The International People's Tribunal on 1965 Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia (Wieringa, 2017)

=== [PDF page 1] === The International People’s Tribunal on 1965 Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia An Anthropological Perspective [Unreadable] 5.1 Introduction The crimes against humanity committed in Indonesia after 1 October 1965 count as one of the least known genocides in modern history.1 The surviving victims are haunted by stigma, and the perpetrators live with impunity. The government of Indonesia has never taken any judicial steps to deal with this period and it does not seem likely it will do so in the near future, in spite of promises made by the current president, Joko Widodo. In the absence of a formal juridical process, what role can human rights activists, researchers and legal experts play? In this chapter, I first reflect on the rationale of the organisers for establishing a People’s Tribunal, its structure and the mandate of the Panel of Judges, and provide an overview of the proceedings. This is followed by a concise historical introduction to the events it considered and a summary of the major legal conclusions reached by the Panel of Judges. The chapter describes my own role as chair of the Foundation International People’s Tribunal and the coordinator of the research team and assesses the significance of the Tribunal both within and outside of * Chair Foundation IPT 1965. I thank Nursyahbani Katjasungkana for her inspiration and insightful comments. The application of the term ‘genocide’ in relation to the mass killings in Indonesia is contested. However, as will be discussed, the Panel of Judges of the IPT 1965 concluded that the term ‘genocide’ was applicable, and I therefore use the term throughout this chapter, in addition to the terms that are most widely used, ‘massacres’ and ‘mass killings’. See IPT 1965, Final Report of the IPT 1965: Findings and Documents of the International People’s Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity Indonesia 1965 (hereafter Final Report) (20 July 2016), http://tribunal1965.org/pdf/IPT_report_of_judges.pdf. Ultimus Publishers in Bandung has published the Final Report in English and Indonesian (March 2017). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 2] === [Unreadable] Indonesia. I also deal with some major ethical and practical concerns and conclude with some reflections on this People’s Tribunal in the light of other tribunals. The Foundation IPT on the 1965 Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia (Foundation IPT 1965 or IPT 1965) was formally established in March 2014. The hearings of the Tribunal established by the Foundation IPT 1965, the International People’s Tribunal on 1965 Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia (hereafter the Tribunal), were held in November 2015. The Final Report of the Panel of Judges was presented in July 2016 and published in both English and Indonesian in 2017. As Simm and Byrnes argue, there is a gap in the official structure of accountability for grave human rights violations, as the international human rights structures built to ensure peace and security often fail to do so, particularly if states refuse to accept their responsibilities.2 As I will argue, people’s tribunals, such as the one established by IPT 1965, both expose the inadequacy of international legal standards and, in their very recourse to international human rights law, attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of the United Nations (UN) system. For both victims and activists have a ‘desire for law’3 and demand accountability of the state for their suffering. If that state, in this case Indonesia, is unwilling to provide justice and truth, at least a people’s tribunal can validate their experiences of suffering and humiliation and confirm the hope that justice is still possible via international recognition. 5.2 Setting Up the Tribunal The 1965 killings in Indonesia can be classified as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century. However, this genocide is hardly known internationally. For more than three decades, Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ government ruled the country with authoritarian power, silencing all voices which campaigned for human rights. Instead, the pattern of violence was repeated in the annexation by Indonesia of East Timor between 1975 and 19994 and in West Papua.5 Gabrielle Simm and Andrew Byrnes, ‘International Peoples’ Tribunals in Asia: Political theatre, juridical farce or meaningful intervention?’ (2014) 4(1) Asian Journal of International Law 103. Andrew Byrnes and Gabrielle Simm, ‘Peoples’ tribunals, international law and the use of force’ (2013) 36 (2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 711, 743. Peter Kasenda, Soeharto; bagaimana ia bisa melanggengkan kekuasaan selama 32 tahun? [How Could Soeharto Perpetuate his Power for 32 Years?] (Kompas, 2002). See Edwards on the Biak Massacre People’s Tribunal, Chapter 9 in this volume. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 3] === [Unreadable] After the fall of the dictator President Soeharto in 1998 hopes were raised that the impunity of the perpetrators of the crimes after 1965 would be lifted. The National Human Rights Commission (KomnasHAM) produced a report in 2012 which concluded that the atrocities committed during those years must be seen as crimes against humanity.6 This landmark report, of which only an executive summary is publicly available, is based on the results of an investigation conducted in six regions between 2008 and 2012 (Flores (Maumere), Bali, Maluku (Buru), North and South Sumatera and South Sulawesi) and the testimonies of 349 witnesses and survivors. Although the report does not attempt to extrapolate the numbers of victims nationwide, overwhelming evidence is given of ‘widespread and systematic’ killings, exterminations, enslavement and forced labour, forced eviction and banishments, arbitrary deprivation of freedom, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence and enforced disappearances. These activities were violations of international criminal law (and national law) at the time they were committed. Such offences are codified as crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to which Indonesia is not yet a party, although the Statute could not be applied retrospectively in any event. The offences also constituted crimes at a national level according to Law No 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts, which closely follows the wording of the Rome Statute. It is this law to which the KomnasHAM Report refers. KomnasHAM acknowledged that the victims were targeted for their alleged ties with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI or Indonesian Communist Party). It recognised the Indonesian State as the mastermind of the crimes, underlining that ‘these events were the result of state policy to exterminate members and sympathizers of the PKI which was deemed to have conducted resistance against the state’.7 Its report was submitted to the Office of the Attorney General which returned it on procedural grounds. To this day the Attorney General has taken no action. Only when the film The Act of Killing by Joshua Oppenheimer was launched in 2012 and screenings took place in several countries were the eyes of the international community opened to these atrocities.8 In Indonesia, The Act of Killing could only be screened secretly. A comprehensive report on the mass killings in Tempo magazine in September 2012 helped raise new awareness in the country about this massacre. Oppenheimer’s Komnas HAM, Ringkasan Eksekutif; laporan penyelidikan pelanggaran HAM berat peristiwa 1965–66 [Executive Summary, Report on the Research into Grave Human Rights Violations 1965–66] (hereafter KomnasHAM Report) (KomnasHAM RI, 2015). Ibid., 3. 8 The Act of Killing film, www.theactofkilling.com. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 4] === [Unreadable] second film, The Look of Silence (2014),9 which was screened more widely in the country despite a rather belated official ban, also increased public awareness. The primary responsibility for ending the impunity of the perpetrators and providing justice for the victims lies with the state of Indonesia. However, it has failed over the last fifty years to investigate these crimes, to prosecute perpetrators, to officially and fully apologise and to provide reparations and other meaningful remedies to the victims and their families. This failure and unwillingness to act has persisted in spite of repeated demands made by victims, human rights activists and scholars, especially since the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998, which saw the beginning of the so-called reformasi era. Meanwhile, discriminatory policies and violence by hardline Muslim and anti-communist groups against the surviving victims of 1965–66 and their families continue and have gone unpunished. Meetings are regularly disrupted by such militia, and former prisoners receive visits from security personnel, particularly in the rural areas.10 Hopes were again raised in 2014 that the Indonesian government would undertake action against the perpetrators of the post- 1965 crimes against humanity when a new president took office. Mr Joko Widodo had promised in his campaign to address serious human rights violations including the post-1965 massacres, but he has disappointed his supporters on this issue. In March 2013 a group of exiles, human rights activists, journalists and researchers decided to organise a people’s tribunal. These activists were convinced that the failures of the Indonesian state to deal with the crimes against humanity committed after October 1965 must not be allowed to silence the voices of victims and their families or to permit the government of Indonesia to escape accountability for these crimes. Our concept note stated that the purpose of the Tribunal was to redress the tendency to trivialise, excuse, marginalise and obfuscate this genocide and the other crimes against humanity, particularly the rapes and other forms of sexual violence and torture of women prisoners. It was also established out of the belief, expressed repeatedly by the victims as well as their families, that acknowledging and assigning responsibility for the crimes The Look of Silence film, www.thelookofsilence.com/. 10 Personal communication from former prisoners during meetings of the Forum 1965, an alliance of various organisations of victims, set up by members and supporters of the Indonesian IPT 1965 team. I attended meetings of this Forum during the first half of 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 5] === [Unreadable] would help ensure that they lived out their remaining years in greater dignity, peace and security. We opted for a small horizontal management structure, consisting of a general coordinator, the well-known women’s and human rights lawyer Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, and two secretariats, in Jakarta and in The Hague. The latter was tasked with organising the hearings for the preparation of which several teams were set up headed by members of the Organizing Committee (OC).11 Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, who headed the team in Jakarta, tried to get political support there, organised seminars and workshops with human rights activists and the victims’ organisations, maintained contact with the Indonesian prosecutors and issued invitations to the judges to participate. She also regularly spent time in The Hague to oversee our work there. In the Netherlands we held regular meetings with exiles. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was defined in the Charter of the Tribunal.12 This Charter was approved by the judges and gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity under customary international law as well as under Indonesian human rights law. The Charter declared that the Tribunal had an obligation to state clearly, based on the evidence presented, whether or not all charges were supported by sufficient evidence and to pronounce a judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The prestige of the seven judges invited to participate contributed to the weight of the Tribunal internationally.13 Some judges had an eminent legal background (Zak Yacoob and Geoffrey Nice), and others had a distinguished career in other international courts (Helen Jarvis and Mireille Fanon Mendès-France), were leading international rights experts (Cees Flinterman), had expertise in human rights (Shadi Sadr) or were highly respected scholars (John Gittings). The team of prosecutors was likewise impressive. The chief prosecutor was Indonesia’s leading human rights lawyer T. Mulya Lubis. The other Indonesian prosecutors were all respected human rights lawyers: Antarini Arna, Uli Parulian 11 On the organisation of the Tribunal and the names of those involved on the Organising Committee and in other roles, see generally Final Report, above n. 1, 10–15. 12 See Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Saskia E Wieringa, ‘Narrative Report of the IPT 1965’ (hereafter IPT Narrative Report), www.tribunal1965.org/narrative-report-hearingsof-the-international-peoples-tribunal-on-the-1965-crimes-against-humanity-in-indonesia/. 13 IPT 1965, ‘1965 Tribunal Hearings: The Judges’ (October 2015), www.tribunal1965.org/ 1965-tribunal-hearings-the-judges/. For a fuller description of the background of the judges of the Tribunal, see IPT Narrative Report, above n. 12. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 6] === [Unreadable] Sihombing, Rinto Tri Hapsoro and Bahrain Van Halen. The prosecutorial team was completed by Silke Studzinsky, an international expert on sexual violence. These experts from all over the world lent credibility to the Tribunal. 5.3 Historical Background In the early morning of 1 October 1965 a group of middle-ranking Indonesian national army officers, led by Colonels Untung and Latief and calling themselves the September 30th Movement (G30S Movement), abducted and murdered six top army generals and a lieutenant. This group was chaired by the shady figure of Sjam, the head of the Special Bureau of the PKI, a secret department, directly under the command of party leader Aidit. Apart from the PKI chair, very few other PKI leaders seem to have known, let alone approved, of the plans of the G30S group. The conspirators were strong supporters of President Soekarno and claimed to have taken the President under their protection to prevent a military coup against him.14 General Soeharto, who was informed of the impending action but took no measures to inform or protect his superior officers, took control of the army and quickly aborted this attempted purge of the top echelon of the army.15 There were some scattered attempts at revolt in a few other cities. All in all, only a small number of army units, as well as some PKI youth department volunteers who had been called up for guard duty at the last moment, were involved. This episode is hereafter referred to as the ‘events of 1965’. To this day there are aspects of these ‘events’ that remain unclear, in particular the role of General Soeharto. The stated intention of the G30S group was to bring the generals before President Soekarno.16 Why some of them were shot when they resisted arrest and the others 14 There is a broad consensus in the literature about these aspects of the G30S affair. The most extensive review of this literature can be found in John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Soeharto’s Coup d’État in Indonesia (University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). 15 Colonel Latief, one of the plotters, visited General Soeharto, a good friend of his, just before the planned action, and possibly earlier as well. Colonel Untung may also have visited him. See Kasenda, above n. 4, and H. Soebandrio, ‘Yang saya alami’: peristiwa G30S [What I Experienced: The G30s Affair] (Bumi Intitama Sejahtera, 2006). Roosa, above n. 14, also mentions Latief’s visit to Soeharto. 16 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 1978); Roosa, above n. 14; Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1967 (Oxford University Press, 1982). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 7] === [Unreadable] were murdered on a training field for nationalist volunteers remains unclear. The lieutenant in charge of the abductions (Dul Arif) went missing and his statement was never recorded. PKI chair Aidit went on the run, was captured a few weeks later and killed extra-judicially, so his statement was not recorded either.17 A recent analysis of the trial of Colonel Untung suggests that the order to kill the generals came from ‘trusted sources’, i.e., from officers higher in rank than the two colonels who headed the military operations of the G30S group.18 During his trial Colonel Latief revealed that he had informed General Soeharto of the impending actions himself.19 Soeharto swung into action after he learnt that the country’s top generals had been killed (apart from General Nasution, who managed to escape) and that President Soekarno did not support the G30S group. His handling of the situation was so uncannily effective that some observers suspect he may not have been improvising.20 It is indeed very likely that several scenarios had been prepared by various groups, as the political situation at the time was highly volatile, partly caused by rumours of the president being ill and by the accelerating economic crisis. Foreign powers such as the United States were also meddling in Indonesia’s internal affairs.21 On 1 October 1965 General Soeharto immediately claimed that a coup had been attempted and vowed to annihilate those involved in the G30S Movement. On 6 October 1965 the PKI was specifically mentioned as being the dalang (puppeteer) of this group. In the meantime in Aceh, a province in a state of high military alert as a result of Soekarno’s policy of Confrontation with Malaysia, the killing of PKI members had already started.22 This occurred although it was evident that the party was totally 17 It is also unclear why he was brought to Halim, the headquarters of the rebel officers. 18 Coen Holzappel, ‘Professional blindness and missing the mark – the thirtieth September movement as seen by the perpetrators. between registered facts and authoritative opinions – part one’ (2014), Rozenberg Quarterly, www.rozenbergquarterly.com/profes sional-blindness-and-missing-the-mark-the-thirtieth-september-movement-as-seen-bythe-perpetrators-between-registered-facts-and-authoritative-opinions. 19 Abdul Latief, Pledoi Kol. A. Latief: Soeharto terlibat G30S [The Defence of Colonel A. Latief: Soeharto’s Involvement in G30S] (Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000). 20 Kasenda, above n. 4; Roosa, above n. 14; Suar Suroso, Bung Karno: korban perang dingin [Bung Karno: Victim of the Cold War] (Hasta Mitra, 2008). 21 Peter Scott, ‘The United States and the overthrow of Soekarno, 1965–67’ (1985) 58(2) Pacific Affairs 239–64; Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford University Press, 2008); and Suroso, above n. 20. 22 Jess Melvin’s work on the extermination of the PKI in Aceh after 1 October 1965 demonstrates clearly the leading role of the army in orchestrating the mass killings and https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 8] === [Unreadable] unprepared for this attack and the majority of its leaders were in no way involved, let alone the millions of members and sympathisers. On 10 October 1965 General Soeharto established the Command for Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), an extra-constitutional security and intelligence agency in charge of political prosecution and control with extra-legal powers: to destroy the PKI and hunt down and arrest its members and sympathizers. A mass campaign of sexual slander against members of the progressive women’s organisation Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women’s Movement) was organised. Members of Gerwani were accused of having castrated and tortured the generals.23 This was the start of an extremely successful propaganda campaign, the effects of which persist fifty years later. The PKI was painted as having betrayed the nation and as being against religion (read Islam) and against the national ideology, the Pancasila (five pillars).24 This was accompanied by a campaign of terror against suspected communists and alleged associates including socialist women, left-wing activists, intellectuals, members of peasant groups and labour unions and sympathisers of President Soekarno in general, as well as against members of the Chinese community. In addition, artists and groups associated with popular culture and those who belonged to indigenous religions were harassed; many of them were imprisoned, tortured and/or killed or disappeared.25 In 1966 Soeharto managed to oust President Soekarno from power and the following year he was inaugurated as president. The political, military the very prompt reactions of Soeharto and allied officers. Jess Melvin, ‘Mechanics of Mass Murder: How the Indonesian Military Initiated and Implemented the Indonesian Genocide: The Case of Aceh’, PhD thesis, University of Melbourne (2014), http://hdl.handle.net/11343/42278. 23 Saskia Wieringa, Sexual Politics in Indonesia (Palgrave/McMillan, 2002). 24 The Pancasila are the five pillars of society, conceived by the nation’s founding fathers, Sukarno and Hatta. It comprises five principles held to be inseparable and interrelated: (1) Belief in the one and only God, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa; (2) Just and civilized humanity, Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab; (3) The unity of Indonesia, Persatuan Indonesia; (4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan; (5) Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia, Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia. They are referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution and are to be found all over the country, in school books and on pillars along the road. 25 Prior to the G30S Affair the cultural association linked to the PKI, LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, People’s Cultural Association) had been very active in promoting ‘people’s art’. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 9] === [Unreadable] and economic machinery he established remained intact after his enforced resignation. This partly explains why the ghost of Communism can still be conjured up when elite groups deem it necessary, and why the stigma of being associated with the PKI still remains strong.26 From late October 1965 onwards the army trained and armed militia units and recruited religious groups, student organisations and rightwing trade unions to help implement the massacres. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people were murdered, imprisoned, tortured and raped and many of them disappeared. Between October 1965 and March 1966, it is reliably estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million people were killed and more than 1.7 million people were imprisoned without trial.27 The campaign of terror did not stop then, though it slowed down. Moreover, the so-called New Order of President Soeharto revoked the passports of hundreds of students and PKI sympathisers who happened to be abroad and who refused to support this government. For years many of them were effectively stateless and suffered from uncertainty about their status before they were eventually granted asylum by the Netherlands and other European countries. 5.4 The Indictment and the Conclusions of the Panel of Judges The prosecution submitted that the inhumane acts committed in Indonesia after the ‘events of 1965’ were crimes against humanity in international law. It also argued that derogation was not permitted under any circumstances, as the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a jus cogens norm under international customary law.28 Crimes against humanity in customary international law are fundamentally inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 26 See, for instance, Ariel Heryanto, State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging (Routledge, 2006), and Baskara T. Wardaya et al. (eds.), Menelusuri akar otoritarianisme di Indonesia [Unravelling the Roots of Authoritarianism in Indonesia] (ELSAM, 2007). 27 Robert Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings of 1965–6: Studies from Java and Bali (Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990); Robert Cribb, ‘Unresolved problems in the Indonesian killings 1965–66’ (2002) 42 (4) Asian Survey 550–63; Douglas Kammen and Katharine McGregor, The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965–68 28 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 263. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 10] === [Unreadable] civilians; they involve acts that are crimes in most national criminal law systems.29 Written material submitted to the Tribunal was supplemented by four days of hearings in November 2015 in The Hague at which witness testimony and further arguments were presented to the judges. After some months of deliberation the Panel of Judges presented its final conclusions in a report on 21 July 2016, accompanied by a video in which Presiding Judge Zak Yacoob read out the major conclusions and recommendations.30 In summary, the Panel of Judges concluded that the state of Indonesia was ‘responsible for and guilty of crimes against humanity consequent upon the commission and perpetration, particularly by the military of that state through its chain of command, of the inhumane acts’ alleged by the prosecutors. The Judges further ruled: [A]ll these acts were an integral part of a broad and widespread systematic attack against the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), its affiliate organisations, its leaders, members and supporters and their families (as well as those alleged to have been sympathetic to its aims), and more broadly against many people having no connection at all with the PKI, in what became a widespread purge, which included many supporters of President Sukarno and progressive members of the Nationalist Party of Indonesia, PNI. They stressed that ‘each inhumane act was... a crime in Indonesia and in most civilized countries of the world.’31 The judges further stated that ‘the State of Indonesia failed to prevent the perpetration of these inhumane acts or to punish those responsible for their commission. To the extent that some crimes were committed independently of the authorities, by so-called “spontaneous” local action, this did not absolve the State from the obligation to prevent their occurrence and to punish those responsible.’32 Thus the Panel of Judges concluded that the Indonesian state must be held responsible for mass killings, imprisonment, enslavement, torture, enforced disappearance and sexual violence. These conclusions are in conformity with the charges in the indictment submitted by the prosecution. They are also consistent with the analysis of the 2012 KomnasHAM 29 Law No. 26, Year 2000, Establishing the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, Article 9; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, in force 1 July 2002, Article 7; UN SC Resolution 827 (1993) concerning Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, S/RES/827, para. 5; UN SC Resolution 955 (1994) concerning Rwanda, 8 November 1994, S/RES/955, para. 3. 30 31 32 Final Report, above n. 1, 79. Ibid. Ibid. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 11] === [Unreadable] Report. In their reasons, the judges refer both to domestic and to international legal standards. Four issues dealt within the Final Report deserve particular attention. First, the judges found that a number of the exiles had been deprived of their full and unconditional rights of citizenship. They argued that ‘the policy of involuntary or forcible exile, apart from being inhumane conduct, formed part of a widespread systematic state attack against a substantial and significant targeted sector of the civilian population, and may well be a crime against humanity in the form of persecution.’33 This ruling will hopefully spark debate, as involuntary or forced exile is not explicitly listed as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute, nor is it mentioned in the 2012 KomnasHAM Report. The second issue was the question of propaganda as incitement to murder, which had been highlighted in the research report. The judges concluded: [T]he official version of what happened to the prisoners at Lubang Buaya was totally false. The true facts were known to the military leadership under General Suharto... [t]he sustained propaganda campaign against those accused of being linked to the PKI helped to justify the extra-legal persecution, detention and killing of alleged suspects, and to legitimize sexual violence and all the inhumane conduct already described. Unchallenged for more than three decades, this propaganda contributed not only to the denial of civil rights of survivors but also to their continued persecution. Spreading false propaganda for the purpose of preparing the ground for violence is integral to the commission of that violence. The act of preparing for the crime cannot be said to be separate from the crime itself. This preparation paved the way and was the beginning and part of the overall, broad attack.34 Thirdly, the prosecution had also laid charges of complicity against other states, notably the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. All three countries had been invited to defend themselves at the hearings, as had Indonesia,35 but none of them had accepted this invitation. The judges concluded that the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia were all complicit to different degrees in the commission of these crimes against humanity and that they were all aware of what was taking 33 Ibid., 81. 34 Ibid., 81. Lubang Buaya is the name of the field where the generals were murdered and buried in a deserted well. It was a training ground for socialist volunteers, in relation to the anti-Malaysia campaign of President Soekarno. See Wieringa, above n. 23. 35 We had asked lawyers from Leiden University to prepare an amicus curiae submission stating the position of the government of Indonesia, but they were unable to do so. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 12] === [Unreadable] place in Indonesia.36 The United States ‘gave sufficient support to the Indonesian military, knowing well that they were embarked on a programme of mass killings and other criminal conduct for the charge of complicity in crimes against humanity to be justified.’37 Finally, the Tribunal addressed the question of whether genocide had been committed. The prosecution had not included the count of genocide in its indictment,38 though the research report had presented arguments in support of such a charge. There were two main reasons for not including the charge. Some argued that they did not support the application of the term ‘genocide’ to groups other than those specifically mentioned in the 1948 Genocide Convention, namely, those belonging to a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.39 The other reason was that, as prosecutors for this highly sensitive Tribunal, they were already under heavy attack. If they had included genocide in the indictment, their situation would have become even more difficult. Two genocide scholars submitted an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief in which they urged the judges ‘to analyse [the] evidence to determine that the events of the case at issue constitute genocide as the partial destruction of the Indonesian national group’.40 The judges eventually decided to consider the arguments on this question of genocide based on the material presented in the research report and the amicus brief.41 They concluded that the evidence put before the Tribunal by the prosecution included acts that fall within the prohibition in the Genocide Convention. These acts had been committed against a significant and substantial section of the Indonesian nation or ‘Indonesian national group’, a protected group under the Genocide Convention, and were committed with the specific intent to annihilate or destroy that subgroup in whole or in part. The same analysis arguably also applies to crimes committed against the Chinese ethnic minority group, on which material had also been presented in the research report. The judges insisted that, although Indonesia had neither signed nor ratified the 1948 Genocide Convention at the relevant time (and as of mid-2017 had still not 36 37 Final Report, above n. 1, 71–72, 81–82. Ibid., 81. 38 IPT 1965, ‘Indictment’ (2015), www.tribunal1965.org/indictment-1965-tribunal/. 39 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277, in force 12 January 1951, Article II. 40 Brief submitted to the Tribunal on 11 November 2015 by Dr Daniel Feierstein and Mrs Irene Victoria Massimino of the Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 41 IPT Research Report, Part 1, 50, 53. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 13] === [Unreadable] done so), the prohibition against genocide contained in the Convention was a rule of customary international law that had been binding on Indonesia by 1965.42 5.5 An Anthropologist’s Perspective Since the early 1980s I have been studying the Indonesian women’s movement. I became intrigued by the sudden disappearance of the third largest women’s organisation in the world at the time, Gerwani. When some ex-prisoners, former members of this organisation, asked for my help to document their history and particularly the circumstances of its demise, I agreed. They still had to report to the police regularly, could not travel around the country freely and were prevented from visiting their former friends and colleagues. I had more freedom of movement but my interviews with former Gerwani members also had to be carried out with great circumspection, and I could only access leaders at the national and higher regional levels, mostly in public or other safe spaces (for instance, religious institutions or non-government organisations [NGOs]). They were particularly troubled by the false accusation that the young women of their group had performed a naked dance at the site where the generals were murdered and had tortured and castrated the generals in an orgy. While in prison they had heard the stories of those young girls who were brought in, terribly tortured and forced to sign false statements (as ‘proof’ some of them were photographed naked within the prison walls). In 1986 I wrote my first paper on the history of the women’s movement in Indonesia and the influence of the events of 1965 on the movement as a whole and Gerwani in particular for a conference at Leiden University. It created an enormous controversy both in Indonesia and in Leiden. My paper was banned from the conference proceedings and I myself was blacklisted from Indonesia for thirteen years.43 This period was the height of the oppression of the military regime, and those involved from the University of Leiden preferred their good relations with the Soeharto regime over academic freedom. During that time I finished my PhD but could not defend it, as it first had to be checked with my informants. We had agreed I would be responsible for the analysis, but they would have the last say on issues 42 Final Report, above n. 1, 78, 82. 43 Sita van Bemmelen, Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Elly Touwen-Boomsma (eds.), Women and Mediation in Indonesia (KITLV Press, 1992). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 14] === [Unreadable] of security. After an underground visit to Indonesia in 1994 I was finally able to graduate in 1995. The thesis was quickly translated and became widely used by activists in Indonesia.44 I was naive enough to believe that once I had written it all down, Gerwani would somehow be rehabilitated and the slander would not be believed any more. After a few years I realised that this was not the case.45 Gerwani members continued to face the stigma attributed to them. I then decided to write a novel on my experiences researching this period in the Indonesian women’s movement. I produced a political thriller entitled The Crocodile Hole (named after the field where the generals were dumped in a well).46 This book was also immediately translated, and though Gerwani members and women activists appreciated it very much and it soon sold out, the stigma continued, and the lies about Gerwani continued to be believed.47 Next I collaborated with a Swedish filmmaker Maj Wechselmann in a documentary film on Gerwani and the campaign against them. In contrast to many Western scholars who ignore the strong impact of sexual slander on a conservative and deeply religious nation, she immediately grasped the impact of this campaign.48 The resulting film, The Women and the Generals (2012), was shown on Swedish television and circulates in activist circles but has not had a wide impact.49 44 Saskia E. Wieringa, ‘The Politicization of Gender Relations in Indonesia’, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, published as Penghancuran Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia [The Destruction of the Women’s Movement in Indonesia] (Garba Budaya, 1999) (translated by Hersri Setiawan). These two versions have been screened for the security of my informants. The unabridged version was published in English in 2002: Wieringa, above n. 23. 45 Though Ibu Sulami, one of Gerwani’s leaders, with whom I collaborated closely during my research, wrote me a moving letter after she had read the first draft of my thesis, telling me that she could now die in peace, that this was a golden thread of hope in the last days of her life, as she now knew that the history of her organisation had been honestly documented. 46 Saskia Wieringa, Het Krokodillengat [The Crocodile Hole] (LaVita, 2007), translated into English as The Crocodile Hole (Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan, 2015). 47 During the Ubud Writers’ Festival in 2015 we were prohibited from launching the book formally and instead organised a book ‘lunch’ which was disturbed three times by members of the security forces. Saskia Wieringa, ‘The crocodile hole in Ubud: How a feminist lunch evades a book ban’ (2016) 19(1) Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies 107. 48 See Saskia Wieringa, ‘Sexual Slander and the 1965–6 Mass Killings in Indonesia: Political and Methodological Considerations’ (2011) 41 Journal of Contemporary Asia 544–66, for an analysis of these politics of ignorance by male-stream scholars. 49 The film can be viewed at https://vimeo.com/119472614 or at www.wechselmann.se/en/ 2013/03/26/the-women-and-the-generals/. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 15] === [Unreadable] After the launch of The Act of Killing by Joshua Oppenheimer in the Netherlands in 2013, a group of some thirty-five exiles sat together in my house with the director and Stanley Prasetyo, a former commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission who had been involved in the research on 1965, and some other human rights activists to discuss what steps we could take to end the impunity of the perpetrators of the post- October 1965 crimes against humanity. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, a prominent human and women’s rights lawyer in Indonesia, shared her experiences as the chief prosecutor for Indonesia of the Tokyo Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s military sexual slavery.50 Those present at the meeting decided a people’s tribunal might end the silence at national and international level, help restore the dignity of the victims and hopefully set in motion a process that would ensure nonrecurrence. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana received the mandate from the exiles to organise this tribunal. In March 2014 the Foundation IPT was formally established. I am the chair and the other board members are Sungkono and Sri Tunruang (treasurer). My major duties were trying to obtain funding, liaising with the Dutch government, assisting Nursyahbani in setting up secretariats in Jakarta and in the Netherlands, and coordinating the team that was preparing the research report. We managed with very great difficulty to get just enough funds for the material expenses related to the hearings. Many funding agencies were hesitant to touch this issue, knowing that the Indonesian government would not take it lightly. The Dutch government was not happy the hearings would be held in The Hague and suggested we hold them in Jakarta. We explained that we would prefer that as well but that it would be much too dangerous to hold the hearings in Jakarta, and that The Hague, with its image as the City of International Justice, would be best qualified. Initially I had hoped we could use the KomnasHAM Report. However, as this report was still under embargo, we had to start from scratch in preparing a research report for the prosecution on which it could base the indictment. In the end, forty researchers and activists responded to requests for assistance, sending in whole chapters, summaries of their research work or sometimes databases. More than half of the researchers were Indonesian, and most of those submitted their work in Indonesian. We prepared a report of some thousand pages, 50 See further Dolgopol, Chapter 4 in this volume. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 16] === [Unreadable] less than half of which was in Indonesian, which most of the prosecutors but not the judges could read. As coordinator I myself filled in various gaps, providing an overview of the scholarly arguments of who masterminded the actions of the G30S group, an analysis of the propaganda campaign against the PKI and arguments on whether the mass killings could be classified as a genocide, as well as material about the campaign of sexual slander on which I had already written. I also wrote a chapter on the complicity of Dutch and Indonesian psychologists who developed tests which were supposed to measure the level of ‘communistness’.51 In the absence of any kind of legal process for the vast majority of detainees, these tests replaced a juridical trial.52 With a small group of co-editors (Sri Wahyuningrum, the late Wijaya Herlambang, Ratna Saptari, Annie Pohlman and Jess Melvin), we collected various kinds of data for thirteen regions all over Indonesia. During the hearings I was anxious to find out whether the judges considered the materials brought before them sufficient. After all we had worked on a totally voluntary basis, for a short period of time, while paid staff had taken several years to compile the reports of both KomnasHAM and Komnas Perempuan (National Commission on Violence against Women53). Fortunately, Mariana Amaruddin from Komnas Perempuan had received official permission to attend the hearings. She confirmed the materials on sexual violence that had been compiled by our researchers, which I had presented as an expert witness. Sadly, KomnasHAM did not agree to having a commissioner attend our hearings; yet the responsible commissioner for the 1965 case, Dianto Bachriadi, came of his own accord. He too testified that the material brought before the judges was totally consistent with the report of the Commission which he had helped 51 A classification system was used to determine who should be tried. Category A were those who were involved in the actual abductions and murders of the generals and the other actions of the G30S group. Category B were those who were not supposed to be released soon, and members of category C spent only a few years in prison. 52 These arguments will be published in 2018 in a monograph provisionally titled Imagined Evil (Routledge). 53 The Komisi Nasional anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan (Komnas Perempuan) (National Commission against Violence against Women) was set up in 1998 after the so-called May riots of that year in which many ethnic Chinese women were raped. It is an independent state institution. Its legal basis is Presidential Decree 181/1998, which was renewed by the Presidential Regulations 65 and 66/2005. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 17] === [Unreadable] prepare. These two testimonies significantly supported the case the prosecutors brought before the judges. 5.6 Practical Matters Organising the Tribunal was a major challenge. Two factors enabled us to implement it. First was the political momentum. This was initially created by the finalisation of the report on the 1965 crimes against humanity of KomnasHam in 2012,54 which had been preceded by a 2007 report on sexual violence by Komnas Perempuan that had received far less attention.55 Both reports contain excellent analyses of the types of violence and violations committed by the state after the ‘events of 1965’. The momentum was increased by the wide attention received by the brilliant films of Joshua Oppenheimer. The presidential campaign and the subsequent election of the candidate most likely to address grave human rights violations also gave hope that this was the time to attract international attention to the massacres. Finally, we could use the slogan ‘breaking 50 years of silence’, as 2015, the year in which we held the hearings, was the fiftieth anniversary of the ‘events of 1965’ which led to the massacres and the destruction of the PKI as well as the toppling of the president. At the national level, the progressive magazine Tempo published two issues on the ‘events of 1965’: one on perpetrators and one on the PKI-affiliated cultural association LEKRA.56 These publications sparked great interest. The second contributing factor was the willingness of so many specialists, victims and students to contribute their expertise, experiences and time to help organise the Tribunal. Researchers undertook research, film-makers documented the process and prepared the live streaming, media specialists ran the social and other media and set up the website, security experts devised a security plan, the prosecutors and the registrar gave legal advice and their time prior to and during the hearings, the 54 Although the full report is not yet officially released, the executive summary is lengthy and gives an excellent and detailed overview of the results of the research. 55 Komnas Perempuan, Laporan Pemantauan Ham Perempuan: Kejahatan Terhadap Kemanusiaan Berbasis Jender – Mendengarkan Suara Perempuan Korban Peristiwa 1965 [Gender-Based Crimes against Humanity: Listening to the Voices of Women Survivors of 1965] (Komnas Perempuan, 2007). 56 In October 1965 the special issue ‘Pengakuan Algojo 1965’ [‘The Confession of a 1965 Butcher’] was published. In September 2013 the special issue was called ‘LEKRA dan geger 1965’ [‘LEKRA and the 1965 tumult’]. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 18] === [Unreadable] translating team worked as hard as they could to translate Indonesian material into English for the judges and the many student volunteers made themselves helpful in numerous ways. And, of critical importance, our judges devoted their time and expertise prior to, during and after the hearings, finalising the report which was released in July 2016. During the hearings about a hundred volunteers were working towards the success of the Tribunal. We faced multiple challenges. First, due to the sensitivity of the issue, it was extremely hard to get any funding. Our major donor to this day does not want to be publicly acknowledged. We first received a modest grant from a small Dutch-based charity which helped us develop our website. By the end of 2014 we finally had the green light from our major donor. Closer to the hearings crowd-funding became more effective and that helped us pay for the last expenses and the presentation of the Final Report. Most of our funding went into the hearings themselves. We decided we needed an impressive venue, not an inconspicuous university lecture hall. We first approached the Peace Palace, which had hosted the Iran Tribunal, but they refused on the basis that they are a politically neutral institution.57 In the end we found the beautiful location of the New Church in The Hague. It could be well secured, which was important as we had received indications that disturbance might occur.58 The rest of the money went into other material costs such as travel expenses and lodging of our judges, prosecutors and witnesses. A small amount went to the secretariats and to meetings with victims in Indonesia. 5.7 Ethical Concerns Victim-survivors and their families continue to suffer discriminatory policies and violence perpetrated by Muslim hardliners and other 57 The Iran Tribunal rented space ‘in the building of The Hague Academy of International Law, immediately adjacent to the historic Peace Palace, which houses the International Court of Justice’: Payam Akhavan, ‘Is grassroots justice a viable alternative to impunity?: The case of the Iran People’s Tribunal’ (2017) 39(1) Human Rights Quarterly 73, 87. The Director of the Peace Palace explained to us that he had felt unhappy about this when he came to know of it. 58 In the Netherlands the only intimidation we experienced was the threat from the Indonesian government that any Indonesian students with an Indonesian scholarship might lose that if they participated in the Tribunal. In the end, Indonesian students from all over Europe travelled to The Hague to assist. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 19] === [Unreadable] anti-communist groups in Indonesia today. The spectre of a communist revival can be conjured up at any moment by particular military or political groups, who control the militias of thugs who carry out raids or other forms of violence. When we started organising the Tribunal, our major concern was to guarantee the safety of the victims. We needed to hold consultations with them, but we were aware that those meetings would attract the attention of such militias. Several planned meetings had to be cancelled. For instance, on 27 October 2013 the Forum Anti Komunis Indonesia (FAKI, Anti-Communist Forum) attacked and broke up a meeting organised by victims and survivors in Jogjakarta. Similarly the meeting organised in Bukit Tinggi on 22 March 2015 was forcibly disbanded by thugs. In Salatiga, the following day, militia supported by the police dissolved the meetings organised by the victims’ support organisation LPH YAPHI (Lembaga Pengabdian Hukum Yayasan Pengabdian Hukum Indonesia, Rights Service Institution Foundation for the Service of Rights in Indonesia) in collaboration with the victims’ organisation YPKP 1965 (Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965, Foundation for Research on the Victims of the Killings of 1965) and to which Komnas Perempuan, KomnasHAM and LPSK had been invited. The purpose of this meeting had been to discuss a new regulation on health allowances for victims of past human rights violations. These attacks were reported to President Joko Widodo, the Chief of Police Headquarters and the Chief Military Commander in Jakarta, but there was no response. In the second half of 2015, tensions increased. The major issues triggering these strains were the fiftieth anniversary of the ‘events of 1965’ and the impending hearings of the Tribunal. For example, on 2 July 2015, members of the mass organisation Ansor (the youth wing of the Muslim mass organisation Nahdlatul Ulama), and leaders of other religious groups, attacked people whom they identified as making up a ‘new style’ Communist movement. These latter groups were identified as various human rights organisations that had been supporting victims of the crimes against humanity after 1 October 1965. They burned so-called PKI flags (which they must have made themselves) in the centre of Blitar.59 The yearly presidential address to the nation on 17 August 2015 (Independence Day) was also very tense. Victims of the 1965 crimes against humanity hoped the president would apologise, while right-wing groups protested fiercely. In the end the president did not apologise. 59 Redaski, ‘Ormas Di Blitar Aksi Perangi PKI Gaya Baru’, Adakita News, 2 July 2015, www.adakitanews.com/ormas-di-blitar-aksi-perangi-pki-gaya-baru. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 20] === [Unreadable] Ultimately, a series of successful meetings was held in Solo, Jombang Cirebon, Jepara, Kupang, Aceh, Semarang, Surabaya and Medan in 2014 and the beginning of 2015. The members of the various victims’ organisations welcomed the idea of the Tribunal, though we warned them that the Tribunal would not be able to ensure that any perpetrator would be brought to justice or that they would get compensation. They were pleased that international attention would be paid to their plight and hoped it would minimally reduce the stigma they still experienced. Out of concern for the security of the witnesses and the prosecutors, an extensive security plan was drawn up. The Jakarta Secretariat lobbied the National Human Rights Commission, the National Commission on Violence against Woman, the Witness and the Victims’ Protection Institute (LPSK) and the Advisory Council to the President to prepare a Standard Operational Procedure for the Security of the Witnesses and Victims. On 13 October 2015, a training workshop on this security plan was conducted by the IPT 1965 Jakarta Secretariat in collaboration with human rights defenders. Human rights lawyers accompanied the witnesses to and from the Tribunal. During the sessions themselves, extra security officials were employed and the police were on standby. For each charge or crime, we invited and prepared at least one direct and one expert witness. Ultimately, seven factual/eye witnesses appeared before the Tribunal at its hearings from 10 to13 November 2015. Due to the quickly deteriorating security situation prior to the hearings, a number of witnesses were forced to use a pseudonym or to testify behind a screen. Fortunately, no incidents occurred during the sessions, and all witnesses and prosecutors were able to leave the Netherlands safely. As was expected the Indonesian government reacted negatively to the Tribunal. The organisers were labelled ‘enemies of the state’ by various functionaries, including the Minister of Defence. When the delegation arrived back in Jakarta on 15 November 2015, the Aliansi Anti-Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Anti-Communist Alliance) greeted them at the airport with large banners stating ‘Selamat Datang Pengkhianat Bangsa’ (Welcome Home, Traitors of the Nation) and ‘Pengkhianat Jangan Kembali ke Indonesia’ (Traitors don’t come home to Indonesia).60 60 Febriana Firdaus, ‘Aliansi Anti-Komunis Indonesia “jemput” tim IPT 1965 di bandara’, The Rappler, 15 November 2015, www.rappler.com/indonesia/112911-aliansi-anti-komu nis-indonesia-tim-ipt-1965. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 21] === [Unreadable] A group of police picked up the delegation and took them to the police station near the airport.61 Lawyers from the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH), a Commissioner of the National Commission on Human Rights and a human rights advocate from Kontras, as well as members of other human rights groups, also came to the airport to make sure that the delegation came back home safely. Members from the state institution LPSK accompanied the delegation to their homes. In December 2015 the militia Pemuda Pancasila, which featured prominently in The Act of Killing as the perpetrators of most of the 1965 killings in Medan, sent a letter demanding that chief prosecutor T. Mulya Lubis, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and prosecutor Uli Parulian Sihombing apologise to the Indonesian public for organising the IPT 1965. The letter informed the recipients that if they did not comply with this order, the Pemuda Pancasila could not be held responsible for any unrest that might result. There were other ethical concerns about potentially endangering witnesses. In Palu (Central Sulawesi), for instance, a careful process of reconciliation has been underway for some years, with the mayor apologising for the crimes committed in 1965 in which he had participated. The activists involved were reluctant to join the Tribunal process, as they feared it might antagonise the authorities. Another concern was voiced by those activists who feared that a narrow form of nationalism might be stimulated by organising the Tribunal abroad, and particularly in the Netherlands, the former colonial ruler. Such sentiments were indeed voiced in the press by conservative generals such as Kivlan Zen and by the Minister of Defence. But more moderate and progressive media realized that this Tribunal simply could not have been held in Indonesia itself.62 After the hearings, the judges, particularly Helen Jarvis and John Gittings who were mandated to draft the report, worked for a number of months on the Final Report. As the situation in Indonesia was still 61 Interestingly, the police used the word mengamankan (to put into safety) when they met the delegation at the gate. Everyone panicked, for that was the euphemism used during the 1965–66 mass murders to arrest people after which nothing more was heard of them. But this time the word was used in a respectful sense and the delegation was led away via a back gate and guided to their transport. 62 See the list of press coverage of the Tribunal in Indonesia up until the end of 2015 in the IPT Narrative Report, above n. 13. The generally progressive media such as Rappler, BBC. com and the Jakarta Post, among others, reported positively. The conservative media such as the Muslim newspaper Republika were opposed. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 22] === [Unreadable] very volatile, with anti-human rights generals and politicians regularly lashing out at anything they considered a revival of the PKI, it was not possible to present the Final Report of the panel of judges in Jakarta, as we had hoped. Instead, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and our major film-maker went to South Africa, where Presiding Judge Zak Yacoob read extracts from the Final Report. The video made of this reading was presented simultaneously in five cities: Jakarta, Melbourne, Phnom Penh, Amsterdam and Stockholm. We had kept the venue of the presentation in Jakarta secret until right before the event, so media, which we had kept informed, attended in large numbers, but the right-wing militia fortunately did not. 5.8 Impact of the Tribunal The significance of the Tribunal cannot be estimated according to the number of convictions. Its impact must be judged in different ways. As a people’s tribunal, it derives its power from the voices of victims, and of national and international civil societies. Though the Tribunal had the format of a formal court, it was not a criminal court. But was the Tribunal then a juridical farce or a political theatre, as Simm and Byrnes provocatively ask?63 From the beginning all involved were very aware that the Tribunal would not lead to any formal judicial process and that no actual perpetrators would be prosecuted. As a people’s tribunal, we realised that the power of the Tribunal lies in its capacity to examine evidence, develop an accurate historical record of the genocide and other crimes committed and apply principles of international law to the facts as found. This Tribunal stepped into the lacuna left by the state of Indonesia, but it did not purport to replace the role of the state of Indonesia in the legal process. Other international peoples’ tribunals have contributed to creating a climate of respect for human rights and to the healing process of the victims and their families. In that sense, the IPT 1965 was a meaningful intervention as it has tangible results, some of which I will mention. But we, the organisers, were very aware of the potential theatrical impact. We deliberately selected a monumental former church with an impressive interior to give cachet to the Tribunal.64 The sessions were 63 Simm and Byrnes, above n. 2. 64 The building has a secular function now: it has been turned into a congress and cultural centre. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 23] === [Unreadable] live streamed and accessible all over the world. In Indonesia, collective screenings were held in several places, with moderators from various human rights organisations. Tens of thousands of people watched the sessions, which are still accessible via YouTube.65 The pronouncement of the Panel of Judges on the applicability of the term ‘genocide’ for the mass killings in Indonesia after 1 October 1965 is significant. This is the first occasion on which a legal institution has come to this conclusion for Indonesia. But it will still be a long process until a more formal human rights body issues a similar statement or resolution on the topic. The process of bringing about such a pronouncement is underway. The Foundation IPT 1965 submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council as part of the third cycle of the Council’s Universal Periodic Review, in which Indonesia’s progress on human rights was discussed in May 2017. If we consider the major objectives of the Tribunal, to fight impunity, to break the silence and to restore the dignity of the victims, a preliminary assessment of the outcome of the Tribunal can be made. Impunity involves ‘a failure by states to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations’.66 Key concepts thus are the right to truth, to justice and to rehabilitation and the guarantee of nonrecurrence. Even in the more liberal Reformasi era (after 1998), the Indonesian state has done virtually nothing to guarantee these rights. In a formal sense, impunity still continues. Nobody has faced criminal charges. But the Tribunal did contribute to creating an archive of truth, and the researchers and activists involved will continue to extend that archive. Through publications, social media and our website, we will contribute to the rewriting of Indonesian history which so far has been 65 The tag IPT1965 lists a number of testimonies, documentaries and other products, many of which were prepared by our media team, with English subtitles where necessary. Narrowing down to live stream gives access to the hearings, including the testimonies in Indonesian. 66 Diane Orentlicher, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/ Add. 1, 7. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 24] === [Unreadable] dominated by New Order historians, who wrote a version of ‘history of the winners’.67 This public ‘archive of the oppressors’ must be replaced or at least complemented by an ‘archive of the oppressed’.68 The massacres and mass incarcerations took place over such an enormous region and over such a long time that only the Indonesian state will ever be able to account for their magnitude. So far it has not cared to do so, so that even now there is no certainty about how many people were murdered or imprisoned. Very few of their graves are known. Many bodies were dumped in rivers or caves with underground rivers, so they were carried to the sea. Others were dumped in unmarked mass graves.69 Every effort by a victims’ organisation or other NGOs to identify the killing sites must be seen as an act of resistance to forgetting, to the silencing of the largest mass murder in Indonesia’s history. The Tribunal has had most success in breaking the silence around the genocide and other crimes against humanity. Hundreds of articles have been written, particularly in online media but also in mainstream print media in Indonesia.70 Some major international papers also reported on the Tribunal. Approximately 300 participants attended the Tribunal each day, including about 30 media representatives, both from Indonesia and from the international media. Many thousands of people all over the world watched the hearings via live streaming.71 In Indonesia, nobar (watching together) and discussions were organised in several cities. In Jogjakarta, the nobar was banned by a fundamentalist group and people from the intelligence services. Film-makers and photographers 67 Katharine McGregor, History in Uniform; Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia’s Past (NUS Press, 2007). 68 Louis Joinet, ‘Le rôle des archives dans la lutte contre l’impunité’ (2003) 72 Matériaux pour l’Histoire de Notre Temps 50, cited in Gabrielle Simm, ‘The Paris Peoples’ Tribunal and the Istanbul Trials: Archives of the Armenian Genocide’ (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 245, 250–51. 69 Very close to our house in East Java a mass grave of possibly 800 bodies was located. We only found this out recently. The grave is not marked, and it is so far not known who was buried there. The same guide who pointed this mass grave out to us took us to four other smaller sites on a nearby plantation where bodies were dumped. Saskia E. Wieringa, ‘Kuburan Massal di Kebun Raya Purwodadi’ [‘Mass grave in the Botanical Garden in Purwodadi’], Yayasan Bhinneka Nusantara, 31 March 2016, www.web.archive.org/web/ 20160331012717/http://bhinnekanusantara.org/kuburan-massal-di-purwodadi/. 70 From August to November 2015, there were 84,494 visitors to our website, which was attacked continuously – most frequently the writings on Gerwani by Saskia Wieringa, which received 4,966 attacks. For details, see IPT Narrative Report, above n. 13. 71 Media statistics released at the end of November 2015: IPT 1965 on YouTube received 773 visitors, while the live stream IPT 1965 was accessed 19,802 times. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 25] === [Unreadable] were invited to document the work of the Tribunal and its background. This material will serve archival, educational and advocacy purposes. The surge in narrow nationalist feelings after the November 2015 hearings had an unexpected positive result. Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security, Luhut B. Panjaitan, organised a national seminar on the topic in April 2016. It generated enormous media exposure. Both victims and supporters of the New Order participated. Through online media, TV shows and news reports, hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were able to listen to the gripping stories of some survivors. Angry that the national seminar generated sympathy for the victims, conservative retired generals such as Kivlan Zen organised a counterseminar on 1–2 June 2016, in which only military and other supporters of the New Order participated. Many concluded on social media that ‘the djinn [genie] is out of the bottle’, meaning that the silence behind which New Order strongmen could hide the crimes committed by the army and militias trained by them after 1 October 1965 had definitively been broken. Two other developments must be mentioned here. The first is that a group of young activists involved in the IPT, journalists themselves and active on social media, have set up an online platform for members of the third generation – those whose grandparents were directly involved, either as victims or as perpetrators. They are encouraged to ask the questions that they were never allowed to ask, about a missing grandparent, about the loss of status and property that families of prisoners typically experienced, about the origin of shame and humiliation or about why certain families always had to be shunned. On the platform they can share these stories. The platform is called Ingat 65 (Remembering 65). Secondly, the divisive tactics of the regime, infighting and discouragement, resulted in some disagreements between the various organisations of victims. Due to the discussions prior to and directly after the Tribunal, to which members of all victims’ organisations were routinely invited, they have set up a Forum 1965, which meets regularly and discusses issues of general interest to the victims at the national level. Many IPT members have also joined this forum. The work of the IPT 1965 is not yet over. There are many challenges ahead. The results of the Tribunal must be made more widely known both within Indonesia and internationally. Lobbying at the national level in Indonesia and internationally will have to be intensified. This may stimulate a process of reconciliation in the country. Educational https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 26] === [Unreadable] materials for various target groups, such as students, on the ‘events of 1965’ and their aftermath must be prepared, as knowledge of this period is still dominated by army propaganda. IPT 1965 will stimulate efforts to build an integrated documentation and archive system and assist where possible with various national and local efforts at memorialisation. 5.9 Conclusion Although the Tribunal was not a formal juridical institution, its pronouncements carry weight and will be recognised in international and national fora in times to come. The Final Report of the Panel of Judges of the IPT 1965 contains some interesting arguments that will spark further debate. These concern the role of propaganda in relation to incitement to hatred and mass murder and to the position of the exiles who lost their citizenship. And of course its arguments as to why the Indonesian mass murders qualify as genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention will continue to be discussed. All this points to a conclusion that this Tribunal is a meaningful intervention in a world in which impunity for the perpetrators of the genocide and other crimes against humanity in Indonesia still continues, and in which the victims still experience shame, stigma and humiliation. The lack of enforceability of the carefully argued judgement of our Panel of Judges is of course deeply regrettable, but the Final Report will continue to shame Indonesia internationally. How the Indonesian state will react ultimately is unknown. At the time of writing, narrow nationalist forces call for the uniqueness of Indonesian human rights as opposed to the alleged foreignness of international human rights standards.72 The lawmakers who advance these arguments are apparently unaware that the present Indonesian human rights law is based on the Rome Statute. Whether Indonesia will ever resort to the international or domestic adjudication of its past human rights abuses is doubtful, but the Final Report of the Judges of the IPT 1965 strengthens the demands of both national human rights commissions to deal with these past abuses. It has already boosted the morale of victims and will help ensure that the world will not forget these crimes. 72 Margareth S. Aritonang, ‘Lawmakers want ‘nationalist’ figures for Komnas HAM’, Jakarta Post, 23 December 2016, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/23/lawmakerswant-nationalist-figures-for-komnas-ham.html. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108368360.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press