The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1961: A Decade of the Aidit Leadership (PhD thesis, Australian National University)

=== [PDF page 1] === (/1s-*-'^yw [Unreadable] === [PDF page 2] === THE COMMUNIST PARTY OP INDONESIA, 1951-1961: A DECADE OP THE AIDIT LEADERSHIP A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at the Australian National University Donald Hindley July 1961 === [PDF page 3] === G %y$~f TABLE OP CONTENTS PAGE Preface Summary Glossary of Terms INTRODUCTION I« The Socio-Economic Situation inJava 1. A general view of rural Java 2. The Javanese village 3« The urban setting 26 The Indonesian Communist Party,1920-1948 38 PART ONE: THE AIDIT LEADERSHIP’S ANALYSIS OP THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION I. Prologue 47 47 II. Indonesia is a Semi-Colonial, Semi-Peudal Country 53 III. The Basic Targets of the Indonesian Revolution 64 IV. The Driving Forces of the Revolution 66 V. The National United Front 82 PART TWO: BUILDING THE PARTY 98 I. The Party Leadership 98 === [PDF page 4] === PAGE 1. The Party leadership, December 1948 to January 1951 2. The Party leadership since January 1951 98 109 II. The Expansion and Education of Party Membership 119 1. 1951 119 2. The first membership drive 128 3* The second membership drive 141 4. The first three-year plan of organization and education 5. Towards the second three-year plan 156 191 6. Solidarity within PKI under the Aidit leadership 'Illegal P K I 1? III. Communist Funds in Indonesia PART THREE: BUILDING MASS SUPPORT 195 208 215 240 I. The Cultivation of General Appeals 240 II. Appeals to Specific Sections of Society 257 1• The Workers 264 a. SOBSI 265 b. Direct Party work 325 2. The Peasants a. The PKI attitude to the peasants 332 332 === [PDF page 5] === PAGE b. Building an organization among the peasants 337 Work among the peasants 359 d. The political usefulness of communist support in the villages 3# The Petty Bourgeoisie 373 379 a. The fishermen 381 b. The intellectuals 383 4. Youth 392 a. Pemuda Rakjat 393 Student organizations: IPPI and CGMI 411 c. Communist scouts and young pioneers 420 5. Women 422 423 The work of the Party b. Gerwani 428 441 The work of SOBSI and itstrade unions d. The work of BTI 446 6. Ethnic groups and minorities 448 7. Veterans of the revolution 457 III, Mobilizing Electoral Support 460 1. PKI*s election campaigns 460 2. The election results 469 === [PDF page 6] === PAGE PART POUR: THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE OTHER POLITICAL FORCES 479 I. The Search for the National United Front 1. The experiences of 1950 2. The Aidit leadership takes 479 479 over 483 II. The National United Front Policy Implemented 494 1* PKI*s political behaviour under the national united front 494 2* The approach to FNI 499 3. Alliance with FNI 521 4* The approach to Sukarno 544 5. Alliance with Sukarno 562 6. Towards an impasse? 591 CONCLUSION 615 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 649 MAPS: at end of thesis A. PKI Votes, 1957 (Java) B. Combined Votes of the Moslem Parties, 1957 (Java) C. PNI Votes, 1957 (Java) === [PDF page 7] === PREFACE I was in the United States in February 1958 when the PRRI-Permesta rebellion broke out in Indonesia* Both the rebels and some echoing Westerners asserted that if Indonesia was not in fact already communist, then certainly the Indonesian Communist Party was on the point of taking over the central government. The State Department’s apparent support for the rebels seemed to confirm that these assertions contained a strong element of truth; and the American newspapers did little to refute them. PKI was the largest communist party in Asia outside the Soviet bloc, and the results of the 1957 local elections indicated that it had the largest popular sup port of any party in Indonesia. PKI was also clearly in alliance with President Sukarno. In other words, the position of PKI was apparently much stronger than that of the communist parties in the other non-communist countries of Asia. In 1958 I had just concluded a study of the failure of the communists to capture control of the leftwing, nationalist upsurge in Bolivia, and I was there fore especially interested to know why PKI had grown so large, as well as to know if PKI was, as the rebels === [PDF page 8] === c la im e d, in r e a l c o n t r o l o f th e c e n t r a l governm ent o r on th e p o in t o f w in n in g c o n t r o l. T h e se, th e n, a r e th e c e n t r a l q u e s t io n s th a t t h i s t h e s i s s e e k s to an sw er: why and how h as PKI won mass su p p o r t and t h e a l l i a n c e o f im p o r ta n t non-com m unist p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s, and d o e s t h i s su p p o r t and a l l i a n c e mean th a t PKI c o n t r o l s th e c e n t r a l governm ent o r i s w in c o n t r o l i n th e n e a r fu tu r e? in a p o s i t i o n to I found t h a t th e grow th o f PKI and i t s mass o r g a n iz a t io n s h as b een made under th e le a d e r s h ip o f a group o f young com m unists who won c o n t r o l o f th e P a r ty in Jan u ary 1951» That month i s th e r e f o r e th e o p e n in g d a t e o f th e t h e s i s. The c l o s i n g d a t e, J a n u a ry 1 9 6 1, was c h o se n a r b i t r a r i l y b e c a u se th e o v e r a l l p o l i c y fo r m u la te d and im plem ented by th e A id it le a d e r s h ip is s t i l l in e f f e c t, and b e c a u se Jan u ary 1961 i s th e l a s t month f o r w hich I c o u ld o b t a in f a i r l y co m p lete in fo r m a tio n. Prom th e s t a r t o f my s tu d y o f PKI I was n o t con cern ed p r im a r ily w ith th e P a r t y ’s r e l a t i o n s w ith Moscow and P e k in g, and i t was fou n d l a t e r t h a t su ch a l i n e o f r e s e a r c h w ould have p roved f a i r l y s t e r i l e b e c a u se s in c e 1948 th e In d o n e s ia n comm unist le a d e r s have b een l e f t t o fo r m u la te t h e i r own p o l i c i e s. The r e s e a r c h f o r t h i s t h e s i s was u n d erta k en w ith a t h r e e - y e a r s c h o l a r s h i p from th e A u s t r a lia n N a tio n a l U n iv e r s i t y. The f i r s t s i x months were s p e n t i n s tu d y in g === [PDF page 9] === iii a l l a v a ila b le E n g lish -la n g u a g e m a te r ia ls on In d o n e s ia, and in le a r n in g to read In d o n e s ia n. D uring th e n e x t s ix months a l l a v a ila b le m a te r ia ls in In d o n e sia n were s i f t e d. The In d o n e sia n v i s a was g ra n te d a t l a s t, and I went to Ja v a f o r alm o st e le v e n m onths. Most o f t h i s tim e was s p e n t in D ja k a rta, b u t I a ls o went to J o g ja k a r ta f o r two p e r io d s, t o t a l l i n g two m onths, in o rd e r to o b ta in a d i f f e r e n t view o f th e s i t u a t i o n. B r ie f v i s i t s were a ls o made to S u ra b a ja and S u ra k a r ta. While in In d o n e sia I examined m a te r ia ls in l i b r a r i e s in D ja k a rta and J o g ja k a r ta, and c o l l e c t e d as much p u b lis h e d communist l i t e r a t u r e as was a v a i l a b l e. Many government o f f i c i a l s were i n t e r view ed, e s p e c i a l l y members o f th e M in is tr ie s o f A gri c u l tu r e and L abour. Much o f my in fo rm a tio n was g a in e d, how ever, from in te rv ie w s w ith n a t io n a l and r e g io n a l le a d e r s o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and mass o r g a n iz a tio n s. The n a t i o n a l le a d e r s o f PKI would n o t meet me, b u t P a rty c a d re s a t th e r e g io n a l l e v e l proved a t tim es f r i e n d l y and in f o rm a tiv e. S e v e ra l a s p e c ts o f th e t h e s i s r e q u ir e e x p la n a tio n. Because l i t t l e o r no p re v io u s r e s e a r c h has been u n d e rta k e n on most m a tte rs d e a l t w ith in th e t h e s i s, much d e s c r ip tiv e m a te r ia l has had to be in c lu d e d. The n eed to in c lu d e so much d e s c r ip tiv e m a te r ia l, and th e l i m i t on th e le n g th o f th e s e s o f th e A u s tr a lia n N a tio n a l U n iv e r s ity, made i t === [PDF page 10] === necessary to limit the scope of the Introduction* With regard to the general political background of the period studied, I have restricted myself to sketching a brief outline history of PKI to 1948. The wider background has been treated adequately in readily available Englishlanguage sources, and I decided against going over the same ground* But I could not omit a study, however brief, of the socio-economic situation in Java. Most of PKI*s advances have been made in Java, especially among the ethnic Javanese, and expansion into other areas has been made mainly from this base* It is essential to examine Javanese society in order to understand why PKI has been able to win broad support, and to understand the character and quality of this support* Most of the introductory chapter is devoted to such an examination because an adequate one has not been undertaken before. It must be noted that I have been unable to divulge the names of the majority of my informants. The trans lations from Indonesian to English are my own. I have at times quoted Indonesian English-language materials, but where the original Indonesian was also available I have at times altered the English if I felt it did not accurately represent the meaning of the original. There are many persons, of varied nationality, occupation, social status, and political persuasion, to === [PDF page 11] === whom I became indebted during my stay in Indonesia. For the information and hospitality they gave me, I express my thanks. Finally, I wish to thank in particular three members of the Australian National University: Professor Leicester Webb, my supervisor, for his constant encourage ment; Dr Bruce Graham, for his advice in shaping the rough draft into presentable form; and Dr Herbert Feith, for his relentless opposition to unsound opinion and the loose generalization. === [PDF page 12] === SUMMARY OP THESIS The Introduction is divided into two parts: an analysis of Javanese society, and an outline history of PKI to December 1948. Because PKI has made its greatest gains among the Javanese and in the villages as well as in the towns, an examination is made of socio-economic conditions in the rural and urban areas of Java. It is hoped that the examination points to some of the reasons for the rapid growth of the communist organization. The outline history of PKI to the end of 1948 is intended merely to sketch in the background of the Party before the opening date of the main part of the thesis. Part One is concerned with the communist leaders* view of Indonesian society and the Indonesian revolution. What I have termed the Aidit leadership considered Indonesia to be a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. The basic enemies of the revolution were seen as the colonialists (imperialists) and the feudalists - in that order. The proletariat was clearly too weak to win power alone, but the Aidit leadership believed that because of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of Indonesia the workers could, given the correct strategy and tactics, win many allies. Because the peasantry and === [PDF page 13] === vii the petty bourgeoisie were oppressed and stifled by the imperialists and the feudalists, they were envisaged as being potential firm allies of the workers, while the national bourgeoisie, also the victim of imperialism and feudalism, was envisaged as an ally under certain conditions* But even such a range of allies might not be sufficient to guarantee victory for *the people*, and the communist leaders believed they might be obliged to form temporary alliances with certain sections of the compradore bourgeoisie at certain times in order to combat other sections. Prom this analysis of the socio-political forces present in the revolution, the Aidit leadership decided on a broad national united front policy that entailed three main tasks: the creation of a mass communist party, the creation of much wider popular support through the work of mass organizations that were steeled by the Party, and the welding of an alliance with the non-communist political forces. Part Two describes the building of the mass party. First the leadership of PKI is discussed, then the expansion of the Party and the political education of the membership, and, leading out of these, there is a discussion of the reasons for the exceptional solidarity shown by the PKI leaders and cadres during the ten years === [PDF page 14] === viii after January 1951. A last section analyses the available evidence as to the income and expenditure of the communist movement• Part Three describes how the Aidit leadership built mass support. An opening section discusses the effort made to create a public image of the Party without which it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to attract mass support and to win the alliance of broad sectors of the other political forces. Most of Part Three is devoted to an analysis of how the Indonesian communists have won mass support by specific appeals to the different sections of 'the people*. An examination is made of the growth and activities of the communist-led mass organizations (which by the end of 1960 claimed about nine million members), but direct Party work is not ignored. At the same time an attempt is made to estimate the quality of the mass support won by PKI and its mass organizations. The sections of 'the people* dealt with specifically are: the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, youth, women, ethnic groups and minorities, and the veterans of the revolution. Part Three is concluded with an analysis of PKI*s election work in 1955 and 1957» and with a discussion of the votes obtained. Part Pour is concerned with the application of the national united front policy to P K I 's relations with the === [PDF page 15] === other political forces. PKI offered its friendship to all but the avowed anti-communists, and in return asked neither participation in the cabinet nor a share in the spoils of office. FNI was particularly eager to accept PKI's offer in order to strengthen its own hand against what it considered to be its most dangerous rival, Masjumi. After the 1955 general elections, the power situation changed radically. PKI and Sukarno sought each other’s support against first the dissident regionalists and then the central army leadership. Too weak to take too independent a line, PKI was forced to give grumbling acquiescence to the curtailment of liberties and the restriction of parliamentary authority that were carried out by Sukarno after 1956 under the banner of guided democracy. As the first decade of the Aidit leadership came to a close, the political situation in Indonesia appeared to be moving in a direction unfavourable to PKI, but PKI could do no more than emit ineffectual protests. The Conclusion further develops some of the main themes of the rest of the thesis. Attention is first given to the general situation in January 1961, with the special object of showing what factors induced the Aidit leadership to formulate and then to implement its national united front strategy. The actual implementation of the === [PDF page 16] === strategy in the years i951 to 1961 is then discussed, special attention being given to the question of whether or not PKI exercised a significant influence on the course of political events. Finally, PKI*s position at the beginning of 1961 is examined. It is suggested here that although PKI and its mass organizations had grown large, they were not of the quality that would allow the PKI leaders to use them as a means of taking power, at least in the near future. PKI was working among the poorer sections of society that were relatively free from strong social antagonisms. At the same time, it would appear that the national united front policy, involving moderation towards the ruling groups and wealthier classes, was unable to create a militant mood among PKI's sup porters. Such a mood was necessary if the massive commu nist organization was to become a. force capable of challenging and defeating those in power. === [PDF page 17] === GLOSSARY 1• Names of Political Parties, The following are the abbreviated names of parties most frequently used in this thesis: NU - Partai Nahdatul Ulama, Party of the Association of Islamic Scholars. NU was founded in 1926 as an association of Moslem scholars adhering to the four orthodox schools of Islamic law. It was formed partly as a reaction to the activities of the modernist Islamic association Muhammadijah. became a member of the all-embracing Moslem party Masjumi founded on November 7, 1945» but withdrew in August 1952 to constitute Itself as a political party. Perti - Partai Islam Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah, Islamic Party of the Islamic Educational Movement. Perti was founded originally as an Islamic edu cational association in Central Sumatra in 1928. November 1945 Perti reconstituted itself as a political party. PIR - Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya, Party of the Union of Great Indonesia, founded on December 10, 1948. === [PDF page 18] === xii PKI - Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party, founded on May 23* 1920. PNI - Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party, founded on February 1, 1946. PSI - Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party. A Socialist Party was founded shortly after the proclamation of Indonesian independence on PSI was formed in January 1948 as a breakaway from the rest of the party that had fallen under communist control. PSII - Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Association Party, was founded in 1947* though a party of the same name and with some of the same leaders had been active before the Second World War. 2. Names of Mass Organizations. The following are the abbreviated names of communist mass organizations frequently used in this thesis: BTI - Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants* Organization, founded on November 25* 1945* CGMI - Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Concen tration of Indonesian Student Movements, founded in November 1958. === [PDF page 19] === xiii Gerwani - Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian W o m e n s Movement* Gerwani is the new name given to Gerwis in March 1954* Gerwis - Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar, Movement of Enlightened Indonesian Women, founded on June 4» 1950. IPPI - Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia, League of Indonesian High School Youth, was formed, with a slightly different name, in September 1945* LEKRA - Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, Institute of People’s Culture, formed on August 17> 1950* Perbepsl - Persatuan Bekas Pedjuang Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesian Union of Veterans, established on December 30, 1951. SAKTI - Sarekat Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants’ Association, established on December 17» 1949« Sarbupri - Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Indonesia, Indonesian Estate Workers’ Trade Union, founded in February 1947 and constituting the largest union in SOBSI. SOBSI - Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, AllIndonesia Organization of Trade Unions, established on November 29> 1946. === [PDF page 20] === xiv 3» Names of Newspapers and Periodicals, BB - Bendera Buruh, Workers * Flag, the periodical of SOBSI. BM - Bintang Merah, Red Star, PKI's monthly ideological journal. FALP - For a Lasting Peace, for a People fs Democracy.1, the journal of the Cominform. HR - Harian Rakjat, People’s Daily, the PKI newspaper. ITUN - Indonesian Trade Union News, a periodical in English issued by SOBSI. KP - Kehidupan Partai, Party Life. This is a continuation of PKI-Buletin, but has become primarily a forum for the exchange of practical experiences in the different fields of Party work. PKI-B - PKI-Buietin, a multipurpose Party journal issued from February 1952 to early in 1955 when its name was changed to Kehidupan Partai. RI - Review of Indonesia, a PKI English language monthly which was originally mimeographed as Monthly Review, but from January 1957 has been printed with the present title. ST - Suara Tani, Voice of the Peasants, the official journal of BTI. TI - Times of Indonesia, an English-language, politically independent newspaper published in Djakarta from 1952 until October 31, 1960, when its license was revoked. === [PDF page 21] === 4* Government A d m in is tr a tiv e A r e a s. The f o llo w in g two term s a re u se d i n t h i s t h e s i s: Kabupaten - In d o n e s ia i s d iv id e d in t o p r o v in c e s, th e p r o v in c e s in t o r e s i d e n c i e s, and th e r e s i d e n c i e s i n t o k a b u p a te n s. In 1958 th e r e were 170 k ab up aten s in I n d o n e s ia, in c lu d in g 80 i n J a v a. Ket;jamatan - Each kabupaten i s d iv id e d i n t o s e v e r a l kew edan aans, and t h e s e i n tu rn i n t o k e tja m a ta n s. In 1958 th e r e were 2,8 2 6 ket,jam atans in I n d o n e s ia, in c lu d in g 1,4 4 9 i n J a v a. === [PDF page 22] === INTRODUCTION === [PDF page 23] === INTRODUCTION THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN JAVA 1 • A General View of Rural Java The Indonesian population is at present estimated to be about 92 millions, compared with 60.4 millions in 1930 and it is growing at the rate of 1.5 to 2 millions per year. Between 1930 and 1952, when total population increased b y about 18.5 millions, the population of the Indonesian municipalities rose from 3.2 millions to 7«1 millions. As only about 2.5 to 3 millions of the urban increase was due to migration from rural areas, it is evident that urban growth was far too slow to absorb even a significant part of the increasing rural population. In Java,2 the population has increased from 41•? millions in 1930 to about 60 millions at present. This rise occurred in an island which was already densely crowded. It is estimated that in 1952 the average popu- Indonesian Participants in the December 1955 United Nations Seminar on Population in Asia and the Par East, "The Population of Indonesia”, Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, February 1956, pp.94-5* All statistics for Java also include the island of Madura which is administratively part of East Java. === [PDF page 24] === lation density for West Java (including Djakarta) was 346 persons per square kilometre, for Central Java (including Jogjakarta) 460, and for East Java 380.1 This high density is not, in general, the result of urbanization but of a dense rural population. The greatest concen trations of rural population occur along the north coast from Tjirebon to Pekalongan; along the south coast from Banjumas to Jogjakarta, and then inland to around Surakarta; and along the lower Brantas from Kediri to Surabaja.2 The highest densities are in the kabupaten of Klaten (an estimated 1,038 persons per square kilometre in 1955)f and the kabupaten of Tjirebon (an estimated 773 persons per square kilometre).^ Within Java approximately 60 per cent of the total land surface is used by peasants for food production and some cash crops, 7*6 per cent is used by estates for export crops, and 8.8 per cent is occupied by towns, roads and rivers.^ Only 23*4 per cent is forest-covered, Indonesian Participants, "The Population of Indonesia", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, February 1956, p.108. Atlas Van Tropisch Nederland, Batavia, 1938, map 18a. Indonesian Participants, "The Population of Indonesia", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, February 1956, p*91» News and Views Indonesia, August 17> 1959, vol.IV, no.7> p. 14. Another official estimate is that in 1958 peasant agriculture occupied 63*3 per cent of the total land area of Java; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1960, Djakarta, 1960, p.48. === [PDF page 25] === although forestry experts estimate that 30 per cent of forest is the minimum required to safeguard the water supply. The forest is in scattered pockets, and much of it is planted teak stands. There is virtually no land available in Java for a further expansion of agriculture,"' and migration from Java to the thinly populated outer islands has been on a small scale.2 in other words, the increase in rural population has to be absorbed on the present agricultural area. The basic crop in Java is irrigated rice, with maize, cassava, peanuts and soybeans grown in the dry season and on unirrigated land. Cultivation is everywhere labourintensive, and agricultural implements are primitive. Little fertilizer is used, and yields are low: 22.7 quintals of dry stalk paddy per hectare in Indonesia, An official commission estimated in 1937 that only about 300,000 hectares of land were still available for culti vation in Java, that is, enough to absorb the population increase for 3i years; Karl J. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics. New York, 1945» p.162, note 9* 1960, the Indonesian Ministry of Agrarian Affairs calcu lated that 181,934 hectares of Neglected* land was available for food production in Java; Departemen Agraria (Ministry of Agrarian Affairs), "Tanah-Tanah Terlantar" (Neglected Lands), mimeographed document, Djakarta, I960, 4P« Prom 1951 to 1959 inclusive, only 231>474 migrants left Java to settle in the outer islands; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.16. === [PDF page 26] === c o m p a re d w i t h 37*8 i n C h in a and 74*8 i n I t a l y. ' L iv e sto c k ( b u f f a l o s, g o a t s and s h e e p ) a n d f i s h i n g ( s e a and i n l a n d ) fo rm a n i m p o r t a n t a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e o f f o o d. A lth o u g h th e g e o g ra p h ic a l l i m i t s o f a g r i c u l t u r e have been reach ed i n J a v a, i n d i c a t i o n s a r e t h a t y i e l d s c o u l d b e much im p r o v e d b y r e l a t i v e l y s i m p le m e a s u r e s, s u c h as i n c r e a s e d su p p ly o f f e r t i l i z e r s. S im i la r ly, i t i s g e n e r a lly ag reed t h a t f i s h p r o d u c t i o n c o u ld b e g r e a t l y e x p a n d e d. The p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e i n J a v a h a s l e d t o t h e f r a g m en tatio n o f h o ld in g s. S t a t i s t i c s p ro v id e d by th e M i n i s t r y o f A g r a r i a n A f f a i r s f o r 19571 2 g iv e th e a re a o f saw ah ( i r r i g a t e d r i c e l a n d ) i n J a v a a s 3>227>694 h e c t a r e s, owned b y 5, 7 8 8,2 4 7 p e r s o n s, t h a t i s, an a v e r a g e o f O.5 6 h e c t a r e s p e r ow ner. The s t a t i s t i c s fo r u n i r r ig a te d lan d See S i e Kwat S o e n, "The Use o f F e r t i l i z e r s i n I n d o n e s i a " Ekonomi d a n Keuangan I n d o n e s i a, S e p te m b e r 1954» p p. 603-14» Soen e s t i m a t e d, f o r e x a m p le, t h a t up t o 1 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s o f i r r i g a t e d r i c e l a n d i n I n d o n e s i a were p h o s p h a t e d e f i c i e n t a n d would n e e d up to 1 0 0,0 0 0 t o n s a n n u a l l y o f d o u b le s u p e r p h o s p h a t e; i n f a c t, o n l y 5,0 0 0 t o n s w ere b e i n g u s e d f o r r i c e c u l t i v a t i o n, com pared w i t h 4 0 0,0 0 0 t o n s i n I n d i a, a n d 2,2 0 0,0 0 0 t o n s i n J a p a n. D e p a rte m e n A g r a r i a, " D a f t a r R a t a - R a t a Luas Tanah Sawah T i a p - T i a p P e m i l i k Sawah d a la m P r o p i n s i, Tahun 1957" ( L i s t o f L a n d h o l d in g A v e rag e s o f Owners o f Sawah by P r o v i n c e, 1957)> m im eographed d o c u m e n t, D j a k a r t a, no d a t e, 3 P * > " D a f t a r R a t a - R a t a Luas T anah D a r a t T i a p - T i a p P e m i l i k D a r a t d a la m P r o p i n s i, Tahun 1957" ( L i s t o f L a n d h o ld in g A v e rag e s o f Owners o f U n i r r i g a t e d Farm Land b y P r o v i n c e, 1957)» m im eo g rap h ed d o c u m e n t, D j a k a r t a, no d a t e, 4 P* As an e s t i m a t e d 50 p e r c e n t o f p e a s a n t s a r e l a n d l e s s, i n 1957 o n l y 0. 2 8 h e c t a r e o f saw ah was a v a i l a b l e f o r e a c h p e a s a n t and h i s d e p e n d e n ts. === [PDF page 27] === w e re: 4*369*099 h e c t a r e s, 9*845*936 o w n e rs, and a n a v e r a g e o f u n d e r 0*5 h e c t a r e s p e r o w n er.^ L a n d h o ld in g s w ere d is tr ib u te d as fo llo w s: Sawah 1 0. 120 over 5. 1-10 8,1 5 3 1 *449 905 577 363 567 under A rea 20 111 93 U n i r r i g a t e d Land 1, 908,821 756 754 137 421 70,227 6,373 A = W est J a v a. B = C e n tra l J a v a. [Unreadable] W h ile th e above f i g u r e s do n o t c a t e g o r i z e la n d o w n e rs a c c o r d i n g to t o t a l l a n d h o l d i n g s, t h a t i s, saw ah p l u s u n i r r i g a t e d l a n d, and do n o t show how much la n d was owned b y th e few la n d o w n e rs w i t h more th a n tw e n ty h e c t a r e s, d e t a i l s p u b l i s h e d b y t h e M i n i s t r y o f A g r a r ia n A f f a i r s do a t l e a s t i n d i c a t e th e a b s e n c e o f l a r g e la n d o w n e rs o v e r I f th e d e t a i l e d f i g u r e s o f saw ah and u n i r r i g a t e d l a n d h o l d in g s and la n d o w n e r s, g iv e n b e lo w, a r e a d d e d u p, t h e y do n o t e q u a l t h e s e g e n e r a l f i g u r e s. The m i n i s t r y 's r e p o r t s do n o t e x p l a i n t h e d i s c r e p a n c y. === [PDF page 28] === much of Java. There were no sawah owners with more than twenty hectares in 3 of the 19 kabupatens in West Java, none in 14 of the 28 kabupatens of Central Java, and none in 10 of the 29 kabupatens of East Java. the Over half of ’l a r g e ’ landowners in West Java were in the residency of Djakarta which covered less than one-fifth of the province, and 71 of the 111 ’large’ sawah owners in Central Java were concentrated in the residency of Pekalongan. Central Java there were nine kabupatens with no owner of more than 10 hectares of sawah, and four, all around Surakarta, with no owner of more than 2 hectares. In East Java two kabupatens had no owner of more than 10 hectares of sawah.1 The peasant organization BTI claimed in 1950> and. PKI claimed in 1951> that 70 per cent of landowners in Java had less than one hectare of land (sawah plus un irrigated land), 20 per cent had 1 to 2 hectares, 8 per cent 2 to 4 hectares, and 2 per cent more than 4 hectares. Despite the land fragmentation indicated in these figures No details were given for the residency of Kediri, which contains five kabupatens. Kementerian Agraria (Ministry of Agrarian Affairs), Himpunan Keputusan Kongres/Konperensi Organisasi-Organisasi Tani"Massa (Compilation of the Decisions of Congresses and Conferences of Peasant Mass Organizations), Djakarta, 1951> p.25; PKI, "Masaalah Tani di Indonesia” (The Peasant Question in Indonesia), BM, June 15-July 1, 1951 > p.304* === [PDF page 29] === and those of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, the intense population pressure on the limited agricultural land has caused the growth of a landless peasantry generally estimated at about 50 per cent of the rural population. With the collapse of Dutch authority in 1942, many landhungry peasants moved onto estate and forestry lands. Official government sources in 1954 estimated that 28,000 peasant families were occupying 80,000 hectares of estate lands in Java, and that in Java and Sumatra combined about 400,000 hectares of forestry land were occupied.^ Such squatters had no legal right to the land they were occupying, and after the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 they came into conflict, often violent, with estate and government authorities endeavouring to evict them. Alongside the fundamentally subsistence agriculture of the great majority of the Javanese peasantry has been juxtaposed modern estate agriculture. In 1958, estates occupied 629,900 hectares in Java, of which 342,600 were in West Java (mostly in the residencies of Bogor and Priangan), 209,100 in East Java, and 78,200 in Central Java.1 At the end of 1955, estates in Java with over HR, August 16 and November 25, 1954« Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.62. 371,300 hectares of the estate lands in Java were under crops; ibid., p.63. === [PDF page 30] === ten permanent workers were employing over 327,000 permanent workers and over 102,000 temporary workers* Sugar mills rented 52,000 hectares of land for sugar cane in 1957» at rents fixed by the government. Forestry also provides rural work outside the sphere of subsistence agriculture, and in 1958 245>349 labourers were employed in forestry work in Java. The Javanese Village4 (a) Occupations, landholding and social status. The percentage of villagers engaged directly in agricultural production varies considerably with such International Labour Office, Report to the Government of Indonesia on Social Security, Geneva, 1958, p.15* Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics), Commercial Crops of Estates 1957» Djakarta, no date, p.18. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook I960, p.78. The following paragraphs are concerned with the villages of the ethnic Javanese who number about 40 millions and inhabit Central Java, areas along the north coast of West Java, and most of East Java. The only recent work on the Sundanese village of West Java is Andrea Wilcox Palmer, "The Sundanese Village", in G. William Skinner (ed.), Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Villas;e Indonesia: a Symposium, New Haven, Connecticut, 1959, p p.42-51. However, the quite atypical voting behaviour of the area she studied suggests that perhaps her village is not typical of Sunda in general. No recent research has been made on the Madurese villages of Madura and the adjacent areas of Java. For a brief description of village forms in the different regions of Java, see B. ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, New York, 1948, pp.71-3* === [PDF page 31] === factors as the size of the village, and its proximity to towns, communications, the sea, estates, sugar mills and forests, and workable raw materials such as clay. some villages 100 per cent of the population engages directly in agriculture, but such villages must now be only a small minority. Non-agricultural villagers include petty traders and owners of small shops, craftsmen in a diversity of work from basketry, weaving bamboo walls and food preparation to masonry, tile-making and bicycle repair. There is often a learned group, consisting of one or more of the following: gurus, teachers of tradition al Javanese lore, dalängs, conductors of puppet theatres or producers and instructors of Javanese dance drama, kiajis, Moslem scholars, imams, mosque officials, and elementary school teachers. Where they are present, the learned people receive great respect from the other villagers. On occasion even the learned engage in agri culture, while most of the petty traders and craftsmen are only part-time specialists, pursuing their trades when agricultural work is slack. Each village also has its own village officials, at least a lurah (village head), For a fairly full list of non-agricultural persons to be found in the Javanese village, see PKI, "Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum Tani" (Programme of Land Change and Peasants* Demands), BM, December 195*1» pp.13-15. === [PDF page 32] === 10 and a secretary, and often an irrigation official, a religious official, a messenger, and kamituas, heads of hamlets. These village officials, too, usually engage in agriculture besides performing their official functions. An American sociologist has explained concisely the relation between land and social status in the Javanese village: There is an extremely complex organization of rights in land, labor and the use thereof, and a clearly graded hierarchy of villagers based on clustering of these rights. Any description of the pattern of landholding in Java is complicated by the continued village, that is, communal, right of disposal over about one-quarter of all landholdings.2 The ’kernel* villagers, those who are envisaged as being the descendants of the original settlers in the village, and who may comprise up to 50 per cent of the village households,3 receive life-long Donald R. Fagg, ’’Authority and Social Structure; a Study in Javanese Bureaucracy” (Harvard University, Ph.D. thesis, 1958), P.136. W. Hollinger, quoted in Clifford Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change: an Indonesian Case Study, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, p.lU. As almost all village-right land is sawah, then, if Hollinger’s figure is correct, up to 50 per cent of all sawah is still ulti mately owned by the village. Geertz found that 24 per cent of sawah in the subdistrict he studied was still village-right land; loc.cit. Compton reported that generally about half the households in the villages of Modjokerto kabupaten of East Java === [PDF page 33] === 11 r i g h t o f u s i f r u c t o v e r e q u a l a r e a s, u s u a l l y l e s s th a n two a c r e s, and t h i s r i g h t i s i n h e r i t a b l e, w h ile t h e la n d i n v o lv e d c a n n o t b e s u b d i v i d e d o r s o l d. S h o u ld a k e r n e l v i l l a g e r d i e w ith o u t h e i r, com m it a s e r i o u s c r im e, o r l e a v e th e v i l l a g e, a m e e tin g o f a l l k e r n e l v i l l a g e r s d e c i d e s t o whom t o t r a n s f e r t h e l a n d, u s u a l l y t o a v i l l a g e r who owns a h o u se b u t no la n d a n d who h a s b e e n w a i t i n g t h e l o n g e s t. No p e r s o n may own two s h a r e s. The v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s r e c e i v e e x t r a l a n d in p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n, and r e l i n q u i s h i t when t h e y v a c a te t h e i r p o s i t i o n. *1 A long w ith t h e r i g h t t o v i l l a g e l a n d a r e many o b l i g a t i o n s, su c h a s m a i n t a i n i n g v i l l a g e r o a d s and i r r i g a t i o n c h a n n e ls and t a k i n g p a r t i n th e n i g h t w a tc h. The i n d iv i d u a ll y - o w n e d l a n d may b e d is p o s e d o f a t w i l l, b u t t h e r e i s s t r o n g s o c i a l p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t a l i e n a t i o n o f t h i s l a n d to p e o p le o u t s i d e th e v i l l a g e. 2 p o s s e s s e d a s h a r e o f v i l l a g e l a n d; Boyd R. C om pton, M o d jo k e rto I, I n s t i t u t e o f C u r r e n t W orld A f f a i r s R e p o r t, [Unreadable] H o l l i n g e r e s t i m a t e s t h a t 27*5 p e r c e n t o f a l l v i l l a g e r i g h t l a n d i s u s e d b y th e v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s; q u o te d i n G e e r t z, The S o c i a l C o n te x t o f E conom ic C h a n g e, p. l 4 > n o te 8. I b i d., p.14. G e e r tz fo u n d t h a t e v e n i n th e m ost su b u r b a n v i l l a g e he s t u d i e d, o n ly a b o u t 10 p e r c e n t o f saw ah was h e l d b y p e r s o n s o u t s i d e th e v i l l a g e. I t s h o u ld be n o t e d in c o n t r a s t, h o w e v e r, t h a t I n d o n e s ia n g o v e rn m e n t o f f i c i a l s fo u n d i n Novem ber 1959 t h a t 34 p e r c e n t o f 2 0, 4 8 8 ow ners o f saw ah i n In d ra m a ju d i s t r i c t, W est J a v a, w ere a b s e n t e e l a n d o w n e rs; Dewan P e rtim b a n g a n Agung (Suprem e A d v is o ry C o u n c i l ), "L a p o ra n P e n j e l i d i k a n === [PDF page 34] === 12 The l a n d l e s s p e a s a n t s a n d t h o s e w i t h o n l y d i m i n u t i v e h o l d i n g s m ust s e e k l a n d t o s h a r e c r o p or* s u p p l e m e n t a r y w ork o u ts id e th e v i l l a g e o r o f a n o n - a g r i c u lt u r a l n a tu r e, such a s p e t t y t r a d i n g, t r a d e s, h a n d i c r a f t s, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n (much o f t r a n s p o r t i s done b y human h a c k ). C o n d itio n s f o r s h a re c ro p p in g a re o f t e n heavy, th e s h a re c ro p p e r u s u a l ly r e c e i v i n g o n l y o n e - t h i r d t o o n e - h a l f t h e c r o p from s a w a h, a n d i n some a r e a s t h e r e i s a d d e d *key money* and t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o work w i t h o u t re c o m p e n se f o r t h e l a n d l o r d. H ow ever, e x p l o i t a t i o n o f l a n d o w n e r s h i p h a s n o t d e v e l o p e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t h a s i n some o t h e r c o u n t r i e s. J a y, i n v e s t i g a t i n g v i l l a g e s i n E a s t J a v a, fo u n d t h a t: L a n d r e fo r m d i d a e r a h Kawedanaan I n d r a m a ju " ( R e p o r t o f L and Reform I n v e s t i g a t i o n i n I n d r a m a ju D i s t r i c t ), m im eographed m a n u s c r i p t, D j a k a r t a, 1 960, pp.3> 5* An i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t o f B a ta n g ( i n P e k a lo n g a n k a b u p a t e n ), w h ic h i n c l u d e s 3 k e t j a m a t a n s a n d 67 v i l l a g e s, fo u n d t h a t *There a r e some v i l l a g e s i n w h ic h a lm o s t a l l t h e l a n d ( s a w a h ) i s owned by p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e * - b u t o n l y t h r e e s u c h v i l l a g e s w ere a c t u a l l y named; Dewan P e r tim b a n g a n Agung, " K e sim p u la n H a s i l P e n j e l i d i k a n d i Kawedanan B a ta n g " ( C o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e R e s u l t s o f t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n i n B a ta n g D i s t r i c t ), m im eographed m a n u s c r i p t, D j a k a r t a, 1960, I t s h o u l d be n o t e d, h o w e v e r, t h a t th e P e k a lo n g a n a re a has th e g r e a t e s t c o n c e n tr a tio n o f la r g e la n d h o ld in g s, and t h e r e f o r e a b s e n t e e l a n d o w n e r s h i p, i n C e n t r a l J a v a. PKI, "L ap o ra n M engenai P e k e r d j a a n P a r t a i d i k a l a n g a n kaum T a n i " ( R e p o r t C o n c e r n in g P a r t y Work among t h e P e a s a n t s ), BM, A p r il- M a y 1959» p«134* On November 20, 1959, p a r l i a m e n t p a s s e d an a c t p r o v i d i n g f o r a minimum s h a r e o f 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e c r o p f o r t h e t e n a n t. T h is new la w i s now b e i n g s l o w l y im p le m e n te d. === [PDF page 35] === 13 a poor family without land rights, in this area at any rate, may reasonably expect to be able to claim a sharecropping right from a well-to-do neighbor without much fear of rejection."1 Willner writes that the wealthier in the village ’feel some measure of responsibility in providing work /for the landless laboured even when rationally of dubious eco nomic gain to himself* Geertz has suggested two main factors as retarding the growth of a large genuinely alienated and politically disinherited agricultural proletariat1: the capacity of the village to absorb an increase in population through an intensification of agriculture, and the capacity of the social structure to adapt to a more complex pattern of social differentiation.-^ Thus, Geertz points out, one piece of land of one acre may Robert Ravenelle Jay, ’’Santri and Abangan: Religious Schism in Rural Central Java” (Harvard University, Ph.D* Jay also wrote (ibid., p.5 8 ) that: the coercive power of close neighbor and kin bonds, together with the shortage of land, permit only the tougher, more aggressive independent landholding households to resist demands for some kind of sharecrop concessions. Ann Ruth Willner, ’’Social Change in Javanese TownVillage Life”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 1958, vol.VI, no.3, p.233. Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese Economy: a Socio-Cultural Approach, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, p.U7» === [PDF page 36] === have an owner, a renter, a major tenant, a subtenant and a wage labourer, all drawing shares from its output, shares that are unequal but not radically so« Many Javanese peasants are forced, by their general poverty, the seasonal nature of their income and the high expense of occasional ritual feasts, to borrow goods or money from moneylenders or to sell their crops at low prices long before they are harvested. Interest rates in the capital-scarce village are high.^ Where the moneylenders are ethnic Indonesians, rather than Chinese, their operations have led to a certain degree of concentration of landholdings, apparently moreso in West Java. However, ’risk capital is... chronically short, and thus becomes the sought rather than the s e e k i n g This fact may partly explain the apparent lack or weakness of peasant resentment at the moneylenders who are helping to meet the great demand for capital that is as yet unmet by government or cooperative enterprise.^1 See Asmu, ’’Masaalah Landreform” (The Question of Land Reform), BM, January 1960, p.24* Justus Maria van der Kroef, ’’Indonesia: Economic Dualism”, Current History, November 1953> vol.XXV, no.147 p.293. Only ethnic Indonesians are allowed to own agri cultural land in Indonesia. Jay, ’’Santri and Abangan”, p.52. Professor A.G. Pringgodigdo, president of Airlangga University, told me that during the Japanese occupation, === [PDF page 37] === Are the poor villagers conscious and resentful of their unfavourable social and economic position? Geertz believes that village society 'has, in fact, proved remarkably capable of absorbing a very dense population without developing a sharp class segregation of haves and have-nots*. Jay found a clear distinction between the 'patrons* and those who must sharecrop, but also a refusal by the villagers to conceptualize the community as divided into two socially unequal categories. Jay further found that there was much movement across this division, and that about half the families on the wealthier side had while he was a wedana in the Banjumas region, the Japanese issued a regulation forbidding loans of more than twelve months' duration. The peasants, however, would not report many of their longer-term debts to the wedana because they felt that they had the duty to pay them* When Pringgodigdo told the peasants that the interest rates were extortionate, they replied that when they were in need the Chinese moneylender was always ready to help with goods or money. He told me that the peasants thought of the moneylenders as a help rather than an enemy. If this attitude is as widespread as my impression would indicate, it helps explain why PKI apparently lost no popular support because of its attempt in 1959 to reverse the government's decision to evict all foreigners from the villages. It should be noted that in Java there were no reports of the villagers molesting the Chinese who were being evicted. For a more sanguine picture of the 'debtserfdom* of the Javanese peasants, see D.H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society: the Village Sphere, Ithaca, New York, 1957, p*12. Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, p.15* Jay, "Santri and Abangan", pp.58-60. === [PDF page 38] === started in their youth on the poorer side, 1 Kattenburg, studying a village near Salatiga, reached the conclusion that: to my mind at least, class distinctions play no effective role in the village... in final account, rights, obligations, privileges and, indeed, status, are pretty well the same for all the villagers.2 While it would be rash to generalize from the ex perience of a few research workers, their general con clusions as to the minimal nature of social antagonisms are supported by my own conversations with many Javanese and by the great difficulty experienced by PKI and its mass organizations in their efforts to create or increase such antagonisms. The impact of the 1945 revolution, with the concomitant penetration of political parties and mass organizations into rural areas, election campaigns,3 and increased primary education,^ has undoubtedly led to Paul M. Kattenburg, A Central Javanese Village in 1950» Ithaca, New York, 1951> pp.13-14* For a brief description of the social effects of the campaigns for the 1955 elections, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955» Ithaca, New York, 1957* gassim. For a brief description of the discontented, more am bitious, younger generation in the village, see Boyd R. Compton, Village Notebook II. What to Believe In?, Institute of Current World Affairs Report, New York, 1955 pp.8-13; also his Mod.jokerto I, pp. 14-17. === [PDF page 39] === 17 i n c r e a s e d m a t e r i a l and s o c i a l e x p e c t a t i o n s among t h e p o o r e r v i l l a g e r s and p e r h a p s t o t h e b e g i n n i n g s o f s o c i a l c o n flic t. But th e p o o r e r v i l l a g e r s a r e s t i l l f a r from t h e p o i n t o f e x p r e s s i n g v i o l e n t v e r b a l o r more a c t i v e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w ith th e i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t e x i s t. (b ) V i l l a g e g o v e r n m e n t. I n e a c h k e t,ja m a ta n t h e r e a r e b e tw e e n f i f t e e n a n d t w e n t y k e l u r a h a n s, w h ic h i n t u r n c o n s i s t o f two t o s e v e n h a m le ts. The l o w e s t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t i s t h e k e l u r a h a n, w h ic h may ha v e a p o p u l a t i o n o f up t o s e v e r a l t h o u s a n d p erso n s. S i n c e 1945 t h e l u r a h h a s b e e n e l e c t e d b y a l l v i l l a g e m a le s a g e d 18 and o v e r. The l u r a h i s g e n e r a l l y e l e c t e d f o r l i f e, o r u n t i l he r e s i g n s o r i s d i s m i s s e d by a member o f t h e c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t r u r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e se rv ic e. He u s u a l l y n o m in a t e s t h e o t h e r v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s, b u t h i s c h o i c e m u st b e e n d o r s e d b y t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e se rv ic e. F o r m e r ly t h e p o s i t i o n o f l u r a h was g e n e r a l l y h e r e d i t a r y, ' 1 and t h e l u r a h a c t e d a s a p a t e r n a l d e s p o t. S i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n t h e l u r a h h a s become l e s s o f a ’ l i t t l e k i n g ’, a l t h o u g h he s t i l l r e t a i n s a m o n a rc h ist A p p a re n tly th e p o s i t i o n o f l u r a h i s s t i l l u s u a l l y r e t a i n e d w i t h i n one o r two f a m i l i e s i n e a c h v i l l a g e, b u t t h e r e i s i n c r e a s i n g c o m p e t i t i o n b e tw e e n members o f t h e l a r g e f a m i l i e s, th e c o m p e tito r s o f t e n s e e k in g th e a i d o f a p o l it i c a l p a rty. === [PDF page 40] === c h a r a c t e r in th e more rem ote v i l l a g e s. He s t i l l r e t a i n s th e r e s p e c t o f h i s v i l l a g e r s, h u t h as b e e n no e f f e c t i v e b a r r ie r t o th e e n tr y o f an a r r a y o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and mass o r g a n iz a t io n s i n t o th e v i l l a g e. P o l i t i c a l l y he i s b ecom in g i n c r e a s i n g l y th e nom inee and d ep en d en t o f a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y, o r he a tte m p ts to m a in ta in p o l i t i c a l n e u t r a l i t y s o as n o t to a n ta g o n iz e any m ajor group in h i s v illa g e. The members o f the r u r a l a d m in is t r a t iv e s e r v i c e u sed t o e x e r c i s e c o n s id e r a b le power and a u t h o r it y o v e r th e v i l l a g e r s, b u t su ch power and a u t h o r it y have b e e n: r a d i c a l l y c u r t a i l e d by th e u p su rge o f n a t i o n a l i s t and d e m o c r a tic f e e l i n g and b y th e d evelop m en t o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and mass o r g a n iz a t io n a t the lo c a l le v e l. * The i n f l u e n c e o f th e r u r a l a d m in is t r a t iv e s e r v i c e i s s t i l l f e l t p o l i t i c a l l y, e s p e c i a l l y i n th e more rem ote a r e a s, and PNI i s s t i l l d ep en d en t upon i t f o r m o b iliz in g much o f i t s v o t e s in e l e c t i o n s, b u t l i k e t h a t o f th e lu r a h s i t i s on th e wane and has b een u n ab le to p r e v e n t th e grow th o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and mass o r g a n iz a t io n s in th e v i l l a g e s. H erb ert F e i t h, " In d o n e sia ", in George McTuman Kahin ( e d. ), G overnm ents and P o l i t i c s o f S o u th e a s t A s ia, I t h a c a, New York, 1 9 5 9 f p.2 0 9. S ee a l s o P agg, " A u th o r ity and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e ", e s p e c i a l l y p p.2 3 2, 4 2 0 - 1, 439> 4 6 0; and S e lo so e m a r d ja n, " S o c ia l Changes in J o g ja k a r ta " ( C o r n e ll U n i v e r s i t y, Ph.D. t h e s i s, 1959)» p p.1 7 8 -8 6. === [PDF page 41] === e d u c a tio n,^ As t h e ab o v e d ia g r a m i l l u s t r a t e s, th e s a n t r i a n d n o n - s a n t r i may b e t h o u g h t o f a s two s u b - c o m m u n i t i e s, b u t t h e y a r e n o t c o m p l e t e l y e x c l u s i v e b e c a u s e, b y and l a r g e, e a c h su b -c o m m u n ity r e c o g n i z e s t h e p r e s t i g e f u l p e r s o n s i n t h e o t h e r s u b -c o m m u n ity, F u rth e r, th ere a p p e a rs to b e a te n d e n c y, e s p e c i a l l y a t th e e l i t e l e v e l, f o r t h e two c o m m u n itie s t o merge a s one n a t i o n a l s t a t u s s y s te m e m b r a c in g p e r s o n s o f d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c a n d r e l i g i o u s background, ( a ) The e l i t e. The s o c i a l e l i t e, o f a few t h o u s a n d p e r s o n s, i s a n a t i o n a l c o n g l o m e r a t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e s members o f t h e o l d J a v a n e s e a r i s t o c r a c y b u t a l s o many more who h a v e r i s e n t o p ro m in e n c e b y a number o f c h a n n e l s: p a r t i e s and mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, t h e b u r e a u c r a c y, b u s i n e s s, t h e arm ed f o r c e s, e d u c a t i o n, and so o n. The s a n t r i s a r e n o t as w e l l r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e e l i t e a s i n t h e m id d le and lo w e r so c ia l c a te g o rie s. The s a n t r i s h a v e, b y and l a r g e, e i t h e r s c o r n e d em ploym ent i n t h e b u r e a u c r a c y, w hich i s one o f t h e m ain a v e n u e s t o m em b ersh ip i n t h e s o c i a l e l i t e, I t m u st be n o t e d t h a t i n I n d o n e s i a c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s t i g e i s s t i l l a tt a c h e d to a ch iev e m e n ts in fo rm a l e d u c a tio n, w h i l e t h e same a p p l i e s, e s p e c i a l l y i n J a v a, t o a r i s t o c ra tic t i t l e s. === [PDF page 42] === "because they are, in general, the indigenous commercial and industrial group with economic and religious outlets for initiative which the non-santris do not have (the remainder of private commerce and industry being effectively tied up by the Chinese); or, if santris do enter the bureaucracy, the armed forces, political parties and so on, and enter the social elite by those channels, they tend to lose their santriness and become absorbed by and indistinguishable from the non-santris. Further more, although santris comprise a high percentage of the small indigenous commercial and industrial group, they were largely excluded from a new element of the social elite created by the PNI-led first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet from which the largest santri party, Masjumi, was excluded: the government-sponsored and protected ’national businessmen1• It should be noted that a position of prominence in such as the political or economic sphere does not neces sarily bring entry into the social elite. For example, almost no persons prominent in PKI or the communist mass organizations are in the social elite; nor are more than a handful of the wealthy ethnic Chinese of Indonesian citizenship. It is also true that while most of the social elite are readily recognizable by obvious status === [PDF page 43] === indicators - a large house in the right location, a large new car (preferably a Mercedes Benz), fine quality textiles purchased abroad, large receptions and even cocktail parties - not all members of the social elite need to possess such material attributes, nor does possession of them automatically ensure a position in the elite. The only sure way to recognize a member of the social elite is to know if he is invited to the homes of other members of the elite, and if he or his children marry other members of the elite. (b) The middle status group. In Indonesia the middle status group comprises that large number of white-collar citizens between the elite and those who have a blue collar or no collar at all. This middle group could almost be called the pegawai (government employee) class because the great majority of its members are associated with the bureaucracy: officials, clerks, technical staff, teachers, officers in the armed forces. The tremendous growth of the bureaucracy since the establishment of the Indonesian republic has been largely caused by three factors: the governments belief that anyone with qualifications, educational or revolutionary, is entitled to a position === [PDF page 44] === in the bureaucracy; the political and family padding of ministries by individual ministers and their subordinates; and the increase in work done by the government, compared with colonial times. Employees of the central government apparatus have increased from about 150,000 in 1940 to 570,000 in 1953**1 One effect of this expansion of the bureaucracy has been to prevent the growth of a literate unemployed, a source of radical politicians in many countries, A significant indigenous commercial or industrial class has not yet emerged. After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949* the major commercial and industrial enterprises were in the hands of Europeans or Chinese, and the Chinese, of whom about one million live in Java, dominated most other forms of economic activity requiring more than a minimum of capital and business skill. There were exceptions, indigenous Indonesians in some medium and small-scale industry, commerce and repair shops, and they were mostly santris. In 1957* Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, p.149* note 118, The government’s National Planning Bureau claimed that at the end of 1953 there were 370*389 employees of the central government and 229*332 employees (excluding village officials) of autonomous government bodies, with the status of government personnel; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.236. === [PDF page 45] === the Indonesian government confiscated all Dutch enter prises, which opened up a new range of positions for Indonesians, but as the larger concerns were retained under government control the new managers were, in fact, government employees, members of the bureaucracy. Indigenous Indonesians also constitute a part of the free professions, doctors and lawyers, and their more eminent members are in the social elite. (c) The lower status group. The gulf between the middle group and the lower group is a marked one in Java. In general the urban lower status group lives in the kampongs, though it must be noted that the housing shortage and the low government wages have forced many lower government employees also to live in kampongs; they are in the kampongs, but not of them. Although I frequently asked Indonesian politicians and government officials how all the kampong dwellers earned a living, none was able to give a satisfactory answer. Under Dutch rule, at least until the 1930's, industrial development was discouraged, and in 1940 only an estimated 200,000 workers in Java were in industry using modern machinery; 2-g- millions, of whom many would === [PDF page 46] === 33 "be in the small towns and villages, were estimated to be employed in small-scale industry.1 A survey of industry in 1955 indicated a little over 400,000 workers in Java employed in undertakings with over 50 workers.1 23 Only 140,248 workers were employed in undertakings with over 249 workers. Furthermore, about 35 per cent of those employed were women.3 Medium and large-scale manufacturing accounts, therefore, for only a small part of the urban labour force. The rest is employed in a bewildering array of occupations, in small-scale manu facture and processing, transportation (by lorry, jeep, oplet, betjak, bicycles, carts and human back), repairs A.M. de Neuman, Industrial Development in Indonesia, Cambridge, England, 1955, pp.20-1; Peter H.W. Sitsen, Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies, New York, 1942, p.5« A lower estimate is that in 1939 up to 600,000 workers were engaged in small-scale, nonmechanized industry; Jan O.M. Broek, Economic Development of the Netherlands Indies, New York, 1942, pp.81-2. International Labour Office, Report to the Government of Indonesia, pp.16-18. Over three-quarters of the companies circularized answered, and the report adds that by implication it was the smaller companies that did not. It should be noted that the industrial undertakings are not concentrated in any one part of Java. Of about 400,000 workers in medium and large undertakings in Java, approximately 146,000 were in West Java, 151,000 in Central Java, and 103,000 in East Java. For details of the percentage of women workers in certain industries, see below, p.442, footnote 1 === [PDF page 47] === 34 of all kinds, small-scale trade, domestic service, and labouring jobs on such as construction, road sweeping, and grass cutting. In the smaller enterprises, which employ the great majority of the urban labour force, it would be broadly correct to say that the employer, whether Chinese, santri or abangan, still exhibits a certain fatherly concern for his workers, a certain responsibility for them in times of family illness, death, or other difficulties. The kampongs, especially in Djakarta and Surabaja, are densely crowded collections of bamboo houses that have arisen behind the shops and better houses on the paved roads. Conditions in the kampongs vary greatly from kampong to kampong and from city to city, but in general the homes are without their own water and electricity, and sewerage arrangements are primitive. The poor living conditions of the kampong dwellers is reflected in their health and nutrition. The death rate among all Indonesians in Djakarta in the 1930's was 30 per thousand, and about 30 per cent for children under one year; and, as Wertheim comments, conditions have, if anything, deteriorated since then.^ W.F. Wertheim, Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society, New York, 1930, p.U&. For information === [PDF page 48] === 33 I n 1957 t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f L a b o u r and H e a l t h made s u r v e y s i n D j a k a r t a o f a random sa m p le o f t h e f a m i l i e s o f w o r k e r s i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g e n t e r p r i s e s. ”' Prom a s u b sa m p le o f 166 f a m i l i e s, t h e M i n i s t r y o f L ab o u r fo u n d t h a t a n a v e r a g e 95*83 p e r c e n t o f e x p e n d i t u r e was on co n s u m p t io n ’i n o r d e r to l i v e ’, and 4 » 17 p e r c e n t on s u c h a s t a x e s, i n t e r e s t on l o a n s, and e n t e r t a i n m e n t. Of t h e e x p e n d i t u r e on c o n s u m p tio n, 6 0. 0 p e r c e n t was on f o o d, o f w h ic h 49*12 p e r c e n t was on r i c e a l o n e. r e p o r t, w r i t t e n i n 1959, a d d e d t h a t The m i n i s t r y ’s ’I t c an be e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n i s a l r e a d y v e r y d i f f e r e n t an d i s b e c o m in g w o r s e. ’ c o v e r e d 180 f a m i l i e s. The M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h s u r v e y I t f o u n d t h a t o n l y 30 p e r c e n t a t e t h r e e t im e s a d a y; t h a t t h e a v e r a g e w o r k e r s ’ c a l o r i e i n t a k e was o n l y 7 0. 4 p e r c e n t o f t h e c a l c u l a t e d minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s, and f o r t h e members o f t h e i r f a m i l i e s, o n l y 8 0.1 p e r c e n t. V ita m in d e f i c i e n c y was w i d e s p r e a d. on t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f tow ns i n I n d o n e s i a, and l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f th e In d o n e s ia n u rb an p o p u la tio n b e f o r e w o rld w ar I I, s e e W.P. W ertheim ( e d. ), The I n d o n e s i a n Town, The Hague and Bandung, 1958, 379 p* K e m e n te r ia n P e r b u r u h a n, L a p o ra n K e m e n te r ia n P e r b u r u h a n, A p r i l 1 9 5 7 - A p r i l 1959 ( M i n i s t r y o f L abour R e p o r t, A p r i l 1 9 5 7 -A p r i l 1959)» D j a k a r t a, 1959, p p. 2 5 - 8; an d L a p o ra n K e m e n te r ia n P e r b u r u h a n, A p r i l - D j u n i 1 9 5 8, D j a k a r t a, 1958, === [PDF page 49] === Wage statistics are useless unless put against cost of living indices - which are not available in Indonesia* Continual inflation, especially rapid in the period 1957 to 1960, has meant that any wage increases have quickly lost their purchasing power*1 Careful studies suggest that real wages are lower than pre-war. To quote Higgins: Available data indicate that national income per capita is below the 1939 level, probably below the 1929 level, and may even be below the level of 1919• There is no clear evidence that per capita real income is currently rising*1 The communist trade union federation has estimated that real wages of government workers fell from an index of 100 in 1954 to 58 in 1959.3 The supply of currency is a rough indicator of inflation. It has risen from 240.0 million rupiahs in March 1938, to 3,328.1 millions at the end of 1951, 7,473.7 millions at the end of 1954, 14,091.4 millions at the end of 1957, and 19,871*7 millions at the end of 1958. By the end of July 1959 the supply reached 33,988 million rupiahs. The severe monetary measures in August cut this to 20,999 millions, but by the end of the year, the supply had increased again to 26,383*1 millions. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.183. Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia^ Economic Stabilization and Development, New York, 1957, p.xv. See also D.W. Fryer, "Indonesia ’s Economic Prospects", Far Eastern Survey, December 1954, vol.XXIII, no. 12, pp. 177-8; and S. Daniel Neumark, "The National Income of Indonesia, 1951-1952", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, June 1954, pp.348-91. ITUN, March 1960, p*4. === [PDF page 50] === 37 In the absence of industrial expansion that equals the rate of urban growth,^ there is less work per head of urban population* This situation has not led to a massive army of unemployed, rather it has led to a pattern similar to that in the villages: greatly increased under employment, more persons doing the same amount of work, but not the creation of a socially disinherited, unemployed proletariat. Indonesia does not have adequate statistics of in dustrial production, but such figures as imports of industrial raw materials, provided in the annual reports of the Bank Indonesia, indicate general slow growth in production since 1950 with a recession in 1958 as a result of the confiscation of Dutch enterprises in December 1957 and the outbreak of civil war in February 1958* But only the imports of malt, paper, cloves and bar iron were higher in 1958 than in 1940. Estimates of the number of unemployed in Indonesia range widely from 15 millions by PKI leader Njoto towards the end of 1954 (quoted in Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Indonesia’s Economic Difficulties”. Far Eastern Survey» February 1955, vol.XXIV, no.2, p.21), to 1,736,000 by the Ministry of Labour in 1958 (Bank Indonesia, Report for the Year 1958-1959. Djakarta, 1959, p.234)* Njoto's figure must have included the partly employed or the 'not fully employed', and if so his figure seems reasonable. The Indonesian National Planning Bureau in 1954 estimated that 30 to 40 per cent of the Indonesian labour force, and more in Java, was underemployed; National Planning Bureau, ’’Indonesia's Economic Developments 1953”, Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, July 1954, p.436. === [PDF page 51] === 33 THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 1920-1946 The f i r s t s o c i a l i s t - o r i e n t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n i n I n d o n e s ia was t h e ISDV ( t h e I n d i e s ’ S o c i a l D e m o c ra tic A s s o c i a t i o n ), fo u n d e d i n 1914 "by f o u r D utchm en r e s i d e n t i n In d o n e s ia * By 1920 t h e more e x tre m e l e f t i s t s i n t h e ISDV h a d e s t a b l i s h e d c lo s e c o n t a c t w ith I n d o n e s ia n l e f t i s t s i n th e n a t i o n a l i s t S a r e k a t Is la m On May (Moslem A s s o c i a t i o n ). 2 3, 1920 t h e I n d o n e s ia n Com m unist P a r t y was e s t a b l i s h e d, w i t h i t s h e a d q u a r t e r s a t th e Sem arang b r a n c h o f S a r e k a t Is la m. F o r th e h i s t o r y o f PKI up t o th e f a i l u r e o f th e commu n i s t r e v o l t s o f 1926 and 1 9 2 7, s e e: D.N. A i d i t, S e d i a r a h G-erakan B uruh I n d o n e s ia ( H i s t o r y o f t h e I n d o n e s ia n L abour M ovem ent), D j a k a r t a, 1952, 64 p.; H a rry J. B enda, ’’The C om m unist R e b e l l i o n s o f 1 9 2 6 -1 9 2 7 i n I n d o n e s i a ”, P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l R e v ie w, 1955» v o l.X X IV, n o. 2, p p. 1 3 9 -5 2; H a rry J. Benda a n d R uth T. McVey ( e d s. ), The Com m unist U p r i s i n g s o f 1 9 2 6 -1 9 2 7 i n I n d o n e s i a: Key D o cu m en ts, I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 19&0, 177 p.; J.T h. P e t r u s B lu m b e rg e r, Le Communisme a u x In d e s N e e r l a n d a i s e s, P a r i s, 1929, 19Ö p.; G.S. B o u s q u e t, A F re n c h V i e ~ o f th e N e th e r la n d s I n d i e s, L ondon, 19 4 0, p p. 2 4 -2 7; G eorge M cTurnan K a h in, N a t io n a li s m a n d R e v o lu tio n i n I n d o n e s i a, I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 1 9 5 2, p p. 7 4 -8 7; N e th e r la n d s E a s t I n d i e s G o v ern m en t, " O f f i c i a l R e p o r t, D a te d J a n u a r y 1927, o f th e G overnm ent o f th e D utch E a s t I n d i e s on th e Com munist D i s t u r b a n c e s o f N ovem ber 1 9 2 6 ”, i n A n n u a ire de D o c u m e n ta tio n C o l o n ia l e C o m p aree, 1 9 2 7, v o l. I, B r u s s e l s, 1928, p p.1 S i - 2 0 0; PK I, 4 0 Tahun PKI (PKI 40 Y e a r s ), D j a k a r t a, 196O, p p.7 - 3 0; B. S c h r i e k e, "The C a u se s an d E f f e c t s o f Communism on th e W est C o a s t o f S u m a tr a ”, i n h i s I n d o n e s ia n S o c i o l o g i c a l S t u d i e s: S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s, p a r t I, The Hague an d B andung, 1 9 5 5, P P.8 3 - 1 6 6; J e a n n e S. M in tz, "M arxism i n I n d o n e s i a ”, i n F ra n k N. T r ä g e r ( e d. ), M arxism i n S o u th e a s t A s i a, === [PDF page 52] === 39 D u ring th e n e x t 6^ y e a r s, th e com m unists a ttem p ted f i r s t to c a p tu r e c o n t r o l o f S a r e k a t Is la m, and when th e y f a i l e d, t o e s t a b l i s h a p a r a l l e l o r g a n iz a t io n. A change in p o l i c y tu rn ed th e P a r t y ’s m ajor e f f o r t t o tr a d e u n ion a c tiv ity. The D utch c o l o n i a l governm ent was q u ick to e x i l e th e more prom inent com m u n ists, l e a v in g th e P a r ty i n th e hands o f e x t r e m is t s who l e d th e P a r ty in t o an i l l o r g a n iz e d s e r i e s o f r e v o l t s i n West Java in November 1926 and on th e w e st c o a s t o f Sumatra in Janu ary 1927« th e tim e o f th e r e v o l t s, th e r e w ere about 3>000 P a r ty members. The governm ent e a s i l y q u e l l e d th e r e v o l t s, a r r e s t e d 1 3,0 0 0 s u s p e c t s, im p r iso n e d 4, 5 0 0, and in te r n e d 1,3 0 8 in a c o n c e n t r a t io n camp i n West I r i a n. ille g a l. PKI was d e c la r e d A lth ou gh th e P a rty d id n o t re-em erge a s a s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l f o r c e u n t i l 19 4 6, i t s a n ti-D u tc h a c t i o n in th e e a r ly 1 9 2 0 ’s p la c e d i t in a p o s i t i o n o f n a t i o n a l i s t honour as th e f i r s t modern n a t i o n a l i s t m artyr a t th e hands o f D utch c o l o n i a l i s m. S t a n f o r d, C a l i f o r n i a, 1939, p p.1 7 7 -8 7; R obert Van N i e l, The Emergence o f t h e Modern In d o n e sia n E l i t e, The Hague and Bandung, 19 6 0, p. 154 e t s e q.; and A lexan d re Von A rx, L ’E v o lu tio n P o l i t i q u e en I n d o n e s ie de 1900 a 1 9 4 2, P r ib o u r g, S w itz e r la n d, 1949, p p.1 0 5 -2 0 8. For th e o f f i c i a l PKI s t o r y o f communist underground a c t i v i t i e s d u r in g t h e s e tw e n ty y e a r s, s e e PKI, 40 Tahun PKI, p p.3 1 -4 3 * === [PDF page 53] === 40 PKI was re-established on October 21, 1945» "but the exiled veteran leaders did not return until 1946, when they took control and ensured that the Party pursued a policy of cooperation with other socialist and nationalist political forces. It is to be noted, however, that many of the returning communists, and many of those who had been members of the communist underground, did not enter PKI, Many went into the Socialist Party, the Indonesian Labour Party, and Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth). Kahin does not consider this development to have been part of a long-term plan. For two years during the revolution, the open and covert communists followed a policy of support for the Republican government, especially in its negotiations with the Dutch. In return they received large represen tation in the appointed parliament and, at times, signifi cant representation in the cabinet. At the same time the For the history of PKI from its re-establishment in 1945 to the outbreak of the Madiun rebellion in September 1948, see Hartono, "The Indonesian Communist Movement 1945-1948: its Development and Relations with the Soviet Union” (Columbia University, Master!s thesis, 1959)» 116 p.; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p.158 et seq.; Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution, Ithaca, New York, 1957» pp.9-70; PKI, 4o Tahun P K I, pp.44-57; and PKI, L a h i m j a Partai Komunis Indonesia dan Perkembangannja (The Birth and Growth of the Indonesian Communist Party), Djakarta, 1951» PP* 15-23« === [PDF page 54] === 41 open and covert communists were active in the mass organizations (or which the labour federation SOBSI, the peasant organization BTI, and Pesindo were the most im portant), and were later to use their positions to capture control of them. The first Republican cabinet, installed on August 31» 19U5, included Amir Sjarifuddin. He was then known as a leftwing socialist leader of the wartime underground but was to declare in 1948 that he had been a communist for thirteen years. The first working committee of the appointed parliament included Sjarifuddin as vice-chairman, and also Tan Ling Djie, then known as a leader of the Socialist Party but who was already a member of the 'illegal PKI' which was coordinating the work of the communists in the various parties. Sjarifuddin was in cluded in the first Sjahrir cabinet as Minister of Defence, a position he retained in the second Sjahrir cabinet that also included a communist, Wikana, as Minister Without Portfolio. Sjahrir's third cabinet, appointed on October 2, 1946, included among its 31 members one open communist and three covert communists. Sjarifuddin retained the post of Minister of Defence. In March 1947 PKI was rewarded for its support of the government by an increase in its parliamentary representation from 2 to 35 when the === [PDF page 55] === size of parliament was enlarged from 212 to 514 members. After the enlargement of parliament, two young communists, who were to win control of the Party in January 1951» became prominent in parliamentary work: Njoto as chairman of the PKI group in the working committee of parliament, and D.N. Aidit as chairman of the PKI group in the full meeting. In the new working committee of parliament, the communist-socialist alliance, Sajap Kiri (Left Wing), received 17 of the L7 seats. The cabinet which succeeded Sjahrir's third, and which was in office from July 5» 1947 to January 23» 1948, went far towards giving the communists a position from which they might have been able to win full control of the Republican government. Of the 34 ministers, Sjarifuddin was both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, two open communists were Ministers of State, a covert communist was Deputy Prime Minister and another was a third Minister of State. It was widely believed that Sjarifuddin was using his position to advance his allies within the army and to establish secret arms and ammunition caches in the mountains. The communists were unable, however, to consolidate their position for two main reasons. First, the Dutch began their first major attack on the Republic at the end of July 1947» and the cabinet was therefore preoccupied with the struggle for === [PDF page 56] === 43 survival and then with precarious negotiations with the Dutch. Second, the government felt forced to sign the highly favourable Renville agreement with the Dutch. This caused the opposition, already concerned at the communist strength, to combine and bring down the govern ment after less than seven months of existence. The post-1950 Party leadership was to criticize ’the transfer of state power to the bourgeois class in February 1948’ as ’the peak of basic errors committed by PKI during the revolution In this way the most important instrument in the class struggle, that is, state power, was entirely removed from the hands of the people, and from that moment became the instrument for oppressing the people. The Sajap Kiri refused to accept a junior position in the next cabinet, that of Vice-President Hatta, but in January 1948 a large part of the intellectuals and other democratic socialists in the Socialist Party split away to form PSI which supported the new cabinet. On February 26, 1948 the Sajap Kiri was reorganized as the Front Demokrasi Rakjat (People’s Democratic Front). The Front soon launched strong attacks, including strikes, against the cabinet, and rejected further offers from Hatta of cabinet posts. PKI, Lahirnja, p.17. === [PDF page 57] === On A u g u st 1 1, 1948, M usso, a com m unist v e t e r a n o f th e 1 9 2 0 ’s, r e t u r n e d to I n d o n e s ia a f t e r o v e r twentyy e a rs o f e x ile i n th e S o v i e t U nion and was im m e d ia te ly a c k n o w le d g e d a s th e l e a d e r o f PK I. Musso d rew up a l e n g t h y r e s o l u t i o n w h ic h c a l l e d f o r th e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f th e co m m u n ist f o r c e s i n t o one o p e n ly com m unist p a r t y, a n d p r e s e n t e d a new f o r m u l a t i o n o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d fro n t p o lic y. The p l e n a r y m e e tin g o f th e PKI c e n t r a l c o m m itte e a d o p te d t h e r e s o l u t i o n on A u g u st 2 7, w hereupon th e l e a d e r s o f t h e S o c i a l i s t and L ab o u r p a r t i e s p u b l i c l y d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n co m m u n ists f o r many y e a r s an d a n n o u n c e d t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e i r p a r t i e s. On S e p te m b e r 1, 1948, th e new 16-member p o l i t b u r e a u o f th e e n l a r g e d PKI was a n n o u n c e d, an d i n c o r p o r a t e d th e p ro m in e n t l e a d e r s o f th e t h r e e fo rm e r c o m m u n is t-le d p a rtie s. P a r t y l e a d e r s t o u r e d th e c o u n tr y t o e x p l a i n th e new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l an d p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s to c a d r e s an d members o f PKI a n d th e n o w - d is s o lv e d p a r t i e s, an d a s t a r t was made i n s i f t i n g a n d r e g i s t e r i n g th o s e members o f th e d i s s o l v e d p a r t i e s who w ere c o n s i d e r e d s u i t a b l e f o r m em b ership i n t h e e n l a r g e d PK I. B ut b e f o r e th e PK I, D j a la n B aru u n tu k R e p u b lik I n d o n e s i a (New Road f o r t h e I n d o n e s ia n R e p u b l i c ), ( s e v e n t h e d i t i o n ), D j a k a r t a 1953, 34 p. === [PDF page 58] === new p o l i c i e s c o u ld "be f u l l y im p le m e n te d, th e M adiun r e b e l l i o n b e g a n on S e p te m b e r 1 8, 1948. I t a p p e a r s t h a t th e M adiun r e b e l l i o n b e g a n when com m unist a n d p ro -c o m m u n is t c i v i l i a n s and arm y o f f i c e r s i n th e M adiun a r e a p a n ic k e d a t th e g o v e r n m e n ts p l a n t o d e m o b iliz e many o f th e c o m m u n is t-le d arm ed u n i t s. A lth o u g h i t i s p r o b a b le t h a t PKI was p r e p a r i n g f o r an e v e n t u a l arm ed s t r u g g l e, th e r e b e l l i o n i n M adiun was p r e m a tu r e a n d p o s e d t h e PKI l e a d e r s th e d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n o f w hat t o d o: to do n o t h i n g, a n d s e e t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n t h e arm ed f o r c e s e l i m i n a t e d; o r t o j o i n t h e r e b e l s, and t r y t o t u r n th e p r e m a tu r e u p r i s i n g i n t o a s u c c e s s f u l re v o lu tio n. Some o f th e p o l i t b u r e a u m em bers, i n c l u d i n g A lim in, m e re ly w ent i n t o h i d i n g; o t h e r s w ere a r r e s t e d b e f o r e th e y c o u ld ta k e a n y a c t i o n; b u t th e m a j o r i t y o f th e to p e c h e lo n l e a d e r s w ent t o M adiun and to o k o v e r th e d i r e c ti o n o f th e r e b e llio n. The g o v e rn m e n t a c t e d s w i f t l y, r e c a p t u r i n g M adiun w i t h i n two w e e k s, and t o t a l l y c r u s h i n g th e r e b e l l i o n w i t h i n two m o n th s. Musso was k i l l e d i n a s k i r m is h a t The b e s t a c c o u n t o f t h e M adiun r e b e l l i o n an d th e e v e n ts l e a d i n g up to i t i s K a h in, N a t io n a li s m and R e v o lu tio n i n I n d o n e s i a, p p. 2 5 9 -3 0 3. A lso good i s H a rto n o, "The I n d o n e s ia n Com m unist Movement 1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 8 ", p p. 8 4 -9 6. F o r t h e more i m p o r ta n t PKI a c c o u n ts o f th e r e b e l l i o n, s e e b e lo w, p.2 4 2, f o o tn o te 1 === [PDF page 59] === 46 the end of October, but the other communist leaders were captured. In all, some 36,000 PKI members, sympathizers and suspected sympathizers wrere imprisoned.'1 Many secondechelon leaders were killed in the fighting or shot after capture, but the PKI suffered the most severe blow in December 1948 when the army shot the eleven most prominent communist prisoners rather than free them in face of advancing Dutch troops. Among those shot were five politbureau members, including Amir Sjarifuddin, and the two top leaders of SOBSI, the trade union federation. The chairman of the Indonesian Labour Party was also killed during the rebellion. Most of the communists captured or arrested at the time of the rebellion were freed when the Dutch attacked and before charges could be brought against them. Many took to the hills and joined the Republican guerrilla bands. When the Dutch finally withdrew at the end of 1949, the government took no further action against them. The personal observation of those who helped put down the rebellion confirms that many thousands were arrested. === [PDF page 60] === PART ONE: THE AIDIT LEADERSHIP'S ANALYSIS OP THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION === [PDF page 61] === PART ONE THE AIDIT LEADERSHIP’S ANALYSIS OP THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION PROLOGUE After the Madiun rebellion and the second Dutch attack on the Republic in December 1948, PKI was broken and disorganized. Reorganization of the Party was not vigorously undertaken until the last months of 1950 when a group of young communists began to take control. leader of the young communists was D.N. Aidit. The He and his colleagues, who constituted the Aidit leadership, began to grope their way towards a new overall policy for the Party. In 1951 and the first months of 1952, they shaped a broad, national united front policy by which the communists were to organize large segments of the popu lation and to align themselves with a wide range of nonA communists against the anti-communists. The new policy The terms anti-communist and non-communist as used in this thesis require explanation. To be anti-communist is to be openly anti-communist, verbally or otherwise. To be non-communist is to be neither openly pro-communist nor openly anti-communist. A non-communist may be, in sentiments or in theory, anti-communist, but for some reason (often political expediency) unwilling to express === [PDF page 62] === 43 was p u t i n t o e f f e c t a n d b r o u g h t PKI a re m a rk a b le s e r i e s o f successes. A t th e same t im e, th e t h e o r y o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t was p r o g r e s s i v e l y r e f i n e d an d e la b o ra te d. A i d i t an d h i s f e l l o w l e a d e r s w ere M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s i n t h a t t h e y a n a ly z e d t h e I n d o n e s ia n s i t u a t i o n i n te rm s o f th e b r o a d t h e o r i e s o f M a rx ism -L e n in ism, b u t, l i k e Mao T s e - t u n g, th e y w ere im p r e s s e d w ith t h e n e e d to f o r m u la te t h e i r own p o l i c i e s and t a c t i c s w ith d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e to th e o b j e c t i v e f a c t s s itu a tio n. ( a s t h e y saw them ) o f th e I n d o n e s ia n As A i d i t s a i d i n M arch 1957: We I n d o n e s ia n com m u n ists a r e n o t d o g m a tic i n th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f M a r x is t an d L e n i n i s t t e a c h i n g s; we a r e c r e a t i v e. M a rx is t-L e n in is t t h e o r y i s o n ly a g u i d e, th e d e c i s i v e t h i n g in o u r p o l i c y b e in g th e c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n i n I n d o n e s ia.1 h i s a n ti-c o m m u n is m. I t s h o u ld b e n o te d t h a t many I n d o n e s i a n s, a n d e s p e c i a l l y th o s e a s s o c i a t e d w ith PNI an d S u k a rn o, c o n s i d e r o p e n ly e x p r e s s e d a n ti-co m m u n ism t o b e i n some way r e a c t i o n a r y, p r o - W e s te r n, and t h e r e f o r e p r o i m p e r i a l i s t, a c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f I n d o n e s i a 's in d e p e n d e n t p o s i t i o n i n th e c o ld w a r. T h is b e l i e f i n h i b i t s th e o p en e x p r e s s i o n o f h o s t i l i t y to communism among a l a r g e s e c t i o n o f th e I n d o n e s ia n p o l i t i c a l e l i t e. I t s h o u ld a l s o b e n o te d t h a t, o f c o u r s e, an y o n e may s h i f t from b e i n g n o n -c o m m u n ist t o a n ti- c o m m u n is t, an d v i c e - v e r s a. One o f t h e c o n s t a n t c o n c e rn s o f t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a s b e e n t o rem ove o r p r e v e n t a n y g ro u n d s f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t n o n -c o m m u n ists b eco m in g a n ti - c o m m u n is t. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 63] === The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a s f r e q u e n t l y a c k n o w le d g e d i t s i n d e b t e d n e s s t o th e r e v o l u t i o n a r y a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y e x p e r i e n c e s o f f o r e i g n com m unist p a r t i e s. I t in s is ts, h o w e v e r, t h a t th e I n d o n e s ia n r e v o l u t i o n p o s s e s s e s c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t a r e u n iq u e. F o r e ig n e x p e r i e n c e m u st b e s t u d i e d: B u t th e m ost i m p o r t a n t t h i n g f o r t h e I n d o n e s ia n co m m u n ists i s th e p ro b le m o f w e ld in g th e g e n e r a l t r u t h s o f M a rx ism -L e n in ism w ith th e c o n c r e t e 2 p r a c t i c e o f th e I n d o n e s ia n r e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f. A l l th e e v id e n c e s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e p e a t e d a s s e r t i o n s o f t h e n e e d to f o r m u la te a p o l i c y b a s e d on th e W h ile t h e r e i s, f o r e x a m p le, a c l o s e p a r a l l e l b e tw e e n th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ^ o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s o f I n d o n e s ia n s o c i e t y a n d t h e I n d o n e s ia n r e v o l u t i o n and Mao T s e - t u n g 's a n a l y s i s o f C h in e s e s o c i e t y a n d th e C h in e s e r e v o l u t i o n (c o m p a re, f o r e x a m p le, D.N. A i d i t, I n d o n e s ia n S o c i e t y an d th e I n d o n e s i a n R e v o l u t i o n, D ja k a r ta ^ 1958, £>9 p., w ith Mao T s e - t u n g,,fThe C h in e s e R e v o lu tio n an d th e C h in e s e Com m unist P a r t y ”, i n h i s S e l e c t e d W orks, v o l. I I I, L ondon, 1 9 5 4 > p p. 7 2 - 1 0 1 ), t h e PKI l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n a t g r e a t p a i n s t o show t h a t t h e r e a r e i m p o r ta n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e tw e e n th e c ir c u m s ta n c e s o f th e I n d o n e s ia n an d C h in e s e r e v o lu tio n s. As ex am p le s o f th e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s, s e e a s p e e c h b y S a k irm a n on O c to b e r 2, 1950> g iv e n i n R i s a l a h P er u n d in g a n 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 5 1 ( I n d o n e s ia n P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e b a te s 1 9 5 0 / i 9 5 1 ) » v o l. I I I, p p. 1 1 4 2 - 3; i n t e r v i e w w ith A i d i t, q u o te d i n A. Doak B a r n e t t, E ch o es o f Mao T s e - tu n g i n D j a k a r t a, A m erican U n i v e r s i t i e s * F i e l d S t a f f R e p o r t, New Y o rk, 1955» PP*7-11; D.N. A i d i t, D ja la n ke D em o k rasi R a k ja t b a g i I n d o n e s ia (The I n d o n e s ia n Road to P e o p l e fs D e m o crac y )7 D j a k a r t a, 1955> P*37; and D.N. A i d i t, The B i r t h a n d G row th o f t h e Com m unist P a r t y o f I n d o n e s i a, D j a k a r t a, 1 958, p.2 7 * D.N. A i d i t, " R e v o lu s i O k to b e r dan R a k j a t - R a k j a t T im u r” (The O c to b e r R e v o lu tio n an d th e P e o p le s o f th e E a s t ), BM, O c to b er-N o v e m b e r 1957» P«383* === [PDF page 64] === 50 I n d o n e s i a n s i t u a t i o n was n o t a v e r b a l s m o k e -s c re e n m a sk in g e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l a n d d i r e c t i o n o f PKI by e i t h e r Moscow o r P e k in g. I n th e f i r s t p l a c e, i t a p p e a r s h i g h l y l i k e l y t h a t th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t was c o n c e iv e d i n 1951 a n d e a r l y 1952 b y th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p a l o n e, w i t h o u t o u t s i d e g u id a n c e o r p r o m p tin g. H e rb e rt P e ith, o b s e r v i n g th e new n a t i o n a l f r o n t p o l i c y a s i t was f i r s t a p p l i e d i n 1 9 5 2, c o n c lu d e d t h a t i t was m ost u n l i k e l y t h a t th e c h a n g e was made a t S o v i e t d i r e c t i o n. fo u r re a s o n s f o r h is c o n c lu s io n. He l i s t e d F i r s t, t h e change h a d no b a s i s i n c o n te m p o ra ry com m unist t h e o r y e ls e w h e r e. S e c o n d, th e c h an g e p r e - d a t e d t h e l a t e r S o v i e t a tt e m p t t o c u r r y f a v o u r w ith A s ia n n e u t r a l i s m. T h i r d, t h e r e was no c o m p a ra b le c h a n g e i n th e p o l i c y o f o t h e r S o u th o r S o u t h e a s t A s ia n co m m u n ist p a r t i e s a t t h a t t im e. And, f o u r t h, c o n te m p o r a r y S o v i e t comment on I n d o n e s ia s u g g e s t e d t h a t PKI was l e a d i n g Moscow r a t h e r t h a n f o llo w in g i t. I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t a f t e r th e f i a s c o o f M adiun, Moscow w ro te o f f th e I n d o n e s ia n com m u n ists a s a l o s t cau se. T h a t i s, Moscow c o n s i d e r e d PKI no lo n g e r w o rth y o f a tte n tio n. O n ly a f t e r 1954» when th e s u c c e s s o f th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p 's n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y h ad H er b e rt F e i t h, The W ilopo C a b in e t, 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 3; a T urning P o in t in P o s t-R e v o lu tio n a r y I n d o n e s ia, I t h a c a, New York, === [PDF page 65] === "become apparent, did the interest of international communism focus anew on PKI. At that stage, the cold war was entering a more complex stage, with the Russians attempting to extend their sphere of influence by winning favour among the neutralists in the underdeveloped and newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America* The lack of interest shown by Moscow in PKI until after the period in which the national united front was formulated is indicated by the Cominform journal, the number of foreign communist delegates to PKI congresses, and the number of PKI delegations invited abroad. Prom the end of 1948 until August 1954» the Cominform journal, "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy.'", made little mention of Indonesia, and none whatsoever during 1952, the year in which PKI began to implement its form of the national united front. Prom August 1954 until 1956, when the journal was discontinued, articles on PKI appeared regularly - written by Aidit, not by Russian 'experts'. In March 1954» only one foreign communist attended the PKI fifth congress, compared with seven who went to the sixth congress in September 1959• And from July 1950, when Aidit and Lukraan returned from abroad, until the beginning of 1956, only two PKI delegations visited the Soviet bloc, and none before === [PDF page 66] === December 1952. In contrast, between January 1956 and January 1960, thirteen PKI delegations visited the Soviet bloc. The tentative conclusion to be drawn from the above evidence is that after Madiun, the Soviet leaders con sidered PKI to be of little interest. It was only after the Aidit leadership^ policy had brought such obvious successes, and after the Soviet leaders became aware of the possibility of winning allies among the neutralists in many underdeveloped and newly independent countries, that the Soviet and other foreign communist parties began to show an increasingly keen interest in PKI. interest did not take the form of interference. This new Rather, the foreign parties studied the PKI policy in order to see if it could have wider application. Hence, many PKI delegations were invited abroad, and PKI received con siderable attention in the Gominform journal. Perhaps in order to provide the foreign parties with material on PKI's policy and tactics, in mid-1954 the Indonesian communists began to publish a monthly periodical in English devoted to the work of the Party and its mass organizations in the Indonesian situation. There are certain parallels between the circumstances in which Aidit and Mao Tse-tung formulated their overall policies. Both Aidit and Mao won control of parties that === [PDF page 67] === were freed from Soviet guidance in policy. Earlier Soviet intervention in both Indonesia and China had helped cause the near-extinction of the local communist parties, with the result that Moscow considered the small, decimated parties to have little or no chance of winning power, and therefore to be no longer worthy of inter vention. In formulating their own overall policy, both Aidit and Mao used Marxist-Leninist analytical tools and studied the experience of foreign parties. But each of the leaders was deeply imbued with the atmosphere of his own country, and used his own assessment of the local situation as the principle basis of an overall policy designed to bring his party to power. In each case, a broad, national united front policy was chosen. Mao has led the Chinese Communist Party to power in the highly favourable circumstances of the Japanese War, but the success of Aidit's policy in post-revolutionary Indonesia is still in the balance. INDONESIA IS A SEMI-COLONIAL, SEMI-FEUDAL COUNTRY The Aidit leadership's theory of the Indonesian revolution is based on the assumption that Indonesia is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. At first the Party === [PDF page 68] === leaders merely asserted this to he self-evident, The semi-colonial position of Indonesia was widely recognized by Indonesians outside PKI, and was emphasized by the heavy terms of the Round Table Conference agreement which had ended the war with the Netherlands, by the control of Indonesia’s export and import trade by large foreign companies, by the extent of the foreign estate agri culture, and by the exploitation of Indonesia’s oil wealth by foreign companies. On the other hand, PKI at first did not elaborate on what was termed the semifeudal nature of Indonesia, perhaps because it was not until 1953 that the Party was concerned with expanding into the rural areas. An early account of Indonesia’s semi-colonial position was given by Aidit in May 1953» He repeated the PKI assertion that by the Round Table Conference agreement the Dutch imperialists had retained their control over Indonesia. Among the terms of the agreement See, for example, PKI, Konstitusl PKI (PKI's Consti tution), Djakarta, 1951 > p*11* The results of the Round Table Conference, as accepted by the Indonesian and Dutch delegations on November 2, 1949» are to be found in Round Table Conference Results, The Hague, no date, pp.7-78* D.N. Aidit, Menudju Indonesia Baru (Towards a New Indonesia), (second edition), Djakarta, 1955> pp.27-31* === [PDF page 69] === that he particularly attacked were the position of the Netherlands monarch as head of the Indonesian-Dutch Union, the control of the Dutch government over Indonesia's financial and foreign policies, the enormous debt to the Netherlands, the restoration to the coloni alists of their former rights in industry, commerce, finance and agriculture, and the control by Dutch civil and military officials of the Indonesian state apparatus and armed forces. That means Indonesia has what is called 'the right of self-government12, but in fact real power, in the political, economic and military spheres, is retained in the hands of the Dutch imperialists, and the Indonesian door is opened wide by the RTC agreement to political, economic and military penetration by the American imperialists and other imperialist countries.'1 Although the first agrarian programme drawn up under the Aidit leadership and issued on November 10, 1951 bad referred to the 'landownership of a feudal and imperialist nature', a clear definition of what was meant by seraifeudalism was not given until July 1953* In that month Aidit wrote a major article, "The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement", which marked the beginning of intensive Ibid., p.29. PKI, "Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum Tani" (Programme of Land Change and Peasants' Demands), BM, === [PDF page 70] === Party work in the rural areas, He stated that after capitalism had operated in Indonesia complete feudalism no longer existed, but that ’important and heavy remnants’ remained. The most significant remnants he listed were: 1. the continued monopoly rights of the large landowners, with the result that the majority of peasants could not own land and were forced to rent land on the landlords * terms; 2. the payment of most of the crops as land rent in kind, so that the majority of peasants were kept in poverty; 3* the payment of land rent in the form of work on the landlords * land, ’which places the majority of peasants in the position of serfs’; and 4. the heavy debts of the majority of peasants, which placed them 'in the position of slaves vis-a-vis the landowners'• In short, Aidit argued, 'there is still feudal exploi tation of the peasants'. Such semi-feudal conditions, Aidit claimed, made impossible the economic development of Indonesia. D.N. Aidit, "Haridepan G-erakan Tani Indonesia” (The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement), BM, July 1953, pp.332-40. === [PDF page 71] === Agricultural techniques were primitive, the internal market was shrinking as agricultural production declined and the relative prices of manufactured goods increased, and industrialization was impossible so long as 70 per cent of the population remained too poor to afford industrial goods. The PKI programme endorsed by the fifth national congress in March 1954 devoted its first section to a description of Indonesia as being semi-colonial and semii feudal. Once more the Round Table Conference agreement was attacked because it 1enslaves Indonesia and maintains her position as a semi-colony*. As a result of the colonialists* control of the Indonesian economy, *our country is in the grip of a continuous economic crisis and is already close to collapse', so that talk about development plans, industrialization and the like came to nothing. Although our land is fertile there is not enough food in our country to meet the people's minimum needs... As a result of the unlimited power of monopoly and of the embargo against trade with China enforced by the American capitalists, the price of export goods... declines gravely, and it is increasingly difficult to find markets for these goods. Indonesian money declines and the price of goods rises. As a result of competition PKI, Program PKI (PKI's Programme), Djakarta, 1954» pp.5-10. === [PDF page 72] === from the Netherlands, America and Japan, the very small number of national industries and trading enterprises is crushed and bankrupt. Except for a small number of feudal landlords, compradores and high officials, the greater part of the Indonesian people lives miserably. The programme also pointed out that 20 per cent of all cultivated land, that is the best and most fertile land, was still in the hands of colonialist estates. On the matter of feudal remnants in Indonesia, the programme added nothing to Aidit's article of July 1953. When Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the Round Table Conference agreement in April 1956 and then cancelled her debts to the Netherlands, the PKI was forced to show new grounds for continuing to describe Indonesia as serai-colonial. This Aidit did in a booklet "Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution” written in July 1957« He examined the degree of political and economic sovereignty enjoyed by Indonesia. Dealing with the political question, he pointed out that West Irian, comprising 20 per cent of Indonesian Ibid., pp.7-8. D.N. Aidit, Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia This booklet was published in English as: Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution, 69 p. I have used the English version, but I have altered the English of some of the direct quotations. === [PDF page 73] === 59 territory, was still occupied by the Dutch, and that as for the rest of the country: The political independence which the Indonesian people now possess is not full and stable political independence but only half and is under the constant threat of the reactionaries• The internal reactionaries working in collabo ration with the Dutch, American and other imperialists are doing all they can to restrict and destroy the political independence of the people. And besides this, the national bourgeoisie is trying to limit the political independence of the working class and other progressive people.1 According to Aidit, an analysis of the economic sphere also gave *extremely clear evidence that Indonesian society is still semi-colonial*. The big foreign capi talists: by utilizing their dominant position in the sphere of the economy and by means of their mercenaries... also participate in determining political developments in Indonesia. They controlled the oil reserves, estates, sea transport, some land transport, the import, export and internal trade, and the banks. As if to emphasize that the abrogation of the agreements with the Netherlands had not altered the situation, Aidit claimed that: The policy of the imperialists in the field of economic affairs is not in principle different from what it was at the time when Indonesia was fully colonized* They have continued to run their old enterprises and have opened up Aidit, Indonesian Society, pp.39-UO === [PDF page 74] === 60 some new ones. This means that they can directly make use of Indonesia’s raw materials, extract Indonesia’s mineral wealth, and utilize cheap Indonesian labour power. They are economically squeezing national industry, that owned by the state and that owned by the national bourgeoisie. The result is that the big foreign capitalists stand in the way of developing the productive forces in our country. The banks and finances as well as the goods for sale in the hands of the imperialists play the decisive role in the economic life of our country at the present time.12 In order to safeguard their capital and facilitate their exploitation of the people, Aidit continued, the imperialists used compradores and usurers: to throw out wide nets of exploitation extending from the busy commercial harbours on the coast and from the towns right out to the most remote villages. Furthermore, they had placed their compradores in the bourgeois parties and so converted those parties into faithful servants of their interests. In December 1957 the Indonesian government took over all Dutch businesses. Once again the PKI had to justify its continued description of Indonesia as semi-colonial, Ibid., pp.40-1. In 1952 the White Engineering Corporation of New York undertook an investigation of foreign capital in Indonesia. Its report to the Indonesian government showed that 70 per cent of the 2,100 million dollars of foreign investments were Dutch. The general findings of the report are quoted in RI, March 1957» p.29* === [PDF page 75] === a n d i n D ecem ber 1958 t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s u b m itte d a new c o m p i l a t io n o f e v id e n c e to s u p p o r t i t s c a s e. b lo w h a d b e e n s t r u c k a g a i n s t t h e D u tc h, th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e a d m i t t e d, b u t t h e D u tc h s t i l l o c c u p ie d W est I r i a n; th e p o s i t i o n o f th e c o n f i s c a t e d D u tch e n t e r p r i s e s was s t i l l u n c e r t a i n; I n d o n e s ia s t i l l made much u se o f D u tc h c a p i t a l i s t c h a n n e ls in i t s f o r e i g n t r a d e; D u tch c a p i t a l i n th e o i l i n d u s t r y, t h a t i s, i n th e A n g lo -D u tc h S h e l l Company, was s t i l l u n to u c h e d; D utch p u p p e ts s t i l l o c c u p ie d im p o r ta n t p o s i t i o n s i n t h e g o v e rn m e n t, th e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s an d th e econom ic f i e l d; arm ed g a n g s w ere s t i l l a c t i v e l y o p e r a t i n g i n th e i n t e r e s t s o f th e D u tc h c o l o n i a lis ts; th e s k y, s e a a n d c o a s t l i n e o f I n d o n e s ia was s t i l l c o n s t a n t l y t h r e a t e n e d by D u tch a i r c r a f t an d s u b m a r in e s; a n d th e D u tch c o l o n i a l i s t s s t i l l h a d i n f l u e n c e i n th e f i e l d s o f e d u c a tio n and c u l t u r e. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e d e c la re d th a t as a r e s u l t o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n, 'D u tc h i m p e r ia l is m i s s t i l l th e f i r s t enemy o f th e I n d o n e s ia n p e o p le '. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e m ust h a v e b e e n aw are t h a t th e d im in is h e d econom ic p o s i t i o n o f th e D u tch h a d made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r PKI to p e r s i s t i n a t t r i b u t i n g a s e m i1 PK I, B ahan-B ahan u n tu k K o n g res N a s io n a l k e -V I P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s ia ( M a t e r i a l s f o r P K I 's S i x t h N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s ), D j a k a r t a, 1 9 5 8, p p.8 - 9. === [PDF page 76] === colonial status to Indonesia, and Party leaders began talking of American imperialism as ’increasingly occupying important positions in Indonesia in the economic, political and cultural spheres*. According to the central committee, the American imperialists main tained military bases in West Irian, controlled rightwing parties and individuals to promote their interests, carried out cultural infiltration via films and education, and were engaged in a programme of assistance to the rebels in Sumatra and Indonesia. All this was cited as ’proof that U.S. imperialism already constitutes a constant danger threatening Indonesia’s sovereignty and independence *. In the central committee report presented to the sixth national congress in September 1959» Aidit once more stated that: For the imperialists, Indonesia continues to be a place for the investment of their capital and a storehouse for cheap labour. They strive not only to defend what capital they already have invested in Indonesia, but also to increase He also added an extra paragraph in denunciation of American imperialism. D.N. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi dan Kablnet Gotong Rojong (For Democracy and a Mutual Cooperation Cabinet;, Djakarta 1959, p p.36-7. === [PDF page 77] === Lukman, in his speech to the sixth congress, justi fied at some length the Party*s continued description of Indonesia as semi-colonial, semi-feudal. He said that except for Dutch-occupied West Irian, Indonesia had political independence. On the other hand, the Indonesian economy was in large part still controlled "by the imperialists and dependent upon the economy of the imperialist states. In order to emphasize the political importance of economic considerations, he declared: Supposing the whole of Indonesian territory was already under the control of the Indonesian Republic, but the Indonesian economy was still controlled b y or very dependent on the imperialist countries, in such a situation Indonesia could not yet be said to be completely independent because political power cannot possibly be separated from economic power, and economic power is even precisely the basis of political power. Therefore it is impossible for a country to have complete power in the political sphere if its economy is still controlled or greatly dependent on other, imperialist, countries. Thus it is clear that if a country is not yet independent in the eco nomic sphere, neither is it yet completely free in the political sphere.3 Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi PKI (Concerning PKI*s Consti tution), Djakarta, 1959» pp.17-10. Aidit claimed in 1958 that 41 per cent of Indo n e s i a ^ exports went to the United States, 35 per cent to Western Europe, 16 per cent to African and Asian countries excluding China, 4 per cent to Australia, and only 4 per cent to the Soviet bloc; D.N. Aidit, "Economic Diffi culties and the Communist Party*s Proposals", World Marxist Review, September 1958 p.71. Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi, loc.cit. === [PDF page 78] === Lukman added nothing to Aidit*s July 1953 description of the semi-feudal condition of Indonesia, a description which remains the basic Party exposition of the matter largely because there have been no major subsequent changes in agrarian relations* In short, PKI chooses to envisage Indonesia as being 8 till semi-colonial, semi-feudal. The continued presence of colonial and feudal elements ensures that the great majority of the Indonesian people remain in a state of poverty, and obstructs general economic and industrial development. It is only ’a small number of feudal landlords, compradores and high officials*, to re-quote the March 1954 PKI programme, who do not suffer from the country*8 semi-colonial, semi-feudal condition. III. THE BASIC TARGETS OF THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION The PKI general programme issued by the central com mittee in April 1951 declared that the Indonesian revo lution *is aimed against imperialism, feudalism and the compradore bourgeoisie*. This bald statement was expanded in the programme of March 1954: PKI, Konstitusi, 1951» p*12. === [PDF page 79] === As long as the /semi-colonial, semi-feudai7 situ ation in Indonesia is unchanged, that is, as long as the power of imperialism has not been over thrown nor the remnants of feudalism eradicated, the Indonesian people cannot possibly free themselves from poverty, backwardness, lameness and powerlessness in facing up to imperialism« The power of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism in Indonesia will never be abolished in Indonesia while state power in our country is still held by the landlords and compradorss who are firmly connected with foreign capital because they want to preserve imperialist exploitation and feudal remnants in our country, because they are most afraid of the Indonesian people.12 Thus the main targets of the revolution are imperialism, with its Indonesian compradore agents, and feudalism. The Aldit leadership has, however, made a clear tactical distinction between the two main enemies. This distinction was most lucidly explained by Aidit in his speech to PKI*s national peasant conference in mid-April 1959. He declared that the two tasks of overthrowing the power of the foreign enemy, imperialism, and the internal enemy, feudal landlord domination, were 'from the strategic angle... very closely interconnected and inseparable*. Strategically inseparable because the imperialists were using the feudalists in order to govern and exploit the people, and because for the revolution to PKI, Program P K I. p.10. D.N. Aidit, "Fly High the Banners of 'Land to the Peasants* and Fight for One Victory After Another'*, RI supplement, June-July 1959* p.12. === [PDF page 80] === 66 succeed it had to mobilize the peasants, which could only be done by providing them with land, which in turn meant taking the land from the feudal landlords. Aidit then went on to say: If viewed from the tactical angle these two tasks, that is the tasks of overthrowing the power of imperialism and the power of feudalism, cannot be executed at one and the same time. If viewed from the tactical angle of the particular conditions of the present moment, the head of the revolutionary spear should in the first place be pointed at the foreign enemy (imperialism) and those feudalists and bourgeois who have become the agents of this foreign enemy. The oppression of foreign imperialism is widely felt by our people. Imperialism is the most criminal enemy with the most intensive exploitation. Thus, at a certain moment and under certain conditions as at present, we must concentrate all our efforts for a blow against imperialism in order thus to be able to settle the first contradiction, the contradiction between the Indonesian nation and imperialism. In other words, the enemies of the revolution are considered too strong to be tackled both at the same time. They must be smashed in turn, first imperialism and then feudalism. THE DRIVING FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION As communists, the PKI leaders believed that the proletariat constituted the basic driving force of the Indonesian revolution, the basic support of the Party. === [PDF page 81] === An analysis of the strength of the proletariat showed, however, that the proletariat was far too weak to destroy the power of imperialism and feudalism. Because the proletariat was so weak, the Aidit leadership undertook a socio-political analysis of the other major social forces in Indonesia in order to determine which might be won as disciplined allies, which might be won as allies under certain circumstances, and which were implacable enemies. The Proletariat According to Aidit, the Indonesian proletariat consists of about 500,000 workers in modern industry (transport workers, factory workers, miners, workers in repair shops, etc.), more than 2 million workers in small industry and handicrafts in the towns, and a large number of workers on estates, in forestry work and in miscellaneous occupations. Their total number is about six millions or, with their families, about 20 millions. They therefore comprise about 25 per cent of the total population.1 Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.61. Aidit*s figures appear to be exaggerated. In a booklet issued in 1959, the leaders of the communist trade union federation, SOBSI, stated that: === [PDF page 82] === The exploitation and poor living conditions suffered by the Indonesian proletariat are obvious to all Indonesians. Aidit could state, without fear of contra diction, that 'the Indonesian proletariat is exploited by three forms of brutal exploitation, that is, imperialism, capitalism and feudalism'. In December 1958 the central committee reported that 'the living conditions of the Indonesian workers are getting worse and worse' - which was a deterioration in an already deplorable situation. The decline was stated to be the result of the rapid and continuous rise in the price of basic daily essentials, and the increasing contraction of work opportunities be cause of the failure to develop state and private industry. the Indonesian workers constitute only 10 per cent of the total Indonesian population, while the peasants constitute not less than 70 per cent. The remaining 20 per cent of the popu lation is comprised of other groups, such as students, small urban industrialists, national industrialists and intellectuals. The SOBSI leaders also stated that: most of the workers consist of casual labourers, both in government work, such as forestry, autonomous areas, estates, and general works, and in private enterprise, such as in sugar enterprises, oil companies, fishing, agriculture, and so on. SOBSI, Masaalah Front Persatuan Buruh (The Question of the Workers' United Front), Djakarta, 1959» p.l4* Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.62. PKI, Bahan-Bahan, p.13* === [PDF page 83] === 60 According to PKI's analysis, the Indonesian proletariat, 'as is also the case of the proletariat in other countries1, has fvery fine qualitiesf. First, because it works in the most advanced economic units, the proletariat has a strong understanding of organization and discipline* Second, because it owns no means of production, the proletariat is not individualistic in nature and cannot fear the loss of its property in the revolutionary struggle* Third, because it suffers the three forms of brutal exploitation, the proletariat is more resolute and thoroughgoing in the revolutionary struggle than the other classes. Fourth, because Indonesia unlike Europe is not fertile soil for social reformism, 'the proletariat in its entirety is very revolutionary indeed, of course with the exception of the small number who have become the scum*. And, fifth, because the Indonesian proletariat has been led by the PKI since it first appeared in the revolutionary struggle, it is politically the most conscious class in Indonesian society. Therefore the proletariat is: the basic force pushing the Indonesian revo lution forward. The Indonesian revolution will not succeed unless it is under the Aidit, Indonesian Society, loc.cit*; see also PKI, Mengapa Front Nasional (Why the National Front), Djakarta, 1 9 5 7 * PP.8-10. === [PDF page 84] === leadership of the Indonesian proletariat... Without the proletariat taking an active part, nothing will ever run properly in Indonesian society. ' On the other hand, the PKI leaders recognize that the Indonesian proletariat has weaknesses*. 12 c ertain unavoidable It is numerically weak compared with the peasants, it is young compared with the proletariat in capitalist countries, and it has a low cultural level compared with the bourgeoisie. By itself it is not strong enough to win victory. It must build 'revo lutionary unity in all situations with all other revo lutionary classes and groups*. The Peasantry What the PKI means when it refers to the peasants 'is mainly the poor and middle peasants that make up the majority of the inhabitants of the villages'.-^ As a group, the peasantry is viewed as suffering not only the remnants of feudalism, but also the depradations of Darul Islam and PRRI-Permesta bandit gangs that allegedly receive assistance from the landlords and foreign estate Aidit, Indonesian Society, pp.62-3» Ibid., p.62. Ibid., p.61. === [PDF page 85] === o’m e p s as well as arms from the imperialists. of their suffering, the peasants as a whole Because ’can be, for the working class, not only the most numerous ally but also the most loyal and most trusted a l l y ’. recognition of the size and revolutionary nature of the peasantry, the PKI agrarian programme issued in November 1951 stated that the worker-peasant alliance was allimportant for the success of the revolution.-^ The Aidit leadership’s increased awareness of the role of the peasantry in the revolution was shown in Aidit ’s decla ration in July 1953 that ’The agrarian revolution is the essence of the p eople’s democratic revolution in Indonesia*.^ Once the Aidit leadership accepted the peasantry as a revolutionary force, it proceeded to grade separate groups within the peasantry according to their revo lutionary potential. The November 1951 agrarian programme included a guide for classifying the peasantry into rich peasants, medium peasants, poor peasants and See, for example, PKI, Program P K I, p.8; and PKI, Bahan-Bahan, p.15* PKI, Mengapa Front Nasional, p.7. PKI, ’’Program Perubahan Tanah”, BM, December Aidit, "Haridepan Gerakan Tani”, BM, July 1953» P*340. === [PDF page 86] === a g r ic u ltu r a l la b o u re rs. B ut i t was n o t u n t i l m id -1957 t h a t A id it gave a p u b lic e x p la n a tio n o f th e r e v o lu tio n a r y v a lu e o f th e r e s p e c t i v e p e a s a n t g r o u p s. A i d i t w ro te t h a t a lth o u g h some r i c h p e a s a n t s le n d m oney, e x p l o i t p e a s a n t l a b o u r e r s, and a r e b y n a t u r e s e m if e u d a l, th e y g e n e r a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n l a b o u r th e m s e lv e s a n d so form p a r t o f t h e p e a s a n t r y. I f a c o r r e c t a p p ro a c h i s made t o th e m, th e y c a n ta k e a n e u t r a l s t a n d i n th e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t th e l a n d l o r d s and c a n j o i n t h e s t r u g g l e a g a in s t im p e ria lis m. The medium p e a s a n t s a r e e c o n o m ic a lly in d e p e n d e n t, g e n e r a l l y n e i t h e r e x p l o i t o t h e r s n o r e a r n i n t e r e s t on l o a n s, a n d s u f f e r fro m t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f th e i m p e r i a l i s t s, th e l a n d l o r d s and th e b o u r g e o i s i e. Some do n o t own enough l a n d f o r t h e i r own u s e a n d m ust r e n t l a n d from th e l a n d l o r d s. T h e re fo re, th e y: c a n n o t o n ly becom e p a r t o f th e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n an d th e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n, b u t th e y can a ls o a c c e p t s o c ia lis m. T h is i s why th e y a r e one o f t h e im p o r ta n t f o r c e s p u s h in g t h e r e v o l u t i o n f o rw a rd an d a r e a r e l i a b l e a l l y o f th e p r o l e t a r i a t. A id it even s t a te d t h a t: t h e i r a t t i t u d e t o th e r e v o l u t i o n i s a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r f o r v i c t o r y o r d e f e a t b e c a u s e th e medium p e a s a n t s w i l l c o m p ris e th e m a j o r i t y i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e a f t e r th e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n. PK I, "P rogram P e ru b a h a n T a n a h ", BM, D ecem ber 1951» p p. 15- 2 2. A i d i t, I n d o n e s ia n S o c i e t y, p p.6 0 - 1. === [PDF page 87] === HM r> Prior to the agrarian revolution, Aidit continued, the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers would continue to form the majority in the villages. They do not own land or do not have sufficient land for their own use, and must rent land or work as labourers for the landowners. In short: they are the village semi-proletariat, they are the largest force pushing the revolution forward and it is natural for them to be the most reliable of the allies of the proletariat and a basic part of the forces of the Indonesian revolution. However, they can attain their emancipation, Aidit claimed, only under the leadership of the proletariat. The Petty Bourgeoisie Aidit, writing in 1957» defined the petty bourgeoisie, ’other than the peasantry', as 'the urban poor, the intellectuals, the small traders, the handicraft workers, the fishermen, the independent workers and so on*. declared that these groups: have a status which is almost the same as that of the middle peasants. They also suffer the oppression of imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie and are every day pushed further and further towards bankruptcy and ruin. This is why they are one of the forces pushing the revolution forward and are a reliable ally of the proletariat. They can attain their freedom only under the leadership of the proletariat.' Ibid., p.59 === [PDF page 88] === Aidit also pointed out that as some sections of the petty bourgeoisie fell easily under the influence of the bourgeoisie, the Party had to devote special attention to revolutionary propaganda and organizational work among them. Aidit*s description of the composition and political character of the Indonesian petty bourgeoisie is an almost direct translation of sections of the analysis of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie contained in Mao Tse-tung’s “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party"^ - though Aidit added fishermen and the urban poor to the definition. Apparently Aidit took over Mao's analysis regardless of its relevance to the Indonesian situation. Earlier in the period of the Aidit leadership, for example in the April 195*1 PKI General Programme, the petty bourgeoisie was not specifi cally included among the driving forces of the revolution. In fact, the only group to be listed in 1951 as a revo lutionary force and later included in the definition of the petty bourgeoisie was the intelligentsia. Only when the national united front policy was being implemented See Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", in his Selected Works, vol.III, pp.90-2. PKI, Konstitusi, 195*1» p.11* === [PDF page 89] === successfully and when the Party leaders were tidying up their theoretical analysis of the Indonesian revolution, did the Aidit leadership define their concept of the petty bourgeoisie and list the petty bourgeoisie as the third of the three basic driving forces of the revolution. The groups that comprise the petty bourgeoisie as defined by Aidit vary greatly in social status and in political behaviour. To put the Indonesian urban poor and fishermen in the same category as the high-status and wealthy doctors and lawyers is almost ludicrous. Politi cally, the urban poor, the fishermen, small traders and handicraft workers, unless they were santri, have provided a ready source of support for PKI and its mass organi zations. On the other hand, the intellectuals and independent workers have been, in general, leaders, members or supporters of what the communist leaders call the national bourgeois and reactionary parties. Why, then, has the Aidit leadership defined the petty bourgeoisie as it has, and why has the petty bourgeoisie been described as a revolutionary force? Perhaps the PKI leaders do believe that given the correct policy and tactics the Party could rally as revolutionary forces all the groups within the petty bourgeoisie as defined. Such a belief could arise from a study of the success of the Chinese Communist Party. It is also === [PDF page 90] === p o s s ib le th a t th e A id it le a d e r s h ip used th e c a te g o ry o f p e t t y b o u rg e o is ie as a p o tp o u r r i o f groups t h a t d id n o t f i t i n t o t h e o t h e r more r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e s o c i o p o l i t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s - and i f t h i s i s th e c a s e, i t w ould a c c o u n t f o r th e h e te ro g e n e o u s n a tu r e o f th e p e t t y b o u r g e o is ie as d e fin e d. The P a r t y l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n a w a r e, t o o, t h a t t h e y n e e d e d members o f t h e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e, who a r e g e n e r a l l y more s e l f - a s s u r e d, b e t t e r e d u c a t e d and f i n a n c i a l l y b e t t e r - o f f t h a n t h e w o r k e r s and p e a s a n t s, as c a d re and f i n a n c i a l s o u rc e s f o r t h e P a r ty a n d i t s mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s. The B o u r g e o i s i e A c c o r d in g t o t h e u s a g e o f t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p, t h e b o u r g e o i s i e i s n o t so much a s o c i a l a s a p o l i t i c a l c ateg o ry. The b o u r g e o i s i e c o m p r is e s t h o s e p e r s o n s o f A l f r e d M eyer, i n h i s s t u d y o f L e n in is m, n o t e s t h a t: An i d e o l o g i c a l s t u d y s u r v e y i n g t h e u s e s o f t h e te r m / p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i § 7 w ould... c o n s t i t u t e a v i r t u a l h i s t o r y o f M a rx ist s o c i a l th e o ry. Such a s t u d y w ould r e v e a l t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f t h i s c o n c e p t, w h ic h h a s b e e n u s e d a s a l a b e l f o r a n y g ro u p n o t f i t t i n g i n t o th e sim p le b i p o l a r schem es M arxism s e e k s t o a p p l y. A l f r e d G-. M eyer, L e n i n is m, C a m b rid g e, M a s s a c h u s e t t s, 1957 p. 115 > f o o t n o t e. Prom my own l i m i t e d s a m p li n g o f com m unist c a d r e s, h o w e v e r, i t w ould seem t h a t t h e y w ere draw n m a i n l y from a g ro u p t h a t h a s b e e n i g n o r e d b y t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p i n i t s s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s: th e w h i t e - c o l l a r w orkers i n g o v e rn m e n t a n d p r i v a t e e m p lo y m en t, i n c l u d i n g t e a c h i n g. === [PDF page 91] === social status higher than the petty bourgeoisie (not including the doctors and lawyers), and who lead, join or support political parties other than those of the extreme left. The bourgeoisie is sub-divided into the compradore bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The Aidit leadership labelled as compradore bourgeois those sections of the bourgeoisie which were pro-Western, or not so outspokenly anti-Western, and which were avowedly anti-communist. Although the label compradore bourgeois has been applied irrespective of whether the victims had business relations with foreign capitalist companies, Aidit has attempted to remain within the bounds of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy by explaining that some of the compradores had capital alliances with the large foreign capitalists, while others were paid 'out of special funds or other forms of bribes provided by the imperialists’. But despite their obvious hatred for the compradore bourgeoisie, the PKI leaders have been aware of the possibilities of exploiting the 'contradictions* between the compradores serving different imperialist masters: When... the Party's policy at a given time is directed against only one particular imperialism, then a part of the compradore bourgeoisie can be Aidit, Indonesian Society, pp.50-1. === [PDF page 92] === an additional force in the fight against that particular imperialism. But, even so, the compradore bourgeoisie remains very reactionary and still aims at crushing the Communist Party, the proletarian movement and other democratic movements.' The national bourgeoisie, according to the usage of the Aidit leadership, is that section of the bourgeoisie which is outspokenly opposed to Western imperialism, and which is not implacably anti-communist. The Aidit leadership envisages the national bourgeoisie as having a dual character: on the one hand its development is stifled by imperialism and feudalism; but on the other, because it is economically and politically weak and has class ties with imperialism and feudalism, the national bourgeoisie does not have the courage to attack in a fundamental manner the two basic targets of the revolution. The vacillating character of the national bourgeoisie was explained by Aidit in his speech to the fifth national congress of the Party in March 1954: The Indonesian national bourgeoisie, because it is also oppressed by foreign imperialism, can, in certain situations and within certain limits, participate in the fight against imperialism. In such certain situations, the Indonesian proletariat must build unity with the national bourgeoisie and defend that unity to the utmost... Aidit, D.jalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat, p.53« Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.57* === [PDF page 93] === 79 B e c a u se t h e I n d o n e s i a n n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e i s weak i n t h e econom ic a n d p o l i t i c a l f i e l d s, u n d e r c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l c o n d itio n s th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e, w h ich i s i n n a t u r e v a c i l l a t i n g, c a n becom e u n r e l i a b l e and b e t r a y. T h e r e f o r e t h e p r o l e t a r i a t and PKI m ust a lw a y s be p re p a re d fo r th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t in a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n th e n a ti o n a l b o u rg e o is ie w i l l n o t p a r t i c i p a t e in th e u n ite d f r o n t b u t, i n y e t a n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n, i t may p o s s i b l y r e j o i n th e f r o n t. The PKI l e a d e r s h a v e shown w i d e l y v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r own a b i l i t y t o win t h e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o is ie to th e s id e o f th e r e v o l u t io n. I n m id -1 9 5 7 A i d i t w r o te t h a t b e c a u s e o f t h e weak c h a r a c t e r o f t h e n a tio n a l b o u rg e o is ie, ' i t i s n o t v ery d i f f i c u l t to p u l l t h i s c l a s s t o t h e l e f t and make i t s t a n d f i r m l y on t h e s i d e o f th e r e v o l u t i o n 1 p ro v id e d t h a t th e p ro g re s s iv e f o rc e s w ere s t r o n g and t h e PKI t a c t i c s w ere c o r r e c t. N a tio n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v e n t s i n 1959 and 1960 rem oved much o f th is c o n fid e n t to n e. When t h e N ehru g o v ern m en t e v i c t e d t h e c o m m u n i s t - le d c a b i n e t i n K e r a l a, A i d i t w arned th e P a r ty t h a t 'e v e n th o u g h t h e p r o l e t a r i a t w a n ts t o t a k e t h e p e a c e f u l p a t h t o w in v i c t o r y f o r i t s p o l i c y, t h e b o u rg e o is ie w ill n o t v o lu n ta r ily accep t th is p a t h ’ b u t c a s t a s i d e c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d d e m o c rac y when t h e y were A i d i t, D.ialan ke D em okrasi R a k j a t, l o c. c i t. A id it, In d o n e sia n S o c ie ty, p.5 8. === [PDF page 94] === 80 harmful to its interests« This was a roundabout reference to the anti-democratic practices of the Indonesian ruling group. In February 1960, Aidit wrote directly of the Indonesian situation that of the national bourgeoisie, ’some groups jointly with the compradore bourgeoisie, want to take the road of military or personal dictatorship12 The Landlord Class The Aidit leadership sees the landlords as oppressing the peasant masses, as opposing their emancipation, and as possessing the land that is required for distribution to the peasant masses in order to mobilize those masses on the side of the revolution. are Therefore the landlords 'a target of the revolution’.^ They are not neces sarily, however, an immediate target. The PKI leaders have concluded that when, for tactical reasons, the primary target of the revolution is foreign imperialism, then it is desirable and possible to obtain the neutrality RI, September-October 1959» pp.8-9« D.N. Aidit, "For National Unity”, World Marxist Review, Aidit, Indonesian Society, p. 57. === [PDF page 95] === and even a l l i a n c e o f s e c t i o n s o f th e la n d lo r d c l a s s i n t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i m p e r ia l is m * A i d i t d e c l a r e d i n 1957 t h a t: B ased on t h e above a n a l y s i s o f t h e c l a s s e s i n I n d o n e s i a n s o c i e t y, i t i s c l e a r w h ich c l a s s e s and g r o u p s a r e t h e p i l l a r s o f i m p e r i a l i s m and f e u d a l i s m, t h a t i s, t h e l a n d l o r d s and t h e c o m p ra d o re s* They a r e o b s t a c l e s s t a n d i n g i n t h e way o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n and t h a t i s why t h e y a r e t h e e n e m ie s o f t h e p e o p le * The above a n a l y s i s a l s o makes c l e a r w hich c l a s s e s a n d groups a r e th e b a s i c d r i v i n g f o r c e o f th e r e v o l u t i o n, t h a t i s, t h e w o rk in g c l a s s, t h e p e a s a n t s and t h e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e * I t a lso makes c l e a r w hich c l a s s c a n t a k e p a r t i n t h e r e v o l u t io n, t h a t i s, th e n a t i o n a l b o u rg e o is ie * T h is i s why t h e w o r k e r s, t h e p e a s a n t s, t h e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e and t h e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e a r e t h e p e o p l e and make up th e f o r c e s o f t h e r e v o lu tio n, th e fo rc e s o f th e n a ti o n a l u n ite d fro n t* ' I n o t h e r w o r d s, from i t s a n a l y s i s o f t h e s o c i o p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s i n I n d o n e s i a, an a n a l y s i s b a s e d on t h e p a s t and c o n t i n u i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f PKI i t s e l f and o f f o r e i g n com m unist p a r t i e s, t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p c o n c lu d e d t h a t t h e p r o l e t a r i a t a l o n e was n o t a b l e t o c o m p le te t h e r e v o l u t i o n (th a t is, to b r i n g th e P a r ty to p o w er). B e ca u se c o n d i t i o n s w ere u n f a v o u r a b l e f o r a c o u p - t y p e s e i z u r e o f p o w e r, PKI h a d t o t r y t o o r g a n i z e t h e s u p p o r t o f o t h e r A i d i t, I n d o n e s i a n S o c i e t y, p*64* === [PDF page 96] === broad sections of society, namely the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. But even this combination was insufficient to guarantee victory. It was also necessary to seek allies among the other major political forces (namely among what was termed the national bourgeoisie), and, in the struggle against imperialism, to win the alliance of sections of the landlord class and to exploit the contradictions that were believed to exist between the different sections of the compradore bourgeoisie. THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT The PKI leaders believe that although the enemies of the revolution, namely the imperialists, compradores and feudal landlords, *are in a stage of disintegration and decay... it would be a mistake for us to underA estimate the strength of these enemies...* Because the enemies are still strong, the struggle to defeat them *is a bitter, difficult and protracted struggle*. *It is a mistake to believe that this struggle can be completed within a short space of time and hastily.* Having also examined the strength of the different social classes and Ibid., p.51 === [PDF page 97] === their position vis-a-vis the revolution, the PKI leaders concluded that in order for the revolution to succeed: the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie must unite in one national front. The alliance of the working class and the peasants must be the foundation of this national united front. The working class must lead the national united front. Only a national united front that is formed on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, led by the working class and formed as the result of the broadest people’s movement and the revolutionary struggle of the masses, will make possible the establishment by the Indonesian people of a people’s democratic government that implements the programme of people’s democracy and leads the people to victory.* In order to win the support of and leadership over the other revolutionary classes and groups, the prole tariat: must aid the peasants' struggle for land, the intellectuals* struggle for their basic rights, the national bourgeoisie’s struggle against foreign competition, and the entire Indonesian people’s struggle for national independence and democratic liberties.1 PKI, Program P K I, pp.21-2. This statement was repeated in the PKI programme endorsed in the September 1959 congress; Njoto, Tentang Program PKI (Concerning P K I ’s Programme), Djakarta, 1959> P»52. PKI, Program PKI, pp.19-20; Njoto, Tentang Program P K I, p.51. === [PDF page 98] === Further, the proletariat must not only assist the other sections of the people, but must also practice selfabnegation: The basic principle we must adhere to in the conduct of the national struggle is to subordinate the class struggle to the national struggle... Only by subordinating the class and Party interest to the national interest, which is the interest of the whole revo lutionary people, and by defending the class and Party interest in a limit-conscious manner, can our cooperation with the other classes and groups be profitable and can cooperation be achieved.1 In other words: class political and economic demands must be based on the condition that they will not harm the cooperation between the classes which, according to their common interest, must cooperate; and... all demands in the class struggle must be based on the needs of the national struggle.23 As the leaders of ’the organized vanguard and highest form of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat the PKI leaders have been faced with the problem of what This quotation is from Aidit’s report to the PKI central committee plenum held at the end of December 1960; D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Mengempur Imperialisms dan Feodalisme.’'* (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism and Feudalism.’), HR, January 2, 1961. This quotation is from Anwar Sanusi's speech to the PKI central committee plenum held at the end of December 1960; HR, January 18, 1961. This phrase is contained in all three Party consti tutions written by the Aidit leadership. === [PDF page 99] === fo rm th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t s h o u l d t a k e i n I n d o n e s i a. The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p i n h e r i t e d a c o n c e p t o f t h e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t from t h e A u g u s t 1948 p o l i t b u r e a u * s "New Road" r e s o l u t i o n draw n up b y t h e v e t e r a n com m unist Musso a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from two d e c a d e s o f e x i l e i n t h e S o v i e t U n io n. A i d i t, Lukman, N j o t o a n d S u d is m a n, t h e m ost i m p o r t a n t members o f t h e p o s t - 1 9 5 0 l e a d e r s h i p, h a d a l l b e e n p r e s e n t a t t h e p o l i t b u r e a u m e e t i n g, a n d h av e c o l l e c t i v e l y g i v e n s u b s e q u e n t e n d o rs e m e n t t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l im p o rtan c e o f th e r e s o l u t i o n. The "New Road" r e s o l u t i o n h a d c a l l e d f o r th e c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l f r o n t i n w h ic h PKI w ould p l a y t h e l e a d i n g ro le. A w i d e l y a c c e p t a b l e n a t i o n a l programme was f i r s t t o b e draw n up i n o r d e r t o a t t r a c t * a ll p r o g r e s s iv e and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t p e o p le * i n t o t h e f r o n t. The f r o n t was t o be fo rm ed from b e l o w, w i t h members o f a l l p a r t i e s as w e l l a s n o n - p a r t y p e r s o n s e l i g i b l e f o r m em bership a s l o n g a s t h e y a g r e e d t o t h e program m e. F r o n t c o m m itte e s w ere t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e c e n t r e and i n th e r e g i o n s, t h e i r members to b e e l e c t e d d e m o c r a t i c a l l y. H e r e, t h e n, was a p l a n f o r th e c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l f r o n t o r g a n i z a t i o n, l i n k e d w i t h b u t s e p a r a t e from t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s, and PK I, D j a l a n Baru u n t u k R e p u b li k I n d o n e s i a (New Road f o r th e In d o n e sia n R e p u b lic ), (se v e n th e d i t i o n ), D ja k a r ta, 1953, p p. 3 1 - 3. === [PDF page 100] === with which the PKI leaders hoped to win disguised control over the members of other parties and over non-party persons. The communist rebellion at Madiun in September 1948 removed any possibility of implementing the plan. As Lukman was to write later: For some time after the "New Road" resolution, there... existed rather widely among we communists stiff and formal thinking about the organization of the national united front. During 1950, PKI made frequent calls for the formation of 'one complete national united formation' or 'a national united front', but gave no further details of what the front would involve. On February 1,195*1» Lukman himself wrote an article entitled "Towards the United Front".3 it was, however, merely a vague restatement of some of the proposals contained in the "New Road" resolution, and called for unity of action based on a joint programme to further the common anti-imperialist M.H. Lukman, Tentang Front Persatuan Nasional (Concerning the National United Front), Djakarta, 1960, p.54; see also p.55. See, for example, the appeals made in parliament by communist representative Hutomo Supardan on October 2, 1950, and by his colleague Peris Pardede on October 9» and vol.IV, p. 1678. M.H. Lukman, "Menudju Front Persatuan" (Towards the United Front), BM, February 1, 195*1» PP*57-9- === [PDF page 101] === objective. Unlike the August 1948 resolution, Lukman*s article avoided any mention of the organizational structure the proposed unity should have. And then the organi zational basis of the front seemed to arrive ready-made. On March 24, 1951, the leaders of the minor Moslem party PSII called a meeting of leaders of several political parties to seek a basis for overcoming the problems facing the nation. Six days later eleven political parties signed a charter of cooperation, a joint programme, and a constitution for the new body, the Political Parties* Consultative Council (BPP). The members of the BPP included, besides PKI, the minor Moslem parties PSII and Perti, the nationalist communist Murba party, the Labour Party, and the small nationalist parties Parindra, PRN, and PRI. Despite certain qualifications, the PKI leaders were jubilant at the formation of the BPP. They warned Party members that the BPP *is not yet in accordance with the concept of the national united front as we desire it*, and that the other parties in the BPP were not yet prepared to accept the PKI proposal that Individuals as well as organizations be admitted as members of the new These documents are given in BM, March 15-April 1, 1951, pp.168-71. === [PDF page 102] === body.^ But they also said that 'we can do much, very much.'' with the BPP. Lukman wrote that 'the Consulta tive Council with its joint programme is one form of the national united front at a certain stage'. He was certain, he wrote, that the joint actions based on the joint programme would force the BPP to adapt its organi zation along lines designed by PKI - that is, along lines similar to the "New Road” resolution. On May 11, 1951» Aidit declared that the creation of the intended national united front had already begun with the creation of the BPP.3 The optimism of the PKI leaders was soon proved to be groundless. Most of the members of the BPP viewed it as a short-term means of applying pressure in the current cabinet crisis. When the BPP was ignored by the cabinet f o r m a t e u r s t h e majority of its members lost interest in Although PKI and its mass organizations worked hard Editorial in BM, March 15-April 1, 1951, pp.161-4. M.H. Lukman, "Mewudjudkan Front Nasional" (To Realize the National Front), BM, March 15-April 1, 1951» p.172. Sin Po, May 12, 1951. Under the 1950 Indonesian constitution, when a cabinet resigned the president appointed one or more cabinet formateurs to form the next cabinet. The formateurs were not necessarily party leaders or even members of political parties, and they did not necessarily sit in the subsequent cabinet. === [PDF page 103] === to build the BPP into a nation-wide system of committees, the other members showed no further interest and within a year it had disappeared completely. The failure of the BPP drove home forcibly to the PKI leaders the certainty of what they must already have felt probable: that no political party was likely to transfer part of its control over its members to another political organization which, covertly but still obviously, was controlled by the PKI. It had also become evident that PKI’s appeals for a national coalition government were of no avail while the PKI was so small that its support was hardly worth seeking. A new concept of the national united front was required. As a result, in the latter part of 1951 and the first months of 1952 the PKI leaders undertook a thorough re-examination of the Indonesian political situation and of the national united front policy. Drastic changes were made in the methods of winning the broad masses of the people, in the Party’s attitude to the parties of the national bourgeoisie, and in the nature of the Party. Before the failure of the BPP, the Aldit leadership appears to have hoped to win the support of the broad sections of the masses by subverting the followers of the other parties and organizations. With the exception of the trade union federation, SOBSI, the communist-led mass === [PDF page 104] === organizations remained diminutive. In August 1951» however, Aidit declared that the national front consisted the workers* front, the peasants* front, the cultural front, the youth front, the students' front, the women's front, the poor urban people's front, the ex-armed fighters' front, the peace front, the Irian struggle front, the parties' united front, and the national industrialists' front.' The agitation and propaganda secretariat of the PKI central committee on April 26, 1952 wrote in a similar vein, but indicated that it would be the communist-led mass organizations that would organize the fronts uniting the various sections of society. In short, the PKI leaders now set the Party the task of uniting the masses through the Party's own mass organizations. This was a long-term task, but the leaders had acknowledged the protracted nature of the revolution. The period of futile appeals for national coalition governments was ended. The Party would work to build its own mass support with which to force or bargain an entry into the national government. At the same time, the Party drastically revised its attitude towards the non-communist political forces. [Unreadable] PKI-B, April 26, 1952. === [PDF page 105] === Sakirman wrote in I960 that at the time of the mass arrest of communists and communist sympathizers in August 1951> PKI was faced with a choice between two political lines. The Party could either consider the ruling classes to be one Compact and intact* anti-communist force, or it could consider the ruling groups to be heterogeneous. If they were compact and intact, then the Party would have to oppose them all, but if they were heterogeneous the Party could work to isolate their reactionary wing, and neutralize, or if possible attract, their non-reactionary elements. According to Sakirman the choice was not an easy one, and *a part of the higher cadres * believed that the entire national bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution by uniting with the reaction aries to crush the communists at the time of the Madiun ’affair*, by acquiescing to the Round Table Conference agreement, and by helping to formulate the 1950 consti tution. That is, some of the PKI cadres believed that Sakirman, "Apa Arti Sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi Terpimpin** (The Meaning of PKI’s Support for the 1945 Constitution and Guided Democracy), part I, BM, May-June 1960, pp.213-14« In PKI usage, the term cadre is applied to an active Party worker with fairly important responsibilities within the Party. The implication is that a cadre has received relatively thorough political education. === [PDF page 106] === because the national bourgeoisie had betrayed the revo lution in the past, it would always do so in the future. The PKI leaders spent their time in hiding after the August 1951 arrests in an intensive study of Lenin*s "Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" and several brochures by Mao Tse-tung. Finally they decided that: 1. the ruling groups within the current cabinet were not compact; 2. the national bourgeoisie was not irrevocably wedded to the reactionary, anti-communist forces, but part or even all of it could be won to a mutually advan tageous alliance with the progressives *; and 3. even the reactionary groups were rent by conflicts which PKI could exploit to advantage. For example, there were conflicts between those in the government and those outside, and between the pro-British and pro-American groups. The basis of this change was the realization that PKI could neither build a large Party and large mass organizations, nor win power without the tolerance and alliance of large segments of the non-communist political forces. The Aidit leadership has therefore constantly emphasized the need to unite with the greatest possible section of the non-communist forces. An exposition of what the national united front policy meant in terms of === [PDF page 107] === the PKI's relations with the non-communist political forces was contained in Aidit*s speech to the central committee on July 3 1 » 1956. He divided the Indonesian social-political forces into three broad categories: the diehard force, consisting of feudalists and compradores who plot with foreign imperialism1; the progressive force, consisting of workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals, and b y which he clearly meant those people within or influenced b y the PKI or its mass organizations; and the middle force, consisting of 'the national bourgeoisie and all other patriotic and anti-colonial forces including the left (rather progressive) landlord group*. line must be Aidit said that the PKI's political 'with all its might and tirelessly to build up the progressive force, to unite with the middle force and to isolate the diehard force'. Aidit went on to say that: It is a fact that in the parties that represent the diehard force and the middle force there exist several groups which can basically be divided into left, centre and right groups. order to be able to unite the greatest strength, the communists must analyze these groups so that we can always establish a correct attitude in order to be able to unite all that can be united, and in order to isolate the truly diehard. D.N. Aidit, "Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan Revolusi Agustus 1945"» (Unite to Complete the Demands of the August 1945 Revolution), HR, August 1, 1956. === [PDF page 108] === Even within the diehard parties, he continued, some leaders and members were anti-communist but not pro imperialist, not yet aware that to be anti-communist assisted the imperialists, while others were anti imperialist and not averse to cooperation with the commu nists. ’The communists must unite with such people.* This readiness to seek cooperation with as many as possible of the political forces, even the most reaction ary, in the pursuit of certain common goals, is a major characteristic of the Aidit leadership’s concept of the national united front as applied to the non-communist political forces. It stems from the leadership’s analysis of the relative weakness of the progressive force in face of the other internal and external forces, and the resultant need to build the broadest possible unity in order to advance step by step against the enemies of the revolution. Thus the Aidit leadership came to create its own concept of the national united front. In his speech of July 31 9 1956, Aidit made this concept clear. He said that the revolution would be successful ’only if there is a united front, if the proletariat has many friends’, and added that ’there are two kinds of fronts and two kinds of friends*. There was the united front between the proletariat, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie; and === [PDF page 109] === 95 the unity or friendship between the proletariat and the people who exploit it, that is, between the proletariat and the employers and government people who represent the interests of the national bourgeoisie* In other words, the Aidit leadership came to conceive of the national united front as entailing unity in two separate spheres and of two distinct qualities: the unity of the masses directly led and controlled by the Party and its mass organizations, a disciplined unity embracing the truly revolutionary classes; and the unity, in the form of friendship and cooperation, between PKI and the non communist political forces, a unity that PKI must work painstakingly to create and maintain, a unity that is limited to certain common objectives* The primary task of the national united front policy has been, however, the creation of a large and disciplined communist party* Only with such a party could the PKI leaders v/eld the unity of the revolutionary classes under communist leadership, either directly or through the intermediary of mass organizations. Only with such a party could they play a significant part in directing the course of national politics, and would they be sufficently strong to warrant other forces seeking alliance with them. And only with such a party, also in control of mass organizations, could they hope to prevent the === [PDF page 110] === establishment of a bourgeois dictatorship once imperialism and feudalism had been shattered. The first step on the road of building a mass party was taken in March 1952 when a campaign was begun to increase Party membership within six months from 7,910 to 100,000. Thus the Aidit leadership in the later months of 1951 and the early part of 1952 formulated its own concept of the national united front in conformity with its analysis of the Indonesian revolution and the forces present in the revolution. The concept envisaged and even now envisages no rapid victory, but many years of hard and patient work to alter the balance of forces in Indonesia. In the implementation of this concept, the PKI has faced three main tasks: 1. To build PKI into a disciplined, mass party. 2. To attract, mobilize, organize and lead the three most revolutionary classes, and to do the same for any other elements in society which might prove susceptible. 3. To gain the tolerance and cooperation of as many as possible of those political forces that are not anti communist, and to use their tolerance and cooperation to PKI-B, March 7, 1952, pp.3-6; PKI, UP Tahun PKI (PKI UP Years), Djakarta, 196P, p.72. === [PDF page 111] === several ends: toleration of the growth of the Party and its mass organizations, the destruction of the strength of imperialism and feudalism in Indonesia, the isolation and destruction of the anti-communist Indonesian political forces, and communist participation in a!national unity government1 as a step towards communist control of a People's Democratic Republic of Indonesia, The main body of this thesis is concerned with the implementation of the national united front policy of the Aidit leadership, and with an estimate of the progress it has brought towards communist control of Indonesia, === [PDF page 112] === PART TWO: BUILDING THE PARTY === [PDF page 113] === PART TWO BUILDING THE PARTY THE PARTY LEADERSHIP The Party Leadership, December 1948 to January 1951 In the period between December 1948 and the final Dutch withdrawal in December 1949» a provisional PKI central committee worked spasmodically in an effort to maintain a rudimentary Party organization* The great majority of the surviving leaders and members were afraid, however, to associate openly with the Party until they were certain it was not going to be persecuted further for its rebellion at Madiun. When the Dutch withdrew, Ngadiman Hardjosubroto, who was acting secretary-general, was chosen by the Party to sit in the working committee of the Republican parliament, and took his place there in December 1949« Ngadiman was then appointed a member of the Indonesian parliament and moved from Jogjakarta, in which city the PKI headquarters were still located, to Djakarta in January 1950. Djaetun, a veteran commu nist who had been active in the PKI in the 1920's, and === [PDF page 114] === 09 had suffered exile in West Irian and Australia from 1926 to 1946, took over the post of acting secretary-general.^ But Djaetun was only a front figure. Throughout most of 1950, PKI operated on three levels. First, there was the legal PKI, with an office in Jogjakarta, and with Djaetun as secretary-general. Second, the Socialist and Indonesian Labour parties were revived. The leader of the Socialist Party was Tan Ling Djie, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent. The Indonesian Labour Party was led b y Asmu and Sakirman. Third, there was an ’illegal PKI* which directed the work of the open parties, and also maintained a clandestine Party organi zation. In other words, Musso's plan for the organization of the communist parties into a single, public MarxistLeninist party was quietly ignored. During 1949 and 1950 no one person exercised leader ship of the ’illegal PKI’, and therefore of the legal PKI and the Socialist and Labour parties. leader was Tan Ling Djie, The foremost with Ngadiman Hardjosubroto Much of the information on the period December 1948 to January 1951 was provided in statements made to the author by Djaetun. This was confirmed b y Djaetun and Darsono (a veteran communist who returned to Indonesia in 1950 after many years of exile, during which he had broken with the commu nists) in conversations with the author. The Aidit leadership later made Tan Ling Djie the scapegoat for the ’errors* committed in this period. === [PDF page 115] === 100 perhaps the second figure. These two were the survivors of the four-man general secretariat of the politbureau that had been announced on September 1, 1948, and their rise to the top two places in the Party was a natural process after the death of the other two general secre tariat members. Alimin, a veteran Party member, retained considerable prestige, and in March 1950 he was reported to be the head of PKI's agitation and propaganda secre tariat, of which he had been a member in 1948. But Alimin could not be a serious contender for control of the Party because of his age (he was b o m in 1889), and of marked ill-health which began in late 1949. Also within the leadership, but of a lesser stature, was Wikana, who had been a Minister of State in the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet from July 1947 to January 1948, and who had been elected head of the youth section of the politbureau announced on September 1, 1948. In July 1950* two young communists returned to Indonesia after eighteen months abroad: Dipa Nusantara Aidit, and M.H. Lukman. They had left Indonesia at the time of the Madiun rebellion and had gone to Viet Nam where they reportedly fought with the Viet Minh guerrillas, Alimin, Riwajat Hidupku (The Story of My Life), Djakarta, 1954, p.44. Sin Po, July 25, 1950. === [PDF page 116] === and to China, where they attended the Asian-Australasian trade union conference in Peking in December 1949> ostensibly as representatives of the trade union federation SOBSI. Aidit was 26 years old on his return, but already had been active for several years in the leftwing movement in Indonesia. He claims to have joined the PKI as early as 1943» and to have taken part in the semi legal youth organizations which prepared the August 17 > 1945 proclamation of Indonesian independence. In the middle of 1946 he went to work for the PKI central com mittee and at the fourth PKI congress in January 1947 was elected to membership of that committee. In 1947 he became a member of the Republican parliament and chairman of the PKI parliamentary group. In the same year he was also a member of the executive of the Indonesian Socialist Youth, and of the executive council of the People*s Democratic Front which united most of the socialist and communist organizations. At the beginning of 1948 Aidit became a candidate member of the PKI politbureau and in August became a full member and a member of its labour Sin P o, November 18, 1949* For brief biographies of Aidit, see D.N. Aidit, Menempuh Djalan Rakjat (Along the People*s Road), (fourth edition), Djakarta, 1954» PP*3-4; and BM, September-October 1953> PP.479-80. === [PDF page 117] === 102 secretariat. His companion, Lukman, was 30 years old and had been raised in the Dutch concentration camp in West Irian to which his father had been sent for his part in the 1926 communist rebellion. Lukman, too, had taken part in the youth movement during the Japanese occupation and the early days of the revolution, and had also worked for the PKI headquarters from mid-1946. He was elected to the central committee in 1948» and in August 1948 to the politbureau, in which he was a member of the agitation and propaganda section. Upon their return Aidit and Lukman worked for the politbureau*s agitation and propaganda secretariat which on August 15, 1950, and despite obstruction from Tan Ling Djie, began to republish, twice a month, the P a r t y ’s periodical "Bintang Merah" (Red Star). Also on the editorial staff were Peris Pardede, then only 32, and Njoto. Njoto, Aidit and Lukman, were to constitute a triumvirate which still controls the PKI. In August 1950 Njoto was aged 25, and like his companions already had an active record in the communist movement. He had taken For brief biographies of Lukman, see BM, SeptemberOctober 1953> pp.481-2; and HR, September 7, 1955. PKI, 40 Tahun PKI (PKI 40 Years), Djakarta, 1960, p. 66. For brief biographies of Njoto, see BM, September-October 1953» PP.483-4; and HR, September 7, 1955* === [PDF page 118] === 10 3 part in the underground movement during the Japanese occupation, and in November 1945 had helped establish the PKI organization in Bekasi, of which he soon became secretary-general. Later he represented PKI in the working committee of the Republican parliament, and be came chairman of the PKI group in the committee. mid-1948 he became a member of both the central committee and politbureau of the Party. The "Bintang Merah" editors claimed in the issue of January 1-15, 195*1 that the periodical had reappeared: at a time when Party members were seeking a way out of the darkness caused by the confusion of the Party leadership, at a time when Party members... did not receive clear leadership in the organizational and political spheres.1 The editors further claimed that the reorganization of the Party in the regions, which gathered force after August 1950, was in large part due to the stimulus and leadership given by "Bintang Merah". They also claimed that the periodical gave the basis and leadership for developing the criticism and self-criticism among Party leaders and ordinary members which led to the ouster of those leaders who clearly ’did not fulfil conditions’. And if the claim is correct that "Bintang Merah" circu1 Editorial, "Memasuki Tahun 1951” (Entering 195i)» BM, January 1— 15, 1951> P*4. === [PDF page 119] === 101 l a t i o n was i n c r e a s e d from 3>000 i n A ug u st 1950 t o 1 0,0 0 0 a t t h e end o f t h e y e a r, t h e n p r e s u m a b ly th e p e r i o d i c a l w ould ha v e h a d a n i n f l u e n c e a l s o e x t e n d i n g f a r o u t s i d e t h e P a r t y, w h ic h a t t h a t tim e h a d p e r h a p s 3 o r 5>000 m em bers. The i n f l u e n c e o f t h e n e w l y - r e t u r n e d l e a d e r s was s o o n fe lt. On O c to b e r 19> 1950, t h e I n d o n e s i a n L abour P a r t y o f f i c i a l l y d is s o lv e d i t s e l f in acco rd an ce, as i t d e c la re d, w i t h M u s s o 's p l a n, a n d i t s l e a d e r s e x p r e s s e d t h e p i o u s hope t h a t Tan L in g D j i e ' s S o c i a l i s t P a r t y would s o o n fo llo w s u i t. ^ H ow ever, n o t a l l th e ’o ld * com m unist l e a d e r s w ere w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t m ee k ly and w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n t h e new l e a d e r s and t h e i r p o l i c i e s. As p r o m i n e n t c o m m unists from t h e p r e v i o u s p e r i o d, a t l e a s t W ik an a, Ngadiman H a r d j o s u b r o t o, Tan L in g D j i e a n d A lim in o p e n l y d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p on m a t t e r s o f p o l i c y. B ut b e c a u s e t h e o l d e r l e a d e r s w ere n o t t h e m s e lv e s u n i t e d, t h e y d i d n o t p r e s e n t a com pact r e s i s t a n c e and w ere q u i c k l y e l i m i n a t e d one b y o n e. The f i r s t o f t h e o l d e r l e a d e r s t o b e p u b l i c l y d i s c i p l i n e d was W ikana. In th e t h i r d c o n fe re n c e o f th e I n d o n e s i a n S o c i a l i s t Y o u th, w h ic h was h e l d from November 4 -12, 1950, he was n o t r e - e l e c t e d t o t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s L o c.c it S i n Po, O c to b e r 19» 1950 === [PDF page 120] === 105 e x e c u t i v e c o m m i tt e e. F u r t h e r, an a r t i c l e "B in t a n g Me r a h ” e n t i t l e d of h is in "Mass Youth O r g a n i z a t i o n ", was s e v e r e ly c r i t i z e d by th e e d i t o r i a l b o a rd f o r a n d c o n f u s e d t h o u g h t ’.*1 ’e r r o n e o u s The b o a r d c a l l e d him i n f o r l o n g d i s c u s s i o n s an d o b l i g e d him t o r e c a n t. On December 29 he was made t o r e s i g n from a s t u d y - g r o u p o r g a n i z e d b y t h e n a t i o n s l i s t - c o m m u n i s t Murba p a r t y, an d w h ich t h e new l e a d e r s d e n o u n c e d a s a ’T r o t s k y i t e e f f o r t ’ h a r m f u l t o PKI. Ngadiman H a r d j o s u b r o t o was a l s o d i s c i p l i n e d i n December 1950. On December 2, a s t a t e m e n t was i s s u e d i n t h e name o f t h e PKI s e c r e t a r i a t w h ic h c a l l e d f o r a con f e d e r a t i o n b e tw e e n a: D e m o c r a tic R e p u b li c o f I r i a n, f r e e from t h e Round T a b le C o n f e r e n c e a g r e e m e n t, and t h e U n i t a r y S t a t e o f t h e R e p u b li c o f I n d o n e s i a n o t y e t f r e e d from th e a g re e m e n t.3 The PKI c e n t r a l c o m m itte e im m e d ia te l y d e n o u n ce d t h e s t a t e m e n t a s t h e w ork o f ’ t h e T r o t s k y i t e and a d v e n t u r i s t g r o u p *, and d i s c l a i m e d a u t h o r s h i p. ^ When i t was fo u n d t h a t N gadim an, a p p a r e n t l y w i t h Tan L in g D j i e ’s k n o w le d g e, h a d i s s u e d t h e s t a t e m e n t, t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e rem oved BM, J a n u a r y 1 - 1 5, 1951» P«26. L o c.c it. The f u l l t e x t o f th e Decem ber 2, 1950 s t a t e m e n t i s g i v e n i n S i n P o, Decem ber 6, 1950. S i n P o, Decem ber 11, 1950. === [PDF page 121] === 106 him as a PKI member of parliament, and he was excluded from the leadership of the Party. The other prominent ^ l d 1 communist to resist openly the policies of the young leaders at this time was Tan Ling Djie himself. By the end of December the new leaders were sufficiently entrenched within the central committee to take Tan to task in a plenary session of the committee held in the first week of January 1951. There he: deviously defended his reformist and legalistic policy concerning West Irian, and also deviously defended the importance of continuing the Socialist Party in order, he said, to gather people who were pro-communist but *dare not enter PKI*.2 The central committee went against him, cancelled his statement on West Irian, and decided to dissolve the Socialist Party. His defeat Resulted in his being deserted by the centrist group in the central committee.*3 The new, five-member politbureau elected by the central committee was announced on January 7, 1951•^ It consisted of Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sudisman, and the BM, January 1-15, 1951, p.22. D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus untuk Sukses-Sukses jang Lebih Besar" (Continue to Advance for Greater Successes) in his Pilihan Tulisan (Selected Works), vol. I, Djakarta, 1959, p.202. Ibid., p.203 BM, January 1-15, 1951, P*50 === [PDF page 122] === 107 a g e d a n d a i l i n g A lim in. A i d i t, now o c c u p y in g th e p o s t o f f i r s t s e c r e t a r y, and S u d ism an, w ere e l e c t e d a s th e l e a d e r s h i p o f th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s e c r e t a r i a t. S u d ism a n, a g e d 3 0, h a d a s i m i l a r p o l i t i c a l "background t o t h a t o f th e new t r i u m v i r a t e l e a d e r s h i p: he h a d j o i n e d PKI d u r i n g th e J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n, was s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l o f t h e I n d o n e s ia n S o c i a l i s t Y outh from i t s f o r m a tio n i n November 1945* w orked i n th e l e a d e r s h i p o f th e P e o p le * s D e m o c ra tic F r o n t, an d i n A u g u st 1948 becam e a f u l l member o f th e PKI p o l i t b u r e a u, i n w h ich he h e a d e d th e o r g a n i z a tio n s e c tio n. From J u n e 1950 to J a n u a r y 1951 he was j o i n t s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l o f th e l e g a l PK I, a n d l e n t h i s s u p p o r t t o th e A id it-L u k m a n -N jo to t r i u m v i r a t e. A id it, Lukman, N jo to and P a rd e d e w ere c h o s e n a s th e e d i t o r i a l b o a r d o f " B in ta n g M erah”. S a k irm a n was c h o s e n to h e a d th e PKI p a r l i a m e n t a r y g ro u p, a p o s i t i o n h e l d p r e v i o u s l y b y N gadim an H a r d jo s u b r o to. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e i t s e l f c o n s is te d o f fo u rte e n p e rs o n s, s t i l l i n c l u d i n g Tan L in g D j i e and W ikana, b u t n o t N gadim an. F o r b r i e f b i o g r a p h i e s o f S u d ism a n, se e P a r la u n g a n, H a s i l R a k ja t M em ilih T okoh-T okoh P a rle m e n (The R e s u l ts o f th e P e o p l e fs E l e c t i o n o f Members o f P a r l i a m e n t ), D j a k a r t a, 1958, p p. 295-6; an d HR, S e p te m b e r 7, 1955» PK I, P u tu s a n - P u tu s a n S id a n g P le n o C e n t r a l C om ite P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a ( D e c is io n s o f th e PKI C e n t r a l C om m ittee Plenum M e e tin g ), D j a k a r t a, 1953* p * 6. === [PDF page 123] === 108 The new leadership had met little opposition from the older leaders, for several reasons. First, the more prominent and capable of the 'old' leaders had been killed, and the surviving leaders did not have a suf ficiently large or loyal following within the Party to stand against the new leadership. Tan Ling Djie had the added disadvantage of being of Chinese descent, and was thereby unable to occupy publicly the top position of the PKI in a country where anti-Chinese feeling was strong. Second, the ^ld* leaders were divided among themselves on matters of personality and policy, and did not present a united front against the new leadership. Third, and partly because of the divisions in the 'old* leadership, the Party during 1950 was in a chaotic condition. Little progress was being made in the task of reshaping the Party organization that had been shattered by the Madiun re bellion and the second Dutch attack, and there was a lack of leadership on both organizational and political policy. Into this situation came the new, young, dynamic leaders. They claimed to have clear ideas on organizational and political policy, and they claimed, in defence of their legitimacy, to be the true implementers of Musso's August 1948 resolution. Perhaps they also claimed to have the approval of the Chinese communist leaders, from whose country they had just returned. Of great, and perhaps === [PDF page 124] === 109 crucial importance was their dynamism. They launched into the publication of "Bintang Merah", feverishly began to re-build the Party organization, and worked hard to subdue their opponents. The result was that by January 7, 195*1» PKI had a new leadership, and the ’old* leaders were relegated to minor positions. The Party Leadership Since January 1951 Among the fourteen members of the central committee in January 1951» the new leadership was faced with three who were discontented with the new leaders, the new policies and the relatively lowly status to which they had been relegated: Tan Ling Djie, Alimin and Wikana. As soon as the Aidit leadership had established firm control over the lower organizations of the Party and was assured of the loyalty of most members of the central committee, it moved to expel the three recalcitrants from the central committee. The first move was made against Tan Ling Djie. August 1952 the central committee established a control commission to investigate those of his activities which were held to conflict with Party policy. Although he dutifully performed self-criticism and admitted many === [PDF page 125] === erro rs, t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e te rm e d h i s s e l f - c r i t i c i s m a s n o t c o m p le te ly s in c e r e * The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e plenum w h ic h met from O c to b e r 6 - 8, 1953 > drew up a r e s o l u t i o n w h ich a c c u s e d him o f m a i n t a i n i n g h i s ’e r r o r s o f s u b j e c t i v i s m, l e g a l i s m and l i q u i d a t i o n i s m * a n d o f i n s i n c e r i t y i n p e r f o r m i n g th e t a s k s s e t b y th e c o n t r o l c o m m issio n. A cam p aig n a g a i n s t ’Tan L in g D j i e - i s m ’ was l a u n c h e d a s a means o f p u r i f y i n g t h e P a r t y i d e o l o g i c a l l y, a n d Tan h i m s e l f was removed from t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e. He was n o t e x p e l l e d from th e P a r t y, b u t was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y: t o p u rg e h i m s e l f o f n o n -c o m m u n is t i d e o l o g y, t o c o r r e c t h i s e r r o r s, to p r o l e t a r i a n i z e h is id e o lo g y, and to d e v elo p h im s e lf as b r o a d ly as p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r t o become a good P a r t y member b y p e r f o r m i n g t a s k s t o be s e t b y t h e p o l i t b u r e a u and by g r e a t e r s t u d y o f th e t h e o r i e s o f M a rx ism -L e n in ism i n r e l a t i o n to th e p r a c t i c e o f th e In d o n e sia n r e v o l u t io n. I n J u n e 1953» a t a tim e when d i s c u s s i o n s w ere b e i n g h e l d c o n c e r n i n g t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a new c a b i n e t, t h e r e w ere r e p o r t s o f d i s a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n A lim in on t h e one hand a n d t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p o v e r w hat c o u r s e o f a c t i o n PKI s h o u l d ta k e. On Ju n e 25 A lim in was made t o i s s u e a s t a t e m e n t t h a t no s u c h d i s a g r e e m e n t e x i s t e d, a n d t h a t he a g r e e d f u l l y " R e s o l u s i T e rh a d a p Kawan Tan L in g D j i e " ( R e s o l u t i o n C o n c e r n in g Comrade Tan L in g D j i e ), i b i d., p p.4 -5 « See b e lo w, p p. 1 4 1 -4 === [PDF page 126] === w i t h A i d i t ' s v i e w s. -1 D e sp ite t h i s, t h e O c to b e r 1953 c e n t r a l c o m m itte e plenum rem oved him from th e p o l i t b u r e a u ' i n v ie w o f h i s a c t i v i t i e s a n d h e a l t h ’, th o u g h f o r t h e tim e b e i n g he r e t a i n e d h i s p o s i t i o n on t h e c o m m i tt e e. He was r e p l a c e d by S a k ir m a n, who was a l r e a d y c h a ir m a n o f t h e PKI p a r l i a m e n t a r y g ro u p and a l o y a l s u p p o r t e r o f t h e A id it le a d e rs h ip. Sakirman-^ was a u s e f u l a d d i t i o n t o t h e PKI l e a d e r s h i p a s one who was a b l e t o c em en t p e r s o n a l c o n ta c ts v i t a l to th e c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l u n ite d f r o n t b e tw e e n t h e P a r t y and t h e n o n -c o m m u n is t p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s. He h a d a h i g h e r l e v e l o f e d u c a t i o n t h a n t h e o t h e r PKI l e a d e r s, h a v i n g g r a d u a t e d b e f o r e t h e war from t h e Bandung t e c h n i c a l h ig h s c h o o l. And h e h a d a l o n g r e c o r d o f c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e n o n -c o m m u n is t n a t i o n a l i s t s. I n 1941 he h a d j o i n e d G e rin d o (Movement o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n P e o p l e ), w h ich i n c l u d e d a few com m unists and many n a t i o n a l i s t s, a n d w i t h i n w h ic h h e becam e a member o f t h e West J a v a c o m m issa ria t, t h e r e b y g a i n i n g t h e a c q u a i n t a n c e o f many n a tio n a lis t le a d e rs. D u r in g t h e r e v o l u t i o n he h a d become f i r s t c h a ir m a n o f t h e P e o p l e ' s Army s t a t i o n e d i n M a g ela n g, PK I-B, J u l y 2 5, 1953, p.1 0 9. PKI, P u t u s a n - P u t u s a n, p.4. For b r i e f b io g r a p h ie s o f Sakirm an, s e e P a rla u n g a n, H a s il R ak jat M em ilih, p p.2 8 6 -7; and HR, Septem ber 7, 1955« === [PDF page 127] === an d l a t e r a m a j o r - g e n e r a l i n t h e I n d o n e s i a n n a t i o n a l arm y, s e r v i n g i n th e h e a d q u a r t e r s. a member o f p a r l i a m e n t. I n J a n u a r y 1950 he became F u r t h e r m o r e, he i s t h e b r o t h e r - i n - l a w o f S a r t o n o, a p r o m in e n t PNI l e a d e r and s p e a k e r o f p a r l i a m e n t from 1950 t o 1959• At t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e plenum o f O c t o b e r 1953 A i d i t was e l e c t e d s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l o f th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s e c r e t a r i a t, w i t h Lukman and N j o t o as h i s d e p u t i e s. S u d is m a n, who h a d s h a r e d th e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e s e c r e t a r i a t s i n c e Ju n e 1950, l o s t t h i s p o s i t i o n b u t r e m a in e d on th e f iv e - m e m b e r p o l i t b u r e a u. By t h e tim e o f t h e PKI f i f t h n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s, w h ic h e n d e d on March 2 1, 1954, t h e num ber o f f u l l members o f t h e P a r t y, t h a t i s members w i t h v o t i n g r i g h t s, had r e a c h e d - a t e n f o l d i n c r e a s e s i n c e J a n u a r y 1951« T h is la r g e in c r e a s e in i t s e l f c o n s o lid a te d th e A id it l e a d e r s h i p 's c o n t r o l o v e r t h e P a r t y b e c a u s e th e new members h a d b e e n a t t r a c t e d i n t o t h e PKI b y A i d i t ' s p o l i c i e s a n d p ro g ram m es, t h e y were r e c e i v i n g p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n from c a d r e s l o y a l t o t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p, and t h e y h a d no l o y a l t i e s 'o l d ' le a d e rs. to th e The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p was a l r e a d y a s s u r e d o f t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e c e n t r a l '" a n d l o c a l P a r t y c a d r e s, a n d D.N. A i d i t, "Some R e s u l t s o f t h e F i f t h N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n Communist P a r t y ", FALP, O c t o b e r 1 5, 1954, === [PDF page 128] === from this position of strength made the fifth congress the occasion for removing the last of the disgruntled ‘old* leaders from the central leadership. Although Alimin sat on the five-man congress presidium,^ he failed to receive enough votes to he re-elected onto the central committee•“ It was not announced whether Wikana stood for re-election, hut he too lost his place on the central committee, Alimin and Wikana were replaced hy Nursuhud and Karel Supit,^ who had proved themselves able and disciplined Party workers under the Aidit leadership. The membership of the central committee remained at 13* As the claimed membership of the Party increased from about 4» or 5>000 in January 195*1 to 165,206 in March 1954» and one million by the end of 1955» the work to be done by the Partyfs central leadership increased considerably, and it became necessary to widen its membership. It appears that the Aidit leadership was at first reluctant to in corporate new members in the central leadership, perhaps through fear of unwittingly importing potential opposition into what had proved to be a reliable central committee. But as time passed, the Aidit leadership was able to judge which of the lower Party workers were most able and most TI, March 18, 1954. HR, March 22, 1953. HR, July 4» 1956, === [PDF page 129] === 114 loyal. In the March 1954 congress, three young commu nists were elected as candidate members of the central committee: A. Anwar, Anwar Kadir and Siswojo, born in 1926, 1916 and 1925 respectively* The central committee plenum which met on August 7> 1955 endorsed the election of three more candidate members: Tjugito, S* Utarjo and Ruslan Kamaludin,"1 born in 1921, 1923 and 1919 respective The central committee plenum which met from July 31 to August 3 9 1956 elected Siswojo to full membership of the committee, June* to replace Bachtarudin who had died in At the same time the central committee secretariat was enlarged to include Sudisman, Jusuf Adjitorop and Siswojo* These slight increases in the membership of the central leadership were soon found inadequate to meet the increased work entailed by a further increase in Party membership to one and a half millions at the beginning of 1959» and by the greatly increased Party work in parliament, the Constituent Assembly, and the local councils*-^ HR, August 9, 1955. The HR, August 6, 1956. The number of PKI representatives in parliament increased from 19 before to 32 after the September 1955 elections; PKI had 60 members elected to the Constituent Assembly in the December 1955 elections; and PKI representation in the regional and local councils of Java increased from a negligible number to 624 in 1956, when the councils were === [PDF page 130] === 115 e x p a n s io n and r e o r g a n iz a t io n o f th e c e n t r a l le a d e r s h ip o rg a n s were u n d erta k en by th e c e n t r a l com m ittee plenum w h ich ended on A p r il 3, 1958. The p o l i t b u r e a u was e n l a r g e d by t h e p r o m o ti o n o f A d j i t o r o p t o c a n d i d a t e m e m b e rs h ip, a n d a p o l i t b u r e a u d a i l y c o u n c i l, c o n s i s t i n g o f A i d i t, Lukman, N j o t o and S u d ism a n, was e s t a b l i s h e d t o p r o v i d e l e a d e r s h i p t o t h e P a r t y b e tw e e n p o l it b u r e a u m e e tin g s. A l l f i v e c a n d i d a t e members o f t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e were e l e v a t e d t o f u l l m e m b e rsh ip, t h u s i n c r e a s i n g t h e s i z e o f t h e c o m m itte e from 13 t o 18 m em bers. Ten o f th e members h a d c o n t i n u e d t o s i t i n t h e c o m m itte e s i n c e J a n u a r y 1951« The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s e c r e t a r i a t was r e o r g a n i z e d, a n d g i v e n t h e t a s k o f p e r f o r m i n g t h e c o m m i t t e e!s r o u t i n e d a i l y w ork. I t s s e v e n members c o n s i s t e d o f S udism an and A d j i t o r o p from t h e p o l i t b u r e a u, p l u s f i v e o t h e r c e n t r a l c o m m itte e members o f whom o n l y one h a d s a t i n t h e c o m m itte e s i n c e J a n u a r y 1951* The form ed on the b a s i s o f the 1955 p a r lia m e n ta r y e l e c t i o n s, and to 973 in th e l a t t e r h a l f o f 1957 a f t e r l o c a l e l e c t i o n s had b e e n h e ld. D.N. A i d i t, "Fase Baru dan P e n je su a ia n O r g a n is a s i Dengan S i t u a s i " (A New Phase and B r in g in g th e O r g a n iz a tio n i n t o L ine w ith th e S i t u a t i o n ), BM, M arch-A pril 1 9 5 8, p p.lU l|.-9; " P u tu san -P u tu san S id a n g P len o k e-V I C e n tr a l Com ite PKI" ( D e c is io n s o f th e S ix t h P le n a r y S e s s io n o f th e PKI C e n tr a l C o m m ittee), BM, M arch-A p ril 1958, p.153» === [PDF page 131] === i n c l u s i o n o f s o many p o s t - 1 9 5 1 c e n t r a l c o m m itte e members i n t h e s e c r e t a r i a t d e m o n s t r a t e d th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ^ c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e l o y a l t y o f t h e new members* The PKI s i x t h n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s, h e l d from S e p te m b e r 7-14, 1959 r e s u l t e d n o t o n l y i n t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e c o n t r o l o f th e A id it l e a d e r s h i p, b u t a ls o in th e f u r t h e r e n la rg e m e n t o f th e P a r ty c e n t r a l o rg a n s, and th e re a d m is sio n o f th e p r e v io u s ly o u ste d ’o ld* l e a d e r s, p r e s u m a b ly p u r i f i e d, to p o s itio n s w ith in th e c e n t r a l le a d e r s h ip. A i d i t was c h a ir m a n o f t h e c o m m issio n w h ich drew up t h e lis ts o f c a n d i d a t e s f o r a l l c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p o r g a n s, and t h e l i s t s w ere a d o p te d u n a n im o u s ly and u n c h a n g e d by th e co n g ress. I t is c e rta in, t h e r e f o r e, t h a t t h e e n la r g e m e n t o f t h e c e n t r a l o r g a n s a n d t h e r e t u r n o f ’o ld * l e a d e r s w ere i n no way a t h r e a t t o A i d i t ' s l e a d e r s h i p. A i d i t was e l e c t e d t o t h e new p o s t o f c e n t r a l c o m m itte e c h a i r m a n, w i t h Lukman and N j o t o a s h i s d e p u t i e s. The p o l i t b u r e a u was u n c h a n g e d e x c e p t f o r t h e a d d i t i o n o f N jo n o, t h e c h a i r m a n o f SOBSI, a s a c a n d i d a t e member. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e was e n l a r g e d t o 35 f u l l members and 11 c a n d i d a t e m em bers. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s e c r e t a r i a t, w i t h S udism an a s i t s h e a d, was f u r t h e r e n l a r g e d b y t h e a d d itio n of K arel S u p it. PK I, Dokumen-Dokumen K ongres N a s i o n a l k e -V I PKI ( Docum ents o f P K I 1s S i x t h N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s ), D j a k a r t a, 1 960, p p. 2 1 8 - 2 0. === [PDF page 132] === The r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f t h e 'o l d * P a r t y l e a d e r s h a d b e g u n some tim e b e f o r e th e s i x t h c o n g r e s s. A lim in, W ikana and Tan L in g D j i e h a d b e e n e l e c t e d as PKI r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o th e C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem bly i n t h e December 1955 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s, and i n December 1956 Tan L in g D j i e a n d Wikana w ere e l e c t e d as s e c o n d d e p u t y c h a ir m a n and s e c r e t a r y r e s p e c t i v e l y o f th e P a r t y g ro u p i n th e a s s e m b l y. 1 N gadim an H a r d j o s u b r o t o was r e p o r t e d, i n 1959» t o be c h a i r m a n o f t h e PKI c e n t r a l e l e c t i o n c o m m itte e e n t r u s t e d w i t h t h e t a s k o f p r e p a r i n g t h e P a r t y 1s cam paign i n t h e fo rth c o m in g g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s. In th e s i x t h c o n g re s s, W ikana r e t u r n e d t o th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e a s a f u l l member, Tan L in g D j i e and Ngadiman were e l e c t e d t o m em bership o f t h e c e n t r a l v e r i f i c a t i o n c o m m is s io n, and A lim in was h o n o u r e d b y a p l a c e on t h e c o n g r e s s p r e s i d i u m. A id it was s u f f i c i e n t l y s u r e o f h i s own c o n t r o l o f t h e P a r t y t o r e - e m p l o y t h e u n d o u b t e d t a l e n t s o f Y/ikana, Tan L in g D j i e a n d Ngadiman i n u s e f u l, b u t, i n te r m s o f p o w e r, unim p o rta n t, p o sitio n s. A n o t a b l e f e a t u r e o f t h e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p o f th e PKI s i n c e J a n u a r y 1951 h a s b e e n t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e PKI d a n P e r w a k i l a n, Decem ber 1956, p. 2 0 1. I n 1958» t h e y w ere r e p o r t e d t o b e o n l y o r d i n a r y members o f t h e g r o u p ’ s n in e - m a n l e a d e r s h i p c o m m itte e; PKI dan P e r w a k i l a n, f o u r t h q u a r t e r o f 1958, p. 2 9. === [PDF page 133] === membership of the inner core. Of the 14 central committee members in January 1951» 11 are still members. Only Bachtarudin, who has died, Alimin, who is too senile for such a position, and Tan Ling Djie are no longer in the committee. And of the five full members of the politbureau elected in September 1959, four were members in January 1951• The control over the Party of these four - Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman - is complete. Not only do they control the politbureau and its daily council, and the central committee and its secretariat, but they also have exercised personal supervision over Party work in parliament and the Constituent Assembly.*1 Furthermore, they have even maintained a close personal supervision over Party publications. publish its own newspaper, When PKI began to Daily), in July 1951» Njoto was given the task of super vising its contents, a task he still performs. With the publication of the newspaper, the importance of the periodical "Bintang Me rahH was reduced, and its editor1 In 1954 f Aidit, Lukman and Njoto entered parliament, replacing communist members who had resigned, and they continue to sit there. In December 1956, when Sakirman was elected fourth deputy chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Lukman took over his post of chairman of the PKI parliamentary group. Aidit, Lukman and Njoto also entered the Constituent Assembly which existed from November 1956 to June 1959* === [PDF page 134] === ship was transferred in August 1951 to the veteran, Djaetun, and later to Supeno, a member of the,fHarian Rakjat" editorial staff* In January 1957» however, the editorship was returned to a board consisting of Njoto, Sudisman and Pardede* THE EXPANSION AND EDUCATION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP 1951 The Aidit leadership took over a party that was small and ill-organized, and most of whose members were lacking even the rudiments of Marxist-Leninist knowledge. The two primary tasks of the new leaders were to put the Party organization into order, and to begin the work of politi cal education. In January 1951 the Party organization was still chaotic as a result of the Madiun rebellion, the second Dutch attack on the Republic, and the failure of the postMadiun leaders to give clear and energetic direction. Total Party membership was about 4, or 5,000. The task This figure is deduced from A i d i t ’s statement (D.N. Aidit, "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia", World Marxist Review, July 1959, p*24) that there were 7,910 full and candidate members at the beginning of 1952, and from the undoubted growth of the Party during 1951« There is doubt, however, as to the accuracy of Aidit*s figure. At another time he stated === [PDF page 135] === 120 of re-establishing the Party organization was begun in earnest after the return of Aidit and Lukman to the Party leadership in July 1950* In September 1950, the newspaper "Sin Po" reported that PKI branches were already active throughout Sumatra (where the Party had stayed aloof from the Madiun rebellion and so continued its public activities unimpaired) and in Java in Djakarta, Banten, Sukabumi, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, north Kedu, Blitar, and Banjumas. It was expected that branches would soon be revived in Semarang, Bandung, Besuki, Pekalongan and Tjirebon in Java as well as in Menado, Makasar, Banjarraasin and Timor in the outer islands. During October 1950, the Party was revived in Surabaja, Bodjonegoro, Madiun and Malang. The revival of former PKI branches and the establish ment of new ones continued after the Aidit leadership won full control of the Party in the first week of January that PKI membership had reached ’the teens of thousands' (belasan ribu) by August 1951; D.N. Aidit, "Menudju Persatuan Nasional dengan Semangat Revolusi Agustus" (Towards National Unity with the Spirit of the August Revolution), PKI-B, August 1954> p.102. On the other hand, this apparent discrepancy could be explained if the government’s mass arrest of communists in August 1951 had caused many members to break their contact with the Party through fear of further government action. Sin P o, September 26, 1950» BM, November 1, 1950, pp.186-7* === [PDF page 136] === 1951* In each locality where reorganization was effected elections were held and leaders chosen who were in agreement with the new central leadership. The Party in Sumatra, however, required special treatment, probably because the pre-Madiun leaders there had remained un changed. On February 1, 1951 the central committee sent Pardede and Hutapea to reorganize the Party in Sumatra. By March it was already reported that undesirable elements had been excluded from the leadership there, and central committee commissariats, led by trusted pro-Aidit members of the central committee, were established in North, Central and South Sumatra. By May 195*1» Aidit declared that the Party organi zation was being built not only in Java and Sumatra as in the past, but also in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Nusatenggara.1 He also claimed that the number of Party members and candidate members was already far more than in 1948, and that the basic Party organizations in places of See BM, March 1, 1951» pp*156-8 for the details of the reorganization of the Party in Sumatra. D.N. Aidit, "Garis-Garis Pokok Perdjuangan Ideologi Didalam PKI" (The Fundamental Lines of the Ideological Struggle in PKI), BM, May 15-June 1, 195*1» P«2ö5» Kalimantan is the Indonesian name for the Indonesian part of Borneo, Sulawesi is the name for Celebes, and Nusatenggara is the name given to the Lesser Sundas stretching from Bali in the west to the Indonesian part of Timor in the east. === [PDF page 137] === w ork and r e s i d e n c e, a s w e l l a s P a r t y f r a c t i o n s w i t h i n mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, h a d a l r e a d y b e g u n t o f u n c t i o n. The w ork o f e x p a n d in g t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s u f f e r e d a blow when, i n A u g u st 1951» t h e g o v e rn m e n t a r r e s t e d some 2,0 0 0 c o m m unists and ’ o t h e r p r o g r e s s i v e s * on a n u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d c h a r g e o f p l o t t i n g a c o u p d ’e t a t. who e v a d e d a r r e s t, Many o f t h e l e a d e r s i n c l u d i n g A i d i t, w ent i n t o h i d i n g from w hich t h e y d i d n o t emerge u n t i l t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a new g o v e rn m e n t i n A p r i l 1952. T h u s, a y e a r a f t e r t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a d won c o n t r o l o f t h e P a r t y, t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n was f u n c t i o n i n g n o t o n l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e m a jo r c e n t r e s o f J a v a and S u m a tra b u t a l s o in th e o t h e r i s l a n d s. F u rth e rm o re, th e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e P a r t y had become more hom ogeneous t h a n e v e r b efo re. The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p had e x e r c i s e d i t s power u n d e r t h e J a n u a r y 1947 and A p r i l 1951 P a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o n o m in a te t h e c o m m issa rs who h e a d e d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a t th e r e g io n a l l e v e l, and had e n su re d t h a t th e l e a d e r s in t h e n e w ly o r g a n i z e d o r r e v i v e d b r a n c h e s w ere p e r s o n s A i d i t, The B i r t h a n d Growth o f t h e Communist P a r t y o f I n d o n e s i a, D j a k a r t a, 1958, p.3 Ö. G eorge MeTu m a n K a h in, " I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s a n d N a t i o n a l i s m " i n W illia m L. H o l l a n d ( e d. ), A s ia n N a t i o n a l i s m a n d th e W est, New Y ork, 1953» p.l 8 9 > s t a t e s t h a t i n A u g u st 1951 15>000 p e r s o n s w ere a r r e s t e d, o f whom many w ere c o m m u n is ts. I can see no r e a s o n, h o w e v e r, why A i d i t s h o u l d have u n d e r s t a t e d t h e m a g n itu d e o f t h e a r r e s t s. === [PDF page 138] === amenable to the central leadership. At the beginning of 1952 there were 7>910 full and candidate members of PKI. At the same time as reviving and expanding the Party organization, the Aidit leadership began the ideological and organizational education of the cadres and members. Aidit, in an article written at the beginning of March 1951> warned that the Party suffered from ideological deficiences and that during the struggle for victory, PKI could be affected by the dangers of ’left* and right opportunism, that is adventurism and capitulationism. At the same time he warned against sectarianism, which entailed ignoring the importance of attracting the broad mass of the workers and the importance of the national united front. The Party’s general programme, included in the April 1951 constitution, introduced the Party members to other dangerous deviations that could isolate PKI from the people and which had to be fought and avoided: tailism, commandism, closed door policy, isolation policy, paternalism, individualism, liberalism, bureaucracy, intrigue, nepotism and militarism.2 D.N. Aidit, "Membolsewikkan PKI" (Bolshevizing PKI), BM, March 1, 1951» pp.129-34. PKI, Konstitusi PKI (PKI’s Constitution), Djakarta, 1951 > pTTST === [PDF page 139] === An a r t i c l e b y A i d i t i n May 1951 p i n p o i n t e d two o t h e r d i s e a s e s p r e s e n t i n t h e P a r t y which l e d so m e ti m e s t o 'le ft* an d so m e ti m e s t o r i g h t d e v i a t i o n. ^ d o g m a t i s m, w h ic h d i d n o t a c c e p t t h a t They were 'M arxism i s n o t a dogma b u t a g u i d e f o r a c t i o n *; a n d e m p i r i c i s m, whose a d h e r e n t s h e l d f i r m l y t o t h e i r own r e s t r i c t e d e x p e r i e n c e s, a n d who d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d o r w i s h t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e im portance o f th e o ry f o r r e v o lu tio n a r y p r a c tic e * o r d e r t o remedy o r a v o i d su c h i d e o l o g i c a l d e v i a t i o n s, t h e new c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p e m p h a s i z e d t h e n e e d t o s t u d y n o t o n ly the c o n c re te s i t u a t i o n i n I n d o n e s ia, b u t a l s o the more i m p o r t a n t an d r e l e v a n t M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t l i t e r a t u r e. In o rd e r to p rovide s tu d y m a t e r i a l s, the c e n t r a l c o m m i t t e e a n n o u n c e d o n March 1, 1951 t h a t i t h a d fo rm ed a c o m m issio n t o t r a n s l a t e communist works i n t o I n d o n e s i a n * 12 The f i r s t b o o k s l i s t e d f o r t r a n s l a t i o n w e r e: S t a l i n * s F oundations o f L eninism ”, L e o n tie v 's " P o l i t i c a l Economy", "The H i s t o r y o f t h e CPSU(B)", a n d L iu S h a o - c h i ' s Party"* "The They were t o b e f o l l o w e d b y L e n i n ' s "On t h e t h e H i g h e s t S t a g e o f C a p i t a l i s m ", " S t a t e and R e v o l u t i o n ", a n d " L e f t - w i n g Communism, a n I n f a n t i l e D i s o r d e r ", Mao T s e -tu n g 's "On New D e m o c r a c y ", S t a l i n ' s "Marxism and t h e A id it, " G a r i s - G a r i s ", BM, May 1 5 - J u n e 1, *1951» p. 2 6 6. BM, March 1, 1 9 5 1 , p p. 1 3 2, 156. === [PDF page 140] === 125 National and Colonial Questions", Engels* Scientific Socialism", and Rutgers* "Utopian and "Indonesia". And so began the systematic translation into Indonesian of the communist classics, basic tools with which the PKI leaders hoped to create a Party united on ideology and thereby on policy matters too. Brochures and pamphlets were not the only means used to make known international communist writings. For example, the periodical "Bintang Merah" contained Mao Tse-tung*s "Strategic Problems of China*s Revolutionary War" in serialized form during the later part of 1950 and the first part of 1951> and during 1951 "the translated works included Stalin*s "Theory" and "The Foundation of Leninism", Mao Tse-tung*s "On Eradicating Liberalism in the Party", and Hong Ha*s "The Victory of the Vietnamese People and its Army". From July 1, 1951 the PKI published its own daily newspaper, "Harian Rakjat", which began with only 2,000 copies, but which played and plays an important role in disseminating Party instructions and in providing materials for the organizational and political education of its readers. published, As soon as **Harian Rakjat" was "Bintang Merah" became a monthly instead of a twice-monthly, and was then temporarily forced by financial problems to cease publication from the end of === [PDF page 141] === 1951 to A u g u st 1 9 5 2. When " B in ta n g M erah" t e m p o r a r i l y c l o s e d dow n, th e a g i t a t i o n an d p ro p a g a n d a s e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e b e g a n t o p u b l i s h a m im eographed p e r i o d i c a l " P K I - B u le tin " w h ic h a p p e a re d on a v e r a g e a b o u t once e v e r y t h r e e w e e k s. The new p e r i o d i c a l c o n ta in e d P a r t y s t a t e m e n t s an d n e w s, a r t i c l e s b y P a r t y l e a d e r s on a w ide ra n g e o f i d e o l o g i c a l, p o l i t i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m a t t e r s, a n d an i n c r e a s i n g num ber o f t r a n s l a t i o n s from th e C om inform j o u r n a l "F o r a L a s t i n g P e a c e, F o r a P e o p l e 's D e m o crac y."'. I n S u r a b a j a, from a b o u t th e end o f 1950» a l a r g e 'w e e k ly o f p e o p l e 's d e m o c r a c y ', "Zaman B aru " (New Age) was p u b l i s h e d u n d e r PKI c o n t r o l. By t h e en d o f 1 9 5 2, when i t s e d i t o r, N a ib a h o, was a p p o in t e d c h i e f e d i t o r o f " H a ria n R a k j a t ", "Zaman B a ru " a p p e a re d i r r e g u l a r l y. M is c e lla n e o u s P a r t y p u b l i c a t i o n s d u r i n g 1951 i n c l u d e d th e A p r i l 1951 P a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n, and a s h o r t h i s t o r y o f th e PK I. One o f t h e P K I - le d p e a s a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s p u b l i s h e d a t r a n s l a t i o n o f S t a l i n 's "The P e a s a n t Q u e stio n ".-^ A c c o rd in g t o A i d i t, th e g o v e rn m e n t's m ass a r r e s t o f c o m m u n ists i n A u g u st 1951 r e s u l t e d in a f r e s h b u r s t o f P K I-B. M arch 7» 1 9 5 2, p p.6 - 7. PK I, K onst l t u s t, 1951» 61+ p.; PK I, L a h i m j a P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s ia d an P e rk e m b a n g a n n ja (The B i r t h an d G row th o f th e Com m unist P a r t y o f I n d o n e s i a ), D j a k a r t a, 1951» 29 p* S t a l i n, M asalah T an i (The P e a s a n t Q u e s t i o n ), D j a k a r t a, 1 9 5 1, 74 p. === [PDF page 142] === study of those of Lenin*s works which in a popular way expounded Marxist strategy and tactics."1 The Party leaders in hiding turned to Lenin*s works in order to seek a way out of the difficult situation PKI was in. a result, extra work was undertaken to translate Lenin*s works, adding to those begun in March 1951 such as "What is to be Done”, "Prom Where to Begin”, ”To the Village P o o r ”, "Thesis”, and "Marxism and Revisionism”. Little information has been published as to the work of formal cadre training in 1951* On April 16, 1951» the Djakarta Raja section of the Party opened a course for Party functionaries at which Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman gave instruction on the fundaments of Leninism, the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, utopian and scientific socialism, and Party organization. A leading Party cadre told me in 1960 that he had attended a central committee cadre school in Djakarta in 1951» but this might have been the one officially organized by the Djakarta section. A report in "Harian Rakjat" mentioned in April 1952 that courses had been organized in Subang and Krawang, on the initiative of the communist-led mass D.N. Aidit, Lenin dan Indonesia (Lenin and Indonesia), Djakarta, 1960, pp.31-2. BM, April 15-May 1, 1951, p.253. === [PDF page 143] === 128 organizations, in order to give cadres the minimum knowledge required in building the national united front.1 But although this report added that it was hoped to extend these courses into other areas, it did not say how long the original courses had been in operation. Within the Party itself, from the time of the August 1951 arrests, periodic discussions concerning theory and concerning practical work were begun in the Party committees, fractions in mass organizations and representative councils, and in lower levels of the organization. The First Membership Drive At the beginning of 1952 the politbureau decided to try to increase Party membership to 100,000 within six months.^ During 195i the Aidit leadership had re organized the Party, purged the national and regional leadership of elements considered hostile to itself, and had begun the work of ideological and cadre training. The Party was strong enough to bring in new members on a large scale, and to begin the primary task of the national HR, April 8, 1952. D.N. Aidit, Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia (The Indonesian Road to P e o p l e d Democracy)7 Djakarta, 1955, P.45. PKI, UP Tahun PKI, p.72. === [PDF page 144] === united front policy, that is, to build the Party into a mass, nation-wide machine. Only a great increase in PKI membership would enable PKI to find large numbers of capable cadres, to successfully build and control mass organizations among the different sections of society, to mobilize millions of voters in the coming elections, to seek entry into the civil service and armed forces which contained only insignificant numbers of Party members, and so to mobilize and control a broad national united front which, it was hoped, would eventually control political life in Indonesia. It is possible, too, that the August 195i arrests spurred the Aidit leadership to expand the Party, for the arrests showed that the removal of only a relative handful of leaders could virtually paralyze the small Party, and they also showed that PKI control over its mass organizations was still extremely tenuous.^ A PKI national conference, which met early in March 1952, took two important decisions. First, it decided Because Party work among the peasants was still little developed, the small communist-led and communistinfluenced peasant organizations could not have been expected to give the Party significant support at the time of the August arrests. But most of the cadres and almost all the members of SOBSI also responded with indifference to the arrest of the PKI and SOBSI leaders. Aidit, "Madju Terus" in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol. I, p. 203; also his D.jalan ke Demokrasi, p.h6. === [PDF page 145] === 130 to promote the study of theory within the Party, as a means of combatting sectarianism, capitulationism and adventurism which had appeared among the Party ranks at the time of the August arrests* Second, it endorsed the plan to expand membership to 100,000 within six months. On March 7 the central committee published a resolution calling for a membership drive which would result in the Party becoming a mass party,1 an objective that had not been envisaged since 1926 at least. It would have been surprising had there not been some opposition within the Party to the new policy, and the resolution in fact incorporated a series of arguments designed to counter objections to the creation of a mass party. To those members who said that the Party needed quality, not quantity, the central committee explained th a t: quantity is necessary in order to achieve quality. Prom a large quantity it is far more possible to achieve higher quality. Therefore we need quantity as well as quality. To emphasize this point the central committee stressed that ’Party cadres cannot appear all of a sudden. People cannot enter the Party as good cadres’ but must enter as ordinary members, the best among them being selected and PKI-B, March 7, 1952, pp.3-6. === [PDF page 146] === 131 trained as new cadres. The resolution also explained that only by increasing the number of members could the Party broaden and strengthen its relations with the masses, and that only with the organized strength of the broad masses could the Party achieve its goals. order to remove the fear that the membership drive might lead to the recruitment of undesirable elements or to the lowering of the quality of members, the resolution ex plained that organizational methods would prevent this. That is, the implementation of the stringent provisions embodied in the April 1951 constitution governing the entry of new members and the elevation of candidate members to full membership, and the practice of criticism and self-criticism would prevent such an occurrence. Finally, the resolution stated that in order to maintain the political and theoretical level of the Party, the membership drive had to be accompanied by the implemen tation of the other central committee resolution con cerning the education of Party members and cadres. The success of the membership drive was immediate. Towards the end of May 1952 PKI was already claiming 100,000 members. This was followed by a period of Sudisman, "Peladjaran Fundamentil Selama 32 Tahun Berdirinja PKI" (The Fundamental Lesson of 32 Years of PKI), PKI-B, May 20, 1952, p.12. === [PDF page 147] === 132 consolidation in which the membership rose more slowly to 126,671 at the end of 1952 and 165*206 in March 1954»^ In May 1953» the central committee gave its comments on the drive«1 23 By the end of 1952 the Party had 8,467 committees, fractions^ and groups. The best efforts had been made by the Party organizations in Priangan (Bandung), Surakarta and Madiun. But not all was satisfactory. Only 1J per cent of members and candidate members were women, and the Party leaders in Banten, Tapanuli (North Sumatra) and Kalimantan still did not consider that women were Mature* enough to enter the Party. Some Party com mittees even had shown indifference to the whole member ship campaign. For example, after the delegates from Kedu returned home from the March 1952 national conference, ’the instructions and plan were discussed a little in the daily committee, and then... deposited in the refriger a t o r ’ and forgotten for a year. In terms of social targets, the campaign appears to have been aimed primarily at the towns in general and PKI, Bahan-Bahan untuk Kongres Nasional ke-VT Partai Komunis Indonesia (Materials for PKl's Sixth National Congress), Djakarta, 1958* p.54. PKI-Bt May 1953, pp.78-81. A fraction is a group of communists operating in a non par ty organization such as parliament, a trade union, and a peasant association. === [PDF page 148] === SOBSI a c t i v i s t s i n p a r t i c u l a r. v e ry l i t t l e PK I, s i n c e 19 2 6, had h ad e x p e r ie n c e o f w ork i n th e r u r a l a r e a s, and i t was n a t u r a l t h a t t h e d r i v e was aim ed a t th e to w n s, w ith w h ic h th e c a d r e s w ere f a m i l i a r and w here th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f r a p i d s u c c e s s w ere g r e a t e s t. R e p o r te d ly one o f th e m ain o b j e c t i v e s o f th e d r i v e was t o c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l o v e r SOBSI b y b r i n g i n g a g r e a t e r num ber o f l o w e r - l e v e l a c t i v i s t s under P a rty d ir e c tio n. T h a t i s, to e n s u r e t h a t i f t h e g o v e rn m e n t t r i e d to c u rb S O B S I's a c t i v i t i e s, a s i t h a d i n A u g u st 1 9 5 1, i t w ould h a v e t o a r r e s t n o t m e r e ly a few n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s, b u t w ould have t o f e r r e t o u t a n d a r r e s t th o u s a n d s o f c o m m u n ists. As f o r th e g e o g r a p h i c a l s p r e a d o f th e P a r t y, A i d i t c la im e d t h a t t h e f i r s t m em b ersh ip d r i v e h a d e x te n d e d PKI t o M adura, S u l a w e s i, K a lim a n ta n, M aluku (M o lu c c a s) an d N u s a te n g g a r a, a l t h o u g h th e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f members re m a in e d i n J a v a a n d, s e c o n d a r i l y, S u m a tra. The g e o g r a p h i c a l s p r e a d o f F e i t h s t a t e s t h a t b e f o r e 1953 PKI h a d e s t a b l i s h e d i t s e l f i n v i l l a g e s i n many p l a n t a t i o n a n d m in in g a r e a s an d i n some o t h e r a r e a s, b u t t h a t PKI p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y was l a r g e l y c o n f in e d t o t h e to w n s; H e r b e r t P e i t h, The I n d o n e s i a n E l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 5 5 » I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 1957» p«29# Boyd R. C om pton, I n d o n e s ia n Communism: The Ranks S w e l l, A m e ric an U n i v e r s i t i e s ’ F i e l d S t a f f R e p o r t, New York7 1954, A i d i t, D ja la n ke D e m o k ra si, p.4 7 » === [PDF page 149] === 134 the Party was illustrated by the establishment in October 1953 of a Party subsection in Lombok, Nusatenggara. As the March 7 central committee resolution on the expansion of membership had emphasized, the campaign was to be accompanied by the implementation of a central committee resolution on the education of Party cadres and members. The latter resolution was not published, but Lukman, in September 1952, did write his comments on the work done to implement it. He stated that the Party had only recently begun to effect the education of Party cadres and members in a wide and more organized manner; but, as according to the resolution, all Party organi zations in the regions were obliged to organize courses for all Party members, arrange periodic discussions of theory, organize self-study, arrange lectures, organize public meetings and other efforts to propagandize Party policy, and arrange for regional publications by either the Party or other progressive groups. By such efforts it was hoped gradually to raise the theoretical and political level of all members, as well as gradually to increase the public's understanding of Party policy. HR, October 23, 1953. M.H. Lukman, "Tentang Agitasi dan Propaganda Partai" (Concerning Party Agitation and Propaganda), BM, September 1952, pp.62-3. === [PDF page 150] === S u c h e f f o r t s, w h ich Lukman r e c o g n i z e d w ould b e a t f i r s t a c c o m p a n ie d b y a l l k i n d s o f d e f i c i e n c e s, w ere e x p e c t e d i n t h e l o n g ru n t o g i v e b i r t h t o: a num ber o f c o u r s e l e a d e r s, d i s c u s s i o n l e a d e r s, l e c t u r e r s, s p e a k e rs in p u b lic m e e tin g s, w r i t e r s f o r r e g i o n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s, e t c., from t h e m ost p r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y m em bers. T h is means t h e c r e a t i o n o f a P a r t y p r o p a g a n d i s t and a g i t a t o r group. I n o r d e r t o im prove t h e w ork o f c a d r e s, Lukman a l s o recom m ended r e g u l a r m e e ti n g s o f t h e p r o p a g a n d i s t s a n d a g i t a t o r s t o d i s c u s s e x p e r i e n c e s g a i n e d i n c a r r y i n g on t h e i r w o rk, and p o i n t e d t o t h e n e e d f o r e s p e c i a l l y t h e c a d r e s t o m a s t e r b o t h I n d o n e s i a n a n d t h e l o c a l la n g u a g e o f t h e a r e a i n w h ich t h e y w orked. n ecessary fo r w ritin g l e t t e r s I n d o n e s i a n was and r e p o r t s, g i v i n g news t o th e p r e s s, and w r i t i n g a r t i c l e s and t r a n s l a t i o n s; m a s t e r y o f t h e l o c a l la n g u a g e w ould e n a b l e th e c a d r e s t o work f a r more e f f i c i e n t l y among t h e m a s s e s, whose k n o w le d g e o f I n d o n e s i a n was o f t e n s l i g h t. L i t t l e e v i d e n c e r e m a in s a s t o t h e m a t e r i a l s s t u d i e d w i t h i n t h e P a r t y d u r i n g 1952, a l t h o u g h A i d i t d i d m e n tio n t h a t t h e y i n c l u d e d Mao T s e - t u n g ' s "On t h e P r a c t i c e and E x t e r m i n a t i o n o f L i b e r a l i s m i n t h e P a r t y " and L iu S h a o c h i* s "On t h e Mass L i n e ". ^ I n March 1953> S u d ism a n A i d i t, D j a l a n ke D e m o k r a s i, p.6 0 === [PDF page 151] === 136 r e p o r t e d t h a t e d u c a t i o n c o u r s e s had b e g u n i n a n o r g a n i z e d m anner a t a l l l e v e l s o f t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t h a t t h e s e c t i o n and s u b s e c t i o n c o m m itte e s w ere g i v i n g l e c t u r e s a t l e a s t o n ce a m onth on t h e h i s t o r y a n d p o l i c y o f PK I, t h e t a s k o f b u i l d i n g t h e w o r k e r s 12 u n i t e d f r o n t, t h e PKI a g r a r i a n program m e, th e p o l i c y o f p e a c e, p e o p l e ’s d e m o c ra c y, t h e c u l t u r a l s t r u g g l e, th e n a t i o n a l u n i te d f r o n t, a n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f th e n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l i s t s * ^ a l s o s t a t e d t h a t w i t h i n a p e r i o d o f s i x m onths a l l P a r t y members h a d t o s t u d y and u n d e r s t a n d s e v e n t e e n s p e c i f i e d com m unist w o rk s, i n c l u d i n g s i x w r i t t e n b y I n d o n e s i a n s, f i v e b y C h i n e s e, t h r e e b y R u s s i a n s, two b y u n i d e n t i f i e d a u t h o r s, and t h e Communist M a n i f e s t o. ^ S u d is m a n, ”J. V. S t a l i n, P e n t j i p t a d a n O r g a n i s a t o r P a r t a i Komunis" ( J. V. S t a l i n, Communist P a r t y C r e a t o r and O r g a n i z e r ), BM, March 95 p*111* I b i d *, p.1 1 0. The I n d o n e s i a n w orks w ere t h e PKI c o n s t i t u t i o n and a g r a r i a n program m e, D j a l a n B aru u n t u k R e p u b li k I n d o n e s i a (New Road f o r t h e I n d o n e s i a n R e p u b l i c ), Kewad.jiban F r o n t P e r s a t u a n B uruh (The D u ty o f t h e W o r k e r s ’ U n i t e d F r o n t ), L a h i r n j a PK I, a n d A i d i t ’s Menempuh D;j a l a n R a k ja t* The C h in e s e w orks w ere Mao T s e - t u n g Ts New D em ocracy and P e o p l e ’s D e m o c r a tic D i c t a t o r s h i p, L iu S h a o c h i Ts The Mass L in e a n d N a t i o n a l i s m and I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m, a n d K ian L i n g ' s The Method o f T h o u g h t, Work, C r i t i c i s m a n d S e lf-c ritic is m * S t a l i n fs The N a t i o n a l Q u e s t i o n a n d D i a l e c t i c a l and H i s t o r i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m and L e o n t i e v *s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o M a r x i s t P o l i t i c a l Economy were t h e R u s s i a n w o rk s. === [PDF page 152] === 137 T h a t n o t a l l w ent w e l l w i t h th e p l a n f o r e d u c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e P a r t y was shown b y a c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s t a t e m e n t i n May 1953* The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e p o i n t e d o u t, f o r e x a m p le, t h a t t h e p l a n f o r D j a k a r t a R a ja was o n l y 15 p e r c e n t a c h i e v e d b e c a u s e o f a b s e n t e e i s m among b o t h members and c a d r e s, and t h a t h i g h e r c a d r e s h a d made o n l y ’ f r a g m e n ta r y * s t u d y o f t h e o r y, w h i l e t h e s t a f f o f t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e c o m m i s s a r i a t s a n d th e members o f t h e s e c t i o n c o m m itte e d a i l y c o u n c i l s ’o f t e n " f o r g e t ” t o s t u d y t h e o r y an d to h o l d d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e o r y ’ * Lukman, i n h i s a r t i c l e o f S e p te m b e r 1952, had p r e d i c t e d t h a t many s h o r t c o m i n g s w ould a p p e a r when t h e P a r t y l a u n c h e d i t s f i r s t l a r g e - s c a l e e d u c a t i o n c a m p a ig n, b u t he had a l s o s t a t e d t h a t d e s p i te i n e v i t a b l e sh o rtc o m in g s a b o d y o f t e a c h e r s and c a d r e s w ould b e form ed w hich c o u l d, w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e o f c r i t i c i s m and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m, te a c h o t h e r s, e x p an d t h e i r own k n o w le d g e, a n d t h u s g r a d u a l l y r a i s e t h e q u a l i t y o f P a r t y e d u c a ti o n * I n t h e s p h e r e o f p u b l i c a t i o n s, g r e a t th o u g h u neven s t r i d e s were made b e tw e e n t h e o p e n in g o f th e m em bership d r i v e a n d t h e f i f t h n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s i n March 1954« " H a r ia n R a k j a t " s l o w l y i n c r e a s e d i t s c i r c u l a t i o n fro m 2,0 0 0 i n J u l y 1951 t o 1 2,5 0 0 i n O c to b e r 1953 and t o PK I-B, May 1953, p p. 78-81 === [PDF page 153] === 138 15»000 in February 1954.1 so well. "Bintang Merah" did not fare It was republished in August 1952 and has continued as a monthly down to the present* From a peak of over 10,000 copies in the first half of 1951» when it was the only official Party periodical, it had declined to only 7 »500 or 8,000 copies in May 1953*2 During 1952 and 1953 "Bintang Merah” contained central committee comments on national and international affairs, articles on theory and practical work, and translations of works by foreign communists* In order to increase its circu lation, and thereby its educational importance, the central committee agitation and propaganda secretariat early in 1953 ordered all Party functionaries to read "Bintang Merah” from cover to cover and to send in their criticisms every month.^ "PKI-Buletin” was published regularly, but in October 1952 its form was changed. For the first time it was printed, instead of mimeographed, and so became available in sufficient numbers for all lower Party committees to receive it. The translated editorial of ”For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy.'" became a regular feature added to its usual contents of official Party H R, October 3 1, 1953» and February 25, 1954. PKI-B, May 1953, p.79. === [PDF page 154] === 139 statements, occasional articles by Party leaders, and comments on methods of work within the Party. When the form was changed, the editors stated that the lower Party committees would still have to translate "PKI-Buietin” into the regional languages.12 During 1952 few translations were yet available of works by foreign communists, but in 1953 translation and publication was greatly increased. By the end of 1953 at least forty, mostly booklet-size, works were available. Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov, Kalinin, Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi were among those whose works were translated, and from the available evidence it would appear that Mao Tse-tung and Lenin, in that order, were most frequently translated at that time. A report b y an American observer suggests, however, that the large number of translated Chinese works was due not&the efforts of PKI but to the Chinese government which was shipping in large quantities of pamphlets and booklets translated into Indonesian.3 PKI-B, October 10, 1952, page reference lost. The evidence consists of the notices appearing in Harian Rakjat of the literature available in the Party’s bookshops. Compton, Indonesian Communism, p.6. === [PDF page 155] === 140 A central committee note of January 18, 1953 expressed continued dissatisfaction with the circulation of Party publications and with the collection of funds for them. The note complained that many Party com mittees were not doing a good job of circulating Party and other progressive publications, and as a remedy ordered all committees to appoint a Party member to be an agent for the publications. These agents were to supplement, not replace, the work of existing non-Party agents. The note also listed 30 Party committees which owed money to "Bintang Merah" and 36 with debts to "PKI-Buletin", and called upon them to pay their debts. The preparations for the fifth national congress were converted into a massive campaign not only for the propaganda of Party policies and programmes among the general public, but also for educating Party members and candidate members. The congress materials, including the new draft constitution and programme, were drafted in the central committee plenum of early October 1953» and were then widely circulated and publicized. 150,000 copies of the draft programme were published, in Sundanese, Batak PKI-B, February 10, 1953» pp.18-19 === [PDF page 156] === and Madurese as well as in Indonesian. About 1,500 public meetings, attended by over 2 millions, were held to explain the draft programme to people outside the Party. Within the Party, in the four months prior to the congress, meetings were organized at all levels and conferences held between equal levels of the Party organization to discuss the draft constitution, programme, and the central committee general report. The Second Membership Drive The PKI fifth national congress which met in March 1954, made two decisions of importance to the education and expansion of Party membership: it endorsed the campaign against *Tan Ling Djie-ism*, and it endorsed the plan for a second membership drive. Although Tan Ling Djie was removed from his position on the central committee in October 1953, the campaign against the error of Tan Ling Djie-ism was developed on a large scale only in the period around the fifth national congress. The congress endorsed both the central com mittee resolution of October 1953 which condemned Tan Ling D.N. Aidit, "Kongres Nasional ke-V Partai Komunis Indonesia" (PKI's Fifth National Congress), in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol. I, p.280; FALP, January 22, 1954, p.6. Aidit, Pilihan Tulisan, vol. I, p.281. === [PDF page 157] === 142 D j i e ’s a c t i v i t i e s, a n d t h e more i m p o r t a n t " R e p o rt on Tan L in g D j i e - i s m ". The cam paign a g a i n s t Tan L in g D j i e - i s m was n o t u s e d t o e x p e l Tan L in g D j i e, f o r he was a l l o w e d t o re m a in w i t h i n t h e P a r t y b e c a u s e he a c c e p t e d t h e c e n t r a l c o m m i t t e e ’s d e c i s i o n s a n d p r o m is e d t o c o r r e c t a l l h is e rro rs.^ Nor was i t u s e d t o p u r g e h i s f o l l o w e r s b e c a u s e, i n t h e w ords o f t h e " R e p o r t ", he had r e c e i v e d o n l y t h e p a s s i v e h e l p o f s e v e r a l c e n t r i s t s who l a t e r a b a n d o n e d him when he was d e f e a t e d i n J a n u a r y 195i • a n n o u n c e m e n ts were e v e r made o f anyone e l s e b e i n g a c c u s e d o f Tan L in g D j i e - i s m. I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e c a m p a ig n, w h ic h was c a r r i e d o u t i n t e n s i v e l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e P a r t y, h a d an e d u c a t i o n a l p u r p o s e, t h a t i s, t o i n c r e a s e th e c a d r e s * a n d members* know ledge a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e b a s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l, i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l c o n t e n t o f t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ’s n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y. I n o t h e r w ords th e c am p a ig n was a u s e f u l fram ew o rk w i t h i n w hich t o u n d e r t a k e t h e p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n o f o l d and new m em bers. " R e s o l u s i T e r h a d a p Kawan Tan L in g D j i e " i n PKI, P u t u s a n P u tu san, p p.4 -5. " R e f e r a t T e n ta n g Tan L in g D j i e - i s m e " ( R e p o r t on Tan L in g D j i e - i s m ), HR, March 19» 1954. L o c.c it. === [PDF page 158] === The "Report on Tan Ling Djie-ism" analyzed the error in detail. In the field of organization, Tan Ling Djie-ism was condemned as basically liquidationist. advocated the creation of a working class party other than PKI, which was 'tailism* because the working class already had sufficient political consciousness to support an openly communist party. In the sphere of policy, Tan Ling Djie-ism was described as 'legalistic*, as 'nothing other than bourgeois liberalism’, because it wished to tone down the Party programme, to divert the members too much from the class struggle, to place excessive emphasis on the parliamentary struggle. This error in policy, declared the "Report", had its roots in a grave under estimation of the strength of the masses and a gross exaggeration of the strength of the reactionaries. But it was in the realm of ideology that Tan Ling Djie-ism received most bitter condemnation. 'Tan Ling Djie-ism in the ideological field has its source in subjectivism*, which resulted in dogmatism and empiricism. It was dogmatist because it attempted to imitate uncritically overseas experience without taking into consideration the conditions in Indonesia. It was empiricist because it considered unimportant the work of raising the theoretical knowledge of Party members. === [PDF page 159] === As the result of the two subjectivist ideologies, dogmatism and empiricism, our Party was tossed about between two diseases. Subjectivism caused our Party to be unable to take a correct attitude, that is, an objective, truly scientific attitude. In one situation our Party committed errors by pursuing a rightist policy, reformist policy, following behind the masses who were already more progressive. But in another situation our Party committed ’left* errors, pursuing adventurism, going far ahead of the masses who were still trailing behind. Therefore the history of our Party after Tan Ling Djie-ism gained control was the history of right and 'left' errors at the same time, the history of capitulationism and adventurism together. Besides endorsing the campaign against Tan Ling Djie-ism, the fifth national congress also endorsed a oneyear plan for the second membership drive. At the time of congress, membership was 165,206, of whom 49>042 were full members and 116,164 candidate members. The goal of the second membership drive was not published. Aidit, however, PKI, 40 Tahun PKI, p.77. , PALP, October 15, 1954, P*3. candidate member is one who has not yet completed the period of candidacy (of from six months to two years, de pending on the candidate member’s social and political background) which is demanded of all prospective Party members. A candidate member has the duties and rights of a full member, except that he may not vote in Party meetings, nor may he be elected to Party offices. The period of candidacy is used 'to give basic Party education to the candidate member and also to ensure supervision by Party organizations of his political quality.’ PKI, Konstitusi Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI*s Constitution), (third edition), Djakarta, 1956, pp.29-30. === [PDF page 160] === 145 w rote on May 2 3, 1954 t h a t i n v ie w o f the P a r ty programme, th e c u r r e n t t a c t i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l i n e s and cadre a c tiv ity, * i t w i l l n o t be s im p ly lu c k i f PKI a t the end o f t h i s y e a r i s a P a r ty w it h a m i l l i o n members and c a n d id a t e members*, n o t j u s t r e g i s t e r e d b u t o r g a n iz e d and r e c e i v i n g p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n. -1 The s e c o n d m em bership c a m p a ig n d i d n o t a c h i e v e a s r a p i d a g ro w th a s A i d i t h a d h o p e d. P ro b a b ly th e f ig u r e o f one m i l l i o n b y t h e end o f 1954 was u n r e a l i s t i c g i v e n t h e num ber o f c a d r e s and members a n d t h e s t i l l l i m i t e d g e o g r a p h i c a l s p r e a d o f t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n i n March 1954. I t seems t h a t t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s h a d a ll o w e d t h e m s e l v e s t o become o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c a s a r e s u l t o f t h e e a s e w i t h w h ic h t h e f i r s t m em bership cam p aig n h a d b e e n c o m p lete d. At t h e e n d o f O c to b e r 1954 A i d i t c l a i m e d - a t o t a l o f h a l f a m i l l i o n members a n d c a n d i d a t e m em bers, a n d i n F e b r u a r y 1956 one m i l l i o n. M em bership f i g u r e s w e re n o t p u b l i s h e d b e tw e e n t h e s e two d a t e s, b u t a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t g ro w th o c c u r r e d b e f o r e A u g u s t 1955* F e i t h, i n h i s m onograph on th e 1955 A i d i t, " P e r k u a t P e r s a t u a n N a s i o n a l dan P e r k u a t P a rta iJ * * ( S tr e n g th e n N a tio n a l U n ity and S tr e n g th e n th e P a r t y ), in h i s P i l i h a n T u l i s a n, v o l. I, p.297* FALP, November 19» 1954* p. 2; BM, February-M arch 1956, p. 112. === [PDF page 161] === 146 elections, mentioned the rapid extension of Party member ship prior to the September elections,*1 while Aidit, in his report to the central committee plenum on August 7» 1955* referred to the success already achieved in the campaign to extend the Party*s organization and member ship*^ During the second membership drive, the PKI organi zation was spread, although thinly, over most of Indonesia. This was shown by the results of the parliamentary elections of September 1955* PKI received votes in all of the fifteen electoral districts, and more than 5 per cent of the total votes cast in nine of them: the four districts in Java, the three districts in Sumatra, and East Kalimantan and West Nusatenggara.-^ But, presumably reflecting the strength of its organization in the different regions, PKI received 37*2 per cent of its votes in East Java, 37*7 per cent in Central Java, 13*8 per cent in West Java, including Djakarta Raja, and only 11*3 per cent outside Java where the only two sizeable communist Keith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955» p.24. D.N. Aidit, Untuk Kemenangan Front Nasional dalam Pemilihan Umum (For the Victory of the National Front in the General Elections), Djakarta, 1955» P»25« A. van Marie, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections", Indonesie, 1956, vol. IX, p.262. === [PDF page 162] === 147 votes were in North Sumatra (12.2 per cent of the total votes cast) and South Sumatra (12•i per cent). Most of the PKI votes in the September 1955 elections came from the rural areas, and it is important to note that the second membership drive had been aimed especially at the peasants. Until July 1953 Party work among the peasants had been negligible except in the estate areas, where SOBSI unions were strong. In that month Aidit wrote a major article which was used as the basis of the P a rty12 s agrarian programme (endorsed by the fifth congress), and which marked the beginning of increasingly intensive work in the villages by the Party and the communist-led peasant organizations. that In November 1954 Aidit claimed ’an extremely important factor' in the expansion of the Party's organization and membership was the improvement in the work among the peasants. A year later he re-emphasized the urgency of extending Party membership in the villages.^ D.N. Aidit, "Haridepan G-erakan Tani Indonesia" (The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement), BM, July 1953> PP.332-40. D.N. Aidit, "For Broad Unity of All National Forces in Indonesia", FALP, December 31, 1954» p*4* D.N. Aidit, Pertahankan Republik Proklamasi 1945i (Defend the 1945 Proclamation Republic.*), Djakarta, 1955> p.29. === [PDF page 163] === 148 Thus, by the second membership drive PKI not only grew numerically and extended geographically, but it also widened the social basis of its membership. Whereas before the second drive the Party*s membership had con sisted largely of urban petty bourgeois and workers, the peasants became the largest group, a position they still maintain. The rapid expansion of membership prior to the 1955 elections had been necessary in order to mobilize the votes needed to ensure PKI a more important role in national politics, which were then revolving largely round parliament. The rapid rise in Party membership again posed the problem of how to maintain the ideological purity of the Party, .As Aidit told the central committee in November 1954: It is wrong if we think that bourgeois ideology and bourgeois influence is only outside the Party, especially as many new people have entered our Party bringing with them bourgeois and feudal ideological vestiges and habits ••• Besides, the enemies of the Party certainly try to enter our Party in order to break the Party*s organization from within and to weaken the ideology of the Party members,' Because of this situation, Aidit declared, it was neces sary to intensify the vigilance of members and cadres, D.N. Aidit, Untuk Persatuan jang Lebih Luas dari Semua Kekuatan Nasional di Indonesia (For the Broader Unity of all National Forces in Indonesia), Djakarta, 1955» pp«31-2. === [PDF page 164] === and ideological work within the Party. Every new member had to be given an understanding of the structure of the Party organization, of the limitless strength of the people, of the Party*s leadership role, and of the importance of the national united front. Every political view expressed by the central committee or the province committees or the Party congress had to become material with which to educate the members politically. In the same speech, Aidit also devoted special attention to the need for the proper education of cadres some of whom, he declared, still did not understand either the essential character of the worker-peasant alliance or the agrarian relations in the villages. a remedy for the cadre shortcomings, cadre courses had to be extended to Party committees at all levels, and at the same time made more systematic and practical. Furthermore, the cadres from the level of section committee upwards were expected to accustom themselves to reading and dis cussing the classical writings of Marxism-Leninism. Aidit said that in July and August 1954 a beneficial campaign had been organized for the study by cadres of Lenin’s "Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder", although several provinces still had not seriously implemented the campaign. === [PDF page 165] === D e s p i t e th e i n s i s t e n c e b y th e c e n t r a l P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p i n th e s e c o n d h a l f o f 1955 t h a t t h e c a d r e s and members s h o u ld b e g iv e n a s y s t e m a t i c p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n, s e v e r a l f a c t o r s p r e v e n t e d th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f t h i s ta s k In th e f i r s t p l a c e, th e P a r t y was o b l i g e d t o c o n c e n t r a t e a ll its r e s o u r c e s on t h e cam p aig n f o r th e S e p te m b e r 1955 p a r l i a m e n t a r y a n d th e D ecem ber 1955 C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem b ly g e n e ra l e le c tio n s, ' I n th e s e c o n d p l a c e, th e c a d r e s ’ low l e v e l o f g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n p ro v e d a s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e to t h e i r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f M a r x is t- L e n in is t t e x t s, and th e P a r t y was o b l i g e d to i n s t i t u t e g e n e r a l know ledge c o u r s e s, r a n g in g fro m th e e r a d i c a t i o n o f i l l i t e r a c y g e o g ra p h y, h i s t o r y an d la n g u a g e s, b e f o r e i t c o u ld p r o c e e d w ith c o u r s e s i n M a rx is m -L e n in is m,3 N j o t o, s p e a k in g t o th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e plen u m on A u g u st 1, 1 956, su m m arized th e e d u c a t i o n a l work a c t u a l l y p e rfo rm e d b y th e PKI s i n c e i t had becom e a m ass p a r t y S e e, f o r e x a m p le, A i d i t, U ntuk K em enangan, p p.2 7 -8; P e r t a h a n k a n, p p,2 8 -9; and M.H, Lukman, ”T ugas P a r t a i S e su d a h P e m ilih a n Umum” (The P a r t y ’s T ask A f t e r th e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s ), BM, N ovem ber-D ecem ber 1955» PP*379-81 N jo to, ’’M a sa a la h P e n d id ik a n d id a la m P a r t a i ” (The Q u e s tio n o f E d u c a tio n i n th e P a r t y ), i n D.N. A i d i t, B e r s a tu u n tu k M e n je le s a ik a n T u n tu t a n - T u n tu t a n R e v o lu s i A g u s tu s 19U5 ( U n ite t o C om plete th e Demands o f th e A u g u st 1945 R e v o l u t i o n ), D j a k a r t a, 1956, p.6 4 * Lukman, ’’T ugas P a r t a i ”, BM, N ovem ber-D ecem ber 1955> === [PDF page 166] === w i t h o v e r h a l f a m i l l i o n m em bers. He s a i d t h a t th e P a r t y h a d a s y e t b e e n u n a b le t o e s t a b l i s h a c e n t r a l i z e d s y s te m o f p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n, b u t t h a t on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p h a d i s s u e d i n s t r u c t i o n s to th e lo w e r P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t: a l l members a n d c a n d i d a t e members s h o u ld b e g iv e n a th o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e P a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n and program m e, and t h a t th e y a l s o s h o u ld f o llo w a n d u n d e r s ta n d a l l c e n t r a l c o m m itte e an d p o l i t b u r e a u s t a t e m e n t s; P a r t y c a d r e s s h o u ld s tu d y c l a s s i c a l w orks o f M a rx ism -L e n in ism su c h a s L e n in * s ’’L e ftw in g Communism, a n I n f a n t i l e D i s o r d e r ” a n d th e ”H i s t o r y o f th e CPSU(B)”. F u r th e r m o r e, P a r t y c o m m itte e s from t h e p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l dow nw ards h a d a l r e a d y b e g u n t o o r g a n iz e v a r i o u s k in d s o f c o u r s e s w h ic h u s e d c e n t r a l c o m m itte e i n s t r u c t i o n s and g u i d e s, an d had made t h e i r own e x p e r im e n ts i n m eth o d s o f te a c h in g. B ut i n th e p e r i o d o f t h e se c o n d m em bership d r i v e, e d u c a ti o n was c o n c e rn e d p r i m a r i l y w ith c a d r e s. N jo to e x p la in e d t h a t t h i s was n e c e s s a r y * b ecau se th e y a r e th e b a c k b o n e i n c a r r y i n g o u t th e P a r ty * s t a s k s *, and b e c a u s e w ith o u t p r i o r c a d r e e d u c a ti o n i t w ould n o t be p o s s i b l e t o e d u c a te th e r e s t o f t h e P a r t y o r h a v e u n i t y N jo to, pp.64-75. ’’M a sa a la h P e n d i d ik a n ”, i n A i d i t, B e r s a tu u n t u k, === [PDF page 167] === 152 of ideology, policy and organization in the Party. short, the rapid expansion of Party membership had created a grave shortage of cadres. As the Party was not yet in a position to provide thorough political education for all members, its educational work was concentrated primarily on the creation of an informed and ideologically attuned cadre force. Party publishing also made considerable strides between March 1954 and August 1956. "Marian Rakjat" increased in circulation from 15,000 in February 1954 to 23.000 in January 1955 and to 55,000 in January 1956« At the last date its circulation compared with 48,000 for the socialist newspaper "Pedoman", 40,000 for PNI's "Suluh Indonesia", 38,000 for the independent but pro-PNI "Merdeka", and 34,000 for Masjumi's "Abadi". A three month campaign to extend sales was launched in January 1956, but succeeded in increasing circulation by only 3,000.3 "Bintang Merah", from a low of 7,500-8,000 copies at the end of 1952, increased its circulation to 20.000 in the second half of 1954 and to 25,000 at the HR, February 25, 1954; January 26, 1955; and January 21, 1956. HR, January 21, 1956. HR, March 23, 1956. === [PDF page 168] === 153 e n d o f 1955»"1 A t th e e n d o f 1953 " P K I - B u le tin " becam e a m o n th ly, w h e re a s p r e v i o u s l y i t had a p p e a re d e v e r y two o r t h r e e weeks* On J a n u a r y 1, 1955 i t s name was c h a n g e d t o "K e h id u p a n P a r t a i " ( P a r t y L i f e ), w ith th e i n t e n t i o n t h a t h e n c e f o r t h i t w ould p r o v id e a p l a c e f o r s h o r t a r t i c l e s b y r e g i o n a l and l o c a l c a d r e s on t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s, a s w e l l a s f o r i m p o r ta n t P a r t y s t a t e m e n t s and some a rtic le s t r a n s l a t e d fro m f o r e i g n com m unist s o u r c e s. A s u r p r i s i n g new P a r t y m o n th ly a p p e a re d i n th e m id d le o f 1954 - a n E n g li s h la n g u a g e "M onthly R eview " p r o v i d in g news o f PKI and a l s o o f th e m a jo r p o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p m e n ts in In d o n e s ia. At f i r s t "M onthly R eview " was mimeo g r a p h e d, b u t from J a n u a r y 1957 was p r i n t e d, i l l u s t r a t e d, an d w e ll- p r o d u c e d u n d e r th e t i t l e "R eview o f I n d o n e s i a ". The p u rp o s e o f t h e re v ie w i s u n c e r t a i n. I t s e d ito r to ld me s im p ly t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d f o r co m rad es a n d f r i e n d s a b ro a d. One c a n o n ly s u r m is e t h a t i t s a p p e a ra n c e r e f l e c t e d th e g ro w in g p r e s t i g e o f th e PKI i n th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l com m unist w o r ld, a n d t h a t i t was i n t e n d e d f i r s t l y t o k e e p th e f o r e i g n com m unist p a r t i e s in fo rm e d, i n a la n g u a g e t h e y u n d e r s t a n d, o f n a t i o n a l and P a r t y e v e n ts i n BM, J a n u a r y 1955> i n s i d e f r o n t c o v e r; N l o t o, "10 Tahun B in ta n g M erah" (1 0 Y e ars o f B in ta n g M e ra h ), BM, N ovem berD ecem ber 1955> P«371* === [PDF page 169] === I n d o n e s i a, a n d s e c o n d l y, p e r h a p s, t o s e r v e a s c o m p a ra tiv e m a t e r i a l e s p e c i a l l y f o r s u c h a s th e I n d i a n Com m unist P a rty. By th e b e g in n i n g o f November 1954 PKI had i s s u e d, b e s i d e s t r a n s l a t i o n s from f o r e i g n com m unist l i t e r a t u r e, 1 5 0,0 0 0 c o p ie s o f th e P a r t y program m e, 1 0 0,0 0 0 c o p ie s o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n, and 2 5 0, 0 0 0 c o p ie s o f i t s e l e c t i o n m a n ife s to. 1 5 0, 0 0 0 c o p ie s o f t h e e l e c t i o n program m e w e re p r i n t e d i n J a v a n e s e, S u n d a n e s e, B a ta k, a n d I n d o n e s ia n i n A ra b ic s c r i p t. At t h e en d o f 1955> th e PKI p u b l i s h i n g com pany, J a j a s a n P em b aru an, r e p o r t e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e y e a r i t h a d p u b l i s h e d 30 d i f f e r e n t b o o k s and p a m p h le ts i n a t o t a l o f 1,1 3 6,0 0 0 c o p i e s. 12 Of t h i s n u m b er, th e t r a n s l a t i o n s from f o r e i g n s o u r c e s a p p e a r to h a v e b e e n p r e d o m in a n tly from C h in e s e a u t h o r s, w ith some a l s o from L e n in and S t a l i n. The e d u c a t i o n a l im p o rta n c e i s c l e a r o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g c i r c u l a t i o n o f ''H a ria n R a k ja t" and th e P a r t y p e r i o d i c a l s, a n d o f M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t c l a s s i c s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o I n d o n e s ia n. HR, November 4> 1954* I n 1955 th e C e n tra l Ja v a p r o v in c e c o m m itte e p u b l i s h e d th e P a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n, i n c l u d i n g th e P a r t y 's g e n e r a l program m e, i n J a v a n e s e. P e r h a p s o t h e r p r o v in c e c o m m itte e s p u b l i s h e d i t i n o t h e r r e g i o n a l la n g u a g e s. HR, D ecem ber 3 1, 1955 === [PDF page 170] === 155 At the same time, the 1955 election campaigns also provided valuable education: for ordinary members and candidate members through the availability sind study of the Party constitution, programme and election manifesto; for all, but especially cadres, through the practical work of winning and mobilizing millions of electors. As the Party membership swelled rapidly during the second membership drive, a new organizational form had to be found that could permit the control, education and activation of the ordinary members and candidate members. The old branches were swamped by large numbers of new members and could no longer perform this function. was therefore decided to organize all members into groups of at the most seven persons. The group was incorporated into the March 1954 constitution, but intensive work to bring all members into groups was started only at the beginning of 1955 when Aidit wrote an important article on the subject. The purpose of the groups was fourfold: 1. to eradicate illiteracy among members by organizing anti-illiteracy courses or obliging members to attend government courses; PKI, Konstitusi, 1954» D.N. Aidit, "Mengaktifkan Grup Partai" (To Activate the Party Group), in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol.I, pp.361-6. === [PDF page 171] === 2. to o r g a n i z e t h e i r members t o r e p o r t on th e c o n d i t i o n s, th o u g h ts a n d a c t i v i t i e s o f th e p e o p le w ith whom t h e y l i v e d and w o rk e d, an d s e n d t h e s e r e p o r t s to th e b r a n c h c o m m itte e s, w hich i n t u r n s e n t them t o th e h i g h e r c o m m itte e s; 3» o n ce a g ro u p h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d some m onths and was a l r e a d y h o l d in g p e r i o d i c m e e tin g s, i t was t o b e g in th e b a s i c p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n o f i t s members b y d i s c u s s i o n s on P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n, th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f m em bers, th e P a r t y program m e, th e u n l i m i t e d s t r e n g t h o f th e p e o p le, an d th e im p o r ta n c e o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d fro n t; 4* to c o l l e c t m em bership f e e s. At th e b e g in n i n g o f 1955 th e PKI b e g a n to e s t a b l i s h s p e c i a l g ro u p s f o r women. T h is was deem ed n e c e s s a r y i n f a c e o f th e t r a d i t i o n a l b a s h f u l n e s s an d s e l f - e f f a c e m e n t o f I n d o n e s ia n women. The F i r s t 3 -Y e a r P la n o f O r g a n iz a t i o n and E d u c a tio n The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e plenum w hich m et from J u l y 31 t o A u g u st 3 9 1956 drew up a t h r e e - y e a r p l a n f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n w h ic h w ent i n t o o p e r a t i o n on A ugust M.H. Lukman, "B agaim ana M e n tjip ta k a n K ader W a n ita " (How t o Form Women C a d r e s ), KP, J a n u a r y 1, 1955» PP*5-6* === [PDF page 172] === 17» 1 9 5 6. The a c t u a l p l a n was n o t made p u b l i c, b u t i t s o u tlin e as w e ll as i t s num ber o f PKI s o u r c e s. r e s u l t s may b e g a th e r e d from a Prom th e a v a i l a b l e s o u r c e s, th e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e p l a n w e re: 1. t o e x te n d m em bership b y 5 0 p e r c e n t from one m i l l i o n to one an d a h a l f m i l l i o n s; 2. t o s p r e a d m em b ersh ip and o r g a n i z a t i o n more e v e n ly th r o u g h o u t I n d o n e s i a; 3. t o open new P a r t y o f f i c e s an d im prove th e o r g a n i z a tio n o f a l l o f f i c e s, to a c t i v a t e th e v a r i o u s c o m m itte e s* b u r e a u x, a n d i n c r e a s e th e num ber an d im p ro v e th e d i s t r i b u tio n o f f u ll- tim e c a d re s; 4. to o r g a n iz e e v e r y member i n t o a g r o u p, w ith women i n s p e c i a l g r o u p s, and t o make th e g ro u p s a c t i v e; A i d i t, " F a se B a ru ", BM, M a rc h -A p ril 1958, p p. 1 4 9 -5 2; " I d e o l o g i c a l W ork", WorTd M a r x is t R ev iew, J u l y 1959» p p.2 4 - 5; U ntuk D em o k rasi d a n K a b in e t G otong R ojong (F o r D em ocracy and a M u tu al C o o p e r a tio n C a b i n e t;, D j a k a r t a, 1959» p p. 1 31-3 J "Ubah Im bangan K ek u atan u n tu k M e la k sa n a k a n K o n s e p s i P r e s i d e n S o e k a m o 100%.*" (C hange th e B a la n c e o f Power i n O rd e r t o Im p lem en t P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o 's C o n cep t 1 0 0 $.'), HR, J u l y 5» 1957; a l s o Amir Anwar S a n u s i, R e s u l ts o f th e F i r s t T h re e -Y e a r P l a n, m im eographed t r a n s l a t i o n, D j a k a r t a, 1959» p p.2 - 5; an d PK I, B a h an -B a h an, p p.5 5 - 6; R e s o l u s i t e n t a n g L a p o ra n Umum CC PKI k e p a d a K ongres N a s io n a l k e -V I ( R e s o l u t i o n C o n c e rn in g th e PKI C e n t r a l C o m m itte e 's G e n e ra l R e p o rt to th e S i x t h N a t io n a l C o n g r e s s ), D j a k a r t a, 1959» p p. 6 9 -7 0, 7 7 - 8 0; PKI 40 T ah u n, === [PDF page 173] === 5* to promote all candidate members to full member ship after they had completed their supervized period of candidacy; and 6. to increase the payment of membership fees and donations, and to ensure that they be forwarded in stipu lated percentages to the higher committees. The education objectives were: 1. to eradicate illiteracy within the Party; 2. to organize Party schools and courses; 3• to organize seminars at the central committee and provincial committee levels on such matters as economic problems, and also to organize conferences in theory; 4« to extend Party publishing and to increase distribution of the publications, with an emphasis on increasing the circulation of "Harian Rakjat"; to establish libraries in committee offices; and 6. to establish educational institutions for nonParty progressives, especially to create a people’s university. Quotas were set for each committee, and special plan bureaux were created in the central committee and the provincial committees. Although not all the plan’s objectives were realized important gains were made: Party membership was increased organizational work advanced, and educational activity systematized. === [PDF page 174] === Membership had reached the goal of one and a half millions by the beginning of 1959,^ at which figure it remained until the sixth national congress held from September 7-14, 1959» Peasants had still constituted less than half the total membership in March 1954, but by December 1958 they had become the majority group. The proportion of peasants in the membership was still growing at the time of the sixth congress, while that of workers remained the same, despite the fact that their number was increasing. ^ The promotion of candidate members to full membership was accelerated until by September 1959 about 50 per cent, or 750*000, of the total members were full members, compared with only 30 per cent, or 49,042, at the time of the fifth congress in March 1954*^ Thus between the two congresses the number of full members had increased fifteen-fold. Aidit, however, still complained that the percentage of candidate members was still too high due to the tardiness of some Aidit, ’’Ideological Work", World Marxist Review, July 1959, p.24. PKI, Resolusi tentang Laporan Umum, p.66. D.N. Aidit, "The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia", RI, November-December 1959, p.45* === [PDF page 175] === ISO committees to promote them, and to the insecurity in the rebel areas which prevented the smooth operation of the Party there. A significant result of the plan was the large increase in the number and percentage of women members. The Party instruction of January 1955 to increase the number of women members and to organize them into special groups was at first implemented slowly owing to the shyness of Indonesian women, but also because many male committee members refused to see any value in women as Party members. In February 1957 guidance was published on how to attract women from the different social strata; during 1957 several provincial committees held conferences on how to attract and activate women members; and not only special groups but also special political schools and courses were organized so as to permit the more rapid political development of women members. ^ in September Loc.cit. Suharti Suwarto, ’’Mendjelang Konferensi Nasional Wanita Komunis” (Awaiting the National Conference of Communist Women), BM, September 1957» p*343* Setiati Surasto, ”Memperluas Keanggotaan Partai dikalangan Wanita” (To Extend Party Membership among Women), KP, February 1957» pp.19-21; Suharti Suwarto, "Mendjelang”, BM, September 1957» p.342; Ibrahim, "Sedikit Pengalaman tentang Menjelenggarakan KPS Wanita” (A Little Experience in Organizing a Section-level Women's Political Course), KP, December 1958, pp.242-4. === [PDF page 176] === iSl 1957 the number of women members had been 100,000, with the percentage of women members ranging from 6 to 17 per cent in Java and lower in the outer islands. As late as May 1958 the number of women members was still given as 100,000, but a PKI national conference to discuss Party work among women and held at the end of that month heralded a rapid increase. By December 1958 there were 150,000 women members, and 258,000 at the time of the sixth congress. 3 At the time of the national conference of May 1958 there were already five women sitting in parliament, six in the Constituent Assembly, and 180 in regional and local councils, who had been elected on the PKI ticket. As for the geographical spread of the Party during the period of the plan, the chairman of the central planning bureau, Amir Anwar Sanusi, told the sixth congress that ’the activities of the Party are now evenly spread over all parts of the country’. He backed the Suharti Suwarto, ’’Mend je lang ", BM, September 1957> pp.343-4. For the main documents of the conference, see BM, June 1958, pp.241-85* PKI, Bahan-Bahan, p.54; Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.3. Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, loc.cit. This report contains most of the published statistics on the results of the plan. === [PDF page 177] === 1 fco statement by claims of membership increases of 38 per cent in West Sumatra and 40 per cent in North Sulawesi, despite atrocities committed on Party members by rebels in these areas, and of 63«5 per cent in Kalimantan. In Java, the increase had been 36 per cent, with the lowest, 31 per cent, in East Java. As for the growth of the Party organization, Anwar Sanusi reported that in Kalimantan the number of subsections had increased by 45 per cent, while in Java the number of branches had risen 250 per cent, and of subsections 42 per cent. At the end of the plan, within Java only 1.3 per cent of the 1,449 ket;lamatans (the level at which the subsection is established) and 15.8 per cent of the 21,047 villages (the level at which the branch is established) were without a Party organization. In order to cope with the increase in membership and organization, the number of full-time functionaries in the provincial and island committees was almost doubled. The number of full-timers in the sections (established for each kabupaten, for medium-sized towns and for areas of large cities) increased 400 per cent and in the sub sections 300 per cent. The number of committee members at all levels was increased seven-fold. Prom these statistics it appears that during the plan PKI increased its cadre force even more rapidly than membership. === [PDF page 178] === t h e same t i m e, increased. t h e e q u i p m e n t o f t h e P a r t y o f f i c e s was F o r e x a m p le, t h e number o f t y p e w r i t e r s i n t h e p r o v i n c i a l c o m m i tt e e an d s e c t i o n c o m m i tt e e o f f i c e s was i n c r e a s e d b y 600 p e r c e n t. A l t h o u g h a r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n m em b ersh ip was e f f e c t e d, g r e a t c a r e was s t i l l tak en to p re v e n t the e n tr y o f u n d e s ir a b le elem ents i n t o the P a rty. T his i s i l l u s t r a t e d b y a n a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n " K e h id u p a n P a r t a i ’’ i n May 1958, w h ic h d e t a i l e d t h e method u s e d i n b r i n g i n g a new p e r s o n i n t o the P a rty. F o u r s t a g e s were l i s t e d: p r e p a r a t i o n, w atching over the r e c r u i t, c a u t i o n, and i n v e s t i g a t i o n. The b a s i c t a r g e t s were t h o s e who h a d v o t e d communist i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n s. F ir s t, for ’r a t h e r a l o n g t i m e ’, t h e c a d r e s w ould n o t e t h e p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t ’s name, a g e, r e s i d e n c e, s o c i a l o r i g i n s, e d u c a t i o n, work, e t c., q u e s t i o n i n g h i s f r i e n d s and a c q u a in ta n c e s to o b t a i n the in fo rm ation. Then b e g a n t h e s e c o n d s t a g e, t h a t o f e d u c a t i n g him t o l i v e s e l f l e s s l y and t o b e p r o g r e s s i v e i n h i s p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k and method o f t h i n k i n g. e n c o u r a g e him i n s u c h w a y s, P a r t y w o r k e r s would p ay p e r i o d i c v i s i t s t o h i s house i n ord er to e x p la in P a rty P a r j o n o, ’’T j a r a Mem persiapkan P e l u a s a n Anggota u n t u k Memperkuat P a r t a i " (The Method o f P r e p a r i n g t h e E x t e n s i o n o f Membership i n O r d e r t o S t r e n g t h e n t h e P a r t y ), KP, May 1958, p p. 5 6 - 9. === [PDF page 179] === policy and convince him of the correctness of the Party*s political position; they would provide him with pro gressive reading materials (at least "Harian Rakjat" every day); invite him to art evenings, receptions or lectures organized b y the Party and other progressive organizations; invite him to public meetings and demonstrations; encourage him to take part in delegations to press both social-economic and political demands; and, if necessary, give him the responsibility of leading small actions. The aim of the second phase was to develop the recruit's political and organizational awareness so that he voluntarily requested to join the Party. But, at that stage, caution was required. A close check would be made of his friends and associates to see whether they were reactionary or progressive. If they were reactionary, the cadres had to convince him of the criminal nature of the reactionaries' actions. Finally, if the recruit passed through the first three stages successfully, there was the period of investigation. A thorough check would be made of the records of the preceding stages, especially of his assistance in imple menting Party policy, his diligence in reading Party literature and his loyalty to the people's everyday demands. If he passed this check he was accepted into === [PDF page 180] === 165 the Party. At the end of the article the author warned committee members not to use the guide in order to keep the entry of new members to a minimum, not to practice 'closed-doorism1; that is, the cadres had to use great care with potential members, but not to the extent of impeding the growth of the Party. Although it was not mentioned in the article, the careful supervision of those who entered PKI was continued during the period of candidate membership when any undesirable elements that had evaded earlier detection could be weeded o u t. ' Little information has been published on the success achieved in pursuing the last objective of the organi zational section of the first three-year plan, to increase the entry of membership fees and donations and to ensure that they were forwarded in stipulated percentages to the higher committees. Prom the little evidence available, it appears that by the end of the plan PKI was still unable to solve either the problem of collecting a large percentage of membership fees or of ensuring that the Under the provisions of the April 1951, March 1954 and September 1959 Party constitutions, anyone wishing to enter PKI had to spend from six months to two years as a candidate, depending on their social origin and previous political activity. Even after the period of candidacy their promotion to full membership required sponsorship by long-standing Party members and the endorsement of higher committees. === [PDF page 181] === 16G l o w e r c o m m itte e s f o r w a r d e d t h e s t i p u l a t e d p e r c e n t a g e s o f incom e t o t h e h i g h e r c o m m i tt e e s, PKI e d u c a t i o n a l w ork a l s o e x p a n d e d c o n s i d e r a b l y d u r i n g th e p l a n. c la im e d t h a t In f a c t, 'i n g e n e ra l, th e s i x t h n a t i o n a l c o n g re ss th e q u o ta s a c h ie v e d i n th e f i e l d o f e d u c a t i o n a r e much b e t t e r t h a n t h a t i n t h e f i e l d o f o r g a n i z a t i o n '• The w ork t o e r a d i c a t e i l l i t e r a c y w i t h i n t h e P a r t y has n o t been d isc u sse d p u b lic ly. I n m id-1957> a t a tim e when t h e num ber o f i l l i t e r a t e s i n t h e P a r t y was 'n o t s m a l l 1,432 th e a g i t a t i o n and p r o p a g a n d a s e c t i o n o f th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e i s s u e d two b o o k l e t s f o r u s e i n th e e r a d i c a t i o n o f i l l i t e r a c y b o t h w i t h i n and o u t s i d e t h e P a rty.^ The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f members i n t o g r o u p s m ust h av e f a c i l i t a t e d a n t i - i l l i t e r a c y w ork, b u t i n 1960 c o m m itte e members c o m p la in e d t o me o f t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f i l l i t e r a c y among n o t o n l y o r d i n a r y members b u t f u n c t i o n a r i e s a s h i g h a s t h e s e c t i o n and s u b s e c t i o n le v e ls. T h is e v id e n c e i s d i s c u s s e d b e lo w i n t h e s e c t i o n d e a l i n g w i t h com m unist fu n d s i n I n d o n e s i a, p p. 2 1 6 - 9. PKI, R e s o l u s i t e n t a n g L a p p ra n Umum, p.7 9 * A i d i t, "Ubah Im bangan K e k u a t a n ", HR, J u l y 1957* [Unreadable] === [PDF page 182] === U nder t h e t h r e e - y e a r p l a n a s y s t e m o f p o l i t i c a l s c h o o l s and c o u r s e s was e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h a l l l e v e l s o f t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n from t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e t o th e b ra n c h e s. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e o r d e r e d t h a t a l l s c h o o ls and c o u rs e s te a c h fo u r s u b j e c t s whenever th e e d u c a t i o n a l l e v e l o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t w o u ld p e r m i t. The f o u r s u b j e c t s w e r e: t h e h i s t o r y o f s o c i e t y, w h ich was d esig n ed to a c q u a in t s tu d e n ts w ith th e M a rx is t-L e n in is t v ie w o f s o c i e t y and th e law s o f s o c i a l d e v e lo p m e n t; t h e b a s i c p r o b le m s o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n r e v o l u t i o n, w h ich was d i r e c t e d to w a r d s c r e a t i n g u n a n i m i t y o f t h o u g h t on t h e s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n r e v o l u t i o n; t h e p ro b le m s o f t h e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t, aim ed t o s e c u r e u n a n i m i t y i n t h e P K I’s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s p o l i c y i n th e In d o n e s ia n s i t u a t i o n; and t h e b u i l d i n g o f th e P a r t y, w hich show ed t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f th e L e n i n i s t - t y p e p a r t y a n d o f t h e a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a l l c o m m unists i n i t s d e v e lo p m e n t. T ex ts have b een p u b lis h e d f o r each s u b j e c t a d a p te d to th e d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f e d u c a tio n and p o l i t i c a l aw areness o f th e s t u d e n t s. Each ’s h i f t 1 o f t h e c e n t r a l s c h o o l, o r g a n i z e d b y t h e c e n t r a l c o m m i tt e e, l a s t e d f u l l - t i m e f o r one m onth. A i d i t, " I d e o l o g i c a l Work", W orld M a r x i s t R eview, J u l y 1959» P P.2 4 - 5. === [PDF page 183] === included two extra subjects: dialectical and historical materialism, which was also taught by some provinciallevel schools, and the international working class movement. The duration of each ‘shift* in the provincial, section and subsection schools has not been published, but information is available about a provincial-level school for women cadres held in Makasar.' In order to avoid the women students* staying in a hostel, which was the normal practice for male students, the school was held for three hours, three days a week for five weeks - or for 45 hours in all. The time was spent in lectures, discussion groups and discussion classes; self-study at home was required; and the course ended with an examination. Prom Surabaja there is information about the duration of branch schools. As the Party leaders had determined that a branch political school should be completed within seven days, the students met for two hours on each of the seven days, making a total of fourteen hours of classwork. At the lowest level the Party faced great difficulties in giving political education because the students in the Ibrahim, "Sedikit Pengalaman", KP, December 1958» pp.2424. Wahjoedi, "Pengalaman Mengadjar dalam Sekolah Politik" (Experience in Teaching in Political Schools), KP, December 1958, p.241. === [PDF page 184] === 169 branch schools were people: whose general knowledge is still low, a large part of them are illiterate, while those who are not illiterate still have a very limited desire to read.12 Not all branch schools covered the four subjects stipu lated by the central committee. One in Surabaja, for example, met for 2j hours on six successive nights but taught only the history of the development of society; the people who attended were heads of groups Absenteeism was also a problem in the schools and courses. Where the students stayed in a hostel for the period of the school, which occurred on at least the central and provincial levels, absenteeism was not significant. But in the lower levels absenteeism occurred for a number of causes: students had to work overtime, or were too tired or too lazy or lost interest. An added cause was the wet season. Leaders of all communist-led mass organizations complained to me of the fall in attendance when the roads were quagmires and the students had no rainclothes and could not afford to come by transport. The Madiun section committee reported Ibid., pp.240-1. Achmad Sjafii, ”Pengalaman Sekolah Politik” (Experiences with a Political School), HP, August 1958» pp.148-9* === [PDF page 185] === 170 that during rain attendance at the political school fell b y 3 0 per cent. Less than a year after the plan went into effect, Aidit told the central committee plenum of July 4» *1957 that ’In general there is already rather enough attention to education for high and middle Party cadres1.23 After this speech, the emphasis of Party education was shifted to the lower cadres and activists, the committee members in the subsections and branches and the leaders of groups. By the time of the sixth congress over 270,000 cadres and activists had graduated from the Party schools or com pleted a Party course. ^ They ’form the Party’s backbone, which can never be broken*. According to Aidit, the 270,000 comprised ’the majority of cadres from the centre to the basic committees*.^4 Concerning the implementation of the plan for seminars and conferences, Aidit told the central committee plenum which met from March 31 to April 3 1958 that conferences in theory were not yet being held as desired, Simat, ’’Sekolah Politik dan Pengaruhnja” (Political Schools and Their Influence), KP, June 1958, p.81. Aidit, ”Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan”, HR, July 5* 1957* Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.4* Aidit, ’’The Sixth National Congress”, RI, NovemberDecember 1959> p«45» === [PDF page 186] === but that the central committee and some provincial committees were already arranging seminars on specific topics. The seminars and special conferences arranged by the central committee during the period of the plan included a seminar on Party work among students, held at about the beginning of 1958, a national conference on Party work among women, held in May 1958, a national seminar on economics, held in February 1959» and a national conference on Party work among peasants and fishermen, held in April 1959* The provincial com mittees also arranged conferences and seminars which were probably devoted to the same topics as, and held in preparation for, the national meetings. One of the principal goals of the seminars and conferences was to exchange experiences in the work of building the Party among the different sections of society. But for the high and middle cadres who took part, there was the danger that their work within the Party organization might result in their losing contact For the main documents of the Party conference on work among women, see BM, June 1958, pp,241-85• For the main documents of the seminar on economics, see Ekonomi dan Mas.jarakat, no.2-3> 1959* For the main documents of the Party conference on work among peasants and fishermen, see BM, April-May 1959» pp.121-222, === [PDF page 187] === To avoid this with the actual condition of the masses danger, the central committee organized a six-month ’go down* and ’three-togethers* campaign in preparation for the national conference on Party work among peasants and fishermen.' All Party committees from the central committee down instructed certain cadres to ’go down* to the villages to study at first hand agrarian relations and the living conditions of the peasants. While in the village, in order to better understand the peasants and win their support, the cadres had to practice the ’threetogethers’: ’living together, eating together and working together with the peasants, especially with... the poor peasants and agricultural labourers*. The communistled mass organizations followed the Party and organized ’go d o w n ’ movements among their own cadres and activists. ’Going-down* has continued since the national conference on work among the peasants, and cadres have been sent into urban kampongs and fishing villages as well as into rural areas. The movement has a greater value than just educating cadres in the realities of the life of the B.O. Hutapea, "Some Lessons from the First National Peasants Conference of the C P I ”, RI, August 1959, P»33* "Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum Tani” (Report on Party Work among the Peasants), BM, April-May 1939, p.138. === [PDF page 188] === masses, for it has also provided the Party leadership with a store of social and economic data which permits the Party to formulate popular demands and slogans. During the period of the first three-year plan, the Party cadres and activists were expected to do more for their political education than attend schools and courses, participate in seminars and conferences, and join in the ’go down* movement. They were also expected to study on their own, and. guides to self-study were published in ’’Kehidupan Partai”. Anwar Sanusi reported in September 1959 that cadres at the provincial and section committee levels were studying on their own such classical MarxistLeninist works as the ’’Communist Manifesto’’, Lenin’s ’’Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder”, and his ’’Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution”. The cadres were also encouraged to read communist novels which had been translated into Indonesian, such as Gorki’s ’’Mother”, Julius Pucik’s ’’Report from the Gallows”, and Mihail Sholokov’s ’’Impressions of a Soviet Soldier”. Cadres were also expected to read ’’Harian Rakjat”, the various Party Siswojo, ’’Beladjar-Sendiri ” (Self-Study), KP, November 1956, pp.21-3; Jono, ’’Beladjar Sendiri", KP, May 1958» PP.65-7. Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.U* === [PDF page 189] === periodicals, pamphlets and booklets, and all Partydocuments that were circulated to their respective committees. The schools, courses, seminars, conferences, down* movement and self-study movement of the first threeyear plan were concerned with the Party cadres and activists. The Party did not yet have the resources for a mass education campaign among the ordinary members. For the 1,200,000 or so members and candidate members who had not achieved the position of cadre or activist, basic political education continued to be received through the group. Instruction on the Party constitution and programme was continued, but apparently a special effort was made to organize study movements that would familiar ize the ordinary members with the line of the moment taken b y the central Party leadership.1 Cadres from the subsection or even section, that is, those who had benefited most from the education campaign, went into the groups to explain decisions taken by the central committee plenums, and any important Party document which Rewang, "Memperbaiki Gerakan Mempeladjari PutusanPutusan CC dikalangan Anggauta dan Tjalon-Anggauta" (To Improve the Movement among Members and Candidate Members to Study Central Committee Decisions), KP, May 1958, pp.60-2. === [PDF page 190] === l a i d down t h e P a r t y l i n e a t a g i v e n t i m e, s u c h a s t h e p o l i t b u r e a u fs New Y ear m essag es* The m e e ti n g s o f o r d i n a r y members w ould t h e n d i s c u s s how t o im p le m e n t t h e P a r t y l i n e i n t h e i r own l o c a l i t y. The f o u r t h o b j e c t i v e o f t h e e d u c a t i o n a l s e c t i o n o f t h e p l a n was t h e e x t e n s i o n o f P a r t y p u b l i s h i n g a n d t h e d i s t r ib u t i o n o f P a rty l i t e r a t u r e, e s p e c i a l l y r a i s i n g th e c i r c u l a t i o n o f " H a r ia n R a k j a t ”. Work to w a rd s t h i s o b j e c t i v e h a d m ixed s u c c e s s. The g r e a t e s t f a i l u r e, p e r h a p s, i n t h e w hole p l a n was met i n t h e a t t e m p t t o i n c r e a s e t h e c i r c u l a t i o n o f " H a r ia n R a k ja t". I n March 1956, f i v e months b e f o r e t h e p l a n w ent i n t o e f f e c t, t h e c i r c u l a t i o n o f,rH a r i a n R a k j a t ” was By F e b r u a r y 1957 i t h a d r e a c h e d 6 0,0 0 0, com pared w i t h a t o t a l c i r c u l a t i o n o f th e 75 d a i l y n e w s p a p e rs i n I n d o n e s i a n o f 747 * 2 5 0. c irc u la tio n, D e s p i t e c a m p a ig n s t o i n c r e a s e i n w h ic h e v e n A i d i t and o t h e r c e n t r a l c o m m itte e members t o o k p a r t, a n d d e s p i t e t h e g r e a t i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f P a r t y m em bers, c o m m itte e members and o r g a n i z a t i o n s, y ears l a t e r. t h e c i r c u l a t i o n was s t i l l 6 0,0 0 0 f o u r I n Decem ber 1960, a l t h o u g h ”H a r i a n R a k j a t " m a i n t a i n e d th e l a r g e s t c i r c u l a t i o n o f a n y n e w s p a p e r i n HR, F e b r u a r y 4* 1957* HR* December 3 1, 1960. === [PDF page 191] === I n d o n e s i a, b u t t h e r e was o n ly one c o p y f o r e v e r y 250 P a r t y m em bers. A ll th e p e r i o d i c a l s from t h e p e r i o d b e f o r e th e p la n c o n ti n u e d p u b l i c a t i o n. re g u la rly. 1956. " B in ta n g Me r a h 11 a p p e a re d "K eh id u p an P a r t a i " r e a p p e a r e d i n O c to b e r Prom May t o D ecem ber 1957 i t a p p e a re d o n ly tw ic e b e c a u s e o f t e c h n i c a l p r i n t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d th e l a c k o f a r t i c l e s b e i n g s e n t i n from t h e r e g i o n s. D u rin g 1958 and 1959 i t was p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y. The E n g l i s h - la n g u a g e m o n th ly "R eview o f I n d o n e s i a ", i n i t i a l l y m im eo g rap h ed, was p r i n t e d from J a n u a r y 1957 an d a p p e a re d re g u la rly. A p a rt fro m th e p e r i o d i c a l s c o n tin u e d from th e p r e v i o u s p e r i o d, s e v e r a l new o n e s a p p e a r e d d u r i n g th e t h r e e - y e a r p la n. The f i r s t was "PKI d an DPR" (PKI an d P a r l ia m e n t ) w h ich b e g a n p u b l i c a t i o n i n Ju n e 1956. changed to Its title was "PKI d an P e r w a k ila n " (PKI a n d th e R e p r e s e n ta t i v e C o u n c ils ) a f t e r t h e 1957 l o c a l e l e c t i o n s. T h is q u a r t e r l y i s i n t e n d e d t o g iv e news o f PKI a c t i v i t i e s p a r l i a m e n t, t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A sse m b ly, and t h e l o c a l r e p r e s e n ta tiv e c o u n c ils. I n J a n u a r y 1957 a p p e a re d th e f i r s t num ber o f "Mimbar K om unis" (C om m unist Forum ) w hich has th e s u b - t i t l e "P ro b lem s o f P e a ce a n d S o c i a l i s m ". "Mimbar K om unis" c o n t a i n s t r a n s l a t e d a r t i c l e s and s p e e c h e s b y f o r e i g n c o m m u n ists, and s e e k s t o f a m i l i a r i z e th e PKI === [PDF page 192] === cadres with the experience of foreign communist parties. It was at first published every two months, but then became a monthly. Early in November 1957 PKI began to publish an English-language quarterly entitled ’’Marxist Science” which was aimed at the intelligentsia and scientists and contained news of the scientific advances in the Soviet bloc. It was soon changed to ”Ilmu Marxis (Marxist Science) in Indonesian. The most recent periodical is the quarterly ’’Ekonomi dan Masjarakat” (Economics and Society). This appeared in March 1959 and contains articles by both Indonesians and foreigners on economic, financial and social matters. All the new periodicals have been published regularly, but their high price must prohibit their purchase by any but Party committees and a few relatively wealthy Party members.' During 1956, the PKI published 700,000 copies of books, booklets and pamphlets - a decrease compared In 1960, the price per copy of the PKI periodicals in Indonesian was about 3 «50 rupiahs for Bintang Merah, one rupiah for Kehidupan Partai, six rupiahs for PKI dan Perwakilan, four rupiahs for Mimbar Komunis, seven rupiahs for Ilmu Marxis, and eight rupiahs for Ekonomi dan Mas.jarakat. The daily wage for an urban or estate worker was about ten to twenty rupiahs; for an agricultural labourer, 7 « 5 0 to fifteen. Njoto, ”Soal Pendidikan dan kaum Inteligensia” (The Problem of Education and the Intellectuals), HR, July 5> 1957. === [PDF page 193] === with 1955* "but the 1955 figure had been bloated with the large printing of the new PKI constitution and the PKI programme and election manifesto used in the 1955 election campaigns, A target of one million copies was set for 1957» "but there was no report of its having been achieved. In 1958, the communist publishing house issued 52 different books and pamphlets as well as over 50 issues of different periodicals. By the end of that year there were available in Indonesian in booklet, pamphlet or article form many works of Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, as well as some by Liu Shao-chi, Ho Chi Minh, Marx and Engels, Dimitrov, Sharkey and lesser foreign communist figures. Communist fiction available in Indonesian included works by Gorki, Julius Fucik, and Ilya Ehrenburg, This wealth of translated material enabled the Party cadres to study many of the classical writings of Marxism-Leninism as well as much that has been written of the practical experiences of foreign communist parties, especially those of the USSR, China and Viet Nam. Although translations from foreign communist sources constituted a majority of the titles published by the PKI, the great majority of total copies were of PKI HR, January 3, 1959 === [PDF page 194] === 179 materials: speeches and articles by the Party leaders, documents of central committee plenums, new printings of the Party constitution and programme, the materials for discussion in the sixth congress, course guides for Party schools and courses, and occasional important central committee statements, such as New Year messages* The largest publishing undertaking has been the two volumes of Aidit's selected works, covering the period from August 1951 to the sixth national congress in September 1959* The first volume, of 537 pages, appeared in mid-1959, but the second volume was delayed until May 1960. These two volumes made readily available for study the most important articles and speeches on PKI in the period of the national united front. The three-year plan also called for increased publishing activity by the Party's regional organizations. Several local Party periodicals appeared, including the twice-monthly "Suara Ibukota" (Voice of the Capital) published by the PKI in Djakarta Raja from the middle of March 1959» "Warta Sunda" (Sunda News) published in Bandung, "Suara Persatuan" (The Voice of Unity) published in Semarang, "Buietin PKI Djawa Timur" (East Java PKI Aidit, Pilihan Tulisan, vol.I, 537 p» 5 vol.II, Djakarta, I960, 590 p. === [PDF page 195] === 180 Bulletin) published in Surabaja, and "Lombok Bangun" (Lombok Awakes) published in Mataram, Lombok. At the time of the 1957 and 1958 local elections in Java, South Sumatra, Riau and Kalimantan, election programmes were published in booklet form by the Party organizations in at least the five province-level regions of Java (that is, Djakarta Raja, West Java, Central Java, the special territory of Jogjakarta, and East Java), and also in some of the cities, such as Surabaja and Jogjakarta. The Party organizations at the kabupaten level also issued election programmes, but these were mostly mimeographed. A little work was done in publishing in the regional languages. In 1957, for example, there was mention of a work by Mao Tse-tung translated into Sundanese, and one by Stalin into Javanese. Because in Indonesia wages for workers are low and the price of printed materials relatively very high, PKI faced the problem of how to make its publications available to the large number of cadres, members and sympathizers who could not afford to buy them. As a partial solution to the problem, the plan aimed to establish a library in every committee. To what extent N., "Buku-Buku Teori dalam Bahasa-Bahasa Daerah" (Books of Theory in Regional Languages), BM, January-Pebruary 1957, p.76. === [PDF page 196] === the plan has been successful in this sphere has not been disclosed publicly, but the work has been taken seriously. The value of the libraries was, however, limited by the illiteracy widespread among the ordinary members and lower cadres and by the ’very limited desire to read’ among those who were literate. The final objective of the three-year plan in the field of education was the creation of educational institutions for non-Party progressives, especially the creation of a people’s university. A committee to organize the Universitas Rakjat (UNRA, People’s University) was established on September 19* 1958 on the initiative of PKI leaders and well-known fellowtravellers. ^ Siswojo, a member of the PKI central committee, became its chairman.^ On October 31» a 21person council of curators was formed and included Aidit Sakirman and Njono, the chairman of SOBSI.^ Aidit was elected chairman of the council on January 17» 1959*^ See, for example, Kisman, ’’Sedikit Pengalaman Mengusahakan Perpustakaan*’ (A Little Experience in Organizing a Library), KP, December 1958, pp.245-7* Wahjoedi, ’’Pengalaman Mengadjar”, KP, December 1958, pp.240-1. HR, September 24» 1958. HR, September 22, 1958. HR, November 3, 1958. HR, January 20, 1959* === [PDF page 197] === When t h e UNRA c o m m itte e was f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d, i t a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y was ft o d e v e l o p s c i e n t i f i c kn o w led g e among t h e p e o p l e ’ • A id it, h o w e v e r, r e v e a l e d t h e t r u e o b j e c t i v e i n an a r t i c l e ’’World M a r x i s t R e v ie w ”. He w r o te t h a t UNRA was i n t e n d e d f o r t h o s e P a r t y members a n d o t h e r p r o g r e s s i v e s who were u n a b l e to a t t e n d t h e n a t i o n a l o r r e g i o n a l P a r t y s c h o o l s f o r la c k o f p la c e s o r b e ca u se t h e i r d a i l y o c c u p a tio n s d id n o t a f f o r d them t h e o p p o r t u n i t y. He f u r t h e r n o t e d t h a t: The c u r r i c u l u m o f th e U n i v e r s i t y i s c l o s e l y lin k e d w ith th e u rg e n t ta s k s o f th e P a rty, n a m e ly t h e b u i l d i n g o f a n a t i o n a l f r o n t a n d th e P a r ty. The e d u c a t i o n i s aim ed a t e lim in a tin g id e o lo g ic a l c o n fu sio n, a t d e e p e n i n g t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p r e s e n t and fu tu re ta s k s. UNRA c o u r s e s o p e n e d i n D j a k a r t a and J o g j a k a r t a i n December 1 9 5 8.^ W it h i n a y e a r t h e r e w ere b r a n c h e s i n e i g h t o t h e r t o w n s: K e b a j o r a n B a r u, Bandung, S u r a k a r t a, HR, S e p te m b e r 2 2, 1958. A i d i t, ’’I d e o l o g i c a l Work”, W orld M a r x i s t R e v ie w, J u l y 1959, p. 2 5. Most o f t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n was o b t a i n e d from S i s w o j o, ’’I n t e n s i f y t h e A n t i - I m p e r i a l i s t S t r u g g l e on th e I d e o l o g i c a l F r o n t ”, R I, S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1959, p * 3 2; HR, S e p te m b e r 2 8, 1959; and e s p e c i a l l y from i n t e r v i e w s w i t h H. P o r k a s, t h e n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r y o f UNRA, D j a e t u n, t h e p r e s i d e n t o f UNRA i n J o g j a k a r t a, and S u j i t n o, a member o f t h e s e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e S u r a b a j a UNRA. === [PDF page 198] === 183 Semarang, Surabaja, Malang, Palembang and Medan, Assistance in equipping UNRA was asked of foreign diplomatic representatives in Indonesia, ’much assistance’. They gave For example, the East German International Relations Bureau and the Indonesia-Soviet Friendship Association gave books and film projectors. Students are admitted to UNRA if they have a junior high school level of education or the equivalent or if they are capable but have not had the opportunity to study. people. UNRA, in spite of its name, is not for the The fees are too high to permit workers or peasants to attend. The UNRA leaders said in interview that their students consisted of lower civil servants, a few teachers, and cadres and activists from the trade unions, youth, women and other mass organizations. at least some cases the mass organizations pay the fees for their members. It is difficult to estimate the number of students in UNRA. In September 1959 the UNRA chairman claimed 2,816 enrolled students, but this figure has to be qualified, and the qualification throws some light on the difficulty faced b y PKI in obtaining sustained activity In 1960 the entrance fee was fifty rupiahs; the monthly fee for each course was twenty to thirty rupiahs. === [PDF page 199] === fro m i t s members I n S u r a b a j a 600 s t u d e n t s b e g a n t h e c o u r s e s, b u t w i t h i n a y e a r o n l y 300 w ere l e f t; J o g j a k a r t a 350 s t a r t e d, b u t a y e a r l a t e r o n l y b e tw e e n 100 a n d 150 w ere l e f t. th e c o u rse s Of t h e s t u d e n t s who c o n t i n u e d ’v e r y few i n d e e d ’, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e UNRA n a tio n a l s e c r e ta r y, a tte n d e d ev ery c la s s. So many d r o p p e d o u t b e c a u s e t h e y l o s t i n t e r e s t o r b e c a u s e i t was t o o much e f f o r t t o a t t e n d o r t h e y fo u n d t h e f e e s t o o h ig h. The r e a s o n s f o r a b s e n t e e i s m among t h o s e who c o n t i n u e d w ere s e v e r a l: t h e w et s e a s o n, many p e o p l e h a d t o work o v e r t i m e o r a t two j o b s and s o h a d l i t t l e tim e o r i n c l i n a t i o n to a t t e n d n i g h t c l a s s e s, and th e c a d re s o f t h e P a r t y and t h e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s w ere o f t e n s e n t out of to m f o r d a y s o r w e e k s. I n May 1960, t h e p e rm a n e n t s t a f f o f UNRA i n c l u d e d se v en a t th e c e n t r e, and f i v e i n S u r a b a ja. f i n d t h e num bers e l s e w h e r e. I d id n o t At t h e e n d o f 1959 t h e r e w ere 250 UNRA t e a c h e r s t h r o u g h o u t I n d o n e s i a, r e c e i v e d no p a y, o n l y t r a n s p o r t c o s t s. They The UNRA h e a d q u a r t e r s i s s u e s m im eographed m o n th ly c o u r s e g u i d e s, w hich t h e s t u d e n t s m u st b u y f o r two r u p i a h s e a c h m onth, UNRA p o s s e s s e d n o b u i l d i n g s o f i t s own b y t h e m id d le o f 1960, and had t o r e n t p r e m i s e s. As o f May 1960, UNRA o f f e r e d f i v e c o u r s e s, e a c h l a s t i n g two y e a r s. The one t a k e n b y t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y === [PDF page 200] === of students was political science which covered seven subjects: Marxist political science, the Indonesian independence movement, Indonesian society and economy, the history of Indonesia, constitutional law, geography, and the history of the world. Political science was taught in all UNRA branches. The second most important course was English, taught in eight branches, with an emphasis on translation from English to Indonesian, ’because many published materials arrive in English’, and on conversation, Indonesia’. ’because many foreign guests come to Journalism was taught in two branches, its importance for PKI being obvious. In the art course, which is taught in two branches, UNRA endeavoured to teach the students to see society and to portray a situation from it. The national secretary pointed out that pictures and caricatures are very important in Indonesia where a high percentage of the population is illiterate* Indonesian language and literature were taught in Djakarta. One day before the first three-year plan ended on August 17> 1959, the central committee established two The editor of a Surabaja newspaper told me of the example of the local newspaper Trompet Masjarakat which was led by a non-communist but which frequently carried pro-communist material because its journalists were communists. === [PDF page 201] === new e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n D j a k a r t a, 11 A cam paign t o r a i s e f u n d s f o r a c e n t r a l c o m m itte e h o u se o f c u l t u r e was o p e n e d i n A u g u st 1956, and r a i s e d 4 m i l l i o n r u p i a h s. The h o u s e was f i n a l l y o p e n ed on A u g u st 16, 1959 w i t h N j o t o a s c h a i r m a n o f th e s u p e r v i z i n g c o m m itte e. At th e same t i m e, A i d i t p r o c l a i m e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e A l i a r c h a m academ y o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e s, w h ic h was t o t e a c h M a rx ism -L e n in ism and a l s o t o s t u d y t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s from t h e M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t v i e w p o i n t. The p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e s i x t h n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s w ere u s e d a s a s t i m u l u s t o t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e t h r e e y e a r p l a n, a n d a means o f h e i g h t e n i n g P a r t y a c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l and s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e t i e s o f t h e P a r t y w i t h th e m asses. On J a n u a r y 5, 1959, t h e p o l i t b u r e a u c a l l e d f o r a n a tio n -w id e c o m p e titio n in fo u r f i e l d s: s e r v i c e s to th e p e o p l e, p r o m o ti o n o f t h e p e o p l e * s c u l t u r e, e d u c a t i o n work w i t h i n t h e P a r t y, and t h e e x p a n s i o n o f t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a tio n. I n t h e c o n g r e s s, t h e b a n n e r s f o r t h e b e s t work w ere won b y West J a v a i n th e f i e l d s o f e d u c a t i o n a n d s e r v i c e t o t h e p e o p l e, C e n t r a l J a v a i n t h e p r o m o tio n o f R I, S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1959, p.3 3 « R I, F e b r u a r y 1959, p. 6. === [PDF page 202] === 15 the people’s culture, and South Kalimantan in the field of Party organization. The most spectacular activity in the preparation for the sixth congress was the formation of voluntary work brigades of Party members. These served a triple purpose: to raise the work enthusiasm of ordinary members and candidate members, to bring the cadres into closer contact with the people, and to increase the people’s support for the Party, The incomplete list of work done by the brigades included the repair or construction of 3,2i+9 kilometres of roads, 985 kilometres of drains, 2,280 houses, 80 school buildings, 5,119 public lavatories, 3,133 public bathing places, and 1,477 bridges; the construction of 139 dams; the establishment of 351 anti-illiteracy centres; and the killing of 186,698 field mice.1 But probably the most important result for the Party of the congress preparations was the intensive discussion PKI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.221. West Java won second place in the promotion of the people’s culture, and third place in Party organization; Central Java won second place in Party organization and third in education; East Java won second place in education, third place in both service to the people and the promotion of the people’s culture; and North Sumatra won second place in service to the people, Aidit, ’’The Sixth National Congress”, RI, NovemberDecember 1959, p.40. === [PDF page 203] === in all levels of the Party of the draft constitution, draft programme, and draft central committee general report which had been published in December 1958« After 1958 the former heated attacks on the ideological deviations and the heinous ’isms’ that could arise during the implementation of the national united front gave way to far more gentle reminders that these dangers still existed. The draft of the central committee report to be presented to the sixth congress, which was published in December 1958, reiterated the need to wage ceaseless war against subjectivism. But although the report as finally presented to the congress retained an outline of methods for combatting subjectiv ism, it dropped the sentence which had stated that ‘subjectivism still exists up to the present’. That the Aidit leadership considered ideological deviation to have become a minor problem was shown markedly in Aidit’s speech in May 1959, "Building the Organization is Important, but Building Ideology is Even More Important."* M.H. Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi PKI (Concerning PKI’s Constitution), Djakarta, 1959, pp«5Ü-5; Njoto, Tentang Program PKI (Concerning PKI’s Programme), Djakarta, 1959* D.N. Aidit, "Building the Organization is Important, but Building Ideology is Even More Important", RI supplement, June-July 1959, 8 p. === [PDF page 204] === Instead of attacking a long list of deviations and errors, Aidit merely stressed the need to study the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism in order to avoid the errors caused by bourgeois ways of thinking. When the second break occurred between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the PKI leaders dutifully warned Its manifestations, the PKI leaders declared, were self-satisfaction, chauvinism, and slanders against the socialist peace camp, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party. But although Aidit told the sixth congress of the continuing danger of modern revisionism, he boasted in February 1960 to the world communist parties that ’the Tito brand of revisionism has not found the slightest response in the Communist Party of Indonesia. In order to explain why, during the first three-year plan, the Aidit leadership ceased its violent attacks on errors of ideology and methods of work, it is necessary to note the changes that had taken place within the Party. In brief, before 1956, and especially in the first years PKI, Bahan-Bahan, pp.68-9. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, pp.156-7. D.N. Aidit, ’’For National Unity”, World Marxist Review, February 1960, p.26. === [PDF page 205] === 190 a f t e r J a n u a r y 195*1 > t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p u s e d s t r i d e n t c a m p a ig n s i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e ’o l d 1 l e a d e r s, and t o f r i g h t e n a n y o f t h e i r r e a l o r s u p p o s e d f o l l o w e r s i n t o a c q u i e s c e n c e t o t h e new p o l i c i e s. F u r t h e r m o r e, t h e new P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p had n e i t h e r t h e m a t e r i a l n o r human r e s o u r c e s t o c o n d u c t a l a r g e - s c a l e e d u c a t i o n a l cam paign w i t h i n t h e P a r t y, and made t h e a t t a c k s on th e v a r i o u s e r r o n e o u s ’i s m s ’ in o rd e r to p i n p o i n t t h o s e e r r o r s w h ic h, a f t e r a r e a d i n g o f th e h i s t o r y o f t h e PKI a n d f o r e i g n com m unist p a r t i e s, w ere deemed m ost l i k e l y t o o c c u r d u r i n g a p e r i o d o f th e n a tio n a l u n ite d f r o n t. By t h e tim e t h e t h r e e - y e a r p l a n was p u t i n t o o p e r a t i o n, t h e n e e d f o r s t r i d e n t a n t i - e r r o r c am p aig n s was rem oved. F irstly, t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p was s e c u r e i n i t s c o n t r o l o v e r t h e P a r t y and i n t h e l o y a l t y o f i t s m em bers. The ’o l d ’ l e a d e r s h a d l o n g s i n c e b e e n rem oved, t h e r e h a d b e e n no s i g n s o f s i g n i f i c a n t s u p p o r t f o r them, th e new l e a d e r s h i p show ed no s i g n s o f d i v i s i o n, and t h e l a r g e P a r t y t h a t had b e e n b u i l t s i n c e J a n u a r y 195*1 d e m o n stra te d a s u r p r i s i n g s o l i d a r i t y. S e c o n d ly, t h o s e c a d r e s who h a d e a r l i e r e x h i b i t e d e r r o r o r t e n d e n c y t o The q u e s t i o n o f s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n PKI d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p i s d i s c u s s e d b e lo w, p p. 1 9 5 -2 0 7. === [PDF page 206] === error had been weeded out or corrected. And thirdly, the Party now had sufficient teachers, funds and translated literature to permit the launching of a massive political education campaign which could tackle political education systematically and so remove the need for particular anti-*isms’ campaigns. Towards the Second 3-Year Plan By the time of the PKI sixth national congress in September 1959* political freedom in Indonesia had been considerably curtailed. On June 4 the central war administrator had imposed a temporary ban on all political activities. Prom August 1 closed meetings were allowed only if the military authorities had been given prior notice. A ban was retained on public meetings and demonstrations and on all political activities in those regions where military operations against the rebels were in progress. In practice, however, after August 1 the political parties and their mass organizations still had to ask permission from the war administrators to hold closed meetings. Sometimes a representative of the military would attend them. When PKI asked permission to hold its congress, it was widely rumoured, and from sources in high government === [PDF page 207] === loo JL s./ h J c irc le s, th a t th e m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s re fu s e d p e rm issio n and r e t r a c t e d t h e i r r e f u s a l o n ly a f t e r th e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f Sukarno. D e s p i t e, and p e r h a p s s t i m u l a t e d b y, t h e g ro w in g r e s t r i c t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y, t h e PKI l e a d e r s e x p re s s e d to th e s i x t h c o n g re ss t h e i r d e te r m in a tio n to draw up a n d e x e c u t e a s e c o n d t h r e e - y e a r p l a n o f o r g a n i z a t io n and e d u c a tio n. They a l s o show ed t h e m a jo r l i n e s t h e p l a n was e x p e c t e d t o t a k e. I n t h e f i e l d o f o r g a n i z a t i o n, t h e o b j e c t i v e was a g a i n t h e e x p a n s i o n o f m em bership an d t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e P a r t y m a c h in e. S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n was t o b e g i v e n t o w in n in g new members from t h e w o rk in g c l a s s. I n a t t r a c t i n g new m em bers, o r i e n t a t i o n t o th e w o rk in g c l a s s i n t h e tow ns a n d v i l l a g e s i s i m p o r t a n t i n o r d e r t o s a f e g u a r d th e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e P a r t y m em b ersh ip so t h a t t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a n e le m e n t i n t h e P a r t y, a lth o u g h i t does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a m a j o r it y, a t l e a s t r e m a in s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o e le m e n t s from c l a s s e s o t h e r t h a n t h e w o r k in g c l a s s. ' I n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f w o r k in g c l a s s members, Lukman c a l l e d on a l l P a r t y c o m m itte e s t o d e v o te s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n to th e p r o v is io n o f e le m e n ta ry p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n f o r w o r k in g c l a s s c a n d i d a t e members so t h a t t h e y c o u l d become f u l l members a s s o o n a s th e minimum p e r i o d o f c a n d i d a c y was c o m p l e t e d. Lukman, T e n ta n g K o n s t i t u s i PKI, p*37« === [PDF page 208] === 103 Aidit gave some of the broad objectives in the field of education: 1. to educate all Party functionaries and activists and a majority of the rank and file; 2. to make the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy the most important subject in all Party schools and courses, and to teach the international working class movement in all schools and courses; 3« to train cadres of theory, politics, and organization. In the central committee report to the sixth congress, Aidit called on the provincial committees to present detailed and objective reports to the central committee planning bureau in order to enable the bureau to draw up a realistic plan. The national rate for the plan went into operation on January 1 1960, but no details had been made public by the end of the year. The uncertainty of the general political situation in Indonesia and the restrictions on political freedom make it unlikely that the second three-year plan will enjoy the smooth operation of its predecessor. At the Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.149; "The Sixth National Congress", RI, November-Deeember 1959, pp.45-6. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.149* === [PDF page 209] === e n d o f A u g u st I 9 6 0, t h e l o c a l wap a d m i n i s t r a t o r s o f S o u th S u m a tr a, S o u th K a lim a n ta n a n d S o u th and S o u t h - E a s t S u l a w e s i p l a c e d t e m p o r a r y b a n s on PKI a c t i v i t y i n t h e i r areas. Prom S e p te m b e r 13 t o November 30 a n a t i o n - w i d e b a n was im p o sed on a l l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s, and when i t was l i f t e d, t h e b a n on com m unist a c t i v i t i e s re m a in e d i n f o r c e i n a t l e a s t S o u th S u m a tra /D ja m b i an d S o u th K a l im a n t a n. W hile th e b a n s a r e i n f o r c e on p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n g e n e r a l a n d com m unist a c t i v i t i e s p a r t i c u l a r, b o t h th e e x p a n s i o n and o r g a n i z e d e d u c a t i o n o f P a r t y m em bership m ust come t o a v i r t u a l h a l t, and t h e r e c r u i t m e n t o f new members h a s p r o b a b l y b e e n made f a r more d i f f i c u l t b y t h e i n c r e a s i n g r e p r e s s i o n o f PKI, t h e g e n e r a l d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w ith and d e c r e a s in g im p o rtan ce o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s, and t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y o b v io u s h o s t i l i t y o f th e army, n a t i o n a l i s t, a n d Moslem l e a d e r s t o PKI, d e s p i t e S u k a r n o 's c o n t i n u i n g p a t r o n a g e o f t h e P a r t y. The s u c c e s s f u l w ork o f th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p i n b u i l d i n g a mass p a r t y i s i n s t r i k i n g c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e h a l f - h e a r t e d, l a c k a d a i s i c a l e f f o r t s made b y t h e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l le a d e rs in In d o n e sia. The PKI l e a d e r s have b e e n b u i l d i n g a v a s t P a r t y n e t w o r k, w in n in g and o r g a n i z i n g t h e a l l e g i a n c e o f m i l l i o n s o f members and s u p p o r t e r s, and t r a i n i n g a l a r g e body o f c a d r e s, a l l i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r an i r r e v e r s i b l e s e i z u r e o f p o w e r. At t h e === [PDF page 210] === same time, the leaders of the other parties have, in general, been unconcerned with the masses, except to use traditional civil and religious authorities to mobilize mass support when it was regrettably necessary for occasions such as elections* They have been preoccupied with the intrigue and manoeuvring within the political elite for government office which they are so eager to use for their own short-sighted interests* The successful construction of a large, united Party has been closely interwoven with the implementation of the second main task of the national united front policy, that is, attracting and organizing large sections of society* The means of attracting mass support have brought in the large Party membership, while the creation of a large, disciplined Party has permitted the organi zation of mass support reaching far beyond the confines of the Party* Solidarity Within PKI Under the Aidit Leadership Since the Aidit leadership assumed full control of the PKI in January 1951» there has been only one overt challenge, by Alimin in 1956, to the wisdom of the leadership’s policies. Ten years free from ’Mensheviks* ’Trotskyites’, ’Titoists* and other ’traitors’ puts PKI === [PDF page 211] === i n t o a s p e c i a l c a t e g o r y among com m unist p a r t i e s. s o l i d a r i t y re q u ire s e x p la n a tio n. T h is The f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n i s co n cern ed w ith o n ly th e c a d re s o f th e P a r ty, th a t is t h e c o m m itte e members and o t h e r f u n c t i o n a r i e s, from whom a n y r e v o l t a g a i n s t t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p w ould he e x p e c te d. I t i s c o n cern ed w ith th e re a so n s fo r th e s o l i d a r i t y t h a t e x i s t s among two g r o u p s o f c a d r e s: t h e m id d le a n d lo w e r c a d r e s, and t h e l e a d e r s a t th e n a t i o n a l le v e l. The s t r u c t u r e o f t h e P a r t y i s t h e f i r s t, a n d m ost o b v i o u s, f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e s o l i d a r i t y w i t h th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p t h a t i s f o u n d among t h e m id d le a n d lo w e r c a d r e s. A l l b u t f o u r o r f i v e th o u s a n d o f th e more t h a n 1-g- m i l l i o n p r e s e n t members o f t h e PKI h a v e e n t e r e d t h e P a r t y s i n c e J a n u a r y 195*1* The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a s t h e r e f o r e been a b le to u se th e te c h n iq u e o f d e m o c ra tic c e n tra lism to p r e v e n t th e r i s e o f e le m e n ts c o n s id e re d h o stile or p o te n tia lly h o s tile w i s h i n g t o e n t e r PKI i s to i t s e l f. Any p e r s o n f i r s t th o ro u g h ly s c r u t i n i z e d and t h e n m ust s p e n d a p e r i o d o f s i x m onths t o two y e a r s o f c a n d i d a c y, d e p e n d i n g upon h i s s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l I t a l s o means t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n on PKI i s made more d i f f i c u l t b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e v i r t u a l l y no i m p o r t a n t e x -c o m m u n is ts from t h e p o s t - 1 9 5 0 p e r i o d. === [PDF page 212] === 107 background, during which he is closely watched. Then, if he is accepted as a full member, his election to a committee post requires the endorsement of a higher committee. Should he become a full-time cadre, he can gain promotion only if he proves fully satisfactory to the leadership. Therefore, because the Aidit leadership has used great care in supervizing the promotion of committee members and full-time cadres, there has been little chance that elements hostile to the central leadership could rise far within the Party. At the same time as exercising this control, the central leadership has constantly stressed that 1there must be democratic life within the Party'. It has encouraged cadres and ordinary members to air grievances, criticisms and queries within the privacy of Party meetings, and has worked to remove them by patient explanations and education. Errors committed by cadres have been met, since 195*1» not by vituperation or expulsion but again by patient correction and education. This method has meant that any nascent opposition to the central leadership has been aired, discussed and removed D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan Peodalisme" (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism and Feudalism), HR, January 2, 1961. === [PDF page 213] === b e f o r e i t r e a c h e d t h e p o i n t o f d e ep d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n o r e x p u l s i o n s o r w i t h d r a w a l s from t h e P a r t y. The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a s e x e r t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t to p ro v id e p o l i t i c a l e d u c a tio n f o r i t s cadres. The p o l i t i c a l s c h o o l s a n d c o u r s e s have b e e n t a u g h t b y h i g h e r c a d r e s l o y a l t o th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p, a n d t h e y have u s e d o n l y m a t e r i a l s w h ic h th e l e a d e r s h i p c o n s i d e r s t o j u s t i f y i t s own p o l i c i e s a n d t a c t i c s. T h is e d u c a t i o n h a s b e e n d o u b l y e f f e c t i v e d u e t o th e s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o r i g i n s o f th e c a d r e s. Most c a d r e s e n t e r e d t h e P a r t y a f t e r t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p had won c o n t r o l, and have no f i r s t - h a n d e x p e rie n c e o f th e o ld e r i d e o l o g i c a l or p e r s o n a l d i s p u t e s w i t h i n PKI o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l commu n i s t m ovem ent. illite ra te Most c a d r e s e n t e r e d t h e P a r t y e i t h e r o r s e m i - l i t e r a t e and w i t h n o p r e v i o u s p o l i t i c a l e x p erien c e. T h e ir p o l i t i c a l e d u c a tio n has come s o l e l y from w hat m ig h t b e te r m e d A i d i t c h a n n e l s, a n d t h e y h a v e no a c c e s s t o com m unist l i t e r a t u r e o t h e r t h a n t h a t w h ic h th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p w r i t e s o r t r a n s l a t e s from f o r e i g n s o u r c e s. ^ T h e r e i s t h e d a n g e r f o r t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s, h o w e v e r, t h a t t h e more t h e y g i v e p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n t o t h e i r c a d r e s, a n d t h e more com m unist l i t e r a t u r e t h e y make a v a i l a b l e i n I n d o n e s i a n, t h e more t h e y i n c r e a s e th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a p o l i t i c a l l y s e l f - a s s u r e d body o f c a d r e s m ig h t be c r e a t e d fro m w h ic h t h e y c o u l d b e a t t a c k e d on M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t g r o u n d s. Such a d a n g e r w ould loom === [PDF page 214] === 109 A n o th e r s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s o l i d a r i t y o f t h e m id d le a n d lo w e r c a d r e s w i t h th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h ip has b e en th e a b i l i t y o f th e le a d e r s h ip t o d i s t r i b u t e r e w a r d s a n d p r o v i d e means f o r s t a t u s a d vancem ent to l o y a l P a r ty w o rk e rs. The p a t r o n a g e a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s i n c l u d e s p o s i t i o n s i n th e P a r t y i t s e l f and i n t h e many c o m m u n is t- le d mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, a l l o f w h ic h h a v e b e e n e x p a n d in g r a p i d l y and t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g w ide p r o m o ti o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s. i n c l u d e s a l s o p o s i t i o n s i n g o v e r n m e n ta l b o d i e s a t t h e n a t i o n a l and l o c a l l e v e l s, a n d i n karrrpong a s s o c i a t i o n s, e l e c t e d v i l l a g e g o v e r n m e n ts, and c o o p e r a t i v e s. The P a r t y l e a d e r s a l s o d e c i d e w h ic h c a d r e s s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e many d e l e g a t i o n s i n v i t e d t o t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e S o v ie t b lo c. l a r g e i f n a t i o n a l o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l im p e r a tiv e s f o r c e d an a l t e r a t i o n in th e P a r t y 's p r e s e n t o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y, o r i f a s p l i t o c c u rre d w ith in th e A id it le a d e r s h ip. 39 p e r so n s were e l e c t e d to p a r lia m e n t on th e PKI t i c k e t i n Septem ber 1955; 60 were e l e c t e d t o the C o n s titu e n t A ssem bly in December 1955* A fte r th e Septem ber 1955 e l e c t i o n s, PKI was a l l o c a t e d 624 s e a t s in th e p r o v in c ia l and l o c a l c o u n c i ls in Java a lo n e, and in th e 1957 l o c a l e l e c t i o n s in c r e a s e d t h i s to 973* S in c e 1956 PKI a n d /o r i t s mass o r g a n iz a t io n s have r e c e iv e d a number o f s e a t s in th e N a t io n a l C o u n c il, th e Supreme A d v iso r y C o u n c il, and th e N a tio n a l P la n n in g C o u n c il. B etw een 55 and- 75 members o f th e new, a p p o in te d p a r lia m e n t, i n s t a l l e d in June 1960, owe t h e i r p o s i t i o n s to membership in PKI or i t s mass o r g a n iz a t io n s. === [PDF page 215] === 200 The apparent validity of the policies and tactics of the Aidit leadership is also a factor which tends to maintain the cadres1 loyalty to the leadership. Under A i d i t fs direction, PKI has grown from insignificance to being by far the largest and best-organized party in the country and the leader of mass organizations embracing over 8 million members. Under his care, PKI has approached, in the eyes of its members, steadily closer to government power. Aidit is not only honoured in his own country by President Sukarno, but also abroad by the leaders of two of the world's most powerful countries, the Soviet Union and China. In such a situation it is not surprising that his leadership has been virtually unchallenged - especially if victory and the distribution of far greater rewards (in status if not in material wealth) appear imminent. An important factor which tends towards the soli darity of PKI as a whole, and of the cadres in particular, is the existence of a Party-centred community. We have seen how the Party can provide routes for status ad vancement. The Party and its mass organizations also provide a defence against hostile or potentially hostile forces, such as the landlord, the employer, the village head or a government official. They provide assistance in times of material need, such as when there are births, === [PDF page 216] === illness or death in the family. When cadres travel away from their homes, their families are looked after. The Party and its mass organizations give education, both political and basic literacy, they organize sports, provide kindergartens, establish cooperatives. They not only provide employment to many cadres but also come to furnish them with their circle of friends. In short, a community is established within the general community and the Aidit leadership has taken care that the cadres benefit most from the Party-centred community. Because serious opposition to the central leadership might lead to expulsion from the Party community, such opposition cannot be engaged in lightly. A final factor, and a nebulous one, is the tradition of authoritarianism that is strong within especially Javanese society, from which the great majority of PKI members are derived. One does not openly disagree with one's 'superiors*. The most one does is to give public agreement and then quietly disregard what the 'superiors' have said or ordered.1 This tradition operates in Prom the little the PKI leaders have published concerning opposition within the Party to their policies or instructions, it is clear that many of the lower committees give formal agreement to policies and then quietly shelve those they do not like. For example, some committees which opposed the concept of a mass party 'forgot' to implement the first membership drive, while some have === [PDF page 217] === f a v o u r o f o v e r t o b e d ie n c e t o t h e l e a d e r s o f a n y o r g a n i z a t i o n, a s lo n g a s th e l e a d e r s a r e s t i l l le a d e rs o r s u p e rio rs. r e c o g n iz e d a s B e ca u se th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a s s o f a r p ro v e d s u c c e s s f u l, i t r e t a i n s th e o v e r t l o y a l t y a n d o b e d ie n c e o f th e c a d r e s a s w e ll a s o f th e o r d i n a r y m em bers. B ut t h i s t r a d i t i o n d o e s n o t o p e r a t e among t h o s e who r e g a r d th e m s e lv e s a s n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s, an d th e phenom enon o f a d e c a d e o f s o l i d a r i t y among th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p r e q u i r e s a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e one a l r e a d y g iv e n a b o v e. Of th e f o u r t e e n members o f th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e i n J a n u a r y 1951 > o n ly t h r e e h a v e b e e n rem oved f o r p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s: Tan L in g D j i e, A lim in a n d Y /ikana. B ut a l l t h r e e w ere e l e c t e d on th e PKI l i s t t o th e C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem b ly i n D ecem ber 1 9 5 5 > an d W ikana was r e t u r n e d t o th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e i n S e p te m b e r 19 5 9. Tan L in g D jie f u l l y c o n f e s s e d h i s e r r o r s b y th e tim e o f th e f i f t h c o n g r e s s i n M arch 195 4 > W ikana was n o t p u b l i c l y c h a s t i s e d a f t e r 1 9 5 1 » and o n ly A lim in h a s p u b l i c l y o p p o se d th e c o n ti n u e d to b e slo w i n p ro m o tin g c a n d i d a t e members t o f u l l m em b ersh ip. Many c o m m itte e s w h ich w ere u n a b le to s e e t h e v a lu e o f women members d i d n o t o p e n ly q u e s t i o n o r o p p o se th e d i r e c t i v e to i n c r e a s e women m em b ersh ip; th e y q u i e t l y ig n o re d i t. S t i l l o t h e r c o m m itte e s h a v e i g n o r e d b u t n o t o p e n ly q u e s t i o n e d d i r e c t i v e s t o c o l l e c t m em b ersh ip d u e s o r to fo rw a rd s t i p u l a t e d p e r c e n t a g e s o f t h o s e c o l l e c t e d t o th e h i g h e r c o m m itte e s. === [PDF page 218] === Aidit leadership. Nor have any of the other members of the central committee, including those who have entered since 1951» opposed the Aidit leadership - either publicly or, if the lack of rumours is any evidence, within the Party. This is an unusual record of solidarity for the central leadership of any communist party. Apart from the factors discussed above as operating among the middle and lower cadres which also affect those above them, the explanation of this solidarity at the national level is to be found in an examination of the two groups that constitute the central leadership: the group which has entered the central leadership since January 1951» and the group which formed the central committee in 1951« The new group has been promoted by the Aidit leadership for ability but also for loyalty to the leadership. While the Party continues to grow stronger, and the leadership’s policies thereby vindicated, it is not to be expected that this group of hand-picked, mostly very young communists who have received their only political education from the Aidit leadership, will give rise to an opposition to the AiditLukman-Njoto triumvirate. The 1951 group in the central committee has also accepted the leadership of the triumvirate with very few === [PDF page 219] === public signs of resentment or disagreement. This is due to the personalities of the triumvirate, and especially to their success in guiding the Party. Aidit, Lukman and Njoto have maintained their unity, and only sparse and unsubstantiated anti-communist rumours have at any time indicated disagreement between them. Not only have these three worked together in a collective and amicable manner, but they have apparently succeeded in achieving the same result with the other members of the central leadership. But of far greater importance in maintaining the solidarity of the central leadership has been the success achieved under the guidance of the triumvirate. This success has strengthened the triumvirate’s position in four ways. First, it has increased the stature of the triumvirate vis-a-vis the other members of the central leadership. Second, with the enormous increase in the size of the Party, the overwhelming majority of members and non-central leaders know only the triumvirate as the legitimate Party leaders, have been subjected to their system of political education, and have no old loyalties or particular reasons for new ones towards the other members of the central leadership. Third, the unbroken and continuing success of the triumvirate’s policies and tactics removes both grounds for opposition or grounds === [PDF page 220] === t h a t m ig h t g a in much s u p p o r t w i t h i n th e P a r t y. F o u rth, when f i n a l s u c c e s s seem s c l o s e "because o f th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ’s g u id a n c e, why r i s k t o t a l d e f e a t "by a t t a c k i n g th e t r i u m v i r a t e? The o n ly p u b l i c c h a l l e n g e t o th e w isdom o f th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ’s p o l i c i e s h a s come from A lim in, th e o n ly v e t e r a n com m unist o f a n y n o te to s u r v i v e th e M adiun re b e llio n. W hile A i d i t was a t t e n d i n g th e t w e n t i e t h c o n g r e s s o f th e Com munist P a r t y o f th e S o v i e t U n io n, A lim in on M arch 2 6, 1956 c i r c u l a t e d among th e re m a in in g l e a d e r s o f th e PKI a s t a t e m e n t i n w h ic h he s t r o n g l y d e n o u n c e d th e l e a d e r s h i p o f th e P a r t y a n d th e p o l i c i e s i t was p u r s u i n g. A lim in c la im e d t h a t an ’o p p o r t u n i s t g ro u p o r s o f t g r o u p ’ h a d ta k e n o v e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e P a r t y, an d h a d th e n p r a c t i s e d c l a s s c o l l a b o r a t i o n, s t i f l e d d em o cracy w i t h i n th e P a r t y, n e g l e c t e d th e r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e o l o g i c a l e d u c a ti o n o f i t s m em bers, and b r o u g h t th e P a r t y t o th e l e v e l o f ’an o r d i n a r y b o u r g e o i s p a r t y t h a t no l o n g e r te a c h e s c la s s c o n s c io u s n e s s ’. The P a r t y h a d grow n q u a n t i t a t i v e l y, b u t was now weak i n q u a l i t y. e x p re sse d A lim in ’d i s a p p o in t m e n t, c o n c e rn and a n x i e t y ’ a t th e A lim in ’s s t a t e m e n t i s g iv e n i n f u l l i n HR, J u l y 1956. === [PDF page 221] === 206 'increasingly unclear12 political leadership given by the Party, Finally, he warned of the great danger that the 'ideological and political deviation’ being followed by the Party would not bring the Party to victory. cleanse the Party, he pleaded for 'The broadest selfcriticism and criticism... freely or without fear... and against anyone’. Alimin's criticisms would have been comprehensible to the old guard of PKI who had studied Marxist-Leninist literature widely and which still remembered the militant extremism that led to the 1926 communist rebellion in Indonesia, But almost all the old guard had died or had been killed or had left the Party. For the reasons that have been outlined above, Alimin's statement fell on barren ground and received no overt support within the Party. After confession of error on May 10, 1956, he was again obstinate and left the Party on August 8, 1956. In November 1958 and September 1959, although he had re-established contact with the Party headquarters, Alimin published booklets which conflicted with Party policy, Aidit, Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan, pp.97-8; HR, August 9, 1955* Alimin, Peladjaran Karl Marx (The Teachings of Karl Marx), Djakarta, 1958, 15 n.; Perdjuangan Klas Karl Marx (The Class Struggle of Karl Marx), Djakarta, 1959, 12 p. === [PDF page 222] === 20? but which produced no ripple within the Party. When I met him in May 1960 he was old, senile, ailing, lonely, no longer visited by Party members and obsessed with what he considered to be the Party leadership’s flouting of the elementary principles of Marxism-Leninism. confirmed that his opposition to the Aidit leadership evoked no response in the Party. The solitary nature of his opposition only illustrated the solidarity among the post-1951 leadership. Prom the available evidence, it appears that while the Aidit-Lukman-Njoto triumvirate retains its solidarity, and while the triumvirate’s policies and tactics lead to continued PKI advances, there is little possibility that the solidarity that has existed for a decade among Party cadres will break down. A break-down might occur only if there is a drastic change in the Indonesian or international political scene requiring a correspondingly drastic re-orientation in Party policies and tactics. At that point, which could be occasioned, for example, by the death of Sukarno, severe government repression of PKI, the development of a revolutionary mood, or a militant line by Moscow or Peking against the neutralist, bourgeois leaders of the newly-independent countries, disunity might be the result === [PDF page 223] === 208 An 'Illegal PKI'? PKI claims to have maintained, an 'illegal PKI' from the end of the communist rebellion of 1926-7 to the return of Musso in August 1948« With the outbreak of the Madiun rebellion in September 1948 and the Dutch occupation of the remaining Republican territory in Java in December, PKI was forced to go underground again. An illegal PKI* was retained throughout 1950 to guide the legal PKI, the Indonesian Labour Party and the Socialist Party. In other words, an 'illegal PKI* had existed for all but one month of the 25 years preceding the January 1951 change in the PKI leadership. Since then there have been reports and rumours of two kinds of illegal PKI: active guerrilla bands, and secret groups which prepare for an eventual revolutionary situation. The purpose of the following paragraphs is to examine the scanty available evidence in order to estimate whether the Aidit leadership has undertaken the organization of one kind or both kinds of illegal PKI. There is no doubt that armed bands were active in East Java during the first half of 1951* PKI, 40 Tahun PKI, pp.31-51. Peith and === [PDF page 224] === 209 Kahin describe them as PKI-connected or PKI-finaneed.^ These groups in East Java mostly ceased operations before the end of 1951» "but an armed force in Central Java, known as the MMC, as late as 1955* carried out armed attacks until Kahin goes so far as to claim that in 1952 the PKI leaders concentrated their armed bands into the MMC area ’and gave intensive military and political training to youths brought in from East and Central Java for short periods on a rotating basis’. Some slight confirmation that the Aidit leadership was at least contemplating guerrilla warfare (and Aidit and Lukman had returned in July 1950 after eighteen months in China and with the Viet Minh) is given by the translation by PKI late in 1950 and early in 1951 of two foreign works on guerrilla warfare.^ Herbert Peith, ’’Indonesian Politics, 1949-1957: the Decline of Representative Government” (Cornell University, Ph.D. thesis, 1961), p.327; Kahin, ’’Indonesian Politics” in Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West, p.140. MMC stands for Merbabu-Merapi Complex. Merbabu and Merapi are two adjacent volcanos in Central Java. George McTuman Kahin, ’’Indonesia” in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments of Asia, Ithaca, New York, 1958» p.557> note 25. The anti-communist newspaper Pedoman on January 14* 1955 also mentioned rumours that the MMC area was being used to train military cadres. Mao Tse-tung’s ’’Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War” was serialized in Bintang Merah and also published in booklet form; Vo Nguyen Giap’s What is the Liberation Army? was published in booklet form. These === [PDF page 225] === 210 The com m unist l e a d e r s h av e d e n ie d p u b l i c l y a n y c o n n e c t i o n w ith th e MMC, an d a s e a r l y a s May 1951 b la m e d th e i m p e r i a l i s t s f o r th e t e r r o r i s m w hich was l a b e l l e d com m unist b y th e a n ti- c o m m u n is ts. i n an a r t i c l e F u r th e r m o r e, i n te n d e d f o r i n t e r n a l P a r t y c o n su m p tio n o n l y, th e PKI l e a d e r s i n J u l y 1951 condem ned th e p l u n d e r i n g o f p e a s a n t p r o p e r t y i n th e MMC a re a.-^ T h ese p r o t e s t a t i o n s o f in n o c e n c e do n o t o f th e m s e lv e s p ro v e in n o c e n c e. H ow ever, n o n -c o m m u n ists I sp o k e w ith i n th e M e rb ab u -M era p i a r e a v ie w e d th e MMC a s re m n a n ts o f th e M adiun r e b e l s who h e ld o u t f o r a w h ile u n t i l t h e i r l e a d e r s were k i l l e d b y th e arm y o r p o l i c e. And i t w o u ld b e s u r p r i s i n g i f PKI c o u ld have b r o u g h t many y o u th s two w orks w ere made a v a i l a b l e i n I n d o n e s ia n a t a tim e when v e r y few f o r e i g n com m unist m a t e r i a l s h ad b e e n tra n s la te d. H ow ever, a s t h e m i l i t a r y p h a se o f th e r e v o l u t i o n h a d j u s t b e e n c o m p le te d, t h e r e was s t i l l c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t i n m a t e r i a l s on g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e. F u r th e r m o r e, a s th e p r e f a c e to M ao's w ork i n b o o k l e t form i n d i c a t e s, th e young PKI l e a d e r s may have e x p e c te d t h a t I n d o n e s ia w ould have to ta k e u p arm s a g a i n i n o r d e r t o r i d h e r s e l f o f th e s e m i - c o l o n i a l s t a t u s im p o se d b y th e Round T a b le C o n fe re n c e a g r e e m e n t. S e e, f o r e x a m p le, I c h t i s a r G erak an T a n i (S u rv e y o f th e P e a s a n t M ovem ent), A p r i l 1 9 5 1 » p p » 2 - 3; a n d HR, November 1 9, 1 954. PK I, " P r a k te k G a n g s te r A m e rik a ” (A m erican G a n g s te r P r a c t i c e s ), BM, May 1 5 -J u n e 1, 1951, p p.2 7 6 - 7 • "M a sa ala h T a n i d i I n d o n e s i a ” (The P e a s a n t Q u e s tio n i n I n d o n e s i a ), BM, Ju n e 1 5 - J u l y 1, 1951> p.3 0 4. === [PDF page 226] === i n t o th e MMC a r e a, t r a i n e d them t h e r e, a n d th e n r e t u r n e d them to t h e i r home a r e a s, w i t h o u t d e t e c t i o n b y th e a u t h o r i t i e s o r a n ti - c o m m u n is ts. From th e l i m i t e d in f o r m a ti o n a v a i l a b l e t o me, i t w o u ld a p p e a r t h a t th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p d i d n o t e n c o u ra g e th e f o r m a tio n o f PKI arm ed b a n d s. Those t h a t e x i s t e d i n E a s t J a v a i n th e f i r s t h a l f o f 1951 q u i c k l y c e a s e d o p e r a tio n s, th o u g h i t i s n o t known i f t h i s was on i n s t r u c t i o n fro m th e P a r t y l e a d e r s o r a s a r e s u l t o f m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t th em. p ro b le m. The MMC i s a s e p a r a t e an d s o f a r u n s o lv e d I t s l e a d e r s w ere com m unists from b e f o r e th e M adiun r e b e l l i o n who f l e d t o th e m o u n ta in s when th e re b e llio n f a ile d. T hey a p p a r e n t l y g a in e d many a d h e r e n t s fro m p o o r p e a s a n t s and d e m o b iliz e d t r o o p s, a n d o p e r a t e d more a s b a n d i t s t h a n th e c r e a t o r s o f a s m a ll l i b e r a t i o n b ase. Due t o arm y and p o l i c e a t t a c k s t h e MMC m o s tly c e a s e d o p e r a t i o n s b y th e e n d o f 1952, an d c o m p le te ly b y th e end o f 19 5 5 As y e t I have o b t a i n e d no c o n c r e t e e v id e n c e o f a command l i n k b e tw e e n t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p and th e MMC l e a d e r s, o r o f K a h in * s r e p o r t t h a t th e MMC a r e a was u s e d to t r a i n nu m b ers o f com m unist y o u th s from o th e r a re a s in p o l i t i c a l and m ilita r y m a tte rs. When v iew ed i n th e w id e r c o n t e x t o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y w h ich th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p p u r s u e d from a b o u t t h e e n d o f 1951, i t seem s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t === [PDF page 227] === t h e PKI l e a d e r s w o u ld h a v e e n c o u r a g e d t h e MMC. The a d v a n t a g e s were t o o s m a l l, t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s t o o g r e a t * The MMC a r e a was r e s t r i c t e d, a n d c o u l d h a v e b e e n, and w a s, e r a d i c a t e d b y r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l numbers o f t r o o p s * F u r t h e r m o r e, t h e PKI l e a d e r s c o u l d n o t r i s k t h e e x p o s u r e o f t h e i r p a r t i n t h e MMC t e r r o r i s m, f o r t h i s m ig h t h a v e n e g a t e d t h e p a i n s t a k i n g work t o c r e a t e t h e image o f PKI a s r e s p e c t a b l e, d e m o c r a c y - l o v i n g, a n t i - t e r r o r i s t * * 12 The s e c o n d k i n d o f ’i l l e g a l PKI* t h a t has b e e n p e r s i s t e n t l y ru m o u r e d s i n c e J a n u a r y 1951 i s t h a t o f a n e t w o r k o f s e c r e t g r o u p s p r e p a r i n g f o r an e v e n t u a l rev o lu tio n ary s itu a tio n. S e v e r a l n e w s p a p e r r e p o r t s seem to c o n firm the rumours. I n November 1954» s i x t e e n PKI members fro m Temanggung, C e n t r a l J a v a, were g a o l e d f o r r e c r u i t i n g a s e c r e t s e c t i o n o f t h e P a r t y which was t o organize a ’l i b e r a t i o n army* t o b e u s e d i f PKI f a r e d b a d l y i n t h e 1955 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s * The D j a k a r t a w e e k l y n e w s p a p e r " G e l e d e k " r e p o r t e d on May 3 1, 1959 t h a t t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o f a ’PKI-Malam' ( N i g h t PKI) h a d b e e n r a i d e d b y t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n Rembang, C e n t r a l J a v a, and a For a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h i s e f f o r t a t im a g e - b u ild in g, see below, pp*240-56. Keng P o, J a n u a r y 1 3, 1 9 5 5; Pedoman, J a n u a r y 1 4 # 1955. === [PDF page 228] === 213 nu m b er o f w eapons s e i z e d. PKI-Malam was r e p o r t e d t o h a v e b r a n c h e s i n C e n t r a l and E a s t J a v a and t o be p r e p a r i n g f o r a r e b e l l i o n t o e s t a b l i s h a p e o p l e ’s dem ocracy. The J o g j a k a r t a n e w s p a p e r " N a s i o n a l " c a r r i e d a r e p o r t on A p r i l 11, 1960 o f t h e a r r e s t and im p r is o n m e n t i n P a t i ( i n c i d e n t a l l y o n l y some 25 m i l e s from Rembang) o f s ix p erso n s, i n c l u d i n g f i v e members o f t h e P a t i r e p r e - s e n t a t i v e c o u n c i l, f o r h o ld in g a s u b v e r s iv e m e e tin g. M a t e r i a l s c o n f i s c a t e d a t t h e m e e ti n g i n c l u d e d n o t e s and l e t t e r s on,fHow PKI c a n c a r r y o u t an arm ed movement i n 1 9 6 0 ”, a n d a " 3 - d a y p l a n t o r e p l a c e t h e b u p a t i and pamong p r a d j a ". ^ Many f a c t o r s m u st b e c o n s i d e r e d i n a t t e m p t i n g to u n r a v e l t h e ru m o u rs a n d r e p o r t s o f a n i l l e g a l PKI t h a t i s p re p a rin g fo r e v en tu al r e b e llio n. F irst, i t is lo g ic a l t h a t t h e PKI l e a d e r s s h o u l d have p r e p a r e d p l a n s f o r t h e e v e n t u a l i t y o f b e i n g f o r c e d u n d e r g r o u n d b y g o vernm ent r e p r e s s i o n, and t h a t i t h a s a t l e a s t a s k e l e t o n u n d e r g r o u n d o r g a n i z a t i o n e v e n i f i t s p r o j e c t e d members a r e a t G e l e d e k, May 31* 1959* N a s i o n a l, A p r i l 11, 1960. B u p a ti i s th e t i t l e g iv e n to th e c i v i l s e r v a n t in ch arg e o f a kali) upa t e n; pamong p r a d j a i s t h e name g i v e n t o t h e members o f th e r u r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c i v i l s e r v i c e. === [PDF page 229] === present working above ground* Second, the Sukiman government was unable to substantiate the charge of plotting to overthrow the government on which it arrested 2,000 communists and communist-supporters in August 1951* Nor have later governments or even anti-communists revealed concrete evidence to support such a charge against PKI. Third, the creation of a PKI-Malam by PKI before legal political activity was repressed would destroy much of the image PKI has built itself as an essential part of the national united front policy* the other hand, if the possibility of severe repression seemed great the PKI leaders might consider the risk of establishing an underground PKI worth taking* But such a possibility did not loom large from ASS'] until about the beginning of 1960, with the doubtful exception of a brief period after the installation of the Masjumi-led Burhanudin Harahap cabinet on August 12, 1955* Fourth, the PKI-Malam as reported in "Geledek" could be comprised of members of the small groups of extremist, self-styled communists such as belong to Ibnu Pama's Acoma. And, fifth, it is possible that PKI contains extremists, militant elements, who are dissatisfied with the national united front policy and have, without the sanction of the central leadership, established their own minor under ground organizations* === [PDF page 230] === 215 In s h o r t, th e re i s no c o n c r e t e e v id e n c e t h a t t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p h a s o r g a n iz e d an u n d e rg ro u n d s e c t i o n o f th e P a r t y w h ich i s p r e p a r i n g f o r th e e v e n t u a l i t y o f re v o lu tio n. R a t h e r, th e l e a d e r s h i p w i l l h a v e made p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r im p o r ta n t c a d r e s and f o r a s k e l e t o n f o r c e o f m id d le an d lo w e r c a d r e s t o go u n d e rg ro u n d i n th e e v e n t o f s e v e r e g o v e rn m e n t r e p r e s s i o n. R e p o r ts o f PK I- Malam a n d s i m i l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s p r o b a b ly ste m from th e a c tiv itie s o f n o n -P K I e x tre m e l e f t i s t s o r o f PKI members a c t i n g w it h o u t th e a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f th e c e n t r a l P a r t y le a d e rs h ip. III. COMMUNIST FUNDS IN INDONESIA PKI i s i n d i s p u t e d l y th e w e a l t h i e s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t y in In d o n e s ia. I t c a n a f f o r d t o m a in ta in more f u l l - t i m e o r g a n i z e r s, p u b l i s h more l i t e r a t u r e, and ru n more c o s t l y e l e c t i o n c am p aig n s th a n a n y o t h e r p a r t y. th is s e c tio n is The p u rp o s e o f to ex am ine th e l i m i t e d a v a i l a b l e m a t e r i a l c o n c e r n in g th e P K I 's incom e an d e x p e n d i t u r e. The incom e an d e x p e n d i tu r e o f PKI i n t h i s a n a l y s i s r e f e r s n o t o n ly t o th e P a r t y b u t a l s o to th e many c o m m u n is t-le d m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, b e c a u s e t o g e t h e r th e y c o n s t i t u t e a f i n a n c i a l a s w e ll a s p o l i t i c a l u n i t. === [PDF page 231] === 216 PKI h a s b e e n u n a b l e t o t a p t h o s e g o v e rn m e n t s o u r c e s w h ic h have p r o v i d e d m ost income f o r a t l e a s t PNI and NU o f th e o th e r m ajo r p a r t i e s # The o p e n l y a c k n o w le d g e d s o u r c e s o f incom e f o r t h e P a r t y and i t s mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s f a l l i n t o f i v e c a t e g o r i e s: P a r t y m em bership f e e s, t h e m em b ersh ip f e e s o f t h e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, d o n a t i o n s, s p e c i a l f u n d - r a i s i n g c a m p a ig n s, and t h e wages o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n g o v e r n m e n ta l b o d i e s # U nder t h e A p r i l 1951 PKI c o n s t i t u t i o n, m em bership f e e s w ere f i x e d a t a b o u t 0#33 p e r c e n t o f incom e f o r t h e lo w e r incom e b r a c k e t s, a b o u t 0.7 5 p e r c e n t f o r mediumh i g h o n e s, and a minimum o f 1^ p e r c e n t f o r h i g h e r incom es# T h is r a t e was r e d u c e d i n t h e S e p te m b e r 1959 c o n s t i t u t i o n t o 0.2 p e r c e n t f o r members i n t h e lo w e r in c o m e s, and a minimum o f 1 p e r c e n t f o r t h o s e i n t h e h i g h e r in c o m e s. The e n t r a n c e f e e h a s r e m a in e d u n c h a n g e d a s t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f one m o n th!s m em bership fees. I f t h e m em b ersh ip f e e s w ere c o l l e c t e d r e g u l a r l y and f u l l y, t h e y w ould be an enorm ous s o u r c e o f incom e, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r c la im e d P a r t y m em bership p a s s e d t h e one m i l l i o n mark b y t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1956. V a r io u s p i e c e s o f e v i d e n c e w o u ld i n d i c a t e, h o w e v e r, t h a t t h e paym ent o f PKI, K o n s t i t u s i PKI, 1951, P P.5 3 -U. Lukraan, T e n ta n g K o n s t i t u s i P K I, p. 9 0. === [PDF page 232] === fees is at a low rate and that the fees collected by the lower Party organizations are not forwarded in stipulated percentages to the higher committees. An article by Anwar Sanusi in October 1956 shed light on the efficacy of the collection of membership fees in West Java. Sanusi stated that the work of the West Java provincial committee was not being performed as well as it should, because not enough money was coming Of the 22 section committees in West Java at that time: only a few send money to the provincial committee every month or occasionally. The average amount that enters each month from the section committees does not reach 20 per cent of the amount that is really needed for the varied work of the provincial committee to be done well. He added that: Prom some kabupatens and large towns, subscription money does not reach the higher committees, especially the provincial committee and central committee or does so only in very small amounts, because... it is used up by the lower committees. An article the following month by Isk of the Djakarta Raja committee reported that 'the Party in Amir Anwar Sanusi, "Sedikit tentang Penarikan Iuran dan Penjetorannja” (A Little about the Collection and Forwarding of Membership Fees), KP, October 1956, pp.8-12. Isk, "Mendjadikan Soal Keuangan Masaalah bagi Seluruh Partai” (Make the Problem of Finances a Matter for the Whole Party), KP, November 1956, pp.24-7. === [PDF page 233] === 218 Djakarta Raja experiences almost the same situation1 as that described by Sanusi. Isk complained of the belief, widely held within PKI, that members and candidate members need not pay membership and entrance fees because the Party could always receive money from people outside the Party. He also complained that some section committees and subsection committees considered it unimportant to forward membership fees to the higher committees. In July 1957 and May 1958 Party leaders referred to continuing deficiencies in the collection of membership fees, and when I was in Java in 1959 and 1960 Party cadres indicated to me that the inflow of fees was still low. The articles on West Java and Djakarta Raja touched upon a problem which has been serious in PKI: that the lower committees which collect the fees keep more than their share and pass on little or nothing to the higher committees. In order to eliminate this *wastage*, the central committee issued an order at about the end of July 1956 that the 10 per cent of membership fees Aidit, "Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan", HR, July 5> 1957; "Untuk Melantjarkan Pemasukan Uang Iuran" (To Speed Up the Entry of Membership Pees), KP, May 1958, p.67* === [PDF page 234] === 219 allotted for the central committee henceforth be forwarded directly by the subsection to the central committee instead of trickling upwards via the section committees and provincial committees as formerly. order was not implemented fully. This A central committee circular to all subsection committees in April 1958 stated clearly that not all subsections were fulfilling the earlier instruction. The above information gives evidence of a certain weakness in Party discipline, but also suggests that the higher Party committees were not receiving from membership fees sufficient funds to operate properly. The second source of funds for the communist movement in Indonesia is the membership fees of the communist-led mass organizations which claimed, in mid-1960, a combined membership of over 8 millions, I spoke with leaders of the trade union federation, SOBSI, the peasant organi zation, BTI, the youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat, the women’s organization, Gerwani, and the village officials1 association, PPDI, and all complained of the impossibility of collecting more than a tiny percentage of membership Anwar Sanusi, ’’Sedikit Tentang Penarikan Iuran”, KP, October 1956, pp.11-12. Aidit, "Untuk Melantjarkan Pemasukan”, KP, May 1958, P.67. === [PDF page 235] === 220 fees. There is also some published information on SOBSI, BTI and Gerwani as well as personal information from Pemuda Rakjat which supports the generalization of their national leaders. In June 1956, SOBSI published a booklet which gave some statistics on the income of the communist-led trade unions. According to this booklet, in 1955 the SOBSI national council received only about 12.5 per cent of the subscriptions it should have according to the number of members. Pew of the national councils of the member unions received more than 30 per cent. The notable exception was the railway workers ' union which achieved 75 per cent because membership fees were deducted from the pay packet before it reached members. The booklet further commented that 'a deficit in the budget is still a common phenomenon’. Two basic causes of the lack of funds were listed: that fees were not collected on a large scale, and that those collected were not forwarded properly to the higher committees. These are the same complaints expressed by the PKI leadership, but within the mass organizations both problems seem to be more acute. SOBSI planned to raise the entry of membership SOBSI, Mengatasi Keuangan dalam Serikat-Buruh (Overcoming the Problem of Finances in the Trade Unions), Djakarta, 1956, 29 p. === [PDF page 236] === 221 fees to 50 per cent during 1958» but the amount that did reach the national council was only 10 per cent of what it should have been based on membership figures*1 - a decrease compared with 1955« The BTI leaders have been less open in their discussion of the organization’s finances. An article in May 1957, however, mentioned that the entry of fees was only 1-1i per cent of what it should have been, and also that the lower committees were keeping an unfair share of those fees that were collected. The Gerwani national council in June 1956 complained that the entry of membership fees in the preceding year had been only about 11 per cent of which it should have been, and that the percentage was steadily declining,^ Prom April to June 1956 the total income for the national council was only 296 rupiahs - or about a month’s wage for a labourer. The national council revealed to the third Gerwani Moh. Munir, Pedoman Pen.jelesaian Plan Organisasi 1958 (Survey of the Implementation of the 1958 Plan of Organization), Djakarta, 1959, p*29* Djadi, ’’Sekali Lagi tentang Keuangan” (Once Again about Finances), ST, May 1957, PP*6, 15* Gerwani, Meluaskan Aksi-Aksi untuk Memperkuat Tuntutan Hak-Hak Wanita-Anak-Anak dan Perdamaian (Extending Actions to Strengthen the Demand for the Rights of Women and Children and for Peace), Djakarta, 1956, p*34* === [PDF page 237] === OOO c o n g r e s s i n D ecem ber 1957 t h a t i n t h e 31 m onths from A p r i l 1955 to O c to b e r 1957 i t s a v e r a g e m o n th ly incom e fro m e n tr a n c e and m em b ersh ip f e e s was 702 r u p i a h s, w h ile t h e e x p e n s e s o f th e c o u n c i l w ere o v e r 8,0 0 0 r u p i a h s p e r m o n th. At th e tim e o f t h e c o n g r e s s, t h e n a t i o n a l c o u n c il had a d e b t o f o v e r 6 0, 0 0 0 r u p ia h s. w ere a g a i n tw o: The c a u s e s ’s h y n e s s * i n c o l l e c t i n g f e e s, an d th e r e f u s a l o f lo w e r c o m m itte e s t o f o r w a r d c o l l e c t e d f e e s to t h e h i g h e r c o m m itte e s i n th e p r e s c r i b e d p e r c e n t a g e s. One o f t h e m ost i l l u m i n a t i n g p i e c e s o f i n f o r m a ti o n on th e in f lo w o f m em b ersh ip f e e s i n t o th e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s was g iv e n i n A p r i l 1 9 6 0 i n a n i n t e r v i e w w ith a Pemuda R a k ja t l e a d e r i n J o g j a k a r t a. He s a i d t h a t a lt h o u g h th e m em bership f e e o f Pemuda R a k ja t was o n ly r u p i a h p e r m onth, a t th e m ost o n ly 5 p e r c e n t was c o lle c te d. Most o f t h i s 5 p e r c e n t was u se d b y t h e lo w e r c o m m itte e s, n one r e a c h i n g th e f i v e k a b u p a te n - l e v e l c o m m is s a r ia ts in th e r e g i o n. He a d d e d t h a t n o n e o f th e a b o u t 2 0 Pemuda R a k ja t f u l l - t i m e r s i n t h e J o g j a k a r t a a r e a w ere f in a n c e d fro m m em b ersh ip f e e s. I d id n o t a sk him t o e l a b o r a t e on w hat o t h e r s o u r c e s w ere t a p p e d. G e rw a n i, L e b ih G ia t M e lu ask an G erak a n u n tu k T e r l a k s a n a n j a Piagam H ak-H ak W an ita I n d o n e s ia (More A c tiv e i n E x te n d in g th e Movement f o r th e Im p le m e n ta tio n o f th e C h a r t e r o f I n d o n e s ia n Women’s R i g h t s ), D j a k a r t a, === [PDF page 238] === Prom the available evidence it would appear certain that none of the communist-led mass organizations receive even an important percentage of their operational costs from entrance and membership fees. The third acknowledged source of funds for the communist movement is donations. The 1951 PKI consti tution lists among the sources of Party finances, 'contributions from non-Party persons and groups’. This the September 1959 constitution re-worded as 'non-binding contributions'. Similar clauses are contained in the constitutions of the mass organizations. . Leaders of Pemuda Rakjat in East Java said in interview on May 9, 1960 that their four province-level full-timers relied on money and other help from 'sympathizers' outside the organization. But although the constitutions and members of the PKI and its mass organizations acknowledge contributions from sources outside their organizations, these sources and the amounts received from them have not been disclosed. It is on these points that the interested non-communists do most speculation. The fourth acknowledged source of funds, and an important one, is that of special fund-raising campaigns. PKI, Konstitusi PKI, 1951, p.53. Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi PKI, p.90. === [PDF page 239] === Two kinds of fund-raising methods are used, although any one campaign may use both: the direct collection of money, and the collection of materials that can be converted into money. Examples of the direct collection of money include the campaigns to finance the March 1954 Party congress, to build a permanent headquarters for the central committee, and to build PKI!s house of culture. order to finance the 1954 congress, Aidit ordered every Party member and candidate member to contribute at least one rupiah. On December 11, 1953> the central com mittee secretariat issued a further order that each Party member and candidate member give three rupiahs during a 3i month period in order to finance a central committee building. The central committee decided in August 1956 to collect funds for a PKI house of culture, and later claimed that four million rupiahs had been collected.-^ Prom the published information, however, it is not possible to ascertain how much of the funds raised in the campaigns were from Party members or should be HR, November 17> 1953« HR, December 14, 1953* The new building was opened on August 19, 1954* RI, September-October 1959» p.33* === [PDF page 240] === p l a c e d i n th e c a t e g o r y o f d o n a t i o n s from n o n - P a r t y p e rso n s. B ut i f t h e P a r t y h a s fo u n d g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n p e r s u a d i n g i t s members t o p a y m em bership f e e s o r i t s l o w e r c o m m itte e s t o f o r w a r d t h e c o l l e c t e d f e e s t o h i g h e r c o m m i t t e e s, i t seem s f a i r t o assum e t h a t s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e f a c e d i n th e s p e c i a l f u n d - r a i s i n g c a m p a ig n s, a n d t h a t d o n a t i o n s fro m o u t s i d e t h e P a r t y c o n s t i t u t e a s i z e a b l e e le m e n t. As p a r t o f i t s cam paign to r a i s e f u n d s f o r t h e 1957 l o c a l e l e c t i o n s, a t l e a s t th e E a s t J a v a p r o v i n c i a l c o m m itte e o b l i g e d e a c h member a n d c a n d i d a t e member t o c o l l e c t money o r p r o d u c e, s u c h as r i c e, b a n a n a s, c o c o n u t s a n d c a s s a v a, from p e r s o n s o u t s i d e th e P a rty.^ Most PKI members and s y m p a t h i z e r s a r e p o o r and u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g to g i v e money t o t h e P a r t y. Fund r a i s i n g h a s t h e r e f o r e h a d t o t a k e on s p e c i a l f o r m s. o r d e r t o h e l p f i n a n c e t h e 1955 and 1957 e l e c t i o n cam p a i g n s, members c o l l e c t e d o l d s a c k s, o i l b o t t l e s, o l d new spapers, in k b o t t l e s, sta m p s, o ld c l o t h e s, o ld t i n s as w e l l a s p r o d u c e; and g r o u p s w ere o r g a n i z e d t o c a t c h f i s h a n d g r e e n f r o g s, c o l l e c t s a n d and s t o n e s from t h e r i v e r s, R u s l a n, " P e r a n a n A n g g o t a /T ja l o n - A n g g o t a d a la m G-erakan Dana P e m i l i h a n DPRD" (The R o le o f Members a n d C a n d id a te Members i n F i n a n c i n g t h e L o c a l E l e c t i o n s ), KP, A p r i l 1957, p p. 59-61. === [PDF page 241] === and g a th e r banana l e a v e s. The r e s u l t s o f t h e i r la b o u r w ere s o l d to th e b e n e f i t o f th e P a rty.^ The PKI a l s o i n s t i t u t e d th e ’P a r ty s h e e p ’ ’P a r ty t r e e ’, ’P a rty h e n ’, e t c. sy stem under which P a r ty members p la n t a f r u i t t r e e o r c o co n u t t r e e or r a i s e a b i r d o r anim al fo r th e P a r ty, and g iv e the produce to th e P a r ty fo r s a le ^ - a sy stem a l s o u sed by BTI.^ The b e s t- d o c u m e n te d PKI f u n d - r a i s i n g c am p aig n was t h a t f o r th e S e p te m b e r 1959 n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s,^ - th o u g h a g a in i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o a s c e r t a i n how much was r a i s e d fro m th e P a r t y an d how much from o u t s i d e. N ot o n ly w ere 3 i m i l l i o n r u p i a h s i n c a s h c o l l e c t e d, b u t th e d e l e g a t e s w ere p r o v i s i o n e d, a t l e a s t i n p a r t, b y p ro d u c e g a t h e r e d "P engum pulkan Ponds P e m ilih a n Umum" ( C o l l e c t G e n e ra l E l e c t i o n F u n d s ), KP, M arch 19 5 5, p.3 8; S. R idw an, "P ekan Sokongan S u k a r e l a " (A Week o f V o lu n ta r y S u p p o r t ), KP, May 1, 1955) P*72; R u s la n, " P e ra n a n A n g g o ta ”, KP, A p r i l 1957, p.6 1. A id it, "Ubah Im bangan K e k u a ta n ”, HR, J u l y 5, 1957« H a r t o j o, "L uaskan A k s i-A k s i kaum T a n i u n tu k Mengembangkan K e k u a ta n P r o g r e s i f 1' (E x te n d P e a s a n t A c tio n s i n O rd e r to D e v e lo p th e P r o g r e s s i v e F o r c e ), ST, O c to b e r 1957, p.1 1. J u s u f A d j i t o r o p, "K ongres ja n g d id u k u n g R a k ja t" (A C o n g re ss S u p p o r te d b y th e P e o p l e ), BM, S e p te m b e r-O c to b e r 1 959, p p. 3 7 0 - 1. === [PDF page 242] === by the Party and its mass organizations, 1 When the congress was concluded, over 2\ million rupiahs surplus remained, which was then used to extend the central committee building and help finance the Party house of culture. Each of the communist-led mass organizations also holds special fund-raising campaigns for conferences and congresses, and, from their own evidence, find it far easier to obtain money for specific and only occasional purposes than for regular membership fees. These special campaigns, however, are not always successful. For example, the BTI leaders complained in March 1957 that the debts incurred for its September 1953 congress were still not settled. And in August 1960, the PKI leadership sent out urgent instructions to all Party committees to assist Pemuda Rakjat in raising funds for its forthcoming congress.^ The produce collected consisted of over 5 tons of rice, 10 quintals of sugar, 5 quintals of coffee, 3 0 kilograms of tea, 234 kilograms of salted fish, over 1,000 coconuts 10 quintals of cassava, more than one ton of vegetables, and 20,000 cigarettes. The surplus congress funds which went towards the construction of the house of culture may have been included in the four million rupiahs that was claimed to have been collected for the house. Editorial, ST, March 1957» p«1* Mimeographed circular, August 1960. === [PDF page 243] === ooc A fifth source of funds for the communist movement in Indonesia is the wages of the PKI and mass organi zation representatives in parliament, in the Constituent Assembly, in local representative councils, and now in the Supreme Advisory Council, the National Planning Council, and the People’s Consultative Assembly.*1 All PKI members who hold positions in the name of the Party must hand their wages to the Party and receive in return an honorarium.2 Members of local representative councils are paid according to the number of meetings they attend, but average about 400 to 500 rupiahs per month. This amount is the bare minimum required outside Djakarta to maintain a full-time middle or lower cadre. Members of the councils’ executive committees earn much more. Because council work takes only a small amount of time, PKI full-time cadres who are also members of councils are in fact financed by the councils, and those council members with other jobs can hand over all their council wages to the Party. See footnote 1, on p.199> for the number of communist representatives in parliament, the Constituent Assembly, and the local representative councils. The number in the Supreme Advisory Council and the National Planning Council is low. The number in the People's Consultative Assembly is unknown, but includes all members of parliament plus others. PKI, Konstitusi, 1954* (third edition), p.64; Lukman Tentang Konstitusi PKI, p.90. === [PDF page 244] === The three main fields of expenditure for the commu nist movement in Indonesia are: the routine work of running the Party and the mass organizations, special activities such as congresses, conferences and the celebration of national and international anniversaries, and election campaigns. One of the major items in the cost of the routine work of the Party and its mass organizations is the full time personnel. The size of this personnel is a closely guarded secret, and any estimates are necessarily tentative in the extreme. In September 1959» PKI claimed to have in Java alone an organization in 18,722 villages and 1,430 ketjamatans. At higher levels, the Party constitution provides for section committees in each kabupaten and municipality, of which there are 99 in Java and 212 in all Indonesia, In Djakarta Raja in mid-1957 there were 19 section committees, of Java each have several. and the larger towns At the time of the sixth congress in September 1959» there were about 22 major district and island committees. The number of fulltimers in the different committees varies widely from area to area. In some areas each village committee has Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.3» === [PDF page 245] === 230 a full-timer, but in others even the section committees are without one. It would probably be correct to say that there are several thousand full-time Party workers, including cadres and typists. Parallel to the Party full-timers, and often inter woven with them because cadres are often full-timers for the Party and one or more mass organizations, are the full-time workers of the mass organizations, numbering probably several thousands in Java. I was told by many non-communists wherever I travelled in Java that a PKI full-time worker at the village or urban neighbourhood level received between 500 and 1,000 rupiahs per month. Observation of the clothes and homes of some of the medium-level full-timers of the Party and its mass organizations showed that they were far below middle class standards, and indicated a monthly income of perhaps 500 rupiahs. To the cost of the fulltimers1 wages must also be added their travel expenses and also the cost of maintaining and equipping offices. The total must be at least two million rupiahs per month, Compton, writing from East Java in April 1956, repeated reports that branch chairmen of PKI were receiving 1,000 rupiahs per month, activists in any field a basic salary of 500 rupiahs; Boyd R. Compton, Red Surabaja, Institute of Current World Affairs Report, New York, 1956, pp.6, 8. He commented that 'It appears that no other Indonesian party can afford to pay out so much to its important lower-level workers.* === [PDF page 246] === remembering that some full-time Party workers receive wages from the governmental bodies. Within what might be termed routine expenditure is the financing of national and local schools and courses. Some indication of the cost incurred in the field of education is given by examples from SOBSI. At the beginning of January 1957» the SOBSI national council announced that a campaign was to be completed by the end of February to collect the 1 to 2 million rupiahs necessary to open SOBSI’s cadre schools. By September, however, the campaign had brought in only 308,722 rupiahs.^ in 1958 and 1959 the SOBSI headquarters held twelve shifts of the national school, training in all about 300 cadres who stayed in Djakarta for the month’s duration of a shift.^ The cost of the national school was not disclosed, but the total cost of the education program for SOBSI alone is indicated by figures for The extent of formal cadre training in PKI has been mentioned above; that in the communist-led mass organi zations is given below in the sections on the various organizations. BB, January 9, 1957> P*5* SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen Konferensi Nasional SOBSI (1957) (Documents of the SOBSI National Conference, 1957)» Djakarta, 1958, p.97* Information from conversation with a member of the SOBSI headquarters staff. === [PDF page 247] === 232 East Java. From 1958 to May 1960, the East Java SOBSI provincial council organized 7 cadre courses of one month*s duration. The cost averaged 25,000 rupiahs for each course (or 833 rupiahs per course member), of which the Ministry of Labour paid 10 per cent. These scraps of information give some indication of how great must be the total cost of the schools and courses organized by PKI and its mass organizations. A second major item of expenditure is publishing. PKI now publishes a vast array of periodicals, booklets and pamphlets besides the daily newspaper. Most of the mass organizations publish at least a periodical and occasional booklets and pamphlets. What evidence there is on the financing of the publications indicates that income trails far behind costs. The PKI monthly "Bintang Me rah” was forced to cease operations from December 1951 to August 1952 with a debt of 20,000 rupiahs; and in January 1953 the central committee published a list of thirty Party committees with debts to "Bintang Merah" and thirty-six to "PKI-Buletin".^ Information from interviews with members of the East Java SOBSI headquarters. The students taking part in schools are lodged together in hostels so that they can more easily participate in study and discussion groups and undertake self-study. PKI-B, March 7, 1952, pp.6-7; February 10, 1953*p.19. === [PDF page 248] === 233 The peace committee's periodical "Damai" (Peace) incurred a deficit of 8,077 rupiahs in the first five months of existence from November 1952 to March 1953» with total income only 650 rupiahs. The national council of SOBSI revealed that from January to October 1955 it had expended 100,603 rupiahs on publications but received only 60,731 rupiahs from them, while the national council of its estate workers' union had spent 105,772 rupiahs and received 29*381. It also revealed that during 1955 the national council of its railway workers* union on average each month had spent 27»000 rupiahs and received 17,000 rupiahs for publications. Before January 1955 the average income of the SOBSI national council for publi cations had been only 10 per cent of the expenditure. In March 1957 the income for the SOBSI periodical "Bendera Buruh" was only lj.0 per cent of its cost.^ December 1957 Gerwani declared that it had a debt of 'tens of thousands of rupiahs' to the printers.^ Pemuda Rakjat was forced by financial difficulties to cease the publication of its chief periodical. Damai, (April 1953), year 1, no.5-6, p.16. SOBSI, Mengatasi Keuangan, p.18. BB, March 13, 1957, p.4. G-erwani, Lebih Giat, p.77* === [PDF page 249] === 23* Only two f i g u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e a s t o t h e c o s t o f t h e v a r i o u s c o n g r e s s e s o r c o n f e r e n c e s: BTI e s t i m a t e d b e f o r e i t s S e p t e m b e r *1957 c o n g r e s s t h a t i t w ould c o s t 2 0 0, 0 0 0 r u p i a h s, a nd t h e S e p t e m b e r 1959 PKI c o n g r e s s c o s t 5 0 0, 0 0 0 rupiahs. The communist movement i n I n d o n e s i a c e l e b r a t e s w i t h much show s e v e r a l n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n n i v e r s a r i e s, i n c l u d i n g May Day, May 2 0 ( t h e Day o f N a t i o n a l A w a k e n in g ), May 23 ( f o u n d a t i o n o f P K I ), A u g u s t 17 ( n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e d a y ) an d November 12 ( t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e 1926 c omm unist r e b e l l i o n ). The c o s t o f t h e c e l e b r a t i o n s h a s n o t b e e n p u b l i s h e d, b u t must be c o n s i d e r a b l e f o r th e o f t e n l a v i s h d e c o r a t i o n s and receptions. No f i g u r e s h a v e b e e n p u b l i s h e d on t h e c o s t t o PKI o f t h e 1955 a n d 1957 e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n s. I n 1955 PKI s p e n t f a r more t h a n a n y o t h e r p a r t y on s u c h a s l a r g e b i l l b o a r d s a n d s m a l l c a r d s sh o w in g t h e P a r t y sy m b o l, on t r a v e l e x p e n s e s f o r t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s, on c a r n i v a l - l i k e ‘p e o p l e d f e s t i v a l s ’ and th e c e l e b r a t i o n o f a n n i v e r s a r i e s, on t h e p r i n t i n g o f p a m p h l e t s and b r o c h u r e s, a n d on t h e l a r g e - s c a l e use o f f u l l - t i m e p a id e le c t i o n s workers. E d i t o r i a l, ST, March 1957» p. 1; A d j i t o r o p, ’’Kongres j a n g d i d u k u n g R a k j a t ”, BM, S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1959» p«371* P e i t h, The I n d o n e s i a n E l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 5 5 » p p. 2 7 - 8. === [PDF page 250] === 235 The Socialist Party leader, Sjahrir, estimated that PKI probably spent 200 million rupiahs on the 1955 campaigns. PKI spent even more proportionately than the other parties in the 1957 local elections. One astute non-communist in Jogjakarta told me that he had heard that PKI spent five million rupiahs in the Jogjakarta Special District an area with only 976,948 of the 27,130,661 voters in Java. Although the evidence is sketchy, it seems that PKI must have spent at least 200 million rupiahs on the 1955 and 1957 election campaigns. This figure might be reduced if one takes into account the large amount of voluntary and free labour that could be mobilized by the PKI and its mass organizations. But it remains a substantial figure and one which, in the opinion of non communist Indonesians and foreign observers, could not possibly be extracted from members of the Party and its mass organizations who are for the most part poor peasants and town dwellers for whom 6 to 12 rupiahs was a d a y ’s wage. After the above examination of the limited infor mation on the sources of income and items of expenditure Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon’s Seed, New York, 1959» p.247. === [PDF page 251] === 236 of PKI and its mass organizations, it would appear correct to state that the Indonesian communists rely on ’contributions from non-Party persons and groups’, on ’non-binding contributions’, for a sizeable proportion of their income. The other sources do not appear to provide even half of what is expended. these non-Party donors? Who, then, are Visible, but limited, assistance is given by the Soviet Union, China and other Soviet bloc countries whose books, periodicals and pamphlets, usually in Indonesian, are sold in all communist bookshops. Presumably the bookshops are given a good profit margin on this literature. Another way the Soviet bloc countries assist the Indonesian communists is by financing delegations to visit the Soviet bloc* But the main source of non-Party contributions is the more than 3 million Chinese living in Indonesia. Kahin states that PKI taps the Chinese business community for ’substantial funds’.^ Some Chinese pay willingly, he writes, but: undoubtedly they usually do so because of persuasion or pressure from the Chinese embassy or pressure from the Communist-controlled labor unions and the threat of retaliatory action in case of noncompliance. Kahin, ’’Indonesia” in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments of Asia, p.559* === [PDF page 252] === 237 Peith believes that the greater part of the PKIfs 1955 election campaign funds came: from individual Chinese businessmen resident in Indonesia, and very possibly also from overseas Communist governments through their consular and business representatives in Djakarta.' Doak Barnett reported in 1955 the generally-held belief in Indonesia that the contributions from Chinese businessmen 'make up a significant source of its /PKI’§7 ample political funds'.^ In Djakarta, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, and Surabaja, the information I received from non-communists confirmed what Kahin, Peith and Barnett had written. The Chinese business community in Indonesia is large, far wealthier than the native Indonesians, but it is treated as alien by Indonesians in general, discriminated against by the Indonesian government and4would be unable to obtain police protection against, say, extortionary threats by a trade union. At the same time Chinese youngsters are full of enthusiasm for the new China and communism. It would be most surprising if PKI did not exploit this source of funds. The non-communist parties Peith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955> p.27. A. Doak Barnett, A Choice of Nationality: Overseas Chinese in Indonesia, American Universities12 Field Staff Reports, New York, 1955> p.26. === [PDF page 253] === 238 have been financed, in general, from the proceeds of government corruption and from large individual donations, and are therefore in no position to criticize PKI for tapping the Chinese businessmen. I know of no concrete evidence of PKI*s receiving funds from the communist embassies, legations and trade missions. Peith, however, did report that in 1952 the Chinese embassy gave both money and literature to the Party; and in i960 a Russian Intourist agent was arrested on the charge of smuggling several million rupiahs into Indonesia for purposes unknown. To summarize, PKI and its mass organizations incur, for routine and occasional matters, an expenditure far exceeding the expenditure of any other political party in Indonesia. But although PKI and its mass organizations have succeeded in extracting from their members some membership fees and perhaps more funds for special purposes, the total income from these sources is far below total expenditures. The deficit is made up by donors, mostly non-Party persons as few communists are wealthy. PKI cannot tap government sources of wealth, Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, 1958, pp.37-8. === [PDF page 254] === 23^ and it seems reasonable to believe that a major part of Indonesian communist funds is derived from the large Chinese business community and also possibly from the foreign communist missions in Indonesia* === [PDF page 255] === PART THREE: BUILDING MASS SUPPORT === [PDF page 256] === PART THREE BUILDING MASS SUPPORT THE CULTIVATION OF GENERAL APPEALS As the Aidit leadership embarked on the implemen tation of the national united front policy, it hoped to win mass support primarily among the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. Winning this support would depend ultimately on the Party’s ability to represent effectively the specific material interest of these groups, and much of the Party’s efforts, especially through its mass organizations, have been directed towards such representation. But the Aidit leadership had the immediate task of making the Party generally acceptable to its potential supporters. It had to create the favourable image of PKI as a nationalist, anti-colonial party, as a party sympathetic to religion, as a re sponsible party, opposed to the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives, and as the resolute defender of democracy. That PKI lacked this image at the beginning of 1951 was partly a result of the Madiun rebellion, in which the communists had attacked the 2 40 === [PDF page 257] === 241 c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t d u r i n g th e w ar a g a i n s t t h e D u tc h, an d i n w h ich t h e y h a d m u rd e re d many s a n t r i s. Prom 1951 o n, much o f PK I*s p ro p a g a n d a a n d a c t i o n s w ere d i r e c t e d s u c c e s s f u l l y t o b u i l d i n g a f a v o u r a b l e im a g e, w ith o u t w h ic h i t w ould h a v e b e e n v e r y d i f f i c u l t, p r o b a b ly i m p o s s i b l e, t o w in m ass s u p p o r t a n d, from t h i s s u p p o r t, to b u ild a la r g e P a rty. W ith o u t s u c h an im a g e, i t w o u ld a l s o h a v e b e e n i m p o s s ib le t o a c c o m p lis h t h e o t h e r m ain t a s k o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t: a l l i a n c e w ith th e non co m m u n ist p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s. The f i r s t t a s k o f t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p was to d i s p r o v e th e a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t t h e M adiun r e b e l l i o n h a d b een an a n t i - n a t i o n a l i n s u r r e c t io n. In S e p te m b e r 1950» s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e r e t u r n o f A i d i t and Lukraan t o th e P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p, PKI p u b l i s h e d a n a c c o u n t o f M adiun w h ic h s e t t h e l i n e s f o r a new, p a t r i o t i c in te rp re ta tio n. d e n ie d t h a t a r i v a l R e p u b lic a n g o v ern m en t h a d b e e n fo rm ed a t M adiun, t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l f l a g h a d b e e n lo w e re d an d t h e n a t i o n a l an th em b a n n e d. The 'a f f a i r * h a d becom e b lo o d y o n ly when P r e s i d e n t S u k a rn o o r d e r e d th e e l i m i n a t i o n o f th e co m m unists an d t h e i r a l l i e s, who t h e n f o u g h t i n s e l f d e fe n c e. I n l a t e r y e a r s, r e f in e m e n ts w ere a d d ed t o S in P o, S e p te m b e r 2 6, 1950. === [PDF page 258] === the new version of the 'affair'. At Madiun anti imperialists and true patriots were mercilessly butchered by those ready to treat with the imperialist enemy; American imperialists had planned the provocation which forced the heroes of Madiun to fight in self defence; and the real Indonesian instigators of the provocation turned out to be Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir, and not Sukarno, whose name was omitted from post-1951 versions of the 'affair'. The evidence suggests that the PKI leaders were pleading their case before a largely sympathetic public* It was easy to establish the Party's anti-Dutch character, which had been demonstrated on many occasions since 1920. Many non-communist political leaders believed that there certainly had been provocation before the rebellion began. And most Indonesians, especially those in the groups PKI For the major pronouncements of the Aldit leadership on the Madiun rebellion, see "Keterangan CC PKI tentang Peristiwa Madiun" (PKI Central Committee Statement on the Madiun Affair), Sin P o, February 10, 1951; Mirajadi, "Tiga Tahun Provokasi Madiun" (Three Years Since the Madiun Provocation), BM, August-September 1951> PP«39-52; PKI, Buku Putih ten tang Peristiwa Madiun (White Book on the Madiun Affair), Djakarta, 1953»' 32 p *; D.N. Aidit, Aidlt Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun (Aidit Accuses the Madiun Affair;, Djakarta, 1955» 64 p.; D.N. Aidit, Konfrontasi Peristiwa Madiun (1948); Peristiwa Sumatera (1956) (Confrontation with the Madiun Affair, 1948; the Sumatran Affair, 1956). Djakarta, 1957, 47 p.; PKI, PKI 40 Tahun (PKI 40 Years), Djakarta, 1960, pp.56-8. === [PDF page 259] === has sought to attract, had little access to news at the time of the rebellion, so that, except among the more santri population, the anti-communist version of the rebellion would not have been heard or, if heard, not given much credence. It is important to note that the Madiun area is still a communist stronghold, that is, that the peasants and workers in the area of the rebellion itself did not consider the insurrection. ’affair* an anti-national But the communist leaders still felt the need to present their version of Madiun in a manner that would free them from any taint of anti-national activity. The revamping of Madiun was the logical prelude to the Aidit leadership’s attempt to portray PKI as the most nationalist of parties. After the revolution against the Dutch, which ended only in December 1949» the level of Indonesian nationalism ran high. Most politicallyaware Indonesians still considered their country’s sovereignty to be restricted or threatened by the remnants of Dutch power, whether in the form of economic power or in the form of the continued occupation of West Irian. PKI was obliged to identify itself with the popular mood. In a speech of May 23» 1952, Aidit declared: For the communists, service to the Party, to the national interest, to the interests of the homeland and to its people is one and indivisible. If a communist does not serve the interests of the nation, of the homeland === [PDF page 260] === a n d o f t h e p e o p l e, i t m eans t h a t he d o e s n o t s e r v e th e i n t e r e s t s o f th e P a r t y and t h a t he i s n o t a good com m unist... E v e ry com m unist i s a p a t r i o t, an d i f t h e r e i s a p a t r i o t who i s n o t a com m unist th e n t h e d o o r o f PKI i s a lw a y s o p en t o r e c e i v e him a s a m em ber. As p o s i t i v e p r o o f o f i t s p a t r i o t i s m, PKI h a s p a i d warm r e s p e c t to t h e sy m b o ls o f I n d o n e s ia n n a t i o n a l i s m: th e n a t i o n a l a n th e m, t h e n a t i o n a l f l a g, th e n a t i o n a l la n g u a g e, n a t i o n a l i s t a n n i v e r s a r i e s, th e h o n o u rin g o f n a tio n a lis t h e ro e s, P a n tja s ila, an d th e P r o c la m a tio n R e p u b lic fo u n d e d on A u g u st 17> 1945« B e g in n in g w ith t h e c e l e b r a t i o n o f N a t i o n a l A w akening Day on May 2 0, 1952, PKI j o i n e d w i t h o t h e r p o l i t i c a l g ro u p s i n o r g a n i z i n g D.N. A i d i t, Menempuh D ja la n R a k ja t (A lo n g t h e P e o p le * s R o a d ), ( f o u r t h e d i t i o n ), D j a k a r t a, 1954» p.3 2. P a n t j a s i l a was r e v e a l e d b y S u k a rn o on J u n e 1, 1945 a s th e f i v e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f I n d o n e s ia n n a t i o n a l i s m: n a t i o n a l i s m, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g o v e rn m e n t, p r o s p e r i t y, a n d b e l i e f i n God th e A lm ig h ty. S e e, f o r e x a m p le, A i d i t * s c l a i m, made d u r i n g th e cam p a ig n f o r t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem b ly e l e c t i o n s o f D ecem ber 1955* t h a t: PKI i n t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem bly w i l l s t a u n c h l y d e f e n d a l l e le m e n ts o f th e P r o c la m a tio n R e p u b lic t h a t b i n d th e g r e a t e r p a r t o f t h e p e o p le. T h ese e l e m e n t s, among o t h e r s, a r e: th e n a t i o n a l f l a g M e r a h - P u tih, t h e n a t i o n a l a n th em I n d o n e s i a R a ja, th e I n d o n e s ia n la n g u a g e a s t h e la n g u a g e o f u n i t y... an d th e R e p u b lic * s m o tto " U n ity i n D i v e r s i t y ". D.N. A i d i t, P e r ta h a n k a n R e p u b lik P ro k la m a s i 1945.* (D e fen d th e 1945 P r o c l a m a t i o n R e p u b lic.* ), D j a k a r t a, 1955> P»32. === [PDF page 261] === nationalist celebrations.^ This cooperation has been maintained in succeeding years* In keeping with their new-found nationalism, the PKI leaders during 1952 gradually reduced their attacks on President Sukarno* This change was inspired partly by the recognition that for the great majority of at least the Javanese, Sukarno enjoyed great personal popularity as a nationalist hero; and partly by the realization that, unlike Vice-President Hatta, he was not avowedly anti-communist but was, if anything, opposed to the extreme anti-communist forces. By the time of the 1955 election campaigns, PKI was even attempting to link the name of the great nationalist leader with itself* The need to effect the link increased after 1955 as Sukarno*s power increased and as he became the major barrier to an assumption of power by the largely anti communist army leaders. The Aidit leadership, despite its preference for denunciation of American imperialism, publicly accepted the popular estimate of what was the major imperialist threat to the country. Although attacks on the American Herbert Peith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, 1955, pp.86-7. === [PDF page 262] === imperialists were not halted, Aidit conceded in March 1954 that: The first enemy of the Indonesian people, from the viewpoint of its great power in several spheres, particularly in the economic sphere, is Dutch imperialism. Therefore the national united front must be aimed in the first place at the liquidation of Dutch imperialism, and not at the liqui dation of all foreign imperialism in Indonesia.^ Even as late as September 1959, after all Dutch enter prises had been seized by the Indonesian government, Aidit, while describing American imperialism as fthe most dangerous enemy of the Indonesian people12, nevertheless conceded to Indonesian nationalist feeling that 'Dutch imperialism still constitutes the first enemy of the Indonesian people’• The communists 1 anti-Western position has stood them in good stead in their effort to demonstrate their nationalist fervour. For example, they attacked the Round Table Conference agreement from the first as a grave restriction of Indonesia's sovereignty, they accused the imperialists of aiding the anti-Republic D.N. Aidit, Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia (The Indonesian Road to People’s Democracy)7 Djakarta, 1955, p.38. D.N. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi dan Kabinet Gotong Rojong (For Democracy and a Mutual Cooperation Cabinet), Djakarta, 1959, pp«13, 12. === [PDF page 263] === Moslem rebels in West Java and Atjeh, and they heatedly denounced the alleged American, SEATO, and Kuomintang assistance to the PRRI-Permesta rebels as an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government and replace it by one subservient to the imperialists* interests. To prove to Indonesians in general that PKI shared Indonesian nationalism was a relatively easy task, but the Aidit leadership was faced with the much more complex problem of proving to the religious that PKI was sympa thetic to religion. As early as May 1951, Aidit, speaking in Bogor, a heavily Moslem town, stressed that under communism religion would not be suppressed but would thrive, and that PKI certainly would not refuse to admit religious people into the Party.*1 Prom 1952 onwards, PKI and its mass organizations have publicized annually their greetings for Idul Pitri, the Moslem feast marking the end of the Ramadan fast. At the same time, Sin Po, May 12, 1951* PKI has received help from both the USSR and China in its efforts to dispel Moslem fears about persecution of religion under communism. Many delegations consisting of or including Indonesian Moslems have been invited to both countries. Their impressions have been almost always favourable and have been widely broadcast by PKI. For an example of how well the Indonesian Moslem delegations are treated, see V. Jefremov, Delegasi Ulama Indonesia dl Sovjet Uni (An Indonesian Ulama Delegation in the Soviet Union), Djakarta, 1957» 48 p* Both the Soviet Union and China publish periodicals in Indonesian which occasionally contain articles purporting to portray the free life of Islam under communism. === [PDF page 264] === 248 the PKI leaders have had to make it clear that they opposed Masjumi and the Darul Islam rebels not because they were Moslem, but because they were anti-national and serving the interests of Indonesia^ external enemies. In August 1953, for example, after PKI had attacked Masjumi and the Darul Islam rebels during the period of discussions that preceded the formation of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, Aidit explained: The accusation that PKIfs anti-DI ^Darul Islam7 policy is the same as anti-Islam is a very dirty and a very stupid slander. In its statements PKI does not urge the disturbance of the Moslem religion, nor does it even oppose Masjumi people. PKI always urges its members to hold high freedom of religion, including the Moslem religion, and to cooperate with the members of all parties including Masjumi... Contrary to Masjumi, PKI clearly and resolutely defends freedom of religion, including the Moslem religion, because PKIfs anti-DI policy is a policy of fighting the groups that dishonour religion.^ During the 1955 general election campaign, in particular, Aidit urged Party members to explain that PKI attacked Masjumi because it was anti-communist, not because it was a Moslem party.“ PKI-B, August 25, 1953, p*138. D.N. Aidit, Untuk Kemenangan Front Nasional dalam Pemilihan Umum (For the Victory of the National Front in the^~Geriei^l ElQctions), Djakarta, 1955, p.23. === [PDF page 265] === 249 Besides proclaiming that they were not hostile to religion, the communists actively sought to win the support of religious people* It was obvious that their efforts to do so would be hampered until they could win the neutrality, or sympathy, of the kiajis, the Islamic religious teachers who held great authority among the Moslem masses* There are some indications that PKI went out of its way to influence kiajis* For example, a member of the South Kalimantan provincial committee has described in an article how PKI in his region set about winning over the local kiajis* Party workers would send communist literature to those kiajis who liked to read, they would deferentially discuss political subjects with kiajis who liked to talk and discuss, they would join the kiajis’ religious instruction classes and there politely but skilfully propound the virtues of PKI, and they would participate in social work of a religious nature (such as cleaning graves and repairing mosques and prayer houses) in order to consolidate the kiajis * sympathy for PKI. In August 1957» it was claimed that such patient work was producing results among the kiajis. ’They are beginning to say that PKI is good, and that this Amar Hanafiah, ’’Pengalaman Tjara Menarik Simpati KiajiKiaji” (Experience in Methods of Winning the Sympathy of Kiajis), KP, May-August 1957» pp.69-72. === [PDF page 266] === 250 or that religious party is not good and only uses religion as a mask, and so on* * Some were already disposed to vote for PKI.12 The Christian minority, which remains small and tightly integrated, has not been an object of PKI recruitment to any extent, although occasional efforts have been made to prove that 'the aims and teachings of the communists are in accord with the Bible's directives’.^ But the Party leaders remain alert to the need to appear sympathetic to religion, especially Islam. That the Aidit leadership is even willing to claim that work for the Party is the implementation of God’s law, is exemplified by the following quotation from a speech made by a communist kia jl in the Constituent Assembly. The speech was in reply to one made by a Masjumi member. To the honourable Mr H. Moh. Thaha, from my own kampong in Solo, I express my thanks for his urging me to return to Islam. But Mr H. Moh. Thaha himself knows that I have never left Islam. And if the honourable gentleman urges me to return to Islam, in the meaning of to carry out God’s law in political practice, then according to my own experience of 33 years in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), that is the only place to practice the law of God in its political meaning, and not anywhere else. When the honourable gentleman truly wishes to carry out God's law and to devote himself wholeheartedly to good works, then let him do it with me within the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Prom the speech of K.H. Achmad Dasuki Siradj, in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (Concerning the Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia), vol.II, Djakarta, no date, p.336. HR, December 9, 1955 === [PDF page 267] === Lukm an, s p e a k i n g a t t h e s i x t h PKI c o n g r e s s i n S e p te m b e r 1959» re m in d e d d e l e g a t e s t h a t w i t h o u t a c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e on th e r e l i g i o u s q u e s t i o n, 't h e P a r t y 's u n i t e d f r o n t w o rk w ould f a c e m ore d i f f i c u l t i e s an d o b s t a c l e s an d c o u ld ev en e x p e rie n c e d e f e a t s The sam e s k i l l w h ic h t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p em ployed i n p r e s e n t i n g PKI a s a s t a u n c h l y p a t r i o t i c p a r t y a n d one s y m p a th e tic to w a rd s r e l i g i o n, w as a l s o em ployed t o co n v ey t h e im p r e s s io n t h a t PKI was a f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e p a r t y, r e a d y to t a k e i t s p l a c e i n th e b u i l d i n g o f a u n i t e d and n a t i o n a l i s t In d o n e s ia. The P a r t y l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n c o n c e rn e d t o s t r e s s t h a t PKI p l a c e s t h e n a t i o n a l good b e fo re i t s own i n t e r e s t s a s a p a r t y, an d t h a t i t t h e r e f o r e sh u n s th e v o l u n t a r y u s e o f f o r c e a s a p o l i t i c a l in s t r u m e n t an d w elcom es t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to w ork w ith th e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s, ev en w i t h th e 'r e a c t i o n a r y * to do so w o u ld b e n e f i t th e n a t i o n. p a rtie s i f T h is p r o f e s s e d c o n c e rn f o r t h e good o f t h e p e o p le a s a w hole h a s b e e n th e b a s i s o f t h e P a r t y 's a p p e a ls f o r a l l - e m b r a c i n g g o v e rn m e n ts o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y. e x a m p le, PKI a l t e r e d i t s I n J u n e 1955» f o r e l e c t i o n g o a l from a p e o p l e 's d em o c rac y t o a n a t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n g o v e rn m e n t w h ic h w ould M.H. Lukm an, Ten t a n g K o n st i t u s i PKI (C o n c e rn in g P K I 's C o n s t i t u t i o n ), D j a k a r t a, 1959» p p.2 5 - 6. === [PDF page 268] === be su p p o r te d b y * a ll d e m o c r a tic p a r t i e s and g r o u p s, e s p e c i a l l y n a t i o n a l i s t, Moslem and communist p a r t ie s * and w h ich would r e p r e s e n t *the i n t e r e s t s o f th e m a jo r ity o f th e p e o p le and o f a l l th e r e v o lu t io n a r y c l a s s e s *. I t h a s b e e n e a s i e r f o r th e PKI le a d e r s t o c r e a te th e im age o f PKI a s *the p a r ty o f th e p e o p le * b e c a u se th e P a r ty has b e e n e x c lu d e d from c a b in e t o f f i c e s i n c e 1948. They have b e e n a b le t o ta k e up p o p u la r demands w ith o u t th e w orry o f h a v in g t o im plem ent them. As th e s e l f - a p p o in te d spokesm an o f the p e o p l e, PKI has advanced su ch demands a s r e d u c tio n s i n fo o d p r i c e s, g e n e r a l in c r e a s e s in w a g es, th e a d eq u a te p r o v is io n o f b a s i c consum er a r t i c l e s, in c r e a s e d e d u c a t io n a l and h e a lt h f a c i l i t i e s, and a p r o g r e s s i v e t a x a t io n sy s te m d i r e c t e d a g a in s t f o r e i g n c o m p a n ie s. I t i s im p o r ta n t t o n o te th a t ea ch demand h a s b e e n p r e s e n te d a s r e a s o n a b le, and o f t e n has b een accom p an ied b y an o u t l i n e o f how i t may be m et. a n o th er l e v e l, PKI has p u t forw ard p r o p o s a ls f o r im p rovin g In d o n e s ia * s econom ic p o l i c i e s. In March 1957» to ta k e an ex a m p le, th e econom ic d ep a rtm en t o f th e PKI c e n t r a l com m it t e e p u b lis h e d a stu d y to show how econom ic d evelop m en t T I, June 27, 1955. H erb ert P e i t h, The I n d o n e s ia n E l e c t i o n s o f 1955» I t h a c a, New Y ork, 1957, P*15* === [PDF page 269] === 253 could be undertaken without calling on private foreign capital. In November 1957» Runturambi of SOBSI and Aidit took part in a national consultative conference on reconstruction, while since the creation in August 1959 of the National Planning Council, to which communist representatives were appointed, PKI has taken an important part in the formulation of long-term national economic policies. The demands and proposals put forward by PKI are contrived proof that PKI has the interests of the whole people at heart, that it promotes these interests in a responsible manner, not seeking merely to embarrass governments and ministers, and that PKI is ready and able to accept responsibility in national administration. In short, PKI wants to be respected as a responsible and restrained party, imbued with a strong sense of the welfare of the people and of the nation as a whole. The Aidit leadership has been at pains to explain that PKI, providing it was not attacked first, would PKI, "Construct a National Economy Without New Foreign Investments", RI, March 1957, pp*28-33* Runturambifs speech in the conference has been published in booklet form as Runturambi, Politik Pembangunan Sekarang (Development Policy Now), Djakarta, 1957, 22 p, Aidit r8 speech has been published as D.N. Aidit, "Let Us Carry Out Planned Construction of Our Country", RI, December 1957, pp*27-30* === [PDF page 270] === never resort to violence to realize its goals. As the leaders pledged in 1951» when several thousand communists and communist sympathizers had been arrested on an (unsubstantiated) charge of plotting to overthrow the government: In the struggle to realize their political convictions, the communists will not use force while the ruling class still leaves the peaceful, the parliamentary way open. there is the use of force, the spilling of blood, a civil war, it will not be the communists who start them but the ruling class itself.12 These sentiments have been repeated down to the present, and the PKI leaders have even eschewed the use of force Sobromalisi, ’’Tentang Perebutan Kekuasaan" (Concerning Seizure of Power), BM, August-September 1951» pp.10-15. For example, when, after the 1956 Soviet Communist Party congress, the PKI central committee considered the question of whether Indonesia could peacefully make the transition to a pe o p l e ’s democracy, the conclusion reached echoed the 1951 article: it is a possibility, and one which we must strive with all our strength to make reality. Thus, if it depends on the communists, the best way, the ideal way, for transition to the system of people’s democratic power •»• is the way of peace, the parliamentary way. Thus, if it depends on the communists, the road of peace will be chosen because the communists certainly are not murderers. Quoted in D.N. Aidit, ’’Revolusi Oktober dan Rakjat-Rakjat Timur” (The October Revolution and the Peoples of the East), BM, October-Noveraber 1957» p*381« === [PDF page 271] === 255 in disputes between labour and management, peasants and landlords, and between itself and other political groups* 1 Indeed, the Aidit leadership has tried not only to present PKI as a party willing to work within a parliamentary regime, but also as a protagonist of that regime, in fact, as a tireless defender of democracy. In October 1951, for example, PKI claimed that it was 'the foremost defender of parliament's prestige, and always will be so', while in May 1953» Aidit declared that: the communist parties and the democratic parties can gather the masses around them only if the Party honours the banner of bourgeois democratic freedom that has been discarded by the bourgeoisie.^ During 1951 PKI was one of the groups most vocal in calling for full democratic freedoms, and at the time of the October 17» 1952 'affair', it defended the parlia mentary system as being 'far better than the fascist military dictatorship system'.^ The defence of There are a few exceptions to this generalization, but very few. Prom the speech of S. Utarjo on October 29» 1951» Risalah Perundingan 1951 (Indonesian Parliamentary Debates, 1951 )> vol.XV, p.7324« D.N. Aidit, Menudju Indonesia Baru (Towards a New Indonesia), (second edition), Djakarta, 1955» P*44* HR, October 18, 1952 === [PDF page 272] === democratic liberties was an important theme in PKI propaganda during the 1955 election campaigns. Since 1956, with the rise of Sukarno and the army to a dominant political position, there has been a gradual constriction of democratic liberties and of the power of parliament. But PKI could not spring militantly to the defence of democracy because the Party was dependent upon its alliance with Sukarno in order to prevent s t e m anti communist measures that the army was believed to advocate. PKI has protested, however, against the most flagrant infringements of democratic rights, and if its protests are more subdued than in previous years, they are still far more numerous and courageous than the protests expressed by PNI and NU leaders. As a result, many millions of Indonesians have come to regard PKI as the most sincere and courageous defender of democratic liberties in general, and of the parliamentary system in particular. For a discussion of PKI*s struggle against the restrictions on democracy after April 1957» see below, p.568 et seq. === [PDF page 273] === o rn APPEALS TO SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF SOCIETY The winning of mass support involved the Aidit leadership in two basic tasks. I have discussed in the preceding section how the Aidit leadership endeavoured to create among the social groups most likely to support the Party, an image of PKI as patriotic, as tolerant of and even sympathetic to religion, and as a responsible, peaceable party working within and defending parliamentary democracy. Such an image was designed to create a climate of opinion in which PKI could pursue with relative ease its second task, that of attracting and organizing mass support by representing the material interests of the different sections of 'the people'. The Party itself remained the focal organization, assimilating members and extending its organizational network as fast as possible. But because of the low level of political awareness of the Indonesian urban and rural poor in general, the Aidit leadership built nominally independent mass organizations as a means of mobilizing, if only for simple action, a vast body of sympathizers who would otherwise remain beyond the Party's influence. The mass organizations could also be relied upon to tap hitherto inaccessible resources of member and cadre talent for PKI itself, and === [PDF page 274] === o r oj apparently they became the chief source of new recruits for the Party. Lukman made clear his party's concept of mass organizations in an article he wrote early in 195i* By mass organization we mean a non-political organization of the masses, of the people* A mass organization binds together several groups of the people according to their social position, for example: a workers' organization (trade union), peasants' organization, youth organization, women's organization, and so on* Also included in the mass organizations are various social and cultural organizations. The mass organizations arise on the basis and stimulus of the most simple and direct interests of the respective groups of the masses. Thus a trade union organization arises on the basis and stimulus of the simple and direct interests of the members •••, and so on. Lukman went on to declare that a mass organization should not have the same basis as the Party, that is, Marxism-Leninism, but: must be based on the ties of everyday socialeconomic needs and must be broad in nature. In order to meet these conditions, the most simple consciousness of the masses of the need to organize is sufficient to be con dition of membership of the respective mass organizations. If Marxism-Leninism was maintained as a basis, two dangers would a rise: either membership would be restricted to M.H. Lukman, "Partai dan Organisasi Massa" (The Party and Mass Organizations), BM, February 15, 1951 > pp.104-5> 119. === [PDF page 275] === 259 those who first agreed with and worked hard to understand Marxism, which would prevent mass membership; or MarxismLeninism would not be maintained as a fighting faith, in which case its meaning ’would become merely an empty slogan* and the working class struggle led by PKI would be harmed. The purpose of the mass organizations, Lukman declared, was to make the masses aware of the importance of organization, ’Even though it is the simplest awareness and based only on their own direct interests'• Lukman also defined the role of the Party vis-a-vis mass organizations. The Party must: give leadership to the mass organizations in their actions, which means to train and raise the awareness of their members. This is the task, the duty of the Party fractions in the mass organizations. The broader the mass organization, the more the masses can be united, the broader the masses we can influence and give leadership to. That is why every communist must fight hard for the unity of each kind of mass organization. Splitting a mass organization is not the work of communists but of Trotskyites and social democrats (socialists). Communists in mass organizations led by Trotskyites and social democrats ••. may not leave the mass organi zation because that would mean allowing the masses to continue under the leadership of persons who are truly the enemies of the people. We communists must have the slogan: where the masses are, that is our place.’ Therefore we communists cannot refuse to work in a mass organization, however reactionary it may be. === [PDF page 276] === 260 Finally, Lukman emphasized that although mass organizations should he non-political, in fascist or colonial or semi-colonial countries their struggle to achieve social-economic goals necessarily involved them in politics. Therefore: it is the communists* basic responsibility gradually to train and to give progressive political leadership to all mass organi zations. Therefore those persons are clearly wrong who believe that the mass organizations cannot give *satisfaction* to people who wish to participate in political action but are still unable to fulfil the conditions for entering PKI. Analysis of the activities of the communist-led mass organizations during the decade of the Aidit leadership shows that their political role has been broadly fourfold: 1. To gather the widest possible sections of society into organizations led by PKI, to arouse in them an awareness of the importance of organization, to give them basic political education, and gradually to discipline them. 2. To open up new social and geographic areas to PKI penetration. One or more mass organizations have been established where it would have been impossible to establish PKI directly because of political ignorance or opposition to communism. Their basic education in organizational and political matters has then created a favourable environment for the establishment of the Party itself === [PDF page 277] === 3* To provide a source of Party members and cadres. The leaders and cadres of the mass organizations are open or covert Party members; they watch to see which of their activists are most susceptible to political education, and then gradually draw them into the Party. U. To assist PKI in its political struggle. The mass organizations have been used, for example, to gather votes for PKI by assisting in the work of propaganda, organizing meetings, and mobilizing the people to go to the polls; to back PKI*s position on various matters or PKI demands by petitions, demonstrations, telegrams, letters, delegations, and the threat of strike action or general unrest; and to impress and woo Sukarno by gathering large crowds for his meetings, mobilizing large contingents for independence day parades, and so on. The mass organizations are also expected to provide a major source of strength for PKI in case the Party ever has to use force in order to resist repression or bid for power. The Party and its mass organizations work closely together in mutual assistance. It is quite common for a cadre or activist to work for the Party and for one or more mass organizations. In some areas the Party organization has been established first, and has then used its cadres to create mass organizations that widen the PKI sphere of influence and control and that prepare === [PDF page 278] === M01 ^ t h e way f o r a f u r t h e r e x p a n sio n o f th e P a r ty i t s e l f. In o t h e r a r e a s, i f th e tim e i s n o t y e t r ip e fo r th e e s t a b lis h m e n t o f th e P a r ty, th e c a d r e s have f i r s t s e t up one or more mass o r g a n iz a t io n s t h a t th e n p rep are th e ground f o r th e P a r ty o r g a n iz a t io n. Not enough i n f o r m a tio n i s a v a i la b l e t o e s tim a te w hich i s u s u a lly e s t a b l i s h e d f i r s t, th e P a rty or th e mass o r g a n iz a t io n. I t would a p p ea r, h ow ever, th a t in th e f i r s t y e a r s o f th e A i d i t le a d e r s h ip, when th e P a rty fe a r e d governm ent r e p r e s s io n and had n o t a c h ie v e d th e r e s p e c t a b i l i t y, a s s o c i a t i o n w ith Su karno, and p h y s ic a l s i z e (w ith a la r g e number o f t r a in e d P a r ty c a d r e s a v a i l a b l e ) w hich i t had b y 1955» i t was more u s u a l f o r mass o r g a n iz a t io n s to be e s ta b lis h e d f i r s t. T h is was more e s p e c i a l l y so in th e r u r a l a r e a s, where PKI had l i t t l e 1954* o r g a n iz a t io n b e fo r e mid* I r e c e iv e d some in fo r m a tio n to in d ic a t e t h a t in more r e c e n t y e a r s, in some a r e a s where PKI and th e mass o r g a n iz a t io n s h ave b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d f o r some tim e, th e P a r ty has ta k en ov er th e work fo r m e r ly done by i t s l e a s t e f f i c i e n t mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, su ch a s BTI, th e p e a sa n t o r g a n iz a t io n. The o b l i g a t i o n o f e v e r y P a rty member: To s e r v e th e p e o p le, to c o n s o lid a t e th e P a r t y 's c o n n e c tio n s w ith them, t o stu d y t h e i r w ish e s === [PDF page 279] === and correctly report these to the Party in time, and to explain Party policy to them, has not been taken lightly. The Aidit leadership has made great efforts to learn the desires and hopes of each section of society, the pressing problems they face in their daily lives. And it has created an extensive network of Party and mass organizations which can present organization, programme and course of action that seem capable of fulfilling the desires and hopes, of tackling the problems. The work of PKI and its mass organizations does not, however, give a full explanation of the success achieved in winning and organizing the support of many millions of Indonesians. The expansion of the Party organization has been facilitated by the apathy of the other parties towards organizational work at the grass roots. This apathy has been even more marked in their work of building mass organizations. The following sections deal with the activities of the PKI and its mass organizations designed to attract and organize support among the different sections of the PKI, Konstitusi Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI’s Constitution), Dj akaria, 1951, p. 21. This obligation, worded slightly differently, has been incorporated in succeeding Party constitutions. The constitutions of the mass organizations contain a similar obligation for their members, with, of course, ’the Party* being replaced by the name of the particular organization. === [PDF page 280] === 264 In d o n e s ia n s p e o p l e 1: w o r k e r s, p e a s a n t s, t h e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e, y o u th, women, th e e t h n i c g ro u p s a n d e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s, an d t h e v e t e r a n s o f th e r e v o l u t i o n. The W orkers Com m unist l e a d e r s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e w o rk e rs c o n s t i t u t e t h e m o st r e v o l u t i o n a r y, th e m o st r e l i a b l e, an d th e m ost e a s i l y o r g a n i z e d s o c i a l b a s i s o f com m unist s u p p o r t. I n d o n e s i a a f t e r in d e p e n d e n c e, u n l i k e i n C h in a a f t e r 1927» n o m a jo r o b s t a c l e s w ere p l a c e d b e tw e e n th e com m unist l e a d e r s an d t h e w o r k e r s. T h e re fo re th e A id it le a d e r s h ip h a s g iv e n f i r s t p r i o r i t y t o o r g a n i z i n g t h e w o r k e r s. t h e PKI l e a d e r s a c k n o w le d g e d in t h e i r May Day m essage o f 1958: S in c e t h e s o u r c e o f th e s t r e n g t h a n d o f t h e c a d r e s o f th e Com m unist P a r t y l i e s p r i m a r i l y i n th e t r a d e u n io n m ovem ent, i t g o es w ith o u t s a y i n g t h a t th e f o r e m o s t t a s k o f th e commu n i s t s i s to w ork i n th e t r a d e u n i o n s. The t r a d e u n io n f e d e r a t i o n, SOBSI, h a s b e e n b u i l t a s t h e c h i e f m eans o f a t t r a c t i n g a n d o r g a n i z i n g th e w o r k e r s, an d t h e f o l lo w in g s e c t i o n i s c o n c e rn e d l a r g e l y w ith SOBSI an d i t s member u n i o n s. M en tio n i s a l s o made o f o t h e r means e m p lo y ed b y t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p t o w in th e a l l e g i a n c e o f t h e u rb a n p o o r i n g e n e r a l. R I t May 19 5 8, p.5 === [PDF page 281] === (a) SOBSI. The Consolidation of PKI control over SOBSI, SOBSI had been founded in November 1946 as an allembracing trade union federation with the basic task of mobilizing the workers for the defence of the Republic* Before the Madiun rebellion it had a virtual monopoly in the field of organized labour within the Republic* Communists and non-communists had been about evenly divided in its leadership, but no disputes had arisen between the two groups who were united by a feeling of leftist solidarity in the struggle to defeat the Dutch and to create a socialist Indonesia* This solidarity was broken by the rebellion, but communists remained in control of the major part of the organization. Hence the problem for the PKI leaders after Madiun was not to establish a new trade union federation, but to consolidate their position in SOBSI, to shape SOBSI into an efficient organization under complete Party control, and to extend its membership and organization. When the rebellion broke out in September 1948, many of the communist leaders in SOBSI either went into hiding or made their way to Madiun* Harjono, chairman of SOBSI, and Maruto Darusman, chairman of the largest member union, the estate workers' Sarbupri, were killed along === [PDF page 282] === with many other communist trade union cadres. But because SOBSI as an organization did not participate in the rebellion it was not declared illegal. Nineteen of the 34 member unions withdrew from the federation in protest against the involvement of some of its communist leaders in the rebellion. Discussions to re-unite the unions were in progress when the Dutch attack on the Republic in December 1940 temporarily stopped all trade union activity. In May 1949 efforts were resumed towards the creation of a single all-Indonesia trade union federation. By the end of October 1949 SOBSI was again functioning. The newly reorganized leadership was already clearly PKI-dominated and the non-communist acting chairman, Asrarudin, left the organization. In attempting to explain the commu nist domination of SOBSI so soon after Madiun, Asrarudin has suggested two reasons: that many of the non-communist individuals and trade unions had withdrawn from SOBSI at the time of the rebellion and thereby increased the already high proportion of communists in the SOBSI leader ship; and that PKI won the allegiance of many trade union cadres and activists by its ability to pay regular wages and to provide trips abroad as rewards for good service. Interview with Asrarudin === [PDF page 283] === Other reasons must include the concentration of PKI efforts and personnel in SOBSI, in contrast with the other parties12 lack of interest in trade union work; and that PKI was the only party which appeared to be truly concerned with the interests of the workers and their activists. On January 5> 1950 a nine-man SOBSI delegation, headed by Njono, left for China to study the workers* struggle there* It was not until November 19 that four of the delegates, including Njono, returned. five members remained longer. The other Presumably the members of the delegation underwent education in political and trade union matters while in China, and on their return provided PKI with a well-trained leadership for SOBSI. Njono, aged 28 when he returned, took over the leading position in SOBSI and has retained it until the present.- According to Kahin*s analysis, by mid-1951 almost the entire membership of SOBSI looked to PKI for leader1 Sin Po, November 21, 1950. Although Njono did not officially ask to join PKI until December 1954» he has been a close associate of the Aidit leadership and might even by considered a member of it. He was elected to parliament as a communist representative in September 1955» and in September 1959 was elected to the PKI central committee and, more important, as one of the two candidate members of the politbureau. === [PDF page 284] === ship, while most of the member unions were PKI-dominated, and the remainder PKI-influenced. A few leaders refused to recognize the leadership of PKI, but they were gradually ousted. Among the last non-communists to leave the SOBSI leadership was Ahem Emingpradja, the present Minister of Labour in the Sukarno cabinet. had been left as acting chairman of Sarbupri when the chairman was killed in the Madiun rebellion. In the Sarbupri congress at the end of 1952 he was finally excluded from the leadership, but he did not leave Sarbupri finally until April 1954 and the SOBSI parlia mentary group until June 1954* His successor as Sarbupri chairman, Coerdian, who was at the same time a member of the finance section of the SOBSI central bureau, also proved unwilling to accept PKI guidance. Coerdian was forced out of Sarbupri and SOBSI along with Ahem. SOBSI claims that some 3,000 of its cadres and members were imprisoned during the August 1951 arrests of Oeorge McTurnan Kahin, '‘Indonesian Politics and Nationalism", in William L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West, New York, 1953» p.13&. For the resolutions adopted by the Sarbupri national council on the 'removal' of Ahem and Coerdian, see Sarbupri, Untuk Kebebasan Demokrasi dan Melawan Pemerasan jang Kedjam (For Democratic Freedom, and Opposing Cruel Repression), Djakarta, 1954» pp.16-17» 18. === [PDF page 285] === g o v e rn m e n t o p p o n e n ts. B ut d e s p i t e th e a r r e s t o f PKI a n d SOBSI l e a d e r s, few B ra n c h e s o f SOBSI o r i t s member u n io n s to o k p r o t e s t a c t i o n. T h is w arn ed t h e PKI l e a d e r s t h a t t h e i r c o n t r o l o v e r SOBSI was n o t d e e p ly r o o t e d. C o n t r o l o f t h e to p l e a d e r s h i p was a l r e a d y f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e, b u t n o t y e t o f t h e m id d le a n d lo w e r c a d r e s. As a r e s u l t, th e PKI m em b ersh ip d r i v e w hich b e g a n i n M arch 1952 h a d a s one o f i t s m a jo r a im s t o b r i n g u n d e r P a r t y d i s c i p l i n e a g r e a t e r num ber o f th e m id d le and lo w e r l e v e l c a d r e s a n d a c t i v i s t s o f SOBSI an d i t s member u n i o n s. 12 By Novem ber 1 9 5 4, i n th e ju d g m en t o f Boyd Com pton, S O B S I's: to p l e a d e r s h i p i s c o m m u n ist, i t s s e c o n d e c h e lo n l e a d e r s a r e com m unist o r co m m u n istd o m in a te d, an d i t s r a n k and f i l e a r e g e n e r a l l y c o m m u n i s t - d i r e c t e d,3 I n t h e m id d le o f 1 9 6 0, when I was l a s t i n I n d o n e s i a, i t a p p e a r e d t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l c a d r e s o f SOBSI an d i t s u n io n s w ere members o f PK I, o r, i f n o t a c t u a l l y P a r t y m em bers, h a d b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o s c h o o ls a n d c o u r s e s Jo h n W o lfa rd, '’S t r e n g t h e n i n g th e I n d o n e s ia n T rad e U nion M ovem ent", W orld T ra d e U nion M ovem ent, May 1—1 5, 1953» Boyd R. C om pton, I n d o n e s ia n Communism: th e R anks S w e l l, A m erican U n i v e r s i t i e s * F i e l d S t a f f R e p o r t, New Y o rk, 1954, p*8. I b i d., p.7 === [PDF page 286] === arranged, and taught by the communist leaders. Communist control of the leadership of SOBS I had ensured that only persons who were Party members or had proved themselves amenable to PKI control were chosen as cadres and received promotion within the unions. For all others the channels of promotion were closed. At the same time as being completely controlled by PKI, SOBSI maintains the fiction of being tied to no political party. As 'proof of this political inde pendence, SOBSI points to K. Werdojo, member of the SOBSI national council and also a member of parliament for the small party Permai. However, of the 61 persons elected to the national council at the SOBSI congress of January 1955> over half were known to be members of the Party. In the September 1955 parliamentary elections eight members of the national council were elected on the 'PKI and non-party' list, six as PKI members and two as socalled non-party men. The nine-man SOBSI central bureau elected in 1956 consisted of these eight members of parliament in addition to Werdojo. PKI has had to pay a price for the consolidation of its hold on SOBSI. As communist control became increasingly evident, many non-communists withdrew, others were forced out, and the non-communist parties began to establish their own trade union organizations. === [PDF page 287] === The non-communist unions are still disunited and organizationally weak, but the system of labour dispute arbitration enforced by the government has permitted them to survive, and their effect of breaking the former SOBSI monopoly in the various labour fields seriously weakens the political usefulness of SOBSI - a question that will be discussed below. The growth of SOBSI. The official SOBSI claim is that as soon as the Round Table Conference agreement was signed in December 1949, SOBSI began a rapid expansion. With the slogan fcancel the Round Table Conference agreement* and the basic demand for Lebaran bonus, SOBSI won much support. Furthermore, many new unions sprang up in the former Dutch-occupied areas and then affiliated themselves with SOBSI. SOBSI branch offices were opened in virtually every kabupaten capital, and within a year of its re-establishment in September 1949, SOBSI claimed to contain 25 vertical trade unions, many local unions, and 2 % million members. From 1950 SOBSI, Sedjarah Gerakan Buruh Indonesia (History of the Indonesian Labour Movement), Djakarta, 1958, pp.86-7* Lebaran is the Moslem holiday and feast at the end of the Ramadan fast. In Indonesia the workers expect to receive a bonus for Lebaran equal to one month*s pay. === [PDF page 288] === u n t i l 1955 SOBS I c o n ti n u e d t o c la im 2 m i l l i o n m em bers, b u t th e num ber o f SOBSI b r a n c h o f f i c e s i n c r e a s e d from 11? i n November 1951 to 125 two y e a r s l a t e r. A t th e se c o n d n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s i n J a n u a r y 1955 a m em bership o f 2,6 6 1,9 7 0 was c la im e d, an d 128 b r a n c h o f f i c e s. S e p te m b e r 1957 th e c e n t r a l b u r e a u a n n o u n ce d t h a t a f t e r th e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f t r a d e u n i o n s, SOBSI now in c l u d e d 31 n a t i o n a l u n i o n s; t h e r e w ere e i g h t SOBSI r e g i o n a l o f f i c e s and 150 b ra n c h e s.* ^ As o f Novem ber 1 9 6 0, SOBSI c la im e d 2, 7 3 2, 9 0 9 m em bers, 165 b r a n c h e s, a n d 5 p r e p a r a t o r y b r a n c h e s.^ 4The o f f i c i a l SOBSI p i c t u r e h a s b e e n a t o t a l member s h i p s i n c e 1950 o f b e tw e e n 2. 5 a n d 2. 7 3 m i l l i o n s, v i r t u a l l y s t a t i c, b u t a s t e a d y i n c r e a s e i n th e num ber o f SOBSI r e g i o n a l and b r a n c h o f f i c e s. The f i g u r e s f o r t h e num ber o f o f f i c e s a r e p re s u m a b ly c o r r e c t a s t h e y c a n b e r e a d i l y c h e c k e d, b u t th e m em bership c la im s hav e b e e n w id e ly c h a l le n g e d b y n o n -c o m m u n ist I n d o n e s ia n an d f o r e i g n HR, November 27> 195 1; November 2 6, 19532 HR, J a n u a r y 11, 1 9 5 5; SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen K o n f e r e n s 1 N a s io n a l SOBSI (1 9 5 7 ) (D ocum ents o f th e SOBSI N a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e, 1 9 5 7 ) » D j a k a r t a, 1958, p.9 3 * SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, l o c. c i t. SOBSI, F o rw a rd f o r t h e C o n s i s t e n t R e a l i z a t i o n o f th e P o l i t i c a l M a n i f e s t o, m im e o g ra p h e d, D j a k a r t a, I 9 6 0, p.1 » === [PDF page 289] === o b se rv e rs. I t i s e x tr e m e ly d i f f i c u l t f o r an o u t s i d e r t o ju d g e w h e th e r o r n o t t o t a l SOBSI m em bership h a s d e c l i n e d s i n c e a b o u t 1951 due to th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c o m p e tin g non-SO B SI u n io n s i n many f i e l d s, o r i f SOBSI m em b ersh ip h a s re m a in e d more o r l e s s s t a t i c, a d v a n c e s among f o r m e r l y u n o r g a n iz e d w o rk e rs b a l a n c i n g l o s s e s t o t h e new n o n com m unist u n i o n s. I n th e e a r l y p a r t o f 1 9 5 2, G o ld b e rg e s t i m a t e d th e t o t a l num ber o f o r g a n iz e d w o rk e rs i n I n d o n e s i a t o b e f a r l e s s t h a n 2 m i l l i o n s, w ith SO BSI’s s h a r e 8 0 0,0 0 0 to T e d ja su k m a n a, a fo r m e r M i n i s t e r o f L a b o u r, e s t i m a t e d in 1958 t h a t some 3 t o 4 m i l l i o n w o rk e rs w ere o r g a n i z e d, o f w h ic h SOBSI a c c o u n te d f o r m ore t h a n 60 p e r c e n t, o r f o r a t l e a s t 1,8 0 0,0 0 0 to 2, 4 0 0, 0 0 0. R ic h a r d s o n, w r i t i n g i n O c to b e r 19 5 8, h o w e v e r, r e p o r t e d I t i s e v e n d i f f i c u l t i n I n d o n e s i a to d e f i n e w hat i s a t r a d e u n io n mem ber. V ery few ’members* p a y a n y d u e s, a n d i t h a s b e e n o f t e n com m ented t h a t SOBSI h a s becom e s o p o p u la r among w o rk e rs b e c a u s e i t r e c e i v e s fu n d s from e ls e w h e r e an d c a n a f f o r d n o t t o c o l l e c t d u e s. F u r th e r m o r e, many w o rk e rs o b t a i n em ploym ent o n ly s e a s o n a l l y. A SOBSI member m u st t h e r e f o r e b e d e f i n e d a s som eone who c o n s i d e r s h i m s e l f a member; he may p a y d u e s o r n o t, b u t he w o u ld ta k e an y p ro b le m t o th e SOBSI a c t i v i s t f o r s o l u t i o n, w ould a t t e n d some m e e tin g s o r g a n i z e d b y SOBSI, a n d w o u ld i n g e n e r a l p a r t i c i p a t e in l a b o u r a c t i o n l e d b y SOBSI. H a rry G o ld b e rg, G erak an B uruh d i I n d o n e s ia (T he L ab o u r Movement i n I n d o n e s i a ), D j a k a r t a, 1952» p.1 9. I s k a n d a r T e d ja su k m a n a, The P o l i t i c a l C h a r a c t e r o f th e I n d o n e s ia n T ra d e U nion M ovem ent, I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 195S, p p.25, 28. === [PDF page 290] === the estimate of Experienced observers* that the total number of organized workers may well have been below two millions. Both Goldberg and Tedjasukraana had access to government and other materials, and their evidence would suggest a considerable increase in SOBSI membership between 1952 and 1958» and would indicate that SOBSI*s earlier claims to large membership were bluff to lend weight to SOBSI*s demands and PKI*s political bargaining position. But, as Richardson’s evidence indicates, much research is still required before any fairly accurate estimates can be made of trade union membership. Strengthening SOBSI. Although SOBSI is a federation of national and local trade unions, it endeavours not only to coordinate the policies of its member unions but also, through the SOBSI regional and branch offices, to coordinate, control and assist trade union activities down to the local level. All workers belonging to member unions are also considered as direct members of SOBSI. Ordinary members participate in the ’basic organizations’ of the trade unions, and wherever there is more than one basic organi1 J. Henry Richardson, "Indonesian Labor Relations in Their Political Setting", Industrial and Labor Relations === [PDF page 291] === zation in one field of work, a coordinating committee is established. The ordinary trade union members ’in the various fields of work are coordinated and led by the SOBSI branch whose area is determined by the SOBSI regional council’. The regional councils have the dual task of coordinating and leading the member unions at the regional level, and of supervising the work of the SOBSI branches. Among other duties, the national council assists in the simplification of member unions, assists and coordinates the central leadership bodies of the member unions, and gives leadership to the lower levels of the SOBSI organization in the implementation of the decisions of the national congress."^ Both the SOBSI regional councils and branches also coordinate and assist the lower levels of the member unions in implementing SOBSI decisions. In short, SOBSI is more than an ordinary federation of trade unions, especially as the leadership of SOBSI and the member unions is unchallengeably in communist hands. Major policy decisions are taken by the central leader ship, which is closely coordinated with the PKI leader1 SOBSI, Konstitusi SOBSI (SOBSI’s Constitution), Ibid., p.35 Ibid., pp.28-9 === [PDF page 292] === ship, and the SOBSI machinery is used to ensure the correct implementation of policy right down to the places of work. What might be termed the leadership role of SOBSI is balanced by the assistance SOBSI gives to the member unions in their everyday work - in such matters as administration, the creation and training of cadres, the maintenance and expansion of membership, the methods of solving labour disputes - while SOBSI by its very size can add weight to their demands and can also, presumably, assist those in financial need. The following section deals with the effort made to strengthen the SOBSI organization, which is also the effort to strengthen PKI*s control over SOBSI and thereby over the SOBSI members. A large number of cadres and activists of SOBSI and its member unions were brought into PKI during the first PKI membership drive which began in March 1952. Before 1956 the only thorough political and organizational training they received was from PKI itself; SOBSI and its member unions did no more than give their cadres organi zational training in an incidental manner. It was only in February 1956, when SOBSI was freed from the hectic work of the general elections campaigns, that the national council decided that SOBSI should === [PDF page 293] === e s t a b l i s h a n e d u c a ti o n s y s te m r e a c h i n g from th e c e n t r e t o th e b ra n c h e s. The i n t e n t i o n was t o s e t up a SOBSI c e n t r a l s c h o o l f o r c a d r e s o f t h e SOBSI r e g i o n a l c o u n c i l s a n d t h e n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l s o f member u n i o n s; SOBSI r e g i o n a l s c h o o l s f o r c a d r e s o f t h e SOBSI b r a n c h e s a n d t h e member u n i o n s 1 r e g i o n a l c o u n c i l s; SOBSI b r a n c h c o u r s e s f o r c a d r e s o f t h e member u n io n s * b r a n c h c o u n c i l s and f o r l e a d e r s o f t h e member u n io n s 1 b a s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s; an d s c h o o ls o r g a n i z e d b y th e n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l s o f th e member u n io n s f o r t h e i r own c a d r e s. On O c to b e r 2 3, 1956, th e c e n t r a l b u r e a u, a d a p t in g f o r SOBSI th e e d u c a t i o n a l program m e d raw n up i n J u l y f o r PK I, d e c id e d t h a t th e SOBSI s c h o o ls an d c o u r s e s w ould t e a c h f o u r m ain s u b j e c t s: th e h i s t o r y o f th e l a b o u r m ovem ent, S O B S I's s o c i a l an d econom ic program m e, th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t, an d p ro b le m s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n.- ^ I n m id-N ovem ber 1956 th e SOBSI r e g i o n a l c o u n c i l i n C e n t r a l J a v a o p e n ed i t s f i r s t c ad re s c h o o l. The c e n t r a l s c h o o l w ent i n t o o p e r a t i o n i n th e f i r s t q u a r t e r o f 1958. By th e en d o f 1958, 133 s t u d e n t s h a d r e c e i v e d t r a i n i n g i n BB, D ecem ber 5, 1956, p.3 « SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p p.9 6 -7 * BB, D ecem ber 5, 1956, p. 3; i n t e r v i e w w ith a member o f t h e SOBSI n a t i o n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s. === [PDF page 294] === six Shifts' of the central school - each shift lasting one month, the students living in a hostel together and undertaking full-time study during their shift.*1 total of 21 school shifts had been held at the regional level, branch courses had been begun in November and December, a seminar on education had been arranged, and Sarbupri and the railv/ay workers 1 union had each held one shift of their central schools. During 1959 the SOBSI central school held six more shifts, bringing the total number of graduates* to about 300. The regional and branch schools and courses were running smoothly. Besides the four main subjects, cadres and activists were also being taught Indonesian language and history, and general knowledge. ITUN, December 1958, pp.8-9; Moh. Munir, Pedoman Penjelesaian Plan Organisasi 1958 (Survey of the Implementation of the 1956 Plan of Organization), Djakarta, 1959, pp.27-8. Interview with a member of the SOBSI national headquarters. Leaders of SOBSI in East Java told me, for example, that the regional council in their province had organized seven shifts of its school between the beginning of 1959 and May 1960, each shift meeting every day for a month, and each attended by about thirty cadres. At the kabupaten level courses were held regularly, lasting for from 15 days, if full-time attendance could be achieved, to 1^ months. Njono, Untuk Mempertahankan dan Memperluas Hak-Hak kaum Buruh (To Defend and Extend the Workers* Rights), Djakarta, 1959, p.69. === [PDF page 295] === 279 T h is s c a l e o f c a d r e e d u c a t i o n m ust e n s u r e n o t onlyc o n s i d e r a b l e PKI c o n t r o l o r i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e c a d r e s o f SOBSI a n d i t s member u n i o n s, e s p e c i a l l y when t h e SOBSI e d u c a t i o n s y s te m i s b o l s t e r e d b y th e PKI e d u c a t i o n a l program m e f o r P a r t y m em bers, b u t a l s o a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n c r e a s e i n t h e s k i l l o f t h e c a d r e s i n t h e i r e v e ry d a y w ork o f a t t r a c t i n g and o r g a n i z i n g th e w o r k e r s. The m a s s iv e SOBSI e d u c a t i o n program m e a l s o p r o v i d e s th e means o f c r e a t i n g new c a d r e s fro m th e ra n k a n d f i l e: F o r th e ra n k and f i l e th e r e a re o p p o r tu n itie s to b e a c q u a i n t e d w ith th e b a s i c p ro b le m s o f t h e l a b o r movement a n d w ith e le m e n ta r y r u l e s o f t r a d e u n io n is m. The b e s t among th e m em b ersh ip a r e th e n g iv e n t h e c h a n c e t o q u a l i f y th e m s e lv e s f o r u n io n p o s t s. In t h i s way t a l e n t s a r e d i s c o v e r e d an d p r o s p e c t i v e c a d r e s a n d l e a d e r s a r e r e c r u i t e d from th e ran k and f i l e. 1 I t g o e s a lm o s t w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t no o t h e r I n d o n e s ia n t r a d e u n io n o r g a n i z a t i o n h a s a n e d u c a t i o n a l program m e o f any s c a l e. N or c a n a n y o t h e r t r a d e u n io n o r g a n i z a t i o n o f f e r th e re w a rd a n d p o l i t i c a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n o f t h e f r e e trip s t o th e S o v i e t b l o c c o u n t r i e s t h a t hav e b e e n e n jo y e d b y many t e n s o f SOBSI c a d r e s. As p a r t o f th e e d u c a ti o n program m e h a s b e e n th e a tt e m p t to i n c r e a s e th e c i r c u l a t i o n o f t h e SOBSI T e d ja s u k m a n a, The P o l i t i c a l C h a r a c t e r, p.7 1 === [PDF page 296] === 280 periodical "Bendera Buruh" (Workers* Flag). In May- 1957 circulation was only 5 >500; this increased only slightly to 5,750 in April 1958, not a large number among a claimed membership of 2.6 millions. A plan to have "Bendera Buruh" received in every basic organization of the member unions by the end of 1958 was not fulfilled, but it was claimed that during 1959 circulation was raised to 15,000.3 The first comprehensive plan to improve the SOBSI organization was drawn up in September 1957 and implemen ted during 1958.^ By the end of 1958 it was clear that the SOBSI leaders had grossly overestimated the efficiency of their organization and its ability to make rapid In 1954 a small, twice-monthly Buietin SOBSI had been issued, reaching a total circulation of 10,000 in May 1955* In March 1956 it was replaced by the larger Bendera Buruh. Njono, Untuk Mempertahankan, p.68. ITUN, March 1960, p.7. According to information given by a member of the SOBSI national headquarters early in 1960, this figure is exaggerated and should have been 7,000 to 8,000. The ITUN figure could be true and yet deliberately misleading: while Harian Rakjat was temporarily banned for two weeks in December 1959, the copies printed of Bendera Buruh probably were greatly increased. The complete plan, including sections dealing with education and with women members, was published as SOBSI, Plan Organisasi 1958 (1958 Plan of Organization), Djakarta, 1957, 15 P* === [PDF page 297] === improvements. Many basic organizations had still not brought their members into groups, and, for various reasons, the work of attracting 'the medium and high workers * and government officials was proceeding slowly. New SOBSI regional committees had been established in East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, Atjeh and Bali while one was in preparation in Central Kalimantan, but the outbreak of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in February 1958 had prevented the establishment of new regional committees in other areas. On the other hand five new SOBSI branches had been opened, and seven were in preparation. The part of the plan to increase the number of full-time workers in SOBSI branches had been achieved basically in East and Central Java although, in general: the work of improving the SOBSI branch leader ship bodies has not yet been successful, while the work of the SOBSI branches increasingly piles up. Efforts to equip SOBSI branch offices with such as a typewriter, roneo machine and bicycle were still being The results of the 1958 plan were given in Munir, Pedoraan, 34 p. The plan had called for one full-time leader and one staff member in each SOBSI branch with up to 5>000 members two leaders and one staff member in each branch with up to 10,000, and so rising progressively to five full-time leaders and four staff members for each branch with over 50,000 members. === [PDF page 298] === o po made. V-/ A V And SOBSI and its member unions fell far short of the goal of receiving 50 per cent of membership fees. In 1958 the SOBSI national council received only 10 per cent of the fees it should have according to membership figures. In the latter half of 1958, SOBSI, at the same time as PKI was doing the same in preparation for the first national conference of peasants and fishermen, undertook a 'go down* campaign: in order to further strengthen the relations between the organization and the masses and between the higher and lower levels of the organization, as well as to avoid subjective methods of leadership not in accordance with the objective facts.* The central secretariat set up a special committee to implement the campaign. A plan of organization for 1959 was drawn up by the SOBSI national council with targets in a wide range of activities but concentrating on education, an increase in the number of full-timers, and increased collection of As of January 1, 1958, however, the 0.20 rupiah paid by each member to SOBSI was increased by an extra 0.30 rupiah ’permanent contribution *. Editorial, "SOBSI 12 Tahun" (SOBSI 12 Years), BB, November 20, 1958, p.1. === [PDF page 299] === OvO m em b ersh ip f e e s * The r e s u l t s o f th e p l a n h a v e n o t b e e n p u b l i s h e d, b u t i n th e a b s e n c e o f a s u c c e s s f u l s o l u t i o n t o t h e f i n a n c i a l p ro b le m, a n d s u c h a s o l u t i o n was now here i n s i g h t a t th e en d o f 1958* a r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n th e num ber o f f u l l - t i m e c a d r e s c o u ld n o t be im p le m e n te d * ^ The f o r m a t io n o f g ro u p s o f o r d i n a r y m em bers, b e g u n w i t h i n t e n s i t y i n 1 9 5 8, c o u ld b e o f g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e i n b i n d i n g t h e o r d i n a r y members t o t h e u n io n l e a d e r s h i p a n d i n i n c r e a s i n g t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f o r d i n a r y members i n u n io n a c t i v i t i e s * G roup l e a d e r s a r e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f th e b a s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n: t h e y p a r t i c i p a t e i n d e l e g a t i o n s to m eet e m p lo y e r s, t h e y g a t h e r members t o g i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f u n io n p o l i c y, to c o l l e c t f e e s, an d t o r e a d SOBSI p u b l i c a t i o n s an d ’’H a r ia n R a k j a t " t o g e t h e r, an d t h e y o r g a n iz e a s s i s t a n c e t o w ork M a rd jo k o, " T riw u la n T e r a c h i r d a la m P e la k s a n a a n P la n O r g a n i s a s i 1 9 5 9 ” (The L a s t Q u a r te r i n Im p le m e n tin g th e 1959 P la n o f O r g a n i z a t i o n ), BB, O c to b e r 5, 1959* p*1* N jo n o, U n tu k M em p ertah an k an, p * 6 0. As h a s b e e n d i s c u s s e d a b o v e, th e com m unist movement in I n d o n e s i a r e c e i v e s c o n s i d e r a b l e sum s from o u t s i d e s o u r c e s * I t i s p resu m ed t h a t b y 1959 t h e s e s o u r c e s w ere b e i n g ta p p e d e f f i c i e n t l y an d t h a t t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p was a l r e a d y a p p o r t i o n i n g th e fu n d s o b t a i n e d i n f a i r l y s t a t i c p r o p o r t io n s * F u r th e r m o r e, a s t h e PKI c e n t r a l c o m m itte e p len u m i n D ecem ber 1960 made c l e a r, th e P a r t y was c o n t i n u i n g t o e m p h a siz e w ork among t h e p e a s a n t r y. T h e r e f o r e a n y f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a b l e i n c r e a s e i n S0B SI*s in c o m e, i n o r d e r t o p a y f o r many more f u l l - t i m e c a d r e s, c o u ld o n ly come from w i t h i n th e o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f. === [PDF page 300] === comrades in times of need, such as deaths, marriages and births. But to what extent the groups of ordinarymembers have been formed and are active has not been revealed. Finally, it is important to make some estimate of the full-timers working for SOBSI and its member unions because it is the existence of a large body of relatively well-paid full-timers enjoying adequate promotion possibilities that distinguishes SOBSI from the other trade union organizations and that greatly facilitates SOBSI's work of organizing the masses and attracting potential cadre material. The evidence is fragmentary, but less so than that for PKI or the other communist-led mass organizations. In the SOBSI headquarters in Djakarta there were, in the early part of 1960, 50 full-timers including the chauffeurs for the two cars, the odd-job men, and the women cleaners and cooks.1 The number of full-timers at the regional and branch levels varied greatly because, in general, the SOBSI regions and branches parallel the government administrative divisions which embrace widely Kastari, "Sekali Lagi Masalah Klompok” (Once More the Question of Groups), BB, February 25, 1960, p.2. Interview with a member of the SOBSI national headquarters. === [PDF page 301] === different total populations and numbers of workers. East Java, a relatively well-organized region with claimed total of 5*10,000 SOBSI members, in mid-1960 there were 9 full-timers in the provincial office, and 15 in the Surabaja city office; in each of the 29 branch offices there was an average of two full-timers. In the Jogjakarta Special District, with a larger population than Surabaja but far fewer trade union members, the SOBSI branch office had 9 full-timers, though a visual examination of the office showed that several of these were female clerical staff. Evidence supplied by SOBSI leader Munir suggests that the number of full-timers in the member unions is high. In December 1958 he reported that the basic organizations of government trade unions and small unions in private concerns had no full-timers, but that those in large private concerns, such as estates, and the sugar and oil industries, in general had them; the coordinating committees for the basic organizations in unions in private concerns generally had at least one Interview with SOBSI leaders in East Java. The total of 5*10»000 members included 130,000 seasonal workers. Interview with leaders of SOBSI in Jogjakarta. Munir, Pedoman, pp.21-2. === [PDF page 302] === fu ll-tim e r I n November I9 6 0 t h e r e w ere 1a b o u t 7,0 0 0 b a s ic o r g a n iz a tio n s.* T h u s, w i t h i n J a v a SOBSI i t s e l f m a i n t a i n s a l a r g e s t a f f a t th e c e n t r e a n d i n th e l a r g e c i t i e s, an d an a v e r a g e o f p e r h a p s two f u l l - t i m e r s f o r e a c h o f th e a p p r o x i m a t e ly 100 to 130 b r a n c h e s in th e i s l a n d. T h is w ould mean a b o u t 300 SOBSI f u l l - t i m e r s i n J a v a a l o n e, a d d e d t o w h ic h i s th e num ber o f f u l l - t i m e r s o f th e member u n io n s w h ic h m u st r e a c h to w e ll o v e r 1,0 0 0 an d p r o b a b ly much h i g h e r. W ith t h i s now w e l l - t r a i n e d an d i n d o c t r i n a t e d c a d r e f o r c e, SOBSI, an d t h e r e f o r e PK I, i s a b le to o r g a n iz e o v e r 5 0 p e r c e n t o f th e u n i o n iz e d I n d o n e s ia n w o rk e rs a n d m o b iliz e them f o r PKI*s p o l i t i c a l a d v a n ta g e. B ut b e f o r e e x a m in in g th e w o rk SOBSI an d i t s member u n io n s h a v e done i n o r d e r t o w in t h e i r m em bers, a b r i e f s e c t i o n w i l l i n d i c a t e t h e m a jo r SOBSI u n io n s so a s t o show w here SOBSI a n d PKI h a v e t h e i r g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h among th e w o rk e rs. The SOBSI member u n i o n s. n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o th e to w n s. The SOBSI u n io n s a r e Some o f th e l a r g e s t u n io n s *are com posed o f p e o p le who a r e s t i l l bo u n d to v i l l a g e an d SOBSI, F o rw a rd f o r th e C o n s i s t e n t R e a l i z a t i o n, p. 1. === [PDF page 303] === country life with its traditional social ties12: Sarbupri, the estate workers' union, SBG, the sugar workers' union, and Sarbuksi, the forestry workers* union. In the first years after 1950, when Sarbupri was still the only important estate workers' union, membership claims of 700.000 were made. More reasonable were those for 370.000 and 390,000 made in October 1956.^ The SBG, founded on March 3» 1946, claimed 305,000 members in 1957» including seasonal and non-active workers;^ Sarbuksi in May 1960 claimed 250,000 members,^ but many of these too would be seasonal workers. Other S0BSI unions with large memberships that include a high number of seasonal and rural workers are: SEBDA, founded in June 1947 for workers and employees of local government at the kabupaten and autonomous town level, with a claimed membership of 82.000 in May 1960; and SBPU, for workers of the pro vincial-level autonomous regions, with 48,000 claimed Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p.80. BB, October 10, 1956, p.3; October 24» 1956, p.3* These figures correlate closely with Goldberg's estimate in 1952 that Sarbupri membership was 350,000 or a little more; Goldberg, Gerakan Buruh, p.19* BB, March 13, 1957» p*3; Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p.31. === [PDF page 304] === o oo members in May 1960. 1 All of the above five unions have proved important channels by which communist cadres and sympathies as well as the rudimentary consciousness of class and of the importance of organization have entered rural areas. Control of transportation would be a vital weapon in the event of a political crisis in Indonesia, and with the trend towards a possible showdown between PKI and the army, the PKI sixth national congress in September 1959 called for improved work among the transport workers. The largest of the SOBSI transport workers* unions is that for railwayman, SBKA, founded in March 1946, and claiming 68,000 members in May 1960.-^ The second largest, SBPP, was formed in 1950 as a merger of several seamen*s and harbour workers* unions, and in 1956 declared 50,000 members.^4- SBKB, for chauffeurs, truck drivers and other workers in motor transport, claimed 50,000 members in 1956. In 1955 the SOBSI post, telegraph and telephone workers’ union claimed 50,000 members, but lost most of HR, May 21, I960; May 7, I960. PKI, Resolusi tentang Laporan Umum CC PKI Kepada Kongres Nasional ke-VI (Resolution on the PKI Central Committee’s General Report to the Sixth National Congress), Djakarta, 1959, p.90. HR, May 7, I960. Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, pp.21, 31« === [PDF page 305] === these when a rival non-communist union was established in 1956. SERBAUD, for workers and employees in air transport, has less than 3,000 members* In the industrial sphere, SOBSI unions are strong among textile workers, oil workers, miners, cigarette workers, and metal industry workers* The textile and clothing workers* union, including batik workers, claimed 65*000 members in May 1960* The oilworkers' union claimed 60,000 members in July 1950 when it was formed as a merger of four vertical and two local unions; in November 1959 it claimed only 30,000.2 The miners* union claimed 19*570 members in 1956, the cigarette workers* union 51,000 in 1957, and the metal industry workers' union 8,685 in February 1957*^ Of the approximately 800,000 government officials and employees, not including 'workers', SOBSI claims that 531*9U6 are members of 40 SOBSI unions.^ Among the more HR, May 6, 1960* HR, July 20, 1951* and November 26, 1959; Thahib, "The Indonesian Oil Workers Form a Single Union", World Trade Union Movement, February 1-15, 1952, p*34. Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p*32* BB, July 15, 1959* p.2; SOBSI, Forward for the Consistent Realization, p*1* I am not sure if these figures include employees and officials of the autonomous districts and towns. === [PDF page 306] === important SOBSI unions of government employees is the union for Ministry of Defence employees, with a claimed membership of 60,000, A small but perhaps in the long run politically important union is the SB Kependjaraan of prison workers and employees. competitor. This union has no In April 1958 it claimed 8,736 members in 217 prisons, out of a total of 10,500 employees in 344 prisons and prison offices, and reported that it was still growing rapidly. Another SOBSI union worthy of note is Sarbufis, for film and stage workers, with a claimed membership of 5,320 in 1956.23 Included in Sarbufis are actors of ketoprak,^ a popular traditional Javanese drama form which is often given contemporary political content, The 'moderate1 SOBSI policy.^ During 1950» 1951 and the early part of 1952 the SOBSI leaders were con cerned to use in militant action against the employers the genuine grievances of the workers at the miserably low BB, April 30, 1958, p,6. Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p,32. BB, September 30, 1957> p*1« The term SOBSI here includes also its member unions because general policy comes from PKI and is implemented throughout the SOBSI organization and unions. === [PDF page 307] === wages a n d t h e g r o s s l y d e f i c i e n t work c o n d i t i o n s and so c ial secu rity. A h a lt to t h is ' s e c t a r i a n i s m 12 was c a l l e d i n a PKI c e n t r a l c o m m i tt e e r e s o l u t i o n o f March 1, 1952 w h i c h e l a b o r a t e d t h e r o l e SOBSI was t o p l a y i n t h e newly evolved n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y. SOBSI was to o rganize the b ro a d e s t p o s s ib le s e c tio n of the w orkers, c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e non-SOBSI u n i o n s, and e v e n m a i n t a i n f r ie n d ly r e la tio n s w ith o th er s o c ia l c la s s e s. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c e n t r a l c o m m i tt e e r e s o l u t i o n, 'The w o r k e r s ' f r o n t m ust c o n s t i t u t e t h e s t r o n g e s t, most u n i t e d, m ost p r o g r e s s i v e and m o st c o n s c i o u s f r o n t i n t h e b r o a d n a tio n a l united f r o n t '. I n o r d e r t o a t t r a c t t h e mass o f w o r k e r s and a l s o e s t a b l i s h good r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r t r a d e u n i o n s a nd t h e e m p l o y e r s: th e s e c t i o n s of th e w orking c l a s s t h a t a r e a l r e a d y m i l i t a n t must p u r g e t h e m s e l v e s o f s e c t a r i a n d i s e a s e s and o f empty ' l e f t ' s l o g a n s... S e c t a r i a n i s m i s a d i s e a s e t h a t m ust b e c e a s e l e s s l y and v i o l e n t l y e r a d i c a t e d. O nly b y t h e r e m o v a l o f s e c t a r i a n i s m can th e s e c t i o n s o f th e working c l a s s who a r e a l r e a d y m i l i t a n t a t t r a c t t h e mass o f w o r k e r s who a r e s t i l l b a c k w a r d, an d d r a w t h e e n t i r e p e o p le i n t o th e s t r u g g l e f o r peace and n a t i o n a 1 i n d e p e n d e n c e •3 Even a s t r o n g w o r k e r s ' u n i t e d f r o n t, including a l a r g e number o f m i l i t a n t w o r k e r s and c o o p e r a t i o n t o w a r d s PKI, K ew a d jib a n F r o n t P e r s a t u a n Buruh (The Duty o f t h e Workers* U n i t e d F r o n t ), D j a k a r t a, 1952, 24 p. I b i d., p. 19. I b i d., p.23 === [PDF page 308] === OAO v> i*V common g o a l s b e tw e e n SOBSI a n d non-SOBSI u n i o n s, w ould n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g, s o t h e PKI c e n t r a l c o m m itte e r e s o l u t i o n c la im e d, to w ith s ta n d th e i m p e r i a l i s t s and in te rn a l re a c tio n a rie s. T h e re fo re th e w o r k e r s 1 f r o n t (w h ic h i n f a c t m eant SOBSI a n d a n y a l l i a n c e b e tw e e n SOBSI a n d o t h e r u n i o n s ) h a d t o e s t a b l i s h a n d m a i n t a i n good r e l a t i o n s w ith o th e r c l a s s e s. T h is c o u l d o n l y be done b y t o n i n g down t h e w o rk e r s * a c t i o n s, b y u n i o n s u p p o r t f o r t h e dem ands o f o t h e r c l a s s e s, and b y w in n in g t h e f r i e n d s h i p o f th e n a t i o n a l e m p lo y ers. The c e n t r a l c o m m itte e c a l l e d on t h e w o r k e r s t o e n s u r e t h a t any a c t io n th e y to o k f u l f i l l e d th re e c o n d itio n s: t h a t i t was c o n s i d e r e d c o r r e c t an d j u s t b y t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e p e o p l e a n d s o r e c e i v e d t h e i r sy m p a th y a n d s u p p o r t; t h a t i t was b e g u n w here t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u c c e s s was g r e a t; and t h a t i t was b e g u n an d c o n c l u d e d a t t h e c o r r e c t t i m e. But a t t h e same tim e a s l i m i t i n g t h e i r own demands and th e m i l i t a n c y o f t h e i r a c t i o n s, th e w orkers had to le n d s u p p o r t t o t h e demands o f o t h e r c l a s s e s who s h o u l d be in c lu d e d i n th e n a t i o n a l u n i te d f r o n t: T h ro u g h a c t i o n s o f s o l i d a r i t y, t h r o u g h sy m p a th y s t r i k e s a n d o t h e r fo rm s o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n t h a t a re i n t e l l i g i b l e, t h a t can r e c e iv e th e sy m p a th y o f and b e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e b r o a d m asses, th e In d o n e s ia n w orkers w i l l s t e e l th e f i g h t i n g u n i t y o f th e m asses, and w i l l g r a d u a lly em erge t o t h e f o r e a s t h e d e f e n d e r o f d e m o c r a t i c === [PDF page 309] === rights and freedom, the champion of peace, the leader, the uniter of all groups of the people and the builder of the national united front.* The workers, as an instrument of the Party's national united front policy, were even instructed by the central committee resolution to strive to remove any hostility felt towards them by the national industrialists. The workers had to explain that sometimes they would demand improvements, but at the same time they would have to assist the national industrialists in their struggle against imperialist monopoly and explain that a people’s democracy, the workers’ political goal, would guarantee the existence of the national industrialists. A SOBSI national conference from September 27 to October 12, 1952 accepted the role of SOBSI within the national united front policy. ’Sectarianism and the "closed-door” policy were thrown far away.'2 A new constitution was adopted, to be endorsed by the second national congress in January 1955» from which were deleted all terms that sounded communistic, such as ’socialism,’ ’democratic centralism,’ ’people's democracy' and ’class struggle’, ’because they have created a Ibid., PP.23-U. BM, December 1952, p.163. === [PDF page 310] === division between the SOBSI unions and those who belong to no trade union federation*• The SOBSI central bureau explained that the 1947 constitution had stated SOBSI’s intention *to mobilize all workers to achieve a socialist society*, but because the revolution had failed: the duty of the Indonesian workers now is not to oppose capitalism and build a socialist society, but, together with the peasants, the petty bourgeois and the non-compradore national bourgeois, to oppose imperialism and build a people*s democratic society as the first step.•• towards a socialist society. B.O. Hutapea, prominent in both PKI and SOBSI, wrote an article in September 1952 which explained the new line taken towards the national industrialists. He repeated the PKI argument that small and medium capital, which is usually Indonesian, developed an opposition to giant capital and could therefore side with the antiimperialists. The proletariat must be able to mobilize this strength /of the small and medium capitalist^7, not only by supporting the economic and social demands of the national industrialists... but M. Adinda, ’’Menjambut Lahirnja Konstitusi Baru SOBSI’* (Welcoming SOBSI*s New Constitution), Zaman Baru, October 15, 1952, p.3. Zaman Baru, August 30, 1952, p.1. O. Hutapea, "Sikap SOBSI Terhadap ’Modal Nasional*” (SOBSI*s Attitude towards ’National Capital’), Zaman Baru September 30, 1952, pp.11-13, 16. === [PDF page 311] === a l s o b y l i m i t i n g th e dem ands o f t h e w o rk e rs who w ork i n t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e s, th o u g h w ith o u t n e g l e c t i n g th e w o r k e r s. U n d er th e new c o n s t i t u t i o n draw n up b y th e 1952 c o n f e r e n c e, m em b ersh ip o f SOBSI was o p e n e d t o: a l l o r g a n i z e d w o rk e rs, th r o u g h t h e i r r e s p e c tiv e tr a d e u n io n s,... i r r e s p e c t i v e o f e th n ic o r i g in, d e s c e n t, se x, r e l i g io n and p o l i t i c a l c o n v i c t i o n.' The f i c t i o n o f SO BSI’s p o l i t i c a l in d e p e n d e n c e h a s b e e n m e t i c u l o u s l y m a in t a i n e d down t o t h e p r e s e n t. I n November 1957» f o r e x a m p le, th e SOBSI l e a d e r s c la im e d t h a t: I n SOBSI we s e e e a c h p e r s o n i s f r e e t o c h o o se th e p a r t y he l i k e s. We hav e p e r s o n s from M asju m i, P K I, PNI an d so o n, an d a l a r g e p a r t a re n o n -p a rty p e r s o n s.2 A t th e same tim e th e l e a d e r s f u r t h e r c la im e d t h a t: The a t t i t u d e o f SOBSI to w a rd s th e p a r t i e s i s d e te r m in e d b y th e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s o f th e p a r t i e s f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f th e w o rk e rs in g e n e ra l.... The sy m p ath y o f SOBSI an d th e w o rk e rs f o r PKI i s b e c a u s e PKI i n w ords a n d d e e d s i s a lw a y s a c t i v e i n f i g h t i n g f o r th e w o r k e r s 12 i n t e r e s t s. T h is a t t i t u d e o f SOBSI i s a l s o h e l d to w a rd s o t h e r p a r t i e s t h a t c a r r y o u t a program m e t h a t b e n e f i t s th e w o r k e r s.3 P re s u m a b ly t h i s f i c t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l in d e p e n d e n c e m u st b e aim ed t o d e c e iv e t h e r a n k an d f i l e SOBSI, K o n s t i t u s i SOBSI, p.2 0. BB, Novem ber 29 > 1957» p * 1. members and === [PDF page 312] === p o t e n t i a l members who a r e non-com m unist b u t n o t p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c io u s. I t c o u ld h a r d ly be ex p e cte d to d e c e iv e non-com m unist p o l i t i c i a n s and tr a d e u n i o n i s t s. P ro b a b ly a n o th e r pu rp o se o f t h i s f i c t i o n i s to o f f i c i a l l y d i s s o c i a t e SOBSI from PKI so t h a t i f th e l a t t e r were to be s u b je c te d to r e p r e s s io n, SOBSI c o u ld c laim immunity as a p o l i t i c a l l y in d ep en d en t o r g a n iz a tio n. S in ce 1952 th e SOBSI l e a d e r s, im plem enting th e n a t i o n a l u n ite d f r o n t p o lic y, have b een u n w illin g to a n ta g o n iz e e i t h e r th e governm ent o r th e n a t io n a l em ployers. In th e words o f th e c e n t r a l b u reau r e p o r t to th e Septem ber 1957 n a t i o n a l c o n fe re n c e: A ll p e rso n s and g ro u p s, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n, r e l i g i o u s c o n v ic tio n, e th n ic g ro u p, and p a r ty, who a re n o t proved to be a g e n ts o f D utch monopoly and who a re n o t pro v ed to be a g e n ts o f th e warm ongers, a re th e f r ie n d s o f th e w o rk e rs.12 Only th o se who had proved th em selv es to be 'v e ry r e a c tio n a r y ' were to be co m b atted, w h ile tow ards o th e rs 'we must a v o id e x c e s s iv e dem ands' in th e i n t e r e s t s o f th e b r o a d e s t p o s s ib le u n ity. N jono, sp e a k in g to th e n a t i o n a l c o u n c il a t th e end o f December 1958, e la b o r a te d on th e theme o f SOBSI i n e f f e c t u a l l y claim ed su ch imm unity a t th e end o f A ugust 1960 when th r e e r e g io n a l army commanders p la c e d tem porary b ans on th e a c t i v i t i e s o f PKI and a s s o c ia te d o r g a n iz a tio n s. SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.25* === [PDF page 313] === 007 different categories of antagonism within society and the different methods to he employed for their solution: contradictions that arose between the workers and the armed forces, the current cabinet, and the national businessmen, were not major ones. They should be solved by democratic means1 in order to strengthen the national unity required to solve the most fundamental contra diction, that between the Indonesian people and imperialism. Prom the formation of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet on August 1, 1953» until the end of 1959» with the exception of the brief period of the Masjumi-led Burhanudin Harahap cabinet, SOBSI carefully avoided blaming the government for the deteriorating economic situation, instead blaming the imperialists and their agents. What is more, the SOBSI leaders frequently stated their desire to assist in the economic development of the country. In November 1937 the SOBSI national conference declared of the government’s five-year plan that ’the trade unions must assist in its accomplishment*, and stated SOBSI ’s policy to be that of ’struggle within RI, January 1959, p.33 === [PDF page 314] === th e fram ew ork o f th e c o u n try * s economic developm ent*; i n th e same month a SOBSI r e p r e s e n ta ti v e p a r t i c i p a t e d in th e g o v ern m en t-sp o n so red n a t i o n a l c o n s u lta tiv e co n feren c e on r e c o n s tr u c tio n; and in A ugust 1959 a SOBSI r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to o k h is p la c e on th e S u k arn o -a p p o in ted N a tio n a l P la n n in g C o u n cil e n tr u s te d w ith th e t a s k o f fo rm u la tin g a com prehensive p la n f o r n a t io n a l developm ent. A f te r th e governm ent ta k e -o v e r o f Dutch e n t e r p r is e s in December 1957» b o th SOBSI and PKI p led g ed t h e i r su p p o rt to th e e f f o r t s to keep them ru n n in g. C oncerning th e non-governm ent In d o n e sia n em p lo y ers, SOBSI has n o t o n ly li m i t e d i t s demands upon them, b u t has c o n tin u e d to d e c la r e t h a t i t s u n io n s ’alw ays a s s i s t th e n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l i s t s to overcome th e d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c in g thern*.-^ SOBSI even has s t a t e d i t s d e s ir e to r a i s e p r o d u c tiv ity and e f f i c i e n c y in t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e s on S u g i r i, ’’The G re a t H orizons Open to In d o n e sia n Trade U n io n s”, World Trade Union Movement, A ugust-Septem ber 1958, p.U 2. The sp eech o f th e SOBSI r e p r e s e n ta ti v e in th e c o n fe re n c e has been p u b lis h e d i n b o o k le t form as R unturam bi, P o l i t i k Pembangunan S e k a ra n g, 22 p. N jono, Tegakkan P a n d ji-P a n d.ii P e rsa tu a n (Uphold th e B anners o f U n ity )’/" D ja k a r ta, 1958, p.§. === [PDF page 315] === the basis of mutual profit# Such magnanimity could be carried too far, however, and the PKI leaders rejected the idea of an increase-production movement to welcome the sixth Party congress on the grounds that such a movement ’could even be a good deed for the bourgeoisie or for the enemies of the people, so that it could harm the people ’. At the PKI congress in September 1959 Aidit once again expressed concern at the danger of radical labour action.^ He said that economic instability, a decline in the p eople’s standard of living, the threat of mass dismissals and efforts to reduce trade union rights had caused: unrest among the working masses and may result in desperate or extremely radical measures if they are not given correct leadership. That is why greater attention must be given to improving work in the basic o rganizations• In other words, PKI, and therefore SOBSI, was not only not inciting the workers to militant action, but, for the sake SOBSI, Program SOBSI Mengenal Perbaikan Ekonomi guna Perbaikan t?pan dan Djaminan Sosial kaum Buruh (SOBSI’s Programme for Improving the Economy in order to Improve the Workers’ Wages and Social Security), Djakarta, 1955» pp.12-13. Editorial, ’’Mendjelang Kongres ke-VI Partai" (Preparing for the Party’s Sixth Congress), HP, November 1958, p.222. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.169* === [PDF page 316] === 300 of the national united front policy, was preparing to restrain them from radical measures provoked by the worsening economic situation. Since the beginning of 1952, then, SOBSI and its unions have moderated their demands and actions for the sake of PKI's national united front. The emphasis has been on Reasonable and just1 demands, on the solution of disputes between the workers and national employers, governmental and private, by friendly means. This has not decreased SOBSI*s attractiveness for the Indonesian workers for four reasons. First, SOBSI has far greater finances, personnel and zeal with which to make its presence felt among the workers. Second, almost all other trade union organizations are either tied to political parties associated with one or more cabinet and therefore strictly limited in the militancy they could show and associated with the cabinets f failure to improve the condition of the workers or they are specifically religious groupings with a severely limited potential membership among the largely abangan workers. Third, the great majority of Indonesian workers, as the PKI central SOBSI, Masaalah Front Persatuan Buruh (The Question of the Workers1 United ^ront), Djakarta, 1959> p«32. === [PDF page 317] === 301 committee resolution of March 1, 1952 indicated, are loath to take radical action. And, fourth, SOBSI has been, despite its moderation and reasonableness, the most effective defender of the workers* interests, the most courageous in pressing for improvements in wages and working conditions. The following section deals with SOBSI*s work in defence of the workers* interests, that is, SOBSI*s basic trade union work by which it has won the allegiance of over 50 per cent or organized workers in Indonesia. SOBSI*s defence of the workers* interests. It is outside the scope of this thesis to make a detailed analysis of all the work undertaken by SOBSI and its member unions in the promotion of the workers* interests, but this section discusses some aspects of this work, namely, the struggle for trade union freedoms, the formu lation of comprehensive and popular programmes of demands, and some examples of large and small successes achieved by SOBSI unions for their members. SOBSI protests were in part instrumental in ending the prohibition of strikes in *vital* industries issued first by some regional army commanders in the latter half of 1950 and then by the Natsir government at the beginning === [PDF page 318] === 302 of 195*1* The emergency law which replaced it in September 1951 removed the prohibition but established a compulsory labour disputes arbitration system and laid down rules which in effect greatly restricted the opportunity for strikes or lock-outs. This also drew SOBSI criticism, but it became less raucous when the national united front policy was put into practice. Partly as a result of SOBSI and PKI demands, the September 195*1 regulation was replaced by a new law in June 1958 which laid down a slightly altered arbitration system, but which brought trade union representatives into the arbi tration committees.^ Meanwhile, however, the state of emergency decreed in March 1957 had placed far greater restrictions on trade union freedom. Because the PKI wished to antagonize neither Sukarno, who had issued the decree, nor the army, which played a major administrative The Natsir g o vernments regulation is given in Kernenterian Perburuhan (Ministry of Labour), Peraturan Perburuhan dan Per a tu ran Administrasi PerburuEarPlLa^bour Regulations and Labour Administration Regulations), Djakarta, 1953» PP.435-40. The September 1951 emergency law is given in Kementerian Perburuhan, Himpunan Peraturan-Peraturan Perburuhan (19U51955) (Collection of Labour Regulations, 1945-1955)/ Interview with Surjanatakusuma, secretary of the central labour disputes arbitration and conciliation committee since its founding in 1951* === [PDF page 319] === role under the decree, SOBSI made few open protests at the infringement of trade union freedom - nor did it protest when, on August 14, 1957» strikes were prohibited in ’vital* enterprises, which meant that virtually all strikes would be illegal* With the general economic deterioration, in which continuous and sometimes rapid inflation has constantly reduced the already low real value of wages, SOBSI has found no difficulty in discovering grievances to represent. More or less comprehensive lists of demands have been presented to the government on each May Day and New Year, by each SOBSI congress, conference and national council meeting, and during periods of cabinet formation* SOBSI has gained popularity by its repeated demands for wages to be adjusted in line with price increases, for the provision of essential commodities at low prices, for a Lebaran bonus equal to one m o n t h ’s pay, for the provision of increased job opportunities, and for the prohibition of mass dismissals. The scope of the SOBSI programmes of demands is illustrated by those drawn up by the SOBSI leadership for endorsement by the August 1960 national congress. Within The programmes of demands endorsed by the January 1955 congress were not quite so full* They are given in SOBSI, Program SOBSI, pp.13-27« === [PDF page 320] === the draft "Programme of Demands for National Economic Development", designed to appeal to all sections of workers, were 80 points grouped under the headings ’lower prices and speed up production12, ’nationalize Dutch enterprises and strengthen the state’s sector of the economy*, ’increase internal production and implement foreign economic relations of benefit to Indonesia’, measures for increasing the production of rice, textiles, oil, sugar and fish, and measures for improving communications. The draft programme of social and economic demands was divided into six categories: a general category dealing with trade union rights and democracy; 44 demands for government employees; four demands for workers in the former Dutch enterprises; 37 demands for workers in private enterprises, with special sub-headings for workers in large foreign enterprises, in national enterprises, and in small enterprises; two demands for young workers; and six ’for the rights and interests of women w o rkers’. Thus the SOBSI leaders try to appeal to the working class as a whole and to each worker in his particular employment. B B, May 15, 1960, pp.2-4* BB, April 28, 1960, pp.2-4. === [PDF page 321] === 205 Obviously lists of demands without concrete results would hardly serve to maintain SOBSI membership. Examples of some of the major successes achieved by SOBSI since 1949 are given. The first major SOBSI success was the Sarbupri strike of August and September 1950 when work in virtually all private estates was brought to a halt. The government finally intervened and established a minimum wage for estate workers that was far higher than the previous average wage rate. Also in 1950 the oil workers successfully struck against dismissals and for workers* compensation and a non-contributory pension. September 1953 Sarbupri strike action forced the govern ment to alter a decision of the arbitration committee and grant a 30 per cent wage increase at a time of stable prices. SOBSI successes during 1955 included general For the background to this strike, the Sarbupri demands, and the favourable government attitude to the strikers, see Kementerian Perburuhan, Dokumentasi Pemogokan Sarbupri sampai 28-8-1950 (Documentation of the Sarbupri Strike up to 28-8-1950), mimeographed, Jogjakarta, 1950, 24 P» Kahin, "Indonesian Politics", in Holland (ed.), Aslan Nationalism and the West, p.159, note 19* Wolfard, "Strengthening the Indonesian Trade Union Movement", World Trade Union Movement, May 1-15» 1953» p.20. Hutomo, "Indonesian Plantation Vforkers Want Higher Wages", World Trade Union Movement, October 16-31> 1953» p.30; Bank Indonesia, Report for the Year 1953-1954» Djakarta, 1954, p.143* === [PDF page 322] === victory of the demand for Lebaran "bonuses, wage increases of 10 to 20 per cent for workers in private industry, the free or cheap distribution of essential commodities in some enterprises, a new wage scale for government employees and workers, and considerable increases in wages and benefits for workers in the Shell and Standard Vacuum oil companies. In 1956 strong SOBSI and PKI opposition was in part responsible for the failure of the plan of the Minister of Finance to cut drastically the number of government employees. During 1957 SOBSI claimed as successful its efforts to obtain a provisional wage increase for government workers. In the latter half of 1958 all trade unions of government workers jointly raised the demand for a minimum wage of 135 rupiahs per month, a demand previously raised only by SOBSI; in December a resolution incorpo rating this demand was tabled by PKI and SOBSI members of parliament, and was carried unanimously, accepted by the government, and put into effect as of January 1, 1959* Njono, Tegakkan, pp,8-9; RI, April 1957» pp.29-30, Njono, "Some Problems of the Indonesian Workers”, ITUN, May 1957, p.U. Ngadiman Suseno, "Successes in the Beginning of the Year", ITUN, February-April 1959, p.9; HR, December 18 and 19, 1958. === [PDF page 323] === 307 When the government took over the Dutch enterprises in December 1957» a grave dislocation of inter-island shipping occurred and at the end of 1958 several tens of thousands of harbour workers and seamen were still fully unemployed. SOBSI then proposed that seamen of the former Dutch shipping company who were still unemployed should receive full pay until they found work; the government agreed to give full pay until the middle of 1959.12 Most of SOBSI*s social-economic successes have not, however, been in the spectacular category. They have been won under the slogan formulated at the end of 1951» 'small but successful*, as opposed to 'large but failed*. Within the scope of such 'small but successful* actions are demands for small wage increases, the issue of work clothes, the provision of a trade union room, sports facilities, meal breaks, and increased distributions of essential commodities free or at low prices. The above scattered examples of successful SOBSI action in the promotion of the workers * interests indicate that SOBSI has effectively proved its worth as an ITUN, January 1959» PP*7-8. Ngadiman, "Apa 'Ketjil Hasil' Itu?" (What is Successful'?), BB, December 20, 1957» p.3« 'Small but === [PDF page 324] === efficient industrial organization. A comparison of the socio-economic gains won by SOBSI through the use of all means at its disposal with those won by other trade union organizations, suggests that SOBSI has been far more active and successful in the basic trade union work which attracts members and binds them to a trade union. SOBSI*s relations with other trade unions. A PKI central committee resolution of March 1, 1952 viciously attacked the non-SOBSI unions but expressed nonetheless the need to cooperate with them. SOBSI was slow to seek unity with the competing unions it had been denouncing as imperialist agents, but gradually developed an increasing enthusiasm for this work. The main fields of cooperation have been three: joint committees of trade unions in particular fields of work, joint committees for national celebrations, particularly for May Day, and joint trade union delegations to fill invitations to the Soviet bloc countries. What is called the cooperation meeting of government employees* trade unions was established in 1953 with This general conclusion was reached largely through interviews with officials of the Ministry of Labour, and especially with officials of the labour disputes arbitration and conciliation service. PKI, Kewadjiban, pp.17-18. === [PDF page 325] === originally 32 members, and grew to include 71 unions and 90 per cent of all government workers by July 1959* The cooperation meeting of trade unions in foreign enterprises was established in 1955» and by January 1960 was reported to include 40 unions with 1^ million members. The cooperation body of estate workers' organizations was formed in 1957 and included Sarbupri plus seven major non-SOBSI unions.^ By September 1957, a cooperation meeting of oil workers' unions had also begun to function. The first joint May Day committee was formed in 1953 when SOBSI and five other trade union federations, including PNI's KBKI, established a central committee.^ Joint May Day celebrations have been held in succeeding years. The countries of the Soviet bloc early invited the Indonesian trade unions to send joint delegations on free visits. One of the earliest reported joint SOBS1 2, Sedjarah, p.95; BB> July 15, 1959, p.2. SOBSI claimed that of the workers represented in the 'meeting' in July 1959 sixty per cent belonged to SOBSI unions. SOBSI, Sedjarah, p.95; HR, January 7, I960. HR, December 3, 1959; interview with Iskander Wahono, secretary-general of KBKI, the PNI trade union federation. SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.18. HR, March 30 and 31, 1953. === [PDF page 326] === delegations attended the 1953 May Day celebrations in Peking and the seventh all-China congress of trade unions, and then went on a tour from Mukden to Canton. Since 1953 the flow of joint trade union delegations to the Soviet bloc has been considerable. The question arises, have the joint actions benefitted SOBSI? negative. And the answer would appear to be Joint meetings have provided SOBSI leaders with broader audiences, but they have also presented the SOBSI rank and file as an audience for the non-SOBSI leaders. Joint actions, especially through the various cooperation meetings and bodies, have apparently brought the unions greater success than individual action would World Trade Union Movement, July 16-31> 1953» pp.9-10. On their return, the SOBSI and non-communist GSBI delegates issued a joint statement full of praise for the Chinese government, and concluding with the call to all Indonesian trade unionists: to take more positive action to form a workers* united front. With their united strength the Indonesian workers can certainly take the road of China, free themselves from the shackles of imperialism and build up their homeland. 44 Indonesian trade unionists were invited, for example, to attend May Day celebrations in 1957• 20 to China, 11 to the Soviet Union, 8 to North Korea, 3 to North Viet Nam, and 2 to East Germany. Of the 44» only 16 were from SOBSI, while 18 were from other trade union federations, 3 from non-federated unions, 1 from the communist-led village officials* association, and 6 from unidentified unions. BB, April 24> 1957> p«6. === [PDF page 327] === O i l 0 x JL have achieved, hut all unions benefit from them and especially the smaller unions, usually non-SOBSI, whose bargaining position would otherwise be much weaker. is also possible that SOBSI's efforts towards trade union unity have in fact brought the non-SOBSI unions closer together. In the period from 1950 to 1960 trade union organization was characterized by the fragmentation of existing non-SOBSI federations and the creation of a large number of new federations and new unfederated unions - in other words, the opposite of a trend towards unity. On SOBSI initiative, however, the non-SOBSI federations and unions were brought together on various joint committees and for joint actions. Recently they have begun to hold informal talks among themselves in order to prevent SOBSI control of the joint committees and actions, and a trend towards non-SOBSI trade union unity has been observable. In other words, S0BSI*s friendship towards and cooperation with the non-SOBSI trade union federations and non-federated unions have not been of direct benefit to SOBSI itself.2 The policy has been dictated by PKIfs Interview with Iskander Wahono. The only post-1950 example of militant action by SOBSI against another trade union perhaps gives some evidence that SOBSI would have benefitted from more aggressive === [PDF page 328] === overriding concern to pursue the national united front policy at the level of national politics. SOBSI*s political usefulness to PKI. Efficient trade union work in the defence of the workers* interests is not the primary purpose of SOBSI under the guidance of the Aidit leadership. That work is necessary in order to attract the broad mass of the workers, but the primary goal of the PKI leaders is to create in SOBSI, as in every mass organization, an organization that can lend support to the Party’s political struggle. Until the present, SOBSI has proved politically useful in a number of related ways: it has provided a source of Party cadres and members, it has provided a platform for pro-communist propaganda, and it has been a valuable assistant in supporting and strengthening the Party in its relations with the other political forces. The Aidit leadership also has endeavoured to create in SOBSI a major source of strength that could prove decisive in the event of a political showdown. The communist leaders of SOBSI and its member unions are constantly searching for potential Party cadres and action. In May 1955» SOBSI used its members to break a strike by the PSI-led KBSI, and SOBSI leaders claimed later that the collapse of the strike and the ’unmasking* of the KBSI leaders caused many members of KBSI unions to leave them and join SOBSI. === [PDF page 329] === ö i. J activists among their members, and use the SOBSI educational machinery, both formal and informal, to raise and guide the political consciousness of their own cadres and activists to the point where they voluntarily enter PKI. Through their publications, bulletin boards and cadres, SOBSI and its unions have faithfully publicized the current PKI line and PKI*s defence of the workers* interests. And SOBSI, like the other communist-led mass organizations, has been an important vehicle for preparing the way for the geographical spread of the Party. The assistance SOBSI has given PKI in the latter*s political struggle is far more complex, and can be considered under four headings: the mobilization of electoral support, assistance in creating a favourable atmosphere for the development of the national united front policy, direct pressure to assist PKI on particular issues, and additional support for PKI in conferences and governmental bodies. In the two national elections of 1955 and the local elections of 1957/1958, SOBSI played a significant part in mobilizing votes for PKI. Before the 1955 elections, SOBSI appointed, at all levels down to the basic organi zation, general election action committees or special cadres with the task of assisting in the election === [PDF page 330] === campaigns; and on July 15, 1955 the SOBSI secretariat issued a call to all member unions and all SOBSI regional committees and branches to prepare the workers for voting by showing them how to punch the hole through the appropriate symbol on the voting paper, SOBSI was also used to distribute PKI literature and mobilize crowds for Party meetings. We have seen how SOBSI has adopted a moderate pose in its dealings with the government and Indonesian employers, and how it has sought cooperation with nonSOBSI unions, - all in order to create the impression that communists are reasonable, responsible persons, and worthwhile allies, SOBSI*s moderation and even friendli ness were perhaps calculated to allay any fears and suspicions which the non-communists may have harboured regarding the disruptive and aggressive nature of the Indonesian communists. The ability of SOBSI to work amicably with the non-SOBSI unions for their mutual benefit, and perhaps even for the greater benefit of the non-SOBSI unions, should be a lesson to the non-communist politicians that cooperation with PKI at the political level could be beneficial. And if the PKI and its mass Buietin SOBSI, June 20, 1955» pp.1-2, Buietin SOBSI, August 20, 1955» P*8. === [PDF page 331] === o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e i n f a c t r e a s o n a b l e and w e ll m e a n in g, how th e n c an t h e y b e r e g a r d e d a s d a n g e ro u s? Why s h o u ld t h e i r r e p r e s s io n be c o n s id e re d n e c e s s a ry? The p o s i t i v e p r e s s u r e t h a t SOBSI, l i k e th e o t h e r c o m m u n is t-le d m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, h a s a p p l i e d i n s u p p o r t o f PKI h a s b e e n i n th e fo rm o f s t a t e m e n t s and r e s o l u t i o n s m ass m e e tin g s and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s, p o s t e r s a n d b a n n e r s, l e t t e r s, c a b l e s, p e t i t i o n s a n d d e l e g a t i o n s t o th e p r e s id e n t, to c a b in e t m in is te r s, sp e a k e rs o f p a rlia m e n t, th e p r e s i d e n t o f th e su p rem e c o u r t, th e a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l, t h e arm y c h i e f a n d a n y o t h e r c o n c e iv a b le g o v ern m en t a u t h o r i t y, and th e u s e o r t h r e a t o f p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s. Two m a jo r e x a m p le s o f SOBSI *s u se o f o r t h r e a t o f p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e a c t i o n o c c u r r e d i n M arch 1957» On M arch 1 8, SOBSI i n S o u th S u m a tra h e l d a 2 4 - h o u r g e n e r a l s t r i k e to p r o t e s t th e s e i z u r e o f pow er b y t h e r e g i o n a l arm y comm ander a n d t o dem and t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f c i v i l g o v e rn m e n t; a n d on M arch 19 a SOBSI d e l e g a t i o n w arn ed S u w ir jo, th e c a b i n e t f o r m a t e u r, t h a t i f a c a b i n e t was fo rm ed w ith M asjum i b u t w ith o u t PK I, 'SOBSI w i l l n o t h e s i t a t e and i s a lw a y s i n r e a d i n e s s t o l e a d a t o t a l s t r i k e a c t i o n a l l o v er In d o n e s ia ' • ^ ITUN, M arch 1957» p. 6. === [PDF page 332] === On July 12, 1957 a 45-member National Council was installed by Sukarno to assist the cabinet, and for the first time the president included ‘functional groups* in governmental bodies* SOBS I received one seat on the National Council, one on the 45-member National Advisory Council appointed on August 15 > 1959» one on the 77-member National Planning Council appointed on the same day, and about eight in the appointed parliament installed on June 25, 1960. The SOBSI seats by themselves are not significant, but when added to those of the other commu nist-led mass organizations they do give important additional representation to PKI. If the national united front policy fails to enable PKI to take power by peaceful means, then SOBSI might be of crucial importance in any possible show of strength between the political forces* In SOBSI, PKI has an organization that reaches into government ministries, that might be able to bring the economy to a standstill, and that might be able to mobilize large numbers of workers to the side of PKI. Perhaps the threat, spoken or implied, of the use of the massive PKI network given at a time of major political crisis might be able to bring PKI to power. The fundamental question, the real strength of PKI vis-a-vis the other political forces, will be dealt with in the concluding chapter. But some examination === [PDF page 333] === n e e d s t o b e made h e re o f SOBSI*s r e a l s t r e n g t h i n th e l a b o u r f i e l d b e c a u s e SOBSI i s P K I 's m ost im p o r ta n t mass o r g a n i z a t i o n, w e ll s u p p l i e d w ith fu n d s a n d c a d r e s, and o r g a n i z e d i n v i t a l s e c t o r s o f t h e econom y among th o s e who s h o u ld b e, a c c o r d i n g to P K I 's M a r x is t a n a l y s i s, th e m o st m i l i t a n t a n d p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c io u s o f th e P a r t y 's s u p p o rte rs. The s t r e n g t h SOBSI c o u ld e x e r t i n th e e v e n t o f a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s d e p e n d s n o t o n ly on th e s i z e o f i t s own m em b ersh ip a n d b o d y o f w e l l - t r a i n e d c a d r e s b u t a l s o on o th e r f a c to r s: th e s i z e, a n d o c c u p a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e non-SO BSI u n io n s an d o f th e u n o r g a n iz e d w o r k e r s, a n d w hat m ig h t b e te rm e d th e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e SOBSI m em b ersh ip. U n t i l th e M adiun r e b e l l i o n, SOBSI an d i t s member u n io n s h a d a v i r t u a l m onopoly o f t r a d e u n io n a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e R e p u b li c. B u t, a s h a s b e e n s e e n, th e r e b e l l i o n a n d th e l a t e r t i g h t e n i n g o f PKI c o n t r o l o v e r SOBSI l e d many t r a d e u n io n s an d u n i o n i s t s to l e a v e. The h i s t o r y o f th e a p p e a ra n c e, d is a p p e a ra n c e, fra g m e n ta tio n a n d g ro w th o f t h e non-SO B SI u n io n s s i n c e M adiun i s m ost c o m p l i c a te d, b u t t h e g e n e r a l o u t l i n e i n d i c a t e s a s t e a d y i n c r e a s e i n t h e co m b in ed s i z e o f t h e non-SO BSI u n i o n s. The s t o r y o f t r a d e u n io n d e v e lo p m e n ts i n t h i s p e r i o d i s g iv e n i n o u t l i n e i n S a n d ra N i t i d i h a r d j o, G e rak a n B uruh === [PDF page 334] === The following paragraphs are concerned only with indicating the relative sizes of the non-SOBSI unions in I960. Several trade union federations exist that are tied to particular political parties* The largest, PNI*s KBKI, was founded in December 1952 and by 1958 claimed over one million members; at the beginning of 1960 it claimed 143 branches with at least one full-timer in each branch.^ The Socialist Party*s KBSI in March 1958 claimed 376,000 members, and contained three important unions: the railway workers* PBKA with a claimed member ship of 32,000 at the end of 1959* the estate workers* Perbupri with 120,000, and a union of civil aviation workers which claimed 60 per cent of all workers in that field.^ The Labour Party runs a small federation with perhaps 30,000 members. Among the trade union feder ations based on religion, the largest is the Masjumi- Indonesia (The Indonesian Labour Movement), mimeographed, Djakarta, 1956, PP»79-97; Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, pp.25-130; also in the Ministry of Labour's periodical Tindlauan Masa *alah Perburuhan (Survey of the Labour Question). I also received much assistance from officials of the Ministry of Labour, and especially from cadres of the various trade union federations. Interview with Iskander Wahono. Tindjauan Masa *alah Perburuhan, May 1958, p.8. Interview with A.Z. Abidin, secretary-general of KBSI. === [PDF page 335] === inclined SBII, founded at the end of 1947 and hopefully claiming 850,000 members at the end of 1959* Three other Islamic trade union federations exist, but their combined size cannot be above 100,000 members. Both Christian Protestants and Roman Catholics also have their own small federations. In 1954 there were about 980 trade union organi zations, with a total claimed membership of 711,000, unaffiliated to any central federation. They included many of the trade unions for white collar workers in banks, air transport, the police, government ministries and public services. Among the more important nonfederated unions is the teachers’ union, with 128,000 members, and a North Sumatra estate workers* union with up to 100,000 members. The rise of the non-SOBSI unions has broken the monopoly of almost every SOBSI union in its particular sphere.^ SOBSI leaders, non-SOBSI unionists and Ministry Interview with Agus Sudono, first secretary of SBII. Richardson, ’’Indonesian Labor Relations”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1958, vol.XII, no.1, p.Ö5* ITUN, February 1960, p.2; Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, [Unreadable] For example, the monopoly of Sarbupri has been broken by the rise of the KBSI affiliate Perbupri, SarbupriS0BRI, Sarbupri-Coerdian, the KBKI’s estate workers’ === [PDF page 336] === of Labour officials alike estimate that SOBSI now includes perhaps 50 to 60 per cent of all organized labour. But the collapse of the SOBSI monopoly means that there is now virtually no labour area in which SOBSI could cause a complete stoppage without the support of the non-SOBSI unions. Furthermore, the reservoir of unemployed and non-unionized workers faces any go-it-alone strike by SOBSI with the possibility of defeat - unless it were in a highly skilled field. The second major factor involved in any estimate of SOBSI’s real strength in the labour field is the character of the SOBSI membership. are the SOBSI members? In other words, how militant How far would they follow the union, SBII, Sarbumusi of the NU, and regional unions; the monopoly of SBKA among railway workers has been broken by the KBSI affiliate PBKA, which is now dominant in West Java and is increasing in East Java with the help of the Moslem parties, and by the small, FNI-led KBKA; Perbum now has perhaps only 50 or 60 per cent of all oil workers; and the SOBSI post, telegraph and telephone union now contains only a minority of workers in that field. See above, p.37, footnote 2, for estimates of the number of unemployed and underemployed. The number of non-organized workers has been estimated by Njono at three millions, by Tedjasukmana at about two millions; Njono, "Beberapa Peladjaran dari Kongres Nasional ke-II SOBSI” (Some Lessons from SOBSI’s Second National Congress), BM, January 1955> p.8; Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p.25. Tedjasukmana*s estimate specifically excluded workers in ’very small undertakings * who ’usually do not form associations’. === [PDF page 337] === Cl hr SOBSI leaders in the event of a political crisis in militant action that would be clearly pro-PKI? The answers given by non-communist trade union leaders, security police officers and Ministry of Labour officials are fairly uniform: 'I do not believe that PKI could lead the workers in political strikes1, 'SOBSI no longer dare start a strike alone; it could not, alone, lead strikes, especially of a political nature', The SOBSI members have a strong attachment to their trade union leaders, but I am not at all convinced that in a political crisis many would follow PKI against the government for clearly political purposes, 'If there was a grave political crisis, the SOBSI workers would say "go fight for yourself" and then go home'*1 The extent to which the SOBSI members would follow their leaders in clearly political action would depend, of course, on where the lines of political division were drawn. But if PKI were opposed to the government and without a powerful ally such as the president, it is very doubtful indeed whether the SOBSI members, with some few exceptions, would militantly support PKI. This relative passivity requires some explanation. These are representative quotations from conversations with me. === [PDF page 338] === o o n O Ay Four factors mentioned in the Introduction help explain the passivity of the Indonesian workers. First, the majority of workers are in small enterprises, which in any country are the most difficult for trade unions to organize for militant action. Second, the small employers still accept, in general, a certain fatherly responsibility towards their workers, which helps prevent the growth of antagonistic labour relations. Third, about 35 per cent of the workers are women, and more in some of the largescale industries, who also constitute an obstacle to the development of militant trade unionism, the moreso in a country where women are traditionally ‘malu1, shy. Fourth, and most important, the Indonesian workers are usually not far removed in time or family connections from the peasantry, and retain a strong sense of acceptance of authority or the tradition of open obedience. Certainly the ingrained behavioural patterns of the village have undergone change with the migration to the cities, especially among the literate and skilled workers and among those who have lived in the towns for a long time; but the patterns do not appear to have changed so much among most workers. See above, pp. 26-7> 32-4* See below, p.442 note 1 === [PDF page 339] === oo o Throughout their history, moreover, Indonesian trade unions have been sternly discouraged from militant action. The workers have received neither the leadership nor the experience in industrial action necessary to rid them of their obedience to established authority and to develop the traits of solidarity in action and aggressiveness in politics. During the Dutch and Japanese rule the growth of trade unions was severely curtailed, and the few strikes were quickly suppressed. When trade unions were formed after the proclamation of independence, they were not the spontaneous creation of the workers but the fabrication of literate middle class persons. today, the Even national and regional leadership of SOBSI and its member unions contains hardly a single cadre of other than white-collar origin, and the SOBSI leaders complain in private of the great difficulty of finding workers who can be trained as trade union cadres. During the revolution strikes were anti-patriotic and reduced to a minimum, and from the end of 1950 military and government regulations as well as PKI's national united front policy In 1935 there were 111 trade unions with 72,675 members, and in 1939 75 unions with 109,547 members; Peter H.W. Sitsen, Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies, New York, 1942, pp.46-7- In 1939 there were only 18 strikes, of from 1 to 18 days, involving a total of 1,628 workers; ibid., p.47» === [PDF page 340] === have also reduced the number of strikes. There have been very few strikes since 1956. When an ordinary worker enters a trade union, what does he expect to put into it, and to receive from it? He joins because the union offers to help him face problems raised by his employment, and more often than not he joins a SOBSI union because it is the largest, the best organized and most successful. however, largely passive. His membership is, Under the labour disputes arbitration and conciliation system established in 1951» when the worker has a complaint or a problem he takes it to the trade union cadre, usually a person of higher, ’superior* social status, who then takes it to the employer or a government committee for solution. The worker himself rarely participates in direct action. Whereas in the village the peasant traditionally has taken problems to the *bapak* (father) lurah or government official, the urban worker takes his problems to a new *bapak* who then negotiates with *the authorities* on his behalf. If the above general picture is correct, the workers have no or very little experience in methods of direct action (and SOBSI is still striving to prevent ’radical* actions), they are not conscious of the power they could exert by such action, and they look upon the union as a === [PDF page 341] === sort of *bapak* who mediates between themselves and the more or less incomprehensible forces that weigh upon them. Such a picture is over-simplified and certainly would not apply to some of the SOBSI unionists, perhaps, for example, the more skilled railway workers. does seem to have wide validity. But it And if it does, then it means that SOBSI could not be of the importance its numbers indicate were PKI to face a show of strength with its political enemies. The workers do not have the militancy, the unity, the training in direct action, or even the belief in their own strength, to follow SOBSI and PKI against *the authorities* if *the authorities* were to demonstrate their determined opposition. (b) Direct Party Work. Although the Aidit leadership has used the mass organizations to gather support and potential members, it has been careful not to obscure PKI*s primary position as the militant defender of the working class. The mass As an illustration of this point, in March 1960 the SOBSI seamen*s and harbour workers* union, which has a virtual monopoly in the ports of Java, tried to stage strikes in Tandjung Priok, Semarang and Surabaja. display of force by the army caused the strikes to collapse immediately and the workers to submit without protest to the arrest of the union cadres. And in this example the union was pressing justifiable socialeconomic demands, not political ones. === [PDF page 342] === 226 organizations swell the vociferous campaigns for popular demands, such as the provision of essential commodities at low prices, but PKI is pointed to as the clear leader of the campaigns. At one level, PKI is presented to the workers as the party most able in representing their material demands, but at another level PKI is presented as the champion of a political system which will ensure social and economic justice for the masses. At the present stage of the Indonesian revolution, PKI offers a people’s democracy. The PKI programme endorsed in March 1954 promised that for the workers people’s democracy would mean industrial expansion, a minimum wage, an annual holiday of at least two weeks with full pay, a social security system paid for by the state and the capitalists, price controls, a six-hour work day in mines and other unhealthy employment, the abolition of ’semi-feudal exploitation of work’, such as contract labour, the prohibition of female, child and youth labour in unhealthy work, the free development of trade unions, and the right of labour to make collective agreements. In the election manifesto endorsed at the same time, the PKI, Program PKI (PKI’s Programme), Djakarta, 1954» pp.16-17* === [PDF page 343] === PKI promise was contained in a single sentence: 'For the workers, to vote PKI means rice, fair wages and just social security'. For the 1957/1958 regional and local elections, PKI issued election programmes for each province and for each kabupaten and autonomous city. The PKI election programme for Surabaja illustrates the promises PKI has made to the workers. Apart from promises of a general appeal, such as improved educational and medical facilities, those designed particularly for the urban worker included: 1. to fight for a minimum daily wage of seven rupiahs for municipal workers; 2. to increase the supply of water; 3. to endeavour to increase the supply of electricity to the kampongs; 4. to build and repair alleys, roads and bridges; 5. to fight for the immediate legalization of houses built by squatters on disputed land; PKI, Manifes Pemilihan Umum PKI (PKI's General Election Manifesto), Djakarta, 1954» p*19* It should be noted that the verb 'memilih* means both 'to vote' and 'to elect'. Program Secom PKI Kotapradja Surabaja untuk Pemilihan DPRD Kotapradja Surabaja (The Programme of the Surabaja City PKI Section Committee for the Elections for the Surabaja City Representative Council), Surabaja, 1957» pp.9-10. === [PDF page 344] === rer 6. t o make more l a n d a v a i l a b l e f o r kam pongs and in d u s try; 7* t o f i g h t f o r t h e re m o v a l o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t women in t h e s p h e r e s o f w ages an d j o b s; and 8. to i n c r e a s e th e num ber o f c o u r s e s f o r t e a c h i n g t h e v a rio u s tr a d e s. The PKI s l o g a n to a t t r a c t t h e S u r a b a ja w o rk e rs w a s: ’F o r th e w o rk e rs an d g o v e rn m e n t e m p lo y e e s, t o v o te PKI means p r o p e r w a g e s, h o u s i n g, s o c i a l s e c u r i t y an d w ork c o n d i t i o n s ’. B e s id e s p r o m is e s o f a b e t t e r l i f e, an d i t s w ork i n th e m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, PKI h a s a l s o u n d e r ta k e n a v a r i e t y o f t a s k s aim ed a t w in n in g t h e s u p p o r t o f th e u rb a n popu la tio n. The P a r t y an d i t s m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s have c o l l e c t e d r e l i e f f o r v i c t i m s o f f lo o d s and kampong f i r e s, an d some P a r t y c o m m itte e s h a v e fo rm ed l o c a l f i r e b r i g a d e s to a s s i s t th e m u n ic ip a l b r i g a d e s. PKI w ork b r i g a d e s h a v e a l s o h e lp e d t o c l e a n kampong g u t t e r s, and t o b u i l d a n d r e p a i r kam pong h o u s e s, p u b l i c l a v a t o r i e s an d b a t h i n g The d a n g e r o f f i r e i n th e d e n s e l y p a c k e d and in fla m m a b le kam pongs i s v e r y g r e a t d u r i n g th e d r y s e a s o n, an d e a c h y e a r th o u s a n d s o f homes a r e d e s t r o y e d. I n Novem ber 1 9 5 9 » f o r e x a m p le, th e PKI D j a k a r t a R a ja c o m m itte e i n s t r u c t e d a l l c o m m itte e s, c a d r e s an d members i n i t s a r e a to fo rm f i r e b r i g a d e s i n e a c h kam pong; HR, November 5, 1 9 5 9 * === [PDF page 345] === onn places, and gutters.-' So far, however, PKI and its mass organizations have been unable to inspire any large number of their members to join such brigades. An important function filled by PKI and its mass organizations among the poor sections of society, both urban and rural, is the provision of mutual assistance in times of need, such as deaths, marriages, births, and illness, a valuable service to people near or at subsistence level and with no or few social security services. Since 1958 PKI has written and talked much on the need to establish cooperatives, including consumer cooperatives which would free especially the workers from the speculative practices of the shopkeepers. As yet, however, concrete results have not been announced, and as the emphasis of the cooperative campaign has been in the rural areas, the campaign will be dealt with more fully in the section on the peasantry. In many cities of Java a system of kampong government has been established distinct from the municipal and national government structure. Rukun-rukun tetangga (associations of neighbours) are united in rukun-rukun kampong (kampong associations) which in turn are united For the results achieved by Party work brigades in preparation for the September 1959 congress, see above, p.187* === [PDF page 346] === i n an a l l - c i t y fe d e ra tio n * The s t r e n g t h, a n d s p h e r e o f a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e kampong g o v e rn m e n t s y s te m s v a r y fro m c i t y to c i t y and th e y have d is a p p e a re d a lt o g e t h e r in som e, s u c h a s M a lan g, b u t i n S u r a b a j a, th e s e c o n d l a r g e s t tow n i n I n d o n e s ia a n d t h e m ost im p o r t a n t i n d u s t r i a l l y, PKI b u i l t th e RKKS (Rukun Kampong K ota S u r a b a j a, S u r a b a j a C i ty Kampong A s s o c i a t i o n ) i n t o s y s te m o f com m unity o r g a n i z a t i o n s • • • s t r o n g enough t o co m p ete w i t h t h e o f f i c i a l l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s y s te m 1• The J a p a n e s e h a d o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d th e ru k u n kam pong s y s te m i n S u r a b a ja d u r i n g t h e i r o c c u p a tio n a s a d i s t r i b u t i o n n e tw o rk f o r s c a r c e c o m m o d itie s, a s a m u tu a l s u r v e i l l a n c e s y s te m, a n d a s a m eans o f m o b i l i z i n g f o r c e d l a b o u r a n d s e m i - m i l i t a r y g u a rd u n i t s. I n J a n u a r y 1950 t h e RKKS was e s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r PKI d i r e c t i o n * I n th e a b s e n c e o f a g o v e rn m e n t s t r u c t u r e b e lo w th e l e v e l o f th e f l in g k u n g a n?, o f w h ic h t h e r e a r e 37 i n S u r a b a j a, th e RKKS becam e th e e f f e c t i v e g o v ern m en t i n th e kam pongs* When, i n th e s e c o n d h a l f o f 19 5 0, th e g o v e rn m e n t a p p o in te d L e t t e r fro m I r e n e T in k e r W alk er to t h e a u t h o r, O c to b e r J o h n D* L e g g e, P ro b le m s o f R e g io n a l Autonomy i n C o n te m p o ra ry I n d o n e s i a, I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 1957, P«23« The b e s t a c c o u n t o f th e RKKS i s g i v e n i n Boyd R. C om pton, Red S u r a b a j a, I n s t i t u t e o f C u r r e n t W orld A f f a i r s R e p o r t, New Y o rk, 1 9 5 6, p p.8 - 1 5. === [PDF page 347] === o ffic ia ls f o r th e lin g k u n g a n s, th e y w ere m o s tly the c a n d id a t e s p r o p o se d b y th e RKKS b r a n c h e s. D u rin g th e s u c c e e d in g y e a r s, i t was d i f f i c u l t t o d i s t i n g u i s h b etw een th e f u n c t io n in g o f th e R.K.K.S. b ra n ch a t th e ward l e v e l and th e ward governm ent i t s e l f. 1 The RKKS c o l l e c t s f e e s from e a ch h o u s e h o ld, b u ild s s c h o o ls, o r g a n iz e s community work t o c le a n g u t t e r s and r e p a ir a l l e y s, s u b s i d i z e s b u r i a l s, and a r r a n g e s f o r th e n ig h t g u a rd s th a t a re u s u a l l y le d b y a member o f Pemuda R a k ja t. The p o l i t i c a l u s e f u ln e s s o f th e RKKS to PKI has b e e n c o n s id e r a b le: i t has m o b iliz e d p e o p le f o r r a l l i e s and d e m o n s t r a t io n s, m o b iliz e d v o t e r s in e l e c t i o n s, and has s e r v e d t o b r in g th o s e kampong d w e lle r s w ith g r e a t e r in itia tiv e its e lf. i n t o th e PKI o r b i t and th e n in t o th e P a rty A lth o u g h th e l o c a l army commander in A p r il 1958 i s s u e d a r e g u la t i o n fo r b id d in g th e RKKS t o engage o p e n ly in p o l i t i c s, th e RKKS c o u ld n o t be banned b e c a u s e, in th e a b se n c e o f a governm ent s t r u c t u r e b e lo w th e lin g k u n g a n le v e l, i t was n eed ed t o perform th e governm ent d u t i e s o f c e n su s t a k i n g, kampong c le a n in g and s e c u r i t y, and th e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f coupons f o r e s s e n t i a l c o m m o d itie s. [Unreadable] T h is r e g u la t i o n i s g iv e n in K otapradja S u rab aja (S u ra b a ja C i t y ), Madja1ah Penerangan (In fo r m a tio n M a g a z in e ), n o. 6, 1959» p p.1 7 -2 0. As o f === [PDF page 348] === May I 9 6 0, PKI members o r s y m p a th iz e r s s t i l l c o n t r o l l e d 26 o f th e 27 lin g k u n g a n o f f i c e s. The im p o rta n c e o f t h e ru k u n kampong s y s te m i n o t h e r J a v a n e s e tow ns i s n o t c o m p a ra b le to t h a t o f t h e RKKS, b u t th e PKI e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e s y s te m o u t s i d e S u r a b a ja s t i l l a w a its r e s e a r c h. The P e a s a n ts ( a ) The PKI A t t i t u d e t o th e P e a s a n t s. D u rin g th e r e v o l u t i o n PKI h a d l a r g e l y ig n o r e d th e p e a s a n try. T h en, i n A u g u st 1 9 4 8, t h e p o l i t b u r e a u a d m i t te d p a s t e r r o r s and d e c l a r e d t h a t 'W ith o u t th e a c t i v e s u p p o rt o f th e p e a s a n ts, th e n a ti o n a l r e v o lu tio n w i l l c e r t a i n l y b e d e f e a t e d '. One o f th e m ain t a s k s o f th e f i f t h n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s s c h e d u le d f o r O c to b e r 1948 was t o f o r m u la te an a g r a r i a n program m e t h a t c o u ld u n i t e th e p o o r, s m a ll a n d medium p e a s a n t s w ith th e w o r k e r s, t h a t i s, w ith th e P a r ty. The c o n g r e s s was n o t h e l d n o r th e program m e f o r m u la te d b e c a u s e i n S e p te m b e r t h e M adiun r e b e l l i o n b r o k e o u t an d i n D ecem ber th e D u tch la u n c h e d t h e i r s e c o n d P K I, D ja la n B a ru u n tu k R e p u b lik I n d o n e s i a (New Road f o r th e I n d o n e s ia n R e p u b li c ), ( s e v e n th e d i t i o n ), D j a k a r t a, 1953, P.1 0. PK I, L a h i m j a P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s ia d a n P e rk e m b a n g a n n ja (The B i r t h a n d G row th o f P K I), D j a k a r t a, 1951, P. 2 2. === [PDF page 349] === attack on the Republic* For almost five years after Madiun the PKI leaders devoted their resources to reconstructing and expanding support in the towns and in the trade unions. Some work was done in analyzing rural conditions, 1 but it was not translated into practical action. This phase came to an end in July 1953 when Aidit published an article which turned the major focus of Party activity onto the rural areas. Aidit stated that ’The agrarian revolution is the essence of the people’s democratic revolution in Indonesia’. Therefore it was vital for the Party to win the allegiance of the peasants. He admitted that the peasant mass was indifferent to and not rarely suspicious of the Party, and blamed this on several factors: first: there is not yet a single Party member who thoroughly understands, and very few who know about, agrarian relations and the life and demands of the peasants; second, the communist-led peasant organizations had raised the slogans ’the right of the state over all land’ and ’nationalization of all land’, which made the peasants See, for example ’’Masaalah Tani di Indonesia” (The Peasant Question in Indonesia), BM, June 15-July 1, 1951» PP*303-6; PKI, ’’Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum Tani” (The Programme of Land Change and Peasant Demands), BM, December 1951, pp.7-22, 32-6. D.N. Aidit, ’’Haridepan Gerakan Tani Indonesia” (The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement), BM, July 1953, PP.332-40. === [PDF page 350] === suspicious because they did not understand them; and third, the Party did not yet have a *correct and revolutionary* agrarian programme to attract the peasants. He called for an end to the 'serious deficiency* in Party work among the peasants, and for an expansion of Party membership in the villages, especially among the labourers and poor peasants. Aidit scornfully rejected the statements of some cadres in the rural areas that the peasants in their areas had no problems which could be exploited in order to bind them to the forces of the revolution. All cadres must realize that the peasants had many demands, and that: For each demand a movement can be made based on a slogan, for example: 'lower land rents', 'lower the interest rate on loans', 'lower state taxes', 'cancel arrears in land tax', 'abolish setoran p a k s a ', 'abolish pologoro', 'abolish rodi ', Td o n ’t touch the land that is worked by the peasants', 'give unworked land to the peasants', 'the peasants' right to determine the rent of the land leased to foreign estates', 'arm the peasants in order to crush the DI, Til and other terrorist gangs', 'assistance in seeds and tools for the peasants', 'one agricultural school for each ketjamatan', 'abolish the fee for permission to kill and sell livestock', 'abolish the fee for identification papers', 'improve the old irrigation and make new', 'form a village government that defends the people', etc., etc. / e i q j These are not all the slogans of the peasants' everyday demands. There are too many to be included here. Ibid., p.339* Pologoro is unpaid labour and services performed by the villagers for the village officials; rodi === [PDF page 351] === It was the duty of Party cadres and members, Aidit wrote, to decide,through discussion with the peasants, which was the most urgent demand in any place at a given time* As the basic slogans with which the Party could attract the peasant masses, Aidit laid down peasants*, 'land for the 'distribution of land to the peasants', and 'peasant private ownership of land'. With these slogans the peasants will certainly have no doubts about our programme, and they will even support it with all their strength. This is the guarantee for firm alliance between the workers and peasants, the guarantee for a strong national united front, the guarantee for our victory.* Aidit was aware, however, of the danger of 'adventurism*, of trying to bring the peasants* struggle to a higher level without preparatory organizational and educational work, and he carefully laid down techniques by which the peasants could be brought by stages towards the point of implementing the 'land for the peasants' slogan. is compulsory, unpaid labour for the government. Setoran p aksa, in this context, is probably the compulsory sale of a certain proportion of the rice harvest to the govern ment, at prices fixed by the government and below the market price. Aidit made clear to the Party cadres who would be reading his article, however, that peasant private ownership of land would not be the final stage of the agrarian revolution. The peasants' own experience plus 'the leadership and education of the Party* would lead to the voluntary abandonment of private for collective agriculture. === [PDF page 352] === The March 1954 Party congress endorsed the new emphasis on the importance of peasant participation in the revolution, and clarified: the basic and most immediate tasks of the Communist Party, that is, to mobilize the peasants and draw them into the struggle to eliminate the remnants of feudalism, and to develop the anti-feudal agrarian revolution« * Since the fifth congress the Aidit leadership has con tinued to acknowledge the agrarian revolution as the essential element of the Indonesian revolution« December i960, for example, Aidit referred to ’the emphasis on activities among the peasants within the framework of strengthening the national front.* The Aidit leadership has classified the peasantry into several broad social divisions based on land owner ship,^ It has been aware that in order to mobilize the support of the non-landlord elements, then it must first understand the specific interests and demands of the different social divisions. Because the conditions of the peasants vary widely from region to region, and even D.N. Aidit, "Indonesian People in Struggle for Complete Abolition of Colonial Regime", PALP, August 27> 1955> D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisms dan Peodalisme.’" (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism and Feudalism.*), HR, January 2, 1961. See above, pp.71-3 === [PDF page 353] === from village to village, and because so little information is available concerning agrarian relations in Indonesia, the Party leaders have endeavoured to collect their own information. in 1958. This task was begun systematically early At the end of that year Party cadres were instructed to *go down to the villages*, to live, eat and work with the peasants, in order to gather first-hand information in preparation for the PKI national peasants* conference in April 1959. Since the conference, both PKI and BTI have continued to compile information from villages (especially in Java) on such matters a3 land tenure, interest rates charged by moneylenders, and the survival of feudal customs. It is hoped that this information will enable PKI and BTI to make their appeals to the different sections of the peasantry more concrete and therefore more effective. (b) Building an Organization among the Peasants. 1. PKI. Prior to the March 1954 congress, PKI had made few direct inroads into the villages. At the "Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum Tani" (Report on Party Work among the Peasants), BM, April-May 1959, p.138. For some of the results of the information-collecting campaign, see ST, January 1959, p.10; and Asmu, "Masaalah Landreform" (TKe Question of Land Reform), BM, January 1960, pp.21-5. === [PDF page 354] === O' i j O c o n g r e s s i t was a n n o u n c e d t h a t l e s s t h a n h a l f o f t h e 1 6 5 »206 P a r t y members w ere o f p e a s a n t o r i g i n. I t is r e a s o n a b l e to assum e t h a t a good p r o p o r t i o n o f th o s e o f p e a s a n t o r i g i n w ere i n th e e s t a t e, f o r e s t r y a n d s u g a r - m i l l a r e a s w here SOBSI u n io n s h a d a l r e a d y b e e n a c t i v e f o r some y e a rs. The m em b ersh ip d r i v e w h ic h f o llo w e d t h e c o n g r e s s was aim ed p a r t i c u l a r l y a t th e p e a s a n t s. B e fo re t h e en d o f 1955 c la im e d P a r t y m em bership had p a s s e d one m i l l i o n, a n d was g iv e n a s one an d a h a l f m i l l i o n s a t th e b e g in n i n g o f 1958» a t w h ic h f i g u r e i t s t a y e d u n t i l th e s i x t h c o n g r e s s i n S e p te m b e r 1959« I n D ecem ber 1958 i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t p e a s a n t s c o n s t i t u t e d o v e r h a l f th e P a r t y m e m b e rsh ip, w h i l e t h e s i x t h c o n g r e s s was in fo rm e d t h a t t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f p e a s a n t m em bers was s t i l l i n c r e a s i n g. T h ese o f f i c i a l P a r t y f i g u r e s i n d i c a t e t h a t b e tw e e n M arch 1954 an d D ecem ber 1958 th e num ber o f p e a s a n t members i n c r e a s e d fro m l e s s t h a n 8 0,0 0 0 to w e l l o v e r t h r e e q u a rte rs o f a m illio n. I n h i s r e p o r t t o t h e s i x t h c o n g r e s s i n S e p te m b e r 1959» Anwar S a n u s i p r e s e n t e d s t a t i s t i c s on th e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n i n J a v a a t t h a t tim e P K I, B ah an -B ah an u n tu k K o n g res N a s io n a l ke-VT P a r t a i Kom unis I n d o n e s i a ( M a t e r i a l s f o r t h e S i x t h PKI N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s ), D j a k a r t a, 1958, p.5 3; PK I, R e s o l u s i t e n t a n g L a p o ra n Umum, p.6 6. === [PDF page 355] === 239 which also can be used to visualize the situation in July 1956. According to his figures, in July 1956 PKI had a branch in about 34 per cent of the 21,047 villages in Java, and increased this to 84.2 per cent in the next three years; in July 1956 PKI had a subsection in about 70 per cent of the 1,449 ketjamatans, and increased this to 98«7 per cent. Prom an analysis of the 1957 local election results, the ’vacant* villages and ketjamatans would be in the strongly Moslem areas of West Java and East Java, including Madura. Vital to strengthening the Party organization in the rural areas has been the creation of good cadres for work among the peasants. This has been difficult in the Javanese villages for a number of reasons. First, the more literate and politically conscious peasants who tend to become cadres in both the Party and the mass organi zations are often middle and rich peasants or even landlords, and retain the attitudes of their social position towards the poorer peasants. Second, in the relative social peace of the village, many cadres, Amir Anwar Sanusi, The Results of the First Three-Year Plan, mimeographed, Djakarta, 1959» p.3* The following information was gathered largely from conversations with cadres of PKI and its mass organi zations; see also, "Laporan”, BM, April-May 1959> PP*135> 144-5. === [PDF page 356] === 240 themselves of peasant origin, are loath to create social disunity in the village or have failed to recognize the existence of landlord exploitation. Third, some PKI cadres have tended to become landlords once they become village officials, and to ignore the sufferings of the poorer peasants. Fourth, the educational level of peasant members is generally so low that they must be taught literacy and basic general knowledge before they can receive political training. And, fifth, cadres from urban areas often do not know the regional language required, or are simply unwilling to engage in rural work. The low level of the quality of peasant cadres was admitted in ’'The Report on Party Work among the Peasants’* submitted to the PKI national peasants * conference in mid-April 1959: The majority of Party cadres at the subsection and branch levels in the villages have not yet deeply studied the class divisions, the characteristics of each class and the class relations in the village. In general they are still unable to distinguish the landlord from the rich peasant, and still do not know the difference between the rich peasant and the medium peasant. This means that they do not yet thoroughly know who are the friends and who are the enemies of the revolution.1 Worse still, the cadres even up to the section level did not, in general, know: "Laporan", BM, April-May 1959* p*131 === [PDF page 357] === n A -f who constitute the landlord group and what is the history of their land ownership, the means by which the landlord steals the peasants* land, the forms of exploitation and the evil nature of the exploitation of the landlord and moneylender, the way the landlord and moneylender squeeze and deceive the peasants, the way the landlord uses government officials and thugs to oppress the peasants*12 The work of the Party in educating a body of cadres has been detailed in the section an building the Party. But special attention has had to be given to peasant cadres because of their generally lower quality. A report presented to the central committee in July 1957 proposed conferences between peasant activists as a means of improving their quality. Before the national peasants 1 conference the Party launched a *go down to the villages* and *three-togethers* movement, as has been described above, partly as a way to increase the middle and upper cadres* understanding of village life. In the conference itself, the Party leaders called for special schools for peasant cadres, and for the replacement of Party rural Ibid., p.132. "Laporan Tambahan Mengenai Masaalah Mengembangkan Pekerdjaan Massa kaum Tani" (Additional Report on the Question of Developing Mass Work among the Peasants), HR, July 10, 1957. === [PDF page 358] === [Unreadable] w o r k e r s whose i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t e d w ith th o s e o f th e p e a s a n ts. I n s h o r t, by S e p te m b e r 1959 th e PKI o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d b e e n e x te n d e d i n t o t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f J a v a n e s e v i l l a g e s a n d i n t o v i r t u a l l y e v e r y v i l l a g e i n th e s t r o n g l y PKI a r e a o f C e n tr a l and E a s t J a v a. An i n t e n s i v e e f f o r t i n c a d r e e d u c a t i o n had g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d b o t h t h e num ber a n d q u a lity o f ru ra l c a d re s. T h e ir q u a l i t y s t i l l l e f t much t o b e d e s i r e d, b u t th e P a r t y l e a d e r s w ere aw are o f t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s and w ere t a k i n g m e a su re s t o e r a d i c a t e th e m. I t s h o u ld b e n o te d h e r e t h a t th e A l d i t l e a d e r s h i p i n i t s w ork o f a t t r a c t i n g and m o b i l i z i n g th e p e a s a n t s h a d u s e d n o t o n ly PKI and t h e s p e c i f i c a l l y p e a s a n t mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s b u t a l s o th e y o u th o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d th e women’s o r g a n i z a t i o n, t h e m a j o r i t y o f whose members a r e v illa g e rs. BTI. When th e A id it le a d e r s h ip won c o n t r o l o f PKI i n January 1951» th e P a rty had c o m p lete c o n t r o l o f one n a t i o n a l p e a sa n t o r g a n i z a t i o n, RTI (Rukun Tani I n d o n e s ia, In d o n e s ia n P e a sa n ts* U n io n ), d i s g u i s e d c o n t r o l o f BTI, and in f l u e n c e i n a t h i r d, SAKTI (S a r e k a t Tani I n d o n e s ia, " L a p o ra n ", BM, A p ril-M a y 1959> p. l 4 6; B.O. H u ta p e a, "Some L e s so n s from th e F i r s t N a t i o n a l P e a s a n ts C o n fe re n c e o f t h e C. P. I. ", R I, A ugust 1959» p p. 3 2 - 3 * === [PDF page 359] === Indonesian Peasants12 3 Association). On July 2, 1951 these three organizations established the FPT (Front Persatuan Tani, Peasants* United Front) with a joint programme of demands. For over two years the FPT operated as a fairly closely-knit body, issuing statements and demands concerning the major peasant problems and political events. In December 1952 the FPT even organized a joint cadre course, using as study material what had been used in an RTI cadre course in June 1951» the first reported peasants' cadre course in Indonesia. the FPT claimed half a million members, In December 1951» the great majority of whom must have been in Java. At the beginning of 1953 the communist leaders of RTI proposed the fusion of BTI, SAKTI and itself. The communists in BTI had finally removed the remaining non communists from the leadership of the organization and readily agreed to the proposal. But although the SAKTI executive committee also agreed, an internal struggle with members of the small Trotskyite party, Acoma, Ichtlsar G-erakan Tani (Survey of the Peasant Movement), BTI, Tentang Agitasi dan Propaganda (Concerning Agitation and Propaganda), Djakarta, 1954* p.3» Sin Po, December 27, 1951* === [PDF page 360] === prevented the fusion for over two more years. Prom September 14 to 20, 1953 BTI and RTI held a fusion congress, the joint organization retaining the name BTI. At the time of the fusion, BTI claimed 240,000 members, RTI 120,000. Once the communist wing in SAKTI was confident of its own control of the organization, a SAKTI congress was held in June 1955 which accepted fusion with BTI. By the time of the fusion between BTI and RTI, PKI was concentrating its efforts in the rural areas, and BTI began to grow rapidly. members.^ In March 1954 it claimed 800,000 One year later it claimed 170 branches in 136 of the 162 kabupatens in Indonesia, sub-branches in 7*638 of the 43,249 villages, and a total membership of 2,027,500.6 When SAKTI fused with BTI it claimed to The difficulties faced by the communist leaders of SAKTI in bringing about fusion with BTI are given in Sidik Kertapati, Untuk Persatuan dan Memperluas Perdjuangan Tani (For Unity and Extending the Peasants1 Struggle), Djakarta, 1955, pp.24-37* HR, September 21 and 22, 1953* D.N. Aidit, "Mengatasi Kelemahan Kita" (Overcoming Our Weaknesses), in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol.I, p.502, note 14* Sidik Kertapati, Untuk Persatuan, p.44* "Laporan", BM, Apri1-May 1959, p*129* HR, April 5, 1955. === [PDF page 361] === have 42 branches, 378 sub-branches, and 200,000 members. At the end of 1955» after what must have been a massive membership drive parallel to the drives by PKI and its other mass organizations in preparation for the general elections, BTI claimed 3,315>820 members. Thus, according to the figures issued by the peasant organi zations, the number of peasants in the PKI-controlled organizations had risen from 360,000 in September 1953 when RTI fused with BTI, to over 3.3 millions at the end of 1955. The BTI national council meeting from March 26 to 28 1955 reviewed the work of the organization. Until that time, BTI had been active principally in the areas of estate and forestry lands where BTI could easily exploit the problems of the peasant squatters who had occupied large tracts of land during the Japanese occupation and the revolution. The council decided that while consoli dation was required in such areas, BTI had to extend its activities into the ordinary villages. This required cadre courses to explain the BTI constitution and the Sidik Kertapati, Untuk Persatuan, p.23. HR, July 23, 1956. The report of the executive committee of the national council to the council meeting is given in full in ST, March 1955, PP.1, 6-7. === [PDF page 362] === class divisions and forms of exploitation in the villages; the increased distribution of the periodical "Suara Tani" (Voice of the Peasants); and improved methods of work, the implementation of collective leadership, and the acti vation of members* meetings. The question was also raised of purging those landlord elements in the organi zation, especially those in positions of leadership, who had entered in order to intimidate or persuade the peasants against resorting to *radical* action. By July 1956 BTI claimed to have 188 branches in 148 kabupatens and cities, and an organization in 1,290 of the 3 »139 ketjamatans. The membership was still that quoted in December 1955* In the fifth BTI congress, from September 3 to 12, 1957» Sardjono, who is reportedly a close associate of Alimin, was removed from the position of chairman and given the honorary post of third vice-chairman. The new leadership consisted entirely of persons of proved loyalty Asmu, "Beladjar dari Sidang Pleno DPP-BTI ke-III untuk Mengatasi Kelemahan Pekerdjaan Partai dilapangan Perdjuangan Tani" (Learning from the Third Plenum of the BTI National Council in order to Overcome Weaknesses in the Party*s Work in the Sphere of the Peasants' Struggle), BM, February-March 1955» p.61. HR, July 23, 1956 === [PDF page 363] === to the Aidit leadership. It was claimed that BTI now had 201 branches, 1,323 ketjamatan-level organizations, 13>787 village-level sub-branches, and 3,390,286 members. The heavy concentration in Java is revealed in the following figures: Province Branches Ketjamatan Organizations Subbranches Members Djakarta Raja 76 20,358 West Java 19 257 1,744 657,134 Central Java 38 416 4,533 1,160,6543 East Java 29 422 4,906 1.163,894 Total: 89 1,101+ 11,259 3,002,040 Total outside Java: 112 219 2,528 388,246 The list of leaders elected in the congress is given in ST, October 1957, p.3» ST, January 1959, pp.6--7. BTI’s membership claims have not been consistent. April 1958, for example, BTI in Central Java claimed to have 37 branches and 600,000 members; TI, April 10, 1958. Sudisman, a member of the PKI politbureau, stated in December 1957 that: BTI ••• has 1.6 million members and is able to mobilize more than three million peasants in actions to demand that empty lands of the Dutch estates be distributed to the landless peasants; Sudisman, "Semangat Bukit 1211 Merabadjakan Rakjat Korea dalam Mengalahkan Agresi dan Membangun Sosialisme" (The Spirit of Hill 1211 Steels the Korean People in Defeating Aggression and Developing Socialism), BM, December 1957, p.511. === [PDF page 364] === The only significant membership claims outside Java were for North Sumatra, 152,094» and South Sumatra, 108,210, but there were already two province-level organizations in Kalimantan, 'several' kabupaten-level branches in Sulawesi, and BTI organizations in many of the smaller islands of East Indonesia and Nusatenggara, from Bali to Halmahera and the Aru archipelago. Among the proposals contained in the executive council's report to the congress were: the further expansion of membership and easier conditions for acceptance of members; an extensive anti-illiteracy drive among BTI activists and the peasant masses; increased distribution of "Suara Tani" as a propaganda tool and a means of raising the cadres* political awareness; and regional conferences to discuss common experiences and problems.2 In April 1959 BTI claimed million members, or 14 per cent of all adult peasants, branches in almost every kabupaten, organizations in 45 per cent of all ket.jamatans, Hartojo, "Luaskan Aksi-Aksi kaum Tani untuk Mengembangkan Kekuatan Progresif" (Extend Peasant Actions in order to Develop the Progressive Force), ST, October 1957, p.11. Loc.cit. === [PDF page 365] === Ci ± J and sub-b ranches in 35 per cent of all villages. Growth since the fifth congress had been largely effected outside Java, especially in Atjeh, Bali, Sumba, Flores and Timor. The national council which met in that month emphasized the need to adapt the form of organization at the village level to the local everyday needs of the peasants. Members should be organized not only in groups based on place of residence, but also in groups based on units of work, for example groups of renters of landlords' land. But, 'besides BTI and cooperatives are also needed arisan and sports groups and various mutual assistance groups..., death associations, etc.'. Of the greatest long-term importance for BTI are its efforts to produce a large and capable cadre force. The generally poor quality of PKI's peasant cadres has already been referred to, but the cadre situation within BTI is far worse in terms of both numbers and quality. As late "Laporan Umum Sidang DPP Pleno II BTI" (General Report to the BTI Second National Council Plenum), supplement to ST, May-June 1959» pp.29-30. Among the ethnic Javanese, a family in which a death has occurred is obliged to provide certain ritual feasts for kin and neighbours, and the proper fulfilment of this obligation is considered necessary for the welfare of the entire neighbourhood. Neighbourhood death associations are organized to assist poor families who could not otherwise fulfill this obligation. In an arisan group, all members contribute a certain sum each week, and each member in turn receives the whole sum. === [PDF page 366] === a s A p r i l 1959» many BTI "branches an d e v e n some r e g i o n a l c o m m itte e s w ere w i t h o u t f u l l - t i m e o f f i c i a l s, a n d a lt h o u g h many c a d r e s o f PKI a n d th e o t h e r m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s d o u b le a s BTI c a d r e s t h i s m eans t h a t BTI w ork d o e s n o t r e c e i v e th e a t t e n t i o n i t s h o u l d. I n May 1957» "S u a ra T a n i" com m ented t h a t t h e r e w ere s t i l l many i l l i t e r a t e a c tiv is ts i n t h e s u b - b r a n c h e s and k e t;ja m a ta n c o m m itte e s, w ith some e v e n h o l d i n g th e p o s i t i o n o f s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l a t th e l a t t e r le v e l. Work h ad a l r e a d y b e g u n on th e e r a d i c a t i o n o f i l l i t e r a c y among a c t i v i s t s b u t h a d n o t a d v a n c e d fa r. What PKI a n d BTI c a l l t h e i d e o l o g i c a l s h o r tc o m in g s among t h e i r p e a s a n t c a d r e s ste m from th e s o c i a l o r i g i n o f many o f th e c a d r e s among th e r i c h p e a s a n t s and l a n d l o r d s. A lth o u g h e f f o r t s h a d b e e n made s i n c e 1955 t o rem ove t h e s e s h o r tc o m in g s b y p u rg e s o r e d u c a t i o n, t h e y w ere s t i l l b e in g r e f e r r e d t o a s a n o b s t a c l e t o c o r r e c t w ork i n 1 9 5 9 *^ W ith t h e g ra v e s h o r t a g e o f l i t e r a t e an d c a p a b le c a d r e s o f [Unreadable] ST, May 1 9 5 7, p.1 1. Asmu, "Bela d b a r ", BM, February-M arch 1955, P*61; P a r to, "Memperbaiki P ek erd ja a n P a r t a i d ik a la n g a n kaum Tani" (Im p rovin g P a r ty Work among th e P e a s a n t s ), KP, O ctober 1 9 5 8, p.2 0 5; B.O. H utap ea, "Some L e sso n s", RI, August B.O. H utapea, l o c. c i t.; "Laporan", BM, A p ril-M ay 1959, === [PDF page 367] === reliable social origins, it has proved difficult to remove those with suspect backgrounds• Before 1959 cadre education in BTI was unsystematic and on a small scale. Then the national council meeting of April 22 to 26, 1959» which met a few days after the PKI national peasants* conference, drew up a three-year plan of organization and education. The general outline of the plan was as follows: Organization: 1. To increase membership by 50 per cent in the first year, 75 per cent in the first two years, and 100 per cent in the three years, that is, to 7 millions. 2. To provide each branch with a typewriter, each sub-branch with a name-board. Education: 1. To extend the circulation of ”Suara Tani”. All BTI committees down to the ket;jamatan level were required to subscribe to ”Suara Tani”, and activists were obliged to write up their experiences for it. The plan was never published in full, but its general outline was obtained from several references in ST: "Laporan Umum”, supplement to ST, May-June 1959 9 PP*31-3; July 1959, pp.1-2; November 1959, p.U; A. Rachman, "Arti Plan 3 Tahun BTI” (The Meaning of BTI*s Three-Year Plan), June 1960, p.3; June 1960, p.7* === [PDF page 368] === 2. To e n c o u ra g e th e lo w e r BTI c o m m itte e s t o i s s u e t h e i r own p e r i o d i c a l s, how ever s im p le and i n lo n g - h a n d i f n e c e s s a r y, i n th e l o c a l l a n g u a g e s, 3. To s p e e d i l y e r a d i c a t e i l l i t e r a c y among a c t i v i s t s a t t h e k e t;ja m a ta n l e v e l, a n d i n t e n s i f y a n t i - i l l i t e r a c y c o u r s e s f o r th e p e a s a n t m asses i n s e a s o n s o f l e a s t a g r i c u l t u r a l w o rk. 4. To i n t e n s i f y c a d r e c o u r s e s a t t h e c e n t r e and i n th e r e g i o n s, and u n i f y t h e i r e d u c a ti o n u n d e r f o u r b a s i c h e a d i n g s: th e p e a s a n ts * s o c i a l a n d econom ic p ro b le m s, BTI an d o t h e r p e o p le * s o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e v i l l a g e s, th e b i r t h a n d g ro w th o f t h e n a t i o n a l p e a s a n t movem ent an d th e e x p e r i e n c e o f p e a s a n t m ovem ents a b r o a d, a n d th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e n a t i o n a l i s t m ovem ent. E d u c a tio n in a g r i c u l t u r e was a l s o t o b e g iv e n. E ach c o m m itte e was s e t a t a r g e t a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n s from t h e l e v e l o f members* m e e tin g s u p w a rd s. Some a r e a s b e g a n w ork u n d e r t h e p l a n on Novem ber 23» "1959» th e r e s t on May 1, I9 6 0. In J u n e 1960 th e BTI l e a d e r s h i p a n n o u n c e d t h a t i n g e n e r a l th e q u o ta s h a d p ro v e d t o b e to o lo w, a n d t h a t some a r e a s, s u c h a s C e n t r a l J a v a, h ad a l r e a d y r a i s e d them. An im p r e s s io n o f w hat th e p l a n m eant f o r ST, Ju n e 1960, p.7 * === [PDF page 369] === e a c h r e g i o n i s g i v e n b y t h e exam ple o f E a s t J a v a. T h e re th e g o a ls o f th e f i r s t y e a r o f th e p la n in c lu d e d: to buy a m im eograph m a c h in e, a new t y p e w r i t e r a n d b i c y c l e f o r th e p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e; tim e o f f i c i a l s t o i n c r e a s e t h e num ber o f f u l l in th e p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e, and t o p r e p a r e two c a d r e s o f t h e b r a n c h l e v e l a n d f o u r o f a l o w e r l e v e l fo r se n d in g o u ts id e Ja v a; t o e s t a b l i s h a s y s te m o f c a d r e c o u r s e s, and t o h o l d two c o u r s e s a t t h e p r o v i n c e l e v e l; t o i n c r e a s e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f " S u a ra Tani'* a n d t o h o l d m o n th ly d i s c u s s i o n s on i t s le tte r; c o n te n ts; t o p u b l i s h a news t o h o l d a s e m in a r on a g r i c u l t u r e; to e f f e c t s y s te m a tic c o n t r o l o f th e b ra n c h c o m m ittee s; to e x te n d th e o r g a n iz a tio n in to V a c a n t* a r e a s; and to l e a d s p e c i f i e d c a m p a ig n s i n t h e p e a s a n t s * in te re s ts* On November 12, 1959, a p e a s a n t s * e d u c a t i o n b u i l d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h BTI*s c h a ir m a n a s i t s c h a i r m a n, a n d i n c l u d i n g l e a d e r s from Femuda R a k j a t, G erw ani and SOBSI u n i o n s. 21 The d e c l a r e d aim o f t h e a s s o c i a t i o n was t o p ro m o te s c i e n t i f i c know ledge among t h e p e a sa n ts and to r a i s e w i d e s t m e a n in g *. th e ir s p i r i t of p a trio tis m * in t h e By J u l y 1960 e a c h BTI member was M im eographed d o cu m en t s e e n a t t h e BTI E a s t J a v a o f f i c e, S u rab aja* HR, November 1 6, 1959 === [PDF page 370] === obliged to pay half a rupiah, part of the money for the new association (which was intended at least for the training of cooperative cadres), and part for BTIfs own central office. At that time BTI was claiming 4 million members. In short, BTI has built a mass membership and an extensive organizational network, especially in Java and with even less competition from non-communist organi zations than either PKI or SOBSI has faced in its own work. For the non-communist politicians, organizational work among the peasants is even less attractive than among the workers. But both BTI and PKI still experience a grave shortage of good peasant cadres. The great majority of peasants are poor, illiterate, parochial, unaware that their conditions could be changed by their own efforts, and they therefore constitute poor cadre material. The efforts of BTI itself and of PKI under their respective three-year plans have increased the number and quality of their peasant cadres, but both are still markedly deficient. BTI especially is faced with such grave and as yet unsolved financial difficulties, that it is unable to appoint sufficient full-time cadres, whatever their quality. ST, July 1960, p.5* See above, pp.221, 227* === [PDF page 371] === 355 PPPI. The Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia (Indonesian Village Officials* Association) was founded on September 26, 1946 by the fusion of seven village officials* associations. After the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949* PPDI spread rapidly from the former areas of the Republic in Java, and by the time of its third congress in May 1951 had extended throughout Java and even into Sumatra. PKI control of the PPDI leadership by 1951 at the latest is indicated by the phraseology used in the statement made at that time of the basis and goals of PPDI*s struggle. The present leaders, all of whom are PKI members or sympathizers, were elected at the last congress in July 1955* Actual leadership is in the hands of Usman Muftiwidjaja who was elected on the PKI list to the Constituent Assembly and is now a member of the appointed parliament. As of May 1960 the PPDI leaders claimed that there were 108 branches at the kabupaten level, and 350>000 Much of the following information on PPDI was obtained from an interview with three of PPDI*s central leaders. The statement is given in D.jaman Baru, March 30, 1953> p.20. === [PDF page 372] === m em b ers, o f whom t w o - t h i r d s w e re i n J a v a a n d M adura. I n S o u th S u m a tra PPDI was a l s o e v e n l y s p r e a d, b u t e ls e w h e r e i t h a d few m em bers. v illa g e T h e re i s no c o m p e tin g o f f i c i a l s ’ a s s o c ia tio n. P P D I’s s t r u g g l e f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f th e v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s h a s b e e n c e n t r e d a ro u n d t h r e e m ain m a t t e r s. The f i r s t i s t h e s t a t u s o f v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s. PPDI dem ands t h a t v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s b e g iv e n t h e s t a t u s o f e i t h e r l o c a l o r c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t o f f i c i a l s, w h ic h w ould mean t h a t t h e y w o u ld b e f r e e fro m a r b i t r a r y d i s m i s s a l an d w o u ld r e c e i v e r e g u l a r w ages a n d p e n s io n r i g h t s. t h e c h i e f l o n g - t e r m dem and. o ffic ia ls * in c o m e. T h is i s The s e c o n d c o n c e rn s th e S in c e 1951 th e c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t h a s s u b s i d i z e d th e p o o r e r v i l l a g e s t o e n a b le them t o pay t h e i r o f f i c i a l s s t i p u l a t e d minimum w a g e s. B ut t h e s e minimums a r e f a r b e lo w minimum l i v i n g r e q u ir e m e n ts and PPDI u r g e s t h e g o v e rn m e n t to p r o v i d e l a r g e r s u b s i d i e s. I n F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 0, SOBSI r e p o r t e d PPDI*s m em bership to b e 2 0 0,0 0 0; ITUN, F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 0, p. 2. The lo n g l i s t o f g e n e r a l a n d s p e c i f i c dem ands a d o p te d b y th e May 1951 c o n g r e s s i s g iv e n i n Djaman B a r u, M arch 3 0, 1953» p p.2 3 - 4; and I c h t i s a r O e rak a n T a n i, J u l y A u g u st 1951» P P *13-14* An a c c o u n t o f PPDI w ork c o n c e r n in g t h e more i m p o r ta n t p ro b le m s f a c i n g v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s i s g iv e n in S u g ijo n o, ’’D engan ta n p a p an d an g b u lu P. P. D, I. s e l a l u ta m p i l k e d e p a n u n tu k B e la N a s ib p a r a Pamong D e sa ” (W ith o u t a n y D i s c r i m i n a t i o n W h a ts o e v e r, PPDI i s a lw a y s t o th e f o r e i n D e fe n d in g t h e W e lfa re o f th e V i l l a g e O f f i c i a l s ), S u a ra Pamong D e s a, Novem ber 1 9 5 8 J a n u a r y 1 9 59, p p.8 9 - W I === [PDF page 373] === The third concerns the situation of village officials in the disturbed areas* Partly because of PPDI demands, the government pays compensation to the families of village officials killed at their posts, and allowances to officials forced from their villages by terrorist or rebel activities* PPDI demands that the allowances be considerably increased* PPDI is clearly the poorest of PKI’s mass organi zations. The head office is a one-room affair up some very steep ladders in a small, run-down shop in Surakarta. At the centre, there are two full-timers, both members of PKI, plus part-time help from those with other employment, for example from Usman and from the secretary-general who is a village head, Almost all PPDI functionaries in the regions are part-timers* In Surabaja I visited the home of the full-time secretary for East Java and found it to be a pantry-size, dilapidated addition to the side of a kampong house* But it is doubtful if even the low expenses of PPDI are met by subscriptions, for when I asked the three members of the central secretariat about membership fees, they all agreed that it was more or less impossible to collect them, but disagreed on what the fee was and had to settle the resultant argument by reading the constitution === [PDF page 374] === A p a r t fro m b e i n g t h e p o o r e s t o f t h e PKI mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, PPDI i s a l s o t h e l e a s t e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l l y a n d h a s f a i l e d t o d e v e l o p among more t h a n a v e r y s m a l l s e c t i o n o f i t s m em b ersh ip a s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e to w a rd s PKI and its p o lic ie s, A w e l l - p r o d u c e d m o n th ly p e r i o d i c a l a p p e a r e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1 9 5 7 » b u t w i t h i n two y e a r s had d isa p p e a re d b ecau se o f f i n a n c ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s. y e t no c a d r e s c h o o l s o r c l a s s e s h a v e b e e n h e l d, b u t w r i t t e n c o u r s e s on a s m a l l s c a l e a r e o r g a n i z e d *to g iv e t h e c a d r e s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f th e r e v o l u t i o n * • Com m unists c o n t r o l PPDI a t t h e c e n t r e b e c a u s e no one e l s e h a s c a r e d t o c h a l l e n g e th em. But from i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d from members o f t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t s r u r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e i t w o u ld a p p e a r t h a t PKI h a s little i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f PPDI m em bers. The members a r e, i n g e n e r a l, more l i t e r a t e, w e a l t h y and p o l i t i c a l l y c o n scio u s th an th e o rd in a ry v i l l a g e r s, th e y t e n d t o b e s u p p o r t e r s o f PNI o r o f one o f t h e Moslem p a r t i e s, and t h e y a r e members o f PPDI f o r t h e s o l e p u r p o s e o f p r o m o tin g t h e i r own s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s. As i n t h e c a s e o f t h e o t h e r P K I - l e d mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, t h e PPDI c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p f r e q u e n t l y i s s u e s s t a t e m e n t s, i n t h e name o f t h e whole o r g a n i z a t i o n, i n s u p p o r t o f PKI p o l i c i e s and dem ands, t h u s a d d i n g n u m e r i c a l w e i g h t, o r a p p a r e n t w e i g h t, t o PKI*s p o s i t i o n. === [PDF page 375] === 359 (c) Work among the Peasants. The following section contains three main divisions: communist work in the areas of easier access, namely, the estate, forestry, insecure, and transmigrant areas; work in the ordinary villages; and work designed to assist and appeal to the peasantry in general, Work in the areas of easier access. PKI first entered the villages in the estate and forestry areas. During the Japanese occupation and the revolution, tens of thousands of land-hungry peasants moved into estate and forestry lands. Under the terms of the Round Table Conference agreement, the Indonesian government was obliged to restore estate lands to their former owners. At the same time the government's forestry service began evicting the squatters from its land. The result was a series of bitter clashes between the authorities and the peasants. In some areas peasants were shot, and in many more the squatters' homes were destroyed, their crops ploughed up. PKI, the peasant organizations BTI, RTI and SAKTI, SOBSI unions such as the estate workers' and the forestry workers' union, and other mass organizations, including Pemuda Rakjat, fought alongside the peasants, often === [PDF page 376] === successfully, to prevent eviction or to obtain compen sation in the event of eviction. The climax to the attempts to dislodge the squatters from estate lands was reached on March 16, 1953 when five squatters were shot by police at Tandjung Morawa in North Sumatra. The FPT strongly denounced the shooting, and on May 2 a SAKTI member of parliament introduced a motion demanding an immediate halt to anti-squatter action in the area, and the creation of a committee, including peasant repre sentatives, to settle the land problem there. This motion led to a division between FNI and Masjumi, and to the downfall of the Wilopo cabinet. Sadjarwo, of BTI, sat as Minister of Agriculture in the next cabinet and was partly responsible for the emergency law of June 8, 1954 concerning the settlement of the question of the people’s use of estate lands. While PKI and its peasant organizations objected to some of the provisions of the new law, they welcomed its recognition of the squatters* right to appoint their representatives to negotiate with the estate owners, and its stipulation that any decision must consider the peasants* interests. In October 1956, the 1954 law was Kementerian Agraria (Ministry of Agrarian Affairs), Undang-Undang Darurat no.8 tahun 1954 (Emergency Law No.8 1954)7 mimeographed, Djakarta, 195^7 8 P* === [PDF page 377] === extended to include squatters on state forestry lands. Despite the 1954 and 1956 laws, occasional violent disputes have continued between the squatters and the authorities, but BTI has usually succeeded in winning ultimate recognition of the peasants* interests in any land settlement. The regions of sugar-cane have also provided a more easy point of entry into the rural areas for PKI and its peasant organizations. Since the transfer of sovereignty in December 19499 the government has fixed, at a level it feels reasonable, the rent of the land leased by the peasants to the sugar-mills for cane growing. This system has been strongly opposed by the peasants and BTI who demand that leasing of land be completely voluntary, and that the rent be fixed in discussions between the peasants or their representatives and the factories. PKI and its peasant organizations have also found a ready problem to exploit in the areas threatened by bandits and rebels. Such areas where they have made progress are parts of West Java, and, since February 1958, the rebel areas of Sumatra and North Sulawesi. Since its Kementerian Agraria, Undang-Undang Darurat no.1 tahun 1956 (Emergency Law No.1, 1956), mimeographed, T>Jakarta, [Unreadable] See, for example, HR, June 16, 1954; ST, February 1960, === [PDF page 378] === N ovem ber 195*1 a g r a r i a n pro g ram m e, PKI h a s c a l l e d f o r th e c o n f i s c a t i o n o f t h e l a n d o f p r o - r e b e l an d p r o - b a n d i t l a n d l o r d s, an d i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n to t h e p o o r a n d l a n d l e s s p e a s a n ts, a demand s t r o n g l y e m p h a siz e d b y PKI and BTI i n W est J a v a, PKI and i t s mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e a l s o b e e n lo u d an d p e r s i s t e n t i n t h e i r demand f o r g o v e rn m e n t p r o v i s i o n o f w eapons to e n a b le th e p e a s a n t s t o p r o t e c t th e m s e lv e s. The com m unist s o l i c i t u d e f o r th e v i c t i m s o f arm ed b a n d s i s i l l u s t r a t e d b y a m ass m e e tin g i n B ogor i n 1954 w h ere PKI d i s t r i b u t e d c l o t h e s a n d r i c e to p e a s a n t s who h a d b e e n ro b b e d o r b u rn e d o u t b y D a ru l I s la m g a n g s. O n ly a b o u t 2 5, 0 0 0 p e r s o n s p e r y e a r h a v e l e f t J a v a f o r t h e o u t e r i s l a n d s s i n c e 1 9 4 9, b u t t h e y c o m p ris e a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r c e n ta g e o f th e p o p u l a t i o n i n S o u th S u m atra w here th e y a l s o p r o b a b ly c o n s t i t u t e a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f B T I’s S e p te m b e r 1958 c la im o f 1 0 8, 2 1 0 members i n t h a t re g io n. U n h a p p ily f o r th e t r a n s m i g r a n t s, t r a n s p o r t s h o r t a g e s c a u s e b o t t l e n e c k s a t p o r t s, t h i e v e s i n th e sh a p e o f s h o p -k e e p e rs, t i c k e t s e l l e r s and ro b b e rs s t r i p them o f S e e, f o r ex a m p le, "Program Perubahan Tanah", BM, D ecem ber 1951> p.1 9; " R e s o lu s i t e n t a n g M e n g ik u ts e r ta k a n R a k ja t d alam Membasmi S i s a - S i s a G erom bolan 'P R R I-P e rm e s ta * ’D I - T I I ” * ( R e s o l u t i o n c o n c e rn in g th e P e o p l e ’s P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n E r a d i c a t i n g th e R em nants o f t h e ’P R R I-P erm esta* ’D I - T I I ’ G a n g s ), BM, A p ril-M a y 1959, p * 2 0 6. C om pton, I n d o n e s ia n Communism, p.9 * === [PDF page 379] === their little wealth, and the areas they go to are often ill-prepared. These conditions provide a source of discontent that PKI and BTI can exploit. Both PKI and BTI recognize the need for transmigration, but declare that it ’must not be of the nature of moving poverty from Java to the other islands’. They demand adequate transportation, work tools, housing, medical facilities, and living expenses while the new land is being opened up. Work in the ordinary villages. In the second half of 1953, PKI and its mass organizations began the immense task of organizing the great majority of J a v a ’s peasants who live in ordinary villages, villages where even PKI and BTI cadres often claimed that no peasant problems existed, that no landlords were to be found. The PKI leaders readily admit that: The task of cultivating the peasants’ trust in the Party and of convincing the peasants of their own strength is a difficult one, especially if we bear in mind their backwardness.1 Aidit recognized in July 1953, as the campaign to attract the peasant masses was begun: BTI, Konstitusi BTI (BTI's Constitution), Djakarta, 1954, pp.9-10. "Laporan", BM, April-May 1959, p. 139. === [PDF page 380] === Only by practical work among the peasants, only by leading the peasants in the struggle for their everyday demands, demands that seem small, insignificant, unimportant, only in this way can Party cadres and members have close relations with the peasants and receive their trust. Only by actions to demand things that seem small, insignificant, unimportant, can the peasants* organization grow stronger, wider and more solid. Only through the work of organizing and educating the peasants can the peasants * struggle be raised to a higher level. Only through this work can the peasants be educated and mobilized so that the time will be ripe to carry out the slogans *land for the peasants*, *distribution of land to the peasants*, and *peasant private ownership of land*. In order to strengthen the peasants* confidence in themselves and in PKI and BTI, the Aidit leadership has concentrated on *small but successful* actions. Passionate and *leftist* measures, not based on the true consciousness of the peasants, must not be taken. Measures of that kind confuse the peasants and retard their consciousness.1 23 In each action, the peasants must be Convinced of its justice, correctness and benefit*, and *the Party must always strive to be able to draw in and mobilize 90 per cent of the village inhabitants*.^ Aidit, "Haridepan", BM, July 1953» PP*339-U0. PKI, Tuntunan untuk Bekerdja dikalangan kaum Tani (Guide for Working among the Peasants "Laporan**, BM, April-May 1959» p.141; D.N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution, Djakarta, 1958, p.61. === [PDF page 381] === The l i s t o f * sm a ll b u t s u c c e s s f u l * a c t i o n s l e d b y PKI a n d BTI among t h e p e a s a n t s r a n g e s fro m th e m ost triflin g t o dem ands f o r r e n t r e d u c tio n * I n th e w ords o f a PKI g u id e f o r i t s p e a s a n t c a d r e s: A f t e r t h e p e a s a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n i s fo rm e d, q u ic k ly u n d e rta k e c o n c re te a c t i v i t i e s in d e f e n c e o f t h e p e a s a n ts * i n t e r e s t s, s u c h a s th e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f f e r t i l i z e r, s e e d lin g s a n d t o o l s a t a c h e a p p r i c e, r e p a i r i n g th e w a te r c h a n n e l s, r e p a i r i n g t h e f i s h - p o n d s and d i s t r i b u t i n g f is h eg g s, e s ta b lis h in g c o o p e r a tiv e s, s in k in g w e lls to g e th e r, r e p a i r i n g th e v i l l a g e b r i d g e s a n d r o a d s, o rg a n iz in g a d e a th a s s o c ia tio n, g e n e ra l e d u c a tio n and e d u c a tio n o f a g r a r ia n l e a d e r s, d e fe n c e o f p e o p le b r o u g h t t o c o u r t, e r a d i c a ti o n o f i l l i t e r a c y j o rg a n iz in g s p o r ts and c u l t u r a l b o d ie s, e t c. ' And e a c h a c t i v i t y i s u s e d t o r a i s e th e p e a s a n ts * c l a s s c o n s c io u s n e s s and m ilita n c y. As a l e a d e r o f PKI a n d BTI re m in d e d t h e p e a s a n t c a d r e s: I n o r g a n i z i n g m u tu a l a s s i s t a n c e when members s u f f e r i l l n e s s o r d e a t h, do n o t f o r g e t to c o n n e c t t h i s a c t i v i t y w ith p ro p a g a n d a to th e e f f e c t t h a t th e l a n d l o r d * s e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d o p p r e s s i o n h a v e c a u s e d th e h e a l t h o f th e p e a s a n t l a b o u r e r s and p o o r p e a s a n t s t o b e v e ry b a d, t h e i r l i f e in g e n e ra l to be s h o r t e r, many o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n t o d i e i n t h e womb o r b e f o r e r e a c h i n g th e age o f s i x, many o f t h e i r w iv e s to d i e i n c h i l d b i r t h... e tc. I n t h i s way t h e p e a s a n t s u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e e n t i r e b a d s i t u a t i o n w hich b e f a l l s them i s t h e r e s u l t o f th e l a n d l o r d * s e x p l o i t a t i o n an d o p p r e s s i o n. In t h i s way t h e p e a s a n t s w i l l g r a d u a l l y r e a c h th e c o n c lu s io n th a t th e la n d lo r d c la s s i s t h e i r PK I, T u n tu n a n, p.UU === [PDF page 382] === first enemy, and "by knowing the methods of exploitation used by the landlord the peasants will understand that the landlord*s ownership of land is unjust and that the landlord must be opposed.12 Actions that directly affect the interests of the landlords, such as demands for joint land rent agreements, and demands for lowered interest rates on loans, higher wages for labourers, and lowered land rents, were not undertaken on any scale until after 1955» They are still limited in scope for three main reasons: first, in the present stage of the revolution the Aidit leadership seeks the broadest alliance in order to combat imperialism, and therefore does not want to alienate political forces containing landlord elements; second, in the relative social peace of the Javanese village, the peasants need much preparatory work before they will take direct action against the local landlords; and, third, PKI and BTI are only now producing sufficient well-trained cadres willing and capable of directing anti-landlord actions. Asmu, "Beladjar", BM, February-March 1955 > pp.59-60. For the Aidit leadership’s tactical separation of the struggle against imperialism and that against feudalism, see above, pp.65-6. Aidit explained on July 8, 1956 that in the anti-imperialist struggle: We also agree to cooperate with the anti imperialist landlords, but at the same time we fight to reduce rents for rice lands, and to ensure that the landlords do not exploit the peasants too much. HR, July 10, 1956. === [PDF page 383] === o n ns, The A p ril 1959 PKI n a t io n a l p e a sa n ts* c o n fe re n c e fo rm u la te d a new campaign s lo g a n which c o u ld be th e b a s i s f o r a r o u s in g th e p o o re r p e a s a n ts a g a in s t th e la n d lo r d s, and y e t be s u f f i c i e n t l y j u s t to make o p p o s itio n ap p e a r g r o s s ly u n j u s t: th e 6:4 s lo g a n. T hat i s, f o r th e d i v i s i o n o f cro p s in th e p r o p o rtio n o f s i x p a r t s f o r th e s h a r e - c r o p p e r and f o u r f o r th e la n d lo r d, w ith th e s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t i f any la n d lo rd s were a lr e a d y r e c e iv in g l e s s th a n f o u r s h a re s th e y sh o u ld c o n tin u e to do s o, w ith a minimum o f 2^ s h a r e s. Communist and a f f i l i a t e d members o f p a r lia m e n t p u t fo rw ard a m otion in p a rlia m e n t f o r th e 6:4 d i v i s i o n o f c r o p s. The governm ent ste p p e d in q u ic k ly w ith i t s own b i l l w hich, a f t e r some amendments, was a d o p ted unanim ously on November 20, 1959» and p ro v id e d f o r a 5:5 d i v i s i o n, though r e t a i n i n g agreem ents a lre a d y more fa v o u ra b le to th e te n a n ts.^ B.O. H utapea, "Some L e sso n s”, A ugust 1959» p p.3 0 -1. A le a d in g FNI member o f p a rlia m e n t to ld me in in te r v ie w t h a t t h i s communist m o tio n was d e s ig n e d to c r e a te u n r e s t i f p a s se d and a t t r a c t i v e propaganda i f p a s se d o r n o t. He claim ed t h a t i f th e 6:4 m otion had become law, th e la n d lo r d s and w e a lth y p e a s a n ts who had fo rm e rly le a s e d la n d would have th en worked i t them selv es w ith la b o u re rs i n o rd e r to r e c e iv e a h ig h e r income th a n th e 40 p e r c e n t o f y ie ld s allo w ed i n th e b i l l p ro p o sed by PKI. T his would have fo rc e d a la r g e number o f te n a n t farm ers and s h a r e c ro p p e rs to become a g r i c u l t u r a l la b o u r e r s. PKI dan P e rw a k ila n, f o u r th q u a r te r 1 9 5 9 - f ir s t q u a r te r I9 6 0, p p.137-46. === [PDF page 384] === Having won this parliamentary victory, PKI and BTI launched a campaign to acquaint the peasants with their rights under the new law. At the same time, the 6:4 demand has been extended gradually, but its implementation is slow and requires careful preparation because: The 6:4 action and other actions against the landlords* exploitation are entirely new for the peasants and even for most BTI cadres. The existence of examples of successful action will facilitate our work to convince the peasants of the justice of the 6:4 demand and of the power of the peasants * unity. It also constitutes an important education for the local BTI cadres Work in all villages. In categorizing PKI and BTI work among the peasants, there is a broad category which concerns all types of villages, which has the purpose of attracting the peasant labourers, poor peasants and medium peasants in general. This work ranges widely from concrete actions to the easier task of drawing up written demands. PKI and BTI cultural and sports activities in the rural areas are difficult to assess because little infor2 mation has been issued. Perhaps, in general, the ST, January I960, p.3. The underlining is mine. The only public mention by BTI of cultural activities was in April 1959 when it was announced that some groups were being organized to play traditional musical instru- === [PDF page 385] === 369 peasants are too old or too tired to participate in such activities which are a feature of Pemuda Rakjat’s work* On the other hand, there are indications that PKI’s anti illiteracy work has been considerable among its members, and BTI too has at least announced the importance of eradicating illiteracy* PKI long scorned the efforts of Vice-President Hatta to create a cooperative movement in Indonesia, and it was not until the Party’s national peasants* conference in mid-April 1959 that a major revision was made in the attitude towards cooperatives* The conference decided to launch attempts to create three types of cooperatives: credit, production, and purchase and sale* The PKI sixth congress in September 1959 repeated the call to establish cooperatives, and demanded government assistance for them* As yet neither PKI nor BTI have published information on the implementation of the cooperative ments, and others practising traditional forms of fighting and wrestling; "Laporan Umum”, supplement to ST, D.N. Aidit, "Ply High the Banners of *Land to the Peasants’ and Fight for One Victory after Another”, in supplement to RI, June-July 1959» pp*13-14. Njoto, Tentang Program PKI (Concerning PKI’s Programme), Djakarta, 1959» P.58; PKI, Resolusi tentang Laporan Umum CC PKI, p.89. === [PDF page 386] === campaign, although in mid-1960 BTI was collecting funds in order to train cadres for work in cooperatives.^ Since the April 1959 conference, PKI and BTI also have begun to help the peasants to raise production. campaign has been launched to popularize what are called the five principles of rice production: *Plough deeply, plant closely, give more fertilizer, improve seedlings, and improve irrigation'. Fantastic production claims have been made for the five principles, but however exaggerated the claims may be, the five principles do lead to some increase in production. Three persons associated with BTI claim to have developed strains of rice with high yields. In June i960 it was reported that BTI in Central Java had established a committee to ensure the equitable distribution of one of the strains produced, and that peasant demand for the seed was high. If the seed is superior, then its distribution must also be an effective means of winning broad peasant support. The written appeals to and defence of the peasants' interests also range widely in scope. Both PKI and BTI ST, July 1960, p.fj. Aidit, ''Fly High the Banners", in supplement to RI, June-July 1959, p.14* ST, June 1960, p.U === [PDF page 387] === Cl t is s u e le n g th y l i s t s o f demands a t tim es o f c o n fe re n c e s and c o n g r e s s e s, lo c a l and n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s, and c a b in e t c h a n g e s. The l i s t s in c lu d e a v a r i e t y o f demands from a g r i c u l t u r a l t o o l s, te c h n ic a l g u id a n c e, ch eap c r e d i t, and th e d e m o c r a tiz a tio n o f v i l l a g e governm ent, to g r e a t l y in c re a s e d h e a l t h and e d u c a tio n a l f a c i l i t i e s and reduced p r ic e s o f e s s e n t i a l com m odities. But th e im p act o f th e s e demands on th e i l l i t e r a t e, tr a d itio n - b o u n d p e a sa n t can b e e x a g g e ra te d. S im ila r ly th e slo g a n ‘la n d f o r th e p e a sa n ts* m ust have some e f f e c t, b u t i f, as th e BTI le a d e r s d e c la r e d, th e p e a s a n ts have s t i l l to be convinced o f th e j u s t i c e o f th e 6:4 demand, i t s e f f e c t o u ts id e th e e s t a t e, f o r e s t r y and tra n s m ig ra n t a r e a s may a ls o be e x a g g e ra te d by d e t r a d i t i o n a l i z e d In d o n e sia n s and f o re ig n o b s e rv e rs. I t a p p e a rs t h a t, in g e n e r a l, th e su p p o rt o f th e p e a s a n ts can be won o n ly by c o n c re te and b e n e f i c i a l a c tio n s w hich a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y sim p le so as n o t to go too f a r ahead o f t h e i r ‘c o n s c io u sn e ss*. Java. PKI e x p l o i t a t i o n o f th e s a n tr i- a b a n g a n schism in Whereas th e s a n t r i p o p u la tio n o f Ja v a h as b een h ig h ly r e s i s t a n t to communist o r g a n iz a tio n a l e f f o r t s, PKI has been a b le t o win th e s u p p o rt o f a b ro a d c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f th e abangan community by e x p l o itin g th e abangans * c o n scio u s h o s t i l i t y tow ards th e d ev o u t Moslems. D uring === [PDF page 388] === xj t,j the revolution, Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia), through which the communists did most of their work in the villages, sought the support of the ab an ga ns on the basis of a vigorous anti-santri position, Pesindo paved the way for later PKI work by successfully identifying itself with the ’original*, that is abangan, people as against the alien-oriented, Arab-oriented santris, with the poorer abangans as against the generally wealthier santri3. Under the Aidit leadership, the communists: In many villages... have taken advantage of the traditional feud between the stronglyMuslim group and the nominal Muslims, offering to the latter an identity and an organization. In such villages the organi zational line between Green (Muslim) and Red may have nothing at all to do with the economic position of the antagonistic groups. Special efforts have been made to win the support of persons of traditional status within the abangan community and the communists have proclaimed themselves to be the true lovers and promoters of traditional elements in abangan culture, from mutual aid in road repair to music and dance-drama. Masjumi, which included the most Robert Ravenelle Jay, "Santri and Abangan: Religious Schism in Rural Central Java ’* (Harvard University, Ph.D. Compton, Indonesian Communism, p.9* === [PDF page 389] === r> yy O fanatical of the Moslem reformist opponents of syncretic beliefs and ritual, was attacked not only for its policies, but also for its foreignness, its fanaticism, and its alleged desire to force others into a pattern of life based on Islam. In many areas PKI has been successful in creating the image of itself as both the defender of traditional values and culture and, at the same time, the harbinger of progress - progress, of course, by traditional ways of doing things. (d) The Political Usefulness of Communist Support in the Villages^ Massive peasant support was essential to the Aidit leadership in order to bring about a communist victory by either peaceful or forceful means. With largescale peasant electoral support, PKI could increase its parliamentary representation. This in turn could increase the Party!s bargaining position in national politics, and bring about if not a communist government or communist participation in a coalition government, at least the alliance of important political forces among the divided revolutionary political elite. It was also possible, though this advantage was realized probably in retrospect, that massive popular support would reduce the possibility of governmental repression of the Party for === [PDF page 390] === two reasons. First, the government would be hesitant to repress a party with obvious popularity - especially PKI which, under the national united front policy, was careful to appear friendly to the nationalists and responsible in the exercise of its role as a non-government party. Second, the government might hesitate to attempt to repress a party with broad, organized support out of fear of the calamitous results such an attempt might bring. The Aidit leadership may have hoped to win power by peaceful means, but it cannot have expected to. It needed to build organized mass support capable of neutralizing or defeating the forces which would be expected to oppose a communist bid for power. mass support With the effort to organize in the countryside, the Aidit leadership must have aimed to develop a force which, in the event of a political crisis, could be a major weapon for one of two purposes: to be displayed so as to intimidate opponents and convince wavering allies, that is, to win power by the mere display of apparent strength; or, if the opposition could not be intimidated, to be used along with the other communist organizations in order to destroy the Party’s opponents* Results have certainly been achieved towards what might be termed the peaceful purposes of peasant support. PKI’s numerical size and apparent organizational ability === [PDF page 391] === helped encourage first PNI and then Sukarno to seek the alliance of the communists - of course on mutually beneficial terms. It is also possible that the size of P K I ’s rural votes and therefore presumed rural strength and popularity has been a factor in deterring repressive measures against the communists. Now that it appears highly unlikely that the other political forces will permit PKI to win governmental power b y peaceful means, the question looms large as to whether the communists * rural organization could be used to achieve power by other means. The real power that the Aidit leadership wields through its support among the peasants is determined largely b y three factors: the authority and influence exercised b y other forces in the villages, the number of unorganized peasants, and the nature of the support given b y the peasants to the communists. The unanimous opinion of those non-communist politicians and government officials with whom I talked and who were concerned with the peasants was that as yet PKI had achieved little in building support that could openly oppose, let alone attack and destroy, authorities* in the countryside. *the The authority of the central government’s rural civil service and of the village officials has certainly declined, but it is still === [PDF page 392] === sufficiently impressive to deter the great majority of peasants from open acts of defiance. Furthermore, while communist organization has grown, so too has the strength and authority of the army and the police in the rural areas. Only in the rarest cases would the peasants, conditioned to obey, stand against a combination of A u t h o r i t i e s ’. PKI and BTI have admitted publicly the great difficulty in making the peasants aware of their exploited position, and in arousing them to even mild actions against Indonesian landlords. The present slogan is ’all roads lead to 6:4*> but even these roads are long and difficult, and if successfully traversed lead only to the start of the fundamental task of building peasant support that can act in a disciplined and militant manner when called upon to do so. As in their trade union work, the Indonesian commu nists have faced competition in their effort to win mass rural support. At the end of 1954? for example, there were 35 peasant organizations in Indonesia, 7 centralized and more or less nation-wide, and 28 locally based. Within Java, it would seem that BTI membership is larger than that of all other peasant organizations combined. Susilo Prawiroatmodjo, Tindjauan Slngkat Organisasi Tani di Indonesia (Brief Survey of Peasant Organizations in Indonesia), DJakarta, 1955> PP*50-4* === [PDF page 393] === Despite this, the Moslem STII and PNI*s Petani have greater influence than their membership would suggest mainly because they contain persons who retain influence and authority in the villages. The former includes many wealthier santris, and the latter many government and village officials. The Indonesian peasants constitute some 55 to 65 million persons, in some 12 to 15 million families. BTI and PKI include perhaps 2 million family heads, and other peasant organizations and political parties account for about 1 million family heads, then between 9 and 12 million peasant families are as yet unorganized. Finally, but perhaps of most importance in con sidering communist strength in the villages, is the nature of communist support among the peasants. What might be termed the intellectual appeal of communism has had little if any effect among the Indonesian peasants. The communists have had to win sympathy by concrete work for the peasants* interests, and this has been done to a large extent in the non-santri areas of Java through PKI and a wide range of organizations from the mass organi zations to cooperatives, savings associations and cultural and sports groups which may or may not be openly linked with the communist organizations. Some areas where traditional social patterns have been weakened have === [PDF page 394] === O '-■I o proved more ready to accept the support of PKI and its organizations. In the majority of villages, however, the communists have had to tread warily, to conform to village modes of behaviour, to work wherever possible through traditionally influential persons. Step b y step PKI has sou$it to give the peasants an awareness of their exploited position, to lead them to actions of an increasing scope to the point where they will oppose the local landowners. But the peasants and even many cadres are still unwilling to oppose the local persons of status, let alone the government authorities. The Javanese peasantry is not militant or revo lutionary; it is passive and basically conservative. accepts help from PKI and the mass organizations, but it gives them little in return other than votes. The Aidit leadership is aware of this situation and expects to take years to create a militant and revolutionary force from the peasantry. This force has not yet been created, and it appears doubtful if it will appear in the foreseeable future. In short, the estimate of most non-communist political, governmental, police and army leaders that the peasants are really of minor importance in the extraparliamentary struggle would appear to be valid as of the present and will probably remain so for the next few years === [PDF page 395] === The P e t t y B o u r g e o is ie D o u b ts e x p r e s s e d ab o v e a s t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ’s c o n c e p t o f t h e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e a s a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l c a te g o ry in In d o n e s ia, a re s tre n g th e n e d b y an a n a l y s i s o f th e e f f o r t s made b y PKI to a t t r a c t a n d o r g a n i z e th e g ro u p s l i s t e d a s c o m p r is in g th e p e t t y b o u rg e o is ie * The g ro u p s a r e o f s u c h d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s, s o c i a l s t a t u s a n d p o l i t i c a l a w a re n e s s t h a t th e PKI l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n f o r c e d to u s e a w ide v a r i e t y o f m eth o d s i n o r d e r t o s e e k t h e i r s u p p o r t - w ith a m arked l a c k o f s u c c e s s among s e v e r a l o f t h e g ro u p s* The I n d o n e s ia n p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e, a s d e f i n e d b y th e A id it le a d e r s h ip, i n g e n e r a l ( w ith t h e o b v io u s e x c e p ti o n s o f t h e u r b a n p o o r an d th e f i s h e r m e n ), b e t t e r e d u c a te d th a n t h e w o rk e rs a n d p e a s a n t s, a n d b e t t e r in fo rm e d on th e p r o g r e s s o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and t h e r e f o r e on th e e x t e n t o f t h e i n c a p a c i t y an d c o r r u p t i o n o f th e s u c c e e d in g I n d o n e s ia n g o v e rn m e n ts * I t a ls o s u f f e r s, w ith th e o b v io u s e x c e p t i o n o f t h e d o c t o r s, th e econom ic c h a o s, t h e i n f l a t i o n, an d t h e s h o r t a g e o f co n su m er goods a n d raw m a te ria ls. As a r e s u l t, th e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e o u g h t t o b e more s y m p a th e tic th a n m ost n o t o n ly t o P K I 's v o c a l See a b o v e, p p.7 4 -6 * === [PDF page 396] === struggle to alleviate the misery of the people, hut also to PKI’s promise of a people’s democracy* The short-term, frequently repeated demands of PKI that should appeal to the petty bourgeoisie in general include: reduced prices and increased distribution of essential commodities, increased educational and health facilities, eradication of corruption, better balance of Indonesia’s foreign trade between capitalist and socialist countries so as to ensure high prices for Indonesia’s exports and the import of adequate industrial raw materials and consumer goods, resistance to fascism and the guarantee of democratic rights, the rapid development of the national economy, and the eradication of imperial ist power and influence. PKI’s opposition to the •fanatical* Moslems in Masjumi has also appealed to the largely unreligious or abangan petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the literate petty bourgeoisie should be able to grasp the significance of PKI’s long-term goal, a people’s democracy, which is promised to bring full national independence, full democratic rights for the people, the eradication of feudalism, and rapid economic development* From the limited evidence I obtained, however, it appears that the political or intellectual appeal of PKI has met with little response, even among the intellectuals. === [PDF page 397] === r* O f The members o f th e p e t t y b o u r g e o is ie have been a t t r a c t e d to th e P a r ty o r one o f i t s mass o r g a n iz a tio n s by what th e com m unists do o r prom ise t o do to promote th e s p e c i f i c s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s of th e p o p u la tio n. The P a rty has so u g h t to a t t r a c t th e u rb a n p o o r by i t s work in the kam pongs, as has b een seen a b o v e t h e women*s o rg a n i z a tio n, G erw ani, h as so u g h t p r im a r ily to a t t r a c t th e p o o re r women, in c lu d in g th o se who c o n s t i t u t e a h ig h p r o p o r tio n o f th e p e t t y t r a d e r s; com m unist-led s tu d e n t o r g a n iz a tio n s have so u g h t to a t t r a c t s tu d e n ts i n h ig h sc h o o l and u n i v e r s i t y; and th e youth o r g a n iz a tio n, Pemuda R a k ja t, has a t t r a c t e d y ouths from th e p o o re r s e c tio n s o f th e p e t t y b o u rg e o isie * ^ The A id it le a d e r s h ip has made s p e c ia l e f f o r t s to a t t r a c t and o rg a n iz e two o f th e groups in c lu d e d in th e p e t t y b o u r g e o is ie: th e fish e rm e n, and th e i n t e l l e c t u a l s * (a ) The F ish erm en. In 1959 th e A id it le a d e r s h ip was in c r e a s in g ly aware t h a t due to th e a tro p h y o f democracy and th e in c re a s e d power o f th e arm y, th e P a r ty would p ro b a b ly fa c e an u ltim a te ch o ice betw een s u f f e r i n g r e p r e s s iv e m easures See b elo w, p p.428-41. See above, p p.325-32 See below, p p.411-20. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 398] === 382 and making a bid for power. If faced with this choice, the support of Indonesia’s fishermen would be a valuable asset: in the absence of more than a token navy, they could run personnel and equipment into or out of Indonesia in general and each island in particular. Mention of the need to organize the ’millions* of fishermen was made by the BTI and PKI leaders in 1957 and 1958, but it was not until the PKI national peasants’ conference of April 1959 that a detailed examination was made of the question of organizing fishermen. analysis was made of the social division among fishermen which closely paralleled the analysis of the peasantry, and which concluded that: The fishermen-labourers and the poor fishermen together with the middle fishermen are moving forces of the revolution and must therefore be aroused, organized and mobilized in actions for improved conditions and democratic liberties, and in the struggle for complete national independence. The conference called for the creation of fishermen’s unions for the labourers, of cooperatives ’serving, in the first place, the interests of the poor and middle fisher men*, and of ’other organizations serving general interests, such as cultural and sports c l u b s ’. On August ’’Conclusions on the Question of Fishermen in Indonesia”, in supplement to RI, June-July 1959» pp.9-10. === [PDF page 399] === 383 3t I960, the PKI central committee issued a circular which admitted that *until now the work of the Party among fishermen has not been developed and in some places has not begun at all'« Section committees were ordered to appoint cadres to supervize the work among fishermen, and instructions were given for the creation of a multiplicity of organizations in the fishing villages, (b) The Intellectuals, The Aidit leadership has been perplexed by the intellectuals. In April 1951 the intellectuals were confidently classified among the driving forces of the revolution, and in 1957 Aidit included them within the supposedly revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. But when they continued to withstand the attractions of the Party, the leadership was forced into qualifications. November 1952, the Party leaders drew a distinction between 'the old-generation intellectuals, who in general can be at the most neutralized, especially in revo lutionary times', and the younger intellectuals who could PKI, Development of Work among Fishermen, mimeographed document, Djakarta, 19&0, p,1, PKI, Konstitusi, 1951> p«11; Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.59. === [PDF page 400] === b e made a r e a l a n d a c t i v e f o r c e i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n * T h is d i s t i n c t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o a g e was r e p l a c e d i n 1957 when A id it d e c la re d th a t: The i n t e l l e c t u a l s and t h e s t u d e n t y o u th a r e n o t a c la s s in s o c ie ty b u t t h e i r c la s s p o s i t i o n i s d e te r m in e d b y f a m i l y o r i g i n, by t h e i r c o n d itio n s o f l iv in g and b y t h e i r p o l i t i c a l o u tlo o k. The s i x t h P a r t y c o n g r e s s i n S e p te m b e r 1959 a c k n o w le d g e d th e i n t e l l e c t u a l s to b e ‘g e n e r a l l y p a t r i o t i c a n d s t r o n g l y a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t ‘, b u t e x p l i c i t l y d i v i d e d them i n t o two c a te g o r ie s: th o se ‘b o r n an d c r e a t e d o f I n d o n e s ia n l a b o u r who a r e s t r i v i n g f o r th e t r a d i t i o n s o f o u r p e o p le an d o f o u r i n t e l l e c t u a l s *, a n d th o s e w i t h a n i n c o n s i s t e n t a t t i t u d e to th e r e v o lu tio n, th e id e o lo g ic a l r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s o f t h e e c o n o m ic a lly a n d p o l i t i c a l l y in se c u re b o u rg e o is ie * * ^ What a c c o u n ts f o r P K I‘s c o n ti n u e d f a i l u r e more t h a n a h a n d f u l o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s? ^ to a t t r a c t A p a rtia l but "B ekerdja dalam k alan gan I n t e l e k t u i l " (Work Among th e I n t e l l e c t u a l s ), BM, O ctober-N ovem ber 1 9 5 2, p p * 120-3« A i d i t, I n d o n e s i a n S o c i e t y, p«59« PK I, R e s o l u s i t e n t a n g L a p p ra n Umum CC P K I, p p * 92-3« I t i s n o te w o r th y t h a t o f t h e 46 f u l l a n d c a n d i d a t e members o f t h e PKI c e n t r a l c o m m itte e e l e c t e d i n S e p te m b e r 1959, I know o f o n l y tw o who h a v e u n i v e r s i t y d e g re e s * === [PDF page 401] === c o m p lex answ er r e v o lv e s around th e s o c i a l o r i g i n s, s o c i a l s t a t u s, and o c c u p a tio n s o f th e i n t e l l e c t u a l s * The o ld e r i n t e l l e c t u a l s te n d t o come from a r i s t o c r a t i c o r w e a lth y f a m i l i e s b e c a u s e su c h f a m i l i e s w ere th e o n ly o n es w h ic h, u n d er D utch r u l e, were a b le to g iv e t h e i r c h ild r e n h ig h e r e d u c a t io n, a n d e v e n to d a y v e r y few u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s have t h e i r o r i g i n s i n th e poor s e c t i o n s o f s o c ie t y * At th e same t im e, a ch iev em en t i n form al e d u c a tio n i s an im p o r ta n t d e te r m in a n t o f s o c i a l s t a t u s so t h a t, b y and l a r g e, a h ig h l e v e l o f fo rm a l e d u c a tio n b r in g s w ith i t a h ig h s o c i a l s t a t u s * And h i g h - s t a t u s In d o n e s ia n s have show n, in g e n e r a l, l i t t l e c o n c er n f o r th e p l i g h t o f t h e i r p o o r e r countrym en* I t h a s a l s o b e e n th e c a s e s i n c e in d ep en d en ce t h a t I n d o n e s ia, u n lik e some c o u n t r i e s, has had no group o f unem ployed i n t e l l e c t u a l s lu tio n a r ie s * to form a r e s e r v o i r o f r e v o Anyone w ith a f a i r l y h ig h l e v e l o f fo rm a l e d u c a t io n h a s found read y and p r e s t i g e f u l em ploym ent, e s p e c i a l l y i n th e grow in g b u r e a u c r a cy and a l s o in th e e x p a n d in g u n i v e r s i t y sy s te m and th e l a r g e, m o stly f o r e i g n p r iv a t e c o n c er n s* In o r d e r to o b t a i n, r e t a i n or advan ce t h e i r p o s i t i o n s, th e e d u c a te d In d o n e sia n s have ten d e d For a d i s c u s s i o n o f th e r e a s o n s, in c lu d in g s o c i a l o r i g i n, t h a t e x p la in why th e u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s, th e fu tu r e i n t e l l e c t u a l s, a r e n o t a t t r a c t e d t o PKI, s e e b e lo w, p p.4 1 8 - 2 0. === [PDF page 402] === either to remain aloof from politics or to support the political parties of the persons in control of employment* And in no case, in government, university or private employment, have those in control been communists. Although PKI has failed to attract many intellectuals it has built LEKRA, the only large, nation-wide mass organization of cultural workers, including a few intellectuals. LEKRA. LEKRA was founded on August 17, 1950 with Njoto as the Party's guiding hand in the central secretariat. Special sections were set up for litera ture, the plastic arts, voice, drama and film, philosophy, and sports. Within a year, 21 branches had been established, sixteen in Java, three in Sumatra, one in Kalimantan, and one in Sulawesi. Major structural changes were made by the first LEKRA congress held in January 1959. Before the congress the structure had been a simple one: at the LEKRA, Menjambut Kongres Kebudajaan (Welcoming the Cultural Congress),?, 1951> p.1. LEKRA, Laporan Umum Pengurus Pusat LEKRA kepada Kongres Nasional ke-I LEKRA (Ihe General Report of the National Council to the First LEKRA Congress), mimeographed,?, 1959f p.27; Keputusan-Keputusan Kongres Nasional ke-I LEKRA (Decisions of the First LEKRA Congress), mimeographed,?, 1959, p.1. === [PDF page 403] === centre, the national council and the secretariat with the six special sections; a LEKRA organization at the regional level; and the local branches. The congress created a system of institutes which runs parallel to the old structure: institutes of literature, plastic arts, music, dance, drama, film, and science, with their own organizations reaching down to the branch level, and actually embracing ordinary members in their own cultural field. The ordinary branches now look after ’general cultural matters’. Under the new system, individual members receive better guidance and assistance in their own field. LEKRA has always kept the size of its membership a secret. The general report to the 1959 congress stated evasively that: We do not know definitely how many members we have, but clearly the number now is not as in the saying ’it can be counted on the fingers of one hand ’•12 In an interview, the LEKRA secretary-general claimed that as of May 1960 there were about 200 branches, each with two or three institute sections.Ä The most important and largest branches were in Jogjakarta, Surakarta and LEKRA, Laporan Umum, p.2. Interview with Joebaar Ajoeb, LEKRA secretary-general, and Basuki Resobowo, a member of the LEKRA secretariat. === [PDF page 404] === D j a k a r t a, w h ile i n J o g j a k a r t a LEKRA was c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r e n g t h e n e d b y t h e d e f a c t o a f f i l i a t i o n o f a l a r g e g ro u p o f y o u n g p a i n t e r s i n t h e n o m in a l ly in d e p e n d e n t P e o p l e ’s A rtis ts * N on -co m m u n ist e s t i m a t e s o f LEKRA m em bership so m e tim e s r u n i n t o t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s, b u t a f i g u r e f a r b e lo w 1 0,0 0 0 w o u ld p r o b a b l y i n c l u d e a l l who ta k e p a r t m ore o r l e s s r e g u l a r l y i n LEKRA a c t i v i t i e s * LEKRA, a s t h e o t h e r m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, h a s e n d e a v o u re d t o a t t r a c t m em b ersh ip by a p p e a l i n g t o th e in te r e s ts o f a s p e c ific s e c tio n o f s o c ie ty. As th e o n l y n a t i o n a l c u l t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t o h a v e s u r v i v e d th e l a s t t e n y e a r s, LEKRA h a s p r o v i d e d n o t o n ly a p l a c e f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f common i n t e r e s t s, b u t a l s o some t r a i n i n g in th e d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l f i e l d s. I n a c o u n tr y a lm o s t d e v o id o f f a c i l i t i e s f o r t h e e x h i b i t i o n o f w orks o f a r t, LEKRA h a s p r o v id e d them f o r a n y a r t i s t, s ty le. irre s p e c tiv e o f As a n o u t l e t f o r t h e work o f b o t h a r t i s t s a n d w r i t e r s, LEKRA p u b l i s h e s a p e r i o d i c a l, "Zaman B arm ", a n d s i n c e 1959 h a s b e g u n t o p u b l i s h b o o k s a n d b o o k l e t s. The c h a irm a n o f th e P e o p l e ’s A r t i s t s ( P e l u k i s - P e l u k i s R a k ja t) r a n a s a ’n o n - p a r t y * c a n d i d a t e on P K I’s l i s t i n th e 1955 e l e c t i o n s. Zaman B aru i s t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f th e c o m m u n istc o n t r o l l e d S u r a b a ja p o l i t i c a l p e r i o d i c a l o f th e same name w hich v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d i n 1953> t o b e r e v i v e d a s a r e g u l a r l y - i s s u e d, w e l l- p r o d u c e d LEKRA p e r i o d i c a l i n m id -1 9 5 6. === [PDF page 405] === oon OöJ LEKRA artists are employed to create the decorations and posters for PKI and its mass organizations at times of celebrations, congresses, conferences and elections, and LEKRA. members also provide the talent for the cultural performances that are a feature of the communist meetings and election campaigns. LEKRA claims to have had success in bringing together and organizing the da längs in West and Central Java, the ludruk groups of East Java, and gamelan players, and to have been instrumental in the formation of BAKOKSI, a separate organization of ketoprak artists. That is, it has acted as a sort of trade union for the players in the traditional forms of Javanese entertainment. LEKRA has been able to provide, thanks to its commu nist connections, the reward of trips to Soviet bloc countries for its most active members. The first LEKRA group to go abroad consisted of six persons who attended the 1951 Berlin youth festival. LEKRA members have attended all subsequent communist international youth This is not to imply that LEKRA members are paid for their work in aid of PKI and its mass organizations. do not know if their labour is given free. LEKRA, Lappran Umum, pp.15, 26. Dalängs are the story tellers in the wajang dramas; ludruk and ketoprak are traditional forms of music-drama; gamelan is the name of the Javanese orchestra that accompanies the wajang and music dramas. === [PDF page 406] === 390 festivals, and have also participated in cultural dele gations to Czechoslovakia, Korea and Tashkent. Finally, in order to attract cultural workers by an appeal to their specific interests, LEKRA has formulated demands in their interest. For example, the second national conference, held from October 28 to 30, 1957» demanded tax relief for artists, bigger subsidies for cultural organizations, lighter entertainment tax, protection and assistance for the national film industry, and the creation of a Ministry of Culture. The national congress in January I960 demanded reduced prices for cultural tools such as books, paints, canvas, and musical instruments. The political usefulness of LEKRA for PKI has been varied. Apart from adding its voice to those of the other mass organizations in support of PKI*s position on particular issues, LEKRA has enhanced the attractiveness of PKI and the other mass organizations by making them more colourful with posters, banners and cultural enter tainment* By organizing the artists in the traditional forms of entertainment, it has succeeded in infusing a pro-PKI political content into these tremendously popular RI, December 1957» p«2i+. LEKRA, Keputusan-Keputusan, p.2. === [PDF page 407] === 391 art forms. And LEKRA has been the spearhead for the attack on Western Rock'n’roll culture*, with its 'immoral', music. 'sadistic', 'war-thirsty' books, films and This attack may have played a part in persuading the government to ban the 'immorality* of Western music, Western dancing, and the hula-hoop. LEKRA has tried to teach its members to portray the sufferings of the people in a realistic manner. But LEKRA is in no position to exact artistic discipline from its members who are in the organization for what it gives them and who still largely follow their own individualistic progress. What LEKRA has done, as the only significant nation-wide cultural organization in Indonesia, is to bring a wide range of cultural workers, from film actors and peasant entertainers to sophisticated poets and artists, into contact with PKI and into work of benefit of the Party. LEKRA's failure to persuade its members to adopt socialist realism is illustrated by Sukarno's reaction to the LEKRA art exhibition held at the time of the 1959 congress: My friends, I have seen an exhibition of paintings by members of LEKRA; I must say that you are very liberal minded. I found so many styles and schools of painting - naturalism, realism, surrealism, impressionism, cubism, futurism, etc. When I asked the artists why there are so many styles, their answers revolved around the individuality of the artist, freedom of the artist, etc. Mimeographed manuscript of the speech, Djakarta, 1959* === [PDF page 408] === 09 Youth The adult workers and peasants in Indonesia have "been slow to discard the tradition of open obedience and to regard inequality as an injustice which they themselves can remove. As a result, they have not provided a satisfactory source of cadre material for PKI and its mass organizations. The Aidit leadership has spent, therefore, much effort in order to attract and organize the youth, to mould them politically before the dead weight of tra ditional values and behaviour is placed upon them. As youth is differentiated according to age and education, several mass organizations have been established for it. The largest and most important is Pemuda Rakjat, the continuation under a new name of Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia of the revolution. Pemuda Rakjat is the only mass organization which has formal ties with the Party, and which receives open assistance from the Party. It is aimed primarily at the urban and rural poor with little or no education. For high school students there is IPPI, and for students of institutes of higher edu cation, including universities, there is CGMI. Youngsters below high school age have been provided with a communistled scout association and, the most recent addition to PKI*s mass organizations, a young pioneer movement. === [PDF page 409] === 393 ( a ) Pemuda R a k j a t. The g ro w th o f th e o r g a n i z a t i o n # D u rin g th e r e v o l u t i o n t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y i n c l u d e d many s h a d e s o f le ftis ts fro m t h e S j a h r i r s o c i a l i s t s t o c o v e r t c o m m u n ists. I t s y o u th o r g a n i z a t i o n, Pemuda S o s i a l i s I n d o n e s i a, p la y e d a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n m o b i l i z i n g y o u th t o t h e d e fe n c e o f t h e R e p u b li c, and o r g a n i z e d i t s own arm ed g r o u p s. h i g h e s t m em b ersh ip r e a c h e d was a b o u t 5 0, t o 1 0 0,0 0 0. The A t th e b e g in n i n g o f 1948 t h e S j a h r i r s o c i a l i s t s b ro k e aw ay fro m th e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y to form th e PSI, b u t th e y d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own y o u th o r g a n i z a t i o n u n t i l th e e n d o f 1954* Many o f th e l e a d e r s a n d m em bers o f Pemuda S o s i a l i s I n d o n e s ia w ere i n v o lv e d i n th e M adiun r e b e l l i o n, a n d th e o r g a n i z a t i o n l a t e r c la im e d t h a t on e th o u s a n d o f i t s l e a d e r s w ere k i l l e d. The r e b e l l i o n d i d n o t r e s u l t i n t h e p r o s c r i p t i o n o f th e o r g a n i z a t i o n, a n d i t s t h i r d c o n g r e s s was h e l d i n D j a k a r t a fro m N ovem ber 4 t o 12, 1950» T o t a l m em bership h a d f a l l e n t o 3 0, 0 0 0, and th e num ber o f b r a n c h e s t o 149* I n t e r v i e w w ith Moh. P a tc h a n a n d Anwar N a s u t i o n, t h e n r e s p e c t i v e l y f i r s t a n d s e c o n d d e p u ty s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l o f Pemuda R a k j a t, a n d w ith Q o d a r, a member o f t h e Pemuda R a k ja t e x e c u ti v e c o u n c i l. S in P o. M arch 2 2, 1951. S in P o, November 8, 1 9 5 0; i n t e r v i e w w i t h P a t c h a n, N a s u tio n an d Q o d a r. === [PDF page 410] === 394 Perhaps in d ic a tiv e o f an attem pt to r e - e s ta b lis h the o r g a n iz a tio n 's good c h a ra c te r was the larg e photograph o f P re sid e n t Sukarno which, sid e -b y -sid e with one o f Mao T se-tu n g, watched over the congress. The congress was a v ic to r y fo r th e A id it group which was then stru g g lin g to c ap tu re complete c o n tro l o f PKI. In lin e w ith the th in k in g o f th e A id it group, the old name o f the o rgani z a tio n was discarded as one which would tu rn away p ro sp e c tiv e members. I t was replaced by Pemuda R akjat. The d e c la re d o b je c tiv e o f the o rg a n iz atio n was a lte r e d from a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e to a p e o p le 's democracy. Wikana, an opponent o f the A id it group, was removed from the le a d e rs h ip. And a t a time when the A id it group was s tru g g lin g a g a in st Tan Ling D jie 's concept o f more than one M arx ist-L en in ist p a rty, the congress promised to a s s i s t in the c re a tio n of a sin g le M arx ist-L en in ist p a r ty, PKI, as th e le a d e r of the re v o lu tio n. Pemuda During 1950 Rakjat joined the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and since then one o r o th e r le a d e r of Pemuda Rakjat has been a v ic e -p re s id e n t of the WFDY. During the f i r s t two years or so a f t e r the December 1950 congress, Pemuda R akjat, lik e the o th er PKI-led mass o rg a n iz a tio n s, continued to show a 's e c ta r ia n ' c h a ra c te r d e sp ite i t s verbal r e je c tio n o f se c ta rian ism. little From the inform ation th a t remains o f i t s a c t i v i t i e s p r io r === [PDF page 411] === to about 1954» it would appear that they were mainly complementary to PKI*s political agitation for a people*s democracy, against colonialism, against the Round Table Conference agreement, against the August 1951 mass arrests, against the state of war and siege regulations, and against PKI*s political opponents. The first signs that sectarianism was being abandoned appeared only when the Aidit leadership was formulating its concept of a broad national united front. The fourth Pemuda Rakjat congress was held in November 1952, attended by about 300 delegates repre2 senting the 118 branches and 46,596 members. The general report to the congress noted that 129 leaders had been imprisoned during the August 1951 arrests,"^ and contained a further strong attack on sectarianism. The constitution adopted by the congress opened Pemuda Rakjat In October 1951, for example, the Pemuda Rakjat leader ship ordered all branches to cooperate with other youth organizations in establishing joint committees to celebrate Heroes* Day; HR, October 15, 1951* In February 1952, Pemuda Rakjat joined with several other youth organizations, including PNI*s Pemuda Demokrat, in the celebration held in Bandung of the International Day of Youth Solidarity against Colonialism; HR, February 22, 1952. HR, November 13, 15 and 17, 1952; also interview with Fatchan, Nasution and Qodar, A report in HR, January 2, 1952, stated that 150 Pemuda Rakjat members arrested in August 1951 were still in prison. === [PDF page 412] === t o a l l b o y s a n d g i r l s, a g e d 14 t o 3 0, who w ere I n d o n e s ia n c i t i z e n s a n d who a g r e e d t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n 's c o n s t i t u t i o n. B o th e n t r a n c e a n d m em b ersh ip f e e s w ere s e t so low t h a t e v e n i f c o l l e c t e d th e y w ould n o t e x c lu d e a n y p o t e n t i a l me mbe r, howe v e r po o r • ^ F o llo w in g th e c o n g r e s s, m em bership b e g a n to r i s e s l o w l y, a n d i n J u n e 1953 th e n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l i s s u e d th e f i r s t p l a n f o r e x p a n s io n o f m em b ersh ip. The g o a l was a n i n c r e a s e fro m 7 0,3 1 9 t o 1 5 0, 0 0 0 b y th e en d o f 1953* By th e tim e o f t h e f i r s t n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e i n J u l y 1954* Pemuda R a k j a t c la im e d 281 b r a n c h e s an d 2 0 2, 6 0 5 m em bers, o f w h ic h 180 b r a n c h e s an d 166,631 members w ere i n J a v a, a n d 81 b r a n c h e s a n d 29>974 members i n S u m a tra. The c o n f e r e n c e la u n c h e d a n a m b itio u s p l a n to r a i s e member s h i p to 5 0 0, 0 0 0 b y th e e n d o f th e y e a r, w ith t h e e m p h a sis o n m oving o u t o f t h e tow ns i n t o th e r u r a l a r e a s. T h is g o a l was n o t r e a c h e d, b u t i n J u n e 1955 Pemuda R a k ja t Pemuda R a k j a t, P e r a t u r a n D a s a r Pemuda R a k ja t (Pemuda R a k j a t 's C o n s t i t u t i o n ), ( t h i r d e d i t i o n ), D j a k a r t a, 1954* Pemuda R a k j a t, R ol Pemuda d a la m P e rd ju a n g a n u n tu k K ernerdekaan N a s i o n a l d a n P e rd a m a ia n D u n ia (The R o le o f Y outh i n t h e S t r u g g l e f o r N a t i o n a l In d e p e n d e n c e a n d W orld P e a c e ), D j a k a r t a, 1955» p.3 7. I b i d.. p p.3 7 - 8. The f i g u r e f o r J a v a i n c l u d e d t h e i n s i g n i f i c a n t m em b ersh ip i n N u s a te n g g a r a b e c a u s e a t t h a t tim e N u s a te n g g a ra was i n c l u d e d i n th e a r e a o f th e E a s t J a v a r e g i o n a l c o m m itte e. === [PDF page 413] === 9 07 c la im e d 458 b r a n c h e s an d 4 5 0,0 0 0 m em bers, and 601 b r a n c h e s a n d 6 1 6,6 0 5 members a t th e e n d o f 1955* A p p a r e n tly th e m ovem ent i n t o th e v i l l a g e s was s u c c e s s f u l, f o r i t was c la im e d t h a t a b o u t 75 p e r c e n t o f t h e members i n J u n e 1955 w e re p o o r p e a s a n t s. By t h e e n d o f 1955» 80 p e r c e n t o f m em bers w ere p e a s a n t s, 15 p e r c e n t w o rk e rs a n d o f f i c e w o r k e r s, 5 p e r c e n t s t u d e n t s o f h ig h s c h o o l a n d u n i v e r s i t y an d 1 p e r c e n t fis h e rm e n.-^ 'o t h e r s *, i n c l u d i n g s m a ll tra d e s m e n a n d The s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l ev en c o m p la in e d t h a t t h e num ber o f young w o rk e rs was now to o lo w. O nly a b o u t 5 p e r c e n t o f members w ere g i r l s. The p ro b le m o f c a d r e e d u c a t i o n was r a i s e d i n th e f i f t h Pemuda R a k ja t c o n g r e s s h e l d i n J u l y 19 5 6. Some a t t e m p t a t p u b l i c a t i o n i n o r d e r to p r o v id e m a t e r i a l o f u s e f o r c a d r e s h a d a l r e a d y b e e n m ade, b u t w ith i n d i f f e r e n t s u c c e s s.^ D u rin g th e e l e c t i o n cam paign f o r t h e A sm u d ji, "M e lu ask a n P e n e r b i t a n O r g a n i s a s i " (To E x te n d P u b l i s h i n g b y t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n ), B u i e t i n Pemuda R a k j a t, n o. 1, 1955, P.5; HR, J u l y 2 6, 1 9 5 ^ A sm u d ji, " M e lu a sk a n ", B u i e t i n Pemuda R a k j a t, n o. 1, 1955» Pemuda R a k j a t, M enudju P e r s a t u a n Pemuda I n d o n e s i a ja n g L uas (T ow ards B ro ad U n ity o f I n d o n e s ia n Y o u th ), D j a k a r t a, 195Ü, p.4 5. I n J a n u a r y 1954 a tw ic e - m o n th ly Pemuda B a m (New Y outh) was to b e g i n, b u t was n o t h e a r d o f s u b s e q u e n t l y; to w a rd s th e end o f 1955 a m o n th ly G e n e r a s i B aru (New G e n e r a tio n ) was a p p e a r i n g, a lt h o u g h th e c i r c u l a t i o n o f i t a n d a l l === [PDF page 414] === Constituent Assembly, the Pemuda Rakjat executive com mittee had instructed members to study Aidit*s "For the Victory of the National United Front in the General Elections" as well as the co m m i t t e e ^ report to the fourth national council plenum* The congress was told that in future education would be concentrated at the centre and provincial and kabupaten levels for cadres, with collective discussions in all leadership bodies and m e mbers* 1 groups. In order to implement Marxist-Leninist education proper relations had to be organized with PKI and the Party's directives carried out. Visits to the Soviet bloc have been of importance as political education as well as rewards. It was not divulged what percentage of youth delegations abroad have been Pemuda Rakjat members, but large delegations have attended, for example, the communist international youth festivals; 63 Indo nesians went to Berlin in 1951> about 100 went to Bucharest in 1953 (61 spending an extra three months in Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China), 37 to Warsaw in Pemuda Rakjat brochures and pamphlets was less than 2,250; and from the end of 1955 the monthly Buietin Pemuda Rakjat appeared, though by July 1956 it had been combined with Generasi Baru. H R, December 30, 1953; Asmudji, ^Meluaskan", Buletin Pemuda Rakjat, no.1, 1955» P»5; Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, p.53* Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, pp.51-2. === [PDF page 415] === 399 1955» and about 200 to Moscow in 1957 (of whom some also visited China and North Korea)* During 1958 Pemuda Rakjat formulated a plan of organization and education to be completed before the sixth congress scheduled for the beginning of 1960. The important goals for the plan were four: 1* To increase membership to one million. 2. To extend organization into new areas, especially outside Java. 3* With regard to cadres: (a) to arrange the movement of cadres from the better-established to the newer areas; (b) to arrange for every province or province-level region in Java and Sumatra (except Djambi and Riau) to have two full-timers, and each similar area outside Java and Sumatra one each; (c) to arrange for every commis sariat in Java and Sumatra (except Djambi and Riau) to HR, July 10 and October 23, 1953; July 28, 1955; July 3* and September 10, 1957« Pemuda Rakjat, Diktat (Outline for Cadre Courses), mimeographed, Djakarta, no date, pp.33-7* Under the Pemuda Rakjat constitution, there is a committee for each province or province-level area, a commissariat to coordinate the branches in each kabupaten and large town, then a branch which coordinates the work of several sub-branches in which ordinary members partici pate. Groups further divide ordinary members as a means of implementing the work of the sub-branch; Pemuda Rakjat, Peraturan Dasar Pemuda Rakjat (Pemuda Rakjat's Constitution), (fifth edition), Djakarta, 1958, pp.31-43* === [PDF page 416] === 400 have at least one full-timer, and outside Java and Sumatra one half-timer; and (d) to arrange for every branch to have at least one mobile activist readily available for work, 4» To implement the following education programme: (a) at the centre, ’shifts* of one month each in a central school to teach the history of social development, the basic problems of the revolution, the Indonesian youth movement, and problems of Pemuda Rakjat organization; (b) at the province level, ‘shifts’ of half a month to teach "How Society Develops’1, the "ABC of the Indonesian Revolution" (both of which are study guides issued by PKI for use in its section and subsection schools), the Indonesian and international youth movements, and problems of Pemuda Rakjat organization; (c) at the commissariat level, schools and courses to study the Indonesian and international youth movements, to give an understanding of the role of Pemuda Rakjat, and to give general knowledge; using (d) in the branches, discussions on theory, material from "Harian Rakjat" as well as the Pemuda Rakjat constitution; and (e) in the sub-branches, political lectures given by leaders of the branch and by members of the local PKI subsection. Students in the schools were to live in hostels, and to work similarly to students in PKI schools. The general plan was that the === [PDF page 417] === schools at each level would educate cadres and activists from the immediately lower level, while the political lectures in the sub-branches would be for both members and non-members. At the end of 1957 there had been 802 branches and a claimed membership of 800,000. In July 1958, the national council raised the membership goal to 1,200,000, and asked the urban sections of the organization to give attention not only to workers and girls, but also to high school and university students. The executive com mittee’s report to the council indicated, however, that in fields other than membership expansion difficulties were being faced.^ The periodical "Generasi Baru" could not be published due to a shortage of funds; the education system was not yet in operation;*4 and the losses suffered by Pemuda Rakjat at the hands of PRRI-Permesta rebels Pemuda Rakjat, Pemuda Pengawal Kemerdekaan Nasional Indonesia (Youth, the Guardian of Indonesian National Independence), Djakarta, 1957* p.6. Pemuda Rakjat, Laooran Umum oada Sidang De wan Nasional ke-III (General Report to the Third Meeting of the National Council), mimeographed, Djakarta, 1958, p.13. Ibid., pp.13-19. The report did comment that the national council was still running a school for preparing cadres from Java for work in the outer islands, and that some commissariats and branches had, on their own initiative, organized schools and courses on politics and theory. === [PDF page 418] === 4.02 forced the organization to give the areas outside Java a prior claim on cadres. By the end of 1959 claimed membership had reached about one million. The social composition had remained fairly stable since 1955» and in April 1960 the Pemuda Rakjat leaders estimated that about 70 per cent of members were peasants, 25 per cent workers of all descriptions from labourers to office workers, and 4 per cent high school and university students. Girls still comprised about 5 per cent. The geographical spread of Pemuda Rakjat was indicated b y the endorsement in July 1958 of province-level committees for Atjeh, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and Nusatenggara.^- Despite this, membership remained concentrated in Java (about 70 per cent) and Sumatra (about 30 per cent), with little outside these two islands. In April 1958, for example, the There were two reasons for this priority: first, many cadres of PKI and its mass organizations were killed by the rebels; and, second, the central government placed a ban on all political activity in the war zones, so that PKI used its mass organizations to fill the political gap left b y the withdrawal of the rebels and the ban on party activities. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.171. Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar. Pemuda Rakjat, Lappran Umum, p.14* Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar. === [PDF page 419] === 403 membership in Nusatenggara, including Bali, was only 6,296^ in a population of about 5>800,000. In 1959 *cadre education was begun on a nation-wide scale and in a carefully organized fashion’. central school began its first The ’shift* in January 1959» and was soon followed by schools and courses at the lower levels as laid down in the 1958 plan. The central school held two shifts each year, each shift lasting one and a half months and taking 30 to 40 cadres. In the pro vincial and commissariat schools the courses lasted from one to three weeks depending partly on how often the students could meet. Subjects taught were in line with the plan. Publishing efforts were not so successful, but in 1960 the small news-sheet ’’Buletin Pemuda Rakjat" was still being published, at a rate of 10,000 copies per month, and was being distributed to each sub-branch where it served as material for discussions, lectures and for improving the organization. HR, April 28, 1958. Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar. HR, January 12, 1959. Interview with Pemuda Rakjat leaders in East Java and Jogjakarta. === [PDF page 420] === I t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r an o u t s i d e r t o e s t i m a t e w h e th e r t h e 1958 p l a n h as b e e n f u l f i l l e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e num ber o f f u l l - t i m e c a d r e s. The num ber o f c a d r e s i s k e p t s e c r e t, and t h e p ro b le m o f e s t i m a t i n g i t i s made more d i f f i c u l t p a r t l y b e c a u s e c a d r e s o f t e n d o u b le a s c a d r e s f o r PKI and f o r one o r more o f t h e o t h e r mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, and p a r t l y b e c a u s e t h e num ber v a r i e s w i d e l y fro m a r e a t o a r e a. A c c o rd in g t o i n f o r m a t i o n I r e c e i v e d from Pemuda R a k j a t c a d r e s i n t h e f i r s t m onths o f 1960, t h e r e w ere f i v e f u l l - t i m e r s i n t h e c e n t r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s, a n d s i x c a d r e s who a l s o h a d o t h e r j o b s; i n E a s t J a v a t h e r e w ere f o u r f u l l - t i m e r s a t t h e p r o v i n c e l e v e l, w h i l e a n e s t i m a t e d 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e c o m m itte e members a t t h e c o m m i s s a r i a t l e v e l were f u l l - t i m e r s; and i n t h e J o g j a k a r t a S p e c i a l D i s t r i c t t h e r e w ere f i v e f u l l - t i m e r s i n t h e J o g j a k a r t a c i t y c o m m i s s a r i a t, a n d b e tw e e n t h r e e a n d f i v e i n e a c h o f th e f o u r k a b u p a t e n c o m m i tt e e s. Prom t h e s e f i g u r e s i t w ould a p p e a r t h a t Pemuda R a k j a t p r o b a b l y h a s a t i t s d i s p o s a l a few h u n d r e d f u l l - t i m e r s o r p a r t - t i m e r s, w h ic h i s i n c o m p a r a b l y more t h a n a n y o t h e r y o u t h o r g a n i z a tio n. F u r t h e r m o r e, Pemuda R a k j a t r e c e i v e s c o n s t a n t a s s i s t a n c e from PKI a n d t h e o t h e r c o m m u n is t- le d mass o rg a n iz a tio n s. === [PDF page 421] === 405 The activities of Pemuda Rakjat. As has been seen, Pemuda Rakjat in the first two years or so after the December 1950 congress concentrated largely on political action. Since 1952 or 1953 political action has not been abandoned, but it has been concerned largely with building the image of the communist group as the militant defender of Indonesian sovereignty, the patriotic bearer of the sacred flame of the 1945 revolution. Vociferous denunciation has been made of colonialism and imperialism, of any real or imaginary interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs, of ’Western culture’ (including the ’immoral’ films and dances which offend a large number of Indonesians, especially the less educated and the more tradition-bound), and of ’subversion*, ranging from Dutch assistance to the Darul Islam rebels to Kuomintang and Western assistance to the PRRI-Permesta rebels. The demand for the return of West Irian has been brought up regularly, and when PKI after 1955 began to move closer to Sukarno, Pemuda Rakjat organized campaigns in support of his concept of guided democracy. More recently, it drew attention to those contents of his Pemuda Rakjat leaders claim that when the PRRI-Permesta rebellion broke out in 1958, Pemuda Rakjat cadres and activists played an active and at times heroic part in opposing and even openly fighting the rebels. === [PDF page 422] === 406 political manifesto of August 17> 1959 which were of benefit to PKI. In a different vein, Pemuda Rakjat instructed its members to vote communist in the 1955 and 1957 elections, and also organized brigades to campaign for PKI. Pemuda Rakjat*s political activities have been of considerable assistance to PKI. They also have attracted a few members and they have served to raise the political consciousness of cadres and activists. They have not been, however, a chief means by which Pemuda Rakjat has attracted over one million members. Sukatno, the secretary-general, wrote in 1955 that the way to attract mass membership was for Pemuda Rakjat to truly know the hopes of youth, for Pemuda Rakjat as a whole to fight for youth*s *everyday interests*, and for the sub-branches to answer *the everyday needs of every section of youth, in workshops, factories, offices, harbours, urban kampongs, villages, estates, schools, etc. * Work towards this end has been twofold: the formulation of programmes of demands aimed at each major section of youth, and the social and economic activities of the sub-branches and groups. Sukatno, "Untuk Memperluas Diskusi-Diskusi dikalangan Anggota.'” (To Extend Discussions Among Members.*), Buie tin Pemuda Rakjat, no.1, 1955> p.3* === [PDF page 423] === 40? An example of the comprehensive programmes of demands drawi up by Pemuda Rakjat is that put forward by the fifth congress in July 1956. It contained twenty general demands, seven demands specifically for young workers, eleven for young peasants, and fifteen for high school and university students. The scope of the demands ranged widely: in the case of young workers, for example, from improved wages, social security, and work conditions, to the abolition of wage differences because of sex or age, the distribution of essential commodities at low prices, and technical education with scholarships from the employers and the government. Political action and published programmes of demands have meant little to the ordinary young worker or peasant. The great appeal of Pemuda Rakjat lies in its social and economic activities, and Pemuda Rakjat did not achieve mass membership until these were given priority. The organization secretary told the first national conference in July 1954: In seeking for the object of activity of the organization to defend the rights of the various groups of youth in the various fields, urgent demands should be chosen which can be felt every day and can be carried out successfully, for example: abolition of pologoro, reduction of land rent, village democratization, higher wages, lower book Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, pp.63-7- === [PDF page 424] === 408 prices, and so on... In order to carry out demands as well as possible, we must cooperate with youth organizations, other mass organizations concerned, and with the mass of youth that is not yet organized ••• what is especially important is to carry out concrete and continuous activity until the demands are successful. Once a demand is successful, then another object of activity must be sought with the goal of further raising the political and organizational consciousness as well as the militancy of the mas3 of youth, of the members and function aries of Pemuda Rakjat. Urgent economic demands have sometimes been pressed by Pemuda Rakjat alone, but usually Pemuda Rakjat has worked in conjunction with PKI and/or one or more of the other communist-led mass organizations. Like PKI and the other mass organizations, Pemuda Rakjat has also organized mutual aid activities. are of two kinds. They The first is the organization of teams to build and repair roads and paths, bridges, houses, irrigation ditches, and gutters. The second is giving assistance to members in times of need or illness, which, among youth who are poor and without social services, is a valuable way of winning support. A member Pemuda Rakjat, Rol Pemuda, pp.50-1. Sukatno told the fifth congress in July 1956, for example, that in the Tjirebon area of West Java Pemuda Rakjat had taken the initiative in demanding that the division of the rice harvest between the landowner and sharecropper be made in the fields, and in refusing to carry the landlords* share free of charge to the rice bams; Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, p.21. === [PDF page 425] === 400 would be reluctant to leave Pemuda Rakjat and thereby forfeit the minimum security it affords him, Pemuda Rakjat also helps its members by the provision of anti illiteracy and general knowledge courses. Professor A.G. Pringgodigdo, president of Airlangga University in Surabaja, told me that when he returned to Java after a visit to the United States he was greatly impressed by the silence and darkness of the villages and urban kampongs once the sun had set, which at that latitude is always about 6 p,m. Pew villagers or kampong dwellers can afford any but the weakest kerosene or candle light, and the atmosphere, in the absence of organized enter tainment at a low price, is usually one of deep boredom. This is a clue to the main reason for Pemuda Rakjat*s success in attracting over one million members, Pemuda Rakjat provides the young members and peasants with something to do, something to relieve the darkness and boredom. The value of sports and cultural activities was recognized by Sukatno in November 1959 when he called for Pemuda Rakjat cadres to attract even greater numbers of workers and peasants by organizing all kinds of sports and cultural groups. Volley-ball, badminton, football, Interview with Patchan, Nasution and HR, November 6, 1959* Qodar, === [PDF page 426] === table-tennis and even chess clubs are organized under the leadership of the commissariats• groups have been established. Physical training The extent of the work in the sports field was indicated by its organization in November 1958 of a national sports festival, the first to be held by a youth organization in Indonesia* Cultural activities vary widely, often in accord with the traditional forms of entertainment in the different regions, and include mixed choirs, many types of musical groups, and drama and music-drama groups. An obvious failure in Pemuda Rakjat*s work has been its attempt to attract girls into the organization. The leaders feel that the causes of this failure cannot be easily overcome: first, girls usually marry between the ages of 15 and 16 in the villages and by 20 at the latest in the towns, and once they are married they should enter the women*s mass organization, not Pemuda Rakjat; and second, there is a strongly ingrained tradition that girls should not mix in public with young men. An effort has been made to overcome this second difficulty by creating special all-girl groups and by experimenting with The 1958 plan of organization and education called on each commissariat to provide uniforms for at least one hundred team members. HR, November 12 and 13, 1958. === [PDF page 427] === a l l - g i r l su b -b ra n c h e s. g irls A c tiv itie s s p e c ific a lly fo r i n c l u d e c l a s s e s i n h a n d i c r a f t s, s u c h a s r a f f i a w o rk, i n how t o r a i s e f i s h, a n d i n h o u s e h o ld s k i l l s su c h a s s e w in g an d c o o k in g, b u t t h e y a r e n o t y e t w id e ly d e v e lo p e d. S in c e th e D ecem ber 1950 c o n g r e s s, Pemuda R a k ja t h a s p ro v e d a v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n t t o PK I. I t has a ttr a c te d o v e r one m i l l i o n young w o r k e r s, p e a s a n t s an d s t u d e n t s i n t o an o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n t r o l l e d b y PKI; i t h a s u s e d them t o ad d w e ig h t t o th e s t r u g g l e o f PKI and t h e o t h e r m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s; i t h a s d raw n fro m them c a d r e s an d a c t i v i s t s who p a s s on to becom e c a d r e s an d a c t i v i s t s o f PKI and th e o t h e r m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s; a n d i t h a s e n d e a v o u re d to a r o u s e in i t s o r d i n a r y members a sy m p a th y f o r PKI an d i t s g e n e r a l o b je c tiv e s. T h ro u g h Pemuda R a k ja t young p e o p le may a c q u i r e s o c i a l, p o l i t i c a l a n d e d u c a t i o n a l v a lu e s w h ich w i l l p r e d i s p o s e them a s a d u l t s t o v o te f o r PKI an d to e n t e r PKI a n d / o r one o f th e o t h e r mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s. (b ) S tu d e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n s: IP P I an d CGMI. IP P I. The Ik a ta n P e la d ja r In d o n e s ia (League o f In d o n e sia n High S c h o o l S tu d e n ts ) was form ed i n J o g ja k a r ta in Septem ber 1945 and in c lu d e d h ig h s c h o o l s tu d e n ts and a Much o f th e i n f o r m a t i o n o n IP P I was r e c e i v e d i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s w ith M a ru li S i l i t o n g a, a n o n -co m m u n ist l e a d e r o f IP P I f o r many y e a r s. === [PDF page 428] === few university students* In February 1948 it merged with the Sarekat Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian University Student Association) to form IPPI. During the revolution IPPI and its predecessors were active chiefly in mobilizing students for the struggle against the Dutch* The leadership consisted of socialists and communists, with no friction between the two* At the time of the Madiun rebellion many of the communistinclined leaders in Java went into hiding, but those in Sumatra remained in their posts* After the second Dutch attack in December 1948 IPPI activists passed into Dutchoccupied areas and helped establish a high school student association which joined IPPI in 1950* A covert communist, Sujono Atmo, was elected to the IPPI leadership at the 1950 and 195*1 congresses, and in the early 1950's the communists won control of most branches in Central and East Java. The non-communists became aware of the attempt to capture IPPI and united in 1954 to elect a central board free from communists. Boon afterwards a split occurred in the Djakarta IPPI, rival communist and non-communist sections competing. In 1957» because the central board would not call a new congress, presumably because it was afraid of losing control to the communists, the communist-led Bandung regional committee took the initiative of inviting the other communist-led === [PDF page 429] === s e c t i o n s to h o ld a c o n g r e s s. The c o n g r e s s was h e l d, a new c e n t r a l b o a r d e l e c t e d, a n d two I P P I 's e x i s t e d, e a c h c la im in g to be th e o n ly le g itim a te one. S in c e 1950 IP P I h a s d e c l i n e d i n r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h. I t s m em b ersh ip t h e n was a b o u t 3 0 0, 0 0 0. I n 1 9 6 0 i t was s t i l l 3 0 0,0 0 0, d e s p i t e a tre m e n d o u s i n c r e a s e i n t h e num ber o f h ig h s c h o o l s t u d e n t s, and i t s tw o. o r g a n i z a t i o n was s p l i t i n A t th e tim e o f t h e s p l i t i n 1957» th e com m unists c o n t r o l l e d b r a n c h e s, m a in ly i n J a v a, c o n t a i n i n g a m a j o r i t y o f t h e m em b ersh ip. The d e c l i n e i n r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h h a s b e e n d u e t o t h e s t r u g g l e b e tw e e n t h e com m u n ists and non c o m m u n ists, t o t h e d e c r e a s i n g a t t r a c t i o n f o r u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s who fo rm ed t h e i r own o r g a n i z a t i o n s and so rem oved w h at h a d b e e n I P P I fs s o u r c e o f l e a d e r s, t o th e a g e ( m o s tly o v e r 3 0 ) o f th e p r e s e n t IP P I l e a d e r s, w hich i n c r e a s e s th e h ig h s c h o o l s t u d e n t s a p a th y to w a rd s th e o r g a n i z a t i o n, and t o th e r e f u s a l o f many p r i v a t e s c h o o l s, r e l i g i o u s and s e c u l a r, to p e r m i t t h e i r s t u d e n t s t o j o i n IP P I b e c a u s e th e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n c l u d e s many c o m m u n ists. The c o m m u n is t-le d IP P I c o n c e n t r a t e s i t s a c t i v i t i e s m a in ly on s p o r t s, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s i n w h ich r e c e i v e s s u p p o r t fro m Pemuda R a k j a t. U nder i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n IP P I i s n o n - p o l i t i c a l, and t h e co m m u n ists do n o t o p e n ly a tte m p t t o i n d o c t r i n a t e i t s m em bers. IP P I i s u s e d p o l i t i c a l l y, i n t h e s h o r t - r u n, t o m o b iliz e s t u d e n t s === [PDF page 430] === to support PKI-led rallies, demonstrations and protests, and in the long-run to plant the seeds of pro-PKI sympathies and to find a few promising students who can he trained to become communist cadres and activists. CGMI. PKI has had indifferent success among the intellectuals as a whole, and very few university students have been won over. As an article in "Bintang Merah" of February 1958 declared: up till now, bourgeois ideology and ways, that is, idealism and individualism, are still dominant in our universities. We see that the youths who graduate from high school with pure spirits and who form progressive elements, fall prey to bourgeois ideology and ways after entering university. The article said that a Party seminar on work among students, had just concluded that the Party must give: leadership and assistance to the students, both in fighting for economic and cultural improvements, especially improvements in their studies, and in raising their still far from adequate political consciousness; Much of the information on CGMI was obtained from inter views with national leaders of CGMI, the PNI student organization GMNI, the Moslem student organization HMI, and the socialist student organization GMS; also from local leaders of these organizations in Jogjakarta and, to a lesser extent, in Surabaja. Banggas, "Memperbaiki Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan Mahasiswa" (To Improve Party Work among the Students), BM, February 1958, pp.57-85* === [PDF page 431] === and that the communist-led student organizations must be broadly based on patriotism and unity. Communist-led local university student associations were established in about 1950 in Bandung, Bogor and Jogjakarta. They fused in November 1956 to form CGMI which initially claimed about 1,180 members. By early 1960 CGMI claimed 7>000 members in sixteen towns with institutions of higher learning, the largest branches being Bandung and Jogjakarta with 1,750 members each, Surabaja with 500 members, Malang with 400, and the University of Indonesia in Djakarta with 300. These figures were hotly denied by the leaders of the other student organizations who estimated that CGMI had perhaps 4,000 members - compared with over 10,000 in the Masjumioriented HMI, about 10,000 in the PNI-oriented GMNI, and about 6,000 evenly divided between the Protestant and Roman Catholic student associations. CGMI claims to be non-political and non-religious, and seeks to attract new members by a variety of activities such as: 1. strong opposition to the often sadistic initiation rites inflicted on new students; The term 'mahasiswa* as used in the titles of the student organizations is roughly translated as university student, but it also applies to students in post-high school academies and teachers* colleges. === [PDF page 432] === 2. waging a struggle for students’ interests, for example organizing a delegation to the Minister of Education in January 1960 to demand reduced prices for books, increased budgets for the Ministry of Education, and increased students’ allowances; 3* social events, such as excursions, badminton and table-tennis; 4* active propaganda in support of President Sukarno’s political lines, and opposition to the PRRIPermesta rebellion, and to all imperialist (Dutch, American and SEATO) real and imaginary infringements of Indonesian sovereignty; and 5 * opposition to 'rock’n ’roll culture’, and appeals for a culture based on 'the Indonesian personality’, CGMI had in early i960 recently begun to organize study groups for its own members, with the more advanced students helping the newer ones. Apart from its own activities, CGMI attracts many new students because of its unique character. All other national student organizations are either openly tied to a political party or to a religion. For young students without political affiliation or strong religious feelings but who wish to join a national student organization, CGMI is the only one open to them. === [PDF page 433] === As one CGMI le a d e r co m p la in ed t o me, In d o n e sia n s t u d e n t s a r e n o t p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c i o u s, and CGMI must work t o a r o u se p o l i t i c a l c o n s c io u s n e s s d ir e c tly but by s te a lth *. *not o p e n ly or Members a re b r o u g h t in t o su ch a c t i v i t i e s a s p r o t e s t s a g a in s t th e v i s i t o f a D utch a i r c r a f t c a r r ie r to West I r ia n i n May 1960, p ea ce weeks and p e a c e cam paigns made more a t t r a c t i v e b y l e c t u r e s and f i l m s, and demands f o r th e e x p u ls io n o f D utch u n i v e r s i t y l e c t u r e r s who opp ose th e In d o n e s ia n c la im to West Ir ia n * Some few s t u d e n t s have b een won to com m unist sy m p a th ies th ro u g h CGMI, b u t th e s p a r s e n e s s o f t h e i r ranks i s shown b y th e d i f f i c u l t i e s e x p e r ie n c e d, f o r exam ple in Gadjah Mada U n iv e r s it y in J o g j a k a r t a, i n f in d in g you n ger s t u d e n t s t o ta k e o v er th e le a d e r s h ip from th o s e who sh o u ld have l e f t u n i v e r s i t y y e a r s ago* In g e n e r a l, w henever members f i n d t h a t CGMI i s c o m m u n ist-le d, m ost o f them l e a v e. Non-com m unist s tu d e n t le a d e r s g e n e r a l l y e s tim a te d th a t no more th a n 5 or 10 p er c e n t o f CGMI members r e a l i z e d t h a t i t was c o n t r o l l e d b y PKI* Over th e p a s t few y e a r s th e im p ortan ce o f a l l s tu d e n t o r g a n iz a t io n s h a s d e c lin e d due to a d e c r e a s e i n s tu d e n t i n t e r e s t in p o l i t i c s, the grow th in im portance and s o c i a l a c t i v i t y o f e l e c t e d s tu d e n t c o u n c i l s i n each u n i v e r s i t y, E a r ly in 1960, th e o n ly u n i v e r s i t i e s o r c o l l e g e s where a CGMI member was p r e s id e n t o f th e s tu d e n t c o u n c il were === [PDF page 434] === and an increasing concern with study. As study groups gained in importance for the student organizations, CGMI suffered a decrease in its attractiveness partly because it did not realize until after the other organizations the keen interest in such groups, and partly because there were very few communist university teachers, and so few who could assist the students in CGMI's groups. The question still remains: why have PKI and CGMI failed to attract more than a handful of Indonesian students to the communist cause? A partial answer might be found in the social origins of the students, and in the general political situation since especially 1956. The great majority of Indonesian university students still come from the social levels above the workers and poor and medium peasants. They come from families which normally would support PNI, Masjumi or the Socialist Party. Many came from families of government officials with a tradition of non-participation in political affairs as a Padang and Malang. CGMI members had held that position in the large Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta from 1956 to 1958, but in the latter year the non-communists had exposed CGMI!s communist orientation, with the result that by the academic year 1959/1960 CGMI held only one of the 27 occupied seats on the student council. For some statistical evidence to support this statement, see Leslie H. Palmier, "Occupational Distribution of Parents of Pupils in Certain Indonesian Educational Institutions", Indonesie, 1957> vol.X, pp.320-76, especially p.369. === [PDF page 435] === 419 safeguard for future positions and promotion. That some of the children of the middle class and aristocracy have not become communists is surprising, but the Indonesian middle class and aristocracy have been remarkably free from the occasional reformist or radical devoted to the welfare of the *lower orders* and willing to risk their own future welfare and status for that cause. The second factor, the general political situation since about 1956, was commented upon by all leaders of student organizations who were interviewed in 1959 and 1960, All claimed that during the past four years or so a decline had occurred in the originally low political interest of students. This can partly be explained by the fact that the generation which fought in the revo lution, and which would be expected to show a greater interest in politics, had largely passed through the universities by 1956 and had been replaced by young students concerned primarily with their studies - and with the jobs and status those studies would provide. The general discrediting of political parties by 1957 has also tended to reduce the students* interest in party politics. Furthermore, very few job opportunities for graduates are to be found outside the government ministries, services, armed forces, nationalized enter prises, and so on. Because Sukarno and the army, which === [PDF page 436] === 420 have become the dominant political forces since 1956, look with a jaundiced eye on the political parties, and because the political future of Indonesia is so uncertain, students have been discouraged from openly engaging in political activity because it could jeopardize their future careers. (c) Communist Scouts and Young Pioneers. For the age group below high school age, PKI has established both scout and young pioneer organizations. A communist-led scout association was already active in 1954« It remained small, its membership was not published, and early in 1961 it was absorbed, by presi dential order, in a single, nation-wide scout association under Sukarno as chief scout. Perhaps because of the lack of success of the scout association, Aidit in 1959 suggested the formation of a young pioneer organization which took the name Fadjar Harapan (Dawn of Hope). Despite its clear PKI origin, the Fadjar Harapan constitution declared that the organization was open to all children aged six to thirteen, and was 'not associated "Experimen jang Berhasil" (Successful Experiment), BM, September-October 1959, pp.409-10. === [PDF page 437] === with any political party*. Activities were to include sports and play, training in farming and handicrafts, study groups to assist with homework, visits to museums and historical sites, and encouragement to read *about the people's heroes and about the creative mind of the people*. Party and Pemuda Rakjat cadres were instructed to study the experiences of pioneer organizations abroad and to adapt them to local conditions. In the initial stages Pad jar Harapan was to be organized on a local basis with no central leadership. By May 1960 there were 1,000 members in Djakarta and groups were already being formed in the other large towns. Through Padjar Harapan the Aidit leadership presumably hoped to build a mass organization that would not only attract parents whose children could use the organization's facilities, but also prepare children for entry into first Pemuda Rakjat and IPPI, and then into PKI and its adult mass organizations. It is still too early to ascertain the success of this new PKI venture, but as there is a great need in both towns and villages for an organization to provide something to do for the Padjar Harapan, Constitution of Padjar Harapan. mimeographed translation, Djakarta, I960, pp.2-3. === [PDF page 438] === teeming millions of Indonesian children, there is every likelihood that, barring external factors, it will achieve mass membership. Women The attempt to organize women and to produce women cadres and activists has required patience and special methods. The poorer Indonesian women have even less experience than their menfolk in organizations, they are generally illiterate, and they are traditionally meek, especially in mixed company. But the Aidit leadership has considered the work of attracting and organizing women to be important because not only do women comprise half the electorate, they also play an important role in the economy. A high percentage of workers in industry are women, and women participate in agricultural work as peasants and as labourers on estates. In order to attract and organize women, especially those of the poorer classes, the Indonesian communists have used the Party itself, the women’s mass organization, G-erwani, the SOBSI unions, and BTI. Considerable success has been achieved These external factors could include a total ban on the activities of PKI and its mass organizations, or, as happened to the scout movement on March 9, 1961, the enforced consolidation of all children’s organizations into one government-led body. === [PDF page 439] === in drawing women into the Party and the mass organi zations, and in the last few years women have begun to occupy cadre and activist positions. (a) The Work of the Party. Mention has already been made of the instruction issued by the central leadership in January 1955 to increase the number of women members and to organize their activities in special womens groups, of the attention paid to the creation of women cadres, and of the increase in female membership of PKI to 100,000 in September 1957 and 258,000 in September 1959. has PKI offered women? But what What has it done to attract them directly? The PKI election manifesto, endorsed in March 1954» claimed that ’for women, to vote PKI means emancipation and the guarantee of equal rights’. An article in ’’Harian Rakjat” just before the Constituent Assembly elections of December 1955» explained at some length what was meant by equal rights. PKI would guarantee equal rights in four fields: in marriage there would be equal freedom for both sexes in choosing a partner, equal rights PKI, Manifes Pemilihan Umum PKI, p.19. HR, December 14» 1955 === [PDF page 440] === i n d i v o r c e a n d i n h e r i t a n c e, j o i n t d i s c u s s i o n b y m o th e r a n d f a t h e r a b o u t m a t t e r s a f f e c t i n g t h e i r c h i l d r e n, and j o i n t o w n e rs h ip o f th e c h i l d r e n; i n t h e econom ic s p h e r e, women w ould p a r t i c i p a t e i n th e p r o d u c t i v e p r o c e s s a s e q u a l s o f men; i n l a b o u r t h e r e w ould b e n o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t women, an d e q u a l p a y f o r e q u a l w ork w ould b e e n f o r c e d; an d i n a g r i c u l t u r e, women w o u ld have t h e same s h a r e a s men when th e l a n d was d iv id e d * p a r t i c u l a r l y to th e i n t e r e s t s A lso a p p e a li n g o f women h av e b e e n th e f r e q u e n t l y r e p e a t e d com m unist dem ands f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f fo o d an d t e x t i l e s a t low p r i c e s, t h e p r o v i s i o n o f a d e q u a te e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s f o r a l l c h i l d r e n, and so The m ethods u s e d b y PKI a c t u a l l y t o a t t r a c t women d i f f e r a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s o c i a l p o s i t i o n o f th e women. a r t i c l e b y one o f th e l e a d i n g women c o m m u n ists, S e t i a t i S u r a s t o, d e s c r i b e d th e m eth o d s u se d among th e t h r e e b r o a d s o c i a l g r o u p s: th e w o rk in g c l a s s and p e a s a n t women, th e m id d le g r o u p, an d th e h i g h e r g ro u p. P a r t y m em bership c a n m o st e a s i l y b e e x te n d e d, s h e w r o te, among w o rk in g c l a s s a n d p e a s a n t women. th e ir lif e T hey f a c e many d i f f i c u l t i e s i n and c a n f e e l p e r s o n a l l y th e l e a d e r s h i p and S e t i a t i S u r a s t o, "M em perluas K e a n g g o ta a n P a r t a i d ik a l a n g a n W a n ita ” (E x te n d in g P a r t y M em bership among Women), KP, F e b r u a r y 1 9 5 7 » p p. 19 - 2 1. === [PDF page 441] === support of the Party in overcoming therm But because in general they are illiterate, have many children, and face an insecure life in terms of both income and marriage, it is difficult to get the poorer women together for meetings, especially meetings that are not very close to their homes. Therefore they are approached by assistance in times of need, and by small meetings of women who live close together. Later, this can be followed by efforts to press their everyday demands and to draw political conclusions from them. And so, gradually, they are prepared for participation in ordinary Party meetings and courses. The middle group includes traders, middle peasants, middle government employees, students, and their wives *longer time will be needed in order to attract t h e m ’. They fear to be connected with the Party, Setiati wrote, because they might thereby lose their social position, or because they have been subjected to reactionary propaganda. PKI assists them in facing their everyday problems, for example by giving explanations of their rights and of such as tax and pension regulations. Few women in Indonesia are prominent intellectuals or high government officials, but in its dealings with the higher groups of women, PKI attempts to win indirect influence over their husbands. Women in this group, === [PDF page 442] === 42G Setiati warned, 'require special attention'. She recognized that they cannot easily he drawn into the Party, and that to try to do so openly would produce the reverse result. 'They are afraid of the word communist' and afraid to lose their own and their husband's positions. The most the Party can do is to invite them at every opportunity to functions as honoured guests, and to explain the Party's position scientifically and openly. In this way PKI hopes to win their sympathy. If they are already_convinced /that the PKI position is correct/ they will assist and support us. And if they are already convinced, then they can give moral and material support to our struggle, although in general they will not wish to give it openly. We must understand this and not hope for more than they can give. Setiati emphasized that the middle and higher groups could give financial assistance to the Party, and she called for the regular collection of subscriptions and 'support* which would cement their relations with the Party as well as give them a feeling of participation in the Party's struggle. PKI held its first national women's conference from May 26 to 30, 1938* The problems of increasing the number of women members were discussed. Aidit pointed The major documents of the conference are given in BM, June 1958, pp. 2 4 1 - 8 5. === [PDF page 443] === 427 out th a t: The g r e a t e s t h in d e r a n c e t o P a r t y w ork among t h e w o rk in g women i s th e s t i l l d o m in a n t b e l i e f t h a t th e p r e s e n t b a d c o n d i t i o n s a r e p r e d e s t i n e d an d c a n n o t b e c h a n g e d.1 T h e r e f o r e, he s a i d, th e P a r t y m ust w ork c e a s e l e s s l y t o c o n v in c e them t h a t th e b a d s i t u a t i o n i s m an-m ade, an d t h a t th r o u g h o r g a n i z a t i o n a b e t t e r s i t u a t i o n c a n b e c r e a t e d. S u d ism a n c a l l e d o n t h e P a r t y t o g iv e g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n t o th e b a s i c e co n o m ic p ro b le m s f a c e d b y women. And S u h a r t i l i s t e d some o f th e m eth o d s t h a t h a d p ro v e d s u c c e s s f u l in a t t r a c t i n g new women m em bers: t a l k s, p r e f e r a b l y g iv e n b y women c a d r e s, on th e r i g h t s o f women an d c h i l d r e n an d on th e P a r t y 's s t a n d f o r e q u a l i t y i n m a r r i a g e; a n d ja n g s o n o g r o u p s; a s s i s t a n c e t o h o u s e h o ld s i n tim e s o f m is f o r tu n e (b irth s, e t c. ); ( d e a t h o r s i c k n e s s ) o r when b u s y e x p l a i n i n g t h e P a r t y 1s s t e m a ttitu d e to w a rd s members who b r e a k t h e com m unist m o ra l c o d e; an d a c t i o n s t o d e fe n d th e e v e ry d a y i n t e r e s t s o f th e women D.N. A i d i t, "W a n ita Komunis P e d ju a n g u n tu k M a s ja ra k a t B a ru " (C om m unist Women, F i g h t e r s f o r a New S o c i e t y ), BM, J u n e 1958, p.2 4 7 * S u d ism a n,,rD engan K e ta b a h a n ja n g B e s a r M e n d id ik d an Mempromosi K a d e r-K a d e r W a n ita " (W ith G re a t R e s o l u ti o n E d u c a te an d P ro m o te Women C a d r e s ), BM, J u n e 19 5 8, p.2 5 0. A nd.jangsono g ro u p s a r e s m a ll g ro u p s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n members t h a t c a l l on n e ig h b o u r s f o r f r i e n d l y v i s i t s and c h a ts. They w ere u s e d by PKI an d i t s m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y a ro u n d th e tim e s o f g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s. === [PDF page 444] === masses. An obvious way of increasing women membership has been to persuade male members to bring their wives to meetings, and so gradually raise their political consciousness to the level at which they ask to join the Party. By its own direct efforts PKI has brought many women into its ranks - but it is impossible to estimate what proportion has been attracted directly, and what through the activities of the mass organizations. (b) Gerwani. The communist-led mass organization for women made its humble entry on June U f 1950 when Gerwis (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar, Movement of Enlightened Indonesian Women) was founded as the merger of six local women’s organizations scattered across Java. Total membership was only 500. In the first eighteen months of its existence Gerwis made little progress because membership was restricted to Suharti, "Menghidupkan Grup Wanita dan Meluaskan Keanggotaan Partai dikalangan Wanita” (Activating W o m e n ’s Groups and Extending Party Membership among Women), BM, June 1958, p.256. Gerwani, Peraturan Dasar Gerwani (Gerwani*s Consti tution), Djakarta, 195^+> p.7; Suharti Suwarto, "Indonesian Women Struggle for Peace and their Rights", PALP, March 9» 1956, p.4. === [PDF page 445] === 429 ’ f u l l y p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c i o u s women’ • The l e a d e r s h i p, w h ic h was d e r i v e d 99 p e r c e n t from t h e b o u r g e o i s i e, i s s u e d p i o u s dem ands f o r im p ro v e d c o n d i t i o n s f o r p o o r women,^ b u t d e s p i t e p l a n s f o r w ork among t h e m a s s e s ^ made no r e a l e f f o r t s t o go down a n d o r g a n i z e t h e m a s s e s. A c t i v i t i e s were c o n c e n t r a t e d on s u p p o r t i n g P K I’s p o l i t i c a l stru g g le. The r e s u l t was t h a t s e v e r a l G erw is l e a d e r s w ere among t h o s e i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e A u g u st 1951 mass I n t e r v i e w w i t h Mrs Umi S a r d j o n o, c h a ir m a n o f G erw ani s i n c e March 1954« Umi S a r d j o n o, ’’P r a e a d v i e s t e n t a n g O r g a n i s a s i ” ( R e p o r t on O r g a n i z a t i o n ), W a n ita S e d a r ( E n l i g h t e n e d Woman), F e b r u a r y 1 5, 1951, p#33* I n t h i s r e p o r t, Umi S a r d j o n o d e c l a r e d t h a t a lth o u g h th e w orkers and p e a s a n t s, th e o p p re s s e d, sh o u ld le a d th e o r g a n i s a t io n, f a c t s a s t h e y a r e i n I n d o n e s i a show t h a t t h e i r a w a r e n e s s i s s t i l l v e r y lo w. The o p p re s se d w orkers and p e a s a n ts a re n o t y e t aw are t h a t t h e y s h o u l d t a k e t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f th e r e v o l u t i o n. I n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n, 99 p e r c e n t o f t h e G erw is l e a d e r s h i p w ere b o u r g e o i s, ’b e c a u s e t h e y c a n m ost q u i c k l y a c c e p t o u r th e o r i e s and te a c h in g s f o r l e a d in g th e s t r u g g l e to v i c t o r y ’• S e e, f o r e x a m p le, t h e demands f o r w o rk in g women draw n up b y t h e f i r s t G e rw is c o n f e r e n c e i n F e b r u a r y 1951» W an ita S e d a r, March 15» 1 9 5 1, p. 1 5. The f i r s t G erw is c o n g r e s s i n Decem ber 1951 f o r m u l a t e d a p l a n f o r a d e m o c r a t i c m a r r i a g e la w w hich w o u ld e n s u r e e q u a l r i g h t s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s f o r b o t h s e x e s, p r o t e c t w iv e s and c h i l d r e n i n c a s e s o f d i v o r c e o r s e p a r a t i o n, e s t a b l i s h a minimum age f o r m a r r i a g e o f 17 f o r women a n d 20 f o r men, a n d ’i n p r i n c i p l e * g u a r a n t e e monogamy; W anita S e d a r, J a n u a r y 1952, p. 6. The f i r s t G erw is c o n f e r e n c e i n F e b r u a r y 1951, f o r e x a m p le, drew up a d e t a i l e d programme f o r w ork i n t h e v i l l a g e s; W an ita S e d a r, March 15, 1951, P«16. === [PDF page 446] === 430 arrests, and that by December 195*1» when the first national congress was held, membership had risen only to 6,000. The first congress concluded, 'after criticism and self-criticism', that in the past too much attention had been given to outside actions and not enough to strengthening Gerwis, to internal actions 'that directly concern the interests of women in their everyday life*. Some leaders and cadres were criticized for their 'sectarian manner' or work, others for creating hostility to Gerwis by their unsubtie methods of work, especially in facing non-Gerwis people. The congress also, however, still concerned itself with political matters of little interest to the mass of women, such as West Irian, the cancellation of the Round Table Conference agreement, and a free foreign policy. It was decided, too, to join the International Federation of Democratic Women. Despite the criticism and self-criticism indulged in at the December 1951 congress, the Gerwis leaders were slow to direct their attention to winning mass support by the study and exploitation of the everyday problems and interests of the women masses. The root of their HR, June 5» 1957. Wanita Sedar, January 1952, p*3. === [PDF page 447] === 431 unwillingness is probably found in their social origins. The Gerwis leaders were almost entirely middle class, and the Indonesian middle class in general has shown itself loath to go among the flower orders12 and organize them. In June 1953 claimed membership was only 40,000, but the beginnings of work among the masses were indicated by a report in February 1953 on the work of Gerwis in East Java. Among the 7>016 members in East Java at that time, Gerwis was running 8 kindergartens, 52 anti illiteracy courses, 29 courses in handicrafts, mutual assistance in 5U places, and cadre courses in 17« The second Gerwis congress was held in March 1954. Membership had reached 80,000, the number of branches 203.3 Three foreign delegates attended, including Monica Felton from the International Federation of Democratic Women, and they sat as honorary members of the congress presidium. Umi Sardjono, the new chairman, announced at the close of the congress that Gerwis had thrown away its Sectarian characteristics’, and to symbolize the end of sectarianism the name Gerwis was replaced by Gerwani. Consequently a new constitution was drawn up which opened HR, June 9, 1953. Djaman Baru, February 28, 1953> p.29. HR, March 26, 1954 === [PDF page 448] === G erw an i t o a l l I n d o n e s ia n women, a g e d 16 and o v e r, ‘i r r e s p e c t i v e o f p o l i t i c a l, r e l i g i o u s and e t h n i c a f f i l i a t i o n ’, who a c c e p t e d th e G-erwani c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d p ro g ram m e. The s e c o n d c o n g r e s s d e c i d e d t o i n c r e a s e m em bership t o two an d o n e - h a l f m i l l i o n s b y th e tim e o f th e n e x t c o n g r e s s, b u t a lt h o u g h t h i s t a r g e t was l a t e r c r i t i c i z e d ’n o t o b j e c t i v e ', a c h ie v e d. a r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n m em b ersh ip was M em bership was c la im e d t o b e 4 0 0,0 0 0 j u s t b e f o r e th e S e p te m b e r 1955 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s, a n d 5 0 0,0 0 0 a t th e tim e o f t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem bly e l e c t i o n s i n D ecem ber 1955* In J u n e 1956, when m em bership was r e p o r t e d t o b e 5 6 5 *147> G erw ani h a d, i n J a v a, b r a n c h e s i n a l l k a b u p a te n s a n d l a r g e to w n s, a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a t th e k e tj a m a ta n l e v e l i n 40 p e r c e n t o f th e k e t j a m a t a n s » an d G e rw a n i, P e r a t u r a n D a s a r, p.1 1. The G erw ani l e a d e r s c la im e d i n Decem ber 1957 t h a t th e t a r g e t was u n r e a l i s t i c b e c a u s e f o r o v e r a y e a r a f t e r th e s e c o n d c o n g r e s s t h e w hole o r g a n i z a t i o n was b u s y c h a n g in g i t s s t r u c t u r e i n l i n e w ith t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n; b e c a u s e G erw ani d i d n o t hav e t h e num ber o f c a d r e s r e q u i r e d t o a c h ie v e th e t a r g e t i n a s o c i e t y w here women a r e u n a c c u sto m e d t o t a k i n g p a r t i n o r g a n i z a t i o n; an d b e c a u s e i n d e c i d i n g on t h e t a r g e t f i g u r e no a t t e n t i o n h a d b e e n g iv e n t o th e p ro b le m s p o se d b y ’d i f f i c u l t r e g i o n s ', s u c h a s i n s e c u r e, m o u n ta in o u s a n d i s o l a t e d a r e a s, e s p e c i a l l y o u ts id e J a v a. G e rw a n i, L e b ih G ia t M elu ask an G erak an u n tu k T e r l a k s a n a n j a Plagam H ak-H ak W an ita I n d o n e s i a (More A c tiv e i n E x te n d in g t h e Movement f o r t h e Im p le m e n ta tio n o f th e C h a r t e r o f I n d o n e s ia n Women's R i g h t s;, D j a k a r t a, 1958» p.6 9 - HR, Ju n e 13> 1955; J a n u a r y 2 1, 1956. === [PDF page 449] === a b o u t 5,0 0 0 s u b - b r a n c h e s a t th e u rb a n n e ig h b o u rh o o d an d v i l l a g e l e v e l; o u t s i d e J a v a t h e r e w ere b r a n c h e s o r p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r them i n a l l o f S u m a tra, i n W est an d S o u th K a lim a n ta n, a n d i n N o rth an d S o u th S u la w e s i, w h ile lo w e r l e v e l s o f th e o r g a n i z a t i o n w ere a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d i n W est N u s a te n g g a ra and M aluku. A t th e tim e o f th e t h i r d G erw an i c o n g r e s s i n D ecem ber 1957> t h e r e w ere 6 7 1,3 4 2 m em bers. I n th e p e r i o d b e tw e e n th e se c o n d and t h i r d c o n g r e s s e s, G erw an i e n g a g e d i n p o l i t i c a l a s w e l l a s s o c i a l an d eco n o m ic a c t i v i t i e s. D u rin g th e 1955 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s, 2 3,0 0 0 G erw ani members in J a v a a lo n e w orked i n th e e l e c t i o n c o m m itte e s fo rm ed by th e g o v e rn m e n t t o e n s u r e th e sm ooth e x e c u t i o n o f th e e l e c t i o n s; an d 23 members r a n on th e PKI l i s t, a n d 1 f o r th e s m a ll n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y P R I. F iv e members w ere e l e c t e d t o p a r l i a m e n t on th e PKI tic k e t, f o u r a s P a r t y m em bers, a n d o n e, c h a irm a n Umi S a rd jo n o, a s 'n o n - p a r t y *. S ix w ere e l e c t e d on th e PKI t i c k e t to th e C o n s t i t u e n t A ssem b ly. I n th e 1957 l o c a l e l e c t i o n s, 59 members w ere e l e c t e d t o l o c a l c o u n c i l s, G e rw a n i, M elu ask an A k s i-A k s i u n tu k M em perkuat T u n tu ta n H ak-H ak W an ita-A n ak -A n ak d a n P e rd a m a ia n (E x te n d in g A c tio n s t o S t r e n g th e n th e Demand f o r th e R ig h ts o f Women and C h i ld r e n an d f o r P e a c e ), D j a k a r t a, 1956, p p.2 6 -7 * G e rw a n i, L e b ih G i a t, p.6 8. R I, J a n u a r y 1958, p p.2 7 - 8. === [PDF page 450] === 431 almost all from the PKI lists. Strong support was given to the peace movement, especially in collecting signatures for the Vienna Peace Appeal, and Gerwani's support was given to whatever PKI*s political stand happened to he at the moment•^ Education on an appreciable scale was begun within Gerwani after the second congress. For ordinary members, an anti-illiteracy campaign was started in 1955 and within a year it was claimed that 30 per cent of members could read, though not all of them could yet write. Courses for cadres concentrated on problems of organization and administration, but towards the end of 1957 an attempt was made to systematize cadre education with schools and courses at all levels of the organization and with uniform mimeographed guides for four basic subjects: the history of the national movement, the history of the national and international women's movement, problems of Gerwani organization and development, and instruction on the International Federation of Democratic Women, on the For example, Gerwani expressed support for the first Ali Sastroamidjojo government, opposition to the Burhanudin Harahap government, support for Sukarno's concept of an all-party government, and support for the president in his efforts as cabinet formateur in April 1957« Gerwani, Lebih Giat, p.73* === [PDF page 451] === 435 r i g h t s o f women a n d c h i l d r e n, and on p e a c e. 1950 u n t i l l a t e c a l. Prom O c t o b e r 1952 G erw is h a d p u b l i s h e d i t s own p e r i o d i At t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1955» G erw ani s t a r t e d a new p e r i o d i c a l "W anita I n d o n e s i a " ( I n d o n e s i a n Woman), b u t a f t e r i r r e g u l a r a p p e a ra n c e s i t c e a se d p u b l i c a t i o n in th e m id d le o f 1956. To r e p l a c e i t, " B e r i t a G erw an i" (G erw ani News) was p u b l i s h e d, a s i n g l e s h e e t d e v o t e d e x c l u s i v e l y t o news o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and d e s i g n e d t o a s s i s t c a d r e s i n t h e i r w ork. o n ly 2,0 0 0. E a r l y i n 1960 i t had a c i r c u l a t i o n o f B etw een t h e s e c o n d and t h i r d c o n g r e s s e s: G e rw a n i, from t h e c e n t r e t o t h e r e g i o n s, h a s t a k e n an a c t i v e p a r t i n a c t i o n s t o d e f e n d t h e r i g h t s o f women and c h i l d r e n, w hich i s t h e.. f u n d a m e n ta l t a s k o f a women*s o r g a n i z a t i o n. - ^ I n t h i s f i e l d G erw ani l a u n c h e d a cam p aig n d u r i n g t h e 1955 e l e c t i o n s t o p r e s s i t s demand f o r a d e m o c r a t i c m a r r i a g e la?;, u r g e d t h r o u g h members o f p a r l i a m e n t t h a t t h e l e g a l c o s t o f r e - u n i o n o f s e p a r a t e d p a r t n e r s s h o u l d b e rem oved w h i l e t h a t o f s e p a r a t i o n s h o u l d b e made g r e a t e r, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n c o m m itte e s s e t up e x p e r i m e n t a l l y i n some a r e a s by th e M in is tr y o f R e lig io u s A f f a i r s to s o lv e m arriag e d i s p u t e s, dem anded h e a v y p e n a l t i e s i n c a s e s o f r a p e and I b i d., p p.7 4 -6. G e rw a n i, L e b lh G i a t, p.5 1 * I n t e r v i e w w i t h Umi S a r d j o n o. === [PDF page 452] === 435 abduction, and, in the sub-branches, carried out many small actions of benefit to its members. In defence of the interests of peasant and working class women, Gerwani assisted BTI and the SOBSI trade unions. Other socialeconomic activities included the creation of some training courses for midwives, and the establishment of 179 kinder gartens and 3 elementary schools. By the time of the third congress, held from December 22 to 27? 1957? Gerwani claimed 671>342 members, dis tributed geographically as follows: 613>262 in Java, of whom 253>750 were in East Java, 219>414 in Central Java, 132,220 in West Java, and 7>878 in Djakarta; 59>740 in Sumatra; 2,680 in Sulawesi; 2,260 in Nusatenggara; 1,900 in Maluku; and 1,500 in Kalimantan. Within Java there were branches in every kabupaten and city, an organization at the ketjamatan level in 75 per cent of all ket;lamatans, and sub-branches in approximately 40 per cent of all In general the Indonesian woman is very insecure in her marriage because her husband may easily repudiate the marriage. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, in the years 1954 through 1958 the number of marriage repudiations within the Moslem com munity was from 50 to 52 per cent of the total number of new marriages plus reconciliations between separated partners; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1960, Djakarta, 1960, p.l8. This insecurity greatly enhances the appeal of an organization that demands a democratic marriage law, and that aids the wife in her efforts to prevent repudiation by the husband. Gerwani, Lebih Giat, pp.68, 71* === [PDF page 453] === 437 v illa g e s. Some s u b - b r a n c h e s h a d b e e n o r g a n i z e d i n p l a c e s o f w o rk, b u t th e y w ere d is b a n d e d when th e SOBSI u n io n s e s t a b l i s h e d s p e c i a l womenfs d e p a r tm e n ts. Prom D ecem ber 1957 to D ecem ber 1960 G erw ani p u t i n t o o p e r a t i o n a t h r e e - y e a r p l a n b y w hich i t was h o p ed f i n a l l y t o c r e a t e a s y s te m o f c a d r e e d u c a t i o n. Many c a d r e c o u r s e s w ere h e l d a t th e v a r i o u s l e v e l s, b u t t h e i r num ber and e x te n t have n o t b e en d iv u lg e d. At th e b e g in n i n g o f 1960 th e n um ber o f f u l l - t i m e c a d r e s w ere s t i l l v e ry lo w: t h r e e a t t h e c e n t r e, an d a n a v e ra g e o f b e lo w one f o r e a c h o f th e b r a n c h e s ( i n D ecem ber 1957 t h e r e w ere 183 b r a n c h e s ). A c o n s i d e r a b l e am ount o f p a r t - t i m e l a b o u r was a v a i l a b l e, h o w e v e r, fro m t h e women c a d r e s i n PKI and o t h e r co m m u n istl e d m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, a n d fro m G erw ani m em bers o f p a rlia m e n t and th e lo c a l r e p r e s e n ta tiv e c o u n c ils. The n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l 's r e p o r t to th e t h i r d c o n g re s s i n D ecem ber 1957 c r i t i c i z e d w hat i t c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a c o n ti n u e d o v e r- e m p h a s is on p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r s w h ich w ere of little o r no i n t e r e s t t o th e mass o f I n d o n e s ia n women: E x p e r ie n c e u n t i l now p r o v e s t h a t a c t i o n s c o n c e r n in g p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s a r e n o t b a la n c e d b y s o c i a l - e c o n o m i c a c t i o n s, so t h a t t h e i r im p o r t a n c e i s l e s s d i r e c t l y f e l t b y t h e wornen m asses. ... t h i s m eans n o t t h a t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n i s u n i m p o r t a n t, b u t t h a t we m ust f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e t h e num ber o f a c t i o n s c o n c e r n in g t h e r i g h t s o f women a n d c h i l d r e n a s w e l l a s s o c i a l eco n o m ic a c t i o n s, a c t i o n s t h a t d i r e c t l y === [PDF page 454] === 438 concern the life of the women masses, for example the question of kampong improvements, the problem of water, the problem of rice, etc. The national council's report to the congress declared that: in order to extend membership, every action must be based on the direct interests of the mass of women, discussed with the women themselves, and carried out as well as supported by them. A double guiding principle was laid down for any action: that its purpose should be reasonable so that it received wide sympathy and support from the community, and that it should be made at the right time and with realized limits. The third congress endorsed a comprehensive 27-point programme of demands which embraced problems ranging from marriage laws, work laws, and equal rights, to compulsory education, adequate medical provisions, and price controls on essential commodities. With this programme Gerwani hoped to appeal to all sections of Indonesian women from working class and peasant women to the literate middle classes. At the beginning of 1960, when Gerwani membership was claimed to be about 700,000, which indicated a considerable The programme of demands is given in full, ibid., p p. 125-7. === [PDF page 455] === 439 slowing d o m in the rate of growth after December 1957> Gerwani was engaged in the following practical work designed to attract and hold its mass membership: 1. A popular activity was the arisan whereby all members of a group contributed a certain sum each week and each member in turn received the whole sum. 2. Mutual assistance was organized at times of need, such as death, birth, marriage, illness and pregnancy. 3. Small-scale credit groups were organized. 4. There were 326 kindergartens and 3 elementary schools. Training courses were being held for kinder garten teachers. A few of the kindergartens were wellequipped and had trained teachers, but the majority were still make-shift. 5. In the middle of 1959 the national council decided that each branch should have at least five or six persons competent to manage a cooperative. Courses for cooper ative cadres were begun in which officials of the govern m e n t s Cooperative Service were asked to teach. By early 1960 a few consumer cooperatives had already been created. 6. Anti-illiteracy courses were still the main activity in Central and East Java. Some branches held The following information was obtained in conversations with Umi Sardjono and with Gerwani leaders in East Java and Jogjakarta. === [PDF page 456] === courses for the general public, sometimes alone and sometimes in cooperation with government agencies* 7. Women were assisted in their marriage problems. G-erwani cadres participated in the semi-official bodies for the solution of marital disputes, and even occasionally defended members in court in divorce cases. 8. Handicrafts were taught: in the villages, the making of baskets and mats, in the towns, cushions and clothes, and everywhere cooking. 9. G-erwani led popular campaigns to demand such as a decrease in the price of essential commodities, rice, textiles, sugar and cooking oil. 10. Some cultural activities were organized, includ ing choirs and drama groups, but these were not yet widespread. 11. Gerwani gave assistance to the other communistled mass organizations and to PKI in their efforts to obtain improvements for the different sections of society. 12. Gerwani joined with other women*s organizations in celebrating Kartini Day (April 21) and Motherfs Day (December 22), and in the larger cities held its own celebrations for International Women*s Day. Kartini is a national heroine; she was one of the first to attempt to give education to girls. === [PDF page 457] === The basic members* groups met at least once a month and sometimes as often as once a week* It seems that the main attraction of Gerwani for the mass of urban and rural members is Gerwani*s social work, the organization of arisan groups, small credit groups, mutual assistance, literacy courses, kindergartens, and assistance in the solution of marriage problems. Little direct political education is given to the ordinary members, but Gerwani endeavours to teach them that bad conditions can be changed by organization, and that PKI is the only political party which truly defends their interests. Gerwani*s political importance to PKI lies in its ability to awaken the mass of women to political problems, to mobilize voters, to add support to PKI*s political line, to aid the other mass organizations, and to provide a source and training ground for female Party members and cadres. (c) The Work of SOBSI and its Trade Unions. The following section deals not with the work of the communist-led trade unions for their members in general, but with the special attention given to women members. === [PDF page 458] === Although the number of women workers is high in Indonesia, SOBSI and its member unions did not give special attention to them until the beginning of 1956, just one year after PKI began to examine the means of attracting and organizing a far greater number of women. On February 25, 1956 the national council of SOBSI passed a resolution concerning women workers and including the following decisions: 1. to demand equal rights for men and women in the same work, including payment of allowances and of the minimum wage; 2. to demand the intensive implementation of work law number 1, 1951» with special attention to the rights of women workers; A survey of medium and large manufacturing enterprises in 1955 found that about 35 per cent of the 450>000 workers reported were women; International Labour Office, Report to the Government of Indonesia on Social Security, Geneva, 1958, pp.17-18. Of 1,452,000 workers employed by over 25,000 officially registered enterprises in 1956, 416,784 were women workers; Njono, "Women Workers of Indonesia", World Trade Union Movement, March 1956, p.9* According to a PKI estimate given in May 1958, women comprised 45 per cent of workers in estates, 65 per cent in textile enterprises, 60 per cent in light industry, sind 65 per cent in cigarette enterprises, with a large number also in the government ministries and services; Sundari, "Memperbesar Aktivitet Gerakan Wanita untuk Memenangkan Partai dalam Pemilihan Umum Parlemen ke-II" (Increasing the Activity of the Women's Movement in order to Bring Victory to the Party in the Second Parliamentary General Elections), BM, June 1958, p.263« === [PDF page 459] === 3* to oppose discrimination against women effected "by some reactionary officials in government offices, enterprises and services; 4. to fight for special rights for women with regard to pregnancy, confinement and work conditions. The resolution also decided on the formation within the trade unions of special women*s groups which could discuss the special demands of women workers and organize an effective fight for their implementation under the leader ship of the respective trade unions. To indicate its willingness to have women share in the work of the organization, the national council in February 1956 increased the number of its women members from one to five. By September 1957, there v/ere 49 women cadres in the central and regional leadership com mittees of SOBSI and its member unions, and ’The number of women cadres who lead or participate in leading the basic organizations has greatly increased’. In that month the SOBSI national conference decided that trade unions with many women members should form women’s departments, that the work of forming special women’s groups in work places should be completed by the end of BB, March 17, 1956, p.3. SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.94* === [PDF page 460] === 1 9 5 8, t h a t c a d r e s s h o u ld b e a p p o i n t e d w i t h i n SOBSI r e g i o n a l an d b r a n c h c o m m itte e s to t a k e c a r e o f w om en's a f f a i r s, an d t h a t women w o rk e rs s h o u ld b e p ro m o te d w i t h i n th e l e a d e r s h i p b o d i e s. D u rin g 1956 a n d 1957 some o f th e member u n io n s h e l d s p e c i a l c o n f e r e n c e s d e v o te d t o t h e p ro b le m s o f women w o r k e r s; i n 1957 some SOBSI b r a n c h e s w ere a l r e a d y o r g a n i z i n g s p e c i a l c a d r e c o u r s e s f o r women; an d i n F e b r u a r y 1958 SOBSI h e l d a n a t i o n a l s e m in a r on women w o r k e r s, th e a g e n d a d e a l i n g w i t h m ethods o f o r g a n i z i n g women w o r k e r s, th e s p e c i a l s o c io -e c o n o m ic p ro b le m s f a c i n g women w o r k e r s, a n d w om en's r i g h t s. The n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l s e c r e t a r i a t i n M arch 1958 r e v e r s e d i t s d e c i s i o n t o o r g a n i z e s p e c i a l w om en's g r o u p s, b u t th e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s o f women w o rk e rs w ere p ro m o te d b y th e t r a d e u n i o n s ' s p e c i a l d e p a r tm e n ts and c a d r e s f o r w om en's a f f a i r s, an d by o c c a s i o n a l a l l - f e m a l e m e e tin g s By th e end o f 1958 few women h a d y e t e n t e r e d th e c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p o f th e SOBSI u n i o n s: t h e r e w ere f o u r women o u t o f 39 members o f th e c e n t r a l c o u n c i l o f th e e s t a t e w o r k e r s ' u n io n w hose m em b ersh ip was 45 p e r c e n t SOBSI, P la n O r g a n i s a s i 1 9 5 8, p p.5 - 6. BB, O c to b e r 15, 1957» p. 6; J a n u a r y 3 0, 19 5 8, p p. 1,3* M u n ir, Pedom an, p p. 1 5 -1 6. === [PDF page 461] === female, 9 out of 29 in the cigarette workers* union whose membership was 65 per cent female and 3 out of 21 in the textile workers * union whose membership was also 65 per cent female* But women were *rapidly* occupying places in the leadership of the basic organizations* Pew statistics have been made available since then of the increase in women cadres within SOBSI and its member unions; but although they and the figures for the end of 1958 show a low proportion of women cadres compared with women members, they also indicate considerable success for SOBSI and its unions in developing organi zational interest and ability among the women members in a country where, at least among the poorer classes, women have no experience of how to run organizations, especially mixed organizations* In short, because women workers constitute a considerable percentage of workers in certain fields of labour, large numbers have been attracted into the SOBSI Ibid., p*17* In August 1959, the estate workers' union, Sarbupri, claimed that it had 681 women activists in a membership of perhaps 350»000 to 400,000; BB, August 25» 1959» p*3« In May 1960 the East Java SOBSI leaders told me that women constituted about five per cent of the cadres, but 30 per cent of total membership, in the province. === [PDF page 462] === unions on the basis of their general interests as workers. Prom February 1956, however, the SOBSI leaders made efforts specifically to attract women workers and to strengthen their ties with the unions through appeals to their specific interests as women workers and through the creation of women activists and cadres. The slow but noteworthy increase in women trade union cadres gives some indication of the success of these efforts. (d) The Work of BTI. An article entitled ’'Extending Membership Among Peasant Women", published in "Harian Rakjat" on June 15# 1955> showed how the PKI-led peasant organization BTI has worked to make the peasant women politically aware and then to recruit them as members of BTI or Gerwani. The author, Kartinah, acknowledged that peasant women were backward, shy and humble, and that they could not be attracted into an organization by merely inviting them to join. Patience was required if they were to be attracted and, wherever possible, the help of a husband, father or neighbour was enlisted. The men were expected to explain the purpose of BTI, to take their womenfolk to meetings, Kartinah, "Memperluas Keanggotaan dikalangan Wanita Tani" (Extending Membership among Peasant Women), HR, June 15, 1955. === [PDF page 463] === and to ensure that they were present at discussions of the situation in their own village* In this way, Kartinah claimed, the women learned that other women faced the same problems, suffering is not different*. 'and that their Soon they reached the point of wanting to join with their menfolk in the peasants* struggle, and they learned the importance of organization in solving their problems. into its organization. Then 3TI or G-erwani drew them Special care was taken to give them a sense of responsibility and participation by at first asking them to perform easy tasks, such as preparing food for meetings, rendering assistance to others in times of need, and other social work. Lessons were also given to eradicate illiteracy and to teach health matters, sewing, and so on. In short, Kartinah wrote, the peasant women: must be given a little responsibility in the organization because by being given responsi bility, even though a little, they feel proud that they can assist the work of the organi zation and they feel that their energy is not wasted. Kartinah*s article illustrates three characteristics of PKI*s work to organize the masses: first, the care and patience employed in raising the consciousness of the masses and in bringing them into an organization; second, the way in which one communist organization assists the === [PDF page 464] === w ork o f t h e o t h e r s - i n t h i s c a s e BTI h e l p s i n th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r g r o w th o f G e rw a n i, a n d G erw ani t h e n a s s i s t s BTI i n t h e s t r u g g l e t o im p ro v e t h e p e a s a n t s * con d itio n s and, th ir d, th e a r t i c l e, a p p e a rin g as i t d id i n t h e PKI n e w s p a p e r, c l e a r l y e n v i s a g e s t h e work o f t h e m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s a s l e a d i n g e v e n t u a l l y t o m em bership i n th e P a r ty. E t h n i c G roups a n d M i n o r i t i e s The I n d o n e s i a n p e o p l e i s composed o f many e t h n i c groups. More t h a n 35 d i s c r e t e g r o u p s e a c h c o n t a i n more t h a n 1 0 0,0 0 0 m em bers, an d t h e r e a r e l a r g e num bers o f sm a lle r g ro u p s. So f a r t h e s m a l l e r e t h n i c g r o u p s have n o t r e a c te d to any s i g n i f i c a n t e x te n t a g a i n s t th e r e a l o r su p p o sed d o m in a tio n o f th e J a v a n e s e, th e l a r g e s t group. The n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e, I n d o n e s i a n, i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o M alay b u t n o t t o t h e l a n g u a g e s o f J a v a. Nor c a n t h e n o n - J a v a n e s e p o i n t t o J a v a n e s e m onopoly o f p o w e r: t h e P r e s i d e n t - P r i m e M i n i s t e r - S u p r e m e Commander, S u k a r n o, i s p a r t B a lin e s e as w e ll as p a r t Ja v a n e se; t h e F i r s t D e p u ty Prim e M i n i s t e r, D ju a n d a, i s S u n d a n e s e; t h e arm y c h i e f, N a s u t i o n, i s a Moslem B a ta k; t h e a i r f o r c e c h i e f i s G. W i l l i a m S k i n n e r, "The N a t u r e o f L o y a l t i e s i n R u r a l I n d o n e s i a " i n S k in n e r ( e d. ), L o c a l, E th n i c, and N a tio n a l L o y a l t i e s i n V i l l a g e I n d o n e s i a: a Sym posium, New H aven, C o n n e c t i c u t, 1959> P*5* === [PDF page 465] === 449 reportedly a Eurasian raised "by a Sundanese family; and the navy chief is Sundanese. The leaders of the main political parties are also drawn from a wide range of ethnic groups. The non-Javanese do complain, however, about 'Djakarta', meaning the central government. They com plain of the waste and corruption, the endless red tape, the lack of interest in the affairs of the regions, and the appropriation of funds obtained from their exports in order to subsidize Java. This discontent with D j a k a r t a 1 has been a prime cause of the acts of insubordination that have occurred in the outer islands, from merely ignoring central government instructions, to smuggling, to setting up local councils in defiance of the central governments apparatus, to open rebellion and the formation of separate but not separatist states. A solution to the anti- Djakarta grievances has been looked for in a considerable increase of regional autonomy - to which the central government has paid lip service. The ethnic minorities, or, in Indonesian official terminology 'the non-native Indonesian citizens1, consist of Chinese, Arabs, and Eurasians. Arabs and Eurasians are relatively few in number, but the racial Chinese of Indonesian citizenship amount to about 1 or million. The ethnic minorities, and especially the Chinese, have === [PDF page 466] === 450 suffered considerable discrimination, particularly in the economic sphere where the government has legislated and officials have acted against them. (a) PKI and the Ethnic Groups. None of the ethnic groups in Indonesia has developed a militant ethnic consciousness. The communist leaders dared not try to develop and exploit such a consciousness because in Indonesia, unlike in India, the growth and existence of the Party has been at least partly dependent upon an alliance with political forces within the central government. Among some of the non-Javanese ethnic groups there has arisen, however, a demand for greater regional autonomy, for a 'fairer share for the provinces' in the distribution of the government's income. During the first years after January 1951» the Aidit leadership was too engrossed in re-establishing and strengthening the Party and its mass organizations in Java to devote more than passing attention to the non-Javanese areas. Interest in the outer regions was first aroused by the 1955 elections, in which PKI sought to gather the highest For a description of discrimination against the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, see Donald E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, 195&> especially pp.51-7> 60-2. === [PDF page 467] === possible number of votes, and was then increased after 1956 when the Party leaders were forced to consider seriously the non-parliamentary means that would be necessary in order to win power, A communist victory even in Java would be difficult without broad support among the Sundanese in West Java, while a victory in Java might be reversed if the outer islands remained in the hands of non-communists, In their efforts to attract and organize the members of the various ethnic groups, the PKI leaders have not created specific ethnic group organizations, but have used the ordinary machinery of the Party and its mass organi zations, At the same time, the leaders have taken pains to declare their support for the interests of the regions, for the broadest autonomy for the ethnic groups. The PKI central committee admitted in October 1953 that the Party 'has not yet given much attention to the problem of the ethnic groups in our country'. The remedy for this deficiency was begun in March 195U when the fifth national congress endorsed a programme calling for the election of democratic regional governments with wide autonomy, and PKI, Putusan-Putusan Sidang Pleno Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia (Decisions of the PKI Central Committee Plenum Meeting), Djakarta, 1953> p.57* === [PDF page 468] === for the right of each ethnic group to use its own language in schools and in court. During the 1955 election campaign, PKI declared: The Indonesian Republic is a unitary state with many ethnic groups. This means that Indonesia must have a central government that is obeyed b y all regions and ethnic groups, but at the same time there must be the broadest autonomy for every ethnic group (provisionally this is possible along the ordinary administrative divisions) for organizing finances, economy, communications, culture and policy special to its area. All ethnic groups, whether large or small, are equal, fraternal, and of mutual assistance, and therefore they may not oppress one another and none may receive special treatment. It is noteworthy that of the 39 persons elected to parliament on the PKI ticket in September 1955» at least 15 were not ethnic Javanese despite the heavy concen tration of PKI votes in the Javanese areas. In 1956, 1957 and 1958 the problem of the ethnic groups was thrown into prominence by the formation of regional councils in protest against the central govern ment in North, Central and South Sumatra, and in East Indonesia, and by the formation of the PRRI-Permesta rebel government in February 1958. Both the councils and the rebel government appealed to regional and ethnic loyalties PKI, Program PKI, pp.13-14» HR, November 18, 1955 === [PDF page 469] === s t r e s s i n g th e a l l e g e d u n c o n c e rn o f t h e g o v e rn m e n t i n D j a k a r t a f o r t h e p r o b le m s o f t h e r e g i o n s and p e o p l e s o u tsid e Java. The PKI l e a d e r s were s t r o n g l y o p p o se d t o t h e a n t i com m unist d i s s i d e n t l e a d e r s b u t were c o n c e r n e d n o t t o a p p e a r opposed to th e i n t e r e s t s o f th e r e g io n s. They w ere q u i c k t o p o i n t o u t t h a t d e s p i t e t h e s l o g a n s o f ’b r o a d autonom y f o r t h e r e g i o n s ’ a n d ’d e v e lo p m e n t o f t h e r e g i o n s ’ t h e c o u n c i l s by t h e i r i l l e g a l s e i z u r e o f pow er h i n d e r e d t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f d e m o c r a t i c r e g i o n a l g o v e rn m e n t, and b y t h e i r c o r r u p t i o n and s m u g g lin g a c c e l e r a t e d t h e b a n k r u p t c y o f t h e s t a t e an d h am p ered e f f o r t s t o im prove t h e economy o f th e r e g io n s. In o rd e r to r e - s t a t e i t s own c o n c e r n f o r b r o a d, d e m o c r a t i c r e g i o n a l autonom y, PKI i s s u e d t h r e e b o o k l e t s i n A p r i l 1958» two m onths a f t e r t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e r e b e l l i o n, w h ic h d e c l a r e d t h e P a r t y ’s s u p p o r t f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f s e v e n t e e n f i r s t - l e v e l a utonom ous r e g i o n s o u t s i d e J a v a, a n d e l a b o r a t e d on i t s 1955 s t a t e m e n t o f P K I ’s g o a l o f r e g i o n a l and e t h n i c g r o u p a utonom y. S e e, f o r e x a m p le, M.H. Lukman, " K e s e t i a a n PKI p a d a P o l i t i k F r o n t P e r s a t u a n dan P em b elaan K e p e n tin g a n R a k j a t ” ( P K I ’s L o y a l t y t o t h e U n i t e d F r o n t P o l i c y and t o t h e D e fe n c e o f t h e P e o p l e ’s I n t e r e s t s ), i n A i d i t, Lukman and N j o t o, 57 Tahun P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a (PKI 37 Y e a r s ), D j a k a r t a, 1957, p p. 1 4 - 1 7» The t h r e e b o o k l e t s w ere i s s u e d u n d e r t h e t i t l e Menudju Otonomi D a e ra h S e l u a s - l u a s n j a (Tow ards t h e B r o a d e s t === [PDF page 470] === That PKI successfully avoided being characterized as ’Djakartan' or Javanese or opposed to regional interests, was indicated by the communist and other reports of rapid Party expansion in the outer islands since 1956, Both Lukrnan and Aidit told the delegates to the PKI sixth congress in September 1959 of the great importance of work among the ethnic groups. Aidit called on the Party to improve this work by promoting the culture of the different groups by promoting and defending broad, democratic regional autonomy as a step toward ethnic group autonomy, and especially by developing work among the peasants who constituted a majority within the ethnic groups. (b) PKI and the Ethnic Minorities. The PKI programme for the ethnic minorities has been simple: equal rights for all citizens, and the prevention of narrow nationalism among the ‘native’ Indonesians at Regional Autonomy), I-III; Djakarta, 1958. A.R. Nungtjik was the author of the first on "Autonomy and its Sphere of Authority”; Peris Pardede wrote the second on "Abolition of the Pamong Pradja System"; and Hutomo Supardan, Harjowisastro and J. Piry wrote the third, which consisted of essays on "The Budget", "Determining the Boundaries of Autonomous Regions", and "Level-Ill Autonomy". See above, pp.161-2. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, pp.175-6; Lukrnan, Tentang Konstitusi PKI, pp.25-6. === [PDF page 471] === 455 the same time as preventing a feeling of superiority among the minorities. PKI’s earnestness in defence of the ethnic minorities was shown by the Party’s campaign in late 1959 and early I960 against the government’s action to evict aliens trading in the rural areas. Because of the muddle of Indonesia’s citizenship regulations, many Chinese and some of the few Arabs are no longer sure which nationality they hold. Therefore the eviction of alien rural traders affected many of confused nationality as well as some of clearly Indonesian nationality, and profoundly distrubed all members of the ethnic minorities as a possible step towards further discrimination against themselves. Whatever PKI's motives in opposing the eviction measure and thereby arousing the wrath of many political and army leaders, its opposition appeared laudable in the eyes of the minorities, especially the Chinese. Because the Chinese are viewed with envy and suspicion by many Indonesians, it would be undiplomatic for PKI itself to organize them. Therefore, although a See, for example, D.N. Aidit, "Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan Revolusi Agustus 1945" (Unite to Complete the Demands of the August 1945 Revolution), HR, August 1, 1956. === [PDF page 472] === few Chinese are in PKI, a separate and officially sovereign party has been formed for them: Baperki. Baperki (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Council) was founded on March 13 > 1954 by Siauw Giok Tjhan, a close associate of PKI, purportedly to unify the different peoples of Indonesia into one people, and to undertake social and educational work especially among the minorities. In fact, Baperki has been an organization of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, with a small number of native Indonesians, mostly communists, also as members. Baperki’s activities have included the building and maintenance of schools, but they have been concerned primarily with assisting the Chinese minority to circum vent and combat all official and unofficial discrimination. Membership is not large, perhaps forty or sixty thousand in the whole country. In the September 1955 parlia mentary elections, Baperki won 178,887 votes. Much of the information on Baperki was obtained in interview from a Baperki leader in Surabaja. Siauw Giok Tjhan in January 1951 had founded the twiceweekly newspaper Suara Rakjat which in July 1951 became the daily Harlan Rakjat, the official mouthpiece of PKI. He was director and then co-director of Harian Rakjat until October 31, 1953* === [PDF page 473] === If rumour has any basis in truth, Baperki is most useful to PKI as an agent for collecting from the wealthy Chinese businessmen large sums that are channelled into PKI's needy coffers. There would be infinitely greater risk of public detection of this source of communist funds if it was tapped directly by PKI, rather than by a Chinese organization for ostensibly social purposes. Veterans of the Revolution Although relatively little actual fighting took place during the revolution against the Dutch, there are approximately 800,000 Indonesian 'veterans’, that is, persons who in the period from August 17> 1945 to December 27 y 1949 joined an official army unit or a recognized armed group in defence of the Republic. The veterans were a major target for PKI organization because they had a higher level of political consciousness than most of the population, because they were, in general, dissatisfied with the fruits of victory, and because they knew how to use weapons. After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949» hundreds of national and local veterans' organizations were formed, of which the communist-led Perbepsi became the largest. Moh. Munasir, "Veterans' Problem", Veteran, August 1959» === [PDF page 474] === Perbepsi was formed on December 30, 1951 by the fusion of 149 national and local groups. In October 1954 it claimed 194 branches and 205,740 members, and in December 1957 300,000 members (at which time PKI claimed it had 265>000), The chairman, Supardi, was elected to parliament in 1955 as a 'non-party' member of the PKI ticket. Perbepsi's three chief social and economic demands were: 1. government acceptance of the principle of preference for veterans; 2. a government policy of settling veterans on land made available by the redistribution of foreign estate holdings and the non-extension of large land leases; 3. provision of training courses for veterans, and the rehabilitation and employment of those disabled. The greatest value of Perbepsi for PKI was that it constituted a para-military organization that would be available in the event of a major political crisis. D.N. Aidit, "Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan untuk Melaksanakan Konsepsi Presiden 100$" (Change the Balance of Power in order to Carry Out the President's Concept 100$), HR, July 5, 1957. TI, October 21, 1954. HR, December 20, 1957; Sudisman, "Semangat Bukit 1211”, BM, December 1957> p*512. === [PDF page 475] === 459 Training courses in military matters were given to members, and Perbepsi formations could be seen 'marching and drilling to the beat of drums'* During the second half of 1953 and during 1954, Perbepsi attempted to persuade and manoeuvre the government into arming its members as part of its proposed people's militia to fight the Darul Islam rebels, and, when this was rejected, to maintain security during the elections. The government was unmoved* At the beginning of July 1957 the PKI central committee heard a report on Party work among veterans stated that if the veterans which 'are well organized and well led this will greatly assist in changing the balance of power so that the situation moves to the left'* end of Perbepsi was already at hand. But the Prom December 26, 1956 to January 2, 1957 an all-Indonesia veterans* congress had been held on the initiative of Nasution, the army chief of staff. The 2,300 delegates had agreed 'by acclamation' to form the Indonesian Veterans' Legion which would absorb all existing veterans’ organizations. The Compton, Indonesian Communism, p.11. "Laporan Tambahan Mengenai Pengalaman Bekerdja dikalangan Bekas Pedjuang (Veteran)” (Additional Report on Experience in Working among the Veterans), BM, May-July 1957» pp.264-7* Munasir, "Veterans' Problem", Veteran, August 1959, p.l6* === [PDF page 476] === individual organizations successfully dug their heels in for a while, but by August 1959 army pressure had forced their dissolution and the merger of their membership into the army-controlled Veterans * Legion. That PKI considers the fusion of all veterans* organizations to be harmful was indicated by the ardent opposition of the Party, Pemuda Rakjat and SOBSI to later attempts by the army and certain government ministers to form all-embracing youth and trade union organizations. III. MOBILIZING ELECTORAL SUPPORT PKI*s Election Campaigns Once they had decided, within the framework of the national united front policy, to exploit the possibilities for political action offered by the parliamentary regime, the PKI leaders were committed to take part in elections. All-Indonesia elections were held in September 1955 for parliament, and in December 1955 for the Constituent Assembly. Local elections for the-provincial, kabupaten, and city councils were held throughout Java from June to November 1957» and later in South Sumatra, Riau, and Kalimantan. In both the national and the local elections PKI applied its organizational and propaganda resources === [PDF page 477] === with great effect, especially in Java but also in the outer islands. It is possible to envisage PKI’s tremendous activity in the election campaigns as having reference to three interdependent factors: the general power situation, the extension of communist support and organization, and the improvement of the Party organization* The more votes PKI obtained in 1955 > the more seats it would procure in parliament and the Constituent Assembly. Politics were still revolving largely around parliament, and an increase in Party representation there could be expected to increase the Party’s bargaining position in national politics. Increased parliamentary strength also could be expected to increase the Party’s chance of gaining entry into a coalition cabinet. Because the Constituent Assembly was to draw up the future consti tution of the country, it was also important for the Party to have major representation there as well. By 1957 the power and authority of the parties in general had declined but it was possibly even more important for PKI to demon strate its own broad support. The two major power centres in the country were now Sukarno and the army. Sukarno needed PKI in order to help maintain his primary political position, just as PKI needed him in order to keep the army leaders, who included many anti-communists, === [PDF page 478] === from t h a t p o s it io n * The s t r o n g e r th e su p p o r t PKI c o u ld d e m o n s tr a te, th e s u r e r th e P a r ty was o f m a in ta in in g th e a l l i a n c e w it h Sukarno and o f s t r e n g t h e n in g h i s hand v i s - a - v i s th e army. And i f Sukarno had d e c la r e d a f t e r th e 1955 e l e c t i o n s t h a t a p a r ty w ith s i x m i l l i o n v o t e r s ( t h a t i s, PKI) sh o u ld n o t be e x c lu d e d from th e govern m en t, w ould n o t h i s c a s e b e s tr e n g th e n e d by a la r g e in c r e a s e i n com m unist v o t e s in 1957? The e l e c t i o n cam paigns p r o v id e d th e P a r ty w ith a g o v e r n m e n t-s a n c tio n e d o p p o r tu n ity to i n t e n s i f y and e x te n d propaganda and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y, e s p e c i a l l y in new a reas. D u rin g th e p e r io d o f th e ca m p a ig n s, l o c a l t r a d i t i o n a l and c o n s e r v a t iv e a u t h o r i t i e s c o u ld n o t c r i t i c i z e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y as d i v i s i v e, and P a rty work was e x te n d e d in t o a r e a s h i t h e r t o c lo s e d t o i t. Furtherm ore p o p u la r i n t e r e s t in p o l i t i c s was h e ig h te n e d d u rin g th e cam paigns - n o t o n ly b e c a u s e o f th e work o f th e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s, b u t a l s o b e c a u se th e M in is tr y o f In fo r m a tio n made a g r e a t e f f o r t to in form th e e l e c t o r a t e o f th e r e a so n s f o r and th e m ethods o f v o t i n g. The PKI le a d e r s to o k ad van tage o f t h i s in c r e a s e d i n t e r e s t to p r e s e n t a b a s i c o u t l i n e o f th e commendable g o a ls o f th e P a r ty. Once i n t e r e s t in and sym pathy f o r PKI had b e e n a r o u s e d, th e com m unists moved q u ic k ly to r e c r u i t th e new sy m p a th iz e r s f o r e i t h e r th e P a r ty o r th e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s. That i s, th e e l e c t o r a l === [PDF page 479] === 463 su p p o r t g a in e d d u r in g th e e l e c t i o n cam paigns was e n v is a g e d a s th e b a s i s f o r a r a p id e x p a n s io n o f th e communist o r g a n iz a tio n s. The e l e c t i o n s w ere u sed t o s tr e n g th e n th e Partyo r g a n iz a t io n in t h r e e w ays. F i r s t, th e cam paigns were u s e d t o t r a i n P a r ty c a d r e s, a c t i v i s t s and members. The P a r ty * s e l e c t i o n m a t e r ia ls were s t u d ie d i n t e n s i v e l y a t a l l l e v e l s o f th e o r g a n i z a t i o n, and th e e n t i r e membership r e c e iv e d t r a i n i n g in th e d is s e m in a tio n o f P a r ty propaganda and th e m o b i l iz a t i o n o f p e o p le o u t s id e th e P a r ty. Secon d, i s p o s s i b l e t h a t th e A id it le a d e r s h ip, a n t i c i p a t i n g com m unist c o n t r o l o f th e governm ent in th e f o r e s e e a b le f u t u r e, was e a g e r t o have th e l a r g e s t p o s s i b l e number o f r a n k in g c a d r e s e n t e r p a r lia m e n t and th e l o c a l c o u n c i ls in o r d e r to overcome th e P a r t y 's d e f i c i e n c y in e x p e r ie n c e d a d m in is t r a t o r s, i n p e r so n s f a m i li a r w ith m a tte r s o f govern m en t. T h ir d, th e e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s p r o v id e d th e P a r ty le a d e r s w ith an o b j e c t i v e b a s i s on w h ich to a s s e s s th e e f f i c i e n c y o f th e P a r ty o r g a n iz a t io n, th e s o c i a l and g e o g r a p h ic a r e a s o f P a r ty s u p p o r t, and, from t h e s e, th e e s s e n t i a l f i e l d s o f fu tu r e P a r ty work. P r e v io u s ly, th e le a d e r s had to r e l y f o r su ch a s s e s s m e n ts on th e s u b j e c t i v e r ep o rts o f lo c a l c a d r es. === [PDF page 480] === Both in 1955 and 1957 PKI was competing m ainly for th e v o te s o f th e n o n - s a n t r i s. W ithin th e n o n -s a n t Pi e l e c t o r a t e, PKI began th e e l e c t i o n campaigns w ith a la rg e n u c le u s o f p o t e n t i a l v o te rs formed b y th e membership o f th e mass o r g a n iz a tio n s, w h ile i t s e f f o r t s to r a l l y e l e c t o r a l s u p p o r t beyond th e f r o n t i e r s o f th e P a rty and mass o r g a n iz a tio n s w ere f a c i l i t a t e d by th e p o p u la r image o f th e P a r ty t h a t had b een b u i l t so c a r e f u l l y s in c e 1951» b y th e p o l i t i c a l l y u n s o p h is tic a te d and uncom m itted n a tu re o f most o f th e abangan e l e c t o r a t e, and by th e c u r r e n t p o litic a l s itu a tio n. I f PKI had b een h e a rd o f p r e v io u s ly by th e mass o f th e ab an g an s» i t was most p ro b a b ly as a re s p o n s ib le p a r ty opposed to te r r o r i s m, and e a g e r to d efen d and prom ote th e i n t e r e s t s o f th e p e o p le. In t h e i r e f f o r t s to a t t r a c t v o t e r s, th e P a r ty le a d e r s u s u a lly d id n o t have to f i r s t b re a k down e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l l o y a l t i e s, w hile t h e i r a tte m p t to make th e P a r ty a p p e ar a t t r a c t i v e was n o t c o n s ta n tl y sa b o tag e d b y a tta c k s from o th e r p o l i t i c a l [Unreadable] At th e tim e s o f th e cam paigns f o r b o th th e 1955 and th e 1957 e l e c t i o n s, PKI was in a l l i a n c e w ith PNI, th e o n ly o th e r m ajor p a r ty a c tiv e among th e a b a n g a n s, and The s a n t r i s in g e n e ra l were e x p e c te d to v o te f o r, and a p p a re n tly d id v o te f o r, th e s p e c i f i c a l l y Moslem p a r t i e s. === [PDF page 481] === 465 neither party attacked the other. That is, the abangan electorate was presented with little anti-communist propaganda. The attacks made on PKI by one wing of Masjumi in fact only served to increase abangan sympathy for the communists. The Aidit leadership early oriented its organization to act as an election machine. For the 1955 elections, Party election committees were formed b y mid-May 1954 at every level of the organization down to the ket jama tan while at that time committees were already being formed in the villages. PKI*s campaign for the 1957 elections was under way by February 1957» Large numbers of full time election workers were employed by the Party, and the mass organizations were also drawn on extensively for assistance. At least SOBSI, BTI, Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani assisted in propaganda work and mobilized people to attend Party meetings and to vote. LEKRA artists designed banners and posters, and helped to provide the popular entertainment that served to attract large crowds to election meetings. At the local level some PNI leaders did attack PKI, but their attacks were inhibited further b y the widespread belief that to be anti-communist was to be pro-imperialist. HR, May 19, 1954 RI, February 1957, p.6. === [PDF page 482] === 466 The large funds available to PKI were used not only to gear the organization for election work but also to exploit a wide variety of techniques for winning the attention and support of the populace. Endorsed by the fifth national congress in March 1954> the PKI election manifesto for the September 1955 parliamentary elections was designed to indicate the Party*s concern for the welfare of the nation as a whole and of the different sections of *the people*. November 1954» already over one quarter of a million copies of the manifesto had been printed in Indonesian, Javanese, Sundanese, Batak, and Indonesian in the Arabic script. For the local elections, the central committee ordered the Party organization in each electoral district to prepare its own election programme. Thus the An account of the campaigns for the 1955 elections is given in Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. p.9 et seq. [Unreadable] Examples of province-level programmes may be found in H R: for East Java on June 13, 1957; for Central Java on June 20, 1957; for West Java on July 1, 1957; and for West Kalimantan on April 2 9 $ 1958. As examples of programmes for autonomous towns, see Program Secom PKI Kota Pradja Surabaja untuk Pemilihan DPRD Kota Pradja Surabaja, 19 p.; and Manlfes Pemilihan Urnurn PKI untuk DPRD Kotapradja Jogjakarta (PKI General Election Manifesto for the Jogjakarta City Representative Council), Jogjakarta, 1957> 48 p. As an example of a programme for a kabupaten, see Program Seksi Comite PKI Sleman untuk Pemilihan Umum DPRD === [PDF page 483] === e l e c t o r s were p r e s e n te d w ith programmes d e s ig n e d s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h e i r own l o c a l s i t u a t i o n, programmes th a t a n a ly z e d th e problem s f a c in g e a c h l o c a l i t y and th a t p r e s e n te d p la n s f o r t h e i r s o l u t i o n. As th e e l e c t i o n cam paigns were d e v e lo p e d, urban and r u r a l a r e a s were p l a s t e r e d w ith th e h a m m e r -a n d -sic k le, p o s t e r s were d is p la y e d w ith p o p u la r s lo g a n s o f p o l i t i c a l and econom ic c o n t e n t, mass m e e tin g s were o r g a n iz e d, p a m p h lets and b r o c h u r e s p r in t e d f o r mass s a l e and d i s t r i b u t i o n, s lo g a n b an n ers were hung a c r o s s roads and a l l e y s, k i t e s were flo w n p a in te d w ith th e P a r ty sy m b o l, and huge b i l l b o a r d s were r a is e d in prom inent l o c a t i o n s. An im p o rta n t f e a t u r e o f PKI*s e l e c t i o n cam paigns was th e u se o f p o p u la r t r a d i t i o n a l form s o f e n te r ta in m e n t to a t t r a c t crowds and p u t a c r o s s p o l i t i c a l propaganda. ' P e o p l e d f e s t i v a l s * were o r g a n iz e d i n towns and v i l l a g e s, Slem an (The Programme o f th e Sleman PKI S e c t io n Committee f o r th e E l e c t io n s f o r th e Sleman R e p r e s e n ta tiv e C o u n c il), ty p e d m a n u sc r ip t, 1957> 6 p. In A p r il 1955 th e s e c r e t a r y o f PKI*s C e n tr a l Java p r o v in c e com m ittee r e p o r te d th a t ’p e o p le * s a r t i s t s * n o t o n ly had c r e a te d many k in d s o f so n g s and d a n ces propa g a n d iz in g PKI, b u t th e y a l s o had g iv e n p o l i t i c a l c o n te n t t o o ld so n g s and d a n c e s. The C e n tr a l Java com m ittee was a t t h a t tim e h o ld in g a c o u r se f o r two p e r so n s from ea ch o f th e s i x t e e n s e c t i o n co m m ittees to t r a i n them as d a n c in g, s i n g i n g, p e r c u s s io n and gam elan c a d r e s. S is w o jo, "S en i untuk Menang dalam P em ilih a n Urnum*' (A rt f o r B r in g in g V ic to r y in th e G en era l E l e c t i o n s ), KP, A p r il 1, 1955» P«57« === [PDF page 484] === and occasionally lasted several nights.^ The festivals consisted of songs, Indonesian boxing, folk opera, and dancing, but they began with a short political speech, while the actual entertainment was given a political slant. Another method of election campaigning that PKI used far more than any other party was social welfare work: cleaning kampongs, the construction and repair of bridges, public lavatories, public bathing places and irrigation channels, and assistance at such times as births, marriages and funerals. PKI also endeavoured to canvass every potential communist voter during the election camapigns. An article in "Boletin PKI Djawa Timur’' (East Java PKI Bulletin) showed how and why canvassing was done. In order to attract and 'control' voters, the article explained, the Party first visited every voter to remind them to register and to tell them how. In this way, 'they know and feel for themselves that there is somebody assisting them'. For accounts of people's festivals, see Boyd R. Compton, The Silent Election, Institute of Current World Affairs Report, New York, 1955, P*4; also Selosoemardjan, "Social Changes in Jogjakarta" (Cornell University, Ph.D. thesis, 1959;» p.216. I also received information from members of the Indonesian rural administrative service. Typed translation of Soekarman, "How to Win the General Elections for PKI", which had appeared in Boletin PKI D.jawa Timur, September 195Ö. === [PDF page 485] === 469 Once registration was completed, the Party kept close contact with the voters in order to answer any queries that might arise. By this close personal contact the ’voters concerned remain nurtured and controlled properly1. Because the PKI machine was much more extensive and efficient than those of other parties, PKI was far more thorough in personal canvassing than its competitors. The effect of personal contacts on the underprivileged Indonesian masses with no traditional political orientation, must have been much greater than the effect of canvassing among the majority of voters in Western countries who are politically committed and who are used to being wooed by different political parties. The Election Results PKI won fifth place in the September 1955 elections, receiving 6,176,914 (or 16.4 per cent) of the total votes."* The results of the Constituent Assembly elections of December 1955 are largely ignored in the following para graphs because they showed only minor changes compared with the September 1955 elections. For discussions of the results of the September 1955 elections, see Peith, The Indonesian Slections of 1955, p.57 et seq.; Justus Maria van der Kroef, ’’Indonesia's First National Election: a Sociological Analysis”, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol.XVi, part I, no.3 (April and A. van Marie, ’’The First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections”, Indonesia, 1956, vol.IX, pp.257-64* === [PDF page 486] === 470 Ahead of PKI were FNI with 8,434,653 votes, Masjumi with 7>903,886 votes, and Nahdatul Ulama with 6,9551141. The fifth largest party, PSII, trailed far behind the big four, receiving 1,091,160 votes, 5,477>707 (or 88*7 per cent) of PKI's votes were received in Java, 435>775 (or 7*05 per cent) in North and South Sumatra (the former an area of estate agriculture and Javanese immigration, the latter an area of oil extraction and Javanese immigration), and only 263,432 in the rest of Indonesia. PKI received less than 10 per cent of the votes cast in each of nine of the fifteen electoral districts: Central Sumatra, the three districts of Kalimantan, the two districts of Sulawesi, the two districts of Nusatenggara, and Maluku. Within Java, communist support was most heavily concentrated in a rough quadrilateral within the line Gunung Kidul-Semarang-Madiun-Patjitan. Within this quadrilateral, PKI received over 50 per cent of the total votes in the towns of Semarang and Surakarta, and in four kabupatens. In eight of the other eleven kabupatens and autonomous towns within the quadrilateral, PKI received between 40 and 50 per cent of the total votes. Outside this area, PKI received between 40 and 50 per cent of the total votes only in the city of Surabaja and in the kabupatens of Blitar and Tjilatjap. Communist support === [PDF page 487] === was particularly weak in the whole of West Java, in a belt of Central Java running south from Tegal and Pekalongan, and in the eastern part of East Java, including Madura, PKI received less than 10 per cent of the total votes in 28 of the 80 kabupatens in Java: 13 in West Java, 7 in. Central Java, and 8 in East Java. A notable feature of the election results in Java was the similar intensity of communist support in the urban and rural areas. With two exceptions, communist support was only fractionally higher in the autonomous t o m s than in the surrounding or adjacent rural areas. The two exceptions were Surabaja, where PKI received 1+1.8 per cent of the votes in the town compared with only 29.6 per cent in the kabupaten; and Pekalongan, where PKI received a lower percentage of the votes in the town than in the kabupaten. In the 1957 local elections in Java, PKI received 7,514*197 votes. This represented an increase of 2,036,1+90, or 37*2 per cent, compared with the September 1955 elections. The increase took place in all of the one hundred autonomous towns and kabupatens. Regionally the comparison between the 1955 and 1957 votes was as follows: === [PDF page 488] === PKI VOTES 1955 D j a k a r t a R a ja W est J a v a C e n tra l Jav a* E ast Jav a T o ta l Ja v a S o u th S u m a tra K a lim a n ta n 1957/8 a. v o te s b.$ o f to ta l a. v o te s b.$ o f to ta l 96,363 755,634 176,900 42,543 12.6 10.8 23.3 12.1 137,305 228,965 71,076 19.4 16.2 29.3 15.7 * C e n t r a l J a v a i n c l u d e s th e S p e c i a l T e r r i t o r y o f J o g j a k a r t a. P o u r r e a s o n s w ould seem to e x p l a i n t h i s c o m p re h e n s iv e i n c r e a s e. r a p i d an d F i r s t, t h e P a r t y a n d i t s mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a d e x p a n d e d b e tw e e n 1955 an d th e m id d le o f 1957« S e c o n d, t h e l e a d e r s o f th e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s d i d n o t c o n s i d e r th e l o c a l e l e c t i o n s t o b e w o rth y o f th e i n t e n s i v e e f f o r t made f o r th e 1955 e l e c t i o n s, and th e cam p aig n w ork o f th e o t h e r p a r t i e s d e c l i n e d r e l a t i v e t o P K I 's. T h ir d, th e PKI l e a d e r s e n d e a v o u re d t o e x p l o i t th e i n c r e a s i n g p u b l i c sy m p a th y o f P r e s i d e n t S u k a rn o f o r th e P a r t y, to p o r t r a y th e P a r t y an d S u k a rn o a s a r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t team i n o r d e r t o a t t r a c t th e s u p p o r t o f th e b r o a d m asses who s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d him t o b e th e l i v i n g sym bol o f a c t i v e I n d o n e s ia n n a t i o n a l i s m. n o t f o llo w e d up i t s F o u r t h, PNI h ad e l e c t o r a l s u c c e s s o f 1955 w ith o r g a n i z a t i o n a l w o rk, w h ile by t h e tim e o f t h e 1957 e l e c t i o n s b o t h th e p r e s t i g e a n d th e m o ra le o f th e p a r t y h a d d e c l i n e d a p p re c ia b ly. === [PDF page 489] === A comparison of the voting patterns of 1957 and 1955 indicates that the socio-cultural division between santrls and abangans is important in explaining the political behaviour of the Javanese. It appears that the santri electorate of the Moslem parties proved remarkably resistant to communist advances, in marked contrast to the ready disintegration of PNI*s abangan electorate: COMPARISON OF 1957 VOTES WITH 1955 VOTES Djakarta Raja West Java Central Java East Java Total Java PKI FNI Moslem* Total votes 40,942 + 542,255 + 800,340 + 652,953 +2,036,490 - 27,076 -134,528 -335,944 -191,128 -688,676 - 62,131 + 22,678 +108,022 -156,490 - 87,921 - 58,417 +155,453 +524»650 +202,646 +824,332 Ä This comprises the votes received by Masjumi, NU and PSII. The above table indicates that, in general, the FNI vote declined sharply, the Moslem vote remained stable, while the PKI vote increased rapidly. If the 1957 votes are compared with the votes in the December 1955 Constituent Assembly elections, the contrast is even more marked: a PKI increase in Java of 2,024*894 votes, a FNI decrease of 985,747» and a Moslem increase of 51,296. In short, it appears that PKI increased its votes among the non-santri population, and that because FNI was the only other large party with support among the non-santris, a large PKI increase involved a sharp fall in PNI*s electoral support. === [PDF page 490] === 474 An analysis of the 1955 and 1957 election results in the hundred autonomous towns and kabupatens seems to confirm this conclusion. When the 1957 elections were held, PKI was able to capture a large segment of the former PNI electoral support. Whereas the communist leaders had followed up electoral successes in 1955 with organizational work to convert electoral support into organized support (in the Party or in the mass organizations), the PNI leaders did not do so. That is, PNI had done little to shape its 1955 electoral support into a conscious and organized body, and many of its former supporters readily trans ferred their votes to PKI, whose organized presence was felt, and whose organizations were usually the only ones to defend the interests of the different sections of the community. PKI's gains at the expense of PNI were facilitated also by the belief among the leaders of PNI, as among the leaders of all parties except PKI, that the local elections were unworthy of the effort made for the 1955 elections to parliament and the Constituent Assembly. But perhaps of greater importance in explaining the large decrease in PNI votes was the demoralization taking place within PNI's ranks. In 1 9 5 5 » according to the claim of PNI leaders, government officials and schoolteachers had been instrumental in mobilizing the large PNI vote. === [PDF page 491] === 475 t h e m id d le o f 1 9 5 7, t h e f u t u r e o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y d em o cracy was i n g r a v e d o u b t, th e p r e s t i g e o f th e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s h a d f a l l e n s h a r p l y, FNI no l o n g e r seem ed a b le t o m a i n t a i n its fo rm e r l e a d i n g r o l e i n t h e g o v e rn m e n t, an d a s PNI*s h o l d on th e g o v e rn m e n t d e c l i n e d, so d i d i t s a b i l i t y to d is p e n s e p a t r o n a g e. The r e s u l t was t h a t many o f t h o s e who h a d w orked h a r d t o m o b iliz e v o t e s f o r FNI i n 1955 e i t h e r w orked l e s s h a r d o r n o t a t a l l i n 1957* The o n ly com m unist g a in s t h a t seem ed to h a v e b e e n made a t th e e x p e n s e o f th e Moslem p a r t i e s w ere s m a l l, e x c e p t i n a few o f th e h e a v i l y Moslem a r e a s. d e t a i l s o f th e 1955 a n d 1957 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s The in d ic a te t h a t b o t h PKI and FNI w ere a b l e t o make a l i t t l e a t th e e x p e n se o f th e Moslem p a r t i e s t h e h e a v i l y Moslem a r e a s. headw ay i n a s m a ll num ber o f I n o t h e r Moslem a r e a s, i n c o n t r a s t, t h e Moslem v o te i n c r e a s e d more t h a n PK I*s - a s i n th e k a b u p a te n s o f P e k a lo n g a n a n d Demak. In s h o r t, t h e r e a r e i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t w here th e s a n t r i s a r e in a n o v e rw h e lm in g m a j o r i t y t h e n o n - s a n t r i p a r t i e s c a n g a in a few v o t e s from th e Moslem p a r t i e s, b u t w here th e s a n t r i s I n t h r e e e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s, D j a k a r t a R a ja, D jem ber ( E a s t J a v a ) and Sumenep (M a d u ra ), th e t o t a l Moslem ( t h a t i s M asju m i, NU a n d P S I I ) v o te f e l l b y 1 6 1, 7 8 2, w h ile th e PKI v o te i n c r e a s e d b y 7 4, 8 6 9. T h is i s n o t p r o o f, h o w e v e r, t h a t many fo rm e r Moslem v o t e r s s w itc h e d t o PK I, b e c a u s e i n th e t h r e e same d i s t r i c t s th e PNI v o te f e l l b y 3 5, 9 7 4, an d th e t o t a l v o te f e l l by 1 1 1, 8 9 1. === [PDF page 492] === 476 a r e f a c e d w ith a s i g n i f i c a n t num ber o f n o n - s a n t r i s, t h e i r c o h e s i v e n e s s i s s u c h t h a t t h e n o n - s a n t r i p a r t i e s c a n make few g a in s among th em. The i n c r e a s e i n com m unist v o t e s i n J a v a o c c u r r e d a t a f a i r l y s i m i l a r r a t e i n u rb a n a n d r u r a l a r e a s. I n te rm s o f r e g i o n s, t h e m ost r a p i d i n c r e a s e was i n W est J a v a (71*8 p e r c e n t), f o llo w e d b y D j a k a r t a R a ja ( 4 2.5 p e r c e n t ), C e n t r a l J a v a (3 4 * 4 p e r c e n t ), and E a s t J a v a ( 2 8.4 p e r c e n t). The n u m e r ic a l i n c r e a s e was g r e a t e s t, h o w e v e r, i n C e n tra l J a v a. PKI r e c e i v e d o v e r 50 p e r c e n t o f th e v o t e s c a s t i n e le v e n o f t h e e i g h t y k a b u p a t e n s, t h e tw e n ty auto n o m o u s to w n s. and i n s i x o f B etw een 40 and 50 p e r c e n t o f th e t o t a l v o t e s was r e c e i v e d i n e i g h t k a b u p a te n s and i n f o u r to w n s. N ot o n ly d i d PKI em erge a s th e l a r g e s t p a r t y i n J a v a a s a w h o le, b u t i t was th e l a r g e s t p a r t y i n 4 4 o f th e one h u n d re d l o c a l c o u n c i l d i s t r i c t s i n J a v a, an d th e s e c o n d l a r g e s t i n 17 o f th em: P K I*8 ELECTORAL POSITION BY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS: 1957 PKI 1 s t D j a k a r t a R a ja W est J a v a C e n tra l Ja v a E a st Jav a T o ta l Ja v a 20 19 12 12 26 l e s s th a n fo u rth T o ta l 23 39 37 100 I n th e k a b u p a te n o f M agetan ( E a s t J a v a ), PKI r e c e i v e d 49*99 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e s, b u t was g iv e n a m a j o r i t y o f t h e c o u n c i l s e a t s b e c a u s e i t h a d fo rm ed a n e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e w ith P e r m a i, w h ic h r e c e i v e d 0.7 2 p e r c e n t o f th e v o te s. === [PDF page 493] === 477 The maps showing the geographical distribution of PKI, PNI and the Moslem parties* electoral support in 1957 indicate the limits of communist electoral support at that time and suggest the possibilities for later communist advance. If the abangan-santri thesis does hold in terms of political behaviour, as is indicated by the comparison of the 1957 and the 1955 election results, the santri population could be expected to form an effective block to large communist gains in the near future in areas of West Java, along the north coast of Central Java, and in parts of East Java, especially in Madura and adjacent parts of the mainland. That is, PKI could not expect to make a rapid advance among the 38.0 per cent of the Javanese electorate that voted Moslem in 1957. On the other hand, PKI could expect to make considerable inroads among the 6,275»919 PNI voters - who were fairly evenly distributed throughout Java, and who were in higher proportions in the rural areas. Since the 1957 elections, PNI has not increased significantly its For the distribution of PKI, PNI and Moslem (that is, Masjumi, NU, PSII, Perti and AKUI combined) votes, see the maps at the end of the thesis. It is as yet too soon to know what the former supporters of Masjumi will do now that the party is banned. It is not to be expected, however, that many of them will turn to PKI. === [PDF page 494] === 473 o r g a n iz a tio n a l a c t i v i t y among th e mass o f e i t h e r th e u rb an o r th e r u r a l p o p u la tio n, so t h a t i t can be assumed t h a t th e n etw o rk o f th e P a r ty and i t s mass o r g a n iz a tio n s, which c o n tin u e d to expand a f t e r 1957 » has a lr e a d y drawn in many o f th o se who v o te d f o r FNI in 1957 * T hat th e communist g a in s a re n o t lim ite d to Ja v a i s shown by the r a p id in c r e a s e in communist v o te s in South Sum atra and th e fo u r p ro v in c e s o f K alim an tan. === [PDF page 495] === PART POUR: THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE OTHER POLITICAL FORCES === [PDF page 496] === PART POUR THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE OTHER POLITICAL FORCES The general outline and goals of the Aidit leader ship’s national united front policy as applied to the Party’s relations with the other political forces have already been given. The following chapter seeks to show how the political situation in which the policy was formulated guided the Party leaders in their choice of foes, friends and potential friends. It then describes the style of political behaviour that the policy has entailed for PKI, and, finally, discusses the imple mentation of the policy. THE SEARCH FOR THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT The Experiences of 1950 In the year between the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia on December 20, 1949 and the assumption of complete control over PKI by the Aidit leadership in the first week of January 1951» three major political develop- See above, p.93 et seq. 479 === [PDF page 497] === 430 ments of importance to PKI took place: a split appeared between the two largest parties, the secular nationalist PNI and the Moslem Masjumi; some political parties showed a willingness to cooperate with PKI; and other political forces demonstrated their strong antagonism to the Communist Party. When the federal state was dissolved and a unitary state inaugurated on August 17, 1950, discussions were held between PNI and Masjumi for the formation of a new cabinet. A dispute arose not over the cabinet’s programme but its composition. When Natsir, of Masjumi, finally formed a cabinet which included members from Masjumi and four minor parties, PNI was excluded from cabinet office for the first time since 1946. This was the beginning of the division between PNI and Masjumi that was to increase during the succeeding years. PNI, bitter at its exclusion from office, declared that Western capitalists had exerted some influence in the formation of the cabinet, and began to work with the other opposition parties, including PKI, towards the downfall of the government. Herbert Peith, "Indonesian Politics, 1949-1957• the Decline of Representative Government" (Cornell University, Sin P o, September 12, 1950» === [PDF page 498] === In the period of the federal republic, from December 27, 19U9 to August 17, 1950, PKI had cooperated, both inside and outside parliament, with PNI and many of the lesser parties on a variety of matters. After the formation of the Natsir cabinet, PNI was much more willing to cooperate with the communists. The first opportunity PKI had after the creation of the unitary state to demonstrate its usefulness to the non-communist parties came on August 19 and 21, 1950 when the new parliament met to elect its speakers. Due to PKI votes, Sartono of PNI was able to defeat the Masjumi candidate for the post of first speaker, and Arudji Kartawinata of PSII was elected second deputy speaker. The new Natsir government won a vote of confidence on October 25 by 118 votes to 73, but, b y coincidence or not, the general alignment of parties in the vote has continued down to the present: Masjumi, the Sjahrir socialist party PS I, and the Protestant and Roman Catholic parties on the one hand, and PNI, PKI, and the minor Moslem parties PSII and Perti on the other. Cooperation between PNI and PKI in the formulation of motions to embarrass and harass the government continued until January 1951 when the Aidit leadership gained full control of PKI. === [PDF page 499] === The third major political development of importance to PKI that had occurred by the beginning of 195*1 was the display of antagonism towards PKI by Vice-President Hatta, Masjumi, and many army officers. Hatta (unlike Sukarno) and Masjumi (unlike PNI) had no inhibitions against attacking PKI and its associated organizations, and indeed led an outright attack on them. Hatta, for example, on October 25» 1950 declared PKI to be a Russian tool.*5 Natsirfs cabinet demonstrated its strong hostility to PKI in a series of actions. November 1950, for example, a ban was placed on a proposed SOBSI demonstration to mark the reburial of a communist leader shot during the Madiun rebellion; then PKI was forbidden to hold mass meetings to celebrate the anniversary of the 1926 communist rebellion; and on November 19, the Djakarta military command twice raided the PKI and SOBSI headquarters. Towards the end of the year, after a SOBSI-directed wave of strikes, many regional army commanders prohibited strikes in ’v i tal’ enterprises and offices - a ban which the central military authority made nation-wide on February 13» 1951* Sin Po, October 27, 1950. === [PDF page 500] === C/ Jr The Aidit Leadership Takes Over During their first few months in full control of PKI, the new Party leaders did no more than watch political developments in order to sense more clearly the demarcation between foe and friend or potential friend. As yet they had no new approach to the other political forces, continuing ad hoc cooperation wherever possible. Towards the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951 a division became visible between PNI and Masjumi on matters of policy. The division stemmed, basically, from their attitudes to the revolution and, from this, to the Western powers. For Masjumi, the transfer of sovereignty marked the end of the revolution and the beginning of what should have been a period of cons truetion; for PNI and other nationalists, including Sukarno, the transfer of sovereignty was merely a stage in the revolution because the revolution would be completed only when all forms of *imperialist’ political, economic and cultural power in Indonesia had been eradicated.^ For Masjumi, once sovereignty had been transferred the Dutch and the West in general were looked upon as friends or potential This sentence is, of course, a broad generalization and ignores the many differences of opinion in all parties. It does, however, hold for the attitudes of the dominant groups in Masjumi and PNI. === [PDF page 501] === friends, while for FNI and Sukarno they remained imperialist opponents. From this major difference in concepts of the revolution arose major differences in question of policy - economic policy, foreign policy, and the means of liberating West Irian. The transfer of sovereignty meant that the Indonesian government and parliament had to formulate a wider range of internal and international policies than they had during the revolutionary war. It was inevitable that the different attitudes of FNI and Masjumi to the revolution and to the Western powers would result in disagreement over many concrete issues which emerged and that, as a result, the gap between the two parties would be widened further. PKI naturally lent its support to FNI in its dispute with Masjumi because FNI was evidently more anti-Dutch, anti-imperialist, and, unlike Masjurai;was willing to cooperate with PKI when convenient and was circumspect in references to the Madiun rebellion. In January 1951 PKI was presented with the opportunity to lend its support to FNI on two important parliamentary motions. The first, jointly sponsored by PNI and PSII, called for the immediate entry of West Irian into Indonesia with the same status as the other regions, the immediate abolition of the Indonesian-Dutch Union, and the cancellation of the Round Table Conference === [PDF page 502] === a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n t h r e e m o n th s. T h is m o tio n was n a rro w ly - d e f e a t e d on J a n u a r y 10, 195i b y 66 v o t e s t o 33» FNI h a d i n i t i a l l y a c c e p t e d t h e Round T a b le C o n f e r e n c e a g r e e m e n t, b u t so o n c h a n g e d i t s m ind. Even a s e a r l y a s J a n u a r y 1951 c o o p e r a t i o n b e tw e e n PNI and PKI f o r t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h e a g r e e m e n t was n o t c o n f i n e d t o p a r l i a m e n t, f o r i n t h a t month a 2+0,0 0 0 - p e r s o n d e m o n s t r a t i o n was o r g a n i z e d b y 49 p a r t i e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n S u r a b a j a t o demand c a n c e lla tio n.^ On J a n u a r y 19, 1951 d i s c u s s i o n s b e g a n i n p a r l i a m e n t on a j o i n t m o tio n o f PNI, PKI, P S I I and t h r e e l e s s e r p a r t i e s w hich l e d e v e n t u a l l y t o t h e d o w n f a l l o f th e g o v e rn m e n t. The m o tio n c a l l e d f o r th e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f a g o v e rn m e n t r e g u l a t i o n w h ic h h a d become la w on A u g u st 14, 1950 and w h ic h p e r m i t t e d t h e g o v e rn m e n t t o a p p o i n t lo c a l re p re s e n ta tiv e c o u n c ils. The m o tio n was p a s s e d on J a n u a r y 2 2, 1951 "by 76 v o t e s t o 4 8. PNI, PK I, P S I I, t h e n a t i o n a l i s t comm unist Murba, t h e L abour P a r t y a n d a num ber o f n o n - p a r t y members b o y c o t t e d th e s e s s i o n o f March 20 w h ich was c a l l e d t o d i s c u s s th e g o v e r n m e n t s s t a t e m e n t on t h e m o tio n. A quorum c o u ld n o t be f o u n d. E d i t o r i a l,,fS e l u r u h R a k j a t Anti-KMB*' (The Whole P e o p le A g a i n s t th e RTC), BM, F e b r u a r y 1, 1951, P*56. === [PDF page 503] === On t h e same d a y t h e m i n o r n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y PIR w i t h d r e w its s u p p o r t fro m t h e g o v e r n m e n t, a n d t h e c a b i n e t thereupon resig n ed. The PKI p a r l i a m e n t a r y g r o u p i m m e d i a t e l y a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e P a r t y would s u p p o r t t h e n e x t c a b i n e t i f t h e c a b i n e t w o u ld c a n c e l t h e Round T a b l e C o n f e r e n c e a g r e e m e n t a n d would p u r s u e an i n d e p e n d e n t, a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t f o r e i g n p o licy. On March 2 1, t h e PKI c e n t r a l c o m m i t t e e p r o p o s e d a p r o v i s i o n a l n a t i o n a l g o v e rn m e n t o f a c o a l i t i o n nature* c o n s is tin g of g r o u p s an d p e o p l e ', dem ocratic p a r tie s, t h a t would f i r s t c a n c e l the agreem ent as m ajor s t e p tow ards c r e a t i n g a ' t r u l y f r e e n a t i o n a l, p o l i t i c a l, econom ic, c u l t u r a l and d e fe n c e s y s t e m. T h e c e n t r a l comm ittee p ro p o se d, t o o, t h a t th e c a b i n e t ' s programme b e j o i n t l y f o r m u l a t e d b y t h e d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s and g r o u p s. "Sin Po", th e pro-com m unist new spaper, reported th a t: we h a v e t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t PKI i s p r e p a r e d t o s i t i n t h e c a b i n e t p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e programme i t p ro p o s e s i s a c c e p t e d as th e c a b i n e t ' s p r o g r a m m e. 12*4 For an o u t l i n e of e v e n ts l e a d i n g to the f a l l o f th e N a t s i r c a b i n e t, s e e "The R e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e N a t s i r C a b i n e t ", I n d o n e s i a n A f f a i r s, March 1951» p p. 1 - 4. S i n Po, March 2 1, 1951. L o c.c it. S i n Po, March 2 2, 1 9 5 1 • === [PDF page 504] === PKI thus offered its support for a cabinet with a basic programme acceptable to PNI. Apparently the Aidit leadership also hoped that its cooperation with PNI during the Natsir cabinet would be sufficient to restore PKI to its pre-Madiun place in Indonesian politics, that is, to participation as any other party in the process of cabinet formation and in the cabinet itself. The PKI leaders were eventually to realize the futility of this hope, and this realization, combined with other factors, was to stimulate a profound re-thinking on the tactics and purpose of the national united front policy. For a while, however, it appeared possible that PKI might gain admittance to the government in the not too distant future. On March 30, 1951» due to PSII initiative, a Political Parties 1 Consultative Council was formed to seek a way out of the cabinet crisis. PNI, after some hesitation, had withdrawn from the negotiations leading to the formation of the council, but the council did include, besides PKI, the Moslem parties PSII and Perti, Murba, the Labour Party, and three small nationalist parties. PKI was pleased with the new council, and the council's ad hoc committee, which included Aidit, was See above, pp.87-9 === [PDF page 505] === persuaded, to issue a statement showing that sufficient votes could he mustered to exclude Masjumi from the next cabinet. P K I ’s jubilance quickly disappeared when Sukarno appointed PNI and Masjumi cabinet formateurs, and when it became clear that the only purpose of the council for the non-communist parties was to increase their bargaining power for cabinet seats. Sartono of PNI was the first formateur, but he failed to reach agreement with Masjumi not only on the composition of the cabinet but also on policy matters, primarily the question of Indonesian-Dutch relations and the implementation of the motion halting the appointment of representative councils. "Sin Po" also reported that PNI objected to Masjumi!s insistence on giving the proWestern PSI control of foreign policy. On April 18, 1951» PNI and Masjumi joint formateurs were appointed, and on April 26 the new Sukiman cabinet was announced. Of the twenty cabinet members, five were PNI, five Masjumi, and the rest were either non-party or from minor parties. PKI at first abused the new cabinet which disap pointed its hopes. On May 31 and during the first two weeks of June, communist members of parliament roundly Sin P o, April 13, 1951 Sin P o, April 11, 1951 === [PDF page 506] === 409 rejected the cabinetfs composition and programme.^ They expressed disgust at P N I ’s participation and hinted that PNI was interested only in obtaining posts, attacked Sukarno for U n d e m o c r a t i c ’ practices in choosing the cabinet formateurs, and strongly intimated that the United States and Britain had exerted great pressure, particularly on Sukarno, to have this cabinet formed. But even during the period of greatest disappointment, the PKI leaders declared that they were not being negatively oppositionist. Aidit, for example, stated on May 23 that PKI was always ready to cease its opposition the moment the government stopped implementing the Round Table Conference agreement. By the formation of the Sukiman cabinet the Aidit leadership was posed the question: did the new cabinet mean that the national bourgeoisie, represented b y PNI and Sukarno, had once more allied itself with the anti communists, and would it again be part to an anti communist drive as in 1948? The young leaders could not yet see the fundamental division within the other See the speeches made in parliament by Sakirman on May 31, June 11 and June 15, 1951, given in Risalah Perundingan 1951 (Indonesian Parliamentary Debates), [Unreadable] Sin Po, May 24, 1951. === [PDF page 507] === political forces, and overestimated the anti-communist forces. For example, Sukarno was believed to be among the Party’s enemies. Throughout 1951> and particularly in the first three quarters of that year, he was attacked for his part in choosing the cabinet formateurs, for being a false and demagogic Marxist, for playing a primary role in the Madiun affair, and for selling out his country in the Round Table Conference agreement. was always identified in Party speeches and documents with first the Natsir and then the Sukiman cabinet. Fears of a second Madiun provocation became intense at the beginning of July 1951* On July 3 the politbureau protested the searches made of the homes of many prominent progressives, and also some arrests that had taken place. It called to all democrats ’to cooperate as closely as possible in order to defend democratic rights, to prevent Indonesia’s becoming a military or police state.’ Then, D.N. Aidit, Perd.juangan dan Adjaran-Adlaran Karl Marx (The Struggle and Teachings of Karl Marx), Djakarta, 1950» p.5; Njoto, ’’Pemalsuan Marxisme” (Falsification of Marxism), BM, January 1-15» 1951> p.17* ’’Keterangan CC PKI tentang Peristiwa Madiun” (PKI Central Committee Statement on the Madiun Affair), Sin Po, February 10, 1951; Mirajadi, ”Tiga Tahun Provokasi Madiun” (Three Years since the Madiun Provocation), BM, AugustSeptember 1951* pp.40, 45-6, 48. Sin Po, July 7, 1951. === [PDF page 508] === o n A u g u st 6, a n arm ed a t t a c k was r e p o r t e d t o hav e b e e n made on a p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n T an d ju n g P r i o k, th e p o r t o f D j a k a r t a, b y p e r s o n s u s i n g t h e h a m m e r-a n d -s ic k le a s a s y m b o l. The PKI c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s e c r e t a r i a t a t o n ce d e n ie d PKI p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e a t t a c k an d w arned P a r t y members t o be on t h e a l e r t a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e p r o v o c a t io n.^ A u g u st 11 many l e a d i n g PKI c a d r e s i n Medan w ere a r r e s t e d, o n th e 1 5 th a r r e s t s and s e a r c h e s b e g a n i n D j a k a r t a, and th e a r r e s t s t h e n s p r e a d th r o u g h o u t I n d o n e s ia u n t i l, a c c o r d i n g to PKI i n f o r m a t i o n, a b o u t 2,0 0 0 o t h e r p r o g r e s s i v e s ’ w ere i m p r is o n e d. ’co m m u n ists an d I t is s ig n ific a n t t h a t a lt h o u g h t h e g o v e rn m e n t j u s t i f i e d t h e a r r e s t s on th e g ro u n d s t h a t a c o u p was b e i n g p r e p a r e d, none o f th e a r r e s t e d was b r o u g h t t o t r i a l an d no e v id e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f th e a l l e g a t i o n was e v e r p r e s e n t e d. A i d i t, Lukman and N jo to e v ad e d a r r e s t and w ent i n t o h id in g. T h e i r r e a c t i o n t o t h e a r r e s t s was v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t ta k e n b y Musso i n 1948. I n th e w ords o f a c e n t r a l c o m m itte e s t a t e m e n t o f A ugust 24» 1951» PKI had ’a l r e a d y b e g u n t o b e a d u l t and knows how t o f a c e th e HR, A u g u st 7» 195*1® PK I, 40 Tahun PKI (PK I 40 Y e a r s ), D j a k a r t a, S ee a b o v e, p. 122, f o o t n o t e 1. 1960, p. 69. === [PDF page 509] === i m p e r i a l i s t s 1 c r i m i n a l p r o v o c a t i o n s 1, and t h e r e f o r e c o u ld n o t b e d r a g g e d i n t o a s e c o n d M adiun a f f a i r. The l e a d e r s i n h i d i n g d e c l a r e d t h a t PKI w o u ld n o t a tte m p t a c o u p, an d o r d e r e d th e P a r t y t o c o n ti n u e a b o v e -g ro u n d a c tiv ity. The b lam e f o r th e *f a s c i s t coup d ’e t a t * a tt e m p t was n o t f i x e d on t h e g o v e rn m e n t a s a w h o le, b u t o n ly on ’a s m a ll g ro u p i n th e g o v e rn m e n t t h a t w is h e s to c a s t r a t e d e m o c r a c y.'3 The g ro u p was nam ed a s ’th e S ukim an- W ib is o n o - S u p ra p to c l i q u e ’^- - Suleiman a n d W ib iso n o b e in g m em bers o f M asjum i, S u p ra p to o f th e L ab o u r P a r t y. PNI c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s w ere i m p l i c a t e d. In t h e i r s e a rc h fo r a l l i e s a rre s te d, t o dem and j u s t i c e f o r th e th e PKI l e a d e r s m et a m ix ed r e s p o n s e w hich p r o v i d e d p o l i t i c a l l e s s o n s t h a t w ere a s t i m u l u s t o th e f o r m u l a t i o n o f a new c o n c e p t o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t. HR, A u g u st 2 5, 1951; A ia m p u tra, ’’M e n g a ta s i K elem ahanK elem ah an " (O vercom ing W e a k n e s s e s ), BM, A u g u s t-S e p te m b e r 1 951, P. 2 2. S o b r o m a li s i, " T e n ta n g P e r e b u ta n K e k u a sa a n " (C o n c e rn in g S e i z u r e o f P o w e r), BM, A u g u s t-S e p te m b e r 1951» p p. 1 2 - 1 5; A ia m p u tr a, " M e n g a ta s i”, BM, A u g u s t-S e p te m b e r 195*1» Imam, " R a z z ia A g u s tu s: S a tu B a g ia n d a r i R e n tja n a P e n g e lu a s a n P e ra n g A m erik a" (The A u g u s t A r r e s t s: a P a r t o f th e A m erican W arm ongering P l a n ), BM, A u g u s t-S e p te m b e r 19 51, p. 9. HR, A u g u st 2 4, 1951 === [PDF page 510] === P ro m in e n t members o f PN I, P S I, P S I I, P e r t i a n d th e P r o te s ta n t P a rty ’w ith s i n c e r i t y and c o u ra g e s t o o d on t h e s i d e o f d e m o c rac y i n f a c e o f th e d a n g e r o f f a s c i s m. ^ B ut PNI a s a p a r t y r e f u s e d to v o te a g a i n s t th e g o v e rn m e n t on a p a r l i a m e n t a r y m o tio n o f Novem ber 1, 1951 e x p r e s s i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w ith th e g o v e r n m e n ts e x p l a n a t i o n o f th e a rre s ts. On th e o t h e r h a n d, PSI, a l t h o u g h a n ’a g e n t o f i m p e r i a l i s m ’, was th e s t a u n c h e s t n o n -c o m m u n ist o p p o n e n t o f th e a r r e s t s. T h ese v a r i o u s r e a c t i o n s an d a l s o th e e x p e r i e n c e o f p r e c e d i n g m onths w ere u s e d b y th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p i n r e a c h i n g th e c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e f o r th e P a r t y to w in sy m p a th y and c o o p e r a t i o n e x te n d in g f a r a c r o s s t h e p o l i t i c a l s p e c tr u m, th o u g h n o t i n c l u d i n g M asju m i, b u t t h a t n o t e n o u g h work h a d b e e n done to w in a n d c o n s o l i d a t e s u c h sy m p a th y an d c o o p e r a t i o n; t h a t t h e g o v e rn m e n t p a r t i e s w ere n o t c l o s e l y u n i t e d; and t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e t o e x p l o i t d i v i s i o n s e v e n among th e im p e r ia lis t a g e n ts. I n th e m onths f o l lo w in g th e A u g u st 1951 a r r e s t s, th e new c o n c e p t o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t was f o r m u l a t e d.^ HR, D ecem ber 19> 1951• R i s a l a h P e ru n d in g a n 1951» v o l.X IV, p.7415 See a b o v e, p p. 8 9 -9 7 === [PDF page 511] === THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT POLICY IMPLEMENTED P K I' s P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o u r u n d e r t h e N a t i o n a l U n i t e d F ront The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p c o n c l u d e d t h a t w i t h o u t t h e t o l e r a n c e a n d a l l i a n c e o f t h e n o n -c o m m u n is ts i t w ould h e i m p o s s i b l e t o g a i n tim e f o r th e g ro w th o f t h e P a r t y and i t s mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, t o i s o l a t e a n d d e s t r o y t h e a n t i com m unist f o r c e s, a n d e v e n t u a l l y t o w in p o w e r. M e n tio n h a s a l r e a d y b e e n made o f how, i n o r d e r t o w in mass s u p p o r t a s w e l l a s t h e t o l e r a n c e and sy m p a th y o f t h e n o n -c o m m u n ist p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s, t h e P a r t y b u i l t an image o f i t s e l f a s p a t r i o t i c, sy m p a th e tic to r e l i g i o n, m i l i t a n t l y d e m o c ra tic, s t r o n g l y o p p o s e d to t h e u s e o f f o r c e i n t h e p u r s u i t o f p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s, an d s e l f - e f f a c i n g a n d r e s p o n s i b l e i n s e e k in g th e n a t i o n a l good. But PKI h a d a l s o t o a l t e r i t s b e h a v i o u r to w a r d s t h e n o n -c o m m u n is t p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s. The PKI l e a d e r s h a v e f r e q u e n t l y r e p e a t e d s e n t i m e n t s a ro u n d t h e theme e x p r e s s e d b y A i d i t a t t h e e n d o f 1954: P K I ' s p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e to w a rd s a p e r s o n o r a p a r t y a t a g i v e n tim e d e p e n d s on t h e p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e o f th e p e rso n o r p a r t y a t t h a t tim e. I n d e t e r m i n i n g i t s p o l i c y, PKI i s n o t m o t i v a t e d b y f e e l i n g s o f g r i e v a n c e o r r e v e n g e. 21 See a b o v e, p p. 2 4 0 - 5 6. D.N. A i d i t, T ig a I n t e r v i u 1954, p p. 1 3 - 1 4. ( T h re e I n t e r v i e w s ), D j a k a r t a, === [PDF page 512] === In other words, PKI would treat as enemies only those who were openly anti-communist* Aidit took every occasion to stress that care should "be taken not to antagonize unnecessarily what he called the middle force, those elements which were ostensibly non-communist and anti-imperialist. In 1956 he admitted that contradictions, that is, differences of interest, existed and would arise between the progressive and the middle forces, especially between the workers and the national capitalists and between PKI and the parties of the national bourgeoisie. 'But it would be wrong for these contradictions to be sharpened.* He said they: must and can be solved by means of discussion, by means of mutual concessions, and in a mutually beneficial manner. In this way the contradictions between the progressive force and the middle force can be prevented from harming national unity, and from benefiting the reactionary force. Aidit promised that PKI would not take steps which could harm other democratic parties - provided those parties did not attempt to harm national unity. Furthermore, PKI would always show restraint towards the other parties The communists must be skilled at restraining themselves in criticising the statements and actions of people from democratic parties. Statements or actions that may hurt our D.N. Aidit, "Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan Revolusi Agustus 1945" (Unite to Realize the Demands of the August 1945 Revolution), HR, August 1, 1956. === [PDF page 513] === feelings but are not important need not be criticized. The communists only criticize statements or actions that promote disunity, divide the strength of the masses and show vacillation in carrying out the anti imperialist and anti-feudal policy. It is also important that the manner of criticism must truly concern the problem and not give vent to passions and feelings. The PKI leaders have also recognized that under the national united front policy PKI and its mass organi zations must support the 'reasonable interests' of the national bourgeoisie. PKI and SOBSI, for example, have been loud in their demands for government protection of national industrialists and businessmen in their struggle against foreign competition."12 Aidit's concern to help the non-communists led him to tell the PKI central committee in December I960 that 'It is also our duty to look after non-Party cadres and cadres of the other democratic parties..., to assist them with complete sincerity. Having established the importance of restrained and friendly behaviour towards the non-communist political M.H. Lukman, Tentang Front Persatuan Nasional (Concerning the National United Front), Djakarta, i960, p*39« See above, p.291 et seq. D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan Feodalisme.* " (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism and Feudalism.’), HR, January 2, 1961. === [PDF page 514] === forces, the Aidit leadership was faced with the problem of how to avoid *tailism*, avoid merely following the non-communists. How could PKI be restrained and friendly and yet at the same time foster the growth among the non-communists of those leftwing elements and sentiments most sympathetic to PKI and most eager to eradicate the remnants of imperialism and crush the internal reactionaries? The answer was given by Lukman in a course guide for use in the Party central school and province-level schools. 1 Lukman pointed out that in view of the *vaciliating and two-faced* nature of the national bourgeoisie with respect to the revolution (that is, it wished to oppose imperialism but at the same time feared the continuation of the revolution because it would bring victory to the working class), PKI must avoid two major errors in its dealing with the national bourgeoisie. The Party must avoid right opportunism, that is, concentrating on the need for unity without waging a struggle against the undesirable characteristics of the middle group; and left opportunism, that is, concentrating on fighting such undesirable characteristics without giving sufficient attention to the question of unity. Lukman, Tentang Front, pp.36-9. Lukman reminded === [PDF page 515] === P a r t y c a d r e s t h a t i n c o r r e c t c r i t i c i s m, a s i n th e f i r s t s e v e n m onths o f 1948, c o u ld a l i e n a t e t h e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e and e v e n d r i v e i t t o a c t a g a i n s t th e P a r t y. He th e n show ed how th e c o r r e c t im p le m e n ta tio n o f th e p rin c ip le * u n ite and f i g h t 1, e n c o u ra g e and c r i t i c i z e, c o u ld f o s t e r, o r h e lp f o s t e r, th e d e s i r a b l e e le m e n ts i n t h e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s e, i n th e n o n -co m m u n ist p o l i t i c a l fo rc e s: B e s id e s b e in g s k i l l e d a t c o r r e c t l y c r i t i c i z i n g th e v a c i l l a t i o n s and e r r o r s o f t h e p o l i c i e s o f th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e, we m u st a l s o b e a b le c o r r e c t l y to e n c o u ra g e an d p o p u l a r i z e th e p r o g r e s s i v e a t t i t u d e s and m e a su re s o f th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e. By c o r r e c t c r i t i c i s m o f th e v a c i l l a t i o n s and e r r o r s o f th e n a tio n a l b o u r g e o is ie, and b y e n c o u ra g e m e n t an d p r a i s e o f w hat i s good o f t h a t c l a s s, e v e r y s t a t e m e n t o f th e w o rk in g c l a s s sind i t s p a r t y w i l l h av e a c o n v in c in g f o r c e; i n o t h e r w o rd s, th e w o rk in g c l a s s and i t s p a r t y w i l l h o ld th e i n i t i a t i v e. I n im p le m e n tin g t h i s m e th o d, a p ro b le m t h a t i s a lw a y s im p o r ta n t t o rem ember i s th e c h a n g in g s i t u a t i o n: w hen, a n d a b o u t w h a t, m u st c r i t i c i s m b e e m p h a siz e d and w hen, and a b o u t w h a t, m ust e n c o u ra g e m e n t b e e m p h a s iz e d.^ T h is was th e w ay, he c o n c lu d e d, t o f o s t e r th e p r o g r e s s i v e g ro u p w i t h i n th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e, t o e n c o u ra g e th o s e i n th e c e n t r e t o move l e f t, an d to i s o l a t e th e s t u b b o r n. I n o t h e r w o rd s, t h i s was th e way i n w hich PKI c o u ld a v o id *t a i l i s m 1 an d c o u ld d raw th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e l e f t w ards w h ile a t th e same tim e b e i n g m o d e ra te an d f r i e n d l y. I b i d., p.3 8 === [PDF page 516] === 499 The A p p ro a ch t o PNI At t h e e n d o f J u n e 1951 t h e r e h a d b e e n r e p o r t s o f M asjum i d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e new r e g i o n a l g o v e r n o r s a p p o i n t e d b y th e PNI M i n i s t e r o f I n t e r n a l A f f a ir s," * b u t t h e f i r s t s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e b e tw e e n t h e two m ain p a r t i e s d i d n o t a r i s e u n t i l a d e c i s i o n h a d t o b e made w h e th e r t o s i g n t h e J a p a n e s e P e a c e T r e a t y drawn up i n San F r a n c i s c o. On S e p te m b e r 8, 195*1 F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S u b a r d j o s i g n e d t h e t r e a t y, b u t t h e c a b i n e t was d i v i d e d, w i t h Masjumi f o r, a n d PNI a g a i n s t. S i g n i n g th e t r e a t y was w i d e l y c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a n abandonm ent o f I n d o n e s i a ' s i n d e p e n d e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y in fa v o u r o f a lig n m e n t w ith th e U n ited S ta te s. The g o v e rn m e n t d i d n o t f a l l i m m e d i a t e l y b e c a u s e a com prom ise was r e a c h e d b e tw e e n PNI an d M asju m i: t h e g o v e rn m e n t d i d n o t s e e k r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t r e a t y, and PNI d i d n o t demand t h e r e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e g o v e rn m e n t. The Sukiman c a b i n e t f i n a l l y f e l l o v e r a new f o r e i g n p o l ic y m a tte r: th e s i g n a tu r e by F o re ig n M in is te r S u b a rd jo, b u t w i t h o u t t h e c a b i n e t ' s k n o w le d g e, o f a M u tu a l S e c u r i t y S i n P o, J u n e 3 0, 1951* Even t h e Masjumi e x e c u t i v e c o m m itte e d e c i d e d t o s i g n t h e t r e a t y b y a v o t e o f o n l y 17 t o 14, w i t h two a b s t e n t i o n s and 27 a b s e n t e e s; G eorge M cTurnan K a h in, " I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s a n d N a t i o n a l i s m ", i n W il l ia m L. H o l l a n d ( e d. ), A s ia n N a t i o n a l i s m an d t h e W e s t, New Y ork, 1953, p p. 1 9 1 -2. === [PDF page 517] === 500 Aid agreement with the United States on February 2, 1952* All major parties condemned the agreement not only because of its contents but also because it had been negotiated secretly. On February 23 the cabinet resigned. So far PKI had done no more than play the role of a vocal bystander, condemning those who were ready to betray the principles of Indonesia's foreign policy, and cheering on the true patriots, the opponents of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the MSA agreement. But as soon as the cabinet had fallen, PKI made an active bid to win the confidence of FNI and to draw that party away from Masjumi. On February 25, 1952 the PKI central committee called for a 'progressive and anti-fascist cabinet* that would include PNI, PSI, members of the Political Parties' Consultative Council, and 'other groups who agree with the programme of the progressive, anti-fascist cabinet, Acceptable to all but Masjumi, the proposed cabinet programme envisaged rejection of MSA aid, the return of West Irian, the release of all arrested in August 1951» the guarantee of full freedoms, direct and free general elections, and the eradication of the Darul Islam Moslem rebels. Furthermore, PKI called for the rejection of Masjumi participation in the next cabinet because of H R, February 25 and 26, 1952, === [PDF page 518] === M a s ju m i*s c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e D a r u l I s l a m, a n d b e c a u s e one o f i t s m i n i s t e r s h a d s i g n e d t h e MSA a g r e e m e n t. I n s h o r t, PKI o f f e r e d PNI t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f o r m in g a c a b i n e t w i t h o u t M asjum i. On March 1, i 952 S u k a rn o a p p o i n t e d P ra w o to M a n g k u sa sm ito o f Masjumi a n d S i d i k D j o j o s u k a r t o o f PNI as fo rm a te u rs. PKI, a la r m e d l e s t a n o t h e r M asjum i-PNI c o a l i t i o n g o v e rn m e n t w ould be fo rm ed w i t h Masjumi p red o m in an ce, e x p re s s e d i t s d is q u ie t a t th e * la c k o f r e s o l u t i o n * b e i n g shown by * s e v e r a l n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s * i n d e f e n c e o f P N I ’s s t a n d f o r t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h e J a p a n e se Peace T r e a ty, t h e MSA a g re e m e n t a n d t h e Round T a b le C o n f e r e n c e a g r e e m e n t, f o r t h e e r a d i c a t i o n o f th e D arul Isla m r e b e l s, and f o r s t r o n g m e a s u r e s t o e f f e c t t h e r e t u r n o f West I r i a n. 1 When P ra w o to and S i d i k f a i l e d t o r e a c h a g r e e m e n t, S u k a rn o a p p o i n t e d P N I 's W ilopo a s f o r m a t e u r. PKI gave him a g u a r d e d welcome a n d o f f e r e d s u p p o r t i f he c h o se a t r u l y p r o g r e s s i v e an d a n t i - f a s c i s t c a b i n e t. 2 W ilopo*s c a b i n e t was i n s t a l l e d, Once th e A id it le a d e r s h ip e x p r e s s e d i t s d i s a p p o i n t m e n t a t t h e i n c l u s i o n o f M asjum i, b u t, i n l i n e w i t h t h e new and e v o l v i n g c o n c e p t o f t h e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t, f o r t h e f i r s t tim e d e c l a r e d t h e HR, March 1 0, 1952. HR, March 2 4, 1952. === [PDF page 519] === 502 Party’s willingness to support a cabinet that did not include ’progressive* ministers: apart from the question of whether or not PKI sits in the cabinet, PKI is ready, with honesty, to give its support to the Wilopo cabinet provided that the cabinet follows an entirely new political course. PKI will support the Wilopo cabinet provided that the government has courage and acts to abandon the old political course, that is, the war policy and the anti national, fascist policy, and follows a new political course, a national policy founded on democracy and peace... PKI wishes that the Wilopo cabinet, following a new political course, will have a long life. 1 For the first time PKI offered support to other political parties without asking the price of partici pation in government. In other words, PKI offered its cooperation and alliance to those parties and groups which were not anti-communist and which were most opposed to 1imperialism*. In return it asked only that they should implement part of their anti-imperialist policy, and that they should permit PKI and its mass organizations freedom from repression. Such easy terms for communist support strongly attracted many nationalists who themselves wished *to complete the revolution* by eliminating imperialist power, who were becoming increasingly antagonistic towards and fearful of Masjumi, and who placed a high premium on ’office*. HR, April 23, 1952 === [PDF page 520] === During the period of the Wilopo cabinet, which was installed on April 3, 1952 and which resigned on June 3» 1953» four major political developments occurred that were of significance to P K I: the further widening of the breach between Masjumi and the nationalists; an increasing willingness on the part of a growing number of nationalists to cooperate with PKI; increased antagonism between Hatta, Masjumi and PSI on the one hand and PKI on the other; and the breakaway from Masjumi of the Nahdatul Ulama. It became evident to PNI that its cooperation with Masjumi and PSI was often injurious to its own interests* For example, changes in the structure and size of the army which were envisaged by the pro-PSI Minister of Defence would have reduced the influence of the PNI supporters in. both the officer corps and the ranks* The cabinet also moved towards the organization of early general elections which PNI feared because it was generally believed that as Masjumi had the best grass roots organization the Moslem party would win a majority The political developments during the period of the Wilopo cabinet are covered by Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, New~York, 195&» 212 p* === [PDF page 521] === 50 of votes. Furthermore, due to an adverse balance of trade, the cabinet, which included a PS I member as Minister of Finance, initiated budget, credit and import policies which burdened primarily the social groups most closely associated with PNI, that is, the civil servants and the new group of Indonesian importers and exporters. Thus a large and increasing number of nationalists came to view cooperation with Masjumi as harmful to their own and their party’s interests. At the same time, the religious issue was of great importance in generating antagonism towards and fear of Masjumi. In general the nationalist leaders were oriented towards traditional Javanese culture and disliked and feared the militant Islam of many Masjumi leaders. For many nationalist leaders, an Islamic state was the greatest threat to what they liked of Indonesia, to what they wanted for Indonesia, and to their own positions. In the first four months of 1953 a bitter feud broke out between some of the more radical Masjumi members and nationalist leaders over the issue of an Islamic state. Hypocritical Moslems were roundly denounced, and hot rejoinders flew back and forth. Feith concludes that the radicalism exhibited by some of the Masjumi leaders ’heightened the fears of the P.N.I. - and of President Soekarno - of === [PDF page 522] === 505 Masjumi strength.*^ This fear made PKI*s task of winning the nationalists* friendship much easier. As the general elections drew nearer, the nationalists looked for allies who could help them to postpone the elections as long as possible and to consolidate PNI*s hold on government officials, whose influence in the elections could be, and eventually was, decisive. PKI*s offer of support with minimal con ditions gained in attractiveness. Peith considers that in 1952 the Sidik group in PNI decided on a more thorough exploration of the possibilities of cooperation with PKI, and that some of the chief PNI leaders were perhaps already working towards a FNI-led cabinet excluding Masjumi - a development PKI had propounded since the fall of the Natsir cabinet. In Peith*s opinion: it is clear that a section of the P.N.I. leader ship was henceforth prepared to assist in a strengthening of the P.K.I.*s position, and in particular to help the party regain nationalist respectability. For such nationalists, PKI*s low-price offer seemed to show that PKI was weak and of no immediate threat, whereas Masjumi was a direct and powerful threat. strengthen the P.K.I. and weaken the Masjumi was demanded by the very mechanics of the P.N.I.*s power position.* Ibid., p.161 Ibid., p.97 === [PDF page 523] === Sukarno^ support of FNI also gave the nationalists confidence that they could hold their own against even a considerably stronger PKI. As a result, many nationalists increased their cooperation with PKI until towards the end of the Wilopo cabinet a major section of PNI was working in close alliance with PKI in order to bring down the government* During the period of the Wilopo cabinet hostility increased between PKI and Hatta and Masjumi, and strong antipathy developed between PKI and PSI* Hatta and Masjumi attacked PKI as the tool of the new imperialism. The closer PKI moved to PNI, the more virulent became the exchange of abuse, with Hatta and Masjumi anxious to warn the nationalists of the dangers inherent in any alliance with the communists, and PKI endeavouring to denigrate the anti-communists on its own account and in order to please its new-found nationalist friends. March 1953, Masjumi-leader Sukiman issued a muchpublicized appeal that Indonesia, like India, should adopt a firmly anti-communist policy in internal affairs. PKI's attitude to PSI varied before the formation of the Wilopo cabinet. The PSI leaders were not liked because they had, early in 1943, split away from the Socialist Party which later fused with PKI; and because they were aware of PKIfs tactics and not hesitant to === [PDF page 524] === 507 explain them to other non-communists. On the other hand, during the Sukiman cabinet PS I had been a staunch opponent of the August 1951 arrests, and had opposed signing the Japanese Peace Treaty. As late as February 1952, PKI sent warm greetings to the PSI congress.1 Then, on May 25, 1952, Aidit attacked PSI for creating its own trade unions, for ridiculing the peace movement, and for refusing to join PKI-led national unity actions.^ This was the end of PKI's vacillations, and the Party later explained PSI’s policy during the Sukiman cabinet in terms of a conflict within the imperialist camp: PSI being a tool of the British, whereas Sukiman was a tool of Washington. The violence of PKI’s attacks on PSI by the end of 1952 are partly explained by three factors. First, the period of the Wilopo cabinet witnessed the growth of ties between Masjumi and PSI. Second, PSI had much support in the army and connived on October 17, 1952 in an attempted coup d*etat that would have led to some form of dictatorship, and probably an anti-communist dictator- PKI-B, February 15» 1952, p.2. HR, May 27, 1952. Sakirman, "Beberapa Pengalaman Fraksi PKI dalam DPRS RI...” (Some Experiences of the PKI Parliamentary Group...), BM, January 1956, p.12. === [PDF page 525] === ship because many of the higher* and pro-PSI army officers had become strongly anti-communist as a result of the Madiun rebellion. Third, as PNI and Sukarno considered PS I an enemy, PKI attempted to curry more favour with them by attacking PSI. A major political development during the Wilopo cabinet was the breakaway of Nahdatul Ulama from Masjumi. In one blow Masjumi lost almost fifty per cent of its popular support, and a new, large Moslem party was established that did not adhere to Masjumifs political line. The NU leaders consisted mostly of politically inexperienced religious leaders, and as the party*s prospects brightened came to include a smattering of opportunists who joined for personal profit. Unlike Masjumi, NU was to show itself ready to cooperate with the nationalists and communists when cooperation could serve personal or party interests. In fact, NU has shown itself more ready to work with the nationalists and communists than with the Masjumi leaders towards whom the break left much bitterness. The reasons for the breakaway are outlined in Peith, The Wilopo Cabinet, pp.44-5; and Munawir Sjadzali, "Indonesians Muslim Parties and their Political Concepts" (Georgetown University, Master's thesis, 1959)> pp. 29-30. === [PDF page 526] === 500 The appearance of NU altered considerably the political picture* Not only was Masjumi weakened, but the nationalists were encouraged to form a government without Masjumi. Neither PNI nor Sukarno dared form a government that completely excluded the Moslems, but now the amenable NU could be brought into the cabinet and Masjumi could be excluded. Such an arrangement could not be labelled anti-Islam. On June 19» 1952, Sakirman told parliament that PKI would support the new Wilopo cabinet while retaining the right to criticize sharply any measures Conflicting with democratic rights, national interests, and the interests of the people.’^ Some Party members were bewildered by the new tactic of conditional support for a government without communist representatives, but as early as mid-July the central committee explained that the advantages of the tactic were already being felt: 'a rather broad opportunity1 had been opened to PKI and *other people’s organizations’ to work openly, not in semi-secrecy as formerly, and the leadership of PKI H R, June 20, 1952. === [PDF page 527] === 510 and its mass organizations had been able to emerge from hiding.^ At the same time as they gave the government their support, the PKI leaders sought to bring together PKI and PNI. At first collaboration was on small matters. For example, PKI and PNI were among the 62 parties and organizations which formed a joint committee to celebrate National Awakening Day on May 20, 1952. The committee issued a statement containing a condemnation of colonialism, an agreement on the need for democracy in all fields, and demands for security (meaning the eradication of the Darul Islam rebels), the return of West Irian, and the cancellation of 'all agreements with other states that harm the people and the s t a t e. I t was significant that neither Masjumi nor PSI signed the statement. Other early forms of PKI-PNI collaboration included parallel statements by leaders of both parties urging strong action against the Darul Islam rebels, vigilance in face of foreign subversive activities, and determined retaliation against Dutch insults "Apa Sebab PKI Member! Kesempatan Bekerdja pada Kabinet Wilopo" (Why PKI Gives the Wilopo Cabinet the Opportunity to Work), HR, July 14, 1952. HR, May 21, 1952. Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, p.94. === [PDF page 528] === 511 On J u l y 2 8, 1952 a d e b a t e b e g a n i n p a r l i a m e n t t h a t was t o l e a d t o a n a t t e m p t e d c o u p, and t o much c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n PKI and PNI. The im m e d ia te r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e b a t e w ere t h e s u s p e n s i o n b y C o l o n e l N a s u t i o n, t h e arm y c h i e f o f s t a f f, o f an i n s u b o r d i n a t e o f f i c e r, a n d t h e p l a n s d raw n up b y th e M i n i s t r y o f D e fen c e a n d t h e arm ed f o r c e s 1 l e a d e r s h i p f o r t h e d e m o b i l i z a t i o n o f 8 0,0 0 0 t r o o p s. The d e m o b i l i z a t i o n w ould have r e d u c e d e s p e c i a l l y th o se groups w ith l i t t l e o r no f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n, w h ich b y and l a r g e c o n s i s t e d o f t h o s e w i t h t h e c l o s e s t p e r s o n a l a n d p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h S u k a rn o a n d PN I. The n a t i o n a l i s t s and co m m u n ists q u i c k l y t u r n e d t h e d e b a t e i n t o a n a t t e m p t t o remove from t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e fe n c e and arm ed f o r c e s t h o s e p e r s o n s who were p r o PSI o r were b e l i e v e d t o be s o, P K I’s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d e b a t e h a d two p u r p o s e s: t o s t a y c l o s e t o PNI; and t o w eaken P S I* s p o s i t i o n i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e fe n c e and t h e army - b u t w i t h o u t cau sin g a c a b in e t c r i s i s. The b a l a n c e o f f o r c e s was s t i l l s u c h t h a t a c r i s i s m ig h t h a v e r e s u l t e d i n a new S u k im a n - ty p e g o v e rn m e n t. The c o m m unists f i r s t a t t e m p t e d t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e m a jo r g o v e rn m e n t p a r t i e s b e h i n d p r o p o s a l s t h a t w ould h a v e o p e n e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p e r s o n n e l c h a n g e s i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e fe n c e a n d t h e === [PDF page 529] === a rm e d f o r c e s. B ut a f t e r S u k a rn o i n t e r v e n e d t o p r e s s u r e h e s i t a n t PNI l e a d e r s t o b e more r e s o l u t e a g a i n s t P S I, PKI swung f u l l y b e h i n d t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s. PN I, NU and PSI I r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s p o n s o r e d a m o ti o n c a l l i n g f o r a c o m m issio n t o r e p o r t on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f im p r o v in g t h e defen ce le a d e r s h ip. T h is was p a s s e d on O c t o b e r 16 b y 91 v o t e s t o 5 4, PN I, PK I, NU a n d P S I I v o t i n g f o r, M asju m i, PSI and t h e P r o t e s t a n t a n d Roman C a t h o l i c p a r tie s v o tin g a g a in s t. F o r t h e moment i t a p p e a r e d t h a t PNI a n d PKI h a d s u c c e e d e d i n t h e i r o b j e c t i v e. And t h e n, on O c t o b e r 17, a s e c t i o n o f t h e arm y a t t e m p t e d a c o u p. The c o u p f a i l e d p a r t l y b e c a u s e t h e arm y was d i v i d e d a n d p a r t l y b e c a u s e S u k a rn o r e f u s e d t o b e i n t i m i d a t e d. When t h e coup h a d f a i l e d, lo w e r o f f i c e r s rem oved p r o coup commanders i n E a s t J a v a, E a s t I n d o n e s i a and N o r t h S u m a tr a. PNI a n d PKI w orked c l o s e l y i n d em an d in g t h e re m o v a l o f a l l who h a d b e e n i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e coup a t t e m p t, and s u b s e q u e n t l y many p e r s o n s w ere rem oved. C o l o n e l N a s u t i o n was rem oved a s arm y c h i e f o f s t a f f on December 5, 1952, t h e p r o - P S I M i n i s t e r o f D e fe n c e T. Mangunsumbogo, F a k t a dan Dokumen-Dokumen u n t u k M enjusun Buku " I n d o n e s i a Memasuki G-elanggang I n t e r n a s i o n a l ": P e r i o d e V: 1 9 5 0 -1 9 5 4 ( F a c t s a n d D ocum ents f o r Making a Book " I n d o n e s i a E n t e r s t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r e n a "; P e r i o d V: 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 4 ), m im e o g ra p h e d, v o l. V I B, D j a k a r t a, 1959, p p. 164-5. === [PDF page 530] === 513 resigned on January 1, 1953» the PSI secretary-general of the Ministry of Defence was replaced on March 31, 1932, and, finally, the pro-PSI armed forces chief of staff was eliminated when his post was abolished on The advantage PNI and pro-PNI officers gained by the removal of those implicated in the coup further estranged Masjumi from the nationalists. One of the principal demands of the October 17 group had been the dissolution of the appointed parliament and the holding of general elections. PKI strenously opposed the dissolution of parliament because action at the parliamentary level was providing it with the opportunity to establish cooperation with the nationalists and certain Moslem groups, and because the Party feared that the dissolution of parliament at that time could lead to a dictatorship. The nationalists feared a dictatorship and also elections in the near future - and PKI was quite willing to help stave off elections in order to win PNI*s favour. Hundreds of petitions poured in, mainly from joint local action committees, evidently sponsored by PNI and PKI, calling for parliament to continue. The electoral Herbert Peith, "Towards Elections in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, September 1954> vol.XXVII, no.3> pp.243-4. === [PDF page 531] === bill was presented to parliament in February 1953» the 27th some two hundred amendments had been proposed, and the debate showed signs of dragging on indefinitely. PKI also seemed to be employing delaying tactics for PNI's advantage and proposed, for example, that a census be held before the elections, which would have delayed them for at least two years. Due to strong public pressure against further delays and due to the taunts of Masjumi leaders that the nationalists were afraid of elections, PNI, and therefore PKI, changed tactics. The bill was rushed through by April 1, 1953- The nationalists presumed that if the government was weak and a cabinet crisis possible, then the bill could be passed but its implementation delayed by other means. In the first part of April 1953 a motion was introduced in parliament, with PNI support, calling for the opening of an embassy in Moscow before the end of the year. Masjumi was strongly opposed to the motion, but when it was passed by 82 votes to 43 on April 9, Masjumi declared that it would resign from the cabinet only when the embassy was established. The main forces in PNI were now eager to bring down the government and they used a communist motion as the means. On March 16, 1953> five peasant squatters were shot and killed by police in Tandjung Morawa, near Medan, === [PDF page 532] === 515 w h i l e r e s i s t i n g e v i c t i o n from e s t a t e l a n d s. The PNI i n N o r t h S u m a tra was e a g e r t o e x p l o i t t h e s h o o t i n g i n o r d e r t o e m b a r r a s s a n d, i f p o s s i b l e, remove t h e Masjumi g o v e rn o r o f th e p ro v in c e. I n mid-May t h e p r o - c o m m u n is t l e a d e r o f t h e p e a s a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n SAKTI i n t r o d u c e d a m o tio n o f no c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e M i n i s t e r o f t h e I n t e r i o r, M a s ju m ifs Mohamad Rum who was b lam ed f o r th e s h o o t i n g. T h i s was s o o n m o d i f i e d, p r o b a b l y t o w in s u p p o r t from PN I, b u t Rum d e c l a r e d t h a t he s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d t h e m o tio n t o be one o f c o n f i d e n c e. o f f ic ia l a ttitu d e As l a t e a s May 23 P N I!s t o t h e m o tio n was s t i l l unknown, b u t t h e N o r t h S u m a tra n s e c t i o n o f t h e p a r t y t h r e a t e n e d t o s e c e d e u n l e s s th e m o tio n was s u p p o r t e d. PNI t h e n made a l a s t o f f e r t o a b s t a i n from v o t i n g i n r e t u r n f o r Masjumi a p p r o v a l o f P N I’s c a n d i d a t e f o r M i n i s t e r o f I n f o r m a t i o n an o f f e r t h a t was r e j e c t e d. F i n a l l y, t h e W ilopo c a b i n e t r e s i g n e d on J u n e 3> b e f o r e a v o t e c o u l d be t a k e n on t h e m o tio n. A m a j o r i t y o f t h e PNI l e a d e r s h a d a t l a s t d e c i d e d t h a t t h e c a b i n e t c o u ld b e r e p l a c e d b y one more a d v a n tag e o u s to th e m se lv e s. T h a t t h e y were p r e p a r e d t o s e e k PKI*s c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t c a b i n e t c r i s i s was shown b y t h e s t a t e m e n t s i n March a n d A p r i l b y t h e PNI s e c o n d d e p u ty c h a ir m a n a n d c h a ir m a n t h a t t h e p a r t y was n o n - c o m m u n is t, n o t a n t i - c o m m u n i s t, a n d t h a t i t was === [PDF page 533] === prepared to cooperate 'with all political tendencies in the community.’^ PKI was willing to bring down the cabinet because it was fairly certain that the balance of power in Indonesia was far more in the progressives' favour than when the cabinet was formed, so that there was little fear that a more rightwing government would be formed* PKI's first proposal after the fall of the cabinet was that a PNI member be made the formateur and that both Masjumi and PSI be excluded from the next cabinet. the same time, PKI called for a united front cabinet, including PKI. Prom June 15 to June 21, formateurs from PNI and Masjumi unsuccessfully tried to reach agreement on a new coalition cabinet. When they failed, PKI at once repeated its demand that a PNI member be made the sole formateur, but, significantly, PKI now dropped its request for communist representation in the future cabinet.^ On June 23, after the appointment on the previous day of PNI's Mukarto Notowidigdo as formateur, PKI called for PNI to resist courageously any attempted TI, March 13, 1953; Peith, The Wilopo Cabinet, p.190, note 5 1 • HR, June 8, 1953. HR, June 5 and 16, 1953. HR, June 22, 1953. === [PDF page 534] === 517 i n t i m i d a t i o n b y M asjum i an d P S I, r e p e a t e d i t s demand f o r a g o v e rn m e n t w i t h o u t M asjum i and P S I, and c h a r g e d t h a t t h e U n ite d S t a t e s h a s a l r e a d y e a rm a rk e d f o u r h u n d re d m i l l i o n r u p i a h s f o r u s e b y M asjum i a n d th e o t h e r re a c tio n a ry p a r tie s in th e f o r th c o m in g e l e c t i o n s. A week l a t e r, A i d i t w ro te a n a lm o s t h y s t e r i c a l a r t i c l e d e s c r i b i n g th e h o r r o r s a M asjum i g o v e rn m e n t w ould u n l e a s h. 12 When M u k arto f a i l e d t o fo rm a c a b i n e t, PKI d e c l a r e d t h a t i t was now p ro v e d t h a t a n y a tt e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h a PN I-M asjum i c o a l i t i o n w ould f a i l. A g ain PKI p ro p o s e d a PNI member a s f o r m a t e u r, b u t S u k a rn o a p p o in t e d t o t h i s r o l e B u rh a n u d in H a ra h a p o f M asjum i. h e ig h ts in i t s T h is l e d PKI to new a t t a c k s on M asjum i and P S I. W hile M ukarto h a d b e e n f o r m a t e u r, 26 p a r t i e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s, i n c lu d i n g PK I, P N I, PSI I and th e com m unist m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, h a d e s t a b l i s h e d i n J o g j a k a r t a an a c t i o n c o m m itte e t o f i g h t f o r a c a b i n e t e x c l u d in g M asjum i an d P S I. When t h e M asjum i f o r m a t e u r was a p p o i n t e d, PNI moved much c l o s e r t o PKI an d j o i n t d e m o n s tr a ti o n s w ere h e l d th r o u g h 1 PK I-B, J u l y 1, 1953, p p. 1 0 0 - 4. D.N. A i d i t, " H i s t e r i a d ik a l a n g a n R e a k s i" ( H y s t e r i a among th e R e a c t i o n a r i e s ), i n h i s P i l i h a n T u l i s a n ( S e l e c t e d W o rk s), v o l. I, D ja k a r ta ^ 1959, p p. 147-9* === [PDF page 535] === 515 out the country to demand a PNI-led cabinet and the eradication of the Darul Islam rebels. The increase in the strength of PNI and its allies compared with Masjumi that had occurred during the Wilopo cabinet, and PNI!s ability to use PKI support without giving any obvious concessions, emboldened PNI to demand of Masjumi a distribution of cabinet seats that the latter found unacceptable. On July 18 Harahap returned his mandate, and on the 20th Sukarno appointed as formateur Wongsonegoro of the minor nationalist party PIR. Joint demonstrations and delegations continued, PKI expressed its support for Wongsonegoro in his efforts to form a new cabinet, negotiations lengthened, and it became clear that PNI was prepared to take the major role in a coalition cabinet that would exclude Masjumi and PSI. The PNI leaders at last risked a complete break with Masjumi and a leftwards shift of alliances. the risk seemed slight and the gain immense. But No one really believed that PKI would be able, in the foreseeable future, to challenge the government, while PNI control of the government apparatus would bring personal and party enrichment as well as the means to face general elections with some confidence. On July 30, 1953 the new cabinet was announced. The Prime Minister was Ali Sastroamidjojo, of PNI, and the === [PDF page 536] === o t h e r members o f t h e c a b i n e t i n c l u d e d t h r e e from FNI, t h r e e fro m NU, two from P S I I, and e l e v e n who were from o t h e r m in o r p a r t i e s o r w ere n o n - p a r t y. c a b in e t as PKI h a i l e d t h e ’a g l o r i o u s v i c t o r y o f d e m o c rac y o v e r fa s c is m.’^ The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d l o o k b a c k w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n o v e r th e p e r i o d o f t h e W ilopo c a b i n e t. C o n d itio n a l s u p p o r t o f t h e c a b i n e t h a d h e l p e d r e - e s t a b l i s h t h e P a r t y ’s r e s p e c t a b i l i t y, a n d i t h a d b e e n r e p a i d b y fre e d o m from g o v e rn m e n t r e p r e s s i o n. had f a l l e n, At t h e tim e t h e Sukim an c a b i n e t th e PKI l e a d e r s were e i t h e r i n p r i s o n o r i n h i d i n g, and t o t a l P a r t y m em b ersh ip was a b o u t 8,0 0 0. But d u r i n g t h e W ilopo c a b i n e t a l l t h o s e a r r e s t e d i n A ugust 1951 w ere r e l e a s e d, a l l P a r t y and mass o r g a n i z a t i o n l e a d e r s came b a c k i n t o t h e o p e n, and th e e x p a n s i o n o f t h e P a r t y was b e g u n. By t h e t i m e t h e W ilopo c a b i n e t f e l l, P a r t y m em b ersh ip was o v e r 1 3 0,0 0 0. In s h o r t, th e ’p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e ’ h a d c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s e l f and b e g u n a r a p id ex p an sio n. What o f t h e 'm id d le f o r c e ’, th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e? A i d i t, s p e a k i n g t o t h e f i f t h PKI c o n g r e s s i n March 1954* d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e c o r r e c t P a r t y t a c t i c to w a rd s t h e W ilopo PK I-B, A ug u st 13, 1953 9 p.1 2 4 === [PDF page 537] === 520 c a b i n e t had im proved and w idened th e road f o r u n it y w ith th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e, a u n it y b ro k en s i n c e 1948 when th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o is ie had s id e d w ith th e a t th e tim e o f th e Madiun r e b e l l i o n. *com pradores* In o th e r w ord s, PKI had s u c c e s s f u l l y e x p l o it e d th e g r o w in g FNI o p p o s it io n t o Masjumi p o l i c i e s and FNI f e a r o f th e f a n a t i c a l M oslem s. PKI had e x a c e r b a te d p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s b etw een PNI and Masjumi in t o a n ta g o n ism s by s t r e n g t h e n in g FNI*s hand to th e p o in t where PNI was i n c r e a s i n g l y u n w i l li n g to com prom ise w ith M asjum i. And PKI had s u g g e s te d th a t PNI i n t e r e s t s w ould b e s t be s e r v e d b y a F N I-le d c a b in e t e x c lu d in g Masjumi and PSI, f i n a l l y making su ch a c a b in e t p o s s i b l e and a t t r a c t i v e b y o f f e r i n g PKI su p p o rt a t no g r e a t e r p r i c e th an f r ie n d s h ip and t o l e r a n c e. At th e same tim e as th e grow th o f th e p r o g r e s s iv e f o r c e and t h e a t t r a c t i o n o f th e m id d le f o r c e le f t w a r d s, th e R e a c t io n a r y fo r c e * had b een f u r t h e r i s o l a t e d from th e m id d le f o r c e and had b een c o n s id e r a b ly w eakened. The PSI p o s i t i o n in th e army and th e M in is tr y o f D efen ce had been g r e a t ly red uced. Masjumi and PSI had b e e n f u r th e r s e p a r a te d from PNI, and ev en e x c lu d e d from o f f i c e - a f a c t w hich in i t s e l f in c r e a s e d t h e i r a n ta g o n ism tow ards D.N. A i d i t, D ja la n ke D em okrasi R a k ja t b a g i In d o n e s ia (The I n d o n e s ia n Road to P e o p l e d D em ocracy)7 D ja k a r ta, 1955, PP.47-8. === [PDF page 538] === P N I, t h e more so a s PKI s u p p o r t f o r PNI was i n p a r t re sp o n sib le fo r t h e i r e x c lu sio n. Masjumi i t s e l f h a d s p l i t, a n d t h e f r i e n d l i n e s s shown b y PNI and PKI to w a rd s NU e n c o u r a g e d a f u r t h e r w id e n in g o f t h e s p l i t. F in a lly, a b lo w h a d b e e n s t r u c k a g a i n s t t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s b e c a u s e t h e new A l i c a b i n e t was l e d b y a PNI c o m m itte d t o t h e r e d u c t i o n o f i m p e r i a l i s t econom ic and p o l i t i c a l pow er, a n d t o a ’f r e e and a c t i v e * fo re ig n p o lic y. A l l i a n c e w i t h PNI A f t e r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e A l i c a b i n e t, many o f t h e p r o m in e n t PNI l e a d e r s came t o a ck n o w le d g e o p e n l y a n d t o j u s t i f y t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h PKI. F o r e x a m p le, PNI c h a ir m a n S i d i k D j o j o s u k a r t o r e a d i l y a d m i t t e d a t th e b e g i n n i n g o f O c t o b e r 1953 t h a t he h a d r e c e n t l y s e n t a n i n s t r u c t i o n t o a l l p a r t y b r a n c h e s w hich r e a d: ’E s t a b l i s h c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e PKI and c o o p e r a t e c l o s e l y w i t h t h e NU. I am c o n f i d e n t you w i l l c a r r y o u t t h i s t a c t f u l l y. ’^ ta sk S i d i k c la i m e d t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n f o l l o w e d l o g i c a l l y fro m th e ’c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w ith b o t h p a r t i e s ’ i n p a r l i a m e n t a s a r e s u l t o f NU’s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a n d P K I’s s u p p o r t f o r t h e c a b i n e t. On May 19> 1954» t h e West J a v a PNI l e a d e r G a t o t M a n g k u p rad ja e v e n p r o p o s e d a T I, O c to b e r 9, 1953 === [PDF page 539] === J Ay common front between the nationalists and communists in the coming elections in order to defeat *the opposite side. ’1 The alliance with PKI was advantageous not only because it helped maintain FNI in and Masjumi out of the government. It also meant that PKI withheld criticism of the worsening economic situation and corruption, and that PKI turned its fire of vicious denunciation against the party FNI considered to be its most dangerous rival. The advantages to PKI of its alliance with PNI were obvious: freedom from government repression, regained respectability, and the separation of the non-communists from the anti-communists. But the Aidit leadership had to take care that support for the government in general did not hide PKI's own identity as a revolutionary party. This problem became more acute when the Ali cabinet demonstrated corruption and economic ineptitude. The solution was a combination of support and criticism: defence of the government against reactionary attacks, which helped promote alliance with the nationalist and non-Masjumi Moslem participants in the government; but enough criticism for the Party to maintain itself as the nucleus of social protest, and to make quite clear to TI, May 25, 1954; HR, May 22, 1954. === [PDF page 540] === ro t* m em bers a n d t h e p u b l i c i n g e n e r a l t h a t a lt h o u g h th e c u r r e n t g o v e rn m e n t may b e b e t t e r th a n p r e v i o u s r e a c t i o n a r y o n e s, o n ly a p e o p l e ’s d e m o c r a tic g o v e rn m e n t c o u ld s o l v e th e m a jo r s o c i a l - e c o n o m i c an d p o l i t i c a l p ro b le m s f a c i n g t h e c o u n tr y « c ritic is m T h is c o m b in a tio n o f s u p p o r t an d h a s b e e n m a in ta in e d down t o th e p r e s e n t, e x c e p t f o r th e b r i e f p e r i o d o f th e M a s ju m i-le d c a b i n e t from A u g u st 1 2, 1955 to M arch 3, 1956* S a k irm a n, s p e a k in g i n p a r l i a m e n t on S e p te m b e r 7> 1953> s e t th e to n e f o r P K I’s a t t a c k s on th e o p p o s i t i o n ’s c ritic is m o f t h e g o v e rn m e n t when he d e n o u n c e d M asjum i an d PSI f o r m o u th in g o l d u t t e r a n c e s o f Van Mook ( t h e l a s t D u tc h L ie u te n a n t- G o v e r n o r o f th e E a s t I n d i e s ), H i t l e r a n d th e U n ite d S t a t e s ’ I n f o r m a t io n S e r v ic e.* ' T ow ards th e e n d o f S e p te m b e r, when r e b e l s d e c l a r e d A t j e h t o b e a p a r t o f th e D a ru l I s la m, PKI la u n c h e d a s u i t a b l e a t t a c k on th e ’c o l o n i a l - m i l i t a r i s t - f e u d a l - f a s c i s t e le m e n ts i n A t j e h ’ a n d o f f e r e d f u l l s u p p o r t t o c r u s h th em. D ecem ber 3 1, 1953» A i d i t l i s t e d s e v e n im p o r ta n t and d e s i r a b l e a c t i o n s ta k e n b y t h e c a b i n e t i n th e b r i e f p e rio d s in c e i t to o k o f f i c e, ^ a n d t h e n t o l d th e P a r t y HR, S e p te m b e r 8, 1953. R a k ja t o f th e i n th e HR, S e p te m b e r 24> 1953* A i d i t, " P e r k u a t K edudukan R e p u b lik.’ T ugas Pokok I n d o n e s i a d i t a h u n D a ta n g ” ( S t r e n g th e n th e P o s i t i o n R e p u b lic.’ The B a s ic T a sk o f th e I n d o n e s ia n P e o p le N ex t Y e a r ), P K I-B, D ecem ber 31» 1953> p.2 0 2. === [PDF page 541] === c o n g r e s s i n M arch 1954 t h a t t h e g o v ern m en t was n o t r e a l l y t o b la m e f o r eco n o m ic c o n d i t i o n s b e c a u s e i t h a d t o b e a r t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e d i s a s t e r o u s econom ic an d f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s o f th e H a t t a, N a t s i r a n d Sukim an g o v e rn m e n ts a s w e l l a s o f th e PS I F in a n c e M i n i s t e r i n th e W ilopo c a b in e t. A t th e same tim e a s d e f e n d in g and c o m p lim e n tin g th e g o v e rn m e n t, h o w e v e r, PKI p r e s e n t e d th e g o v ern m en t w i t h t e n dem ands t o b e m et d u r in g 1954*2 an d th e P a r t y c o n g re s s o f M arch 1954 p u t f o rw a rd tw e lv e dem ands t o be met b y th e g o v e rn m e n t i f i t w ish e d t o c o n tin u e t o r e c e i v e com m unist s u p p o r t.3 The PKI l e a d e r s d i d n o t e x p e c t th e g o v e rn m e n t t o t a k e t h e dem ands to o s e r i o u s l y b e c a u s e, f i r s t l y, th e g o v e rn m e n t was n o t c a p a b le o f im p le m e n tin g them f u l l y, a n d, s e c o n d ly, i f i t c o u ld hav e im p le m e n te d them th e e co n o m ic s i t u a t i o n w ould h av e b e e n im p ro v ed a n d r e a l o r p o t e n t i a l d is c o n te n t red u c ed. The dem ands w ere f o r p o p u l a r c o n s u m p tio n, t o show t h a t t h e P a r t y had th e i n t e r e s t s o f th e p e o p le a t h e a r t, and t o show t h a t th e A i d i t, D ja la n ke D e m o k ra si, p.2 8. A id it, " P e r k u a t K ed u d u k an ", PK I-B, D ecem ber 3 1, 1953* PK I, P ro g ram PKI ( P K I 's P ro gram m e), D j a k a r t a, 1954> === [PDF page 542] === 525 government was incapable of solving the major problems facing the country. During February 1954» Masjumi made a show of strength in Djakarta that was countered by joint PKI-FNI action. Masjumi announced that it would hold a demonstration on the 13th to demand a change in the recently-appointed Djakarta Raja election commission, which included only one Masjumi member. Nine political parties, including PKI, PNI, NU, PSII and Perti, and eight mass organi zations immediately issued a statement declaring Masjumi*s intention to be the removal of PNI's mayor and the creation of an all-Masjumi election commission.12 13th Masjumi held a rally attended by 30,000. On the One week later, 27 parties and mass organizations combined to hold a giant rally, addressed by speakers from PKI, PNI, NU and Perti, and attended by 250,000. The rally adopted a resolution which rejected MasjumiTs demand and called for alterations in the Masjumi-dominated city council. Masjumi in turn replied with a rally of half a million people on the following day, and used it to attack what were considered insults to Islam made by nationalist leaders. HR, February 12, 1954* HR, February 19 and 22, 1954* === [PDF page 543] === 520 An army captain was killed during the second Masjumi rally, which led PKI to emit loud cries of horror and to request that the government ban all Masjumi demonstrations. The anti-Masjumi parties could not compete with Masjumi's crowd-raising, but on April 12 a joint delegation, including PKI and PNI representatives, visited the Minister of Internal Affairs to discuss the matter of changing the composition of the Djakarta city council. The government obliged by increasing the number of council members from 25 to 60 on June 18, thus giving large representation to the non-Masjumi groups. At some time around the beginning of June 1954, a Committee for Cooperation between Parties and Organi zations in Djakarta was established, probably on the basis of the joint anti-Masjumi actions. It contained a broad range of parties and mass organizations, including all government parties plus PKI, but excluding Masjumi and PSI.3 The committee was active in demanding stern measures against the Dutch, the unilateral abrogation of the Indonesia-Netherlands Union, and the immediate creation of a province of West Irian.^ Boyd Compton PKI-B, March 1954» pp.28-9. HR, April 13, 1954. TI, June 23, 1954. TI, July 5, 1954. === [PDF page 544] === 527 r e p o r t e d t h a t l o c a l p a r t y c h i e f s i n o t h e r c i t i e s w ere fo rc e d by t h e i r D ja k a rta h e a d q u a rte rs to e s t a b l is h s i m i l a r c o m m itte e s, b u t t h a t i n a t l e a s t S u ra b a ja th e l o c a l c o m m itte e s o o n d i s a p p e a r e d a m i d s t d i s p u t e s b e tw e e n m em bers. I n f o r m a l c o o p e r a t i o n c o n t i n u e d where t h e f o r m a l c o m m itte e s d i s a p p e a r e d, and t o o k t h e form o f j o i n t m a n i f e s t o s, s t a t e m e n t s and a few mass m e e t i n g s. M eanw hile t h e cam p aig n f o r t h e 1955 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s was u n d e r w ay. In i t s e l e c t i o n m a n ife s to, en d o rsed i n t h e M arch 1954 c o n g r e s s, PKI e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e d i t s s e lf-e ffa c in g frie n d lin e ss to w a rd s t h e p a r t i e s o f t h e ’m id d le f o r c e * b y c a l l i n g on t h e e l e c t o r s ’t o v o t e f o r PKI a n d t h e o t h e r d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s, ’ a n d n o t m e r e ly f o r PK I.2 On May 18, 1954» A i d i t u r g e d a l l d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s who w ere c o n v in c e d o f t h e n e e d t o d e f e a t M asjum iPS I i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s t o e i t h e r p o o l t h e i r s u r p l u s v o t e s o r a g r e e n o t t o a t t a c k one a n o t h e r d u r i n g th e c a m p a ig n.^ No v o t e - p o o l i n g was a r r a n g e d b e tw e e n PKI a n d Boyd R. Com pton, I n d o n e s i a n Communism: F r i e n d s and A l l i e s, A m e ric an U n i v e r s i t i e s ’ F i e l d S t a f f R e p o r t, New Y ork, 1 9 5 5 5 p p. 6 - 7. PKI, M a n ife s P e m il i h a n Umum PKI ( P K I ’s G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o ), D j a k a r t a, 1954, p. 2 0. PK I-B, May 1954, p. 5 5. U nder t h e v e r s i o n o f p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a s p r a c t i s e d i n t h e 1955 e l e c t i o n s, two o r more p a r t i e s, o r g a n i z a t i o n s o r in d iv id u a l c a n d id a te s c o u ld, in each e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t, p ool t h e i r s u r p lu s v o te s a f t e r th e f i r s t d i s t r i b u t i o n o f se a ts. === [PDF page 545] === rr?o^ oo a n y o t h e r m a j o r p a r t y, b u t b y an u n s p o k e n a g r e e m e n t none o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t p a r t i e s o r PKI e n g a g e d i n m u t u a l r e c r i m i n a t i o n d u rin g th e cam paign. T h e i r c o m b in ed f i r e was a im ed e s p e c i a l l y a t M a sju m i, and e v e n NU j o i n e d i n t h e a t t a c k on i t s f e l l o w Moslem p a r t y. I n O c t o b e r 1954 t h e A l i c a b i n e t was t h r e a t e n e d by d isse n sio n w ith in i t s own r a n k s. On O c t o b e r 17 t h e m i n o r n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y PIR c a l l e d f o r t h e r e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e c a b i n e t, a n d PIR s p l i t i n t o a n o p p o s i t i o n f a c t i o n l e d b y what PKI was a l r e a d y c a l l i n g ’ t h e T a d j u d d i n Noor c l i q u e, 1 a n d a p r o - g o v e r n m e n t f a c t i o n l e d b y D e p u ty Prime M i n i s t e r W ongso negoro. In th e r e s u l t a n t c a b in e t r e s h u f f l e, P e r t i e n te r e d th e governm ent. S u k a r n o worked h a r d t o drum up s u p p o r t f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t, p e r s u a d e d t h e w a v e r i n g P S I I l e a d e r s t o k e e p i n l i n e, and c a l l e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’s o p p o n e n t s t r a i t o r s. PKI r e a c t e d b y d e n o u n c i n g t h e PIR a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t group as ’f u l l y s u p p o r t e d b y t h e D u t c h an d A m e ric an im p erialists, t h e Kuom inta ng a n d t h e i r a c c o m p l i c e s, ’ b y a s s u r i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e P a r t y ’s s u p p o r t, an d b y t h r e a t e n i n g t h a t i f t h e g o v e r n m e n t f e l l PKI would demand F o r a c c o u n t s o f t h e s p l i t i n PIR, s e e F e i t h, ’’I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s ”, p p. 6 2 9 - 3 0; an d J u s t u s M a r i a v an d e r K r o e f, I n d o n e s i a i n t h e Modern W o r l d, p a r t I I, B a ndung, 1956, [Unreadable] === [PDF page 546] === 52D participation in the next cabinet. When Masjumi introduced a motion of no confidence in the government*s policy to liberate West Irian, Aidit in parliament declared that if a Masjumi-PSI cabinet were to replace that of Ali, then the general elections would be held according to procedures applied by Bao Dai, Syngman Rhee, Zahedi and Mohammed Ali. Aidit's words were no mere rhetoric as far as PKI was concerned. The memory was still fresh of the August 1951 arrests and of Sukiman's proposal for a stern anti-communist policy, while the Anti-Communist Front, sponsored by a wing of Masjumi, was leading a strenuous anti-communist campaign. Fortunately for both PNI and PKI, the Masjumi motion was defeated on December 14 by 115 votes to 92 with 6 abstentions. After the split in PIR, total government support in parliament was only 119 votes, including 17 PKI, 2 each of SOBSI and BTI, and 9 Progressives, including several fellow-travellers; the opposition held 101 votes; and the Murba party, with 4 votes, remained neutral.^ Thus, from October 1954 the Ali cabinet was directly dependent on communist votes. D.N. Aidit, "For Broad Unity of All National Forces in Indonesia", FALP, December 31, 1954» p.4; HR, October 15, 18 and 20, 195^7 [Unreadable] TI, October 29, 1954* === [PDF page 547] === This did not give PKI a special lever because PNI was fully aware that PKI needed the cabinet in order to prevent a possible Masjumi-led, anti-communist alterna tive; but it did demonstrate to PNI the benefits of cooperation with the communists. The PSI newspaper "Pedoman" reported that the PKI central committee meeting of November 8 to 10, 1954 decided to sound out Ali as to the possibility of the Party*s receiving the post of Minister of Agrarian Affairs,-* but nothing further was heard of this. As the PNI leaders found it increasingly necessary to appeal to anti-Dutch feeling as a means of winning support and diverting attention from their obvious failures in the economic field, joint West Irian action committees were established throughout Indonesia and included PNI, PKI and other political parties and mass organizations, though usually excluding Masjumi and PSI. The first major action by one of the committees was in Djakarta where a mass demonstration of over half a million people was organized on December 5> 1 9 5 4. speakers included two communists. Reported in TI, November 17> 1954« HR, D ecem ber 1 2, 1954# The === [PDF page 548] === At the beginning of May 1955, PKI and SOBSI proved of service to the government by breaking a strike of the PSI-led KBSI trade union federation. The strike began in Djakarta on May 7 as a protest against deteriorating economic conditions, the strike as PKI and SOBSI leaders denounced 'reactionary, anti-worker,' and as 'a sabotage effort,' and claimed it was part of the imperialist plot to overthrow the Republic,*12 SOBSI used its members as strike-breakers, and the strike collapsed. The end of the Ali cabinet was approaching, not because of opposition within parliament but because of unrest within the army leadership at the government's 'interference' in army affairs. In brief, many high army officers were becoming increasingly concerned at the application of the political spoils system to the army. Opposition crystallized especially against the Minister of Defence, Iwa Kusumasumantri, a close friend of both Sukarno and the communists. When the army chief of staff HR, May 9 and 11, 1955; Buletin SOBSI, May 15, 1955, For accounts of what became known as 'the June 27 affair', see Robert J. Myers, ’’The Development of the Indonesian Socialist Party” (Chicago University, Ph.D. thesis, 1959), pp.144-52; and Justus Maria van der Kroef, ’’The Place of the Army in Indonesian Politics”, Eastern World, January 1957, vol.XI, no.1, p,15» === [PDF page 549] === coo vJ Ci resigned, Iwa did not consult the army but appointed a Colonel Bambang Utojo as the new chief. Bambang Utojo was considered a partisan of PNI and Sukarno, and the other officers did not believe him to be professionally qualified for the highest post in the army. PKI welcomed the appointment under the headline ’'Tactics of the '17th Octoberists' Again Defeated,” and the Party was particularly relieved because the acting chief of staff, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, was an adamant anti communist. The central army leadership boycotted the installation of Bambang Utojo on June 27> 1955# and refused to recognize his appointment. Iwa summoned Lubis to his office, Lubis refused to go. Iwa dismissed him, Lubis refused to accept dismissal, and the army regional commanders backed Lubis despite strong pressure from Sukarno to accept Utojo. In the midst of the events PKI proposed disciplinary measures against the insubordinate officers, and called on the people to give ’the greatest possible assistance’ to the government ’in order to remove the danger of military dictatorship, the danger of fascism.’ Party members and sympathizers were mobilized to state their conviction of the sagacity HR, June 22, 1955. HR, June 30, 1955. === [PDF page 550] === 533 o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t 's a p p o in t m e n t o f Bamhang U t o j o a s army c h ie f o f s ta f f. On J u l y 18 S u k a rn o l e f t on a p i l g r i m a g e t o Mecca, a n d one o f t h e c a b i n e t ' s c h i e f p r o p s was rem oved. becam e c l e a r t h a t t h e army l e a d e r s w o u ld r e j e c t any c o m p ro m ise w i t h t h e c a b i n e t, i n c l u d i n g t h e r e s i g n a t i o n o f Iwa who h a d d e p a r t e d f o r Mecca w i t h th e p r e s i d e n t. F i r s t t h e m in o r n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y P a r i n d r a and t h e n NU d e c i d e d t h a t t h e c a b i n e t s h o u l d r e s i g n - w h ic h i t d i d on J u ly 24. The f i r s t A l i c a b i n e t h a d s t a y e d i n pow er f o r o v e r two y e a r s, a r e c o r d f o r I n d o n e s i a. r e a p e d fro m i t s The b e n e f i t s PKI a p p a r e n tly s e l f l e s s su p p o rt f o r th e c a b i n e t i n g e n e r a l and PNI i n p a r t i c u l a r were c o n s i d e r a b l e. F irst, t h e g o v e rn m e n t h a d p e r m i t t e d PKI a n d i t s mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o work w i t h a minimum o f g o v ern m en t r e s t r i c t i o n s and o b s t r u c t i o n. I t was d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f th e A li c a b i n e t t h a t th e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p d ev elo p ed w hat was t h e l a r g e s t n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n I n d o n e s i a: PKI grew from a b o u t 1 3 0,0 0 0 members t o a lm o s t one m i l l i o n; SOBSI c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s o rg a n iz a tio n, th e HR, J u ly 12, 1955. In Septem ber 1953» th e governm ent gave a b o o s t to th e SOBSI e s t a t e w o r k e rs' u n io n by s u b m ittin g to a s t r i k e backed demand f o r a change in a m ajor award by th e c e n t r a l la b o u r d is p u t e s a r b i t r a t i o n and c o n c i l i a t i o n co m m ittee. === [PDF page 551] === communist-led peasant organizations fused, and their claimed membership increased from about 400,000 to about 3i millions; Pemuda Rakjat*s claimed membership rose from less than 70,000 to about 500,000; and Gerwani claimed that its membership rose from about 43>000 to about 400,000. Second, the advantages of cooperation between nationalists and communists was demonstrated to an important section of PNI, and also to Sukarno. Third, cooperation with the nationalists permitted PKI to regain its nationalist respectability, to promenade alongside prominent nationalists in campaigns demanding militant action against Dutch imperialism. Fourth, an unstated agreement was reached between PKI and the government parties not to attack one another during the election campaign - which made the communists* task of winning mass support much easier. Fifth, communist support of the Ali cabinet permitted the cabinet to remain in office for many months longer than it would otherwise have done, and each month of the PNI-led cabinet which excluded Masjumi increased the rift between those two parties. This was especially so when the cabinet depended directly upon PKI votes. Sixth, communist support permitted the cabinet to remain in office longer, and so allowed PNI to consolidate its hold === [PDF page 552] === u O J over the civil service, particularly over the rural administrative service, with which it was to emerge as the largest single party in the September and December 1955 general elections. This meant that the future parliamentary balance was tipped away from Masjumi. Seventh, PKI support of the government gave the Party full freedom to attack the anti-communists, especially Masjumi and PSI, with little fear of government action against the attacks.' On the other hand, the government in September 1953 banned demonstrations by anti-communists to celebrate the outbreak of the Madiun rebellion. The PSI leader Sjahrir has suggested that the communists supported the Ali cabinet ’because they believed it would lead the country into a blind alley more quickly than any other.* Certainly the period of the Ali cabinet was marked by extensive corruption, inflation, and general decline in standards of living. Aidit was belatedly brought to court at the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 for defaming Hatta in a statement on the Madiun rebellion. A three-months suspended gaol sentence was finally given, and the Party was not prevented from publishing Aidit’s defence which repeated and embellished the original defamation. Sutan Sjahrir, "Problems the Country Faces", in "Perspective of Indonesia", a supplement to Atlantic Monthly, June 1956, p.24* === [PDF page 553] === 533 But what might he called the economic incapacity of the groups in the Ali cabinet was merely a fortunate coincidence for PKI, who chose to support them primarily because they were less hostile to PKI and more hostile to Western colonialism than Masjurai and PSI. NU had taken its place on the political scene by joining the Ali cabinet. Because the NU leaders were prepared to take opposite sides to Masjumi, and showed their willingness to cooperate with any political group as long as they felt cooperation could benefit themselves their party or their Islamic principles, the Aidit leader ship extended a hand of friendship. Early in September 1954, for example, PKI sent warm greetings to the NU congress.-1 The "Harian Rakjat" editorials always included NU among the 1democratic parties.! As soon as the Ali cabinet resigned, PKI proposed that instead of a completely new cabinet there should be a reshuffled Ali cabinet entrusted with carrying out the elections and opening new discussions with the army leadership. Vice-President Hatta, acting in Sukarno*s absence, appointed three formateurs on August 1, i955 2 Wilopo, Sukiman, and Assaat, an independent politician HR, September 9, 1954. HR, July 27, 1955. === [PDF page 554] === closely linked with Masjumi and PSI. They failed to reach agreement, and on August 3, Hatta appointed Burhanudin Harahap of Masjumi as formateur. PKI thereupon mobilized the Party and its mass organizations to flood the head of state with petitions and telegrams demanding the preservation of parliamentary democracy and rejecting a Masjumi-led government. On August 7» Aidit proposed an all-party cabinet, though one not led by Masjumi, that could settle the dispute with the army and carry out *truly free and honest elections. However, Harahap succeeded in forming a cabinet, which was installed on August 12, 1955 and included members of NU, PSII, PSI, and four smaller parties as well as Masjumi. PNI and PKI moved into the opposition. Aidit declared that Masjumi and PSI ’collaborate with the federalists, the hirelings of the Dutch imperialists,’ and that this reactionary combination: threatens the democracy and unity of the Indonesian Republic. At the bidding of the Dutch imperialists, these parties are inciting the Darul Islam and other terrorist gangs to anti-democratic activities. [Unreadable] D.N. Aidit, ’'The General Elections and the Tasks of the Indonesian Communist Party”, P A L P, September 9, 1955> === [PDF page 555] === 533 B u t A i d i t was w ary o f o f f e n d i n g t h o s e p a r t i e s o t h e r t h a n M asjum i a n d PS I w h ich w ere i n t h e g o v e rn m e n t. th e r e f o r e e x p la in e d: The CPI /C om m unist P a r t y o f I n d o n e s i a / h o l d s, h o w e v e r, t h a t t h e s e f a c t s do n o t d e t r a c t from th e m e rits o f c e r t a i n m in is te r s o f th e c a b in e t who b e l o n g t o t h e p a r t i e s t h a t f o r m e r l y b e l o n g e d t o t h e A l i S a s t r o a m i d j o j o g o v e rn m e n t a n d t h a t show ed good w i l l. In k e ep in g w ith i t s p o l i c y o f s e l e c t i v e a t t a c k s on t h e g o v e r n m e n t, PKI c r i t i c i z e d t h e H a ra h a p c a b i n e t f o r its f i n a n c i a l an d eco n o m ic p o l i c y, i t s d e f e n c e p o l i c y a n d its f o r e i g n p o l ic y - b e c a u se th e m in i s t e r s in charge o f t h o s e p o l i c i e s w ere members o f M asjum i, PS I o r th e Roman C a th o lic P a rty, E s p e c i a l l y th e q u e s tio n o f r i s i n g p r i c e s, n o t a new phenom enon i n I n d o n e s i a, was u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e l i f e o f t h e c a b i n e t t o w in b r o a d s u p p o r t and t o e m b a r r a s s t h e g o v e r n m e n t. When t h e new c a b i n e t b e g a n t o t a k e a c t i v e s t e p s t o b r i n g t o t r i a l t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e m ost b l a t a n t e x a m p le s o f c o r r u p t i o n u n d e r t h e p r e v i o u s c a b i n e t, PKI d is p la y e d th e v a lu e o f i t s f r i e n d s h i p t o th e n a t i o n a l i s t s. I n s t e a d o f p r a i s i n g th e a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n d r i v e, PKI a tta c k e d i t. th at S a k ir m a n, s p e a k i n g i n p a r l i a m e n t, d e c l a r e d ’To com bat c o r r u p t i o n i n a d i s h o n e s t way i s t o c re a te g re a te r c o r r u p tio n.’ HR, A u g u st 2 2, 1955« He d e f e n d e d D jody === [PDF page 556] === 539 Gondokusumo, th e PRN M in is te r o f J u s t i c e i n th e A li c a b i n e t, who was th e f i r s t prom inent p e r so n b rou gh t to a c c o u n t, f o r h i s cou rage i n f i g h t i n g th e ‘Kuomintang p l o t 12 and r e a c t io n a r y e le m e n ts in h i s m in is t r y. "Harian R a k ja t", i n an e d i t o r i a l, commented t h a t th e a n t i c o r r u p t io n s lo g a n c o u ld be u sed as a f i r s t s t e p tow ards f a s c i s t p o w er, as w it n e s s th e D im itro v c a s e i n H it l e r * s Germany. Such d e fe n c e o f th e n o t o r i o u s l y c o r r u p t must have r a i s e d d o u b ts among th e l e s s p o l i t i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a te d P a r ty members, b u t A id it rem inded them t h a t ‘In p u r s u in g th e u n it y p o l i c y we must n o t do a n y th in g s tr a n g e o r deform ed i n the e y e s o f th o s e who sh o u ld u n i t e w ith In o th e r w ord s, u n it y was param ount, and, i f n e c e s s a r y, e v e n c o r r u p tio n had t o be e x c u s e d. Two i s s u e s t i e d PKI and FNI c l o s e r t o g e t h e r: th e q u e s t io n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s w ith th e D u tch, and, more im p o r t a n t ly, th e q u e s t io n o f f o r c in g th e governm ent to r e s ig n on ce th e p r o v i s i o n a l r e s u l t s o f th e Septem ber 1955 p a r lia m e n ta r y e l e c t i o n s were known. In December th e governm ent opened n e g o t i a t i o n s w ith th e N e th e r la n d s in o r d e r t o s e t t l e p e a c e f u l l y th e r e tu r n HR, A ugust 2 3, 195 5. D.N. A i d i t, P ertahan kan R ep u b lik P rok lam asi 1945» (D efen d th e 1945 P ro c la m a tio n R e p u b l i c! ), D ja k a r ta, 1955» P.31. === [PDF page 557] === 540 o f W est I r i a n, th e a b r o g a t i o n o f th e I n d o n e s i a N e t h e r l a n d s U n io n, a n d a ch an g e i n th e te rm s o f th e Round T a b le C o n fe re n c e a g re e m e n t. NU an d t h e n PSI I o b j e c t e d t o th e n e g o t i a t i o n s, and on J a n u a r y 1 8, 1956, PSI I w ith d re w from th e g o v e rn m e n t. PN I, PKI and PSI I d e m o n s tr a te d t h e i r j o i n t, m i l i t a n t o p p o s i t i o n t o i m p e r i a l i s m i n g e n e r a l an d D u tc h im p e r ia l is m i n p a r t i c u l a r by o r g a n iz in g a g ia n t a n t i - c o l o n i a l r a l l y in D ja k a rta on J a n u a r y 15, 1956. The s p e a k e r s a t th e r a l l y w ere A l i S a s t r o a m i d j o j o, A i d i t and a P S II l e a d e r, an d th e r a l l y a l s o c a l l e d f o r a c a r e t a k e r g o v e rn m e n t to r e p l a c e th e H a ra h a p c a b i n e t. The p r o v i s i o n a l r e s u l t s o f th e S e p te m b e r 1955 p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s w ere known b y th e f i r s t week i n O c to b e r 1955* A i d i t c a l l e d f o r th e f o r m a tio n o f a n a t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n g o v e rn m e n t t h a t w o u ld be l e d b y PNI a n d NU, w ould a l s o i n c l u d e PK I, M asju m i, P S I I, th e P r o te s ta n t P a rty 'a s w e ll a s o t h e r p a r t i e s and g r o u p s, ' a n d w ould p u rs u e th e c a b in e t. 'a n t i - c o l o n i a l p o lic y * o f th e A li On November 14, PN I, PKI an d some s m a l l e r g ro u p s b e g a n a b o y c o t t o f p a r l i a m e n t. N ext d a y, h o w e v e r, th e g o v e rn m e n t s u c c e e d e d i n r e c e i v i n g s e v e n t e e n v o te s more th a n t h e n e c e s s a r y quorum, and on th e 1 7 th th e HR, O c to b e r 11, 19 5 5. === [PDF page 558] === 544 g o v e rn m e n t p a r t i e s v o te d t o a d v a n c e th e d a t e o f th e p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e c e s s from D ecem ber 10 t o November 2 1. The g o v e rn m e n t c o n ti n u e d i n o f f i c e, th o u g h PKI p o i n t e d o u t t h a t o n ly 83 o f t h e g o v e r n m e n ts v o t e s w ere v a l i d a s t h e r e s t came fro m g ro u p s and i n d i v i d u a l s who h ad r e c e i v e d no p o p u l a r s u p p o r t i n th e e l e c t i o n s. When PNI show ed no r e a d i n e s s to c o n s i d e r PKI f o r i n c l u s i o n i n th e n e x t c a b i n e t, 2 PKI c h a n g e d i t s p r o p o s a l s. On N ovem ber 3 0, 1955 A i d i t s t a t e d t h a t b e c a u s e M asjum i h a d r e j e c t e d t h e id e a o f a n a l l - p a r t y c a b i n e t, PKI now p r o p o s e d a c a b i n e t o f P N I, NU, P S II a n d P e r t i w ith co m m u n ist s u p p o r t b u t n o t p a r t i c i p a t i o n. ^ g iv e, he s a id, ' r e a l and c r i t i c a l * PKI w ould s u p p o rt f o r such a c a b i n e t i f i t s program m e was a c c e p t a b l e. E a r l y i n 1 9 5 6, th r o u g h o u t th e c o u n t r y j o i n t PN I-PKI m e e tin g s w ere h e l d and j o i n t d e l e g a t i o n s fo rm ed t o demand a t r a n s i t i o n a l c a b i n e t whose c o m p o s itio n was more i n l i n e w ith t h e e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s. On F e b r u a r y 1 6, P N I, NU, P S I I a n d P e r t i t a b l e d in p a r l i a m e n t a j o i n t m o tio n o f no HR, November 16, 1955« S a rm id i M a n g u n sa rk o ro, PNI g e n e r a l c h a irm a n, f o r exam ple, on J a n u a r y 7> 1956 r e j e c t e d t h e i d e a o f PKI p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n th e n e x t c a b i n e t, b u t s a i d t h a t PKI s u p p o r t was p o s s i b l e; T I, J a n u a r y 9, 1956. HR, D ecem ber 3> 1955 === [PDF page 559] === confidence in the government, and on the 27th PNI and NU issued an ultimatum to Masjumi that unless the cabinet resigned by March 2, then both parties would refuse to consider future cooperation with Masjumi* When the official announcement was made, on March 1, of the distribution of seats according to the September 1955 elections, 68 members of parliament resigned - including those from PNI, PKI, NU and PSII. Two days later the cabinet returned its mandate. The general elections had not led to a simplification in the number of parties, and after the new distribution of parliamentary seats the two largest parties combined still could not command a majority. Multi-party coalition government was still necessary. The PKI leaders expressed their relief at the fall of the *reactionary * Harahap cabinet, and again proposed an improved version of the Ali cabinet in which neither PKI nor Masjumi would participate. 'But if Masjumi must sit in it, then so also must PKI in order to The distribution of seats in the new, elected parliament was: PNI - 57, Masjumi - 57, NU - 45, PKI - 39, PSII - 8, Protestant Party - 8, Roman Catholic Party - 6, PSI - 5, IPKI - 4, Perti - 4, seventeen small parties - 23, and one individual. HR, March 7, 1956 === [PDF page 560] === counterbalance Masjumi policy.’ The PNI leaders, reportedly under pressure from NU, whose representation in parliament had increased from 8 to 45» and presumably afraid that Masjumi and NU together with such as the Protestant and Roman Catholic parties, IPKI, and several smaller groups, might form a cabinet to the exclusion of themselves, negotiated with Masjumi for a broad coalition cabinet. Ali Sastroamidjojo as formateur presented his proposed cabinet to Sukarno for ratification on March 16, but the president delayed ratification for four days because, according to "Harian Rakjat", he was dissatis fied with the composition and wanted to have included either Professor Purbodiningrat, a well-known fellowtraveller, or Sadjarwo, who for many years was a member of the BTI leadership - which Masjumi refused. The PKI politbureau on March 18 welcomed Ali as formateur and the cabinet programme he put forward, but criticized the proposed inclusion of Masjumi and the weak attitude taken by PNI and NU towards Masjumi. The politbureau approved Sukarno’s hesitation over ratifying the proposed cabinet, and called on ’the democratic parties* to improve its composition. Peith reports that PKI HR, March 21, 1956 HR, March 19, 1956. === [PDF page 561] === tried to have Purbodiningrat, Sadjarwo or the procommunist Hanafi included in the cabinet. This sounds plausible as none of the three was openly a PKI member, and would therefore not raise violent objections from the non-Masjumi parties, while any of the three might have served as a listening post in the cabinet, ready to warn the Party of any impending government repression, Ali*s proposed cabinet was finally installed, unaltered, on March 24, 1956. It consisted of five PNI members, including Prime Minister Ali also in charge of the Ministry of Defence, five Masjumi members, five NU, two Protestant Party, two PSII, two Roman Catholic Party, one IPKI, one Perti, and one non-party, PKI could do no more than offer critical support, for opposition might have meant forfeiting the goodwill of PNI in particular, and might also have given Masjumi the opportunity to persuade the rest of the cabinet to pursue an anti communist policy. The Approach to Sukarno The second Ali cabinet, which was to return its mandate on March 14» 1957, proved to be a turning point in Indonesian politics. Pour major political develop- Peith, ’’Indonesian Politics”, p.771 === [PDF page 562] === 545 ments occurred that forced the Aidit leadership to seek a basic alliance with Sukarno rather than with PNI. The first development was the drastic decline in the prestige of the parliamentary system and of political parties in general. When the second Ali cabinet took office, the political parties were still the most important and decisive political forces. Many deficiencies in the actual practice of parliamentary democracy were recognized - for example, widespread corruption and the spoils system, the failure to promote economic development, and frequent cabinet changes due to disputes between and within the many parties - but hopes had been pinned on the general elections as a means of somehow removing them. Then, after the new cabinet was installed, and the new parliament two days later, nothing seemed to have changed. There were still the squabbling parties, the same old faces in the cabinet, the same economic gloom. As a result, there developed among the politically conscious Indonesians a widespread feeling that the parliamentary system - *free fight liberalism* as Sukarno was to call it - had failed and must be replaced. The political parties did little to defend the parliamentary system. The second major political development was closely related to the first. As the political parties virtually === [PDF page 563] === surrendered their authority and admitted their inability to solve Indonesia's economic and political problems, two extra-parliamentary political forces rose to fill the power vacuum: Sukarno and the army. By the time the Ali cabinet resigned, these two political forces dwarfed the parties. The third development was the removal from the central government of the last representatives of what PKI calls the reactionary force, which included Hatta, Masjumi and PSI. After Sukarno had made it plain that he no longer wanted Hatta as vice-president, Hatta resigned at midnight on November 30, 1956. Masjumi withdrew from the cabinet on January 9, 1957* With the removal from the central government of Hatta and Masjumi, who by and large represented much of the population outside Java, and the implacable opposition of Sukarno (and therefore PNI) and PKI to their return, important segments of the population of the outer islands came to feel increasingly that the government in Djakarta in no way represented their interests. This feeling was one of the factors which led many of the leaders of the outer islands to reject, with varying degrees of politeness, the authority of the central government. The fourth development, also closely related to the others, was a political realignment by Sukarno. Until === [PDF page 564] === the September 1955 elections, Sukarno had identified himself closely with the party he had helped establish, PNI. Then, at first hesitantly, in 1955 he began to seek the alliance of PKI. Two factors help explain his leaning towards the communists. First, Sukarno felt that the hegemony of the political parties was drawing to a close, and he wished to diminish his identification with what had proved to be a corrupt, basically conservative, and clearly incompetent PNI. Sukarno may have felt that PKI was the only party able and willing to help him towards his major goal, ’the completion of the revolution’. What Sukarno conceives as the completion of the revolution is difficult to ascertain, but it includes maintaining the people in a state of nationalist fervour through mass actions towards the elimination of all imperialist (that is, Western) economic, cultural and political power in Indonesia. And PKI, which combined a vociferous anti colonialism with an efficient organizational network, was the only party that could be of much assistance to him. Second, particularly during the period of the second Ali cabinet when the end of parliamentary democracy was in sight, Sukarno sought allies to help counterbalance the other emerging political power, the army, which he viewed with suspicion as it included many persons who === [PDF page 565] === would be glad to oust him, PNI, despite rare floutings of his wishes, was so dependent upon him for its mass support and his backing in political manoeuvres that he was sure it would stand by him whatever happened. PNI was not strong enough to counter Masjumi and the army, Sukarno sought the alliance of the largest and best-organized party, PKI. PKI could collect enormous crowds for his speeches, and so apparently demonstrate to the army his great popularity and strength. The threat of bringing PKI into the cabinet or other governmental positions could also force concessions from the army. Sukarno reportedly believes that the growth of PKI can only add to his own strength, and that if the PKI leaders became truculent he could remove their mass support with one speech, as he did in September 1948. The changing political situation created serious tactical problems for the Aidit leadership. As will be seen, PKI worked hard to assist the second Ali cabinet and thus to save parliamentary democracy or at least stave off its demise. But when it was clear that the regime would be drastically overhauled, PKI was forced to adapt its basic national united front policy to the special circumstances of a political situation in which the role of parliament would be greatly reduced, and in which the chief power centres would be the army on the === [PDF page 566] === one hand and Sukarno on the other. The old parliamentary alliance might still serve a useful purpose, but a new alliance obviously had to be established with either the army or Sukarno in order to safeguard the existence of the Party. Within the army there arose loud voices advocating the abolition of all parties, and many prominent officers, both in the central command and in the regions, were outspokenly anti-communist. Therefore the PKI leaders, in private reluctantly, but in public eagerly, accepted Sukarno’s proffered hand. Alliance with Sukarno had clear drawbacks. enabled him to consolidate his own power and proceed towards the creation of a one-man dictatorship or an oligarchy; but there was no alternative. The alliance with him would, however, have its advantages too. Not least, it would strengthen Sukarno’s hand in his efforts to prevent a military dictatorship. The PKI leaders must also have presumed that the president’s balancing game with the army and other enemies meant that in the last resort he would have to retain those political parties that provided him with support. If he eliminated them he would tilt the balance in favour of his extra-parliamentary political rivals. Another advantage was that the identification of PKI with Sukarno would greatly enhance the Party’s popular prestige and === [PDF page 567] === s u p p o r t, w h i l e h i s i n f l u e n c e on PNI and NU w ould p r e v e n t t h o s e p a r t i e s from t a k i n g a n a n t i - c o m m u n i s t l i n e. F u r t h e r m o r e, S u k a rn o was p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g n a t i o n a l i s t f e r v o u r, n o t w i t h t h e econom ic d e v e lo p m e n t t h a t p o s s i b l y c o u l d h av e removed much o f t h e b a s i s o f com m unist s u p p o r t. The r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e tw e e n PKI a n d S u k a rn o was n o t s u d d e n, b u t was t h e r e s u l t o f d e v e lo p m e n ts o v e r s e v e r a l y ears. S t r o n g a t t a c k s on S u k a rn o h a d c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g t h e f i r s t few m onths a f t e r t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p g a i n e d c o n t r o l o f PKI. T hen, a s t h e new form o f t h e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t was f o r m u l a t e d and im p le m e n te d, t h e a t t a c k s on him were h a l t e d when i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t he was a p o p u l a r n a t i o n a l i s t sym bol and t h a t he was o p p o s e d t o Masjumi and P S I, t h e m ost a r d e n t a n t i - c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s. A lim in, a t a c erem o n y on May 25» 1952 t o c e l e b r a t e t h e f o u n d i n g o f PKI, e v en l e d c h e e r s f o r S t a l i n, Mao T s e - t u n g Kim I I Sung and... S ukarno. I n h i s A u g u s t 17 s p e e c h i n 1952, S u k a r n o, much t o P K I 's d e l i g h t, p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e t r a n s f e r o f s o v e r e i g n t y was n e i t h e r c o m p le te n o r u n c o n d i t i o n a l, a n d t h a t t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m i n I n d o n e s i a was a s See a b o v e, p. 4 9 0. HR, May 2 6, 1952 === [PDF page 568] === y e t u n finished. affair, At t h e t i m e o f t h e O c t o b e r 17, 1952 Sukarno proved h i s o p p o s i t i o n to m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p and was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e r e m o v a l o f PSI members and s y m p a t h i z e r s fro m i m p o r t a n t p o s t s i n t h e arm y a n d t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n c e. still B u t, w i t h t h e memory f r e s h i n t h e i r minds o f S u k a r n o ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e a n t i - c o m m u n i s t s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e Madiun r e b e l l i o n and d u r i n g t h e Sukiman c a b i n e t, t h e PKI l e a d e r s s t i l l c o u l d n o t r e g a r d him a s a t r u e p o l i t i c a l a l l y * I n November 1952 he was c a t e g o r i z e d w i t h t h e o l d g r o u p o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s who h a d ' c e a s e d t o b e p r o g r e s s i v e t h e moment th ey them selves o ccupied p la c e s o f le a d e r s h ip in s o c i e t y ' who d e f e n d e d t h e s t a t u s quo a n d were a f r a i d o f t h e rev o lu tio n ary fo rces, and 'who, i n g e n e r a l, c a n a t t h e m ost b e n e u t r a l i z e d, e s p e c i a l l y i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y t i m e s '. D uring th e f i r s t A li c a b i n e t, however, S u k a rn o 's a c t i o n s o p e n e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t he m ig h t become an i m p o r t a n t a l l y f o r PKI. I t was p a r t l y due t o S u k a r n o ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n t h a t Masjumi a n d PSI were e x c l u d e d from t h e c a b i n e t, and he d i d h i s u t m o s t t o d e f e n d t h e c a b i n e t, even a c c u s in g i t s opponents o f b e in g f o r e i g n a g e n t s. August 17> 1953 he o u t s p o k e n l y a t t a c k e d t h e D a r u l I s l a m " B e k e r d j a d i k a l a n g a n I n t e l e k t u i l " (Working among t h e I n t e l l e c t u a l s ), BM, O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r 1952, p p. 1 2 1 - 2. === [PDF page 569] === as an enemy of the state and people, which the government had previously been afraid to do. And from December 1954 he began to advocate national unity specifically embracing the communists. In that month he proposed a congress to include all parties and tendencies in order to create the power with which to liberate West Irian. The formation of the congress was left to the parties. Masjumi, and the two PSI Christian parties refused to cooperate from the beginning, and PNI withdrew in about July 1955» after which the congress organization fell under communist control. Although the congress never came to anything important, the very idea of such a congress, which would bring the parties together, increase nationalist, anti-Dutch agitation, and strengthen the identification of PKI with Sukarno’s charisma, was most attractive to the PKI leaders. Sukarno’s actions during the Burhanudin Harahap cabinet further increased PKI’s readiness for and decreased its fear of alliance with him. He made his opposition to the cabinet quite clear, intervened in a dispute among airforce officers in order to save the procommunist airforce chief, and prior to the Constituent Assembly elections toured the country speaking on West Irian and Pantjasila. belief that: More than this, he expressed his === [PDF page 570] === It is... illogical that the Indonesian Communist Party, whose ideology and ideals are supported by six million.people, should be excluded from the government.12 On January 15, 1956, he told the mass rally against colonialism that had been addressed by Ali, Aidit and P S I I fs Arudji Kartawinata: Now facing me is the Triple-A: Ali-ArudjiAidit... The present Triple-A is an anti imperialist Triple-A, an anti-colonial Triple-A, a Triple-A defending the people*s rights. This makes me happy, this is why my heart is alight to receive the present Triple-A. This Triple-A represents three groupings. has just been said by Mr. Dipa Nusantara Aidit, your giant meeting is indisputable proof that there can be Moslem-nationalist-communist unity. For 37 years I have worked for unity. There fore I am happy to see unity now created... How can I, who have worked for unity for 37 years, how can I say, fHeh, Indonesian people, unite, unite, but twenty per cent, sixteen millions, that is, the communists, are not [Unreadable] Can we create unity while bunging twenty per cent, sixteen millions, the communists, down a mouse-hole?^ Then, at the time of the formation of the second Ali cabinet, Sukarno, as has been seen, is said to have Boyd R. Compton, Indonesia, 1955» Institute of Current World Affairs Report, New York, 1956, p.11. H R, January 16, 1956. Sukarno presumably included in the figure of sixteen million communists the families of the six million who voted for PKI in the 1955 general elections. === [PDF page 571] === delayed endorsement of the cabinet while he unsuccessfully attempted to have several fellow-travellers included in The ground was therefore prepared for the shift in P K I ’s basic alliance from PNI to Sukarno. The ideal situation for PKI would have been the continuation of parliamentary democracy and the paramount role of the parties, but also an alliance with Sukarno. When this was impossible because of the changed political situation, the PKI leaders threw in their lot with the president. The second Ali cabinet was soon faced with grave insubordination from prominent army officers. The first major affront to the government occurred on August 13 > 1956, when the Foreign Minister, Ruslan Abdulgani of PNI, was arrested by the West Java military commander on charges of corruption. In November, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis of the central army command planned an unsuccessful coup. And on December 20 the first of the regional councils in defiance of Djakarta’s authority was set up For an account of the army officers’ grievances against the government, see Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey, April [Unreadable] For a quite full chronology up to September 1957 of the disputes between the regional army commanders and the central government, see Report on Indonesia, August-October 1957» pp.11-25* === [PDF page 572] === o O J when former members of the long-demobilized Banteng Division, led by Lt. Colonel Achmad Husein, took over the government of Central Sumatra. Two days later, Colonel Simbolon, the army commander in North Sumatra, announced that he had taken over the government in this region and that he refused to recognize the Ali government. The central government acted quickly and successfully against Simbolon, replacing him by his second-in-command who effected a counter-coup on December 27* This did not deter other regional commanders. March 2, 1957» Lt. Colonel Sumual took over the government of East Indonesia; and, after some months of rumblings, the military commander of South Sumatra did likewise in his area on March 9. PKI’s fear of the army was justified by the arrest of members of the Party and its mass organizations by the councils established by the dissident army commanders. PKI was therefore the first party militantly to oppose the regional councils. On December 23» 1956 the PKI politbureau issued a statement denouncing Husein's action as ’anti-democratic * and Simbolon’s as 'rebellion*. PKI, "Bersatu dan Bantu Pemerintah untuk Mengatasi Peristiwa Sumatera Tengah dan Sumatera Utara" (Unite and Assist the Government to Overcome the Central and North Sumatra Affairs), HR, December 24» 1956. === [PDF page 573] === The politbureau blamed Masjumi and PSI for the creation of the councils and for Lubis ’ attempted coup, and declared that the regional commanders’ action ’divides and stabs the Indonesian Republic from within; in this way they directly benefit the Dutch and American imperialists’. Finally, the politbureau called on the people to assist the government and armed forces in settling the two Sumatran affairs. At the same time as the acts of insubordination by the regional army commanders, the government coalition was falling apart. On December 26, 1956, the small party IPKI, which had close ties with many high army officers, withdrew from the government; on December 30, the Protestant Party called for the dissolution of the cabinet; and on January 9, 1957» Masjumi withdrew into the opposition. Many leaders of the army as well as Masjumi and many smaller parties sought a solution to the crisis in a fresh period of cooperation between Sukarno and Hatta, and there was much talk of making Hatta Prime Minister. This prospect was a grim one for PKI which at once claimed that the withdrawal of Masjumi actually strengthened the government. On January 11, 1957» For the official Masjumi explanation of its withdrawal, see Suara STII (Voice of STII), January 1957» pp.6-7* HR, January 11, 1957 === [PDF page 574] === A i d i t e x p r e s s e d P K I’s c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t f o r t h e g o v e rn m e n t and d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e P a r t y w ould n o t a s k f o r c a b in e t p o s ts. On F e b r u a r y 7 > a PKI member t o l d p a r l i a m e n t t h a t t h e r e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e c a b i n e t w ould mean c a p i t u l a t i o n b e f o r e t h e ’m i l i t a r y coup p l o t '. - A c r o s s th e c o u n t r y PN I, PKI and t h e com m unist mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s h e l d m e e ti n g s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e g o v e rn m e n t. At t h i s p o i n t S u k a rn o a n n o u n c e d h i s c o n c e p t f o r s o l v i n g I n d o n e s i a ’s p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e s, and PKI t u r n e d to th e p r e s i d e n t as th e o n ly p o l i t i c a l f o r c e c a p a b le o f p r e v e n t i n g t h e e m e rg e n c e o f e i t h e r m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p o r a r i g h t w i n g a n t i - c o m m u n i s t g o v e rn m e n t h e a d e d b y H a t t a. A f t e r t h e c o m b in ed o p p o s i t i o n o f a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s e x c e p t Murba t o h i s s u g g e s t i o n o f O c to b e r 2 8, 1956 t o ’dream away t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s o many p a r t i e s ’, S u k a rn o on F e b r u a r y 2 1, 1 9 5 7 » a n n o u n c e d h i s l o n g - a w a i t e d c o n c e p t. I t c o n t a i n e d two m ain p o i n t s: a ’m u t u a l - c o o p e r a t i o n ’ c a b i n e t t h a t w ou ld r e f l e c t t h e p a r t i e s ’ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n p a r l i a m e n t a n d w ould t h u s e l i m i n a t e o p p o s i t i o n; and a N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l t h a t w ould i n c l u d e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s fro m a l l i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n a l g r o u p s i n s o c i e t y, w ould a d v i s e t h e c a b i n e t i n i t s w o rk, and would be h e a d e d b y h im se lf. I n a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n why com m unists HR, J a n u a r y 12, 1 9 5 7 « HR, F e b r u a r y 8, 1 957 * === [PDF page 575] === 558 s h o u ld, h e i n c l u d e d, h e r e p l i e d t h a t a p a r t y t h a t had won s i x m i l l i o n v o t e s c o u l d n o t h e i g n o r e d, and t h a t ’e v e r y b o d y i s n e e d e d i n t h e work to w a rd s n a t i o n a l p r o g r e s s ’.^ to w ard s The c o n c e p t was S u k a r n o ’s f i r s t s t e p 'g u i d e d d e m o c r a c y ’. The PKI l e a d e r s gave S u k a r n o ’s c o n c e p t a jo y o u s w elcom e b e c a u s e i t was a r e b u f f t o p r o p o s a l s f o r an a r m y - l e d o r H a t t a - l e d c a b i n e t, and b e c a u s e i t p r o m is e d e a r l y com m unist p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e c a b i n e t, s o m e th in g t h a t t h e a l l i a n c e w i t h FNI had n o t a b l y f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e. F o r S u k a r n o ’s b e n e f i t, a n d p e r h a p s a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o o r d i n a r y members o f t h e P a r t y ’s new a l l i a n c e w i t h a h i g h l y d u b io u s ’d e m o c r a t ’, th e p o l i t b u r e a u c la im e d t h a t: t h e W e ste rn s y s te m o f d e m o c ra c y c a r r i e d o u t i n I n d o n e s i a up t o t h e p r e s e n t h a s b e e n h a r m f u l t o t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y and d e m o c r a t i c movement, t h a t t h e W e s te rn s y s te m h a d p r o v e d u n a b l e t o s o l v e th e f u n d a m e n ta l p ro b le m s i n s o c i e t y, and t h a t i t h a d b e e n u s e d b y ’ t h e f o r e i g n i m p e r i a l i s t s a n d t h e i r p u p p e ts w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y ’ t o p l a y o f f one g r o u p a g a i n s t another. 3 The p o l i t b u r e a u c la im e d t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i n T I, F e b r u a r y 2 2, 1957. HR, F e b r u a r y 18, 1957* PKI, ”Bung K a r n o 's C o n c e p t A nsw ers t h e U r g e n t P o l i t i c a l P ro b le m s F a c e d b y t h e I n d o n e s i a n P e o p le T o d a y ”, i n s u p p le m e n t t o R I, F e b r u a r y 1957> p p. 9 - 1 1. === [PDF page 576] === 559 n o way d i s t u r b e d t h e p a r t y s y s te m o r t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y s y s t e m, and t h a t i t p e r m i t t e d t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f dem ocracy* I t m ust a l r e a d y h a v e b e e n e v i d e n t, h o w e v e r, t h a t t h e f u t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l d e m o c ra c y was s e v e r e l y lim ite d. W hile Masjumi e x p r e s s e d o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e c o n c e p t, a n d s u c c e e d e d i n p e r s u a d i n g NU, P S I I, PIR and t h e Roman C a th o lic P a r ty to is s u e a j o i n t s ta te m e n t r e j e c t i n g i t, a n d w h i l e FNI h e s i t a t e d o v e r i t s c h o i c e o f a p o l i c y, th e PKI l e a d e r s l a u n c h e d i n t o f e v e r i s h a c t i v i t y t o a r o u s e m ass s u p p o r t f o r S u k a r n o 's p r o p o s a l. An A c t io n C o m m ittee o f S u p p o r t f o r Bung K a r n o 's C o n c ep t was i m m e d i a t e l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n D j a k a r t a w i t h comm unist S u h a r t o Rebo a s c h a i r m a n. D e m o n s t r a t i o n s and r a l l i e s w ere o r g a n i z e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y t o e x p r e s s s u p p o r t f o r th e c o n c e p t. The l a r g e s t m e e ti n g was o r g a n i z e d i n D j a k a r t a o n l y t h r e e d a y s a f t e r t h e o f f i c i a l announcem ent o f t h e c o n c e p t, when a m i l l i o n p e o p l e w ere g a t h e r e d to g e th e r. The g o v e rn m e n t f i n a l l y r e s i g n e d on March 14> h a v i n g b e e n u n a b l e t o cope w i t h t h e r e g i o n a l a c t s o f i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n and h a v i n g l o s t t h e s u p p o r t o f many o f t h e o r i g i n a l member p a r t i e s. S u k a rn o p l a c e d t h e whole c o u n t r y u n d e r a s t a t e o f w ar a n d s i e g e w h ic h gave g r e a t pow ers t o t h e army commanders i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s war === [PDF page 577] === 560 administrators. Sukarno attacked those who wished to exclude PKI from a coalition government, commenting ’They want me to ride a horse, but insist that they must first chop off one foot of the horse. I cannot and will not ride a three-footed horse.’"' SOBSI, probably made brave by expressed or presumed support from Sukarno, led a 24-hour strike in South Sumatra on March 18 to demand the restoration of civil government there.^ On the following day the SOBSI leaders told formateur Suwirjo that if a cabinet were formed including Masjumi but not PKI, ’SOBSI will not hesitate and is always in readiness to lead a total strike action all over Indonesia.*3 PKI wanted Suwirjo to succeed because the alterna tives, ranging from Hatta to Sukarno as formateur, were much less attractive. Aidit therefore told Suwirjo that PKI accepted his proposed programme, that PKI would support a cabinet based on PNI and NU, and that PKI would demand a mutual-cooperation cabinet only if Masjumi was brought into the next cabinet.^ The PKI leaders New Age (weekly, New Delhi), April 21, 1957» p.12. ITUN, March 1957, PP.4-5* ITUN, March 1957, p.6. In response to this threat, the Djakarta military command announced that severe action would be taken against any political strike; TI, March 28, 1957. HR, March 22, 1957 === [PDF page 578] === knew that the army and NU were strongly opposed to commu nist participation in the cabinet, and so they renounced PKI’s claim in order to encourage NU to accept another cabinet that excluded both FKI and Masjumi* But NU was adamant in its insistence on including Masjumi, and Suwirjo returned his mandate on April 2* later Sukarno appointed himself, Two days ’citizen Sukarno’, as formateur of an ’emergency extra-parliamentary business cabinet’* Masjumi at once condemned Sukarno’s action as illegal, but PKI called on ’the entire people and armed forces to give the fullest assistance to our President-Supreme Commander’. On April 7, the politbureau declared Sukarno’s action to be fully legal, but also raised the slogan ’prevent all abuses of the state of war and siege The new cabinet, the Djuanda cabinet, was installed on April 9. It included four PNI members, four NU, two Masjumi, one each from PSII, IPKI, SKI, Murba and the Protestant Party, and eight non-party persons* Masjumi rejected the cabinet outright as unconstitutional and expelled its two members who had joined the cabinet; NU refused to identify itself with the cabinet, but Editorial, HR, April 5, 1957. RI, April 1957, pp.8-9. === [PDF page 579] === permitted its members to participate as individuals* Significantly, Sukarno did not choose any of the PNI leaders as ministers, and the 23 cabinet members were almost all political nonentities who owed their position to the president and who would be amenable to Sukarno’s commands* Within the new cabinet, PKI could count at least five progressives1 who were considered at least quite friendly towards the Party: Sudibjo, the PSII Minister of Information, Sadjarwo, ex-BTI Minister of Agriculture, Prijono, Murba Minister of Education and Culture, Chairul Saleh, the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, and Hanafi, the Minister for the Mobilization of the National Strength for Reconstruction* Alliance with Sukarno The period of the Djuanda cabinet, from April 9, 1957 to July 6, 1959, marked the transition from parliamentary democracy to guided democracy, that is, to the formal assumption of power by Sukarno. In April 1957, however, Sukarno still preferred to rule indirectly and once he had formed the cabinet stepped back into the guise of constitutional president. Prime Minister Djuanda declared that although he led an ’extra-parliamentary business cabinet’ he felt he was responsible to parliament. === [PDF page 580] === One of the first major acts of the Djuanda cabinet heartened PKI and indicated that Sukarno might truly be aiming at a mutual-cooperation cabinet and not just talking about one in order to win communist support* July 12, 1957, the National Council was installed as an adviser to the cabinet. Its forty-five members represented what Sukarno calls ’functional g r o u p s a n d included nine persons who were either communist or known to be sympathetic to PKI. The newspaper ’’Indonesia Raja” reported that the president’s original list of members had been mostly ’leftists’, but that it had been modified by the cabinet. In April 1957, Aidit explained that the Djuanda cabinet was not the 100 per cent implementation of Sukarno’s concept, but that ’it is a phase which, according to the hard facts of the situation, must be traversed before 100 per cent implementation’.-^ While supporting the cabinet, PKI raised as its major slogan, ’Implement The ’functional groups’ represented in the national council were: workers, peasants, intellectuals, youth, national industrialists, artists, citizens of foreign descent, reporters, women, religious groups (Moslem, Protestant, Roman Catholic and Bali-Hindu), the generation of 1945, the armed forces (including the police), the attorney-general, the cabinet, and the regions. Quoted in TI, June 17, 1957* HR, April 15, 1957. === [PDF page 581] === Bung Karno’s Concept 100 Per Cent.’1 Efforts were made to identify the Party as closely as possible with the president. Communist policies, programmes and requests came to be justified by suitable quotations from Sukarno speeches and writings of thirty years. This close identification served several purposes at that time. strengthened Sukarno’s friendship with PKI, and it made it very difficult for PKI’s opponents to attack the Party without appearing to attack the president. Furthermore, it permitted PKI to exploit his tremendous personal appeal in order to win votes in the local elections held from June to November 1957 in Java, and then in some of the outer regions. PKI’s identification with Sukarno played some part in enabling the Party to emerge as the largest party in the local elections. In Java, the communist vote was increased from 5,477>707 in September 1955 to 7>514>197* PKI was now the largest party in Central Java, and the second largest in the other regions of Java. appeared that at least some of the communist gains were made at the expense of FNI. In the September 1955 parliamentary elections, PKI had been the second largest party in Central and East Java, the third in West Java, and the fourth in Djakarta Raja. For a brief discussion of the 1955 and 1957 election results, see above, pp.469-78* === [PDF page 582] === The communist gains caused much resentment among the other political parties. As soon as the results of the first, the Djakarta Raja, elections were known, a "Harian Rakjat" editorial stated in reply to charges that PKI-PNI-NU cooperation was benefiting only PKI: PKI does not like it if cooperation benefits only the other side, but neither does PKI like it if cooperation benefits only its own side. This is the elementary principle of cooperation: the principle of equal status and mutual benefit.-’ Aidit advised PNI and NU that they had lost votes because they had not been resolute enough in adhering to the path of democracy and unity with the people, nor in attacking the reactionaries.2 He said that the results showed ’a shift to the left of the Indonesian people’, and that only parties that realized this and also swung left would gain the people’s confidence. Some of the regional leaders of PNI in particular were angered by PKI’s electoral gains. First the Central Java section of the party and then the East Java, North Sumatra and West Java sections instructed their branches to cease cooperation with PKI.*^ Worse still for PKI, on August 10, 1957» the PNI secretarygeneral declared PNI’s readiness to cooperate with HR, June 27, 1957. HR, June 28, 1957. TI, November 1 and 6, 19575 February 5, 1958. === [PDF page 583] === 560 Masjumi and NU 'in the interest of the defence of democratic principles1,”1 and although PNI-Masjumi cooperation did not materialize on a national level, the PNI regional councils in West and Central Java and North Sumatra expressed their desire for such cooperation. PNI national and local leaders attacked PKI as a Soviet tool, while the PNI newspaper on November 14 declared that PKI was trying to create a 'second Yenan' in East Sumatra as a prelude to an armed takeover of all Indonesia.^ NU leaders also said harsh things about PKI.U In the developing situation, in which the regional army-led councils were taking stern anti-communist measures at the same time as apparently strengthening their position vis-a-vis the central government, and in which important elements in PNI and NU were becoming ever more critical of PKI and were seemingly moving towards a TI, August 12, 1957« TI, November 1 and 6, and December 28, 1957* Editorial, Suluh Indonesia, November 14» 1957« For example, Abdulwahab, a member of the NU executive council, was reported as saying that PKI's advances were bringing Indonesia close to civil war, and as demanding that PKI and other communist organizations be outlawed; Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey, part I, April 1958» vol.XXVII, no.4» PP.57-8. === [PDF page 584] === rapprochement with Masjumi, the PKI leaders could only maintain their support of the government and endeavour to move even closer to Sukarno. Lavish praise of Sukarno became a regular feature of PKI statements and speeches, and is widely believed to have made a favourable impression on the flatteryloving president. In August 1957» when Sukarno launched a ’New Life Movement', a vaguely defined movement to renovate the life of the Indonesian people, the PKI central committee at once ordered all Party leaders in the regions to join in it. On August 19> Aidit was among the president's party which did a little but much publicized work in cleaning one of Djakarta's markets. On October 20, Aidit declared PKI's acceptance of the Pantjasila unchanged as the basis of the state. Sukarno created the Pantjasila and was currently striving to have it accepted by the Constituent Assembly, PKI's acceptance of it unchanged, despite objections to the first sila, the belief in God the Almighty, was a gesture of friendship towards the president. Apart from praising Sukarno and giving support to his ideas and to the government he had appointed, the PKI HR, August 6, 1957» RI, October-November 1957> pp.19-20. === [PDF page 585] === leaders also increased their attacks on the common enemies, the army-led regional councils, Masjumi and PSI. The increasingly derogatory attacks on the councils was illustrated by a booklet, written by the communist leader in West Sumatra, which attacked ’the fascism of the "Banteng Council - PSI”’ for its ’little warlord government’, its protection of Dutch capital, and its efforts to bring down both Sukarno and the cabinet. PKI opposition to the councils was not limited to words. A 24-hour general strike was launched by SOBSI against the Garuda Council in South Sumatra on March 18, 1957* and on August 21, PKI organized a giant rally in Bukit Tinggi, the capital of West Sumatra, in protest against the Banteng Council. These were the only non-verbal actions taken by political parties against the councils, and afforded evidence for Sukarno that PKI would stand bravely at his side in his dispute with the councils. Communist attacks on Masjumi and PSI continued, especially for their alleged complicity in the creation of the regional councils. In November 1957* both ’’Harian Rakjat" and another communist newspaper in Nursuhud, Meniingkap Tabir *Dewan-Banteng’ (Lifting the Banteng Councils Curtain), Djakarta, 1958» 36 p. The Banteng Council was the council established in Central Sumatra by Lieutenant-Colonel Husein. === [PDF page 586] === 560 Djakarta, "Bintang Timur", published a report from China which had originated in the Indian periodical "Blitz" and which linked Masjumi and PSI with *the American plot to overthrow the Sukarno regime*. The report also claimed that Masjumi had requested Taiwan to furnish more assistance to the Darul Islam rebels. An anomaly in PKI*s political line was a temporary halt towards the end of 1957 in attacks on Hatta. This occurred for one of two reasons, or for a combination of both. First, a conference of national and regional military and civilian leaders, held at the beginning of September, had shown that many important persons wanted renewed cooperation between Sukarno and Hatta. The possibility of a new period of cooperation between the two seemed possible, and PKI, unsure of Sukarno*s intentions or his ability to keep Hatta out of a top government post, played safe by not antagonizing Hatta too much. Second, Hatta had visited China in October, and not only had been well received by the Chinese leaders but had also made favourable comments on China*s development under communist rule. PKI*s leaders might have felt that he had experienced a genuine change of heart, or they might have wished not to embarrass the Reported in TI, November 22 and 28, 1957* === [PDF page 587] === Chinese government or themselves by attacks on him at that time. Prom September attacks on Hatta were dropped, and Lukman, speaking in parliament on a reso lution to establish a commission to re-create the Sukamo-Hatta duumvirate, expressed support for the resolution and even his gratitude that there were meeting points in the views of Hatta and the Party. Fortunately for PKI, events were to take a rapid turn which irrevocably separated Hatta from Sukarno and strengthened Sukarno's hand sufficiently so that he could continue to ignore Hatta. It should be noted that at the same time as it gave support to the Djuanda cabinet, PKI also made sufficient criticisms of the government in order still to present itself to its members and society at large as a critical and revolutionary party. SOBSI strongly criticized a regulation of August 24> 1957 which banned all strikes in ’vital* industries, enterprises and offices.2 August 27 parliament voted 94 to 81 against a government draft state of emergency law and for amendments proposed by PKI.3 A popular campaign was waged to urge the TI, December 2, 1957* RI, September 1957> pp.28-9* RI, September 1957» PP*15-16* === [PDF page 588] === government to implement SOBSI and BTI proposals for the distribution of rice at low prices, and in October "Harian Rakjat" called on the government to end the ban by local and regional army commanders on the shipment of rice from their areas. Towards the end of the year, communist representatives in parliament criticized the governments budget for its low allocations for such as the Ministry of Education and Culture, thus implying that expenditure on the armed forces was too high. Such criticism was, however, kept very much in check so that it would not alienate the government or its supporters, or provoke repression by local army commanders. Towards the end of 1957 an anti-Dutch campaign spread across Indonesia in preparation for the United Nations' discussion of the West Irian question at the end of November. In the second week of November, Sukarno went so far as to warn that if the United Nations did not back Indonesia's claim for West Irian, then Indonesia might use methods that 'would startle the world' in order to win West Irian. On November 18, Sukarno and several political leaders including Aidit addressed a Liberate Editorial, HR, October 12, 1957« RI, December 1957» p*25. === [PDF page 589] === West Irian rally in Djakarta* The rally endorsed a resolution which demanded that if the United Nations did not uphold Indonesia’s claim, then the government should nationalize the vital enterprises owned b y the Dutch and accelerate the participation of Indonesians in the management of all Dutch enterprises* When the United Nations failed to give the necessary two-thirds vote in favour of the Indonesian claim, the government on December 1 ordered a general strike for the following day against all Dutch enterprises. Local boycotts against Dutch companies and nationals had already begun in different parts of Indonesia. On December 3> workers began taking over Dutch concerns. The extent to which PKI was responsible for the course of events which led to the take-over of all Dutch enterprises is difficult to ascertain. Certainly the communists were happy to encourage or foment anti-Dutch feelings, and communist mass organizations had called for stern measures and boycotts, while PKI gave its support to the government’s threat to take r o a d ’ to liberate West Irian. ’the other On October 21, however, the "Harian Rakjat" editorial, while it agreed that ’clear measures must be b e g u n ’ against Dutch capital, HR, November 19, 1957 === [PDF page 590] === *j t j p o i n t e d out that Indonesia was in no position to confiscate at one stroke all Dutch capital in the country. ' On November the central committee issued a statement b y Aidit which also spoke vaguely of ftaking action in proportion to the Dutch stubborn and insolent attitude', but put forward no concrete proposals for action. It would appear that Sukarno was one if not the prime mover in the campaign to seize all Dutch enterprises,* 2 and that PKI gladly followed him, though always careful never to get one step ahead in case that would bri n g retribution. The actual take-over was effected by the trade unions, of which the majority belonged to SOBSI. Hearsay has it that many members of the cabinet, and probably including Djuanda, were opposed to such drastic action against the Dutch partly because they feared the economic disruption that was expected to ensue. But once the take-over had taken place they were presented with a fait accompli that they had to support. The first government reaction to the w o r k e r s ' take-over was HR, October 21, 1957. Sukarno told Louis Fischer that he had given the order for the take-over and that he h a d urged the confiscation of Dutch properties as early as 1950 when he had be e n opposed by the Natsir cabinet; Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia, London, 1959> p.300. === [PDF page 591] === t o d e c l a r e a l l D u tc h e n t e r p r i s e s t o b e u n d e r g o v e rn m e n t m a n a g e m e n t. The PKI l e a d e r s, p r o b a b l y a f r a i d t h a t t h e w o r k e r s ’ a c t i o n m ight f r i g h t e n th e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e a n d t h e arm y i n t o an a l l i a n c e w i t h M a sju m i, c a l l e d on t h e w o r k e r s i n t h e s e i z e d e n t e r p r i s e s t o a v o i d ’a d v e n t u r i s t ’ acts, t o m a i n t a i n f i r m work d i s c i p l i n e, to a s s i s t t h e new management ’w i t h a l l t h e i r e n e r g y ’, a n d t o h e l p p r e v e n t sabotage* On December 13, N a s u t i o n, a s army ch ief of s ta ff, o r d e r e d t h e m i l i t a r y t o t a k e o v e r and s u p e r v i z e d i r e c t l y i n t h e name o f t h e R e p u b l i c a l l D u tc h e n t e r p r i s e s - a m e a s u r e t h a t PKI welcomed as PKI a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t ’In o r d e r to p r e v e n t s a b o t a g e, to i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i o n a n d t o r a i s e q u a l i t y i t would b e v e r y w i s e ’ f o r th e government to i n t r o d u c e worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e management c o u n c i l s o f t h e e n t e r p r i s e s. T h i s t h e arm y r e f u s e d t o c o u n t e n a n c e. C r i t i c i s m o f t h e t a k e - o v e r, w h i c h came from H a t t a a n d M a sju m i, m o s t l y condemned t h e l a c k o f p r e p a r a t i o n w h ic h was r e s u l t i n g i n e conom ic d i s o r d e r. PKI, i n o r d e r E d i t o r i a l, HR, December 7, 1957* PKI, "Memasuki Tahun 1958 d e n g a n E a s e Ba ru P e r d j u a n g a n A n t i - K o l o n i a l i s m e ” ( E n t e r i n g 1958 w i t h a New P h a se i n t h e A n t i - C o l o n i a l S t r u g g l e ), BM, J a n u a r y 1 958, p. 6. L o c.cit. === [PDF page 592] === t o d e m o n s t r a t e i t s s u p p o r t f o r t h e g o v e rn m e n t and t o p u rsu e i t s b a s i c p o l ic y o f i s o l a t i n g th e r e a c t i o n a r i e s, d e n o u n c e d a l l o p p o n e n ts o f t h e g o v e rn m e n t a s t r a i t o r s, " ' a n d h a d A b u l h a j a t, a ’n o n - p a r t y ’ member o f p a r l i a m e n t e l e c t e d on t h e PKI l i s t, i n t r o d u c e a m o tio n o f c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e s a g a c i t y o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’s e f f o r t s t o f r e e West Iria n. The m o tio n was c a r r i e d on F e b r u a r y 2 8, 1958 by 95 v o t e s t o 2 0, w i t h PN I, NU and PKI v o t i n g f o r, Masjumi a n d PS I a g a i n s t, a n d IPKI a n d t h e P r o t e s t a n t and Roman C a th o lic p a r t i e s a b s ta in in g. M eanw hile t h e PRRI- P e r m e s ta r e b e l l i o n had b r o k e n o u t. An a s s a s s i n a t i o n a t t e m p t on S u k a rn o on November 3 0, 1957 m arked t h e end o f e f f o r t s a t r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e tw e e n S u k a rn o and h i s D ju a n d a c a b i n e t on th e one hand and t h e d i s s i d e n t r e g i o n a l c o u n c i l s on t h e o t h e r. on a f o r t y - d a y 1958. S u k a rn o l e f t ' r e s t t o u r * o f t h e w o r ld on J a n u a r y 6, W hile he was away t h e B a n te n g C o u n c il on F e b r u a r y 10 p r e s e n t e d t h e c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t w i t h a f i v e - d a y u l ti m a t u m e i t h e r t o w i t h d r a w t h e m an d a te o f t h e D ju a n d a c a b i n e t and d e s i g n a t e H a t t a and t h e S u l t a n o f J o g j a k a r t a a s f o r m a t e u r s, o r to s e e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a s e p a r a t e s t a t e i n C e n t r a l S u m a tr a. N e x t day t h e c a b i n e t r e j e c t e d th e u ltim atu m and d is h o n o u r a b ly d is c h a r g e d th e le a d in g I b i d., p.1 1 HR, March 1, 1958 === [PDF page 593] === a rm y o f f i c e r s who had d r a m up t h e u l t i m a t u m. g o v e rn m e n t was a n n o u n c e d on F e b r u a r y 1 5. The r e b e l S u k a rn o r e t u r n e d t o I n d o n e s i a on t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y and was a p p a r e n t l y t h e c h i e f v o i c e dem an d in g s t e r n m e a s u re s a g a i n s t th e r e b e l s. A i d i t, on t h e 1 7 t h, c a l l e d f o r im m e d ia te a n d f i r m a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e tre a c h e ro u s ’c o r r u p t and " r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t " ’ and a g a i n s t i t s su p p o rte rs. o rg a n iz a tio n s. H is c a l l was e c h o e d b y t h e com m unist mass B o th PNI and NU a l s o demanded t h e s p e e d y e l i m i n a t i o n o f th e r e b e l s. The c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t a c t e d w i t h s u r p r i s i n g s p e e d. L a r g e num bers o f t r o o p s l a n d e d i n E a s t S u m a tra on M arch 7, and on t h e w e s t c o a s t o f S u m a tra on A p r i l 17* The r e b e l f o r c e s w ere q u i c k l y p u s h e d i n t o th e j u n g l e w here t h e y ha v e c o n t i n u e d t o e x i s t a s g u e r r i l l a b a n d s. PKI n o t o n l y gave v e r b a l s u p p o r t t o t h e c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t, b u t a l s o c l a i m e d t h a t i n C e n t r a l S u m a tra members o f t h e P a r t y a n d o f Pemuda R a k j a t t o o k t o t h e h i l l s an d a c t i v e l y fo u g h t th e r e b e l s. W id e s p r e a d r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e c om m unists s e r v e d a s s o u r c e s o f i n t e l l i g e n c e f o r t h e a d v a n c i n g g o v e rn m e n t t r o o p s a n d w ere o f a s s i s t a n c e i n [Unreadable] T h is c l a i m was made t o me b y PKI a n d Pemuda R a k j a t cad res. See a l s o t h e r e f e r e n c e t o ’p e o p l e ’s g u e r r i l l a s ’ f i g h t i n g t h e P R R I-P e rm e sta r e b e l s, i n PKI, 40 Tahun P K I, === [PDF page 594] === helping re-establish an administration in the cleared areas. Persons from North Sulawesi also reported that communists from Tondano organized guerrilla units to harass the Permesta rebels there. Communist support to the government forces can have been of only peripheral importance, but it did demonstrate PKI's support for the Djakarta regime. It also resulted in the government forces tolerating organizational activities by PKI and its mass organizations in the cleared areas at a time when all political activity was theoretically banned there. In the heat of the first weeks of the rebellion, PKI was unwilling to make criticisms of the government. The central committee, in its meeting from March 31 to April 3, 1958, blamed the rising price of rice on the rebels, Kuomintang agents, commission agents and landlords - but not on the government. When a cabinet reshuffle occurred in June 1958, Aidit pledged even See above, p.162, for PKI's claim that during the period from August 1956 to August 1959 it increased membership t>y 38 per cent in West Sumatra and 1+0 per cent in North Sulawesi. "Resolusi tentang Penurunan Harga Beras" (Resolution on Lowering the Price of Rice), BM, March-April 1958, p.178. === [PDF page 595] === s tro n g e r su p p o rt. Once t h e d a n g e r o f t h e r e b e l l i o n was p a s t, h o w e v e r, PKI resu m ed i t s p o l i c y o f s u p p o r t p l u s c ritic ism. I n d i v i d u a l g o v e rn m e n t m e a s u re s t h a t r e c e i v e d c ritic is m i n c l u d e d t h e a l i e n t a x a c t, o f J u l y 1958, w h ic h im p o s e d a s e v e r e h e a d t a x on a l l a l i e n s, w hich i n e f f e c t m ea n t on t h e C h i n e s e; t h e f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s a c t, o f S e p t e m b e r, w hich i f im p le m e n te d w ould h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d c o n d itio n s f o r th e r e g u l a te d in flo w o f f o r e ig n p r i v a t e c a p ita l; t h e 1959 b u d g e t; a n d a d e c r e e o f May 1959 w h ic h s t a t e d t h a t l ic e n c e s f o r fo reig n -o w n e d, t h a t i s, C h in e se owned, s h o p s i n a l l v i l l a g e s a n d s u b - d i s t r i c t c a p i t a l s w o u ld b e w ith d ra w n b y t h e end o f 1959* The econom ic s i t u a t i o n gave t h e P a r t y t h e g r e a t e s t o p p o rtu n ity fo r c r itic is m o f t h e g o v e rn m e n t t h a t w o u ld be o f b ro ad p o p u la r a p p e a l. The t a k e - o v e r o f D u tc h e n t e r p r i s e s h a d c a u s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e econom ic d i s r u p t i o n, a n d t h e n t h e r e b e l l i o n c a u s e d e v e n m ore. Enormous q u a n t i t i e s o f new money w ere p r i n t e d t o f i n a n c e t h e a n t i - r e b e l o p e r a t i o n s, and i n f l a t i o n r o c k e te d. Prom t h e b e g i n n i n g o f S e p te m b e r 1958, SOBSI waged a c am p aig n t o p r e v e n t in c r e a s e s in th e p r ic e o f r i c e. At t h e e n d o f O c t o b e r, D.N. A i d i t, " P i d a t o d i h a d a p a n K ongres k e -V P a r t a i P e r s a t u a n S o s i a l i s D jerm an" ( S p e e c h b e f o r e t h e F i f t h C o n g r e s s o f t h e German S o c i a l i s t U n i t y P a r t y ), BM, A u g u st 1958, p p.3 8 4 - 5 * === [PDF page 596] === 579 Lukraan w arn ed t h e g o v e rn m e n t t h a t u n l e s s i t w is h e d t o fa c e g r e a t o p p o s itio n i n s i d e and o u ts id e p a r lia m e n t, th e n s h o u ld c a n c e l p r o p o s a ls to f u r t h e r in c r e a s e th e o f f i c i a l p ric e of ric e November 5« - w h ic h th e g o v e rn m e n t d i d on When t h e SOBSI n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l met fro m D ecem ber 22 t o 2 8, 1958, i t p o i n t e d t o t h e c o n f u s e d n a t u r e o f t h e g e n e r a l eco n o m ic s i t u a t i o n and o f s t a t e f i n a n c e s, and t o t h e m arked d e t e r i o r a t i o n liv in g sta n d a rd s. in th e w orkers* I n s t e a d o f b lam in g o n ly th e r e b e l s, t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s and t h e c o r r u p t, t h e c o u n c i l a t t r i b u t e d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n p a r t t o t h e g o v e rn m e n t* s i n a d e q u a t e e co n o m ic and f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s. The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p was p r e s u m a b ly f o r c e d t o c ritic iz e t h e g o v e rn m e n t o r e l s e r i s k l o s i n g t h e s u p p o r t o f i t s c a d r e s and t h e p o p u l a c e i n g e n e r a l who w ere d i r e c t l y s u f f e r i n g th e d e t e r i o r a t i n g econom ic c o n d i t i o n s. As f o r m e r l y and i n th e f u t u r e, h o w e v e r, PKI h a d t o t r e a d w a r i l y l e s t i t s c r i t i c i s m s becam e s o h a r s h a s t o a l i e n a t e t h e r u l i n g g r o u p s and d r i v e them to w a rd s t h e a n t i c o m m u n is ts. HR, November 1, 1958» " R e s o l u t i o n on t h e G e n e r a l R e p o r t o f t h e C e n t r a l B u re a u o f SOBSI", ITUN, J a n u a r y 1959, P - 3. === [PDF page 597] === The rapid removal of the PRRI-Permesta as a threat to the central government greatly strengthened the position of both Sukarno and the central army leadership, and enabled the former to move further towards guided democracy, the latter towards greater participation in government. Parliamentary democracy suffered in the middle and was finally eliminated. PKI was without the strength to effect any major change in the course of political events, but decided on a line that was designed to try to influence the course as far as possible away from dictatorship, and yet at the same time retain Sukarno’s now all-important protection and not bring down army repression. This line, which was to continue beyond the end of the Aidit leadership’s first ten years in control of PKI, has consisted of rearguard action in defence of parliamentary democracy and the party system, promotion of Sukarno’s main policy decisions (though at the same time trying to influence them along channels more desirable to PKI), and the expression of strong opposition to dictatorship, military dictatorship in particular. The major political force which was most intolerant of the political parties and of the parliamentary system was the army. Army participation in extra-military affairs had been greatly increased under the state of war === [PDF page 598] === a n d s i e g e d e c r e e o f March 1 4 » 1957 b y w hich t h e army commanders h a d become war a d m i n i s t r a t o r s. T hen, b e g i n n i n g i n J u n e 1 9 5 7 » t h e arm y e s t a b l i s h e d c o o p e r a t i o n c o m m itte e s b e tw e e n t h e army a n d t h e f u n c t i o n a l g r o u p s, s u c h a s y o u t h, w o r k e r s, p e a s a n t s and women, w h ic h c o n t a i n e d a l l e x i s t i n g mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e f i e l d s and were d e s i g n e d p r i m a r i l y s o t h a t t h e arm y c o u l d k e e p w a tc h a n d some c o n t r o l o v e r t h e fu n c tio n a l gro u p s. When t h e D u tc h e n t e r p r i s e s h a d b e e n s e i z e d, army o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d t h e i r m anagem ent, and on F e b r u a r y 1 0, 1958 an a r m y - l e d N a t i o n a l F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f West I r i a n was e s t a b l i s h e d t o c h a n n e l a l l a c tiv itie s i n t h e c a m p a ig n. f i r s t th a t th e F ro n t I t lo o k ed p o s s ib l e a t m ig h t become a p o w e r f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n u n d e r army c o n t r o l, b u t, r e p o r t e d l y due t o S u k a r n o ’s o p p o s i t i o n, i t f a i l e d t o becom e s i g n i f i c a n t. As o f May Day 1 9 5 8, t h e arm y b r o u g h t t h e May Day t r a d e u n i o n r a l l i e s u n d e r c o n t r o l, b a n n i n g p a r a d e s and v e t t i n g th e te x ts o f speeches. I t was a l s o s u s p e c t e d b y t h e commu n i s t s t h a t t h e army was b e h i n d t h e A u g u st 2 4 » 1957 b a n on s t r i k e s i n ’v i t a l ’ e n t e r p r i s e s a n d o f f i c e s, and a l s o t h e p o s t p o n e m e n t, a n n o u n c e d on S e p te m b e r 2 2, 1 9 5 8, o f t h e 1959 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s. The PKI l e a d e r s n a t u r a l l y v ie w e d w i t h a l a r m t h e g ro w in g army p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n n o n - m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s, === [PDF page 599] === [Unreadable] e s p e c i a l l y a s t h e army w a s, b y a n d l a r g e, a n t i - c o m m u n i s t, a n d a s t h e r e w ere rum ours t h a t many i m p o r t a n t o f f i c e r s w a n ted a m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p. T h e r e f o r e, a t t h e same t im e a s h a i l i n g t h e e t e r n a l u n i t y o f t h e a r m y - p e o p le ’d w i t u n g g a l ’ ( t w o - i n - o n e ), PKI waged an i n t e n s i v e c a m p a ig n among P a r t y members t o w arn a g a i n s t t h e f a s c i s t d a n g e r p r e s e n t e d b y t h e arm y, a n d p u b l i c l y o p p o s e d army 1i n t e r fere n ce ’ in n o n -m ilita ry a f f a i r s. The f i r s t o u t s p o k e n o p p o s i t i o n t o arm y i n t e r f e r e n c e was made b y b o t h PKI a n d SOBSI i n November 1958. A i d i t, s p e a k i n g t o t h e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e on November 19» 1 958, s a i d t h a t t h e p e o p l e were w i l l i n g t o g i v e c e r t a i n p o w e rs t o t h e arm ed f o r c e s s o l o n g a s t h o s e p o w e rs w ere n o t m is u s e d, b u t he c o m p la in e d o f ’ t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e b y c e r t a i n o f f i c e r s i n e c o n o m ic, f i n a n c i a l an d g o v e r n m e n ta l p o l i c y m a t t e r s ’. I n b r i e f, t h e g ro w in g i n t e r f e r e n c e o f c e r t a i n o f f i c e r s i n econom ic a n d f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s c a n l e a d t o d e m o r a l i z a t i o n, c an g iv e b i r t h t o w a r l o r d s, and i s a t h r e a t t o t h e p u r i t y o f t h e p a t r i o t i c arm ed f o r c e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c. A i d i t a l s o a t t a c k e d t h e a r m y ’s u s e o f t h e s t a t e o f war and s ie g e to r e s t r i c t d e m o c ratic l i b e r t i e s by such D.N. A i d i t, ’’B e r s a t u Menempuh D j a l a n D em okrasi T e r p im p in Menudju P e l a k s a n a k a a n K o n s e p s i P r e s i d e n S u k a rn o 100%” ( U n i t e A long t h e Road o f G u id e d D em ocracy to w a rd s t h e 100% I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o ’s C o n c e p t ), HR, November 2 0, 1958. === [PDF page 600] === CT O O %J ö ö measures as the prohibition of political meetings and the prohibition of strikes. Aidit's v/ords were echoed by Njono, the SOBSI secretary-general, on November 2 9 ^ The PKI central committee^ New Year message, issued on December 31, 1958, went further to state that the communists must resist all efforts towards the creation of a military dictatorship. During December 1958, the extension of the state of war and siege for another year was accepted unanimously by parliament, probably because opposition would have been futile and might have antagonized the army into increased pressure for an end to parliamentary activities. Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of 1959» PKI reportedly struck a blow which threatened to remove Nasution from his post as army chief when it leaked the news of massive army illegal trade dealings through Tandjong Priok, the port of Djakarta. ^ Nasution should have taken the blame, but it was placed on officers around him who were moved to other posts. If this report is correct, it would mean that PKI greatly antagonized the ITTJN, December 1958, pp.7-8. HR, December 31, 1958. My source for this report was a prominent politician, but one who must remain anonymous. === [PDF page 601] === 584 army leadership but at the same time earned the thanks of Sukarno who was attempting to reduce the power and prestige of the central army command. Communist opposition to the army became more courageous during the first months of 1959> and one suspects that the courage derived from Sukarno’s connivance. On January Lukman stated the Party’s opposition to the appointment to parliament of unelected representatives of the armed forces, while in May Aidit declared that: There has never yet been, nor will there ever be, anything to prove that a military dictator ship can save the people and further advance world developments. If a military dictatorship were established, Aidit warned, then the Indonesian communists would fight it. The PKI fear of and shadow boxing with the army forced the Party to a greater reliance on Sukarno as its protector against the military. The essential nature of the alliance in turn compelled PKI to support Sukarno’s moves towards guided democracy, while at the same time pleading for the maintenance of the party system and for the greatest possible authority for parliament. HR, February 1959* D.N. Aidit, ’'Building the Organization is Important, but Building Ideology is Even More Important”, supplement to RI, June-July 1959> pp.4-5* === [PDF page 602] === I n a s t a t e m e n t i s s u e d on O c t o b e r 24» 1958» A i d i t a t t e m p t e d t o show t h a t s u p p o r t o f g u i d e d d e m o c r a c y was ’ t h e m ost r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i c y ’. He a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t l i b e r a l d e m o c rac y h a d f a i l e d t o s o l v e I n d o n e s i a ’s m a j o r p r o b l e m s an d was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c o r r u p t i o n and bureaucracy. As an a l t e r n a t i v e, PKI a c c e p t e d g u i d e d d e m o c r a c y on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t i t was o p p o s e d t o b o t h d i c t a t o r s h i p and l i b e r a l i s m. He t h e n d e f i n e d t h e a n t i - l i b e r a l a s p e c t s o f guided democracy i n t h e p o l i t i c a l f i e l d a s t h e 100 p e r c e n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f S u k a r n o ' s concept, th a t i s, t h e c r e a t i o n o f a c a b i n e t b a s e d on p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n; and i n t h e e co n o m ic f i e l d a s b u i l d i n g t h e s t a t e s e c t o r o f t h e economy t o a d o m i n a n t p o sitio n. A i d i t claim ed t h a t o n ly Sukarno sh o u ld be th e guide i n guided democracy, and 'n o t as a d i c t a t o r, b u t as a d e m o c r a t who r e s o l u t e l y o b s e r v e s t h e p a r t y s y s t e m a n d the r i g h t s o f p a r lia m e n t'. rig h ts was S u k a r n o w o u ld r e q u i r e s p e c i a l in order t o guide, b u t A id it i n s i s t e d t h a t t h i s 'The o n l y way t o d e f e a t m i l i t a r y o r i n d i v i d u a l d i c t a t o r s h i p on t h e one h a n d, and t o d e f e a t l i b e r a l i s m on t h e o t h e r ', t h e o n l y way t o b r i n g S u k a r n o ' s c o n c e p t into e x isten ce. D.N. A i d i t, "Mendukung De m o k ra si T e r p i m p i n A d a l a h P o l i t i k j a n g P a l i n g R e v o l u s i o n e r " (To S u p p o r t G u id e d Democracy i s t h e Most R e v o l u t i o n a r y P o l i c y ), HR, O c t o b e r 2 5, 1958* === [PDF page 603] === Just what Sukarno meant by guided democracy had not been revealed, and here Aidit was attempting to formulate a definition for the president and then to use the Party and its mass organizations to popularize it. Aidit’s definition involved relinquishing a little of democracy in order not to antagonize Sukarno or strengthen the hand of those demanding the complete abolition of the party and parliamentary system. In short, an attempt at a tactical retreat to a position chosen by the Party. But the retreat was to continue. At the end of December 1958 and in January 1959» the PKI leaders were vocal in their defence of parliament. They praised it for the record amount of work done in 1958, spoke of ’the great prestige of parliament*, and declared that ’Only fascists and foul thieves do not respect a parliament chosen by the people.*12 On January 11, 1959» however, when Sukarno bluntly asked for PKI’s opinion of his proposal for the inclusion of functional groups in parliament, Aidit was forced to declare the Party’s support ’in principle’. On February 19, 1959> the cabinet reached important decisions on the implementation of guided democracy. HR, December 31, 1958; January 3> 1959« HR, January 12, 1959. === [PDF page 604] === 587 The c a b i n e t d e c i d e d f i r s t, t o a s k t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assem bly t o r e s t o r e t h e 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n, second, to in tro d u c e an a c t to s i m p li f y t h e p a r t y system, t h i r d, t h a t f u n c t i o n a l g r o u p s w o u ld h e i n c l u d e d a s e v e r y s e c o n d c a n d i d a t e i n a l l e l e c t o r a l l i s t s, w i t h t h e armed f o r c e s r e c e i v i n g 35 a p p o i n t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s, a n d, f o u r t h, t h a t a N a t i o n a l F r o n t would he e s t a b l i s h e d to a s s i s t th e president. F i v e d a y s l a t e r t h e PKI p o l i t h u r e a u a n n o u n c e d i t s s u p p o r t f o r a r e t u r n t o t h e 1945 co n stitu tio n. S a k i r m a n, w r i t i n g i n 1960, g a v e t h e o f f i c i a l PKI v e r s i o n, an d one w i t h a r i n g o f t r u t h, o f why t h e P a r t y d e c i d e d t o s u p p o r t t h e r e t u r n t o t h e 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n. - ^ He e x p l a i n e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e t h a t t h e c a b i n e t d e c i d e d to u r g e t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n, PKI had l i t t l e choice h u t t o a g re e. The C o n s t i t u e n t Assem bly I t sh o u ld he n o te d a g a in t h a t under th e 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n th e p r e s id e n t h o ld s pow ers r o u g h ly e q u iv a le n t to th o s e o f th e p r e s id e n t o f th e U n ite d S t a t e s. The 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n was s o b r i e f and v a g u e, h ow ever, th a t th e p r e s id e n t c o u ld ta k e t o h i m s e l f powers fa r beyond th o s e o f h i s Am erican c o u n te r p a r t. N j o t o, "Hold High t h e S p i r i t o f 1 9 4 5 ”, RI, A p r i l - M a y 1959, p.1 7. S a k i r m a n, "Apa A r t i So k o n g a n PKI k e p a d a UUD 1945 d a n D e m o k ra si T e r p i m p i n " (The Mean ing o f P K I ' s S u p p o r t f o r t h e 1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d G u id e d D e m o c r a c y ), p a r t I I, BM, J u l y - A u g u s t 1960, p p. 3 2 0 - 8. === [PDF page 605] === had been meeting for two years but had made little headway towards a new constitution because the Pantjasila and Moslem blocs were unable to compromise. At the same time, certain groups outside the assembly were putting forward the demand, which ’greatly endangered democratic life’, for the complete dissolution of political parties. In such a situation, according to Sakirman, PKI was faced with three possibilities: to unite with the antiPantjasila bloc, led by Masjumi, and so permit the assembly to continue, with the possibility of completing its work by compromises harmful to the people’s struggle; to take a passive attitude, or reject Sukarno’s appeal for the restoration of the 1945 constitution, which would have meant in effect uniting with the anti-Pantjasila forces, continuing the assembly meetings, or supporting the continuation of the 1950 constitution; or to unite with ’the democratic groups’ led by Sukarno by accepting his appeal unconditionally but at the same time fighting outside the assembly for conditions to prevent the misuse of the 1945 constitution by 'reactionary groups'. Sakirman explained that for PKI the third possibility was the best, bearing in mind the national united front policy of isolating the reactionaries. To agree with the reactionaries to continue the Constituent Assembly was not possible either politically or psychologically. To agree === [PDF page 606] === t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e 1950 c o n s t i t u t i o n was a l s o i m p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e o f t h e i n t e n s i t y o f t h e cam p aig n a g a i n s t l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y and f o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a rtie s. To a g r e e t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e 1950 c o n s t i t u t i o n, S a k irm a n c l a i m e d, w ould have s t r e n g t h e n e d th e hand o f th e th e p a r t i e s. *f a s c i s t e l e m e n t s ’ who w ish e d t o d i s s o l v e T h e re fo re in o r d e r to i s o l a t e f u r t h e r th e r e a c t i o n a r y g ro u p and to s t r e n g th e n th e u n i t y o f th e d e m o c r a t i c g r o u p, PKI t o o k q u i c k a n d c o n c r e t e s t e p s t o overcom e t h e c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n b y u r g i n g t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n. On A p r i l 2 2, 1959» S u k a rn o a s k e d t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A sse m b ly t o a p p r o v e t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e 1945 c o n s t i tu tio n. M asjum i s u c c e e d e d i n r a l l y i n g t h e o t h e r Moslem p a r t i e s, NU, P S I I and P e r t i, to p r e s e n t a s o l i d f r o n t, so t h a t when t h r e e v o t e s w ere t a k e n i n t h e a s s e m b ly on May 30 and J u n e 1 on a p r o p o s a l t o r e s t o r e t h e o l d c o n s t i tu tio n, t h e p r o p o s a l f a i l e d t o o b t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y tw o i th ird s m a jo rity. I n t h e l a s t s e s s i o n o f t h e a s s e m b ly, FNI l e a d e r A l i S a s t r o a m i d j o j o i s r e p o r t e d t o h a v e s t a t e d t h a t PK I, u n h a p p y w i t h t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e 1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n, s p r e a d rum ours d e s i g n e d t o f r i g h t e n NU i n t o o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e r e s t o r a t i o n; I r e n e T i n k e r and M i l l i d g e W a lk e r, " I n d o n e s i a ’s P a n a c e a: 1959 M o d e l", F a r E a s t e r n S u r v e y, Decem ber 1959, v o l.X X V I I I, n o. 12, p. 179* c o u l d b e a r g u e d t h a t PKI h o p e d t o p r e v e n t t h e p r o p o s a l fro m r e c e i v i n g t h e t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y i n o r d e r t o f o r c e S u k a rn o t o co m p ro m ise w i t h t h e p a r t i e s and g r a n t them a === [PDF page 607] === 590 Aidit proposed the dissolution of the assembly on the grounds that it had failed to draft a new constitution and was no longer representative of the balance of forces in society. He also pointed out that there were now two ways of legalizing the 1945 constitution. Either a new Constituent Assembly could be elected, which was the democratic and constitutional way, or the president could decree the restoration of the old consti tution, a course that PKI could accept because the constitution had the support of a majority in the assembly. On June 4, 1959* the central war administrator placed a temporary ban on all political activities. Aidit at once instructed all Party members to observe the ban, ’the purpose of which is none other than to prevent unnecessary contradictions from arising among the ranks of the people.’ He called on members to intensify greater status and authority than given by the 1945 constitution. But it would seem that the communist leaders were genuinely afraid that if the 1945 consti tution was not approved, then the forces that wished a complete end to all party and parliamentary activity might have won the presidents support. Therefore if the report of All’s statement is correct, it would appear that he made it in order to sow discord between Sukarno and PKI as a means of restoring Sukarno’s decreasing sympathy with PNI. RI, June-July 1959, pp.16-17« RI, June-July 1959, p.11« === [PDF page 608] === their education, and to: ponder deeply over the steps that we have taken up to the present and... give serious thought to the future steps so as to further strengthen national unity. Sukarno returned from a two-month world tour on June 29, and on July 5 decreed the restoration of the 1945 consti tution. The Djuanda cabinet resigned on the following day, and Sukarno was left to form his own presidential cabinet which, under the terms of the 1945 constitution, would not be responsible to parliament. Towards an Impasse? Sukarno announced his cabinet on July 12, 1959* The civilian ministers were either non-party persons or party members who could not be expected to go against the presidents wishes. Prominent party leaders were conspicuously absent. The armed forces were represented by eleven ministers. PKI could count five ministers who might act as listening posts for the Party: Sadjarwo, Minister of Agrarian Affairs, Yamin, minister in charge of social-cultural affairs, Prijono, Minister of Education and Culture, and Sudibjo and Sudjono, the two ministers in charge of Mobilizing the people’s energy1. In the rapid turbulence of events that occurred in the following eighteen months, a fairly simple pattern === [PDF page 609] === was d i s c e r n i b l e. On t h e one h a n d, i t became e v i d e n t t h a t S u k a rn o was d e p e n d e n t on t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s, e s p e c i a l l y PKI, i n h i s b a l a n c i n g a c t w i t h t h e arm y. trie d t o d o m e s t i c a t e t h e p a r t i e s t o become t h e i n s t r u m e n ts o f h i s own w i l l, b u t he p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t d i s s o l u t i o n th o se t h a t d e c la r e d th e m se lv e s to be h i s a llie s. On t h e o t h e r h a n d, s t r o n g p r e s s u r e was a p p l i e d b y t h e army t o c u r b t h e pow er o f th e p a r t i e s, e s p e c i a l l y PK I. The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h f o u r a s p e c t s o f t h e e v e n t s o f t h e e i g h t e e n m o n th s: P K I 's r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e g o v e rn m e n t, t h e P a r t y * s r e a r g u a r d a c t i o n i n d e f e n c e o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e m o c rac y a n d p o l i t i c a l freed o m, an a s s e s s m e n t o f th e P a r t y 's g a in s a n d l o s s e s u n d e r g u i d e d d e m o c r a c y, and t h e e f f e c t w i t h i n t h e P a r t y o f t h e c o n t i n u e d a l l i a n c e w i t h S u k a rn o a n d t h e move t o g u i d e d d e m o c ra c y. On J u l y 13, 1959, A i d i t a n n o u n c e d P K I 's a t t i t u d e t h e new g o v e rn m e n t. He s a i d t h a t PKI w ould do e v e r y th in g p o s s i b l e to e n su re th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f th e c a b i n e t ' s t h r e e - p o i n t program m e, and t h a t th e P a r t y ' s S to p p r e s s s u p p le m e n t t o R I, J u n e - J u l y 1959, p p.2 - 3 » The programme was f o o d an d c l o t h i n g f o r t h e p e o p l e, s e c u r i t y (m ea n in g t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f r e b e l a n d b a n d i t g ro u p s ), and a n ti - im p e r ia li s m. === [PDF page 610] === attitude was basically the same as that taken towards the Djuanda cabinet: unreserved support for measures of benefit to the people, criticism of wavering measures, and strong criticism of ministers * actions harmful to the people* Subsequently, the Party was to maintain its eulogies of Sukarno himself, but, perhaps aware that the power situation forced Sukarno to protect the Party, to take greater freedom in outspoken criticism of government measures. As Sukarno was the only barrier preventing stern anti-communist repressive measures by the army, PKI has taken care to continue its praise of him, its support for his leadership of the revolution* Aidit went so far as to show that it would be quite compatible with Marxism for a non-proletarian, such as Sukarno, to become the leader of a socialist Indonesia* Marx nor Engels was a worker.* After all, neither In the communist criti cisms of the government, Sukarno was never implicated, and in turn he never defended those of his ministers who were criticized. As early as August 6, 1959» Aidit expressed disap pointment at the composition of the cabinet, suspicion at D.N. Aidit, Peladjaran dari Sedjarah PKI (Lessons from PKI*s History), Djakarta, i960, pp.22-3« === [PDF page 611] === 594 the inclusion of so many military personnel, and his determination to work for communist inclusion in the cabinet. Communist participation in the government, he said: is just as certain as the fact that the Indonesian people will wake up tomorrow to see the sun rising in the east, and to see it setting in the west in the evening. In September, SOBSI warned of ’secret counterrevolutionary passengers’ in the cabinet. The first major attack on the government was launched in December 1959 and January i960 when the Party and its mass organizations led a massive campaign to protest the government’s economic measures, and to demand a 25 per cent increase in wages with a 50 per cent cut in the price of essential commodities. Delegations, petitions, letters and telegrams flooded in - until Nasution ordered strict measures against demonstrations held under the cloak of economic grievances. In the midst of the agitation against the govern ment’s economic measures, Lukraan on January 10, 1960, declared that the people had lost its hope and trust in D.N. Aidit, "Back to the 1945 Constitution for a Change in Politics and Living Conditions", in supplement to RI, September-October 1959, pp.3-11* Editorial, "After the Proclamation of the Presidential Decree", ITUN, September 1959, pp.2-3. === [PDF page 612] === the c a b i n e t s a b i l i t y. S u k a r n o was r e q u e s t e d t o r e p l a c e the d e f i c i e n t m i n i s t e r s. The r e q u e s t f o r a n a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e c a b i n e t was c o n t i n u e d u n t i l Sukarno l e f t the c o u n tr y f o r a n o th e r w orld t o u r on A p r i l 1. The moment S u k a r n o l e f t, PKI a t once d ro p p e d t h e r e q u e s t, and denounced e f f o r t s tow ards a c a b i n e t r e s h u f f l e a s aimed a t c r e a t i n g new te n s io n s.^ I t was f e a r e d t h a t w i t h o u t S u k a r n o a r e s h u f f l e m ig h t mean a s w i n g t o t h e r i g h t. Once h e r e t u r n e d, the r e q u e s t was r e s u m e d. The m ost t h o r o u g h a t t a c k on t h e c a b i n e t was made on J u l y 8, 1960 when t h e PKI p o l i t b u r e a u i s s u e d a document en titled "An E v a l u a t i o n o f t h e K e r d j a C a b i n e t a f t e r One Year i n O f f i c e ". ^ According to th e p o l it b u r e a u: a y e a r i s l o n g enough t o know w h ic h o f t h e p r e s i d e n t s a s s i s t a n t s o r m in is te r s are c a p a b l e and w h ic h o f them a r e n o t, o r do n o t w i s h t o c a r r y o u t t h e t h r e e - p o i n t programme o f the K e rd ja c a b in e t in a l l e a r n e s t n e s s. BB, J a n u a r y 1 5, 1960, p. 1; HR, J a n u a r y 11, 1960. S e e, f o r e x a m p l e, HR, F e b r u a r y 11, 1960; an d R I, A p r i l 1960, pp.4-5* B i n t a n g T im u r, A p r i l 2 2, 1960. PKI, An E v a l u a t i o n o f t h e K e r d j a C a b i n e t a f t e r One Year i n O f f i c e, m im eo g rap h ed, D j a k a r t a, i 960",' 14 p. Kerdja (Work) C a b i n e t i s t h e name g i v e n t o S u k a r n o S c a b i n e t. Of c o u r s e t h e m i n i s t e r s c r i t i c i z e d i n t h i s s t a t e m e n t h a d b e e n p r e v i o u s l y s u b j e c t t o c r i t i c i s m by PKI. === [PDF page 613] === r,;t) rJ I t t h e n w e n t on t o a t t a c k ’th e i n a b i l i t y o f th e M in is te r o f T r a d e, A r i f i n H a ra h a p *; t h e M i n i s t e r o f L a b o u r, Ahem E r n i n g p r a d j a, who ’d o e s n o t d e f e n d t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e w o r k e r s ’; Yamin, f o r ’h a r b o u r i n g d a n g e r o u s i l l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s *; F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S u b a n d r i o f o r p u rsu in g a fo re ig n p o lic y th a t ’i s more one o f n e e d i n g im p e r ia lis m th a n o f o p p o sin g i t ’, and f o r e x a c e r b a tin g In d o n esian -C h in ese r e l a t i o n s; A ffa irs, th e M in iste r o f I n t e r n a l I p i k Gandamana, f o r i s s u i n g a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c r e g u l a t i o n s; and th e M i n i s t e r o f I n f o r m a tio n, M alad i, f o r h i s t o l e r a t i o n o f t h e r e a c t i o n a r y D e m o c r a tic L e a g u e. As f o r t h e arm y, t h e p o l i t b u r e a u c la i m e d t h a t is n ot s u c h a d i f f i c u l t t h i n g ’ t o sm ash t h e r e b e l s, ’so l o n g a s a s e r i o u s a t t e m p t i s made t o do s o ’, so l o n g a s t h e s e c u r ity fo rc e s ceased ’a l s o w a g in g a f i g h t a g a i n s t t h e p e o p le and th e c o m m u n ists’. H ow ever: I n c o n t r a s t w i t h some o f h i s m i n i s t e r a s s i s t a n t s... we s e e t h e e f f o r t made b y P r e s i d e n t S u k a rn o t o pave t h e way f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e programme o f h i s c a b in e t. The p o l i t b u r e a u e n d ed w i t h a p l e a f o r c h a n g e s i n t h e c o m p o sitio n o f th e c a b i n e t. I n t h e l a t e r m onths o f 1960 S u k a r n o ’s new s l o g a n ’N asakom ’, s t a n d i n g f o r n a t i o n a l i s t r e l i g i o u s - c o m m u n i s t u n i t y, was u s e d b y PKI t o demand a Nasakom c a b i n e t === [PDF page 614] === 597 PKI*s hardest battle during the first eighteen months of the Sukarno cabinet was a continuous one against restrictions on political freedom. It was a losing battle because the Party was not strong enough to with stand the combined pressure of Sukarno, who wanted to domesticate the parties for his own use, and the army, which in general was eager to ban the parties, especially PKI, or, if that was not yet possible, to severely restrict their freedom of action* The temporary ban on all political activities, imposed on June 4, 1959, was eased in the areas free of rebels on August 1, 1959* Public meetings and demon strations were still forbidden, but closed meetings were allowed on the sole condition that the authorities be informed in advance of the intention to hold one* practice, however, many, if not all, war administrators retained the power to prohibit closed meetings, and if one was permitted, military. to send along a representative of the At the end of July 1959, all higher govern ment officials were given until August 31 to resign from political parties - a measure which met ineffectual communist protest. Then, at the beginning of September, it was announced that henceforth the heads of autonomous H R, July 29, 1959; RI, September-October 1959, p.8. === [PDF page 615] === cno J u ' U provinces, kabupatens and towns would be appointed, not elected as formerly, and that they and the members of their executive councils would have to resign from party membership. This new measure brought a storm of protest from all political parties, which led the government to agree to review the system after a trial year. At this point, the PKI congress in September 1959 courageously endorsed the statement that: the people of Indonesia not only love democracy, but under the alert leadership of the Party the people actively defend democracy. For the progressive development of Indonesia, PKI will continue to fight against the danger of military dictatorship or individual dictatorship, and at the same time to defend and extend democracy. But in case a military or individual dictatorship cannot be prevented,... the duty of every commu nist will be to fight it with all his strength.' Despite the words of courage, primarily intended to boost the morale of the congress delegates, the retreat con tinued. PKI had no weapons with which to fight. Under the 1945 constitution the powers of the president are not clearly defined, and Sukarno took the right to rule by presidential decrees and decisions PKI, Resolusi tentang Lappran Umum CC PKI kepada Kongres Nasional ke-VT (Resolution on the PKI Central Committee fs General Report to the Sixth National Congress), Djakarta, 1959, PP-33-4. === [PDF page 616] === 500 without requesting parliaments approval. This meant, in fact, that parliament was being reduced to complete impotence. On October 2, 1959» FKI described what it considered to be the important role of parliament under the 1945 constitution,^ and, made bolder by PNI support, asserted, during the parliamentary debates of December 1960 through February 1961, parliament’s right to control the budget, Sukarno thereupon demonstrated his power by dissolving parliament and announcing his intention to appoint a new one. At the same time that Sukarno was removing the power of parliament, the army was increasing its harrying tactics against the communists. Examples are many. "Harian Rakjat” was suspended for a total of 65 days from January to September 1960 inclusive, and it was tempo rarily banned in several regions; the communist news service, INPS, was closed for several months; the small pro-communist Djakarta newspaper "Republik” had its licence cancelled on April 26; and SOBSI’s periodical, "Bendera Buruh", had its licence cancelled in October 1960. Several central and regional Party leaders were Editorial, HR, October 2, 1959. The main speeches of the communist representatives in the budget debates are given in abbreviated form in RI, February 1960, pp.10-15« === [PDF page 617] === 600 im p r is o n e d f o r s h o r t te rm s o r i n t e r r o g a t e d on s e v e r a l p r e t e x t s; many SOBSI c a d r e s w ere a r r e s t e d f o r i n c i t i n g o r a l l e g e d l y i n c i t i n g w o rk e rs t o s t r i k e; a n d i n M arch, s t r i k e s i n th e p o r t s o f T a n d jo n g P r i o k, S e m ara n g, a n d S u r a b a j a w ere q u i c k l y s u p p r e s s e d b y t h e arm y, t h e i r SOBSI l e a d e r s a r r e s t e d. I n E a s t J a v a th e w ar a d m in is t r a t o r o r d e r e d p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s an d t h e i r s u b s i d i a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o rem ove a l l s i g n s a n d n a m e b o a rd s from p u b l i c v ie w. D u rin g th e s e c o n d h a l f o f A u g u st 1960, a s e r i e s o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n s, a p p a r e n t l y l e d b y Moslem an d P S I y o u t h s, dem anded a b a n on PKI an d i t s z a tio n s. m ass o r g a n i On A u g u st 2 2, th e r e g i o n a l w ar a d m i n i s t r a t o r i n S o u th K a lim a n ta n im p o sed s u c h a b a n, a n d was so o n f o llo w e d b y h i s c o l l e a g u e s i n S o u th S u m a tra /D ja m b i, a n d S o u th an d S o u th - E a s t S u la w e s i. PKI r e a c t e d a t once t o th e b a n s b y a s k i n g S u k arn o to r e p e a l them a n d t o p u n is h t h e i r p e r p e t r a t o r s f o r c o n t r a v e n i n g th e la w and f o r s l a n d e r i n g PK I. The com m unist m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l s o p r o t e s t e d th e b a n s. S u k a rn o r e c e i v e d A i d i t on S e p te m b e r 1, a n d t h e n c a l l e d i n a l l r e g i o n a l w ar a d m i n i s t r a t o r s. The com prom ise b e t ween S u k a rn o, who o p p o se d a b a n on PK I, a n d t h e arm y, m ost o f w h ich w a n te d o n e, was a d e c i s i o n on S e p te m b e r 13 to R I, S e p te m b e r-O c to b e r 1960, p.7 * === [PDF page 618] === 601 s u s p e n d a l l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s u n t i l December* 1, 1960. When t h e b a n was l i f t e d a new r e g u l a t i o n w en t i n t o e f f e c t u n d e r which m e e tin g s, g a t h e r i n g s or p a ra d e s o f a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e would b e p e r m i t t e d o n l y i f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s h a d b e e n i n f o r m e d 72 h o u r s i n a d v a n c e and i f th e agenda had f i r s t b een s u b m itte d. l o c a l s t a t e o f emergency a u t h o r i t i e s ^ p ractice, Presum ably th e s t i l l e x ercised, in the r i g h t to p r o h i b i t m eetings o r to se n t s p e c ta to r s along. I n South Sum atra/D jam bi and South K a lim a n ta n th e s t a t e o f emergency a u t h o r i t i e s c o n tin u e d t h e b a n on a l l a c t i v i t i e s b y PKI a n d i t s mass o r g a n i zatio n s. Thanks t o S u k a r n o ’s p r o t e c t i o n, PKI s u c c e e d e d i n a v o i d i n g c o m p l e t e s u p p r e s s i o n b y t h e a rm y. But t h e P a r t y c o u l d n o t e v a d e S u k a r n o ’s own e f f o r t s t o d o m e s t i c a t e t h e p a r t i e s a n d p a r l i a m e n t f o r h i s own u s e. As h a s b e e n s e e n, he d i s s o l v e d t h e e l e c t e d p a r l i a m e n t on March 5» I960 because i t claim ed the r i g h t to c o n tr o l the budget. March 7> A i d i t s e n t a t e l e g r a m t o S u k a r n o e x p r e s s i n g e x t r e m e r e g r e t a t t h e a c t i o n w h i c h, he w r o t e, endangers dem ocratic l i f e i n our c o u n t r y ’. ’s e r i o u s l y A idit W ith a c h an g e i n t h e s t a t e o f w a r a n d s i e g e l a w, t h e wa r a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a r e now c a l l e d s t a t e o f e m e r g e n c y au th o rities. RI, A p r i l 1960, p. 9 === [PDF page 619] === 602 proposed that either a new parliament be elected or a temporary parliament be nominated in conformity with the balance of forces among the people. PKI's "Review of Indonesia" commented that the guided part of guided democracy had already been elaborated; 'it now remains for the "democracy" aspect of it to be established12 In order not to alienate the parties too far, Sukarno invited the chairmen of PKI, PNI and NU to his palace in Bali to discuss the composition of a new parliament. March 29 > I960 the appointed parliament was announced. Of the 261 members, 131 were from functional groups, including 35 representatives of the armed forces, and 130 were from the political parties, including 30 from PKI. Masjumi and PSI were excluded. General elections for a new parliament were promised for before the end of 1962, security conditions permitting. Aidit announced PKI's reluctant acceptance of the new parliament, commenting that an appointed one was better than none. He said that including communists in the functional groups, PKI would have 50 votes, or just under 20 per cent of the total. NU leaders RI, April 1960, p.11. RI, April 1960, p.12, Suara Ibukota, year III, no#7> === [PDF page 620] === 603 estimated communist representation to be between 65 and 70, and due to their protests at the low number of Moslems, Sukarno added an extra 22 members, mostly Islamic leaders. That the appointed parliament would have only minor power was made clear b y the government announcement on April 20 that the 1960 budget was in operation by decree. The appointed parliament was installed on June 25, 1960. Once parliament had been 're-tooled*, it was only a matter of time before the regional and local repre sentative councils were similarly dealt with. presidential decree ordered that as of September 30, 1960 all councils would be brought in line with guided democracy. seats. Functional groups were to receive half the Former members of the now-dissolved Masjumi and PSI were excluded unless they had proved their loyalty to Sukarno's goals. The Minister of Internal Affairs proceeded to appoint the members of the provincial councils, the province heads to appoint the members of lower councils. As the new councils were announced, PKI and its mass organizations raised cries of protest because communist representation was often greatly TI, April 22, 1960; also interviews with NU leaders. === [PDF page 621] === 60 * red u c ed, S u k a rn o e a r l y i n J a n u a r y 1961 a g r e e d t o a r e v ie w o f t h e a p p o in t e d c o u n c i l s, b u t even i f PKI and its m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s w ere t o g a in more s e a t s, u n d e r g u id e d d e m o c ra c y th e c o u n c i l s c o u ld b e e x p e c te d t o e x e r c is e even l e s s a u th o r i ty th a n fo rm e rly. As p a r t o f h i s p la n t o d o m e s ti c a t e th e p a r t i e s, S u k a rn o w is h e d t o b r i n g th e n e w s p a p e rs u n d e r c o n t r o l. The arm y was e x e r c i z i n g i t s pow er u n d e r th e s t a t e o f e m e rg en c y to s u s p e n d o r ev en b a n n e w sp a p e rs and p e r i o d i c a l s f o r p u b l i s h i n g news o r o p i n io n s i t d i d n o t l i k e. T h e n, on F e b r u a r y 15, I9 6 0 a d e c r e e was a n n o u n c e d u n d e r w h ic h th e g o v e rn m e n t c o u ld w i t h h o ld n e w s p r in t fro m any n e w s p a p e r o r p e r i o d i c a l whose c o n t e n t s f a i l e d t o d e v e lo p p u b l i c o p i n io n a n d / o r a n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e a lo n g t h e l i n e s l a i d down b y S u k a rn o i n h i s A u g u st 1 7, 1959 s p e e c h. O c to b e r 1 2, 1 9 6 0, p u b l i s h e r s w ere t o l d t h a t t h e i r n e w s p a p e rs a n d p e r i o d i c a l s m ust s u p p o r t and d e f e n d th e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e A u g u st 17» 1959 s p e e c h, a s s i s t i n th e a b o l i t i o n o f l i b e r a l i s m, i m p e r i a l i s m an d s e p a r a t i s m, p ro m o te a f r e e a n d in d e p e n d e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d n o t b e i n s t r u m e n t s o f th e c o ld w a r, an d p ro m o te t h e I n d o n e s ia n p e rs o n a lity. On O c to b e r 3 1, t h e l i c e n c e s o f s e v e r a l S e e, f o r e x a m p le, HR, D ecem ber 3, 6, 19» 2 1, 23 an d === [PDF page 622] === 605 Djakarta newspapers were revoked, including that of the communist ’’Pantjawarta", formerly called "Sin Po". short, the government issued decrees with conditions so vague as to permit it to ban any newspaper if it is so desired. "Harian Rakjat" was saved from extinction by Sukarno’s protection, but the army continued to harass it with frequent suspensions. Of greater concern for PKI has been Sukarno’s effort to simplify the party system. On January 12, 1960, Sukarno issued a law entitled "Conditions and Simplifi cation of the Party System". Pour stipulations in the law could cause trouble for PKI: 1. political parties must accept and defend the 1945 constitution and the Pantjasila, and must use peaceful and democratic methods to attain their political goals; 2. political parties may receive assistance from abroad only with the consent of the government; 3. the president may order an investigation into the administration, finances and wealth of any party; 4« the president may dissolve any party whose programme is aimed at undermining the principles and objectives of state policy, or which has not officially condemned the actions of any member of the party who has acted in support of a rebellion. === [PDF page 623] === The PKI leaders were in no position to condemn the law out of hand. Lukman explained that the best way, the democratic way, to simplify parties would be through general elections and changes in the electoral law so that, for example, only parties receiving a certain percentage of votes could sit in parliament. At the same time, he meekly declared that PKI's attitude to the new law would depend on how the law was implemented. Later in 1960 the parties were required to present the government with a list of their branches and members 2 which PKI did on February 4* 1961. In an assessment of PKI's losses and gains during the first eighteen months of the Sukarno cabinet, the most important loss was the eradication of most aspects of democracy. Even if elections were to be held in the future, neither parliament nor the regional and lower representative councils could be expected to exercise much authority. The block of appointed military representatives in parliament also reduced what likelihood there was of a communist majority there. Strikes were RI, February 1960, p.16. On April 25, 1961, the PKI politbureau announced that so far 694*633 Party members had been registered with the government; HR, April 27* 1961. === [PDF page 624] === 607 repressed, BTI dared not lead any militant actions, demonstrations and rallies were forbidden except for causes chosen by the government, cadres were harassed. Worse still, the government now had laws by which it could ban PKI or its publications at will. And the importance for any communist party of presenting a non communist government with a list of its members cannot be exaggerated. However, in the power situation in which Sukarno needed PKI, the Party could make more criticisms than at first appeared possible - as was shown by the July 8, 1960 statement, the protests at the temporary bans on PKI in three regions, and the loud cries for a revision of the appointed regional and local councils, PKI would appear to have alienated many PNI and NU leaders, especially in the regions. Important factors in this alienation were their jealousy at PKI*s obvious favours from Sukarno, and their resentment at PKI*s superior organizational ability. At the centre, however, PNI and NU were forced to maintain at least overt friendship towards PKI. This was due partly to Sukarno 's insistence on nationalist-Moslem-communist unity which to oppose, he declared, was treason, and partly to PNIfs fear of the army and the need for an alliance with PKI to oppose what both parties regarded as the greatest danger to their existence === [PDF page 625] === 603 An ominous developm ent f o r PKI in 1960 was the a tte m p t "by th e M in is te r o f Labour to c r e a te an a l l em bracing tr a d e u n io n f e d e r a t io n, to be c a lle d OPPI, w hich would n o t b e under communist c o n tro l* Most o f th e non-com m unist u n io n s e x p re s se d t h e i r s u p p o rt f o r h is e f f o r t s, and com m ittees to p re p a re such a f e d e r a tio n were e s t a b l i s h e d in s e v e r a l p r o v in c e s. SOBSI s tr e n u o u s ly r e s i s t e d th e m i n i s t e r ’s e f f o r t s. Sukarno e i t h e r s u p p o rte d SOBSI o r r e a c te d n e g a tiv e ly to th e id e a o f OPPI f o r o th e rw ise OPPI would a lr e a d y be in e x is te n c e. Of th e ad v an tag es a c c ru in g to PKI from th e f i r s t e ig h te e n months o f th e Sukarno c a b in e t, th e most im p o rta n t was th e c o n tin u e d e x is te n c e o f th e P a rty and i t s mass o r g a n iz a tio n s. The P a r ty even in tro d u c e d a second th r e e - y e a r p la n, BTI lau n ch ed i t s f i r s t th r e e - y e a r p la n o f o r g a n iz a tio n and e d u c a tio n, w h ile SOBSI in August 1960 fo rm u la te d i t s f i r s t th r e e - y e a r p la n. At th e same tim e, Masjumi and PSI were o rd e re d on August 17> I960 to d is s o lv e th e m se lv e s, and th e D em ocratic League, formed The D em ocratic League was r e p o r te d ly formed by le a d e r s o f M asjum i, PSI and IPKI w ith th e co nnivance o f c e r t a i n s e c tio n s o f th e c e n t r a l army le a d e r s h ip. I t s s h o r t- te r m g o a l was to p re v e n t th e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f th e a p p o in te d p a r lia m e n t; i t s lo n g -te rm g o al was to b r in g to g e th e r th e d iv e r s e elem en ts d i s s a t i s f i e d w ith S u k arn o ’s le a d e r s h ip. Some members o f NU, th e C h r is t ia n p a r t i e s and even PNI were a t t r a c t e d in to i t. B u t, a g a in r e p o r te d ly, th o se === [PDF page 626] === 609 in March 1960, was banned on February 27, 1961* The only anti-communist newspapers in Djakarta, "Abadi”, "Nusantara", "Pedoman” and "Pos Indonesia” were all closed* In return for their support of Sukarno, the commu nists were given considerable representation in the three new governmental bodies: the National Advisory Council and the National Planning Council, installed on August 15 9 1959» and the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly, which began work on November 10, 1960. PKI was also given representation in the executive committee of the National Front, a Sukarno organization, installed on September 8, 1960. When the appointed heads of autonomous regions were announced in the first months of 1960, communists obtained the posts of deputy governor in West and Central Java, and of deputy mayor in Djakarta. The communist mayors in at least Surabaja, Surakarta, Magelang and Salatiga were re-installed, and a communist became mayor of Tjirebon, a post formerly held by NU. It was widely rumoured that Sukarno had wanted to appoint communists as governors, but that he had retreated before army objections. None of the positions given to PKI sections of the central army leadership which had supported the formation of the League soon withdrew their protection and the League failed to prosper. === [PDF page 627] === 610 entailed, real power, but they did provide status rewards for important Party cadres, they allowed some extra pressure to be exerted on the government, they increased the Party’s knowledge of administrative procedures (which would be important if PKI should ever win control of Indonesia), and they provided apparent proof for Party members of the leadership’s assertion that PKI was moving ever nearer to power. Of long-term importance to PKI was the retention of the key political position by Sukarno and the radical nationalists. reform may Plans for economic development or land have been talked about, but the emphasis was on continued nationalist agitation, diatribes against Western colonialism, and the struggle to liberate West Irian. Meanwhile the economy deteriorated. communists assured As several me in private, the ruling group was utterly incapable of making profound improvements in Indonesia’s social and economic condition, which meant that social tensions must increase and the basis of communist support must be both strengthened and broadened. The PKI leaders may also have been content to see the army participating but not dominant in the Sukarno cabinet. If the cabinet failed to solve Indonesia’s major problems, and it gave no indication that it would succeed, then both Sukarno and the army might be discredited. PKI === [PDF page 628] === 611 might then appear as the only alternative, the other political forces having tried and failed. Sakirman, writing in May 1960, admitted that there was concern within the Party at the support given for the return to the 1945 constitution and for the establish ment of guided democracy. Some comrades were asking whether guided democracy was not in fact *a semi-fascist political and economic system more criminal than liberal democracy*. Others were concerned that the Party, by identifying with the Sukarno government, would be blamed by the people for the continuing economic deterioration. In reply, Sakirman said that since the failure of the Constituent Assembly to produce a new constitution, the Party *has tried hard to decide on a correct and true political attitude* on the basis of a Leninist analysis of the Party*s past and present experience. The situ ation *is difficult*, he admitted, especially as the middle group held state power, possibly a unique situ ation never before faced by a communist party. But the Party already had the correct strategy and main tactics of the Indonesian revolution. Where the Party was not Sakirman, "Apa Arti**, BM, part I, May-June 1960, pp.194-219; part II, July-August 1960, pp.320-40, 348. === [PDF page 629] === 612 yet in complete agreement was Concerning problems of day-to-day tactics or short-term political tactics*. repeated the official Party view that the contradictions between the ruling groups and the democratic forces outside the cabinet were not basic, but were contra dictions within the people. In order to reassure the doubtful, he declared that the Party*s general line, especially since the restoration of the 1945 constitution, *has given beneficial results and gives a perspective that will make the internal and external reactionaries tremble*. The Party leadership was itself concerned at the behaviour of the ruling groups. When the Nehru govern ment evicted the communist-led cabinet in Kerala, Aidit warned that *even though the proletariat wants to take the peaceful path to win victory for its policy, the bourgeoisie will not voluntarily accept this path* but cast aside democracy when it was harmful to its interests."12 In February 1960, Aidit wrote of Indonesia that groups of the national bourgeoisie, 'some jointly with the compradore bourgeoisie, want to take the road of military or personal dictatorship*. RI, September-October 1959, pp.8-9* D.N. Aidit, "For National Unity", World Marxist Review, February 1960, p.21. === [PDF page 630] === I n h i s s p e e c h t o th e c e n t r a l c o m m itte e p lenum a t th e e n d o f D ecem ber 1960, h o w e v e r, A i d i t e x p r e s s e d o n ly c o n f id e n c e i n th e c o u rs e o f e v e n t s i n I n d o n e s i a. c la im e d t h a t ‘b a s i c a l l y t h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n a t home c o n t i n u e s t o s h i f t to th e l e f t i n s p i t e o f th e many d i f f i c u l t i e s, o b s t a c l e s an d t r o u b l e s *, and t h a t th e co m m u n ists 'h a v e a c h ie v e d c e r t a i n e n c o u ra g in g s u c c e s s e s in b u ild in g th e n a ti o n a l f r o n t *. He c a l l e d on members t o i n t e n s i f y t h e i r w ork o f b u i l d i n g th e P a r t y, e s p e c i a l l y b y w ork among th e p e a s a n t s, b u t re m in d e d them t h a t 'The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e we m ust a d h e re t o i n th e c o n d u c t o f th e n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e i s t o s u b o r d i n a t e th e c l a s s s t r u g g l e t o th e n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e * - m a i n t a i n i n g, o f c o u r s e, th e in d e p e n d e n c e o f th e P a r t y. I n s h o r t, A i d i t 's s p e e c h c o n t a i n e d n o h i n t o f an o v e r h a u l o f th e form o f th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y t h a t had b e e n i n o p e r a t i o n s in c e e a r ly i n 1952. S u p p o rt f o r S u k a rn o w ould c o n tin u e b e c a u s e th e a l t e r n a t i v e, o p p o s i t i o n, w ould s p e l l t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e P a r t y a t l e a s t a s an a b o v e -g ro u n d o rg a n iz a tio n. B ut was t h e o p tim is m e x p r e s s e d b y S a k irm a n a n d A i d i t o n ly in te n d e d to s t r e n g t h e n th e f l a g g i n g m o ra le o f P a r t y m em bers? The P a r t y h a d s u r v i v e d, and any A id it, "M adju T e r u s ", HR, J a n u a r y 2, 1961. === [PDF page 631] === 614 a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y w ould b r in g s t e r n r e p r e s s io n, b u t was PKI, in f a c t, m aking p r o g r e s s tow ards i t s b a s i c g o a l, th e a ssu m p tio n o f power? === [PDF page 632] === CONCLUSION === [PDF page 633] === CONCLUSION The Situation in 1951 When the Aidit leadership won control of PKI in January 1951» certain factors made a militantly oppo sitionist policy seem to contain little if any likelihood of bringing the Party to power in the foreseeable future: the condition of the Party, the relative weakness of social antagonisms, the completion of the political revolution (except for the liberation of West Irian), the strong coercive power available to the government, the geographical nature of Java, and the international situation. In January 1951* the total membership of PKI was about four or five thousands. Work to re-establish the Party organization, after the Madiun rebellion and the second Dutch attack, was being undertaken but was not far advanced. The lines of command from the centre to the members were, apparently, still tenuous, while many of the local and regional leaders were unsatisfactory to the Aidit leadership. Furthermore, the Socialist Party of Tan Ling Djie was still in existence, and the Indonesian Labour Party had been dissolved officially only in October === [PDF page 634] === 1950. The Aidit leadership therefore urgently needed time in order to re-establish an efficient Party organi zation, to weed out undesirable elements from within the central, regional and local leadership bodies, to effect the dissolution of the Socialist Party, and to sift the membership of the two ’cover parties* and incorporate into PKI those of their members who were found to be trustworthy. The Madiun disaster had a profound and lasting psychological effect on all levels of the PKI leadership. Although at the outbreak of the rebellion PKI had had armed units at its command, these had been broken quickly by only a small part of the government forces. Most of the top-level leaders had been killed, and many thousands of communists and sympathizers had been imprisoned, escaping trial only because of the disorganization caused by the second Dutch attack. As a result, the surviving Party leaders dreaded the occurrence of a ’second Madiun* and they sought policies which could avoid another insurrection, either one planned by the Party or one provoked by the government. At the same time as the Party was unprepared physically and psychologically for a militant policy, social conditions in Indonesia further discouraged mili tancy. The Indonesian revolution of 1945 to 1949» being === [PDF page 635] === primarily a struggle for national independence from a foreign power, was not fought for the radical alteration of society at all levels* Nor were *the masses*, the poorer sections of the urban and rural populations, aroused to demand a social revolution* Under Dutch rule the poorer sections of society were, on the whole, successfully insulated from political party activities or even from sectional mass organizations such as trade unions and peasant associations. Under the Japanese, political parties, trade unions and peasant associations were banned. And although the Moslems were encouraged to organize Masjumi and the nationalists were allowed to broadcast nationalist propaganda, neither group prepared its followers for radical social change. Masjumi was led by generally conservative Moslems, while nationalist propaganda was directed towards building a sense of Asianness, towards fomenting anti-white hatred. During the revolution, from August 1945 to December 19499 the Republican leaders could demand and receive support on the basis of nationalism alone. Vague, almost mystical, concepts of a future just and prosperous society were created, but few concrete programmes of social and economic re-organization. Where mass organizations and *people*s armies' were formed, the basic rallying force was either nationalism, religion, charisma or a combination === [PDF page 636] === C i o of these, not the promise of social revolution. With the success of the political revolution, Indonesians moved in to fill the political and administrative posts formerly reserved for Dutchmen, but the condition of the workers and peasants was little affected. The political revolution led to neither a strong demand from the poorer levels of society for radical social change, nor a realization among those levels that by organization such a change could be effected. In 1951, there were certain areas of the countryside, especially around estates and where peasant squatters had occupied estate and forestry lands, where a certain political consciousness and the makings of political radicalism were to be found among the rural poor. Elsewhere, in the great majority of villages, social antagonisms remained weak. Inequalities existed in both social and economic life, but, in Java at least, village society was able to absorb an increasing population with out creating a genuinely alienated agricultural prole tariat. It is significant that the political revolution was not accompanied by popular demands for land reform or by peasant attacks on landlords and moneylenders. Demands for the removal of inequalities were not made because, in general, the poorer peasants accepted the inequalities as natural, not as an injustice. Long after 1951 > the PKI === [PDF page 637] === 619 leaders complained that even some cadres were unable to see in what ways the peasants were exploited by the landlords. After over five years of extensive work among the peasants, the PKI leaders in 1959 admitted that 'The task of cultivating the peasants 12 trust in the Party and of convincing the peasants of their own strength is a difficult one, especially in view of their backwardness', and that the task would be completed only after *a long time, facing difficult tests, and hard and diligent work'.^ In January 1960, the BTI leaders acknowledged the difficulty they were meeting 'to convince the peasants of the justice of the 6:4 demand and of the power of the peasants' unity'. That is, the peasants were still unaware that they themselves could alter conditions, or even that it was just to demand a larger proportion of the harvest for the sharecropper. In 1951 the situation in the towns resembled that in the villages: the 'tradition of open obedience* was still strong among the poorer sections of society, and social antagonism was no more than latent. There were few workers employed in large, impersonal undertakings and PKI, "Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum Tani" (Report on Party Work among the Peasants), BM, April-May 1959, p.139* ST, January 1960, p.3* === [PDF page 638] === 620 few with experience in trade union work* Even during the revolution, militant trade union action was at a minimum: in the Republican areas it was regarded as antipatriotic, and in the Dutch-occupied areas it was not permitted. Other mass organizations among the poorer classes were either small (such as Pesindo, which had been badly broken by the participation of many of its members in the Madiun rebellion), newly formed or as yet unformed in January 1951- In short, the Indonesian urban poor were in no condition for revolution or for militant action of any description* Aidit, speaking in May 1958 to the first national conference of communist women, described the submissive, passive nature of the workers as seen from the communists* point of view: The greatest obstruction to Party work among working women is the old-fashioned belief, still dominant, that the present bad situation is predestined and cannot be altered. This old-fashioned belief also exists among the men. It would, perhaps, be misleading to state that the Dutch repressed militant trade union action during the revo lution. The Indonesian workers in the Dutch-occupied areas did not attempt to engage in massive strike action, even for nationalist reasons. I have not heard, for example, of large scale strike action b y the Indonesian dock labourers or transport workers in order to disrupt the flow of Dutch military equipment into Indonesia. D.N. Aidit, "Wanita Komunis Pedjuang untuk Masjarakat Baru" (Communist Women, Fighters for a New Society), BM, June 1958, p.247- === [PDF page 639] === L» r-s As for what the PKI leaders call the urban petty bourgeoisie, many of its members had joined non-communist political parties, mass organizations and armed groups during the revolution. Any propensity for political radicalism among them was considerably diminished by the status, if not material, benefits they reaped from the victory of the political revolution. The Indonesian petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie filled the administrative and political positions vacated by the Dutch, and the many new positions afforded by the burgeoning bureaucracy. In both China and Viet Nam the communists were able to win the allegiance of broad sections of the indigenous society through the appeal of nationalism, resistance to the foreign invaders. In 1951 the political revolution in Indonesia was over, with the exception of the struggle for West Irian which at that time was not yet a focussing point of militant nationalist fervour. Political forces other than the non-communists had been brought to power, and non-communist radical nationalists could shout at least as hard as PKI in any future nationalist agitation over West Irian. Furthermore, the Indonesian government had at its command strong coercive power in case of communist attempts to seize power or disrupt the economy by sabotage and guerrilla bands. In January 1951» the === [PDF page 640] === PKI leaders had neither access to weapons nor more than a handful of supporters in the armed forces. The geographical nature of Java also militates against a communist attempt at forceful overthrow or disruption of the government before there is strong PKI infiltration into the armed forces and government apparatus. All but about twenty per cent of the long, narrow island is occupied by cultivated land, towns, villages, roads, and rivers, while the scattered pockets of mountain and forest are mostly encircled by good rail or road communications. The relatively extensive tracts of more impenetrable country are in West Java (especially south of the line Bogor-Bandung-Banjumas) and in the extreme east of East Java - both areas with strongly santrl populations, while the anti-communist Darul Islam operates in the West Java area. The international situation in ^95^ also discouraged a bid by the Indonesian communists to seize power through violence. The United States had made clear by the Korean War and the seventh fleet*s protection of Taiwan that it would fight to prevent a communist victory in eastern Asia, and it had the ability to stop large scale aid reaching communist rebels in Indonesia. In Malaya, the British were waging a ruthless war against the Malayan === [PDF page 641] === €23 Communist Party that had chosen to start a war of liberation* While in 1951 conditions were unfavourable for either insurrectionary action or a militant anti-government stand on the part of PKI, there were many factors in the situation which encouraged the leadership to choose a long-term policy of extending greatly its support among the masses, and exploiting the differences among the other political forces* These favourable factors were: the disunity of the national revolutionary leadership, the lack of rival political and mass organizations among the urban and rural poor, the lack of strong, vested *antipeople* political interests in the countryside and the towns, and the general socio-economic pressures apparently working against the prevailing social calm. Indonesia has no ’liberator party*, such as the Congress Party in India, the Anti-Fascist People’s League in Burma, and the Viet Minh in Viet Nam, with an accepted right to govern and with an unrivalled organization* The Indonesian political elite was divided between person alities, between different concepts of the revolution, between santri and non-santri parties. Even the santri population was divided politically between the amorphous Masjumi, within which different groups were maintaining an uneasy alliance that was soon to break, and the smaller === [PDF page 642] === PSII and Perti Within each party, santri or not, cliques jockeyed for position and at times broke away to form new parties. The fragmented, clique nature of the revolutionary leadership was reflected in parliament where no two parties combined could command a majority, where parties struggled for office and the spoils of office, and where cliques within parties worked against each other. In this situation, PKI was given the possibility of forging alliances with other political forces. This possibility was greatly increased by the emergent power conflict between FNI and Masjumi, in which PNI was to seek allies against what it considered to be its most dangerous rival. In 1951» the santri population was already relatively well organized under the Masjumi party and the Moslem associations which were its associate members. But the lower levels of the non-santri population, in both urban and rural areas, were still largely untouched by political parties and mass organizations. The few mass organi zations of any size that existed, notably SOBSI, BTI and Pesindo, had fallen under communist control, despite PKI*s small size, because of the absence of other claimants. The non-communist, non-santri political forces were engrossed in the in-fighting within the political elite, little concerned with developing strong grass-roots === [PDF page 643] === organizations because they believed that ’the masses’ were without important political effect. The Aidit leadership was therefore presented with the possibility of filling the political and organizational vacuum among the poorer non-santris. Indonesia, and more specifically Java, lacked strong socio-economic vested interests, with political power, that could successfully oppose the spread of political parties and mass organizations in either rural or urban areas. Java had very few large landowners who could control the politics of their peasants. Most of the few areas with a significant number of large landowners were strongly santri, where PKI, anyway, could not be expected to make large advances. And neither the lurahs nor members of the pamong pradja were effective barriers to the growth of parties and mass organizations. This absence of strong ’class enemies* in the villages facilitated the growth of parties and mass organizations, as it also made more difficult the communists’ task of creating or increasing social antagonisms. In the towns and the estates, the large employers were mostly foreigners The other non-santri forces did realize, of course, that mass support would be vital when elections were held, but they presumed that they could rely on traditional authorities to mobilize that support. === [PDF page 644] === with little or no political power in newly-independent Indonesia, and the government, in general, encouraged the growth of trade unions and supported trade union demands against the foreigners. That is, there was no effective harrier to the growth of trade unions or other mass organizations and political parties in the towns. Finally, despite the prevalence of relative social calm among the Indonesian poorer classes, both urban workers and peasants had many small problems which any organization could exploit in order to win support. Furthermore, expectations had been raised among certain sections of the poorer classes as a result of the revo lution and the subsequent increase in elementary education while the relentless population growth could be expected to create or exacerbate social conflict. The National United Front Implemented A communist party is not compelled to pursue a policy which seems from available evidence to be most suitable to its own growth in a particular situation. A party may take a line that leads to decimation or stagnation as a result of doctrinal rigidity, of the leaders* personal preference for a particular line, or of instructions or suggestions from Moscow. In the case of PKI, it appears that after the failure of the Madiun rebellion Moscow did === [PDF page 645] === n o t in t e r v e n e in PKI p o lic y -m a k in g. The A i d i t le a d e r s h i p, em erg in g as th e c l e a r v i c t o r s in an i n t e r n a l P a r ty d i s p u t e, and f r e e from f o r e ig n i n t e r f e r e n c e, was a b le to d e c id e w hat o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y was m ost l i k e l y t o p e r m it th e P a r ty to grow and e v e n t u a l ly to win pow er. The s t r a t e g y c h o se n was a lo n g -te r m one d e s ig n e d to e x p l o i t th e fa v o u r a b le f a c t o r s in th e In d o n e sia n s i t u a t i o n. The A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p ’s b road n a t i o n a l u n it e d fr o n t p o l i c y h a s e n t a i l e d two main t a s k s: b u i ld in g mass su p p o rt among th e p o l i t i c a l l y uncom m itted and u n o rg a n ize d m asses (and c r e a t i n g from t h a t su p p o r t a mass p a r t y, d i s c i p l i n e d and i n d o c t r in a t e d ); and w in n in g th e c o o p e r a tio n o f a broad range o f o t h e r p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s, avowed a n ti-c o m m u n is ts. in f a c t w ith a l l b u t th e The n a t i o n a l u n it e d fr o n t se r v e d and s e r v e s s e v e r a l p u r p o s e s, t h a t i s, i t p r e p a r e s f o r s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e ways o f a c h ie v in g pow er. Mass su p p o rt was n e c e s s a r y f o r a p o s s i b l e e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y. I t was n e c e s s a r y t o in c r e a s e th e P a r t y ’s b a r g a in in g p o s i t i o n in th e p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e, to make th e P a r t y ’s a l l i a n c e w orth s e e k in g. I t was a ls o n e c e s s a r y t o p rep are f o r v i c t o r y b y o th e r m ean s, b e c a u se in 1951 PKI had few good c a d r e s, few members in s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s in th e armed f o r c e s and b u r e a u c r a c y, and l i t t l e d i s c i p l i n e d su p p o rt lo c a t e d in s t r a t e g i c i n d u s t r i e s or s t r a t e g i c g e o g r a p h ic a l a r e a s. In o r d e r t o d i s c i p l i n e th e mass s u p p o r t, th e P a r ty had to === [PDF page 646] === be enlarged and to be trained in political and organi zational matters. Cooperation with the broadest range of non-communist political forces was desirable for three reasons. First, it was probable that the recruitment of mass support and the building of a large Party would have been impossible without it. A disruptive, oppositionist policy could have brought down repressive government action, which PKI, small and weak, was in no position to withstand. Second, friendship with the non-communists might have prepared the way for communist participation in the government and an eventual bloodless seizure of power. Third, alliance with the non-communists opened the possibility of isolating and breaking the anti-communists as part of the piecemeal destruction of the other political forces. These two basic tasks forced the Aidit leadership to build a certain image of the Party, without which neither task could have been accomplished: the image of PKI as militantly patriotic, sympathetic to religion, responsible and self-effacing, democratic, opposed to the use of violence in the attainment of political goals (other than the restoration of West Irian), and humanitarian. In order to build mass support, the Aidit leadership has relied basically on a vast network of mass organi- === [PDF page 647] === €29 zations; to consolidate, discipline and train that mass support, it has relied basically on the Party itself. The great majority of the people that the Indonesian communists sought to attract and organize had such a low level of political awareness that they were unprepared for entry into a communist party. Therefore mass organi zations have been built, each aimed at a specific section of 'the people', each attuned to the simplest demands of its respective section, and each seeking to attract the largest possible number of people in that section. With the exception of Pemuda Rakjat, each mass organization has maintained the fiction of political independence largely in order not to alienate potential members. The Aidit leadership has attempted to raise the political conscious ness of the ordinary members of the mass organizations, and to create from out of the mass membership a welltrained body of cadres sind activists. Through 'small, insignificant, trifling* actions in defence or promotion of the people's interests, an attempt has been made to overcome 'the tradition of open obedience' of authorities, 'the old-fashioned belief that the present bad situation is predestined and cannot be altered*. This work is slow, but it has been hoped to use each action to teach two lessons: that 'class enemies* are responsible for the === [PDF page 648] === 630 existing inequalities, and that those class enemies can be successfully opposed by united, organized action* Mass support has been viewed as the essential material from which to create a large body of trained cadres and activists. The more active members of the mass organizations have been brought into PKI and there given political and organizational education. Since August 1956, when the PKI first three-year plan of organization and education went into effect, an education system has been established that reaches from the centre into the ordinary members* groups. As the Aidit leadership has become assured of the loyalty and capabilities of the Party members in the mass organizations, the larger mass organizations themselves have initiated their own Partyplanned education systems. It is claimed that so far several hundred thousand cadres and activists have passed through the schools and courses of PKI and its mass organizations• The Party and its mass organizations have worked together in the geographical spread of the communist movement. In fact, cadres often work for two or even more organizations. Where conditions are favourable, a Party organization is first established, which then helps establish mass organizations. In other places, mass organizations are established first, the more active === [PDF page 649] === members trained, and then a Party organization created. Where Party and mass organizations exist together, the Party assists the mass organizations in matters of organi zation, while they in turn act not only as ’spheres of influence* for the Party, but also as recruiting grounds for Party members. Although the Aidit leadership has at its disposal larger funds than any other Indonesian party, they are not inexhaustible and there has been the question of priority in the apportionment of funds and cadres. The Party itself has received first priority, but it is closely followed by SOBSI which is perhaps the major recruiting agent for Party membership, and which, with its membership in key industries, is certainly the best potential weapon in case of a political crisis. Since July 1953» the communist leaders have made repeated avowals of the agrarian nature of the Indonesian revolution, and in December i960 Aidit once more called on the Party to give special attention to work among the peasants. At the same time, BTI remains chronically short of money and cadres. Here, then, there seems to be a discrepancy between what the Aidit leadership says and the actual work carried out by the communist organization. Work in the rural areas has been hampered by the great difficulty of developing good cadres from the peasantry, and by the === [PDF page 650] === reluctance of urban cadres and activists to go into the villages. It is also possible that the leaders of PKI, like the other political leaders in Indonesia, may in fact consider the peasantry to be really of little political importance in the foreseeable future, especially when the future of free elections and of the authority of parliament appears to be severely restricted. Pemuda Rakjat has received priority somewhere a little behind BTI, with Gerwani trailing far in the rear. In viewing the other political forces, the young communists early drew a distinction between the noncommunists, among whom PNI was the most important party, and the anti-communists, to be found mainly in Masjumi. In 1951 PNI and Masjumi were already in disagreement over matters of policy, personality, and the distribution of government offices. PKI threw what weight it had in an attempt to widen the gap between the two main parties, and to exclude Masjumi from office. The PNI leaders welcomed PKI*s proffered friendship because its advantages were large, its cost apparently minor. The support of PKI strengthened PNI in its struggle first to be the major partner in a coalition government, and then to be the dominant party in a government that excluded what was considered to be its most dangerous rival, Masjumi. Alliance with PKI also meant that the communists withheld === [PDF page 651] === criticism from PNI ministers and directed their attacks against PNI*s enemies, Masjumi and PSI. In return for its support, PKI asked for neither inclusion in the government nor a share in the spoils of office, hut merely government toleration of communist organizational and propaganda work, and a corner of the broad cloak of nationalist respectability. The PNI leaders also believed that should PKI grow large and become truculent, it could still easily be put back into place, especially with the help of Sukarno. On August 1, 1953» PNI at last formed a cabinet that excluded Masjumi and PSI. The exclusion of Masjumi from government office during the long period of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, the cabinet's direct dependence on communist votes from October 1954 to August 1955» and the PNI's open friendship with the communists, further exacerbated the hostility between the two main parties particularly as PNI was using its position in the govern ment to fill the party's coffers and to consolidate its control of the bureaucracy in preparation for the general elections. After its control of the government for the two years preceding the general elections, PNI was able to emerge from the elections as the largest party although Masjumi had been expected to win. The PNI victory in turn affected the power balance after the elections. === [PDF page 652] === 63 i During the brief Burhanudin Harahap cabinet, PNI, PKI and Sukarno cooperated in attacks on the Masjumi-led govern ment, thus decreasing what possibility there remained for a true rapprochement between Masjumi and the nationalists. Masjumi was to withdraw from the second Ali cabinet after only nine months. In February 1958 many of the Masjumi leaders joined the unsuccessful PRRI-Permesta rebellion, and in August 1960 Sukarno ordered the dissolution of the party. In short, PKI*s policy of low-price support for PNI was one of the factors that separated Masjumi further from PNI, and that permitted those nationalists tolerant of PKI to play the major role in the government, certainly during the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. It is interesting to speculate what would have been the course of Indonesian politics if the Aidit leadership had pursued a militant, oppositionist and disruptive policy as the communist parties did in Malaya, Burma and the Philippines. If PKI had pursued a disruptive policy, not only is it likely that PKI would have been reduced to a minor, persecuted sect, but it is possible that PNI would have been forced to maintain the basic Masjumi-PNI coalition, and that Masjumi would have retained the major role in that coalition. And if Masjumi had continued to participate in, let alone dominate, the pre-election === [PDF page 653] === cabinets, it is possible that the election results would have been far less in PNI's favour, which in turn would have had major repercussions on post-election politics« During the second Ali Sastroamidjojo and the Djuanda cabinets, the power situation in Indonesia changed radically. The focus of power moved away from the parties and parliament to extra-parliamentary forces: Sukarno, the regionalists, and the central army command. PKI was too weak to stand alone in the new situation, and a mutually protective alliance was forged with Sukarno against first the regionalists and then the central army leadership. The price of Sukarno’s alliance was a certain domestication of the Party, servile praise of the president, and grumbling acquiescence to the curtailment of political freedom and of the power of parliament. return, the Party received the p r e s i d e n t s protection against severe repression by the army, it exploited his prestige in order to win wider support, and it enjoyed his patronage to gain substantial representation in a wide range of governmental bodies. Communist support for Sukarno would seem to have influenced the course of events since 1956 - apart from ensuring that the large communist organization was kept intact. In order to demonstrate Sukarno’s apparently tremendous popularity, the communist organization has been === [PDF page 654] === 630 u s e d t o a s s e m b le huge cro w d s t o h e a r S u k a rn o s p e a k, to s e n d f l o o d s o f p e t i t i o n s, l e t t e r s, d e l e g a t i o n s an d t e l e g r a m s i n p r a i s e o f th o s e o f h i s p r o p o s a l s t h a t PKI f a v o u r s, a n d to e m b e l l i s h w a l l s w ith h i s l a t e s t s l o g a n. S u k a r n o ’s p e r s o n a l p o p u l a r i t y i s so f o r c e f u l l y demon s tra te d t h a t th e arm y l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n a f r a i d t o a tt e m p t t o r e l e g a t e him t o a l e s s e x a l t e d p o s i t i o n. And know ing t h a t t h e arm y d a r e n o t a tt e m p t t o r e p l a c e h im, S u k a rn o h a s u s e d t h e c o m m u n ists a s a l e v e r to e x a c t c o n c e s s i o n s from th e m i l i t a r y: e i t h e r th e y a c c e p t a c e r t a i n p r o p o s a l, o r t h e c o m m u n ists w i l l b e g iv e n more o f f i c i a l p o s t s, p e rh a p s e v e n s e a t s i n th e c a b i n e t. Due i n p a r t t o a s s u r e d com m unist s u p p o r t, th e r a d i c a l n a tio n a lis ts, i n c l u d i n g S u k a rn o, h a v e o b t a i n e d a m a jo r p a r t i n g o v e rn m e n t. T hey h a v e e m p h a siz e d n a t i o n a l i s t, a n ti- im p e r ia lis t a g ita tio n (w h ic h PKI c a n e x p l o i t t o o ), n o t e co n o m ic g ro w th an d p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i z a t i o n t h a t m ig h t rem ove o r r e d u c e th e b a s e s o f com m unist s u p p o r t. I t is m ost p r o b a b l e, f o r e x a m p le, t h a t a s s u r e d com m unist s u p p o r t and good b e h a v i o u r e n c o u ra g e d t h e r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t s to s e i z e a l l D u tc h p r o p e r t y i n D ecem ber 1957 d e s p i t e s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n ev en w i t h i n th e c a b i n e t. s h o r t ru n a t l e a s t, E c o n o m ic a lly, i n th e t h e t a k e - o v e r was d i s r u p t i v e, and l e d to i n c r e a s e d unem ploym ent a n d i n f l a t i o n, d e c r e a s e d === [PDF page 655] === 637 p r o d u c t i o n, an d a g ra v e t r a n s p o r t c r i s i s i n many o f th e e x p o rt-p ro d u c in g o u te r is la n d s. C om m unist s u p p o r t f o r PNI an d f o r S u k a rn o e n a b le d them t o b e more u n c o m p ro m isin g to w a rd s th o s e th e y c o n s i d e r e d to b e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e n e m ie s: M asju m i, PSI a n d th e r e g i o n a l i s t s. M asjum i and PSI w ere f i r s t f o r c e d i n t o th e o p p o s itio n; th e n S u k a rn o s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h s t o o d th e s tro n g p re s s u re in 1957 t o r e s t o r e H a tta t o a m a jo r r o l e i n th e g o v e rn m e n t; a n d, f i n a l l y, th e r e g i o n a l i s t s an d some l e a d e r s o f M asjum i an d P S I w ere d r i v e n, b y t h e i r c o n ti n u e d e x c l u s i o n fro m a r o l e i n t h e c e n t r a l g o v e rn m e n t, i n t o t h e a b o r t i v e P R R I-P e rm e sta r e v o l t. The arm ed s t r e n g t h o f th e o p en a n ti- c o m m u n is ts was q u i c k l y e l i m i n a t e d, an d S u k a rn o was g iv e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b a n b o th M asjum i and P S I. Once t h e r e v o l t was b r o k e n, com m unist s u p p o r t f o r S u k a rn o was a n i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r, a s we h a v e s e e n, i n e n a b l i n g th e p r e s i d e n t t o r e t a i n th e p r im a r y p o s i t i o n i n h i s g o v e rn m e n ta l a l l i a n c e w ith th e c e n t r a l array l e a d e r s h i p. W h ile many f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d t o th e c o u r s e o f e v e n t s s i n c e t h e 1955 e l e c t i o n s, i t i s re a s o n a b le to a sk w h e th e r t h e c o u r s e w ould hav e b e e n d i f f e r e n t i f PKI i n th e p o s t - e l e c t i o n p e r i o d had b e e n d i s r u p t i v e an d o b s t r u c t i o n i s t, n o t c a l c u l a t i n g l y f r i e n d l y w ith th e ra d ic a l n a tio n a lis ts. F o r e x a m p le, c o u ld S u k a rn o an d === [PDF page 656] === PNI, without assured communist support, have successfullyresisted the demands for the restoration of Hatta to a prominent position in the government? If Hatta had been restored to such a position, would the seizure of Dutch property have been effected in such an ill-prepared manner, and would the rebellion have occurred? And if PKI had not supported Sukarno would he have been able to retain the leading position in his government coalition with the central army leadership? The Situation in 1961 In January 1961, the Aidit leadership, after ten years in control of PKI, had cause for both satisfaction and for concern. An organizational network had been built which was claimed to include almost two million members in the Party itself and about nine millions in the mass organizations. These claims were exaggerated, but it is certain that several million people belonged to or were associated with one or other of the organizations led by PKI, and that the organizational network was strengthened by a large body of full-time, politically indoctrinated cadres. At the same time, PKI was in alliance with President Sukarno and had been granted substantial representation on a large number of govern mental bodies, ranging from parliament and the People’s === [PDF page 657] === 630 C o n s u l t a t i v e A ssem bly t o t h e N a t io n a l A d v is o ry C o u n c il, t h e N a t i o n a l P la n n in g C o u n c il, th e N a t i o n a l F r o n t, and th e p r o v i n c i a l and l o c a l c o u n c ils. On t h e o t h e r h a n d, th e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s w ere s t i l l f a r s t r o n g e r th a n PK I, an d th e com m unists a p p e a re d t o b e s t i l l f a r from p o w er. S u k a rn o was an a l l y, b u t a s a n a b le p o l i t i c a l m a n i p u l a t o r he was c o n c e rn e d w ith m a i n t a i n i n g PKI a s a d o m e s tic a te d f o r c e an d w ith p r e v e n t i n g i t fro m a c q u i r i n g s u f f i c i e n t pow er t o b e a b le to c h a l le n g e b y i t s e l f th e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s. The o t h e r m a jo r p a r t n e r i n th e g o v e rn m e n t, th e arm y l e a d e r s h i p, seem ed w i l l i n g an d a b le to im p o se c r i p p l i n g r e p r e s s i v e m e a su re s on PKI a n d i t s m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s - i f S u k a r n o 's v e to on su c h a c t i o n w ere rem o v ed. W hile th e com m unist o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d e x p a n d e d a n d grow n s t r o n g e r, t h e arm y to o h ad im p ro v ed g r e a t l y i t s its fig h tin g a b il i ty. in te r n a l u n ity, i t s e q u ip m e n t, and PKI was i n no p o s i t i o n y e t to f i g h t t h e arm y, and th e arm y a l s o c o u ld b e e x p e c te d to r e c e i v e th e s u p p o r t o f th e p o l i c e an d th e pamong p r a d ja i n th e e v e n t o f a showdown w ith t h e c o m m u n ists. Many l e a d e r s o f b o t h FNI an d NU who h a d e a r l i e r b e e n open a l l i e s o f PKI w e re, i n J a n u a r y 1961, n o t u n w i l l i n g t o s e e th e s u p p r e s s i o n o f t h e com m unist o r g a n i z a t i o n. In s h o r t, th e s i t u a t i o n was v e ry d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f th e e a r l i e r y e a r s o f t h e A i d i t l e a d e r s h i p when a l a r g e m a j o r i t y o f th e === [PDF page 658] === 640 political elite as it was then constituted would not have contemplated op condoned anti-communist action by the government. Although the PKI leaders could point to their Party's impressive popular support, both in organizational member ship and electoral backing, they must have had misgivings about the quality of that support. As we have indicated particularly in the study of SOBSI and PKI's peasant support, it was extremely doubtful whether, in a crisis situation, PKI could count on the disciplined and militant action of its supporters. Given the general political conditions obtaining in January 1961, and given the dubious quality of their mass support, the PKI leaders had to envisage special organizational work in preparation for any one of three possible future situations: a con tinuation of the present situation, with legal recognition of the communist organization but restrictions on its freedom of action; severe repression by the central government or by sections of the army; and a situation providing an apparent opportunity to seize power. It appears at the time of writing that even a con tinuation of the existing situation contains dangers for the communist organization. It is conceivable that if the cadres and members of the Party reach the conclusion that the national united front policy has brought the === [PDF page 659] === P a r ty i n t o an im p asse, th e n i n t e r n a l d is p u te s c o u ld b re a k o u t o v e r q u e s tio n s o f d o c trin e and p o lic y * I t i s a ls o c o n c e iv a b le t h a t th e r e s t r i c t i v e m easures imposed on th e a c t i v i t i e s o f th e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and mass o r g a n iz a tio n s and th e t h r e a t o f s e v e re an ti-co m m u n ist r e p r e s s io n in th e f o r e s e e a b le f u tu r e co u ld hamper th e P a r ty in th e r e c r u itm e n t o f new members and co uld even s c a r e away some p r e s e n t members* There i s a l s o th e d anger f o r PKI t h a t i f th e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n c o n tin u e s, th e n c a d re s and a c t i v i s t s w ith p o s i t i o n s o f s t a t u s in th e P a rty o r mass o r g a n iz a tio n s o r governm ental b o d ie s from th e n a t io n a l p a r lia m e n t to th e v i l l a g e m ight become in f e c te d w ith b o u r g e o is v a l u e s 1, a t l e a s t to th e e x te n t o f lo s in g r e v o lu tio n a r y m ilita n c y * That i s, i f communist c a d re s and a c t i v i s t s o b ta in p o s it io n s o f s t a t u s and l o c a l o r even n a t i o n a l in flu e n c e under th e p r e s e n t regime th e y m ight lo s e what a rd o u r th e y have f o r th e o v erth ro w o f th e regime* ' fB o u r g e o is if ic a tio n seems to be a u n iv e r s a l co m p lain t o f p r o l e t a r i a n p a r t i e s In S u r a k a r ta, f o r exam ple, I met a communist member o f th e c i t y c o u n c il. He was a s c h o o lte a c h e r and liv e d in a kampong h o u se. As a c o u n c i l l o r, how ever, he had g r e a t p r e s t i g e: he mixed w ith th e s o c i a l e l i t e, ev en in c lu d in g th e Susuhunan, and re s e rv e d s e a t s f o r him and h i s w ife in th e f r o n t two rows o f th e S riw e d a ri w ajang t h e a t r e d em o n strate d h is h ig h s t a t u s to a l l. One wonders i f he would be w i l l i n g to r i s k h is e n v ia b le p o s i t i o n u n d er th e p r e s e n t regim e f o r the gamble o f m i l i t a n t a c tio n * === [PDF page 660] === 64 0 w o r k in g o p e n ly in b o u r g e o is s o c i e t i e s, an d PKI w ould seem t o b e no e x c e p t i o n. PKI l e a d e r s h a v e h i n t e d on o c c a s i o n t h a t some o f t h e i r c a d r e s h a v e becom e ’d e m o r a l i z e d 12 when th e y h a v e re c e iv e d p o s itio n s o f s t a t u s. F o r e x a m p le, th e c h a irm a n o f th e PKI g ro u p i n th e C e n t r a l J a v a r e g i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o u n c i l a d m itte d i n A p r i l 1958 t h a t: fro m t h e moment t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o u n c i l s w ere fo u n d e d / I n 19567» th e P a r t y c o m m itte e in C e n t r a l J a v a h a s w i t n e s s e d th e a p p e a ra n c e o f sym ptom s o f b u r e a u c r a c y, d e c r e a s e d g e n u in e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i n t e r n a l l i f e o f th e P a r t y, d e c r e a s e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c o n d i t i o n o f th e m a s s e s, c o n c e i t, e a s y s a t i s f a c t i o n, d i s l i k e o f c r i t i c i s m, and s la c k e r P a rty d i s c i p l i n e.1 A t th e v i l l a g e l e v e l, th e PKI l e a d e r s h a v e a d m itte d t h a t ’so m e tim e s P a r t y members v o l u n t a r i l y lo w e r th e m s e lv e s to becom e l a n d l o r d s a f t e r t h e y h a v e o b t a i n e d th e p o s i t i o n o f lu ra h o r v illa g e o f f i c i a l '. p o s s i b i l i t y o f th e B e a r in g i n m ind th e 'r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e m o r a li z a t io n * o f com m unist c a d r e s u n d e r th e n a t i o n a l u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y, t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n o f S u k a rn o i n g i v i n g PKI an d i t s m ass M u s a jid, "Mengembangkan P im p in an P a r t a i d ip e m e r in ta h a n D a e ra h ” ( D e v e lo p in g P a r t y L e a d e r s h ip i n R e g io n a l G overn m e n t), KP, A p r i l 1958, p.3 3 * M u s a jid c la im e d t h a t t h e P a r t y c a d r e s i n th e l o c a l c o u n c i l s w ere b e i n g g iv e n s p e c i a l e d u c a tio n in p r o v in c e - le v e l P a r ty s c h o o ls in o r d e r t o overcom e th e u n d e s i r a b l e t e n d e n c i e s. PK I, " L a p o ra n ", BM, A p ril-M a y 1959» p*135* === [PDF page 661] === 643 organizations substantial but not conclusive represen tation in the appointed local, regional and national governmental bodies is not as rash as might at first appear to be the case. The president's policy may well accelerate revolutionary demoralization and thereby further reduce the Party's capacity to act militantly if necessary. To exclude the communists from positions of prestige could increase the militancy of cadres, and strengthen their resolve to replace the present regime by a new one. As Sakirman acknowledged in 1960, there is the danger for PKI that continued support of a 'semi-fascist' govern ment which is, moreover, unable to improve the condition of the people, could cause the people to place on the Party some of the blame for present conditions. Many questions arise from continued communist support, even with criticism, of the present government. Could this support lead to disgust or apathy among the cadres and members of PKI and its mass organizations who suffer most from the government's repressive measures and from the continued decline in living standards? Are cadres Sakirman, "Apa Arti Sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi Terpimpin" (The Meaning of PKI's Support for the 1945 Constitution and Guided Democracy), part II, BM, July-August 1960, pp.320-40, 348. === [PDF page 662] === sufficiently trained to understand the need for the present tactics, and is the members1 loyalty still maintained by the communists * socio-economic activities? While PKI builds up Sukarno as the leader of the revo lution, are cadres and members sufficiently trained to realize that Sukarno's support is essential for Party survival, that the daily eulogies are meant to fool only the eulogized? Or does this constant praise of Sukarno in fact place many of the members under his ultimate leadership so that if the necessity arose he could, as some think him to believe, cut the mass support away from the Party leadership with a single speech as he did in September 1948? Should PKI be faced with severe repression or a coup situation which would require or suggest a change in the national united front policy, it is possible that an intra-party dispute could arise over what action to take* The Party leaders must be more concerned, however, with the condition of the membership of the Party and of its mass organizations and of the Electoral communists'. This condition is such that the leaders would experience extreme difficulties in adapting their large organization to a radically different situation or policy. The present form of the national united front is in part the result of the unrevolutionary nature of the === [PDF page 663] === social groups on which PKI depends for most of its support. But the front policy, with its friendliness towards the ’national capitalists’ and ’patriotic land lords’, its opposition to ’radicalism*, and its inhibitions against displays of militancy against ’the authorities’, is hardly likely to develop the degree of social antagonism that would be needed to prepare communist supporters and members for militant action. Severe repressive measures against the few signs of peasant or trade union militancy have also restricted the opportunity for the people and cadres to gain experience in militant action. Perhaps, but only perhaps, social tensions have increased since 1951» "but the people in general and the great majority of the members of at least the communist mass organizations still do not feel that their inferior social, economic and political condition is grossly unjust or that they have the right and the strength to oppose the authorities. The members of the Party and the cadres of the mass organizations are part of the wider society whose poorer sections are still largely free from strong social antagonisms and the belief in their own ability to alter conditions. All but about five thousand of the Party members and mass organization cadres have entered the Party or have become associated with it after March 1952. That is, they have not been attracted by clandestine work === [PDF page 664] === or by militant action. And once within the sphere of PKI they have been subjected to a programme of education that explains and justifies the national united front policy, the moderation that must be displayed by the progressives, the tolerance that must be shown towards the national bourgeoisie, and the need for cooperation with other political and social groups. Education has also been aimed at creating organizational discipline, but it is very doubtful if a large segment of even the Party itself, raised on the broad national united front and existing within the wider society, could adapt readily to an abrupt change of Party policy that would be required by severe repression or a coup situation. In short, the leaders of PKI cannot be satisfied with the ability of their organization to meet the demands of even a limited range of future situations: they have reason to suppose that its strength may not increase, and may even decrease, so long as the present general politi cal situation continues; they must doubt the ability of the organization to weather a period of severe repression and yet retain sufficient strength to remain within striking distance of power; and even without repression, they must doubt whether their organization is able to undertake a militant drive for power. In order to prepare the organization to meet any one of these three === [PDF page 665] === contingencies, the Party leaders must work first to preserve the organization, to resist any attempt to ban the Party or to merge or dissolve any of the mass organi zations, especially the most important ones, SOBSI, BTI, and Perauda Rakjat. At the same time they must strive to strengthen both the Party and the mass organizations* This will have to be done largely through education because overt action is repressible and repressed by the authorities, and because the Party leaders dare not risk the demoralizing effect of unsuccessful actions. Through education an effort will be made to prevent the spread of Bourgeois values * among cadres who obtain positions of prestige, to prepare cadres and members psychologically for government repression and militant action, and especially to weld a firm discipline among the cadres of the Party and its mass organizations so that they will act as instructed in the event of an emergency. The Party leaders will also presumably continue to attempt to infiltrate government ministries and the armed forces, and to extend and consolidate SOBSI!s control of the workers in key work, especially in transport. If the PKI leaders are able to accomplish the diffi cult tasks of preserving their organization and of strengthening it along the lines indicated, then they will still have to await a situation favourable to the acqui- === [PDF page 666] === sition of power. At the time of writing, such a situation appears a remote possibility, but it could arise, international factors excluded, in one of three ways: the very unlikely development of an insurrectionary mood among the poorer sections of Indonesian society, an unlikely capitulation of the ruling groups as a result of their inability to rule well, and a more possible, but still improbable, disintegration of the ruling groups. === [PDF page 667] === SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY === [PDF page 668] === SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY The following bibliography is a highly selective one. It includes only materials that have direct relevance to the period 1951 to 1961. Only the most important or useful secondary sources for this period are cited. But although only the most important articles from Indonesian communist newspapers and journals have been included (because the newspapers and journals them selves are listed), the list of communist books, booklets and pamphlets excludes only the most irrelevant. compiling this bibliography I made no attempt to dis tinguish between books, booklets and pamphlets because many of the materials dealt with do not fall readily into such categories. Special mention ought to be made of the reports issued between 1952 and 1960 under the auspices of first the Institute of Current World Affairs and then the American Universities! Field Staff. The individual reports are too numerous to mention individually, but I found them most useful, especially those by Boyd R. Compton in the period 1952 to 1955* It should also be noted that I have not listed the following periodicals of which I was able to obtain only one or two scattered 649 === [PDF page 669] === 650 numbers: "Berita Gerwani” for 1959 and 1960, "Buletin Pemuda Rakjat” for 1955» and Gerwani's "Wanita Indonesia” for 1955 and 1956. The English-language materials were, in general, readily available in Australian libraries. The Indonesian-language materials were more difficult to come by* Some were borrowed from Australian libraries and from colleagues in Australia, others were microfilmed in Cornell University library, but most were obtained or examined during my stay in Indonesia. The following libraries in Indonesia were found to contain a fair amount of political literature: the libraries of the Djakarta museum, of parliament, and of the Ministries of Infor mation and Labour, all in Djakarta; and the Hatta Foundation library in Jogjakarta. BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS Aidit, D.N. 1955. Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun. Djakarta, _______• Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan-Tuntutan Revolusi Agustus 1945 dan Bahan-Bahan Lain dari Sidang Pleno ke-IV CC PKI jang Perluas. Djakarta, 1956. 100 p. Dari Sembllan Negeri Sosialis* Djakarta, 1959* 164 P« _______• Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia. Djakarta, 1955* 63 p. === [PDF page 670] === 651 — • Introduksi tentang Soal-Soal Pokok Revolusi Indonesia, Djakarta, 1959* 16> p. — • Konfrontasi Peristiwa Madiun 1948; Peristiwa Sumatera 1956, Djakarta, 1957* bl p. Lenin dan Indonesia, Djakarta, I960, 32 p, • Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia, Djakarta, 1957* 72 p. Menempuh Djalan Rakjat, Djakarta, 1954* 38 p. Fourth edition. Menudju Indonesia Baru, D jakarta, 1555• 48 p, Second edition, — • Peladjaran dari Sedjarah PKI. 31 p. Djakarta, 1960. — • Perdjuangan dan Adjaran-Adjaran Karl Marx, D jakarta, 1950. 64 p. Pertahankan Republik Proklamasi 1945.1 1955 • 3*> P. Pilihan Tu1isan. vol.II, 1960, 591 p. Djakarta, [Unreadable] • Sedjarah Qerakan Buruh Indonesia. 1952. STpI Djakarta, — • Selamatkan dan Konsolidasi Kemenangan Front Persatuan. Djakarta, 1955* 19 p. Sendjata ditangan Rakjat. Djakarta, 1958. 24 p. — • The Birth and Growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1958. 49 p. __Tiga Interviu. Djakarta, 1954. 16 p. __ • Untuk Demokrasi dan Kabinet Gotong Rojong. D jakarta, 1959* 181 p. __ • Untuk Kemenangan Front Nasional dalam Pemilihan Umum. Djakarta, 1955. 28 p. === [PDF page 671] === 65 O ________. U ntuk K o n s t l t u s i R e p u b lik P ro k la m a s i 1 9 4 5 « D j a k a r t a, 1957* 32 p. ________. U ntuk P e r8a tu a n ja n g L e b ih L uas d a r i Semua K e k u a ta n N a s io n a l d i I n d o n e s i a, D j a k a r t a, 1955. A i d i t, D.N., e t a l. 37 Tahun P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, 1957* 28 p. ________. U n tu k B e k e rd ja L e b ih B a lk d i k a la n g a n kaum T a n i. D ja k a r ta '7 i 95Ö• 4 O p. A lim in. P e l a d j a r a n K a r l M arx. D j a k a r t a, 19 5 8, 15 p. ________. P e rd ju a n g a n K la s K a r l M arx. 12 p. D j a k a r t a, 1959. 1954. R lw a ja t H id u p k u. D ja k a rta, 52 p. Anwar S a n u s i, A m ir. The R e s u l t s o f th e F i r s t T h re e -Y e a r P l a n. D j a k a r t a, 1959. 5 p. B a r is a n T a n i I n d o n e s i a. K o n s t i t u s i B a r is a n T a n i I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, 19 5 4. 67 p. ________ • K o n s t i t u s i B a r is a n T a n i I n d o n e s i a. 1955. D ja k a rta, ________ • K o n s t i t u s i B a r is a n T a n i I n d o n e s i a. 1957. 71 P. D ja k a rta, ________ • T e n ta n g A g i t a s i dan P ro p a g a n d a. 13 P. D ja k a rta, 1954* B ro, M a r g u e r i t te Harm on. I n d o n e s i a: Land o f C h a ll e n g e. [Unreadable] B u r g e r, D.H. S t r u c t u r a l C hanges i n J a v a n e s e S o c i e t y: The S u p r a - V l l la g e S p h e r e. I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 1956. 3$ P* ________. S t r u c t u r a l C hanges i n J a v a n e s e S o c i e t y: The V i l l a g e S p h e r e. I t h a c a, New Y o rk, 1957* 17 P* C e n t r a l B u reau o f S t a t i s t i c s. S t a t i s t i c a l P o c k e tb o o k o f I n d o n e s i a, 1960. D j a k a r t a, i 9 6 0. 2^9 p. === [PDF page 672] === 653 Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia Daerah Jogjakarta* Manifes Pemllihan Umum Partai Komunis Indonesia untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta* Jogjakarta, 1957* 31 P* Padjar Harapan. Constitution of Padjar Harapan* Djakarta, Peith, Herbert* The Indonesian Elections of 1955* New York, 1957* 91 p. Ithaca, _______ • The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1955: a Turning Point in Post-lRe volutionary Indonesia* Ithaca, New York, 1958* 212 p. Fischer, Louis* 341 p. The Story of Indonesia* London, 1959« Geertz, Clifford* The Development of the Javanese Economy: a Socio-Öulturai Approach* Cambridge, Mass., 1958. 130 p. . The Religion of Java* 356 p. Glencoe, Illinois, 1960. _______ • The Social Context of Economic Change: an Indonesian Case Study* Cambridge, Mass.7 195^« 179 p. Gerakan Tani Indonesia. 10 p. 17 September 1953« Bogor, 1953* Gerakan Wanita Indonesia. Lebih Giat Meluaskan Gerakan untuk Terlaksananja Piagam Hak-Hak Wanita Indonesia* Djakarta, 195ST l44 _______ • Meluaskan Aksi-Aksi untuk Memperkuat Tuntutan Hak-HalE Wanita-Anak-Anak dan Perdamaian* Djakarta, 79W. WT* Peraturan Dasar Gerwani* Djakarta, Goldberg, Harry. Gerakan Buruh di Indonesia* 1952. 32 p. Hanna, Willard A. Bung K a m o ' s 1960. 232 p. Indonesia* 1954. 42 p. Djakarta, New York, === [PDF page 673] === 65! Holland, William L. (ed.). Asian Nationalism and the West, New York, 1953« 449 p. Hutomo Supardan, et al. Menudju Otonomi Daerah SeluasLuasnja. 3 vols. Djakarta, 195&» [Unreadable] Kahin, George McTurnan. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, 1952. U90 p, Kahin, George McTurnan (ed,). Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia. Ithaca, New York, 1959* 531 p. _______, Major Governments of Asia, 1958. 607 p. Ithaca, New York, Kattenburg, Paul M, A Central Javanese Village in 1950. Ithaca, New York, 1951• 15 p, Kementerian Penerangan. 1950* 108 p. Kami Perkenalkan, Kami Perkenalkan, Djakarta, Djakarta, 1954* 158 p. _______ • Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia, Djakarta, 1954* 704 p. Kepartaian di Indonesia. _______ • Kepartaian di Indonesia. 203 P. Djakarta, 1951* Jogjakarta, 431 P* 1950. Kementerian Perburuhan. Dokumentasi Pemogokan Sarbupri sampai 28-8-1950. Jogjakarta, 1950. 24 p. _______ • Laporan Kementerian Perburuhan, April 1957 April 1959« Djakarta, 1959. 81 p. Kementerian Pertanian. Himpunan Keputusan Kongres/ Konperensi Organisasi-Organisasi Tani Massa. Djakarta, 1951. 55 P_______ • Pemandangan tentang Organlsasi Tani Massa, Djakarta, 1952. 18 p. _______ • Pergerakan Tani di Indonesia, Djakarta, 1954. === [PDF page 674] === 655 _____ Supplement No. 1, Maret 1952ypada Himpunan Keputusan Kongres/Konperensi Organisasi-Organisasi Tani Massa. Djakarta, 1953- 27 p. Kerdjasama Partai-Organisasi Djakarta Raja. Djakarta, 1954. 55 P» 20 Mei. Komite Perdamaian Indonesia. Musjawarah Nasional untuk Perdamaian. Bandung, 196ÜI 39 p. Legge, John D. Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia. Ithaca. New York. 1957« 71 p. Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat. Lappran Umum Pengurus Pusat LEKRA kepada Kongres Nasional ke-I LEKRA. L*lJ* 1959. 27 P. _____. Keputusan-Keputusan Kongres Nasional ke-I Lekra. [Unreadable] Menjambut Kongres Kebuda.jaan. Lukman, M.H. 24 p. 1960. H O, 1951* Mengamalkan Tjinta Tanahair. Tentang Front Persatuan Nasional. 49 p. Djakarta, 1957* Djakarta, 61 pT Tentang Konstitusi PKI. Djakarta, 1959* 92 p. McVey, Ruth T. The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution. Ithaca, New York, 1957. S~3 p. Metcalf, John E. The Agricultural Economy of Indonesia. Washington, D.C., 1952. 100 p. Munir, Moh. Introduksi tentang Manifesto Politik Republik Indonesia“! Djakarta, 19&Ö. 1& p. ______ • Pedoman Penjelesaian Plan Organisasi 1958. Djakarta, 1959. 34 p. Nasution, Abdul Haris. Tjatatan-Tjatatan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia. Djakarta,1955• 3ÖÖ p. Njono. Tegakkan Pandji-Pandji Persatuan. 36 p. Djakarta, 1956. === [PDF page 675] === 65 G ________ • U n tu k M em pertahankan d a n M em perluas Hak-Hak kaum B u ru h. D j a k a r t a, 1959* 79 p. N jo to. P e r k e n a la n P e rtam a d e n g an D unia B a ru. 1 9 5 3. 31 P. P e r s d a n M assa. D j a k a r t a, 19 5 8. PKI d an P a n t j a s i l a. D ja k a rta, 136 p. D j a k a r t a, 1958. 64 p. _______ • R e v o lu s i S o s i a l i s O k to b e r dan P e n g a ru h n ja a t a s G-erakan K em erdekaan In d o n e s i a " D j a k a r t a, 195U. 2 b p. T e n ta n g Program PK I* D ja k a r ta, 1959. N u rs u h u d. M en jin g k a p T a b i r "Dew a n -B a n te n g ". 63 p. D ja k a rta, P a r la u n g a n. H a s i l R a k ja t M em ilih T okoh-T okoh P a rle m e n. D j a k a r t a, 1956. 440 p. F a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a. ABC R e v o lu s i I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, 1958. 24 p. _______ • An E v a l u a t i o n o f th e K e rd ja C a b i n e t. A T ter One Y e ar i n O f f i c e! D j a k a r t a, i9 6 0. 14 p. ________ • B ahan-B ahan u n tu k K ongres N a s io n a l k e -V I P a r t a i Komunis’ I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, 1958. 11 5 p. ________ • Buku P ro g ram a M e m p e rin g a ti U lan g Tahun k e -3 5 P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a, 2 3 -3 0 Mei 1 9 5 5. D j a k a r t a, 1955I _______. Buku P u t i h t e n t a n g P e r i s t i w a M adiun. [Unreadable] D ja k a rta, ________ • D ev elo p m en t o f Work among F is h e rm e n. 1960. 5 p. D ja k a rta, ________ • D ja la n B aru u n tu k R e p u b lik I n d o n e s i a. e d i t i o n. D j a k a r t a, 1953. 34 p. S e v e n th ________ • D ocum ents o f t h e S i x t h Plenum o f th e C e n t r a l C o m m ittee o f th e Com munist P a r t y o f I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, 19 5 8. 123 p. === [PDF page 676] === 657 __ • Dokumen-Dokumen K o n g res N a s io n a l k e -V I P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, v o l. I, I9 6 0. 3 5 5 p. UP Tahun PK I. D ja k a r ta, 1960. K e p a ls u a n M asjum i. D ja k a rta, 99 p. 1955. —• K e w a d jlb a n F r o n t P e r s a t u a n B u ru h. 1 9 5 2. 24 p. 20 p. D ja k a rta, K o n s t i t u s i P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a. 1951 • s f t: D ja k a rta, __. K o n s t i t u s i P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a, p rin tin g. D j a k a r t a, 1 9 5 6. 7T "pI T h ir d __ • L a h i m j a P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a d a n Pe rk em b a n g an n jeu D j a k a r t a, 1951. 29 p. __ • M adju T e ru s Menggempur I m p e r ia lis m s d a n F e o d a lis m e i D ja k a rta V 19^1. 51 p. —• M a n ife s P e m ilih a n Umum P K I. 20 p. Mengapa F r o n t N a s i o n a l. Pedoman O r g a n i s a s i. D j a k a r t a, 1954* D j a k a r t a, 1957* D j a k a r t a, 1951. 12 p. 30 p. P e m ilih a n Umum u n tu k P e m e r in ta h K o a l i s i N a s i o n a l. " D ja k a r ta, 1955* 23 p. P en g ak u an M asjum i. D j a k a r t a, 1955* PKI d an K o n s t i t u a n t e. P ro g ram PK I. 52 p. D j a k a r t a, 1955* D ja k a r ta, 1954. 16 p. 31 P* ___• P u tu s a n - P u tu s a n S id a n g P le n o C e n t r a l C om ite P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a. D j a k a r t a, 1 9 5 3. 63 p. ___• R e s o l u s i - R e s o l u s i K o n g res N a s io n a l k e -V I P K I. D j a k a r t a, 1959. 103 p. ___• R e s o l u s i t e n t a n g L a p o ra n Umum CC PKI k e p a d a K o n g res N a s io n a l K e-V I. D j a k a r t a, 19 5 9. 99 p. === [PDF page 677] === 653 _______ • Tuntunan untuk Bekerdja dikalangan kaum Tani. Djakarta, 1955. 48 p. _______ • Tuntutan P.K.I. sekitar Kabinet Baru dan Program Pemerlntah Ali"lce-II. Surabaja, 195^* 23 p. Partai Komunis Indonesia, et al. Djakarta, 1959- 31 p. Pemuda Rakjat. Diktat. Menempuh tahun 1959. Djakarta, no date. 38 p. _______. 21 Februari, Hari Pemuda Melawan Kolonialismen Djakarta, 1955* 32 p. _______ • Laporan Umum pada Sidang Dewan Nasional ke-III 17 J u l y 1956. Djakarta, 195o. 19 p. ________ • Menudju Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia jang Luas. Djakarta, 195&* 58 p. _______ • Pemuda Pengawal Kemerdekaan Nasional Indonesia. Djakarta, 1957* 36 p. ________. Peraturan Dasar Pemuda Rakjat. [Unreadable] Third printing. _______ • Peraturan Dasar Pemuda Rakjat. D jakarta, 195&. 51 P« Fifth printing. _______ • Rol Pemuda dalam Perdjuangan untuk Kemerdekaan Nasional dan Perdamaian Dunia. Djakarta. 1955. 73 p. Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia. Peraturan Dasar Persatuan Pamong Des a Indonesier. Surakarta, 1957* 93 P. Runturambi, F. Politik Pembangunan Sekarang. 1957. 22 p. Sakirman. Tentang Pemilihan Umum. Djakarta, Djakarta, 1952. 128 p. Sandra Nitidihardjo. Gerakan Buruh Indonesia. 1957 (?)• 125 P. Djakarta, Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia. Untuk Kebebasan Demokrasi dan Melawan Pemerasan jang Kedjam. Djakarta, 1^54« 32 p. === [PDF page 678] === 659 S e k s i C o m ite P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a K o ta b e s a r J o g ja k a rta. M a n ifes P e m ilih a n Umum P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s ia u n tu k Dewan P e r w a k ila n R a k ja t D a era h K o ta p r a d ja J o g j a k a r t a ^ J o g j a k a r t a, 1957. 46 p. S e k s i C o m ite P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a K o ta P r a d ja S u r a b a j a. P ro g ram u n tu k P e m ilih a n DPRD K ota P r a d j a S u r a b a j a. S u r a b a j a, 1957« 19 p. S e k s i C om ite P a r t a i Komunis I n d o n e s i a S lem an. P ro g ram U n tu k P e m ilih a n Umum DPRD S le m a n. S le m a n, J o g j a k a r t a, 1957* 6 p. S id ik K e rta p a ti. U ntuk P e r s a t u a n d a n M em perluas P e r d ju a n g a n T a n i. D j a k a r t a, 1 ^ 5 5. 49 p. S k i n n e r, 0. W illia m ( e d. ). L o c a l, E t h n i c, and N a t i o n a l L o y a l t i e s i n V i l l a g e I n d o n e s i a: a Sym posium. New H aven, C o n n., 1959* 68 p. S e n t r a l O r g a n i s a s i B uruh S e lu r u h I n d o n e s i a. DokumenDokumen K o n f e r e n s i N a s io n a l SOBSI ( 1 9 5 7 ) * D j a k a r t a, [Unreadable] ________. F o rw a rd F o r The C o n s i s t e n t R e a l i z a t i o n o f th e P o l i t i c a l M a n if e s to. D j a k a r t a, 1960* 6 p. K o n s t i t u s i SOBSI. D j a k a r t a, 1955* . K o p e ra s i d an S e r i k a t b u r u h. 60 p. D j a k a r t a, 1959* ___. M a sa a la h F r o n t P e r s a t u a n B u ru h. • M a s a a la h -M a s a a la h O r g a n i s a s i. 57 p. D j a k a r t a, 1959» D j a k a r t a, 1959* M e n g a ta s i K euangan da lam S e rik a t-» B u ru h. D j a k a r t a, 1956. 29 p • P la n O r g a n is a s i 1 9 5 8. D ja k a rta, 1957* 15 P- __ • P ro g ram SOBSI M engenai P e r b a ik a n Ekonomi guna P e r b a ik a n Upah d a n D jam in an S o s i a l kaum B u ru h. D j a k a r t a, 1955* 27 p. === [PDF page 679] === 660 _______ • Program Tuntutan SOBSI: UntukSandang Pangan dan Demokrasi. Djakarta, I960. 74 p. _______ • Resolusi-Resolusi Kongres Nasional ke-III SOBSI. D jakarta, I960. 35 P* _______ • Sedjarah Gerakan Buruh Indonesia. 1958. 1ÖU p. Djakarta, Suharti, et al. Undang-Undang Perkawinan. 1960. 132 p. Djakarta, Susilo Prawiroatmodjo. Tindjauan Slngkat Organisasi Tani di Indonesia. Djakarta, 1955. 74 p. Tauchid, Mochammad. Mengapa Saja Tidak Menjetudjui Fusi BTI-RTI. Bogor, 1953. 25 p. Tedjasukmana, Iskandar. The Political Character of the Indonesian Trade Union Movement. Ithaca, New York, 19564 130 p. ter Haar, B. 255 P. Adat Law in Indonesia. New York, 1948. Träger, Prank N. (ed.). Marxism in Southeast Asia. Stanford, California, 1959. 3Ö1 P* van der Kroef, Justus Maria. Indonesia in the Modern World. Bandung, vol.I, 1954, 30Ö p.; vol.II, 1956, 306 p. Vlekke, B.H.M. (ed.). Indonesia in 1956. Political and Economic Aspects. The Hague, 1957. 92 p. ______• Indonesia's Struggle 1957-1958. 1959. 76 p. The Hague, Wertheim, W.P. Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society. New York, 1950« 83 p. _______• Indonesian Society in Transition. and Bandung, 1956. 360 p. The Hague Widjojo Nitisastro and Ismael, J.E. The Oovernment, Economy and Taxes of a Central Javanese Village. Ithaca, New York, 1959. 37 p. === [PDF page 680] === 661 Willmott, Donald E. The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia. Ithaca, New York, 1956>. 86" p. Woodman, Dorothy. The Republic of Indonesia. 1955. 444 p. London, PERIODICAL AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES Adina, A.M. "Menjambut Lahirnja Konstitusi Baru SOBSI", Zaman Baru, 15 October 1952, 2-3. Adjitorop, Jusuf. "Kongres jang didukung Rakjat", Bintang Merah, September-October 1959* 370-4. "Rol Grup dalam Kehidupan Intern Partai", Kehidupan Partal, 1 April 1955» 49-53« Aidit, D.N. "Back to the 1945 Constitution for a Change in Policies and Living Conditions", Review of Indonesia, September-October 1959» supplement, 3-17. "Building the Organization is Important, but Building Ideology is Even More Important", Review of Indonesia, June-July 1959» supplement, 8 p. _______ • "Communist Party Gets Ready for Elections", New Age (weekly, New Delhi), 29 May 1955» 5* _______ • "Economic Difficulties and the Communist Party's Proposals", World Marxist Review, September 1958, 71-2. __ • "Fase Baru dan Penjesuaian Organisasi dengan Situasi", Bintang Merah, March-April 1958, 97-152. "Fly High the Banners of 'Land to Peasants' and Fight for One Victory After the Other", Review of Indonesia, June-July 1959» supplement, 11-14. "For National Unity", World Marxist Review, February 1960, 20-6. • "Front Persatuan Nasional dan Sedjarahnja", Bintang Merah, August 1952, 3-8. === [PDF page 681] === _______• "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia", World Marxist Review, July 1959» 24-7* _______• "Indonesian Situation", New Age (monthly, New Delhi), April 1959, 15-28. • "Membolsewikkan PKI", Bintang Merah, 1 March 1951, 129-34. _______• "Referat tentang Tan Ling Djie-isme", Harian Rakjat, 19 March 1954» _______• "Revolusi Oktober dan Rakjat-Rakjat Timur", Bintang Merah, October-November 1957, 373-83* _______ • "Some Results of Vth National Congress of Indonesian Communist Party", For a Lasting Peace, For a People*s Democracy.', 15 October 1954, 3* _______ • "The General Elections and the Tasks of the Indonesian Communist Party", For a Lasting Peace, For a Peopled Democracy♦', 9 September 1955, 3-4. _______• "The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia", Review of Indonesia, NovemberDecember 1959, 40-8. _______• "Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan untuk Melaksanakan Konsepsi Presiden Soekamo 100$", Harian Rak.lat, 5 July 1957. Alamputra (pseudonym). "Mengatasi Kelemahan-Kelemahan", Bintang Merah, August-September 1951, 16-39. Amar Hanafiah. "Pengalaman Tjara Menarik Simpati KijaiKijai", Kehidupan Partai, May-August 1957, 69-72. Anonymous. "Trade Unions in Indonesia", Indonesian Review, December 1950, 6-10. Anwar Sanusi, Amir. "Sedikit tentang Penarikan Iuran dan Penjetorannja", Kehidupan Partai, October 1956, 8-12. Asmu. "Beladjar dari Sidang-Pleno DPP-BTI ke-III untuk Mengatasi Kelemahan Pekerdjaan Partai dilapangan Perdjuangan Tani", Bintang Merah, February-March 1955, 57-64. === [PDF page 682] === 663 _______ • "Masalah Landreform", Bintang Merah, January 1960, 14-28. Banggas. "Memperbaiki Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan Mahasiswa", Bintang Merah, February 1958* 57-65. Barisan Tani Indonesia. "Laporan Umum dan PutusanPutusan Sidang DPP Pleno II BTI", Suara Tani, MayJune 1959» supplement, 60 p. _______• "Memperluas dan Mengkonsolidasi Organisasi B.T.I.", Suara Tani, March 1955» 1, 6-7» Bone, Robert C. "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties", Far Eastern Survey, XXIII, no.2 (February 1954), 17-23. Budiardjo, Miriam S. "The Provisional Parliament of Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey, XXV, no.2 (February 1956), 17-23. Feith, Herbert. "Towards Elections in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, XXVII, no.3 (September 1954), 236-54. Geertz, Clifford. "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations", Economic Development and Cultural Change, IV, no.2 (January 195 &), 134-58. ______ • "Ritual and Social Change: a Javanese Example", American Anthropologist, LIX (1957), 32-54. Hartojo. "Luaskan Aksi-Aksi kaum Tani untuk Mengembangkan Kekuatan Progresif", Suara Tani, October 1957, 5-11. Hatta, Mohammad. "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs", Foreign Affairs, XXXVI, no.3 (April 1958), 480-90. _______ • "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, XXXI, no.3 (April 1953), 441-52. Higgins, Benjamin and Jean. "Indonesia: Now or Never", Foreign Affairs, XXVII, no.1 (October 1958), 156-65. Hutapea, B.O. "Sikap SOBSI Terhadap 'Modal Nasional'", Zaman Baru, 30 September 1952, 11-13, 16. === [PDF page 683] === 664 _______ • ’'Some Lessons Prom the First National Peasants Conference of the CPI”, Review of Indonesia, August 1959, 30-4. Imam Suprapto. "Bagaimana Menerobos Daerah Kosong”, Kehidupan Partai, July 1958, 111-13. Iman (pseudonym). ’’Razzia Agustus: Satu Bagian dari Rentjana Pengeluasan Perang Amerika”, Bintang Merah, August-September 1951, 5-9. Isk. ’’Mendjadikan Soal Keuangan Masaalah Bagi Seluruh Partai”, Kehidupan Partai, November 1956, 24-7« Jay, Robert R. ’’Local Government in Rural Central Java”, Far Eastern Quarterly, XV, no.2 (February 1956), 215-27. Kahin, George McT. ’’Communist Leadership in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey, XVIII, no.16 (10 August 1949), 186-9. Lubis, Mochtar. ’’Party Confusion in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey, XXI, no.15 (29 October 1952), 155-8. _______• ’’The Indonesian Communist Movement Today”, Far Eastern Survey, XXIII, no. 11 (November 1954), 161-1+. Lukman, M.H. ’’Bagaimana Mentjiptakan Kader Wanita”, Kehidupan Partai, 1 January 1955, 4-6. _______• "Menudju Front Persatuan”, Bintang Merah, 1 February 1951, 57-9. _______• ’’Mewudjudkan Front Nasional”, Bin tang Merah, 15 March-1 April 1951, 172-4. _______• ’’Partai dan Organisasi Massa”, Bin tang Merah, 15 February 1951, 104-5, 119. _______• "Tentang Agitasi dan Propaganda Partai”, Bintang Merah, September 1952, 57-64. Mirajadi (pseudonym). ”Tiga Tahun Provokasi Madiun”, Bintang Merah, August-September 1951, 39-52. === [PDF page 684] === Njono. ’’Beberapa Peladjaran dari Kongres Nasional ke-II SOBSI”, Bintang Merah, January 1955» 7-10. Njoto. ’’Masaalah Pendidikan didalara Partai”, Harlan Rakjat, 3 August 1956. _______. ’’Pemalsuan Marxisme”, Bintang Merah, 1-15 _______ • ”Soal Pendidikan dan kaum Inteligensia”, Harian Rakjat, 5 July 1957Palmier, Leslie H. ’’Aspects of Indonesia’s Social Structure”, Pacific Affairs, XXVIII, no.2 (June 1955), 117-131. _______ • ’’Occupational Distribution of Parents of Pupils in Certain Indonesian Educational Institutions”, Indonesie, X (1957), 320-76. Pardede, Peris. ’’Daerah Majoritet Mutlak Komunis Selama Setahun”, Bintang Merah, January-Pebruary 1959, 39-43* Partai Komunis Indonesia. ”Apa Sebab PKI Memberi Kesempatan Bekerdja pada Kabinet Wilopo”, Harian Rak.jat, 14 July 1952. _______ • ’’Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum Tani”, Bintang Merah, April-May 1959, 128-46. _______ • ’’Laporan Tambahan Mengenai Masaalah Mengembangkan Pekerdjaan Massa kaum Tani”, Harian Rakjat, 10 July 1957. _______. ’’Masaalah Tani di Indonesia”, Bintang Merah, 15 June-1 July 1951, 303-6. _______ • ”PKI Berkampanje untuk Pemilihan Konstituante”, Harian Rakjat, 18 November 1955* _______• ’’Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntu tan kaum Tani”, Bintang Merah, December 1951, 1-36. _______• ’’Resolusi CC ten tang Peluasan Keanggotaan Partai”, PKI-Buletin, 7 March 1952, 3-6. Pauker, Guy J. ’’Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia”, Asian Survey, I, no.3 (May 1961), 26-35« === [PDF page 685] === 68G _______. "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, no«9 Rewang. "Apa jang Harus diperhatikan oleh Kader jang dimutasi", Kehldupan Partai, January-March 1958, 3-5* Richardson, J. Henry. "Indonesian Labor Relations in Their Political Setting", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XII, no.1 (October 1958), 56-78. Sakirman. "Apa Arti Sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi Terpimpin", Bintang Merah, part I, MayJune 1960, 194-219; part II, July-August 1960, 320-40, 348. Siewojo. "Seni untuk Menang dalam Pemilihan Umum", Kehidupan Partai, 1 April 1955» 57-8. Sjahrir, Sutan. "Problems the Country Faces", in "Perspective of Indonesia", a supplement to Atlantic Monthly, June 1956, 21-5« Sobromalisi (pseudonym). "Tentang Perebutan Kekuasaan", Bintang Merah, August-September 1951» 10-15. Sudisman. "Untuk Perluas Pengaruh Partai dikalangan Massa Wanita", Harian Rakjat, 5 July 1957* Suharti. "Menghidupkan Grup Wanita dan Meluaskan Keanggotaan Partai dikalangan Wanita", Bintang Merah, June 1958, 252-60. Suroso. "The Indonesian Council for Asian-African Peoplefs Solidarity", Dian Setiakawan. Torch of Solidarity, December 1958, 33-6. van der Kroef, Justus Maria. "A New Course in Indonesia?", International Journal, XI, no.2 (Spring 1956), 129-37* _______• "Agrarian Reform and the Indonesian Communist Party", Far Eastern Survey, XXIX, no.1 (January I960), 5-13. "Disunited Indonesia", Par Eastern Survey, XXVII, part I, no.4 (April 1958), 49-^3; part II, === [PDF page 686] === • ” 'G u id e d D em ocracy* i n I n d o n e s i a ", P a r E a s te r n S u r v e y, XXVI, n o. 8 (A u g u st 1 9 5 7 ), 1 1 3 -2 4. ________ • " I n d o n e s ia n Communism u n d e r A i d i t ", P ro b le m s o f Communism, V I I, n o. 6 (N ovem ber-D ecem ber 1 9 5 8 ), 1 5 -2 3 • ________ • " I n d o n e s ia n Com m unist P o l i c y an d th e S i x t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s ", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, X X X III, n o. 3 (S e p te m b e r 1 9 6 0 ), 227 -4 9 1 " I n d o n e s i a ’s F i r s t N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n: a S o c i o l o g i c a l A n a l y s i s ", The A m erican J o u r n a l o f E co n o m ics & S o c i o lo g y, XVI, p a r t I, n o. 3 ( A p r i l 1 9 5 7 ), 237- W; p a r t I I, n o. 4 ( J u l y 1 9 5 7 ), 4 0 7 -2 0. ________ • " I n d o n e s i a ’s L ab o u r M ovem ent: i t s D ev elo p m en t a n d P r o s p e c t s ", U n ite d A s ia, V, n o. 4 (A u g u st 1 9 5 3 ), ________ • " I n s t a b i l i t y i n I n d o n e s i a ", P a r E a s t e r n S u rv e y, XXVI, n o. 4 ( A p r i l 1 9 5 7 ), 4 9 - 6 2. "The C h a n g in g C la s s S t r u c t u r e o f I n d o n e s i a ", A m erican S o c i o l o g i c a l R ev iew, XXI, n o. 2 ( A p r i l 1 9 5 6 ), 130-45. "The P la c e o f th e Army in I n d o n e s ia n P o l i t i c s ", E a s t e r n W o rld, X I, n o. 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 5 7 ), 1 3 -1 8. v a n M a rie, A. "The F i r s t I n d o n e s ia n P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n s ", I n d o n e s i e, IX ( 1 9 5 6 ), 2 5 7 -6 4. W e rth e im, W.F. "C hanges i n I n d o n e s i a ’s S o c i a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n ", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, X X V III, n o.1 (M arch 1 9 5 5 ), W i l l n e r, Ann R u th. " S o c i a l C hange i n J a v a n e s e TownV i l l a g e L i f e ”, E conom ic D e v elo p m en t a n d C u l t u r a l C h a n g e, V I, n o. 3 ( A p r i l 1 ^ 5 8 ), 2 2 9 -4 2. THESES P a g g, D o n ald R. " A u t h o r i ty an d S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e; a S tu d y i n J a v a n e s e B u r e a u c r a c y." P h.D. t h e s i s, H a rv a rd U n i v e r s i t y, 1958. 599 p. === [PDF page 687] === 653 Feith, Herbert. "Indonesian Politics, 1949-1957: the Decline of Representative Government«" Fh.D« thesis, Cornell University, 1961. 928 p. Hartono« "The Indonesian Communist Movement 1945-1948: its Development and Relations With the Soviet Union." Master’s thesis, Columbia University, 1959. 116 p. Jay, Robert Ravenelle. "Santri and Abangan: Religious Schism in Rural Central Java«" Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1957. 394 p. Meek, John Paul« "The Government and Economic Development in Indonesia, 1950-1954.” Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia, 1956. 349 p. Munawir Sjadzali. "Indonesia’s Muslim Parties and Their Political Concepts." Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 1959. 145 P* Myers, Robert J. "The Development of the Indonesian Socialist Party." Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1959. 256 p. Purwoto Gondosubroto. "Provisional Report on Research in Villages in Banjumas Residency." Unpublished manuscript, University of Indonesia, 1959* 79 p. Selosoemardjan. "Social Changes in Jogjakarta." thesis, Cornell University, 1959. 529 p. Ph.D. Subandrio, Hurustiati. "Javanese Peasant Life: Villages in East Java." Academic post-graduate Diploma in Anthropology thesis, University of London, 1951• 198 p. D. NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, ANNUAL REPORTS Bank Indonesia Annual Reports. 1953 to 1959. Bendera Buruh. March 1956 to July 1960. Bintang Merah. November 1950 to October 1960. Buietin Perdamaian. 22 September 1958 to December 1959 === [PDF page 688] === 669 Buie tin SOBS I. Damai. May 1955 to February 1956. November 1952 to September 1953* Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia. Ekonomi dan Masjarakat. 1953 to 1960. March 1!959 to October 1960, For a Lasting Peace, For a People!s Democracy.* 194Ö to April 1956. Harian Rakjat. July 1951 to June 1961. Ichtisar Gerakan Tani. December 1950 to October 1953. Indonesian Trade Union Ne w s. Kehidupan Partai. Juily 1955 to March 1960. January 1955 to December 1958. New Age (weekly, New Delhi). PKI-Buletin. August February 1952 to October 1954« PKI dan DPR (name later changed to PKI dan Perwakilan). First quarter 1956 to third: quarter i9 6 0. Review of Indonesia. January 19'57 to October 1960. Risalah De wan Perwakilan Rak.jat Republik Indonesia Serikat. Risalah Perundingan Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia. 1950 to 1951* Sin Po. November 1949 to December 1951» Suara Pamong Des a. Suara Tani. November 195 7 to January 1959. March 1955 to January 1961. The Java Bank Annual Reports. Times of Indonesia. Wanita Sedar. January 1953 to October 1960. October 1950 to August 1952. World Trade Union Movement. Zaman Baru. 1941 to 1953* 1952 to 1959. May 1952 to February 1955 === [PDF page 689] === BANDUNG VOTES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES MAGELANG KABUPATEN PROVINCE BOUNDARY BOUNDARY JOGJAKARTA === [PDF page 690] === RK.I. V OTE S, 1957 (JAVA) MADIUN 50 IOO MILES KEDIRI BLITAR MALANG === [PDF page 691] === COMBINED VOTES BOGOR SUKABUMI [Unreadable] BANDUNG VOTES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES MAGELANG KABUPATEN 20 30 40 50 PROVINCE BOUNDARY BOUNDARY JOGJAKARTA SURAKART, === [PDF page 692] === VOTES OF THE MOSLEM PARTIES, 1957 50 IOO MILES [Unreadable] === [PDF page 693] === D J A K A R T A RAJA KABUPATEN PROVINCE BOUNDARY BOUNDARY === [PDF page 694] === P.N.I. V O T E S,,1957 1957 VOTES PN.I. (JAVA) 20 (OO MILES SALATIGA SURABAJA MODJOKERTO eteeeeo ree Orrrreeee9 e@eseeeteoeeose .KARTA SURAKARTA MADIUN KEDIRI BLITAR MALANG PASURUAN PROBOLINGGO === [PDF page 695] === ProQuest Number: 28818439 INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest. Distributed by ProQuest LLC ( 2021 ). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted. 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