The Butterfly Effect: Stealth Politics by the Reformist Women's Movement in Indonesia in the Struggle for Gender Equality (1945-Present)

=== [PDF page 1] === NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY The Butterfly Effect: Stealth Politics by the Reformist Women’s Movement in Indonesia in the Struggle for Gender Equality (1945-Present) A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Field of Political Science Sabina Satriyani Puspita EVANSTON, ILLINOIS June 2023 === [PDF page 2] === [Blank page] === [PDF page 3] === Abstract How can powerless social groups win major policy changes? The existing scholarship in social movements, elite theory, and democratization tends to emphasize the significant role of accumulating power resources for achieving significant policy change. However, theories about the success of groups with limited resources in attaining policy change remain inadequate. This dissertation uses the case of the reformist women’s movement network in Indonesia to argue that one significant pathway for making policy change for powerless groups “is by exercising stealth politics—a carefully timed and low-profile strategy that can be pursued once participants of a group gain direct access to state power,” whether they are engaged as staff or as volunteers, in ministries or in other state agencies. The Indonesian reformist women’s movement network’s success is framed as the butterfly effect—a mobilization of small-scale protest on policymaking at one level that exerts a profound impact on other levels of policymaking. This dissertation conducts 1) a historical study on the Indonesian women’s movement’s relations with the state; and 2) a case study on the establishment in 2021 of Regulation 30 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions, to illuminate three key insights. First, there are many countries where social movements such as some of the Indonesian women’s movement networks during certain periods, that make change through other levers of power such as lobbying politicians, allying with political parties, supporting certain presidents, etc. Second, however, countries with a history of having 1) a very politically active civil society in the beginning of their formation, then 2) mass depoliticization after a regime transition, and later 3) an increasing authority of religious groups in the public sphere after democratic consolidation, render participatory politics less effective for making policy change that protects the civil rights === [PDF page 4] === of the disempowered. Third, in countries with those conditions, such as Indonesia, stealth politics become more effective for 1) resisting state cooptation in policymaking processes and 2) improving inclusion and accountability in governance. === [PDF page 5] === Acknowledgments Writing a dissertation in the beginning, middle, and seemingly-never-ending phases of a global pandemic is depressing. On the one hand, the forced isolation helped the writing process. On the other hand, the everyday news of family and friends who were hit hard by the financial and psychological impacts of Covid-related cases and policies, were a constant disruption to the thought process. Nevertheless, my dissertation committee’s patience and guidance have been the crucial factor for my efforts to cross the finish line. As chair, Jeffrey Winters has put a ridiculously large amount of his time and energy to guide me through my chaotic trains of thoughts. Furthermore, he has been extremely patient with my struggles to write with confidence. I have never been sure of my ability to complete the PhD program, but he has consistently asserted his belief in my research and ability to finish. I truly appreciate him. My dissertation committee is further strengthened by Wendy Pearlman and Andrew Roberts. Wendy has been incredibly supportive of my writing struggles. I worked with Wendy for my master’s thesis. I thought she would never want to have anything to do with me again since the thesis, but I was overjoyed when she agreed to be co-chair of my dissertation committee. Andrew has also been tremendously helpful in my struggles to organize and communicate my thoughts in a clear and structured manner. I worked with Andrew for my predoctoral research paper, I thought that Andrew, too, would not agree to take me on as a mentee again. However, I was beyond happy when I saw Andrew accepted my electronic request for him to co-chair my dissertation committee. === [PDF page 6] === Jeffrey, Wendy, and Andrew have always shown great care in replying to my emails, reading my every draft of the prospectus and dissertation chapter, and responding to each draft with stimulating comments and meticulous critique. Words are simply not enough to express my admiration of and gratitude to them. They have demonstrated not only admirable scholarship but also irreplaceable mentorship. Should the quality of this dissertation fail to achieve the reader’s expectations, the fault is all mine. Numerous global institutions have funded major portions of my study, fieldwork, and dissertation. I am indebted to the Indonesian Scholarship Research Support Foundation (ISRSF), the Equality Development and Globalization Studies Program (EDGS), Indonesian Ministry of Finance’s Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP), and the American-Indonesian Cultural and Educational Foundation (AICEF). I am also grateful for the workspace environment, or institutional home base, provided by the Buffet Institute for Global Affairs at Northwestern University when I was in the United States, and the Center for Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Indonesia (Puskagenseks LPPSP FISIP UI) when I was doing fieldwork in Indonesia. Moreover, as the global pandemic impacted the progress of my dissertation project I would not have had the privilege of completing my dissertation beyond my scholarship years without the generosity of Northwestern University’s Department of Political Science, the Institutes For Advanced Research Consortium (IFAR), Monash University at Jakarta (Indonesia), and the Monash Herb Feith Indonesian Engagement Centre at Melbourne (Australia). A major part of my intellectual development also cannot be separated from other professors at the departments of Political Science, Sociology, and History who helped my intellectual development. They are William Hurst (now in Cambridge), Elizabeth Hurd, Ian Hurd, Karen Alter, Stephen Nelson, Marina Henke, Edward Gibson, William Reno, Laurel === [PDF page 7] === Harbridge, Rachel Riedl, Jason Seawright, Jacqueline Stevens, Mary Dietz, Ana Arjona, Kimberly Suiseeya, James Mahoney, Ann Orloff, Leslie McCall (now in CUNY), Amy Stanley, Rudolf Mrazek (now in UMICH), and Haydon Cherry. My Political Science cohort also made my learning experience truly unforgettable. They are Yoes Kenawas, Nathalia Justo, Malia Bowers, Andrew Thompson, Christa Kuntzelman, Brianna White, Arturo Chang, Ayodeji Perrin, Jahara Matisek, Kyle Jones, and Miruna Barnoschi. I am also grateful for the academic support from other Political Science colleagues such as Laura Garcia-Montoya, Shaul Notkin, Julia Brown, David Peyton, Adam Howat, Sean Diament, Jake Rothchild, Richard Shafranek, Joshua Freedman, Evgenia Mikryukova, Sasha Klyachkina, Rana Khoury, Gina Giliberti, Napon Jatrusripitak, Zhihang Ruan, Safa al-Saaedi, Dara Gaines, Sarah Moore, Andrene Wright, and Lauren Baker. I also could not have survived without coordinators Courtney Syskowski and Stephen Monteiro. I would like to acknowledge and thank fellow warriors in the Arryman Program: Gde Metera, Luthfi Adam, Muhammad Fajar, Rahardhika Utama, Wara Urwasi, Yoes Kenawas, Sindhunata Hargyono, Norman Joshua, Sari Ratri, Mirna Nadia, Aulia Nastiti, Bahram Naderil, Perdana Roswaldy, Sofyan Ansori, Robie Kholilurrahman, Muhammad Ridha, Eunike Setiadarma, Febi Ramadhan, Atmaezer Simanjuntak, and Amrina Rosyada. I also thank Hipolitus Wangge, Ahmad Syarif, and Ayu Yolandasari for the knowledge-exchange throughout our brief yet meaningful meetings at the Evanston campus. Some of the Arryman folks came to Evanston with their partners and their role in my survival was indispensable. They are Ixora, Rani, Dani, Nida, Tiara, and Vidya. Many thanks also to my mentors from Taiwan: Andrew Hsia, Wayne Liang, and Mark Lai, for paving my way to the Arryman Program. I also thank Ariel Pradipta who, back in 2013, opened my mind about applying to a doctoral program in the first place. === [PDF page 8] === Folks in the International Summer Institute at Northwestern University have supported my predoctoral fellowship years and those beyond. I thank Melike Arslan, Rungmai Limvorapitux, Silvia Lam, Walther Maradiegue, Ümit Aslan, Nastaran Shojaei, Boran Ma, and Lin Sun. I thank the Indonesian Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology. The hard work and dedication of Minister Nadiem Makarim, his team of special staff, and the ministry’s officials from the most senior- to junior-levels of the echelon are inspiring. Moreover, I am grateful for my interviewees who have been generous in their time with me and wish to remain anonymous. I want to especially thank Ledia Hanifa Amaliah and Popon Otje Djundjunan for their time and insights despite their busy schedule, as well as Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Ratna Batara Munti, Nursanita Nasution, Euis Sunarti, and Wahidah Bulan for stimulating discussions throughout my fieldwork. I also thank Bella Ananda, Putri Ayu Iramaya, Ratih Mandalawangi, Fadila Munawaroh, and Untari Hestungkoro for their labor in transcribing. I am also indebted to incredibly supportive mentors such as Elizabeth Morrissey, Dewi Puspasari, Antarini Arna, Carol Yoken, Kathleen Geraghty, Ted Fishman, Andrew MacIntyre, Ika Idris, Sharyn Graham Davies, Diana Pakasi, Irwan Hidayana, Ida Ruwaida, Ani Soetijpto, Melani Budianta, Lidwina Inge Nurtjahyo, Mirza Buana, Azalea Ayuningtyas, Dei Sudarmo, Hanna Keraf, Melia Winata, Nevo Shinaar, Pavinee Praneeprachachon, Janjala Chirakijja, Toar Hutagalung, Sondang Manullang, Ratri Istania, Mochammad Tonie, Iim Halimatusa’diyah, Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Ayu Nova Lissandhi, Al Foe, Kiri Palm, Dave Kuntzelman, Josh Covell, Reyhaneh Maktoufi, Lama Takruri, Katarina Mellyna, Brigitta Isabella, Paula Litha, Audrey Isabella, Hestu Prahara, Mirisa Hasfaria, Naimah Thalib, Susan Herawati, Donna Swita, Zakia Nisa, Sita Aripurnami, Damairia Pakpahan, Titi Soentoro, Mariana Amiruddin, Alimatul === [PDF page 9] === Qibtiyah, Maria Ulfah Anshor, Ita Nadia, Dhyta Caturani, Ajeng Anggraini, Wildan Teddy, Irine Wardhanie, Lini Zurlia, Tante Threes Amin, Ignatia Glory and friends, Lisa Buchter, Leona Pröpper, and Lina Knorr. Furthermore, Nadira Chairani, Frisca Putri, Ainun Mutmainnah, Julia Ginting, and Lathiefah Retyaningtyas have been my role models for practicing communitybuilding and collective care. I owe my intellectual development to more people and hope they forgive my failure to mention them here. This dissertation is also completed in loving memory of my father-in-law, Bapak, and dear friends, Ida Rustam and Lusiana Rumintang. Bapak texted me to stay well and happy just the night before he passed away. Mbak Ida was in fighting energy at the beginning of our struggle for a sexual violence regulation in Indonesian campuses. Ceu Lusi and I were writing our dissertations and planned to graduate together. May they rest in peace. Finally, my dissertation would not have finished if it were not because of the support from my family. I thank Muhammad Fajar for being such a caring life partner. Fajar tolerates my erratic work/leisure schedule and has also been an impeccable listener and critic throughout the process of writing my dissertation. I appreciate Fajar for his initiative to run errands and do the housework when it was supposed to be my turn to complete those tasks. Furthermore, Fajar and Boce, our beloved rescue pitbull, always show sincere enthusiasm for my research ideas that have yet to be written in complete form. I cannot wait to spend more quality time with you. I also received so much help from my sister, brother, and their respective spouses. My sister tirelessly read almost the entire draft of my dissertation multiple times. My older brother’s curious questions about my research help me sharpen my writing. My mother-in-law, Ibu, supports me through her text messages of love each day. More importantly, I thank my mother for her endless care labor. I dedicate this dissertation to her. === [PDF page 10] === 10 For Mother === [PDF page 11] === 11 List of Abbreviations AILA Family Love Alliance (Aliansi Cinta Keluarga) Demokrat Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) DPR House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) DWIKORA People’s Double Commands (Dwi Komando Rakyat) GERAK Perempuan Alliance for Anti-Violence Against Women Movement (Aliansi Gerakan Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan GERINDRA Great Indonesia Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya) GERWANI Women’s Movement of Indonesia (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia) GOLKAR Functional Groups Party (Partai Golongan Karya) HTI Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) JKP3 Network for Pro-Women Legislation (Jaringan Kerja Prolegnas Pro- Perempuan) Komnas Perempuan National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan) KOWANI Indonesian Women’s Congress (Kongres Wanita Indonesia) KPI Indonesian Women’s Coalition (Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia) KUPI Indonesian Women’s Ulama Congress (Kongres Ulama Perempuan Indonesia) MHTI Muslim Women of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood (Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) MOE Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (Kementerian Pendidikan, Kebudayaan, Riset, dan Teknologi), formerly known as Ministry of Education and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan) MPR People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) MRA Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementerian Agama) MUI Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) Nasdem National Democratic Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat) NU Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic Organization PAN National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) PDIP Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) PILKADA Regional Heads’ Election (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah) PKB National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) PKI Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) PKS Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) PRD People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik) PPP United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) Regulation 30 Minister of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology’s Regulation No. 30/2021 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions RTND Tjut Nyak Dien Clan (Rumpun Tjut Nyak Dien) TRITURA People’s Triple Commands (Tri Komando Rakyat) === [PDF page 12] === 12 Glossary The Period of Reform (Reformasi) Reformasi refers to Indonesia’s brief transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Indonesia’s Reformasi began on the day Suharto resigned from his decades-long dictatorship (May 21, 1998) and ended on the day Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded impeached Abdurrahman Wahid as president (July 23, 2001). From the perspectives of elite theory and gender equality, Megawati’s presidency ended Reformasi because she 1) revived the powers of elites from the previous regime and 2) selected as vice president Hamzah Haz who openly practiced polygyny. Hence, the period after July 2001 is referred to as Post-Reformasi. Sexual Violence Crimes Law (Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Kekerasan Seksual) In 2012, Komnas Perempuan announced the urgency of sexual violence cases’ rising trend nationwide. Then, in 2016, Komnas Perempuan formulated the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill and the bill was deliberated for the first time in the DPR. Finally, in 2022, the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill was renamed Sexual Violence Crimes Law because the emphasis on regulating the recovery of victims shifted to incarcerating perpetrators. The Sexual Violence Crimes Law represents a nomenclature and contents that resulted from years-long negotiations between nationalist and religious conservative members of parliament. The Alliance for Anti-Violence Against Women Movement (GERAK Perempuan) Since 2013, a group of women’s rights activists would gather annually to organize marches and other events to mark International Women’s Day every March 8 in Jakarta. Then, on January 24, 2020, the group decided to form GERAK Perempuan not only for organizing International Women’s Day events but also for strengthening the Indonesian feminist movement because the group was agitated by the state’s increasing injustices toward genders and sexualities. GERAK Perempuan evolved into an alliance of approximately fifty non-governmental organizations, workers’ unions, university students’ groups, and independent collectives. Emancipated Learning (Merdeka Belajar) Merdeka Belajar refers to the identifying “brand” of policies and programs run by MOE’s incumbent minister, Nadiem Makarim, since his tenure began on October 23, 2019. His concept of realizing emancipated learning for students and educators entails 1) reforming the national school curriculum to have more flexibility; 2) connecting higher education institutions with the jobs industry; and 3) propagating character traits based on the state ideology (Pancasila). The propagative agenda includes raising public awareness and making policies which address issues of bullying, intolerance toward diversity, and sexual violence—issues which Makarim dubbed “The Three Major Sins in Education” (Tiga Dosa Besar Pendidikan). === [PDF page 13] === 13 Table of Contents Chapter 1 - Introduction............................................................................................................ 18 1.1 The Puzzle and Significance of the Study.............................................................................. 18 1.2 Limits of Existing Scholarship................................................................................................ 30 1.2.1 Global Context.......................................................................................................... 30 1.2.2 The Indonesian Context............................................................................................. 38 1.3 The Argument......................................................................................................................... 39 1.3.1 Stealth Politics by the Reformist Women’s Movement Network.............................. 42 1.3.2 Direct Access to State Power, Political Opportunity Structures, and Cooptation..... 48 1.3.3 Policy Change on Sexual Violence in the Struggle for Gender Equality.................. 52 1.4 Methodology........................................................................................................................... 56 1.5 Plan of the Dissertation........................................................................................................... 61 Chapter 2 - Types of Women’s Movement Networks in Indonesia........................................ 63 2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 63 2.2. The Old Order (1945-1965)................................................................................................... 71 2.2.1 The Traditionalist Women’s Movement Network: 1945-1952 KOWANI................. 72 2.2.2 The Traditionalist Turned Liberal Women’s Movement Network: 1952-1965 KOWANI.............................................................................................................................. 75 2.3. The New Order (1966-1998).................................................................................................. 78 2.3.1 Back to be the Traditionalist Women’s Movement Network: Post-1965 KOWANI. 79 2.3.2 Emerging Religious Liberal Women’s Movement: The MHTI................................. 83 === [PDF page 14] === 14 2.3.3 Emerging Reformists: Rumpun Tjut Nyak Dien, Pre-JKP3, and Pre-KUPI.............. 86 2.4 Post-Reformasi (2001-Present)............................................................................................... 91 2.4.1 The Islamic Traditionalist Women’s Movements: Tarbiyah Women and AILA....... 92 2.4.2 Shifting Back to be the Liberal Women’s Movement: Post-1965 KOWANI............ 93 2.4.3 The Reformist Women’s Movements: JKP3, KUPI, and GERAK Perempuan........ 94 2.5. Summary.............................................................................................................................. 100 Chapter 3 - The Structural Conditions for Networking and Mobilization Strategies........ 103 3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 103 3.2 Structural Conditions for Networking.................................................................................. 106 3.2.1 The Old Order Period (1945-1965)......................................................................... 106 3.2.2 The New Order Period (1966-1998).........................................................................114 3.2.3 The Post-Reformasi Period (2001-Present)..............................................................118 3.3 Modes of Mobilization.......................................................................................................... 126 3.3.1 Collaborating with the State.................................................................................... 126 3.3.2 Gaining Direct Access to State Power..................................................................... 132 3.3.3 Challenging the State............................................................................................... 136 3.4 Summary............................................................................................................................... 140 Chapter 4 - Policy Change........................................................................................................ 144 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 144 4.2 Regulation 30, Stealth Politics, and Direct Access to State Power....................................... 146 4.3 The Political Context............................................................................................................ 153 === [PDF page 15] === 15 4.4 The Planning Stage............................................................................................................... 160 4.4.1 Data Collection........................................................................................................ 166 4.4.2 Literature Review.................................................................................................... 170 4.4.3 Database Building................................................................................................... 172 4.4.4 Gap Finding............................................................................................................. 175 4.4.5 Grand Strategy......................................................................................................... 177 4.5 The Harmonizing Stage........................................................................................................ 181 4.6 The Launch and Public Reception........................................................................................ 189 4.7. Summary.............................................................................................................................. 205 Chapter 5 - Conclusion............................................................................................................. 207 5.1 Future Directions.................................................................................................................. 216 5.2 Policy Implications............................................................................................................... 218 5.3 Movement-Organizing Implications..................................................................................... 220 References.................................................................................................................................. 222 Books and Journal Articles......................................................................................................... 222 Online Articles............................................................................................................................ 245 Online Video............................................................................................................................... 254 Thesis and Dissertation............................................................................................................... 255 Newspaper Articles..................................................................................................................... 255 Archival Documents................................................................................................................... 255 === [PDF page 16] === 16 Interviews.................................................................................................................................... 257 Appendices................................................................................................................................. 259 Appendix 1 - Interview Book..................................................................................................... 259 Appendix 2 - English Translation of Regulation 30................................................................... 260 === [PDF page 17] === 17 List of Tables and Figures Figure 1 - The butterfly effect: a series of events leading to sexual violence laws……………. 26 Figure 2 - The three pathways for social movement groups to make policy change.…….……. 40 Figure 3 - Types of women's movement networks based on each network’s strategies (x axis) to achieve its goal (y axis) ………………………………………………………...... 67 Table 1 - Types of women's movements (T) across periods (P)………...……………………..... 70 Figure 4 - Post-1965 KOWANI's goal for women’s role in society that aligned with the New Order’s gender ideology...…...………………….……………………………………. 80 Figure 5 - The reformist women's movement network's struggle for Regulation 30…………..148 Figure 6 -The bureaucratic stages of establishing Regulation 30………………………………152 Table 2 - Mapping of the public’s reaction…………………………………………………….. 201 === [PDF page 18] === 18 Chapter 1 - Introduction “Women’s bodies are the last defense for democracy in Indonesia.” (RS012, women’s rights activist since the New Order) 1.1 The Puzzle and Significance of the Study How can powerless social groups win major policy changes? This dissertation does not assume that a group can be utterly powerless or that power is completely absent within the group. However, relative to other existing groups (e.g., international non-government organizations, political parties, or oligarchs), “powerless groups” in this dissertation will be used interchangeably with “relatively powerless groups” and refers to groups or institutionally devalued non-state actors such as women and other minority groups that have significantly less power.1 The challenges to institutionally devalued non-state actors’ attaining their policy change of interest are particularly hard, because these actors have been either denied redistribution or displaced due to their identity (e.g., class, racial, ethnic, religious, or gender).2 Most cases yield less favorable outcomes for the less powerful. For instance, the African American poor women’s movement that persistently went to government agencies to claim welfare benefits in the hope of reforming policies on redistribution instead instigated the establishment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996.3 1 Hobson, 2003; social norms and civil laws can institutionally devalue people when they misrecognize or even do not recognize their rights, status, or identity—for instance, the United States before the 1920s did not recognize women’s capacity to vote, and Indonesia to date by law does not recognize a married woman’s ability be head of her family. 2 Fraser, 2003. 3 Levenstein, 2009. === [PDF page 19] === 19 In other cases, the policy change aligns relatively with the interests of the powerless groups. African American groups in the United States underwent decades of organizational strength building and other political processes to mobilize insurgent activities for the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.4 In Japan, it was socially unacceptable for women to organize themselves politically, yet the Japanese feminist movement’s organizing activities since the mid-1970s eventually succeeded in pushing for the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1986.5 In short, cases of powerless groups making significant policy change exist but explanations for the phenomenon remain inadequate. The following events in Indonesia set the scene for a study seeking to better solve this puzzle. On February 10, 2020, a group of approximately thirty young women and a few young men marched on the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture6 (MOE) in Jakarta. They were mostly university students marching as the Alliance for Anti-Violence Against Women Movement (Aliansi Gerakan Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan, GERAK Perempuan); they explained they were protesting in relation to a reported sexual assault at the State University of Padang, West Sumatra.7 A lecturer at the university had sexually assaulted his female student in a public bathroom on the campus, and demonstrators of GERAK Perempuan were outraged by the comments made by the university’s rector to the media in the course of the investigation. In his comments, he doubted the victim’s innocence and indicated that he was more inclined to believe it was a consensual relationship that had gone bad and he was ready to give disciplinary action to 4 McAdam, 1999. 5 Gelb, 2000; Kobayashi, 2004; Zacharias-Walsh, 2016. 6 The ministry’s nomenclature was later changed to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology on April 28, 2021. 7 Indoleft. (February 10, 2020). “Women’s alliance protests at education ministry over sexual violence on campus.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.indoleft.org/news/2020- 02-10/womens-alliance-protests-at-education-ministry-over-sexual-violence-on-campus.html. === [PDF page 20] === 20 both the lecturer and student if that were proven to be the case.8 MOE’s silence in the face of such comments by the rector caused many to be concerned that the female student would experience a similar fate as “Agni.” Agni is a pseudonym for a female student in Yogyakarta’s University of Gadjah Mada who had made a report to the university about being raped by a graduating student during an off-campus internship program. The university administrators pressured her to enter into a “peaceful resolution” of the matter with the graduating student and allowed the latter to graduate. 9 Her case has come to represent the tragic magnitude of sexual and gender-based violence and the lack of consequence for the perpetrators among Indonesia’s institutions of higher education which the MOE had overlooked for years. GERAK Perempuan mobilized in the hope of attracting the attention of the youngest MOE minister in Indonesian history, Nadiem Makarim, to prevent another Agni-like case from happening again. 8 Langgam.id. (January 21, 2020). “Rektor UNP Pastikan Oknum Dosen yang Diduga Lecehkan Mahasiswi Dipecat [UNP Rector confirms dismissal of faculty staff member suspected of sexually harassing female student].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://langgam.id/rektor-unp-pastikan-oknum-dosen-yang-diduga-lecehkan-mahasiswi-dipecat/; Askara. (February 7, 2020). “Ribuan Orang Desak Dosen Universitas Negeri Padang yang Lecehkan Mahasiswi Dihukum [Thousands of people demand UNP faculty member who sexually harassed female student be punished].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from Diduga Cabuli Mahasiswi, Rektor UNP: Terbukti Bakal Dipecat. [Faculty member suspected of sexually harassing female student, UNP Rector: Will be fired if proven guilty].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.suara.com/news/2020/01/20/161255/oknum-dosendiduga-cabuli-mahasiswi-rektor-unp-terbukti-bakal-dipecat?page=2. 9 Muryanto, B., & Mariani, E. (February 9, 2019). “Sexual assault survivor's long battle to find justice in UGM.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 2019/02/08/sexual-assault-survivors-long-battle-to-find-justice-in-ugm.html; and Balairung Press. (November 7, 2018). “Nalar Pincang UGM atas Kasus Perkosaan [UGM’s Lame Reason on Rape Case].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.balairungpress.com/2018/11/nalar-pincang-ugm-atas-kasus-perkosaan/. === [PDF page 21] === 21 On October 25, 2021, just three days prior to Youth Pledge Day,10 Minister Makarim, gathered all state polytechnics’ directors and state universities’ rectors across the Indonesian archipelago at his ministry in Jakarta for a historic announcement. In the closed meeting with over one hundred directors and rectors, Minister Makarim announced the rationale and details of his ministry’s newly issued Regulation 30 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions (hereafter referred to by its full name or simply as “Regulation 30”). The regulation was made to protect over 8 million students as well as hundreds of thousands of staff and faculty members of 4,550 higher education institutions.11 The background and objective of the regulation are similar to those of the United States’ Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (US Title IX) and Nigeria’s Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal of Sexual Harassment in Tertiary Educational Institutions Bill of 2019 (Nigeria Bill). However, unlike US Title IX and the Nigeria Bill, Regulation 30 is a legal product of the executive branch of the state, not the legislative branch. Notwithstanding the closed nature of the meeting, news about the ministerial regulation circulated on social media platforms the following day. Numerous women’s rights groups and social movement organizations that advocate for sexual violence victims’ rights and human rights issues posted on social media their appreciation for Minister Makarim’s move. University students’ groups that focus on sexual and gender-based violence in campus environments also made the following declaration on their social media: “A preliminary victory 10 Indonesian Youth Pledge Day (Hari Sumpah Pemuda) is a national day to commemorate the October 28, 1928 convention of youth groups from different ethnic and religious groups across the Indonesian archipelago in Jakarta. The participants pledged allegiance to Indonesia as their nation and homeland and declared Bahasa Indonesia their national language. The Youth Pledge in 1928 was key—or at least was later framed by the Indonesian state’s three regimes as crucial—to uniting people on and outside Java Island for countering the Dutch East Indies’ divide-and-conquer politics. In short, the political momentum at the time opened the prospects for inclusivity in Indonesia (Tudor and Slater, 2016). 11 Nurtjahyo et. al., 2022a; however, the definite number of staff and faculty members is missing. === [PDF page 22] === 22 is won for campus sexual violence victims and their advocates!”12 In contrast, a wave of opposition came from predominantly conservative Muslim political parties and organizations such as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS)—President Joko Widodo’s strongest opposition since 2014; the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI); and the Muhammadiyah.13 They all condemned Regulation 30. The conservative Muslim opposition held press conferences, sent letters of objection to the ministry, mobilized protests, and pushed Minister Makarim to either annul Regulation 30, revise it by eliminating all phrases with the term “consent” and adding punishments for fornication (zina), or resign.14 They further opposed the regulation’s definition of sexual violence. Regulation 30 defines sexual violence as “any act of degrading, insulting, harassing, and/or assaulting a person’s body and/or reproductive organs, owing to unequal power and/or gender relations, which costs or could cost the person’s psychological and/or physical wellbeing including uncompromised reproductive health, and opportunity to pursue higher education safely and optimally.” They also criticized Regulation 30’s detailed list of actions considered sexual violence found in Article 5 (Appendix 2) and accused Regulation 30 of effectively “legalizing 12 Luviana. (October 27, 2021). “Kabar Baik: Pemerintah Terbitkan Permendikbud Kekerasan Seksual Di Kampus [Good News: Government Issues MOE Regulation on Sexual Violence in Campuses].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.konde.co/2021/10/nadiemmakarim-terbitkan-permendikbud-kekerasan-seksual-di-kampus.html/. 13 Muhammadiyah is the second largest Muslim mass organization after the Nahdlatul Ulama 14 Afrianty, D. (November 24, 2021). “Will Islamist sentiment smother Indonesia's 'me too' movement in the education sector?” Retrieved December 3, 2021, from https://indonesiaat melbourne.unimelb.edu.au /will-islamist-sentiment-smother-indonesias-me-too-movement-inthe-education-sector/; see also McBeth, J. (November 24, 2021). “Indonesia's culture wars overly fixated on sex.” Retrieved December 3, 2021, from https://asiatimes.com/ 2021/11/indonesiasculture-wars-overly-fixated-on-sex/. === [PDF page 23] === 23 free sex, tolerating the LGBT community, and instituting liberalism.”15 They claimed that terms such as “relations of power,” “gender,” and “consent” in the regulation are Western imports, against Pancasila as the Indonesian state’s ideology, and, more importantly, un-Islamic.16 Muhammadiyah—once known as the modernist Muslim organization—even labeled Regulation 30 “evidence of democracy and human rights in their extremity.” 17 From at least October 2021 to February 2022, major mainstream as well as independent or non-mainstream news companies focused on two main things when discussing Regulation 30. First, they discussed the opinions of politicians, religious authorities, academics, and other public figures about the legitimacy of and controversy over Regulation 30, and particularly the regulation’s Article 5 (Appendix 2).18 Second, they uncovered and reported on major cases of educators sexually harassing and abusing their female students. The first major case concerned a 15 VOI. (November 26, 2021). “Rejection And Support of Permendikbudristek Number 30 Of 2021 Concerning PPKS.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://voi.id/en/berita/108049/ penolakan-dan-dukungan-permendikbudristek-nomor-30-tahun-2021-tentang-ppks. 16 KumparanNEWS. (November 2, 2021). “Majelis Ormas Islam Tolak Permendikbud 30 yang Dinilai Bisa Legalkan Seks Bebas [Council of Islamic Mass Organizations rejects MOE Regulation 30 considered to potentially legalize free sex].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/majelis-ormas-islam-tolak-permendikbud-30-yang-dinilaibisa-legalkan-seks-bebas-1wq7i6OruLX/4. 17 Muhammadiyah’s chairman, Professor Haedar Nashir, quoted Levitsky and Ziblat (2018) to make the case that Indonesia’s democracy will end in the hands of an authoritarian civil society that is built upon oligarchy; see KumparanNEWS. (November 16, 2021). “Haedar Nashir: Permendikbud 30 Bukti Ekstremitas Demokrasi dan HAM [Haedar Nashir: MOE Regulation 30 is Proof of Democracy and Human Rights’ Extremity].” Retrieved January 27, 2022, from https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/ haedar-nashir-permendikbud-30-bukti-ekstremitasdemokrasi-dan-ham-1wvcr0ImXbu. 18 Lisan, I. H. and S. Hardiah. (December 30, 2021). "Kubu Paling Aktif Menolak Permendikbud 30 di Medsos Berhasil Dipetakan [The most opposing camp of MOE Regulation 30 on social media successfully mapped]." Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.vice.com/id/ article/qjbj4x/hasil-riset-kultura-kubu-paling-aktif-menolak-permendikbud-30-di-twitter-berasaldari-akun-pks-dan-influencer-agama. === [PDF page 24] === 24 dean at Riau University19 who inappropriately touched and kissed his student in late October 2021, and the second pertained to the arrest of two lecturers at Sriwijaya University 20 in late November 2021 (one lecturer touched and kissed his female student, while the other sexually harassed three female students via text messages or mobile phone). Then, another major case surfaced on the internet in early December 2021 which struck a chord with everyone, including, significantly, the conservative Muslim groups who had opposed Regulation 30. It was the case of Herry Wirawan, an Islamic boarding school principal in East Java, who sexually abused thirteen female students and impregnated eight of them.21 Because Islamic boarding schools do not fall within Regulation 30’s purview, an ally of GERAK Perempuan, the Indonesian Women’s Ulama Congress (Kongres Ulama Perempuan Indonesia, KUPI) held a massive public prayer in Cirebon, West Java to address the recent and increasing number of sexual violence cases—and prayed for the state’s intervention in this regard. In addition to the hundreds of participants who attended offline, at least 832 participants attended online.22 On January 4, 2022, following intense and continuous reporting and public debates on social media about sexual violence cases in secular and religious schools and universities, President Joko Widodo demanded legislators to accelerate the deliberations and ratification of 19 Harsono, A. (April 13, 2022). “Epidemic of Sexual Harassment on Indonesian Campuses Continues due to Culture of Impunity.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/12/epidemic-sexual-harassment-indonesian-campusescontinues-due-culture-impunity. 20 NewsBreezer. (December 2, 2021). “Cases of sexual harassment on the Unsri campus, 2 lecturers become suspected perpetrators, 3 students are victims.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://newsbeezer.com/indonesiaeng/cases-of-sexual-harassment-on-the-unsri-campus-2lecturers-become-suspected-perpetrators-3-students-are-victims/. 21 Reuters. (April 4, 2022). “Indonesia court sentences Islamic school teacher to death for raping 13 students.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/04/asia/ indonesia-teacher-sentenced-rape-students-intl-hnk/index.html. 22 Direct participation in Zoom meeting room, December 14, 2021. === [PDF page 25] === 25 the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill in the national parliament. 23 The Sexual Violence Crimes Bill was originally called the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill. It was first proposed to the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) by the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) and its partners within the Indonesian women’s movement network in 2016.24 The title change had to do with a difference in emphasis. While the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill emphasized victims’ recovery, the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill emphasizes jailtime and fines for perpetrators. Deliberations on the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill were deadlocked for five years due to opposition from the same set of conservative political parties and mass movement groups that objected to Regulation 30. Eventually, Puan Maharani as the national parliament’s speaker—and the first woman to head the DPR—officially passed the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill on April 12, 2022. The bill was codified as the Law No. 12/2022 on Sexual Violence Crimes on May 9, 2022. On October 5, 2022, the youngest Minister of Religious Affairs, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, issued the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Regulation No. 73/2022 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Religious Educational Institutions (hereafter referred to as “MRA Regulation No. 73/2022”). Key elements from Regulation 30’s Article 5 were incorporated into MRA Regulation No. 73/2022, although the latter omitted references to “victim’s consent” found in Regulation 30. 23 AntaraNews. (January 4, 2022). “President pushes ratification of sexual violence bill.” Retrieved January 27, 2022, from https://en.antaranews.com/news/ 207845/ president-pushesratification-of-sexual-violence-bill; and The Straits Times. (January 11, 2022). “Debate on sexual harassment Bill to resume in Indonesia after six years.” Retrieved December 29, 2022, from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/debate-on-sexual-harassment-bill-to-resume-inindonesia-after-six-years. 24 Puspita et. al. (2020). “Tersendatnya Penghapusan Kekerasan Seksual Melalui Jalur Legislasi [Sexual Violence Elimination Blocked via Legislative Route].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://genseks.fisip.ui.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Tersendatnya-Penghapusan- Kekerasan-Seksual-melalui-Jalur-Legislasi.pdf. === [PDF page 26] === 26 The case of Herry Wirawan would have been the subject of MRA Regulation No. 73/2022 had it been issued earlier. The series of events ignited by GERAK Perempuan’s small-scale protest which led to the establishment of Regulation 30 and eventual passages of the Sexual Violence Crimes Law and MRA Regulation No. 73/2022 are referred to as “the butterfly effect.” Something so slight and subtle as the motion of butterfly wings (GERAK Perempuan’s small-scale protest in front of the MOE), had set in motion much larger forces or processes (heightened visibility of sexual violence issues and policies for redressing sexual violence at the national and other ministerial levels).25 Figure 1 below illustrates the series of events. The gray boxes with a dotted outline represent the sequence of key intervening actions, while the white boxes with a solid outline represent the policy outcomes. The bold text indicates the national-level law issued by the legislative branch of government. Figure 6 - The butterfly effect: a series of events leading to sexual violence regulations and law Returning to the question of how powerless social groups can win major policy changes, this dissertation argues that a case study, such as the emergence in Indonesia of regulations and law addressing sexual violence, can demonstrate the ways in which a small social movement network such as the Indonesian reformist women’s movement influences policy change. These ways include gaining direct access to strategic positions within a state’s structure and exercising 25 MacKinnon, 2017. === [PDF page 27] === 27 stealth politics. By “small” this dissertation means that the social movement network is not resource-rich in the mobilizational and financial senses. 26 In the mobilizational sense, the social movement network lacks followers or participants, popularity, and elite allies. Moreover, it lacks elite allies because it mobilizes for the interests of marginalized populations (i.e., women, children, and other gender minorities). In the financial sense, the social movement network’s funds are limited and depend on completion of programs approved by donors. By “direct access to strategic positions within a state’s structure” this dissertation means the social movement network’s participants are engaged as either staff members or volunteers in ministries or other government agencies. By “stealth politics” this dissertation means directly participating in the policymaking process with a prudent view of the policy environment and a low-profile mode of operation. Stealth politics is neither opposed to transparency nor in conflict with democracy. Rather, it is a strategy of managing and timing visibility and exposure to minimize the ability of powerful status quo actors to block or veto change at an early stage in the policymaking process. It is intended as a social movement term best associated with James Scott’s “weapons of the weak” formulation,27 and should not be confused with backroom and hidden maneuvers by oligarchs and elites. Stealth politics as defined in this study always refers to the efforts of relatively powerless groups and actors. The argument is premised on two propositions which this dissertation will establish. First, policy change is not always state-initiated; it can sometimes be movement-initiated. By “movement-initiated” this dissertation means the policy change could not have happened without the mobilization of protest and other strategies pursued initially by a social movement. The 26 The power resources framework; see Korpi, 1985; Winters, 2011 & 2013. 27 Scott, 1985. === [PDF page 28] === 28 phenomena described in this dissertation represent one success case of an undermined movement that initiated policy change and, as such, merit a comprehensive analysis. Second, social movements such as the women’s rights movement can be considered a type of social movement industry which comprises numerous social movement organizations that share similar beliefs on social change and redistribution. 28 However, differences across organizations’ tactics and goals may lead to different types of networks within a movement. Consistent with this line of thought, countries with conditions similar to those of Indonesia may experience three types of women’s movement networks: traditionalist, liberal, and reformist. While the traditionalist and liberal women’s movement networks tend to 1) adopt tactics of collaborating with the state and 2) develop goals which do not challenge the patriarchal division of labor in the private sphere, a reformist women’s movement network deviates from them by 1) challenging the state from the outside and 2) tackling gender and intersectional inequalities (e.g., they advocate for job creation laws and indigenous land reforms also, in addition to other pro-women policies).29 Therefore, a related question that this dissertation addresses is why it is difficult or challenging for activists of powerless groups such as the reformist women's movement network in Indonesia to gain direct access to the state, let alone influence policy change. This dissertation argues that the challenges are due to two main factors. The first is a disconnect or lack of strong links between the state and society. In this specific instance, the cutting of links between the state and society took place throughout Indonesia’s New Order regime in 1966-1998.30 President Suharto depoliticized parties and social movement organizations, especially the women’s 28 McCarthy and Zald, 1977. 29 Intersectionality pushes us to take “multiple grounds of identity” such as gender, race, and class into account when comprehending a social problem; see Crenshaw, 1990. 30 Case, 2013. === [PDF page 29] === 29 movement organizations, through repressive tactics and policies. This made gaining direct access to the state for members or participants from any mass movement organizations very difficult. It was made even more difficult in contexts such as the Indonesian reformist women’s movement network because the network’s tactics are mostly oriented toward mobilizing the society, more than collaborating with the state (in fact the network typically challenges the government through repertoires of provocative chants and posters during protests). As a result, activists from the reformist women’s network rarely gain direct access to strategic positions within the state’s structure. The second factor is the persistent stigmatization of women’s rights activists who historically in Indonesia have been suppressed using sexual violence.31 Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1998-1999 did not establish necessary reforms for addressing massive sexual violence. The absence of such reforms has had enduring consequences for the success of women, as an institutionally devalued or powerless group, in organizing for policy change addressing sexual violence against women and, in turn, gender equality. The consequences are at least threefold. First, the general perception or narratives about women’s place in society and, in turn, gender equality vary highly, because no national precedent for bringing justice to victims of sexual and other types of gender-based violence and for deterring potential perpetrators has ever existed. The lack of such precedence, combined with the proliferation of competing narratives, are advantageous for ruling regimes or anti-gender equality actors to maintain patriarchy or the status quo. Second, the maintenance of this status quo has created an unequal playing field for women’s rights groups, relative to political parties or other mass movement groups. In other words, Indonesian women’s movement organizations have not been as successful (when 31 Pohlman, 2017. === [PDF page 30] === 30 compared to other groups), if successful at all, in gaining access to the state structure and influencing the government’s gender ideology. Third, because women disagree on how they relate themselves to the government’s gender ideology (as a consequence of the absence of reforms to address sexual violence which, in turn, causes perceptions or narratives about women’s place in society to vary), individual women and women’s movement organizations remain deeply divided. In circumstances where gaining access to the state becomes increasingly 1) important for women to influence the government’s gender ideology and 2) difficult for women who mobilize politically to disrupt the status quo and improve the conditions for gender equality, the butterfly effect (i.e., mobilization by GERAK Perempuan in 2020 which unexpectedly prompted a series of events culminating in the passing of various ministerial regulations and law on sexual violence within two years after decades of state inaction) serves as a rare but important case study to help solve the puzzle. 1.2 Limits of Existing Scholarship 1.2.1 Global Context Theories about the pathways which social movement organizations adopt to achieve success in making policy change have been plenty. Before discussing the pathways, it is important to clarify what constitutes movement success for this dissertation. Several scholars define success as the sustenance of the movement despite its seemingly not having achieved any tangible goal for a long time.32 Others define a movement’s success as movement’s outcome 32 Taylor, 1989; Disney and Gelb, 2000. === [PDF page 31] === 31 matching its goals, 33 and, conversely, a movement’s failure as occurring when the outcome denies its goals.34 This dissertation follows the latter approach. It studies how a relatively powerless reformist women’s movement network achieves its goal of realizing a sexual violence regulation and why it achieves success at not only realizing the regulation of interest but also expediating the passages of a national level law and another ministerial regulation addressing sexual violence. Social movements’ pathways to successfully realizing policy change in many cases has included strategies such as accurate calculation of a movement’s capacity to adopt confrontational tactics,35 incorporation of electoral concerns in organizational activities,36 and framing of narratives to shift public opinion and create pressure on the state.37 Social movement organizations have also adopted persuasive and disruptive tactics, 38 formed party alliances,39 and responded to political opportunity structures with a decisive action 40 in securing the policy change of their interests. This dissertation complements studies which illuminate how and what responding to political opportunity structures with a decisive action entail. “Political opportunity structures” refer to the sets of historical precedents, institutional boundaries, and resources at a point in time that can be enabling or disabling for a movement organization to mobilize and advance the attainment of its goals.41 A similar term, coined by scholars of women’s movements, is “state 33 Ayoub, 2016. 34 Rayside, 1998. 35 Luders, 2010. 36 Burstein and Linton, 2002. 37 Burstein, 1985; Rucht, 1999. 38 Andrews, 2004; Uba, 2005; Nulman, 2015. 39 Giugni, 2004; Stearns and Almeida, 2004; Almeida, 2006; Anderson, 2022. 40 Flammang, 1987; Gelb, 1987; Banaszak 1996; and Linders, 2004. 41 Kitschelt, 1986. === [PDF page 32] === 32 reconfiguration.”42 However, state reconfiguration tends to treat the state as a rational bureaucracy that make structural changes based on more technical than political considerations. Furthermore, in some instances, a movement’s success has involved responding to political opportunity structures beyond the state by strategically utilizing international organizations’ legitimacy to pressure domestic state actors to obtain the policy change of the movement’s interest. For instance, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer, and Intersexual (LGBTQI) rights movements in Poland and Slovenia responded to the increasing legitimacy of European Union (EU) regulations on gender equality by adopting a strategy of increasing their movements’ visibility. 43 They claimed their success when the Polish and Slovenian governments passed laws allowing persecution or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a ground for granting asylum.44 With regard to the Indonesian case in this study, however, the United Nations or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and global media visibility of the #MeToo Movement may not be treated as a political opportunity structure such as that in the Polish and Slovenian cases, because the policy change happened amid the increasing revival of religious and nationalist sentiments since Jakarta’s gubernatorial race in 2016. Hence, this study contributes to the existing scholarship on movements and policy change by adding knowledge from a political context wherein a majority of the people are skeptical of Western influence yet are catching up with global trends. The policy change of interest in this dissertation’s relates to issues of gender equality and, beyond the social movements scholarship, existing studies about 1) the observable outcomes of gender equality in countries, 2) the sequences which countries must go through to realize gender 42 Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht, 2011. 43 Ayoub, 2016. 44 Ibid. === [PDF page 33] === 33 equality, and 3) the factors which underpin the observable outcomes and sequences. The first set of gender equality research comprises works by scholars and practitioners who build indexes and measure gender equality in countries by looking at some key categories such as women’s political activity or involvement,45 a political system’s response to feminist demands,46 hours contributed to household work,47 and hourly wage.48 Scholars focusing on this line of research also conceptualize the characteristics of women empowerment, a crucial factor in improving countries’ gender equality.49 This group of gender equality studies demonstrates the characteristics which countries ought to show when we describe them as achieving improvements in gender equality; further, it stimulates readers to develop research questions about the characteristics of the women who are politically active, the sexual and reproductive healthcare provided by the political system, the source of household income, and the educational institutions in which women can enroll, etc. The second set of gender equality research emphasizes either a developmental shift or a relational change in explaining how and why gender equality policies can be achieved. Research emphasizing developmental shift asserts that countries could achieve gender equality because their societies have entered a postindustrial phase. 50 Postindustrial societies differ from industrial and agrarian societies by the change in mode of production from factories and fields to the service industry. Women in postindustrial societies can provide professional domestic and caretaking services, or even outsource them to other workers. The trend disrupts a domestic 45 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978. 46 Verba et. al., 2013. 47 Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001. 48 McCall, 2002. 49 Sundström et. al., 2017. 50 Inglehart and Norris, 2003. === [PDF page 34] === 34 division of labor and the family structure, and change becomes inevitable. This contention is extended from modernization theories that argue that economic growth spurs attitudes for change of cultural values,51 and the attitudinal change is motivated by women’s increasing level of education, participation in paid work, influence in commercial businesses, and substantive representation in political positions or offices. The second type of studies within the second set of gender equality research emphasizes relational change in their explanation. This change occurs in state-market and state-religion relations.52 These relational changes account for which gender equality policies get to be improved, sustained, or pushed back. Gender equality policies such as abortion rights and marriage equality would change state-religion relations and, therefore, are difficult to improve in countries where religious authorities have a strong influence in the public sphere. Conversely, gender equality policies that would change state-market but not state-religion relations, such as maternal healthcare and childcare policies, could improve without much pushback from religious authorities. In fact, religious authorities would applaud state actions which support and maintain women’s “destined” childbearing and childrearing roles. The third set of studies on gender equality, which focuses on factors underpinning the observable outcomes and sequences, is known as scholarship on state feminism. State feminism explains the means by which the observable outcomes (e.g., number of women-occupied seats in parliaments and ministerial positions, policies that improve women’s sexual and reproductive healthcare, the range of opportunities to obtain economic resources, and education level) are 51 See Inglehart and Norris (2003). “The True Clash of Civilizations.” Retrieved January 10, 2022, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/04/the-true-clash-of-civilizations/. They argue that the irreconcilable differences between the West and Muslim countries have to do more with core values about sex than about democracy. 52 Htun and Weldon, 2018. === [PDF page 35] === 35 achieved. This scholarship explains the range of state and non-state apparatuses as well as the interaction among them which bring about these outcomes. The apparatus includes ministries for women’s affairs, special committees for the advancement of women’s rights, women parliament members, and the women’s rights movement organizations.53 In some instances, even annual international conferences (such as those at the United Nations level) which facilitate interactions and dialogue among these entities can be the decisive force or key explanatory factor for why one policy issue and not others can be solved.54 These sets of scholarship investigate or explain the underlying causes which bring about the observable desired outcomes of gender equality. The first two groups of studies on gender equality (i.e., research focusing on observable outcomes of gender equality in countries and sequences which countries must go through to realize gender equality) can inform us about the macro-level outcomes that approximate gender equality and the necessary conditions for realizing it. They inspire this dissertation’s questioning of the power struggles and mechanisms that set the changes in motion and underpin similar outcomes and conditions. The third group is driven primarily by issues pertaining to women in historical welfare states in Europe, North America, and Australia. Hence, the model does not quite fit with the Indonesian context where the existence of femocrats in state structures is questionable and its women policy agencies, such as the Ministry of Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection, and the National Commission on Violence Against Women, have always been financially and politically constrained across all Indonesian presidents’ administrations. 53 Lovenduski, 2005; Kantola and Outshoorn, 2007; Barnes, 2016. 54 Sauer, 2007. === [PDF page 36] === 36 This dissertation complements the state feminism scholarship by focusing on the organized groups of women who do not go through the usual politics of either gaining proximity with femocrats or lobbying state actors in women policy agencies to achieve their goals (i.e., the two interactions that have been the focus of the state feminism scholarship). This dissertation also reveals the sequence of events which have been effective for powerless groups to achieve the policy change needed to attain gender justice for victims of sexual violence, most of whom have been women, and, in turn, improve gender equality. Additionally, existing scholarship on gender equality often implicitly assumes that the idea of gender equality is incompatible with Muslim societies. This dissertation asserts that assumptions made about Muslim societies being generally hostile toward the ideas of democracy and gender equality are a result of an ahistorical understanding of Muslim populations. By using Indonesia as a case study, this dissertation seeks to displace these assumptions, as it rejects arguments that view gender inequality as inherently immutable in Muslim populations. Judaism and Christianity have also become the bases for their communities to impose restrictions on women. Islam only reasserted the other existing monotheistic religions’ paradigms about sex segregation and the subordination of women. The dissertation demonstrates that the contemporary condition of hostility toward women in any country, whether religious or otherwise, is typically due to the manifestation of discriminative groups’ dominance over their respective states’ affairs. 55 The proclaimed Islamic 55 I concur with Fatema Mernissi’s (1975) claim that all religious ideologies and phases of modernization have been exploitative and violent toward women, but they take shape in different forms. While “Muslim exploitation of the female is cloaked under veils and behind walls, Western exploitation has the bad taste of being bare and over-exposed.” In fact, predominantly secular countries such as Singapore and Japan maintain gender inequalities for protecting the traditional model of family as a unit. See Yenn, 2007; Belarmino and Roberts, 2019. === [PDF page 37] === 37 laws that are paradoxical to Islam’s core messages about peace, justice, and equality, are established by the politically dominant actors. Political actors of the left, center, and right who attempt to dominate state affairs have used Islam to legitimize discourses. 56 Democratic ideas such as mutual consultation (shura), civil contract (aqd`), and consensus (ijma`) are ubiquitous in Islamic texts and teachings.57 The ethical messages in the Quran about equality for all, including gender equality, form the core values of Islam, but these messages were deliberately not articulated in the laws instituted by Islamists.58 If women are seen as “objects of control” and “activist adjuncts” in Islamist movements, these characterizations are manifestations of the choice for mobilization made by the Islamist movements that view justice as achievable without equality for all.59 Similar choices were made by conservative movements linked to the Catholic Church in Latin America, 60 Christian far right movements in post-Cold War Europe,61 and the Christian Coalition in the United States. 62 Similar to this line of thought, this dissertation treats the challenges to policy change for achieving gender equality in many countries, including Indonesia, as extensions of political groups’ struggles to preserve local authenticity amid the impacts of global Westernization. In the context of Indonesia, for these groups, local authenticity means Muslim authenticity. 56 Badran, 2013. 57 Hashemi, 2013. 58 Ahmed, 1992. 59 Badran, op. cit. 60 Jaquette, 1994. 61 Koonz, 2013 62 Deckman, 2016. === [PDF page 38] === 38 1.2.2 The Indonesian Context Studies on the Indonesian women’s movement are plentiful, and this dissertation’s attempt to offer a more systematic and analytical study is built from these preceding studies that have paved the way for understanding the rich history of struggles which Indonesia’s women’s rights organizations have undergone. Scholars such as Julia Suryakusuma (1988), Susan Blackburn (2004), and Kathryn Robinson (2008), have advanced our understanding of the Indonesian state’s gender ideology and relations with women’s movement organizations. Their works have also shed light on several key and gendered policy issues in Indonesia. Teri Caraway (2016) reveals how Indonesia’s industrialization policies that are not explicitly gendered have nonetheless generated employers’ gendered expectations for working women and the side-effect of organized labor unions’ restraining working women’s wage increment and bargaining position. Furthermore, Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi (2015), Ella Prihatini (2020), Nankyung Choi (2019), and Misbah Zulfa Elizabeth (2019) have added to our knowledge on the pathways, advantages, and challenges which women legislators in Indonesian national and subnational parliaments experience. At the movements-level of analysis, Saskia Wieringa (2002), Katharine McGregor (2012), and Ruth Indiah Rahayu (2007) have extended our knowledge about the works done by Indonesia’s leftist women’s right group, The Women’s Movement of Indonesia (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, GERWANI). Nursyahbani Katjasungkana (2004), Yanti Muchtar (2016), Yuniyanti Chuzaifah (2022), and Gadis Arivia (2018) have extensively illuminated the emergence and development of feminist women’s movement organizations in Indonesia. Neng Dara Affiah (2017), Alimatul Qibtiyah (2009), and Rachel Rinaldo (2013) have pushed us to study the history of organized Muslim women’s groups and their significance for the growth of the overall === [PDF page 39] === 39 development of the Indonesian women’s movement. Lies Marcoes (2002), Christine Holike (2011), Kristina Grossmann (2012), Sonja Van Wichelen (2010), and Annisa Beta (2019) have also stimulated further research on the ways in which Muslim women’s activism in the public sphere, whether through social activism or for-profit entrepreneurship, influence gendered norms and practices. Sharyn Graham Davies (2010) and Evelyn Blackwood (2010) have laid out the context and diversity of genders and sexualities in Indonesia amid the state’s gender ideology. Eddyono et al. (2016) ask when and why states respond to demands for gender equality policies. In discussing several policy issues related to gender equality, they broadly lay out the numerous factors which have contributed to the discourses on the subject, but they do not detail the ways in which women’s groups have participated in the policymaking processes. This dissertation focuses instead on a policy change addressing a singular issue—sexual violence—to show 1) the definitive strategy which a women’s movement network normally would not but then eventually must undertake (gaining direct access to strategic positions within state agencies or ministries and exercising stealth politics), 2) the key tactics for a strategy’s success (acting in a prudent and low-profile manner throughout the policymaking), and 3) the movement-state interactions that follow from this strategy and these tactics before, during, and after the policymaking process. 1.3 The Argument The argument of this dissertation builds on the literatures about stealth politics and cooptation. Adopting insights from the two literatures, the arguments of this dissertation are threefold. First, for countries with conditions such as Indonesia’s (from 1945-1965, civil society was politically active; from 1966-1998, it then experienced mass depoliticization and systematic === [PDF page 40] === 40 marginalization of women through mass sexual violence; and since 1999, it has witnessed religious groups having more authority in public spheres), gaining direct access to state power is the most effective mobilization strategy for powerless groups to make policy change. Gaining direct access to state power can be done through the powerless group’s participants, whether they are engaged as staff or volunteer, in ministries or other state agencies. Their direct engagement with policymakers is key to making the desired policy change align with powerless groups’ desired interests and goals. Pathway 1: Collaborate movement cooperative change outside with the state Pathway 2: Challenge the movement confrontational change outside state Pathway 3: Exercise movement access to state policy change stealth politics Figure 7 - The three pathways for social movement groups to make policy change There are two other strategies of mobilization, namely: collaborating with the state (Pathway 1 in Figure 2) and challenging the state (Pathway 2 in Figure 2). Both Pathway 1 and Pathway 2 may yield the groups’ desired policy change, but without the groups’ direct inclusion in the policymaking process. Powerless groups that collaborate with the state from outside state structures, depicted in Pathway 1, exercise cooperative tactics such as campaigning for the state’s political agenda at the grassroots level or creating nonstate auxiliary committees to support the === [PDF page 41] === 41 state in making the desired policy change, etc. Conversely, powerless groups that challenge the state from outside state structures, shown in Pathway 2, exercise confrontational tactics such as publicly protesting the state’s political agenda or pressuring the state to make policy change through petitions, etc. However, neither of these two pathways is as effective as gaining direct access to state power for influencing and achieving policy change (Pathway 3 in Figure 2). Second, for movement networks that are not resource-rich, such as the Indonesian reformist women’s movement network, exercising stealth politics maximizes the movement network’s chance of remaining inside the state and achieving policy change. Exercising stealth politics involves tactics of prudence and staying low-profile. Tactics of prudence entail careful analysis of the power balance within the state structure (i.e., the Indonesian MOE) and beyond (i.e., groups beyond the MOE with interests in influencing MOE’s policies and filling an official position in the MOE). Tactics of staying low-profile involve restraining information flow regarding both 1) the progress of the policy of interest from going beyond the policy team and 2) the ideology and activism which the reformists engage from being known by the ministry’s staff members for as long as possible, until policy change is eventually inevitable. While tactics of prudence maintain the reformist women’s autonomy from state cooptation, tactics of staying low-profile secure the reformist women’s position inside the state until the reformists achieve their goal. Third, relative to the other types of women’s movement networks—the traditionalist and liberal women’s movement networks—the reformist women’s movement network mostly challenges the ruling regime and rarely gains access to state power because its goals and tactics are ideologically different from the state’s gender ideology or status quo (patriarchy). However, once they have gained direct access to state power, exercising stealth politics then is key for === [PDF page 42] === 42 relatively powerless groups such as the reformist women’s network to resist state cooptation and still obtain the kind of policy change which satisfies the movement. This dissertation uses Regulation 30 as a case study to shed light on the three arguments above. If we remove our normative presumptions about stealth politics and cooptation, 63 the case study, essentially, aims to show that stealth politics and cooptation can be the way to effectively include marginalized people’s demands for policy changes and to defend a country’s democracy. 1.3.1 Stealth Politics by the Reformist Women’s Movement Network By “women’s movement,” this dissertation means the mass movement that focuses on issues affecting women and engages in political activism to address those issues. The groups within the women’s movement “favor activist modes of intervention in the social order.”64 The women’s movement can be considered a type of social movement industry which comprises numerous social movement organizations that share similar beliefs about social change and redistribution.65 Although in many cultural and political contexts, states and societies have, historically, considered women as apolitical, the women’s movement organizations mobilize, based on their gender identity as women, to influence public decision-making processes.66 Hence, women’s movement organizations coalesce with other groups with similar target goals within the women’s movement to form a network.67 However, sharing similar gender identity and beliefs are not enough to influence policy change. Some groups coalesce and form a network for working on a particular issue, but the 63 Lapegna, 2014. 64 Kornhauser, 1959. 65 McCarthy and Zald, 1977. 66 Baldez, 2002. 67 Diani, 2003. === [PDF page 43] === 43 same groups may not coalesce and be in the same network for other issues. In the Indonesian case, for example, the women’s movement organizations such as Perempuan Mahardhika and Solidaritas Perempuan coalesced in the advocacy for Sexual Violence Elimination Bill through GERAK Perempuan in 2020. However, Perempuan Mahardhika is not actively pursuing advocacy for migrant workers’ rights as much as Solidaritas Perempuan is doing in another network. In the words of a women’s sexual and reproductive health rights activist who is based in Yogyakarta: “Our network has a few organizations that do not support abortion and other organizations that do not support the LGBTQI community. So, it is fine if some of us do not support a certain issue but remain in the network and support other common issues. Ideological differences should not hinder us from taking action.” 68 Essentially, powerless groups form different large networks to pressure the state for different policy issues. For the GERAK Perempuan case, the relatively new alliance or network of longtime women’s movement organizations was formed to strengthen solidarity among organizations that are concerned about the (lack of) progress of the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill and the strikingly speedy progress of other bills that would push back the struggle for women’s rights, namely, the Job Creation Omnibus Bill and the Family Resilience Bill. The usage of “stealth” in this dissertation’s conception of stealth politics should not be conflated with that in the literature on stealth democracy. 69 This dissertation conceptualizes stealth politics in ways similar to how most people relate stealth politics with the strategy of 68 RS016, Personal Interview in Yogyakarta, August 2, 2019. 69 See Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; their research shows that thousands of ordinary votingage Americans in late 1990s would have preferred stealth democracy, that is, having the procedures to make government officials and politicians accountable in place yet allowing professionals or experts to run the government without revealing their decision-making processes to the public all the time. === [PDF page 44] === 44 influencing public policy discreetly. Billionaires in the United States operationalize stealth politics to achieve the economic policies of their interest.70 Stealth politics in this context assumes that it is mostly oligarchic elites who can afford such a strategy because of their wealth, and the state’s economy is dependent on the profits which their businesses generate. Hence, the amount of money these billionaires deploy to influence the state’s economic policies through lobbying senators or funding grassroots activists’ mobilization, enables their ability to be “unaccountable and unchallengeable” by ordinary citizens.71 Female ministers of defense and of foreign affairs and trade in Australia adopt pro-gender norms in their policies without attracting media attention regarding their commitment to feminist goals.72 Similar to billionaires’ stealth politics, stealth politics in the Australian female ministers’ case assumes the use of the strategy is ultimately for maintaining one’s position of power in formal politics. Furthermore, both the United States’ billionaires and Australian female ministers’ cases assume that mobilizing stealth politics makes sense for actors whose views about any issue would always be newsworthy for journalists.73 Hence, restraining their public comments or going stealth on certain policy issues that would otherwise cause uproar in the press or resistance from civil society organizations is their strategy to achieve their policy of interest. A pro-nuclear association in India stealthily promotes the country’s submarine technology through popular films to familiarize Indian citizens with their national government’s “responsible prowess.”74 Quite similar to the previous two literatures, stealth politics in the Indian case assumes the mobilization of resources such as in the form of film production to be a tactic of 70 Page, Seawright, and Lacombe, 2018. 71 Ibid. 72 Lee-Koo, 2020. 73 Page, Seawright, and Lacombe, op. cit.; Lee-Koo, op. cit. 74 Kaur, 2021. === [PDF page 45] === 45 implanting or changing people’s opinions about nuclear power. The theory of stealth politics in this dissertation, nevertheless, differs from the assumptions of these literatures on stealth politics. Stealth politics in this dissertation is mobilized by groups of women who historically have been marginalized by different regimes through numerous ways. They are known to be minorities because of the rights and privileges which they, unlike their male counterparts, institutionally have been denied by law, and the effects they informally experience in real life. They organize themselves to participate in formal politics, but they are not wealthy billionaires. They do not necessarily discuss feminism publicly because of the anti-Western sociopolitical context they live in. Furthermore, they seldom attract media attention and are rarely represented in popular culture. Borrowing from transgender studies about the rationale for powerless groups to go stealth in everyday life and advocacy activities, the reformist women’s movement network in Indonesia exercises stealth politics because they are a group that “visually transgresses otherwise clear gender norms.”75 In the Indonesian context, unmarried and young women who do not exhibit expected feminine looks or behavior are generally viewed as deviants, and most of the participants in the Indonesian reformist women’s movement network visually fall within this category. Strategies of prudence and staying low-profile constitute stealth politics by powerless groups in conditions such as these which the reformist women’s movement network in Indonesia confronts every day. Unlike powerless groups, powerful actors can mobilize stealth politics without prudence because their power resources are plentiful. They operate in a clandestine mode not because they cannot afford the financial costs and political consequences of pushing back their critics or opposition. Rather, keeping low-profile for powerful actors is for 75 Beauchamp, 2019. === [PDF page 46] === 46 concentrating or not losing any of their power resources for as long as possible. This logic is similar to that of the business owners who were still able to live relatively well during the pandemic after laying off many of their employees for reasons of economic difficulties due to Covid-19. The issue is not that these business owners would lose a lot of money; it is that they did not want to lose any more of their money. Should a powerful actor be stripped of a position in a policymaking process for not being prudent, she/he can reclaim her/his space or challenge her/his opposition through other means because of the extraordinary amount of power resources she/he has accumulated and that are readily available to be mobilized. Conversely, for powerless groups to succeed, they must exercise stealth politics with prudence because of their limited resources. They may lose their only direct access to state power and never be able to reclaim the access they once had, as a consequence of exercising stealth politics without prudence. With prudence, powerless groups are consciously aware of their small chance of resetting and attempting again to gain direct strategic access to state power if they hit the wrong chord. The logic of prudence in powerless groups’ stealth politics is threefold. First, because of historical precedents, powerless groups are aware that their interests or views are unpopular, and their voice or visibility would only add fuel to the opposition. Hence, powerless groups mobilize with prudence on the assumption that the policy environment is always a hostile place for them to enact activism within the state structure. Second, because of institutional arrangements, powerless groups are aware that any locus of policymaking—a ministry, a provincial government office, or even a room full of movement activists—is not unitary or, in other words, is filled with actors and interests competing for resources. Hence, powerless groups mobilize with prudence when identifying potential allies (inside and beyond the state structure) throughout the policymaking process. Third, because of resources, powerless groups are aware that being inside === [PDF page 47] === 47 the state exposes them to the risk of lacking autonomy at best and being coopted by the state’s interests at worst. Hence, powerless groups mobilize with prudence when engaging state actors in order to maintain their autonomy in formulating the design and substance of the policy of interest. In addition to prudence, stealth politics necessitates strategies of maintaining a lowprofile. Powerless groups translate “low-profile” into its exercise of restraint. Exercising restraint manifests in powerless groups’ avoiding attention from state actors, the media, and participants of other movement networks in the early phases of policy formulation. One tactic which movement activists can use to avoid too much attention from state actors is to adjust their speech and conduct vis-a-vis the culture of the bureaucracy or state structure where they are mobilizing. Another way to describe this phenomenon is that movement network participants “blend in” with the bureaucracy’s culture but at the same time maintain their autonomy, in order to achieve the desired policy change. Staying low-profile in powerless groups’ exercise of stealth politics is different from powerful groups’ or elites’ going stealth in politics. The low-profile strategy for elites serves as a tool to defend and hide their own power, while the low-profile strategy for powerless groups serves as a tool to overcome and outmaneuver others’ power. Another significant difference is that elites’ goal in activating the low-profile strategy is to remain permanently untraceable or unexposed, whereas powerless groups’ goal in keeping a low-profile is avoid being permanently nontransparent or anti-democratic. For powerless groups, exercising stealth politics with prudence and remaining low-profile is about delaying or managing the timing of visibility so that powerful actors cannot terminate the desired policy change at an early stage. Mobilizing with prudence and staying low-profile is instrumental to powerless groups’ formulating and, finally, establishing inclusive policy change. Lack of prudence or absence of a === [PDF page 48] === 48 low-profile can risk a total discarding or hijacking of the policy change’s substantive components, based on external undemocratic motives. 1.3.2 Direct Access to State Power, Political Opportunity Structures, and Cooptation This dissertation contends that transformative actions need major concentration of power and that power is concentrated in the state’s structure. The works of powerless groups beyond the state structure, such as the Indonesian reformist women’s movement network, can gradually make real changes toward major policy change, such as Regulation 30 for battling sexual violence, and, in turn, improving gender equality. However, powerless groups such as women’s movement networks must gain direct access to state power to accelerate the changes by transforming the movements’ aspirations for change into a state-endorsed change. Gaining access to state power can also set the momentum for other forces of similar change in other institutions within the state structure. “Gaining access to state power” refers here to the action by which a participant of a women’s movement network works within a ministry or government agency and engages in policymaking processes closely. She/he gains access to state power by acting as a government staff member, a parliamentarian, or a minister. In the Indonesian context, as the GERAK Perempuan’s role in Regulation 30 case shows, engaging closely in policymaking processes as an unpaid volunteer (neither becoming part of nor receiving money from the government) is possible. This dissertation describes the movement’s mode of mobilization as gaining direct access to state power because women’s movement actors usually mobilize outside of the state system, without resources from the state. By becoming government staff member, parliamentarian, or minister, the participants of a women’s movement network can exercise === [PDF page 49] === 49 power and derive informational and discursive resources through five mechanisms. First, she can directly intervene in policymaking processes. Second, she can obtain information from as well as provide information for the relevant members of the women’s movement network that share similar concerns about a given policy issue. Third, she can obtain information from as well as provide information for the government about the aspirations and sentiments of the civil society toward the government regarding a given policy issue. Fourth, she can open opportunities for other members or associates of the women’s movement network to gain direct access to state power even further. Fifth, she can further the government’s engagement with various civil society organizations that are relevant for a given policy issue. Three points specific to the context of powerless groups and direct access to state power are worth mentioning. First, unlike elites, powerless groups are usually distant from the networks of state power. Therefore, second, gaining direct access to state power is usually preceded by a set of political opportunity structures which serve as cognitive cues for powerless groups to act upon.76 Third, political opportunity structures can be external (e.g., pandemic, global recession, war, etc.) or internal (e.g., election, newly appointed state actor, death of a state actor, military coup, etc.). In the Indonesian reformist women’s network case, GERAK Perempuan participants were able to gain strategic direct access to the state because of an internal political opportunity structure, namely, the appointment of Nadiem Makarim (who is of a younger generation than most ministers, political party-less, and popular for his revolutionary enterprise) as education minister. GERAK Perempuan acted upon the political opportunity by staging a protest in front of the MOE, which set in motion other series of events. Moreover, after that, an external political opportunity structure in the form of the Covid-19 pandemic occurred—the forced slowdown in 76 McAdam, op. cit. === [PDF page 50] === 50 businesses, people’s mobility, and state affairs. The external political opportunity eased the way for GERAK Perempuan to maintain a low-profile in its stealth politics. Participants of the reformist women’s movement network who gain direct access to state power should not be conflated with the concept of an institutional activist or insider. While institutional activists are social movement participants who work in bureaucratic agencies to pursue their movements’ goals, 77 insiders are politicians-turned-feminists within government institutions.78 They also should not be conflated with builders of state actor-social movement coalitions.79 Participants of the reformist women’s movement network gain direct access to state power with intentions of holding the state accountable for the systematic violence against women but not of coalescing with state actors despite strategic motivation alignment.80 It can be argued that the ambivalence of the reformist women’s movement network toward gaining direct access to state power has to do with its feminist stance that assumes collaborating with the state is equivalent to sustaining the practice of masculine politics. Feminism emphasizes the importance of women’s spearheading and expanding collective action that is antithetical to the oppressive structures of patriarchy, and that remains outside of the state structure. Hence, most of the participants within the women’s movement network carry with them the feminist goal of pressurizing the state until the patriarchal state structure is completely abolished. In essence, the reformist women’s movement network is aware of the dangers of state cooptation. The trajectory of prominent 1998 Reformasi activists from the left-leaning People’s Democratic Party (Partai 77 Santoro and McGuire, 1997. 78 Banaszak, 2010. 79 Stearns and Almeida, 2004. 80 I follow Castillo (2019) in understanding strategic motivation as “the calculated benefits (electoral and of legitimacy) of including new voters.” === [PDF page 51] === 51 Rakyat Demokratik, PRD) who to date have become pragmatic politicians has had a lasting impact on most reformist women’s movement network’s participants.81 The literatures on cooptation show, essentially, that when it comes to making movementinitiated policy change, some degree of cooptation is inevitable. The French and US cases show that it is actually the women’s policy agencies within the state structure that bring feminist movement activists in, to pursue gender equal policy changes. 82 One form of transitioning from movement activist to political party activist is seen in the case of Mexico’s Party of the Democratic Revolution which gradually detached from its social movement base;83 another form is seen in the case of Chile’s Mapuche workers who went from indigenous movement activists to government staff members, which later caused a dilemma within the indigenous rights movement.84 Nevertheless, states with weak capacity to govern usually resort to treating powerless groups with coercion, and the “normal” reaction of powerless groups or civil society in general is to disengage from state affairs and politics.85 Hence, this dissertation contends that efforts to gain access to the state should be viewed more as a form of resistance rather than a form of cooptation. Disengaging from politics or depoliticization only accomplishes what every ruling regime or government aims to do. In contrast, the policy changes regarding sexual violence in Indonesia demonstrate the reformist women’s movement network’s success in maintaining autonomy after gaining direct strategic access to state power. The evidence lies in 81 This sentiment surfaced frequently during conversations with several interviewees in between our interview breaks; their comments had a with sorrowful undertone when talking about former PRD activists such as Budiman Sudjatmiko (now PDIP cadre) and Dita Indah Sari (was PKB cadre and now special staff member to the incumbent minister of manpower). 82 Stetson and Mazur, 2000. 83 Özler, 2009. 84 Park and Richards, 2007. 85 Tripp, 2001. === [PDF page 52] === 52 the reformist women’s movement network’s ability to maintain 1) the umbrella definition of sexual violence, 2) explicit mention of “victim’s consent,” and 3) a detailed list of 20 actions considered sexual violence in Regulation 30, despite strong opposition among parliament members and religious conservative groups regarding similar contents when deliberating the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill in previous years. Had the reformist women’s movement network lost its autonomy and succumbed to cooptation, Regulation 30 would have ended like the Sexual Violence Crimes Law which in lacking these three elements. 1.3.3 Policy Change on Sexual Violence in the Struggle for Gender Equality The policy change which addresses sexual violence and is the focus of this dissertation is Regulation 30. Regulation 30 is used as a useful case study because it is the first ministerial regulation in Indonesia to address the identification and processing of sexual violence cases within a comprehensive framework. The framework includes a specific definition of what sexual violence is in general and the kinds of punishable acts, as well as measures for prevention and redress. Although it has a limited scope, being applicable only in tertiary institutions, its passing sparked intense debates and paved the way for the passing of other related regulations by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (covering primarily Islamic educational institutions) and the Indonesian national parliament (DPR). In the latter case, the law applies universally to individuals without regard to their marital status. 86 These regulations have been long overdue. Historically, Indonesia has struggled to punish perpetrators of sexual violence, and, without effective redress, sexual violence has been used as a 86 Before this, DPR passed the Domestic Violence Elimination Bill in 2004 but it protects only legally married couples. === [PDF page 53] === 53 tool to stigmatize women's rights activists, thereby hampering their ability to gain direct access to state institutions and/or pursue a gender equality agenda. Sexual violence, especially mass rape, is an effective weapon for perpetrators to permanently humiliate and damage their victims,87 victims’ communities,88 and political opponents.89 Furthermore, mass rape bonds perpetrators and often escapes post-conflict prosecution.90 Hence, tragedies of sexual violence leave not only lasting trauma but also extra work for victims to break the stigma and be accepted by their communities,91 without a credible outlet for seeking justice and restitution. 92 For example, Indonesian troops were reported to have committed massive sexual violence in many of their domestic operations,93 but to date no meaningful mechanism is in place to end past perpetrators’ impunity and deter potential perpetrators. There was an attempt such as the International People’s Tribunal for 1965 in 2015. 94 However, the contemporary Indonesian government ultimately refused to recognize and apologize for the 1965 atrocities. 95 Indeed, while decades of democratization have enabled the Post-Reformasi regime to institutionalize peaceful transfers of power via national and subnational elections, it has not held a fair trial even for the 87 MacKinnon, 1989. 88 Mukwege and Ensler, 2009. 89 Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2015. 90 Cohen, 2013. 91 Koos, 2018. 92 Necessary reforms for addressing massive sexual violence would include at a minimum the ideals of the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (Kirby, 2015). The ideals comprise systematic investigation and documentation of cases, better support and aid for victims, and policy responses that are based on the principle of gender equality. 93 Cohen and Nordas, 2014. 94 See Wieringa, Melvin and Pohlman, 2019; the Tribunal is similar to the Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery in 2000 (Chinkin, 2001) and the World Tribunal on Iraq in 2003 (Borowiak, 2008). 95 Polycarpus, R. (June 27, 2016). “Presiden Jokowi Tegaskan Pemerintah tidak Akan Minta Maaf kepada PKI [President Jokowi Asserts Gov Will Not Apologize to PKI].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/53287/presidenjokowi-tegaskan-pemerintah-tidak-akan-minta-maaf-kepada-pki. === [PDF page 54] === 54 perpetrators of the May 98 rape cases which occurred under the supervision of two high-ranking military officers who are still holding positions of power in the Post-Reformasi government.96 In fact, a recurrent event at the beginning of every regime transition in Indonesia is an unprecedented level of sexual violence against women that has accompanied the fall of a regime. Moreover, each transition would put women activists on trial for engaging in, allegedly, activism against the state. During the transition from the Old Order (1945-1965) to the New Order (1965-1998) regimes, Indonesia’s then-largest women’s group, commonly known as GERWANI, was effectively disbanded and stigmatized. Due to GERWANI’s public support for then-President Sukarno and political alignment with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), the Suharto-led military arrested not only the members but also any women who allegedly were engaging in GERWANI’s activities. In addition, the military created a national narrative and made the narrative visual through a sculpture on the 1965 Memorial in East Jakarta, that GERWANI had performed a sexual dance for several high-ranking generals before cutting the generals’ testicles.97 GERWANI was banned, and its members endured torture, sexual harassment, and rape in prison. 98 Members who survived prison were brought to trial in 96 Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto were two high-ranking military officers during the May 98 riot who were never brought to trial. They even participated in the general elections to become vice president or president, and served as ministers. Currently, Wiranto is Chair of the President’s Advisory Council, while Prabowo is Minister of Defense. Similar atrocities in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya were never brought to trial (Stanton, 2016). 97 Wieringa, 2002. 98 The 1965 operations, particularly in Jakarta, were very effective in annihilating left-leaning groups, such that “The Jakarta Method” became a shorthand for similar operations in Latin America (Bevins, 2020). See also Du Rocher, S. (October 19, 2020). “The Jakarta Method: How US-backed communist purges shaped our world.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://southeastasiaglobe.com/the-jakarta-method-indonesia/. === [PDF page 55] === 55 the 1970s and then released on the condition that they go to the closest local military post every month for regular check-ins.99 Then, just before Indonesia’s second regime transition in May 1998, from the New Order to the Post-Reformasi regime (2001-present), two events occurred. First, in February 1998, the Voice of Concerned Mothers (Suara Ibu Peduli) held the first ever public demonstration during Suharto’s authoritarian rule. The Voice of Concerned Mothers protested the price hike in staple food products such as rice and milk since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Three leaders of the women’s group were arrested, brought to trial, and later freed.100 The media reports on the Voice of Concerned Mothers network’s public demonstration and its leaders’ arrest paved the way for university student groups to mobilize a massive number of participants and publicly demand for the authoritarian President Suharto to step down. 101 Second, hundreds of women, who were mostly Chinese descendants, were raped during the four-day riot in May 1998, at the same time as the university student groups’ public demonstrations. During the brief regime transition or Reformasi period from late May 1998 through July 2001, a few women activists from a coalition of several other women’s groups in the post-May 98 Fact Finding Task Force (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta) conducted investigations and found a strong link between the May 98 rape cases and military or state sanctioned orders.102 In October 1998, one of the rape survivors, who was scheduled to give her testimony to the United Nations Assembly, Ita Martadinata, was murdered at her home on the night of her scheduled departure for New York. To date, no trial has been held 99 RS002, Personal Interview in Central Java, August 17, 2019. 100 Arivia, G. (May 21, 2018). “Politik Representasi Suara Ibu Peduli [Voice of Concerned Mothers’ Politics of Representation].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.jurnalperempuan.org/blog/politik-representasi-suara-ibu-peduli. 101 See Fajar (2020) for understanding further the Indonesian university students’ movement. 102 Kemanusiaan, 1998. === [PDF page 56] === 56 to prosecute the May 98 rape cases. Since Ita Martadinata’s death, there has been no record of women organizing to hold the Indonesian state or the New Order government accountable for the May 98 rape cases. In fact, the quasi-independent state institution that was established after the May 98 rape cases, Komnas Perempuan, is frequently underfunded 103 and subject to closure by the president.104 The foregoing events and omissions make the Regulation 30 all the more unusual: the use of stealth politics by a powerless group that gained direct access to state power, such as GERAK Perempuan, which leads to the issuance of Regulation 30 shows the struggle for gender equality in Indonesia in action—by addressing sexual violence that largely affects minorities and primarily women. 1.4 Methodology This dissertation research uses a qualitative approach. Fieldwork to obtain data from primary sources was conducted between July 2019 and December 2021. However, due to the global pandemic which began in the middle of March 2020, interviews with the research subjects were conducted mostly online, whether through the popular mobile chat application among Indonesians called WhatsApp or virtual meeting rooms such as GoogleMeet and Zoom. The author also retrieved data concerning the ideas and interests of relevant or key research subjects 103 Tempo.co. (July 3, 2012). “Tak Ada Uang, Komnas Perempuan Kurangi Program [No funds, Komnas Perempuan cuts programs].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://nasional. tempo.co/read/414386/tak-ada-uang-komnas-perempuan-kurangi-program. 104 Kompas.com. (July 20, 2020). “Jokowi Wacanakan Pembubaran 18 Lembaga, Komnas Perempuan Berharap Tak Kena [Komnas Perempuan hopes for exclusion from Jokowi’s plan to disband 18 institutions].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2020/07/20/17045831/jokowi-wacanakan-pembubaran-18-lembaga-komnas-perempuanberharap-tak-kena. === [PDF page 57] === 57 through webinars in which these subjects were the main speakers. These webinars were either by-invitation or available to the public on YouTube. The interviewees have given their consent for the author to audio-record their answers and asked the author to maintain their anonymity. They wish to remain anonymous because either their struggles for gender equality are ongoing or they feel much safer or helpful with anonymity. However, of the thirty-one interviewees, two gave their consent to be identified. Archival research at the National Indonesian Archives (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, ANRI), scheduled for January through June 2020, was cut short due to the pandemic. The archives which the author retrieved from ANRI are mainly letters of correspondence between GERWANI and the Old Order regime’s executive government. Another set of documents from ANRI which pertain to GERWANI are the transcripts of President Sukarno’s speech during GERWANI’s anniversaries in 1962 and 1965. Also retrieved from ANRI is a 1953 document of the Indonesian Republic Police Force’s surveillance of several women’s movement organizations’ activities. These materials have been essential to sharpening the author’s mapping of key women’s movement organizations during the Old Order. Another set of crucial archives can be found in bookshops that have made publications from the late period of Old Order and early period of New Order regimes available for analysis. This dissertation relies on KOWANI’s 1978 publication of its history to analyze the development of the women’s movement network’s views on women’s place in society and, in turn, gender equality.105 The publication also documents attempts to collaborate with the state. Several reports were used to analyze the structural conditions for the Indonesian women’s movement or the political context of the Old Order and New Order regimes. These are: 1) the 1957-1959 cabinet 105 The second edition was republished in 1986. === [PDF page 58] === 58 to the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR); 2) decrees made by the 1960 Temporary MPR; 3) results of the 1966 Temporary MPR’s fourth general assembly; and 4) the 1976 Indonesian Democratic Party’s (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) first congress. This set of materials inform the historical perspectives which are incorporated in this dissertation to theorize the challenges of making major policy changes related to gender. 106 The dissertation centers on a single case study of Indonesia’s ministerial level policy on preventing and redressing sexual violence in higher education institutions that was launched in 2021. The case study is significant for explaining at least three facets of the politics of gender equality. First, the case study reveals the ways in which gender equality in a country is improved through an interactive model of both bottom-up and top-down approaches. A bottom-up approach to social change involves mainly grassroots organizing, public demonstration, and media engagement, while a top-down approach entails several phases of carefully strategized policymaking. The first is outside the state structures or apparatus; the second is inside. Second, the case study demonstrates the importance of tracing the emergence, growth, mobilizing strategies, and success of some Indonesian women’s movement organizations in influencing state policies across different political regimes or periods. Such tracing is necessary to understand why and how some women’s movement organizations but not others can directly engage in the policymaking process. Third, the case study shows that policymaking at one level can have a major social impact by way of exerting a profound impact on other levels of policymaking. Regulation 30 was issued at a ministerial level and applies to thousands of higher education institutions across Indonesia under the MOE’s oversight. Its issuance increased visibility of sexual violence issues in the media, mobilized support from other movement networks and the 106 Tripp, 2007. === [PDF page 59] === 59 public for the government’s action, and attracted the president’s attention to the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill’s slow progress at the national parliamentary level. Ultimately, this series of events led to the passage of 1) the Sexual Violence Crimes Law which applies to the population of at least 250 million people; and 2) MRA Regulation 73 which applies to at least 63,000 religious schools and universities across Indonesia under the Minister of Religious Affairs’ oversight.107 Furthermore, MRA Regulation 73 adopts a major portion of Regulation 30’s contents. To explain these three insights and highlight the significance of this dissertation, the author employs primarily site-intensive methods such as participant-observation and ethnography.108 Between July 2019 and March 2020, the author conducted participation observation in two key women’s movement organizations’ general assemblies, which are usually conducted once every four or five years. They are the Women’s Solidarity Congress (Kongres Solidaritas Perempuan) in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi; and the Leadership Festival of the Indonesian Women’s Coalition (Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, KPI) in Surabaya, East Java. Another participant-observation was conducted during the creation of a key women’s movement network called GERAK Perempuan, and its days of organizing the 2020 International Women’s Day commemoration in Jakarta. Equipped with introductions from these interviewees, the author went to a few places in Central Java and interviewed women who had participated in the 1965, 1998, and post-1998 women’s rights activism. 107 See the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) webpage “Nomor Statistik PTKI [Statistical Figures of Islamic Universities].” Retrieved February 21, 2023, from https://diktis.kemenag. go.id/bansos/cari_nspt.php; and MRA’s System of Islamic Boarding School Resources“Statistk Per Provinsi [Statistics By Province].” Retrieved February 21, 2023, from https://sikap.kemenag.go.id/statistik. 108 Kapiszewski, Maclean and Read, 2015. === [PDF page 60] === 60 The author also participated in and observed numerous street protests during the Reforms Corrupted (#ReformasiDikorupsi) demonstrations of the university students’ movement in Jakarta on September 25-30, 2019; as well as during the GERAK Perempuan’s Tuesdays (#Selasaan) offline and online demonstrations in Jakarta from July to October 2020. Conducting participant-observation in these major events was significant to the development of this dissertation’s theoretical framework and data triangulation. While reviewing the scholarship on Indonesian women’s movement organizations was helpful for orienting the author’s search for finding members of key women’s movement organizations to meet, it was directly interacting with the members during a major event proved significant for identifying critical gaps between the existing scholarship and the author’s direct observation on the field. For instance, through participant-observation, the author has a better knowledge of how organized women’s movement organizations are or how united they are when organizing as a network for the same cause. Furthermore, through experiencing the Reforms Corrupted demonstrations, the author directly experienced both the police’s use of tear gas and women’s rights activists taking the lead and other actions of solidarity which unite the Indonesian women’s movement and university students’ organizations. Between March 2020 and December 2021, the author had the privilege of conducting participant-observation in the Indonesian MOE’s program to address sexual violence in the higher education sector. The author played a leadership role in the MOE’s Special Team for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress. The MOE’s upper level of leadership has given permission to the author to include detailed historical information in this dissertation and for the scholarly advancement of knowledge. Given the ongoing struggles which the incumbent antisexual violence team in the MOE (Team KS) faces in their work for the effective implementation === [PDF page 61] === 61 of Regulation 30 across the Indonesian archipelago, this dissertation maintains the anonymity of the team members’ identities. 1.5 Plan of the Dissertation This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the puzzle, in addition to the limits of existing scholarship, the significance of the study, its argument, and the methodology of the research conducted for writing this dissertation. Chapters Two and Three set the antecedent conditions for policy change. In other words, the two chapters make the case for three things: first, why policy change becomes increasingly important for powerless groups that are concerned with improving gender equality such as Indonesia’s women’s movement networks; second, how gaining direct access to the state for engaging in a policymaking process is more difficult for one type, but not other types, of women’s movement network; and third, how and why women’s movement organizations must coalesce as a network to advance their movement’s goals. Chapter Two elaborates types of women’s movement—traditionalist, liberal, and reformist. Then, Chapter Three illustrates the structural conditions which shape how women’s movement organizations form networks and mobilize politically over time. It shows how they either collaborate with the state, challenge the state, or gain direct access to the state. Gaining direct access to the state also means being in close or direct contact with policymakers, whether as paid staff or unpaid volunteers. Chapter Four is a detailed case study that discusses the policy change or the success of the reformist women’s movement as a powerless group in making policy change related to sexual violence prevention and redress and, in turn, improving gender equality. It details the policymaking process from the day of the reformist women’s movement network’s public === [PDF page 62] === 62 demonstration in front of the MOE, to the period after Regulation 30’s enactment. In other words, Chapter Four is an example of how social change starts from a bottom-up approach— initiated by a powerless group such as the reformist women’s movement, followed by a topdown approach through direct access by representatives of the reformist women’s movement network to the policymaking process at the ministerial level, and then with spillover effects to the acceleration of: 1) the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill’s ratification at the national level; and 2) the MRA Regulation 73, which extends the legal protection from sexual violence, to students in thousands of institutions that fall under the MRA’s purview but not under the purview of the MOE. Sexual violence perpetrators now can be prosecuted with, not only one, but two types of charges: administrative and criminal charges. It was during this direct access phase that strategies of stealth politics were engaged to ensure that the regulation drafting process would not be derailed by outside forces at a premature stage. The stealth phase was followed by a strategy of controlled opening of the new regulation which engaged all groups in society but did so in a way that minimized their capacity to derail or block the policy change. Finally, Chapter Five, the dissertation’s conclusion, reiterates the main research question and the arguments of the dissertation. It also discusses the implications of the dissertation’s findings for future research in comparative politics. Then, following an elaboration of the policy implications, a discussion of implications for future movement-organizing closes the dissertation. === [PDF page 63] === 63 Chapter 2 - Types of Women’s Movement Networks in Indonesia “Every person has her or his time, and each time has its person.” (Popong Otje Djundjunan, MP from 1987-2019)109 2.1 Introduction In March 1928, during the first Women’s Congress in Yogyakarta, the most divisive issue was polygyny. In her speech, one of Aisyiyah’s spokeswomen, Siti Moendjijah, defended polygyny and why Islam did not forbid the practice. 110 Participants representing other women’s groups—Muslim, Catholic, and secular—disagreed with Moendjijah in their rebuttal speeches. 111 After that, the Women’s Congress would minimize talks about polygyny during their major meetings, to avoid further fragmentation among women’s groups and thus hinder the national movement against the colonial Dutch government. Indeed, women’s groups at the time collectively viewed removing Dutch influences from Indonesia as far more urgent than fighting against fellow women activists with different views.112 Without such bonding after the colonial 109 Personal Interview in Jakarta, August 2, 2019; Popong Otje Djundjunan, also known as Ceu Popong, was an MP from GOLKAR Party since 1987. She became the oldest person to sit in the national parliament during her last (2014-2019) tenure. Ceu Popong made the statement to explain how every social actor who has overcome the barriers to leadership and access must be relevant to the zeitgeist of her time. 110 Aisyiyah became the women’s wing of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim social movement after the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Established in 1917, Aisyiyah is dependent on or almost steered by Muhammadiyah, its male-led and patron organization that was formed in 1912 (It, 2005). Although Aisyiyah gradually has become more autonomous since 1966 (Qibtiyah, 2005), its policies and programs to date are fundamentally designed to mobilize socially and politically within the framework of Muhammadiyah’s values (Darban et al., 2010). 111 Blackburn, 2007. 112 Blackburn and Ting, 2013. === [PDF page 64] === 64 Dutch government’s disestablishment in Indonesia, a complete demobilization of the women’s movement to fragmentation among its participants may have happened. 113 From the 1920s to date, issues of Islamic law on marriage, especially polygyny, have always been the most divisive arena within the Indonesian women’s movement. In November 2019, the Network for Pro-Women Legislation (Jaringan Kerja Prolegnas Pro-Perempuan, JKP3) held a meeting at the national parliament’s building in Jakarta.114 Its participants were byinvitation and mostly from more than fifty women’s rights groups that coalesced to mobilize either as JKP3 or its ally. The meeting was held to discuss past and future strategies for pushing national laws that would further protect women from economic exploitation, 115 gender-based discrimination,116 domestic abuse,117 and sexual violence.118 During the discussion session, a question was raised by one participant representing Aisyiyah—a participating organization in JKP3’s advocacies: “What about the women in a polygynous marriage? Are we not going to fight for a law that protects them as well?” One of the coordinators of JKP3 responded by condemning polygyny and labelling it as a form of violence against women. She continued by explaining that JKP3 would take steps only to prevent or to remove women from—not maintain them in— polygynous marriages. Almost all the participants in the meeting hall applauded this response. The two accounts show not only the changes and continuity in discourses or goals about women’s role in society and gender equality, but also the fragmentation among women’s 113 See Qibtiyah (2005) on how women’s organizations after Indonesia’s declaration of independence disagreed with each other on polygyny but decided to ease the tension in order to provide a “single voice” as women when meeting with policymakers. 114 Direct Participation, Jakarta, November 2019. 115 The 2004 Bill on Domestic Workers Protection. 116 The 2015 Bill on Gender Justice and Equality. 117 Law No. 23/2004 on Domestic Violence. 118 Law No. 12/2022 on Sexual Violence Crimes. === [PDF page 65] === 65 movement organizations in the same network across different time periods. Given these varieties, this dissertation asserts that mapping the varieties of different women’s movement networks is key to understanding why gaining direct strategic access to state power is challenging for groups such as Indonesia’s reformist women’s movement network. Furthermore, this dissertation will show how using the historical comparative method to comprehend the reformist women’s movement network’s power to gain direct access to the state, relative to other women’s movement networks, can help solve the puzzle of why or how powerless social groups can win major policy changes. This dissertation emphasizes the importance of getting inside the state and exercising stealth politics for purposes of policy changes that support victims of sexual violence and, in turn, greater equality. The emphasis is based on the premise that major policy changes which could improve gender equality or inclusion in a country are relatively dependent on the alignment of perceptions among the major women’s movement networks. This is true for two reasons. First, historically states are built on the basis of patriarchal aspirations 119 and, in most cases, it is because of pressure from organized women that gender equality measures and related legislations can occur. 120 Second, misalignment of interests or irreconcilable differences among women’s movement networks generally hinder the effective organization of women’s mobilization to push the state for gender equality in concrete terms and actions, such as establishing and implementing policies which address sexual violence. 121 This dissertation further argues that under conditions such as Indonesia’s, the ability of reformists to gain direct access to state power plays a vital role in winning improvements for 119 MacKinnon, op. cit.; Walby, 1996. 120 Lovenduski, op. cit.. 121 Poerwandari et al., 2018. === [PDF page 66] === 66 gender equality or inclusion and state accountability. Conversely, inclusion and state accountability may deteriorate when actors in the non-reformist women’s movement network gain access to state power. This is a factor in movement struggles and power battles that has not received sustained attention or theorization. This chapter explains the characteristics of a reformist women’s movement network, as one type of women’s movement network, relative to two other types of women’s movement networks which I categorize as the traditionalist women’s movement network and the liberal women’s movement network. The analytical objectives of this chapter are twofold. The first is to highlight the significance of getting inside the state for realizing policy changes that support greater equality for women. The second is to comprehend why gaining direct strategic access to state power is challenging for groups such as Indonesia’s reformist women’s movement network, but not for others such as the traditionalist women’s movement network and the liberal women’s movement network. The categories—traditionalist, liberal, and reformist—reflect two aspects (Figure 3), namely, the women’s movement network’s strategies (x axis) and their goal (y axis). The strategies of a women’s movement network fall within the spectrum of primarily collaborating with the state (on the extreme right of the x axis) and mostly mobilizing the society (on the extreme left of the x axis). The goals of a women’s movement network fall within the spectrum of fundamentally sustaining the traditional gender roles in society and legislations (y axis’ downward direction) and typically fighting for intersectional equality (y axis’ upward direction). === [PDF page 67] === 67 Figure 8 - Types of women's movement networks based on each network’s strategies (x axis) to achieve its goal (y axis) As seen in Figure 3, this dissertation identifies 1945-1952 KOWANI in the Old Order, Post-1965 KOWANI in the New Order, and the Tarbiyah Women as well as the Family Love Alliance (Aliansi Cinta Keluarga Indonesia, AILA) in Post-Reformasi as elements of the traditionalist women’s movement network. This dissertation categorizes a women’s movement network as traditionalist because of its goal to promote traditional gender roles by conserving the current conditions which highlight differences between men and women—the two statesanctioned genders. 122 Naturally, traditionalist women’s movement networks easily collaborate 122 This dissertation acknowledges that one of its limitations is its lack of analysis of struggles by groups beyond those representing the two sanctioned genders, such as the LGBTQI movement network, aimed at making policy change. This omission in part is because the Indonesian government’s policies have yet to include other genders than women and men in its framework for improving gender equality. Hence, for analytical parsimony, this dissertation focuses on women’s struggles for making policy change. === [PDF page 68] === 68 with the state as their strategy because they place emphasis on advancing women’s skills in the spheres of domestic care (i.e., childrearing, home economics, etc.). Note that even within the traditionalist women’s movement network, degrees of the gender-conservative ideology and strategies of collaborating with the state vary among different elements of the network. For instance, Post-1965 KOWANI and AILA were keener than 1945-1952 KOWANI and women of the Tarbiyah movement about collaborating with the state as their strategies. As further shown in Figure 3, this dissertation identifies 1952-1965 KOWANI in the Old Order, and Post-1965 KOWANI as well as Muslim Women of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood (Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, MHTI) in Post-Reformasi as the liberal women’s movement network. “Liberal” in this context should not be conflated with liberalism. Instead, this dissertation categorizes a women’s movement network as liberal because its goal is to liberalize the public space for women’s participation and leadership. In this sense, the liberal women’s movement network moderates women’s grievances by striking a balance between holding the state accountable to women and conforming to the status quo or predominant gendered division of labor in the public and private spheres. This dissertation asserts that the liberal women’s movement network recognizes the consequences of emphasizing differences between men and women and aspires to realize equal opportunities for women, by way of increasing women’s leadership and representation in the public sphere. Yet, the liberal women’s movement neither contests the patriarchal model of the public/domestic division of labor between husband and wife nor problematizes the unpaid aspect of care labor that is performed mostly by women. In fact, the liberal women’s movement network tends to celebrate women’s ability to juggle domestic care and public responsibilities. Note that relative to 1952-1965 KOWANI in the Old Order and Post-1965 KOWANI in Post-Reformasi, MHTI in Post- === [PDF page 69] === 69 Reformasi had preferred to pursue strategies of mobilizing the society more than those of collaborating with the state. This is true because MHTI’s fundamental goal is to realize or replace the state with an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. 123 A final depiction in Figure 3 is this dissertation’s identification of JKP3, KUPI, and GERAK Perempuan as the reformist women’s movement network. While the founding organizations of JKP3 and KUPI have emerged since the New Order in the 1980s, essentially these two women’s movement networks have mobilized as JKP3 and KUPI only in Post- Reformasi. This dissertation categorizes the three women’s movement networks—JKP3, KUPI, and GERAK Perempuan—as the reformist women’s movement network because their goal is to achieve not only gender but also intersectional equality, with the assumption that inequalities cannot be ended without addressing gender inequality. In this sense, the reformist women’s movement network deemphasizes the issue of increasing women’s representation in the public sphere and instead emphasizes the freedom of women from all forms of oppression in both the domestic and public spheres. For this goal, the reformist women’s movement network focuses more on strategies of mobilizing discourses and groups within the society, rather than strategies of collaborating with the state to pressure the state for policy change. Their focus more on social mobilization than state collaboration is linked with the belief that first consolidating the society’s belief in and solidarity for the movement network’s goal can better pressure the state to make policy change. Conversely, a lack of the society’s belief and solidarity would facilitate the state’s inaction to make policy change. This dissertation also contends that, relative to JKP3 and KUPI, GERAK Perempuan typically pursues 1) strategies of social mobilization more than those of collaborating with the state, and 2) goals that address intersectional inequalities more than 123 Nisa, 2019. === [PDF page 70] === 70 merely challenging traditional gender roles. For example, GERAK Perempuan in 2020 actively participated in the movement against the Job Creation Omnibus Bill, a not necessarily gender equality policy but one that indirectly affects the living conditions of “blue-collar” workers or workers in the informal economy. Most Indonesian women perform this kind of work domestically and abroad.124 T P Old Order New Order Post-Reformasi • Post-1965 KOWANI • Tarbiyah women Traditionalist 1945-1952 KOWANI • Tarbiyah women • AILA Liberal 1952-1965 KOWANI MHTI Post-1965 KOWANI • JKP3 • Pre-JKP3 • Pre-KUPI • GERAK Perempuan Table 1 - Types of women's movements (T) across periods (P). Table 1 specifies the women’s movement networks which this dissertation identifies as either traditionalist, liberal, or reformist, across the three different periods. Table 1 also shows KOWANI’s multiple shifts in its strategies and goals through its 1945-1952 and Post-1965 (in New Order) versions that show traditionalist characteristics, and its 1952-1965 and Post-1965 (in Post-Reformasi) versions that demonstrate liberal characteristics. The Tarbiyah women and AILA are traditionalists, while MHTI is no longer a liberal women’s movement network in Post- Reformasi because the Indonesian government banned all organizations affiliated with HTI in 2017.125 JKP3 and KUPI emerged as reformist women’s movement networks only in Post- Reformasi, but their founding organizations, which this dissertation identifies as Pre-JKP3 and 124 Suara.com (March 8, 2020). “Aksi Melawan Kekerasan Sistematis terhadap Perempuan [Demonstration Against Systematic Violence Toward Women].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.suara.com/foto/2020/03/08/120500/aksi-melawan-kekerasan-sistematisterhadap-perempuan. 125 Arifianto, 2018. === [PDF page 71] === 71 Pre-KUPI, first emerged during the later years of the New Order. This dissertation also asserts that the Old Order lacked a reformist women’s movement network. The following sections in Chapter Two will analyze each type of women’s movement network by different periods in modern Indonesian history—Old Order (1945-1965), New Order (1966-1998), and Post-Reformasi (2001-present). Analyses of Indonesia’s period of reform or transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government (Reformasi, 1998-2001) are incorporated in the subsection about Post-Reformasi. 2.2. The Old Order (1945-1965) By the start of the Old Order, the Indonesian women’s movements had thrived for over two decades and mobilized for the national resistance against foreign occupation. 126 The women’s movement’s emphasis was on improving women’s intelligence in fulfilling their duties as women in the fight against imperialism. Most organizations within the existing women’s movement network in the Old Order defined women’s duties as educating the young and fulfilling the needs of men who were the main fighters of the national struggle against imperialism. The most visible or perhaps only well-documented women’s movement network in the Old Order was KOWANI. KOWANI was a network of over a dozen women’s movement organizations. KOWANI’s core organization members had not only been the secular ones such as the Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia (Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia, PERWARI) and the Women’s Labor Front (Barisan Buruh Wanita), but also religious ones including Aisyiyah, Muslimat, the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement (GPII Putri), and the 126 Blackburn, 2007. === [PDF page 72] === 72 Catholic Women (Wanita Katolik).127 For the traditionalist women’s movement, women should contribute to the fight against imperialism by managing domestic affairs such as those in home economics, as means to support the men leading the resistance beyond the home and on the frontlines. 2.2.1 The Traditionalist Women’s Movement Network: 1945-1952 KOWANI The traditionalist women’s movement in the Old Order was the 1945-1952 KOWANI. KOWANI was formed as a federation of dozens of women’s movement organizations of which some are religion-based while others are secular. The federation went through a series of structural changes throughout the Old Order regime as ideological fragmentation among its organization members was relatively high. 128 For instance, three Muslim women’s rights groups ended their membership in 1948 because of a disagreement between them and the remaining groups regarding decision-making mechanisms.129 Nevertheless, they activated their membership again in the following year, as records showed that Badilah Zuber from Aisyiyah attended KOWANI’s annual congress in 1949.130 By today’s standards, 1945-1952 KOWANI had been patriarchal in its discourses and programs. Unlike today’s most feminist or queer movement networks, KOWANI established layers of organizational structure and centered its movement agenda primarily on issues that directly affect women and then gradually more towards the national government’s anti-colonial propaganda. The 1945-1952 KOWANI created programs and autonomous working groups that 127 KOWANI, 1986, p. 112. 128 Ibid., pp. 127-129. 129 Ibid., p. 120. 130 Ibid., p. 122. === [PDF page 73] === 73 advocated for: 1) women’s equality to men before the law, as written in the 1945 Constitution; 2) change in the laws on marriage and inheritance; 3) protective laws for women’s labor; 4) hygiene issues; and 5) increasing women’s literacy rate. However, it was still conforming to the Old Order’s gender ideology because 1945-1952 KOWANI would still orient its members to contribute to national struggles by filling roles that are deemed as naturally women’s and feminine or roles that aid men fight in the frontlines. Just before Indonesia’s declaration of independence from the Japanese and Dutch colonial governments, several member organizations of the 1945-1952 KOWANI took part in the struggles for self-determination. A few of the 1945-1952 KOWANI’s member organizations called Surakarta Women Workers Association (Perkumpulan Pekerja Putri Surakarta, PPPS) and the Women Workers Front from Kediri (Laskar Buruh Wanita) sent its members to the frontline in battles for reclaiming their land from the Japanese colonial forces. 131 Records show that PPPS and Laskar Buruh Wanita were sent to various regions on Java Island to run the public kitchens, organize food delivery to the fighters, and care for war victims. 132 The 1945-1952 KOWANI also recorded that the Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia’s (PERWARI) Jakarta chapter called Women of the Indonesian State (Wanita Negara Indonesia, WANI) took the initiative to help soldiers who went to battle and civil servants who could not return home from work due to security risks, after Indonesia’s declaration of independence. 133 They also opened public kitchens and offered sewing services to fighters in the inner forests who needed food or repair of their uniforms. 131 KOWANI, op.cit., p. 96. 132 Ibid., p. 96. 133 Ibid., p. 94. === [PDF page 74] === 74 Furthermore, 1945-1952 KOWANI collaborated with the Defense Department’s War Bureau and Women’s Inspectorate. In addition to interrogating female prisoners suspected to be spies, the Women’s Inspectorate was created to care for the fighters’ wellbeing including delivering packages from 1945-1952 KOWANI’s member organizations for the fighters in the frontlines.134 Cooking, sewing, and caretaking are not exclusively women’s jobs, but the emphasis on these sectors throughout 1945-1952 KOWANI’s records strengthen this analysis of 1945-1952 KOWANI as the traditionalist women’s movement during the Old Order. The 1945-1952 KOWANI conformed to the dominant gender ideology during the Old Order which presumed certain jobs or roles in the hierarchy of labor, or even of society, were gender specific, given women’s natural traits in doing works that were deemed as motherly, feminine, and providing domestic care. The dominant ideas that viewed women are individuals whom the state and society expect to support men’s domestic care needs for the sake of fighting against foreign occupation constituted a spectrum. Between “women’s place is not in the resistance” on the extreme right and “a women’s place in the resistance is at home” on the extreme left, lay a centrist ideology which posited that “a woman ought to partake her domestic care work not only at home but also in societal activities.” These motherly, feminine, and domestic divisions of labor were particularly crucial in battles such as the one in Nusa Tenggara, eastern Indonesia. The 1945-1952 KOWANI members who delivered food from the public kitchen to the soldiers in the frontlines at the same time provided real-time intelligence which proved crucial for advancing in the battles. Nevertheless, 1945-1952 KOWANI’s framing of the motherly, feminine, and domestic division of labor led to 134 KOWANI, op.cit., p. 96. === [PDF page 75] === 75 the government’s tendency to further separate the division of labor between men and women over time. 2.2.2 The Traditionalist Turned Liberal Women’s Movement Network: 1952-1965 KOWANI Beginning in 1952, however, KOWANI became increasingly pragmatic. Three years before Indonesia’s first ever general election in 1955, KOWANI had started lobbying the government to select more women in central and regional election offices. 135 KOWANI also campaigned to get women to vote and run for political offices. For these reasons, this dissertation differentiates the 1952-1965 KOWANI from the traditionalist 1945-1952 KOWANI and Post- 1965 KOWANI (in New Order). The pragmatism of 1952-1965 KOWANI can arguably be shaped by the emergence of GERWANI, a women’s movement organization that mobilized with socialist aspirations and later coalesced with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), and GERWANI’s rise to claiming a leadership position in 1952-1965 KOWANI. The 1952-1965 KOWANI made a breakthrough move in 1952 by lobbying religious courts for recruiting more women. 136 In 1955, the network followed through their 1952 campaign on increasing women’s representation in religious courts, by collaborating with the Ministry of Religious Affairs to educate the women recruits in Indonesia’s religious courts. The 1952-1965 KOWANI’s agenda in 1955 was very much leaning towards collaborating with the state and gaining strategic access to state power. On the one hand, 1952-1965 KOWANI was pushing for 135 KOWANI, op.cit., pp.138-139 136 Ibid., pp.138-139; in addition to their lobbying activities, two key programs in 1952 were organizing courses on religion and morality and establishing a work center for solving women’s labor issues. === [PDF page 76] === 76 the regulation of menstruation leave in employment law. On the other hand, KOWANI supported the Old Order government’s priority of claiming West Irian from the Dutch, by having its member from GERWANI be part of the Special Committee for West Irian (Pansus Irian Barat). By today’s standard, KOWANI’s participation in the latter committee would be considered antifeminist. Fragmentation and greater power struggle within the 1952-1965 KOWANI became apparent in 1958, as records show that one of 1952-1965 KOWANI’s member organizations, GERWANI, had attempted to create an alternative coalition called the Mass Movement (Gerakan Massa).137 GERWANI members allegedly had required 1952-1965 KOWANI members to choose between remaining active in the 1952-1965 KOWANI or leaving it for the development of Gerakan Massa. It was not clear why and how GERWANI initiated Gerakan Massa, but the latest structural change in 1952-1965 KOWANI which demanded the agreement of all member organizations of the federation before deciding on any action or stance may be the trigger which frustrated and motivated GERWANI to build an alternative coalition. The liberal women’s movement in the Old Order tended not to challenge patriarchal strategies of domination and patriarchal ideas of motherhood. In 1959, for instance, 1952-1965 KOWANI celebrated President Sukarno’s decree on the date for Mothers’ Day as a (non-holiday) national day. The network also refused to celebrate International Women’s Day until GERWANI gained a leadership position in 1952-1965 KOWANI during 1964. Even KOWANI’s framing of its International Women’s Day debut commemoration adopted Sukarno’s views on the women question in his book entitled Sarinah. Many of today’s Indonesian women’s movements have attempted to criticize the framings of both Indonesian Mothers’ Day and women’s emancipation 137 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 155. === [PDF page 77] === 77 in the book Sarinah. The framings highlighted the notion of difference between genders, and today’s women activists believe the framings hinder contemporary and future advocacies for gender equality in the state and society. The 1952-1965 KOWANI’s view on women’s full autonomy and gender equality was clearly ambivalent as it supported further the Old Order regime’s West Irian appropriation and anti-Malaysian agenda. In 1959 and 1961, 1952-1965 KOWANI sent its representative to participate actively in deliberations and committees on the establishment of the Indonesian armed force’s women corps. 138 Hence, 1952-1965 KOWANI shifted from being a traditionalist to a liberal women’s movement because its development was moving toward liberalizing more public spaces for women to fill and make meaningful contributions—without confrontationally challenging the notion of difference between genders and division of labor between men and women in Indonesian private homes. 2.2.3 Absent a Reformist Women’s Movement Network Based on the scope and conditions or characteristics of a reformist women’s movement which this dissertation has set (Figure 3), no reformist women’s movement network can be found during the Old Order. Although GERWANI can be considered as the women’s right group of the Old Order that demonstrated “reformist” characteristics, GERWANI eventually became too close to Sukarno’s ruling regime and violated its own group’s and network’s position about polygyny. Therefore, this dissertation argues that as GERWANI’s influence grew stronger within the KOWANI leadership, its grassroot activities and alliance with the PKI had led GERWANI to 138 The corps is known as KOWAD in the Indonesian language. In 1959, a few KOWANI members joined the Panitia Delapan. Two years later, two KOWANI members became part of KOWAD’s advising committee (KOWANI, op.cit., pp. 158, 164-165, 171). === [PDF page 78] === 78 adopt tactics of collaborating more with the state—including accepting Sukarno’s practice of polygyny, rather than focusing more on mobilizing the society. 2.3. The New Order (1966-1998) During the Japanese colonial government’s rule in pre-independent Indonesia, Fujinkai was the only legitimate or allowed women’s organization to exist between 1942 and 1945. 139 The New Order regime adopted a similar policy. Hence, the New Order centralized all women’s movement organizations into KOWANI as the one and only federation of women’s groups that can exist, and so other women’s movement organizations that were not members of KOWANI mobilized covertly. The “allowed” and visible women’s movement network’s emphasis remained on improving women’s intelligence in fulfilling their duties as women, not in the fight against imperialism but in the support for the central government’s national development agenda instead. In other words, the New Order gave no other room for women wanting to engage in womenoriented activism peacefully but to be within a traditionalist women’s movement. The traditionalist women’s movement networks in the New Order period rejected the idea of women having full autonomy of their bodies and the choice to marry or not, have children or not. The traditionalist women’s movement networks strictly defined women’s duties as serving as wives and mothers at men’s homes. Hence, younger and unmarried women could not be active participants of the traditionalist women’s movement. Post-1965 KOWANI and the religious women’s network of the Tarbiyah movement fall under this category. They conserve the patriarchal status quo and mobilize politically to make it 139 Marlita and Poerwandari, 2005; see also Mariana (2015) on fascist similarities between Japanese-occupied Indonesia and the New Order regime. === [PDF page 79] === 79 more ‘live-able’ for women. Furthermore, inclusiveness was not part of the membership criteria in both Post-1965 KOWANI and the Tarbiyah women’s movement. Women with no civil servant or military spouse could not participate in Post-1965 KOWANI as members or active participants, and only Muslim women who strictly follow the Tarbiyah prayer meetings (liqo) and the other rules entailed in being a pious Muslim women could gain access to the activities for the Tarbiyah movement’s women’s network.140 2.3.1 Back to be the Traditionalist Women’s Movement Network: Post-1965 KOWANI After the dismissal of GERWANI as a member organization and the ousting of Hurustiati Subandrio from the KOWANI leadership in 1966, 141 Post-1965 KOWANI increasingly become the traditionalist women’s network which strived to push better state-level policies for women— to fulfill their traditional gender roles or, in other words, within the confines of the New Order regime’s gender ideology.142 Particularly in the 1970s, Post-1965 KOWANI focused its programs on increasing economic gains for women in the rural areas. 143 On the one hand, Post-1965 140 This dissertation follows Fuad’s (2019) conception of liqo. According to Fuad, liqo means “meeting” and can interchangeably be termed as halaqah which means “religious circle” in Arabic. She further explains that both liqo and halaqah are “weekly religious mentoring sessions developed for the purpose of teaching the religious doctrine and ideology of the Tarbiyah movement.” 141 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 193; in KOWANI’s official records, KOWANI’s members suspected Hurustiati Subandrio of leaning more to the socialist and communist groups than the New Order regime and its allies, because of her tendency to send KOWANI delegates to communist states and to celebrate the International Women’s Day every March 8. Furthermore, the arrest of Hurustiati Subandrio’s husband strengthened other KOWANI members’ pressure on her to step down from leadership. Her husband was deputy prime minister during Sukarno’s first DWIKORA cabinet. 142 See Soetjipto and Adelina (2021) for deeper understanding of the state-led women’s movement organization, the PKK, that promote the regime’s gender ideology at the community level. 143 KOWANI, op. cit., pp. 246-253. === [PDF page 80] === 80 KOWANI made efforts to include and empower women who had yet to have an equal amount of socioeconomic access as the urban women. For example, the 1974-1977 leadership stated that one of its priorities was to “intensify and include mothers especially those in the rural areas to attend informal education programs about health, nutrition, environmental hygiene, citizenry, religiosity, and cooperatives.”144 On the other hand, Post-1965 KOWANI imposed an added burden for women in the rural areas and reproduced assumptions about the hierarchy of urban women as more developed or advanced than rural women. In its seminar series that commenced in 1975, Post-1965 KOWANI asserted that rural women, in addition to fulfilling the five women’s duties, could be the productive force in their family (black box in Figure 4), community and, therefore, the country.145 Figure 9 - Post-1965 KOWANI's Goal for Women’s Role in Society that Aligned with the New Order’s Gender Ideology. 144 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 234. 145 Ibid., p. 249 === [PDF page 81] === 81 Figure 4 illustrates the gender ideology of the ruling regime which KOWANI internalized to its members and women in the rural areas who were receiving KOWANI’s training. Every woman’s duty can be categorized into three main aspects, namely, 1) she must stimulate her family members’ growth, 2) she must strengthen her family’s material infrastructure, and 3) she must also be a good citizen to the country. Stimulating family members’ growth entails attending to her husband’s needs, reproducing healthy offspring and good citizens, and improving her children’s education and nutrition. Furthermore, strengthening her family material infrastructure includes not only managing her home finances but also generating additional income. Generating additional income is emphasized in the context of rural women for spurring their villages’ development. The socialization of these norms in Figure 4 to women across Indonesian rural and urban communities would go on for at least a decade until the issuance of the 1985 Law on Mass Organizations. The law enabled the proliferation of new women’s movement organizations that would counter these norms or provide alternatives to them. 2.3.2 Emerging Religious Traditionalist Women’s Movement: The Tarbiyah Women While Post-1965 KOWANI was focusing its programs on increasing economic gains for women in the rural areas, the Tarbiyah movement emerged in 1968. 146 Pious Muslim women play a crucial role in reinforcing the Tarbiyah movement’s expansion through organizing weekly liqo communities.147 Similar to the Post-1965 KOWANI, the women’s network of the Tarbiyah movement seeks to empower women in fulfilling their biologically determined role, commonly known as “kodrat,” to be mothers, wives, and the vanguard of the family’s morality. 148 146 Kahin, 2012. 147 Fuad, 2019. 148 Blackburn (2004) and Arimbi (2018) understand ‘kodrat’ as ‘destiny.’ === [PDF page 82] === 82 Towards the end of the New Order, the dominant ideology that women and men possess different traits, such that division of labor in the job market was segregated by gender, prevailed.149 Furthermore, the Tarbiyah movement’s pious women’s groups as the religious traditionalist women’s movement network were subtly competing with other groups including the women’s wings of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood (MHTI) in higher education institutions for followers.150 Then, the religious traditionalist women’s movement network became increasingly more visible between 1994 and 1997, especially across public universities.151 The Tarbiyah movement’s women’s groups were militant in not only convincing female friends or new female students to join the movement’s prayer meetings or liqo, but also reminding them of “the Islamic way” to dress, behave like a Muslim woman (Muslimah), and build a family. For the Tarbiyah movement’s women’s groups, women must marry Muslim men who are approved by their female mentor (murabbiah). These groups also emphasize the sanctity of an Islamic marriage, and so dating is prohibited (haram) and considered adulterous (zina). One former follower of the Bogor Agricultural Institute’s Tarbiyah women’s group in the 1990s, stopped becoming a follower because she could no longer accept a fellow Tarbiyah friend’s accusing her of tarnishing her male friend’s worth. She recalls: 149 The Jakarta Post. (November 25, 1997). Seeing students gain self-esteem is reward enough. TJP. In the article, a female teacher comments about women naturally having traits that better qualify them as teachers than men. The article also quotes former Education and Culture Minister Syarif Thayeb who had publicly stated women should participate in fields that are appropriate to women’s biological characteristics, to help modernize and develop Indonesia. 150 RS059, Online Interview in Zoom Meeting Room, March 11, 2021. RS059 observed the dayto-day competition on her campus and experienced both Tarbiyah and HTI women’s groups approaching her to join. Muhtadi (2009) also highlights the competition for followers between the Tarbiyah and HTI female activists in several universities. 151 RS059, op. cit. === [PDF page 83] === 83 “During my senior year in college, my male friend would often visit me at my place, and we just chat for hours. Seeing that, my neighbor…the friend who first introduced me to the Tarbiyah women’s groups and took me to [the group’s] prayer meetings…she would remind me of the Tarbiyah doctrine. That women are the source of calumny and so I should limit my interactions with him because he is going to be the next leader of a key Muslim student group…and I will bring dishonor to him if I keep talking to him and don’t restrain myself. I moved out of my place and stopped going to Tarbiyah meetings since then.”152 Women’s groups of the Tarbiyah movement were very devoted to the movement’s cause and highly organized in expanding it. By 1997, they had already expanded their presence in at least six major public universities and conducted intercampus meetings to strengthen sisterhood.153 Their growing visibility and organizational strength made them well-prepared for gaining access to state power, such that some of the key Tarbiyah women leaders cofounded the Justice Party, an earlier version of today’s PKS Party, in 1999.154 2.3.2 Emerging Religious Liberal Women’s Movement: The MHTI The dominant ideology about women during the New Order regime stereotyped women who were engaged in political activism that challenged the state as sexual deviants. Women’s movements were centralized and the only network that could operate was post-1965 KOWANI. A liberal women’s movement network could not emerge, due to Suharto’s dictatorship, until 152 RS059, op. cit. 153 Ibid. 154 RS058, Personal Interview in Jakarta, July 10, 2019. === [PDF page 84] === 84 1985 when Suharto allowed the passing of the bill on the freedom to assemble and to form mass organizations. In 1984, activists of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood or HTI movement had already coalesced with Bogor Agricultural University’s Campus Proselytization Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) which, in turn, expanded the HTI network with other major public universities’ LDK.155 By the end of the 1990s, the MHTI were already expanding and competing with the Tarbiyah women’s groups in public universities across Indonesia. 156 While the women’s groups of both the Tarbiyah and HTI movements mobilized for expanding the pious Muslim women mass base, they differ in their ideas about women’s leadership. Precisely because of MHTI’s ideas about women’s leadership which differ from those of the Tarbiyah women’s groups, this dissertation views MHTI as not a traditional but rather a liberal women’s movement network. MHTI was aimed at liberalizing the political space for Muslim women to promote ideas about the caliphate. Quite similar to 1952-1965 KOWANI, MHTI activists boosted the belief in every woman they met that women’s power is in their ability to perform duties in both the domestic and public realms. 157 The MHTI network trained their women cadres on how to speak publicly with confidence and other organizing skills. 158 MHTI also conducted women-led seminars that were aimed to further strengthen female university students’ belief in HTI causes. MHTI never used the term “gender equality” explicitly because it negated the term as western feminists’ entry to colonize Muslim communities.159 However, the MHTI in Surabaya, for 155 Muhtadi 2009; by this time, the Indonesian education ministry had already enabled student organizations to exist after lifting the 1978 Ministerial Decree on the Normalization of Campus Life (the NKK/BKK policy). See also Fajar (2020) about the context of the NKK/BKK policy. 156 RS059, op. cit. 157 Ibid. See also Seise, 2011. 158 RS059, op. cit. 159 Ilmiyah, 2020. === [PDF page 85] === 85 instance, conducted discussion of 1) books such as “The Muslimah’s Rainbow” which centered on women’s image in Islam and how women reflect a nation’s quality; and 2) political topics such as “Revealing the Globalization Trap behind ‘World Class University’ Narratives” which emphasized the Muslim identity as the source of honorable intellect. 160 A former Bogor Agricultural University student in late 1990s states: “[MHTI] Is different from Tarbiyah because women are taught to be politically active. I was never interested in getting married and so I didn’t feel like I fit in… didn’t feel quite comfortable being in the Tarbiyah. It could have been a different story if I did not consider my close relationship with my Tarbiyah neighbor and chose HTI in the beginning instead.”161 Nevertheless, the MHTI network maintained that women are, first and foremost, responsible for their families’ domestic affairs. Numerous MHTI alums would even join the Islamist party, PKS,162 and continue the informal institution of encouraging women to be politically active once their domestic affairs were settled. 163 For these reasons, this dissertation categorizes the MHTI movement as the religious liberal women’s movement that existed during the New Order. 160 Ilmiyah, op. cit. 161 RS059, op. cit. 162 Ibid. 163 RS011, Personal Interview in Depok, August 31, 2019. === [PDF page 86] === 86 2.3.3 Emerging Reformists: Rumpun Tjut Nyak Dien, Pre-JKP3, and Pre-KUPI Reformist women’s movement networks did not emerge publicly throughout the New Order because of the authoritarian political context. Reformists mobilized covertly due to fear of repression including being arrested by the ruling military dictatorship of the New Order. However, one could argue that two types of reformists in the New Order had already existed. They are the religious and secular reformist women’s movement networks that challenged the New Order’s gender ideology. They advocated for the liberation of women from the negative impacts of capitalistic development. While the religious reformist women’s movement network approached the women question through reinterpretations of the Koran, the secular reformist women’s movement networks did so through a feminist-leaning lens. The feminist-leaning lens were mostly influenced by readings written by activist-scholars of second wave feminism in the Global North. In the 1980s, university students in Yogyakarta developed informal reading groups within and across different universities to discuss secular feminist thoughts and ongoing social issues. One of the notable networks was known as the Yogyakarta Women’s Discussion Forum (Forum Diskusi Perempuan Yogyakarta) formed in 1989.164 At one point, the students of the Yogyakarta Women’s Discussion Forum organized an awareness-raising event on the increasingly authoritarian New Order regime, by distributing a subversive calendar entitled “Land for the People” which revealed military violence in land-grabbing cases. 165 The calendar also featured pictures of President Suharto in swimming trunks and the First Lady Tien Suharto in bikini. The regime’s military officers went looking for the students, such that the students had to rename 164 RS042, Online Interview on Whatsapp Chat Room, March 19, 2020. 165 Ibid. === [PDF page 87] === 87 their group Rumpun Tjoet Nyak Dien (RTND).166 Towards the beginning of the Reformasi period, the RTND network transformed into a foundation (yayasan). The reasons were threefold. One, the transformation was a response made to adapt with the situation that changed as the New Order regime developed. Two, it received funding from foreign donors and its students started to graduate. Three, the gradual migration of RTND members from Yogyakarta to Jakarta could factor into the sustenance of RTND as a movement network and foundation. Furthermore, the former Yogyakarta Women’s Discussion Forum or RTND was a precursor to today’s Network for Domestic Workers National Advocacy (JALA PRT), founded by one of RTND’s participants, Lita Anggraini. Since 2004, Anggraini has led the ongoing advocacy for the ratification of the Domestic Workers Protection Bill. JALA PRT later became active participant in GERAK Perempuan’s activities during Post-Reformasi. Reading groups among university students in different campuses across Indonesia can be consequential to an individual’s activist trajectory. In Depok, West Java, the University of Indonesia’s progressive, left- and feminist-leaning reading groups generated some of the most vocal activists that Indonesians saw during the start of Reformasi and Post-Reformasi, such as Gadis Arivia and Rocky Gerung. One of their fellow students who joined the reading group, years later became one of the founders of the Justice Party (the earlier version of PKS), during Reformasi.167 Cases in the opposite direction also happened, in which former students of their campuses’ fundamentalist Islamic study circle (halaqah) would later become key leaders of 1) feminist-leaning women’s rights organizations such as Women’s Journal (Jurnal Perempuan) and Women’s Solidarity (Solidaritas Perempuan), 2) the quasi-independent or partially state-funded 166 RS042, op. cit.; Tjoet Nyak Dien is a national heroine from Aceh and so RTND is an abbreviation of “Rumpun Tjoet Nyak Dien [Tjoet Nyak Dien clan].” 167 RS058, op. cit. === [PDF page 88] === 88 National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), and 3) other progressive and women-oriented organizations on sexual and reproductive rights.168 Before Komnas Perempuan was established during Reformasi in 1999, the 1985 Law on Mass Organizations set the stage for the emergence of women’s rights groups which focus on violence against women. Kalyanamitra emerged in 1985 and the Solidaritas Perempuan emerged in 1989. Later, in 1995, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and six other women lawyers created the Association of Indonesian Women for Justice (LBH APIK).169 LBH APIK can be considered as one of the first women’s rights groups that openly challenged the New Order regime’s gender ideology, including criticizing KOWANI.170 The traditionalist women’s movement network and other women’s movement organizations outside of the network could openly disagree with each other even as one delegation in an international forum. In 1995, Post-1965 KOWANI clashed with some of the senior activists in the reformist women’s movement during the NGO Forum on Women meeting prior to the 1995 Beijing Conference.171 The clash occurred because Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Sita Aripurnami of the reformist women’s movement showed a poster of women in shackles in a strong protest against the New Order regime. 172 The Post-1965 KOWANI’s chair and deputy, Enny Busiri and Kuraesin Sumhadi, disagreed with the move primarily because it was done without prior discussion with the entire Indonesian delegation of 140 women’s rights activists. They were embarrassed to be part of a divided delegation and 168 RS048, Online Interview in Whatsapp Call, July 10, 2020; RS059, op. cit., and RS061, Personal Interview in Jakarta, August 9, 2019. 169 APIK to date has offices in 16 different locations in Indonesia. See LBHAPIK.or.id. “Tentang Kami [About Us].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://lbhapik.or.id/tentang-kami/. 170 The Jakarta Post. (November 2, 1995). Women must challenge laws, policies – lawyer. TJP. 171 The Jakarta Post. (September 1, 1995). RI Envoys To Forum On Women Divided. TJP. 172 The Jakarta Post. (September 10, 1995). Women's struggle against gender injustice continues. TJP. === [PDF page 89] === 89 stipulated that the poster “hurt the Indonesian people.” Enny Busiri was not shy to maintain Post- 1965 KOWANI’s position that was in favor of the New Order regime’s strategy in pushing gender equality and that Post-1965 KOWANI would mobilize without confrontation with the government.173 Women’s rights activists of LBH APIK, Solidaritas Perempuan, and Kalyanamitra later during the Post-Reformasi government coalesced and formed the Network for Pro-Women Legislation (Jaringan Kerja Prolegnas Pro-Perempuan, JKP3).174 Hence, pre-JKP3 in this dissertation refers to the reformist women’s movement network led by LBH APIK, Solidaritas Perempuan, and Kalyanamitra since issuance of the 1985 Law on Mass Organizations. The religious reformist women’s movement network started to emerge between the 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, a non-profit organization called the Association of Islamic Boarding School and Community Development (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, P3M) was established. The major Muslim mass organization, NU, was influential in the development of P3M and the religious reformist women’s movement network in general. P3M was led by NU leaders including Abdurrahman Wahid who became 1999-2001 Indonesian president; and in 1986, the Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama (Pengurus Besar Nadhlatul Ulama, PBNU) advised its women’s wing organizations such as Fatayat and Muslimat to suspend collaborations with Post-1965 KOWANI because the Board wanted to return to NU’s 1926 founding principles (khittah), maintaining loyalty to the nation but not to the ruling New Order regime. 175 The advice 173 The Jakarta Post, op. cit. 174 Since 2004, JKP3 succeeded in pushing several key gender equality national laws such as those on domestic violence elimination, human trafficking crimes, and sexual violence crimes. 175 Affiah, 2017. === [PDF page 90] === 90 from NU was a response to the New Order’s informal institutions’ coercing KOWANI’s member organizations to vote for the GOLKAR Party. 176 In this atmosphere, Lies Marcoes headed P3M’s division of Islamic jurisprudence on women in 1994,177 and was committed to developing a network which would incorporate gender mainstreaming in Islamic discourses, mass organizations, and boarding schools. She forged P3M’s partnerships with Fatayat and several secular women’s movement organizations such as Kalyanamitra, Solidaritas Perempuan, and LBH APIK—organizations that motored the future JKP3. Arguably, Lies Marcoes influenced the formation of three religious women-oriented organizations—Rahima (2000), Fahmina (2001), and Alimat (2009), that continued the works of P3M in Post-Reformasi and formed the future Indonesian Women’s Ulama Congress (Kongres Ulama Perempuan Indonesia, KUPI) in 2017.178 Hence, the factors supporting the rationale of this dissertation which asserts that RTND, pre-JKP3, and pre-KUPI are the reformist women’s movement networks during the New Order regime are twofold. First, their tactics were focused more on mobilizing ideas within the society than collaborating with the government. RTND used a provocative tactic to raise public awareness on the government’s lack of accountability through handing out calendars that mocked the president and first lady. The Pre-JKP3 activists openly challenged Post-1965 KOWANI’s 176 By informal institutions, this dissertation follows scholars who define them as the “unwritten rules that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Meng, 2020). 177 Affiah, op.cit. 178 Affiah, N. D. (April 29, 2017). “Cerita dibalik Kongres Ulama Perempuan Indonesia (KUPI) [The Story of the Indonesian Women’s Ulama Congress (KUPI)].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://kupipedia.id/index.php/Cerita_dibalik_Kongres_Ulama_Perempuan_ Indonesia_(KUPI); and Haeruddin, M. M. (April 29, 2017). “Revolusi Umat Melalui Ulama Perempuan: Dari Wacana ke Aksi [Followers’ Revolution through Women Ulema: From Discourse to Action].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://kupipedia.id/index.php/ Revolusi_Umat_Melalui_Ulama_Perempuan:_Dari_Wacana_ke_Aksi. === [PDF page 91] === 91 programs and position toward the state. Pre-KUPI leaders urged its participants to keep an arm’s length with Post-1965 KOWANI because of the latter’s allegiance to the government. Second, their goals were not to conserve traditional gender roles but to address intersectional inequalities. RTND focused on land-grabbing projects done by the powerful toward ordinary people in the name of development. Pre-JKP3 activists highlighted the authoritarian New Order regime’s oppression of women. Pre-KUPI leaders were focused on providing ordinary people with access to religious education through an updated reading of the Koran, in a time when—after the PKI was banned in 1965—acts of piety were suppressed by the New Order government. 2.4 Post-Reformasi (2001-Present) Tactical and even bolder women activists during the Reformasi period started to form new women’s rights groups and women’s movement networks that would greatly deviate from the women’s movement network in the New Order. Women’s movement groups seized Suharto’s resignation as an opportunity to break free from the centralized and traditionalist women’s movement network. During the brief democratic transition or Reformasi period from 1998-2001, post-1965 KOWANI under Enny Busiri’s leadership slowly began to shift away from the traditionalist position, as she declared her plan in 1999 to democratize KOWANI and orient its programs to societal needs more than to the government’s. 179 The fall of the New Order also meant the end of decades-long suppression of religious assemblies 180 and religious expressions including veiling.181 Consequently, religious women’s 179 The Jakarta Post. (February 3, 1999). Women seeking greater future role. TJP. 180 Salim, 2004; Muhtadi, op. cit.; Fuad, op. cit. 181 Candraningrum, 2013; Yolandasari, 2019; see also Fujita, A. (October 7, 2015). “Hijab fashion is so popular in Indonesia non-Muslim designers are getting in on it.” Retrieved === [PDF page 92] === 92 groups fill the traditionalist women’s movement’s space. Relative to the emergence of other women’s movement organizations, the traditionalist women’s movement evolved into a network of Islamist women’s rights groups. This dissertation argues that the traditionalist women’s movement in Post-Reformasi comprises women’s groups of the Tarbiyah movement, and the relatively new Family Love Alliance (AILA). In Arabic language, AILA which is pronounced as ailah means “big family.”182 2.4.1 The Islamic Traditionalist Women’s Movements: Tarbiyah Women and AILA Women of the Tarbiyah movement usually mobilize in three ways: through the 1) Islamist political party, PKS; 2) grassroots-level social activism such as the Salimah women activists;183 or 3) private liqo meetings. Indeed, the role of the Tarbiyah movement’s women participants in nurturing the size and strength of the Tarbiyah movement cannot be downplayed because they give birth to many children 184 and publish popular books.185 Female university students who were active in the Tarbiyah movement’s clandestine liqo meetings and larger gatherings during the 1980s and 1990s, seized the opportunity of channeling their political activism and leadership aspirations by cofounding the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) during December 31, 2022, from https://theworld.org/stories/2015-10-07/hijab-fashion-so-popularindonesia-non-muslim-designers-are-getting-it. 182 Fazeri, A. (January 29, 2014). “Bentengi Keluarga dari Feminisme, AILA Bangun Jaringan Berbagai Ormas [Shielding Families from Feminism, AILA Builds Network of Various Mass Organizations].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/ read/2014/01/29/15648/bentengi-keluarga-dari-paham-feminisme-aila-bangun-jaringanberbagai-ormas.html. 183 Salimah was established in 2000 to accommodate the groups of either Tarbiyah or the broader pious Muslim women who want to contribute to the Islamist agenda without going through political platforms (RS011, op. cit.); Salimah has chapters in multiple countries as well, with members who are overseas students and migrant workers. 184 Arimbi, 2018. 185 Asyari and Abid, 2016. === [PDF page 93] === 93 Reformasi.186 PK is the precursor to PKS, the Islamist political party that has direct linkages to the fundamentalist Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood (HTI), AILA, and other religious conservative and fundamentalist networks. PKS managed to stall deliberations of the Gender Justice and Equality Bill and Sexual Violence Elimination Bill in the period before the 2014 and 2019 general elections. PKS’ parliament member, Ledia Hanifa Amaliah, argues that Indonesia has enough legal infrastructure which supports women’s advancement in public-private spheres and protects victims of sexual assault and harassment—the real homework is to make good use of the laws and regulations and monitor their implementation. 187 Her emphasis on maximizing the advantages of available laws to protect women differs from AILA’s which associates the Gender Justice and Equality Bill and Sexual Violence Elimination Bill with feminist and Westernization agendas that ultimately serve as leeway to government’s recognition of LGBT rights. 2.4.2 Shifting Back to be the Liberal Women’s Movement: Post-1965 KOWANI The Post-Reformasi regime has enabled an extensive array of ideologies about women and their place in society to coexist or compete without state repression. Hence, on the extreme left of the spectrum, there are women’s movements that fight for women’s full autonomy of their lives. On the extreme right of the spectrum, lie the women’s movement organizations that maintain that women’s liberty is in the hands of men who are the extension of God. The liberal 186 RS011, op. cit.; and RS058, op. cit. 187 Personal Interview in Jakarta, July 2, 2019; a top politician and community organizer, MP Amaliah was deputy speaker of the national parliament (2016) and PKS’ former head of women’s empowerment division (2005-2010). Before joining PK in 1998, she organized her neighborhood’s middle-lower income housewives to produce hand-sewed clothes which, ultimately, mitigated the women’s economic hardships from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. === [PDF page 94] === 94 women’s movement network in Post-Reformasi does not challenge ideas that presume women are inevitably soon-to-be mothers. In fact, they would add that because women are soon-to-be mothers, women ought to excel in public affairs as well because women would be the ones to know what is best for future generations. Enny Busiri’s leadership has shifted Post-1965 KOWANI’s position from mobilizing as a traditionalist women’s movement network into a liberal women’s movement, starting in 1999. Post-1965 KOWANI no longer sees the need to conform to the government of that time because 1999 was a period of Reformasi in which the Indonesian state was reconfiguring its political institutions and state structures to make a peaceful transition into a democratic regime. By then, some of Post-1965 KOWANI leaders had joined other activists of the reformist women’s movement network in the collective efforts to solve the cases of massive sexual violence during the May 1998 riot. One of the efforts that come into fruition and had a consequential impact for future gender equality policies is the lobbying of Suharto’s successor, President Habibie, to establish Komnas Perempuan. Post-1965 KOWANI has remained a liberal women’s movement network throughout Post-Reformasi. It later sided with the reformist women’s movement network in support of the Regulation 30 when counter-movements emerged to oppose it. 188 2.4.3 The Reformist Women’s Movements: JKP3, KUPI, and GERAK Perempuan During the Reformasi period, approximately a hundred women’s rights activists across different networks convened for three days in Yogyakarta to commemorate the Indonesian 188 Antaranews.com (December 17, 2021). “KOWANI: Permendikbud 30/2021 sasar pemulihan korban kekerasan seksual [KOWANI: Regulation 30 targeted on victims’ recovery].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2592337/kowani-permendikbud- 30-2021-sasar-pemulihan-korban-kekerasan-seksual. === [PDF page 95] === 95 Women’s Day on December 22, 1998. 189 They convened to transform the meaning of Women’s Day, from a day of celebrating “women as mothers” (New Order) to observing “women’s political aspirations and their demand for a voice in public life.” 190 These women did not intend to associate mothers with negative connotations but strive to socialize the meaning that being a woman does not equate only to giving birth. 191 They were very critical of the gender ideology sustained by the recently toppled New Order regime. However, the convention did not unite but instead made visible the seemingly irreconcilable differences among the participants, such that several organizations and individuals staged a walkout on the third day. 192 Nonetheless, the convention ended with an agreement to form a coalition of women from fifteen groups representing different sectors: women farmers, fisherwomen, professional and informal workers, street girls, the rural and urban poor women, elderly women, women with disabilities, students or young women, sex workers, and sexual minorities.193 The coalition is known today as the Indonesian Women Coalition (KPI). The participants in the 1998 convention also agreed that KPI would accept individuals representing organizations or independent individuals as members. They also agreed that the KPI would be registered as a mass organization, not as a federation such as KOWANI. The participants’ decision not to replicate KOWANI’s model could imply the unspoken trauma of Post-Reformasi women’s rights activists from the New Order regime. In the words of a women’s rights activist since the New Order, the final decision to form an 189 Yatim, D. H. (December 23, 1998). Momentous women's congress rectifies history. TJP. 190 Ibid. 191 Amiruddin, M. (December 21, 2015). “Hari Ibu bukan Mother’s Day [Woman’s Day Is Not Mother’s Day].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://majalah.tempo.co/read/bahasa/ 149725/hari-ibu-bukan-mothers-day. 192 Ibid. See also IRIP. (April 1, 1999). Women’s Congress. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.insideindonesia.org/womens-congress. 193 Ibid. === [PDF page 96] === 96 organization rather than a federation was “unfortuntate” and a missed opportunity because working to mobilize together as a federation would make the reformist women’s movement network politically stronger than mobilizing as an organization—which would make the newly formed organization not very different from the already proliferating women’s movement organizations of the time. 194 The division within the reformist women's movements during this time has been not only intergenerational but also sectoral. Sectors include women’s interest groups, the religious pious, factory workers, domestic workers, migrant workers, and university students. The rise of the internet and new technologies has also spurred the development of young women activists. 195 This dissertation identifies women’s movement organizations that loosely coalesced in 2020 under the Anti-Violence Against Women Movement (Gerakan Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan, GERAK Perempuan). GERAK Perempuan comprises approximately 50 organizations and was previously an informal forum for various women’s movement organizations to communicate with one another and to prepare for annual International Women’s Day celebrations. It was only in 2020 that the forum decided to consolidate and name itself GERAK Perempuan.196 The organizations that coalesced are primarily women’s rights groups, although workers unions, international NGOs, and university groups have also joined the alliance. While most of the organizations were created after the Reformasi period, older women’s organizations also work with younger women’s organizations under the banner of GERAK Perempuan. 194 RS009, Personal Interview in Magelang, August 3, 2019. 195 Winters, 2002. 196 Direct Participation in Jakarta, circa January 2020. === [PDF page 97] === 97 Women’s movement organizations from the early Reformasi period such as the Indonesian Women’s Coalition (KPI) and Solidaritas Perempuan actively engage in GERAK Perempuan’s organizing activities. Hence, GERAK Perempuan is a women’s movement network that is both intersectional and intergenerational. Younger organizations, those created after 2010s, such as Perempuan Mahardhika and Sanggar Swara have also joined GERAK Perempuan. The issues which each organization focuses on vary highly although they are mostly cross-cutting. For instance, while Perempuan Mahardhika focuses primarily on young women in universities and women factory workers, KPI has over a dozen subgroups that garner women from various fields including women farmers, politicians, academicians, and sex workers. The alliance’s core interest is eliminating violence against women that includes not only physical and sexual but also economic and psychological violence. Furthermore, GERAK Perempuan also comprises women’s rights collectives that are not necessarily mass-based but have massive followers online. Their advocacies, agenda, and interests are distributed online by their followers and other online, non-following viewers. These collectives include Purple Code, PerEMPUan, etc. Women activists with substantial experience of state repression during the New Order regime or Reformasi period founded some of the organizations in the GERAK Perempuan network and maintain some repertoires of their time on the field. GERAK Perempuan is a loose coalition because it has no structure, leadership, or institutionalized communication channel. However, its organizing of advocating for some key issues through its members’ social media platforms has resulted in a few notable repertoires and policy-related achievements. The few notable repertoires include an annual march to commemorate International Women’s Day, protests in front of the national parliament on Tuesdays, press releases on major cases of discrimination against women and other gender === [PDF page 98] === 98 minorities, etc. The policy-related achievements included GERAK Perempuan’s organizing for 1) advanced deliberations on the Domestic Workers Protection Bill and the Sexual Violence Crimes Law, and 2) the protests on the Omnibus Law on Jobs Creation and Family Resilience Bill. Another policy which GERAK Perempuan motored was Regulation 30. Another landmark regulation is the Sexual Violence Crimes Law.197 Regulation 30, the Sexual Violence Crimes Law, and the Minister of Religious Affairs’ Regulation No. 73/2022 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Religious Educational Institutions (MRA No. 73/2022) are the three sexual violence laws established during the Covid-19 pandemic. While Regulation 30 and MRA No. 73/2022 are two laws that are technically in different jurisdictions from the Sexual Violence Crimes Law, they pave the way for sexual violence victims (who are largely women and historically could not seek proper redress) to have more legal options of redress and recovery and for perpetrators to be denied impunity by the state. GERAK Perempuan had been one of the various women’s movement networks—in addition to JKP3 and KUPI—that advocated for these laws’ establishments. Women activists have struggled for better protective laws that effectively aid victims of sexual violence for almost a decade. This struggle is relatively short if we compare it to the Indonesian women’s movement’s struggle for the 1974 Law on Marriage which took approximately 50 years. Between the days since Regulation 30 was launched and the Sexual Violence Crimes Law was ratified, two things occurred. First, the ministerial regulation and national law ignited counter-movements to mobilize for a repeal of the laws, such that the executive, legislative, judicial, and even civil society organizations felt compelled to 197 In the Indonesian language, the law is known as Undang-Undang tentang Tindak Pidana Kekerasan Seksual or UU TPKS. === [PDF page 99] === 99 immediately announce their explicit support for the the ministerial regulation and national law through various online and print media outlets. Second, they mediated the passing of the Bogor Regency’s Regulation on Sexual Deviancy Prevention and Redress, a subnational law which arguably violates the human rights framework. GERAK Perempuan, KUPI, and JKP3’s relative mobilizational success through the issuance of Regulation 30, the Sexual Violence Crimes Law, and MRA Regulation No. 73/2022 signify three things about external shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic. First, the pandemic amplified the state of emergency pertaining to sexual violence in Indonesia. Sexual violence do not stop when lockdowns occur; rather, cases of domestic violence and online sexual violence soar during lockdowns. GERAK Perempuan, KUPI, and JKP3 saw the opportunity to continue their usual campaigns on anti-sexual violence and shift them to online platforms. Second, the pandemic intensified organizing within movement networks especially in GERAK Perempuan. GERAK Perempuan continued holding limited protests with Covid-safe protocols in front of the DPR as well as in Zoom meeting rooms from July through October 2020, to maintain the public’s awareness about a long overdue piece of legislation on sexual violence elimination. It has also intensified organizing within the counter-movements such as AILA and other actors in opposition of the sexual violence laws and in support of sexual deviance (or anti-gender minorities) laws. Third, GERAK Perempuan’s intensified organizing offline and online during the pandemic may have expediated decision-making by the state bureaucracies that prepare and launch these laws’ enactments. === [PDF page 100] === 100 2.5. Summary Three types of women’s movements in Indonesia since its independence can be identified as traditionalist, liberal, and reformist women’s movement networks. The same women’s movement network may have been traditionalist during the beginning of the Old Order, later liberal in the end of the Old Order, back to being traditionalist again in the New Order, and then liberal again in Post-Reformasi regimes. For instance, KOWANI’s ideas, goals, and programs emphasized women’s potential strength to the newly independent Indonesia. However, KOWANI conformed to the prevailing norms about domestic affairs as women’s responsibility as well as about the patriarchal state’s division of labor. Therefore, its stance developed it into a traditionalist women’s movement from 1945-1952. KOWANI became a liberal women’s movement in the second half of the Old Order when GERWANI joined membership from 1952- 1965. Then, KOWANI became traditionalist again during the New Order when GERWANI was ousted from its leadership of KOWANI in 1965. KOWANI since then has advocated that women’s place is in the home, in the role of companions to their husbands, and with primary responsibility as procreators, their offspring’s caretakers, and home finances managers. KOWANI remained its stance as a traditionalist women’s movement throughout the New Order regime. Towards the end of the New Order, the traditionalist, liberal, and reformist women’s movements were diverse. Religious and secular women’s movement networks proliferated after Suharto liberalized his New Order regime through the establishment of the Law on Mass Organizations in 1985. Tarbiyah movement’s women’s groups and the MHTI emerged as, respectively, traditionalist and liberal women’s movements during the New Order. Tarbiyah women’s movement network is considered traditionalist because it sustains the patriarchal model === [PDF page 101] === 101 of labor division at home. Meanwhile, the MHTI network pushes women to participate politically and actively in public once the MHTI members have fulfilled their duties at home. The Pre-KUPI network fills the reformist women’s movement’s position in the New Order. The Pre-KUPI network works toward convincing the state and societies that men and women have an equal right l to choose how they want to contribute to either the public or domestic sphere, and that there is nothing un-Islamic about doing so. The Pre-KUPI network encourages the growth of women ulamas and ulamas who focus on women’s and gender issues to lead and transform Islamic boarding schools. Unlike its fellow religious women’s movement, Pre-KUPI network coalesces with its secular counterpart, the Pre-JKP3 network, in disseminating the Islamic narratives about gender equality. Finally, the Tarbiyah movement’s women’s groups maintains itself as a traditionalist women’s movement during Post-Reformasi. Meanwhile, the regime in 2017 banned HTI and its affiliated networks including MHTI. Post-1965 KOWANI shifted from being a traditionalist to a liberal women’s movement network in Post-Reformasi. KUPI and JKP3 networks finally materialized, with the addition of a younger and even more loose network, GERAK Perempuan, as part of the reformist women’s movement network. Despite their many versions, the traditionalist and liberal women’s movement networks have participated relatively longer than the reformist women’s movement network in engagements of political and movement-organizing activities. Furthermore, the dominant gender ideology based on biological determinism—that men and women are born with different genitals and functions and, therefore, different roles to fill in society—has gone through decades of socialization and permeated millions of families in Indonesia. Therefore, the competition has been tough for a “relatively new” and relatively === [PDF page 102] === 102 powerless social group such as the reformist women’s movement network to gain direct access to state power. === [PDF page 103] === 103 Chapter 3 - The Structural Conditions for Networking and Mobilization Strategies “No women’s organizations could cross the lines that had already been set by the ministry for the role of women. So, [the ministry] did not give any counsel or advice, but monitoring. Any group that deviated would be shut down.” (RS002, women’s rights activist in Old Order and parolee in New Order) “The efforts of fellow activists and non-activists to run for legislative office are truly different. Activists lack the money but have plenty of strategies and knowledge. People know us [activists] because of our work in community organizing.” (RS018, women’s rights activist and member of subnational parliament in Post-Reformasi) 3.1 Introduction The testimonies above reflect the key distinction between mobilizing politically as a woman in the New Order and in Post-Reformasi. RS002 describes the structural conditions of the New Order that pushed relatively powerless people to conform with the ruling regime’s gender ideology and state agenda. Even the New Order regime’s ministry which oversaw women’s affairs was tasked with disciplining the content of existing women’s movement organizations’ activities. In contrast, RS018 celebrates the advantages she has as a credible women’s rights activist when running for political office at the subnational level in Sulawesi island.198 Unlike the New Order regime, the structural conditions during Post-Reformasi have enabled people—even relatively powerless ones—to gain direct access to state power. 198 RS018, Personal Interview in Kendari, July 24, 2019. === [PDF page 104] === 104 Furthermore, the structural conditions in Post-Reformasi allow women with strong grassroots links and networks with other social movement organizations—including holding active membership in a reformist women’s movement organization that usually challenges the government—to run for office, lose an election, rerun for another, and then win after a second attempt of running. RS018’s situation is something that RS002 could not experience when and after she was chapter head of GERWANI. Post-Reformasi is not as constraining as the authoritarian period of the New Order, but the democratic context of Post-Reformasi makes network-building a necessary and important factor to advance a goal. Some may view gaining direct access to state power as co-optation. However, this dissertation agrees with scholars who contend that “even activism that looks like co-optation may include elements of contestation and tactical struggles for change.”199 This dissertation argues that policy change is better achieved when relatively powerless groups such as the the reformist women’s movement network not only collaborates with the government from outside of state structures, but also directly participates in the government’s policymaking processes. Access to key state actors and engagement in policy formulation have the potential to introduce policies that would not otherwise be set in motion, to shape the content of policies so that they are strong and impactful rather than just being lip-service, and to accelerate the process of change for equality by allowing reformist actors to move the process along quickly from inside the state apparatus while minimizing the opportunities of opposition forces to block or veto the process. As subnational parliament member, RS018 stresses the importance of gaining direct and strategic access to state power for participants of the women’s movement. Having a women’s movement participant working inside the state structure truly makes a difference because no one 199 Johnson and Saarinen, 2013. === [PDF page 105] === 105 but her in the government will follow through the women’s movement’s protests or demonstrations.200 The author will demonstrate the structural preconditions for gaining such direct access to state power in this chapter. This chapter further shows that geopolitics and the domestic political economy influence 1) how women’s movement organizations form networks of advocacy and, thus, 2) their chances of improving their progress for achieving the desired policy goal. The following section lays out the geopolitics and the domestic political economy in each period which this dissertation claims as the structural conditions for the Indonesian women’s movement to network with nonstate and state apparatuses. This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first main part discusses the structural conditions which shape the kinds of networking that women’s movement organizations can pursue. By networking, this chapter means the action of forming either a positive-sum or a letterhead coalition.201 The women’s movement organization’s perception of the structural conditions influences not only their decisions about the kind of network they would like to engage, but also the cost-benefit calculation made by the government. In other words, this dissertation complements existing studies which argue structural conditions are not only political but also gendered.202 The second main part reveals the ways in which women’s movement networks mobilize their agenda. Three modes of mobilization are identified, i.e., the women’s movement network 200 RS018, op. cit. 201 Tattersall, 2010; this dissertation follows Tattersall who conceptualizes positive-sum coalitions as networks that show organizational strength, a common concern, and scale; and letterhead coalitions as networks that are formed to showcase the number of groups agreeing on a particular issue or cause. 202 Caraway, 2010. === [PDF page 106] === 106 either challenges the state, collaborates with the state, or gains direct access to state power. Gaining direct access to state power means becoming a state actor, a paid staff member, or an unpaid volunteer, all within a ministry, state agency, or subnational government’s institution. In short, gaining direct access to state power also means holding formal positions right in the locus of policymaking. 3.2 Structural Conditions for Networking 3.2.1 The Old Order Period (1945-1965) The first movement goal for every women’s movement organization during Sukarno’s Old Order was a continuation of the movement goal set during colonial time, initially in 1928. The agenda was a postcolonial or newly independent Indonesia’s law on marriage. The dominant narrative to date about the establishment of the Indonesian state is that Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence in front of a few local political elites at Sukarno’s residence in Central Jakarta on August 17, 1945. The establishment was a speedy one as it was made right after news about the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki circulated over the radio.203 Part of the dominant narrative was the role of Fatmawati, independent Indonesia’s first First Lady, in sewing the red and white flag for the nation’s first ever flag-raising ceremony. Fatmawati’s recorded role was central to the Old Order and reflected the government’s efforts in shaping the modern state and society’s gendered expectations for Indonesian women. It remains unclear whether male state actors or elite women activists were the first to construct and diffuse 203 Mrazek, 2018. === [PDF page 107] === 107 the idea of “ibu bangsa” or mothers of the nation, but the term to date has carried significant weight on the Indonesian women’s movement organizations’ political mobilization. 204 During the Old Order, women as mothers of the nation were expected to have nurturing skills and qualities. The expectation was further amplified through the book Sarinah,205 which discusses President Sukarno’s views about women’s rights and role in society and is dedicated to his domestic worker named Sarinah. 206 Furthermore, Sukarno (who was and still is known to be a nationalist) explains in the book that he believes nation-building requires the building of societies, and such processes are dependent on women’s participation. For this reason, he took the initiative to conduct courses about and for women after the declaration of independence. 207 Sarinah is a compilation of Sukarno’s “teachings” for those courses when he was in Yogyakarta.208 Hence, contemporary Indonesian society’s predominant assumption of feminism as a western, imperialist, or colonial ideology can arguably be rooted in the narratives which Sukarno push in Sarinah and his public speeches. Contrary to most observers who view Indonesia’s rising Islamism in post-Reformasi as accompanying the increasing trend of domesticating women, 209 this dissertation argues that Sukarno’s ideas about gender equality already laid the groundwork for later rulers interested in further domesticating Indonesian women or strengthening the status quo.210 204 Dewi, 2020. 205 Sukarno, 1974. 206 Sarinah exerts a significant impact to date, such that contemporary Indonesian senior women’s rights activists even established The Sarinah Institute as an organization advocating for better women’s rights. 207 Sukarno, op. cit. 208 Indonesia’s capital city was moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta in 1946. 209 Chuzaifah, 2022. 210 See Bourchier (2015) on how Sukarno’s innovation of a National Council (Dewan Nasional) which includes women as “functional representatives” laid the groundwork for his successor, === [PDF page 108] === 108 Furthermore, Sukarno’s view of gender equality that is based on the notion of difference between men and women and his view of feminism being an imperialist concept were the prevailing views in the Old Order. The national parliament even established the 1958 Law on Citizenship which denied citizenship to local women who marry foreign nationals. 211 The 1958 Law on Citizenship also required that children born of parents with different citizenship automatically follow their fathers’ citizenship, thus making things complicated for Indonesian women’s custody rights when divorced. 212 In addition, the 1958 Law on Citizenship recognized polygyny and regulated men with more than one wife to seek all his wives’ approval before obtaining Indonesian citizenship. However, despite KOWANI’s commitment to stop polygyny, evidence of KOWANI’s objection to the Law on Citizenship is lacking. Bestowed with the assumption of women as mothers of the nation, KOWANI positioned itself as the peacekeeper in local conflicts. For example, after the ceasefire between the Dutch army and Indonesian nationalists, the United States and the United Nations held talks, on the Renville ship in 1948, for the Dutch and Indonesia to reach a peaceful agreement. While the Renville agreement succeeded in holding a truce between the Dutch and Indonesians, it essentially asked Indonesians to surrender to Dutch power.213 The KOWANI leadership in its 1948 annual congress then brought the subject of KOWANI’s taking an active role in mitigating the societal divide because of the Renville agreement.214 One of the ways which KOWANI Suharto, in demobilizing women activists and limiting political participation to women of status—as wives or daughters of a prominent man in politics. 211 Known in the Indonesian language as Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 62 Tahun 1958 tentang Kewarga-Negaraan Republik Indonesia. It was revised in 2006 and is currently known as the Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 12 Tahun 2006 tentang Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia. 212 Irianto and Hendrastiti, 2020. 213 Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, 2002 214 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 119. === [PDF page 109] === 109 undertook for that purpose was maintaining contact with their counterparts overseas, such as the Women’s International Democratic Federation, and conveying KOWANI’s protest to the United Nations’ Security Council through the Women’s International Democratic Federation’s platforms about the Netherlands’ August 1948 shootings of youths in Jakarta. 215 In 1949, KOWANI focused its work on building the newly independent Indonesia’s economy. KOWANI believed that expanding the production of goods was key to boosting economic growth. Hence, their action plan for making an economic contribution was conducted in at least five ways.216 First, KOWANI created programs to assist former war and political prisoners and their families in obtaining jobs. Second, KOWANI set a three-year plan of activities to eliminate illiteracy through providing women with courses and general knowledge on navigating home economics. Third, KOWANI ran scholarship programs for women. Fourth, KOWANI created childcare facilities. Fifth, KOWANI increased the creation of cooperative banks and cooperatives for consumers. However, food shortage was widespread across the Indonesian archipelago throughout the 1940s and 1950s,217 and hours of labor in the paddy fields and domestic care at home prevented women from taking a more active role in community organizing. GERWANI initiated reading and learning activities in the paddy fields for farmers— men and especially women—to learn to read and write. 218 GERWANI also voiced and wrote their demands to the Sukarno’s administration on monitoring the distribution of rice down to the 215 Ibid., p. 120. 216 KOWANI, op. cit., pp. 124-125. 217 Spar, 1996; Bosma, 2019. 218 RS002, op. cit. === [PDF page 110] === 110 village level.219 KOWANI supported GERWANI’s initiative by urging other women’s movement organizations within KOWANI to follow suit. The government during the Old Order was relatively democratic until 1957. The political system was open and liberal from 1950 until 1955, when the first national democratic elections were held.220 That posture continued through the regional elections of 1957, but then regional rebellions and the astonishing electoral successes of the PKI had led to the decline of Indonesian democracy.221 With GERWANI members being active leaders in KOWANI, the largest federation of women’s rights groups maintained its support of Sukarno as the revolutionary general of the newly independent nation’s fight against colonialism. Despite KOWANI’s position against polygynous practices,222 GERWANI as member organization of KOWANI would still regularly invite Sukarno to its anniversary celebrations every year. 223 There was no restriction for women to engage in political activism during the Old Order. In fact, part of the government’s propaganda was that every woman should contribute to the revolutionary struggle of maintaining Indonesia’s independence from foreign occupation. Being revolutionary women included supporting the annexation of the western area of Irian or today’s Papua, and Indonesian women’s movement organizations supported the annexation. KOWANI created the Special Committee on West Irian in 1957.224 As part of the KOWANI leadership, 219 ANRI Document of GERWANI Mojokerto correspondence with President Sukarno (April 8, 1958) 220 Horowitz, 2013. 221 Feith, 2006. 222 RS002, op. cit.; she asserts that GERWANI’s enemies were not only capitalists and imperialists but also polygynists. 223 ANRI Document No. NST.51/62 (Amanat PJM President Sukarno Pada Kongres GERWANI Ke-IV, Gedung Wanita, Djakarta, 14 Desember 1961); and NS7.564/65 (Amanat PJM President Sukarno Pada Peringatan 15 Tahun GERWANI di Istora, Senajan, Djakarta, 8 Djuni 1965) 224 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 153. === [PDF page 111] === 111 GERWANI even took part as treasurer of the Special Committee on West Irian and collaborated with the military forces. The ibu bangsa propaganda drove KOWANI’s activities of educating girls and women in West Irian. With the assumption of Western Indonesian girls and women as closer to the center of development and therefore more “modern,” KOWANI supported West Irian’s regional government’s creation of the West Irian Women’s Association (PERWIB) in 1964.225 KOWANI even organized programs specifically for Irian girls and women through PERWIB. Most scholars would view Sukarno as the Indonesian leader who could have made better economic policies but did not, for fear of foreign colonial forces creeping back into the archipelago.226 Western countries were aware of postcolonial states’ major efforts of indigenizing and nationalizing foreign companies. However, the Old Order government was torn between Sukarno’s nationalistic agenda to Indonesianize the economy and Hatta’s realistic view of the importance of western capital and expertise in rebuilding the newly independent state’s economy.227 Furthermore, the newly independent Indonesia had to take on the Dutch colonial government’s billion guilders of debt. 228 In terms of gendered job segments, textile companies had been one of the main drivers of economic growth since the 1930s and women had been key workers in this segment.229 Women during the Old Order government worked in not only the 225 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 202. 226 However, there is very little evidence that he paid close attention to economic policies. His attitude toward the economy was highly erratic. His main goal was to hold on to power and prevent violence and fragmentation among major domestic groups. His economic policy failures ensured that he would fail in both respects—something he surely did not want. 227 White, 2012. 228 Clerx, 1992. 229 Van der Eng, 2013. === [PDF page 112] === 112 local traditional markets but also farms and plantations.230 It was not until the 1950s that women’s work shifted to the informal sector and primarily domestic care. 231 Parallel to the economic and political turmoil at the national and subnational levels, KOWANI also experienced quite a dramatic change in 1950. KOWANI exited from the Women’s International Democratic Federation. 232 Later, in 1954, GERWANI filled the leadership position in KOWANI and pushed for KOWANI’s reentry to the Women’s International Democratic Federation.233 In the words of GERWANI’s former leader of the GERWANI branch in Central Java’s locality: “There was no women’s rights group like GERWANI that had external networks.”234 KOWANI’s relationship with the Women’s International Democratic Federation, through its GERWANI members’ participation in the Federation’s activities, drove many of KOWANI’s political campaigns domestically. 235 Issues such as the real conditions regarding women’s ability to enjoy their constitutional rights and of women workers’ rights were often brought to the table of discussions in Women’s International Democratic Federation’s congresses. In 1958, the Old Order government established the Institute of Atomic Energy or Lembaga Tenaga Atom (precursor to its expanded version, the Indonesian Nuclear Agency or Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional). KOWANI in the same year declared its support of using nuclear energy for peaceful purpose. 236 Sukarno also wrote to The New Statesmen, a London-based magazine, commemorating Indonesia’s anti-H bomb week and condemning Western countries’ 230 RS002, op. cit. 231 Dick, 2002; RS063, Personal Interview in Yogyakarta, August 3, 2019. 232 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 136. 233 McGregor, 2012. 234 RS002, op. cit. 235 McGregor, op. cit., p. 199. 236 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 157. === [PDF page 113] === 113 nuclear arms race as another form of colonizing Asians.237 However, Indonesia then produced its first successful nuclear reaction in 1964, 238 and Sukarno announced plans for producing the country’s own nuclear bomb to attendees of the 36th Muhammadiyah Congress in 1965. 239 There is little evidence of KOWANI’s critique of Sukarno’s move whatsoever. Nevertheless, much evidence suggests that KOWANI’s decisions sometime could be the opposite of Sukarno’s political moves. For example, during the 1960s, China’s deteriorating relations with India motivated the PRC’s attempts to give Sukarno the impression that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was planning on taking over the leadership of Sukarno’s anti-imperialist movement initiative.240 In 1964, KOWANI initiated becoming host of the second Women’s Asian-Afro Conference.241 Meanwhile, Sukarno was more interested in cofounding the conference of non-aligned countries with India and Yugoslavia than in organizing the Second Bandung Conference.242 However, the conference of non-aligned countries rejected Sukarno because of his Konfrontasi or “Confrontation with Malaysia” campaign, and Sukarno withdrew Indonesian membership from the United Nations when Malaysia entered the UN Security Council. Yet, KOWANI supported Sukarno’s Konfrontasi campaign and Indonesia’s membership withdrawal from the United Nations. KOWANI had not been shy in allying closely with the Indonesian state. Following the economic nationalism in the early 1950s, ethnically Chinese people in islands outside of Java who identified themselves as supporters of the Kuomintang government were either arrested or 237 Zhou, 2019. 238 Siwabessy, 1979; Rachman et. al., 2014. 239 Zhou, op. cit., pp. 89, 103. 240 Zhou, 2015. 241 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 173. 242 Zhou, op. cit., p. 215 === [PDF page 114] === 114 murdered.243 The Chinese government in Taipei supported rebellions in Sulawesi and therefore the Indonesian government closed all Taipei-affiliated schools in Jakarta during 1958. 244 In light of this series of events, KOWANI urged or supported the Old Order government in putting sanctions against the Kuomintang government. 245 The Old Order did not have the apparatus to repress women activists whose ideas did not align with the government. However, KOWANI’s proximity to the government contributed to the tremendous number of obstacles for women whose ideas did not resonate with the government’s. These women included members of the groups that were KOWANI’s members. Hence, fragmentation within KOWANI emerged and widened, with the dismissal of GERWANI as a member during the climax in 1965. GERWANI’s position as the motor of KOWANI failed to achieve the women’s movement’s goal of establishing a Law on Marriage. 3.2.2 The New Order Period (1966-1998) The annihilation of GERWANI, the PKI-affiliated women’s rights group, and the persecution of its members and alleged sympathizers paved the way to the New Order’s centralization of women’s rights activism. The start of the New Order was animated by maneuvers to consolidate Suharto’s rise to power and repress Sukarno’s supporters. Building the image of politically active women as potentially communists was central to controlling women and producing policies that strengthened gender inequality. 243 Goto, 1997; Dick, 2002, op. cit. 244 Zhou, op. cit., p. 218. 245 Ibid.; ANRI Document of correspondence between GERWANI’s Modjokerto Chapter and President Sukarno (April 8, 1958). === [PDF page 115] === 115 Beginning in the late 1960s, foreign-funded projects in places with rich mineral resources such as South Sulawesi province’s Soroako mining town, home to Canadian-funded nickel mining and a processing plant, proliferated. 246 Changing patterns of marriage between locals and transmigrants, between Javanese and Sundanese elites, and with foreign nationals emerged. 247 The Suharto government’s policy also shifted from the 1978 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) which placed a double burden on women and the 1983 GBHN which defined the Family Welfare Movement’s (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK) role in spurring national development through “educating women” for the welfare of families from across Indonesia’s urban and rural areas248 to the 1993 GBHN which mentioned the much-needed awareness for both women and men that they were responsible for their children’s education.249 GBHN was a long-term development plan produced by Suharto’s administration, and a term not used since the beginning of Post-Reformasi; but GBHN is similar to the National Long-Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional, RPJP-N) that has been used as government agencies’ reference point since Yudhoyono’s administration.250 The New Order government’s industrialization policies increased opportunities for women to work in the formal sector. For a large country, Indonesia had been one of the least industrialized countries in the world. 251 Nevertheless, it followed the trend of countries that 246 Robinson, 1986; 1998. 247 Robinson, op. cit. 248 Robinson, 2008. 249 Ahmad, 1993; Sen, 1998. 250 Saroso, W (August 20, 2019). “GBHN and Effectiveness of Development Planning.” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://www.kompas.id/baca/utama/2019/08/20/gbhn-andeffectiveness-of-development-planning. 251 Hill, 1990; 1993. === [PDF page 116] === 116 followed the path of export-oriented industrialization and increasingly feminized their laborintensive industries as a result. 252 However, the gendered ideas shared by factory owners and managers in Indonesia since the 1970s contribute to the detrimental effects of workforce feminization.253 Indonesia’s strong labor unions have further implicated the negative impacts of workforce feminization.254 In the second half of the New Order, Suharto ratified the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and translated it into national law (1984 Law on the Ratification of CEDAW). Following the ratification, as well as the 1985 Law on Mass Organizations, women were able to organize politically. Although their existence was legitimate only if they had registered their organization’s details, including the names of members, to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 255 the number of liberal and reformist women’s movement networks started to flourish. Perhaps one notable opportunity being structured in 1995 was Asyiyah’s success in initiating changes within the larger Muhammadiyah organization— having women leaders in its religious council. 256 The government’s ibuism ideology has solidified its state apparatuses and the larger Indonesian society’s gendered expectations toward women. Although the New Order government started to promote the image of “working women” in the late 1980s, 257 diffusion of the “working women” narratives overlooked the needs and hardships which working women in middle- and lower-income households faced. Industrialization under Suharto’s rule was export-oriented and 252 Benería, 2001., Caraway, 2007. 253 Caraway, op. cit., pp. 36-61. 254Ibid., p. 4. 255 Hadiwinata, 2003. 256 Syamsiyatun, 2007. 257 Sen, op. cit. === [PDF page 117] === 117 labor-intensive.258 Although KOWANI managed to materialize the Law on Marriage in 1974, gender inequality persisted with the enabling of polygyny practices through the 1974 Law on Marriage; in addition, the feminization of the formal, labor-intensive sector did not improve the work conditions nor pay structure for women workers.259 The 1974 Law on Marriage explicitly allows men to marry more than one woman if his wife could not perform her obligations as wife, is disabled or suffers an incurable disease, and/or could not give birth to his offspring. The 1974 Law on Marriage also allows both men and women to file for divorce on the condition that it is filed through the state court. When the law first emerged to the public, Muslim organizations, including Muslim university students’ organizations, protested the government’s encroachment on their Islamic values about marriage. 260 KOWANI representatives regretted the government’s marginalization of women’s participation in the law’s formulation process.261 Nevertheless, KOWANI remained supportive of the government and “sympathetic” to the law’s contents. 262 Given the authoritarian context and the lack of a reformist women’s movement, the substance of the 1974 Law on Marriage reasserts the domestication and subordination of women to men. Women today would view the 1974 Law on Marriage as a subordination of women in the private sphere.263 Nevertheless, the “progressive” element during that time was the clause which limits men who have interests in practicing polygyny. 258 Caraway, op. cit., p. 24-32 259 Caraway, op. cit., p. 27-28, 160-167. 260 Aprianto, 2018. 261 Ibid., p. 84. 262 KOWANI, op.cit., p. 336 263 Nurbayanti, 2020. === [PDF page 118] === 118 3.2.3 The Post-Reformasi Period (2001-Present) Post-Reformasi was preceded by a brief period of Reformasi (1998-2001). The Reformasi period was the Indonesian state’s transition from authoritarian to democratic rule through three events. The first was the resignation of Suharto after a series of protests led by women and university students as well as riots in May 1998. The second was the indirect election of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati as president and vice president, respectively. The ultimate event which marked the end of the democratic transition was Wahid’s impeachment and Megawati’s succession as president, along with the appointment of Hamzah Haz as vice president. With the third event, Indonesia’s democracy had been pretty much consolidated. During the brief transition, a key institution established by Habibie, as Suharto’s successor, was the decentralization policies. The set of policies comprises a package of nonsequential devolution of power from the central to subnational governments, with immediate implications for the rights of minorities including women. While the reform was lauded by international organizations at the time of the policies’ launch, critics later questioned the move’s positive contributions to Indonesia’s democratization. The early Post-Reformasi government’s nonsequential decentralization 264 set the stage for religious bylaws at the subnational level.265 While most of these bylaws have sharia features, some have features of Christian fundamentalism. Komnas Perempuan has publicized the discriminatory features of the bylaws and approached subnational governments to revoke the bylaws. Nevertheless, decentralization nurtures the development of outright conservatism, such that a regulation on anti-propaganda of sexual deviance was established in 2021 by the regent of 264 Falleti, 2005. 265 Candraningrum, 2007; Buehler, 2016; Amirullah, 2018; Afrianty, 2019. === [PDF page 119] === 119 Bogor. Women’s activism was highly centralized in Jakarta and thus reformist women were not able to confront the local-level politics around these bylaws. On the one hand, Indonesia’s manufacturing sector made a positive contribution to the increase of exports and, in turn, consumer spending and unanticipated economic recovery by the third quarter of 2000.266 On the other hand, the post-1997 Asian Financial Crisis furthered the Indonesian economy’s vulnerabilities to the United States’ economic slowdown. 267 Nevertheless, the topic of Indonesia’s manufacturing-led economic recovery cannot be separated from the problems of increased feminization of factories. By the World Bank’s standard, Indonesia in late 2003 got out of the Asian Financial Crisis and its national focus moved from managing the crisis to spurring growth rates. 268 Post- Reformasi Indonesia has seen physical infrastructure development as means to promote economic growth.269 Improved physical infrastructure development increases security in areas usually inaccessible by vehicles or even unsafe for pedestrians to walk through. Consequently, women’s perceived threat of sexual assault, harassment, or even murder gradually diminishes and, in turn, their competitive advantage in the formal labor force, relative to their male counterpart’s competitive advantage, increases. RS008, a senior woman activist who has been active participant of the reformist women’s movement network for years, became a member of the national parliament during Reformasi and the early period of Post-Reformasi government. She dubs 2004-2009 the “golden period” for 266 Bird, 2001. 267 Ibid.; and 1.2.1. Indonesian economy growing but slowing down in the last quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001. (2001). The Indonesian Economy. Retrieved December 31, 2022 268 Davidson, 2015. 269 Ibid. === [PDF page 120] === 120 gender equality.270 The golden period refers to the 14 national legislations that did not explicitly regulate gender relations but included perspectives about gender. For example, she succeeded in expanding the definitions of witness and victim, from delimiting them within the framework of human rights violation to including them within the framework of any form of violence against women. Another example is the revised 1958 Law on Citizenship in 2005. Her collaboration with the reformist and liberal women’s movement networks and advocacy within the national House of Representatives (DPR) proved successful, as Indonesian women would no longer lose their citizenship automatically because of their legal spouse’s citizenship. Thus, RS008 is also another case of a reformist women’s movement network participant who managed to gain access to state power and win policy change under structural conditions that were more democratic than the New Order period. Stronger guarantees of citizens’ constitutional rights to assemble, acquire knowledge, and hold branches of government accountable enable Indonesians to be active users of social media. Digital technology increasingly becomes a convenient tool for women’s rights groups, particularly those with young women holding most of the group membership, to mobilize and diffuse their ideas about and interests in gender equality. Social media increase the visibility of diverse women’s movement networks as well as the resources for women’s movement networks to spread awareness of their movements’ agenda to a broader audience. Post-Reformasi Indonesia enables the establishment of electoral institutions which set a larger stage for more women to grab formal political leadership, but in practice these institutions are tilted toward women with oligarchic networks’ favor.271 270 RS008, Personal Interview in Jakarta, October 2, 2019. 271 Kusumaningtyas, Dewi and Izzati 2017; Dewi, 2022. === [PDF page 121] === 121 Soon after the fall of the New Order, NU leaders who had been concerned with issues of gender equality and how Islam is the way to realize it established Fahmina in 1999. 272 This establishment coincides with the founding of the Justice Party or Partai Keadilan (PKS’ earlier version) by a group of pious Muslim women activists in 1999. Fahmina, Rahima, and Alimat years later formed the network of progressive Muslim woman intellectuals or the Indonesian Woman Ulama Congress (KUPI) which comprises religious leaders whose main goal is to promote Islam as driver of gender justice and equality.273 Democratic transitions also decentralize opportunities for the women’s movement. With this double movement of decentralization at the level of both formal and informal institutions institutions, the available opportunities can easily transform into obstacles in the long run, if one puts all her eggs in one basket. In 1998, most women’s movement organizations that used to work in communities shifted their focus and transformed into policy advocacy-oriented groups. They left their bases open to religious conservative women’s rights groups that are just as capable of organizing their communities. 274 This change can arguably be described as a matter of women’s rights activists having been overly Jakarta-focused.275 The migration is correlated with conditions during the New Order in which narratives about domesticating women were prevalent, and therefore the reaction to the New Order’s dominating narratives about women’s subordination and domestication after Reformasi was women pushing other women to prioritize populating the public spheres. 276 272 Rinaldo, 2013; Nisa, 2019. 273 Nisa, op. cit. 274 RS036, Personal Interview in Jakarta, July 30, 2019. 275 Mulligan, 2004, p. 123. 276 RS013, Personal Interview in Depok, September 23, 2019. === [PDF page 122] === 122 What is happening at the global level can instigate changes at the national level, and this applies to military institutions as well. The Indonesian military institution started opening its military academy to women when military institutions of several Western countries had started to open, and when United Nations Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon requested the assignment of an all-women peacekeeper unit from Indonesia in several areas of conflict. 277 The recruitment of more women to the Indonesian armed forces even encouraged Indonesia’s first woman to serve as foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, to initiate guidelines for states to support the increasing participation of women in peacekeeping duties. 278 Social media also demand extra resources from women’s movement networks, adding or expanding the field for winning the battle of competing discourses and of attracting followers, members, allies, and donors. The placement of women’s rights issues in the House of Representatives’ Commission VIII plays a role in building one of the many obstacles Indonesian women face today. RS008 recognizes her failure in keeping women’s rights issues away from Commission VIII.279 The House of Representatives’ Commission VIII oversees issues on religion, social welfare, disaster relief, and child protection, whereas Commission III oversees issues on law, human rights, and national security. RS008 fought for the allocation of women’s rights issues to Commission III. Her consideration was because women’s rights are human rights.280 She lost the fight to the camp which called for the allocation of women’s rights be placed with issues on child protection, social welfare, and religion. She recalled one notable defender of that camp was Badriyah Fayumi from the National Awakening Party (PKB). 277 Timur, 2016. 278 Newby and Sebag, 2020. 279 RS008, op. cit. 280 Friedman, 2018. === [PDF page 123] === 123 This dissertation does not view placing the women’s issues in the same commission which oversees religious issues as morally wrong. However, relative to placing women’s issues in the same commission which oversees human’s rights issues, the former creates greater obstacles to achieving gender equality in subsequent years. The obstacles are represented by the configuration of parliament members in the respective commissions. While Commission III which oversees human rights issues are generally dominated by former key human rights movement actors, Commission VIII which oversees religious issues is predominantly filled by religious leaders with a conservative mass base. Hence, the chance of getting a bill that advances gender equality passed has been slim. For example, Commission VIII stalled deliberations about the 2014 Bill on Gender Justice and Equality and the 2016 Bill on Sexual Violence Elimination. Another, separate unit within the DPR had to take over the role of leading deliberations about the Bill on Sexual Violence Elimination and the unit, not Commission VIII, finally passed it as the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes in 2022. The brief Reformasi period gave enough time, room, and energy for women of the Tarbiyah movement to organize politically and join their male counterparts in forming a political party which suits their ideology. The formation of the PKS has energized its women members in creating allying Islamic women’s rights group such as Salimah and networks such as AILA.281 PKS itself has its own women affairs division which later developed into the Women and Family Resilience Division. The division is key in promulgating the idea of family resilience. Family resilience legislations proliferated at the subnational level circa 2014. At the national level, however, the Family Resilience Bill was first formulated only in 2019, by senators or the nonpartisan members of the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, 281 RS011, op. cit. === [PDF page 124] === 124 DPD). The DPD is less powerful than the DPR but is equivalent to the British Upper House or American Senate. PKS sponsored the Family Resilience Bill to enter the first phase of harmonization at the national parliament (DPR) in 2020—right after the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill was withdrawn from the Prioritized National Legislation Program for the third time in the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill’s eighth year. 282 The Family Resilience Bill regulates Indonesian households’ housing standards, wives’ duties, management of families’ data, etc. The bill also requires the national government to allocate funds for “rehabilitating” households with family members who are lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders. Most opponents view the Family Resilience Bill as a setback to women’s decades-long struggle for gender equality.283 A few other opponents view the bill as an attempt by the PKS and AILA to promote religious conservatism and further push their political agenda to Islamize Indonesian societies according to their conservative worldview, through distorting the concept of gender equality.284 In other words, ratifying the Family Resilience Bill can expand the conservative and Islamists’ mass base. The Family Resilience Bill eventually reached a stalemate in late November 2020, with a 5-4 vote count against the PKS’ favor.285 282 One of the pioneers of the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill asserts that the bill was first drafted in 2012; see Rahayu, N. (January 23, 2022). “Jalan Terjal RUU P-KS Menjadi RUU TPKS [The Sexual Violence Elimination Bill’s Steep Road to being Law].” Retrieved January 27, 2022, from https://www.jalastoria.id/jalan-terjal-ruu-p-ks-menjadi-ruu-tpks/. 283 Susiana, 2020; Astuti, 2021. 284 Nurmila, 2020. See also Asumsi.co interviews with woman activist Tunggal Pawestri on February 19, 2020, and political scientist Bakir Ihsan on February 21, 2020, at Ramadhan. (March 4, 2021). “Gerak Senyap PKS di Balik Kontroversi RUU Ketahanan Keluarga [PKS’ Silent Movement behind the Family Resilience Bill Controversy].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://asumsi.co/post/4059/gerak-senyap-pks-di-balik-kontroversi-ruu-ketahanankeluarga. 285 Republika.co.id. (November 24, 2020). "RUU Ketahanan Keluarga Kandas, Pengusul Bersedih [Sponsors of the Family Resilience Bill saddened by its stalemate]." Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qkag45409/ruu-ketahanankeluarga-kandas-pengusul-bersedih and Putri, B. U. (November 24, 2020). “Saat Golkar === [PDF page 125] === 125 Democratization after 1998 has decentralized not only state power to the subnational level, but also control to the community level. 286 Stigma and persecution of women and people who are seen as showing non-conforming gender expressions have become even more prevalent. Violent repression is so decentralized that women’s movement networks have not been able to keep up with the resources needed to advocate for their communities. Hence, networks often mobilize sporadically and dependent on whoever still has the energy to draft petitions or other organizing activities.287 In some ways, raising citizens’ awareness through social media campaigns raises the visibility of the issues at stake and women’s movement network’ profile. Increasing visibility also raises the chance of adding fuel to counter-movements and the state’s apparatus of surveillance. Furthermore, placing viewers or social media users’ engagement as an indicator of the movement’s reach can be debilitating psychologically and organizationally. Statistics of virtual engagement may overlook the work needed offline to attract more supporters or expand followership. Increasing the visibility of issues at stake is not enough, absent direct access to state structures of power. The following section discusses the modes of mobilization which a women’s movement network chooses as strategy to achieve the policy of its interest. Tersinggung PKS, Lalu Sindir Gerindra soal RUU Ketahanan Keluarga [Golkar Offended by PKS and Quipped GERINDRA Party on the Family Resilience Bill].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://nasional.tempo.co/read/ 1408374/saat-golkar-tersinggung-pks-lalu-sindirgerindra-soal-ruu-ketahanan-keluarga. 286 RS016, op. cit. 287 Ibid. === [PDF page 126] === 126 3.3 Modes of Mobilization 3.3.1 Collaborating with the State KOWANI mobilized its ideas and goals around the government’s gender ideology. Consider the gender ideology of the Old Order. The Old Order placed emphasis on women as having the equal amount of duty as men to participate in the revolutionary struggle against foreign imperialism. KOWANI, therefore, focused its works on rehabilitating former political prisoners during Dutch and Japanese occupations to have access to jobs, mobilizing Indonesian identity as an independent nation to conferences overseas, creating military women’s forces, garnering women’s support for Sukarno’s Konfrontasi campaign, etc. Then, consider the New Order’s gender ideology. The New Order domesticated women and relied on women’s subordination and care labor to sustain the government’s developmental agenda. KOWANI kicked off its close collaboration with the New Order government by cancelling GERWANI’s membership and ejecting symphatizers of the PKI and GERWANI from the federation. Then, KOWANI wrote a resolution out of its extraordinary congress which states, among other things, that women’s primary dutyis to be fully devoted to being her husband’s companion, a housewife, and the nation’s mother or ibu bangsa.288 During the Old Order, KOWANI collaborated with the government in at least three key areas: social mobility, domestic political consolidation, and foreign affairs. For social mobility, KOWANI focused on regulating civil unions or marriage, combating illiteracy, and increasing employability skills. One of KOWANI’s early steps to push for a pro-woman regulation on marriage in postcolonial time was to emphasize the status of women as equal to men as written 288 See Suryakusuma (1988) for a deeper discussion on the implications of this part of the resolution. === [PDF page 127] === 127 in Article 27 of the 1945 Constitution. Although KOWANI since 1947 had been very engaged in activities to stop forced marriages and child marriages, the renewed emphasis on women’s equality with men before the law was set forth in KOWANI’s 1948 congress. Then, in 1950, KOWANI narrowed to two actions its goal of realizing a marriage law that does justice for women. The first is collaborating with the Ministry of Religious Affairs in monitoring the equal representation of men and women in the ministry’s Committee for the Study of Marriage Laws (Panitia Penyelidik Hukum Perkawinan). The second is supplying the committee and Ministry of Religious Affairs with studies on the place of women in marriage according to local customary as well as religious law. While the advocacy for a marriage law was a constant goal throughout KOWANI’s existence in the Old Order, KOWANI particularly set it as the network’s main agenda in the 1955 and 1958 congresses. In its 1957-1959 public report,289 the Ministry of Religious Affairs stated its success in collaborating with women’s organizations since 1955, through the establishment of the Committee for Marriage Counsel and Divorce Proceedings in Jakarta, Bandung, and other regions. Furthermore, main concerns in the report of the Ministry of Religious Affairs included 1) the rising trend of Indonesian Muslims getting married overseas and 2) the increasing divorce rate. Meanwhile, KOWANI’s major and longheld concern since 1928 was to generate a renewed and just bill on marriage and passing it as soon as possible. No mention of such a bill was noted by the religious affairs minister in the 1957-1959 report. By its 1949 congress, KOWANI had committed to set up scholarship funds for young women to go to school as part of its focus on combating illiteracy. However, KOWANI in 1952 289 Archived report of the 1957-1959 cabinet to the People’s Consultative Assembly (Menjelang Dua Tahun Kabinet Kerja Wilopo). === [PDF page 128] === 128 focused its programs primarily on moral education. The network’s three main programmatic goals were to organize as many courses as possible on religion and ethics, increase women’s representation in religious courts, and strengthen women’s participation in subnational and national elections. KOWANI translated these goals into executing special education programs for officials whose job was to administer matrimonies, divorces, and reconciliations. It also ran strict monitoring of posters, magazines, ads, and other publications that violate ethical or moral standards. In its 1946 congress, KOWANI established the Center for Indonesian Women’s Struggle (Pusat Tenaga Perjuangan Wanita Indonesia). One of the four core features of the Center’s works was workers’ issues. In addition to prioritizing programs of improving former political prisoners’ access to jobs, KOWANI in 1949 also emphasized activities that encourage goods production and developed a three-year plan to organize courses for upgrading women’s general knowledge and employability skills. KOWANI’s Center for Indonesian Women’s Struggle even conducted a survey of women workers’ pay in government agencies and private companies in 1952. Furthermore, the Center for Indonesian Women’s Struggle fervently fought against unemployment by establishing a job hub (werk centrale) and conducting studies on the feasibility of a national bill on workers’ allowance and pension funds. The work agenda of 1952 was very coherent because KOWANI also established daycare services. On the one hand, KOWANI recognized (or sustained) the caring labor in the family which women workers still had to endure. On the other hand, KOWANI was consistent in its promotion of women’s capability and freedom to participate in the workforce and earn their own money.290 These two positions indicate KOWANI’s inclination to improve’s womens rights and status without 290 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 139. === [PDF page 129] === 129 challenging patriarchy’s notion about division of labor in the family—a characteristic of the liberal women’s movement network in Indonesia. With regards to domestic political consolidation, KOWANI collaborated with the government through two ways: 1) centralizing the Indonesian women’s movements and 2) feminizing the Indonesian armed forces. KOWANI centralized the Indonesian women’s movements by urging all political party members’ wives and daughters to participate in and be active members of KOWANI.291 It also proclaimed KOWANI to be the only federation of legitimate women’s rights organizations across the Indonesian archipelago. The reason for this call is undocumented, but it is safe to assume that KOWANI made the call in order to mitigate further fragmentation and unite all women, should conflicts arise among the male-dominated political parties.292 KOWANI played a key role in feminizing the Indonesian armed forces. One of the first KOWANI programs was organizing trainings on using firearms and public kitchens for soldiers.293 Then, at the start of the Old Order’s period of Guided Democracy, KOWANI cooperated with the Military Youth (Pemuda Militer) to discuss the West Irian issue and to form a collaborative division between women and the military, in 1957 and 1958, respectively. 294 More importantly, KOWANI actively participated in the establishment of the women’s corps in the armed forces by of its membership in the Committee of Eight for the establishment of the Women’s Army Corps in 1959. KOWANI also initiated the formation of the Committee of Counselors for the establishment of the Women’s Army Corps in 1961. Furthermore, KOWANI 291 Ibid., pp. 112, 114. 292 This call or initiative continued throughout the New Order, but not Post-Reformasi. 293 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 110. 294 Today’s Papua was known as West Irian (Irian Barat). === [PDF page 130] === 130 also played a role in the establishment of the Women’s Navy Corps and Women’s Air Force Corps in 1963. In full support of the Old Order government, KOWANI in 1964 formed its own volunteers’ front to aid the campaign of confronting Malaysia, widely known as ‘Ganyang Malaysia.’ Collaborating with the state has been a major strategy of KOWANI from its inception to date. At the heart of its establishment is developing women who would bring success to Indonesia as a nation state, by living the state-sanctioned life of dutiful wives and mothers. Nevertheless, KOWANI’s forms of collaboration vary as much as the development of the network’s configuration of member organizations. In terms of foreign affairs, for example, KOWANI was outgoing and connecting with women’s movement network overseas between 1947 and 1950, when Siti Mangunpuspito of the Women’s Association of the Republic of Indonesia (PERWARI) filled the KOWANI leadership position. 295 Mirroring the Old Order’s active non-bloc position (bebas aktif), KOWANI developed a close relationship with the Soviet Union and sent its members information about the Soviet Women’s Committee’ activities in 1956, but it also sent a statement condemning the Russian state’s violent intervention in the Hungarian revolution. Furthermore, KOWANI sent its members to the United Nations in New York to attend the Status of Women Commission’s assembly in 1957. KOWANI’s close collaboration with the Old Order led to the Indonesian state’s ratification of “The Political Rights of Women” by Prime Minister Juanda’s administration in 1958.296 In short, KOWANI mobilized for not only domestic but also global political demands. KOWANI was very 295 Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1991. 296 Archived report of the 1957-1959 cabinet to the People’s Consultative Assembly (Menjelang Dua Tahun Kabinet Kerja Wilopo), op. cit. === [PDF page 131] === 131 outgoing, especially during 1964. 297 Most of its programs touched upon its relations with fellow women’s movements all over the world. KOWANI explicitly took the position of supporter of Sukarno-initiated New Emerging Forces. KOWANI thought it would follow through Sukarno’s aspirations by initiating the second Asian African Women’s Conference. At home, KOWANI organized preparations for the commemoration of the Asian African Conference’s 10 th anniversary, by inviting a coalition of women from the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Guinea, South Vietnam, and Iran to the city of Bandung in West Java, Indonesia. Furthermore, it became host to visiting women’s rights groups from socialist-leaning countries such as the Soviet Union, Hungary, East Germany, North Vietnam, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China. Then, KOWANI also sent its members from Nahdlatul Ulama’s Muslimat and GERWANI to North Korea and the PRC, as a response to the respective countries’ invitation to KOWANI to attend a series of network-building meetings. KOWANI also sent its leaders to Algeria for the AFRO ASIA conference, which is a different conference from the Asian African Conference. KOWANI furthered its relationship with the Hungarian women’s movements by flying some of its members to Budapest to witness the Labor Day celebrations. KOWANI’s position of collaborating with the government became stronger in 1964 and 1965. First, KOWANI supported the Gerakan Wanita Marhaenis, formerly known as the Indonesian Women Democrats who were affiliated with the nationalist party (PNI), in officially proclaiming Sukarno to be the “Grand Advisor of the Indonesian Revolutionary Women’s Movement.” Then, KOWANI advocated for Indonesia’s exit from the United Nations and participated in DWIKORA cadres’ training. 298 297 KOWANI, op. cit., pp. 177-178 298 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 173; DWIKORA is the military operations to resist the Malaysian state’s creation. === [PDF page 132] === 132 3.3.2 Gaining Direct Access to State Power In the field of formal political representation, KOWANI in 1952 started a serious focus on gaining direct access to state power by pushing women’s numeric representation further in two arenas within the state structure, namely, the parliament and religious courts. In the lead up to the 1955 general election, the PKI approached GERWANI to be allies for electoral ends. 299 The same goes for KOWANI’s member organizations such as Aisyiyah, the Catholic Women (Wanita Katolik), and Indonesian Women Democrats (Wanita Demokrat Indonesia) who were approached by other parties. The Masyumi Party approached Aisyiyah to garner votes from the Muhammadiyah followers, while the Catholic Party approached Wanita Katolik to organize Catholic women voters. The nationalist party of PNI approached Wanita Demokrat Indonesia to mobilize nationalist women’s votes. The PNI also approached PERWARI to coalesce closely for the general election, but PERWARI declined. Nevertheless, a PERWARI member named Supeni was a PNI member and the party’s de facto ambassador who would go around Indonesia to talk to PNI cadres about strategies to win the election. 300 Hence, another strategy of having direct access to state power is having as many members of the same movement network as possible, without necessarily mobilizing under or on behalf of the movement network’s interests. From a cost-benefit perspective, PNI was relatively more powerful than PERWARI, and therefore filling positions of power within the state with a PNI instead of a PERWARI ticket was strategic. These member organizations of KOWANI may have mobilized as individual organizations in this regard. Nevertheless, KOWANI as a network succeeded in realizing its goal 299 Janti, N. (March 9, 2019). “Perempuan dalam Pemilu Pertama [Women in the First Election].”Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://historia.id/politik/articles/perempuandalam-pemilu-pertama-6k4qn/page/1. 300 Janti, op. cit. === [PDF page 133] === 133 of pushing women’s numeric representation in the 1955 parliament. For the first and historic election, women filled 7.4% or 19 of the total 257 seats in the parliament. 301 Consider the election results in 1987 and 2002 when women filled, respectively, only 8.5% and 8.8% of the total seats in parliament. Beyond the election arena, KOWANI succeeded in officiating two women in the religious court’s office in 1959. These two women were part of the twelve women who graduated in 1957 from the Religious Affairs Ministry’s 1956 training course and examination for female civil servants in the religious courts. Pushing for more women to fill positions in the religious courts ahead of the renewed marriage law was strategic. Even more strategic is that KOWANI was directly involved in the trainings and examination; thus, KOWANI was able to maximize opportunities for inserting women who share similar perspectives with KOWANI’s about marriage and other gender issues. In other words, through close engagement with the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ programs, especially those related to marriage, KOWANI could deter the opposition of the network’s gender ideology from gaining proximity to the state apparatus which regulates marriage. Furthermore, cases such as Mahmudah Mawardi can be enablers of further opening political opportunity structures. Mawardi was member of Muslimat, KOWANI’s member organization. She worked in the Religious Affairs Ministry in the early 1950s and 301 Ibid. However, Parawansa (2002) argues that Indonesian women reached a 6.5 percentage instead. For the growth of women’s representation in parliament over time, see also The World Bank. “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) - Indonesia.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS? locations=ID. === [PDF page 134] === 134 became a parliament member by winning the 1955 election. Winning her political tenure in the parliament allowed her to closely engage with the drafting of the Bill on Marriage. 302 The 1945 Constitution which recognizes the equality of men and women before the law was reinstated in 1959. Following the spirit of the Constitution that was relatively progressive for its time, KOWANI aimed for gender equality in every state institution including the military. KOWANI leaders filled positions in the government’s Team of Eight which prepared the establishment of the women army corps, or KOWAD. KOWANI also strived to achieve the global standard of equality in the military by having women taking combat roles. One of KOWANI’s members who went to and took combat roles was Moeljati, the secretary of Pemuda Putri Indonesia.303 Then in 1961, KOWANI proposed the creation of an Advising Committee for KOWAD’s establishment. Essentially, this committee advised the Team of Eight. KOWANI also sent two of its members to be candidates for core team membership in the women’s army. In the same year, KOWANI also joined the national front for supporting TRIKORA. KOWANI’s actively gaining strategic positions in government task forces related to women in the military was deemed fruitful. The establishment of the women’s navy and air forces corps materialized in 1963. Furthermore, KOWANI also created a volunteers’ front to support the Ganyang Malaysia campaign in 1964. KOWANI played a key role in many of the Old Order’s offensive policies in strengthening the government’s power. Even before 1959, a GERWANI leader had become treasurer to the special committee for the West Irian question. 304 302 Muslimatnu.or.id. (November 7, 2019). “Lima Tokoh Muslimat NU [Five NU Muslimat Figures].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from http://muslimatnu.or.id/jejak/lima-tokohmuslimat-nu/. 303 Soewito et. al., 2005. 304 KOWANI, op. cit., p. 153. === [PDF page 135] === 135 In 1966, when the New Order decided to reboot or “refresh” as many state institutions as possible, KOWANI saw an open political opportunity structure for filling strategic positions in the government’s parliament. It was able to capture a seat at the national parliament. S.R. Lasmindar of Persit Kartika Chandra Kirana, KOWANI’s member organization that is formed and run by spouses of military officers, represented KOWANI in the national House of Representatives from 1966 to 1971. Lasmindar resumed office from 1971 to 1977, but no longer as KOWANI’s representative. Nevertheless, being a parliament member as well as a KOWANI member beyond parliamentary activities was crucial for safeguarding the contents of the forthcoming Bill on Marriage. 305 Gaining direct access to the state by populating as many positions and roles as possible in government agencies can be strategic in establishing a set of laws that implicate women and do not go against the Indonesian women’s movement’s gender ideology. Hurustiati Subandrio, for instance, accepted an appointment as Chief of Public Health division in the Health Ministry in 1956.306 Then, the Social Affairs Ministry and National Coordination Board of Family and Children Welfare invited KOWANI to participate in the committee for drafting laws on social affairs, and KOWANI captured the opportunity. KOWANI’s representative, Saljo, even became co-chairperson of the board. Saljo spearheaded the research and workshops of the laws regulating youths and children. KOWANI engaged closely with the ministry and board from 305 Ibid., p. 200; KOWANI also nominated B. Simorangkir from the Indonesian Christian Women Association (PWKI) to represent the women’s movement network in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) but she chose to represent the Indonesian Christian Party (PARKINDO) instead. 306 Janti, N. (May 26, 2020). “Hurustiati Subandrio, Dokter yang Aktif dalam Gerakan Perempuan [The Doctor who is Active in the Women’s Movement: Hurustiati Subandrio].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://historia.id/politik/articles/hurustiati-subandriodokter-yang-aktif-dalam-gerakan-perempuan-P3Nx7. === [PDF page 136] === 136 1968 to 1972. The National Coordination Board of Family and Children’s Welfare is strategic because it also comprised key state actors from strategic ministries such as the social affairs, education and culture, health, labor, religious affairs, and agriculture ministries. 3.3.3 Challenging the State From its formation, KOWANI’s member organizations demanded that the government put the Bill on Marriage as a top priority. Its demand eventually stimulated the government in 1950 to form the Commission for Marriage, Divorce, and Reconciliation (Komisi Nikah, Talak, Rujuk).307 The commission’s first task was to conduct a comprehensive study on the Indonesian laws on marriage. Some of KOWANI’s members participated in the commission. KOWANI sought its members’ opinions on a set of questions pertaining to the ideal type of regulation on marriage for Indonesian women. The member organizations could not agree with each other on the ideal type of regulation about marriage, and then only later, in 1952, did the commission send its preliminary draft of the bill to the parliament. While the parliament postponed deliberations about the commission’s marriage bill and decreed that the 1949 law on civil servants’ pension funds remain effective in 1952, KOWANI staged a public protest. The 1949 law allowed male civil servants to include up to four names of their wives as beneficiaries of their pension funds, and KOWANI saw this as the government’s official approval of polygyny. 308 On the one hand, KOWANI’s perception of the government is not wrong. On the other hand, the government may have perceived that since men at that time had multiple wives, providing only one space for someone with three wives would harm two wives by providing them with no pension funds. 307 De-Stuers, 1960, p. 184. 308 De-Stuers, op. cit. === [PDF page 137] === 137 Hence, it is possible that the government’s move was both an accommodation and an endorsement of that reality. Some of KOWANI’s member organizations met with the prime minister in April 1953 to demand two things. First, the government must repeal the 1952 decree. Second, it must include women’s rights organizations in deliberations about amending laws such as those of 1949 and 1952. In December 1953, PERWARI and several member organizations of KOWANI organized a nationwide demonstration to protest the law on pension funds and demand for the immediate deliberations of a marriage bill. Regarding the policy issue on marriage, KOWANI during the New Order changed its position from regime collaborator to challenger. KOWANI urged the Ministry of Justice and national parliament members to expedite the Bill on Marriage in 1968 and 1970, respectively. The push resulted in a series of dialogues about the Bill on Marriage in 1973. Then, in 1974, the national parliament passed the Law on Marriage. Although this appears to be a successful case of standard external pressure tactics getting results, in fact this victory was also linked to activist women gaining direct access to state power and influence. The acceleration was made possible because of then-first lady Siti Hartinah’s hands-on approach to the policy issue regarding marriage.309 As President Suharto’s trusted confidante and someone who had almost unlimited access to him, she was able to exert tremendous influence in policy areas about which she cared deeply. It was no secret that Siti Hartinah was against the idea of men having multiple wives, 309 Siti Hartinah was also known as Tien Suharto; see also Pratama, S. I. (January 15, 2014). “Ibu Tien dan Letupan-letupan Pemicu Malari [First Lady and Explosion of the Triggers to Malari].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://nasional.tempo.co/read/544935/ibu-tien-dan-letupanletupan-pemicu-malari on Hartinah’s key role and supporter in the drafting of the Bill on Marriage in 1973. Intense deliberations about the Bill were held around the time when university students in Thailand staged major demonstrations with one of the most violent repercussions in the country. The event in Thailand inspired university students in Indonesia to stage a massive protest during the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit. The Indonesian students’ massive protest is now known as the Malari tragedy in 1974. === [PDF page 138] === 138 such that she was able to collaborate with Ali Murtopo, who was President Suharto’s trusted aide, in drafting the law on marriage that makes the choice for polygyny difficult. 310 When challenging the state, the Indonesian women’s movement has yet to show any similarities with the East and West African women’s movements that use transgressive tactics such as showing masculine expressions or exposing private parts in public protests. 311 However, mobilizing “motherhood” to challenge the government when women’s lives have been greatly impacted by the government’s unruly actions are utilized not only by the East and West African or Latin American 312 women’s movements, but also by the Indonesian women’s movement. Utilizing the New Order’s gendered stereotypes about mothers can bring political advantage to the liberal Indonesian women’s movement. Countless research papers mention the impact which the Voice of Concerned Mothers (Suara Ibu Peduli) network has had on the subsequent public protests on Suharto’s dictatorship and his New Order regime. Voice of Concerned Mothers’ demonstration at Central Jakarta’s Hotel Indonesia Roundabout in February 1998 was one of the earliest, major public displays of protest during Suharto’s authoritarian rule. 313 However, little is known about whether participants of the Voice of Concerned Mothers network gained access to positions of influence within the state or attempted to do so during the brief period of Reformasi from 1998 to 2001. 310 Agustina et. al., 2014. 311 Tripp et. al., 2008. 312 Plaza de Mayo movement; see Bouvard, 1994. 313 This dissertation views the Voice of Concerned Mothers’ demonstration as a major public protest because it set in motion the waves of student demonstrations which led to the resignation of Suharto. Relatively large protests before 1998 such as those in 1974 and 1978 had only radicalized rather than destabilized Suharto’s authoritarian rule. On the 1978 student protests, see Kamm, H. (April 4, 1978). “Indonesia’s Student Protesters Emphasize Their Loyalty.” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/04/archives/indonesias-studentprotesters-emphasize-their-loyalty-agreement-on.html. === [PDF page 139] === 139 Many scholars have already studied the various groups of women’s rights activists who have been active since the New Order in challenging the state. 314 A new and younger generation of women’s rights activists that coalesced under the loosely formed alliance called GERAK Perempuan is less captured. Hence, this dissertation is shifting gears to demonstrate how this movement network of a newer generation has challenged the state. GERAK Perempuan challenged the state during Joko Widodo’s administration in three ways. First and foremost, GERAK Perempuan challenged the government to pass the two bills that have been stalled by the national parliament for over a decade, namely, the Domestic Workers Protection Bill and the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill. Second, GERAK Perempuan opposed two bills that have been highly controversial yet intensely deliberated in the national parliament, namely, the Jobs Creation Bill and the Family Resilience Bill. Third, GERAK Perempuan has raised public awareness about the prevalence of systematic violence against women and other minorities in Indonesian society, and the government’s inaction in addressing this problem. To achieve these goals, numerous women activists in GERAK Perempuan have also actively participated in organizing activities with other networks that are not focused on women’s rights. Key women activists during the end of New Order and beginning of Reformasi times, for instance, coalesce with the alliances of predominantly industrial workers called The Workers and People’s Movement (Gerakan Buruh Bersama Rakyat, GEBRAK), human rights activists known as the Thursdays movement (Kamisan movement), and the university studentsled movement named “Reform Corrupted,” widely known as #ReformasiDikorupsi.315 314 Katjasungkana and Wieringa, 2011. 315 The Kamisan movement and #ReformasiDikorupsi coalition were formed before GERAK Perempuan emerged as an alliance. However, the set of key women activists who consolidated their preferences and resources to form or mobilize as part of GERAK Perempuan is the same set of activists who took part in organizing activities throughout the weekly Kamisan === [PDF page 140] === 140 During the meeting to decide the overall concept and details of the 2020 International Women’s Day, just before the forum agreed to coalesce as GERAK Perempuan, women activists from the organization Perempuan Mahardhika led the brainstorming on which grievances and demands mobilization was urgently needed around. The main and repeated set of grievances touched upon the absence of the state amid rampant and systematic violence against women and the increasingly strong presence of oligarchy in almost all aspects of policymaking. From these grievances, the forum delineated the sets of policies which needed to be tackled in the 2020 IWD march. When news about the postponement of deliberations on the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill circulated amid the global pandemic, GERAK Perempuan members convened online to discuss the subsequent strategy for realizing one of their goals. The vocal members of the network suggested that they emulate the Kamisan movement that holds protests every Thursday in front of the presidential palace in Central Jakarta. 316 GERAK Perempuan decided to stage weekly protests on Tuesdays by the national parliament’s entrance gate. Its members outside of Jakarta such as those in Bandung (West Java), Yogyakarta (in Central Java), and Samarinda (East Kalimantan) later followed suit, in front of their respective provincial parliaments. 3.4 Summary The Old Order government enabled the formation of a major network based on a wide range of policy issues. KOWANI as the major and most probably the only prominent network of demonstrations, as well as before, during, and after the #ReformasiDikorupsi demonstrations from September 25-30, 2019. 316 Sympathizers of the Kamisan movement outside of Jakarta would do similar protests on the same day and regularly in their respective towns. === [PDF page 141] === 141 women’s movement organization mobilized to address the pressing issues in both Indonesia and overseas. Had GERWANI in late 1950s or early 1960s readjusted its proximity to Sukarno as leader of the government, the massive women’s movement organization would not have been disbanded and it could have continued to lead KOWANI into pushing progressive changes for women. However, GERWANI failed to make that adjustment and risked ejection from KOWANI. Decades later, KOWANI did not to take the lead in several key and landmark regulations for advancing gender equality in Indonesia. Other networks, such as pre-JKP3, JKP3, KUPI, and GERAK Perempuan, with structures that differ greatly from KOWANI, took the lead instead. Meanwhile, the New Order government disabled the activities and emergence of any other women’s movement networks other than KOWANI. The climate of severe political repression shaped KOWANI’s focus on mobilizing issues that did not run against the state’s developmentalist agenda. The Post-Reformasi government has allowed formations of diverse sets of networks based on a specific issue. Growing press freedom and social media technology contribute not only to the many opportunities for women’s rights groups to form networks, but also to the complex sets of obstacles to their mobilizing their resources strategically. These varieties show that structural conditions ignite some and resist other kinds of ideas about networking. To achieve gender equality, women’s rights groups coalesce and form different networks of advocacy for different policy goals. Indonesian women’s movements focus on national-level policies to acquire the needed resources for creating nationwide impacts. However, policies’ importance grows in Post-Reformasi because of the government’s increasingly democratic === [PDF page 142] === 142 nature. As the government democratizes further, women’s rights groups prefer loose networks to the rigid federation that resembles KOWANI. This chapter has shown how the Indonesian women’s movements—be it traditionalist, liberal, or reformist—have mobilized their ideas and goals across three different periods. While the traditionalist women’s movement pursue its goal in one issue through collaborating with the state, it may pursue its goal in other issues through gaining direct access to state power, within the same period. It then may pursue its goal of the same issue in the subsequent period through challenging the government. This had been the case with the issue of marriage. During the Old Order, KOWANI pushed its agenda on feminizing the military by gaining direct and strategic access to government bodies, and on marriage law by collaborating with the state without securing access to positions of influence within the state. Then, in the New Order, KOWANI suspended its agenda on feminizing the military and it pursued the marriage law by challenging the state. Furthermore, Post-Reformasi KOWANI collaborates with JKP3 to challenge the state in revising the legal minimum age for marriage. This chapter has argued for the importance of gaining direct access to state power in the Indonesian women’s movement’s struggles to achieve the desired policy goal. However, gaining direct access to state power includes not only collaborating with the government outside the state structure, but also capturing state power by actively intervening in the policymaking process within the state structure—a ministry, government agency, or national working committee. Intervening in the policymaking process entails two processes. The first process includes accepting government bodies’ invitation to participate in focus group discussion, working as expert staff in any government bodies at the village, subnational, or national levels, or running for formal political office. The second process comprises linking state actors with the women’s === [PDF page 143] === 143 movement network whether through a formal audience with the state actors, by-invitation policy discussion forums, or public hearings. The following chapter discusses the ways in which a reformist women’s movement network, GERAK Perempuan, was able to win major policy changes during President Widodo’s second term. It further strengthens this dissertation’s main argument about achieving the desired policy goal in countries with structural conditions such as Indonesia, for relatively powerless groups such as those mobilizing as the reformist women’s movement network—that is, first and foremost, gaining direct access to state power. Chapter Four further explains how GERAK Perempuan, after gaining direct access to state power, must maintain its proximity to the state by exercising stealth politics. === [PDF page 144] === 144 Chapter 4 - Policy Change “This is a revolutionary step amid our loss of hope during this long period of rising sexual violence cases in our society and campuses.” (Dhyta Caturani, activist since New Order regime) 317 4.1 Introduction Chapter Three explained the positions which women’s movement networks— traditionalist, liberal, and reformist—take in fighting for their intended policy outcomes. The traditionalist and liberal women’s movements mostly either collaborate with the state or gain direct access to state power by filling positions in a government body or parliament. The reformist women’s movement almost always challenges the state. In other words, the traditionalist and liberal women’s movements tend to capture key momentums when a political opportunity structure opens, but the same strategy has not applied to the reformist women’s movement. However, Chapter 4 will show that when a relatively powerless group such as the reformist women’s movement has gained access to the state, it has succeeded in pushing the government to establish a policy change at one ministerial level (Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology or MOE) along with rippling effects that lead to policy changes at another ministerial level (Ministry of Religious Affairs or MRA) and at the national level. 317During a December 3, 2021 event, “Forum Publik ‘Bersuara untuk Keadilan: Dukungan terhadap Permendikbud 30/2021,” conducted by LETSS TALK, a “feminist knowledge production and circulation” collective which publicly supports the regulations; at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4gexQ_Fv2s. Dhyta Caturani endured police beatings during one of the 1998 demonstrations to topple Suharto and the New Order regime. === [PDF page 145] === 145 This chapter demonstrates how events unfolded once a political opportunity structure opened during Post-Reformasi. It uses the case of the Indonesian MOE’s Regulation 30 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions to explain the mechanisms and events following an open political opportunity structure for three reasons. First, Regulation 30 is a landmark piece of government regulation issued in September 2021, not only because it addresses a relatively divisive issue in a Muslim majority country such as Indonesia, but also because it has had ripple effects. This dissertation does not assume that predominantly Muslim societies or Islamic teaching are inevitably hostile to ideas about tackling sexual violence. However, this dissertation acknowledges the current political climate that tends to drive Indonesian Muslims’ opinions to draw correlations between addressing sexual violence issues and Westernizing or liberalizing Indonesian societies.318 The ripple effects from Regulation 30 arguably include the acceleration of the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill’s ratification in May 2022 and the Minister of Religious Affairs’ Regulation 73/2022 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Religious Educational Institutions in October 2022 (MRA Regulation 73). Second, the case is a direct example of a reformist women’s movement, GERAK Perempuan, that manages to gain direct access to state power. Third, the author of this dissertation has firsthand knowledge of the process because of her leadership role in the policymaking team that formulated Regulation 30 and planned the strategy for communicating its launch to the public. 319 318 Afrianty, D. (December 1, 2021). “Indonesia’s fight for a law against sexual violence needs to involve a discussion of Islamic values” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/indonesias-fight-for-a-law-against-sexual-violence-needs-toinvolve-a-discussion-of-islamic-values/. 319 I was a participant-observer in the case study presented in this chapter. In many instances, I will cite internal documents, memos, or reports associated with the events described. Sometimes the sources are digital communications via Whatsapp—the most widely used mobile chat application among Indonesians. These citations include dates of messages. Whenever possible, sources will also be named. If the source cannot be named, I will use abbreviations which follow === [PDF page 146] === 146 4.2 Regulation 30, Stealth Politics, and Direct Access to State Power Given Indonesia’s regime transitions, sexual violence has historically been a difficult issue to solve. Hence, the stakes are high and politically very costly if the planning and execution of a policy which aims to tilt the balance of fairness when processing sexual violence reports in Indonesian higher education institutions are not done carefully and strategically. By “politically costly” this dissertation means that various interest groups’ pressures on Minister Makarim to resign or on the president to dismiss the minster could actually heighten and, in turn, end Minister Makarim’s tenure, including the ongoing and planned programs on his desk. Furthermore, the unity of religious fundamentalist groups that have been opposing the executive government’s policies could again grow stronger and could cost the ruling party and its coalition a major loss in the next election cycle. Hence, the mechanisms are primarily stealth politics. Team KS, the special team-incharge of Regulation 30, which consisted of GERAK Perempuan participants and the MOE’s civil servants, had to 1) select their collaborators carefully, 2) engage the media and broader public participation strategically, and 3) launch the policy sequentially. Having information as complete as possible about the balance of power at most campuses, within the ministry, and across different societies in Indonesia was key to Team KS’s strategy of identifying collaborators and mitigating pushback from the opposition and counter-movement organizations during public engagement or when Regulation 30 started to gain media attention. Ultimately, what made Team KS operate in this way stemmed from its prudence or awareness of three things. First, Team KS the system set by this dissertation’s codebook. In some instances, I am the source as the direct participant in an event, meeting, or conversation. In those cases, I will cite the source as “Direct Communication” when a conversation was with me or “Direct Participation” if I was present for something being said. These citations will include dates and, whenever possible, locations. === [PDF page 147] === 147 was fully aware that if contents of the draft were leaked to the public before getting most of the MOE officials on board with the draft, groups of fundamentalists similar to those that stalled the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill at the national level would most likely mobilize to either push the formulation of Regulation 30 in a different direction or stop the project entirely. Second, Team KS was mindful of possible opposition to Regulation 30 within the MOE bureaucracy itself. Third, given the size of the MOE bureaucracy, Team KS was conscious of possible takeover by other groups within the broader constellation of supporters for anti-sexual violence regulations. Such a takeover was possible because other groups could have reached out to a higher echelon official in different parts of the large bureaucracy, and the official could have opened the policymaking door to them without knowing either one of two things. First, the official could have no information that a special team was already being formed specifically to work on Regulation 30; and second, the official could have no knowledge about the ideology and interests of the group with which he or she had engaged. The situation at Indonesian universities prior to the passage of Regulation 30 was not effective in addressing sexual violence. On most campuses, sexual violence reports were investigated by ad hoc ethics committees formed at the discretion of the university rector and in a non-transparent manner. In most cases, the ad hoc ethics committee members were either all male or, even if there were female lecturers and professors, possessed a very patriarchic view of gender and power relations. For example, responding to Gadjah Mada University’s student journalists on their query regarding the Agni case, one of the university administrators made an analogy about how any cat who sees a fish lying around would naturally grab the fish--meaning, it was Agni who fished for trouble in the first place and therefore it was only natural for her === [PDF page 148] === 148 perpetrator to follow through. 320 Furthermore, committee members at various universities tended to produce decisions focused more on the kind of needed punishment for perpetrators rather than on the recovery of the victim’s rights and safety to resume her or his studies or work on campus. In worse cases, committee members ended up giving impunity to the perpetrators and either blamed the victim as the one igniting sexual violence or asking the victim to forgive the perpetrator and move on. For instance, Riau University’s lecturers who were first responders to the Syafri Harto case asked the victim to move on instead of complaining.321 This chapter traces how these practices were challenged and ultimately reformed—a process that represents a major advancement of gender equality in Indonesia. The impact of Regulation 30, particularly after other reform policies were adopted in its immediate wake, reached thousands of institutional entities and millions of Indonesians. The case study begins with protests by GERAK Perempuan, a reformist women’s movement network which opened the door to direct access to state power, which in turn was decisive in preparing and passing a new set of the institutional reforms that otherwise could have taken years or decades to accomplish. Figure 5 explains the process of GERAK Perempuan’s struggle for establishing Regulation 30. Figure 10 - The reformist women's movement network's struggle for Regulation 30 320 Balairung Press, op. cit. 321 Kabaran.id (November 4, 2021). “Viral, Oknum Dekan Diduga Lecehkan Mahasiswa [Viral, A Dean Allegedly Harassed a Student].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://www.kabaran.id/2021/11/viral-oknum-dekan-diduga-lecehkan.html. === [PDF page 149] === 149 The circles in Figure 5 represent major events, while the bullet points in each arrow represent the mechanisms mediating the process between one circle and another. Using processtracing,322 this dissertation argues that, without one or another of the mechanisms, an event would not have been major or significant enough to ignite the subsequent set of mechanisms, thus for the major event to happen, and, ultimately, to cause the outcome. In other words, each major event and each mechanism are necessary steps for movement networks such as GERAK Perempuan to take to achieve policy change—including Regulation 30’s issuance with rippling effects on the passage of the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill and MRA Regulation 73. The first major event comprises GERAK Perempuan’s 1) mobilizing a public protest outside of the MOE and then 2) verbal and written demands to officials inside the MOE. GERAK Perempuan met with two groups of MOE officials on different days. The first group was the MOE’s public relations officials, and the second was the top leadership in the MOE. This first event is major because it opened the opportunity for meeting with officials within the MOE’s top leadership, including a minister who was willing to appoint reformers and collaborate with a reformist women’s movement network such as GERAK Perempuan. The profile of this education minister is a form of political opportunity structure. Had the education minister held conservative views about gender and sexual violence, then GERAK Perempuan would not have been invited inside the MOE to address the issue of sexual violence directly to the MOE’s top leadership. The second major event concerns GERAK Perempuan’s managing to gain direct access to the state after meeting the second group of MOE officials. Five members of GERAK Perempuan at first became unpaid volunteers 1) to provide the MOE with grassroots- and campus-level findings and developments and 2) to check on the MOE’s progress and 322 Bennett and Checkel 2015 === [PDF page 150] === 150 accountability. Then, as the workload intensified and the budget allocation permitted, one of the GERAK Perempuan members agreed to engage with the MOE as its paid staff member. She became part of the MOE’s special team for anti-sexual violence issues and, therefore, GERAK Perempuan’s strategic direct access to state power. The event is major because mechanisms 1) and 2) enabled the formulation and, in turn, establishment of Regulation 30 that is substantively progressive or challenging the status quo. Regulation 30 provides a clear definition of sexual violence which acknowledges that sexual violence happens because of unequal gender and power relations between victim and perpetrator as well as in the society (Article 1 point (1) in Appendix II). It also specifies twenty kinds of actions that are regarded as sexual violence (Article 5 paragraph (2) in Appendix II) and recognizes that the other kinds of actions constituting sexual violence could develop in the future and look different from those specified in Regulation 30 (Article 5 paragraph (2) point (u) in Appendix II). Furthermore, Regulation 30 explains that in certain conditions—i.e., the victim is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, unconscious, under 18 years old, etc. (Article 5 paragraph (3) in Appendix II), campus authorities can save themselves the time needed to assess whether a reported case is consensual because in such conditions the victim could not have willingly given her or his consent during the perpetrator’s action. Thus, many stipulate that Regulation 30 is a “pro-victim” legal product, meaning that it accommodates most victims’ lived experience. Had the activists of GERAK Perempuan not gained direct access to the state, Regulation 30 would likely not be as progressive as it is now. Moreover, it could even resemble the Sexual Violence Crimes Law from which major progressive portions of the bill (when it was still coined as the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill) had been either omitted or truncated. For instance, 6 of the 15 kinds of sexual violence in the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill were === [PDF page 151] === 151 omitted. In addition, the phrase “victim’s consent” (persetujuan korban) was verbosely rephrased as “against the victim’s will” (bertenangan dengan kehendak korban). Furthermore, an umbrella or explicit definition of sexual violence such as that in Regulation 30 and previous drafts of the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill was omitted. With a long history of systematic misrecognition of sexual violence victims’ lived experiences, making explicit both the meaning of “consent” and a clear umbrella definition of what sexual violence is matters because they serve as discursive resources for victims of sexual violence when reporting their case to the authorities. 323 The third major event is when GERAK Perempuan mobilized support after the issuance of Regulation 30 by producing online campaigns to counter the opposition’s narratives. GERAK Perempuan also mobilized support by gathering marchers offline around public places or organizing campus events to promote the meaning and contents of Regulation 30. GERAK Perempuan’s members even mobilized their other social movement networks to write an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in support of Regulation 30 when a conservative group filed for a judicial review of the regulation by the Supreme Court. Regulation 30 and GERAK Perempuan’s mobilization of support triggered the public’s intense online engagement and news media reports about the regulation and the opposition’s interpretation of the regulation for weeks. This third event is major and necessary because, in addition to the hybrid (offline and online) massive public prayer for the state’s protection of sexual violence victims held by GERAK Perempuan’s ally KUPI, the intensity led to at least two rippling effects which are the fourth, and final, major event: the ratification of the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill into national law and the issuance of MRA Regulation 73. Had GERAK Perempuan not fought back the opposition with its mobilization of support for Regulation 30 through mainstream and social media engagement, 323 Hobson, op. cit. === [PDF page 152] === 152 then the opposition would control the narratives of framing Regulation 30 negatively and the opposition’s pressure could have led to the president’s instructing the MOE to revise Regulation 30 with discursive power resources such as omission of the phrase “victim’s consent.” A similar action had happened in the Ministry of Labor’s case concerning its regulation on pensions. The chapter’s next section lays out the political context. A description of the entire process then follows (Figure 6); it begins with the early stage of recruiting the team and planning the form of policy to curb sexual violence in Indonesia’s education institutions. After that, an explanation of the policymaking process is provided. The penultimate section specifies the launching of the policy and the public reactions to it. Finally, a discussion on the implications of the policy concludes the chapter. Figure 6 -The bureaucratic stages of establishing Regulation 30 === [PDF page 153] === 153 Figure 6 describes the stages of establishing Regulation 30 within the MOE bureaucracy. The dark boxes at the top of Figure 6 indicate three primary stages: planning, harmonizing, and launching.324 The planning stage took 3 months, while the harmonizing stage took the longest time, 14 months. The launching stage was executed one month after the issuance of Regulation 30. Each stage has a few substages, represented by the white boxes. The substages depicted under the primary stages of planning and harmonizing were not conducted in chronological order. However, those under the launching stage were conducted sequentially, first through three closed meetings with focused targets, and then through a public launch, livestreamed on the MOE’s YouTube channel. The entire process took approximately 18 months. Relative to other policies under Minister Makarim’s watch, Regulation 30 is considered to have undergone one of MOE’s lengthiest policymaking processes. 325 The following section can shed light on why it became one of the lengthiest policymaking processes, by discussing the political context that preceded Regulation 30 or that situated the reformist women’s movement network’s mobilization and the regulation’s making. 4.3 The Political Context President Widodo won his second presidential term in June 2019. Before winning his first term (2014-2019), Widodo was mayor of Solo, a city in Central Java province (2005-2012), and then became governor of Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital city (2012-2014). Unlike his predecessor, former president Yudhoyono, who owned a political party (Partai Demokrat), Widodo has been party-less and has run as the PDIP’s cadre in all the elections he won. On the one hand, PDIP has 324 Direct Participation in Jakarta, from March 2020 to December 2021. 325 Direct Participation in the first closed meeting of the regulations launch in MOE’s D Building, Jakarta, October 25, 2021 === [PDF page 154] === 154 been the largest political party since 1999. On the other hand, it is former president Megawati, Yudhoyono’s predecessor, who rules over PDIP. Thus, Widodo is not as “free” as one might think, to make decisions such as appointing his cabinet’s ministers. Nevertheless, the track record of Widodo’s political career shows his ability to balance technocratic and political considerations when making decisions. Many assume his previous experience as a small-medium business owner before entering politics may play a part in his tendency to prioritize practicality over bureaucratization.326 One can argue that an example of Widodo’s decision-making being based more on technocratic than political calculation is his appointing Nadiem Makarim, cofounder of a major tech-cum-transportation company in the gig economy, as Education and Culture Minister, on October 23, 2019. Traditionally, the position of education and culture minister would be filled by a well-known and relatively senior-age male scholar of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah—two of the largest Muslim social movement organizations in Indonesia. 327 The position is strategic not only for shaping the kinds of knowledge young generations of Indonesians can or cannot have access to, but also for redistributing resources to institutions or associations on which teachers, lecturers, and professors are economically or politically dependent. Redistributing resources also contributes to garnering public support for the ruling education and culture minister’s policies and programs. Both NU and Muhammadiyah privately own and operate a massive number of education institutions across Indonesian urban and rural 326 Relative to Indonesia’s former presidents, many consider Widodo to be a political outsider because he is neither an intellectual elite like Sukarno and Habibie, a military elite like Suharto and Yudhoyono, a religious elite like Wahid, nor a dynastic elite like Megawati whose father is Sukarno. 327 See Noer (1973) on the development and kinds of modernist Muslim movements in Indonesia from 1900-1942. === [PDF page 155] === 155 areas, from the pre-school level to the higher education sector. Hence, having an education and culture minister from either of the two major Muslim mass organizations could help the executive government’s work to coordinate logistical operations and quality control with thousands of education institutions and millions of actors. More importantly, being education and culture minister means having the authority over the kinds of values and gender norms that are socialized through teachings in schools and internalized by students and educators. Direct influence over these values in education have traditionally been in the hands of overtly Islamic figures.328 Nadiem Makarim came from neither of the two major Muslim mass organizations nor any political party. On the contrary, Minister Makarim is a millennial businessman who managed to turn a startup company into one of the most influential businesses in Southeast Asia. 329 Hence, almost every single move Minister Makarim makes has been subjected to constant scrutiny by only by NU and Muhammadiyah but also by academics who associate the newly appointed minister with the further commercialization of Indonesia’s education sector that has made educational institutions inaccessible to many people and more expensive for all. Furthermore, local norms and culture shape most Indonesians’ expectation that an education and culture ministry is best be led by a wise, old, pious Muslim, a fatherly figure with a strong academic background and experience in the field of education. To the public, Minister Makarim does not meet that expectation or fit that profile. Hence, facing nearly constant media speculations about both President Widodo’s intent to reshuffle his cabinet and the education and culture minister has 328 See Hefner (2009) on Islamic schools, social movements, and democracy in Indonesia. 329 Afifa, L. (October 14, 2022). “GoTo Named the Top Southeast Asian Company in Fortune ‘Change the World’ List.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://en.tempo.co/read/ 1645419/goto-named-the-top-southeast-asian-company-in-fortune-change-the-world-list. === [PDF page 156] === 156 been a day-to-day challenge for Minister Makarim. However, he defied all odds when, rather than seeing his ministerial portfolio taken away, he actually saw it greatly expand when President Widodo merged the Research and Technology Ministry with the Education and Culture Ministry and appointed him to head the Education, Culture, Research, and Technology Ministry on April 28, 2021. The new nomenclature meant not only more responsibilities but also a larger portion of the national budget. One main reason for Minister Makarim’s surviving the president’s cabinet reshuffles was possibly the Covid-19 pandemic.330 Minister Makarim mitigated the effects of the “learning loss” phenomena through his ministry’s decisive actions in at least three aspects. 331 First, the ministry developed a digital learning application or platform for remote learning. 332 Second, it made clear policies and campaigns regarding the closing and opening of offline or inschool learning.333 Third, it distributed subsidies for students and educators’ online classroom and other learning activities that require an internet connection. 334 Nevertheless, the policies issued since Minister Makarim’s tenure have never ceased to attract intense policy debates. For example, the public accused Minister Makarim of stealing Najeela Shihab’s ideas and marketing her school when he announced that his ministry’s overarching agenda is granting every student, teacher, and academic “Emancipated Learning” (Merdeka Belajar).335 Shihab, in fact, had granted permission for the Education Ministry’s usage 330 AntaraNews. (April 18, 2022). “Silver lining of COVID-19 for Indonesian education system.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://en.antaranews.com/news/225521/silver-lining-ofcovid-19-for-indonesian-education-system 331 Engzell et. al., 2021. 332 Azhari and Fajri, 2021. 333 Lase et. al., 2022. 334 Sajida and Ranjani, 2020. 335 CNNIndonesia. (July 14, 2020). “Najeela Shihab Izinkan Nadiem Pakai Istilah ‘Merdeka Belajar’.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/ 20200713210035-20-524239/najeela-shihab-izinkan-nadiem-pakai-istilah-merdeka-belajar. === [PDF page 157] === 157 of the term. Education practitioners worry about Minister Makarim’s decision to annul the National Examination for students in grades six, nine, and twelve; and to run a national assessment of students’ literacy, numeracy, and character which replaces the National Examination. Furthermore, the public doubted Minister Makarim’s objectivity when his ministry’s program of empowering non-governmental organizations that train or conduct capacity-building programs for educators was heavily criticized for awarding the contract to a large corporation’s relatively new non-profit organization rather than to the long-established mass organization run by Muhammadiyah’s women’s wing, Aisyiyah. The minister accepted the criticisms, apologized to the major Muslim mass organization in-person, and adjusted the selection process in the program’s subsequent cycle. 336 However, there were then two notable public challenges pertaining to not explicitly stating “religion” in the ministry’s 2020-2035 road map, and to the seemingly inevitable commercialization of the ministry’s “Independent Campus” (Kampus Merdeka) policy and programs.337 The issue of sexual violence in universities did not catch the Education Ministry’s attention despite the previous high-profile Agni case during 2018 at a major public university, called Gadjah Mada Univeristy, having caused public outrage over the lack of protective 336 Tempo.co. (July 29, 2020). “Nadiem Makarim Hopes Muhammadiyah, NU, PGRI Join Ministry's Program” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://en.tempo.co/read/1370371/nadiem-makarim-hopes-muhammadiyah-nu-pgri-joinministrys-program. 337 VOI. (March 12, 2021). “Nadiem Makarim answers criticism of missing phrases of religion in PJP: not true, impossible for the Ministry of Education and Culture to delete religion.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://voi.id/en/news/38454/nadiem-makarim-answers-criticism-ofmissing-phrases-of-religion-in-pjp-not-true-impossible-for-the-ministry-of-education-andculture-to-delete-religion. === [PDF page 158] === 158 measures for victims of sexual assault and harassment in universities. 338 During a meeting in late January 2020 at Jakarta’s Legal Aid Institute’s office (LBH) to prepare for the 2020 International Women’s Day march, one senior women’s rights activist from Yogyakarta presented the idea of writing to the education ministry for an audience with Minister Makarim to discuss the increasing number of unsolved sexual violence cases in schools and universities. 339 The meeting was concluded by the attendees’ agreement to organize themselves as a reformist women’s movement network called GERAK Perempuan. However, writing to the education ministry for an audience with its minister did not seem to spark anyone’s interest. GERAK Perempuan began to plan for a march on the MOE and an online petition only in early February 2020 because of the worryingly slow progress in the State University of Padang’s sexual violence case. When they marched on the Education Ministry’s premises on February 10, 2020, to protest the ministry’s inaction pertaining to an ongoing campus investigation of that case, news coverage of the prevalence of violence, including religious intolerance, in schools and universities emerged.340 Minister Makarim then publicly stated that he would make the issues of “intolerance,” “bullying,” and “sexual violence” top priorities throughout his tenure as Minister of Education and Culture. He then named these issues “The Three Major Sins in Education” (Tiga Dosa Besar Pendidikan).341 His emphasis on these three concerns means that a considerable amount of the 338 Vice. (December 12, 2018). “A Campus Sex Assault Victim Is Calling for an End to Systemic Rape Culture In Indonesia.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.vice.com/en/article/d3b5mw/a-campus-sex-assault-victim-is-calling-for-an-end-tosystemic-rape-culture-in-indonesia. 339 Direct Participation in Jakarta, January 24, 2020. 340 Indoleft, op. cit. 341 Tempo.co. (February 21, 2020). “Nadiem Makarim Points Out 3 Deadly Sins of Education.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://en.tempo.co/read/1310275/nadiem-makarim-pointsout-3-deadly-sins-of-education. === [PDF page 159] === 159 state budget for the MOE is allocated for taking the necessary actions to tackle them. Hence, Minister Makarim directed his ministry’s newly established Center for Character Building (PUSPEKA) to include the three major sins in education in its development planning, campaign materials, and public engagement activities. Since Minister Makarim’s public statement on his position and commitment to solve sexual violence issues in the education sector, national parliament members have deliberated and revised the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill multiple times. The Sexual Violence Elimination Bill draft that had continuously reached deadlock for approximately five years. The reformist women’s movement and parliament members supportive of the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill had been fighting against the misinformation which most Islamist parties and groups had quite successfully mobilized. These parties and groups framed the bill as an opening for further Westernization, sexual liberalization, moral degradation in, and secularization of the predominantly Muslim Indonesian society. 342 Scholars have even observed that numerous campuses across Indonesia at that time tended to restrict female students’ freedom of mobility and expression on campus as part of a sexual violence prevention campaign. 343 In short, the stakes were high for the young minister, in making any decision to improve or transform Indonesia’s progress in matters related to education, culture, research, and technology.344 Moreover, the political context made it highly difficult for the Education Ministry 342 Miichi, 2020. 343 Nurtjahyo et. al., 2022b. 344 The Ministry of Education and Culture and Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Technology are two of the few Indonesian ministries with a very patriarchal history of leadership. The only woman who headed the Education Ministry was Artati Sudirdjo from 1964- 1966, and her main task was to resolve the ministry’s internal conflicts between communistleaning and nationalist-religious staff and teachers associations; see https://historia.id/ politik/articles/artati-marzuki-menteri-pd-dan-k-di-tengah-konflik-departemen-Dpgey. Responding to a 2012 case of a secondary school expelling a 14-year-old student who was raped === [PDF page 160] === 160 to initiate any effective policy or action to address sexual violence in school and campus environments without significant repercussions for at least three reasons. First, the minister’s profile or public image does not fit with that of the previous ministers and therefore groups that traditionally fill the position continuously pressured the minister to resign and the president to replace the minister. Second, the Education Ministry’s policies and programs have disrupted the continuity of most of the education institutions, attracting even more challenges—and less cooperation--from change-resistant groups. Third, as the issue of sexual violence has been politically divisive and costly at the national level, producing a regulation on tackling the issue could impact not only the minister’s political career but also the government’s durability. 4.4 The Planning Stage After GERAK Perempuan’s protest to the education ministry on February 10, 2020, two of GERAK Perempuan’s participants who were working in Change.org, helped amplify GERAK Perempuan’s online petition on Change.org, a global social enterprise. 345 GERAK Perempuan wrote on the petition that if GERAK Perempuan managed to collect more than 100,000 signatures of support, it would deliver the petition directly to Minister Makarim on March 8, which coincided with International Women’s Day. However, even before achieving 100,000 by someone she met online, Mohammad Nuh, then the education minister, blamed the student, sparking outrage from the Indonesian Teachers Union.Federation; see https://www.beritasatu.com/%20news/77529/serikat-guru-minta-mendikbud-mundur-darijabatannya#. Furthermore, Mohamad Nasir who was then higher education minister publicly stated that LGBT communities are not welcome on Indonesian campuses; see https://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2016/01/25/lgbt-not-welcome-university-minister.html. 345 Widuri, T. (2020). “Kampus Merdeka Kekerasan Seksual [Sexual Violence Free Campuses].” https://www.change.org/p/kemdikbud-ri-pak-nadiem-makarim-kampus-merdeka-merdekabelajarjuga-harus-merdekadarikekerasan-seksual-segera-terbitkan-sop-penanganan-pencegahankekerasan-seksual-di-instansi-pendidikan?redirect=false. === [PDF page 161] === 161 signatures,346 one of Minister Makarim’s special staff members (Staf Khusus Menteri) had initiated contact with the leadership of Change.org, and the active participants of GERAK Perempuan’s activities from Change.org passed the information to other GERAK Perempuan participants about a possible audience with the minister before International Women’s Day. 347 The reason that the minister’s special staff member contacted Change.org’s leadership is unknown, but a past networking event could have been the link because members of both the minister’s special staff and Change.org’s leadership are of the same generation. The top leaderships in both the education ministry and Change.org were run by individuals in their 30s or 40s, and networking events connecting young professionals from the public sector with those in private sector were at the time common and popular in Indonesia. In the days prior to an agreed March 6 meeting with the minister, GERAK Perempuan held a few meetings in Jakarta to decide who would get to participate in the audience with Minister Makarim. 348 In the meantime, a member of the MOE’s all-women expert staff, specially assigned to identify and solve problems of higher education institutions’ bureaucratic reform, and a team under the minister’s special staff members’ supervision had prepared a template for a set of slides for GERAK Perempuan participants to fill in. Therefore, GERAK Perempuan also convened to discuss what needed to be stated in the slides. The expert staff briefed Minister Makarim and his special staff on the points of discussion they should expect and anticipate in their upcoming meeting with GERAK Perempuan. An expert staff member also communicated closely with a GERAK Perempuan participant to make sure that the GERAK Perempuan delegation was organized and prepared with presentable data and slides for its upcoming 346 The final total number of signatures reached only 13,379; Ibid. 347 Electronic communication, March 4, 2020, Jakarta. 348 Electronic communication, March 4, 2020, Jakarta. === [PDF page 162] === 162 audience with Minister Makarim. 349 She treated the meeting as a rare political opportunity for GERAK Perempuan to deliver s itconcerns, ideas, and interests directly to the top position in the ministry. Within the Indonesian government’s bureaucracy, ministers are entitled to recruit noncivil servants as their special staff and expert staff members. Given the volume and magnitude of issues in the education sector, non-civil servants are professionally hired to ease the bureaucratic and administrative burden on civil servants. The special staff members usually serve the ministry until the minister who appointed them steps down, while the expert staff members are recruited temporarily from the private sector because of projects requiring special or technical expertise which the civil servants in the ministry may lack. Hence, the expert staff members are the experts whom civil servants can consult when completing a project. The special staff members supervise the completion of projects including collaborations between the expert staff members and civil servants within the ministry, and report progress or problems directly to the minister. In other words, special staff members are equivalent to civil servants or officials of the first echelon, part of the top leadership in a ministry. On March 6, 2020, GERAK Perempuan filled the twenty slots which the expert staff had offered with youth activists who were mostly university students. 350 These students were active anti-sexual violence campaigners on their respective campuses. GERAK Perempuan also entrusted three young women professionals (a campaigner and organizer of young women’s leadership on campus, a social media campaigner on anti-sexual violence, and a journalist) and a 349 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 4, 2020. 350 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 6, 2020. === [PDF page 163] === 163 male university student (an anti-sexual violence advocate and law student on his campus) to be the spokespersons when the slides were presented to the minister. The group of people under 35 years of age presented the slides, using the template the expert staff had prepared and they had filled. Toward the end, GERAK Perempuan asked Minister Makarim to release a letter authorizing GERAK Perempuan’s member organizations to act as the legitimate aide to victims of sexual violence across Indonesian campuses. GERAK Perempuan’s rationale was that the minister’s letter could give GERAK Perempuan participants leverage when they respond to sexual violence victims’ reports and meet with university administrators, because they were often intimidated or threatened by university administrators and perpetrators’ peers whenever aiding a victim’s ongoing case. The minister declined GERAK Perempuan’s request, as he believed it is not good practice to give special privileges to one particular group before going through a set of procedures including public consultation. However, the minister and the GERAK Perempuan delegation reached a shared understanding that the MOE’s systematic intervention was urgently needed and must be oriented, first and foremost, to the protection and recovery of sexual violence victims’ rights to education. Hence, the minister vowed to come up with a legally binding and sustainable solution for stopping sexual predators in higher education institutions. Minister Makarim also welcomed GERAK Perempuan participants to regularly check on the working progress of his team that had been specially recruited to address sexual violence issues. Following the March 6 meeting and just before the Covid-19 pandemic, the Sexual Violence Team under the direct supervision of Minister Makarim’s special staff was formed. It comprised one non-civil servant expert staff member and five unpaid volunteers who were either women’s rights activists or university student activists who had years of experience advocating === [PDF page 164] === 164 for sexual violence victims’ rights. These volunteers were the GERAK Perempuan participants who had attended the March 6 meeting with the minister. They adhered to their self-imposed ideology of positioning themselves as voluntary watchdogs and providers of real-time, grassroots intelligence. GERAK Perempuan, as a loose network of over fifty women’s rights organizations, does not exercise hierarchical forms of communication. 351 Nor does it have an elected leader, but it does include at least three to four “motors” of the alliance. These motors are vocal and active in group conversations via mobile phones and during meetings offline. They are from different organizations but have known one another for a considerably long time through other advocacy and protest events. The four young women’s rights activists are also well-connected to other social movement networks and can be considered the heartbeat of the reformist women’s movement network. By end of 2020, the MOE’s Sexual Violence Team, Team KS, eventually developed into a team of two expert staff members, four volunteers, and three civil servants from the Education Ministry’s Center for Character-Building (Pusat Penguatan Karakter, PUSPEKA). The team was predominantly women, although one of the five volunteers was a male university student. The ministry informally referred to the team as Team KS, a shorthand for Tim Kekerasan Seksual or the Sexual Violence Team. The main job for professional hires such as the expert staff members (non-civil servant) in Team KS was to build the confidence of the civil servants and higherechelon officials of the entire MOE for comprehending and taking decisive actions that address sexual violence. While the minister’s special staff expected a few months of work, Team KS had already explained to the MOE’s top leadership that a comprehensive regulation on sexual 351 Direct Participation in Jakarta, January-March 2020. === [PDF page 165] === 165 violence elimination could take more than one year, reflecting on the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill’s history of advocacy. Team KS argued that laying down a regulation on sexual violence in a society that has never allowed sex education in schools or universities would be extremely challenging.352 Drafting a new regulation is the last thing that any minister would like to do. President Widodo, in his second term, pushed for major simplification of regulations in the form of the Jobs Creation Omnibus Law, amid strong criticism from the political opposition and the middlelower working class. However, based on the his last meeting with GERAK Perempuan, Minister Makarim was convinced by Team KS’s argument that a ministerial regulation (Peraturan Menteri) was necessary to get universities to move forward in the cause of sexual violence prevention and redress. Decrees (Keputusan Menteri) or Releases (Surat Edaran) are not legally binding enough to get people to move, and Team KS was aware of the political, psychological, and financial costs of drafting an effectively implementable ministerial regulation. Its careful planning entailed five tasks which were mostly done simultaneously. The first task was collecting data from news and internal reports about how cases of violence in schools and universities occurred and were handled in Indonesia. The second was reviewing the literature on sexual violence such as causes, effects, theories, and comparative cases for redress. The third was building a database of experts and practitioners whom the ministry should engage. The fourth was finding out if any gap existed in the already enacted regulations, both within the MOE and at the national level. The fifth was deciding on the grand strategy for advancing the agenda for a comprehensive approach to tacking sexual violence in campus environments. 352 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 12, 2020. === [PDF page 166] === 166 4.4.1 Data Collection For the most part, the MOE’s internal data showed only cases of bullying and none involving sexual violence. The only data about sexual violence were found precisely because the February 2020 demonstrators from GERAK Perempuan brought it to public attention in the case that implicated the State University of Padang. Demonstrators were demanding the minister’s attention to this case, of an adjunct lecturer harassing a student in the university’s women’s bathroom, and the minister’s special staff followed through via the ministry’s human resource department. It turned out that the university rector had formally sent a written request to the MOE to terminate the adjunct lecturer’s employment but lacking the required documentation from the university rector’s side, the ministry had not fulfilled the request. 353 It can be argued that the lack of resolution was not because of reluctance on the part of the ministry to work with university rectors in tackling sexual violence perpetrators on campus, but rather stemmed from the risk of dismissal that civil servants in the MOE’s human resource department face if they do not strictly adhere to presidential and ministerial regulations. Hence, the State University of Padang case shows the need not only have rigorous and fair procedures in place but also to eliminate unnecessary or overly burdensome regulations or procedures that effectively make action impossible, and thus do not achieve the goal of safety and responsibility for sexual offenses. Team KS found that one reason the MOE and public universities had been taking a long time to decide on disciplinary sanctions for civil servants who committed sexual violence on others, was that the Government Regulation on the Discipline of Civil Servants (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 53/2010) lacks explicit mention of the spectrum and processes of sanctions that 353 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 6, 2020. === [PDF page 167] === 167 must be taken to punish offenders. However, amending the Government Regulation was beyond the MOE’s jurisdiction or scope of authority and would take a very long time. Hence, the team was aware that whatever policy would be produced to address sexual violence in campus environments would have to refer to the existing Government Regulation for regulating the process of giving administrative sanctions to sexual violence perpetrators who are civil servants. Although cases of a wide range of violence, including sexual violence, can be found in various news media on the internet, one reason that the ministry has no data on such cases is that they end up being reported to the police instead of the MOE. In this sense, coordination between one state institution and another, in the Indonesian case, is relatively weak. Therefore, establishing this line of clear and structured coordination is necessary. It is very difficult to accomplish, however, not only because each state institution has its own priorities but also because a new demand for coordination requires additional sets of resources—appointing the staff-in-charge, technology to ease communications, an increased number of meetings for coordination, and, ultimately, budgeting. For instance, an improvement of services delivered by civil servants is under the jurisdiction of the Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform Ministry, and therefore it is that ministry that manages the single public channel for redress, including complaints on the conduct of schoolteachers or university staff members. Hence, the MOE must schedule a series of meetings with the department in the Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform Ministry that administers the channel, to be able to add a submenu specifically for complaints on “the three sins of education.”354 One of the teams assigned to tackle the three sins of education in the Education and Culture Ministry decided that such a submenu is necessary to ease usage of 354 Direct Participation in Zoom meeting room, May 2021. === [PDF page 168] === 168 the channel by those who experience violence in their schools or universities or who are witnesses and wish to report with a sense of urgency. Fortunately, a group of journalists in three media outlets, Vice, Tirto, and The Jakarta Post,355 had previously formed the #CampusReputation (#NamaBaikKampus) consortium which could provide relatively comprehensive data online about their findings of sexual violence in Indonesia’s prestigious universities as well as small colleges. The name “Nama Baik Kampus” in English literally means the campus’ good name, referring to how most faculty members in universities across Indonesia would ask their students who were victims of sexual violence not to disclose their case to anyone, for the good of the university’s reputation. The facts which the consortium revealed were so impactful that it won the prestigious Society for Publishers in Asia award for Best Public Service Journalism in 2020. 356 The series of reports by journalists of the #CampusReputation consortium and the absence of exact numbers in MOE’s database really exposed the pervasiveness of silencing sexual violence victims on Indonesian campuses. Team KS’s findings about the lack of statistics in reports of sexual violence on campuses strengthened its stipulation that a systematic framework for prevention and redress is urgently needed not only for solving sexual violence cases in campus environments but also for increasing universities’ accountability in creating a campus climate that is safer for everybody including, particularly, women and other minorities. 355 The BBC Indonesia was part of the consortium but then left due to irreconcilable differences between it and Vice, in the way the two media companies decide on the issue of revealing a sexual violence victim’s identity despite the victim’s consent. 356 The Society of Publishers in Asia. (2020). “The SOPA 2020 Awards for Editorial Excellence Awards Winners List.” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://sopawards.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/SOPA-2020-Awards-Winner-List.pdf. === [PDF page 169] === 169 One journalist of the #CampusReputation consortium had heard of GERAK Perempuan’s meeting with the MOE and approached two of the Team KS’s volunteers who were GERAK Perempuan members.357 Part of their stealth politics is that the two GERAK Perempuan members exercised restraint and did not disclose any details about the MOE’s work-in-progress with regards to designing a sexual violence elimination regulation at the ministerial level. 358 Exercising restraint to keep the ongoing work toward the main goal (a regulation for system of sexual violence redress and prevention) away from media attention as long as possible was important. Otherwise, the MOE would quickly be swamped with an overwhelming number of opinions or people of diverse interest groups who would want to be included in the early stages of policymaking or simply to block the entire process.359 With a modest amount of data from primary sources, Team KS on March 13, 2020 conducted a focus group discussion (FGD) of fifteen people who were representatives of the MOE’s Higher Education Directorate General, the state’s quasi-independent Witness and Victims Protection Agency, a public university, Islamic and secular private universities on and beyond Java, an education think-tank, and a Quran study center. 360 Given the list of the FGD participants, Team KS aimed to study how diverse actors with authority—i.e., professors, researchers, religious leaders—and experts in the education sector view sexual violence reports in campus environments. The FGD results strengthened Team KS’s preliminary hypothesis that educators were expecting a major policy intervention from the Education Ministry on the issue, and that it had long been treated as a chicken-and-egg problem. While universities expected or 357 Electronic Communication on September 15, 2020. 358 Electronic Communication in Jakarta, February 9, 2021. 359 Following the logic of collective action, the larger the group, then the harder it is to control and the higher possibility of free riders to emerge (Olson, 1965). 360 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 13, 2020. === [PDF page 170] === 170 awaited a ministerial intervention, Education Ministry officials assumed each university— empowered by the “campus autonomy” principle—already had rules and procedures for redress in place.361 4.4.2 Literature Review Team KS reviewed academic publications and similar policies in other countries with the main question of: What has been done in education institutions overseas or in Indonesia? Hence, the bulk of the literature review was conducted in a comparative method. Analyzing what worked and failed entails identifying the similarities and differences across a wide range of contextual details. For example, Team KS decided to focus on the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States as points of reference for answering the team’s main question. Team KS was aware of the general understanding of sexual violence and possible frameworks for redress and prevention according to the United Nations guidelines. Nevertheless, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia were selected because they are neighboring Southeast Asian countries and, hence, possess demographic contexts that are similar to Indonesia’s. The Philippines has had a national level law on anti-sexual harassment since 1995, while Singaporean and Malaysian penal codes have already further specified the kinds of sexual misconduct and harassment considered a criminal offense. 362 The Nigerian case was imperative for building the team’s confidence in arguing for a legally-binding and sound form of policy which solicits 361 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 2020. 362 Websites and sources provided by women’s rights groups and law firms are helpful in providing a comprehensive collection and view of the available legal codes in their respective countries. === [PDF page 171] === 171 universities’ compliance and provides better protection for students and staff in Indonesia’s higher education ecosystem. Not only does Nigeria have demographic contexts closely similar to those of Indonesia, but also it had just recently passed a national law specifically addressing sexual violence in its country’s tertiary institutions. 363 Finally, the team was most familiar with the US Title IX because not only have cases related to Title IX become increasingly visible on social media but also a few of the Team’s members had direct experience in either conducting in-depth research about Title IX for previous projects or had lived in the United States.364 To gain more relevance to the Indonesian context of a predominantly Muslim population, the team even conducted research on the ways in which the United States’ Islamic colleges and universitiescommunicate their policies following Title IX. The research on the United States’ Islamic higher education institutions’ adoption of Title IX was conducted to appease the Muslim mass organizations and universities in Indonesia who have been skeptical about the universality of anti-sexual violence regulations or that any attempt to address the issue is un-Islamic and a fully liberal Caucasian enterprise. Team KS found one of the earliest scholarly works on sexual violence in an Indonesian university and its effects, written by the anthropologist Myrtati Artaria. 365 Artaria’s article was a revelation because it explained the vulnerability of administrative staff members to sexual violence on campus. The article used cases of administrative staff members who endured years of sexual harassment by male peers or senior-level coworkers. Furthermore, the cases discuss the long-term effects of sexual violence on the administrative staff members’ career and relationship with people in their work and home environments. 363 Anierobi et. al., 2021. 364 Has and Apsari, 2022. 365 Artaria, 2012. === [PDF page 172] === 172 The article informed Team KS about the necessity of including administrative staff members--an often-overlooked population vis a vis the issue of sexual violence in campus environments--in conceptualizing the policy design. This article was crucial to two of Team KS’s key decisions. First, Team KS proposed that a team of multidisciplinary scholars who possess a victim-oriented perspective was needed to write the a feasibility study (Naskah Akademik) which would explain the urgency of a policy addressing sexual violence in higher education. At the time, Indonesian law did not require the preparation of feasibility study before a legal product is drafted.366 However, Team KS considered having a feasibility study before the drafting phase good policymaking practice. Second, Team KS was keen to delve further into the idea of obligating universities to include administrative staff members in all campus-organized activities related to sexual violence prevention and redress. 4.4.3 Database Building In addition to searching on the internet including social media accounts, Team KS relied on its members’ networks to build a database of experts and activists who with considerable experience in organizing collective action to tackle sexual violence. 367 Team KS mapped them into five groups. The first was the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan). Komnas Perempuan was founded because of sexual violence cases during riots across some of Indonesia’s major cities in May 1998. It is a quasi-independent state institution that has the presidential mandate of educating the public on preventing and handling cases of 366 President Widodo later issued his Presidential Regulation on President’s Approval of Draft Regulations by Ministers or Heads of State Agencies (PERPRES No. 68/2021) in August 2021 which mandates every policy must be preceded by a feasibility study which explains the urgency of a ministry’s proposed draft regulation. 367 Direct Participation in Zoom meeting room, July 2020. === [PDF page 173] === 173 violence against women through Presidential Regulation No. 65/2005. Komnas Perempuan also, about 2014, initiated the move to conduct feasibility studies and draft the earliest version of the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill. 368 Team KS believed that Komnas Perempuan’s commissioners who are women’s rights activists, women’s studies scholars, or gender experts could strengthen the diversity of knowledge which the Education Ministry needs to push forward the agenda of eliminating sexual violence in campuses. Furthermore, these commissioners could connect the contacts and aspirations of women’s rights activists, women’s studies scholars, or gender experts with the Education Ministry and vice versa. Certainly, they could also garner their networks’ support for the Education Ministry’s policies and vice versa. For instance, Chief Commissioner Andy Yentriyani and Co-Deputy Chief Commissioner Mariana Amirruddin have not only served as commissioners before but have also endured the struggles of advocating for the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill’s drafting and ratification since 2014. Commissioners Maria Ulfah Anshor and Alimatul Qibtiyah are active members in, respectively, NU and Muhammadiyah circles. Both are also part of the KUPI. Furthermore, it was Co-Deputy Chief Commissioner Olivia Salampessy who first reached out to Team KS’s expert staff for collaboration, when the expert staff attended Komnas Perempuan’s public event to launch the commission’s annual report on violence against women cases across Indonesia. 369 Commissioner Salampessy was the first woman to be deputy mayor, from 2006-2011, of Ambon, a major city in the eastern part of Indonesia. 370 368 “Darurat Kekerasan Seksual dan Pembahasan RUU PKS yang Lambat [Sexual Violence Emergency and the Slow-Paced Deliberation of the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://ykp.or.id/darurat-kekerasan-seksual-dan-pembahasanruu-pks-yang-lambat/. 369 Direct Participation in Jakarta, March 12, 2020. 370 Olivia Salampessy ran for the vice mayorship with the GOLKAR Party. === [PDF page 174] === 174 The second group was the academics or Team NA. Team NA conducted research and wrote the feasibility study (Naskah Akademik). Team KS focused on the diversity of expertise, experience, gender, and institutional affiliation within Team NA. Hence, Team NA included researchers and teaching faculty from different universities and disciplines. Lidwina Inge Nurtjahyo (gender and law) and Widati Wulandari (criminology) teach in West Java’s two major public universities. Mirza Satria Buana (human rights and law) teaches in South Kalimantan’s public university. Khaerul Umam Noer (anthropology) and Theresia Indira Shanti (psychology) teach in Jakarta’s religious private universities. The third and fourth groups comprised the network of disabilities’ rights groups and that of religious groups. Most of the groups and individuals in these two networks were close partners of Komnas Perempuan, collaborating to advocate for policies and cases of gender-based violence within their respective communities. Team KS viewed persons with disabilities and religious minorities as more vulnerable to discrimination, harassment, and abuse. Thus, closely collaborating with these groups could inform Team KS about whether a designed policy was sensitive to the groups’ vulnerabilities and needs. For example, the disabilities’ rights groups’ network emphasized the importance of explicitly mentioning accessibility and equal rights for victims and witnesses with disabilities. 371 The religious groups highlighted the explicit mention of victims’ rights to choose a religious leader as their aide throughout the case’s processing. 372 Finally, the fifth group comprised advocacy groups for women and other minorities. They included groups that either help children and women, including victims of sexual violence, and 371 Electronic Communication with a Team KS member, March 22, 2021; see also Article 3(c) in Education Minister’s Regulation 30. 372 Electronic Communication with a Team KS member, January 15, 2021; see also Article 11(2)(e), 20(1)(d), and 20(2)(e) in Education Minister’s Regulation 30. === [PDF page 175] === 175 journalists who uncover difficult cases; or provide services in the form of psychological aid, medical assistance, legal representation, religious guidance, or education on sexual and reproduction health and rights. The fifth group has chapters in areas outside of Jakarta and therefore the group was key to disseminating key updates about Team KS’s work on the policy to places across the Indonesian archipelago. For example, when the Education Ministry’s Legal Bureau planned to hold a public examination of an early draft in Yogyakarta, Team KS was able to ask the fifth group to send a few of its Yogyakarta-based members to attend the public examination. 4.4.4 Gap Finding With violence permeating every education level and a very limited ministerial budget, Team KS had to make a strategic decision. The team consulted several legal experts, but it was one of the four volunteers in Team KS, a law student in his senior year, who ultimately highlighted the gap in Indonesia’s legal infrastructure and emphasized the urgency and importance of drafting Regulation 30. The Indonesian state’s penal code regulates the punishment primarily for rapists, adulterers, human traffickers, and pedophiles, without a clear definition and scope of the actions they commit.373 The Indonesian state also has national level laws which protect non-adult victims of violence, victims of human-trafficking, and victims of domestic violence. The Education Ministry itself has its Minister’s Regulation No. 82/2015 on Violence Prevention and Redress in Pre-, Elementary, Middle, High and Vocational Schools. Hence, the people who lacked legal protection were victims of sexual violence over 17 years of 373 The Penal Code’s Articles 281 through 299 regulate Crimes of Indecency. === [PDF page 176] === 176 age and those who were unmarried or not a legal spouse of the perpetrator—a profile which primarily fits polytechnic, college, and university students. When the team decided higher education was the environment needing intervention, the question of form of policy came next. To some higher-echelon ministry officials, disseminating a release letter (Surat Edaran) or Higher Education Director General’s Decree (Keputusan Direktur Jenderal; KEPDIRJEN) could be one solution that did not require a long or complex process. However, neither a release letter nor a decree is legally binding. Historically, release letters and KEPDIRJEN have been demonstrated to exert an advisory but not a compulsory overtone. Hence, going with this solution would mean that university administrators’ incentive to start thinking seriously about their campus’ solutions to sexual violence was minimal, with no meaningful sanction for perpetrators. Based on the working hypotheses among Team KS and Team NA members, higher education institutions would benefit from a policy form that could explicitly highlight the urgency of sexual violence prevention and redress in Indonesian higher education and solicit university administrators’ full compliance. In fact, the form or level of policy itself (whether a release letter or a decree) was insufficient because the previous MOE Regulation No. 82/2015 on Violence Prevention and Redress in Pre-, Elementary, Middle, High and Vocational Schools had been ineffective and weakly implemented. Team KS decided that a larger solution was needed, that is, a policy package. 374 The Education Ministry must directly deliver the policy package to university administrators, systematically monitor its implementation, and aim for the impact of the regulation’s enactment to be sustainable. A policy package means that, in addition to a ministerial regulation on 374 Direct Participation in Zoom meeting, June 12, 2020. === [PDF page 177] === 177 prevention and redress, a set of “tools” must be ready by the time of the ministerial regulation’s enactment date. These tools must be user-friendly, meaning they should ease implementors’ understanding of the regulation through simple and communicative language—with minimal technical legal terms, and direct communication channels with the Education Ministry. For example, an official website was the one tool that must be made available for all—including persons with disabilities—by the regulation’s launch date. This website should concentrate all the relevant information on the regulation itself, other prevention strategies, principles of redress, helplines, videos for educational purposes, and announcements regarding progress in the regulation’s implementation. Team KS was aware of numerous areas with poor internet infrastructure, but the idea was to establish a visibly online presence before socializing the regulation to campuses in offline mode. Team KS initially was created to help MOE officials come up with the most fair and rigorous policy design and substance for victims of sexual violence in university environments. However, along the way it realized that if tools for implementation could also be established, Team KS would maximize that opportunity. 4.4.5 Grand Strategy The top leadership in the ministry mentioned to Team KS that the ministry was willing to allocate a serious amount of the budget for a comprehensive plan to tackle sexual violence. By that time, early March 2020, the team had already passed the current year’s deadline for budget proposal submission. However, the team had about three months to work on a draft for the following year’s finances. === [PDF page 178] === 178 Team KS worked on a comprehensive plan which entailed setting the design principles, preparing the deliverables, and establishing the enabling institutions (Figure 3). The team based its policy design on four principles. First, the policy on anti-sexual violence on campuses must lay a system of empowering universities to do more for victims of sexual violence on- and offcampus, rather than punishing them. Translating this principle necessitated Team KS to conduct meetings with and trainings of PUSPEKA’s team on providing more empowering, less bureaucratic assistance to universities when responding to queries about implementing the regulation.375 Second, the policy must serve as a foundation for educating students and staff in higher education institutions on sexual violence prevention. Team KS translated this principle by detailing verbatim in the regulation the kinds of misconduct considered sexual violence. 376 Third, the policy must be the basis for developing a campus climate conducive to learning and working for anyone, regardless of gender, disabilities, class, or ethnicity. Team KS rendered this principle by detailing in the regulation the kinds of interventions university administrators, faculty, and student communities could do to prevent sexual violence cases.377 Fourth, the policy must provide grounds for coordination between higher education institutions and civil society organizations’ networks that work on the issue of sexual violence elimination. Translating this principle meant explicating the possibility for universities and other relevant organizations to collaborate when engaging in a prevention activity or responding to a sexual violence report. 378 375 Electronic Communication with a Team KS member, July 18, 2020. 376 Ibid.; see also Article 5 in Education Minister’s Regulation 30. 377 Electronic Communication with a Team KS member, op. cit.; see also Articles 6, 7, 8, 49, and 50 in Education Minister’s Regulation 30. 378 Electronic communication with a Team KS member, June 20, 2020; see also Articles 6(3)(j), 34(2)(d), and 47(2)(b) in Education Minister’s Regulation 30. === [PDF page 179] === 179 To enact the four design principles, Team KS thought of four deliverables or instruments that needed to be launched in tangible terms. The first, naturally, was a ministerial level regulation on sexual violence prevention and redress in higher education institutions. The second was a specific team within the Education Ministry fully dedicated to monitor and respond to inquiries pertaining to the implementation of sexual violence prevention and redress regulations from pre-school to K-12 and through higher education. The third was a tripartite memorandum of understanding between the MOE, Komnas Perempuan, and relevant networks of civil society organizations with a proven track record in aiding sexual violence victims. The MoU would regulate the terms and conditions for the relevant entities to collaborate with one another in the fight against sexual violence, bullying, and intolerance in schools and universities across Indonesia. Furthermore, the MoU would be the basis for entities such as Komnas Perempuan and civil society organizations to initiate collaboration with the MOE within the framework set by the MoU. Similarly, the MOE could use the MoU as the basis for inviting the signed parties to MOE internal and external events as collaborators, speakers, trainers, etc. The fourth deliverable was synchronization with other closely related regulations. Synchronization involves working with the legal coordinators of other bureaus, within and outside of the MOE. These four instruments were needed to set in motion another four essential components as enablers of transformative change. The first component was a unit or office dedicated to implementing the sexual violence prevention and redress regulation in every private and public higher education institution. Team KS considered the establishment of offices of equity or Title IX coordinators in all American colleges and universities an important direct translation of Title IX clauses into the enabling institutions. However, Team KS was aware of the contextual differences in funding structures between higher education institutions in the United States and === [PDF page 180] === 180 those in Indonesia. Hence, the format of offices of equity or Title IX coordinators in the United States could not simply be duplicated without meticulous contextualization. The second component was a ministerial website for the public and certification programs for every higher education student as well as faculty and administrative staff. Both the website and the certification programs serve to educate users and provide them with resources about sexual violence, and its prevention and redress. The third component was a carefully planned and programmed series of media-monitoring tasks and ministerial campaigns to raise public awareness about sexual violence and how to understand the details of the ministerial regulation. The fourth component comprised setting and formalizing indicators of sexual violence-free campus to be a required set of criteria for campus accreditation. In short, the top leadership of the ministry agreed with the team that the regulation could not stand alone if the greater cause was preventing further sexual violence cases in Indonesia’s higher education and to do so with enduring impact. Hence, Team KS strategized to think in concrete terms or steps when designing or drafting the regulation, in order to determine how the law could be operationalized. 379 Furthermore, thinking in concrete steps would strengthen the argument the team would have to make during the regulation harmonization stage with other state officials in and outside the Education Ministry. Finally, they also agreed to make the regulation as detailed as possible so that each higher educational institution could start implementing the regulation on an equal level playing field. 380 379 Thinking in concrete steps necessitates studying published and unpublished cases of sexual violence in higher education. For instance, the #NamaBaikKampus consortium’s data demonstrate that many cases of sexual violence occur between student and faculty during oneon-one thesis consultation behind closed doors. Hence, Team KS fought hard to maintainArticles 7 and 8 in Education Minister’s Regulation 30. 380 Direct Participation in Jakarta, 2020. === [PDF page 181] === 181 4.5 The Harmonizing Stage Harmonizing entails reviewing the proposed draft with careful deliberation to make sure the draft does not overlap with or contradict other regulations and higher-level laws. This stage had an internal and an external phase. The internal phase had two steps: 1) elementary deliberations within the Legal Division of the Higher Education Directorate General and 2) advanced deliberations within the Legal Bureau of the ministry. Team KS encountered at least two difficult challenges during the elementary deliberations with the Legal Division of the Higher Education Directorate General that took place between July and August 2020. The first pertained to the Legal Division of the Higher Education Directorate General’s unfamiliarity with the topic. The Higher Education Directorate General usually oversees technical issues related to Indonesian colleges’ and universities’ development, such as improving policies on faculty staff’s key performance indicators or students’ credit transfers. Regulating a system of redress for sexual violence was technically an unusual task for the Higher Education Directorate General’s Legal Division. Hence, Team KS began its meeting with the Higher Education Directorate General’s Legal Division by presenting slides that explained the grand strategy and the critical components which the draft regulation must have to correspond to the grand strategy. Furthermore, the team of scholars, or Team NA, had not yet concluded the feasibility study. Therefore, Team KS was tasked with assuring the Higher Education Directorate General’s Legal Division of the urgency and magnitude of sexual violence in Indonesian campuses, while the feasibility study was still being written. Team KS convinced the Legal Division that the Education Ministry is mandated to improve the quality of education institutions under its purview and, therefore, the Education Ministry’s institutional intervention would be the right thing to do as a good governance practice === [PDF page 182] === 182 and to address sexual violence in campuses across Indonesia. GERAK Perempuan volunteers played a crucial role in the meetings because they were able to support the need for intervention with case studies from campuses and other contexts in which they had been directly involved in aiding the victims’ recovery. 381 The second difficulty was related to bridging the generational gap between the two teams. While Team KS was composed mostly of millennials who were exposed to the #MeToo movement daily through social media, the Legal Division of the Higher Education Directorate General was mostly senior civil servants who were not used to talking about issues of sexuality, let alone sexual violence, in a formal forum. Hence, the senior civil servants would occasionally show subtle expressions of discomfort during the discussion or comment in jest to release the tension. In contrast, Team KS would remain silent and resume the discussion, subtly showing disagreement with the recently made comments. Nevertheless, discussions would frequently turn into constructive debates that informed participants who were unfamiliar with the topic and gradually changed the minds of civil servants who initially had been skeptical. These discussions could be as brief as two hours or as exhaustive as four hours, but both teams would discuss the draft legislation in depth, article per article and at times verse by verse. However, the Legal Division of the Higher Education Directorate General ultimately proposed that further deliberations be suspended until the feasibility study was concluded. 382 After the completion of Team NA’s feasibility study in September 2020, Team KS did not continue discussing the draft regulation with the Legal Division of the Higher Education Directorate General. The deliberations that resumed in October 2020 proceeded to the second 381 Direct Participation in Zoom meeting rooms, June 2020-May 2021. 382 Ibid. === [PDF page 183] === 183 step of the internal phase, facilitated by the ministry’s Legal Bureau Chief, although a few members of the Higher Education Directorate General’s Legal Division were present. The ministry’s Inspector General herself, Chatarina Girsang, also attended all the meetings regarding the draft regulation.383 In short, deliberations on the draft regulation were transferred from the Higher Education Directorate General’s desk to the Secretariat General’s. The transfer was important because the speed and quality of deliberations and revisions showed more steady progress after the transfer. Two possible explanations for this significant change merit reflection. First, transfer to the Secretariat General meant the draft was handled directly by a woman superordinate such as the Legal Bureau Chief, Dian Wahyuni. On-site observations throughout rounds of meetings about the draft indicate that women were more able than men to empathize and understand the rationale of the clauses related to protection of sexual violence victims. Second, possible emotions of relatability to the issue made the Legal Bureau Chief’s approach to the policymaking process significant. She demonstrated a hands-on approach in supporting her team to remain consistent in perfecting and pushing the draft of Regulation 30 to the finish line. During the Legal Bureau Chief’s first meeting, the forum immediately discussed the document drafted by the bureau’s team. The Legal Bureau had studied all the slides Team KS had previously presented to the Higher Education Directorate General’s Legal Division. The bureau team had also incorporated key recommendations from the feasibility study, commissioned by the Higher Education Directorate General and written by Team NA, into the preliminary draft. Relative to the previous rounds of discussion with the Higher Education 383 Minister Makarim promoted Indonesia’s first ever female Inspector General in its Education Ministry. Before joining the Education Ministry as former education minister Anies Baswedan’s Regulation Specialist (Staf Ahli Bidang Regulasi), Chatarina Girsang was Legal Bureau Chief of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) from 2013 to 2015. === [PDF page 184] === 184 Directorate General’s Legal Division, the rounds of discussion facilitated by the Legal Bureau were less tense. However, debates on explicating the kinds of misconduct considered sexual violence and the administrative sanctions for perpetrators who are faculty or staff in public universities (civil servant status) were mostly intense. For example, some participants saw a need to classify the severity of each kind of misconduct considered sexual violence and match it to three different categories of sanctions: minor, severe, and dismissal.384 Others thought that, because every victim is different and if an action is considered less severe by the regulation but in reality causes severe consequences for the victim, such a move would likely fail to bring justice to many victims. Another example concerns determining whether the term “victim’s consent” needs to be explicitly stated in the document. GERAK Perempuan volunteers’ insights from their past experiences in advocating for sexual violence victims on campuses managed to convince the participants of the significance of maintaining the explicit mention of “victim’s consent” in the draft. Finally, participants agreed on the preliminary draft in February 2021, four months since the first meeting that included the Legal Bureau. The draft regulation could then move to the external phase. The external phase also had two steps. The first was an examination of the deliberated draft by representatives from the public and other relevant state institutions. These representatives from the public included polytechnic and university students and staff, and sexual violence victims’ rights activists, including those from religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Relevant state institutions include the Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry and its women and children protection units at the subnational level (Unit 384 Direct Participation in Zoom meeting rooms, circa end of 2020. === [PDF page 185] === 185 Pelaksana Teknis Daerah Perlindungan Perempuan dan Anak, UPTDP2A) of Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. The public examination was conducted only in these three cities although the Legal Bureau had initially planned for a public examination in Padang, Medan, and Makassar as well— all of which are beyond Java Island. However, Covid-19 cases were increasing again at the time and, therefore, the bureau had to limit mobility to Java Island because land transport from Jakarta to the three cities on Java Island was considered safer than air transport to other islands. The MOE’s Legal Bureau was very meticulous in ensuring the confidentiality of the draft regulation when distributing it to the participants of the public examination, because of the sensitivity of the topic and the bureau’s having learned from past events related to the advocacy for the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill’s ratification at the national parliament. The Legal Bureau wanted to protect participants’ focus on the matter and substantive contents of the draft regulation from counterproductive opposition. By “counterproductive opposition” the legal bureau meant the people who already intended to oppose the draft without reading the it in its entirety.385 Every little detail was handled carefully, such that some of the participants even said in jest that the Legal Bureau was conducting, in fact, a “semi-public” examination.386 GERAK Perempuan volunteers who knew of this strategy also exercised restraint by passing on information about the MOE’s progress without disclosing too many details on the strategy of organizing the public examination. 387 During the questions-and-answers session in the public examination, the MOE received not only critiques but also appreciation and applause from the participants who had long waited 385 Direct Participation in Zoom meeting room, circa February 2021. 386 Direct Participation in Bandung, February 19, and Surabaya, February 26, 2021. 387 Ibid. === [PDF page 186] === 186 for a regulation to protect campuses from sexual predators. Immediately after the public examination, the Legal Bureau asked for feedback from related bureaus within the ministry as well, such as the Human Resources Bureau and the Organization and Institutional Management Bureau. Then, the Legal Bureau facilitated further rounds of discussion, throughout March and April 2021, to revise the draft regulation based on feedback from the public examinations and the ministry’s internal bureaus. The second step in the external phase of the harmonizing stage was an examination by the Law and Human Rights Ministry of the agreed draft—a revised draft the Education Ministry’s Legal Bureau prepared based on feedback it received from the representatives of the public. This step took approximately four months, from April to August 2021. The Law and Human Rights Ministry is led by Yasonna Laoly, a politician from the ruling party PDIP who did his postgraduate studies in Virginia and North Carolina, in the United States. As Minister Makarim had briefly communicated with Minister Laoly about the draft regulation’s currently undergoing the harmonizing stage with his ministry, Team KS was rather confident about obtaining the Law and Human Rights Ministry’s support.388 Team KS believed, one, the fight against sexual violence aligned with PDIP’s agenda and, two, Minister Laoly was familiar with the United States’ Title IX and therefore could relate to what the draft regulation was aiming to achieve. 388 Team KS was also relieved to know that Minister Laoly did not appoint his deputy, Edward Hiariej, to lead discussions of the draft regulation. Edward Hiariej publicly defended Anand Krishna, a prominent interfaith and spiritual guru when allegations of the latter’s sexually harassing his students surfaced in 2010. Edward Hiariej is also the brother of Eric Hieariej, a lecturer at Gadjah Mada University (Indonesia’s major public university) who was suspected of sexually harassing a student in the university’s library in 2016 but was never investigated. Edward Hiariej later was appointed to lead discussions of the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill and Revision of the Penal Code instead. === [PDF page 187] === 187 The Law and Human Rights Ministry’s official who led the cross-sector and ultimate harmonization was a female official who had pursued her master’s education in Chicago. She was familiar with Title IX and therefore was able to connect with the ideas of Team KS and the Education Ministry’s other officials who attended the harmonization. Her ministry also invited officials from the Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry and Komnas Perempuan to attend the entire harmonization process. The process must have been lengthy for the MOE’s Legal Bureau because approximately 80% of the draft regulation was either revised or developed with lengthier details in the chapters regarding the scope of sexual violence, administrative sanctions, and institutional mechanisms of redress. After these two steps n the external phase of harmonizing the draft regulation, Team KS needed to conduct a final review of the most updated and agreed upon draft with Minister Makarim, his special staff, and higher-level echelon officials—including the Higher Education Director General, Inspector General, and Secretary General. A final review entails an hour-long online session of questions and answers before the education minister finally approves and provides his insights—on matters which the team must subsequently address. For example, the team was asked to work with the special staff overseeing communication materials and prepare the minister’s speeches as well as supplementary materials for his upcoming meetings with different state actors from the cabinet, parliament members from the women’s caucus, rectors of public universities, leaders of key mass organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, and journalists. There was minor pushback that pertained to Minister Makarim’s question on whether the draft regulation should address other forms of violence as well, such as bullying and discrimination. Team KS argued that such a move would be considered as big bang approach that === [PDF page 188] === 188 would be more likely to cause confusion and ineffective implementation. 389 Team KS used the Education and Culture Minister’s Regulation No. 82/2015 on the Violence Prevention and Redress in Pre-, Elementary, Middle, High and Vocational Schools as an example. The regulation was made during Anies Baswedan’s brief tenure as minister in 2015 to tackle various kinds of violence including bullying. However, PUSPEKA had conducted a survey of educators’ knowledge about violence prevention in schools and the results showed that very few participants were aware of Regulation No. 82/2015. 390 Given the inefficiency of Regulation No. 82/2015, Team KS maintained that the Education Ministry should not repeat a big bang approach. Fortunately, Minister Makarim was finally convinced, signed the draft on the last day of August 2021, and sent the regulation’s hardcopy back to the Law and Human Rights Ministry for its seal and issuance of the State Gazette (Lembaran Negara). Had Minister Makarim disagreed with Team KS’s approach and insisted on modifying the fully harmonized draft, Team KS would have had to start over from the planning stage. Furthermore, Team NA would have had to conduct another feasibility study, and many ongoing policy tools supporting the implementation of the sexual violence regulation would have been terminated. Three possible explanations for why the minister agreed to Team KS’s argument merit reflection. First, the minister’s technocratic background led him to believe in the team’s research and analysis of Regulation No. 82/2015. Second, the minister was empathetic about the labor that almost his entire bureaucracy had done each day for almost two years to reach this stage of completion. Denying Team KS’s recommendation would only add fuel to factions among the MOE’s civil servants who since the beginning had been skeptical of 389 See Falleti (2005) on the consequences of a big bang approach vs. a sequential approach in decentralization policy packages. 390 Direct Participation in a closed meeting with PUSPEKA officials in Jakarta, circa April 2021. === [PDF page 189] === 189 the draft or the minister’s leadership. Third, reformulating the draft would have wasted a relatively large amount of resources from his limited ministerial budget. A major change would have complicated the paperwork needed to justify budget readjustments. Finally, the State Gazette no. 1000 declared the official establishment of Regulation 30 on September 3, 2021. The regulation’s final main components constitute 58 articles and 9 chapters.391 The chapters include General Provisions, Prevention, Redress, Task Force, Mechanisms of Redress, Review, Rights of Victims and Witnesses, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Closing Provisions. The five essential parts of the regulation are 1) definition of sexual violence and the specifying of 20 actions considered as sexual violence; 2) guidelines for prevention at the teaching, management, and campus community levels; 3) the kinds of administrative sanctions; 4) requirements for Task Force establishment, including that students must be involved; and 5) the option for respondents of sexual violence complaints to ask the MOE for a review of his/her case. 4.6 The Launch and Public Reception The Education Ministry’s special staff and higher-echelon officers agreed with Team KS that due to the sensitivity of the issue addressed by Regulation 30, its launch had to be planned with extreme caution. On the one hand, the stakes were high because the issue was being pushed also at the national level in parliament. Team KS was aware that negative public reaction to the launch could reverse the progress of the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill in the national parliament.392 On the other hand, the Education Ministry had to deliver the details of the 391 See Appendix 2 in this dissertation. 392 The Sexual Violence Crimes Bill is the revised version of Sexual Violence Elimination Bill. === [PDF page 190] === 190 regulation to every university and assure university administrators that the Education Ministry would provide guidance to and ease universities in implementing the regulation. Rather than emphasizing the punishable aspects in the regulation, soliciting support and compliance was the first and main goal of the launch. Thus, Team KS argued that a closed large-scale meeting between Minister Makarim and all public university rectors must be prioritized. The higherechelon officials, special staff, and minister agreed, but the downside was that the launch could not happen until mid-October 2021, due to the minister’s prior engagements. Because key political communication at the elite level was also necessary, Team KS and the special staff asked Minister Makarim to contact or speak to several key elites with whom he would be meeting between early September and October 2021. Team KS and the higher-echelon officials mapped the key elites with whom the education minister himself must speak. Anticipating a wave of opposition entails directly explaining a regulation in greater detail to related ministers, Therefore, the team identified at least three key ministers in this regard, namely, 1) the Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection Minister, 2) the Religious Affairs Minister, and 3) the State Secretariat Minister. Notifying the Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection Minister was important because Regulation 30 addresses the issue of gender inequality in the higher education sector, and she is a key politician of the ruling party PDIP. Hence, obtaining the endorsement of Minister I Gusti Ayu Bintang mattered in this regard. The Minister of Religious Affairs was also struggling with tackling sexual violence in education institutions under his purview, 393 and Regulation 30 was, in fact, somewhat based on the 393 Team KS received intelligence from Komnas Perempuan’s Commissioner Alimatul Qibtiyah about Minister Qoumas’ struggle and concerns about the rising number of sexual violence cases in schools and universities on which he had received information at that time. See also Larasati, C. (October 12, 2021). “Menag Minta Kampus Keagamaan Punya SOP Pencegahan Kekerasan Seksual [Minister of Religious Affairs Urge Religious Universities to have Standard Operating === [PDF page 191] === 191 Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Director General of Islamic Higher Education’s Decree No. 5494 on the Guidelines for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Islamic Universities, issued in 2019. A GERAK Perempuan volunteer had flown to East Kalimantan to help female university student activists who were organizing a push to their professors to immediately implement Regulation 30. She met there with a few students from an Islamic public university who previously had met with their vice rector. They told the GERAK Perempuan volunteer that the vice rector looked forward to receiving the order or a statement from Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas to implement Regulation 30. The GERAK Perempuan volunteer immediately contacted the Team KS members in Jakarta who in turn immediately forwarded the news to Minister Makarim’s special staff team, also notifying them that receiving Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas’ public support was key to Regulation 30’s survivability, as many anticipated strong oppositions would come from the religious fundamentalists. “Victim’s consent” is at the heart of sexual violence regulations and laws. It is the vocabulary for a victim to identify whether her body and/or psychological wellbeing has/have not been violated by another person. However, religious fundamentalists are not keen on the idea of emphasizing “consent” as the basis of identifying the problem. Many of them provide “marriage” as the solution to prevent sexual violence.394 Religious fundamentalists construct a dichotomy between sexual consent (Western liberal and feminist) and marriage (Indonesian and Procedures on Sexual Violence Prevention].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://www.medcom.id/pendidikan/news-pendidikan/9K5QL63K-menag-minta-kampuskeagamaan-punya-sop-pencegahan-kekerasan-seksual?utm_source=share_mobile&utm_ medium=share_whatsapp&utm_campaign=share. 394 Nurtjahyo, et. al., op. cit., 2022b. === [PDF page 192] === 192 Islamic). This was the same set of objections which they had made to stall the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill in previous years. Hence, the oppositional voice to Regulation 30 was no surprise. The young Minister Qoumas was also a former leader of NU’s youth wing, GP Ansor.395 He, therefore, has a massive base of supporters. Lastly, notifying State Secretariat Minister Pratikno was key to updating President Widodo and obtaining his support because the state secretariat minister’s job entails providing analyses for the president’s political choices.396 The higher-echelon officials also suggested that Minister Makarim notify several members of the Women in Parliament Caucus (Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen Replublik Indonesia, KPPRI). The reason was that KPPRI members had been supporting primarily the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill’s ratification. Thus, notifying them could mitigate the effects of the opposition’s voice within the parliament, especially within the parliament’s Commission X which is mandated to check on the education minister’s work. Minister Makarim agreed and Team KS and PUSPEKA organized a closed meeting during the weekend between Minister Makarim and some of KPPRI’s female parliament members. Due to the Covid-19 protocol and budget constraints, Team KS had to limit the number of invitees to the KPPRI’s leaders and MPs who oversee education issues. 397 395 GP Anshor had just opened its membership for women in 2016. See NU Online. (November 27, 2016). “Pertama Kali PKD Ansor Diikuti Perempuan [Women Attend Ansor’s Basic Leadership Training for the First Time].” https://www.nu.or.id/daerah/pertama-kali-pkd-ansordiikuti-perempuan-Sey3Y. 396 Minister Pratikno was former rector of Gadjah Mada University, a major public university in Indonesia and President Widodo’s alma mater. He also served as chair of the university’s board of trustees. 397 The cost is associated with food and venue order, not honorarium for the parliament members because parliament members are already receiving salary for their government work. === [PDF page 193] === 193 In addition to KPPRI, the higher-echelon officials requested that the special staff and Team KS notify key mass organizations, such as NU’s women wings—Fatayat and Muslimat, Muhammadiyah’s Higher Education group (PP DIKTI Muhammadiyah) and women’s wing Aisyiyah, the women’s movement network KOWANI, and major women and gender studies associations (ASWGI and APPHGI) prior to the regulation’s public launch. Minister Makarim agreed and the Higher Education Directorate General and Team KS organized a closed meeting between the special staff and the suggested organizations. Team KS added Commissioner Maria Ulfah Anshor and Commissioner Alimatul Qibtiyah of Komnas Perempuan as invitees, given the signed MoU between the ministry and Komnas Perempuan and their connections with Fatayat and Aisyiyah. In the meeting, an Aisyiyah representative openly expressed her disappointment as she felt that the ministry had engaged her only at the last minute, whereas she should have been consulted on the issue since the beginning of the drafting because of the number of polytechnics, colleges, and universities which Muhammadiyah and Aisyiyah own.398 Lack of public engagement in the entire process of drafting regulations would later be one of Muhammadiyah’s and many other opposers’ argument against Regulation 30’s enactment. In fact, the issue was not whether the ministry had or had not already included them in the process—because the ministry had indeed invited these organizations to send their members. 399 Essentially, it was a matter of 398 See the head of Aisyiyah’s council for legal and human rights affairs Atiyatul Ulya’s comments in Retrieved December 31, 2022 from Fida A. (November 9, 2021). “Masukannya Terkait Permendikbudristek No. 30 Tak Digubris, Aisyiyah Sebut Hanya Dilibatkan Secara Formalitas [Her Suggestions on Regulation 30 Ignored, Aisyiyah Claims the Engagement was Mere Formality].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/ read/2021/11/09/219503/masukannya-terkait-permendikbudistek-no-30-tak-digubris-aisyiyahsebut-hanya-dilibatkan-secara-formalitas.html. 399 Electronic Communication with a Team KS member, November 12, 2021. === [PDF page 194] === 194 specific persons who were unhappy that they had not been informed of the invitation and spoke to journalists of their discontent. Parallel to strategizing the education minister’s political communication, between early September and mid-October 2021 Team KS went through rounds of revision of the script and slides for the education minister’s upcoming public speech on the regulation. The minister’s special staff who oversees the minister’s external communication affairsand the special staff who oversees the education minister’s governmental and political affairs worked with Team KS in writing the script and slides. Versions were differentiated by the intended recipient of the messages to vary the emphasis depending on to whom the minister would be speaking. The script and slides were always being updated because of the political dynamic and media coverage of sexual violence cases which could fluctuate from time to time. Nevertheless, the main goal was to convince all of the education minister’s audience that the regulation was urgently needed, carefully researched, examined by experts and relevant communities, and implementable in realistic measures. In addition, Team KS was in the final stages of preparing a frequently asked questions (FAQ) sheet, animated videos explaining the regulation’s contents step-by-step, a website for universities’ uploads of their implementation progress, learning modules for university students and staff, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between MOE and Komnas Perempuan. Team KS also made sure that any actors involved with the preparation would maintain confidentiality about Regulation 30/2021’s existence until Minister Makarim publicly announced its launch. The restraint was needed to prevent political noise from the opposition that could affect universities’ compliance in implementing Regulation 30. For example, when Komnas Perempuan released a statement to the press on its website about its === [PDF page 195] === 195 MoU signing with the Education Ministry and its role in pushing Regulation 30/2021, Team KS requested Komnas Perempuan to withdraw the statement until the public launch. 400 The Education Ministry, beginning with Minister Makarim’s tenure, had institutionalized its major policy and program launches through episodes of Merdeka Belajar that could be streamed live and replayed on the ministry’s official YouTube channel. It had become one of the keyways for the education minister to communicate his agenda to students, educators, and a broader public audience. Journalists also resort to the channel for news. Each episode is delivered in a relatively grandiose manner, but with a clear and consistent presentation by the minister and a lively discussion panel of experts, students, educators, other state actors, etc. Each episode would usually attract intense public engagement. For instance, the debut, seventh, and fifteenth episodes attracted 6,000 likes, 3,700 likes, and 14,000 likes, respectively. These episodes collected hundreds to thousands of comments, with a mix between positive and negative responses. Furthermore, relative to other ministries’ YouTube channels, the Education Ministry’s channel is the most popular. Yhe Education Ministry reached 707,000 subscribers, while the tourism, finance, communication, and religious ministries’ all ranged between 71,900 and 190,000. Considering past hits and misses in a few of the Merdeka Belajar episodes, Team KS decided that the launch of Regulation 30 must be conducted differently. The team’s first argument was that Regulation 301 was one of the very few policies that touched upon gender and violence—a highly sensitive topic in the Indonesian context. Most of the policies which Merdeka Belajar had launched were either technical or financial. In fact, a series of backlashes unfolded after Merdeka Belajar launched the decree issued by the Education and Culture Minister, Interior 400 Electronic Communication with a Team KS member, September 22, 2021. === [PDF page 196] === 196 Minister, and Religious Affairs Minister (Surat Keputusan Bersama Tiga Menteri) warning schools about enforcing religious attributes for students—primarily requiring or restricting the wearing of the hijab by Muslim and non-Muslim girls as a public school uniforms. The backlashes were multifaceted. Not only did the public reaction primarily critique the Education Ministry for being biased against religious Muslims, but also a civil society organization that claimed to represent the voices of the Minangkabau ethnic group in West Sumatra (Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau)401 filed for a judicial review of the decree to the Supreme Court. The backlash also set a precedent for fundamentalist groups and government opposition to further challenge gender equality policies. Learning from the backlash that ensued from the Merdeka Belajar episode launching the three ministers’ decrees on enforcement of students’ religious attributes in schools, the team decided to distance Regulation 30 from the media spotlight at first and instead to prioritize highlighting the urgency and substance of Regulation 30 to university rectors. Hence, the education minister agreed with the team that a first round of closed meetings would be held between the minister and rectors, university administrators, and students on the Education Ministry’s premises—not at a hotel convention room or hall. The team planned three closed meetings in which the first would be Minister Makarim’s presentation of the details of Regulation 30 to 124 public university rectors and two leaders of the associations of private university rectors.402 Due to the national protocol on organizing offline events during the COVID-19 pandemic, the team had to make the efficient decisions on the number of invitees. 401 Later, Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau attempted to shoot down Regulation 30/2021 through a similar tactic, that is, filing a judicial review of the regulation to the Supreme Court. 402 Among the 4,550 higher education institutions which the MOE oversees, 124 are public universities; see Nurtjahyo et. al., op. cit., 2022a. === [PDF page 197] === 197 Despite the meetings being closed, the team had anticipated news about the them, from the meetings’ participants, would circulate on mobile phone chat groups and social media. Hence, the idea was for Team KS to observe people’s reactions and assess whether a larger launch in the form of a Merdeka Belajar episode was necessary to clarify the clauses in Regulation 30/2021 that were misunderstood or deemed controversial. In short, the team decided that Minister Makarim would speak—in three separate closed meetings—to public polytechnic and university rectors as well as two leaders of the private university rectors’ association in a closed meeting on October 25; then, to the vice rectors in charge of student affairs and administrative staff on October 26; and finally, to selected students from public and private polytechnics and universities on October 27. Due to last minute scheduling, however, Minister Makarim attended only the first closed meeting in person, taping his remarks for the second and third closed meetings. The minister’s higher-echelon officials related to higher education delivered the materials and answered the attendants’ questions on the minister’s behalf in the closed meetings on October 26 and 27. The October 25 meeting was set up in a semiformal manner, in which Minister Makarim and five other higher-echelon officials sat in front facing the audience sitting in a half-circle. The Higher Education Directorate General’s Secretary, Paristiyanti Nurwadani, chose this seating arrangement for one reason. She explained that psychologically it would build a warm and less hierarchic atmosphere between the minister and the rectors from Indonesia’s 34 provinces who had flown all the way to Jakarta on short notice to see the minister. Team KS seemed to agree with her, and no surprising or strong criticism from the audience was shown in these meetings. However, typical comments regarding the potential of Regulation 30/2021 to liberalize young === [PDF page 198] === 198 people’s minds and criminalize educators that prevent students from becoming LGBT surfaced from one of the rectors present during the questions and answers period. The seating arrangement also presented to the audience a sense of unity and close cooperation between the minister, his higher-echelon officials, and an external official. The education minister’s protocol staff arranged the seats according to their bureau’s protocols. Higher Education Director General Nizam and Vocational Education Director General Wikan Sakarinto sat on the minister’s left side. Inspector General Chatarina Girsang, Secretary General Suharti, and Komnas Perempuan’s Commissioner Alimatul Qibtiyah sat on the minister’s right side. Although the protocol staff made it look like a gender divide between the minister’s left and right sides, the appearance highlighted gender equality in the representation of legitimate authorities to the audience. The three closed meetings were held during the week of Youth Pledge Day (Sumpah Pemuda) that falls every October 28, with the third closed meeting designed as an intimate dialogue between Education Ministry officials and students, just one day before Youth Pledge Day, about keeping their campuses safe from sexual violence. The timing was deliberately planned to symbolize victory day for the students who had been fighting for a safer and egalitarian campus climate. The Higher Education Directorate General also happened to have planned a whole-day special event for students to celebrate Youth Pledge Day by discussing pressing issues with Minister Makarim. Hence, the third closed meeting invitees were the same set of students who had previously received the higher education and vocational education directorate generals’ invitation. On the one hand, the composition was a matter of convenience. On the other hand, the team needed as many students as the higher education and vocational === [PDF page 199] === 199 education directorate generals could invite to attend the closed meeting and then organically spread the word on Regulation 30/2021 to their respective campus communities. Just after the first closed group meeting on October 25, 2021, details of Regulation 30 spread from one mobile phone group chat to another regarding Minister Makarim’s presentation and Regulation 30. Already by October 26, the team was informed that the first opinion article opposing Regulation 30 was being widely circulated in WhatsApp and Telegram group chats.403 Supporters of the regulation published two kinds of materials on social media. The first was an announcement of “The People’s Victory,” and the second was an appreciation post to Minister Makarim and the Education Ministry. The Merdeka Belajar episode on November 12, 2021 attracted more dislikes than likes. The team received intelligence from supporting civil society organizations that had members with access to right-leaning religious conservative groups. These groups sent messages through mobile phone group chats about the episodes’ airtime and asked members to hit “dislike” and protest through the comments box. The reformist women’s movement mobilized its networks as well, but the number of dislikes and negative live comments still exceeded the number of likes and positive live comments by a few hundred. One of the Education Ministry’s special staff to the minister asked that the dislike button be disabled, but others contended that it should remain enabled. The YouTube channel did not show the final number of dislikes and likes, due to its new policy on preventing hate speech and bullying. Journalists watched the episode and published 403 Husaini, A. (October 26, 2021). “Peraturan Menteri tentang Kekerasan Seksual terlalu Sekuler, dan Mengabaikan Ajaran Agama [Ministerial Regulation on Sexual Violence is Too Secular and Neglects Religious Teachings].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://www.adianhusaini.id/detailpost/peraturan-menteri-tentang-kekerasan-seksual-terlalusekuler-dan-mengabaikan-ajaran-agama. === [PDF page 200] === 200 stories on what Minister Makarim and other supporting guests stated in the episode. For almost a month, until the end of November 2021, reporters published news about Regulation 30, groups and state actors who oppose and support it, and emerging cases of sexual violence in universities and even Islamic boarding schools. Protestors404 marched on the Education Ministry in the days after the Merdeka Belajar episode was aired, primarily people over their fifties. They claimed to march based on their concern for the younger generation’s future, because MOE Regulation 30/2021, they said, endorses free sex and liberalism. One of the groups that marched named itself Indonesia’s Alliance of Parents’ Concerns (Aliansi Keprihatinan Orangtua Indonesia, AKOI). AKOI claims to be made up primarily of graduates of the University of Indonesia. The Alliance demanded an audience with MOE’s officials, and the ministry granted the request. Appointed officials from the Legal Bureau and the Higher Education Directorate General allowed some AKOI representatives to enter the building for a dialogue. After the dialogue, AKOI handed its statement of demands to the ministry’s officials. Contents of the statement carry no surprising elements because they resemble those of the other mass organizations that publicly oppose MOE Regulation 30/2021. One of the demands was that MOE Regulation 30/2021 be annulled because its contents are against Pancasila as the Indonesian state’s ideology and, therefore, illegal and inappropriate. They further demanded the president’s dismissal of Minister Makarim. 404 LDTV (November 26, 2021). “Live! Aksi 2611 Permendikbud No. 30 Tahun 2021! [Live! 2611 Demonstration Against Regulation 30].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8q2taHxHEUI to see protestors not related to campus; and Nugraha, F. (November 23, 2021). “Aliansi Mahasiswa Bersuara Tolak Permendikbud Nomor 30 Tahun 2021, Ini Alasannya [The Students Speak Up Alliance Rejects Regulation 30, Here is Why].”Retrieved December 31, 2022 https://telisik.id/news/aliansi-mahasiswa-bersuara-tolakpermendikbud-nomor-30-tahun-2021-ini-alasannya to see student protestors in Kendari. === [PDF page 201] === 201 Reaction Statement Movement Groups Political Party • Aliansi Sumatra Utara Bersatu • PDIP Fully support • Forum Pengada Layanan • Nasdem Positive Appreciate better sentiment socialization • PKB Appreciate revision PBNU • Demokrat Reject regulation but not pro-violence Withdraw flawed • Majelis Ormas Islam • PAN Negative regulation sentiment Demand a judicial Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam review Minangkabau Withdraw regulation Presidium Alumni 212 - and resign Table 2 - Mapping of the public’s reaction. The debate on the legality and appropriateness of Regulation 30/2021 shows as least three interesting patterns (Table 2). First, the spectrum of reactions, from positive to negative sentiments, is extensive. The extremely positive sentiment shows full support, without any condition. Movement organizations such as the United North Sumatra Alliance (Aliansi Sumatra Utara Bersatu) and the Service Providers Forum (Forum Pengada Layanan, FPL), and political parties such as PDIP and Nasdem fall within this category. PDIP and Nasdem are the parties that tend to earn minorities’ trust and attract their voters. The United North Sumatra Alliance is a civil society organization which advocates the rights of minorities whose beliefs do not belong to one of the six state-sanctioned religions, while FPL is a civil society organization which aids sexual violence victims’ recovery. Furthermore, FPL is proximate to some PDIP and Nasdem politicians for pushing the Sexual Violence Elimination Bill. The positive but close to neutral sentiment expresses ambivalent appreciation for the education minister’s efforts to make Indonesian === [PDF page 202] === 202 campuses safer. Within this camp, some actors call for the education minister to better socialize the regulation so that it no longer generates multiple interpretations. These actors include movement groups such as LBH APIK and political parties such as GOLKAR. LBH APIK is an association which provides legal aid for women. Others would emphasize the need to place religious above secular values and call for the minister to revise the regulation’s definition and scope of sexual violence. The NU Leadership (PBNU) is part of the latter group of actors, along with its political party PKB and the Demokrat Party. GOLKAR, PKB, and Demokrat are all part of the government’s ruling coalition. They acted carefully because they wanted to accommodate the aspirations of their voters or potential voters who pressured their parties’ politicians to oppose the flawed regulation. Hence, they did not publicly oppose the executive government’s preferred regulation. Meanwhile, the extremely negative sentiment demonstrates complete rejection of the regulations plus a demand for Minister Makarim’s resignation or dismissal as education minister. Presidium Alumni 212, which comprises anti-government activists and fundamental Islamists, falls within this part of the spectrum. No party elite, not even from the opposition, fall into this space. The actors who are close to the extremely negative sentiment mobilize under the ethnicbased group name Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, from West Sumatra. Then, those who simply demand the regulation’s withdrawal are movement groups such as Muhammadiyah, Majelis Ormas Islam, and AILA. Muhammadiyah’s position on the regulation shows its development to becoming a more orthodox, than a modern, Muslim mass organization. Majelis Ormas Islam was formed by members of the banned group Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), and AILA is the pro-family resilience network which is similar to the United States’ Christian pro-life conservatives. Political parties which fall within the extremely negative === [PDF page 203] === 203 category are the exact same ones which led the push for the Family Resilience Bill: PPP, PAN, and GERINDRA. These parties collaborate with AILA in the drafting of and deliberations on the Family Resilience Bill. Finally, groups and political parties such as Aisyiyah and the PKS reject the regulation’s legitimacy but defend themselves by saying their rejection does not make them pro-violence. Aisyiyah then explains in its social media that the women’s wing of Muhammadiyah has been an established fighter for sexual violence victims. The PKS simply overinterprets the flaws of the regulation to affect its followers’ and allies’ opinions. GERINDRA is part of incumbent President Widodo’s parliament coalition, yet no political price is paid for publicly disagreeing with his minister’s policy. The second notable pattern in the debate on the legality and appropriateness of Regulation 30/2021 concerns the variation in the reasons made by those urging revision. Some proponents highlight the idea that the regulation’s flaws are procedural, that is, the policymaking process was not inclusive and transparent. Others emphasize that substance-wise it challenges the state ideology or anti-Pancasila. This line of thought assumes the phrase “victim’s consent” implies that the ministry tolerates or allows consensual sex and adultery in campuses or among campus couples outside of wedlock. Still others contend that the regulation is overregulating and, therefore, violates the “campus autonomy” principle. In this sense, they reject the regulation’s requiring campuses to create task forces which prevent and handle sexual violence cases in their campus environments. The third pattern is that political party elites’ relations to movement groups reflect their position within the spectrum, or vice versa. Parties such as PKS, PPP, and PAN are well known for their religious fundamentalist inclination, especially since the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Race. GERINDRA is a secular party that has never been reluctant to be opportunistic and ride === [PDF page 204] === 204 the wave of Islamist voters. Therefore, its alignment with movement groups within the negative sentiment spectrum is no surprise. Just like the actors in the negative sentiment spectrum, parties and movement groups in the positive sentiment spectrum collaborate to push for the similarly desired policies. The MOE had already anticipated Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau’s filing for judicial review of Regulation 30 to the Supreme Court in March 2022. The Supreme Court gave the Education Ministry approximately one week to respond to the complainant’s documents. The Legal Bureau, Inspector General, and Team KS convened to discuss the complaints and the Legal Bureau also commissioned two legal experts to compile the forum’s responses into a single document. Komnas Perempuan, the reformist women’s movement network, and the safe campus alliance sent their respective amicus curiae document in support of Regulation 30/2021’s establishment to the Supreme Court.405 By April 2021, the Supreme Court finally denied Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau’s request. Regulation 30/2021 remained in effect and by November 2022, 189 higher education institutions had already implemented the regulation and had begun to work toward establishing sexual violence prevention and redress task forces in their campuses. 406 Nevertheless, the opposition’s failed attempt to annul the regulation would only radicalize it further by encouraging their young 405 YLBHI (April 11, 2022). “Penyerahan Amicus Curiae dan Mendorong Mahkamah Agung Menolak Perkara Uji Materi Permendikbud 30/2021 [Amicus Curiae Submission and Urging the Supreme Court to Decline the Request for Judicial Review of Regulation 30].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://ylbhi.or.id/informasi/siaran-pers/lindungi-korban-janganhilangkan-harapan/. 406 See the number of campuses that have started forming selection panels to establish their respective task forces in “Pengumuman Kelulusan Pelatihan dan Seleksi Calon Panitia Seleksi Satuan Tugas Pencegahan dan Penanganan Kekerasan Seksual di Lingkungan Perguruan Tinggi [Announcement of Results on the Training and Selection of the Committee for Campus’ Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress Task Force Formation].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://merdekadarikekerasan.kemdikbud.go.id/pengumuman/. === [PDF page 205] === 205 students and senior academic allies to infiltrate the task forces and orient them toward the opposition’s vision.407 4.7. Summary This chapter has illustrated the events once political opportunity structures opened and activists within the reformist women’s movement responded by gaining and maintaining their direct access to state power. They stage protests outside and inside the state structure (MOE). Then they gain direct access to state power by closely engaging policymakers throughout the policy planning and policymaking processes, whether as a volunteer or paid staff (strategy of prudence in stealth politics). Before the policy of interest is established, they organize and exercise restraint within the collaborating networks by not publicly commenting on what the ministry is working on (strategy of low-profile in stealth politics). Once the policy of interest is established, the reformist women’s movement activists continue to garner and mobilize support across networks and even push the executive and legislative governments to accelerate the deliberations of other bills and regulations related to sexual violence. When a challenge at the Supreme Court arises, the reformist women’s movement sustains its network’s support by sending an amicus curiae document to maintain Regulation 30’s enactment. This chapter shows that when some participants of a powerless social group, such as the reformist women’s movement, gain and maintain their direct access to state power through stealth politics which involve prudence and low-profile strategies, the chance for making policy 407 Via Direct Communication with Tyas Widuri, a youth and women’s rights activist who has been organizing female university students to lead the fight against sexual violence in campus environments since 2015. Widuri found that some female university students who once publicly rejected MOE Regulation 30/2021 later went through the selection process and joined their campuses’ task forces as active members. === [PDF page 206] === 206 change which includes the rights of marginalized people increases—in this case, the rights of sexual violence victims. Even having only one person gain access to strategic state positions or have direct access to the ministry which produces the policy of the movement’s interest can make a major difference in the outcome, including critical openings for ripple effects. For example, success in safeguarding the contents in Regulation 30 through its enactment has spurred national debates and media engagement on sexual violence. The latter has added to public pressure on the president, cabinet, and parliament members to pass the much awaited and needed Sexual Violence Crimes Bill and the Religious Affairs Minister’s Regulation No. 73/2022 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Religious Education Institutions. === [PDF page 207] === 207 Chapter 5 - Conclusion “The classic problem has always been about whether we should emancipate society or women first. The problem has become even more apparent today and evident from the absence of women’s issues as a top priority in the national agenda.” (RS001, women’s rights activist since New Order) Many activists within the reformist women’s movement share the sentiment of RS001 shown above. In countries such as Indonesia, national and subnational governments almost always marginalize women from policymaking processes. As Chapter One has illustrated, women in Indonesia have repeatedly experienced gruesome sexual violence during regime transition and territorial conflicts in the past and been denied recognition by the state of its past atrocities toward women. 408 Furthermore, Indonesian women’s status and bodies are still subject to discriminatory state regulation.409 Ultimately, Indonesian women to date remain underrepresented in managerial and leadership positions at key strategic or influential offices 410 and, thus, one could argue that Indonesia’s women’s movement organizations are relatively 408 Blackburn, 1999a; Pohlman, 2014; Park and Sim, 2022. 409 Blackburn, 1999b; see also Blackwood, 1995 on how the Indonesian state’s policies and programs that legitimate male authority led to the urban-village divide in subnational contexts such as Minangkabau communities in West Sumatra, where state-endorsed organizations such as Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau in urban areas reproduce ideas that marginalize Minangkabau women and, yet, institutions at the village level retain the matrilineal traditions of Minangkabau communities that substantiate women’s power over lineage and land. Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau is the same organization which opposed and requested a judicial review of Regulation 30 to the Supreme Court as explained in Chapter Four of this dissertation. 410 See Wright and Tellei (1993) on women in management in Indonesia; Sohn (2015) on the earnings gap by gender; and Prihatini (2019) on parties’ lack of prioritizing women’s electability despite gender quotas. === [PDF page 208] === 208 powerless groups in their civil society. This dissertation further argues that women’s movement organizations’ power resources are not even close to those of the teachers’ or labor movements, let alone the religious conservative movement. While the teachers and labor movement organizations have relatively strong leverage on the Indonesian education and manpower ministries respectively, 411 the women’s movement organizations have no considerably strong leverage on any government agencies including the Ministry of Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection.412 Yet, as this dissertation has shown, despite being relatively powerless groups, the Indonesian reformist women’s movement network’s protest on policymaking at one level exerted a profound impact at other levels of policymaking;, in turn, it devastated relatively more powerful groups such as in the religious conservative movement. One march on the MOE—that was so slight and subtle as the motions of a butterfly’s wings—by the Indonesian reformist women’s movement GERAK Perempuan set in motion major processes and forces that established 1) Regulation 30; 2) the Sexual Violence Crimes Law; and 3) MRA Regulation 73. This dissertation has explored the question of how powerless social groups win major policy changes. It makes three arguments. First, there are many approaches which powerless groups in different countries can take to influence policy change, but gaining direct access to state power is the most effective way for powerless groups in countries with conditions such as Indonesia’s; that is, a once very politically active civil society was depoliticized for decades by an authoritarian regime, and is now experiencing an increase in religious groups’ authority and legitimacy in the public spheres. Gaining direct access to state power means having at least one 411 See Rosser (2020) about Indonesia’s major teachers’ union that influences government policies related to teachers; and Caraway and Ford (2020) on the Indonesian labor movement’s “rising prominence and effectiveness” since the start of Post-Reformasi. 412 See Budianta (2000) about women activists’ apprehension of officials’ perspectives about gender in the Woman’s Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry. === [PDF page 209] === 209 of the movement network’s participants inside a state institution or agency as paid staff member or unpaid volunteer. Working inside or closely volunteering for a state institution or agency allows the network participants to be connected to upper echelon officials, if not top leadership. Access to the upper echelon officials and top leadership is key to intervening in the policymaking process. As Chapter Four has shown, GERAK Perempuan participants were able to gain direct access to state power as a paid staff member and unpaid volunteers of Team KS from the start of Regulation 30’s formulation until its launch. Second, powerless groups or movement networks with minimal resources, such as the Indonesian reformist women’s movement’s network, exercise stealth politics to assert their movement goals until the desired policy change is achieved. GERAK Perempuan, as one of the reformist women’s movement networks in Indonesia, uses the strategy of stealth politics which entail tactics of prudence and keeping a low-profile. Prudence is key in every step including engaging allies because GERAK Perempuan is aware that their views are unpopular in the society and that by becoming part of Team KS they are exposed to the risk of state cooptation. While exercising prudence maintains Team KS’s autonomy, mobilizing in a low-profile mode sustains Team KS’s position inside state institution, connection with state officials, and role in the making of the policy change until its launch. Chapter Four has demonstrated the ways in which Team KS sequentially became open to engaging wider ranges of allies in the formulation and launching phases. Third, for powerless groups that are reluctant to enter state structures when a political opportunity structure opens and to struggle for policy changes (that still align with the movement’s goals) from inside the state, a rethinking of stealth politics and cooptation becomes necessary. Stealth politics can be a re-empowering move for powerless groups for two reasons. === [PDF page 210] === 210 One, stealth politics maintain the powerless group’s autonomy within the state structure from cooptation. Two, stealth politics enable the establishment of a policy change which incorporates the lived experiences of other relatively powerless individuals in the broader population and strengthen other relatively powerless groups’ mobilizations for other policy changes that extend the scope of legal protection. Chapter Four has elaborated the steps which Team KS took to maintain key clauses of Regulation 30, such as “victim’s consent” as an indicator of violence, which serve as discursive power resources for victims of sexual violence in higher education institutions. Team KS did so because absence of such clauses would only sustain the preexisting conditions which tend to distort the realities of sexual violence victims and, in turn, downplay victims’ reports. Note that this dissertation has emphasized the magnitude of the challenges for powerless social groups such as the Indonesian reformist women’s movement network to gain direct access to the state, let alone to win major policy changes. To show the emphasis, Chapter Two has explained the characteristics of different women’s movement types and demonstrated the proximity of other types of women’s movement to the state, relative to that of the reformist women’s movement. In addition, Chapter Two has also illustrated how, whether a reformist women’s movement network is religious or secular, the chance for a reformist women’s movement network to exercise stealth politics even after gaining direct strategic access to the state is minimal because of its moral views of power. Chapter Three has illustrated the ways in which reformist women’s movement networks challenge the state when its movement groups face difficulties at the grassroots level and need policy solutions. Furthermore, a reformist movement network’s mobilization is based on the premises that under systems of oppression women cannot be free and inequalities will prevail. === [PDF page 211] === 211 One caveat is that rarely can a single social movement organization push the state for a policy reflecting the organization’s ideals. 413 Hence, this dissertation contends that social movement groups, especially the relatively powerless ones such as women’s movement organizations in Indonesia, must coalesce to form an extensive network to render themselves relatively strongly visible to state actors. This is true because, with a large population and many other things at stake such as negative publicity, decreasing public approval rating, dismissal from office, or defeat in the following election, state actors would not do things for the benefit of only a small fraction of the population. 414 An extensive network, however, presents the case that what the state actors will be doing is for the common good or for potential large bases of voters that would sustain state actors’ political tenures. Moreover, an extensive network not only increases the women’s movement’s political leverage as a useful mobilizational resource for state actors, but also expands the women’s movement’s human resources for organizing and coordinating even more activities and labor behind the scenes. The first part of Chapter Three has elaborated the ways in which women’s movement organizations’ decision to network are shaped by the state’s conditions that evolve in its domestic politics and relations with other countries. The second part of Chapter Three has explained women’s movement networks’ responses to those conditions. Another caveat is that, because reformist women’s movement’s strategies are usually completely focused on mobilizing solidarity among citizens in the society, reformist women’s movements tend to avoid collaborating with the state, let alone attempting to gain direct access to 413 See Allen (2009) and Brown (2019) about how even activists for the Anti-Pornography Law in 2008 formed the West Java Muslim and Million Muslim Action networks to pressure the government and win their desired policy change. 414 See Levi (1988) on the tendency of rulers to assess the revenue from each political decision or public policy, before anything else. === [PDF page 212] === 212 state power. In many cases, when a women’s rights activist of the reformist women’s movement manages to gain direct access to strategic state power or positions, she is then perceived as government-oriented, is kept at arms-length, and feels alone or unsupported by peers in her network.415 The second part of Chapter Three has illustrated the policy issues which mobilize different women’s movement networks by their challenging the state, collaborating with the state, or gaining direct access to state power. Challengers continue to pressure state actors from outside of state structures but must succumb to policy changes that do not align with the movement network’s goal. Collaborators align their preferences with those of state actors but remain outside of state structures because of their trust in state actors to make policy changes that are aligned with the movement network’s goal. Reformists enter the state structures, exercise stealth politics, and push state actors to establish the reformists’ desired policy change. This dissertation strengthens it arguments by using the case of the Indonesian Minister of Education’s Regulation No. 30/2021 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions (Regulation 30). Chapter Four has revealed the antecedent conditions and effects of the regulation—with members of the reformist women’s movement network as the main actor throughout the policymaking process. The regulation may be at the ministerial level and provide legal protection only for university students, staff, and communities that interact with them. However, Regulation 30 made an impact on public opinion and media coverage about sexual violence, and the ripple effects on national-level law and other ministerial regulations has been profound. Regulation 30 is an outcome of the reformist women’s movement’s challenging and then gaining direct access to state power. The reformist women’s movement marched on the MOE and demanded an audience with MOE’s officials. Then, MOE’s top leadership invited the 415 RS001, Personal Interview in Jakarta, July 17, 2019; RS059, op. cit. === [PDF page 213] === 213 reformist women’s movement to discuss the movement’s grievances. Later, a few members of the reformist women’s movement network joined the ministry’s team in charge of tackling sexual violence, as either paid staff or unpaid volunteers. The volunteers remained low-profile after meeting with MOE’s top leadership and mobilized with prudence, including keeping ministry’s team informed about key developments in recent cases and organizing activities among student anti-sexual violence activists—without attracting media attention. The paid staff exercised stealth politics which involved methods of prudence and keeping a low-profile by updating the volunteers with developments in the policymaking process, for two purposes. The first was to maintain the trust between the reformist women’s movement network and the state. The second was to help volunteers prepare their network for organizing activities at the grassroots or community level in support of the regulation’s imminent public launch. This dissertation has also demonstrated how and why the Indonesian case is imperative for advancing our knowledge about not only the dynamics of relatively powerless groups’ struggles in outmaneuvering powerful actors’ influence, but also the political underpinning for struggles of gender equality over time. In particular, the Indonesian case reveals women’s movements’ struggles in advocating policies for equality between women and men in different political contexts. In the Old Order or post-Cold War context, the women’s movement attempted to “fit-in” with the nation-wide struggle against the impacts of US-Russia or liberalismcommunism tension. This nation-wide struggle included playing an active role in fighting for Irian Jaya (today’s West Papua and Papua provinces) as part of the newly independent Indonesia after Dutch occupation, and against Malaysia (due to British annexation of parts of Borneo). In an authoritarian context such as the New Order regime, the women’s movement network was divided into the state-sanctioned one and the one mobilizing covertly, for fears of physical === [PDF page 214] === 214 repression. Repression impacted the development of women’s movement organizations other than those under KOWANI. Finally, the democratic context throughout Post-Reformasi provided the women’s movement networks with a complicated mix of opportunities and obstacles amid increasing nationalist and pious public sentiment. Religious and secular women’s movement organizations have collaborated to form networks and contain the trend of fundamental Islamist groups’ influence on domesticating women and blurring the modern state’s public-private divide. While the reformist and liberal women’s movement networks in Post-Reformasi have achieved some gains such as those pertaining to sexual violence policies, they have yet to obtain a decisive win in other issues such as gender diversity and interfaith marriage. For example, although the Family Resilience Bill and the Sexual Deviance Bill currently have reached stalemates at the national level, at least 32 subnational governments have passed laws on family resilience since 2014, and Bogor City has passed its Subnational Regulation No. 10/2021 on Sexual Deviance Prevention and Redress.416 Subsequently, the Family Love Alliance (AILA) went to the Constitutional Court to request a judicial review of Law No. 1/1974 on Marriage, claiming that the law’s passages which enable interfaith marriages are encouraging divorce and, consequently, are detrimental to the institutions of the family and the state. 417 Another important argument in this dissertation is that gaining direct access to state power does not necessarily enable cooptation. Gaining direct access to state power, however, 416 Saudale, V. (March 30, 2022). “Bogor Mayor Dropped from USAID Conference over Controversial City Law.” Retrieved 31 December 2022, from https://jakartaglobe.id/news/bogormayor-dropped-from-usaid-conference-over-controversial-city-law. 417 Fida A. (July 15, 2022). “AILA Indonesia: Pernikahan Beda Agama Membuat Rapuh Institusi Keluarga [Indonesian AILA: Interfaith Marriages Weaken the Institutions of Family].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2022/07/15/ 233403/aila-indonesia-pernikahan-beda-agama-membuat-rapuh-institusi-keluarga.html. === [PDF page 215] === 215 does increase the chances for the Indonesian women’s movement networks to directly influence policymakers and to channel key information about the ongoing work within the state structure to its networks outside of the state structure. While influencing policymakers betters the chance of having a policy with substantive contents that cohere with the reformist women’s movement network’s ideas of equality, channeling information to networks outside of the state structure furthers the possibility of more solid and concerted support during the public launch of a desired policy. More importantly, gaining direct access to state power increases the chance of making a bigger impact that is in accordance with the women’s movement network’s goal for equality. The reformist Indonesian women’s movement aims for a national-level regulation that can better prevent sexual violence, guarantee the recovery of victims, and punish perpetrators. As this dissertation has shown, the reformist women’s movement’s decision to gain direct access to state power through engaging with the education ministry has led to the enactment of not only Regulation 30, but also the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes at the national level, and later the Minister of Religious Affairs’ Regulation No. 73/2022 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Religious Educational Institutions. Had the reformist women’s movement network maintained its position of challenging the state, the Bill on Sexual Violence Crimes would still be at an impasse and the obstacles for victims of sexual violence in the private and public spheres to seek help and justice would have remained or even grown. It is also worth noting that struggling for national laws and regulations which address sexual violence is important in contexts such as Indonesia—a country that historically has used sexual violence as an instrument to stigmatize the women’s rights activists who challenge the patriarchal model of ordering society—to improving gender equality. Furthermore, the lack of a === [PDF page 216] === 216 national precedent for sexual violence redress signals the ruling regime’s reluctance to bring justice to victims of sexual and other types of gender-based violence, and to deter potential perpetrators. The existence of sexual violence laws and regulations, therefore, can enable the socialization of gender norms about what conduct constitutes as inappropriate act and has legal consequences. Such laws and regulations can also make the use of sexual violence as an instrument for repressing minorities and political opponents costly for powerholders. 418 5.1 Future Directions This dissertation opens new questions about at least five matters. First, future research is needed to study the extent of direct access to state power that relatively powerless social groups’ members—such as those of the women’s movement network—could gain. As being inside state structures can mean a powerless group’s infiltrating the state, it also runs the risk of the state coopting the member or affiliate of the relatively powerless actors working within state structures. In other words, future studies can examine or measure the right balance of powerless social groups’ members or participants of the women’s movement network being inside and outside of the state structures, for the purposes of mitigating inequalities and redistributing resources to marginalized populations including women. Second, future research might also further examine the substantive role of minorities such as women in key leadership positions within the state structure. Within the policymaking process, some key steps require the approval of, for instance, a division coordinator, bureau 418 RS012, Personal Interview in Yogyakarta, August 2, 2019. RS012 was part of the team which investigated the rape cases in May 1998, and she asserted that the rape cases were systematically designed because of a few powerful actors’ anger towards the ethnically Chinese oligarchs and business communities. === [PDF page 217] === 217 chief, director general, etc. In cases of policies to which women can relate better than men, such as policies related to women’s reproductive health, working under menstrual pain, etc., having women filling these strategic positions could mediate the progress of the policies being deliberated. Furthermore, women leaders can improve the substantive contents of such policies, using their lived experience as women working in predominantly male or masculine environments—where people set masculine expectations on a leader. Third, studies in the future may also look more closely at the significance of elite champions of marginalized people’s rights, including “male champions of women’s rights.” In other words, future studies can probe the ways in which women’s movement networks might not only generate or insert more woman leaders with reformist characteristics into the state structures, but also expand or stimulate more male leaders who can be credible allies or supporters of the gender equality agenda. Many studies have discussed gender quotas or the struggles of women’s movement organizations in producing women leaders, members of parliaments, ministers, etc. However, not much is known about the ways in which women’s movement organizations can be successful in advancing the quantity and quality of male politicians, parliament representatives, party leaders, ministers, etc., who deliver the work necessary for mitigating gender inequality and achieving gender equality. Fourth, scholars can study the effectiveness of sexual violence laws and regulations since their inception. A study conducted within a one-year time frame or even through a longitudinal approach can open interesting discussions on whether the intended policies have or have not met the intended objectives of the design. Fifth, social movement scholars can also conduct further investigations on the ways in which or whether social movement organizations maintain the political momentum by 1) shifting === [PDF page 218] === 218 the opinions of unsure or disagreeing groups or 2) supporting policymakers in strengthening the implementation of enacted policy changes. In most cases, social movement organizations shift to other policy issues once they have succeeded in achieving a goal. Little is known about how relatively powerless social groups such as women’s movement organizations sustain their victory after winning hard-fought battles at the subnational or national levels in an increasingly constraining social and political context for minorities including women. 5.2 Policy Implications This dissertation strives to be an addition to the list of required readings for students of public policy studies, and a key resource for current policy analysts, policy entrepreneurs, and policymakers who are tasked with innovating policies of social change. Addressing social problems that urgently require policy solutions can drive policymakers into having a short horizon or uncontextualized and, consequently, an unimplementable or unsustainable policy. Additionally, while this dissertation acknowledges that policymaking cannot be a fully inclusive exercise, it also asserts that striving for inclusion as much as possible during the policymaking process is essential. Economic development, social mobility, and globalization have diversified the demographics of all societies. Thinking as inclusively as possible, therefore, not only is a good governance practice but also increases the chance of gaining stronger public support. 419 In contrast, policymaking with exclusionary premises, objectives, and language is likely only to cause more social problems going forward. 420 419 Béland and Schlager, 2019. 420 See Crul et. al. (2019) about the role of inclusive policies on education and refugees in mitigating the risks of a rising unemployment rate and of leaving people uneducated and to live without well-informed perspectives and values. === [PDF page 219] === 219 Therefore, inclusion must start from the selection of the policymaking team members. The processes of establishing Regulation 30 exemplify the inclusion of young adults and those of middle age. While the team in charge was predominantly women, the team that wrote the feasibility study was gender-balanced. This configuration is considered unusual in most ministries or government bodies in places such as Indonesia. Tackling a social problem with approaches that include diverse generational contexts, gendered experiences, minority identities, multi-disciplines, and professional affiliations can give policymakers a broader view of the antecedent conditions and future possibilities under different conditions, before designing the architecture of their policy. While Regulation 30 anticipates its main beneficiary will be more women than men, and more university students than staff, it avoids exclusionary language in anticipation of outliers—for example, if a woman is the perpetrator of sexual violence, or a university staff member is the victim of a student’s sexual offense. The dissertation also shows the importance of contextualizing a policy’s contents within the ecosystem of preexisting and upcoming policies at the national and ministerial levels. Indonesian Law No. 12/2022 on Sexual Violence Crimes exemplifies how a regulation at the ministerial level can accelerate the passing of an eight-year-old bill at the national level. Before the two legal documents got passed, the policymakers of Regulation 30 kept the drafting and deliberating processes within the ministry and across its relevant stakeholders as discreet as possible, to avoid spillover effects affecting the Sexual Violence Crimes Law’s deliberation processes at the national level. Then, Regulation 30 policymakers handled the political and public communication of the regulation’s launch in a way which increased media attention on cases of sexual violence in education institutions and beyond. Finally, Regulation 30’s establishment gave not only leverage for the executive government to pressure the legislative === [PDF page 220] === 220 government into passing the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill, but also additional avenues for sexual violence victims and impacted higher education communities who wish to seek justice—through administrative disciplining, the criminal code, or both frameworks. In short, the trajectory of the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill informed Regulation 30 policymakers in choosing their strategic actions and, in turn, the passing of the regulation has increased the political leverage of the policymakers and women’s rights movement networks that support not only the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill, but also the Minister of Religious Affairs Regulation No. 73/2022’s draft. Furthermore, the establishment of Law No. 12/2022 on Sexual Violence Crimes incentivizes the Supreme Court in rejecting the request of Regulation 30 opponents who filed for a judicial review of the regulation. 5.3 Movement-Organizing Implications This dissertation aspires to be a conversation starter for social justice activists—including women’s rights activists—who are looking for an analytical reference of past successes and failures in pressuring the state for reforms. The history of the Indonesian women’s movement networks has shown that influencing both the state and society is significant for achieving the outcome of interest. Influencing policymakers and mobilizing society’s solidarity toward relatively powerless groups need to go in parallel, especially in today’s world where social media and various online technologies are developing rapidly. Furthermore, influencing the patriarchal state and societies to redistribute power to marginalized groups, including women, requires a tremendously large number of resources (i.e., time to organize strategy, energy to coordinate with numerous people, social capital to gain people’s trust, etc.). This is especially true when the one doing the influencing is either a person with disability; or of a racial, ethnic, or sexual minority; === [PDF page 221] === 221 or all these intersecting identities, or even a woman. Given the difficulties, social justice organizations, including women’s rights activists, must coalesce and form a large and coordinated advocacy network aimed at changing the minds of people not only at the grassroots level but also within state structures. Besides forming an advocacy network, preparing a movement network’s representative who is ready to persuade policymakers with actionable solutions is highly necessary. Protesting in front of government offices is one thing, but penetrating those offices with the movement’s demands and ideas is another thing. Most social justice activists stop at protesting in front of government offices and are resistant to making changes within those offices when the opportunity arises, for fear of state cooptation. This dissertation has explained that such a move is not “state cooptation” unless the activist intends to give the state that much power. Activists should start viewing the move of making social change from within government offices as “movement infiltration” instead. In the latter sense, activists can still work toward making changes with government resources and infrastructure without disposing of their ideational links, goals, and communication with the movement network outside of the state structure. At the same time, the movement network activists that perform the labor outside of the state structure must regularly check on their fellow activists who have infiltrated the state structure to keep them accountable and to sustain the movement network’s collective action in and outside of the state to work toward the common goal. === [PDF page 222] === 222 References Books and Journal Articles Affiah, N. D. (2017). Potret Perempuan Muslim Progresif Indonesia [Portrait of Indonesian Progressive Muslim Women]. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. Afrianty, D. (2020). Rising public piety and the status of women in Indonesia two decades after reformasi. TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia, 8(1), 65-80. doi:10.1017/trn.2019.14 Agustina, W. (2014). Massa misterius Malari: rusuh politik pertama dalam sejarah Orde Baru. [Malari’s Mysterious Mass: The First Political Riot in New Order’s History]. Tempo Publishing. Ahmed, L. (1992). Women and the rise of Islam. In Women and gender in Islam (pp. 41-63): Yale University Press. Almeida, P. D. (2006). “Social Movement Unionism, Social Movement Partyism, and Policy Outcomes.” Pp. 57-73 in H. Johnston and P. Almeida, eds, Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Allen, P. (2009). Women, gendered activism and Indonesia’s anti-pornography bill. Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific, 19(1). Anderson, C. F. (2020). Fighting for abortion rights in Latin America: Social movements, state allies and institutions: Routledge. Anderson, C. F. (2022). Legalising Abortion in Argentina: Social Movements and Multi-Party Coalitions. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 14(2), 143-165. doi:10.1177/1866802x221100274 === [PDF page 223] === 223 Andrews, K. T. (2004). Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Legacy. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. Anierobi, E. I., Etodike, C. E., Nwogbo, V. N., Okeke, N. U., & Nwikpo, M. N. (2021). Evaluating sexual harassment against female workers in higher institutions in Anambra State, Nigeria. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 11(2), 265-278. Aprianto, T. C. (2018). ATURAN DI PERSIMPANGAN JALAN: Perdebatan Rancangan Undang-Undang (RUU) Perkawinan 1973-1994—Tulisan ini adalah ringkasan skripsi Jurusan Sejarah Universitas Jember, dengan judul aslinya “Negara dan Masalah Keislaman, Studi Historis Perdebatan Rancangan.” [Rules at the crossroads: debates on the draft marriage law 1973-1994—The paper is a summary of the thesis with original title “The State and Problem of Islamic-ness: Historical Study of Debates on Draft Laws” from the History Department of Jember University] Historia, 1(1), 41-57. Arimbi, D. A. (2018). Politicizing Piety: Women's Rights and Roles in the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia. Religious Studies and Theology-Interdisciplinary Studies in Religion, 36(2), 227-243. Arivia, G., & Subono, N. I. (2017). A Hundred Years of Feminism in Indonesia. Jakarta: Friedriech Ebert Stiftung Indonesia. Artaria, M. D. (2012). Efek Pelecehan Seksual di Lingkungan Kampus: Studi Preliminer. Biokultur, 1(1), 53-72. Astuti, D. (2021). Meneropong potensi kemunduran upaya kesetaraan gender dalam RUU Ketahanan Keluarga [Examining the potentials of regression in the struggle for gender equality in Family Resilience Bill]. Gulawentah: Jurnal Studi Sosial. === [PDF page 224] === 224 Asyari, S., & Abid, M. H. (2016). Expanding the Indonesian tarbiyah movement through Ta ‘āruf and marriage. Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, 54(2), 337-368. Ayoub, P. (2016). When states come out: Cambridge University Press. Azhari, B., & Fajri, I. (2021). Distance learning during the COVID-19 pandemic: School closure in Indonesia. International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 53(7), 1934-1954. Badran, M. (2013). Political Islam and Gender. In J. L. Esposito & E. E.-D. Shahin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics: Oxford University Press. Baldez, L. (2002). Why women protest: Women's movements in Chile: Cambridge University Press. Baumgartner, Frank, and Christine Mahoney. 2005. "Social Movements, the Rise of New Issues, and the Public Agenda." in Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy. Edited by David S. Meyer, Valerie Jennes, and Helen Ingram, 65-86. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Banaszak, L. A. (1996). Why movements succeed or fail: Opportunity, culture, and the struggle for woman suffrage (Vol. 52): Princeton University Press. Banaszak, L. A., Beckwith, K., & Rucht, D. (2003). Women's movements facing the reconfigured state: Cambridge University Press. Banaszak, L. A. (2010). The women's movement inside and outside the state. Barnes, T. (2016). Gendering legislative behavior: Cambridge University Press. Beigbeder, Y. (1998). Judging war criminals: The politics of international justice: Springer. === [PDF page 225] === 225 Béland, D., & Schlager, E. (2019). Varieties of Policy Feedback Research: Looking Backward, Moving Forward. Policy Studies Journal, 47(2), 184-205. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12340 Belarmino, M., & Roberts, M. R. (2019). Japanese gender role expectations and attitudes: A qualitative analysis of gender inequality. Journal of International Women's Studies, 20(7), 272-288. Benería, L. (2001). Shifting the risk: New employment patterns, informalization, and women's work. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 15(1), 27-53. Beta, A. R. (2014). Hijabers: How young urban muslim women redefine themselves in Indonesia. International Communication Gazette, 76(4-5), 377-389. Beta, A. R. (2019). Commerce, piety and politics: Indonesian young Muslim women’s groups as religious influencers. new media & society, 21(10), 2140-2159. Bevins, V. (2020). The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World: Hachette UK. Bird, K. (2001). The Economy in 2000: still flat on its back? In G. Lloyd & S. Smith (Eds.), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History (Vol. 52). Blackburn, S. (1999). Gender violence and the Indonesian political transition. Asian Studies Review, 23(4), 433-448. Blackburn, S. (1999). Women and citizenship in Indonesia. Australian Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 189-204. Blackburn, S. (2004). Women and the state in modern Indonesia: Cambridge University Press. Blackburn, S. (2007). Kongres perempuan pertama [The First Women’s Congress]. Yayasan Obor Indonesia. === [PDF page 226] === 226 Blackwood, E. (1995). FOUR. Senior Women, Model Mothers, and Dutiful Wives: Managing Gender Contradictions in a Minangkabau Village. In Bewitching women, pious men (pp. 124-158). University of California Press. Borowiak, C. (2008). The World Tribunal on Iraq: Citizens' tribunals and the struggle for accountability. New Political Science, 30(2), 161-186. Bosma, U. (2019). The integration of food markets and increasing government intervention in Indonesia: 1815–1980s. In An Economic History of Famine Resilience (pp. 142-161): Routledge. Bourchier, D. (2014). Illiberal democracy in Indonesia: The ideology of the family state. Routledge. Bouvard, M. G. (1994). Revolutionizing motherhood: The mothers of the Plaza de Mayo: Rowman & Littlefield. Brown, G. (2019). Civic Islam: Muhammadiyah, NU and the Organisational Logic of Consensus-making in Indonesia. Asian Studies Review, 43(3), 397-414. doi:10.1080/10357823.2019.1626802 Budianta, M. (2000). Reflections on the Indonesian Women’s Movement After Reformasi’. Asian Exchange, 16(1), 104-112. Buehler, M. (2016). The politics of shari'a law: islamist activists and the state in democratizing indonesia: Cambridge University Press. Burns, N., Schlozman, K. L., & Verba, S. (2001). The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation: Harvard University Press. Burstein, P. (1998). Discrimination, jobs, and politics: The struggle for equal employment opportunity in the United States since the New Deal. University of Chicago Press. === [PDF page 227] === 227 Burstein, P., & Linton, A. 2002. "The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns." Social Forces 81(2): 380-408. Campbell, K., Demir, E., & O’Reilly, M. (2019). Understanding conflict-related sexual violence and the ‘everyday’ experience of conflict through witness testimonies. Cooperation and conflict, 54(2), 254-277. doi:10.1177/0010836719838586 Candraningrum, D. (2006). Perda sharia and the Indonesian women's critical perspectives. Neue Willkuer gegen Frauen in Indonesien: Kontroversen um die Umsetzung der Regionale Scharia-Gesetze Perda Syariah (New Arbitrary against Women in Indonesia: Perda Sharia and Women’s Rights), ÜBERSEEMUSEUM Bremen, Germany, 11. Candraningrum, D. (2007). Unquestioned Gender Lens in Contemporary Indonesian Shari ‘ah- Ordinances (Perda Syariah). Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, 45(2), 289-320. Candraningrum, D. (2018). Negotiating women’s veiling: Politics & sexuality in contemporary Indonesia: Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine. Caraway, T. L. (2007). Assembling women: The feminization of global manufacturing. Cornell University Press. Caraway, T. L. (2010). Gendering Comparative Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 8(1), 169-175. Caraway, T. L., & Ford, M. (2020). Labor and politics in Indonesia. Cambridge University Press. Case, W. (2013). Politics in Southeast Asia: democracy or less: Routledge. Chinkin, C. M. (2001). Women’s international tribunal on Japanese military sexual slavery. American Journal of International Law, 95(2), 335-341. === [PDF page 228] === 228 Choi, N. (2019). Women’s political pathways in Southeast Asia. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(2), 224-248. Chua, L. J. (2022). The Politics of Rights and Southeast Asia. Elements in Politics and Society in Southeast Asia. Chuzaifah, Y. (2022). Exploring the Landscape and Trajectories of Women’s Movements and Islam in the “Post-reformation” Era in Indonesia. Women's Studies, 51(2), 201-214. Clerx, J. (1992). Financiële verhouding tussen Nederland en Indonesië opnieuw bezien (1945- 1967). Cohen, D. K. (2016). Rape during Civil War: Cornell University Press. Cohen, D. K., & Nordas, R. (2014). Sexual violence in armed conflict: Introducing the SVAC dataset, 1989–2009. Journal of peace research, 51(3), 418-428. doi:10.1177/0022343314523028 Cohen, D. (2013). Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War. World Politics, 65(3), 383-415. Coppedge, M. (2012). Democratization and research methods: Cambridge University Press. Crenshaw, K. (1990). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stan. L. Rev., 43, 1241. Crul, M., Lelie, F., Biner, Ö., Bunar, N., Keskiner, E., Kokkali, I.,... Shuayb, M. (2019). How the different policies and school systems affect the inclusion of Syrian refugee children in Sweden, Germany, Greece, Lebanon and Turkey. Comparative Migration Studies, 7(1), 1-20. Davidson, J. S. (2015). Indonesia's changing political economy: Cambridge University Press. === [PDF page 229] === 229 De Stuers, C. V. (1960 (2008)). Sejarah Perempuan Indonesia: gerakan dan pencapaian. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu. Deckman, M. (2016). Tea Party Women: Mama Grizzlies, Grassroots Leaders, and the Changing Face of the American Right: NYU Press. Dewi, K. H. (2015). Indonesian women and local politics: Islam, gender and networks in post- Suharto Indonesia (Vol. 14): NUS Press. Dewi, K. H. (2020). Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 42(2), 224-250. Dewi, K. H. (Ed.) (2022). Gender and Politics in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Women Leaders within Local Oligarchy Networks: Springer. Diamond, L., & Morlino, L. (2004). The Quality of Democracy. An Overview. Diani, M. (2003). Networks and social movements: A research program. Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action, 299-319. Dick, H. (2002). Formation of the nation-state, 1930s–1966. In The Emergence of a National Economy (pp. 153-193): Brill. Disney, J. L., & Gelb, J. (2000). Feminist Organizational “Success” The State of US Women's Movement Organizations in the 1990s. Women & Politics, 21(4), 39-76. Dolan, C., Baaz, M. E., & Stern, M. (2020). What is sexual about conflict-related sexual violence? Stories from men and women survivors. International affairs (London), 96(5), 1151-1168. doi:10.1093/ia/iiaa095 Eddyono, S. W., Fanani, E., Sabaniah, D. A., Maurice, Y., Ghazali, H., Warlif, J., Velayati, S., & Ciciek, F. (2016). When and why the State responds to women’s demands: understanding === [PDF page 230] === 230 gender equality policy change in Indonesia. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Elizabeth, M. Z. (2019). Resistensi perempuan parlemen: Perjuangan menuju kesetaraan gender [Women Parliamentarians’ Resistance: The Struggle for Gender Equality]. LP3ES. Engzell, P., Frey, A., & Verhagen, M. D. (2021). Learning loss due to school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(17), e2022376118. Falleti, T. G. (2005). A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in comparative perspective. American political science review, 99(3), 327-346. Feith, H. (1962 (2006)). The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia: Equinox Publishing. Flammang, Janet A. 1987. "Women Made a Difference: Comparable Worth In San Jose." In The Women’s Movements of the U.S. and Western Europe. Mueller, Carol, and Mary Katzenstein (eds.) Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Fraser, N. (2003). Rethinking recognition: overcoming displacement and reification in cultural politics (pp. 21-34). In Recognition Struggles and Social Movmeents (pp. 21-32): Cambridge University Press. Friedman, E. (2018). Women’s human rights: The emergence of a movement. In Women's Rights Human Rights (pp. 18-35): Routledge. Fuad, A. F. N. (2020). Da’wa and politics: lived experiences of the female Islamists in Indonesia. Contemporary Islam, 14(1), 19-47. Gelb, J. 1987. "Social Movement 'Success': A Contemporary Analysis of Feminism in the United States and the United Kingdom." In The Women’s Movements of the U.S. and Western === [PDF page 231] === 231 Europe. Mueller, Carol, and Mary Katzenstein (eds.) Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 267-289. Gelb, J. (2000). The Equal Employment Opportunity Law: A Decade of Change for Japanese Women?. Law & Policy, 22(3‐4), 385-407. Gibson, E. L. (2013). Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies: Cambridge University Press. Giugni, M. (2004). Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Gotō, K. i. (1997). 'Returning to Asia': Japan-Indonesia Relations 1930s-1942: 龍溪書舎. Gouda, F., & Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2002). American visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US foreign policy and Indonesian nationalism, 1920-1949: Amsterdam University Press. Grossmann, K. (2012). Women as change agents in the transformation process in Aceh, Indonesia. Women and politics in Asia: A springboard for democracy, 97-122. Hadiwinata, B. S. (2003). The politics of NGOs in Indonesia: Developing democracy and managing a movement: Routledge. Hartlyn, J., & Valenzuela, A. (1994). Democracy in Latin America since 1930: Duke-University of North Carolina Program in Latin American Studies. Has, M., & Apsari, P. K. (2022). Sexual Violence on the Higher Education Institution. In Gender- Based Violence in South-East Asia (pp. 69-88): Springer. Hashemi, N. (2013). Islam and Democracy. In J. L. Esposito & E. E.-D. Shahin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics: Oxford University Press. === [PDF page 232] === 232 Hefner, R. W. (2008). Making modern Muslims: the politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia: University of Hawaii Press. Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2002). Stealth democracy: Americans' beliefs about how government should work: Cambridge University Press. Hill, H. (1990). Indonesia's industrial transformation part I. Bulletin of Indonesian economic studies, 26(2), 79-120. Hill, H. (1993). Southeast Asian economic development: an analytical survey. Hill, H. (2000). The Indonesian Economy: Cambridge University Press. Holike, C. (2011). The state of Islam—Negotiating democracy, Muslim women’s rights and morality in Indonesia and Malaysia. Women and politics in Asia: A springboard for democracy, 71-95. Htun, M., & Weldon, S. L. (2018). The logics of gender justice: State action on women's rights around the world: Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, R., Norris, P., & Ronald, I. (2003). Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world. Cambridge University Press. Jaquette, J. S. (1994). The Women's Movement In Latin America: Participation And Democracy. Boulder: Westview. Johnson, J. E., & Saarinen, A. (2013). Twenty-first-century feminisms under repression: Gender regime change and the women’s crisis center movement in Russia. Signs: Journal of women in Culture and Society, 38(3), 543-567. Kahin, A. R. (2012). Islam, nationalism and democracy: A political biography of Mohammad Natsir: NUS Press. === [PDF page 233] === 233 Kantola, J., & Outshoorn, J. (2007). Changing state feminism. In Changing state feminism (pp. 1-19): Springer. Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L. M., & Read, B. L. (2015). Field research in political science: Practices and principles: Cambridge University Press. Katjasungkana, N. (2011). Chapter Three the Future of Asian Feminisms. The Future of Asian Feminisms: Confronting Fundamentalisms, Conflicts and Neo-Liberalism, 16. Katjasungkana, N., & Wieringa, S. E. (2011). The future of Asian feminisms: confronting fundamentalisms, conflicts and neo-liberalism: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Kaur, R. (2021). Stealth-Spectacles: The Discursive Waves of the Nuclear Asian Seascape. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 4(1), 163-185. Kemanusiaan, T. R. U. (1998). Temuan tim gabungan pencari fakta peristiwa kerusuhan Mei 1998. Komnas Perempuan. Kirby, P. (2015). Ending sexual violence in conflict: the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative and its critics. International affairs (London), 91(3), 457-472. doi:10.1111/1468- 2346.12283 Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. British journal of political science, 16(1), 57-85. Kobayashi, Y. (2004). A path toward gender equality: State feminism in Japan. Routledge. Koonz, C. (2013). Mothers in the fatherland: Women, the family and Nazi politics: Routledge. Koos, C. (2018). Decay or Resilience?: The Long-Term Social Consequences of Conflict- Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone. World politics, 70(2), 194-238. doi:10.1017/S0043887117000351 === [PDF page 234] === 234 Kopkin, N., & Roberts, A. Gender gaps in policy responsiveness. Political research quarterly, 10659129221136476. Kornhauser, W. (1959). Politics of Mass Society: Routledge. Krizsán, A., & Roggeband, C. (2021). Reconfiguring State–Movement Relations in the Context of De-democratization. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 28(3), 604-628. Kusumaningtyas, A. N., Dewi, K. H., Ekawati, E., & Izzati, F. F. (2017). Perempuan kepala daerah dalam jejaring oligarki lokal: LIPI Press. Lapegna, P. (2014). The problem with ‘cooptation’. States, Power, and Societies, 20(1), 7-9. Lase, D., Zega, T. G. C., Daeli, D. O., & Zaluchu, S. E. (2022). Parents' perceptions of distance learning during COVID-19 in rural Indonesia. Journal of Education and Learning Lee-Koo, K. (2020). Pro-Gender Foreign Policy by Stealth: Navigating Global and Domestic Politics in Australian Foreign Policy Making. Foreign Policy Analysis, 16(2), 236-249. Levi, M. (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. Univ of California Press. Levenstein, L. (2009). A movement without marches: African American women and the politics of poverty in postwar Philadelphia. Univ of North Carolina Press. Linders, Annulia. 2004. "Victory and Beyond: A Historical Comparative Analysis of the Outcomes of the Abortion Movements in Sweden and the United States." Sociological Forum 19(3): 371-404. Linz, J. J., Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe: jhu Press. === [PDF page 235] === 235 Lohman, Susanne. 1995. "A Signaling Model of Competitive Political Pressures." Economics and Politics 7:181-206. Luders, Joseph E. 2010. The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lovenduski, J. (2005). State feminism and political representation: Cambridge University Press. MacKinnon, C. A. (1989). Toward a feminist theory of the state: Harvard University Press. MacKinnon, C. A. (2017). Butterfly politics. In Butterfly Politics. Harvard University Press. Marcoes, L. (2002). 15. Women’s Grassroots Movements in Indonesia: A Case Study of the PKK and Islamic Women’s Organisations. In Women in Indonesia (pp. 187-197): ISEAS Publishing. Mariana, A. (2015). Perbudakan seksual: perbandingan antara masa fasisme Jepang dan neofasisme Orde Baru [Sexual slavery: comparison between Japanese Neofascism and New Order Neofascism Periods]. Jakarta: Marjin Kiri. Marlita, T., & Poerwandari, K. (2005). Indonesian Women’s Movement in the Period of 1928- 1965. Indonesian Women in a Changing Society., 41-74. McAdam, D. (1999). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970. University of Chicago Press. McCall, L. (2002). Complex inequality: Gender, class and race in the new economy: Routledge. McCammon, H. J., Campbell, K. E., Granberg, E. M., & Mowery, C. (2001). How movements win: Gendered opportunity structures and US women's suffrage movements, 1866 to 1919. American sociological review, 49-70. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American journal of sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. === [PDF page 236] === 236 McGregor, K. (2012). Indonesian Women, The Women's International Democratic Federation and the Struggle for ‘Women's Rights’, 1946–1965. Indonesia and the Malay World, 40(117), 193-208. Mernissi, F. (1975). Beyond the Veil: Male-Female. Dynamics in a Modern. Miichi, K. (2020). Post‐islamism revisited: the response of indonesia’s prosperous justice party (pks) to gender‐related issues. The Muslim World, 110(4), 589-604. Mrázek, R. (2018). Engineers of happy land. In Engineers of Happy Land: Princeton University Press. Muchtar, Y. (2016). Tumbuhnya gerakan perempuan Indonesia masa negara Orde Baru: Institut KAPAL Perempuan. Muhtadi, B. (2009). The quest for hizbut tahrir in Indonesia. Asian Journal of Social Science, 37(4), 623-645. Mulligan, D. (2004). The discourse of dangdut: Gender and civil society in Indonesia. In Gender and Civil Society (pp. 135-156): Routledge. Nisa, E. F. (2019). Muslim women in contemporary Indonesia: Online conflicting narratives behind the women ulama congress. Asian Studies Review, 43(3), 434-454. Noer, K. U., Hendrastiti, T. K., Nurtjahyo, L. I., & Damaiyanti, V. P. (Eds.). (2022). Membongkar Kekerasan Seksual di Pendidikan Tinggi: Pemikiran Awal [Uncovering Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Preliminary Thoughts]. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. Noerdin, E., Aripurnama, S., & Muchtar, Y. (2007). Decentralization as a Narrative of Opportunity for Women in Indonesia: Women Research Institute. === [PDF page 237] === 237 Nulman, E. (2015). Climate Change and Social Movements: Civil Society and the Development of National Climate Change Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nurmila, N. (2020). Respon terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Ketahanan Keluarga [In Response to the Family Resilience Bill]. Melihat Lebih Jauh Ancaman Rancangan Undang-Undang Ketahanan Keluarga [Looking Further into the Family Resilience Bill’s Threats]. Jakarta: PKBI. Nurtjahyo, L. I., Shanti, T. I., Wulandari, W., Noer, K. U., Buana, M. S., Puspita, S. S., & Rosvianti, R. (2022a). Urgensi Peraturan Menteri Pendidikan, Kebudayaan, Riset Dan Teknologi Nomor 30/2021 Tentang Pencegahan Dan Penanganan Kekerasan Seksual di Lingkungan Perguruan Tinggi [The Urgency of Minister of Education, Culture, Research and Technology’s Regulation Number 30/2021 on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions]. In K. U. Noer, T. K. Hendrastiti, L. I. Nurtjahyo, & V. P. Damaiyanti (Eds.), Membongkar Kekerasan Seksual di Pendidikan Tinggi: Pemikiran Awal [Uncovering Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Preliminary Thoughts] (pp. 3-106). Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. Nurtjahyo, L. I., Puspita, S. S., Retyaningtyas, L. W., & Hanifah, L. (2022b). Moralitas dan Seksisme: Hubungan dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Upaya Penghapusan Kekerasan Seksual di Kampus [Morality and Sexism: Their Correlation and Influence on Campuses’ Struggle for Sexual Violence Elimination]. In K. U. Noer, T. K. Hendrastiti, L. I. Nurtjahyo, & V. P. Damaiyanti (Eds.), Membongkar Kekerasan Seksual di Pendidikan Tinggi: Pemikiran Awal [Uncovering Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Preliminary Thoughts]. Jakarta: Yayasa Pustaka Obor Indonesia. === [PDF page 238] === 238 O’Donnell, G. A. (1998). Horizontal accountability in new democracies. Journal of democracy, 9(3), 112-126. Osman, M. N. M. (2018). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Political Islam: Identity, Ideology and Religio-Political Mobilization: Taylor & Francis. Özler, Ş. İ. (2009). Out of the Plaza and into the Office: Social Movement Leaders in the PRD. Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 25(1), 125-154. Page, B. I., Seawright, J., & Lacombe, M. J. (2018). Billionaires and stealth politics: University of Chicago Press. Parawansa, K. I. (2002). Perempuan di Parlemen: Bukan Sekedar Jumlah [Obstacles to Women’s Political Participation in Indonesia]. Stockholm: International IDEA. Park, Y. J., & Richards, P. (2007). Negotiating neoliberal multiculturalism: Mapuche workers in the Chilean state. Social forces, 85(3), 1319-1339. Park, S., & Sim, Z. M. (2022). Tolerance as implicit order: Militias and sexual violence as practice in Indonesian counterinsurgency operations. Journal of intervention and statebuilding, 16(1), 18-39. Pearlman, W. (2012). Precluding Nonviolence, Propelling Violence: The Effect of Internal Fragmentation on Movement Protest. Studies in comparative international development, Pearlman, W. (2018). Moral Identity and Protest Cascades in Syria. British journal of political science, 48(4), 877-901. doi:10.1017/S0007123416000235 Poerwandari, E. K., Munti, R. B., & Viemilawati, J. (2018). Pro-women's policy advocacy movements in Indonesia: Struggles and reflections. Asian Journal of Women's Studies, 24(4), 489-509. === [PDF page 239] === 239 Pohlman, A. (2014). Women, sexual violence and the Indonesian killings of 1965-66. Routledge. Pohlman, A. (2017). The spectre of Communist women, sexual violence and citizenship in Indonesia. Sexualities, 20(1-2), 196-211. Porter, M. (2001). Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Learning from Women's Groups in Indonesia. Sociological research online, 6(2), 1-13. doi:10.5153/sro.590. Prihatini, E. S. (2020). Islam, parties, and women's political nomination in Indonesia. Politics & Gender, 16(3), 637-659. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America: Cambridge university press. Qibtiyah, A. (2009). Indonesian Muslim women and the gender equality movement. Journal of Indonesian Islam, 3(1), 168-196. Rachman, E., Sotyati, D. E., & Aipassa, J. A. (2014). Sang Upuleru: Mengenang 100 tahun Prof. Dr. Gerrit Augustinus Siwabessy (V. Nikijuluw & E. Rachman Eds.). Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Rahayu, R. I. (2007). Konstruksi Historiografi Feminisme Indonesia dari Tutur Perempuan. Paper presented at the makalah dalam Workshop Historiografi Indonesia: di antara Historiografi Nasional dan Alternatif, Pusat Studi Sosial Asia Tenggara UGM dan Australia Research Council, Hotel Yogya Plaza, Yogyakarta. Rahayu, R. I., & Ikayanti, A. (2014). The Success and the Barriers to Women's Representation in Southeast Asia: Between State Policies, Political Parties and Women's Movement: Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan. Rahayu, R. I., & Katjasungkana, N. (1997). Interview with Ruth Indiah Rahayu and Nugroho Katjasungkana. Hecate, 23(1), 128-134. === [PDF page 240] === 240 Rayside, D. M. (1998). On the fringe: Gays and lesbians in politics. Cornell University Press. Rinaldo, R. (2013). Mobilizing piety: Islam and feminism in Indonesia: Oxford University Press. Roberts, A. (2009). The quality of democracy in Eastern Europe: public preferences and policy reforms: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, A., Seawright, J., & Cyr, J. (2013). Do electoral laws affect women’s representation? Comparative Political Studies, 46(12), 1555-1581. Robinson, K. M. (1986). Stepchildren of progress: The political economy of development in an Indonesian mining town: State University of New York Press. Robinson, K. M. (1998). Love and sex in an Indonesian mining town. In K. Sen & M. Stivens (Eds.), Gender and Power in Affluent Asia. London: Routledge. Rosser, A. (2020). Governing Guru: The Political Economy of Teacher Distribution in Indonesia. In Preparing Indonesian Youth (pp. 48-65). Brill. Roth, B. (2004). Separate roads to feminism: Black, Chicana, and White feminist movements in America's second wave: Cambridge University Press. Rucht, Dieter. 1999. “The Impact of Environmental Movements in Western Societies.” In Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.), How Social Movements Matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 204-224. Sajida, S., & Ranjani, R. (2020). Examining the Internet Quota Subsidy Policy in Indonesia. Paper presented at the Iapa Proceedings Conference. Sauer, B. (2007). What happened to the model student? Austrian state feminism since the 1990s. In Changing state feminism (pp. 41-61): Springer. Seise, C. (2011). Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: An introduction to its thoughts and activities: Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Humboldt-University. === [PDF page 241] === 241 Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. Journal of democracy, 2(3), 75-88. Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. yale university Press. Sen, K. (2002). Indonesian women at work: Reframing the subject. In Gender and power in affluent Asia (pp. 49-76): Routledge. Siwabessy, G. A. (1979). Upuleru: Memoar Dr. G. A. Siwabessy. Jakarta: Gunung Agung. Sjamsiah Ahmad (1993) ‘Mewujudkan Kemitraan Pria-Wanita Dalam Mensukseskan PJPT II’, unpublished paper, presented at the National Workshop on Equal Partnership between Men and Women, University of Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia, 5–7 July. Soetjipto, A. (2017). Indonesian Women and Local Politics: Islam, Gender and Networks in Post- Suharto Indonesia. In: Taylor & Francis. Soetjipto, A. W., & Adelina, S. (2013 (2021)). Suara dari desa: Menuju revitalisasi PKK [Voices from the Village: Towards a Revitalization of the Family Welfare Movement]: Yayasan TIFA. Soewito, Irma H.N.; Irsyam, Tri Wahyuning M.; Nurliana, Nana; Suhartono, Sudarini (2005). Wanita Pejuang. Jakarta: Paguyuban Wanita Pejuang Spar, D. (1996). Trade, investment, and labor: The case of Indonesia. The Columbia Journal of World Business, 31(4), 30-39. Stanton, J. A. (2016). Violence and restraint in civil war: civilian targeting in the shadow of international law: Cambridge University Press. Stearns, L. B., & Almeida, P. D. (2004). The formation of state actor-social movement coalitions and favorable policy outcomes. Social Problems, 51(4), 478-504. === [PDF page 242] === 242 Stetson, D. M., & Mazur, A. G. (2000). Women's movements and the state: job-training policy in France and the US. Political Research Quarterly, 53(3), 597-623. Sukarno, S. (1974). Kewajiban Wanita Dalam Perjuangan Republik Indonesia. In: Jakarta. Sundström, A., Paxton, P., Wang, Y.-t., & Lindberg, S. I. (2017). Women’s political empowerment: A new global index, 1900–2012. World Development, 94, 321-335. Suraiya, I. (2005). The Women's Movement In Indonesia: With Special Reference To The'Aisyiyah Organization. Temple University, Suryakusuma, J. I. (1988). State Ibuism: The social construction of womanhood in the Indonesian new order: Institute of Social Studies. Susiana, S. (2020). Kritik Terhadap Pasal 25 RUU Tentang Ketahanan Keluarga dari Perspektif Gender [A Critique of Article 25 in Family Resilience Bill from a Gender Perspective]. Info Singkat, XII. Syamsiyatun, S. (2007). A daughter in the Indonesian Muhammadiyah: Nasyiatul Aisyiyah negotiates a new status and image. Journal of Islamic Studies, 18(1), 69-94. Tatersall, A. (2010). Power in a Coalition: Strategies for Strong Unions and Social Change. Cornell. In: ILR Press. Taylor, V. (1989). Social movement continuity: The women's movement in abeyance. American sociological review, 761-775. Tripp, A. M. (2001). The politics of autonomy and cooptation in Africa: the case of the Ugandan Women's Movement. The journal of modern African studies, 39(1), 101-128. Tripp, A. M. (2007). Historical perspectives in comparative politics and gender studies. Politics & Gender, 3(3), 397-408. === [PDF page 243] === 243 Tripp, A. M., Casimiro, I., Kwesiga, J., & Mungwa, A. (2008). African women's movements: Transforming political landscapes: Cambridge University Press. Tudor, M., & Slater, D. The Content of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Uba, Katrin. 2005. "Political Protest and Policy Change: The Direct Impacts of Indian Anti- Privatization Mobilizations, 1990-2003." Mobilization 10(3): 383-396. Valenzuela, J. S. (1992). Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings. MAINWARING, O’DONNELL y VALENZUELA Issues in democratic consolidation, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame. Van der Eng, P. (2013). Why didn't colonial Indonesia have a competitive cotton textile industry? Modern Asian Studies, 47(3), 1019-1054. Van Wichelen, S. (2010). Religion, politics and gender in Indonesia: Disputing the Muslim body: Routledge. Verba, S., Kelman, S., Orren, G. R., Miyake, I., Watanuki, J., Kabashima, I., & Ferree Jr, G. D. (1987 (2013)). Elites and the Idea of Equality. In Elites and the Idea of Equality: Harvard University Press. Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison: Cambridge university press. Walby, S. (1996). Key Concepts in Feminist Theory. Aalborg: Department of History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University. (FREIA's tekstserie; No. 33). DOI: 10.5278/freia.14136354 Weix, G. (2005). Resisting history: Indonesian labour activism in the 1990s and the ‘Marsinah’case. In Gender Politics in the Asia-Pacific Region (pp. 132-148): Routledge. === [PDF page 244] === 244 White, N. J. (2012). Surviving Sukarno: British business in post-colonial Indonesia, 1950–1967. Modern Asian Studies, 46(5), 1277-1315. Wieringa, S. (1994). Women's interests and empowerment: Gender planning reconsidered. Development and change, 25(4), 829-848. Wieringa, S. (2002). Sexual politics in Indonesia: Springer. Wieringa, S. (2011). “GERWANI (Movement of Conscious Indonesian Women): 1950-1965” in Feminist Writings from Ancient Times to the Modern World: A Global Sourcebook and History [2 volumes] (T. K. Wayne Ed. Vol. 1): ABC-CLIO. Wieringa, S., Melvin, J., & Pohlman, A. (2019). The International People's Tribunal for 1965 and the Indonesian Genocide: Routledge New York. Wieringa, S. E. (2000). Communism and women's same-sex practises in post-Suharto Indonesia. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 2(4), 441-457. Winters, J. A. (2002). The political impact of new information sources and technologies in Indonesia. Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands), 64(2), 109-119. Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy: Cambridge University Press. Winters, J. A. (2013). Oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia(96), 11-33. Wright, L., & Tellei, V. C. (1993). Women in management in Indonesia. International Studies of Management & Organization, 23(4), 19-45. Yolandasari, A. R. (2021). Against the Tarbiyah’s Symbolism of Hijab: Feminism, Islamic Conservatism and Reconstruction of Hijab Symbolism in Indonesia. Journal of Asian Social Science Research, 3(1), 15-38. You Yenn, T. (2007). Inequality for the greater good: Gendered state rule in Singapore. Critical Asian Studies, 39(3), 423-445. === [PDF page 245] === 245 Zacharias-Walsh, A. (2016). Our unions, our selves: The rise of feminist labor unions in Japan. Cornell University Press. Zhou, T. (2015). Ambivalent alliance: Chinese policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965. The China Quarterly, 221, 208-228. Zhou, T. (2019). Sukarno's Nuclear Ambitions and China: Documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives. Indonesia(108), 89-120. Zulkifli, A., Publishing, T., & Agustina, W. (2014). Massa misterius Malari: rusuh politik pertama dalam sejarah Orde Baru: Tempo Publishing. Online Articles 1.2.1. Indonesian economy growing but slowing down in the last quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001. (2001, 2001). The Indonesian Economy. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.proquest.com/magazines/1-2-indonesian-economy-growing-slowingdown-last/docview/195551094/se-2?accountid=12528 Afrianty, D. (November 24, 2021). Will Islamist sentiment smother Indonesia's 'me too' movement in the education sector? Retrieved December 3, 2022, from https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/will-islamist-sentiment-smother-indonesiasme-too-movement-in-the-education-sector/ Afrianty, D. (December 1, 2021). Indonesia’s fight for a law against sexual violence needs to involve a discussion of Islamic values. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/indonesias-fight-for-a-law-against-sexual-violenceneeds-to-involve-a-discussion-of-islamic-values/ === [PDF page 246] === 246 Amiruddin, M. (December 21, 2015). Hari Ibu bukan Mother’s Day. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, from https://majalah.tempo.co/read/bahasa/149725/hari-ibu-bukan-mothers-day Amirullah. (November 20, 2018). Komnas Perempuan: Ratusan perda diskriminatif terhadap perempuan. Tempo. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1147997/komnas-perempuan-ratusan-perda-diskriminatifterhadap-perempuan. AntaraNews. (January 4, 2022). President pushes ratification of sexual violence bill. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://en.antaranews.com/news/207845/president-pushesratification-of-sexual-violence-bill AntaraNews. (March 14, 2019). Debat Capres - KPPPA sebut RUU PKS jadi komoditas politik [Presidential Candidate Debates-Women’s Empowerment Ministry claims SVEB becomes Political Commodity]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.antaranews.com/berita/ 809859/debat-capres-kpppa-sebut-ruu-pks-jadikomoditas-politik AntaraNews (December 6, 2018). DPR diminta tuntaskan RUU Penghapusan Kekerasan Seksual jelang pemilu [DPR asked to finish Sexual Violence Elimination Bill before general election]. Retrieved December 5, 2021, from https://www.antaranews.com/berita/775228/dpr-diminta-tuntaskan-ruu-penghapusankekerasan-seksual-jelang-pemilu. Arivia, G. (May 21, 2018). Politik Representasi Suara Ibu Peduli [Voice of Concerned Mothers’ Politics of Representation]. Retrieved from https://www.jurnalperempuan.org/blog/politik-representasi-suara-ibu-peduli === [PDF page 247] === 247 Askara. (February 7, 2020). Ribuan Orang Desak Dosen Universitas Negeri Padang yang Lecehkan Mahasiswi Dihukum [Thousands of people demand State University of Padang’s faculty member who sexually harassed female student be punished]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.askara.co/read/2020/02/07/906/ribuan-orangdesak-dosen-universitas-negeri-padang-yang-lecehkan-mahasiswi-dihukum BalairungPress. (November 7, 2018). Nalar Pincang UGM atas Kasus Perkosaan [UGM’s Lame Reason on Rape Case]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.balairungpress.com/2018/11/nalar-pincang-ugm-atas-kasus-perkosaan/ Bank, T. W. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) - Indonesia. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=ID. Available from https://data.worldbank.org/. Retrieved December 31, 2022 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=ID CNNIndonesia. (November 27, 2018). Perda Dinilai Jadi Momok Diskriminasi untuk Perempuan [Regional Regulations Become Specter of Discrimination for Women]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/ 20181123204334-12-348840/perda-dinilai-jadi-momok-diskriminasi-untuk-perempuan Fida A. (July 15, 2022). “AILA Indonesia: Pernikahan Beda Agama Membuat Rapuh Institusi Keluarga [Indonesian AILA: Interfaith Marriages Weaken the Institutions of Family].” Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/ read/2022/07/15/233403/aila-indonesia-pernikahan-beda-agama-membuat-rapuhinstitusi-keluarga.html. Harsono, A. (April 13, 2022). Epidemic of Sexual Harassment on Indonesian Campuses Continues due to Culture of Impunity. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from === [PDF page 248] === 248 https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/12/epidemic-sexual-harassment-indonesiancampuses-continues-due-culture-impunity Indoleft. (February 10, 2020). Women's alliance protests at education ministry over sexual violence on campus. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.indoleft.org/ news/2020-02-10/womens-alliance-protests-at-education-ministry-over-sexual-violenceon-campus.html Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2009). The True Clash of Civilizations. Retrieved December 31, 2022 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/04/the-true-clash-of-civilizations/. IRIP. (April 1, 1999). Women’s Congress. Retrieved Decmber 31, 2022, from https://www.insideindonesia.org/womens-congress Janti, N. (May 26, 2020). Hurustiati Subandrio, Dokter yang Aktif dalam Gerakan Perempuan. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://historia.id/politik/articles/hurustiatisubandrio-dokter-yang-aktif-dalam-gerakan-perempuan-P3Nx7 Janti, N. (March 9, 2019). “Perempuan dalam Pemilu Pertama [Women in the First Election].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://historia.id/politik/articles/perempuan-dalampemilu-pertama-6k4qn/page/1. Kartika, D. A. (March 4, 2019). What will Indonesian women win this election? Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.newmandala.org/will-women-win-indonesia- 2019/ Kompas.com. (July 20, 2020). Jokowi Wacanakan Pembubaran 18 Lembaga, Komnas Perempuan Berharap Tak Kena [Komnas Perempuan hopes for exclusion from Jokowi’s plan to disband 18 institutions]. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, from === [PDF page 249] === 249 https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/07/20/17045831/jokowi-wacanakan-pembubaran- 18-lembaga-komnas-perempuan-berharap-tak-kena Kompas.com. (August 13, 2020). Indonesia Darurat Kekerasan Seksual, Kenapa RUU PKS Tak Kunjung Disahkan? [Indonesia in State of Sexual Violence Emergency, Why is the SVEB Not Passed Yet?]. Retrieved December 13, 2021, from https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/08/13/09403501/indonesia-darurat-kekerasanseksual-kenapa-ruu-pks-tak-kunjung-disahkan KumparanNEWS. (November 2, 2021). Majelis Ormas Islam Tolak Permendikbud 30 yang Dinilai Bisa Legalkan Seks Bebas [Council of Islamic Mass Organizations rejects MOE Regulation 30 considered to potentially legalize free sex]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/majelis-ormas-islam-tolak-permendikbud-30yang-dinilai-bisa-legalkan-seks-bebas-1wq7i6OruLX/4 KumparanNEWS. (November 16, 2021). Haedar Nashir: Permendikbud 30 Bukti Ekstremitas Demokrasi dan HAM [Haedar Nashir: MOE Regulation 30 is Proof of Democracy and Human Rights’ Extremity]. Retrieved January 27, 2022, from https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/haedar-nashir-permendikbud-30-bukti-ekstremitasdemokrasi-dan-ham-1wvcr0ImXbu Kusnandar, V. B. (September 30, 2021). Sebanyak 86,88% Penduduk Indonesia Beragama Islam: Databoks [As many as 86.88% of the Indonesian Population are Muslims]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2021/09/30/sebanyak-8688-pendudukindonesia-beragama-islam === [PDF page 250] === 250 Langgam.id. (January 21, 2020). Rektor UNP Pastikan Oknum Dosen yang Diduga Lecehkan Mahasiswi Dipecat [UNP Rector confirms dismissal of faculty staff member suspected of sexually harassing female student]. Retrieved Deember 31, 2022, from https://langgam.id/rektor-unp-pastikan-oknum-dosen-yang-diduga-lecehkan-mahasiswidipecat/ Lisan, I. H., & Hardiah, S. (December 30, 2021). Kubu Paling Aktif Menolak Permendikbud 30 di Medsos Berhasil Dipetakan [The most opposing camp of MOE Regulation 30 on social media successfully mapped]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.vice.com/id/article/qjbj4x/hasil-riset-kultura-kubu-paling-aktif-menolakpermendikbud-30-di-twitter-berasal-dari-akun-pks-dan-influencer-agama Luviana. (October 27, 2021). Kabar Baik: Pemerintah Terbitkan Permendikbud Kekerasan Seksual Di Kampus [Good News: Government Issues MOE Regulation on Sexual Violence in Campuses]. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, https://www.konde.co/2021/ 10/nadiem-makarim-terbitkan-permendikbud-kekerasan-seksual-di-kampus.html/ Mardzoeki, F. (2021). False Truth: Confronting History's Cruel Treatment of Gerwani Women. Retrieved from https://www.magdalene.co/story/false-truth-confronting-historys-crueltreatment-of-gerwani-women Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff. 2015. “Genocide/Politicide” spreadsheet. PITF State Failure Problem Set, 1955–2014. Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. McBeth, J. (November 24, 2021). Indonesia's culture wars overly fixated on sex. Retrieved December 3, 2022, from https://asiatimes.com/2021/11/indonesias-culture-wars-overlyfixated-on-sex/ === [PDF page 251] === 251 Mukwege, Denis, and Eve Ensler. 2009. “Group Fights Rape in Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Interview by Scott Simon. Weekend Edition Saturday. NPR, January 24. http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=99838343. Muryanto, B., & Mariani, E. (February 9, 2019). Sexual assault survivor's long battle to find justice in UGM. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2019/02/08/sexual-assault-survivors-long-battle-to-find-justice-in-ugm.html Muslimatnu.or.id. (November 7, 2019). Lima Tokoh Muslimat NU. Retrieved December 31, 2022 from http://muslimatnu.or.id/jejak/lima-tokoh-muslimat-nu/ NewsBreezer. (December 2, 2021). Cases of sexual harassment on the Unsri campus, 2 lecturers become suspected perpetrators, 3 students are victims. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://newsbeezer.com/indonesiaeng/cases-of-sexual-harassment-on-the-unsricampus-2-lecturers-become-suspected-perpetrators-3-students-are-victims/ Du Rocher, S. (October 19, 2020). The Jakarta Method: How US-backed communist purges shaped our world. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, from https://southeastasiaglobe.com/the-jakarta-method-indonesia/ Fujita, A. (October 7, 2015). Hijab fashion is so popular in Indonesia non-Muslim designers are getting in on it. Retrieved from https://theworld.org/stories/2015-10-07/hijab-fashion-sopopular-indonesia-non-muslim-designers-are-getting-it Polycarpus, R. (June 27, 2016). Presiden Jokowi Tegaskan Pemerintah tidak Akan Minta Maaf kepada PKI [President Jokowi Asserts Gov Will Not Apologize to PKI]. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, from https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-danhukum/53287/presiden-jokowi-tegaskan-pemerintah-tidak-akan-minta-maaf-kepada-pki === [PDF page 252] === 252 Pratama, S. I. (January 15, 2014). Ibu Tien dan Letupan-letupan Pemicu Malari [First Lady and Explosion of Triggers to Malari]. Retrieved from https://nasional.tempo.co/read/544935/ibu-tien-dan-letupan-letupan-pemicu-malari Puspita, S. S., Nitya, Hanif, Huang, M. S., Prasetya, A., Amat, Fahrezi, L., Ariani, D. A., Admilla. (2020). Tersendatnya Penghapusan Kekerasan Seksual Melalui Jalur Legislasi [Sexual Violence Elimination Blocked via Legislative Route]. Retrieved from https://genseks.fisip.ui.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Tersendatnya-Penghapusan- Kekerasan-Seksual-melalui-Jalur-Legislasi.pdf. Putri, B. U. (November 24, 2020). Saat Golkar Tersinggung PKS, Lalu Sindir Gerindra soal RUU Ketahanan Keluarga [Golkar offended by the PKS and quipped GERINDRA Party on the Family Resilience Bill]. Retrieved from https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1408374/saat-golkar-tersinggung-pks-lalu-sindir-gerindrasoal-ruu-ketahanan-keluarga Rahayu, N. (January 23, 2022). “Jalan Terjal RUU P-KS Menjadi RUU TPKS [SVEB’s Steep Road to being Law].” Retrieved January 27, 2022, from https://www.jalastoria.id/jalanterjal-ruu-p-ks-menjadi-ruu-tpks/. Ramadhan. (March 4, 2021). Gerak Senyap PKS di Balik Kontroversi RUU Ketahanan Keluarga [PKS’ Silent Movement behind the Family Resilience Bill Controversy]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://asumsi.co/post/58815/gerak-senyap-pks-di-balikkontroversi-ruu-ketahanan-keluarga/ Republika.co.id. (November 1, 2020). Tertibkan Perda Diskriminatif, BPIP Gandeng Komnas Perempuan [Disciplining Discriminative Regional Regulations, BPIP Partners with === [PDF page 253] === 253 Komnas Perempuan]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://republika.co.id/ berita/qj48vr423/tertibkan-perda-diskriminatif-bpip-gandeng-komnas-perempuan Republika.co.id. (November 24, 2020). RUU Ketahanan Keluarga Kandas, Pengusul Bersedih [Sponsors of the Family Resilience Bill saddened by its stalemate]. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qkag45409/ruu-ketahanan-keluargakandas-pengusul-bersedih Reuters. (April 4, 2022). Indonesia court sentences Islamic school teacher to death for raping 13 students. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/04/asia/ indonesia-teacher-sentenced-rape-students-intl-hnk/index.html Saudale, V. (March 30, 2022). “Bogor Mayor Dropped from USAID Conference over Controversial City Law.” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://jakartaglobe.id/ news/bogor-mayor-dropped-from-usaid-conference-over-controversial-city-law. Suara.com. (January 20, 2020). Oknum Dosen Diduga Cabuli Mahasiswi, Rektor UNP: Terbukti Bakal Dipecat [Faculty member suspected of sexually harassing female student, UNP Rector: Will be fired if proven guilty]. Retrieved from December 31, 2022, https://www.suara.com/news/2020/01/20/161255/oknum-dosen-diduga-cabulimahasiswi-rektor-unp-terbukti-bakal-dipecat?page=2 Tempo.co. (February 20, 2020). “Aktivis Perempuan: RUU Ketahanan Keluarga ingin Tandingi RUU PKS [Women activists: the Family Resilience Bill is contesting the SVEB].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://nasional. tempo.co/ read/1310025/aktivisperempuan-ruu-ketahanan-keluarga-ingin-tandingi-ruu-pks/full&view=ok. Tempo.co. (July 3, 2012). “Tak Ada Uang, Komnas Perempuan Kurangi Program [No funds, Komnas Perempuan cuts programs].” Retrieved from December 31, 2022, === [PDF page 254] === 254 https://nasional.tempo.co/read/414386/tak-ada-uang-komnas-perempuan-kurangiprogram TheStraitsTimes. (January 11, 2022). Debate on sexual harassment Bill to resume in Indonesia after six years. Retrieved December 29, 2022, from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/seasia/debate-on-sexual-harassment-bill-to-resume-in-indonesia-after-six-years VOI. (November 26, 2021). Rejection And Support Of Permendikbudristek Number 30 Of 2021 Concerning PPKS. Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://voi.id/en/berita/108049/ penolakan-dan-dukungan-permendikbudristek-nomor-30-tahun-2021-tentang-ppks Worldometer. Countries in the world by population (2023). Retrieved from https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/. Online Video KEMENDIKBUD RI (Organizer). (November 12, 2021). [Video file]. In “Merdeka Belajar Episode 14: Kampus Merdeka dari Kekerasan Seksual [Emancipated Learning Episode 14: Sexual Violence Free Campus].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GT-3gF75l8. LETSS Talk (Organizer). (December 03, 2021). [Video file]. In “Forum Publik Bersuara Untuk Keadilan: Dukungan Terhadap Permendikbud 30/2021 [Public Forum on Voice For Justice: Support for MOE Regulation 30/2021].” Retrieved December 31, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4gexQ_Fv2s === [PDF page 255] === 255 Thesis and Dissertation Fajar, M. (2020). The Path to Preemption: The Politics of Indonesian Student Movements During the Regime Transition (1998-99) Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University. Ilmiyah, N. (2020). Kesetaraan Gender dan Peran Perempuan: Studi Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia [Gender Equality and Women’s Role: A Study of the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir in Surabaya]. Kota Surabaya. B.A. Thesis, UIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya. Salim, Agus (2004) “The Rise of Hizbut-Tahrir (1982−2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames.” Unpublished M.A. Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. Newspaper Articles RI Envoys To Forum On Women Divided. (September 1, 1995). The Jakarta Post. Women's struggle against gender injustice continues (September 10, 1995). The Jakarta Post. Seeing students gain self-esteem is reward enough. (November 25, 1997). The Jakarta Post. Women seeking greater future role (February 3, 1999). The Jakarta Post. Women must challenge laws, policies – lawyer. (November 2, 1995). The Jakarta Post. Yatim, D. H. (December 23, 1998). Momentous women's congress rectifies history. The Jakarta Post. Archival Documents Amnesty International. (December 1995). Wanita di Indonesia dan Timor Timur: Berlawan terhadap Penindasan [Women in Indonesia and East Timor: Fight against Oppression]. ASA 21/51/95. London: International Secretariat. === [PDF page 256] === 256 Belum Dikoreksi [Rough Draft]. (December 14, 1961). Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Kongres GERWANI ke-IV, Gedung Wanita, Djakarta [His Excellency President Sukarno’s Remarks in GERWANI’s 4th Congress, Gedung Wanita, Jakarta]. Document No. NST.51/62. ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia]. Menjelang Dua Tahun Kabinet Kerja Wilopo: 1957-1959. [Towards Two Years of the Wilopo Working Cabinet: 1957-1959]. Djawatan Kepolisian Negara [National Police Force]. (June 1953). Ichtisar Mingguan Mengenai Activiteit Organisasi: Wanita Locaal [Weekly Summary of Organizations’ Activities: Local Women]. Week: 25.ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. D. P. A. T. GERWANI Tjisarua [GERWANI Tjisarua Branch’s Leadership Board]. (December 3, 1955). Surat Protes kepada Pengadilan Rapat Tinggi Tandjung Radja Palembang: Bebaskan Maisuri dari Hukuman Pendjara [Letter of Protest to Palembang’s Tanjung Raja Higher Court: Free Maisuri from Prison Sentence]. Document No. 8/SOK/55. ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. D. P. T. GERWANI Kabupaten Modjokerto [GERWANI Modjokerto Regency Chapter’s Leadership Board]. (April 8, 1958). Surat kepada PJM Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi RI: Resolusi [Letter to His Excellency President/Supreme Commander of the Republic of Indonesia: Resolution]. ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. KOWANI, K. W. I. (1978 (1986)). Sejarah Setengah Abad Kesatuan Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia [History of the Indonesian Women’s Movement’s Half-Century of Unity]. Jakarta. Balai Pustaka. === [PDF page 257] === 257 Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia]. (March 18, 1964). Surat Balasan Menko/Menteri Penerangan Roeslan Abdulgani kepada D.P.P. GERWANI [Letter of Response from the Coordinating Minister/Minister of Information Roeslan Abdugani to Gerwani Center Leadership Board]. ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. Sekretariat Dewan Pimpinan Pusat GERWANI [GERWANI Central Leadership Board Secretariat]. (February 8, 1964). Surat kepada Menteri Penerangan Roeslan Abdulgani: Siaran Radio dan Televisi [Letter to Minister of Information Roeslan Abdulgani: Radio and Television Broadcast]. Letter No. 716/Sekrt/DPP/I. ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. Sekretariat Negara Kabinet President Republik Indonesia [State Secretariat of the Indonesian Republic’s Presidential Cabinet]. (June 8, 1965). Amanat PJM Presiden Sukarno Pada Peringatan 15 Tahun GERWANI di Istora, Senajan, Djakarta [His Excellency President Sukarno’s Remarks on the Commemoration of GERWANI’s 15th Anniversary in Istora, Senayan, Jakarta]. Document No. NS7.564/65. ANRI, Jakarta, Indonesia. Interviews Ledia Hanifa Amaliah, woman MP in Post-Reformasi Popong Otje Djundjunan, woman MP from 1987-2019 RS001, women’s rights activist since New Order RS002, women’s rights activist in Old Order and parolee in New Order RS005, Komnas Perempuan staff member in Post-Reformasi RS007, women’s rights scholar-activist in Post-Reformasi RS008, women’s rights activist since New Order and MP in Reformasi and Post-Reformasi === [PDF page 258] === 258 RS009, women’s rights activist since New Order RS012, women’s rights activist since New Order RS013, women’s rights scholar-activist in Post-Reformasi RS014, historian of women’s affairs pre- and post-independence Indonesia RS016, women’s sexual and reproductive rights activist in Post-Reformasi RS018, women’s rights activist and subnational MP in Post-Reformasi RS019, women’s rights activist since New Order RS020, women’s rights activist in Post-Reformasi RS036, women’s rights activist since New Order RS037, women’s rights activist since New Order RS041, family rights scholar-activist in Post-Reformasi RS042, women’s rights activist since New Order RS043, social entrepreneur for women’s empowerment in Post-Reformasi RS048, women’s rights activist and expert staff in national parliament in Post-Reformasi RS054, women’s rights activist in Post-Reformasi RS057, women’s rights groups scholar in Post-Reformasi RS058, student activist in New Order and female co-founder of a political party in Reformasi RS059, women’s sexual and reproductive rights activist in Post-Reformasi RS060, women’s rights activist since New Order RS061, student activist in New Order and women’s rights activist in Post-Reformasi RS062, former unionist turned woman workers’ rights activist in Post-Reformasi RS063, women’s rights activist since New Order Tyas Widuri, woman’s rights activist in Post-Reformasi === [PDF page 259] === 259 Appendices Appendix 1 - Interview Book Questions for Women Activists: 1. When and how did you start your women’s rights activism? 2. What changes do you see or experience throughout your years of activism? 3. Why do you think those changes occurred or have not occurred? 4. Which groups do you think play a role in the changes/stagnation related to women’s rights and women’s rights activism? 5. Based on your assessment, what strategies led to those changes (or stagnation) you mentioned earlier? Questions for Scholar-Activists of Indonesian Women’s Rights and Movements: 1. When and how did you start your post in the organization or the project in Indonesia? 2. Based on your assessment, how have women’s rights in Indonesia fared? Furthermore, how have they fared in relation to women’s rights in other countries or projects? 3. What changes do you see or experience throughout your years working in the organization or in Indonesia? Questions for Members of Parliament: 1. When and how did you start your post in the legislative government? 2. Based on your assessment, how have women’s rights in Indonesia fared? 3. What changes do you see or experience throughout your years working in the government? === [PDF page 260] === 260 Appendix 2 - English Translation of Regulation 30 EDUCATION, CULTURE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY MINISTER’S REGULATION REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA NUMBER 30 YEAR 2021 SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND REDRESS IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS BY THE GRACE OF GOD ALMIGHTY THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, Considers: a. that each citizen has the right to be protected in accordance with Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia’s Constitution of 1945 from any forms of violence including sexual violence; b. that the increase of sexual violence occurring in communities including higher education has direct or indirect effects on the optimization in the conduct of the Tridharma in Higher Education Institutions and on improving the quality of higher education; === [PDF page 261] === 261 c. that, in order to prevent and redress sexual violence in higher education institutions, a regulation which guarantees legal certainty in the prevention and redress of sexual violence in higher education institutions is needed; d. that based on the considerations made in point (a), point (b), and point (c), issuance of the Education, Culture, Research, and Technology Minister’s Regulation on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institutions is necessary; In view of: 1. Article 17 paragraph (3) of the Republic of Indonesia’s Constitution of 1945; 2. Law Number 7 Year 1984 on the Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 1999 Number 165, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 3886); 3. Law Number 39 Year 1999 on Human Rights (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2003 Number 78, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 4301); 4. Law Number 20 Year 2003 on the National Education System (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2003 Number 78, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 4301); 5. Law Number 39 Year 2008 on State Ministries (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2008 Number 166, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 4916); === [PDF page 262] === 262 6. Law Number 12 Year 2012 on Higher Education (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2012 Number 158, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 5336); 7. Law Number 8 Year 2016 on People with Disabilities (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2016 Number 69, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 5871); 8. Government Regulation Number 53 Year 2010 on Civil Servants’ Discipline (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2010 Number 74, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 5135); 9. Government Regulation Number 4 Year 2014 on the Conduct of Higher Education and Management of Higher Education Institutions (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2014 Number 16, Republic of Indonesia Additional State Gazette Number 5500); 10. President’s Regulation Number 62 Year 2021 on the Education, Culture, Research, and Technology Ministry (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2021 Number 156); 11. Education, Culture, Research, and Technology Minister’s Regulation Number 28 Year 2021 on the Organization and Institutional Management of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (Republic of Indonesia State Gazette of 2021 Number 963); ESTABLISHES: === [PDF page 263] === 263 Decides: THE EDUCATION, CULTURE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY MINISTER’S REGULATION ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND REDRESS IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS. CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1 The Minister’s Regulation defines: 1. Sexual Violence as any act of degrading, insulting, harassing, and/or assaulting a person’s body and/or reproductive organs, owing to unequal power and/or gender relations, which costs or could cost the person’s psychological and/or physical wellbeing including uncompromised reproductive health and the opportunity to pursue higher education safely and optimally. 2. Higher Education Institution as the educational unit that conducts higher education. 3. Prevention as the actions/means/processes undertaken so that one or a group of people does not commit Sexual Violence in a Higher Education Institution. 4. Redress as the actions/means/processes undertaken by a Higher Education Institution to tackle Sexual Violence in a Higher Education Institution. 5. Investigation as the actions/means/processes undertaken by a Higher Education Institution to follow through a report of Sexual Violence in a Higher Education Institution. 6. Students as participants of Higher Education. === [PDF page 264] === 264 7. Educators as the education personnel who are qualified to be members of the teaching faculty, instructors, and tutors who participate in the conduct of higher education. 8. Education Personnel as the members of society who dedicate themselves and are appointed to support the conduct of higher education. 9. Campus Community Members as the people who have activities and/or non-academic employment on campus. 10. Higher Education Institution Leader as the Rector of a University or Institute; Chairperson of an Academy; Director of a Polytechnic, College, or Community College. 11. Tridharma of a Higher Education Institution which hereafter is referred to as Tridharma, as the obligation of every Higher Education Institution to conduct education, research, and public engagement. 12. Victim as the Students, Educators, Education Personnel, Campus Communities, and members of society who experienced Sexual Violence. 13. Reported Party as the Students, Educators, Education Personnel, Campus Community Members, and members of society who are reported to have committed Sexual Violence. 14. Task Force for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress which hereafter is referred to as Task Force, is part of a Higher Education Institution and functions as the center for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress. 15. Ministry as the ministry which conducts governmental affairs in the field of education. 16. Minister as the minister who conducts governmental affairs in the field of education. Article 2 The Minister’s Regulation serves: === [PDF page 265] === 265 a. as a guide to every Higher Education Institution in formulating its policy and taking action for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress related to the conduct of Tridharma on and off campus; and b. to nurture a campus life that is humane, dignified, equal, inclusive, collaborative, and nonviolent among Students, Educators, Education Personnel, and Campus Community Members in their respective Higher Education Institution. Article 3 The conduct of Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress is based on the principles of: a. the Victim’s best interest; b. gender justice and equality; c. equal rights and accessibility for people with disabilities; d. accountability; e. independence; f. prudence; g. consistency; and h. guarantee from reoccurrence. Article 4 The subjects of Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress: a. Students; b. Educators; c. Education Personnel; === [PDF page 266] === 266 d. Campus Community Members; and e. members of society who interact with Students, Educators, or Education Personnel during the conduct of Tridharma. Article 5 (1) Sexual Violence includes actions that are done through verbal contact, non-physical contact, physical contact, and/or information and communication technology. (2) Sexual Violence as referred to in paragraph (1) includes a. verbally discriminating against or harassing a Victim’s physical appearance, condition, and/or gender identity; b. exhibiting one’s genitals deliberately without a Victim’s consent; c. luring, expressing jest, and/or whistling with sexual overtone to a Victim; d. gazing with sexual overtone and/or to discomfort a Victim; e. delivering a message, jest, image, photo, audio, and/or video with sexual overtone to a Victim despite the Victim’s expressed disagreement; f. taking, documenting, and/or distributing photo and/or audio and/or visual recording of a Victim with sexual overtone without the Victim’s consent; g. uploading a Victim’s private information and/or personal photo with sexual overtone without the Victim’s consent; h. distributing a Victim’s bodily and/or personal information with sexual overtone without the Victim’s consent; i. peeping and/or deliberately looking at a Victim’s private activity and/or being inside a private room; === [PDF page 267] === 267 j. encouraging, promising, offering something, or threatening a Victim to engage in a sexual transaction or activity denied by the Victim; k. giving discipline or punishment with sexual overtone; l. touching, stroking, molesting, grabbing, embracing, kissing, and/or rubbing one’s body part on a Victim without the Victim’s consent; m. opening a Victim’s clothes without the Victim’s consent; n. coercing a Victim to engage in sexual transaction or activity; o. practicing a community culture of Sexual Violence among Students, Staff, or Faculty; p. attempting rape, but no penetration occurred; q. committing rape including penetrating with objects or body parts other than the genitalia; r. coercing or deceiving a Victim into having an abortion; s. coercing or deceiving a Victim into getting pregnant; t. deliberately enabling Sexual Violence to occur; and/or u. committing other acts of Sexual Violence. (3) A Victim’s consent as mentioned in paragraph (2) b, f, g, h, l, and m, is considered unlawful in cases where the Victim was: a. below the adult age by law; b. experiencing a situation in which the perpetrator threatens, coerces, and/or misuses his or her authority; c. under the influence of medicine, alcohol, and/or narcotic drugs; d. sick, unconscious, or asleep; e. having a vulnerable physical and/or psychological condition; === [PDF page 268] === 268 f. experiencing tonic immobility; and/or g. experiencing shock. CHAPTER II PREVENTION Section One Prevention by Higher Education Institution Article 6 (1) Every Higher Education Institution must conduct Sexual Violence Prevention through: a. academic activities; b. organizational strengthening; and c. strengthening of Students, Educators, and Education Personnel communities’ culture. (2) Leader of the Higher Education Institution shall conduct Sexual Violence Prevention as mentioned in paragraph (1) point (a) by obligating Students, Educators, and Education Personnel to study the module on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress decided by the Ministry. (3) Prevention through organizational strengthening as mentioned in paragraph (1) point (a) at the least includes: a. formulating policy that supports Sexual Violence Prevention in Higher Education Institutions; b. forming a Task Force; c. formulating guidelines for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress; === [PDF page 269] === 269 d. limiting appointments between Students and Educators and/or Education Personnel outside of the campus’ operational hours and/or campus premises; e. providing access to report Sexual Violence; f. training Students, Educators, Education Personnel, and Campus Community Members for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress; g. organizing routine socialization of guidelines for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress to Students, Educators, Education Personnel, and Campus Community Members; h. displaying informative signposts which contain: 1. the campus’ Sexual Violence report channel; and 2. a warning that the Higher Education Institution’s campus does not tolerate Sexual Violence; i. providing decent accommodations for people with disabilities for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress; and j. collaborating with relevant institutions for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress. (4) Prevention through the strengthening of Students, Educators, and Education Personnel communities’ culture as mentioned in paragraph (1) point (c) in the forms of communication, information, and education on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress at the least in activities such as: a. campus life orientation for Students, Educators, and Education Personnel; b. student organizations; and/or c. informal communication networks among Students, Educators and Education Personnel. === [PDF page 270] === 270 Section Two Prevention by Educators and Education Personnel Article 7 (1) Sexual Violence Prevention by Educators and Education Personnel include: a. limiting meetings with an individual Student: 1. off-campus; 2. after campus’ operational hours; and/or 3. for non-academic purposes, without approval from the director/head of program or head of faculty; and b. playing an active role in Sexual Violence Prevention. (2) Should an Educator be director/head of program or head of faculty, then approval as mentioned in paragraph (1) shall be given by the superior of the director/head of program or head of faculty. (3) Approval as mentioned in paragraph (1) point (a) shall be exercised under these terms: a. the Educator and/or Education Personnel must submit permission to conduct the planned meeting with the Student, either in written form or through a medium of electronic communication; and b. the permission as mentioned in point (a) is to be delivered to the director/head of program or head of faculty prior to the meeting. Section Three Prevention by Students === [PDF page 271] === 271 Article 8 (1) Sexual Violence Prevention by Students include: a. limiting meetings with an individual Educator and Education Personnel: 1. off-campus; 2. after campus’ operational hours; and/or 3. for non-academic purposes, without approval from the director/head of program or head of faculty; and b. playing an active role in Sexual Violence Prevention. (2) Approval as mentioned in paragraph (1) point (a) shall be exercised under these terms: a. Student submits permission to conduct the planned meeting with the Educator and/or Education Personnel, either in written form or through a medium of electronic communication; and b. the permission as mentioned in point (a) is to be delivered to the director/head of program or head of faculty prior to the meeting. Article 9 The Higher Education Institution Leader’s Decree establishes the procedures of giving approval as mentioned in Article 7 paragraph (3) and Article 8 paragraph (2). CHAPTER III REDRESS Section One General Requirements === [PDF page 272] === 272 Article 10 The Higher Education Institution shall redress Sexual Violence through: a. providing support; b. ensuring protection; c. enforcing administrative sanctions; and d. facilitating the Victim’s recovery. Section Two Providing Support Article 11 (1) Providing support as referred to in Article 10 point (a) is given to the Victim or witness who are Students, Educators, Education Personnel, or Campus Community Members. (2) Providing support as mentioned in paragraph (1) entails: a. counselling; b. health services; c. legal assistance; d. advocacy; and/or e. social and spiritual guidance. (3) In the event that the Victim or witness are persons with disability, providing support as referred to in paragraph (2) is exercised by considering the needs of persons with disabilities. (4) Providing support as referred to in paragraph (1) is conducted based on the Victim’s or witness’ consent. === [PDF page 273] === 273 (5) In the event that the Victim does not give her/his consent as referred to in paragraph (4), then the consent can be given by the parents or the Victim's guardian or support. Section Three Ensuring Protection Article 12 (1) Ensuring protection as referred to in Article 10 point (b) is given to the Victim or witness who are Students, Educators, Education Personnel, or Campus Community Members. (2) Ensuring protection of the Victim or witness as referred to in paragraph (1) entails: a. assurance for Students to complete their education; b. assurance for Educators and/or Education Personnel to resume their career in the impacted Higher Education Institution; c. guaranteed protection from physical and non-physical threats by the perpetrator or other parties, and from reoccurring Sexual Violence, by facilitating reports of the physical and non-physical threats to law enforcement officers; d. confidentiality of identities; e. information about the rights and facilities for protection; f. access to information about the conduct of ensuring protection; g. protection of the Victim and/or claimant from the treatment and behavior of law enforcement officers that strengthen the stigma of and/or undermine the Victim; h. protection of the Victim and/or claimant from criminal charges; i. civil lawsuit for reporting Sexual Violence; === [PDF page 274] === 274 j. provision of a safe house; and/or k. security and protection from threats following a given testimony. Section Four Enforcing Administrative Sanctions Article 13 (1) Enforcing administrative sanctions as mentioned in Article 10 point (c) is exercised in the event that the perpetrator is proven to have committed sexual violence. (2) Enforcing administrative sanctions as mentioned in paragraph (1) is approved by the Higher Education Institution Leader’s Decree, following Task Force’s recommendations. Article 14 (1) Enforcing administrative sanctions as mentioned in Article 13 consists of: a. third degree administrative sanctions; b. second degree administrative sanctions; or c. first degree administrative sanctions. (2) Third degree administrative sanctions as referred to in paragraph (1) point (a) include: a. a written warning; or b. a written apology published in internal campus or mass media. (3) Second degree administrative sanctions as referred to in paragraph (1) letter b include: a. temporary dismissal from employment without receiving employee’s rights; or b. removal of rights as Student including: === [PDF page 275] === 275 1. suspension of attending courses (detention); 2. revocation of scholarships; or 3. removal of other rights. (4) First degree administrative sanctions as referred to in paragraph (1) point (c) in the form of: a. permanent dismissal as Student; or b. permanent dismissal from office as Educator, Education Personnel, or of Campus Community Members as appropriate within the provisions of laws and regulations from the impacted Higher Education Institution. (5) After completing third degree and second degree administrative sanctions as mentioned in paragraph (2) and paragraph (3), perpetrators are required to take part in the counselling program appointed by the Task Force. (6) The perpetrator is responsible for the financing of the counselling program as mentioned in paragraph (5). (7) The report on the results of the counselling program serves as a basis for the Higher Education Institution Leader to issue a letter that verifies the perpetrator’s completion of the imposed sanctions. Article 15 The imposition of sanctions as referred to in Article 14 is exercised in a proportional and fair manner as recommended by the Task Force. === [PDF page 276] === 276 Article 16 (1) The Higher Education Institution Leader may impose a more severe degree of administrative sanctions than those recommended by the Task Force. (2) Considerations for enforcing a more severe degree of administrative sanctions as mentioned in paragraph (1): a. whether the Victim is a person with a disability; b. the impacts of the Sexual Violence on the Victim; and/or c. the Reported Party or perpetrator is a member of the Task Force, head/chief of a program, or chair of a department. Article 17 (1) In the event that the Higher Education Institution Leader holds no authority to impose administrative sanctions, the Leader of the Higher Education Institution shall forward the recommendation of administrative sanctions to the Minister through the director general in charge of higher education affairs. (2) In the event that the Reported Party is the Leader of the Higher Education Institution and is proven to have committed Sexual Violence, the Task Force shall forward its recommendations for sanctions to the Minister through the director general in charge of higher education affairs. Article 18 Enforcing administrative sanctions as mentioned in Article 14 does not exclude the enforcement of other administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions that are in accordance with the governing laws and regulations. === [PDF page 277] === 277 Article 19 A Higher Education Institution that does not implement Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress is subject to administrative sanctions in the form of: a. termination of financial aid or facilities and infrastructure support for the Higher Education Institution; and/or b. downgrading of the Higher Education Institution’s accreditation level. Section Five Facilitating Victim’s Recovery Article 20 (1) Facilitating a Victim’s recovery as mentioned in Article 10 point (d) entails: a. medical treatment; b. physical therapy; c. psychological therapy; and/or d. social and spiritual guidance. (2) Facilitating a Victim’s recovery as mentioned in paragraph (1) may engage a: a. medical doctor/other health workers; b. counsellor; c. psychologist; d. public figure; e. religious leader; and/or f. other needed support including for the needs of a Victim with disability. === [PDF page 278] === 278 (3) Facilitating a Victim’s recovery as mentioned in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) is conducted based on the Victim’s consent. (4) In the event of a witness experiencing secondary traumatic stress, recovery as mentioned in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) may be given to the witness based on her/his consent. Article 21 Duration of a Victim’s recovery as mentioned in Article 20 does not reduce the Victim's rights to academic activities, employment rights, or other rights in accordance with the governing laws and regulations. Article 22 (1) In the event that a Victim or witness is member of society, the Higher Education Institution can provide support, protection, and/or recovery for the Victim or witness by involving the agencies related to Sexual Violence Redress or organizations for Victims of Sexual Violence. (2) In the event that a Victim or witness as mentioned in paragraph (1) is underage according to the governing laws and regulations, the Higher Education Institution may provide support, ensure protection, and/or facilitate the recovery of the Victim or witness, by involving organizations related to child protection. (3) The Leader of the Higher Education Institution determines the support, protection, and/or recovery as mentioned in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2). === [PDF page 279] === 279 CHAPTER IV TASK FORCE FOR SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND REDRESS Article 23 (1) In the implementation of Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress, the Leader of the Higher Education Institution establishes a Task Force at the Higher Education Institution level. (2) The initial formation of a Task Force as mentioned in paragraph (1) is by way of a selection committee. Article 24 (1) The selection committee as mentioned in Article 23 paragraph (2) must comprise an odd number of people with at least 3 (three) people and a maximum of 7 (seven) people. (2) The selection committee as mentioned in paragraph (1) shall pay attention to the women’s representation with at least 2/3 (two thirds) of the total number of members. (3) Members of the selection committee as mentioned in paragraph (1) consist of the following elements: a. Educators; b. Education Personnel; and c. Students. (4) Members of the selection committee as mentioned in paragraph (1) must meet the following requirements: a. have experience in supporting Victims of Sexual Violence; b. have conducted a study on Sexual Violence, gender, and/or disabilities; === [PDF page 280] === 280 c. have participated in an organization on or off campus that focuses on issues of Sexual Violence, gender, and/or disabilities; and/or d. have never been proven to have committed violence including Sexual Violence. (5) The requirements as mentioned in paragraph (4) are attached with the following administrative documents: a. Curriculum Vitae; b. letters of recommendation from the superior of prospective members who are Educators or Education Personnel; and c. letters of recommendation from educators for prospective members who are Students. (6) The nature of the selection committee as mentioned in paragraph (1) is ad hoc. Article 25 (1) Procedures of the formation and recruitment of members to the selection committee as mentioned in Article 24, include: a. The Higher Education Institution Leader recruits at least 10 (ten) candidates to be selection committee members and announces their selection; b. candidates to be selection committee member as mentioned in point (a) shall follow the training and selection processes organized by the working unit in the Ministry that executes the functions and duties of character-building; c. results of the training and selection processes as mentioned in point (b) are announced through the webpage of the working unit in the Ministry that executes the functions and duties of character-building; and === [PDF page 281] === 281 d. candidates for selection committee member who have passed the training and selection as mentioned in point (b) shall undergo a public examination process to receive feedback from the public. (2) Results of the formation and membership of the selection committee as mentioned in paragraph (1) is concluded by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree. Article 26 Committee selection as mentioned in Article 24 has the duties of: a. creating technical guidance for the selection of the Task Force’s members; b. executing the selection of the Task Force’s members; and c. recommending the Task Force’s members to the Leader of the Higher Education Institution for acceptance. Article 27 (1) Members of the Task Force at their respective Higher Education Institution consist of the following elements: a. Educators; b. Education Personnel; and c. Students. (2) Membership of the Task Force as mentioned in paragraph (1) consists of: a. a chairperson who is concurrently a member; b. a secretary who is concurrently a member; and c. members. === [PDF page 282] === 282 (3) Members of the Task Force as mentioned in paragraph (2) must comprise an odd number of people with at least 5 (five) people as members. (4) Members of the Task Force as mentioned in paragraph (2) pay attention to women’s representation in the membership with at least 2/3 (two thirds) of the total number of members being women. Article 28 (1) The chairperson as mentioned in Article 27 paragraph (2) point (a) is an Educator. (2) The secretary as mentioned in Article 27 paragraph (2) point (b) is from either Students or Education Personnel. (3) At least 50% (fifty percent) of the total number of members as mentioned in Article 27 paragraph (2) point (c) are Students. Article 29 (1) The chairperson and secretary of the Task Force as referred to in Article 27 paragraph (2) point (a) and point (b) are selected from and by the members of the Task Force through deliberations that reach consensus, and with attention to gender equality. (2) The members of the Task Force as mentioned in Article 27 paragraph (2) must meet the following requirements: a. have experience in supporting Victims of Sexual Violence; b. have conducted a study on Sexual Violence, gender, and/or disabilities; c. have participated in an organization on or off campus that focuses on issues of Sexual Violence, gender, and/or disabilities; === [PDF page 283] === 283 d. show interest and ability to work together as a team in carrying out Prevention and Handling Sexual Violence in their Higher Education Institution; and/or e. have never been proven to have committed violence including Sexual Violence. (3) The requirements as mentioned in paragraph (2) must be attached in documents such as: a. Curriculum Vitae; b. interview results; c. letters of recommendation from the superior of prospective members who are Educators and Education Personnel; and c. letters of recommendation from educators for prospective members who are Students. Article 30 (1) Membership of the Task Force as mentioned in Article 27 is approved by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree no later than 1 (one) month after receiving recommendations from the selection committee. (2) Members of the Task Force who have been approved as mentioned in paragraph (1) must attend the training organized by the working unit in the Ministry for executing the functions and duties of character-building. Article 31 (1) The term limit for a Task Force is a period of 2 (two) years and can be extended for 1 (one) more period. (2) Membership of the Task Force ends due to: a. expiration of the term limit; === [PDF page 284] === 284 b. death; c. resignation; d. one no longer fulfils the membership element as mentioned in Article 27; e. one no longer qualifies as a member of the Task Force as mentioned in Article 29; f. indefinite absence for more than 6 (six) months; and/or g. one is sentenced by a court decision that has entered into force. Article 32 (1) The Higher Education Institution Leader conducts the selection of Task Force members no later than 3 (three) months prior to the end of the Task Force’s members’ term limit. (2) Mechanism for the selection as mentioned in paragraph (1) is conducted in accordance with the technical guidance for selection as mentioned in Article 26 point (a). Article 33 (1) Replacement of Task Force’s members as mentioned in Article 31 paragraph (2) point (b) through point (g) shall be executed by the Task Force. (2) Members of the Task Force as mentioned in paragraph (1) are approved by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution. === [PDF page 285] === 285 Article 34 (1) The Task Force is tasked with: a. assisting the Leader of the Higher Education Institution in compiling the guidelines for Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress at the Higher Education Institution as mentioned in Article 6 paragraph (3) point (c); b. conducting a Sexual Violence survey at least 1 (one) time every 6 (six) months at the Higher Education Institution; c. delivering the results of the survey as mentioned in point (b) to the Leader of the Higher Education Institution; d. promoting gender equality education, persons with disabilities’ equality, sexual and reproductive health education, and Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress for Campus Community Members; e. responding to incoming reports of Sexual Violence; f. coordinating with units that handle services for persons with disability, in the event of a report concerning a Victim, witness, claimant, and/or Reported Party with disability; g. coordinating with relevant agencies in providing protection for Victims and witnesses; h. monitoring the implementation of recommendations from the Task Force by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution; and i. delivering a report on activities of Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress to the Leader of the Higher Education Institution at least 1 (one) time in every 6 (six) months. (2) In executing the tasks as mentioned in paragraph (1), the Task Force is authorized to: a. summon and request information from the Victim, witness, Reported Party, Victim’s support, and/or experts; === [PDF page 286] === 286 b. request assistance from the Leader of the Higher Education Institution to have the physical presences of the witness, Reported Party, Victim’s support, and/or experts in throughout the Investigation; c. conduct consultations regarding the Sexual Violence redress with relevant parties and consideration of the Victim’s condition, safety, and comfort; and d. cooperate with the Higher Education Institution in respect to reports of Sexual Violence involving a Victim, witness, claimant, and/or Reported Party from the Higher Education Institution in cooperation. Article 35 (1) Members of the Task Force must highly uphold the Ethical Code approved by the Higher Education Institution. (2) The Ethical Code as mentioned in paragraph (1) comprises norms and principles that members of the Task Force must comply with in exercising their duties. (3) The Ethical Code is an integration of values which entails: a. guaranteeing the confidentiality of the identities of the parties involved directly with a report; b. ensuring the safety of Victims, witnesses, and/or the claimant; and c. maintaining the independence and credibility of the Task Force. === [PDF page 287] === 287 Article 36 Any suspicion of abuse of power in the: a. process of forming and recruiting members of the selection committee as mentioned in Article 25; b. implementation of the selection committee’s duties as mentioned in Article 26; c. process of forming the Task Force mentioned in Article 29 and Article 30; and d. implementation of the duties and authorities of the Task Force as mentioned in Article 34, is reported to the Minister through the Ministry’s working unit that exercises the functions and duties of character-building. Article 37 (1) The Leader of the Higher Education Institution facilitates the implementation of the duties and authorities of the Task Force as mentioned in Article 34. (2) Facilitating the implementation of duties and authorities as mentioned in paragraph (1) includes: a. providing facilities and infrastructure for operations; b. financing the operations of Prevention and Redress; c. protecting the safety of the Task Force’s members; and d. providing legal assistance for members of the Task Force who are implicated in a lawsuit following the implementation of their duties and authorities as Task Force members. CHAPTER V TASK FORCE’S MECHANISM FOR SEXUAL VIOLENCE REDRESS === [PDF page 288] === 288 Section One General Requirements Article 38 The Task Force redresses Sexual Violence reports through the following mechanisms: a. receipt of reports; b. Investigation; c. formulation of conclusions and recommendations; d. recovery; and e. reoccurrence prevention measures. Section Two Receipt of Reports Article 39 (1) Reporting of Sexual Violence is available to the Victim and/or witness. (2) Reporting of Sexual Violence as mentioned in paragraph (1) is submitted through: a. phone call; b. electronic short message; c. electronic mail; and/or d. the Higher Education Institution’s official website. (3) Reporting of Sexual Violence as mentioned in paragraph (2) must be exercised with mechanisms easily accessible to persons with disability. === [PDF page 289] === 289 Article 40 (1) Receipt of reports are from every Victim or witness/claimant. (2) In receiving each report, the Task Force shall: a. identify the Victim or witness/claimant; b. formulate the chronology in the reported Sexual Violence; c. conduct an Investigation of the documents/evidence submitted by the claimant; d. list the needs of the Victim and/or witness/claimant; and e. provide information regarding the rights of the Victim or witness/claimant and the mechanism for Sexual Violence Redress, anticipating possible risks and plans for risk mitigation. (3) The Task Force notifies its Redress in relation to the report as mentioned in paragraph (2) to the Leader of the Higher Education Institution. Section Three Investigation Article 41 (1) The Task Force conducts Investigation of a report on Sexual Violence. (2) The Investigation as mentioned in (1) is aimed at collecting information and/or documents related to the Sexual Violence report. (3) Investigation as mentioned in paragraph (1) is conducted on the Victim, witness, and/or the Reported Party. === [PDF page 290] === 290 (4) In the event that the Victim, witness, and/or the Reported Party are persons with disabilities, the Task Force provides disability support and accommodates disability needs appropriately. (5) The Investigation as mentioned in paragraph (3) is conducted with the Task Force’s discretion. (6) The Investigation as mentioned in paragraphs (1) through paragraph (4) must be completed within no more than 30 (thirty) workdays. (7) Results of the Investigation as mentioned in paragraph (3) are included in the Minutes of Investigation. Article 42 Throughout the Investigation as mentioned in Article 41, the Leader of the Higher Education Institution can temporarily suspend the Reported Party’s right to education for Students or right to work for Reported Parties whose status falls within the categories of Educators, Education Personnel, or Campus Community Members. Section Four Formulation of Conclusions and Recommendations Article 43 The Task Force draws conclusions and recommendations for Sexual Violence Redress. === [PDF page 291] === 291 Article 44 (1) The conclusion as mentioned in Article 43 explicates the statement regarding whether or not Sexual Violence is proven. (2) In the event of proven Sexual Violence, the conclusion as mentioned in paragraph (1) shall at the least describe: a. the identity of the perpetrator; b. the forms of Sexual Violence; c. the support given for the Victim and/or witness; and d. the protection of the Victim and/or witness. (3) In the event of no proven Sexual Violence, the conclusion as mentioned in paragraph (1) shall at the least describe: a. the identity of the Reported Party; b. the Sexual Violence allegation; c. the summary of the Investigation; and d. the statement that there is no evidence of any Sexual Violence committed. Article 45 (1) Recommendations in terms of proven Sexual Violence as mentioned in Article 44 paragraph (2) shall at the least contain recommendations for: a. the Victim’s recovery; b. sanctions on the perpetrator; and c. measures for reoccurrence Prevention. === [PDF page 292] === 292 (2) In the event of no proven Sexual Violence as mentioned in Article 44 paragraph (3), the Task Force recommends the restoration of the Reported Party's good name. Article 46 Recommendations as referred to in Article 45 are approved by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree. Section Five Recovery Article 47 (1) The Task Force facilitates the Recovery of theVictim. (2) The forms of Recovery facilitation as referred to in paragraph (1) include: a. a definite period of conducting Victim’s Recovery as approved by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution; b. cooperation with related parties to deliver Victim’s Recovery; c. notification to related parties in the Higher Education Institution that: 1. the period of Recovery for Victims who are Students does not reduce Victims’ enrollment or right to a leave of absence; 2. during the recovery period, Victims who are Educators or Education Personnel can still obtain their rights in accordance with other governing laws and regulations; and/or === [PDF page 293] === 293 3. Victims who are Students and experience academic loss have the right to additional academic guidance from the Educators; and d. monitoring of the Victim’s Recovery process and any developments in the Victim's condition, exercised through coordination with the service provider for the Victim’s Recovery. (3) Facilitation for the Victim’s Recovery other than the ones as referred to in paragraph (2) is conducted with theVictim's consent. Article 48 (1) In the event of the Reported Party not proven to have committed Sexual Violence, the Task Force makes recommendations to the Leader of the Higher Education Institution to execute the recovery of the Reported Party's good name. (2) Restoration of the Reported Party’s good name as referred to in paragraph (1) is approved by by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree. Section Six Reoccurrence Prevention Article 49 (1) Measures to prevent Sexual Violence reoccurrence shall at the least include improvements in: a. academic activities as referred to in Article 6 paragraph (2); b. strengthening of governance as referred to in Article 6 paragraph (3); and c. strengthening of community culture as referred to in Article 6 paragraph (4). === [PDF page 294] === 294 (2) Strengthening academic activities as referred to in paragraph (1) point (a) may entail: a. developing module materials; b. developing learning methodologies; c. disseminating and circulating module materials intensively; d. evaluating understandings of the module material; and/or e. exercising other activities for Prevention of Sexual Violence reoccurrence. (3) Strengthening governance as referred to in paragraph (1) point (b) at the least includes improving the formulation and implementation of the Higher Education Institution’s policies on Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress. (4) Improvement of community culture strengthening as referred to in paragraph (1) point (c) at the least includes intensive socialization and education for Students, Educators, Education Personnel, and Campus Community Members about Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress. (5) The Task Force assists the Higher Education Institution Leader in executing Sexual Violence recurrence Prevention as referred to in paragraph (1) through paragraph (4). Article 50 Further provisions regarding the mechanisms for implementing Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress as well as the Task Force’s working procedures are regulated by the Leader of the Higher Education Institution. CHAPTER VI INVESTIGATION REVIEW === [PDF page 295] === 295 Article 51 (1) In the case that a Higher Education Leader's Decree as referred to in Article 46 is considered unjust, the Victim or the Reported Party has the right to request a review of her/his case’s Investigation. (2) Request for an Investigation review as referred to in paragraph (1) is submitted through the Ministry’s reporting channel. Article 52 (1) An Investigation review is conducted by the director general in charge of higher education affairs. (2) Results of the Investigation review as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be in the form of either: a. affirming the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree as referred to in Article 46; or b. providing recommendations to the Higher Education Leader for: 1. Amending the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree; or 2. Cancelling the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree, as referred to in Article 46. (3) Recommendations to amend the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree as referred to in paragraph (2) point (b) number (1) shall be in the form of either adding or easing sanctions in the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree. (4) Recommendations to cancel the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree as referred to in paragraph (2) point (b) number (2) shall be in the form of revoking the Leader of the Higher Education Institution’s Decree including either: === [PDF page 296] === 296 a. restoring the Reported Party's good name; or b. enforcing administrative sanctions for the Reported Party. (5) The decision on the Investigation review made by the director general in charge of higher education affairs as referred to in paragraph (1) is final. (6) The technical guidelines for an Investigation review are approved by the director general in charge of higher education affairs. CHAPTER VII RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND WITNESS Article 53 (1) Victims of Sexual Violence in a Higher Education Institution have the rights to: a. be guaranteed the confidentiality of her/his identity; b. request support, protection, and/or recovery from the Higher Education Institution through the Task Force; and c. request information from the Task Force on the progress of her/his Sexual Violence report. (2) Witnesses of Sexual Violence in a Higher Education Institution have the rights to: a. be guaranteed the confidentiality of her/his identity; b. request support, protection, and/or recovery. CHAPTER VIII MONITORING AND EVALUATION === [PDF page 297] === 297 Article 54 (1) Leaders of Higher Education are obliged to exercise the monitoring and evaluation of the Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress conducted by the Task Force. (2) A report of monitoring and evaluation results as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the Minister through the Ministry’s working unit that implements the functions and duties of character-building at least 1 (one) time every 6 (six) months or at any time if needed. (3) The report on the results of monitoring and evaluation as referred to in paragraph (2) contains: a. Sexual Violence Prevention activities; b. results of the survey conducted by the Task Force; c. data on Sexual Violence reports; d. Sexual Violence Redress activities; and e. activities to prevent recurrence of Sexual Violence. Article 55 (1) In the event that a Higher Education Institution Leader is not exercising the obligations as referred to in Article 54, she/he is subject to administrative sanctions in the form of: a. a written warning for the Higher Education Institution Leader; or b. dismissal from office as Higher Education Institution Leader. (2) Enforcing the administrative sanctions as referred to in paragraph (1) is conducted in accordance with the governing laws and regulations. === [PDF page 298] === 298 Article 56 The Minister may at any time monitor and evaluate Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education in the event of a Sexual Violence report that: a. is severe; b. causes the Victim's condition to become critical; c. involves Victims in a different country or cross jurisdictions; and/or d. involves perpetrators who are tasked with and authorized to implement Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in the Higher Education Institution. CHAPTER IX CONCLUDING PROVISIONS Article 57 As this Ministerial Regulation enters into force: a. The Existing Task Force in charge of Sexual Violence Prevention and Redress in Higher Education Institution must comply with the provisions set forth by this Ministerial Regulation within 1 (one) year; and b. Higher Education Institutions that do not yet have a Task Force must form a Task Force based on the provisions set forth by this Ministerial Regulation within 1 (one) year of the promulgation of this Ministerial Regulation. === [PDF page 299] === 299 Article 58 This Ministerial Regulation shall enter into force upon promulgation. For assuring all persons’ knowledge, a promulgation of this Ministerial Regulation in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia is mandated. Established in Jakarta on August 31, 2021 MINISTER OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, Signed by NADIEM ANWAR MAKARIM Promulgated in Jakarta on September 3, 2021 DIRECTOR GENERAL LEGISLATION MINISTRY OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, Signed by BENNY RIYANTO STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA YEAR 2021 NUMBER 1000 === [PDF page 300] === 300 This copy corresponds to the original document. Chief of Legal Bureau Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology Signed by Dian Wahyuni NIP 196210221988032001 === [PDF page 301] === ProQuest Number: 30488086 INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest. Distributed by ProQuest LLC ( 2023 ). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted. This work may be used in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license or other rights statement, as indicated in the copyright statement or in the metadata associated with this work. Unless otherwise specified in the copyright statement or the metadata, all rights are reserved by the copyright holder. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code and other applicable copyright laws. Microform Edition where available © ProQuest LLC. No reproduction or digitization of the Microform Edition is authorized without permission of ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 USA