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Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism: Afro-Asian Solidarity and Related Activism 1955-1965 (McGregor and Hearman, 2017)

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=== [PDF page 1] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism Reassessing Afro-Asian Solidarity and Related Activism in the Decade 1955–1965 katharine mcgregor and vannessa hearman introduction In his fiery opening speech to the Bandung Conference in 1955, entitled “Let a New Asia and Africa Be Born,” President Sukarno articulated bold dreams for the new nations that gained independence following the Second World War. Critiquing colonialism, imperialism, and racism while charting a new way amid the polarization of the Cold War, Sukarno suggested the newly independent countries would constitute a new and important voice in world politics.1 The principles agreed to at Bandung provided an important compass not only for the elite leaders of the countries represented but also for political activists from these countries who looked to Bandung for inspiration in renegotiating entrenched global hierarchies and their place in the world as the Cold War set in. This chapter challenges political scientist Jamie Mackie’s argument that “the Bandung conference can best be seen today as a fleeting moment of convergence of various trends in the postcolonial history of the world.”2 Mackie focuses on the Conference as a fleeting moment of consensus, but by looking beyond its impact on elite politics, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, we can reassess the impact of the so-called Bandung Spirit on political activists. This chapter examines how Afro-Asian solidarity and related struggles for economic and political autonomy connected activists across the Indian Ocean and beyond in new ways. In the same speech at Bandung, Sukarno proposed an alternative geographical conception of the world whereby people were connected on Sukarno, “Let a New Asia and Africa Be Born,” in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 454–460. Jamie Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur and New York: Australian Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 22. 161 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 2] === 162 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman either side of the Straits of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Sea of Japan. Countries positioned along these waterways comprised, in his words, the “lifeline of imperialism,” and together they were “awakening” and resisting imperialism in all its forms. Although the language that Sukarno and other radical nationalists used to articulate the challenges facing the countries of Asia and Africa and their capacity to shape their destinies seems dramatic (and at times romantic), the emphasis on the continued Western economic hold over these nations in the 1950s and 1960s fits with recent scholarly analysis of the very slow decolonization processes and the economic motives of former and new colonial powers that underpinned this.3 Furthermore, Sukarno’s emphasis on the Indian Ocean provides an alternative geographic conception of the world that scholars have recently found highly productive in terms of reconceptualizing transnational connections brought about through trade and the practice of slavery over several centuries of formal imperialism through to more recent political connections across this zone during the Cold War.4 The shared struggle for a more equal global order produced new solidarities that have not yet been fully appreciated. In their study of the global color line and concurrent efforts around the world to defend whiteness as a transnational form of identification, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds suggest that Benedict Anderson’s emphasis on the nation as a natural unit and an “imagined community” has paradoxically “obscured the ascendancy of transnational racial identifications and their potency in shaping both personal identity and global politics.”5 Taking this point further, we wish to reassess the impact on personal and global politics of an alternative form of identification, that of Afro-Asian solidarity, which was in large part a reaction to the perceived continuation of white dominance. In doing so we are conscious of Christopher Lee’s critique of “a triumphal narrative of postcolonial autonomy” and we follow his suggestion that we instead need to “recuperate Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See, e.g., Shanti Moorthy and Jamal Ashraf (eds.), Indian Ocean Studies: Cultural, Social and Political Perspectives (Hoboken: Routledge, 2009), and Christopher Lee, “The Indian Ocean During the Cold War: Thinking Through a Critical Geography” (2013) 11 History Compass 7, at 524–530. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 7. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 3] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 163 a more useable past by identifying the varied locations and complex, situated meanings of ‘Afro-Asianism.’”6 One of the most significant expressions of Third World solidarity after Bandung was the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), which was inaugurated at the Afro-Asian Conference of December 1957 to January 1958 in Cairo. The seeds of AAPSO originated in the people-to-people nongovernmental Conference of Asian Countries held in 1955 in New Delhi, which preceded Bandung by only a few days. At this conference, held April 6–10, 1955, 250 delegates from 16 Asian countries met to discuss peace in the Asian region.7 Studying the issues and ideas promoted by AAPSO and affiliated organizations leads to reevaluating the meaning of Afro-Asian solidarity in the decade 1955 to 1965. This chapter asks how people in this organization interpreted the Bandung Spirit and articulated an alternative worldview through their actions and the causes for which they campaigned. Until now, many have dismissed AAPSO as a “very radical”8 (presumably meaning communist) organization and studied it only through the lens of Cold War politics – that is, the contest between the Soviet Union and China for control of Asia and Africa.9 In response to Szonyi and Liu’s critique that much of the historiography of the Cold War continues to focus on elites and artificially divorces Asian experiences from other global processes under way – such as decolonization, nation-building, revolution, and economic globalization – this chapter examines how non-Western actors, including Asians and Africans, responded to these simultaneous challenges.10 This chapter focuses primarily on the decade beginning 1955 because Afro- Asian solidarity suffered serious setbacks by 1965. This is most strongly symbolized by the failure to hold a second formal Asia-Africa conference. According Christopher Lee, “Between a Moment and an Era and an Era: the Origins and Afterlives of Bandung,” in Christopher Lee (ed.) Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), pp. 3–4. Asian delegates at the Stockholm Meeting for the Relaxation of International Tension in June 1954 proposed the idea for this conference. “Conference of Asian Countries” (1955) 9 Bulletin of the World Council of Peace, at 7. Jamie Mackie, Bandung: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005), p. 109. See Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation, 1957–67 (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1968), and Darryl C. Thomas, “The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization: Afro-Asianism versus Non-Alignment, 1955–1966” (1992) 11 Journal of Asian and African Affairs 2, at 167–191. 10 Michael Szonyi and Hong Liu, “New Approaches to the Study of the Cold War in Asia,” in Szonyi and Liu (eds.), The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Leiden: Brill, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 4] === 164 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman to Mackie, the second conference did not transpire because of “disputes, recriminations and wars” between Asian and African countries in the 1960s, “as the world order became more fissured and multipolar.”11 This is part of the story, but Afro-Asian solidarity was also seriously affected by the forced removal from power of political leaders Mehdi Ben Barka (Morocco), Felix Moumié (Cameroon), Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Sukarno (Indonesia), and Ben Bella (Algeria). In all cases, the leaders’ removal resulted in the rise of pro- Western regimes.12 These men threatened the interests of colonial powers because of their economic policies and ideologies, which favored national independence and strict limits on foreign economic control. the bandung conference By 1955, when Indonesia hosted the Bandung Conference, many Asian countries had gained independence and the Vietnamese had just defeated the French after an eight-year war, bringing a new sense of pride to anticolonialists. At the same time, there were growing concerns across the countries of Asia and Africa about continuing colonialism in Africa, foreign intervention, and the pressure to choose sides in the Cold War. The representatives from twenty-nine countries ranged ideologically from those who supported nonalignment in the Cold War (India, Burma, and Indonesia) to those who supported Western security treaties such as the SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) agreement of 1954, which aimed at curtailing communist influence. The Conference raised concerns in the Soviet Union and the United States, and alarmed colonial powers the Netherlands, Britain, and France, who feared a communist-backed “anti-white” coalition of Afro- Asian states united by racial solidarity and anticolonialism.13 Conference delegates formulated the principles of Bandung, emphasizing equality between nations, territorial sovereignty, nonintervention by other nations, mutual cooperation, and peaceful conduct. For example, despite the promises of equal rights “of nations large and small” contained in the 1945 UN Charter, this was not the practice. The UN had not recognized the People’s Republic of China. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared independence in 1945 but had had to fight against the return of French 11 Mackie, Bandung: Non-alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity, p. 26. 12 On assassinations in the Middle East and Africa and their motives, see Victoria Brittain, “They Had to Die: Assassination against Liberation” (2006) 28 Race and Class 1, at 60–74. 13 Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p. 17. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 5] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 165 colonial powers. Despite the withdrawal of French troops in 1954, Vietnam was forcibly divided between South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north. For the conference host country, Indonesia, the continuing Dutch occupation of West Irian was one of many examples of stalled independence struggles. The presence of foreign military bases and the American occupation of Korea and Japan also raised concerns about territorial sovereignty. The experience of the Second World War and the outbreak of new wars led conference delegates to focus on the importance of peace and halting the arms race. The Conference also emphasized mutual support and explored possible scientific, cultural, and political cooperation. The Bandung principles guided Afro-Asian solidarity from 1955 onward. Following Lee, one of the most significant effects of Bandung was “the feeling of political possibility represented through the first occasion of ‘Third World’ solidarity, what was soon referred to as the ‘Bandung Spirit.’”14 the founding of afro-asian peoples’ solidarity organization The 1955 Non-government Conference of Asian Countries in Delhi set up solidarity committees and expressed their support for the Bandung meeting of Asian and African leaders. These committees focused on renewing and creating networks among African and Asian activists and movements based on the assumption that people from this region had common problems and desires.15 In October 1957, these solidarity committees proposed a second conference to involve African countries. They believed such a conference was needed because of the “ominous” state of the world due to threats posed by the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, they remained frustrated by the inability of African and Asian peoples to enjoy the fruits of independence because of foreign intervention. According to Ibrahim Isa, an Indonesian delegate to the Conference, Cairo was chosen as the host city as a sign of support for President Nasser following his bold move to nationalize the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, in the face of strong disagreement from Britain and France.16 By gaining control of the canal, Nasser was able to show that economic self-determination through nationalization was possible. His actions became an important global precedent for other Afro-Asian leaders. Dr. Anup Singh, a member of parliament for India’s Congress Party, stated that Nasser had delivered “a shattering blow to imperialism” at the Suez 14 Lee, “Between a Moment,” p. 15. 15 Bulletin of the World Council of Peace, at 15. 16 Ibrahim Isa, Interview with Katharine McGregor, Amsterdam, Aug. 13, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 6] === 166 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman Canal.17 Suggesting continuity between Bandung and Cairo, Singh described how Afro-Asian solidarity committees established in each country had been working to popularize the “Bandung Spirit.” His appeal that “the Cairo Conference be the People’s Bandung” suggests some delegates wanted to see a further popularization of certain ideals put forward at Bandung. The Bandung emphasis on furthering the decolonization process continued at the Cairo conference. One of two designated speakers on colonialism was Dr. Felix-Roland Moumié of the Cameroons, which was still under UN trusteeship. Moumié was a medical doctor and president of the radical nationalist party UPC (Union of the People of Cameroon), which advocated an end to UN trusteeship and a reunification of the British and French Cameroons.18 At the time he spoke to the Cairo conference, the French had proscribed the UPC in the Cameroon from July 1955. The UPC moved to the British Cameroon, but on May 30, 1957, the British also banned the UPC and arrested a number of its leaders. In this political context, in his speech Moumié congratulates Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, and Ghana for achieving independence after Bandung, claiming the conference inspired hope in independence movements and lent them “new vigour.”19 Quoting comments from colonialists such as Jules Ferry and Montesquieu, which betray their aims of exploitation for profit, he implores conference delegates to “condemn colonialism as a crime against humanity” and for independent African and Asian countries to help nonindependent states to win their freedom and “above all to support in every way the peoples of the countries taking part in their struggle for national liberation.” He appeals to the delegates, stating, “This is not only a duty for them, but also a necessity.”20 In line with Moumié’s call, pro-independence organizations such as the National Liberation Front (Front Liberation Nationale, FLN) in Algeria were later represented in the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The second designated speaker on colonialism was Sirajuddin Abbas, an Indonesian who later participated in many AAPSO meetings and was a leader 17 Anup Singh, “Report by Dr Anup Singh (India),” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 64. 18 Meredith Terretta, “Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global: From Forest Maquis to a Pan African Accra” (2010) 51 Journal of African History 2, at 194. 19 Felix-Roland Moumié, “Report by Dr Felix-Roland Moumié (Cameroon),” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 88. 20 Id., p. 100. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 7] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 167 of the Indonesian Afro-Asian solidarity committee in Jakarta. He was a member of the traditionalist Muslim organization PERTI (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah) in Indonesia.21 Abbas reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to neutrality at this conference, stating that the nation opposed imperialism from wherever it came.22 As the second speaker on colonialism, Abbas reminded delegates that Indonesia had not forgotten the support offered from African and Asian countries during the Indonesian struggle for independence of 1945–1949, noting that this compelled Indonesians to support other nations in their struggles. Abbas called for a resolution supporting many specific struggles, including those of the peoples of Algeria, Palestine, South Arabia, Cyprus, the Cameroons, Ifni, and Taiwan.23 He defended Indonesia’s then-recent nationalization of Dutch companies, stating it was intended to end Dutch economic dominance.24 He also appealed to conference delegates on West Irian: “We too, badly need your full support for our struggle to recover West Irian from Dutch imperialism and thereby prevent the Dutch from entering the territorial waters dividing the islands of Indonesia.”25 Although Indonesia’s claim to West Irian is today a major source of dispute, in the 1950s Indonesian political activists saw the Dutch claim as the continuance of Dutch colonialism and viewed this case only from the perspective of Indonesian, not West Papuan, self-determination.26 Conference delegates passed a resolution supporting West Irian’s so-called return to Indonesia and recommended neighboring countries “not allow the Netherlands to use their harbours and airports for troops or weapons or for any purpose hostile to Indonesia.”27 21 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU 1952–1967 (Jakarta: LKiS, 1998), p. 129. 22 Sirajuddin Abbas, “Report by Sirajuddin Abbas (Indonesia),” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958). 23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Question of West Irian in the United Nations, 1954–1957 (Djakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1958), pp. 297–308, 399–415. 24 Abbas, “Report,” pp. 105–106. See also Thomas Lindblad’s documentation of Dutch economic control in Indonesia extending after Indonesian independence in 1949 in Lindblad, “The Economic Decolonisation of Indonesia: A Bird’s-Eye View” (2011) Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities 4, at 11–20. 25 Abbas, “Report,” p. 107. 26 See Richard Harry Chauvel, The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State: Essays on West Papua, Volume 1 [online], Working Paper 120 (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University Press, 2003), p. 17. 27 Afro Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, “Resolutions on Imperialism,” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26,1957–January 1, 1958, 224–231 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 228. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 8] === 168 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman Conference delegates at Cairo overall, however, paid greater attention to the urgent situation in nearby Algeria. Algerian Aiah Hasan, who was presumably a representative of the National Liberation Front (NLF), provided an emotive report on the ongoing anticolonial war, which was already three years in progress.28 Hasan explained the history of French settlement in Algeria, including displacement of Algerians from communal lands, the French use of violence against resistors, and the Algerian people’s eventual formation of the NLF to fight for independence. He outlined French methods of extreme brutality, including torture, indiscriminate mass killing campaigns (which he describes as genocide), and the use of concentration camps.29 Speaking to an Afro-Asian audience, Hasan condemns NATO support for the French and the lack of UN response, suggesting that in this context Algerians were fighting against not just France but a “coalition.” Connecting a string of events across Asia and Africa, he states, “We have reached a stage when all conflicts entail international repercussions. Algeria has already seen world peace in peril. The Suez aggression, in which France had the largest share, is clear proof of this.”30 In this way he suggested an alliance of former colonial powers and their dominance of the UN. In response to this report, conference delegates prepared a special resolution on Algeria condemning the war and related French atrocities.31 They demanded immediate recognition of Algerian independence and an end to the use of Africans in the French Army in Algeria, calling on soldiers to refuse to fight. The Conference encouraged delegates to spread information through press campaigns and demonstrations to mobilize public opinion against what they termed “the genocide” in Algeria, and to make France respect the Geneva Conventions on the Rules of War. Committees of solidarity for Algeria throughout Asia and Africa organized an Algeria Solidarity Day on March 30, 1958, and events were held in Indonesia, Burma, India, Japan, Egypt, and Vietnam.32 As the war progressed, Algeria became “the primary symbol of Third World unity and, for many Third World Leaders, a clear sign 28 Aiah Hasan, “Report by Aiah Hasan (Algeria),” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference Cairo, December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 108. 29 Marnia Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 30 Hasan, “Report,” p. 127. 31 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, “Resolution on Algeria,” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), pp. 234–236. 32 “Millions of Signatures, Campaigns in the Press, Meetings and Demonstrations Save Djamila and Call for Solidarity with Algerian People” (1958) Women of the Whole World 5, at 13. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 9] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 169 that the West was not willing to accept the full liberation of their continents from imperial domination.”33 Looking across the countries of Asia and Africa, AAPSO members saw the same patterns repeated, and Algeria remained a major rallying point for AAPSO until the end of the war in 1962. Delegates at the Cairo conference discussed not only the importance of realizing the aims of Bandung among ordinary people and the importance of decolonization, but also post-decolonization discontent with the lack of economic power and the continuing dominance of colonial masters. Khaled Mohieddin, who had participated with Nasser in the 1952 revolution against the monarchy, spoke of new methods of coercion against newly independent governments continuing to allow foreign capital exploitation. Mohieddin referred to protests by Britain, France, and other Western countries at Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal company.34 Defense of Egypt’s control of the canal, Mohieddin suggested, was a shared responsibility. Conference delegates from Sudan, Egypt, Japan, Syria, China, and the Soviet Union discussed a range of issues such as racial discrimination, the banning of nuclear weapons, the promotion of economic cooperation and cultural exchange, and the situation of women and children. Conference delegates also agreed to more general actions concerning social development and efforts to improve the living and working conditions and protection of rights throughout Asian and African countries, showing the tentative steps made in these areas at this time. The Conference closed on January 1, 1958, and produced a document called the Cairo Declaration,35 which reinforced a commitment to the principles of Bandung. Delegates agreed to set up a permanent secretariat in Cairo for the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization to carry out the resolutions of the Conference. aapso activism related to anticolonialism The founding of AAPSO opened new connections for emerging leaders and political activists from Asian and African countries. For Indonesia, AAPSO and Indonesian representation within it provided a channel for rallying 33 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 105. 34 Khaled Mohieddin, “Report by Khaled Mohieddin (Egypt),” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958) p. 79. 35 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, “Declaration of the Afro Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference,” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26,1957–January 1, 1958, 217–220 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 10] === 170 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman support on the issue of West Irian. From 1960 onward, Indonesian Ibrahim Isa served in the AAPSO permanent secretariat in Cairo.36 International peace activists in Europe invited Indonesians to take part in the World Peace Council. First, a local peace committee was formed, and Isa became involved in the Indonesian Peace Committee and assumed the position of secretary. The Indonesian Peace Committee shared its offices later with the Afro-Asian solidarity committee, and through these links Isa began his Afro-Asian solidarity work. The Indonesian AAPSO committee sent him in 1960 to represent Indonesia at the Permanent Secretariat in Cairo. Isa recounts that his role on the AAPSO secretariat was to assist the African independence movements.37 He recalls visiting a number of African countries to investigate the needs of newly decolonizing nations and those of proindependence organizations. Isa (and Indonesia) also saw his AAPSO role as well positioned to build solidarity for the West Irian campaign with Arab and African organizations.38 Following the Dutch decision in 1960 to send the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman to West Irian, Isa convened a meeting with AAPSO and the African Association. The AAPSO secretariat called for Egyptian solidarity to keep the Suez Canal closed to Dutch warships heading to Indonesia.39 The campaign against Dutch warships draws on earlier examples of the black bans placed on reequipping Dutch warships by Indian seamen in Australia.40 To commemorate Africa Day, Isa organized a large meeting at Al Azhar University in Cairo to explain the West Irian campaign. He also held public meetings on West Irian in nearby Arab and African countries, thus ensuring that there was a degree of knowledge about West Irian as an example of unfinished decolonization. Following independence at the end of June 1960, a crisis shortly developed in the Congo, which brought AAPSO again to the center of anti-imperial struggles. Congolese soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers, and shortly after the mutiny, Moises Tshombe, president of the provincial government of Katanga, declared the secession of his oil-rich province. A UN intervention to restore order was subsequently criticized for bias against Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a popular and democratically elected politician. 36 37 Ibrahim Isa, interview. Ibid. 38 Ibrahim Isa, Bui Tanpa Jerajak Besi: Pikiran Seorang Eksil Indonesia di Luar Negeri [A Gaol without Iron Bars: Thoughts from Abroad of an Indonesian Exile] (Jakarta: Klik Books, 2011), p. 197. 39 40 Heather Goodall, “Shared Hopes, New Worlds: Indians, Australians, and Indonesians in the Boycott of Dutch Shipping, 1945–1949” in Shanti Moorthy and Ashraf Jamal (eds.), Indian Ocean Studies: Cultural, Social and Political Perspectives (Hoboken: Routledge, 2009). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 11] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 171 Between July 1960 and June 1964, the UN Mission in the Congo (UNOC) was one of the biggest UN peacekeeping missions, with more than 20,000 troops and logistical support from 30 countries.41 The actions of Andrew Wellington Cordier, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s assistant, who filled in as his interim representative to the Congo for three weeks, were crucial in setting the UN on a course in the Congo that aligned it closely with U.S. interests in the Cold War in Africa.42 The United States saw Lumumba’s government as a threat to American access to rich mineral deposits in the Congo.43 Events in the Congo divided the world and led to distrust of the UN. By 1960, Lumumba and his allies believed the UN was violating the sovereign government by negotiating directly with Moises Tshombe and therefore supporting the Katanga secession. In order to address financial vulnerability that engendered dependence on the UN, the AAPSO Beirut executive committee meeting in November 1960 opted to set up a Solidarity Fund committee.44 The fund received pledges of donations from China, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, and the United Arab Republic.45 The fund was designed to ensure a measure of autonomy for countries struggling against imperialism because after the events in the Congo they no longer trusted the UN. AAPSO tried to support the struggles of both the NLF in Algeria and the Congolese National Movement against the French and the Belgians, respectively. By 1960, both organizations had their own Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees that liaised with AAPSO and representatives on both the AAPSO Executive Committee (twenty-seven members) and the Permanent Secretariat (twelve people) based in Cairo.46 AAPSO set up the Solidarity Fund to aid Algeria and the Congo in 1961. Ismail Touré of Guinea, Ben Barka of 41 Carole J. L. Collins, “The Cold War Comes to Africa” (1993) 47 Journal of International Affairs 1, at 244–245. Participating countries included Burma, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Malaya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, and Tunisia. 42 Id. at 246. Cordier occupied the role temporarily after the departure of African-American diplomat Ralph Bunche from the position and before the arrival of Bunche’s Indian replacement, Rajeshwar Dayal. 43 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 137. 44 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, “Afro Asian Solidarity Fund,” in Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Movement (Cairo: Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, 1962), pp. 111–126. 45 46 The Executive Committee included Antoine Gizenga for Congo and an unnamed NLF representative for Algeria, and on the Permanent Secretariat, Anicet Mbiasi for Congo and Ahmed Zemerline for Algeria. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Movement; Principles, Structure, Friendly https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 12] === 172 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman Morocco, and Chu Tze-Chi of China led the Fund Committee.47 The fund was considered urgent because of the arrest of Lumumba and other politicians. The AAPSO Council called on all members to assist the Congolese people, such as by sending volunteers, collecting funds, providing support to the legitimate government, and rallying public opinion. In addition, the AAPSO council appealed to Afro-Asian governments and so-called peace loving governments to give diplomatic recognition to Lumumba supporters. To express disappointment with the UN, several countries declared their intention to withdraw troops from peacekeeping roles. The council called on those governments (such as Guinea, United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Morocco, and Mali) to send those troops to aid Lumumba instead.48 Lumumba was seized and killed in September 1961 as a result of cooperation between civilian leaders and the military officer and later Congolese dictator Joseph Mobutu. African and Asian political activists in AAPSO viewed his murder as an indictment of Western interference in the affairs of a sovereign country and demonstrated the bias of the UN. The Solidarity Fund received multiple requests from members for other urgent needs. These included requests for printing materials and equipment; scholarships for and training of technicians; donations for medical treatment, food, clothes, and medicine; judicial assistance for organizations or persons on trial for participating in national liberation movements.49 Applications for funds soon outweighed the amount available for distribution, and financial constraints overshadowed the operations of AAPSO, despite the fact that several conferences were held in different parts of the world. It remained largely a shoestring operation driven by spirit. AAPSO held its main conferences in Cairo in 1958; in Conakry, Guinea, in 1960; and in Moshi, Tanganyika, in 1963. Affiliate organizations to AAPSO were rapidly founded. These included the Afro-Asian Writers’ Bureau, founded in 1959 in Cairo and based in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), one of the aims of which was to promote and preserve local cultures. The Afro-Asian Jurists’ Association was based in Conakry, Guinea. The Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association was formed in 1963, based in Jakarta, and sought to create independent news sources. A women’s section was also set up, first meeting in Cairo in January 1961. There is no space in this chapter to detail the activities Organizations (Cairo: Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, 1962), pp. 104–105. 47 48 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Movement, pp. 138–139, and James Mayall, Africa: The Cold War and After (London: Elek Books, 1971), p. 123. 49 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Movement, pp. 117–118. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 13] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 173 of these affiliates, which deserve more scholarly attention, but they tried to challenge the dominance of world powers in many aspects of life. changing attitudes to afro-asian solidarity at a state level The world was changing by 1960, and pressures arose that inhibited holding a repeat of the Bandung Conference. Armed conflicts developed between India and China, and Pakistan and India, that flew in the face of Bandung principles like peaceful settlement of conflicts. The Sino-Soviet split, the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961, and Sukarno’s formulation of the New Emerging Forces (versus the Old Forces; NEFOS/ OLDEFO) undermined the premise of Afro-Asian solidarity.50 The founding of NAM challenged the supremacy of Afro-Asian solidarity by incorporating countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe around goals that seemed at first quite similar to those agreed to in the Bandung principles.51 Some countries, such as Pakistan, did not share Indonesia’s radical views in excluding Malaysia from the Afro-Asia umbrella, or in its critical attitudes to the United Nations. As Indonesia moved toward Sukarno’s Guided Democracy from 1959 – with a restriction in press freedom, a lack of democratic elections, and suspension of parliament – the emphasis on individual rights as contained in the UN Charter became a challenge. Attitudes hardened in Indonesia against Western countries as a result of the battle to win West Irian from the Dutch. Sukarno was also opposed to the creation of Malaysia, accusing the British of creating a puppet state on its borders.52 Indonesia called on Afro- Asian solidarity in winning over world opinion to its side, but it was not always successful. Foreign Minister Joseph Leimena, former chairperson of the Bandung Conference Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Secretary General of the Asia Africa Conference Roeslan Abdulgani argued that a second Afro-Asian 50 According to Sukarno, NEFOS included “all the forces in the world, all the forces in mankind, which are fighting for the establishment of a new world, a new world without imperialism, a new world without colonialism, a new world without capitalism, a new world without exploitation de l’homme par l’homme, a new world without exploitation de nation par nation.” Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia, in Executive Command for the Commemoration of Ten Years of the First Afro-Asian Conference, 119. 51 Milos Dromnjak, The Policy and Movement of Non-Alignment 1961–1979: A Survey of Participants and Activities (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, 1979), p. 29. 52 Mackie, Konfrontasi. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 14] === 174 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman conference could safeguard and further the legacy of Bandung and reduce conflict.53 Delegates at the Conference in 1955 initially emphasized winning independence as a key goal for Afro-Asian solidarity. Discussion shifted to emphasizing that formal independence did not go far enough in fulfilling the needs of the people. Indonesian representatives at the fifth anniversary stated that Afro-Asian solidarity should continue beyond independence. Former Secretary General of the Bandung Conference Roeslan Abdulgani went further and articulated that the spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity was about decolonization in the short term and socialism in the long run.54 These more radical ideas were not universally accepted. Indian ambassador J. N. Khosla saw Bandung more as a repository of moral power, with the purpose of cooling down international tensions rather than arguing for ideological agreement.55 Disagreements on how much emphasis to give to combating imperialism and neocolonialism exposed some of the limitations of the Afro-Asian “alliance.” In April 1965, there was much fanfare in Indonesia surrounding the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of Bandung, including cultural performances, sports events, a film festival, and a range of exhibitions.56 Sukarno discussed the dangers of neocolonialism, imperialism, and the broadening of the Afro-Asian alliance to include Latin America following the Cuban revolution and evidence of its leftist orientation.57 Afro-Asian solidarity had been reenergized by preparations for the second Asia-Africa conference in Algeria, planned to take place in June 1965. The Organization of African Unity chose Algeria to host the conference because it had been such a focus for Afro-Asian solidarity during the Algerian independence war. Indonesia continued to participate at both state and nonstate levels in many Afro-Asian solidarity initiatives, but the army’s unseating of Sukarno in 1966 radically changed Indonesia’s international outlook and alliances. The last AAPSO conference in which Indonesians participated before the upheaval in Indonesia was in May 1965 in Winneba, Ghana. In his opening address, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah continued to try to find sources of unity between Africans, Asians, and the people of Latin America, 53 See Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Pidato-Pidato Peringatan Ulang Tahun ke- V Konperensi Asia-Afrika: tahun 1960 [Speeches for the Commemoration of the Fifth Year since the Asia Africa Conference: 1960] (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I., 1960), pp. 7–18. 54 55 Id., p. 18. Id., p. 21. 56 See Executive Command for the Commemoration of Ten Years of the First Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 11–12. 57 Sukarno, “After Ten Years, Still Onward, Never Retreat,” pp. 32–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 15] === Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism 175 emphasizing their shared struggled against neocolonialism, which aimed to “inhibit or slow down the economic development of the ex-colonies so that they will remain colonies in everything but name.”58 At the same time, however, he critiqued the “distressing conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia,” describing it as a “great source of embarrassment to all Afro-Asians and a threat to Afro-Asian solidarity” and calling for Sukarno and Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to negotiate.59 He also criticized India and Pakistan for their border dispute, calling for resolution, and referred to these examples of disunity as retarding the struggle against imperialism.60 Despite these indictments, the Conference passed a resolution supporting Indonesia’s position on Malaysia, thus showing Indonesia’s strength within AAPSO. The second African-Asian conference, scheduled for June 1965 in Algeria, was never held, as the government of Ben Bella fell as a result of a military coup led by Houari Boumedienne in June 1965. In Indonesia, the military’s seizure of power by the end of 1965, the crushing of the Indonesian Communist Party, and the end of the Sukarno era similarly closed the chapter on Afro-Asian solidarity and an emphasis on anti-imperialism for Indonesia. Those governments that had been the most active supporters of Afro-Asian solidarity suffered similar defeats. Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah fell victim to a coup in 1965. conclusion AAPSO has continued to operate from a base in Cairo since the mid-1960s, but its focus changed because of the fractures outlined here. From 1955 to 1965, postcolonial solidarity across the countries of Asia and Africa was at its strongest. Christopher Lee argues that Afro-Asian solidarity is “an ill-defined term that has signalled both a cold war ideology of diplomatic solidarity as well as a more general phenomenon of intercontinental exchange and inter-racial connection.”61 Through the examples from AAPSO this chapter has sought to capture more of the complexity of this solidarity by looking at the dynamics within third world activism. Through the common experiences of overcoming colonialism, nonstate actors engaged in advocacy based on shared concerns about peace and economic and diplomatic equality with other nations. Despite fractures across Afro-Asian alliances, the Bandung Spirit continued to influence and inspire a range of political movements into the late 1960s and beyond. At the level of people’s movements, the Bandung principles of 58 Nkrumah, “Inaugural Address given by Dr Kwame Nkrumah,” at 24. 59 Id. at 28. 60 Id. at 30. 61 Lee, “Between a Moment,” pp. 3–4. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press === [PDF page 16] === 176 Katharine McGregor and Vannessa Hearman equality between nations, nonintervention, and peaceful conduct resonated strongly throughout global anti–Vietnam War activism. At the state level the principle of equality among nations and the emphasis on the need for a new international economic order also underpinned the Non-Aligned Movement.62 62 Helen E. S. Nesaduarai, “Bandung and the Political Economy of North-South Relations: Sowing the Seeds for Re-visioning International Society,” in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 71–74, 77–80. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press