuary and inscriptions on the monument, the combined role of the people and the military in crushing the communists (see photo above). NU official histories from as early as 1971 also eulogized the role of the NU in defeating the communists. One 1971 publication noted the NU’s quick support for banning the PKI and also detailed the death of an NU “martyr” on 6 October in Banyuwangi. The individual was allegedly killed by a PKI member. A battle with the PKI ensued and an estimated forty Ansor members died. The same publication claimed that Pertanu and even Fatayat were ready to oppose the communists.33 In the context of the regime’s central ideology of anticommunism, the NU continued to celebrate this history to remind the regime of the NU’s past service and thus of the debt owed to this community. In the 1990s, several former Ansor members published works that either showcased NU’s role in the violence of 1965–66 or reminded Indonesians of violence committed against ulama (Islamic religious scholars) by the Left prior to the coup attempt, dating back to the 1948 Madiun Affair, when Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth) troops attacked Islamic religious leaders (kiai) following Pesindo’s failed attempt to seize local government and as their troops fled Republican forces. In 1990, Choirul Anam, a former Ansor member, wrote a commemorative history of Ansor that celebrated their role in crushing the communists. It refers to the jasa (merit or service) of Ansor as the backbone of the East Java operations. Anam states that “the communists were enemies of religion, they had to be wiped out [diberantas].”34 That same year, Agus Sunyoto, historian and former head of Ansor in East Java, published Lubang-Lubang Pembantaian Petualangan PKI di Madiun (The pits of slaughter: The PKI’s schemes in 35 Madiun). Written together with Maksum and A. Zainuddin, the book focuses on the events of the Madiun Affair of 18 September 1948, in which lower echelon Communist Party leaders, who were aggravated by Muhammad Hatta’s ra- 31. The floating mass doctrine refers to the 1975 law that restricted the activity of political parties in rural areas on the basis that the rural population, a “floating mass,” should not be distracted from the task of development. See Cribb and Brown 1995, 130–1. 32. Fealy 1998, 358. 33. Lembaga Pendidikan Maaruf NU, 1971. 34. Anam 1990, 92. 35. Sunyoto, Maksum, and Zainuddin 1990. 202 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 10] === tionalization of leftist troops from the military, attempted to seize control of the local government. The Pits of Slaughter highlights “communist” brutality in the 36 Madiun Affair. George Kahin has written that members of the Islamic party Masyumi, which had the support of NU members at this time, were singled out for cruel treatment, including torture and execution.37 In the clashes between communists and santri (devout Muslims) around eight thousand people, mostly communists, died.38 The publications by Anam and Sunyoto appeared shortly after the end of the cold war and paralleled military efforts to revive the communist threat with a new emphasis on the links between anticommunism and religious piety.39 This effort was in part a response to waning belief in the communist threat, which created the possibility for greater sympathy toward members of the Left, but it also involved concerns about the increased emphasis in society on human rights. In 1996, for example, Sunyoto wrote another publication, Banser Undertakes Jihad to Crush the PKI,40 which is devoted entirely to clarifying Banser’s role in crushing the communists. In the foreword to the book the author acknowledges that he wrote the book in response to military objections to accusations that only the military were responsible for the killings.41 The military and the NU were thus already anticipating a reopening of this past in the late New Order period and both had begun to moderate the previously celebratory tone in publications canvassing their respective roles in the killings. Changing Ideas and Approaches in the NU 1984–1998 The New Order regime was authoritarian in its control of information and in its willingness to use force to suppress dissent, but not all avenues of expression or activism were closed. The government, for example, allowed NGOs to organize and operate within certain limits from the early 1980s onwards on the basis of their potential contribution to developmental goals.42 The regime also adopted a two-pronged approach to Islam, constraining political Islam and at the same time encouraging the development of cultural Islam (meaning the private practice of Islam) by means of support for religious institutions and places of worship. One direct result of the regime’s policy was NU’s decision in 1984 to withdraw from politics.43 In the early 1980s leaders within the NU decided to “return to the khhitah” (the original NU strategy). In 1926 when the NU was first formed it was a religious organization focusing on culture and educational tasks. In 1984 some NU leaders urged that the NU should return to this original mission because they felt that there was no more room to move within the political sphere, especially 36. Ibid. 37. Kahin 1952, 300. 38. Fealy 1998, 313, n. 24. 39. See McGregor 2002, 50–55. 40. Sunyoto, 1996. 41. Ibid., ii. 42. Eldridge 2005, 150. 43. van Bruinessen (1996, 163–89) has covered these developments most comprehensively. McGregor / Confronting the Past 203 === [PDF page 11] === in the only Islamic party, the PPP, within which, they felt, the NU leaders had been marginalized. Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari (NU’s founder) and son of Kiai Wahid Hasyim (a prominent NU leader and former minister of religious affairs), claimed that in effect the NU “left politics to play better politics,”44 meaning that given tight constraints over their political activities their political impact would be greater if they concentrated on internal reform and participated in politics from the sidelines. Although political interests drove the decision to return to the khittah, this reorientation brought about a shift within the NU and created new spaces for younger members of the organization. In his 1979 work, Khitthah Nahdliyah, Kiai Achmad Siddiq identified the two core NU values as tawassuth (moderation, keeping to the middle road) and rahmatan lil alamin (compassion and kindness toward the entire world, except for the “implacable enemies of Islam”). He also emphasized education, charity, and economic activities.45 Reformists like Wahid tried to formulate more specific recommendations concerning the path the NU should take and emphasized charitable work and social solidarity as another form of worship (ibadah), thus widening the definition of worship from personal observance.46 Wahid was elected NU chairman-general in 1984 and reelected again in 1989 and 1994. During this time he oversaw and encouraged many new initiatives in the NU, with varied responses from more conservative ulama. Young members within the NU welcomed the return to the khittah, because they felt the emphasis on elite political struggle during the past decades had led to neglect of the NU’s educational role and its responsibility for the welfare of its followers.47 While NU’s older members were more focused on the pesantren world, the organization’s new generation — who had been exposed to modern education due to the introduction of more diverse curricula in the pesantren and at secular schools and universities — favored a return to the khittah. They were also more receptive to new ideas and social theories.48 This was especially true of those active in NGOs. Young people who became followers of the reformers were mostly from educational institutions, especially pesantren and madrasah (Islamic schools), but also from the State Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN) and other higher education organizations. In their student years, these young intellectuals were the leaders and activists in organizations that were affiliated with the NU, like the PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Student’s Movement), the Women’s Corps of PMII, Fatayat, and Ansor. In the 1980s they became active in study groups within and outside of the NU. These groups were important venues for the discussion of social and 49 political issues in the context of limited formal political roles. 44. Quoted in Fealy 2007, 158. 45. van Bruinessen 1996, 177–79. 46. Ibid., 183. 47. Ibid., 174. 48. Prasetyo et al. 2002, 109. 49. Ibid., 124. 204 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 12] === In addition to being inspired by the thoughts and writings of Abdurrahman Wahid, with their emphasis on humanitarianism and civil society, young members of the NU were also influenced by wider sources of thought including the prolific writer and Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi and Fatima Mernissi who offered new liberal perspectives on Islam. In the 1990s their discussions focused on the backwardness of the Third World, economic justice, and human rights, including the rights of women in Islam.50 The emergence of discourses on democracy, human rights, and gender equality also reflected an effort to critique the New Order. In the 1990s there was also a boom in Islamic literature canvassing these ideas, which were generally classified as liberal versions of Islam. Chief among the publishers of such literature was LKiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies), a Yogyakarta-based group founded by NU members with the aim of spreading tolerant and transformative Islam. Thousands of students received LKiS training as social ac- 51 tivists and went on to form their own organizations. To spread these new ideas, young members of the NU held training programs in big cities as well as with students and teachers in village-based pesantren. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, a prominent representative of liberal Islam, notes, however, that his generation encountered widespread resistance in spreading some of these ideas in pesantren circles.52 For example, young NU members frequently had to ask Wahid to intervene to convince the kiai to allow the training to take place in their pesantren.53 It seems that there were already significant differences about how far reform should be taken. The Founding of Syarikat When the Suharto regime finally ended in May 1998 there was a sense of euphoria in particular amongst members of the younger generation. Some NU activists were already involved with the NU-linked organizations such as P3M (Perhimpunan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society), LKiS, and Lakpesdam NU (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia, NU Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources), all of which addressed human rights concerns less directly through the promotion of the discourse of human rights, but the fall of Suharto presented new possibilities for actively addressing past abuses. With the end of press censorship and interest in new studies about the 1965 coup attempt among the public, there was also intense media coverage from late 1998 through 2000 in the long-banned topics of the events of the 1965 coup attempt and the killings. Information about the coup attempt and theories that diverged from the government’s view had been tightly controlled for over thirty years. In 50. van Bruinessen 1994, 234. 51. Miichi 2003, 22. 52. Ulil Abshar Abdalla was a founder of the NU Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources (Lakspesdam NU). He is now head of the Islamic Liberal Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal). 53. Prasetyo et al. 2002, 195–96, 200–1. McGregor / Confronting the Past 205 === [PDF page 13] === a climate of strong anticommunism, coverage of the plight of victims of anticommunist violence had been minimal. Because of this newly created space for the discussion of history and increased public attention to human rights abuses during the Suharto period, some members of Ansor who had been active in the reform movement of 1997–98 began to grapple with the issue of how to deal with the stigma associated with Ansor’s past. Martin van Bruinessen notes that this stigma was not confined to groups outside of the NU; even the NU-based student group PMII was somewhat dismissive of Ansor and Ansor’s paramilitary wing, Banser, because of the legacy of 1965–66.54 One Syarikat researcher, Taufiqurrahman, spoke of the burden he felt he bore as a member of the younger generation of Ansor.55 He said, “The young generation feel a burden…we want this to end. In my family some participated in the killing and then my grandfather helped the PKI by hiding them. We did not know what was happening.”56 Another researcher commented to me that after the fall of Suharto, perhaps as more information became public about the killings, this stigma became stronger, especially in activist circles. A key question for Ansor members was how they could join in the democratization process if their organization in the past was responsible for such crimes.57 In the 1999 NU Congress in Kediri members of the NU decided that in the new climate of reform they should engage in repentance (taubat) and utterances for God’s forgiveness (istigfar).58 This call was not made specifically with reference to 1965, but in the same year NU activists from eighteen towns met to discuss the effects of the 1965 tragedy on Ansor and Banser.59 Their aim was to try to challenge the stigma of the NU and the PKI as enemies by undertaking research into the role of NU members in the killings. They were further encouraged when in 2000 Wahid, who was then president of Indonesia, proposed that the 1966 ban on communism be lifted and offered a personal apology to victims of the violence of 1965. Some Islamic groups expressed outrage,60 but Wahid’s proposal inspired some activists in the NU, mostly young people, to do something about this past. The Yogyakarta branch of Ansor followed Wahid’s lead and offered an apology to victims of the violence of 1965.61 At the same time as they made an apology to victims of 1965–66, the Yogyakarta branch of Ansor, headed by Nuruddin Amin, stated a long-term commitment to investigate Ansor’s role in the killings and also to demilitarize the armed wing of Ansor, which had for decades used military symbols and ideology.62 The Central Board of Ansor had 54. van Bruinessen 2002, 15. 55. Author interview with Taufiqurrahman, Syarikat, Yogyakarta, 25 May 2005. 56. Ibid. 57. Author interview with Rumekso Setiyadi, Syarikat, Yogyakarta, 25 May 2005. 58. Masdar 2003, 4. 59. Author interview with Munib, Lakpesdam NU, Blitar, 29 February 2008. 60. For analysis of these responses, see Purwadi 2003, 59–67. 61. Said 2000, available at http:www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/11/29/0006.html (accessed 22 May 2007). 62. PW Ansor DIY bentuk tim pelurusan sejarah 65 [Ansor Yogyakarta branch forms a team to investigate 1965]. Kompas, 21 November 2000. 206 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 14] === entrusted its Yogyakarta branch with formulating a new concept and profile for Banser. Then, in December 2000, on International Human Rights Day, NU activists from eighteen towns in Java founded Syarikat. With its central headquarters in Yogyakarta, Syarikat now has a network of partner organizations across Java, with one partner in Bali. Members of the network meet several times a year to discuss future programs and report on activities.63 Most researchers in Syarikat today are in their thirties or forties and were thus born after the violence of 1965. In addition to the desire to reform the image of Ansor and the NU, those joining Syarikat from the beginning of its work until now are also motivated by compassion for survivors of the violence, including many people who were imprisoned without trial for long periods following the coup attempt. This is consistent with the organization’s prescribed focus on charitable work and vulnerable groups, as set out during the 1984 reform process. The background of Syarikat founder and director Imam Aziz highlights the links between Syarikat and the generation within the NU that was most strongly shaped by the process of reform and the emergence of new thinking following the return to the NU’s original mission. Aziz is not an Ansor member, but he is a former PMII activist. This suggests that Syarikat represents a broader network of people including those within Ansor who are supportive of change as well as wider circles of NU activists. A graduate from the State Islamic Institute Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, Aziz was involved in setting up LKiS together with other Yogyakarta IAIN students.64 Before working at Syarikat, he worked for Lakpesdam NU. In 1997 Lakpesdam commenced grassroots human rights training in several pesantren, which inspired Aziz’s focus on 1965.65 In the first few years of operation Syarikat adopted a cautious and calculated approach to their work. The first step that researchers in the Syarikat network took was to conduct interviews with a number of survivors of the violence, typically former political prisoners. Many researchers were surprised to learn of the extent of the suffering and the violence that occurred.66 These new narratives about 1965 conflicted dramatically with what they had been told in New Order history classes. The next steps they took were to promote their ideas in local communities and to consider what kinds of activities or projects would be suitable in each location. Syarikat describes its activities, which now range over twenty-six towns across Java, as grassroots based, because it draws on the wide existing network of NU followers, pesantrens, and organizations. Recognizing the sensitivity of their work, they aim for slow and gradual change and small-scale initiatives 63. The current member organizations include Syarikat Yogyakarta; Salatiga and Probolinggo; Lakpesdam branches in Jakarta, Cirebon, Cilacap, Blitar, Klaten, Pasuruan and Banyuwangi; P3M Jakarta; Incres Bandung; Indipt Kebumen; Kolmaster Wonosobo; LKiS Yogyakarta;LKTS Boyolali; Gapura Blora; FSAS Jepara; Alur Batang, Lepim Kediri; and SD Inpers Jember. 64. Miichi 2003, 22. 65. Olliver 2004. 66. Author interviews with Sari Eminghayu, Kediri, 29 February 2008; Khusnul Widuri, Yogyakarta, 22 May 2007; and Lutfhfi, Lakpesdam NU, Blitar, 29 February 2008. McGregor / Confronting the Past 207 === [PDF page 15] === without being confrontational. Until 2008, Cordaid, a Catholic relief organization based in the Netherlands provided funding for Syarikat’s activities. In its promotional literature, Cordaid stresses its support for civil society organizations that “include vulnerable groups, strengthen social cohesion and produce 67 social capital.” One tension in Syarikat’s work is that by forging links with former political prisoners Syarikat has prioritized the accumulation of bridging capital, meaning intragroup cohesion, over bonding capital, meaning internal group cohesion across the NU community.68 At the same time Syarikat has experienced resistance from within the NU; making contact with former political prisoners was not an easy process. One activist in Lakpesdam Blitar, part of the Syarikat network, reflected that it took some time to build bonds of trust between them as young members of the NU and victims. When they first tried to meet former PKI members and people from formerly associated PKI organizations, they were politely rejected.69 On the other hand, the families of some activists within Syarikat also continue to feel it is dangerous to mix with, let alone advocate for, former leftists.70 As a result some researchers have chosen to conceal their involvement from their families. This gives some indication of the continuing sensitivity of the issue of 1965 in NU circles, which I will return to later. Syarikat’s Mission and Activities Syarikat uses the word reconciliation to describe the aim of its work, its guiding slogan is “building a peaceful and democratic Indonesia” by means of a grassroots community reconciliation movement. The term “grassroots” refers to the use of existing NU networks, as well as a community-specific approach to this issue, paying careful attention to local attitudes in each area for which an initiative is planned. The term “reconciliation” is very popular in discourses of democracy in post-authoritarian contexts, but it has multiple and sometimes conflicting meanings. Based on a survey of uses of the term, Daly and Sarphin explain that “reconciliation describes coming together; it is the antithesis of falling or growing apart. Reconciliation has a normative — almost moral — aspect as well. It is the coming together (or re-coming together) of things that should be together.”71 They also claim that politically the term reconciliation is used to refer to personal healing, interpersonal relationships, community rebuilding, national stability, and international peace. At a conceptual level the term is used to refer to justice, with truth, and with forgiveness, but many questions remain in each specific case about how much of a focus there should be on the past, or forgiveness or justice.72 67. Cordaid 2006, 14. 68. van Bruinessen 2004, 53–55. The terms “bonding” and “bridging capital” draw upon Putnam 2000. 69. Masrukin 2007, 14. 70. Author interviews with Khusnul Widuri, Yogyakarta, 22 May 2007, and Sari Eminghayu, Kediri, 20 February 2008. 71. Daly and Sarkin 2007, 5. 72. Ibid., xiv. 208 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 16] === These complexities behind the almost generic term of reconciliation are mirrored in Syarikat’s multiple aims. Primarily motivated to strengthen society’s 73 social fabric and prevent future conflict, Syarikat engages in activities that include organizing meetings and collaborative projects involving former members of the Left and their families and the NU community, creating associations for women victims, and undertaking efforts to lobby members of the parliament to address the past and in particular to end discrimination against former political prisoners and their families. Syarikat members have worked together with victims’ organizations to advocate for restoration of victims’ rights, and a reintegration of former leftists into society.74 They also seek to promote truth telling, using their publications, films, and photographic and artifact-based exhibitions. Syarikat seeks to enhance the bonds between two groups that have been deliberately isolated from one another for almost forty years, due, on the one side, to the risks of being labeled sympathetic to former communists and on the side of former leftists, a lingering fear of the NU. Yet their goals of victims’ rights advocacy and alternative truth telling imply potential clashes with the aim of achieving societal harmony. Syarikat has tried to foster cooperation, in multiple ways, between members of the NU and victims. In the Blitar area in 2002, Lakpesdam NU arranged a joint celebration of the Islamic holiday Syuro accompanied by a cultural performance involving former political prisoners, prominent NU figures, and community leaders. Syarikat followed this event with a joint community project to install clean water pipes in South Blitar, an area that had missed out on much development because it was a former PKI area.75 In 2006 they helped facilitate a meeting between women survivors in Yogyakarta and the Bantul branch of Fatayat.76 Lakpesdam NU Blitar and partner organizations in the Syarikat network have also arranged silaturahmi (goodwill) gatherings between members of the NU and victims such as the one held in Batang and Pekalongan on the occasion of Eid on 28 October 2007.77 With the exception of the 2002 Blitar meeting, most of these efforts involved joint activities or cooperative efforts between the NU and former leftists without any direct discussion of the past.78 In their analysis of multiple modes of reconciliation, Daly and Sarphin note that some of the most effective community reconciliation programs promote reconciliation only indirectly by means of engagement in joint projects.79 Syarikat’s approach in the case of these initiatives is similarly nonconfrontational. Syarikat has also assisted survivors in the task of economic development. In 2005, for example, Syarikat worked together with the Yogyakarta NGO Fopperham (Forum Pendidikan dan Perjuangan Hak Asasi Manusia, Education Forum 73. Author interview with Rumekso Setyadi, Syarikat, Yogyakarta, 21 May 2007. 74. Ibid. 75. Masrukin 2007, 14. 76. Ambarmirah 2007, 7. 77. Saiful 2007, 12. 78. On the Blitar meeting, see Farid Wajidi’s detailed description of testimonies from both members of the NU and former political prisoners. Wajidi 2003. 79. Daly and Sarkin 2007, 89. McGregor / Confronting the Past 209 === [PDF page 17] === A photograph from Plantungan women’s prison that appeared in Syarikat’s 2006 exhibition entitled Remembering What Has Been Forgotten held in Yogyakarta. (Credit: Image reproduced from an exhibition brochure) for Human Rights Defense) to help women from the women’s survivor organization Kiprah Perempuan (Women’s Progress) form a savings and loan cooperative.80 When an earthquake hit Yogyakarta in May 2006, damaging the homes of several victims of 1965, Syarikat launched a program together with local prominent individuals, architects, and volunteers from Syarikat to rebuild the houses of the poor.81 In other cases it has helped victims’ groups set up small health clinics for their members. In 2006 Syarikat, the National Commission on Women’s Rights, and the Jakarta-based Women’s Discussion Circle (Lingkar Tutur Perempuan) used Women’s Day (Hari Ibu) as a way of bringing survivors from the violence of 1965 together with other women in a wider project aimed at addressing violence against women.82 For the duration of the New Order regime state-produced versions of official history claimed Gerwani women were involved in the torture, genital mutilation, and murder of the military men killed in the 1965 coup attempt. After realizing the impact of this stigma on these women and their subsequent reluctance to join in activities,83 Syarikat turned its attention to projects that focused specifically on women survivors from 1965 and debunking myths about Gerwani. In December 2006 it held an exhibition in Yogyakarta, entitled Remembering What Has Been Forgotten, based on photographs collected from survivors of their experiences in Plantungan women’s prison (see photo above). To promote historical revision Syarikat relies on personal accounts from survivors. Syarikat has facilitated discussions in which university students hear directly from survivors about their experiences. One sociology program at Atmajaya University in Yogyakarta, for example, focuses on marginalized community members by asking them to talk to students about their views. In November 2007, Syarikat facilitated several victims of the violence of 1965 to meet 80. Ambarmirah 2007, 7. 81. Nusantara, Wulandri, and Ambarmirah 2006, 7. 82. Author interviews with Sudjinah and Lestari, Depok, 21 February 2007; Putmainah, Blitar, 1 March 2008. See also McGregor and Hearman 2007, 379–80. 83. Author interview with Ira Febrianti, Yogyakarta, 21 May 2007. 210 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 18] === students in this program. By sharing their experiences the victims gave the students perspectives on history that they had never heard before.84 Syarikat also publishes the stories of former political prisoners in the Syarikat magazine RUAS. RUAS is a bimonthly magazine, which commenced in September 2001. The print run for RUAS is usually around fifteen hundred; it is read primarily by people in Java, the heartland of the NU. Copies are also sent to NU Islamic boarding schools, survivors and survivor organizations and libraries, and to members of the parliament as The cover of a 2006 edition of RUAS focusing on artists, part of a lobbying exercise writers, and performers who had been imprisoned. to garner support for the rehabilitation of former political prisoners. Each edition of the magazine includes stories of survivors from 1965, mostly those who were imprisoned for some time. RUAS has profiled the stories of many from Gerwani, the People’s Youth, the Indonesian Peasants’ Front and also members of various leftist organizations such as teacher and trade unions and student organizations, whose members were accused by default of involvement in the coup attempt because of their organizational links to the PKI. The reliance on accounts in the form of live testimonies and published interviews in RUAS approximates the globalized practice and discourse of truth telling prevalent in truth commissions that focus on allowing victims to tell their stories and formally acknowledging the crimes committed against them. This focus, however, raises questions about the compatibility between truth telling and reconciliation in the sense of bringing members of a community together. David Mendeloff challenges the popular and scholarly view that truth telling and truth seeking are necessary determinants for peace building. We know very little about the relationship between truth telling or truth seeking on peace, he points out, and he argues, therefore, that all assumptions about the links between truth telling and social healing, the promotion of justice, the establishment of an official historical record, public education, institutional reform, de- 84. Saiful 2007, 12. McGregor / Confronting the Past 211 === [PDF page 19] === A colossal diorama depicting the alleged torture of a general during the 1965 coup attempt. The diorama is located at the Sacred Pancasila Monument complex. (Image reprinted from Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI. Buku Panduan Monumen Pancasila Sakti Lubang Buaya. Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1997. 36) mocracy and the preemption and deterrence of future violence need to be examined carefully.85 In some countries, such as South Africa, truth commissions have been promoted because of an assumed link between telling the truth and “national healing.”86 Syarikat’s history projects are less formal than such national truth commissions and they are not premised on the idea of truth telling as a form of healing. Instead Syarikat has prioritized historical revision because of the perceived need to rebut dominant views of history that hinder the acceptance of former political prisoners in society.87 Wajidi also explains that Syarikat investigates the past for the purposes of “freeing people from it, rather than for academic reasons. They want to conduct oral history for a practical purpose. They want to break down stereotypes on both sides of this conflict.”88 The stereotypes to which Wajidi refers have arisen due to widespread circulation of the New Order version of the coup attempt that describes members of the PKI, the People’s Youth, and Gerwani as not only having murdered the army leadership but also having mutilated their bodies. This version, which is not supported by forensic evidence, is reflected in the state memorialization of these events and can be seen in the life-size diorama at the Sacred Pancasila Monument (see photo above), in the adjacent museum, in reports of the annual commemorative day of 1 October, in the state-produced film The Betrayal of the 30 September Movement/PKI, and in school history textbooks.89 This narrative of the coup attempt, combined with bans on former political prisoners and their children from working in the civil service as teachers and journalists and restrictions on their movement has enduringly stigmatized members of the Left. Annual screening of the film The Betrayal of the 30 September Movement/PKI ceased in 1998, but the 1 October date continues to be commemorated. The government’s attempted revision of portrayals of 1965 in history textbooks came to a dramatic halt when the Attorney General’s Office banned the revised textbooks because they failed to name the PKI as being responsible for the 1965 85. Mendeloff 2004, 358–63. 86. Wilson 2001, 14. 87. Author interview with Rumekso Setiyadi, Yogyakarta, 21 May 2007. 88. Wajidi 2003, 71. 89. McGregor 2007, 68–104. 90. Pelajaran sejarah kembali ke kurikulum 1994 [History teaching returns to the 1994 curricula], Republika, 24 June 2005. 212 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 20] === 90 coup attempt. In this climate, Syarikat has decided to focus on the long-neglected stories of survivors because they realize that these versions of history are still marginalized. Syarikat’s goal is to challenge the propaganda that portrays all leftists as barbaric and untrustworthy. Syarikat has also sponsored three films dealing with the violence of 1965. Sinengker: Satu yang Dirahasiakan (That which was concealed) is a Javaneselanguage, dramatized fictional account of one family’s experiences of the violence of 1965. The film focuses on one young woman, Asih, who lives in a village and whose brother’s association with leftist cultural politics results in his disappearance. Asih loses the rest of her family one by one and goes on to live a tormented life. Despite a willing suitor, she never marries because of her grief and her unwillingness to trust anyone. The two other films are documentary-style films focusing on women and their experiences. The first film, directed by Rumekso Setyadi, Gift for Mother (2006), focuses on women’s stories through interviews. The second documentary, White and Grey: Women’s Pasts (2007), consists of six short films made by high schools students from Bandung and Yogyakarta.91 Two common patterns in the accounts from former political prisoners in RUAS and in these films are an emphasis on the suffering of survivors and a lack of historicization of the wider political landscape of the 1960s. The interviews with former political prisoners in RUAS are very short and focus on the lives of victims just before they were captured, while they were in prison, or after their release. In some cases, like that of land reform, some attempt is made to explain what happened before 1965,92 but in most cases little context is provided. RUAS provides no broader discussion of the role of the Left in the 1960s or, for example, of land reform initiatives or other efforts to mediate class differences. Syarikat emphasizes the suffering of the survivors and hence their experiences after being arrested in order to humanize these individuals in the eyes of what they hope is a wide readership across the NU. Yet focusing solely on imprisonment obfuscates any sense of agency on the part of survivors. The absence of historical context in Sinengker leaves it unclear, for example, who the violence targeted and why. The film, for instance, offers only vague allusions to the associations of the main protagonist’s brother with the PKI: one clip shows him handing Asih a sickle made out of coconut leaves. Many women in the documentaries Gift for Mother and White and Grey: Women’s Pasts acknowledge that they were members of Gerwani, but the films do not discuss Gerwani’s ideology or activities. Why is this? It may be that Syarikat avoids descriptions of the events so audiences can decide for themselves, but more likely this was a calculated decision based on the contemporary political climate and the lack of any formal measures to recognize or address this violence. In the ten years since the end of the Suharto regime, some state-level initiatives have addressed selective cases of past human rights abuses, including the 91. Author interview with Rumekso Setiyadi, Syarikat, Yogyakarta, 21 May 2007. 92. See for example, Syamsir 2003, 8–9. McGregor / Confronting the Past 213 === [PDF page 21] === commissioning of fact-finding teams in the case of the May 1998 riots and limited National Commission on Human Rights investigations into the political imprisonment at Buru Island of those with suspected links to the PKI and into the cases of East Timor, Aceh, and the deaths of Muslim protesters in the Tanjung 93 Priok incident in 1984. In addition, the Indonesian parliament passed a law on human rights in 1999 and a law on human rights courts in 2001. Both laws paved the way for Ad Hoc Human Rights Courts to deal with both Tanjung Priok and the 1999 atrocities in East Timor.94 In 2004 the parliament passed a law enabling the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began to consider a list of potential commissioners. The commission was abandoned in 2006, however, after the Constitutional Court declared the TRC law to be unconstitutional. The Court was responding to objections human rights groups had raised against proposed amnesty provisions that would have allowed impunity for those who confessed crimes.95 Particular cases of human rights abuses in Indonesia have shown more traction than others. Some progress was made in the East Timor case, largely in response to external pressure, and in the Tanjung Priok case, due to the lobbying power of Islamic parties in the post-Suharto period. In the case of the 1965 killings, there are no equivalent powerful or significant lobby groups either inside or outside Indonesia pushing for justice on this case. In addition the case has less traction because there is no shared consensus that the New Order, especially in its origins, was a shameful period in Indonesian history. Each time NGOs or surviving victims have attempted to open this past to public scrutiny or stake claims for justice, protests, instances of direct intimidation, and violence have followed. Although human rights are now receiving more attention and some investigations of human rights abuses have been launched, the continuing influence of the Indonesian military, despite its formal withdrawal from politics, and the limited capacity of Indonesian courts to uphold the rule of law have stifled significant progress, perpetuating a continuing culture of impunity for human rights violators. The failure of the state to recognize this violence in a formal manner and the deeply rooted culture of impunity in Indonesia encourages NGOs to represent survivors of violence in a one-dimensional fashion or primarily as victims. In the case of Argentina, as Inés Izaguierre has shown, even after the Commission on Disappeared People was established and subsequent military trials by the Alfonsín government took place in 1985, human rights organizations continued their efforts to represent those who had suffered under the previous regime as victims, in the face of ongoing military efforts to claim impunity. She notes that it 93. For a discussion of the National Human Rights Commission and tribunals between 1998 and 2001, see Eldridge 2002, 145–49. 94. Sulistiyanto 2007, 80–83. 95. A second request for review was filed by interest groups who stood to lose from investigations into past human rights abuses, but this request was denied. These interest groups did lobby the court heavily to cast out the TRC law, hence ending any immediate prospects for the formation of a TRC. 214 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 22] === was only after the military confessions of 1994–95 — in which the military admitted to the atrocities — that family members started to portray their disappeared relatives as social and political activists instead of categorizing them in 96 singular fashion as “victim.” Syarikat’s position on this issue is thus connected to the wider political context of debates about 1965 and a strategy of first achieving societal acknowledgment of the suffering of those on the Left in 1965–66. Syarikat may also be less comfortable about exposing this past because their primary motivation is to show compassion for these long-marginalized people rather than necessarily sharing the political ideas of the survivors. Their aim is not to recover the diverse lives of those who suffered or to emphasize their involvement in social change efforts. Oglesby has observed a similar pattern in Guatemala in the circulation of narratives about the genocide against Mayans in the early 1980s, in the wake of the 1999 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification.97 Although the Guatemalan Commission detailed cases of social activism by Mayan labor activists and by land reform activists who were subsequently targeted in the violence, Oglesby noted that liberal human rights discourse tended to frame the violence in an individualized fashion. She attributed this bias to the agendas of international funding agencies, which are more concerned about peace and stability than reviving histories of past political activism.98 Similarly focused on the goal of peace, Syarikat tries to avoid commenting on the past political goals of organizations such as Gerwani, the Indonesian Peasants’ Front, or the People’s Youth. Elizabeth Jelin extends this argument concerning the representation of victims further by arguing that there is a fundamental clash between the language of human rights and the project of history writing. In her view, a human rights framework “demands a polarity” between victim and perpetrator and as a result a victim is depicted only as “a passive being harmed by the actions of others. The victim is never an active agent.”99 She attributes the decontextualization of historical memory in postauthoritarian regimes in Latin America to the concurrent rise of discourses of human rights. Syarikat’s tendency towards historical decontextualization is similarly driven by the original influence of discourses of human rights on these young activists. Because they are primarily motivated to rehabilitate former political prisoners and make peace they prioritize the identification of these people as victims, ahead of conveying historical complexity. Responses to Syarikat and Efforts to Reexamine 1965 Syarikat has tried to canvass broader support for their work and they have also featured interviews in RUAS with influential Indonesians about 1965 and how it should be addressed. In their interviews three prominent Muslim women’s rights activists — Kamala Chandrakirana (head of the Women’s Rights Commission), Haji Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid (wife of Abdurrahman Wahid), 96. Izaguierre 1998, 28–31. 97. Oglesby 2007. 98. Ibid., 77–81, 90–92. 99. Jelin 2003, 54–55, as quoted in Olgesby, 2007, 80. McGregor / Confronting the Past 215 === [PDF page 23] === and Nursyahbani Katjasungkama (lawyer) — expressed strong sympathy for victims of the violence, especially members of Gerwani and other women who suf- 100 fered. In their comments they also expressed support for Syarikat’s work, especially its efforts to challenge New Order historiography and the stigmas this history had created towards survivors of the violence. The views expressed in RUAS by two male NU leaders are no doubt indicative of wider views of Syarikat within the NU. Writing in RUAS in 2003 as a member of NU’s National Religious Council (Syuriah), Kiai Masdar F. Mas’udi commends Syarikat for its work, but notes it will not easily be accepted by the mainstream of the NU.101 He also tries to justify the NU’s involvement in the violence of 1965 based on the violence carried out by Pesindo troops against Islamic leaders following the Madiun Affair of 1948. He claims that from the NU’s perspective “1948 will be raised because they say there were many victims from the Islamic side. 1948 could be seen as the cause of 1965, so it is not fair to just accuse the 102 NU of being involved in 1965.” He acknowledges the scale of 1948 was more limited (several villages were targeted versus half a million killed in 1965), but claims it will always be brought up alongside the topic of 1965: “People often say they had already killed us [in 1948]. So it is not surprising in 1965 people said it was a matter of kill or be killed.”103 Said Aqiel, who is more sympathetic to Syarikat, makes the same paral- 104 lel with 1948. Both men are correct in stating that 1948 is a common reference point amongst members of the NU who defend the violence of 1965, but the frequently touted idea that in 1965 people acted only because it was a case of “kill or be killed,” or out of fears of a repeat of Madiun must be seriously examined. As the documents and literature surveyed above show, support for the violence from within the NU was systematic and organized. Some NU members I have interviewed adopt the more comfortable narrative that “we were all victims,” arguing that members of the NU were completely manipulated by the military. This is also true for members of the Syarikat network. At the first Yogyakarta Ansor “goodwill gathering” in 2002 on the 1965 killings and imprisonments, an understanding emerged between victims and older members of the NU “that the two sides had been made into enemies for the purposes of those in power.”105 Even after researching the NU’s role in the violence members of Syarikat continued to argue that the violence of 1965 was vertical and not horizontal in origin, concluding that therefore the violence was state di- 106 rected. This is of course a more palatable narrative for members of the NU. Again Syarikat seems to have been influenced by the primary goal of bringing 100. Katjasungkana 2004, 4–6; Chandrakirana 2004, 3–6; Sinta Nuriyah 2004, 3–6. 101. Masdar was once hailed as a leading reformer in the NU. From this perspective his comments in RUAS are disappointing. See van Bruinessen 1994, 221–22. 102. Masdar 2003, 5. 103. Ibid. 104. Said 2003, 6. 105. This is according to Masrukin, from Lakpesdam NU in Blitar. Masrukin 2007, 14. 106. Author interview with Rumekso Setyadi, Yogyakarta, 25 May 2005. 216 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 24] === people together rather than fully interrogating the role of the NU in this violence. It is critical to understand the military’s role in directing the violence of 1965–66 and to recognize cases of coercion, but suggesting that both those who killed and were killed were “all victims” again obscures historical reality. Unlike members of the Left, members of the NU were not the subject of mass purges; they and their families were not terrorized — whether during the period of violence, while in prison, or throughout most of the New Order regime. They did not have their property destroyed or taken, and most did not lose members of their family, unless they were members of the Left. They have not had their rights restricted for the last four decades. Hasyim Muzadi, the current general chairman of the NU, was born in Tuban East Java in 1949 and was sixteen years old at the time of the coup attempt. Muzadi declined to talk at length about the violence of 1965 and tried to deflect attention from the killings, pointing to many other cases worldwide of mass violence including white Australian violence against indigenous Australians: a deliberate reference to my own background as a white Australian.107 In our inter- 108 view he also claimed that the PKI had been “planning a genocide.” This speaks to another idea circulated frequently in NU circles, namely, that communists had dug holes in many places as mass graves in preparation for further killings after the 1965 coup attempt.109 When pressed Muzadi said he supported cultural reconciliation, which he interprets to mean informal reconciliation and he also stated that the full rights of former political prisoners should be restored and that the children of victims should not suffer discrimination, but he seemed to be wary of Syarikat as an organization stating that “their aims were not clear.”110 The meaning of this last statement is made clearer by the more candid comments Muzadi made in his opening speech to participants in an internal NU 2004 dialogue concerning “victims of the PKI.” Here Muzadi openly addressed the revival and rehabilitation of “the extreme left wing” during the reform era. He expressed concerns about organizations “right down to the village level” agitating to investigate the past, arguing that this would only reopen old wounds.111 His reference, presumably, was to victim groups such as YPKP 1965/1966 (Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/1966, The Foundation for the Research into Victims of the 1965–66 Killings) that are researching the past and demanding various forms of redress. Syarikat has fostered links with these organizations. In more closed discussions such as this internal NU dialogue Muzadi has thus expressed fears of former political prisoners gaining too much 107. Author interview with Hasyim Muzadi, PBNU, Jakarta, 19 May 2007. An interesting parallel between the two cases of the NU and white Australians is that both groups are as Morris-Suzuki (2005) argues in the case of Australia “implicated” in past violence in the sense that both groups and their descendants benefited, and continue to benefit, from the violence indirectly. 108. Author interview with Hasyim Muzadi, PBNU, Jakarta, 19 May 2007. 109. Author interview with Abdullah Faqih, Tuban, 27 February 2008. 110. Author interview with Hasyim Muzadi, PBNU, Jakarta, 19 May 2007. 111. Dialog Ulama NU Dengan Keluarga Korban PKI 48 di Madiun and 65 di Jakarta 2004. McGregor / Confronting the Past 217 === [PDF page 25] === influence. Underlying this concern is possibly a deeper worry about members of the NU being prosecuted for their roles in 1965. In 2006 one of the most prominent anticommunists in the NU, Yusuf Hasyim, who was a key leader in Ansor in 1965,112 invited members of Syarikat to a seminar at Tebuireng pesantren to discuss the 2004 law that established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. When they arrived they were made to listen to arguments about why a commission was unneces- 113 sary. In 2007, the year after the Constitutional Court rejected the Truth and Reconciliation Com- The front cover of the May 2007 East Java regional NU magazine AULA, reading “Beware of the PKI.” mission, Syarikat faced more direct and open criticism no doubt in an attempt to end further exploration of the NU’s role in the events of 1965–66. In 2007, for example, the East Java NU magazine AULA devoted most of its May edition to warnings about the revival of the PKI (see cover above). The magazine included attacks on both Abdurrahman Wahid and on organizations viewed as products of his liberalism, implying a link between liberal Islam and a communist revival.114 AULA’s editor, Abdul Wahid Asa, is deputy head of the NU in East Java and a member of Commission C in the regional East Java parliament. In the May issue he recounted his experience of the aggressiveness of the PKI in the land seizures of 1964, recalling how in these situations Ansor naturally defended the hajji (those who had made the pilgrimage, a mark of being a santri) and how NU later crushed the PKI. Writing more than forty years after the events of 1965, Asa observed that NU youth who had never witnessed these events blame their parents and defend the PKI. Their excuse is for the sake of human rights. These kids are just the victims arising from the failure to 112. Hasyim 2005. 113. Email communication with Rumekso Setyadi, Syarikat, Yogyakarta, 2 May 2007. 114. AULA: Majalah NU, May 2007, 28. 218 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 26] === absorb the meaning of birrul-walidin [Arabic for being loyal to one’s parents] and fell for the propaganda of the communists for the sake of a few bank notes and pretending to defend 115 human rights. Senior NU member Abdul Muchith Muzadi echoes this direct slight at young members of the NU involved with Syarikat, saying he cannot understand the attitude of the young “because Islam — particularly the NU — was the PKI’s foremost enemy 116 in the 1960s.” For individuals like Asa and Muzadi, Syarikat represents a betrayal of the NU elders. Responses such as these demonstrate the An article in the May 2007 edition of AULA entitled “NU hardened attitudes of Cadre Infiltrated.” Covers of Syarikat’s RUAS magazine are presented as evidence. some within the NU to former members of the Left and indicate an unwillingness to let go of their grievances against leftists. There is a strong perception amongst some in the NU that there is only one valid interpretation of the early to mid 1960s in Indonesia. According to this version of events, members of the NU acted only to protect themselves and the Islamic faith in the face of an aggressive PKI and based on their experiences of 1948. They committed no crimes and if anything they were victims of the communists. On this basis they perceive activists within Syarikat to be betraying their roots. This critique is inseparable from a broader critique of liberal Islam that has intensified in the last decade both within and outside the NU. Since the fall of Suharto, Islamists such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahadeen Council) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council), who have been able to express their views more freely in the new democratic era, have criticized liberal Islam, charging that it is a West- 115. Abdul 2007, 9. 116. Subhan 2007, 22. 117. Al Qurtuby 2004, 250–52. McGregor / Confronting the Past 219 === [PDF page 27] === 117 ernized or secularized version of Islam. In 2002, for example, Ulil Abshar Abdallla, the head of the Islamic Liberal Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL) and one of the founders of Lakpesdam NU, wrote an article in Indonesia’s leading newspaper Kompas suggesting that there is no “Law of God,” only general universal principles. This statement contradicts the strongly held belief in shariah, or a set of Islamic laws, that Islamists have increasingly emphasized in recent years. His article resulted in calls for a death fatwa against Ulil.118 Critiques of liberal Islam have also gained ground within the NU and are linked to the internal politics of the NU. In 2003 the NU hosted a conference on Islamic thinking in which some religious scholars attacked liberal Islam on the basis it had already crossed the limits of fittingness by rejecting the views of classical ulama. In arguments similar to those of Islamists, these scholars recommended that liberal Islamic ideas amongst young NU should be halted so that 119 they would not disturb the stability of Islam. The criticisms of liberal Islam expressed in this conference are inseparable from critiques of Abdurrahman Wahid because of his central role in driving reformist thinking within the NU, but they also relate to a wider rejection of Wahid’s influence following his impeachment as president in 2001. Growing critiques of liberal Islam within the NU are indicative of a broader trend identified by Fealy of the abandonment of the reform agenda.120 As I have demonstrated above Syarikat was a product of this reform agenda and the new thinking that this produced and for this reason it is vulnerable. Conclusions The Syarikat network of activists shows that some within the NU continue to support reform and want to help marginalized members of society. Although Syarikat was founded partly in reaction to the negative stigma attached to Ansor, members of the Syarikat network continue to advocate for victims eight years after the founding of Syarikat, indicating they are genuinely concerned about the plight of survivors. Given the limited means of many survivors Syarikat strives to address the economic needs of survivors by establishing cooperatives. Through their history projects and publications Syarikat members have focused on achieving societal acknowledgment of the suffering of those affected by the violence of 1965–66. Due to a broader ambiguity about this past, the particular demands of a human rights discourse and Syarikat’s primary goal of bringing together these people and members of the NU it has, however, carefully avoided direct discussion of the political lives of those affected by the violence and chosen the more comfortable narrative that both the NU and members of the Left were victims in the violence of 1965–66. In his research on Syarikat, completed in 2002, Budiawan argued that despite continuing contestation over which parts of the past should be empha- 118. Fealy 2006. 119. Al Qurtuby 2004, 250. 120. Fealy 2007, 156. 121. Purwadi 2003, 252–54. 220 Critical Asian Studies 41:2 (2009) === [PDF page 28] === sized, Syarikat’s work had the potential to shatter deeply entrenched anticom- 121 munism in Indonesia. This may hold true for the younger generations in Indonesia who Syarikat and survivors jointly report show the most interest in their work and stories. The younger generation have not invested in a mono-focused version of 1965, but there are still those who wish to keep anticommunism alive and to continue to marginalize survivors of 1965 because of the potential ramifications of admitting to involvement in human rights abuses. The responses to Syarikat provide further insight into the effects of “truth telling” and the complex process of promoting new versions of the past. They also confirm the assertions of Mendeloff that opening the past does not lead in any straightforward fashion to “national healing” or reconciliation, particularly when revising versions of the past has implications for long-standing claims for legitimacy. Ironically in the new democratic era of post-Suharto Indonesia —with human rights issues being given greater attention — Syarikat has encountered opposition because of the links between this organization and liberal Islam. In the broader picture of human rights advocacy, the case of Syarikat highlights a new challenge that NGOs face, the growing influence of Islamists and an increasing tendency to police the limits of acceptable Islam. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This research is part of a larger research project entitled Islam and the Politics of Memory in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, supported under the Australian Research Council’s Discovery (Project Number DPO772760). 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