Dossier of the Indonesian Drama (New Left Review 36)

=== [PDF page 1] === Dossier of the Indonesian Drama Rey, Lucien New Left Review; Mar 1, 1966; 0, 36; ProQuest pg. 26 Lucien Rey Dossier of the Indonesian Drama For all but six months the world has awaited news of the fall of President Sukarno, his position gravely threatened by the ascendancy of the army anc the attempted physical obliteration of the Communist Party. Yet throughout this period Sukarno refused to surrender, deploying his persuasive diplomatic skills to baffle and brake the army commanders and permit once agair hopes of the impending re-entry of the Communist Party into civic life. He ever proved adroit enough to dismiss the Minister of Defence, Abdul Haris Nasution unquestionably the most powerful of the generals, at a time when the army wa loudly celebrating its grasp over power and massacre of its political opponents Certainly the story is not yet finished. The vacuums which have been forme: may be filled by still unsuspected forces; new contradictions may crystallize new relations between fire-power and diplomacy emerge. But the time ha already come when it is possible to look back on the events which triggered 0 the political oscillations of the last six months with some degree of detachmen: the first shock past. 26 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LIC. Alll rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Lid === [PDF page 2] === The mainspring of the forces which briefly seized power in Djakarta on October 1 last year were dissident officers and troops from the Seventh (Diponegoro) Division of the Indonesian Army, stationed normally in Central Java. A group of junior officers from this Central Java Division had apparently become disenchanted with the conduct of the top army command. They accused them of corruption, falling into decadent and luxurious habits and, most seriously, dragging their heels over Confrontation with Malaysia. They also suspected undue American influence. Accordingly they determined to rid the nation and the Revolution of these parasites. The junior officers concerned were not necessarily left-wing; some of them appear to have definite anticommunist records. They were however highly conscious of what they considered the proper duty of the army and its role in the Indonesian Revolution. They bore some resemblance to the Young Officers in Japan or, say, their counterparts in Turkey today. However, it is one thing to sit and plot in Semarang or Jogjakarta, another to be in a real position to act. But opportunity presented itself. One of the junior officers, Lt. Col. Untung, was transferred to the Presidential Guard (Tjakrabirawa Regiment) in Djakarta, as a Battalion Commander. More than that. He was put in charge of arranging a historical pageant for the marchpast on Army Day. This was crucial; it enabled the plotters to move battalions sympathetic to their aims into the capital for the parade. They now had troops available on the spot, not hours away in Central Java. The plotters set about perfecting their plan. In particular, they won to their side the Commander of the Guard at the Halim Airbase, just outside Djakarta, Flight Major Sujono. Control over the Halim Base would give them both a secure operations centre and a means of keeping contact with Central Java. They also involved a Brigade Commander from the local Fifth Division of the Army, Colonel Latief. Finally they made preparations to use armed auxiliaries being trained at the Halim Airbase as part of the projected Fifth Armed Force. These auxiliaries were mostly volunteers from the Communist People’s Youth; the Fifth Armed Force, inaugurated about three months previously, was designed in effect to give the px1 (Indonesian Communist Party) a military presence. In the event, this unauthorized involvement in the affair was to cost the PKI dear. The plot was put into action in the early hours of October 1. The first stage had three parts. First, action was undertaken to seize seven top army generals at their villas and bring them to Halim Base. These generals were named as members of the clandestine Generals’ Council, which had been prepared to take over the State in the event of Sukarno’s death or, indeed, should any other favourable opportunity suggest itself. There are strong signs of the existence of at least a close clique; the exclusion of the kosrraD Army HQ Commander, General Suharto, from the list of seven was due to the fact that such a clique did exist but he was not a member of it. His omission was to prove disastrous to the plotters; it is hard otherwise to imagine why he was overlooked. Those to be arrested included almost every other top staff officer, including the chiefs of intelligence, finance and political activity. Second, key installations in the city centre were to be seized: 27 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 3] === the Presidential Palace, the Radio Station, the Telephone Exchange crucial road intersections. (For some reason, the KOsTRAD Supremi Army HQ was neglected). Thirdly, various other personalities, includ ing Sukarno himself, were to be brought to Halim. The Coup Moves into Action At about 3.15 a.m. seven armed groups, ranging in size from roughly twenty to a hundred men, left the Halim Base for Djakarta. They proceeded to the villas of the seven generals and, in all cases, succeeded swiftly in overpowering the guards. After that, however, they met with uneven success. Three of the generals were killed during the raids. General Yani, Minister-Commander of the Army, lost his temper when refused permission to bathe and change out of his pyjamas. He stormed back into his bedroom and was shot down through the glass door. General Harjono heard the intruders coming, switched off all the lights and tried to overpower the first man to come through the bedroom door. He was shot. General Pandjaitan lived in a two-storey house} unlike the others. After a great deal of shouting up and down the stairs he eventually agreed to come down when his family was threatened. Besides his sten-gun had jammed. However, he put up more resistance in the front yard and was shot. Three more generals were successfully bundled into trucks and taken off to Halim. General Suprapto had recently had some teeth out; he was unable to sleep and, hearing dogs bark, went down to the front door, where he was seized. General Parman thought the next-door house was being burgled and went down into the garden to investigate. He was seized in the front yard. General Sutojo was arrested in his bedroom and blindfolded before being taken to the waiting truck. These arrests were completed shortly after four o’clock. But by far the most important general, Abdul Haris Nasution, the Minister of Defence, managed to escape. The intruders successfully disarmed his look-outs and quite extensive guard, as well as the guard of his neighbour, Dr. Leimena, the Second Deputy Prime Minister. They then entered the house. General Nasution’s wife, hearing the noise of doors opening and shutting, went to see what was happening. When she opened the bedroom door she saw a soldier standing there with a gun. She slammed the door shut and told Nasution. He insisted on looking for himself and nearly got shot. The soldiers outside started to try and break the door down. While they were doing this, Nasution’s sister appeared with his daughter and asked to go into the room herself. When the door was opened, the soldiers opened fire again; the young daughter was fatally wounded. Meanwhile Nasution had made his getaway and managed to scramble over the garden wall into the next-doo! Iraqi Embassy. He was shot at as he got over the wall and fell down the other side, breaking his ankle. He then lay still, in the Iraqi Embass} garden, for about three hours until the coast seemed well clear. Th« intruders had lost Nasution. However, they did seize his Adjutant, Lt | Tendean, who looked vaguely like Nasution in the dark. He was dis armed, thrust into a truck and driven off to Halim. The second part of the plan was achieved without incident. By the tim 28 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 4] === the three still live generals and Lt. Tendean arrived back at Halim, the crucial installations of Djakarta were in the hands of the plotters. The third part also went well. Sukarno was at the house of his Japanese wife, Dewi. Untung went there, told the President that the top generals had launched a coup and asked him to come to Halim for the sake of his safety; the Air Force and the Presidential Guard had remained loyal. Sukarno agreed. The second personality asked to come to Halim was Omar Dhani, Commander of the Air Force. For some time Dhani had been at loggerheads with the Army; he himself was disliked by the top army staff and regarded as a creature of Sukarno’s; tension had got worse since the Air Force was supposed to be in charge of the North Kalimantan action, from which the Army was suspected of withholding its full co-operation and also since the Air Force had agreed to train and officer the Fifth Armed Force, seen as a direct pxi threat by the army staff. Dhani eventually agreed to go to Halim. As well as Dhani, Brig. Gen. Sabur, Commander of the Presidential Guard, was also fetched. The fourth personality seized was D. N. Aidit, Chairman of pki. Some mystery surrounds Aidit’s presence. It seems that the plotters must have calculated as follows: since our military support is, in fact, relatively thin—two paratroop battalions, elements from the Guard, elements from the Air Force, some armed auxiliaries—we need Sukarno’s backing. For this reason, he must be brought to Halim. Once he has agreed to back us, presumably over the radio, we shall need street demonstrations in support. We therefore need Aidit too. Moreover, it will also be as well to have him safely at Halim in order to paralyze the pxi until Sukarno has openly backed us. Otherwise we might be pre-empted by unplannedfor pki action. This explanation—obviously only a reconstruction— would explain the point of arresting Aidit, bringing him to Halim and then, as far as can be seen, holding him incommunicado, while at the same time being quite friendly towards him. Clearly, the plot was something of a gamble on the hope that Sukarno would back the plotters before the power vacuum in the army was filled in some other way. This was not a futile gamble. Sukarno came very close to playing along, close enough indeed to singe his wings. Later, Flight Major Sujono suggested that he was indeed implicated. However, two things went wrong. First, General Suharto swiftly seized command of the Army and acted with considerable competence. Second, Sukarno, casting around for a suitable new Army Commander —obviously Untung himself was out of the question—picked on General Pranoto instead of General Suharto. The Alarm is Given Suharto was wakened by neighbours at about half past five, told shots had been heard and a number of generals and other personalities appeared to have been abducted. Soon afterwards, a colleague came and confirmed the news. Suharto got in his jeep and drove himself to the KOSTRAD headquarters, arriving about 6.30. Having confirmed that Yani had been abducted he assumed command of the army and set about contacting fellow officers and representatives of the other armed services. General Umar, the Djakarta Territorial Commander, had already been alerted by Nasution’s family and had done some rather 29 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 5] === listless reconnoitring. He was able to tell Suharto that the Presidential Palace was under the control of troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Supardjo, Commander of the 4th Combat Command from Mandau, West Kalimantan. (Supardjo had flown in to Djakarta on receiving a goahead telegram saying that his daughter was gravely ill. However, he had not reported his arrival in Djakarta to anybody. It was now clear to Suh. arto that junior officers were acting illegally). Umar put himself under Suharto’s command. Suharto also got in touch with the First Deputy tc the Navy Commander and the Djakarta Police Commander. They agreed to keep their troops confined. Suharto next set about identifying the whereabouts of all the various army battalions supposed to be ir Djakarta. Most of them, he ascertained, had turned up as expected ai Senajan for a rehearsal for the army parade. However, parachute battalions 454 and 530, from Central and East Java respectively, wert missing. These also, judging from insignia, seemed to be the battalion: holding Merdeka Square, the Presidential Palace, etc. Suharto alsc ascertained that the Air Force was being evasive when he contacted them. He did not yet know however the whereabouts of the President, the status of the coup de force or the role being played by the Halim Base. At 7.00 a.m. the first Untung broadcast came on the air. (They had t: wait till 7.00 because it was only then that national broadcasting began) In this broadcast, the 30th of September Movement, under the com. mand of Lt. Col. Untung, was credited with saving the President from a Generals’ Council coup. In particular, generals were accused of the fact that they ‘lived in luxury, led a gay life, insulted our women an¢ wasted government funds’, as well as plotting to overthrow Sukarno However, the broadcast laid very little stress on Sukarno himsell Nobody hearing it would imagine that Sukarno had thrown himsel behind the 30th September Movement. Evidently he was playing fo time. His first priority was to re-establish contact with the outsid world; information at Halim, all sifted through Untung, was inade quate for making vital decisions. Accordingly, a number of messengers were sent out, summonin; advisers to confer with the President. Most of the top civil officials o the State were out of Djakarta at the time. Subandrio, accompanied b Njoto, one of the top pxr leaders, was in Sumatra. Charul Saleh an: Ali Sastroamidjojo, leaders of the Murba and Nationalist Parties, wer in Peking, Lukman and Sakirman, the other top pxr leaders, were i Semarang, Central Java, Abdulghani, the second leading Nationalis' was also out of town. But Sukarno did manage to get in touch wit Leimena, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, about mid-morning. H also managed to accumulate at Halim the Minister-Commander of th Navy, since dismissed by Sukarno, and the Minister-Commander the Police. It now began to look as if things might go the way the 30th Septembe Movement hoped. At 9.30 Omar Dhani signed a statement throwin, the Air Force behind the coup. Although this was not then released! was a strong card. Sukarno was beginning to feel his way towards diplomatic outcome. At 1.15 p.m. a broadcast went out announcin: that the President was in control of the situation, read by Sabur’ 30 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 6] === Deputy Commander of the Presidential Guard and signed by Sabur himself. About the same time, the President issued an order appointing General Pranoto Acting Commander of the Army, under the President and on a day-to-day basis. Pranoto was a former commander of the Central Java Division, whose term of command had been cut short by Nasution. He was now 3rd Assistant to Yani, with responsibility for personnel. All this pointed to a situation in which Sukarno would soon re-emerge, the 30th September Movement would be—presumably—rewarded and the leftward turn in Nasakom would be consolidated. However, Sukarno had not personally committed himself to anything. Suharto at the Kostrad HQ At about this time, possibly a little earlier, messengers from Sukarno had reached Suharto at the KosrrAD HQ. It seems likely they were forwarded there by Umar or were looking for Pranoto. Suharto was now able to sum up the situation. During the morning he had’ managed to subvert most of the 530th (East Java) Battalion, by sending former officers (mostly from the West Irian campaign) to talk to them. He felt confident he could do the same with the 45 4th battalion, given time. He now knew that the Halim Base was the centre of the 30th September Movement operations. This meant he would have to tread carefully as far as the Air Force was concerned; there was a possibility Djakarta would be bombed. But, on the whole, militarily speaking, he was in a position to be confident. Also he now probably knew that Nasution was alive, though hurt and in hiding. He must have suspected that the other six generals were all dead. At any rate, he refused to let Umar and Pranoto go to Halim, remarking later that ‘we had already lost quite enough of our generals’. Conversely, when the messengers returned, it became clear that the 30th September Movement, and—in other terms—Sukarno himself, were in a position to feel depressed and pessimistic. Sukarno’s interest was to disinvolve himself from Untung as swiftly as possible; perhaps he had already gone too far. Untung himself was clearly in desperate straits. At 2.00 he had issued another proclamation over the radio, announcing the formation of a Revolutionary Council, made up in an apparently random fashion of the names of top armed forces commanders, various political personalities, youth leaders, journalists, a university rector and so on, all mixed up promiscuously with some of the actual plotters. This proclamation, strangely, did not mention Sukarno at all. Perhaps this was because Sukarno had instructed them not to, as the price for possible future support; perhaps because they realized he was lost to them and tried instead to make a bid for as many other elements as they might possibly rally. Then at 3.30 they released Dhani’s morning statement of Air Force support: this appears something of a last throw. It was clear the crunch was coming. At 4.00 Sukarno sent for his children and had them flown to safety in Bandung. By 6.00 much of the 45 4th Parachute Battalion had followed the 530th into Suharto’s hands. The rest were withdrawing towards the Halim Base; some Communist Youth auxiliaries, wandering blindly into Merdeka Square, were rapidly mopped up. Also at about 31 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 7] === six, after an ultimatum. Suharto won control of the radio and the 30th September Movement went off the air. By 7.00 Suharto had all key installations in Djakarta under his control. About this time further messengers left Sukarno; their aim, in effect, was to find out what Suharto’s conditions were. He indicated that Sukarno must disassociate himself from Untung; in fact, he must leave the Halim Base. Accordingly Sukarno left Halim for his out-of-town palace at Bogor. Suharto asked a colleague to check Sukarno’s arrival. At 9.00 Suharto himself went on the air announcing his full control. Flames in Central Java At the Halim Base, things must have looked gloomy indeed. However, there was still some hope for the 30th September Movement. Following the 7.00 a.m. broadcast, a number of their colleagues, including Col. Suherman, head of army intelligence in the division and probably the brains of the coup, had seized control in the principal cities of Central Java. By evening Semarang, Jogjakarta and Surakarta were all in the hands of junior officers, associated with the 30th September Movement. (There had been one blunder: the Division Commander, General Surjosumpeno, had managed to get away and had reached the Military Academy at Magelang). Thestage was now set for the second, brief, eventually tragic act. At about midnight the President’s Jetstar flew into Halim Base. It contained the Air Force Second-in-Command, who had been with Subandrio in North Sumatra (Subandrio himself had sagely decided to stay put). More consultations took place. Soon afterwards two planes left Halim for Central Java, both Hercules transports. One, which landed at Semarang about 1.30, contained Untung. The other, which arrived at Jogjakarta at about 2.00, contained Omar Dhaniand D.N. Aidit. By dawn the Halim Base had fallen to Suharto. By this time, Untung and his associates were effectively finished. There was really no hope that Central Java could be held once Djakarta hac fallen. Untung was a good soldier — the first officer parachuted intc West Irian— but himself no politician. Faced with general falling morale. he went into hiding. Some days later he was arrested. Dhani, on the other hand, could still save himself. The essential thing was to brief the Air Force, bring back dissidents into line and ensure no provocation was given the army. Consequently, he flew from field to field, having talks, finally returning to the Semplak Airfield, near Bogor, at 4.00 that afternoon, immediately proceeding to the Palace to be with Sukarno. The PKI is compromised Aidit was in by far the most difficult position. How far was the PKI compromised? How far could it pull itself clear? In fact, as we now know, all was already lost. The px had already been fatally compromised in the following ways: 1. The involvement of People’s Youth auxiliaries in the abduction of the generals, the occupation of installations in Djakarta and—most serious of all—the killing of the three generals who had survived Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 8] === arrest. These three generals had been shot at a place called Crocodile Hole, within the perimeter of the Halim Base, a few hours after their arrival there. One of them and also Lt. Tendean, mistaken for Nasution, were beaten up with rifle butts. After execution they were thrown into a well to join the corpses of the other three generals previously killed. Involved in all this were auxiliaries, undergoing training at Halim Base, from both the Communist People’s Youth and the Communist Gerwani women’s movement. The executions were given a kind of ritual character by singing and mass firing at the dead bodies. There is no hard evidence however of disfigurements or other atrocities. The auxiliaries involved definitely appear to have not been acting under any kind of pxt instructions, but merely to have been obeying, in a blind way, the Air Force officers who were their military superiors at the Halim Base. 2. The involvement of People’s Youth elements in the rising in Jogjakarta, where they demonstrated against the Generals’ Council, covered the town with pro-30th September Movement placards, seized the radio and so on. Again, they do not seem to have been acting under any kind of px instructions. More serious, in some ways, was the support given the coup by the Communist mayor of Surakarta, Utomo Ramelan. This was a stupid political mistake. The px1 paid the price for backing a ‘popular’ man for mayor instead of a more politically trustworthy cadre. 3. An editorial, hedging violently but nonetheless indicating support for the coup, appeared in the main pK1 newspaper, Harian Rakjat, on October 2nd. It had gone to press the previous afternoon. More explicit was a cartoon published at the bottom of the front page, mentioning the 30th September Movement and associating the Generals’ Council with the cra. It is difficult to explain these blunders. It is possible of course that the paper was set up, awaiting the go-ahead from some responsible pxr leader, found on the presses in that state by the Army when they seized the works and finally printed deliberately by the Army, in order to discredit the px1. On the other hand, it was nota suitable editorial whichever way vou look at it: there is no point in hedging for 90% of an editorial if you let slip a parti pris in the other 10%. It is all the more strange since another PKI newspaper, Kebudajaan Baru, managed to confine itself to a short item in a box, reading: THE SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL The situation in the capital today remain calm. Life continues as usual. The streets remain crowded with traffic, offices continue work as usual. So also street vendors, shops, schools and so on. 4. Later, Njono, head of the pK1 in Djakarta, was to make—and withdraw —a confession to the Army, admitting px1 complicity in the coup. However, this confession does not bear examination. It is full of obvious flaws. People were said to have been at meetings they could not have attended; others who would have attended are omitted. No concrete actions are attributed to the px1; all depends on the coup being a masterplan in Aidit’s head. Of course, since the px1 did nothing whatever on the fateful day, it is difficult to invent a role for them. Stress is laid on the hapless volunteers at the Halim base who, as we have 33 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 9] === seen, did nothing but act blindly and confusedly throughout: certainly they did not behave like people playing a crucial role in a well-laid plot, backed by a two million strong Party. In fact they were pathetic dupes. 5. Aidit’s own presence at the Halim Base was compromising to some extent. However, the Army has not used it since: perhaps because they have not yet cooked up a satisfactory story; perhaps because it would be embarrassing as far as Sukarno was concerned and anyway would have to be squared with his version. Subsequently Aidit may have made a mistake in heading for Jogjakarta. He might have done better to stick like a burr to Sukarno. As it was, by the time Lukman and Njoto arrived at Bogor, the anti-pKI campaign was well under way. Aidit never made it back at all. However, Aidit immediately on his arrival set about trying to ensure that PKI members stayed at home, did nothing to provoke the Army and confined themselves to following the political path trodden by the President at Bogor. He got immediately in touch with Sujono Atmo, the young pro-pxr Acting Governor of Central Java, with Utomo Ramelan, pK1 mayor of Surakarta and with top pxr leaders Lukman and Sakirman, who were staying in Semarang. After talks, they got into Lukman’s ministerial car and drove round Central Java making efforts to put down any pxi demonstrations which had flared up. Aidit also tried to requisition a plane to fly to Bali, another pK1 stronghold, but by now opportunist officials were getting rather chary of him and he was unsuccessful. However, in his major endeavour he was indeed successful: there were no further pK1 manifestations in Central Java and the renewal of control by General Surjosumpeno was not resisted. On the 5th Lukman set off by car for Bogor. Aidit tried to get a plane, failed and set out by road. He was almost certainly arrested on his way back and shot. Undoubtedly it is unnerving that a party of the strength of the px can be so destroyed as a result of what seems a malign twist of fate. The main problem of course was that once Sukarno’s unquestionable authority had been blemished, there was no armed shield which the pk! could rely on. Evidently the Party was aware of its potential weakness; this lay behind plans to create the Fifth Armed Force. (Plans, of course, which backfired, as we have seen, in a quite disastrous way). Nevertheless, what is really astonishing is the lack of any contingency planning. What happened when Aidit was taken from his home by soldiers of the Presidential Guard in the middle of the night? Nothing. There seems to have been no contingency plan whereby, for instance, Njono—head of the Djakarta party—was informed and in a position to put prearranged instructions to effect while awaiting renewal of contact with Aidit or else Lukman or Njoto. The party press was left completely uncertain of what to do, no effort was made to find out what the People’s Youth were doing and re-establish a proper command chain, it seems that no contacts were made with the sonst trade union federation in case street demonstrations might be needed. The pn1 (Nationalist Party), in contrast, held two top-level meetings on October 1st, one at 10.30 a.m., the other at 6.00 p.m., presided over by Surachman. Again, Lukman and Sakirman—equally in the dark—heard the Untung broadcast while having breakfast in Semarang. They do not seem 34 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 10] === to have left the house all day. It is difficult to think that they had any idea of what they might do. They seem to have just waited for Aidit and then, later, concentrated on getting to Bogor for the October 6th Cabinet Meeting. This was particularly unfortunate since the PKI knew that it might any day have to act in an emergency: if for instance Sukarno died or if Nasution launched a coup. In its ignorance and baffiement, it seems to have been mesmerized and paralyzed. The anti-PKI Massacres Begin The outcome proved to be disastrous. The Army swiftly inaugurated an anti-PKI campaign in Djakarta; Nasution was the main man behind this. The crucial events were the discovery of the six generals’ bodies and the death of Nasution’s daughter. These were used to start an immense propaganda campaign against the pKI, magnifying every small detail of its association with the 30th September Movement and pinning all kinds of horror stories on it. Armed mobs were encouraged to take advantage of this anti-pk1 climate. Pogroms began. In Central Java the anti-PkI campaign took longer to get off the ground. Surjosumpeno had re-established control of Central Java by October 6th, using the same methods as Suharto had: splitting the opposition by cajolery and ultimatums. Both he and Sujono Atmo issued appeals for calm and a return to normality. It seemed that the counter-coup had been completed without bloodshed. However, almost a fortnight later, on October 19th, an Army Victory Parade in Semarang, and the coincidental discovery of two army officers’ bodies, were the signal for a wave of repression to start in Central Java. The tide of massacre eventually spread throughout Indonesia. Reliable estimates suggest that as many as half a million pk1 members and sympathizers have been slaughtered. The Army stands triumphant above this swamp of blood and death. Practically the whole of the top leadership of the pki has been killed. The only Politburo member to escape was Adjitorop, who was in Peking for health reasons. Aidit was shot probably in the last week of October; his execution was never announced, presumably in order to prevent him from becoming a martyr figure. Lukman and Njoto managed to hold on longer, having taken refuge in the Presidential Palace at Bogor. They were removed on November 30 and shot about two days later, in the square of the Naval Academy. But the slaughter did not stop with the Central Committee, it went all the way down. In Bali reliable estimates put the figure killed at 150,000. Whole Balinese villages have been depopulated. After Bali, the scene of the worst massacres has been in East Java and North Sumatra. The technique has been for the army to enter a village, force the headman to give names of all pxr members and sympathizers, round them up and then let the extremist right-wing muslim and Christian mobs know when they are to be released. As they come out of jail they are chopped up with billhooks and machetes. The number killed far exceeds the casualties in the Vietnam-war. The scale has been even greater than the French massacres in Madagascar or the Baath rafissage in Baghdad. These massacres have struck down totally unarmed people: men, women and children. They have not followed blindly in the aftermath of riots. They have been properly planned, organized and executed. 35 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 11] === It is difficult to see what the future of Indonesia will be. Sukarno was left, despite all, still in a position to manoeuvre, though his former great charisma and freedom of action was impaired. And the px1, of course, has experienced decimation before, at the time of the Madiun Affair in 1948. Meanwhile, the country has been plunged into economic chaos, blood-. shed and resentment. From such a cauldron, anything might bubble up. Perhaps the one thing that we can now be certain will not occur is the orderly and peaceful progression to power of the pki as Sukarno’s heir. Ina country such as Indonesia, where power is centralized in the capital, and where the popular forces, if they are not to confront the Army openly in civil war, must rely on intricate diplomatic manoeuvres, then it is always possible for a vital pivot to be suddenly and unexpectedly upset and the whole precarious system to be shattered. Then nothing remains except crude armed confrontation: in the case of Central Java at the outbreak of the repression, army tanks against the bamboo stakes of hopeless pxr villagers. It is easy to conjecture what might have happened if Aidit had not been almost alone in the capital and then held incommunicado or perhaps if Sukarno had named Suharto and not Pranoto as Acting Commander of the Army. But all we can really say is that the pK1 was wrecked by the sudden brusque emergence of forces into the political arena which had been brewing silently in the officers’ clubs of Semarang and Jogjakarta, forces it was unable to cope with because unable to predict. It is hopeless to suppose that the revolutionary forces will always have perfect vision. As consolation, we can only imagine what will be re-created and recrystallized from the ruins of the pxt in the opacity which remains. Document Also made available to New Left Review has been this verbatim transcript of the written question and answer exchange between Asahi Shimbun Djakarta correspondents Risuke Hayashi and Takebiko Tadokoro and Second Deputy Chairman Njoto of the Indonesian Communist Party, obtained shortly before he was shot. Question: Do you think the 30 September Movement is a counterrevolution to the Indonesian revolution, as the army charges? Njoto: If we talk about revolution and counter-revolution, there must first be an answer to the question: Revolution by whom and against whom? In Indonesia, one may say, people are all agreed that the issue is: Was Untung’s premise about’there being a ‘Council of Generals’ that wanted to carry out a coup d’état true? If there was not a ‘Council of Generals’ then Untung was wrong, or it may be said, counter-revolutionary. If there was a ‘Council of Generals’ then Untung was not wrong, or it may be said, revolutionary. 36 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 12] === Question: How about the foreign influence on the movement? Njoto: I don’t know anything about foreign influences on the 30 September Movement. As you gentlemen know, the pxK1 believes that it is an internal matter of the army. If vou ask was there any foreign influence on the 30 September Movement it means the same thing as asking, is there any foreign influence in the army. Question: What do you think about the activities of Nekolim, especially the activities of the American c1a before this movement? How about the connections between this movement and c14? Njoto: Nekolim activities, in particular the c1a of the United States, were there not only before, but also during and after the 30 September affair. It is not very easy to see CIA activities because, first of all, the c1a works in a subversive way; and second, because in Indonesia nowadays all persons state they are anti-cra. cra agents themselves shout they are anti-cra. Certainly, the cra is not like the ‘good fairy’ in children’s stories with the result that, while things are happening in Indonesia as today, they only sit doing nothing, idly looking on. It is certain there are connections between the cia and the prologue and epilogue of 30 September. I cannot yet say whether the c1a stood on that side or this side. Question: What do you think about the reports or announcements which relate the Communist Party with this movement and the murders of seven generals? Njoto: Concerning the connections between the pxt and the 30 September Movement and the murders of seven generals, the px1 leadership, as was the case with most others, knew nothing of either of these until after they happened. At that time, I, together with First Deputy Premier Dr. Subandrio and a number of army, navy, air force, and police generals, was on a journey in Sumatra for the State. We heard about the 30 September affair together when we were in Pangkalan Brandan, North Sumatra, and we were all shocked in the same way. Question: What do you think of President Sukarno’s announcement that the 30 September Movement was not just within the army, but also a problem of the nation? Njoto: President Sukarno on one side said that ‘there have taken place events in the army and in the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (Presidential Guard Regiment)’, and on the other side he said it is a ‘national question.’ The pki feels the same. If it is said that it is an internal matter of the army, this does not mean to say that it is not a national question. Or that it cannot become a national question. The px1 has never believed that. Neither President Sukarno’s opinion nor the pK1’s opinion which is the same are a contradiction in terms. Question. What do you think about the activities of the army or the religious parties urging that the Communist Party should be outlawed or prohibited? 37 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 13] === Njoto: I don’t think that the whole army and every religious party is urging the dissolution of the px1. This is not an ‘effort to (word indistinct)’ because I am only—to borrow an expression used by Gen. Ibrahim Adjie—stating facts. If the whole army was already anti-px1, then there would not be a necessity for ‘Koti instruction No. 22’ on the ‘cleaning-up.’ As you know, for almost two months, the left side of the frontpage up to the right side of the backpage has demanded the dissolution of the pK1. But President Sukarno has not dissolved the Px1. He has even retained the Nasakom theory. This is indeed the objective basis of the Indonesian revolution. As President Sukarno said: ‘It will not be an Indonesian revolution if there is no Nasakom.’ Question: What do you think of the suppression or arrests of communists by the army? Njoto: In Japan and also in South Korea, in Australia as well as in Indonesia, suppressions and arrests of communists are always part of an anti-democracy policy. Concerning Japan, what I mean is not the ‘anti- Comintern pact’ of former times, but during the time of MacArthur during the 1950’s. Regarding Indonesia, this is not just the first time the PKI has become the target of mass oppression and arrests. We experienced them during the Dutch colonial time in 1926, then in 1936, and we experienced them yet again under Hatta’s government, in 1948, and under Sukiman’s Masjumi government in 1951. Each time, we rose again, and became bigger than before because, as Bung Karno said, a revolutionary movement is an objective thing which cannot be ‘made’ by the revolutionaries, just as it cannot be curbed by the counterrevolutionaries; it will advance if not suppressed but it will also advance even if suppressed. Question: How about the anti-communist or anti-Chinese demonstrations of the right-wing who sometimes carried out burnings: Do you think some parts of the religious parties are right-wing? Njoto: Both anti-communism and anti-Chinese demonstrations are directly opposed to the republic’s State policy as stated in the Manipol. Regarding burnings of offices, houses, shops and so on—which are always done by the right-wing and never by the left-wing—President Sukarno announced that the ones doing such things can be shot. In the religious parties, there are right-wingers or groups that represent the policy or are related with former members of Masjumi or formerly of the p1-r11. But the mass members of those parties are ordinary peasants and workers, and the interests of these are the same as the interests of the mass members of the non-religious parties. Question: What do you think about disregard by the army, religious Parties, or right-wing organizations of such presidential orders as the prohibition of demonstrations? Njoto: Indeed, truly, the President’s commands—not only his commands concerning the ban of demonstrations—are being upset by the right-wing, civilian as well as military. But the majority of the masses support President Sukarno’s commands. These actions to upset the 38 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 14] === President’s commands are the reason why a ‘committee for safeguarding the President’s messages’ has been set up, organized by the ppmi— the Federation of the Students’ Mass Organizations of Indonesia. Question: Who are the real powers in Indonesia? Njoto: The Indonesian Constitution spells out that President Sukarno in addition to being Head of State is also Supreme Commander of the Abri and Prime Minister, too. The powers of President Sukarno, in combination with the forces of the people, shall determine Indonesia’s fate and future. Question: What do you think about the reshuffle of the Sukarno cabinet in the near future which the parties are now urging? Njoto: Sooner or later, a Nasakom cabinet will be established in Indonesia. This is the wish of the President Sukarno; it is the wish of people. If President Sukarno takes this way, not only the px but the whole of the people will welcome it with joy. Question: How about your party’s course in the countryside in the future? How does your party set up liberated areas in the countryside? Njoto: The line of the pxr in the villages is the same: support implementation of the uupa (land reform law) and uupsH (law concerning the dividing of crops), up till the time that the principle of ‘land for the tillers of the land’ and the principle of ‘peasants who work the land get land’ can be implemented. The pxr’s programme is to divide the land as the individual property of each peasant, which means that a bigger family gets more. In Indonesia there is only one kind of power, the power of the Republic of Indonesia, and there are not any sort of ‘liberated areas.’ Question: How can your party set up your own army? Lenin and Mao Tse-tung have maintained that the establishment of the army of the Communist Party is an indispensable condition of revolution. Njoto: The pxt always regards the Indonesian army as being not the same as armies in the imperialist countries or as in India now, seen both from the history of its formation as well as from the tasks of being against imperialism and feudalism, and also seen from the composition of its soldiers which mostly come from the peasant and worker classes. That there still exist in the national army anti-people’s elements is the same thing as the republic as a whole. This is the reason for the Manipol to talk about retooling the right elements from the State bodies. But there are times when people forget this line of the Manipol and carry out retooling of the left-wing. Question: How about the relations between your own army and the present professional army? Njoto: The pxt has never had its own army. This is why there is no connection in any way between this thing that never existed and the national army. 39 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd === [PDF page 15] === Question: What do you think about the tone of Soviet arguments which regard the 30 September Movement as a rebel movement or regard General Nasution as the representative of your country along with President Sukarno? Njoto: I only read the long article in Pravda on November 26th which as well as other things told of the great role played by the pxi in the national independence movement and of it being not right to oppress this party, unless you want to oppress the whole revolutionary movement. The tone of the article was defending the pxi’s right to live and this is why I think it is good. The pxr only knows one Head of State, supreme commander, great leader of the revolution, namely, President Sukarno, and knows no other. Question: What do you think about the foreign reports or information about the new Communist Party whose policy will be peaceful coexistence such as in the Soviet Communist Party? Njoto: It is not possible in Indonesia to establish another Communist Party except the PKI, unless persons want to force and bring about the forming of a party of crypto-communism or pseudo-communism. About ‘peaceful coexistence,’ this is not the foreign policy line of the republic. Not only the communists oppose this line, but also every Manipolist in Indonesia. The correct pxr and republic’s foreign policy line is aimed at building a new world where no imperialism exists. Consequently the foreign policy is anti-Nekolim, and making confrontation of the Nefo against Oldefo, for building a new world without imperialism. Question: How does your party plan to avoid a civil war? Njoto: It is true that the PKI is trying as much as possible to prevent a civil war in Indonesia. Although some are trying to misinterpret the 5th October statement of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PKI, five days after the 30 September affair, it is nevertheless undeniable that the attitude of that statement is a serious attempt to prevent civil war. If murders in fact and other acts of violence happen, this is not the responsibility of the px1, they are fully the responsibility of the ones who go against the commands of President Sukarno. But if the pki continues to be acted against unjustly then, of course, it will have the right to defend itself. 40 Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Copyright © New Left Review Ltd