The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI): A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali (PhD Harvard, 1992)

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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === O rd e r N u m b e r 9307607 The destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (a comparative analysis of East Java and Bali) Sudjatmiko, Iwan Gardono, Ph.D. Harvard University, 1992 C o p y rig h t © 1992 b y S u d ja tm ik o, Iw a n G a rd o n o. A ll rig h ts reserv ed. UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, M I 48106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 5] === HARVARD U N IVERS ITY T H E GRADUATE SCHOOL O F ARTS AND SCIENCES T H E S IS A C C E P T A N C E C E R T IF IC A T E (T o be placed in Original Copy ) The undersigned, appointed by the Division Department o f Sociology Committee have examined a thesis entitled The Destruction Communist Party Comparative th e Indonesian (PKI) Analysis E a s t J av a and B a l i ) presented by I w a n G. S u d j a t m i k o candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and hereby certify that it is worthy of acceptance. S ig n a tu r e Typed nam e Andrew Walder S ig n a t u r e 1 yped nam e dja jBk^pcpol S ig n a tu r e Typed va?h/ John Campbell Date July 30, 1992 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 7] === The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali) A thesis presented Iwan 6. Sudjatmiko The Department of Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Sociology Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts July, 1992 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === For my mother: Garsemi Sujatmiko and my father: Sujatmiko @1992 by Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko All rights reserved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === ABSTRACT The destruction of the Indonesian communist Party (PKI) following the coup of 1965 has never been systematically analyzed. Existing analyses emphasize the social context, but do not explain the causes of the event. Moreover, while some accounts provide a snapshot they lack both theoretical and comparative perspective. Explaining both the destruction the PKI and the processes set in motion prior to, and following the coup of 1965, is the primary objective of this dissertation. The conclusion is reached that the destruction of the PKI was the result of the revolutionary strategy it initiated in 1963. The PKI's attempt to seize power is analyzed within a model of mobilization incorporating mass radicalization, coalition with public figures, and infiltration of the military. A comparison of East Java and Bali shows how the PKI implemented its strategy. In addition, an inquiry into the effects of regional communization is augmented by focussing attention on a number of villages in East Java and Bali. During the implementation of the PKI's programs, these areas experienced conflict over land, politics, and religion. It is found that in Bali, the PKI benefitted by having a pro-PKI governor, close relations with the army from Java, the assistance former members and voters the dominant socialist party (PSI) banned in 1960, and the support of pro- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 10] === PKI veterans. While in East Java, the PKI only attracted the abangan (nominal Muslims), particularly its lower strata, who had no ties to either the NU or the PNI. regard the violence, find that the widely accepted analyses owing to their own emphasis on psychological and cultural factors are unsatisfactory. My finding suggests that the violence was shaped by the decisiveness of public figures, the availability of army units, and the size of the PKI in each area. Following the coup, the violence took several forms: military operations, joint actions between the military and political parties, and the actions of political parties themselves. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 11] === TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures vii List of Tables viii Acknowledgements CHAPTER I Explaining the PKI's Destruction Introduction Existing Explanations of theDestruction of the CPI The PKI in A ComparativePerspective 18 The Analytical Model 25 Comparing East Java and Bali 36 The Organization of the Thesis 39 Notes on Research Method 41 CHAPTER II Mobilization and Coalition 48 Islam and Communism 48 Hinduism and Communism 65 Mobilization in EastJava 75 Mobilization in Bali 91 CHAPTER III State and Public Figures inthe Mobilization 105 1. The Army and PKI from 1945 to 1965 105 2. The Implications of The Regional and International Context 112 3. The Army in East Java 120 4. The Army in Bali 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 12] === 5. Public Figures in East Java and Bali 127 CHAPTER IV PKI's Revolutionary Actions and Rural Conflicts 139 1. Land Reform and Political Mobilization 140 2. Rural Conflict in Historical and Theoretical Perspective 151 3. Land Conflict in Rural Areas 160 4. Political Conflict 169 5. Religious Insult 174 CHAPTER V 179 Patterns of Violence 1. Existing Explanations of theViolence 179 2. The Coup and Its Implications 190 3. The Violence in East Java 198 4. The Violence in Bali 213 CHAPTER VI Conclusion 232 Appendix A. The Army's Civic Mission inEast Java 239 Appendix B. Land Conflict in East 241 Appendix C. Land Conflict in Bali Appendix D. Religious Conflict in Java 245 EastJava Bibliography Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248 251 === [PDF page 13] === Figures The Likelihood of a Successful Revolution 27 The Challenger and Army Disloyalty in A Revolution 29 Public Figure, Challenger and Army in Revolution 31 Map of Indonesia 46 Map of East Java 47 Map of Bali 47 II. 1. The Rank of the NU and the Presence of Pesantren 78 II.2. The PNI's Votes in East Java 82 III.1.The PKI's Likelihood of Success in East Java and Bali 137 The Pattern of Countermobilization and Violence 187 Army Units in western East Java 207 Pro-Coup Military Units in Bali 216 Map Appendix A. The Location of the Army's Civic Mission 240 Map Appendix B. The Location of Land Conflict in East Java prior to 1965 244 Map Appendix C. The Location of Land Conflict in Bali prior to 1965 247 Map Appendix C. The Location of Religious Conflict in East Java prior to 1965 vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250 === [PDF page 14] === Tables 11.1. Village Land for Village Officials 81 11.2. The 1955 Election in Kediri 83 11.3. The 1955 Election in Magetan 87 11.4. The 1955 Election in Jember 90 11.5. The 1955 Election in Bali 95 III.1.Public Figure, Social Challenger, and the Army in East Java and Bali 136 viii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 15] === ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Research is commonly the result of a collective effort extending over a significant period of time. This dissertation is no different. Three people in particular deserve my special thanks. Professor Andrew Walder, my dissertation advisor, guided me in focussing my theoretical perspective and in refining my analytical model. Professor Theda Skocpol stressed the importance of state, international factors, and comparative perspective in explaining local events. Professor John Campbell assisted in attempting to reconcile seemingly contradictory perspectives. Their advise and their own works have directly and indirectly shaped the content and style of this dissertation. Special thanks also go to my informants in East Java and Bali for providing information regarding the object of my study and giving considerable insight concerning the local communities of East Java and Bali. Without them, this dissertation would have been mere speculation. Their contributions go far beyond my own efforts; the general audience will enjoy a better understanding of the history of rural Indonesia during the period under examination. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === I would like also to thank various institutions, colleagues and friends in East Java, Bali and Jakarta who made it possible for me to conduct this study. Their assistance, inspiration and criticism are part of this work. Several people also deserve special thanks: Prof. Dr. Kabul Santoso, Drs. K. Sudhana Astika, Maksum, A. Zainnudin, and the family of Bu Ridwan. I am also very thankful to those whose works are quoted in my dissertation: learning from them has been a truly rewarding experience, transcending the academic rituals. An earlier version of my dissertation proposal and draft received a great deal of constructive criticism from Dr. Donald Warwick and Professor John Hall for which I am very grateful. I would like also to thank Professor Orlando Patterson, the Chair of Committee of Higher Degree, and Beverly Douhan, the Department graduate advisor, for their attention and assistance. During my field work, Drs. Adi Pamadi Wibowo assisted me to whom I am very thankful. Finally, my thanks go to my family: my brother Garibaldi (and the family: Ima, Gariyanti, Gemala, and Grahani), my sisters Grasiani (and the family: Legowo, Glen and Garini), Gayatri, and Garina. My greatest thanks go to my mother, Garsemi Sujatmiko, and my father, Sujatmiko, to whom this dissertation is respectfully dedicated. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === CHAPTER EXPLAINING THE PKI'S DESTRUCTION During the brief period between 1965 and 1966 the Indonesian people experienced violence on an unprecedented scale, particularly in its rural communities. By comparison, previous rural unrest and violence (interkingdoms rivalries, rivalries over succession, messianic movements, colonial intrusion, tax revolts, independence movements, and Islamic rebellion) had been far less traumatic. The violence 1965-1966 was a unique phenomenon in Indonesian history: will elucidate its social origins and process. This is a study of the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party ("Partai Komunis Indonesia" or PKI). This study attempts to provide a perspective based on the role of public figures, the structure of the military, and the balance of power between the PKI and its opponents. We shall explore the PKI's strategy in its effort to gain power, the reaction of those who opposed the PKI, and the violence following the 1965 coup. A comparative analysis of East Java and Bali will provide the empirical basis for understanding the events. We shall see how the PKI faced greater difficulties in contending with Islamic East Java than with Hindu Bali. We shall also examine why it was that the PKI in Bali— but not East Java— was able to create a coalition with public figures. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === 1.1. INTRODUCTION The PKI was founded in 1920 and it rebelled against the Dutch in 1926 and against the Indonesian republic in 1948. After 1951 it became a legal party, gaining strength within a liberal democracy. With 16.4% of the vote it ranked fourth in the general elections 1955. the 1957 regional elections, PKI ranked first with 27.4% of vote.1 The national political situation at this time can be described in terms of a triangle consisting of Sukarno, the PKI and the army. Sukarno and the PKI needed one another to face the army. Prior to 1963, the PKI had no fully developed revolutionary program; its strategy resembled the one adopted in the Soviet Union (CPSU), consisting of revisionism and united front. However, beginning in 1963 the PKI moved toward adopting a strategy more akin to China's (CCP) and launched various revolutionary activities including forced implementa tion of the land reform program. In rural East Java, the PKI came into conflict with the landowners and managers of state-owned estates. It also began attacks on the bureaucracy as well as competing political parties such as the N.U. and the P.N.I. in East Java and the Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964) 222-229. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === P.N.I. in Bali.2 In both rural East Java and Bali, this attempt at land invasion in addition to political attacks and religious insults resulted clashes with casualties. Finally, in 1965 the PKI demanded the arming of peasants and workers as a fifth force (column). In addition, there was an effort to create and place political commissars within the armed forces. The balance of power was significantly altered when the PKI became involved in the coup of 1965. Following the coup, S o e kamo remained passive; in contrast to his previous defense of the PKI in July I960.3 He failed to protect the PKI and was unable to neutralize the army. This situation was conducive to the destruction of the PKI. The role of the armed forces (especially the army) and the various organizations that opposed the PKI varied from region to region. Between PKI members, October 1965 and symphatizers, and March 1966, the suspected number of symphatizers that 2 For a discussion of the role of Islam see Jacob Walkin, "The Moslem-Communist Confrontation in East Java, 1964-1965," Orb is 13 1969: 828-830. Regarding Bali, see Kenneth Young, "Local and National influences in the violence of 1965," The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali Ed. Robert Cribb (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia no. 1) (Clayton, Monash University, 1990) 90-91. 3 For the crack down in 1951 and I960, see Justus M. Van Der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History. Program and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965) 49, 234-236. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === were killed numbered approximately 450,000 the victims were among Central 150,000),5 East Java's people.* Java's 20.6 Most of million (over 22 million (100,000-200,000)° and Bali's two million (30,000-200,000).7 Four politburo members were summarily executed, two following trial in 1967. One politburo member survived, having been in Beijing at the time, while another was sentenced to life imprisonment.8 Moreover 374 PKI leaders and 224 armed forces members and non-PKI In 39 articles and studies compiled by Cribb, the range of victims appears to fall anywhere from 78,000 to 2,000,000. I calculate the mean as 430,590. This seems close to the official statement of the Commander of Kopkamtib (The Command for the Restoration of Security and Order/The national command to deal with the PKI) who stated that the number of victims was about 450,000-500,000. See Cribb, ed. The Indonesian Killing 12. The victims among non-PKI forces (Muslims and nationalists) were below 500. 5 Jean Cotenay, "Heritage of Blood," Far Eastern Economic Review. 14 Dec. 1967: 509. Jean Cotenay, "Another Bloodbath?" Far Eastern Economic Review 23 Nov. 1967: 357. 7 The army command in Bali estimated that the number of victims was 30,000, see Dinas Sejarah Komando Daerah Militer XVI Udayana [Disjarah Kodam XVI], Komando Daerah Militer XVI/Udavana dalam Lintasan Seiarah (Denpasar: Dinas Sejarah Komando Daerah Militer XVI Udayana, 1980) 196. The number of victims in Bali came to 50,000 according to Sudisman, one of the three members of the PKI politburo tried by the government, see Deirdre Griswold, Indonesia: The Second Greatest Crime of the Century (New York: World View Publishers, 1975) vii; 100,000 in "One Million Dead?" The Economist. 20 Aug. 1966: 727-728; 150,000 mentioned by Lucien Rey, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama," New Left Review March-April 1966: 35; 200,000 reported by the Guardian of Britain April 7, quoted in Grieswold 9. 8 This sentence was commuted to 20 years and the accused (Rewang) was released in August 1991, see Editor. 10 Aug. 1991: 25-26. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === people involved in the coup were tried between 1966 and 1979. During those trials, 31 members of the armed forces and 43 PKI members were sentenced to death.9 In addition to those who were tried, there were roughly 1.8 million untried political prisoners; presently almost all have been released and are able to vote.10 1.2. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PKI There are several journalistic reports, historical descriptions and analyses that have attempted to explain the destruction of the PKI from different perspectives. analyses take into consideration number These factors, including: who the real actors were,11 the passivity of the PKI,12 the local origins of the conflict,13 and long term Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law. Propaganda and Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983) 153. After 1983, several more PKI members were executed. 10 The figure was stated by the Armed Forces Commander in Editor February 17, 1990: 29. 11 There are several theories regarding the real actor of the coup, see Harold Crouch, The Armv and Politics in Indonesia. Revised Edition, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) 101-125. 12 This issue is discussed in Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), especially chapter 11. "Why the Communist Failed?" 13 A study which (over)emphasizes the local causes (religion and land) is Margo L. Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java (Research Monograph No. (University of California Berkeley, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 1970). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === macro causes.14 Most analyses incorporate journalistic reports and theoretical interpretations; there is a paucity of empirical studies available. Even the existing empirical studies do not directly examine the unrest and violence of 1965. Most of the analyses place the event within the context of a discussion of other issues, such as the development of local politics,15 political and economic change in East Java highland,16 and the school system Central Java.17 The few empirical studies contribute a good deal to our understanding of the destruction of the PKI during the period from 1965 to 1966. Existing explanations of rural unrest and the destruction of the PKI fall under two categories: first, those emphasizing macro social change and, second, those focusing PKI strategy. The first utilize models based on a social science perspective. From this perspective, rural unrest and the de struction of the PKI appear as consequences of changes in the 14 For example, see Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience (Chicago: Rand Me Nally & Co., 1971). Reuven Kahane, The Problem of Political Legitimacy in An Antagonistic Society; The Indonesian Case (London/Bever ly Hills: Sage Publication Inc., 1373). 15 John Bowen, Sumatran Politics and Poetics: Gavo History. 1900-1989 (New haven: Yale University Press, 1991), particularly chapter 6. 26 Robert W. Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), particularly chapter 7. 17 Kenneth Orr, "Schooling and Village Politics in Central Java in the time of turbulence," The Indonesian ed. Cribb, 177-194. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 23] === social system: modernization, the dysfunction of the political system, uncontrolled primordial tensions, the impact of state building, as well as national identity and the changing of rural society. These analyses place the PKI's revolutionary strategy in the background of events prior to 1965. Such analyses may explain the intensity of the conflict, but not the origin of the conflict itself. The second type of explanation is represented by several historical interpretations of the PKI in Indonesian history. Each accurately identifies the PKI's revolutionary strategy from 1963. Each study accounting for the concentrates this strategy rural unrest beginning in 1963. Most of these studies also underscore the significance of the PKI's cooperation with Sukarno, a charismatic public figure whose political power systematically was place decisive. the But phenomenon these studies not comparative theoretical perspective. Doing so will make the destruction of the PKI understandable in the taxonomy of political conflict and violence. In what follows, I review five analyses that represent the first perspective. Kahane, I will begin with Reuven Kahane. using Eisenstadt's Modernization theory, concludes that the conflict of 1965 was the result of a long process polarization which became transformed into focused political Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 24] === antagonism.18 He argues that the conflict occurred owing to Indonesia's being in a transitional stage and "in marginal situation of legitimacy in which the old principles are no longer enough, while new ones are still not valid."19 His analysis applies the "Breakdown theory" making use of concepts such as "the breakdown of political community," and "social disintegration." Kahane's analysis takes into account the inability of the Indonesian system to manage the tensions that resulted from the power struggle involving the army, the PKI, the PNI (Nationalists) and the NU (the Orthodox Muslim). However, he fails to systematically account for why it was only the PKI that was victimised, and whyit was that an alliance the by the army, PKI was forged against the PNI and the NU. considers the confrontation as a conflict among groups: From a political point of view, the forces were organized against each other and there were small violent struggles, and.protests in many places, especially from 1964 on. reality, the confrontation was the result polarization between the PKI and its opponents which found a basis in the PKI's revolutionary strategy beginning in 1963. 18 Kahane 31. His book is a volume in the Studies in Comparative Modernization Series, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and D. Weintraub. In the introduction of Kahane's book, Eisenstadt emphasizes the "transitional system" as a new path from traditional to modern society. 19 Kahane 37. 20 See Kahane 30. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 25] === The transitional stage merely provided the context in which the conflict occurred; the coup itself was a mere trigger for the violence that followed. Another analysis is Stephen Sloan's. Sloan applies David Easton's "systems theory" in explaining the macro causes of the events of 1965. According to Sloan, the conflict was a result of the inability of the Indonesian political system to synchronize its center (Jakarta) with its periphery (the rural areas): The Indonesian coup attempt and reaction represented a breakthrough in demands from the rural environs and, in so doing, bridged the classic gap between the politics of the capital and hamlet. Like Kahane, Sloan does not systematically explain why the PKI instigated the unrest nor why it became the sole victim of the violence. Moreover, in both urban and rural areas, the polarization was between the PKI and its opponents. Just as in the case of Kahane's dichotomy of a traditional and modern stage, Sloan's dichotomy between the capital and rural areas overlooks the significance of the polarization between the PKI and its opponents caused by the former's revolutionary strategy. Clifford having taken Geertz interprets place the result PKI's destruction certain primordial attachments retained by new states: attachment which caused tension and conflict during the nation-building process. He 21 Sloan 74. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === discusses the primordial tensions Indonesia and concentrates on region. He divides Indonesia into two parts: Java and outer Java.22 Though his analysis may explain the regional separatism Aceh, Central Sumatra Sulawesi during 1950s, it will not explain violence of 1965. the and North unrest and In regard to the violence following the coup, Geertz says: The "growing conviction of an impending political catastrophe" turned out to all too accurate.... There followed several months of extraordinary popular savagery— mainly in Java and Bali, but also sporadically Sumatra— directed against individuals considered followers Indonesian Communist Party, which was generally regarded to have been behind the coup... Several hundred thousand people were massacred,.. . mainly along the primordial lines— pious Muslims killing Indie syncretists.... In his analysis, Geertz appears to vary his focus from regionalism (Java and outer Java, his main focus on primordial analysis) political leadership prior the considerations coup)2* and (the finally duality religion 22 See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 255-310. 23 Geertz, The Interpretation 282. However, Geertz's discussion of Malaya, Burma, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Srilanka are excellent examples— and predictions— of primor dial conflicts. 2* Earlier Geertz, The Interpretation 281, simplified regional tensions, employing a duality where Sukarno is portrayed as Java and Hatta (the Vice President) as outer Java. Later (p. 282) Geertz continues this approach, contrasting Sukarno and General Nasution (the army chief and later of the armed forces). The latter, like Hatta, is portrayed as a representative of outer Java: "another colorless Sumatran" figuring in regional tensions. Actually the tension was between Sukarno (backed by the PKI, and the 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === (another primordial phenomenon, particularly between santri and abangan in the violence following the coup). The polarization between PKI and its opponents was not a primordial phenomenon resulting from either regionalism or religionism; it was political, a result of the PKI‘s own revolutionary strategy. During the period in which the PKI adopted a more united front strategy (1952-1963), it coexisted less peacefully with other political groups. Primordial factors merely served to intensify the situation. The unrest and polarization that emerged between 1963 and 1965 as well as the violence of 1965 were not inevitabilities brought about through the process of nation building. The upheaval of 1965 and political disorders prior to 1965 are described by Michael van Langenberg as the result of a contradiction between the "needs of state power and the search for national identity.1,25 Unrest and violence are viewed as a stage in the workings of state control following Indonesian independence 1945. Furthermore, Langenberg argues that Sukarno's National Front since 1960 as well as the PKI's theory of state power since 1964 was unable to quell the unrest. It is clear that his analysis fails to emphasize that the unrest and polarization resulted from the revolutionary strategy it initiated in 1963. The Sukarnoist in the Armed Forces) personified the army. and General PKI's own political Nasution who 25 Michael van Langenberg, "Gestapu and State Power," ed. Cribb, The Indonesian 55. 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === disorder caused by the state or identity building would not have led to political violence had such a strategy been absent. Another study, one offered by Margo Lyon, intends to be a comprehensive account of the conflict in rural Java. Lyon emphasizes the importance of three long term fundamental changes that took place in rural Java: For the conflict resulted primarily not from nationally directed political activity, but from the fundamental religious, cultural and political division existing within the framework of an al tered village social and economic scene. These violence, factors but shaped and they are intensified insufficient the unrest explanation and its origins. Political division was reflected in the results of the 1955 general election, but such divisions did not render inevitable the unrest that took place prior to 1965. It was the PKI's revolutionary strategy after 1963 that heightened tensions significantly. Furthermore, violence much like that described in Lyon's analysis (rural East Java) took place Central Java, although the religious division of orthodox and nominal Muslim was weaker. In Central Java, the confrontation was between nominal Muslims from the PKI and its rivals, particularly the nationalist PNI. The case of Bali suggests that religion was relatively unimportant: violence took place between Hindus in the PKI and those from the PNI. 26 Lyon, Bases 71. 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 29] === In summary, instability created by macro factors such as primordial tensions, development, identity building, prior to 1963, but with transitional the stages, and local political changes existed implementation of the PKI's revolutionary strategy beginning in 1963 these took on a new significance. The PKI's revolutionary strategy worsened tensions thereby intensifying the violence. The second perspective consists of analyses attempting to interpret the destruction of the PKI as the result of the PKI's own revolutionary strategy. This perspective does not utilize abstract theoretical models, it bases its conclusions on generalizations from empirical fact. Scholars specializing in the study of the PKI or Indonesian political history have long been aware of the importance of the PKI's revolutionary strategy. A comprehensive analysis of the destruction of the PKI was undertaken by Rex Mortimer. He notes the shift of the PKI's strategy: Gradually, after attempting for some time to adept a middle course between the two disputants, the PKI shifted away from the generalized endorsement of Soviet world analysis that had marked its policy in the fifties and toward a close identification with the interactional standpoint of the Communist Party of China. Regarding the unrest in rural areas, Mortimer identifies 27 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics. 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974) 330. 13 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === its cause in the PKI's new strategy which abandoned the united front strategy along Soviet lines: There can be little doubt that in deciding to stimulate unilateral peasant actions [land invasion] in support of the land reform provisions, the PKI leaders were consciously stepping outside the bounds of the united front strategy [with the nationalist and the Muslims] which they had been pursuing for many years. Mortimer argues that the PKI's revolutionary strategy could never have succeeded. He cites the existence of vertical loyalties between (nominal Muslims) This might factors santri (orthodox in Java as Muslims) and abangan preventing class struggle.29 be true as far as it goes, but there were other besides Islam such as the bureaucratic patronage of the PNI and the strong resistance of the army, particularly its officer corps.30 The shift from a Soviet style strategy to a Chinese one is also noted by Guy Pauker: The PKI, however, increasingly expresses agree ment with the Chinese and hostility toward the 28 Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform 1959-1965 (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 1) (Melbourne, Monash University, 1972) 29. 29 Rex Mortimer, "Traditional Modes and Communist Movements: Change and Protest in Indonesia," ed. John Wilson Lewis, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974) 123. 30 In addition to battle commands, the army had territorial commands as well as territorial officers and NCO's monitoring socio-political affairs at the regency and village levels. I discuss this in chapter III. 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === Pauker maintains that although the approach of the PKI was closer to that of the Chinese communists, it was not geared for open armed struggle. The PKI tried to grab power by acclamation and expected to rule. Revolutionary struggle or radicalization was considered a means to achieve this goal. It was also intended to create strong base for a future showdown with the army.32 Like Mortimer and Pauker, Justus Van der Kroef recognizes the change in the PKI's strategy. He says that: Meanwhile it is clear that the PKI is retaining its ideological affinity with the Chinese Communists. At the Central Committee's plenary session, from December 23 to 26, 1963 in Jakarta the party reaffirmed its opposition to 'revisionism.'33 Van der Kroef also points out that the PKI attacked the •Dange clique' of the Communist Party of India which was considered pro Soviet.34 The revolutionary strategy is also PKI's shift the discussed by Olle Tornquist: This meant that the PKI broke with the non-capitalist and peaceful coexistence approach of Guy Pauker, "Indonesia: The PKI's "Road to Power," ed. Robert A. Scalapino The Communist Revolution in Asia; Tactics. Goals, and Achievements (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965) 257. 32 Pauker, "Indonesia," 272. The prospect of the PKI's coming to power by acclamation was compared with the cases of Italy in 1922 and Germany in 1933. See Ewa T. Pauker "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?," Asian Survey. September, (1964): 1067. 33 Van der Kroef, The Communist 292. 34 Van der Kroef 288. 15 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 32] === Moscow, moving towards Peking's ideas uncompromising anti imperialism and self reliance. Tornquist maintains that the PKI's revolutionary strategy was a "front from below" while the 1965 coup was a "front from above" as had been the revolution in Cuba. The destruction of the PKI has also been analyzed by Sartono Kartodirdjo. He does not emphasize the shift in PKI strategy to the Chinese approach. However, on his account the PKI's radical programs since 1963 were at the bottom of agrarian unrest prior to 1965.36 The second perspective provides considerable evidence of the importance addition, some the PKI's revolutionary analyses also stress the strategy. alliance between Sukarno and the PKI as a factor prior to 1965. For example, Pauker states that: Detailed scrutiny of current policies of the Sukarno regime suggests that the PKI, despite its lack of formal executive prerogatives, has already considerable influence on the policies of the Sukarno government. An analysis by Arnold Brackman suggests that "Sukarno's tactical alliance with the Communist [PKI] was now replaced by Olle Tornquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism, The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia (London: Zed Books, 1984) 53. 36 Sartono Kartodirdjo, Modern Indonesia: Tradition and Transformation. A Bocio-Historical Perspective (Yogyakarta: sajah Mada University Press, 1984), Chapter II and III. 37 Pauker, "Indonesia," 283. 16 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 33] === strategic alliance." 38 Other analyses account Sukarno's alliance with the PKI. also take into 38 Two motives were behind Sukarno's alliance with the PKI; first, he wanted to balance the power of the army,*0 and second, his obsession with the concept of "Nasakom," that is, the unity of Nationalism, Religion (Islam), and Communism which he wrote in 1926.41 Even following the destruction of the PKI, Sukarno remained intent on creating a new nationalist communist party under the leadership of Semaun, who from 1926 to 1955 lived in Russia and had followed Moscow's line.*2 The explanations emphasizing Sukarno and the PKI's revolutionary strategy provide the groundwork for explaining the destruction of the PKI. In what follows I shall compare briefly the PKI with other communist parties in order to highlight certain similarities and differences.*3 38 39 Brackman, The Communist 32. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism 374-375; Walkin 847. *° Sukarno also balanced the army by strengthening the other services (navy, marines, air force and police). 1,1 For Nasakom, see Soekarno, Nationalism. Islam and Marxism, trans. Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon, and introd. Ruth T McVey (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970). *2 See Brackman, The Communist 165-66. 43 For the logic of similarities and differences, see Theda Skocpol, "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology" ed. Theda Skocpol, Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1S84) 374-386. 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === 1.3. THE PKI IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE The experience of the PKI will be more easily understood following a comparison with communist parties in India (Kerala and West Bengal), Finland, France, and Italy.44 In these countries, the communist party received sufficient electoral support: 8.3% (India), 20.6 % (Finland), 23.4 % (France) and 25.4% (Italy).45 These parties applied the united front strategy and enjoyed peaceful coexistence with other parties. There were no demands for the arming of peasants and workers for the placement political commissars the military.48 For India, see Ralph H. Retzlaff, "Revisionism and Dogmatism in the Communist Party of India," ed. Scalapino, "The Communist Revolution," 309-42. For Italy, see Donald L. M. Blackmer, Unitv in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), particularly chapter four. For Finland, see James H. Billington, "Finland," ed. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) 117-144. For France, see Francois Fejto, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967) 1-5, 158-173. 45 For the data on India (1969), see Victor M.Fic, Kerala: Yenan of India: Rise of Communist Power: 1937-1969 (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1970) 539. The data for Finland, France and Italy are for the 1944-1978 elections. See Frances Fox Piven, "The Decline of Labor Parties: An Overview, ed. Frances Fox Piven, Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 10-11. In the "Peaceful Transition to Communism" in India (Kerala) in 1957, the Communist Party after controlling the government through election introduced the policy of the "Neutralization of Police" and the creation of armed militia. This resulted in a reaction from its opponents and the central government (the Congress Party) that led to its downfall in July 1959, see Fic 77-116. 18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 35] === However, it is possible that the united front strategy could be followed by a power take over. The putsch, in Russia (1917), and the threat of putsch in Czechoslovakia (1948) and Laos (1975) led to successful communist takeovers. In China (Shanghai, 1927), however, the united front strategy failed. Similar results were experienced in Germany (1933), Indonesia (1948), and Singapore (1950s). During the period extending from 1952 1963, the revisionist and united front strategies were adopted by the PKI. During this period, the PKI became involved in conflict. But this amounted to little more than political competition. Moreover, it was cyclic and took place only during general elections. It is clear that beginning in 1963 the PKI diverged from the path prescribed by Moscow, a path that would lead to stagnation of communist parties in India, Finland, France and Italy/7 The revolutionary strategy of the PKI was closer to that of China, but it was intended primarily as a "revolution from above and below." At that time leaders within the PKI judged that they should conduct a "revolution from above" and took power "from above" the context Sukarno's Nasakom program/8 Moreover, it was useful to radicalize rural areas *7 In his visit to Indonesia in 1963, the Italian communist leader, Giuliano Pajetta, realized the big difference between the PKI and the Italian Communist Party. See Pauker, "Indonesia," 257. *8 Tornquist 229. 19 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === or "revolution from below" for any possible showdown with the army. The PKI leadership stated this strategy in a Central Committee report in December 1963: Our cadres are aware of the fact that all national democratic revolutions in Asia that have won victory and have been able to follow up victory by speedy socialist construction have been able to do this first and foremost because of the integration of the Marxist-Leninist parties and the peasants of the country in question. The Cuban revolution also won because of this.... In brief, the question of the peasants or the villages is the question of lifeor death for the revolution, and even the question of life or death for revolutionary cadres. It is important to note that the PKI's revolutionary slogan was familiar to Indonesians during the period 1963 to 1965.50 The word revolution wasnot taboo, and counterrevolution became a commonplace term. In 1959, Sukarno launched his imperialism revolution: and programs such National colonialism.31 The Revolution revolution asnationalization, opposing implemented land reform with compensation, cultural assertiveness and national personality. Sukarno considered the "Dutch, Dutchified group, and Dutch spies" to be enemies of his revolution 32 *9 Quoted in Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 33. 30 Sukarno was called President and the Great Leader of Revolution. And the generals killed in 1965 coup were called the "Heroes of Revolution." 31 Soekarno, Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man (h Collection of Five Speeches (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961) 157. 32 Soekarno, Toward 42. 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 37] === However, in 1965 he became receptive to the PKI's idea of a "fifth force,"53 and the placement of political commissars in the armed forces. It is unknown whether Sukarno attempted to wrestle these programs from the PKI, or to soften them, or even whether he agreed entirely with the PKI.5* Thus a united front based on Sukarno's revolutionary strategy would abandon the moribund revisionist approach but it would likewise avoid a more open armed struggle a Chinese strategy would have implied. The PKI's strategy was referred "peaceful version the Chinese Revolution." This strategy offered a better chance of success: it would provide solid basis for future armed struggle China. Moreover, this strategy would also lead to a "revolution from above" as it had in Cuba. It was said that Aidit, chairman of the PKI, had compared the path taken by the PKI to that of Castro's Cuba where the communist party had succeeded in delivering support for a non communist leader. Aidit was also attracted to the idea of a communist party that worked together with a leader who needed support like Houri Boumedienne of Algeria.55 53 China promised 100,000 rifles to arm the fifth force. A few thousand had been given by the air force to PKI's volunteers during the coup. 5* Previously Sukarno had softened the PKI's land reform program, especially those which demanded the redistribution of the land to those who tilled it. 55 Tornquist interviewed Aidit's colleagues and the latter found that Aidit discussed the case of Castro and Boumedienne, See Tornquist 235 (n. 21). 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === In this respect, the PKI's alliance with Sukarno opened new doors and increased the prospect of a successful PKI power grab. At that time, the PKI's strategy was considered a good one. Some scholars who had studied the PKI recognized that the chances of success were good and that Indonesia might become the 15th people's even said that [Indonesia] democracy.56 One "The Logic political history observer has demanded Communist."57 Theoretically, the that PKI could succeed because it was protected by Sukarno and controlled the "National Front" from national to regional levels.58 In January 1965, Sukarno stated that he did not care about the trend toward communism in Indonesia "as long as they not make trouble for the Indonesian state."59 It unknown whether Sukarno merely wanted to frighten the U.S. or whether he really meant to deliver all power to the PKI. It is also possible that he merely intended to increase the PKI's share of formal power to one third with the expectation of balancing the PNI and the NU. He had envisioned this in his concept 36 Pauker, 304. Nasakom which allowed for the coexistence Ewa Pauker, "Has the Sukarno," 1070. See also Guy "Indonesia," 285, and Van der Kroef, The Communist 57 T.B. Simatupang in Brackman, The Communist 137. 58 This was stated by General Sumitro, the former deputy commander of the armed forces, see Leila S. Chudori, "Jendral Soemitro: Lebih Suka Melihat ke Depan," Tempo. 6 Apr. 1991: 62. 59 Sukarno's interview with CBS's Face the Nation January 31, 1965 in Pauker, "Indonesia," 284. 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 39] === Nationalism (PNI), Religion (Islam) and Communism (PKI). The destruction of the PKI is one instance of a failed communist takeover.60 The PKI's path to power resembled that taken by communist parties in Cambodia and Cuba.61 In Cuba and Cambodia the takeovers succeeded while failing Indonesia. In Cambodia, prior to the 1970 coup, Sihanouk and the army repressed the Communist Party, but during the civil war (1970-1975) he worked together with the Party in order to counter the army that had toppled him in 1970. He rallied rural support for Pol Pot and soon after won the war.62 Later the Communist Party took him prisoner. the case Castro's Cuba, the communist party (Partindo Socialista Popular) was invited to share power after Castro's middle class revolution took control. Castro immediately controlled the new communist party and discharged 60 See Thomas T, Hammond, ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) 30-37. 61 Thomas Hammond, Anatomy 639-40. Hammond, The 62 Timothy Carney, "The Unexpected Victory," ed., Karl D. Jackson, Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 13. In addition, the bombing of Cambodia by the U.S. and South Vietnam's aggression contributed to people's hate of Lon Nol. see William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger. Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1979) 246-7. 23 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 40] === leaders of the old one.83 The coup of 1965 in Indonesia left several important choices open for Sukarno. He might invite the PKI to partake of real power along with the nationalists and Muslims. might even try to control and reorganize the Party as Castro had done in Cuba. There was another choice. During the coup when General Suharto threatened attack Halim airbase Jakarta, Sukarno, who was in the airbase, refused to join Aidit (the PKI chairman) in his flight to Central Java.8* If, during the coup, Sukarno had intended to oppose the army in Jakarta, he would have joined with the PKI in gathering popular support, as Sihanouk and Pol Pot had done. It was possible that the PKI would eventually monopolize power and imprison Sukarno, as Pol Pot had done to Sihanouk. The previous discussion shows that the communist path to power involved an alliance with a public figure, in addition the strategies the united front as well armed struggle. However, even when such alliance succeeded it did not necessarily follow that the public figure would go on to convert communism. The case Sihanouk shows that 63 Juan M. del Aguila, Cuba; Dilemmas of a Revolution (Revised and updated edition) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) 54-56, 70-74. This province was the base of the PKI, and four out of five army regimental commands supported the coup while controlling the province. Instead, Sukarno fled to Bogor, 40 miles from Jakarta, and attempted a political solution to the coup. 24 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 41] === following take over, the communist party could govern without the public figure. What is important is that a public figure may function as a main participant in a power struggle. In the following discussion, I will show in an analytical model how it was that the PKI in a joint venture with Sukarno worked enhance its prospects for seizing power. This alliance would assist the PKI in overcoming its non-majority vote (30-35 %) as well as opposition from a majority of the army. Only by examining the PKI's revolutionary strategy and its alliance with Sukarno can we fully understand how it was that the PKI enjoyed some chance of success. On the other hand, a continuation of a Moscow strategy would have led to stagnation, as it had in India, Finland, France, and Italy. 1.4. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL Within the following model, I will analyze how the PKI implemented its revolutionary strategy by creating an alliance with a well known public figure.65 It complements existing analytical models which emphasize the significance of the military and revolutionary coalitions explaining revolution's success or failure. Several models take the military into account 65 This model is a development of Hammond's notion of paths of communist takeovers. One of the paths is categorized as "A Non-Communist Leader Seizes Power and then Decided to Adopt Communism." See his article "A Summing Up," 639-640. 25 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === assessing the success or failure of revolutions. Russell found that the failure. army's 66 loyalty correlates with revolution's This implies that unlike wars between nations, in revolutions or civil wars, the losing army units are neither passive nor inclined to surrender but defect to a potential winner before final victory. This action intended demonstrate (new) loyalty in exchange for survival and perhaps even a share in the victory. Concentrating on the role of the military, Tilly argues that a successful revolution is unlikely unless the challenger has an army and can depend on armed irregulars as well as defecting government troops. He notes that not all three circumstances existed in Indonesia.67 Actually, the PKI was able defection create cells within number the army army units. and hoped The PKI for the also had organized volunteer units for the Malaysia campaign, but it failed to arm them as a fifth force.68 Another more general model considers the overall capacity 66 D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion. Revolution, and Armed Forces (New York: Academic, 1974) 77=89. Chorley makes a similar claim, see Katherine Chorley, Annies and the Art of Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973 [1943]) 243. 67 Charles Tilly,"Town and Country in Revolution," ed., John Wilson Lewis, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974) 294. 66 In the 1948 rebellion, the PKI had their own armed militia and 15 defecting army and marine battalions. See Ann Swift, The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948. Monograph Series no. 69 (Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1989) 77-78. 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 43] === the state explaining the success failure revolution in the Third World. Using a state-polity oriented model, Goodwin and Skocpol graphically illustrate the vulnerability of a state to revolution. On the basis of their state-centered model, they argue that a revolution is likely to succeed if the state has a low degree of bureaucratization, penetration, and inclusion, as the following illustrates: Revolution Least Likely Exclusionary Indusionary Revolution Most Likely Figure 1.1. The Likelihood of A Successful Revolution, Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," Politics and Society 4 (1989): 504. In addition to the role of the state and its military, the presence assessment. The revolutionary revolutionary challenger challenger requires coalition discussed by Tilly who emphasizes coalitions between members 27 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === of the polity and the contender for power.68 The importance of social coalitions as factors in successful revolutions is also discussed Goodwin and state-centered model, civil society context inclusionary nature of the of the Skocpol.70 discussed state. their the A more inclusionary state is one with greater participation for civil society. Their model suggests that an inclusionary state is more or less impervious to revolution. However, there also the possibility that inclusionary state might face a revolutionary challenge from coopted groups with revolutionary goals. revolutionary movement can accept a general election and participate in government while clinging to the idea of revolution. A general election can even create an opportunity for a revolutionary movement. The cases of the communist takeovers in the context of the united fronts illustrate how a pluralistic democracy or inclusionary state not necessarily immune revolutionary movement. Indeed, the inclusionary nature of a state may create a revolutionary threat from within. This situation arose in Indonesia in 1948 and 1965, a place where the inclusionary nature of the state increased the PKI's chances for successful revolutions. 69 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978) 213-16. 70 Goodwin and Skocpol 492-97. 28 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 45] === We have found that by combining state— whether it is exclusionary or inclusionary— and social challengers, we can derive a model for predicting the likelihood a revolution has for success. indicator For the revolutionary challenger, is the percentage of votes a reliable it may garner in a general election. A good indicator of state power is Russell's consideration loyalty within the military.71 The confluence of these indicators may be graphically illustrated as follows: 100 % ''revolution most likely percentage of challenger 100% percentage of army disloyalty revolution least likely Figure 1.2. The Challenger and Army Disloyalty in A Revolution The above figure suggests that a high percentage of challenger and army disloyalty will increase the likelihood of a successful revolution. This indicator might be an oversimplification but it is the most feasible one available in explaining a state facing a revolutionary situation. See Russell 74. 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === The factors probability pertaining successful army revolution disloyalty and combining revolutionary challengers is increased by the presence of public figures who support the revolutionary movement.72 A public figure can create defection or passivity within military units and social forces. In a populist system73 the role of public figures is decisive; it can significantly affect both state and society. Thus Sukarno's alliance with the PKI had a significant impact to the configuration of power in Indonesia. three-dimension model can constructed which incorporates a public figure, social challengers, and loyalty among the military to explain the prospect a revolution: There is also a possibility for a non-communist public figure working within revolutionary movement (e.g. Khomeini in Iran). 73 Like other post-colonial societies, Indonesia led by Sukarno took the populist route toward modernity. For Populism see Peter Worsley, The Third World (Second Edition) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), particularly chapter four. Earlier, developing countries had taken three routes: capitalist democracy, fascism, and communism. See Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant In the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === Most Likely 100% 100% Army Disloyalty Least Ukely Figure 1.3. Public Figure, Challenger and Army in Revolution The figure represents how it is that a public figure may increase the chances of a successful revolution.74 The more important the charismatic figure is the greater the chances of success. Unlike army disloyalty or social assessed by challengers who can the percentages, a public difficult to evaluate. figure is more If the public figure is an elected politician, matters are simpler. For example, a presidential candidate can garner 50% the vote presidential election. This shows the candidate's popularity among the In this model, I deal only with public figures supporting revolutionary movements. There also possibility that a public figure may counter a revolutionary movement. For example, Sukarno condemned the PKI rebellion in 1948 reducing its chances of success. 31 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === voters. (The popularity of a public figure is reflected in the vertical plane Figure 1.3.)75 There was specific indicator of people's loyalty to President Sukarno but his popularity was high. Basing our analysis on Figure 1.3, we find that the PKI prior to 1965, with an estimated 33% of the vote, did not have a majority.78 Contrary to popular belief, it is unlikely that the PKI would have won an election after I960.77 After 1960, the Masyumi (a Muslim reformist party) was banned and its backers most likely shifted to the NU (the orthodox Muslim party), rather than to the PKI or the nationalist PNI.78 In the election of 1955, the combined vote of NU and Masyumi was 43.2% while the PKI gained only 16.4 %. In the election of 1957 in Java and South Sumatra, the PKI received 30.9% while the combined votes of Masyumi (19.0%) and the NU (25.1%) came 75 A poll can become an indicator of figure loyalty in addition to election result. 76 The 33% PKI's vote was claimed by Aidit in May 1964, see Pauker, "Indonesia," 267. 77 For an optimistic prediction of the PKI's victory, see Pauker, "Has The Sukarno Regime" 1060. Aidit (the PKI Chairman) made a similar prediction, see Harian Rakyat June 27, 1964 quoted in Pauker "Has the Sukarno Regime" 1058 and Obor Revolusi May 29, 1965, SPS. If the election had been held before 1960, the PKI would most likely have won. However, a majority was not achieved and the creation of a coalition with other major parties (particularly Masyumi and NU) was impossible. Moreover, the formation of the cabinet was the President's privilege, not the winning party's. 78 I discovered the shift in Masyumi's vote and support for the NU in Magetan, a regency where the Masyumi was strong. See chapter 2. 32 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 49] === to 44.1%.79 The PKI's Infiltration of the military was a complex phenomenon. Aidit (the PKI Chairman) at one point claimed that 30% of the armed forces supported the PKI.80 General Nasution estimated that between 50% and 60% of the army territorial units had been infiltrated the PKI.81 was also mentioned that 40% of the military in Java supported the PKI.82 Actually, it would have been truer to say that those army units supported not only the PKI but Sukarno as well. They would fight for the PKI and Sukarno. But if they had to choose between the Sukarno. 83 PKI The and Sukarno, failed PKI the majority rebellion would 1948 support proved the 79 Outside of Java, Masyumi was strong. In the election of 1955, Masyumi got 49% of its vote in Java. On the other hand, the PKI, which was called a Javanese party, received 90% of the vote in Java, particularly in Central and East Java. See Alfian, Basil Pemilihan Umum 1955 Untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (D.P.R.) (Jakarta: Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional (LEKNAS), 1971) 17. For the election of 1957 see Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics. 1957-1959 (Monograph Series) (Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1966) 97. 80 See his claim in Pauker, "Indonesia," 273. A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panaailan Tuoas. Jilid 6: Masa Kebangkitan Orde Baru (Jakarta: C.V. Haji Masagung, 1988) 95. 82 "Indonesia: 1966: 22. Vengeance with a Smile," Time. 15 July 83 This convincing argument was made in a post-1965 evaluation by pro-Soviet PKI members "Information Bulletin," Prague, 1967, no. 18 quoted in Antonie C.A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Bantena: Indonesian communists between Moscow and Peking. 1959-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973) 240. 33 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === influence of Sukarno's charismatic personality. Sukarno outdid Muso when he requested that people, including rebellious army units, choose between Muso (the PKI General Secretary) himself.84 And during coup of the 1965, those and army units which had been infiltrated by the PKI gave no resistance when Sukarno refused to give his blessing to the coup. The change of power through revolutionary means such as the establishment of a "parallel army" will result in the most violent reaction. The level of violence also increased when (some sections of) workers and peasants were mobilized against the power holders. A less violent reaction is likely when a power holder is about to be voted out by challengers. It is not surprising that the demands of the PKI for a "fifth force," labor radicalization, and land seizure increased the violence. This violence originated not only with the army but also from other political parties with their labor unions and peasant organizations. The above situation resembles that of Chile, where we find a political situation— not social structure— comparable to Indonesia prior to 1965. In Chile, a president supported by communist and leftist organizations (the Unidad Popular or UP) attempted implement revolutionary changes and faced 84 Many soldiers of the FDR/PKI cried when they knew that Muso had rebelled against Sukarno, see Maksum et al., LubanaLubana Pembantaian: Petualanaan PKI di Madiun (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1990) 94, 177. 34 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === resistance from the armed forces as well as various social groups. One distinguishing fact in Indonesia was that the conflicting parties and armed forces supported Sukarno. A very different situation horizontal polarization industrialized and faced urbanized Allende.85 Unlike contradiction society), Chile's more developments Indonesia led to vertical polarization. The nationalist PNI and the Muslim NU had their own labor and peasant unions. In 1971 Sweezy said that the non Unidad Popular would accept a reformist (social democracy), but not revolutionary change. program of if the UP with its "Peaceful transition to socialism" pushed the revolutionary strategy, they would face difficulties: [The] Chilean bourgeoisie is prepared to let Allende make the decision for social democratic reformism: if he does, his decision will stand. But if he decides for Marxism-Leninism, i.e., for real socialism, then he will be abdicating his historic responsibility and it will be up to some one else to step in and make the decision for him. Given the situation in Chile today, this "some one" can only be the army. This prediction could have been applied to the PKI's strategy prior to 1965. The PKI would have survived had they continued with their united front reformist strategy (1952-1963). The PKI might have experienced a similar fate as 85 Allende was at first supported by the "Constitu tionalist faction" under the command of the army commander (General Schneider). After the killing of Schneider in 1970, the armed forces were unified in their opposition to Allende. 86 See Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: Advance or Retreat?" ed., Sweezy and Magdoff 91. 35 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === had the communist parties of India (Kerala), Finland, France, and Italy. Instead, it pressed ahead with its revolutionary strategy. It was thought that given Sukarno's support, mass radicalization and the sympathy within the armed forces they were reasonably secure position and had great opportunity to seize power. The gamble gave hope for success but ran the risk of catastrophe; and catastrophe it was.87 1.5. COMPARING EAST JAVA AND BALI The previous discussion describes the PKI's national strategy to grab power which consisted of mass radicalization, military infiltration and alliance with a public figure. To get a better picture, I will compare the implementation of the PKI's strategy in East Java and Bali. It is not difficult to draw certain comparisons between East Java and Bali, agrarian systems. experience of change, particularly with In addition to this, respect their they share in the fundamental social, political and economic as members of a common polity and economy. Yet, 87 In the failed united fronts (China, 1927; Germany, 1933; and Indonesia, 1948) the violence was more a purge dominated by the army. In the Indonesian case (1965), the PKI had confronted and came into conflict with other political parties. This led to massacres by the army and political parties. The role of the army and political parties in 1965 varied, I discuss this in Chapter V. 88 These are described in Geertz's comparative study of the emergence of entrepreneurs and economic "take off" in East Java and Bali, see Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes; 36 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === there are substantial differences: East Java is Muslim while Bali is Hindu; East Java is ten times the size of Bali and its population in 1965 was more than ten times that of Bali. Several earlier studies make clear the usefulness of comparing the two. Clifford Geertz, for example, compares the emergence of an entrepreneurial class and the consequential economic "take off."89 He also analyzes the social bases of party loyalty.90 this work, number significant issues are addressed. First, by systematically comparing East Java and Bali, we gain an understanding of how the PKI managed to mobilize the Balinese Hindus. Up to the present, the dominant analyses concentrate mainly on Muslim Java in the context of the PKI's "abangan" (syncretic/nominal Muslims) versus the East Our inquiry will reveal how Islamic organizations in Java into political Balinese transformed Hinduism, themselves however, never became the parties. basis political party. There are factors that explain this. Until Social Change and Economic Modernization University of Chicago Press, 1963) 7. (Chicago: The 89 Geertz, Peddlers. 90 Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Village," ed., G. William Skinner, Local. Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium. Cultural Report Series no. 8 (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1959) 34-41. 37 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === 1963, Balinese Hinduism lacked official recognition;81 the central government in Jakarta feared the creation of ethnic based political parties. 92 In addition, the nature of Hindu law, unlike that codified in the Islamic Syariah, provided for separation of religion and politics. Second, this study affords the opportunity understand why it was that the PKI was more successful with the military and civilian leaders in Bali than it was in East Java. Existing studies Indonesian communism typically discuss the PKI's hostile relations with the military at the national level. The case of Bali also provides us with the rare opportunity of examining how public figures contributed to communization. The governor of Bali, for example, was considered a supporter of the PKI, and played a significant role in the PKI's mobilization prior to 1965. On the other hand, in East Java such public figures opposed the PKI. Third, Bali is an interesting and unique case where the role of a modern and secular charismatic group (nationalist and republican veterans) in recruiting people for a political party is markedly evident. Bali contrasts with East Java in that charismatic groups were traditional and religious (Islamic ulama). Such comparisons show how a mobilization was 91 For the process of the official recognition of the Balinese Hindu see Geertz, The Interpretation 170-189 ("Internal Conversion in Contemporary Bali"). 92 G. William Skinner. "The Nature of Loyalties in Rural Indonesia," ed., Skinner, Local 9. 38 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 55] === conducted through a process of identification with reference groups. Elaborating upon these three points, contrasting East Java and Bali, will increase our understanding of the PKI's rural strategy prior to 1965 as well as the violence following the coup. 1.6. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS The Second chapter will deal with patterns of political mobilization. I will show why the Muslims of East Java were more resistant to communization than the Hindus of Bali. This was caused mainly by the nature of Islamic symbols and the establishment of Islamic institutions. (nominal Muslims) It was the abangan from the lower strata that were mainly attracted to the PKI. While in Bali, the PKI benefitted from former members and voters of the PSI (the Indonesian Socialist Party) banned in 1960. Chapter three examines the PKI's relations with regional public figures and military. In Bali, the PKI enjoyed the support of the governor who acted like Sukarno at the national level. Moreover, the PKI could maintain strong ties with the army because the army was from East Java and its commander was very supportive of Sukarno and the PKI. In East Java, the rank and file, who were abangan (nominal Muslims), were more receptive to the PKI, which was also abangan. But most of the army officers opposed the PKI. 39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 56] === In the fourth chapter, we shall explore the impact of the PKI's revolutionary respect, the strategy implementation upon rural land areas. reform this Bali was relatively more successful than it had been in East Java. The PKI benefitted from the presence of the floating mass of former PSI members after the party was banned 1960. Moreover, land ownership was highly unequal in Bali. In addition to land invasion, the PKI initiated political conflict, attacking the PNI, which controlled regional and village bureaucracies. There were also religious conflicts that took place mainly in East Java. This was owing mainly to the fact that the PKI was mostly abangan. By contrast, in Bali both the PKI and its opponents were devoutly Hindu and religious conflict was avoided. In chapter five I shall discuss the violence itself and conclude that supra local organizations were dominant, while local-communal ones merely acted to shape developments. I have found that the violence followed three patterns, and depended on the decisiveness of military leaders, the size of the PKI in each area, and the availability and reliability of army units. In the final chapter (Six) I summarize my findings. conclude that the destruction the PKI must seen primarily as the result of its own revolutionary strategy. Other factors, such as primordial tensions, local changes, the urban-rural dichotomy, political transition, and nation-state 40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 57] === building, were merely societal contexts intensifying the conflict preceding the coup, and the violence which followed. I show that a model incorporating public figures, army units, and the organizations can balance between the systematically PKI and non PKI explain the political mobilization prior to 1965. Regarding the violence, the model also shows that inadequate psychological explaining variation cultural factors are intensity the violence. 1.7. NOTES ON RESEARCH METHOD A study of an unusual event such as mass killing raises a number of issues. First, unlike ordinary events, such as those that follow upon a pattern of socialization, work, or commonplace political activity, political violence has many variations. Two neighboring villages or sub-districts are very likely to exemplify similar patterns of socialization. But in the cases political violence difficult to come interval separating additional time Second, uncertainties with the generalizations become a lengthening in the event accompany and fading its analysis, recollections; especially of events considered unusual or traumatic. Third, the propensity to dramatize ordinary events is compelling; dramatizing extraordinary events is virtually inevitable. Fourth, the study of political violence involves with winners and losers. My study is based on interviews with those on the 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 58] === winning side. However, most interviews dealt with events rather than opinions concerning the PKI and its sympathizers. There have been many accounts of the destruction of the PKI. They have provided many perspectives, and most are useful those with fundamental interest weakness the these events. studies However, one concerns the generalizations they draw. Most provide a limited number of examples in support of their claims. They fail to caution readers on the limited generalizability of their accounts. A reader might easily conclude that a report accurately represents an area, a regency, a province or even the entire country. Thus, report concerning the participation children in the killings, the burning of houses, or the extent of the killing may often be accepted without question. At that time there were roughly 579 villages in Bali and 8,254 in East 93 Java. Thus a generalization based on several cases shall hardly suffice. A study of events such as these can hardly overcome all methodological difficulties, but with effort improved reliability will be achieved. By studying a number of diverse areas, we obtain a broader and more varied picture of both ordinary political mobilization and the extraordinary instance of wide-scale political killing. 93 This data is based on the 1961 census, see Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk. 1961— Seluruh Indonesia (Anaka2 Sementara Hasil Penqolahan 1% sample (Jakarta, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1963) 10. 42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 59] === In order to achieve a better picture, I have chosen three regencies in East Java and Bali, respectively, as theoretical samples. In East Java, I chose a "red" regency: one in which the PKI was strong (Magetan). In (Kediri), and a "green" area addition, a mixed area (Jember) were selected. This division is based on a recognition of the PKI's position in the general elections of 1955. Using a ratio of population and pesantren (Islamic boarding school), I observe that East Java can also be reasonably divided into these three areas. These three areas also represent three types of military situation. In Magetan, the army had the capacity to control the situation while in Kediri, the army remained passive. In Jember, the absence of the army did not lead to uncontrolled killings. In the case of Bali, I chose three regencies depending on whether the PKI's influence was strong (Buleleng), medium (Klungkung), and weak (Tabanan). Klungkung was considered the most traditional area while Buleleng was regarded as the most modern, being in the northern island where many non Balinese lived and had experienced a strong Dutch influence since the early part of the century= In addition, the three regencies also fit within another important category with respect to military power. Being closer to Denpasar (capital of Bali), Tabanan had a strong military presence. Klungkung, however, had a mid-level military presence while Buleleng had a weak military, in relation to its size. In order that we may acquire a more vivid picture of the 43 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 60] === rural unrest prior to 1965 and the killing that took place between 1965 and 1966, I examine newspaper accounts emanating from East Java and Bali. Fortunately, important news from 1961 to 1967 from East Java is contained in the Surabaya Press Summary publication English) consulate in Surabaya (capital of East Java).9* the The SPS is a summary of political and economic news drawn from Djawa Pos, Harian Umum, Hung Pai Pao, Indonesia Daily News, Surabaya Post, Perdamaian, Pewarta Surabaya, Trompet Masyarakat, Djawa Timur, and Suara Rakyat. In Bali, Suara Indonesia is the sole newspaper studied. The selection of informants was purposive and was guided their apparent knowledge events. Some friends and colleagues at local universities as well as acquaintances also became primary sources. These people in turn introduced other informants in the selected areas. They became key informants who knew well the events that led up to and followed the coup. Some of the informants also knew well the events in neighboring villages: this proved useful in drawing relevant comparisons. In the interviews, I attempted to gather information regarding the situation prior to and during the PKI's land invasion as well as the killing. For example, I was determined to find out how many people became PKI's followers within the 9* The SPS in the form of microfilm is available in the Ollin Library at Cornell University. 44 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === villages, as well as who they were and why they had joined the PKI. I asked whether there had been conflict (land, politics and religion) in the villages. I also asked how many had been killed, and by whom, and about the process and pattern of the violence in general. Most informants proved quite willing. In order to acquire the best data, opinions and feelings toward the PKI were not discussed. However, some informants offered their opinions, such their admiration the dynamics and preserverance of the PKI cadres. But they hated the PKI's tactic deceiving landless and uneducated peasants. Most of them took pity on fringe members of the PKI. Some of them disliked the extremism some participants and deplored the killing of fringe members. List of Informants East Java Kediri Magetan Jember Informant no. Bali Buleleng Klungkung Tabanan Denpasar 10, 11 12, 13 14, 15, 16 17, 18, 19, 20 In the following table, I present the data of population and area in the regencies studied: 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 62] === East Java Bali 96 Regency Area (sg. km) Population Magetan Kediri Jember 672.70 963.21 2,948.87 557,081 1,080,695 1,706,271 Buleleng Tabanan Klungkung 1,320.80 863.06 315.00 321,832 272,569 127,814 Republic of Indonesia SULUStA £ SOUTH CHINA SULAWESI S t A PACIFIC OCtAM fflfcn ifaBJUAYA 2 JAVA StA MADURA fL O A lS S tA Figure 1.4. Map of Indonesia. Reproduced from Leslie Understending Indonesia(Brookfield. Vt: Gower, 1975) xii. Palmier, 95 For East Java, 1 use 1971 data, see Kantor Sensus & Statistik Propinsi Djawa Timur, Jawa Timur dalam Anoka 1971 (Surabaya: Kantor Sensus & Statistik Propinsi Djawa Timur, 1972) 2. 86 For population statistics, see Sensus Penduduk 1961. Penduduk Desa Bali dan Nusa Tenoaara. Seri Laporan No. 24 (Pusat Penelitian dan Studi Kependudukan Universitas Gajah Mada Yogyakarta & Biro Pusat Statistik, 1980) 25. For the area, see Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Propinsi Bali (Pemda Bali), Monoarafi Daerah Bali (Denpasar: Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Propinsi Bali, 1986) 5. 46 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 63] === 100 km Magetan Kediri Jeaber Figure 1.5. Map of East Java Buleleng 50 km Tabanan. Klungkung Figure 1.6. Map of Bali 47 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === CHAPTER II MOBILIZATION AND COALITION In this chapter I will examine why the PKI was unable to gain a majority of the vote or even form a coalition with other major organizations in rural East Java and Bali. The PKI attempted to improve its support over the 20-30 % of the vote it received in the 1957 regional (Java) election. It could attract followers from people who had no social affiliations to other groups such as the abangan (nominal Muslims) in East Java and former members of the banned PSI Socialist Party) Bali. But, (the Indonesian in general, the PKI was hampered by the Muslim NU with its pesantren in East Java and the nationalist PNI with its bureaucratic patronage in Bali and East Java. To explain these failures, we must begin by discussing the role of Islam and Hinduism. It is imperative that we understand why and how Islam in East Java hampered the PKI while Hinduism in Bali created no significant barriers. what immediately follows, I will show why and how Islam responded to communism and the PKI. II.1. ISLAM AND COMMUNISM The following organizations, and comparison between Islamic doctrines and those the PKI will increase 48 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. our === [PDF page 65] === understanding of relations between them. It is a commonly held view that Muslims rarely accept communism; and that Islamic countries have never gone communist or experienced significant trends toward communism.1 The case of Indonesia, particularly East Java, affords us an opportunity to show the limitations of this view. Although Muslims who practice their rituals or santri have resisted communist expansionism,2 nominal Muslims or abangan in East and Central Java became a dominant force within the PKI.3 Thus in areas where Islam was weak and the Muslims were less than devout communism prevailed. That the abangan were receptive to the PKI was shown in the results of the 1955 general election in East Java. There the abangan had no clear cultural delineation: they professed a syncretic belief in In South Yemen, Albania, Afghanistan and some republics ir. the former Soviet Union, communism was imposed by force, but Islam survived and even began to reassert itself. 2 Ritualist Muslims consisted of the orthodox ("kolot") and the modernists ("modern"); their differences and quarrels fall within the bounds of Islamic doctrine. On my analysis, both are categorized as ritualistic because there were no significant difference between them. See also Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press,1960) 148-150. For a criticism of Geertz's analysis, see H.W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary," Maialah Ilmu-llmu Sastra Indonesia V (1973): 85-115. 3 In reality, the division between abangan and santri is not clear cut. Some abangan practice rituals. The differences between Protestantism and Catholicism can supply an analogy in coming to understand the differences between abangan and santri. 49 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === Hinduism, animism, spiritism and Islam.4 In general, they accepted Islamic beliefs, especially belief in God, but most did not practice rituals, except during birth, circumcision, marriage and death; nor did they implement Syariah or Islamic law. The santri themselves never considered abangan as real insiders or good Muslims. However, abangan, unlike Christians or Hindus, were not considered real outsiders. The abangan were considered by the santri as "more a liability than an asset to the position of Islam in Indonesia."5 The Islamic and Communis Doctrine In the doctrines, following discussion, especially those I will compare Islamic contained in the Qur'an, and Communist ideology. The Qur'an is considered a sacred book written in Arabic and even now Muslim orthodoxy prohibits its translation into other languages.6 It consists of roughly 400450 pages divided into 114 "surat" chapters.7 These chapters discuss marriage, family, trade, property, behavior, crime and punishment. 4 For a comparative analysis of santri and abangan, see Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Singapore; Oxford University Press, 1985) 316-445. 5 Deliar Noer, The Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Monograph Series no. 58) (Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, 1978) 2. See H.A.R. Gibbs, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947) 3. 7 See The Koran, trans. with notes N.J. Dawood (London: Penguin Books, 1990). 50 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === In Islam, there is no separation between religion and politics. The Qur'an should cover religious and non-religious spheres as well. Since it is considered the word of God, the legal force the Qur'an absolute. therefore universal and unchangeable. The Qur'an is regarded as self justifying. summary, contained in the Qur'an, Islamic doctrine, especially is more "totalistic"8 or as some might even be inclined to say more "totalitarian"8 than the sacred books of other existing religions. While the Qur'an was readily available to the Muslims, non members (voters) of the PKI seldom had access to the works on communism. The force of communist doctrine, including the thoughts of later PKI leaders, and its programs, applied and accepted the abangan was limited certain concepts regarding aspects of social life such as egalitarianism. The deeper internal commitment was limited to and understood only by leaders, activists, and certain party members. Even among communist leaders, only true ideologues had a strong commitment. A living commitment to communism was a rare phenomenon. Other leaders such as activists and careerists were primarily attracted by organizational and leadership 8 According to Geertz the notion of being totalistic also applied to the santri's acceptance of the Qur'an. He says that all santris are "totalistic" compared to the nominal Moslems (abangan and priyayi), see Geertz, The Religion 152. 8 Gibbs says that Islam and other religions such as Judaism and Christianity are potentially and in principle totalitarian. Gibbs 85. In reality, Islamic doctrine is more totalitarian. 51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === opportunities primarily for personal advancement.10 The PKI's fringe members and symphatizers were not true believers. Their commitment to the PKI was owing to its programs or a PKI public figure or solidarity with other family members fellow villagers. By contrast, ritualistic Muslims, or santri, even though they were not members Islamic parties, resembled communist ideologues in being internally committed to doctrine. The socialization of communist doctrine was limited to party members. Moreover, the values of communist doctrine were not easily transferred to children at home.11 On the other hand, the socialization of Islamic doctrine was perpetuated in homes, mosques, and by the teaching of religious subjects in the public schools. Pupils, from the abangan and the santri, in grades four, five and six received two hours of Islamic instruction every week. The parents of PKI oriented abangan did not withdraw their children from these classes though instruction was voluntary. This would have been considered impolite. Subjects covered "how to pray, the characteristics 10 For ideologue, activist and carrerist, see Robert A. Scalapino, "Communism in Asia: Toward a Comparative Analysis," The Communist ed. Scalapino, 6-9. 11 In one abangan village, Jay found that there was socialization of communist teachings such as the History of Chinese Communist Revolution, see Robert Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (Cultural Report Series no. 12) (New Haven: Yale University, Program in Southeast Asian Studies, 1963) 94-95. But this was limited to teen-aged active members of Pemuda Rakyat (PKI's youth organization), and was not extended to children of PKI members. 52 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === of God; who the Prophet was, the correct marriage and death procedures; and simple ethics."12 The above facts will provide background for our understanding of the more familiar responses of Christian and Confucian societies to communization. Islamization differs from Christianization; the latter is usually thought to be attained when a majority simply professes faith in biblical sources or belief in its moral pronouncements. Moreover, the Bible or Analects, unlike the Qur'an, is accepted as the source of social ethics as well as a world view, not as a detailed civil code that must be implemented. Missionary work Islam not just a matter of converting people and building mosques; it is a process of implementing Islamic laws taken from the Qur'an. Islamic Ritual and Communist Ceremony Besides doctrine, both private and collective rituals of the santri are many and more complex than those the abangan: the Islamic supporters of the PKI. The practice of private Islamic rituals resulted in a strong attachment to God. The intensity of the doctrine was reinforced primarily through private and collective ritual. As stated in the Quran, each adolescent Muslim is obliged to pray five times a day: morning, noon, afternoon, sunset and evening. 12 For the religious subjects Geertz, The Religion 197-198. in public Each prayer school, 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. see === [PDF page 70] === takes about five to ten minutes and consists of two rakaat (set consisting of stand, bow, and sit) for the morning, and four, four, three, four rakaat, respectively, successive prayers.13 During all prayers, for the one must mention God's name (Allah and other names) 200-300 times. This self programming includes other everyday behaviors such as offering the greeting "Assalamulaikum" bless the you), mentioning ("Bismilahhirohmannirahim"), ("Alhamdulilah") and name giving (God/Allah thanks Allah God before and after eating as well as other occasions. Given the above routine, and rigid private rituals, it was unlikely that practicing Muslims would be attracted to the PKI any other ideology. Private rituals where individuals mention God 200-300 times each day are like a continuous program relating individuals with God. The situation was different among nominal Muslims (abangan) who did not routinely practice private or collective prayers. Moreover, the abangan disliked the strictness and ritualism foreign. Even, the santri, considering them too Arabic the clothes of the santri and the abangan differed. A typical santri man wore a sarong and black fez while an abangan wore trousers without a cap. Women santri wore scarves while the abangan women wore none. Usually the abangan would cluster together as did the 13 See Jacgues Jomier, How To Understand Islam (New York: Crossroad, 1S39) 54-58. 54 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === santri.14 This rendered them susceptible to forces opposing the santri. The contrast in life between abangan and santri resulted considered closed causal the abangan chain. The more santri imperfect Muslims who the more abangan there were who withdrew from the santri. The abangan did not send their children to pesantren (Islamic boardingschool) or "madrasah" (Islamic school) nor did they socialize with santri or commit themselves to Islamic values. In short, the santri considered the abangan as flawed Muslims in need of indoctrination, i.e., in need of practicing private prayers, reading the Qur'an, attending mosques, giving alms (zakat), and taking a pilgrimage to Mecca. But the abangan considered themselves Muslim as long as they professed belief God and the prophet. their cards they identified Islam as their religion. Collective Ritual and Ceremony Collective rituals, whether religious or not, reaffirmed a sense of group solidarity and identity. They served to recreate the group boundaries separating "us" and "them." For the santri, there were several other collective religious rituals. The most important being the weekly Friday prayer in 14 This has been stated by Jay in the results of his research in the Kediri area. For Jay's description, see Jay 90. This is supported by my own field research. But in strong Islamic areas (Jember regency) the abangan was scattered, while in strong abangan area (Magetan) the santri were limited to the pesantren surrounded by abangan villages. 55 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 72] === the mosque which every man was obliged to attend. It took about 20-30 minutes and was usually followed by a sermon. Other yearly collective rituals included: Idul Adha (Sacrifice Day, commemorating Abraham's sacrifice), Miradj (the day on which Mohammed ascended to heaven to address God), Maulud (the Prophet1s birth-and-death day). Moreover, every evening during the month of fasting, the santri would actually perform rituals or obligatory nightly prayers in the mosque. In addition to collective religious rituals, Muslims together with other groups, especially the PNI and PKI, would perform secular ceremonies. These reaffirmed their religious solidarity as the clusters were formed around political organizations. Secular celebrations included anniversaries of independence day, Heroes day, or Women's Movements Day.16 In addition to secular ceremonies, the abangan PKI had rituals called "slametan," which, however, were not necessarily a weekly routine. Geertz identified a number of occasions for practicing such rituals including "birth, marriage, sorcery, death, house moving, bad dreams, harvest, name-changing, opening a factory, illness, supplication of the village guardian spirit, political circumcision, meeting."17 However, many and starting off a santri also performed 15 See Geertz, The Religion 375. 10 Geertz, The Religion 375. 17 Geertz, The Religion 11. 56 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === this slametan, thus redoubling their efforts towards solidarity: prayer to God rather than to spirits or ancestors usually marked the occasion. The Organization of Islam and the PKI Islamic organizations were more varied and numerous compared to those of the PKI. The former included the "House of Qur'an" or pesantren with their kiayi.18 The latter did not own a net work of the "House of Marxism/Communism." The Muslims also had wide spread madrasa (Islamic schools) while the PKI's effort to establish schools was limited.19 The nucleus ("Nahdatul Ulama" Muslims East Java the or Scholar/Ulama organization), and the nucleus of the N.U. is the kiyai (ulama). The NU was founded in 1926 as a social organization; it flourished especially in areas where Islam was strong. As an established organization that survived the Dutch and Japanese occupation, the NU could easily transform itself political party after the independence. Though the PKI was formed in 1920, it experienced several obstacles. It was suppressed under the Dutch because of its 18 Kiyai (ulama) has a greater power base compared to the Chinese literati regarded as guardians of Confucian ideas. The latter was similar to the Qadhi or the Islamic religious officials who worked in palace/state. 19 For the PKI's school, see Ruth Me Vey, Modernity: The PKI as an Educational Institution," 50 (1990): 5-27. "Teaching Indonesia 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === rebellion in 1926, and the Japanese only incorporated the nationalist and Muslims during its occupation in 1942-1945. Moreover, the PKI had to work hard to rebuild its own party following setbacks caused by the 1948 rebellion and the "razzia" (mass arrest) of 1951. Organizationally, the NU possessed a wide trading network that contributed its development. Another important advantage was its power within the Ministry of Religion which had offices bureaucracy. 20 villages; the PKI remained outside the The NU with the help of its members in the bureaucracy played an important role in Islamic education and within the religious courts. In addition, the NU controlled the office of religious administration at the sub-district level. It connected rural areas with the regency. On the other hand, the PKI did not have a "province" within the bureaucracy though some of its members were sympathetic to them. Islamization in Indonesian History The above considerations should help counter the misleading impression that the PKI in Indonesian and Java, from 1950 on, was busy trying to communize passive Muslims. More realistically we ought to see communization by the PKI as being collided with an earlier but nevertheless active force of Islamization: one which had begun in the 14th century. In what follows 20 hope explore the ongoing process Geertz, The Religion 200. 58 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === Islamization. There are a number of interpretations associated with Islamization. One study divides the process into three stages, consisting of religious conversion (14th to 18th century), the differentiation of committed and less committed believers (the 19th century), and finally, the purification of Muslims (the 20th century).21 Other studies see contemporary Islamization (after 1945) as a process closely linked to the development of Islamic parties,22 Islamic social institutions (pesantren and religious schools)23 and rituals ("dakwah" religious sermon and collective rituals).2* All studies seem to agree that Islamization in Indonesia general continuing process, though there disagreement as to its persistence. Some analysts consider the intensification of Islamization.25 Some suggest that Isiami- 21 Ricklefs 101-126. 22 See Jay 104-105. 23 Clifford Geertz, "Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case," Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, ed. Robert N. Bellah (New York: the Free Press, 1965) 95. 2A Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java," The Journal Of Asian Studies. 46 3 (1987): 554-551. 25 Advocates of this perspective include Hefner and Ricklefs. Ricklefs is correct regarding long range trends within Islam; Hefner's analysis, especially of the strong influence of the dakwah (sermon), in East Java is also correct, see also Editor June 24, 1989: 54. 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === zation in Indonesia remains incomplete. 26 Other studies argue that Islamization is on the decline.27 In my analysis, I will define Islamization as having three consequences: first, regarding professions, second, the practice rituals and the development Islamic organizations and parties, and third, the implementation of Syariah. The first consequence includes conversion, following acceptance of the first pillar of Islam Gr the admission that one believes in Allah as the God and Mohammad as the prophet. In general, the majority of the abangan can be included in this category. The second consequence includes rituals: prayers five times daily, one month of fasting each year, the giving of alms, a pilgrimage to Mecca and other religious activities, particularly willingness parties. The "dakwah" join third sermon. Islamic also organizations consequence the involves political implementation Syariah as the constitution, either partially or totally. The three consequences Islamization result in a 26 See the comments of Soedjatmoko in Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Soekarno (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1971) 54. See also M.C. Ricklefs, "Six Centuries of Islami zation in Java," Conversion to Islam, ed. Nehemia Levtzion, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc, 1979) 100-128. 27 For this kind of argument see Clifford Geertz, "Religious Change and Social Order in Soeharto's Indonesia" Asia 27 (1972): 71. See also Margo L. Lyon, "The Hindu revival in Java: Politics and Religious Identity," Indonesia: The Making of a Culture, ed. James J. Fox (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, 1980) 205-220. 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === complex type of Muslim. One may, for example, practice only a few of the rituals such as fasting or giving alms. Some may perform all the rituals but advocate a secular state without the implementation of Syariah.28 Moreover, not all who join Islamic organizations implementation of Syariah. parties advocate the full But those who accept the third consequence, particularly the full implementation of Syariah, tend practice all rituals while joining Islamic organizations and parties. The first and second consequences Islamization involved no significant resistance from either nominal Muslims (abangan) or non Muslims. However, the third consequence or the implementation of Syariah resulted in conflict. This took the form of a parliamentary struggle. The debate over the Syariah the became quite intense during early years Indonesian independence. It polarized Muslims who wanted to implement Syariah and other groups (nominal Muslims), modernist Protestants. It was including the Muslims, and abangan Catholics initiated by a committee 62 and that gathered in Jakarta in 1945 in preparation for Indonesian independence. The committee produced preamble the constitution known as The "Jakarta Chapter": 28 This is exemplified by Mohammad Hatta, the former Vice President of Indonesia (1945-1956) and General Nasution, the former armed forces commander and minister of defence, see C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985) 79. 61 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === The constitution of the Indonesian state which is to exist in the form of the Republic of Indonesia, and to be based upon the sovereignty of the people, is founded on the following principles: Belief in God, Hwith the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law [Syariah]," the principle of righteous and moral humanitarianism; unity of Indonesia, and democracy led by the mutual deliberations of a representative body which2ewill lead to social justice for the entire people. However, Muslims and its rejection by some members of committee, non Muslims alike, forced omission from the constitution of the phrase "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic Law [shari'a]."30 In 1950, the parliament introduced a new constitution and the union Islamic parties (the orthodox and the modernist Masyumi) failed to achieve a majority. They received only about 48% the vote becausethe other (especially the nationalist PNI and the PKI) parties rejected the Syariah. Finally with a return to the constitution of 1945 in the Guided democracy (1959), Muslims failed once again to mandate the implementation of Syariah.31 Syariah, addition the parliamentary struggle over Indonesia also experienced armed the struggles after several groups attempted to forge an Islamic state in West 29 Anthony H. Johns, "Indonesia. Islam and Cultural Pluralism," Islam in Asia. Religion. Politics, and Society, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) 210. 30 After independence, Indonesia applied civil law inherited from the Dutch as well as some traditional law or "adat." 31 Noer 2. 62 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === Java (1948-1962), South Kalimantan (1950-1959), South Sulawesi (1951-1965), Central Java (1953-1962).32 These conflicts (1951-1954), and Aceh suggest the third that consequence of Islamization faced opposition. In other words, Islamization the implementation Syariah was less successful compared to the first and second consequences. The third consequence Islamization was not sacralization, that is, a process whereby an ecclesiastical organization expands its influence.33 It is, perhaps, proper describe this third consequence more "deprofanation."34 It is carried out "from below" not only by ulama or religious groups but by the Islamic community at large. Islamization at this stage is intended to widen the "scope" of the Syariah to include all areas of life, including education and the economy. In addition, there is the effort to 32 For a brief summary of the rebellion, see Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and T.A.M. Simatupang, "The Indonesian Experience in Facing Non-Armed and Armed Movements: Lessons from the Past and Glimpses of the Future," Durable Stability in Southeast Asia, ed. Kususma Snitwongse and Sukhumband Paribatra (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987) 109-111. 33 Presently in Iran, the "hierocracy" (religious bureaucracy) is dominant. Although it may face secularization, it does not necessarily imply a decrease in the influence of the symbols (Syariah). The Syariah can still be imposed by the bureaucracy, non-ulama organizations and the community itself. 34 Daniel Bell divides religious change at the level of social organization (sacred and secular) and of culture (holy and profane), see Daniel Bell, The Winding Passage: Essavs and Journeys 1960-1980 (Cambridge, Abt Books, 1980) 324-354. In the preface (p. xvii), Bell uses profane as the opposite of holy, but in the chapter (p. 332) he uses the sacred— not the holy— as the opposite of the profane. 63 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === strengthen the "force" of the Syariah through social sanctions 35 or laws. Finally, its implementation by means of law is carried out "from above" Islamic parties that owing to their electoral victories, have the power to implement the Syariah (part of ) the state constitution.36 A Muslim political activist, who was not a kiyai (ulama), envisioned the process as follows: If we want "slamet" [well-being, secure] life, we must go by the Islamic Ideology, which is based on the Koran and Hadith [the Prophet's sayings]... . We must struggle in three arenas: in the home, in society, and in politics. Politics concerns how we will be able to grasp the State. This must be done not by revolt but by election. Then if the State is in the hands of the Moslems, the fight for the slamet life can be carried on through the State Police, the Civil Service, the National Radio, the National Newspapers... and obviously this will be much faster than merely struggling in the home. The changes one person can make in twenty years of effort in the home can be made in one year through politics. It is clear that the third consequence of Islamization (the implementation of Syariah) is an expansion of the "holy." The second consequence of Islamization has progressed, but it has not been a sufficient condition for the third consequence of Islamization. There are those who practice rituals (the For the definition of scope and force in religion, see Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968) 111-113. 36 The implementation of the Syariah is presently taking place in Sudan and the Kelantan state in Malaysia. 37 Gaertz, The Religion 368. 64 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === second consequence) who advocate secular state. Moreover, those who reject the implementation of the Syariah abangan, non-Muslims, the armed forces and (Muslim civilian bureaucracy) may become more resistant to those who try to implement the Syariah. In short, the third consequence of Islamization leads to an unknown future. The history of Islamization reveals that Islam was a real, active century. and The expansive nature force its beginning doctrines, the 14th rituals and the solidarity of its organizations enabled it to hold its own against Communism and other ideas. II.2. HINDUISM AND COMMUNISM In respect to doctrines having to do with rituals and organization, there are a number of significant differences between Islam and Balinese Hinduism. Moreover, the history of Balinese-Hinduization in Bali goes back further, beginning in the 9th century and without significant interruption following Dutch colonization. In the following I will discuss the nature Balinese Hinduism and the implications had for communization. The Doctrine of Hindu and Communization Unlike Islam, Balinese Hinduism has many sources; these 65 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === include Veda, ancestor worship, and deitism.38 There was no holy book like the Qur'an considered to be the source of all principles of social life as well as individual morality. There were books limited to priests as manuals for rituals and religious practices but unlike the Qur'an these were inaccessible to ordinary people. The most important book in the Balinese community ("awig-awig banjar") was the village constitution introduced in the 11th century by Mpu Kuturan.30 Each of Bali's 1304 traditional villages'0 has its own constitution consisting of 10 to 20 pages and usually includes the following: 1) the name and area of the traditional village; 2) the aims and principles; 3) rules for village order or social behavior 4) rules for the implementation of religion; 5) rules for personal behavior; 6) violations and sanctions or punishments; 7) rules for the change of constitution; 8) end. The village constitution emphasizes the purity of the temple, attendance at monthly meetings, and participation in 38 For a description of the Balinese complex and unique religious doctrine see Pemda Bali 26-33. 39 Pemda Ball 20. *° The data is as of 1986 but the number in the 1960s was not significantly different, see Pemerintahan Desa Jilid 1. Laporan Penelitian Daerah Istimewa Aceh. Sumatra Utara. Sumatra Barat. Kalimantan Barat. Bali (Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Departemen Dalam Negeri Kerjasama Dengan Yayasan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, 1988) 231. 41 See Pemda Bali 67. 66 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 83] === village rituals, especially cremation, and communal labor. Unlike the prayers, Qur'an or civil it does law. not cover In short, obligatory 42 personal unlike the Qur'an which demands the creation of an Islamic community beyond the local community, the village constitution is a set of local rules, preserving village order and solidarity. In addition to the village constitution, there are rules for the allocation and distribution of water as well as rules governing other matters relevant the maintenance and cultivation of the ricefields. Regarding these matters, the constitution provides for: 1) a just system of water distribution; 2) preservation and maintenance of ponds and drainage systems; 3) collective pest control; 4) religious rituals that pertain to agriculture.*3 In short, the Balinese are accustomed to rules; in fact, these rules in concert with the system of collective control have resulted in a strong sense of fraternity and equality among the local people. However, the scope Balinese Hinduism in general and the constitution in particular is partial and fragmented. In addition, the village constitution may be revised by a meeting ("sangkepan" or "paruman") of the members of banjar ("krama"). This contrasts with the Qur'an 42 For an example of the constitution see Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz, Kinship in Bali (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975) 182-196. 43 Subak was mentioned in inscription as early as 1071, see Pemda Bali 69. 67 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 84] === which is all encompassing and pervades all facets of Islamic life— politics (the difference between "people of the books" and infidels), economics (e.g. usury and gambling) and the social life (e.g. dress code). The collision of communism and Hinduism in the villages of Bali was not as much a conflict of doctrines as it proved to be in East Java. Moreover, the PKI did not emphasize the abstract principles of Marxism-Leninism. In Bali, the issue of atheism was not a factor. Unlike, the Javanese abangan who some felt had insulted Islam, the Balinese PKI, in general, had neither an ostensible reason nor the ability to challenge existing Hindu doctrine. Personal and Collective Ritual Unlike Muslims, most Balinese Hindus have no fixed, obligatory daily personal prayers, though priests preside over two daily obligatory prayers. Moreover, weekly religious rituals are absent, and obligatory temple rituals, once in 210 days, do not demand the presence all family members; usually a family is represented by the mother. A description of Balinese religion shows an emphasis on collective rituals: In very general terms, Balinese religion can be characterized as "public," "social," and "civic." Worship is, by and large, collective and external, a matter of visible dramatic actions. Private silent prayer, inward contemplation, and personal religious speculation are unusual, though they of course occur.*4 ** Geertz and Geertz 10. 68 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 85] === Another description reveals absence routine personal and collective rituals among the Balinese: The Balinese have no daily holy mass to attend and no weekly service, but their temples once in 210 days celebrate their anniversary. Those temples are the places of worship for a local group, for members of a trade, for relatives of the same caste, but neyer for the god Siwa or the god Wisnu, as in India. The above collective rituals, including the yearly (210 days) temple ceremony (odalan) and the monthly banjar meeting were conducted by the PKI and its opponents. In Bali, most PKI members and symphatizers abandoned neither the rituals nor the collective works. death.*6 This fact These rituals took place owes lot the from birth to nature local organizations which were both inclusionary and compulsory: failure to attend incurred fines and excommunication. In Bali, religious rituals dissolved divisions separating the PKI and its opponents.47 In East Java, by contrast, Islamic rituals were practiced five times daily, and were performed mainly by See C. Hooykaas, Religion in Bali (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973) 2, Hooykaas1 quotation included that of Jane Belo, Bali: Temple Festival. Monograph of the American Ethnological Society, XXII, New York 1953. 46 There are many rituals of passage (from six to 14) but not all were practiced. Everything depends on the region, caste, and class. For the ritual passages see J.L. Swellengrebel, Introduction.11 Bali: Studies in Life. Thought, and Ritual (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1960) 54-67. See also Katharane E. Mershon, Seven Plus Seven. Mysterious Life-Rituals in Bali (New York: Vantage Press, 1971). 47 After the PKI's unilateral action (1964), the situation became tense. People still attended pura (temples) but their place were clustered according to their party orientation. I will discuss this in chapter IV. 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === the santri. These rituals reaffirmed group boundaries between the abangan PKI and the santri NU. Individually, Balinese's most important religious obligation as a Hindu is to conduct the religious ritual of cremation for hit. or her parents and to maintain the ancestral altars in the home ("sanggah" or "pemerajan").*8 All Balinese properly conduct these rituals being afraid that if they are neglected they will have karma or will themselves be neglected by their children. Improper cremation, or ancestor worship, will result suffering, the lacking souls the deceased wandering food and spiritual contact with their descendants, with no prospect for a better reincarnation or moksa. Much is based on the continuity of collective rituals. In the northern areas (Buleleng), the power religion considered to be weak. Many rituals intended to be performed monthly are, instead, performed only annually. In part, this is owing to the presence of outsiders (Dutch, Chinese, and Javanese). On the other hand, the impulse is very strong in Klungkung, a small but most highly regarded kingdom since it is considered to be the point of origin for Balinese kingdoms. But the difference between the two areas is only a matter of degree of attachment: "strong Balinese Hindu" versus "weak Balinese Hindu." situation differs division The santri and abangan who from that express of the themselves *8 Pemda Bali 64. 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 87] === differently in both social life and politics. Hinduization in Bali The development of a temple system in Bali bore witness to several important events affecting Balinese Hinduism/9 The first was the establishment of village community with its three temples ("Kahyangan Tiga") by Mpu Kuturan, a Buddhist sage from Kediri, East Java.30 The three temples are based on "Trimurti" yielded a "pura puseh" (temple of origin), a "pura bale agung" (village hall), and "pura dalem" (near cemetery). These three communal temples symbolized Brahma (The Originator), Wisnu (The Preserver) and Syiwa (The Destroyer). In addition to this innovation, Mpu Kuturan introduced the village constitution or awig-awig (literally "something unbreakable") to ensure social order and preserve solidarity. The creation banjar with its constitution, which was 49 In regard to the development of Balinese Hinduism, one analysis suggests a connection to India, see D.B. Miller, "Hinduism in Perspective: Bali and India Compared," Review of Indonesia and Malaysian Affairs 18, Winter (1984): 36-63. Covarrubias suggests that Balinese Hinduism was introduced by Majapahit, a kingdom in East Java during the 14th century, see Miguel Covarrubias, Island of Bali (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972) 25. 30 In 1001, Mpu Kuturan was invited by the King of Bali (Udayana) to reconcile conflicts among the followers of the Buddhist Mahayana, Ciwa Java, and Bali Aga sects ("original Balinese"), see the inscription of Pura Samuan Tiga, Bedulu/Gianyar in Ktut Soebandi, Seiarah Pembancrunan Purapura di Bali (Denpasar: C.V. Kayumas, 1983) 66-72. Presently, there are several communities of Bali Aga (in Tenganan, Trunyan, Sembiran) that still reject the reformation. The Bali Aga came from Aga, a village in Mt. Raung, Jember, East Java in the 8th century, see Soebandi 63-66. 71 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 88] === enforced through fines and expulsion, resulted in a solid village. Yet another contribution of Mpu Kuturan was the creation of household temples ("sanggah" or "pemerajaan") in each house house family ancestors.51 This worship, a non-Hindu ritual, incorporated ancestor into the Balinese revision of Hinduism. This event bespeaks the importance of the house or family among Balinese Hindu. Moreover, the presence communal temples and organizations reduced the power of the caste system. Events shifted the locus of religion to local organizations though there were also non-local temples such as the Mother temples in Besakih and other important regional temples ("Sad Kahyangan") which conducted only annual rituals. Another important event altering the Balinese religion was initiated by Danghyang Nirartha, a Brahman priest who came from Majapahit, East Java in 1489.52 He introduced religion into all matters and God (Ida Sang Hyang Widi) was worshipped different functions. Various temples were established according to people's professions and need. For example, there was a temple in every market for the God of market (Pura Melanting),53 Moreover, introduced rituals and offerings remembrance of God in nearly all activities in every sector of 51 Pemda Bali 20. 52 Pemda Bali 21-22. 53 Pemda Bali 21. 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === life. Thus, a dancer, a carver or a peasant always asks the blessing of God and gives offerings before performing his or her tasks. The performance of collective offerings and of rituals demanding collective participation were overseen by priests and local organizations. In short, the introduction of rituals and offerings into every secular activity resulted in ritualistic year. society performing rituals throughout the 54 In contrast to Islamization in East Java, Hinduization in Bali reached completion? there was no polarization resembling that between "complete11 Muslims (santri) and "incomplete" or nominal ones (abangan) as in East Java. The completion of Hinduization in Bali was a two-step phenomenon: the creation of village temples and constitutions, and the performance of rituals and offerings. Hinduization in Bali was more a forced matter than was Islamization. All regions of Bali seemed to have completed the process. There was no other requirement such as the implementation of "Balinese/Hindu civil law", as there had been in the case of Islamic law (Syariah). Moreover, during the Dutch colonization, Hinduization in Bali went more smoothly than did Islamization in East Java. The conquest of the Dutch early in the 20th century spared the small and poor land of Bali from the colonial exploitation (sugar, tea, and tobacco) that had occurred in Java. Moreover, the strong resistance of the Balinese to Christianity led to 54 The word Bali itself means offering, see Pemda Bali 3. 73 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 90] === the Dutch policy of "Cultural conservation." The previous Hinduism collective and discussion Islam action. had The for role clarifies the political mobilization implications organizations and and public figures remains important, but the nature of symbols in Islam and Hinduism retains marked significance coming understand social change in the region. The course taken by Islamization shows that given the purest form of Islam, secularization or the separation of religion and state (and other social institutions) becomes an alien notion. A purely Islamic community applies religious law (Syariah) to all civil affairs.55 (There is no division between God's and Caesar's realms.) All this has enormous implications for how political legitimacy is assessed within Islam, particularly by those who advocate the implementation of the Syariah. legitimate government is one which applies Syariah, whether in toto or not. This runs counter the conventional wisdom that increased secularization follows modernization as well as the notion legitimate government government by consent through general elections.56 Hinduism, contrast, along with Christianity and Buddhism, does not advocate the application of their books as 55 See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991) 191-204. 56 See also Beetham 162. 74 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === constitutions. Bali, the religious reformation by Mpu Kuturan and Danghyang Nirartha affected the force and scope of Balinese Hinduism. Mpu Kuturan introduced village constitution ("awig-awig banjar") that enforced the grip community within the village,- but it did not impinge upon the supralocal polity. He provided no alternative to the notion of legitimacy. In addition, Danghyang Nirartha widened the scope of religion to include all aspects of social life, but this took the form of religious rituals, rather than civil law, as it had in the case of Islam. Thus, an Islamic party or organization receives support from Islamic leaders and the community because it is a means to apply the Syariah as well as to achieve other political and economic objectives. This contrasts with the case of the Balinese who being Hindu did not see the importance of a supralocal organization implement Balinese/Hindu civil laws. In the Islam, following section I will along with other factors, discuss the role of toward the PKI's mobilization. II.3. MOBILIZATION IN EAST JAVA There are two competing theories regarding political mobilization in East Java. The first has been suggested by Clifford Geertz who emphasizes 'aliran' (vertical groupings). Opposing this view, Ernts Utrecht considers the patronage 75 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 92] === system developed by the landowners, traders, bureaucrats, and public figures the principal determinant loyalty. In the following discursion, Geertz's and Utrecht's theses are of political I hope to show that complementary and not contradictory in content. Geertz provides two definitions of "aliran": the first is in terms of world view while the second is concerned with social movements containing certain core organizations. As a world view, aliran consists of abangan (the animistic aspect of Javanism), priyayi (a Hinduistic component), and santri (an Islamic aspect).57 aliran as two: Later Geertz first, the santri reclassifies these three (practicing Muslims) and second, the abangan and priyayi (nominal Muslims).58 Aliran as a social movement was manifested within four political parties: the Nationalist PNI, the Communist PKI, the Reformist Muslim Masyumi, and the Orthodox Muslim NU.58 Thus one's aliran (world view) determines one's choice of aliran (social movement/political party). If one was abangan, one was very likely to choose the nationalist PNI or the PKI. On the other hand, a santri was likely to choose an Islamic party, whether that of the reformist Masyumi or the orthodox 57 Geertz, The Religion 6. 58 Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965) 107. 59 Geertz, The Social 127. 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 93] === 60 Geertz calls the recruitment pattern in East Java "constitutive”: [R]ather than personal ideological commitments being derivative from position in local social structure, position local structure derivative, at least in increasing degree, from ideological commitment. Agreeing with Geertz, Taintor mobilization of rural people. tries explain the He describes the effect of colonization as breaking the ties that had existed between peasants and gentry. Employing a theory of "mass society," he shows that orthodox Muslims (santri) retained vertical ties and communal support. Despite their landlessness, they were not recruited by the PKI. 62 For him, the abangan (nominal Muslims) were more available and willing to become PKI members and symphatizers. He states: Those areas of Java marked by an institutional formlessness and lacking solid social group ties [Islam] were the areas63in which the Indonesian Communist Party thrived. one wants understand the political choices available to East Javanese, Islam as an aliran, as argued by Geertz and Taintor, must be considered. East Java could be divided into strong (western), medium (central), and weak 60 Geertz, The Social 128. 61 Geertz, "The Javanese Village" 40. 62 Mavis Bunker Taintor, "An Ecological Model of Peasant Revolution: The Indonesian Communist Experience 1952-1965," diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1974, 251-252. 63 Taintor 251. 77 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === (eastern) Islamic areas. The following figure indicates a relationship between the number of pesantren, the nucleus of Islam, and the ranking of the NU in the general election of 1955: 12 Magetan Kediri Jeuber Figure II.1. Rank of the NU and the presence of Pesantren. I categorize pesantren as high (H) where the ratio between population and pesantren was less than 15,000, medium (M: 15,000*30,000), and low (L: more than 30,000). For example, H-l means a regency which had a high ratio (H) and where the NU ranked first. Pesantren can predict the rank of the NU (Somers* d:.57 and p<.013). Sources: For the data of NU in the election, see Alfian 90*91. For population see Tim Penyusun Monografi Daerah Jawa Timur Monografi Daerah Jawa Timur iilid 1 (Jakarta: Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, Dep. P dan K, 1977) 123. For pesantren, see Tim Penyusun Monografi Daerah Jawa Timur, Monografi Daerah Jawa Timur Jilid 2 (Jakarta: Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, Dep. P dan K, 1977) 63*64. The previous figure shows that the NU gained votes in areas with a strong pesantren presence.6* In the western part of East Java with fewer pesantren, the PKI was able to control the upper levels of the bureaucracy. The regents in Magetan, 6i| There were also votes of other Islamic parties, but in East Java, the NU was the most dominant Islamic party. 78 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === Ngawi, Madiun, and Trenggalek were from the PKI.65 In addition to the aliran thesis, another explanation of political mobilization instructive. Rejecting rural Geertz's East aliran Java may thesis, prove Utrecht emphasizes the patron-client relationship, ethnic loyalty, and personal prestige as the important factors in mobilizing the peasants. 66 On his analysis, landowners were dominant while tillers were submissive. He remarks: the author [Utrecht] found hundred examples [of patronage]. For instance, asked why they had joined the NU, the political party of their santri [orthodox Muslim] landowner, abangan [nominal Muslim] sharecroppers and land-labourers in the areas of Lumajang, Bondowoso, Situbondo, Jember [all are strong Islam areas] and Malang [mixed area] usually gave reasons as, "We were ordered to do so by our landowners"; "Our landowners are members of the NU [orthodox Muslim party] and in order to prevent conflicts which usually give reasons for them to throw us off their land, we decided to join their organization [NU]. There some truth to Utrecht's analysis, yet his tendency is to exaggerate the role of patronage. In fact, there were many Muslims who voted voluntarily in support of 65 See Soegiarso Soeroio.Siapa Yana Menabur Anain Akan Menuai Badai (Jakarta: P.T. Rola Sinar Perkasa, 1988) 181. 66 Ernst Utrecht, "Class Struggle and Politics in Java," Journal of Contemporary Asia 2. 3. (1972): 278-279. 67 Ernst Utrecht, "Political Mobilisations of Peasants in Indonesia," Journal of Contemporary Asia 6. 3 (1976): 274. Utrecht was a lecturer in Jember where Islam was strong. His observation was mostly in areas near Jember where santri landowners could force their tillers to join their party (NU). In Kediri, santri landowners did not force their tillers while in Magetan, where Islam was weak, santri landowners only accepted santri tillers. 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === Islamic parties. Their support originated in their loyalty to ulama and their devotion to Islamic solidarity.68 In this regard, Geertz's analysis is more convincing than Utrecht's. Utrecht also stresses other factors determining political orientation unrelated to land patronage. He considers the role of party (PNI) patronage and the position of Sukarno as a public figure linked to the PNI: In the regions where President Sukarno was extremely popular, political parties like the PNI could claim the authority and prestige of the man who founded the Indonesian state. In Madura, Surabaya, Sidoarjo, and Kediri even santri traders joined the PNI simply because this party "has been founded by Sukarno, who now guides our national economy and rejects foreign capital investment"— in fact the trader hoped that by becoming a member of the PNI, 60he could easily obtain economic facilities. Utrecht’s analysis of the PNI's bureaucratic patronage system and Sukarno's role in supporting the PNI has merit. The PNI controlled village bureaucracy and used official land ('tanah bengkok') distribution of to entice followers. 'official land' An example of the is given in the following table: 66 For the role of the Islamic kiyai, see Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijai: The Changing Role of A Cultural Broker," Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (1960): 228-249. 69 Utrecht, "The Political" 274. 80 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 97] === Table II.1. Village land for village officials Officials amount of land 20 acres secretary 12 Kamitua (3) hamlet head Religous (Islam) official 4 Water official Police official (4) Heralds (5) Source: Jay 44. bureaucracy. 30,000 Almost all villages have 'bengkok' land for village Sixteen village officials controlled 54 acres with an average of more than three hectares. This was greater than the minimum of two hectares considered necessary for living but less than the five hectares permitted under the land reform act. The above table also shows that a village head and their staff, who were mostly from the PNI, stood a chance of gaining followers owing the fact that 'village land' ('tanah bengkok') was exempted from land reform. Largely because 'tanah bengkok' and the Sukarno factor, in 14 out of 31 regencies the PNI proved to be the runner up in the general election of 1955 as the following figure shows: 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 98] === 100 km Magetan Kediri Jeaber Figure II.2. The PNI's votes. Source: Alfian 90. The figures show the ranking of the PNI's vote: first (4 regencies), second (14 regencies), third (8 regencies) and fourth (3 regencies). In some areas where Islam was weak the PNI even managed to beat the PKI. Many abangan in weak Islamic areas chose the PNI over the PKI. Thus, Utrecht's patronage analysis may account for why in most regencies the PNI with its bureau cratic patronage and the backing Sukarno acquired significant support in its opposition to the Islamic parties and the PKI. Geertz's aliran analysis, by contrast, fails to give an account of why some abangan voted for the PKI while others voted for the PNI. He merely states that abangan tended to vote for the PKI o£ the PNI.70 In what follows, I will examine the mobilization that 70 See Geertz, The Social 128. 82 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 99] === took place in Kediri (the "mixed" area: Islam 31.3 % and PKI 31.1 %), Magetan (the "red" area: PKI 42.8 % and Islam: 17.8 %), and Jember (the "green" area: PKI 11.2 % and Islam 48.8 %). In Jember and Magetan, the nationalists PNI took second place with 20.2 % and 23.6 %, respectively. In Kediri, the PNI gained third place with 19.6 %.71 Mobilization in Kediri72 Kediri was a regency where red (the abangan) met green (the santri). Here are the results of the election of 1955: Table II.2. The 1955 Election in Kediri Party vote PKI 31.1 143,789 PNI 19.6 90,776 Islamic parties 31.3 144,951 Source: Alfian 90-91. In the Kediri regency, mobilization by PKI and competing parties, particularly Islamic parties, was intense, and the numbers supporting the PKI was equal to those supporting the Islamic parties. Near the city of Kediri, there were several prominent pesantren such as Lirboyo. But there were also 71 For the data see Alfian 90-91. 72 The description of Kediri 1 and 2 was information given by informants no. 1,2, and 3. based 83 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === several sugar plantations which would become the bases of PKI. The Kediri areas were the site of many "unilateral actions" ("Aksi Sepihak" or land invasion).73 In addition, famous religious conflict (the "Kanigoro the most affair") also occurred in this regency.7* In the areas studied (Kediri 1 and Kediri 2), most of the villagers were peasant laborers who cultivated corn, onions and peanuts. Kediri 1 was a santri hamlet consisting of 60 households. Not one of which Kediri 2 was a households joined the PKI. Neighboring "basis" (base) of the PKI and most of J.ts 324 joined the Party. The pattern residential separation between the two was typical, especially in those areas where santri were the minority. In Kediri 1, there was a small pesantren or pondok with 40-50 santri (pupils) under the leadership of a kiyai or Islamic Ulama. Prior to 1965, the kiyai (ulama) did not confront the PKI: There was no tension or conflicts here. If the kiyai gave 'dakwah' (Friday sermons), they [the PKI] came to hear the kiyai. They came but they never said or asked anything.... Kiyai in this area were soft unlike those in Lirboyo [a big and famous pesantren near the city of Kediri]. Land distribution in this area reflected the general pattern existing in Java: large landowners were rare and many The famous "Jengkol Affair" occurred in Kediri in 1962 when the military and police killed eight and wounded 18 peasants mobilized by the PKI to seize land of a state's estate. 7* Walkin 829-830. 84 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === inhabitants were landless peasants. In Kediri 1 and 2, 60% of the population consisted of landless peasants;75 there being only one owner with more than the five hectares allowed by the land reform act. Other landowners retained about one sixteenth of a hectare, i.e., an area equal to 600-700 sq.meter.76 The sharecropping system in this area was "maro" or fifty-fifty. The recruitment pattern Kediri supports Geertz's aliran thesis from which it follows that one tended to join or support a party in line with one's world view. Thus, in Kediri 2 abangan usually joined the PKI whereas santri in Kediri 1 would more likely align themselves with an Islamic party, usually the NU. Utrecht's thesis, on the other hand, suggests that santri landowners tended to force their tillers into Islamic parties. The absence of this pattern in Kediri might well have resulted from a limited supply of santri tillers. In general, a santri land owner and his abangan tillers enjoyed good relations prior to 1965, as one informant states: There was no inclination for a santri landowner to force his abangan tiller to accept his politics.. .. "Work was work;" after he finished his work the tiller got paid. The landowners did not force their tillers because they needed them; on the other hand, the (abangan) tillers needed the (santri) landowners because land in this area was very scarce. We often talked about politics when the tillers took a rest. But there was no tension. Thus 75 Similarly, in Java, 60 % of the peasants were landless, see Lyon, Bases 24. 76 A minimum of two hectares (20,000 sq.meter) was needed for a family see Tornquist 189. 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === it was "Lakum dinnukum walliaddin." [a famous phrase stating that one has the right to worship one's god and pursue one's religion.] We needed work to live, and until 1965 this area was tranquil. (Informant no. 1) Utrecht's PNI patronage analysis appears to have had some support as the village head, who was in the PNI, had tillers who were mainly abangan and followers of the PNI. Thus, the choiceof those abangan of the PNI was not random, but based on the land patronage system of the village head who was usually connected with the PNI. Mobilization in Magetan77 The regency of Magetan, in the western part of East Java, was considered strongly abangan. The strength of the PKI in 1965 was reflected in the fact that the regent of Magetan was from the PKI.78 Historically, the regency was a red area, becoming the center of the 1948 PKI rebellion. The regency had the greatest number of victims during the 1948 PKI rebellion, where the regent, commanders, the heads of subdistricts, the police and the ulama were the military killed.70 Most participants in the coup were not punished since they were willing to join the republican (central) government fighting against the Second Dutch Aggression 1948-1949. Thus, 77 The description of Magetan is based on the information provided by informants no 4 and 5. 78 Soerojo 181. 79 Swift 80. 86 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === Muslims in this regency felt that the rebels had been unfairly punished; they saw many who had participated in the revolt go unpunished. The growth of the PKI in the regencies of Magetan went smoothly as the following comment suggests: By nature, this is an abangan ("red") area even until now [1990]; outside the pesantren, the people are still abangan. In 1948, [the PKI rebellion] the pesantren was surrounded by thousands of "red" soldiers.... The influence of Islam is only in the pesantren. (Informant no.4) Like other areas in the western part East Java, Magetan was close to former Syncretist Javanese (Hindu-Islam) kingdoms of Central Java where people were mostly abangan or nominal Muslims. This areas had a history of not backing Islamic parties during elections. The PKI gained substantial support in the election of 1955, as the following table shows: Table II.3 The 1955 Election in Magetan party vote PKI 42.8 112.313 PNI (Nationalist) 23.6 62.163 Islamic parties80 17.8 46.696 Source: Alfian 90-91. In this regency, santri were in the minority and tended 80 The Islamic parties were the Orthodox N.U. (9.7% or 25,411 votes) and the Modernist Masyumi (8.1% or 21.285 votes). 87 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === to live in certain villages and hamlets.81 In the village studied, about half of the population belonged to the PKI while the remainder were affiliated with either the PNI or the NU. Santri in this village clustered together around the a pesantren.82 Many villagers were Masyumi Islamic modernists who would join the NU following the banning of their own party in I960. Surrounding villages were dominated by supporters of the PKI while the village bureaucracy had close ties to the PNI. At first, many peasants joined the PKI: The BTI (PKI peasant front) activists were very cunning; they first approached peasants who owned small lands and asked them to join the BTI. The BTI cadres also approached landless peasants and they were promised land. The peasants were not told that BTI was the PKI's Peasant front. The peasants rashly joined the BTI. The BTI did little more than give them membership cards, only later were they told by PNI and NU leaders that the BTI was controlled by the PKI. Those who had joined the BTI were asked to dissociate themselves from it. There were letters of resignation. Many from the NU and PNI left the BTI. (Informant no. 5) Mobilization in the villages of Magetan was conducted by PKI cadres. Generally, communization was obstructed when the pesantren had to be confronted. However, the mere presence of a pesantren commonly thought of as a fortress of Islam did not guarantee that its neighbors would accept control by Islamic organizations and parties. Neither patronage nor pesantren provided the foundation for recruitment of Muslims. Nor were 01 Koentjaraningrat discusses the exclusiveness of santri where they are minority, see his book Javanese Culture 198. 82 In Magetan regency, the village's description is based only on a village consisted both santri and abangan. 88 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 105] === they decisive factors within many villages, particularly in the western part of East Java or abangan areas. PKI members "really resisted the influence of kiyai... they openly and unreluctantly challenged kiyai (ulama) in pesantren."83 In the village studied, its head was a member of the PNI who had a greater following than did the Islamic parties. Patronage became his principal political tool and he commonly retained tillers from his own party. Like Kediri, peasants in this area owned little land (1000-1500 meter). The recruitment in Magetan was focused on party affiliation: It had been a system where landowners within PKI sought tillers from among PKI youth... from their clique, not our [santri] clique. And a santri landowner had santri tillers. (Informant no. 5) In this regency, prior to land reform in 1960, the PNI, the PKI and the NU managed to live together. however, the PKI intensified threatening landowners. its In addition, land After 1963, seizure program, the PNI village heads were subject to political attacks.84 Mobilization in Jember85 In Jember, the PKI's mobilization was made difficult by the presence of many pesantren. Like other regencies in the 83 As told by informant no. 5. 84 I will discuss the economic, religous and political conflict after 1963 in chapter IV. 85 Information for Jember informants no 6,7,8, and 9. regency was provided 89 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 106] === eastern part of East Java (the 'horse shoe' area) Islam was powerful.86 The strong presence of Islam was proven in the general elections of 1955. The Islamic parties dominated as the following table indicates: Table II.4. The 1955 Election in Jember Party vote 39.9 317,814 71,008 PNI (Nationalist) 20.2 160,864 PKI 11.2 89,198 (Orthodox Muslim) Source: Alfian 90-97. In the village studied, the PKI was weak: in hamlet A only two out of 210 households joined the PKI; in hamlet B which consisted households there 290 households were only one and hamlet and eight PKI C with 200 households containing PKI members, respectively. Among all hamlets, the NU was the strongest party followed by the PNI and the PKI. In the village studied, there were no pesantren, but there was one in a nearby village. Before the village was politicized as a result of land reform measures, relations between landowners and tillers were 86 The PKI had only strong support in the most eastern regency (Banyuwangi, near Bali), a former strong Hindu kingdom (Blambangan). 90 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 107] === merely economic. Abangan tillers who worked at an NU kiyai might still follow the abangan life style marked, for example, by the absence of daily or weekly prayers. And PNI landowners did not require NU tillers either that they become members of the PNI or adopt an abangan lifestyle. Following the land reforms of 1963-5, politics acquired greater significance for ordinary person— the result being that patrons and tillers alike tended cluster around certain political parties. Thus the NU kiyai attracted NU tillers; and village heads who were members of the PNI chose tillers from the PNI. Following the destruction of the PKI (1966), abangan tillers joined with their patrons (Utrecht's thesis) primarily for security reasons.87 We see, then, that in East Java both religion (Islam) and the bureaucratic patronage played an important role in shaping political mobilization. II.4. MOBILIZATION IN BALI Prior to 1965, the PKI in Bali failed to acquire a majority despite considerable effort. Even the PKI's good relations with the governor as well the head the agrarian bureau was to no avail. The already established PNI proved to be a more than formidable rival, figure Sukarno and enjoying the relying on the support 87 The information was provided by informant no. 6. 91 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. well === [PDF page 108] === entrenched bureaucracy. 88 Prior to 1960, political mobilization in Bali was more an identification process where people would identify themselves with a public figure (a king), a reference group (veteran or the aristocracy), or a local community group (a banjar, subak dadia). regard political mobilization, Geertz emphasizes the importance of community or traditional group solidarity: If the rival kingroup in your village is PNI, you are, in Bali, ipso facto Socialist [PSI]; if it happens to be socialist [PSI], you are ipso facto Nationalist [PNI]. The explanation of political mobilization in terms of "in group solidarity" might have some merit, but it tells us neither why nor how a certain individual or group decided at first to join the PNI or the PSI, or for that matter the PKI. As we shall discover, the external factor which influenced villagers most was the influence kings, veterans, bureaucrats, and noble houses ("puri").90 To understand the development of political parties in 88 Anak Agung Ngurah K. Suweda, "Partai Nasional Indonesia di Bali (1950-1966)," Skripsi (B.A. Thesis), Universitas Udayana, Bali, 1989, 67-69. 89 He defines the Balinese pattern of political integration "infusive" in contrast to "constitutive" in East Java, Geertz, "The Javanese Village," 39. 90 Hildred Geertz discusses the roles of traditional elites and veterans in the process of political mobilization. However, she seems to emphasize local communities. She also underestimates the role of veterans, see Geertz, "Balinese Village" 29, 32. 92 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === Bali, it is necessary that we first examine matters at the regional level, rather than at the local level just as Geertz has suggested. Political mobilization at the regency level was a symbiotic relationship between traditional political elites (kings and aristocracies) and emerging political parties such as the PNI, PSI or PKI. Traditional elites strove to gain through their support of parties which they recognized as new political realities. And the emerging parties needed to absorb kings and aristocrats in order to advance their respective causes. One important fact in determining the effectiveness of their attempts at mobilization was how old they were: older parties stood a better chance of success. The of the PNI in Bali in 1950 early formation (March in Buleleng, April Jembrana, May in Tabanan and Badung, and June in Gianyar) and in 1951 (February in Klungkung, Bangli and Karangasem), as well as the support of the king of Klungkung worked in its favor. 91 Moreover, the PNI had an advantage in Sukarno was the founder of the old PNI.92 In addition, the position of PNI members on the "Regency Council" and in other government offices helped promote growth the PNI. This was particularly true during elections. Within certain circles, 81 Suweda 31-34. 92 Actually the (new) PNI differed from the one founded by Sukarno which was banned in 1931. However, people considered the two identical and the new PNI exploited this. 93 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 110] === the PNI was in fact regarded the government party.83 The PSI, a relative new comer on the scene, managed despite this to enlist the backing of a number of traditional elites, such as the kings of Tabanan, Badung, Gianyar and Bangli. Thus, the late formation of the PSI (April 1952 in Gianyar, October 1953 in Tabanan, September 1953 in Klungkung; and April 1955 Bangli) proved little significance.84 In its early days, the PKI, as a late arrival, did not receive a significant number of electoral votes; it garnered only 7.9 % of vote in the 1955 general election and ranked third following the nationalist PNI (51.4 %) and the socialist PSI (30.6 %),8S The PKI received its greatest support (21.5%) in the former Jembrana kingdom partly as the result of the efforts of a sympathetic king. The following table gives the results the 1955 election— one in which the PNI and PSI became leading parties: 93 Suweda 67. 94I Gusti Agung Cakrawati, "Perkembangan Partai Sosialis Indonesia di Bali 1951 - 1960," Skripsi (B.A. Thesis), Universitas Udayana, Bali, 1988, 42-43. 95 Alfian 125. 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === Table The 1955 Election Bali Regency PSI PNI PKI Others Buleleng Badung Tabanan Gianyar Klungkung Karangasem Jembrana Bangli 47.3 51.9 46.1 10.8 27.6 30.0 63.2 31.7 41.5 47.4 68.8 57.7 56.0 67.2 16.0 21.5 18.9 13.8 11.5 22.2 30.6 51.4 10.1 Source: Alfian 124-126. From these results it is easy to infer that the influence of kings was significant in party. determining choice of political is clear that politics in Bali had "palace" dimension, but the incorporation of local people demanded some kind of power broker. In what follows we will shall discover that veterans served this role. Veterans in Bali had been the guerrilla fighters who had fought the Dutch from 1945 to 1950. Prior to 1945, their leaders armies Dutch (PRAYODA) had served and with Japanese the local (PETA the the Defenders the Fatherland). The later had been a paramilitary youth group formed during the Japanese occupation in the years 1942-1945. On an island of two million, the presence of 24,000 veterans 95 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === was quite impressive.86 Actually the guerrillas numbered between three and four thousand, but who was to count as a veteran would be determined by one's "participation" in the struggle for independence. There was, therefore, an opportu nity for anyone sponsored by a veteran to qualify as a veteran himself.87 Being a veteran in Bali amounted to being a member of a new high caste; people wanted to be recognized as veterans and as having fought against the Dutch. 88 There were two reasons for wanting to be recognized as a veteran: status and group identification. Status was pursued by the ambitious while the desire for group identity testifies to the fact that people tended to seek affiliation with organizations perceived as representative of their friends and neighbors. 88 These accounts indicate that the political mobilization The number was provided by informant no. 10 who was a veteran leader in Bali. In East Java, there were only 85,038 registered veterans among its 22 million population, see Manifesto April 12, 1962, SPS. 97 Many people were not considered to be veterans because they did not have convincing evidence of participation in the struggle. For example, the registered veterans in Klungkung regency were 400, but after the screening only 262 were considered authentic. (Informant no. 12) 98 The presence of veterans was recognizable in the presence of a veteran's office at both the sub-district and village levels. Such an office was very rare in Java. In Bali, the sons of veterans, who were nationally organized as "Pemuda Panca Marga," had a strong influence. 99 In 1990, when I visited informant no. 16, a local veteran leader, I met four people who had asked to be recognized as veterans. 96 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === in Bali was strongly influenced by the status of veterans at the regency level. This can be explained in terms of the reference group theory. This theory explains why one group can be in solidary, emulate and respect another group.100 This issue has been discussed by Merton: [Men] frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations, and it is the problems centered about this fact of orientation to non-membership group that constitute the distinctive concern of reference group theory, [italics original]1 The relations between such groups were not just functional interdependencies or an organic solidarity. They were based more on a matter of status admiration between groups. This was particularly true when a group represented a highly esteemed value such as nationalism or anti colonialism, as in the case of veterans in Bali. The mobilization of the PNI and the PSI was conducted by competing groups of veterans. The first group, PNI, was made of guerrillas who chose the who had surrendered in 1948.The The notion of an 'out' group or reference group seems to be synonymous with positive reference group. Actually, there are also negative reference groups. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968) 300-301. John Urry interprets dissent in Indonesia, discussing the Chinese in 1926-7 and the Dutch in 1942-5 as negative reference groups, see his book, Reference groups and the theory of revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). 101 Merton 282. 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === second group, having surrendered in 1950, chose the PSI. 102 In 1960, the PSI was banned resulting in "floating mass" of former PSI members: 30.6% of the total vote in Bali. 103 The impact of the banning of the PSI was described as follows: In the competition between the PNI and PKI both parties had new members from what had been the PSI. However, those who turned to the PNI were few; they felt that their competition with the PNI was unfinished though the PSI itself was finished. They chose the PKI as a new organization within which they could continue the struggle against the PNI. I think that the leaders of the PKI were not as good as those from the PNI and PSI, they ranked third in this area. But the PKI had an opportunity when the PSI was banned because the government continued monitor former PSI activists. In 1957, there were many veterans in the regencies of Tabanan, Badung, Gianyar who supported the socialist PSI. After the PSI was banned many of them joined the PKI. ((Informant no. 16) These mobilization accounts was indicate strongly that influenced the PKI's the political presence "floating mass" or former PSI members and sympathizers. In what follows, I will discuss the pattern of mobilization in rural areas within the regencies of Buleleng, Klungkung, and Tabanan. 10z See I Nyoman Sarwa, "Pergolakan Sosial Politik di Bali Sejak Pemilihan Umum 1955-165," Skripsi (B.A. Thesis), Universitas Udayana, Bali, 1988, 24. 103 In East Java, the dissolution of the PSI had little effect because it ranked eighth and only gained 0.6% or 59,093 out of East Java's 10,672,571 votes, see Alfian 90,92. 98 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === Mobilization in Buleleng10* Buleleng, the largest regency, is in the north of Bali; it was the regency of the PNI and was known for being weakly influenced by tradition. In the elections of 1955, 63.2% went with this party while the PKI came in second with 16.0%.105 The recruitment pattern seems to support the reference group (veterans) model. To compare and contrast the development of the PNI and the PKI in this regency, we shall consider two neighboring villages; one was "kompak" PNI 100% PNI (Buleleng 1), while the other was strongly PKI (Buleleng 2). Buleleng 1 was not subject to the PKI's mobilization effort before 1965; PKI activists from the neighboring areas, including Buleleng 2 seemed unable to extend their influence to this village. The 'PNI'zation of this village had been the work of one rich and successful landowner who was an important veteran leader.106 contrast, underwent the intensive neighboring process PKI-dominated communization. village The PKI leaders of this village were atypical insofar as they were four brothers. All were veterans and all worked as government officials, active member of the Information of Buleleng informants no. 10 and 11. (PKI), and agricultural regency provided was 105 Alfian 124-126. 106 In the time of my visit (1989-1990), he was active in helping people to grow citrus with the assistance of Italian experts from the F.A.O./U.N. 99 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === official. The attempt at communization has been described as follows: At first, only two of the younger brothers were PKI members but later the two older brothers switched from PNI to PKI. After that many villagers in Buleleng 2 were also attracted to the PKI... but most supporters were just "blind followers." This was owing to the status of the four brothers who were veterans and their aggressiveness attempting to persuade villagers. (Informant no. 10 ) The figures who backed the PKI in Buleleng 2 were a group (veterans) who had a great deal of public respect. They took advantage not only of their identity, but also of the land reformprogram in undertaking their in this recruitment efforts. And area land was scarce: only 40% of the peasants had their own land. In short, the communization campaign of the PKI was quite effective: its motto was "vote for PKI and you get land." Mobilization in Klungkung107 The Klungkung regency is regarded by many as the most conservative kingdom in Bali.108 The king supported the PNI, which received 68.8% of vote in 1955, while the PSI and the 107 Information of Klungkung informants no. 12 and 13. regency was provided 10d Nyoman S. Pendit Bali Beriuang (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979) 79. Another sign of the strong influence of the kingdom is the fact that from 1950 (when the eight kingdoms in Bali were changed to regencies) to the present the regents in Klungkung were from the palace: the king himself, his sons or his nephews. In other regencies, the regents were mostly commoners. This information was provided by informant no. 12. 100 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 117] === PKI garnered a mere 10.8 % and 8.9 %, respectively. One village in Klungkung illustrates particularly well how the PKI made their attempt to mobilize the villagers. The village was considered a "minus area," i.e., an area where only 25% of the peasants owned their own sharecroppers. land; the rest were tillers In this village, the PKI was small, but it recruited many followers: 50% of the 295 households, in fact, joined the PKI. The recruitment strategy of the PKI received the praise of one witness: The PKI leaders were cunning. They seldom recruited lay people. They recruited new members who were eminent people in the community. These eminent people included veterans, traditional healers, puppeteers, and artists. These people would later gain support and would ask others to join the PKI. Here the PSI was strong until its dissolution in i960. Afterwards, the PKI took the opportunity of recruiting former PSI members: The PKI launched a propaganda campaign alleging that the PSI [social democrat] and the PKI were ideologically similar, i.e. Marxist. Most PSI leaders eventually became neutral because they did not want to join the PNI, their local enemy, or the PKI, their enemy at the national level. As banned party members/activists [since 1960], the former PSI leaders became passive when their followers were recruited by the PKI. The PKI activists did not face counter action or resistance from former PSI leaders. (Informant no. 12) In short, the PKI's political mobilization in Klungkung made use of reference groups and targeted former members of the banned PSI. 101 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === Mobilization in Tabanan109 Tabanan had large rice fields and eventually became the bread basket of Bali. There were 15 'puri' in this regency110 and most were big landowners. Because of the king's sympathy, Tabanan was a stronghold of the PSI before it was banned in 1960. In the elections of 1955, the PSI acquired 51.9% of the vote while the PNI and PKI received 41.5% and respectively. A comparison of Tabanan 1 and Tabanan 2 shows that a puri head who was also a non PKI veteran had the ability to block mobilization by the PKI. In Tabanan 1, communization was not as intense as in neighboring villages; of 150 village members there were only four PKI members. Most of them were poor peasants they and politically naive; were considered "ikut-ikutan" or " blind followers." In this village, the PKI was not as aggressive as in villages around the Tanah Lot. The absence of unilateral action in Tabanan 1 might have been the result of the fact that few rice fields were owned by big landowners. Here only 5% of peasants owned their (small) land. In Tabanan 1, one of the most important local leaders was the puri (noble house). The puri lacked large landholdings but retained some influence because of his status as a veteran 109 Information of Tabanan was given by informants no. 14, 15, and 16. 110 See Geoffrey Robinson, "State, Society and Political Conflict in Bali, 1945-1946," Indonesia 45 (1988): 17. 102 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === leader:111 People around here were my fpuri] followers.... They did not want to abandon me during the land reform period sponsored by the PKI.... But some of my men abandoned me because they were promised land by the PKI. (Informant no. 16) The PKI, however, was successful in Tabanan 2 where 40 of its 80 villagers became PKI members. In these areas, there was anabsence influential local leaders who might have prevented villagers from choosing the PKI. When the PSI was banned 1960, the PKI recruited former members and supporters of the PSI. According to one informant: A lot of my friends were disappointed with the government's decision [to ban the PSI]. By joining the PKI, they believed they could continue their old "wars" with the PNI. However, many PSI activ ists retreated from political life because they did not want to choose the "musuh" (enemy/PNI) or the Thus the availability of former PSI voters was a gift to the PKI, since the PNI, as the strongest party, did little to recruit its former enemies. The coming PKI leaders, especially veterans, was welcomed by former members of the PSI. Moreover, the Balinese themselves commonly participated in many organizations; if one of their neighbors, family, or kin, joined an organization, it was likely that they would join as well. The case of Bali reveals that the PKI's mobilization in This aristocrat had little land because in the early century his father sold most of the puri (noble house) land to buy luxury goods, such as cars, in order to compete with a nearby puri. The puri become the victim of a 'status war. ' 103 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === the 1955 election was relatively slow. However, following the ban of the PSI in 1960, the PKI was able to recruit former PSI members and sympathizers. During this mobilization, the PKI relied heavily on veterans and respected individuals such as teachers and artists. The discussion in this chapter has described the PKI's strategy mobilize the people. East Java, the PKI attained a majority in western areas, but failed elsewhere. It received strong opposition from the Islamic community through that community's well organized political party (NU) well the kiyai (ulama) and their pesantren. This response added to the polarization of the mainly abangan PKI and the santri NU. In addition, the response from the PNI which controlled regional and village bureaucracies was also intense. In Bali, the role of the Hindus was minimal: there was no religious polarization as there had been in East Java. mobilize the population the PKI employed veterans, a respected reference group, and other eminent local personages. After the socialist party (PSI) was banned in 1960, the PKI absorbed many of its members and sympathizers. As in the case of East Java, the PKI in Bali also faced strong resistance from the PNI with its bureaucratic patronage. the following chapter, I will discuss the PKI's alliance with regional public figures and the military. 104 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === CHAPTER III STATE AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN THE MOBILIZATION the previous chapter examined the PKI's mobilization strategy and explored the response of various social groups. In this chapter, I will analyze the PKI's relations with regional armies as well as public figures. A comparison of East Java and Bali will serve to increase our knowledge regarding the role of army and public figures in the PKI's mobilization. I will explain why the army in Bali was more receptive to the PKI than the army in East Java. I will also examine why the governor in Bali initiated a coalition with the PKI while in East Java the PKI tried to unseat the governor. The relationship between the PKI and the army, which developed within the context of regional and international conflicts, national was another power, however, regional events. important fact. could not The struggle circumvent global for and Conflict provided the opportunity for the army and the PKI to consolidate their power. Before we discuss the above issues, it will be useful to review the relations between the army and the PKI from 1945 to 1965. III. 1.THE ARMY AND PKI FROM 1945 TO 1965 From 1945 1947, the pro-PKI defense minister 105 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 122] === consolidated power by preserving armed militia. When the cabinet resigned, the faction belonging to the PKI kept its armed militia. defecting In September 1948, the PKI militia and 15 army and marine battalions, revolted in Madiun, East Java. The revolt was directed by Muso, the PKI General Secretary, who had just returned from Moscow where he had been following the failed PKI revolt against the Dutch in 1926. He tried to implement the Gottwald program, proclaiming the United Indonesian Soviet Republic which received immediate recognition from radio Moscow.1 The rebellion lasted only less than one month, however, Sukarno condemned it, and people were asked over the radio and pamphlets to choose between him and Muso/the PKI. Moreover, it was militarily untenable as was made evident when it was challenged by the West Java division that had been temporarily stationed in nearby Central Java as well as the East Java division.2 During this rebellion, the PKI executed about 400 army, police, nationalist and Islamic leaders around the Madiun-Magetan regency in East Java.3 Among the victims were 1 See Leslie Palmier, Communist in Indonesia; Power Pursuit in Vain (New York: Anchor Books, 1973) 133-137. 2 The West Java army division consisted of 35,000 troops and had to move to Central Java because West Java was under Dutch control as agreed upon in the Linggadjati agreement. See Swift 3. 3 For the list of victim see Liga Pembela Demokrasi, Rakvat Menocruqat: Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia cs. di Madiun (Surabaya: Liga Pembela Demokrasi, 1953) 3-8. Many victims were never found. 106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === the former governor of East Java, the Police chief of East Java, the regent of Magetan, and several senior police and army officers. The rebellion resulted in national trauma for non PKI factions. From that time on, the PKI bore the stigma of being "back stabber." Following the failure of the rebellion, the government jailed 35,000-40,000 PKI troops and sympathizers. But before judicial actions could be taken against them, the Dutch launched their attack on December 18, 1948. During the invasion, most prisoners were released but several PKI leaders were executed by the army.4 The second confrontation became known as the "Sukiman Razzia," a mass arrest taking place in August 1951. The PKI incited labor unrest and the police station in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta was stormed. In a "razzia” (mass arrest), about 2,000 PKI leaders and activist were jailed.5 However, the PKI was saved by the fall of the cabinet which had been involved in the MSA (Mutual Security Act) scandal involving the U.S.6 The government's action had a significant impact on PKI leaders; they now realized that they were vulnerable to attacks by the government/army. The PKI faced set backs and in response they 4 See Swift 90. 5 See Van der Kroef 49. 6 See Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) 160-165. 107 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === implemented a strategy of peaceful coexistence.7 As in the case the 1948 coup when the PKI was saved Dutch invasion, in 1951 the PKI was saved again by an international event. The third major confrontation came to be known as "the July 1960 evaluation Affair."8 On July 1960 the PKI's newspaper (The People's Daily) published a starkly negative evaluation of the cabinet's programs dealing with the economy, foreign affairs and security (regional rebellions). The army regarded it as a PKI tactic involving the attempt to play Sukarno off against them. On July 20, the army arrested a member of the politburo (Sakirman) who had helped to write the evaluation. All politburo members were interrogated and placed under virtual arrest for a week. The army initiated further actions such as banning the PKI newspaper, and arresting a number of its members. This commanders was that followed the PKI orders suspend issued its local activities army South Sumatra, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. This came to be known as the "Three South affair." At the time, Sukarno would act as a brake on the army's actions. He protected the PKI, and lessened the army's advantage by appointing PKI leaders 7 The turn to the "right" strategy was declared at the PKI's National Conference in January 1952. See Brackman, Indo nesian 171-172. 8 The discussion of the July 8 Evaluation is based on Van der Kroef 227-240. 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 125] === such as Aidit and Nyoto to the New National Front. This took place intervene, August 16, I960. The ability given the power he had acquired dissolution the parliamentary system Sukarno following the July 1959, convinced both the PKI and the army of his decisive role in national politics. Besides these three conflicts, relations between the army and the PKI from 1952 to 1965 resulted in several half-hearted coalitions. For example, the PKI became a strong supporter of the central government and the army in confronting regional separatism (Sumatra and Sulawesi) that had been supported by the CIA in 1958.9 They also sided with the army in opposing the Islamic rebellion West Java (1948-1962).10 The attempts at regional separatism were easily overcome, the Islamic rebellion, however, proved more unmanageable. During the Islamic rebellion, the PKI demanded the arming of its veterans organization in order to assist the army, but the proposal was rejected. During the rebellion, there were 9,321 dead and 3,944 missing on the central government side (Jakarta) while the rebels lost 22,174 people, see Penders and Sundhaussen 125. 10 In 1948, the Renville agreement between the Dutch and Indonesian Republic demanded that the West Java army (Siliwangi Division) be relocated in Central Java. At that time the Hizbullah (Islamic armed Militia) rejected the agreement and created an Islamic State in West Java. During the Islamic rebellion, approximately 25,000 civilians and military personnel lost their lives, see Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority. Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 15. 109 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === By 1965, the army and the PKI found themselves in a very tense situation: one created by the PKI's public demand for the arming of peasants and workers as a "fifth force" to combat Malaysia and Great Britain. Interestingly enough, China had pledged 100,000 rifles.11 The army rejected the demand, although it was backed by the air force chief. The army remembered the ordeal it experienced when in 1948 its 350,000 soldiers had to reorganize and disarm a 470,00 member People's army. 12 In addition, the PKI demanded the placement of political commissars in the armed forces. The army rejected the idea, realizing that political commissars appointed by the PKI would create divisions and defections from their ranks. They also remembered that in 1947, the PKI defense minister had created the Political Commissar bureau to control the army; the army, of course, rejected the idea.13 Looking at the other side, the army had been responsible for attempting neutralize the PKI. For example, compromise and general amnesty offered to regional the rebels 11 The air force did train and arm 3,700 PKI youths with rifles from China, and some participated in the 1965 coup. See Dinas Sejarah T.N.I.-A.D.[Disjarah TNI-AD], Pemberontakan G30S/PKI dan Penumoasannva (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah 12 Many units of People's army were controlled by pro-PKI defence minister himself a communist, see Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982) 38-40. 13 Sundhaussen 26-27. 110 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === during the period of 1956-1958 proved antagonistic to the FKI.1* could radicalization not the exploited mass and the the PKI creation for the armed volunteers. One other event of considerable significance was the army's seizure of the nationalized, formerly Dutch, companies through which it would exert pressure on workers loyal to the PKI.15 The army had also been successful in asking Sukarno to postpone the general elections of 1959. It also supported Sukarno in his desire to create a "Guided Democracy" where power would shift from parliament to the presidency. In the "Guided Democracy," the army stood gain more representatives in both the executive and legislative bodies. In summary, relations between the PKI and the army from the time of independence on were never good. It was the existence of parliamentary democracy (1945-1959) and Sukarno himself (1959-1965) that protected the PKI and inhibited the army's opposition to it. It was only after the coup and the killing of the generals that the army and other social groups dared act against the PKI. Even so, Sukarno persisted protecting the PKI though he eventually failed. 14 See Brackman, Indonesian 253. 15 Brackman, Indonesian 243. Ill with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === III.2.THE IMPLICATIONS THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT The confrontation between the PKI and the army was complicated by regional and international conflicts that were exploited by the PKI as well as the army for the purpose of increasing their own power. The PKI might have succeeded had the army been kept busy fighting external enemies. Historically, modern revolutions have enjoyed a greater chance success following a military defeat the incumbent government.16 The low morale of the defeated troops was more likely to result in defection or their being absorbed into revolutionary movements. Prior to 1965, the central government had embarked upon two campaigns; both of which were exploited by the PKI and the army. The first was the campaign to take over West Irian; the second was Federation. prevent the formation the Malaysian The former was successful while the latter was terminated following the 1965 coup and the subsequent fall of Sukarno.17 The campaign for West Irian resulted in a stronger central government. A more significant immediate result was the formation of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Force, under the 16 See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France. Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 23. 17 Under the Indonesian threat, the Dutch agreed to abandon West Irian but Indonesia had to hold a referendum in 1969. For the West Irian and Malaysian Campaigns, see Crouch 51-62. 112 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 129] === command of army headquarters. This force had the capacity to prevent any revolt on the part of local commanders. It was the Kostrad units that were first sent to Central and East Java, and Bali in order to face the PKI and its sympathizers among army units, particularly in Central Java. There were other results, however. The Malaysia campaign placed the army in a delicate position. It has been maintained by some that Indonesia would have faced considerable diffi culty if it had changed from a policy of confrontation to one of open war with Malaysia. The army in Java had deployed 27 infantry battalions or three-fourth of its forces outside of Java itself. They became a part of the 47 battalions Sumatra and Kalimantan needed for the Malaysia campaign. In addition, 17 battalion went to repress the Islamic rebellion in Sulawesi. In Java, the army retained only one fourth of its forces or nine battalions; this came to be of concern for the army leaders.18 In tnis respect, the creation of the "fifth force" consisting of 100,000 armed peasants and workers, as suggested by the PKI, could totally shift power to the PKI. All these facts had considerable implications for the army; tried not escalate what had been mere confrontation to open warfare. Secret missions were sent to See Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat [Puspenad], Fakta-Fakta Persoalan Sekitar "Gerakan 30 September" (Jakarta: Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat, 1965) 329. It seems that non infantry units such as airborne, cavalry, and artillery units were still present in Java. 113 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 130] === Malaysia order convey this message.19 And army headquarters blocked the campaign by not providing troops for Sukarnoist commanders; among them were Omar Dhani and Suparjo who were eager to implement Sukarno's campaign.20 Had Sukarno decided to go to war and had the army experienced great losses, the consequences would have been decisive. However, the war against Malaysia and the Islamic rebellion in Sulawesi proved a blessing in disguise for the army leaders. The outer islands would function as an excuse for sending army units infiltrated by the PKI to an area where they could do no harm. It was a face saving situation because the disloyal and rebel soldiers were sent on the pretext that they had to defend the country. During the coup, rebellious infantry battalions from Central Java were sent to Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.21 And in East Java, three heavily communist infiltrated army battalions were sent to Kalimantan and Sumatra.22 Thus, the war with Malaysia and the Islamic rebellion Sulawesi both had negative and positive consequences for the army. 19 See Crouch 74-75. 20 Omar Dhani was the air force chief and the commander of the command against Malaysia, while Suparjo was a brigadier general and the commander of Army Battle Command posted in Kalimantan. Both were involved in the 1965 coup. Dhani's sentence was commuted to life, while Suparjo was executed in 1968. 21 See Puspenad 208,211, 302. 22 See "Report From East Java," Indonesia 41 (1986): 147. 114 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 131] === In addition to regional conflicts, there was also the cold war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.. This affected the state building as well as PKI-army relations in Indonesia. In what follows, I will focus on how Indonesia was drawn into the cold war rivalry between the United States and the U.S.S.R.. Subsequently, I will show how this resulted both in a stronger state and army. In coming to understand the above phenomenon, benefit from "Structural synthesis Imperialism" Johan Galtung's we may theory and Georg Simmel's theory of the "Triad." Galtung's theory is relevant in analyzing Indonesia since it goes some way in explaining the link between the international context and national politics.23 His theory's most salient contribution the discussion the "politico-military" factor in imperialism. Although, Galtung's model neglects inter-empire rivalries, which have always been quite relevant to the Indonesian case, we shall discover that it has its merits. the international context, the Indonesian state, headed by Sukarno, became a "tertius gaudens" (the third party who enjoys) in a triadic consisting of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia. Simmel's theory of "tertius gaudens" regards a third party as equally powerful and has decisive relation to 23 Johan Galtung, "Conflict on A Global Scale: Social Imperialism And Sub-Imperialism - Continuities in the Structural Theory of Imperialism," World Development. 4. 3. (1976): 153-165. 115 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === the other two.2* With respect this triad, Indonesia introduced asymmetry since it was less powerful by comparison the other location two. Nevertheless, Indonesia's strategic was crucial to the balance of power politics being played out between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In come quarters, it was regarded Vietnam.25 Thus even more strategically Indonesia's neutrality, located than hostility partisanship had the potential to affect relations between the and the U.S.S.R. in Southeast Asia and Pacific general. Galtung's theory of Strategic Imperialism provides credible explanation politico-military capitalism and satisfactory. of the strengthening of the state's power. Other international The theories economics international based are economic not world quite situation might, under certain circumstances, increase the strength of a state and its army but it was the super powers that would strengthen the state-military apparatus. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. supported satellites states such Vietnam and Cuba, respectively, even to their own economic detriment. Like Sukarno, The Indonesian army played the role of the "tertius gaudens." That is, it was willing to receive aid from 2* Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel ed. and trans. with an Introduction by Kurt H.Wolff, (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1950): 154-162. 25 This was stated by J.B. Smith, Director of Planning for the Far East of the CIA in Editor 2 June, 1990: 23. 116 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === both the U.S. and the Soviets. For example, the U.S. agreed to re-equip twenty army battalions. 26 When the U.S. refused to provide more weaponry for the West Irian campaign, the army easily acquired from the Soviets.27 The and the Soviets, up to December 1965, provided Indonesia with massive assistance: nearly 2 billion in US dollars. The notion of a "tertius gaudens" can be applied to many triadic situations in international relations. In general, we may distinguish two types of "tertius gaudens": "negative" and "positive." In the first instance, the third party benefits from the absence of the two conflicting parties. For example, Thailand, as a free and never colonized country, acted as a "buffer" between the British and the French.28 In the case of the "positive" model, the presence of two conflicting parties in the third party's vicinity provides a distinct advantage for the third party. Such was the case of Indonesia prior to 1965. Previously Indonesia faced threats 26 Horace Sutton, "Indonesia's Night of Terror: Exclusive Report from Jakarta on the Red Purge" Saturday Review 4 Feb. (1967): 75. 27 For the Soviet weaponry provided to Indonesia, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1965-1966 (London: International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1966) 34-35. 26 A similar argument is advanced by Burke who explains the emergence of city-states in Europe, using his 'vacuum theory' of the city-state, see Peter Burke, "City-State," States in History, ed., John A. Hall (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 152. The city-states were buffer between empire and papacy. 117 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 134] === from both parties: the U.S.S.R. sponsored a rebellion aimed at establishing a Soviet Republic of Indonesia in East Java in 1948, and the CIA backed regional rebellion and separatism in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958. 20 The "positive" model also accommodates a situation in which a third party comes to the area of the two conflicting parties, and takes advantage of the conflict. This is well described by Simmel speaking of another time and place: ".. . it was said that France and Spain [in the 16th century] were the scales of the European balance, but England was the "tongue or the holder of the balance."30 Thus, a more international politico-military perspective will increase our understanding of the formation of emerging states in developing countries. Some analyses emphasize the importance the international capitalism peripheral economic capitalism) system and the (world internal development of the bureaucracy (developmentalist). However, this perspective is inadequate. World capitalism from the 16th to the 20th century as well as global politico-military competition following the Second colonies in the former case, latter. The former World War resulted and satellite states development was economic; the in the latter politico-military. 29 For the CIA's involvement see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964). 30 See Simmel, The Sociology 158. 118 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === International competition and the weakening of state power that followed has been given as explanation of state breakdowns China. 31 and social By contrast, revolutions France, Russia and international competition during the years prior to 1965, resulted in a stronger Indonesian state. It became a "strategic state," something not easily explained by some prevailing theories of state building in Indonesia. The logic of the international division of labor or world capitalism affected the Indonesian economy, but it was by no means the most important factor at work in the restructuring of the politico-military structure of Indonesia prior to 1965. This restructuring politico-military must factors, not explained terms international economic We now see that the strengthening of the Indonesian processes. state, and its army, was not solely an internal matter, nor just a bilateral one either. Rather, it took on a triadic pattern: Indonesia, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. Prior to 1965, China complicated the situation, offering 100,000 rifles for the creation of a fifth force sponsored by the PKI. The competition between super powers resulted in a strengthening of the national state, particularly the power of the central government in Jakarta. In the following discussion we will examine the relationship between the army and the PKI in East Java. 31 Skocpol, States 285. 119 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === III.3.THE ARMY IN EAST JAVA The army in East Java had its origin in the militia called Peta ("Pembela Tanah Air" or The Defenders of the Father Land) which had been formed by the Japanese. In each regency, a battalion was formed, and in 1945, Peta became the People's Security Body (B.K.R. or "Badan Keamanan Rakyat") which later became the regular army of East Java.32 The army also retained four battalions formerly Dutch soldiers (KNIL) who were native Indonesians. In addition, some armed units such as the student army (TRIP), Hizbullah and the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo) had joined the army. A majority of the army was abangan or nominal Muslim while orthodox Muslims (santri) were rare.33 It has been stated that the santri (orthodox Muslims) were unwilling to become soldiers because army life hampered the ritual of daily prayers.3* Actually, there were about 50,000 Muslim guerrillas (Hizbullah and Sabillilah) who participated in the war against the Dutch.35 32 See Sedjarah Militer KODAM VIII/Brawidjaja [Semdam, 1974], Sam Karya Bhirawa Anoraga: Seiarah Militer Kodam VIII/Brawidia'ia fSurabava: Semdam VIII/Brawijaya, 1968) 71-74. 33 Only one battalion (battalion 514 in Probolinggo) was dominated by former member of Hizbullah, see "Report" 147. 3A See Geertz, The Religion 217. 35 This figure covers all Java and for East Java it might be about one third of this figure. In West Java, the Hizbullah rebelled from 1948 to 1962, demanding an Islamic state. 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 137] === In East Java, former members of the militia as well as former guerrillas who were in the army became incorporated within the Army Legiun Veteran under the control of Division Brawijaya. There were veterans out of 85,038 who registered. the East Java 46,361 recognized The rest were under the control of IKABRA (Ikatan Karyawan Brawijaya or "the Union of Brawijaya Workers") which had been set up in 1961 to counter communism.37 The central army was also active through such organizations as SOKSI, MKGR, and Kosgoro and the army-sponsored political party (IP-KI). In addition to mass organizations, the army in East Java developed territorial commands: there was a KODIM (Military District Command) under a captain or major having about 100 men each regency38 and three KOREM (Military Resort Command) under the command of colonels who coordinated all KODIM. However, the sub-district level, the army was relatively weak having only several territorial N.C.O. 's (NonCommissioned Officers). This was the result of a lack of funds and a feeling that East Java was secure. Actually, the army established 36 strong territorial units, during the guerrilla Manifesto April 12, 1962 in Surabava Press Summary (SPS). 37 Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study Papers on Southeast Asia No. 2. Clayton, Australia: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974) 64. 38 For the number of army officers in Kodim, see Sundhaussen 141. In reality, the number of officers might be fewer than 100. 121 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === war against the Dutch; but these were abolished in 1950 when the situation stabilized.39 To counter the PKI, the army made use of its doctrine of Territorial Warfare, Social System Weapons and Civic Action policies.40 The army's experience in the guerilla war with the Dutch from 1945 to 1949 and the Islamic guerilla war in West Java (1948-1962) benefitted the army during its confrontation with the PKI. The army launched a civic mission and provided socio-economic services in order to attract people to its side. The army was active in building schools, roads, water supplies, power plants, dams and clinics. In addition, the army assisted people in agricultural projects, for example, by providing land for landless peasants, rebuilding rubber plantation, killing rats, and planting sugar cane.41 The news of civic actions shows that the army, like the village bureaucracy incentives for and the (presumably) Muslim their landowners, followers and provided neutral peasants from all areas of East Java. There were also other 39 See Semdam VIII, Sam Karva 251. The situation differed from that of the army of West Java, which maintained and de veloped a territorial command to counter the Islamic rebellion of the 1950s. In 1963, the West Java army command had 330 territorial commands at the sub-district level or kecamatan and 3474 village army NCO's in addition to its 26 battalions of mobile troops. See, Sejarah Militer KODAM Vl/Siliwangi, Esa Hilang Dua Terbilana: Siliwangi dari Masa ke Masa (Bandung: Semdam Vl/Siliwangi, 1980) 90. 40 Sundhaussen 168, 173, and 188. 41 For the news items regarding the army's civic mission, see Appendix A. 122 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === army services such as health centers and medical assistance which were made available to the public. Most likely those who received benefits from the army's civic missions supported the army and rejected the PKI. Despite the army's civic action, the PKI's infiltration of the army was relatively successful. It seems that the closeness of the army to local people also meant closer relations to PKI members and sympathizers. During the coup, there was no significant involvement among high ranking army officers, the highest being lieutenant colonel.*2 But it was discovered that there were about 200 army officers and NCOs who had been "cultivated" by the PKI's special bureau.*3 In addition, there were three army battalions which were heavily infiltrated by the PKI. They were located in regencies where the PKI was strong: battalions 511 and 512 in the Malang regency and battalion 513 in the Blitar regency. In general, the East Java army command estimated that about 30% of its units were involved in the coup.** III.4.THE ARMY IN BALI Most of the army in Bali came from East Java. The It was reported that during the coup, a lieutenant colonel in Malang was arrested after trying to break into an army arsenal and distribute weapons to supporters of the coup in East Java, see Disjarah TNI-AD, Pemberontakan 187. *3 Crouch 83. ** See "Report" 146. 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === percentage of Balinese guerrillas, who had fought the Dutch from 1945 to 1950 and had been incorporated into the regular army was significantly lower than that in East Java. In 1950, a proposal by former Balinese guerrilla fighters to form two battalions was rejected by the central government (Department Defense).*5 Fearing Balinese separatism, the central government prevented the formation of a strong local army there. The central government formed a new battalion (706), consisting of four former Dutch companies and one company of former guerrillas, under the leadership of a former major in the Dutch army.*6 This battalion was not well received by former guerrillas who had first proposed forming their own battalions.*7 In 1950, battalion 706 was posted in Flores?*8 while an East Javanese battalion (battalion VIII, Infantry Regiment 39) from Sukadana/Lumajang (East Java) was moved to Bali.*9 In *5 Pendit, Bali 344. *6 Dinas Sejarah Kodam XVl/Udayana [Disjarah Kodam XVI], Lambanq Lambanq Kesatuan Komando Daerah Militer XVI/Udavana (Denpasar: Dinas Sejarah Kodam XVI/Udayana, 1988) 10. *7 Disjarah Kodam XVI, Lambanq 100-101. Informant no. 20 stated the disappointment of the former guerilla company. *8 Flores is an island east of Bali with a mainly Catholic population, see Figure 1.4 of this thesis. *9 The East Javanese battalion VIII,R. 1-39 was later renamed the 31th battalion (in 1950), and the 702th battalion (in 1950), the 701th battalion (in 1952) and the 741th battalion (in 1965). Its base was in Singaraja, Buleleng regency. See Disjarah Kodam XVI, Lambanq 100-101. One company of the battalion (company 'A') was posted in Kuta, Badung regency, later considered a supporter of the coup. 124 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === addition to the mobile battalion, there was one company of Cakrabirawa (Presidential Palace Guard) at the Tampaksiring Presidential Palace in Bangli, as well as a company of Air Defense Artillery in Gianyar. Prior to 1965, the relatively weak infantry battalion was supported by merely three territorial commands. Together they had eight regencies to control: 50 Kodim (Military District Command) 1627 of Denpasar (Badung) with four territorial army NCO's ("Buterpra or Bintara Urusan Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat"). Kodim 1619 of West Bali in Singaraja three territorial (Buleleng), which had army NCO's and was responsible for the regencies of Tabanan, Buleleng, and Jembrana. Kodim 1624 of East Bali in Klungkung, having three territorial army NCO's cover the regencies Klungkung, Bangli, Gianyar and Karangasem. The lack of an army command in each regency and the insufficiency territorial officers reflected the overall weakness of the military. Moreover, the army in Bali was less active in its civic mission. Perhaps it lacked the personnel and funds. There was a report in Suara Indonesia (Bali), August 8, 1963 in which the army engineering tim left Bali (presumably back to East Java) after three months of helping overcome the damage caused by the eruption of Mount Agung.51 Another civic action by the 50 Disjarah Kodam XVI, Lambanq 70-71. 51 See also Suara Indonesia 1 July 1963. 125 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === army was the "greening" or reforestation of dry land Karangasem, Jembrana, Gianyar, and Tabanan.52 The "greening" program had little direct effect on the people. The lack of civic mission might have contributed to the weak integration between the army and local people. The army commander on Hay 27, 1964 admitted to a decline in discipline among army personnel that: "[The decline on discipline] not only weakens unity, but drives a wedge between the army and the people. [There were] crimes and fights in which servicemen sometimes took the law into their own hands." 3 He ordered all local commanders to take drastic actions against those who were guilty. shows that the army In any case, the comparison in East Java with its civic mission attempted to be close to the people. The remoteness of the army from society was exploited by the PKI in its attempt at cultivating good relations with There were about 30 officers who were "managed" by the PKI's Special Bureau whose task was to infiltrate the armed forces.54 As in the case of pro PKI veterans, the closeness of army units to the PKI affected people's perceptions of the PKI. It was not uncommon for acceptance of the PKI to be brought about at least in part by the close relations that obtained between 52 Suara Indonesia. January 21, 1963. 53 Suara Indonesia May 28, 1964. 54 See Crouch 83. The number was rather high compared to figure for East Java, being 200 when the army in East Java was about 20 to 30 times bigger than Bali's. 126 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 143] === the PKI and a given army unit. In the case of one village an informant relates the following: The PKI in this village was rather high profile since they were often visited by Cakrabirawa (The elite palace guard stationed in Kintamani, bangli). The presence of this unit bolstered the confidence of the PKI. This unit often accompanied PKI members at religious ceremonies in pura [temples] and during planting and harvest seasons. They even took pictures together (informant no. 12) Thus the alliance of the PKI and the palace guard, respected group, gave the PKI a morale boost and attracted lay people to the cause. In this respect, the Cakrabirawa (Palace Guard) functioned as a guarantor or endorser justifying the PKI and its programs. The good relations between army units and the PKI not only bolstered PKI morale but instilled fear among non PKI groups, especially when the PKI's supporters were officers who could easily mobilize their subordinates. In the following I will discuss the role of public figures in the mobilization. III.5. PUBLIC FIGURES IN EAST JAVA AND BALI In regard to Indonesian loyalties both Skinner and Geertz maintain a separation between national loyalty to President Sukarno and local loyalty to hamlet, kinship group, and family. In addition, Skinner in discussing "regional loyalty" refers to the Sultan of Jogja who was neither a local nor 127 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 144] === national figure.55 The notion of regional figure is apt here. One might also include ulama, Balinese Kings, and governors and army regional commanders among personages whose popularity would most likely qualify as regional. many traditional societies, public figures and charismatic individuals are politically important. Together with social organizations and states, public figures shape and direct how society gets mobilized. They relate directly to the masses, regardless the availability organizations. Public figures may not necessarily lead, but they have the ability to create organizations and coalitions. Theoretically, public figures are strongly related to an identification perspective emphasizing affective normative attachment. From this perspective, people identify themselves with certain values and norms, in-group, out-groups (reference group), and public figures. Unlike the exchange or rational choice perspective popular in economics and psychology, the identificatory perspective is applied mainly in sociology and anthropology.56 The ritual: identification reference process resembles it is an end in itself. The process might best be 55 Skinner, "The Nature" 4. 56 The debate over the application of rational choice theory in explaining social action is discussed in Richard Swedberg, ed., Economics and Sociology. Redefining Their Boundaries: Conversations with Economists and Sociologists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Even some economists (e.g. Amartya Sen) question the application of economic rationality to social actions. See Swedberg 249-267. 128 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 145] === referred to as an "emotional choice or expression," rather than a "rational" one. The emotional choice is concerned with social while identification or reference "homo sociologicus" rational choice is a central concept in a rational choice theory that emphasizes "homo economicus." Elster notes: One of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The difference between these two types and the specific actions relating to them have been clarified by Max Weber. He defines the rational actions of homo economicus in terms of "aggregation," and the non-rational actions homo sociologicus in terms of "communalization": The communalization of social relationships occurs if and insofar as the orientation of social behavior— whether in the individual case, on the average or in ideal type— is based on a sense of solidarity: the result of emotional and traditional attachment of the participants. The aggregation of social relationship, on the oicher hand, is the result of reconciliation and a balancing of interests which are motivated either by rational value-judgment or expediency. The above definitions indicate that there are two species social relationships that action may exemplify 57 See John Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 97. 58 Max Weber, Basic Concent in Sociology Trans, and with an Introduction by H.P. Secher. (Secaueus: The Citadel Press, 1980) 91. 129 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === differing degrees. Thus non-rational actions or identificatory actions are irreducible to rational choice theory.59 In the process of identification people identify and orient themselves with respect to prominent individuals or public figures. The affection or commitment that makes this possible was called by Pareto "sentiments of social ranking (hierarchy)."80 Within his hierarchy, Pareto's notion superiority subsumes Merton's idea of a public figure (eminent person, opinion maker/leader) who has no direct relations with lower groups. 61 Such view differs from one where the superior-subordinate relations are identical with those one often finds within organizations. In short, adherence values, solidarity to a group, and loyalty to a certain public figure may best be comprehended as resulting from a process of identification or reference. In the case under study, people identified with a certain figure because they wanted to affirm their commitment to the figure who represented certain values, such as nationalism and Islam. The public figures in question were frequently unknown to their followers personally; still they were known through 59 For an argument that tries to explain social actions with rational choice or economics explanation, see "Gary S. Becker," in Swedberg 27-46. 60 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society. A Treatise of General Sociology (New York: Dover Publications,1963) 686-687. See also George C. Homans and Charles P. Curtis, Jr., An Introduction to Pareto. His Sociology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934) 153-155. 61 For Public figure, see Merton 304. 130 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 147] === their relatives, neighbors, and the mass media. There was no two way interaction between public figures and the people. The situation was not a market place where buyers would face sellers. It was a situation similar to a column where people identify themselves with and follow their leaders. Thera are several popular terms in Indonesia that attempt to capture this: "membebek" (to march like ducks) and "ikut-ikutan" (to follow blindly). We have already had occasion to see the importance of public figures, especially in developing countries where they are seen embody certain esteemed values. Like public figures at the national level, those at the regional level also affected political mobilization. In this regard, the closeness of the governor of Bali, and to a certain extend the army commander of Bali, to the PKI increased the PKI's claim to legitimacy and power. Governor Suteja was the son of king Jembrana and was a nationalist youth leader during the independence movement. The relation between Suteja and Sukarno was very close. Suteja was considered more a Sukarnoist than a staunch supporter of the PKI. For Sukarno, whose mother was Balinese, Bali was a second capital. Sukarno might respect Suteja's father (the king of Jembrana) who proved to be a valuable supporter following his recognition of the Indonesian republics. Immediately after the proclamation of 1945, the other seven kings refused to join the newly independent Indonesia. They went so far as to form 131 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 148] === armed militia, supported by the Dutch, for the purpose of fighting those supporting Indonesian independence. The armed militia in Jembrana was formed by the rival noble house of the 1950 Suteja was a candidate for the position commander of the army in Sunda Kecil (Bali, Lombok, Flores, Timor) 63 but the creation of this force (seven battalions) was rejected by the central government in Jakarta.6* In the same year Sukarno chose Suteja to lead Bali over a candidate from the Klungkung palace.65 During the governor's election in Bali in 1959, Suteja, who was supported by the socialist PSI, was again chosen by Sukarno even though he lost to I Nyoman Mantik who had received the support of the PNI, the then dominant party.66 Thus, prior to 1965, Suteja was at odds with the PNI and became an ally of the PKI though he was from Partindo (Party of Indonesia, a small leftist-nationalist party).67 Prior to 1965, the land reform program made Suteja and the PKI strong allies. Moreover, Suteja also selected a PKI members as regent although he was a loser in the election. 62 Robinson 10-15. 63 See Figure 1.4 of this thesis. 6* Pendit, Bali 344. 65 Pemda Bali 45. 66 See Suweda 87-88. 67 Crouch 77-78. See also Sutton 29. 68 Sarwa 62. 132 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 === [PDF page 149] === His reasoning was that Nasakom elements (Nationalism, Islam, and Communism) should be represented on the Executive and the National Fronts at the regional and district levels. Another public figure was the army commander Brigadier General Syafiudin with whom Sukarno had very close relations. During the PKI rebellion of 1948, Syafiudin was a battalion commander in Jember; he was dropped into Trenggalek, near Kediri, to join his battalion which was then fighting the PKI's troops.89 However, prior to 1965, his political rhetoric resembled Sukarno's, and it benefitted the PKI. In June 1964, during the anniversary the army Military Police, he warned that counter revolutionaries were trying to infiltrate the state apparatus.70 He further maintained that the state apparatus should not represent feudalists and landlords. On Labor Day May 1, 1965 he is reported as having said that workers and peasants should be armed to destroy stated that workers should destroy not higher wages simply demand imperialism. capitalist and better also society, and clothing.71 Semdam VIII, "Sam Karva" 180-184, 194. 70 This was reported in Suara Indonesia June 23, 1964. The army Military Police in Bali was considered one of the army units that supported the 1965 coup, see Sarwa 67. 71 See Suara Indonesia May 3, 1965. In East Kalimantan, prior to 1965, the old army commander's rhetoric was full of revolutionary slogans, and he was very close to the PKI. This commander also had direct relations with Sukarno. His subordinates, who were mostly from Java, were not anti PKI, and even had sympathy for it. The new commander (Brigadier General Sumitro) discharged three lieutenant colonels (a 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === It was also said that his wife publicly supported the PKI.72 Suteja and Syafiudin must seen relation Sukarno's position within the national triangle of Sukarno, the PKI and the army. Unlike Sukarno, who had enormous charisma, these two figures failed to balance the PKI against its opponents. At the regional level, the balance of power politics led polarization the PKI and organizations. No third position would be allowed. non PKI In this respect, Suteja's history of antagonism of the PNI and his imitation of Sukarno's role brought him closer to the PKI. This also applies to Syafiudin whose close relationship with Sukarno also brought him close to the PKI. In contrast to the situation in Bali, in East Java, there were no regional public figures who supported the PKI. The principal regional public figures in East Java were eminent kiyai (senior ulama) who were strongly anti PKI.73 Kiyai are charismatic individuals having social and political organizations at their disposal. Most of them were from the NU and had a kinship network in the province.74 The most eminent battalion and district commander, a district commander, and a territorial assistant), and closed the province, arresting PKI leaders. See Chudori 47-61. 72 Dewa [Soe Hok Gie],"The Mass Killings in Bali," Cribb, "The Indonesian" 254. 73 For the role of kiyai in general, Javanese Kiyai" 228-249. see Geertz, "The 74 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren. Studi Tentana Pandanaan Hiduo Kivai (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982) 61-87. 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 151] === kiyai became members of Svuriah or "Council of Kiyai." All decisions by Syuriah, such as, calling for a jihad, were regarded as legitimate and were obeyed by many Muslims. Other important figures such as the governor (a Brigadier General) and army commander likewise found themselves at odds with the PKI. In 1963, the governor, who was a candidate of the East Java army division, won over the PKI's candidate who later became the deputy of Governor.75 The Governor, who had considerable backing from the NU opposed by the left-wing PNI and the PKI.77 In 1964, the PKI tried unsuccessfully to unseat him several times.78 Although the PKI could count on the support of the pro PKI deputy governor,79 the bureaucracy was dominated by the PNI. In addition, the East Java army commander, along with a majority army officers, was anti PKI. 1960, the commander and staff officers from East Java called a meeting with other regional commanders in order to ask Sukarno to ban the PKI. When Sukarno defended the PKI, however, they did not dare confront him. 80 October 1965, the regional commander and the army chief planned to meet President Sukarno 75 Obor Revolusi May 22, 1963, SPS. 76 "Report" 149. 77 See Walkin 838. 78 Obor Revolusi December 14, 1964, SPS. 79 80 Walkin 840, see also Crouch 38. See Sundhaussen 149. 135 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 152] === in order to discuss PKI's activities in East Java, which appeared to them disruptive.81 In summary, the comparison between East Java and Bali strongly suggests that the PKI in Bali was the greater beneficiary of the status of public figures. By contrast, the PKI in East Java had to face off against the charismatic ulama, the governor, following table and the army regional commander. compares the PKI's power in The East Java and Bali: Table III.l. Public Figures, Social Challenger, and the Army in East Java and Bali Public Figure Challenger/PKI Army Sympathy East Java none 30%* 30%b Bali governor 25-30%° 50%d Sources:* The result of the 19S7 rational. election, saa also Hindley 223. k "Raport" 146. Sana tarritorlal units and thraa battalions In araas whars the PKI was strong wars heavily infiltratad by tha PKI. According to Russell’s index, 30Z disloyalty was considered "considerableaaa Russell, 74. c Thera is no formal indicator of the strength of tha PKI. In 1933, tha PKI had only 7.9 Z but after tha dissolution of tha socialist PSI in 1960 ar.d the land reform of 1963, tha PKI had more followers. According to two informants (no. 12 and 16) the PKI controlled between 23Z and 30Z of the people. ** There were many units Involved in the coup. Moreover, involvement of high ranking officers was more common in Bali than in East Java. The real percentage is unknown, but it might be in excess of 30Z. According to Russell the disloyalty of army was considerable (26-50Z), majority (31-93Z), and all (96-100Z). Thus, the army in Bali mr.y be classified "low-majority" in favor of tha PKI. Saa Russell 74. 81 John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay, 1967) 35. The regional commander had strong anti communist convictions, see Sundhaussen 171. Following the coup, he was promoted to Minister of Veteran Affairs and later became Minister of Interior. 136 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 153] === The data Table III.1. can presented the following figure: Most Likely Bali 100% Army Disloyalty East Java Least Likely Figure 1II.1. The PKI's Likelihood of Success in East Java and Bali. The above figure indicates that the PKI had a greater chance of seizing power and control state in Bali than it did in East Java. The support of regional figures in Bali shown in the vertical line) and sympathy in the army increased the likelihood of success for the PKI. In this chapter, I have shown how the PKI, which lacked an electoral majority, attempted to increase its power by allying itself with public figures and infiltrating military units. In East Java, the PKI had less success gaining the 137 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 154] === support of the deputy governor only. Moreover, public figures such as kiyai countered the influential PKI's efforts toward communization. The PKI also had to face territorial army units and their civic action programs. However, the PKI retained the possibility of gaining the sympathy of some army units with bases in abangan areas. In Bali, the PKI benefitted from good relations with the governor as well as army commander who were similar to Sukarno in their relations with the PKI. Moreover, the PKI had better relations with the army which was mainly from East Java. In short, the chances for a PKI victory in Bali were greater. In the following chapter, I will discuss the impact of the PKI's strategy as well as public figures and the military in regards to the development of the conflict in East Java and Bali prior to 1965. 138 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === CHAPTER IV PKI'S REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS AND RURAL CONFLICTS The previous chapter described the PKI's mobilization. We now proceed to discuss the impact of a number of actions initiated by the PKI, particularly its "unilateral action" or land seizure. deliberately This mobilize event evident that peasants part the PKI their mass radicalization or "revolutionary gymnastics." In this chapter, I will show how the PKI shifted from the political competition that existed during the 1955 and 1957 elections to a direct confrontation with state and private estates in 1961. I will also discuss how the PKI since 1963 began to implement "unilateral action" or land seizure that led to conflict with other social forces, particularly NU in East Java and PNI in Bali. Examining rural conflict, we find that the confrontation was not limited to issues pertaining to land; it included issues of politics and religion. A review of newspaper reports gives some indication as to how widespread the conflict in rural areas was. Such conflict was particularly evident in East Java and Bali during the period 1963-1965. However, not all areas experienced conflict and not all conflicts resulted in casualties. Several factors, such as the balance of power between the PKI and its opponents help explain the different 139 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 156] === patterns of conflict. IV.1. LAND REFORM AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION The land conflict originated with the land reform act of 1960. This act was the result of a compromise between radical and conservative factions. The radicals included the PKI and some members of the (left wing) PNI who demanded that land be redistributed to those who tilled it. On the other hand, conservatives who were mainly orthodox Muslims resisted the reform program.1 The compromise, supported by the reformists, was to redistribute land which was above the maximum allowable standard: five hectares for irrigated land and seven for dry land, but this varied with population density. In addition, loss of excess land was to be compensated for. Sukarno was a strong proponent of reformist land reform and he argued and supported its implementations: The government has decided upon "the Draft Agrarian Law".... This is important, most important, progress in Indonesian Revolution! The Indonesian Revolution without Land Reform is just a building without foundation.... And yet, do not imagine that the Land Reform which we want to implement is "Communist." We still recognize the property rights over land. People may still own hereditary lands.. .. This is not "Communist"! Besides that, do not people know that many non-communist countries also carry out land reform? Pakistan... Egypt... Iran is carrying out land reform.2 The implementation of land reform did not go smoothly; 1 See Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 14. 2 Soekarno, Toward Freedom and Dignity of Man (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961) 102-103. 140 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 157] === there were many factors hampering it: the lack of data, the resistance of landowners, and the lack of preparation by the local land reform committee.3 The PKI was the most ardent supporter of land reform, and by supporting land reform, it became Sukarno's supporter, thereby alienating its enemies/ In 1964 the PKI Congress pushed the idea that the PKI had to get closer to peasants in order to radicalize them.5 special program; they government programs. The PKI did not need to create a merely However, attempted implement the PKI adopted in place of Sukarno's moderate land reform policy one of its own: one which demanded that land be distributed to those who tilled Landless peasants also tended to become convinced that with the help and guidance of the PKI they were actually supporting a government program. All conflicts or revolutionary movements are the result of internal pressure or external mobilization. The former is Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 18-20. Soerojo suggests that land reform did not fail, see Soerojo 133. 4 The PKI had also came up with a brilliant idea during the campaign of the 1955 general election, promising that if they won they would elect Sukarno as president; other parties did not touch this issue. In Indonesia, the president was chosen by parliamentary members in accordance with the constitution, not by a direct election. This strategy was considered excellent even by PKI's enemy, see Mohammad Hatta, Bung Hatta's Answers: Interviews Dr. Mohammad Hatta with Dr. Z. Yasni (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1981) 33. 5 Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 7. 6 The PKI's version was defeated Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 14. in parliament. 141 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. See === [PDF page 158] === addressed by the "outside agitator" model while the latter is incorporated within the "pressure cooker" model.7 In many cases, the two existed in differing degrees. Conflict over land prior to 1965 was a mobilized effort by the PKI to gain power. This conflict was not merely a spontaneous agrarian uprising that owed its existence to local pressures and socio-economic hardships. There were widespread food or tax riots prior to the conflict.8 The movement was conducted by peasants or youths from the PKI, and not byall or the majority of the peasants. The rural unrest fostered by the PKI was a part of a revolutionary strategy that included other programs, such as the demand for the creation of the fifth force. In a private conversation, Aidit (the PKI Chairman) said that the PKI attempted to radicalize rural areas in the pretext of land reform program: We are going down to the people... there is now a law of land reform. But it is not implemented. We are going to incite the people to demand its implementation. We are going to do it legally. From the Bupati (the Shire Head) down, the government apparatus does not implement land reform. That is why we are going to incite the people to make legal These models are mentioned in Walter L. Goldfrank, "The Mexican Revolution," Revolutions: Theoretical. Comparative, and Historical Studies, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986) 105. There was a report of starvation in Ponorogo in 1961, but the hardship was overcome, see Harian Umum June 30, 1961, SPS. Mortimer states after surveying Djakarta Press that there were no 'food riots or other forms of overt social unrest in the villages or small towns of unusual size or extent.' See Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 31. 142 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === demands. Formerly, we did wrong in Madiun [the 1948 rebellion]. We did it illegally. Now we are doing it legally, based on law on land re|orm, which is legal but is not being implemented." It is clear that the PKI deliberately made use of the land reform program as a means to increase its power. The success this strategy, however, depended on the land inequality in each area. A comparison of socio-economic conditions and internal pressures prior to 1965 shows that the situation in Bali was worse than that in East Java. The population density of East Java in 1961 was 455 per square kilometer while Bali it was only 341.10 However, according land reform committee, there were 3,701 landowners who had 83,065 hectares of excess land out of a total land mass in Bali's 556,100 hectares which had two million people.11 The average landowner's excess land amounted 22.4 hectares. The great inequality land ownership in Bali owed much to the presence of the puri (noble houses) which controlled vast territories. The situation in Bali was worsened by Mount Agung's eruption in 1963. Of Bali's two million population, 93,785 became refugees and 148,109 9 See Hatta 25-26. 10 The above figure is calculated from the 1961 census, 82% of Bali's population lived in the southern part of the island which had only 76,6% of the island's area. The average population per square kilometer was less dense or 321 if we consider the population as evenly distributed. 11 Suara Indonesia May 24, 1962, SPS. 143 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 160] === were menaced by hunger.12 By contrast, there were only 83,750 hectares of excess land owned by private and state estates out of a total of 4,792,200 hectares in East Java (eight times that of Bali).13 Of this land, 45,060 hectares of excess private property was owned 7,219 people from population.1* The average landowner excess land. It varied East Java's had from 10 hectares 22 million hectares in Magetan to hectares in Jember.15 In short, socio-economic hardship prior to 1965 was worse in Bali than in East Java. However, conflict land itself did not between rich and landless peasants. period between between inequality the PKI 1961 and and 1963, state and result During the conflict in East Java was private estates,18 whereas between 1963 and 1965, the PKI came into conflict with other political groups, in particular the NU in East Java, and the 12 Suara Indonesia June 21, 1963, SPS. 13 See Indonesia Daily News December 31, 1964, SPS and Diawa Timur Triweekly January 27, 1965, SPS. x* Harian Umum November 22, 1962, SPS. 15 For Magetan see Suara Rakvat October 4, 1961, SPS: for Jember, see Harian Umum December 5, 1962, SPS. The number of landowners in Kediri could not be obtained. In the nearby Madiun residency (5 regencies), the average of landowners' excess land was 7,45 hectares, see Suara Rakyat October 4, 1961, SPS. Excess land includes irrigated and unirrigated lands. 16 There were many reports regarding this conflict in SPS 1961-1963. The British, Belgian, and French owned 37 estates with 39,686 workers, while the state had 82 estates with 107,068 workers, see Diawa Timur June 2, 1962, SPS. 144 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === PNI in Bali. Between 1961 and 1963, the PKI through its peasant front (BTI) protested in support of allowing peasants to till estate land,17 and for lowering rent within the estates.18 addition, the PKI labor union demanded pay raise and a lower work load in state companies. The PKI also incited landless peasants to seize the land of state plantations.19 In some cases, the state managers, army, resisted the assisted by the police and the demands. management was more willing estate. The East Java 20 Estate other cases, distribute Service the state neglected maintained land that 74 neglected estates would be distributed in the regencies of Malang, Besuki, Surabaya, Kediri, and Jombang.21 In general, during the period of protest against the state and private estates (1961-1963), the PKI's peasant union (BTI), its estate workers union (Sarbupri), and its sugar workers union (SBG) took the lead. At that time, non-PKI labor organizations such as the NU and the PNI became passive or took free ride. There were events where all labors 17 For example, it took place in Jember, see Diawa Timur November 15, 1962, SPS. 16 This occurred in Jember, see Diawa Timur September 8, 1961, SPS. 19 There were many instances of this, Diawa Timur June 2, 1962, SPS. for example see 20 The "Jengkol affair” in 1961 in Kediri was the most well known, see Diawa Pos November 18, 1961, SPS. 21 Suara Rakyat November 11, 1964, SPS. 145 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === organizations (PKI's Sobsi, PNI's KBKI, and NU's Sarbumusi) took part in protesting the state/army formed labor union (SOKS1).22 These three labor unions also conducted a joint action to demand a 100% pay raise for the sugar worker of East Java.23 During the period 1961-1963, horizontal conflict between labor plantations and peasants, who were mostly from the PKI, and estate (state and private) managers were conspicuous. Between 1963 and 1965, the PKI widened the scope of the conflict by launching unilateral actions (land seizures and the demands to increase sharecropping). The PKI initiated horizontal conflict between landowners, mostly form the NU and PNI, and tillers. This conflict turned the already vertical structure into a more consolidated group. At this time, the PKI directly confronted the other major social groups: the NU and PNI in East Java and the PNI in Bali. The NU was under the control of kiyai/ulama while the PNI was the party of the village, and regional bureaucrats. Revolutionary conflict, as a new phenomenon, resulted in a new social reality constructed by both the PKI and its opponents.2* The two parties had to redefine the political 22 23 Trompet Masvarakat July 9, 1963, SPS. Trompet Masvarakat April 2, 1963, SPS. 2* For a reconstruction of social reality see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden 146 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === arena from a competitive political market (prior to 1963) to a battle field where political and human survival became the new stakes. Social interaction also changed, and new violent actions, such as beatings, kidnapping, and killings, replaced prior actions, such as "horse trading." Moreover, these new activities took place all year-round, not just before general elections or the election of village heads. This conflict had important implications for all villages, though not all areas experienced those conflicts. The mass media and political organizations propagated news of the conflicts, leading to solidarity within both PKI and its opponents. Thus, conflicts as social realities were trans ferred, imagined, reconstructed, and mostly over dramatized, by people in other areas who did not experience the conflict. A transfer of emotion took place. This explains why areas without prior conflict experienced mass killings following the coup.25 Members the organization from other areas and orders form supra local organization played an important part. But the psychology of the local participants who were solidary with their friends experiencing the conflicts led to a revenge situation, as though they had also prior conflicts. Following the PKI's unilateral action or land seizure, Sukarno did not denounce it, rather, on the contrary, he was angry with the slowness of its implementation. This is what he 25 These occurred in the villages studied (Kediri in East Java and Tabanan in Bali). 147 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === said in his annual address on August 17, 1964 in which he stated: I know that there are efforts to implement the land reform, but frankly speaking, I am not satisfied! I ’received many reports regarding the obstacles, even sabotages of it.... I cannot wait any longer: Land Reform Act must immediately be accomplished in Java, Madura and Bali. For other regions I can wait for one or two more years.... Once more: Land Reform Act must be implemented soon in Java, Madura, and Bali.... Sukarno's strong support for land reform had different implications for East Java and Bali. East Java, the acceleration of land reform was countered strongly by the Muslims, especially those from the NU, and the nationalist village bureaucracy. Declaration" The December situation 1964. There led the Sukarno "Bogor asked all competing parties to cease all conflict and unify themselves around the Nasakom (Nationalism, Communism, and Islam).27 The forced implementation of land reform (unilateral action) resulted in wide spread conflict and put the PKI on the defensive. A newspaper reported that between Sukarno's annual address (TAVIP) 1965 of August 17, 1964 and that of January (five months), four wounded, 409 were BTI/PKI arrested, and cadres 13 were PKI's killed, houses 43 were 25 The above quotation is a translation of Sukarno's annual address of 1964, see Soekarno, "Tahun "Vivere Pericolosi," Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Jakarta: Jambatan, 1965) 579. 27 See Mortimer, Indonesian Communism 322. 148 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === destroyed. 28 Even the chairman of the PKI had to admit that the PKI's revolutionary actions had backfired; however, blamed the the failure more BTI/PKI cadres, not aggressiveness of anti-PKI forces, such as Muslim youths: The efforts these reactionary landlords succeeded because of the mistakes of some party cadres.... In several places, BTI [PKI's peasant union] cadres, carried away their desire to spread the peasants immediately, became impatient, indulged in individual heroism, were insufficiently concerned with 2gdeveloping the consciousness of The impact of Sukarno's annual address in Bali was an acceleration in implementing the program. In Bali, this was encouraged by the governor as well the chief the agrarian bureau, himself a PKI supporter. The governor had been active since 1961 and had issued orders to implement land reform and protect landless peasants and sharecroppers. These orders were; 30 first, order regarding sharecroppers August 29, 1962 no. 6/1/206; second, an order pertaining to the withdrawal of tilled land April 24, 1963 No. A6/1/104; third, an order having to do with disputes over tilled land, July 30, 1963 No. 7/Pem-4/Rahasia [secret]; fourth, an order regarding the sharecroppers act, November 1963, A6/1/641; and, fifth, instructions regarding the settlement of 28 Diawa Timur January 27, 1965, SPS. 29 Mortimer, The Communist Party 60. Appendix B shows that in East Java, the PKI's cadres and activists became victims rather than aggressors. 30 See Suluh Marhaen July 14, 1966. 149 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 166] === pawned land, June 17, 1961 No. 74/A6?l-124. The governor's orders show that he was trying hard to advance the land reform laws of 1960 since 1961. Moreover, Suteja's position as Pepelrada Authority) power. 31 (Regional Dwikora Executive since September 1964 had given him considerable As one informant stated, the governor became more active following Sukarno's annual address of 1964: Governor Suteja backed the program which was a President's order. For the Governor, his support of the program was solely as a show of his loyalty to the President who wished that the program could be implemented soon. I knew with certainty that the Governor was a Sukarno's loyalist and that people knew about this, (informant No. 15) Even before Sukarno's annual address (August 17, 1964), Suteja had said in May 1964 that the implementation of the land reform act had to be completed by the "National Day of thePeasant," September 24, accordingto central 1964. government It would still dead line (the overdue end 1963).32 The increase in land conflict finally resulted in an explosive situation. Neither the national consensus nor the "Bogor Declaration" could defuse the situation. On March 24, Pepelrada was the head of the anti-Malaysia campaign. All (22) provinces Pepelrada were the local army commander except in Bali and three other provinces. See Sundhaussen 186. By appointing army commanders and governors in a parallel structure (such as the Command to Crush Malaysia) outside of ministries of defence/army commands and interior, Sukarno had direct commands to regional army commanders and governors, and vice versa. 32 Suara Indonesia May 18, 1964. 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 167] === 1965, the seven (the five political parties and the "Panca Tunggal" regional authority: the governor, the army commander, the police chief, the regional attorney, and the high judge), issued a joint statement of unity in their obedience to Sukarno and the Bogor Declaration, and to crush neocolonialism and imperialism.33 RURAL CONFLICT HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES In discussing conflict prior to 1965, it will prove useful to review the historical and theoretical perspective on rural conflict. Previous studies rural conflict Indonesia provide a limited understanding of the conflict prior to 1965. There were unrest and violence caused by interkingdoms or noble houses wars, succession rivalries,3* millenarian/messianic movements,35 colonialist intrusion, tax revolts, independence/guerrilla movements, and Islamic rebellion. Most conflicts described in these studies were 33 Suara Indonesia March 24, 1965. In Hindu and Islamic kingdoms or princedoms succession wars were common largely because the polygamy system resulted in rivalry, especially among older princes from concubines versus younger princes from queens. For an account of succession conflict in Java see H.J. de Graaf, Disintearasi Mataram dibawah Manakurat I (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafitipers, 1987) 3-10, 31-37. 35 For the best historical interpretation of the Javanese messianic movement, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt University Press, 1972) 71-125. 151 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 168] === frequent. However, we require an explanation different for the rural conflict 1965. The conflict was sort previously unknown. addition historical studies, there have been several theories that attempt to explain the rural unrest.36 We shall begin with the theory advanced by Joel Migdal who identifies non-peasant organizations and non-local factors such as imperialism and population increase, withdrawal of patronage, new taxes and diminishing income.37 Even though his theory may help explain rural unrest in Indonesia under Dutch colonialism, it is weak in explaining the unrest that resulted from PKI's land invasion policy prior to 1965.38 addition capitalism created revolutionary Migdal, Eric Wolf notes that world a macro change may lead to the creation of peasants. 39 Like Migdal's, Wolf's analysis promotes an understanding of rural unrest during the colonial era but offers little insight into the Indonesian rural unrest that began in 1963. World capitalism as a macro change did not 36 A part of this discussion is based on Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary"? Power and Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia. Europe, and Latin America, eds. Robert P. Weller and Scott E. Gugenheim (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982) 157-179. 37 Joel S. Migdal, Peasants. Politics, and Revolution: Pressure toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) 110. 38 Migdal discusses briefly the colonial Indonesian situation quoting Geertz's analysis, see Migdal 236-237. 39 Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper S Row, 1969) 276, 288-289. 152 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 169] === necessarily lead to a revolutionary movement of peasants. Land invasion prior to 1965 was not a spontaneous movement. It was in fact a political mobilization from above by the PKI. The invasion was part of the PKI’s revolutionary program. The situation prior 1965 cannot explained Jeffery Paige's theory either.40 The revolutionary movement of the PKI was not caused by a particular agriculture system such as sharecropping system as Paige's theory would suggest. The presence of the PKI and its revolutionary program was a sufficient condition revolutionary situation all agricultural systems prior to 1965.41 The revolutionary movement even included attacks on the village bureaucracy which was controlled by the nationalist PNI and managers of private and state estates. Thus, it was the implementation the PKI's program that led revolutionary situation, not the sources of incomes and the Jeffery M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution; Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 1975). 41 Paige discusses the exception of Malaya [Malaysia] that had a revolutionary movement in plantation (rubber) caused by the Malayan Communist party. Paige 50-51. This only shows that the presence of communist party was actually correlated with a revolutionary movement. Unfortunately, his case study of the correlation between sharecropping systems and revolutionary movements was Vietnam which lacked plantation or commercial haciendas. He discusses Peru— based on the data of 1955-1970— as an example of hacienda where conflict was labor reform. However, the presence of Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) since 1980 can change the pattern of conflict to a revolutionary one. This shows that mobilization by a party can be more important than a combination of income and agricultural system in shaping patterns of social conflicts. 153 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === types agricultural systems. Prior I960, the PKI's competitive program did not create a revolutionary situation in rural areas. study, not analyze plantations but one description of a sugar plantation in Kediri before 1965 shows that the revolutionary situation created by the PKI's sugar estate labor union (SBG) was countered by the labor unions of Islam/NU (Sarbumusi) and the nationalist PNI (KBG). This analysis shows that the revolutionary situation would have emerged in a plantation estate, not just a reformist labor movement suggested counterrevolutionary vertical, movement Paige. was not Moreover, the horizontal, but emanating from other labor unions. The vertical counter response was reinforced when the plantation management cut the wages of the SBG/PKI workers union and transferred them to the other two unions. Finally, the help of regency troops preserved the status quo until the 1965 coup.*2 Another analysis is based on the effect of the friction caused by the development of world capitalism, the collapse of colonial states, organizations.*3 and This the emergence analysis underscores revolutionary the macro politico-military dimension of peasant revolutionary unrest. *2 The vivid description of this process prior to the coup was given by the son of the plantation director, who was not an NU or PNI man, but was defended by the two unions since he symbolized the PKI's enemy. See Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI or Non-PKI?" Indonesia 40 (1985): 37-56. *3 Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants" 177-78. 154 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === This analysis nay well explain the Indonesian guerrilla movenent of 1945-1949 when rural youths, whatever their status and background, participated in the nationalist inter-imperialist rivalry between the struggle. The Japanese and the Dutch-British in 1945, leading to the collapse of the Japanese state in Indonesia, provided an ample opportunity for rural military organizations.** Political factors (inter empire rivalry and nationalism) are, therefore, highly significant factors in rural, as well as urban, unrest. However, this account will not explain the rural unrest, after 1963, which originated in the PKI's revolutionary path to power. Charles Tilly and Samuel Huntington provide theories of political order worthy of consideration.*5 Tilly’s analysis identifies very large social changes such as urbanization, industrialization, resulting and state making as the primary factors collective actions and violence.*6 However, The Islamic guerrilla organizations were the Hizbullah and the Sabililah, while the nationalists were represented by the former Japanese-created local army (PETA/the Defender of the Fatherland), the student army (TRIP), and other small groups. For those military organizations, see Kartodirdjo, Modern Indonesia, particularly chapter IV. "The Role of Struggle Organization as Mass Movements in the Indonesian Revolution." *5 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization. and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). *6 Tilly discusses the macro or "causal analysis" or external forces of collective action and mobilization in addition to the micro and "purposive model" emphasizing internal factors such as interest, organization, mobilization, threat, and opportunity, see Tilly, From Mobilization 229. 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 172] === Indonesian unrest and violence was not the result of what Tilly identifies as macro changes. change— if non-revolutionary, Communization— a macro such as in Finland, French, Italy and India or Indonesia during 1950s, did not lead to revolutionary situation. In addition, Huntington's analysis of political disorder and violence as the result of "... the gap aspirations and expectations produced by the escalation of aspirations which particularly occur in the early phases of modernization" is inapplicable.47 Indonesia in 1945, following independence, experienced social mobilizations that included "urbanization, increase literacy, education, and media exposure."48 However, political instability and rural unrest, beginning in 1963, was not caused by this social mobilizations? the cause was the PKI's revolutionary strategy. Moreover, rural unrest after 1963 cannot be subsumed under Huntington's "Green uprising" when political parties made rural areas the target their organizational efforts.49 Indonesia experienced the "Green uprising" 1955 and 1957 when parties competed in general and local elections. After 1963, communization became a "Red uprising," 47 See Huntington, Political Order 56. 48 Huntington maintains that social mobilization without economic development results in social frustration. And social frustration without political participation can lead to political instability. See Huntington, Political Order 47, 55. 49 Huntington, Political Order 433-461. 156 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === occurring both in rural and urban areas. In 1950s, Geertz analyzed the "Green uprising" where rural areas were organized by political parties in preparation for the general elections. Geertz argues that religious, and ideological tensions, coupled with the decolonization and increased status mobility, exacerbated the conflict. However, he considered several factors that had a tendency to moderate the conflict: (a) The sense of a common culture, including the increasing importance nationalism, which emphasizes what all Javanese (or Indonesians) have in common rather than their differences. (b) The fact that religious patterns do not become embodied in social forms directly, purely and simply, but in many devious ways, so that religious commitments— to class, neighborhood, etc.— tend to balance off, and various "mixed type" individuals and groups arise which can play an important meditating role. (c) A general tolerance based on a "contextual relativism" which sees certain values appropriate context and so minimizes "missionization." (d) The steady growth of social mechanism for a pluralistic, non syncretic form social integration within which people of radically differing social outlook and basic values can, nevertheless, get along well enough, with one another to keep society functioning. actions, clear the that prior conflict was the manageable. PKI's revolutionary Geertz described situation of rural conflict during the election of a village head. Tensions had begun a year before the elections and ended 50 Geertz, The Religion 356. 157 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 174] === when the new village head was elected. ("Nearly a year of political warfare was over.") Even, the competing factions made a pact before the support his enemy election where candidate would position were given after election.51 Another analysis by Robert Jay characterizes the conflict prior to 1960 as mostly limited to rural elections, such as for a village head. Each party and faction tried "to unseat other's members as officials in favor of their own."52 With the PKI's revolutionary strategy since 1963, the moderating mechanism of social tensions ceased and conflict led to a situation where the winner got all. The situation was ripe and ready for a civil war. The unrest prior to 1965 was organized from above, and it useful we examine it. Jeffrey Race provides theoretical framework based on the exchange theory in order to explain the buildir.zjof revolutionary movements.53 Using his theoretical framework, we PKI find that, in general, the lacked both the material and spiritual resources to support their ideas of land reform. Unlike Vietnam wherethe guerilla 51 Geertz, The Social History 202. 52 Jay 104-105. In rural elections, an elected village head could appoint a village bureaucracy including the secretary, heraldman, irrigation man, and security official, each was to be compensated with a portion of communal land. 53 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 158 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === government controlled incentives as well provide given party and as coerce people, promises.54 Furthermore, religion, area and could the PKI the vertical bureaucratic patronage promise could only alliance hampered the development of horizontal class formation. East Java and Bali represented a situation where the PKI could only promise land while non-PKI factions (the Muslim NU and the nationalist PNI) provided material incentives to their followers. Close 1965, East Java, the Muslims and the nationalist landowners only accepted sharecroppers from their political parties (the NU and the PNI). Moreover, Muslim landowners transferred their excessive land to the mosque (wakaf) to avoid land reform. In Bali, landowners or puri (noble houses) illegally distributed land to their fellow PNI members or forced neutral landless peasants to become PNI members. The PKI sharecroppers found the situation more difficult since there were very few PKI landowners. Moreover, most small landowners, who by laws were exempted from land reform, did not support the PKI's version of land reform or the "land for the tiller" program. In addition, the kiyai provided spiritual incentives (promise) such as heavenly reward for fighting the (atheist) 54 In 1948-1962, the Islamic rebellion in West Java created a parallel government and approached village heads before controlling the villages. If local people were supportive, the village heads were promoted to higher positions, e.g. from a village commander to a subdistrict commander. See Jackson, 16. 159 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 176] === PKI. Thus, values (particularly those of Islam for the santri) delimited policies of the PKI. The presence of spiritual incentives countered the promises made by the revolutionary movement. Race has shown how the revolutionary movement in Vietnam faced difficulty in dealing with a village (Luong Hoa) that was mostly Catholic.55 In this regard, the presence of Islam as a strong social institution clearly helped block the PKI's mobilization.56 Thus, the santri community around the pesantren and the kiyai mobilized to protect their religion, not just their land. They had a supra local organization, the NU, which was established in 1926 and functioned as a strong political party since the 1955 general election. IV. 3. LAND CONFLICT IN RURAL AREAS In what follows I shall discuss conflicts prior to 1965 in the villages studied. Not all villages experienced conflict Race 186-187. In Italy, the role of Catholic with Christian Democratic party hampered the development of communism, see David I. Kertzer, Comrades and Christians; Religion and political struggle in Communist Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). I find that the success of communism in China was also caused by the nature of Confucianism, not just communist doctrine. Confucianism lacked ideological symbols. Mao Tsetung was correct when he said: "Apart from their other characteristics, China's 600 million people have two remarkable peculiarities; they are, first of all, poor, and secondly blank." R.J. Rummel, China's Bloody Century. Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991) 205. Muslim (santri) peasants in Java were poor but their minds were full of Islamic symbols. In addition, the literati had no power base; it differed from the kiyai with their pesantren. 160 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === but this does not mean that they did not feel its presence. They might have seen, heard, and have been told about the conflict by neighboring villagers or relatives from other villages. I will begin by discussing land conflict in East Java. Land Conflict in East Java Prior to the coup of 1965, there were conflicts over land that resulted in casualties opponents in both the PKI and its (the NU and the PNI). The East Java Newspapers reported that most conflicts took place in regencies where the two conflicting parties had equal power, Banyuwangi and Kediri. The conflicts such as Jombang, took the forms beatings, house burning and killings. In general, the PKI was turned into defensive: there were more PKI members killed and house burned.57 During the land reform period and unilateral action, the Kediri area was relatively peaceful: We can negotiate with the PKI and the negotiator was the head of NU. There was only one owner (seven ha) whose land was distributed in landreform. The owner gave the land (two ha) and until now the land has not been returned to the owner. (Informant no. Another fact was the giving of one hectare of land from a Muslim land owner to the mosque in Kediri l. Some Muslims landowners evaded land reform and gave their land to the 57 Appendix B shows the conflicts and their locations. 161 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === mosque 'religious land' (wakaf) rather than have redistributed to PKI tillers.38 The wakaf according to the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law, Article 49, Section 3, was protected by law.30 In short, land reform in Kediri 1 and 2 did not become an issue since the surplus land was very scarce. On the other hand, in a nearby sugar plantation the conflict became quite intense: in 1961, 8 peasants, mobilized by the PKI, were killed and 48 were injured by the police and the army following their attempt control the estate land.60 Prior to 1965, there were strikes conducted by the PKI's plantation labor union (Sarbupri). These were countered by the NU union (SBG) and the nationalist PNI conflict almost led to a physical clash, but the arrival of 58 There is very little news about the land transfer, but this does not mean that it did not occur or that it was a rare phenomenon. An Islamic school (pesantren) in East Java, for example, received 240 hectares, see Tornquist 219. A haji from Solo donated his 300 hectares in the Ngawi regency to Pondok Gontor and the Muhamadiyah in Ponorogo. This was a violation of the law and the land was confiscated by the government, see Trompet Masvarakat November 25, 1962, SPS. Contenay reported how a high official who was a haji and NU activist in Surabaya, East Java, evaded land reform by renaming his 100 hectares with the names of his family, see Contenay, "Another Bloodbath?" 358. 59 Mahadi, "Islam and Law in Indonesia," Indonesian Religions in Transition, eds. Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rodgers (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1987) 218= Other Basic Agrarian Law's articles related to religion are Article 5 and 14. 60 Conflicts in nearby areas are important because after 1965 many PKI members were executed even if in their areas there had been no conflict at all. This means that prior conflicts in areas nearby could justify killing, especially if there were many PKI members present. 162 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === the army succeeded in preserving order.81 Afterwards social order in the area was artificial and the coup provided the opportunity for non PKI factions to attack and kill members of the PKI. In Magetan, conflict did occur and it was known as "aksi patok" or a "pole action" where PKI cadres put poles on lands owned primarily by Muslims and nationalists. In this area, the dominant Muslims Muslims) and sympathizers were after its shifted from the Masyumi party ban the I960, its (Modernist members and seized land had been fenced off by PKI members. But they had been unable to redistribute it and work on it because the local village bureaucracy from the PNI had rejected their demands. In addition to the "pole action," there were also kidnapping among both the PKI and its opponents. But these actions did not result in casualties because of the presence of a security apparatus (the army and police). In Jember, the conflict between PKI and non PKI factions was less intense. There were conflicts over water distribution and irrigation dykes, but it was a mere war of words. The incidents were left unresolved until the coup. 61 Rochiyat 41. 62 This was local evidence of the shift of former Masyumi members and voters to NU. It was very likely that former Masyumi would shift to the NU, rather than to the nationalist PNI or the PKI. It shows that if general election had been held after the ban of the Masyumi in 1960, the NU would have won. 163 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === Land Conflict in Bali The macro-regional data shows that the great inequality of landownership in Bali was evident at the village level. Land scarcity was a more serious matter: in Buleleng, the number of landless peasants amounted to 60%,63 in Klungkung, 75%,64 and in Tabanan, land scarcity, the 95%.83 In short, support the the combination of governor, and the availability of organization (the PKI) promoted land reform. Moreover, the ease with which Balinese joined organizations as well as the presence of respected veterans to guide them led to a situation where the peasants were enthusiastic, trustful and even aggressive in demanding implementation of the law. Before the PKI's effort to implement land reform, its attractiveness resided in its association with public figures and reference groups that supported the PKI. After 1963, these were magnified by the issue of land reform. It is no wonder that the above combination resulted in a tense situation prior to 1965 which led to the violence of 1965. The pattern of land conflict in Bali differed fromthat in East Java. In Bali, there were fewer estates; the Dutch did not develop the plantation system. This was in part the result of the resistance of the kings in Bali and thesmallness 63 Informant no. 10, Buleleng. 64 Informant no. 12, Klungkung. 65 Informant no. 16, Tabanan. 164 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 181] === the area involved. took place peasants During 1961-1963 no wide-spread conflicts between and estate PKI mobilized managers, plantations like those labors East and Java. Beginning in 1963, the PKI began to launch unilateral actions, leading to physical confrontations. The PKI seemed to be on the offensive and conflicts ensued with the PNI, particularly in Buleleng, Tabanan, and Jembrana.66 In Bali, the conflict was manifested differently from that East Java: there lacked religious overtones. Conflict took place because the PKI tried hard to implement land reform and had the support of Sukarno and the governor. Actually, the government's or Sukarno's land reform was a reformist one: only excessive land holdings were redistributed and the owners would be compensated. However, the PKI redefined land reform according to its insistence of "land to those who tilled it." And they told the landless peasants that their version was indeed the government program. PNI leader remarked on the PKI's version of land reform: In land reform acts it was very clear that everyone had the right to have land [the limit varied with population density and the type of land at issue. In Bali, it was usually 5 hectares]. But at that time there were many poor peasants and they were easily deceived by the PKI. The PKI cadres used slogan such as: "Land for the tiller." They attacked landowners who by law had the right to their lands [within permissible limits]. (Informant no. 11) In Buleleng 1, there was no conflict over land, but in 66 The news of the conflicts and their locations can be seen in Appendix C. 165 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 182] === Buleleng 2 the PKI's unilateral actions took effect. The actions were initiated by four brothers who mobilized the masses: They conducted open meetings and shouted things such as "crush seven village devils." Sometimes there was extortion of landowners. However, there was no violent conflict because of the strength of the PNI in the Buleleng regency. (Informant no. 10) The PKI's unilateral action was mounted also Klungkung: The situation was tense during the PKI's unilateral action. Usually it was conducted after the formation of PKI branches in the villages. After the ceremony, they mobilized their people under the leadership of BTI activist who gave speeches. The PKI invaded land primarily owned by PNI people who lived in the city or other sub-districts [absentee land]. The PKI put the poles for the boundary, planted and harvested the plant. It occurred over a period of several planting seasons. However, they [BTI/PKI] still delivered the owners' share according to the land reform rule. 7 (Informant no. 12 ) The landless peasants mobilized by the PKI also invaded an informant's laud which consisted of only 0.2 hectares. There were about 50 peasants there, but the informant came with his veteran’s uniform and a samurai and the PKI people backed off. Elsewhere, small landowners retreated and the lands eventually came under the control of the BTI. For big landowners, the situation might be different. They could provide incentives (better share and land distribution) their followers and this countered for the PKI's appeal of land The rule was fifty-fifty, but prior to land reform, the sharecropping Klungkung was the worst (two for owner and one for sharecropper). 166 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === reform. The PKI's unilateral actions which took place on the pretext implementing Tabanan. The news conflicts were land reform were duplicated of conflict shows that in Tabanan the intense. This was, in part, caused by the presence of many noble houses: a circumstance that usually led to the concentration of land. There were about 15 noble houses this regency. 66 Another factor was the ability of PKI to mobilize former members and voters of the PSI, a party ranking first with 51.7% of votes during the 1955 general election prior to its ban in 1960. The PKI mobilized people at open gatherings by pointing out that they had supported land reform, a government program. But they always attacked government officials (sub-district heads "camat") (bureaucratic and yelled capitalists).68 "exterminate the kabir" response the PKI's activity, a fake redistribution of land to the tillers was conducted by the PNI noble house (puri). The puri asked their tillers to support his party (PNI) otherwise they had to go: Puri A had vast lands... hundreds of hectares.70 With the coming of land reform, their lands were distributed among their tillers. If the tillers did not support the PNI, they would not acquire land. 68 Robinson 17. 66 Sub-district heads were outsiders or government career officials appointed by the interior ministry/regional bureaucracy. 70 One hectare equal approximately two acres. 10,000 square meters 167 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === Host of the tillers agreed to support the PNI. In addition, many landowners distributed land to members of their party (PNI): There were many among the nationalists PNI who had their land distributed to members of the PNI. So peasants from BTI/PKI could not take their land. Landowners reported to the land reform teams that their land had been redistributed. The landowners produced list of the new owners [their fellow PNI members] and the amount of land they held. Attacks on landowners who joined the PKI also took place in a nearby area: A PKI leader thought that if he ordered his PKI followers to attack non-PKI landowners he would preserve his own vast holdings. He also joined the attacks and when they could find no more non PKI owned land, his followers said that they attacked other landowners, but not his vast land. The people began to attack and demand his land. Then the leader quitted from the PKI! There were several cases like that." (Informant no. 16) The issue of land reform could even cut into patronage loyalty: some veteran land laborers and sharecroppers Klungkung were attracted most to the BTI/PKI's peasant front: I myself am a veteran and my tiller was a veteran too but he joined the BTI. The leader of the BTI in this sub-district was also a veteran and the military [army] and resort police supported land reform. (Informant no. 12) This shows that a respected veteran without provision of economic interest would be defeated by another veteran who had promised an interest (land). The Shifting alliance and the eagerness Balinese peasants to join the BTI/PKI owed a lot to the fact that the 168 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === BTI/PKI, like the PNI and other parties, was considered mainly interest group. The peasants did not think about ideology or future programs of the PKI though the cadres might be moreaware of it. This also says something about the nature of social and cultural patterns in Bali. Culturally, as I argued in chapter 2, the Balinese peasants, or most Balinese, considered themselves as living within a single culture and religion. such This monoculture mingled with many organizations hamlet polity, irrigation society, temple congregation, kin group, and other "seka" (organizations, such as art). Geertz aptly describes these circumstances: This combination of a somewhat antiike attack on the performance of important social activities— which the Balinese themselves wryly describe as bebek-bebekan ("duck-like"), after the way masses of happily quacking ducks waddle along the roads and canals in tight formation— on the other hand, with a tendency to direct any one group to a single end rather than employing the same group for multiple purposes on the other, leads to what one might call^ paradoxically, pluralistic collectivism. Thus for a peasant to join the PKI was just to join another group, a common affair, particularly, if this group was led by veterans. IV.4. POLITICAL CONFLICT In addition to land conflict, there was also political conflict not necessarily related to the land. This conflict usually took place during a mass rally celebrating national 71 Geertz, Peddlers 84-85. 169 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === anniversary.72 Even prior to 1965, the atmosphere was tense: people were mobilized for the campaigns against the Dutch over West Irian and the British and Malayans over Malaysia. There were military drills for the civil bureaucracy and young people. The para-military groups consisting of platoons and battalions, and special units were formed. For example, the Ansor Serbaguna") youth created Banser or Multi Purpose Ansor Unit.73 ("Barisan Ansor The nationalist PNI youth ("Pemuda Demokrat" and "Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis") formed the "Banra"74 in East Java and "Tameng" Bali. (Shield) There was no information as to whether the PKI had formed any special units from its "Pemuda Rakyat" (People's Youth).” 72 For example, an Ansor parade was stoned in Sidoardjo, see Obor Revolusi June 12, 1965, SPS. 73 The choice of Banser gave a military connotation to the army's Panser (army personnel carrier/APC). In May 1965, Idham Cholid (NU Chairman) stated that the Banser was formed for the Malaysia campaign, see Suara Rakyat May 5, 1965, SPS. Jusuf Hasyim of East Java NU stated that the NU suspected the PKI's action before the coup as a result the NU formed the Banser, see Surabava Post June 4, 1966, SPS. 74 Banra is the abbreviation of 'Barisan Rakyat' (People's Front/Unit) as well as 'Banteng Dwikora' (Wild Buffalo of Dwikora/Anti Malaysia campaign). The former was only familiar in Magetan while the latter was more mentioned in newspapers. For example, the PNI in Tulungagung celebrated the anniversary of Pemuda Marhaenis youth by forming 138 "Banteng Dwikora" platoons, see Suara Rakvat June 7, 1965, SPS. 75 In Klaten regency, Central Java, the PKI created paramilitary units equal to platoons and deployed them in the city of Klaten, sub-districts and villages. See Center for the Rural and regional Studies, Gajah Mada, "Rural Violence in Klaten and Banyuwangi," The Indonesian Killings 130. 170 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === In addition to organizational consolidation, some youths began to prepare for the future by visiting kiyai (senior ulama). For example, youths from Magetan came to a kiyai in the nearby Madiun regency and asked charged with supernatural power. They were given a verse from the Qur'an that supposedly enabled them to kill people with their bare hands.76 At the village level, the most common acts consisted in attacks and protests against village heads most of whom were connected with the PNI. These incidents occurred in Magetan but not in Kediri or Jember. In the Kediri villages examined, political, like land, conflict was absent. However, there was the case known as the "Gayam affair" in this regency. The village head, who was from the PNI, was attacked by 500 BTI men and suffered wounds inflicted by sickles. This took place on February 15, 1965. In retaliation, thousands of people participated in burning down six houses occupied by BTI/PKI activists.77 In Jember in the village studied, here too political conflict was absent. However, it was in this regency that the famous "Tanggul affair" occurred. A member of Pemuda Rakyat (the PKI's youth front), who was also member the 76 Based on an interview with informant no. 5. A Muslim youth in Surabaya told how he had become invulnerable to bullets, rocks and arrows after he consulted and was blessed by a Muslim holy man, see Don Moser, " Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery," Life 1 July (1966): 27-28. 77 Perdamaian February 23, 1965, SPS. 171 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === veteran's legion, shot three people (from Muslim organization) with a sub-machine gun. The three were wounded but not dead.78 This incident was followed by the destruction of 20 houses and an office of the Pemuda Rakyat by people claiming to be Muslims.79 In Magetan, the PKI held demonstrations at the village head office and demanded the lowering of prices. The village head managed to handle the situation and the situation cooled. The most conspicuous political conflicts at the village level occurred during mass meetings. PKI and its opponents sabotaged each other's meetings: At an Islamic mass meeting in Madiun (a nearby regency), the People's Youth [the PKI's youth front] joined our meeting, but they brought "reog" [from the Ponorogo regency]. The Muslims could not continue the meeting... the meeting dispersed, but we did similar things to the PKI. When Aidit [the PKI Chairman] came to a PKI's mass gathering in Madiun, we, the Muslim youths arrived; we brought "reog" and loudspeakers. The PKI could not hold their meeting. The situation grew quite intense. (Informant no. 5) Political someone [feast], a very from 80 divisions outside influenced the PKI held everyday village. routine 'kenduren' they did not invite PKI people and vice versa. In important feast such as a marriage ceremony, the conflict would continue: 70 Obor Revolusi February 6, 1965, SPS. 79 Harian Umum February 22, 1965, SPS. 80 This includes many important life cycle ceremonies like birth, circumcision, marriage, and death. 172 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 189] === In the western part of this village, a PKI man conducted a marriage ceremony for his daughter. Former Masyumi activists81 came there with "pelopor" [leaders/activists] of the PNI and NU. Usually villagers gave money to those who held the feasts. But we prevented villagers who were Muslims or from the PNI to attend the ceremony. If Masyumi people arrived, their leaders would order them to go home and not give money. Villagers from the NU and the PNI were also prevented by their leaders to attend the ceremony. In short, only PKI people came to the party. At that time, the situation was very hot. (Informant no. 5) The above situation, which occurred in 1965 suggests that villages were polarized between the PKI and non PKI factions (the Muslim NU/former Masyumi and the nationalist PNI). Political conflict also took place in Bali. The most well known incidents were the Denpasar incident and the killing of Made Parlemen. In the Denpasar case, the governor (Sutedja) asked Wedastera Sujasa (the leader of PNI) to leave the podium during a mass rally on March 6, 1965. On March 9, Sujasa was detained by Authority. Suteja who acted as the Executor of the War Following the incident, on March 11, PNI people demonstrated and bringing banners reading "hang Sutedja," and Moreover, there was another well known conflict. This was the killing of Made Parlemen, a PNI youth, by PKI youths in Klungkung city on May 20, 1965. 82 This event resulted in a grudge on PNI youths, and his cremation was attended by PNI 81 Masyumi party, a reformist Islamic party, was banned in 1960 but its members and voters moved to the orthodox NU. 82 Suara Indonesia June 9, 1965. 173 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === youths from all over Bali. In Balinese villages, political conflict was tied to PKI's anniversary and conflict over land. Unilateral actions or land invasions were usually preceded by political attacks on sub-district heads Buleleng, Tabanan, (camat). In all villages studied in and Klungkung, the PKI attacked sub district bureaucracies who were mostly from the PNI.83 IV.5. RELIGIOUS INSULT In addition to land conflict, which became the focal point of rural violence, there were religious disputes. These occurred for the most part in East Java, especially in central and eastern part (Banyuwangi) where the PKI was strong. have indicated in chapter 2, the process As I Islamization resulted in two religious communities: santri and abangan. The latter actively supported the PKI. Thus, land and political conflict were intensified by religious disputes. In Bali, both PKI and non PKI political (the PNI) were devout Hindus and land and conflict did not spill over into religious institution. In East Java, political conflicts between the PKI and the Islamic parties, particularly NU, was not the only cause of religious disputes. Another source conflict was the provocation by the PKI's local cadres who had insulted the 83 For the description of political conflict, conflicts in the villages studied (Chapter IV.3). see land 174 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === symbol of Islam. Prior to 1965, reports in the press show how PKI cadres insulting the symbol of Islam (God and Qur'an), and not just Islamic political parties or Muslim landlords. Reli gious insults were not common in comparison with the number of land conflicts. Most insults occurred in "ludruk" play (folk theater) and served to anger the majority Muslims.84 As word spread of such insults the result was empathy and solidarity among Muslims. Actually, the Muslims, especially, the kiyai attacked the PKI as atheists but with little effect. The PKI seemed were unperturbed by such accusations.85 Of the villages studied, only in Magetan was a PKI member reported to have insulted Islam. In Kediri village, the PKI was not anti Islam though it was strong. Many members of the PKI even joined and listened to kiyai's sermons. In Jember, Islam was very strong; there were only 11 PKI households out 700 symbols, households. and the PKI members conflicts were did not minor, degrade limited Islamic water distribution and dykes. In Magetan, the situation was different. The regency was strongly PKI in abangan (red) areas and the PKI was not reluctant in showing their discontent with Islam. During the 84 For the news of the religious conflicts and their locations, see Appendix D. 85 There were no complains arising from this issue in the pro PKI newspapers fDialan Rakvat Triweekly. Tromoet Masvarakat. and Suara Rakvat 1. No informant in East Java reported protest emanating from the PKI regarding kiyai/Muslims' attacks on their atheism. 175 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === PKI's rebellion of 1948, the kiyai, together with the army, police and civilian bureaucrats, were the primary targets. An informant reported how a PKI local leader had insulted Islam prior to 1965: I was just returned from 'ziarah' [visit to a graveyard] when I was called by my old friend who was the leader of the PKI in this village. He was my friend in primary school until the third grade. At first I was reluctant but he asked me to drop by his home. Then he asked me "Why does a Muslim who wants to conduct daily prayers after he farts, wash his face, instead of his butt?[Prior to the five daily prayers, a Muslim had to have a 'wudhu': to wash his or her face, hand and feet] Is this right? Is that what Allah says?" I was angry and answered that it was an axiom, a dogma. Since then I have hated him. (Informant no. 5) He went to a kiayi in a nearby regency and the kiyai told him that the blood of PKI was "halal" or permissible. In areas where Muslims were a minority they became more consolidated and made contacts with Muslims in other areas. This was true especially if they were active members of an organization. This became increasingly evident following the coup in 1965 when Muslims from strongly Muslim areas came and helped those in areas where the PKI was dominant. 86 In Bali, Hinduism did not result in conflicts: there was no polarization as existed between 'santri' and 'abangan' in East Java. Moreover, the PKI chairman (Aidit) warned that in Bali "any PKI members who spread anti-religious propaganda 86 I find this case in Kediri village; I discuss this in chapter V. 176 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 193] === will be expelled from the party.”87 The conflicts were mostly related on land issues and party rivalries. Generally speaking, both the PKI and non-PKI people avoided bringing conflict to the pura [temple]. In Klungkung city, the PKI disturbed the funeral ceremony of King Klungkung prior to the coup. 88 But this attack is not best understood areligous insult; the king was considered ardently anti republic during the years 1945-1950, a strong PNI supporter and the richest landlord in Bali. In the Klungkung village studied, the PKI only criticized the dance in pura (temples) as a waste of money. At pura, the PKI did not make trouble. Like non-PKI people, the PKI members always performed their religous duties. The PKI people were sometimes accompanied by several members of Cakrabirawa Regiment (Palace guard) during religious worship at the pura. They only rejected the dances in pura which was considered a waste of money. (Informant no. 12) A similar pattern arose in Tabanan; a religious conflict between PKI and non-PKI people did not take place in pura; We never had a conflict in pura. The PKI members did not dare, maybe they did not really know about politics. We went together to the pura but we sat separately: PKI and non-PKI people clustered with their own group. Sometimes a temple priest from the PNI was rather reluctant to lead the PKI people in the worship. But the pura, unlike banjar (hamlet), 87 Suara Indonesia September 22, 1964. 88 See Adrian Vickers, Bali: A Paradise Created (Ringwood, Australia: Penguin Books, 1989) 170. 177 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 194] === could not be split. 80 In general, the PKI in Bali did not disturb religious institutions. No religious conflict similar to that which had occurred in East Java occurred in Bali. In this chapter, we find that the PKI prior to the coup had created conflict in rural areas. Between 1961 and 1963, the PKI conflicted with state and private estates. And since 1963, the conflict was extended to the nationalist PNI and the Muslim NU. Conflict over land took place in both Bali and East Java but religious conflict was limited the latter, particularly in areas where the PKI and the NU had equal power. addition, there were political attacks on the nationalist bureaucracy which were most intense in Bali. In East Java, the PKI experienced strong resistance from an alliance of the PNI and the NU. On the other hand, the PKI in Bali was somewhat more successful in facing non-PKI small landowners landowners, who the had PKI to protect received themselves. stiff resistance facing big from the landowners' tillers and their fellow party (PNI) members. 89 The separation-of place in temple was also stated by informant no. 15. The situation in the temple was like a cold war and after both parties left the temple the combative atmosphere was more conspicuous. 178 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 195] === CHAPTER PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE In this chapter I will discuss the pattern of violence and killing that followed the coup of 1965. Existing analyses though useful, do not present the big picture; they merely discuss local actions or the motives of the participants in the killing. In addition, national considerations tell us little about the violence in rural areas although they were of some influence. Like the mobilization prior to the coup, the violence that followed will be analyzed within a model that incorporates public figures, the military, and the size of the PKI. V. 1. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE The violence in both East Java and Bali may be explained from a “Collective Action” and "Collective Behavior" per spective. We will begin by discussing the Collective Behavior perspective which focuses a limited set of facts and claims: the killings of members of the PKI by rural people who simply ran amok, and the violence against the PKI resulting from social disorganization. The claim that the violence was something mysterious, unthinkable, or irrational, is suggested by the following comment: What had caused bloodthirsty, so horrible a 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === reaction in a people often thought to be so gentle and even courtly?... Trying to understand such an emotional reaction through cold Western logic can prove confounding and fruitless.... Running amok is a Malay tendency— the term itself was derived from Malay word "ngamuk." The weakness of the notion of character and cultural perspective in explaining the violence lies in their inability to explain the variety of violent behavior. If the character of Javanese (or Balinese) had been homogeneous why was there not similar violence in all areas. Another analysis (Sloan) emphasizes frustration. As rural Indonesia was drawn into the conflict, the carnage that was to take place would be phrased in terms of anti communist campaign. However, the attack against the party was largely rationalization which allowed the peasantry to vent its frustration over a wide variety of issue.2 The idea of frustrated peasants may misleadingly suggest that in many villages most peasants rose up in attacking the party. In reality, the violence was systematic and was carried out by members of several organizations (the NU in East Java and PNI in Bali) and military units hostile to the PKI. The notion of frustration supports the impression that the entire community rose up against the PKI. As Pye suggests: People [the Javanese villagers] just interacted and did pleasurable things with whoever happened to be around. But if the tranquility of community life was broken, the Javanese could hold deep grudges and seek violent revenge, as they did in 1965 when they slaughtered thousands of communists after the 1 Sutton 27, 28. 2 Sloan 71. 180 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 197] === failure of the PKI coup attempt.3 The spontaneity of local villagers is also described by Geertz who says that the violence was promoted by primordial lines of difference between santri and abangan.* This may be true but the santri mobilized through organizations and in general primordial lines became less relevant. For example, the abangan PNI killed the abangan PKI members in Central and western East Java where Muslim organizations were weak. The important role of character and culture also provides the dominant explanation of violence in Bali. One journalist reports the situation in Bali this way: Whole villages, children included, turned out against communists, chasing them across fields and finally stoning and slashing them to death.... Almost every village on the island was affected by the purge. In many villages, according to one offi cial, it was a point of honor to have executed communists. A village was ashamed when it had not killed anyone. And in several instances, whole villages with communists affiliations were wiped out by neighboring non-communist villagers. Other character analyses the psychological violence factors. One Bali emphasize Balinese writer stresses certain characteristics of the Balinese who it is said "have life spirit, brutal and hard working." This brutal Lucien W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 132. * Geertz, The Interpretation 282. 5 Hughes 180. 181 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 198] === character showed itself in the mass killing of members of the PKI during the period 1965-66."6 Ted Gurr traces the violence in Bali to socialization and frustration: The intensity of normative justifications for political violence varies moderately with the degree of emphasis placed on extrapunitiveness in socialization.... These two traits [the pattern of conditioning and a strong inhibition against overt aggression] may help account for the high apparent toleration of the Balinese frustration, which, if exceeded, leads to extraordinary intense outburst of suicidal individual violence analogous to the Malay amok and collective violence like massacre of hundreds of thousand of Indonesian communists 1965-66 massacres that were particularly intense in Bali."7 Another explanation, set forth by Shaplen, applies a point raised by Margaret Mead: Although basically tolerant, the Balinese could be whipped to a frenzy, as happened after the coup, when the killing there had been greater in relation to the size of the population than it was anywhere else. Margaret Mead once described the Balinese as "schizophrenic"; having lived under feudal conditions and resisted change for centuries— they were not colonized by the Dutch until the end of the imperial era— they tended become psychopathic when exposed too suddenly to the hazards of modern politics. In addition to the psychological analysis, there is a cultural analysis, expounded by Geertz, who tries to explain 6 See Nyoman S. Pendit: Pi Lambuna Gununa Aauna. Sebuah Kisah Perialanan. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1978) 11-12. 7 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) 165-167. 8 Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) 169- Reaction 170. 182 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === the extensive violence in Bali in terms of Balinese symbolism. In a famous article about a cock fight in Bali, he briefly discusses the violence of the Balinese toward the PKI: This is not to say, of course, that the killings were caused by the cockfight, could have been predicted on the basis of it, or were some sort of enlarged version of it with real people in place of the cocks, all of which is nonsense. It is merely to say that if one looks at Bali not just through the medium of its dances, its shadowplays, its sculpture, and its girls, but— as the Balinese themselves do— also through the medium of its cock fight. The fact that the massacre occurred seems, if no less appalling, less like a contradiction to the laws of nature. The above discussion shows that the Collective Behavior perspective cannot explain the lack homogeneity that characterized the violence. This can only be explained within the Collective Action perspective defined as follows: An event of collective action is not an outburst of eruption heretofore latent tensions frustrations which take their manifest form in an organizational vacuum, but rather as the outcome of a continuous process of organizational activity.10 The organized, purposive, and systematic violence directed against the PKI, fits the description of collective action: [W]e consider how new forces of social organization may help endanger breakdown and strain in older forms.... Social Organization is our key... 9 Geertz, The Interpretation 452. 10 Ronald Aminzade, "Revolution and Collective Political Violence: The Case of the Working Class of Marseille, France 1830-1871." Working Paper # 86, Center for Research on Social Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, October, quoted in William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1975) 139. 183 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === not the aggregation of individual responses.11 Thus, conflict. the violence was was conducted continuation organizations, previous not individuals or the community as a whole.12 The destruction of the PKI or the killing of its members was influenced by national issues and the power struggle between PKI and its opponents. Local actions were ordered mainly by national organizations, and some local participants did not fully realize this. For local participants, revenge might have been the incentive. For example, the placement of the heads of decapitated PKI members in public places (by, create terror the youth)13 was intended and demoralize the PKI. It is unnecessary to regard the killing as an irrational act of "traditional" societies. The killing was intended as a "shortcut to final victory" by non-PKI factions (the military and political parties). Such shortcuts to final victory are hardly unique. They were taken in the bombing of Dresden, 11 James Schelenberg, The Science of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 110-111. 12 The role of the NU and PNI in East Java is discussed in Hughes 157 and Shaplen 152, respectively. While the dominant participation of the PNI youth (Tameng) in Bali is discussed in Shaplen 125 and Hughes 179. For the role of the military, see Hughes 197-8, Crouch 151, Contenay, "Heritage of Blood" 513, and "Report" (a report of the army intelligence of East Java). 13 This is reported by informant no. 7 (Jember) and it also occurred in Kediri area, see Rochijat 44. 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === Berlin, London, Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. The killings children, of civilians, including the old, women, and in these instances were not "collateral damage," they were deliberately targeted so as to encourage immediate and unconditional surrender their government.1* Indonesia, the killing and terror continued because non PKI organizations had not achieved final victory manifested in formal dissolution of the PKI.15 The above discussion shows that the Collective Action model— which emphasizes organization— is more persuasive than the Collective Behavior model However, the reality in explaining the violence. quite complex. Whether the organizations were civilian or military must be specified. In addition organizations, the role public figures, particularly military commanders, appears highly significant. short, the focus organizations both military and civilian as well as public figures, as in the mobilization model, will provide better explanation the coun termobilization and the violence following the coup. 1A The killing in 1965 was done manually compared to the bombings in the WW II. This increased the violence nature of the killing in 1965, but the essence was the same: to create a demoralization in the enemy. The victims in 1965 were PKI members and sympathizers, rather than innocent civilians like those in the bombings. PKI members were considered potential soldiers of the PKI in the future civil war. 15 Some army commanders dissolved the PKI in their regions but at the national level, the PKI was formally dissolved on March 12, 1966 by General Suharto after receiving "Super Semar" or Sukarno's order to preserve security and order. 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === In regard to public figures, we find that those who were considered close to the PKI (governor and army commander in Bali) were often caught off guard. They failed to take the initiative, simply waiting for Sukarno to act from Jakarta. Owing to their inaction, they were considered unreliable by forces opposing the PKI. The situation was different in East Java, in general, where the leaders were anti PKI and took the initiative. first, the governor and army commander in East Java were also considered slow act against regimental army commander did the take PKI. the However, one initiative and prevented unconstrained killing. Unorganized violence in many parts of East Java was limited. Despite of the decisiveness of leaders, the availability army units influenced the degree orderliness characterizing the violence. In areas lacking army units, the violence was uncontrolled. Regarding the military, I will show how the weaker state/military of Bali could not control the situation. However, the strong presence army units did not necessarily assist the destruction of the PKI or preserve order. The presence of PKI infiltrated army units would even lead to defection and civil war. This was evident in the Kediri area; the infiltrated army units had to be moved to other areas; and this led to a situation of uncontrolled local violence. Another factor determining the level of violence was 186 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === the size of the PKI. It would appear that when within a given area the PKI and its opponents strength violence was more enjoyed likely, roughly the such was the same case Kediri. The decisiveness leaders, the availability and reliability of army units, and the equal size of challengers can be represented using the following "Countermobilization" model that helps explain the variation in the degree violence experienced: high violence Bali low East Java yes high equal power availability of army high low low violence Figure V.l. The Pattern of Countermobilization and Violence 187 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 204] === The model shows that in general, the violence in Bali was greater owing to the indecisiveness of its leaders and the paucity army units. regard the strength challengers, we shall see that in areas where the influence of the PKI and its opponents was equal, the violence was more serious. Unlike explanations that emphasize culture and personal ity, the coutermobilization model explains variation participation in the violence, particularly in relation to the availability of the army units and the size of the PKI. My findings support one report which stated that in East Java, popular participation was assured by the dominance of non-PKI factions in the area. In areas where the PKI was strong, mobilization was dominated by the army while in those areas in which it was weak, the people took the initiative.18 It appears that these patterns also took place in Bali. These findings are a rejection of both left and right versions of the violence.17 It was not solely a military operation as in the case of the Nazi genocide (the "leftist” version). Nor, on the other hand, was it a purely communal action either (the "rightist" version). According to left wing versions, the killing was state/army persecution. As Griswold 16 See "Report" 137. 17 See also the translator’s note in "Report" 135. 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 205] === notes: It was Nasution [then the Defense minister] and Suharto's [then the army commander] army that systematically went from village to village, rooted out the peasant leaders, the communists and nationalists, the workers who had led seizures of Dutch and American property or feudal plantations. They hauled before the firing squad thousands of teachers, infected with ideas of "liberation." This analysis decidedly simplistic and has low generali zabi 1ity. In general, the pattern of the killing can be classified in three types: First, in areas where the military was dominant and took the initiative the killing was dominated by them. This pattern had all the marks a characteristic of a military operation. This occurred in areas where the PKI was very strong such as Banyuwangi, neighboring regency Jember. In this regency, the PKI, which had 50 weapons, struck first killing 62 people from the nationalist PNI and the Muslim N U.19 This pattern also appeared in Jembrana, a neighboring regency of Tabanan, Bali. Second, in areas where the army was passive or absent, the killing was conducted by civilians. This pattern had a communal character, but it was directed by local politicians 18 Griswold 10. 19 Puspenad 218. See also "Additional Data on CounterRevolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East Java" The Indonesian Killings ed. Cribb 174-176. This pattern occurred in Central Java where the CPI was strong and a significant part of the army supported the coup. 189 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === and various non-PKI organizations. uncontrolled controlled and Klungkung, less violent arrival of the military, The killing was either Buleleng, and in Jember. Kediri Following the the killing was more controlled, though it did not necessarily cease. The third pattern was joint actions between the military and political parties where there was selection of victims. Only leaders and their cadres were killed while fringe members were spared. Such was the case in Magetan and Tabanan. In discussion that follows, we shall see how our model applies to East Java and Bali in accounting for the violence following the coup. However, we shall first discuss the coup briefly. V.2. THE COUP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS I will next show that the pattern of violence in rural areas was closely related to the regional situation which, in turn, was affected by the national situation. Thus, the neutral response of Sukarno to the coup provoked the enemies of the PKI to destroy the party. In areas such as Bali, where the leaders had close relations with Sukarno, this wait and see attitude similarly resulted in a preemptive strike against the PKI. On the other hand, in East Java, it was the army that took the initiative and prevented further uncontrolled violence. I shall briefly discuss the response in Jakarta to the coup. 190 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 207] === On October lf 1965, several young officers launched the "September 30th Movement" kidnapping and killing six army generals. 20 The units involved in Jakarta were: one battalion of the Presidential Palace Guard, one airborne battalion from Central Java and one from East Java, one battalion of air force base guards, one battalion of Jakarta infantry, and 2000 armed volunteers from Pemuda Rakyat (the PKI's youth front).21 The coup officers said that their intent was to launch a preemptive strike against the "Council of Generals' October 5" coup which was sponsored by the CIA. They deactivated the cabinet and instituted national revolutionary council consisting of 45 civilian and military officers. Moreover they issued orders that "Revolutionary Councils" at the provincial, regency, and sub-district levels be established.22 The coup leaders also ordered local army officers in all Indonesian 20 They were Lt. General Yani/Army Chief of Staff, Major Generals: Suprapto/2nd Deputy, Haryono M.T./3rd Deputy, S. Parman/lst Assistant, Brigadier Generals: M. T. Panjaitan/4th Assistant, Sutoyo S./Prosecutor General, and Lt. P. Tendean the ADC of General Nasution/Armed Forces Chief of Staff. General Nasution himself was narrowly escaped. The pro-coup army faction in Java kidnapped and killed Colonel Katamso and Lt. Colonel Soegijono, the commander and chief of staff Korem (Military Resort) 72, Jogjakarta in Central Java. 21 See Soerojo 201-207 and Crouch 99-100. 22 See the order of Lt. Colonel Untung Coup leader in Soerojo 197-199. 191 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === provinces General."23 The subdue coup the followers the failed since General "Council Suharto swiftly mobilized forces to counter the coup nor did President Sukarno support the coup. On October 2, 1965, the first public statement condemning the involvement of the PKI was issued from Jakarta, while the first public action that the PKI was behind the coup was made on October 4 at Taman Sunda Kelapa.24 The forces opposing the PKI were united behind a front called the "Kesatuan Aksi Mengganyang Gerakan Kontra Revolusi 30 September" or The United Front to Crush the Counter Revolution of the movement of September 30. This front included: Pemuda Pancasila, GP. Ansor, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, GKMRI, PII, HMI, Gasbindo, Pemuda Muslimin and other organizations the under the direction IPKI, Katolik and the PSII.25 The statement contained the following injunctions: first, support President Sukarno in crushing the coup; second, follow Sukarno's orders; third, condemn the coup; fourth, offer 23 In Central Java, the coup was supported by four out of seven battalion commanders and four out of five resort commanders under the control of coup officers. In North Sumatra, a brigade commander's plan to displace the army commander of Sumatra and the commander of a battle command failed; General Suharto's action in Jakarta affected local coup supporters. See Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD [Disjarah TNI-AD], Peranan Periuanoan TNI-AD Dalam Memeoertahankan Kemurnian Pancasila (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, 1982) 308. 24 Sulastomo, Hari-Hari vana Paniana 1963-1965 (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1989) 34. 25 Puspenad 105-107. 192 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === condolences to the families of the kidnapped generals; fifth, demand President Sukarno ban the PKI and affiliated organizations such as the SBPU, SOBSI, Pemuda Rakyat, CGMI, BPI, SOBSI, Gerwani, Lekra, HSI etc, B) ban newspapers that supported Btekti, the coup: Harian Bilitanq Tjrour, Rakvat (People Daily), Warta Kebudavaan Baru. Ekonomi Nasional. Gelora Indonesia, etc; C) eliminate the PKI's capacity for maintaining a governmental apparatus; sixth, ask Sukarno to clean up the Cabinet and Governmental institutions, expelling those who had been involved and those who had sympathized with the coup; seventh, crush economic speculators and corruptors; eight, demand that those who killed the generals be punished. The anti-PKI forces did not oppose demand to rejected eliminate the PKI. this, considering the Sukarno their However, President Sukarno coup small matter. His indecisiveness and protection of the PKI eventuated in more aggressive actions against the PKI. Even after the killing of PKI members began, he rejected banning the PKI: Gestok [the coup] must be crushed, but not communism, because communism, like nationalism and religion [Islam] was a result of objective condition of Indonesian society. I wrote Nasakom [Nationalism, Religion/Islam and Communism] when I was 25 in 1926, and I will hold this until I go to my grave. Sukarno begged for the killings to stop and sent a fact finding mission to gather data on the killing which was 26 This is a translation of his speech on December 18, 1965, see Nasution 354. 193 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === considered minimal (87,000). The opportunity became a "scarce thing/event" and non PKI factions (army and civilian youths) attempted exploit fast they could. The opportunity had been considerable: the PKI had been involved in the coup and had attempted to replace the cabinet with a revolutionary council. This took place within a limited time frame, a function of Sukarno's ability to protect the PKI. A rapid mobilization was begun by the army and by some non PKI party members to ensure that the destruction of the PKI or at least that it would be greatly weakened before it could be protected by Sukarno, as had occurred in 1960 (the 8 July Evaluation 1960 affair). An analysis by Marshall Green takes into account Sukarno's protection of the PKI: We reported early in November that the Army seemed to be training and arming Muslims (especially Muslim youth organizations) in Central Java against the PKI because Suharto was convinced that firm measures were essential to strike against the PKI before it (with Sukarno's backing) could re-group and lash back against the Army. In October-December of 1965, Sukarno had intended to create a new communist party, either a new PKI or one with a different name. He considered the Soviet-oriented Semaun a new Marshall Green was the American ambassador to Indonesia during the coup, see his book Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation: 1965-1968 (Washington, D.C.: The Compass Press, 1990) 67. 194 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === leader: one strongly backed the Soviet Union.28 This illustrates Sukarno's obsession with his concept of Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion/Islam, and Communism). For Sukarno, the Communist element, whether the PKI or a new communist party was an important factor. The neutrality and passivity in Jakarta of Sukarno had a crucial effect upon regional leaders, particularly army commanders. In East Java, the army commander was considered too slow, and a regimental commander soon took the initiative. In Bali, the commander was considered to be "protecting the PKI; this resulted preemptive attacks non PKI violence was the organ izat ions.29 Another important factor the availability and reliability of army units. The East Java army was later reinforced with units from other divisions. contrast, Bali's few territorial and mobile units, and the suspicion that some of them had been involved in the coup, fostered a less controlled manifestation of violence. variation The in the availability and reliability of military units yielded different patterns in the killing. Lack of army units in areas where the PKI and non PKI were equally powerful 28 Semaun, the first chairman of the C.P.Indies [Indonesia] in 1920, was a principle aide of Sneevliet (or Maring) who brought communism to Indonesia. He infiltrated the Islamic League (later became White League), creating its left wing (later became People's/Red League in 1923). Semaun lived in Soviet for 30 years after the failed 1926 rebellion and returned to Indonesia in 1956. Brackman, The Communist 165-6. Shaplen 124. 195 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === led to uncontrolled killing of PKI members, even that of PKI fringe members. Regarding the availability and reliability of army units, we observe the following patterns: First, if resources (army units) had been sufficient, the ensuing actions might have detainment of PKI members. been limited arrest and Some moderation was exercised, particularly in Jakarta and in much of the West Java. In rural areas where the army had a sufficient number of units, PKI members were merely detained. But their leaders and activists were likely to be executed. In Jakarta, swift army action resulted in the detainment of 2,200 PKI members by the middle November 1965. 30 Jakarta mass killings were reported, except for two PKI politburo members who had been summarily executed.31 Army units in West Java were also strong since only a few had been sent to campaign against Malaysia (Kalimantan or Sumatra) and against Islamic rebels in Sulawesi. In West Java, the army faced remnants of the Islamic rebellion (1948-1963) and was busy conducting territorial efforts in filling a power vacuum. Mass killings in West Java occurred only in the Cirebon regency since the local brigade (three battalions) had been sent to Sulawesi for the purpose suppressing 30 Crouch 142. 31 Nyoto and Lukman were executed in Jakarta while Sakirman and Aidit in Central Java. The other three politburo members were tried. 196 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 213] === Islamic rebellion.32 Second, lack of resources (army units) as in Central Java, created a problem that was solved by training and arming local Muslims as well as Nationalist youth. This was made known by some reporters who interviewed several army field commanders in Central Java.33 The paramilitary groups were led by the army, and these had the effect of preventing indiscriminate killing. There was a selection process: After a delay, permission was granted, and the youths [Nationalists and Muslims] were given two or three days of training before being sent out into the villages in units led by RPKAD men [army para commando from Jakarta] with the task of breaking the back of the PKI. In each village members of Communist organizations were rounded up and taken away. After quick interrogation, those considered to be activists were killed and passive supporters were placed under detention in camps and jails. Third, limited resources (army units) led to uncontrolled mass killing that was extended to PKI fringe members. This occurred in East Java, particularly in the Kediri area, and Bali in general. In the case of the first or second pattern these fringe members the PKI would have been merely detained, not killed. Crouch compares the killings in East and Central Java and concludes that in East Java the killing was less controlled 32 Sundhaussen 216. 33 Contenay, Sundhaussen 215. "Heritage of Blood" 513, Hughes 151, and 3* See Crouch 151. 197 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 214] === and that many PKI members were often given to Ansor youth,35 Hughes arrives at a similar conclusion: In Central Java the army seems to have exercised broad control over the blood bath, although many civilians were also recruited to kill communists. In East Java, the mass execution of Communists was largely handed over to civilians, mainly the black-shirted Ansor youth of the Nahdatul Ulama [NU]... who killed with fanatical relish.36 Besides the military's limited resources, prior local conflicts, whether based on land or religion, also contributed the heightened degree violence. decisiveness of the army commanders, In short, the the availability and reliability of army units, and prior conflicts all became important factors in varying in the degree of violence. V.3. THE VIOLENCE IN EAST JAVA After news of the coup reached Surabaya, the army and non PKI organizations did not take direct action to control the situation. It was the PKI which seized the opportunity; the Surabaya PKI labor union (SOBSI) attempted to control many state companies.37 The situation in Surabaya had been guite tense since September 28 when the PKI ransacked the Governor's office. On October 14, the people (non-PKI factions) held a mass rally in Surabaya and a Crushing Command Action of the PKI was 35 Crouch 225. 36 Hughes 154. 37 See Puspenad 337. 198 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === formed by the Islamic parties (NU, PSII), the Catholic party, the Protestant Party party), and the (Parkindo), IPKI PNI-Hardi. 38 This (an army-affiliated demonstrates how much quicker the people were in taking action against the PKI than was the state-army. The East Java governor, considered irresolute and the army commander, in taking action against the This led to mass action by non PKI organizations, were PKI. 39 fearing preemptive strikes by the PKI and its supporters.40 Not until October 22, 1965 was the PKI frozen by the army commander.41 Prior to that (October 13), the masses in the Kediri areas began move kill PKI members and to destroy their properties.42 On October 18, the PKI in Banyuwangi regency, with its army supporters, killed 64 Ansor youths.43 The PKI in Banyuwangi were quickly immobilized by army units from Malang under the direct command of Colonel Sumadi. After the clashes between the PKI and non PKI factions, the army, particularly the Malang commander, Colonel Sumadi, took the 38 "Report” 136. 39 For the case of the East Java army commander see Nasution 326; see also "Report” 146, 148. 40 It was reported that the East Java army command lacked army units and about 30% were involved in the coup, see "Report" 146. 41 The commander was practically forced to freeze the PKI. See "Report" 146. 42 See Crouch 147. 43 "Report" 138. 199 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === initiative and called meeting with several regents, residents, and former governors and residents for the purpose of:44 Finding a way to make the provincial government more dynamic. Finding a policy which would achieve more intensive cooperation between military and civilian authorities. solving problems which arose result the extermination of Gestapu/PKI Solving those economic problems which the PKI might exploit. The resolve of Colonel Sumadi made the East Java state stronger and more able to control the violence against the PKI.45 Unlike the Central Java army which strongly supported the coup, or the West Java army, which opposed it, the East Java army was equivocal in its support of the PKI. There was no rebellion among army district commands, but some mobile troop units were considered to have been highly infiltrated by the PKI, and were sent out of East Java.46 The temporary weakness of the military in East Java was overcome with the arrival one RPKAD battalion (army 44 "Report" 148. 45 Personally, Colonel Sumadi had a long history of anti-communism; it was his company who killed Muso (the PKI leader in 1948 Madiun rebellion), see Sumadi, "Kisah Terbunuhnya Gembong PKI Muso," Vidva Yudha (1982): 8-13. 46 "Report" 147. 200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === paracommando from Jakarta), one battalion from the Siliwangi division of West Java, two Christian Ambon province) battalions and one from Pattimura battalion from South Sulawesi province. In addition, two other East Java battalions (517 and 518) deployment Britain.*7 for were brought from Kalimantan confrontation against following Malaysia and In the following I will discuss the killings in rural areas beginning with Magetan, East Java. The Killings in Magetan The people's response in Magetan is interesting since the area was PKI dominated and in 1948 had been the center of its rebellion. As in other PKI strongholds, popular action was rare; this Magetan, prompted the army to take stern action.*8 In the army district commander quickly arrested the regent, who was from the PKI, and the chairman of the national front (an army major). In this regency, the joint action between the armed forces and the Muslim and nationalist groups was considered excellent.*9 Magetan, like other provinces in the western part of East *7 See "Report" 147. *8 See "Report" 137, 147. 48 Obor Revolusi November 1, 1965, SPS. Prior to the coup, the PKI of Magetan proposed the Police chief in Sampang, Madura, who was a native of Magetan, as the candidate for regent of Magetan. During the action against the PKI in Madura, the Police chief was murdered, see "Report" 140. 201 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 218] === Java, was considered an abangan or "red" area.50 During the PKI failed rebellion of 1948, the Magetan regency became the area which suffered the most: the regent, army commander, nationalist leaders, Islamic ulama were all executed by PKI forces.51 Thus the desire to "get even" in addition to a fear of a possible PKI preemptive moves, became important considerations in the mobilization against the PKI. In the village studied, the arrest of PKI members took place during the day and was conducted by the state apparatus under the full control of the army sub-district command. In this task the army was assisted by an executioner unit which consisted of 64 people from "Banser" N.U. and "Banra" PNI. These units were under the direct command "Muspika" ("Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan" or the Sub-District Leaders Council, Commander consisting mobilization the the Sub-District army and head conducted these Head, and the the police). The units was orderly: the "Muspika" provided a list of PKI members in order to avoid mistargets. The daytime arrest of PKI members in their homes was orderly and did not create anarchy in the villages: We had the list and categories whether ones were to be killed or just to be detained. We wanted to create an image that the arrest was primarily a The presence of a pesantren in a "red" area did not necessarily influence the surrounding area in becoming devout moslems. The pesantren was a small "island" in the "sea" of abangan or "red" people. 51 For the complete list of the PKI's victims see Liga Pembela Demokrasi 3-8. 202 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === formal and lawful government's action, not an il legal action of the rivals of the PKI. So that there would be no vengeance of the children of the PKI toward us or our children.(Informant no.5) Those who were arrested were subsequently placed in a school, across from the sub-district office. This "camp" was to be used as a temporary prison for the entire regency. At night, PKI members whose names were on the list were taken by truck to a place of execution. Priority was placed on PKI leaders and activists. The site of the killings was changed nightly and if it became known a new site was found. From the beginning, executioners swore to eternal secrecy. For four months, the killing continued, beginning mid-October: the first month was the peak. At that time, at least thirty people were executed each night. it was raining, the number of victims increased, since the team could use rivers as graves. After the first month, the number of victims was estimated at 15-20 each month. The executions ended when there were no important PKI members left; the rest of the detainees were returned to their villages and given the status of "Walap" ("wajib lapor" or compulsory report) and made to report periodically to the local army command. The killing in the Magetan area shows that where the PKI was strong, non-PKI forces (the PNI and NU) were led by army units. The result was more selective killing. The participation of the army tended to lessen the killing of those considered to be "blind followers," or those who were wives or children of PKI supporters. 203 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === The Killings in Kediri In the regency of Kediri the strength of the PKI was equalled the forces opposing it, including the Muslim N.U. In this area, the number of victims was perhaps the highest in all East Java; in part, this was the result of the Kanigoro affair where a Muslim training center was raided by the PKI. There are three other explanations of the intensity of the violence in this area: first, at the systemic level, the balance of power created fear, particularly among civilians, that the PKI might overpower them. Second, the intensity of the violence may have been owing to the fact that the brother of the regency army commander was one of the generals killed during the 1965 coup.52 Third, an eminent kiyai (ulama) in a pesantren nearby the city of Kediri who chaired the Syuriah (ulama) council of East Java had proclaimed a jihad.53 These three possible explanations of the violence in Kediri are useful, but the most plausible explanation is most likely to be found in the army's role, the last factor making the violence possible. The presence of the army, as suggested by the 'left' version, could lead to violent killings. On the other hand, the presence of the army also prevented anarchy and unselective killing. The situation in the Kediri area was 52 See Hamish McDonald, Soeharto's Indonesia (Victoria: The Dominion Press, Blackburn, 1980) 88. 53 The kiyai stated to his followers that "by killing Communists they were serving both the state and Islam,” see Time 15 July, 1966: 23. 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === unique. The army units in the Kediri regency were absent and army units in neighboring regencies were unreliable and were immediately removed following the coup. In Kediri, the army's situation was as follows: First, after regency/B1itar the coup, (Battalion a battalion 511) (Malaysia campaign) as well as area.3* Two other battalions was sent the adjacent Kalimantan to a strongly anti communist in the adjacent Malang regency were sent to Medan/Sumatra for the Malaysia campaign, and Besuki (eastern East Java/Muslim area). These three battalions were considered heavily infiltrated by the PKI. In addition, the commander of battalion 531 in the Malang regency deserted on October 2.55 Second, the battalions in the Kediri-Maaiun area (517 and 518) were arrived in Kalimantan during the Malaysia East Java late November campaign and 1965.36 Later battalions 517 and 518 were used to control East Java. At that time, the situation in Jakarta was clear. The army commander (Suharto) had denounced the coup with Sukarno adding his 33 For the removal of those battalions and the situation of the military following the coup, see "Report" 147. There is no other information regarding the bactalion 531. For the location of battalions in East Java, see Semdam VIII, Sam Karva Bhirawa Anoraaa 262-263, and Semdam VII, Sam Karva Bhirawa Anoraaa iilid II. 17. For the arrival of those battalions, see "Report" 147. 205 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 222] === disapproval. If the battalions were present during the coup (October 1965), they stood a chance of being removed to other areas. Almost all soldiers were abangan and had relatives and friends in local areas. Third, during the coup, Kediri-Madiun Sulawesi area for (516 the rebellion.57 Fourth, two other battalions and 507) were deployed purpose repressing in the South Islamic an airborne battalion in Madiun (530) was involved in the coup, though it later assisted the army in Jakarta in controlling the city.58 In the western part of East Java, the military situation was critical. battalion; Ngawi, the army had one air each regency had a Sub-district command defense (25-50 people). In addition, there was a military resort command in Madiun consisting of 50-100 people. Thus, at the outbreak of the killing, most army units (eight battalions) the Kediri-Madiun area were absent while the local territorial command lacked sufficient resources to manage affairs. fact, PKI some symphatizers. officers and soldiers were considered The presence of these units, mostly abangan, might have restrained the NU thus avoiding indiscriminate killings. However, there is also the possibility that some 57 The battalions were deployed from May 1964 until late November 1965, see Suara Rakvat December 17, 1965, SPS. For the report of battalion 507, see also Diawa Pos November 20, 1965, SPS. 58 See Puspenad 188. 206 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === soldiers defected, fleeing to their friends/relatives who were PKI members. (This took place in Solo/Central Java, and may explain immediate the removal the 511, 512, and 513 battalions to other areas.) The following map shows the configuration of army units in western East Java (Kediri-Madiun area): 100 km Magetan 530 514 512 511 513 531 515 Kediri Jeaber Figure V.2. Army units in western East Java. Source: "Report" 147. In the eastern East Java, the commander of 514 in Probolinggo was removed while batcalion 515 assigned to Infantry Cadre School that became a center for PKI's infiltration. In the following, we will discuss the killings in the Kediri 1 and Kediri 2. In this area, about 25-50 Ansor of N.U. along with hundreds students from GSNI ("Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia" or Nationalist PNI's Student Movement) led 207 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 224] === the killings.39 The leaders of the Ansor youths were Kiyai's (Ulama) sons who came to the village accompanied by two or three body guards: Actually, there were Ansor youths in villages but in this area the PKI youths [the People's Youth] were stronger. So "Ansor" youths from the nearby area were invited..'.. They were led by the sons of kiyai [Islamic ulama] in three nearby pesantren. The Ansor stayed in mosques and peoples' [non-PKI] houses. The were given food by people.... They wore black dress with red scarf. (Informant no. 1) Unlike the mobilization in Magetan, in Kediri it was communally sponsored. There were no execution teams or formal orders from officials.80 The state participation the people is described as follows: "The leaders and groups... [to hunt the PKI] could be called as a unit or organization which was formed by people's spontaneity. They did not have headquarters or command posts from where orders were given. The masses and the leaders stayed at their houses and at certain time they met and went together to "hunt" the PKI members. (Informant no. 2) An important figure connecting village and urban politics was Mr. W., a member of N.U., (Islam Orthodox party) who lived in the village but who worked in the city of Kediri (20 km from the village) as a member of the regency parliament as well as an official Through him, the in the Office community asked of Religious the Affairs. assistance of Ansor A similar pattern in Kediri area where thousands of GSNI students raided the PKI villages is described in Rochijat 43. 60 The dominant role of Ansor in Kediri is also reported in "Additional Data" 172-174. 208 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 225] === leaders the neighboring pesantren who had arrived support non PKI forces within the villages. Without the help and leadership of the Ansor leaders, the village in Kediri 1 would likely have perished, since the PKI was the dominant force in adjacent Kediri 2. The fear among non-PKI villagers of the PKI in Kediri 1 is described as follows: This area was an abangan ["red”] areas and the PKI was very strong here. In the neighboring village [Kediri 2] almost all of the people became PKI followers. Without the help of the Ansor youths from other areas it was very likely that this village would have been "jebol" [perished]. (Informant no. 2) Execution groups came to the houses of PKI members during the day. PKI members were arrested in an orderly manner. They were put imprisoned in the village head office while those who fled were chased; they were often apprehended and immediately killed either in their haven in the mountains or in their homes upon their return. Out of 325 family heads in the neighboring Kediri 2, 174 were killed. There were only four executioners as compared to the 25-30 members of the "hunting" squad. short, can conclude that mobilization in the village of Kediri was more organization (N.U.) directed than state-directed. The high proportion of the population killed in Kediri 2 (174 out of 325) shows that the selection process was either absent, or ineffective. It is also possible that in areas where the PKI was strong, the PKI, nonetheless, suffered considerable loses. The rather violent mobilization 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 226] === in Kediri 2 was said to have been provoked by the killing of two non PKI youths by members of the PKI. There is no evidence to support this conjecture.61 There was an active army command in Kediri 1 and 2 had no such level. Moreover, the Magetan, whereas army command at the sub-district community initiated mobilization Kediri resulted from a fear that the PKI was powerful: "It's them or us." The passivity of the army, which led to the uncontrolled mobilization in Kediri, has been described as follows: The army and the police were passive during the crushing of the PKI in this area. They just functioned as witnesses and watchers of the mobilization. The army from the Kodim [The Army Regency Command], for example, just patrolled in small units with "power wagons" in sub-districts around here without ever involving in mass actions. And the police were only a few; they were only four officers each in the two neighboring sub-districts. There was no police in our sub-district and at that time not all sub-districts had police. They only became spectators. (Informant no. 1) In Kediri 2, civilians would come to the detainment camps (former schools or government offices) in order to take PKI members to a nearby sugar plantation or rice field to be This was claimed by informant no. 3 but other informants (no.l and 2) could not recall nor do other sources (newspapers or array document) mention it. The killing of opponents of the PKI (nationalist PNI and Muslim NU) occurred in Central Java and Banyuwangi (eastern part of East Java) before the mass killings of PKI members began, see "Report" 137-138, and Puspenad 216-217. It is possible that the NU leaders ordered their members to begin to strike against the PKI after the Banyuwangi clash. 210 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 227] === executed.62 The taking of prisoners by villagers (Ansor) also took place in the army district command city. 63 (Kodim) of Kediri In other areas, there was greater selectivity. shall now discuss mobilization and violence in Jember. The killings in Jember Jember is an important Islamic or "green" area in East Java; it has a large number of pesantren.6* In the period immediately demonstrations following and the coup, challenged the Islamic PKI conducted organizations. PKI members were protected by soldiers from artillery units and some army territorial officers were heavily infiltrated by the PKI. However, the commanders of the army brigade and the regency command, who were strongly anti PKI, would later be able to control the situation.65 In the following, I will discuss mobilization in the village studied, which was mild in scope and intensity. The spontaneous mobilization conducted by the people, without the 62 63 This is reported by informant no. 3. This is reported in Rochijat 45. 64 There is no data concerning the number of pesantren in 1965, but according to the 1977 data, Jember had 202, while Kediri had a moderate number with 84 and Magetan had only 17. See Pemerintah Daerah Jawa Timur [Pemda Jatim], Monoarafi Daerah Jawa Timur.Jilid 2. (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1977) 59-60. 65 "Report" 139. 211 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 228] === army's assistance or guidance, took place in November:66 We only knew the PKI coup in Jakarta at the end of the month [October].... And since that time we from the N.U. participated in securing our villages. (Informant 7) During the mobilization, Banser (the N.U. youth front) killed two PKI activists in the village. One of the victims was the leader of the BTI/PKI who had led the land conflict with the Nationalists in 1964. The Banser was described as follows: The Banser wore black uniform and green beret; there were about six or seven groups and each group consisted of 12 to 15 youths. The formation and activity of the Banser was coordinated by the local santri (pupils) who studied in a pesantren in the neighboring village. Within a month, the mobilization was under control, mainly by the army, and the remaining nine PKI members became prisoners) "Tapol" ("Tahanan Politik" political with the category of "C."67 The mobilization in Jember did not result in uncontrolled killing although the army arrived late (one month), following the beginning of the mobilization. Unlike Magetan, in Jember the army was absent at the beginning but the anarchy experienced Kediri was absent. 66 Another source reports the dominant action of the army (battle artillery unit) in executing CPI members, see "Additional data" 171-172. 67 They were not detained but they had to periodically report to the army/police. Presently all of them joined GOLKAR (the government/army backed party). 212 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === V.4. THE VIOLENCE IN BALI Almost all discussion of the killing maintains that the killing in Bali was the most violent, having the highest proportion other deaths compared areas. Even paracommando units from Jakarta were sent to direct what, at the time, was uncontrolled killing. However, recent data indicates that there were about 39,400 former PKI members and sympathizers categorized as political prisoners.68 This data suggests that many PKI members survived. It is supported by my own local study which suggests that a high proportion of PKI members were not killed, though almost all their leaders and cadres were. Some analyses attempt to explain the violent killing as caused by personality, culture, or socialization patterns. 69 Another analysis suggests that the violence of the killing in Bali was exacerbated by the role played by leaders of the nationalist PNI, who were actually quite close to the PKI. In order show their antipathy PKI, the encouraged.70 The dominant faction of the PNI killing was in Bali was leftist-populist, pro-Nasakom, and Sukarnoist but it had no 66 In the 1988 election there were still 70 people who were not eligible to vote. This was reported in Bali Post February 19, 1990. 69 See Pendit, Pi Lambuna 11-12, Gurr 165-167, Shaplen 169-170, and Geertz, The Interpretation 452. 70 Dewa [Soe Hok Gie] 255. 213 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === alliance with the PKI.71 Prior to 1965, conflict between the PNI and PKI had already begun to spread.72 As I have shown using my model, the intense violence in Bali must be seen in the context of the resolve of the leadership, the availability of army units, and the size of PKI as compared to its opponents. These factors explain why there was variation in the level of violence in Bali, a fact unexplained those emphasizing the role culture, personality and socialization. The response to the coup in Bali was slow to come. The governor and army commander both waited for news from Sukarno. The situation became polarized and news of PKI involvement made non PKI forces nervous eager to destroy the PKI. However, in the absence of guidance from the state/army, anti-PKI forces merely waited. Moreover, news arrived that if the coup were successful, the PKI and army units would control Denpasar (the capital of Bali). They would launch "tunjuk hidung" and "buka topeng" (literally 'pointing nose' and unmasking) and try anti PKI individuals in people's tribunals.73 71 Dewa suggests that the nationalist PNI in Bali was a strong proponent of Nasakom [Sukarno's concept of Nationalism, Religion and Communism], see Dewa [Soe Hok Gie] 255. At that time, all forces, including the armed forces, were pro Nasakom; however, this was a sign of loyalty to Sukarno, not a support of Communism/PKI. 72 See news of conflict between PKI and PNI in Appendix 73 Suara Indonesia October 5, 1965. On October 1, several army officers (middle, junior, NCO) and PKI leaders had a meeting discussing the control of Denpasar, see Disjarah XVI, 214 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === October Jakarta. 8 and 17, the governor was summoned When asked by Sukarno whether he was pro PKI he strongly denied it.7* In December, he and his family were given protection by Sukarno in Jakarta but he was kidnapped by Balinese youth and executed in Jakarta.75 Following the coup, the army commander behaved much like Sukarno, protecting the PKI;78 he was later arrested.77 Non-PKI organization in Bali were quite tense and feared strong support for the coup within the army and bureaucracy. These forces extended number important military organizations: the Presidential Palace Guard in Tampak Siring (A), a Police Mobile Brigade Company in Baturiti, Tabanan (B), Company "A"/Battalion 741 at Kuta, Badung (C), an army unit of Infantry Training Depo in Kediri, Tabanan (D), the military police of Regional Army HQ Udayana in Denpasar (E), and a company of the army attached to HQ in Denpasar the following map for the location of the units.) Komando 192-193. See also Suara Indonesia November 28, 1965. 7* Dewa [Soe Hok Gie] 254-255. 75 Willard A. Hanna, Bali Profile. People. Events. Circumstances 1001-1976 (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1976) 116. 76 Sundhaussen 216. 77 See Crouch 208. In 1973, he was still under arrest, see Dake 368. 78 Disjarah XVI, Komando 192. 215 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === Buleleng 50 km Klungkung Tabanan Figure V.3. Pro-Coup Military Units in Bali. Source: Disjarah XVI, Komando 192. However, the news from Jakarta of the failure of the coup changed the situation in Bali. Both PKI and non-PKI forces were pacified and awaiting news of further developments. On November 13, 1965, occurred in Gerokgak, event that triggered the killings Buleleng where four PKI youths, two Ansor (Muslim) youths, and one nationalist PNI youth died in a clash.79 This was followed by the killing of a soldier in a clash with the PKI in Jembrana. 80 This regency was the 79 Suara Indonesia November 15, 1965. 80 Tjokorda Gde Agung Sukawati with Rosemary Hilbury, Reminiscences of a Balinese Prince (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Southeast Asian Studies, 1979) 79. 216 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === central stronghold of the PKI in Bali where the king, father of t te governor, was a PKI sympathizer.81 Like clashes Central Java and Banyuwangi the early (East Java), the initial desperate killing by PKI members led to violent reprisals. Following this event, the army took action against the PKI; 82 there were similar actions in other areas. A chain reaction of killings soon spread to other regencies. The killing in Bali was not entirely on orders from supra local organizations. It was sometimes initiated by local people who were non-PKI political activists who, however, had ties to supra local organizations. In what follows, I will discuss how in one village the killing began.83 After hearing news of the killing of PKI members in neighboring regencies, one activist this village began discussing matters with Tameng youths who often gathered in his house. He asked that a number of PKI activists be arrested. The Tameng youths then detained two leaders of the PKI Peasant Front and brought them to Mr. K's house. He told the Tameng to finish them off, and the two were brought to the village borders and were executed. 81 During the violence, 14 members of the palace were killed and the palace itself was destroyed. See Ernst Utrecht, "Het bloedbad op Bali," De Groene Amsterdammer January 14, 1966 quoted in Cribb, The Indonesian Killings" 245. See also Hughes 180. 82 The military was reported to launch a "clean up" operation in the Jembrana regency, see Suara Indonesia November 30, 1965. 83 Based on an interview with informant no. 12. 217 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 234] === News of the execution spread throughout the village, and people, led by Tameng youth, began to seize members of the PKI and its front groups. In a short time, more than ten PKI members, including two "Gerwani" (the PKI's Women Front), were executed, and the Tameng proceeded to burn seven homes.8* Villagers began to lock for other PKI members as well as their families. Many PKI members fled, requesting protection by either the PNI leaders or the army in Denpasar. Most of those who were neither leaders nor activists were not killed. This situation surprised Mr. K and soon he with several others began concealing PKI members, particularly the old. He saved, perhaps, 20 people. In the following I will discuss the killings in the Buleleng regency. The Killings in Buleleng The case of two Buleleng villages contains a contrast: Buleleng 1 was "kompak PNI," that is, solidly (100%) PNI, while Buleleng 2 was PKI dominated.85 This pattern resembled that in Kediri 1 and 2 in East Java. members in Buleleng 2 was violent: The killing of PKI four brothers who had become PKI leaders were all killed. The killing was done by "Tameng" (Shield) youth from the Nationalist party. The burning of the houses of PKI members was not uncommon in Bali while in Java it rarely took place. 85 Informants no 10 and 11 gave information concerning the villages and the mobilization j.n Buleleng. 218 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 235] === Organizationally, in Buleleng, as in other regencies, there were "Tameng" leaders and members in every party branch in villages; their ages were between 16 and 48 years. Usually the "Tameng" conducted the killing in their own village but if the neighboring villages needed them they would help them. Regarding the violent killing in the Buleleng regency, people tended identify the "character factor" the principal cause: Basically the Bulelengese were rough and aggressive. Why?... from its history we know that the Bulelengese came from South Bali; they were rebels who had escaped to Buleleng.... Their character differed from those of other parts of Bali, it was like East Java,... rough. (Informant 11) This might be true, directing the military's killing but the role of the military in involvement more the significant. killings would Without have the become uncontrolled, as stated by an informant: In Buleleng if the masses knew that one was a member of the PKI they immediately killed him... . In Tabanan, the killing was under the control of Kodim [Army regency Command] In the city of Buleleng, about 600 PKI prisoners were about to be moved to another place, but the Tameng and the masses blocked the road and all were immediately killed. People's determining the character nature and emotion were the killing influential but was less important compared to other factors such as the push factor (mobilizers) and the absence of constraints (such as a strong 219 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 236] === state/military). It seems that the lack of a local army command to control the killing led to a situation of anarchy in which "blind followers" of the PKI were included among the victims. The largest regency in Bali, Buleleng, together with the regencies of Jembrana and Tabanan, prior to 1965 had only three territorial army officers. In Buleleng alone there were seven sub-districts, 157 villages.86 The Killings in Tabanan In the Tabanan regency, the state/military was relatively strong being close to Denpasar, the capital of Bali.87 In Tabanan, the killing were controlled from the beginning. On October 7, a joint command called Pemulihan Keamanan") Command to Restore Security) was formed to crush the PKI. It consisted of the Nationalist party or The (PNI) Operation leaders, police, army territorial units, and village heads. It had headquarters in the regency capital, and the PNI branches in every village became village Based on the 1961 census data, Sensus Penduduk 1961. 1-6, 25. For the number of army officers in 1961,see Disjarah Lambanq 70. There might be an increase of territorial army officers in 1965, but the number was still low considering the three regencies covered by them. In addition, the mobile elite "Raiders" company in Singaraja (the capital of Buleleng) was sent to South Sulawesi to suppress the Islamic rebellion, see Suara Indonesia 31 March 1965. This weakened the army to direct the killings. 87 The mobilization in Tabanan was told by informants no. 14, 15, and 16. 220 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 237] === "Kokap."88 In addition to the formation of the committee, there was also a method for selecting those who were to be executed: The task of this command [joint command of civilian and military in crushing the PKI] was to discuss the procedure of the "clean up". There were several steps: first, to determine who the activists, cadres, ordinary members and "blind followers" of the PKI were. There were several criteria such as social background, education, and party activities. Second, to list names of PKI's cadres and activists whose participation in party [PKI] was beyond doubt. Third, to report the names on the list to the military. And fourth, to search and arrest those who were on the list by government (police, army). Those who were arrested were put into jail and were executed at night, mostly near graveyards in the city outskirts. (Informant no. 14) The following examples of the killing in two villages (Tabanan 1 and Tabanan 2) contrasts sharply with the situation in Buleleng. The well orderly killing in this area was partly the result of a well defined strategy at the regency level: In this area, we could control the extermination, so there were PKI members in a nearby village who are now still alive. They were only listed in KODIM (the Army District Command in Tabanan city).... other areas where the killings were uncontrolled. In Tabanan 1, there were four PKI members among its 150 households but none were killed as they were simply "blind followers." In the neighboring village or Tabanan 2, 40 of 80 households were PKI but only the members of five households were killed. The killing was "a sign of our participation in 88 The presence of "Kokap" was told by informants in Tabanan regency and Denpasar (the capital of Bali). Other informants in Buleleng and Klungkung did not mention the existence or activity of "Kokap." 221 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === the crushing of the PKI"; they would have been accused of being "different" by other villages had they not killed PKI members. Victims were selected by village "Kokap" and the killing itself was carried out by Tameng who was described as follows: The "Tameng" youths were young; their ages were between 20 and 25 years and some had already married. They worked as peasants or peasant laborers. They wanted to shew that they were "jagoan" [champion and bully] and thought that people would later respect and fear them. They even asked that more PKI members to be killed. the villages included even the Tabanan, the selection process protection of PKI members from another village who had taken refuge there. When the Tameng youth from a ban jar in Denpasar arrived, the Tameng of Tabanan 1 resisted demands to surrender a Denpasar PKI member who had hidden in Tabanan confrontation. quarrel That resulted that nearly night the Tameng youth led from Denpasar returned with a squad of soldiers from the Denpasar military district; the result was that the man was finally turned over to them. The protection of this PKI member had more to do with banjar pride than sympathy toward the PKI. It was believed that the people in the ban jar had the authority and the autonomy to determine the fate of PKI members who came to or from their banjar.88 89 Internal village solidarity leading to the protection of PKI members was also relevant in Pare, Kediri, East Java. In the village the lurah (head village) and the local Ansor youth at first protected about 300 PKI members and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === The Killings in Klungkung The violent mobilization in Klungkung regency was well known. 90 However, the anarchy in Klungkung was not the result of a lack of army units; it was the passivity of the units that counted. The army units they in the Klungkung area relatively strong; consisted Cakrabirawa (Presidential Guard) Bangli regency, a detachment one company were posted in the neighboring of air defense artillery in the Gianyar regency and the army command of Eastern Bali (covering the regencies of Klungkung, Bangli, and Gianyar). Prior to 1965, members of the Palace Guard and artillery units often visited the PKI members affiliation with the following the coup; PKI they the Klungkung rendered stayed those the regency. units Past inactive sidelines. This provided the opportunity for Tameng youth of the PNI to move freely, killing PKI members and sympathizers with impunity. The Tameng youth were described as follows: The organization of "Tameng" youth consisted of squads (eleven people) and platoons (fifty people). They were peasants and peasant laborers from the PNI [the Nationalist Party] and gathered every night from 6 or 7 o'clock. In daytime they worked [as peasants] but there was always a picket. Their symphatizers. But the sudden arrival of the army and Ansor youth from another area resulted in the immediate killing of the 300 PKI members. This led to mistrust among the Ansor themselves. See "Report" 145. 90 This was reported in a newspaper (Suara Indonesia November 24, 1965) in which Major Djasmin (the Battalion Commander of RPKAD/Army Commando from Jakarta) stated that the killing of women, old people and children, that occurred in Klungkung, had to be prevented. 223 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === ages were between 20 and 30 years and some had already married. Their leaders dressed in black and red headbands while the members had no uniforms. They had swords, like the Japanese samurai and spears. They roamed the villages within this sub-district. (Informant no. 12) Actually, the situation in Klungkung could have been controlled, but the local army command in Klungkung remained passive: The passivity of the "Kodim” [the Army Command] and the "Polres" [the Police Resort] was the result of confusion: there were no clear instructions from Denpasar. The army command and police had only 15 and 50 people, respectively. All lived in the city; there 8vere no commands at the sub-district levels. The killing in Klungkung was more supervised when army commando (the Red Beret) from Jakarta arrived in the middle of December. 92 In the Klungkung regency 30 pro PKI veterans were killed, and in the sub district of the village studied seven veteran members were killed, including the one who had become the head of PKI's peasant front (BTI). Of those villages studied in the Klungkung regency, about 50% of its 295 households were PKI: there 15 people were killed. The killings in this village, which were called "few," might easily be regarded as atypical, given the level of According to 1961 data, the army command of West Bali (Kodim 1603) in Klungkung covered regencies of Klungkung, Gianyar, Bangli, and Karangasem. The population in these regencies were about 660,000. The command had only four territorial army NCO ("Buterpra"), see Disjarah XVI, Lambana 71. 92 This was told by informant no. 12 and was reported in Suara Indonesia December 24, 1965. 224 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === violence throughout of the rest of the Klungkung regency. The neighboring villages (T., M., Tk., B., Ts., P. and A.) were considered villages having "many" victims. The Role of Banjar in Mobilization Non-communal reaction by Balinese organizations such as banjar (hamlet polity), subak (irrigation society) and pemaksan (temple congregation) was an interesting phenomenon. Actually the PKI was considered as having threatened the very foundations of all communal organizations, this was modern political, rather 93 but response to than communal, organizations. The non-participation of banjar appears to disconfirm Simmel's theory of renegadism, which maintains that a close and cohesive group will put up strong resistance if it is threatened with dissolution, especially by members of its own group. Coser reformulates Simmel's theory of renegadism: Individuals who participate intensively in the life such groups [which encompassing total personality] are concerned with the group's continuance. If they witnessed the breaking away of one with whom they shared cares and responsibilities of group life, they are likely to react more violent way against such "disloyalty."... This leads to Simmel's second point: renegadism is perceived by a close group as a threat to its unity." "Indeed, as Simmel suggests, the reaction may be stronger under these conditions because the "enemy" from within, the renegade or the heretic, not only puts into question the values and interests of the group, but also threatens its unity. Renegadism 83 Hughes 177. 225 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 242] === signifies and symbolizes a desertion of those standards of the group considered vital to its well being, if not xcs actual existence."9* Social structure in Bali is very cohesive; primarily manifested banjar which consists roughly 75 households, and subak with between 100 to 500 members.85 The PKI's threat to the small hamlet is best analyzed by Simmel's theory, according to which factionalism or renegadism is more dangerous in small rather than large groups: This is one reason why well-organized groups can afford more inner splits and factions than can more me c h a n i c a l, internally disconnected conglomerations. The unity which can be brought about in a larger group only through a more complex organization can more easily balance the credits and debits within its social life, and can bring any force available to bear on the points of weakness that results from discords among its members (or from other sources of loss).... It is comparable to the bottom of a ship which is composed of many watertight compartments-if it is damaged, the water can still not penetrate all of it.... There are thus two methods: organic solidarity, where the whole makes up for damages from partial conflicts; and isolation, where the whole preserves itself against such damages."86 The above thesis, which emphasizes the scale of a group, is relevant in explaining the response of the banjar renegadism and factionalism. Two informants explain why banjar did not participate in the mobilization: 9* Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1956) 69. 95 Geertz and Geertz 18, 19. My study finds that the number of households in banjar in 1965 ranged from 80 to 300. 96 Georg Simmel, Conflict And The Web Group-Affi1iations (Translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix) (New York: The Free Press, 1955) 66, 67. 226 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === There were party leaders in banjar, it was different from now [since 1970s, parties were prohibited to operate in villages]. At that time, parties had branches in banjar. Those party leaders played an active role in the action since they had the list of PKI members and their activities. [This was possible since there was a monthly (35 days) meeting in banjar; thus the names and activities of PKI members were easily monitored by banjar Banjar did not organize its members to kill PKI members since it had already been sponsored and conducted by party [the PNI] youths (Tameng). Sometimes banjar assisted the Tameng in arresting PKI members. (Informant no. 16) It is understandable if the banjar, which was concerned with village social relations, such as cremation, marriage, did not respond to new political games played by party members within it. There would have been a communal response from the banjar to the PKI’s if there had been no other organizations, such as the Nationalist party. Thus threatened banjar members used other organizations, veteran's associations or parties (e.g. PNI), these in order to protect their banjars.87 organizations were quite powerful having networks to other villages and sub-districts, Moreover, ties and even at the regency and provincial levels. 97 Even urbanization fails to significantly change one's attitudes, participation, and loyalty to one's home baniar (the place/village where one was born). Usually one has to participate in most important rituals, such as cremation of a baniar member, even if one lives far from one's home banjar. For the resistance and flexibility of baniar in modernization see Ketut Sudhana Astika et. al. Peranan Baniar Dalam Masyarakat Bali (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan kebudayaan, 1986). 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === The Role of Puri in Mobilization Unlike the situation during the struggle for independence in 1945, puri (noble house) had only u minor role the 1965 mobilization. organizations The state/military and modern (political parties and veterans) overshadowed the puri. However, a puriJs early affiliation with a political party had consequences. the brief follows, I will provide two examples where puri played indiscriminate killings that (Puri 1 and Puri 2) unseen well description role preventing defining who the sympathizers of the PKI were. One early incident took place in Puri 1 and was recounted by Mr. A., a local notable, who had been a leader within the Socialist Party before its banning in 1960. mobilization against the PKI, was Following the nearly "ditumpas" (exterminated) by a group of Tameng youth from other areas. He believed that the Tameng youths involved had been given orders by certain Nationalist Party (PNI) leaders in the city who had been his opponents prior to the dissolution of the Socialist Party (PSI) in 1960. Apparently considered former PSI the leaders of leaders/activists obstacles the PNI the future development of the PNI. The anarchy created by the killing of PKI members seems to have provided an opportunity to settle old feuds. At the time, PNI leaders believed that with the demise the PKI and the PSI leadership Nationalist party would become dominant. 228 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the === [PDF page 245] === The local Tameng youths in Mr. A. *s house were Infuriated and were ready to fight the Tameng youth who had tried to kill him. For his own safety, Mr. A. went to Puri 1 for help; the Puri apparently told the Nationalist Party leaders to spare his life. The aristocrat in Puri 1 was considered a supporter of the Nationalist Party. and dominance Mr. A. survived, and the emergence "Golkar" (government backed-party/army) helped to end the old conflicts. Another instance of power being exercised by puri was during the selection for detainment and execution of PKI members and sympathizers in the area of Puri 2 that covered six banjar (hamlets). The leader of Puri 2 became the chairman the Action Committee Crush the "September 30th Movement"/PKI and was authorized to issue an introductory letter PKI. 98 certifying non-involvement either the coup But during the selection process, people in the banjar began to feel that the puri hampered members and activists within the Nationalist Party (PNI), even those who had clearance from their banjar. Later people within the banjar learned that the leader of Puri 2 was a Socialist Party (PSI) sympathizer. The meaning of "non-PKI members and sympathizers" 98 Letters of "Non-Involvement" in the Coup/CPI were issued by the "Kodim" (Army regency command), but what one needed was an introductory letter from the local authority (neighborhood, village). Later, the letter "Non-Involvement" was issued by the Police Resort Command, a counter-part of the Kodim. Both are in the regency level. 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === for Puri 2 excluded those who were not (former) Socialist party (PSI) members or sympathizers. Those who were affiliated with the PNI, an old rival of the PSI prior to 1960, had difficulty during the mobilization. To overcome this, the six banjar established their own local committees to issue letters "non-involvement." Thus, old conflict between the nationalist PNI and the socialist PSI persisted even in the face of a common enemy (the PKI). These two examples show that Puri retained some influenced in local politics, while acting under the shadow of the various political parties (the Nationalist Party/PNI and the banned Socialist Party/PSI). This chapter argues that the killing in rural areas was neither a mere local matter nor a psychological outburst: psychological factors will not explain variation in the level of violence. Furthermore, while prior conflicts shaped the violence to a degree, it was supra local organizations that proved most important. The violence witnessed must be seen as an attempt at a shortcut to victory aimed at demoralizing the PKI the context national power struggle. socio-political framework seems more apt explain the violence than a psychological approach. Like violence political mobilization prior was influenced factors also the coup, such the public figures, military units and size of the PKI in a given area. 230 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === Public figures who had been close to the PKI were unable to control the killing. And availability and reliability army units resulted in different patterns of killing. Finally, in areas where the PKI was strong, the number of victims tended to be high. During the violence, attempts were made by the army and political parties select victims: this was complemented by the actions of a number of local communities to spare fringe members of the PKI. 231 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 248] === CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION This has been a discussion of the destruction of the PKI. The process included political mobilization and conflict before and after the attempted coup of 1965. Here I begin by reviewing and classifying existing explanations of the event. Two large perspectives can culled from existing explanations: one emphasizing context and another attempting to trace the development of events. The first primordial dualism, perspective tensions, and concentrates transition, the urban-village social state-building; each provides local change, contextual setting within which the PKI's revolutionary strategy as well as its opponents' response took place. Contextual factors may help explain the intensification of conflict prior to 1965 and the killing that followed the coup, but this will not explain the origin of the conflict. It was the PKI's revolutionary strategy beginning in 1963 that led to conflict during 19631965. The second perspective involves detailed historical studies and journalistic reports. This perspective argues that the change in the PKI's strategy to a revolutionary one was a highly significant event in explaining the conflict. However, without systematically comparing the PKI's destruction with the reception of communist parties elsewhere, these studies 232 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 249] === fail to provide a big enough picture of the events that transpired. A comparison with other communist parties seeking to implement peaceful coexistence (French, Finland, Italy and India) shows that the destruction of a communist party was not inevitable. I have further shown that the destruction of the PKI was not a unique phenomenon: it was, however, one failed attempt to monopolize power just as had existed in China in 1927, Indonesia in 1948. and Singapore in the 1950s. In order to monopolize power, the PKI relied on public figures, conducted mass radicalization, and infiltrated the military. This strategy appeared to enjoy a greater likelihood of success. Employing analytical model that combines public figures, social challengers and military disloyalty, we gain a better understanding of the impact of the mobilization prior to 1965 and the violence following the coup. A comparison of East Java and Bali shows how the PKI's mobilization and the response of non-PKI organizations took place. The triangular arrangement consisting Sukarno, the PKI and the army eventually led to polarization between the PKI and non-PKI factions each having a different pattern of affiliation within the two provinces. In regard to the political mobilization, we find that Balinese Hinduism failed to hinder the development of the PKI. Complete Hinduization did not create religious divisions among Balinese that could be exploited by the PKI, as occurred in 233 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 250] === the case of the santri and abangan in East Java. However, the PKI benefitted from the floating mass of former PSI members who had considerable influence in Bali. While in East Java, the PKI did not benefit from the banning of the PSI and the Masyumi (Modernist Islam) in 1960. The former had few voters while members of the Masyumi shifted to the NU. The PKI only attracted a significant number of nominal Muslims or abangan who were not supporters of the PNI. It is true that the majority of the PKI's supporters came from the lower social strata and that their leaders were from the lower middle class. However, competing groups, the nationalist PNI and the Islamic parties, also had people from this strata (labor unions and peasant fronts), though they had significantly more middle and upper class members as well. These groups were mass organizations existing independently of the state-military. Even after the destruction of the PKI, the state-military used force to control and reorganize the PNI and the NU.1 examining newspaper accounts, discover that conflicts between 1961 and 1963 were mainly between the PKI on the one hand and state and private plantations on the other. 1 Both ceased as political forces, but the NU progressed as a socio-religious organization. The Kediri regency is an interesting case. Prior to 1965, there was polarization between the PKI and non-PKI factions (PNI and NU). In 1966-67, the PNI was considered an element of the "old order" (Sukarnoism) and was purged by the military and NU. Finally, in 1971 general election, the NU found itself as an enemy of the state-military backed party (GOLKAR). 234 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 251] === During this period, non-PKI organizations were passive cr became free-riders. However, from 1963 to 1965, the PKI faced off against the NU and the PNI. This led to intense conflicts that occurred mostly in mixed area (Kediri, Banyuwangi, and Jombang in East Java) where the power of PKI and non-PKI factions was nearly equal. The religious conflict was overland/economic, political and issues. In the "green belt," the PKI avoided open conflicts. In Bali, conflict was usually over land in areas where PKI's action was wide spread. There were no wide spread religious disputes in Bali, as there had been in East Java. Host studies the destruction the PKI fail systematically analyze conflicts that took place between 1963 and 1965. If these conflicts are not taken into account, one might get a false impression that the coup of 1965 was the starting point for the violence. In regard to the violence, I find that existing analyses tend to concentrate on a given pattern or they merely list cases without connecting them to a broader social context.3 The dominant analyses tend to emphasize psychological factors such as socialization and character. validity: This might have some vengeance and hatreds might color the violence. However, the violence must be seen primarily as a shortcut to 2 An exception is Mortimer's The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform 1959-1965. 3 See chapter V.l of my thesis. 235 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 252] === ultimate victory. Non-PKI factions feared that Sukarno would protect the PKI; this would lead to a PKI counteraction. Like the political mobilization, the violence itself was shaped by regional public figures, the availability of army units and the balance power between the PKI and its opponents. In Bali where the governor and army commanders were considered protective of the PKI before 1965, the violence was, in general, uncontrolled and sporadic. On the other hand, in East Java the violence was more controllable. To arrive at a better analysis of the killing, I have considered second, three military types actions: operations; and first, third, local joint actions; action military and political parties. Even neighboring sub-districts experienced different patterns of killing. For the present the frequency of each type of killing is difficult to determine, though we know that all three patterns existed. It is certain that the violence and the killing, after the coup, was not solely military operation. generalization to the effect that the military was solely responsible for the killing is inaccurate.* On the other hand, the killing was neither a spontaneous communal conflict. We cannot generalize the killings communal or peasant action.5 Local actions were initiated and led by political men * For this analysis see Griswold, Indonesia 10. 5 One might arrive at this conclusion from description of peasant's violence, see Sloan 71. Sloan's 236 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 253] === or activists who were members of or had ties to anti-PKI organizations, and not by ordinary peasants, santri, and villagers.6 My study shows also that a majority of PKI members and sympathizers were not killed, though most of the leaders and activists were. The selectivity from above was complemented by protection from below; community spared fringe members of the PKI. Within the bigger picture, the destruction of the PKI in 1965-1966 was a historic moment Indonesia's route to modernity. Indonesia experienced several routes to modernity following decolonization. liberal route which Between 1945-1959, resulted failure. it explored a addition, alternatives routes proposed by Muso (communism or The Soviet Republic of Indonesia, 1948) and Kartosuwiryo (Darul Islam or The Islamic State, 1948-1962) also failed.7 And Sukarno's route, which attempted to unify nationalism, religion (Islam) and communism (Nasakom), was eventually superseded by state For the participation of peasant, see Sloan 71; for santri, see Geertz, The Interpretation 282; and for villagers, see Pye 132. 7 It is interesting to know that Sukarnor Kartosuwiryo (executed in 1962), and Muso (killed in 1948) once stayed with Cokroaminoto (the Leader of the Islamic League) in Surabaya, the capital of East Java during the 1920s. Muso was a former activist in the Islamic League before joining the Red League (the PKI). Kartosuwiryo was Cokroaminoto's foster son and private secretary while Sukarno was Cokroaminoto's son-in-law. In 1948, Muso proclaimed the Soviet Republic of Indonesia in East Java followed by Kartosuwiryo who established an Islamic State (Darul Islam) in West Java. At that time, Sukarno himself was in Central Java. 237 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 254] === corporatism6 with a technocratic pattern of development.9 Without considering this big picture, the events surrounding the destruction of the PKI in Indonesia can only be partially understood. The destruction of the PKI shows that the majority of Indonesian people were convinced that communism compelled by the PKI was not the only alternative or the best route to modernity.10 The new pattern of the state resembled that of Turkey and Thailand, see Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 360-365. 9 For the technocratic model see Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 21-25. 10 The universality of communism is now challenged by decommunization of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. A reverse domino-effect appears evident. 238 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === APPENDIX A. THE ARMY'S CIVIC MISSION IN EAST JAVA Following are several summaries of news items in SPS regarding the army's civic mission in East Java: Diawa Timur. September 4, 1961, SPS: The 16th regiment in Kediri built a sport/cultural hall, accommodating 2,500 people.(A) Diawa Timur. September 4, 1961, SPS: The 18th regiment in Pasuruan built a camp for 125 ex-tramps, providing them with jobs including carpenters, painters and farm workers.(B) Diawa Timur. September 5, 1961, SPS: The army's 18th regiment in Malang rebuilt four rubber plantations and a 500 hectare estate, cultivation being left to the people. The army also planned to build a power plant for the Djapanan and Dampit areas (Malang).(C) Surabaya Post. December 8, 1961, SPS: The anniversary of the East Java division was celebrated by a contest including building a high school in every regimental and garrison command. Included were other civic actions such as making blackboards, eradicating plant pests, cleaning the water supply lines, and providing meals to needy people. Surabava Post. February 6, 1963, SPS: The East Java Brawijaya division switched part of its activities to civic actions in support of national developmental projects. Surabava Post. April 5, 1963, SPS: The army commander inspected 150 engineering trainees in Malang in a context of civic actions.(D) Manifesto. May 28, 1963, SPS: Two companies of the 17th regiment conducted a civic mission that included dredging a 10 km long canal and repairing roads in the Djombang regency.(E) Obor Revolusi. June 26, 1963, SPS: The 17th army regiment donated a school building and rice barn to the people of Babat in the Lamongan regency.(F) Trompet Masvarakat. July 27, 1964, SPS: The army conducted a 1 It is safe to assume that there were some unreported army civic missions. 2 The "A" sign is the location of the army's civic mission in Kediri. Other locations will follow alphabetically. 239 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 256] === corn pilot project in Bodjonegoro part of the 2,000 ha project in East Java. This corn project was to be followed by rice projects sc that the army's rice would be available to people.(G) Manifesto. August 6, 1964, SPS; The army was to harvest sugar cane which was planted in connection with the Rejosari sugar mill and the local community of Magetan (Korem 81, Madiun). (H) Indonesia Daily News. August 13, 1964, SPS: In 1963 the army repaired 37 km of roads and two dams, constructed 2 clinics, produced 38,425 tons of paddy and 23,795 tons of corn, killed of 11,082,239 rats and initiated other projects. Trompet Masvarakat. August 22, 1964, SPS: On the pretext of a civic action, the army in the Jember regency provided 142 hectares of land to be tilled by landless farmers with the crops to be divided according to land reform laws.(I) D-ialan Rakvat. May 26, 1965, SPS: The army command of the Banyuwangi regency organized a harvest of paddy, coconut, and fish in conjunction with other army civic actions.(J) The following map shows the location of the army's civic missions: 100 km Magetan Kediri Jenber Map Appendix A. The Location of the array's civic mission. 240 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 257] === APPENDIX B. LAND CONFLICT IN EAST JAVA The following news items in the East Java's newspapers describes conflict between the PKI and its opposition (mainly the NU).1 Ngawi (A):2 Suara Rakvat. November 1964, SPS: In Ngawi, 118 people who carried BTI [the PKI's peasant front] banner and national flag occupied 15 ha of land on November 5, 1964. All were arrested by police as their four leaders fled. Obor Revolusi. May 5, 1965, SPS; 20 farmers mobilized by the PKI were wounded and masses burned 16 BTI/PKI's houses in Sumberredjo, Ngawi. Indonesia Weekly. May 23, 1965, SPS: Landlords burned the homes of farmers in Mantingan, Ngawi. Tulungagung (B); Pi a1an Rakvat Triweekly. February 20, 1965, SPS: The destruction of PKI signboards and the distribution of anti PKI leaflets in Tulungagung. Kediri (C): Jalan Rakvat Triweekly. 18 October, 1964, SPS: BTI/PKI houses were looted and destroyed in Kediri. Trompet Masyarakat. November 27, 1964, SPS: A landlord in Plemahan village, Kediri hired 500 people to destroy the riceplant of two peasants. Blitar (D): Some of the following news items are also quoted in Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist 48-50, Pro PKI's newspapers included Dialan Rakvat. Diawa Timur (banned on October 8, see Trompet Masvarakat October 9, 1965, SPS). and Trompet Masvarakat (banned on October 8, 1965, see Diawa Pos October 11, 1965, SPS). It must be assumed that not all conflicts were reported. 2 The "A" sign shows the location of the Ngawi regency on the map. Other regencies will follow alphabetically. 241 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === Dinamika. September 15, 1964, SPS; Seven peasants mobilized by the PKI were tried for invading a factory's land. Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. November 4, 1964, SPS: In Blitar, a haji [a Muslim who had gone to Mecca] organized 400 youths with swords to cancel the sharecropper agreement. Djombang (E):3 Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. October 7, 1964, SPS: In a mass rally in Jombang, a group [Muslims] yelled "Come down BTI goat," "Crush the BTI," brandishing hoes, knives, spears, etc. at local BTI leader. Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. November 11, 1964, SPS: A BTI/PKI peasant front delegation, escorted by 7,000 peasants, came to the regent and asked for the implementation of land reform. Trompet Masvarakat. November 23, 1964, SPS: A BTI leader was beaten up by 200 men in Gempollegundi, Jombang. Trompet Masvarakat. November 28, 1964, SPS: A BTI leader in Gempollegundi (Jombang) and Karakbelah (Jombang) were attacked. There were also attacks on five BTI men and two PKI's houses were destroyed. Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. December 25, 1964, SPS: A BTI member, who was a former sergeant major during the guerilla war, was beaten to death by 300 people in Djombang. Trompet Masvarakat. June 11, 1965, SPS: A local land reform committee member representing the BTI [PKI] was wounded and beaten unconscious; he was beaten by a brother and a cousin of a village head. Gresik (F): Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. December 25, 1964, SPS: A BTI and a PKI leader in Sumput (Gresik) were beaten by 3,000 [Muslims] headed by Hadji Huseini. The people then insulted PKI/BTI officials in public, and paraded them through four villages, destroying PKI/BTI signboards. One of the most intense conflicts prior to 1965 and the killings after the 1965 coup took place at Jombang-Kediri. After the killings of 1965, some Sanser/Ansor commanders in Jombang area were killed or kidnapped in revenge, see Front Revolusioner July 29, 1966, SPS and Duta Masvarakat June 29, 1966, SPS. 242 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === Sidoardjo (G): Harian Umum. September 26, 1964, SPS; A BTI man was beaten by his village chief in Sidoardjo. Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. November 26, 1964, SPS; A PKI youth was attacked by youths who shouted "Allahu Akbar" [Muslims youths] in Kludan, Sidoardjo. Trompet Masvarakat. February 20, 1965, SPS; In Sidoardjo, a Pemuda Rakyat's (PKI's youth front) lecture attended by 3,000 was attacked and rocks were hurled by local youths [Muslim youths were suspected]. Malang (H): Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. October 21, 1964,£E£: The BTI chairman of Sumberputjung, Malang was arrested by police. Dialan Rakvat. November 16, 1964, SP£: Members of the Pemuda Rakyat (PKI's youth front) were shot in Malang. Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. December 23, 1964,SPS; A PKI secretary in a village Malang was confronted by the village secretary, a military policeman, and an army lieutenant over a plot of land. Pasuruan (I); Trompet Masvarakat. November 6, 1964, SPS; A BTI man was beaten by the mantri polisi (village security official) in Gempol, Bangil. Probolinggo (J): Trompet Masvarakat. October 31, 1964, SPS; A BTI man was murdered and a few days earlier an attempt was made upon a BTI leader. Jember (K): Trompet Masvarakat. December 7, 1964, SPS; A BTI/PKI man was killed by a landlord's man in Sukokulon, Jember. Situbondo (L): Trompet Masvarakat. February 18, 1965, SPS; At the Olean Sugar Factory a conflict took place between the SBG (PKI) and the Gasbiindo (Muslim;; the latter invited Ansor youths to ransack a local SBG office in Situbondo. 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 260] === Banyuwangi (M): Trompet Masvarakat. January 5, 1963, SPS: A BTI man was beaten up by a village chief in Bimo village, Banyuwangi. Dialan Rakvat Triweekly. June 24, 1964, S£S: 70 farmers launched a unilateral action in a 9 ha absentee estate in Glenmore, Banyuwangi. Trompet Masvarakat. August 21, 1964, SFS: During a rally in Banyuwangi, anti-PKI slogans were displayed. Manifesto. October 26, 1964, SPS: 97 cases of unilateral actions were to be brought to court in Banyuwangi regency. Pewarta Surabava. November 20, 1964, SPS: A PNI activist was attacked by 2,000 people in Banjarsari, Banyuwangi. Pewarta Surabava. February 17, 1965, SPS: A BTI/PKI man tried to kill a PNI man in Banyuwangi. In the following map we will see the distribution of conflicts prior to 1965: 100 km Magetan Kediri Jenber Map Appendix B. The Location of Land Conflict in East Java prior to 1965 244 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 261] === APPENDIX C. LAND CONFLICT IN BALI There were a number of reported conflicts in the press: Buleleng (A): Suara Indonesia. September, 1964: The Petani (PNI's peasant organization) protested that certain peasants and groups [BTI/PKI] did not implement the normal procedures contained in the crop-sharing agreement. On January 1965, a landowner's house was destroyed by 250 peasants mobilized by his tenant who was a BTI member. The BTI attacked not only big landlords but also small owners. In Kubutambahan, Buleleng, a small peasant's plants were removed by his former tenant with the help of 200 people.2 [There is no other information as to whether these people were from BTI/PKI or not] Jembrana (B): In Yeh Embang, the PKI invaded state forests and distributed the lands to PKI members for the planting of cash crops. The PNI protested and distributed land in state forest to their followers. On March 4, 1965 several PNI members were attacked with "parang" (machetes) and knives by three PKI members. Meanwhile the PNI captured nine people [no other information as to whether they were connected with the PKI] from Poh Santen and Pakutatan, Mendoyo district, Jembrana. Suara Indonesia. July 13, 1964, SPS: The PNI demanded that authorities take firm measures in response to the Yeh Embang incident where a hand grenade had been thrown. Tabanan (C): Suara Indonesia. July 13, 1964, SPS: The PNI protested the kidnapping at Megati [Tabanan] and Bantas Bale Agung [Tabanan], the attempted murder at Yeh Buah, the beating up of a PNI man at Petiga [Tabanan] and other acts of humiliation Center for Rural and Regional Studies, University of Gajah Mada, "Rural Violence in Bali," The Indonesian Killings 249. 2 Center for Rural and Regional Studies 250. 3 Center for Rural and Regional Studies 250-251. 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 262] === toward government officials [mostly PNI men]. Suara Indonesia. November 4, 1964, SPS: A Petani's [PNI's peasant front] lecture in Pesagi-Penebel, Tabanan, attended by Petani and Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis (PNI youth front) stated that unilateral actions [by the PKI] would be crushed by the PNI. Suara Indonesia. November 12, 1964: 400 people from the PNI in Penarukan, Kerambitan, Tabanan, acted in revenge over land invasion by a BTI peasant. Suara Indonesia. December 16, 1964, SPS: The PNI urged the authorities to take drastic measures against those who stole PNI signboards in Selemadeg and Selabih. Suara Indonesia. January 20, 1965: On January 17 and 18, 1965, there were nearly armed clashed between the PNI and BTI/PKI's peasant youth in Selemadeg, Tabanan regency. Suara Indonesia. March 5, 1965: A peasant and his wife in Djatiluwih, Penebel, Tabanan, were kidnapped and beaten by 100 BTI members and reassured that they would be safe if they joined the PKI. Badung (D): Suara Indonesia. June 29, 1964: The Marhaenis Youth Front (PNI) condemned unilateral actions [by the PKI]. Suara Indonesia. August 20, 1964, SPS: The PNI in Munggu.. Badung regency protested slogans in various parts of Bali, particularly in Badung, which insulted Pancasila [the state's ideology] and the Marhaenist [PNI] front. Suara Indones ia. August 12, 1964: The PNI stated that they knew that it was Pemuda Rakyat [PKI's front youth] of banjar Sajan who threw sand and stones at PNI members at Abiansemal, Badung. The following map shows the distribution the violence:* * Not all incidents were reported. Many minor ones, such as in the villages studied, were not reported by the press. 246 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 263] === Buleleng 50 km Tabanan Klungkung Map Appendix C. The Location of Land Conflict In Ball prior to 1965 247 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 264] === APPENDIX D. RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN EAST JAVA the following, I will show various instances religious insults taking place prior to 1965i1 Trenggalek (A): Obor Revolusi. May 11, 1965, £PS: A ludruk [theater] play insulted religion at Wonorejo, Trenggalek. It was entitled "God is getting married." On the following day, Ansor youths protested to police and the deputy regent revoked the ludruk's permit. Kediri (B): Obor Revolusi. January 21, 1965, SPS: On January 13, 1965, 4 a.m., a training center organized by the East Java PII (Muslim high school student association) at the Kanigoro village, Kediri was raided by a group of 3,000 men headed by Suryadi (BTI/PKI leader), all were armed with knives.... The trainers were ordered to leave the classrooms with their hands tied. The attackers then looted their books, paper, clothing, watches, and money. Obor Revolusi. February 10, 1965, SPS: On the evening of February 6, the IPNU and IPPNU (NU's high school student association) of Ngadiluwih, Kediri, held a lebaran ceremony (Islam's holy day) during which stones were thrown at them. Java Bava. October 13, 1985: 18: Muslims in Majasari, Kediri threatened to burn the theater where the PKI had planned to stage a ludruk play entitled "the Death of Allah." The police revoked the permit before the play could be performed. Kediri and Nganjuk: Perdamaian. February 23, 1965, SPS: The troupe of Lekra (the These news stories appeared primarily in Obor Revolusi an NU newspaper, while the PKI's Dialan Rakvat (People's Path) and Trompet Masvarakat (Society's Trumpet) did not report the events. 2 See also Front Revolusioner September 30, 1966, SPS. This is the most well known case of religious cor.fli.ct in East Java before 1965 (the "Kanigoro affair"). It was also stated that the PKI ransacked religious books and the Qur'an, saying: the "Qur'an is disgusting, the cause of leprosy," see Jawa Pos September 27, 1989. 248 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 265] === PKI's Cultural/Art Union) repeatedly insulted Islam in Nganjuk and Kediri. Djombang (C): Obor Revolusi. May 31, 1965, SPS; A woman activist from the PKI insulted GP. Ansor as Malaysia's lackeys and attacked the NU's religious teachers for being conservative. This took place at Ngadiredjo, Jombang. Bangil/Pasuruan (D); Obor Revolusi. February 18, 1965, SPS; At a PKI's mass rally at Gondanglegi, Bangil two BTI/PKI activists stated that "Islam is a religion made by Arabs" and "The prophet of the Christians is Jesus, the prophet of farmers is Usus (bowels)." Ansor youth were angry and raided the rally but the offenders managed to flee. Probolinggo (E); Obor Revolusi. May 22, 1965, SPS; A representative of the teacher's^union insulted religion for saying that there is no Doomsday. Lumajang (F); Obor Revolusi. June 22, SPS; Ludruk Insults Islam: According to G.P. Ansor of Pasirian, the Lumadjang regency, last week the "Gotong Royong" Ludruk Troupe performing in Bades village contained a scene insulting to Islam.... Another ludruk group performing in the Pasirian area also offended Islam in the same way.... It is reported that the same thing has happened in other areas. Banyuwangi (G): Obor Revolusi. February 11, 1965, SPS; "On February 8, some 500 Muslims went to the office of the Village Chief of Djambewangi (Banyuwangi). Led by 2 youths respectively representing Pemuda Marhaenis [PNI youths] and G.P. Ansor [of NU], they demanded that authorities take firm actions against those who had insulted religion and Muslims. A PKI man who spoke before a waiana [shadow puppets] show read out a passage of the Koran and intentionally changed the words "Laa roibafih" to "Rai babi," Javanese words meaning "mouth of a pig." * Doomsday is a conviction in Islam. 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 266] === Mimbar Rakvat, May 6, 1965, £E£: Three BTI members of Olehsari, Banyuwangi were investigated on charges of insulting religion by comparing Islam with dogs, wild pigs and feces. Obor Revolusi. June 5, 1965, SPS; "For the fourth time on May 26 the state court of Banjuwangi tried Basuki, village secretary of Olehsari. He was accused of saying"Muslims are bad" on December 8, 1964. The prosecutor demanded 8 months imprisonment. The judge adjourned the court until June 10." Obor Revolusi. June 9, 1965, SPS; Some members of IPNU [NU student association] demanded the punishment of actors who insulted Islam in their performances. Obor Revolusi. June 25, 1965, SPS; A delegation of Muslim youth in Banyuwangi saw the local prosecutor and demanded that those who had insulted Islam in shows and performances be punished according to Presidential Decree No. 1/1965. [The decree states that insults to religion are criminal acts] The following map shows that insult to Islam took place mostly in areas where the PKI was strong and nearly equal to the NU. 100 km Magetan Kediri Jenber Map Appendix D. The Location of Religious Conflict in East Java prior to 1965 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 267] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Adas, Michael. Prophets of Rebellion. Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Additional Data Indonesia, Counter-revolutionary especially East Java." Cruelty The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali. 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