Youth and the Wane of Soekarno's Government

=== [PDF page 1] === 70-17,470 PAGET, Roger Kent, 1936YOUTH AND THE WANE OF SOEKARNO’S GOVERNMENT. Cornell University, Ph.D., 1970 Political Science, general University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan ROGER KENT PAGET 1970 PLEASE NOTE: The negative m icrofilm copy of this dissertation was prepared and inspected by the school granting the degree. We are using this film without further inspection or change. If there a re any questions about the film content, please w rite directly to the school. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 2] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === YOUTH AND THE WANE OF SOEKARNO'S GOVERNMENT A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Roger Kent Paget January 1970 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Roger Kent Paget was born on September 26, 1936, in. New York. His secondary school and undergraduate education were undertaken at Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University respectively. After several years' military service and secondary school teaching experience he entered graduate school at Cornell University in political science and Asian studies. After field work in Indonesia and two years' additional research and writing at Cornell, he assumed a teaching position in Southeast Asian politics. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 5] === To almarhum Zainal Abidin (Zakse) and untold thousands of his youthful com patriots consumed on the Rails of the Revolution. iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer is grateful to George Kahin for providing an intellectual model characterized by uncompromising inquiry and invariably penetrating analysis. He is grateful to John Echols for his patient teaching and ever available and sympathetic ear, and to John Lewis for his contagious optimism and encouragement of innovation. Mario Einaudi and Theodore Lowi in different ways motivated and enriched the author's intellectual development in political science. George Kahin was especially instrumental in helping to secure the very considerable funding without which the author's graduate career might often have foundered. edgment in this regard is due to several agencies: Ackn o w l to the National Defense Education Act whose admirable Title VI program provided fellowships for three years (one year for Indonesian, two for Javanese); to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program which generously underwrote two years of research in Indonesia and in the United States; to the London-Cornell Project and to Cornell's Center for International Studies which contributed a year's support; and to Cornell's Southeast Asia Program and Modern Indonesia Project, both of which generously made additional monies available. Deep thanks to Eleanor Parker who was ever patient and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 7] === critically helpful in the long process of bringing the manuscript to completion. Many friends at Cornell University and in Indonesia shall remain unacknowledged, but they have the wri t e r ’s apprecia tion nonetheless. Among Indonesians Zainal Zakse, Bujung Tanisan, Nawir, Miss Nining and Mrs. Ferdinandes were essential to the research project. Zainal Zakse, who in many ways symbolized the spirit of ’66, fought a losing battle for life after sustaining multiple bayonet wounds. Finally, the author acknowledges profound debt to his wife, Ren, who endeavored to tolerate the many uncertain years of graduate study. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER Page INTRODUCTION: DYNAMICS OF THE OCTOBER 1 EVENTS THE LINE-UP IN O C T O B E R................................ 23 The Army and S o e k a m o............................. 24 The Army and Civilian G r o u p s....................... 29 The Emergence of Action Groups.................. 37 Action Groups and Political Parties 53 66 Some Remarks on Political Style III. LOCAL ACTION GROUPS 72 K a l i m a n t a n.......................................... 72 North Sumatra ........................... 76 North S u l a w e s i......... ’......................... 82 West J a v a.......................................... 84 Central and East J a v a............................. 86 D j a k a r t a............................................ 92 ACTION GROUP POLITICS 94 BATTLE LINES SOLIDIFY 112 International Commitments--KIAPMA, Case In P o i n t................... >......................113 S o e k a m o ' s P r e d i c a m e n t............................ 116 Locating the Mass B a s e.......... 127 THE EMERGENCE OF K A M I...............................134 Elitism and A p a t h y................................ 134 Organizational Development--Two Eras........... 141 Organizational Structures--1965 143 Extra-University: PPMI Intra-University: MMI 153 161 The Limits of Guided Democracy Solidarity Post-October 1 Maneuvers........................ 169 PPMI and M M I..................................... 173 GMNI ( N a t i o n a l i s t s )............................ 194 HMI (Modernist M o s l e m s )........................200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === CHAPTER Page VII. KAMI: A NEW FORCE E M E R G E S.......................... 216 VIII. CONSENSUS VERSUS POWER............................. 249 An A n a l y s i s....................................... 249 A Campaign Begins: Adult Political Forces and the Student/ Youth Movement. .............................. 300 Soekarno Responds ............................... 325 A Fragile Consensus ............................. 339 A MUTED FINALE: A YOUTHFUL TRIUMPH 370 APPENDICES DJAKARTA NEWSPAPERS: 1965-1967 INDONESIAN STUDENT AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS 418 448 G L O S S A R Y...................................................... 463 vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 477 === [PDF page 10] === LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS CHART p age 45 73 Scheme for Indonesian Student/Youth Organization 146 Organizational History of PPMI (Perserikatan Perhimpunan [2] Mahasiswa I n d o n e s i a )........... 155 National/Djakarta Action Groups Daerah Action Groups viii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 11] === CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: DYNAMICS OF THE OCTOBER 1 EVENT From October 1965 to March 1966 the Indonesian student/ youth sector evolved from a confusing jumble of dozens of parochial organizations,'*' federations and fronts, related for the most part only by the factor of age, into a substantially cohesive force of formidable political potential. This trans formation was integrally connected with the political interests of adult political forces at the national level, but was no less the result of special motivations among the students and youths themselves. A basic objective in recounting student/ youth events of the October-March period is to reveal some of the reasons why this element in Indonesian society, previously regarded by foreign specialists is insignificant politically, could so swiftly wrest popular attention and substantial power away from dominant groups. For convenience the term ’’student/youth movement" will be used henceforth. It conveys the uncertain, sometimes strong, sometimes non-existent, unity of these two groups. An example of the number of organizations involved is found in the formation of Komando Aksi Pemuda Anti Kontra Revolusi (KAPAK) for South Borneo (Kalimantan Selatan) on October 6, 1965 in Bandjarmasin, where 105 groups partici pated. PPAB, Oct. 14, 1965; Antara, Oct. 19 [Bandjarmasin, Oct. 16]7"I3'65. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 12] === The emergence of effective student/youth political pressure helped to lay bare a number of effects of Guided Democracy, which until then were camouflaged by the dramatics, of revolutionary rhetoric and the momentum of apparent change. It revealed strengths and weaknesses in Soekarno's ideological format. In the rural areas and outlying cities it gave enthusiastic force to one of history's most gory bloodbaths. It provides more testimony to the unpredictability of holistic models of change. By September 1965, Indonesia's national political style was characterized by a mode of expression both shrill and assiduously conformative. Variation of view on substantive issues was impermissible. It was predictable that any aberrant view or deviant action would attract unusual public interest. Indonesia's abrupt departure from the United Nations the previous January could have been regarded as such a deviant action, except that Soekarno, as still the most important force of Indonesian politics, was quickly able to rationalize it as conforming perfectly to the continuity of steps fulfilling Indonesia's international and national revolutionary destiny. On October 1 an event took place which was of a wholly different order. A group calling itself the September 30 Movement proclaimed substantial governmental changes, took control of many Government installations, and "Soekarno" and "Sukarno" are used interchangeably in Indonesian literature; for former will be used throughout this dissertation, since it was how the President generally signed his name. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 13] === assassinated six army generals. This action, led nominally by Lt. Col. Untung, did not win endorsement by major legiti mizing forces--the President, the Army, or the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)--and it grossly deviated from orthodox political style. Furthermore, it managed to implicate all three of these major forces and unintentionally to bring into focus for many Indonesians weaknesses in the political founda tions of the system. This vulnerability was revealed as much by the response--unsure, exaggerated, desperate--of the major political forces, as by the actions of the September 30 Movement itself.^ Incessant, rigid incantations of the central conventions of the system, all the faithful nostrums of the past, were used to stall the gathering momentum toward disaster. There were two somewhat distinct levels of Indonesian politics at the national level as of September 1965: the semi secret elitist level and the public level reflected in speeches, newspapers and radio. Barring flagrant trespass upon one The name, "September 30 Movement," will be used hence forth in regard to the organization variously called Gerakan 30 September, Gerakan Tiga-puluh September, Gerakan September 30, Gestapu or GESTAPU (acronym for Gerakan September Tiga-puluh or [much less frequently] Gerakan Subversif Tiga-puluh September), Gestok or GEST0.K (Gera kan Satu Oktober), G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September), or in English, September Thirtieth Movement, or Thirtieth of September Movement. There were important subtle differ ences between some of these terms, which will be discus sed later. The term, "October 1 event," will be used to indicate the significant events of that day. Other terms often applied to that day are "the attempted coup," "coup," or "putsch." These terms will not be used since they are inaccurate and, more importantly, were fre quently employed in the following months with deliberately contradictory meaning as to whom the antagonists and protagonists were. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 14] === another's independent spheres of influence, the elites had previously proved capable of mediating their own differences and in the face of real or imagined challenge to the nation, rallying round whatever decision (keputusan) President Soekarno proferred. Organizationally the National Front was in this respect a united front and the entire body politic was expected to mirror its unity. It was thus essential that any political force seeking to enhance its own position or to effect national political and governmental changes should phrase its cause and structure its actions in such a way as to allow potential opposing forces, however reluctantly, to rationalize the results in terms of the presumed national front. In the case of the October 1 events, it is not sur prising that most citizens and groups presumed the actors were conforming with the rules of the game as it had always been played. My interview notes and general observations of October 1 reveal no instance of individuals who expres sed surprise at the course of events publicly disclosed early that day. On the afternoon of October 1 no one talked about a coup or attempted coup. The natural inclination was to r e gard the events, so far as they were known, as publicly acceptable, consistent with the political trend of preceding months. People appeared invariably prepared to acknowledge the Untung explanation that the September 30 Movement was an action to protect the State from further reactionary in fluence of the corrupt capitalist-bureaucrat generals sus- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 15] === pected of consorting with the allegedly omni-present American CIA in a plot to overthrow the Indonesian Government. The pure, younger military officers, the PKI or any other respon sible party in this heroic act could expect full support both of the President and of the people. While the young officers, nominally led by Lt. Col. Untung, took immediate credit for their actions, it was also immediately assumed, at least by elitists, that the action was sufficiently anti-establishment in character that the ubiquitous influence of the PKI must be involved. Immediate concrete indications of PKI and other leftist connections with the September 30 Movement were evident in the various proclamations of the Movement and in the wellinformed endorsements by some civilian groups and media. This information was augmented in the following week by evidence of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani participation. More important in evaluating the general elitist and popular response, however, was the PKI's public image. President Soekarno's radicalization of the language of political e x pression meshed well with the radical objectives of the PKI and speeded the party on its way to becoming the most popular exponent of that expression. If young officers had been mobilized to take action against established generals, this was proof of the success not only of the President's ideologic mobilization efforts but of the PKI's self acknowledged and much vaunted increasing influence among the lower and younger Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === echelons of the military. The essential domestic implications of the radicalization of political language, the growing pr o m inence of the PKI as the major exponent of this radicalization, and the successful mobilization of other sectors of the population (such as the young military and mass youth organ izations in urban and rural areas), was that the future for "old-guard," "extablishment," "reactionary," "capitalistbureaucrat" groups was at best precarious. In the last years of Guided Democracy Soekarno radicalized the State ideology and sought to mobilize the masses to transcend primordial loyalties and join in national united mass activi ties. He deliberately undermined any of the remaining leadership vitality of traditional political parties. His encouragement of the PKI appeared to be far less an endorse ment of its leaders than a pragmatic realization that it offered the best transitional mass vehicle for challenging traditional primordial loyalties. It is very unclear what concrete governmental forms he envisioned for the period after his death, but by September 1965 he had gone far to arrest the operations of the existing form, to erode the influence and vitality of political parties and to generate radical aspirations and forms of political expression. had, whether deliberately or not, made himself, at least for the present, absolutely essential to the peaceful resolution of conflict in what he regarded as a transitional period Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === from national democracy to socialist construction.^ It is for the above reasons that every Indonesian on October 1 and 2 awaited a statement by President Soekarno, which would provide a proper explanation of the September 30 Movement. By the same token it seems highly unlikely that, See, for instance, "Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno pada Musjawarah Nasional Tehnik di Istana Olah Raga Senajan, Djakarta, 30 September 1965," Sekretariat Negara, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, nst. 1182/65, p. 10. "National democracy" and "socialist construction," used as transla tions of Soekarno's "[tahap] nasional demokratis" and "[tahap] pembinaan sosialisme," must be regarded with some reservation, for a more literal rendering would be "democratic nationalism" and "construction of socialism." However, the PKI did see their use as an attempt to apply to the Indonesian Revolution the standard revolutionary stages of the Chinese lexicon. In 1963 in Peking, Aidit insisted that "national democracy" meant a different thing to Soekarno than it did to communists. In 1965 the PKI repeatedly indicated its consternation over the Presi dent’s use of the terms, claiming that the Indonesian Revolution was nowhere near as far along as the President was suggesting. While in the September 30 speech Soekarno stated that the stage of national democracy was nearly concluded and Indonesia was about to enter the stage of socialist construction, he had been much more modest in his claims when he addressed the whole nation in his August 17 address six weeks before. See Soekarno, Tjapailah Bintang-Bintang Dilangitl Prapantja, 1965; dikutip dari penerbitan chusus Deppen no. 382), p. 34. Soekarno's more strongly worded conceptuali zation was, however, still acceptable long after October 1. Ruslan Abdulgani, Soekarno's most prolific propagandist, addressing a GMKI delegation on Nov. 27, 1965 asserted that the September 30 Movement had not impeded Indonesia's progress toward the "stage of socialism." According to Ruslan, the "stage of national democracy" was virtually completed and, contrary to the class struggle prescription of the P K I, had been accomplished through "unity" and cooperation ("kegotong rojongan"). PPAB Nov. 30, 1965. Even KAMI, as late as Dec. 16, 1965, called for a girding of strength to hasten "the completion of the national demo cratic revolutionary stage and entry into the stage of Indonesian socialism." KOMPAS Dec. 17, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === had Presidential endorsement been forthcoming, any political group would subsequently have been so bold as to voice objec tion, much less have had the will and capacity to organize violent opposition against Soekanro's "political solution."*’ Presidential endorsement was not forthcoming, Nasution was not killed, and the September 30 Movement was vanquished in short order by the brilliant moves of a knight in shining armor, General Suharto. Such was the public image of events by late afternoon on October 2, not more than thirty-six hours after the crisis began. The fate of the generals, however, was known very early to General Suharto and to the President, and appears to have influenced the latter in his decision not to provide necessary endorsement. Later specu lations considered three reasons for this failure: first, Soekarno’s well-known aversion to bloodshed; second, the aspect of political crudity which the killings attached to the September 30 Movement and the unknown and possibly ex6. "Political solution" was a term increasingly used by and identified with the President in respect to the September 30 Movement and its aftermath. He used it in a sense which connoted the resolution of an issue and his own unlimited control over the matter ("mendapatkan perumusan bagi penjelesaian politik daripada persoalan jang timbul karena 'Gerakan 30 September'" and "Laat dat maar aan mij over. Wait and see!"). Reported from an interview with Soekarno by the chairman of the governing board of A n t a r a, Moh. Nahar. A n t a r a, Oct. 14, 1965. Soekarno's first use of the expression in an official address was on Oct. 14 at the installation ceremony of Major General Suharto as Minister/Commander in Chief of the Army. See "Amanat Presiden Sukarno pada Pelantikan Major Djendral Suharto Mendjadi Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat, Istana Negara, Djakarta, 16 Oktober 1965," Sekretariat Negara, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, nst. 1146/65, p. 4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === plosive reactions which might follow upon their almost inevi table disclosure; and third, the fact that neither Suharto nor the intended victim, Nasution, had been killed. Soekarno thus remained silent when he was completely free to speak. When he finally did speak, the Movement had already suffered military defeat in Djakarta, and Soekarno was confronted with the accomplishments of Suharto. His statements were then necessarily short, defensive and tentative, reflecting at least temporary recognition of detente with the General. Widespread public and elitist knowledge of the killings did not come until the public exhumation of the slain generals' bodies on October 4. Since General Nasution was suffering from injured ankles and grieving for a daughter critically wounded by a nearly point-blank shot in the stomach, decisions of far-reaching consequences, which had to be taken on October 2, fell largely to Suharto. Injuries notwithstanding, it is problematic whether Nasution, at this point a political figure rather than an operational or tactical commander, could have con tributed effectively to the vigorous response required of the remaining Army leadership. This leadership echelon, by a capricious twist of history found itself in an unprecedented unexpected and unprepared (even if long desired) position of greater political influence. It had been the Army leadership Thus, the Indonesian Army's assumption of power might fit Morris Janowitz' category of "reactive militarism." The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1964), p. 85. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === 10 and notably Nasution, who played the major role in pressing President Soekarno for a return to the 1945 Constitution and a Guided Democracy form of government. While the Army leaders could not be held responsible for Soekarno's assump tion of powers vastly in excess of those stipulated in the Constitution, the President's power had nonetheless grown to such a point by October 1965 that to remove him would have been tantamount to destroying the system. To allow him to emerge from the affair unscathed would assure con tinued protection of just those elements (the dissident young officers and the PKI) who had affirmed their power by practically eliminating the Army General Staff. Furthermore, the PKI through its permeation of communi cations media, gave promise even on October 2 of branding the September 30 Movement as a purely intra-army affair. Though the degree of PKI involvement may never be definitively ascertained, the fact of involvement is denied by few, even including the members of the banned PKI and fringe PKI leftists interviewed by this researcher. In any event, it is under- See Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," Pacific A f f a i r s, XXXVI:4 (Winter 1963-1964), pp. 354-355 and his exhaustively detailed case in Cha p ters II and V (esp. p. 270ff.) of The Transition... op. c i t. The PKI's active initial opposition to, but eventual grudging acceptance of, the abridgement of the parliamentary system and the instituting of Guided Democarcy is fully documented in Hindley, The Communist Party... op. c i t., pp. 270-274 and passiiiu For a general history of the military, see Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in J. J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, I96'2)"---- --------------------------------- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === 11 standable why the Army leadership should conclude that a movement seeking to assassinate the General Staff and shift the Government dramatically to the left was serving the interests of the PKI and was in fact under the direct sponsorship of the PKI. There were many other considerations surrounding the decisions of Generals Nasution and Suharto on October 2. Among them were the fundamental antipathy of at least the old-guard army men towards the communists, the recollection of the 1948 Madiun uprising, and most recently the losing popularity contest with the PKI. General Suharto himself was confronted with the fact that most of the insurrectionary units and their leaders had been under his former personal command. He may indeed have recalled attenting Lt. Col. Untung's wedding a year and a half before. Some Djakarta elitists in the first days of October referred openly to his attendance at this wedding as the most convincing reason why General Suharto was not marked for elimination.*0 By far the most important considerations, however, revolved around An account of the wedding, including a picture of the couple and mention of the then Major General Suharto's attendance, appeared on the front page of Kedaulatan Rakj a t, April 29, 1964. I am indebted to Ruth T. McVey for this reference. 10. The term, elitists, unless otherwise specified, will be used throughout the dissertation in a very broad sense, appropriate to the Indonesian scene. It thus includes many more varieties of people and a far larger proportion of the population than seemed applicable for the time period examined by Robert van Niel in The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (Chicago: Quadrangle, I960). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === 12 the potential threat to the army leadership's most basic image of the place of the army in Indonesian history and in the current constellation of political forces. However attached they may have been to the highly leftist complexion of the state ideologic fabric, the Army, as evidenced in dozens of books by officers, 11 remained first and foremost concerned with its own special image as the vanguard of the early Revolution, as the force which had assured In donesian national unity by ridding the country of the Darul Islam and other dissident and separatist movements of the 1950's, and more recently as the organization with the person nel and technical skill necessary for projected large-scale economic and social ventures envisioned under Guided Democracy. Now this heritage stood threatened, not only by young Turk The number of teachers, businessmen, politicians, mili tary officers had accelerated by a very large factor since 1940. Elitists in this broad sense would thus run into the hundreds of thousands, complexly variegated by every criterion, a group only in the important sense of a feeling of being special, of separation from the great bulk of Indonesian society. 11. See by Nasution for example: Tiatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Djakarta, 1955); Towards a People's Army (Djakarta: Delegasi, 1964); Kibarkanlah Pandji Angkatan *661: Kumpulan Sambutan/Tjeramah Dr. A. H. Nasution (Djakarta: no pub., 1966); Sedjarah Perdjuangan NasionalT diBidang Bersendjata (Djakarta: Mega, 1966). Also, Sokowati, TNI dan Civic Mission: Suatu Aspek Pembinaan Wilajah (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangen, 1963); Sutjipto, A B R I: "Pengawal Revolusi jang Berkonstitusi (Dj akarta: Matoa, 1966). For 1965 views prior to October, see Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya C a k t i," Buku Induk, Hasil Seminar Angkatan Darat tgl. 2 s/d 9 April, 1965 bertempat di "Grha Wiyata Judha/Seskoad," Bandung; Dikeluarkan oleh Departemen Angkatan Darat (Malang: IKIP, n. d. ). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 23] === 13 army officers (the Untung group) eager to chastize their superiors, but by a dangerously broad based movement. For, judging by its declared membership and program, the Septem ber 30 Movement ostensibly coordinated a leftist-oriented inter-service military contingent with the PKI Central Committee and mass organization members trained in part by military personnel. Army leadership, which in the late Guided Democracy period had come to follow the ideological and political lead of President Soekarno and the Communist Party, now confronted a dilemma partially of its own making. To downplay the September 30 Movement would serve as tacit acknowledgement of the validity of the communist alle gations against the capitalist-bureaucrat generals and would thereby provide justification for closer cooperation in the future between Army elements and the Communist Party in roles which previously had been reserved to the Army itself. is conceivable that the Army could have successfully dis claimed any involvement of the Communist Party at all, but the credibility of such a disclaimer would be doubtful in light of the simultaneous actions in other parts of Indonesia, where PKI mass organizations were more publicly involved than in Djakarta. Moreover, such an admission of intra-army disunity would have automatically absolved all other groups of any responsi bility either for the actual September 30 Movement or for the creation of conditions under which it could emerge. The stature of the other military services would consequently have Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 24] === 14 been enhanced, and the Army's bargaining power versus that of the PKI in dealing with Soekarno would be reduced. While the Army in terms of its real power as measured by weaponry, personnel and budgetary claims might have been able to wit h stand some erosion of power at the level of national politics, the most pressing threat to the Army leadership of such an admission was the territorial divisiveness which could easily ensue within the Army itself. If national censure against the Movement and the killings were directed solely against the Deponegoro units and leaders which largely comprised the in surgent elements, this could be regarded in Central Java as an attack on the whole Diponegoro division. Furthermore, it could weld bonds between the PKI and a division whose loyalty to Djakarta had long been suspected. The most important immediate consideration for Nasution and Suharto was how to handle Sof^arno. Well aware of the peril of trying to compete with the President's oft proved political acumen, they had to move most cautiously. With the immediate challenge of the Untung action quickly con tained, the President's presence at Halim Air Base--which initially lent tremendous stature to the Untung group--became a potential trump card for the generals. This, more than any other fact, gave the embarrassed Army leadership room for immediate and subsequent political maneuver. As if to dra matize the seriousness of the decisions they would have to make, no sooner were the Djakarta Untung forces defeated Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 25] === than Soekarno proceeded to shore up his own position and redress the balance of political forces through several bold maneuvers of his own. In his first public statement Soekarno proclaimed his own safety, assured the nation of his uninterrupted continuing leadership of the nation and the revolution, declared his assumption temporarily of direct command of the Armed Forces, and appointed to operational command of the Army the centerleftist former commander of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Division, Major General Pranoto Reksosamudra. 12 In his second statement he appealed to all groups in the nation to remain tranquil and claimed to have met with his top officials "quickly to resolve the problem" of what was being called the "Thirtieth of September Incident."*5 Finally, on October 3 he explained forthrightly that he had gone to Halim Air Base entirely of his own will, for he "believed that this was the best place for me, that is, a place close to an airplane which could transport me at any moment to someplace else, 12. Tape recorded from Radio Republik Indonesia, October 2. Major General TNI Pranoto Reksosamudra's position at the time of this appointment was Third Assistant to the Minister/Commander of the Army. In this first state ment he also ordered all citizens to remain at ease, raise their vigilance and safeguard the national unity and one-ness as compactly as possible ["memelihara kesatuan dan persatuan nasional sekompak-kompaknja"]. 13. My emphasis. Recorded from Radio Republik Indonesia. He also stated that he had taken direct command of the Army, appointed Pranoto to the running of daily affairs, and now Major General Suharto to the job of retrieving security and peace related to the Thirtieth of September Incident. Again he called on everyone to uphold the spirit of unity and to intensify the anti-Nekolim spirit. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === 16 should something unforeseen happen."*^ In one terse sentence he declared that "accusations concerning AURI [Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia] being involved in the Thirtieth of September incident are u n t r u e. His clear intention, at least after the failure of the Movement's initial offensive, was to minimize its political significance and to emphasize that the course of the revo lution lay unbroken.*^ He was later to say that any revolu tion has its ups and downs but must be kept firmly on the rails and not be sidetracked by momentary diversions. 17 For the Army leaders Soekarno's statements emphasized that unless they capitalized more fully upon General Suharto's initially successful politico-military response to the Untung action, the President might well be the major beneficiary of the 14. Recorded from Radio Republik Indonesia. My translation. 15. Ibid. This sentence actually preceded the 'personal volition' statement. Sukarno's third point, a warning against AURI and the Army being set against one another such that Nekolim and others might benefit. 16. In his next public statement, on installing Major Gen eral Suharto as Minister/Commander of the Army, Soekarno referred to the "occurrence of September 10" and re ferred to such events as "ripples in the mighty ocean, which is named the Republic of Indonesia" ["rimpel in de geweldige oceaan"]. Amanat PJN Presiden Sukarno pada Pelantikan Major Djendral Suharto Mendjadi Menteri/ Panglima Angkatan Darat, Istana Negara, Djakarta, 16 Oktober 1965," Sekretariat Negara, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, nst. 1146/65, pp. 1-2. 17. "Amanat Presiden Sukarno,... 16 Oktober 1965," lo c. cit. "Rails" refers to "keeping to the rails of the Revolution," a phrase he popularized in his 1959 August 17 Address. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === 17 whole affair. The appointment of persons like Pranoto might partially satisfy important forces in Central Java and elsewhere among those groups which would have supported an Untung victory. The inchoate demands of the masses were crystallized by Soekarno (and those whom he favored) around the idea of retrieving the purity of the Revolution. could be said that the removal of the Kapbir (Capitalist- Bureaucrat) senior officials was part of this objective. With some regret, the objective was satisfied in the "execu tion" of the generals. The weakness of the Army leadership, at least temporarily, would encourage Soekarno to recruit PKI members and other important leftists to important cabi net posts and other governmental positions. These and other factors contributed to General Suharto’s decision, strongly seconded by General Nasution, to drama tize the assassinations as fully as possible. Motion picture equipment, TV cameras, the press and photographers, many ranking witnesses, foreign correspondents, and as large an audience as possible were assembled at Lubang Buaja on M o n day, October 4, to witness the grisly exhumation. Every means of public communication was utilized to thrust the brutality of the assassinations vividly before the Indonesian masses, as well as the elite. The resulting intensity of public emotion was sustained in the following days by the ceremonious military funeral, by the death of Nasution’s daughter and by Nasution's heartrending, tearful speeches Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === 18 both at the military funeral and at the graveside of his daughter. Except for his few terse announcements, the voice of the President during these grief-filled days was practically mute. Nor did he attend the funerals. For the first time in most people's memory his presence was not at the center of public attention. PKI news media were closed, and there was no opportunity for attention-getting demonstrations. The Army nervously occupied a novel position at center stage. The condition and justification for holding this po s i tion, however, was a formal commitment by Suharto to maintain security, to safeguard the State, in effect to preserve the status quo. Without the deceased generals, who had comprised most of the Army's political politburo, the Army leadership was now in the hands of a man who, despite his demonstrated tactical competence, was a political neophyte. 18 His nomi nal superior, General Nasution, while possessing considerable political experience, was also committed to the established political system. Both generals, in October 1965 and during the following year, proved to be most comfortable when dealing with practical problems, analogous to military maneuvers and tactics. President Soekarno himself by the end of October's dramatic first week was embarked on the task of re-establishing 18. Though in intra-Army politics he ostensibly demonstrated considerable skill in successfully bringing to fruition in 1963 his plan for a Strategic Command (Kostrad), relatively free from General Staff (SUAD) control. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 29] === 19 the same unquestioning master-servant relationship (ideolo gized and modified in Soekarno's modernization of the musjawarah-mufakat mechanism for the convivial resolution 19 of conflict and compulsory absolute consensus), both with the elite and with the masses, which had previously pr e vailed. Initially his problem lay more with the elite, who were aware of the challenge to his authority. Yet even on the elitist level the governmental system facilitated Soekarno's task, for there were hundreds of top officials whose status and income were dependent directly upon the Presi dent's continued largesse. The bureaucracy too, as pointed out by Donald Hindley, was essentially characterized by docile obedience and lack of cohesion. 20 They would follow that leader who paid their salaries and gave the most con vincing image of authority. In their tentative steps to strengthen their new status, the Army leaders were no match for the President and other civilian elitists. The Army had no established public mechanisms, such as major politi cal parties, through which it could bring support for its 19. The best treatment of this tradition is Soemarsaid Moertono's State and Statecraft in Old Java (An Inte grated Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th-19th Century) (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968). 20. Political Power..., ojd. c i t. pp. 245-246. An ex ception proving the rule xs IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, League of Upholders of Indonesian ’ Independence), an Army-based party founded by Nasution in 1954, which won four out of 257 seats in the Parlia mentary elections of 1955. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === 20 interests and objectives to bear on the national level. 21 It did have a monopoly of military powdr, with armament and other equipment concentrated in a relatively small propor tion of units, some of which were stationed on the Malaysian border in Kalimantan. Other elitist units, more readily deployable from Djakarta, were the elitist par a -commandos, RPKAD, and the strategic reserve, KOSTRAD. The Army also enjoyed possession of the only nation-wide communications network, a technologically advanced micro-wave system in stalled less than two years before. It was thus found easier to protect and to further Army interests by observing the mandate to restore security and safeguard the State, and by cultivating this image so far as was possible in the public media. Palace politics in Djakarta could be matched by the vigor with which an allegedly communist insurrection was crushed. Drawing on his mandate to restore security, Major General Suharto in the third week of October.launched a massive police-action in Central and then East Java, spear-headed by para-commandos; One consequence of this domestic policeaction was to draw the Army into far closer contact with all levels of Indonesian society than ever before. While many Outer Island areas had already experienced years of firm and sometimes harsh and exploitative direction under 21. IPKI was of minor importance politically and merely proves the point. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === 21 martial law conditions, this was much less true of Java. Through its very tangible presence in 1965, the Army grew steadily as a focus for political representation and leader ship. The Masjumi and the PSI parties remained outlawed. The PKI was rendered inoperative and the PNI (by its "coat tails” relationship with the PKI) was discredited; this was also true of Partindo and Perti. Most religious parties late in 1965 threw their support fully behind -the Army leadership. This support, however, was much more manifest in public declarations than in real support from party leaders in Djakarta politics. Party leaders tended to be old and feeble, as in the case of the PNI, or hopelessly disunited, as with the NU. In any event, with the exception of the crippled PKI, the Army leadership could not depend on party affirmations to reflect the strengths of party leadership. President Soekarno proved ever capable of mobilizing the necessary elitist sup port. When necessary he could still fireside-chat the nation into submission and capture all the headlines. The Army leadership, precariously headed by General Suharto, desperately needed a better mechanism for marshalling public opinion. This they found in the students. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 32] === CHAPTER II THE LINE-UP IN OCTOBER KAMI came late upon a scene of many action fronts, action commands, action coordinating committees--all of which had blossomed since early October. Collectively, their formation represented a resurgence of political p a r ticipation, an ecstatic and often outrageous exercise of free speech, a bursting forth of political expression on a sudden, virtually limitless expanse of eligible issues. The vehicles for all of this activity were the demonstration (demonstrasi), the rally or roll call (apel), the massive get-together (rapat), and the newspapers, which could now write about these events and emboider upon them at will. Prompting most of the activity were serious issues, such as outrage at the killing of the Generals and at the perpe trators of the September 30 Movement, or demands for the dissolution of the PKI and for the "retooling" implicated government officials. (ouster) of But as a driving force, the motivation of serious issues was easily matched by the outright jollity and camaraderie exhibited by most partici pants. They suddenly indulged their fancy in newly liberated self-expression--a pleasurable contrast to the clawing, catechistic conformism and forced enthusiasm of the previous 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 33] === 23 several years. The levity could not last longer, however, than the shaky post-October 1 detente among adult political forces; this detente shielding from view developing c on frontations of power which in turn eventually would narrow the issues and force decisive and serious commitment. KAMI'S formation may thus be viewed as one step in the natural gravitation of organizations into political alignments suitable for effective participation in a political context substantially altered by the October 1 events. Ultimately, the shielding dStente would be upset in a direct confrontation of organized political forces and the concomitant national awareness that a decisive resolution of the political u n certainty was underway. It was the work of the Army leaders which assured that the forces set in motion by the October 1 events would gain momentum in the direction of a new defini tion of issues. The Army and Soekarno To place the emergence of KAMI in meaningful context it will be necessary to recapitulate in some detail the con fusing series of political events which began with the kid napping of the generals. The interplay between traditional forces; the flounderings of lesser groups dependent upon them; the pressing momentum of the nation's previous political thrust; the collision with that thrust of new, unforeseen events; and the fitful forays of new political groupings Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === 24 born of the October 1 chaos--all contributed to a dynamic, tension unknown since the Revolution. Indonesian student/ youth activities figured prominently every single day of this period. Few events occurred in the adult political world outside the purview of interested student/youth elements. It would therefore be impossible to understand the period prior to K A M I ’S formation without serious con sideration of the wider political context. It is doubly important to develop this context in light of the constant reference back to this period by all student/youth movements during the next two y e a r s. General Suharto on October 3 publicly and bluntly con tradicted President Soekarno's exoneration of the Air Force from allegations concerning its involvement in the September 30 Movement. This violated one of the basic tenets of the late Guided Democracy period--that responses to Presidential statements be affirmatory or silent. Indonesians appeared generally shocked, but in retrospect regarded this act as more responsible than anything else, including Suharto's skillful thwarting of the September 30 Movement, for dramati cally enhancing popular confidence in the Army. Instantly, leaders of dormant civilian and military groups met and moved tentatively to explore the possibilities of this seemingly new freedom. The prominent characteristic of this political renais sance was the emergence of new groups, called action fronts Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 35] === 25 or action commands. Influenced by its earlier use in the Revolution, the term "action" connoted.(as mentioned eariler) an ad hoc formation, sense of urgency, but equally, of tem porary existence. Nevertheless, these action groups were remarkable for the degree to which some of them reflected a rapprochement among normally antagonistic component organ izations (political parties, mass organizations, unions) for the sake of a common issue. Here, in the first days of October, an event occurred--whatever the cause and whomever the protagonists--to rivet public attention upon the most vulnerable aspects of the political system. Until then, whatever discontent there may have been about the system had remained silent, or more commonly, stayed buried beneath strident testimonials to its health. Its ideological founda tions, Soekarno believed, were fit for emulation by the entire world.* Action groups focused their initial atten tion in the post-October 1 period almost solely upon the PKI for its alleged masterminding and participation in the September 30 Movement. This attention quickly broadened to relate most ills of the nation causatively to the party's inherently subversive nature. During his speeches of the previous year Soekarno had often dwelled upon the paramount importance of youth and of revolutionary temperament. On the latter subject he appeared See for instance, Soekarno, Tjapailah..., op. c i t., p. 38. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === 26 to regard the PKI as something of a model. Now, quite sud denly, two pillars of the political system, the Army and the PKI--inferior only to Soekarno--stood thoroughly embarrassed by a small, if vicious, attack. It was an action coordinating young officers of the Army (with the yeoman assistance from communist youth organizations) with mature, adult PKI Central Committee members. The action served to eliminate the allegedly corrupt and counter-revolutionary political politburo of the Army and then to set up structures ostensibly designed to alter the governing process of the State. The populace was well primed to accept the first part of this plan and (had Soekarno provided endorsement) might have tolerated the second idea as well. Only those political groups which were "progressive revolutionary" could legitimately be regarded as "on the rails of the Revolution." All political groups consistently proclaimed themselves progressive revo lutionary. Thus, conceptually, the idea of progressive revolutionary elements of the three major forces of the political system acting radically in concert was entirely feasible. However, the September 30 Movement failed dr a matically and thus demonstrated in differing ways the vu l nerability of each of the major political actors. The three actors scrambled to tar one another and to retrieve as much pride as possible. Action groups grew out of the confusion of these recriminations. The Army brought to the struggle three crucial advantages. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 37] === 27 First, the Army's immediate reaction under Suharto's command was dramatic, politically astute and militarily successful, thus providing the 'defenders of the Motherland' an unassailably heroic image. Second, the Army leaders possessed a reservoir of power nationally, sufficient to maintain a kind of status, while power conflict among factions of generals within the Army could resolve itself relatively insulated from the public eye. The A r m y ’s specific indebt edness to Major General Suharto gave him a powerful asset in this regard. Third, the Army leaders collectively, however far they had gone in acquiescing to the ideological and other schemes of the President, had nonetheless retained a clearly anti-PKI image. They were able to enlist the immediate sympathies and valuable support of all those ele ments of society who for various reasons had suffered under the increasingly personalist posture of the President and/ or the mounting popular appeal of the PKI. The Suharto group, in the first days after the collapse of the September 30 Movement, deliberately embellished its heroic image and dramatized the heinous nature of the crime which had been committed toward the State. However, it is. not possible to assess the degree to which these leaders, in their understandable effort to minimize the role of insurgent army groups, deliberately set out to exaggerate the communist role, even to set up the entire PKI as straw man with the intention of mobilizing popular support for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === 28 subsequent wholesale execution of a large segment of the p a r t y ’s membership. The reason for dwelling upon these aspects of the first week of October is to emphasize the importance of the initial frame of reference from which new groups--’’action" groups-emerged. Much of the perspective of Indonesian politics in the next two years was determined by the impression which groups and individuals formed of their respective roles during a week which many people regard in retrospect as a kind of Rubicon. The question of "Where you stood... " became very important. What was most important to the con text of action group emergence was the narrowness of criteria upon which the answers to this question were determined. There was no open challenge to the system, absolutely no acknowledgement that the events had revealed flaws in it. Rather, every major group and every emergent group sought to assure itself and one another of the inviolability of the Nasakom ideology., the health of Guided Democracy, the great ness of Soekarno, and the relevance of Indonesia's view of the world. Hubristic statements were a prominent feature of Guided Democracy. Not to have accentuated self assurance during times of crisis would have been tantamount to recognition of national failure in the root values of the system. Open expression of doubt about the basic tenets of the system would have been an admission of complicity in its failure, since every group had affirmed its merits for so Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 39] === 29 long. The perspective which developed concerning the October 1 event tended therefore to be both selective and devastatingly inclusive: selective of what precisely was to blame, in clusive as to the panoply of national ills then attributed to the blameworthy party. The Army and the Civilian Groups There was a natural congruity of interests between the Army leaders and many civilian groups. First, since all were dedicated to the existing political system, it followed that mass attention should be directed away from any notions that a systemic failure had occurred. Instead, the onus needed to be placed clearly upon specific individuals and groups as perpetrators of the treachery. Second, since the objectives of the September 30 Movement had been directed towards the lofty task of 'protecting* the State, it was necessary to assure the public that this was actually a ruse to upset the existing Government. Cast in this light, the magnitude of the Suharto group's heroism was much greater than if his actions were seen simply in terms of the containment of an essentially military dissidence. But it also placed the Suharto group squarely in the September 30 Movement's stead, as the force which was claiming to serve as the legitimate protector of the existing order. This was again congruent with the interests of many civilian Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 40] === 30 groups who needed to have the stability of the State affirmed but who also could expect greatly augmented freedom of mov e ment under the umbrella of Suharto's protection. Third, to secure their claim of having protected the State against an attempted coup, it was essential that the Suharto group and its potential civilian supporters be able to ascribe to the dissident act a convincing ideologic character, since political expression under Guided Democracy required a high intensity of ideologic content. It would have been difficult to attribute this kind of character to the September 30 Movement, for Untung and his cohorts were plainly a drab lot, uninterested or unwilling to provide ideologic justifi cation for their actions. The connection of communists with the September 31) Movement automatically provided an ideologic aegis upon which the Suharto group could concen trate public attention. The possibility that the Untung group's decision to abjure ideologic justification had indeed been deliberate was regarded as particularly dangerous, for no stance could have contrasted more dramatically with the prevailing^style of Indonesian politics. If the Septem ber 30 Movement, though abortive, came to be thought of as truly unselfish and untied to ulterior interests, it would have succeeded in raising embarrassing questions about the norms of the political system. It is unnecessary to the context of this analysis to deal with the controversial question of precisely how the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 41] === 31 PKI was related to the young officer group in the September 30 Movement. Of relevance here is simply the example of further affinity between the interests of the Army leaders and those of the many civilian groups. A thinly veiled implication of the popular perspective on events which emerged in the first days after the October 1 events was that the dissident military elements had been merely the dupes of a far more serious threat to the State, posed by a PKI dis ruption of the ideologic Nasakom equilibrium. The assassi nation of the generals and the other dissident acts of the military units could not be forgotten, but the potential damage to the Army's public image was largely ameliorated when placed against the magnified spector of a cunning ideologic attack on the State. Communism, for all its popular success in Indonesian politics, by comparison with religionist, traditional nationalist, and Soekarno-national2 ist aliran's, in fact remained most vulnerable to the claim that it was an alien strain of political thought. The general public image of events which developed in the first week of October, then was an expression of three areas of congruent interests between the Suharto group and. non-communist civilian groups: unbroken systemic continuity; the belief that the September 30 Movement sought The term, "religionist," will be used henceforth to refer to those political groups whose salient political character istic is a particular religious affiliation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === 32 to upset the system; the assertion that the September 30 Movement's adherents possessed a common ideological orienta tion inherently alien to Indonesian society. This public image provided a tentative frame of reference governing subsequent political behavior. On the one hand there was the assurance of unbroken systemic continuity, for this was Suharto's mandate, directly from President Soekarno. On the other hand, irrespective of whether or not the onus was justified, there was a new and flexibly useful enemy--the PKI and its mass organizations. Further more, through the precedent of Suharto's initiative, there was the opportunity for new groups to emerge in the penum bra of his heroism. Before turning to the actual emergance of the action groups, a few further remarks are needed about the evolvement of plans within the Army leadership and between the Army leaders and civilian groups. In retrospect, events of the post-"coup" period (i.e., post October 1) have often been viewed as the gradual unfolding and prosecution of a strategy fully delineated immediately subsequent to the "attempted coup," or in previous contingency planning. The September 30 Movement had specifically named an alleged Council of Generals (Dewan Djenderal) as the group which developed and then sought to carry out plans to overthrow the government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 43] === 33 the 3 966 Mahmillub (Extraordinary Military Court) sessions, much time was devoted to refuting this claim and to showing that the Council of Generals had been no more than a board to act on promotions of officers to general grade. The Council was, however, evidently more than that. During the last week of September, not only the rumor mongers but quite significant figures in Djakarta political circles were guardedly discussing the activities of such a Council. Interviews by foreigners (including this researcher) with some of these people prior to October 1 disclosed that the function of the Council of Generals had expanded appreciably beyond its formal duties of promotion-evaluation. It had in fact come to provide a forum--invariably convening at one or another of the members' homes--for general discussion of Army problems among an intimate group largely comprised of those generals who were marked for kidnap by the Untung group. What these interviews also revealed, however, was that the informality of this aspect of the Council's activities together with the differing opinions of individual members prevented Mahmillub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa) was created by Presidential Decree (Penetapan Presiden) No. 16, 1963 (Lembaran Negara, 1963, No. 119), on Dec. 24, 1963. Presidential Decision (Keputusan Presiden) No. 370, 1965, signed on Dec. 4, 1965, affirmed the jurisdiction of Mahmillub to try alleged participants in the September 30 Movement. Previous sessions of Mahmillub had tried the secessionist leaders, Mr. Dr. Chr. Soumokil of the Republic of the South Moluccans (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) and Letnan Dua-If. Iben Hadjar of Oppressed People's Front (Kesatuan Rakjat Jang Tertindas, K.R.J.T. See G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub, Vol. I. (Perkara Njono) (Djakarta: Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman A.D., 1966). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === 34 any resolute attention to the actual construction of contin4 gency plans. Thus while acknowledging a greater political role on the part of the Council than was officially conceded later, it may be fair to conclude that few preparations re sulted which were directly material to the Army's response to ensuing events.** The severe attentuation of Indonesian political party activity in the later years of Guided Democracy has already Those interviewed, if reminded of their remarks some months later, invariably insisted that the interviewers had misunderstood them, that claims to the existence of a Council of Generals were patent nonsense. One possible concrete exception to this lack of general preparation concerned the issue of confrontation with Malaysia. The Suharto regime in early summer of 1966, moving towards a peaceful resolution of Konfrontasi, asserted that Indonesian Army representations had been made directly to the Malaysian Government as early as August 1965. An open secret (perhaps of questionable foundation) since spring 1966 was that Colonel Ali Murtopo and others had represented the Army in visits to Malaysia since the previous summer. The Suharto regime later spoke of these initiatives as proof of general army opposition to the Soekarno Government's policies of the pre-"coup" period. However, in summer 1966 Government officials, in interviews, were suggesting no more than that these initiatives demonstrated the rectitude and courage of specific general officers, such as Suharto. A further example of Army preparation was the formulation of an elaborate new ideologic doctrine emphasizing non-military sides of the Army's mission and its relationship with Indonesian socio economic progress. This doctrine, known as Tri Ubaya Cakti, was formulated in an Army seminar held well before the October 1 events in April 1965. See Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya C a k t i," Buku Induk, Hasil Seminar Angkatan Darat tgl. 2 s/d 9 April, 1965 bertempat di "Grha Wiyata Judha/Seskoad," Bandung; Dikeluarkan oleh Departemen Angkatan Darat. (Malang: IKIP, n.d.). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 45] === 35 been given enough attention here and elsewhere. It suggests the general state of organized civilian political participa tion as of the first week of October, 1965. All resurgent efforts of the previous two years had quickly petered out and had the effect merely of further eroding self-confidence and public image of the political parties. There was thus apparently no more planning on the part of civilian groups than there had been on the part of the Army leaders. Nor could Army leaders depend upon the formal leadership elements of the civilian groups, when it became obvious th^t Army prestige post-October 1 would depend on the mobilization of wide popular support. Clearly the train of political u p heaval following the October 1 events did not rest upon any ostensible pre-formed, coordinated plan of action involving the Army leaders or non-communist political parties, sepa rately or collectively. Rather, the actions of the Untung group together with the tactical response and dramatic initiative of General Suharto, served in the broadest sense, however unintensionally, to smash the equilibrium of the system, to shatter the foundations of the ideological pillars to which all leaders of major political groups had been able safely to appeal in the previous ritual of po l i tical expression. The Emergence of Action Groups Discontent in the pre-October 1 period had been ritualized, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === 36 and to some extent neutralized, in political campaigns against all kinds of foreign and domestic threats. Among these threats were the imperialist/neo-colonialist ogres, the stultifying effects on world progress of old, established (and hence reactionary) nations, and those particular Indo nesian officials or groups thought to have deviated from Indonesia's own ideological precepts. These officials and groups were depicted as tarnished by corrosive alien influ ences, including the residual ill-effects of Indonesia's own colonial legacy. This kind of discontent, which at least had the benefit of being issue oriented, was accompanied by another type of discontent--that of primordial groups forever jockeying among themselves for improved pecking order status in the Capital. These groups displayed little or no interest in change which might in any way alter the system of existing primordial groups. Finally, there was the dis content of the accelerating number of people neither mean ingfully represented by the primordial groups nor related effectively by personal interests with the lofty ideological models of Indonesian and world progress as promulgated by President Soekarno and propagated by all formal political groups. The PKI was prominently successful in harnessing this type of discontent to its own objectives. Less dramatic but representative of far more people was the discontent of persons, who by ethnic group, social class or regional loca tion, were nominally believed to be represented by other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === 37 existing formal groups, yet had lost any sense of meaning ful representation through them. The creation of functional groups under Guided Democracy, rather than providing new channels of representation for these elements, diffused the power of political parties. These elements included quite diverse groups: the landless peasantry much of the growing urban population, especially that sector of growth representing persons who had emigrated from rural areas or small towns, only to find conditions as bad in the cities** Those young officers, non-coms and enlisted men in the military, especially the army, whose political loyalty was increasingly to the corps itself, rather than to any primordial group of origin The vastly expanding number of college, high school or technical school graduates; while tending to subscribe to parental political affiliations, they were more and more disaffected both by the inherent social dislocation effects of education and by the difficulty of finding employment commensurate with acquired skill and status. This point is fully documented in Geoffrey McNicoll, "Internal Migration in Indonesia: Descriptive Notes," Indonesia, No. 5 (April, 1968), pp. 29-92. See also, Karl J. Pelzer, "Physical and Human Resource Patterns," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Yale Univ., HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 19-26. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === 38 In the pre-October 1 period all the elements expressing this third type of discontent had retained at least nominal alignments with formal existing organizations. These align ments were sufficiently strong to forestall the emergence of any new coalition of forces to represent their collective interests in Indonesian politics. Expression of this type of discontent was further neutralized by President Soekarno's deliberate cultivation of among them. ritualized political expression It was, after all, upon these groups, individu ally or collectively, that Soekarno had expended much of his energy in the Guided Democracy period in his effort to mobilize massive, unified, national commitment to his model of Indonesian development. And, as documented earlier, the overwhelming proportion of the audiences which gathered to hear his words and cheer him onward were youth and students. In turn these youth comprised the major proportion of those who manifested this fourth type of discontent. This was true irrespective of whether the audience was composed of landless peasants and sharecroppers, or urban masses, or young officers, non-coms or enlisted men, or students of whatever level or field of education. The youthful makeup of this group was the most impor tant characteristic of the new type of political sector developing in the last years of Guided Democracy. The PKI and the Army sought to impose strict regulation upon their youth in conformity with the interests of their respective Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 49] === 39 organizations. Soekarno intentionally sought to cultivate in the entire youth sector just the opposite-- a cavalier disregard of organizational loyalties of any sort, in favor of a much broader loyalty to the Revolution and to the President. Over and over again, while recognizing the existence of three strains in Indonesian society--nationalist, religionist and communist--Soekarno emphasized the need to break down these divisions. He referred to himself as a paradigm of how these three strains could be personified in a single Indonesian, who would then embody full commit ment to the Indonesian Revolution. Soekarno thus encouraged disaffiliation from traditional organizations. Receptivity to his appeals was naturally greatest in the youth sector. However, an equally important factor lent additional sig nificance to the severely reduced number and intensity of traditional organizational allegiances at the time of the October 1 events. This was the diverse nature of grievances held by the various components of the youth and younger generational sector. This diversity had in itself served to forestall new coalitions and hence to maintain the general trend toward disorganization and amorphous commonality suitalbe to the President's intention of creating a new foundation for national consensus. Despite the inchoate formulation of its discontents, it was the growing, new, disaffected, national sector, which provided the foundation for the political developments which followed upon the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === 40 October 1 event. Considered from this vantage point, one of the most important aspects of the October 1 event was the catalytic effect it had upon the political system. Former ritualistic response to Soekarno*s fiery admonitions had required fiery acclamation and much shaking of fists at awesome but rather distant and elusive enemies. The Septem ber 30 Movement, however, provided a more tangible butt for all this pent up volatility. The more open political arena which developed over the next few months allowed for the real discontents of these various elements to gain a less symbolic, more direct, political expression. For several days after the initial Untung moves, public political activity in Indonesia virtually ceased, as every one sat and listened to the conflicting authoritative state ments about what was happening. Life in Djakarta went on almost as usual except for a dusk to dawn curfew; in the early morning of Saturday (a work day), October 2, cars of bureaucrats flooded the main suburban artery into the cen tral city as though nothing affecting their own daily pattern had been disturbed. Only as they approached Hotel Indonesia A number of foreign observers remarked on this curious im perturbability of life in Djakarta. An Associated Press report written on October 3 noted that "Despite the heavy military activity in the city, daily life went on as usual in Jakarta. The streets were jammed with cars, shops were open and government offices and business continued to oper ate [these remarks apparently concern Saturday, October 2] The population was apparently nonchalant to the extensive military movements." See Newsday [Long Island], Oct. 4, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === 41 and ran into the cross-fire of skirmishing troops did they slam on brakes, bounce across the traffic island and scurry for home. The political giants might be coming to blows, but even in the Capital this appeared to be a fantastic spectacle, too awful to comprehend but thankfully distant from most people's humdrum existence. Political parties, their affiliates, and other mass organizations appeared to be only slightly more well informed. The first statement issued by several political organi zations collectively was publicized in differing accounts on Monday and Tuesday, October 4 and 5. The heavy type lead-off paragraph of a report in Berita Yudha on Tuesday morning read as follows: Djakarta, (Yudha). Hundreds of thousands of the people of Greater Djakarta, gathered in the "Action Front for Crushing the Counter-Revolutionary September 30 Movement," on Monday morning held a general mee t ing to curse the action of the counter-revolutionary group which called itself "The September 30 Movement." [The meeting] took place in Taman Sunda Kelapa [Sunda Berita Yudha, Oct. 5, 1965. There was always a great problem ins estimating crowds. The consensus among those foreign journalists and this author who observed the meet ing, was that there were perhaps ten thousand persons pres ent. The figure noted in a Herald Tribune report was 5,000. Herald Tribu n e, Oct. 6, 1965. The term "Front," will be used as the translation for "Kesatuan," since foreign and Indonesian writers rendered it that way nearly from the beginning. More literally kesatuan means unity and had wide acceptance in this form in such frequently used phrases as "kesatuan nasional," or national unity. Used with a word such as "action," the permanence which is conjured up on "national unity" renders the translation of kesatuan as unity inadequate. Thus, kesatuan aksi may most accurately be translated as "action unit.'* Yet this con Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === 42 This was the first use of the term, "action front." The report appeared to regard the Action Front for Crushing the Counter-Revolutionary September 30 Movement as an actual organization with a formal (though possibly ad ho c ) structure. The accuracy of this description will be discussed below. There was, however, an important aspect of post-October 1 politics foreshadowed in this first report. By using the term Action Front, the definition of what kinds of organizations could belong was left as broad as possible. The role of political parties was de-emphasized. Instead of stressing the presence of the usual party official dom, other organizations and leaders received equal or greater prominence. This was especially evident in respect to student and youth organizations. The report continued: The general meeting... which was organized by various revolutionary mass organizations, has al ready decided upon several representatives to confront the Commander of KOSTRAD [Major General Suharto] and forward to him the statement issued notes a cohesiveness and small size seldom warranted. "Front" certainly captured more accurately the nature of groups which used the term "kedatuan aksi." The only real objection to "front" in translation is that it is then dif ficult to distinguish the many Indonesian organizations which use the English "front" as part of their names. The term "kesatuan" had, however, been frequently used as part of an organizational name such as Kesatuan Buruh Marhaen (Marhaen Labor U n i t ), or Kespekri (Kesatuan Pederdja Kristen Indonesia, Indonesia Christian Workers' Unit), or KING (Kesatuan Islam Nieuw-Guinea, New Guinea Islamic Unit). "Kesatuan Aksi," so far as this writer knows, had not been employed by any organization previously in the post-inde pendence period. It was, however, used at least as early as 1948 during the Revolution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === 43 by the general meeting already mentioned. Mass organizations participating... were among others Pemuda Pantjasila, GP Ansor, Pemuda Muhammadijah, GKMRI [probably an error, actually PMKRI], PII, H M I, Gasbindo, Pedmua Muslimin, and other p r o gressive mass organizations gathered among four political parties, i.e., NU, IPKI, Katolik and PSII, as well as mass organizations gathered under the Sekretariat Bersama Front Nasional [Joint Secretariat of the National Front].... Student and youth groups comprised all but one of the mass organizations named, and most of the people in attendance were clearly under twenty-five years of age. The paragraph con cluded by prefacing the full text of the statement which was to be presented to Suharto. At the meeting it was read by Subchan, the young leader of the growing liberal faction of the NU and the party's vice chairman. Since the contents of this relatively long and obviously carefully prepared statement were destined to be reiterated in slightly (often important) varying ways by dozens of organiza tions during the following months, it is worthwhile to outline them briefly. The Action Front stated that it stood "completely and unreservedly behind H.E. the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno," was prepared to help in any way to destroy the September 30 Movement and to that end suggested to the President several steps. These included the banning and dissolving (melarang/ membubarkan) of all political parties and mass organizations in any way connected with the Movement, such as SBPU, SOBSI, 10. Berita Yudha, Oct. 5, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === 44 PKI, CGMI, BTI, Gerwani, Lekra, HSI and others, the permanent cessation of all implicated newspapers and magazines, such as Harian Rakjat, Warta B h a k t i, Bintang T i m u r, Kebudajaan B a r u, Ekonomi Nasional, Gelora Indonesia, etc., and confisca tion by the State of all the possessions of these counter revolutionary organizations and elements. It urged Soekarno, furthermore, to purge (membersihkan) counter-revolutionary types from all of the top governmental institutions of the State, from State institutes, the National Front, the National News Institute Antara, and from the student/youth, federations: Front Pemuda, PPMI, and M M I. It acknowledged the significance of the President's TAKARI message in "taking action against bureaucratic capitalists, corruptors, speculators and other sowers of economic confusion." It expressed "deep gratitude" to Allah for protecting the President and General Nasution. Finally, and most significantly, it called for the cooperation of all truly Pantjasilaist and Manipolist forces.** On the same day as the report of this "giant" rapat in Berita Y u d h a, a somewhat different account appeared in the only other publishing Djakarta daily newspaper, Angkatan Bersendjata. Many of the participating organizations, though of the same general political persuasions, were different, 11. This statement of the Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September or Action Front for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary September 30th Movement, appears in translation among the "Selected D o c u ments Relating to the September 30th Movement and Its Epilogue," in Indonesia, I (April, 1966), pp. 203-204. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 55] === 45 CHART 1 NATIONAL/DJAKARTA ACTION GROUPS Party-Oriented Action Groups Date Indonesian English Oct. 4 Masa Aksi Mengganjang Kontra Revolusi 30 September. Mass Action for the Crush ing of the Counter-Revolu tionary September 30 Movement. Oct. 8 Kesatuan Aksi Menggan jang Kontra Revolusi "Gestapu." Action Front for the Crush ing of the CounterRevolutionary "Gestapu." Oct. 13 Panitia Aksi Menggan jang Kontra Revolusi '’Gestapu.1' Action Committee for the Curshing of the CounterRevolutionary "Gestapu." Oct. 15 Panitia Aksi Pengganjangan Kontrev Gestapu Mahasiswa U.I. University of Indonesia Student Action Committee for the Crushing of the C ounter-Revoluti onary Gestapu. Oct. 15 Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjangan Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September. Action Front for the Crush ing of the Counter-Revolu tionary September 30 Move ment. Oct. 25 Aksi Massa Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusioner Gestapu Mahasiswa U.I. University of Indonesia Mass Action for the Crush ing of the Counter-Revolu tion Gestapu. Nov. 9 Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjang G.30.S. Action Front for the Crush ing of G.30.S. Nov. 6 Biro Politik Penggan jangan G.30.S. Pengurus Besar Nahdatul Ulama. Nahdatul Ulama Executive Committee Political Bureau for the Crushing of G.30.S. Army-Oriented Action Groups Oct. 11 Komando Aksi Penumpasan Gerakan 30 September. Action Command for the Annihilation of the September 30 Movement. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 56] === 46 CHART 1 (con't.) Date Indonesian English Oct. 22 Front Aksi Karyawan Buruh Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi. Labor Functionalist Action Front for the Crushing of Counter-Revolution. Nov. 16 Komando Aksi Buruh. Labor Action Command. Soekarno-Oriented Action Groups Oct. 13 Komando Aksi Golkar Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi Front Nasional. National Front Functional Group Action Command for the Crushing of CounterRevolution. Oct. 21 Kesatuan Aksi Pengurus Besar Front Nasional. National Front Executive Committee Action Front. Oct. 22 Kesatuan Massa Aksi Progressif Revolusioner. Progressive Revolutionary Mass Action Front. Oct. 17? Panitia Aksi Pengamanan Adjaran Bung Karno dan Pengganjangan Gerakan 30 September. Action Committee for the Safe-guarding of the Teach ings of Bung Karno and for the Crushing of the Septem ber 30 Movement. O c t. 29 Panitia Aksi Penggan jangan Gestapu. Action Committee for the Crushing of Gestapu. Nov. 12 Komando Aksi Pengamanan dan Peningkatan Produksi (KAP-3). Action Command for the Safe-guarding and Stepping Up of Production. Nov. 20 Ko-ordinator Panitia Aksi P3 Action Committee Coordinator. Dec.? Komando Aksi Golkar Anggota Front Nasional Pengganjangan Kontrev "Gestok." National Front Functional Group Action Command for the Crushing of the Counter Revolutionary "Gestok" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 57] === 47 and the Catholic Party is not even mentioned. 12 The Angkatan Bersendjata (AB) article also did not intimate that this was a meeting of an organization, although it was more accurate in recording the time of the meeting as about midday, not in the morning. The AB reporter simply stated that Mmidday yesterday there took place a mass action meeting for the 13 Crushing of the counter-revolutionary September 30 Movement.11 As confirmed by personal observation, the organizational aspect of the meeting was not nearly so clear to many of those present as it was to the Berita Yudha reporter. The formal statement and the sense of organization were the work of a small number of organization leaders, mainly persons like Subchan of the NU Party and influential leaders of several other organizations who took a certain degree of initiative on their own to propel their groups at the national level into firmer and faster commitments than might have occurred had conventional leadership deliberations taken place. Similar initiatives took place within many of the student and youth organizations. Here, however, the leaders had 12. Participating organizations mentioned in the AB article included PSII, NU, IPKI, GASBIINDO, SARBUMUSl7~G0BSI, Sukwati Dep. Agama, H M I, Front Katholik, SEM M I, Muhammadijah, Ansor, P U I, IPM, Gerwabsi, Pemuda Muslimin, PII, Dawah Islamiah, Sepmi, P'umuda Muhammadijah, Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, Lesbumi, Alwasjiah. Those under lined were not mentioned in the Berita Yudha article. Conversely, there were organizations listed by Berita Yudha but not by AB. The AB article does state t h a t t h e r e were 27 supporting organizations and that their list is only partial. A Suara Islam report on Oct. 7 conforms substantially with the AB article, including the exclusion of Partai Katholik. 13. Angkatan Bersendjata, Oct. 5, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 58] === 48 several advantages. Though ineffectual in terms of real political power, these organizations had been continuously tuned to an increasingly feverish pitch of political expres sion over the past several years. Politization through ritual expression had the effect of cultivating and sustaining viable communications between leaders and led. It also tended to prevent the emergence of hero-leaders and the dependency upon them which characterized adult groups. (Faster turn-over of student/youth leadership was of course equally responsible for this.) Student and youth groups in the post-October 1 months proved themselves relatively more flexible and adapt able than the political parties to the exigencies of a chang ing political milieu. Similarly, party affiliated student and youth organizations proved relatively less adaptable than independent groups. As a general rule, however, aggressive student and youth leaders faced a less formidable problem than their party counterparts, since the latter had to mobil ize entrenched and jaded adult leaderships and combat the inertia of apathetic membership. 14. Towards the end of October, a report by Seth S. King in the New York Times aptly quotes an Indonesian scholar concerning the dimension of mass apathy: "You should remember that politics in Indonesia is like rivers in the sun. The top three inches of water are warm, but below them are several feet of cool water that flows on uncon cerned. Here the politicians are the three warm inches and the people are the cool part. A lot of what is going on now is to them just another fight among the politicians that will neither help nor hurt them." It is then noted that, as of that date, none of the top PKI leaders was known to be in custody, nor had any communist sympathizer in the Government been forced to resign. Of the currently Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 59] === 49 These legacies of the recent past were evident as early as the October 4 Meeting and the events leading up to it. At that juncture the participating parties, through the efforts of their few aggressive leaders, were able to use their sparse number to good advantage. Perceiving almost from the outset of the October 1 dissidence that their future was endangered whether the victor be the Untung group, the communist partciipants, the President or any combination thereof, the anti communist parties were immediately able to take an unequivocal stance against the September 30 Movement. The statement which leaders of the October 4 Meeting proclaimed as the result of the spontaneous proposals of the participating organizations, was virtually identical--except for certain important ampli fications of several points--with an earlier statement by the four participating political parties. This earlier statement-- reported in Angkatan Bersendjata on October 4 and purportedly released midday on Saturday, October 2--was thus signed by NU, PSII, Partai Katholik and IPKI, plus six mass organizations, only one of which was a student/youth group. anti-communist campaign of most political parties, King recalled that "Most of these same parties had been just as active in demonstrating under the guidance of the Communists and in wrecking installations that the party had condemned." New York T i m e s, Oct. 27, 1965. 15. The mass organizations were Muhammadijah, Gerakan TP (perhaps Gerakan Tenaga Pembangunan), Secretariat Bersama Golkar anggota Front Nasional, Gasbiindo, Generasi Muda Islam and K B K I. Only Generasi Muda Islam is officially a youth organization. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 60] === 50 The differences between the two statements illustrate to some extent the tremendous influences which student/ youth groups began to exercise even this early in the postOctober 1 period. The Tuesday, October 5, statement was pre pared prior to the mass meeting. 3, was conditioned by two factors. Its formulation, on October One was the growing public realization that the kidnapped generals had probably been treated violently The other was the strong lead taken by 16. Although no reference was made in the Kesatuan Aksi state ment to the assassinated generals, all of the major group leaders had been apprised of the officers' fate. The Kesatuan Aksi Meeting was deliberately planned to coincide with the exhumation of the generals' bodies which was taking place almost simultaneously. Although it is fairly well established that Soekarno was informed of the assas sinations UDon his arrival at Halim Air Force Base on the morning of October 1, it is not certain that Suharto and Nasution had definitely ascertained by the end of that day the fate of all of the kidnapped generals. They, of course, were aware of those assassinations which had taken place at individual homes and could envision the worst. Angkatan Bersendjata of October 5 records that RPKAD (Suharto) troops were already examining areas of freshly turned earth at Halim on October 2. The article is ambiguous as to whether the malodorous spot, a filled in well, under which the bodies lay actually was dis covered and examined on that day or the next. However, the excavation of earth and other fill began at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 3. "Technical difficulties" were said to have caused the actual exhumation to be postponed to Monday. The nature of the exhumation and reportage regarding it has already been discussed. Interviews indicated, however, that the initiatives, first by certain party leaders, then by student/youth leaders as well, were essentially motivated by early knowledge (i.e., by late Saturday or early Sunday) of the assassinations and of where the corpses lay buried. An Associated Press account sent out on Sunday, October 3, mentioned unconfirmed r e ports that General Yani was dead and that General Pandjaitan had been killed while resisting arrest by the rebels. See Newsday [a Long Island, New York, paper; the New York Times was on strike], Oct. 4, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === 51 the Suharto group to intimate communist complicity in the September 30 Movement. The only way the anti-communist political parties could hope to affect a course of events dominated by military operations and the Soekarno-Suharto power struggle, was to organize their collective strength. This could be accomplished, amidst a chaotic political scene to which they were currently no more than bystanders, only by mobilizing large demonstrations involving as many organi zations as could be gathered together and issuing collective statements. It was in the promise of numbers that student/ youth leaders were able, despite their organizational frag mentation, to press for a strengthening of the wording of the statement prepared earlier by the initially sponsoring political parties. Student/youth leaders successfully pressed for the following: 1. firmer wording on regard to the September 30 Mov e m e n t; 2. stronger suppressive action to be taken against the P K I, its specific mass organizations, and sympathetic newspapers; 3. less equivocation about the Action Fro n t ’s own ideological posture. Perhaps the most interesting of these changes was the particular ideological terms used to couch appeals to other groups and to the nation in general. The party statement used Trisakti and the Lima [Pantja] A z i m a t, terms strongly Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 62] === 52 identified with the leftist ideological thrust of the past two years, and in the case of Lima A z i m a t, a term which President Soekarno ranked first among the pantheon of symbolic guidelines of the nation. 17 The Kesatuan Aksi state ment made no mention of these terms, instead used the neutral and historically rooted Pantjasila and the foundational sym18 bolic term of Guided Democracy, Manipol. Also strongly emphasized in this statement was a firm recognition of the importance of the Army leaders and a commitment to work with them, not only in the task of crushing the September 30 Mov e ment but in other spheres as well. In tone this document was more forceful on several important issues than any of the further statements, which appeared over the next couple of months, under the auspices of the Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang 17. Trisakti = three promises (or pillars, principles, talismans). The first is berdaulat dalam politik, political sovereignty. The second, berdikari dalam bldang ekonomi, stand on our own feet economically. The third, berkepribadian sendiri dalam kebudajaan, be of our own personality culturally. Lima or Pantja~Rximat Revolusi means "the five charms (or principles) of the Revolution": 1) Nasakom (acronym for unity of nationalists, religionists and communists), 2) Pantjasila, or the five pillars included in the 1945 Con stitution (belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, popular sovereignty, and social justice), 3) ManipolUSDEK (the political manifesto of Guided Democracy, in cluding five basic tenets for which the letters of USDEK stand: the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Personal ity), 4) Trisakti (see above), 5) Berdikari (see above). 18. For a general discussion of these ideological constructs, see Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and their Wielders," World Politics, 16 (Oct., 1963) pp. 7997. See also Ben Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," Indonesia, I (Apr., 1966), pp. 89-116. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 63] === 53 Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September, its individual component organizations, or other groups. 19 These early p o s i tions- -concerning communist groups, cooperation with Army leaders, and ideological appeals--were strongly worded in spite of, or perhaps because of, the general political con fusion of those first days of October. The momentum of new political action was, however, soon offset by inhibitory factors, such as entrenched leaders, parochial interests, and renewed initiatives undertaken by the President and the Army leaders themselves. Action Groups and Political Parties The period of early October until the end of the year was thus a time when many political parties sought to regener ate a meaningful political role. This was also true for other political organizations whose status in Indonesian politics had suffered steady attrition since the advent of Guided Democracy in 1959. In fact, they had little choice in the matter; failure to participate soon was regarded as an indi cation of sympathy, or nearly as reprehensible, indifference, with regard to the September 30 Movement. For those like the 19. Discrepancies between immediate reactions and later, more fully deliberated considerations, were especially appar ent with regard to the orthodox Muslim political parties, NU and PSII. Space especially devoted to reactions to the Thirtieth of September Movement in the two publishing newspapers on October 4 and 5 was filled almost exclusive ly with statements by the central leaderships of these two parties and their affiliates. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === 54 NU, PSII, IPKI, and Partai Katholik whose traditional stance in respect to the PKI was clear cut, this renewed partici pation was a relatively easy task. They were hampered only by the inadequacies of their leaders, organizational wea k nesses, and the legacy of complacency in the immediate past. For others, such as the P N I, Partindo, and Perti, regenera tive moves were automatically hobbled by unfavorable preOctober 1 public images, to one degree or another compromised 20 by tacit or actual support of the P K I. So much effort was consumed in struggles between alleged pro-Gestapu.and antiGestapu intra-party leadership factions, that little energy remained for effective leadership in competitive or cooper ative ventures with other political parties. The Masjumi, PSI and Murba parties, banned during Guided Democracy, re mained organizationally non-existent, but individuals clearly identified with them were very active in the formation and administration of new organizations or were influential in advisory capacities. In these cases the absence of organi zational encumbrances became a distinct advantage. The parties were thus on the one hand obliged by the new and confusing issue of an allegedly PKI-sponsored 20. Parkindo, The Indonesian Christian Party, representing Protestants, since it was not really compromised by any image of PKI support is not placed in this group. Ho w ever, internal leadership factionalism, dependence at the national level upon Leimena (who was so close to the President), and failure to react quickly and "pro perly” to G-30-S, prevented Parkindo from ever being fully accepted as one of the "New Order" forces of the post-"coup" period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 65] === 55 attempted "coup” to come forward and declare themselves unequivocally in support of those who had saved the nation. On the other hand it was somewhat difficult to conceptual ize just what the nation had been saved from, for this quickly verged on the basic question of whether the ideologic system (of which communism had been an integral part) was going to undergo serious change. Uncertainty about the future and fear that precipitate moves could have adverse consequences subsequently, tended to turn the normal caution of the party leaders into utter inaction. Recitations of ideologic ritual grew increasingly platitudinous as denun ciations of the Gestapu and the PKI grew increasingly shrill. Ad hoc action fronts were effective politically to the extent that they could wend their way between these posturings and forge new images of relevance to concrete issues, or perhaps more precisely, to market concrete issues around which new forces could marshal an image of relevance. During October three forces manuevered for prominence in the creation of action groups. Each attempted to remain aloof from official commitments, preferring to encourage involvement by intermediate or subsidiary group leaders and hence leave the superior groups free to deny or ignore con nections with action groups should untoward circumstances arise. The political parties comprised one of these superior forces, the other two being the President and the Army leaders. At stake was no less than control over the modalities Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === 56 of public political expression, a monopoly which until October had been exercised by the PKI, its subsidiaries and affiliates. To this end each force sought to establish its action group along the broadest lines possible. Each at tempted to include under its banner the identification, ho w ever nominal, of the component groups of the other major forces. Such co-options were initially unopposed by the respective forces and component groups, for it was very u n certain where the general political trend was moving and multiple action group alignments served as a kind of insur ance. The nation awaited President Soekarno's promised solution to the perplexities of G-30-S. This was expected to be a definitive explanation, which would narrow the activities of action groups or perhaps even eliminate them. His statement, if history was any precedent, could be d e pended upon to knock existing groups temporarily off balance and to require every major force and lesser group to adjust to a new and probably confusing interpretation of how the ideological system should be implemented. Hence, it was only as the months went by and no Presidential solution was forthcoming, that mass oriented political groups gained a boldness and confidence sufficient to pursue their respective interests more explicitly and thus reduce the necessity for broad coalitions. October and November, however, were months of frenzied activity as action groups formed, demonstrated, accused, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === 57 demanded, interminably switched alignments, and ganged up upon and cast out sudden heretics. students and youth predominated. In all of this activity Where previously their hyperactivity was but an entertainment, a diversion from drab conditions, and seldom beyond the control of adults, it now became consequential. Traditional conventions ap peared increasingly in doubt, and adults could not glibly invoke them to enforce control. The salient characteristic of this period was thus the growing effectiveness and con sequent cohesiveness of student/youth action, as adult forces even in the realm of action fronts proved unable to leave traditional organizational loyalties behind them. The initial mass action--described earlier and styled by some of its leaders as an "Action Front for the Crushing of the Counter-revolutionary September 30 Movement"--was basically a party oriented affair, although most of the participants were students and youth. For the party leaders, expecially Subchan of the NU, it was an exhilarating, new experience to see wild enthusiasm generated in a rightist political rally. So inspired were the participants that they resumed their activities the next day, gayly marching through the streets of Djakarta shouting epithets and painting slogans denouncing the PKI and calling for its dissolution. 21 Now, however, no party leaders were present, nor was there a con21. This October 5 demonstration is noted in the Herald Tribune, Oct. 6, 1965, which estimated the number of participants at 5,000 and headlines the story, "Students Back the Army." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === 58 tinuation of the organizational unity introduced on the previous day. It was a wholly student/youth affair and impressed upon the party leaders that a much greater effort would be needed to harness this rightist mass action into an organizational form amenable to continued adult control. The success of such an effort, as mentioned earlier, was hampered by the party leaders' reluctance to commit their organizations in any formal sense or to take any action which subsequently might impinge on their respective autonomy. The next mass meeting--on October 8 at Taman Surapati, a small park or square in the most elite section of Djakarta-further indicated the magnitude of the burgeoning enthusiasm of many political elements. It also illustrated the diffi culty leaders encountered in attempting to be at once domi nant and yet not too conspicuous in the action movement. The formal organization, the Action Front for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary September 30 Movement, issued a state ment which reiterated and expanded upon the October 4 release. But its contents and the primary role of party leaders in formulating them were largely lost in the drama of thousands of milling people and in their subsequent festive march to. PKI headquarters (which they sacked and burned down) and to the National Front building farther downtown. 22 22. Slogans, shouted or painted on signs and banners, just as under Guided Democracy were a feature of these demonstra tions. Participants and onlookers now, however, took great joy in using terms and inventing phrases which previously would have seemed blasphemous. Some of these Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === 59 Few newspapers in reporting the event mentioned the organizational aspect, and fewer still included verbatim the Action Front statement. 23 Even then, different n e w s papers used different versions of the Action Front title and emphasized the presence of some component groups over others. The main Army newspaper, Angkatan Bersendjata, neglected (as it had previously) any mention of an organi zational name and instead emphasized the massiveness of the rally and the broad variety of groups in attendance. 25 were: Bubarkan PKI (Ban the PKI); Aidit Agen CIA (Aidit is an Agent of the Chinese Intelligence A g e n c y ); Gantung Aidit (Hang A i dit); Gerakan 30 September adalah puntjak dari Aksi2 Sepihak (The September 30 Movement is the epit ome of Unilateral Actions [refers to a category of nonNasakom types of political action condemned by Soekarno the previous year]); Ganjang Baperki Kasir Gestapu/PKI (Crush Baperki [Chinese association], the Cashier of Gestapu/PKI [another acronymic variation on Gerakan 30 September]). Mertju S u a r, Oct. 8, 1965, and personal observation. 23. The only facsimile of the Action Front statement I have found was one in Suara Islam, Oct., 9, 1965. 24. A p i *s version--Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang Kontra Revolusi Gestapu--was close to the version used by Berita Yudha for the October 4 meeting, Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September. A p i, Oct., 8, 1965. Suara Islam (Oct., 9) used for the first time the name which after several months of temporary permutations finally prevailed, Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi Gerakan 30 September (often shorted to KAP Gestapu). 25. Mentioned in Angkatan Bersendjata were NU, IPKI, Gaspindo, PSII, Sarbumusi, Gobsi, H M I, Lesbumi, SOK S I, IPPI Pantjasila, PII, IPM, Pelmasi, KBM, Perti, S E M M I, Pemuda Ansor, Pemuda Katholik, Pemuda Muhammadijah, Pemuda Muslimin, Dawah Islamijah, Front Katholic, Gamki, PUI, Gerwapsi, Muhammadijah, Sukwati Dep. Agama, Sekretaris Bersama Golongan Karya, Pertakin. As previously, the paper spoke only of a "mass action meeting to annihilate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 70] === 60 Its headline read, "Half Million [man] Mass Action by 46 Political and Mass Organization Demands Banning of PKI." Though the accompanying article indicated that the "half million" referred to the membership of the organizations mentioned and not just to those in attendance, political parties nonetheless were rather submerged in the vast variety of political organizations listed. 27 It was of signi ficance to the Army leaders that the rally's formal state ment: 1. affirmed the participants' loyalty to the President and the Armed Forces (ABRI); 2. wished to help ABRI annihilate Gestapu; 3. demanded the banning of the P K I; 4. supported Information Minister Achmadi's order form ally closing down implicated newspapers; and 5. supported the contemplated purging of State insti tutions. 'The Counter Revolutionary 30 September Movement'" (rapat massa aksi menumpas "Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September). AB, Oct. 9, 1965. Mertju Suar (Oct. 9), organ of the non-party Muhammadijah, also neglected any mention of an "Action Front," although it did report the attendance of two organizations of poor people (Abang Betja and Gembel Berdjuang) which were to play important roles on several occasions over the next two years. 26. Ibid. 27. Api stated that "tens of thousands" attended. A p i, Oct. 8, 1965. Mertju Suar reported 60,000 (Oct. 9, 1965)'. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === 61 Army leaders were glad to have the declared support of the political parties--NU, Perti, IPK I, Parkindo, PSII, and PNISuhardi--but in any open conflict with the PKI, this could be taken for granted. 28 Of more problematic loyalty and hence more important to the Army were those many political or quasi-political mass organizations--students/youth, tradeunion/labor, and religious. Though never in any way affili ated with the PKI they had nonetheless been more susceptible than the rightist party leaders to the influence of PKI ideas. The Army leaders' political stature vis-h-vis President Soekarno would depend on their successful cultivation of mass support more than on their command of military power. The success of the party-oriented Action Front in mobilizing dramatic action in Djakarta automatically drew into this new arena of mass action political competition the other two centers of political force, the Army and the President. On October 11, three days after the KAP-Gestapu demonstration and action against the PKI headquarters, the Greater Djakarta branch of the Army-sponsored labor union, SOK S I, proposed to the Territorial National Front (Front Nasional Daerah) and to the Greater Djakarta Territorial War Authority (Penguasa Perang Daerah Djakarta Raja, or Peperda) the creation of an Action Command for the Annihilation of Gestapu (Komando Aksi Penumpasan Gestapu). This command would be composed of all parties, mass organizations and functional 28. See the editorial in A p i, Oct. 8, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 72] === 62 groups not involved in the dissident movement. 29 SOKSI, ironically standing for Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Workers (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia), was already an acknowledged participant in the earlier Action Front meetings. If accepted, creation of this new "Action Command" would serve several purposes con genial to the interests of Army leaders. Direct endorsement by the War Authority would assure a continuing degree of control by a military office directly responsible to the Suharto group. Endorsement by the National Front would inte grate the new organization with the appropriate official con trol structure for mass organizations, and hence provide legitimation directly within the general framework of Guided Democracy. It would also signify Presidential recognition, while at the same time allowing the Army sponsor of the Action Command to exert pressure within the National Front against its current leadership, which was largely communist, leftist and Soekarnoist. Finally, alteration of the Action Front movement into a "Command" had a certain military appeal and change of the operative word, "Pengganjangan," to "Penumpasan" suggested that the task at hand was of a different order than Konfrontasi, for which Soekarno had specially cultivated the Javanese root word, "ganjang" (literally, no masticate). This Army inspired attempt to impose a more direct control upon the development of the action movement eventually failed. 29. AB, Oct. 12, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === 63 It failed in no small part because the dramatic rise of the centrality of the Army in Indonesian politics made it unneces sary and even inadvisable for the Army to demonstrate any formal connections with organizations already generally sym pathetic with its objectives. However, the SOKSI proposal and several similar forays which followed, dramatized a dimen sion of political competition which was repeatedly manifest during the following year. Just two days after SOKSI, the National Front inaugurated its own version of an action front in a large pep rally Capel siaga) followed by the customary ransacking and burning, this time of the Youth Building on Djalan Merdeka Utara. 30 usual the participants discovered incriminating evidence-Tjakrabirawa badges, commando knives, and Pemuda Rakjat uniforms. 31 The strategy of the National Front differed some what from that of SOKSI or the political parties. Neither the SOKSI proposal nor the existing political party action front was recognized. In talking to the press a spokesman for the National Front simply ascribed to the large group gathered in front of the National Front building a new collec tive name, "Komando Aksi Bersama Golongan Karya Mengganjang 30. By October 14 ransacked and/or burned buildings included those of the PKI Central Committee, Pemuda Rakjat, Sobsi, Lekra, Gerwani, C G M I, and the homes of PKI leaders, Aidit, Njoto, Lukman and others. Suara Islam, Oct. 14, 1965. 31. A p i, Oct. 13, 1965. Various newspapers gave conflicting accounts of what items were in fact found. Cf. A p i, Oct. 13; WB, Oct. 13; WB, Oct. 14; Suara Islam, Oct. IS. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === 64 Kontra Revolusi Gerakan 30 September" (Joint Functional Group Action Command for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary 32 September 30 Movement). From most newspaper accounts it would have been impossible to tell that this was not simply another demonstration of the same groups as in the partyoriented Action Front, except that now the National Front administration had come forward to take its rightful official role as coordinator of all such activities. 33 A later Antara report did acknowledge that it had been a gathering wholly of youth but gave their affiliation as Youth Workers Group (Golongan Karya Pemuda), a component of the National Front. This information was released by a person who called himself an "information staff" member of the "Youth Action Command." The confusion, to some extent deliberate, derived from the National Front's attempt to utilize for different purposes 32. WB, Oct. 13, 1965. Angkrtan Bersendjata reported the name slightly differently as "Functional Group Action Command for the Crushing of Counter-Revolution/National Front" (Komando Aksi Golkar Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi F N ), Oct. 14. 33. Even the Api account stated that this was the "umpteenth time" that a "mass action for the crushing of Gestapu" had occurred. It then mentioned that the action was "coordin ated by the Functional Group Action Front of the National Front for crushing the Gestapu movement (Kesatuan Aksi Golkar, Front Nasional mengganjang gerakan "Gestapu"), thus further confusing the issue by calling the group a Front instead of a Command. 34. WB, Oct. 14, 1965. He gave his name as Ch.T. Nggebut, and also claimed that the confiscated Youth Building, whose contents had been burned, was now the property of a Ce n tral Youth Foundation (Jajasan Centrum Pemuda), previously called the Youth Building Foundation (Jajasan Gedung Pemuda). If they could not claim the adults, the National Front was at least determined to dominate the youth. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === 65 a set of terms and structures first roughly laid out in a conference the previous July. For purposes of instilling a spirit of "action" in the implementation of Nasakom and for the fight against Malaysia, "command apparatuses" (aparat komando) were to be formed by the National Front at all levels of society. 35 These new structures, though by October apparently not established beyond a paper or very rudimentary state, offered a convenient mechanism whereby the Front Nasional could co-opt to its own jurisdiction the fledgeling party-oriented Action Front movement. 7 Its endeavors, ultimately futile, to manuever into a favorable 35. Dengan Turba Mendjalankan Revolusi-Dalam-Tjara-Bekerdja! [By Going Down Below, Carry out a Revolution in the Method of Work!] (Djakarta: Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, 1965), p. 61. For authorization for these structures the docu ment refers to "keputusan Menteri/Sekdjen Front Nasional No. 087/Kpts/PBFN/SI/1963, tentang pembentukan organisasi dan tugas-tugas Komando Aksi Mengganjang ’Malaysia'" [... concerning the formation of an organization and tasks for the Action Command for the Crushing of "Malaysia"], p. 64. Dengan Turba... included documents and results of the First Turba Seminar (Seminar Turba Pertama) con ducted by the Executive Board of the National Front in Djakarta, July 28-31, 1965, and improved at the All-Indonesia Working Conference of the Executive Board of the National Front in Tjibogo, August 3-6, 1965. Its purpose was to lay out in some detail plans and strategy for the remaining months of 1965. 36. Two of the National Front Executive Board (Pengurus Besar) members, whose ouster for alleged G-30-S involvement KAPGestapu demanded on October 14, were identified as con nected with a "Kesatuan Aksi PBFN" [Action Front of the National Front Executive Board], WB, Oct. 15, 1965. A week later Brigadier General Djuhartono, one of the four Vice Secretary Generals, in a further attempt by tne National Front to mount and control the Action bandwagon, styled himself "Secretary General/Chairman of the Action Front Section of the National Front." Mimbar Revolusi, Oct. 22, 1965. Inconsistencies in the titles of FN officials, in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === 66 bargaining position as the main representative of Soekarno's interests were an important feature of the next several m o n t h s 1 events. Some Remarks on Style The three initiatives for mobilizing mass political power in the aftermath of the Untung Movement came from the President, the Suharto Army group, and the political parties. These initiatives, aside from their relevance as the first steps in the solidification of student/youth power, are il lustrative of a basic characteristic of the style of Indonesian political conflict. Resolution of most conflicts in post independence Indonesian politics had demonstrated a distinc tive style, probably derived from two major influences: first, the special kind of colonial relationship which Indonesia had with the Dutch and, secondly, the way in which the European socialist model of nationalism and revolution propelled c e r tain social groups in Indonesia suddenly to the forefront of leadership strata. Much has been written on the history of these two influences, and there have been some attempts to deal with the socio-psychological residues. Most simply, the resulting style of political interchange reflected a fundasupposedly existing FN departments, and in the titles of several new "action” organizations proposed or announced by the FN in October and November, confirm that no signi ficant action structures had actually come into being before this time. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === 67 mental contradiction between two modes of conflict resolution. On one side was a kind of refined predictability, a mannered symmetry of form, a keen sense of proprieties, a dread to manquer aux biensSances. On the other was the thrust of u p heaval, revolution, the urge to discard anachronistic tradi tions, to leap-frog over Western revolutions and establish with third World soul brothers a wholly new order. Ideally, resolution of conflict in the first case was characterized by its imperceptibility, by conformity to conventions so as to homologize what might otherwiseNhave been revealed as substantively opposing views. In Indonesia the distinctive feature of this proverbial tradition-modernization conflict was that politics did not bifurcate along these lines. The fundamental antagonism manifested itself in virtually every group and in most in dividual actors. President Soekarno best typified the ambiv alence in his assiduous cultivation, both of transcendent, revolutionary political solutions, and of touchstones in Indonesian (usually Javanese) them. tradition upon which to anchor The contradiction of "change must be total" and "let us abide by our true antecedents" is seen in his increasingly desperate attempts to find appropriate formulas for this major problem of conflict resolution. Though temporarily the most successful conflict mediator, Soekarno ultimately proved in adequate (perhaps inevitably so) to the task of contriving either a new style of Indonesian political behavior, or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === 68 institutions which might neutralize the antagonism or channel it to constructive ends. His posture became increasingly strident and frenetic in the late Guided Democracy as the problem pressed upon him. Increasingly he hid behind the apparent immutability of his own stature. At the same time he fiercely demanded revolutionary fervor on the part of all Indonesians. This fervor, however, was not permitted to trespass outside a multitude of ideologic orthodoxies. The ideologic guidelines unfortunately had no vital connection with the fragile, flaccid, emasculated political structures. There were innumerable channels for demonstrating revolution ary spirit, each with built-in protections against revealing who or what was being revolted against. Proprieties of traditional conventions usually prevailed over the spirit of revolutionary abandon in Indonesia's style of conflict resolution. The atmosphere of revolutionary conformity in late Guided Democracy had made it difficult to discern in public media (largely state-controlled) where real political con flicts lay. Some foreign scholars were reduced to counting up the number of times such words as Nasakom appeared in particular newspapers, as a measure of relative leftism. This was not an entirely fatuous task, for though channels of legitimate conflict expression grew fewer, the basic con flicts sharpened, and battles were joined through subtle but sometimes devastating innuendo. These skills were still Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === 69 valuable in the post-October 1 period, so long as the State, albeit now through conflicting agancies, claimed control over the media. All newspapers, for instance, continued daily to proclaim their abiding love and loyalty for Great Leader of the Revolution/President Soekarno. Yet it was possible for an NU paper, less than two weeks after the October 1 event to slip in the following remarks under a lead article entitled "The View from Djakarta's Merdeka Palace": It's Monday! Merdeka Palace and the State Palace are guarded as usual. It is as though the situation were just the same as before the Gestapu treachery.. .. The atmosphere seems tranquil. As the Puta Masjarakat reporter mounted the steps of the State Palace yesterday, it was evident that the atmosphere had not changed. It was just as normal. The Palace remained peaceful and serene, as though it had experienced nothing. Apparently the counter-revolutionary traitors have not yet been able to shake up the Palace. The President was wearing brown clothing. His countenance seemed refreshed. A smile constantly graced his lips. The President received credentials from the Ambassador and Plenipotentiary of the Confederative [sic] Republic of Switzerland, Jean Revilliod. Also in attendance were First Vice Prime Minister Dr. Subandrio, Coordinating Minister Ruslan Abdulgani, Coordinating Minister Sumarno SH, Coordinating Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, Minister Ichsan, Minister Maladi and Minister Omar Dani. When President Soekarno saw the many reporters taking pictures of him, with a smile on his lips, he [honorific] nodded, in a kind of sign that he was safe and sound and filled with good cheer. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === 70 Yes, the atmosphere at Merdeka Palace remains as usual. The President remains safe and sound. The atmosphere is peaceful again. But nevertheless, out side the Palace the people insistently demand that the perpetrators of Gestapu be punished and they clamor for the banning of the PKI which acted as dalang of the Gestapu treachery.37 The proprieties were all observed, but barely. The Palace was used almost as a synonym for the President, and the impli cation was that the center of Government was rather out of touch with reality, that Soekarno was hardly living up to his oft-heralded role as "conveyor of the message of the people" (penjambung lidah rakjat). He was made to appear'imperturb able and pleased with himself. Considering the serious task of dealing with Gestapu and its dalangs, how could he, the article seemed to ask, take time for diplomatic amenities, and, worse yet, abide by the presence of some of the very cabinet members widely thought to be implicated in the September 30 Movement? As the President and his Ministers reasserted control over the press in November and December, transparent criti cisms of Soekarno such as the above disappeared. Most such examples of the public verbalization of conflict were more subtle or simply ignored unfavorable aspects or implications of a story. This was the case with reportage concerning the three general Action Front or Action Command movements. no case did any group acknowledge the existence of another action group. Each purported to represent organizations 37. Duta Masjarakat, Oct. 13, 1965. My translation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === 71 already claimed by other groups, and each claimed a similar, but not quite identical name. Each proclaimed essentially the same objectives but with a varying order of priorities and phraseology of differing intensity. However, no news paper report or editorial indicated these differences and similarities or noted in any way that there was a problem of conflicting jurisdictions and overlapping claims. Newspapers participated in the developing political conflict in much the same way as the groups themselves, by giving a story prominence or by relegating it to a back page, by selective stress on certain parts of a story and by the omission of others. During the fall of 1965 it was in the subleties of phraseology that the major public political battles raged. The style of com petition was highly mannered, formal, of an almost ceremonial symmetry, even though the tone of expression was highly emotional, shrill, almost revolutionary. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === CHAPTER III LOCAL ACTION GROUPS Outside Djakarta, politics at local levels, though to a large extent microcosmic of events in Ibukota, were less attuned to national issues, less complex due to fewer groups and were less governed--except for Central and East Java--by the subtle constraints of social interchange assured in the Capital by a majority Javanese population and political predominance. By examining the development of action movements outside Djakarta, where issues were often more bluntly stated and where national preoccupations were usually bent to fit local interests, it is easier to identify the real modalities of political conflicts which were developing simultaneously in Djakarta itself. Kalimantan One hundred and five student/youth political and mass organizations joined in a mass demonstration as early as October 6 in Bandjarmasin, the capital of South Kalimantan. They explicitly called for the dissolution of the PKI and its affiliates and endorsed the creation of an action organiza tion to work for that end. KAPAK (Komando Aksi Pemuda Anti Kontra Revolusi, Anti Counter Revolution Youth Action Command), 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 83] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHART 2 DAERAH ACTION GROUPS Island Indonesia English Kalimantan KAPAK, Komando Aksi Pemuda Anti Kontra Revolusi. (South Kalimantan, Oct. 6) Anti-Counter-Revolution Youth Com mand. Sumatra Front Pengganjang Total Kontra Revolusi 30 September. (Lampung [in Southern Sumatra], Oct. 8). Front for the Total Crushing of the September 30 Counter-Revolu tion. Sumatra Barisan Pemuda Penumpas G.30.S. (Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra, Oct. 18). Youth Front for the Annihilation of G.30.S. Java Panitia Aksi Pengganjangan "Gestapu" Djawa Timur. (East Java, Oct. 21). East Java Action Committee for the Crushing of "Gestapu." Sumatra Komando Aksi Pengganjangan "Gerakan 30 September." (North Sumatra, Oct. 19). Action Command for the Crushing of the "September 30 Movement." Java Panitia Penampungan Korban Terror G-30-S Djawa Tengah. (Central Java, Oct. 30). Central Java Receiving Station Com mittee for Victims of G-30-S Terror. Sumatra Panitia Aksi Bersama Kaum Buruh/ Komando Aksi Mengganjang Imperialis Sumatra Utara. (North Sumatra, Oct. 21). Coordinated Labor Action Committee of the North Sumatra Action Command for the Crushing of United States and Belgian Imperialism. Sumatra Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang "Gestapu." (Medan, North Sumatra, Oct. 22). Action Front for the Crushing of "Gestapu." === [PDF page 84] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHART 2 (con't.) Island Indonesia English Kesatuan Aksi SB 2 [Serikat-Serikat Pelni. (State enterprise, Oct. 18). Pelni State Enterprise Labor Group Action Front. Java Komando Aksi Djihad Mengganjang Gestapu PKI. (Tasikmalaja, West Java, Nov. 1). Jihad Action Command for the Crush ing of Gestapu PKI. Java Komando Aksi Bersama Front Pantjasila. Front Pantjasila Joint Action Com mand. Moluccas Komando Aksi Pengganjangan Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September Dati I Maluku. (Amboin, Molluca, Nov. 17). First Administrative Area Moluccan Action Command for the Crushing of the September 30 Counter-Revolutary Movement. Sulawesi Komando Aksi Ummat Beragama. Sulawesi, Nov. 17). Religious Community Action Command. Java KOMII, Kesatuan Organisasi Mahasiswa Intra Universitas Indonesia. (Bandung, West Java, Nov. 24). (North Indonesian Intra-University University Student Organization Front. === [PDF page 85] === 75 unlike its counterparts in Djakarta, acknowledged that its objectives were para-military and that it sought "integration" with the Armed Forces.* In subsequent amplification of its objectives KAPAK referred to the Pantja Azimat Revolusi as the basis upon which to implement the Dwikora and asserted that the Revolution must be ever anti-Nekolim-and-its puppets. But it stressed that the overriding objective must be the crushing of "kaum KAFIR" (the kaffirs, or infidels), spelled out as "colonialism/counter-revolution, atheism/anti-unity, feudalism, imperialism and racialism/reaction." A signifi cant aspect of the nationwide reaction to the PKI in late 1965 was opposition to the atheistic character of communism. C om munists were kaffirs but so were foreign imperialists, hence the anomalous conjoining of the communists and colonialists. 1. PPAB, Oct. 14, 1965. The affiliates whose dissolution it also called for were: Pemuda Rakjat, SOBSI, BTI, Barisan Nelajan Indonesia, Gerwani, CGM I, IPPI, HSI, Lekra, and others. 2. It is hard to tell what the antecedents of KAPAK were. "Komando Aksi Pemuda" is identical to the name employed by National Front spokesmen in Djakarta in connection with the auspices of Komando Aksi Golkar Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi FN. It is possible that the provisions regarding the formation of action groups set out in the National Front executive meetings the previous July and August had been pursued more vigorously in the daerah than in Djakarta. Only slight alteration was necessary to change the name, in this case, to Komando Aksi Pemuda Anti Kontra Revolusi. 3. WB, Oct. 19, 1965 (Antara, Bandjarmasin, Oct. 16). The KAPAK statement also claimed that a PKI official, Umar Hanafiah, had arrived from Djakarta and had spoken of a Generals' Council which planned a coup and of a counter revolutionary movement called G-30-S. It also reported Hanafiah's efforts on October 1 to set up a Revolutionary Council for South Kalimantan. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === 76 However coyly phrased, these sentiments infused action front developments in Djakarta just as unmistakably as in the daerah. When coupled with the notion of impending military engagement, sparked by the half-hearted Untung effort in Djakarta and several skirmishes elsewhere, the task for politicized masses of youth seemed clear. In many areas away from the capital, the Army commanders through the residual authority of Pepelrada were able to mobilize masses in the manner of martial law.^ Action groups, especially the student/youth elements, tended to visualize their activities in part as para-military. North Sumatra Indonesia's most politically sensitive region outside Java is North Sumatra, with the politics of its capital city, Medan, approximating in some respects the modalities of Djakarta politics. As an important trade center and raw material export point, the city in recent history attracted large numbers of migrants and immigrants from other parts of the country. The local Batak population was augmented by numbers of Javanese, Chinese and Minangkabau. The develop ment of action groups thus tended to some extent to parallel 4. Pepelrada is an acronym for Regional Authority for the Implementation of Dwikora (Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah) set up in 1964 to expedite Confrontation activities. Ironically, though in late Guided Democracy the PKI con sidered it a standing threat, the structure was never really used until after the "attempted coup," when it pro vided a vehicle for de facto martial law functions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 87] === 77 the situation in Djakarta. Lt. Col. Slamet Ginting, commander of the 21st Military Resort and a PNI member of Parliament, addressed a gathering of youth in Pematang Siantar on about October 18, cursing the killing of the Generals and pointing out how violently this act deviated from the precepts of the Bogor Declaration.^ The 12,000 persons reportedly in attendance immediately formed a Youth Front for the annihilation of G-30-S (Barisan Pemuda Penumpas G-30-S) to facilitate united effort against Gestapu (September 30 Movement).** The leadership of the North Sumatra branch of the PNI on about October 18 issued a statement in which the National Front of North Sumatra was invited to cleanse itself of Gestapu elements and was re quested to form an Action Command for the Crushing of "Gerakan 30 September."^ A few days later SOBSI, the PKI affiliated labor union, was ousted temporarily from the Coordinated Labor Action Committee of the North Sumatra Action Command 5. WB, Oct. 21, 1965 (Antara, Medan, Oct. 18). Ginting played an important role on the Central Government’s side during the P.R.R.I. rebellion in 1957, and is not to be confused with the infamous Djamin Gintings of the anti-Government forces. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 530. The Bogor Declaration was the Presidentially forced mufakat (universal settlement) signed on December 12, 1964 by all political parties (at that time ten in number), pledging them inter alia to the subsequent amicable resolution of all conflicts which might arise among them. 6. "Barisan" is another word for "front." 7. WB, Oct. 21, 1965 (Antara, Medan, Oct. 19). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 88] === 78 for the Crushing of United States and Belgian Imperialism. On October 22 North Sumatra branches of seven political parties--PNI, NU, IPKI, PSII, Parkindo, Perti and Partai Katholik--announced the formation of an Action Front for the Crushing of Gestapu (Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang Gestapu). This Action Front stated its intention to promote and coor dinate all mass action in the region, to establish branches down to the lowest village level, carry out the Dwikora, work for the success of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers, and help ABRI (Armed Forces) stamp out the counter-revolu tionary September 30 movement.*® The Action Front for the Crushing of Gestapu did in fact manage to dominate and to some extent control mass political activities for the next month and a half. This was largely due to the active participa tion at that time of a PNI leadership which remained tempor arily unchanged from the pre-October 1 period, and which had particularly close connections with the officer echelons of the regional military command. The Action Front for the Crushing of Gestapu’s position, however, grew untenable as the incumbent national leadership in Djakarta came under increas8. Trans., Panitia Bersama Kaum Buruh/Komando Aksi Mengganjang Imperialis AS/Belgis Sumatra Utara. WB, Oct. 23, 1965 (Antara, Medan, Oct. 21). This is another example of an action group ostensibly set up in accordance with the pr o visions of the central National Front seminar a few months before. 9. WB, Oct. 23, 1965 (Antara, Medan, Oct. 22). 10. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === 79 ingly critical fire both from within the ranks of the party and from the action movements.^ The PNI did not succeed in getting the regional National Front to establish the Action Command it requested, but it did succeed, at least for a while, in riding the general anti-PKI political tide. In fact, as indicated in several Ginting speeches and in the p a r t y ’s aggressive Action Front participation, the PNI here as in other parts of the country (especially Central Java and Bali) proved quite prepared to turn viciously on the PKI, with whom it had developed in the recent past the closest alliance it had had with any party. Unfortunately from the PNI's point of view, the PKI movement in North Sumatra was quite small except in the city of Medan, and to a lesser extent, in Pematang Siantar. Thus, the PNI--and through its pressure the party Action Front also--directed its attentions more heavily to international issues such as Confrontation, the Algiers Conference, and particularly, the Chinese People's Republic's inflamatory statements regarding the October events in Indonesia and the Algiers Conference. Mass demonstrations at the CPR consulate in Medan in turn sparked a general repressive movement against Chinese residents of North Sumatra (and neighboring Atjeh). The first major mass action occurred when a reported 600,000 11. This point was emphasized in interviews with Medan acquaintances who visited Djakarta in February, 1966, and was confirmed by North Sumatra KAMI delegates to the KAMI working conference in Djakarta in September, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 90] === 80 people (supposedly in the Action Front) on November 2 stormed and ransacked the consulate. 12 It should, however, be noted that while the PNI found an anti-Chinese campaign to be consistent with its interests, other party components of the Action Front, such as the NU and the PSII, harbored far deeper inherent prejudices against the Chinese than the PNI. Emphasis on the issue of domestic Chinese continued long after the North Sumatra PNI was itself discredited and sub jected to violent repressive action. The North Sumatra scene thus exposes additional dimen sions of the issues of late 1965: the problem of relating to the national scene in instances where the PKI was only a marginal local problem; the ambivalent position of the PNI; the tendency once again in recent Indonesian history to re kindle the Chinese issue; the inclination of traditional political groups, when undecided or confused about domestic events, to couch appeals for support in terms of what appeared to be purer international issues or transcendent foreign policy truths. In all of this there was much obvious cant. generation in North Sumatra, The younger as all throughout Indonesia dur ing the following months, believed it saw through the cant. 12. WB, Nov. 18, 1965 (Antara, Medan, Nov. 17). This figure is almost certainly highly exaggerated, since the total population of Medan according to the 1961 census was well under half of million. See Karl J. Pelzer, "Physical and Human Resource Patterns," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia, o p. c i t., p. 19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === 81 The youth also demonstrated initiative, numbers, and organi zational experience sufficient to engage in political forays which traditional adult groups could neither understand nor contain. Nevertheless, in^Sumatra there was a built-in impediment to the development of any really united younger generation movement, even in 1966. Excluding perhaps the Minangkabau area, political eruptions of youth were strongly bound to traditional basic loyalties, despite the eagerness to disobey the traditional adult groups. Sumatran branches of the university student front, KAMI, never became a gener ational vanguard such as the Djakarta and Bandung groups did. Student/youth discontents, especially in North Sumatra, were displayed in increasingly bitter conflicts among groups which were subsidiaries of traditional political parties. Party leaders tried to capitalize on youth discontent and appeared to incite their respective youth organization toward militant confrontations. 13 The commander of the First Military 13. In South Sumatra there was somewhat more unity than in ' North Sumatra. Here, some of the same religious motiva tions noted in respect to South Kalimantan was prominent in the organization of the action movement. The "Front Pengganjang Total Kontra Revolusi 30 September" (Front for the Total Crushing of the 30 September Counter Revolution) was formed in early October, entirely of Islamic mass organizations. These included Sarbumusi, Gasbiindo, Gobsi Indonesia, GP Ansor, Pemuda Muhammadijah, Pemuda Muslimin, Pemuda Al-Irsjad, Sesmi, Semmi, PMII, H M I, Lesbumi, Laksami, HSBI, KSBI, and Gertasi. Some mass organizations of other religious groups were soon allowed to join also. This action group launched a rally before the First Level Pantja Tunggal of Lampung on October 8. Api Pantjasila, Oct. 20, 1965. Serious conflicts among the Islamic elements and between the Front and various Army commanders developed in December and appeared to forestall the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 92] === 82 District/Sumatran Pepelrada District, on November 11 p r o hibited all high school or lower level party organizations, strongly admonished political parties for involving young people in needless controversy, and ordered all students to join the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts.*^ Student unity in the raging protests that followed, though short-lived, assured that younger generation political participation whatever the form and however fragmented, would not only continue but would be a major aspect of politics with which any government officials would have to deal. Student/youth activities in Djakarta, with ample access to media, appeared more glamorous and dramatically disruptive, but in fact no where was the generational scission deeper than in certain parts of the Outer Islands. North Sulawesi The religious theme was a common characteristic in action movement development in Lampung, South Kalimantan, North Sulawesi and West Java.*** The movement which materialized in continuation of unified mass action in 1966. In Lampung the Christians initially held a rally of their own and issued a statement supported by the local branches of Parkindo, Pertakin, Gamki, Kespekri, PWKI and G M K I. They did not however form into an action front. Kompas, Oct. 30, 1965. 14. Confirmed in September, 1966, interviews with North Sumatra, Atjeh, Riau and South Sumatra KAMI delegates in Djakarta. BY, Nov. 30, 1965. 15. For Lampung see footnote 13 above. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 93] === 83 North Sulawesi was actually called The Religious Community Action Command (Komando Aksi Ummat Beragama). here and in West Java, Uniquely, the group (despite its name) included not only the religious political parties, mass organizations and student/youth groups, but important non-religious elements as well. The North Sulawesi Religious Community Action Com mand in addition to the PNI even included Partindo, a party which in the current political spectrum was considered to be just slightly to the right of the PKI.*** In addition to the usual aims it also "rejected absolutely the reincarnation of the PKI in any form whatsoever," a direct rebuttal to one kind of "solution". President Soekarno seemed to be considering that of a newly structured communist organization. 17 Thus, once again we find a daerah situation which though it general ly followed the lead of events in Djakarta, failed in some significant way to mirror the changes which had taken place in the capital. The sense of the North Sulawesi Action Com mand statement conformed to the ideological bases of late Guided Democracy; it found acceptable all Indonesian political groups, even the PNI and Partindo, so long as they conformed to the principle of Nasakom. 18 Many national and local 16. Komando Aksi Ummat Beragama included, among others, the following groups: PSII, NU, IPKI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, PNI, Partindo, Muhammadijah, HMI, Gasbiindo, Gamki and Persami. Sinar Harapan. Nov. 20, 1965 (Antara, Menado, Nov. 17). 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === 84 officials lived to regret their assertions during this period that to punish the Communist Party was to be against the "kom" of Nasakom. Some, who translated "kom" as socialist or Marxist, maintained that a truly Nasakom Indonesia would be more surely realized in the absense of the PKI. The North Sulawesi Action Command thus was a manifestation of religious conservatism, stood implacably against the PKI because of its atheism, but conceptualized its position as perfectly ha r monious with the precepts of Nasakom. This position exempli fies in more simple form a dimension of Post-October 1 problems which in Djakarta tended to be shrouded in circum locutions. West Java In Bandung, the Sundanese center of West Java, another religion-oriented Action Command emerged, somewhat on the order of those in Lampung and North Sulawesi. Here the population if anything was more orthodox Islamic than in Lampung, which perhaps accounts for the name, "Islamic Mass Action Command Front of West Java" (Komando Kesatuan Aksi 19 Massa Islam Djawa Barat). Only Islamic political parties 19. WB, Oct. 13, 1965 (Antara, Bandung, Oct. 12). In Bogor tEe religious exclusive-ism was also quite evident, though not reported as an action front or command. gathering of 150,000 people, all from religious groups, did meet, calling itself simply The Bogor Religious Com munity (Ummat Beragama Bogor). The groups attending were Partai Katholik, Parkindo, IPKI, PII (Peladjar Islam Indonesia), PUT (Persatuan Umat sic Islam), GPA (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor), SEMMI, Pemuda Muslimin, HMI, A1 Irsjad, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === and mass organizations belonged. Two weeks later the nearby city of Tasikmalaja outdid Bandung by gathering together a reported 250,000 Muslims in a "giant rally." The result was the formation of a Jihad Action Command for the Crushing of Gestapu/PKI 20 (Komando Aksi Djihad Mengganjang Gestapu/PKI). As in North Sumatra, the PNI participated along with the Moslem groups. The implications of the above Command name were too much for the Government in Djakarta, quickly discouraged. and its use was But the choice symbolized quite accur ately the nature and depth of religiously based retaliatory sentiment against the PKI. There was a generally valid correlation between a region' distance from Djakarta and the degree of visible involvement by the local Army command in setting up an action group. most cases little urging was needed. Interviewees from out lying regions usually insisted that action group formations were spontaneously initiated by the component organizations themselves. 21 However this may be, the fact that action Persatuan Islam, Matlaul Anwar, Gerakan Pelaksana Ampera. Warta Bogor, Oct. 24, 1965 and Nusa Putera, Oct. 21, 1965. 20. WB, Nov. 6, 1965 (Antara, Tasikmalaja, Nov. 2). The "2*50,000 people" must be regarded as a grossly inflated figure, even though the report claimed the presence of people from all over the Second Level administrative district. On a list of cities of over 100,000 population based on the 1961 census, Tasikmalaja does not appear. Pelzer, op. c i t., p. 19. 21. Action Front leaders were naturally more firm on this point than interviewees who at the time had been on lookers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === 86 "commands” with relatively similar names mushroomed into existence across the country often within a few days of one another suggests that the Army was at least an active proponent if not a participant. In South Kalimantan, KAPAK's desire to be "integrated" with ABRI indicated as much. In Ambon the Action Command set up for the Moluccas explicitly included representatives of seven political parties, all their mass 22 organizations, functional groups, and A B R I. true in Kupang for East Nusatenggara. 23 The same was In outlying regions the problem was more one of inertia than of ideological recalcitrance. Here as elsewhere the nexus of central Army directive and civilian group initiative is not fully dis cernible. Yet, once again socio-political inertia and the question of Army sponsorship, which in relative terms were more evident in the outer regions, were also important aspects of the scene in Djakarta. Both became subjects of public debate as the political arena widened and opened during the following year. Central and East Java In Central and East Java, action group development rested on different and more complicated bases than in other regions 22. This was the Action Command for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary 30 September Movement of the First Regional Level, Maluku (Komando Aksi Pengganjang Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September Dati I Maluku). 23. Interview, November 1966, with a high official of the island of Timor. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 97] === 87 of the country, yet revealed in microcosm additional dimen sions of national, particularly Djakarta, politics. Action Fronts or Commands in Central Java were never more than rudimentary in form and political effectiveness, and in East Java were really operative only in large cities such as Surabaja and Malang. There were several reasons for this. First, during the late 1965 period, and in contrast to most other parts of the nation, the Central and East Java regional political situations were viewed in Djakarta as incipient chaos. The September 30 Movement actions in Djakarta appeared directly coordinated with a number of more closely PKI-related erruptions in several high-population centers of Central and East Java. Failure of the Movement in Djakarta left only one conceivably successful course open to its leaders. This was to turn their efforts to shoring up bastions of control in areas of popular political strength. Government control, particularly in Central Java, was to depend on the doubtful loyalties of the Brawidjaja and Diponegoro Division commands and their capacity to retain, and in some cases restore, the loyalty of subordinate ranks. Theirs was a holding action, which under the circumstances of political turmoil, neces sarily verged on martial law control in all spheres of govern mental activity. In Central Java, arrival of the wellequipped para-commandos (RPKAD) in the third week of October, while relieving pressure on the regional command, contributed further to the general sense of disruption. Sweeping through Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 98] === 88 the villages and towns of Central Java in search of an often phantom enemy, the assault of the para-commanders appeared as a veritable blitzkrieg to the local populace. Until then they had experienced no more than the most fleeting contact with any of the activities inspired by the Untung Movement. few days of strange announcements from the Jogja radio sta tion, sporadic acts of terrorism, millenarian promises more wild than usual from local PKI cadre--that was about a l l. ^ Now all of a sudden the shock troops swooped down in frantic search for members of the PKI, alleged one and all to be part of a great conspiracy to upset the Government and destroy the beloved Soekarno. From the Djakarta Suharto group's point of view, the composition of the September 30 Movement lent credence to the spector of a similarly dangerous coalition of opposition in Central and East Java--perhaps of far greater magnitude than demonstrated in the initial Djakarta foray. In any event the effect of the large-scale Central Government military reaction, first in Central Java and later in East Java, was to shelve temporarily virtually all civilian political intercourse. This was one reason why Action Fronts or Commands, when they finally did get started, never gathered 24. The point about the relatively normal nature of local PKI activities was strongly confirmed upon examination in Djakarta by University of Indonesia academics of masses of confiscated PKI documents from local levels in Central Java and elsewhere. This material was examined in November and early December, and its contents reported to this writer shortly thereafter by several of the academics involved. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 99] === 89 significant momentum. They were irrelevant to the main thrust of political activity. The second reason lay in the fact that culturally, small town and rural Java were remarkably self-sufficient, and sophisticated. cohesive The most vital and aggressive youth organ ization in Indonesia, the Ansor Youth Movement, a subsidiary of the NU party, was predominantly composed of small town members, especially in East Java. Not only was it unnecessary for military commanders to urge the creation of united action fronts, but it is doubtful that such appeals would have found much acceptance at the small town or rural level. Ansor is generally "credited" as the civilian group which, more assiduously than any other, responded through its own para military Bansor units in East Java to the Army's appeal for help in exterminating Communists. Para-military Banteng units of PNI youth filled a somewhat similar function in Central Java. In this latter case, however, the total activities were of much lesser magnitude than the Army's own effort. The PNI organization, mainly GSNI (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Student [high school] Movement), was essentially a student movement, thus much smaller than its NU counterpart. 25 Unlike Ansor, the PNI student/youth movement was not anchored in the small town 25. There were of course NU high school student associations, such as IPNU (Ikatan Peladjar Nahdatul Ulama), but these never played the significant role within NU that Ansor did. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === 90 countryside, but rather in urban centers. Moreover, the PNI at both levels drew more of its membership from among bureaucrats, teachers and other functionaries. These factors, coupled with the PKI's huge popular base, the PNI's previous declared affinities with the PKI, and the Army's recognition of the area as the enemy's base of operations, accounted for the lesser degree of civilian para-military youth activity in Central Java. Furthermore, since urban centers were brought under effective control more rapidly than rural areas, the atmosphere of tension in the former also eased more quickly. Regional PKI youth leaders soon were confronted with ample political opposition in their own immediate urban locales. Nowhere in the country did action organizations ever become an integral part of sub-urban politics. But outside of Central and East Java, it was relatively easy for these organizations to appear convincing in their respective claims to inclusive regional representation. A common characteristic of Central and East Java was the clear confinement within urban centers'of action group development. Outside these centers previously existing organizations were sufficiently vital to pursue objectives quite similar to the urban action groups without creating new organizations. A third reason for the generally small and ineffective action movement development in Central and East Java lay in the difficulty of conforming to the Djakarta lead and defining Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === 91 the conceptual terms and context of confrontation. The over whelming majority of ethnic Javanese are abangan or p r i a j i; consistent with the philosophico-cultural-religious-social universe which these two groups mutually inhabit, they were unaroused by the spirit of Holy War which prevailed in many action organizations elsewhere and for which both Islam and Christianity provided ready-made rationale. On the other hand, if repression of the PKI were to be based on the threat posed to Soekarno and to the system of Guided Democracy as symbolized in the ideological constructs, then the Great Leader himself would have to provide vigorous, unequivocal endorsement. The abangan and priaji loyalty to Soekarno rested on a nearly impregnable base of mystical affinity and allegiance. Particularly for these groups, the PKI had gained credible political party purchase and had seemed most privy to Soekarno's ideological benediction. The few action movements that did get under way in Central and East Java, even though largely confined to urban areas, reflected these difficult problems of adjustment. The best example was Surabaja, where an East Java Action Committee for the Crushing of Gestapu (Panitia Aksi Pengganjangan Gestapu Djawa Timur) was formed in the third week of October by representatives of the P N I, NU, Partai Katholik, PSII, Parkindo, IPKI, Muhammadijah, Al-Irsjad and dozens of their affiliated mass organizations--a total number Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === 92 of sixty-seven groups. 26 A huge rally was held at the Surabaja Heroes Monument; the resulting statement dwelled, more than any other action group’s in the nation, on allegi ance to Soekarno and on the intimate relationship o£ his well-being and the welfare of the State. 27 The need to crush Gestapu and the PKI was given no religious overtones. Aside from condemning the heinous assassination of the Generals and the foolish adventurism of an attack on the State, this Action Committee regarded the crush Gestapu concern as an impediment to the more urgent matter of crushing, Nekolim, 78 the Tengku and Malaysia.“* Even for this urban group, dominated as it was by local conservatives backed by the Army, it was necessary to phrase the (September 30 Movement) issue in terms which avoided too blatant trespass on regional sensitivities. Djakarta To some extent Djakarta has evolved an autonomous cultural base, even with its own distinctive linguistic dialect. The national level of Government thus served not only as the representative and administrative pinnacle of Indonesia's 26. WB, Oct. 21, 1965. 27. Ibid. The rally according to personal reports was large, but the reported figure of 750,000 persons in attendance is patently unreliable, as this would be about 75% of the total population of Surabaja. Pelzer, op. c i t., p. 19. 28. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === 93 component geographic parts, but also as the mediator in a somewhat separate, superordinate, political system. autonomous, capital A common Djakarta joke belying a serious problem concerns the seeming speed with which newcomers ad just to the new environment, shed ties with home town and ethnic group, never to return. This is truer of elitists than of most people, who congregate in urban ethnic ghettos, but even the ghetto dwellers seem to undergo noticeable acculturation. Djakarta politics is a skewed refraction of lower level regional issues. of Guided Democracy, This was accentuated toward the end as President Soekarno tinkered more and more frequently with political structures and ideological symbols to solve or sublimate pressing economic, social and political problems. Djakarta itself remained relatively responsive to his tutelage, and national communications media reported Djakarta politics as if a microcosm of national politics. Regional examples of action group development were drawn upon above to highlight some of the complex issues at the national level in the capital. Issues more easily discernible at the regional or local level met head on in Djakarta, in an ever changing artificial format contrived by the President and his advisors. All lower level issues had somehow to fit upon Djakarta's mediatory grid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === CHAPTER IV ACTION GROUP POLITICS The competition among the three major action group p ro genitors reflected the problems of Djakarta's special role of adopting issues requiring mediation to the official structure and ideological constructs. The task was complicated in the post-October 1 period by the inherently temporary char acter of any "action" group. As the action movement grew and encompassed more of the issues of Indonesian society, so the implication also grew that existing institutions were inade quate to fulfill their designed functions. The battle among the action groups went through several stages, ultimately resulting in a victory for the partyoriented Front. This victory, however, was so costly that the winner was largely destroyed in the process and never recovered. The National Front-inspired Action Command's first public statement, demonstration and building ransacking on October 13, as was pointed out, completed the initial round of action group formations. The next two weeks entailed a series of meetings, often with elements of the three basic groups over lapping; news reports often noted the attendance at a single meeting of an ostensibly anomalous combination of groups. 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The === [PDF page 105] === 95 National Front was reported as participating with the politi cal parties in a meeting at the University of Indonesia.'*’ Next day the Rector of the University of Indonesia, Sumantri, announced the formation of a separate Mass Action Committee just for that university. A huge rally of the party-oriented Action Front, now claiming a membership of twenty-four million people, was the occasion for a new statement, which demanded among other things the expulsion of the National Front's entire Standing Committee. A new SOKSI sponsored labor Action Front also emphasized the need to purge the National Front.^ Almost simultaneously the National Front's Vice Secretary General and "Chairman of the Action Front Section," 1. This was called a meeting of the Panitia Aksi Mengganjang Kontra Revolusi Gestapu (Action Committee for the Crushing of the Counter Revolutionary Gestapu). A p i, Oct. 4, 1965. 2. Api Pantjasila, Oct. 15, 1965. 3. The statement listed them by name and title: Anwar Sanusi, Vice Secretary General of the Executive Committee: M. Munir, member of the Standing Committee; Adlin Indoprop; Hamid Nasution, Foreign Relations; Mirin, Action Front; Slamet, Administration; Romlah, Finance; Badjang Muljono, Action Front; Supinar, Organization; Muslich, Documentation; Aruan, Finance. It also called for the retooling of several Kepala Daerah (District Heads) of Second Level Administration Districts: Utomo Ramelan, mayor of Solo; Morahman SH, mayor of Surabaja; S. Prabewo, mayor of Tjirebon; Pamtak Tarigan, mayor of Pematang Siantar; and the Bupati1s of Bekasi, Labuhan Ratu, Sragan, Langkat and Banjuwangi. 4. This was the Action Front of Labor Functionalists for the Crushing of Counter-Revolution (Front Aksi Karyawan Buruh Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi), composed of SOKSI, Buruh Pantjasila, KUBU Pantjasila, Kespekri, Gasbiindo, GOBSI, KBIM, KBKI, and headed by Adolf Rachman of SOKSI. Oct. 22, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 106] === 96 Brigadier General Djuhartono,5 proposed a different organi zation for labor and other functionalists, Revolutionary Mass Action Front.^ the Progressive (Already the term, "progressive revolutionary," acquired a special new meaning, which eventually marked any user as a partisan for the N a tional Front, Subandrio, and Soekarno.) This new name and new proposal were curious considering that the National Front had already created an organization for the same sector of the population and for the same purposes a week earlier. Some people regarded Djuhartono*s announcement as an admission that the earlier Action Command had simply not caught on. Soon, however, the Progressive Revolutionary Mass Action Front appeared as part of President Soekarno*s first concerted reassertion of his domination over the public arena--a domina tion seriously eroded by the abrupt reduction of his public activities during the previous three weeks. In a formal command to the nation Soekarno had just called for a step up and perfecting of the operational units of Dwikora which "already have been prepared." He did not 5. See Chapter II, Footnote 36. 6. Kesatuan Massa Aksi Progresif Revolusioner. Revolusi, Oct. 22, 1965. Mimbar 7. An impression frequently conveyed in interviews during the week following the Djuhartono announcement. 8. This was the President's Command of October 21. It also called for the avoidance of all acts "which might damage our struggle" and for the mobilization of all potentials for perfecting and safeguarding the defense of the Revolution. AB, Oct. 22, 1965 and Sekretariat Negara, Kabinet PresiHen Republik Indonesia, nst. 1259/65, p. 10. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 107] === say "which already exist," and the implication of the words he chose suggested that he was referring to the very rudi mentary structures initially planned for Dwikora mass action mobilization in the National Front seminar of the previous summer. In accompanying oral remarks, the President warned of the "threat which [recent events] pose to security and to progressive revolutionary unity along the axis and spirit of NASAKOM."9 A few days later the South Sumatra branch of the National Front "instructed" parties, mass organizations and functional groups, in line with the President's Command, to participate in no "actions" outside the auspices of the National Front. In Djakarta Sudibjo, the Minister/Secretary-General of the National Front, taking as his authority the President's Com mand, announced the creation of five national task forces with sweeping jurisdiction throughout the country in fields of security, production, distribution, doctrination. 11 communications and in- Again referring to the Command, he ordered all action committees in the Djakarta environs to have three man delegations report to the National Front Secretariat building in Djakarta on November 1 at 9:00 a.m. 12 The 9. Ibid. 10. WB, Oct. 29, 1965 (Antara, Palembang, Oct. 27). 11. WB, October 29, 1965 (Antara, Djakarta, Oct. 28). 12. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 108] === 98 National Front regional heads were told to report in Djakarta by November 3 for instructions on setting up the Task Forces. 13 It was another grandiose, overblown panacea, announced with all the hoopla of dozens of similar sweeping solutions over the past few years, and without any expectation of success in terms of its declared objectives. It was of questionable utility even as a political ploy, for the National Front, more than any other national governmental structure, depended upon effective manipulations of mass political support. Mass organizations--labor, functional, student, youth--affiliated with the PKI and largely drawn from the younger generation, had supplied a substantial proportion of the participants and the major source of dynamic energy for this popular base. With the PKI eclipsed, and its second strongest supporter, the PNI, in disarray, success for the National Front "Task Froce" effort rested on two elusive conditions: (1) more effective influence within the daerah administration Pantja Tunggal,*^ and (2) capture of the coordination and leadership of the growing action movement. The first condition was difficult to fulfill 13. Ibid. These were all separate announcements on the same day. 14. The Pantja Tunggal (literally, five in one) regional administrations each consisted of the following: kepala daerah, or regional head; the army commander; the police commander; the regional prosecutor-general, and the regional head of the National Front. A presidential decree in March 1964 had provided for the inclusion of the National Front official in this group. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === 99 since there were already two military men on the Pantja Tunggal, sometimes three, and now with the turmoil of re establishing security in the post-October 1 period, oppor tunities for military domination of the group were even greater. In Djakarta, moreover, all Secretariat and Executive Committee officials of the National Front were forbidden to leave the city except under special p e r m i t. ^ Fulfillment of the second condition was just as problematic, since the major action group, the party-oriented Action Front, was composed of those organizations which had previously suf fered the most inferior status in National Front activities. In late October the party-oriented Action Front for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary September 30 Movement or KAP-Gestapu, established a looser but more formal organi zational structure and girded for more long range operations. At the top was an Action Front Coordinating Body with Subchan of the NU as Coordinator and head of the Standing C o m m i t t e e. ^ 15. PPAB, Oct. 10, 1965. Sudibjo officially issued this restriction himself, and it was from him that the special permit was to be obtained. It was, however, clearly a disciplinary action forced upon the National Front as such from a higher authority, reportedly Soeharto. 16. Action Front Coordination Group (Badan Koordinasi Kesatuan A k s i ); Standing Committee (Badan Pederdja Harian). A mimeographed publication (no title) of KAPGestapu in February, 1966, dates the formation of this organization as October 2 and gives the impression that these formal structures, though in slightly different form, were established at that time. The central struc ture then was the Joint Secretariat Deliberative Group (Badan Musjawarah Sekretariat Bersama). The February document also mentions the offices of General Secretary, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 110] === 100 Beneath were categories variously acknowledged as "sub-organi zations," "action committees," or component "action fronts." By this time it had become evident to Subchan and to others in the leadership (such as Drs. Achmad Ramli and Sjarifuddin St. Kasaj angan) that they had neither the prestige, power nor numbers adequate to weld into a unified movement the disparate elements which might potentially support their cause. Initial ly they had hoped to create a massive organization, controlled from Djakarta, integrating elements from party and mass organizations, functional groups, student/youth organizations and all socio-economic strata, and permeating to the lowest village level. These expectations were slowly given up in favor of the more realistic prospect of providing general coordination of separate, relatively autonomous Action Fronts. The highly vertical organizational chart and the public announcements of early October intimating structural unity, became administratively horizontal rather quickly. Adminis trative jurisdiction was effectively confined to Greater Djakarta and even then, by early November restricted to the function of loose Action Front coordination. 17 Secretaries, and daerah organizations for First, Second and Third level Government administrations. As estab lished earlier in this chapter, KAP-Gestapu came into being in several fitful steps and with several changes in the process. Inconsistences in the February document suggest that there was some confusion in retrospect over just how the changing structures evolved. 17. The February KAP-Gestapu (it had actually changed name from KAP-Gestapu to Front Pantjasila) document was very inconsistent on these points. While the structural chart Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === 101 On the day after Sudibjo's call for action group repre sentatives to report to the National Front, Sjarifuddin St. Kasajangan, Secretary of the Coordinating Body of KAP-Gestapu, organized a meeting of scholars faculty) (college and university at the Secretariat of the Economics Institute of the Muslim Scholars Association. 18 Calling itself a sub-organiza tion of the Coordinating Body of KAP-Gestapu, this group issued a statement which declared undying devotion to Bung Karno and to the ideological pillars, including the Pantja Azimat. It also declared the composition of the National. Front leadership intolerable in light of the President's command to reestablish a climate of peace and serenity. 19 A Women's Section of the Action Front, membership in cluding female affiliates of the PNI, student/youth organiza tions and other non-party mass organizations additional to the usual Islamic groups, was set up and also demonstrated provided for channels of control down to the village level, the text states that the central leadership was to have direct authority only in Djakarta. Its role was seen as one of promoting action fronts in every echelon of society which would then function "independently under the coordination of KAP-Gestapu." 18. WB, Nov. 1, 1965. Sekretariat Lembaga Ekonomi Persami. I*ersami-Perserikatan Sardjana Muslimin Indonesia. This meeting was attended by Ikatan Sardjana Pantjasila, Ikatan Sardjana Katholik, Persatuan Sardjana Muslim Indonesia, Serikat Sardjana Muslimin Indonesia, Persatuan Sardjana Hukum Indonesia, Persatuan Dokter Hewan Indonesia, Ikatan Sardjana Ekonomi Indonesia, Persatuan Insinjur Indonesia, Keluarga Alumni Gadjah Mada, and Persatuan Sardjana Ilmu Administrasi Nasional (Persiran), and others. 19. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === 102 en masse at the National Front. 20 Djuhartono and Imam Pratignjo, both closely associated with the National Front, tried to address the demonstration and were roughly jeered. At Kostrad headquarters General Suharto spoke to the same demonstrators from atop a car and was cheered. The next day a rally was held at Banteng Square (Lapangan Banteng) which can be regarded as the high point of the KAPGestapu effort to weld massive support behind its basic objective: to persuade President Soekarno to ban the PKI and to purge the top governmental organs of PKI members and sympathizers. Planned a week in advance by KAP-Gestapu, the rally was given a noticeable formality by the attendance of Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, who spoke on behalf of the President. Leimena, acting for Soekarno, was also specifically assigned to receive the collective statement of the rally, which in reality was the statement of the Coordin ating Body of KAP-Gestapu. A number of Cabinet Ministers came and members of the foreign diplomatic corps were also in attendance. 21 Although the affair was generally reported 20. AB, Nov. 9, 1965. 21. Government officials in attendance included Minister/ Commander in Chief of the Navy Vice Admiral Martadinata, Minister of Plantations D r s. Frans Seda (a Catholic leader), Minister of State Assistant High Commissioner Drs. Boegie Soepeno, Minister of Maritime Industries R. Mardanus, Minister of the Trans-Sumatra Highway Ir. Slamat Bratanata, Minister of Social Affairs Mrs. Rusiah Sardjono SH, Minister Seconded to the President Professor Iwa Kusumasumantri SH, Minister of Basic Industry Teuku M. Hadi Thajeb, and National Front Secretary General Djuhartono. This is a combined list from the differing Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === 103 simply as a mass rally of the Action Front for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary September 30 Movement, the actual representation of component groups was remarkably diverse. These included not only the usual parties and mass organizations--NU, PSII, Partai Katholik, Parkindo, IPKI, Perti and Muhammadijah--but also the PNI/Front Marhaenis and the Functionalist Secretariat of the National Front. 22 The presence of an additional forty-four party and non-party mass organizations contributed to a total estimated attendance of one and a half million people. 23 Subchan, the first speaker, elaborated upon the twelve point formal statement which was to be forwarded to the accounts of Nov. 10 newspapers such as Mertju S u a r, Kompas, and Berita Y u d h a. 22. Kompas, Nov. 10, 1965. PNI/Front Marhaenis refers to the official PNI. Soon after the "attempted coup" the PNI began to break up into several groups. PNI/Ali Surachman (later the more derogatory PNI/Asu) was used to refer to those who were loyal to the leftist, pro-PKI wing, which still comprised the leadership of the party. Loosely gathered under an oppositionist leadership of those who had been ousted from the PNI presidium the previous August was a group which believed that the Ali-Surachman group had been deeply implicated in G-30-S. This right wing PNI was called PNI/Osa-Usep (Osa = Osa Mal i k i; Usep = Usep Ranawidj aj a), though sometimes also referred to as the Hardi wing or the Iskaq group. Hardi and Iskaq Tjokrohadisurja often played a mediating role between the leftist and rightist wings. Angkatan Bersendjata (Nov. 10) referred to Perti as "Perti Rusli," also indicating acknowledgment of the presence at the gathering only of one segment of the party, believed to be divided somehow between "pro" and "anti" communists. 23. Most of the newspapers gave this figure, though a few mentioned two million. The figure’may be somewhat in flated, though it is true that the huge Banteng Square was filled with people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === 104 President by Leimena. He also dwelled on the larger impli cations of the September 30 Movement, the PKI, and the President's role in Indonesian politics. In a seemingly di rect jab at Soekarno's ever insistent emphasis on maintaining an equilibrium of forces and welding them into a consensual mass of political support, Subchan asked rhetorically, "Does 24. WB, Nov. 10, 1965. The text of the KAP-Gestapu was en titled "Voice of the People's Heart." It read: giant gathering of the Capital's popular masses, organ ized by the Coordinating Body of the Action Front for the Crushing of the Counter Revolutionary Movement 'Gestapu' and attended by one and a half million people midday Tuesday at Banteng Square, has issued the voice of the Indonesian people's heart, in the form of a statement: (1) Affirms for the umpteenth time steadfast loyalty to the President/Great Leader of the Revolution. (2) Con tinues to intensify the crushing of Nekolim, 'Malaysia' in particular. (3) Urges Bung K a m o to ban the PKI and its mass organizations, and to bring to trial 'G-30-S' elements. (4) Urges Bung Karno to ban Baperki, because Baperki is a source of racialism. (5) Rejects the idea of the Minister of Information, that each political party may own only one newspaper. (6) Expresses salut to the Minister of the Interior for his firm actions and urges that he oust Governors Sutedja, Ulung Sitepu, Oevang Oeray and KDH2 involved in 'Gestapu.' (7) That the teaching of Bung Karno, Nasakom, operate with consequence and revolutionarily without the existence of communism in the form of PKI Gestapu or in other forms of communist party. Urges Bung Karno to purge [membersihkan] the Dwikora Cabinet of PKI, Baperki, HSI elements and those who are uncommitted [kaum plintat plintut]. (9) Is of determined will to help ABRI to annihilate PKI-Gestapu and its pup pets. (10) Calls on all progressive revolutionary/ Pantjasilaist Manipolist people to participate in the Berdikari Economic Task Force. (11) Expresses greetings to the PWI on the results of its successful Congress and hopes that candidates for membership in PWI who were not involved in Kontrev Gestapu, will be received as full PWI members without having to go through the conventional procedures. (12) Proposes to PJM President/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno that he declare all of Indonesia in a state of emergency [keadaan bahaja perang, SOB], for the sake of preserving peace and safety." Berita Y u d h a, Nov. 10, 1965. My translation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === 105 religion still constitute a primary element in nation and character building [one of the President’s favorite phrases], or are doctrines of a power a la Machiavelli to be the determinants of Indonesian problems?" 25 Or, put more simply, "Ought justice to be based on humanitarianism and principles of justice or exclusively on political exigencies?" Subchan and many other intellectual elitists were faced with a dilemma. Excision of the PKI from the political process inevitably would attentuate the proverbial "balance of forces," so basic on Soekarno's concept of government. was difficult for Subchan and similar persons to contrive a rationale for undiminished allegiance to Soekarno and rejec tion of his most basic concept. In late 1965 and early 1966 they sought to resolve the dilemma through heightened p r o testations of fidelity to the President and his ideological constructs and through claims that the PKI was irrelevant to the basic verities of Indonesian political process as defined by Soekarno himself. "Great Leader of the Revolution has never taught us doctrines of communism," said Subchan. "What we have been taught is Marxism." The KAP-Gestapu leader argued that the banning of the PKI would enhance the teaching of Nasakom, that the "kom" need not be represented by a communist party, that a communist party has by nature no loyalty to the nation and in the absence of easy success 25. WB, Nov. 10, 1965. 26. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === 106 will employ "obstructive" and "destructive" tactics against the existing government. "How can we implement self-reliance (Berdikari) when there is a group which perpetrates destruction and obstruction?" And he concluded, "Let the world see and witness the loyalty of the Indonesian people to the Great Leader of the Revolution as manifested in this great gathering." 27 General Nasution expressed almost identical sentiments three days later. 28 There followed speeches by Cosmos Batubara representing students and youths. 29 Miss Herlina, Srikandi Trikora (honorary title for heroic acts in the West Irian campaign), representing male and female military volunteers, Major General Djamin Gintings, representing the Functional Group 27. Ibid. 28. Pelopor, Nov. 13, 1965. This was an informal statement at a meeting with a delegation from central KAMI head quarters on November 12. A translation of his remarks is to be found in "Selected Documents Relating to the September 30th Movement and Its Epilogue," Indonesia, Vol. I (April 1966), 182-183. KAMI itself as late as December 31, 1965 issued a statement which followed directly upon the Subchan view of Nasakom and the PKI. The Marxist-Lenin class struggle was held to be in consistent with Indonesian characteristics and Soekarno's teachings. While the PKI could not be tolerated, the "kom" of Nasakom was upheld, but constrained within the meaning of "social justice." Nusa Putera, Dec. 31, 1965. 29. The speech by Cosmos Batubara was probably the most innocuous of the day, confining itself just to the deleterious effects of the PKI upon students and youth in general. Several newspapers made no mention of his speech or failed to record his name. See Puta Revolusi, Berita Yudha and Mertju Suar, November 10, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 117] === 107 of the National Front, 30 and Mrs. Ratu Aminah Hidajat repre senting political parties, a reading of the KAP-Gestapu statement by Drs. Lukman Harun, and finally the address by Leimena. 31 Cosmos Batubara urged banning of the PKI b e cause of its disruptive effects upon many educational insti tutions and all levels of students and youth. returned from the Sarawak front speaker, damned Gerwani, 32 Herlina, just and the most emotional the PKI women's organization, not participating in the fight against Malaysia, stabbing the Revolution in the back. for and instead, Glancing at Leimena who sat behind her, she said, "Beloved Pak Leimena, see here this flooding mass of humanity. Relate the presence of these people to the Great Leader of the Revolution whom we love. Tell him that the people do not want to be communized (dikomuniskan)." 33 Gintings recalled previous counter revolutionary incidents, all of which had been crushed, and expressed his confidence that the same end would come to Gestapu. He said nothing, however, about the PKI. Aminah Hidajat referred to the Constitution and to some of the President's own edicts to demonstrate the legal basis for 30. This is the Djamin Gintings, then Lieutenant Colonel, who figured prominently in North Sumatra during the PRRI rebellion. See Feith, Decline..., op. c i t., pp. 528-530. 31. The Lukman Harun reading was mentioned in only a few papers, such as Mertju Su a r, Nov. 10, 1965. 32. Ibid. 33. Kompas, Nov. 10, 1965 34. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === 108 banning the PKI. 35 Finally it fell to the mild, gentlemanly Protestant, Leimena, easily the most congenial emmisary the President might have sent, to render the temper of his audience into some form consonant with the views of Soekarno. Leimena reiterated Soekarno's own castigation of the September 30 Movement and the Council of Generals. He ad vised his audience to have confidence that the President would punish those who were guilty in the matter. What was most important to keep in mind, he said, was to stay on the "rails of the Revolution, that is, the rails of Pantjasila and Pantja Azimat Revolusi," and to remain ever alert to the reactionaries, particularly Nekolim, who would attempt to turn Indonesia's "incident" to their own advantage. Repeating a statement by Soekarno, he stated that Gestapu and its epilogue had caused the Indonesian revolution an eight year regression. He admonished the gathering not to forget that, after all, what they were struggling for was true socialism, in conformity with Indonesia's special requirements. The meeting showed precisely where the axes of political conflict in Djakarta lay. First and foremost was the contest between the President and the Army over how the power-balance 35. Ibid. 36. His language on this point was very strong, and from the mild-mannered Leimena had considerable impact on the gathering. He stated, for instance, that the "... Gestapu incident has simply dumped a lot of crap [he used the Dutch word, rotsoi] into Indonesian society." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === 109 would be redressed in the post-October 1 period, over the kind of "solution" to the September 30 Movement that should be given to the people, over how the "kom" side of nasakom should be manifested organizationally in the future. Second, there was the conflict between the political parties (except ing the PKI and perhaps Partindo) and all those forces which had worked over the previous several years to reduce their role in Indonesia’s political process. The PKI had been the most prominent, and from their point of view the most unde serving, beneficiary of this general attrition of party power, and thus perhaps the one domestic issue around which most parties could coalesce. The third axis of conflict cut through party, military and functional groups on the question of whether basic political--as against philosophic, cultural, religious--loyalty was to President Soekarno or to one’s more immediate organizational affiliation. The PNI, and to a lesser extent Partindo, proved quite willing to participate in the extermination of the PKI, but not if this was to be popularly regarded as reflecting opposition to Soekarno's political views. The question of loyalty to Soekarno was a point of friction which developed within every political group and eventually became the major point of contention when the PKI was out of the political picture. was generational conflict. Finally there To many people under thirty years of age Soekarno was a great but nonetheless distant hero. That youth had become so highly politicized in late Guided Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === 110 Democracy was largely thanks to Soekarno, but again it was national and international issues rather distant from the real world of prosaic choice which would determine their traditional political alignment on entry to "responsible" adulthood. The October 1 event was for most youth a very confusing event. Consistent with Soekarno's teachings, it should have been seen as a popular action against reaction aries. The Government, however--and Soekarno was still ostensibly the unchallenged head--appeared to define it as a counter coup against the true revolutionaries. If so, then where were the Government reactionaries the President was forever talking about? Only one thing was really clear in events surrounding the "attempted coup," and that was the distance of political parties, at least as represented by their leaders, from the real arena of national politics. Thus, despite vast primordial residues and innumerable organizations to perpetuate them, the student/youth generation held several important counts in common upon which to register discontent with the older generation. The November 9 rally, in revealing these conflicts, also reflected a common assumption of most of the speakers and the groups they represented. This was that the September 30 Movement, even though it might lead to the elimination of the PKI was nevertheless, as the President put it, nothing more than a "ripple in the ocean of the Revolution." After all, the rally was essentially to praise Soekarno, "to affirm our Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === Ill loyalty," as well as to raise enthusiasm for crushing Malaysia, and to urge the President to ban the PKI. KAP-Gestapu, even as the most effective action group, had in fact met with only the most limited success. Inspiring nothing but the most confederative relationship among component groups, it had been forced into no more than a loose coordinating pos i tion. KAP-Gestapu was thus essentially limited to marshaling support to influence the President on the PKI issue. many in the predominantly student/youth audience at Banteng Square it seemed like the same old politics speeches re bounding in platitudes, controversial issues handled as obliquely as ever. Ensuing events confirmed these impres sions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 122] === CHAPTER V BATTLE LINES SOLIDIFY The history of action group emergence was influenced by events at the top level of national government, which often seemed to be part of a different world of political life. Some events, like the October KIAPMA (Konperensi I n t e m a s i o n a l Anti Pangkalan Militer Asing, International Conference against Foreign Military Bases) meeting and the continued planning and building for Conefo (Conference of New Emerging Forces), involved previous international commitments. Soekarno, Subandrio and other Cabinet members, when participating in these affairs, acted and behaved just as they had prior to September 30 events, as the personification of Indonesia, as the Government. Other events involving the restructuring of top governmental bodies, such as KOTI (Komando Operasi Tertinggi, Supreme Operational Command) and KOTOE (IComando Operasi Tertinggi Ekonomi, Supreme Operational Command for the Economy), or individual appointments by Soekarno, or regulatory edicts by Suharto on the one side and by Ministers especially close to the President on the other--were part of a struggle at the national level for political power. Still other events reached down directly into the midst of lower level politics in efforts involving the manipulation of 112 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === 113 political parties, mass organizations, and other groups and individuals to the advantage of opposing political forces at the top. As the power struggle, which was basically between Soekarno and the Suharto group, became more intense and more public, the lines of opposition permeated more deeply to the lower levels. The action movement grew more substantial as major issues at the top became legitimate and familiar sub jects of public political discussion in lower level political deb ate. International Commitments--. KIAPMA, Case in Point Held at Djakarta in mid-October, the KIAPMA conference occasioned President Soekarno's first appearance at a public function since before the October 1 events.'*' No event could have captured more fully the anomalies of Indonesia’s new political condition. The conference, many observers believed, had been organized by Soekarno as a palliative to his disappointment over the failure thus far to organize the Second Afro-Asia Conference (KAA-II). This failure was caused in no small part by the recalcitrance of Indonesia's closest 1. On October 13 it was announced that the conference would be in Bali. This would have involved considerable addi tional expense and effort, since the Indonesian Government would have had to provide transport and accommodations. Bali, however, would have given Soekarno a more congenial atmosphere than Djakarta, and it would also demonstrate that his proverbially quixotic changes of plan were being complied with as usual. Without explanation, the Govern ment announced the next day, October 14, that KIAPMA would take place in Djakarta. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === 114 major ally, China People ’s Republic. KIAPMA brought together on a relatively minor issue many nations which would have found it impossible to convene on more controversial premises. At the same time it emphasized in Asia the centrality of the Djakarta--Pnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang Axis, Soekarno inspired concept. another The events of the conference as well as the auspices of its sponsorship, placed Indonesia's current political condition in awkward relief for many Indonesians. First, though various explanations can be given for the fact, no participating nation sent emisaries of the diplomatic rank expected. Obviously they felt that the present Indonesian Government was undergoing serious domestic challenge. Second, KIAPMA dramatized the degree to which Indonesia's foreign policy had shifted from non-alignment to open commitment to an anti-Western, or in Soekarno's coinage, anti-oldefo (old established forces) position. This took the form of consistent partiality to what he considered to be truly revolutionary regimes, such as China, Cuba, North Korea, or North Vietnam. The KIAPMA Planning Committee had been dominated in Indonesia by communists and far leftists; this fact seemed to confirm Indonesia's stance, not only in respect to foreign military bases, but also concerning the Mao-HoCastro model of national socio-political revolution. Third, KIAPMA was a trial run for the Conference of New Emerging Forces. From the beginning it had appeared as a joint project Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 125] === 115 of Indonesia and Peking, with the latter supplying large sums of money, expertise and material for a huge complex of build ings on the outskirts of Djakarta. At KIAPMA, Soekarno's suddenly weakened position seemed to emphasize the impression of on-lookers that he was becoming increasingly dependent upon China. KIAPMA was seldom mentioned after it was over. A year later it was nothing but an embarrassing memory, but at the time it was a very serious occasion. Billed as a major inter national event, sponsored by Indonesia, and held in Djakarta, political custom dictated that every Indonesian political group and mass organization come forward with a statement of unqualified affirmation. These statements were indeed forth coming, even from the most rightist elements. Their dilemma was evident, however, for it was very difficult to demand ouster of the KIAPMA Planning Committee's communist members, while at the same time rationalizing full endorsement of the conference. It was difficult to laud relations with China, while at the same time moving toward increasingly acerbic confrontations with Chinese domestically. Allegations of Chinese financial and material support for PKI involvement in the September 30 Movement were increasingly adumbrated both at home and abroad. Much was made of the Chinese embassy's failure to lower its flag in honor of the slain generals. Peking Radio Indonesian language broadcasts expressed increasing opposi- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === tion to the "reactionary generals" implying that Indonesian Government continuity had been broken. Even for the sake of maintaining her special relations with Indonesia or for the well being of her hundreds of thousands of overseas subjects in the country, China seemed more and more unwilling to accept the fiction that Indonesia's former international posture could remain substantially unchanged if the PKI's power was seriously damaged. KIAPMA was thus a jolt to most Indonesian political groups, for up until that time they had sincerely believed that domestic power politics were separable from the larger realm of State ideology, international posture, and the supra-political position of Soekarno. Only gradually over the following year and a half did the various parts of this top level government realm become consumed in domestic power politics. The KIAPMA conference therefore singularly presaged the complex issues toward which Indonesian politics was gravitating. Soekarno's Predicament The second genre of events at the national level were those which directly involved the power struggle between Soekarno and the Suharto group. These wre a counterpoint 2. Peking Radio, however, was very careful for several months to avoid explicit opposition to the Indonesian govern ment. Condemnatory statements were confined to reaction ary generals (usually unspecified) and to the treatment of Indonesian-Chinese by reactionary elements (again unspecified). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === 117 of actions both subtle and not so subtle--assiduous attempts by Soekarno to regain, shore up, or simply retain, control over various government jurisdictions. Equally persistent, less skillful but more pertinacious, were the efforts of the Suharto group to assure that at least in terms of power the situation would not return to the status quo a n t e. Much of the time it was a complicated struggle involving all the involutions, overlappings and general complexities of the Indonesian political process. Sometimes the act of a particular General could be interpreted as "pro-Soekarno" or a ministerial decree would seem clearly to further the inter ests of the emerging Suharto group. Often, these impressions also were attached to failures to act; an example is the case of Major General Surjosumpeno, Commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, which eventually led to his removal. Other acts, however, were more decisive and were widely inter preted as such. The official appointment of Suharto as Minister/Commander in Chief of the Army, the simultaneous demotion of Soekarno's initial protege, Pranoto Reksosamudra, and the President's uncharacteristically terse remarks at Suharto's installation, were a clear earnest of the General's enhanced position of power. language: The gradual suspension (in varying freezing, prohibiting, stopping the activities of) by regional commanders of the activities of the PKI in open disregard of Soekarno's repeated statements on the subject of communists was a further indication that the Army under Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === 118 Suharto had the will and apparently the capacity to act inde pendently of the President’s wishes. One of the most decisive developments was the reorganiza tion of KOTI, the Supreme Operational Command. This in effect meant the ouster of its civilian members, including the First Deputy Prime Minister, Subandrio, who in this shakeup also lost his crucially powerful position as head of BPI the [Indonesian] Central Intelligence Agency. Lesser developments which accrued to the Suharto group's advantage included Minister of Higher Education Sjarif Thajeb's closing down of fourteen universities (some known for their close connections with the President as well as for their sympathies with the PK I ), and the suspension and withdrawal of all official privileges for about one-sixth of the membership of the MPRS (Provisional People's Deliberative Assembly). Soekarno's success as President of Indonesia during Guided Democracy depended on his continued ability to trans late into institutions his own proven capacity to diffuse political conflict. His special technique for doing this had always been deliberately to juxtapose potentially antagonistic elements, ply them with his overwhelming charm, and educate them to the traditional forms of Javanese conflict resolution. In Guided Democracy these juxtapositions were reflected in the impossibly complex proliferating plethora of official structures and agencies. The variety of political groups with significant active power, as discussed earlier, nonetheless Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 129] === 119 decreased appreciably during Guided Democracy. The President saw this as conformation to the trend toward Nasakom unity throughout Indonesian society and government. In fact, the simple factor of power remained and was simply transformed into a gradual coalescence of previous political elements around either the Army or the P K I. Some elements could ration alize what might otherwise have appeared as unholy alliances by stressing the necessity--for the sake of the revolution-of strict allegiance to the wishes of the Great Leader of the Revolution. In the post-October 1 period, however, President Soekarno found himself seriously disadvantaged by this narrow ing of the real political power divisions. PKI leaders were unable or unwilling in October to con tinue publicly to represent the interest of the communist/ socialist sector of Indonesian society, even if this repre sentation had required the sacrifice to Army revenge of several individuals. This inaction greatly reduced the instrumental ities upon which Soekarno might have drawn to redress the Nasakom equilibrium disrupted by the October 1 event. And, the quick disappearance of all the members of the Central Committee of the PKI gave substance to the allegations of involvement in the September 30 Movement. The entire party and its mass organizations were thus immediately relegated to the status of fugitives. Soekarno arrogated to himself a stature comparable to the supra-political, Mao-ist kind of centrality, a kind of organic fusion of person and nation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 130] === 120 And he attributed only divisiveness to the variegated power competition which had characterized the period of parlia mentary democracy. Soekarno was thereby hoist by his own rhetorical petard, for he could not suddenly verbalize the post-October 1 conflict in terms of power politics. He could only beg the Army and the non-communist political parties to play the game according to the rules of Pantja Azimat Revolusi, particularly of its Nasakom component which assumed a trinitarian indivisibility of nationalists, religionists and communists. He could not descend from his own lofty aerie and apply his political acumen directly to the leadership of one group against another. He was harnessed to the role he had created for himself, of orchestrating Indonesian political life from an Olympian perch. However reluctant he may have been, Soekarno was gradually compelled by the P K I ’s inactivity to involve himself in a direct power struggle with the Suharto group. At first this took the form of patriarchal chastizing as in his rebuking of Njoto and Lukman at the October 6 Cabinet meeting in Bogor (this was the last official appearance of PKI Central Committee members). This was followed by incessant semi-public demon strations of his continued personal control of the Government. Cabinet meetings, conferences with various groups of ministers and other officials, suddenly convened sessions with regional military commanders, requiring their immediate travel to Djakarta--all were accompanied by Soekarno speeches. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Typically === [PDF page 131] === 121 imperious in tone, these speeches invariably dealt with n a tional conditions and only tangentially with matters which were directly germane to the duties and interests of those addressed. He was in fact addressing the nation and in this context would occasionally without ostensible prior consulta tion with Army leaders or other officialdom who might be affected announce dramatic decisions. He could do this openly with confidence that no one would dare to challenge him, as they might in closed-door sessions through subtle persuasion or implied threats. One instance where Soekarno used the safety of his public platform for this type of announcement occurred on November 10, 1965, a Heroes Day speech and the bestowal of the national medal upon a youthful hero killed by the Dutch. Almost as an afterthought at the close of his two-hour discourse, Soekarno announced the termination, beginning that day, of the "state of emergency" (SOB) for Djakarta. In a final sentence he said, "And I hope, pray that before very much longer I shall be able to withdraw it for Central Java." This was the morning after the giant rally at Banteng Square, where the party-oriented Action Front, KAP-Gestapu, had presented Leimena with its Statement of proposals for transmission to the President. KAP-Gestapu had among other things urged the 3. "Amanat PJM President Sukarno pada Peringatan Hari Pahlawan dan Pemberian Tanda Djasa Bintang Maha Putra III Kepada Almarhum Robert Wolter Mongisidi di Istana Negara, Djakarta, 10 November 1965." Sekretariat Negara, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, nst. 1260/65, p. 22. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === 122 President to extend the "State of Emergency" to the whole of Indonesia as a means of assuring the preservation of peace and security. Official proclamation of a "state of emergency" would of course automatically have widened the scope of military fiat throughout the country. The Heroes Day speech thus constituted a reply not only to KAP-Gestapu but to the Suharto group in general. Rescind ing the SOB for Djakarta, was the finishing touch to an address devoted to the importance of national unity. Soekarno began with appropriate reference to some of the same author ities he had quoted for thirty-five years, such as Sir John Seeley, Lothrop Stoddard, Jean Jaures and Abraham Lincoln C"A nation divided against itself cannot stand").* He then accused a "free world" ambassador of bribing an Indonesian with 150 million rupiah to help foment disorder during the "epilogue" of the October 1 event. He visualized the October 1 event as the kind of challenge that any great revolution must. confront and overcome. To Soekarno the epilogue was separate from the September 30 Movement. It was, he said, a situation wherein the enemies of Indonesia were seeking to destroy the Indonesian nation by capitalizing on the October 1 event. Against this threat stood the indomitable spirit of the Indonesian people united in the ideological trinity of Nasakom. Bernard Brecht, Freilegard, Thomas Carlyle, Jean Jacques 4. Later in the speech he also mentioned in this connection Giuseppe Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cavour. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === 123 Rousseau--Soekarno drew on all of them for confirmation of the resilience of the human spirit. The imperialists were most afraid of the "Indonesian Revolution" and it was "this they would extinguish." Thus while the September 30 "event" (kedjadian) was rightfully to be cursed, it was unthinkable that a "witch hunt" should follow which might imperil the entire Revolution. The 150 million rupiah, the spreading witch hunt, not only against communists, but against other leftists as well, and all such disruptive acts reflected, according to Soekarno, nothing but a gross misunderstanding about the importance of the Revolution. Soekarno acknowledged that he was under pressure to ban the PKI and had the subject under advisement. But what really aroused his fury, he said, were those who were inciting public sentiments, burning, and generally sowing dissension among the people. led up to this point. The whole speech He specifically threatened to ban any of the seven remaining political parties and mentioned them individually by name. Over and over again, on this occasion and many others, he appealed to the dictates of Nasakom and allowed that it would be futile for any Indonesian to enter tain the possibility of a continuing Revolution without the full participation of the communists.^ The skillful utilization of his own imposing stature to gether with his famed oratorical prowess were the most im portant of Soekarno's assets in his power struggle with the 5. "Amanat PJM President... passim. 10 November 1965," op. c i t., Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 134] === 124 Suharto group. This fact, however, makes the assessment of the relative power balance between the President and Suharto at any point in this period very difficult. What was the actual consequence of Soekarno's1 announcement lifting the "state of emergency" in Djakarta? presence was noticeable. No reduction of military Was its value then only as an example of Soekarno's capacity still to issue orders and com mand automatic Army acquiescence? Could he effectively p r o gress from this example to more direct control over signifi cant military units and influence over political parties and mass organizations? From the vantage point of one or two years' hindsight it is hard to credit Soekarno as having any realistic understanding of the limitations of his own power. But at the time, there was no group, not even any Action Front, which appeared to regard the political controversy as related to anything more than the question of punishment for those responsible for the September 30 Movement, especially for the PKI. Innumerable figures such as Adam Malik, Frans Seda, Sjarif Thajeb, and Nasution, who, a year later were proclaim ing unequivocal opposition to Soekarno, in the fall of 1965 gave repeated public reassurance that it was only a matter of days or weeks before the Great Leader of the Revolution, after due consideration, would ban the PKI. In no discernible way did these or other prominent leaders express anything but steadfast adulation towards President Soekarno, to Guided Democracy, and to the ideological conventions. Soekarno's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === 125 style of control, after all, had never involved one basic common feature of dictatorial regimes--the development of a monolithic control structure. His power struggle with the Suharto group remained consistent with the tactics of subtle maneuver which had always been his style and forte. Guided Democracy he had tried to assume a stance supra the various loci of competing power groups, insulated from their rather mundane world, free to keep the Indonesian Revolution ever on the rails of its promised destiny. Only as Soekarno allowed himself to be drawn down into the arena of political opponents did his vulnerable position become apparent to many Indonesians. and December, However, in November 1965, the discrepancy between his pontifical pronouncements and the coercive power actually at his disposal was virtually unseen. He could abolish "states of emergency," call for more restraint on the part of newspapers he felt were responsible for inciting violence, and demand the curtailing of reprisals in general; significantly, he could expect these instructions to be carried out. most people believed they would be carried out. take place. Moreover, KIAPMA did Minister of Information Achmadi did impose whole sale reduction in the number of newspapers and curtailment of journalistic freedom, especially for papers most ill-disposed to the President’s interests. The Supreme Economic Operations Command (KOTOE) was eliminated and a new body under Chaerul Saleh took some draconian stabs at economic reform. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === 126 there were several concrete actions to which people could point as proof of Soekarno's continued paramount authority. In a number of rounds of the power struggle it was u n clear just which side would benefit by a particular act. This invariably occurred when the incident, at least officially, took place at a lower echelon of Government. Action Front rally was on November 9. The massive On the same day re strictive action was taken by the Information Ministry against A p i, the newspaper most aggressive in its attacks on the PKI but also most vigorous in attacks on members of the Soekarno Government, such as Subandrio.^ Api was closely identified with the interests of the party-oriented Action Front, and Information Minister Achmadi was one of the Cabinet members most energetic in protecting Soekarno and the Cabinet Presidium through the manipulation of media. What was unclear was the extent to which the Suharto group also felt that Api was treading dangerous ground by amplifying the anti-PKI/ Gestapu campaign into attacks on top Soekarno deputies as well. Suharto's basic assignment was to protect the existing Government; aside from his own personal interests and those of the Army, it is quite possible that in the case of Api and in other instances he sanctioned a restrictive action against elements which counted themselves among his most enthusiastic supporters. 6. Berita Yudha, November 10, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 137] === 127 Locating the Mass Base Of the three types of political events mentioned earlier, it was the third which was most central to the development of the united student/youth action movement. These were the kinds of events which reflected the attempts of the major political actors to manipulate to their own advantage the mass base in its various forms--political party memberships, mass organiza tions, unions, student/youth groups, ethnic groups, regional groups, and religious groups. Or they were events which germinated somewhere in the mass base itself and somehow managed to capture popular imagination, nudge aside existing impediments and command some attention from the political giants. Many of the acts of violence toward PKI members, other leftists, and their families exemplified this kind of popularly generated event. Government officials (Army officers, noncoms, and local administrators) or civilian political leaders often set the violent precedent. However, of the officials and leaders interviewed some months later, none had foreseen the inclination of a large proportion of the populace suddenly to focus all its diverse grievances upon "communists," to the extent of engaging in collective acts of suppression which cumulatively mounted to genocidal proportions. Given the overall context of national instability, any manipulations from Soekarno or the Suharto group were essentially tactical, designed for immediate or short-term political profit. If any manipulations did cause dramatic Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === 128 new political entities--it is now very difficult, perhaps impossible, to pinpoint precisely what (or who) was respon sible. The perplexity is understandable, but nonetheless irksome, and it is a bane of political analysis. The problem is locating those factors, which though extraneous to the manipulative actions, were politically activated by them and thus brought to widespread popular consciousness. The problem is also perceiving psychological hyper-sensitivities which can operate as powerful catalysts in a political climate, vastly altering "ordinary" events and reactions. And finally the problem is distinguishing intrinsic qualities of the political environment from the pomp of current political circumstance. The formation of all the Action Fronts and Commands fell within this third group of events. question arises: In every case the which was the more influential factor, the initiative from major political actors or the spontaneous expression among various loosely united, low-level elements. Varying reactions to the communist threat seemed to determine the cohesiveness of many action groups, especially among the students and youth. Again, it is difficult to assess the degree to which manipulation of the reporting about post-October 1 communist activities originated in deliberate decisions taken by the Suharto group itself. Evidence clearly shows, however, that reportage was in strumental in the success which action group leaders had in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === 129 their appeal for mass support. It began with the well docu mented fact of the attendance of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani elements at Lobang Buaja. Whatever role individuals of these two PKI youth organizations did play in the actual assassina tions or in the alleged (and flimsily substantiated) orgy of mutiliations, their attendance was sufficiently incriminating. Similar acts were reported in many parts of the country and were stressed by non-communist party leaders (most notably the conservative Muslims), by action group leaders, and by officers of the Suharto group, as corroboration of the "sub human," heathen, sacriligious character of communists. These reports began simultaneously with the exhumation of the generals' bodies at Lobang Buaja and grew in number and horror over the following month. Though unfounded and sub sequently denied, the report of the assassination of the entire family of Col. Katamso, commander of the special region of Jogjakarta, seemed especially shocking. Freshly turned earth, holes allegedly prepared for victims, eye gouging instruments (with photographs and descriptions of use), dozens of lengthy lists of intended victims (usually includ ing the leaders of each local area), and other such horribilia constantly implied what the success of the September 30 Move ment would have meant. Together with the actual discovery of significant numbers of buried victims in various parts of the country, the conclusion drawn by many leaders was entirely credible to most Indonesians: that the continued toleration Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === 130 in Indonesian society of communists in whatever organizational form would be a sin against Allah. This conceptualization of a communist menace has a special significance for students and youth, for almost invariably it was communist students and youth who figured most prominently in the reports. terror, Whether an act of random an organized attack, or the almost daily reports of groups of "rebels" arrested, the participants were almost always characterized as youths. Retaliation, and in many cases, provocation, came from the youth of traditional non communist political organizations, soon organized into "alert brigades" or other para-military groupings. almost certain that many more communists It is (and members of PKI mass organizations) were killed by official military units than by youth, but in the news media it was the "heroic" anti-communist activities of youth which consistently dominated reportage regarding the suppression of communists. Historians will undoubtedly provide a more judicious evaluation than is now possible of the complex factors which contributed to Indonesia's great carnage. Almost all the killing occurred in small towns or rural areas, but confirmation, through silence 7. Mohamad Iskandar Djajusman BBA, head of Pemuda Muhammadijah for Central Java, quoted the Koran in support of his contention that Muslims and all progressive revolu tionaries were obligated to participate in a jihad against communists. WB, Nov. 18, 1965 (Antara, Semarang, Nov. 17). The national chairman of Pemuda Katholik affirmed the sense of this view when he declared that whatever b e fell the PKI and its mass organization was "a punishment directly from God." WB, Nov. 17, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === 131 or active encouragement, had to come from the cities, especial ly from the Capital. And from Djakarta came ideological justification and the leaders who would ultimately have to govern amidst the resulting disruption. One of the important factors contributing to the momemtum of carnage in November and December, 1965, was thus the nature of reports of events in the daerah which appeared in urban media and vice v e r s a. Reports of communist aggression from the daerah were dramatized in the urban media, especially in Djakarta. The massive demonstrations, usually of students and youth, in. Djakarta and other large cities, in reaction against communists-and increasingly charged with emotion based on the reports from the daerah--were fully reported in the daerah. It was an oscillating escalation of anger, further structuralized as Action Fronts or Commands emerged in the cities and were complemented by the less sophisticated surge of youthful fury in the countryside. This anger was partially a function of the manipulative efforts of the major political actors as evidenced by the nature of available channels of communication. Except between Java and Sumatra there had been no previous inter-island telephone service. After October 1 nearly all telephone service halted, between regions, between Djakarta and the regions, and within the Capital itself. Aside from the occasional reporter or other traveler, the only channel of communication in late 1965 between Djakarta and the daerah Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === 132 was the microwave system of the Army. Thus not only the Armed Forces News Service but the Antara National News Agency and most reportage in individual newspapers was dependent upon the Army communications system for news of regional events. It is clear then that in the power struggle between the President and the Suharto group--with the political parties naturally gravitating to the Suharto side on the issue of strong repression of the PKI--the latter had a strong advantage in respect to managing news nation-wide. Ironically, control of the communication apparatus hobbled twp of Soekarno's best known assets, his oratorical skill in appealing directly to the masses and his political skill in bringing the resulting image of mass support effectively to bear in Djakarta. In late Guided Democracy, as discussed earlier, youth had become the increasingly dominant and publicly visible segment of his clientele. Now, in the post-October 1 period, Soekarno's freedom to be heard was appreciably reduced. 8. This system through U.S. aid was installed in 1964. the time the Army generals justified it in terms of pr o viding better coordination of the fight against Malaysia. It is generally averred in retrospect, however, that the primary concern was effective communications in the event of domestic emergency. 9. One test of how extensively the civilian media were depen dent upon the Army communications system is an examination of the time lapses in Antara between the two dates general ly accompanying each report, one for the city of origin and another for when it appeared in Djakarta. For in stance, a report from Ambon which normally would take two to three weeks to reach Djakarta might appear with only a one day lapse, indicating almost surely the use of Army channels. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 143] === 133 He tried to regain the upper hand as true definer of how events ought to be perceived, as the penjambung lidah rakjat (mouthpiece of the people, literally, extension of the tongue of the p e o p l e ). He tried to squeeze the October 1 events and the strange forces which were unleashed back into the compartmentalization of Nasakom, back onto the "rails of the Revolution." From December 1965 to February 1966 Soekarno's endeavors seemed to be gaining dramatic success, as he addressed huge gatherings of youth. But this was in Djakarta, and echoes from the daerah grew ever fainter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 144] === CHAPTER VI THE EMERGANCE OF KAMI Elitism and Apathy Uniquely devoid of fanfare, almost imperceptibly, KAMI appeared on the Indonesian political scene. Considering its later meteoric ascendancy and crucial political role in early 1966, it is important to note the modest circumstances of its creation and expectations. The annual abstract (1,373 pages)-- complied and published by the Indonesian national news agency, Antara--of daily news releases for 1965, does not mention the formation of KAMI.* No mention appears in the New York Times until January 1966. Even in Djakarta newspapers, word of KAMI'S formation Monday, October 25, 1965 first appeared in print on Thursday, October 28. This initial announcement to the press along with a statement of objectives was released by SOMAL (Sekretariat Bersama 0rganisasi2 Mahasiswa Lokal di Indonesia, Joint Secretariat of Local Student Organizations in Indonesia), one of the new federation's least important com ponent leadership organizations in terms of numerical strength This is all the more strange, since the Abstract was en tirely prepared in 1966 and early 1967. Antara. Ichtisar Tahunan (Djakarta: Lembaga Kantorberita Nasional "Antara," 1967). A n tara, Oct. 28, 1965. 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 145] === 135 and public image. the Department Antara reporters were obliged to go to [Ministry] of Higher Education and Science to obtain a list of KAMI'S member organizations. Indonesiaphiles arriving from abroad as late as February and March, 1966, on hearing of KAMI, inquired if that was the new term for communists. It was as if those interested in forming KAMI had needed a transcendent burst of effort to wrest potential member groups out of the confortable inertia of their previous fragmenta tion. The circumstances of the initial announcement and events leading up to it, showed that the formation of KAMI was not solely the work of students. Final agreement by the student leaders was reached in the home of Minister of Higher Education and Science Sjarif Thajeb, and, as stated in the press, through his "good offices." His participation implied a certain official endorsement and hence a seriousness of p u r pose which KAMI would not otherwise have enjoyed. There was nonetheless a fragility about the new organization, indicated by the weak student auspices of the initial public announce ment, by the highly confederative nature of the organization's structure, and by the tentative phraseology of the statement of objectives and the ad hoc and impermanent organizational status implied in them. Though more will be said about Thajeb, it should be noted at this point that he had for a long time enjoyed close association with the Army and in fact had the rank of Brigadier General, by which title he was normally addressed. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === 136 For the setting up of KAMI was essentially the initiative of a select group of elite Djakarta students who happened through socio-economic status to have intimate connections with powerful military officers most sympathetic to the Suharto group. It would be inaccurate to say these were me m bers of SOMAL, the organization which ultimately issued the first report concerning the creation of KAMI, but in fact their outlook on life generally conformed to that of the typical SOMAL member. In terms of public image, SOMAL it self was unheard of. It was no more than a loose confeder ation of tiny, highly elitist, local, urban university stu dent organizations in several of the main cities of Java. SOMAL members would normally come from families fairly aloof from politics, except for occasional steps to assure their continued privacy. The typical SOMAL type was well educated, spoke Dutch at home, and boasted a kind of premature urban ity. In regard to Indonesia's political, social, and economic problems he was quietly and cooly cynical about the prospects for change. The activities of SOMAL's six component groups resembled those of the local branches of an American national fraternity. They organized picnics, dances, poetry readings and occasional chamber music. No segment of Indonesian society was father from the mainstream of Indonesian life or freer of movement within it. This coolness and political detachment, so unlike the frenetic emotionalism of general student/youth activity, found sudden appeal in the post-October 1 months of 1965. There were many young people of similar socio-economic Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 147] === 137 status, who, generally becasue of their parents, had auto matically joined one or another of the larger, more popular organizations. Often, directly because of their status, they had become leaders in these organizations, donning or shedding as required the public personality of the individual group. This was true of some of the groups whose national image was highly conformative, in a religious, ethnic, ideological, or regional sense. Good examples were the Islamic University Students’ Association (HMI) and the Indonesian Nationalist University Student Movement (GMNI), the former loosely identified with the banned Masjumi political party(banned in 1961) and the latter a direct subsidiary of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). These were the two largest party affiliated university student movements in the country. the case of GMNI, prominent members were often the wealthy, well-educated children of persons, who as the prize for nationalist and revolutionary activities in their own youth, had for years held sinecures in the Government or in the business world. In the case of HMI, the leaders weTe usually from Outer Island ethnic groups, and were the children of persons who had succeeded in the business world. Those whose parents had been in any way connected directly with the 1958 P.R.R.I./Permesta rebellion did not become leaders of HMI. But in many cases the families of HMI leaders were neverthe less highly sympathetic to the rebellion and to the interests of the Outer Islands and their own particular ethnic group. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 148] === 138 A year later (in fall, 1966), it became a badge of honor to have participated in the earlier rebellion, now seen largely as an anti-communist effort. Many people would enthusias tically exaggerate their rebellion experience or sympathy for it. In any case, both HMI and GMNI, in all formal r e spects on opposite sides of the political fence, harbored elitists with a certain sense of common identity--modernist, youthful university students, and cynical observers of their elders' feeble attempts to fulfill the promises of independence. A number of foreign academics concluded, on the basis of impressionist observation and rudimentary surveys prior to October 1, 1965, that Indonesian student political party activities were very meager compared with other nations, also that the student movements were ineffective, and that students were categorically apathetic to politics. These conclu sions, if accurate, highlight the difficulties even under assessments of political dynamics among youth in a volatile political climate. There was very little contact between See for instance, Stephen Arneal Douglas, Political Socialization in Indonesia (Urbana, Illinois: Unpub lished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, 1967), p. 142 and Joseph Fischer, "Indonesia," in Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development, p. 112, quoted and affirmed in Douglas, p. 142. Also, it is interesting to note that foreigners with varying degrees of previous knowledge of Indonesia repeatedly expressed amazement on visiting the country in early 1966 to observe the dramatic student/youth political involvement. Even specialists on Indonesia were totally unprepared by their previous training to provide e x planations of the current activity out of their own knowledge of social-cultural-economic-political d y namics, or in terms of antecedent events of contem porary Indonesia history. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 149] === 139 urban student/youth organizations and those in the concen trated population areas of rural and small town Indonesia. Students, even in the urban setting, tended to be grouped homogeneously in schools and universities. By whatever criteria used, it was continually evident that the great majority of these urban students were sedulously noncommital about political matters. As confirmed by innumerable Indonesian friends, this was not a matter of diffidence in the presence of foreigners, but a predominant characteris tic attitude even among social peers. Responsible causative factors are complex and involve consideration of the special nature of political socialization in Indonesia, a subject upon which Professor Stephen Douglas had done some investi gation.^ Here, it is more convenient and pertinent to limit the criteria by which the nature of student/youth political activity and its explosion onto the adult political scene will be explained. Discussion will be confined to the con ventional level of the acts, associations and statements of individuals and groups. The urban student elite of educated, socio-economically well-placed, cynical individuals had nowhere to escape. like many countries, there was no tradition in Indonesia for See Stephen Douglas, op. c i t., expecially pp. 211-213. where he outlines five general dimensions of Indonesian political orientation, each of which, according to Douglas, has "its own peculiar pattern of continuity or discontinuity." The five dimensions are: the Indonesian nation, authority, participation, political style and particularistic political orientation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === 140 societal misfits, the products of later colonialism and modernist orientation to Western civilizations, to emigrate to the West, or once abroad for university education, to linger and often finally, simply to stay. On the contrary, except for the Eurasians, no special class had been created by the Dutch to serve as a kind of educated administrative level, an insulation, between them and Indonesian society generally. That small group of Indonesians, largely secular nationalists, who had been Dutch educated, were also the activists of nationalism and finally the political heroes of the Revolution. They were the archetypal image of post-independence Indonesian citi zenry, to which nearly everyone endeavored to conform. They were in turn, with their children and the entire burgeoning post-independence elite, ineluctably immersed in, and often dedicated to, the new nation, the new society, for which they had fought. So, however skeptical they may have been of their government's grandiose schemes and no matter how cyni cal they may have been about the plight of their less fortu nate countrymen, the elitist student leaders of 1965, at least had nominal organizational attachments and knew that sooner or later their destiny and that of Indonesia would be importantly affected by their own acts. Professors Joseph Fischer and Stephen Douglas accurately sensed the apathy which characterized many students during Guided Democracy. However, as proved so dramatically by the events of 1966, this apathy went only so deep, and no farther, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 151] === 141 than the comfortable life bequeathed in the acts of their parents. Ironically, events set in motion by the September 30 Movement drew from the students just the kind of active participation in the "Indonesian Revolution" which President Soekarno had so persistently tried to elicit. Organizational Development--Two Eras There is a strong similarity between the pattern of political organizational development in the last days of the Japanese Occupation and that which emerged toward the end of Guided Democracy. Both situations generated an explosion of student/youth activity and influenced subse quent organizational developments, in the former case, for the Revolution and in the latter case for the post-October 1 period. Professor Benedict Anderson could have been speaking of 1965 in his graphic description of the Indonesian polit ical organizations sponsored by the Japanese and the relation ship to them of Indonesian youth: One could easily compare the Hokokai and the organizations like it to motor engines revolv ing at increasingly high speeds, but still not put into gear. The bodies themselves were built up to ensure against the future... and had little real function in the existing situation... except to heighten expectancies without giving them any chance for fulfilment. In such a situation the frustrations, particularly of the younger generation, found their outlet in growing hostility to what was conceived as the timidity, opportunism, and lack of virility in the older Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 152] === 142 generation of politicians and administrators who staffed the upper echelons of the Hokokai and its companion organizations.6 In Guided Democracy Soekar.no increasingly turned to students and youth to ensure against the future. He caused the creation of organizations to mold the younger generation to his model of Indonesian society, and he rewarded those which most faithfully espoused this model. model for the future. But this was a The existing sdult political organi zations, even the newly constructed National Front, however attuned to Soekarno's ideological fervor, were idling engines, which could not be "put into gear." Shackled by years of built up obligations and the weight of conventional politiking--"timidity, opportunism, and lack of virility"-the adult world was regarded with increasing hostility by youth. Understandably, because of their own confinement within the conventional system, the youth manifested this hostility in the form of cynicism. But as Anderson so aptly noted in respect to the period of nationalist revolution, "the combination of conservative practice a n d 1'radicalactivist' propaganda was to prove as explosive and unstable a mixture in Java as it had been in Japan." The socio-economic elitist contingent of various stu dent organizations in 1965 had its counterpart at the close Benedict Anderson, Pemuda..., op. c i t., p. 20. Anderson, op. c i t., p. 33. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 153] === 143 of the Japanese Occupation. The 1965 elitists were roughly no larger a proportion of the total Indonesian population, than the 2,000 out of fifty million which Anderson estimated for 1945. In 1965, as in the earlier period, some groups harbored a larger proportion of these elitists than others. The Djakarta component (IMADA) of SOMAL had a number of members who played important roles in the formation of KAMI. They continued to command influence during the following year, even as SOMAL waned and larger national groups gained prominence in KAMI. This influence by a small socio-economic, educationally definable contingent within the entire student/ youth movement helps to explain how observers prior to October 1, 1965, could see the movement as politically apathetic. Only under extraordinary conditions of political turmoil sould the disparate elitists coalesce and become capable of exercising influence out of all proportion to their numbers. But this, after all, had been a major factor in the history of Indonesia's successful fight for Independence. In September 1965 there were three general categories of student/youth organization, seen in the sense of horizontal organizational layers. These were: basic groups, federa tions of groups, and fronts of federations. Organizational looseness increased upwards through these levels. Vertical Ibid., p. 28. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 154] === 144 cleavages fell generally between leftist-communist, orthodoxIslamic or Christian, and secular nationalist organizations.® These divisions cut more or less neatly down through the horizontal categories of groups, federations and fronts. Vertical divisions, while largely corresponding to political party divisions, reflected more accurately than the adult organizations the real loyalties of cultural, religious, ethnic, social class, economic and other affinities. This was due to the much greater formal freedom or organization which the student/youth groups enjoyed compared with the parties, limited by mid-September 1965 to nine nationally. There were probably several hundred student/youth organiza tions at that time, mostly local groups, although in almost all cases they maintained some connection with larger national groups, either in the vertical or horizontal hierarchies. These are arbitrary terms. They follow loosely the analytic divisions used by most observers and by Soekarno. However, the qualifying adjectives purposely disturb some of the usual meanings. "Leftist-communist" especially reflects the climate of late 1965 onwards. It tones down the many expletives, epithets, and derog atory phrases used for leftists and communists collec tively, but retains the sense that differences between the two were no longer recognized in public. "OrthodoxIslamic," a very confusing term as used in most writings on Indonesia, again is used in a post-October 1 sense-as those (PSII, NU, ex- or pro-Masjumi) who generally conceptualized progress as a task of purifying (memurnikan) all aspects of the state in conformity with formal religious principles. "Secular-nationalist," is a kind of catch-all term. Here, it is not used in the simple sense appropriate to the "non-religious" nationalists of the Revolution. Rather, it includes such types as European socialists, arch Soekarnoists, and the cynical, aloof socio-economic elitists who loathed Soekarno. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === 145 For the subsequent analysis of student/youth organiza tional activities leading to the formation of KAMI, it will be necessary to give some substance to the artificial schematization suggested above. At the lowest level the vertical cleavages were fairly clear. Pemuda Rakjat was a PKI male youth subsidiary, hence fit neatly into the leftistcommunist vertical category. GPA (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor) was an NU male youth subsidiary, hence fit just as well in the orthodox Islamic category. Finally, GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia) as the male and female university stu dent subsidiary of the PNI is conveniently placed with the secular nationalists. (See Chart) These vertical cleavages become less clear as they intersect with the next higher horizontal level, that of federations. CGMI (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia) was a federation of leftistcommunist university student organizations, but in fact was popularly understood to be an affiliate of the PKI and headed by PKI members or candidate members. It sought to supersede other university federations and become the sole representa tive of "progressive revolutionary" Indonesian university students. There is thus some question in the schematization if it should be placed among the lowest level of simple groups or if it legitimately belongs with the federations. Even more confusing is an organization like the "Front Peladjar" which is a member organization of the Front Pemuda. Though its name would automatically classify it in the horizontal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 156] === 146 CHART 3 SCHEME FOR INDONESIAN STUDENT/YOUTH ORGANIZATION LeftistCommunist Othodox-Islamic or Christian SecularNationalist Front PPMI MMI MMI Federation CGMI Front Peladjar PMII GPPSKSI FMB Front Peladjar GPU Front Peladjar SOMAL Group IPPI Gerwani Perhimi Germindo PPI HMI PII SEMMI PMKRI GMKI GPA IMM GAMKI IPNU GMNI IMADA GMD GSNI Germahi GMRI GPM Mapantjas a. This chart is intended only as an illustration of the general organization of the Indonesian student/youth groups. Representative groups have been listed in the appropriate categories but comprise only a very small proportion of total groups in existence. See Appendix Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 157] === 147 category of "Fronts," Front Peladjar actually belongs on the level of federations. Only in the sense that it p os sessed broader political representation than the typical federation (of like organizations) did it perhaps fit some of the criteria of fronts. While the Front Peladjar included organizations from each of the vertical categories of groups, other federations, more like the CGMI, served much narrower political interests. GPU (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) is classifiable as a federation largely because of its history as a federation and front maker. Masjumi oriented, G P U in 1955 had been easily the largest youth organization in Indonesia.*® had suffered with the demise and banning of the political party but was still a very important group in 1965. Its appeal, however, was now much more confined to orthodox M u s lim youth of Outer Island ethnic groups. GPPSKSI Similarly, the (Gabungan Perhimpunan Peladjar Sekolah Katholik 10. Started in October, 1945, G P U had been a member for a while of the BKPRI and FNP federations, but had finally withdrawn from both, charging Pesindo domination. established a rival coalition, the Front Nasional Pemuda, in late 1948. It failed to join the 1950 FPI, instead formed the FPII, and through its huge membership suc ceeded in dominating the new federation's leadership. G P U was also one of three organizations represented in the Secretariat of PORPISI. Membership in 1955 was estimated at between 750,000 and one million. This in formation is from James Bruce Amstutz, The Indonesian Youth Movement, 1908-1955 (Medford, M a s s.: Doctoral dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1958), pp. 188, 192, 381-382, and from Hardjito, Risalah Gerakan Pemuda, First Edition (Djakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1952), p. 376 and passim. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 158] === 148 Seluruh Indonesia) was solely a Catholic federation.** contrast to G P U, however, GPPSKSI had a large number of separate member organizations, in fact, so many as to nullify independent action on the part of any one of them. name suggests,.it was a "collectivity" bunch or fussion) As its (gabungan, lit., of Catholic School Student Associations. In sharp contrast to the Front Peladjar, G P U and GPPSKSI, the federation, mentioned earlier, SOMAL, which played such an important role in the formation of KAMI, had little super-structure and consisted of just six groups, each of which had special interests and considerable independent power within their own very limited jurisdictions. Finally, there was the top horizontal level, that of Fronts. As mentioned earlier, organizational looseness in creased upwards through the horizontal levels. What this meant is best examined in terms of the effective influence which the leadership at the Front level could exercise over lower levels in Indonesian politics generally. Once again, the question of public image is crucial. Theoretically, all students and youth in Indonesia were members of the National Front through some organizational channel. On paper the National Front student/youth echelon 11. Following in the wake of PMKRI, however, GPPSKSI played an increasingly important role in late 1965. The General Chairman, Alex Gunur, became one of the most in fluential leaders in the sub-university student movement. The GPPSKSI leadership had particularly good relations with the Suharto army group. See WB, Oct. 23, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === 149 ultimately was to become the major organizational attachment for all students and youth. But in fact, even at the stage of Guided Democracy reached by summer 1965, there was v i r tually no integral connection between the national level of the National Front and lower levels of student/youth organiza tion. Although on an organizational schematization of the Indonesian Government, the National Front's role in respect to students and youth might appear prominent, we can validly dismiss the National Front from serious consideration as a significant factor in younger generation political activi ties. But this does not serve as an adequate answer to the question of public image. The National Front was created to mobilize the Indone sian masses into a consensual revolutionary organization which would more forcefully carry out Soekarno's ideas. Soekarno, as discussed earlier, during Guided Democracy increasingly stres.sed the importance of youth and appealed to youth as if they were a united and loyal sector of the population. Had the October 1 event not occurred, it is certain that Soekarno would have continued to favor the expanding inclusiveness of the National Front and further erosion of student/youth loyalties to separate organizational affiliations. By Se p tember 1965, the National Front, both for adults and for students and youth, had an exaggerated image as measured by prominence in media. The entertainment of foreign dignitaries, the sending of student/youth delegations to international Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 160] === 150 conferences, and the constantly nurtured image of intimacy with the President, all helped to sustain and cultivate the National Front's public prominence. This public prominence helped to secure an important role for the largest of the student/youth fronts, the Front Pemuda, for some time after the October 1 event. The Front Pemuda was formally connected with the National Front, but had the important benefit of an independent history in its own right. Through various permutations it could be traced back to the Front Pemuda Indonesia (which began in July, 1950) and even to the earlier Front Nasional Pemuda (which had lasted from August til December, 1948). 12 Generally close to the political center throughout most of its history, the Front Pemuda might have endured longer into the post-October 1 period, if its leadership in late Guided Democracy had not become monopolized by representatives from leftist-communist organizations. This, and increasing dependence upon the National Front for support and protection in the post-October 1 period, were liabilities which virtually assured the Front Pemuda's eventual collapse. 12. The 1948 Front had been created by G P U after the latter had withdrawn from the BKPRI. Its members were G P U, P D I, HMI, PII and Muda Katholik Indonesia. At that time it was politically middle of the road and far less sig nificant than its rival Republican coalition, the BKPRI. The 1950 Front was more successful, with thirteen m e m bers, including another important federation, PPMI. Seriously reducing its potential, however, was the refusal of G P U to join. Federations competing with the Front Pemuda Indonesia were FPII and PORPISI. Amstutz, o p. c i t., pp. 192, 206, 269, 275, 377, 384. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === 151 The Front Pemuda benefited in late Guided Democracy from the automatic advantage, which attached to any overcapping organization whose major function was to impose unity upon unlike sectors of the Indonesian society. In these organizations, however, the only effectual leadership was at the national level. Measures contrived during the summer of 1965 to remedy this weakness had not begun to be imple mented by October. Moreover, there were no leaders of the Front Pemuda whose primary allegiance was not to a component federation and/or lower group. Thus, irrespective of the October 1 event, there was distortion in Guided Democracy news media of all stories regarding Front Pemuda activities. The influence of the Front Pemuda among its member organi zations was extremely shallow. It was an easy task for the leftist-communist leadership to produce daily headlines which gave the impression that the largest student/youth organi zation in Indonesia was fully in support of leftist-communist interests. 13 But the activities upon which these headlines were based were largely confined to participation in national or international level events. Members of the Front Pemuda delegation which traveled to Peking in September and stayed there following October 1 were from the following lower level groups, all leftist-communist: PR, CGMI, PI, PPI and 13. See, for instance, newspaper reports of demonstrations during the last week of September, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === 152 14 APPI. On the Front P e m u d a fs Committee for the Ninth A l l world Festival of Youth, High School and University Students, which was to take place in Algiers, leftist-communists oc cupied the following positions: two chairmen, general secre tary, secretary, finance, information, souvenirs/displays, seminar meetings, art work and transportation. 15 Activity at the national level, as in so many other of Indonesia's integrative institutions in Guided Democracy, was monopolized by persons who were willing to adulate the President's every notion. Adulatory bureaucracies were to be found not just in the few intentionally integrative institutions, but were char acteristic of the national level echelons of every Government agency. Leftist-communists, more committed to radical change and familiar with its style, were simply more clever and presistent in their efforts to gain strategic leadership mon o p olies. Also, it was much easier to gain political control in organizations not already dominated by other groups with 14. The individuals were: Murdjiwati (PR), Sulardjo (CGMI), Rusli Affendi (PI), Theo Keng Bauw (PPI), and Hudojo (APPI). Api Pantjasila, Oct. 22, 1965. 15. The individuals, their positions on the Committee and their groups were as follows: Soenjoto Karnen, Chair men, RP; M. Rasjid Ridlo Hamid, Chairman, PI; Geno Soesanto, General Secretary, APPI; Robby Sumodang, Secretary, IPPI; Houw Siang Hok, Finance, PPI; Sri Wijono, Information, RP; Budiman Soedarsono, Souvenirs/ Displays, PR; Daulat Iskandar, Transport, PR; Liem Soen Bo, Seminar Meetings, Germindo; Pattiwael, Seminar Meetings, PI; Tan Giok How, Art Work, PPI; Winda Pagah, Transport, CGMI. WB, Nov. 17, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === 153 long-established vested interests which would be aggres sively defended. But integrative institutions, whether Government like the National Front or quasi-Government like the Front Pemuda, really could not be expected to produce a form of society conforming with Soekarno’s model, so long as their leaders maintained primary loyalty to lower, mutally conflicting groups. In the Front Pemuda, as in other integrative institutions, the leftist-communists com manded a highly vulnerable monopoly. Extra-University: PPMI While the Front Pemuda was the largest, and theoreti cally the most important of the fronts sitting at the top horizontal organizational level of student/youth activities, two other organizations at this level were more important and operated more successfully as organizations. These were the Indonesian University Student Assembly (MMI) and the Federation of Indonesian University Student Associations (PPMI) mentioned earlier. Their importance stemmed auto matically from their connection with university students, for even in the egalitarian thrust of Guided Democracy ideology, the traditional respect for educational status remained undiminished. This was true even among PKI members, as indicated by the prestige of the CGMI among communistoriented student/youth organizations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === 154 The PPMI and MMI provide a good example of how the political conditions of late Guided Democracy affected many organizations. From its inception in 1947 the PPMI had been a student political federation; MMI's declared purposes since its founding during Guided Democracy had been confined to inter and intra university matters. By September, 1965, the political PPMI had become thoroughly involved in n o n university affairs, and conversely, the non-political MMI had become seriously involved in extra-university political matters. Both organizations absorbed the imperative of Soekarno's ideological admonitions to revolutionize all aspects of Indonesian life. But also, as the vanguard of the youth sector of Indonesian society, which Soekarno was deliberately elevating to more influential roles in national political life, adult political elements felt increasingly compelled to cultivate the sympathy of student groups. Thus, PPMI and MMI were drawn ever farther into the midst of real political battles. In its eighteen year history (See Chart, p. 155) PPMI had evolved in stages from a center-left political dispo sition to thorough leftist-communist control as of summer, 1965. Center-left in the earlier period, however, was not particularly dependent on communist-anti-communist positions. It depended, rather, on PPMI's position relative to other federations, such as BKMI or PORPISI, which were either purely Islamic or were pro-federalist (the Dutch-favored ploy Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHART 4a ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF PPMI (PERSERIKATAN PERHIMPUNAN [2] MAHASISWA INDONESIA)15 1947'-1950 1950 -1955 PPMI PPMI HMI PMKRI PMKI PMI (religious) (religious) (religious) (religious) PMKH PMD MMM (university) (local) (local) BKMI PMS Permai PMIB PMB PMID 1965° (local) (local) (local) (local) (local) PPMI GMD CMB CMJ (leftist) (leftist) (leftist) HMI PMKRI GMKI (religious) (religious) (religious) GMS PMB MMB (local) (local) (local) CGMI PERHIMI GMNI GERMINDO (leftist) (leftist) (leftist) HMI PMKRI GMKI SEMMI PMI I IMM (religious) (religious) (religious) (religious) (religious) (religious-nonparty) MMB IMADA IMABA GMS CSB pendent) 155 a. Some of the organizations changed names over the 18 year period. PPMI had no more than 1000 members in Republican territory during the Revolution, had an estimated 9,766 members in 19S5, and a very speculative estimated 90,000 in 1965. The 1965 figure is based on the arbitrary and challengable assumption that half the national total of students in universities, colleges and other higher educational institutions were members of one or more of PPMI's member organizations. For a well designed, if dubiously substantiated, table on higher education enrollments from 1950-1964, see Howard Hayden, Higher Education and Development in South-East A s i a, Vol. 2 (Country Profiles) (Paris: Unesco, 1967), p. 497. === [PDF page 166] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHART 4 (con't.) b. In order of appearance: PPMI, Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia; PMKRI, Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia; PMKI, Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia; HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; PMD, Perhimpunan Maha. Djakarta; PMI, Pemuda Muslimin Indonesia; PMKH, Perhimpunan Maha. Kedokteran Hewan; MMM, Masjarakat Maha. Malang; B K M I, Badan Kongres Maha. Indonesia; PMS, Perhimpunan Maha. Surabaia; Permai, Perhimpunan Maha. Indonesia Makassar; PMIB, Perhimpunan Maha. Indonesia Bandung; PMB, Perhimpunan Maha. Bogor; PMID, Perhimpunan Maha. Indonesia Djakarta; GMD, Gerakan Maha. Djakarta; CMB, Consentrasi Maha. Bandung; CMJ, Consentrasi Maha. Jogjakarta; GMS, Gerakan Maha. Surabaja; MMB, Masjarakat Maha. Bogor; CGMI, Consentrasi Gerakan Maha. Indonesia; PERHIMI, Perhimpunan Maha. Indonesia; GMNI, Gerakan Maha. Nasional Indonesia; GERMINDO, Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia; SEMMI, Serikat Maha. Muslimin Indonesia; PMII, Pergerakan Maha. Islam Indonesia; IMADA, Ikatan Maha. Djakarta; IMABA, Ikatan Maha. Bandung; CSB, Corpus Studiorum Bandungense; IMP, Ikatan Maha. Pontianak; IMM, Ikatan Maha. Muhammadijah; SOMAL, Sekretariat Bersama 0 rganisasi2 Lokal di Indonesia. c. GMRI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Revolusioner Indonesia), HMB (Himpunan Mahasiswa Bandung), and GMD (Gerakan Mahasiswa Djakarta) were also members, but it is unclear where they should fit on tis chart. The National Front Action Command (Komando Aksi Golkar Pengganjangan Kontra Revolusi Front Nasional) had earlier accused GMRI of aiding Gestapu. AB, Oct. 14, 1965. === [PDF page 167] === 157 for allowing greater Indonesian autonomy). The dominant member organizations nonetheless were religious groups. PPMI was further secularized in 1950 when it combined with the previously pro-federalist federation, BKMI. The new, larger federation, which retained the name, PPMI, by the mid-1950's regarded itself as the representative of all Indonesian youth, certainly of university y o u t h. I t began to cooperate at this time with the increasingly left ist student/youth organization, IPPI (Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia), which though primarily a high school political organization also dominated student representation at Gadjah Mada. Of the ten organizations comprising PPMI in 1955, four were apparently under strong communist influence. 17 Nevertheless, it would be distorting to attribute undue significance to such ideological distinctions at that time. The spirit of PPMI, IPPI, and most other federations and organizations was essentially nationalistic. Proof of that fact was the continued membership in PPMI of the major Islamic university student organization, HMI. 18 Despite 16. Its claim to 9,766 members reflected the fact, however, that no Gadjah Mada (Jogjakarta) university students were members. Also, many members were counted twice when, as often happened, they belonged to more than one member organization. Amstutz, op. c i t., pp. 236, 350. 17. Ibid., p. 342. 18. The matter of fusion with BKMI caused some concern in 1950. HMI almost left the federation, but did ultimate ly remain, partly because its own large membership could exert considerable power despite the additional members brought into PPMI by the fusion. HMI was also a member of the two Islamic federations, FPII and PORPISI. Ibid., pp. 275, 350, 363, 377. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 168] === 158 steady erosion of its influence, HMI continued to be a moderating influence right up to the fall of 1965. this time however, the official leadership and public stance of PPMI were clearly leftist-communist. Again, but for different reasons than in 1955, this leftist-communist domination should not be given undue sig nificance. PPMI had greater organizational coherence than the Front Pemuda, but just as in the latter organization, primary activities concerned national level and internation al events. The individual leaders in the PPMI presidium maintained primary allegiance to their respective member or ganizations. To the foreign observer in September, 1965, every available public criterion pointed to an increasingly united front among Indonesian students and youth, a front of unquestioning loyalty to Soekarno and in absolute agreement with his views on all issues. It is easy to insist in retro spect that this was all a facade, that the leaders of the various fronts and federations were merely opportunists, playing Soekarno's game and protecting themselves by donning his ideologic cloak. In this view, the member organizations, except for the avowedly leftist-communist ones, are not seen as having compromised themselves in any way. The subsequent national events are assumed inevitable with the anti-com munists just waiting for the right moment to strike. Under scrutiny, neither view is satisfactory. Control of the governing body of PPMI, the Presidium, fell to the leftist-communist member organizations at the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 169] === 159 Fifth Congress in July, 1961. With the P.R.R.I./Permesta rebellion fresh in everyone’s mind, the major question in Indonesian student/youth politics (aside from the conquest of West Irian) was that of loyalty to the State. P P M I ’s leftist-communist contingent--CGMI, PERHIMI, GMNI,*9 and GMD --sought to bar HMI and GEMSOS from further partici pation on the PPMI Presidium. They observed that already the Masjumi party (to which HMI was generally regarded as oriented) and PSI (parent organization of GEMSOS) had been banned, and they argued that President Soekarno held HMI and GEMSOS in clear disfavor. Unable to capture the Presidium through this tactic, the leftist-communists proposed that the matter of selecting Presidium members be handed to Soekarno for his personal decision. On this note the other member organizations which in varying degrees supported HMI and GEMSOS--such as PMKRI, IMADA, and GMKI-capitulated, the result being a leftist-communist-dominated "Provisional Presidium" to be endorsed or rejected at the next Congress. The Provisional Presidium was still in office four years later and no Congress met in the interim. An interesting indication of the internal political and organizational viability of PPMI occurred in March, 1965, just six months prior to the October 1 event. 21 The 19. GMNI much later, after October 1, 1965, split overtly into two factions, GMNI/ASU and GMNI/Osa-Usep, the second of which was for awhile a member of KAMI. 20. GMD also had two factions of differing political hue. 21. Information regarding the two incidents discussed below Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === 160 Provisional Presidium felt sufficiently confident to call a "periodic Meeting" of the PPMI's Advisory/Supervisory Board 22 Unlike the Presidium, the Board included representatives of all the member organi zations of PPMI. The Presidium sought explicit endorsement by this board of several campaigns already conducted by the Presidium in the name of the entire organization. These included the raising of the official status and radicaliz ing of function of the Committee for the Retooling of the State Apparatus 23 (PARAN), the kicking out of the Peace Corps, and the "retooling" of the apparatus of higher education. 25 While the first two objectives were already faits accomplis and the third was underway, and while the Provisional Presidium could claim (largely unwarranted) based on interviews with an assistant, Zainal Zakse, from two HMI leaders and one GMNI leader, all of whom were present at both events. 22. The meeting was held in the building of the 17 August University on Djalan Teuku Tjik Ditiro in Djakarta. Presiding was the Chairman of the Provisional Presidium, Bambang Kusnohadi, who also happened to be the General Chairman of GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia) and a PNI delegate in the MPRS. 23. PARAN was disbanded and replaced with KOTAR, The C o m mand for the Retooling of the State Apparatus, on a par with the other top sub-presidential governing bodies of the nations. 24. The Peace Corps was kicked out of the country. 25. Politically doubtful instructors came under increasing harrassment. Few were dismissed, but freedom to teach was severely abridged. HSI (Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia), the leftist-communist scholars' association, gained in creasing influence. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === 161 responsibility for them, enough of the member organizations refused to cooperate in the "Board" meeting, so that no consensus was reached on any of the issues. The Periodic Meeting ended in stalemate and no firm endorsements were forthcoming.2<* Recounting this 1965 PPMI incident is not intended to dismiss the common Western view of that time that Indonesian institutions were permeated by pro-communist orientation and that the Indonesian Government was virtually communistdominated. This image, which has become politically useful to many Indonesian groups more recently, was also believed by many Indonesians in mid-1955 to be moving all too steadily towards reality. Yet just as with the Front Pemuda and the National Front, image was not reality, as demonstrated once again in the PPMI incident. Intra-University: MMI The MMI, or Indonesian University Student Assembly, was a different sort of organization than the PPMI. Set up under the direct auspices of the Department (Ministry) of Higher 26. The issue of retooling PARAN was supported by CGMI, GMNI, PERHIMI, GERMINDO and GMD. It was strongly opposed by HMI, PMDRI, GEMSOS, and GMS. Other organizations, in cluding GMKI, remained neutral. A resolution to oust the Peace Corps from Indonesia was unsuccessful and the issue was left to individual organizational decisions. The matter of retooling the higher education apparatus, which essentially meant to oust rightist teachers and administrators, broke down along the same divisions as the PARAN issue. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 172] === 162 Education and Science (PTIP), MMI simply constituted a loose administrative relationship among the Student Councils (Dewan Mahasiswa) of Indonesian universities and made them somewhat more accessible to central Government influence. The Student Council of each university was composed of representatives from Student Senates the various departments At the university level (fakultas). the MMI normally handled issues concerned with such matters as book purchases, course unit fees, dormitories and other accommodations, scholarships and the like. MMI is included among the fronts in the top hroizontal organizational level of Student/youth movements, since in addition to the Dewan Mahasiswa and Senat Mahasiswa it also informally represented several other intra-university organizations. These included the University Students Athletic Body (BKMI, Badan Keolahragaan Mahasiswa), the Indonesian University Student Cooperative Art Group (BKSMI, Badan Kerdjasama Kesenian Mahasiswa Indonesia) and the Indonesian University Student Press Association (IPMI, Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia). Of the various "fronts" MMI understandably had the most effective organization in the terms of vertical cohesiveness because of its parallel congruence with the university system. MMI purported to be a non-political entity, but for several reasons it gradually took on a political aspect. First, most of its members also belonged to extra-university Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === 162a student organizations, which in most cases were political. Second, the nature of the state ideology as Soekarno fre quently reminded the students, demanded political involve ment. Third, MMI automatically clashed with PPMI over which one was to be regarded, nationally and internationally, as the official representative of Indonesian university students. A recurrent issue in this conflict was the question of which organization should sit in the National Union of Students (NUS), a paper entity which theoretically would comprise the Indonesia branch of a higher international organization. A fourth and final reason for the politization of MMI was the increasing attempt of rightist Army elements, working through the Higher Education and Science ministry (PTIP), to build MMI into an effective competitor of the leftistcommunist PPMI. This rightist army effort, however, was offset by a similar effort of anti-rightist (some of them pro-left) army officers. Closer to the national temper, this latter group managed superficially to impart a leftistcommunist character to public activities of MMI. During Guided Democracy MMI was never able to compete effectively with the openly political PPMI; nevertheless, MMI did provide an organizational basis and protective cover for many university students who were anti-communist and/or had misgivings about the general political disposition of the Soekarno Government. This protection was offered as much by the relatively unobtrusive profile of MMI activities Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 174] === 163 nationally as by the internal leadership or the partial Army and PTIP protection. Many of the individuals active in the formation of KAMI were previously active in MMI. The.Limits of Guided Democracy Solidarity All these special characteristics of individual fronts, federations, and lower groups were nevertheless much less prominent of September 30, 1965 than they now appear in retrospect. To be sure, there were individuals then who well understood the true nature of some of the top level student/youth organizations and who discussed these matters guardedly in private with a few of their most trusted friends. Occasionally one of the bolder students would insist to a foreigner that the leftist-communist complexion of the student/youth leadership generally did not truly reflect the sentiments of the great majority of their followers. There was invariably a sense of desperation in these assertions. If the complexion of student/youth leadership was clearly leftist-communist, the entire student/youth sector was as clearly gravitating towards full conformity with Soekarno's views on all issues. Newspapers in reporting demonstrations regarding almost all foreign and domestic issues usually noted the participation not of one or two, but of all, the major student/youth fronts. Thus, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === 164 major PKI newspaper, Harian R a k j a t, reported on Sept. 30 a demonstration against capitalist bureaucrats by "tens of thousands of people," including representations from Front Pemuda, PPMI, and MMI. Only at the end of the article was it also mentioned that the student/youth contingent consisted of "youths from GPM, PR, university students from GMNI, CGMI, high school students from IPPI and GSNI," all of which were leftist-communist organizations. Harian R a k j a t, like other newspapers, whenever possible would refer to the higher, integrative, fronts rather than the lower level with special political affiliations. This was justifiable on the grounds that lower organizations invariably belonged to one or more of the higher federations and fronts. Through the horizontal federations and fronts, all vertical groups (political divisions) were in some way r e lated to one another. Even those groups, such as CGMI and HMI, which lay at opposite poles of the ideological spec trum and which were carrying on vicious campaigns against one another, could be found organizationally at some level to be related.* Their competition, in fact, was publicly con fined to questions of which group most faithfully reflected the political prescriptions of the Great Leader of the Revolution. Thus, although CGMI was itself a federation, it was also a member, along with HMI, a modernist Islamic Group, in the Front Peladjar, which in turn was a member of the Front Pemuda. CGMI and HMI were also listed as indi- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 176] === 165 vidual member organizations of Front Pemuda without acknow ledgement of the theoretically intermediary Front Peladjar. CGMI and HMI were member organizations of PPMI, a top level front, but PPMI was itself a member of Front Pemuda. The Front Pemuda, as discussed earlier, was distinctly leftistcommunist in political complexion, yet among its members was one of the most orthodox, conservative, Islamic groups, SEMMI--the university student subsidiary of the political party, PSII. Also in Front Pemuda were the relatively rightist intra-university, top-level, student front, MMI, and the largest and most powerful Islamic youth organiza tion, GPA (also commonly known as A n s o r ), subsidiary of the Nahdatul Ulama political party. Even KAMI, for a while after its formation, was listed as a member of Front Pemuda and occasionally as a member of the organization KAMI was ostensibly replacing, PPMI. These examples represent a mere fraction, albeit the most important one, of the com plex organizational arrangements of Indonesian student/ youth activities in late Guided Democracy. Because of the serious pressure which had mounted in the previous two or three years for consolidation in the horizontal groupings, it is impossible to determine the exact number of Indonesian student/youth groups or of the size of this membership in late 1965. Soekarno's major ideologic thrust during this period was toward eliminating the effective structural divisions between the nationalist, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === 166 religionist and communist political groups nationally. This was relatively easy to accomplish among the student/ youth groups, because of their growing disaffection from traditional party leaders, who appeared to youth as several generations removed and of marginal relevance to the political process. Yet the student/youth groups’ own distance from effective Government decision-making structures, somewhat like the MMI members from their own leaders and other national student leader echelons, also served as a kind of protection. Ideologically, Soekarno equated youth with the rak j a t, or people generally. It was they who were easily the most visible group in the political process by their massive attendance at both political rallies and speeches by the top echelon of national political leaders. Dozens of local student/youth groups could be relevant to the nation al level and absorb the inspiration of the real leaders of the Government simply by maintaining membership, however nominal, in several of the higher horizontal and integra tive levels of the student/youth world. Many people claimed after the events following September 30 that these memberships had in most cases never been more than nominally binding, and that the local groups and local branches of several politically compromised national-level groups had always remained loyal to certain basic Indonesian and/or Islamic values, which automatically precluded leftist or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === 167 communist permeation. Nevertheless, in September 1965 the student/youth segment of the Indonesian population, however passive in the face of the actual Government decision making process, was the most significant organized massive respon dent to Soekarno's political dialogue. Concerning public positions on political issues, they stood largely united. Soekarno could depend upon them as a vehicle for carrying his views to the nation and for providing large scale public affirmation of his revolutionary schemes. In the open and unstable political climate unleashed by the October.1 event, students and youths took part as openly and joyously as did most sectors of Indonesian society. The student/youth sector, as revealed in tracing the development of action groups, was indeed the best p r e pared of all social elements for the tactics of mass p ar ticipation. This preparation afforded them a special op portunity to exert political influence not known since their elders were student/youth leaders in the Revolution. Now, as then, youth suddenly formed a social and political vanguard. They could combine their special participatory preparation with release from the ties of family, occupa tion and custom--thus they ideally qualified for leadership in a time of turmoil. Parallels with the Revolution, none theless, have certain major limitations. Neither the social nor the political conditions in 1965 conformed more than superficially with those in 1945. The dynamics of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === 168 relationship of the student/youth sector with the rest of soci ety were similar. But in 1965 the problems of the country were essentially centripetal, vectoring strongly inward and resolv able only in terms of internecine conflict within Indonesia's borders. The most basic and difficult problem in assessing the last several years of Indonesian politics is the question of how viable the political organizations of Guided Democracy were and whether they had real potential for transcending those tradi tional alignments and primordial loyalties which many sophis ticated Indonesians believed were the nation's primary obstacle to progress. The student/youth sector, more than any other, had the potential for unquestioning commitment to the Guided Democracy system and for enthusiastic dedication to its imple mentation. If the actions of the Untung movement are regarded not as amounting to an attempted coup, not as actions deviant to the system, but as actions conforming to the thrust of Indo nesian politics as understood by most Indonesians, especially by mass organizations, in September, 1965, then one has to con sider the eventuality of their success as but another step in the cumulative formulation of the political system which S o e k a m o envisioned. An Untung success would have meant further discreditation of those older generation elitist elements which S o e k a m o, all mass organizations, unions, student/youth groups, and even political parties had been holding increasingly accountable for the economic plight of the nation. Had Untung succeeded, the Government could Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === 169 have included a larger proportion of "progressive revo lutionary" elements, which meant elements most enthusiastic about Soekarno's schemes for generating homogeneous revo lutionary momentum. Seen in this light, the unification of the student/youth generation in September 1965 was crucial to Soekarno’s ostensible plan for a nationalist-communist political framework for mobilization and modernization. The more 1945 Generation leaders sacrificed to the increasing fury of mass discontents, the more Soekarno would be depen dent upon the student/youth generation for maintaining his own special image of revolutionary vitality. Thus it was the students and the youths who, despite the proverbial generational rebelliousness of youth and despite the grieved boredom suffering through endless r e quired courses in the State ideology from grade school through college, were most deeply dedicated to the Guided Democracy system. This partly explains the curious persis tence of student/youth affection for all the precepts of Guided Democracy long into the post-October 1 period, all the while expressing increasing anger for what they con ceived as the causes of the system's failure. Post-October 1 Maneuvers Beginning October 1, then, all of the student/youth organizations commenced jostling with one another, trying to sort out just what their individual organizational Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 181] === 170 identities were, what it was about the State system they really did believe in, who were friends and who were enemies, and where in the adult world lay the force which might arbi trarily decide these questions for them. Given the general chaos, these were often unanswerable questions. The questions were soon shelved and the frustration transferred to a more familiar realm, that of action. The new sense of freedom gave their action a novel aura of accomplishment in contrast to the previous carefully channeled activity of late Guided Democracy. It also allowed for new organizational efforts, self-generated in the student/youth sector. To unravel the story of each organization's activities during this period of late 196S would be a herculean task and would confuse rather than clarify the dynamics of the emer gence of effectively united student/youth political effort, which is the basic object here. Instead, some attention will be given to just a few of the organizations, arbitrar ily selected to illustrate the more important aspects of the entire student/youth sector. MMI They will include the following: (Madjelis Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian University Student Assembly) horizontal category: front, official political category: non-political, descriptive political category: rightist, army- PTIP oriented. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 182] === 171 PPMI (Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Federation of Indonesian University Student Associa tions) horizontal category: front. official political category: non-partisan political, descriptive political category: leftist-communist. HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic University Students Association) Horizontal category: group. official political category: non-partisan political, Islamic. descriptive political category: religionist, rightist, modernist Islamic, Masjumi party oriented. GPA (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, Ansor Youth Movement) horizontal category: group. official political category: Nahdatul Ulama party subsidiary. descriptive political category: religionist, rightist orthodox Islamic, NU subsidiary. FP (Front Pemuda, Youth Front) horizontal category: front. official political category: non-partisan political, descriptive political category: leftist-communist In considering the activities of each of these organizations from October 1 until the close of 1965 attention will be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === 172 given to three basic themes: 1) responses to national events, 2) relations among the selected organizations and with other student/youth organizations and action groups, and 3) the way in which each organization reaffirmed, altered or denied its own previous identity. These themes, taken together, can be regarded as one of the several general features of the student/youth movement during this period; these were the dominant characteristic in every public manifestation of an organization's activities. Other features were the general tendency of organizational acts to be identified publicly in terms of an organization's name rather than its leaders' names and the tendency in creasingly to gravitate into forms of action group affilia tion rather than rest public acts and statements principally upon their own individual organizational authority. Both of these features were to a somewhat lesser extent also characteristic of the adult organizations and their connec tions with action groups, as discussed earlier. In a time of great political uncertainty action groups provided a form specially suited to conditions. Behind the shield of action groups, student/youth organizaions, like the adult groups, could participate aggressively in the pu b lic arena politically without committing themselves irre vocably to any course of action. The ad hoc temporary qual ity of action groups allowed the member, or supporting, organizations the opportunity, if necessary, to assume a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === 173 posture of equally tentative commitment to them. Toward the end of 1965, when certain action groups began to gain an image of permanence and of major public impact, individual leaders gained prominence, and the projection of their person alities became a part of the action group's public image. Yet the strengthened action fronts during the second period of this study, from January through June, 1966, capitalized on the aspect of student/youth unity and did not permit strong reassertions of individual member organizations' ities. ident Popular action front leaders during this period d e emphasized their root organizational connections. Only in the third period, from July, 1966, through March, 1967, did individual organizations reassert themselves and diminish the early 1966 image of action group unity. These remarks are a little bit ahead of the story, but help to set the perspective of developments in late 1965. PPMI and MMI The activities of MMI, the Indonesian University Student Assembly, and of PPMI, the Federation of Indonesian University Student Associations, were inextricably entwined with one another from October 1 onward. Considering their previous identities as the two major and competitive university stu dent fronts, repeatedly in conflict with one another, this post-October 1 association appears contradictory. The ex planation lies in the difference between the public image Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === 174 of the two fronts as against the more substantive charac teristics of their memberships and dominant leaders. terms of public image and even the image held by most students and youths, PPMI was political, partisan in favor of leftist-communist interests (despite the non-partisan scope of its list of member organizations), and clearly '•against the MMI" in matters of university student power rivalry. The MMI was appreciably less political, relatively non-partisan, but by association with PTIP (the Ministry of Higher Education and Science) and Army elements, clearly to the right of PPMI in the current political spectrum. the post-October 1 period, however, MMI was nearly as damned for its previous acquiescense to Establishment interests and gradual capitulation to its own leftist-communist ele ments as was the PPMI for its unequivocal leftist-communist stance. This matter will be pursued further shortly. Here it suffices to point out the basis for the immediate tendency for MMI and PPMI to be identified with one another publicly after the October 1 event and to act subsequently in tacit and sometimes open agreement to support their mutual interests. Bambang Kusnohadi was one of five student speakers (the other, featured, speakers were President Soekarno, Third Deputy Prime Minister Johannes Leimena, and the head of the P K I, D. N. Aidit) at the concluding general session of the huge CGMI Third Congress in Djakarta's Senajan sports complex on September 29, one evening before the September 30 Movement Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === went into action. 27 On this occasion he spoke not as General Chairman of GMNI, the PNI's subsidiary university student group, but rather in his capacity as Presidium Chairman of the PPMI. Among the major member organizations of PPMI, as mentioned earlier, was HMI. Banbang Kusnohadi lauded the accomplishments of CGMI and recommended that President Soekarno ban the clearly counter-revolutionary and terrorist HMI. 28 Martin Saragih, Chairman of the Central Committee of CGMI, but a member of the PPMI Presidium as well, accused HMI of being a loyal supporter of BPS and Manikebu, respec tively an allegedly reactionary political group (banned by Soekarno in December, 1964) and the equally reactionary Cultural Manifesto. 29 He reminded his listeners of HMI's many acts of terrorism, particularly its "mob attack on Police Commissar II Drs. Basirun Nugroho," which he held to be a singularly offensive insult to the MMI (of which Nugroho was a Chairman) and to Indonesian university students in general. Bambang Harianto SH of the Presidium of MMI, Sufjar Rasamitaputra, First Chariman of the Central Executive Board of the PNI subsidiary, GPM (Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis, Marhaenist Youth Movement), and Bambang Kuntjoro, Chairman of the Committee in charge of the Congress, all supported these statements by Kusnohadi and Nugroho and added further 27. Harian Rakjat, Sept. 30, 196S. 28. Harian Rakjat, Oct. 1, 1965. 29. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === 176 to the general adulation of CGMI and aversion to HMI.^® Official, ranking representatives of the two major univer sity student organizations, as well as other leaders from subsidiary student/youth organizations (CGMI and GPM) of Indonesia's two most prominent current political parties, were thus able, as of September 29 to lambast the major Islamic university student organization, HMI, almost as a matter of course, despite the fact that HMI was closely linked with each of them, either as a subsidiary member or as a co-member. The posture of the State was leftist-communist. There fore, although PPMI statements normally favored a leftistcommunist complexion, while MMI statements favored a more centralist and nationalist complexion, their meaning on any specific issue was substantially similar. Within a week of the October 1 event nearly every one 30. Ibid. Bambang Harianto SH noted acts of HMI terrorism in Malang, Semarang, Djember, Palembang, Djakarta, and most recently in Surabaja. Sufjar Rasamitaputra's remarks as representative of GPM were especially note worthy. He called on all media to be vigilant against giving access to the banned political parties, Cultural Manifesto types, BPS members, or other opportunists (kaum plintat-plintut). The first must go on, he said, especially against such "parasites" (benalu) of the Revolution as HMI. He stated that GPM was of the opinion that it was time to ban all mass organizations not affil iated with political parties (this was an acknowledge ment of the official non-party-affiliated status of HMI) and to "Nasakomize" them all, including the Cabinet. In this last regard he referred specifically to the need to rid the Cabinet of any hang-overs (Adam Malik most notably) from the Murba political party (nationalistcommunist). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === 177 of the dozens of student/youth groups (those on the lowest horizontal level of the organizational chart) issued an official statement thanking God for protecting President Soekarno, cursing the assassins of the generals, and call ing for strong measures against the September 30 Movement. These statememts came from the "orthodox-Islamic or Chris tian," the "secular nationalist," and the "leftist" segment of the "leftist-communist" vertical groupings outlined earlier. Admittedly, the statements by leftist groups were tardy, but from the communist groups came not a word. was as if they had disappeared completely from political life. The reasons for this have already been discussed in respect to adult organizations and action groups, but the effect on the student sector, while directly related to adult groups, was especially acute because top-level repre sentation was limited to two organizations, the PPMI and the MMI. With the PKI and CGMI suddenly out of the political picture important leaders in PPMI and MMI were also eclipsed. The remaining leaders could variously be termed Statists, leftists (non-communist), or Soekarnoists. Theoretically it was possible for these leaders simply to shift weight to stress in the post-October 1 period the centralist/nationalist side of their collective leftist-communist complexion. was the course they elected. This Its success depended, however, upon the continued centrality of Soekarno among the forces holding political power at the top level of Government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 189] === 178 Under the title, "Quo Vadis MMI § PPMI?," the major postOctober 1 newspaper CAngkatan Bersendjata, sponsored by the Army) published a commentary which remarked that nothing had so far been heard or read by way of "reaction from the two top Indonesian university student organizations, MMI and PPMI" to the September 30 "affair." The question was raised as to whether this lack of response, ten days after the event, did not indicate that the MMI and PPMI leaders were supporters or sympathizers of the counter-revolutionary movement. 31 More strongly, HMI, so villified by MMI and PPMI leaders at the CGMI Congress just two weeks before, now demanded a purge in both fronts of "Gestapu lackeys." 32 In Djakarta mass action demonstrators shouted "Purge PPMI-MMI of Gestapu accomplices I" Seldom were the MMI and PPMI mentioned separately. 33 Differences between the two fronts were of secondary significance to those who saw them essentially as coercive instruments of forces loose ly identifiable with the interests of the September 30 Movement. Leaders of MMI and PPMI acknowledged their unified interests when on October 13 they issued a press release concerning a Joint Statement purportedly signed by them on October 5. Signed by Bambang Kusnohadi for PPMI and by 31. AB, Oct. 11, 1965 32. Suara Islam,Oct. 11, 1965 33. AB, Oct. 34. WB, Oct. 14, 1965. This official Antara, national news service, account conforms, here as elsewhere, unless otherwise noted, with original documents collected by the writer. 14, 1965, and repeated personal observation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === 179 Basirun Nugroho (whose alleged ill-treatment by HMI had been so lamented by CGMI head, Martin Saragih, at the CGMI (Con gress), the document demonstrated the strategy to be followed by the two fronts in the next couple of months. After voicing the standard regrets and denunciations concerning the October 1 event, it instructed all Indonesian students to do their part in restoring a "political atmosphere of peace and secur ity." It called for full submission to President/Great Leader of the Revolution Soekarno's promised "political solution," and declared fealty to all of Soekarno's teachings as subsumed under the Five Talismen of the Revolution (Lima Azimat Revolusi). The Presidiums of MMI and PPMI would, the docu ment went on, take strong action against those members "who it was clear had consciously participated or had involved themselves in the counter-revolutionary adventure known as the September 30 Movement." 35 The document, in conclusion, instructed all member mass organizations, university councils and senates "to intensify their revolutionary vigilance against nekolim [neo-colonialist-imperialist] subversive actions." This MMI-PPMI Joint Statement conformed p re cisely with the attitudes and positions taken by Soekarno in the immediate post-October 1 period. In fact, release of the Joint Statement was one result 35. Emphasis added by the writer. 36. This and the above quotations are from WB, Oct. 14, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === 180 of a flurry of activity on October 12 and 13 by leaders of both organizations meeting separately and collectively. 37 Many individuals were already moving out from the PPMI or MMI umbrella and into various action groups. The University of Indonesia campus in Djakarta was becoming a center for action group meetings, and moves were underway to set up a student action group separate or semi-autonomous from the adult action groups. Masses of students and youths in p a r tially spontaneous outbursts were tracking down communist leaders, sacking their houses, attacking the headquarters of various leftist organizations, including the PPMI build ing in Djakarta. Most important, on October 11, the Minis ter of Higher Education and Science, Brigadier General Doctor Sjarif Thajeb, issued three orders: 1) closing tem porarily fifteen institutions of higher education which allegedly were involved directly or indirectly in the Sep tember 30 Movement, 2) "freezing" temporarily two student organizations, CGMI and PERHIMI (a Baperki subsidiary), and 3) firing one of his ranking subordinates, who was also a communist member of Parliament. 38 These developments, all 37. Much of the discussion that follows is based on informal interviews with students and student leaders in November and December, 1965, and more formal inter views during the following year, when this became feasible through less volatile political conditions in Djakarta and elsewhere. 38. These were released as Surat Keputusan Nos. 01, 02, and 03/1965. Covered in all newspapers, perhaps the fullest account was in PPAB, Oct. 14, 1965. The closed insti tutions included! Universitas Res Publica, Universitas Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === 181 within a two or three day period, plus the fact that almost without exception member organizations had already issued statements independently, prompted MMI and PPMI to consider what actions they should take. It will be recalled that failure to act was in itself becoming an untenable position in Indonesian politics by mid-October, inevitably leading to just the kinds of allegations already being voiced about MMI and PPMI. A basic reason for the two fronts' tardiness was of course the absence of the communist leadership elements. This caused special difficulties for PPMI, whose Presidium comprised explicitly polticial interest groups. (It should be noted parenthetically that little distinction was made in the PPMI Presidium between membership meaning individuals who happened to represent certain organizations, and member ship meaning the presence of an organization representation, in which the participation of particular individuals might be a secondary consideration. Thus, CGMI was a member organi zation of P P M I, and persons and articles often mentioned that "CGMI is a member of the PPMI Presidium," but they also Rakjat Indonesia, Akademi Ilmu Sosial Aliarcham, Akademi Ilmu Politik Bachtarudin, Akademi Technik Ir. Anwari, Akademi Jurnalistik Dr. Rivai, Akademi Sastra Multatuli, Akademi Ilmu Ekonomi Dr. Ratulangi, Akademi Sedjarah Ronggowarsito, Universitas Rakjat, Universitas Pemerintah Kotapradja Surakarta, Akademi Jurnalistik W. R. Supratman Surabaja, Akademi Jurnalistik dan Publisistik-Taruna Patria di Malang, and Institut Pertanian Bogor. The fired PTIP official was Siswojo, who in the ministry sat on the Evaluation and Planning Group (BAPPERDEP) and in Parliament was on the "J Commission [Education, Science and Culture]." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 193] === 182 occasionally spoke of Martin Saragih (CGMI) of the PPMI Presidium. This confusion pertains to most Indonesian fronts and federations. tions In the case of PPMI, many member organiza (such as HMI) were neither on the Presidium nor repre sented on it. As reported in Antara on October 14, a "meeting of the Presidium of PPMI" the previous day was attended by four university student organizations: GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia), PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mashasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia), GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia), and MMB 39 (Masjarakat Mahasiswa Bogor). Though true, the words were carefully chosen and disguised the fact that leaders of the four organizations had in effect constituted themselves a new Interim Presidium.^® Together they issued a point by point statement in the name of PPMI.^* This statement was very much like the Joint Statement of MMI-PPMI released the same day, except that it contained several additional points: 1) that CGMI and PERHIMI were suspended from the Presidium until the "political solution" of Presi dent Soekarno; 2) that in addition to intensifying "revo lutionary mass action to crush counter-revolution," it also urged its members to work for the "fulfillment of Bung 39. WB, Oct. 14, 1965. 40. It will be recalled that the PPMI had had only an "Interim" Presidium since 1961. 41. The individual leaders signing it were: Kartjono (GMNI), Gosmos Batubara (PMKRI), Binsar Sianipar (GMNI), and Tula A. Siregar (MMB). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 194] === 183 K a m o ' s great ideas such as KIAPMA, KAA-II, CONEFO, the striving for true independence, Indonesian Socialism based on Pantjasila, and for the creation of a new world;" and 3) that neither the PPMI Presidium nor Bambang Kusnohadi, its chairman, knew anything about the circumstances of the latter's inclusion on the so-called "Revolutionary Council" (the quasi-governmental institution announced by the SeptemA O ber 30 Movement). The interesting aspect of this state ment was the degree to which it ignored the emerging political temper of Djakarta. No other organization's statement had so timidly dealt with the PKI or so lavishly reaffirmed the President's position by enumerating his various schemes. But of even greater significance from the point of view of stu dent/youth movements was the fact that this statement came out of a Presidium from which the communist representation had been eliminated. Each of the member groups--GMNI, PMKRI, GM K I, and MMB-in the new Interim Presidium had already issued an indepen dent statement far more strongly worded than their collective statement as the new leaders of the PPMI. Again, several conflicting loyalties and interests were at work. GMNI in the pre-October 1 period had attained a reputation of follow ing the lead of the CGMI on almost every issue. It was now in a position of both great potential power and dangerous vulnerability. If the PNI (the Indonesian Nationalist Party, 42. WB, Oct. 14, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 195] === 184 of which GMNI was a subsidiary) could disavow any connection with the September 30 Movement and quickly forge a new image of independent vigor, then it might be able to take over the mantle of the P K I, and grasp a virtually unassailable position combining the majority of the center and left in Indonesian party politics. But, as stated above, this course would once again depend not basically on the PNI's own initiative but on the lead taken by President Soekarno to secure his own position and bestow new favors upon a party from which he had cut his own ties many years before. Even with these conditions satisfied, however, the PNI would still be con fronted by its own serious division. As the PPMI met, the rightist leaders ousted from the PNI the previous August were preparing to make their own move to replace the party presidium. This would spark a battle which would last for months, for the success of the rightists would depend on identifying the current leadership with the September 30 Movement. So the GMNI at this point was torn between the question of which side of the party to support. In any event, the safe course seemed to be, to issue a relatively strong anti-September 30 Movement/anti-PKI statement (it nonetheless came later than those of the other student groups) on their own part, while pressing in the PPMI (which they could now expect to dominate) for a strong pro-President, weak anti-PKI positon. In this way they could expect group safety with the newly powerful Suharto group and with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === 185 their previous leftist-communist cohorts, if, as expected, the President in his "political solution" reactivated them in some form. Finally, they could expect to find favor with the President if they kept the PPMI clearly in his camp. The GMNI, the Protestant university student group, under the strong influence of Johannes Leimena (Third Deputy Prime Minister and member of every Cabinet since the Revolution) was drawn to a Soekarno-loyalist political position in late Guided Democracy. Because of this devoted allegiance to Soekarno in the post-October 1 period GMKI avoided taking any position which might offend him. The effect of this posture, despite the undoubted anti-PKI attitude of Indo nesian Protestants, was generally to discredit GMKI on the communism issue and to give it the image of partiality to Old Order interests. At the PPMI Interim Presidium meeting GMKI sided with GMNI. Weakly opposing the GMNI and GMKI representatives were Cosmos Batubara of PMKRI and a delegate from MMB. Cosmos, shortly to emerge as head of KAMI, was preoccupied with the burgeoning activities of the party-oriented action movement; PMKRI, the Catholic student group, like their superior politi cal party (Partai Katholik), were fully involved in support activities for the Suharto group. MMB, a small elitist group from Bogor, was an affiliate of SOMAL, which was playing a central role in moves toward the formation of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 197] === 186 KAMI. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that despite the strongly pro-Suharto group activities of these two organisations, they could find it possible to sign the PPMI statement. Unlike PPMI, the intra-university front, MMI, did not have the problem of competing political member organizations. In this sense it was appreciably freer than PPMI to choose its own course in the post-October 1 period. As already dis cussed in regard to the Joint Statement, MMI opted for a course similar to that of PPMI. Its dominant leaders were military officers, such as the Periodic Chairman, Police Comissar D r s. Basirun Nugroho, and the Voce SecretaryA? General, Police Commissar Supolo Prawotohadikusumo Be. H k., persons even more committed to the lead of Soekarno than some of their PPMI colleagues.^ Invariably they issued statements similar to those of the PPMI and usually on the same d a t e s. ^ 43. Many Indonesian organizations have at the top a presidium whose members rotate as chairman (often for three month periods). "Be. Hk." stands for "Bacculareat Hukum," a law degree given by the Akademi Hukum Militer after a three year course, mostly for Military Police officers. Supolo Prawotohadikusumo is also often referred to as "Major TNI," or Army major. Indonesian students invariably regarded him as the head of MMI, despite his formal organizational title. General Nasution, when he became chairman of the MPRS, desig nated Supolo "MPRS spokesman." 44. In press releases concerning MMI their military capacities were seldom, if ever, mentioned. They did not mention their military connections in signing MMI documents either. 45. For instance, a statement similar to PPMI's, also issued on October 13. This MMI statement, however, appeared in Antara only on Oct. 19. See WB, Oct. 19, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 198] === 187 PPMI and MMI persisted in the political course outlined in their first post-October 1 joint and individual statements, despite the mounting anger of many member groups and other.or ganizations.^ On November 7 the two fronts belatedly a n nounced their creation on October 27 of an Action Committee for the Safeguarding of Bung Karno's Teaching and for the Crushing of the September 30 Movement (Panitia Aksi Pengamanan Adjaran Bung Karno dan Pengganjangan Gerakan 30 September). Its objectives were consistent with the previous MMI-PPMI Joint Statement, except that the Committee also recommended vigi lance against Nekolim/CIA infiltration and subversion seeking to divert the Revolution to the right. 47 The announcement in structed that Action Committees also be set up across the country at sub-national levels. In political style the MMI-PPMI actions were of the same order as the Action Front-Action Command maneuvers. Creation 46. In Jogjakarta, for instance, fifty-five political and mass organizations signed a demand for a purge of PPMI and MMI. WB, Oct. 25 (Antara Jogjakarta, Oct. 23), 1965. A similar demand was made by 22 student/youth organizations in Pontianak. WB, Oct. 20 (A n t a r a, Pontialak, Oct. 14), 1965. Djakarta demonstrations con tinued to display banners, which among other things, called for various punitive actions against the two fronts. At the University of Indonesia in Djakarta students met in an all-university forum calling itself the U. I. Student Deliberative Assembly (Madjlis Permusjawaratan Mahasiswa U. I.) Led by a Secretary Gen eral, Alwi Hadji Masoed, they demanded that the Univer sity Rector disband the Student Council (Dewan Mahasis wa) and reconstitute it "sans oknum" (without elements [sympathetic to the September 30 Movement]). Berita Y u d h a, Oct. 11, 1965. 47. Dwikora, Nov. 8, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === 188 and/or announcement of the setting up of the Action Committee was a direct rejoinder to the formation of KAMI, which had been announced just two weeks before. As with the more broadly based action groups, it avoided any direct objection to the endeavors of other groups; it simply took parallel organizational steps, while emphasizing objectives which sub stantively contradicted those of the opposition. MMI-PPMI leaders repeatedly endorsed Governmental decisions, such as Thajeb's, 48 expressed approval of the ouster from student/ youth federations of communist and Chinese affiliates.^ their own official statements the MMI-PPMI leaders reiterated the correct ritual regarding the September 30 Movement. picking up a Presidential admonition just a few days before-concerning Nekolim/CIA attempts to divert the Revolution to the right--and repeating it in their own statement as a formal instruction, the MMI-PPMI leaders were in effect displaying the banner of Soekarno and the whole effort on his behalf. For as their adversaries in KAMI and many others were well aware, the President had made his remarks in the context of a general insistence that in some form or other the communist elements must remain part of the Revolution. KAMI, while pa r ticipating fully in the ritual of constant expressions of loyalty to Soekarno, intended to persuade him to ban the PKI. MMI and PPMI, with the President, opposed any diversions to 48. See, for example, Supolo statement, A p i, Oct. 18, 1965. 49. See MMI statement, WB, Oct. 18, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === 189 the right. The effective head and spokesman for the re-constituted Interim Presidium of PPMI was Kilian Sihotang, a member of the Central Committee of the Protestant group, GMKI. GMKI and the other groups which had signed the MMI-PPMI Joint Statement, except for GMNI, were also members of KAMI upon its establishment on October 25. Again, as in respect to the Joint Statement, PPMI, now with its own Action Committee (with M M I ), continued to provide for a number of organiza tions a kind of like insurance, to be used if their more risky ventures, like KAMI, failed. There were nevertheless, substantial elements of each of the Interim Presidium organi zations and the member groups, who seriously believed in the Revolution as defined by Soekarno, who took Nasakom seriously as well, and who, while perhaps glad to see the power of the communists reduced, were quite prepared for Soekarno to salve over the wounds of the October 1 event and for Indonesian politics to "resume life as normal." In this indeterminate and unorganized way PPMI and MMI did retain sizeable con stituencies. From the outset KAMI enjoyed the benefit of burgeoning popular interest in action groups generally. MMI and PPMI seemed to move steadily toward eclipse after the formation of KAMI. GMNI, at first not in KAMI, soon joined. called for loyalty from its regional consulates PPMI (Konsulat Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === 190 Daerah) across the c o u n t r y, ^ and then announced that the PPMI Sixth Congress (the Fifth had been held in 1961) would be held in J a n u a r y. ^ Regional consulates, however, gradu-: ally disintegrated, as local branches of KAMI sprang up. Since KAMI provided membership not just for political organi zations but for individual university branches as well, MMI membership also began to suffer attrition. 52 In Djakarta, KAMI gained Governmental recognition of November 18 as the only legitimate representative of university groups. Finally, by the end of December when it was clear>that KAMI had es tablished its political importance and had the support of substantial backers at the national level, PPMI member 50. WB, Nov. 16, 1965. 51. D r s. Kilian Sihotang made the announcement, saying that its purpose would be 1) to strengthen the revolutionary tasks of Indonesian university students in carrying out the Pantjasila Revolution, 2) to help in the crushing of Nekolim, and 3) to crush the September 30 Movement and help to make Tahun Berdikari (Self-Reliance Year) a success. Sinar Harapan, Dec. 16, 1965. 52. For instance, 22 student organizations in Bandung declared that MMI, since the September 30 Movement, had not p r o vided adequate leadership, representatives from student councils and student senates from 22 institutions of higher education in Bandung stated collectively that MMI had failed to provide adequate leadership since the September 30 Movement. They therefore created an organi zation to replace MMI called the Indonesian Intra-Universi ty Student Organization Front (Kesatuan Organisasi Mahasiswa Intra Universitas Indonesia). WB, Nov. 28, 1965. MMI was still in existence in December, though essentially reduced to its Standing Committee (Badan Pekerdja Harian) still headed by Supolo. It was mid-December before Iljas Hamid, head of the Student Council at the State University of Riau (Universitas Negara Riau) and a member of C G M I, was ousted from the MMI Presidium. P P A B, Dec. 18, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === 191 organizations gathered for a "Sixth Congress" (earlier than Kilian Sihotang had expected) and summarily dissolved the front permanently. Concluding this run-down of PPMI and MMI events in late 1965, a few further remarks can be added to the earlier discussion of organizational alignments as related to organi zational and individual freedom of political maneuver. The strategy elected by the PPMI and MMI leaders in early Oct o ber was essentially the strategy of all Indonesian political and quasi-political organizations whose previous actitities had been tied almost exclusively to national issues and whose public image was one of total allegiance to Soekarno and to the implementation of his plans in domestic and foreign policy. strategy. It was a "wait and see," "hold and consolidate" It rested on the assumption, repeated constantly throughout the nation by leaders and organizations for many months after the October 1 event, that despite the September 30 Movement and the consequent punishment of its alleged perpetrators and sympathizers, Guided Democracy would continue in substantially the same form as previously. Even as the reaction against the September 30 Movement rippled outward to encompass more and more "oknum" groups and individuals, 53. The attending members were: PMII, PMK R I, IMADA, CSB, MMB, IMABA, GMS, GMRI. They were actually only endorsing a decision already taken by the Presidium on December 23. A B, Dec. 30, 1965. It is uncertain whether GMS referred to Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis (usually known as GMSos or GEMSOS) here or to Gerakan Mahasiswa Surabaja. GMRI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Revolusioner Indonesia). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === 192 faith in Guided Democracy, in N a s a k o m, and in Soekarno con tinued. But in this ''return to normalcy" the role of Soe karno was paramount. With increasing desperation, organiza tions like PPMI and MMI urged the President to disclose his promised "political s o l u t i o n. T h i s was not forthcoming, and by the close of the year, new organizations, like KAMI and other action groups, had wrestled mass political initiative away from the pre-October 1 pattern of alignments. It was relatively easy for MMI individual members to drop their relationship to MMI simply by ignoring the front and moving into other organizations more suited to their new interests. In most cases all this meant was devoting one's attention to a student/youth group of which one was already a member, since dual memberships were the rule rather than the exception. Organizationally, MMI was more cohesive than PPMI, but this was a function of a strong central leadership whose members were only loosely bound to the interests of individual universities' Student Councils. MMI's cohesion was not based on effective representative apparatus or on meaningful precedents where the central leadership had achieved successes important to their constituency. There was little intrinsic value for MMI to retain even marginal loyalty of constituent Student Councils, once it was clear that the leaders would not act except within the parameters set by 54. See, for instance, the PPMI Presidium statement of mid-November. WB, Nov. 16, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 204] === 193 Soekarno, and that Soekarno in post-October 1 politics was not fulfilling his normal role. The big advantage that di s enchanted individual MMI members had was their freedom to maneuver in the student/youth political arena. Often not bound to other organizations, or only loosely attached to them, these individuals were freer than many of their PPMI colleagues to participate in the formation of new alignments. Their previous relationship through MMI with the Ministry of Higher Education and Science also served them well in this regard. The leadership of PPMI, on the contrary, was the leadership of its member organizations, the most important of which were subsidiaries of political parties. Thus, even with the communist members removed, the PPMI Presidium was under considerable indirect influence from adult politi cal parties. This influence, in fact, intensified as the student/youth party subsidiaries, reflecting their parties' interests, sought to secure power in a Presidium long domi nated by their leftist-communist political party adversaries. PPMI disintegrated as its student/youth political party elements gradually cut ties from their own individual parties and gravitated into collective, non-party, action alliances. These alliances were intitially part of the adult action movement but soon moved away from even this new adult politi cal thrust, finally jelling in KAMI--the Indonesian Univer sity Student Action Front. The demise of PPMI, therefore, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 205] === 194 by contrast with MMI, resulted from the concrete decisions of component organizations rather than in the gradual di s affiliation of individuals. GMNI Some attention has already been given to GMNI (57-59), the subsidiary university student organization of the largest political party, PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party). Organi zationally, GMNI presents a much simpler picture than MMI or PPMI, falling as it does in the lowest horizontal category of student/youth organizations, that of "groups.” Unlike most other political party affiliates, GMNI, for several years following its founding in March, 1954, 55 avoided member ship in superior federations or fronts, and remained a loyal subordinate to PNI. When it did finally start joining feder ations and fronts, as required under Guided Democracy, it brought a greater sense of cohesion, independence, and selfimportance than possessed by most other groups. Bambang Kusnohadi, its General Chairman, quickly became the head of PPMI, and John Lumingkewas, in addition to being a leader of GMNI, was also a PNI member of the Provisional People's Deliberative Assembly, MPRS. GMNI moved toward the leftistcommunist political stance which characterized the PNI in late Guided Democracy, with considerably less internal dis ruption than its parent political party. The younger 55. Amstutz, o p. c i t., p. 371. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === 195 generation was far less influenced by the heritage of the PNI's earlier periods compared to the party leaders, all of whom had been prominent at the time of the Revolution. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the October 1 event presented the PNI with special problems and opportunities. The major problem was to divorce itself in image and reality from identification with the interests of the PKI. The major opportunity was to capitalize upon the PKI's demise, broaden its appeal to sectors of the population previously cultivated and organized by the PKI. If this succeeded, PNI could expect to emerge with its stature greatly enhanced; the mass support previously belonging to the PKI could com bine with PNI's traditional power in Government bureaucracies and among many military officers. The PNI would become the major Indonesian political party. Apathy among its followers, irreconcilable scissions in its leadership, and the legacy of friendship with the PKI doomed this dream to failure. But the PNI university subsidiary, the GMNI, because of its relatively greater cohesion and independent influence, was able for awhile to pursue the course of action its elders might have followed more vigorously if the October 1 event had not found the party in such disarray. With the support of GMKI, GMNI was able to continue and increase its control over the PPMI Presidium. On October 13, simultaneous with the MMI and PPMI statements GMNI issued a joint statement with GPM Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 207] === 196 (Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis, Marhaenist Youth Movement, youth subsidiary of PNI) and the student/youth counterparts, PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic University Student Movement) and GPA (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, Ansor Youth Movement), of the only other major post-October 1 political party, Nahdatul Ulama (NU).^^ In the absence of the PKI and Partindo, the PNI and the NU, by practically all political criteria, should have been polar opposites of post-October 1 party politics. But in October there were common threats which transcended their differences. The September 30 Movement was seen as a threat from the left, but the action movement and dramatic increase in Army power were seen as threats almost as dangerous from the right. The October 13 Joint Statement thus pledged help to ABRI (The Armed Forces) against the September 30 Movement but emphasized the signers1 "compactness” in the task of carrying the Revolution to completion under Soekarno, and affirmed their undeviating loyalty to the Five Talismen of the Revolution (Lima Azimat Revolusi). 57 In violence which swept Central and East Java, Bali and North Sumatra from late October through January, the contribution by PNI youth nearly equalled that of NU youth at the forefront of civilian participants. In Bali, with virtually no NU presence, PNI youth organized in para56. Suara Islam, Oct. 13, 1965. 57. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === 197 military Tameng squads. They wreaked violence against alleged communists or sympathizers on a concentrated scale probably unequalled anywhere else in the country. In urban areas, such as Surabaja, GMNI competed with the NU groups in rounding up communists and Chinese and in McapturingM (confis cating) their facilities, which were then handed over to miliCO tary authorities. In the cosmopolitan, non-violent setting of the Capital, the prosecution of GMNI interests was just as assiduous, if less dramatic. There was the Joint Statement with the NU student/youth groups. There was mass participation in some of the adult action movements, particularly in the Soekarno-oriented, National Front sponsored, action fronts and commands. There were civic clean-up campaigns, national and regional con ferences and mass initiations. At a ceremony in Djakarta for "thousands" of GNMI initiates an ikrar (profession of faith or oath) was read which lavished allegiance on Soekarno and to his objectives. Reading the ikrar was Sri Ratna Purwati 58. On October 27, for instance, GMNI in Surabaja captured URECA (Universitas Res Publica), the Chinese university, and handed it over to the Kodim (Kimando Distrik Militer) commander. WB, Nov. 1 (Antara, Surabaja, Oct. 28), 1965. In early and mid-1966 anti-Chinese actions became in creasingly frequent as the campaign against the PKI reached fulfillment and gave way to direct criticism of the President. In Central and East Java this was a very unpopular trend, and the affiliates of the dominant PNI did their best to counter it. Both GMNI and KAMI in Surabaja and Semarang tended to devote their energies to the anti-Chinese aspect of their campaigns. Inter view with entire Surabaja KAMI delegation, September 5, 1966, and with Lalu Imran, Chairman of the Presidium of KAMI, Semarang, of September 8, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === 198 Astuti Suprapto, daughter of one of the six assassinated generals. 59 GMNI expressed its pride that she, along with the son of General Hartono--another of the six assassinated generals--and children of many other prominent people were GMNI initiates in late 1965. Ruslan Abdulgani spoke before a large GMNI meeting on the need for GMNI to broaden its interests, to integrate itself with laborers, peasants, lowrank soldiers and others. He urged his audience not to have a phobia against religionists (agama-phobi) but rather to foster the spirit of nasakom and s o c i a l i s m. I n.also ad monishing them that GMNI was not the property of Bambang Kusnohadi, John Lumingkewas or Kartjono, he seemed to be advising that the political temper of post-October 1 might require that these leaders be sacrificed. The PNI subsidiary should nonetheless rally and use this opportunity to enhance their political strength by appealing to additional sectors of the populace. However, GMNI renewal, no matter how vigorous, would be in vain unless a comparable effort were made by the PNI leadership. Even on the student/youth level, however, there were many forces at work which impeded GMNI's progress. When demonstrators were shouting "Quo Vadis MMI § PPMI?" they were also shouting "Quo Vadis GMNI?"^* Despite PNI youth 59. Sokoguru Revolusi, Nov. 26, 1965. 60. Berita Y u d h a, Nov. 61. AB, Oct. 29, 1965. 14, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === 199 involvement in annihilating or suppressing alleged communists, GMNI was constantly harrassed by allegations of being per9 meated by CGMI infiltrators. Finally, there was the in evitable carry-over of the PNI's own leadership struggle. After the leftist leadership had been replaced in the second week of October, it was only a matter of time before the GMNI leaders, no matter how willing they were to recast their own image, were replaced also. By late November news reports invariably specified the "Presidium GMNI (Osa-Hardi-Usep)-- meaning the new leadership, General Chairman Drs. Soerjadi and Secretary-General Agus Murad Alwan.^^ Since this change in no way reflected change in party strategy decisions made in October, its sum advantage for GMNI was problematic at best. A change in leadership was a gain in the sense of 62. At Universitas Udayana in Denpasar, Bali, GMNI guarded against this by announcing that new members would tem porarily be prohibited. AB, Nov. 12, 1965. In Bandung GMNI was directly accused of harboring communists. Berita Republik, Nov. 23, 1965. Demonstrations in Djakarta frequently carried banners charging CGMI-GMNI collusion. 63. The new Central Committee (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat) was as follows: Osa Maliki, General Chairman; Hardi SH, First Chairman; Sabilal Rasjad, Second Chairman; M. Isnaeni, Third Chairman; Mohamad Achmad, Fourth Chairman; Usep Ranawidjaja, Secretary-General; Abadi, First SecretaryGeneral; Gde Djaksa, Second Secretary-General; Karim M. Doeriat, Treasurer. A p i, Oct. 15, 1965. Party statements were henceforth usually signed by Osa Miliki and Usep Ranawidjaja. 64. Berita Republik, Nov. 23, 1965. "Osa-Hardi-Usep" referred to the new leadership of the PNI. The parenthetical affix, "Osa-Hardi-Usep," when applied to PNI or GMNI was soon shortened to the simpler "Osa-Usep." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === 200 appeasing public opinion. But in terms of internal control during this time of general political upheaval, the replace ment of well-known, strong leaders such as Bambang Kusnohadi with new, unknown figures was ill-advised. The end of the year thus saw GMNI in an increasingly ambivalent situation. On the one hand, it had gained from the eclipse of CGMI, PERHIMI, and other organizations on the left, and from the attention now given GMNI by Soekarno and his closest supporters. On the other hand, increased asso ciation with the interests of the President,0 made / it difficult for GMNI to combat charges of being soft on the issue of banning the PKI. Many organizations which were unable or unwilling to use overly harsh language in pressing Soekarno to ban the PKI vented their anger on groups like G M N I. With CGMI gone, GMNI gradually appeared the best existing target for other university student groups. Thus by the year's end, GMNI was tenuously holding its own, stronger in some ways than it had been prior to October 1 but threatened by broadly based opposition. HMI Compared with GMNI, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic University Students Association) reached the close of 1965 with its ledger heavily weighted to the credit side. It was advantaged, however, from the outset in the post-October 1 period by a history and public image specially suited to the new political situation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === 201 HMI, in the first place, had a consistent history, largely unbroken by internal disputes, going back to February, 1947.^ It also had organizational coherence second to no. other group. While the PRRI/Permesta rebellion caused HMI some loss of prestige and membership, its dominant historical features remained unaffected. Among the various types of student/youth organizations, it fell somewhere between the outright party affiliate position of GMNI and the historically non-political IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadijah) of Muhammadijah. Constitutionally a non-partisan group, it was nonetheless commonly identified during the 1950's with the Masjumi political party. The official non-political stance helped to protect HMI from dissolution in the aftermath of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion when Masjumi was discredited and finally banned. Though still frequently accused of harboring former Masjumi members, HMI as of 1965 was essentially con sidered the main representative of modernist Islamic students. It naturally attracted many Outer Islanders, but even in Djakarta and Java it seemed to have an appeal--a group not as bland as the Muhammadijah, or so politically conformative and religiously orthodox as the NU party. This attractiveness increased in late Guided Democracy as it became difficult for citizens, especially for youth, not to participate in some organized form of political expression. HMI provided an outlet for many young Moslems, genuine and nominal, who 65. Hardjito, op. c i t., p. 377. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 213] === 202 sought an affiliation which was neither overly political nor religiously orthodox. Related to this appeal were the loose provisions regarding age. Though this is a charac teristic of all major Indonesian student/youth organizations HMI was distinctive in having some leaders whose tenure went back almost as far as its founding. Organizationally, HMI fell among "groups" at the lowest horizontal level, but operationally it was in some ways akin to a federation. Branch consulates were all over the country and, more than in any other organization at the "group" level, they were fairly evenly distributed between big cities and small town interior locations. Moreover, relative to other groups, the chain of command in HMI was effective and accounted for the best mobilization preparedness of any major student/youth organization in the post-October 1 period. HMI's second great advantage in the fall of 1965 was clear innocence of any September 30 Movement involvement and its even clearer public image--after the banning of 6 6. It is, incidentally, also a reason for skewed and m i s leading membership figures. Many persons keep their membership in one organization when joining another, even if they have passed a generally recognized age norm. This is particularly true of leaders. Amstutz observed that in the m i d - 5 0 fs persons on joining HMI were generally encouraged to retain their earlier membership in the largely high school age organization, PII (Peladjar Islam Indonesia). Amstutz, o p. c i t., p. 350. 67. Dahlan Ranuwihardjo, for instance, was still the Chair man of the Executive Committee of the Central Leadership Board of HMI in fall, 1965. Suara Islam, Nov. 8, 1965. In 1949 as "Assistant" he was the eighth ranking member of the Executive Committee. Hardjito, o p. c i t., p. 378. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 214] === 203 Murba on September 23--as the PKI's and CGMI's prime preOctober 1 organizational target. No legal group in the nation had more cause for revenge and restitution than HMI. Freedom from political party strings was the third and final advantage of HMI. This freedom, which had served the group well in the aftermath of P R R I, once again proved to be a special advantage in the post-October 1 period. HMI was not a federation or a front and therefore had no incriminating friends. It had great prominence nationally both as the enemy of the PKI and as a strong, relatively independent minded organization in its own right. For these reasons practically all adult organizations in the'postOctober 1 period, political parties and mass organizations alike, invariably sought out HMI as a co-signer of any col lective statements. No organization in the country signed its name to more statements from a greater variety of groups than did HMI. Because of these three areas of advantage, the general demeanor of HMI contrasted sharply with the defensive posture of GMNI and with the front-level organizations, PPMI and MMI. The self-confidence and public assertiveness of HMI evoked growing popular respect and persuaded many people to look expectantly upon HMI activities as an indicator of the nation's general political drift. To the observer HMI thus provided, relative to other student/youth organizations, a standard of candor, an organization whose statements could Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === 204 be accepted with relatively little scrutiny. Its candor was largely a concomitant of the special advantages which HMI enjoyed in late 1965. HMI actions and statements, in fact, shared most points in common with other organizations and often were jointly undertaken with them. HMI's vigorous participation in calls for renewed commitment to the tenets and objectives of Guided Democracy is the best available proof of earnestness of popular support in the political system as they knew it. Furthermore, it is evidence of the relatively negligible effect which the September 30 Movement had upon that support, at least through the end of 1965. Additional to Executive Committee statements in Djakarta, HMI issued statements individually or in conjunction with other groups in Bogor, Bandung, Surabaja, Pontianak, Menado, Medan, Simalungan, Pakanbaru, Lampung, Ampenan and elsewhere. In early October the Executive Committee in Djakarta instructed all HMI members to work closely with all true "PantjasilaistsManipolists" to crush Gestapu (September 30 Movement) to its roots, carry out Dwikora and "ganjang Nekolim." 69 These 6 8. For reports from these individual cities see: Bogor, Warta B o g o r, Oct. 24, 1965; Bandung, WB, Oct. 13, 1965 and WB, Nov. 23, 1965; Surabaja, WB, Nov. 11 (Antara, Surabaja, Nov. 9), 1965; PontianaIc7 WB, Oct. 20 (Ant a r a, Pontianak, Oct. 14), 1965; Menado, Sinar H a r a p a n, Nov. 20, 1965; Medan, WB, Nov. 20, 1965; Simalungan, WB, Oct. 18, 1965; Pakanbaru, WB, Oct. 19 (A n t a r a, Pakanbaru, Oct. 15), 1965; Lampung, Api Pantjasila, Oct. 20, 1965; Ampenan, WB, Nov. 10, 1965. 69. Pelopor, Oct. 11, 1965. Dwikora (lit., double command) was the August 27, 1964, Double Command of the President Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === 205 objectives were reiterated not only in the daerah statements but also in each of the initiation sessions which were part of HMI's campaign to recruit new members in October and November 1965. 70 Dr. Sulastomo, General Chairman of the Executive Committee, asserted in November that HMI was "perma nently leftist," that it should dissolve itself if it ever allowed itself to be pushed to the right. In the same speech he stated that Islam is leftist, because it is anti-imperial ist, anti-colonialist, and anti-feudalist. He concluded that all HMI members must embrace and implement every command of the Great Leader of the Revolution. 71 Finally, in December as part of their National Working Conference, the leaders and a large delegation of HMI members visited with President Soekarno in the Bogor palace, listened respectfully to a chastening speech, presented him and his wife, Hartini, with a HMI cap (petji), and joined in dancing and other entertainment until late at night. tion by 72 other group in fall, 1965, was given so much atten top government leaders as H M I. The visit to the to intensify the Indonesian Revolution and to assist the peoples of Malaya, Singapore and North Kalimantan in achieving their independence or in crushing Malaysia. 70. For reports of these sessions see: WB, Oct. 25, 1965; W B, Nov. 1, 1965; Suara Islam, Nov. F 7 1965; WB, Nov. 20, 1965; Pelopor, Dec. 22, 1965. 71. The speech took place in Bandung, a city whose atmos phere often seemed especially conducive to fiery or a tory. WB, Nov. 23, 1965. 72. AB, Dec. 20, 1965. The meeting took place on Dec. 18. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === 206 Bogor palaqe was the climax of this attention and was the President's tacit acknowledgement of HMI's national promi nence. It was also evidence of a great reservoir of loyalty both to the President and to Guided Democracy. Even in HMI which among major student/youth organizations had suffered most in the pre-October 1 period, affection for Bung Karno still remained largely undiminished. However, in the events involving HMI in late 1965 there was also a set of implications quite different from those suggested in the account above. It was as though there were two contradictory dynamics at work. On the one hand HMI was driven toward renewed dedication to the existing national system, with assured improvement in its own status. And on the other hand, HMI veered toward open break with the system, and fusion with those emerging forces set on destroying the known political system and replacing it with something wholly new. Compared to other student/youth groups HMI was better prepared for the second option, but nevertheless, such a move would require the difficult decision to break with the familiar. Within the H M I ■leadership the Bogor Palace affair brought a climax to these contradictions. A number of considerations were brought into clearer focus, and resolution soon followed. The dynamic which eventually propelled HMI into firm alliance with forces tending to challenge the national sys tem developed very gradually. It was not caused by the October 1 event itself, but rather grew out of political Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 218] === 207 conflicts which were shaped and sharpened in the post-October 1 period. From mid-October it was evident in positions taken by the Suharto group, by Soekarno, and by most adult, political party leaders, that suppression of the PKI was not going to occasion the reemergance of a Masjumi or other, new party with which young Moslems might align. PRRI/Permesta rebellion was too fresh, September 30 Movement easily political interest. Memory of the and the drama of the displaced all other matters of On the more immediate level of the power contest between remaining post-October 1 political groups, HMI faced powerful opposition. If leftism was still to be the most desired political posture, as Sulastomo ap peared to believe in November, then GMNI, HMI's arch postOctober 1 adversary, had an unbeatable headstart. Moreover, if Soekarno were to be the judge in any "leftism" contest, it was a foregone conclusion that HMI and all similar groups would be the losers. Soekarno's speeches in November and December, culminating in his address to HMI at the Bogor Palace, made this abundantly clear. That it was not clearer sooner to the HMI leaders was due to the cohesiveness of their organization and the other special advantages of HMI in the post-October 1 period. HMI endeavored for two months to capitalize independently upon their enhanced position and avoided any but the loosest alignments with other groups. Participation in the action front/command movement was acceptable so long as it was limited Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === 208 to the short range objective of crushing the September 30 Movement and suppressing the PKI and its mass organizations. When the party-oriented Action Front--in which HMI was active-began to change into more solid forms suitable for longer range and broader objectives, HMI faced a difficult decision. To join KAMI--which grew out of the party-orienned Action Front--it would be necessary for HMI to forfeit some of its newly enhanced independent prestige. Joining KAMI would also mean opting for a radical course whose end could not be fore seen. If on the contrary HMI retained its fully independent position, it had a good chance of dominating student political activity in the future by gaining control of a revamped PPMI. In November, 1965, the latter seemed the wiser and less radical choice. HMI therefore compromised by joining in the formation of KAMI as a regular member organization but not as a Presidium member. Meanwhile it continued to build up its own membership and establish strong independent channels to adult centers of power. It also encouraged daerah branches to take active part in local efforts to help ABRI suppress "gestapu." The Bogor Palace affair was one of several occasions in late 1965 and early 1966 when student/youth groups tried to pit their wits against Soekarno's. Usually, as in the case of HMI, they came off a bad second. One can only speculate on the President's reasons for inviting a HMI delegation to visit with him in Bogor. For all its protestations of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === 209 loyalty to Soekarno, HMI by December was publicly regarded as in the forefront of those groups most aggressively at tacking several of his closest advisors for alleged collabo ration with the September 30 Movement and with the PKI. The President may actually have hoped to win over the HMI leaders through his miraculous powers of charm and persuasion. Or he may have been trying to divide the increasingly united and antagonistic student/youth movement by casting favor upon one element of it. He may have been genuinely seeking to shore up the flagging spirit of nasakom, of national unity. He may have intended to use HMI attendance at the Palace as an indication to the nation of his continued appeal relative to that of Generals Suharto and Nasution. Most likely, his motives were a combination of these and other factors. For the HMI leaders' part, their objectives to a large degree complemented those speculated for the President. December HMI was on the Presidium of KAMI in Djakarta and in the daerah affiliates. Contact with the President as well as the holding of the special National Working Conference would strengthen the HMI position within KAMI and at the same time reassert HMI's separate individual identity. It was also still deeply believed by many students that if only Soekarno would detach himself from his current advisors and turn to those who "really had his interests and the nation's at heart," the PKI problem would then easily be solved and all true "progressive-revolutionaries" could get back on the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === 210 "rails of the Revolution" with the President. In any event no one could seriously think of turning down the gay pros pect of an evening with Bung Karno at Bogor Palace. The experience for the HMI leaders that evening was typical of encounters which are proudly if slightly bashfully retold by countless individuals and groups that have come afoul of Soekarno. The beautiful setting, the gracious greeting, the abusive tongue lashing, the deliberate presence of arch enemies, the quickly changing mood from rigid peda gogy to the embarrassingly familiar level of participatory entertainment--all the usual scenes took place. A few Cabinet level friends of students were there, such as Sjarif Thajeb and Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh. 73 Much more striking, and disturbing, to the students, however, was the presence of First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, Minister of Central Bank Affairs Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister/Secretary-General of the National Front Sudibjo, Minister of Home Affairs Brigadier General Sumarno, and J. K. Tumakaka. With these prime targets of student charges 73. Chaerul Saleh was at that time still considered by the stu dents and many others as one of the more tolerable top Government leaders. He and Adam Malik were frequently mentioned as likely replacements for the hated Subandrio's position as First Deputy Prime Minister. Because of Chaerul Saleh's prominent Government position, be was then considered a more realistic prospect than Malik. 74. AB, Dec. 20, 1965. Sumarno and Tumakaka were not men tioned in the news media, but Soekarno addressed them by name during his speech. Tumakaka was the editor of Pelopor and subsequently became Minister/Secretary-General of the National Front in the Perfectionized Dwikora Cabinet a p pointment on February 24, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 222] === 211 of Government venality prominently seated around him the President began his address, which was a study in skillful admonishment. 75 His only direct attack came in the first few seconds, when he deliberately caught his HMI audience off guard on a point of Islamic courtesy regarding greetings and responses. After tutoring the Islamic elitists before him on basics of Islamic politeness known to most every child, he began once again with the standard Islamic greeting. This time his antagonistic audience, now chastened and co n trite, roared the proper response, and Soekarno proceeded with his planned speech. Essentially he discussed two related matters. The first concerned the reasons for the rise and fall of empires, particularly of Islamic civilizations. The second concerned the slaughter taking place in Central and East Java, Indo nesians "butchered or stabbed or smashed to death, corpses with throats slit, heads split open, bellies with intestines tumbling out..." left to rot untended. Soekarno explicitly eschewed any discussion of who was to blame. Rather, he dwelled on what he believed to be the inevitable demise of any civilization which, for whatever good or bad reasons, succumbs to widespread internecine violence, especially violence which transgresses not only human life 75. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Dihadapan Para Mahasiswa HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) Pi Istana Bo^or, 18 Desember 1965* (Djakarta: Sekretariat Negara, Kabxnet Presiden Republik Indonesia, nst. 1410/65). 76. Ibid., p 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === 212 but a civilization's religious and ideological foundations as well. Islam would not fail, no ideology would fail, but every surviving individual and group would suffer the irre mediable damage which would follow in the train of civilizational decline. In Indonesia and in Islam there are perhaps no stronger sanctions than those regarding proper respect and care for corpses. It was on this score that Soekarno turned to the direct responsibility of his HMI listeners. Not stated, perhaps because he had said it so many times before, was his view that the killings of PKI members, Pemuda Rakjat members, other communist mass organizations members, and sympathizers--irrespective of post-mortem religious considerations--were a violation against another foundation of Indo nesian society, nasakom. To his HMI listeners Soekarno confined his message to something part way between an admonition and an appeal. He tried to appeal to their intellects through reference to the fates of other civilizations. By concrete reference he used the violations of basic Islamic laws occurring in Indonesia. Finally, he strongly admonished the HMI stu dents, who knew the laws of Islam and their value, to "go down to East Java, go down to Central Java, inform the Islamic community there ..." about these violations. 77 If Moslems could not abide by the basic tenets of their own religion, he said, then "we are going to hell, betul-betul 77. Ibid., p. 11. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 224] === 213 we are going to hell." 78 In closing he noted, as he seemed to do with increasing frequency through 1965, his advanced age, with the implication that the solution of the nation's problems was no longer entirely dependent upon him: "The future of our nation depends on you." 79 Refreshments and dancing and hobnobbing with Cabinet ministers followed the speech. Most of the guests had a good time and it was the next day before any of them admit ted that on the level of palace politics HMI had proved itself no match for the President. Suharto knew this too and in his own address to HMI a few days later mocked and ridiculed what Soekarno had said (without of course ever referring directly to Soekarno or the Bogor Palace speech). Using the rubric, Gestapu-- by then employed generally to include the September 30 Movement organizationally, all communists and anyone however faintly sympathetic to either--Suharto bluntly stated several times that this enemy would be crushed (ganjang) to absolute extinction because it had dirtied and betrayed the historical struggle of the Indonesian people. He pro claimed his agreement with the teaching of Great Leader of the Revolution Bung K a m o that ill would befall any people who did not believe in God, who were atheists, or who were so bold as to make fun of the existence of God. To assure 78. Ibid., p. 15. The quoted phrase is untranslated. 79. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 225] === 214 that no un-Godly Gestapu elements would continue to plague Indonesia, Suharto said he was launching territorial opera tions to clean up all such elements in the fields of ideology, politics, economics, and social-cultural activities. 80 These remarks emphasized even more emphatically the point of view taken by Sjarif Thajeb the night before, when he spoke before a "second wave" of HMI initiates, pointedly calling themselves the "'Jihad' Force." Even though HMI was the largest university student organization in the country, he said, "it must not in these times allow its militancy to slacken off for a moment, all the more so in the task of crushing Gestapu." 81 Due care would be taken to give the President his say and to justify every action in terms of his "teachings," but the Bogor Palace speech and the pointed rejection of its message was one more benchmark in Soekarno's loosening hold on the political process. On the final day of its National Working Conference, HMI issued some resolutions which in effect constituted in writing the conscious shift of HMI into full-scale political alliance with groups seeking change in the substance of the Indonesian political system. of nekolim or confrontation. 82 There was hardly any mention There was still support for the struggle to achieve Indonesian socialism, but with the 80. Suharto did not address HMI in person. His address was read by Colonel Gatot Suwagio of DEPAD. AB, Dec. 22, 1965. 81. Pelopor, Dec. 22, 1965. 82. Mertju S u a r, Dec. 29, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 226] === 215 qualification that this would have to be Pantjasila-based and have the benediction of Allah. The major call, however, was for "revolutionary action" by way of a "jihad for justice and truth." Task forces would be set up to work with A B R I, both in military operations and in indoctrination efforts to get the nation back on the proper rails of the revolution. This work would clearly fulfill the intent of the President’s "indoctrination address" in Bogor, for in carrying out the above objectives, HMI intended to "go down to the people" in Central Java, East Java and Bali. 83 HMI, for the present, was committing itself to the KAMI camp. 83. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 227] === CHAPTER VII KAMI: A NEW FORCE EMERGES KAMI was a fresh wind which stirred the imagination of Djakarta within weeks of its creation and quickly attracted the loyalty of large numbers of people, as much for its style as for its causes and objectives. It caught on elsewhere more slowly, but even in those many areas of the country where it never materialized organizationally it nevertheless commanded avid interest and much sympathy. Such vast popular appeal was unforeseen and served to spur the movement on to ever greater exploits. By the end of 1965 KAMI was the vanguard of a popular upheaval which was verging on the euphoria of revolution. It had by this time become a Goliath bearing only faint resemblance to the modest body born just two months before. It was different organizationally, in composition of member ship and in objectives. It was actually a new entity, and its magnitude seemed all the more dramatic under revolution ary conditions, where time seemed blurred and events receded more quickly than usual into the past. KAMI'S credentials were faulty--its history was too short, its structure uncer tain. Myths sought to correct the imbalance between KAMI the reality and KAMI the modest group of youngsters whose 216 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 228] === 217 advent as a group had gone almost unnoticed in October 1965. Individual leaders of KAMI were reluctant to talk about the organization’s founding. Questions about the subject irritated them and were answered with an insistent disclaimer that how the group was founded was unimportant. What was important was the massive movement which was now underway and of which KAMI happened to be the leader. For the moment, leaders and groups within KAMI were unimportant. did his best to deny their existence. Everybody Heroes did emerge of course, but not of the order of Rudi the Red (Dutske), Mario Savio, Daniel Cohn-Bendit or Mark Rudd. And root organizations were hardly mentioned for several months. They seemed to be an embarrassment. The vanguard of anti-gestapu grew finally into the v a n guard of the New Order, calling itself loosely ’’the '66 1. This concept (of self-generating mass movement) was con sistent with Indonesian nationalist political culture. By the time of the Revolution (1945-1950) the debate in volving the organizational philosophy of cadre formation versus mass politization had been clearly resolved in favor of the latter. [See the Preface by George McT. Kahin and the Introduction by Benedict R. O ’G. Anderson in Sutan Sjahrir, Our Struggle (Ithaca, N. Y.: Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1968); and Kahin, Nationalism..., op. c i t., pp. 93, 165, 321.] Soekarno, always an exponent of the latter philosophy, continuously justified his leadership, especially later during Guided Democracy, on the principle that he was merely the penj ambung lidah rakj at, or voice of the people (literally, extension of the tongue of the people). This characteristic endured in the post-October 1 period, for instance, as expressed in a January 1966 Kompas editorial (January 31) which justified the action groups as spontaneous manifestations of popular will and generated in a manner similar to the Pantjasila itself. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === 218 Generation." It was not until summer 1966 when the euphoria had grown a bit wan and many individuals and groups began to return to the security of their earlier organizational homes, that the rehash of accounts of KAMI'S birth began. KAMI, by that time was as different an entity from the January-March KAMI, as the latter was from the nascent group of October 1965. It became important to each root organiza tion to claim as much credit as possible. The story of the birth of KAMI is therefore not amenable to simple narrative. It is essentially a pastiche: of conflicting post-mortems a year later, weighed against the unified but vague version of the period of euphoria, and somewhat balanced by the writer's notes and interviews of the earliest period. The interest of the story, as suggested earlier, lies more in the modesty of its initial circumstances rather than in any dramatic power confrontations illustrative of political interaction in Indonesian student/youth movements. The small, politically unattached, elitist groups were the prime actors. The role of adults, military and civilian, was confused and conciliatory..To adults and students alike, the creation of KAMI was essentially an arbitration device to help avoid student/youth conflicts. It might serve to augment the influence of rightist elements and hence aid the interests of the Suharto group. The participation of the Ministry of Higher Education and Science in the formation of KAMI served to impose greater Government control on the student/youth Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === 219 movement generally. Though on balance this promised to be a pro-Suharto control, the prospect for greater Government control, whatever the auspices, may have brought at least tacit initial endorsement from President S o e k a m o. The forma tion of KAMI was, then, no more than a small re-ordering of structure at the top level of student/youth ’’fronts." It was hardly even that, for no old fronts or other organizations were eliminated. It was just one more accretion to the com plex mound of overlapping, federations and groups. lackluster, ever bickering fronts, And if history ruled, its appeal would not go much beyond the city limits of Djakarta and perhaps Bandung. Even persons directly involved in KAMI'S formation had no great expectations for its future. These modest circumstances must be kept in mind in the recounting of KAMI'S birth. From October 3, 1965 onward, university student leaders met informally in private homes and in various organizational headquarters. For the first two weeks these meetings dis cussed participation in adult action groups; student/youth direct action against PKI affiliate and other leftist buildings, 2. HMI meetings usually took place in private homes. Many discussions concerning the formation of KAMI were held at the SOMAL Headquarters at Djl. Palem 45 and at the PMKRI Headquarters at Djl. Sam Ratulangi 1. Later, several meetings took place at the home of Sjarif Thajeb, Djl. Imam Bondjol 25. As regards the October 3 activity, see the discussion concerning the first Action Front/ Command statements on pp. 37-49. Much of the following discussion is based on information gained in confidential interviews with KAMI leaders from each of its component organizations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === private homes and members; and plans to mobilize pressure for official sanctions against the communist and leftist organizations. After the Thajeb October 11 edicts and the successful actions against the communist groups organization ally, meetings turned to the question of how to deal effec tively with organizations such as PPMI, MMI and Front Pemuda. Though not officially leftist-communist affiliates, these groups were nonetheless dominated by persons and groups un able and unwilling to provide overlapping leadership. The mounting successes of action movements in mid-Octpber attracted interest and excitement among organizations such as HMI, PMKRI and the SOMAL member groups, which began to demand more sympathetically attuned channels for pursuing common objectives. There is general agreement about when and where the major meetings leading to the emergence of KAMI occurred, but on who or what organization initiated them, views are highly contradictory. It is possible to provide a composite picture out of both the commonly agreed upon and contradic tory information, and then point out the areas of controversy. Five groups were particularly active in the early stages: IMADA, PMB, and MMB, respectively the Djakarta, Bogor and Bandung components of SOMAL; PMKRI, the Catholic group; and HMI, the major modernist Islamic, Masjumi-oriented group. PMB, MMB, and PMKRI were Presidium components of PPMI (the overcapping extra-university front), the first two of these Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === 221 groups were very small elitist organizations, estimated by their leaders to have no more than a few hundred members each. PMKRI must also be classified as a small group, even though its membership of several thousands indicates other wise. This is.because of its affiliate status as the un i versity student organization of the Partai Katholik, which represented only a proportion of the nation's Catholics (who in total are 2% of the total Indonesian population). Against this must be placed the disproportionately high educational and socio-economic level of the nation's Catholics, especially among those many Catholics who are Chinese. PMKRI therefore also had a greater importance and influence within its superior political party than the university student affiliate of any other party. The factors of small minority party, Catholicism and the membership of many Chinese were neverthe less liabilities which required the PMKRI leadership to move more delicately in the political arena than was necessary for SOMAL member organizations. Roughly speaking, PMKRI was therefore, despite its greater membership, comparable to PMB and MMB. Each of these organizations, as discussed earlier, had greater opportunity for political activity in a politically unstable situation than they did normally. 3. See remarks regarding SOMAL, pp. 136 § 143. 4. Estimate provided in April, 1966. 5. A similar kind of situation occurred during the transition to Guided Democracy, 1957-1959, when small political groups, such as the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) and other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === 222 In PPMI (with the communist CGMI, the Chinese PERHIMI and the leftist political party Partindo's GERMINDO all removed), ^ PMB, MMB, and PMKRI were faced with a GMNI-GMKI opposition now much more self-assured than previously when those two organizations simply followed the lead of CGMI. The proliferation of Action Fronts or Commands during the first two weeks of October indicated the willingness of many individuals and organizations to suspend normal political alignments, at least temporarily. Organizations like PMB, MMB, and PMKRI saw this as an opportunity not only to sup press leftist-communist opponents more effectively but also as a chance to recast the overcapping structures of the student/youth world in forms more suited to their minority interests. Success, of course, depended appreciably upon the coincidence of their immediate objective with those of major national forces such as the Suharto group and other sympathetic elements. From early October the students began to hope for a little more out of Suharto's good fortune than the assurance that the September 30 Movement had failed. In the student*world it was clear that in any national attempt to redress political equilibrium permanently in favor of elitist organizations, were able to exercise more politi cal influence than under normal conditions before or afterwards. 6. GERMINDO, however, was not banned nationally as were CGMI or PERHIMI. KAMI was still demanding Sjarif Thajeb's action on this issue in mid-December. Dec. 16, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 234] === 223 the "right"--in so far as the Suharto group and its supporters constituted a "right"--the PNI and therefore GMNI would side with President Soekarno. Since GMNI with the help of GMKI now dominated the PPMI Presidium, PMB, MMB, and PMKRI con cluded that their best course was to promote an entirely new front, drawing on the party-oriented Action Front for the Crushing of the September 30 Movement, as precedent and model. No such formation would materialize, however, without the full support of several of the large and powerful student groups, such as HMI and the NU's PMII. HMI, though still nominally in PPMI at the time of the October 1 event, was effectually in a state of suspension. For reasons outlined above in a separate section, HMI, the major remaining lower level university student group in the nation, suddenly found itself in a position of unprecedented independent influence and power. No group was more quickly and sincerely committed to the elimination of the PKI and the suppression of leftists generally than HMI. Nor was any group more eager for a redressing of power in the overcapping student/youth fronts and federations. But this commitment and eagerness was countered by the pragmatic consideration of what kind of new structure would grant HMI the dominant power and influence it felt was its due. On the question of the September 30 Movement and leftist-communists, HMI leaders believed the interests of PMB, MMB, and PMKRI were identical with their own. In other regards, however, they looked on Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. === [PDF page 235] === 224 these groups as grossly inferior, as Westernized elitists, as Catholics or poor Moslems, as harboring suspicious Chinese, and as basically urban groups of Djakarta, Bogor and Bandung. Moreover, all three groups combined could not muster more than a tiny percentage of the membership of H M I. For these reasons HMI leaders were reluctant to commit themselves to any new organiztional plan conceived and promoted by PMB, MMB, and PMKRI. Some of the HMI leaders argued that if HMI just held out long enough, a PPMI Congress could be held under circumstances favorable enough to assure a dominant leadership position for HMI. After a number of informal meetings with several com binations of groups, PMB, MMB, and PMKRI finally called a '•full session" of PPMI--an extra-constitutional way of getting the attendance of all member groups, not just Presidium members--at PMKRI headquarters some time between October 15 through 19. GMNI, GERMINDO, GMRI, and GMD reportedly had no representatives present. Even so, the SOMAL CPMB, MMB plus other groups)-PMKRI proposal for holding an independent con gress was greeted coldly, and the session ended with yet another vague statement about intensifying the struggle against Gestapu and the communists. On October 20 SOMAL sent an "ultimatum" to the PPMI Presidium to the effect that if a PPMI Congress was not held within two weeks, SOMAL would sponsor one on its own. Months later a few SOMAL leaders conceded confidentially that the leaders of both Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 236] === 225 PMKRI and HMI supported the ultimatum fully, but were reluc tant to do so openly for fear of adverse reaction from members. The ultimatum caused Sjarif Thajeb to step more actively' into the picture. As Minister of Higher Education and Science he had already taken several steps acceding to student/youth demands. the President. This had cost him loss of favor with If, despite these concessions, PPMI split in half anyway, not only would Soekarno be furious, but Thajeb would lose much of the unifying influence he had so far been able to exercise over the entire student movement. Moreover, he would lose some of his value to the Suharto group and the party-oriented Action Front, for whom he already stood as an important Cabinet ally. Sjarif Thajeb therefore called the SOMAL leaders to his office on October 22 and forbade them to hold the Congress, though declaring his deep sympathy with their objectives. He held informal meet ings with other group leaders individually and finally brought representatives of HMI, SOMAL, PMKRI, PMII, and MAPANTJAS together at his home on October 24. The attendance of PMII as the NU affiliate is understandable, but the presence of MAPANTJAS, smaller even than SOMAL in membership, is of special significance, for it indicated a direct influ ence from Army officers especially close to Nasution and Suharto. MAPANTJAS was the affiliate of the tiny Nasutionfounded political party, IPKI, headed by Brigadier General Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 237] === 226 Achmad Soekendro. Soekendro also ran the most radically pro- Suharto-Nasution, anti-PKI-Subandrio newspaper (Api) in Indonesia during the post-October 1 remainder of 1965. this October 24 meeting final plans were made for the formation of KAMI, the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian University Student Action Front), and for handling the full scale meeting of all university student organizations scheduled for the following day in such a way as to secure common agreement among the diverse groups. The agreement reached on October 24 among five groups represented a compromise among those, like SOMAL and PMKRI, and MAPANTJAS who sought a wholly new, radical front, and those like HMI and PMII. The latter two, though also eager for a radical front, believed that it could be accomplished simply by replacing GMNI, if necessary by force, on the PPMI Presidium. The compromise, urged by Sjarif Thajeb, was to create an interim body, KAMI, which would help consolidate student efforts in fighting both the September 30 Movement and the communists until a PPMI Congress could be held. PPMI would then take over KAMI'S efforts and return to its full normal jurisdiction, leadership. albeit with substantially new The groups all accepted the Thajeb compromise. On the next day, October 25, KAMI was officially founded, in a meeting of seventeen extra-university student organizations, again held at the home of Sjarif Thajeb. Here, the groups of the previous day's meeting put forward Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === 227 a more or less united front, emphasizing only that aspect of their own informal compromise which dealt with the creation of KAMI. An exception to the united front was HMI, which displayed its reservations by taking a cool and essentially non-participatory stance during the meeting. GMNI, GMD, and to a lesser extent, GMKI, were aggressively opposed and insisted that simply holding a PPMI Congress would be adequate. Again, Sjarif Thajeb offered a compromise, which was in fact the compromise already agreed upon the day before, to form KAMI but to call for the holding of a PPMI Congress as soon as possible which would then assume the responsibilities of KAMI. This compromise was received favorably, and all the groups present assented finally to the proposal that the mechanics be left to Sjarif Thajeb as formateur. Thajeb then sought GMNI's agreement as one of the new organization's Presidium members. GMNI, however, the most staunch proponent for an-undisturbed PPMI, declined and also chose not to be included as a regular member organization or supporter. The first public disclosures concerning KAMI were limited to information about the three point statement issued by Sjarif Thajeb as Minister of Higher Education and Science. Organizationally KAMI took the following form: 7. WB, Oct. 28, 1965. Since 17 organizations reportedly attended the October 25 meeting, the following listing reveals that one or two elected not to support KAMI, one if SOMAL is considered a separate organization additional to its six components, two if it is not. GMNI was one of those which decided negatively. Participants in the meet ing claim they do not recall which other group or groups Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === 228 Presidium: PMKRI--Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Catholic University Students Association)--Catholic Party (Partai Katholik). PMII— Perserikatan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic University Students Association)--Nahdatul Ulama. MAPANTJAS--Mahasiswa Pantjasila (Pantjasila University Students)--IPKI SOMAL--Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi Mahasiswa Lokal Indonesia (Joint Secretariat of Indonesian Local University Student Organ izations) --independent. Supporting Elements (The above and): SEMMI--Sarekat Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students Association)-PSII. GMKI— Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (Indone sian Christian University Students Movement)-Parkindo. IMM Ikatan Mahasiswa Muslimin (Moslem University Students Association)- -Muhammadijah. HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic University Students Association)- -independent, Masjumioriented, Islamic. PELMASI--Pelopor Mahasiswa Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist University Students Vanguard). GMD Gerakan Mahasiswa Djakarta (Djakarta Univer sity Students Movement)--independent. were omitted from the initial offical KAMI list. GERMAHII and/or GMRI are mentioned as possibilities, although they, like GMNI, eventually were members. GERMAHII seems the most likely, since as a Perti (political party) affiliate, it received wide criticism in the immediate post-October 1 period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === 229 The three point statement resolved: 1. To form the Indonesian University Student Action Front (KAMI) in which all progressive revolutionary Indonesian University student organizational strength will be marshalled for the task of: a. safeguarding the foundation and philosophy of state, Pantjasila, together with the guidelines for its fulfillment; b. intensifying the crushing of the Nekolim project, "Malaysia"; c. helping ABRI to annihilate the counter-revolutionary "Gestapu" down to its roots. 2. That PPMI quickly hold a Congress to improve and refresh itself, so as to take over the tasks of KAMI. 3. That the leadership of KAMI consists of PMKRI, PMII, MAPANTJAS, SOMAL (Joint Secretariat of Indonesian Local University Student Organizations) whose members are CSB, GMS, IMADA, IMABA, MMB and PMB. There was in fact no binding commitment by the inferior member organizations (or supporting elements) to KAMI, and the "leadership" (pimpinan) organizations were appointed by Thajeb and therefore only loosely committed themselves. 8. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === 230 Both the wording of the statement and the arrangements for membership served to protect all parties concerned. The leadership organizations had little to lose, for they were either very small groups or, in the case of PMII, clearly identified with a rightist (conservative) political party, The inferior groups were not mentioned in the official announcement. Due acknowledgment was paid the standard concerns of safeguarding the state philosophy and crushing Malaysia, thus averting objection from arch nationalists. The loosely defined objectives, the explicitly temporary existence of KAMI, and the vague organizational apparatus tied to the strings of a Government ministry--all contributed to a very undramatic public d£but and also offered assurance to major political forces opposed to the creation of KAMI, most notably Soekarno, that its chances for survival were negligible. The writer has intended the above to be an objective account of events leading up to the founding of KAMI. this account it is now possible, Against and useful, to weigh the contradictory retrospective versions of some of the participants. Since none of the events except the final meeting and announcement received any media coverage at the time, later claims by participants are hard to dispute. The general myth about the founding of KAMI, which evolved in early 1966 and has endured, is that KAMI resulted from a spontaneous mass outburst of indignation at the September 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 242] === 231 Movement, at communists, and at the whole Soekarno regime, further, that KAMI sprang fullblown as a unified organization. That this is indeed a myth will be shown in an account of K A M I ’S first two months' history below. Here, the concern is simply with the views of specific participants one year later in October 1966.® The contradictions were essentially ones of perspective, of choosing which events were important, of emphasizing cer tain developments over others. Representing HMI, for instance, Mar'ie Muhammad, one of its chairmen, stated unequivocably that it was HMI which from the beginning took the initiative for the setting up of KAMI. According to him HMI organized the meetings and was responsible for bringing together SOMAL, PMKRI, MAPANTJAS and PMII representatives for the important session at the home of Sjarif Thajeb on October 24. In the discussions it was HMI which took the lead in the vanguard of those, admittedly including SOMAL, who were stTong advocates for creating a wholly new student front. Sharply contrasting with the claim to HMI domination were repeatedly expressed assertions by leaders of SOMAL member groups that it was SOMAL which was the prime mover. In this view the most important meetings transpired at 9. The best single published sampling of some of these con tradictory accounts appeared in the student newspaper, Harian KAMI, on October 25, 1966, the first anniversary of KAMI's founding. Most of the particulars of the following account are in that source, but were re iterated in many interviews by this writer with other student leaders before and after October 25, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === 232 SOMAL headquarters, it was SOMAL which persuaded HMI and PMKRI to the radical objective, and it was the SOMAL ultimatum which by forcing the issue of holding a PPMI Congress brought a reluctant Sjarif Thajeb into active participation in the general direction supported by all of the radical student groups. Finally, there was the recollection of Sjarif Thajeb, who saw himself as the initiator. According to Thajeb it was he who from the outset strove to weld the disparate student elements into a form more suitable for th.e fight against the counter-revolutionaries. It was he who coined the acronym, KAMI, which in itself is a common Indonesian word for "we,M used when other persons present are excluded. The Education Minister also held that he had from the begin ning envisioned KAMI not only as a more effective activist anti-Gestapu front but, equally important, as a political organization in its own right supplementing the larger as pects of ABRI's efforts. As mentioned earlier, these recollections were contra dictory in emphasis as much as in fact. HMI, when it did eventually choose to work fully within the confines of KAMI, soon gained domination because of its size, resources and strong distribution throughout the country. It was perhaps inevitable that leaders, such as M a r ’ie Muhammad, would then exaggerate HMI's initial contributions. Similarly, SOMAL, particularly two of its member groups, PMB and MMB, had taken Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === 233 a gamble, which paid off in part only because of the eventual contribution of H M I. Though SOMAL had exercised a more im portant founding role than HMI, a year later it was playing a distinctly inferior role. Thus, it too perhaps felt a need to enlarge its claim as to the real contributions of its early involvement. As for Sjarif Thajeb, October 1966 found him no longer a Minister and only recently back in favor with the students, who had rejected him eight months before as a sell-out to the Old Order and S o e k a m o. Again, it was under standable that he should lend special emphasis to,his role in KAMI'S formative period, for without his intercession the front would not have materialized or else would have been denied the important aegis of Government protection. After the actual formation of KAMI on October 25, Sjarif Thajeb proved incapable of controlling the front of which he was the formateur and to which he had given the official sanction of the Ministry of Higher Education and Science. On the contrary all those forces to whom the grow ing public activism of KAMI was objectionable tended to place the blame on Sjarif Thajeb. His attempts to assuage the grievances of these forces only served to arouse the in creasing distrust of KAMI and further to confirm the KAMI leaders in acting without any prior consultation with Thajeb. The success of their action campaigns gave further confi dence to the leaders and catapulted KAMI into a securely independent position. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 245] === 234 There were four steps in the transition of KAMI from its loose organizational status on October 25 to national politi cal prominence by the end of the year. In the first of these steps the KAMI leadership on November 10 announced that "KAMI Commands" (Komando Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia) would be established nationwide at all universities and other in stitutions of higher education. This was held to be in response to the growing Gestapu threat to KAMI and to the nation from certain intra-university elements. The effect of this step was to widen the scope of KAMI well beyond its unofficial initial limitation as an extra-university stu dent organization. KAMI was now moving into the area p r e viously governed by MMI, the Indonesian Student Assembly.^® The first three weeks of K A M I ’S existence, however, were also important in terms of action in Djakarta. Demonstrations took place almost daily and attracted the participation not only of eager member organizations but of other groups, such as GSNI (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, the PNI high school affiliate), some GMNI members, GERMAHII and GMRI.** The writer recalls an air of excitement and frivolity during those early demonstrations. The demonstrations were sometimes spontaneous, but usually were planned beforehand 10. In most cases where these intra-university KAMI Commands were established, there was an explicit disaffiliation from the local MMI. See, for example, footnote 6 above concerning the formation of KOMII in Bandung. 11. WB, Nov. 3, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === 235 and skillfully led by a small group of activists whose faces soon became familiar. Most persons present seemed about eighteen to nineteen years of age, both male and female-invariably there was some attempt at distinctive common garb (all in white, or matching scarves, etc.). Every group sported its own prepared banners, makeshift flags, and scrawled epithets; often patriotic songs, many with new and risque verses, were enthusiastically sung. The demonstrators usually started from the elitist Menteng section of the city on foot or, with increasing frequency, by calvacade of trucks and busses (the busses often with official signs still on the sides--TAVIP, acronym for Tahun Vivera Periculoso, or "Year of Living Dangerously"). The vehicles were invariably supplied by the Army and were driven by Army non-coms. Depending on the importance of the objective of the particular occasion, the number of vehicles varied from 10 to 100, each carrying from 20 to 80 demonstrators. While the demonstra tions of early and mid-October tended also to involve physical action (such as burning and ransacking buildings), later demonstrations turned more into massive rallies in front of government buildings. After the initial Thajeb announcement of the formation of KAMI, all further statements were issued by the KAMI leaders themselves. These tended to be much more sharply worded than the Thajeb statement, whether dealing with the September 30 Movement and communists or with pre-October 1 national Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === 236 issues. On the one hand, the objective of crushing Gestapu was now invariably designated the most crucially essential objective of any named. 12 On the other hand, during this period KAMI made a serious attempt to earn at least the p r o visional approval of President Soekarno, who, after all, had publicly declared his opposition to the September 30 Movement and his abhorrence of the assassionations of the Generals and of those who perpetrated them. In a long letter to Presi dent Soekarno on November 2, KAMI delcared its unswerving loyalty to him, to the Five Talismans of the Revolution ( P a n t ja Azimat Revolusi), and to his foreign policy strategy. 13 KAMI tried to persuade the President that his own position, the ideologic foundations of the State, and the destruction of Oldefo could more easily be secured without the continued existence of the PKI. In response to previous Presidential charges of large scale Western subversive activities, including bribery of Indonesian officials, KAMI argued that by sabotaging the economy and cultivating domestic conflict, class and otherwise, the PKI had so weakened Indonesia as to facilitate the odious schemes of Oldefo. Whether the KAMI leaders had any serious expectation of earning Soekarno's favor is a moot point. Few leaders a year later would admit that there ha d been 12. See Kompas, Oct. 29, 1965; WB, Nov. 3, 1965; WB, Nov. 11, 1965; Suara Islam, Nov. 17,"T965; and repeateHTy there after. 13. WB, Nov. 3, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 248] === 237 anything but thorough opposition to Soekarno, both privately and in public. On the public side, this was patently un true, for there were innumerable protestations of absolute loyalty. This was nowhere more apparent than in a large KAMI demonstration two days after the letter to the Presi dent. The yells and banners were typical of dozens of such occasions: "Hang Aidit," "Ban the PKI," "Crush American imperialists," "Destroy 'Malaysia,'" "Long live Bung Karno." Cosmos Batubara of PMKRI read the collective statement of the students present which among other things "strongly deplored the continuous aggressive and provocative savagery of the United States imperialists in South Vietnam" and "their active assistance to the British Nekolim project, 'Malaysia. Zamroni of PMII, addressing the demonstra tors in his capacity as KAMI Presidium Chairman, said that they wanted no other leadership so long as there was Soekarno and "would continue to carry out the teachings of Bung Karno and would defend them unto death." 15 Certainly there were 14. WB, Nov. 3, 1965. For about two months after the forma tion of KAMI, individual leaders, such as Cosmos Batubara, continued to be identified with their root organizations rather than with KAMI. Cosmos Batubara is a Batak b o m in Bindjai, North Sumatra. Previously a member of IPMI, he became General Chairman qf PMKRI in 1965and subse quently was a Chairman of the KAMI Central Presidium. He resided with his parents in Djakarta. Among students he was particularly respected as an effective orator. 15. Ibid. Mohamad Zamroni B.A. was born in Kudus, Central Java, but had lived in Djakarta for most of his life. In 1965 he was in his fifth (final) year at theInstitut Agama Islam Negeri (I.A.I.N.), majoring in linguistics. He was also working for the Department (Ministry) of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 249] === 238 some leaders, especially in SOMAL, PMKRI and MAPANTJAS, who were fiercely, but privately, against Soekarno. But if the KAMI leadership were collectively opposed to Soekarno, then their public statements must be regarded as motivated solely by the political objective of drawing students and youth out of the Soekarno camp. Interviews with students in November and December, 1965, rarely disclosed much talent or interest in this form of craftiness. Quite to the contrary, loyalty to Soekarno by the great majority of students and youth continued well into the following year. This loyalty was frequently exhibited even by KAMI leaders, who soon realized that they were very unlikely either to win over Soekarno to their views or to reach any satisfactory rapport with him. The second step in K A M I ’S development was revealed in two acts by Government officials on November 17. In the more important instance, the military Regional Authority for Implementation of the Dwikora (Pepelrada) in Djakarta summoned the KAMI Presidium to its office and after some discussion designated KAMI the single authority for Greater Djakarta over all student activities. KAMI Pusat, or the Central Religion as Director of an Institute of Religion, PGA in Mampang, Prapatan, Djakarta. In PMII he was Second Chairman, and he was also PMII's representative in KAMI. In KAMI he was the Periodic Chairman (KAMI had a revol ving chairmanship) of the central Presidium. He fre quently consulted with NU leaders H. A. Sjaichu, K.H.M. Dahlan and Djamaluddin Malik. 16. Sinar Harapan, Nov. 18, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 250] === 239 or national level of KAMI, was henceforth to constitute a "Command" with the former PMKRI headquarters at Djalan Sam Ratulangi designated as the temporary secretariat. The new responsibilities gave KAMI the right to pass on all intra university and extra-university activities, including Periodic Student Inductions to all individual organizations, mass actions, demonstrations and the like. According to Pepelrada the reason for assigning KAMI this task was to help deter subversive and counter-revolutionary Gestapu student ac tivities and to improve the coordination of progressive revolutionary activities in the Djakarta area. The author ization theoretically gave KAMI a monopoly in the student world with practically unlimited opportunity to orchestrate events in the Capital which would receive nationwide p u b licity. In fact, some military figures saw it as a means of controlling and limiting the scope of student activities generally. All of the events over which KAMI now exercised authority still required additional licensing by Pepelrada. Some of the censure directed at Pepelrada by the President and others for* favoring some groups over others would now be shared by KAMI. KAMI itself would now be supervised by a military authority as well as by the Education Ministry. In practice KAMI proved unable to exercise authority over groups other than its own members, and Pepelrada was unable to exercise much influence over KAMI. 17 But the Pepelrada 17. P P A B, Nov. 18, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 251] === 240 authorization did give an important fillip to the enhancement of KAMI’S public image, if for no other reason, by showing that it had earned the military's serious attention. The second Governmental act was Sjarif Thajeb's authori zation for KAMI Commands at all institutions of higher edu cation to set up "Task Forces" for purging counter-revolu tionary elements and for helping the administrations of these institutions evaluate all students desirous of resuming their studies. 18 Following upon the November 11 extension onto campuses, KAMI now possessed an even more important Governmental sanction for semi-official intrusion into university affairs. This authorization became particularly 18. Creation of Komando KAMI Kotaraya Djakarta occasioned confusion within KAMI, for it had the effect of scrambling the front's internal leadership structure. Already there was provision in Djakarta for a national level, that is KAMI Pusat, a city level called Kami Djakarta Raya and several "commands" in the Capital's universi ties. The super-imposition of another element with special privileges sanctioned directly by military authority and with jurisdiction which overlapped KAMI'S national and city levels and extending to control over non-KAMI student affairs as well, constituted a dis ruptive influence which caused internal conflict among KAMI leaders for the next month until the structures were simplified and jurisdictions made clear. Compo sition of the KAMI Djakarta Command was announced on November 23 and indicated for the first time the move ment of HMI into a fuller commitment. The Presidium consisted of: PMKRI, PMII, MAPANTJAS, HMI, and IMADA (the Djakarta SOMAL element). On the Secretary level were GMKI, S E MMI, and GMD. WB, Nov. 23, 1965. The in clusion of GMD was of note, since this was one of the organizations earlier accused of involvement in the September 30 Movement. See AB, Oct. 14, 1965. Con fusion and conflict developecTas the various leader ship structures issued contradictory statements whose sponsors were unclear. The problem was resolved after a public dispute in mid-December between KAMI Pusat and the city KAMI consulate. See Kompas, Dec. 17, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 252] === 241 useful some months later in those academic institutions and areas of the country where KAMI member organizations had little or no previous influence. Both by its nature and by its attraction of some of KAMI'S least intelligent, most revengeful and narrow-minded, types, this "screening" eventually cost KAMI considerable support and brought serious erosion in late 1966 of KAMI'S heroic image. As of November 17, however, it was merely one more addition to the purview of KAMI interests. The third stage of KAMI'S growth actually extended from the third week of November well into December. During this period branches of KAMI, later known as consulates, emerged in many parts of the country. 19 While the particulars of each situation varied, there were several features in common. Invariably the consulate appeared in a university location which usually meant an urban center. All of the first branches were known by a city designation, such as KAMI Bogor or KAMI Pontianak. Theoretically there was to be a relatively cohesive national organizational structure, and in KAMI'S first rudimentary constitution there was provision for a territorial level between the Capital and individual 19. For reports on the formation of KAMI in particular areas see: Djakarta, WB, Nov. 23, 1965; Bandung, Suara Islam, Nov. 17, 1965; Fogor, Suara Islam, Nov. 17, 1&65; Malang, Put a Mas j arak a t, Nov. IS, 1965; Pakanbaru, W B, Dec. 15, 1965; Surabaja, Kompas, Nov. 18, 1965; Semarang, Api Pantjasila, Nov. 22, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 253] === 242 city consulates. 20 Neither the cohesiveness nor the terri torial levels ever really materialized, and KAMI nationally remained loosely federative. In each branch formation the power structure more or less duplicated the national level. The Presidium normally included SOMAL, PMKRI, PMII and MAPANTJAS, and the Secretariat (a second leadership level, which emerged in Djakarta shortly after KAMI'S formation) 21 usually consisted of HMI and GMKI. Another common fea ture in consulate formations was reference in intial announce ments to PPMI, usually in the form of an assertion that the local KAMI was being created to assist PPMI in better carry ing out its functions as an "instrument of the Revolution" Calat Revolusi). Finally, note must be taken of the ubiquitous and curious participation of MAPANTJAS. Its diminutive size and negli gible pre-October 1 influence hardly warranted inclusion among the Presidium member organizations of KAMI. The im portant role of MAPANTJAS must therefore be attributed to its status as an affiliate of IPKI. Interviews revealed that 20. KAMI, Landasan Dasar K.A.M.I. (Djakarta: Komisi Organisasi, Dec. 13, 1965). This document was signed by Elyas and Nazar E. Nasution, respectively Chairman and Secretary of the Commission on Organization. 21. There were exceptions to the rule, such as in Malang where PMII and MAPANTJAS held the chairmanship or Pre sidium level, PMKRI and GMKI the Secretariat level. Below this the Treasurer was a HMI representative, and the General Assistants were from GERMAHII and IMM. Duta Masjarakat, Nov. 15, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 254] === 243 military influence over student activities in the fall of 1965, especially from those Army officers close to Nasution, was channeled through MAPANTJAS representatives. 22 The general result of the springing up of KAMI consulates across the country, however small in membership and limited in s u b sequent influence, was to add an important aspect of national representativeness to KAMI'S public image. The fourth step in KAMI'S development came in December when the question of the student action front's relationship with PPMI, left uncertain initially, was finally resolved. PPMI was eliminated, and KAMI was recognized as a permanent organization. It will be recalled that PPMI continued to operate during this period and that the initial statement concerning the formation of KAMI specified that once a PPMI Congress was held it was expected that PPMI would resume its full previous functions. 23 By December, however, KAMI had grown in stature and jurisdiction well beyond the expectations of most of its founders. It was now a formidable competitor in its own right and by mid-December had weathered several sizeable street engagements which brought national publicity 22. The most important of these was David Napitupulu, a Batak born in Tapanuli, a long time resident of Djakarta and prior to October 1965 attending the PNI operated Universitas 17 Augustus. Of unknown livelihood, he was in his mid- to late thirties, married and a father. Chairman of MAPANTJAS, he was also the most fiery and temperamental of the several KAMI National Chairmen. He was reputedly a close friend of Soekendro and had fre quent contact with Nasution. 23. See p. 226 [PPMI operations] and p. 228 [KAMI provisions]. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === 244 and a mounting notoriety. KAMI concerns were gradually focusing on three issues: the banning of the PKI, the re shuffling of the Cabinet, and tending to pressing economic issues. 24 These issues were to be more formally shaped and appropriately sloganized in January, but even in late November and December, 1965, they served to place KAMI at increasing odds with the official Indonesian Government and to draw KAMI into an ever more radical program of action. The last gesture reaching toward some sort of accord with both the intra-university MMI and the extra-university PPMI--and by implication therefore with the President-occurred in the first KAMI national working conference (MUKER). Representatives from branches all over Indonesia were brought together in Djakarta, December 11-14, 1965. 25 The Working Conference decided that in order to overcome the divisiveness and domination over Indonesian student affairs of fronts such as PPMI and MMI, it would set up a National 24. The banning of the PKI was the main demand and by December was no longer softened by protestations of leftism and loyalty to the Pantja Azimat Revolusi. The first formal demand for a Cabinet re-shuffling occurred at the end of November and was signed by the Front Pemuda as well as by KAMI. PPAB, Nov. 29, 1965. Economic concerns crystalized in reaction to the sudden Government actions raising transportation and fuel costs meteorically (the price of gasoline went up 6,000%) and partially devaluating (sanering) the currency. 25. KAMI was now acknowledging the membership of 19 mass organizations: SOMAL (PMB, CSB, IMABA, IMADA, MMB, GM S ), PMKRI, PMII, MAPANTJAS, HMI, PELMASI, G M N I, GERMAHII, SEMMI, IMM, GMKI, GMD, and I P M I. (SOMJOTwas" here'cbunted separately from its members'?) A B, Dec. 17, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 256] === 245 Union of Students This organization would r e solve to mobilize student power and accelerate the completion of the national democracy stage of revolution and entry into the stage of Indonesian socialism. 27 Some months later KAMI leaders in interviews refused even to conceive of the pos sibility that they could ever have endorsed the use of such "leftist" language. The creation of an active N.U.S. would have been the culmination of a battle which had gone on ever since the beginning of Guided Democracy over which the existing Indonesian student front constituted the country's N.U.S. and thus was privileged to send delegations to the superior Prague-based International Union of Students gettogethers and enjoy the other benefits of membership in this global federation. KAMI leaders who previously had always had to sit idly by as PPMI won the battles regarded the r e placement of MMI and PPMI with N.U.S. as just reparation. President Soekarno failed to reciprocate. In the only formal address to a KAMI audience he was ever to give, 28 Soekarno ignored the N.U.S. idea even though reminded of it in a speech by KAMI'S Periodic Chairman, Zamroni, a few '29 minutes before. Instead, he took the occasion for an 26. Kompas, Dec. 17, 1965. The event was reported in only two or three papers and was featured by none. In the confer ence's concluding statement there were of course the usual demands for PKI dissolution additional to the N.U.S. decision. 27. See Soekarno and other statements, p. 120. 28. This was on December 21, 1965. There were subsequently several instances of informal contact, usually abrasive. 29. Api Pantjasila, Dec. 22, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 257] === unremitting attack on the people sitting before him. 30 handed out no carrots as he had with the HMI audience a few days before. He badgered, belittled and accused, and for once, established no rapport. The students, he said, repeat edly claimed to be carrying out his command, but how could this be when most of them were nothing more than the underlings of bickering political parties. 31 Once again, for what to many in his audience felt must be the thousandth time, he gave them the standard indoctrination on Nasakom as an "objective fact" of Indonesian society. Nasakom as a basic part of the Indonesian spirit was indomitable, and here as usual Soekarno invoked his favorite aphorists on spirit: Freiligrath, Lincoln, Toynbee, Gibbon. As prime examples of unquenchable Indonesian spirit, he dwelled on the PKI, on the diminutive female hero of West Irian, Herlina, self. 32 and on h i m He strongly implied that the KAMI members stood up poorly by comparison, even by comparison with the communists who "sacrificed to bring independence to Indonesia." 33 There had been many "Gestok's" (October 1 event) in Indonesia's history, but the spirit of Nasakom had always overcome them. 30. Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Dihadapan Komando Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI) Pi Istora, Senajan, Djakarta, 21 Desember 1965 (Secretariat Negara. Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, nst. 001/66). 31. I b i d., p. 2. 32. See mention of Herlina's speech at the November 8 rally, p. 107. 21 December, op. c i t., p. 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === 247 But now, the students--addressing those before him, who were KAMI members--racked by hate, by the urge to destroy, had failed the national spirit. Their acts, he literally screamed Perhaps influenced by HMI's loss of face a few days before, KAMI members were skeptical even before the speech began. 35 When Soekarno finished, they departed nevertheless with a special heaviness of heart. must be senile. Some remarked that he It was certain to them that he was far out of touch with reality, the reality of their widespread en thusiasm, of their disillusionment with the entire Establish ment, of their really deeply felt anger at Indonesian commun ists. They speculated on what it would take to make the President see the light. never yield. But they also sensed that he would For this they were truly sorrowful, and worried.^ On the last day of the year KAMI issued a statement which in effect brought to completion the fourth and final step of K A M I ’S development to full maturity as a national political force. 37 First, it maintained that Marxism/Leninism with its teaching of class struggle was inconsistent with Indonesian 34. Ibid., p. 10. 35. Many did not even come, a fact for which Soekarno also chided them. Ibid., p. 1. 36. These remarks are based on the writer's observations at the meeting and from conversations with a number of those who attended. 37. Nusa Putera, December 31, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === 248 character and with the teachings of Soekarno. The "kom" of nasakom should therefore be henceforth regarded as signifying nothing more than "social justice." KAMI therefore reaffirmed its commitment to working for the thorough elimination of the PKI from Indonesian society. In effect, the KAMI leaders deliberately chose to regard Soekarno as no longer competent to handle the exegetics of his own teaching. The second part of the KAMI statement was a criticism of its own most powerful member organization, HMI. Without naming HMI, it expressed firm disapproval of student working conferences, congresses and similar sessions (of which HMI had recently held several) as detracting from the concerted student effort needed to achieve the objectives students--here all assumed to be under KAMI auspices--had set themselves. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 260] === CHAPTER VIII CONSENSUS VERSUS POWER An Analysis In many ways the month following Christmas 1965 comprises the most crucial and dramatic weeks covered in this study. Soekarno made his most serious bid to restore his political control. A combination of issues--the PKI, the Cabinet, and the economy--commanded public attention and enabled KAMI to assume the characteristics of an adult political force. was, moreover, a period in which alternative political forces, substantially parallel to the three types of action groups discussed earlier, competed from as nearly equal power posi tions as they were ever to attain. When the close of Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting) was near in mid-January, tempers flared with increasing frequency and contributed to a general acceleration of the rate at which political confrontations occurred. These con frontations, which usually appeared unexceptional individually, gained a cumulative magnitude prompting in many Indonesians apprehension that a major show-down was impending. Several factors, even at the outset, gained special significance in light of the approaching new year. Expectations of improve ment in the economy from Draconian measures (replacement and 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 261] === 250 partial devaluation of the rupiah, severe fuel and transporta tion cost increases) had within weeks (rather than in the customary several months) proved to be illusory. The widely heralded importation of large quantities of rice and cloth in preparation for the gay festivities of Lebaran (a celebra tion at the end of Ramadan) proved to be an ephemeral hope based on nothing more than empty promises. On the interna tional scene, ever prominent among the priorities of Indonesia’s domestic political dialogue, a conference in Havana recognized only a pro-Communist Indonesian delegation. This, together with the increasingly vocal anti-Djakarta delegates in Peking, accentuated for many Indonesians the bankruptcy of the nation's vaunted self-image of international leadership among the "non-aligned nations." The anniversary of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations added further to the chagrin, for especially now, in the post-Gestapu period, it deprived Indonesia of the major forum where redress of international grievances and recognition of the country's "new directions" might have been most profitably prosecuted. The approaching new year marked most clearly, however, the fact that President Soekarno had so far proved unable or unwilling to provide for the Indonesian people his promised "political solution" to the October 1 events. For reasons discussed earlier, most political groups had come to rest their public activity on the idea that "political solution" was necessarily only a euphemism for the inevitable formal dissolution of the PKI. Oddly, among political groups in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 262] === 251 Djakarta at the close of 1965 the dawning realization of the magnitude of violence rampaging through much of the country, merely intensified their belief that the crucial element of any "political solution" was to ban the PKI and that the Government by not taking this action was only contributing to conditions of continued turmoil. Since it was President Soekarno himself who had promised the "political solution," it became increasingly difficult for political activists, notably the students, to separate Government lassitude from the reluctance (or failure) of Soekarno to act. These three general factors--failure of economic reforms, international embarrassments, and continued political dis ruption attributed by many activists to the failure to ban the PKI--thus conditioned Indonesia's public political atmosphere as the new year began. Ensuing confrontations were characterized by ever more direct reference to these issues, and even given Indonesia's sophisticated art of surreal politesse, it became difficult to avoid them. Part of the acceleration of the incidence of public political conflict can be explained by the expanding axes of conflict. As most political issues gradually were subsumed in the one transcendent issue of Soekarno-versus-the Suharto Group, so the political exponents of these issues felt obliged to partake of public conflict for the sake of protecting their own personal interests. Group alignments--especially the ad hoc types of Action organizations created during the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 263] === 252 fall of 1965--had for a long time remained indistinct. They now grew more obvious and there was less tendency toward subtle evasion of conflict. Hardly a day passed in January without several indica tions of the intensification of political encounters in Djakarta, as if carried forward in the wake of the gory blood letting in the hinterlands. All the while there was incessant effort to restore the symbols of the past, there was also a studied twisting of these symbols to fit the current pragmatic contest for power and authority. For a few weeks the axes of conflict grew hopelessly confused, as individual groups and leaders strove to protect their own faltering positions rather than to preserve previous allegiances. Subandrio (First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), for instance was already established in the minds of students, most youth and many others as an incarnation of the infamous D u m o, a characterization con sidered so clever and apposite that by January, rescue of his previous image of authority would have been virtually impossible. Chairul Saleh, by contrast, had established h im self by mid-December as one of the more rational and competent members of the Soekarno entourage, a person actively discussed as possible successor to the President's mantle. He expressed deep concern for the state of the economy and was appointed by Soekarno to head a commission for an emergency attack on the deteriorating non-political, non-military sector. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. As a === [PDF page 264] === 253 consequence, Saleh's political career abruptly ended, for the momentum of economic decline, from the point of view of all on-lookers, had advanced well beyond facile measures of reform. Subandrio, however, saw the appointment of Saleh as a direct threat to his own eventual ascent. The bitter con test between these two most senior subordinates of President Soekarno was fought out on a number of levels, among the semi-secret political elite in Djakarta and through the more popular vehicle of newspapers, newly established ones or old ones under the direct influence of one or the other of these two leaders. More significant, however, was the fact that both Subandrio and Saleh had become, by January, butts of general student/youth discontent. Both were allegedly just the sort of high officials who had "played patsy" with the communists and who, for the sake of preserving personal power, were advising their superiors (presumably Soekarno) in the postponement of action on the PKI. to persist Subandrio and Saleh, with no hope of winning the students to their side, thus found common cause in general castigation of the entire student sector> admonishing them as "naughty children" (anak nakal), "juvenile delinguents" (crossboy), or "cowboys" As the students (and, to a lesser extent, youth generally) persistently sought to popularize real issues, the personal vendettas of Subandrio and Saleh became increas ingly irrelevant to the political arena. Moreover, these vendettas served most damagingly to depreciate popular Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 265] === 254 confidence in the Soekarno government. This was, however, but one of many axes of contention which gained special prominence in the first two months of 1966. Manifestations of the looming S o e k a m o - S u h a r t o con frontation were discernible in conflicts among newspapers, in the generally Soekarno-favoring Indonesian H e r a l d, Dwikora, Indonesia Djaya, Genta, Pelopor, and Warta Peladjar posed against the rightist Kompas, Abad Muslimin, Angkatan Bersendjata, Berita Y u dha. Api Pantjasila, Djihad and Puta Masjarakat. Gradually the special interests promoted by each of these (and many other) papers were submerged in the dominant Soekarno-Suharto confrontation. Intensity of anti communist editorial sentiment became one measure by which citizens could assess the general temper of a political faction thought to be represented. A further measure was the test of how staunchly a paper continued to rail against Nekolim. Neither Soekarno nor Suharto succumbed to the temptation of public confrontation and even in those rare instances when they did indulge in public repartS, the innuendo was difficult to discern. The Djakarta political public spent much of its time on these occasions poring over the subtle strokes of Soekarno's and Suharto's verbal stilettos. The two major concerns of this study have been the narrative treatment and analysis of student/youth political Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 266] === 255 involvement and the significance of this involvement in more universal political terms. Both concerns gain special vivid ness in this December-January period. The emergent prominence of student/youth activities meshes with a question which probably stands uppermost in the mind of political analysts. This is the question of whether student/youth political activity, however noisy it may become and whatever its degree of organization, can ever be regarded as more than a superficial manifestation of the "real" dynamics of conflict which operate in the larger, and generally older, body politic.* A corrollary question is the political scientist's concern with how the significance of student/youth political activity can adequately be measured. The approach taken in this study is quite frankly a loose one. The December-January period presents a consistently sustained recurrence of certain kinds of incidents all directly involving student/youth activity. The quantity and similarity of these incidents warrants an attempt to categorize them, both for purposes of narrative 1. Michael Harrington suggests the dimensions of the problem with regard to the 1968 student events in France: "The traditional radical--and even academic sociological-wisdom holds that there is no such thing as a 'youth class' and that young people must therefore be analyzed according to their different environments, occupations, aspirations and the like. Yet in the curious alliance of lycde students, collegians, blousons noirs and young workers, a generational solidarity may have transcended class lines. Whether or not this is the case one cannot know at this point. Yet the possibility is there and if such a transcendence of class did occur, it will require a rewriting of all the political textbooks." "Wisdom and Unwisdom," The New Republic, July 20!, 1968, p. 25. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 267] === clarity and as an effort to gain insight into the larger categorical significance of student/youth politics under certain conditions. Yet the essential task is viewed here as the elucidation of Indonesian student/youth political activities. The dynamics of those activities were most vivid in the December-January period. As frequently stated already, a key question of the postOctober months was whether or not the mass mobilization thrust of the Guided Democracy period would be maintained. An object of Guided Democracy was to diminish the prominence of primordial groups as the basic unit for individuals' social allegiance and replace them with an ardently national istic, centrist,oriented and mobilization-minded focus. One might argue that President Soekarno's concept of nation offered associative connections for the individual which were functionally homologous to those found in primordial groups. We have argued that the action organizations of the post-October period were qualitatively different both from the national mass organizations of Guided Democracy and from the primordially oriented political parties and other groups of the post-independence years of parliamentary democracy. The mode of organization, the nature of leadership, and the relative degree of issue-orientation support this thesis. And yet, for all these differences, one is compelled to recognize the degree of relativity rather than the degree of change. The dramatic events of December-January are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 268] === 257 intrinsically worthy of descriptive attention, if only because so many Indonesians were moved by them. But if one measures the organizational development with indices such as structure, group representation, method of leadership succes sion, and scope of program, then the drama pales considerably and different kinds of questions arise. The political scientist may find that factors such as communism-anti communism, Guided Democracy-Parliamentary Democracy, Old Order-New Order--which is to say the distinctions between manifest systems--are neither as interesting nor as important as the apparently dominant continuities of style, political culture and other customary features. Evidence for the superordinate significance of these latter factors is amply provided in the December-January period. Ironically, the student/youth generation in most societies is the element most free to set a new course and at the same time most harnessed to the nurturing environment. We have already demonstrated in earlier chapters the extent to which the emergence of action organizations, particularly student/ youth organizations was favored by the fortuitous circumstance of political vacuum. It is thus interesting that the major student organization, KAMI, at the same time it was most actively pursuing an image of radical advocacy, was also operating in an associative style largely customary to existing Indonesian political culture. This was no less true of other student/youth action groups as well. Save for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 269] === 258 avowedly communist elements, there was virtually no Indonesian political leader or faction for which one could not find instances of at least superficially voluntary and amicable association with any other leader or group during the DecemberJanuary period. This was true of student/youth relations with established elements, such as top subordinates of the President, Army leaders, the technical experts, Soekarno himself, politi cal organizations Moreover, (orpol), and mass organizations (ormas). it was true also of relations among all the current ly most active student/youth groups themselves. This was at a time when the most bitter and decisive political contests were being fought, when across the country literally hundreds of thousands of persons perished as a result. Thus, once again the tendency to assume that political events at the national level--those involving the top leadership echelons of institutions and the incidents of urban, and especially, Djakarta, politics--manifest the real substance of national politics must be severely tempered by the knowledge that all was not civilities and punctured auto tires. student/youth activism in Djakarta ( a n d The drama of other large cities) was symbolic of, and therefore meaningful to, the citizenry of 2. Explanation of this phenomena may include: the lesser political sophistication of the rural areas, the increasing rather than decreasing socio-economic gap between urban and rural areas during the pre-October period, the perhaps traditional symbolic quality of Indonesian centers of political power, the freer (and heavier) hand which the military could indulge in martial law and hinterland areas. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 270] === 259 the nation at large, yet to some extent it remained just that, a drama, on a stage which was lit because all others were short-circuited. In January 1966 virtually all elements of Indonesian politics in Djakarta tried to ignore or think away the glaring fact that the nation was no longer gravitating toward crisis but was already in the midst of chaos, a state of chaos easily patching the other great instances of social disintegration recorded in the history of the world. The natural insulation protecting national level politics in Djakarta and contributing to the sense of unreality felt by the foreign observer, thus lent itself, for longer than might have been the case had the violence been more immediate, to attempts by all political elements to order the chaos. This took varied forms, most simply, the attempt to sustain the past by ever more insistent affirmation of its basic tenets, or the attempt to retain but reorder the precepts of the past by definitively isolating a causal agent (or agents) responsible for the current difficulties. Students and youth proverbially are by nature more simple in motivation, more clear of perception more ideal istic, and conversely, less consciously attached to ulterior motives, as yet untamed, not yet subdued, by the tragedies of life, and unready to accept the burden of jading experience. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 271] === 260 It was thus not just the circumstance of political vacuum which prompted student/youth political activism, nor were the clever manipulations of established politicians primarily responsible. Other factors equal, students and youth were by nature and by previous modes of political socialization the best equipped political element to exercise imagination and enthusiastically experiment with the resulting insights. By the close of 1965 student/youth forces constituted a political sector with which senior politicians had to contend. In turn, senior politicians handled student/youth activism in ways consistent with their own political dispositions. There were some who attempted to ignore the activism or categorically depreciated its significance. But most sought to manipulate the new forces to advantage,; that is, to restore the cohesiveness of Guided Democracy, to strengthen further the power of generally rightist groups vis-h-vis both Soekarno and the PKI, or simply to retain or build personal support in the face of a highly uncertain future. Talks to student/youth groups in fact became the primary vehicle through which to address the general public on political topics of any sort. One reason for this trend was that the student/youth groups, while activist and of constant interest to the media, were relatively indistinct 3. For further discussion of the political socialization of Indonesian students see Stephen A. Douglas, Political Socialization in Indonesia (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1967). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 272] === 261 in terms of traditional Indonesian political alignments and thus offered a certain protective cover. Some politicians tried to dismiss student activitism as the shenanigans of rich people's children surfeited with time and money. Ruslan Abdulgani (Coordinating Minister of the Compartment of Public Relations), South Sumatra Attorney General R. Sugiharto SH (also the Pantjatunggal of South Sumatra), and Sudibjo (Minister/Secretary-General of the National Front) were among many who expressed this view and who may have taken their lead from Soekarno's December speech to KAMI. Others, such as Soemantri, Rector of the University of Indonesia, quickly came forth in staunch defense of the students, contending that far from ill-behaved, they exhibited heroism in both pursuing their studies and participating as effective citizens despite poverty of means and grossly inadequate facilities. Soemantri pointed out that transporta tion costs alone virtually prohibited attendance of classes by both students and teachers. State vehicles, which were supposed to transport teachers to the university, were no longer available. The few University-owned vehicles had to be sold just to provide money for minimal transportation costs. Use of public transportation was impossible, since a faculty 4. See pp. 245-247 above. Ruslan spoke at Wisma Warta in Djakarta at the closing session of an indoctrination course for students (see Berita Yudha, Jan. 3, 1966); Sugiharto addressed the celebration of the opening of the Palembang chapter of PMII (see Duta Masiarakat, Jan. 3, 1966); Sudibjo spoke to demonstrators from tne Presidium of the Front Pemuda Pusat (Central Youth Front) at the National Front Secretariat building in Djakarta (Sinar Harapan, Jan.. 10, 1966). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 273] === 262 m e m b e r ’s total monthly salary was the equivalent of no more than a few days' bus fares. A single cheap textbook, when available, cost the student the equivalent of several months of a faculty member's salary.^ Claims that academic activism stemmed from riches and idleness thus were regarded as fatuous in the extreme. In fact, these allegations undoubtedly served to expand the ranks of activists and focus their attention ever more vigorously upon the basic ills of the socio economic environment. As unexaggerated as Soemantri's illustration about trans portation costs was, there was nonetheless some truth in the allegations of Soekarno, Ruslan and others. Despite the proliferation of institutions of higher education during Guided Democracy and the general popularization and increased availability of education at all levels, the socio-economic composition of faculties and student bodies continued to be highly elitist, especially at those institutions of established and recognized academic worth, such as the University of Indonesia. Whatever the economic plight of public institutions in the post-October period, both teachers and students continued to regard themselves and to be regarded by the general public as occupying highly enviable positions in Indonesian society. If the number of motor scooters, the quality and stylishness 5. Sinar Harapan, Jan. 4, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 274] === 263 of clothing and the kinds of food consumed are valid indica tors, then one must assume that the resources of parents in many cases were still sufficient to offset the ostensibly impossible burden reflected in the statistics cited above. There is no concrete information on just how severely the general deterioration of the Indonesian economy over the preceding several years had drained the previous accumulated resources of students’ parents. Queries posed in the post- October period lead me to believe that the residual resources of parents in most cases were nearly exhausted. In any event it was clear that both students and faculty perceived of themselves and their institutions as suffering acute financial duress. It was equally clear to them that the charge that their political activism was motivated by wealth and idleness would find many a receptive ear, considering the actual com parative advantage they enjoyed relative to society at large. If this socio-economic difference was true in Djakarta, it was doubly true in smaller cities of the country. Everywhere, however, students (and many young faculty) experienced ambivalent popular response to their activist forays. Many students, often with the encouragement of their parents, responded to the charges concerning their motivations with renewed commitment, as if to prove to society the seriousness of a cause common to everyone. The students would have to prove, as did their parents in the '"45 Revolution," that they were legitimately situated on the true rails of Indonesia's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 275] === 264 revolutionary destiny. With several years' retrospective view it is evident that the transfer of power ultimately resulting in the Suharto presidency constituted a major change in the substance of Indonesian political life and in the general perceptions of political leaders. Considering the degree of political violence attending the transfer of power and the degree to which the character of the former Government was identified with an individual political leader, Soekarno, such a state ment appears to belabor the obvious. Yet one of fhe most salient features about the January-June 1966 period of greatest student/youth activism and of Indonesian politics generally during that period, was not a thrust toward radicalism and revolution, but rather the desperate attempt to perceive and describe desired changes in the language of reform. The PKI was to be banned, not to demolish the previous political process, but to reform behavior fully within the precepts of Guided Democracy. Retionalization of the economy also was discussed almost exclusively in terms of rational administration rather than structure. It was person nel who needed to be replaced, not structural elements of the system or the system itself. Demands for retooling the Cabinet meant the appointment of more honest and capable members, with training and experience relevant to the position occupied. This was another matter of reform, in no way intended to challenge the functions of the Cabinet, its size, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 276] === 265 or its structural place in the governmental system. other words, the three major issues formulated by KAMI, which became the major issues of the entire national political arena, were basically matters of reform and were popularly perceived as such. The enormity of the violence, the eclipse of S o e k a m o and the PKI, and the apparently dramatic shift in the international arena, collectively contributed to the retrospective view of many Indonesians concerning the 1965-1966 period. The magnitude of the pogrom, the totality of the PKI's eclipse, the lingering shame of S o e k a m o ' s demise, and the facile categorization of Indonesia's regimes by the international community--all demanded popular explana tion. If the differences between the "Old Order" and the "New Order" were indeed so great, then it behooved all citizens and all political groups to assert their earliest possible identification with the latter. Even by late in 1966 it had become very unwise for anybody to recall in detail the positions individuals and groups had taken early in the year. The temper of reform yielded before the need to justify radical change. Students and youth, perhaps more than any other element of Indonesian society, set about the futile but universal pastime of perpetuating the sense of relevance and immediacy of their most euphoric moments. Political developments in January 1966 were refonnoriented despite the drama of much of the student/youth activism. If there was a theme to the month's activities, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 277] === 266 it was the concerted attempt by all elements to reiterate the basic priorities of the nation, all the while escalating the power confrontation among political groups and endeavor ing to define certain qualifications of basic priorities in such a way as to build power without arousing popular suspicion that national priorities were under attack. By January no speeches or organizational statements, with the exception of those by S o e k a m o, were failing to omit endorsement of the demand that the PKI be banned. One typical example was a statement made by Johnny G. Sondakh, a major national student leader, in denouncing the South Sumatra military commander's decision to disband all elementary and high school mass organizations. Representing the Presidium of the High School Student Front (Front Peladjar), he recited the usual demand that the PKI arid its mass organizations be banned. However, he also called on all high school students in the national to remain steadfast in their loyalty to the Pantja Azimat Revolusi and to the struggle to implement Pantjasila Sosialisme. They were to await the commands of the President (Soekamo) and avoid the divisive influences of Gestapu/Nekolim.^ Within a few months statements such as Sondakh's became unthinkable in domestic politics and would have branded their proponents as heretics and traitors. The term, "Gestapu/Nekolim," gained frequent use only during that period when political leaders 6. Api Pantjasila, Jan. 8, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 278] === 267 were still trying to be selective about how large a sector of the population ought to be damned by alleged association with the Old Order subversive political forces. "Gestapu" by January, 1966, came to mean not only those alleged communists involved directly in the October 1 assassinations but more inclusively, all those whose active subversion of the Revolution stemmed from the general influence of the left. "Nekolim," used in conjunction with "Gestapu,11 hedged the possible comprehensiveness of application implicit in the idea of leftist influence and recognized the continued importance of one of Guided Democracy’s pet bogeymen, the kind of subversive who served the interests of the ’’Free World," especially the former colonial metropoles. More seriously, Sondakh1s support of Pantja Azimat by summer, 1966, would have been regarded as indicating strong sympathy with the PKI, since Pantja Azimat included Nasakom, and one component of Nasakom was "communist." Even the call to await the President's commands and the talk of "Pantjasila Socialism" were to become unacceptable political language (under the claim that pantjasila was an indivisible concept). The Sondakh statement, repeated in substance by many other leaders and in countless organizational statements at about the same time, is significant as an illustration of the predominant reform-orientation. Sondakh, despite his clear identification with rightist political forces, and the High School Student Front, despite its strong anti- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 279] === 268 communism in the post-October period, still were operating on the basic assumption of systemic continuity. While staking out as strong as possible a power position under the fortuitous circumstances of the anti-PKI campaign, it was believed that return to normalcy was only a matter of time. It would then be necessary, consistent with the character of Indonesian political culture, to seek compromise. Those closest to the rails of revolutionary dogma would then, as always, benefit most. The language of student activism was still the language of reform. Neither the political system nor any of its structures were yet recognized, at least publicly, as challengeable. This was not merely student naivet6, for their political elders were even more sedulous in their display of reformist attitude. Newspapers, especially those politically aligned with elements supporting the President, while admitting to the severity of some national problems, indulged in almost daily affirmation of the Government's general health: short, the ideological guidelines of the Revolution laid down by the Great Leader of the Revolution have undergone no change during the aftermath of the 'GESTOK' program. General Nasution (Coordinating Minister/Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Menko/KASAB), a man who manifestly wishes to be remembered as "chief anti-communist" and "staunch opponent of S o e k a m o, " in January, 1966, was admonishing 7. Dwikora, Jan. 5, 1966, editorial. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 280] === 269 audiences not to go so far as to fall into "Nekolim's antiO communist trap." He advised students to curb criticism and bend their efforts toward helping the established leadership of the State to maintain law and order. In Djakarta the possibility of promoting Nasution to the vacant Vice-Presidency was seriously discussed, and there seemed to be effort by several political groups to start a grass roots movement to that end. 10 Quite naturally the language of reform grew loudest as systemic cohesion approached its breaking point. From the point of view of many tens of thousands of people across the country, especially in rural areas, the breaking point already had been reached, as amply attested by the flow of blood. In Djakarta and other large cities politics continued to be played in civilities and maneuver. Hunting communists was not the urban dweller's problem. was, however, exposed daily to the consequences of economic mismanagement, bureaucratic stasis, and the outrage of elitists' high living coupled with their imperviousness to popular problems. The breaking point in Djakarta is measurable in terms of the crystalization of issues and the development of active 8. Ibid. 9. At the Seminar on Economic and Financial Problems, held at the University of Indonesia and sponsored jointly by KAMI and the Economics Faculty. Nasution's speech was on Jan. 13. See Paget, "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs, XL:3 and 4 (Fall and Winter, 1968), pp. 303^304. 10. See Api Pantjasila, Jan. 8, 1966; Nusa Putera, Jan. 17, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 281] === 270 popular interest in them. Conversely, it is also measurable in terms of the Government's increasingly frantic efforts to prevent the crystalization of issues and its inability to sustain the most conventional substitute, i.e., public ceremonies enlisting popular affirmation of national ideological precepts. Persons like Nasution were oddly distant from the dynamic center of these developments. The General was a high ranking member of the Government, though he was no longer a confidant, of the President and did not sit with the real decision makers. At the same time, he was one of the top-ranking original advocates of Guided Democracy and still provided vigorous public support for virtually all of the pre-October policies. The fact that he had been a target of assassination in October and that as early as 1961 he had been replaced by S o e k a m o as Army Chief of Staff, contributed to his relatively independent popular identity in 1966. For several reasons this identity was nonetheless difficult to transform into political power. As a consistent advocate of Guided Democracy and its policies, Nasution could not suddenly change easily to arch critic. With the post-October 1 dramatic military actions essentially the work of others, with no direct personal command of any military units, and with other personal problems, Nasution did not, and probably could not, capture popular imagination as did several lesser known and lower ranking military officers. In the fall of 1965 he attempted Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 282] === 271 to operate as a popular politician, but, due in part to undramatic and generally inadequate oratorical skills and to a poor sense of timing, his performance was fitful and unconvincing. To students and youth Nasution remained a "good guy" and elder statesman (though he was only 47) de serving respectful deference, and distance. Finally, discussed earlier, the fall of 1965 provided a long-awaited opportunity for the reemergence of many individuals and groups who for various reasons had been on the fringe of public activity or unable to participate at all. The newly popular military commanders, the new boldness of many civilian leaders, and especially the emergence of action groups characterized by youthfulness, imagination and daring, posed a challenge to the inertia of the Establishment. Even the Establishment "good guys" could not keep apace the spirit of change, or counter the scepticism of old answers, of Guided Democracy. Students and youth came to epitomize this spirit and thus moved almost inexorably toward a new realism with regard to the state of the nation. S o e k a m o told Bernhard Dahm in October, 1966, that he had supported nasakom in 1926 and would support it on his deathbed.This commitment by S o e k a m o to nasa k o m, by January 1966 brought to a temporary stalemate the central post-October 1 issue of public discussion and political 11. Bernhard Dahm, "The Rise and Fall of Soekarno," Ventures, Spring, 1969, p. 47. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. === [PDF page 283] === 272 conflict. 12 All political groups and all political leaders had gradually joined the demand for the banning of the PKI. Soekarno postponed his "political solution" and aggressively maintained his support for the nasakom concept. he would not ban the PKI. Apparently, All political groups and all political leaders affirmed their support of Guided Democracy, their loyalty to the President, and their agreement with national ideology and policies. As will be seen, they even proved willing to reaffirm publicly their dedication to Nasakom. They would not, however, tolerate the re-emergence of the PKI, hence the stalemate. The effect once again was to create a political vacuum, at least where public dis cussion and political participation were concerned. The student/youth sector took the lead among the action groups to focus searching attention on economic conditions and on 12. In citing 1926 as the beginning of nasakom S o e k a m o was referring (as he often did in speeches) to his 1926 pa m phlet, Nasionalisme^ Islamisme dan Marxisme (published in English as Nationalism, Islam and Ma r x i s m, trans. by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon, intro, by Ruth T. McVey [translation series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1969]), which was indeed an appeal for support of common nationalist interests and does offer impressive evidence of the consistent quality of Soekarno's ideas over time. It also illustrates one of Soekarno's serious debilities, his gross exaggeration, often coupled with a stance of moralist rectitude resting on the con sequent distortion. The marxism S o e k a m o wrote about in 1926, and upon which he expatiated elsewhere at length (e.g., in Indonesia Menggugatl, 1931), was wholly of the liberal-socialist, Western European variety. Resemblance of this term to the "communist" third of nasakom in the 1960fs is quite faint. Nor, of course, was there in the earlier instance any acronymic symbolism, much less con notation of easily attainable, permanently cohesive amalgam among Indonesia's political aliran (major currents). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 284] === 273 the government organ which could most conveniently be held accountable, the Cabinet. A Campaign Begins: Student/ Youth Disunity For two days running, January 10-11, KAMI mobilized large demonstrations in Djakarta, occasions which eventually came to be commonly regarded as the commencement of KAMI'S perdjuangan, or struggle. 13 The first day's activities took place at the National Secretariat building and involved trans mission of a note of protest to the President (via Saleh), presentation and discussion of the issues by action group leaders and an invitation to Chairuh Saleh, S o e k a m o ' s appointed economic reformer, to address the demonstrators, which he finally accepted late in the afternoon.1* On the second day, after receiving publicly the kind of response from Saleh KAMI undoubtedly expected, the demonstration was much less polite, with the emphasis on mobilization, shouted demands, denunciatory placards and directly obstructionist 13. Actually, the lead had already been taken two days before by the somewhat younger colleagues of KAMI in the Presi dium of the Youth Front (Front Pemuda) who had success fully undertaken the same kind of confrontation with Chairul Saleh. See Nusa Putera, Jan. 10, 1966. His cavalier response to their queries contributed to the magnitude of the larger, KAMI-led, Monday mobilization. 14. See, for instance, [KAMI], [no title page], a long pam phlet which appeared in February (39 pp.), 1966, pp. 1920; and K.A.M.I., "60 Hari Jang Menggetarkan Indonesia," Biro Penerangan, 25 October 1966, p. 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 285] === 274 activity. As usual the demonstrations were well organized and even exhibited a flair which reminded some onlookers of the Pemuda Rakjat and other PKI mass organization affairs of the recent past. On Monday morning, January 10, there was a preliminary gathering on the common of the University of Indonesia. KAMI leaders previewed the themes of the demon stration and advised their mass following on strategy and tactics. The three-fold theme was as follows: escalate the crushing of Gestapu/PKI, demand the lowering of prices, and finally, support the dissolution of PPMI. 15 These themes were elaborated in a resolution released at the preliminary gathering. KAMI did not demand the banning of the PKI and its mass organizations, but it firmly rejected the prospect of a "neo-PKI" in any form whatsoever. This was clearly a response to Soekarno's frequently adumbrated intentions. Concerning the economy, KAMI demanded reduction of prices for gasoline, oil, postage stamps and telegrams, railroad, bus and other forms of public transportation. KAMI also pressed for greater fiscal responsibility designed to stabilize the price of consumer goods and requested that the Government undertake directly the task of supplying at least the minimum daily needs of the people. KAMI argued against 15. A general account of the Monday activities appeared in AB, Jan. 11, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 286] === 275 the practicality of a political, economic, and fiscal policy exclusively designed to satisfy the interests of the State. This policy, KAMI held, was in violation of Ampera (Message of the People's Suffering, another basic national concept formulated and popularized by Soekarno), since it placed the State before the people. To substantiate the allegation KAMI played rather freely with the State/people distinction. Recent Presidential Decrees, Nos. 26 and 27, concerning respectively the sale of Government vehicles and the re valuation and replacement of the rupiah, were viewed by KAMI ieaders as potentially desirable measures.*** They were based on ideas, however, which according to KAMI leaders, derived from proposals made as early as 1962. These proposals came from labor unions in response to Soekarno's solicitation of advice on economic and fiscal reform. The Presidential Decrees were legitimate, therefore, because they originated from among "the people." Government attention were: Three suggested priorities for strict limitation for the amount of money in circulation, maintenance of sufficient reserves of basic commodities, and assiduous effort to keep budget deficits minimal. 17 KAMI thus viewed the decree that Govern ment vehicles be sold at general auction as a legitimate effort to help compensate for the mounting deficit already 16. This information is based on interviews with KAMI leaders in January, 1966. 17. These particular proposals were made by Jusuf Wibisono on behalf of Gasbiindo, the major Islamic labor union. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 287] === 276 incurred. Similarly, the decree re-valuating (to some extent, devaluating) the currency was accepted by some as an effort to restore confidence in the rupiah. Though there were rampant rumors about counterfeit currency, the Government, especially Chairul Saleh, had explained the decree basically as a fiscal control measure. KAMI recognized the Presidential Decrees as sinerely motivated and possibly efficacious, but emphasized that they were also rooted in the popular will. Implementation and related measures, to the contrary, KAMI considered inimical to the fulfillment of the policy objectives. On these matters KAMI spoke of "the State" or "the Government," leaving noticeably open the question of whether this included Soekarno. The term, Government, however did appear to be becoming synonymous with the power group within the Cabinet, i.e., with those persons who collectively or individually were the implementers of Presidential policy. Government officials, instead of auctioning off the vehicles, sold them to themselves on installment plans whose terms varied according to particular officials' power. Not only was the Government losing a large number of vehicles but it was forfeiting their monetary worth as well. With monetary depreciation moving at a rate of several thousand percent a year, only a fractional return on the initial price would eventually reach Government coffers. Now, in addition to income gained from the standard practice already in force, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 288] === 277 of renting out a Government vehicle for taxi service or other transportation purposes (this was commonly done even by p e r sons of ministerial rank), the new owner would actually possess one of the best hedges against inflation and monetary depre ciation available in the Indonesian economy. From the point of view of KAMI, responsibility for implementation of the sale of Government vehicles fell ultimately upon Chairul Saleh, and other powerful Cabinet ministers. The "Government" had failed to accomplish the intention of Presidential Decree No. 26. Government boondogling and personal benefit once again had taken precedence over service to the people and effective economic reform. Monetary re-valuation appeared to have even more p re dictably adverse consequences than the sale of Government vehicles. To students and to many others the condition of the economy moved from bad to "catastrophic" during the single month subsequent to the December re-valuation. The Government had promised to raise the real wages of civil servants, and, perhaps with this in mind, moved to increase transportation' and fuel costs commensurately. The sudden 400 percent increases would presumably augment Government revenues as well. Salaries failed to increase, and the work of Government offices came virtually to a standstill, as civil servants found they could no longer afford transporta tion. In the marketplace prices skyrocketed, both because of the increased costs of transportation and distribution Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 289] === 278 and because of the Government’s own example. scarce, Goods grew and hoarding soon set in among the few who could afford it. The monetary re-valuation, sponsored and imple mented by Chairul Saleh, became the symbol of short-sighted, clumsy and self-serving senior bureaucrats. The final theme of the January 10 gathering was a declaration of full support and endorsement of the dissolu tion of PPMI, the former major national university student front, dissolved by its member groups a few weeks before. Inclusion of this particular theme evidenced the continuing, and, in some ways mounting, internecine battles of the student/youth movement. A number of groups did not recognize the legitimacy of their own leaders who participated in the PPMI dissolution. Also, as the general political significance of the student/youth movement mounted, older politicians cultivated particular groups and leaders to represent their interests in this new major dimension of Indonesian political life. KAMI still had a long row to hoe before attaining its full measure of representational potential. Nevertheless, the basic themes of the resolution and demonstration were closely enough related to the concerns of most Indonesians to attract their attention and to com mand response from the Government. Chairul Saleh, Third Deputy Prime Minister and hence fourth ranking official of the Government, provided the response. All governmental activities concerning the economy, he said, were prescribed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 290] === 279 by Presidential Decree (Penpres). As far as implementation was concerned, Saleh stood prepared to make any revisions necessary, consistent with Presidential policy. Saleh could not respond personally to the students1 demands but would be glad to forward them to the President for his consideration. Occasionally the speech was interrupted by direct questions from student leaders, such as: why were there virtually no rice and sugar in the market place and why were prices, supposedly under Government control, so high the public could not pay them? The gathering was assured that ample rice and sugar were available in Government godowns. Coming, as this admission did, from the official ostensibly most influential over economic matters, the response was decidedly cool. It was a massive response, not just from KAMI or from the rest of the demonstrators present, but from a wide spectrum of influential adult politicians, and from the general public. from the media It represented a major change, an escalation, in the political dimensions of the power conflict. Most mildly there was endorsement of the KAMI resolution, recognition that it manifested grievances held by many citizens, and a suggestion that if the object of raising fuel, transportation and other costs was to provide a budget surplus for the Government, then priorities ought to be reconsidered with an eye to easing the daily burden of the people. 18 More commonly there was direct evaluation 18. BY, Jan. 11, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 291] === 280 of the Saleh-student interchange and bitingly sarcastic commentary on what the incident revealed about the workings of the Government and the morality of top officials. 19 An editorial in KOMPAS, the most informed and articulate of the nation's newspapers during this period, was repre sentative of these views: The dramatic actions of youth and students at the National Secretariat on Veteran Street, have revealed the deepest concerns of the people. Youth and students, in expressing their reluctance to shoulder the mounting burden of Government economic and financial regulations, are voicing what is a widely felt general dissatisfaction. The public cannot help wonder if the Government means to extinguish the very capacity to sustain life. Thus we must recount an interesting dialogue between the Government--represented by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chairul Saleh--and students and youth, beloved children of the People. From that dialogue we learn that goods have vanished from the market place and from among the people. Basic commodities, such as rice and sugar, are not to be found in the market place. And, when they are available, the price shoots up each day until the general public cannot afford to pay. Such was the grievance put forward by the youth and students as spokesmen for the people. The Government replied: there is rice and sugar in the godowns. According to a journalist who witnessed the scene, the youth and students departed quite unsatisfied. This admission by officials prompts two questions. First, why is there no co-ordination between officials who regulate the rise of prices and officials who keep the market place stocked? Rises in prices should not be announced and put into force until the supply and distribution of goods is adequate to sustain these new burdens. Currently officials fail to co-ordinate their activities--even for the good of the general public. What are we to conclude? 19. For one of the most critical commentaries, see the editorial in Nusa Putera, Jan. 10, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 292] === 281 It is no longer any secret that ever since preGestapu days, there has been little cooperation within the circle of Government officials. Each acts independently, and the consequences are cer tainly disturbing. The second question: if there really is ample stock in the godowns, why doesn’t the Government official in charge quickly get it to the market? And, if there is sabotage, why have firm steps not been taken, in accord with the dictates of justice and the interest of the general public? If a Government official is unable to take the steps necessary within his responsibility to the people, then where do his power and responsibility lie? If things have actually come to this pass, shouldn’t the concerned official act like a ksatria [knight]; that is, submit his resignation from office and give someone else an opportunity to discharge these duties adequately? For a long time society has been asking, why we don't observe the custom of resigning, in ksatria fashion, when we show our selves clearly unwilling to perform duties con ferred in the name of service to the general public. Had we respected this custom, things wou l d surely never have degenerated into the present mess. At the very least, such a solution would help over come the problem we now f a c e. 2 0 Given the style of Indonesian political metaphor--formal language, studied politeness, innuendo--this constituted a scathing indictment of public policy and a direct vote of no-confidence in the highest level of officialdom. It could no longer be assumed that the generally accepted practice in political commentaries would continue, of emotional but opaque generalities, of criticism restricted carefully to the fringes of officials' and of ritualistic, and Government agencies' activities, lugubrious affirmation of loyalty to the 20. Kompas, Jan. 11, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 293] === 282 Great Leader of the Revolution, whatever the subject under consideration. KOMPAS, in choosing to regard the Salehstudent/youth dialogue as a Government-student/youth dialogue, and by implying that it could also be viewed as a GovernmentPeople dialogue, cut through several layers of customary obfuscation. Irrespective of the special political interests, and probable ulterior motives, of a group like KAMI, an official like Saleh, or a newspaper like KOMPAS (which was true of any other groups, officials or newspapers as well), it was a simple and obvious truth that economic privation was an immediate and pressing problem for most citizens. Popular confidence in Government power and authority began to depend on the effectiveness of its treatment of this problem. The Saleh-student/youth dialogue evidently raised serious question for KOMPAS as to the integrity, competence and efficiency of particular high officials, and moTe importantly, as to the capacity of the Government as a whole to provide minimally adequate leadership toward the solution of a problem the citizenry perceived as critical. The seriousness of*the problem was attested by the number of newspapers which now began to acknowledge the student/youth movement as the most legitimate popular vanguard. This acknowledgment was in turn tantamount to a widespread admis sion that the established political process was verging on bankruptcy, that the myriad political, governmental and administrative structures of the State had reached their limit of resiliency, and that adult human resources had grown Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 294] === 283 adulterated or, by the accumulated inertia of inaction,, had rendered themselves ineligible for undertaking the task at hand. The students and youth were mute and peaceful as they departed from the dialogue session with the "Government.*1 Their answer came the following day. Financial inability to commute to school was transformed into a "lecture strike," a strike against attending classes. and youth took to the streets. By the thousands, students In demonstrations they focused their demands on the Government's recent se.veralthousand-per-cent hikes in fuel and transportation costs. More dramatically, they began to demonstrate their capacity to disturb the equanimity of the bureaucrats and to affect the basic activities of the capitol. Only a few minutes were required to bring traffic to a standstill on all the major arteries of the city. backed up for miles. Under searing midday heat vehicles Before being allowed to pass they were plastered or painted with signs, special attention being given to the cars of bureaucrats, ministers, diplomats (domestic and foreign) sample: and other apparent elitists. A representative "Stop the Rise in Prices," "ABRI is the Protector of the People," "PPMI is the same as Gestapu," "The People Eat Rice, not Promises," "ABRI doesn't Eat Bullets, but Rice, No?" out] Stupid Ministers Demonstrators shouted "Retool [kick [menteri goblok]" and demanded that the Government rethink its position concerning the hike in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 295] === 284 fuel and transportation costs. There were even some crudely printed but openly anti-Soekarno pamphlets handed out (angrily disclaimed by KAMI and held to be the work of Gestapu sub versives). The contagion of collective emotional enterprise ricocheted through the city, as citizens witnessed the capacity of students and youth to Mdo something." Instruc tions from the virtually defunct University Student Assembly not to disrupt traffic, not to be distructive, and to maintain discipline fell on deaf ears.^* Major newspapers again followed the student/youth lead by featuring their activities and by editorializing on the public issues involved. Government," "Presidential hangers-on," " force majeure in the hands of pseudo-leaders hiding behind the power of Bung K a m o, " "National Front Gestapu collaborators," these phrases and others were common fare. The President himself was immune and would remain so as long as the editors continued to have faith in Guided Democracy and in the legitimacy of S o e k a m o as propounder of the ideological concepts and as general strategist for the nation. The perspective of the editors was of course conditioned by the ever shifting balance of power among that large group of officials--national and local, military and civilian--who might exercise jurisdiction, if not challenged, to close down or otherwise impair their operations. 21. See AB, Jan. 13, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 296] === 285 Nonetheless, the major newspapers did appear quite sincere in their concern with the issues which the student/youth movement was articulating. Some did in fact see the student/youth activities, as pointed out above, as symptomatic in themselves of impending wholesale systemic disaffection. 22 Seemingly drastic reform measures, such as the resignation or firing of a number of top level government officials and the mobilizing of all Government resources to the task of p r o viding basic commodities, would actually constitute no more than the minimal steps necessary to surmount the national crisis. Failure to take these measures, they pointed out, could easily result in political extremism and a popular fanaticism undoubtedly directed at the Government. The editors realized that society would be the loser in terms of violence, increased turmoil and worsened economic condi tions. From the student/youth confrontations it appeared very questionable that vital reform leadership would emanate from the "Government within the Government" comprising people like Chairul Saleh or Subandrio. 23 Frustration, on this issue, on the ban-the-PKI issue, and bred of their own history of bluntly doused enthusiasms, provided the circum stances upon which editors and many others began to take seriously the proverbial urge to purge, to rid Indonesian Government of its most convenient cancer, the "neo-PKI" and "neo-Gestok" or "neo-Gestapu" elements. To some extent this 22. See, for.instance, the editorial in Api Pantjasila, Jan. 12, 1966. 23. Api Pantjasila, Jan. 12, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 297] === 286 development may be regarded as the complement to the massive slaughter of communists, alleged communists and sympathizers which was already engulfing rural Indonesia and hinterland towns and cities. There too, youth constituted a vanguard of the Revolution, albeit much more closely tied to military and conservative religious elements. Competition among various student/youth groups mounted, as the student/youth activism met with increasing success in the national political arena. The original emergence of KAMI brought to surface a new grouping of leaders, some of whom were from previously insignificant component organizations and others who had only come to positions of leadership of component organizations in the post-October 1 weeks. Now, several months later, they represented the collective leader ship of what was the most popular student/youth group in the nation. Leaders of previously existing fronts and federations, though in some cases sympathetic with the objectives of KAMI, found themselves increasingly removed from the center of dramatic action. Their component member organizations, in whole or in part, gravitated toward the banner of KAMI. The dissolution of the major national student federation, the PPMI (Federation of Indonesian University Student Associations), voted on December 23 by representatives of some of its component organizations, who were committed to its replacement Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 298] === 287 by KAMI, demonstrated the momentum of this movement. was really at this point that serious competition began, for the relationship between component student/youth organizations and their various fronts and federations was analogous to the relationship between political parties and the National Front. Support was cheap and the return included gay celebrations, congresses, and other get-togethers in Djakarta, perhaps even a voice in the palace and occasional pork barrel. Membership so long as it posed no threat to the primordial cohesiveness of the component group, remained a convenient, if sometimes extravagant, investment. In the case of PPMI representatives of two substantial organizations, PPMII and PMKRI (respectively subsidiaries of the NU and Catholic political parties), plus the tiny aggregate groups of SOMAL, and GMRI, undertook to disband the Federation, as though they alone had comprised the Federation's member organizations. This posed a direct challenge to the several PPMI organizations not allowed to participate in the decision. While there were few students who still might have objected to the exclusion of CGMI, PERHIMI and GERMINDO, the absence of HMI, GMNI, and GMKI was another matter. The combined membership of the latter organizations amounted to several times the total membership of those organizations whose representatives participated in the dissolution decision. And they were joined in exclusion by several other, minor Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 299] === 288 organizations, such as SEMMI, HMB and G M D. ^ The effect was a) to insinuate a connection between the excluded organiza tions and the anathematized CGMI, PERHIMI, and GERMINDO; to suggest that the participant organizations were those closest to the current temper of national student activism; and c) to imply that the excluded organizations were powerless to resist. There were other dimensions to the issue, such as the variety of excluded organizations. HMI was a relatively independent, modernist Islamic group, ethnically mostly Outer Islander. It had been the largest and most active of those groups in the pre-Gestapu days still opposing the leftistradical character of student political activity. The suddenly improved atmosphere of the fall 1965 political scene offered to HMI an irresistable opportunity. Without too much effort it could expect to achieve much greater influence within the national level of student activity, that is, in the leadership of the PPMI. GMNI on the other hand, statistically the largest of all university student organizations, but suffering under the leadership divisions of its parent organizations, the PNI, saw itself as the logical heir to leadership of the "progressive revolutionary" student forces of Guided Democracy. Now that the communist organizations were defunct, this was GMNI’s great chance to command 24. The discontent of some of these groups is described in an article in Warta Peladjar, Jan. 9, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 300] === 289 influence commensurate with its huge membership which p r e viously remained foreclosed by the general disunity of the Nationalist Party. 25 There were good, if differing, reasons for these and other organizations to be unhappy with the dissolution of the PPMI. In several instances, membership had been gravitating very rapidly toward the banner of KAMI. This was most notably true of HMI, but it was substantially true of GMKI, SEMMI, and GMD as well. As for the GMNI, virtually the entire rightist wing, and many of the moderates, were moving into the KAMI ranks. Hence, those who were responsible for the dissolution of PPMI knew that leaders of the excluded elements had already lost much of their previous influence within their own organizations. HMI had in fact already moved into a Presidium position within KAMI. The fact that serious protest did not commence until several weeks after the dissolution of PPMI indicates another dimension of the problem. It was not until the new year that the magnitude of student/youth activism and its capacity popularize issues became fully apparent. Soekarno's en counters with HMI and then with KAMI in late December fore shadowed the serious attention adult political organizations would be compelled to give student/youth politics in the new 25. A number of January newspaper accounts disclosed efforts in this direction, often in corporation with several other organizations, such as Germindo, Gema Bung Karno (GMK), GSNI, and GPM. See Warta Peladjar, Jan. 9, 1966; Kompas, Jan. 18, 1966; FBIS, Djakarta Domestic Service, Jan. 2 6 1966; Pelopor, dan. 29, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 301] === 290 year. It is questionable whether the dissolution of PPMI, however insulting, would have evoked the eventual reaction from the excluded organizations had it not been for the encouragement of Government officials and adult politicians. The only way they could counter the dangerously independent but Army-protected KAMI was to elicit cooperation from sympathetic groups on the fringe or outside the new Front. A further dimension of the ensuing tug of war was the underlying uncertainty of KAMI'S own general objectives. KAMI was distinguishing itself by mobilizing public attention nationally around several specific issues: lower prices, retool the Cabinet. ban the PKI, Organizationally, however, KAMI was nothing but a loose amalgam of established groups, most of whose representatives still retained primary identi fication with the basic group. Were some of the leaders working for eventual replacement of individual group align ments with a more homogeneous mass of members owing direct allegiance to KAMI? How far would KAMI go in opening its doors to all previously recognized student elements? Did KAMI envision, in keeping with its name, a temporary role, or did it expect to become permanent? Did it really want to assume a national political role commensurate with established adult political parties and other groups? Was it a "reform" organization or a "revolutionary" organization, i.e., would satisfaction of its announced demands suffice to conclude operations, or were these demands merely a cloak for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 302] === 291 accomplishing systemic change? Did KAMI'S proclaimed desire to help rescue Guided Democracy require support for such features as Nasakom, Pantja Azimat, and the Djakarta-Peking axis? How many of these features could be rejected without rejecting, or appearing to reject, Guided Democracy itself? Was S o e k a m o still the beloved Great Leader, or a senile, irascible old man, or both? Could KAMI convince him of the venality of many of his subordinates without incurring his implacable hostility? What were the real objectives of KAMI'S Army sympathizers? What would be the consequences of KAMI's dependence upon the Army for trucks, printing and other media facilities, and general protection? These ques tions have been posed with regard just to the single most prominent vehicle of student/youth movement in early 1966. The answers would depend at least as much on the disposition of other political elements and their initiatives, as upon any courses of action KAMI might undertake. KAMI'S uncer tainty about its own identity was clearly reflected in the student/youth organizational competition of January. The "liquidation" of PPMI, allegedly the work of KAMI proponents, incurred strong protest from GMNI, GMKI, GMD andHMB. These organizations officially repudiated the dissolution and announced that the Sixth PPMI Congress would begin February 1. They attested to the "progressive revolutionary" quality of PPMI as a "forum of the Progressive 26. Warta Peladjar, Jan. 9, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 303] === 292 Revolutionary National United Front’1 and declared that the renegade action had impeded the achievement of a unified Indonesian student movement ’’based upon and inspirited by the Pantja Azimat Revolusi.” 27 Area representatives from all over Indonesia were instructed to attend the Congress in Djakarta, for which, rather significantly, Sjarif Thajeb, the Minister of Higher Education, provided his strong sanction. Conversations with many student leaders and followers who at that time opposed the dissolution of PPMI suggest that a variety of motives were involved. Most common was the simple view that the dissolution was illegal. Many felt that KAMI really had little potential, and moreover, was led by a cabal of self-interested persons who did not repre sent substantial elements of their own root organizations, much less the student movement in general. This view was expressed with particular vehemence by those leaders who believed that with the demise of the communists, they could now rightfully assume positions of greater leadership so long denied them. Others believed quite honestly that the KAMI proponents were insufficiently committed to Soekarno and to the ideological precepts of Guided Democracy. During the first few months of 1966 these views and the language used to express them came to be regarded by dominant Indonesian political groups, including student/youth groups, as clear 27. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 304] === 293 indications of subversive tendencies and general opposition to the "New Order." Frequent use of the term, "progressive revolutionary," favorable attitude about the "National Front," any reference to "Pantja Azimat"--came to represent flagrant trespass on national taboos. The outlines of this kind of polarization, however, were far less clear in January than suggested in most commentaries about the period written months later. From its inception KAMI endeavored to expand its popular ity among the non-communist student/youth sector. effort, This as already discussed, was remarkably successful. It was a more difficult task to secure permanance struc turally at the lead of student/youth activity. The displace ment of PPMI and MMI was a necessary prerequisite for only then would KAMI be assured its followers would not con veniently slip back at some critical moment to the more secure, historically legitimated fold of other federations and fronts. KAMI sought therefore to offset the ill-will engendered by the PPMI dissolution by co-opting the other major aggregate organization for university student groups, the MMI, or University Student Assembly. The MMI was susceptible to this effort for two reasons. First, it was not organized in such a way as to facilitate activist opera tions in the public political arena. The leaders of MMI, if they were to have any appreciable influence over the current explosion of student/youth activity, had to find Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 305] === 294 common cause with an organization better adapted to the exigencies of massive public participation. Second, the close military connections of some of the top MMI leadership encouraged association with KAMI in order to keep closer track of its activities and to exert influence when necessary. The consequence of this type of association became apparent when Major Supolo Prawotohadikusumo, head of MMI, suddenly began to make appearances as Vice Secretary-General of KAMI. While his name on the leadership roster undoubtedly expanded KAMI'S appeal to certain students and others, his public speeches also contributed new dimensions to KAMI'S public positions on issues. He stressed, for instance, that the crushing of Gestapu did not stem from any communistphobia such as the PKI had claimed; that the Armed Forces, far from being anti-communist, had from birth been infused with Nasakom; and finally that the primary task was to stamp out any deviation from the rails of the revolution, not just by the PKI, but as in the past, by the PRRI, Permesta, DI/TII and other rebellious elements as well. 28 Cosmos Batubara, Zamroni, and others in the top KAMI leadership were furious. So far, though holding very strong views on these issues, they had carefullly confined themselves to the popularization of three basic concerns likely to have the broadest appeal 28. See for example the account of Supolo's speech in Medan, Mertju Suar, Jan. 8, 1969. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 306] === 295 possible. It is not necessary to challenge the motivations of KAMI leaders in laying forth these particular concerns; the importance of banning the PKI, reforming the cabinet and lowering prices was amply demonstrated by the popular responsiveness to these issues. Indeed, they were matters of self-evident importance to virtually every political observer of the Indonesian scene. Yet Supolo, perhaps unwittingly, stepped rudely on some of the most sensitive nerves of the KAMI leadership. KAMI, communist-phobic or not, would oppose the resurrection of communism in any form whatsoever, as clearly stated at the beginning of the January 10 offensive, just a few days after the Supolo speech. There were indeed elements of the Armed Forces which considered themselves wedded to Nasakom, but they were precisely the the forces most eager to curtail the activities of KAMI. issue only slightly less sensitive was the suggestion that the PRRI/Permesta rebellion was of the same order of magnitude as the PKI actions. To many leaders of KAMI, participation in the 1958 Outer Island rebellion was now a badge of honor, and was offered with increasing openness as proof of early opposition to the PKI. Supolo vanished from the roster of KAMI leadership as suddenly as he had appeared. The lines were however now more clearly drawn, for KAMI in dissociating itself from Supolo's views was also taking a firmer stand against some of the strongest views held by President Soekarno himself. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 307] === Polarization of political elements into a new pattern of political competition involved not just KAMI among the action group contenders but older and younger generational groups as well. Front Pemuda--sometimes referred to as Front Pemuda Baru in recognition of Draconian changes in the composition of its top leadership--represented youth in general and therefore commanded potential membership vastly more numerous than KAMI. Though the average age of its leaders was probably similar to KAMI, i.e., in the mid-twenties, its generally younger and much larger membership rendered the Front Pemuda more vulnerable to manipulation by various adult political factions. There was some effort, for instance, to capitalize upon the Front Pemuda*s confrontation with Chairul Saleh, which occurred two days prior to the more well publicized KAMI confrontation. The MMI, slighted by KAMI, called for popular support of the price lowering movement coordinated 29 by the Front Pemuda. Similarly, the older generational counterpart of KAMI, KAP/Gestapu, underwent change as a result of the widening dimensions of the basic issues. KAP/Gestapu was wholly unprepared for the radicalizing and activating of issues manifest in the KAMI mid-January offen sive. The result, as will be described shortly, was rapid strategic withdrawal from the "action" banner; KAP/Gestapu changed its name to the pallid and undramatic " Front Pantjasila," 30 moved openly behind Soekarno's banner (and 29. Api Pantjasila, Jan. 13, 1966, emphasis added. 30. For one account, see Duta Masjarakat, Jan. 19, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 308] === 297 that of his subordinates), and began to offer public criti cisms of KA M I ’S activities. This all began, however, only after the failure of an attempt to claim the initiative for the three issues KAMI was promoting, and to impose some actual structural control over KAMI. 31 KAMI was suddenly, within days of the beginning of its open campaign of issues-confrontation, embroiled on all fronts by serious challenge. As already mentioned, Sjarif Thajeb himself apparently sanctioned the efforts by some of the disgruntled PPMI elements to save that organization. On the heels of MMI's abortive attempt to ameliorate the thrust of KAMI radicalism, even Subchan, a youthful leader of the conservative NU and self-proclaimed champion of student anti-PKI efforts, now remarked on the need for unity between KAMI and the PPMI. 32 These sentiments were loudly seconded by Soekarno's avuncular information minister, Ruslan Abdulgani. 33 At the Bogor Cabinet session, January 15, to which Soekarno extended a special invitation to KAMI leaders in order personally to hear their complaints and discuss them, it turned out that separate invitations had also gone to other organizations, most notably GMNI and G M K I. To the distress of KAMI, newspapers ordinarily most sympathetic failed to view this as a blatant attempt to subvert the 31. See Berita Y u d h a, Jan. 15, 1966. 32. Pelopor, Jan. 15, 1966. 33. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 309] === 298 people's cause and instead seemed quite complacently to laud any developments which might promote unity of any kind. Initiatives for various sorts of national organizational unity proliferated and seemed to come from every significant side of the political spectrum. The conversion of KAP/Gestapu to Front Pantjasila was in part a manifestation of this trend, as was promotion by Subandrio of a new Baris an Soekarno, or Soekarno Front, and the direction by the President that all university student groups be incorporated into a National Union of Students (NUS). There was the very real possibility that the PKI-Cabinet-Price issues would be neutralized in the quest for national unity. The spector of national political disintegration--with urban awareness of large scale violence in the countryside, and with the sharp radicalization of issues even in Djakarta politics--plumped hard for the salving of threatening scissions. KAMI proved to be little more resistant to the national concern for unity than other political groups. Another threat to KAMI'S leadership of the student/youth movement came from member and non-member political groups, which while more or less in agreement with KAMI'S basic objectives, nonetheless had special interests placing them in potentially sharp opposition with one another. Nasution, General for instance, took notice of the exchange of recriminations which were exacerbating relations between 34. See, for instance, Kompas, Jan. 15, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 310] === 299 NU and Muhammadijah and between HMI and Ansor. 35 From the point of view of the KAMI leadership these two conflictual situations alone had divisive overtones, which irritated ethnic antipathies, and pitted conservative Moslems against modernist Moslems, rural against urban, educated against uneducated. It is however equally plausible to regard these ever present sources of conflict as an escape valve which helped prevent wholesale violence in the urban areas. Had there been no such variety of conflictual situation available to temper the radicalism of KAMI leadership, the entire student/youth movement might easily have found itself in the midst of rigid political polarity and consequent violence of unimaginable proportions. This of course begs the question of whether it was not the inability of Indonesian political culture to transcend primordial loyalties which was a prime contributor to the degeneration into massive violence in the first place. A final source of conflict within the student/youth movement stemmed from the general identification of KAMI leadership elements and influential members with faculties (departments) of the University of Indonesia in Djakarta or with ITB (Institut Teknologie Bandung, Bandung Institute of Technology) in Bandung. KAMI thus tended to be vulner able to attack, particularly on a local basis, from universities which happened to have substantial numbers of 35. Kompas, Jan. 17, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 311] === 300 students and faculty opposed to the dominant component groups of KAMI. The most notable example was Universitas Bung K a m o, whose orientation toward leftist elements of the PNI was reflected in a student organization, Gema U B K, which attempted to marshal opposition to KAMI in Djakarta. 36 Encouragement for these individual university initiatives in January came not only from political parties but also from the M M I, for which such initiatives were the only way to reassert its power at the federation/front level of the student/youth movement. 37 The broadening composition of KAMI’S leadership was in part an attempt to counter accusa tions that KAMI was essentially a University of Indonesia affiliate and hence could not legitimately represent the interests of students nationally. Inter-group competition within the student/youth movement thus became an important dimension of Indonesian politics. It gained such importance partly because of its comparatively greater freedom to operate in the public arena relative to the disorganized, discredited and unsure leadership of the political parties, and partly because of the increasing vigor with which adult political forces attempted to exploit student/youth groups as the major vehicles for public politi cal representation. 36. See Nusa Putera, Jan. 17, 1966. 37. For a suggestion of this connection, see Kompas, Jan. 18, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 312] === 301 Adult Political Forces and the Student/Youth Movement The account of how adult leaders, political and n o n political, gradually came to regard the KAMI focus on national issues as constituting the vanguard of political involvement provides more clearly a sense of the real dynamics of Indonesian political change in 1965 and 1966. politics, Party as pointed out earlier, was on the wane in the years prior to 1965. This trend reached its apex with the shake-up of the PNI in August, 1965, the banning of Murba in September, and finally the plummeting demise in October of the only really powerful political party, the PKI. It is doubtful, however, that this statement accurately reflects the perception of party leaders of what had transpired. Assent to Guided Democracy implied, if nothing else, some minimal support for a diminution in electoral competition such as had characterized the period of parliamentary democracy: virtually all were agreed that so-called M free fight liberalism" was not a viable political style for Indonesia. During Guided Democracy party leaders proved increasingly content to occupy semi-permanent positions in the highest official institutions of government, to compete for the perquisites of office, to engage when possible in moderate persuasion of colleagues and of President Soekarno, and to be drawn ineluctably away from the power bases implicit in party identifications. Both leaders and membership had Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 313] === 302 come to accept the idea that parties were anachronistic. There was serious discussion in the fall of 1965 and in early 1966 of the possibility that Soekarno's "solution" to the Gestapu problem would entail the abolition of all political parties and their replacement with some form of expanded National Front. Persons expressed dissent to this writer only in deepest confidence and in guarded tones. action was much stronger, however, and generally negative, on the question of whether effective national mobilization could be based on any expansion of the existing National Front, for it too was now regarded as a special interest group within the restricted club of top governmental institu tions. The party leaders, especially those in secure govern mental positions, found themselves on the sidelines of Indonesian politics. Their only role seemed to be the in creasingly thankless task of offering public justification and approbation for the Government's faltering policies. Their only hope for sustaining some degree of personal in fluence lay outside the existing official channels of the political process. Through steady accretions of power over the previous decade and through the events of autumn 1965, the military, especially the Army, came to constitute such an alternative channel. By the end of January, 1966, the student/youth movement had become another. Not just the party leaders, but civilian bureaucrats and even the military, turned to the student/youth sector for cultivation of public political pressure. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 314] === 303 This was neither a gradual accumulation of legitimacy on the part of the student/youth movement nor a sudden leap into the public eye due to emergency circumstances. Adult sentiment oscillated back and forth between serious exploita tion of the student/youth groups or others), (either the "action" variety and cavalier dismissal of their importance. Though Soekarno had addressed and entertained two of the groups, HMI and KAMI, in December, this seemed still to be regarded as falling within the normal activities of Presiden tial diversion and ceremony. In January, however, officials began to trade statements about the ill-breeding, indiscipline, and surplus wealth of the student demonstrators. 38 Whether it happened to be Information Minister Ruslan posed against the University of Indonesia Rector Soemantri or Soekarno posed against Suharto, the argument over whether the students were representatives of the people or merely "naughty boys" went on for many weeks. What was clearly evident was that prominent adult politicians, including m e m bers of the Government bureaucracy, party leaders, and military officials, were spending an increasing proportion of their time addressing student groups, and to a lesser extent, 39 youth groups. 38. See BY, Jan. 3, 1966; Duta Masjarakat, Jan. 3, 1966; Sinar~~Harapan, Jan. 4, 1966. 39. See, for instance, accounts of separate individual speeches for the single day of January 10 in AB, Nusa Putera, Sinar Harapan, PPAB (speeches of ZuhrT, Zein, Sudibjo, Ruslan, Saleh). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 315] === 304 Cultivation of popular support by means of appeal to youth and manipulation of student/youth organizational struc tures was one major feature of adult political activities in early 1966. The prominent emergence of this feature was consistent, however, with another theme of post-independence Indonesian politics. The "red and/or expert" controversy in mainland China politics finds considerable analogy in the "solidarity maker/administrator" dichotomy of Indonesia.^® In Indonesia's case it was of course more a distinction between stress on unity as against economic pragmatism rather than a problem of ideological orthodoxy. politicians' Clearly the adult appeal for youth, particularly student, support was consistent with previous periodic efforts to discover political solutions by turning to the academic sector, the repository of "expertise" and source of future experts. Again, as in 1958 there was the frequently expressed hope that the nation's problems could be solved if only the Govern ment would listen to expert advice. This hope was in no way dimmed by the knowledge of those who were expressing it, that they, along with most of the experts themselves, constituted a latent political element in fundamental opposition to the current Government, however much they were reluctant to admit The academics were as ready in 1966 as they had been 40. The terminology was coined and the concept elaborated in application to Indonesia, by Professor Herbert Feith in his book, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, hJ.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 316] === 305 in 1958 to welcome invitations to proffer their talents. No occasion illustrated this feature of Indonesian politics better than the KAMI Economics Seminar, January 10-20, at the University of Indonesia, a number of whose papers were subsequently published in a volume entitled The Leader, the Man and the G u n. faculty as well as by KAMI, able list of speakers. Sponsored by the economics the seminar attracted a remark Interspersed among Indonesia's most prestigious sociologists and economists, such as Professors Widjojo Nitisastro, Selo Soemardjan, Mohamad Sadli, Ali Wardhana, Fuad Hasan and Emil Salim, were such major govern ment officials as Generals Suharto and Nasution, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono, Adam Malik, and Sjarif Thajeb.41 Ten out of the twenty speakers were ministers in Soekarno appointed cabinets. 42 Sanction of the seminar, in the form of agree- 41. The original program for the three days of introductory sessions was issued as Lampiran Sural No. 0011/KamiFE/Sek/Ext./65. 42. Actually, two of the ten had not by this date become ministers. Subchan, Z. E. became Deputy Minister/Vice Chairman of the MPRS and Major General Achmad Tirtosudiro became Deputy Minister seconded to the Fourth Deputy Prime Minister (Deputy Ministers could, as in these cases, be full members of the Cabinet) in the Further Perfected Dwikora Cabinet of March 30, 1966. The other eight speakers of ministerial rank were all members of each of the three Soekarno-appointed cabinets operative during the post-October 1 period: the Dwikora Cabinet, in augurated on September 2, 1965; the Perfected Dwikora Cabinet of February 24, 1966; and the Further Perfected Dwikora Cabinet of March 30, 1966. These ministers in cluded: Lieutenant General Suharto (Minister/Army Commander), Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX (Coordinating Minister/Chairman of the Financial Affairs Inspection Board in the first of the three cabinets, Coordinating Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 317] === 306 ment by these officials to attend, is striking evidence of the seriousness with which major political figures regarded the academic community, either as focus of activist students and youth or as a source of expert knowledge. It was hardly a conventional seminar. In form it was for the most part merely a series of individual speeches over a period of several days, and there was no opportunity for questions from the audience. In the oppressively over-crowded room were many students, rarely any faculty, but plenty of foreign and domestic journalists and diplomats, some of whom avidly scribbled notes. After the first four days of formal speeches, some seminar-type sessions did take place, under the guidance of faculty members, but it was almost exclusively the sessions of the first days which interested the Indonesian Minister/Minister of Tourism in the second, Fourth Deputy Prime Minister for Economic, Financial and Developmental Affairs in the third), Adam Malik (Coordinating Minister for Implementation of Guided Economy in the first, Coordinating Minister/Foreign Economic Relations in the second, Sixth Deputy Prime Minister for Social and Political Affairs in the third), Drs. Frans Seda (Minister of Forestry in the first, Minister of Plantations in the second, Minister/Deputy Minister of Plantations in the third), Brigadier General Professor Doctor Teuku Sjarif Thajeb (Minister of Higher Education and Science in the first, Deputy Chairman of the DPRGR [Gotong Rojong Parliament] in the second, Deputy Minister/DPRGR Caretaker in the third), R. Maladi (Minister of Sport in the first, second and third), Drs. Radius Prawiro (Minister/Deputy Auditor-General in the first, second, Minister/Central Bank Affairs in the third). The one remaining speaker of ministerial rank was General Dr. Abdul Haris Nasution (Coordinating Minister/Armed Forces Chief of Staff in the first, Deputy Minister/Commander of KOGAM in the third). For further information on these cabinets and the su b sequent Ampera Cabinet, see Indonesia, II (October 1966), pp. 185-222. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 318] === 307 student/youth population and which yielded The Leader, the Man and the Gun. The substance of most papers was also of singular inter est. There appeared to be common agreement with the senti ment expressed by Mustopadidjaja AR (KAMI member and head of the Seminar’s organizing committee) in a preface to the published volume, that the economy was in desperate shape. There was little agreement as to where the fault lay. Far and away the most interesting aspect of the seminar, however, was the function it played in Indonesian politics. For a number of government officials the seminar was quite utilitarian in that it provided a traditionally protected platform from which to level criticism at governmental policies. For the experts it was a ceremony, in which political lions once again formally welcomed them to the fold. In return the experts, assuming for the most part the con ventional posture of academic disinterest, attacked with surgical skill the innards of government policies and conduct. For University of Indonesia students and probably for Indonesian intellectuals and academics generally, it was a thrilling spectacle. Moreover, it was a fitting adjunct to activism in the streets, which began in earnest the first day of the seminar. The function of the seminar in Indonesian politics was as a kind of national hearing, with magisterial overtones. It was time for the supreme authority, that is, the people, to undertake ’’indoctrination” of the Government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 319] === 308 The U.I. seminar, according to Mustopadidjaja AR., would initiate the process. Subchan's presentation typified a position characteristic of much of the popular propaganda, especially of religious groups. He stressed that there was an intimate connection between the PKI and the state of the economy. The PKI, anti- God and anti-nation, would have to be banned along with all its mass organizations before progress could begin. Like many other speakers, he also called for drastic change in the membership of the Cabinet Presidium and for the Cabinet generally to be staffed with experts. Others, such as Major General Tirtosudiro, pointed out that the Government functional authority lay fully in the Dwikora Cabinet Presidium and that therefore all Government decisions must be seen as their work: "we (presumably meaning subordinate cabinet members, other officials, or persons attending the seminar) are merely lending them assistance. There were endless examples of Government stupidity, bungling, and outright venality. The government vehicle sale, the currency devaluation, and the fuel price anomalies have been described already. The most bittingly ironic paper of all, however, was presented by Emil Salim, who the follow ing July was offered an important position in the Ampera Cabinet formation, but characteristically declined. Rather 43. The Leader, the Man and the Gun, Chapter VIII, p. 2. 44. Ibid., Chapter X, p. 1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 320] === 309 than an instrument for the liberation of man, the Indonesian Government, said Salim, might more accurately be regarded as an "inefficiency a p p a r a t u s S o e k a r n o was always harping about " I*exploitation de l'homme par l'homme" and " I'exploita tion de la nation par la nation." All his life Soekarno had striven to overcome both types of exploitation. Manipol (the Political Manifesto) was an earnest of this endeavor domestically and Indonesia's international activities re flected a foreign policy which also was based on firm oppsition to oppression. Unfortunately, the operations of the Government in practice showed utter disregard for these worthy objectives. Instead, there was apparently an "in efficiency apparatus" under which man was systematically exploited by the state, and conversely the state was cunningly exploited by those few men with access to the strings of control. The Government sale of official cars (most of which became the private property only of top officials), the monetary devaluation and the suddenly jacked up prices were three examples among hundreds. Paragraph 31 of Dekon (Deklarasi Ekonomi), the economic guidelines of Guided Democracy, had in fact expressly prohibited any sudden monetary changes. Though Salim's message was amply couched in "academese" and larded with dry economic analysis, the punch was hardly blunted. Salim, however, like all the other speakers, was very 45. Ibid., Chapter VII, p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 321] === 310 careful to maintain one crucial demurer, that whatever his criticism of the Government, this did not mean Soekarno, nor was the President to be held to blame. The bureaucracy, Government ministers, and most prominently the Cabinet Presidium, were fair game--but not Soekarno. Only through the deepest dedication of the true believers in the pantjasila and in manipol, was there any hope that the teachings of Bung Karno would ultimately find Indonesia on the way to fulfilling its destiny as a socialist state with a socialist economy. 46 The influence of Soekarno was palpable and can be illustrated by recounting events which attended the seminar presentation of General Nasution. At 7:30 on the morning of January 13, the fourth day of the seminar, President Soekarno presided over his usual relaxed breakfast session with several of his top Presidium subordinates. Brigadier-General Professor Doctor Sjarif Thajeb (Harvard-trained pediatrician), the Minister of Higher Education and Research, and official sponsor in October of KAMI, strolled into the room. The President leaped out of his chair in a screaming rage, b e rating Thajeb for not being out in the streets or at the university restraining the students from further outrageous acts such as those of the preceding days. He told the minis ter to go directly to General Nasution's house and convey the President's command that the General must not further 46. Ibid., Chapter VII, p. 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 322] === 311 inflame the students in an address scheduled for an hour and a half later. Many expected Nasution’s address to be among the most forceful and also assumed that he would give the seminar his full and explicit blessing. Instead, when he arrived an hour and a half late, he chose not to present his prepared address (the one subsequently published in The Leader, the Man and the Gun), stating extemporaneously that, while the Seminar might be an interesting intellectual exercise, it had no real relevance to the problems of running a nation. What the students and the experts ought to be doing, he said, was to stop their criticisms and bend their efforts towards helping the established leadership of the State in maintaining law and order. They could rest assured that the national leaders were doing everything possible to rectify the economic situa tion. Although he did aver that there were good and bad officials and, like other speakers before him, that the Cabinet Presidium was responsible for all decisions, he identified himself most clearly with the Government leader ship. His imprimatur, though perhaps not falling on the Cabinet Presidium, was assuredly no more readily available for the Seminar. As a national hearing the seminar had no more than limited success despite the power, quality and prestige of the contributors. Primarily this was due to the far greater drama of what was happening in the streets. The conjunction Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 323] === 312 of K A M I ’S offensive in the streets, demanding lower prices, with the opening of the seminar on economic problems, placed the Government speakers in a very embarrassing position. the street offensive gained momentum under K A M I ’S tutelage, the seminar speeches of Government officials grew steadily tamer and in several cases officials either did not appear or sent subordinates in their stead. After Nasution's speech the remaining days of the Seminar were anti-climatic, and the results of the Seminar made few headlines. It was assumed in elitist circles that General Nasution was angling for the Vice-Presidency and that Sjarif Thajeb had sold out to the Great Leader.47 The Seminar, however, was a major factor legitimating the larger KAMI program of bringing optimum pressure to bear upon the Government, both directly and through the cultiva tion of popular support. For KAMI the political utility of the Monday, January 10 confrontation with Chairul Saleh on Veteran Street, discussed at some length above, was rein forced by the commencement of the Seminar on the same day. 47. The same day, in fact, former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta spoke out for the first time publicly during this period. He acknowledged Soekarno's good intentions in creating Nasakom, as a legitimate effort to end "free fight democracy" and to foster cooperation among Indone sia's four significant groups: nationalists, religionists, communists, and functionalists. It was unfortunate, Hatta said, that the Nasakom concept had been misused by the PKI. Djihad, Jan. 20, 1966. The day after the Nasution speech, a resolution submitted to the KAMI Presidium by the Extension Student Senate of the U.I. Economics Faculty, called for, among other things, the filling of the office of Vice-President, as one way to help surmount current national problems. Nusa Putera, Jan. 17, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 324] === 313 For the rest of the week each subsequent day saw marked escalation of political confrontation, with parallel channels of activism and argument at times diverging, at times con verging but through mutual reinforcement always adding to the momentum of impending crisis. The incident on the fourth day, Thursday, involving Soekarno and Nasution, though it was not publicized, offers a preview of what was to materialize two days later when the President intervened personally and publicly. After this crucial week few Indonesians would any longer deny that the student/youth movement had gained full access to the adult political arena. On the second day, Tuesday, the lecture strike began in earnest, and, drawing on the fervor generated in the previous day's confrontation with Saleh, actions grew bolder. Various buildings of the University of Indonesia were taken over. Thousands of students and other youth, of all ages, milled around the commons adjacent to the university buildings. Gradually, as planned by KAMI leaders, the crowd moved out into Djalan Salemba, a wide thoroughfare running through the campus and the major access artery to central Djakarta from the southeast. When traffic came to a standstill students systematically painted, stenciled and pasted prepared slogans on as many vehicles as possible. Among the selections were: "Lower the price of rice," "Crush the PKI and Blockhead Ministers," "Retool the Dwikora Cabinet," "Students will strike until the price of rice goes down," "Cease Vacuous Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 325] === 314 Speechifying,” "Crush Devil Ministers.” Gradually the captive vehicles were released and suddenly the traffic disappeared. Word arrived that on a feeder thoroughfare several blocks away students from the technological, economics, law and medical faculties had sat down in the street. Thou sands of non-student adults watched the entertainment. Apparently the "strike” was a success. The horizon of possibilities widened and new tactics begged to be put to the test. The activist, rapidly enlarging crowd, moved en masse toward the central business district, and from there to Hotel Indonesia on Djalan Thamrin, the only direct road to Djakarta's elitist suburb, Kebajoran. Military policemen gently reminded demonstrators they were blocking traffic, but readily withdrew in the face of jocular refusal. It was inter esting, however, that the demonstrators became very exercised when they observed foreign residents high on the balconies of Hotel Indonesia (the only Western-type hotel in Djakarta) gazing down upon them. "We are watching them, not they us, the fat cat capitalist-bureaucrats, anti-God sybarites," such was the sentiment expressed in varying forms by many. Attack on the hotel seemed imminent before the military police warned the demonstrators off; this time the crowd obeyed, and moved back down the highway to the huge Sarinah Department Store. Tuesday's activities seemed almost to be a form of train ing for the more serious enterprise of Wednesday. Early in the morning outside the building of the Medical Faculty of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 326] === 315 U.I. the demonstrators assembled in preparation for a "long march" from Salemba to Senajan, site of the national Parlia ment (DPRGR). Though it would only be a fifteen kilometer hike round-trip, student/youth leaders regarded it as aptly derivative from other "long marches," such as the Siliwangi Long-March, and, oddly enough, the Chinese march to Yenan. Two weeks later students in Bandung determined to better the Djakarta record by marching the 130km. to Djakarta to present their demands to President Soekarno personally. The Bandung- Djakarta march was prevented by the military at the last moment, but at least the Salemba-Senajan feat did transpire. At the DPRGR building in Senajan the thousands of demonstrators were greeted by the Parliament's Chairman, Arudji Kartawinata (rank of Coordinating Minister in the Cabinet) and Deputy Chairman, I Gusti Gde Subamia (rank of Minister in the Cabinet). Representing not just KAMI but all the demonstrators, Cosmas Batubara addressed the entire gathering, transmitting in a new sharpness of phrase three demands. as usual at the head of the list. The PKI ban was He then demanded that "the insane Government regulations be rescinded" (peraturan2 gila pemerintah ditjabut), and finally that the Dwikora Cabinet be retooled and lame-brained ministers be eliminated. The response of Arudji was quite skillful, earning the rousing applause of his audience, while giving up nothing (though it might have contributed to his dismissal in the next Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 327] === 316 Cabinet reshuffle). He said he would tender their demands to the President within the next three days, and if nothing came of it, proof would suffice that the DPRGR "was of no usefulness, and the building might just as well be burned down." 48 He then invited the students into the building, where they liberally decorated the walls with graffiti, such as "Ministers, stop running around with whores!" and "The DPRGR is impotent." Many of the demonstrators commandeered passing trucks to take them back to Salemba. On Thursday everyone went to U.I. to hear the Nasution speech at the Seminar. Those few who were able to crush into the room came away disappointed but undaunted, perhaps more tolerant of the vagaries of top leaders than many of the foreigners present. In the streets earlier in the morning things had gone more successfully. Organized groups were now assembling every morning on strategic arteries all over the city for the task of disabling enough vehicles to assure a thorough matjet, or traffic jam. Tires were punctured, cars weTe decorated, and some vehicles, especially those of drivers showing some recalcitrance, were overturned or demolished. Military policemen invariably were closeby 48. AB, Jan. 13, 1966. A few days later, just before the Saturday Cabinet meeting, Arudji issued a statement denying Djihad's January 13 version of what he had said about burning down the Parliament building. Nusa Putera, Jan. 17, 1966. The Djihad report, however, is substantially the same as the AB report. An informant for the writer, who witnessed the encounter, corroborated the original news reports. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 328] === 317 keeping a protective eye on the situation. Smaller groups were busy running the state gas stations all over the city, where they revised the state fixed price of 100ORp. downward to 200 Rp., or in some cases charged nothing, depending on entrepreneurial inclinations. After the Nasution speech the student/youth force marched off in the direction of Pasar Senen (one of Djakarta’s seedier but most lively market centers), again evoking great interest and open approbation from on-lookers. A sizeable delegation of at least several hundred, mostly literature and psychology students, paid a visit to the Department of Justice to present Brigadier General Sutardjo (Minister/ Attorney General) with a note protesting a statement by Chief Public Prosecutor Dan Sulaiman SH calling the student demonstrations illegal. 49 As usual most of the functionaries came out of their offices to watch the demonstrators. Their attitude appeared to be a combination of nervousness, curiosity, and delight at the opportunity for respite from idle offices. Demonstrators tried to be fierce and managed to chant some epithets about justice, but it was obvious that they found it somewhat difficult to muster much animosity against the petty bureaucrats before them. They moved off toward the main column of demonstrators a short distance 49. The Suleiman’statement was reported in Berita Yu d h a, Jan. 12, 1966. Reports of the student reaction appear in Nusa Putera, Jan. 14, and Kompas, Jan. 14, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 329] === 318 away at Banteng Square. Serious things were happening. What they were exactly, no one seemed to be quite sure. "Things cannot go on this way, the people must be heard." Somehow, within the massive ness of the gathering one felt some intrinsic meaning, an observation which of course has often been made of modern manifestations of mass ritual elsewhere in the world. was the most prominent feature. Gaiety Casual on-lookers and worried Government officials frequently saw this and con cluded that the demonstrations were nothing more than a faddish diversion of over-zealous youth. themselves endangered, Some officials felt for they interpreted the gaiety as evidence of pure malleability and hence susceptible to the inimical purposes of political enemies. In neither case was there appreciation of the seriousness of purpose which under lay the gaiety and which in the process of mass togetherness was forging a new social identity. The formation of this identity, which came to be called the '66 Generation, was a phenomenon largely independent from the role of the demonstra tors in helping to fulfill the specific political objectives of organizational leaders. Hence, during this fourth day of action, the Nasution speech and the excursion to the Department of Justice may be seen as nodal points, which focused the demonstrations on objects of direct concern to organizational leaders, especial ly to the KAMI Presidium. At Banteng Square, however, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 330] === 319 crowd took its own head, general enthusiasm generating mass euphoria, and a centrifugal force which called for further movement. The massive cloud began to move, almost spontane ously, along a path trod unsuccessfully several days before. The objective was Pasar Baru, perhaps the best known market place in the city for foreign merchandise, black marketeering in higher price goods, and general excitement. Wooden barriers and military police in close, double ranks had barred the way on Monday, but there were no obstructions this time. From Pasar Baru, the crowd meandered through the more formal department store area of Harmoni, across the kali from Merdeka Palace, on down Djalan Thamrin past Hotel Indonesia, and home to U.I. along Imam Bondjol and Diponegoro. Once again the rakjat had assembled and affirmed the Indonesian spirit, a spirit every day more clearly re-incarnated in the student/youth mass. This spirit was substantially affirmed on another plane the same day. As the next day's headlines put it: DEMANDS ARE MET."^® "KAMI Pepelrada and Organda officials met with KAMI leaders on Thursday afternoon and reached an agreement which sanctioned a decrease of several hundred percent from the Government stipulated fare for public transportation.^* Not only did this constitute satisfaction of one of KAMI'S 50. Berita Yud h a, Jan. 14, 1966. similar headlines. 51. Ibid. Other newspapers carried Cosmos Batubara headed the KAMI delegation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 331] === 320 demands, but it also implied sanction of the student/youth action of the previous several days in occupying gas stations and selling gasoline for 200Rp. instead of the official 1000 Rp. Not only were there no more soldiers barring demonstrations in places like Pasar Baru, but there also appeared to be willingness in high ranks openly to support the student/youth movement in opposition to the Government. Newspaper editorials universally praised the united action of military and youth. It was usually pointed out that while the drastic Government regulations had without doubt been well intentioned and as a corrective economic measure had raised the hopes of many people, a concomitant effect had been rapid rise in the price of basic commodities. The inconvenience of higher fares and fuel costs had not been matched by a decrease in the price of rice. At least the inconvenience could be ameliorated. The student/youth movement received a rousing vote of thanks. S o e k a m o himself gave indication that the student/youth movement was making impact. Unfortunately his response, and the response of Government officials closely identified with him, was once again ill-timed, poorly designed, and seemingly gauged to exacerbate rather than assuage the predominant popular sentiments. Arudji, in a press conference the day after his remarks at the Parliament building, said that the President fully understood and sympathized with the concerns 52. See for instance the editorials in Nusa Putera, Jan. 14, 1966, and in Put a Masjarakat, Jan. 11 7, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 === [PDF page 332] === 321 of the students, but deeply resented the mode of their expression. 53 Like other socialist nations Indonesia ha d certain basic principles, including principles of student conduct. To serve the socialist cause students ought to stay in their dormatories and study hard. If possible, as in the Soviet Union, students would be exempt from any fees for their education or transportation. Older students should take responsibility for supervising younger students. In short the President, through Arudji, was once again commanding the students to maintain unquestioning obedience to the Great Leader of the (socialist) Revolution. Almost simultaneous with the military-student/youth agreement on lower fares, the Government announced Soekarno's instruction, based on consultation with his ministers, that there would be a fifty percent fare reduction for students. One major newspaper immediately labeled this a "sop for the kids."^ Another editorialized on the well-designed, orderly quality of the Indonesian student/youth activity. Unlike student turmoil elsewhere in the world--in Tokyo, in Seoul, in Rangoon, in. Singapore and other places--the Indonesian students had managed to maintain close identification with the people. They were able to enlist mass support because they had studied S o e k a m o so faithfully; hence, a bribe would not suffice. It would simply not work, "just to give 53. AB, Jan. 14, 1966. 54. Mertju Suar, Jan. 15, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 333] === 322 the small boy a small t o y. " ^ Nonetheless, it was apparent by late Thursday or early Friday that Soekarno was giving the student/youth actions more serious attention than these cavalier responses suggested. Some days previously it had been announced that there would be a full cabinet meeting at the Bogor Palace on Saturday, January 15. On Thursday afternoon the Government announced that the President was inviting a delegation of KAMI leaders to attend the Cabinet session and would at that time formerlly respond to the KAMI demands. The student/youth movement, the press, many government officials and the general public re graded this announcement as of extreme importance. For the KAMI leaders it represented victory for their organizational efforts. The invitation seemed to be recognition that the student leaders were truly carrying a message from the rakjat. The major newspapers gave substance to this view by emphasizing the significance of the Saturday Cabinet session and urging all citizens to focus their expectations upon it. Berita Yudha headlined the event as "Soekarno To Answer Directly the KAMI Resolution."^ Nusa Putera advised all citizens 57 to await Soekarno's answer to the students and to the p e o p l e. The militantly Islamic Djihad gave assurance that the President would announce the long awaited banning of the 55. Sinar Harapan, Jan. 15, 1966, editorial. 56. BY, Jan. 15, 1966. 57. Nusa Putera, Jan. 15, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 334] === 323 58 PKI. Of no less importance than this general press build up, was the affirmation of many Government officials and other adult political leaders. Their analysis and general castigation of Government financial and economic policies was put forth in detail at the U.I. Economics Seminar. The military support of the student/youth demonstrations, particularly in the specific instance of the fare reduction, offered strong encouragement of this critical attitude. Friday the adult, civilian counterpart of KAMI, KAP Gestapu/ Front Pantjasila, in which Sub chan was the most dramatic figure, suddenly lay claim to primary credit for the "action politics" which now promised to yield success. KAMI, it was understood, was an operation, albeit an important one, safely under the wing of KAP Gestapu/Front Pantjasila. KAMI leaders felt it was beneath their dignity to argue the point. The success of the student/youth movement, in which KAMI had now emerged as driving force, was there for all to see. The adult political world for the moment was following in the wake of the younger generation. It was this realization which initiated the counter attack in earnest, both from the older generation as a whole, and from substantial center and left-of-center political 58. Djihad, Jan. 15-16, 1966. 59. BY, Jan. 15, 1966. Interestingly enough, though KAP ISestapu had changed its name to Front Pantjasila just a week before in an apparent effort to encompass center and left-of-center elements, it now chose to call itself by its earlier name, KAP Gestapu. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 335] === 324 forces, including Soekarno, who saw the KAMI-led movement as the insidious tool of Army rightists. On the same day that most newspapers were applauding the student/youth successes, leftist papers maintained a more restrained tone and reported a discussion between Subchan and Ruslan Abdulgani, emphasizing the need to unite KAMI and PPMI.**® Here the most prominent leader of KAP Gestapu joined with Soekarno's information minister to minimize the significance of KAMI by insinuating its functional comparability with the supposedly defunct PPMI. Even KOMPAS, one of the papers which had provided the firmest support for the student/youth demonstrations, now welcomed a sudden change in the President's invitation, such that separate representatives from GMKI and GMNI were also included.**1 To the KAMI leadership it appeared that at the Cabinet session, rather than respond to the formal demands of KAMI, the President would take the opportunity vent his wrath on wayward youth, much as he had done at the meeting in December. Cosmos Batubara seemeu to be anticipating the President's remarks when he angrily informed the National News Service on Thursday afternoon that KAMI was under the control neither of rightists nor of any other group. feared quite correctly that at the Cabinet session Soekarno would put his formidable oratorical skills to work and once 60. See for example Pelopor, Jan. 15, 1966. 61. KOMPAS, Jan. 15, 1966. 62. A B, Jan. 15, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 336] === 325 again in his inimitable way, capture the limelight of the political arena. Soekarno Responds To look back on the Bogor Cabinet session from the vantage point of a well-established New Order tempts a perception of what transpired very different from the impres sion voiced at the time by those in attendance. The President's address now reads as the desperate gesture of a pathetic man whose grasp was rapidly slipping from the reins of power. Megalomania, paranoia, desperate pleas, cloying reminiscence--foreign journalists could take their pick of which characteristic to stress. But this had been the trend of Soekarno's speeches for a long time. Indonesians were used to the style, and judging from the next several weeks' re actions, they sat listening in deadly earnest to catch the policy implications of what he had to say. As usual Soekarno began very casually, appologizing to the Islamic community for his inability, under doctor's orders, to fulfill the customary Ramadan fast, describing in some detail his urinary disabilities, and calling on an Islamic leader present to verify that religious law allowed for ex63. A mimeographed transcript from a tape recording was cir culated as "Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Di Sidang Paripurna Kabinet Dwikora Dengan Dihadiri Djuga Oleh Wakil-Wakil Dari Mahasiswa-Mahasiswa Dan Wartawan, Bogor, 15 Djanuari 1966," (Sekretariat Negara, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, Nst. 64/66). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 337] === 326 ceptions in such cases. He assured everyone, however, that in general his health was excellent, and that there was no truth to the nekolim stories that he was "on the verge of death." 64 In lieu of fasting the President would of course pay a generous fidiah. He would in fact contribute far more than the standard Islamic requirement of an amount equivalent to the individual's food consumption of one day. the Muslims, A nod to an appeal to sympathy concerning his health, a poke at nekolim, a bit of generosity, and assurance of personal asceticism--Soekarno had now established appropriate distance from his audience and had cast the special Soekarno ambiance. Discussion of the fidiah and his own simple eating habits provided Soekarno with the opportunity gradually to work into the substantive issues of the day. The audience knew within minutes that it was not going to be an "official" type address. There was no text, and the President fumbled absently with his spectacles, as he built toward rhetorical momentum. That he was angry was obvious, but what the anger would produce by way of policy, no one could tell. There were many nervous glances around the room. Soekarno was angry about the student demands. If it was difficult to assess what the appropriate fidiah should be for the Great Leader of the Revolution, it was infinitely more difficult to find the appropriate price of rice and 64. Soekarno specifically cited a U.S. News and World Report statement that "fifty-fifty, one year from now there will be no Sukarno anymore." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 338] === 327 other basic costs in the economy. He had, he said, assembled "our best heads” to ponder these issues. He had •'created” the DPA, or Supreme Advisory Council, to produce guidelines on such matters, and its members had told him that prices must be lowered. "Even my big toe knows that prices must be lower,” said the President. had repeatedly floundered. The best experts in the nation So where did the students get the gall to call his ministers "lame-brained?” certain: One thing was somewhere in the background lurked the dirty hand of nekolim. How serious was this problem of prices? So serious that the President was prepared to issue a challenge. but step forward and offer his services. Anyone need He would be appointed to a suitable rank, like Market Minister or Price Minister. If in three months prices were lower, he would be rewarded. However, if he failed, Soekarno would throw him in prison for at least five years: "I have the power to do this as Supreme Commander of the High Command” (Panglima Besar KOT I ). The audience stirred visibly, and Soekarno began to embellish upon his dramatic notion. "Who will volunteer," he asked, "someone from the Army, or from among the Ormas or Orpol leaders, or from the students--I'11 make him a minister, right now, immediately," Then the reservation. after three months prices are still rising, "I'll have him shot dead." If no improvement, a ten year prison term. Finally, Soekarno asked if there was someone who thought Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 339] === 328 he could do the job in three days. In that case the success ful man would be appointed Prime Minister of the Dwikora Cabinet. Was the big Bung serious? No one could quite tell: "There'll be nothing to it Gentlemen!" In the next breath, however, the smile vanished, and shaking his finger at the audience, he admonished, "Don't take this problem lightly. It is a tough problem--tough, tough, tough, tough, and again, tough!" It seemed as though there was little more that could be said. Soekarno, as he had done with increasing frequency in previous months when confronting himself with seemingly impossible issues, began to reminisce. In several different ways he described his central place in modern Indonesian history. Since prior to his twentieth birthday he had, he said, been at the very forefront of the Indonesian revolution; indeed, he had been the central figure in all of Indonesia's revolutions: the nationalist revolution, the political revolution, the economic revolution, the cultural revolution, and the humanitarian revolution. The plight of his people, including the problem of prices, had been on his mind con stantly, whether he was awake or asleep, all his adult life. "It is I who am the Penjambung Lidah Rakjat Indonesia [mouthpiece of the Indonesian people]." The successes were manifest, for Indonesia had become an example for the entire world. But for this scale of achievement to continue, it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 340] === 329 was essential that every element of the nation be dedicated to excellence, and weld itself into a totally unified national purpose. Again Soekarno had laid the groundwork for his next point of concern, the evil ways of contemporary youth. The villification of Cabinet ministers, the dirty words, the graffiti covering walls all over the city, the filthy language etched on cars and other property--were enough to make him gag. His concern was clearly not just esthetic. There seemed to be three separate aspects of his displeasure with student/ youth activism. First he objected to their style, saying that it was worse than the communist tactics, which the current movement was trying to replace: "My God..., we hate Gestapu, but now I am seeing the same sort of slogans the PKI used to employ, and in still worse form." he was concerned about world opinion: Second, "What do you think foreigners will think when they see this stuff--in our capitol, which I have worked so long to make beautiful?" This last clause reveals Soekarno's final, and by far, most acute, level of consternation. For if he truly attached as much importance to his role in symbolizing the nation, as he frequently claimed, then he would have to suspect that any instance of dissension, any upset of any kind, might really be motivated out of opposition to the President. Soekarno spent most of his address demonstrating how Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 341] === 330 crucial his participation had been to every significant under taking of the nation. After nearly every example, he would return to the evil ways of youth, as symptomatic of perverse unwillingness to conform to the pre-destined course of a revolution, of which Soekarno, it so happened, was Great Leader. "What is it all coming to?," he asked. It was he, Soekarno, who had singlehandedly promoted national spirit and brought Indonesia to a position of greatness in the world. No one had done more for rice production than he. It was Soekarno who had put forth the national objective;of selfsufficiency in rice production, and who had encouraged the use of corn products as a way of alleviating temporary food deficiencies. As for the monuments youth were railing against, this was an example of the same type of unpatriotic response Soekarno had been subjected to in the past by the PKI, and before that, by the PSI. As soon as he arrived in Djakarta in 1949, he had erected a flagpole in front of Istana Merdeka (Freedom Palace), and the PSI complained, "The streets are muddy ruts, but Bung K a m o puts up flag poles I" "Man lives not by bread alone," said Soekarno, beginning a long list of quotes and accounts of conversations with world notables, whose substance was a support of symbolic monuments as essential to the promotion of national spirit. He cited monuments in France, England, Italy and Mexico. He referred to the adage of the wife of Sun Yat-sen that "the stomach cannot wait," but he took note of the huge monument in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 342] === 331 Peking’s Tienanmen Square. Indonesia, like other great nations, would continue to build fitting monuments. The demonstrations of the previous two weeks leveled particularly sharp criticism at the construction of Indonesia's first full-fledged department store, which demonstrators termed a "luxury for a socialist economy." To Soekarno this was juvenile stupidity, for "there is not a single socialist economy which does not have a department store," and he cited Hanoi, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Moskow, Budapest and Prague. Moreover, such stores, with,Government controlled prices, were "absolutely essential" economically. If Sarinah Department Store proved successful, Soekarno would build three more department stores in Djakarta alone. Again he chided youth for their intemperate and ill-informed criticisms. Now, a gesture of humility, as Soekarno admitted he really found the rice supply and price reduction to be of almost impossible complexity. He told the audience that quite frankly he was a politician, not an expert on economics or finance. For such matters he had assistants, whom he had done everything in his power to prod toward solution of the rice and price dilemma, apparently to no avail. Soekarno, despite his heroic efforts, could not do everything. even the experts seemed stymied: But "So for that reason I ask our young people, please be patient--bring the problems to me, and say, 'Pak, can't we do this, why can't we do that?'... Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 343] === 332 Don't call my ministers stupid or whatever.... You are saying in effect that my life has been worth nothing..." As Great Leader of the Revolution, Soekarno envisioned two alternative courses of action in the current economic dilemma. These were the courses he had just put forth, on the one hand to put "our best brains" to work, on the other to challenge some unknown hero to step forward and try his hand at the job for a three month period (with failure meaning prison or death). Soekarno chose to entertain discussion of no o t h e r ( "dilemma" than the economic one. Nowhere in his address did he so much as mention the subject of possible banishment of the PKI. Nonetheless, his political disposition was quite clear. After asking for sympathy from the nation's youth, he indicated that he did not necessarily mean to include univer sity students. Had members of the audience seen these types, he asked, with shiny shoes, pleated shirts, wearing lipstick and incredible hair-do's? The audience was to understand, therefore, that the "three-month challenge" was not open to everyone. No unpatriotic types, and especially, no help from n e kolim, would be tolerated. And it was clear that the scurrilous attacks, the subversive literature, the graffiti, and the other recent un-Indonesian behavior were all part of a coordinated effort to cause confusion and further exacerbate the nation's problems. The criticism seemed even to be directed at Soekarno himself, as disclosed in some under ground pamphlets accusing Soekarno of complicity with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 344] === 333 Gestapu. Only the nefarious activities of some subversive force could be responsible for criticism of Soekarno, and of his top subordinates, such as Subandrio and Chairul Saleh. Soekarno1s best evidence of subversive influence in the student/youth movement lay in the report of a Fact-Finding Commission which he had appointed, and which had stated that at least 87,000 people had been killed in the aftermath of Gestok (the President again insisted on the appropriateness of "Gestok" over "Gestapu"). He was not, of course, directly attributing the slaughter to the student/youth movement. However, from his point of view, as well as from the point of view of persons with humanitarian concern the world over, Indonesia's retaliatory violence in the post-October 1, 1965 period was grossly out of proportion to the original assas sinations. "We must finish Gestok, revenge the death of the Generals" Soekarno conceded, but he continued, "At this price? We must compensate the assassinations with who knows how many tens of thousands, maybe even hundreds of thousands of souls, of our own people? problem. This, Gentlemen, is my Not just as Commander in Chief, but more specifical ly, as Great Leader of the Revolution and Great Leader of the People, Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution." Soekarno viewed the KAMI demands and the recent youth activity generally, as but one part of the larger threat to the nation represented by the large-scale killing. The nation appeared to be verging on self-destruction, a fate about which Soekarno Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 345] === 334 had often quoted Gibbon, Toynbee and Lincoln in the past, as he did now. Since Soekarno regarded himself as the personi fication of the Indonesian nation, and regarded Indonesia as exemplary among nations, the conclusion was obvious. The "young p e o p l e ’s abuse of their elders, sitting here," the demands of the student/youth movement, just as much as the rampant massacres, constituted acts against the nation, and against Soekarno himself. However, since the Indonesian people were a chosen people, living in a nation destined for unimaginable greatness, the cause of the present domestic conflict had to lie elsewhere: I have arrived at one conclusion. I am not accusing anyone, I am not accusing the students, but hear this: nekolim is involved, nekolim is a part of it. Nekolim is out to topple Soekarno.... I say this after the deepest possible investigation. It is not you they are after, Bandrio [Subandrio], though they call you Durno, with the duck's nose. Nor you, Chaerul Saleh, though they accuse you of selling out your people. They're not after Achmadi, or this person, or that--no! At base, they're all out to get Soekarno. Those Indonesians who were presently engaging in acts of dis obedience were in effect abetting the efforts of alien sub version. And the entire Indonesian people, if they allowed this to continue, would be perpetrating mortal sin against Soekarno, and therefore against the nation. Young people, especially university students, he considered to be just as guilty as the killers of "communists" or the assassins of October 1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 346] === 335 Having offered subversion as his basic explanation of domestic discontent, and having insinuated the involvement of substantial segments of the Indonesian people (even in cluding officialdom), Soekarno had once again, deliberately or not, boxed himself into a c o m e r. In retrospect, the following concluding paragraphs of his address seem pathetic, a jumble of maudlin pleas and a tantrum of empty expletives. Nonetheless, at the time, he was still clearly regarded as a giant among men, and his roar seemed to reach the marrow of everyone before him. The dramatic moment had come for Soekarno to offer to walk the last mile, for the sake of the nation. The effect was surely as Soekarno desired, for as everyone in the audience well knew, and reminded one another when the session was over, the President had made a similar offer twice before in his career, in 1948 and in 1958, in the midst of other crises: I have already spoken face to face with my nation, in a full Cabinet meeting, in a meeting with the top Military Command, and also with the political party [leaders], I said: Here I am, President, named by the MPRS President for Life. I am Com mander in Chief of the Armed Forces, as stipulated in the Constitution. I am Chief of the Supreme Command, [determined] by Penpres [Presidential Decree], uh, what was the Number? I am Penjambung Lidah Rakjat Indonesia [Mouthpiece of the Indonesian People], my own doing. I am Great Leader of theRevolution, said the MPRS.... Here I am, for as long as you still love me.... But if you do not love me any longer, than I shall No one has to kick me out. I will leave of my own accord, if you do not love me anymore. That is what I have to say to the entire Indonesian people. Now, when I see the kind of things going Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 347] === 336 on, waaah, things are crazy this way. So I now issue another pronouncement. I say what? I, here, Soekarno, Great Leader of the Revolution, President of the Republic of Indonesia, I, the Leader of the Revolution, I am here. Okay, whoever wants to follow me, then follow me! I will not budge one millimeter. I am responsible to the people, to God Almighty, to Nabi Mohammad. I am Soekarno, Great Leader of the Revolution. Like Luther, Martin Luther, who said at Wurtemburg Cathedral, 'Here I am, I cannot be anything else!', I too say, I Soekarno stand here, Great Leader of the Revolution, I can not be anything else. Ajo [Hear ye], whoever is happy with Soekarno, accepts Soekarno, as Great. Leader of the Revolution, gather your strength, fall into the ranks [barisanmu susun], defend Soekarno! For it is clear that there are those who seek to overthrow Soekarno. Only to my fol lowers I say, do not act wildly! Await my command! I will not be overthrown by such tactics, by sub version, by underground pamphlets, or by other such underhanded methods. So also I say to KAMI, I am not pleased with your actions. Therefore, it is my intention to create an organization of all university students. And I shall do this myself. It will consist of KAMI, of PPMI, of all university student groups united in a single 'National Union of Indonesian Students'. Mr. Minister of PTIP [Higher Education and Research, i.e., Sjarif Thajeb], what was that you called it before? Dewan Mahasiswa [Student Assembly] or some thing like that? I shall set this up. Because truly I am not happy with things the way they are. After repeating his call for loyal followers to close ranks behind him, and assuring his audience that he would put suitable experts back to work to tackle the economic and financial problems, Soekarno sat down. There was no further mention of the "three-month challenge." Not one of the KAMI resolutions had been satisfied or even received direct attention. Since the major portion of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 348] === 337 political forces, most of the media agencies and a su b stantial number of distinguished individuals were on record in firm support of most of the resolutions, the impact of Soekarno’s response was immense. The President failed to provide his long-awaited "political solution," which he might have used as a substitute for his apparent decision not to deal with the immediate demands before him. The PKI was still not abolished, and many drew the conclusion that Soekarno had become even more intransigent on the issue. None of the offensive Presidential Decrees was rescinded or adjusted in any way. There were no concrete initiatives on the acute problem of rice supply or other basic commodities. Neither the price of fuel nor the public transportation fares--both arbitrarily set at exhorbitant Government fixed rates--was ameliorated. No new controls for inflation were suggested. Though there was some acknowledgment of inadequacy on the part of some of the Government’s advisory elements, Soekarno conceded no mistakes on his own part and made no mention of possible reorganization or retooling of the Dwikora Cabinet. Instead he excoriated those who would criticize Government policy and Cabinet members and was especially protective of Subandrio and Saleh, who had been the primary butts of popular discontent. Finally, far from banning the PPMI, Soekarno decided to punish KAMI, by aggregating all student groups into a single national organization of his own construction. The implications were even greater than the above Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 349] === 338 catalogue suggests. To the many adult moderates--including most notably the economists, sociologist and others who had addressed the U.I. Economics Seminar--who were making every effort to couch their recommendations for reform within the framework of Guided Democracy and who fully accepted the central position of Soekarno, this presidential address was keenly disappointing. It meant that Soekarno was no longer going to accept what had seemed to be one of the central con ventions of the political system. Under this convention the rules of propriety precluded direct criticism of the President himself, while leaving other members of the Government fair game for political attack. This allowed for the rhetoric of political address to include identification of Government policies with particular Government officials, and encouraged critical attention to both. The student/youth movement had obviously been playing very close to the borders of the con vention, and Soekarno believed, with some justification, that the movement had grossly transgressed against it. Yet he chose not to differentiate between this alleged transgression and the much wider spirit of criticism permeating adult moderate (and rightist) elements of the population. Soekarno, based on the content of his Bogor address, believed that all of the current domestic turmoil constituted deviation from proper Indonesian ideological orthodoxy, that is, deviation from Soekarno1s own teachings. By assuming this posture Soekarno imposed an appreciable new strain upon Indonesia's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 350] === 339 already seriously weakened political system. For, by suddenly stepping down off his pedestal of aloofness from practical Governmental problems, by directly associating himself with subordinate policy-making, and by equating patriotism with unquestioning obedience to the Government, Soekarno placed in jeopardy the conventional escape valve for inter-aliran, inter-factional political dissidence. Soekarno was making one of the greatest political gambles of his life. All groups would either have to stifle their criticism or take the risk that any political foray would be interpreted as ^ direct attack on Soekarno. The question in January, 1966, was whether such an attack was likely still to be as politically expensive as it would have been in the past. A Fragile Consensus Public reactions during the two weeks following Soekarno's address indicate that the President was still believed to have tremendous power at his disposal, that he remained as he said so often in his speech, Great Leader of the Revolution, in fact, as well as in title. Actions of students and youths on the day of the Bogor Cabinet meeting probably contributed to the public reaction, for the President's accusations about outrageous and inflammatory student behavior seemed to be given immediate credence by actions of the students and youth themselves. When the President concluded his speech Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 351] === 340 and then refused to entertain any discussion with student members of the audience, pleading that he felt ill and had to retire, the reaction was one of outrage. The KAMI-types felt triply betrayed, first because of the invitation sent to GMNI and GMKI members, second because of S o e k a m o ' s apparently cavalier dismissal of the KAMI resolutions, and third because of his refusal to give the audience any opportunity for discussion (despite the presumption of the students that they had been invited to the Cabinet session for just that purpose). Approximately 130 soldier-driven Army trucks full of students and youth accompanied the KAMI invitees to the Bogor Palace that Saturday morning. Many of the truckloads came from Djakarta, and when the occupants were sprung from their cramped confines, their mood, if expectant and festive, was also irritable and susceptible to aggravation. It was the conclusion of an extremely active week, with emotions almost constantly on edge, with meals eaten erratically, and with very little sleep. The sight of the elegant palace grounds, the filigreed ironwork, and the President's herd of freely grazing deer had an almost ornamental and bazaar quality about it. Heavily armed, well uniformed, cocky Tjakrabirawa guards, the same palace guard battalion which played a central role in the Thirtieth of September Movement, added to the picture, which was completed by the steady arrival of seemingly numberless luxury limousines of Cabinet ministers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 352] === 341 When the student leaders emerged from the palace emptyhanded and in fuming rage, the spark was lit. Fights broke out between KAMI supporters and other student/youth elements. The crowd began to razz the Tjakra troops and deliberately sought to provoke them, with some success. torn down and automobiles damaged. Iron fences were Slogan painting resumed and epithets reached their earthy best. Black slogans in huge letters on white walls commanded special attention, and when the message was "whore palace" or "breeding pocket," the impact was graphic indeed. But these were little more than spontaneous acts and did not represent a considered reaction to the President’s address. That reaction began the next day. The reaction was one of support for the President, and the support was overwhelmingly affirmative. It was as if the events of the previous week had not occurred. Virtually every political leader and every newspaper sought to show how what the President said was precisely what the student/youth movement and the rakj at had been eager to hear. A n t a r a, the National News Service and only news sheet printed on Sunday,*’® even exaggerated the President's remarks about students, reporting that he had said that in forming the new National Union of Students, a number of existing student organizations would be eliminated. The report went so far as to state the President's regret that "current student activities are 65. With the exception of P P A B. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 353] === 342 ’under the control of N e k o l i m, " ' ^ something which everyone in Soekarno's audience knew he was probably intimating, but which he never in fact said. Next day, on Monday, all the daily newspapers were filled with articles and editorials concerning the Saturday speech and its implications. The major Protestant newspaper stressed the lies of the Western press about Soekarno's health as proof of the all-out Nekolim effort to topple Soekarno and destroy Indonesia. Hence, the President’s call for the people to choose between him and Nekolim lyas welcomed as a modern day gesture the equal of what had happened at the time of Madiun. Several newspapers carried the official KAMI reaction, which declared full support for the President, pledged eagerness to join the ranks (barisan) of those leading Indonesia on toward the attainment of a "pantjasila socialist" society, regarded the call for N.U.S. as the fulfillment of one of KAMI'S long-time objectives, and called on all Indonesian students to remain orderly and d i s c i p l i n e d. ^ the same day KAMI leaders had a relatively amicable meeting with Soekarno himself and with Ruslan Abdulgani and Sjarif Thajeb, all with an end to expeditious implementation of the 6 6. WB, Jan. 16, 1966. 67. Sinar Harapan, Jan. 17, 1966. 6 8. This was quite true, since KAMI had in fact called for the setting up of NUS the preceeding December. See p. 245 above. 69. Kompas, Jan. 17, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 354] === 343 President’s wish for a new mass student organization. 70 Of a different order of positive support was the reaction to Soekarno's challenge about the price control. At a student/youth rally at U.I. Bung Tomo, the almost legendary hero of the battle of Surabaja in 1946, read a letter he had just sent to the President offering his services, and he told the students he was quite prepared to be shot right along with them if that was what was necessary to help the nation. 71 A number of people offered to take up the President's chal lenge, including a Doctor of Economics from the Angkatan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim League). "When this gentleman's letter was tendered to Chairul Saleh for trans mittal, a reporter asked Saleh, "and are you prepared to be shot too?" 72 Soekarno's challenge did not make Saleh's life 70. AB, Jan. 19, 1966. Those KAMI leaders invited to the meeting were: Zamroni, Cosmas Batubara, Elyas, David Napitupulu, Djoni Sunarja HS., Tommy Wangke, Firdaus, Liem Bian Koen, Soewarto and Abdul Cafur. WB, Jan. 18, 1966. 71. Sutomo (Bung Tomo) had been Minister without Portfolio for Veterans' Affairs and for a short while Minister of Social Affairs in the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet of 1955-1956. He appeared in public and in the news a number of times in the post-October 1 period, always looking somewhat like a bantam rooster, and to the delight of activists, always expressing his outrage at someone or issuing a challenge to the "great men in power," Styling himself a sort of super patriot, he wrote a number of broadsides, including: "Kini Terserah pada Bung K a m o, " October 12, 1965 "Surat Terbuka Bung Tomo Kepada Dr. Subandrio," A p i, Nov. 14, 1965; Sesudah "Madiun" dan "Gestapu" Lantas A p a? (Djakarta: Balapan, 1966), a collection of his articles; "Dialog Blak2an Bung Tomo Cs. Dg. Bung K a m o, " Pelopor Baru, September 14, 1966. 72. Sinar Harapan, Jan. 19, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 355] === 344 any easier, especially when it became quite evident that most of those responding took themselves seriously. It would probably be impossible to know the degree to which the formal response of KAMI, and the less formal responses from those elements who had displayed enthusiasm for the student/youth demonstrations previously, was genuine. At one extreme is the view that it was all part of a care fully worked out strategy, involving the closest cooperation of KAMI with the Suharto forces in a design to soften the opposition for the subsequent kill. The miasma of intrigue which pervades Djakarta politics lends some plausibility to this view. Against it is the fact that virtually no secret in Djakarta has been known to last for more than a few hours. A sensible conclusion, and one confirmed by inter views with many participants at the time, is that individuals and groups saw what they wanted to see, in what they said. The language even of the KAMI statement was sufficiently opaque to allow the skillful verbal gymnast to discern a number of contrastive meanings (e.g., N.U.S. had been p r o moted by KAMI in December, but obviously for very different purposes than the President had in mind in January). What is certain, however, was that KAMI and its supporters did strive consistently over time to find a way of accomplishing their objectives which would incur the enmity of the least number of people. To this writer KAMI and most other student/ youth leaders appeared genuinely anxious not to antagonize Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 356] === 345 Soekarno, not out of fear, but because they simply assumed the continued central position of Soekarno, no matter what else might eventuate. There was a profound and nearly universal love for the President. The approval from politicians, political groups and newspapers known to be both strongly sympathetic to Soekarno and unsympathetic to the KAMI-led student/youth movement, was noticeably more enthusiastic and explicit in expression. Statements from National Front elements and from the Foreign Ministry provide the best examples. Both the National Front Executive Committee leadership and the National Front Action Command issued strongly worded statements, expressing u n qualified fealty to Soekarno. Claiming membership of all four armed services plus 175 mass organizations, all of which were imbued with the spirit of Nasakom, the National Front declared its readiness to volunteer its special assistance in protecting the President from the menace of Nekolim stooges and in carrying out any command he might issue. 73 The Action Command, whose full name in earlier incarnations, unlike most other action groups, had omitted either of the acronymic 73. The National Front Executive Committee statement was signed by Sudibjo, the Secretary-General, and by the Vice Secre taries General: Major General Achmadi, Brigadier General Djuhartono, D r s. Imam Pratignjo, AKBP Drs. Poerwoto, Hadji Mohammad Djambek and Hadji A. M. Rachman. WB, Jan. 18, 1966. The National Front Action Command also issued a strong statement of support for the formal establishment of the Soekarno Front. Pelopor, Jan. 18, 1966. Pelopor itself gave one of the strongest pleas on behalf of the Front, several days later, on January 21. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 357] === 346 names for the October 1 event, now adopted the Presidentially favored "Gestok." The teachings of President Soekarno, it said, must be absorbed, safeguarded and cherished in their e n t i r e t y. ^ The Foreign Ministry (or Department of Foreign Affairs as it was then called) was no less enthusiastic in its su p port for Soekarno than the National Front: [We] recognize Bung K a m o as the only Great Leader of Revolution, unreservedly stand behind him, and demand those trying to uproot Bung K a m o ' s leader ship be taken action against in equal manner as those committed in Gestok counter revolutionaries [sic]. 74. The new full name of the National Front Action Command was Komando Aksi Golkar Anggota Front Nasional Pengganjangan Kontrev "Gestok," or National Front Functional Group Action Command for the Crushing of the Counter Revolutionary "Gestok" [October 1 Movement). The Action Command's statement was issued on January 17 and signed by Ibnu Rahardjo. Particularly strong ed i torial support for the National Front's militant posture came from Pelopor whose Editor-in-Chief, J. K. Tumakaka, became Secretary-General of the National Front in the new Cabinet Soekarno appointed in February. See Pelopor, Jan. 17, 1966. 75. The National Front Action Command fashioned itself as representative of a so-called FN Gaja Baru, or National Front, "new style." General Nasution, in a discussion with a HMI delegation, stated that nothing about a "new style" National Front had been communicated to him or to Suharto or other military commanders. And on behalf of the Armed Forces Nasution disavowed any military involve ment in political matters. In other words he directly contradicted the increasingly frequent claims of National Front officials associating the Armed Forces with National Front political statements. Kompas, Jan. 17. 76. The Indonesian Herald, Jan. 17, 1966. paragraph of a three point statement. This was the first Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 358] === The major English language newspaper in Djakarta, The Indo nesian H e r a l d, controlled by the Foreign Ministry and there fore by Subandrio, emphasized Indonesia's successes abroad and the general progress of the Nefos fight against neo-colonialism and imperialism around the world. Special attention, for instance, was focused on the apparent military coup d'Stat against Sir Abubakar and other alleged British toadies in Nigeria, which the Herald welcomed as another victory in the Nefos struggle. 77 Soekarno's stature, at home as well as abroad, the Herald editorialized, might best be affirmed through the convening of an emergency session of the MPRS, which after deliberation could by secret ballot take a vote of confidence on the President. The true voice of the people would then be heard, and the treachery of those indulging in outrageous demands would be revealed. 78 Considerable support for convening the MPRS came from the PNI, especially PNI-Asu, and other left-of-center elements, because as presently constituted, there was no question that even with the PKI members removed, the MPRS would vote full confidence in Soekarno. Such a vote of confidence, together with the formal establishment of a massive national Barisan Soekarno (Soekarno Front), whose establishment Subandrio announced in a speech following shortly upon the President's, would virtually guarantee continued security for most members of 77. The Indonesian Herald, editorial, Jan. 17, 1966. 78. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 359] === 348 the present Government. 79 The Barian Soekarno, while massive, would nonetheless be somewhat selective: It will constitute a mighty fortress to defend Sukarno and his teachings. As such, this Front must include only those people whose loyality [sic] to the Great Leader of the Revolution and his teachings is beyond doubt. The leadership of this Front must remain in the hands of President Sukarno himself. But Bung Karno will need the assistance of persons of high integrity. ... the door of this Front must be closed to those who had organized such things as Darul Islam, the South Moluccas Republic, PRRI-Permesta, Madiun-affair, the September Thirty Movement, and other counter-revolutionary activities.®® "Nekolim subversives and counter-revolutionaries" were "work ing hand in hand to isolate Bung K a m o according to the Herald. from his people," There seemed little doubt that groups like KAMI, which the President had implied was guilty on both counts, would have to be barred from the Soekarno Front. As one official suggested, there were "Nekolim instruments" harbored among the students and other groups as well. 79. This was particularly important for officials such as Subandrio and Saleh whose plaintive demurs to the effect that they were no more than "intermediaries" were of no avail before the onslaught of the student/ youth movement. For a Saleh statement of this sort, see Sinar Harapan, January 19, 1966. 80. The Indonesian Herald, January 18, 1966. 81. Statement by Minister of the Interior Sumarno. January 18,1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 === [PDF page 360] === 349 For several days statements pledging loyalty to the President and support for the Soekarno Front poured in from all over the nation, from mass organizations, student and youth groups, labor unions, Government employees' associations, and virtually every other conceivable source. 82 Though quality varied, substance was generally the same. Exceptions, however, could be revealing, as in the case of Ansor, the huge youth affiliate of the Nahdatul Ulama party. Not one for subtle inflections, this essentially small town based conservative organization, lauded the President with a vigor, which some months later would seem embarrassing in retrospect. 83 But this was characteristic of Ansor and p r o vides elucidation of the often seemingly contradictory positions taken by NU type organizations during this period. For while groups like Ansor found themselves immediately in enthusiastic support of the drive against communists, the enthusiasm quickly palled when it became apparent that the 82. In just one day Pelopor featured statements from the Komando Aksi Golkar Anggota Front Nasional Pengganjangan Kontrev "Gestok" [see p. 346 above], Front Pemuda Pusat (Central Youth Front), KAMI, Antara (the national news service), Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia), SOKSI (the Army controlled labor union), KESSBANEG (Kesatuan Serikat2 Sekerdja Bank2 Negara, (Front for State Bank Affiliates), GEMPAR (?), Brig Sukwan PToduksi Berdidari Kompag Pusat Bamunas and Gerakan Koperasi Indonesia (Indonesian Cooperative Movement). Pelopor, January 18, 1966. . 83. For the full text of the Ansor statement, see WB, January 18, 1966. It was signed by the General Chairman, H. A. Chamid Widjaja. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 361] === 350 major student/youth movement, especially in Djakarta and Bandung, was dominated by youth who were in one combination or another, modernist Moslem, Western-oriented, Outer Island, ethnic alien (Chinese or Arabic), and cosmopolitan. The bona fides of A n s o r 1s anti-communism were unassailable, but on most other issues, Ans o r 1s outlook quickly diverged from that of compatriot activists at the national level. Intra-Government action on national economic and finan cial problems also followed shortly upon the Presidential address. Soekarno at the Cabinet meeting on January 15 set up two Ad Hoc Committees, one for the Perfecting of the Imple mentation of Presidential Decree No. 26, the other for The Examination of Prices, Fares and Wages. Despite this evidence of the President's concern, U.I. economists were not pleased to discover that the membership of these committees was domin ated by those ministers known to be prime abusers of the regula tions they were assigned to investigate.®^ They were also not 84. Also, the title of the first committee in itself conveyed a policy decision, i.e., that the decree would stay in force and only its implementation was to be discussed. This committee was headed by Brigadier-General Achmad Jusuf (Minister of Internal Trade and Acting Minister of Foreign Trade), with membership as follows: Drs. Frans Seda (Minister of Plantations), Brigadier-General Ashari Danudirdjo (Minister of the Textile Industry), Teuku Jusuf Muda Dalam (Minister for Central Bank Affairs), Drs. Surjadi (Minister for State Budget Affairs), Drs. A. M. Achadi (Minister of Transmigration and Cooperatives), and Brigadier-General Achmad Tirtosudiro (Chief of Division VII of KOTI, the Supreme Operations Command). The Prices, Fares and Wages Committee was headed by Major General D. Suprajogi (Coordinating Minister of the Compartment of Public Works and Power), and included Sutomo Martopradoto Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 362] === 351 mollified that Soekarno gave the committees a time limit of four hours, after which they were to submit their reports to a Steering Committee of several other ministers for review before the final recommendations would finally be forwarded to the President. Considering the circumstances it is not surprising that the results were never made public. To complete the national ritual outpouring of affection for Soekarno, 85 KAMI, with more than a bit of irony, p e r formed the ultimate sacrifice, by requesting from the Mayor of Djakarta whitewash, with which to cover up the. offending graffiti. 86 Whitewashing itself became an activity of al most ritual frequency in the next several months. (Minister of Labor [in this news item, wrongly identified as Minister of Communications]), Major-General Dr. Ibnu Sutowo (Minister of State Seconded to the Cabinet Presidium), Brigadier-General Drs. Hugeng Iman Santoso (Minister of State Revenues), K. H. Aminuddin Azis (Minister of State. Seconded to the Cabinet Presidium), Teuku M. Hadi Thajeb (Minister of Basic Industry), Major-General Ali Sadikin (Minister of Sea Communications/Coordinating Minister of the Compartment of Maritime Affairs), and Sadjarwo SH (Minister of Agriculture/Coordinating Minister of A g r i culture and Agrarian Affairs. The Steering Committee was headed by Dr. Johannes Leimena (2nd Deputy Prime Minister) and also included Dr. Soeharto (Coordinating Minister/ National Development and Planning), Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (Coordinating Minister/Chairman of the Financial Affairs Inspection Board), Sumarno SH (Coordinating Minis ter of the Compartment of Economics and Finance), MajorGeneral Soeharto (Minister/Commander of the Army [but in this news item, identified as Command Chief of Staff]). Berdikari, January 18, 1966. 85. As will be shown below, not all newspapers were equally profuse in their praise. Those papers which were especial ly complementary included Pelopor, Dwikora, and The. Indonesian Herald, and to a lesser extent, Sinar Hara p a n. 8 6. Kompas, January 19, 1966. Berita Yud h a, however, editor ialized against "wiping out positive graffiti," January 19, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 363] === 352 Indeed, running parallel beneath the level of pomp and panegyric was a bitter struggle for power, which promised to be joined at a new dimension of intensity consequent to the President's address and Subandrio's promotion of a formal "Barisan Soekarno." While the President's remarks were a blow to the KAMI leadership, it was the apparent capitulation to Soekarno's charisma on the part of so many elements previously sympathetic to the activist student/youth movement which really threw the young people into a slough of despondency. Both Suharto and Nasution immediately declared their loyalty to Soekarno. apparently would be a reality. 87 The Barisan Soekarno By Sunday evening, the day after the President's speech, KOSTRAD (strategic reserve) troops were operating the gasoline pumps, again at the Government-fixed rate of lOOORp./liter. Students and youth sympathetic to Subandrio and strongly opposed to KAMI were unobstructed as they erected placards, put up banners and distributed pamphlets in support of the Barisan Soekarno and of Subandrio and against Nekolim subversives. 88 The pro- Baris an Soekarno groups included GMNI-Asu (the PNI university student group identified with the left side of the party), Germindo (the Partindo party's university student group), Gema Bung Karno (the student movement of Bung K a m o University 87. Berita Yudha, January 17, 1966. 8 8. According to Kompas pamphlets were produced and distri buted by GMNI, Germindo and Gema Bung K a m o, January 18, 1966. I saw pamphlets only from GMNI and Gema Bung K a m o. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 364] === 353 whose rector was Major General Achmadi, one of Soekarno's closest confidants), and the seemingly many-lived MMI (Indonesian Student Assembly). 89 There were also many others who for diverse reasons lent active support or sympathy to this "counter-KAMI" movement. Reasons for this support ranged from basic ethnic, religious or social antipathy toward the KAMI leadership to protection of vested interests requiring the continuation of the present Government. The KAMI-led student/youth movement now found itself confronted by formidable opposition, just as the confrontation of adult forces also appeared to assume sharper lines of battle, despite the superficial cloak of renewed protestations of national unity.90 Monday's newspaper editorials in several cases were expressions of thanks to the student/youth movement for its role in attaining sharply reduced public transportation fares the previous Friday. 91 A question was raised, however, which was predicated on the weekend's events, and which more and more was on the minds of many citizens: "what if gentlemanly 89. Most of the information in this paragraph is based upon personal observation and interviews with members of each of these groups at the time. 90. One way in which the lines of battle sharpened was through the technique of invidious association, as when a news paper wrote about an "alleged Action Committee to Defend the PKI (Komite Aksi Pembela PKI) and a Committee to Support the President's Command (Panitia Pendukung Komando Presiden)." Ampera, Jan. 23, 1966. 91. E.g., Duta Masjarakat, Jan. 17, 1966, and AB, Jan. 17, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 365] === 354 protest doesn’t work?" 92 For some weeks young people had provided the Suharto Group with important free assistance. To be sure, the Army could not have predicted their success and was undoubtedly apprehensive about the rashness of activities and the radicality of ideas. Now, however, the momentum of this essentially pro-Suharto thrust threatened to flounder, unless Suharto was prepared to recognize publicly a firmer identity of political purpose and a directly pr o tective role. To do this was to move one step further away from the posture of military aloofness from political matters and toward a stance of direct confrontation with Soekarno. Initially, therefore, when Major-General Amir Machmud, as head of the Djakarta PEPELRADA (Regional DWIKORA Executive Administrator), issued a prohibition against all demonstra tions in the area of Greater Djakarta, many in the KAMI-led movement were unhappy. 93 Yet it was soon evident that the prohibition was retroactive, so that many in those groups which the night before had been campaigning on behalf of Subandrio and the Barisan Soekarno, could be arrested and charged with disseminating political literature and demonstrating without permission of PEPELRADA. The prohibi tion against demonstrations, together with the previous PEPELRADA instruction that all student action required the 92. JU3, Jan. 17, 1966. 93. Kompas, Jan. 17 and 18, 1966. Kompas, while strongly m support of the students, did suggest they must direct their criticisms inwards as well as outwards. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 366] === sanction of KAMI, was unmistakable proof that the Suharto Group was committed not just to preferential treatment, but to openly discriminatory treatment in favor of politically sympathetic student/youth elements. Strongly pro-Soekarno newspapers felt constrained to endorse the prohibition, 94 because it was expressly in line with Soekarno's admonition to the students that they return to the classroom. 95 ment from pro-KAMI papers was pro forma. Endorse- Except for occasional street fights between the two general student/ youth elements, the KAMI-led group was temporarily safe. 96 However, the Machmud precedent, repeated shortly thereafter by Major-General Ibrahim Adjie, Commander in West Java, 97 opened the way to increased assistance to pro-Soekarno/ Subandrio youth on the part of some military units, partic ularly sympathetic to the President or unsympathetic to the Suharto Group. The six days beginning with Soekarno's Bogor address form one of those numerous occasions in m o d e m Indonesian history when everyone, even the betjak drivers, perhaps even a few peasants, knows that something terribly important is happening. Rhetoric flows in torrential downpour, 94. E.g., The Indonesian Herald and Pelopor, Jan. 17, 1966. 95. E.g., Kompas and AB, Jan. 17, 1966. 96. See, for instance, accounts in Nusa Putera and Kompas, Jan. 17, 1966. 97. WB and AB, Jan. 20, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 367] === 356 political brokers frantically scamper to and fro hawking fantastic rumors, great leaders posture their stalwarts for war. And when it is all over, no one quite knows what has happened--days, weeks, and even months may pass before some thing, if anything, is different from before. The enigma on this occasion turned on the question of power versus consensus. force of events? Was struggle for power the motive If so, why did the product take the form of a mass act of consensus? But if the dominant theme was a search for consensus, a consensus which ostensibly was discovered, why did it dissipate almost within moments of discovery? It is tempting to ignore the quest for consensus, instead, to dwell on the power struggle. To this observer, however, it was clearly the former which commanded the greater human energy. Consensual politics, which might more appro priately be called consensual struggle, concedes the factor of power in the formation of consensus. Nonetheless the question of which was the dominant force--power or consensus-obtrudes into any analysis of Indonesian politics in 1966, if for no other reason, because so many writers, Indonesian and foreign alike, have dismissed or ignored the consensus level, as just so much obfuscation of the "real11 issues. The tendency to do this is largely explained by the fact that consensus politics--Soekarno's lifetime preoccupation-in late Guided Democracy clearly covered up, rather than illuminated, many national problems. The subsequent Suharto Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 368] === 357 "victory" and the tendency of New Order apologists totally to separate new style from old, unfortunately has led to the view that events of the several months prior to the now famous March 11 Order amounted to a pure power struggle. The consensus politics of the six day period under considera tion offers serious qualification of this assumption. The major topic of public discussion was the question of an endangered national consensus. All political groups and all political and Governmental leaders voiced confidence that such a national consensus did in fact exist, whatever the level of abstraction. The problem was to bring the level of abstraction into closer alignment with the realities of concrete national problems. The student/youth movement had sought to identify problems in pragmatic terms and to lift them into the realm of national consciousness by incorporating suggested solutions within the national ideology, within the existing consensual apparatus. that is, Appropriate tactics, based on close study of Soekarno's time tested methods of mobilizing mass support, called for concerted dramatic, and activist cultivation of popular will', to lead the public toward the belief that the suggested course of action was the only possible course consistent with the tenets of national ideology and inherent national consensus. Hence, the KAMI program (eventually the national program of the New Order) which called for dissolution of the PKI, retooling of the Dwikora Cabinet and lowering of prices, carefully wended its Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 369] === 358 way in the interstices of ideological and consensual conven tions. Both the KAMI-led student/youth movement and the Suharto Group for many months presumed that the specific objectives could be accomplished without radically jarring the myths of national consensus. Part of the problem was indeed that the presumed con sensus was multi-faceted. Soekarno met w ith remarkable success in the 1950fs in his cultivation of popular interest in the quest for national integration, and in the search for an identity of national purpose far transcending the attain ment simply of international recognition of sovereignty. the 1960's Soekarno abused this success by deliberately propounding ideological constructs as an integral part of the process of governmental problem solving. Whether to salve over particular political fissures or to inspire compliance with specific new domestic programs, or to assist his aspirations in the international arena, the long range effect was to confuse the public and dilute the fragile but coherent consensual identity, which many believed Soekarno had achieved with the establishment of Guided Democracy. In early 1966 Soekarno again sought to utilize the reservoir of popular confidence in national identity, this time as his primary source of leverage in an increasingly uncongenial political environment. Strength of national identity, the President implied in his Bogor address, was synonymous with the preservation of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 370] === 359 Soekarno himself, as the symbolic and living repository of national integrity. His demand that all loyal citizens unite in a barisan (rank or front) behind him also implied that all political movement emanating from levels of Indonesian society subordinate to the President was un-Indonesian and inconsequential unless given his sanction. The Barisan Soekarno, formally sponsored by Subandrio, was ironically reminiscent of the Badan Pendukung Soekarno in that it was, once again, an apparent attempt to neutralize formidable political conflicts by damping them in the aura of Soekarnoism. The embarrassing collapse of the earlier foray together with the complex, overlapping, sometimes contradictory, and ever proliferating other consensual apparatuses, served to condition the public for a slightly new kind of response. Though all political elements endorsed the call of consensus, they now stood in less awe of con sensual solutions casually dropped from the lofty heights of the Presidency. Soekarno's remarks, hastily propped into vague structural promise by his most unpopular subordinate, seemed to invite interpretive endorsement. The result was that political groups immediately began to compete, each seeking to widen its own margin of safety by edging the Barisan toward congenial ideological shape. Setting the pace for the new kind of popular response to Soekarno, Ibrahim Adjie in Bandung scheduled an address at Padjadjaran University for about the same time the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 371] === 360 President would be making his own address. Contrary to the several Presidential advisors who in the previous week had admonished students that to help the nation stay on the '•rails of the Revolution" they should go back to their classes and behave, Adjie chided his audience for not taking their political responsibilities seriously enough. 98 Students in far greater numbers, he said, should be out in the streets, a vanguard guiding the nation along the most productive paths. When he subsequently gave his own endorsement of the President, he also prohibited the Barisan Soekarno from all of West Java. 99 It was clear that his interpretation of Soekarno's address was distinctive. Suharto's official statement on behalf of the Army--General Staff and troops alike--offered no more than affirmation of support for the President and intent to await his further command.1®® All was correct, for in fact the President had asked for no more. However, the statement pointedly ignored Subandrio and made no mention whatever of the Barisan Soekarno. So began the battle of the big "B" and the little "b." Those groups favoring Soekarno tended to employ the term, Barisan Soekarno,1®1 for it was assumed that Subandrio would never have announced a formal organization without 98. Api Pantjasila, Jan. 17, 1966. 99. WB and AB, Jan. 20, 1966. 100. Berita Yudha, Jan. 17, 1966. 101. One of the strongest statements appears in Pelopor, Jan. 21, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 372] === 361 direction from the President. 102 Those groups basically favoring the KAMI-led student/youth activism and Suharto deliberately used a small "b." But the situation was actually much more confusing, since there were many who still hoped that if popular sentiment against Subandrio became sufficient ly severe, he might be prized from his protective Presidential cover. The PNI, for instance, favored the Barisan Soekarno idea for reasons having little to do with Subandrio. Soon the big MB,s" won, probably because they stood out more clearly in newsprint, and because proponents of a formal Barisan had more reason to expend effort to promote 103 include. Then the debate began over whom the Barisan should The National Front, as mentioned above, envisioned the four armed services and all those mass organizations The Front Pantjasila (broadened replacement of KAP-Gestapu), however, saw its own claimed membership of seven political parties plus Muhammadijah as central to any such consensual institution. 105 Finally, Front Pantjasila, along with the labor union, SOKSI, did sign a statement that they together with the Armed Forces 102. It is at least conceivable, however, that Subandrio may have acted on his own. See footnote 79 above. 103. See, for example, The Indonesian Herald, Jan. 18, 1966. 104. WB, Jan. 18, 1966. 105. Duta Masjarakat, Jan. 19 and 20, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 373] === 362 collectively constituted "Bung K a m o ' s troops."1®® The permutations seemed to be endless, quite ingenious. and some were Angkatan Bersendjata, the principal Army newspaper held that the Barisan Soekarno was already in existence, in the form of the entire Indonesian people plus the Armed Forces. Generously it proposed a more appropriate term, Tritunggal (literally, three in one), comprising Bung Karno, ABRI (the Armed Forces) and the Rakjat (People).1®^ KOMPAS, the Catholic paper, suggested Tri-unsor, with the same meaning as Tritunggal. 108 Another variation was Triabdi Ampera, literally, three in the service of Ampera (Message of the People's Suffering). 109 Front Pemuda (Youth Front), claiming a membership of fifteen million, allowed that it had always stood in the "front rank" ("barisan") of the Revolution.1'*'® Though never stated explicitly, the implication of the suggestions with the prefix, three, was that they were appropriate substitutes for Nasakom. Soekarno's name would be more prominent than ever, if he would simply dissolve the PKI. National consensus would be firmer, for it would no longer be based on what many regarded 106. AB, Jan. 20, 1966. 107. AB, Jan. 18, 1966. 108. Kompas, Jan. 19, 1966. 109. A B, Jan. 20, 1966. 110. Pelopor, Jan. 18, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 374] === 363 as the insidious political divisions of Nasakom. There were nonetheless several cases in which opposition to the Barisan Soekarno was expressed in stronger terms. Djihad editorial offers the best example of the approximate limits of acceptable public opposition: We shout, let us continue to strengthen the Pantjasila Front, which already exists, a front for the support of Bung Karno, which already exists, a front for absolute loyalty to Bung K a m o, which already exists, a front of the Supreme Commander. (Soekarno) -ABRI -Rak j at, which already exists, and we urge Bung Karno as Great Leader of the Revolution, to stop the existence of this Barisan Soekarno before it becomes a Soekarno Front to kill Soekarno h i m s e l f I m Far more moderate papers, however, also recognized how rapidly the buffer between criticism of the Government and criticism of Soekarno was narrowing. 112 Consensus politics was being sorely tested. The prohibition against demonstrations, proclaimed on Monday by Amir Machmud, did not serve to restrain student/ youth activism, but on the contrary gave many a heightened 111. Djihad, Jan. 19, 1966. Ampera suggested that the "Barisan Soekarno" is "simply a method for the Gestapu/ PKI to infiltration through legal action." Jan. 23, 1966. Api Pantjasila held the National Front responsible for the Barisan Soekarno idea. Jan. 27, 1966. Angkatan Bersendjata, apparently accepting the inevitabil ity of the Barisan, held that it ought to be completely purged of its counter-revolutionary and Gestapu/PKI elements. 112. See, e.g., Kompas, editorial, Jan. 19, 1966, and also a statement by M. Ch. Ibrahim, Deputy Secretary General of the PSII, about "people who stand behind the shield of Soekarno as protection for their own rotten political games...." Nusa Putera, Jan. 19, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 375] === 364 sense of radicalism and righteousness. The "djaket kuning" or yellow jackets, as the KAMI-led group had come to be called because of their uniform, were heroes. Their war on prices was at least temporarily a success, even despite (and partly because of) Soekarno’s speech. The defiant initiative of the hated Subandrio, via the Barisan Soekarno sponsorship, focused student/youth activism on another of their major concerns, the quality of membership in the Cabinet. 113 KAMI began seriously to regard itself as the vigilant and aggres sive vanguard of popular political desires: The yellow jacket is not only honored but also feared. When Capitalist-bureaucrats in their fancy automobiles see the yellow jackets gather ing, they quickly turn, to left or right it doesn’t matter, anything to avoid the yellow jackets. For the counter-revolutionaries too, the sight of yellow jackets fills them with hate.114 It was just five days after the Bogor address that the first serious clash occurred between opposing student/youth factions. Several thousand persons milled around outside Merdeka Palace where the President addressed a "roll call" 113. One symptom of this focus was another demonstration of several tens of thousands at the Foreign Ministry for the purpose of tendering to Subandrio a demand that he retract his statement on the previous Sunday that KAMI was in the hands of Nekolim. The crowd chanted: "Long live Bung Karno, KAMI stands behind Bung Karno, Bung Karno is not KAMI'S enemy, Durno [Subandrio] is KAM I ’S enemy." AB, Jan. 19, 1966. There was strong invective as well, such as "Crush Subandrio" and "Subandrio is a Peking dog." 114. KAMI, (Djakarta: 1966, 39pp), p. 4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 376] === 365 ceremony of the Dwikora Cabinet. When the ministers began to emerge, a stream of epithets confronted them. KAMI-led demonstrators seemed to be reaching for new heights of invective, prompted in part by the presence of a large group of what can loosely be called a GMNI-led faction. There were taunts at the "yellow jackets" and a quickly mounting mutual provocation, until finally rocks began to fly. Many injuries were sustained before vigillant security troops intervened and gently separated the two groups. Accusations commenced, with each side claiming the other started it all, and KAMI stating that among the GMNI-Asu and Marhaenist Labor demonstrators were ex-CGMI communists. 115 As with the Tjakrabirawa activities the previous year, the Palace vicinity had once again become the scene of civil strife. It was as if the symbolic center of the nation had been sullied. More and more the mystics hinted that life-giving spirits of the nation were unhappy in the Palace and were moving elsewhere. The Palace incident brought to a head the power versus consensus issue generated by S o e k a m o in Bogor. Unless all political elements could find some larger area of common agreement, as S o e k a m o prescribed, the bloodshed of the countryside threatened to wash into the cities as well. 115. Their names alledgedly were Hadi Susilo Rachman and Hasanudin, both medical students. KAMI accused GMNIAsu of harboring them as members. AB, Jan. 21, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 377] === 366 Basic issues, as crystalized into public awareness over the previous months, demanded attention to fundamental reform of economic and political structures. Formal institutions of government seemed to be unavailable for the discussion of these issues. However, power struggle based on these issues seemed to be inviting additional bloodshed which threw the nation into further disarray. Massive consensus, d e pendent upon the nation's only major consensus maker, appeared to be the only way both to forestall bitter conflict and to spark enough popular support to break the inertia of the formal institutions. The Palace incident worried just enough of the various political leaderships to move them to a voluntary act of consensus, designed to fit as closely as possible the President's views. Next day, attracted by radio or by word of mouth, thousands of Djakartans filled the huge Banteng Square. As usual on such occasions, the crowd "produced" a state ment. Entitled "The Oath of the Four Ideals of the People's Desires" ( I k r a r Tjatur Tjita Rasa Rakja't), it was signed by representatives of virtually every political disposition in Djakarta. It combined in its four parts the essential aspects of both the popular and the Presidential concerns. While not discarding any of the three demands which had b e come the basis of the student/youth movement, it acknowledged and gave full commitment to the ideologic framework demanded by the President. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 378] === 367 1. We swear fully to support the January 15 Address of... Bung K a m o, which called on the rakjat to marshall its strength and close ranks in order to safeguard the Pantjasila Revolution under the leadership o£~~... Bung K a m o, from the interference of Nekolim and the counter revolution of 1Gestapu/PKI.' 2. We consciously and earnestly stand on the founda tion of the 'Lima Azimat Revolusi1 and have steadfastly absorbed, disseminated and safeguarded all the Teachings of Great Leader of the Revolu tion Bung K a m o, to the very limits of our abilities; we have in reality constituted a 'Barisan Bung K a m o.' 3. We swear our readiness to carry out the Command of PBR Bung K a m o to vanquish any attack on or interference in the Revolution, and in the leadership and teachings of Bung K a m o, no matter from what direction [the attack] may come, whether from Nekolim, from subversive elements, whether by calumny, or through vested interests, whether from inside or from outside the country. 4. We swear--for the sake of raising the fighting strength of the Baris an Bung K a m o, the living fence of Pantjasila heroes, the unity of the TRI TUNGGAL [trinity] PBR [Pemimpin Besar Revolusi, Great Leader of the Revolution], BUNG KARNO, ABRI [Armed Forces] and progressive revolutionary Rakjat--to struggle continuously until the inner most demands of the rakj at are realized, i.e.: a) Dissolution of the PKI, its mass organiza tions and fronts. b) The purge of counter-revolutionary elements, profiteers, intriguers and vested interests from all instruments of the Revolution, including the State institutions from the very top to the very bottom. c) The undertaking of a reaffirmation of mental, political, economic, social and cultural life based on the principle of gotongro jong [mutual help], by means of a dialogue between PBR BUNG KARNO and all other instrumentalities of the Revolution which have proved their loyalty, capability and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 379] === 368 integrity in confronting Nekolim and domestic counter-revolution, particularly Gestapu/PKI.116 The National Front, the Nahdatul Ulama, both the left and the right wing factions of the PNI, all the other political parties, student and youth groups on all sides, labor unions, social and cultural organizations--no currently existing non-military element was missing. 117 The massive 116. WB, Jan. 26, 1966. 117. Signers of the oath were: 1. Front Nasional, 2. DPRDGR PCI Djaya, 3. Sekber Golkar, 4. Nahdlatul Ufama, 5. P. S.I.I., 6. PNI Osa-Usept 7. PNI Ali-Surachman, 8. Partai Islam Perti, 9. I.P.K.I., 10. Partai Katholiek, 11. Parkindo, 12. Muhammadijah, 13. Gasbiindo, 14. Pemuda Muhammadijah, 15. I.M.M., 16. K.A.M.I., 17. P.M.I.I.. 18. PMKRI, 19. M. M.I., 20. Pemuda Sosialis, 21. Mahasiswa Pantjasila [MAPANTJAS], 22. GP Ansor, 23. Pemuda Katholik, 24. A1 Washlijah, 25. Wanita Katholik, 26. IMABAl 27. iMADA, 28. M. M. B., 29. P.M. B., 50. Pemuda Muslimin Indonesia, 31. GAMKl, 32. Ikatan Mahasiswa Rebajoran ClMK), 37. Kubu Pantjasila, 34. iPPl Pantjasila, 35. P3 I, 36. Pelmasi, 377 Pelpasi, 58. GP Marhaenis Osa-Usep, 39. GKMI Os a-Us e p, 40. KBM Os a-Us e p, 41. ^SNI Osa-Usep, 42. Gerakan Wanita Marhaenis Osa-Usep, 43. LKN Osa-Usep, 44. Petani Osa-Usep, 45. Pjamiatul Muslimin Osa-Usep, 46. ISRI Os a-Usep, 4 7. DPD-SSTTT, 48. Peladjar Islam Indonesia, 49. Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis (GM S q s J*, 50. Gerakan Pemuda Sosialis, 51. GMkl, 52. GSKI, 53. GP Ampera, 54. Sarbumusi, 55. Sentral Pantjasila, 56. KBKT, 57. Sebumit, 58. SfcBM, 59. Sespondo, 60. Veteran/ Demobilisasi Putra SiliwangT^ 61. Serbium, 62. SOKSI, 65. Perkapen-SOKSI, 64. Rukun Tani Indonesia-SOKSl, 65. Serbupi-Gasbiindo, 6 6. SSPG-Gasbiindo, 67. SBPTGasbiindo, 6 8. Karyawan Imigrasi, 69. KBIM, 70. DPP KBM Ali-Surachman, 71. Kespekri, 777 Pemuda Democrat, 73. Ikel 400/TP Siliwangi, 74. Ikel Jon 500/TP Banjumas, 75. Akademi Koperasi Diakarta, 76. s Om AL, 77. Karyawan Maritim, 78. Karyawan K K O, 79~. Karyawan Angkatan Kepolisian, 80. Ikatan Wanita Intra Departemen, 81. Karyawan Deparlu, 82. Gerakan Pramuka, 83. Gerakan TP, 84. MKGR, 85. Ikatan Petani Pantjasila, 86. Ikatan Nelajan Pantjasila, 87. Gema Bung Karno, 8 8. Korps’ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 380] === 369 crowd chanted its praise of S o e k a m o. If Soekarno wanted an expression of mass national sentiment in support of a Soekarno-led consensus, he had it. Whatever blemish attached to his name as a result of the September 30 Movement, all was now forgiven. The Rakj at recognized, even demanded, the fully restored centrality of S o e k a m o. Only he would be capable of maintaining some semblance of national integra tion, while enlisting sufficient popular energy to effect some degree of economic progress. In the dialogue between S o e k a m o and the nation, which was the only dialogue Soekarno now appeared prepared to recognize, it was now S o e k a m o * s turn to respond. Mahasiswa Pantjasila, 89. Wanita Satya Pradjam, 90. Sukwan Dept. Dalam Negeri, 91. PB PGR I, 92. PSPN, 93. Korps Mahasiswa A M I, 94. Perpeki (PeTsatuan Peladjar Kristen Indonesia), 95. Lembaga Kebudajaan Kristen CLKIK), 96. Dewan Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia, 97. DPP Ibu-tanep Pantjasila, 98. PB Pemuda Al Irsjad, 99. PB Peladjar Al Irsjad, 100. P.W. Pemuda Al Irsjad, 101. RK II/Kelurahan Petodjo, 102. DP Gerakan P R M, 103. PP Persatuan Sardjana Kehutanan Indonesia (Persaki), 104. Pemuda Islam, 105. IPNI Clhatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia), 106. Front Katholik"~Komda Djaya, 107. Hansip/Hanra Dept. Hekakiman, 108. Persatuan Inteligensia Kristen Indonesia, T09. Korps Pierre Tendean, 110. Persatuan Petani Kelapa Indonesia, 111. DPP Kebusi, 112. Madjelis Mahasiswa Indonesia (M M I ), 113. Ikatan Karyawan BPU-Industri Kim i a, 114. Perkumpulan Sosial Tjandra N a j a. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 381] === CHAPTER IX A MUTED FINALE: A YOUTHFUL TRIUMPH As a consequence of the Bogor address and the subsequent attainment of a new, tentative national consensus, the options available to Soekarno in his attempt to restore his political power were measurably reduced. However, political conflict now centered on a testing ground, which he apparently found amenable to the further application of some of his special political skills. Soekarno, after all, was peerless in his ability to manipulate any mass movement in which all factions committed themselves categorically to disallow any internal dissension. Under the cloak of consensus Soekarno could expect a freer hand to promote those individuals, groups and ideas he happened to favor. Soekarno decided to joust on the level of mass politics by denigrating and ridiculing the KAMI-led student/youth movement, which claimed to repre sent prevailing popular sentiment, and by submerging and displacing that movement through the weight of what he was confident would be a much more appealing and inclusive Soekarno-led consensus. It is questionable whether or not Soekarno would have chosen to give such recognition, even though it was negative recognition, to the student/youth movement, had he not already concluded that opportunities 370 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 382] === 371 for effective intra-elitist maneuver on other fronts were closed to him. It is in this sense that his decision to turn to the level of mass politics represented a narrowing of his options. Effective utilization of a mass consensual base to enhance presidential freedom of maneuver at the elitist level, had on previous occasions always required simulta neous initiative among the elitist leadership of major adult political forces. By late January opportunities for en listing the cooperation of such elitist interests,were severely attenuated by the unprecedented political power which had already attached to the military. Since October the political resources of Suharto had appreciated consider ably. Soekarno was to face an exceedingly difficult task, if he expected to increase his political capital solely by effecting some chemistry of his own charisma and vague popular protestations of mass national consensus. For adult elitist assistance he could depend only on those Government subordinates to whom alternative avenues to protection were foreclosed, upon fragments of the badly mauled PNI leadership, and upon some officer elements of the military itself. With out a reservoir of reasonably powerful and secure adult political leaders in possession of bargaining capital and with the will to take risks, what would Soekarno be able to do with whatever mass support he was able to enlist? How would his actual capacity to wield power within the Government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 383] === 372 vis-k-vis the emerging vitality and aggressiveness of the Suharto group be improved? Suharto astutely refrained from any direct public con frontation with Soekarno, despite the onset of what to him must have appeared to be extreme provocation. The intensifi cation of Djakarta's political atmosphere, which inclined sharply shortly after the consensual ceremony described in the last chapter, continued right up until the now famous March 11 formal transfer of Governmental authority. Most Indonesians regard this as the most dramatic period of postOctober 1 Indonesian politics. Students and youth generally claim it was they who were the major causative factor p r o pelling Suharto toward some sort of decisive resolution of the power conflict, and it is likely that most citizens would agree with this claim. Nevertheless, Suharto's astuteness becomes less remarkable in light of his own power resources. As dramatic as the public student/youth confrontations were, it remains necessary to qualify their apparent political impact by keeping in mind Suharto's silent consolidation of other established loci of power. The extent to which Soekarno used the new consensus to pursue his own objectives is easily demonstrated. Even before the list of organizations signing the declaration of fealty reached its fullest length, Soekarno commenced to test the loyalty proclaimed. His first opportunity came with the celebration of Idul Fitri on January 22, which occasioned a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 384] === 373 massive congregation of the faithful at the huge Senajan Stadium. Muslim youth arrived in truck caravans from all over West Java and even from more distant points. Among the banners specifying particular groups, those on Ansor, the militant youth contingent of NU, were clearly the most numerous. Soekarno could not have confronted a more uncon genial, anti-communist and conservatively religious audience. Student/youth leaders and many others in Djakarta expected that Soekarno would be strongly rebuffed and that the Islamic youth, once exercised, might even go on a rampage through the city. Yet, it took Soekarno only about ten minutes to mesmerize his audience. Signs with slogans critical of the Government quickly disappeared and the young audience re peatedly stood and cheered. Soekarno's appeal to religious principle and to their love for him, once again turned a potentially disastrous spectacle into a mass demonstration of loyalty for the President. On another front Soekarno frequently invited leaders of PNI and other sympathetic student and youth groups to the ■... palace, where he endorsed their activities and encouraged further efforts to mobilize support for the Government.* On January 26, for instance, he met with Pemuda Marhaenis, GMNI and GSNI. F B I S, January 26; slightly differing re ports appeared in WB, January 28 and P e l o p o r, January 29. The fullest account of this meeting appeared in the weekly student newspapers, Warta Peladj a r, February 6, 1966. lists the members of the delegation of students as: J.S.S. Tiranda Nursalim (GPM), Randusara (GPM), Lucien Pahala Hutagaol (GMNI), Kartjono (GMNI), Djoni Sastrawiguna (GSNI), Rudi Sihombing (GSNI) and Suwardi (GPM). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 385] === 374 He called on these groups to go into Central and East Java to find those many millions whose loyalty to the President was still "without reservations" Ctanpa reserve). He in structed his Minister of Information, Ruslan Abdulgani, and Sjarif Thajeb as well, to tour Java and enlist support for the Soekarno Front. Ruslan, under the pretext of an im pending GMNI anniversary celebration in late February, spoke most frequently to "planning sessions" of this and other PNI groups.^ He stressed the need for loyalty without reservations to the President and frequently affirmed the correctness of pantja azimat as the nation's foremost ideolo gical guidelines. The efforts of GMNI and other such organi zations, he said, could materially assist in making the ap proaching CONEFO (Conference of New Emerging Forces) a success. Soekarno stated that he was confident none of the university student members of these groups had participated in the dem onstrations which had called cabinet ministers stupid. Warta Peladj a r, Feb. 6, 1966. Another, particularly important meeting took place on Feb. 23, also at the Palace. This time Soekarno admonished the delegation to lead its followers aggressively against all of the President's opponents and to destroy all obstacles. See accounts in Pelopor, Feb. 29, • 1966; P P A B, Feb. 24, 1966; and WB, Feb. 25, 1966. The order to Thajeb was reported in WB, Jan. 28, 1966. Two such speeches were given by ThajeF in Jogjakarta, WB, Feb. 10, 1966. A speech by Ruslan was reported in WB, Feb. 9, 1966. He spoke, for instance, to Marhaenist women in Malang, to GMNI students at Universitas Airlagga, and again to students at Universitas 17 Augustus in Surabaja. He noted that GMNI was especially rooted in the teachings of Soekarno, as was proved by GMNI's ever staunch defense of RESOPIM. PPAB, Feb. 17, 1966 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 386] === Soekarno, in his own frequent speeches, reiterated ever more stridently the central tenets of the pre-October 1, 1965 national program. Indonesia's basic struggle, he insisted, was centered more than ever on the battle against the colonial ism and imperialism of Western nations. Failure to fulfill the imperative manifest in the pantja azimat, failure to c om bat the domestic subversive activities of NEKOLIM, failure to establish CONEFO, would signify the failure of Indonesia's dearest aspirations. Indonesian society, he said, was still only in the stage of National Democracy and would have to work onward to achieve the stage of Democratic Socialism.** peatedly, Soekarno intimated that those elements of Indonesian society opposing these objectives or in any way lacking in enthusiasm for them, were walking a dangerous path. magnanimity of Soekarno had limits, he said: Even the at some point "force will be met with force. These thinly veiled threats, made both in private and in public, became the subject of widespread speculation. To the general public the old Soekarno seemed to be re-emerging--his aura of confidence, his consistent defense of long standing policies, and his aggressive initiative in the mass political arena, all gave promise that Soekarno would once again rise up, vanquish all obstacles and retain his leadership. Since he seemed to be unopposed by Suharto, who often appeared to 5. WB, February 24, 1966. 6. Warta Peladjar, February 6, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 387] === 376 endorse the principal Guided Democracy objectives himself, many took his threats quite seriously. Some were fearful that Soekarno’s long-waited "political solution" would deal with the student/youth movement and its adult sympathizers rather than with the PKI.^ Presidential subordinates lent credence to this possi bility by their increasingly open and harsh treatment of KAMI. Subandrio openly accused KAMI of treachery and of participa tion in a. conspiracy to lead the Indonesian Revolution toward the right (mengkanankan). Sjarif Thajeb repeatedly ordered all students to return to their classes and threatened to resign his post as Minister of Higher Education and Research unless they promptly complied.® Even those who were close to the Suharto group or known previously to be sympathetic to the student/youth activity now manifested apprehension about KAMI. Amir Machmud strongly seconded Sjarif Thajeb's instruction,'*'® and Soemantri, the Rector of U.I., issued his own order that the students return to class.** Newspapers, whether strongly pro-Suharto or not, Subandrio said as much, when he told a student delegation that the PKI had already in effect been banned and that the President's political solution would be designed further to safeguard the Revolution. Api Pantjasila, Feb. 16, 1966. See the report of his speech to GSNI on February 28. Mar. 1, 1966. WB, Feb. 10, 1966, and AB, Feb. 14, 1966. 10. P P A B, Feb. 19, 1966. 11. WB, Feb. 16, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Genta, === [PDF page 388] === 377 for the most part retreated from previous positions and argued that failure to attend classes was essentially damaging to the Revolution, for it would ultimately deprive the Rakjat of the skilled leadership essential to progress. 12 Months later persons like Thajeb justified their actions during this period with the argument that they were helping to forestall p r e cipitate action on the part of Soekarno which might prematurely have forced Suharto's hand in confronting the President. One of the difficult questions of this early 1966 period is indeed the problem of ascertaining precisely what kind of confronta tion, if any, Suharto may have envisioned. Certainly, to the extent that he sought to maintain maximum national consensus, he was obliged to discourage direct confrontations, whether between himself and Soekarno, or among any political groups proclaiming allegiance to Guided Democracy, with the exception of the PKI and other allegedly pro-communist groups. As stated earlier in this study, the principal figures of the KAMI-led student/youth movement, however partial to Suharto, did not represent a cross-section of Indonesian society, but on the contrary, were with few exceptions non-Javanese, educated (often in a Western vein), socially elitist, and where religious, quite conservative. Some astute Indonesian political analysts pointed out privately at the time that Suharto's growing dependence on the KAMI-led movement as a popular political vanguard was 12. See, e.g., the two editorials in AB, Feb. 14, 1966. Duta Masjarakat was an exception. See”Tts editorial, Feb. 15, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 389] === 378 becoming a liability. Were Suharto to challenge the President's power directly and publicly and win, he would then be strongly indebted to a composite of minority and/or fringe elements of Indonesian society. Javanese and Sundanese, prijaji or abangan, whose strong support would be essential to the success of any new government, would feel slighted. Suharto, himself strongly rooted in the Javanese prijaji, would ultimately have to locate his popular support in rural Java. Soekarno therefore p r o ceeded to drive a wedge into the inherently unstable substance of KAMI'S claim to popular leadership in what was an over whelmingly Javanese or Sundanese social environment. The composition of GMNI, the university student group of the PNI, was in fact much closer to the potential sources of mass political support than was the leadership of KAMI, if only because of its predominantly Javanese ethnic identity. Virtually every day of the month of February saw an increase in the boldness with which GMNI and sympathetic student/youth groups pressed their campaign of opposition to the KAMI-led movement. Soekarno, as pointed out earlier, actively e n couraged the GMNI offensive. (This was GMNI-ASU, that majority of GMNI which remained outside the KAMI cam p ). began more openly to lend assistance. Military units The KAMI activities had for months enjoyed the protection of KOSTRAD, RPKAD, or KUDJANG troups. Now, GMNI also had protection--from elements of BRIMOB, POMAD, KKO and others. civilian dress. Soldiers were frequently identified in The major public political issues began to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 390] === 379 skew away from banning the PKI, retooling the DWIKORA Cabinet, and lowering prices and toward a more traditional, primordial and divisive conflict based on long time Java-non-Java, strong Muslim-weak Muslim, antipathies. The advantages to Suharto of the KAMI-led student/youth support began to be offset by the disadvantage of jeopardized popular support on a more enduring basis. However much Suharto may have wished to bring Soekarno to some permanent reconciliation with a reformed Guided D e m o cracy, he had to allow for the contingency that Soekarno might remain implacable. Suharto's power, following a (presumably victorious) showdown, would have to rest essentially on a Javanese military and civilian base. Soekarno now threatened to cut seriously into that base. On February 21 Soekarno announced his formation of a Perfected DWIKORA Cabinet. In an accompanying speech he char acterized the new Cabinet as a solution to many of the country's basic problems. Many Indonesians thus believed that the Presi dent regarded the Perfected DWIKORA Cabinet as the "political solution" they had so long awaited. This was confirmed by the nature of the fifteen changes in personnel. the dismissal of Nasution. Most notable was No action short of the dismissal of Suharto could have evidenced more clearly Soekarno's willing ness to tread on the sensitivities of those for whom the October 1 assassinations were the most heinous crime of modern Indonesian history. Soekarno's intransigence was made doubly apparent by his retention of several ministers commonly believed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 391] === 380 to have directly participated in or abetted the September 30 Movement. These included Achmad Astrawinata (Minister of Justice), Ir. Surachmen (Minister of Public Irrigation and Village Development; and the "SU" part of PNI-ASU), Vice Marshal Umar Dhani (relieved as Air Force Commander, now Commander of the Aviation Industry Command [KOPPELAPIP]), and Oei Tjoe Tat (Minister of State; member of BAPERKI). Teuku Jusuf Muda Dalam, generally characterized by the KAMI-led student/youth movement as the most corrupt man in the nation, also remained as Minister in charge of Central Bank Affairs and Governor of Bank Negara Indonesia. The nationally revered Sultan of Jogjakarta received the dubious honor of becomming Minister of Tourism. 13 New additions to the Cabinet included the editor of P e lopor, J.K. Tumakaka, who was one of the most vocal public opponents of KAMI and most loyal of the President’s advocates, as Minister/Secretary-General of the National Front. Especially objectionable from many students' points of view was the appointment of Sumardjo as Minister of Basic Education and Culture, 14 and the removal of Sjarif Thajeb as Minister of Higher Education and Science. Sumardjo was generally recognized as strongly sympathetic to the PKI. Finally, there was the elevation of Lt. Col. Imam Sjafe'i, who became Minister Seconded 13. He also, however, was given the largely powerless position of Coordinating Minister of the Compartment of Development, of which the Ministry of Tourism was a part. 14. See WB, Feb. 24, and Duta Masjarakat, Feb. 28, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 392] === 381 to the President for Special Security Affairs. Known pr e viously as "King of the Pickpockets," heading one of the larger organized crime rings in Djakarta, it was believed that Soekarno had in effect hired Sjafei to head a campaign to clamp down on the KAMI-led movement. The new Cabinet was to be installed three days later. The day before, the Greater Djakarta Military Command staged a "Loyalty Rally for Soekarno" at Banteng Square. A sub stantial portion of the huge crowd drifted away from the square and headed for the National Secretariat building next to Merdeka Palace. There they waited several hours hoping, they later claimed, that the President would speak. Amir Machmud, the Djakarta Military Commander, arrived and tried to persuade the crowd to come to his headquarters for discus sion. Either the crowd or the Tjakrabirawa troops, it is unknown which, finally became openly belligerent. The National Secretariat was sacked, and some of the troops opened fire, wounding several s t u d e n t s. S o m e KAMI leaders later claimed that ironically, on that particular day, neither they nor other KAMI leaders had had anything to do with organizing the crowd. Neither KAMI leaders nor many members, they said, had even been there. The next day, on February 24 Soekarno installed his Cabinet, although, in the face of a concerted KAMI-led effort to prevent the ministers from getting to the Palace, he had to fetch many 15. WB, February 24, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 393] === 382 of them in his personal helicopter. It was on this occasion that some of the Tjakrabirawa troops finally opened fire directly at the crowd demonstrating in front of the Palace, wounding several students and killing one of them. Arief Rachman Hakim instantly became K A M I ’S first martyr. This incident and the humiliation Soekarno suffered at the nearly successful student/youth effort to impede the Cabinet in stallation, probably were the factors of immediate considera tion in the President's banning of KAMI the following day.*’** Immediately after the banning of KAMI a student regiment was formed by KAMI members and high school students and was named the Abdul Rachman Hakim Regiment, after the deceased KAMI member. A few days later, on March 1, a Cadre Force of the Soekarno Front opened its headquarters in Djakarta. 17 the same day Amir Machmud issued a prohibition against all student demonstrations in the Greater Djakarta area, 18 and the 16. Actually, although Soekarno announced the ban on the evening of February 25, it went into effect the following day. The decree was issued by Soekarno in his capacity as Commander in Chief of Crushing Malaysia (KOGAM). It was based on three explicit considerations: 1) that the current stage of the Revolution required the utilization of maximum nation al potential, 2) that attempts to undermine the Revolution and the Great Leader of the Revolution were impairing the concentration of national potential and weakening Revolu tionary defense, and 3) that the actions of students in the organization, KAMI, were damaging the struggle to crush Malaysia and stalling Indonesia's revolutionary progress. The decree also prohibited all gatherings of more than five university students, irrespective of organizational affili ation. DWIKORA, Feb. 26, 1966. 17. WB, Mar,. 3, 1966. 18. PPAB, Mar. 3, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 394] === 383 Regional DWIKORA Administrator (PEPELRADA) announced the formation, in accordance with Presidential orders, of PNMI, a new National Organization of Indonesian University Students, to exist pending further commands from Soekarno which would finally result in a National Union of Students, such as he had described in his January 15, Bogor speech.*® On March 3 Soekarno had his Second Deputy Prime Minister, Leimena (who had replaced Thajeb on an ad interim basis), close University of Indonesia. 20 the Suharto remained silent, and other military leaders previously helpful to KAMI, now seemed to acquiesce to each of the President's moves. On March 9 and 10 Soekarno met with various political party leaders and finally extracted from them a public statement of affirmation'for the President and for his various actions which he held were designed to maintain security in the nation. 21 This capitulation of political party leaders, including those who had been most sympathetic to the KAMI-led student/youth movement, produced widespread dejection among the activists. 22 19. P P A B, March 2, and WB, March 3, 1966. 20. WB, March 3, 1966. 21. WB, March 11, 1966. 22. Reaction to the political party leadership, not just by the student/youth movement, was especially bitter after the following day's transfer of authority to Suharto. In effect, party leaders had made the worst blunder possible, if their hope was to gain political influence. The March 11 event seemed to prove that political party leaders were simply out of touch with all real sources of power in the nation. Although the Indonesian Herald (March 12, 1966) greeted the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 395] === 384 Another GMNI attach struck at the American embassy, 23 and diplomats whispered worriedly about whether their families would again have to leave the country, as they had in October. The next day was Friday, March 11, when Soekarno was compelled to transfer caretaker governmental authority to Suharto. Some mystery, mostly apocryphal, attaches to the story, yet the simple fact is that Suharto finally had decided to make a decisive move. Publicly it was of course Soekarno who voluntarily "ordered11 Suharto to assume certain responsibilities. The opportunity was left open for Soekarno gracefully to adjust to the New Order, whenever he chose to do so. One side of the pre-March 11 events has been presented here. To explain the role of the student/youth movement it is now necessary to retrace the period from the point of view of Soekarno’s opposition. From the beginning of its ’formal’ campaign in early January KAMI characterized itself as spokesman for the Rakj a t. By the advent of Soekarno’s Bogor address many adult citizens Political Party Declaration, other papers generally indicated their disdain. See the AB editorial, March, 11 and especially the Fadjar editorial, March 13, 1966. 23. WB, March 9, 1966. 24. See WB, March 12, 1966 for the full text of the transfer order. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 396] === 385 had come to acknowledge this characterization. Newspaper editorials commonly recognized KAMI'S three basic demands-which in February were reduced to the popular acronym, tritura--as an accurate specification of the major needs of the nation. Civilian and military leaders regularly centered their speeches around them and, more frequently than not, gave credit to KAMI for bringing these issues vividly to attention. Soekarno, through his Bogor address and the follow-up speech of Subandrio, unwittingly contributed to the image of KAMI as people's advocate. By demanding that citizens in effect make a choice, either to stand unquestioningly behind him or to throw in their lot with KAMI and elements of similar disposi tion, Soekarno lent a significance to KAMI which it might otherwise never have acquired. Soekarno gambled that through a dramatic personal appeal to the masses he could break asunder the public identification with KAMI and hence its support for K A M I 's demands. Though the above remarks seem to stress the importance of the growing power conflict, they are not intended as a chal lenge to the earnestness of Soekarno, KAMI, the Army or other political elements in their quest for consensus. Concern with public unity has been a major feature of modern Indonesia, a basic preoccupation of political culture, and as such need not necessarily in any way preclude vigorous polticial compet ition. Invective, even at its hottest, rarely approached the earthiness of debate commonly heard in the august senates Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 397] === 386 of certain Western governments. Unless Soekarno's appeal for mass support very quickly produced an operational momentum among student and/or youth elements basically antagonistic to KAMI, it could be expected that KAMI would capitalize on the President's recognition in an effort to expand its influence and broaden its base of support. Though distinctly unrepresentative of the ethnic and other balances of the general population, KAMI came to battle with the Presidentially backed GMNI (et alia) with a number of advantages, most of which have already been m e n tioned. The two most significant, however, were the protection of Suharto and the fact that KAMI had already identified and appropriated to its own banner the major issues of popular concern. GMNI could pay frequent visits to the Palace. KAMI'S not quite defunct federational predecessor, the PPMI, could claim along with the intra-university MMI federation, to be the only legitimate representatives of university students. 25 25. PPMI issued a joint statement on behalf of MMI, GERMINDO, GEMA Bung Karno and itself, after a meeting at the Palace on February 15, to which leaders of these groups had been summoned by the President. The PPMI statement proclaimed the eagerness of progressive revolutionary students to set up a Barisan Soekarno and to destroy enemies of the Indonesian Revolution. These enemies included all those who deviated in any way from the teachings of Soekarno or who wanted to sway the Revolution to the right. The statement expressed complete opposition to student strikes, fully supported CONEFO, and offered full commitment to the holding of CONEFO in 1966. Finally, it condemned the heinous sin of American bombing and other atrocities in Vietnam and demanded immediate U.S. withdrawal. No mention was made of China. WB, Feb. 16, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. === [PDF page 398] === 387 Soekarno could give his benediction to these three organizations--GMNI, PPMI, and MMI--and to GSNI, GPM, GERMINDO and GEMA Bung Karno. He could inspire them, as true "manipolists," "Pantjasilaists," socialists, "Marhaenists," to wage battle against his KAMI-led opposition, and he could provide military protection. He could issue punitive decrees on his own or through subordinates, against the opposition. But all this notwithstanding, he could not provide his supporters with con crete demands alternative to those of K A M I. For he had already stated unequivocally that the nation would either have to com ply with his leadership "without reserve" or suffer his resigna tion from office. As soon as it was clear that the 'new consensus' of late January was primarily ceremonial, KAMI expanded and accelerated its tritura campaign. Expansion occurred on four planes: 1) demonstrations, 2) propaganda and public information, 3) or ganizational expansion, and 4} para-military operations. The first and most visible was intensification of demonstrations and an increase of the variety of officials, ministries and other agencies demonstrated against. The entire KAMI-led stu dent/youth movement gradually came to resemble a mass messianic brotherhood. Adherents began to congregate not just in the daytime but at nighttime as well. At first they gathered in small groups, eating and sleeping communally in the homes of one friend of another. Eventually, the buildings of the Univ ersity of Indonesia were transformed into one large commune. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 399] === 388 Individuals drifted in and out, but the population always numbered in the hundreds forming a kind of symbolic bastion of righteousness. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of mothers provided cooked food, clothing and other supplies. Parents in increasing numbers thrilled to the euphoria of youth and harkened back to their own experiences at the time of the Revolution. The student/youth activities grew into one single, massive, continuous demonstration, in which parents and other adults enjoyed vicarious participation. In this form the demonstration became in itself a ceremony of consensus. A second plane of expansion centered on public information. Press releases, public ’’fact sheets," banner, stickers, mimeo graphed pamphlets spewed forth daily in ever increasing numbers. Clandestine radio stations emerged, eventually numbering more than one hundred and fifty in the Greater Djakarta area alone. Most "stations" consisted merely of a small transmitter with a broadcast radius of no more than a hew hundred yards. Some, however, such as Radio Ampera, were supplied with Army equip ment and eventually were able to reach distances as far away as Bogor (and some said, even Bandung). These stations gave vent to another long repressed student/youth interest, by 26. Radio Ampera eventually circulated mimeographed collections of many of its broadcast commentaries. These were entitled Radio Ampera Menggugat, a take-off on the title of Soekarno's book of 35 years before, Indonesia Menggugat, (Indonesia Accuses). According to the preface to the first of these collections, Radio Ampera commenced broadcasting on February 28, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 400] === 389 broadcasting liberal amounts of the officially prohibited ngak ngik n g o k, or rock 'n roll music. "Cultural release" was in fact an important aspect of the entire movement and, probably as much as any other factor, tended to attract to the KAMI banner many who in most other respects were quite u n sympathetic. Students presented pantomimes in the streets, constructed ingenious pictorial displays, wrote poetry and short stories, and composed songs. As everyone knew, it was all in flagrant defiance of the curtailing of artistic free dom initiated by the President in response to the,Cultural Manifesto (MANIKEBU) the year before. Mini-skirts, peg pants, garish lipstick, jaunty caps and other adventures in costume were also abundant. And it seemed that the more orthodox Islamic one's family, the more bold was one's costume--and behavior. Denunciations by middle-aged Government officials, citing the inimical effects of Western influence, failed to blunt the enthusiasm of young people, much less cause them to desist from their evil ways. Many adults who remained adamant on the subject of Western cultural influence, nonetheless succumbed to the appeal of honestly youthful enthusiasm. The third plane entailed organizational expansion, an attempt to broaden the base of KAMI'S active membership and to generate new organizations, affiliated with or sympathetic to KAMI'S objectives. Such expansion was dictated by several considerations, the most important of which was the fact that the composition of KAMI'S leadership stratum was unrepresentative Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 401] === 390 of major ethnic and religious divisions of Indonesian society. Personalist leadership, wherein individual names gain public prominence, had so far been avoided. Direct confrontation with a GMNI, P P M I, and MMI offensive, however, threatened to draw individual KAMI leaders more frequently before the public eye. They could expect to be seriously disadvantaged in the event of individual competition with predominantly Javanese opponents. A second consideration was the mounting threat that Soekarno might formally restrict KAMI'S operations or abolish the organization all together. KAMI began to encourage the formation of additional independent action groups repre senting various sectors of society, not just students and youth, but modeling themselves on KAMI and offering voluntary support both for the tritura and for KAMI itself. One further consideration concerned KAMI'S position vis-h-vis the Army and the increasing general militancy of political conflict in Djakarta. As illustrated on numerous occasions in this study, the disposition of military officers toward one another, toward various political groups, and about questions such as what parts of the Guided Democracy framework were inviolable, was no less ambivalent than that of civilian elitists. Probably most officers, while solidly with KAMI on the ban-the-PKI issue, found the indiscipline of the whole KAMI-led movement objection able and dangerous and believed that it would benefit from a bit of fatherly guidance to assure its continued maturation in the "right" directions. Conversely, the KAMI membership, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 402] === 391 and more importantly the number of youth generally who were hoarding in under KA M I ’S wing, required sizeable material assistance. The increasing militancy of demonstrations added to this requirement. Thus the interests of Army officers and of student/youth elements met, and the result was the forma tion of large para-military units. It is questionable whether the momentum of K A M I ’S leader ship of the student/youth movement would have endured as long as it did, through 1966 and 1967, if Soekarno had not banned the organization on February 25. Since the composition of KAMI'S leadership was fluid, precise categorization in terms of ethnic group is difficult. However, out of fifteen persons who can be classified as occupying leadership positions in early 1966, twelve were of Outer Island or alien ethnic background. 27 Of these twelve at least three were Minangkabau (Central Sumatra) and three were Batak (North Sumatra). were of Arabic background, and one was Chinese. Two None of the twelve represented a root organization of more than a few thousand members, and several represented no formal root organization at all. Their relative freedom from the con straints which inevitably encumbered those from much larger 27. The twelve were: Cosmas Batubara (Batak), Ismit Haddad (Arab/Pekalongan), Fahmi Idris (Arab/Minangkabau), Ojong Karmajuda (Minangkabau), Nono Makarim (Arab/Central Java), David Napitapulu (Batak), Firdaus Wadji (Minangkabau), Elyas, Johny Sunarja, Tommy Wangke, Hakim Simamora (Batak), and Liem Bian Koen (Chinese). The three Javanese, all santri, were Marie Muhammad (Surabaja), Slamet Sukirnanto (Solo), and Zamroni (Kudus). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 403] === 392 organizations, such as HMI or PMII, was an important asset. Nonetheless, when circumstances required KAMI to seek the active assistance of really large numbers of citizens in order to compete with Soekarno's mass mobilization campaign, this narrow leadership base became a liability. The tritura cam paign would falter, if the student/youth movement did not generate attractive organizational alternatives acceptable to the wider, especially Javanese, sector of Indonesian society. The fourth and final plane of KAMI-led activity concerned the development of para-military operations, which have been mentioned above as part of the attempt at organizational ex pansion. Because of their eventual magnitude and other poli tical dimensions, however, para-military developments require some separate recognition. Military training somewhat akin to the American ROTC had been in existence since early Guided Democracy. Each major city had a university student regiment, such as Resimen Mahasurja for Surabaja, Resimen Mahasura for Surakarta, and Resimen Mahadjaya for Greater Djakarta. Their claimed strength varied considerably (e.g., 30,000 in Djakarta, 5000 in Surakarta) and was grossly exaggerated in all cases. 28 Deficiencies in facilities, equipment and interest helped to prevent them from being little more than paper organizations. Their most notable enterprize was garbage collection campaigns (gemah ripah). 28. The figure for Djakarta appeared in PPAB, Oct. 19, 1965; for Surakarta, in WB, Dec. 4, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 404] === 393 In the post-October 1, 1965 period the existence of these regiments provided a convenient justification for direct student participation in "security" operations. The Mahasurja Regiment, for instance, actually sought to assume a role simi lar to that of the Tentara Peladjar of Revolutionary days. Divided into twelve "Combat Platoons," it engaged in "security patrols" under the guidance of former members of the Tentara Peladjar and with the cooperation (and encouragement) of ABRI. 29 This activation of student regiments, which was in full operation in Surakarta by November, did not commence in Djakarta until February, 1966. In November, 1965, Resimen Mahadjaya was still collecting garbage. 30 Even in 1966 Resimen Mahadjaya never developed an active para-military role such as had occurred in Surakarta. It did, however, make political statements which implied that if necessary such activities would commence. Instead of the Resimen Mahadjaya, it was a new organization, the Abdul Rachman Hakim Regiment, instituted immediately after the fatal shooting incident at the Palace, which absorbed a substantial number of students and other youth from the larger KAMI-led movement. By that time KAMI had been banned by Soekarno, so that the Regiment afforded KAMI leaders a mechan ism for maintaining at least some degree of continuing control over the student/youth movement. Yet creation of the regiment 29. WB, December 4, 1965. 30. Nusa Putera, November 4, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 405] === 394 was also the culmination of an effort by Suharto to impose formal supervision upon KAMI. Actually, the ban against KAMI had little effect upon the freedom of movement of KAMI leaders, but the emergence of another organization, however sympathetic it was to KAMI'S tritura demands, automatically opened the student/youth movement to other sources of influence than KAMI. As a para-military organization, the A.R. Hakim Regiment was especially subject to the influence of military subordinates of Suharto, such as Kemal Idris who had done most to promote the idea of a formal military adjunct to the KAMI movement in the first place. Though the establishment of the A.R. Hakim Regiment was the most prominent example of the militarization of the stu dent/youth movement, the process was also manifested on a lesser scale elsewhere. So-called "multi-purpose Brigades" (Brigade Serba Guna) attached to most organizations affiliated to political parties. In some cases such bodies already ex isted and were strengthened; in others, new bodies were created. Also, as will be seen, there was some attempt by KAMI to pre empt the term,'Barisan Soekarno, for its own use and to fashion it into a military-type organization. There were then these four different planes of activity involved in the KAMI-led offensive. It was an offensive not only against the student/youth elements marshaled by the President but against any elements seeking to deflect the public eye from the public interest, as defined by KAMI'S Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 406] === 395 three demands. A n atmosphere of affirmation characterized the offensive as noticeably as the thrust of opposition. Cultural release and freedom of expression, once indulged, were irrepressible. The fact that one substantial sector of Indonesian society, all those people labeled communists, were excluded, did not diminish the general sense of liberation. One of the tragic aspects of this period was that the price of release from years of mounting frustration was exacted almost totally from the peasantry, the group perhaps least responsible among all the sectors of Indonesian society for the attenuation of freedom against which many were now rebelling. The mounting cultural radicalism of the younger generation had little to do with ideological conflict of the communist-anti-communist variety. Repression of civil liberties in Indonesia, as most people were well aware, was not the special propensity of communists. Since Soekarno in virtually every recent speech had been laying special stress on the Nekolim threat and the need for solidarity among Nefos nations, it is not surprising that student/youth activities also increasingly turned to issues of Indonesian foreign affairs. The renewal of the KAMI-led offensive, as the President's barisan consensus proved ephemeral, began with an effort to show that the term, Nekolim, must now apply not just to the American and British involve Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 407] === 396 ments in Southeast Asia but to the People's Republic of China as Well. The alleged Chinese assistance to the Se p tember 30 Movement and characterization of the post-October 1 Indonesian Government as rightist and reactionary, were proof, according to KAMI, that China was now endeavoring to subvert the legitimate Government of Indonesia headed by President Soekarno. 31 February 3 marked the commencement of a series of demonstrations against the Chinese Embassy and other official offices in Djakarta. 32 By the end of the month these demonstrations were to become armed attacks involving the sacking and burning of all CPR facilities and beatings and shootings of official personnel. To prove the impartiality of its anti-Nekolim wrath, KAMI also launched attacks on the American Embassy in protest against the bombings in Vietnam. 33 Many official vehicles were overturned and burned, plate glass windows were broken, fences torn down, and equipment smashed, though there was no physical abuse of personnel. The response of the Americans was to transform the elegant compound, with its non-functional fences and vulnerable build31. The statement of this argument appeared in the journal published by students of the Psychology Faculty of the University of Indonesia. See Gema-Psychologi (Ediai Istimewa, Demonstrasi Mahasiswa), Feb., 1966, pp. 31-32. 32. For one editorial account, fully approving of the attacks, see Djihad, Feb. 4, 1966. 33. Demonstrations against the American Embassy received little press attention. For one account, see P P A B, Feb. 24, 1966. Later, after March 11, KAMI leaders insisted that only GMNI members and supporters had participated in the American Embassy attacks. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 408] === 397 ing facades, into what by the first week of March was an armed camp, with reinforced fences, heavy gates, barbed wire, rock proof and bomb resistant building shields and bullet proof glass. The second step of the offensive was an official re affirmation by KAMI, many universities, and other sympathetic organizations of the strike against attending classes. 35 More effort was made to clarify the symbolic significance of this defiant act. The demand for the banning of the PKI, KAMI insisted, was not in any way to be construed as ideological deviation from national policies. It was a demand pragmatically dictated by the fact that the PKI had resorted to physical violence in an attempt to topple the nation's only constituted Government. Both KAMI and the adult KAP-Gestapu insistently claimed the continued purity of their "leftism." KAMI did argue, however, that events of the pre vious months served to complicate the task of ascertaining who was left and who was right. Judged on the diplomatic plane of other Governments' friendliness toward Indonesia, 34. The barbed wire was mentioned in an article in WB, Mar. 10, 1966. 35. The major statement re-affirming the strike was issued on February 8 in response to Thajeb's order to return to classes. It was signed by KAMI Djakarta, the university and faculty senates of seventeen universities, and at least eleven academies. It marked the beginning of serious disaffection of the KAMI-led movement from Thajeb and a sharpening of language with regard to the three standard demands. Instead of asking for a reform or retooling of the DWIKORA Cabinet, KAMI now demanded that the Cabinet be demolished and purged. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 409] === 398 it was now possible to regard Havana and Peking as being rightist. Domestically, if being leftist was synonymous with support of revolutionary socialism, then one important criterion of political criticism had to be the efficacy of Government policies regarding major political, social, and economic problems. The Bandung KAMI was especially aggressive in arguing that the DWIKORA Cabinet, judged in these terms, was a total failure and that the best indication the Govern ment might give that the nation was progressing toward its goal of socialism would be its capacity to lower prices. 37 All parts of the tritura demands were thus viewed by KAMI as intimately interconnected. Their realization would be an accomplishment of revolutionary socialism, of leftism. Soon, most newspapers and even Government officials began to voice this same view. Even Chairul Saleh expressed his agreement that the PKI must be banned and that the Cabinet must be retooled. 38 KAMI succeeded magnificently in its campaign 36. This view was elaborated in Gema-Psychologi, op. c i t., pp. 29 and 32. 37. This argument was formally set forth as early as January 12 in a petition sent to President Soekarno by KAMI Bandung. This petition is the best example of attempts by students to wrestle with the conceptual difficulties of probing practical problems of the nation all the while maintaining loyalty to Soekarno and to the national ideology. The entire petition, which is very lengthy, is included in Gema-Psychologi, op. c i t., pp. 4-10. 38. This position was expressed in a speech in Bandung on February 5. Saleh asked the students think further about the problems of economic reform. For an editorial com mentary on Saleh’s speech, see Nusa Putera, Feb. 9, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 410] === 399 to gain national identification and agreement with the tritura demands. Nevertheless, acceptance of the principles of the tritura promised to signify very little, if the result was to be no more than another form of vacuous consensus. The intention of the student strike was to build moral suasion such that the Government would take concrete steps to accomplish the substance of the demands. Many of those officials who most loudly endorsed the tritura in public, proved unwilling to rise above the constraints of office and challenge the Government itself. In view of the flaccid, nearly inopera tive condition of the MPRS, the DPRGR and the DPA, this was understandable. The only agent of Governmental authority capable of decisive response was the President, who over a period of several years had systematically removed himself from access by subordinate levels and other agencies of the Government. KAMI'S plea that Soekarno break loose from the confining screens of palace regalia and witness the miserable condition of his people was matched in the silent frustration of Government officials, who while supportive of the tritura in principle, were unable to extricate themselves from the regalia upon which they had grown comfortably dependent. Appeals to consensus had come too often to be used as a rationalization for the deeply permeated inertia which characterized all sources of leadership and influence. To an American observer the material advantage of most individual Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 411] === 400 Indonesians, who were leaders or who were in positions of in fluence in comparison with other citizens, was marginal. to them, it was all they had. But It was a precious advantage of which they could easily be deprived in the wake of any radical change. Sjarif Thajeb ordered all students back to class, saying that the student strike was directly interfering with the operations of Government and obstructing the "wheels of the Revolution." He admonished the students to demonstrate their professed loyalty to the President by refraining from any kind of matjet (literally, breakdown or Jamming). 39 He reminded all university student groups that they would be compelled to join the new National Union of Students. With one or two exceptions all newspapers supported Thajeb.*® Long editorials elaborately distinguished between the constructive effort to bring pressing issues to the attention of the public and the destructive consequences of further activism intended to compel the fulfillment of demands. The basic apprehension, which now began to be acknowledged, was that the KAMI-led student/youth movement was not representative of a large enough popular consensus. ments.*1 There were now two general move The one led by KAMI was responsible for formulating 39. WB, Feb. 10, 1966. 40. See footnote 12. 41. This was clearly acknowledged in Puta Masj arakat, which editorialized that however exciting the hunting down of traitors and the hurling of epithets might be, the re- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 412] === 401 the tritura and had so far met with little organized r e sistance. Now the resistance was organized, under the general direction of GMNI-ASU. GMNI-ASU supported the banthe-PKI demand but on the issues of economic reform and cabinet retooling remained mute. The public conflict, increasingly bloody, between KAMI and the movement led by GMNI-ASU, was thus waged not basically over disagreement concerning the tritura. It was waged over the more intrin sically divisive question of loyalty to Soekarno. For newspaper editors, like other sources of leadership and influence, the prospect of a public kortsluiting (shortcircuiting) of the nation's central guarantee of consensus, the Soekarno/Rakjat solidarity, immediately displaced all other considerations. 42 Students were advised to extend to themselves the same "social control" which they had so admirably exercised over the community at large. Establishment of the Barisan Soekarno was in part an attempt by Soekarno to impose some "social control" of his own. Each group which subscribed to the Barisan sought to define its purposes in a fashion consistent with the parti cular group's interests. Since the organization of the Barisan was left rather indeterminate, the opportunity also suiting animosity within the student/youth movement would be very costly. The deeper the rift between the contending groups, the more difficult it would be subsequently to attain the national consensus which both groups held up as the central objective. Puta Masiarakat. Feb. 17, 1966. 42. See, for example, the editorial in AB, Feb. 25, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 413] === 402 rose to define the Barisan in terms of particular structures. As pointed out earlier political elements asserted that the Barisan comprised all of the Indonesian people, or the Army and the People and Soekarno. In February KAP-Gestapu implied that it was itself the legitimate manifestation of the Barisan. KAMI announced the creation of a Volunteer DWIKORA Battle Brigade, a ’'Barisan Soekarno” which would willingly and eagerly parachute into the front lines of the battle against the neocolonialist M a l a y s i a. ^ Kemal Idris, Commander of KOSTRAD, welcomed the contribution and described it as a confirmation of the close association of KAMI with the Army.*** From the point of view of some, KAMI was once again exercising effective ’’social control.” The militarization and organizational expansion of the student/youth movement are illustrated by the quiet emergence of KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia, Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front) on February 9.*** KAPPI was 43. It also obliquely suggested that there were "reactionary elements" at work insidiously trying to accomplish a drastic re-grouping and castration of political parties, mass organizations and functional groups, under the guise of contributing to the President's "political solution." Here the term, "reactionary elements," referred to those who were closest to Soekarno. Nusa Putera. Feb. 17, 1966. 44. Kompas, Feb. 18, 1966. KAMI at this time claimed mem b e r ship of eighteen organizations totaling 150,000 individuals. 45. Idris also thanked KAMI for a Rp. 1,000,000 contribution raised by KAMI to help the Army support the volunteers. 46. Reminiscent of KAMI, the first news account of the creation of KAPPI appeared several days after the event and contained only the barest information. See AB, Feb. 12, 1966. On sue ceeding days the picture became more complete. See WB, Feb. 13, and Kompas, Feb. 14, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 414] === 403 to become temporarily very significant as the functional substitute for KAMI after Soekarno's February 25 ban. High school students and youth in general now had a KAMI-type organization of their own, which while expressly supportive of KAMI'S demands, was more satisfactorily adapted to the special requirements of a larger and younger clientele. two-fold objectives of KAPPI were: The 1) to foster progressive revolutionary student/youth unity and to cooperate with other progressive revolutionary forces, and 2) to secure the well-being of its members and to sponsor the creation of a Multi-Operational Student Regiment (Resimen Peladjar Serbaguna) and Scout Troop (Pramuka) in accord with the directives of KOTI (Supreme Operations Command) and the Ministry of Basic Education and Culture. 47 Amir Machmud, the Greater Djakarta Military Commander, expressed his delight, and although he admonished the studetns to go back to class, he urged the members of KAPPI to be vigilant against reactionary PKI influence and to struggle onward in the campaign to demolish Nekolim and all counter-revolutionaries.*® To the Army the formation 47. Kompas, Feb. 14, 1966. As KAMI had done several times, K A P P I t u r n e d previous government directives to its own advantage. High school and other secondary school stu dents had been directed a couple of months before to con fine their extracurricular activities to scout troop mem bership. Youth could also go into any one of a variety of semi-military organizations well supervised by adults. Students and youth now complied but with purposes in mind, quite different than intended by those officials responsible for the original directives. 48. PPAB, Feb. 19, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 415] === 404 of KAPPI was another step on the direction of "social control" in the student/youth movement. There is considerable disagreement concerning the origins of KAPPI, just as there is about the antecedents of KAMI. Initially leaders of each organization claimed that the for mation of KAPPI was the result of an independent student/youth initiative, even though K A P P I ’s objectives were virtually identical with those of K A M I. After the banning of KAMI the relationship for a short while became rather proprietary, with KAMI members claiming very close association,with, and influence over, their still legal 'younger brothers.' KAPPI, whose membership naturally dwarfed that of K A M I, grew to mamoth proportions during March and April while KAMI rested in a sort of limbo. To KAMI, KAPPI's pretensions to playing the primary role within the '66 Generation became quite of fensive, and the close relationship quickly waned. Eventually KAPPI began to break up, in large part because of its unwieldly size and its vulnerability to outside influence. Considering the large reservoir of students and youth available and the precedent of KAMI'S widespread appeal, it is interesting that KAPPI was founded on an even more limited cross section of Indonesian society than its elder counterpart. 49 Of ten founding root organizations only one, PII 49. An indication of how limited this cross-section was, is the fact that no Indonesian questioned by this writer at the time was acquainted with more than two-thirds of the names of the initial member organizations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 416] === 405 (Peladjar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students), was a substantial group with a major position among all Indonesian student or youth groups.*5® PI I, like H M I, had formerly been an ancillary organization of Masjumi, and, also like HMI, had retained its vitality and membership despite the banning of the parent organization five years previously. The membership of PII was therefore largely from the Outer Islands and of modernist Islamic persuasion. Unlike HMI in relation to KAMI, PII played the key role in founding KAPPI and continued pe r manently thereafter to exercise dominant control. Six of the other nine root organizations were small, Outer Island or local Djakarta groups, mostly connected with particularist Islamic religious schools or other directly Islamic religious interests, or representative of specific private schools. A small Protestant student group, the rightist off-shoot of 50. In the order they appeared in initial news accounts and KAPPI bulletins they were: P U P Pantjasila (Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia, Pantjasila; Indonesian Youth and Students League, Pantjasila [type]); GSNI Osa-Usep (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, Osa-Usep; Indonesian Nationalist Students Movement, Osa-Usep [type]); PERPEKI (Persatuan Peladjar Kristen, Christian [Protestant] Stu dents Organization); IPMA (Ikatan Peladjar Mathlaul Anwar, Mathlaul Anwar Students’ League); IP A1 Washlijah (Ikatan Pemuda A1 Washlijah, A1 Washlijah Youth League); IP A1 Irsjad (Ikatan Pemuda A1 Irsjad, A1 Irsjad Youth League); IPE Indonesia (Ikatan Peladjar Ekonomi Indonesia, Indonesian League for Students of Economics); PPI (Peladjar Putri Indonesia, Indonesian Young Women Students); PPTI (Persatuan Peladjar Teknik Indonesia, Organization for Indonesian Students of Technology). News accounts gave only the acronymic names and included a number or errors. 51. The religious groups included IPMA, IP A1 Washlijah, IP A1 Irsjad and PPI. The school groups were IPE Indonesia and PPTI. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 417] === 406 GSNI, and a purged IPPI comprised the rest. 52 KAPPI thus differed appreciably from the composition of KAMI. While similar in its essentially Outer Island and/or local character, it had almost no secular organizational membership and only the slimmest connection with any existing political parties. Only later, after the banning of KAMI and the March 11 transfer of governmental authority did KAPPI build a wider variety of components. 53 The additional member organizations included ancillary groups of the political parties, NU, PSII, Partai Katholik, IPKI, and P e r t i. ^ But the combination of PII domination and a messianic, almost apocalyptic, flavor was never lost. The palace incidents, which attended the P r e s i d e n t s 52. They were respectively: PERPEKI, GSNI Osa-Usep, and IPPI Pantjasila. The first news accounts did not add "OsaUsep" to "GSNI," hence giving the impression to some that a more substantial portion of PNI was involved. See, e.g., WB, Feb. 13, 1966. 53. By the month of May the smallest and least influencial of the earliest member organizations were no longer formally listed. There were then fifteen official member organiza tions. See KAPPI, Landasan Perdjoangan, May 20, 1966. 54. These additional party related groups were: IPNU (Ikatan Peladjar Nahdatul Ulama, Nahdatul Ulama Students' League), SEPMI (Serikat Peladjar Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Moslem Student Association [PSII]), PPSK (Persatuan Peladjar Sekolah Katholik, Catholic Schools' Student Organization [Partai Katholik]), GPP (Gerakan Peladjar Pantjasila, Pantjasila Student Movement [IPKI]), GERPII (Gerakan Peladjar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students' Movement), and IPPNU (Ikatan Peladjar Putri Nahdatul Ulama, Nahdatul Ulama Female Students' League. Also in KAPPI were PPTS (Persatuan Peladjar Taman Siswa, Taman Siswa Students' Organization) and Corps PII Wati (Corps Persatuan Islam Indonesia Wati, Indonesian Islamic Students' Volunteer Women's Corps). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 418] === announcement and installation of the Perfected DWIKORA Cabinet, brought the KAMI/KAPPI student/youth movement to the peak of its pre-March 11 activity. The appointment of Sumardjo to head the ministry most directly concerned with persons of KAPPI's age group, provided the perfect focus for KAPPI's mobilization of large demonstrations. 55 The ouster of Nasution probably aroused the ire of nearly all of Indonesia's youth and certainly enhanced the image of both KAPPI and KAMI and augmented their capacity to enlist active support. Sympathy for the Army and particularly for Suharto increased noticeably as a result of the President's actions. The banning of KAMI and the closing of U.I., following closely on the Cabinet announcement and the death of Abdul Rachman Hakim served to accelerate the growing militancy of the student/ youth movement and to justify ever bolder initiatives. Attempts by Soekarno to keep a grasp on the student/youth movement were as futile as trying to hold on to a fistful of molasses, for the custom of organizational proliferation and complexity which he had himself so long encouraged now offered sure escape to his avowed enemies. KAPPI displaced the Student Front and the Youth Front just as KAMI had displaced the P P M I. Soekarno banned KAMI, but was almost immediately faced with two new organizations, the PNMI (Persatuan Nasional Mahasiswa Indonesia, National Organization of Indonesian University Students) and 55. See, e.g., the account of a KAPPI demonstration at the Ministry of Basic Education and Culture in PPAB, Mar. 2, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 419] === 408 the A.R. Hakim Regiment. The first, drawing its legitimacy from the President's own call for a new, more inclusive extra and intra university student organization and declaring its fealty to NASAKOM, was functionally meaningless. The second found justification in the frequent call by the Presi dent and other adult politicians for youth and students to help constructively in the battle against Nekolim, against counter-revolutionaries, against subversives and against those responsible for GESTOK or GESTAPU. Youth with a pen chant for uniforms, drill and militancy now found a home under the wing of the Army. The vaneer of national consensus grew preciously thin in the last week of February and the first week of March. The Mahadjaya Regiment flew its flag at half mast as did the University of Indonesia. Soekarno virtually ordered his GMNI-led sympathizers into battle. 57 Bloody encounters occurred at the headquarters of the Mahadjaya Regiment and at many other points around the city of Djakarta. 58 Editors worried about rifts in national unity, warned about the consequences of a possible gap between the President and the People, and lamented the disrespect of the younger generation. 56. WB, Feb. 24; AB, Feb. 25; PPAB, Mar. 2, 1966. 57. P P A B. Feb. 24; WB, Feb. 25, 1966. 58. P P A B. Mar. 2, 1966. 59. See editorials in AB, Feb. 25 and Mar. 3, 1966; in Api Pantjasila, Mar. 3 and Mar. 5, 1966; and in Duta Masjarakat, Mar. 4, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 === [PDF page 420] === 409 Subandrio accused the younger generation of being counter revolutionaries and demanded that the Rakjat shoulder some of the responsibility for stemming the rightist tide.**® Neither the President not Government agencies, he said, could do the job on their own. Students from Jogjakarta begged Soekarno to reconsider the banning of KAMI,*** and at least one major newspaper expressly stated that the bann would not solve anything. As if to confirm this view, Amir Machmud in his implementation order prohibiting KAMI and curbing the right of assembly for university students in Djakarta made an exception for the Mahadjaya Regiment. The effect of this exception was to give a public endorsement to the A.R. Hakim Regiment, which now took on the formal name, Laskar Ampera A. R. H a k i m. ^ Divided into seven battalions named after the assassinated officers of October 1, 1965, the regiment f l o u r i s h e d E a c h battalion operated as a 60. Genta, Mar. 1, 1966. 61. WB, Mar. 10, 1966. 62. Api Pantjasila, Mar. 5, 1966. 63. P P A B, Mar. 1, 1966. 64. Literally, A. R. Hakim Soldiers for the Message of the People's Suffering. 65. The seven battalions and the areas of Djakarta under their jurisdictions were as follows: Jon Yani (Menteng/Gambir); Jon Pandjaitan (Kebajoran Baru); Jon Sutojo (Djatinegara); Jon S. Parman (Salemba/Rawamangun/Kemajoran); Jon Harjono (Petodjo/Grogol/Tanah A b a n g ); Jon Suprapto (Pasar Baru/ Kota); Jon P. Tandean (Tandjung Priok). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 421] === 410 kind of vigilante committee, with full authority over its own assigned section of D j a k a r t a. C o n f i d e n c e in national unity and in the integrity of the State, according to the private assessments of many Indonesians, could not be main tained much longer without some substantive rearrangement of power at the top level of Government. For KAMI and KAPPI and all those who had participated in the previous months' events, March 11 was a muted finale. The '66 Generation had come to dominate the center stage of public Indonesian politics at the national level. Outside Djakarta and Bandung, however, student/youth activities, though often much more aggressive, were localized and d i rectly dependent upon the sanction of military commanders. Suharto effectively isolated Djakarta and Bandung, especially the former, from the rest of the nation. Although it is widely believed that he wanted to wait longer, his decision to compel the President to transfer authority to him was put to the test only when he was certain that no Area Military Commander would directly challenge the act. Djakarta was clearly the center of national politics, but the inadequacies and deterioration of the official agencies of government 6 6. It should be noted that none of the battalion heads (who were students) was Javanese. After March 11 the battalions took upon themselves, with Army encouragement, the task of helping to round up those ministers ousted from the Cabinet and accused of various crimes. This usually entailed thorough ransacking of the homes of those concerned and invariably the discovery of important incriminating evi dence. See, e.g., the report in Api Pantjasila, Mar. 16, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 422] === 411 threw into doubt its claim to be the seat of Government. Student/youth activities easily captured the popular imagin ation, but they were seen cynically by some as functioning essentially to deflect urban scrutiny away from Suharto's campaign to consolidate power elsewhere. Others are just as positive that the Army could not have captured the urban dwellers' imagination on its own and would have encountered overwhelming opposition had it not been for the largely independent student/youth movement. Seen from this point of view, the apparent fact that few if any of KAMJ's or KAPPIfs leaders were informed as of March 11 about what was going to transpire that day, does not seriously detract from their contribution to the triumph. In terms of formal organizational development, the hold ing of congresses, the proliferation of broadsides, pamphlets and other propaganda, and the maturation of the social entity known as the '66 Generation, both KAMI and KAPPI made their greatest progress only after March 11. It was ironic but probably inevitable that as their popular appeal grew and they acquired more or less complete freedom of movement, their power to affect political events waned commensurately. The mystique of the October-March period will of course forever remain with those youth who were a part of it. Their modest reward may be the knowledge that they lived up to the tasks prescribed by Soekarno for students and teachers many years before. They had learned well, and they had taught well. 67. Soekarno, "Mendjadi Goeroe Dimasa Kebangoenan" [On Being Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 423] === 412 This dissertation has presented a detailed analysis of a single episode in the history of Indonesian student/youth political movement, with consideration also given to at tendant factors in the national political process. Inevit ably, the analysis has led to some distortions which must be identified in order to isolate more clearly the significance of post-October 1, 1965 student/youth activity within the framework of Guided Democracy politics and national level ideological constructs. First, it must be noted that President Soekarno, the major formulator of Guided Democracy ideology, did not view the emergance of action groups and their eventual consolida tion behind the leadership of KAMI as representing a culmina tion of his mass mobilization efforts. Quite to the contrary he literally wrung his hands in fury as his basic ideological teachings became twisted to shapes congruent with the realities of power competition over which his control was quickly slipping. No groups, however, viewed their activities as deviating from the "Rails of the Revolution." All groups asserted faith in Soekarno and in Guided Democracy and sought to mobilize for action as they had been taught to do by the Great Leader. It is therefore appropriate, Soekarno's chagrin notwithstanding, to situate the October-March period, not in a Teacher in an Age of Development], in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Vol. I (Djakarta, 1959), pp. 611-626. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 424] === 413 the commencement of the New Order, but in the continuation, in some ways the culmination, of Guided Democracy. Only after March 11, 1966, did the conviction that Guided Democracy was systematically deficient begin to gain purchase of substantial sections of the civilian and military political community. Second, retrospective accounts written by Indonesians concerning the post-October 1, 196S period place virtually no emphasis on the October-December political events (though the intrigues of GESTAPU and the "mop-up" operations of the military are always stressed). Invariably it is the January- March period of 1966 which receives primary attention, under standably, since events by then were beginning to render the political conflict into its simplest and most dramatic ideological terms of "New Order" versus "Old Order." October, 1966, KA M I ’S historical pamphlets were citing January 10, as the effective start of its action program. By mid-1966 all groups, political and non-political, sought to identify themselves firmly with the "New Order," as firmly as they had previously identified with the "Old Order." For most people it became quite distasteful and embarrassing to recall too carefully the period of ideological uncertainty. This study is not entirely devoid of the tendency to read radical change into dramatic events. However, despite the degree of actual continuity in this period of supposed radical change, the fact that most Indonesians perceived radical change is an important datum in itself. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 425] === 414 Third, virtually no attention has been given in this paper to the student/youth components of the PKI. These groups, despite consistently massive demonstration activities and a vanguard position in the student/youth sector prior to October 1, miraculously disappeared from view. Except for a few pale initiatives and half hearted instances of resistance in the weeks following the assassinations, the PKI student/ youth contingent was noticeably absent from public political activity. Many explanations are apparent but none seems adequate. Inadequate organization and discipline within the superior party leadership structure, over-dependence of student/youth leaders on adult party direction, lack of military materiel and training, increasingly categoric decimation of PKI party and mass organization ranks by other elements of Indonesian society, unavailability of media, arganized repression by the Army in all spheres of activity-such factors come quickly to mind. The only clear fact is that the PKI and most organizations associated or directly sympathetic with it very soon lost access to the public political arena. It does not automatically follow that the communist aliran, especially its student/youth component, suddenly lost all significance in Indonesian society. For purposes of this dissertation, however, assessment of the degree of continued significance of the PKI has had to be relegated to the imponderable. A final element of possible distortion has to do with several common themes characteristic of the analytic litera- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 426] === 415 ture concerning post-October 1, 1965, Indonesian politics. While March 11, 1966, is frequently cited as the date when Suharto (et a l.) acquired de jure power, his attainment of. de facto power is often assumed to have occurred on October 1, 1965. The genocidal campaign against the communists must then be viewed not essentially as part of an intra-elite Indonesian struggle for power but as a popular action, sparked by the assassinations, against a group espousing an alien and atheistic ideology. Indonesians at present are particularly receptive to the notion that visceral abhorrence of communism had always been the fundamental disposition of most citizens. Mass activity, seen in this light, when constitutes evidence of rightist persuasion (the anti-communist, pro-capitalist variety). When Soekarno's loss of power is viewed as a function of Suharto's success in thwarting an attempted communist coup, the impression follows that there was direct comparability of involvement on the part of both Soekarno and the alleged sponsor of the coup, the PKI. To crush the coup attempt was then tantamount to crushing Soekarno. This d i s sertation has not addressed itself to the task of untangling the complexities of these erroneous themes. Soekarno, especially in his later years of power, headed what he and others regarded as an increasingly revolutionary regime. His ideological pronouncements were increasingly oriented to the task of evoking revolutionary fervor. He did not retreat from this mission in the October-March period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nor === [PDF page 427] === 416 did any political group, new or old, until very late in this period view the October 1 event as justifying departure from the central task of late Guided Deomcracy-- the promotion of revolutionary mobilization in accordance with the Pantja Azimat Revolusi. Political parties, action groups, Soekarno, Suharto, Nasution--all repeatedly provided assurances to the nation on this point. The most interesting aspect of the October-March student/ youth activity was the manifestation of mass ideological mobilization keyed to the objective of effecting change at the national level and to achieving more direct participation in Guided Democracy. The national ideology was so complex, so detained, so inclusive and so ambivalent as to be adaptable to the uses of virtually any political group. In effect ideological affirmation had become an independent variable, a neutral given in situations calling for the organization of political action. Organizationally, political parties were rusty and immoble. The Army, though well-muscled, was distinctly non-verbal. It was the student/youth sector which stood ready to take advantage of its training in mass mobilization and popular maneuver. Ideology was worn as a badge; mundane issues like the price of basic commodities, fuel and fares, began to find more direct appeal to their sense of reality. The more adults solaced their apprehensions behind recitations of ideologic orthodoxies, the more the student/youth leaders guffawed. Soekarno had taught his Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 428] === 417 charges well, for it was but a few months before all political elements followed the lead of KAMI in demanding that the nation's problems be tackled "setjara realistis dan Pragmatis" tically and pragmatically). (realis TRITURA, the product of student/ youth mobilization, has formed the basis of the new Government's program. This was a substantial accomplishment, even though the force of continuity in Indonesian politics ostensibly predestined a recession of the '66 Generation into conventional, but more traditional, life patterns. One can hope that their political elders, who owe them so much, will spend their talents wisely. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 429] === APPENDIX I DJAKARTA NEWSPAPERS: 1965-1967 The complexity and fluidity of the Indonesian newspaper medium present a formidable problem to new students of con temporary affairs.'*’ Old students, if diverted even for a few months, will resume their interest only to find that many a familiar paper has vanished and new ones taken its place. Or, if a favorite paper still exists, it may have undergone significant transformation--a new or altered title, a new editorial policy or politically important staff changes. These changes are often mystifying; for instance, when individuals known to represent antagonistic political camps suddenly are found on the same masthead. The reason may re main unfathomable, or it may be discovered that the anomalous journalist is an in-law of the editor-in-chief. In Djakarta alone there have been as many as one hundred items classifiable as newspapers or bulletins publishing simultaneously. A guess places the median life-span at well under one year, with some papers appearing continuously for twenty years or more and others for as few as two or three issues. While a paper's longevity appears to correspond to For a lengthy work on the subject, see Robert H. Crawford, The Daily Indonesian-language Press of Djakarta: Analysis of Two Recent Critical Periods (unpublished Ph.D. disser tation, Syracuse University, 1967). 418 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 430] === 419 the durability and longevity of its sponsor organization, some of the most effective and popular papers have been short term affairs designed for quick marshaling of popular opinion on a topical issue. Few dailies print as many as 50,000 copies, and many print fewer than 2,000. While circulation estimates are notoriously speculative, there are discernible trends. The total number of publishing newspapers decreased nationally by at least two-thirds or three-fourths between late 1965 and mid-1967. Total copies printed per day decreased by two-thirds, to about 500,000 by summer 1967, half of them in Djakarta (servicing a national population of about 110,000,000, a Djakarta population of about 4,000,000). In the period 1959- 1961, there had also been a major decrease both in the number of papers and in copies printed. It is hard to ascertain for either period whether the number of readers was similarly reduced, since a single copy is read by more people as prices rise. Only a small proportion of Djakarta's newspapers from 1965-1967 are included in the following "Comments," and even then their selection is not deliberately representative. They are simply some of the newspapers, usually of political interest, for which information became available to this observer. The information offered is neither systematic nor. consistent, but rather a preliminary assessment based on subjective impressions and bits and pieces of material gathered Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 431] === 420 together from Indonesian informants and acquaintances. Bibliographic information additional to the title has not been included but is available elsewhere. Titles have been translated, but the translations are bracketed to emphasize that the English rendition often captures only roughly the flavor of the Indonesian. The name of the actual or effective publisher follows the title translation. In almost every case this is not the bibliographic publisher, but the force popularly believed to be responsible for a particular paper. This popular opinion can usually be confirmed by evaluation of editorial content, supplemented by the opinions of Indonesian government officials and journalists. It is nonetheless a subjective judgment, and apologies are offered beforehand for what may be a gross error as to who really is the responsible force. A final point concerns tense and dates. In most cases a paper which has ceased publication is discussed in the past tense and the date of termination is noted. It is almost certain, however, that there are instances of termi nation as yet unknown to this writer, in which cases the tense of discussion is incorrect. Similarly, the frequency of personnel changes may have resulted in the mention of 2. See Roger K. Paget, "Indonesian Newspapers 1965-1967," Indonesia, No. 4 (October), 1967, pp. 170-210; and U.S., The Library of Congress, Public Law 480 Project, Accessions List: Indonesia; cumulative list of serials (January 1964 through September 1966), American Libraries Book Procure ment Center: Djakarta, June, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 432] === 421 individuals in the present tense who are no longer connected with the paper under discussion. Military ranks and other official titles may also be out of date. These comments are a cursory foray into a subject which is by nature complex and controversial. ABAD MUSLIMIN [Muslim Century]. LESBUMI/NU. ABAD MUSLIMIN is published by LESBUMI, cultural organi zation of the political party, Nahdatul Ulama. The general chairman of LESBUMI, Hadji Usmar Ismail, also heads the newspaper staff. Among the editors are several well-known cultural figures, such as asrul Sani and Anas Ma'ruf. While its declared general objective was to provide cultural news for conservative Islamic readership, ABAD MUSLIMIN was actually planned for publication in mid-1965 as part of a drive against the build-up of Communist-influenced media. Publication did not commence, however, until October 4, 1965. Since LESBUMI is directly subordinate to NU, the newspaper faithfully represented party positions during the post G-30-S period. ABAD MUSLIMIN was the first newspaper to dramatize the distinction between the terms "Gestapu" and "Gestok," and also contributed to the list of several dramatic adjectives which eventually attached to any mention of the PKI. the epithet,,fPKI--pengchianat dan penjeleweng Pantjasila" (traitor and deviator from the Pantjasila), it added "penentang Pantjasila" (opponent of the Pantjasila). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 433] === 422 ABAD MUSLIMIN during the first half of 1966 built up readership well in excess of most other weeklies by competing effectively in the successive popular campaigns against PKI-Gestapu, against Subandrio, and finally against President Soekarno. With these issues gone, and faced with an increasing ly acute paper shortage, ABAD MUSLIMIN declined rapidly in interest and appeal. AMPERA [Amanat Penderitaan Rakjat, Message of the People's Suffering]. SOKSI. AMPERA is the organ of SOKSI, a major anti-Communist labor federation. AMPERA is one of a number of papers which emerged in the aftermath of G-30-S, whose control lay not with the official sponsor organization but actually in the hands of army officers. Like TRISAKTI, API, and FADJAR, AMPERA'S circulation mushroomed to the neighborhood of perhaps 70,000 in early 1966, as it capitalized on violent anti-PKI-Gestapu stories. With the immediate political objectives of its sponsors won, AMPERA failed to deal effectively with more mundane subjects. Though it managed to advance from weekly to daily publication in September 1966, its estimated circulation nonetheless dropped off to about 3,000. ANGKATAN '66 Independent. This daily unofficially is published by the Department of Information. On the editorial staff there are several Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 434] === 423 prominent names of the 1945 Generation, such as Erie Sudewo, Nasrum Iskandar and the late Adinegoro siderably older group). appears to be, (actually of a con The general editorial objective (1) to persuade other members of the Angkatan '45 (the '45 Generation) that they should support fully the emergance of the '66 Generation, and (2) to engender support for the New Order of General Suharto. ANGKATAN BARU HMI. HMI, publishers of ANGKATAN BARU, while never officially affiliated with any political party, was generally identified in the period prior to October 1965 as a youth organization of the Masjumi Party, banned by President Soekarno in 1961. The appearance of ANGKATAN BARU in June 1966 reflected H M I ’s newly paramount position among all student groups (save the overcapping organization, KAMI), resulting largely from an influx from those segments of Java-based youth which had previously gravitated toward youth groups of the NU or Muhammadijah. ANGKATAN BARU in the summer and fall of 1966 was particularly outspoken in its campaign against Soekarno. ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA [Armed Forces]. GOLKAR/ABRI. As of October 2, 1965 ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA immediately gained an even greater circulation and influence than it had previously enjoyed as one of Indonesia's two or three most important newspapers. Appearing first in February 1965 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 435] === 424 as part of the effort to fill the gap left by the banning of MERDEKA and several other dailies (casualties of BPS), ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA is under the control of the Director of Information of the Armed Forces Staff (SAB), Major General Sugandhi. While all other papers on October 2 or 3, 1965 were forced to suspend publication pending application for new publishing permits, ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA and BERITA YUDHA appeared continuously during these and the following days. Articles by reporters such as Wiratmo Sukito quickly cast the national image for the October events in term? of a "PKI-Gestapu" conspiracy. During the five months following the October 1, 1965 affair, the major dynamic of Indonesian politics revolved around the contest between the Soekarno-Subandrio forces and the initially less well organized forces surrounding the Army leadership of Nasution-Suharto. With the general revival of the suspended newspapers and the emergence of many new ones, ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA once again found itself confronted with major competitors. In December 1965 under the authorization of Subandrio (and presumably with the agreement of Soekarno), Minister of Information Achmadi prepared an order for the withdrawal of the paper's p u b lishing permit. Though never implemented, the fact that the order was prepared is an indication of the major political importance attached to newspaper control. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 436] === 425 After the successful establishment of the Suharto regime in March 1966, ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA soon attained what amounted to a permanently privileged position among Indonesian news papers. When the government in August 1966 ordered the di s continuation of all dailies subsidized by government funds, ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA was exempted. Harsono, Director General of Press Supply and Graphic Arts in the Ministry of Information, speaking for the government, stated (Antara, September 17, 1966) that ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA, as the major medium of Armed Forces functionalists, must be considered as occupying a position equal in status to the media of any other social revolutionary group, thus exempting ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA from the government regulation. The editorial staff of ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA, particularly during late 1965 and early 1966, has exercised considerable freedom of expression, and some of Indonesia's most articulate, pertinent and incisive reporting and editorial comments have appeared in it. Part of its success, both in circulation and in influence, aside from its reportorial functions, has resulted from ethnically diversified entertainment sections, which through cultural columns, sensational rumors and other low brow tidbits appeal to a wide cross-section of society. API [Flame]. Independent. Originally planned as a replacement for MERDEKA should that paper be banned, API finally appeared only after Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 437] === 426 the October 1 affair. Led by Brigadier General Achmad Sukendro, an officer of varied background including intelli gence work, and staffed by a number of former MERDEKA reporters, API quickly became the most widely read and most controversial newspaper in Djakarta. It was API which affixed the label, "Durno," the wily court advisor of the wayang, to Subandrio, and wielded the most effective stiletto against not only the PKI but almost immediately against the SoekarnoSubandrio regime as well. It was API which the President singled out most frequently in excoriating antagonistic newspapers. On November 6, 1965 Achmadi (orginally appointed minister at the behest of Subandrio) succeeded in forcing API to change from daily to weekly publication. API ci r cumvented this restriction by publishing a weekly every day-a Monday edition, a Tuesday edition, and so on. This con tinued until November 14, when its weekly status was finally enforced. API then published weekly, but with double the normal number of pages, half sold in the morning, half in the afternoon. November 24. Its publishing permit was finally revoked on Other papers soon emerged to carry on where API left off, e.g., TRISAKTI, AMPERA, and FADJAR. API PANTJASILA IPKI. API PANTJASILA is run by military officers, particularly those from the army who are members of the political party, IPKI, and also by members of the organization Angkatan '45. Appearing first in June 1965, API PANTJASILA in the aftermath Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 438] === 427 of G-30-S seemed to be competing with API and indeed tem porarily captured much of that paper's readership after it was banned. ARMED FORCES DAILY MAIL. GOLKAR/ABRI. In most respects this is simply an English language version of ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA or BERITA YUDHA. Like the former, it was headed by the Director of Information of the Armed Forces Staff, Brigadier-General Sugandhi. (now Major-General) However, the ARMED FORCES DAILY MAIL is much more overtly pro-American than are either of the Indonesian language papers, especially in editorial policy. Frequently the United States role in Vietnam is defended, and scores of editorials magnify for English language readers the dangers of the "Chicom Menace" and the truths of the domino theory. It became a weekly in April 1967. BANGUN [Arise]. Departemen (Kementerian) Penerangan. This paper was called DWIKORA (Dwi Komando Rakjat) from its inception on November 2, 196S until July 30, 1966, when it was changed to BANGUN. (This DWIKORA is not to be confused with the DWIKORA, sometimes called DWI KOMANDO RAKJAT, which was circulated internally, in the Department of Information.) Originally it was published by the Department of Information and was headed by the Minister of Information, Achmadi. Until his fall in March 1966, the paper sought primarily to quell dissent expressed toward Subandrio and Soekarno. Subandrio- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 439] === 428 Soekarno speeches were headlined, while speeches by leaders such as Nasution were given little space or simply ignored. While DWIKORA changed its name and character in early August 1966, a month later it fell under the Government's pr o scriptive decree against subsidized newspapers. BANGUN (DWIKORA) with its numerous editions both in Djakarta and in the dearah, published separate papers in Chinese and in Indonesian, and was the major medium for the Chinese commun ity in the post G-30-S period. BERITA INDONESIA [Indonesian News]. Independent. One of Indonesia's oldest newspapers, BERITA INDONESIA has been forced several times in history to suspend publi cation, but always has managed to reemerge. Though headed by Sumantoro, a prominent member of the Murba Party, BERITA INDONESIA has generally been regarded as an independent paper, not as a party organ. Sajuti Melik, an equally prominent member of the PNI, was an important contributor. Calling himself a student of Soekarno, Sajuti Melik published articles in BERITA INDONESIA (and in other papers) which sought to promote the idea of "studying the meaning of Soekarnoism." There ensued the short-lived BPS movement, headed by Sumantoro. BERITA INDONESIA and other papers sympathetic to the BPS fell in the aftermath of Soekarno's banning of BPS in January 1965. Sajuti Melik was discredited within the PNI and pushed off the editorial board of SULUH INDONESIA. The day after Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 440] === 429 BERITA INDONESIA Ceased, BERITA YUDHA commenced publication, taking on much of the former's staff. BERITA INDONESIA, again headed by Sumantoro, reemerged on May 28, 1966. its staff of experts wife of Sajuti Melik. (staf ahli) sat S. K. Trimurti, the BERITA INDONESIA suspended publica tion indefinitely in July 1967. BERITA REPUBLIK [News of the Republic]. PNI/Osa-Usep. BERITA REPUBLIK, which had published for nearly two years prior to G-39-S, represented the right-wing faction of the PNI led by Osa Maliki and Usep Ranuwidjaja. Su b sequent to the October 1 affair, its editorial objective appeared to be, (1) to cultivate Soekarno, and (2) to appeal to Marhaenists generally. Although BERITA REPUBLIK was most successful in tarring its factional opponent in the PNI--the ASU group-with responsibility for involvement in the PKI-Gestapu movement, it was eventually forced to cease publication in December 1965. This was one paper which suffered a two month suspension shortly before the October 1 affair for being too right-wing and another suspension afterwards for not being right-wing enough. BERITA YUDHA [War New s ]. GOLKAR/ABRI. Much of the comment concerning ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA applies also to BERITA YUDHA. The major difference is that the latter is directly under the control of the head of the Information Center of the Army, Brigadier General Ibnu Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 441] === 430 Subroto. Much of the paper's staff previously worked for the banned BERITA INDONESIA, but stayed on with BERITE YUDHA when the former paper reemerged in mid-1966. BERITA YUDHA, while having interests generally akin to those of ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA, has been consistently less flexible editorially. DERAP INDONESIA MUDA [The Stomp of Indonesian Youth], PNI/ASU^ A weekly primarily for students, DERAP INDONESIA MUDA was controlled by the left-wing PNI faction led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and Ir. Surachman (ASU). It actively pro/ moted ASU interests in the PNI conflict, supported the general political line of Soekarnoism/Marhaenism and in early 1966 promoted the Barisan Soekarno, a Subandrio plan to replace all existing political parties with one state organization based on affirmation of Soekarno and his ideas. DERAP INDONESIA MUDA ceased publication in March 1966. DJAKARTA MINGGU [Sunday Djakarta]. PII. This weekly was the organ of the Indonesian Islamic [high school] student organization, which officially has no political party ties and is vaguely subordinate to the large HMI. In some degree PII is the high school version of HMI and similarly gained vast new membership in the aftermath of G-30-S. PII came to have an influence within KAPPI commensurate with HMI's influence within KAMI. DJAKARTA MINGGU ceased publication in August 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 442] === 431 DJIHAD [Holy W a r ]. Perti. DJIHAD is the organ of Perti, headed by Kijai Hadji Rusli Abdul Wahid, who also controls the paper. The ascendancy of Wahid is widely considered proof that Perti has rid itself of the allegedly pro-Communist elements predominant when Siradjudin Abbas ran the party. DJIHAD is the most aggressively Islamic of Djakarta papers. Two DJIHAD's appeared almost simultaneously in the first week of December 1965. Their unique masthead types were almost identical, both purported to be Perti organs, and both were afternoon papers. Their offices, however, were at different addresses; they had different publishers and separate editorial staffs exceptions). (with a few important DJIHAD, Edisi Pusat, was headed by Bachtiar Djamily, former Masjumi Party activist, and had received its two required publishing permits on November 18 and December DJIHAD, Edisi DCI Djaya, was headed by Wahid and received its permits on November 30 and December 2. The latter announced it would remain an afternoon paper only temporarily. While on many issues their policies seemed identical, the Bachtiar Djamily edition was clearly more moderate than its rival. Bitter personal battles between the leaderships of these two papers found their way im:o the pages of the press, until the temporary suspension of DJIHAD, Edisi Pusat, in March 1966. When this paper reappeared on March 30, its staff was headed by Wahid and included most of the names Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 443] === 432 previously on the masthead of DJIHAD, Edisi DCI Djaya. DJIHAD, Edisi DCI Djaya, however, had not stopped publishing and also continued with its Wahid staff until April 30, 1966. Thenceforth, there was only one paper, DJIHAD, Edisi Pusat, whose editorial policy grew steadily less aggressively Islamic during the second half of 1966. DJIWA PROKLAMASI Independent. DJIWA PROKLAMASI, a weekly, was another of the several papers headed by Bachtiar Djamily (see comments on DJIHAD and on OPERASI), ostensibly representing independent non military interests but noticeably connected with certain West Sumatran military officers. The paper was established on the initiative of John Naro of the Justice Department and Bujung Nasution, one of the top Djakarta public pro secutors (hence the name of the publisher, Jajasan Keadilan), the former becoming the editor-in-chief. Bujung Nasution soon became a leader of KASI and withdrew his name from the masthead. DJIWA PROKLAMASI, established for very immediate and narrow editorial objectives within elite circles of Djakarta, ceased publication in May 1966. DUNIA BARU [The New W o r l d ]. LEKKRINDO. Headed by Pala Manurung, Chairman of LEKKRINDO, DUNIA BARU is non-political and confines itself to film world entertainment news. (LEKKRINDO is not to be confused with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 444] === 433 LKIK, the cultural organization of the political party, Parkindo.) Pala Manurung, sometimes calling himself Pala Manru, is one of Djakarta's larger newspaper industry speculators. DUNIA BARU was formerly published under the title, BERDIKARI, and at that time was more concerned with financial news and had distinct political overtones. DUNIA BARU suspended publication from December 1966 until April 1967. DUTA MASJARAKAT An official organ of the NU, DATA MASJARAKAT at its inception in 1945 was headed by K.H. Sjaifuddin Suhri. After Zuhri became Minister of Religion in 1962, leader ship was transferred to Hadji Mahbub Djunaedi. Publishing costs were reportedly underwritten by Hadji Mohammad Hassan (Tan Kim Liong), former Minister of State Revenues, Finance and Audits in Soekarno's Dwikora Cabinet. DUTA MASJARAKAT in 1965 and early 1966 reflected in its editorial posture the mixed feelings of the NU leadership concerning the gradual erosion of the Soekarno-Subandrio government and the ascendancy of the Suharto group. The paper frequently engaged in scurrilous debate with NUSA PUTERA, the official organ of the Arudji faction of the PSII, the two papers trading accusations with one another on issues such as softness toward the PKI or later toward Soekarno. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 445] === 434 DUTA REVOLUSI [Representative of the Revolution]. SARBUMUSI/ DUTA REVOLUSI, owned by SARBUMUSI, is headed by the chairman of that organization, Drs. Sutanto Martoprasono, and is under the general supervision of SARBUMUSI*s general chairman, K.H. Masjkur. The editors of DUTA REVOLUSI often call themselves the RPKAD of the NU and indeed have followed a much more aggressive editorial policy than DUTA MASJARAKAT. From December 1965 until April 1966, the paper was entitled DUTA MASARAKAT [sic]. Reportedly, the NU, the political organization sponsoring SARBUMUSI, during 1966 frequently advised the editors of DUTA REVOLUSI to temper their edi torial comments when dealing with other political parties. It has been asserted that the NU leadership in the summer of 1966 tried to persuade both DUTA REVOLUSI and DUTA MASJARAKAT not to editorialize against SULUH MARHAEN, the PNI organ, arguing that all parties must protect each other's rights in the face of the military. The editors of DUTA REVOLUSI apparently yielded on this point. EL BAHAR [The Se a ]. ALRI. Clearly supporting Soekarno and openly critical of the Suharto group, EL BAHAR's appearance in September 1966 was a surprise to many people. The paper was thought to be politically more to the left than SULUH MARHAEN, until then considered to represent the limits of the regime's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 446] === 435 toleration of public dissent. Introductory and subsequent issues clearly indicated that the paper was being published under the auspices of the navy, although the roster of names on the masthead suggested additional interests as well. The staff is headed by R.S. Poegoeh, a relative of Soekarno. Next in line is Sjamsu Sutjipto, head of the Information Office of the Navy. On the "staff of experts" sits Navy Colonel Bahrum Rangkuti, who is often regarded not so much as a naval officer but as an important Islamic leader. Two of the board of editors, A. Eddy Pangin and Soejanto, and the illustrator, Deddy Sumitro, formerly appeared on the masthead of SULUH INDONESIA, which was banned after October 2, 1965. Some of the staff whose names are not on the masthead were also formerly of the SULUH INDONESIA staff. Remarkably, EL BAHAR has published continually, if irregularly, ever since, with the exception of one temporary suspension in early 1967. GENTA [Gong]. KOTRAR and Subandrio. GENTA was reportedly established on Subandrio's initiative in December 1965, for the purpose of self protection and competition with the many papers increasing ly hostile to the Soekarno regime. Its publishing permit was revoked in mid-September 1966, when the government decreed the closing down of all newspapers published by government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 447] === 436 agencies. GENTA was published by KOTRAR, which was officially terminated by Soekarno at the same time. HARIAN KAMI [KAMI Daily]. KAMI. HARIAN KAMI, the most important of the student newspapers, gained substantial circulation and influence almost from the moment it first appeared in June 1966. This resulted partly from the vital role KAMI was playing politically, but also reflected a freshness its editors brought to the Indonesian newspaper medium. Shunning the opaque and circumspect quality characteristic of the editorial policies of other important papers, HARIAN KAMI declared its intention to treat all issues frankly and to spare no political group or individual in its quest for factual reporting. One test of this resolve soon followed, When SULUH MARHAEN was suspended by the military authorities for stories and cartoons bitingly critical of the regime. HARIAN KAMI came immediately to its defense, arguing for freedom of the press, however antagonistic a newspaper’s views might be to the ruling group. Headed by Nono Anwar Makarim, the paper is sometimes suspected, because of its intellectual and cosmopolitan quality, of being under the influence of former members of the PSI. INDONESIA DJAYA [Indonesia Victorious]. LKN/PNI ASU. INDONESIA DJAYA is headed by one of the leaders of LKN, C. M. Nas (born Katimun Surun). Reportedly he had listed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 448] === 437 himself in the pre-October 1965 period as a member of LESBUMI, cultural organization of NU. The format of INDONESIA DJAYA copied that of the banned BERITA MINGGU. Contributors included several PNI ASU members of LKN, such as Virga Belan and Sitor Situmorang. THE INDONESIAN HERALD. DEPARLU Until the prohibition against newspapers owned by government agencies in September 1966, THE INDONESIAN HERALD was the organ of the foreign ministry. It resumed almost immediately, with the same format and staff, as THE DJAKARTA TIMES, an independent publication under the leadership of Zein Effendi SH, formerly a member of the BPS on the staff of ANTARA. INDONESIAN OBSERVER. Independent. Actually, INDONESIAN OBSERVER is published by the Indonesian language paper, MERDEKA, and manifests almost identical editorial policy. INDONESIAN OBSERVER is headed by Herawati Diah, wife of the present Minister of Information. First appearing in 1954, the paper was banned in February 1965, resumed daily publication in September 1966, suspended publication in January 1967, and reappeared as a weekly in February 1967. KARYA BHAKTI [Faithful Work]. PSII/Marhaban. Successively a daily, a weekly and again a daily, this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 449] === 438 paper is published by the labor organization of the PSII and is headed by Sjech Marhaban, a leader of the PSII and the son of the most important ulama in Atjeh, Sjech Hasan Krengkale. Marhaban was previously Deputy Minister of Agriculture in the second Ali Cabinet. KARYA BHAKTI reputedly has been funded by the corporation formerly known as P. T. Karkam (now P. T. Berdikari). Editorially, KARYA BHAKTI reflects the split within the PSII between the Marhaban and Arudji. factions, the former accusing the latter of softness toward the PKI, and capitalizing upon these accusations in the post G-30-S period. The Marhaban faction took a violently anti-PKI and subsequently anti-Soekarno position and published several papers to further its interests. A party congress in July 1966 failed to heal the intra-party rift, and the factional newspapers continued, KARYA BHAKTI for the Marhaban side and NUSA PUTERA for the Arudji group. KOMPAS [Compass]. Partai Katolik. KOMPAS clearly stands as the most sophisticated and respected of present Indonesian newspapers. While partial - in the pursuit of special Catholic interests, no other paper rin as temperate and judicious in its coverage. KOMPAS is especially valuable for the period of late 1965 through mid-1966. Its consistently well-informed editorials were said to have resulted from particularly close contact with Palace politics. One cause in which KOMPAS editors suspended Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 450] === 439 their normal moderation was in their campaign against the movement to promote the Piagam Djakarta, a movement thought to be part of an effort to set up an Islamic dominated state. KOMPAS is also particularly solicitous of Indonesian Chinese.• problems, probably because so many Indonesian Chinese are Catholics. MAHASISWA INDONESIA [Indonesian Student] Independent. This is actually two different newspapers, one published in Djakarta and another in Bandung, each with its own staff and manifesting very different political dispositions. The Djakarta paper is headed by Louis Taulin, generally identified as a strong supporter of J. K. Tumakaka, one of Subandrio*s close government colleagues. Although in the summer of 1966 the paper constantly proclaimed its anti Communism, it was regarded by most students as falling far short of fully sup porting the positions of KAMI, the major student organization. In June 1966 the Djakarta MAHASISWA INDONESIA was using the term "Gestok" rather than "Gestapu," was emphasizing the dangers of Western political liberalism, and was demanding the maintenance of the prohibition against rock-and-roll music--attitudes taken by many students at that time as clear indicators of opposition to the New Order. • The Bandung MAHASISWA INDONESIA, headed by Ryandi S., Awan Karmawan Barhan and Iwan Ramelan, commenced publication three months after the Djakarta paper, competed for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 451] === 440 circulation in the latter's territory and very soon became the major student weekly in both Djakarta and West Java. The Bandung paper utilized the best literary and journalis tic talent among both Bandung and Djakarta students. Its cartoons were so clever, biting and unsparing of all persons and groups that they were soon assembled in exhibitions which toured the nation. These talents, coupled with polit ical views radically reformist in nature, led to considerable circulation and made the paper essential reading for all political elites. As the paper primarily representing the Bandung branch of KAMI, its views were invariably stronger than those of HARIAN KAMI or of the parent organization in Djakarta. The Bandung MAHASISWA INDONESIA led the muckraking campaign into the personal affairs of President Soekarno and even in the summer of 1967 still demanded that he be brought to trial. It remains the boldest and most consistently anti-Establishment of Indonesian newspapers. MERDEKA [Freedom]. Independent. Founded on October 1, 1945 by Burhanudin Mohammad Diah, the present Minister of Information, MERDEKA was banned in February 1965 because of its support for BPS and only resumed publicationon June 2, 1966. During the period of suspension, its interests continued to be represented through a magazine under the same management, also entitled MERDEKA. The magazine, which, like the newspaper, was one Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 452] === 441 of the few journals daring to criticize the P K I, was finally banned one month before G-30-S. At the time the daily was banned, B. M. Diah was Indonesian Ambassador to Thailand. resuming publication in June 1966 MERDEKA immediately levelled its guns directly at Soekarno and in return was singled out for scathing counter-denunciations in the following months. MERDEKA's vaunted independence suffered somewhat after Diah became Minister of Information in the Ampera Cabinet. MERTJU SUAR [Lighthouse]. Muhammadijah. MERTJU SUAR is the official organ of Muhammadijah, a major Islamic organization which, in contrast to the NU, PSII, Masjumi and Perti, is not officially a political party. The paper is headed by D r s. Sjafaat, who is the son-in-law of Hadji Muljadi Djojomartono, former prominent member of the Masjumi Party and Minister (always of Welfare or Social Affairs) in many cabinets of the Guided Democracy period. MERTJU SUAR, until its suspension (reason unknown) in December 1966, reflected the difficulties of Muhammadij!. ambivalent political position. Its place on the politi. sidelines was a haven of safety during the Guided Democracy period but became less attractive in the post G-30-S period when political participation for groups of similar outlook became safe and advantageous. Political timidity cost the paper in terms of circulation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 453] === 442 NUSA PUTERA [Son of the Nation], Edisi Pusat Djaya. PSII/ Arudji. NUSA PUTERA is the official organ of the faction of the PSII headed by Arudji Kartawinata and Anwar Tjokroaminoto. should not be confused with the NUSA PUTERA which was super seded by KARYA BHAKTI. The paper lost appreciable circulation as the Arudji faction lost ground to the Marhaban faction in the PSII's public controversies in 1966 (see comments on KARYA BHAKTI). OPERASI [Operation]. Independent. OPERASI is another of the several papers (see DJIHAD and DJIWA PROKLAMASI) headed by Bachtiar Djamily. While he claims no party affiliation and OPERASI claims to be editorially independent, the paper tended in 1966 to promote the interests of Subchan supporters in the NU (its offices were once attacked by Ansor). OPERASI at one point in 1966 was temporarily sus pended by the Djakarta Military Territorial Authority for Dwikora Implementation for its fulminations against Ruslan Abdulgani and Johannes Leimena. SINAR HARAPAN Parkindo. SINAR HARAPAN is generally regarded as one of Indonesia's most sophisticated newspapers. However, in late 1965 and 1966 it was temporarily somewhat discredited as a result of what many believed as a "yes-man" relationship to the "Old Order" and an equivocal stance in respect to the Subandrio left during the first months of the "New Order." Reportedly, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 454] === 443 a basic policy conflict within the editorial staff still remains unresolved. The paper is headed by J.C.T. Simorangkir SH and is the main organ of the Indonesian Christian Party (Protestant), SOKOGURU REVOLUSI [Pillar of the Revolution]. PNI/ASU. SOKOGURU REVOLUSI was one of the papers which almost, but not quite, survived after being accused of involvement in G-30-S. Though the issue for October 2, 1965 was allegedly printed, it was supposedly withdrawn and de s troyed before reaching the streets. until December. The paper survived SOKOGURU REVOLUSI was published by a Marhaenist labor group headed by Mohammad Djambek, member of the Further Perfected Dwikora Cabinet as Deputy Minister/ Deputy Secretary-General of the National Front. SUARA ISLAM Islamic groups. The editors of SUARA ISLAM claimed they represented the new wave of Islam in Indonesia, an attempt to foster unity within the Muslim community and a greater sense of Islamic brotherhood. Officially representing no single organization, the editors were all members of Islamic groups, such as the NU, HSBI, and others. This was the excuse used by Minister of Information Achmadi to close down the paper in December 1965 under the regulation requiring all newspapers to be affiliated with some recognized political group. After API, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 455] === 444 it was perhaps the most aggressive Djakarta paper in the fall of 1965. SUARA PELADJAR [Student’s Voice], Independent. SUARA PELADJAR is unofficially put out by Islamic stu dents, mainly from HMI and PII. It is intended primarily for teenagers and is headed by an active member of PII, Drs. Hariri Hadi. SULUH MARHAEN [Marhaen T o r c h ]. PNI/Front Marhaenis. SULUH MARHAEN, from its inception in June 1966 as the organ of the PNI/Front Marhaenis, has played a vital role among Indoneisan political media. As the organ of the PNI, it automatically fell heir to representing the great majority of Javanese who are not religiously orthodox Muslims. The government’s tacit recognition of SULUH MARHAEN as repre sentative of the ’’new" left gave the paper added prestige, reflected in the rapid proliferation of editions from Medan to Ambon. Though the terms "Marhaenis" and "Front Marhaenis" had long been in special use by the PNI, they became the major self-descriptive terms after the extraordinary PNI congress held in April 1966. The congress was held on the suggestion of General Suharto, who reportedly hoped that a refurbished PNI, uniting the ASU, and Hardi, the Iskaq and the Osa-Usep factions, would produce a manageable left, mainly repre Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 456] === 44S senting Javanese interests, but loyal in general terms to the Nasution-Suharto leadership. At the close of the PNI congress, again at Suharto's behest, a new newspaper appeared, called SULUH INDONESIA MERDEKA, apparently designed to repre sent the new look of the party. It was headed by Sulistio, a member of the innermost groups of supporters around Adam Malik and the Sultan. SULUH INDONESIA MERDEKA lasted only a month and a half, or until it was abundantly clear that the new image of unity among the PNI leadership had endured only slightly longer than the congress in Bandung, which had taken place in t building surrounded and occupied by soldiers. SULUH MARHAEN acknowledged no connection with SULUH INDONESIA MERDEKA when it began publication about ten days after the latter terminated. Headed by Mohamad Isnaeni and Sabilal Rasjad, two leaders thought to be near the party's ideological center, the appearacne of SULUH MARHAEN seemed to be an acknowledgement by the Triumvirate of the Necessity to permit some organ obviously representative of the PNI. The paper's immediately large circulation, in two Djakarta and several daerah editions, indicated that a significant vacuum was being filled. In April 1967, SULUH MARHAEN, Edisi Ibu Kota (Sore), changed its title to SULUH RAKJAT. An editorial in the first number of SULUH RAKJAT (SULUH MARHAEN had, or was permitted, no editorials) insisted that the change in title was not to be construed as having any significance. However, the name Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 457] === 446 of Sabilal Rasjad was no longer on the masthead as General Head and Editor-in-Chief. Djawab Bardant B.A., formerly Penanggung (Responsible Official) now additionally occupied the post of Editor-in-Chief. Isnaeni, as the representative PNI party official, no longer topped the list of Pembimbing/ Pengawas (Leader/Supervisor). disappeared. Both his name and the post The new SULUH RAKJAT appears to be markedly more sympathetic to the Suharto regime. The second Djakarta edition, SULUH MARHAEN, Edisi Nasional, continued with no ostensible changes. TRISAKTI [Three Pledges]. Independent. Several former staff members of MERDEKA ran TRISAKTI, a paper which tried to take up editorially where the banned API left off. TRISAKTI gained attention in early 1966, when it directed its attention toward giving Chairul Saleh an image of "evil genius" on a par with Subandrio and the PKI. Though the tie with certain Army elements was very close, the paper ceased publication in about May 1967. WARTA PELADJAR' [Student N e w s ]. PNI/FM ASU. In early 1966 a number of newspapers whose titles included the word "peladjar" were thought to be related to some kind of common support of the leftist faction of the PNI. WARTA PELADJAR frequently criticized the KAMI/ KAPPI student demonstrations as the hoodlum activities of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 458] === 447 '’cowboys.*' One of the paper's leaders, former Public Prosecu tor Aruan SH, was ultimately arrested and jailed for allegedly leading a terrorist organization, Banteng Djakarta (also known as Badja). Reportedly, Aruan was a loyal supporter of the PNI/ ASU faction. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 459] === APPENDIX II INDONESIAN STUDENT AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS Sample: IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadijah), Muhammadijah Univer sity Students' League ABC, III, MH, p, 3-4 Code Explanation: Period(s) of activity: Sector identity: Symbol Explanation Post-October 1, 1965 Guided Democracy, 1959-1965 Pre-Guided Democracy Party Organization Government Organization III Non-Party, Non-Government Organization Party identification: IP IPKI KA Partai Katholik MA Masjumi MB Murba MH Muhammadij ah* NU Nahdatul Ulama PD Parkindo PE Perti Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) * Muhammadijah, though not officially a political party, in most ways approximates one. This was particularly true in 1966 when it gravitated toward a more openly political role. 448 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 460] === 449 Membership estimate: Symbol Explanation Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI) PSII Partindo tens or hundreds thousands tens of thousands hundreds of thousands millions Political significance: 1 Non-political; local; narrow interests. Largely non-political; ethnic, religious, geographical identity; broad based but diffuse in organization and distribution of membership; narrow interests. Ancillary of adult organization, whose leadership is largely followed. Political; affiliate of adult organization, Government or non-Government; occasionally acts independently on own initiative. Highly political; broadly based; membership too large and organi zationally cumbrous or diffuse to allow effective focus on any issue; or, membership too small and organization too weak for same. Highly political; independent; successful with bold initiatives taken selectively. Highly political; acts command immediate attention of top Government officials; frequent meetings with top Government officials; broadly based, includ ing relatively diverse elements. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 461] === 450 Explanation of Sample: IMM was active in all three periods (ABC). It was a Non-Party, Non-Government Organization (III), though an ancillary of Muhammadijah (MH). the tens of thousands Its membership numbered in Muhammadijah, a persistently non-political organization with educational, religious, social welfare and cultural interests, exercised clear and continuous control over its ancillary organizations, including IMM. In early 1966, however, many IMM members became very impatient with the adult organization's avoidancb of political involvement and did move IMM toward some concrete political initiatives; hence, the ambiguous classification of political significance (3-4). Amal Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Guild A, III, r, 6 [essentially an adult organization, but HMI included] Angkatan Muda Islam, Islamic Youth Force A, III, p. 5 Angkatan Muda Muhammadijah, Muhammadijah Youth Force ABC, III, MH, p. 3 Angkatan Muda Siliwangi, Siliwangi Youth Force A, II/III, o, 4 Angkatan Pemuda Pembangun[an] APPI (Angkatan Pemuda Pembangun[an] Indonesia), Youth Force for Indonesian Development ABC, II/III, o, 6 [C period]-3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 462] === 451 ASMI (Akademi Sekretaris Management Indonesia), Indonesian Secretarial and Management [Training] Academy AB, III, n. 3 [ASMI as a student organization assumed the same name as the institute in which its members were students] Badan Aksi Kesatuan Mahasiswa [see BAKEM] Badan Keolahragaan Mahasiswa Indonesia [see BKMI] Badan Kerdjasama Kesenian Mahasiswa Indonesia [see BKSMI] Badan Kesatuan Mahasiswa Sumatra Tengah [see BKMST] Badan Koordinasi Kesatuan2 Aksi [also called, Badan Koordinasi Kesatuan2 Aksi Massa Djawa Barat], Coordinating Committee for Action Fronts A, III, p. 5 [West Java] Badan Koordinasi Kesatuan2 Aksi Kalimantan Selatan, Coordi nating Committee for Action Fronts in South Kalimantan A, III, n. 5 Badan Musjawarah Mahasiswa Kalsel (se Djawa), South Kalimantan University Student Deliberative Body (in Java) A, III, n. 5 BAKEM (Badan Aksi Kesatuan Mahasiswa), University Student Action Front Committee A, III, n. 6 [Pontianak] Bangkung Ranggaek alleged] BANSER (Barisan Serba Gun a ), Multi-purpose Force A, I, PN, o, 6 Barisan Serba Guna (see BANSER) BKMI (Badan Keolahragaan Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Athletics Committee AB, III, p. 1 BKMST (Badan Kesatuan Mahasiswa Sumatra Tengah), Central Sumatra University Student Action Committee A, III, o, 5 [a loose Federation] BKSMI (Badan Kerdjasama Kesenian Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Cooperative Committee for Art AB, III, o, 1 CGMI (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Movement Federation ABC, III, PK, 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 463] === 452 CMB (Consentrasi Mahasiswa Bandung), Bandung University Student Federation A, I/III, [PK], n, 4 CMP [see Corps Mahasiswa Publisistik] Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia [see CGMI] Consentrasi Mahasiswa Bandung [see CMB] Corps Mahasiswa Publisistik (CMP), Publishing [Industry] University Students Corps AB, III, n, 1 Corpus Studiorum Bandunger.se [see CSB] CSB (Corpus Studiorum Bandungense), Bandung Student Corps ABC, III, n, 2 Daja Mahasiswa Sunda [see DAMAS] DAMAS (Daja Mahasiswa Sunda), Sunda University Student Force A, III, n,? DMUI (Dewan Mahasiswa U.I.), U.I. Student Assembly ABC, III, n, 4 [often approxi mated an autonomous student organization in the postOctober 1 period] FMB [see Front Mahasiswa Beragama] FP [see Front Pemuda] FPP [see Front Pemuda Pusat] Front Mahasiswa Beragama (FMB), Front for Religious University Students A, III, o, 5 [Bogor] Front Mahasiswa Islam,Islamic University Students' Front A, III, p, 5 Front Peladjar, Students' Front AB, III, p, 5 Front Pemuda (FP), Youth Front ABC, III, r, 5 Gabungan Perhimpunan Peladjar Sekolah Katholiek Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Federation of Catholic Student Associations ABC, I/III, KA, o, 3 GAMKI [see Gerakan Angkatan Muda Kristen Indonesia] GAOK [see Pasukan Gaok] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 464] === 453 GEMARA (Gerakan Mahasiswa Pelaksana AMPERA), University Students' Movement to Fulfill AMPERA A, I I I, o, 6 [alliance of anti-KAMI groups] GEMPAR A, III,?,? [pro-Soekarno, anti-Nekolim, anti-KAMI] GEMSOS (Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis, or GMS, or GMSos), Socialist University Student Movement ABC, [I]/III, PI, n, 4-5 Generasi Muda Islam [see GMI] Generasi Pemuda Islam Pembantu A B R I, Islamic Youth Generation A, II/III, o, 3 Gerakan Angkatan Muda Kristen Indonesia (GAMKI), Indonesian Christian Youth Movement AB, I, PD, o, 2 Gerakan Anti Orang Kaja [see Pasukan Gaok] Gerakan Bandit Kesatrya, Bandit Kesatrya Movement A, III,?,? [alleged] Gerakan Mahasiswa Djakarta [see GMD] Gerakan Mahasiswa '45, The *45 [generation] University Student Movement ABC, III, m, 6 Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia [see GMKI] Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia [see GMNI] Gerakan Mahasiswa Pelaksana AMPERA [see GEMARA] Gerakan Mahasiswa Revolusioner Indonesia [see GMRI] Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis [see GEMSOS] Gerakan Mahasiswa Surabaja [see GMS] Gerakan Peladjar Pantjasila [see GPP] Gerakan Pemuda Ansor [see GPA] Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia [see G P U ] Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis [see GPM] Gerakan Pemuda Sosialis Djabar, West Java Socialist Youth Movement A, III, n, [5] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 465] === 454 Gerakan Pramuka, Scout Movement ABC, II/III, p, 1 Gerakan Siswa Kristen Indonesia [see GSKI] GERMAHII (Gerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), Indonesian Islamic University Student Movement AB, I, PE, o, 3 GERMINDO (Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Movement ABC, I, PT, n, 3 GERPII (Gerakan Peladjar Islam Indonesia) [see G P U ] GMD (Gerakan Mahasiswa Djakarta), Djakarta University Students' Movement ABC, III, n, 2 GMI (Generasi Muda Islam), Islamic Youth Generation A, III, [n], 3 GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia), Indonesian Christian University Student Movement ABC, I, PD, o, 3/5 GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia), Indonesian Nationalist University Student Movement ABC, I, PN, p, 4/7 GMRI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Revolusioner Indonesia), Indonesian Revolutionary University Student Movement AB, [III], n, 5 GMS (Gerakan Mahasiswa Surabaja), Surabaja University Students' Movement ABC, III, n, 2 GPA (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, or A n s o r ), Ansor Youth Movement ABC, I, NU, p, 3/7 G P U (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia), Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement ABC, I, MA, r, 4. GPM (Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis), Marhaenist Youth Movement AB, I, PN, q, 3 GPP (Gerakan Peladjar Pantjasila), Pantjasila Student Movement AB, I, [PE], o, 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 466] === GSKI (Gerakan Siswa Kristen Indonesia), Indonesian Christian Students' [grammar and middle school] Movement ABC, I, PD, p, 3 GSNI (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia), Indonesian Nationalist Students' [grammar and middle school] Movement ABC, I, PN, p, 3 Harapan Muda Himpunan Mahasiswa Bandung [see HMB] Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam [see HMI] Himpunan. Peladjar Malaysia di Indonesia [see HPMI] HMB (Himpunan Mahasiswa Bandung), Bandung University Students' Association AB, III, n, 5 HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), Islamic University Students' Association ABC, [I]/III, [MA], p, 6 HPMI (Himpunan Peladjar Malaysia di Indonesia), Association of Malaysian Students in Indonesia A, III, n, 1 Ikatan Kekeluargaan Organisasi Mahasiswa Indonesia [see IKOMI Sulsera] Ikatan Mahasiswa Bandung [see IMABA] Ikatan Mahasiswa Djakarta [see IMADA] Ikatan Mahasiswa Jogjakarta [see IMAJO] Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadijah [see IMM] Ikatan Peladjar Nahdatul Ulama [see IPNU] Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia [see IPPI] Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia [see IPMI] Ikatan Siswa Jogjakarta [see ISAJO] IKOMI Sulsera (Ikatan Kekeluargaan Organisasi Mahasiswa Indonesia Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara), League of the South and Central Sulawesi Family of University Student Organizations A, III, n, 1 IMABA (Ikatan Mahasiswa Bandung), Bandung University Student League AB, III, n, 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 467] === 456 IMADA (Ikatan Mahasiswa Djakarta), Djakarta University Student League AB, III, n, 2, 5 [post October 1, 1965] IMAJO (Ikatan Mahasiswa Jogjakarta), Jogjakarta University..Student League A, III, n, 2 IMAPON (Ikatan Mahasiswa Pontianak), Pontianak University Student League A, III, n, 5 IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadijah), Muhammadijah University Student League ABC, III, MH, p, 3-4 Indonesia Muda, Young Indonesia [III], n, 2 [Chinese] IPMI (Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Press League [service] AB, III, n, 5 IPNU (Ikatan Peladjar Nahdatul U l a m a ), school] Students' League ABC, I, Nahdatul Ulama [high NU, p, 3 IPPI (Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia), Indonesian Youth and [high school] Students' League ABC, III, q, 5 ISAJO (Ikatan Siswa Jogjakarta), Jogjakarta [grammar and middle school] Students' League A, III, n, 2 KAMAN (Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang Antek Nekolim), Action Front for Crushing Nekolim Stooges A, III, n-o, 2 [Chinese, Medan] KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Action Front A, III, p, 7 KAMPAK (Kesatuan Aksi Massa Pengganjangan Antek2 Komunis), Mass Action Front for Crushing Communist Stooges A, III,?, 2 [Chinese] KAPAK (Komando Aksi Pemuda Anti Kontra Revolusi), AntiCounter-Revolution Youth Action Command AB, III, o, 5 [Bandjarmasin] KAPI (Kesatuan Aksi Peladjar Indonesia), Indonesian [high school] Student Action Front A, III, p, 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 468] === 457 KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia), Indonesian Youth and [high school] Student Action Front A, III, q, 7 Keluarga Mahasiswa Katholik Indonesia [see KMKI] Keluarga Mahasiswa Lebak [see KUMALA] Keluarga Mahasiswa Seni Rupa [see KMSR] Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia [see KAMI] Kesatuan Aksi Massa Pengganjangan Antek2 Komunis [see KAMPAK] Kesatuan Aksi Mengganjang Antek Nekolim [see KAMAN] Kesatuan Aksi Peladjar Indonesia [see KAPI] Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia [see KAPPI] Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Mahasiswa Rakjat Progresif Revolusioner, Action Front for Progressive Revolutionary Youth, [high school] Students, University Students and the Rakjat A, III,?, 5[Surabaja] Kesatuan Organisasi Mahasiswa Intra Universitas Indonesia [see KOMII] KMKI (Keluarga Mahasiswa Katholik Indonesia), Indonesian Catholic University Students’ Family A, I, KA, n [overseas] KMSR (Keluarga Mahasiswa Seni Rupa), University Students' Family of the Plastic Arts A, III, n, 1 Komando Aksi Pemuda Anti Kontra Revolusi [KAPAK] Komando Djihad Pemuda Islam, Islamic Youth Holy War Command A, III, o, 5 Komando Kesatuan Front Command Aksi Sumatera Utara, North Sumatra Action III, p, 5 [KAMI, KAPPI and adult organizations] Komando Marhaen, Marhaen Command A, I, PN,?, 5 KOMII (Kesatuan Organisasi Mahasiswa Intra Universitas Indonesia) III, o, 5 [Bandung] Komunis Muda, Communist Youth AB, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 469] === 458 Kudjang Putra A, II, n, 3 KUMALA (Keluarga Mahasiswa Lebak), Lebak University Student Family A, III,?, 2 ICutjing Hitam, LDMI Black Cat A, [I], PK,?, 5 [alleged PR underground group] [see Lembaga Dewan Mahasiswa Islam] Lembaga Dewan Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI), Islamic University Student Assembly Institute III, n, 2-5 Madj[e]lis Mahasiswa Indonesia [see MMI] Madjlis Permusjawaratan Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia [see MPMUI] Mahasiswa Pantjasila [see MAPANTJAS] Mahasiswa Pengemban AMPERA [see MAHPA] MAHPA (Mahasiswa Pengemban AMPERA), University Students to Shoulder the AMPERA A, III, o, 5 [Bogor] MAPANTJAS (Mahasiswa Pantjasila), Pantjasila University Students AB, I, IP, n, 4 MAPEMI (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia), Student Deliberative Assembly of the University of Indonesia A, III, n, 5 Masjarakat Mahasiswa Bogor [see MMB] MMB (Masjarakat Mahasiswa Bogor), Bogor University Student Society AB, III, n, 2 MMI (Madjlis Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Assembly AB, III, p, 5 MPMUI [see MAPEMI] National Union of Students [see NUS] NUS (National Union of Students) [much discussed, never materialized] P 3 [see Pelopor Pemuda Progresif Revolusioner] P3MIB (Persatuan Pemuda Peladjar Mahasiswa Indonesia Asal Irian Barat) A, III, n, 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 470] === 459 Pasukan Bambang Ranggaek alleged] [existence Pasukan Beruang Merah alleged] [existence Pasukan Gaok (Gaok, or Gerakan Anti Orang Kaja), Anti Rich Man Movement Force PR underground organization] Pasukan Mawar Putih/Matjan Putih, While Rose/White Tiger Corce alleged] PELMASI (Pelopor Mahasiswa Sosialis Indonesia), Vanguard of Indonesian Socialist University Students AB, III, n, 5 Pelopor Mahasiswa Sosialis Indonesia [see PELMASI] Pelopor Pemuda Progresif Revolusioner, Vanguard of Progressive Revolutionary Youth (P 3) A, III, n, 5 Pemuda Al-Irsjad, Al-Irsjad Youth AB, [III], o, 2 [Arabic Indonesian] Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Youth AB, I, PT, o, 3 Pemuda Islam, Islamic Youth ABC, I, PE, o, 3 Pemuda Katholik, Catholic Youth ABC, I, KA, p, 2 Pemuda Marhaenis [see Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis] Pemuda Muhammadijah, Muhammadijah Youth ABC, I, MH, p, 3 Pemuda Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Moslem Youth A3, I, P S, p, 3 Pemuda Pantjasila, Pantjasila Youth AB, [III], o, 5 Pemuda Pemuda Pantjasila Sedjati, Genuine Patjasila Youths A, II/III, o, 5 [Army auxiliary assisting compulsory relocation of villages] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 471] === 460 Pemuda Puteri Indonesia (PPI), Indonesian Young Men and Women ABC, II/III, q, S Pemuda Rakjat (PR), People's Youth ABC, I, PK, q, 4 Pemuda Sekber-Golkar, Youth of the Functionalist Joint Secretariat A, III,?, 3 Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia [see PMII] Pergerakan Pemuda Geredja Protestan Indonesia, Youth Movement of the Indonesian Protestant Church ABC, III, n, 1 PERHIMI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Association ABC, [I[, o, 5 [Baperki] .Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia [see PERHIMI] Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia [see PMKRI] Perhimpunan Peladjar Indonesia [see PPI] Perhimpunan Peladjar Sekolah Katholik [see PPSK] Permusjawaratan Pemuda Indonesia [see PPI] Persatuan Nasional Mahasiswa Indonesia [see PNMI] Persatuan Peladjar Indonesia [see PPI] Persatuan Pemuda Angkatan Besi [see PPAB] Persatuan Pemuda Peladjar Mahasiswa Indonesia Asal Irian Persatuan Pemuda Siswa dan Mahasiswa Indonesia [see PPSMI] Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia [see PPMI] PII [see G P U ] PMB (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Bandung), Bandung University Student Association ABC, III, n, 2 PMI (Peladjar Muslimin Indonesia), Indonesian Moslem [high school] Students AB, I, [PS], o, 3 PMI [see Pemuda Muslimin Indonesia] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 472] === 461 PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), Indonesian Islamic University Student Movement ABC, I, NU, p, 3 PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia), Catholic Student Association of the Republic of Indonesia ABC, I, KA, o, 4/[6] PNMI (Persatuan Nasional Mahasiswa Indonesia), Indonesian University Student Nationalist Organization A, II/III, p-q, [7] [officially began, but never really operative] PP [see Pemuda Pantjasila] PPAB (Persatuan Pemuda Angkatan Besi), Young Weight Lifters* Association AB, I/III, [PK], [n], 2/3 PPI [see Pemuda Puteri Indonesia] PPI (Perhimpunan Peladjar Indonesia) Peladjar Indonesia)] [see PPI (Persatuan PPI (Permusjawaratan Pemuda Indonesia), Indonesian Youth Conference AB, [I], o-p, 3 [Baperki] PPI (Persatuan Peladjar Indonesia), Indonesian Student Association ABC, II, o, 2 [overseas] PPMI (Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia), Federation of Indonesian University Student Associations ABC, II/III, q, 5-7 PPSK (Perhimpunan Peladjar Sekolah Katholik), Catholic Schools* Student Association AB, III, o, 2 PPSMI (Persatuan Pemuda Siswa dan Mahasiswa Indonesia), Association of Indonesian Youth, [high school] Students and University Students AB, I, p, 3 [Baperki] Putra Sunda, Sunda Sons A, III, n-o, 2 Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi Mahasiswa Lokal Indonesia [see SOMAL] SEMMI (Serikat Mahasiswa Muslimin Indonesia), Indonesian Moslem University Student Association ABC, I, PS, o, 5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 473] === 462 SEPMI (Serikat Peladjar Muslimin Indonesia), Indonesian Moslem [high school] Student Association ABC, I, PS, o, 4 Serikat Mahasiswa Muslimin Indonesia [see SEMMI] Serikat Peladjar Muslimin Indonesia [see SEPMI] SOMAL (Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi Mahasiswa Lokal Indonesia), Joint Secretariat of Indonesian Local University Student Organizations AB, III, o, 2/6 [post-October 1, 1965] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 474] === GLOSSARY* (Angkatan Bersendjata) Armed Forces ABRI (Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia) Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia AD[RI]-TNI Indonesia]-Tentara Nasional Indonesia) Army AKRI (Angkatan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Police Force AKSI SEPIHAK Unilateral Action ALI [see ASU] ALRI (Angkatan Laut Republic Indonesia) Navy AMANAT (PRESIDEN) Presidential Address AMPERA (Amanat Penderitaan Rakjat) Message of the People's Suffering ANGKATAN ’45 The '45 Generation ANGKATAN *66 The '66 Generation Of abbreviations, acronyms, terms and slogans used in this dissertation, excluding all student and youth organizations (see Appendix I have benefited from occasional refer ence to English renditions of terms in the glossary of T.K. Tan (ed.)» Sukarno's Guided Indonesia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 19617). The following letter code is in tended to facilitate usage of the list: 1) Indonesian Govern ment organizations and organizational terminology, geographic areas [A]; 2) Non-Governmental organizations [B]; 3) Ideologi cal and Political terms [C]; 4) Other terms [D]. Periods after initials of organizational names have been omitted, because they are rarely employed in Indonesian documents. 463 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 475] === 464 (Amerika Serikat) United States of America ASTENG (Asia Tenggara) Southeast Asia Ali Sastroamidjojo, Ir. Surachman [suffix denoting left wing of PNI and its mass organizations] National Deliberative Council for Private Entrepreneurs BAPPENAS (Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional) Council for National Development Planning BERDIKARI (Berdiri Diatas Kaki Sendiri) Self Reliance [lit., Stand upon One's Own Feet] BINREV (Pembina Doktrin Revolusi Indonesia) Promotion of Indonesia's Revolutionary Doctrine BKKA (Badan Koordinasi Kesatuan Aksi) Action Front Coordinating Committee BPH (Badan Pekerdja Harian) Daily Operations Committee Body for the Promotion of Soekarno Indonesian Peasants' Front [PKI] ASU BAMUNAS (Badan Musjawarah Pengusaha Nasional) BPS (Badan Pendukung Soekarno) BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia) CONEFO Conference of the New Emerging Forces [also, see NEFO] DALANG Puppeteer DAM (Dae rah Mi liter) Military Area [District] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 476] === 465 DASWATI (Daerah Swatantra Tingkat) DCI (Daerah Chusus Ibukota) DEPINAS (Dewan Pimpinan Nasional) DEPPEN (Departemen Penerangan) Autonomous District Special Capitol City Area [Djakarta] Committee for National Leadership Department of Information [Information Ministry] DEWAN DJENDERAL Council of Generals DJABAR (Djawa Barat) West Java DJATENG (Djawa Tengah) Central Java DJATIM (Djawa Timur) East Java DJAYA [DJAJA] Greater Djakarta DPA (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung) Supreme Advisory Council DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat) Central Executive Board DPP-GR [DPRGR] (Dewan Perwakilan RakjatGotong Rojong Gotong Rojong [Togetherness] Parliament DPRDGR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah Gotong Rojong) Area Gotong Rojong Parliament Twofold Mission [of the AMPERA Cabinet: (Political and Economic Stabilization] DWI DHARMA DWIKORA (Dwi Komando Rakjat) The People's Twofold Command [C] EKONOMI TERPIMPIN Guided Economy Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 477] === 466 EKUBANG (Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Pembangunan) Economy, Finance and Development FINEK (Finansiel, Ekonomi) Finance, Economy FRONT MARHAENIS Marhaenist Front [PNI] FRONT NASIONAL National Front G-30-S [see GESTAPU] GERAKAN TP (Gerakan Tenaga Pembangunan) GERPOL (Gerilja Politik) GERWANI (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia) GERWAPSII (Gerakan Wanita Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia) (Gerakan September Tigapuluh Movement to Inspire Development Political Guerrilla Indonesian Women's Movement [PKI] PSII Women's Movement The September Thirtieth Movement GESTOK (Gerakan Satu Oktober) The October First Movement [B,C] GESURI (Genta Suara Revolusi Indonesia) Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution GOLKAR (Golongan Karya) Functional Group HANKAM (Pertahanan Keamanan) Security and Defense HANSIP (Pertahanan Sipil) Civil Defense Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 478] === 467 HANURA (Hati Nurani Rakjat) HSBI (Himpunan Seni Budaja Islam) Conscience (or innermost sentiments) of the People Islamic Art and Cultural Association HSI (Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia) Indonesian Scholars' Association IKAHI (Ikatan Hakim Indonesia) League of Indonesian Judges League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence ISTANA Palace ISTORA (Istana Olah Raga) Sports Palace [in Djakarta] ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung) Bandung Institute of Technology KABI (Kesatuan Aksi Buruh Indonesia) Indonesian Laborers' Action Front KABINET INTI Inner Cabinet KABIR [see KAPBIR] KAGI (Komando Aksi Guru Indonesia) Indonesian Teachers' Action Command KAMSPI (Kesatuan Aksi Murah Sandang Pangan Indonesia) Action Front for Cheap Basic Commodities in Indonesia KAN I (Kesatuan Aksi Nelajan Indonesia) Indonesian Sailors' Action Front (Kapitalis-Birokrat) Capitalist-Bureaucrat IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 479] === 468 KAPMI (Kesatuan Aksi Potensi Maritim Indonesia) Action Front for Indonesian Maritime Potential KAPNI (Kesatuan Aksi Pedagang Nasional Indonesia) Action Front of Indonesian National Businessmen KAP-Gestapu (Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjangan Gerakan September Tiga Puluh) Action Front for the Crushing of the September thirtieth Movement KARYA Work or Function KARYAWAN Functionaries KASAD (Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat) Army Chief of Staff KASI (Kesatuan Aksi Sardjana Indonesia) Action Front of Indonesian Scholars KATI (Kesatuan Aksi Tani Indonesia) Indonesian Peasants' Action Front KAWI (Kesatuan Aski Wanita Indonesia) Action Front of Indonesian Women KBKI (Kesatuan Buruh Kerakjatan Indonesia) Indonesia People's Labor Organization KKO (Korps Komando Operasi) Marine Corps KODAM (Komandan Daerah Militer) Regional Military Commander KOGAM (Komando Ganjang Malaysia) Crush Malaysia Command KONTREV (Kontra Revolusi) Counter Revolutionary KOPRONEF (Komando Projek Conefo) Command for the Implementa tion of the CONEFO Project Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 480] === 469 KOSGORO (Koperasi Gotong Rojong) KOSTRAD (Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat) Gotong Roj ong Cooperative Army Strategic Command KOSTRAM (Komando Strategi Ampera) Command for AMPERA Strategy KOTI (Komando Operasi Tertinggi) Supreme Operational Command KOTOE (Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi) Supreme Economic Operational Command KOTRAR (Komando Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi) Supreme Command for the Retooling of the Apparatus of the Revolution Indonesian People's AntiCommunist League Institute for People's Culture National News Service LKIK (Lembaga Kebudajaan Kristen Indonesia) Institute for Indonesian Christian Culture LKN (Lembaga Kebudajaan Nasional) Institute of National Culture LPKB (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangs a) Institute for the Promotion of National Unity MAHKAMAH AGUNG Supreme Court MAHMILUB (Mahkamah Militer Luar Bias a) Extra Ordinary Military Tribunal LAKRI (Liga Anti Komunis Rakjat Indonesia) LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat) LKBN (Lembaga Kantor Berita Nasional) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 481] === MANIKEBU (Manifesto Kebudajaan) MANIPOL (Manifesto Politik) MAPERTA (Malam Inaugurasi Masa Perkenalan Tjalon Anggota) MAPRAM (Masa Prahhakti Mahasiswa) MARHAEN Cultural Manifesto Political Manifesto [initiating Guided Democracy] Evening Inauguration and Welcoming Ceremony for Candidate Members University Student Initia tion [usually into an extra-university student organization] The Indonesian 'Little Man ["proletarian" qualified for Indonesian use by Soekamo] MASJUMI (Madjelis Sjura Muslimin Indonesia) Indonesian Islamic Federa MENKO (Menteri/Koordinator) Minister/Coordinator MUBES (Musjawarat Besar) General Conference MUKER (Musjawarat Kerdja) Working Conference MURBA Proletarian Party [Political Party] NAHDATUL ULAMA [see NU] NASAKOM (Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme) Nationalism, Religion and Communism NASAKOMIL (Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme dan Militer) Nationalism, Religion, Com munism and the Military Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 482] === 471 NASASOS (Nasionalisme, Agama dan Sosialisme) Nationalism, Religion and Socialism NAWAKSARA [Soekamo's 'Nine Principles' Speech on June 22, 1966] NEFOS New Emerging Forces NEKOLIM (Neokolonialisme, Kolonialisme dan Imperialisme) Neo-colonialism, Colonialism and Imperialism (Nahdatul Ulama) OKNUM Moslem Scholars' Party [Political Party] Adventurer (of evil character) OLDEFO Old Established Forces ORBA (Orde Baru) New Order ORLA (Orde Lama) Old Order OSA-USEP (Perwakilan Pimpinan Pusat) PANGTI (Panglima Tertinggi) PANGDAM (Panglima Daerah Militer) PANTJA AZIMAT REVOLUSI Osa Maliki, Usep Ranuwidjaja [suffix denoting right wing of PNI and its mass organizations] Central Leadership Committee [or Delegation] Commander-in-Chief Commanding Officer of a Military Area Five Talismans of the Revolu tion [1. Pantja Sila, 2. Manipol-USDEK, 3. NASAKOM, 4. Tri Sakti, and 5. Berdikari] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 483] === 472 PANTJA SILA The Five [original] Principles of the State Ideology [1. Be lief in God, 2. Nationalism, 3. Humanism, 4. Democracy, 5. Social Justice] PANTJA TUNGGAL lit., Fivefold, or Five in One [the Regional administra tive control board, comprising: 1. Area Head, 2. Army Commander, 3. Police Commander, 4. Pros ecutor-General, and 5. N a tional Front Head] PARKINDO (Partai Keristen Indonesia) PARPOL (Partai Politik) PARTINDO (Partai Indonesia) (Pengurus Besar) PBR (Pemimpin Besar Revolusi) PEMILU (Pemilihan Umum) PENPRES (Penetapan Presiden) PEPELRADA (Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah) PEPERDA (Penguasa Perang Daerah) PERBARA Tenggara) Indonesian Christian [Pro Party] Political Party Indonesian Party [Political Party] Central Leadership [or, Executive Committee or Executive Board] Great Leader of the Revolu tion [Soekamo] General Elections Presidential Decree [ordinance] Regional DWIKORA Executive Administrator [military] Regional State-of-War Administrator Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 484] === 473 PERMESTA (Perdjuangan Semesta) [Celebes centered rebellion against the Djakarta Government, 1957] PERSAHI (Perhimpunan Sardjana Hukum Indonesia) Indonesian Lawyers* Association PERSAMI (Perserikatan Sardjana Muslimin Indonesia) Indonesian Moslem Scholars’ Association Islamic Educational M o v e ment Party [Political Party] Teachers' Association of the Republic of Indonesia Exalted Leader [honorific for Soekarno] Indonesian Communist Party Indonesian Nationalist Party Armed Forces News Center Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia Indonesian Socialist Party PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Perseroan Terbatas) PUSHANSIP (Pusat Pertahanan Sipil) Center for Civil Defense PRTI (Pergerakan Tabyah Islamyah) PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik . Indonesia) PJM (Perdana Jang Mulia) PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) PPAB (Pusat Pemberitaan Angkatan Bersendjata PRRI (Permerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 485] === 474 PUSPEN (Pus at Penerangan) Information Center RAKJAT The People (Republik Indonesia) Republic of Indonesia Army Para-Commando Regiment SAB (Staf Angkatan Bersendjata) Armed Forces Staff Sarbumusi (Sarekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia) Indonesian Moslem Laborers' Association SBPU (Serikat Buruh Pekerdjaan Umum) Public Works Labor Organization SEKBER (Sekretariat Bersama) Joint Secretariat State Secretariat [the President's administrative office] SEKRETARIAT BERSAMA Joint Secretariat SESMI (Serikat Sardjana Muslimin Indonesia) Indonesian Moslem Scholar's Association (PSII) (Sardjana Hukum) SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia) All-Indonesia Central Labor Organization (PKI) Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees Social Politics RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat) SEKNEG (Sekretariat Negara) SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia) SOSPOL (Sosial Politik) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 486] === SS PENDIDIKAN (Serikat Sekerdja Pendidikan) Association of Comrades in Education (PKI) SULSEL (Sulawesi Selatan) South Sulawesi SULUT (Sulawesi Utara) North Sulawesi SUMBAR (Sumatra Barat) West Sumatra SUMTENG (Sumatra Tengah) Central Sumatra SUMUT (Sumatra Utara) North Sumatra TAKARI (Tahun Berdikari) TAVIP (Tahun Vive re Peri col os o) TJAKRABIRAWA TJATUR KARYA TRIKORA (Tri Komando Rakjat) TRI SAKTI TRITURA (Tri Tuntutan Rakjat) Year of Self Reliance [Title of Soekarno's 1965 Independ ence Day Address] Year of Living Dangerously [Title of Soekarno's 1964 Independence Day Address] [Presidential BodyguardRegiment] [Four Point Program of the Amepra Cabinet] The People's Triple Command [in West Irian Campaign] [A 1965 Soekarno formula: Political Sovereignty, Economic Self Reliance and Cultural Identity] The People's Threefold Demand [1) Ban the PKI, 2) Retool the Cabinet, 3) Lower Prices] [C] Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 487] === 476 TURBA (Turun Kebawah) UBK (Universitas Bung Karno) lit., Go Down Below [A common acronym deriving from Soekarno's call for people in high ranking positions to spend more time among the Rakjat] Bung Karno University University of Indonesia University of the Republic Tri Sakti University [new name for the former URECA] [University] Student Train ing Obligation [Military Training] [Compulsory] Militer Service WAPANGSAR (Wakil Panglima Besar) Deputy Commander-in-Chief WAPERDAM (Wakil Perdana Menteri) Deputy Prime Minister (Warta Berita) News (Universitas Indonesia) URECA (Universitas Res Publica) USAKTI (Universitas Tri Sakti) WALAWA (Wadjib Latihan Mahasiswa) WAMIL (Wadjib Mi liter) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 488] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Abdulgani, Roselan. Dengan Pantjasila Berdjiwa Nasakom Menumpas G-30-S. Djakarta: Prapantja, 1965. Achmad D.S. Wawantjara Djendral dengan Wartawan. Rilan, 1966. Solo: Agustaman, Harry. 5 Tahun Melawan SAC (Subandrio, A i d i t, Chaerul). Bandung: Badar, 1966. Air P a s a n g. Djakarta: (KAMI), 1966. Akasah, Badaruttamam. Hantjurnja Gestapu, Gestok, G-30-S. Bandung: Badar, 1967. Amanat2 Penting di Saat-Saat Penghantjuran "Gestapu. Djakarta: Direktorat Penerangan Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, n.d. Amstutz, James Bruce. The Indonesian Youth Movement, 1908-1955. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, May 1958. Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1967. Angin Baru Dari Simposium U.I., Tgl. 6 Mei 1966. Angkasa, 1966. Bandung: Anwar, H. Rosihan (ed.). Perdjalanan Terachir Pahlawan Nasional Sutan Sjahrir7 Djakarta: Pembangunan, 1966. Bahan-Bahan Musjawarah Pokok dan Bahan-bahan Musjawarah Pelengkap. Djakarta: MPRS, 1966. Boerhan dan Soebekti. Fakta dan Latar-Belakang MGerakan 30 September.11 Djakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Kebudajaan Kosgoro Djakarta, 1966. Chalid, Idham. Haluan Politik Negara (untuk Kuliah Pendidikan Kilat Kader NASAKOM). Djakarta: Endang, 1<)65. Coleman, James S. (ed.). Education and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 477 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 489] === 478 Damar, Satya. P.K.I. kontra P.P. No. 7/1959. N usantara, 1966. Djakarta: Dari Djalan2 Raya Menggema Keforum Konstitusi--Kumpulan Didato Wakil2 Manasiswa $ Hasil2 Sidang Istimewa M. P. R. S. Djakarta: Biro Penerangan KAMI Pusat, 1967. Deklarasi--Pembentukan P.P.P.-P.N.I. O s a - U s e p. Djakarta: Departemen Pen. Prop. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Nasional Indonesia, (1965). 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