Chinese Policy in Indonesia, 1949-1967

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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 2] === 73-28,737 MOZINGO, David Paul, 1930CHINESE POLICY IN INDONESIA, 1949-1967. University o£ California, Los Angeles, Ph.D., 1973 Political Science, international law and relations University M icrofilm s, A XEROX C om pany, A nn Arbor, M ichigan 1973 DAVID PAUL MOZINGO ALL RIGHTS RESERVLD Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Chinese Policy In Indonesia, 1949-1967 A dissertation submitted In partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science David Paul Moslngo 1973 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === The dissertationaf David Paul Mozingo is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm. Bernard Brodie DamodfuT'Sardesai' %r^zTC{ David A. Wilson Committee Chairman University of California, Los Angeles 1973 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 5] === This manuscript was submitted to the University of California, Los Angeles, In the form It was accepted for publication and therefore did not meet standard requirements for binding margins acceptable for dissertation filing. Copyright by David Paul Moclngo 1973 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === T A B LE OF CONTENTS Chapter Pages 12 19 21 40-76 THE INDONESIAN SETTING... 12-39 Peking's Theory of International Relations- - - Ideological Goals and National Interests- - - - Chinese Foreign Policy Strategy - - - - - - - - - 40 52 59 III. REVOLUTION AND DIPLOMACY: THE "LEFT" UNITED FRONT 35 89 96 IV. TOWARDS PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED FRONT FROM ABOVE STRATEGY.......... - - - -10 7-133 The Peace Offensive - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Failure of the Peace Offensive- - - - - - - - - The Normalization of Peking-Djakarta Relations- The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty - - Bandung and the Peaceful Coexistence Strategy - - 107 117 119 12 5 V. MILITANT ANTI-IMPERIALISM: A MODIFIED UNITED FRONT FROM ABOVE STRATEGY - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 3 4 - 1 6 7 Estrangement from Moscow- - - - - - - - - - - - Heightened Tensions with the U. S. - - - - - - - Defection of the Neutrals from the United Front Sino-Soviet Differences on Peaceful Coexistence China Calls for Anti-Imperialist Strategy - - - The 1958 Indonesian Rebellion - - - - - - - - - China's Response to the R e b e l l i o n.......... _ _ _ VI. CHINESE POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: THE OVERSEAS CHINESE DISPUTE AND SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN 134 136 138 139 142 146 152 154 -168-207 The Ban on the Chinese Traders- - - - - - - - - Implications of the Anti-Chinese Measures for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 172 175 === [PDF page 7] === Toward a Settlement of the Overseas Chinese 183 189 VII. TOWARD SINO-INDONESIAN ALIGNMENT: THE THIRD FORCE -208-257 The Malaysia Controversy - - - - - - - - - - - - Chinese Communist Attitudes Toward Malaysia-- The Emergence of the Peking-Djakarta Axis- -- The Peking-Djakarta Axis and Indonesian CommunismSources of Tension in the Sino-Indonesian Axis - Sino-Indonesian Relations on the Eve of the Untung 211 219 222 231 237 248 VIII. THE COLLAPSE OF CHINESE POLICY IN INDONESIA- - - -258-292 The Coup: Its Origins and Actors - - - - - - - - China's Response to the Coup - - - - - - - - - - The Destruction of the Peking-Djakarta Axis-- The PKI's "Self-Criticism" and Sukarno's Fall- - A Revolution Policy Restored - - - - - - - - - - - 259 269 274 277 283 -293-305 -306-334 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am greatly Indebted to a number of people for help and encouragement In the completion of thla atudy. la due to two men: Special appreciation H. Arthur Steiner and George McT. Kahln. As a graduate student I was fortunate In being able to study under both of them. For assistance In a variety of other ways — comments on earlier drafts, reference material and general encouragement -- I am most grateful to the following: Benedict R.O.G. Anderson, Herbert S. Dinersteln, Herbert Felth, Arnold Horellck, Ian Graham, Paul F. Langer, John V. Lewis, Guy J. Parker, Myron Rush and David A. Wilson. I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee -David A. Wilson, Damodar Sar Deaai and Bernard Brodle — for a number of useful suggestions which were Included in the final draft. Appreciation is also dye to the Ford Foundation for its generous financial and other support which enabled me to carry out the basic research for this study in Indonesia and Hong Kong. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === VITA April 17, 1930 — 1952 — Born, Cleveland, Ohio A.B., University of California, Los Angeles 1952-1955 -- U.S. Army, Korea, Japan 1955-1957 — M.A., University of California, Los Angeles 1957-1959 — Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles 1959-1960 — Ford Foundation Foreign Area Pellamship, Cornell University, Ithaca 1960-1962 — Ford Foundation Foreign Area Fellowship, Indonesia and Hong Kong 1963-1966 — Staff Member, Social Science Department, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1967-1970 — Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca 1970-present — Associate Professor of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca PUBLICATIONS MOZINGO, DAVID PAUL "The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty," Aslan Survey (Dec. 1961), Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 25-31. "New Developments in China's Relations with Indonesia," Current Scene China Mainland (Feb. 1962), Vol. I, No. 24, pp. 1-7. "China's Relations with Her Aslan Neighbors," Current History. (Sept. 1964), Vol. XLVII, pp. 156-161. Sino-Indonesian Relations? An Overview. 1955-1965. RAND Corporation Research Memorandum (July 1965), 85 pp. Lin Plao on 'People's War'; China Takes A Second Look at Vietnam. RAND Corporation Research Memorandum (Nov. 1965). /with Thomas W. Robinson/ 23 pp. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 10] === "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," World Politics Vol. XIX, pp. 361-377. (April 1967) "China: Her Southern Borderlands" SAIS Review. School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, (Spring 1968), Vol. XII, No. 2 pp. 43-54. "The Maoist Imprint on China's Foreign Policy," John C. Daley China Briefing. University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 23-52. "China's Policy Toward Indonesia," Tsou, Tang (ed) China in Crisis (Vol. II), University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 333-356. China's Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution. Inter national Relations of East Asia Project, Cornell University, Interim Report Number 1, March 1970, 62 pp. "China's New Diplomacy" (symposium) Problems of Communism (Jan.-Feb. 1972) Vol. XXI, No. 1, pp. 61-63. vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 11] === ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Chinese Policy In Indonesia, 1949-1967 David Paul Kozingo Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 1973 Professor David A. Wilson, Chairman This study examines the formation and evolution of Chinese policy in Indonesia, a policy which seemed, at one point, on the verge of scoring a major diplomatic triumph but ended in crushing defeat. A general problem raised in this case study is how to account for the interplay between the various nationalistlc, revolutionary and strategic elements in Chinese foreign policy. More specifically, the study attempts to re-construct the considerations which moved China's decision-makers to attempt an ambitious policy in Indonesia despite the unstable character of the Djakarta govern ment and a formidable body of Chinese Communist doctrine explicitly opposed to entanglements with "bourgeois nationalism." The investigation is conducted at several levels of analysis: 1) the pattern of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic and political inter actions during the period 1949-1967; 2) the Impact of Chinese Communist global perspectives, especially the contest with Russia and America, on policy toward Djakarta; and, 3) the effect of the triangular relationship between Peking, Sukarno and the PKI on viii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 12] === Chinese policy alternatives and strategies. A general argument is advanced that Chinese foreign policy -- globally and In Indonesia ~ can best be Interpreted as an extension of Chinese united front strategies adopted from the earlier civil war experience which the leadership In Peking saw as still being applicable to problems of statescraft in the post-1949 era. The study finds that Chinese diplomacy, despite seeming success during certain periods, proved unable to resolve persistent conflicts between the CPU's national power and revolutionary Interests. Her attempt to combine both sets of interests by a policy of alliance with Sukarno's army-dominated regime and the PKI, which aimed eventually to succeed his regime, ended in a mdjor setback when both Sukarno and the Indonesian Communists were destroyed by the abortive 1965 coup against the anti-communist generals. The pursuit of an alliance with the inherently unstable Sukarno regime Indicated the extent to which Peking's policy In Indonesia had, prior to the Cultural Revolution, become basically a function of her great-power rivalry with Russia and America. Two further conclusions seem warranted on the basis of the data examined in this study. First, Chinese policy was consistently on the defensive in Indonesia. In part, this was due to the greater strength and influence America and Russia could bring to bear on Djakarta. More fundamentally, however, it was because the real levers of power In Indonesia were always in the hands of political elements hostile to China, the overseas Chinese and to communism. Second, an analysis of the Indonesian case reveals that the united Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 13] === front was not an effective device for organising anti-Soviet and anti-American coalitions. Unlike the domestic united front model, Peking could not control the behavior of her foreign alllee. Sukarno, the PKI and other largely autonomoua political actors in Indonesia repeatedly undermined and finally destroyed China's Indonesia policy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 14] === INTRODUCTION In his speech of August 17, 1965 commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Indonesia's proclamation of independence, President Sukarno announced the existence of a diplomatic and political alignment between the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) and the Republic of Indonesia. Although a d£ facto entente between the two powers had been steadily developing since late 1963, Sukarno's speech was the first official acknowledgment that their foreign policies were aligned in a joint effort to break up the Federation of Malaysia, to outflank the Anglo-American position in Southeast Asia and to organize an Afro-Asian coalition of "newly emerging forces" in opposition to the Western "imperialist" powers. Six weeks later the Peking-Djakarta axis suddenly began to disintegrate following an abortive October 1st coup attempt by junior army officers, apparently aided by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which aimed at liquidating the pro-Western Indonesian army high command. The coup attempt set off a massive anti communist chain reaction which, in rapid succession, led to the bloody suppression of the PKI, the overthrow of the Sukarno govern ment by a right-wing military junta, a complete diplomatic rupture with Peking and the restoration of Indonesia's close ties with, and dependence on, the Western capitalist powers. Almost over night what had appeared to be the most spectacular achievement of Communist China's diplomatic strategy in Southeast Asia became a major foreign policy disaster. The shortlived Peking-Djakarta axis and the Indonesian coup are the two episodes which most dramatically illustrate the con sistently unstable foundations of Chinese Communist policy in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 15] === Indonesia. In the seventeen years interim between the establish ment of relations and the suspension of diplomatic ties with Indo nesia in 1967, Chinese policy came full circle. It began in 1949 on a platform of revolutionary militance and hostility toward the newly independent Indonesian republic, shifted to a posture of "peaceful coexistence" and friendship in the mid-1950's, reached its zenith of success in the period of the "anti-imperialist" Peking-Djakarta axis, and returned to its revolutionary origins in 1967 following the consolidation of an anti-communist counter revolution in Indonesia and the radicalization of China's foreign policy line during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Overall, the general stages through which the Chinese policy in Indonesia has passed closely correspond to the larger pattern of her policies in the Afro-Asian world since 1949, policies which demonstrate that Peking has had great difficulty overcoming her highly ambivalent attitude toward non-communist Asian neighbors. The test of an effective foreign policy is not, of course, that it suppresses manifestations of ambivalence. The foreign policies of very few states could be said to meet this test. Nor is an effective policy measured by whether it is consistent, stable or produces harmonious relations with other states. These attributes may not be a policy's main, or even its desired goals. Rather, effectiveness is measured by whether, on balance, a policy advances the national objectives as perceived by its decision making elite. Stated in these terms, down to the present at least, the record of Chinese policy in Indonesia is one of failure, punc tuated here and there by spasms of momentary success. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === The central question this study attempts to answer is why China's policy in Indonesia failed. At an abstract theoretical level it would appear that the general or specific policy of any state may fail for one or a combination of reasons: 1) there may exist an imbalance between the goals a state seeks and the re sources available or committed to achieve them; 2) the policy makers' assessment of objective conditions may be unrealistic; 3) important new factors or events may emerge in ways that inval idate a previously successful policy; and 4) faulty execution of policy may, of course, undo the most carefully fashioned Machiavel lian schemes. From the mid-1950's until the 1965 coup China's policy in Indonesia, to most observers, appeared to have skill fully navigated its way between these shoals, and to be on the verge of a major triumph with potentially far-reaching geo-political consequences. The immediate factor which altered this projection was the disastrous Indonesian coup, an event Peking could not have predicted or prevented. In this sense, it could be said that Chinese policy in Indonesia was not really defeated, rather it simply proved to be vulnerable to one of those unexpected internal upheavals which have periodically undermined the foreign policies of all the great powers. In a more fundamental sense, however, the failure of Indonesia must be placed squarely at China's doorstep. It was entirely within Peking's discretion to pursue more modest objectives and to adopt more cautious strategies than those which led to an attempted axis. China could certainly have avoided a defeat of the magnitude she eventually sustained, simply by scaling down the importance of her relationships with Indonesia. Instead Peking deliberately attempted Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === a power alignment with the highly unpredictable Sukarno govern ment. She incurred this high risk despite the prominent influence pro-Western, anti-communist generals exercised on that regime, Djakarta's well-known suspicion of Peking's ties with the Indonesian communists, and the fact that China lacked the military, economic or political power to bend this alliance to her will, or to protect it if endangered. That any government which based itself on Marxism-Leninism should have gambled on the "bourgeois nationalist" Sukarno regime requires some explanation, especially in view of the historical experience and the doctrine of all communist parties which con sistently- -and for good reason--has warned against precisely this kind of "adventurism." Chinese Communist doctrine especially stressed the basically treacherous nature of the "bourgeois nationalist" class in colonial countries. Hence the Chinese leaders should have anticipated that relations with a non-communist Indonesian state would be unstable, and therefore inherently danger ous. But Peking began to ignore her own time-tested experience after the mid-1960's when, so it appeared to those in the leader ship making foreign policy, an alliance with Sukarno's Indonesia could become a central component in the realization of a Chinese great power strategy in the contest with Russia and America. Pre cisely because they unwisely staked so much on the venture in Indonesia, the policy failure must be assigned primarily to the Chinese leaders who made it. In foreign policy studies, as in other fields of political science, the analyst ordinarily proceeds to the investigation of his subject matter with some conceptual scheme or model, more or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === less explicitly in mind, even if it is not boldly stated. Since the selection of this scheme largely determines what questions will be taken up, which factors will be considered, how they will be weighed and which relationships will or will not be examined, the rationale for its adoption should be put forth at the begin ning. There are basically two kinds of conceptions which underlie this study: the first refers to a general set of assumptions about the nature of China’s conduct toward the outside world; the second involves essentially a method of relating various components, phases and levels of Chinese policy together. In retrospect, al though the explanatory value of the scheme adopted in this study did not completely fulfill the writer's expectations, it was more useful in answering the questions he most wanted to get at than the other models which were considered. To begin with, the foreign policy of China is fundamentally a reflection of the fact she is an "alterationist," anti-status quo power. Whatever other inconsistencies, shifts, reversals or con tradictions in her behavior may be noted--and these are many--the drive to break out of and ultimately to recast an international order she does not accept, has remained a constant feature of her role in world affairs. This characteristic is at once above specific national objectives the Chinese leadership may have, since it is not so much a decision as an instinct, but also a powerful thrust behind those objectives because the attributes of the existing nation state system are not to China's liking. Hence, although her policies may be shown, historically, to place greater emphasis on the attainment of nationalistic, revolutionary or even chauvinistic goals at one time than at another, the direction all Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === of these impulses point toward is sweeping and fundamental change. China does not seek an eventual consolidation of national gains within that framework which the few Western industrial powers have imposed on the many underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is chiefly this deep, and historically wellfounded, resentment toward the West which permits Peking to look upon her opposition to the status quo as an act of self-defense. A second general assumption which pervades this study, but is nowhere spelled out as such, concerns what might be called the evolution of China's sense of national identity, and how this pro cess affected the conduct of her external affairs. The Chinese leadership is perceived as slowly but steadily emerging from a transitional period in the late 1940's and early 1950's which necessitated deference and subordination to the Soviet Union. Increasingly, more authentic expressions of an individualistic Chinese Communist tradition and style in foreign relations came to the fore. As this assertion of national independence took place, however, it actually set the stage for the emergence of conflicting approaches to international strategy within the Chinese leadership. For,in effect, the same basic debate has been going on over China's domestic and her foreign policies since the mid-1950's; how best to fuse the philosophy and principles of China's great but essentially un-Marxian revolutionary experience with the recog nized practices and doctrines of Marxism-Leninism which were already heavily codified by the Soviet Union. In both spheres of national policy it was the "nativist," or Chinese, tendency which ultimately triumphed, though this did not become clear until the Cultural Revolution and certainly does not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === predetermine the future. Prior to 1967, however, intra-elite differences over national strategy, though probably severe--as the outcome of the 1959 Lu Shan phenum and the dismissal of mili tary leaders Peng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing would seem to indi cate- -were contained. To the extent that the inputs of the "nativist" and the more "orthodox Marxist" tendencies can be gauged at all, and this wouldbe difficult to show conclusively, down to the debate over how to respond to the 1965 American inter vention in Vietnam, the "nativist" influence was at best muffled. As was true of the domestic political struggle well into the Cul tural Revolution, the rhetoric and categories of Chinese foreign policy were Maoist, but its actual contents and execution were not. In view of the length and intensity of previous policy debates, which suggests strong backing on both, or indeed several sides, it seems likely the influence of the "orthodox Marxists" has not been entirely silenced either, and that the debate will crop up again, if it has not already. the main aims of the present study While do not require that these inferred factional differences be ex plicitly identified, it is important to stress the more general point, for which conclusive evidence does exist, that the larger process of thrashing out her national self-identity inevitably worked its will on the evolution of China's foreign policy. The question of what analytical tools should be applied to explain the evolution of that policy globally, and its relation to the concrete case of Indonesia, points up the second part of this study's conceptual apparatus. Chinese foreign policy can be interpreted as an attempt to achieve ideological and national power objectives by projecting Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === various forms of the "united front" strategy, modeled after the Chinese revolutionary war experience, onto the post-1949 inter national arena. Analyzing Peking's foreign policy strategy from this perspective has several advantages, the most important of which is that it utilizes the orientation closest to the Chinese decision-makers themselves. It is possible, therefore, to use their own frame of reference as a diagnostic tool, and thus to attain a clearer insight into the mainsprings of the policy. The united front concept is a highly flexible device which the Chinese and other communist leaders consciously employ in a wide variety of political-military contexts, and in support of nationalistic as well as revolutionary aims. It may come into play whether in dealing with friendly or hostile non-communist classes, movements or leaders. In this study the specific forms, stages and objectives of Chinese united front strategy as applied to Indonesia are seen as having been closely related, in the Peking leaders' conception, to their larger aim of organizing a united front strategy on a global basis. Throughout the period that will be examined the factor which most often determined the key shifts in Chinese policy toward Indonesia was the perceived requirements of this larger international united front strategy, a ranking of priorities that does not seem to have been seriously challenged any time between 1949 and 1967. Particularistic Chinese aims and interests in Indonesia were not viewed as basically in conflict with her global foreign policy goals, but in harmony with them, or at least amenable to resolution. The study finds that the Chinese effort to operationalize front strategies at the global and the bi-lateral level though Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === seemingly successful during certain periods, essentially failed because certain fundamental political and power handicaps could not be overcome. These restraints arose from various circumstances: 1) Indonesia's geo-political position rendered her virtually immune from either direct Chinese assistance or pressure since she lay within the sphere of Anglo-American air and naval predominance; 2) the power balance within Indonesia consistently and overwhelm ingly favored anti-communist elements hostile to mainland China; 3) vastly greater economic and political resources were available to the United States and the Soviet Union, which gave them a deci sive advantage in competing for influence or exerting leverage in Indonesia; 4) unpredictable fluctuations in Indonesia's domestic politics repeatedly undermined Chinese policies; and 5) as its size and influence grew, the very existence of the autonomous, nationalistic PKI compromised the Chinese policy of alliance with the non-communist Sukarno regime. Aside from the pressures exerted by these factors, an analysis of the Sino-Indonesian relationship leads to the further conclu sion that Peking was unable to harmonize, much less remove, per sistent conflicts between revolutionary and national power interests. Though apparently convinced of their ability to design policies which resolved "contradictions", in practice Chinese strategy in Indonesia did not succeed in reconciling these competing interests or coordinating the global with the specifically Indonesian dimen sions of their policies. Ultimately Chinese policy in Indonesia became, essentially, a function of her rivalry with the United States and the Soviet Union. The importance of this objective began to emerge as early.as the late 1950's, but it became the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 23] === predominant concern after 1963 when the Sino-Soviet dispute became irreconcilable. By that time, Sukarno's radical nationalist foreign policy had thrust Indonesia forward as a leading exponent of Afro-Asian struggle against the Western presence in the colonial world. The domestic basis for a forward policy was seemingly quite precarious because the PKI, having become by far the largest effective poli tical force in Indonesia, was engaged in a desperate competition with the army to establish its succession to Sukarno before he passed from the scene. Indonesia was the acid test of the Chinese leaders' major argument in the dispute with Moscow over foreign policy, namely that the ideological and political aims of the socialist camp could be simultaneously pursued by organizing a grand united front strategy directed primarily to linking up the communist revolutions and the nationalist-led anti-imperialist movements in the colonial world. This thesis lost much of its credibility when Peking's alliance with Sukarno as well as the very existence of the PKI were destroyed by the Indonesian coup.Inter nationally, whatever ambitions China had to play the role of a great power were set back, and her much cultivated image as the reliable champion of anti-imperialists and revolutionaries was severely tarnished. More than any other single episode in the international affairs of the CPR down to 1967, the defeat in Indo nesia revealed the inherent dilemmas of Chinese foreign policy strategy and hence its fundamental weaknesses. The study comprises three parts. Chapters I and II consider the Indonesian context which Peking was confronted with, and the basic ideological, national and doctrinal elements which shaped her Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 24] === policy. Chapters III to VIII analyze the evolution of the Chinese united front foreign policy from the period immediately preceding the establishment of the CPR down to the suspension of relations with Indonesia in 1967. A concluding chapter summarizes the study's main findings and assesses their meaning and implication for Chinese foreign policy in general. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 25] === CHAPTER I THE INDONESIAN SETTING This chapter introduces the relevant geo-political, socio economic and historical factors which, in their development and interaction, constituted the essential nature of the Indonesian state that confronted Communist China in 1950. The purpose of the following discussion is to set forth the most salient charac teristics of Indonesian society and its pre-1950 relations with mainland China in order to establish the necessary background data to support the subsequent phases of analysis in this study. Objective Conditions Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago, a sprawling complex of islands linking the Asian and Australian continents. For nearly two thousand years this oil and mineral rich country has been a major crossroad of trade, culture and ideas. Its natural resources and strategic position invited European domina tion as early as the 17th century. But in this century alone Indonesia has experienced a Japanese invasion and occupation (1942-1945), a colonial independence war against the Dutch (19451949) and since 1950 the more covert forms of aggrandisement spawned by the Cold War power rivalries. Indonesia's 120 million people inhabit more than two thousand islands covering a total land-water area approximately the size of the United States."*' As such, it is the third most populous Asian nation, behind China and India, in the race to overcome poverty and backwardness. This basic fact is quite important to an understanding of Indonesia's place in world politics, for the 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === major Cold War adversaries alike contend that the form the moder nization process takes in the emerging countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America— that is, whether it is inspired by doctrines originating in the capitalist or communist systems— will deci sively affect the future world balance of power. Each of these great power adversaries has, therefore, been quite reluctant to permit Indonesia to determine, independently, the form her own modernization and political development will take, since that process is seen as affecting their own aspirations and interests. As a result, the open and clandestine political warfare Russia, China and the United States have waged in Indonesia during the past twenty years has seriously impaired her capacity to develop free of unwanted foreign interference, and it has undermined the authority of every government in Djakarta period. since the independence Dissidents of the Left or Right have always known they had powerful friends abroad ready to support subversive causes. The guerrilla and rebel movements which have erupted during Indonesia's turbulent post-independence era could usually find many natural sanctuaries in the vast mountains and rain forests of Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. Overall, however, Indonesia's geography is unfavorable to the development and maintenance of insurgent warfare. With the notable exception of a mountainous region in West Java, where the Darul Islam rebels were able to hold out for more than a decade after 19^9, in Indonesia the ter rain best suited for rebellious guerrillas is not contiguous to the country's major concentrations of population which insurgents would have to win and hold to be successful. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === Population density is highest on Java and Bali,and on both islands there is widespread rural poverty, one of the conditions most readily exploited by revolutionary movements in the under developed countries. But neither island has a large remote hinterland capable of safeguarding insurgent forces from the stronger military power of the government in Djakarta. In the outer islands the geographic picture is basically reversed. Ideal guerrilla terrain abounds but the peasant community, as compared to Java, is both small and relatively prosperous. various times since 19^9 rebel movements outside Java have been able, temporarily, to defy Djakarta but they were never able to gain control of a population base sufficient to conquer or hold any of the outer islands, much less pose a serious challenge to control all Indonesia. Hence the familiar demographic configura tion on mainland Southeast Asia which has worked to the advantage of revolutionaries— hill and Jungle redoubts adjacent to peasant concentrations in the valleys and deltas of major river systems— is not characteristic of Indonesia. This fact contributed heavily to the final defeats suffered by the Darul Islam, the Sumatran and Sulawesi revolt of 1958, and it has thus far frustrated the efforts of the PKI to generate a peasant rebellion in East and Central Java following the 1966 overthrow of the Sukarno regime by the Indonesian army. Chinese Communist theories about "sur rounding the cities from the countryside," therefore, have always confronted formidable obstacles were they to be adapted to Indo nesian conditions. The pattern of economic relationships in Indonesia also is not generally conducive to revolution in the countryside. Most Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === of the population is made up of small, independent subsistence farmers, but massive rural poverty is largely confined to areas of Central and East Java and Bali. Even here, despite intense population pressures and rising absentee landlordism after 1950, social and political tensions seem never to have reached the level of pre-revolutionary China or Vietnam. The Indonesian landlord class is not large, cruel, or characterized by great wealth vis-a-vis the tenant and landless elements. Moreover, in many of the impoverished districts on Java a communalistic tradi tion with respect to land ownership and use in the villages acted, through most of the 1950's and 1960's, to blunt the potential appeals of class war in the countryside.3 Rural socio-economic radicalism was on the upsurge in the mid-1960's, but the sub sequent annihilation of the PKI ended this brief threat and has forced the Indonesian peasantry to continue its conservative, passive traditions. In the outer islands, where a favorable land-population ratio exists, rural poverty has yet to become an explosive political factor. Despite the country's overall rural character, potential sources of discontent arising from poverty also exist in the cities and towns. As in other underdeveloped countries, Indonesia's urban centers have had to absorb heavy migrations of unemployed or discontented villagers seeking--but rarely finding--a better life in the city. It was partly due to the growth of a large, impov erished urban population that the Indonesian communists were forced to concentrate much of their organizational and political efforts in the cities, although the Party's formal doctrine stressed the peasantry as the basic element of the Indonesian Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 29] === revolution.4 This was disadvantageous for the communists, strate gically, because the heavy concentrations of military, police and commercial power were mainly in urban, not rural, communities. And since the real levers of powers were, at all times since 1949, in the hands of the country's anti-communist elements, it was they, strong in the cities, who always occupied the commanding political-military position during any internal upheaval. Because Indonesia is a pre-industrial country it does not have a powerful capitalist class or a trade union movement, at least in the Western sense.^ The absence of a strong labor move ment has limited the extent to which Indonesian communism could expect to pursue, successfully, a genuine "proletarian" strategy. On the other hand, lacking an equivsient to. Western-type "captains of industry", basically, Indonesia'.• 'tepreneurial class is not Actually, given the fact that Army officers since 1957 have run nearly all the confiscated enterprises that make up most of the national industry, "bureau cratic capitalism" is a more appropriate description. The country has a long tradition of energetic trading classes, the most vigorous ethnic components coming primarily from the Bataks and Minangkabau of Sumatra, the Makassarese of South Celebes and, most importantly, from the resident three million foreign and local-born Chinese.^ On the other hand, the dominant ethnic group, the Javanese, who constitute over 40% of the population, generally speaking have not produced a strong class of merchants and traders. The occupation which has most attracted enterprising Javanese is government service where they tend to dominate military and bureau cratic roles, especially at the national level. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === These differentiations within the Indonesian community have produced several important forms of economically-generated poli tical friction. The greater entrepreneurial prowess and wealth of the outer islanders has fostered demands for increased regional autonomy, demands which have conflicted with persistent Javanese efforts to centralize power in Djakarta. By the same token, it is not the numerically dominant Javanese but the commercially vigorous outer-island natives and the Chinese who constitute most of the Indonesian middle class. This class, however, has not been allowed to play a principal role in national politics, as is the case in most other underdeveloped countries, because it reflects ethnic and racial minorities which have had to yield to Javanese numerical supremacy in national political life. The dominant position of the Chinese minority in the local economy is greatly resented by both the bureaucratically oriented Javanese--who, nevertheless, traditionally extort large sums from the Chinese in exchange for protection, licenses, etc.--and the outer island traders. As a result, one of the few domestic poli tical issues that unites the indigenous elite classes is a deep antipathy toward the Chinese community. Indonesians have tended to project this hostility onto any external Chinese government-whether in Singapore, Taipei or Peking, in the belief, not entirely unfounded, that this minority's true loyalties are attached to one or another Chinese State, but certainly not to Indonesia. Since Indonesian independence was won there have been an extensive number of government regulations designed to curb Chinese dominance over the local economy. These measures have, indeed, greatly reduced the wealth and efficiency of the Chinese Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === merchants without, however, generating any substantial Indonesian entrepreneurial talent and energy to replace them. Prom time to time state run enterprises or cooperatives have been held up as an economic alternative to the Chinese traders; to date these experiments have not proven to be very effective. Nevertheless, discriminatory measures against the Chinese, whatever the degree of legality and despite the harmful consequences for the economy, have been politically quite popular. Although it contains important elements of cohesion, Indo nesia’s cultural and ethnic composition presents serious obstacles to national integration. Most of the 250-odd spoken languages belong to the Malayo-Polynesian family, and the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, is very widely used. Some ninety-percent of the population practice or profess Islam. A long history of inter island commercial and cultural contacts has also helped to spread many commonly shared values and customs. Nevertheless, there are over 300 separate ethnic groups and many strong regional/cultural identifications. The inevitable tendency of a Java-dominated Djakarta government to exert hegemony over the Indonesian agglom eration has, on the whole, had the effect of impeding the forma tion of a larger, integrated nationalism. It would, however, be misleading to overemphasize the centrifugal tendencies and fric tions arising from Indonesia's diverse cultural makeup. Histori cally, the country has adopted a receptive, though selective, attitude toward successive waves of cultural, religious and ideo logical influences. Indonesia has borrowed extensively from her contacts with the Hindu, Islamic and Western traditions, weaving what was compatible, or simply useful, into the existing cultural fabric without losing her own identity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 32] === Political Influences The capacity to absorb and "Indonesianize" a variety of diverse foreign influences has functioned less effectively at the political level. Indonesia has received her basic political ideas from very different sources: an original, indigenous authoritarian tradition; Western social-democratic and Marxist philosophies introduced by the Dutch; and islamic beliefs. No successful syn thesis of these largely conflicting ideas has yet been found. However, the official state ideology, Pantjasila (the Five Prin ciples), first proclaimed in 1945, and Sukarno's ill-fated "Guided Democracy," espoused after 1959, were reflections of the country's continuing search for a harmonious integration of the major poli tical creeds which have taken root during its history. Although it is the dominant religious belief, Islam has not exerted a correspondingly strong influence on Indonesia's polig tical history. In part this is because Indonesia received pri marily "modernist" Islamic teachings, less militant than the ver sion of this creed which is usually found in the Middle East. Being already a moderated form of Islam, it was all the more sus ceptible to the absorptive process of Indonesianization. But Islam also has never registered its full political impact on national life because soon after independence was won the Moslems split into two rival party organizations (Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama), roughly equal in strength, an event which greatly weakened the force of Islam in national p o l i t i c s. M o r e o v e r, the fact that Moslems led the Darul Islam and Sumatran rebellions, while seeking aid from foreign powers, also served to discredit the Islamic political class as genuine nationalist spokesmen. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 33] === Historically, the appeals of Marxism have also been weakened by the split between the national communists (represented by Tan Malaka and later the Murba party) and the internationally affil iated PKI.I* The latter's identification with Russia and China could never be entirely removed and, consequently, has always acted to undermine the PKI's quest for nationalist credentials. On the other hand, communism's emphasis on class struggle little suited the society's traditional values of harmony and compromise. In the 1954-1964 decade the PKI successfully exploited rising social-economic tensions between the better off, strongly Moslem santri class and the poorer, non-Moslem abangans. The subsequent bloody suppression of the PKI and its supporters, however, reaf firmed the power and the willingness of the dominant segments of Indonesian society to resist radical social change. Standing between the Islamic and communist movements, a variety of secular nationalist parties have borne the brunt of the effort to provide the nation with a set of political ideas that combine Westernderived notions of representative democracy and social-economic justice with traditional Indonesian conceptions of leadership and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g. T h e largest of these, the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party),founded by Sukarno, though persistently hobbled by factional splits, has usually offered the main alternative for those who rejected the rigidities of Islam and communism. Under conditions of such ideological divergence it is not surprising that post-independence Indonesia was unable to reach a viable consensus on the basic questions of national political life, namely, the form of the state and the institutions through which legitimate authority was to be exercised. The country's strongest Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === tradition, before and during the Dutch period, was elitist and authoritarian. The men who led the independence struggle, partly out of personal conviction and also because they hoped to win the support of the Western democracies, attempted to transplant parlia mentary government in Indonesian s o i l. T h i s effort was not des tined to long survive the society's much stronger authoritarian impulses. All the major contenders for power--Sukarno, the Army and the leaders of the communists, Islamic and nationalist parties --soon proved unwilling to conduct their rivalry solely within the Republic's formal institutions and laws. Instead, each of these actors worked outside the system, tried to subvert it, and thus deprived the constitutional experiment of the basic condition necessary to its success. Historical Background For all the setbacks Indonesia has suffered since 1949, her leaders have, nevertheless, reconstituted an Indonesian state with boundaries roughly corresponding to the area once dominated by the maritime powers of Shrivijaya and Majapahit, the great Indonesian states of the 9th and 14th century.^ Like contempo rary Indonesia, these states were loose political entities whose control over outlying territories was always tenuous, though at one time or another greater Indonesia seems to have extended as far as parts of what today is the Philippines, Cambodia and the Malayan peninsula. As maritime trading powers, ancient Indonesian kingdoms had rather extensive contact with China from about the 6th century A. D., including a small flow of Chinese traders who settled in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 35] === the islands. But diplomatic missions and emissaries were, as far as is known, quite irregular up to the Dutch colonial period. In no sense was the Indonesian archipelago ever under Chinese domination, but during periods of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, the Chinese tended to regard Java, at least theoretically, as being part of the tributary system. The Mongol (Yuan dynasty) invasions of Southeast Asia in the late 13th century led to a brief conflict with Madjapahit which is of some significance because it stands as an early example of the rivalry that might be expected to develop between China and Indonesia under conditions when both countries were strong and expansionist. Following Madjapahit's mistreatment of Kublai Khan's envoys, who it seems had come to demand submission to the new emperor of China, in 1292 the Mongols sent a punitive military expedition to Java. However, the expedition met with failure, was soon forced to retire and no subsequent attempt was ever made by China to subjugate the islands. When the Ming dynasty sent its famous naval expeditions to Indonesia, India and beyond in the early 15th century, the imperial fleet again stopped to mete out punishment, this time to the Chinese-ruled settlement at 17 Palembang (Sumatra). On the other hand, toward the Javanese kingdom, the Ming envoys cultivated friendly diplomatic and com mercial ties, apparently seeking to bring the Javanese more fully within the Chinese tributary system. Had the pattern of relations which began to emerge during Ming times continued, a growing and harmonious intercourse between the two countries might well have been expected to develop. it turned out, however, in future years China and Indonesia were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === destined to be driven apart by forces neither country played much part in generating. Imperial China's decline under the impact of the West, the rise of Islam and the Dutch conquest of Indonesia were the three major developments which, cumulatively, introduced serious frictions between the two societies. These frictions were to last, and hence to aggravate the Sino-Indonesian relationship down to the present day. The early Chinese settlers in Indonesia^ere small in number and largely confined to the commercial cities along the coast, where a lively trade between the Indies and China had developed. As of the 14th century, the different cultural practices and eth ical beliefs of the Chinese had not caused any serious antagonism with the native population. Another harmonious coexistence was possible down to that time because the indigenous value system was quite tolerant and, moreover, because the Chinese had little close contact with Indonesian society outside the coastal cities. But with the spread of Islam through the islands in the 15th century the formerly tranquil relations between Indonesians and Chinese began to deteriorate. Islam championed not only a religious creed sharply antagonistic toward Chinese beliefs and customs, but also a rival Moslem merchant class anxious to displace the'Chinese traders. Potential frictions between the native population and the Chinese settlers were still in an embryonic stage when the Dutch began the conquest of Indonesia in the 17th century, at which point the situation changed completely. The Dutch discovered that the Chinese could perform several key economic roles for the colony: as middlemen in the collection of agricultural produce for export; as retail merchants; and as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 37] === licensed operators of salt* opium and other revenue-producing monopolies. Because it helped the Dutch pattern of exploitation the Chinese were allowed, indeed encouraged, to establish a near complete economic dominance in the villages and towns. As a re sult, the Chinese traders quickly displaced the already less vigorous native merchants. By the late 19th century the Dutch had begun to encourage large scale Chinese migration from the mainland as a source of cheap labor to work the colony's mines and plantations. Over time, many of the Chinese who originally came to Indonesia as indigent laborers eventually saved and toiled enough so that they were able to make a start in business for themselves, usually as small traders. Not infrequently, it was from precisely such humble beginnings as merchants in the villages and towns that the wealthy and economically powerful Chinese moved up the ladder of success in the Netherland's Indies. The short run economic advantages gained from indirectly using the Chinese to exploit the colony were of considerable importance to the maintenance of Dutch rule. Through their support for a Chinese-dominated middleman system the Dutch effectively prevented the development of a strong native entrepreneurial class that could become politically troublesome. In turn, the pervasive economic dominance of the Chinese in the towns and villages helped to deflect some of the natives' rising discontent onto the alien Asians in their midst, rather than exclusively against the alien Europeans. For their part, the Chinese got less that was of enduring value from their role as middlemen. At one time or another the Chinese did generally speaking, enjoy both preferential legal status and pronounced economic advantages vis-a-vis the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === Indonesians. However, and of more importance for the long term interests of the Chinese, the Dutch consistently discouraged assimilation with the native population. In failing to do this the prospects for social peace in the future were greatly dimin ished. Ultimately, it became Dutch policy to prevent the Chinese from owning land in the villages (though some form of renting or leasing was usually possible), to foster separate Chinese schools, guilds, etc., and to treat the Chinese as a special category of Netherlands' subjects distinct from both the European and the native populations. Many Chinese, especially second generation, local-born peranakans did, in fact, intermarry with and adopt the customs of the Indonesians. But among the foreign-born, totok Chinese, who were numerically larger and more conscious of their cultural identity, Dutch policies encouraged the growth and strengthening of a separatist Chinese community. The long term consequences of Dutch colonial policy proved to be exceedingly harmful for relations between the overseas Chinese and the local population. In the first place, a strong native entrepreneurial class could not develop, and the weak one that did harbored deep resentment against its Chinese competitors. These feelings were shared by many Indonesian farmers and laborers as well since the Chinese largely controlled the system of goods, credit and marketing in the villages and towns. On top of this, the generally separatist attitudes of the Chinese, which not infrequently resulted in looking down on the native population, helped to stamp them, in the eyes of most Indonesians, as alien ex ploiters who had a vested interest in the perpetuation of Dutch rule. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 39] === By the 1900's a socio-economic situation had developed to the point that the overseas Chinese were certain to become isolated from the mainstream of the Indonesian movement for national inde pendence. Indeed, the immediate stimulus to this movement was the increasing Chinese commercial dominance over the already hardpressed native merchant class, out of which grew the first large nationalist organization, Sarekat Islam, formed in 1912 as a coop erative trade association for protection against the Chinese.*9 few Chinese who understood the implications of Indonesian nation alism for the future of relations between the two races joined the independence movement. But a far greater number of overseas Chi nese was more excited by another political phenomenon of the early 1900's--the rise of nationalism on mainland China. Traditionally, imperial China had recognized all Chinese descendants through the male line as its subjects, irrespective of their place of birth or whether they had acquired the citizen ship of a foreign country. In practice, however, subjects who opted to live in a "barbarian" land were regarded as outcasts, undeserving of the emperor's protection or his concern for their welfare. Thus, although many eventually hoped to return to their motherland, the overseas Chinese as a whole felt little reason to be politically loyal to, or even particularly oriented toward the mainland. This attitude began to change in the last two decades of the Manchu dynasty. In a reversal of traditional attitudes, Peking suddenly began to take a serious interest in the overseas Chinese--pa,:sing laws confirming their Chinese citizenship, soli citing remittances from them, dispatching various commercial and educational delegations to overseas Chinese communities. At length, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 40] === in order to draw closer to these communities, Peking began nego tiating with the Western powers for the establishment of Chinese consular representation in the colonies. It was largely as a result of the growth of these contacts that, unassimilated with either the native or the European population in Indonesia, many overseas Chinese soon developed a strong identification with the Chinese mainland they did not formerly have. Dutch efforts to control and check the spread of mainland Chinese influence were successful legally, but not politically. Peking was allowed to open consulates in Indonesia in 1910, but on the condition that Dutch law, rather than Chinese, would determine the status of the local overseas Chinese. 21 In this way, an attempt was made to force Peking to abandon its citizenship claims on those overseas Chinese the Dutch considered to be Netherlands' subjects. In practice, this had little concrete effect since Peking's consulates went ahead registering and soliciting funds from local and mainland-born Chinese alike, despite repeated Dutch protests and restrictions. Moreover, there was really no way the Dutch could prevent the development of the Chinese revolution from exerting a politicizing effect on the attitudes and ideas of con cerned overseas Chinese. This was becoming quite evident as early as 1927, when the rupture of the first KMT-CCP alliance triggered a similar split within the politically active segments of the Indonesian Chinese community. Later on, during the Sino-Japanese war, most Indonesian overseas Chinese groups put aside their internal differences to organize various anti-Japanese "bond drives" and boycotts in support of the Nationalist Chinese government. 22 On the eve of World War II it had become clear that Dutch Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 41] === colonial power might be able to slow down, but could not entirely arrest the attraction that the nationalistic symbols stirring the mainland held for the politically conscious elements in the over seas Chinese community. The fact that the Chinese minority had given visible evidence of support for Chiang Kai-shek's government inevitably exposed them to harsh treatment at the hands of the Japanese during the latter1s conquest of Indonesia between 1942 and 1945. In destroy ing Dutch rule the Japanese did more than remove the colonial system under which the Chinese had acquired wealth and preferential status. During the occupation the Japanese facilitated the growth of Indonesian nationalist organizations with the aim of creating native puppet support for Tokyo's "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere." This objective the Indonesian nationalist leaders were prepared to serve, as a temporary tactic, because it enabled them to build the kind of mass movement the Dutch had thoroughly sup pressed, and because they hoped to win independence, eventually, even if this could only come about through a period of tutelage 23 and dependence on Japan. The Japanese did not attempt to break the Chinese stranglehold on the economy. But by allowing the nationalist elements to build a rudimentary political-military organization, they did put into the Indonesians' hands the means to take effective action against the Chinese traders if ever the native population freed itself from foreign rule. In view of the long pent-up resentments against them, the local Chinese suffered less during Indonesia's 1945-1949 indepen24 dence struggle than might have been expected. To some extent this was because a number of Chinese fought alongside the Indonesians Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === against the Dutch, while others held prominent positions in the Republican government. Primarily, however, it was due to the fact that the principal nationalist leaders, such as Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir, were not men of racist, anti-Chinese tempera ment. They were also politically alert to the dangers which might stem from repressive actions that could create a thoroughly alien ated Chinese minority to contend with after independence was won. International considerations also must have influenced the Indo nesian leaders' attitudes toward their Chinese problem. encourage anti-Chinese actions would have undercut the Republic's diplomatic efforts to win the support of the major foreign powers at the United Nations. One of these was Nationalist China, a veto-exercising member of the Security Council and a staunch advocate of Indonesian independence from the beginning of the struggle against the Dutch. The fact that the Indonesian nationalist leaders were politi cal moderates thus helped to keep the revolutionary struggle from simultaneously becoming an internal racial conflict. But this did not prevent periodic anti-Chinese violence by the native pop ulation during the war, especially in some of the Dutch occupied and contested territories. Generally speaking, the Chinese at tempted to remain neutral during the independence struggle, offer ing no resistance to the Dutch but giving little or no active sup port to the revolutionaries. tion. This proved to be an untenable posi In the eyes of the Indonesians it amounted to the continu ance of "business as usual" Chinese profiteering from the war and de facto alignment with the Dutch. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 43] === Following several localized but bloody anti-Chinese massacres, the worst occurring in 1946 at Tangerang in West Java and taking more than 600 lives, the Chinese formed local "self-protection forces" (pao-an tui), sometimes with Dutch assistance and weapons. A natural response under the circumstances, the existence of these para-military units nevertheless freed some Dutch troops to attack the Republic. Once again, and not entirely without reason, the Chinese became identified as enemies of the Indonesian nationalist movement. To make matters worse, like the Japanese occupation period, the economic dominance of the Chinese was not broken during the war against the Dutch--in fact it expanded, so that many Indo nesian independence fighters came home from the war to find that the major beneficiary of their hard won victory was, after all, the much resented local Chinese minority. Tension arising from the Chinese minority issue was only one of the divisive factors that was built into Indonesia's emergence as a new state. Nationalist, Islamic and Marxist political group ings had toiled together in the opening phases of the independence struggle. In 1948, however, the PKI suddenly bolted the alliance with the non-communist parties and attempted to seize the leader ship of the independence movement. Although it was then in a weak military position vis-a-vis the Dutch, the Republican government under Sukarno-Hatta thoroughly crushed the PKI challenge. 2 6 This action won Indonesia the decisive support of the United States in pressuring the Dutch to grant independence, but it also stamped her leaders as anti-communists and "imperialist lackeys" in the eyes of all foreign communist states and parties. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === The terms under which Indonesia was granted independence, in December 1949, largely confirmed the communists' analysis of the new state's neo-colonialist status. Her leaders were obliged to settle for a Dutch-rigged federal republic--when they desired a unitary state; to shoulder a huge war debt owed to the Dutch; to protect all Dutch and other foreign economic assets; to become junior partners in the Netherlands - Indonesian Union; and to accept the retention of Dutch sovereignty over the West Irian territory, subject to a vague formula for future negotiations. It was this last provision, the disposition of West Irian, which most clearly symbolized the fragility and incompleteness of Indonesian indepen dence. Such terms virtually assurred that Indonesia would be weak, disunited and dependent on the Dutch and their Western capi talist allies.^ The wisdom of accepting a much compromised independence, when and how this state of affairs could be rectified, were issues that divided the leaders of the new Indonesian state from the outset. That their country lay within the economic and geo-political orbit of the Western powers was a fact the political elite fully recognized. 28 But they were divided on whether Indonesia's national aims and interests should be pursued within the framework of accepting this reality or challenging it. President Sukarno became the main, but by no means the only, exponent of a radical nationalist view which saw modern Indonesia as the successor to the ancient glories of Madjapahit and Shrivijaya, an historic destiny which could only be fulfilled by breaking out of the Western orbit. 2 9 At the very least, this view called for an Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism in the Cold War. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. That === [PDF page 45] === it might also include strong anti-Western overtones was clear from the fact that Sukarno, like most of the educated elite, had been heavily influenced by the Leninist theory of imperialism. The behavior of the Western powers toward Indonesia, before and after 1949, did much to strengthen this theory's credibility. Other leaders, including those from economic and military interest groups, had more modest ambitions for their country. They too accepted the desirability of neutralism in the Cold War but believed such a policy could be asserted from within the Western orbit, taking advantage of capitalist aid and the strategic pro tection Anglo-American power afforded Indonesia vis-a-vis any potential external communist danger. This latter conception of Indonesia's place in the world was ascendant in the immediate post-1949 period, with the consequent result that Djakarta's foreign policy aims were quite limited and softly pursued. While the conflict between proponents of an Islamic and a secular nationalist Indonesian state existed from the outset, and was never wholly resolved, the ruling elite was able to establish a measure of consensus on certain basic questions concerning the country's internal order. institutions a chance. They were prepared to give parliamentary For some this was a matter of expediency and compromise; for others it was a matter of principle and convic tion. Some modified form of the capitalist system was accepted, even though this meant prolonged Dutch-Chinese control of the economy, and despite the fact most of the governing elite nominally espoused one or another variant of welfare or Marxist socialism as necessary to bring about a "just and prosperous" society. How such a society was to be created by an elite singularly lacking in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === economic and administrative expertise, and representing, in es sence, the Western-educated offsprings of a colonial aristocracy, proved to be an early stumbling bloc. One thing was clear. crushing the 1948 communist bid for power, Indonesia's post independence elite served notice of the fate that awaited those who might attempt violent or radical change of the existing social order. At this point it may be useful to summarize briefly the main characteristics of the Indonesian policy that confronted the Chi nese leaders in late 1949, and to suggest, in broad outline at least, the main issues that were most likely to shape the pattern of future Sino-Indonesian relations. The following generaliza tions summarize the implications of the preceding discussion: Because Indonesia had experienced predominantly Hindu, Islamic and Western influences, she lay outside the traditional Chinese sphere in Asia. That sense of a special mission and rela tionship to countries such as Korea and Vietnam, which has influ enced ancient and modern Chinese policies was not, therefore, likely to be a significant factor motivating Peking's post-1949 aims and interests in Indonesia. In the absence of this legacy, it was more likely that China's policies would be shaped, pri marily, by more compelling and recent events in China, such as resurgent anti-foreign nationalism and the revolutionary ambitions of an elite which had just come to power in the first indigeneously created Marxist state in Asia. Indonesia, on the other hand, emerged as the successor to a Western colonial entity--albeit after a struggle--and her leaders were pledged not to radicalism Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === or basic reform, but dependence on,and institutional adaptation from, the leading capitalist democracies. The two countries' wellsprings and motivations having thus developed in fundamentally different directions, there was the strong likelihood that the resulting opposed nationalisms would clash sharply and soon, if given the chance. The most immediate source of potential friction between Peking and Djakarta was almost certain to arise from the status of the Indonesian Chinese minority, and any ties the communist mainland might try to establish with it. Although this minority had proven to be highly responsive to influences from China in the past, in 1949 Peking's capacity to manipulate the Indonesian Chinese was, in fact, sharply limited. By playing on such themes as nationalism or overseas Chinese nostalgia for the mainland, Peking could expect to win support in some Indonesian Chinese quarters. But what was essentially a petty bourgeois trading class, after all, could not be expected to embrace the basic eco nomic and political appeals of communism, unless the Indonesians made life intolerable for the resilient Chinese. Moreover, to follow in the path of the previous Manchu, Republican and Nation alist governments --wh ipping up enthusiasm and support for mainland causes--was almost certain to expose the Indonesian Chinese to s/iolence, possibly massacres, as had happened in the past. The end result could only be damage to the diplomatic position of China and gain for that of her enemies, who could be expected to profit from any racially-inspired Sino-Indonesian conflict. As an underdeveloped island-state two thousand miles to tne south, lacking military power and overwhelmingly occupied with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === its internal problems, Indonesia itself posed no direct security threat to Peking. However, in Chinese communist eyes, this appa rent weakness did not conceal the larger geo-political reality; namely, that Indonesia was a creature of "neo-colonialism," in effect, an appendage of the powerful and warlike "imperialist" system. Because the Western powers were, in fact, dominant in Djakarta, the Chinese leaders automatically assumed Indonesia would be used to further "imperialist plots" directed not only against the CPR but also against the true interests of the Indo nesian "people" and other Asian-African "people" struggling for "national liberation." What could be done to remove Western influ ence, or at least deny the "imperialists" control over Indonesia, therefore, was a central objective of any policy the Chinese leaders might adopt. From Indonesia's political, economic and ideological cleavages it followed that her foreign and domestic affairs were likely to be highly unstable. Such a situation was certain to invite external intervention by powers which were interested in preserving Indonesia's dependence on the capitalist states, as well as by those powers, like the CPR, which were interested in promoting anti-Western revolutions. The unstable nature of Djakarta's relations with the West, arising from the Indonesian elite's various dissatisfactions with their country's mortgaged, semi-independent status, would likely afford communist powers an opportunity to fish in troubled waters. On the other hand, the possibility that foreign communists might successfully exploit anti-Western nationalism so as to ignite a radical revolution looked most unpromising in the light of the 1948 PKI suppression. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 49] === And any Chinese Communist government seeking to promote a class war in Indonesia naa to reckon with the certainty that their own kinsmen, the overseas Chinese, would immediately become its first victims. Objectively considered, the restraints operating on any assertive, forward Chinese Communist policy toward Indonesia after 1949 were, from the outset, exceedingly formidable. Overall, Peking was faced with a very large, distant, complex and volatile neighbor; no placid Laos, Cambodia or Thailand; and no small Vietnam or Korea, which could easily be made to feel the weight of Chinese power. Yet, the new leadership in Peking did not come to any such assessment of limited Chinese interests in or capacity to influence the future development of events in Indonesia. Why Peking assumed that an assertive, active policy in Indonesia was possible is the subject of the next chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === Footnotes For basic geographical and social data on Indonesia see Karl J. Pelzer, "Physical and Human Resource Patterns", in Ruth T. McVey, editor, Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963), pp. 1-23. Ibid., pp. 13-20. For a generally Marxist treatment of the characteristics of Indonesian social structure and its role in the country's economic history see W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1959). See D. N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revo lution (Djakarta: For a general summary of the Indonesian Trade Union movement see Everett D. Hawkins, "Labor in Transition", in Indonesia, o p. cit., pp. 257-269; and Iskandar Tedjasukmana, The Political Character of the Indonesian Trade Union Movement (Cornell: Modern Indonesia Project, 1959). On the economic role of the Chinese in Indonesia the best studies are W. J. Cater, The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies (Oxford: Basic Bookwell and Mott, 1936); HT FI MacMair, The Chinese Ahrvad (Shanghai, 1925); J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, A Study of Plural Economy (New York: 1941)1 and Victor Purcell, The Chinese in South east Asia (Oxford: 1951). This problem is discussed in J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Admin istration (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961). Among the most important works on Indonesian culture, its roots and adaptations, are B. J. 0. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies (2 vols.) (The Hague: van Hoeve, T9'57); Clifford Geertz, The Religion of J a v a,(Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); and W. F. Wertheim! Indonesian- Society in Transition, o p. cit. An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Islamic poli tical parties, as compared to other forces in the country in the 1949-55 period, is presented in Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia", in Phillip W. Thayer, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 128-140. 10. This process is discussed in Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). 11. On the origins and problems of communism in Indonesia see Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === - 38 12. The struggle between the nationalist and communist factions in Indonesia from the early 1900's to 1950 is fully analyzed in George McT. Kahin's classical study Nationalism and Revo lution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19S2) and from 1950 to 1957 in Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, op. cit. 13. Ibid. 14. Sources consulted for the historical background include, D. G. E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955); Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1960), 2n”d ed., J. C7 Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society (The Hague: van Hoeve, 19 55) 15. This conclusion is based on the official Chinese dynastic records examined in W. P. Grnoeneveldt, Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya (Djakarta: Bhratara, 1960). 16. Ibid., pp. 20-34. 17. Ibid., pp. 34-45. 18. The single, best overall English-language account of the Chinese in Indonesia is Purcell, loc. cit., pp. 11-54; 441-568. 19. The impact of the Chinese economic stranglehold on the devel opment of the Indonesian nationalist movement is analyzed by Kahin, o j d. cit., pp. 37-63. 20. For the major events in this process see Donald E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia (Cornell: Modern Indonesia Project, 1961), pp. 2-11 and 15-19; Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); and Purcell, loc. cit., pp. 511-525. 21. Purcell, loc. cit., pp. 514-515. 22. Ibid., p. 544. 23. On the Japanese occupation period see Harry Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 19 58) and Kahin, opI cit., ppT TOT-132. 24. For this period see Purcell, oja. cit., pp. 551-568 and Willmott, 0£. cit., pp. 19-24. 25. Ibid., Purcell, pp. 554-566. 26. The background and development of the split is carefully analyzed in Kahin, o^. cit., pp. 256-303. 27. Ibid., pp. 421-445. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === 28. The clearest admission of this fact is in former Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta's "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, April 1953, pp. 441-52. The same view was also expressed, with somewhat greater reluctance, by another Prime Minister, Sjahrir, in Perdjoeangan Kita 29. For the expansionist, anti-Western view of Indonesia's place in the world see Muhammad Yarnin's address of May 31, 1945 to the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence. Full text in Yarnin's Naskah Persiapan UndangUndgang Dasar 1945 [Drafting the 1945 Constitution] (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), voll 1, pp. 126-135. Tt was in this speech that Yamin developed the "Greater Indonesia" doctrine which underlay Sukarno’s foreign policies after 1961. Yamin argued that the territorial basis of the Indo nesia state should include West Irian, Portugese Timor, British North Borneo and the Malayan states. While Hatta took issue with these imperialist notions at this conference, Sukarno's speech at the meeting fully supported Yamin's thesis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === CHAPTER II ELEMENTS OF CHINESE POLICY In the preceding chapter it was necessary to review certain facets of Indonesia's social history and her relations with main land China prior to the communist period in order to reconstruct an objective picture of the general situation existing between the two countries in late 1949. The purpose of this section is to identify the most important ideas and objectives shaping the Chinese leaders general outlook on external affairs, and to show how these elements affected the development and character of the specific Chinese policy toward Indonesia. Accordingly, this chapter is concerned with the sources of the Chinese leaders* views on global politics, how they perceived the relationship between various power and revolutionary goals and what strategies they intended to follow in foreign policy. Peking's Theory of International Relations The Chinese Communist view of international relations proceeds from the basic conception laid out in Lenin's theory of imperialism. According to this theory, the contemporary international scene is the era of the final collapse of the world imperialist system. This system, which is the culmination of monopoly capitalism, is the root cause of poverty, war and the oppression of one state or people by another. These destructive consequences are regarded as inherent in the nature of the imperialist system, for the indus trialized capitalist countries must become increasingly militaris tic, expansionist and aggressive, seeking to enslave the colonial countries and the lesser capitalist states in order to secure the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === markets and resources necessary to stave off internal economic collapse and revolution. Like other Marxists, the Chinese leaders hold that the final overthrow of the imperialist system is inevitable, its destruction being pre-determined by the dialectical laws governing the devel opment of economic forces. However, the complete destruction of imperialism ultimately requires violence because the classes it represents will not step down from history peacefully. On the contrary, as the crisis inside and between imperialist states deepens, communist theory posits that the imperialist leaders will be compelled to launch foreign wars, and to grab up new colonies in order to perpetuate their moribund system. Socialist states are seen as especially threatened by attack for they repre sent the new world order that will replace imperialism. In this theory of international politics the colonial, semi colonial countries have a central importance in two respects. First, they are the areas the imperialists must hold and exploit to survive. Second, they are imperialism's achilles heel, being the focal point of a rising tide of "national liberation move ments." To all Communists it therefore follows that since imper ialism is the common enemy, the socialist states and the "national liberation movements" should be natural allies. Communism and nationalism, in effect, can give mutual support to each others' struggle because imperialism, by its nature, must commit aggression against the "people" of the world; hence the "people" have no choice but to join together in the fight against their common enemy. Finally, because the enemy is, inherently, incapable of abandoning his aggressive behavior, no lasting peace, only temporary Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 55] === accommodation, is really possible until imperialism is finally destroyed. As the leading capitalist power, "U. S. imperialism" has, for most of the Cold War, been depicted as the "main enemy" of the "people" of the world, the leading--but by no means the only--opponent which must be defeated before colonial liberation and the universal triumph of socialism can be completed. Adherence to the Leninist theory of imperialism thus embues the Chinese leaders with a strong belief that their international posture, vis-a-vis imperialism, (especially the United States and its allies) is essentially defensive. It is also clear that Leninism can serve as a rationalization for Chinese actions and policies which, from the non-Communist perspective, may stem from Peking's revolutionary and/or expansionist motivations. But the most fundamental point about this aspect of Leninist doctrine is that, owing to China's prolonged domination by the West--and the Chinese Communist Party's interpretation of that experience, the theory of imperialism has acquired a strong truth in the minds of Peking's leaders, and indeed, most educated Chinese. To them the past has amply proven that imperialism is the pernicious enemy of China. Since they have good reason to view the last hundred years and more this way, it should surprise no one if present-day Chinese leaders automatically assume that some aggressive, exploitative aims lie behind the policies of capitalist states, not only in their dealings with China but also with socialist and underdeveloped countries. The same reasoning has convinced the Chinese Commu nists that to protect and advance their own state and revolution China must align herself with and support other nations and "people" in the struggle against imperialism. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 56] === The objective source of Peking's enmity toward the United States is the record of American intervention in the Chinese civil war. This intervention, which began before the completion of the Chinese civil war but has continued to the present, was decisive in the creation of a de facto Nationalist Chinese state on Taiwan, and hence the incomplete nature of the communist vic tory on the mainland. While U. S. obstruction of the CPR's sover eignty has intensified Sino-American enmity, another source of Peking's antagonism is rooted in Chinese Communist ideology which perceived Washington (more exactly, "Wall Street") as the leader of an implacably hostile camp bent on war and world domination. This view was already firmly established as early as 1946, that is before the Communist victory in China, the emergence of the Taiwan dispute or the onset of the East-West Cold War. As Mao Tse-tung analyzed the international situation at that time, the United States had replaced Nazi Germany and Japan as the leading imperialist predator. Moreover, she was attempting to gain control over most of the world, including the Far East, in order eventually to attack the Soviet Union. Before this attack could be launched, however, Mao concluded that the "U. S. imperialists" would have to subjugate "a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa." If a new war was to be prevented, he said, the "people" in this zone, together with the socialist movement, would have to unite and struggle; otherwise the war was unavoidable. The expectation of a new imperialist-instigated war, the strategic importance of an intermediate "zone" between the U. S. and the socialist states, and the necessity for a global struggle Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 57] === against imperialism, were thus fundamental tenents of the Chinese Communists' perception of the world situation well before they took power in late 1949. So strong is this anti-imperialist ethic that it has colored virtually every aspect of China's foreign policy, including her attitudes and relations with all countries. This fundamentalist element in Chinese foreign policy doctrine may acquire greater or lesser prominence at certain times but it is most unlikely to disappear altogether. Any favorable change in U. S. policy toward China would, as the recent thaw in U. S.-China relations suggests, be interpreted in Peking as the result of the weakened American position in the capitalist system, rather than a "change of heart" in Washington. Next in importance to the theory of imperialism, and closely related to it, is the Chinese Communist conception of the revolu tionary process in the colonial countries. In its basic formula tion, this conception is also of Leninist derivation. in his theory of the "New Democracy" However, Mao Tse-tung introduced important modifications in the concept concerning: 1) how revolu tionary movements would unfold in other colonial, semi-colonial countries; 2) the important role of these movements in the struggle against imperialism; and 3) the relationship of the colonial lib eration struggles to the socialist camp. In these respects, what Mao’s innovations did was to lay the basis for the later Chinese Communist theoretical emphasis on the overriding importance of independence, or "liberation" movements in bringing about radical changes in the global balance of power between socialism and imperialism. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 58] === Basic Leninism conceives the revolution in colonial, pre capitalist countries as developing in two sequential phases: a "bourgeois-democratic" stage in which the "national bourgeoisie," bent on establishing the supremacy of native capitalism, leads the struggle for independence against "imperialism and its lackeys" in the country, the reactionary compradore and feudal elements; and a "transition to socialism" stage in which the proletariat (i.e., the local communist party) establishes a worker-peasant dictatorship and proceeds to complete the socialist revolution. Ever since Lenin's time "bourgeois-democratic" revolutions strug gling against imperialism have been regarded as useful allies in the tactical sense that they can, and should be manipulated by communist states to further the world revolution. But until these revolutions entered the second, or "transition,” stage they could not be considered, in Leninist theory, as an integral part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution.^ Mao's 1940 "New Democracy" formulation altered the Leninist theory in two ways. First, in semi-colonial countries waging a liberation struggle against imperialism (as in the Chinese case) Mao argued that the bourgeois-democratic revolution would not be led by the bourgeoisie alone, but by the "joint revolutionarydemocratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes" in which the proletariat would play the leading role. The conception of a multi-class revolutionary alliance was refined and carried forward in Mao's 1949 work, On People's Democratic Dictatorship,^ where he proclaimed that a dictatorship of all revolutionary classes led by the CCP would continue into the "transition" stage and, in effect, replace sole hegemony by the proletariat, as Lenin had Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 59] === envisioned the situation after the seizure of power. Hence, the "New Democracy" theory introduced the idea that Lenin's two-stage revolution could be transformed or compressed, over a substantial period of time, into one stage. In other words, before the bourgeois-democratic revolution was actually completed the commu nists could become the leaders of a multi-class alliance in cer tain colonial, semi-colonial countries where the national struggle against imperialism had, in terms of tactical significance, superceded the internal class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The second revision of Lenin that grew out of Mao's 1940 theory was his contention that "New Democracy" revolutions in the colonial, semi-colonial countries were actually an integral part of the "proletarian-socialist world revolution," despite the fact they had not yet entered the "transition" stage. Mao argued it was possible to consider colonial movements, like China's, as already exhibiting a sufficiently proletarian character because "New Demo cracy" represented "the new type of revolution," one "led by the proletariat [which] aims at establishing a new democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes," and thus "serves to clear a path even wider for the development of socialism." In effect, Mao was making the argument that anti-imperialist colonial revolutions could be considered as having already become part of the general movement toward socialism, rather than capitalism, once the proletarian elements were in a position to assert leadership over a multi-class alliance. Neither of these innovations was presented as a modest revi sion applicable only to the special characteristics of the Chinese Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 60] === revolution. On the contrary, both were advanced as being exceed ingly relevant to the future of the colonial world and the social ist movement. In projecting the relevance of these ideas onto other external revolutionary settings, Mao revealed several basic assumptions about his analysis of the dynamics at work in the international system. It seems clear, for example, that the "New Democracy" theory assumed the existence of a greater degree of congruence between the colonial revolutions and the socialist movement in waging the anti-imperialist struggle than had been assumed by Lenin or his successors. Similarly, "New Democracy's" optimism about the prospects for a "new type" revolution which would enable the proletariat to establish its leadership during the "bourgeois-democratic" stage, stood in marked contrast to the more pessimistic evaluation Moscow usually made concerning what the communist parties could be expected to achieve in the first stage of the revolution. But the assumption which has had the most pervasive impact on Peking's analysis of third world politics in the post-1949 period was the strong implication in "New Democracy" that all anti-imperialist revolutions in the developing countries were an integral part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution. This conception assigned to anti -imperialist revolutions a far more important role and status in the international communist movement than Lenin, Stalin or Khrushchev conceded in the course of design ing the Kremlin's tactical alliances between communism and anti imperialist nationalism in the third world. The significance these different Maoist interpretations of Leninist doctrine were to have for the continuance of Soviet-Chinese accord in foreign policy did Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === not begin to emerge until the late 1950fs, when Peking began to urge that the socialist camp should concentrate its strategy in the Afro-Asian countries. But the theoretical rationale support ing the contention that the colonial world should be considered so integral a part of the world socialist revolution as to deter mine its direction and emphasis had its roots in Mao's "New Democ racy" nearly twenty years earlier. Peking's general approach to international relations has also been shaped by Mao's theory of "contradictions", first adq vanced in 1937. Like other Maoist innovations, the "contradic tions" theory also derives from an earlier Marxist classic, in this case the theory of "dialetical materialism". To Chinese Communists the significance of this Maoist innovation is the analy tical use they make of "contradictions" theory in deciding major internal and external policy issues. Basically, "contradictions" theory develops the idea that all human and natural phenomena are in a process of constant change, the motive force being the uninterrupted emergence of "contradic tions" inherent in the nature of everything. The operative part of this theory holds that although every process has a number of "contradictions", only one of them is the "principal contradiction" (chu-yao mao-tun) at any given time. This "principal contradiction" plays "the leading and decisive role while the rest occupy a secondary or subordinate position." The important link between this theory and concrete matters of Chinese Communist policy making was established long ago when Mao said: studying any complex process... "Therefore, in we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this principal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 62] === contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily resolved."1® That the Chinese leaders, in fact, have consistently and consci entiously analyzed the domestic and international problems of their revolution in the framework of "contradictions" theory has already been pointed out in several scholarly studies.11 The range and importance of foreign policy decisions that may be affected by employing "contradictions" theory is substan tial because the Chinese Communists believe this theory guides them in solving such questions as: what hostile force(s) is to be regarded as the "main enemy" facing the leadership; what force(s) can be united with to defeat the enemy; and what strategy and tactics should be followed under various types of situations. non-Chinese parlance, operationalizing "contradictions" theory means to make an application, at the strategic decision-making level, of class analysis techniques in order to diagnose the impli cations of various policy choices facing the leadership, and thus to chose the optimal one. Since the successful resolution of this problem is seen as crucial to everything else, determining the "principal contradiction" is really what the Chinese elite would recognize as the acid test of their abilities as statesmen and strategists. Since few theories command respect unless their explanatory power has proven to be considerable, it is important to understand the concrete historical context in which Mao’s ideas about "con tradictions" emerged. He first advanced the "contradictions" theory at the time of the Japanese invasion of China, the event that marked the decisive turning point in the fortunes of the CCP, and indeed the whole course of the Chinese revolution. Mao used Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 63] === his theory to demonstrate the strategic necessity of subordinating the internal class "contradictions" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in China to the external but "principal contradic tion" between the Chinese nation and Japanese imperialism. the basis of this analysis the CCP entered a tactical "anti imperialist united front" with the Kuomintang, a decision that subsequently enabled the communists to mobilize the military capability and the mass political support necessary to win the final victory. The fact that Mao’s decisions proved to be cor rect at this crucial juncture, and at other points later on, no doubt strengthened the credibility of policy analyses based on "contradictions" theory. In essence, China's leaders believe that a correct application of the theory reveals the "main enemy" or the main strategic problem to be solved. Of equal importance, once the designation of the "principal contradiction" is made, it resolves the question of appropriate tactical responses open to the leadership. In other words, how the "principal contradiction" is identified determines the selection of which united front policy to pursue. While the alliance with the Soviet Union was intact Peking did not publicly invoke the "contradictions" theory to argue the case for the primacy of confronting "imperialism" in the colonial world. Instead several "fundamental contradictions" were usually identified, but not openly discussed in terms of any particular order of importance. 12 Although the importance of the struggle between "imperialism" and the "oppressed nations and peoples" had been clearly emphasized in Chinese writings since the mid-1950's, this contradiction was not explicitly singled out Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === as the most crucial one to be solved until 1963, 13 and it was not designated the "principal contradiction" until 1 9 6 5. ^ By that time, of course, state and party relations had so deteriorated that the Sino-Soviet debate over grand strategy was more a reflec tion than a cause of their differences. It seems quite probable, therefore, that China's leaders all along regarded the struggle with imperialism in the colonial world as the decisive strategic battleground, and that their appraisal reflected primarily the fact Peking's most vital interests were centered in this arena. Seen in this light there are clearly some important parallels and con tinuities between Mao's 1946 concept of the "intermediate zone", the 1949 advocacy of Maoist-type colonial revolutions, the post1954 Chinese emphasis on Afro-Asian anti-imperialist unity, and; of course later the 1965 "people's war" doctrine. Underlying each of these major Chinese foreign policy campaigns was the assumption that the fundamental "contradictions" between imperialism and the colonial, semi-colonial world could be exploited on behalf of the interests of the socialist states, as well as to support anti-Western revolutions. Subordinating the internal class struggle to the national "contradiction" with imj. jrialism during the anti-Japanese war had demonstrated to the Chinese a method they believed other communist parties could employ, where similar conditions existed, to gain leadership of national revolu tions in colonial countries. In projecting this strategy onto the international scene of the 1950's and 1960's, essentially Peking meant that the communist powers should be prepared to sub ordinate struggle between the developed socialist and imperialist states to the allegedly more decisive conflicts stemming from the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 65] === contradictions between imperialism and the "oppressed nations and peoples". Stated in non-Chinese Communist parlance, the outcome of the struggles of the colonial third world countries to liberate themselves from the U. S.-led imperialist system would also deter mine the course of the contest between socialism and capitalism. Thus the common thread that runs through the major theoretical underpinnings of Chinese foreign policy is the decisive importance of the conflict between imperialism and the colonies to the whole evolution of the international system. In the Chinese view the nature of this conflict pre-determines the aggressive behavior of the imperialist powers and the common interests the socialist and the colonial countries have in opposing them. The nature of the conflict also alerts the Chinese to what they believe are the imperialists' fatal weaknesses, which can be exploited to defeat the enemy. In essence, from their interpretation of the world wide conflict with imperialism, the Chinese Communists have devel oped a general theory of international relations which provides both a framework of perceptions and a set of general policy guide lines. Ideological Goals and National Interests How did this theory of international relations condition the Chinese leaders' attitudes toward Indonesia at the time of the establishment of the CPR on October 1, 1949? Although the CCP did not formally hold the reins of government in China before this time it nevertheless most certainly had a "foreign policy" in one sense. Peking's basic conception of other nations and the general principles she would adhere to in future relations with them had been formulated several years before. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === As early as 1948 the Chinese Communist Party rejected what it conceived to be the "bourgeois-nationalist" attitude toward the state which assumed the existence of an inherent conflict between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the national interests of the Chinese state. On the contrary, in an authoritative statement on the whole question it declared that the aims of "genuine, patriotic nationalism" and "proletarian internationalism" were 15 mutually consistent and re-enforcing. In supporting the world proletarian revolution China would be advancing the highest form of her own true national interests; on the oiher hand, in pursuing her own patriotic and nationalistic goals she would be rendering powerful support to the proletarian internationalist movement.‘t“ In a word, Chinese policies supporting the ideological goal of world revolution also advanced the real national interest of the CPR, and vice versa. To most non-Marxist-Leninists the notion that the Chinese leaders really do have a conception of the oneness of ideology and national interests is probably not believable. For many in this category their own ideology requires that Chinese Communist pronouncements on the subject be regarded as merely convenient rationalizations. In fact, viewing the matter this way, a number of Western observers have tended to regard the making of Chinese foreign policy as a series of crafty zig-zags designed to mask Peking's real motivations, whether these be naked power, chauvinism, revolution or spur of the moment opportunism. Such impressions are quite misleading because they fail to grasp the strength of the frame of reference from which the Chinese leaders perceive external affairs. Conditioned to analyze political questions in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === Marxist-Leninist categories, their dominant intellectual orienta tion is accustomed to thinking about major international problems in dialectical terms. Hence changes in "the balance of forces" or the nature of the "contradictions," for they may logically re quire a mandatory shift of emphasis in foreign policy which appears inconsistent or opportunistic to those who do not share their frame of reference. The tactical consequences of such decisions may result in assigning higher priority to what is regarded in the West as Chinese "ideological" or "national" interests. 17 Actually, no such distinction or choice is perceived in Peking, but the persistent assumption of outsiders that they do acccounts for a good deal of the faulty Western analysis of Peking's diplomatic moves. Keeping in mind the Chinese leaders' conceptions about the workings of the international system and the essential complimentarity they see between ideological and national interests, it is possible to reconstruct how the Chinese leaders viewed the general problems of developing a policy toward the Indonesian state in late 1949 and early 1950. Four basic issues must have been on their minds: (1) To the Peking government the central fact about Indonesia was its continuing subordinate relationship to the imperialist powers. Indonesia was a semi-colonial country, in fact, the crea tion of her economic masters, the Americans and the Dutch. Inevit ably, in the Chinese view, the imperialists would try to use these strategically located islands as a base from which to stamp out the Southeast Asian "liberation movements," gobble up the "inter mediate zone" and prepare for the eventual attack on China and the socialist camp. Similarly, imperialist control of Indonesia meant Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === there could be little if any expectation of "normal" diplomatic,' cultural or trade relations with Djakarta. Ties of this sort could not possibly be advantageous to the CPR because the imper ialist powers would prevent or subvert them, whether by direct intervention or through local henchmen. To develop a policy that would help to frustrate U. S./Dutch dominance therefore, of primary importance and security grounds. in Indonesia was, to Peking, purely on geo-political Ideology heavily conditioned how this issue would have been perceived at the time because it defined the nature of the conflict with imperialism in Indonesia as amenable to no viable settlement or compromise short of breaking up the position of the Western powers. In effect, there was no real basis for friendly relations with Djakarta, from the Chinese viewpoint, until the imperialists' grip on Indonesia had been broken. C23 Frustrating imperialism was closely related to the Chi nese interest in supporting the "national liberation" movement in Indonesia. As perceived in Peking, the Indonesian people's strug gle for liberation had already sustained two serious setbacks. 1949 the "reactionary" segment of the native bourgeoisie had sold the country's independence to imperialism in exchange for puppet status in the Netherland's-Indies Union. Moreover, the Indonesian Communist Party, the true repository of the people's aspirations, had been crushed earlier in 1948, thus leaving the patriotic forces of national liberation without effective leadership. long as the foreign-backed, "reactionary" Indonesian classes were ascendant, there was comparatively little China could do to aid a genuine movement for national liberation, or to assist the PKI in leading that struggle. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === At best Peking might be of some indirect assistance in help ing the PKI to recover from its crushing defeat. But this role would necessarily be limited to such guidance, for example on matters of party-building and united front tactics, as the inde pendently-minded Indonesian comrades might be willing to accept. From Peking’s vantage point in 1949, an active Chinese policy in Indonesia.could only come into play later on, when the inevitable "contradictions" between imperialism and the Indonesian nation had produced a resurgence of anti-imperialist momentum. Hopefully, that eventuality would have the effect in Indonesia, as it had had in China and other colonial countries, of polarizing the domestic classes into "progressive" and "reactionary" factions. This stage would then open up a basis for Peking's political co operation with Indonesia's anti-imperialist elements. Until this process began to unfold, however, China was really in no position to give much help to the weak cause of Indonesian national libera tion. As a more distant objective it would have to remain a distinctly secondary factor in her 1949-1950 policy calculations. China's objectives in Indonesia were partly defined by the way she interpreted her relationship to the socialist camp. Especially in the early years of the Sino-Soviet alliance, Russian views and policy on Southeast Asia carried important weight, cer tainly enough to dampen or postpone a conflicting Chinese impulse. At the outset there did not appear to be evidence of sharply divergent interests; but in one respect the ties to the socialist camp were necessarily in competition with China's freedom of action in Asia. For the Chinese analysis of international power politics attached great strategic importance to the anti-imperialist Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 70] === struggles which had already, or would develop in countries like Indonesia. It was predictable, therefore, that Peking would make an early effort to persuade the socialist camp that greater atten tion be devoted to supporting the anti-imperialist elements in the third world. To achieve this objective pre-supposed a coordi nation of policies with Moscow since Russia was the only socialist state which commanded impressive military-economic power. Though highly desirable, a coordinated Sino-Soviet policy was probably not seen as indispensable to achieving Chinese objec tives in Southeast Asia. In the Chinese Communist analysis, coun tries like Indonesia would inevitably throw off the Western yoke and move onto the socialist path. This process would unfold as the colony's "contradictions" with imperialism intensified, and as revolutionary forces in the oppressed countries like Indonesia matured under the leadership of communist parties. Two implica tions for Chinese policy would seem to follow from these considera tions. First, although Soviet views and interests no doubt carried great weight, Peking was unlikely to permit her own policy toward Indonesia to be governed, ultimately, by the Soviet relationship. Second, in international communist councils, Peking was likely to argue vigorously that the most effective influence the socialist camp could exert in support of Indonesia's, or other, national liberation struggle was to maintain a strong anti-imperialist policy in the colonial world. How to assert the mainland's long dormant claims of legal jurisdiction over the local Chinese community in Indonesia was clearly a major objective any Chinese government would pursue. This goal was particularly pressing in 1949-1951, however, because of its close relationship to Peking's effort to end the Chinese Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === civil war, and to prevent the establishment of a rump KMT regime on Taiwan. Since a good deal of Taipei's claim to represent an alternative China rested on its as yet unbroken ties with most of the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, the destruc tion of this influence had urgent priority. In view of the under standable tendency of the overseas Chinese during the past four decades to align with whatever the dominant political currents on the mainland happened to be, the new Chinese leaders had reason to believe that their recently concluded victory over the Nation alists would soon prompt something of a mini-political civil war among the Southeast Asian overseas Chinese. Apparently the Chinese leadership did not, at first, see that for them to intervene in the local affairs of a country like Indonesia, if only via radio broadcasts and literature, would undercut their larger objective of focusing the attention of "pro gressive" elements on Western imperialist interference in Indonesian domestic affairs. The political line taken by the Peking govern ment in the early 1950's argued that the Chinese minority could, simultaneously, give its loyalty to the new CPR and support the national struggle of the Indonesian "people's" for liberation since the overseas Chinese and the native population were commonly oppressed by Western imperialism. By an extension of the Marxist conception that class interests transcend national or ethnic attachments, theoretically, Peking's attempt to assert jurisdic tion over the resident Chinese population probably was not seen as constituting an infringement on the sovereignty of the Indo nesian nation. Few non-communist Indonesians, or overseas Chinese for that matter, were likely to comprehend this logic, much less act on it. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 72] === Since the "imperialists" and their "bourgeois lackeys" ruled the Indonesia of 1949 there is every reason to assume the Chinese leaders believed it would not be possible to assert their legiti mate claim on the overseas Chinese minority without a protracted struggle, and no doubt they anticipated this would prompt a hos tile reaction from Djakarta. Acting on behalf of the "national interest" represented by the overseas Chinese, therefore, auto matically raised a formidable dilemma: on the one hand, to weaken KMT influence and rally Indonesian Chinese to support the CPR, it was desirable to establish normal diplomatic relations with Djakarta as soon as possible; on the other hand, the nature of the Indonesian state and the classes it represented obviously informed the Chinese Communists that they could only expect the "bourgeois" government in Djakarta to obstruct ties between its local Chinese residents and the mainland. The real issue here was that the overseas Chi nese could only remain a major consideration of CPR policy as long as her leaders were prepared to downgrade the importance of rela tions with a non-communist Indonesian government. Chinese Foreign Policy Strategy What emerges most clearly from the preceding analysis of basic aims and interests in Indonesia is the inherent weakness of the Chinese position. For China to exert any decisive influence on any of her main concerns in that country would have required the capabilities of a great power. Realistically considered, Peking could do very little, on her own, to weaken the Western position, to improve the fortunes of the Indonesian Communists, to determine Soviet policy toward Indonesia--much less Southeast Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === Asia--or even to protect her own nationals in a foreign land. the other hand, as the consumers of Indonesia's exports, suppliers of the aid she received and the trainers of her military officers, the leading capitalist powers did nrt have to rely solely on their naval and air forces to bring decisive influence to bear on the turn of events inside and outside Indonesia. And such power as the socialist camp could muster, even as it grew in proportion to that of the West, would remain in Soviet hands. Hence, in the short range future, even within the communist movement Moscow's policy was most likely to be a more decisive factor in the success or failure of China's policy than any power input Peking alone could make. Objectively speaking, therefore, if Chinese interests in Indonesia were to be advanced it would seemingly have to come about largely as the result of superior Chinese diplomacy. other words, the course of the rivalry among the other dominant powers would have to work to Peking's advantage, and she would have to respond adroitly to the opportunities created by their rivalry. To understand why Peking could even contemplate an ambitious, forward policy in Indonesia in the face of these objective weak nesses, it is necessary to examine the Chinese Communist view of the relationship between power and strategy. Over the period covered in this study, the evidence shows that the Chinese leaders consistently strove to attain the kinds of national goals in the foreign policy arena which are sought by great powers. Part of this drive undoubtedly stemmed from her leaders having overly ambitious goals. But what we are most concerned with at this point is the Chinese Communists' extraordinary confidence in the body Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === of strategy and tactics they had developed, and which they believed had repeatedly enabled them to triumph over objectively stronger adversaries. At the heart of their strategic philosophy is a deep-seated rejection of conventional power relationships which, in the West, are regarded as decisive to the outcome of politicalmilitary conflicts. The whole experience of their revolution has, to the Chinese satisfaction, convincingly demonstrated that, though outwardly strong, in reality China's enemies have fatal weaknesses which she can exploit to defeat them in the course of a protracted struggle. 18 From this perception flows such standard Chinese Communist slogans as: the enemy is a "paper tiger"; "man is more important than weapons"; and "despise the enemy strategically, take full account of him tactically." These phrases are not simply psycho logical boosters to compensate for the CPR's relatively inferior military and economic situation. They are genuine reflections of the Chinese leaderships' confidence in other factors they believe will determine the long term outcome of the contests with their enemies. Because the CPR has been a comparatively weak power, in most international conflict situations affecting the CPR since 1949 her leaders have assumed that the adversaries initially have the advantage. However, the longer the contest continues the more the Chinese believe the adversaries' fatal "contradictions" will undermine their temporary superiority. Where Chinese strat egies excel is in the exploitation of the opponents vulnerable points and his mistakes over a long period of time. This may be seen, historically, in the classic successes the Chinese have achieved: over the Japanese, the Kuomintang and most recently Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === the Americans, who have publicly proclaimed the abandonment of their anti-China "containment" policy. In the most basic sense, Peking did not defeat these opponents by overwhelming them; actually her strategies proved to be very effective in manipulating their weaknesses, while their physical superiority was an inadequate substitute for policies which lacked a solid political base. The core element of this strategy is Mao Tse-tung's famous three-point revolutionary model: party, army and united front. 19 By party is meant a disciplined communist leadership, skilled in the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and closely linked with the masses. The second component of the model, the army, must be led by the communist party and eventually develop enough independent military power to make possible the waging of an armed struggle from secure base areas in the countryside. Finally, the united front must be a broad national alliance of all those forces opposing imperialism and feudalism, and it must be a "revolutionary" united front which aids the party in seizing state power. These three components are interrelated in such a way as to form a single entity. principal weapons. Army and united front are the strategy's The former is necessary to guarantee eventual communist control over,, or at a minimum independence within the front. By means of the front the revolutionaries divide and isor late their enemies while organizing their potential allies into a broad national coalition. In a leadership sense, the party is regarded as the grand strategist wielding these weapons. The successful employment of this model in the Chinese revo lution established Mao Tse-tung as a formidable strategist in the management of political-military conflict. That the Chinese have Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === consciously tried to apply the strategic lessons of their revolu tion in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives since 1949 has been pointed out in several scholarly studies, 20 and has been loudly proclaimed by the Peking government on various occasions. 21 Again, it must be noted that the relevance of the model to Peking's foreign policy necessarily proceeds from the fact the Chinese leaders, in common with all Marxist-Leninists, reject any distinc tion between separate internal and external spheres of politics. Since the class struggle permeates everything, it follows that a variety of political-military conflict situations at the sub national, national and international level can be diagnosed and acted upon, from the Peking leadership's viewpoint, by relying on the precepts of their time-tested strategic model. The key to analyzing Peking's foreign policy behavior, therefore, lies in understanding how the Chinese perceive the philosophy and principles of their revolutionary strategy can be applied to problems of national statescraft. In turning the theoretical model into a useful tool for the conduct of foreign affairs it is clear that the Chinese leadership has not effected an altogether successful transposition. Inter nationally, the logical equivalent of the CCP should have been the socialist camp and, by implication, Soviet rather than Chinese leadership of the communist movement. While the Sino-Soviet alli ance was intact there was apparently no challenge to Russian leadership, but after the two powers came into open conflict there really could not be an international equivalent of the unified, disciplined "party" the Maoist model requires. Subsequently, Peking tried to present the anti-revisionist communist states and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === parties oriented toward Peking as a substitute for Sino-Soviet unity in the struggle against the imperialists, but this slight of hand only retained the "party" component of the model in a theoretical sense. Similarly, the combined military power of the communist states, the equivalent in the international model of the Chinese Red Army, could not fulfill its role after the SinoSoviet rupture. Presumably anti-imperialist struggles by revolu tionary people around the globe could be regarded as an effective substitute for the Red Army component, but here the difficulty was that even where such struggles w e r e led by communists they were neither controlled by Peking nor could they be relied on to act in accordance with the interests of the CPR. "National lib eration" movements simply proved to be incapable of performing a power function in the international arena similar to that which the PLA had played in the Chinese revolution. In the absence of bonafide international equivalents for the party-army components, actually the only element in the Maoist revolutionary model which could be operationalized for China's foreign policy strategy was the united front. An analysis of how the Chinese view this compo nent is appropriate at this point in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the role it performs. Peking's conception of the united front is basically of Leninist derivation. For all communist elites since the Russian revolution, the necessity of forming or joining united fronts arises in response to a specific historical circumstance. This is the weak or threatened position of the revolutionary party prior to the seizure of power. By an extension of this premise, internationally, the socialist camp is also in great danger until the final collapse of the imperialist system. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === The possibility of joining united fronts arises from the characteristic way Marxist-Leninists analyze power relationships among the main participants in any given conflict situation. one end of the spectrum are the "progressive" forces led by the proletariat; at the other end are the "reactionary" enemies led by the "imperialists" and their anti-communist allies. Between the two poles are the "middle-of-the-road" groups who, because they constitute the vast majority of people, are of central impor tance to the contending Left and Right forces. In the competition for supremacy the strength of the anti-communists is perceived mainly to lie in their military power. On the other hand the fundamental weakness of the reactionaries is political since, according to Marxism-Leninism, the vast majority of the world's people want to throw off the capitalist-imperialist yoke and make revolution. Hence in situations where the "balance of forces" is objectively against the proletariat, communist doctrine holds that the revolutionaries must attempt to organize a united front. possible the front should include the vast majority of the people, who comprise the familiar four "progressive” classes: workers, petty and national bourgeoisie. peasantry, As Mao Tse-tung put it, the essential purpose of the united front is "to develop the pro gressive forces, to win over the middle-of-the-road forces and to isolate the diehards" (i.e., the imperialists and the reactionaries). 22 Depending on the specific situation facing Communist revolu tionaries, the united front takes different forms and expresses different tactical objectives. Historically, two classic models of the united front have appeared: 1) the united front from "below", wherein the communists attempt to lead a worker-peasant Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === alliance to overthrow a capitalist and feudalist regime; 2) the united front from "above", wherein the communists attempt to col laborate with certain "bourgeois" governments and parties which, like the communists, are more immediately threatened by fascism (i.e., a particularly virulent form of imperialism). Either type of front can be employed to cope with internal as well as external conflict situations: the "below" model usually reflecting a some what narrow "revolutionary" class base; the "above" model gener ally reflecting a broad inclusion of many non-proletarian elements. Virtually all tactical situations justify one or another type of united front; hence its ubiquitous role in the politics of all communist states and parties. Mao Tse-tung introduced yet another innovation of Leninism by developing a combination of the united front from "above" and "below." 23 Because China was a semi-colonial country where the immediate task of national revolution against foreign domination superceded the internal class struggle, it had been possible to forge a united front linking both the proletarian-led workerpeasant alliance (i.e., from "below”) and the "patriotic" segments of the bourgeoisie (i.e., from "above"). In Mao's formulation the front from "below" must always remain the basic cement in the alliance since it consists of the genuinely revolutionary forces the party can rely on and control. The front from "above," on the other hand, was always regarded as playing a subordinate role due to the fact it represented less reliable, "bourgeois" elements. Theoretically, however, a combination of the two-fronts approach was possible and desirable so long as the "principal contradic tion" facing the revolutionaries required an overall anti imperialist strategy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === While the formation of united fronts is thus an important political objective of the Chinese leadership, before this device can be effectively used two essential conditions must be met. The front must be led by the proletariat, rather than its rival, the bourgeoisie; and the proletariat must retain independence of, and freedom of action within, the front. These conditions are necessary to ensure that the front maintains a genuine revolution ary thrust. For there is always the danger, as communists see it, that united fronts will come under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. This class, which is seen to have an anti-imperialist or antifeudal role to play in certain periods, is at best a waivering ally. According to communist doctrine, at some point even the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie will betray the front and attack the revolutionaries. They will do this because their class drive is to establish domestic capitalism, and the communists stand in their way. The Chinese Communists have particular reason to be wary of alliances with bourgeois nationalists, whose true nature is concealed by their apparent anti-imperialism. The united front with the Kuomintang between 1923 and 1927 ended in Chiang Kaishek's bloody suppression of the communists. As a result of that bitter experience the CCP did not reject the utility of united fronts, but it did thereafter insist that the party would enter fronts only if it controlled and retained freedom of action within them. Such strictures make the possession of independent military power all the more important since, if the united front collapses, the revolutionary movement can be defended and preserved. An expectation of continuing struggle between the communists and the bourgeoisie for control over the united front is, therefore, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === fundamental to the Chinese view of how this instrument can be used, and what potential dangers it poses. Whether the struggle with the bourgeoisie takes predominantly an armed or political form, and whether the united front with them is of long or short 25 duration, depends on different historical conditions. Analyzing the future of the CCP-KMT alliance during the war against Japan, Mao predicted that the united front would eventually "turn into an armed struggle when we are forced to split with the bourgeoisie.' After the final split came in 1946 the Chinese Communists went on to seize power, having used the wartime collaboration with the KMT to expand greatly their military and political strength. After the victory in 1949 the CCP did not terminate the alliance with its non-communist allies. On the contrary, minus the KMT and other elements designated as "reactionaries," the united front of "all the revolutionary classes led by the proletariat" was not only retained as the political coalition which would exercise power in the period of "the people's democratic dictatorship", it was ele vated to the status of a basic principle in the 1954 CPR constitu27 tion. Thus the Chinese revolutionaries, though wary of colla boration with non-communist elements unless they control such relationships, perceive the united front to be a useful long term, as well as short term device in overcoming various kinds of political-military problems. In order to underscore what is distinctive in the Chinese adaptation of the united front it may be useful to review the Soviet attitude toward the use of this instrument. Historically, Moscow has employed united fronts on a number of occasions, and she has used both the "above" and the "below" model. In 1918-1920, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === for example, when the Bolsheviks incorrectly anticipated a revolu tionary floodtide in the industrialized European nations, they adopted a "Left" and "below" front policy aimed at mobilizing a coalition of workers and peasants to seize power, not only in Russia but abroad. By the early 1920's, the Kremlin shifted its attention to Asia, attempts were made to align with the bourgeois led "national liberation movements" in China, India and Indonesia in the hope of undermining the Western colonial powers. The united front took a distinctly "Right" form, however, between 1935-1945 when the Soviets devised the "Popular Front" and joined in a grand alliance with the capitalist democracies to defeat the Axis powers. Following the collapse of wartime allied cooperation, between 1947 and 1952 Moscow's united front line again reverted to a "Left" model which espoused revolutionary uprisings in the capitalist as well as the colonial countries. Since 1954 the Kremlin has, generally speaking, followed a "Right" united front line. This has entailed collaborating extensively with Afro-Asian "bourgeois nationalist" regimes while, at the same time, mildly discouraging communist parties in the capitalist, newly independent or colonial countries from taking provocative initiatives where to do so might undermine the Soviet Union's central aim of managing the Cold War within the framework of a U. S.-Soviet bi-polar power system. The nature of Moscow's limited interest in the united front device after the mid-1950's is not too difficult to understand. Russian Communism was no longer a weak or isolated movement in great need of allies, but a nuclear superpower comparable in strength to the United States. Under these circumstances the united front plays a much less important role in Moscow's foreign Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 83] === policy than it did in the past. Strategically, the CPSU leaders do not need to win over "progressive" and "middle-of-the-road forces" in OTder to protect the Soviet state or even to advance the more distant, vague goal of world revolution. On the contrary, it is other communist and non-communist states and movements which seek Moscow's protection, patronage and good will. As a result of this fundamental reversal in Russia's global position her leaders can afford to be relaxed--even reckless some strict Bolsheviks might say, about the bourgeois, capitalist or even feudalist ele ments they may choose to align with from time to time. The conclu sion of the Soviet experience thus seems to be that united front entanglements may be necessary in the early stages of the develop ment of communist power, but once this power is solidly estab lished these fronts are largely tactical conveniences rather than necessities. Chinese experience appears to have led to a different conclu sion. The course of their revolution points to the strong possi bility of transforming the united front into a permanent general strategy applicable to both foreign and domestic affairs. 28 This high estimate of the front's worth is partly explained by the fact it has been useful in attracting popular support for domestic programs in China and in seeking external non-communist allies as a defensive measure to cope with stronger powers. As the Chinese probably saw it, the CPR needed as many allies on as many issues as she could muster because the industrial base of her revolution was weak and she was partly encircled by stronger enemies. another sense, however, the importance the Chinese have attached to the united front reflects the strong populist undercurrent in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 84] === Chinese Communism, Mao's ideology in particular, which assumes that the overwhelming mass of the Chinese people support Communism. Internationally, the extension of this populist idea leads to the presumption that the people of various countries, not alone on a class basis, can be won over to revolutionary programs. From this perspective, then, political associations developed in the united front context can lead, in the Chinese view, to a conver sion of certain non-communist elements into permanent allies of the revolution. The transformation of the united front into a general strategy also appears to have been aided, indirectly, by Mao's theoretical innovations of Marxism-Leninism. "New Democracy" theory, it seems clear, contributed to the vitality of the united front concept because it envisioned a continuation of the multi-class alliance up to the socialist transition stage and, implicitly, beyond that stage. Similarly, "contradictions" theory has also tended to pro long the usefulness of the united front concept. For the whole line of reasoning that developed out of Chinese "contradictions" analysis after World War II (to the effect that the colonial, semi-colonial countries were the decisive theatre in the struggle with imperialism) logically led to a foreign policy emphasizing long term support for a variety of united front alignments in the Afro-Asian world. In other words, to put the formula in terms of the Chinese revolutionary model, just as the KMT played a progres sive role in the period of the war against Japan, so the contem porary struggles of the Afro-Asian countries for genuine indepen dence from the imperialist powers could be the basis for a Chinese international united front strategy linking communism and nationalism Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 85] === in the third world. It was this contention of the Chinese, that the center of the struggle between imperialism and socialism lay in the colonial regions, which the Soviet Union rejected out of its equally strong conviction that the main arena was the EuropeanAtlantic zone. In theory at least, there should not have been a divergence between Moscow and Peking on this issue since, according to MarxistLeninist doctrine, the selection of the appropriate type of united front is preceded by an "objective" class analysis of the main "contradictions" in the present situation, the "balance of forces" between socialism and capitalism, as well as who are the principal "enemies and friends" of the revolution. Actually, of course, the history of both Russian and Chinese foreign policy demonstrates that the type of united front each nation has employed is invari ably determined by its leadership’s perception of the requirements of national strategy. [Nowhere was this subordination of doctrine to nationalism in the workings of communist politics more strik ingly evident than the way the Sino-Soviet polemics were used to justify the two powers' increasingly divergent aims.] Thus, whereas the special interests of the Soviet state led Moscow gradually to assign distinctly secondary importance to front-type relationships with the Afro-Asian countries, from the mid-1950's on Peking's national objectives tended increasingly to emphasize the priority that should be given to alignments with, and commitments to, a wide variety of supposedly anti-imperialist elements in the third world. Precisely because Chinese united front policies have been a function of national strategy--in fact a more or less direct outgrowth of the leaderships' perception of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === the main tasks and possibilities under existing conditions, the analysis of the type(s) of front being pursued is a most important diagnostic tool in trying to understand the motivations and the execution of various Chinese strategies. In the following chapters an analysis of the united front in Chinese foreign policy will be undertaken in order to get at three fundamental aspects of the relationship with Indonesia: How Peking's response to the evolving international situation influenced the general aims and forms of her policies toward the third world, especially Asia; how the shifts in China's global strategy speci fically affected the policy toward Indonesia; and to what, if any extent Chinese international strategy was shaped by the policy being carried out in Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 87] === FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), vol. 1, pp. 433-568. For example, see Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 368 p p.; Shao Tiehchen, Revolutionary Dialectics and How to Appraise Imper ialism, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963j, 2 0 pp.; Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), 123 pp. "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," Selected Readings From the Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp. 283-284. On New Democracy, separate pamphlet (Peking: guages Press, 1954), pp. 18-27. Lenin's basic thesis on the united front was adopted at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920. See Jane Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943, (London: Oxford University Fress, 1956-65), vol. 1, pp. 143-144. (Peking: Ibid., pp. 11-12. Moscow's disenchantment with the prospects for revolution in the colonies has a long history. It is rooted in the setbacks suffered by the Comintern in the 1920's when various efforts to support and subvert national independence movements re sulted in crushing defeats for Moscow and the Asian Communist parties, without producing any compensatory weakening of the imperialist system. Similar consequences attended the post1948 Kremlin effort to disrupt the Western alliance by en couraging another round of communist revolts in Southeast Asia. Ironically, the two Asian communist movements which did succeed, that in China and in Vietnam, did not have strong Soviet support or encouragement. On Contradictions, separate pamphlet (Peking: Languages Press, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 311-347. 10. Ibid., pp. 331-332. 11. For example, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 101-104; John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Commu nist China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 4752; Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 24-29. Foreign Lan- Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 1-26. Foreign Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 88] === 12. Although the precise wording and number varied in Peking's usage, generally speaking there were said to be four "funda mental contradictions": between the imperialist and the socialist camps; between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist countries; between the "oppressed nations" and imperialism; and between the imperialist countries. These were spelled out definitively in the letter of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee of June 14, 1963. See The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement [Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 6-7. 13. See, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the Inter national Communist Movement," the Letter of the Central Com mittee of the Communist Party of China in reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963 (June 14, 1963), in the Polemic... op. cit., pp. . Also Shao Tieh-chen, Revolutionary Dialetics ~and How to Appraise Imperialism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 20. 14. Former Politbureau member P'eng Ch'en made the Chinese anal ysis a matter of public record on May 25, 1965 in a speech in Indonesia. Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), 1965, no. 6, p. 4. 15. Liu Shao-ch'i, Lun kuo-chi chu-i yu min-tsu chu-i [On Inter nationalism and Nationalism]^ (Peking 1949), pp. 7-50. Various English language editions have been issued; see for example, Internationalism and Nationalism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), pp. 2-42. 16. Ibid., pp. 2-15. 17. For an analysis of the interplay between ideology and national interests in Peking's foreign policy down to 1957, see H. Arthur Steiner, The International Position of Communist China: Political and Ideological Directions of Foreign Policy (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 195*), Paper No. 2, pp. 1-33. 18. The best statement of the Chinese posture depreciating the enemies' stronger power--including their nuclear weapons, is Mao's "Talk with the American Correspondent, Anna Louise Strong," op. cit. 19. Mao presented a succinct formulation of the model in, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," op. cit., p. 23. 20. For example, see Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tsetung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review, March 1965, pp. 80-99; and Robert A. Scalapino's article in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson, editors, Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 549-588. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === 21. The best known are Liu Shao ch'i's opening speech at the Asian-Australasian Trade Union Conference on November 16, 1949, broadcast by the New China News Agency [hereafter NCNA]. November 23, 1949; and Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's Wars", Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1965, pp. 9-30. 22. Selected Works, Volume III (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 23. The significance of this innovation and its implications for other Asian Communist parties has been analyzed by John Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1956), p. 220; Mao Tse-tung showed why it was possible to integrate both types of fronts in a semicolonial country during the anti-imperialist struggle in the essay On New Democracy. 24. Mao Tse-tung, "The Question of Independence Within the United Front," separate pamphlet (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 1-6. 25. Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," Peking Review, March 2, 1962, p. 12. 26. "Introductory Remarks to The Communist," Selected Works, Volume III (London: Lawrence and Wishart^ 1954), pp. 59-60. 27. This is made explicit in the Preamble. See Liu Shao-ch'i, Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the appended document, Constitution of the People^s Republic of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), especially pp. 17-22 and 63. 28. The most detailed analysis of this process is the excellent study by Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, the United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 278 pp. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 90] === CHAPTER III REVOLUTION AND DIPLOMACY: THE ’’LEFT" UNITED FRONT STRATEGY It was in the context of the East-West Cold War that the Chinese Communists formed their initial impressions of Indonesia. Any analysis of the evolution of Peking-Djakarta relations must, therefore, begin with the impact this conflict had on the Chinese Communists' view of the international situation, and consequently external forces they regarded as friends and enemies of their revolution. The genesis of the Cold War, especially the question of Moscow's and Washington's relative responsibility for trigger ing it, is still a matter of scholarly debate, and certainly can not be dealt with here. Although the Chinese were not principals in the opening phase of this conflict, their attitude toward post-World War II nationalist movements was affected by the out break of the Cold War, hence it bears on this study. With the formation of the Cominform in September 1947 the international Communist movement adopted a generally militant revolutionary line toward most capitalist, colonial and newly independent countries. This stance was officially announced in the Zhdanov's "two camp" doctrine which divided the entire world between the "progressive" and "peaceloving" forces headed by the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, those led by the "reaction aries," namely the "United States imperialists" and its "lackeys" in various parts of the world. All states, parties and classes were regarded as having to choose either to support the camp of "peace and socialism" or the camp of "war and imperialism".1 From the time of this authoritative pronouncement until the middle of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === the Korean War all the communist parties (except Yugoslavia) took the "two camp" doctrine as their basic guideline on external af fairs, cooperating with those forces which were prepared to sup port revolutionary and anti-imperialist causes, while engaging in various kinds of political or armed struggle against those ele ments which did not support Soviet foreign policy. Internation ally, during this period the Cominform's united front program was defined in very narrow, revolutionary terms, and it admitted of next to no possibility of cooperation with nations or groups which were not aligned with Moscow or local communist parties. When the "two camp" doctrine appeared the Chinese Communists had already made the final break with the Kuomintang. A state of armed conflict was underway which by 1948 would lead to the de struction of the Chinese Nationalist armies and, soon thereafter, communist victory on the mainland. Stalin's hard line toward the West thus fully accorded with the perceptions of the Chinese Com munists that a massive revolutionary floodtide was coming which would soon sweep China and, eventually, liberate the rest of Asia. It was in a spirit of ideological solidarity and mutual interest that the CCP in late 1947 welcomed the extension of the Cominform's revolutionary line to Asia. By endorsing the Cominform position, the Chinese Communists made it very clear, nearly two years before the CPR was established, and with virtually no experience outside the Chinese context, that they viewed neighboring Asian countries as part of a world revolutionary storm center. Given this fact the anti-colonial upheavals then shaking this part of the world could only have been viewed in the "black-white" logic of the Cold War. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 92] === During its first phase, the Indonesian independence movement fitted the Cominform's definition of a "progressive" force in the anti-imperialist struggle. Although the Indonesian Communists had not been able to assert leadership over the movement, down to 1948 they were allied with non-communist "bourgeois" parties in an anti-colonial war against the Dutch, a united front of sorts which could be viewed as rendering support to the larger, global anti-imperialist struggle.^ After January 1948, however, the position of the PKI began to change rapidly. In that month the Renville agreements were signed following a U. S. mediation effort to resolve the conflict through negotiations. The decision to accept these arrangements split the Indonesian leadership and led to the resignation of the Sjarifuddin cabinet which had signed the agreement on behalf of the Republic. Instantly the Cominform attacked this settlement as a sell out to the imperialists.^ The Chinese Communists joined in too, calling the Renville agreements "disgraceful", the result of "vacillation [by] upper elements within the country" and "American imperialists... [who worked to] buy up Indonesian reactionaries to split the Indonesian national camp."^ At the beginning of August 1948 the old Indonesian Communist leader Musso, for many years an exiled refugee in the Soviet Union, returned to Indonesia and shortly thereafter took charge of the PKI. The situation appeared to be quite favorable for the Indo nesian Communists at this time, for the Renville agreements had recently broken down, sporadic fighting had occurred and there was widespread disillusionment among nationalist circles over the fail ure of the United States to support their cause. Musso proclaimed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 93] === a "Djalan Baru" ("New Road") program which was intended to organ ize a more broadly based united front alliance enabling the PKI to align with those segments that were actively fighting the Dutch and not opposed to the PKI's efforts to mobilize popular support. The fact that Musso had openly called the "Djalan Baru" his "Gottwald Plan" for Indonesia spoke plainly enough of the PKI's intention to take over the Republic government from Sukarno and Hatta--apparently by political means rather than by armed insurrection, as Gottwald's forces had done in Czechslovakia a few months earlier. In the event political struggle was not enough, however, Musso's plan included the possibility of armed struggle as soon as the PKI had developed sufficient strength. The most careful accounts of this period have concluded that, in fact, an armed uprising was Musso's fall back position, rather than his preferred strategy. Musso's Czech-takeover model proved to be ill-fated for several reasons. The Republican leaders learned of the plans early on and the Indonesian Communists were, in any event, not themselves strong or united enough to take power. required time, but events moved too rapidly. Musso's plan By mid-September, before Musso could get the PKI fully organized, the Hatta govern ment had already begun to purge the Republican army of pro communist officers, and to disband unreliable military units. appears this move prompted local communist political and military leaders in the Madiun-Surakarta area (Central Java) to pre-empt Musso's gradualist strategy by staging a coup and beginning, fait accompli, an armed insurrection. On September 19, 1948 Sukarno took to the radio and presented the Indonesian people with a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === choice between himself and communism. Although Musso did not, in fact, call for the overthrow of Sukarno and Hatta until after this speech, the PKI was effectively painted as forcing a total confrontation. The end result was the bloody defeat of the insur gents’ forces at Madiun and the virtual annihilation of the PKI as a political movement. Many senior communist leaders, including Musso, were killed.'*'® Madiun eliminated the possibility that the Indonesian revolu tion might take a radical direction. It put the moderate bourgeois nationalists securely in charge of the revolution, and for this reason decisively shortened Indonesia's independence struggle. Before Madiun the Dutch possessed military power too great for the Republic to overcome and, generally speaking, they also enjoyed the indispensable advantage of U. S. diplomatic support and mili tary aid. After Madiun Washington was no longer so easily per suaded, as she had been earlier, that the Sukarno-Hatta leadership might be a leftist group. A number of factors contributed to Washington's disenchant ment with the Dutch attempt to hang on in Indonesia. The logic of the Cold War after 1948 tended to develop its own "two camp" doc trine in American policy. Nationalists who had shown themselves to be anti-communists were welcomed as part of the "free world"; other neutralist or anti-Western leaders were, to say the least, often suspected of being the agents or dupes of Moscow. In these simplistic terms, Indonesia’s independence struggle suddenly acquired an importance, largely because of its recent anti communist overtones, it did not have before. Soon after Madiun, the United States threatened to cut off Marshal Plan aid to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === Netherlands unless a settlement was reached with her rebellious colony. By this and other devices Washington applied the major part of the diplomatic pressure that resulted in the December 1949 Round Table Conference agreements which granted Indonesia independence within the Netherland's-Indonesian Union. Whereas Madiun won Indonesia the decisive support of the United States, it earned her the strong enmity of the communists. By early 1949 authoritative Chinese Communist publications were already leveling ideological broadsides against the Indonesian nationalist leaders. A particularly critical sample of the Chi nese attitude described the Sukarno-Hatta government as "feudal aristocrats" and "fascist stooges of the Japanese occupation period" who opposed the "people", "weakened anti-imperialist strength" and had the same outlook as the "Nehrus, Jinnahs, Luang Phibun Songgrams, Quirinos, Syngman Rhees" and other "feeble minded bourgeoisie of the East." The "shameless bourgeoisie of Indonesia" had placed themselves "in complete opposition to the people at home and abroad," pursued "anti-Communist and antipopular policies" and could "only lead the national struggle towards defeat and capitulation."'*'* Such expression of strong ideological hostility toward the Indonesian leaders in early 1949 did not preclude the possibility that once the CPR was established Peking, nevertheless, might be prepared to enter diplomatic relations with the "bourgeois" govern ment in Djakarta. As early as June 1949 Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that in its relations with foreign countries the CPR would oppose "exclusively the imperialist system and its plots against the Chinese people." Peking would be "willing to discuss" the question Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === of diplomatic relations with "any foreign government" on the basis of "equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty." There were also the further condi tions that foreign governments must "sever relations" with Nation alist China and adopt a "genuine attitude" of friendship toward the CPR. On these terms, "friendly cooperation" would be possible with the "people" of all countries. 12 At the same time Mao did not try to conceal that the CPR's willingness to establish normal diplomatic relations with "bourgeois" states would not be purchased by softening statements of anti imperialist and revolutionary intent. In his basic policy state ment of June 30, 1949 Mao reaffirmed the Cominform's "two camp" doctrine as the foundation of China's foreign policy, declaring that all nations and classes, "without exception", must line up on the side of "socialism" or "imperialism." There was no "third road", and neutrality was merely a "camouflage."^ By taking this position the Chinese leader essentially limited the possibility of genuine "friendship" he had earlier mentioned to members of the communist bloc and other "revolutionary" forces. In the 1949 context, "lean to one side" could hardly mean anything but an assurance of hostility toward "bourgeois-democratic" or capitalist governments like Indonesia which were not, in any sense, opposing imperialism and hence could hardly be acceptable, politically, to Moscow or Peking. The principal objective in offering to estab lish diplomatic ties with states like Indonesia, therefore, seemed to be that of making direct contact with potential revolutionary groups and supporters in these countries. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 97] === It was against this background that Liu Shao-ch'i delivered the famous November lo, 1949 speech advocating that certain types of colonial, semi-colonial countries could adopt "the path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys". Liu's re-statement of the Maoist revolutionary strategy was ex pressed in a four-point formula which may be summarized as follows: 1) There must be a broad, national united front of all those classes and elements opposing imperialism and domestic reactionaries. The basis of this front must be a worker-peasant alliance led by the Communist Party, not the classes or parties of the bourgeoisie which are inherently unreliable. The Communist Party must be of a special type: thoroughly skilled in Marxist-Leninist theory, strategy and tactics, and closely linked to the masses. 4) "Wherever and whenever" possible, the colonial peoples must organize a "liberation army" led by the Communist Party and carry out "armed struggle," the main form of 14 struggle in many countries. The assertion of this advice removed any doubt about who the Chinese regarded as their friends and enemies in the newly inde pendent states. But it also revealed that some revolutionary objectives had much greater priority than others in her foreign policy. By late 1949 the Chinese Communists were well aware that in Indonesia, and in every other newly independent Asian country except Vietnam, the post-1947 armed struggle path had led to the crushing defeat of communist parties and, consequently, that the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 98] === revolutionaries in a number of countries, including Indonesia, found themselves in an isolated position. Awareness of this hard fact was reflected in other passages of Liu's speech which have not received the attention they deserve. The substance of these passages tends to qualify substantially the call for armed struggle with which this speech is identified. For Liu also proposed that in countries where premature uprisings had failed, the main task confronting the communists was to get organized and begin creating multi-class united fronts. Taking this statement as a whole it is more accurate to say that the principal message being conveyed in "the path of the Chinese people" in late 1949 and early 1950 was not, as is usually suggested, a call for "armed struggle" along Chinese civil war lines, but a call for an indefinite period of communist organizational and ideological spadework in many countries until such time as international and domestic factors were more favorable. The Recognition Issue The fact that the Chinese Communists regarded Indonesia as a neo-colonialist creation of the Americans and the Dutch did not deter the new leaders in Djakarta from deciding to seek diplomatic relations with Peking. This was a surprising development in one sense since the decision was highly controversial in many Indo nesian circles, especially some of the political parties. anti-communist Moslem circles there was a strong feeling that relations with all communist states should be avoided, as the recent Madiun experience demonstrated to the satisfaction of many. For others there was a quite justified suspicion that Peking's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 99] === diplomatic presence in Indonesia would intensify the overseas Chinese community's sense of identification with mainland Chinese nationalism, whatever form it took.*** The prevailing opinion in the government of the day, however, expressed by Prime Minister Hatta (himself staunchly anti-communist) was that Indonesia could not ignore the CPR, for to do so would discredit the country's proclaimed independent, neutral foreign 17 policy. It was not an easy decision to make because the Amer ican government, to which Djakarta looked for aid and diplomatic support in the early years after 1949, opposed any state's estab lishing relations with Communist China, and invariably brought a variety of pressures to prevent this. Hatta also feared that Nationalist China, a permanent member of the Security Council, might veto Indonesiaj^ if she established United Nations' membership 18 eking. Djakarta decided to risk mmunist states in order to assert an ind< er leaders hoped this expression of aut in Moscow and Peking, and that it would ted normalization of relations with the conES Indonesian independence was proclaimed on December 27, 1949, and most of the international community promptly recognized the new state. Even the Soviet Union, whose past criticism of the "re actionary" Sukarno-Hatta leadership had been no less virulent than Peking's, announced recognition of Djakarta within three weeks, on 19 January 15, 1950. China was in a position to do the same since, by recognized diplomatic practice, the fact the CPR was estab lished the previous October 1, 1949, conferred on her the prerogative Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === diplomatic presence in Indonesia would intensify the overseas Chinese community's sense of identification with mainland Chinese nationalism, whatever form it t o o k. ^ The prevailing opinion in the government of the day, however, expressed by Prime Minister Hatta (himself staunchly anti-communist) was that Indonesia could not ignore the CPR, for to do so would discredit the country's proclaimed independent, neutral foreign 17 policy. It was not an easy decision to make because the Amer ican government, to which Djakarta looked for aid and diplomatic support in the early years after 1949, opposed any state's estab lishing relations with Communist China, and invariably brought a variety of pressures to prevent this. Hatta also feared that Nationalist China, a permanent member of the Security Council, might veto Indonesia's application for United Nations' membership 18 if she established diplomatic ties with Peking. Djakarta decided to risk the displeasure of anti-communist states in order to assert an independent foreign policy. Her leaders hoped this expression of autonomy would be recognized in Moscow and Peking, and that it would help to promote a limited normalization of relations with the communist powers. Indonesian independence was proclaimed on December 27, 1949, and most of the international community promptly recognized the new state. Even the Soviet Union, whose past criticism of the "re actionary" Sukarno-Hatta leadership had been no less virulent than Peking's, announced recognition of Djakarta within three weeks, on 19 January 15, 1950. China was in a position to do the same since; by recognized diplomatic practice, the fact the CPR was estab lished the previous October 1, 1949, conferred on her the prerogative Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === of first extending recognition to a "junior" state. It had been expected that China's recognition would follow Moscow's as a matter of course, but a positive signal was not forthcoming even though Hatta cabled a formal request for recognition to Peking via the 20 Dutch government on January 11, 1950. For reasons this writer was unable to discover the Dutch did not forward his communication to Peking until February 27. Even then, however, more than a month after the Soviet response, Chou En-lai waited another month before cabling the CPR's recognition on March 28, 1950. 21 Although the transmission of Hatta's message via the Dutch may have offended protocol-conscious Peking, and thus prompted her to wait another month before replying to it, a more serious issue appears to have caused the delay in recognizing Djakarta. This factor was the ambiguous relationship between Indonesia and Nationalist China. At the time of the transfer of sovereignty Nationalist China maintained seven consulates in Indonesia which had been established during the period of Dutch colonial rule. The Nationalist Chinese had been staunch supporters of the Indonesian independence cause, and for this reason alone had some hope the new government in Djakarta would decide to establish relations with Taipei. To this end Nationalist China immediately recognized Indonesia on Decamber 27, 1949 and, leaving no stone unturned, dispatched a special mis sion under General Wu Teh-chuan to Djakarta hoping to negotiate the question of future relations between the two states. 22 view of the fact the Nationalist consulates were still in opera tion, a Taiwan mission was on its way to Indonesia, and Djakarta had thus far done nothing to terminate its cte facto relations with Taipei, it is hardly surprising that Peking temporized. Under Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === the circumstances the suspicion that Djakarta might be trying to achieve recognition from both Chinas was not entirely unjustified. Since any suggestion of "two Chinas" was wholly unacceptable the Chinese leaders apparently decided to withhold recognition until the exact nature of the Taiwan-Indonesia relationship was clarified to their complete satisfaction. Actually Hatta's cable to Peking meant just what it said. promptly informed General Wu of his governments' intention to establish relations with Communist China. At the same time he notified General Wu that Nationalist China's consulates in Indonesia would have to be closed within the next few months. 23 Al though the consulates were not closed until early April, news of the decision and the KMT diplomatic setback no doubt quickly reached Peking. Once it was clear what course Djakarta would follow Peking could downplay the fact that the Chinese Nationalist consulates had not actually ceased operations before she formally extended recognition to Indonesia. Chou En-lai's March 28 cable to Hatta acknowledged the CPR's willingness to establish "regular diplomatic relations" with Djakarta "on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty." Hatta replied on April 13 stating that his government was "gratified" by the CPR's earnest desire to establish relations with Indonesia, and that he agreed with Chou's statement of the principles on which relations should be b a s e d. I n May Chou sent another cable suggesting that diplomatic missions be exchanged at the ambassadorial level, and at the same time proposing Wang Jen-shu to be the first CPR ambassador. 2 5 Hatta agreed to these proposals in a reply sent to Peking in June. He stated, however, that since a determination Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === of Indonesia's ambassador had not yet been made, he proposed to appoint a charge d'affairs ad interim to Peking. Wang Jen-shu's appointment was announced in Peking on July 20, and upon arriving in Indonesia the next month he presented his credentials to Presi27 dent Sukarno on August 14 in Djakarta. On January 21, 19 51, six months later, charge d'affairs Isak Mahdi presented his credentials to Foreign Minister Chou En-lai in Peking. 28 Although four-and-ahalf years would pass before the Indonesian government actually ap pointed an ambassador to its mission in China, the initial barriers to diplomatic relations between the two states had been overcome. Diplomatic Representation The question of CPR consular representation in Indonesia had not been raised in the initial diplomatic communications between Peking and Djakarta. This was a matter of first priority to Peking since an adequate consular establishment would be neces29 sary to act on behalf of the Chinese citizens in Indonesia. Consulates also would beuseful in the longer range political goal of eliminating the KMT's position. Kuomintang influence in the Indonesian Chinese community had been paramount for twenty years, and the retreat of the Nationalist government to Taiwan in 1949 did not decisively weaken it. Because Taiwan's claim to represent China was now, more than ever, heavily dependent on the support she received from the thirteen million Chinese subjects abroad, over 95% being domiciled in Southeast Asia, the early severing of these ties was a major objective of Peking's foreign policy. Economically, as in other South East Asian countries, the resident Chinese population controlled a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === disproportionate percentage of the wealth, and for most of the twentieth century had sent millions of dollars in remittances to mainland China. Funds received from the overseas Chinese in this way had come to play an important role in China's foreign exchange position. Securing the continued flow of overseas Chinese remit tances and deposits to the mainland--if possible increasing the amount, must have been one of the key reasons Peking wanted to displace her Taipei rival in Southeast Asia as soon as possible. Given goals and interests of this nature it was most unlikely that Peking and Djakarta would view the proper role of Chinese representation in Indonesia in the same way. The Chinese govern ment clearly regarded the main tasks of its future diplomatic mission in Indonesia to be, among other things, extending the CPR's influence in the Chinese community, defeating the KMT organ izations, extracting remittances and, almost certainly, develop ing a variety of contacts with the Indonesian Communists. It was not the character of these objectives that differed so completely from the goals of other foreign powers in Indonesia, but rather the scale. No Indonesian government, with the power to do other wise, could possibly permit the CPR to make contact with some three million people it claimed were nationals of China. This was particularly true in light of the economic influence the over seas Chinese exerted on the country, and in view of Djakarta's anxiety about foreign-directed subversive elements. The funda mentally conflicting objectives of Peking and Djakarta quickly surfaced over the question of consular representation. Ambassador Wang Jen-shu began negotiations with the Indonesian government on this question in October 1950 and the talks dragged Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 105] === on for five months. An agreement was finally reached in March 1951 which permitted the CPR to open a consulate in Djakarta (Java), Medan (Sumatra), Bandjarmasin (Indonesian Borneo) and Makassar (Celebes).30 Since Peking's original request had been to re-open the seven consulates Nationalist China had operated prior to April 1950, it was clear that, for China, the principal outcome of the negotiations had been a setback. The talks were marked by basic conflict on two points: the jurisdiction of the Chinese consulates; and the date the consulates would open. At first, Djakarta held that no consulates should be established until the status of the Chinese born in Indonesia had been clarified in accordance with the provisions governing the division of citizenship in the Round Table Conference Agreements. 31 These agreements provided that Indonesian-born Chinese, formerly assimilated under Dutch law as Netherlands subjects, would acquire Indonesian citizenship within two years (dating from December 27, 1949) unless they made a declaration to the contrary during this period. Those who took the trouble to formally reject Indonesian citizenship were to be considered nationals of China. A few Chi nese in either category might opt for Dutch citizenship or, by making no option, be regarded as stateless. 32 In effect, there fore, most locally-born Chinese could acquire Indonesian citizen ship "passively". The Indonesian government argued that because the total number of alien Chinese could not be determined before December 27, 1951 at the earliest, e.g., at the close of the option period, no CPR consulates should be opened prior to that date. The Chinese negotiators argued that since, under Chinese law, the local-born as well as the China-born Chinese were considered Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 106] === subjects of the mainland, there could be no unilateral Indonesian determination of their citizenship. The Indonesian government's stand was criticized openly as having "no legal basis" and as be ing "completely contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Chi nese people." In order to take Indonesian citizenship under the Round Table Conference provisions, according to a clarification of the Chinese Embassy, overseas Chinese would be required to ob tain "letters of explanation" from the Chinese government. The issuance of such letters, the Chinese side maintained, would neces33 sxtate the opening of CPR consulates before December 1951. Naturally Djakarta feared that any early opening of CPR con sulates might be used by Peking to encourage local-born Chinese to reject Indonesian citizenship. While attention was focused on the need to prevent this possibility, the Indonesian side lost sight of a more important implication behind the position the Chinese Embassy was taking. Clearly the meaning of "letters of explanation" was that as early as 1951 Peking was prepared to accept, in principle, the idea that the Chinese government might be willing, in fact, to renounce claims on some of the overseas Chinese, provided this was done on the basis of formal negotia tions between the concerned parties, not unilaterally or under duress. Ultimately an accommodation was reached whereby the four CPR consulates were allowed to open in April 1951, rather than the following December. But since there would be only one CPR consulate for each of the main Indonesian islands, it did not seem that the degree of political influence Peking might assert within the overseas Chinese community prior to the end of the citizenship option period was going to be very great. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 107] === Like the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, the consular agreement had far from unanimous support within the Indonesian government. Some members of the cabinet opposed granting the CPR any consular representation on the ground that to do so would inevitably strengthen overseas Chinese orien tations toward the mainland, with all the unwanted political reper cussions that could follow. However, in the view of the government headed by Prime Minister Natsir, which negotiated the agreement, this risk had to be weighed against a more compelling argument. To deny the CPR any consular representation would not inspire the Chinese community to cooperate with Djakarta or enhance its loyalty to Indonesia, but would instead arouse its resentment. Hence a complete rebuff of Peking was not seen as likely to avoid the adverse political consequences the dissenters in the government were concerned about, but rather to magnify them. Majority opinion in the government also assumed that the anti-capitalist creed of the CPR would not strike a responsive cord in the Indonesian Chinese, the overwhelming percentage being engaged in commercial enterprises. Nor did the government believe, at the time, that the presence of CPR consulates would have a decisive effect on the choice of citizenship the Indonesian-born Chinese would make. 3 5 Fragmentary data in early-1950 indicated that only about ten percent of the Chinese would actually go to the trouble to reject Indonesia. On the strength of the early trend during the option period, allowing the CPR to open four con sulates did not seen to be endangering the government's intention to curb Peking's influence on the Chinese community. This analysis of the situation proved to be quite wrong. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 108] === Under Wang Jen-shu, 37 the Chinese Embassy lost no time in developing an extensive campaign to bring the Indonesian overseas Chinese into the orbit of the Peking government's policies and programs. The CPR embassy and consulates began to register Chi nese families--foreign as well as local-born, to solicit funds for various Embassy-sponsored activities, to provide pro-Peking instructors and teaching materials in the overseas Chinese schools, and to set up a new system of CPR-oriented community associations in competition with the long established KMT organizations. The result was a small but intensely bitter struggle between the rival 38 overseas Chinese factions. Peking won a major victory early on when the Bank of China, the most powerful Chinese financial insti tution in Indonesia, went over to the CPR. This event caused many wealthy and influential Chinese to follow suit. It also meant that the Chinese Embassy's activities would have strong economic and political leverage throughout the country. Having lost a substan tial part of their financial base, demoralized KMT supporters be came more closely dependent on their natural ally in Indonesia, the U. S. Embassy. The resulting collaboration took a number of overt and covert forms, 39 and no doubt played a role in the 1958 decision Djakarta made to crush the KMT organizations altogether. Although Djakarta objected to many of the Chinese Embassy's political activities, particularly in the Chinese schools, the developing mini-Chinese civil war between the KMT and CCP loyalists was of some advantage to the Indonesian government. While the Chi nese community fought amongst itself there was no possibility of anyones' dominating all of it, which was what the Indonesian leaders feared most. Moreover, a good deal of useful intelligence Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === about the activities of both factions, and their external allies, reached various government departments. Presumably this informa tion helped Djakarta to decide what counter-measures were neces sary. In one respect, however, the government's intelligence about the affairs of the Chinese community was quite faulty. Djakarta greatly underestimated the number of local-born Chinese who actually would go to the trouble to opt for Peking citizenship, despite the petty capitalist background of most Chinese and the fact they could so easily acquire Indonesian citizenship by simply remaining silent. When the option period ended in December 1951 Djakarta's in adequate administrative facilities still had only a fraction of the information they needed to ascertain what the final outcome had been. But by 1953 the government was startled to learn that somewhere between 600,000 and 700,000, or approximately forty per cent of the local-born Chinese, had formally rejected Indonesian citizenship. 40 Since nearly another one million Chinese were foreign-born, and were thus already considered CPR nationals, this meant that about half the entire Chinese population now had to be considered mainland citizens according to the outcome of the Round Table Conference provisions. This result had not been anticipated and it raised grave doubts about how genuine was the loyalty of the other half of the Chinese population which had simply said 41 nothing. As the implications of this situation began to sink in, Djakarta became increasingly apprehensive about the impact the Chinese Embassy was having in Indonesia's domestic affairs. More over, that so many Chinese would reject Indonesia created serious disenchantment with the whole Round Table formula for dealing with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 110] === the citizenship issue. To many inside and outside the government, it had now become clear the 1949 citizenship agreements had raised more problems than they had solved. The Crackdown on the Chinese Embassy There was not a great deal Djakarta could do, in the short run, to reverse the rising tide of pro-Peking sympathy which devel oped in the Chinese community after 19 50. The government had created much of the problem, inescapably, by the citizenship op tion formula of 1949, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking and the decision to permit the CPR to open consulates. These actions naturally encouraged many Chinese to assume that contact with the Chinese Embassy was quite appropriate. On the other hand, the government was not similarly restrained from curb ing the more controversial activities initiated by Ambassador Wang Jen-shu and the Chinese Embassy. In particular, Wang began quite early to deliver political speeches attacking "U. S. imperialism." Aside from the fact Djakarta did not then share this view of Amer ican policy, Wang's attacks were in violation of accepted diplo matic norms and could not be tolerated. On several occasions in 1950-51 the Indonesian government warned the Chinese ambassador to cease his anti-American speeches. In turn these opportunities were also used to insist that the Chinese Embassy confine its activ ities to normal diplomatic functions and to cease its contacts with 42 those local-born Chinese Djakarta regarded as Indonesian subjects. It appears, however, that these admonishments failed to pro duce the desired response from Peking, at which point the issue came to a head. A minor diplomatic rift with Peking in mid-1951 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === was effectively used by Djakarta to drive home a political lesson. On July 22 CPR Consul General Ho Ying arrived in Indonesia accom panied by nineteen other newly appointed diplomatic staff personnel. Sixteen of these were refused entry by the Indonesian authorities, although apparently all of them had official entry visas duly ap proved by the Indonesian Embassy in Peking.^ According to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry this action had been taken because it was the third time Peking had failed to give adequate "prior noti fication" concerning the arrival of new Embassy personnel, and had thus committed a "breach of diplomatic c o u r t e s y. P e k i n g immed iately protested, charging that advance notification had been given, and that the Indonesian action constituted an "unreasonable and unfriendly attitude. The CPR protest was rejected, however, and the diplomatic personnel in question were obliged to return to China. The real issue Djakarta raised apparently had very little to do with the question of adequate "prior notification". What dis turbed the Indonesian government was the unacceptable activities of the Chinese Embassy, a symptom of which, in Djakarta's view, was the unnecessarily large and growing number of Chinese diplomatic personnel. In limiting Peking to four consulates Djakarta's inten tion had been to reduce sharply the CPR's contact with the Indonesia Chinese minority. That objective was being partially circumvented, so the government in Djakarta believed, by the dispatch from China of unexpectedly large numbers of diplomatic personnel to staff the embassy and consulates in Indonesia. According to Indonesian informants, it was discovered that many of the Chinese personnel coming into the country, though officially designated as clerical Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === and maintenance assistants, in fact were specialists in political education and overseas Chinese affairs.*6 It would, therefore, appear Djakarta simply used the alleged infraction of "diplomatic countesy" to show Peking that she would not permit her purpose in originally limiting the CPR to four consulates to be undermined. China had been served fair warning that her efforts to increase contacts with the Indonesian Chinese would be successfully opposed and that her attempt to circumvent this could prove to be diplo matically embarassing. Not unreasonably, the CPR must have questioned the real motiva tions behind Indonesia's offensive treatment toward Chinese diplo matic personnel. For example, the staff of the U. S. Embassy, and the number of its consulates (8) were larger than those of China, though the number of U. S. citizens in Indonesia was quite small. U. S. intelligence agents also masqueraded as "foreign service officers." One reason Djakarta cracked down on Peking, but not on Washington, was that the government of the day favored a decidedly stronger anti-communist policy than had its predecessors. But if Peking thought the Hatta and Natsir governments were out-and-out "reactionary lackeys of imperialism," she was to see in the cabinet headed by Dr. Sukiman what a truly anti-communist Indonesian government looked like.*^ The Sukiman cabinet was dominated by the iMoslem Masjumi Party, the strongest anti-communist voice in the country next to the army. It followed a foreign policy more closely identified with the U. S. than any of its predecessors -and that said quite a bit given the fact Indonesia's "neutral" position in the Cold War had been substantially more reliant on the West than, for example, that of India and Burma. Sukiman's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === government decided to align Indonesia even more closely with the U. S. by accepting aid under the Mutual Security Act--a device to set up facto military alliances in instances where formal NATO/ANZUS type treaties with the United States might not be politically feasible given internal opposition to joining Cold War pacts. Sukiman also decided to crack down on the PKI and the Chi nese Embassy. Whether this move was also inspired by, or at least coordinated with, the U. S. Embassy, seems likely but has not yet been established. On the basis of an alleged communist plot to overthrow the government, in August 1951 the Sukiman cabinet suddenly launched a series of massive arrests netting more than 15,000 persons, 48 including PKI leaders and several hundred overseas Chinese. The fact that many of those arrested were neither Indonesian nor Chi nese Communists--but political enemies of Dr. Sukiman, stamped the "August Raid" as something less than a bonafide defense of the country from subversion. Nevertheless, the raids struck hard at people and groups Peking regarded as "progressive" and "revolution ary". That she was prepared to be identified with Sukiman's targets was indicated when the Chinese Embassy granted asylum to Alimin, a 49 prominent leader of the Indonesian Communist Party. That event alone was enough to give anti-communist voices a basis, otherwise absent in fact, to suggest that Peking and the overseas Chinese were implicated in the alleged plot to overthrow the government. In the end the Sukiman government was unable to convince Parlia ment that there had been any threat to the state and, eventually, it was forced to release those who had been arrested. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === On the other hand, the "August Raid" was another in a series of events which had demonstrated the readiness of the Indonesian government to risk--indeed to provoke, diplomatic ruptures with Peking. Djakarta had not been very successful down to 1951 in curbing CPR influence on the overseas Chinese, but other political activities on the part of the Chinese Embassy had come under tighter control and surveillance. All this must have seemed pre dictable but nevertheless disturbing to policymakers in Peking, especially in light of the ascendance of the Sukiman government and the intensified anti-communist foreign and domestic policies it pursued. Sukiman's government seemed plainly bent not only on suppressing the Indonesian Communists again--then just beginning to reorganize themselves after the Madiun disaster, but also determined to press conflicts with China. More importantly, to the Chinese, American influence in Indonesia was then at its peak. By mid-1951 it was becoming clear that Peking's policy of assertive nationalism toward Indonesia had reached a dead end. This policy had been viable and even logical as long as the ideologically-derived assumption on which it was based bore some relation to the concrete situation. However, as it became evident that China lacked the power or influence to assert, effectively, a nationalistic policy in the face of mounting resistance from Djakarta, conditions seemed to call for Mr. revamping of Chinese policy. Further confrontations could only serve the interests of the Indonesian "reactionaries" and their "imperialist" masters. But the decisive factor which was soon to cause a reassessment by Peking was not the dawning recognition that an impasse had been reached in Indonesia. As the next chapter will attempt to demonstrate, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === the ultimate source of the policy shift was less the failure in Indonesia than the new Chinese analysis of the whole international situation. By mid-1951 the Chinese Communists were beginning to see that the attitudes and policies formed in the period of the Cominform's "two camp" doctrine no longer reflected Asian or global realities. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === Footnotes Chapter III The full text of the Zhdanov thesis appears in the Corainform journal, For a Lasting Peace for a People's Democracy, (Bucharest, no. 1, November 10, 1947), p. 2~. Mao was certain the Chinese revolution was soon going to inspire and strengthen the revolutionary struggle of oppressed peoples everywhere. See, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1956), Vol. V. December 25, 1947, pp. 157-158; for another optimistic view of revolutionary potential at this time see, "Congratulations on the Opening of the Southeast Asia Youth Conference", NCNA broadcast, North Shensi Radio, February 16, 1948. "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", loc. eft. p. 173. For a detailed analysis of the Soviet attitude, which was in effect the basic Cominform position toward the Indonesian revolution during the 1945-1949 period, see Ruth T. Me Vey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, 1957), pp. 66-90. Me Vey, ££. cit♦ pp. 74-75. NCNA Broadcast, North Shensi Radio, February 16, 1948. This interpretation of events in Indonesia from 1945 to 1949 relies heavily on Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indo nesia, op. cit., especially pp. 256-303. Djalan Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia, [The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia], (Djakarta: 1953). This was the resolution adopted by the PKI Politburo in August 1948 after Musso took over the party. Kahin, 0£. cit. 10. Ibid. 11. Sha Ping, "Lessons from Indonesia", China Digest, vol. V, April 5, 1949, pp. 5-6. Harsh attacks on the Indonesian elite continued until early 1950. See Chieh-fanr Jih-pao (Liberation Daily) December 11-12, 1949, and Sooug Ching-ling, "The Difference Between Soviet and American Foreign Policies," 700 Millions for Peace and Democracy, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), p. T5~. 12. Speech at the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, June 15, 1949. In People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit. pp. 33-34. pp. 282-288. pp. 288-303. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 117] === He repeated this offer in a speech in Peking on October 1st. Jen-min Jih-pao, October 2, 1949. 13. Ibid. p. 11. 14. Opening address to the Asian-Australian Trade Union Confer ence, loc. cit. 15. Ibid. The bulk of this speech was not devoted to eulogizing the Chinese revolutionary model but rather to an analysis of the present international situation, especially the diffi culties facing the Communist parties in the colonial, semi colonial countries. Liu laid particular stress on the need for these parties to develop local worker-peasant alliances and the national multi-class united front. The Chinese model favors armed struggle--a point Liu mentioned last in summar izing Mao's path--at some point in the revolution but not unless the mass support and political organizations have been built to sustain it. 16. Interview, former Prime Minister, Mohammad Hatta, June 8, 1961. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Report on Indonesia (Djakarta: February 10, 1950, p. 1. 20. "Ho-lan cheng-fu te chao-hui" (Communication of the Dutch Government), March 27, 1950. In, Chung-hua jen-min kung-hojuo tui r:ai juan-hsi wen-chien chi (Selected Documents on the Foreign Relations of the Chinese People's Republic). Vol. 1, 1949-1950 (Peking, 1957), p. 31. 21. "Chung-kuo cheng-fu chih yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya lien-pang jung-hokuo cheng-fu te chao-hui" (Communication of the Chinese Government to the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia), March 28, 1950. In Selected Documents, loc. cit., pp. 31-32. 22. Aneta (Indonesian News Service), December 29, 1949. 23. Interview, Hatta, June 8, 1961. The Nationalist Chinese Consulate did close down in early April. See Sin Po, (Djakarta) April 5-11, 1950. 24. "Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya lien-pang hung-ho-kuo cheng-fu te fu-chao" (Reply of the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia), April 13, 1950. In Selected Documents, op. cit., p. 32. Ministry of Information), Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === 25. Interview, Hatta, June 8, 1961. I have not found the text of this note in the Chinese documentation. 26. Ibid. 27. See Jen-min Jih-pao, July 20, 1950 and Sin Po (Djakarta), August 15, 1950. 28. Current Background (Hong Kong: United States Consulate General), NoT 31, February 1, 1955, p. 4. 29. The Common Program, adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 29, 1949 as the CPR's basic constitutional document, until it was replaced in 1954, considered all overseas Chinese to be CPR citizens. It declared that Peking would "adopt the measures necessary... to facilitate remittances from overseas Chinese"... (Article 37) and "do its utmost to protect the proper rights and interests of the Chinese resid ing abroad." (Article 58). Later, article 23 of the electoral law of March 1, 1953 would provide that "the overseas Chinese shall elect 30 deputies to the All China [National] People's Congress. 30. Pengumuman Kementerian Luar Negri [Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], March 16, 1951. Indonesia did not open a consulate in China until 1957. See NCNA (Peking), August 21, 1957. 31. Statement by the Indonesian Minister of Information, M. A. Pellaupessy, reported in Antara (Indonesian News Agency), November 2, 1950. 32. United Nations Commission for Indonesia, Appendices to the Special Report to the- Security Council on the Round Table Conference (United Nations Security Council publication, S/1417/Add. 1, November 14, 1949), p. 84. For further dis cussion of Chinese citizenship status at this time, see Donald E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1961), p. 29. 33. Keterangan Dari Pihak Ambassade Republik Rajkat Tionghwa Mengenai Soal Rembukaan Konsulat-Konsulat (Statement b y t h e Embassy of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Opening Consulates), November 18, 1950. Reported in Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia), November 18, 1950. 34. Interview, Muhammad Roem (former Foreign Minister in the Natsir Cabinet), June 13, 1961. Also interview, Hatta, June 8, 1961. 35. Ibid. 36. An early report from East Java indicated that only 39 of 411 Chinese had taken the trouble to reject Indonesian citizenship. Shen Huo Pao (Surabaja), June 12, 1950. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === 10S 37. Wang had lived in Medan, Sumatra, before 1947 when he was deported by the Dutch. While in Indonesia he was a teacher in a teacher's training school and active as a leftist in the revolutionary movement. Following his expulsion Wang returned to China and in 1949 published a book entitled "The Country of the Indonesian Archipelago" in which he accused Hatta of treason. Dunning Idle, Indonesia's Active and Inde pendent Foreign Policy, op. cit. pp. 26-27. According to Hatta, he was unawareof Wang's background until after he was appointed ambassador; otherwise he would not have accepted his appointment. Interview, June 8, 1961. 38. For a discussion of the political situation in the Indonesian Chinese community around this time see G. William Skinner, Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Cornell: Southeast Asia Program, 19503, especially pp. 67-73. For useful data on various aspects of CPR policies toward the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries at this time see Lu Yu-san, Program of Communist China for Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1950), pp. 1-82. 39. Nationalist Chinese sympathizers told this writer that Nation alist Chinese overseas Chinese organizations and leaders maintained close though sub rosa contacts with the United States Embassy and Consulates m Indonesia after Djakarta established relations with Peking. They also said, though documentation is unavailable, that money from the U. S. Embassy found its way into various KMT activities, parti cularly such pro-Taipei newspapers as Keng Po and the Nation alist Chinese school system before it was closed down in 1958. 40. Interview, Indonesian Department of Justice, Djakarta, August 21, 1961. 41. Ibid. 42. Interview, Hatta, June 8, 1961 and Roem, June 13, 1961. 43. NCNA, July 25, 1951. 44. Statement by Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Dr. Darmaesetiawan. Text in Antara (Indonesian News Service), July 26, 1951. The statement charged that on previous occa sions, Peking failed to notify the Indonesian government of the arrival in Djakarta of the CPR Consul General and two military attaches. 45. Statement of the CPR Foreign Ministry, July 26, 1951. Text in NCNA, August 11, 1951. 46. Interviews, Hatta, June 8, 1961 and Rccm, June 13, 1961. Ibid. Hatta and Roem. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === 47. For an analysis of the Sukiman cabinet's policies see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, op. cit~ p p. 177-224^ 48. Ibid. 49. Aneta (Indonesian News Bureau), August 16, 1951. pp. 187-192. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === CHAPTER I V TOWARD PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED FRONT FROM ABOVE STRATEGY The bloom of optimistic, assertive nationalism had by no means faded from the CPR’s estimate of the international situation when the Soviet-backed North Korean army struck across the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950. What first appeared to be another major triumph for the communist powers soon developed into a strategic reversal following the defeat of the North Korean army and the advance of United Nations' forces to the Yalu River. To prevent the liquida tion of the Pyongyang regime and the consequent deployment of American military power on her border, Chinese forces intervened, successfully checking General MacArthur's advance. The resultant military stalemate, including the heavy costs inflicted on the CPR to maintain it, was a major factor prompting the Chinese leadership to re-appraise the whole international situation. The immediate consequence of the Korean conflict was to put China and the entire socialist camp in a defensive military and diplomatic position. For the war spurred the leader of the "imper ialist" camp, the United States, to reverse its post-1949 policy of disengagement from the affairs of the Chinese mainland, and added fuel to its efforts to organize the remainder of the Asian states into a military bloc directed against the CPR. Those nations Washington could not persuade to take up arms against China in Korea she tried to draw into "collective security" pacts - 10 7 - - Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 122] === intended to provide American military bases and the development of local anti-communist armed forces. In an attempt to further isolate and punish China, Washington succeeded in forcing through the United Nations resolutions condemning the CPR as an aggressor and imposing a trade embargo against her. By placing the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits and undertaking to revitalize the Nationalist Chinese army and government, the United States termi nated any early prospect that the Chinese Communists would be able to settle the Chinese civil war on their terms. Indeed, American revitalization efforts in Taiwan were accompanied by official declarations of support for the KMT's proclaimed goal of eventually retaking power on the mainland. Far from driving "U. S. imperialism" out of East Asia, the Korean war had the most unwanted effect of producing a vast American political, military and economic buildup in the region, a development threatening every conceivable Chinese interest. Nor could it be said in the early 1950's that there was much on the revolutionary side of the ledger to offset these adverse trends. Asian communist parties attempting to generate armed struggles had suffered crushing defeats everywhere except in Vietnam. Partly in response to this reality, from early 1951 on the communist parties in all the key Asian states, Japan, India, and Indonesia, began to reject violent forms of struggle which had simply failed to produce anything but their own weakening or destruction. These parties shifted to parliamentary, or "united front" strategies in order to build up bases of popular support and political organization which, as the previous insurrection ary period had shown, the communists did not have. As the real Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === conditions prevailing in Asia became more fully known, the general line of the major communist powers began to reflect the interests of the defense, rather than the advance, of socialism in the Far East. The tactical effect of this shift away from the Cominform's "two camp" doctrine was the gradual adoption by Russia and China of foreign policy positions enabling them to enlist the support of various international political elements which were willing to oppose American policy. The Asian neutrals could, seen in this new light, be regarded as potential candidates for inclusion in an enlarged anti-imperialist united front since, contrary to the "two camp" doctrine, they had not, in fact, proven to be the flunkeys of the United States. India and Burma, in particular, had opposed the U. N. resolutions branding China an aggressor and declaring a trade embargo against her. Even the more U. S.-oriented Indonesian government would not go along with American policy on these issues, despite its own frictions with Peking, and abstained from the U. N. votes con demning the CPR.1 But if the independence of the neutral countries was to be encouraged and their separation from the U. S. sphere completed, this necessarily required an overhaul of the communist powers' previous attitude toward the leaders of the developing countries, still depicted in 1950-1951 as merely representatives of the Western powers. The shift in communist attitudes towards the Afro-Asian nationalists regimes was reflected first not in Soviet but in Chinese policies. This was not unnatural since it was Chinese interests which were suffering most from the situation growing out of the Korean War. As early as June 1951 several years before Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === Moscow took steps in this direction, authoritative CPR spokesmen began to endorse the need for "coexistence" between socialist and non-socialist states in the interest of thwarting the alleged plans of the "imperialists" to start a new world war. In an important foreign policy speech in October 1951 Chou En-lai expli citly stated that "countries of diverse social systems all over the world can exist peacefully side by side." China, he said, had "never thought of threatening or invading anyone" but neither would she tolerate "threats and aggressions" directed against her by others. Well before the end of the Korean War, therefore, Peking was beginning to conceptualize the political and class basis for a conciliatory policy toward those Asian governments which, by not tying themselves to the United States, could be regarded as subject to an entirely different relationship to China than the Western capitalist powers and their clients. It was to further explore this line that China sponsored the Asian and Pacific Peace Confer ence in May 1952.^ By this time her former straight-forward revo lutionary line had given way to a "people's diplomacy" aimed at organizing a broad multi-class "peace" front. Virtually any "pro gressive" elements in the Asian countries which might actively oppose United States policies, espouse peace and friendship with China, were a target of this appeal. At the formal diplomatic level the new line found expression beginning in 1951 in the improved rela tions which Peking was able to develop with India, Burma and Ceylon. Failure of the "Peace" Offensive in Indonesia The state of tension between Peking and Djakarta that had grown out of the Chinese Embassy's provocative activities in 19501951 was clearly in conflict with the CPR's new appreciation of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 125] === - Ill the need to develop better relations with her Asian neighbors. Indonesia's Charge d'Affairs in Peking at this time noted that a decidedly more friendly attitude was displayed by Chinese officials after mid-1951 than when he first arrived in Peking, despite the hostile attitude of the Sukiman government toward China.^ Further evidence of change on the Chinese side was forthcoming when in late 19 51 Peking suddenly withdrew the main symbol of her there tofore unfriendly attitude toward Indonesia, namely Ambassador Wang Jen-shu.6 In retrospect, though it was not seen as such at the time, his recall was clearly the first concrete indication that Peking's hard line in Indonesia had come to an end and that the occasion for a more conciliatory posture was near at hand. The main obstacle to an early improvement in the situation was the political orientation of the Sukiman government, which was not interested in loosening its ties to the United States so as to win the approval of the CPR. This government was not even very interested in normalizing the two countries' strained rela tionship. On the other hand, opposing Dutch imperialism, which continued to hold the territory of West Irian, did interest the Sukiman cabinet; but to pursue this end it needed the diplomatic and economic support of the United States. The Indonesians had hoped to negotiate the transfer of sover eignty over this irredenta by 1951, in accordance with their interpretation of the Round Table Conference Agreements' provi sions governing this question. However, when these negotiations broke down Djakarta turned to the U. S. for assistance in mounting pressure on the Dutch. Indonesia's dependence on the U. S. to further its West Irian policy did not incline her to go the whole way in supporting American Far Eastern policy, but it did lead Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === Sukiman to follow Washington's initiative on two policy questions that fundamentally compromised Indonesia's declared neutrality in the Cold War.^ First, the Sukiman government in September 1951 signed the Japanese Peace Treaty a document Peking charged, not entirely without justification, the United States had "compelled a group of satellite countries to sign." ded Indonesia. That reference obviously inclu There was strong opposition in the Indonesian Par liament to Sukiman's endorsement of this treaty (and for this reason ratification was delayed until 1958), but the government was able to ride out the storm. The second Cold War act of the Sukiman cabinet was its decision in February 1952 to accept American aid under the 1951 Mutual Security Act. However, this move precipi tated a far more serious political crisis than the first and ended in Sukiman1s resignation. The MSA crisis marked the passing from the scene of the last flagrantly pro-U. S. government Indonesia was to have until the overthrow of Sukarno in 1966. The successor cabinet headed by Wilopo has rightly been called a turning point in Indonesia's post-independence history.10 During its tenure (March 1952-June 1953) Indonesia made the transi tion from the anti-communist, Western-oriented foreign policies which had been dominant since 1950 to a more non-aligned posture in foreign affairs. Wilopo's cabinet prepared, as it were, the changes that by 1954 would result in the full normalization of Indonesia's relations with the communist states and the first assertions of Djakarta's nationalistic diplomacy. In a certain sense it could be said that the Wilopo govern ment, though it changed, did not itself have a foreign policy. For if one existed, it was well concealed. Because this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === government's support in Parliament was fragile, it tried to avoid controversial foreign policy decisions. As a result no new at tempts were made to conclude agreements for U. S. military, economic or technical assistance. Plans to reopen the West Irian question with the Dutch were abandoned. On the other hand, the substance of Wilopo's policies toward the communist states did not differ radically from those of Hatta and Natsir. The running argument with the Chinese Embassy was dropped, but Wilopo did not attempt to normalize relations with the CPR. No effort was made to fill the still vacant ambassadorial post in Peking; nor did Wilopo press for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 11 On foreign policy grounds, therefore, there was little that the Wilopo government did, in a positive way, which was likely to encourage the development of a thaw in Sino-Indonesian relations. This policy stood in contrast to other Asian neutrals which were improving their relations with Peking at this time. On the other hand,important political changes were occurring in Indonesia's internal situation which could not have escaped Peking's atten tion, though they did not immediately affect Peking's policy toward Djakarta. From the Chinese viewpoint it must have been an important factor in their planning for the future that the Wilopo cabinet was the first to receive the support of the PKI in Parlia ment. This action symbolized the radical re-orientation of the political line and strategy of the Indonesian Communists, and could not fail to give an added incentive to improve relations with the Indonesian government as soon as conditions would permit. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === - 114 Since 1950 the PKI had been allowed to exist as a legal party, and it had been allotted sixteen seats in the Provisional Parlia ment. But the Indonesian Communists had stood in opposition to every government since the first Hatta cabinet, and they still bore the anti-nationalist badge because of the Madiun uprising. Until mid-1951 the party's attempts to instigate labor strikes and other disturbances served only to re-enforce this image, while Sukiman1s 1951 August raids further weakened and discredited the PKI. It was not until this government fell that the PKI's new leadership, under Aidit and Lukman, was in a position to shift the party's line.1^ In March 1952 the PKI took this step with the announcement it would support the Wilopo cabinet, provided that the latter's policies were "progressive and national."13 The decision to put the PKI's parliamentary support behind the Wilopo cabinet was a consequence of the party's shift to an inter^ nal "right" united front line emphasizing political-legal struggle and the avoidance of discredited agitational tactics. In this way the party hoped to build mass popular support, strong labor union organizations and to focus its attack on "imperialism-feudalism" and their domestic "reactionary" supporters. The tactical objectives of the new united front line were to exploit the serious frictions which had begun to develop between the PNI and Masjumi parties, and to align the PKI squarely behind the nationalist issue of the struggle to liberate the West Irian. Assertion of the claim on the Irian territory had become the central issue in Indonesian foreign policy, and the party perceived in the nationalistic feelings this issue evoked among nearly all Indonesians the vehicle for turning external "imperialist Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 129] === - 115 aggression" into widespread domestic political radicalism that would restore popular confidence in the communists. Although based on a tenuous parliamentary coalition composed of PNI, Masjumi and PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) factions, Wilopo's cabinet was the first since independence to be led by the PNI. Wilopo was no radical on either foreign or domestic issues. The attractive thing about his government, from the PKI point of view, was that the conservative, anti-communist types, dominant in past cabinets, were momentarily eclipsed. Therefore, the Indonesian Communists had a strong interest in helping to sustain Wilopo and in cooperating with some of the other political parties which, for one reason or another, could be considered useful to the PKI in keeping the anti-communist factions out of the government. It thus becomes clear that the Aidit-Lukman shift to a "right" united front policy ran parallel to the "right" international united front line Peking had initiated in 1951. On the other hand, it does not seem very likely that Chinese Communist influ ence prompted the 1952 shift in PKI's domestic strategy. Doctrinally, the essential element in the new line of Indonesian Communism was its concentration on legal, parliamentary struggle, to the exclusion of radical programs in the countryside or even a pro nounced emphasis on political work among the peasantry--the central focus of revolutionary and party-building activities in the Chinese revolutionary model. Actually, of course, it was this low priority the PKI assigned the peasantry, rather than its "parliamentary road," which from the beginning stamped the Aidit leadership as a non-Maoist group. It is also difficult to see Chinese influence Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 130] === behind the PKI’s shift when we look more closely at Peking's diplomatic behavior toward Indonesia at this time. It was eight months after the PKI shift had occurred, and nine months after the recall of Wang Jen-shu, before Peking made any conciliatory overtures toward the Wilopo government. In view of the important role the new cabinet played in the Indonesian Communists' attempt to make a political comeback this seems a strangely long delay if, in fact, Peking was exerting a major influence on the PKI to bring its policies into line with China's. Then, in October 1952, the Chinese Embassy proposed discussions with Djakarta concerning the establishment of trade relations between the two countries.^ Previous trade deals with India and Ceylon had been preceded by this overture but, of course, had occurred much earlier. In view of Indonesia's decision to honor, even though she had not signed, the U. N. embargo against the CPR, this initiative appeared to be a probe on the part of Peking to see whether Djakarta's policy had changed in any significant way since the overthrow of the Sukiman government. The door was quickly closed, however, for the Wilopo cabinet failed to show any serious interest in discussions with Peking concerning trade, and the whole matter was allowed to drop. Nevertheless this event is instructive because it shows that even so mild a rebuff as Djakarta's disinterest in trade talks was sufficient to deter the Chinese from other diplomatic gestures which could be used to signal the desire for improved relations. Had the concern to coordinate tactics with the PKI been a major factor in Chinese policy at this time, other avenues to wooing the Indonesian government were open, such as appointing a new ambassador to Djakarta. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 131] === This would have indicated, quite openly, a Chinese desire to ter minate the era of bad feelings left behind by Wang Jen-shu. conclusion seems evident. The Peking was not going to give any more friendly signals to Djakarta until there was an Indonesian govern ment prepared to demonstrate, concretely, its interest in improv ing relations with the CPR. And there matters stood for the dura tion of the Wilopo cabinet. The Normalization of Peking-Djakarta Relations Favorable opportunities to improve relations with Djakarta began to emerge after June 1953 following the formation of a new cabinet headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo.^ Unlike previous Indonesian governments Ali's cabinet was actually dependent on the parlia mentary support of the PKI for its majority. play this key role because the Ali The PKI was able to government was based on a weak coalition led by the left wing of the PNI. The latter, in order to hold a working majority which excluded the conservative Moslem parties, required parliamentary support from the extreme left, and this could only be the PKI. Although the PKI was not invited to join the cabinet--A1i1s "left wing" PNI faction intended no program of serious reforms, it derived more than sufficient rewards from the bargain. As a parliamentary ally of the govern ment of the day, PKI restored its nationalist credentials. More over, the support given to Ali helped the party to develop its campaign to build mass organizations, and thus to isolate the Moslem anti -communists. From Peking's perspective two things were encouraging about the Ali cabinet: its commitment to an anti -colonialist foreign Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === policy, and its decision to seek the normalization of relations with the communist states. On most Cold War issues Ali adopted a position parallel to that of Burma and India. Moreover, it was during this government's tenure that the West Irian issue and the assertion of a leadership role in the Afro-Asian world began to make their appearance as dominant objectives of Indonesia's foreign policy. Eventually, the pursuit of these aims would re sult in the reversal of Djakarta's previous de facto alignment with the American camp, and thus open the way for a more active relationship with the communist powers. The first step the cabinet took in improving relations with China was the sending, in October 1953, of a well-known member of the Indonesian elite, Arnold Mononutu, to Peking as Indonesia's first ambassador.^ Possible economic contacts were next explored and in December 1953 a Sino-Indonesian two-year barter-trade agree17 ment was signed. The Ali cabinet's program also called for the 18 establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Negotiations on this question were successfully completed in Moscow and a Russian embassy was opened in March 1954. Peking responded to these encouraging developments in November 1954 by sending as her new ambassador to Djakarta^ Huang Chen, a senior diplomatic officer previously posted in Eastern Europe--a man quite the opposite from the bombastic, non-professional Wang Jen-shu. By late 1954 full normalization of diplomatic relations had been established. The moment was ripe for the two powers to consider substantive political problems they heretofore had been unable to discuss, much less negotiate. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === - 119 The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty Important domestic policy considerations had been one factor prompting the Ali government to normalize relations with the CPR. The program Ali had placed before Parliament in 1953 included proposals for a new law on Indonesian citizenship which would affect the legal status of overseas Chinese. was completed in February 1954. 2 0 A draft of this law However, before this law could come into force there would have to be negotiations with China about certain aspects of the proposed legislation since, as a result of the 1949-1951 option, many local-born Chinese were claimed as nationals of both Indonesia and the CPR. The 1954 draft law was the outgrowth of Djakarta's mounting dissatisfaction with the results of the Round Table Conference formula. Prior to the Ali cabinet, no Indonesian government had been prepared to grapple with this thorny issue, and during the period when rela tions with China were strained a negotiated settlement was out of the question. Ali concluded that the time was now quite favorable for a settlement. The basic policy of the CPR toward the overseas Chinese popu lations in Southeast Asia as of 1954 was still based on the 1949 Common Program and the 1953 Electoral Law. These documents plainly regarded foreign domiciled Chinese as mainland citizens and, in effect, seemed to express Peking's intention to strengthen, not weaken, the CPR's ties with the overseas Chinese. On the other hand, by 1954 this stance was becoming clearly incompatible with Peking's emerging policy of peaceful coexistence which required an amelioration of potential sources of friction with the South east Asian neutrals. And anti-imperialist united front cooperation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 134] === certainly could not become the basis of China's relations with these countries so long as Peking's insistence that local Chinese were citizens of the CPR continued to alarm her neighbors. Whether expansionist Chinese nationalism or peaceful co existence, in fact, determined Peking's policies was, from the perspective of Southeast Asian countries, a question that would largely be answered by evidence of the mainland's readiness to modify its citizenship claims on the overseas Chinese. If Peking would not make substantial concessions on this issue there was little prospect of improving her relations with these countries to any significant degree. On the other hand, the vexing problems posed by this overseas Chinese minority might be turned to her advantage, in the wider diplomatic context, if Peking could hold out the possibility of renouncing her claims on the foreign-born Chinese as an inducement to certain Southeast Asian governments to improve their relations with the CPR. Ambassador Mononutu raised the question of settling the Chinese citizenship issue soon after his arrival in Peking, and he found Chou En-lai receptive to the idea. According to Mononutu, the Chinese leader emphasized that agreeing to negotiate this question was a major departure from China's traditional policy, and that his government would regard any conclusion of a treaty with Djakarta as a test case which, if successful, might be extended to other countries on a bilateral basis. 21 Following this initial meeting of the minds the first phase of serious, unpubli cized negotiations got underway in Djakarta between Indonesian representatives and members of the Chinese Embassy. Shortly thereafter a special Indonesian team was sent to Peking where the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === 121 second and more formal phase of negotiations was resumed between November 4 and December 23, 1954. A third and final phase of negotiations took place in Djakarta and Bandung from March 29 to April 20, 1955, concluding with a formal agreement just in time for the Asian-African Conference. 22 The basic terms of the 1955 Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty provided that those overseas Chinese designated as simul taneously possessing both CPR and Indonesian nationality would formally choose the nationality of one country within two years after the treaty had been ratified. For those who failed to choose, citizenship would be determined by the nationality of their father.^3 Beyond these provisions, the treaty incorporated important political pledges and understandings both sides wished to see re flected in the document. Peking pledged that those Chinese who re mained CPR nationals must "abide by the laws and customs" of Indo nesia and "not... participate in political activities.... These two provisions, which were stated in general terms rather than specific principles, enabled the treaty, in effect, to record Peking’s public renunciation of any interference in Indonesia's internal affairs arising from the Chinese minority. This, of course, was a major objective of the Indonesian government. For her part Djakarta pledged "to protect the proper rights and interests" of those Chinese who remained CPR nationals. Natu rally, it was this provision Peking most wanted explicitly written into the treaty as a restraint on discriminatory Indonesian economic or civil regulations affecting Chinese nationals. 2 5 From the text of the treaty it appeared that China won another important safeguard. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === There were provisions for an "exchange of mind" and "negotiations" between the two parties in the event that differences of "interpretation" arose in connection with "implementation" of the agreements. Strictly interpreted, these provisions could be the legal basis for Peking to challenge or delay Indonesian regulations affecting Chi nese nationals which, in the CPR's judgment, contravened the treaty. The major Indonesian objective in these negotiations was to undo the results of the citizenship option period stemming from the execution of the provisions of the Round Table Conference agreements. A second objective was to secure Peking's renuncia tion of legal claims on the local-born Chinese before they were offered a new option of taking Indonesian citizenship. This time the overseas Chinese could not get it "passively"; they would have to make formal application, and undergo an irritating bureaucratic process (fees, proofs, forms, etc.) which would test how genuinely they wanted Indonesian citizenship. That China was willing to accept Djakarta's determination of those who had to choose, and those who did not, was conclusively demonstrated not only by the 1955 Treaty's provisions but also by supplemental agreements. In June 1955, Chou En-lai agreed to recog nize as Indonesian nationals an additional category of Chinese, not explicitly covered by the treaty, who Djakarta regarded as already having implicitly opted for Indonesia by virtue of "their political and social status." 2 7 Depending on how meticulous the Indonesian government wanted to be about the documentation the Chinese would have to present in order to establish proof of birth in Indonesia --thousands of Chinese had never conceived it would be necessary Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 137] === to do this, Djakarta could make the choice of Indonesian citizen ship very easy or very hard. Although the Treaty said nothing specific about provision for implementation, the basic principles in the agreement indicated China had accepted Indonesians right determine the number of local-born Chinese who would be eligible to choose Indonesian citizenship. Whether large numbers of local-born Chinese should be en couraged to take Indonesian citizenship, or prevented from doing so, was a matter Djakarta had not determined in any statutory law at the time the treaty was concluded. Since they had gone to the trouble of negotiating an agreement wherein Peking renounced claims over the Chinese, the logical assumption was that the Indo nesian leaders must have wanted large numbers of them to opt for Indonesian citizenship. In fact, however, opinion on this matter in the government was sharply divided. It appears instead that what Djakarta wanted in 1955 was not a definitive, spelled out settlement, but only the removal of Peking's claim on the localborn Chinese. In this way Indonesia could preserve the option to carry out a broad or a narrow assimilation policy toward the over seas Chinese in the future. Djakarta's interpretation of the Dual Nationality Treaty satisfied this objective, but this was certainly not what Peking understood the agreements to mean. Peking's interests also seemed to be well-served by her interpretation of the Treaty. Its provisions enabled her to renounce, honorably, a previous nationalistic policy without abandoning the remaining foreign-born Chinese who would automatically be regarded as CPR citizens, and those local-born overseas Chinese who might opt to remain CPR citizens, to a potentially hostile environment. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === As subsequent anti-Chinese outbursts demonstrated, China's fears of what might happen to her nationals were completely justified. But in April 1955 there were more reasons for hope than fear. Peking-Djakarta relations were improving rapidly, and there were grounds to hope that the conciliatory position China had taken on the citizenship issue would be reciprocated by Djakarta's restraint in applying economic regulations against the Chinese nationals. It was probably a calculation as well that these concessions strengthened the hand of a moderate government which would be more likely to protect the Chinese from the more openly hostile anti-Chinese elements in the country. The Treaty's provision that Indonesia would protect the "rights and interests" of the Chinese nationals was phrased in very general terms, indicating that the negotiators actually had been quite far apart in their interpretations of what this concept meant. According to Indonesian informants who were members of Djakarta's negotiating team, Peking had pressed for a specific understanding between the two sides that by "rights and interests" was meant all rights and interests, including economic ones. Indonesia negotiators, The on the other hand, insisted that this pro vision should mean only "legal" rights and interests; that is, in accordance with whatever Indonesian law said those rights and interests were. Inasmuch as the language adopted in the treaty was quite unspecific, this provision clearly came out looking closer to the Indonesian conception than what China had proposed. Hence, the fundamental conflict of interests over the economic position of the Chinese in Indonesia was not resolved, but merely papered over in the Treaty. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === The importance of this failure to reach a clear understanding on the "rights and interests" issue was not fully understood at the time. It became of utmost significance four years later, in 1959, when Djakarta suddenly placed drastic restrictions on Chinese traders in the villages, thereby precipitating a major diplomatic rupture with Peking. ferent. But the atmosphere in 1955 was quite dif There were problems here and there in the Treaty, but the larger domestic and foreign interests of the two governments were propelling them toward a very cooperative period of relations. Under the influence of this heady wine potential conflicts over what the Treaty's provisions meant must have seemed small and very far away. Bandung and the Peaceful Coexistence Strategy The conclusion of the Dual Nationality Treaty with Indonesia was an important plank in the pattern of new Chinese diplomatic initiatives after 1954. Agreements such as this made it possible for Peking to completely alter her relations with Southeast Asia, and thus to transform the nature of the political alignments at work in the entire Far East. As a consequence of her post-1954 diplomatic triumphs the CPR seemed on the verge of breaking out of the isolated and defensive position forced upon her by the Korean conflict. Four factors were primarily responsible for the CPR‘s new diplomatic flexibility: Stalin's death in 1953, and the accompanying leadership struggle in the Soviet Communist Party, greatly weakened Moscow's leadership of the Sino-Soviet alliance, a process probably begun as a result of dissatisfactions relating to the Korean war. Peking's readiness to take independent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === initiatives within the alliance had been established before Stalin's death, but his passing from the scene--leaving no one really com parable to Mao Tse-tung in stature, must have increased this ten dency in the Chinese leadership; 2) the unwillingness of the Asian neutrals to support American foreign policy objectives, and the possibility they might even be "united with" to oppose the United States, made it much easier for China to drop the former ideologi cal attack on the "bourgeois nationalist" regimes, and to settle outstanding questions left over from the colonial period; 3) to an increasing number of Asian governments, including U. S. allies like Japan, Thailand and Pakistan, Peking's demonstrated modera tion had largely disproved American charges that she was an "aggres sive" power. By concluding a treaty with India on the status of Tibet (April 1954), playing a major role in bringing the Indo china War to an end (July 19 54) and by joining with India and Burma to proclaim the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (June 1954), the CPR had established the fact she was prepared to live at peace with her neighbors; 4) for their part, the Asian neutrals had correctly gauged the implications of the important shift which had occurred in the foreign policies of the communist powers around 1954, and they were consequently unable to accept the American thesis that the pattern of Cold War alignments re flected in the European situation should be transferred to East Asia. At a time when intra-regional conflicts, spawned during the preceding colonial era seemed amenable to solution on the basis of cooperation and negotiations with the CPR, the American thesis that anti-communist military pacts were necessary to save this area from a Chinese menace had a hollow ring. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === Nowhere was China's diplomatic breakout more effectively and dramatically exploited than at the meeting of the 29 Asian and African leaders at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. The domestic as well as foreign interests which might be served by such a con ference were in the minds of leaders like Nehru, Ali and other Columbo power statesmen who called the conference. But there was also genuine concern among the Afro-Asian states that the time had come to discuss their own problems, and to act in concert to prevent their own countries from becoming ever more entangled in the Cold War rivalries. For most of the delegates attending the historic meeting Chou En-lai gave a convincing presentation of China's desire to see the principles of peaceful coexistence become the basis of relations between all the non-Western states. 28 These countries, he said, had basically the same interests, despite their differ ing social systems, and China had "no intention whatsoever to subvert the governments of its neighboring countries." Openly declaring Peking's renunciation of any attempt to use her over seas Chinese communities or to influence foreign communist parties to subvert her neighbors, Chou claimed, "if nations gave assurances not to interfere in each others' internal affairs, it [would]then be possible for the people of these countries to choose their own political system and way of life in accordance with their own will." Henceforth, any provable charges of Chinese subversion or interference on behalf of revolutionaries in newly-independent states would certainly expose the Peking government before the entire Asian-African community as a leadership whose words did not match its deeds. Even those leaders at the conference who doubted Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === the sincerity of China's pledge to pursue a peaceful coexistence policy were unable in the ten years that followed Bandung to present a valid case where Peking broke this pledge. The obstacles to friendly relations between China and the Afro-Asian countries, Chou En-lai argued, was not the social system or foreign policy of the CPR, but the actions of the United States which continued "to create tensions in the Taiwan area" and was "establishing more and more military bases in Asian and African countries." Although the Chinese Premier acknowledged that many countries had become independent, he insisted that "the rule of colonialism was not dead... and new colonialists ing to take the place of the old ones." [were] attempt Hence, the main basis for "unity" and "common ground" between all the Asian-African countries was their mutual interest in ending "the suffering and calamities under colonialism." If this were achieved, Chou stated, "it will be very easy for us to have mutual understanding and respect, mutual sympathy and support instead of mutual suspicion and fear, mutual exclusion and antagonism." A number of pro-Western leaders at Bandung still had doubts about how far Peking was prepared to carry the peaceful coexistence doctrine. In a separate statement issued immediately after the Conference the Chinese Premier offered to "enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of re laxing tensions in the Far East, and especially the question of 29 relaxing tensions in the Taiwan area." This offer almost, but not quite, amounted to the implication that peaceful coexistence might even be possible with the leader of the imperialist camp itself, if Washington ceased its interference in China's internal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 143] === affairs, and was prepared to withdraw American military power from other areas. Whereas the practical result of this initia tive led only to the Sino-American talks in Geneva and later Warsaw, its immediate political impact was to strengthen further the CPR image among the Afro-Asian neutrals as a state ready to abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence. The proposals for Afro-Asian cooperation which Chou En-lai announced at Bandung showed the extent of the transformation that had occurred in China's foreign policy strategy by 1955. What the Chinese leader had said and pledged amounted to replacing the 1949-1950 Mao-Liu call for a revolutionary united front from "below" with a call for the united front from "above". Peking's new allies could be the bourgeois governments of newly independent Afro-Asian states which might, for reasons of their own, share China's interest in banding together to prevent the United States from dragging the Third World into the Cold War. Indonesia certainly looked like a prime candidate for member ship in the new coalition China was proposing. The overseas Chinese issue appeared to be settled, or at least no longer a major source of tension. Peking's renunciation of the Mao-Liu revolutionary line also helped to diffuse the potential conflicts arising from her fraternal ties to the PKI, especially since the latter was itself already committed to peaceful parliamentary struggle and a policy of united front cooperation with the same elements of the Indonesian bourgeois elite who favored friendly relations with the CPR. Indeed, the PKI's domestic policy fully complemented the Chinese leaders' global united front strategy and vice-versa. Now that the overseas Chinese, revolution and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 144] === - 130 subversion issues seemingly had been laid to rest the obvious commonality in Sino-Indonesian foreign policy interests might come to the fore. This, of course, was the similar irrendentist struggles of Peking and Djakarta for recovery of Taiwan^and West Irian--symbols of incomplete sovereignty forced on both countries by imperialist intervention. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 145] === Footnotes Chapter IV For the official Indonesian position on the United Nations' sanctions against Communist China see Report on Indonesia, January 31, February 9, May 25 and June 7, 1951. The first indication on the part of a leading figure in the Peking government that its foreign policy had shifted was the speech by Soong Ching-ling, "On Peaceful Coexistence", People's China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, bi-monthly current affairs journal beginning 1950, superceded by Peking Review after 1957), June 1, 1951, pp. 1-6. Political Report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, October 23, 1951 in New China Forges Ahead (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952), p. 12. See the collection of documents published in Ya-chou taip'ing-yang chu-yu ho-p'ing hui-i chung-yao pao-kao chi chueh-i [Important Reports and Resolutions of the Peace Conference of the Asian-Pacific Region](Peking^ 1952). Interviews, former Charge d'Affairs, Isak Mahdi, February 18 and June 5, 1961. According to Mahdi, the very cool treatment he and other Southeast Asian diplomats had initially received in Peking began to change sometime before Wang Jen-shu was recalled, or about the time the Korean war reached a stale mate. Thereafter, cordial contacts with the CPR Foreign Ministry were frequent. Mahdi also recalled that the Chinese seemed very anxious to normalize relations with Indonesia from 1952 on, and that they also wanted to settle the over seas Chinese nationality question. This testimony suggests Peking was by no means so reluctant to relinquish claims on the overseas Chinese as is commonly supposed. Reported in Antara, December 26, 1951. On the politics and policies of the Sukiman cabinet see Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit., pp. 177-224. Chou En-lai, Political Report, op. cit., p. 15. Jih-pao, September 10, 1951. The details of the MSA crisis are in Feith, op. cit., pp. 198-207. 10. For the best analysis of this period see Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia (Cornell: Modern Indonesia Project, 1958), 212 pp. Also Jen-min Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === 132 11. The Wilopo cabinet's foreign minister, Mukarto, had initiallystated that it was not possible to delay any longer the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union CAntara, April 24, 1952). In July, the cabinet approved, in principle, a decision to send an ambassador to Peking (Antara, July 2, 1952). This followed suggestions by Indonesian Charge d'Affairs Isak Mahdi that an ambassador was required in Peking in view of China's importance in the world (Report on Indonesia, Indonesian Ministry of Information, June 30, 1952, p. 3)'". Again, however, opposition from the Masjumi Party obliged the Wilopo government to shelve any plans for proceeding with the normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union. 12. On the history of the PKI during this period, and the events leading up to its change in strategy, see Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 22-26; and Jutus W. vander Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: Univer sity of British Columbia Publications Centre, 1965), pp. 44-53. 13. Statement of the PKI Central Committee, Harian Rakjat, March 26, 1952. 14. Reported in Antara, October 27 and November 5, 1952. 15. For an analysis of the Ali Cabinet see Feith, op. cit., pp. 331-413. 16. Jen-min Jih-pao, October 19, 1953. 17. Antara, January 16, 1954. 18. Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo (Government Statement and Replies on the Program of the Ali Cabinet), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1953. 19. NCNA (Peking), November 22, 1954. 20. Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, loc. cit., p. 385. 21. Interview, Arnold Mononutu, former Indonesian Ambassador to China, August 4, 1961. 22. Interviews, Dr. Tayibnapis, member of the Indonesian team which negotiated the Dual Nationality Treaty, July 11, 12 and August 30, 1961. 23. For complete text of the Treaty see Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 130-134. Also People's China (supplement), no. 10, 195 5, pp. 2-4. 24. Ibid., Article XI, paragraph 1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 147] === 133 25. Ibid., paragraph 2. 26. Ibid., Articles XII and XIII. 27. Note of Prime Minister Chou En-lai's to Prime Minister Ali 5~astroamidj o jo on the Implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty, June 3, 1955. Full text issued by the Cultural and Information Office, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Djakarta, 1955. 28. For the full text of Chou En-lai's three speeches at the Conference see China and the Asian-African Conference [documents], (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), pp. 9-2 7 and 29-31. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 148] === CHAPTER V MILITANT ANTI-IMPERIALISM: A MODIFIED UNITED FRONT FROM ABOVE STRATEGY The major foreign policy initiative China took at the Bandung Conference was based on two assumptions: continuing Sino-Soviet unity; and an increased scope for application of the peaceful coexistence doctrine. If the Chinese assumptions were correct the combined effect of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the com posure of relations between Peking and her neighbors would be to expand the basis for a united front strategy of opposition to the American presence in Asia. These expectations, however, soon proved to be unrealistic. After Bandung the hoped-for united front possibilities did not materialize and, in fact, it was China rather than the "imperialists," which became increasingly isolated and thrown on the defensive. To grasp the nature of the pressures which prompted the shift in Chinese strategy after 1958 and the effect this shift had on the developing pattern of Sino-Indonesian relations, it is necessary to analyze briefly the factors behind the breakdown of the Bandung policy. Estrangement from Moscow The Chinese Communist Party claims that the rift with Moscow began at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 when Khrushchev denounced Stalin and advanced theses for dealing with the United States which Peking could not accept. In fact the controversy had begun to take shape before this event.^ The Soviet Union chose to de-emphasize the significance of the Bandung Conference, especially the implications Peking saw as arising from it; namely that the communist bloc should concentrate its strategy on the - 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 149] === 135 Afrc-Asian states to the end of exploiting their differences with the "imperialist" powers. It was already clear from the Soviet's participation in the Big Four talks on Berlin and disarmament at the July 1955 Geneva Conference that Moscow's primary attention would remain focused on the Atlantic theater and, consequently, that she did not welcome pre-emptive Chinese moves to redirect the efforts of the socialist camp elsewhere. That Moscow was, in fact, interested in the relaxation of tensions with the United States in the Far East,on the basis of accepting the status quo, was revealed in the October 1956 Soviet decision to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Though unprotested by Peking, this move implicitly undermined the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance under which both powers had theretofor followed a common policy of refusing to normalize ties with Tokyo (both had rejected the 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty) pending Japan's withdrawal from the military alliance with the U. S., severance of ties with Nationalist China and recognition of the CPR. The main political effect of the Soviet resumption of ties with Japan was to encourage conservative circles in Tokyo, and other Asian governments, in the belief that a "two Chinas" policy was possible. The Russian action also suggested that the commu nist powers' militance was weakening, and that they might even tually become reconciled to the continuance of military pacts between Asian nations and the U. S. This was certainly not the message Peking was trying to convey by its consistent policy of resolute, united opposition to the military pacts of the United States, nor was it the objective China had in proposing the Bandung formula. Given Moscow's disinterest in a clear anti-imperialist Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === 136 line in Asia, the Chinese now had to re-appraise the implications of the Soviet's post-1956 diplomatic and economic campaign in India, Burma and Indonesia. Was it so clear after 1956 that these Russian initiatives were being made for the purpose of countering American policy; or was their real intention to curb China's growing influence in the region? Heightened Tensions with the U. S. Accumulating evidence of divergent Soviet and Chinese policy in Asia necessarily had the effect of undermining China's posi tion vis-a-vis the contest with America in East Asia. The Sino- U. S. talks on relaxing tensions in the Taiwan Straits area, which began in 1955, revealed from the beginning that Washington would not agree to remove her military presence from the area unless Peking was prepared to recognize the U. S.-created status quo, i.e., the perpetuation of the Nationalist Chinese regime. While these talks continued the U. S. proceeded with the training and rearmament of the Nationalist armies. Further evidence of the real U. S. intention was the steady re-armament of Japan and the development of Okinawa into the most powerful air, naval and nuclear weapons base in the Pacific. Since these efforts pro ceeded apace, despite the moderate and restrained foreign policy of the CPR at this time, Peking had to conclude that the American side did not want a relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asia. Whatever possibility existed that the Bandung policy might have been the basis to begin a whole new approach toward the United States--as faintly implied by Chou En-lai's offer to talk with Washington--rather than a bid to organize a broader united front against her, was quickly dashed by the concerted U. S. Far Eastern Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 151] === 137 policy after 1954 which aimed at organizing Asia into a politicalmilitary system directed against China. In Southeast Asia the tenuous political-military arrangement worked out at the Geneva Conference was by 1955 also being rapidly undermined by the U. S. which had decided to overturn the 1954 Indo-China settlement. The first consequence of this decision was SEATO (September 1954), a security treaty covering Laos and Cambodia under which an umbrella clause permitted the signatory powers--but actually the U. S.--to intervene in these countries in the event of "aggression", this despite the plain language of the Geneva Agreements which explicitly called for the neutraliza tion of these two states. As the French withdrew from South Vietnam, the U. S. undertook to create a regime in Saigon under Ngo Dinh Diem, the aim being the establishment of a permanent division of Vietnam into communist and . anti-communist zones parallel to the Korean situation, again in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Under the SEATO treaty Thailand and the Philip pines could serve on the flanks of the main U. S. bastion being created in South Vietnam. By 1956 Washington was already develop ing a pattern of covert diplomacy and intervention in Laos--exten ded to Cambodia in 1958--and to other Southeast Asian countries, designed to shore up the remaining weak links in the chain that the United States was forging to "contain" Communist China. It was during this same period that a massive U. S. aid effort (matched by the Soviet Union and, thus indirectly support ive of American aims) was made to underwrite the Indian Five Year Plans, a development that was hard to see in any light other than an attempt by Washington (and Moscow) to strengthen New Delhi as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 152] === 138 a counterweight to China in Asia. On the other hand, in 1957-1958 rightist military coups were carried out in Burma, Pakistan, Laos and Thailand, and the army became the dominant political influence in Indonesia. Whereas covert American intervention on behalf of the military in this region at that time has only been documented with respect to South Vietnam, Laos and Indonesia, it is clear that the Dulles policy welcomed the coming to power of armycontrolled regimes which might be more easily influenced to over turn the previous civilian leadership's moderate attitudes toward China. lu Peking, the period between 1955 and 1958, therefore, had to be regarded as a new American drive to dominate East Asia and to sabotage the Bandung formula. The success of this U. S. effort to "roll back" China had a great influence on the subsequent policy shift Peking was forced to make. Defection of the Neutrals from the United Front The Bandung policy of promoting common "unity" and "support" between Asian-African states on the basis of resistance to "imper ialism" also notably failed to inspire most of the parties to whom it was directed. Overall, the Afro-Asian states seemed to interpret the Chinese position to mean acceptance of the status quo not a call to resist American policies. In other words, peaceful coexistence meant only live and let live. This was not an un reasonable inference since Chou En-lai's statements at Bandung had stressed the point that all the new countries should concen trate on national economic construction, and that task was not exactly consistent with the diversion of energies to confrontations with the colonial and imperialist powers. Had China not also said Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 153] === 139 that peaceful coexistence was possible even with the Asian mili tary allies of the U. S.--Japan, Thailand and Pakistan? And if Peking could offer to sit down to talk with the imperialists themselves after Bandung, on what basis could China logically object to the Asian neutrals' adopting a non-militant posture toward the United States? What was not so clear in 1955, however--as it became after 1956, was that the Bandung policy was not going to deter the U. S. from intensifying its forward containment strategy in Asia. More over, it turned out that the conciliatory position she adopted toward her neighbors did not garner Peking much support from other powers, notably Russia and India, to offset the adverse effect of American efforts to promote an anti-communist roll back. In this situation, the Bandung approach could not remain a viable policy unless Peking succeeded in infusing it with a stronger anti imperialist motif. To do this China would have to organize much stronger regional and international support on behalf of programs directed to undermining American policy. In strategic terms, Peking needed to turn the thrust of the communist-led inter national united front to Asia in defense of threatened Chinese interests. Sino-Soviet Differences on Peaceful Coexistence It was primarily because the Bandung policy failed to deter the American roll back campaign in Asia that China became so alarmed over the ideas contained in the main foreign policy theses Khrushchev raised at the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress. His interpretation of peaceful coexistence meant essentially nuclear Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 154] === 140 coexistence with the U. S., and thus carried the clear implication of the Soviet Union's willingness to accept not only the American imposed status quo in Asia but also U. S. actions designed to roll back communism and neutralism. In Moscow's view an active anti imperialist strategy by the socialist powers to counter the U. S. offensive strategy in Asia was unacceptably dangerous since it might lead to general war. Instead, Khrushchev held that the dislodgement of the imperialists from the colonies and the newly independent countries must be pursued, primarily, by strengthening the socialist camp. This growing strength, plus what Khrushchev asserted to be the bright prospects for communist parties winning victory through legal parliamentary struggle in the industrialized European countries, would lead to the advance of socialism in the West and, eventually, render decisive assistance to the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. From this line of argument it was perfectly clear what the priorities of the socialist camp should be. China, and other countries at odds with the imperialists, would have to wait until the Soviet Union had prevailed over the West in a prolonged, essentially industrial struggle. Khrushchev's assertion that peaceful coexistence should be "the general line" of the foreign policies of all communist parties really meant that Moscow would formulate what strategy the world movement should follow, and this strategy would be determined by the over-riding consideration of Soviet-American nuclear rivalry. Peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems was not a doctrine contrary to Chinese foreign policy in 1956, or in the years thereafter. Peking had advanced peaceful Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === 141 coexistence as a basic, but not the exclusive, principle in her foreign policy several years before Khrushchev suddenly became attached to it. Since 1954 it had been the main principle applied in relations with friendly Asian states. The conflict arose over Khrushchev's interpretation that peaceful coexistence should also apply equally to "U. S. imperialism", which was pursuing roll back, anti-communist policies in Asia inimical to Chinese interests. Acceptance of Khrushchev's definition of peaceful co-existence meant Peking could not actively oppose the enlargement and the consolidation of the American sphere in Asia until such time as the balance of power in the West had decisively shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. In view of other Soviet policies in Asia after 1956 the Chinese were entitled to doubt how soon, if ever, they would receive Moscow's support. Khrushchev's ideas about "peaceful transition" were also unpalatable to the Chinese. For if the main task of communist parties in the colonial and newly-independent countries was to wait for the victory of socialism in the West to weaken imperialism, then revolutionary struggles were not only unnecessary they could, in fact, be avoided. As the colonial world became more attracted to the socialist system’s high levels of production, so Khrushchev argued, more people would flock to the banner of the communist parties in distant lands, enabling them to participate in "bour geois nationalist" — controlled governments. Khrushchev's thesis envisioned the colonial world as gradually moving toward a "non capitalist road of development", or "national democratic states", which would evolve into socialist states as they were co-opted into the orbit of Soviet poitfer. In other words, there was no Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 156] === 142 need for strong, independent communist parties, national united fronts--certainly not independent communist military forces--and probably no need for a "dictatorship of the proletariat" at the time that the bourgeois system was peacefully overthrown. Khrushchev1s program for the Afro-Asian world thus repudiated the basic core of Chinese revolutionary theory and doctrine as well as the interests of the Chinese state. If accepted in its unaltered form, there could be no serious pressure exerted by local commu nist parties on their governments to pursue anti-imperialist foreign policies. In the Chinese view, such parties could not build the kind of strength or militance they would need to win power politi cally, or by armed struggle, when the eventual showdown came. They could not be "self-reliant," as the Chinese insisted they must be, because their success or survival was to be essentially dependent on Moscow’s handling of the world struggle, and the Soviet’s ability to prevent the unreliable bourgeois-nationalist governments from suppressing local communist parties. With respect to the last con dition, all past experience had shown that an attempted anti-communist suppression by the bourgeoisie would occur at some stage during the anti -imperialist phase of the national revolution, and that exter nal communist aid could not prevent this from happening. China Calls for an Anti-Imperialist Strategy These were the basic concerns that led China after 1957 to call for a militant stance by the socialist camp against the U. S. It was a call which reflected not only China's endangered national interests, but also her deepening lack of confidence in the Soviet leadership's global objectives and its longer range intentions toward the CPR. The call to action came from Mao Tse-tung himself Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 157] === 143 in the famous "East Wind over West Wind" speech delivered at the 195 7 Moscow Conference. His basic thesis in this speech--that the total strength of the forces of socialism had surpassed those of the imperialists, was actually a reiteration of the view he and other Chinese leaders had asserted since 1946,^ namely that the Soviet victory over the axis powers and the victory of the CCP over the KMT in China had shifted the world balance of forces in favor of the communist camp. of forces Mao's analysis of the balance also stressed ideological, political and economic factors, not just military ones. Because this re-affirmation of socialist bloc supremacy coincided with the launching of the first Soviet Sputnik, most foreign observers completely misinterpreted Mao's speech, and subsequent Chinese pronouncements on the same theme. It became commonly accepted that the Chinese were demand ing Soviet adoption of a strategy of military force against the "imperialists," and that Peking, indiscriminantly, advocated com munist- led revolutionary struggles in the colonial and newlyindependent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.^ Subsequent Chinese actions and statements proved that Peking was, indeed, urging a more militant strategy to counter the Amer ican attempt to destroy neutralism and to roll back communism in the Afro-Asian countries. Nor was there much doubt that the Chinese tried to force the Soviets to adopt a strategy which would concentrate the efforts of the socialist camp in support of the crumbling CPR position in Asia. The form the Chinese urged this struggle should take was not war initiated by the socialist countries, but a determined readiness to oppose the United States "imperialists" when they intervened in the internal affairs of socialist states (e.g., Taiwan, Tibet), independent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 158] === - 144 countries, or when they attempted to suppress the "national lib eration movements" in the colonial world. From the Chinese view point, the motivation behind this call to action was defensive, not offensive. To them, the major power which was making it per fectly clear it would not accept "peaceful coexistence," neutralism or non-interference in the affairs of other countries, was none other than the United States. On the question of peaceful coexistence, therefore, the dis pute with Moscow was essentially over the Chinese insistence that this principle could not be applied to relations between "oppressed and oppressors" (i.e., liberation movements struggling against imperialism). Nor could peaceful coexistence be the "general line" of all communist parties, irrespective of the national conditions in each country, or whether the stage of violent conflict with the capitalist order had arrived. On the other hand, Peking made no calls for revolution toward any country which was friendly to China, including some of the capitalist partners of the United States. Peking temporarily went along with the Soviet definition of peaceful coexistence, as expressed in the 1957 Moscow Declaration, because it reaffirmed those very principles China had earlier pledged would govern her relations with Asian-African states.^ Indeed, if the genuineness of the communist states' commitment to peaceful coexistence was in doubt in late 1957, it was due to Soviet intervention in Hungary and Poland, not because of aggressive actions taken by China. Peking's principal external activity in 1956-57 was an Asian diplomacy of friendship and negotiation with neutralist neighbors, most of which were dominated by military elites--hardly the posture of a reckless or revolutionary radical. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === For the sake of Sino-Soviet unity, which might yet be preserved through future negotiations, the basic issues that had been raised in 1956-57 were papered over with formulas intended to conceal Moscow's and Peking's increasingly divergent foreign policies. After the Moscow Conference, however, China attempted to alter the course the Soviet Union was set upon by herself proceeding down a different path. In effect Peking tried to redirect the thrust of the communist powers' international line. China's own policies after 1957 made it clear she welcomed collaboration with bourgeois states and leaders who actively opposed the United States. Peaceful coexistence with all friendly or neutral states was still highly desirable and genuine neutralism in the Cold War would be respected. And there was no espousal of revolution by Peking toward independent countries clearly outside the U. S.-controlled orbit. But China did try to heighten the militance of the communist states and parties through her increas ing more verbal encouragement to all types of what were asserted to be "anti-imperialist struggles." On the state-to-state level, more emphasis was put on strengthening political ties with any of those states which, like China, were threatened by or opposed to United States policies. Post-1957 Indonesia was a prime candidate for membership in China's new attempt to revise the socialist camp's international aims and commitments. A major political up heaval was taking place in Indonesia about this time. The way it developed soon led to a closer identification of foreign policy interests between Peking and Djakarta. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 160] === - 146 The 1958 Indonesian. Rebellion In February 1958 dissident military commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes) rebelled against the central government. The rebellions followed a series of internal crises after late 1956 which had demonstrated Djakarta's inability to control regional insubordination. The usurpation of authority by certain regional military commanders was motivated by local opposition to Djakarta's policies toward the outer islands. To a lesser, but not unimportant, extent the rebellions stemmed from mounting fears among conservative Moslem and army circles over the Ali cabinet's friendly ties with the PKI, Russia and China. Following its inability to assert con trol over the rebels, the Ali government resigned in March 1957. It was the end of Indonesia's ill-fated attempt to ameliorate the country's sprawling regions and divisive political forces by means of borrowed and inapplicable Western institutions. The collapse of the parliamentary order quickly brought on political chaos. President Sukarno filled the void, backed up by the army which in March 1957 he endowed with martial law authority. Under the previous regime the Masjumi and PS I parties had attempted to shunt Sukarno aside as a figurehead president. He had always re jected this conception of his presidential role, however, and con tinued to use his great prestige and influence with the elite and the masses to force the political parties to take account of him, on occasion deciding major policy issues by his direct intervention in the political process. Sukarno had never been enthusiastic about the parliamentary system, believing it to be unsuited to Indonesian conditions and personality. Hence he was not sorry to see this experiment fail. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === 147 As early as 1956 he had begun to call for a different form of democracy, demokrasi terpimpin (democracy with leadership or "guided democracy") and to argue that it was time "to bury the political parties" whose idea of "fifty-percent plus one democracy" was not in harmony with traditional Indonesian customs of decisiong making. These customs, which Sukarno excelled at manipulating, tended to emphasize mutual help (gotong-rojong), consensus (mufakat) and collective deliberations (musjawarat). On the other hand, these customs were inappropriate in the highly contentious style of combat Sukarno perceived to be characteristic of Western democratic processes. Despite his antipathy toward the system, Sukarno, like many others in the Indonesian elite--including much of the officer corps which shared his views--went along with the experiment in parlia mentary democracy. He took a stand against the 1952 "October 17th Affair," an attempt by dissident army officers to win his support in a coup to topple the Wilopo cabinet, and he backed the antiq communist policies of the earlier Ilatta and Sukiman cabinets. But he began to withdraw his support from the parliamentary system when it became clear that the wrangling political parties were going to reject his ideas and leadership but were, themselves, unable to galvan ize the nation for a campaign to force the Dutch out of West Irian. Ever since negotiations with the Netherlands broke down on this issue in late 1951 Sukarno had repeatedly insisted that Indo nesia's energies must be focused on the struggle for West Irian. He had supported the pro-U. S. Sukiman government largely because its policies emphasized this struggle, even though Sukarno's own anti-imperialist ideology favored a neutralist Indonesian position on Cold War issues. Aside from the left wing of the PNI, the only other political party which shared his conception of national Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === 148 priorities was the PKI, and this fact heavily influenced the post-1952 rapprochement between Sukarno and the Indonesian Commu nists. After 1956 the PKI was also the only major party which supported his call for a new political system to replace Indo nesia's discredited constitutional democracy."^ In backing Sukarno, the PKI hoped to gain greater influence within his government and, ultimately, to improve its long range prospects for taking power. It was precisely this prospect, of course, which most alarmed the other political parties and the anti-communist elements in the country. On the one hand, these circles were not themselves overly grieved to see the parliamentary order collapse, since the electoral route to power for the PKI was now clearly foreclosed. On the other hand, once much of the lucra tive spoils of office were lost, the corrupt and poorly organized non-communist parties were at a serious disadvantage vis a vis the PKI. Unlike its rivals,the PKI was not dependent on the spoils system Indonesia's parliamentary democracy provided to mobilize political supporters. There was, therefore, great fear among domestic and foreign anti -communist circles that the Indo nesian Communists would be the principal beneficiary of Guided Democracy, unless PKI could somehow be excluded from, or contained within, the new political order. Just as Sukarno was negotiating with other political leaders how this requirement could be built into Guided Democracy,two events occurred which profoundly altered the course of Indonesia's internal political evolution and Sukarno's attitude toward the great powers. On November 30, 195 7 Moslem fanatics, who appear to have been linked to dissident army officers and Masjumi leaders, attempted Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === to assassinate Sukarno.3-1 When, two months later, the P. R. R. I./ Permesta outer island rebellions erupted and their leaders sought assistance from the West, Sukarno drew the not unnatural conclu sion that some sort of conspiracy existed between certain Western 12 countries and the rebels to depose or kill him. Much under emphasized by most commentators on the Sukarno era, these two events played a critical role in generating the deepening suspi cion and hostility the Indonesian president subsequently displayed toward the West, especially the U. S. and Britain. The rebellion and assassination attempt also played an important role in the genesis of Sukarno's decisions to seek the support of the PKI for his internal policies while turning to the Soviet Union and China for the aid he needed to carry out an independent, nationalistic foreign policy. The day before the assassination attempt a vote in the United Nations General Assembly rejected Indonesia's petition that the Netherlands be called upon to negotiate the status of West Irian. Sukarno carried out his threat to take "dramatic action" if the United Nations failed to act. In mid-December he ordered the seizure of Dutch property in Indonesia and expelled the more than 40,000 Dutch nationals in the country. The resulting political situation was of enormous advantage to the PKI. It responded to the crisis by staging mass demonstrations and by joining with PNIdominated labor unions to seize Dutch property, thus pressuring the government to put nationalization measures into effect. 13 The PKI at last had the issue it so desperately needed to become the mobilizing force behind Sukarno's militant policies and, in playing this role, ultimately to capture leadership of Indonesia's resur gent anti-Western nationalism. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === 150 The anti-communists made their counter-move on February 15, 1958 with the formation of a rival government on Sumatra. action split Indonesia into two hostile camps. This Although the army shared the rebels' concern about the alarming growth and influence of the PKI,and Sukarno’s apparent willingness to treat the commu nists as a bonafide nationalist party, it was not prepared to side with dissident brother officers in actions that could destroy the country. Evidently, the assumption of the rebels--and the U. S. and Nationalist Chinese intelligence services which gave assistance to them--was that by raising the charge of growing communist influ ence on the government, the central military commanders in Djakarta would force Sukarno's downfall or at least a reversal of his poli cies. This assumption might have been sound enough had it not been for the fact that once the external hand behind the rebels had been exposed the army high command saw the issue of interven tion by Western capitalist powers as a more immediate threat to the state than were the Indonesian Communists. Officially, the U. S. announced it had adopted a "neutral" position on the Indonesian civil war. From the beginning, howc/er, Secretary of State Dulles made it quite clear that Washington's sympathies lay with the rebels. 14 In early March 1958 U. S. Ambassador to Indonesia, John Allison, a man moderately disposed toward Sukarno, was replaced--apparently over his disagreement with the emerging U. S. plan to aid, covertly, the rebellion. As soon became evident, what Secretary Dulles meant to convey by "neutrality" was, in fact, public U. S. encouragement to the rebels' efforts to unseat Sukarno. A March 13, 19 58,SEATO Council communique, obviously pointing to the events in Indonesia, noted the "parti cular danger arising from some non-communist governments' failing Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === to distinguish between the aims and ideals of the free world and the purposes of international Communism. Shortly thereafter, as the Indonesian army began to send forces to put down the rebels in Sumatra, units of the U. S. Seventh Fleet arrived off the coast, ostensibly to stand by to protect any American nationals and property which might be threatened by the civil war. many Indonesians, however, the 17 presence of the U. S. Navy smacked of "gunboat diplomacy" and a veiled threat of possible intervention in their domestic affairs. That threat became a reality when Chinese Nationalist arms were flown to the rebels via U. S. bases in the Philippines. One of the rebel's aircraft, a U. S.-made B-26, was later shot down and its American pilot, Allan Pope, was captured complete with papers and documents connecting him with the U. S. military command on Okinawa. Not only did Washington's complicity in the rebellion become an international news item; it completely backfired when the Indonesian army failed to turn against Sukarno, as the U. S. had hoped. In the light of this failure the United States was obliged to withdraw its support of the rebels for it had become clear that the intervention was undermining relations with the army, the major political force Washington had decided to back in Indonesia. Although 18 the outer island revolt did not completely end until 1961, the withdrawal of U. S. support, moral and material, quickly sealed the fate of the resistance. The United States did not thereafter seriously attempt to mend fences with Sukarno. Rather Washington continued to look to and to aid, openly and covertly, the Indo nesian army as the main force that could be relied on to curb the PKI's influence and restrain Sukarno's nationalistic policies. That decision robbed the U. S. intervention in the civil war of the therapeutic value it might otherwise Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 166] === 152 have had on American policy in Indonesia. And, of course, the failure of the United States to make amends reinforced Sukarno's suspicion that Washington still had not abandoned the aim of even tually overthrowing him. China's Response to the Rebellion The 1958 Indonesian rebellion thus not only hurt U. S. policy but also put Peking in a position, for the first time, to invite active Sino-Indonesian cooperation in the struggle against American "imperialism." The Rebellion's failure dealt a heavy blow to the anti-communist elements in Indonesia, and it brought to the fore, in the person of Sukarno, the leading exponent of militant struggle against the Dutch for control of West Irian. This "imperialist" issue could now be linked to China's own struggle for the removal of U. S. presence in Taiw^an. American intervention in the Indo nesian rebellion had created a real "imperialist" threat Djakarta could see for herself. China's concrete response to the Indonesian crisis took the form of timely diplomatic and material support to Sukarno. She promptly condemned the March 15 SEATO communique as an attempt by the 19 "Manila bloc" to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs. In an exchange of notes on April 17, 1958,Chinese political support was backed up by a $16 million credit to Djakarta for rice and textiles. 2 0 On May 15, a CPR government statement directly linked American inter vention in Indonesia to the major theme of Peking's policy toward Djakarta, the need to heighten anti -imperialist unity between the two countries. 21 The May 15 statement drew attention to the fact that "China's territory of Taiwan" was being used by the U. S. and her agents Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 167] === 153 "the Chianj Kai-shek clique" to sustain the rebellion in North Sulawesi (the rebels' position in Sumatra having collapsed earlier). These U. S.-directed actions w e r e seen as designed "to subvert the laA\rful Indonesian government... to suppress the Indonesian peoples' movement in defense of their national independence and against imperialism and thus to shackle the Indonesian people again Avith colonial rule." Moreover, the broader U. S. aim Avras "to deal a ’ oIoav to the resurgent national independence movements in Asia and Africa." Such action "not only constitute(d) an open provocation to the Indonesian people but also a serious challenge to the principles adopted by the Bandung Conference.... " In an effort to stress the two countries' parallel interests the May 15 statement said it Avas noAtf necessary "to emphasize the gravity of the situation" resulting from the U. S. use of TaiAiran to conduct "interference in Indonesia" and that the continuance of this development 'Vi 11 inevitably give rise to very dangerous consequences." The statement pledged "further assistance... may be requested by the Indonesian government" and called for "the support of the Asian and African peoples and all countries and to aid the Indonesians in their defense of "national independence and against U. S. intervention." Although it A\ras not, evidently, reported at the time, the present Avriter was told by Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials that Peking also offered to send "volunteers" at Djakarta's request. If true, Peking was no doubt aAvare this kind of assistance was not really feasible, as it involved transport over Abaters controlled by the U. S. Seventh Fleet. Since it also seems clear Djakarta certainly Avould have had no need or intention of asking for Chinese Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 === [PDF page 168] === military assistance, tlie purpose behind the gesture, if it was made at all, must have been largely to demonstrate solidarity with Sukarno. As such, its impact is hard to calculate. At the least it must have been sincerely appreciated by a leader who believed the world strongest power, the U. S. A., was trying to depose him. Peking and Sukarno An important pre-condition for the later alliance with Sukarno was thus established by Peking's support during the critical period of the Indonesian rebellion. In the years since 1949 Communist China's evaluation of the Indonesian president had undergone a com plete transformation. Because of his role in suppressing the PKI at Madiun, and as a member ef the leadership that had accepted Indo nesian independence under the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, Sukarno was initially regarded as a "lackey of imperialism." He had been a major factor in the rise of the Sukiman cabinet, and he made no effort to obstruct the latter's anti-communist campaign or its feud with the Chinese Embassy. During Indonesia's immediate post-independence years Sukarno had also warned the local Chinese not to side with the communists, on the very sound grounds that if there were ever a social revo lution in the country it would immediately become a racial conflict as well 2 3--as later events were to demonstrate, he proved to be quite accurate in that prediction. Despite his anti-communist record Sukarno was never afflicted with the racist attitudes toward the local Chinese commonly shared by nearly all segments of the Indonesian elite. And it evidently took the leaders in Peking several years to understand that most overseas Chinese regarded him as the leading, perhaps the 24 only, source of protection xn an otherwise hostile environment. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 169] === Sukarno displayed other characteristics which defied easy codification in the communist stereotype of bourgeois-democratic man. Although he had already shown by his handling of the Madiun uprising that he would crush the communists if they threatened the republic, he regarded the major Western powers as being the most serious and immediate external danger to Indonesia's independence. Nor could his opposition to colonialism be readily explained in Marxist terms, i.e., a function of his class background which made him, ultimately, an agent of aspiring native capitalism. Sukarno's deep belief in the need for harmony among Indonesia's diverse peoples placed him squarely in opposition to any notions of violent class struggle, but he was far from an admirer or advocate of capi talism. If, in fact, he ever had a coherent economic ideology it was closer to a form of welfare state socialism--slowly brought about and protective of the class status of the Indonesian feudal elite, than anything else.“ In any event the main problems that Sukarno was concerned with were not economic but political. From his standpoint these questions were how to solidify the Indonesian nation, focus atten tion on the West Irian issue and contain the destructive rivalry between the Islamic, communist and secular nationalist political parties. He welcomed the PKI's support of his stand on the Irian question and he was not alarmed by the prospect that the communists might be strengthened by his association with them. In a single speech in September 1948 he had brought down on the PKI a massacre of such proportions that the communist movement was virtually exterminated. And he was well aware that all the guns in Indo nesia lay in the hands of an army that would cneerfuily Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === 156 exterminate the PKI again whenever he gave the word. In effect, he knew he held the Indonesian Communists' death sentence in his pocket 26 --and so did they. The possibility that the PKI might again attempt to seize power during his lifetime never appears to have figured prominently in Sukarno's worries. His troubles, as he saw them, lay in how to deal with the anti-communists who had all those guns, who doubted the wisdom of his attempt to fuse nationalism, Islam and communism, and who had powerful friends in the West anxious to see that Sukarno's ideas failed. Exactly when Sukarno's potential as a "progressive" anti imperialist nationalist began to play a prominent role in Chinese policy toward Indonesia is difficult to determine with any pre cision. The PKI clearly realized the significance of the posi tions Sukarno was taking on both foreign and domestic affairs as early as 1952, for from that time on the Party aligned itself squarely behind him. 2 7 The fact that, publicly China did not give any attention to Sukarno before 1956 may nave been at the expressed wish of the PKI, believing that for China to do so might tarnisii Aidit's carefully developed efforts to create an image of the PKI as a genuinely national communist party completely independent of the Soviet Union and China. But it is more likely that Peking's belated appreciation of Sukarno's potential, in Indonesia and in the Afro-Asian world, developed only after it became clear his power was on the rise, and only after Peking--not the PKI--was prepared to believe lie would assert Indonesia's inde pendence from the United States. There is some indication Peking first began to take Sukarno seriously shortly before the 1955 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === - 157 Bandung Conference. Following a visit of CPR Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-ling to Indonesia, Peking invited Sukarno to make an official state visit to the CPR. The context of the October 1956 visit to China appears to explain much of its impact on Sukarno. It took place during a world tour which first included visits to the United States and the Soviet Union. In neither country was he particularly well received or favorably impressed. The timing of the China trip was politically significant too because the decline of Indonesia's constitutional system was by then far advanced, and Sukarno was already acting like a powerful, rather than a figurehead, presi dent. Shortly before arriving in Peking he demonstrated his increasing sense of power by single-handedly negotiating an aid agreement with the Soviet Union without the prior approval of the Ali cabinet, the formal repository of such authority at that time. In press statements before his arrival, Peking credited Sukarno, in somewhat exaggerated terms, with a major part in "all the important achievements of Indonesia." 2 9 She praised him "for promoting peace in the Asian and African regions," for making "outstanding contributions to the victorious struggle of the Indo nesian people against colonial rule... " mined stand to maintain national solidarity." and for his "deter Singled out for emphasis was a speech Sukarno had made earlier that year in the U. S. inhere he had said, "We will labor in our land and jungles with bare hands rather than exchange any part of our freedom for any aid." 30 This was evidently taken in Peking as an indication that Sukarno was serious about insisting on Indonesia's indepen dence of the U. S. With a record like this--even a recent one-- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 === [PDF page 172] === - 158 it was not surprising that his visit was hailed in Peking as "an event of paramount importance in the friendly relations and co31 operation between China and Indonesia." The visit to China had a profound effect on Sukarno, far beyond what the Chinese leaders might reasonably have expected. Much of what he observed in China reinforced his beliefs that parliamentary democracy was wrong for Indonesia, and that it was possible, as China had shown, to mobilize national unity and to achieve economic progress with stability. This dominant impression was evident in a statement he made to correspondents accompanying him on the tour. Obviously thinking about the Indonesian domestic situation, he said that in China he had seen the practice of "demo cracy under leadership" and that only this form of leadership could "bring the people a real, just and prosperous new world." 32 Such observations seemed to imply that to modernize Indonesia it might be desirable to adapt some of the techniques and methods Sukarno had seen in the CPR. Of course, since "every nation had its own special features, its own characteristics, its own orbit and its own individuality," Sukarno felt constrained to say also that he saw his country moving toward "socialism corresponding to the national characteristics of Indonesia." 33 There was not much doubt, then or later, that the Indonesian "socialism" he envisaged did not provide for a dictatorship of the proletariat or the over throw of the native bourgeois elite. Nevertheless, Sukarno seems to have been genuinely impressed by the possibility that the tech niques of mass mobilization on behalf of national construction and unity that he had seen in China might somehow be adapted to a non-communist Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === When Sukarno unveiled his conception of "Guided Democracy," a few months later in February 1957, he seemed to be consciously striving to articulate a role he could perform in Indonesia’s modernization equivalent to that performed by the Chinese Commu nist Party, i.e., some combination of leader, energizer and organ izer of a society in revolution. An essential difference, of course, was that Sukarno hoped to perform these roles by relying on traditional Indonesian methods of persuasion and compromise, rather than highly structured and disciplined controls employed by the Chinese Communist Party. The most notable proposals Sukarno made in his 1957 Guided Democracy formula-'-inclusion of the PKI in the cabinet and an advisory National Council composed of various functional groups,^ represented an amalgamation of heterogeneous elements altogether different from the "people's dictatorship" under the leadership of the CCP. But the form of the new insti tutions he proposed may very well have been influenced by his earlier impressions of democracy-with-order in China. Well before the train of events set in motion by the 1958 Indonesian rebellion, therefore, a convergence of interests and attitudes was gradually beginning to emerge in the relationship between Peking and the Indonesian president. Whether on foreign or domestic policy issues, the kinds of stands Sukarno was taking after 1956 were precisely what the Chinese leaders had hoped the Bandung policy would help to develop more widely among the non communist leadership of the Afro-Asian states. Indeed post-1957 Indonesia, under Sukarno's leadership, looked like one of the few bright prospects for building an anti-imperialist united front any where in the third world. In their subsequent eagerness to support Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 174] === 160 Sukarno nationalistic foreign policy, however, it is not at all clear that the Chinese showed a sufficient recognition of the political ob stacles to any alignment between Indonesia and the CPR. Internation ally, Djakarta's conflicts with the Western powers were certainly propelling the two powers together on anti-imperialist issues; but domestic trends in Indonesia after 1958 were pushing them in oppo site directions. The re-emergence of the thorny issue of the overseas Chinese and the rising powers of the Indonesian army were manifesta tions of how fragile the Peking-Sukarno relationship, in fact, was. One of the important political dividends Peking received from the 1958 rebellion was the total destruction of the Kuomintang posi tion in the overseas Chinese community, a victory her own efforts theretofore had been unable to achieve. As a consequence of Nationalist China's assistance to the rebels in 1958 Djakarta banned all pro-Taiwan Chinese newspapers and associations, confiscated the commercial enterprises and banks run by Taiwan supporters, and ar rested or deported many Chinese known or suspected of being Kuomintang sympathizers.^ These actions left Peking as the only source of external protection to which the local Chinese could turn. the other hand, the crushing of the KMT supporters created a pre cedent for similar measures against the pro-Peking Chinese in Indo nesia. Since 1956 the indigenous native entrepreneurial class had been demanding that the government take stronger measures to break the hold of the Chinese traders, and few Indonesian merchants made any distinction between the Peking and Taipei-oriented Chinese. 3 6 These demands had such widespread popular support it was by no means certain Sukarno could politically afford to resist demands for nationalization measures against the CPR nationals, even if he was inclined otherwise. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === The political class which benefited most from the suppression of the Nationalist Chinese followers was not, however, the native capitalists but the Indonesian army. As in the case of the earlier confiscation of Dutch assets, nationalization of KMT-Chinese property actually resulted in bureaucratic capitalism for the domestic officer class. The army managed nearly all the larger enterprises which had been seized, and it had the determining voice in who ran many of the smaller ones as well. This was the common practice during the whole period the army had martial law powers, and it expanded during the later period of the so-called "Guided Economy." The resulting pattern of spoils-throughnationalization which accrued to politically well-placed army officers--confiscated homes, extortion of money, "managerial" salaries, automobiles, etc., was one of the main economic lubricants of the system created by Sukarno's radical nationalism and the army's power. As the principal beneficiary of Indonesia's groping search for state capitalism the army naturally had a strong interest in the early confiscation of the as yet untouched assets of the Pekingoriented Chinese. The fulfillment of this interest only awaited the appropriate pretext for action. Again, owing to the delicate nature of Sukarno's political relations with his generals, it was by no means certain he could prevent, or would necessarily want to prevent, them from taking over the remaining Chinese enterprises so as to advance their own economic interests. Any future threat to the economic position of the CPR Chinese was, therefore, certain to strain the Peking-Sukarno relationship unless Communist China was prepared to yield to the kind of mistreatment of her own nationals that had been meted out to those of Nationalist China and the Dutch. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 176] === - 162 Nor was it entirely clear that China's developing policy of support for Sukarno offered anything tangible to the Indonesian Communists. So long as Sukarno needed the PKI as an instrument to arouse the masses and counterbalance the real power in the country, the army, the communists might be allowed to expand their organizations. PKI could do this, however, provided it raised no demands which seriously challenged the regime's authority and pro grams. "Guided Democracy" was not intended, by Sukarno or the army, to lead to radical reforms or to a social revolution, but rather to shore up the existing system and to contain and suppress any forces advocating fundamental changes harmful to the vested interests of the conservative Indonesian elite. 37 Given the power realities of the situation the PKI had no real alternative, other than a suicidal one, but to go along with Sukarno's make-shift bourgeois-feudal system, hoping and working for political oppor tunities that might somehow enable the PKI to capture the leadership of Indonesian nationalism somewhere down the road. 3 8 It is difficult to escape the parallels between the position of the PKI under Sukarno after the 1958 rebellion and that of the CCP during the 1923-1927 period of collaboration with the KMT. And, from the record after 1958, it is equally difficult to escape the conclusion that by this time Peking had made an appraisal of the Indonesian situation that was similar to Stalin's appraisal of China in the mid-1920's. The PKI was not yet a strong force; the Indo nesian revolution was still in an early "bourgeois-democratic" stage; hence the correct line for the PKI was a collaborationist policy with the anti -imperialist Indonesian elements (e.g., Sukarno) to the end of consolidating leadership of the national united front. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === This was the only realistic course of action open to the PKI at the time. It also complemented China's post-1957 foreign policy strategy which centered on efforts to create an anti-imperialist united front between communism and nationalism in the Third World. To further this policy, friendship and support for the anti-Western, nationalist regime of Sukarno was seen in Peking as necessary and attainable. Whether, in fact, this was a correct analysis of the basis for a viable Chinese policy in Indonesia was soon to be severely tested. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === - 164 Footnotes The Origins and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (July 14, 1963), dated September 6, 1963. Full text in The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement,(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 59 -6T. For analyses of Khrushchev's theses on these questions, s*?e Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 39-42; and Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 39-69. An English language text of Khrushchev's speech appears in the Soviet Tass dispatch, February 14, 1956. Excerpts from Mao's speech are presented in Comrade Mao Tsetung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers", Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 35^ cf. "Interview With the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," Selected Works, loc. cit., pp. 281-284; also, his speech and that of Chou En-lai at the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, October 23, 1951, in New China Forges Ahead, op. cit., pp. 4-5 and especially p. 11. Zagoria, o p. cit., pp. 152-171; Alice L. Ilsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs: Halpern, "Communist China and Peaceful Coexistence," The China Quarterly, July-September 1960, pp. 16-31. However, in a November 10, 1957 memorandum circulated to Communist delegations at the Conference, the Chinese objected to the Declaration's language emphasizing only the possibility of peaceful transition rather than a formula admitting the possibility of both violent and peaceful seizures of powers. In this way, the Chinese contended, the Communist parties would retain flexibility. See Outline of Views on the Ques tion of Peaceful Transition, in The Polemic on the General Line..., op. cit., pp. 105-108. A good account of the 1958 regional rebellions is in James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia's Civil War (London: Jonathan Cape, 19 61); also, Herbert Feith's chapter on Indo nesia in Kahin, editor, Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), second edition, pp. 262-265. See his speeches of October 28 and 30, 1956, in Antara, same dates, and Indonesia, Pilihlah Demokrasimu jang sedjati [Indo nesia, Chooi~e Your Own True Democracy]^ (Dj akarta: Ministry of Information, 1956). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === Feith, Wilopo Cabinet, loc. cit., pp. 109-136 and Decline of Constitutional Democracy, loc. cit., pp. 46-224. 10. On Sukarno's relations with the Indonesian Communists, see Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication", American Political Science Review, December 1962, pp. 915-926; Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, editor, Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 336-342; and Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in A. Doak Barnett, Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 148-198. 11. For the factors and events leading up to the rebellion, see George McT. Kahin's chapter on Indonesia's post-revolutionary government in Kahin, editor, Major Governments in Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 5 57-572. Also Daniel J. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p p. 11-43. 12. See, for example, his speech of April 3, 1958 which explicitly connects the rebellions with foreign powers. Full text in Indonesian Students Meet the Challenge of the Times (Djakarta: Ministry of Information, 1958). 13. Kahin, o p. cit., p. 570. 14. In 1956, the United States declined to sell the Ali government arms and munitions it had requested in order to be able to deal more strongly with internal security problems. Fear that the arms might be used to promote Dutch withdrawal from West Irian was the official United States explanation for this decision, but many Indonesians believed that the United States possibly did not want the government equipped to crush rebellions. This suspicion was heightened when the 1958 rebellion occurred and many of those involved were anti communist elements desirous of closer ties to the United States. 15. Speaking before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (testi mony made public on March 9, 1958), Dulles said there was "a fair chance" that the Indonesian rebellion would bring a "curtailment of the trend toward Communism." He observed that "We (the U. S.) would be very happy to see the nonCommunist elements who are really in the majority... exert a greater influence" in Indonesia. Sukarno's "so-called guided democracy theory," Dulles said, was a "nice sounding name for what I fear would end up to be a Communist despotism." Reported in the New York Times, March 9, 1958. For statements affirming United States' neutrality, see Secretary Dulles' press conference statements of February 11, April 18, May 1 and May 20, 1958; texts in Bulletin (Washington: U. S. Department of State), May 3, 1958, p. 334; April 28, 1958, pp. 684-685; May 19, 1958, p. 808; June 9, 1958, p. 946. 16. Text of SEATO Council final communique in Bulletin, March 21, 1958, pp. 504. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === 17. This phrase was frequently used by Indonesian government officials and political leaders interviewed by the writer in 196.1. Even then, three years after U. S. intervention had ceased, the incident was well-remembered and evoked strong feelings. 18. On the collapse of the rebels, and the Indonesian army's skillful efforts to bring them back into the Republic, see Herbert Feith and Dan S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, Spring 1963, pp. 32-46. 19. CPR Government Statement on the SEATO Council Session, March 10, 1958. Text in Peking Review, March 18, 1958, pp. 22-23. 20. NCNA (Peking), March 25, 1958; see also, NCNA (Peking), April 17, 1958. 21. CPR Government Statement on United States Intervention in Indonesia; text in Peking Review, May 20, 1958, pp. 19-20. 22 Interviews, Indonesian Foreign Ministry, June-July 1961. The offer was made in order to deter further Taiwan intervention, and therefore, in the expectation that Washington might also rethink its policy toward Djakarta if Peking stood to gain from an unsuccessful rebellion. Chou en-Lai reportedly reiterated the offer of "volunteers" in August 1958 at a reception in the Indonesian Embassy. Asian Recorder, August 17, 1958, p. 2225. 23. For examples of Sukarno's early speeches warning the Commu nists and the local Chinese, see Antara, November 10, 1951 and Aneta, August 20, 1951. 24. This feeling was universally expressed in all the interviews the writer had with local Chinese, irrespective of their political views, wealth, status or power. It was even true of KMT supporters who much disliked the trends in Indonesia, blamed Sukarno for many of them, but did not associate him with the racist attitudes expressed by others in the native elite. 25. cf. the "Political Manifesto" speech of August 17, 1959 (Djakarta: Ministry of Information, 1959), pp. 27-85; and, his "Marhaen dan Proletar" speech of July 3, 1957, translated (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia, 1960). 26. This was the impression George Kahin received in interviews with Sukarno in 1954 and 1955, Major Governments of Asia, op. cit., p. 541. 27. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 255-274. Also, McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," op. cit., pp. 162-180. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 181] === 167 28. Indonesian-Soviet Joint Statement, September 10, 1956. See Willard A. Hannah, "Moscow Comes to Bung Karno--and So Does Peking," Newsletter of the American University Field Staff, November 30, 1956. 29. Shortly before his arrival, Peking announced the publication in Chinese of Sukarno's selected speeches that had emphasized themes of anti-imperialism and Afro-Asian solidarity. This indicated the CPR's recognition of his growing importance as an anti-Western leader. See NCNA (Peking), September 26, 1956. No other Indonesian leader at that time, not even PKI chairman D. N. Aidit, had been accorded similar recognition. 30. Ibid. 31. Jen-min Jih-pao, September 30, 1956. 32. This remark was reported in Harian Rakjat (People's Daily), in Djakarta, October 17, 195FI 33. Speech by Sukarno at the Joint Session of the Standing Com mittee of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, October 4, 1956. NCNA (Peking), October 5, 1956. 34. See Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," op. cit., pp. 319320. 35. A general discussion of these events is V. Hanssen, "The Campaign Against Nationalist Chinese in Indonesia," in B. II. M. Vlekke's Indonesia's Struggle, 1957-1958 (The Hague: Nether lands Institute of International Affairs, 1959), pp. 56-76. 36. This has been called the "Assaat Movement," taking its name from a former minister of the Interior in the Natsir cabinet who had a prestigious political background. Actually, the main force behind these demands in the economic field was the All-Indonesian Congress of National Importers (KENSI) at whose 1956 convention in Surabaja Assaat delivered a bluntly anti-Chinese keynote address. For the details see Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy..., pp. 481-487. capture the real flavor of Indonesian anti-Chinese racism, however, it is necessary to read A. J. Muaja's pamphlet, The Chinese Problem in Indonesia (Djakarta: New Nusantara, 1958). 37. The theme of the Indonesian elite's interest in Sukarno's system is developed in Dan S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Cornell, Modern Indonesian Project, 1966). 38. McVey, Communist Strategies in Asia, loc. cit., pp. 167-189. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 182] === CHAPTER V I CHINESE POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: THE OVERSEAS CHINESE DISPUTE AND SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN INDONESIA On the bisis of the promising developments that had taken place between 1955 and 19 58, the future course of China's relations with Indonesia appeared to be headed in the direction of an era of growing cooperation and harmony. Although the political stability of Sukarno's new regime was by no means assured it had, nonetheless, put down a foreign-backed anti-communist rebellion and had evidenced no inclination to drive the PKI underground. No issues had yet arisen to threaten the increasingly cordial diplomatic ties between the two states; indeed, Djakarta seemed bent on expanding contacts with all the socialist countries. The essentially fragile nature of the Sino-Indonesian relationship, however, became all too apparent in the three years after 1959. During this period several basic aims and interests of the two powers came into sharp conflict, calling into question the central premise of Chinese diplomacy, namely, that their policy could be based on continuing collabora tion with the Sukarno regime. The most serious and immediate source of conflict was the sudden emergence of a dispute over the legal and economic status of the Indonesian Chinese minority, an issue which, or so it appeared, had been resolved by the 1955 treaty on dual citizen ship. Peking-Djakarta relations were also strained, if more subtly and in a manner not so easily documented, by Moscow's bid for influence in Indonesia which began to unfold in 1960. The latter threat soon led to massive Soviet military aid in support of Sukarno's campaign to dislodge the Dutch from the disputed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === West Irian territory. The general effect of both developments was a rise in U. S. and Soviet influence, and the consequent near collapse of the CPR's influence in Indonesia. Taken as a whole, the period 1959-1962 was to demonstrate, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the "Guided Democracy" system contained powerful antiChinese and anti-communist elements which were largely beyond ' Sukarno's control, and anxious to destroy the developing pattern of Sino-Indonesian accord. Despite his anti-imperialist creden tials, even Sukarno was to show that he was quite willing to begin currying favor with Russia and America to secure his domestic and foreign goals, at the expense of the adverse effects these manipu lations might have on the prospects for close ties with Peking. Overall, it was a period when China's diplomacy in Indonesia was very much on the defensive. The events and forces to be examined in this chapter, there fore, constitute a major turning point in the evolution of Chinese policy. In the following section the analysis centers on the inter play of two themes: 1) hoi\r the dispute over the Chinese minority and the rise of Soviet influence nearly destroyed Peking's posi tion in Indonesia; and 2) how the adjustments China was obliged to make in order to salvage her influence affected the subsequent direction of her policies. The Ban on the Chinese Traders Two Indonesian government decrees in May 1959 precipitated the first major crisis in Sino-Indonesian relations: a Ministry of Trade regulation cancelling the trading licenses.of aliens in the rural areas by December 1959;^ and a decree by the central Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === army headquarters empowering regional military commanders to re move aliens from their places of residence for "security reasons."^ On the basis of the central army decree, the military commander in West Java, Colonel Kosasih, issued a separate decree in August ordering all aliens in his district to evacuate the villages and move to towns and cities by December 1959. These measures appeared, in part at least, to reflect a con certed drive by the Indonesian government to use a sweeping economic reorganization program as the pretext for eliminating the local Chi nese traders. In a major policy speech of August 17, 1959, Sukarno called for a complete "re-tooling" of the national economy. announced that "all funds and all forces which have proved to be progressive," including "non-native forces and funds which have already settled in Indonesia," would be given "an appropriate place and opportunity” in the economy. On the other hand, "vulture capi talists of our own nation" and "foreign non-Dutch capital illegally gives support to contra-revolution... acts of economic sabotage" would be crushed. [which] or carries out The continuance of non-native funds and forces, Sukarno insisted, was contingent on their absolute obedience to Indonesian laws and regulations.^ This declaration established beyond any doubt that Sukarno intended to make, or had agreed to, substantial changes in the economic position of the Chinese traders, and that the May retail trade ban had his approval. Unless Peking was prepared to rupture her carefully nourished relations with him there was not much scope for an effective policy of opposition on this issue once Sukarno had publically committed the government to this course of action. But the Manipol speech had said nothing to indicate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === that the residence of foreign Chinese might be the subject of arbitrary regulations. Hence the West Java commander's residence ban appeared to be, if not in flat contradiction to, clearly well beyond the general guidelines Sukarno had laid down. If implemented, the economic ban alone would flatly wipe out the Chinese interpretation of the 1955 Treaty under which Indo nesia had pledged to "protect the rights and interests" of the Chinese nationals. Such an action also meant Djakarta intended to take these measures without holding "consultations" with Peking, as provided for in the Dual Nationality Treaty. Thus the unresolved differences about the interpretation to be placed on the Chinese "rights and interests" had at length come to the surface with all the potential for conflict Peking and Djakarta had tried to paper over in the 1955 formula. On legal grounds, the decrees affecting the local Chinese were clearly an exercise of Indonesia's sovereignty on matters of internal regulation which the Chinese government could not con test. Moreover, when the measures were announced Djakarta was not bound, in any contractual sense, by the terms of the Dual Nationality Treaty since that document was not yet a valid legal instrument. 1957.° The CPR had ratified the 1955 Treaty on December 7, But at the time of the 1959 bans the Indonesian parliament had not ratified it; hence, the Treaty had not come into force. The reasons behind this delay on the Indonesian side explain a great deal about the origins of the overseas Chinese dispute and Peking's response to it. Having gone to the trouble of negotiating the Treaty, after 19 55 the Indonesian government began to have second thoughts about Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === the wisdom of this decision. Aside from the Ali cabinet, which was removed from the scene in early 19 57, the Treaty had very few supporters. Conservative elements in the political parties raised numerous objections to it, mainly on the grounds that, if carried out,, there would still exist an overly large alien minority in Indonesia.and, consequently, that Peking's unwanted influence in the country was likely to increase.^ A more important source of opposition to the Treaty, however, was that after 1956 native capitalist elements began a major cam paign demanding discriminatory legislative measures against the Chinese traders. Naturally, the native entrepreneurial class did not want a treaty that would create legal obstacles to reducing the future economic position of alien competitors. This view had powerful support in the government after 1957 since, in the era of "Guided Economy," civilian and military bureaucrats alike were warmly disposed to the idea of nationalization and expropriation of foreign assets in the country. For these elements the problem was that in 19 59 Djakarta was stuck with a treaty which, in principle but not in law, pledged Indonesia to protect the interests of the alien Chinese minority. that pledge. Indonesia wanted to get out from under Basically, therefore, the retail trade ban measures were Djakarta's first steps in unilaterally undoing the 1955 Treaty with China so that she could become free to attack the economic position of the overseas Chinese. Implications of the Anti-Chinese Measures for Peking's Policy The Peking government was not only in a poor position to argue that a valid treaty had been violated, it was also hard put to defend the interests of petty "capitalism" in Indonesia considering Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === the fate of private enterprise in People's China. For a brief period Peking did try to get around the logic of her own socialistic programs by arguing that, unlike the big foreign oil companies-which Djakarta's decrees did not touch--the local Chinese traders were a "progressive" economic force in the country. But it soon became clear that the defense of overseas Chinese capitalism was only a secondary objective in the Chinese leaders' decision to risk a rupture of relations with Djakarta over the status of their nationals. The real irritant was the West Java commander's residence ban which, if carried out under the umbrella of restricting alien domination of the retail trade, would result in uprooting tens of thousands of Chinese from their homes and moving them to towns and cities where taking up a new life would be a very painful exper ience. Moreover, the army's ban served a broader and distinctly anti-communist purpose. Since May 1959 the army had begun to harass various PKI organizational activities in a search for pre texts to prevent or disrupt the Party's forthcoming Sixth National Congress. It did not require a great deal of intuition on Peking's part to see that certain elements in the army--encouraged by the Americans --hoped to pick a quarrel with China over the local Chi nese minority which could be turned to its advantage in the domestic political struggle with the Indonesian Communists. The army also did not like Sukarno's growing friendship with Peking and, by pro voking an anti-Chinese campaign, it thereby hoped to create frictions between the two. It was thus patently transparent that considerably larger issues were present in the anti-Chinese measures than a rampant demand by the indigenous capitalist class for the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === elimination of alien domination over the rural economy. Actually, the Indonesian anti-communists were spoiling for an issue that could be turned, with a little luck, into a campaign leading to the suppression of the PKI, the overthrow of Sukarno's policies toward the communist powers and the return of Indonesia to the Western capitalist fold. There were other threatening implications arising from the anti-Chinese bans, but none of these risks could really be avoided, or made to go away, by adopting either of the two basic policy options open to Peking. Passive acceptance of the Indonesian decrees might avert an immediate rupture with Djakarta and might, temporarily, deprive the army of the fight it was looking for. would the anti-communists not then create another incident? other alternative was not much better. But The Since the West Java Com mander's ban exceeded Sukarno's generally more modest statement on nationalization policy, it was conceivable a firm protest by Peking might produce a split in the Indonesian government that would end in the dropping or modifying of the residence decree. On the other hand, it was more likely that outside pressure by Peking would have the effect of driving the army and Sukarno closer together. A spirited defense of the local Chinese was almost certain to place many of them in a most difficult, possibly precarious, position; but to abandon them was tantamount to surrendering any future Peking claim to represent their interests, and must have been unacceptable on purely nationalistic grounds. Internationally, the prospect of a rupture with Indonesia could not have come at a more inopportune moment. The Sino-Soviet dispute had just begun to pass to the stage of an open power rivalry, with each contestant Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 189] === - 175 seeking the support and favor of the Afro-Asian states. China's ability to compete in this theatfe of the struggle with Moscow had already been compromised by the border conflict with India. additional dispute with Indonesia was certain to undermine the whole concept of Afro-Asian unity against the West and, however unfounded, to raise serious doubts in the minds-of the neutralist countries as to the sincerity of China's commitment to peaceful coexistence and the Bandung principles. It by no means followed from all this that China's basic inter national interests would best be served by a retreat in the face of the blatantly discriminatory and humiliating actions Djakarta sought to impose on her. Peking certainly had not meant to convey at Bandung, or by her policy of accommodation and friendship toward the Afro-Asian states, that agreements any of them made with her could be broken at will, or that she would not defend her national interests in protecting overseas Chinese, simply to stay on good terms with her neighbors. It was, in truth, by no means clear that retreat was the best way to prevent the issues raised in Indonesia from becoming a conflict that worked to the benefit of the Indo nesian anti-communists and also Washington and Moscow as well. Diplomacy and Intervention The initial phase of the dispute was characterized by Chinese diplomatic efforts to secure the abandonment of the anti-Chinese measures before a crisis erupted. failed. From the outset this attempt More importantly, the behavior of the Chinese revealed that the Peking leadership apparently did not see that what it was faced with was nothing less than an agonizing, unavoidable Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === 176 decision to sacrifice the overseas Chinese for the sake of larger policy interests. Because Peking tried to avoid this choice, the dispute did indeed explode and nearly led to a complete diplomatic break. On September 7, 1959, shortly after the West Java residence ban and Sukarno's Nlanipol speech, Peking privately protested the anti-Chinese measures and, at the same time, suggested that the two governments hold discussions as soon as p o s s i b l e. E v i d e n t l y, by means of "quiet diplomacy" Peking not only hoped to head off a rupture but also to conceal the seriousness of the issues involved from the light of international attention. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, flew to Peking where talks were held with Chou En-lai and Chen Yi beginning October 7. At the conclusion of these talks a joint communique of October 11 suggested that the impending clash had been averted. Its key paragraph stated that both parties took note that the "economic position of the Chinese nationals... may be affected in some ways" and that "an appropriate way should be sought [to solve the question] in the interests of the economic development of Indonesia... and the proper rights and interests of the Chinese nationals [which] will be respected." 11 However, since the communique in no way directly addressed the main issue in dispute--what was to be done about the army's resi dence ban--it was clear nothing substantive had been accomplished. In fact, Subandrio's visit had added more fuel to the fire. was soon learned that he had been subjected to an intimidating session with an enraged Chinese leadership. According to Professor George Kahin's interviews with Indonesian officials who had Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === - 177 attended these talks, Peking threatened to punish Djakarta if she carried out the anti-Chinese decrees by calling on Singapore's communist-dominated dockworkers to boycott the handling of goods to or from Indonesian ports. 12 Subandrio made no concessions, as the communique's language confirmed, and returned to Djakarta to report the failure of his mission. Peking's rough handling of Subandrio only strengthened Djakarta's determination to deal firmly with China, but the government--no doubt minus the support of the army--still hoped to avoid a showdown. Its desire to conciliate Peking, short of compromising the principle of internal sovereignty, was shown by the modified form in which the trade ban finally appeared. The version of the decree which becrme law, issued November 16, 1959, exempted some 16 categories of Chinese traders or provided alter13 natives to outright confiscation. Neither of these options had been provided for in the original May regulation. Similarly, Sukarno apparently brought pressure on the West Java commander to modify the residence ban, for the final form of this decree, issued November 11, exempted those Chinese aliens who had applied for Indonesian citizenship before May 4, 1 9 5 9. ^ Despite the collapse of Subandrio's efforts in Peking it still seemed possible to avoid a major rift over the Chinese traders. That slim hope vanished when, immediately after the November 11 modification of the army residence ban, Colonel Kosasih began to forcibly expel all the Chinese traders in the villages of West Java. Even before its amendment, the original West Java command residence ban had given the Chinese until December 29, 1959 to move out of the villages. The modified version said only that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === - 178 they should prepare to leave, presumably before the December dead line. But Kosasih ordered them to evacuate at once, frequently on overnight notice, and when compliance was not immediate the Army personnel in charge of the operations literally threw hundreds of Chinese families into trucks and took them to hastily constructed relocation camps. Not infrequently resistance was me^ with harsh tr eatment. Kosasih's forced removal campaign openly contradicted the conciliatory gestures the civilian government had made toward Peking in modifying the retail trade ban, and thus smacked strongly of an effort by the army high command to ignite a conflict with China. It was apparently on the basis of this appraisal that Peking decided to respond by directly intervening in the conflict. The hope must have been to force Sukarno to bridle his recalcitrant officers. Presumably, Peking reasoned that his interests were not served by the army's blatant provocation, and that he was aware the army's real game was, if possible, to turn the whole affair into a campaign against the PKI. Since the success of this provocative venture could only weaken the political balance between the anti-communists and the PKI, which was the basis of Sukarno's power, Peking apparently thought the Indonesian presi dent would have to side against his generals. As the only political group which had consistently opposed the main stream of Indonesian antipathy toward the overseas Chinese,^ the PKI was certain to be hurt by the dispute whether it came out in defense of this minority--thereby isolating itself on an issue which had widespread popular support--or whether it abandoned the Chinese to racist forces--thereby causing it to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 193] === split with the CPR. What appears to have been the Indonesian army's expectation was that Peking and/or the PKI would, by tak ing a stand in defense of the local Chinese, create an issue of alleged communist "subversion" which could be used as a pretext to ban the PKI. Since only Sukarno could overrule the generals, forcing his immediate intervention in the crisis necessarily had to be the main objective of Chinese policy. As soon as the army's forced removals began, the Chinese embassy launched an extensive pattern of obstructive actions. Embassy personnel engaged in a series of forays into the West Java countryside interposing themselves between the Chinese and the army officials at places where the evictions were being carried out. Meetings were arranged with local Chinese organizations where the embassy even went so far as to instruct its nationals to disobey the army's orders. Printed instructions, evidently drawn up by the CPR embassy in Djakarta, were sent to villages ordering the local Chinese to stay in their places of residence until Peking could "solve the problem. These actions, of course, played directly into the army's hand. The West Java commander promptly responded with a November 20 decree banning all members of the Chinese embassy from entering or staying in the region until further notice. 17 It released detailed reports to the Indonesian press of the Chinese embassy's interfer ence, including documents the Chinese officials had issued instructing the overseas Chinese to disobey the army's orders. 18 A number of Chinese nationals were arrested and the army intensified its forced removal campaign against the local settlers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 194] === The first phase of the confrontation had not brought Sukarno's intervention. On December 9, 19 59 Chen Yi appealed directly to the Indonesian government urging "immediate consultations" to work out a settlement. To this end, he advanced a three-point proposal: 1) immediate ratification and implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty so that those Chinese opting for Indonesian citizenship would be "entitled to the civil rights of Indonesia without dis crimination;" 2) protection of Chinese nationals' "rights and interests;" and 3) assurance of voluntary repatriation for those Chinese who now wished to return to China, allowing them "to sell their properties" and make other necessary arrangements for 19 departure. The Chinese government, Chen Yi said, was particularly dis turbed by the passive attitude Djakarta was showing toward the actions of the "forces bent on sabotaging the friendship between our two countries." He openly solicited Sukarno's intervention by stressing the contradiction between the Indonesian president's "repeatedly proclaimed policy of friendship toward China" and the provocative actions being taken by "some influential forces (i.e., the army) which dared so wildly to carry on disruptive activities against the friendship of our two countries." 2 0 From the contents of this note it was evident that Peking's basic grievance was not the retail ban--which Chen Yi did not demand be rescinded--but rather the army's forced removals and its campaign to destroy Sino-Indonesian relations. The note also showed that Peking hoped to protect some of her nationals by winning Indonesia's early agreement to ratify the 1955 Treaty, and that she was prepared to bring home those who no longer wished to stay in Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Thus === [PDF page 195] === a negotiating position had been staked out offering Sukarno a settlement on his terms, as expressed in the Manipol speech, if only he would rein in the army which was making a compromise of the issues impossible. Subandriofs reply of December 11 ended any hope that Sukarno was going to attempt to override the army. The Indonesian Foreign Minister agreed to an early ratification and implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty, and to assist the departure of those Chinese who wanted to leave the country. An accord on these ques tions, however, was not seen as eliminating "the obstacles stand ing in the way of the realization of the [retail trade ban] Pres idential Decree No. 10/1959... " Only if Peking would accept this "could [Indonesia] protect without discrimination the rights and interests of the overseas Chinese." 21 Subandrio was careful to avoid coming to grips with the real issue raised by Peking--the army's forced removals and its fanning of an anti-Chinese, anti-Peking campaign. His contention that acceptance of Decree No. 10 by China would provide the basis for a settlement could only have been a strawman since he knew per fectly well that Peking was not using the Chinese embassy to ob struct the retail ban, which applied throughout Indonesia, but only to oppose the army's forcible removal of Chinese families from West Java. The real, though unstated, message in Subandrio's note was that Sukarno would not be coerced by Peking into an open dispute with his generals on an issue that had widespread popular support. At this point it should have become clear that the poli tical repercussions of a potential confrontation with the army were more threatening to Sukarno's vital interests than was the deterioration of his relations with China. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === - 182 Peking Calls the Overseas Chinese Home With the failure of the attempt to force Sukarno's interven tion on her behalf Peking should have realized that nothing further was to be gained by a policy of confrontation. A diplomatic re treat was now inevitable since further frictions could only harm Peking's overall position in Indonesia, endanger the Chinese com munity and the PKI, and advantage the Indonesian anti-communists. But the Chinese leadership evidently did not see the situation as being this hopeless. Instead, they attempted to use what economic leverage they had to punish the Indonesian government, apparently in the belief this would force Sukarno's hand. Beginning on December 10, 1959,Peking launched a campaign to call the overseas Chinese back to the mainland. For several weeks thereafter Radio Peking beamed daily broadcasts urging the Chinese to return to the "warm bosom of the motherland" where "excellent opportunities" existed for them to take part in "socialist construction." 22 Fang Fang, Vice-Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, declared that the CPR ivelcomed not only those affected by the discriminatory Indonesian decrees "but also all overseas Chinese who had difficulties or for some reason did not want to stay overseas." "We want none of our dear ones to suffer in foreign lands," he said, "and it [is] our hope that they will all come back to the arms of the motherland." He further declared that "the Chinese Government has decided to receive all returned overseas Chinese whether they were half a million, a million or several million." 23 Whereas this call made no distinctions between those who were affected by the 1959 decrees and those who were not, in practice Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 197] === the Chinese embassy and consulates in Indonesia were instructed to do their recruiting primarily from among those Chinese who had skills or trades useful for building socialism on the mainland. The departure of persons in this category \\rould also do the most damage to the already shaky Indonesian economy. Within a short time hundreds of Chinese carpenters, mechanics, electricians, teachers and other more or less highly-trained laborers were induced to return to the mainland. This recruitment campaign was not limited to foreign-born (totok) Chinese but also extended to local-born (peranakan) Chinese with dual nationality who otherwise might be eligible to take Indonesian citizenship.^ In taking this step Peking evidently wanted to demonstrate that she too could violate the 1955 treaty--the provisions of which prohibited her from trying to influence Chinese who were Indonesian citizens, if Djakarta was prepared to break the spirit of the agreements. As thousands of Chinese made ready to leave Indonesia severe inflationary pressure struck the economy. Fearing the possibility of a general pogrom, the Chinese community began to hoard scarce consumer goods and to trade their local currency on the black market for foreign exchange deposited in Singapore and Hong Kong. A steep rise in the cost of all locally available goods was the immediate affect, and this hit the native Indonesians far more severely than the Chinese. 2 5 Toward A Settlement of the Overseas Chinese Dispute From the course of the dispute down to late December 1959 two facts had become clear. Djakarta had shown she could ride rough-shod over Peking's objections, ruthlessly uprooting the Chinese minority from their homes and occupations in the villages. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 198] === On the other hand, Peking was proving that, simply by calling home certain elements in the Chinese community, she could inflict serious damage on the Indonesian economy. It would seem the Chi nese hoped this war of attrition would soon have the affect of bringing Djakarta to modify her stand. Evidence of this is implied from the fact that Chen Yi's note of December 24, 1959,again indi cated China's desire to settle the dispute on the basis of compromise. In this new initiative the Chinese foreign minister called on Djakarta to join in establishing a joint committee to negotiate the various problems involved in the repatriation of the Chinese nationals and to speedily implement the Dual Nationality Treaty. Indonesia responded favorably to these proposals and on January 20, 1960, instruments of ratification were exchanged in Peking bringing 27 the Treaty into force. At the same time a joint committee was established to work out methods of implementing the Treaty." How ever, on the matter of the principles that \vould govern the repat riation of the departing Chinese, no compromise was forthcoming. Instead Peking was again forced to accept Djakarta's very harsh terms. The Indonesian government flatly rejected any notion of negotiations with the CPR on the terms of repatriation, holding that the exiting Chinese would be permitted to leave solely in 29 accordance with Indonesian laws and regulations. The practical effect of this ruling was that those Chinese who departed did so virtually penniless. Djakarta denied them compensation for their confiscated property and prevented them from leaving the country with their capital and personal belongings. 30 As of May 1960 some 40,000 Chinese were gathered in Indonesian ports awaiting passage to China. 31 Before the dispute ended the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === number ultimately swelled to 119,000, 32 and it required four ships of the CPR's very small merchant fleet to ply back and forth between the mainland and the islands in the unprofitable trade of 33 bringing the Chinese home. While several thousand returnees had useful skills, the vast majority of them were old or middleaged and usually of some trading background, that is, people of little economic use in "socialist construction" and not easily remolded into "socialist man." Since the recruitment campaign by Peking had been directed to enlisting the young and the semi skilled, it seems reasonable to assume the high numbers of older and non-skilled working people who applied for repatriation were both unexpected and unwanted. In any event, by early 1960 it was becoming clear that the effort to punish Indonesia v^as also begin ning to involve prohibitively high economic and social costs for the CPR. Around April 1960 the Chinese Embassy dropped the recruit ment campaign and quietly began to urge other potential repatriates to stay in Indonesia.^ The fact that Peking was, belatedly, reversing her stand found official expression in Chou En-lai's report to the Second Session of the National Peoples' Congress on April 10, 1960. Peking's premier placed the dispute with Indonesia in a much broader political perspective than the immediate difficulties. Me said that China's peaceful foreign policy had "stood the test of time" despite the schemes of "U. S. imperialism” joined by "reactionaries, revisionists and their followers in various coun tries [which were] causing temporary commotion." The efforts of these elements to "prevent the spread of China's influence and to isolate China in international affairs," however, had failed. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === When he got around to the specific Indonesian case Chou En-lai declared that a "good start" had been made in solving the repatria tion problem--when of course it had not--and that now "a reason able all-around settlement of the overseas Chinese question [could] be arrived a t. " ^ The continuing obstacle to a settlement of the dispute was much more candidly identified by another speaker at the NPC, the Overseas Chinese Commission's Deputy Vice Chairman, Fang Fang. depicted the anti-Chinese movement in Indonesia as "part of the Cold War scheme by U. S. imperialism... to infiltrate the coun tries of Southeast Asia and strangle the national democratic move ment in the area; a handful of bourgeois elements" (i.e., the Indonesian army) were using anti-Chinese measures "to undermine the patriotic democratic forces in their own country [i.e., Sukarno and the PKI... ] to pave the way for achieving military dicta36 There was little of the conciliatory spirit in this torship." speech that had been present in Chou En-lai's remarks, but between the two it was reasonably clear what Peking was trying to say to Djakarta, and to whom the message was directed. In effect, Sukarno was being told that, by quietly backing down on all the major issues, Peking was trying to settle the dispute, and that if the conflict was not speedily brought to an end only his generals, and the Americans behind them, would profit from continuing SinoIndonesian discord. Far from helping to end the dispute, Fang Fang's scarcely veiled attack on the Indonesian army added more fuel to the fire. A strong protest note from the Indonesian Embassy in Peking promptly followed his speech. 37 The Indonesian army, on the other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === hand, began to step up the campaign to remove the Chinese settlers from West Java, thus re-opening the main irritant which had sub sided somewhat following the negotiations on implementing the Dual Nationality Treaty earlier in January. Regional army commanders followed suit on April 27, forcibly evicting the Chinese consuls in Selatpandjang (Sumatra) and Samarinda (Borneo) for allegedly interfering in the army's handling of the overseas Chinese repat riating from these areas. After a strong Chinese protest of these 38 actions on May 13, the Indonesian government backed up the army 39 by demanding the recall of the two consular officials. There was another strong protest from Peking, and by this time the dis pute appeared to be fully heated up and on the verge of an open diplomatic break. Despite the unintended assistance it was getting from Peking, the Indonesian army's efforts to inflame the dispute--now clearly on the edge of succeeding--suddenly collapsed as a result of its own overzealous enthusiasm for the fight. On July 3, 1960 two Chinese women in Tjimahi (West Java) were killed by soldiers when they resisted being forcefully evicted from their h o m e s. ^ This time the West Java command had gone too far; provoking the CPR in pursuit of the anti-communist game was one thing, but wantonly killing innocent Chinese citizens was an entirely different matter. The long and futile effort Peking had made to force Sukarno's hand was finally accomplished by the actions of the Indonesian army itself. No official document exists which can be cited to verify exactly when and how Sukarno put down the generals, but the fact that the forced removals stopped soon after the "Tjimahi Affair" could not have been the work of anyone e l s e. ^ Characteristically, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === the rebuke of the army was delivered with the subtle, indirect Sukarno touch: Colonel Kosasih, the commander in West Java and the main instrument in the army's (and probably the Americans') campaign to rupture relations with China, was soon transferred to Central Sumatra--but later promoted to General. While Sukarno had no intention of criticizing the army in public, after Tjimahi he left no doubt that he wanted an immediate end to the rift with the local Chinese and Peking. In his national address of August 17, 1960,Sukarno again declared that all "non native funds and forces" would be given an appropriate place in Indonesia, provided they were "progressive" and conformed to the government's program. But he now urged that for the sake of the national economic program no groups in the country should do any thing to harm "an atmosphere of cooperation."^ Although it was not until Foreign.Minister Chen Yi visited Indonesia in April 1961, nine months later, that the previous atmosphere of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic concord was formally restored, by August 1960 the over seas Chinese issue was a dead letter. Considering the great political damage, as well as human suf fering, which could have been inflicted on her if the anti communist elements in Indonesia had won their game, Peking's losses in the overseas Chinese conflict were comparatively small. But it should be pointed out how weak her position was throughout the dispute and why, ultimately, her policy in Indonesia was not crippled in 1959-1960. The rift did not become a disasterous full blown diplomatic rupture for two reasons: China steadily retreated on all the major points at issue; and the army at length so over played its hand that Sukarno was compelled to intervene. Peking Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === did not win the struggle for Sukarno's support, the anti-communists lost it. Although the dispute did not come to an end until July 1960, following Sukarno's response to the Tjimahi killings, it is clear that Peking had already decided to shift from confrontation to accommodation the previous April. conclusion is quite strong: The evidence supporting this first, the steps taken by the Chinese embassy to discourage further repatriation; and second, Chou Enlai's conciliatory statements at the NPC linking China's general "peaceful coexistence" stance to the "temporary" disturbances in relations with Indonesia caused by the imperialists and their "reactionary" followers. Both actions, which occurred in April 1960, stood in marked contrast to the confrontation posture Peking had adopted prior to that time. While some of the change of atti tude on the Chinese side undoubtedly reflected hopes for a smooth repatriation process and speedy implementation of the dual citizen ship treaty, the ultimate source of the shift in Peking's policy toward Djakarta after April 1960 lies elsewhere. A close examina tion of other issues confronting Chinese policy at this time indi cates that Peking altered her stand on the overseas Chinese dispute primarily because it had come into conflict with more important interests and objectives in Indonesia. Peking-Moscow Rivalry and the Sino-Indonesian Dispute Strictly on the basis of its high costs vis-a-vis other interests and objectives in Indonesia, there was ample reason Peking should have abandoned the effort to protect the overseas Chinese well before April 1960. It had been clear since December Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 204] === 1959 that the Chinese embassy's interventionist and obstructive tactics were not going to force Sukarno to bridle the army, but would only drive the two together. Moreover, in failing to stop the anti-Chinese repression by extreme diplomatic and economic pressures, Peking exposed how really weak her leverage was in Indonesia. The long term effect of this test of strength would, naturally, be to encourage the Indonesian anti-communists, and their American backers, that provoking China was politically safe and profitable. Peking's militant defense of the overseas Chinese also cer tainly worked to the disadvantage of the Indonesian Communists, and presumably she did not wish to compromise or antagonize them. Whatever the extent of local Chinese contributions to the PKI's coffers^ these were most unlikely to increase, or to be freely given in the future, once it was clear, as the dispute was proving, that any overseas Chinese ties with communism at home were poten tially quite dangerous. Similarly, the resulting inflation and commodity shortages caused when Peking called home the overseas Chinese hurt the PKI's worker-peasant supporters far more than other classes; indeed, the whole affair was advantageous only to the Indonesian army. There is some evidence to suggest that the PKI and Peking differed on the principles involved in the overseas Chinese dis pute and on how it should be handled. The PKI Politburo's care fully worded statement of November 22, 1959, had taken a position mid-way between Peking and Djakarta. It strongly protested the army's forced removal measure in West Java, charging that such actions contradicted Sukarno's guidelines as expressed in the Manipol speech, and it asserted that "right wing" elements were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 205] === attempting to destroy Sino-Indonesian friendship. But the Polit buro had accepted, without question, the right of the Indonesian government to implement the retail trade ban, and it did not echo the Chinese allegation that this measure violated the 1955 treaty’s provisions concerning prior consultations with Peking. Because the Indonesian army’s anti-Chinese campaign presented Peking and the PKI with an essentially common danger, the possibility that they differed over how to respond to it should not be blown out of proportion. However, it is important to bear in mind that although the PKI repeatedly criticized the army's behavior after November 1959 and, editorially at least, befriended the local Chinese, it did not defend Peking's attempted intervention through the Chinese embassy or endorse her proposals for resolving the crisis. Logically, since the PKI was the real target of the army's provocations, its leaders had the strongest interest in an early termination of the dispute, even at the expense of the local Chi nese and Peking's injured prestige. It seems equally clear that in making the decision to press the defense of their nationals in Indonesia, the Chinese leaders were willing to risk the prospect that the PKI might, as a result, be seriously harmed. That Peking would assign the PKI this low priority reveals a great deal about the primary objectives of Chinese policy at this time and the basic assumptions underlying it. From whatever standpoint Peking chose to view the matter, the Indonesian Communist Party in 1959-60 could only be a distinctly secondary consideration in Chinese policy. That party had, in fact, become an increasingly less important political force as the result of its steady domestication under the Sukarno regime.^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === His government had simply nullified the PKI’s excellent prospects for becoming the largest party in parliament, and thereby exerting some influence on the government, by canceling the general elec tions scheduled for 1959. Thereafter the Sukarno regime demanded that all demonstrations and other political activities in support of radical causes be "guided" by and through officially sponsored channels and agencies, which were almost exclusively presided over by the Indonesian army. The PKI’s collaboration with the Sukarno regime certainly found no critics in Peking, which thing. was doing precisely the same Insofar as tactics were concerned, discord in the two parties' relationship more likely stemmed from the Indonesian com rades' ideas and programs about how to build a domestic united front. PKI policy on these issues must have raised serious doubts in the Chinese leaders' minds that this party could become a gen uinely strong political force in Indonesia in the near future. 1958 the PKI's electoral strength was close to that of the rival PNI and Moslem parties and its labor, youth and women's organizations were already large and rapidly expanding. 4 6 But the party remained an urban-based movement dominated by intellectuals and trade-union types. Largely because the Sukarno government, in effect, co-opted much of their political and organizational activ ities in the cities, the Indonesian Communist leadership did not make a serious effort to organize in the countryside until after late 1959. 4 7 This must have been seen as a cardinal error in the eyes of the Chinese Communists, for whom the mobilization of peasant support is the decisive pre-condition a revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries must have to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 207] === survive and expand. PKI's failure to do this before 1959 was not entirely a matter of necessity but also of free choice. Basically PKI opted to concentrate in the cities on the false assumption that legal-political struggle would be permitted by the bourgeois regime if the Party played by the rules of parliamentary democracy. In following this strategy consistently after 1951 the PKI showed quite clearly that it was not much impressed by the relevance of Chinese theories and experience to the Indonesian situation. While it is reasonable to assume the Chinese Communists thoroughly disagreed with the rationale behind their Indonesian comrade's slighting of the peasantry, by itself, this issue was unlikely to cause a deep strain in relations between the two parties. Other considerations apart, urban-oriented communist parties following the peaceful "parliamentary road" strategy had no difficulty staying on good terms with Peking. In any event, China was in no position to insist that these movements should emulate a Maoist-type program where it did not apply, since to do so would have weakened her own argument in the movement, namely that there should be no "great nation chauvinism". source of CCP disenchantment A stronger was the PKI's drift toward the Soviet camp,and its endorsement of Soviet policies in Indonesia, policies which increasingly appeared to be motivated by the desire to undermine the CPR. As the leading specialists on Indonesian Communism have pointed out, after 1956 the Aidit group skillfully used the SinoSoviet dispute to assert the autonomy and influence of their own party in the international communist movement. However, on the key issues raised in the polemics down to 1963, the PKI's position Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === was much closer to that of Moscow than Peking. 48 There were verygood reasons why the Indonesian Communists should have been favor ably disposed toward Soviet policy, despite its increasingly antiChinese overtones. Since 1956 Djakarta had been receiving sizable amounts of Soviet economic aid and prospects looked very bright that even more would be available in the future. As elsewhere, Soviet assistance could be useful to local communist parties be cause in some instances its continuance acted as a deterrent against suppression of leftists by the recipient government, while it also served to bolster the internal prestige of communist parties. January 1960, at the height of the Peking-Djakarta dispute, Khrush chev visited Indonesia and extended a U. S. $250 million credit to the Sukarno government. This action, warmly applauded by the PKI, greatly helped to shore up Djakarta's economic position at the very moment in the overseas Chinese dispute when Peking was trying to weaken it. Actually the 1960 aid deal was only the first step in a bold Soviet bid to displace the faltering position of Peking and Wash ington. It heralded a new phase of great power competition in Indonesia, set in motion by massive Soviet military aid program in support of Sukarno's campaign to wrest West Irian from the Dutch. The PKI was enthusiastic about Moscow's post-1960 bid to establish a political-military beachhead in Indonesia; moreover, its pro-Soviet stance in the communist movement suggested that it did not disapprove of the main objective behind Soviet policy in Indonesia, which was to undermine the position and influence of Communist China. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === Against this background of a developing Soviet challenge, and considerable evidence of the PKI's tacit support for it, the funda mental reasons behind Peking's April 1960 shift to accommodate Djakarta on the overseas Chinese dispute becomes more intelligible. The sequence of events suggest that China's sudden retreat, in fact, was less motivated by a recognition that she could not pre vail in defense of the overseas Chinese than by her appreciation of the new and more important threat to her interests posed by the Soviet Union. If there was any way of checking the alarming growth of Moscow's influence on Djakarta and on the PKI, then a speedy termination of the overseas Chinese conflict was essential to Peking's interest. This interpretation is supported by other documentary evidence. Chou En-lai had explicitly mentioned the "revisionists" (i.e., Soviet) plots to undermine Sino-Indonesian relations in his conciliatory statements of April 10. But, more revealing, on April 16 Peking released "Long Live Leninism!", her major ideological broadside precipitating the phase of open PekingMoscow rivalry for supremacy in the communist parties and competition for influence in the Afro-Asian anti -imperialist movements. 4 9 The decision, to lay down an open challenge to the Soviet Union had the effect of subordinating bi-lateral Chinese policy in Indonesia to the larger dictates of the struggle among the great powers. When Sukarno finally brought his generals to heel in July 1960 the stage seemed to be set for a composure of relations between Peking and Djakarta. But this development in no immediate way acted to curb a new source of potential tensions, the threat of rising Soviet influence in Indonesia. Actually the end of the dispute with China freed Sukarno to announce, on August 17, 1960, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === - 196 his campaign to seize West Irian^--a venture, it later became clear, he was determined to carry out with Moscow’s military aid unless the Dutch yielded, or were induced to, by Washington's diplomatic pressure. During 1961-1962 over U. S. $1 billion in Russian arms, including modern aircraft and warships, were delivered to Indonesia. Indonesia thereby became the strongest indigenous military power in Southeast Asia, while the Soviet Union, by virtue of the large training programs and advisory missions it set up, acquired a position to exert further influence on the Sukarno-army regime. From whatever standpoint--to forestall suppression of the PKI, to turn Indonesia against both China and the United States, or eventually to create forward military bases in the Pacific, Sukarno's West Irian campaign seemed to encourage the Soviet Union to attempt a limited but nonetheless forward strategy in Southeast Asia. This interpretation gains plausibility when it is recalled that the Soviet arms deal in Indonesia paralleled similar Russian policies in the Middle East and Latin America at this t i m e. ^ In the end Sukarno did not have to put his Russian-equipped forces to the acid test of carrying out an attack against the Dutch, a showdown it was by no means certain the Indonesians could have won. The United States, as alarmed as China by the Soviet penetration of Indonesia, brought diplomatic pressure on the Netherlands to accept a face-saving formula that turned over West Irian to Djakarta as 1962 drew to a close. Unlike its predeces sors, the Kennedy administration could see that Indonesia's incor poration of the disputed territory was in the long term interests of the United States, especially since its policies aimed at beef ing up native anti-communist elements and protecting American Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === business and investments. Thus it was that the timely diplomatic pressure which was brought to bear on the Dutch not only reduced Djakarta's dependence on the Soviet Union, but also helped to restore some of the good will many Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno, still felt for the United States despite its blunders in the 1950's. The fact that Moscow and Washington emerged the principal gainers from the outcome of the West lrian dispute, did not inflict a correspondingly severe setback on Peking's position in Indonesia, though it appeared to have at that time. It was true that the Moscow-Djakarta arms deal greatly strengthened an Indonesian army which had already shown its eagerness to provoke Peking and the PKI. To this extent the Indonesian "reactionaries" might, in the future, feel more emboldened to launch an anti-communist suppression or even to depose Sukarno. On the other hand, most of the new Soviet weapons went to Indonesia's navy and air force, services which were actually more malleable to Sukarno's influence than was the army. One of the most important, though longer range, political consequences of the Soviet arms deal, therefore, was to further diffuse power and to magnify potential frictions within the Indonesian military establishment. It must also be assumed Peking understood the fact that the weapons Indonesia acquired also made her an "anti-imperialist” force to be reckoned with, particularly if Sukarno's radical anti-Western brand of nationalism continued to hold sway in the country. To the Chinese leaders, therefore, much depended on how Sukarno would use his new military power, and whether the possession of these arms would weaken or strengthen his independence of Moscow and Washington. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === The evidence points to the conclusion that Peking decided Sukarno would not allow himself to become either a U. S. or Soviet client and, therefore, that it was possible to improve relations with him, even at the very height of Djakarta's rapproachment with China's enemies. Foreign Minister Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in April 1961 thus can be seen as marking the onset of yet another Peking effort to woo Sukarno. The visit produced official expres sions of China's satisfaction with the joint committee's formula for implementing the Dual Nationality Treaty, an invitation to Sukarno to visit the CPU and offers to supply economic aid for the 52 new Indonesian development plan. On the occasion of Sukarno's second visit to Peking in June 1961 Chinese Communist papers hailed the "heartening developments [that] have taken place in the friendly relationship between our 53 two countries." CPU Chairman, Liu Shao-ch'i, went out of his way to express strong confidence in Sukarno, saluting him as having "all along been devoted to the great project of the bridge of friendship between China and Indonesia. China's confidence in the Indonesian leader soon proved to be well-justified. At the Belgrade conference of non-aligned nations in September 1961, Sukarno advanced the doctrine of the struggle between the "newlyemerging" and "old-established" forces, an idea almost identical to Peking's call for the Afro-Asian countries to unite against the industrialized Western powers. The Indonesian president was hailed by the Chinese Communists for his strong anti-imperialist stance on most international issues raised at the conference, particularly for his opposition to Nehru's attempt to dampen criticism of the Western powers. 5 5 While this conference was well before the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 213] === renewal of heavy fighting between China and India on their frontier, it had already become clear that Sukarno's was the voice Peking wanted to hear in the Afro-Asian world. In October 1961, the CPR extended Indonesia a U. S. $30 million credit for machinery and technical assistance to build textile mills and factories,^6 con crete evidence that Peking regarded Sukarno as an anti-imperialist in good standing, and that his rapproachment with the Soviet Union and the United States, in view of his Belgrade declaration, was seen to be by no means stable or permanent. While the relationship with Sukarno had improved by 1962, the distance between Peking and the PKI had, if anything, grown wider. All during the period when Russian arms deliveries were fueling the West Irian campaign the Aidit leadership continued to take an essentially pro-Soviet position in the widening ideological rift within the international communist movement. 57 PKI did not, it is true, join Moscow in the condemnation of Albania at the CPSU 22nd Congress in October 1961, but that was because it saw this issue as being a question of the national autonomy and self-determination of communist parties, rather than a matter of being pro-Moscow or pro-Peking. On the other hand, at the same Congress the PKI praised the Russian party's "Program for the Development of Communism," a document the Chinese ridiculed as sheer "revisionism." 5 8 When Stalin was further vilified at the Congress, Aidit upheld the right of the Soviet Communists to "do whatever they wished with their former leader," 59 a far cry from China's growing defense of Stalin's historical role as a staunch anti-imperialist leader. As to who was entitled to lead the international communist move ment, the PKI's position could not have been stated more unequivocally Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 214] === than when Aidit told the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee in December 1961: "There is only one vanguard of the world commu nist movement, and let there be no doubt about it, that vanguard is the Communist Party of the Soviet U n i o n. T h i s was to be the strongest--and the last--of Aidit's pronouncements showing the PKI's decidedly pro-Soviet leanings. But it was a rather blunt admission which left little doubt that the PKI supported Moscow's handling of the "imperialists," and expected the Soviet Union would remain the major communist power exerting influence on Indonesia. The preceding analysis of Sino-Indonesian relations during 1959-1962 demonstrates that a bewildering array of "contradic tions" faced Chinese policymakers. Despite a series of major defeats and retreats, at the close of this period the policy of united front cooperation with Sukarno w a s, theoretically, still intact, though not really operational. There was still little to show that such a policy had any substance or much of a future. As the overseas Chinese issue and the Indonesian army's largely autonomous power had shown, the essential nature of the regime headed by Sukarno was clearly quite "reactionary." Even the anti imperialist justification for an opportunistic rapproachment with Sukarno was extremely weak since, as the West Irian affair proved, he was quite prepared to move closer to Russia and America, the two powers most anxious to destroy China's influence in Indonesia so as to become dominant themselves. And insofar as the PKI was a factor in Chinese policy calculations, that party had shown pro nounced "revisionist" tendencies, whether in terms of its internal strategy or its inclination to adopt pro-Soviet attitudes; it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === could not be seriously regarded as a Chinese ally until these "errors" were corrected. What inferences can be drawn from Peking's attempt after the overseas Chinese dispute to revive the prospects for united front cooperation with Sukarno? Basically it seems that the Chinese leaders decided the principal contradiction affecting their policy toward Sukarno was international, namely, between imperialism and the Indonesian nation, rather than the internal contradictions between the Sukarno/PKI "progressive" elements and the "reaction ary" anti -communist led by the army and the Moslems. This analysis of the strategic aspects of the relationship still placed the CPR and Indonesia in the same "anti-imperialist" camp. While this continued to be the principal contradiction it followed that China's policy should be one of promoting a united front with Sukarno. Other existing, but non-principal, contradictions affect ing the two powers' relationship would, necessarily, have to be regarded as subordinate considerations in the overall determina tion of Chinese policy. It does not vitiate the important role that contradictions theory plays in the Chinese leaders' decisions on global policy to underscore the evident fact that by 1962 this analytical technique, as applied to the Indonesian case, had also become a convenient way to rationalize the policies of an aspirant great power. For the way Peking began to view the "contradictions" in Indonesia after 1962 meant that her interests in the overseas Chinese, and even the fate of the PKI, could only be pursued in accordance with the higher dictates of a realpolitik strategy. How this ranking of priorities was to affect the future evolution of Chinese policy is the theme of the next chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === FOOTNOTES SK Menteri Perdagangan Tangga 14 Mei, 1959, No. 2933/M (Ministry of Trade Decree, May 14, 1959). Pengumuman Penguasa Perang Pusat No. Prt/Peperpu/039/1959. (Central War Administrator Announcement No. 039, May 12, 1959). Keputusan Penguasa Perang Daerah Svatara I Djawa Barat N o. KPTS. 70/8/PPD/1959 (West Java War Administrators Decree M o. 70), A u g u s t 28, 1959. "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution," address by Soekarno on the anniversary of the proclamation of Indonesian indepen dence. August 17, 1959. This speech became known as The Political Manifesto, the major philosophical and ideological foundation of Indonesia's Guided Democracy. Complete text in Political Manifesto Republic of Indonesia (Department of Information, I960), pp. 2 /-85. Announced in Jen-min Jih-pao, December 7, 1957. For an analysis of Indonesian reactions to the treaty see Willnott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 48-50. The relevant historical data on the increasingly strong antiChinese activities among the native entrepreneurial class after 1956 is examined by Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, op. cit.,""pp. 481-487. On the army-PKI rivalry during this period see Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism Under Guided Democracy," in A. Doak Barnett, editor, Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Praeger, 1963), ppl 168-170. This appraisal of the army's intentions was frequently brought up by a number of knowledgeable Indonesian political observers in the course of interviews with the author in 1961. 10. The text of this note was never released but a reference to it appears in Chen Yi's protest note of December 9, 1959. Officials of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry also confirmed to this writer that a note to this effect had been received and that it prompted Subandrio's mission to Peking. 11. Joint Communique of Foreign Minister Soebandrio and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, October 11, 1959. See Special Release on Current Indonesian Affairs, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, No. 80/1959. 12. "Indonesia and Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Fall 1964, pp. 253270. See also the article by Dennis Bloodworth, who inter viewed members of the Subandrio delegation shortly after their return from China, in The Observer (London), November 1, 1959. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === 203 13. Peraturan Pemerintah, No. 10/1959 (Government Regulation No. 10, 1059). The final form exempted those firms engaged in service trade and those which included one or more Indonesian partners. There were several alternatives to outright confis cation: compensation was promised, the firms could be trans ferred into cooperatives, sold to Indonesian nationals, or the entrepreneur could relocate his business in a town or city with the permission of the Ministry of Trade. Finally, the December 1, 1959»deadline was set back indefinitely into 1960 to permit the Chinese sufficient time to make the neces sary arrangements. See statement by Prime Minister Djuanda, reported in PIA, November 24, 1959. 14. Statement of the West Java War Administrator's Office, re ported in Aneta, November 11, 1959. 15. For a general discussion of the historical and political factors behind the PKI's attitude toward the local Chinese minority, see McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," in Tang Tsou and Ho P'ing-ti, editors, China in Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), volume II, p p. 357-366. 16. A copy of one such instruction fell into the army's hands and it was promptly released to all the news media. It read, in part: "If the fundamental human rights are violated and the personal property of the Overseas Chinese are confis cated, then the Chinese Government will protect the Chinese with all its power. So in this regard it is expected that the Overseas Chinese should not feel dis turbed and remain in their places, because the Chinese Government will try to solve the problem \*ith the Indo nesian Government in a friendly way." As reported in the New York Times, November 18, 1*959. 17. Text in Antara, November 20, 1959. 18. For details of the West Java War Administrator's reports on the Chinese Embassy activity, see PIA, November 19, 21, and December 9 and Indonesian Observer, December 10, 1959. 19. Full text in Peking Review, December 15, 1959, pp. 6-7 and Jen-min Jih-pao, D e c e m b e r 10, 1959. 20. Ibid. 21. Press Release No. P/52/59 Departemen Luar Negeri (Press Release Department of Foreign Affairs), Dj akarta, December 13, 1959. 22. Radio Peking broadcast to Indonesia, December 10, 1959. These exhortations to the Overseas Chinese to return to the Mainland continued for two weeks. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 218] === 23. Report on the Current Situation and Overseas Chinese Affairs at the Fourth Plenum of the First Committee of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. Ta Kung Pao, December 20, 1959. Translated in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 2164, December 28, 1959, pp. 13-15. (Hereafter cited as SCMP) 24. A number of overseas Chinese, both supporters and detractors of the Peking government, told the writer this was the policy of the CPR embassy during the early phase of the dispute. 25. There has always been a popular conviction in Indonesia, shared by every government since independence, that the Chi nese community's role in the economy is wholly an exploitive one. Like the Dutch, however, the Chinese performed many crucial economic functions the Indonesians had not learned to do, and showed no particular interest in learning, them selves. Because skilled Chinese played a key role in the processing and marketing of Indonesia's exports, notably rubber, tin, oil and copra, their departure was a heavy blow to the foreign exchange earning capabilities of the economy. After 1960, a major reason Indonesia's foreign exports con tinued to decline steadily was the loss of these skilled Chinese. Similarly, the small Chinese traders were the basic source of credit for the farmers in the villages and the only effi cient mechanism whereby the produce of the countryside reached the cities and consumer goods flowed back to the villages. Some Indonesians hoped the 1959 decrees would replace this system with local cooperatives. But after the Chinese were driven out the cooperative movement never got off the ground. Where cooperatives were established they did not prove to be efficient, to result in higher prices for the farmer's pro duce or lower prices for what he had to buy. 26. Complete text in NCNA (Peking), December 25, 1959. 27. Jen-min Jih-pao, January 20, 1960. 28. Ibid. 29. Letter of Foreign Minister Soebandrio to Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, January 23, 1960. Complete text in PIA, January 27, 1960. The CPR's proposals for settling the repatriation questions appear in Chen Yi's notes to Soebandrio, NCNA, December 25, 1959, and Jen-min Jih-pao, December 28, 1959 and March 17, 1960. For Indonesia's negative response, see text of Soebandrio's replies in Antara, January 27 and March 30, 1960. 30. The departing Chinese found Indonesian exit regulations to be exceedingly harsh. They were allowed to take with them such clothing and household belongings as they could carry by hand and no more than U. S. $30 per person in foreign exchange. An exception was made in the case of those leaving by commercial Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === shipping which permitted them to purchase foreign exchange currency up to the amount of their fare. Interviews Indo nesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 21 and September 3, 1961. 31. NCNA (Canton), June 9, 1960. 32. Interviews, Indonesian Department of Immigration, June 23, 1961. According to these sources, approximately another 17,000 repatriated to Taiwan. 33. Most of the departees, however, bought passage on commercial ships to Hong Kong where they were put on trains and trans ported into the mainland. 34. This was freely admitted by a number of Chinese nationals oriented toward Peking whom this writer interviewed in 1961. According to them, Chinese families and friends in Indonesia began to receive letters from the newly arrived repatriates in China urging those still in Indonesia to postpone any plans they had to return to China; that the situation was not •.yet favorable for them to return and that they should remain in Indonesia unless this was really impossible. Similar ap peals came from the Chinese Embassy through the Overseas Chinese associations. The Embassy let it be known that it preferred the Chinese to stay in Indonesia for the present until better conditions were obtained on the mainland. the same time, the Chinese were told that one day the CPR would make a home for all of them. 35. "On the Current International Situation and China's Foreign Relations," Peking Review, April 12, 1960, pp. 7-9. 36. Text in NCNA (Peking), April 10, 1960. 37. Text in Antara, April 13, 1960. 38. Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo ta-shih-kuan shou-yin-jen te sheng-ming (Statement by the Spokesman of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China), May 13, 1960. English text also in Antara, May 13, 1960. 39. Text of the Indonesian protest notes in Press Release No. P/27/60, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, May 19, 19 60. 40. Text of CPR protest note in News Bulletin: Cultural and Information Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Indonesia, No. 43/1960, Djakarta, July 4, 1960. 41. This was the construction placed on the episode by most Indo nesians the writer interviewed in 1961. The Indonesian specialist Professor Herbert Feith has reached the same con clusion. See his chapter on "Indonesia" in George McT. Kahin, editor, Government and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), p"I 267. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === 42. "Like an Angel that Strikes from the Skies: The March of our Revolution," Department of Information, Djakarta, 1960, p. 30. 43. Professor Donald Hindley, who has done the most extensive analysis on this question, concludes that the local Chinese business community was the "main source" of non-party contri butions. The Communist Party of Indonesia (Berkeley: Univer sity of California Press, 1964), pp. H7-T18. Other leading scholars on Indonesia, Kahin and Feith, agree. See Kahin’s chapter, "Indonesia," in his Major Governments of Asia, op. cit., p. 599 and Feith's, The Indonesian Elections of~19?5 (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1962), pp. 27-28. 44. Text in Review of Indonesia, November-December 1959, pp. 3-5. 45. On the increasingly narrow scope for PKI activities during the early years of Guided Democracy see Ruth McVey's excel lent analysis in "Indonesia: Communism Under Guided Democracy," op. cit., pp. 148-195. 46. For details on the organizational growth and structure of the PKI from 1951 to 1960 see Hindley, op. cit., pp. 61-230. 47. McVey, op. cit., pp. 177-179. 48. See the discussion of the PKI's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute in Hindley, "The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second Congress," Asian Survey, March 1962, pp. 20-27 and McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," op. cit., pp. 369-377. 49. Hung-ch*i (Red Flag), no. 8, April 16, 1960. 50. "Like an Angel that Strikes From the Skies," op. 51. For details of the arms deal and an interpretation of Soviet intentions in Indonesia during this period see Guy J. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," Foreign Affairs, volume XV, No. 4, July 1962, pp. 612-6"26. 52. "Chen Yi fu tsung-li wai-chiao pu-chang tsai ka.-pieh yen-hui shang ti chiang-hua" (Speech at farewell banquet for Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi), Djakarta, March 31, 1961. Text in News Bulletin, published by the Cultural and Information Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Indonesia, Special Issue, April 20, 1961, p. 13. See also Jen-min Jih-pao, April, 1961 and Peking Review, April 7, 1961, pp. 6-10. 53. Ta Kung Pao (Peking), June 13, 1961. 54. Speech welcoming Soekarno to China, June 13, 1961. text in NCNA (Peking), June 13, 1961. cit., pp. 38-46. Full Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === 55. For example, see the Chinese article hailing Sukarno's speech at the conference, "Indonesia Differs with Nehru's Stand," NCNA (Djakarta), September 5, 1961. 56. The agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed in Peking, October 11, 1961. NCNA (Peking), October 11, 1961. 57. Hindley, "The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU TwentySecond Congress," op. cit., pp. 20-27. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. D. N. Aidit, Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity, Documents of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1962, p. 24. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 222] === CHAPTER VII TOWARD SINO-INDONESIAN ALIGNMENT: THE THIRD FORCE STRATEGY The decision to conciliate Sukarno at a time when Soviet and American influence in Indonesia clearly seemed to be on the rise soon proved to be highly advantageous for Peking. Between 1963- 1965 a growing convergence of Chinese and Indonesian foreign policy aims and interests led to a tacit power alliance that appeared to overshadow the underlying conflicts in their relation ship which had surfaced at the time of the overseas Chinese and West Irian disputes. During this period Peking established pre eminent influence in Indonesia, not only by forging a mutuality of interests with Sukarno, but also in finally winning the support of the PKI. These victories in Indonesia had major significance for Chinese foreign policy strategy because they occurred in the larger context of Peking's post-1963 efforts to organize a world wide anti-U.S., anti-Soviet coalition. Moreover, in view of the fact that Djakarta was to be one of the key pillars in this coali tion, the consolidation of the relationship with Indonesia was essential to the success of Peking's attempt to organize a rival power bloc. The primary impetus behind the Peking-Djakarta rapprochement stemmed from the common threat posed to the two states by the creation of the Federation of Malaysia. To China, this new state was further evidence of the "imperialists'" intention to estab lish a chain of anti-communist regimes in Southeast Asia and thus a sufficient reason for Peking to join forces with any other power opposed to the Federation. In this sense the Malaysia Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === issue intensified China's determination to pursue a militant anti-imperialist strategy in the region. On the other hand, the formation of Malaysia had an even more dramatic effec. on Indo nesia's foreign policy because it was presented in a way that ultimately terminated Sukarno's dependence on Moscow and Washing ton, pressuring him into an alignment with Peking. This shift necessarily followed from Sukarno's perception of Malaysia as a scheme designed to block Indonesian hegemony in the Malaya world and possibly also to encourage the dismemberment of Indonesia in the event any of the outer islands, fearing the growth of communist influence under Sukarno's rule, might attempt to join the new federation. The PKI also had a strong interest in opposing Malaysia, primarily because an external crisis was sorely needed to regain the momentum the Party had lost following the West Irian dispute. In the short run at least, only by capitalizing on the danger of a new confrontation could the PKI hope to force its way into the government and, at the same time, keep the army pre-occupied with external affairs. When it became clear that the Soviet Union would not, as she had on the West Irian issue, back Sukarno's policy toward Malaysia, the PKI rapidly began to reverse its proMoscow stance. •During the 1963-1965 period, therefore, the actions of the super powers in dealing with the Malaysia issue played into the hands of China's diplomatic strategy in Indonesia. The rapidity with which the Sino-Indonesian axis emerged, however, tended to obscure the basic restraints that were still operating against a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 224] === durable alliance between the two states. Indonesia's anti communist elements still held all the real levers of power under Guided Democracy. While the army rallied in support of the new anti-imperialist struggle, actually it had no intention of allow ing the Malaysia question to deflect its attention away from the more important internal contest with the PKI. An alliance with Peking, therefore, could only go so far as not to alter the domestic balance of power in Indonesia. For its part, the Aidit group eventually came out in support of China only because Peking's alliance with Sukarno helped the PKI to exploit the Malaysia crisis for its own domestic ends, not because there was any sudden conversion to Maoism. As events after 1963 soon demonstrated, Aidit's internal strategy was, in fact, basically in conflict with China's realpolitik foreign policy toward the Sukarno regime. Finally, as earlier flirtations with the great powers had proven, Sukarno's attraction for a power alignment with Peking was mainly the product of his increasing international isolation and the worsening of his relations with Moscow and Washington, rather than the outgrowth of a solid con vergence of mutual long-term interests and goals. Given these factors, the Peking-Sukarno-PKI alliance was inherently unstable. Primarily, the existence of the Malaysia issue held it together. The evidence presented in this chapter points to the conclusion that, despite the obvious drawbacks, the Chinese leaders again seriously misjudged their capacity to control the triangular coalition represented by Peking, Sukarno and the PKI. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 225] === The Malaysia Controversy When it first surfaced, the formation of the Federation of Malaysia did not immediately appear to be an issue on which Djakarta and Peking would find common ground. On the contrary, the opening phase of this dispute indicated that Sukarno might again turn to Moscow for additional military/economic aid, or, if he decided to accept Malaysia's existence, that Indonesia could expect a grateful outpouring of largess from the United States. For Malaysia looked very much like another West Iriantype issue Sukarno could use to force Moscow and the Western powers to compete for Indonesia's favor. Sukarno's handling of the dispute down to September 1963 suggested that the lessons learned two years before in the West Irian campaign were still fresh in his mind. Djakarta did not publicly oppose the British plan to merge her Borneo dependencies with Malaya-Singapore at the time this scheme was first announced in 1961. That Sukarno and his leading generals were, however, hostile to the arrangement rather early on seems clear in the light of other developments. Shortly after the British plans became known it appears, circumstantially, that the Indonesian army secretly trained, or allowed to be trained, several hundred dissidents from the Borneo territories on the Indonesian side of the island, following which they were sent back to Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. Subsequently, on December 8, 1962, a rebellion broke out in Brunei pledged to oppose the merger with Malaysia and to establish an independent state. though Sukarno gave vocal--but lukewarm--support to the Brunei uprising almost immediately, he did not publicly attack the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 226] === - 212- Malaysia scheme until February 1963. By that time there was little doubt Sukarno viewed the proposed merger as a "neocolonialist" scheme directed at Indonesia, and at maintaining the economic and military pre-emince of the Western powers in this area.1 The prospect of a new external crisis involving Indonesia was excellent news for the PKI which, in fact, had come out against the Malaysia concept well before Sukarno. Independent of Sukarno's attitude, on December 15, 1962, Peking announced her support of the Borneo rebellion. Over the next three months the apparently developing congruence of interests between Peking, Sukarno and the PKI gave CPR Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i's visit to Indonesia in April 1963 the appearance of foreshadowing important new diplo matic moves. Liu's visit was part of a larger venture in South east Asia which had taken him to Burma and Cambodia, and it marked the preparatory stage of a concerted Chinese effort to forge an anti-Soviet, anti-U. S. coalition in the area. Therefore, if Sukarno and Peking were preparing for concerted action on Malaysia, the timing was perfect. However, from the contents of the Liu- Sukarno communique of April 26, 1963, the possibilities for a common position did not look very bright. The two leaders did express "resolute support" for the "righteous struggle of the people of Borneo for self-determination and independence,and thus against falling into the trap of neo-colonialism in the guise of Malaysia." But this was a minor paragraph in a document which otherwise supplied no evidence of their having reached accord on the handling of any concrete issues connected with the dispute. It was to become clear two months later that Liu's visit had pro duced nothing tangible because, in fact, Sukarno had not made up his mind but was exploring other diplomatic possibilities. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 227] === At a summit meeting of the Malay powers which produced the Manila Accords of June 12, 1963, Sukarno abruptly altered Indo nesia's course. He joined the Philippines and Malaya in welcoming the formation of Malaysia, "provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impar tial authority, the Secretary General of the United Nations or his representative."^ A second summit meeting of the three states in August produced the concept of "Maphilindo"--a vague confedera tion of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia--and the "Manila Declaration" which declared that foreign military bases in the Maphilindo area were regarded as "temporary in nature" and that they should not be used "directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries." The Declara tion further pledged the parties to abstain from "the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular inter ests of the Big Powers," and reserved to themselves "a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation.... These shifts in Sukarno's diplomacy could only be regarded with suspicion and dissatisfaction in Peking. Read one way, Sukarno had agreed to accept the Borneo territories' inclusion into Malaysia, provided the "peoples'" will was impartially "ascer tained"- -which left Djakarta free to oppose the outcome if she did not like it. On the other hand, the Manila Declaration could also mean Sukarno thought he had succeeded in winning the agree ment of the Malay powers to the early termination of U. S. and U. K. bases in the area, the neutralization of these states in the Cold War and the establishment of a loose entente among the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 228] === -.214 three states under the nominal leadership of Indonesia. Given the pronounced anti-communist, pro-Western leanings of the Phil ippine and Malayan governments, Peking could hardly be expected to assume that the latter objective, however consistent it might be with Sukarno's desires, was a serious possibility. The absence of any statements by Peking endorsing Sukarno's diplomatic moves of June-August instead indicated that the Chinese leaders drew the same conclusions about his motives as did the "imperialists" and other interested parties at the time. Most informed observers attached the greatest significance to that por tion of the Manila Declaration which spoke of the three powers' primary responsibility for the region's "stability," "security" and defense against "subversion." This interpretation, in some instances based on interviews with government officials who had attended the summit, stressed that the real meaning of the Declara tion was the three powers' recognition of the common dangers to their internal security posed by Communist China and, indirectly, by their overseas Chinese communities. Such an assessment was undoubtedly correct because any idea of regional security arrange ments that was not implicitly anti-Chinese and anti-communist would most certainly have been rejected by the Indonesian army. Consequently, in signing this document Sukarno must have known full well that Peking and other Cold War capitals would view his action as another step in the direction of compromise with the anti-communist powers. This reading of Sukarno's motives gathered increasing credibility in the light of his domestic policies between May and August 1963. During this period he: 1) adopted an economic stabilization program recommended by the U. S.; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === 2) negotiated a settlement with the Western oil companies in Indonesia, whose assets had been threatened a few months before by nationalization plans and PKI harassment; and, 3) received tentative assurance that U. S. and International Monetary Fund credits would be forthcoming. And, in moving to the Right at this time Sukarno simply overrode the strong objections raised by the PKI, which had urged the government to seize the foreign oil interests and to denounce Malaysia. Just as it appeared that Sukarno was on the verge of abandon ing radical nationalist policies, however, the whole context of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies was transformed. The United Nations' "ascertainment" did conclude that the proposed Malaysia federation had the support of the "people" of the Borneo territories. But this finding could hardly be presented to Sukarno--or any objective audience--as a bona fide execution of the Manila Accord since, in fact, Malaysia was proclaimed a sovereign state (September 16, 1963) before the "ascertainment" had even been officially completed. Sukarno immediately charged, correctly, that the U. N.'s informal plebiscite, conducted in close cooperation and with the guidance of the British colonial administrators, was improper and, hence, that the findings were invalid. No doubt what was especially objectionable to him was the fact that, in the main, only the views of those known to favor the merger were consulted while persons who had, or might, oppose Malaysia were largely ignored. Moreover, the existing U. K.-Malaya defense treaty was to be extended to embrace the newly absorbed territories, and this action was totally unaccept able to Sukarno. On September 25, 1963*he announced his Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === "confrontation" policy, pledging that Indonesia would "crush" Cganjang) Malaysia," a creature of imperialism designed to oppose the Indonesian revolution. The choice of the word "crush" (or "smash") was no doubt partly a rhetorical flourish but it also strongly implied Sukarno's intention to destroy Malaysia. He had been prepared, in principle, to accept Borneo's merger with Malaysia if the ascertainment included a wide selection of political opinion in this territory. But he evidently did not believe findings derived on this basis would show convincing popular support for the merger. Djakarta officially denied any desire to annex the British dependencies herself.1^ This disclaimer was, however, hard to square with the statements of some of her leaders, like foreign minister Subandrio, who were saying in effect that it would only be natural if the people of North Borneo someday joined their Indonesian "brothers." Since roughly three-fourths of Borneo was already Indonesian territory any government in Djakarta was likely to feel a strong security interest could be advanced by pursuing a long range policy aimed at eventually absorbing the remainder of the island. How strongly Sukarno was motivated by this consideration is dif ficult to judge. On the other hand accepting Malaysia in the form it was presented meant that the former British territories would be under the control of a Western client-state. Such an outcome would have been totally unacceptable to Sukarno or his generals, and would have sparked a desire to break up the federa tion even if none previously existed. Although the issues confronting Sukarno in the Malaysian controversy were extremely complex, and not all of his motives Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === 217 can be gauged, it is possible to reconstruct the principal objec tives behind his confrontation policy: He was very concerned, as were many other Indonesian leaders--including the generals, that the absorption of the Borneo territories by Malaysia would not prevent local Chinese political domination of the new state in the future. The perpetuation of Malay political supremacy--if necessary by artificial and anti-democratic means--had also been a key objective of the British and of Malayan Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, in creating the Federation; but Sukarno was unconvinced their scheme would work; 2) a Malaysian state was unacceptable to him because, as a creature of "neo-colonialism," it was an obstacle to Indonesian pretensions to leadership in the area; 3) In view of the covert assistance the United States and Malaya had given the 1958 Indonesian rebellion, Sukarno feared the federation was not only intended to block communism, the over seas Chinese and Peking, but also to break up Indonesia as well. He knew the Western powers were worried that the PKI might one day grow beyond its Java base to dominate the outer islands and, hence, that the existence of Malaysia might one day encourage the cessession of Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi; 4) Sukarno wanted to limit any potential expansion of Chinese Communist power and influ ence in the area. The danger from that quarter, however, he preceived as being long range, whereas the military bases and the economic-political presence of the United States and Britain posed a more immediate threat to Indonesia, not to mention his own regime. Sukarno might have been prepared to accept a Federa tion of Malaysia, and a Maphilindo entente, provided these arrange ments held out some promise of removing British and U. S. dominance, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === - 218 thereby permitting Indonesia to assert a primary role in organiz ing the area to curb any future internal or external Chinese danger. These aims, of course, could not be pursued when it become clear that Western influence was going to remain dominant in Malaysia. Since Sukarno was not prepared to accept a humiliat ing defeat, or to abandon his goals, a struggle over which powers were going to determine the geo-political alignment of the Malay nations was inevitable. Indonesia's first move to intervene struck a familiar note-the sending of small armed bands into Malaya and the Borneo terri tories, as had been done in the West Irian campaign. Politically, the objective appeared to be that of precipitating a diplomatic crisis wherein, to advance their own interests in containing the CPR, either Washington or Moscow would be forced to sponsor some settlement that would give Sukarno what he wanted. to be wrong on both counts. his confrontation policy. Sukarno proved Moscow adopted a cool attitude toward This time there were no dramatic pledges of major Soviet economic or military assistance to Indo nesia. Not even a partial cancellation of the huge Indonesian debt was offered, which was the least Moscow might have done had it wanted to demonstrate Russian support without provoking a possibly hostile response from Washington. The exchange of visits between Subandrio and Mikoyan in July 1964 led to reports that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide Indonesia with an additional small credit of U. S. $50-100 million for arms, but this aid did not materialize.1* On the other hand, the United States, made it equally clear that she would support Kuala Lumpur. In a joint communique of July 23, Washington announced it would Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === 219 extend military assistance to Malaysia. 12 Sukarno thereupon accused the U. S. of "giving Malaysia preference over the Indo nesian Republic" and warned of a worsening of Washington-Djakarta relations. Indonesia's rebuff by the super powers was followed by a further diplomatic setback in October 1964 at the conference of non-aligned nations in Cairo. Here Sukarno attempted to win Afro- Asian support for his confrontation policy by lashing out at "the military bases of the big powers built in all strategic positions." But the final conference declaration did not even mention the Malaysia dispute and it condemned only those foreign bases that were maintained "against the expressed will" of the countries concerned. 14 The non-aligned states having implicitly rejected Sukarno's policy, by late 1964 Indonesian diplomacy was essen tially isolated. Chinese Communist Attitudes Toward Malaysia Although Sukarno had openly tried to find backing from nearly every quarter except the CPR, by their consistent opposition to Malaysia the Chinese leaders left the door open to an eventual Indonesian pact with China. In early 1963, Peking's condemnations of Malaysia had been made virtually without reference to how the proposed federation affected Indonesian interests. But after Sukarno's September 1963 "crush Malaysia" speech, Chinese Commu nist editorials and statements increasingly stressed the common danger posed to the CPR and to Indonesia. Malaysia was described as "part of a SEATO move to surround Indonesia" and a "new threat to peace in that region and Asia as a whole....13 The U. S. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 234] === 220 agreement to provide Kuala Lumpur with military assistance was attacked as an attempt at "direct armed intervention in North Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) and Peking warned that "should U. S. imperialism dare to launch aggression against Indonesia, the Chinese people will back the Indonesian people with all their might. Strategically, Malaysia was seen as a serious security threat to both countries. It was a scheme that could be "expanded to form a great system of military points for centrally planning 17 the military activities of Britain in the Far East"; and more over, the Federation was important because "in the eyes of the U. S. imperialists, to control Malaysia and Indonesia is one of the key factors for carrying out their global strategy." 18 The expression of these hostile attitudes toward Malaysia involved no immediate conflict of interests for Peking. Over the years a profitable balance of trade had developed for the CPR in 19 this region, especially with Singapore. But this trade had grown despite the absence of diplomatic relations, and was likely to continue irrespective of China's attitude toward the merger of these territories. Economic considerations aside, moreover, the CPR had ample political reason to oppose the Malaysia concept. Despite proclamations of an independent foreign policy, in fact, Kuala Lumpur had already placed herself in the camp of China's enemies by her official support for India on the Tibetan boundary question; and in November 1964 Malaysia reversed her neutrality on the China recognition issue [prior to that time Kuala Lumpur recognized neither the CPR nor Nationalist China] by permitting Taiwan to open a consulate in Malaysia. This decision Peking promptly attacked as "an open challenge to the Chinese people" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 235] === instigated by the United States. 221 20 In view of Malaysia's defense treaty with Britain, and the latter's membership in the SEATO/ANZUS bloc, in Chinese Communist eyes by late 1964 the Federation had been effectively absorbed by the U. S. security network in South east Asia. A policy of open enmity toward Malaysia, therefore, not only complimented China's hope to forge an anti-imperialist united front with Indonesia, it would in any event have followed from Kuala Lumpur's alignment with Peking's enemies. Over the long run, however, it was by no means certain Chi nese interests and objectives in Malaysia would be compatible with the policy she was then pursuing in Indonesia. The seemingly expansionist thrust of Indonesian nationalism centered on the assertion of Djakarta's leadership over the Malay nations. Peking could support these ambitions, in the short run at least, because the gains Indonesia might realize would come at the expense of China's main and stronger enemy, the Western powers. Beyond the common interest in removing the Western presence, however, basic Chinese and Indonesian objectives did not appear to be harmonious. In Chinese Communist eyes the "bourgeois nationalist" radicals in Djakarta did not intend to "liberate" the Malaysian "people," particularly not the overseas Chinese population. From the Marxist- Leninist perspective the conclusion would have to be that Sukarno's expansionist nationalism intended to dominate and contain both the Chinese minority and the "revolutionary" people of the Malay countries in order to prop up his own internal regime. Several factors nevertheless suggest that in 1963-1965 Peking was prepared to accept temporary Indonesian pre-eminent in the Malay world and that she was quite willing to renounce, or sharply scale down, any assertion of potentially rival Chinese ambitions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 236] === 222 There could be no basis for an alliance with Sukarno if he, and especially his generals, believed that China's real objective was a pro-Peking, Chinese-dominated Malaysia. The same was true for the PKI which, if it eventually came to power, would inevitably be expected to assert Indonesian Communist influence in the Malay countries and would not welcome Peking's interference or competi tion. Hence any attempt by Peking to hold sway in this area by means of ethnic ties to, or revolutionary support for, the pre dominately Chinese Malayan insurgents was wholly incompatible with China's attempt to promote an Indonesian alliance, whether Djakarta's government was bourgeois or communist. No documentary evidence has come to light which indicate that these issues were thrashed out between Peking and Djakarta, or between the CCP and the PKI, during the period of the rapprochement. However, the efforts China made to secure an alignment with both Sukarno and Aidit after 1963 strongly suggest that she took no positions which were opposed, in principle, to predominant Indonesian influence in the Malay area, and that this was done for the sake of her broader great power objectives. It is difficult to escape this conclusion in the light of the rapidity with which the SinoIndonesian axis developed. The Emergence of the Peking-Djakarta Axis At the very time that his position on the Malaysian contro versy was driving Sukarno into an increased diplomatic isolation Peking reached the stage of the open split with Moscow. The sign ing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 was taken in Peking as conclusive evidence of Soviet "collusion" with the United States against China. With this treaty the most vehement Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 237] === - 223 phase of the Sino-Soviet polemics began. It quickly became apparent that Peking’s ideological assault on the Russian leader ship formally announced China's departure from the old socialist camp and the establishment of a rival Chinese power center in Asia. In setting up a third camp the Chinese leaders sought to organize a broad international united front of all those nations, forces and classes which were opposed to U. S.-Soviet global dominance. Such a front could not, of course, rest exclusively on proletarian-led insurrections and so-called ’’liberation strug gles”, but had also to include those "national democratic" and capitalist states which were resisting or otherwise at odds with the two super powers. Within the communist world, Peking's coali tion strategy took the form of attempts to de-couple various states from Moscow's orbit (notably the Asian members) and to promote a series of rival pro-Chinese splinter parties in Western Europe and Latin America. In the non-communist world it involved more extensive economic contacts with the industrialized Western nations and Japan, apparently in the hope that the "contradictions" within the capitalist system could be exploited to weaken U. S. influence in these countries. The final group of potential allies to whom the idea of the third force was directed was the radical nationalist regimes, "liberation" movements and neutralist states of the Afro-Asian world. About the only common denominator that could link these elements, politically, to China was their varying degrees of opposition to the policies of Washington or Moscow. The rationale for China's third force found expression in an up-dated version of Mao's 1946 concept of the "intermediate zone." Extending the Leninist idea of the antagonisms between imperialism Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === and the colonies to include relations between imperialism and the lesser capitalist states, in early 1964 Peking began to describe the possibility of creating a new "intermediate zone" comprised of two elements: 1) the independent states and those oppressed nations still struggling for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and 2) the second rank capitalist powers like France, Germany, Italy, Britain, Australia, Canada and Japan, which, like China, were targets of U. S.-Soviet domination.^ the list of those leaders China spent the most time cultivating after the Test Ban Treaty shows--Sukarno, Nkrumah, DeGaulle, Ne Win, Nasser, Sihanouk, Ayub Khan, even the Sheik of Yemen--most of the united front allies she tried to recruit were, in fact, staunch nationalists, many of them with quite anti-communist records on domestic issues. Anti-Soviet and anti-American they might be; radical revolutionaries they were not. In effect, this proposed coalition reflected Peking's attempt to project a modified Maoist-type united front Ce *g* "below" and "above") onto the international setting of the 1960's. Hotirever, it differed from the internal Chinese civil war model in one cru cial respect, namely that aside from China the composition of this front leaned heavily to the political Right and, as a foreign policy, it stressed the primacy of Peking's relations with bour geois governments and leaders over communist revolutionary move ments. The effort to woo the communist states and parties of Asia away from Moscow was an important part of Chinese policy after 1 9 6 3, ^ but the larger great power strategy she tried to forge was actually based much more on the prospects she saw for alliances with "bourgeois" countries like Indonesia and Pakistan. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === Ayub Khan's dispute with New Delhi presented Peking with an opportunity not only to outflank her enemy, India, but also to undermine the U. S. and Soviet positions in the sub-continent. On the other hand, Sukarno's conflict with Malaysia might be ex ploited to counter-encircle the SEATO/ANZUS bloc and, therefore, ultimately to weaken the U. S. position in Indo China and the Pacific. In these two areas lay hard, important Chinese strategic interests. Compared to these considerations in 1963-1965, the small, disorganized struggling insurgent groups in Africa, Latin America--or the rest of Asia for that matter--had yet to demon strate any substantial anti-imperialist or internal revolutionary potential. It was useful to laud them now and again but they were a long way from exerting major influence on Peking's foreign policy strategy. This dominance of great power over revolutionary interests in Chinese policy toward Indonesia came fully into view during the year following Sukarno's diplomatic defeat at the 1964 con ference of non-aligned nations. Shortly after his return from Cairo, Sukarno took his first step toward the Chinese camp. November 4, 1964, three weeks after the CPR's first nuclear detona tion (October 16), he suddenly flew to Shanghai where talks were held with Chou En-lai. No statements or communiques issued from this apparently urgent and unpublicized meeting. However, it evidently produced a decision to hold subsequent formal negotia tions on various forms of substantive cooperation between the two states, for Sukarno's visit to China was quickly followed by the arrival of Chen Yi in Djakarta on November 27 for a week-long series of discussions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === 226 The exceptional candor of the Sino-Indonesian joint press release of December 3, revealed an unprecedented degree of agree ment between Djakarta and Peking on a wide range of global and regional issues. It openly expressed that the two powers were working out ways by which their foreign policies could become mutually re-enforcing. Chen Yi reaffirmed the CPR's full support for Indonesia's struggle "to crush... 'Malaysia' which consti tute [d] a direct threat to the security and growth of the develop ing countries of Southeast Asia." The two parties reached "a common understanding and agreed that the struggle against imper ialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism [were] a single struggle [whose parts] cannot be separated from one another." They noted an "exchange of information and experience on the present stage of the common struggle... " and that "various world problems now being faced, and others to be faced in the near future", were 23 discussed as well as "ways of raising the level of struggle." At the same time Chen Yi extended Indonesia a U. S. $50 million credit for economic development and foreign exchange reserves. With these accords, Peking became the major external force sup porting Sukarno's foreign policy and, as the new credit suggested, an alternative source of aid to shore up the deteriorating Indo nesian economy. The full extent of China's desire to remove all obstacles in the path of a rapprochement had become clear earlier in March 1964 when Peking volunteered to turn over the assets of the Bank of China in Indonesia to Sukarno's government. This institution was regarded by virtually all politically conscious Indonesians of non-communist persuasion as the CPR's main source of leverage Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === 227 on the overseas Chinese business community and as the ever-ready 24 bank account of the PKI. Precisely because the Bank of China was widely believed to be the principal instrument of Peking’s suspected subversive activities, when it passed into the hands of the Indonesian government the following November, anti-communist circles in Djakarta were hard pressed to explain this transaction as another manifestation of "the threat from China." spoke for themselves. The facts Peking had not only given the Sukarno regime new sources of financial power, she had also liquidated, on her own initiative, the most important base for interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs. In January 1965 Sukarno announced Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations following the seating of Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. He regarded the recognition accorded to Malaysia by this action as another slap at Djakarta which rendered the United Nations useless as a forum where Indonesia might expect to advance her national interests. In response, Sukarno would soon call for a new international organization, CONEFO [the Conference of the "New Emerging Forces"] which would stand in opposition to the United Nations, an insti tution he charged was dominated by the "Old Established Forces." These were the kind of sentiments the Chinese leaders had them selves expressed and hoped other nationalists would do. Hence they greeted Indonesia's withdrawal from the U. N., pledging 25 "resolute" support for Sukarno's decision and condemning the U. N. as a place where genuinely independent and revolutionary nations could no longer "uphold justice" in the face of "manipulations" by the United States. But the most significant fact Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 242] === 228 the U. N. withdrawal disclosed was that Sukarno’s perspective on world affairs had by 1965 essentially boiled down to that of Peking's. In effect, there was little difference between the concept of a polarization between "NEFO's" and "OLDEFO's" and China's image of the contradiction between the "imperialists" and the "oppressed nations and peoples." The two countries reached the stage of a de facto power axis in late-January 1965 when foreign minister Subandrio led a 42member delegation of high-level Indonesian civilian and military officials to Peking. This was the largest group of Indonesian leaders ever to visit China and the inclusion of ranking army, air force and naval commanders implied impending new developments of considerable political significance. Since the top Indonesian military leaders had long regarded China as the covert ally of their domestic rivals, the PKI, and a potential external threat to their country in the future, it is most unlikely these feel ings had been swept away by Sukarno's recent expressions of friend ship for Peking. But the generals also shared Sukarno's national istic ambitions and, to the extent the CPR might support these aims, they could endorse the alliance with Peking while at the same time carefully scrutinizing it. Aside from their natural interest in Chinese economic and possibly military assistance, the Indonesian generals presumably had reason to believe Sukarno had reached a general understanding with Peking that was compat ible with their own conception of Indonesia's security interests and her leadership aspirations in Southeast Asia. For the aims and interests of the generals were not abandoned simply because no other major powers were prepared to support Djakarta. As the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === 229 earlier Soviet arms deal had shown, the Indonesian military was quite prepared to use capitalist or communist aid to further its own ends. On January 28, 1965, a joint statement was issued which revealed the extent of the Sino-Indonesian axis and that it might even have future military implications. The statement announced mutual agreement on virtually every major international question. assailed the U. S. as the "leader of imperialism, colonialism,... carrying on interference, subversion, intimidation, inter27 vention and aggression in Asia, Africa and Latin America." expressed Sino-Indonesian support for the "peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia" and stressed that "the anti-imperialist revo lutionary movements of all peoples form an integral whole and that they should support and coordinate with each other." Both nations reaffirmed support for Indonesia’s "confrontation" policy, and China "solemnly declared that should the British and U. S. imperialists dare to impose a war on the Indonesian people, the Chinese people would absolutely not sit idly by." The last phrase was language Peking would soon use to warn the U. S. of possible Chinese intervention in Indo-China following the bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965. The Sino-Indonesian declaration of diplomatic and political unity also noted that the two powers had agreed to "strengthen their technical cooperation, expand their trade, develop maritime transportation..., and strengthen their friendly contacts in the military field." It was later learned that "friendly contacts in the military field", in fact, included a Chinese promise to deliver small arms to Indonesia. 28 But in the light of the CPR's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === nuclear test the previous October, the joint statement's references to "technical" cooperation carried the more important implication that the longer-range possibilities of an-.alliance with a nuclear China was a new factor in Indonesia's calculations. After the Subandrio delegation left Peking, there were persistent statements from Djakarta to the effect that Indonesia intended to become a 29 nuclear power. Incredible as this appeared, given the primitive state of her industrial capacity, if there were serious preten sions of this nature some of Djakarta's military and civilian leaders apparently regarded the alliance with China as a means of obtaining the necessary assistance to make a start in the nuclear direction. It seems most unlikely that nuclear, or any other prospects for aid did much to lower the Indonesian military's suspicions about China. But the generals were also suspicious of Russian 30 and, to a lesser extent, American intentions. What can be said is that Sukarno's generals stood to gain from the aid and techno logical agreements with Peking--just as they had been the major beneficiaries of all the past aid deals--and that there is no persuasive evidence to indicate they seriously tried to bloc the axis. On the other side the steady exchanges of military delega tions between the two countries after January 1965 suggests the Chinese were making a concerted effort to woo the Indonesian officer class, especially its pro-Sukarno elements. Since the viability of the axis ultimately depended on the Indonesian mili tary's support, an effort had to be made to overcome their suspi cions about China, even though Peking could not offer the quan tity, types or quality of modern military equipment which attracted Sukarno's generals to Moscow and Washington. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 245] === The Peking-Djakarta Axis and Indonesian Communism Numerically and organizationally, by early-1963 the PKI had become the largest single political force in Indonesia. But the problem of sustaining momentum under conditions where the party had no access to, or immediate prospects of sharing, power had become acute. Although the Party had tried to acquire a measure of organizational and political independence in the cities and the countryside, in neither area could it be said this objective had been realized. Under Guided Democracy only government-approved strikes, seizures and other demonstrations were permitted. The Party's large labor, youth and women's organizations could produce splendid rallies for Sukarno to address; these activities, however, could do little to persuade the rank and file in the cities and towns that the PKI itself was moving closer to power. In the countryside the situation had become somewhat more favorable. Following the decision in 1959 to build up organiza tional strength in this area, by 1962 the PKI claimed that the communist-controlled Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants 31 Front) had grown to 4.5 million members. However, much of this expansion was possible because, unlike the cities, the army was less able to interfere in or harass PKI activities in the villages. Actually this did not mean there were no obstacles to communist power in the countryside, but only that the restraints took dif ferent forms. Aside from the outer islands, where PKI activities were generally blunted by the regional military commanders, in Java, middle and rich peasants tended to be heavily santri Moslems, ideologically quite resistant to communism or to the agitation of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === village grievances. On the other hand, the Party's appeals were 32 highly successful among the more non-Moslem abangan Javanese. Any attempt to play the abangan class off against the santri types, however, was almost certain to ignite a communal war which, given the geography and the overall balance of power, the PKI could not possibly win. Moreover, since the Army officer class itself, more strongly prijaji (aristocratic/bureaucratic) than Moslem, had a vested socio-economic interests in the status quo-there were landed santri and prijaji relatives to protect--any serious economic threat to the status quo in the villages invited instant repression. This had been demonstrated in the incidents 33 at Keairi in 1961 when the Army forcefully evicted squatters whom the PKI had encouraged to take over state lands seized from the Dutch by the Indonesian army in 195 7. The PKI knew pressing a general land reform campaign--despite the dormant 1960 land reform law as justification, was dangerous. Aidit himself had earlier rejected class warfare in the countryside as unsuited to Indonesian conditions. Thus careful radicalism in the countryside was about as far as the Party could go; Kediri and other showdowns tended to prove it was dangerous to go even that far. As a consequence of the PKI's containment in the cities and the countryside a political breakthrough at the national level was the only feasible route open to the Indonesian Communists. In January 1963, Aidit urged that the PKI be brought into the government in order to realize national unity in accordance with Sukarno's proclaimed policy of bringing the nationalist, communist and Islamic elements together.34 By including its leaders in the Cabinet Sukarno hoped not only to unify the country but also to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === conciliate and domesticate the PKI. But the Indonesian generals feared the consequences to themselves of this scheme and there fore consistently blocked it. In the light of the dilemmas facing the Indonesian Communists it is not difficult to see why the onset of the Malaysia dispute appeared to be a development that might break the internal dead lock. The PKI's situation was such that it had a strong interest in a prolonged and militant struggle with Malaysia. This crisis would tend to preoccupy the army with external dangers, and thus give the Party a greater opportunity to enlarge its organizations under the banner of anti-imperialist nationalism, as it had done with great success during the Irian dispute. Moreover, a pro tracted crisis might give Sukarno the leverage he needed to bring the communists into the government. Consequently, the last thing the PKI wanted was a composure of the dispute that would probably restore the handicaps and dilemmas of the previous status quo. Its attitude toward Russia and China after 1963, therefore, neces sarily had to be based on how the policies of these two nations contributed to sustaining the momentum of the Party in Indonesia. Aidit's shift to the Chinese camp in the dispute with the Soviet Union was a gradual and cumulative process. Moscow's failure to give strong support to Indonesia's confrontation policy was the decisive factor but the general drift of Soviet policy after late-1962, especially in Asia, appears to have weakened the Indonesian Communists' heretofore pro-Moscow posture even before the outbreak of the Malaysian issue. The decline of Soviet influence on the Indonesian Communists dates from OctoberNovember 1962 when the Cuban missile crisis and the border war Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 248] === between China and India forced most communist parties to take a stand in favor of Moscow or Peking. That the Soviets would draw back from a confrontation in Cuba they themselves had precipitated and also side with "bourgeois" New Delhi against "socialist" China evidently had a profound effect on the PKI leaders. If the Soviet Union so prized a detente with the imperialists that it would re treat from Cuba and support India against China there had to be grave doubts about Moscow's credibility to support the interests of the Indonesian Communists should a dangerous test come in the future. The fact the PKI took positions on both disputes essen tially parallel to those expressed by the CCP indicated that by late 1962 a basic reappraisal of its attitudes toward Russia and China was near at hand. The turning point came on February 10, 1963, when Aidit de livered a major report to the PKI Central Committee in which, for the first time, he emphasized "modern revisionism" (i.e., Soviet policies) as the main danger to the international communist move ment. Heretofore, the PKI had condemned both "modern revisionism" and "classic and modern dogmatism" (i.e., Chinese policies). Peking gave this speech the widest possible circulation at home 37 and abroad --previous statements by Aidit had received scant, if any, mention in China. On May 20, 1963 Red Flag, the CCP's lead ing ideological journal, for the first time carried a major article on the Indonesian Communist Party. It hailed the PKI as having adopted "the correct political line and policy" not only with respect to opposing "modern revisionism" but also in its domestic united front strategy. Moreover, quite exaggerated praise was given to the PKI's "theoretical contributions to Marxism-Leninism" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 249] === - 235 and to its "influence and prestige" in the communist movement. By saying these things Peking seemed to be making a bid for an ideological alignment with the Aidit group that would re-enforce her parallel diplomatic policy toward Sukarno. Aidit's decisive step into the China camp did not occur until September 1963, following his unsuccessful attempt to help mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute. The PKI leader was given a brief and cool reception for his efforts in Moscow, whereupon he flew to Peking and received a welcome bordering on that accorded only to major communist statesmen. - Aidit was promptly hailed as "a brilliant Marxist-Leninist theoretician" and a "close friend and comrad in arms of the Chinese people [whose] theoretical general39 izations... are of vital educational experience to us." Peking also announced its discovery that the PKI's policies and strategy had "ever increasing attraction for the Communists and revolutionary peoples of the capitalist world, particularly of the Asian, African and Latin American countries." Its "great suc cess and rich experience" were seen to be "of great international 40 significance for the international Communist movement." As Aidit and his Chinese hosts well knew, the "brilliance" and "significance" of the PKI's contributions to Marxism-Leninism consisted solely of an internal united front program, as a result of which the leadership of the Indonesian revolution had been sur rendered to Sukarno while the Party existed at the sufferance of a reactionary, anti-communist army. PKI was, in fact, a Party whose revolutionary rhetoric scarcely concealed its close resemb lance to the French and Italian "structural reformists" on whom Peking was then leveling an unrelenting ideological broadside. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The === [PDF page 250] === argument made by the "structural reformists," that socialism could be achieved by the workers' gradual capture of parliamen tary institutions, was essentially the same as Aidit's thesis about "peacefully changing the balance of forces" in Indonesia by winning over the "pro-people" elements and isolating the 41 "anti-people" elements. That idea was a far cry from Maoism any way one looked at it. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the Chinese leaders' eulogy of the PKI's "revisionist" strategy is that the ideological and political terms of an alliance between the two parties were being hammered out during the Aidit visit. This was apparent from the contents of the two major speeches Aidit de livered in China.^ They were not, as might have been expected for a communist party about to line-up with the CCP, scathing at tacks on Soviet "revisionism" or calls for "armed struggle." the contrary, they were lengthy, careful justifications of the PKI's peaceful road theories, explaining why it was possible win victory in Indonesia by relying on the masses and the PKI's organizations--a tactic wholly unsupported by independent mili tary power or rural base areas--the <-ore of Chinese revolutionary doctrine. Both speeches contained strong declarations that the PKI had "Indonesianized" Marxism-Leninism and that it would accept no criticism from foreign parties. The deal that was struck, therefore, apparently involved the CCP's agreement to endorse the PKI's internal "revisionist" line in exchange for the latter's support for Peking on the major issues of global strategy raised in the polemic with Moscow, i.e., opposition to the Soviet policies of detente with the United States Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 251] === and abandonment of the anti-imperialist struggles in the AfroAsian world. When Aidit returned to Indonesia in late September he spoke for the first time of a "momentous choice" facing all the communist parties, a choice that would reveal "who were the genuine Marxist-Leninists and who were false Marxist-Leninist 43 revisionists." On the basis of the PKI's record, however, "genuine Marxist-Leninists" could now include those parties which, in fact, had adopted the Soviet-style "peaceful transition" line on the question of internal strategy, provided they joined China's third force coalition on foreign policy issues. As their endorse ment of the PKI "revisionist" line indicates, the Chinese leaders welcomed an alliance with their Indonesian comrades on these terms. Sources of Tension in the Sino-Indonesian Axis What is the main conclusion to be drawn from Peking's gradual embrace of the "revisionist" PKI and the army-dominated Sukarno regime? It is that Peking's policy in Indonesia had by late 1963 become, essentially, a function of her emerging great power strategy in the rivalry with America and Russia. That strategy viewed the "principal contradiction" to be the international struggle between "imperialism and the oppressed nations and peoples," the successful resolution of which required that the anti-U. S., anti-Soviet forces cooperate in the broadest possible united front. In terms of where the primary "revolutionary" emphasis should be placed, it meant that the main political blows must be directed against the United States and the Soviet Union. An important revolutionary corollary, of course, was that in countries like Indonesia (still in the "national democratic" stage) the internal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 252] === class struggle should be subordinated to the external conflict with "imperialism." Fundamentally, however, Chinese strategy in Indonesia was dependent not on global events but on two local factors: 1) the continuance of the assertive, anti-Malaysia foreign policy; and 2) the avoidance of a showdown between the PKI and the army which, if it occurred, would destroy the alliance with Sukarno. In the remainder of this chapter the analysis will try to show why it was that Peking could not decisively influence the course of events in Indonesia and, therefore, how little the alliance with Sukarno and the PKI could actually help to advance China's global foreign policy interests. The decisive sequence of events that triggered the fateful confrontation between the PKI and the Indonesian Army began well before the October 1, 1965 coup attempt, in fact, with Aidit's December 1963 report to the Party's Central Committee.^ That document raised again the dangerous issue of the government's un fulfilled land reform law and announced the PKI's intention to radicalize the countryside. During most of 1964 the Aidit leader ship pushed implementation of a "Unilateral Action Movement" (the Gerakan Aksi Sefihak campaign), as a result of which the peasants were incited to seize unoccupied government land, or that of absentee landlords, and to reduce the amount they paid under crop sharing agreements. There followed a number of violent clashes between the police and the peasants, the most serious being at the towns of Klaten, Indramaju and Bojolaliis on Java. incidents also occurred on Bali. A number of Sukarno was able to defuse the issue for a time by creating temporary land reform courts, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 253] === decisions of which were binding on the rival claimants* But on December 10, 1964,he was forced to bring PKI, Government and Army leaders to a conference at the Bogor palace to warn all concerned that the violence and disturbance must cease. As it had on other showdown issues, the PKI did Sukarno's bidding. The Party agreed to drop the aksi sepihak campaign. By this timely action the PKI's latest attempt to gain new momentum in the villages was again thwarted, but the political climate in the countryside had been irreparably disturbed. was now clear the communists would, if they could, challenge the local status quo. On the other hand, it was certain that the anti communists would take stern counter measures to protect their vested interests in the rural areas. With the covert assistance and encouragement of the army, after the clashes of 1964 many land owners quietly began to organize Muslim youths into quasi-village militia groups against the day when it might become necessary to suppress a tide of peasant demands for land redistribution.^ was these groups, rather than the army directly, which carried out the most savage phases of the communist massacre in 1965-1966.] Anxiety among anti-communist circles was further heightened by the growing accumulation of evidence that Sukarno, though he would tolerate no challenge to his own power, had no intention of totally curbing the PKI's militance, indeed regarded it as useful in counterbalancing the army and other conservatives. And Sukarno did, in fact, need the PKI as an instrument to prod and challenge the status quo in order that his own conception of radical nation alism could go forward. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 254] === In his annual address on August 17, 1964,Sukarno asserted that "the Indonesian revolution aims at socialism... " and he sharply criticized those elements who opposed his idea of fusing nationalism, Islam and communism (i.e., the NASAKOM formula).^ A short time before this he abolished the "Committee for Retooling the State Apparatus," PARAN, an organ controlled by the army and intended to indoctrinate government officials with the Sukarnoist ideology. To replace PARAN he created a new body, KOTRAR, in which the PKI was represented, much to the army's dissatisfaction. In December, he banned the "Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism," BPS, another scheme put forth by anti-communist political leaders --with army support--to outflank the PKI's increasingly effective efforts to identify its own slogans and programs as the epitome of Sukarno's teachings. ^ When asked by American journalists whether trends in Indonesia did not portend an eventual communist ascendence, Sukarno replied: "I do not care as long as they [the 48 PKI] do not make trouble for the Indonesian state," sentiments hardly reassuring to those elements which were determined to pre vent even the Party's inclusion in the government. The PKI took another radical step in January 1965 when Aidit asked Sukarno to agree to the arming of a "fifth force" composed of workers and peasants He declared this militia could provide 15 million armed citizens to defend the nation from possible attack by the British, then claimed by Djakarta 49 to be preparing to launch aggression against Indonesia. Shortly thereafter Aidit proposed that a "NASAKOM Committee" be established in the Army down to the battalion level to insure ideological in doctrination throughout the instruments of the state to ensure Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === - 241 conformity with Sukarno's teachings.^ During 1965, articles and editorials in PKI organs began to clamour for the resignation of "bureaucratic-capitalists" from all government services, plants and commercial enterprises--a thinly disguised attack on the Indo nesian officer corps which held these managerial positions. Sukarno did not implement these proposals, nor did he reject them outright. Opposition to them was very strong in anti-communist circles and there was never the slightest possibility that the then existing army leadership would have accepted a rival armed militia, or what no doubt was intended to be a political reliability--or commissar--system in its own ranks. Nevertheless, these issues remained very much alive throughout 1965, and in his August 17 speech of that year proclaiming the alliance with the CPR, Sukarno said he was still weighing the matter of the "fifth force" and that he would soon make a judgment.^ Shortly before the coup attempt, therefore, an acute state of tension existed between the army and the PKI. Whichever way Sukarno decided the issues, the old balance of power was certain to be disrupted. Either the army's position would be undermined or the PKI's effort to sustain momentum would again be blocked. In view of the dangers involved, what factors explain why the PKI decided to present the Indonesian anti-communists with a direct challenge? The least likely explanation is that Peking pressured the Aidit group to take this fateful step. Aside from all the historical evidence which demonstrated the PKI took orders from no external authority, Chinese foreign policy interests and strategy required that the PKI avoid any actions that might under mine her relations with Sukarno. Because the preservation of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 256] === friendship with Sukarno had been uppermost in China's calculations since the late 19501s--during which time relations with the Indo nesian Communists could scarcely be described as close--it seems most improbable that the quite recent rapprochement with the "revisionist" PKI leadership suddenly led Peking to reappraise the overall situation in Indonesia or the basic policies she was pursuing. It is also conceivable that leftist elements in the PKI had recently succeeded in forcing Aidit to adopt a more mili tant line, but there is no solid evidence the Party leadership was 52 beset by important factional disputes. Such evidence as does exist points to the conclusion that the sheer size of the PKI, and the highly unstable domestic situation it confronted, were creating pressures to which the party leadership had to respond. They fatally misjudged what could be done. By June 1964, the PKI claimed three million party members. 5 3 The number of women, youth, labor and peasants associated with, or under the control of, its organizations were estimated at up wards of fourteen million. In August 1965, shortly before the Coup attempt, the PKI estimated over twenty-six million people were members of organizations it had created.^ Allowing for exaggeration, it appears that no less than fifteen to twenty mil lion Indonesians, roughly one-sixth of the population, were to a greater or lesser degree under the direct political influence of the PKI. In fact, Aidit claimed the party would poll no less than one-third of the vote if elections were ever held.5^ This was probably no exaggeration considering what PKI had done at the polls in 1955 and in 1957-58. Notwithstanding their earlier, well-known contempt for the worth of electoral support in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 257] === - 243 absence of independent military power, the Chinese Communists themselves published Aidit's boast that "the enemies of communism are unable to openly launch political attacks on the PKI, since many of the Party's political viewpoints have already been incor porated in State documents. When these assessments are combined with the evidence of Sukarno's growing encouragement to PKI militancy, the effect on the PKI is not difficult to see. By 1965 the Indonesian Communists had concluded that their movement was too large to repress, its very size being a deterrent against a pre-emptive army strike since that action was likely to ignite a civil war. Moreover, Sukarno's encouragement and protection of the party gave it quasigovernmental status. Viewing the overall situation in this light, the Aidit group apparently decided that a program of carefully timed but steadily mounting radical demands would meet with Sukarno's favor, help him to achieve the goals he sought during his own lifetime and, thereby, eventually clear the path for the PKI to succeed him as the legitimate leader of the revolution. With the PKI's fateful move to a more radical domestic line in 1964-65 the inherent conflict in Peking's policy toward Indo nesia finally came to the surface: On the one hand, China's great power strategy required that the Indonesian Communists take no adventurist actions which might undermine the alliance with Sukarno. On the other hand, the PKI looked like it was attempting to become, in the Indonesian context, a Maoist-type revolutionary movement, a transformation which was bound to alarm and alienate the very elements in Indonesia on which the survival of the Peking-Djakarta axis depended. In failing to resolve, or possibly ignoring, this "contradiction" the Chinese leaders revealed how far they had, in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === 244 fact, veered from the original Maoist basis of their foreign policy doctrine. At first glance it appears that the PKI's provocative moves in 1964-1965 bore no relation to basic Chinese revolutionary theory and tactics and, moreover, that any genuine Maoists in Peking should have been alarmed by what the PKI was doing. Aidit's decision to press the land reform, "fifth force" and "Nasakomization" of the army were not, after all, convincing evidence of armed revolution in the countryside, but only further manifesta tions of the PKI's attempt to promote militant legal struggle within the framework of the unshaken and unchallenged Indonesian bourgeois system. The Indonesian Communists still had no inde pendent military force, no peasant population they could rely on or control and no secure base areas; hence their brand of radi calism merely invited the very same kind of suppression that had fallen on the CCP in 1927 as a result of pursuing policies basi cally similar to those adopted by Aidit after 1964. In view of their larger foreign policy interests and the fact that the PKI did not, in any event, possess the politicalmilitary wherewithall, clearly the Chinese leaders did not want their Indonesian comrades to take adventurist actions. The prac tical question facing Peking, therefore, was whether or not, given the situation, the PKI's radicalism was safely below this threshold. Since there is some evidence to suggest that Peking 57 approved the land reform campaign and the "fifth force" idea which, however, were attributed mainly to Sukarno--the presumption must be that Aidit's growing militance had, at least initially, Peking's tentative support. Moreover, with a little juggling of the finer points of Maoist theory, the Indonesian revolution Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === 245 could be viewed as moving into its "New Democratic" stage under the impetus of the "imperialist" threat created by Malaysia's presence. The essential criteria for a Maoist-type movement was not that independent military forces be organized immediately, but that the revolutionaries must eventually develop this compo nent. While circumstances confronting the PKI made this require ment exceedingly difficult to fulfil, in radicalizing the peasants and pushing for a fifth force militia there were indications the Aidit leadership might, with Sukarno's assistance, ultimately be able to develop in Indonesia the Chinese equivalent of the Red Army. In this sense, the PKI's attempt to exploit an Indonesian "national war of resistance" against imperialism--Malaysia appears to have been regarded in Peking as leading to a revolutionary situation comparable to the anti-Japanese war period of 19371945. Indeed, since the conflict model of the anti-Japanese war was explicitly projected onto the world scene as characterizing the contemporary international struggle in the famous Lin Piao 58 article of September 3, 1965, it is reasonable to suppose this perception governed the Chinese leaders' appraisal of future trends in Indonesia. This perception contained two fundamental shortcomings. First, unless the imperialists actually attacked or invaded Indo nesia, the massive explosion of anti-foreign nationalism required to turn the revolution over to the PKI was most unlikely to occur. And, second, the PKI's time-frame was entirely different from China's. As the Lin Piao statement revealed, Peking envisioned a very protracted struggle before the imperialists were gradually, but slowly, surrounded and driven out of Asia, Africa and Latin Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 260] === - 246 America by a China-led alliance between nationalism and communism. The PKI, on the other hand, with no weapons but only a 64-year-old protector--Sukarno--who would probably not be around much longer, could not afford to wait until the unfolding of China's grand de sign produced the conditions for communist hegemony in Indonesia. The ambivalence underlying Peking's attitude toward the poli cies of their Indonesian comrades was clearly revealed at the 45th anniversary of the PKI in May 1965. This occasion provided CCP Politbureau member Peng Chen, the leader of the Chinese delegation to the ceremonies, with a platform to deliver major statements on Peking's global strategy and its implications for the Indonesian Communists. He praised the "creativity" and the "correct line and policies" of the PKI leadership, including its "resolute struggle" against "the seven devils' in the rural areas... " and its "call for arming the workers and peasants." "[E]ven more brilliant achievements" lay ahead, so Peng Chen said, for the PKI's struggle against local "feudalism, compradore-capitalism and bureaucratic-capitalism" (i.e., the Indonesian army and its anti-communist allies)... and against the external enemies, "imperialism" and "modern revisionism." 59 That such praise did not, however, constitute full endorse-ment or encouragement for radical action on the Indonesian domestic front was sharply apparent from the thrust of Peng Chen's theses in his second and major address during the visit to Djakarta.^0 The present era, he said, was one of many "contradictions" facing the communist movement. However, "taking the world situation as a whole the contradiction between the oppressec nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 261] === 247 States is the most prominent and acute of all the basic contradic tions and is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world." (emphasis added) He then cited the "national-democratic revolutionary movements" in Indo-China, the Congo, the Dominican Republic and Indonesia as "the most important force directly hit ting imperialism." These "anti-imperialist struggles" were render ing great assistance to the socialist states and those countries where the proletariat "has not yet won victory." On this basis, Peng Chen went on to make the case that "the resolution of the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism" had "a vital bearing" and was of "key importance" for the development of the whole communist movement. "It was," he said, "essential for Marxist-Leninists to single out this prin cipal contradiction... and grasp it firmly. Only by so doing can one correctly discern and determine the principal enemy and the principal target of attack..., decide which forces to rely on and which to unite with, and formulate the correct strategy and tactics." (emphasis added) The attitude communist parties adopted toward this question, Peng said, "constitute[d] the most important criterion for distinguishing between Marxist-Leninists and modern revisionists, between revolutionaries and counter revolutionaries and between real revolutionaries and sham revolu tionaries." There followed what can only be interpreted as an open Chi nese declaration that the present international situation required that the PKI should subordinate its internal revolutionary tactics in Indonesia to Peking's global strategy for opposing the imper ialists. In the "present stage," Peng said, the task of the com munist parties was "to unite all the revolutionary people... Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 262] === 248 to combat the imperialists and reactionaries, win world peace, national liberation, peoples' democracy and socialism"; and he noted, as the last objective, to "strive for the gradual achievement of complete victory in the proletarian world revolution." (emphasis added) Every communist party's struggle went through "different stages" and had its "own charI acteristics," Peng admitted, "but none can be independent of the general laws governing the development of world history." (emphasis added) The point he was belaboring was that "the contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed nations" was "the governing law" of the present era, and no Marxist-Leninist party should conduct its internal revolution in a manner that impaired China's global strategy of uniting as many anti-imperialist "oppressed nations" as possible. The "future" of the world proletarian revolution was seen to be very "bright," especially in "the next hundred years"(!) when there would be "still greater revolutionary changes in the world." With this long range view in mind, Peng Chen was saying that for non-governing communist parties, like the PKI, the global anti-imperialist struggle had to be given priority over their immediate internal revolutionary aspirations. Sino-Indonesian Relations on the Eve of the Untung Coup Peng Chen's line of argument in his lecture to the PKI on the meaning and implications of the present "principal contradic tion" laid bare the conflicting nature of the two Party's interests. From Peking's analysis it followed that the PKI should not take actions which might impair the Chinese alliance with Sukarno. was also saying the Indonesian Communists should remember that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. She === [PDF page 263] === 249 their revolution was still in its "anti-imperialist, nationaldemocratic" stage. However, the direction in which the PKI was moving clearly threatened to make the "principal contradiction" in Indonesia an internal one between the bourgeoisie and the pro letariat. That development could only undermine China's global strategy which required emphasizing the external contradiction between the Indonesian nation and imperialism. problems and needs differently. The PKI saw its It could not carry out a "revolu tionary" united front from "below" strategy. On the other hand, though Sukarno might somehow still bring the party into the govern ment he had not been able to do it in nine years; consequently, there was serious doubt whether a prolonged united front from "above" strategy would help the PKI avoid becoming domesticated. Although the PKI appeared to be moving in the Maoist direc tion, therefore, in fact the radical actions it took after 1964 seem designed to preserve both the front from "above" and "below" options. In essence, what the Aidit leadership ended up with-- willingly or not--was a two-part strategy embodying elements of the conflicting Soviet and Chinese theories on the seizure of power. Its pressure for land reform and the "fifth force" were attempts to find, in the Indonesian context, the equivalent of Mao's united front from "below." But this was minus the armed struggle, peasant revolution and base area components essential to that strategy, hence it was phoney Maoism. On the other hand, the PKI hammered away at winning over the left-wing of the Indo nesian elite, infiltrating the armed forces and the bureaucracy, pressing for a Nasakom system in the Army and staunchly aligning with Sukarno. That looked like a united front from "above" aimed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 264] === at the possibility of an eventual peaceful takeover, as the Soviets had argued was possible. But Khrushchev's theory of "peaceful transition" was based on national-democratic states gradually being drawn into the Russian, not the Chinese, orbit--a' la the Cuban and Egyptian route, where the bourgeoisie supposedly em braces socialism in order to build a modern industrial state. effect, the PKI attempted to "Indonesianize" the Russian and Chi nese models but left out the essential core ideas of both. The triumph of Chinese diplomacy, marked by Sukarno's August 17, 1965,speech heralding the alliance with Peking, really masked two serious and unresolved problems: Peking finally had the long sought anti-imperialist alliance with Indonesia and, evidently, had been able to arrive at some preliminary understanding with Djakarta about the two powers' respective roles in Southeast Asia. But Sukarno's past record as an ally of communism was an unreliable one and, in the final analysis, the stability of the axis depended on his rela tions with his generals. By wholeheartedly supporting Indonesia's external nationalistic objectives, shared by the generals, Peking's policy hoped to reduce this danger to the alliance. Only time would tell whether her efforts would be successful. The PKI had been won over to the Chinese camp because the CCP had endorsed Aidit's "revisionist" internal strategy. That strategy was entirely compatible with, indeed essential to, the CPR's primary goal of forging an alliance with Sukarno. maintain the alliance with the PKI after 1964, however, Peking was compelled to endorse Aidit's shift to a more radical line Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 265] === 251 which ran the serious risk of undermining the alliance with Sukarno and thus clearly conflicted with China's global strategy. The pursuit of a great power policy in Indonesia had ulti mately placed the CPR in a position that bore a striking resem blance to the Soviet quandry in China forty years before. Peking's struggle with her external enemies necessitated collaboration with Indonesia's anti-imperialist bourgeois nationalist government. This collaboration was eventually expected to help the PKI capture leadership of the Indonesian revolution in the course of a pro tracted, global anti-imperialist struggle. But it also meant that Indonesia's internal revolution had to be subordinated to the world revolution, the former gaining momentum as the inter national balance of forces changed so as to facilitate the seizure of power by the proletariat in various countries. Within this framework, theoretically, the PKI was correct in trying to fuse both an "above" and "below" united front strategy--provided this did not compromise the dominance of the external over the internal revolution. The main difference between the situation Moscow faced in the 1920's and that of Peking in 1965 was, of course, that the Chinese Communists were not the directors of the PKI. They could urge, but could not compel, Aidit to follow an internal line tailored to Peking's handling of the international situation. The difficulty was that Aidit's views of what was necessary for the advance of the Indonesian revolution and the preservation of the PKI did not accord with Peking's foreign policy. Hence, at the zenith of its success Peking's great power strategy in Indo nesia had produced its own "contradiction": it could not solve Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 266] === 252 the fundamental problem inherent in China's attempt to externalize the united front model. She could not control the behavior of the constituent parts of the front, Sukarno and the PKI, yet what these two actors did, or what happened to them, would decisively effect the success or failure of her policy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 267] === CHAPTER VII FOOTNOTES The most authoritative analysis of the background to the dispute and its impact on Indonesia is Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, Fall 1964, pp. 253-270. For an excellent analysis of Sukarno's evolving policy during the early phases of the controversy see, Fredrick P. Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1969, especially Chapters I, III and V. In fact, PKI was the first to attack the British plan for a merger. See Harian Rakjat, August 31, 1961. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 15, 1962. Full text in Peking Review, April 26, 1963, pp. The complete text of the Accords appears in the New York Times, June 12, 1963. Ibid., August 5, 1963. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," op. cit., pp. 264-267. Also see Mohammad Halta, "One Indonesian's View of Malaysia," Asian Survey, March 1965, pp. 139-143. For the Indonesian governments objections see, A Survey of the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federa tion of Malaysia, Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. CT., 1963. Radio Djakarta domestic service, September 25, 1963. 10. Cf. A Survey of the Controversial Problem of the Establish ment of the Federation of Malaysia, op. cit. 11. That the Soviet Union was considering a new aid grant to Indonesia was reported in the New York Times, January 7, 1965. 12. New York Times, July 23, 1964. 13. Speech of August 17, 1964, commemorating the nineteenth anni versary of the proclamation of Indonesia's independence, Djakarta Radio domestic service, August 17, 1964. 14. Middle East News Agency, October 6, 1964. 15. Jen-min Jih-pao, September 29, 1963. 16. Ibid., September 9, 1963. 11-12. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 268] === 254 17. Pi Wen, "Ma-lai-hsi-ya lien-pang chi-hua po-shih," (Dissect the Federation of Malaysia Plan), Shih-chieh Chih-shih (World Knowledge), Peking, April 10, 1963, p. 16. 18. Jen-min Jih-pao, September 9, 1963, loc. cit. 19. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1964, p. 3. 20. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 2, 1964. 21. See the important article in Jen-min Jih-pao, January 21, 1964. 22. For the history and documents pertaining to this effort see William E. Griffith's The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1964). 23. Full text in NCNA (Djakarta), December 3, 1964. 24. It was widely believed that the Bank of China lent credit to local Chinese businessmen on condition that they contribute to the PKI. The Bank was also a source of foreign exchange for Peking since, under a s r j ^ ^ ^ r a n s f e r of profits agree ment, a percentage of i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B h j u n g s could be taken out of the country, a enterprises were also permitted to d o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H f e v ’ernment This was unable the under per year. to stem the reserves. Jen-min Jih-pao, 26. Jen-min Jih-pao, Ja nu^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ P ^ i l s o the article "Yintu-ni-hsi-ya jen-min t e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m i n g tou-cheng" ("The Indonesian People's Revolut^H^^*inti-Imperialist Struggle"), Shih-chieh Chih-shih, January 1965, pp. 17-19. 27. Full text in Peking Review, February 5, 1965, pp. 6-8. 28. As reported in the New York Times, October 19, 1965. 29. For example, see the statement by General Hartono, Antara, February 2, 1965. The foundations for an Indonesian nuclear development program were virtually non-existent. Under an agreement concluded in 1958 the Soviet Union supplied some economic and technical assistance to get a "peaceful uses of atomic energy" program going but little progress had been made. However, the construction of a Soviet-built nuclear reactor was supposed to begin in early 1965. Tass, January 30, 1965. 30. During the formation of the Peking-Djakarta axis high-ranking Indonesian military officers frequently condemned the presence of the Western powers in Southeast Asia. On one occasion Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 269] === 254 17. Pi Wen, "Ma-lai-hsi-ya lien-pang chi-hua po-shih," (Dissect the Federation of Malaysia Plan), Shih-chieh Chih-shih (World Knowledge), Peking, April 10, 1963, p. T(k 18. Jen-min Jih-pao, September 9, 1963, loc. cit. 19. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1964, p. 3. 20. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 2, 1964. 21. See the important article in Jen-min Jih-pao, January 21, 1964. 22. For the history and documents pertaining to this effort see William E. Griffith's The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1964). 23. Full text in NCNA (Djakarta), December 3, 1964. 24. It was widely believed that the Bank of China lent credit to local Chinese businessmen on condition that they contribute to the PKI. The Bank was also a source of foreign exchange for Peking since, under a special transfer of profits agree ment, a percentage of its yearly earnings could be taken out of the country, a practice other foreign enterprises were also permitted to do by the Indonesian government. This writer was unable to find any reliable data on the sums in volved under this arrangement, though several Indonesian foreign ministry officials mentioned the figure $20 to $25 million per year. This estimate seems high in view of the economic crisis in Indonesia after 1959 and the government's actions to stem the flow of foreign exchange reserves. 25. Jen-min Jih-pao, January 6, 1965. 26. Jen-min Jih-pao, January 10, 1965. See also the article "Yintu-ni-hsi-ya jen-min te fan ti-kuo k'e-ming tou-cheng" ("The Indonesian People's Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Struggle"), Shih-chieh Chih-shih, January 1965, pp. 17-19. 27. Full text in Peking Review, February 5, 1965, pp. 6-8. 28. As reported in the New York Times, October 19, 1965. 29. For example, see the statement by General Hartono, Antara, February 2, 1965. The foundations for an Indonesian nuclear development program were virtually non-existent. Under an agreement concluded in 1958 the Soviet Union supplied some economic and technical assistance to get a "peaceful uses of atomic energy" program going but little progress had been made. However, the construction of a Soviet-built nuclear reactor was supposed to begin in early 1965. Tass, January 30, 1965. 30. During the formation of the Peking-Djakarta axis high-ranking Indonesian military officers frequently condemned the presence of the Western powers in Southeast Asia. On one occasion Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 270] === 255 Army Chief of Staff, General Yani--a leading anti-communist-proclaimed Indonesia's role to be that of displacing U. S.U. K. power in Southeast Asia. Djakarta Radio domestic service, January 27, 1965. 31. Harian Rakjat, April 30, 1962. 32. McVey, "Indonesian Communism Under Guided Democracy," op. cit., p. 158. 33. Ibid., pp. 178-179. 34. Reported in Antara, January 12, 1963. 35. On Cuba, see Aidit's statement of November 7, 1962, declaring: "It is a regrettable sacrifice that strategic defensive weapons are being dismounted in Cuba. It is regrettable be cause a sovereign state, Cuba, was forced to do things against its will." As reported in NCNA (Djakarta), November 7, 1962. On the Sino-Indian conflict, see Harian Rakjat, October 30, 1962. 36. Hindley, "The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU TwentySecond Congress," op. cit. 37. D. N. Aidit, Dare, Dare, and Dare Again, Political Report to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1963, p. 66. This statement was broadcast on Radio Peking and published in Jen-min Jih-pao, February 14, 1963. 38. On September 5, 1963, Aidit was made an honorary member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a clear Chinese recognition of his status as a major theoretician. NCNA (Peking), September 5, 1963. Peking also announced the publication in Chinese of Aidit's Selected Works. NCNA (Peking), August 30, 1963. 39. See speeches by Politburo member Peng Chen, reported in NCNA (Peking), September 4, 1963 and Alternate Politbureau membe"r Kang Sheng, NCNA (Peking), September 2, 1963. 40. Ibid., Kang Sheng speech. 41. For an analysis of the PKI's "changing the balance of forces" strategy see Pauker, "Indonesia: the PKI's 'Road to Power'," op. cit., pp. 260-265. 42. D. N. Aidit, "Several Questions on the Revolution in Indo nesia and the Indonesian Communist Party," Peking, September 4, 1963 and "The Indonesian Revolution Is an Inseparable Part of the World Socialist Revolution," Canton, September 25, 1963. See NCNA (Peking), September 25, 1963. 43. Harian Rakjat, September 30, 1963 as reported in NCNA October 3, 1963. (Peking), Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 271] === 256 44. Kobarkan Semangat Bantengl Madju Terus, Pantang Mundur (Awaken the Buffalo Spirit! Forward, Never Retreat). Poli tical Report to the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp. 21-22. 45. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," op. cit., pp. 377-378. 46. Full text in Djakarta Radio domestic broadcast service, August 17, 1964. 47. For the details on Sukarno's attempt to create a new state ideology see Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Haven: Vale University Press, 1966). 48. CBS News interview of January 31, 1965 as reported in Pauker, "Indonesia: The PKI's 'Road to Power'," op. cit., p. 284. 49. Antara, January 14, 1965. 19, 1965. 50. PKI Central Committee statement of May 7, 1965. Rakjat, May 7, 1965. 51. Djakarta Radio domestic service, August 52. At one point Aidit did admit that "internal contradictions" existed in the Party, but he gave no indication to suggest how serious they were or over what issues they had arisen. See his speech in Harian Rakjat, July 6, 1964. It seems unlikely a severe split existed since the PKI leadership had experienced no purge since 1951. 53. Harian Rakjat, June 27,1964. 54. Ibid., August 20, 1965. 55. Ibid., May 6, 1964. 56. The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Task of the Com munist Party of Indonesia, Report at the Higher Level Party School of tne Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, September 2, 1963 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 32. 57. Peking reported, without comment, excerpts of statements by Sukarno and also PKI editorials endorsing the need to imple ment the government's land reform law. See NCNA (Peking) releases of August 17, 18 and 24, 1964. 58. "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Peking Review, September 3, 1965, pp. 9-30. Also see Harian Rakjat, January In Harian 17, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 272] === 257 59. Speech to the PKI Central Committee, May 26, 1965. text in NCNA (Peking)> May 26, 1965. Full 60. Speech at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences in Indo nesia, May 25, 1965. Full text in Peking Review, June 11, 1965, pp. 10-20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 273] === CHAPTER VIII THE COLLAPSE OF CHINESE POLICY IN INDONESIA Because many of the crucial facts surrounding the October 1, 1965, Indonesian coup remain unknown the affair is still largely a puzzling, though highly debated, mystery. For the purposes of this study it is necessary to consider certain aspects of the coup in order to establish: 1) what, if any, role the CPR played in the episode; and 2) the immediate and longer range impact of the coup on the Chinese policy of alliance with Indonesia. The main conclusion which emerges from the evidence presented in this chap ter is Peking's continuing attempt to preserve the alliance with Sukarno after the coup, despite the determination of the anti communist officers who survived it to provoke a rupture with China. For more than a year after the generals began their campaign to suppress the overseas Chinese minority and to exterminate the PKI, Peking continued to hope that Sukarno might yet bridle the army and prevent the complete destruction of China's position in Indonesia. She clung to this feeble prospect even after the PKI's 1966 shift to a Maoist line of armed struggle in the countryside, and despite the Suharto regime's systematic overthrow of Indonesia's previous anti-imperialist foreign policy. When at length China endorsed the "people's war" doctrine in Indonesia it was well into 1967, and after the CCP leadership purge in the Cultural Revolution had produced a more militant Chinese foreign policy line inter nationally and in Southeast Asia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 274] === - 259 The Coup: Its Origins and Actors Known and circumstantial evidence indicates that the October 1 coup was primarily the work of dissident junior officers loyal to Sukarno, and evidently convinced that the army's anti-communist high command would have to be removed for the president's concep tion of the Indonesian revolution to go forward. alities involved in the plot were: The main person Colonel Untung (of the Palace Guard), whose forces momentarily seized control of central Djakarta; Vice-iMarshal Omar Dhani (Commander of the Air Force); General Supardjo (Commander of the Fourth Combat Command in West Borneo); Colonels Suherman, Usman Sastrodibroto and Marjono, Diponegoro Division, Central Java). (all of the Army Colonel Latief and Flight Major Sujono also played prominent roles in the Djakarta coup. To carry out the action in the capital the plotters had very limited forces. These consisted of units from the Palace guard, Battalion 454 (Diponegoro Division) and a small number of young men and women drawn from the PKI-controlled organizations, Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat. The communist groups had undergone some mili tary training at Halim Air Force Base outside Djakarta and, although they played a minor role in the coup, their participation fatally implicated the PKI. Council Untung's proclamation of a Revolutionary to protect Sukarno and the Revolution was apparently timed in coordination with another coup within the army in Central Java aimed at seizing control of the Diponegoro division. The fact that at every key point--the palace, Air Force Headquarters, Central Java and Halim Air Force Base--the success or failure of the whole plot was in the hands of military officers stands as the most glaring evidence that the coup was mainly the outgrowth of intra-service conflict. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 275] === The political situation in Indonesia immediately prior to the event also suggests the stronger likelihood of a provocative move within the army than by the PKI. As noted earlier, since 1965 tensions between the army and the communists has risen sharply as a result of the latter's increasingly radical demands, and Sukarno's at least vocal receptivity to them. Whether wholly true or not, from the army's standpoint the President had, to a dangerous ex tent, moved away from his past role of arbitrator between the rivals and toward positive encouragement of the communists. Prior to the coup a situation existed where, in the near future, either the anti-communist generals would have to stop Sukarno or he would have to remove some of them in order to carry out his poli cies and programs. It seems most unlikely that the generals ever contemplated more than deterring Sukarno from moving too far toward the left, for the Indonesian officer corps was sharply divided in its loyalties, and a move to unseat the President risked igniting a crisis in the army, and possibly civil war. And though it is quite probable Sukarno wanted--and may have in tended- -to displace certain generals with officers he could more easily control, that too ran the risk of a showdown which might unite his opponents. Under these circumstances the least likely prospect was a unilateral move by the PKI to break the deadlock. An attempt to seize power directly would have been suicidal from any standpoint. On the other hand, although the communist leaders greatly feared an army suppression, Sukarno's gradual but progressive move to the left advantaged them, the more so since he might ultimately be able to dismiss the "reactionary" generals and bring the PKI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 276] === into the government, something only he could do. Hence it is inconceivable that the communists would have involved themselves in any action aimed at removing the main barrier between them and suppression. It also does not seem likely that the PKI, acting alone, would risk leading a pre-emptive coup a&iinst the generals. For if the Party's gradualist and "revisionist" strategy reflected an unpromising but unavoidable meld of the:conflicting Soviet and Chinese revolutionary models, as suggested earlier, a pre-emptive coup against the army might very well have split the Party. Those elements favoring gradual revolution from "bel-.;! could not want to force a direct confrontation they had not prepared for, and could not win. For any supposedly "pr~>-Maois t" types to advocate a coup would have been a contradiction in terms because the whole core of the Maoist strategy is based on i.h e precupt that coups don't work, only long, arduous preparatic • and struggle in the countryside. If the idea of a coup sprang from any group in the PKI favoring the Soviet-styled "above" -"-ategy, it could only mean some ultra-radical faction suddenly ejected the Khrushchev peaceful co-optation line in favor of a / Lni-bolshevik "putsch" a la Lenin in 1918. The difficulty here, of course, was that Aidit didn't have Lenin's worker-soldier "soviets"--the famous 20,000 who seized Petrograd--and in Sukarno and Nasution he faced no bungling Kerensky. To attempt a coup at all, the PKI would have had to rely on dissident army commanders and units. It requires some stretch of the imagination to believe even PKI "revisionism" had gone so far as to place the fate of the whole communist movement in the hands Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 277] === of a few "bourgeois" officers, and thus to risk a full showdown with no possibility of external help, and no reliable strongholds or military forces of its own to fall back on should the operation fail. Finally, it is hard to conceive of a PKI leadership so careful and methodical as to escape these pitfalls, but so stupid as to endorse the coup in the Party's leading journal the day after it had already failed. PKI involvement in the coup seems far more probable if two different assumptions are made: 1) that it was initiated and directed by loyalist Sukarno officers; and 2) that its aim was limited to removing the key generals who stood in the way of the President and his allies, so that Sukarno's nasakom view of the Indonesian revolution could go forward. This appears to have been the coup group's aim, but its accomplishment was contingent on eliminating all the generals who were the target of the operation, and on quickly gaining Sukarno's legitimization of their deed. When Generals Suharto and Nasution escaped, Sukarno, whose own motives and role are the crucial missing links in the riddle, temporized and the coup quickly collapsed. The fact that members of PKI organizations participated in the murder of the generals, and that Harian Rakjat endorsed the Untung coup, implicated the communists in the movement but did not establish their control of it. Had the Party played a lead ing role it is inexplicable why, at the decisive moment in the early hours--when success still seemed possible--the communists did not mobilize their massive organizations for direct political action in the streets; and why, once the coup had failed, the Party's offices and most of its leaders continued to operate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 278] === openly, even as the army began to arrest them. Such suicidal behavior does not square with the image of the PKI leadership as infinitely crafty plotters. At the most it suggests that if the Party played any role it was a supporting rather than a directing one. For the PKI leaders and organs acted in the immediate post coup period as if it were clear to everyone that what had occurred was a dispute within the officer coups, and that Sukarno would somehow control the situation and protect them. To explain away the predominant role brother officers played in the coup the army's case of exclusive PKI guilt rests on a con tention that can neither be proven nor disproven, but is neverthe less highly dubious. This case is that the PKI had duped, misled, persuaded or otherwise influenced several hundred officers and men to do its bidding, yet not one of them had sense enough to see he was being used by a communist plot to seize power. From the standpoint of the army's post-coup political problems, however, this explanation made very good sense. No other interpretation could justify the subsequent massive extermination of the PKI, following, and certainly not the army's overthrow of Sukarno, who was the "Supreme Great Leader of the Revolution" and the "Great Teacher," in fact, the personal embodiment of the state, by law. How else could the army overthrow the embodiment of the state on the grounds that six generals had been slain by rebellious junior officers working with communist youth and women's groups armed and trained by the Air Force? Constitutionally, the power to mete out punishment to the assasins was vested wholly in the Sukarno government, not the army. But by making the charge that the PKI planned and directed the coup, the army succeeded in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 279] === -264 displacing Sukarno with itself as the embodiment of the state. The careful and deliberate way in which the army gradually stripped Sukarno of his powers after the incident shows how delicately this overthrow of Indonesian constitutionalism had to be accomplished. One final aspect also supports the intra-army conflict inter pretation of the coup. Long after the Communist Party was sup pressed the army has continued to carry out a sweeping purge of its own ranks, arresting and imprisoning large numbers of officers and men allegedly involved in the Gestapu (September 30 Movement). This ongoing purge is hard to reconcile with the army's original case that only a handful of "dupes" in its own ranks took part in an otherwise PKI-run affair. On the contrary, the continuing officer purge suggests that the faction in the army which even tually won out as a result of the coup has tried to stamp out what was, evidently, a sizeable number of officers whose primary loyalty was to Sukarno, not the anti-communist high command. Sukarno and the coup-planners had this much open and latent sup port within the army it seems even less likely that Gestapu was stage-managed by the PKI or, had it succeeded, that the winners would then have been dependent on the communists. Although conflicts within and between the Indonesian military apparently ignited the coup, the PKI surely played a major role in the overall genesis of the crisis. Whatever the real problems or needs the PKI was responding to, its policies and actions after 1964 were provocative and bound to produce a confrontation some where along the line unless the army or Sukarno yielded. The decision to re-open the land reform issue was a direct challenge to the status quo in the countryside, and the army could not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 280] === possibly watch the position of the Muslim land-holders deteriorate unless it was willing to countenance a drastic political change in the villages that would also, at some point, undermine the balance of power nationally. The whole course of the post-1957 rivalry with the communists repeatedly had shown that the army would not permit this to happen. For the same reason the army could not tolerate a "fifth force" in which PKI-controlled organ izations would acquire military training and weapons. The same logic applied to the concept of nasakomization in the armed ser vices, an undisguised plan to break up the officer corps' control over its own units, and hence its base of power. When the PKI, not satisfied with raising these issues, openly attacked certain segments of the army as "bureaucratic capitalists" it was clear that the Party hoped Sukarno would respond by remov ing the obstreperous generals blocking radical reforms and commu nist participation in the government. And since Sukarno seemed about ready to meet these demands, one does not have to accept the army's version of the coup to appreciate that the PKI had given the anti-communist generals ample cause for alarm, and a solid reason to suppress the Party after the immediate crisis had passed. It is equally clear that China's policy toward Indonesia also contributed, indirectly, to the tensions precipitating the coup, though a PKI-army showdown cannot have been Peking's inten tion or in her interests. China wanted a militant Indonesian ally that was prepared to run substantial risks in the dispute with Malaysia, and to alienate herself, as Peking had, from all those nations save the members of the CPR's anti-imperialist Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 281] === coalition. 266 Sukarno's commitment to external radicalism was not motivated by Peking's strident calls for action against the imperialists; he was, if complicated and difficult to understand, very much his own man. But Peking's support buttressed Sukarno's disposition to press on with militant nationalism, and this no doubt conflicted with the objectives of some Indonesian generals who favored more cautious tactics, even though they shared many of his basic foreign policy aspirations. The effort China made to cultivate ties with the Indonesian military leaders may have lessened their past suspicions about her motives, and may even have inclined some officers to look favorably on Sukarno's alliance with her. But that did not mean the army was prepared to engage in actions which, from the mili tary viewpoint, threatened Indonesia's security or played into the hands of the PKI. After the British military build-up in 1964, the Indonesian military took care to insure that its actions in the Malaysian campaign were well beneath the threshold of a direct confrontation. With or without additional Soviet arms, Indonesia's air and naval forces were greatly overmatched in any conflict with those Britain had deployed in Malaysia. If the generals truly feared a British attack, as Djakarta charged was eminent, then by encouraging Sukarno's policy of further heightening the anti imperialist struggle, Peking helped to exacerbate tensions between him and the army. The aid and friendship China was willing to give to a militant Indonesian foreign policy, therefore, had the unintended and harmful side effect of strengthening the generals' objections to an alliance with the CPR. Whatever quarters in the Indonesian military favored the axis with China were quickly Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 282] === silenced after the coup, while the faction that emerged victorious attempted to link Peking to its theory of a PKI plot against the state. It was not surprising that the Indonesian army failed to produce evidence implicating Peking in the coup, and shortly abandoned the effort.^ China's attempt to forge an alliance with Sukarno, and her theses on how revolutions should be waged, both argued against the likelihood she favored, or would have supported, an adventurist move in Indonesia, especially had it been undertaken by the PKI. P'eng Chen's two speeches in Indonesia, the last Chinese statements on the PKI's road to power prior to the coup, smacked of lecturing Aidit not to emphasize the internal class struggle at a time when China and Indonesia should be concentrat ing their efforts to defeat the external imperialist danger. Moreover, had the Indonesian coup been successful it could not have been presented as a triumph of the Chinese revolutionary strategy--being just the reverse of it--; and what anti-imperialist "bourgeois nationalist" country would thereafter be interested in an alignment with Peking if Indonesian-like pro-communist coups were the specter of things to come? At best, a successful coup would make the army headquarters in Djakarta more responsive to Sukarno. Would he then need the PKI to balance off the anti-communists? And if the coup at length brought the PKI into the government what would the anti-communist commanders and their Moslem supporters in the outer islands do? Would they simply collapse, or would they turn to Malaysia and the West (as they had in 1958) with whom they had no real quarrel? Would the United States, then deploying a massive force in South Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 283] === Vietnam, stand idly by and permit the still stronger Indonesian anti-communist forces to go under gradually when its declared policy was to prevent the expansion of communism and Chinese influ ence in Southeast Asia, by force of arms if necessary? And how would the mercurial Sukarno view the alliance with Peking had the coup strengthened his own domestic position? On every occasion in the past, when circumstances had permitted, he invariably turned first to Washington and Moscow, and only to Peking in desperation. It is reasonable to take at face value Chinese Communist ideological pronouncements assailing the prospects of "peaceful transition," and hence to assume Peking very much doubted the Aidit line would succeed in Indonesia. But it does not follow that the Chinese would urge the PKI to seize power in a manner wholly contrary to their position on how power should be seized. In view of their past relations with the independently-minded Aidit group it is very doubtful Peking rated the prospects, or the value, of an alliance with him as high or higher than those with Sukarno. To whom would a Communist Indonesia--a large Southeast Asian Cuba--turn for military protection and economic aid? groping To China, her way out of the earlier collapse of the Great Leap For ward and on the brink of war with the United States? Or to the Soviet Union, as North Korea and North Vietnam were doing in 1965, mending their fences with Moscow when the international going really got tough? Of all the international parties affected by the Indonesian coup, Peking stood to win the least if it succeeded, and to lose the most if it failed. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 284] === China's Response to the Coup The day the coup took place seventeen Indonesian delegations were in Peking, some to attend the fifteenth anniversary of the CPR, others to conclude negotiations on technical and economic cooperation as well as trade and payment agreements between the two countries.5 When Indonesian Trade Minister Chaerul Saleh left Peking after the issuance of a joint statement on October 4, 1965^ there was no indication that China's plans to consolidate the alliance with Sukarno had been at all affected by the turn of events in Djakarta, though by this time the whole world knew that a coup with communist overtones had been put down. China's first official response to the crisis in Djakarta was a personal message from Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai to Sukarno on October 3 extending "cordial regards and heartfelt wishes" on hearing he was safe, and expressing the hope that under his leadership, Indonesia would "develop still further the spirit of opposing imperialism and Malaysia." Whatever hope Peking had that by ignoring the coup the status quo ante between China and Indonesia could be preserved was, however, quickly dashed by the Indonesian generals. Within two weeks of the coup's suppression the army's devel oping campaign to suppress the PKI led to a rash of anti-CPR incidents, including the arrest and detention of suspected Chinese nationals. On October 16 the impending conflict between Peking and the Indonesian generals came into the open when the army forcibly entered and searched the offices of the Chinese Commer cial Counsellor in Djakarta. The same day the army's newspaper charged that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry had lodged a protest Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 285] === with the CPR over the latter's refusal to fly its Embassy's flag at half-mast on October 5 in honor of the generals killed during the attempted coup. This announced the official opening of the army's campaign to destroy the alliance with China. Peking delivered a strong protest on October 18 assailing the Army's search of her Counsellor's offices and calling the army's attempts to implicate China in the coup "lies and slander." She warned that "an anti-Chinese wave is starting in Indonesia and if it is not checked the consequences will be serious." China dismissed as "sheer fabrication" the army's allegation that Djakarta had protested the flag incident, explaining that no pro test note had been sent by Djakarta and that CPR normal diplomatic custom was to lower its flag only upon the death of a chief of state.10 The army, of course, knew that Peking was not going to "honor" the slain anti-communist generals. The Cuban Embassy also did not lower its flag, but since the army was interested in pro voking a rupture with Peking, not Havana, this slight was over looked. For two weeks after the coup was put down China withheld any comment on the overall political situation in Indonesia. Then on October 19 she released a long and carefully constructed resume of documents and reports from Indonesian and foreign sources.11 claimed that the New China News Agency CHsin Hua) in Djakarta had been prevented by the army from sending any reports, and hence that the present dispatch had to rely on information other than that normally supplied by its own correspondent. However, the timing of the October 19 Peking dispatch indicated China had pur posely delayed a statement until she could appraise the situation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 286] === - 2 71 - What she saw was most disturbing. The contents of the dispatch, as it appeared in People's Daily the following day, revealed a great deal about Peking's estimate of the crisis and what her initial response to it would be. Hsin Hua began with excerpts from "Documents of the September 30 Movement" showing that Untung's coup was "an internal affair of the Army" designed to forestall a plot to seize power by the CIA-backed "Council of Generals," i.e., the same position taken earlier by the PKI. Next, it dealt with "The Attitude of the Indonesian Army," making it plain that General Suharto, by crushing the Untung group, was in the process of bringing off a counter coup, purging the pro-Sukarno Air Force command and banning the PKI's organizations. Thus far this disguised political editorial had said, in effect: "loyalist officers have attempted to save the Indonesian revolution from a CIA-Army plot, but the reaction aries under Suharto are gaining the upper hand." The next items to be taken up were statements and speeches by Sukarno and on this count the outlook, though very bleak, was not hopeless. Hsin Hua noted that on October 1 Sukarno had "temporarily" appointed General Pranoto (a pro-Sukarno officer) to assume "routine charge of Army affairs," called for "an atmosphere of calm" permitting him to make "a political statement" and, on October 2 and 3, that he had described the coup as "not correct," a "misunderstanding in the Army"... [which] must not be allowed to sow discord beneficial to "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism." But the Hsin Hua report made it clear Peking feared Sukarno's efforts to regain control of the situation were crumbling. The very day he had appointed Pranoto, Suharto declared that he had Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 287] === taken personal command of the Army "for the time being." There after Sukarno's power position began to deteriorate rapidly. October 2 he attempted to divide the army command, by reasserting Pranoto's appointment while at the same time giving Suharto the authority to "restore order... laid down by me." in compliance with the policy Reports such as this suggested that Sukarno had been compelled to turn over the real power of the army to the anti-communist officers. Leaving a cabinet meeting on October 6 Hsin Hua reported Sukarno as again asking all sides not to "deepen the hatred." But the slain generals (whose funeral he had earlier declined to attend) he now described as "revolutionary heroes." That Sukarno had lost the first round for control over the Army was positively established on October 15 when he was forced to replace Pranoto with Suharto and, on the 16th, to empower the latter to conduct the "investigation" into the coup, as a result of which, so Sukarno said, he would make a judgment. General Suharto's conception of the "investigation" evidently produced the raid on the Chinese Counsellor's offices (October 16) and a decree temporarily outlawing the PKI (October 18). These moves accelerated the army's two-pronged attack on China and the PKI which had been building up since October 5 with the arrest of hundreds of suspects (many of them Chinese nationals), the sup pression of Party organizations, the closing of left-wing schools and editorials in the anti-communist press which included such exhortation of things to come as: "Hang Aidit" and "Get the Gallows Ready." Having reviewed this background the Hsin Hua report next took up "The Position of the Indonesian Communist Party," noting Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 288] === - 2 73 - an Aidit letter of October 2 which called the coup "an internal affair of the Army... will not interfere." [in which] the Indonesian Communist Party But Hsin Hua also mentioned Aidit's support for "purification" measures in the state organs, his condemnation of the "Council of Generals" and the fatal Harian Rakjat statement describing the coup as "patriotic and revolutionary" and urging the peoples' "vigilance and readiness to face all eventualities." Although the PKI's organizations were already in the process of being suppressed, there was no hint in the Hsin Hua report that Peking thought the time had come for revolutionary struggle. the contrary, if any advice was being conveyed China seemed to be saying: "stand your ground; don't panic." The Hsin Hua dispatch struck the basic posture Chinese state ments and editorials adhered to until mid-1966. China would verbally respond to the gauntlet thrown down by the Indonesian army in order to expose the generals' anti-Chinese, anti-communist actions. In doing this she probably hoped to strengthen Sukarno's position, the collapse of which would mean the end of the alliance. Despite growing right wing army provocation, there was no early consignment of Djakarta to "reactionary" status, or calls for an Indonesian "peoples' war," as might have been expected of Peking given the precarious position of the PKI and the militant sounding revolutionary line China had been identified with since the early 1960’s, and especially following the 1965 Lin Piao statement. Over whelming evidence to the contrary, Peking responded to the immed iate post-October 1965 crisis in Indonesia as if the threat it posed to her was similar to the overseas Chinese dispute of 19591960 and could be resolved, ultimately, when Sukarno managed to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 289] === regain the upper hand. Much the same posture was adopted by the PKI which, after the coup had failed and the army suppression began, refrained from engaging in resistance in the mistaken hope that Sukarno i\rould sooner or later save the situation. Beginning in mid-October 1965, the Indonesian Army carried out numerous provocative actions against the CPR, almost on a weekly basis, including a series of demonstrations against its diplomatic mission and the mistreatment of overseas Chinese resi dents. Predictably, these incidents were followed by official Chinese protests condemning the anti-communist generals. 12 The main theme running throughout these documents, however, was that the army's behavior ran contrary to President Sukarno's policies of friendship with China and Indonesia's adherence to the anti imperialist struggle. In turn, the Indonesian anti-communist press tried to present Peking's verbal resistance to army brutal ity against the overseas Chinese and suspected communists as evidence of China's complicity in the coup or other forms of foreign intervention in Indonesian affairs. To this extent, as in 1959-1960, China's open defense of her friends and allies actually played into the army's hands. The Destruction of the Peking-Djakarta Axis By February 19, 1966 friction with China had been exacerbated to the point that the generals were able to demand the recall of Ambassador Djawoto from Peking, ostensibly to face charges of involvement in Gestapu. While Peking's vitriolic attacks on the army made a diplomatic break more likely than ever, presumably they also helped to force the ultimate showdown between Sukarno Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 290] === and his generals. On February 21, Sukarno removed General Nasution as Defense Minister, an attempt to restore the authority he had lost vis-a-vis the army since the coup. This political comeback, however, proved to be very shortlived. On March 11, 1966, Sukarno was forced to make General Suharto "Acting President" and to give him sweeping powers. Suharto promptly installed a new cabinet which was devoid of the old Sukarno supporters but dominated by the army. This event marked the de facto fall of the Sukarno regime and foreshadowed the end of the alliance with Peking. Once the army had emerged victorious from the showdown with Sukarno the formal dismantling of the Peking-Djakarta axis pro ceeded rapidly. In early April Peking charged that a "rightist military clique," in collusion with the United States and the Soviet Union, had "coerced" Sukarno and "seized state power by staging a coup d'etat." 13 Apparently convinced there was no longer much possibility of ensuring the protection of the most ill-treated of the overseas Chinese, on May 18, 1966 Peking an nounced that ships would be sent to repatriate those CPR nationals 14 wishing to leave Indonesia. Although the abuse to which the local Indonesian Chinese were subjected was far more extreme in 1966-1967 than in 1959-1960, this time Peking Radio broadcast no appeals for a massive exodus. Fragmentary reports indicate that the number who availed themselves of the option to leave Indonesia was apparently no more than 10,000.15 The impossibility of providing protection for the overseas Chinese after Sukarno fell was reflected in Peking's decision to close "temporarily" her consulates in Medan, Bandjarmasin and Makassar.**’ But while she retreated on this front, China moved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 291] === - 276 deliberately to retaliate on other fronts. In April the CPR granted Ambassador Djawoto political asylum--thus openly siding with former Sukarno friends and PKI-sympathizers--and in May she dramatized the break with Suharto's new regime by recalling Yao Chung-ming, the ambassador to Indonesia. These actions were followed by the suspension of all Chinese economic aid and tech nical assistance, the abrogation of the 1965 agreement to establish a Sino-Indonesian shipping line and the closing of the New China News Agency in Djakarta. General Suharto quickly went to work on the destruction of the axis from the other end. In July 1966 the Indonesian consulate in Peking and the Antara News Agency were closed. A short time later airline flights to Canton were suspended and all trade with China was cut off. However, the most dramatic actions Djakarta took in breaking up the alliance were reflected in her relations with China's enemies. Indonesia: After the army took over the government, 1) terminated the confrontation with Malaysia (June 1, 1966); 2) secured assurances of forthcoming U. S. economic aid (September 19, 1966); 3) reclaimed her U. N. seat (September 27, 1966); and 4) obtained a rescheduling of the extensive debt pay ments owed to Western powers (September 29, 1966) and the Soviet Union (November 24, 1966). In taking these steps it became clear that Suharto's government was not o n l y committed to destroying domestic communist influence and the alliance with China, but that it intended to restore Indonesia's foreign policy to a brand of non-alignment which, in practice, served the interests of the "imperialists." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 292] === - 277 The PKI "Self-Criticism" and Sukarno’s Fall By every ideological test--the massacre of the PKI, suppression of the overseas Chinese, destruction of the alliance and restora tion of close ties to Malaysia and Washington, the Suharto regime should have been immediately singled out as the target for a Chinese Communist declaration calling for revolutionary war in Indonesia. Everything but this had been said as early as April 1966 when the Indonesian Army was labeled "loyal agents of U. S. imperialism and diehard reactionaries" who were "opposing China and wrecking the Afro-Asian cause of solidarity against imperialism... [and had] shamelessly trampled underfoot the Bandung principles and 17 soiled the glorious name of Bandung... " The attacks on Suharto, however, stopped short of adopting a revolutionary line toward Indonesia, a restraint suggesting that Peking still had not completely abandoned hope that a Sukarnoist restoration was pos sible. The perfect opportunity--and a seemingly compelling reason-to call for revolution in Indonesia was presented to the Chinese leaders between May and September 1966, but they chose to ignore During this period the remnant leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party met somewhere in Central Java to conduct a "selfcriticism" of the Party's past mistakes and to map out a new strategy. these deliberations, under- As a result of ground Politbureau published three documents 18 the PKI which repudiated the "petty-bourgeois" and "revision:! s c" line of its slain leader D. N. Aidit and announced a new Maoist path of armed revolutionary struggle in the countryside. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 293] === Among the many revelations contained in the PKI "selfcriticisms" three warrant mention at this point because they shed useful light on the relationship between the Aidit leadership and the CCP prior to the 1965 coup. First, it is clear that PKI strategy, to the extent it was influenced by external advice at all, was closer to Khrushchev's than to Mao's views. The "selfcriticisms" charge that after 1951, and especially after the CPSU 20th Party Congress in 1956, the Aidit line "merged with the influ ence of modern revisionism in the international Communist move ment" and that up to the coup Moscow's influence on the Party "was by no means irradicated. " This error was committed because the PKI leadership, allegedly, wanted to be on good terms with the CPSU in order to preserve the united front with the Indonesian national bourgeoisie. 19 Second, the "self-criticisms" openly admit that the PKI had a hand in the coup, though it is not clear what the hand actually did. Apparently the charge that the PKI's leadership had been engaged in "adventurism" and that "[vjiolating organizational rules they had easily involved themselves in the September 30th Movement," 20 was an elliptical way of confessing that Aidit had consorted with the Sukarnoist army officers in their plot without the approval or knowledge of the Party Central Committee, and perhaps not even the full Politbureau. Third, the documents explicitly deny that the PKI suffered the disaster be cause "it had adhered to the so-called Peking line" but, "on the contrary," that its defeat was "precisely the result of its Right opportunist and revisionist mistakes, of its failure to consistently put into practice Comrade Mao Tse-tung's teaching on Party building, on armed struggle and on revolutionary united front... " 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 294] === Points 1 and 3 of the "self-criticisms" point to the conclu sion that the Indonesian Communists had never been seriously com mitted to or under the influence of a Maoist type revolutionary strategy. This admission also tends to support the interpretation presented in Chapter VI, that the P'eng Chen visit in May 1965 exposed the existence of important differences, rather than agree ment, on strategy between the CCP and the PKI. Point 2 strongly implies that if Aidit "violated organizational rules" and "easily involved" the leadership in the junior officers' plot by not tell ing the Politbureau, then it is most unlikely he conferred with, or was influenced by, Chinese radicals in Peking. Moreover, Aidit1s failure to rally the Party organization to resistance after the coup and his decision to wait for a Sukarno comeback, could hardly be held up as proof of his slavish enthusiasm for the Chinese revolutionary line, especially since that stern code regards coups from the top and reliance on the bourgeoisie as cardinal sins. On the contrary, the "self-criticisms" appear to have charged Aidit, fairly, with: 1) "adventurism," in allowing the Party to become trapped in a situation where the leadership participated in a reckless act, isolating itself from the Party organizations and the masses; and with 2) "capitulationism," in turning the fate of the movement over to Sukarno after a counter-revolutionary suppression had left the Party with no alternative but to go under ground and wage resistance. The commission and admission of these errors by the PKI constitutes yet another link in the chain of evidence which indicates that, apart from their common interest in a Peking-Djakarta anti -imperialist alliance, the CCP and the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 295] === 2 80 - PKI were very far apart on the question of the correct strategy to be followed in the Indonesian revolution, long before the coup and after it. China's failure to endorse the PKI's shift to Maoism did not necessarily mean she had reservations about the PKI's new tactics. If the CCP intended to back the PKI's armed struggle line, pre sumably Peking preferred to wait for an occasion when she could do this with the appropriate fanfare and drama. Such an occasion presented itself during the first week of November 1966 when the Albanian Communists held their Fifth Party Congress. Indeed that gathering of Peking's staunchest ideological allies could hardly have been improved on as a suitable platform from which to hail the triumph, at long last, of Maoism in Indonesia. Since in May 1966 the Albanians themselves had pre-empted the PKI's shift by issuing a major statement arguing that the Indonesian Communists now had to wage an "armed struggle of workers and peasants," 2 2 the stage seemed to be well prepared for a Chinese ideological finale calling for revolutionary war against the Suharto government. The leader of the PKI delegation to the Congress, Politbureau member Jusuf Adjitorop, (asylumed in Peking since the coup) spelled out the essence of his Party's previous errors and reiterated the May-September "self-criticisms'" call for a new three-point pro gram: 1) reconstruction of the PKI "on Marxist-Leninist lines"; 2) preparation "to lead a long, armed struggle fused with the agrarian revolution of the peasantry in the countryside"; and 3) formation of a united front of "all forces opposed to the rightwing generals" and based on "the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, under the leadership of the proletariat." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 296] === Thus armed with "Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung," Adjitorop declared that the PKI would "vanquish" the SuhartoNasution regime and establish "the people's power." 23 The Chinese Communist spokesman at the Congress, far from taking this as the cue to welcome the repentant Indonesian Communists into the fold, made no mention of the complete about-face recently taken by the 24 PKI. Moreover, Peking's subsequent report on Adjitorop's speech for international audiences was limited to brief excerpts which did not include the passages admitting past PKI errors, or Adjitorop's main point that henceforth the Indonesian Communists would 25 follow a Maoist armed struggle line. Clearly the PKI's shift to a Maoist strategy had not, in itself, been sufficient to cause the CCP to further escalate the dispute with Djakarta at this time. In so far as events in Indonesia alone influenced Peking's decision to withhold a declaration of revolutionary war against the Suharto regime, the only factor that was still operative after the Albanian Party Congress was whether a Sukarno comeback was even remotely possible. The fact that the Indonesian army had not felt strong enough to depose him completely and officially in March 1966 must have sustained Peking in the hope that the counter revolutionaries would not be able to consolidate their power. was not alone in this assessment. She Western reporters observing the Indonesian scene in mid-1966 saw evidence that Sukarno's political support was still very considerable in Java. 2 6 East and Central Java were also the main strongholds of PKI strength; hence the Party's move to an armed struggle line in the period between May-September 1966 may have been viewed in Peking not in strictly revolutionary, class war terms, but as helping to trigger Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 297] === - 2 82 - a broadly based uprising of nationalists and communists groups that might bring down the generals and restore Sukarno. An en dorsement of the PKI's position as expressed in the 1966 "selfcriticisms" obviously would have conflicted with China's hopes for a Sukarno comeback since the Indonesian comrades had prematurely repudiated their former policy of collaboration with him. therefore appears that the different objectives and interests of the two communist parties were still operable, even after the PKI had shed its "revisionist" ideas and programs. Had the Indonesian situation of 1966 developed into a civil war advantageous to the Sukarnoist elements no doubt more would have been learned about the extent of the discord between Peking and the PKI. But Sukarno's disorganized supporters did not put up a spirited resistance and the PKI's shift to armed struggle tactics did not ignite a national resistance movement. On the contrary, the army was able to continue the communist suppression compaign without unleashing a civil war. By April 1967 the Suharto regime felt strong enough to com plete the last stage of Sukarno's overthrow and thereupon formally divested him of the Presidency. Confined thereafter to house arrest in the palace at Bogor, he no longer constituted a serious threat to the generals' consolidation of power. At this point Peking's last hope for a political miracle vanished and with it her interest in maintaining the semblance of normal diplomatic ties. On April 24, 1967, Indonesia expelled the CPR's Charge d'Affairs and its Consul General in Djakarta. The following day China responded by expelling the Indonesian Charge d'Affairs in Peking. Diplomatic relations between the two states were sus27 pended in October that year and to date (1969) have not been restored. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 298] === A Revolutionary Policy Restored Peking's long delayed endorsement of the PKI's Maoist revolutionary line came in July 1967, 28 three months after Sukarno was stripped of the presidential title. Ironically the fact that for the foreseeable future at least, it was now beyond doubt that anti-communist rule in Indonesia was firmly established made pos sible a closer identification of views and interests between Peking and the PKI than at any previous time. That the Chinese leaders waited three months after Sukarno's final fall to endorse the new line of their Indonesian comrades suggests the implica tions of adopting an unequivocally revolutionary posture toward Djakarta had been carefully weighed. The timing of this decision was also influenced by other foreign and domestic events. Soon after the Indonesian coup and the overthrow of Sukarno China was caught up in the throes of an unprecedented internal upheaval--the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The disrup tion of national policies which occurred during this crisis was so extensive that virtually no governmental activity or agency escaped intact. Actually, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was subjected to considerable harassment by the Red Guards and many of its top policy-making officials were purged. Relations with a number of countries were inevitably impaired when the ideological momentum building up in the Cultural Revolution spread from its domestic confines to the external world. The hostile attitude China adopted toward many countries she had previously been on good terms with did not subside until late 1968 by which time "normal" relations with most of these states had been re-established. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 299] === Although the tone of Chinese policy toward Indonesia was undoubtedly affected by the generally militant fervour of the Cultural Revolution, the substance of that policy was not the product of irrational inputs. The "hard line" toward the Suharto regime was not taken until a year after the Hay 1966 launching of the Cultural Revolution.and it was not abandoned once the Chinese domestic scene had calmed down after September 1968. What the more sensational episodes of that two year period obscured was the fact that in the course of the Cultural Revolution a major shift quietly occurred in Chinese policy. The defeat in Indonesia and an analysis of its lessons was one of the main factors causing this shift. A general reappraisal of CPR foreign policy began in 1966 when Peking called home her ambassadorial corps. The review it self appears to have been the outgrowth of the political realign ment taking place in Peking and a series of disastrous external setbacks that befell China in 1965. It seems probable these events were related since the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch’i in part centered onthe foreign policy line China was following as well as domestic issues. After Liu was purged from the leadership in 1968, the Maoists charged he had generally favored "revisionist" and "capitulationist" policies toward the U. S., Russia and foreign "reactionaries", and they implied that he had long opposed Mao's concept of armed revolutionary struggle for other countries. Liu's alleged role in the formation of the policies adopted toward Indonesia and Burma, in particular, have been brought up in the indictment against him. During his 1963 visit to Indonesia, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 300] === so the Maoists have charged, he supported the Khrushchev line on "capitulating to imperialism, revisionism and reaction and stamp ing out the flames of revolul'.c.V, and "desperately advocated the 'parliamentary road"’. Liu is further charged with acclaiming the bourgeois leader Sukarno and supporting Indonesia's membership in the "imperialist-sponsored" maphilindo bloc, though this "com pletely departed from Chairman 'iao's teaching... " Finally, the Maoists allege that Liu urged the PKI to take the "peaceful transition road" and advanced the theory of "structural reform," the latter being a "trick" he used to "hold back the Indonesian proletariat from smashing thr old state apparatus by violent revolution and setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat." all this, so it is charged, Liu "wanted the Indonesian revolution to take the reformist path, which ultimately lee.s to failure." 30 Whether or not these charges are true, the Maoists' attempt to place the blame for the defeat in Indonesia (and Burma) at Liu's feet, in effect, constituted a "self-criticism" of China's past policies toward the "bourgeois nationalist' east Asia. regimes in South And it is also clear the decision to declare ideological war on both countries, simultaneously, in July 1 9 6 7 ^ marked the major step in Peking's return to a more revolutionary-oriented foreign policy. In essence, foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution called for a united front from "below" with the genuinely "revolutionary" forces in all countries led by anti-revisionist communist parties. Apart from Cambodia and Pakistan, which re mained on good terms with China, the 1967-1969 posture virtually excluded the possibility of cooperative relationships with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 301] === "bourgeois-nationalist"--the very elements which Peking had assiduously cultivated during the previous decade. China's endorsement of a revolutionary line in Indonesia had been a long time coming, but when it came the approval was complete. In assessing the PKI1s 1966 "self-criticisms" as "correct," the Chinese stressed that the Indonesians had, indeed, committed "Right opportunist errors," allowed themselves to be injured by "Khrushchev's counter-revolutionary line" and had "deviated" from Marxism-Leninism by stressing the possibilities of the "peaceful 32 road." However, once the PKI had come around to "Mao Tse-tung's Thought" the future, though arduous, was seen as being much brighter, provided this party establisheda "broad anti-imperialist and antifeudal united front led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance." Red Flag's observation that it was "particularly important" for the PKI to "grasp that form of armed struggle in which it integrates with the peasants and wins their support" was a pointed reminder that the Indonesian comrades henceforth must abandon their past tradition of concentrating on the cities. "This change [would] not be easy"... but "the objective realities of the revolutionary struggle [would] compel people to make the change and compel them to learn armed struggle." There remained only one thing more to say: China stood "unflinchingly on the side of the Indonesian Communist Party..., the Indonesian revolutionary people" and would "firmly support" them in overthrowing the "Suharto-Nasution fascist regime." This declaration was made in 1967, and while such intent guides Chinese policy in Indonesia there seems to be little early possibility that relations between the two countries can be restored or com posed. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 302] === The defeat China suffered in Indonesia could be said to con tain a silver lining in the sense that the main dilemma which confronted her policy after the late 1950's has been removed, at least for the foreseeable future. Peking's present policy of hostility toward the Suharto government no longer poses a conflict between her revolutionary and great power interests because, with the overthrow of Sukarno and the suppression of the PKI, Indonesia has become, in the Chinese Communist perception, an appendage of American, Japanese and European "imperialism." Accordingly, Peking's support for the Indonesian Communists' armed struggle line is in harmony not only with her ideological desire to inspire revolutionary movements in the third world but also with her national interest in alignment with any forces which resist U. S.Soviet global domination. Does this mean the basic "contradictions" which previously undermined Chinese policy in Indonesia have been resolved? Probably not. Like the CCP after its suppression in 192 7, the PKI has now fled to the countryside on the course of another Long March which it apparently believes will one day spark the flames of peasant revolution. Here the parallel must end, for the road to an Indonesian Yenan requires a second Mao Tse-tung. Such a leader would inevitably be forced to change and adapt Maoism to Indonesia, as Mao had to revise Leninism in China. In considering what this might mean for the future relations between the Chinese and Indonesian communist movements it is worth remembering that the roots of Sino-Soviet conflict go back to Mao's sinicization of Leninism. Any successful, latter day Maoist revolutionary leader in Indonesia would be most unlikely to slavishly ape the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 303] === Chinese model. On the contrary, like Mao, it seems more likely he would eventually create another highly independent and nation alistic movement. Insofar as past history does provide some clues about the direction of future trends, it seems these movements are most likely to continue to act as a principal, if not the most important, agent sustaining that gradual but steady disintegration which has been overtaking the international communist movement and any pretensions it once had to centralism or secular orthodoxy. While tiie Chinese cannot expect the Indonesian Communists to become their disciples, neither can they afford to rule out the future possibility of mending fences with Djakarta's ruling bour geois elite. The same ideology that supports communist-led peasant revolution in Indonesia also insists that the national "contradictions" between that country and "imperialism" will grow ever more sharp. And the ideology also says that Peking's foreign policy should seek to exploit these "contradictions," not only for China's sake but also for the ultimate independence of Indo nesia from foreign control. In the Chinese view, the rise of the Suharto government is merely another stage in Indonesia's struggle to attain genuine independence. This struggle is marked by the dual nature of the Indonesian bourgeoisie which alternately opposes and then submits to foreign domination. However, because its own drive to establish native capitalism is unquenchable, this class must eventually come into irreconcilable conflicts with the "imperialists"which will give rise to another "liberation struggle." That is to say, the greater U. S., European and Japanese capitalism penetrates and controls Indonesia, the sooner the fundamental "con tradictions" between these powers and Djakarta will become politi cally operative. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 304] === - 289 Hence, while Peking stridently condemns the Suharto govern ment's policy of inviting the return of foreign capitalism, she also expects this policy will eventually spawn serious conflicts within the Indonesian elite, and between it and the "imperialist" powers. And should these "contradictions" come to the surface, the same diplomatic and strategic interests that led China to pursue a policy of friendship and support for Indonesian national ism in the past may very well come to the fore again. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 305] === 290 CHAPTER VIII Footnotes ^"Various hypotheses have been advanced concerning the Indo nesian coup. See, for example, Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," China Quarterly, January-March 1966, pp. 144170; Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," op. cit.; John 0. Sutter, "Two Faces of 'Konfrontasi': 'Crush Malaysia' and 'Gestapu,'" Asian Survey, October 1966, pp. 523-546; and Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," in Tang Tsou (editor), China in Crisis, volume II, 1968, pp. 357-394. Text broadcast by Djakarta radio, October 1, 1965, at approximately 7:15. See Harian Rakjat, October 2, 1965. By the late afternoon of October 1 General Suharto was already deploying overwhelmingly stronger forces in the capital. In the absence of a public state ment by Sukarno supporting Untung, or direct mass action in the streets by PKI organizations, the ultimate fate of the coup was sealed by this time. Under these circumstances, if PKI was direct ing the coup it surely had the strongest reasons, and ample time, to prevent the publication of this incriminating article support ing Untung. ^Several Indonesian newspapers circulated the story that China had secretly shipped the weapons used in the coup into the country by means of crates ostensibly containing supplies and machinery to be used in building the site for the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo). When it became known that from the moment of their arrival in Indonesia the crates from China were the exclusive possession of the Army, to support its own case that the coup was a PKI-run affair, the high command was obliged to deny the report. See Djakarta Radio Broadcast, October 21, 1965. ^Peking Review, October 8, 1965. ^Text in NCNA (Peking), October 5, 1965. ^Text of letter in NCNA (Peking), October 4, 1965. Angkatan Bersendjata, October 16, 1965. ^Text in NCNA (Peking), October 18, 1965. 1(^NCNA (Peking), October 20, 1965. 11NCNA (Peking), October 19, 1965. The full text of this news report was reprinted in People's Daily on October 20. 12 See CPR Foreign Ministry protest notes in NCNA (Peking), November 3 and 5, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 306] === - 291 13NCNA (Peking), April 4 and 6, 1966. 14 Text of CPR Foreign Ministry note in NCNA (Peking), May 18, 1966. ■^3In the province of Atjeh (North Sumatra) alone several hundred Chinese were killed. Elsewhere the Chinese endured wide spread destruction of property, looting and innumerable acts of vandalism in what was tantamount to a pogrom. ■^Text of CPR Foreign Ministry statement in NCNA (Peking), March 26, 1966. 17 The basic condemnation of the Suharto regime was spelled out in an "Commentator” editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao, April 27, 1966. For other attacks on Suharto see NCNA (Peking), May 27, 1966; June 12, 1966; and the CPR Foreign Ministry protest note of June 9, 1966 in Peking Review, June 17, 1966, pp. 31-35. 18 See "Uphold the Honour and the Reputation of Communists," Political Bureau Statement of May 23, 1966; "Take the Road of Revolution to Realize the Tasks that Should Have Been Accomplished by the August Revolution of 1945," Political Bureau Statement of August 1966; and "Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia," Political Bureau Statement of September 1966. The May 23 and August 17 Statements appear in Indonesian Tribune, Volume I, No. 1, November 1966, pp. 6-20; the September Statement in the same journal, Volume I, No. 3, January 1967, pp. 6-29. The Indonesian Tribune is published in Tirana, Albania. 19,'Build the PKI...," pp. 8-9. ^9Ibid., p. 6. 21 Editor's note, Indonesian Tribune, January 1967, p. 5. 22 For the Albanian Communist position on the PKI's past mis takes and what it should do to correct them see, "The Fascist Coup d'Etat in Indonesia and its Lessons for Communists." From Zeri I Popullit, May 11, 1966. 23 Text of Greetings to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Worker's Party from the Central Committee of the Indonesian Commu nist Party, Radio Tirana, November 4, 1966. 24 See the speeches by CCP Politbureau member Kang Sheng, full text in Peking Review, November 11, 1966, pp. 13-18 and Peking Review, November 18, 1966, pp. 31-33. 25 Peking Review, November 25, 1966, p. 20. 26 For example, Donald Kirk, "Sukarno's Holdouts in Central Java," The Reporter, September 8, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 307] === ^ C P R Foreign Ministry note of October 27, 1967. Review, November 3, 1967, pp. 5-6. In Peking 28 "People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime," Hung-ch' i (Red Flag), No. 11, July 7, 1967. The appearance of this article in the CCP's leading theoretical journal established that it was a major statement of policy on Indonesia. 29 These setbacks were: 1) the collapse of the Second AsianAfrican Conference in Algiers which deprived Peking of a forum to attack Russia, the U. S. and India in the hope of rallying the Afro-Asian states to support an anti-imperialist stance; 2) the beginning of the massive U. S. ground intervention in Vietnam which changed the nature of the war and constituted a direct threat to China; 3) the Indonesian coup which destroyed the Peking-Djakarta Axis; 4) Pakistan's poor military performance in the September 1965 war with India which obliged Ayub Kahn to accept Soviet diplomatic cooperation to restore peace; 5) the defection of the Korean, Viet namese and Japanese Communist Parties from the Chinese ideological camp after the U. S. escalation in Vietnam. 30 "Renegade to Socialism; Lackey of Imperialism, Revisionism and Reaction," Peking Review, January 17, 1969, pp. 25-28. 31 Peking published and broadcast a major attack on the Ne Win government by the Burma Communist Party (White Flag) Central Committee's Vice-Chairman, Thakin Ba Thein, on July 5. See NCNA (Peking) July 5, 1967 and Peking Review, July 14, 1967, pp. 10-15. The Red Flag blast against Suharto appeared July 7, 1967. 32 "People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime," op. cit. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 308] === CONCLUSIONS The central problem under analysis in the preceding discus sion was how the Chinese leadership attempted to externalize a united front strategy which served, simultaneously, the pursuit of policy aims in Indonesia and those of more global dimension. With respect to the evolution of this policy in responding to these differing demands, two general conclusions seem warranted by the evidence: 1) During the 1949-1967 period Peking's policy in Indonesia gradually became a function of her international great power needs and aspirations; and 2) Despite the dominance of grand strategy considerations in the design and execution of that policy, the decisive factor shaping the outcome of the SinoIndonesian relationship consistently proved to be the domestic political process in Indonesia, over which Peking had little or no control. In the end, the growing tension within China's policy, between her realpolitik interests which required an alliance with the Sukarno regime and her revolutionary ethos which seemingly called for an endorsement of the PKI1s bid for power, could not be resolved. With the advantage of hindsight it is easier to enumerate the objective causes behind the Chinese defeat than it was during the apparently triumphant days of the Peking-Djakarta axis. Fore most, of course, was the fact that China was never able to exert decisive influence on the behavior of the principal actors and forces contending for power on the Indonesian political scene. Yet the outcome of this rivalry had, at every point from 1949 to 1967, determined the extent to which Chinese purposes could be achieved, irrespective of what those purposes were. In this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 309] === respect the 1965 coup, and the disasterous consequences that followed it, were only the most dramatic examples in a historical pattern which had repeatedly demonstrated Peking's feeble leverage on Indonesia, and the unreliability of her communist and nonCommunist allies in that country. The PKI's "self-criticism" of 1966 indicates that the Aidit group, in fact, had nev^r accepted the essential features of the Maoist path as applicable to Indonesia. On the other hand, Sukarno, who might have saved the PKI and the alliance with China had he thrown his great prestige behind the coup group on October 1 when the issue was still in the balance, did not--in the crunch-act like the ally of communism or the loyal client of Peking. Instead, he tried to recapture his own authority by various maneu vers short of a call for civil war, and when these failed he pas sively bowed to the right-wing counter-revolution. Down to the end Sukarno was true to his life-long struggle to achieve his country's independence, refusing to legitimize the generals' decision to pull Indonesia back into the Western capitalist system. But he was not prepared to lead the Left in a civil war on behalf of a social revolution, much less to serve or follow China. Far from being able to manipulate events in Indonesia, or to take the initiative herself, Peking scored her major diplomatic achievements by adroitly responding to gratuitous opportunities, such as Sukarno's confrontation of Malaysia or the periodic ups and downs of U. S. and Soviet influence in Djakarta. Certainly another general characteristic of the evolution of Sino-Indonesian relations during the period examined in this study was the steady Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 310] === accommodation of China to Sukarno and the PKI, rather than the other way around. But in neither case can it be shown that these accommodations actually brought Peking much closer to any funda mental objectives or advantages. What these compromises and accommodations did help to do, in the end, was to get China ever more deeply involved in the fate of the Sukarno regime and the Indonesian Communists, unreliable allies whom she could neither bend to her own purposes or bail out of difficulty. There are good reasons to assume that the Sino-Indonesian relationship would have remained, perhaps have become even more, unstable even if the 1965 coup attempt had succeeded. The elimi nation of the army's anti-communist hierarchy would have strength ened, first and foremost, Sukarno and the conservative elite classes he represented. It is of course possible he would have continued the policy of alliance with China. But in a situation where his domestic power position was improved Sukarno also would have had a new opportunity, and no doubt strong incentives, to explore what Moscow and Washington might be prepared to offer him in exchange for abandoning his radical Chinese friends. In the matter of avoiding excessive dependence on external powers--capitalist or communist--Sukarno1s record was impressive. And at every juncture in the past, when circumstances permitted, he had invariably turned first to Washington and Moscow, and only to Peking as a last resort. Faced with the choice of seeing the Indonesian revo lution fall into the hands of the anti-communists, who really wanted to rejoin the American orbit, or the radicals led by the PKI, by 1965 Sukarno was apparently reconciled to helping the communists. But a successful removal of the pro-Western generals Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 311] === would have revived the political solution he had always favored, namely the NASAKOM idea. For what Sukarno really wanted was a fusion of the various political groupings which could harness the energy of the Indonesian Communists while at the same time con taining their strength. To the extent he was able to achieve this Sukarno's hand would have been greatly strengthened in deal ing with the great powers, especially China which had never been able to dominate the relationship even when Indonesia was weak and disunited. As for the PKI, far from placing it under greater Chinese influence, a successful coup would have immediately vindicated Aidit's "revisionist" line (and that of Moscow as well), thereby strengthening the PKI's stature and independence, not to mention its capacity to undercut, the CCP, in the communist movement. Whether a successful coup would have strengthened the PKI's domestic position is highly questionable. Although a Sukarnoist regime, purged of West-leaning officers, presumably would have been less inclined to suppress the PKI, the Aidit group would not have been politically secure, and it certainly would still have been a long way from taking power. An army more malleable to Sukarno's influence would still hold all the guns and, though its threshold of tolerance toward the communists might be higher with the pro-U. S. generals gone, after all it was the instrument of conservatism and the status quo in Indonesia, and there is no doubt it would have happily crushed any reform-minded radicals whenever Sukarno gave the word. Under certain conditions the Aidit leadership might, over the long run, have been able to avoid becoming "domesticated" or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 312] === - 297 suppressed. If the Sukarno regime ultimately crumbled through some combination of its own corruption and external Western pres sures, it is conceivable, but not probable, that the PKI would have been able to acquire the independent military power necessary to capture and to hold a radicalizing nationalist revolution. Assum ing an eventual communist government in Indonesia, the divergence between the policies and interests of Peking and the PKI, which had clearly developed by the time of the abortive coup, could be expected to ease somewhat. But there is no good reason to assume, especially on the basis of the earlier record, that a successful coup would have propelled the CCP and PKI together after 1965. the contrary, because independent communist parties--like sovereign states--have invariably developed nationalistic temperments, the stronger evidence and logic points to the opposite conclusion. It is when we look at the more subjective factors which im pelled Peking to court, and later to gamble on an alliance with, Indonesia that the primary cause of the Chinese defeat comes more clearly into focus. At the most fundamental level the false ap praisals of Indonesia which led to the earlier and the final defeats were rooted in the assumptions and expectations underlying Chinese foreign policy theory and strategy. Acting in accordance with their understanding of what the truly dynamic factors in international politics were, and how they understood Chinese Com munist ideology and doctrine could be creatively applied to advance Chinese and world revolutionary interests, Peking's leaders repeat edly entertained quite unwarranted optimism about what their policy could achieve in Indonesia and what that country's poten tial role could be in regional and global affairs. Why they Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 313] === should so overrate weak, vacillating, unreliable countries like Indonesia is the central riddle which needs to be explained before the operational side of Chinese policy falls into place. All of the major ideas that comprise the Chinese Communist political-military philosophy were developed during the period of the war with Japan, an enemy whose ferocity inflicted mortal damage on a weak and narrowly based Kuomintang government, and whose cruelty enabled the CCP to mobilize and lead the aroused forces of anti-foreign nationalism. The core ideas on guerrilla warfare, building a party-army apparatus and the role and tactics of the united front--whether attributed solely to Mao or other CCP leaders --were formulated and tested during this crucial struggle. the Chinese leadership, the notion that these ideas could later be used to understand and solve problems of foreign policy neces sarily followed from the lessons of the war against Japanese imperialism, where these ideas were tested and proven. Their Marxist-Leninist world outlook also helped to give these ideas significance beyond the solely Chinese experience since that doc trine recognized no inherent distinction between the applicability of successful revolutionary strategy and tactics to internal as opposed to external spheres of politics. To the Chinese Commu nists, therefore, what they had learned and successfully applied to the political-military problems of seizing power in the national context could also be transferred to the arena of international grand strategy. In this glorification of the exportability of the national myth, America and China have had much in common. The expectations and assumptions underlying Chinese Communist foreign policy strategy after World War II thus may be seen as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 314] === stemming from a specific historical conflict-model, namely the essential class alignments and national-international "contradic tions" which were present during the anti-Japanese war period. As early as 1946, after the defeat of Japan but well before they had won victory on the mainland, the Chinese leaders proclaimed that "U. S. imperialism" had replaced Japan as the "main enemy" of China and the "people" of all countries. Subsequently Peking's foreign policy was largely predicated on the assumption that the role of "American imperialism" in the post-1949 international situation was analogous to that of Japan in the Chinese civil war, and that U. S. intervention against China and other third world countries could be combated successfully by the strategies the Chinese had employed in the earlier conflict. In other words, for foreign policy purposes, the kind of political chain-reactions that Chinese united front strategies are most adept at responding to--whether for revolutionary or realpolitik aims--require a truly virulent imperialist enemy. The crucial expectation underlying these strategies was that the inter ventionist-minded United States would behave like Japan, and the more aggressive she became the greater the prospects of rallying an international coalition of nations and peoples against her--as the CCP had done against the Japanese in China. Eventually there was the further expectation that the revolutionary forces would also gain the upper hand in concrete national contexts as the struggle against the imperialists developed into its higher stages. Theoretically, the international behavior of the United States fit Peking's model admirably, especially since the "imper ialists" were indeed intervening in the affairs of many countries Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 315] === and, from the standpoint of Chinese assumptions, vigorous antiforeign movements could be expected to emerge. Aside from Vietnam, however, where the local and international reaction to American intervention has come the closest to vindicating the expectations of the Chinese model, U. S. "imperialism" takes forms quite dif ferent from the Japanese invasion of China and produces altogether different social-political consequences. American global influence is maintained primarily by an elaborate and sophisticated network of economic, political and military relationships which are designed to aid, undermine or otherwise manipulate foreign governments. Even where it carries out direct intervention, however, the United States prefers to rely on covert instrumentalities and to work through its allies within the native elite. Wherever possible the United States employs its own military forces only as a last resort, that is when diplomacy, rewards, sanctions, coups and other threats have failed. In most target countries like Indonesia, this form of "neo-colonialist" intervention has not, to date, precipitated any massive anti-foreign nationalist movement and has, consequently, generally deprived the Chinese of the heavy-handed imperialist adversary their foreign policy strategy requires to oppose success fully the penetration of stronger powers in the third world. Since straightforward "imperialist aggression" is not the American style of intervention, third world nationalist govern ments are rarely driven into the arms of communist powers. It is more often the case that the "neo-colonialist" forms and methods Washington employs, in fact, help to sustain and "lubricate" the bourgeois systems of Afro-Asian countries. In this way the impor tant native classes, far from becoming radicalized or disposed to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 316] === throw the "imperialists" out, instead become increasingly wedded to the existing order and to maintaining their countries' dependent relationship with Western capitalism. Afro-Asian nationalist leaders often loudly condemn "imperialism", they sometimes restrict or confiscate foreign capitalist assets and they welcome aid from the socialist states. But these actions are invariably taken to shore-up the existing bourgeois order and, ordinarily, are carried out in a manner sufficiently cautious so as not entirely to cut off the native elite from future economic and military "assistance" these same "imperialist" powers may be prepared to give. And if a more radical bourgeois government makes so bold as to go beyond the level of pin-prick anti-imperialism, to date one of two things has usually happened: 1) the native elite splits and its rightist faction, frequently with covert help from the U. S. or other Western governments, overthrows the anti -imperialist wing (i.e., post-coup Indonesia, Ghana, Iran, Guatemala and Cambodia); or 2) the radical nationalists successfully use the anti-imperialist issue themselves to consolidate power vis-a-vis other contending left or right wing groups (i.e., Egypt, Burma, Iraq and pre-coup Indonesia, Cambodia and Ghana). In both types of cases the nation alist elites have compiled an impressive record of manipulating Peking and Moscow to further their own ends. To date it would be difficult to make the case that any of these elites have become the captive allies of communism, certainly not of Peking. Similarly, in the absence of outright aggression by the "imperialist" powers, the longer range revolutionary expectations underlying Chinese foreign policy strategy cannot be shown to have materialized. For the revolutionary element of the model to become Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 317] === operational requires that the "imperialist" intervention take forms so extreme as to ignite a local upheaval approximating a national war of resistance. In the course of this struggle, so the Chinese theory goes, a communist party--provided it is not afflicted with the disease of "revisionism"--will gradually come to dominate a multi-class coalition which will be formed to oppose the foreign invader, and the insurgent leaders will learn how to create their own military forces and tactics. In this way, the local communist party is seen as eventually displacing its erstwhile anti-foreign, bourgeois nationalist allies. Since the bourgeoisie has no clear program for attracting, much less mobilizing mass support, this class loses what to do with it. the revolution because it doesn't know But this scenario has truly happened only in China and, to a lesser extent, in Vietnam. In the vast majority of cases, two very different patterns have tended to emerge: the "imperialists'" aggression is short-lived, or half-hearted, and eventually leads to a political accommodation with the native bourgeoisie before the necessary radicalization of the revolutionary process can occur (nearly all the former colonial countries fall into this category); or 2) where the anti-imperialist struggle has been severe or prolonged, the bourgeoisie gains the dominant position in the revolution early on and simply suppresses, or proves to be more vigorous than the local communists (i.e., Algeria and Indonesia). Both patterns again indicate that when Communist states give assistance to anti-imperialist revolutions it has usually strengthened the hand of the native bourgeoisie. Thus for China, or other communist powers, efforts to weaken the posi tion of the Western capitalist states in the former colonial areas Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 318] === 303 usually comes at the expense of the radical elements in these countries, especially the communists. It therefore becomes clear that the classic model of China's political-military strategy, as applied to developing a foreign policy in the third world, is beset by a fundamental ambivalence. One of its declared revolutionary purposes is to assist in driving the imperialists out of these countries, an objective which has been most often best advanced by supporting primarily the non communist elements, rather than the Communists, in the anti-foreign elite. On the other hand, as an instrument in support of social revolution abroad, the Chinese strategy actually requires that the imperialists struggle violently to remain in the third world since it is allegedly their rapacious exploitation which eventually gives rise to a deepening social conflict and, at some point, a communist-led national liberation movement. ience demonstrates The Indonesian exper that the problem the Chinese faced in trying to orchestrate their ideas on political-military strategy so as to serve both types of revolutionary objectives was never success fully solved. The effectiveness of united front strategies in support of China's great power aims is also open to some question. Down to 1967 the historical record shows that Peking's policies have been most successful in relations with front partners which happened to be both dissatisfied (like the CPR) with the status quo imposed by Soviet-American power, but also had weak internal revolutionary potential. The presence of these two conditions permitted an essentially straight forward united front from "above" policy without regard to questions of social revolution. Again, however, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 319] === the real cement in these alignments has been how severely and how long the actions of the common "imperialist" enemy drove the Chinese and their allies together. For the pattern of her diplomacy with Indonesia and a number of other nations indicates that Chinese united front relationships proved ''.o be quite vulnerable to shifts in Soviet and American policy toward her allies. On the other hand, in relation to countries allied to, or dominated by, the United States--or, since the rift, those nations seen to be under Soviet control--it seemed to serve Chinese great power and strategic interests to encourage insurgent causes, whether the local revolu tionaries were weak or strong. Here the rationale apparently has been that, by giving moral and material help to anti-American or anti-Soviet revolutionaries, Peking was helping to tie down, weaken and disperse the "imperialists" enemies, thereby rendering them less capable of concentrating their strength against China. Again, however, the assumptions behind Chinese united front strategy do not adequately account for sudden changes of fortune. Governments presently branded as "lackeys of U. S. imperialism" or "Soviet social-imperialism" may, even within the Chinese "contra dictions" framework, be regarded in a quite different light should their relations with the super powers sour in the future. Past Chinese condemnation of these regimes has not, of course, helped to lay the basis for cooperation with them in the future, when and if the Chinese leaders believe this might be desirable. An examination of the Sino-Indonesian relationship has impor tant analytical and explanatory value in understanding Chinese foreign policy in the period down to the Cultural Revolution. For the attempted but unsuccessful merger of great power and revolu tionary aspirations in the policy toward Indonesia was, in a much Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 320] === larger sense, a test of the fundamental assumptions and modalities of Chinese policy throughout the third world. In the post-1968 emphasis Peking has attached to renouncing superpower ambitions, while also quietly but steadily retrenching on the extent of her commitments in the still volatile third world, there is an unspoken acknowledgement that her previous policy was quite weak. The defeat in Indonesia was only one of the symptoms, not a cause, of this weakness; but it was an experience the Chinese leaders will undoubtedly return to ponder--and to learn from--as they chart new policies for the future. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 321] === S E LE C TE D B IB L IO G R A P H Y Documents Address of the Head of the Indonesian Delegation to the 5th Congress of the Albanian Labor Youth Union. Indonesian Tribune (Tirana), 1, No. 8/9 (June/July 1967), 25-31. -----Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism. Press, 1964. Peking: Foreign Languages Aidit, D. N. Aidit Accuses Madiun Affair. D. N. Aidit's Defence Plea at the Trial in the Jakarta State Court on February 24, 1955. Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1955. Anti-Imperialisme dan Front Nasional. CC PKI, 1962. Djakarta: Depagitprop _____. The Birth and Growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Speech delivered by D. Nl Aidit, General Secretary of the C. P. I., on the occasion of the 35th Anniversary of the C. P. I., May 23, 1955. Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan." 1958. _____. Dare, Dare, and Dare Again! Political report presented on February 10, 1963, to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee on the Communist Party of Indonesia. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963. . The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. _____. Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution. Jajasan "Pembaruan, 1958. Djakarta: _____. Kobarkan Semangat Bantengi Maaju Terus, Pantang Mundur [Awaken the Buffalo Spirit! Forward, tfever Retreat], Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964. _____. Problems of the Indonesian Revolution. Bandung, 1963. . The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia. General Report on the Political and Organisational Situation, delivered at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia, March 1954. Djakarta, Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1955. _____. The Selected Works of D. N. Aidit. 2 Vols. Washington, D. C.: iH 5"! Joint Publications Research Service, 1961. _____. Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat! Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. . Tentang Tan Ling Djie-isme [Concerning Tan Ling Djiel. Djakarta: Departemen Agitprop, CC Partai Kommunis Indonesia, 1954. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 322] === Ambekar, G. V. and V. C. Divekar, eds. Documents on China's Rela tions with South and Southeast Asia (1949-1962). Bombay: Allied Publishers Private, Ltd.\ 1964. Background to Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information and Jabatan Chetak Kerajan, 1964. Biro Pusat Statistik [Central Bureau of Statistics]. Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1960. Djakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1960. _____. Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1962. Biro Pusat Statistik, 1962. Djakarta: Chang Hsi-jo. "Ya-fei hui-i ti yi-i ch'eng-chiu ho yin-hsiang" (The Meaning, Achievement and Impact of the Asian African Conference). Jen-min Jih-pao, May 21, 195*5, p. 3. Chen Yi. Vice Premier Cher. Yi Answers Questions Put By Corres pondents. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966. Cliien-tao chih kuo (Nation of a Thousand Islands). Translation of Vit Het Rijk Per Duizand Hilanden by Joop Wolff. Peking: Shih-chieh. Chih-shih (World Knowledge Press), 1955. China (People's Republic of China). Ch'iao-shih cheng-ts'e wenchi [Collected Documents on Overseas Chinese Policies]. Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she (People's Publishers), 1957. . China and the Asian-African Conference [Documents]. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955. . "Chinese Statement on United States Intervention in Indo nesia," May 15, 1958. Peking Review, 1, No. 12 (May 20, 1958), 21-22. _____. Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa (The Constitution of the People's Republic of China). Peking: Jen-min ch'upan-she (People's Publishers), 1954. _____. Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi [Selected Documents Concerning the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China]"! 5 Vols. Peking: Shihchieh chih-shih chu-pan she [World Knewledge Publishers], 1949-1958. _____. The Common Program and Other Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con ferenced Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. Documents of the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955. . The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China. Foreign Languages Press, 1953. Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Peking: === [PDF page 323] === . Main Documents of the First Session of the Third National People’s Congress of the People's Republic of China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965. _____. New China Forges Ahead: The Achievements of the Chinese People in 1950-1951^ Important Documents of the Third Ses sion of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952. _____. "Statement on the SEATO Council Session," March Peking Review, 1, No. 3 (March 18, 1958), 22-23. "China-Indonesia Joint Statement," January 28, 1965. 8, No. 6 (February 5, 1965), 6-8. 10, 1958. Peking Review, Chinese Communist Party. Documents of the National Conference of the Communist Party of China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955. Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, ed. the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Foreign Languages Press, 1960. A Victory for Peking: Chou En-lai. Mu-ch'ien kuo-chi c h ’ing-hsing ho wo kuo wai-chiao cheng-ts'e (The Current International Situation and Our Country's Foreign PolicyJT Peking: Shih-chieh chih-shih ch1u-pan-she (World Knowledge Publishers), 1958. . "On the Current International Situation and China's Foreign Relations." Peking Review, 3, No. 15 (April 12, 1960), 7-9. _____. Political Report of the Second Session of the Second National Political Consultative Conference, January 30, 1956. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956. _____. "Political Report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con ference," October 23, 1951. In New China Forges Ahead. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952, pp. 7-37. _____. "The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy." People's China, No. 16 (August 16, 1955), 3-8. _____. Prime Minister Chou En-lai's Note to Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo on the Implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty, June 3, 1955. Dj akarta: The Cultural and Information Office, Embassy of the People's Republic of China--Djakarta, 1955. _____. Report on the Work of the Government at the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's' Republic of China, September 25, 1954. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954. A Chronology of Indonesian History. Djakarta: Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1960. Department of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 324] === Chung-hua jenr-min kung-ho kuo ta-shih-kuan shou-yin-jen te shengming, Statement by the Spokesman of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, May 13, 1960. Drive U. S. Imperialism Out of Asia! Press, 1960. Peking: The Era of Confrontation. Affairs, 1964. Department of Foreign Djakarta: Foreign Languages Exchange of Opinions Between the Representatives of the Communist Party of Indonesia and Foreign Fraternal Delegations during the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indo nesia. Review of Indonesia, Supplement, September-October 1959. Fan Hsiu-chu. A Struggle Between Two Lines Over the Question of How to Deal with U. S. Imperialism. Peking: Foreign Langu ages Press, 1965. The First Year of Victory. 1950. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, Fu Hsiung. "The Indonesian People's Revolutionary Struggle and the Indonesian Communist Party." Peking Review, 6, No. 2 3 (June 7, 1963), 7. A Guide to New China. Press, 1952. 2nd Rev. Ed. Peking: Foreign Languages The History of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. Compiled by Army Headquarters, Military History Division. Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1960. Ho Cheng. "The Great Asian-African Conference." No. 10 (May 16, 1955), 3-6. People's China, Hsieh Pien. "A Visit for Friendship, Unity and Peace."Peking Review, 6, No. 16 (April 19, 1963), 7. iisien-tai ti yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya (Contemporary Indonesia). Shanghai: llsin Chih-shih ch'u-pan she (New Knowledge Press), 1956. Hu Ciiiao-mu. Thirty Years of the Communist Party ofChina. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959. Hu Sheng. Imperialism and Chinese Politics. Languages Press, 1955. Peking: Hung Lan. "SEATO--Instrument of U. S. Aggression." Review, 5, No. 9 (March 2, 1962), 7-8. Foreign Peking Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers. Enlarged edition. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, T95 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 325] === 310 - Indonesia. Kedutaan Besar. (Embassy of Indonesia--U. S.). A Survey on the Controversial Problem of the Establishment~~of the Federation of Malaysia. Washington, D. C.: Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, 1963. Indonesia, Pilihlah Demokrasimu jang sedjati [Indonesia, Choose Your Own True Democracy]-] Djakarta: Ministry of Information. 1956. Indonesian Communist Party. Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1958. _____. 40 Tahun PKI [Forty Years of the Communist Party of Indo Washington, D"I C.: U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, No. 8209 (May 1961). _____. "Four Amulets Against Four Demons." Resolution of the Central Committee of the Indonesian C. P. on the revolutionary situation in Southeast Asia. Peking Review, 7, No. 7 (February 14, 1964), 22. _____. "Hold Aloft the Banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought! March Forward Along the Road of Revolution." Message of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PKI on the occasion of the founding of the party. Indonesian Tribune, 1, No. 10/11 (August/September 1967), 4-8. _____. Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialism dan Feudalisms! (Go Forward to Storm Imperialism and Feudalism!)^ Documents of the Second Plenum of the CC of the PKI, Djakarta, end Dec. 1960. Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1961. _____. Materials of the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Dj akarta: Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, 1958. _____. "Resolution of First National Conference of Indonesian C. P.," July 5, 1964. Peking Review, 7, No. 30 (July 24, 1964), 14-15. . "Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party," (excerpts), August 17, 1966. Peking Review, 10, No. 29 (July 14, 1967), 18. _____. Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity; Documents of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Dj akarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, T9 62. Indonesian Involvement in Eastern Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: ment of Information, Malaysia, (1964?). Depart - "The Indonesian People's Revolutionary Armed Struggle: A Great Beginning." Peking Review, 11, No. 4 (January 26, 1968), 21. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 326] === The Indonesian Revolution: Democracy. Dj akarta: of Indonesia, 1960. Basic Documents and the Idea of Guided The Department of Information, Republic The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Task of the Communist Party of Indonesia^ Report at the Higher Level Party School of tne Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, September 2, 1963. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. Indonesian Students Meet the Challenge of the Times. Ministry of Information, 1958. Djakarta: Joint Communique of Foreign Minister Subandrio of the Republic of Indonesia and Foreign Minister Chen Yi of the People's Repub lic of China (October 11, 1959). Special Release on CurrentT Indonesian Affairs, No. 80. Dj akarta: Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1959. Keputusan Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatara I Djawa Barat No. KPTS. 70/8/PPD/1959~ West Java War Administrators Decree No. 70, August 28, 1959. Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo [Government Statement and Replies on the Pro gram of the Ali Cabinet]. Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, Ministry of Information, 1953. Keumuman Kementerian Luau Negri [Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. March 16, 1951. Lenin, V. I. "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism." Selected Works, Vol. 1. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publish ing House, 1952, 433-568. Li Wei-han. "The Chinese People's Democratic United Front." Hung-ch'i, No. 12 (June 16, 1961). . "The Role of the United Front in the Chinese Revolution." Hung-ch'i, No. 11 (June 1, 1961). . The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New Democratic Revolution. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1"S62". Lin Piao. "Long Live the Victory of People's Wars." Review, 8, No. 36 (September 3, 1965), 9-30. Peking _____. "The Victory of the Chinese People's Revolutionary War is the Victory of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung." Hung c h 1i, No. 19 (October 1, 1960). Liu Shao-ch'i. Lun kuo-chi chu-i yu min-tsu chu-i (On Internationalism and N a t i o n a l i s m P e k i n g: Hsin Hua (New China), 1949. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 327] === _____. The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Com munist Party of China to the Eighth National Congress of the Party, September 15, 1956. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956. _____. Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Constitution of the People's Republic of China. 2nd ed. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962. _____. The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China. Foreign Languages Press, 1959. Peking: Lo Jui-ching. Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U. S. Imperialism Through to the End! Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 196 5. _____. The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Cer tainly Defeat U. S. Imperialism, Too. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965. The Malaysia Issue; Background an.d Documents. Department of Foreign Affairs, 1965. Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works, 4 Vols. Press, 1965. 2nd ed. Peking: Djakarta: Foreign Languages Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Inhumanity Perpetrated by Indonesian Bands on Innocent Chinese Before and After the Dutch Police Action Was Enforced on July 21, 1947. Batavia, Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation of Chinese Associations), 1947. Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie, Dato. Confrontation: A Manifesta tion of the Indonesian Problem. Kuala Lumpur: Federal Department of Information Malaysia, July 1964. Muso. Djalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia (The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia). Dj akarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 195 3. Neo-colonialism, a Threat to World Peace. oT" the Republic of Indonesia, 1964. Djakarta: "New Page in Sino-Indonesian Comradeship-in-arms." 8, No. 6 (February 5, 1965), 8. Government Peking Review, News Bulletin, Cultural and Information Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Indonesia, No. 43/1960, Djakarta, July 4, 1960. News Bulletin, Cultural and Information Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Indonesia, Special Issue, April 20, 1961. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 328] === 313 Njoto. Strive for the Victory of the Indonesian Revolution with the Weapon of Dialectical and Historical Materialism! speech at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences on June 3, 1964. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965. "Outstanding Contributions of the Communist Party of Indonesia." Peking Review, 6, No. 37 ([September 13, 1963), 36. P'eng Chen. "Speech at the Aliarcham Academy in Indonesia." Peking Review, 8, No. 24 of Social Sciences (June 11, 1965), 10. Pengumuman Penguasa Perang Pusat No. Prt/Peperpu/039/1959, Central War Administrator Announcement No. 039, May 12, 1959. "People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime." Peking Review, 10, No. 29 (July 14, 1967), 15. Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation), No. 10 (1959). Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1959. Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation), No. 20 (1959). Dj akarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1959. Pi Wen. "Ma-lai-hsi-ya lien-pang chi-hua po-shih" [Dissect the Federation of Malaysia Plan]. Shih-chieh Chih-diih [World Knowledge]. Peking: April 10, 1963, 16. The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement^ Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965. Political Manifesto Republic of Indonesia of 17th August 1959. Dj akarta: Department of Information, 1960. Press Release No. P/27/60. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, May 19, 1960. Press Release No. P/52/59,Departemen Luar Negeri. Department of Foreign Affairs, Dj akarta, December 13, 1959. The Question of West Irian. Djakarta: Ministry of Foreign Rahman, Tunku Abdul. "Malaya's Stand on Communist China's Aggres sion against India;" full text of November 1962 speech to the House of Representatives. (Kuala Lumpur): Penerangan, 1962. "Resolutely Support the Indonesian People's Just Struggle Against 'Malaysia.'" Peking Review, 7, No. 37 (September 11, 1964), 8. Rewang. "From the Experience of the Communist Party in Indonesia," World Marxist Review, 6 (August 1963), 57-60. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 329] === "Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party," (excerpts), September 1966. Peking Review, 10, No. 30 (July 21, 1967), 13. Setiati Surasto. "The Peaceful Road is the Suicidal Road." Indonesian Tribune (Tirana), 1, No. 6/7 (April/May 1967), 16-18. The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions. Languages Press, 1953. Peking: Foreign Sha Ping. "Lessons from Indonesia." China Digest, 5 (April 5, 1949), 5-6. Shao Tieh-chen. Revolutionary Dialectics and How to Appraise Imperialism. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963. Shih Tung-hsiang. "The Distinction and Link-up Between the Two Stages of the Chinese Revolution." Peking Review, 4, No. 3 (January 20, 1961), 9-18. "The Significance of Chairman Liu Shao-chi's Fruitful Visits." Peking Review, 6, No. 22 (May 31, 1963), 9. "Sino-Indonesian Joint Statement," April 20, 1963. 6, No. 17 (April 26, 1963), 11-12. Peking Review, "Sino-Indonesian Joint Statement." October 4, 1965. S, No. 42, (October 15, 1965), 3. Peking Review, SK Menteri Perdagangan Tangga 14 Mei, 1959, No. 2933/M (Ministry of Trade Decree, May 14, 1959). "Some Questions of the Indonesian Revolution and the Communist Party of Indonesia." Peking Review, 6, No. 37 (September 13, 1963), 37. Soong Ching-ling. "The Difference Between Soviet and American Foreign Policies." In 700 Millions for Peace and Democracy. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950, 23-36. "The Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique--Sworn Enemy of the Revo lutionary Indonesian People." Peking Review, 11, No. 47 (November 22, 1968), 24. "The Soviet Revisionists' Towering Crimes Against the Indonesian Revolution." Peking Review, 11, No. 11 (March 15, 1968), 30. Su-chia-no tsung-t'ung ts'ai chung-kuo (President Sukarno in China). Hong Kong: Chung-hua shu chu yin-hsing (China Books Printers), 1957. Sukarno. After Ten Years, Still: _ Onward, Never Retreat! Address delivered by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, H. E. Dr. Sukarno, at the solemn commemoration ceremony of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on Twenty-first Anniversary of Inde pendence, Djakarta, 17 August 1966. Djakarta: Department of Information, 1966. _____. President Soekarno's Reply to Questions Put By United Press of London, on 28th December 1957^ Dj akarta, Ministry of Information, 1957. . Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance. Djakarta, Department of Information, Republic of IrTdonesla, 1965. _____. The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution. Djakarta! Directorate of Foreign Publications, Department of Information, 1963. _____. Tahun 1Vivere Pericoloso, (The Year of 'Live Dangerously1). Dj akarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964. _____. To Build the World Anew. An Address by President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia at the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations, September 30, 1960. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1960. _____. Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man. ment of Foreign Affairs, 1961. Djakarta: Depart Sukarno: President, Supreme Commander, Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia. Dj akarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1960. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 331] === A Survey of the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. Washington, C.: Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, 1963. Teng Hsiao-ping. The Great Unity of the Chinese People and the Great Unity of the Peoples of the World. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959. Tirtoprodjo, Susanto. Hasil-Kerdja Panitya-Bersama [Work Report of the Joint Committee]. Dj akarta: Dj ambatan, 1961. Tsung Shan. "Indonesia's Anti-Imperialist Record." 8, No. 4 (January 22, 1965), 11-12. Peking Review, Tung-nan-ya tiao-yiieh tsu-chih (The Southeast Asia Treaty Organ ization). Peking: Shih-chieh chi-shih ch'u-pan-she (World Knowledge Publishers), 1958. United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Appendices to the Special Report to the Security Council on the Round Table Conference. United Nations Security Council publication, S/1417/Add. November 14, 1949. U. S. Department of State. World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1959. Wang En-yuan. "President Sukarno in Peking." 21 (November 1, 1956), 8-12. People's China, No. Ya-chou tai-p'ing-yang chu-yu ho-p'ing hui-i chung-yao pao-kao chi chueli-i [Important "Reports and Revolutions of the Peace Conference of tne Asian-Pacific Regime]. Peking, 1952. Yamin. Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 [The Drafting of the 1945 Constitution]7 Vol. 1. Dj akarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959, 126-135. Yao Teng-shan. "The Blood Debts Owed by the Reactionary Indonesian Government to the Chinese People Must Be Settled." Peking Review, 10, No. 21 (May 19, 1967), 22-24. Yeh Chi-chuang. "China's Economic Relations with Asian and Afri can Countries: Progress and Prospects." People's China, No. 6 (March 16, 1956), 12-15. Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya Kung-ch'an tang ti ssu-shih nien (Forty Years of the Indonesian Communist Party). Peking: J e n - m m Ch'u-panshe (People's Publishers), 1963. Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Yin-tu Kung-ch'an-tang ho Jih-pen Kung-ch'an-tang ti tiao-chien (Documents on the Communist Parties of Indonesia, India and Japan)^ Peking: Shih-chieh chih-shiii ch'u-pan-she (World Knowledge Publishers), 1957. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 332] === Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya ti i-tzu min-tsu ch'i-i, 1926 (The First Uprising of the Indonesian People). Peking: World Knowledge Publishers, 1963. Yu Chao-li. "Imperialism--Source of War in Modern Times--and the Path of the. People's Struggle for Peace." Hung-ch'i (April 1, 1960), 1-12. --------Zhdanov, A. "The International Situation." For a Lasting Peace for a People's Democracy (Ducharest), No^ I (November 10. 1947), 2-4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 333] === - 318 Books and Monographs Baperki. Segala Sesuatu Tentang Kewarganegararaan Republik Indo nesia [Concerning the Problem of Indonesian Nationality]. Dj akarta! Pengurus Pusat Harian Baperki, no date. Bardjo, Imam. Masaalah Kewargaan Negara Republik Indonesia [The Problem of~Republic of Indonesian Citizenship]. Semarang: Baperki, 1958. Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy. New York: Harper and Bros., 1969. _____, ed. Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, .1963. Benda, Harry J. The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945. The Hague: IV. van Hoeve^ 195 8. Benda, Harry J. and Ruth T. McVey, eds. 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Asian Educational Exchange, 1969. _____. Indonesian Communism: A. Praeger, 1963. New York: A History. New York: New AmericanFrederick Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 334] === _____. Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelego. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Brimmel, J. H. Communism in Southeast Asia: London: Oxford University Press, 19 59. A Political Analysis. Bunnell, Frederick P. American Reactions to Indonesia's Role in the Belgrade Conference. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, 1964. Cator, William. The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. Chang Chao-ch1iang. Chan-hou yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya ti cheng-chih ho ching-chi [Politics and Economics of Postwar Indonesia]. Peking: Shih-chieh chih-shih [World Knowledge Press], 19 56. Chatham House Study Group. Collective Defence in Southeast Asia: The Manila Treaty and Its Implications. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Cbcford University Press, 1956. Ch'en I-ling. Yin-ni hsien-chuang yu hua-cn'iao [The Present Situation in Indonesia and the Overseas Chinese]. Taipei: Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying she, 1954. Chen Po-ta. Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese Revolution. Foreign Languages Press, 19 53. Chiang Kai-shek. 1947. China's Destiny. New York: Peking: The Macmillan Co., Ch'iu Shou-yii. Tung Yin-tu yu hua-ch'iao ching-chi fa-chan shih [The East Indies and the Historical Development of the Over seas Chinese Economy]. Shanghai: Cheng-chung shu chii, 1947. Clark, Marilyn W. Overseas Chinese Education in Indonesia: Minority Group Schooling in an Asian Context. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Deoartment of Health, Education and Welfare, 1965. Dahm, Bernard. Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Indepen dence. Trans. by” Mary F. SomersHeidhues. Cornell University Press, 1969. Dai, Shen-yu. Peking, Moscow, and the Communist Parties of Colonial Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 23, 1954. Degras, Jane, ed. The Communist International 1919-1943. London: Oxford University Press, 1956-65. 3 Vols. Dinerstein, Herbert S. Intervention Against Communism. Washington, D. C.: Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, John Hopkins University Press, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 335] === Dutt, Vidya Prakash. C M n a and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy. Rev. ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Elegant, Robert S. The Dragon’s Seed, Peking and the Overseas Chinese. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. Elsbree, Willard H. Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-1945. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. Fairbank, John King. China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U. S. A. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967. Fairbank, John King, ed. The Chinese World Order: China's Foreign Relations. Cambridge, Mass.: versity Press, 1968. Traditional Harvard Uni Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indo nesia Ithaca^ NN Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962. _____. The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project Interim Reports Series, Cornell University Press, 1957. _____. The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in PostRevolutionary Indonesia. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press, 1958. Fifield, Russell H. The Diplomacy of Southeast New York: Harpers, 19 58. Fischer, Louis. The Story of Indonesia. Asia: New York: 1945-195S. Harper, 19 59. Fitzgerald, C. P. The Chinese View of Their Place in the World. London: Oxford University Press, 1964. . The Third China: The Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, T965. Fried, Morton H., ed. Colloquium on OverseasChinese. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. New York: Sittings, John. A Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Gnoeneveldt, W. P. Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya. Djakarta: Bhrataral I960. Griffith, Samuel B. Peking and People's Wars: An Analysis of Statements by Official Spokesmen of the Chinese Communist Party on th~e~ Subject of Revolutionary Strategy. London: Pall Mall Press, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 336] === Griffith, William E. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, MIT Press, 1967. The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, Mass.: Ilall, D. G. E., ed. A History of Southeast Asia. Macmillan, 1955. Halpern, A. M. New York: Policies Toward China: McGraw-Hill, 1965. MIT Press, 1964. London: Views From Six Continents. Hindley, Donald. The Communist Party of Indonesia. University of California Press, 1964. Berkeley: Hinton, Harold C. China's Relations with Burma and Vietnam: A Brief Survey. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. Communist China in World Politics. Mi fflin, 1966. New York: Houghton Hsieh, A. L. Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era. Englewood Cliffs, W. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Hudson, G. F., Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar. The Sino-Soviet Dispute. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Hughes, John. The End of Sukarno: A Coup that Misfired: that Ran Wild. London! Angus and Robertson, 1968. _____. Indonesian Upheaval. New York: A Purge D. McKay Co., 1967. Jaspan, M. A. Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Indo nesia. Dj akarta: Gunung Agung, 1959. Kahin, George McT. The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955. Ithaca, N! Y.": Cornell University Press, 1956. _____. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Cornell University Press, 1952. Ithaca, N. Kautsky, John II. Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Post-War Evolution of International Communist Strategy! Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956. Kennedy, Captain Malcolm D. A History of Communism in East Asia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Legge, J. D. Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indo nesia: A Study in Local~~Adm inis t rat ion. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1961. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1964. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 337] === Lev, Daniel S. The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959^ Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966. Levi, Werner. Modern China’s Foreign Policy. University of Minnesota Press, 1953. Minneapolis: Lewis, John Wilson. Leadership in Communist China. Cornell University Press, 1963. Lowenthal, Richard. Secular Faith. Ithaca, N.Y.: World Communism: The Disintegration of a New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Lu Yu-sun. Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese. Communist China Problem Research Series, No. 12. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, June 1956. MacNair, Harley F. The Chinese Abroad. Press, Ltd., 1924. Shanghai: Commercial McLane, Charles B. Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Ex ploration of Eastern Policies under Lenin and Stalin. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. McVey, Ruth T. The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings. Ithaca, >H Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Report Series, Cornell University Press, 1958. The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and Its Relations with~~the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 16, 1954. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. University Press, 1965. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, Cornell University Press, 1957. McVey, Ruth T., ed. Indonesia. Area Files Press",' 1963. New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Mehnert, Klaus. Peking and the Neiv Left: At Home and Abroad (.Center for Chinese Studies Research Monograph Number TJ. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1969. Mintz, Jeanne S. Mohammed, Marx, and Marhaen; the Roots of Indo nesian Socialism. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Morse, Hosea Ballou. The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. 3 Vols. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910-1918. Mossman, James. Rebels in Paradise: London: Jonathan Cape, 1961. Indonesia’s Civil War. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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