The United States and the 'New Order' in Indonesia (PhD American University, 1969)

=== [PDF page 1] === 70- 10,564 SULLIVAN, John Henry, 1935THE UNITED STATES AND THE "NEW ORDER" IN INDONESIA. The American University, Ph.D., 1969 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan JOHN HENRY SULLIVAN 1970 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 2] === THE UNITED STATES AND THE "NEW ORDER" IN INDONESIA John H; 'Sullivan Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy International Relations Signatures of Committee: Chairman: Dea/h of the School of International Service Date •liVlERlCAI'J uNi ut. LIBRARY 1969 NO V 4 196ir The American University Washington, D.C. WASHINGTON. 0 C If O S * R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE THE ANTI-AMERICAN P E R I O D..................... 61 III. THE SEPTEMBER 30 MOVEMENT AND ITS A F T E R M A T H................................... 160 THE GOING OF THE OLD O R D E R......................220 ESTABLISHING A NEW ORDER 296 INDONESIA AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 377 VII. INDONESIA AND THE COMMUNIST W O R L D............... 420 VIII. NEW ORDER ECONOMICS AND THE THE U.S. AND INDONESIA: CONTINUING ENCOUNTER 488 THE 567 635 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === relationship between the United States and Indonesia was available. By using these data and by doing considerable additional research, it became possible to reconstruct in some detail the interaction between the United States and Indonesia from roughly 1963 to 1958, a half decade of unusual significance for both nations. To my knowledge, such an effort had never before been undertaken. My purposes were four: (1) To reconstruct the events in a systematic and meaningful way; (2) To examine the con troversies which have arisen about the Indonesian situation and resolve them, if possible, from available materials; (3) To point out issues which cannot be successfully dealt with until more is known; and (4) To provide some initial analysis of the dynamics of the Indonesian-American encounter during the period studied. The tone throughout most of this work is cautious, and purposely so. Working in Indonesian materials teaches prudence since so many prediction.'- and assumptions about Indonesia have subsequently proven to be false. There is a further difficulty in working with events which are so contemporaneous. Although the author has been privileged to R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 5] === interview a number of American and Indonesian officials who have been intimately involved in continuing relationship of the two nations, some pertinent information of necessity has remained classified or otherwise unavailable. Despite this handicap, however, enough material is extant to provide a coherent and useful treatment of these recent happenings. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like at this time to express appreciation to the many individuals who assisted him in the research and writing of this work. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Dr. Millidge Walker of School of Inter national Service, The American University, who served both as chairman of my dissertation committee and as my mentor throughout the planning and execution of the project. His expert advice as an Indonesian specialist, as well as his encouragement and guidance, were particularly valuable. Thanks also must go to two other members of the School of International Service faculty, Dr. Kenneth W. Landon and Dr. Marian Irish, who also read manuscript draft and offered helpful suggestions for its improvement. I also was Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === vii fortunate to have the opportunity to discuss aspects of the work with several outstanding Southeast Asian specialists, including Dr. Guy Pauker, Dr. Bernard Gordon, Dr. Harry Benda and Mr. Frederick Bunnell. Their comments on my proposed treatment of the Indonesian situation were useful. On a more personal note, I am grateful to Congressman Clement J.-Zablocki, my employer for the period during which this work was conceived and executed, for his encouragement and understanding. The benefits which he extended to me during the past several years are beyond repayment. To the American Political Science Association and Mr. Donald Tacheron, then of its Washington, D.C., staff, go my thanks for the award of a six-month Congressional Staff Fellowship which permitted me to travel to Indonesia to do research and to begin the writing of the manuscript. During my visit to Indonesia and elsewhere in South east Asia, countless individuals, Americans, Indonesians and others, contributed to the success of the project. A key group were those who submitted patiently to being interviewed. Their names can be found in the bibliography. Others whose names do not appear there but were helpful require mentioning R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 7] === viii here. Among Americans were Mr. John Melton, Mr. Richard Underwood, and Mr. Michael Schneider of the United States Information Agency; Mr. Robert Rich of the Department of State; and Dr. Alex Shakow of the Agency for International Development. Valuable assistance has also been provided by Indonesian friends and acquaintances, both in Washington and in Djakarta. They include His Excellency, Ambassador Soedjatmoko, Mr. Adolph Ratulangi, Mr. Marius Rengkoe, Mr. Ed Sinaga, Mr. Alex Alatas, and Mr. R. Kusumasmoro. The author was also fortunate to have friends who contributed to the success of the project by saving relevant documents, pointing out useful references and, in general, extending the eyes, ears and knowledge of the author. Most notable by their contributions are Mr. Guy Smith, Mr. George Berdes, Mr. Frank Albert and Mr. Morris Casuto. Gratitude also is due Miss Jean Smith who typed the greater part of the final draft of the manuscript with the eye and skill of an accomplished editor. Finally, a salute to my wife, Paula, to whom this work is dedicated. Throughout many days and nights while the research and writing were in progress she, without Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === complaint, shouldered more than her share of the burdens a young family. Her faith and encouragement have been essential elements in the completion of this project. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === CHA PTER LESSONS OF TILE PAST The first two decades of the Indonesian-American encounter— 19*15-1965— were a period of progressive disillu sionment. One by one, as the years and contacts multiplied, myths and false assumptions were disgarded on both sides. Initially the illusions were many, the product of a great mutual ignorance in Indonesia and the United States of the history, culture and society of the other country. The Indonesians, of course, had not carried on any independent foreign intercourse for more than a century while under Dutch colonial control. The elites were most familiar with the United States through the writings of earlier political leaders and 'writers. Sukarno, for example, is known to have read works by Lincoln, Emerson and Jefferson during his exile on Flores, and has long considered himself something of an authority on George Washington, Thomas Paine, and the American Revolution. Having read Jefferson and not Theodore Roosevelt, Paine and'not Admiral Mahon, the Indonesians formed a naive picture of Americans as anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and equalitarian. This was evidenced by the English-language posters which greeted British soldiers during World War II when they made the initial landing at Batavia on September 29, 19*15. Expecting American soldiers R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 10] === instead, the Republic had put on prominent display quotations from the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.1 The soldiers would have been Americans, and the signs not inappropriate, had not a decision by the combined Angdo-American Chiefs-of-Staff at the Potsdam Conference in July, 19*15, transferred military jurisdiction of the entire Southwest Pacific below the Philippines to the Southeast Asia Command of Britain's Admiral Mountbatten. Although that Command had always included Sumatra, for much of the Pacific campaign the rest of the Netherlands East Indies was part of the Pacific theater of operations under General Douglas MacArthur. The change at Potsdam, in which Winston Churchill played a key role, came despite the preparations which the United States had made for Other examples of American influence have been seen in Indonesia's own Declaration of Independence and first Constitution by Charles Wolf Jr. The Indonesian Story (New York: The Institute for Pacific Relations and the John Day Co., 1948) pp. 18 and 52. Note that among the first postage stamps of the Republic were ones depicting portraits of Washington and Lincoln. ^In a memorandum to the Defence Committee on February 29, 1944, Churchill said: If the Japanese should withdraw from them or make peace as the result of the main American thrust, the United States government would after the victory feel greatly strengthened in its view that all possessions in the East Indian Archipelago should be placed under some international body upon which the United States R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 11] === specialized operations in the Indies. Programs already had been initiated in the Malay and Dutch languages at Stanford and Yale Universities, and the military government schools at Virginia, Harvard and Columbia. The transfer also was made over the strong opposition of the Dutch, who apparently preferred to deal with the anti-colonial Americans rather than co-colonial Britons in the return of their possessions. Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook, governor general of the Netherlands East Indies, expressed prevailing Dutch distrust of British motives when he said: Notwithstanding the great objections on our part, the Allied Supreme Command in this area was trans ferred from the Americans, who had for years been would exercise a decisive control. They would feel with conviction: 'We won the victory and liberated these places, and we must, have the dominating say in their future and derive full profit from their product, especially oil. Along the lines of this thinking the British Joint Planning Staff noted, following the Potsdam decision, that "It is desirable that the French and Dutch should deal with us rather than the Americans on questions concerning the recovery of their possessions." Both quotations from Saul Rose, Britain and South-East Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) pp. 105-106. ^Perhaps the Dutch were recalling the British occupation of Java and other parts of the East Indies during the Napoleanic Wars, and the dream of Sir Stamford Raffles that archipelago be added to the British empire. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 12] === preparing themselves for their task in this part of the world, to the British whose operational field up to this time had been much more limited.... Despite the preparations for occupation and the commercial contacts which Americans had made in the region, U.S. foreign policy makers knew relatively little about the people of the East Indies or about the nationalist leaders who had emerged with the defeat of the Japanese to declare inde pendence for the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 19^5. In the years of struggle which followed, they would learn something about both. The Revolutionary Period The Indonesians believed that obtaining strong American support for their independence struggle should be a major objective of their diplomacy. To that end, they apparently were prepared to offer the United States a special role in the exploitation of the country's natural resources. This offer was contained in a cautiously-worded "Political Manifesto of the Indonesian Government," drafted by Premier Quoted by Wolf, o£. cit., footnote on p. 16. It is interesting to speculate on how different the history of Indonesia might have been if the United States had occupied it rather than the British. According to Robert Shaplen: "Many Indonesians today feel that if the Americans, who... were more popular at the time, had taken over the ensuing four year tragedy might have been averted." "A Reporter at Large: Indonesia: I-Before and After Sukarno," The New Yorker (December 7, 1968) p. 189. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 13] === Sutan Sjahrir and signed by Vice President Hatta on The manifesto linked participation in the Indonesian economy, however, with international acceptance of the Indonesian people's righfc to self-determination, recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic, and termi nation of the conflict with the Dutch. Sjahrir, a Socialist, may have believed that the statement would appeal both to the Jeffersonian idealism of the American people and to the cupidity of American capitalists. If so, it was a miscalculation and he was to be disappointed at the lack of response. Having given the British responsibility for the South west Pacific, the United States was content to acquiese in the British policies of pacifying the East Indies and restoring Dutch power there. In fact, for almost the first two years after the Republic had declared its independence, Washington does not seem to have had any clearly defined policy on Indonesia. It took no part in the Linggadjati talks, and early debates in the United Nations on the Indonesian question found U.S. representatives speaking largely in generalities.^ 5see Alastair Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London: Stevens and Son, Ltd., i960) p. 389. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 14] === This reluctance to intervene actively in the Indonesian situation ended in June, 19^7, when it became clear that the Linggadjati Agreement had broken down to an alarming degree and that widespread resumption of hos tilities between the Dutch and Indonesian nationalists was imminent. U.S. intervention came in the form of aid memoire dispatched to both sides from Washington on June 27. Apparently aimed at strengthening the position of Sjahrir, who was under fire at home for his willingness to compromise with the Dutch, the message called for the immediate formation of an interim federal government and held out the promise of U.S. financial aid to help rehabili tate Indonesia once mutual cooperation had been assured. The aid memoire must be accounted a clumsy attempt to in fluence a situation only dimly understood by Washington. As Charles Wolf has pointed out, the note failed to recognize that what divided the sides were not specific issues but the inability of both parties to agree on a single interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement.^ Not only did the move fail to save Sjahrir, but it also indicated the belief that the nationalists might be bought off by the promise of economic help. Clearly the aid memoire was not motivated by considerations of justice, but rather resulted ^Wolf, 0£. clt.. pp. 123-124. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 15] === from a grave concern that order be maintained. Deeply troubled by the Communist advances in Europe and on the Mainland of China, the U.S. viewed with increasing alarm the dangers inherent in the Indonesian situation, with its implications for world political and economic stability. This same concern moved the United States to take a new, active part in the United Nations debates on the Indonesian question, where its voice was heard on the side of compromise, stability and order. American diplomats, seemingly ignorant of deep hostility which divided the Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists, apparently believed that the parties would pursue a settlement by peaceful means, that military forces would fade away and that a civil govern ment would take over in the Indies by common agreement. As Alastair Taylor has noted, "...Washington was guilty of a fundamental miscalculation which had the effect of gravely weakening the Republic's material resources and political strength...."^ Intended or not, the courses of action recommended by the United States worked almost ex clusively to the benefit of the Dutch who had the predomi nance of military power. Little wonder then that in August, 19*17, the Indonesians rejected an American offer of 7o p. cit., p. 390. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === "good offices" in lieu of United Nations' action, because they were uncertain about the attitudes and sympathies of the United States toward their independence struggle. Many in the Indonesian political elite believed that the U.S. could quickly end the Dutch military effort by cutting off its Marshall Plan aid. The disillusionment grew during the period of the making and breaking of the Renville Agreement until December, 19^8, when Washington, in a major realignment of policy, took steps to bring the Netherlands to terms. The shift was the result of three factors. First, Indonesian representatives in the United States had been energetic in pleading their cause. They found a willing audience George McT. Kahin says that this rejection of the U.S. offer was "symptomatic of the fact that even at this early date the formerly overwhelming pro-American sentiment among the Republicans had become strongly overlaid with sus picion that covertly the U.S. was partial to the Dutch and that, if it had strongly desired to, it could have stopped them from resorting to force." Nationalism and Revolution in ^The U.S. was pre-occupied with organizing the de fense of Europe, which it considered the area of primary interest, against Soviet advances. Seeking European coopera tion, it was prepared to "go easy" on the Dutch without actually supporting its position. Some State Department offi cials, however, were openly pro-Dutch and, according to Dr. Frank Graham, considered the Indonesian nationalists to be "bandits, grafters, collaborators and Communists." Taylor, op. clt., p. 397. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === among many Americans sympathetic to the independence struggle of the Indonesians. Some of these were actively working to persuade members of Congress and State Depart ment officials of the justice in the Indonesian cause. Second, the swift and unequivocal crushing of the Communist revolt at Madiun and the subsequent execution of party leaders in 19^8 was convincing proof to many in America that the nationalist forces were not Communistic. Finally, the all-out military drive against Republican forces in Java and Sumatra launched by the Dutch in December, 19*18, was so flagrant a violation of the Renville Agreement and the United Nations Charter as to call down worldwide condem nation. Washington began to see the Dutch, rather than the Indonesians, as trouble-makers and the primary threat to order in the region, Philip Murray, president of the six-million-member Congress of Industrial Organizations, wrote Secretary of State Marshall urging that the U.S. take immediate steps to terminate the Dutch action. Prominent members of the U.S. Senate, led by Wayne Morse of Oregon and Owen Brewster of Maine, introduced a resolution calling on the government to halt all aid to the Netherlands. ■^Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor cite this as the prime reason for the U.S. policy change in The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956) p. 679. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === 10 Ultimately economic and diplomatic pressures wev-e applied by the United States, forcing the Dutch formally to con fer sovereignty on the Indonesians. The grant of independence came on December 27, 19^9, some four years after Indonesians had greeted Allied sol diers with quotations from the Declaration of Independence. In the interim, nationalist leaders had learned that American policy could be swayed not so much by appeals to the ideals of its founding fathers as1by raising the spec ter of C o m m u n i s m. A n d while they might acknowledge the efficacy of U.S. assistance in gaining complete independence for Indonesia, they could — as being long overdue. and did — denegrate the help On the American side the encounter 1-*-An example of the use of this tactic occured in June, 19^9, when a group of 15 leading American newsmen flew to Djakarta for a press conference with Sukarno at s. time when he was beginning to attract major world attention. At the end of the interview, Sukarno dramatically pounded the arm of his chair and said: "I ask the world to give me a weapon to fight Communism. That weapon is national independence. Give me that and I will be strong." He was also quoted as having said on that occasion: "Don't be too late, restore the Republic, otherwise Communism will grow and grow." Cited by Colin Mason, Sukarno*s Indonesia (Sydney, Australia: Horowitz Publications, 1966), p. 60ff. As Mason points out, the Indonesians were quite consciously exploit ing American fears, reflected in the questions of the cor respondents, that Indonesia, like the Philippines and Malaya, might becomfe the scene of Communist rebellion. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === 11 had resulted in a greater — if still insufficient — respect for the depth and intensity of Indonesian national ism. It also provided a lesson to Washington that the "Third World" was watching its actions as well as listen ing to its rhetoric.-*-2 The experience, however, apparently raised a new illusion: that American aid to Indonesian independence and subsequent economic assistance had given the U.S. considerable leverage within Indonesian governing circles. M.S.A. and the Fall of the Sudlman Cabinet This misconception was to be partially corrected in 1952 when the Sukiman Cabinet fell as a direct result of an American effort to tie new political conditions to its foreign aid for Indonesia through the Mutual Security Act of 1951. While details of the incident need not be recounted -1-2 Senator Wayne Morse said: "I hold to the view, Mr. President, that so long as we permit the Dutch to get by with the course of defiant action which has been theirs since the violation of the Renville Agreement, we are going to be misunderstood in Indonesia; we are going to be misunderstood elsewhere in the world where weak people are looking to us to take a dominant role in protecting freedom. The Congressional Record, April 6, 19^9, p. 5878. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === 12 here,"*^ it is instructive to note that Ambassador H. Merle Cochran, upon whom much of the blame for the situ ation has fallen, was a staunch and effective patron of the Indonesian independence cause. On that account he may well have felt an almost paternal obligation to assure continued U.S. aid to Indonesia and to help steer the Indonesians to the "right side" in the Cold War conflict. Although he was successful in obtaining agreement from the Indonesian foreign ministry, he badly underestimated the impact of the terms on the Indonesian political public. Having just won their nation's independence from the Dutch they were fiercely hostile to Great Power paternalism or to political alignments of any kind. As for the Cold War, their chief interest was in staying out of it. The incident undoubtedly increased suspicions of U.S. policies among Indonesian elites, many of whom already believed they were The incident is described in Herbert Feith, The De cline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y,: Cornell University Press, 19^2) pp. 198-207; Russell Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 195^) PP. 158-159; and George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia," Ma,1 or Governments of Asia, Second Edition, Kahin editor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963) p. 619. Kahin contends that Cochran "exceeded his instructions from Washington and, quite unnecessarily, prevailed upon the Indonesian Foreign Minister to subscribe to a statement widely interpreted by Indonesians as signifping their country's aban donment of an independent foreign policy and committing it to alignment of with the United States." "Indonesia," p. 619. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === 13 more subject to American economic and naval power than that of the Communist world. J On the American side the diplomatic fiasco seems to have had some educative effect. John M. Allison, later U.S. Ambassador to Djakarta, has recounted an interview which he had with President Truman in 1952, just before visiting Asia as Assistant Secretary of State for the Par East. says Truman gave him the authority to tell the governments and peoples of Indonesia and Burma that the United States fully understood their desire to be neutral and tc settle their own internal difficulties before getting involved in international problems. "We did He quotes Mr. Truman as exclaiming, exactly the same thing when we were young! ■^Robert Sherrod, writing in the Saturday Evening Post, May 16, 1953, reported he had found that Americans irrank second" only to the Dutch in the prevailing dis trust of the Indonesian public. Cited by Eugene W. Castle, The Great Giveaway: The Realities of Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Life Line Book Club Edition, 1959) p. 127. * "United States Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The Limits of Policy," Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy, William Henderson, editor (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963) p. 170. Allison says he was able to use these Presidential statements to good effect in Asia where they were taken as an indication that Americans were beginning to understand more of the real aspirations of the Asian peoples. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === 14 For a time Secretary of State John Foster Dulles seems to have adhered to a flexible policy vis a vis Indonesia, despite his professed belief that neutralism in the Cold War was "immoral." During his visit to Djakarta in 1956. the Secretary made liberal offers of foreign economic assistance with assurances that aid would not be coupled with requirements of cooperation in "Free World" causes. 17 Dulles' visit was followed shortly by a 19-day visit of state from President Sukarno to the United States during which he was received by President Eisenhower and other top-level government officials, addressed a special joint session of Congress, and was generally applauded as the "George Washington of Indonesia" by press and public. the time Sukarno returned home, after having paid visits to the Soviet Union and Communist China,however, the blos soms of friendship had begun to wilt. In ensuing months as the Indonesian President moved leftward into his "Guided Democracy" period, the Eisenhower Administration began to l?For a discussion of this policy toward Indonesia in the larger context of Dulles' Asian strategy, see Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles, A Re-Appraisal (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962) p. 203. In that speech Sukarno urggd greater American under standing of Asian nations and said that without adequate know ledge of conditions varying in different countries, "the flow of even billions of dollars could lead only to strained re lations." The New York Times, May 18, 1956. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 23] === 15 fear that Indonesia would fall completely under Red domination. These misgivings were, at least in part, incited by some Indonesian political leaders, particularly those from outside Java, who opposed Sukarnoist policies. This situation set the scene for an extensive intervention by the U.S. in the internal affairs of the Indonesian Republic: its support for the PRRI-Permesta rebels. The U.S. and the PRRI-Permesta Revolt United States' encouragement of anti-Sukarno rebels in Sumatra and the Celebes during 1958 wrote a new chapter in this history of Indonesian-American relations. 19 Involvement in the outer-island revolts by dissident politicians and army officers took two forms: covert. overt and Officially Washington took a stand of neutrality in the struggle, but made no secret that its sympathies were not with the Djakarta governmtnt. In February, 1958, as the conflict was reaching a climax, Secretary of State ^For accounts of the rebellion which implicate the United States see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Bantam Books, 1965) pp. 136146; James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia's Civil War (London: Jonathan Cape, 196lT; and William Stevenson, Bird* s Nests in Their Beards (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Comoany, 1964). The reFellion is often referred to as the PRRI-Permesta revolt. PRRI is the initials of the "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" with its seat originally at Bukittingi, Sumatra. Permesta Is an anagram for the name taken by the Celebes rebel council. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 24] === 16 Dulles, In a press conference, expressed doubts about the constitutionality of Guided Democracy, adding that the system apparently did not satisfy large segments of the society. On yet another occasion, the Secretary said there was a "fair chance" that the Indonesian rebellion would bring "curtailment of the trend toward communism." said he feared that Sukarno's "so-called Guided Democracy theory" was a "nice-sounding name for what I fear would end up to be Communist despotism." Quite justifiably, the Indonesian government considered such statements to be tacit support of the rebels and anti-American feeling greatly intensified in Djakarta. 21 Another source of anxiety for the Indonesians was the deployment of several ships of the Seventh Fleet, including a carrier, off Sumatra during 20 Quoted in Hal Kosut, editor, Indonesia: The Sukarno Years (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1967) p. 72 21 Antara pointed out at the time that Dulles had never found it necessary to voice concern over the ob servance of constitutional and democratic forms in Formosa, South Korea or the Dominican Republic. See Robert Bone Jr., The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea Problem (Ithaca, N.Y.: Interim Report Series, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) p. 155. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 25] === 17 this period — although ultimately they made no attempt to intervene.^2 Despite repeated denials that it was secretly aiding the rebels, the United States, through the covert actions of the Central Intelligence Agency and its opera tives, was providing the insurgents with weapons and other military supplies. It was not long before loyalist forces captured some of this equipment, most of it designed and manufactured in the United States. The issue of U.S. in volvement came to a head in May, 1958, with the capture of an American pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, who was shot down while piloting a rebel B-26 in a raid on the Ambon Island airstrip in the Moluccas. Ey this time the rebellion was beginning to disintegrate as the Indonesian army, under General Abdul Haris Nasution, retook vital areas. Within five days of Pope’s capture, Washington's adventure was over. Quickly, the State Department moved ^ A c c o r d i n g to Daniel Lev, the Indonesian's feared that the United States might send Marines to the area of Pakanbaru to protect American oil company personnel. Earlier Washington had made just such a proposal and it was immediately rejected by Djakarta. The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics. 1957-1959» (Ithaca, N.Y.: Monograph Series, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1966) p. 42. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === 18 to Improve relations with the Sukarno government. It approved the sale of 37,000 tons of rice to Indonesia for local currencies and lifted an embargo on $1 million in small arms, aircraft parts and radio equipment which had been destined for Indonesia but which had been frozen at the start of the rebellion. Dulles called in the Indonesian ambassador for a twenty-minute talk and, in Djakarta,Ambas sador Howard Jones entertained Sukarno and his wife, Hartini, at a luncheon and film showing to dramatize the restoration of Indonesian-Amtrican amity. For their part, the Indonesians were most interested in improving relations with the U.S. and thereby eliminating the danger of intervention. Their responsiveness to the U.S. initiatives did not, however, lessen their suspicion of Washington's motives. The U.S. had undertaken its involvement in Indonesia because of its concern lest the island nation become a 23 Communist beachhead in Southeast Asia. According to Ross and Wise, many in the CIA and State Department saw definite 23a SEATO commander reportedly told William Stevenson: "Indonesia is like a sagging hammock. If it collapses, the rest of Southeast Asia falls through. This is the justifi cation for our interest in a country not technically covered by a pact." ojo. c it., p. 163. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === 19 advantages in supporting the dissidents. Even if Sukarno were not overthrown, it might be possible for Sumatra to secede, thereby protecting British and American oil interests. At the very least, the rebellion might cause Sukarno to loosen his ties with the Communists and move to the right. At best, Nasution might join the rebels and force large-scale changes to the liking of the United States. The failure to accomplish any of these objec tives may be attributed to gross miscalculations by the United States of the fighting capacity of the rebels and the popular support which they commanded, what Mossman has termed "about the most reluctant civil war in history." 25 Much of the blame has fallen on CIA operatives in Indonesia who reputedly were passing overly-optimistic reports on to Washington where CIA Director Allen Welsh Dulles was pro viding them to his brother, John Poster Dulles, at the Department of State. But the fact that these CIA men clt., p. 148. 250]p. c it., p. 133. 2^Sumitro Djojohadi Kusumo is reported to have said of the CIA men: "They get too excited. They believe anyone who says President Sukarno is a communist and then they make wild pro mises." Stevenson, op. cit., p. 29. Mossman comments: "These dismal 'spooks' as £ney are called, were delighted at the prospect of a neat little right-wing conspiracy of their own, and over-stated their case in both Washington and Padang." o p. cit. p. 174. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === 20 were heeded speaks of a lack of understanding about Indonesia in Washington, particularly in the upper reaches of the State Department. The experience must be accounted among America’s gr?”e diplomatic blunders. By dabbling in Indonesia’s troubled waters, the United States had gained absolutely no political advantage. Rather, it had suffered considerable embar rassment and had earned new resentment among the Indonesians. Sukarno, for whom the U.S. had clearly indicated its dis like, was even more firmly in power than he had been when the PRRI-Permesta revolt began. Now Americans would be forced to approach him with the guilty memory of the recent past. 27 Similarly, the forces within Indonesia which the U.S. had hoped to displace were instead strengthened and their anti-West, anti-colonial appeals were reinforced by 2?During Sukarno’s 1962 visit to the White House, President Kennedy is said to have commented to an aide.that it was no wonder the Indonesian President did not like Americans very much - since he must sit down with people who tried to overthrow him. Ross and Wise, op. cit., p. 154. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 29] === 21 the clumsy intervention. Finally, those Indonesians who had supported the rebellion and had, in effect, cast their lot with the West, emerged from the period dis credited in their own country and profoundly disillusioned with the U.S. for seemingly having broken its commitments to them. At the same time, however, the experience had its beneficial aspects for the United States. It was cured of any itch to intervene actively in Indonesia's internal politics; it resigned itself to dealing indefinitely with the man who had acclaimed himself the penjambung lldah rakjat Indonesle or literally, "Conveyor of the Message of the Indonesian People;" and it had a new, considerably more realistic grasp of political forces within Indonesia. Gradually a policy would emerge which would accept Sukarno as a necessary evil, while trying to support the more moderate forces around him, including elements within the civil service and the army. The key issue on which this policy would be tested was one which had plagued Indonesian-American rela tions for many years: the West Irian question. ^®0f the U.S. intervention Sjahrir r e p o r t e d l y said: "...The dangerous temptation is for the West to intervene in every little country that flints with Marxist ideas. This only confirms the communist propaganda that the West im plies, under United States leadership, a new and disguised form cf imperialism. Stevenson, O]0. cit., p. 46. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === 22 The U.S. and V/est Irian For more than a dozen years the foreign policy Issue of West Irian (Western New Guinea) was by far the most Important to Indonesians. From the time of the 19^9 Hague Conference they had attempted to wrest control of the 160,600 square mile area from the D u t c h. ^ After bilateral negotiations with Holland failed, Indonesia sought to internationalize the conflict by bringing It before the United Nations General Assembly. Before long the issue had become its most Important touchstone for measuring the friendship of foreign nations. Initially at least, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry seems to have devoted much of its effort to enlisting the United States in its cause. Recognizing that American pressures on the Dutch had been ultimately responsible for the grant of independence, it was hoped that the U.S. would exercise similar influence on behalf of Indonesia's West Irian claim. Feith suggests that the Sukiman government approved the American-sponsored Japanese Peace Treaty, which was domestically unpopular, in the expectation that 29For a history of the dispute see Bone, op. cit., and Justus M. van der Kroef, The West New Guinea~I5Ispute (New York: Institute of Pacific"Relations, 195U). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === 23 it might result in an early settlement of the Irian issue. 30 If so, these hopes were to be dashed as the United States maintained a carefully neutral position on the issue. Three times between 1954 and 1957 Indonesia brought the West Irian question before the United Nations; three times the United States abstained; and three times the proIndonesian motion failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority. With more than a little justification, Indonesians felt that U.S. support of the motion would have ensured its success. 31 Bitterly they interpreted American neutrality as acquiescence in the status quo and, thus, as favoring the 32 Netherlands. 30 clt• 31 See Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs," Foreign Affairs, XXXVI:3 (April, 1958) p. 486. Bone says that if the United States had backed the Indonesian cause, the support of most of the Latin American bloc would have been available. As it was, given the official American position of neutrality, the Latin countries went their own way on the issue, 0£. clt., p. 126, ^20n August 20, 1954, the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka speculated that if forced to make a choice the United States would have lined up with the Dutch — because of doubts that the Djakarta government could execute effective administration of the area involved. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 32] === 24 There was validity in that view of Washington's stand. Among controlling factors was U.S. unwillingness to risk further Dutch resentment and thus possibly jeo pardize NATO alignmtnts. Then too, Australia, which had been a champion of Indonesian independence, was opposed to Indo nesia's claim to West New Guinea. In the Australian House of Representatives in January, 1950, Sir Percy Spender, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, had argued that Indonesian control of the territory was not feasible since the Papuan population was racially related and in the same state of development as people in neighboring, Australian-held East New Guinea. 33 Since Australia was a valued Southeast Asian ally of the United States and its partner in the ANZUS and SEATO pacts, the U.S. was pre disposed to accede to its views on regional matters. Secretary of State Dulles also had an increasingly jaundiced view of Indonesian non-alignment, as we have seen, and probably was loath to place any further territory under Djakarta's control. Beginning with the Indonesian's re prisals against Dutch economic interests in late 1957 and 33 »The officials I met in Canberra made no bones about the fact that they would heartily dislike sharing a frontier with Indonesia....And at all costs Indonesia should be kept out of Australia's Melanesian back yard." Mossman, ojd. clt., p. 82 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 33] === 25 early 1958, there was a tendency In the State Department to see the Irian issue simply as Sukarno's means of promoting:\ational unity under the Guided Democracy aegis and of diverting attention from the government's domestic shortcomings. Officials saw agitation on the issue as originating from a leftist minority, including Sukarno's ultra-nationalist followers and the Communists. In fact, a minor diplomatic rumble was created by a 1957 press release from the United States Information Agtncy which sought to link the anti-Dutch campaign with a pamphlet written in 1955 by Aidit, the head of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Publicized in the American press, the incident forced an official apology by the State Den 3^ partment early in 1958. A final reason for America's official "don't rock the boat" attitude on West Irian may well have been that, when compared with other real or imagined crises of the 1950s, it did not seem to be very important or pressing. According to one writer, for example, President Eisenhower in I960, at a time when the 3^Bone has called the USIA release an "inept and pointless slur." 0g_. clt., p. 161 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === 26 Indonesian-Dutch confrontation was intensifying, was not briefed on the situation by his aides and apparently believed the conflict to have been settled. The American position appears tc have been based on several misconceptions of the situation. First, the West Irian claim was not merely a stage-managed affair, designed to divert the populace from domestic woes, but had been a major thrust of Indonesian foreign policy since independence. Second, the West Irian cause was widely popular in Indonesia among all political groups, not just leftists. Even before the PKI made the issue its principal topic of propaganda, moderate leaders of the Catholic, Christian and Moslem parties had expressed their support. Finally, given the energetic Soviet support for the Indonesian side, and the U.S. alignment with the 35"The West Irian problem, which at the end of Eisenhower's term as President in i960 was reaching a peak, never got his attention or was never mentioned to him by his principal assistants. That is why Eisenhower was rather startled to hear from our Ambassador at the time, Mukarto Notowidigdo, who was saying farewell at the White House before leaving his post in Washington, that the West Irian problem was not yet solved at all." Marius L. Rengkoe, Antara Dally Bulletin (Djakarta), August 4, 1967. ^ D e n i s Warner, an Australian journalist with an ad mitted anti-Sukarno bias, has written: "From the very first day of Indonesian independence in December,19^9, Indonesia has been shouting for Irian....Maybe the issut has snowballed a little in size but it was serious three years ago and it is serious today — not ju't a political expedient." Melbourne Herald, November 26, 1957. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 35] === 27 Netherlands in NATO, the clash over Irian contained no small danger of a confrontation into which the Super Powers would be drawn. Further, there seems to have been no calculation on the part of Washington that both the USSR and Communist China were reaping immense good will in Indonesia because of their help in promoting Djakarta's claim. There was only anguish over the leftward movement of Indonesian neutralism and dismay when Indonesia turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance, after having been turned down in Washington. That refusal came in i9 6 0, near the end of the Eisenhower Administration, following a period in which the United States had re-equipped twenty Indonesian divisions as a gesture of rapport toward the Army and its top command under General Nasution. This action reflected the policy judgment that the Army was a 37 bulwark against Communism and instability in Indonesia. Sukarno's request for heavy arms,however, was refused by Washington, despite a personal visit and plea from General ^"Wa s h i n g t o n was impressed by both the Army's technical and political capabilities — reflected in the military operations — and Nasution's moves to prevent the Communists from advancing their own interests as the Army engaged the PRRI." Arnold Brackman, Indonesian Communism, A History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963) p. 252. Policy-makers also may have recalled Nasution and the Army's role at Madiun in 19^8. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === 28 Nasution. Subsequently, Nasution stopped in Moscow where he signed an arms purchase agreement totalling $^50 million. This development was a definite setback to American efforts to cultivate the Indonesian armed forces. It meant an increase of Soviet influence on the military, with a correspondending reduction in the importance of the American role. This was coupled with anger at the U.S. among Indonesian officers for the repeated refusal to give heavy arms. 38 Although a more flexible policy toward Indonesia had been adopted in the wake of the abortive intervention of 1958, it was not until 1961 following the election of John P. Kennedy to the American presidency that there was any break in the U.S. position on West Irian. Not long ^ For ah interesting treatment of the ramifications of the Soviet-Indonesian arms deal see Frederick P. Bunnell,"Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965," Indonesia,(Oct. 1966) p. *18. 3^Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East in the Kennedy Administration, credits American Am bassador Howard W. Jones with being the architect of the new policy after he had concluded that "the nature of Indonesian nationalism had not been correctly understood." Hilsman indi cates that while some of the policy changes suggested by Jones were approved by the Eisenhower Administration, other sugges tions were ignored. To Move a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: 1967) p. 372. Hilsman’s favorable treatment of the Kennedy Admin istration’s change in policy on West Irian (pp. 361-381) should be contrasted with that of Arnold Brackman in South east Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1966) pp. 101-114. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 37] === 29 after Kennedy took office, Sukarno visited Washington on a world trip and met amicably with him. 240 About the same time the U.S. gave the first indication that a policy change on West Irian might be in the offing. It disclosed that it would decline a Dutch invitation to atcer.d the opening of a newly elected New Guinea Council at the capital of Hollandia (Kota Baru). Since the elections had been branded a fraud and the council unrepresentative by the Indonesians, Washington's action was hailed by Djakarta. Unlike its predecessor, the Kennedy Administration saw that the West Irian issue was a deeply-emotional, popular and nationalistic cause among Indonesians of all Hilsman contends that Kennedy invited Sukarno at Jones' suggestion as a goodwill gesture, and that the talks provided Kennedy with insights into Sukarno's personality. O p. clt. p. 373. Brackman, on the other hand, contends that Sukarno virtually invited himself to the U.S. and Kennedy had no choice but to respond. He also sees Sukarno taking Kennedy into camp: "He capitalized on Kennedy's desire for a fresh start between the neutralists and the West.... Sukarno played on the President's desire to win the support of countries like Indonesia to contain the spread of Communist incluence. He told Kennedy that if the United States opposed Communism, 'Give me your support,' and described himself as the 'best bulwark in Indonesia against Communism.'" O p. cit., p. 101. Of that meeting, Sukarno has said: ^Totm F. Kennedy and I liked each other at once.... President Kennedy and I had a meeting of the minds...." Sukarno: An Autobiography. As Told to Cindy Adams (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965) pp. 6-7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === 30 political stripes, and believed that the American position of neutralism was a factor in the Asian country’s leftward slide. If the U.S. policy of tolerating Sukarno while attempting to strengthen the hand of Indonesian moderates was to succeed, this irritant in Indonesian-Amtrican rela tions would have to be removed. But a shift from neutrality to pressing for negotiations was not an easy one. Roger Hilsman has noted that: The Kennedy Administration took pride in its sympathy and understanding for the emerging nations, but American friendship for the Netherlands was old and treasured. It was also intimately interconnected with the problems of NATO and the defense of Europe, and this was at a time when the Soviet Union was renewing its threats on Berlin. Thus the power line up in the United States and Washington was tricky. As far as the general public was concerned, the prin cipal fact was a massive lack of knowledge or under standing of either Indonesia or its peculiar brand of the new nationalism.... With time and shifts in State Department personnel, the policy change was made. It was given impetus by a rapid escalation of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands Op. cit., p. 375. Hilsman adds that: "Even among the ’attentive publics’ and the well informed, in the press, in the academic world, and in Congress, knowledge of Indonesia was superficial at best." p. 376. He notes that opposition to the shift did not come from the Pentagon, but from an "Old Europe"group inside the State Department, supported by strong voices at the CIA. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 39] === 31 into a military confrontation. Following a diplomatic ultimatum to the Dutch in early January, 1962, the Indo nesians began to prepare for a military drive against the Dutch forces on West Irian. sides ensured. Armed clashes between the President Kennedy already had made clear that the U.S. interest lay in preventing a conflict which might involve antagonists in the Weast-West struggle, or enhance the position of the Communists inside Indonesia. Thus, as Bunnell has pointed out, it was Cold 'War considera tions which ultimately spurred the U.S. to act, just as they had been responsible for American intervention in 19^9 and 1958. As the combat threatened to escalate, the President sent his brother, Robert, the attorney general, to Indonesia and Holland. Robert Kennedy expressed to both sides the American hope for a negotiated settlement, out lined American policy, and sought to initiate a mediation effort. In addition, he made a number of appearances before student groups in which he was struck by the deep feelings Appointed "theater commander" to direct military operations against the Dutch on January 9 was Brig. Gen. Suharto. It was the first time his name had come to international notice. 43ojd. cit., p. 52 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 40] === 32 which the West Irian issue evoked in his audiences. Following an appeal for a peaceful settlement to both sides by United Nations Secretary General U Thant, the United States arranged a meeting for preliminary secret negotia tions at a site near Washington. It was attended by Dutch and Indonesian officials and ex-U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as a "third party" ostensibly representing the Secretary General. Although the American-sponsored nego tiations quickly collapsed in discord and the combatants returned to the fighting, by the end of May, Bunker had renewed the mediation effort and had proposed a plan that provided for transferring the administration of Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia by May 1, 1963, after temporary United Nations control of the territory. There followed weeks of discussions and negotiations, including three at 45 a secluded estate near Middleburg, Virginia. The principals, in addition to Bunker, were Indonesian Foreign ^ K e n n e d y noted that the Indonesian students came armed with analogies to American historical territorial acquisitions, including the struggle over Texas which re sulted in the Mexican-American War and the "54/40 or Fight" dispute with Canada. Just Friends and Brave Enemies (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers Inc., 1965) p. 1I5-II6. ^5por an insight into Bunker’s methods of media tion see Richard Eder, "A Quiet American Goes to Vietnam," The New York Times Magazine, March 26, 1967, p. 78. his address at the U.N. signing ceremony, Subandrio said of R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 41] === 33 Minister Subandrio; Adam Malik, the former Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Jan H. van Roijen, Dutch ambassador to the United States. On August 15, after difficult negotiations, a Netherlands-Indonesian agreement on West Irian was signed at the United Nations in New York. Althou^j there was some satisfaction in Washington over the settlement, there was little outright elation. "The whole affair was dreary and disheartening," says Hilsman. Bunker: "On behalf of the Indonesian government and people, I also want to thank, sincerely, the tireless efforts and patience of Ambassador Bunker who never spared himself physically or mentally in order to overcome all the diffi culties and obstacles which sometimes seem to flood the path towards this agreement. To be frank, without the personal qualities inherent to Ambassador Bunker, it would be almost impossible to formulate an agreement within such a short period." Report on Indonesia, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, ^60£. clt., p. 380. Clifford Geertz has stated that: "The fact that, so far as I know, the United States government has never attempted to defend or even to explain its actions suggests to me that this general feeling that we behaved both immorally and pusil]animously pervades official quarters as well and that, in fa-;ts the agreement was more an accidental result of the play of immediate political pressures than of genuine political understanding." "Social-Cultural Con text of Policy in Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press’^ 1963) P. 56-57. Hilsman's spirited defense of the U.S. mediation effort suggests that Geertz*s conclusions were not warranted, at least not for top officials dealing with Par Eastern affairs. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === 34 The United States had been severely criticized by the Dutch who believed that they had been pressured to accept the so-called "New York Agreement" against their will. The Indonesians also had often proved difficult to work with. But President Kennedy and key advisors like W. Averell Harriman believed that the mediation effort had averted a war in the Southwest Pacific. In view of Indonesia's military preparations, it probably had. They also assumed that by removing this point of nationalistic irritation the American position and amount of leverage would be enhanced in Indonesia, especially among the moderate elements Washington was attempting to encourage. 47 In view of ensuing events, the American effort to solve the East Irian issue has been vindicated. If the dispute had been allowed to continue to fester, the result might well have been a much earlier and sharper leftward swing in Indonesia — one from which there might have been 47 'Kennedy himself was immensely popular among these elements, a popularity which he enhanced by such small gestures as referring to the territory invrlved not as "West New Guinea" (the Dutch name) but as "West Irian" (the Indonesian name) when speaking to the press after the New York Agreement. See Marius L. Rengkoe, Antara Dally Bulletin (Djakarta) Aigust 4, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 43] === 35 no return. Further the U.S., through this indication of friendship for Indonesia, had restored some of the good will lost during the 1950s and had re-established for many Indonesians its credentials as a world power which could be trusted. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the Kennedy policy was initiated years too late. As Brackman has pointed out, the failure of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations (and other Western governments) to encourage an international settlement on West Irian had sapped the strength of pro-West, democratic elements in Indonesia who were attempting to contain Sukarno and the Communists. 48 By 1962, therefore, the power in Indonesia lay not with the moderates, upon whom the U.S. based its hopes, but with Sukarno and Sukarnoists. It was in its assessment of the Indonesian President, that the Kennedy Administration made a fundamental miscalcu lation. Its officials believed Sukarno was basically pro- West in his outlook, but was prevented from changing the direction of Indonesia's domtstic and foreign policies be cause of opposition from the huge, vocal Communist Party of Indonesia. Given a gesture from the West in the settlement ^Southeast Asia's Second Front, p. 103. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === 36 of the West Irian question, it was believed that Sukarno would turn from aggressive gambits to the hard job of reform and development within his co u n t r y. ^ Thus American initiatives toward Indonesia had two aspects: (1) settlement of the West Irian issue and (2) increased foreign assistance to Indonesia for the "economic stabili zation" which would follow. "Both sides apparently interpreted this as a tacit promise that America would expand her aid program — provided the West Irian dispute was settled ^This is the view of Sukarno's Indonesia which was assiduously being promoted by Ambassador Jones. Note the following paragraph from a briefing sheet prepared by the embassy and given to visiting members of Congress and others: "The August 15 agreement has removed the greatest single source of discord between Indonesia and the Free World Alliance. While it is not expected that Indonesia will, as a result, deviate from its deeplyheld policy of non-involvement in the Cold War, the agreement should permit a progressive increase in cooperation between Indonesia and the Free World. It is also anticipated that Indonesia, freed from the compulsion to concentrate its full energies and re sources on the West New Guinea dispute, will now be able to turn increasingly to the urgent task of re building its economy and mastering its internal problems." October, 1962 (Mimeographed) p. 9. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 45] === 37 peacefully." As a first step In this process, President Kennedy sent to Indonesia in August, 1961, an American economic survey team led by Professor Don D. Humphrey to review the progress of the eight year plan which had been adopted that year and to make specific recommendations re garding future U.S. economic assistance. The Humphrey mission report was fundamentally optimistic about the pos51 sibilities for rapid economic growth in Indonesia. recommended that, if Indonesia took the proper steps toward economic stabilization, an aid program should be developed at between $325 and $390 million, of which $200-$235 million 50Bunnell, 0£. cit., p. 52. In his excellent study of 1960-1965 Guided Democracy foreign policy, Bunnell notes that this tacit promise of aid may have been more a lever on the American, rather than the Indonesia, position. "The deepening American resolve to encourage Indonesia on the path of political stability and economic development appears to have led to some wishful thinking in Washington." Loc. cit. 51 "To summarize our conclusions briefly, we can say that we found Indonesia still in the early stages of economic development but moving in the right direction. We believe the native ability of her people and her rich natural resources make the outlook for progress in economic development promising, once the pre-conditions of selfsustaining growth are developed.... We predict that when the Indonesian economy does take off it will fly high and fast." Indonesia: Perspectives and Proposals for United States Economic- A i d, A Report to the President by the United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia (Washington, D.C.: 1962) p. xii. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === 38 would come from the United States and $125-$155 from inter national, multilateral banking institutions over a period of five years. The mission suggested that the U.S. aid program should (I) place major emphasis on helping Indonesia build a strong and independent nation; (2) accept the Indonesian view that some increase in consumption was required in the first three years of the plan and (3) include all necessary training of personnel and assure that the project could be successfully operated by Indonesian personnel after it was completed. 52 Significantly, the report was presented to Sukarno in June, 1962, almost ten months after the Humphrey Mission visited Indonesia, but at a time when the negotiations on West Irian were entering a cru cial stage. What, if any, effect it had on the Indonesian bargaining posture can only be conjectured. Nevertheless, with the West Irian issue out of the way, the United States found itself embarked on a new phase in Indonesian-American relations. 5 2 ^. cit., pp. 20-21. None of these recommendations were designed to anger the Indonesians and were consistent with the generally sympathetic tone of the report. Although the report was not officially submitted until June, 1962, the Indonesians had received a preliminary briefing on its findings during a September, 1961, visit to Washington by Chaerul Saleh, Indonesian Minister for Development. See Frederick P. Bunnell, American Reaction to Indonesia* s Role in the Belgrade Conference (Ithaca, N.Y.: Interim Report Series, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1964) pp. 28-29. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === 39 The U.S. and Economic Stabilization in Indonesia The period from the signing of the New York Agreement in August, 1962, through September, 1963, was a particularly crucial one in Indonesia's economic and diplomatic history. On the one hand it could continue its anti-Western cam paign while acting aggressively on the international scene. On the other hand it could dampen the fires of nationalism somewhat in favor of rescuing its economy from a state of progressive disintegration. The United States clearly intended to make the second alternative as attractive as possible. The Kennedy Administration position was summed up by Stanley J. Janow, Assistant Administrator for the F-Jt.?' East of the Agency for International Developmtnt, when he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee: The Indonesian government now seem’ to be taking a first step away from the abyss (security deletion) and is preparing to commit the country to an economic stabilization program. If this decision is translated into workable practice, we and other free nations should assist in a stabilizationdevelopment program which will enable it to avoid deeper dependence on Communist aid and will focus the Indonesian leadershipis attention on longneglected internal tasks. 5^United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*Hearings, Government Printing Office, 1963) P. 752. (Hereafter re ferred to as Hearings, 1963.) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === 40 The new policy found a favorable response from key members of the Congress. Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senate majority whip and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared that the United States "should help build up the infrastructure of the Indonesian economy — light industry and so forth...." transport, In the House, Represen tative Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, urged that Americans quit "wringing our hands" over Indonesia and "get on with the real job, that of helping the people of this rich, stra tegically vital nation to resist Communist blandishments and pressures." 55 Three U.S. senators, following a visit to Southeast Asia, declared that Indonesia should be 56 given "top priority" in the U.S. foreign aid program. The American press also was generally favorable to the idea. Even the conservative Reader*s Digest featured an article •^Congressional Record, August 2, 1962, p. 14474. ^ congressional Record, May 23f 1963, p. 3283. 56 The senators — McGee of Wyoming, Church of Idaho, and Moss of Utah — declared that the U.S. had a great opportunity to bring Indonesia within the sphere of "really independent and energetic nations." "Indonesia Foreign Relations," Deadline Data on World Affairs, p. 68. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 49] === 41 calling for massive U.S. assistance to Indonesia and warned against vacillation or timidity in implementing the policy. ^ By the end of 1962, the United States had already provided more than $665 million in foreign assistance to Indonesia. The U.S. aid included $244.5 million for technical cooperation and development grants and loans under the MSA and AID programs; $194.5 million in surplus agricultural products under Public Law 480; and $164.2 million in loans from the Export-Import Bank. As a first step toward assisting Indonesia to economic sta bilization there was an additional loan of $17 million from the President's emergency foreign aid fund early in 1963 to allow Indonesia to purchase spare parts for certain paralyzed industries. It also was to be used in part for the purchase of cotton for Indonesian textile plants which were working at 20 percent of capacity be cause of a fiber shortage. Coupled with the U.S. credit was a release of $40 million in its own foreign exchange 57william J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, "Indonesia: Time Bomb in the South Pacific," The Readers Digest (March, 1963) pp. 129-134. The authors suggest dealing sympathetically but firmly with Sukarno: "He is a man who will listen to reason when It is backed by toughness and resolve." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === funds by Indonesia for the importation of raw materials and spare parts. At the same time, the U.S. was assisting Indonesia in its application for a loan from the International Monetary Fund. 58 One a longer range basis, American authorities were making preliminary soundings among the European allies to raise an additional $50 million in emergency credits. In these efforts, the United States received cooperation from Indonesian officials, particularly Prime Minister Djuanda, a very able administrator. Under Djuanda*s direction, the first four and one-half months of 1963 were spent making preparations for the implemen tation of economic stabilization measures, conforming to suggestions made by IMF experts. On may 27, a series of economic and fiscal reform measures were put into effect, designed to curb inflation and excessive imports and to encourage exports. Price controls were also removed and government subsidies curtailed. "Showcase projects" were ^Negotiations took place in Washington in February and March, 1963, with Soetikno Slamet, former Minister of Finance, heading the Indonesian team. "Officials at the highest level from several Western nations, including the United States, are deep in the IMF planning for Indonesia." Robert R. Brunn, Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 1963. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === 43 declared to be at an end, and priorities were given to agriculture and industrial production. 59 Sukarno, however, was proving to be considerably less cooperative. He continued to make speeches branding the West as "imperialist" and "neo-colonialist." February, 1963, he took up a new, but related, theme. Speaking in Djakarta for the first time on the proposed Malaysian federation, he expressed vigorous opposition to it as an "attempt to save the rubber, tin and oil of the area for imperialists." In addition, he indicated that Indonesia was supporting rebels in Brunei and pledged that if Malayan leaders persisted in the federation nlan, Indonesia would have no choice but to follow a policy of economic and political "confrontation."^ Americans also found Sukarno;s continued flirtation with Communist nations worrisome. In late March, 1963, J In an interview with American Journalist Warren Unna, D.iuanda noted that the economic measures would be strict and unpopular and seemed to question the willingness of Sukarno to weather the political storm they might evoke. The Washington P ost. May 9, 1963. 60Associated Press dispatch, February 13, 1963. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Y. Malinovsky paid an official visit to Indonesia. Subsequently, Radio Djakarta announced that an Indonesian military mission would soon leave for Moscow to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union for the "modernization" of the Indonesian armed forces. April 12, the Communist Chinese head of state, Liu Shao-chi, began an eight-day visit to Indonesia. In welcoming the top-ranking Peking official, Sukarno declared that Indonesia and Communist China were "two comrades in arms" fighting "imperialism, colonialism and the exploitation of man by irv^nSukarno's love of fast jets also proved em barrassing to the Kennedy Administration. At the same time that AID was negotiating the $17 million emergency loan, Indonesia was purchasing — amount — for almost that exact three Coronado jet airplanes for its national airline, Garuda. 62 A further complicating factor was Indonesian pres sure on three big oil companies with operations in the country, Caltex and Stanvac, both American firms, and ^ " I n d o n e s i a Foreign Relations," Deadline Data on World Affairs, (New York: Deadline Data, Inc., 19(3*0 p7 FST--------62 Christian Science Monitor, (February 11, 1963.) R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === 45 Shell, a British company. Negotiations on pricing and profits had dragged on since I960 when the Indonesian government decreed that oil resources were controlled by the state and, in effect, sought to reduce the oil com panies to the status of contractors working for the government. In April of 1963 Sukarno proclaimed a regu lation stipulating that foreign oil companies must get out within five months, submit to unspecified limitations to be imposed by the Indonesian government, or arrive at a contractual agreemtnt with authorities by June 15. As the incidents of anti-American and anti-Western behavior multiplied, opposition to AID assistance for Indonesia grew on Capitol Hill and elsewhere. It was fueled by the report of the "Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World," headed by former General Lucius D. Clay, which had been appointed by President Kennedy to review both economic and military aid programs. Issued in March, 1963, the Clay Committee Report declared that Indonesia was of special concern to the Free World because of its population, resources and strategic location. Then it added: However, we do not see how external assistance can be granted to this nation by free world countries until it puts its internal ho.use in order and refrains R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === 46 from international adventures. If it follows this course, as we hope it will, it deserves support of free world aid sources.°3 With the opening of the 1963 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings on foreign aid, it became evident that there was significant anti-Indonesian feeling among members of Congress. 64 Perhaps the most vocal Congressional opponent to any further economic or military aid to Indonesia was Rep. William Broomfield. The Michigan Republican, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, proposed an amendment to the aid bill cutting off all aid "until such time as we have reasonable assurance that Indonesia will not indulge in further international adventures." 65 Faced with the destruction of their Indo nesian policy, Kennedy Administration officials made vigorous attempts to dissuade Broomfield, but without success. General Clay was brought before the committee to ^The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs, Report to the President of the United States from the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, March 20, 1963) PP. 8-9. Of the Com mittee's specific statements on Indonesia, Hilsman says "although not unsound, they were not veiy helpful as a public statement" and were taken as a gratuitous insult by the Indonesians. Op.cit., p. 395. 6^See statemtnts by Reps. Pilcher and Hays, Hearings, 1963, op. cit., pp. 81 and 165. ^ Washington s t a r. July 25, 1963. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 55] === 47 testify that his group had not been recommending dis continuance of technical assistance, civic action military programs, or Public Law 480 agricultural surplus aid. said he believed they should be continued "regardless of Indonesian economic performance."^ Ultimately,Broomfield’s flat ban on aid to Indonesia was amended by Rep. Zablocki to allow aid upon a presidential determination that its continuance was in the national interest. it passed Congress and became law. In that form It was the first time in many years that Congress had placed such a restriction 67 on aid to a country not behind the Iron Curtain. Despite the rumblings on Capitol Hill, the Kennedy Administration pressed ahead with its initiatives toward Indonesia. In May, 1963 > it doubled its contribution to the Indonesian military’s civic action program. Hand tools, shovels, and axes were supplied to 10 battalions. Fifteen more battalions were to be supplied the following year. If the program succeeded, the U.S. promised to send larger and more expensive equipment for road work and ^ Hearings. 1963« p. 292. ^ H i l s m a n is particularly bitter about the Broomfield Amendment and claims that it strengthened the hand of the hardliners in the Indonesian government. Ojd. ci t., p. 396. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 56] === 48 bridge construction, along with mobile training teams from the U.S. Army Engineers. 68 The State Department also determined to take an active role in solving the deadlock between the oil companies and the Indonesian government. With the companies threatening to close down rather than accede to Indonesian demands, American officials were fearful of the effects of a shutdown on Indonesia's economic stabilization and development, since oil was a major source of foreign exchange. There was concern as well that Sukarno miget turn to the Communist Chinese to sell Indonesian crude oil. Such a move would lessen China's dependence on Soviet oil at a time when the Sino-Soviet conflict was growing increasingly bitter, and thus have significant political effects. 69 The President agreed to send a special mission, headed by Kentucky's Lieutenant Governor, Wilson Wyatt, to the Par East to offer the good offices of the U.S. toward a solution. The Wyatt Mission was successful in bringing the parties to gether and an agreement was reached on June 1, some two ^^Warren Unna, Washington Post, May 13, 1963 ^ Manchester Guardian. May 13, 1963, and Hilsman, o p. cit., p. 339. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 57] === 49 weeks before Sukarno's deadline. 70 be pleased with the agreement. Both sides professed to President Kennedy in a statement from the White House congratulated President Sukarno and his associates. "The manner in which this prob lem has been resolved," he said, "is in the best tradition of the spirit that has characterized relations between Indonesia and the United States." 71 The Administration also was encouraged by a report by a team from the International Monetary Fund which visited Indonesia in June, 1963. It concluded that Indo nesia had now taken all the preliminary measures necessary for an economic stabilization program. Subsequently, on July 24, the IMF announced a standby agreement under which Indonesia was authorized to draw up to $50 million during the next twelve months to support its efforts at stabilizing the economy. Two days later Fund officials, with U.S. assistance, convened a Development Assistance Committee "^"Government officials and oil company executives in Indonesia feel that a new era has begun. The approaches which have been initiated have cleared the atmosphere of tension and conflict." Ruth Sheldon Knowles, "Eight Year Exploratory Campaign Planned for Indonesia," World Petroleum (February, 1964) p. 33. "^Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1963, p. 17. For an extensive report by the State Department on the Indonesian oil negotiations see Hearings, 1963. op. cit., p. 1569ff. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 58] === 50 meeting in Paris and informed the member nations that Indonesia would need $250 million in additional economic aid in 1964. Representatives of Western European nations and Japan who were in attendance were led to believe that the U.S. was prepared to contribute $90 million of that amount. In its presentation, the American delegation em phasized that unless Sukarno got a friendly nod from the West he would find it difficult to make the new economic policies stick in the face of strenuous opposition from 72 the Communist Party. About the same time, there were reassuring stories in the American press about Indonesia. Seth King, Djakarta correspondent for the New York Times cited indications that Indonesia was turning to the West again as its economy showed signs of accomplishing some initial objectives of the stabilization program. 73 From the United Nations, William Frye saw "economic pressures pushing Indonesia toward the West." ^ Washington Post. August 1 and August 8, 1963. On August 7, the House Foreign Affairs Committee called Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Hilsman and AID's Janow on the carpet to explain why the U.S. had taken the lead in raising the money for Indonesia when the House Committee had passed legislation banning aid until conditions were met. ^ J u l y 7 and August 13, 1963. The Washington Star. August 11, 1963. These stories may well have been inspired by optimistic Administration offi cials. Of this period Hilsman says: "We felt that Indonesia was teetering on the verge of a fundamental decision whether to turn toward cooperation with the Communist nations or toward mrre peaceful channels for achieving the goals of nationalism, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 59] === 51 There also seemed to be progress toward a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the formation of Malaysia. On June 7, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines met in Manila. They agreed to "welcome" the formation of Malaysia provided that the Secretary General of the United Nations or his represen tative ascertained that the people of the Borneo territory supported the Malaysia concept of nationhood. The foreign ministers also proposed the formation of a permanent con sultative organizations among the three states, to be called "Maphilindo" an amalgam of their three names. The Manila ministerial agreement was widely hailed in the United States. U. Alexis Johnson, deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs, said that Maphilindo "may well become a familiar term to us all," and Lincoln White, State Department press officer called the Manila agreement, "a welcome indication of the desire of the three countries to work together to promote their common interests." 75 A Washington Post editorial called the pact "an enormously and the evidence at the time was that the decision was in the direction of the peaceful." Op. cit., p. 406. 75johnson, Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1963, p. 82. White, quoted in Division of Cultural Affairs, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C. Mimeographed News Release (June 13, 1963) p. 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 60] === 52 hopeful agreement in terms of the security of Southeast Asia" and a New York Times correspondent saw the accord as "a significant shift in favor of the West in the power alignments of Southeast Asia." Optimism about pan-Malay unity faded quickly, however, when it became clear that President Sukarno was more concerned about the formulation of Malaysia than the security of Southeast Asia against Communism. On July 9, 1963, Malaya and Great Britain signed an agreement in London which provided for the es tablishment of Malaysia on August 31. Sukarno almost immediately objected, charging that the Malayan Prime Minister, Abdul Tunku Rahman, had agreed not to proceed with the formulation of Malaysia until after a "summit" conference of "Maphilindo" heads of state. Claiming a personal affront, the Indonesian president resumed his confrontation policies and threatened not to attend the summit meeting in Manila. At the 11th hour he agreed to go and once there appeared to find agreement with Rahman and Philippine President Macapagal on the formation of ^ P o s t, June 13, 1963; Times, Robert Trumbull, Dis patch from Manila, June 12, 1963. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === 53 Malaysia. 77 The United Nations "ascertainment” almost immediately became a subject of controversy among the par ticipating states, however, and the final U.N. report — which found popular support for the Malaysian Federation in North Borneo (Sabah) — was rejected by Indonesia on September 14. Fearing such a reaction in Djakarta, President Kennedy on September 13 sent a letter to President Sukarno warning him that if Indonesia went against the findings of the Secretary General it was risking bitter confrontation and would open the region to "exploitation by unfriendly influences." The American President stated further: Worse still, it will inevitably frustrate my strong desire to assure United States and international support for the sustained efforts you are making to stabilize and develop the Indonesian economy for the benefit of your people.'® Kennedy's letter concluded with the notation that he was looking forward to visiting Indonesia as a high point in a ^ T h e intense interest of the United States in the Manila talks is indicated by Hilsman, o£. cit., p. 393 and pp. 397-399. Hilsman blames the British for angering Sukarno. The British, for their part, believed some American State Department officials to be "soft" on Sukarno. Flora Lewis, Dispatch from London, The Washington Post. September 19, 1963. "^Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., Mimeographed, p. 1. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 62] === 54 contemplated trip to the Par East. "No United States President has made an official visit to Indonesia and I fully intend to be the first. The letter, delivered by Ambassador Jones on September 15, received a reply from Sukarno on September 17 in which he upheld his government's decision to reject the U.N. findings but assured Kennedy that he would do his best to maintain peace and security 80 in the region. On September 16, however, about 5,000 Indonesian demonstrators attacked the British Embassy in Djakarta. They smashed windows, ripped down an iron fence, burned the automobile of Ambassador Andrew A. Gilchrist, and tore down the British flag. Two days later a mob estimated at 10,000 sacked and burned the embassy building. In addition, Djakarta homes of British embassy personnel were raided, nineteen British-owned cars were set afire, and the British Cricket Club and the Shell Oil Company's residential com pound in the suburb of Kebajoran were burned. It was a grave breach of diplomatic custom and resulted in severe criticism of the Sukarno government from Capitol Hill and the American press. 79Ibid. 80Ibid., p. 2. In an editorial, the Washington Post — which pre viously had supported the economic stabilization program and R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 63] === 55 American shock at the Indonesian behavior was reflected in strong representations made to Sukarno by Amkassador Jones and, in Washington, by Secretary of State Rusk to Indonesian Ambassador Zairin Zain. On September 24, at the United Nations, Rusk also told Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio that the United States wanted to see a "prompt normalization" of the Malaysian situation and was "very concerned" about the way Indonesia had vio lated British diplomatic rights, including the attempt of government agents to break into the embassy's strong room containing top-secret files. 82 At the same time Washington sources informed the press that the U.S. had put a freeze on any new aid to Indonesia, including parti cipation in the $250 million economic stabilisation program. Simultaneously, the International Monetary Fund announced that it was suspending "temporarily" the $50 million standby credit arrangement concluded the previous July, of had criticized Rep. Broomfield's efforts to cut off Indo nesian aid — calDfidfor the United States to withdraw its ambassador and re-study relations. It also suggested that contingency plans be made for military measures "which alone seem to hold any prospect of containing Indonesian agression." September 19, 1963. ^ Washington Post, September 25, 1963. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === 56 which $20 million already had been withdrawn. As a consequence, the multilateral "Aid to Indonesia" consor tium pro;'v_-ct collapsed. The flames which burned the British Embassy also had consumed the heart of the Kennedy Administration policy toward Indonesia. Another era in the Indonesian-American encounter was at an end. The Lessons of the Past The brief historical review in the preceding pages, although far from definitive, serves to illustrate the disillusionment and disappointments which marked IndonesianAmerican relations from 1945 to 1964. One author has called 84 the relationship a "tragedy in diplomacy." Insofar as it is often a lack of understanding that dooms characters in a tragedy, the figure is particularly apt. Too often in their relationship the two countries were operating on the basis of images of the other which diverged from reality. For example, the Indonesians initially saw the New York Herald-Trlbune, September 25, 1963. September 22, AID Administrator David Bell stated that the Kennedy Administration was reviewing its aid program to In donesia in view of the burning of the British Embassy. "We've made it quite plain...to the Indonesian government... the United States is able to assist other governments only when they behave sensibly in international matters." Washington Post, September 23, 1963 84 Frank N. Trager, "The U.S. and Indonesia — A Tragedy in Diplomacy," The New York Times Magazine (August 29, 1965 PP. 26ff. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 65] === 57 United States largely in terms of the philosophy of its Eighteenth Century frunders, not as a nation which had emerged from World War II with worldwide commitments and responsibilities. Later they would embrace an almost equally simplicistic view of America as motivated only by the fear or threat of communism. American foreign policy elites, on the other hand, consistently underestimated the depth and intensity of Indonesian nationalism. This miscalculation was exhibited in the 19^7 attempt to gain Republican cooperation with the Dutch on a promise of future economic assistance, in the 1952 fiasco over Mutual Security Assistance, and in the 1958 support for the "outer islands" revolt. With the advent of the Kennedy Administration there was increasing understanding of the "new nationalism" as expressed in Indonesia's foreign and domestic policies. the past. And yet it too bore some legacies of It approached Indonesia with a kind of activist paternalism which is evident in the following description of American policy by Roger Hilsman: The task for United States diplomacy was to use whatever influence it could muster to steer Indonesian nationalism into constructive channels. 85og_. cit., pp. 395-396. Elsewhere Hilsman says: "Our policy...in the Kennedy Administration had been to try to encourage Indonesia to steer the forces of its nationalism into constructive channels, to turn toward economic develop ment and toward picking up some of the responsibility for peace and security in the region." p. 400. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === 58 Although Hilsman adds that American influence was "marginal in any case," 86 it was not on a premise of marginal influ ence that the Kennedy Administration was operating in Indonesia. Rather, the U.S. was attempting to play a major role in charting Indonesia's future course: first by mediating the West Irian dispute and, second, by promoting international support for a program of domestic economic reform and stabilization. Proud of their understanding of the "new nationalism," men like Harriman and Hilsman in the State Department believed the U.S. to be a major force in Indonesian policy calculations because of American ges tures of good will and assistance, and because of the close personal relationship between Ambassador Jones and Sukarno. Jones himself encouraged this view. He saw Sukarno as the single most crucial factor in the Indonesian political equation. If he moved left, so also did the country; if he moved right, Indonesia would follow. The United States was in a position to provide options to the right, and Jones was in a position to point them out to Sukarno. This American involvement was also encouraged by Indonesian moderates like Djuanda, many of whom were Loc. cit. Hilsman is writing here with the wisdom of 1967, not of 1963. In fairness, it must be pointed out that the author of this paper himself sup ported tne Kennedy Administration position on Indonesia at the time and only subsequently has come to see it as misguided. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === 59 fighting their own battles for power and influence and saw the U.S. as a valued ally. Washington, therefore, adopted a "carrot and stick" policy; the carrot was the promise of significant foreign assistance once steps toward economic stabilization had been taken, and the stick (much less brandished) was the threat of suspension of other aid programs if reforms were not forthcoming. In forming this policy, however, Washington had seriously misread Sukarno's personality and attitudes. Underestimated or overlooked was the central factor of the Indonesian President's frank disinterest in the complex, undramatic problems of economics. out, 87 As Bunnell has pointed even as Sukarno was giving approval to the Americansponsored stabilization program in the spring of 1963, he did not give his all-out backing. By the time the initial regulations were put into effect, he was less interested and he grew increasingly discouraged as the Communists initiated a strong attack on the regulations as a neo colonialist plot to weaken Indonesia. On the other hand, an aggressive and adventurous foreign policy had glamour and appeal for Sukarno. Indonesia's militant posture over ^ " G u i d e d Democracy Foreign Policy" p. 58. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === West Irian not only had gained the territorial object, but also had enhanced Indonesia's position in the "third world" and Sukarno's power inside the country. Recognizing that the tedious task of economic development would not bring Indonesia to world power status within his lifetime, Sukarno saw a shortcut to ascendency in a bold foreign policy. In this situation, no American carrot was large enough no American stick thick enough. As Subandrio told an American newsman in September, 1963, Indonesia was willing to fore go all foreign aid rather than give up its confrontation 38 of Malaysia. The burning of the British Embassy was a clear indication that Sukarno's Indonesia had chosen dan gerous living in the international arena over domestic development. There was nothing unique about the choice since status has often been more highly prized than prosperity. The situation was one,however, which American officials had difficulty in understanding and accepting — confident as they were in the validity of their own policies. Although the past had taught Americans several lessons about Indonesia, this one had yet to be learned. ^ i n t e r v i e w with Warren Unna at the United Nations, The Washington Post, September 24, 1963. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === C H A PTE R THE ANTI-AMERICAN PERIOD Although assistance for Indonesians economic stabilization program had been suspended in the wake of the attack on the British Embassy, Kennedy Administration officials responsible for Indonesian policy seem to have considered the incident a temporary setback rather than an outright defeat. In To Move a Nation, Roger Hilsman contends that: ...Sukarno had not so much turned his back on economic stabilization as he had leaped at the opportunity for political gain that the British had given him in the way they had handled the formation of Malaysia.^ Consequently the Kennedy Administration indicated that while it would withhold any new economic assistance to Indonesia, it would continue its regular aid program to O p. cit.. p. 405. William P. Bundy, who succeeded Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Par Eastern Affairs, had a considerably different view when he told a House committee: "It is, quite literally, a tragedy that the events of September 16, 1963, reversed these promising trends....That was the day when a long-simmering IndonesiaMalaysian confrontation gathered alarming momentum." United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Hearings before Committee, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 10502, March 23-May 6, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964) p. 178. (Hereafter referred to as Hearings, 1964.) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 70] === 62 Indonesia, amounting to some $70 million annually. addition, State Department officials, including Hilsman and Ambassador Jones, developed a new set of policy recom mendations which were, in effect, an extension of the old "carrot and stick" approach. The plan revolved around a visit to Asia which President Kennedy tentatively had de cided to make either late in 1963 or early in 1964. Earlier he had been urged to include Indonesia on his itinerary. No American President had yet visited the Republic and Sukarno was known to be very eager for a visit by the popular young world leader. Because the Indonesian president was aware that Kennedy could not visit while confrontation was in full swing, it was hoped that the trip would provide political leverage to force him to the conference table. As an additional "sweetener" Jones would return to Indonesia with an offer of $11 million in Public Law 480 surplus rice, which Indonesia needed. He would mention the trip and the need to expedite nego tiations with Malaysia if Kennedy was to be able to visit Indonesia. If this went well, Hilsman would follow in about a week, visiting all the Maphilindo countries. Although the President approved the idea on November 19, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === 63 it was not to be carried out because three days later he was dead, victim of an assassin's bullet in Dallas. The Malaysia Issue and the Kennedy Mission As Lyndon Baines Johnson was taking hold of the reins of government in the United States, tensions were rising in off-shore Southeast Asia over the formation of Malaysia, which merged Malaya with Singapore and the British Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah. Indonesia and the Philippines refused to recognize the new state, and Indo nesia cut off all trade with Malaysia. In an Inflammatory speech delivered at Jogjakarta on September 25, President Sukarno had charged that the creation of Malaysia was a conspiracy and an attempt to encircle Indonesia, thereby forcing his nation to "fight and destroy" Malaysia. The Indonesian military effort was, at least initially, confined to the training and equipping of guerrilla forces which would operate out of Indonesian Kalimantan for forays Hilsman, o£. cit., pp. 406-407. Sukarno subsequently suggested that Kennedy was killed precisely to prevent him from visiting Indonesia. New York Times, September 26, 1963. The official slogan was "Crush Malaysia" or "Ganjang Malaysia." Ganjang is a Javanese word mtaning to devour, crush, to chew be tween the jaws and was chosen rather than a word like "kermut" — to swallow — which would have suggested territorial designs. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 72] === 64 into Sabah and Sarawak. The Indonesian plan apparently was to accelerate the guerrilla war to force Malaysia and Britain into an unacceptably high defense expenditure. In response to the Indonesian threat, Malaysian and British forces began to prepare for hostilities. The crisis over Malaysia raised some serious questions for the United States. ruled out. An actual armed struggle could not be Britain seemed determined to stand behind Malaysia against any attack by Indonesia. If a conflict drew in Australia, New Zealand or the Philippines, the United States might be faced with a decision to fulfill its obligations to Australia and New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty of 1952, and under the mutual defense treaty of 1952 to the Philippines. The fifth article of each treaty reads: Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and de clares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its consitutional processes. The same article of both treaties defines the treaty area to include not only the metropolitan territories and the island territories under the jurisdiction of the parties ^For a detailed, but extremely pro-Malaysian account of Indonesian guerrilla efforts, see Douglas Hydes's Confrontation in the East (London: The Bodley Head, 1965). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === 65 in the Pacific, but also its armed forces, vessels or aircraft. Noting these contingencies, a congressional study mission which visited Malaysia in the autumn, 1963, stated that: "The present conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia is, in some respects, potentially as dangerous to world peace as the war in Vietnam."^ Its report recommended that the U.S. direct efforts toward easing the confrontation. Another harbinger of troubles to come was the Indonesian reaction to President Johnson’s announcement on December 18, 1963, that the United States' Seventh Fleet would extend its operations into the Indian Ocean, a farreaching strategic move. Almost immediately Sukarno accused the U.S. of attempting to halt Indonesia's con frontation of Malaysia. "I want to declare tonight," he said, "that even if two, three, four or seven fleets want to deter Indonesia, we will continue to crush Malaysia." United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission to Southeast (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 21. Russell J. Leng, "Indonesian Speeches and Acts of an Anti-American Nature Since 1961: A Chronology," (Washington: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1965) p. 1. (Mimeographed.) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === 66 Several days later a youthful crowd demonstrated against the U.S. action before the American Embassy, shouting, "Crush America." Sukarno's reaction paralleled that of the Communist Chinese, who also denounced the plan, rather than his non-aligned Indian Ocean neighbor, India, which accepted the fleet movement. The significance of the Indonesian protest did not go unrecognized. "That the Indonesian government is beginning to build up a cam paign against the U.S. presence in its part of the world seems clear." said one observer. As the signs of hostility multiplied in the Southwest Pacific, the Johnson Administration decided to take a dip lomatic initiative. In a private "warning" note to Sukarno on January 2, President Johnson called on Indonesia to reach a peaceful settlement in its dispute with Malaysia and stated that no improvement in United States-Indonesian relations could be expected as long as Indonesia continued 'One of the reasons for the move was to deter further Red Chinese aggression against the Indians. Nehru told the Indian parliament that "the international waters of the Indian Ocean are naturally open to the United States as they are to any other power," thereby indirectly endorsing the move. The New York Herald-Trlbune. December 20, 1963. Guy Pauker, Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities (Santa'Monica, California: A RAlto Corporation Report, 196 *t). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === 67 its aggressive policies. A cutback of some $2.5 million in American military aid to Djakarta underscored the President's words. When the letter had no visible impact, Johnson agreed at National Security Council meeting on January 7 to use a direct, personal approach to peace making. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had the advantage of having the Kennedy name and who knew Sukarno from his previous Indonesian trip, was delegated as a highlevel presidential emissary to visit the four capitals involved in the dispute: and London. Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila Initially, however, Kennedy met with Sukarno in Tokyo. The young Attorney General repeatedly stressed his limited role in the dispute and the need for the Asian countries involved to reach a solution on their own. warned, however, that the Sarawak and Sabah border incidents gave "every indication they would spread into what well could be a major conflict." During the talks, Kennedy apparently did not press Sukarno to call off his policy of confrontation or to arrange a withdrawal of armed guerrillas •^American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1964 (Washington: Governmtnt Printing Office, 1965) p. 896. Washington Post, January 18, 1964 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === 68 from the northern part of Borneo. Rather, he stressed more immediate steps of calling a ceasefire and arranging a meeting with Malaysia at which a solution might be found. As Kennedy expressed it, his chief mission was to "take the controversy out of the jungle, out of the war fare that is now taking place, and put it around the conference table."'1"® Following two meetings with Sukarno at Tokyo's Imperial Hotel, the American emissary flew to Manila where President Macapagal of the Philippines gave full endorsement to his peace-making efforts. After visit ing Malaysia for two days of talks with Prime Minister Rahman, he flew to Djakarta for a third meeting with Sukarno. Following that conference on January 23, in a joint statement, they announced agreement on a cease-fire along the borders of northern Borneo and revealed that the three heads of government had agreed to meet in an effort to solve the Malaysia dispute. This second "summit" was to be preceded by a foreign minister's meeting. No sooner had Kennedy's plane left for Britain, however, than Sukarno at a mass rally vowed to continue hostility toward M a l a y s i a. ^ •^Washington P o s t, January 19, 1964. ■^Omitting any mention of the cease-fire, Sukarno said: "The struggle goes on — onward, no retreat....We may change tactics but we will still crush Malaysia." Washington Post, January 24, 1964. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === 69 Partially as a result of the incident, the Kennedy mission 12 came under fire from the British press. Expressing confidence in Sukarno's good faith, the Attorney General replied hotly in London: I never assumed that President Sukarno had given up his hostility to Malaysia. If the con ference is not successful, everyone can go back to the jungles and shoot one another again. nothing has been lost but two weeks of shooting and killing. ^ After conferring with top British officials for several days, Kennedy returned to Washington, declaring that "The role of the United States is complete." After reporting to the President on January 28, Kennedy stated at a news conference that he believed the cease-fire, which had gone into effect, was a forward step. Noting that many difficult problems remained to be solved, he expressed confidence that the conference had a chance of success. Kennedy also emphasized the seriousness of the dispute to the United States because of its treaty obligations in the area. 12 "Superficially...yet another victim of Dr. Sukarno's well-known charms," said the London Times, January 20, 1963. 13 The New York Times, January 25, 1968. 14 Robert Kennedy news conference, February 9» 1964. New York Times, February 10, 1964. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === 70 "This country and this Government look on the situation with great concern.""^ The foreign minister’s meeting which Kennedy had helped arrange began in Bangkok on February 5. After six days of talks a communique was issued by representatives 15 ^Kennedy soon began to suspect that the President had not placed as much importance on his mission or the problem as the Attorney General himself had. According to Theodore H. White: "Kennedy had taken the mission seriously but when he had returned to tell the President his findings, he had been received just once in the Oval Office — to find himself required to brief a clutch of congressmen in the new Presidential presence. Thereafter— no contact with the President nor any solicitation of his findings from the State Departmtnt. Kennedy...felt he had been used as a decoration to paste the Kennedy name over the politics of another man." The Making of the President. 1964 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 19&5) p. 2bl. In Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, Philip Geyelin views this incident as illustrative of the President’s belief in diplomatic campaigns for what they might produce, but also for appearance sake, regardless of their outcome: "He believed in dispatching Attorney General Robert Kennedy for talks with Indonesia's President Sukarno in the early weeks, in search of a solution to the worsening IndonesiaMalaysia ’confrontation.' And if nothing much was to come of that he also believed in earning an E for effort by having Kennedy make his report, on his return, to an open kleig-lit Cabinet meeting, rather than in the confidential confines of the President's office." (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966) p. 135. At the meeting, the President had said of Kennedy: "We are of the unanimous opinion that he has carried out his assignment constructively and with real achievement." Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1964, pp. 239-243. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === 71 of the three countries welcoming the cease-fire, delegating Thailand to undertake its supervision, and requesting U.N. Secretary General U Thant formally to appoint the task to Thailand.1^ But final details of an accord were never reached because of Indonesia's refusal to withdraw its guerrillas from northern Borneo against Malaysia's in sistence that only such a withdrawal could insure full effectiveness for a cease-fire. When the conference was adjourned the parties merely agreed to hold another confer ence at the same level before any meeting of heads of state. Upon his return to Djakarta, Foreign Minister Subandrio reaffirmed unwillingness to withdraw guerrillas before a general political settlement and Djakarta subsequently announced its intention to continue to supply the rebel units by air. On February 23, exactly one month after it had been announced, the cease-fire was broken by gunfire along the Sabah border. Although negotiating efforts con tinued among the nations involved, two other conferences — one at the ministerial level in Bangkok in March and a head of state "summit" in Tokyo during June — also failed. ^ F o r text of communique, see A. G. Mezerik, editor, Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict (New York: International Review Service, 1965) pp. 114-115. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === 72 In view of subsequent events, the Kennedy mission has been severely criticized. The Attorney General himself was cited for lacking knowledge and judgment on the Malaysia dispute. It was charged that the net effect of the effort was to enhance Sukarno's image in Indonesia. 17 In view of the rather limited goals which Kennedy had set for him self, however, the mission was a relative success. The fighting had, after all, been stopped for a month and a series of negotiations set in motion — unsuccessful — which if ultimately nonetheless held out the hope of a non violent solution for almost six months. Through a small investment in time by the Attorney General, and without any new commitments to the parties involved, the United States had raised the possibilities of a peaceful settlement where none before existed. 17 "Washington has undoubtedly assisted him in main taining the aura of his international importance. Robert Kennedy's flight to Tokyo to ask Sukarno to cease and de sist in Malaysia was a dramatic display to the Indonesian people and to the world at large of the attention their leader could command. If an important representative of a major power could plead with him, Sukarno could hardly do less than graciously comply— temporarily. But if Washington had any expectation that the Kennedy mission would bear permanent fruit, it is because Washington has refused to face up to the implications of its own appeasement of Sukarno." Ann R. Willner, "The View from Jakarta," The New Leader (March 15» 1965) p. 13. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === 73 The Johnson Administration and the Broomfield Amendment The Kennedy mission and its effects also had a domestic benefit for the Johnson Administration. Much to the consternation of many in the State Department, Johnson refused early in his presidency to sign the determination called for by the Broomfield Amendment, by which the Presi dent had to certify that continuing economic aid to Indo18 nesia was essential to the national interest. The new Chief Executive, still wary about foreign affairs, undoubtedly was reluctant to endorse a statement which might later be come a political embarrassment, particularly one which concerned the erratic Bung Karno. Yet the President's refusal put the State Department in an extremely awkward position. State strongly desired to continue economic assistance programs to Indonesia in order to implement the policy (known in some circles as the "Jones policy") adopted during the Kennedy Administration. Although economic "Since everyone down the line had known that President Kennedy would have signed the determination routinely, we were all surprised when President Johnson refused." Hilsman, o£. clt. p. 407. Hilsman clearly be lieves the President should have signed. He suggests that signing might have aided the Bangkok conference: would have been helpful If steps could have been taken to create the right kind of atmosphere for the meeting, to put pressures at one point and inducements at another. But this was not done. The presidential determination con tinued to be an obstacle." p. 408. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === 74 stabilization aid was out of the question for the time being, continuation of established programs would, it was thought, help the U.S. maintain its position of influence with the Indonesians. It would, in order words, permit Washington to conduct a holding action. 19 Under the terms of the Broomfield Amendment, however, all aid would have to be cut off if the Presidential determination were not forthcoming. House hearings on the foreign aid bill would be opening soon. Rep. Broomfield and others would surely be asking pointed questions about the implementation of the previous year's Congressional directive. To that chilling prospect, the negotiations initiated as a result of the Kennedy mission provided an excuse for Presidential inaction. Thus on March 23, Secretary of State Rusk opened testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 1964 aid bill by declaring that: ■*■9"What we have attempted to achieve in the Indonesian situation is to maintain our position both directly with the leaders of the Indonesian government and also with the leaders of the Indonesian military forces....We have maintained,...I think to a degree which no other major power external to the area has been able to attain, a degree of influence. We hope that we can continue to do so." Testimony of Henry Meyers, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (April 17, 1964) Hearings. 1964, p. 553. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 83] === 75 The President, in considering whether to make this determination, has awaited the outcome of negotiations among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines which should indicate the prospects for peace in that area. Meanwhile only limited established programs of technical assistance, education and malaria eradication have been con tinued on new funds.20 Rusk added that the U.S. was "in the midst of very delicate discussions among the governments directly concerned. stakes here are very high." The He assured the committee that the Administration was watching the situation on an hourly basis and weighing all the factors carefully "in connection with any drastic action that we might take at a particular moment." 21 While Rusk was counseling the congressmen against "rocking the boat" in the Southwest Pacific, his own words were winging their way to Djakarta where they would cause more than a few ripples. Sukarno took umbrage at the 20 Hearings. 1964, p. 5. Rutherford Poats, then acting assistant administrator of AID'S Bureau for the Par East, put it this way: "...The executive branch has interpreted this amendment and its legislative history to mean that the President has a reasonable period of time in which to make this determination, whether to cut off the program en tirely or declare formally that it is in the national Interest to continue it. Obviously (security deletion) precipitous action could have profound effects, complicating the MalaysiaIndonesia pro^'em." Hearings. 1964. p. 191 21Ibid. p. 25. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 84] === 76 implication of Rusk's statement to the House committee: that Indonesia could not expect any sizeable foreign aid from the United States until the Malaysian dispute was settled. Speaking at a rally in Djakarta, the Indonesian President pointed a finger at Ambassador Jones and said: T o h e l l w i t h y o u r aid. ca n do without aid. We'll never collapse. Indonesia is rich in natural resources. Indonesia is rich in manpower with its 103 million inhabitants — not like Malaysia with its 10 million. 2 The American ambassador did not walk off the dias and later explained that he did not believe the statement was specif ically aimed at the United S t a t e s. ^ To clear up any lingering doubts, Sukarno on May 3 again scorned American aid. Speaking to 1J00,000 persons in Merdeka Square, facing the United States Embassy, he declared: "I said 'Go to hell with your aid,’ and I meant the United States because there are circles in the United States who attached the condition 22 Quoted in Kosut, o£. cit., p. 92. It was not the first time Sukarno had publicly criticized Western aid. In a 1962 speech President Sukarno had exclaimed that while the countries of the "new emerging forces" (NEFO) only sought to help Indonesia without splitting hairs as to terms of credit, the "old established forces" (OLDEFO) coun tries would haggle "for days, weeks, months or even years." Cited by T. K. Tan, "Indonesia's Guided Economy and Its Implementation: 1959-1965*" The Australian Quarterly, XXXVIII: 2 (June, 1966) p. 25. 2^Brackman believes that Jones' failure to leave impaired the position of the United States in Indonesia and displayed the weakness of the "Jones policy" there. . -Southeast Asia* s Second Front * p. 226. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 85] === 77 to their aid that Indonesia stop its confrontation toward Malaysia." P il Later Sukarno would explain that he did not mean any ingratitude for the $600 million in assistance which the United States had already extended to Indonesia. Rather, he said, he was reacting to "save face" against the public airing of U.S. conditions on new aid to Indonesia. W h a t e v e r his effect from t he letters severe and motives, the U n i t e d press and public, to members reaction foreign aid States. There reflected Congress. Capitol alike. Sukarno's Hill L e d by was had angry was and a similarly opponents Senator electric outcry in e d i t o r i a l s There from words of S u k arno Kenneth Keating p4Quoted in Kosut, o£. cit., p. 92. “^ " N o w about my saying to the United States of America, 'Go to hell with your aid' — first let's explain this term 'aid.' I am very grateful for the six hundred million dollars with which America has helped me. However, American aid to Indonesia is NOT free. It is not a present from a rich father to a poor child. It is a system of borrowing and paying back. #***Don't embarrass me around the world. Instead of silently recalling this so-called aid, you did it in headlines. Have I not to save face in my own country? America, couldn't you have done it quietly?...Don't publicly treat Sukarno like a spoiled child by refusing him any more candy unless he's a good boy because then Sukarno has no choice but to say, 'The hell with your aid.'" Autobiography, pp. 296-287. ^ R e p. Broomfield took the House Floor to call Sukarno "a minor-league Hitler who has been molly-coddled long enough by the U.S." Washington Pos t, March 27, 1964. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === 78 New York, an attack was mounted on the U.S. aid program to Indonesia, particularly the training of Indonesian military and police personnel.2"^ Both projects were con sidered extremely important by the Pentagon and the State Department in opening contacts between U.S. personnel and important elements of Indonesian society who might be crucial in a showdown between Communists and anti-Communists within Indonesia. Under the military assistance program some 1,200 Indonesian officers and 850 enlisted men had been brought to the United States for specialized training by June, 1963. These included the chiefs of staff of the army and air force and an estimated two-fifths of the army general staff. In a related program, the U.S. had pro vided training and equipment for the Indonesian national police and to its mobile brigade, a paramilitary arm that had a primary responsibility for internal security. ^The total 1964 U.S. aid "package" for Indonesia contained five parts: (1) Education and specialized train ing, (2) Advisory services in economic development planning, fiscal management, civil aviation and maritime training, (3) Malaria eradication, (4) Technical support for the AID mission, and (5) The controversial "internal security" police training program. Total value: approximately $11 million. See Bundy and Poats testimony, Hearings, 1964, pp. 1 78, 184 and 207* Among police officials trained in the U.S. were the Indonesian minister of police, the chief of the national police, and the chief of civil defense. It should be noted that equipment for the mobile police brigade did not include weapons. An earlier military assistance program (MAP) of providing.30 calibre rifles and.45 calibre machine guns had been suspended following the attack on the British Embassy. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 87] === 79 was charged in the U.S. Senate that American aid to this mobile brigade was, in effect, training Indonesians in guerrilla warfare at a time when the Sukarno government was openly supporting subversion In Borneo. 29 was hotly denied by Administration spokesmen. The charge American aid, said Rutherford Poats of AID, "does not encourage or contribute to the Indonesian government's campaign 30 against Malaysia." Rather, the mobile police unit was to be employed against the depredations and banditry of insurgent groups in the outer islands, such as the fanati cal Moslem Darul Islam. AID officials stressed the appre ciation which the military and police programs had gained for the United States among key segments of the Indonesian population. Despite such assurances, the Senate voted a flat ban on all aid to Indonesia as an amendment to Its version of the foreign assistance legislation, and forbid any further training of Indonesian military personnel in the United 29 Statement of Senator Keating, Congressional Record, April 29, 1964, p. S9260. 3°Hearlngs, 1964, p. 184. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 88] === 80 States. 81 The Johnson Administration immediately began efforts to overcome the Senate action, claiming that it would reduce the flexibility of the United States in deal ing with Indonesia and would fuel growing anti-American feelings in that country. Since the House version of the foreign aid bill had not contained a ban on aid to Indonesia, but had let stand the Broomfield Amendment, the State Department directed its attack to the House-Senate conference committee where it hoped the Senate provision would be eliminated or modified prior to final passage. 82 By virtue of an active campaign of persuasion directed at the conferees, the Administration ultimately prevailed and the ban was dropped. In a sense, however, it was an empty victory since American policy-makers themselves were beginning to question seriously the assumptions underlying the American approach ^1The vote for the ban was 62 to 28 on August 13. The amendment had been sponsored by Senator Tower of Texas who said Sukarno was "walking in lock step with the Communists." New York Times, August 14, 1964. As a direct result of this vote the Indonesian government the following month barred the sending of Indonesians to the United States for study on grants from the United States Government or American foundations. 82 J See statement by Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Director, State Department Office of News, Department of State Bulletin, August 3d, 1964, and by William Bundy, Department of State Bulletin, September 7, 1964, p. 338. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === 81 to Indonesia. Although Sukarno's slap at U.S. aid officially had been taken matter-of-factly by the Johnson Administration, there were signs of growing doubt about the continued utility of the "Jones policy" in Indonesia. For the U.S. ambassador's plea that Sukarno was basically pro-West and could be made to see the light with continued patience and foreign aid rang increasingly more hollow. For example, on April 7, Assistant Secretary of State Bundy candidly admitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee: It is not easy to judge what is the wise policy for the United States to pursue toward Indonesia at this moment in its h i s t o r y. The View from London and the Commonwealth Among the strongest voices calling for an American policy reassessment were those of Great Britain and its Commonwealth allies in the Southwest Pacific. Since the beginning of the Malaysian confrontation the British had viewed the U.S. as too "soft" on Sukarno, too willing to see him as a bulwark against Communism in the region rather 83 Rusk, at an April 3 press conference said that he himself did not regard Sukarno's remark "as an inter governmental communication." The Secretary then reiterated his statement before the House committee, noting that some U.S. aid programs to Indonesia were of great importance, "regardless of the political situation" and singled out malaria eradication. Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1964, p. 613. ^ Hearings, 1964, pp. 177-178. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 90] === 82 than as an instrument, witting or unwitting, of Communist objectives. While the Kennedy mission was in progress, Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home had warned the American public that the West must be "very, very careful" in deal ing with the Indonesian President who "has lived for a long time on excitement" and whose "appetite has been whetted for expansion." Douglas-Home followed this with a visit to Washington for two days of talks with President Johnson. In a joint communique of February 13, 196*4, it was announced that the two leaders had given special consideration to Southeast Asian matters, with Britain reiterating its support for American policy in South Vietnam, while Johnson "reaffirmed the support of the United States for the peace ful national independence of M a l a y s i a. T h e statement could not have been altogether to the liking of the British since it omitted any indication of what the U.S. might be willing to do if the situation worsened. Following some 35 In a pre-recorded television interview, shown on American television January 26. "Malaysia," Deadline Data on World Affairs, May 22, 196*4. The British saw Sukarno as a believer in the Irredentist "Indonesia Raya" ("Greater Indonesia” ) movement of Mohammed Yamin, which Included in Indonesian territory Malaya, Singapore, all of Borneo and parts of Thailand. See Brian Crozier, South-East Asia in Turmoil (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965) PP. 113ff. 3^New York Times, February 1*4, 196*4. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === 83 particularly warlike statements from Sukarno and Subandrio in late April and early May, the British — responsible for the defense of Malaysia but short of troops and funds — called on the United States for more concrete help. The American response was a May 5 statement from William P. Bundy warning that the U.S. might be forced to stop all remaining aid to Indonesia if it continued its aggression against Malaysia. 37 The Johnson Administration during that period was not, however, prepared to go further. Later that month, the British Amkassador Lord Harlech secured an appointment with the President to ask that units of the Seventh Fleet be assigned to "show the flag" in the Indian Ocean and demonstrate U.S. military support for the British and Malaysians. With advice from the State Department, the President r e f u s e d. ^ Believing that the J This statement went beyond the Rusk statement on U.S. aid policy toward Indonesia by threatening an end to existing aid programs. Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967) p. 128. Weintal and Bartlett quote the President telling Lord Harlech that he had always hated Sukarno: "'He is an S.O.B.,' Mr. Johnson explained. 'If I had to choose between the British and Sukarno, of course, I would choose the British. I love Sir Winston Churchill,' the President continued with genuine tears glistening in his eyes, 'but right now I cannot do much to help you.’" R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 92] === only way to deal with Sukarno was to call his bluff, the British were unhappy with repeated American rejections of their "hard line" posture; some officials saw the U.S. attempting to create a new sphere of influence. 39 At least equally concerned about the American posi tion on the Malaysian issue were the Australians, who had shared possession of New Guinea with the Indonesians since 1963 and whose geographical position put them in close proximity to the area of conflict. In 1963, Canberra had sought assurances from Averell Harriman that the ANZUS treaty would cover an Indonesian attack on Australian New Guinea or on Australian troops stationed in Borneo, and had received them. ijn When Australia's Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies visited the White House later that year, he asked President Kennedy to reaffirm Harriman's inter pretation. Kennedy did so, but added that the United States 3^The former British secretary of state for air, Julian Amery has written: "Until recently American policy makers tended to support Nasser and Sukarno. They hoped in this way to keep Egypt and Indonesia out of the Communist sphere and to supplant Britain's economic position in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. There is nothing new in such rivalry. But as a policy it has not paid off. British interests have been injured by it but American interests have not gained." "East of Suez Up for Grabs," The Atlantic Community Quarterly (Summer, 1967) p. 211. ^ S e e Hilsman, o£. cit., p. 392-393. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 93] === 85 was not handing out blank checks for Australia to dispatch troops to various hotspots and invite a t t a c k. T h e conditions which the U.S. had placed on the invocation of the ANZUS Treaty became clearer in April, 1964. The Aus tralian Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick said upon returning from a SEATO Council meeting in Manila that "it would surely take a sizeable Australian engagement— perhaps a sizeable defeat— t o prompt involving of ANZUS." defeat Another prerequisite, he added, would be the or w i t h d r a w a l th e British forces. 42 Despite effort by Australia and New Zealand to get a more definite commitment from the United States at an ANZUS Council meeting in Washington on July 18-19, a decision on how and when the United States would respond was deferred. U.S. spokesman, in the presence of the Australian and New Zealand representatives, characterized the defense of Malaysia as a Commonwealth matter, but added that the ANZUS 43 Treaty placed an obligation on the U.S. "at some point." J **^-Washington Post, May 5, 1964. Quoted by T. B. Millar, Australia* s Defence (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965) p. 75. 43 Max Frankel, New York Times, July 19, 1964. The Australians may well have wished additional assurances fol lowing a speech by Assistant Secretary Hilsman on "Australia's Strategic Position" at the Australian Institute of Political Science in Canberra, January 25, 1964, in which Hilsman sig nificantly omitted any mention of Indonesia or the Indonesian threat. Department of State Bulletin. February 17, 1964, contains the text of Hilsman's remarks/ R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === 86 Buoyed by these assurances — seemed to be — vague though they Australia committed troops to Malaysian defense and by August, 1964, had engaged in combat with Indonesian forces on the Malay Peninsula. Independent of their Commonwealth protectors, the Malaysians also made efforts to obtain American diplomatic and military support. During a twelve-day tour of the United States in late July, 1964, Prime Minister Rahman paid a two-day state visit to Washington. Following two meetings with President Johnson, a joint communique was issued in which the U.S. declared that it supported Malaysia's effort to live in peace and to maintain its 44 freedom, independence, security and sovereignty. The President also agreed to allow Malaysians into U.S. military training schools and promised to consider promptly and sym pathetically a request for military assistance credits to buy such equipment as reconnaissance jet planes, helicopters and small landing craft to help protect Malaysia's border with Indonesia. As Rene Peritz has pointed out, however, 44 Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1964, p. 193» Antara, the Indonesian news agency, reported that Johnson had given Malaysia "a solid pledge of support which diplo matic observers interpreted as a red stop light for Indo nesia's confrontation policy." July 23, 1964. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === 87 Washington was uncertain about the international political gains of aiding a small Commonwealth country which was locked in a dispute with a nation which by size, location and resources was more important to American aims. 45 Therefore, it offered the Malaysians a loan on standard commercial terms — that is, a private loan for seven years at five percent with a guarantee by the American government. The Malaysians who had been expecting more liberal treat ment reacted angrily and rejected the offer. The incident put new strains on relations between Malaysia and the United 46 States. Hot Winds from Dj akarta As pressures for a change in U.S. Indonesian policy mounted from Congress and abroad during the spring, summer and early autumn, 1964, Johnson Administration officials were viewing with growing concern the intensifying intransi gence of the Sukarno regime and the rising tide of antiAmerican feeling in Indonesia. On May 27 a crowd of about 150 students had forcibly entered the United States Information 45 ^"American-Malaysian Relations: Substance and Shadows," Orbis, XI:2 (Summer, 1967) p. 536. Peritz's article Is a good review of U,S.-Malaysian relations. 46 Although the State Department moved quickly to "express regret" over the rejection in an effort to lessen diplomatic friction. New York Times, December 30, 1964. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === 88 Service building in Surabaya, smashed a movie projector and destroyed film, books and magazines, ostensibly in protest against American support for Malaysia. 47 On August 14, a mob in Jogjakarta surrounded the USIS library while emissaries of the leftist National Front entered the pre mises and demanded that it be shut down. As a result, the library was closed by local authorities, was not re-opened and eventually was taken over by the Indonesian government. It was evident that this belligerency was being inspired, if not actually encouraged, by the rhetoric of Sukarno and his supporters, in tandem with the Communists. In his August 17, 1964, Independence Day address, entitled "A Year of Dangerous Living," Sukarno attacked the United States for its Asian policies and predicted the defeat of American "aggression" in Vietnam. He voiced his support of North Vietnam's struggle against "colonialist" inter vention and repeated his pledge to crush Malaysia. The Indonesian president further charged that the JohnsonTunku joint communique of July 23 had contained words hostile to the Republic of Indonesia. And he announced that in time ^ D a m a g e was estimated at $500. It was the fifth such attack on a USIS facility — the others occurred March 22 and 27, 1958, February 16, 1962, and November 8, 1962 — at Surabaya. For details see USIA Correspondent, 7:3 (March, 1965) p. 1. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 97] === 89 no foreign business "owned by imperialist capital" would be allowed to operate in Indonesia. 48 Within hours of Sukarno's inflammatory exhortation to the Indonesian people to "Come on, march on. Go on tearing down," 49 an Indonesian invasion force of more than 100 men had landed by sea in the Pontian area, north of Singapore, where they apparently had hoped to establish a guerrilla base camp. It was the first of a series of Indonesian landings, raids and parachute drops on the Malaysian mainland. Although none of these forays were successful, they resulted in a Malaysian protest to the United Nations' Security Council. The Council met on 48 "A Year of Dangerous Living" Antara News Bulletin, Djakarta, August 17, 1964. One reason for Sukarno's dis pleasure about the United States at this time may well have been his inability to wangle an invitation from President Johnson to make a state visit to Washington while in the United States to view the New York World's Fair and open the Indonesian pavilion there, a project in which he had taken a close personal interest. He could not come to New York without being received at the White House or he would lose face. To Johnson in an election year, however, the prospect of entertaining Sukarno was seen as a definite political liability. He never received the awaited invi tation and is reported to have told Cindy Adams: "Johnson does not like Sukarno. America does not like Sukarno. America plots to have Sukarno dead." My Friend the Dictator (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, T5"67) tn 227 ff. Sukarno subsequently called off his U.S. trip saying he had been advised that the American public was hostile to him. 49 ^"A Year of Dangerous Living," p. 37. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 98] === 90 September 9 to consider charges by Kuala Lumpur that Indonesia was guilty of "blatant and inexcusable" aggression. Indonesia's delegate admitted that guerrillas from his country had joined Malaysian rebels in Sarawak and Sabah and contended that Indonesia was not fighting Malaysia but colonialism. While emphasizing the interest of the United States in maintaining friendly relations with both dispu tants, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, America's U.N. represen tative, delivered a stinging rebuke to the Indonesian position: This incursion is the complaint before this Council. And it is this specific act of violence which my delegation specifically deplores. A Norwegian resolution deploring Indonesia's airdrop of guerrillas in Malaysia was supported by a nine-to-two vote of the Security Council on September 17, but was nullified by a Soviet veto. This would be the first and last United Nations action on the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict. ^ Department of State Bulletin (September 28, 1964) p. 449. On the same day (September 10, 1964) Secretary Husk, commenting to the press on the Indonesian para-drops on Malaysia, said: "...If such actions continue there will develop a very serious situation, the end of which no one can predict." Ibid., p. 429. 51 Voting for the resolution were the U.S., Britain, Bolivia, Brazil, Nationalist China, Prance, the Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway; against, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. In the resolution the Council expressed regret over "all the incidents...In the whole region: and called on the two combatants to avoid future incidents. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 99] === 91 The effects of Djakarta's escalation were, however, being felt elsewhere in the region. Although the Philippines, because of its Sabah claim, earlier had seemed to side with Indonesia in its refusal to recognize the validity of the Malaysian Federation, the aggressive attacks on the Malay sian mainland were viewed with misgivings in Manila. Faced with domestic pressures and conscious that an irredentist Indonesia might well be interested in the Philippines' southern-most, Moslem-populated island of Mindanao, President Macapagal visited Washington in early October to seek reassurances about American defense arrangements with his country. In contrast to his earlier position, the Philippines President complained publicly that his nation's efforts to mediate the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute had been frustrated by the Indonesian attacks of August and September. The success of Macapagal's mission was evident in an October 6 statement by President Johnson that "any armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack on the United States forces stationed there and and against the United States, and would be instantly repelled." 53 As if to dispel any lingering doubts, Secretary In a speech at the Washington, D.C., National Press Cluk on October 6. Washington Post, October 7, 196^. Quoted in New York Times, October 7, 196A. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === 92 of State Rusk two days later at a press conference gave a subtle warning to Indonesia about any aggressive acts against the Philippines. Policy Debate at State In the background of these events a debate was in progress at top levels of the Johnson Administration over American policy in Indonesia. Ranged on one side were Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, Robert Komer, a White House aid and foreign affairs advisor to the President, and Ambassador Jones. On the other side of the argument were Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, William P. Bundy,who had replaced Roger Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Par Eastern Affairs in the spring of 1964, and Bundy's deputy, Marshall Green, who later would succeed Jones in Djakarta. The first group, which tended to be ^ "I point out that our own defense arrangements with the Philippines are very far-reaching, are without qualifica tion, and that if there is an attack on the Philippines from any quarter, that is an attack on the United States. And I would think it would be very reckless, indeed, for anyone to suppose that there is any doubt whatever about our commitment to the security of the Philippines." This in answer to a ques tion on Philippine concern about Indonesia. Department of State Bulletin, October 8, 1964, pp. 579-580. -^This configuration and the material which follows is reconstructed from interviews with several State Depart ment and other sources. Characteristically, the Secretary of State does not seem to have played a major role in this debate. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === 93 indulgent toward expressions of the "new nationalism" in the developing nations, 56 believed that the policy which had been adopted in the late years of the Eisenhower Administration and which was given new emphasis in the Kennedy Administration continued to be valid and useful, despite the seeming leftv/ard thrust of Indonesian society. There was a feeling that the Indonesians themselves were good people, capable of commor sense, and that they would someday see the light and desert the Communists for the West. The objective of American policy should therefore be to keep the channels open between the U.S. and key elements of Indonesian society. Important instruments of this policy were a sizable American diplomatic presence, including a full range of U.S. Information Agencies services such as libraries and publications, and significant U.S. J Hilsman recalls being angered at the Indonesian self-destructive move of banning trade with Singapore during the Malaysia dispute. Reacting differently, Harriman re called that in the nineteenth century Britain would send a cruiser to stand offshore whenever particularly difficult negotiations were in progress. "It may seem like cutting off your nose to spite your face," Hilsman quotes Harriman as saying, "but that's the only 'cruiser' the new nations have." Ojo. clt., pp. 365-366. 57 one source termed this belief, "a kind of Leibnizian philosophy transferred to diplomacy." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === 94 aid program. 58 Not only could economic and military assistance gain Indonesian gratitude, but it could also be used to "put pressures at one point and inducements at another" — to use Hilsman*s phrase — and thereby help direct Indonesia's nationalistic energies into acceptable channels. A key element in this policy was the close personal friendship between Ambassador Jones and President Sukarno. Jones was seeing the Indonesian President two or three times a week — Djakarta. more than any other foreign envoy in He and others believed this friendship offered unique opportunities to influence Sukarno in constructive ways. Because of his proximity to the chief power-wielder in Indonesian society, Jones became something of an "indispensable man" and stayed at his post some eight years, far longer than usual. The Ball-Bundy-Green group saw the situation in rather different terms. To them, it appeared that the more 58 J Prior to this period the American presence in Indonesia was a sizable one. There were more than 300 U.S. aid officials who were deeply engaged in many aspects of Indonesian society, from assisting its merchant marine to sponsoring forestry and fisheries teams. The AID building was a large and imposing one in Djakarta flying huge American and Indonesian flags. Hundreds of American vehi cles plied the city's streets. The U.S. was, in other words, highly visible. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === 95 permissive the United States became with Sukarno, and the more understanding it tried to be, "the more he kicked us 59 around."^ They were sensitive to the criticism coming from the Congress and from diplomatic circles where America’s tolerance for Indonesia’s actions and Sukarno's rhetoric was becoming something of a scandal. 60 The American presence and aid programs, while failing to halt Indonesia's growing radicalism, were simply battening the Sukarno regime’s self-esteem by giving the Indonesian President convenient, unresponding targets for his revolutionary distribes. Instead of providing useful channels of con tact, U.S. aid was a prime source of mutual irritation which was almost certain to lead to an escalation of recrimi nations and bitter feelings between the two nations. Under the circumstances, the United States would be well advised to reduce its involvement in Indonesia, these "hardliners" argued. Nor were they completely satisfied with Jones' 59 The terminology is Ambassador Green's. November 7, 1968. role Interview, ^ B e c a u s e of his European-centered view, George Ball probably was particularly attuned to the effects of America's Indonesian policy in Britain and the Continent. Of all public statements by Administration officials during the July visit of Tunku Rahman, his seemed most sympathetic: He said the U.S. would give strong support "not only to the concept of Malaysia but to its government In the difficulties it is now facing." Quoted in Kosut, o£. cit., p. 97. R eproduced with permission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === 96 in Indonesia. While liking the ambassador personally and convinced of his sincerity, they saw Jones as often more influenced by the force of Sukarno's personality than Sukarno by his. The American ambassador had become so personally attached to a policy of which he was the ad mitted architect that he could not clearly recognize the changed conditions inside Indonesia which dictated a U.S. policy change. Further, Jones was known to be interested in leaving the post in the near future; at that time another ambassador would have to be appointed whose ability to sus tain a close personal relationship with Sukarno was by' no means guaranteed. This argument was strengthened when /•. 61 Jones submitted his resignation in November, 1964. Two important factors in the policy debate of which both sides were well aware — and which militated against any radical change in Indonesian policy — were the Vietnam situation and American economic interests in Indonesia. Jones had planned to leave in the summer of 1964, but as the Malaysian crisis heightened he appeared to be more and more the "indispensable man" to Washington and was asked to stay on. Offered the position of chancellor of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, how ever, he could not turn down the opportunity and resigned. It was not until late May, 1965, when his replacement had been chosen, that he was actually able to leave Djakarta. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 105] === Deeply concerned about the deteriorating conditions inside South Vietnam, the Johnson Administration was reluctant to add to its political and military burdens by openly taking sides in the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute. creation of the British, Malaysia at times appeared to be a rickety melange of Malays, Chinese, Indians and Borneo tribesmen whose chances of attaining true nation hood appeared doubtful. Already deeply involved in the affairs of one faction-ridden, strife-beset Southeast Asian nation, the U.S. was not about to become committed to another. Moderation also was counseled by the vulnerability of American investment in Indonesia, which totaled an estimated $350-400 million, the bulk of it in oil and rubber. The Indonesian government already had made clear its intentions of eventually nationalizing all foreign interests on its soil (and, in the case of the Dutch and British, already had done so) and American investment was a virtual hostage to Sukarno's whim. The initial result of the Indonesian policy debate, therefore, was only a moderate hardening of the American position. This was reflected in the firm statements by Rusk 62 Estimate in "Pact Sheet, Indonesia," U.S. Department of State, (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1963) p. 11. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 106] === 98 and Stevenson, in the gradual cutback of technical cooperation projects and personnel, and in the willingness to assist the Australians and Malaysians with some military assist ance credits. In the case of Malaysia, it was only $4 million for small arms — but it was money which earlier might have gone to Indonesia. At the same time, the Johnson Administration remained unwilling to cut off aid to Indonesia entirely. For example, the U.S. continued to play an active role in the country's malaria eradication program as required by its 1951 agreement with the World Health Organization a nd the Indonesian ministry of public to m a i n t a i n friendly 64 health. contacts with this period, also continued th e Indonesians. America was efforts As o n e approaching o b s e r v e r has noted Indonesia with ing policy but with flexibility in the policy line.” a "harden- 65 ^Prime Minister Rahman advised Malaysians not to be unduly excited over the terms of the American loan offer and not to feel unkindly toward Americans. "I thank the Americans all the same for their offer of a loan although it is not generous," the Tunku added. Malaysian Bulletin, Embassy of Malaysia, Washington, D.C~ (January, 1965) p. 3. 64 O n D e c e m b e r 18, 1964, A n t a r a c a r r i e d a l e n g t h y s t a t e m e n t b y H o w a r d E d w a r d s, d i r e c t o r of t h e A I D m i s s i o n in D j a k a r t a, in w h i c h he d e n i e d that the a gency's w o r k was b e i n g t e r m i n a t e d in Indonesia on orders from Washington. I n s t e a d he s t r e s s e d the c o n t i n u e d m a l a r i a e r a d i c a t i o n effort. ^ B r u c e G r a n t, D i s p a t c h i n T he S t a t e s m a n o f N e w D e l h i, O c t o b e r 19, 1964. T h i s a r t i c l e c o n t a i n s an i n t e r e s t i n g a n d l a r g e l y a c c u r a t e a s s e s s m t n t o f th e c h a n g e in U. S. Indonesian policy. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 107] === 99 The Anti-American Fury During the next few months the hand of the "hard liners" in the State Department would be strengthened by three interrelated and unmistakable trends in Indonesia: (1) a rapid escalation of anti-American feeling and demon strations of hostility, (2) movement away from a nonaligned foreign policy toward a Peking-Djakarta axis, and (3) the growth of power, influence and militancy of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The prime target for displays of anti-Americanism continued to be the facilities of the United States Informa tion Agency. USIA had been in Indonesia for seventeen years, maintained libraries in five cities, carried on an active publications program, and had an annual budget of $1,180,000. According to two expert observers, the USIA program in Indonesia was "the best means" for projecting a favorable 66 American image. For this reason, perhaps, leftist-led mobs continually struck at USIS libraries and reading rooms. On December 4, some 300 Communist Youth Front members sacked ^ P a u l m.A. and Genevieve Linebarger, "The Psychological Instruments of Power in Southeast Asia," in Henderson, editor, 0£. clt. pp. 227-248. This article contains a chart showing the extent of the USIS program in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 108] === 100 the USIS Library in Djakarta, smashing windows, wrecking furniture and burning about 20 percent of the center's 20,000 books. After this incident was condoned by a spokesman for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, a similar attack was made on the Surabaya library, burning one-fourth of a 13,000 volume collection and doing damage estimated at $7,500. The Indonesian government closed the facility and refused to allow Ambassador Jones to travel to Surabaya to survey the damage. During the next two months there were three more incidents as the USIS Center in Djakarta was stormed and seized, the reading room in Makassar was shut down by government authorities and the Medan library was invaded by a mob. The initial American reaction was to issue strong protests to the Indonesian government following each inci67 dent but to continue the library program. With the seizure of the Djakarta center by the Indonesian government— which was still in control of the Surabaya and Jogjakarta libraries— On December 8, Carl Rowan, USIA director, in a speech said: "The hunger for books in Indonesia has been enormous. Almost every university in Indonesia continually called up the USIS in that country to supply books and more books and an infinite variety of information." While citing and deploring the raids on USIS libraries, he added: "But we do not despair in our mission to spread the truth...." Department of State Bulletin, December 28, 1964. pp. 908-909. For an eye-witness description of the attack on the Djakarta library, see John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay Company, 1967) pp. $6-100. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === 101 it became clear that conditions would no longer allow this USIS operation. "With greatest reluctance and only after a long period of deliberation," in the words of Ambassador Jones, 68 the United States announced that it was officially closing all USIS libraries and reading rooms in Indonesia and withdrawing agency personnel in volved. In a sharply worded statement, Director Carl Rowan blamed the Indonesian governmtnt for giving the United States: ...No choice but to close these libraries. Not only has it failed to restrain those who have at tacked the libraries periodically, but it now has seized the libraries and placed the whole USIS operation under conditions that we find Intolerable. Despite the closing of the libraries they continued to be a cause of discord between the United States and Indo nesia. The American position was that the USIS buildings should be returned, but the Sukarno government refused and instead, in Djakarta and Surabaya, turned over the facilities 68 Quoted by Antara, March 5, 1965. 69 USIA Correspondent. March, 1965, p. 1. Later Secretary Rusk denied that the USIS had been "thrown out" of Indonesia. In an answer to a newsman’s question, he said: "They did not throw us out. We withdrew under the conditions in which they were forcing us or trying to force us to operate." Department of State Bulletin, March 29, 1965, p. 4^7. It was the first time that the USIA had withdrawn its facilities from a nation. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 110] === 102 and equipment to left-wing youths for anti-American propaganda centers. United States officials also had hoped to donate the remaining undamaged books, numbering about 60,000, to the libraries of appropriate universities there. But talks with Indonesian officials on implement ing the gift were unsuccessful and eventually the books were confiscated by the National Police and moved to warehouses. There they became a constant worry to American diplomats who feared that the volumes would be used in a giant bookburning and cause a further rupture between the United States and Indonesia. 70 Prom Autumn, 1964, into the Spring, 1965* there were a rash of other anti-American incidents in Indonesia.^ October, Indonesian postal workers refused to accept USIS 70 Interview with Ambassador Green, November 7, 1968. Sukarno had complained to American newsman about the American reaction to earlier book-burnings: "We Indonesians were angry and insudted by the American Senator who, after the burning of the books in the American library in Djakarta, scolded us for being uncivilized because we burnt books. That man could not understand this was an explosion of dis like for American policy...." Quoted by Thomas Morgan, Among the Anti-Americans (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 19l>7) p. 106. 71 L i s t i n g s of t h e s e i n c i d e n t s c a n be f o u n d in s e v e r a l i n c l u d i n g: T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s, F e b r u a r y 20 and A u g u s t 1965; L e n g, op. c i t.; J u s t u s M. v a n d e r K r o e f, sources, 16, "Indonesian Communism’s Revolutionary Gymnastics,"' Aslan Survey (May, 1965) pp. 217-218, and Morgan, 0£. cit., P. 78-79. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === 103 mail, except first-class letters, and the Indonesian government-owned Garuda Airlines refused to ship as air freight; USIS magazines in The Indonesian language. Communist workers twice were allowed to prevent Pan American World Airways flights from landing in Djakarta, and Communist dominated dock workers union ordered its members to boycott and refuse service to any ship flying the American flag. A boycott of American films was successful in most big cities, and a government order outlawed the Boy Scouts. American embassy personnel became subject to harrassment. In January the Indonesian government refused the U.S. air attache per mission for internal flights in the embassy-owned trans port plane. lifted. Only after repeated protests was the ban The electricity was cut off at the home of the U.S. naval attache for more than two days by Communist workers. In March the Communist postal workers union imposed a mail and telegraph boycott on the U.S. embassy and refused to handle traffic for Amtrican news agencies In Djakarta. Pekanbaru, three Americans were arrested for whitewashing walls covered with slogans such as "Crush Britain and America," "Take Over American Enterprises," and "Expel the Peace Corps." They were charged with disturbing the activities of Indonesian workers writing the signs. And on February 28, in what the State Department called a "most outrageous" incident, 500 Indonesian students invaded the R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === 10 4 grounds of Ambassador demonstration, X as a Moslem ostensibly the the sacking Robert warning Banned Christian of the McCabe was also lications an anti-American murder had offended M o n i t o r was USIS library, detained in the wake American for unfavorable activities. stories N e w s w e e k *s a story of a S uka rno speech. who as w e l l his filing Indonesian about John r o ughed up and newsmen entourage, the of M a l c o l m indignities. as T i m e, L i f e, N e w s w e e k, a n d U. S. which printing of his the suffered illegally riots Americans. Science from Indonesia were or members Djakarta of p o s s i b l e Sukarno Report newsmen residence to p r o t e s t assassinated American Hugees Jones' News had angered such pub and World President public 72 and personal 73 7^For details of McCabe's arrest see his Storm Over Asi a: China and Southeast Asia: Thrust and Response (New York: The New American Library, 1967) p. 188. For a more complete view of the situation of the press situation see John Hohenberg, Between Two Worlds: Policy, Press and Public Opinion in Aslan-American (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 19^7) p p. 2^16-256. ^ ^ S u k a r n o, in a s p e e c h to a r a l l y of u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s o n F e b r u a r y 25, d e n o u n c e d t h e f o u r b a n n e d A m e r i c a n p u b l i c a t i o n s by n a m e a n d a d d e d that he h a d t o l e r a t e d m a n y a n t i A m e r i c a n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in I n d o n e s i a b e c a u s e "the A m e r i c a n government, magazines, papers and radio are always slandering and c u r s i n g I n d o n e s i a. " Let the p r e s s a t t a c k s stop, he sug= g e s t e d, a n d i n r e t u r n he w o u l d t r y to s t o p the d e m o n s t r a t i o n s. N e w Y o r k T i m e s, F e b r u a r y 26, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === 105 Anti-American expressions abounded in the Indonesian press. Since 1962 when the decidedly leftist government news agency, Antara, was merged with the PIA (Persbiro Indonesia), a non-Communist, independent agency, Western press coverage had been in an extremely unfavorable position. This disadvantage grew as Antara began to rely more and more heavily for its foreign news coverage on Hsinhua, the Communist Chinese news agency. The United States was also a frequent target of hostile editorial comment by Indonesian newspapers. On September 18, 1965, the Indonesian Herald commented: ...The U.S. leaders, it has been established beyond a doubt, do not shrink back from employing the most horrendous means. Causing a whole nation to starve, killing women and children and employing bacterial and chemical bombs seems to have become,fair means to them in attaining their objective. 74 On June 9, 1965, for example, the Indonesian Herald, an English-language, semi-official paper, carried a Hsinhua story datelined "Peking” about an incident which allegedly occurred in Jackson, Mississippi. It should be noted that while Antara had at least two correspondents in the U.S. at that time, Hsinhua had none. ^ T h e author's study of a year's issues of the Herald, an important organ in shaping the views of the "foreign affairs public" in Indonesia resulted in a conclusion that: "...The Indonesian Herald's America, if cast in the form of a human metaphor, would appear as an egg-headed, super annuated adolescent with shifty eyes and a weak chin, dressed in a cowboy outfit surrounded by scientific gadgets of all types, whose ten fingers, like the tenacles of an octopus, stretch over the globe, stirring trouble and doing damage. It is, in other words, a portrait of America as a technocratic bully." John H. Sullivan, "Portrait of America as a Technocra tic Bully" (Washington: Unpublished, mimeographed research paper at American University, 1966) p. 23. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === 106 The press was also printing statements by Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders which were critical of the United States. Principal targets for these attacks were American actions in Vietnam, U.S. policy in the Southwest Pacific, alleged support for Malaysia and purported activities of the Central Intelligence Agency inside Indonesia. Perhaps even more serious than the demonstrations, arrests, harassments and press attacks aimed at America and Americans were the confiscations of U.S. economic interests which began early in 1965. On February 15, a resolution was passed at a rally of the semi-official National FrontOrgan ization advocating the seizure of all American capital and properties in Indonesia. The same day Communist-led Sumatran workers attempted to take over rubber plantations owned by the United States Rubber Company of New York and the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company of Akron. Plan tation Affairs Minister Frans Seda subsequently called upon the workers to hand over the estates to the government. At this point American officials optimistically believed that Djakarta might be trying to insure the continued operation of the plantations against demonstrations or seizures by Communist-led unions. Under a legal concept inherited from Dutch colonial days the Indonesian government reserved the right to assume "protective custody" of R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === 107 property in times of crisis or strife. On February 26, however, the governmtnt announced that it was taking over the American-owned plantations: ...In consideration of the increasing intensity of the Indonesian revolution and in view of the Indonesian people's determination to realize the principle of standing on their own feet with due attention to the production, operation and the ownership of the American entrepreneurs. On March 19, after having been petitioned by Communist-led Indonesian workers, the Sukarno government announced its decision to seize the three foreign oil companies — Stanvac, Caltex and Shell — agreement. in abrogation of their 1963 Three days later, workers locked out the American management of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber tire plant in Bogor and the following day the government seized that facility. On April 3, the Indonesians took over the National Cash Register Company operations. During the ensuing period almost all American-owned property in Indonesia was seized. Finally, on April 24, President Sukarno signed a decree ordering the confiscation of all foreign-owned enterprises in Indonesia. 7^Quote from News Release No. 8, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., "Indonesia Puts American Plantations Under Government's Control." (Mimeographed.) R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === 108 In almost every case, the take-overs of American property followed the same pattern. First agitation and disturbances were fomented by leftist workers. Then the government would take over the enterprise and order would be restored. Shortly thereafter the government would issue a decree placing the industry or enterprise under its control. Although these decrees differed in details, each vested direct custody of the property in the Indonesian government while calling on the American management to give its assistance and cooperation in order to continue production and insure smooth operation. orders also established a custody/control The government 77 team or "leadership" of Indonesians to oversee the day-by-day operations of the enterprise. In most cases these teams, which were responsible to the government, included bureaucrats, Indonesian employees of the enterprise, and representatives of the labor unions. They were in structed to exercise supervision of all activities and actions of the management. ^^The Indonesian word used was "penguasa/pengawas," which allows of differing translations of varying severity in implications. Among them are: "custody/control," "control/supervision," "administrative/supervisory." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 117] === 109 Although Washington vigorously protested each cials were for There were few and had been the and were any foreign that the aid the a means programs some assurances had assets the given freeze the to b a r g a i n w i t h in t h e already Indonesian American tended interests, offi retaliation. Indonesia in D j a k a r t a American effective officials business began seizures, rights been embassy Heartened property kept, the U.S. Indonesian But not curtailed. respected, optimistic.^® similar severely assurances would a loss and mindful Dutch t he owners that 1957 Indonesian E a c h o f the s e i z u r e d e c r e e s c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t s u c h as " w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s, " " w i t h out p r e j u d i c e t o t h e p r o p e r t y o f s a i d A m e r i c a n e n t e r p r i s e, " o r " w i t h o u t i n f r i n g i n g t h e o w n e r s h i p r i g h t s of t h e o w n e r s. " See, for e x a m p l e, D e c i s i o n of the P r e s i d i u m of the D w i k o r a C a b i n e t No. Aa/D/26/1965. G o v e r n m e n t of Indonesia. As k e d about the s e i z u r e s d u r i n g t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e th e H o u s e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e, W i l l i a m S. G a u d, t h e n D e p u t y D i r e c t o r o f AI D, s a i d: " S o f a r t h e t a k e - o v e r hasn'.t h a d a n y e f f e c t b e c a u s e, as I u n d e r s t a n d it, t h e a r r a n g e m e n t t h a t t h e o i l c o m p a n i e s h a v e w i t h the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d o n e s i a t h e y... s t i l l h a v e t h e i r i n t e r e s t in the e a r n i n g s of the c o m p a n y and are t a k i n g t h e m out. It is a c u r i o u s k i n d of a r r a n g e m e n t t h a t t he I n d o n e s i a n s h a v e w o r k e d o u t w h e r e t h e y take o v e r the m a n a g e m e n t of the c o m p a n i e s, in e f f ect, but don't disturb the ownership." Embassy officials have confirmed t h a t G a u d ’s r e a d i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n w a s m u c h t o o s a n g u i n e and seems to h a v e b e e n b a s e d on i n a d e q u a t e i n f o r m a t i o n. See U n i t e d States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s, F o r e i g n A s s i s t a n c e A c t o f 196 5. H e a r i n g s o n H.R. 7750, 8 8 t h C o n g r e s s, 2nd S e s s i o n, ( W a s h i n g t o n: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e, 1965) p. 1173. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === 110 government on selling their property in an attempt to salvage what they could. 79 Among other effects of the seizures was a steady shrinking of the non-governmental American community, which numbered an of U.S. firms. estimated 2,200, many of them employees Some managers of small businesses left and turned their firms over to the Indonesian staff. Those Americans who remained found it harder and harder to do business. Most purchases were made by government departments and Indonesian officials were becoming afraid to buy from U.S.-owned companies. Unquestionably, economic ties between the United States and Indonesia were being severed. 79 Subsequently both Goodyear and U.S. Rubber came to terms with the Indonesians and compensation was agreed on. Paced with a deadline by the government, Shell sold out its holdings for $110 million, to be paid for by future oil deliveries. The American firms, Caltex and Stanvac, were more steadfast and ultimately did not have to sell. The Singer Sewing Machine Company eventually relinquished all of its property in Indonesia, reportedly without re ceiving a cent of compensation, despite earlier promises. With regard to the Dutch, Thomas Morgan has reported that some of them who had returned to Indonesia about this time, as Indonesian-Netherlands relations warmed once more, envisaged a bonanza interest in the pressures against U.S. owned companies. "They could reasonably expect to share the profits if the government were to take over American interests, then re-lease them to new (perhaps Dutch) management." Ojo. cit., p. 100. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === Ill The Move from Non-Alignment Just as worrisome to American policy-makers as the anti-American campaign in Indonesia, was Djakarta's move away from nonalignment in its foreign policy to an ever closer relationship with the People's Republic of China. This change began as Indonesia gave full diplo matic recognition to North Vietnam and public support to the Vietcong. Then, at the conference of nonaligned nations in Cairo in October, 1964, President Sukarno de clared that the West was still building military bases in all strategic areas and urged "a battle cry" for the "struggle against imperialism." Ke argued that it was impossible for the emerging nations to co-exist with the old ones (Nefos vs. Oldefos) when surrounding bases and economic strongholds of capitalism were used to subvert Nefos' domestic activities. Other nonaligned leaders— including Tito, Nasser and Shastri — were conspicuously displeased by Sukarno's challenge to peaceful co-existence. 80 This speech was only a prelude, however, to Sukarno's world-stunning address on January 7, 1965, in which he announced that Indonesia would leave the United Nations and its specialized agencies: ^ New York Times, October 7, 1968 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === 112 W e ca n a f f o r d to o p e r a t e w i t h o u t t h e U n i t e d Nations specialized agencies. I s a i d " go to h e l l w i t h y o u r aid. Yes, w e w i l l h a v e n o t h i n g m o r e to d o w i t h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s. In ma k i n g United order I n d o nesia the Nations, hi s a member first Sukarno was country ou t states. withdrawal was January 20, 1965. presented of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t he United Nations that its th e United Nations pleas from the Indonesia's United Nations While vowing to uphold the "lofty principles might t o t he threat th e if M a l a y s i a b e c a m e other nonaligned formal cooperation Charter," the Djakarta's catalyst in s p i r i t and of n e o - c o l o n i a l p o w e r s. formally withdrew body despite U n i o n an d placency world his Council, Soviet act to w i t h d r a w f r o m fulfilling of the o f the S e c u r i t y nation f r o m th e statement " r e f o r m and in d e e d " 82 enshrined against Subsequently specialized suggested retool th e com- Indonesia agencies (which Antoine Yared, Dispatch from Djakarta, Washington Post, January 8, 1968. "Formal Notification of Indonesia's Withdrawal from the U.N.," Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C. (Mimeographed), pp. 1-3. On previous occasions Sukarno had expressed displeasure with the organization of the U.N., including his September 30, I960, speech before the General Assembly. On September 5, 1963, he called the U.N. "an obsolete arena" and suggested it be reorganized. Washington Post, September 6, 1963. He and other Indonesian leaders recommended that the Indonesian national ideology, the Pantjasila, be made the basis of a new charter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === 113 earlier had earmarked the W o r l d Bank, from such Maritime dent The ganda actions members, only the Consultative which munist f r o m the treaties Indonesian Nations $50 could nations China and campaign organization Convention distinctly to th e to a p p l a u d allies. against in w h a t aid International feared lead it s Peking wa s called and and International unfavorable had the among set of the Indonesian from Fund Reaction dissolution the U. N. Monetary the w a l k - o u t th e for on t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n. was who million United a preceorganization. action were s t e p p e d up attacked its Com propa the w orld "the b i t t e r e s t terms since ^ W i t h d r a w a l f r o m the W o r l d B a n k h a d l i t t l e s i g n i f i cance since that organization had never made a single loan to Indonesia. I n d o n e s i a aid, h o w e v e r, l e a v e b e h i n d a m u l t i - m i l l i o n d o l l a r d e b t w h e n It l e f t th e IMF. See C h a p t e r V. U. S. o f f i c i a l r e a c t i o n w a s r e s t r a i n e d, as o f f i c i a l s p o i n t e d o ut I n d o n e s i a ' s r i g h t t o t a k e s u c h a c t i o n, bu t w a r n e d t h a t i t c o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t get b a c k in a g a i n w i t h out g o i n g t h r o u g h t h e r e g u l a r a d m i s s i o n s p r o c e s s, i n c l u d i n g a p p r o v a l by th e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a n d G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson declared that Indonesia's w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d help, not hurt, the U.N. "The withdrawal of I n d o n e s i a w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e l o y a l t y a n d s o l i d a r i t y of th e b a l a n c e o f t h e m e m b e r s h i p, " S t e v e n s o n t o l d n e w s m e n d u r i n g a visit to Bloomin gton, Illinois. The Washi n g t o n P o s t, J a n u a r y 13, 1965. Stevenson's view was a distinctly m i n o r i t y one, h o w e v e r. E d i t o r i a l l y, the W a s h i n g t o n Post called his statement: "...S training prett y h ard to find a s i l v e r l i n i n g. " J a n u a r y 15, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sii === [PDF page 122] === 114 the Korean War." 85 American officials— who In retrospect seem to have been remarkably well Informed— believed that Sukarno’s decision related more to Indonesia’s growing ties with China, rather to displeasure at Malaysia's seat86 ing in the Security Council. In ensuing days this observation would be verified, as Indonesia and China rapidly developed an active, militant and continuing campaign of cooperation in matters political, economic and cultural. On January 29, Indonesia associated itself with The People’s Republic of China on a wide range of political questions in a joint statement issued in Peking. The statement, signed by Foreign Ministers Chen Yi of China and Subandrio of Indonesia, charged that the United Nations was "manipulated by the United States and other 85 Reuters Dispatch in The New York Times, January 11, 1965. At least two writers have suggested that Sukarno's action may have been in conspiracy with Peking. See Salipada K. Pendatun, Political Stability and Economic Security Through the United Nations (|_Manlla J;Ln. p.J, 1^66) p. 7 Pendatun was speaker pro tempore of the Philippines House of Representatives. And Byron S. Weng, "Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations," International Organization (Autumn, 1966) pp. 15-17. Tad Szulc in a story datelined Washington to The New York Times, January 4, 1965, quotes unnamed "key" officials as predicting (1) emergence of a Peking-Jakarta axis and (2) formation of a Communist-oriented Asian arrangement outside the United Nations, drawing into it North Vietnam, North Korea and possibly Cambodia. In the light of future events, this assessment was amazingly accurate. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === 115 big powers" and that, discredited, the world body must be thoroughly reorganized. It also asserted that the 'United States imperialist expansion of the war of aggres sion in Indochina" and the British military reinforcement of Malaysia were aggressive activities carried out by neoO rw colonialists in support of each other. Upon his return from Peking, Subandrio announced that the Chinese had promised a $50 million credit for non-military projects. The two countries also agreed to exchange technical and scientific information, and China promised to provide tech nical aid in agriculture and fisheries — the U.S. had been helping. sectors in which Among other signs of growing Chinese influence were a visit by Indonesian central banking experts to Peking to study China's banking and credit system, a Chinese film festival in eight major Indonesian cities with free admission, and the scheduling of regular Garuda Airlines flights from Djakarta to Canton, China, via Pnom Penh, Cambodia. O rj Quoted in Leng, Ojd. cit., p. 7. On February *), Sukarno asserted that the Indonesian and Chinese Communist revolutions shared a common goal of defeating Western imperialism and that a joining of the movements would bring stability to Asia. Ibid. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === 116 By far the most ambitious cooperative project on which the two nations embarked, however, was the construc tion of a new world organization to rival the United Nations. Christened the Conference of New Emerging Forces or CONEFO by Sukarno, the concept had the enthusiastic political backing and some financial support from Peking. The Indonesians staked their hopes for success on the feelings of many governments in the developing world that they must be represented at any major international meeting that appealed to Afro-Asian unity. It was also possible to use the ploy of inviting individuals without the sanction of the governments concerned and present them at the conference as national delegations. 88 As plans progressed, an enormous building complex patterned after the United Nations headquarters in New York City began to arise in a Djakarta suburb. It was to contain a 2,500-seat assembly hall, an eleven-story secretariat building and the promise that Djakarta would be a world capital. Indonesians may also have been encouraged by the limited success of GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces), which Sukarno had organized in November, 1963, in Djakarta as a rival to the Olympic Games. Indonesia had been suspended from The Olympics for excluding Taiwan and Israel from the Asian Games held in Jakarta in August, 1962. Despite problems with GANEFO, it seemed viable as Egypt agreed to hold the next games. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 125] === 117 Sukarno also moved to strengthen relations with North Korea and North Vietnam. The Korean Premier Kim II Sung visited Indonesia in April, 1965, expressed support for the confrontation of Malaysia, and was given a 89 lavish welcome. Pleased with Sukarno's diplomatic support in its struggle with South Vietnam and the United States, Hanoi reciprocated with backing for Indonesia's 90 campaign against Malaysia. Djakarta also sought the friendship of the Laotian neutralist leader, General Kong Le, by providing him with military equipment, including uniforms and office machines, and training for his officers. Expressions of friendship and solidarity flew back and forth between Djakarta and Peking. "I have not ex perienced one occasion, one opportunity, one happening that China has not respected our freedom to be free," declared 91 Sukarno. Chinese Politburo member Peng Chen told Sukarno's ^^News Release No. 15, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C. April 26, 1965, p. 2, 90 News release No. 21, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1965, p. 2. 7 "Transcript of President Sukarno's Interview with C.B.S. News Correspondents," (Televised January 31, 1965) Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C. p. 9. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === 118 Supreme Advisory Council that: "The unity between the Indonesian and Chinese peoples should be strengthened to such a degree that it could frustrate every attempt made 92 by the imperialists to harm them." On July 24, 1965* Minister of Natural Resources Sudjono stated: On the basis of the similarity of our revo lutions, Indonesia and China, together with the Afro-Asian and NEPOS countries, have decided to eliminate the remnants of imperialism a n ^ colonialism from this part of the world. The rhetoric of Sino-Indonesian cooperation was capped by the 1965 Indonesian Independence Day address of Sukarno. Speaking before a gathering of more than 100,000 in Merdeka Square, the Indonesian President proclaimed a new "anti-imperial axis" in Asia, Joining Indonesia with China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia. The ob jective of this quasi-alliance was to make the United States, Britain and other Western powers "get out of the whole of Southeast Asia altogether."9^ Although he attacked the British and Australians for their contribution to the defense of Malaysia, Sukarno seemed to reserve his special 92 Quoted by Denis Warner, "The Peking-DJakarta Axis," The Reporter, (September 23, 1965) p. 26. 93Ibid., p. 27. 9**New York Times, August 22, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === 119 fire for an assault on American Involvement in Vietnam. To some Western diplomats it appeared that he was shift ing the brunt of his anti-Western campaign from Britain to the United States, perhaps in an effort to please the Chinese and to gain new respect in the Afro-Asian world, which had not responded as hoped to the Malaysian confrontation. 95 Regardless of Sukarno’s motives, the new "axis" which he heralded could not be ignored by Western statesmen, portending as it did a potential instrument for organizing Communist hegemony in Asia. Even viewed in retrospect, it is clear that a true Sino-Indonesian alliance could well have been, as one observer declared at the time, "the most significant political development in Southeast Asia." 96 The Growth of the PKI A third element in Indonesian society which concerned American policy-makers was the rapid rise of the PKI. 97 John Hughes in the Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 1965. So sharp were Sukarno's comments about the United States, that the new U.S. Ambassador, Marshall Green, boycotted an Independence Day cultural performance later. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership," Orbls, VIII:2 (Summer, 1964) p. 356. 9^The story of the PKI's rapid recovery from 1948 is well documented in Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964); Arnold Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963); and Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 19^5). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === 120 Having considerable f r e e d o m to organize access and to p o w e r operate and within Influence, Indonesian relative society, and enjoying the support and apparent confidence of President Sukarno, 98 the Indonesian Communist Party was able to broaden its base of support significantly, par ticularly from 1963 to 1965. By the summer of 1965, many American specialists and other foreign observers believed that the PKI had grown so powerful that Indonesia was destined to succumb to Communism. Particularly impressive was the tremendous rise in membership in the party itself and in the wide variety of front groups which it spawned. The largest Communist party in the world outside the Socialist Bloc (and third behind the USSR and China), the PKI claimed a membership of three million. In addition, it boasted some sixteen million Indonesians in its sponsored organizations: two million in its youth movement, Permuda Rakjet; 3.5 million in SOBSI, its labor front; eight million in the Barisan Tani Indonesia Peasant Front; 1.7 million in Gerwani, the woman's movement, 9®Sukarno's idea of a NASACOM state (NationalismReligion-Communism), in effect, conferred legitimacy on the PKI. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 129] === 121 and 500,000 in LEKRA, a "Cultural League" for the intelligensia. In addition, the party exerted controlling or con siderable influence in numerous other professional,occupational communal, and student groups. In 1964, Ewa T. Pauker, a RAND Corporation specialist on Indonesia, estimated that the PKI 99 controlled 17.5% of the Indonesian people. And in May, 1964, the man chiefly responsible for the Communist resur gence, Party Chief D. N. Aidit, predicted that if general elections were held in Indonesia— the first since 1955— the PKI would get thirty percent of the vote. More than that, the PKI often seemed to be the only solid, purposeful, disciplined, well-organized force in Indonesia.'*'^ It exuded a spirit of confidence and victory. In a 90 percent rural and agrarian population, it appeared to be carrying on an effective program of information and grievance collection, social welfare assistance, propaganda ^ " H a s Sukarno Weakened the PKI?" Aslan Survey, I V:9 (September, 1964) p. 1058. 100 After interviewing the PKI leadership triumverate, Aidit, Lukman and N.foto, American Journalist Neil Sheehan noted that although they were hostile to the U.S. "they are also the only men here who frankly admire American efficiency and have attempted to inculcate it into their cadres. ’You have to be efficient if you want to get anything done,' Njoto said, 'we imitate you that way.'" New York Times Magazine (August 15, 1965) p. 76. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 130] === 122 and— particularly in 1965— agitation for land reform and 101 redress of other perceived Ills. A prime target In the PKI's political strategy at the national level was inclusion in Sukarno's cabinet. In 1962, over Army opposition, the Indonesian President conferred ministerial rank on Aidit and Lukman, although the titles were largely honorary and neither served formally in the cabinet. As a further bestowal of respectability, Aidit accompanied Sukarno to the United Nations and on state visits to the United States and other countries. In 1964, Njoto, a PKI vice chairman, was brought into the inner cabinet, and a 1965 cabinet re-shuffle saw Communists given two of seven new ministerial posts. In addition, an increasing number of Communist sympathizers were being appointed to key government positions. At the same time moderate elements were suffering setbacks in the political struggle. In a major effort to offset PKI Influence, a heterogeneous group of individuals from the nationalist-Communist Murba Party and the religious parties, representatives of the Army and Navy, and former adherents of the discredited Masjumi ■'■^^For an interesting account of PKI grassroots activities in 1964 see Suhanjo, "Indonesian Communist Party and the Peasants, World Marxist Review, 8:7 (July, 1965) pp. 45-51. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 131] === 123 and Socialist Promotion united P a r t i e s, j oin e d to of Sukarnoi sm." front, th e the PKI. moderates' manuever, porting press, The overt widespread armed and officers, considered to be been seriously still further, among th e board composed chiefs The sition, scotched th e idea. a kind rejected only t o be s u p p o r t e d by pendence Day address. even Ai r among Department the military policy Communist each general strong P KI p r o p o s a l Sukarno the A policymaking and faced with of " F i f t h F o r c e " and "troika" service. A second 102 b u l w a r k — had w o u l d h a v e b e e n a t t a c h e d to government, into to w e a k e n religious sup- Communists. State a NASACOM each and its The Marines the the augmented chief anti-Communist of s t a f f sharply reached In a n e f f o r t the anti-Communist infiltrated, Army— which PKI p r o p o s e d Sukarno peasants ranks. of n a t i o n a l i s t, staff. to t h e PKI was heavily infected. representatives an d of the to be the organization closer government was for Sukarno rejected operation which a n d th e the the even position Force were believed senior banned clandestine services immediately Subsequently and moved "Body A thinly disguised BPS almost t a c k e d by fo r m the also Army arm workers initially in h is oppo was 1965 I n d e S u k a r n o c h a r g e d t h a t t h e B PS w a s a c r e a t i o n of t h e A m e r i c a n C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, d e s i g n e d to fight C o m m u n i s m i n I n d o n e s i a — an a l l e g a t i o n p u b l i c l y d e n i e d by A m b a s s a d o r Jones. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === 124 The PKI both encouraged and benefited from Indonesia's sharp swing to the left in international affairs. could point to its record of consistent opposition to the colonialist, capitalist powers which were now Indonesia's enemies and of its early opposition to Malaysia as a neo colonialist plot. Rampant anti-Americanism and the entente with Peking were clearly in its interests as it established itself ever more firmly within Indonesian society. Little wonder then that most assessments by American observers were pessimistic. In late 1964, Dr. Donald Zagoria, a specialist on Communist affairs, concluded that: "The possibility of Indonesia becoming an Asian Cuba is no longer remote." 103 Other experts had similar misgivings about the country's future. 104 American journalists were almost uniformly certain that a Communist take-over was virtually inevitable. In May 1965 Keyes Beech of the Chicago Dally News reported from Djakarta that: "The question is not whether Indonesia will go Communist but when." The PKI, ~^^The Washington Post, October 4, 1964. 104 These include Ewa Pauker, op. clt., Guy Pauker, Communist Prospects in Indonesia (Santa Monica, California: A RAND Corporation Memorandum, 1964), and Justus M. van der Kroef in Communist Party of Indonesia, o p. clt. and several articles. At the same time there were "optimists," those who tended to counter or qualify most of the evidence of coming R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === 125 Beech said, would take full control of the country when the time was ripe "and the way things are going it will be 105 sooner rather than late." The Bunker Mission The events of the first two months of 1965 had dra matically demonstrated the inadequacy of the Jones policy in Indonesia. As the USIS Libraries prepared to close and the confiscation of American property increased in tempo, the Ball-Bundy-Green "hardliners" had won their case. In early March the State Department acknowledged that it was reviewing U.S. policy in Indonesia as a result of anti-American events but a spokesman denied that any change in the U.S. position Communist domination in Indonesia. Those included Hindley, op. c l t., Ruth McVey, "Indonesia:Communism Under Guided Democracy," Communist Strategies in Asia, A. Doak Barnett, editor, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963)> and, to a lesser extent, Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History, op. cit. For a comparison of the ideas and opposing arguments of the optimists and pessimists see Stuart L. Graham, "Assessments of the PKI," Australia *s Neighbors (JanuaryFebruary, 1966) pp. 4-7. 105 Seymour Topping reported in August, 1965,that Indonesia was "slipping even more firmly into the Communist orbit." The New York Times, August 22, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 134] === 126 already had taken place. At the same time, however, Secretary of State Rusk was giving strong indications of a new firmness in the Administration's approach to Indonesia. In answer to a newsman's question on a television interview program, Rusk said: Now, we would like to see good relations with countries like Indonesia. But this requires some effort on both sides. I think at the present time it is fair to say that our relations are being re duced; they are becoming, to use a diplomatic term, simplified. We think Indonesia needs to make a real effort on its side if our relations are to be improved in the months ahead. We hope that it can be, but I cannot assure you that they will be.^07 Despite calls from some quarters in Washington for a complete severence of relations with Indonesia, or at least downgrading American diplomatic representation from an ambassador to a charge d'affaires, the United States was hopeful of continuing regular diplomatic contacts with Indonesia, 108 At the same 1070n C.B.S. "Pace the Nation," March 7, 1965. See Department of State Bulletin, March 29, 1965, p. 447. Rusk, on that occasion, drew a distinction between traditional diplomatic relations "in order to have channels of communica tion even with those whom you might be in serious disagreement on particular points and the other problem, which is the richness, the depth, the extent of those relationships across the board." nn ft Philip Geyelin points out that President Johnson could have drawn applause from Capitol Hill by a break with Indonesia, but saw the logic in the State Department position that a foot in the door might be fortuitous should Sukarno lose his grip and a new, less-antagonistic regime take his place. He quotes an unnamed diplomat to say that Johnson was "quite able to understand that a little something was better than nothing in a place like Indonesia..." 0g_. cit., p. 271 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === 127 time, however, should be it w a s a minimal s h o u l d be effects. f el t one an d terminated. First, as a p r o t e s t tha t Such a move the Second, Indonesian outrage ( s u c h as th e ditions presence vide Communists with the to r e d u c e Indonesia was that presence. have and it w o u l d m i n i m i z e murder eventual c h a n g e w i t h tim e. no t e s s e n t i a l would Sukarno policies States. to d e l a y representation seen domestically the Un i t e d serious formal all a c t i v i t i e s it w o u l d be against this Since a handy two p o s i t i v e an d w o r l d w i d e insults the reconciliation a highly-visible target, little it w a s risk o f an A m e r i c a n accomplishing of an citizen) should con American save only to p r o logical 109 109 Some moderate Indonesians also apparently felt this way. Thomas Morgan quotes a "Dr. N." of an unnamed govern ment ministry saying: "Americans can do nothing to influence this situation. It is one hundred percent domestic. All the anti-American demonstrations are organized by the Communists, but the feeling against you grows. We want to be alone. You, then, should be neutral, strictly neutral. You can only lose by getting involved. Think about that. Americans always talk about getting involved as thouget it were, by itself, the Good. Not getting involved is sometimes better." 0£, cit.. p. 97. The A u s t r a l i a n writer, M a s l y n Williams, e x p r e s s e d s i m i l a r i d e a s f o l l o w i n g his v i s i t to I n d o n e s i a. He noted t h a t the b i g U.S. p r e s e n c e i n J a k a r t a p r o v i d e d t h e C o m m u n i s t s w i t h t h e i r b i g g e s t p r o p a g a n d a a s s e t a g a i n s t the W e s t: " So l o n g as A m e r i c a n s c o n t i n u e t o p l a y t h e m a j o r W e s t e r n r o l e in A s i a (the t r a d i t i o n a l v i l l a i n ' s r o l e ) th e C o m m u n i s t s n e e d d o n o t h i n g a b o u t the r e a l i s s u e s, a n d n o t h i n g p o s i t i v e t o p r o v e t h e i r o w n c a p a c i t y to p l a y a u s e f u l p a r t i n b u i l d i n g u p t h e c o u n t r y. A l l t h e y n e e d d o is t i e a t i n c a n t o t h e v i l l a i n ' s c o a t t a i l s a n d b o w w h e n the c r o w d l a u g h s. " Five Journeys from Djakarta (N e w York: W i l l i a m M o r r o w a n d Co., I n c., 1966 ) p. 237. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === 128 The new policy apparently met with some opposition from Ambassador Jones who, while favoring some aid cutbacks, believed that the action being contemplated by Washington was too sweeping and would do harm to the American position, such as it was, in Indonesia. To bolster his arguments he continued to cable reports to the State Department of his conversations with Sukarno which seemed to augur well for the adoption of more moderate policies by Djakarta. Yet the Indonesian President had made similar— and unkept— promises before and such assurances found a skeptical recep tion. To get a fresh look at the situation and to implement the new firm line to the degree believed necessary, the State Department put forward the idea of sending Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia for discussions with Jones and Indonesian leaders on the deteriorating state of relations. Following White House approval of the idea, President Johnson announced the move on March 22. On the surface, the Bunker mission seemed an extension of the conciliatory policies of the past and a last-minute effort to salvage Sukarno's good will. President Johnson was reported to have spoken per sonally and at length with Bunker about the trip because of his deep personal concern about the situation. Administration spokesmen emphasized that the United Stfetes wished to "look beyond the irritations of the moment" to determine what R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 137] === 129 meaningful one relations objective of the could still visit undoubtedly of b e t t e r i n g r e l a t i o n s, aspects of the window dressing deeper purpose of both Indonesia Sukarno it w a s United nations. President was t o be p e r s u a d e d doing him a favor cutting d o w n its been largely the Bunker's idea that best cut interests source Diplomatically, that by p h a s i n g embassy staff, b a c k the become,a two investigatory on the Although explore ways Djakarta. States or m i g h t and s e e m to h a v e relations that were, was will" a welcome "sell" and the m a i n t a i n e d. 1 1 ^* the would program, good points" friction between States assure was retain Indonesian "good Bunker mission order to "exposure the the out and the United its aid by w i t h d r a w i n g T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s, M a r c h 23, 1965. These c o n c i l i a t o r y - s o u n d i n g s t a t e m e n t s brought some sharp c r i t i c i s m f o r the B u n k e r M i s s i o n as a n e x t e n s i o n o f a " s o f t " p o l i c y o n Indonesia. T h e R e p o r t e r c o n c l u d e d e d i t o r i a l l y: " To a s s u m e t h a t g r a d i t u d e, w h i c h it e x i s t s i n f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s, is a d e p e n d a b l e l e v e r a g e i n f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s is a b i t i n g e n u o u s.... I n a v e n t u r e w h e r e t h e o u t c o m e is l i k e l y t o g o a g a i n s t o u r w i s h e s, to a p p o i n t a n e m i n e n t s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e is t o risk public i z i n g our discomfiture whe n the predictable s et b a c k o c c u r s a n d to enab l e our a d v e r s a r i e s to m a g n i f y grea t l y their success. This isn't good diplomacy. It i s n ' t e v e n good public relations." M a y 6, 1965, p. 8. Brackman, S o u t h e a s t A s i a ' s S e c o n d F r o n t, p. 227, t o o k a s i m i l a r v i e w o f the B u n k e r M i s s i o n. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === 130 the Peace Corps. For a task of this delicacy, Bunker was a natural choice. In addition to his long diplomatic experience, he well well known and respected by the Indo nesians for his work as mediator in the West Irian dispute. The Bunker appointment was well received in Indonesia. The Indonesian Herald, a semi-official voice of the Foreign Office, editorially bid welcome to the seventy-year-old emissary of President Johnson and expressed the hope that "he can now rescue Indonesian-American relations from fur..l12 ther deterioration." It may also have influenced an announcement by Foreign Minister Subandrio on March 15 that Indonesia had no intention of breaking off relations with the United States despite its opposition to America's 113 "imperialist policy." He subsequently warned that the Bunker— who, in effect, was going into Indonesia over the head of Jones— appears to have been given fairly wide latitude to determine the precise scope of the American cutback on the basis of his personal judgment during talks in Djakarta. According to a source close to the Bunker mission, the envoy probably had the option of suggesting that no ambassador would be sent to replace Jones unless Indonesia met certain conditions. Apparently it was not necessary to make such a threat. March 25, 1965. ■'■•'■^News Release No. 10, Embassy of Indonesia, Wash ington, D.C., p. 3. Implicit in the Bunker mission, of course, was a threat of a complete break in relations by the U.S., should no cooperation be possible. See The Washington Post, March 25, 1965. Perhaps Subandrio was reacting to that implication. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === 131 Indonesian government could not condone any form of damage inflicted on buildings owned by foreign diplomatic missions in Indonesia, "especially those owned by the United States." 11 i4 Bearing a letter to Sukarno from President Johnson, Bunker arrived in Djakarta on March 31. During five confer ences with Sukarno and talks with Subandrio and other Indo nesian officials, it was emphasized to him that the decline in relations with Washington could be directly traced to the growing American support for Malaysia. The Indonesians pointed to the joint communique issued by President Johnson and Abdul Tunku Rahman the previous July in which the United States had recognized Malaysia’s independence and territorial integrity, and to the American decision to give Malaysia a $4 million arms credit. Sukarno reportedly hinted that U.3.- Indonesian relations would significantly improve if the United States would pressure Malaysia to accede to Indonesian demands. According to State Department sources, Bunker did not react to the suggestion and, instead, made clear that while the U.S. hoped for resolution of the Indonesian-Malaysia dispute, it did not intend to take an active role in seeking a settlement. 114 News Release No. 11, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C. p. 3. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === 132 For his part, Bunker emphasized the desire of the United States to assure the safety of its nationals in Indonesia. Although no American had yet been killed or even hurt seriously, the threats and pressures being applied by the PKI were coming closer and closer to outright violence. This was especially true of the Peace Corps Volunteers, some 30 young men and women working as athletic instructors in locations scattered throughout Indonesia. Since January the Communists and their front organizations had carried on an intensive campaign for expulsion of the American Corpsmen. The vulnerability of these young people was a growing cause of concern to the Johnson Administration, particularly since the Congo experience of three months before was still fresh in the minds of officials. 115 When Sukarno proved reluctant to let the Peace Corps go, Bunker requested a written guarantee from the government pledging the safety of the volunteers, pointing out the hostile reaction in the United States which would result from the killing or serious injury of one or more of the Volunteers. After delaying a 115 William S. Gaud of A.I.D. told Vermont's Senator Aiken: "...You cannot help but worry about the Peace Corps in Indonesia, because most of them are serving out in the boondocks and they can get into trouble an awful lot faster and be a great deal harder to protect than some of our other people there." United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Hearings on H.R. 11380 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965) p. 420. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === 133 day, Sukarno advised Bunker that he could not give such a guarantee and agreement was reached on withdrawing the 116 Peace Corps. The joint communique which ended the Bunker meeting with Indonesian leaders, released April 15, gave ample evi dence that the ambassador had done an effective job of convincing Sukarno about the wisdom of cutbacks in U.S. aid and presence in Indonesia. "Sukarno bought the line." As Marshall Green has put it, 117 The statement emphasized that both governments recognized the importance of friendly relations and agreed that U.S. aid programs should be re viewed and revised "to make sure they conform to the desires of the two governments." Bunker said the U.S. would continue to fund a program of technical assistance to certain Indonesian universities. 118 Sukarno, for his part, welcomed the assist ance and pledged that it had the "full support of the govern ment of Indonesia." The joint decision to terminate Peace Corps activities was noted, and the statement ended with the See the R o w l a n d Evans and R o b e r t W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, A p r i l 19, 1965. The last v o l u n t e e r l ef t I n d o n e s i a on M a y 5, 1965. 117 Interview with author, November Novak Column, Peace Corps 7, 1968. 118 T h i s i n v o l v e d a c a d e m i c t e a m s f r o m th e U n i v e r s i t i e s of C a l i f o r n i a an d Kentucky who were teac h i n g Indonesians h o w t o b u i l d up c o l l e g e f a c i l i t i e s in f o u r c i t i e s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === 134 recommendation that "personal communication" between Sukarno and Johnson was of great importance to both countries and should be maintained. 119 Despite American press criticism calling the Bunker mission a "failure," 120 the new approach had reason to be elated. the advocates of Without causing further hard feelings in Indonesia, the U.S. had successfully disengaged itself from continued substantial involvement in Indonesian society. Better still, Sukarno had been persuaded by Bunker to accept the cutbacks as being in the best interests of both nations. Not only had the Indonesian President not lost face in the transaction, but he could actually claim a victory. 121 At the same'time, the simplification of the U.S. presence would allow Washington to employ a considerably firmer and more businesslike approach to the Sukarno regime and, in the process, help free the anti-Communist forces in Indonesia from a false and inhibiting "American-made" label. 119 Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1965, PP. 654-655. 120 See New York Times, April 16, 1965, Reporter, May 6, 1965, p. 8. U.S. News and World Report, May 17, 1965, pp. 80-81. 12i And he did. In his 1965 Independence Day address, he said: "Take for instance the experience we had of negotiating with the colonialists....When Mr. Ellsworth Bunker came here and an agreement was reached between the Government of Indone sia and the Government of the U.S.A., we did not give in at all....The American Peace Corps had to leave Indonesia. With this our maturity in facing imperialism reached a higher level." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 143] === 135 Jones O u t; Green In Following the Bunker mission the Johnson Administration was faced with the problem of replacing Ambassador Howard Jones who had tendered his resignation the previous November but had stayed on in Djakarta pending the selection of his successor. Jones had been kept at his post in Indonesia since 1958, through the administrations of three Presidents, and for a period longer than any other serving ambassador of the United States because of his popularity with the Indonesians 122 to Sukarno. and, most particularly, because of his closeness A man with an informal, gregarious style, ready laugh and hearty handshake, Jones had become a favorite of the Indonesian President President and visited the Pres idential Palace two or three times a week. Sukarno was fond of referring to Jones as "my good friend Howard Jones" and calling Mrs. Jones "my favorite ambassador's wife." 122 Jones' personal popularity among Indonesians has been noted by U.S. newsmen startled to hear Indonesian young sters call "Hi, Jones," "Hi, America," and "Long Live Jones," to the passing American ambassadorial car. Robert Kennedy was impressed by the ovation accorded Jones by the Indonesian audience at a diplomatic function and held it to be an ex pression of high esteem. Just Friends and Brave Enemies, p. 133. Journalist Robert Trumbull, however, after witnessing small boys cheering Jones' car, expressed the belief that it was the American "image" rather than Jones being cheered. The Scrutable E a s t: A Correspondent's Report on Southeast Asia (New York: David McKay Company, 196^) p. 51. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 144] === 136 Because of his proximity to Sukarno, Jones was considered very well informed by Washington and by his fellow ambassa dors in Djakarta, many of whom beat a path to his office door in an effort to keep current on Indonesian affairs. In keeping with his popularity, Jones had a deep and abiding affection for the Indonesian people and almost grandfatherly concern for their welfare. Tolerant of Sukarno's foibles, Jones seemed ever ready to forgive and forget Indonesian 123 transgressions against American interests. As we have noted, this personal style became an integral part of an American policy which was gradually discredited and, finally, changed. 123 In a typically Jonesian fashion, he said to the Indonesian press on March 13, 1965, following a period of anti-American tumult, "Recognizing that there are differences of view between us with reference to several important mat ters, I have always felt that friends can disagree and still remain friends. This is as true of nations as it is of indi viduals." Antara, March 13, 1965. Jones' willingness to believe the best of Sukarno and the Indonesians was a source of frustration and bitterness to some officers in the Embassy who believed he was not transmitting a true picture of the situation to Washington. While Jones himself became cynical of Sukarno's treatment of him near the end of his stay, he did not convey that impression to his superiors but continued protestations of optimism. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 145] === 137 But just as changing the policy would be a matter of no little diplomatic delicacy so too would be changing the ambassador. Initially at least, the candidates were individuals who already had established some rapport with the Indonesians and might at least look to an Initially friendly reception in Djakarta. Among the names considered were Wilson Wyatt, President Kennedy's representative in the oil negotiations of 1963, Ellsworth Bunker, and even Robert Kennedy. 12 ^4 The ultimate White House decision was to give the post to a career diplomat who was as much the architect of the new policy in Indonesia as Jones had been of the old policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Par Eastern Affairs Marshall Green. During his months as assistant to William Bundy, Green had concentrated primarily on the problems of offshore Asia, while Bundy was wrapped in the concerns of Vietnam and the Asian mainland. It was Green who had carried much of the ongoing debate with par tisans of the Jones' policy. A ^-ye a r - o l d diplomat with 20 years experience in the foreign service, Green had served 12k Prom State Department sources. Bunker declined because of his advanced age and the strenuous nature ofthe post, an ironic protest in view of later assignment as ambassador to South Vietnam. Kennedy at that time, of coumse, was a U.S. senator and his availability for such an assignment was very questionable. It demonstrates the "brain-storming" which finding Jones' replacement entailed. R eproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === 138 in a variety of posts in the Par East and was considered an Asian expert with an awesome capacity for work. His position as a State Department "hard liner" on Indonesia was not, however, unknown to Sukarno and the task of getting agreement on the assignment proved difficult. Ultimately Ambassador Jones was able to overcome Sukarno’s reluctance and persuaded him to accept Green's credentials. Thereupon President Johnson on May 14, named him to the post and the Senate confirmed him on June 2. The Green appointment was not well received in Indonesia. Antara, the official Indonesian news agency, denounced the ambassador designate as "too anti-Communist" and described him as a specialist "in keeping the Par Eastern situation under control." Green's assignment to Djakarta, Antara said, "has given rise to doubts that Indonesian-United States relations will be improved as hopefully as expected until recently." 125 The new Ambassador immediately became a personal target of the Communists and other leftist elements, including Sukarno. No sooner had ^ ^ Q u o t e d in The New York Times, May 15, 1965. Among press attacks on Green was one calling him an evident mil itarist since his given name, "Marshall," actually was a military rank. R eproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 147] === 139 Green arrived at the Djakarta airport when he was greeted by a flurry of signs demanding that he go home. When he presented his credentials to Sukarno on July 26, the Indonesian President— contrary to international protocol for such occasions and to the shock of foreign diplomats present— read a statement to him denouncing American policy in Malaysia and Vietnam as "discouraging the Indonesian people in their wish to develop friendship with the United States. As Green was presenting his credentials at the Presidential Palace, a crowd of about 2,000 people, most of Green recalls the incident vividly and believes Sukarno intended a calculated insult at the U.S. His own reaction was to listen and make no reply. Later, however, while standing in a receiving line next to Sukarno, Green greeted Madame Supeni of the Indonesian Foreign Office. Complimenting her on her beautiful gold dress, green sash, raven hair and sparkling eyes, Green added that he was so distracted by her beauty that he could not keep his mind on what President Sukarno was saying and really had not heard him. Whereupon he asked Madame Supeni to tell him what Sukarno had said. Overhearing the entire conversation, the Indonesian President burst into laughter. In drastic contrast to Sukarno's reception of Green was the May 5 ceremony in which Indonesia's new ambassador L.N. Palar presented his credentials to President Johnson. On that occasion Johnson had extended a cordial, if not exceptionally warm, welcome to the Indonesian representative and had asked that Palar convey to Sukarno "my highest per sonal regard and my hope for the continued wellbeing of the Indonesian people." Press Release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1965. R eproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 148] === 140 them from Communist organizations, was being assembled at the National Youth Front headquarters about 150 yards down the street. Clearly acting with government permission, the demonstrators marched with police escort to the Ambassador's residence once Green had returned there. Chanting "Green go home," the crowd sent a delegation to read the new Ambassador a statement accusing him of being "a leader of the CIA" who had come to Indonesia to commit "intervention, subversion and aggression," and calling upon Indonesia to break diplomatic relations with the United 127 States. Because of this openly hostile welcome, it seemed to some observers only a short time before Green would be returning home as a result of a complete break between the United States and Indonesia. The new Ambassador immediately began taking steps to implement the State Department's firmer approach to Indonesia. Although the number of American officials in the country had been cut back to about 135 by the time of his arrival, Green reduced the figure to 75 within several months. ^ ^ The New York Tim e s, July 27, 1965. Green said the delegation told the crowd that while they read their state ment he was cowering in fright and had to be supported by aids— a description duly reported in the Djakarta press the following day. Interview, November 7, 1968. R eproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 149] === also took action to increase the security of the American embassy against mob attack by constructing a high fence close in around the main Embassy building, installing an alarm system and initiating other precautionary procedures and devices. At their residence, the Greens lived behind double locked doors — other of iron bars. one made of a steel sheet and the Green also assumed the task of attempt ing to avert the confiscation of the few remaining American business interests in Indonesia and to halt the Communistled demonstrations against the Embassy and consular offices. In that effort, his first major test came in early September, 1965. On September 7 a mob of about if,000 Indonesian youths occupied the American consulate grounds in Surabaja. They broke windows, tore down and trampled on the American flag, and wrote anti-American slogans on the walls. Although no Americans were hurt and police prevented t h e.mob from entering the building, it was the second such incident within the month and a vice consul had narrowly Although iron grilles had been erected behind the front door of the Embassy and iron bar guards across the stairway leading to the second floor while Jones was ambas sador, he was hesitant to take further security measures lest they be construed as unfriendly acts by the Indonesians or signal lack of trust for the Sukarno regime. "As a result, the most elemental physical security had been neglected," said one U.S. official. Green called in a military security team from Okinawa to counsel him on safeguards. He credits the inner fence he had built as preventing the sacking of ' the Embassy on March 8, 1966. R eproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === 142 escaped injury. The consulate was becoming a virtual fortress for Americans in the heart of a seemingly hostile city. Two days later the Indian embassy, its information service, and library buildings in Djakarta were sacked, and their contents destroyed by a mob of some 4,000 Indonesian youths. They acted only scant hours after Foreign Minister Subandrio had emerged from a meeting with President Sukarno to declare that India had committed aggression against Pakistan as that conflict flared into armed combat on the 129 subcontinent. Although the Sukarno government promptly apologized for the destruction of the Indian property, Subandrio issued a statement saying he "appreciated" the revolutionary actions of Djakarta's youth in their condemna tion of Indian aggression. To Green and others in the American Embassy, it seemed only a matter of time before a similar act of destruction was visited on an American diplo matic outpost. 129 Indonesia's diplomatic support for Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pak war was in keeping with its "axis" concept. Peking also was backing Pakistan against India. On September 13, the Ceylonese government announced that it had rejected an Indonesian request to allow military airplanes to be routed through Ceylon to Pakistan. These planes apparently •-were jet fighters loaned to Pakistan during the conflict. Indonesia also gave the Paks some military equipment. R eproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 151] === 143 With several other ambassadors, Green made a show of solidarity with the Indians and visited the ruins of their mission. At the same time he asked Washington to let him make the strongest possible representation to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry insisting that the United States had reached the limit of its forbearance. Granted permission, he met with Subandrio and emphasized that if any American consulate was sacked, the United States would withdraw its Embassy and consulates and, in turn, shut down the Indonesian Embassy and its consulates in the United States. The Amtrican Ambassador knew that the Sukarno regime would be reluctant to see its New York consulate closed because through that channel Indonesia did much of its foreign ex change-producing business in international commerce. With its economy already well past the danger point, Djakarta could ill afford a blow at one of the major conduits of government financing. Subandrio proved to be conciliatory. 130 Green notes that Subandrio smiled throughout his virtual ultimatum, almost as if relieved, "as if he knew things had gone too far." Interview, Nov. 7» 1968. this encounter, Atlantic Magazine said: "Green spoke to Subandrio in terms that he was not accustomed to hear from an American ambassador. If the United States were pushed in this way, it would reserve the right to push back, he told Subandrio. The pushing quickly ceased. "Report on Indonesia," 217:1 (January, 1966) p. 17. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13' === [PDF page 152] === 144 The Indonesian Foreign Minister acceded to Green's request for a meeting with General Sujipto, chief of the Indonesian National Police and called him personally to make the arrange ments. Sujipto received the American ambassador cordially and together they ceremonially conducted a review of police forces. More important, the police official also agreed to a list of requests by Green to help secure the embassy and its personnel against possible mob assault. As a symbol of this assurance of more adequate protection, a new police guard — himself — one directly responsible to Sujipto was stationed in front of the embassy. From that day forward, through the tumultuous events of the next five months, and until March 8, 1966, the American Embassy, consulates, and personnel were free of harassment. Congress Cooperates Just as implementation of the new policy required intensive efforts at persuasion in Djakarta, it was also necessary for the Johnson Administration to convince the Congress that it was now dealing firmly and correctly with Indonesia in order to head off even more stringent measures from Capitol Hill. In September, 1964, Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut had introduced, with twenty co-sponsors, a resolution calling for the suspension of all residual aid program' to Indonesia and the condemnation of its confrontation R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 153] === 145 of Malaysia as "open aggression." efforts in bot h th e House and 131 There also were active Senate and other aid shipments to Indonesia. c ut off all food A few voices called for a complete break in diplomatic relations. 132 The Administration, anxious to pursue its policy with flexibility, was strongly opposed to such suggestions from Capitol Hill. As anti-American incidents mounted in Indonesia during the early months of 1965, however, it appeared that a flat ban by Congress on further aid to Indonesia was a danger. To head off such a move, State Department and A.I.D. officials made a strenuous effort to convince key members and committees of Congress that (1) the Administration had indeed adopted a new, "no nonsense" policy on Indonesia; (2) aid programs had been cut to a trickle; and (3) remaining assistance was in America's interest. Thus there was the House unusual Foreign harshness Affairs in W i l l i a m Committee during Bundy's hearings words 131 The resolution also 1) endorsed President Johnson's stand for Malaysian independence and territorial integrity; 2) a s k e d t h a t t h e I n d o - M a l a y s i a n d i s p u t e be p u t on t h e U.N. G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y c a l e n d a r u n d e r t he " U n i t i n g f or P e a c e " r e s o l u t i o n; 3) u r g e d t h a t t h e U N a s k a l l m e m b e r s s t o p ar ms s h i p m e n t s t o I n d o n e s i a, a n d 4) r e - a f f i r m e d f r i e n d s h i p for the I n d o n e s i a n people. C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d, S e p t e m b e r 2H, 196H, pp. 2 2 0 8 2 - 2 2 0 8 ^. 132 12, 1965j Senator Birch Bayh srote u r g i n g s u c h a s t e p. The S e c r e t a r y R u s k on A u g u s t Washington P o s t, August 13, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 154] === 1*16 the foreign aid bill: "We condemn the Sukarno government's unrelenting military pressure against Malaysia," Bundy said. "We condemn it for standing by when American property has been destroyed by undisciplined mobs." 133 Administra tion spokesmen noted that no development loan had been made to Indonesia for two years, that the P.L. *»80 food program had not been renewed, and that technical assistance had been reduced to four American university teams in Indonesia and some 400 young Indonesians studying in the United States. In addition, in March, 1965, there were still eleven Indo nesians in military training in the U.S. Again and again, Administration spokesmen emphasized that maintenance of these programs did not indicate support for the policies of the Indonesian government but allowed the U.S. "to maintain our contact with the Indonesian people themselves, particularly 133 United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before Committee, 89th Congress,1st SessTon, on H.R. 7 75 0, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965) p. 368. (Hereafter referred to as Hearings, 1965). 11*1 At the end of February, 1965, there was a total of $3.8 million in undisbursed loans to Indonesia. The only active loan was for a harbor development project of which $2.7 million remained undisbursed out of a total loan agree ment of $6 million. Letters of credit had been issued for all but $173,000 of the $6 million and irrevokable letters of credit had been issued for all but $662,185. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === 147 with those next generation. The among them who success became evident. further fo o d House Floor. of t h e 136 I n d o n e s i a was to h a l t all to the allow 1965 foreign for Pre sid enti al victory press the President Since Lyndon Johnson for strictly In t h i s "...The aid Congress' had th a t Indonesia through There "watered was down" another Broomfield Amendment. signed the pre s i d e n t i a l speaking, President on the Gruening the on a n y by S e n a t o r legislation, situation, ban seeming reluctance under not a flat bill was discretion. action still required should, action. ai d o f th e soon defeated others amendment took leaders efforts to p l a c e an e f f o r t automatically. Department Senate, and Indonesia State in M a y the In t h e (Dem-Alaska) determination comprise An a t t e m p t shipments Administration could have Johnson went further been cut himself far as aid off reportedly take it up Bundy, Hearings, 1965, p. 368. A.I.D. Director Bell made a similar statemtnt on February 9, 1965, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Ibid.. p. 57. 136 In support of that ban, its principal sponsor, Rep. Paul Findley of Illinois, said his amendment would have the beneficial effeet... serving notice to Nasser and Sukarno that we resent the insults (they) have directed our way in recent months; that we are putting on record our desire to shut them off from this form of foreign aid." Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965 Edition (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1966) p. 130. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 156] === 148 quietly with the right people on the Hill; there was a conspiracy of silence and the point was never raised." 137 As 1965 proceeded there was growing confidence in the State Department that any anti-Indonesian eruptions on Capitol Hill could be capped. 138 Two incidents, however, shook any complacency in Foggy Bottom. The first concerned the issuance of an ex port license to the Philco Corporation to permit the sale of $3 million in radio transmission equipment to Indonesia. The equipment was to be part of a "tropospheric scatter system" which would provide the Indonesian Army with a highly accurate point-to-point radio network which would be difficult to intercept or monitor and was virtually Jamproof. Indonesian Army spokesmen had convinced the Pentagon that such a system would be useful in any showdown with the Communists since the country's regular communications chan nels were in the hands of leftist elements. United States was to build the entire system. Initially, the When relations deteriorated and military assistance was drastically cut back, "'■^An unidentified official told Robert Brunn of the Christian Science Monitor, February 25, 1965: "Congress has been overbriefed. The key members of Congress under stand the American approach to Indonesia." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 157] === 149 only three stations had been completed. Further, the U.S. was unwilling to build stations in Sumatra or Borneo because they were frontline areas in the Malaysian confrontation. There were recriminations from Generals Achmad Yani, Army chief of staff, and S. Parman, head of intelligence, who had staked much on the project. As a way out, the Defense Department agreed that the Indonesians could buy the necessary equipment themselves from Philco on a commercial basis; apparently little considering that obtaining an export license would prove a problem. As word of the transaction leaked out, however, the reaction was sharp on Capitol Hill. "The sale of superior communications equipment to Sukarno's army would seem absolutely contrary to U.S. interests," said Rep. Paul Findley. 139 Charging that the equipment might be used for Indonesian propaganda broadcasts into Malaysia, the British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart "deplored" the sale in the House of Commons and the issue was seen as a serious irritant I GQ House Floor, Congressional Record, July 26, 1 965. p. 18124. Findley was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 158] === 150 140 to Anglo-American relations. As before, State Department officials were able to convince key members of Congress that the sale would help U.S. contacts with the Indonesian military without benefiting Sukarno. Despite tacit approval of the sale from Capitol Hill, it was never completed be cause of a lack of funds by the Indonesians. Another problem was the dilemma posed to the Administration of whether to renew the Atoms-for-Peace agreemtnt with Indonesia. Signed first in I960, the program was to lapse on September 20, 1965. Under the agreement, the Indonesians had purchased a small reactor from General Dynamics Corporation; the U.S. provided the enriched uranium fuel to power it and a $350,000 grant as a share of building costs. The project first became controversial during the 1964 Presidential campaign when Senator Goldwater charged that it would help the Indonesians develop an atomic bomb. At that time, the State Department and Atomic Energy Commis sion strongly denied the allegation. By September, 1965, 140 Karl E. Meyer, Dispatch from London, The Washington Post, August 4, 1965. The entire furor might well have been avoided had not a secret briefing on the transaction for members of the House Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific been listed on the House Committee Calendar as a hearing on "U.S. military aid to Indonesia." This alerted the British and the press to the matter. Ordinarily such briefings are not publicized at all; how the mistake occurred has never been satisfactorily explained. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === 151 when the treaty was due for renewal, however, officials were becoming increasingly concerned about repeated boasts by Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno, that Indonesia would soon build its own atomic weapon. While doubting that the Indonesians possessed the technology to develop a weapon on their own, it was feared that the Communist Chinese might help them. The American assistance, although limited to peaceful applications and research, could indirectly help the Indonesians militarily by training a group of scientists and engineers in a nuclear technology that could be applied to war purposes. If the U.S. failed to renew the agreement and with drew its uranium, however, the Indonesians could get a re placement from the Soviet Union or China. In the process, the United States would lose its right to insist upon inspec tion of the reactor. Because of those circumstances and despite domestic criticism, President Johnson, on advice from the State Department, decided to offer the Indonesians a five year extension of the program. The announcement was made on September 8, 1965, and the agreement signed January 12, 1966. See Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1966, p. 182. For other details of the situation see the Washington Post, April 3» 1965, and The New York Times, Brackman, Southeast Asia* s Second Front, pp. 227-228, believes that American participation in the reactor project, R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 160] === 152 The Strategic Situation: 196*<-1965 Underlying American policy toward Indonesia during 1964 and 1965 were certain assumptions about that country's importance, the intentions of its leaders, the nation's capacity to fulfill those intentions, and feasible American responses. A key consideration was the geographically stra tegic position of the Indonesian archipelago. Stretched between the peninsula of Southeast Asia and Australia/New Zealand, Indonesia was in a position to control the entrance to the Indian Ocean by blocking off the Straits of Malacca, the narrow channel between Sumatra and the southern Malayan Peninsula which links the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. Indonesia also was situated astride possible alternative routes through the Lombok or Sulu Straits. Pinching off these channels of commercial and military sea traffic would have a number of adverse effects on the maritime nations. would, in effect, be isolated. Australia and New Zealand Japan's industry, dependent for a majority of its oil supplies on shipments from the Middle East through the Straits of Malacca, would come to a at the Institute of Technology at Bandung, was "coming when it did, irresponsible." And another author has noted that: "The Atoms for Peace Program, whatever its motives and safeguards, has unquestionably speeded up the prolifera tion process." Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science. Technology and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967) pT 43. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === 153 grinding halt. The British position in Malaysia would become virtually untenable and the United States, fighting a large-scale local war in Vietnam, would find its logistics problems further complicated. into Communist hands," said "If Indonesia should fall Admiral H a r r y D. Pelt, Navy Commander in the Pacific, "this could be a tragedy 142 for the free world." In addition to its geographic importance, Indonesia was a significant actor on the stage of world politics because of its 110 million population, which made it the fifth largest nation in the world, and the richness of its natural resources. While, for the above reasons, an Indonesia friendly to the West seemed imperative, the avowed intentions and actions of its leaders were hostile. Again and again, Sukarno, Subandrio, and others in the government hierarchy had railed against Western influence in the region and had vowed its eventual extinction. Furthermore, the Indonesian military— often seen as an anti-Communist bulwark— openly had announced a blueprint for establishing Indonesian hegemony in Southeast ^ 2House Hearings, 1963, p. 797. 1^3por a discussion of these aspects of Indonesian importance, as viewed by a top American official, see William P. Bundy, "The United States and Asia," China and the Peace of Asia, Alastair Buchan, editor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) PP. 25-26. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === 154 Asia. At a seminar of senior naval officers in 1965, General Yani stated that "our defense conception must cover all of Southeast Asia." He declared that Indonesian kingdoms of old had maintained primacy over Southeast Asia for centuries through control of the seas and noted that: ...The Indonesian nation and people will not ignore the demands of history, and it has been my conclusion since 1963 that at some time the Indo nesian Navy will take over the role of the United States Seventh Fleet and the British Far Eastern Fleet in Southeast A s i a. 1 4 4 The first step in this effort to achieve paramountcy was to knock out the British base at Singapore and thus break through the "encirclement" of Indonesia represented by Malaysia, according to General Nasution, defense minister in Sukarno's cabinet. As a symbol of these designs for power, the Indonesians renamed the Indian Ocean as the "Indonesian Ocean" and the Straits of Malacca became the "Straits of Sumatra." Although much of Indonesia's "forward" policy was rhetorical— some said it was all bluff— the nation did possess a formidable military establishment far overshadowing any of its immediate neighbors. It had a 300,000-man army, of which an estimated one-third were well-trained, well- ~^^The New York Times, August 25, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === 155 equipped troops. Its navy, with an estimated 12 Sovietbuilt submarines, was believed to be the match for the fleet of any other country in Asia, including India and Australia. Its air force had been supplied with 20 to 30 Russian "Badger" bombers, capable of flying 600 miles per hour with a range of 4,000 miles. Within bombing distance was every country in Southeast Asia, including Australia. Further, as George Modelski has pointed out, although Indonesia's per capita national income was less than $U.S. 100, in aggregate national income it ranked 25th in the world and loomed large among its neighbors. "The size of aggregate income made it possible, once unity of purpose was restored and a choice was made, to mount a defense budget 146 that would have significant impact." In addition to Indonesia's own resources, it also might be able to call on substantial help from Communist nations. The Soviet Union already had supplied almost $1 billion in military aid and appeared willing to give more, despite Indonesia's entente For a more detailed breakdown of the Indonesian military strength and equipment see Millar, ojo. cit., p. 64. 146 George Modelski, Indonesia and Her Neighbors (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center of International Studies Memorandum, October 29, 1964) p. 5. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === 156 with China. Peking, for its part, might help Sukarno 147 obtain his dreamed-for atomic bomb. Although Indonesia posed no direct security threat to the United States and although it was not yet Communist, it had become in terms of American strategic interests, a "troublemaker," to use General Maxwell D. Taylor's 148 description. By its confrontation against Malaysia, Indonesia was disrupting the internal order of a nation in which an earlier Communist threat had been crushed. was causing Anglo-American frictions, drawing into the con flict Australia, an ANZUS ally, and posing new problems for SEATO. Furthermore, there was growing evidence of Indo nesian infiltration and agitation among the Moslem peoples of the southern Philippines and of considerable sums of money being paid to Filipinos serving Djakarta's aims, in cluding bribes to journalists for fomenting anti-Americanism. '"Peking has little to lose and much to gain by promising and eventually giving nuclear weapons to Indonesia ancf some other countries of the underdeveloped world" con cluded a study by the Research Department of Radio Free Europe, "Will Sukarno Get the Bomb?" July 29, 1965 (Mimeographed) p. 3. Uri Ra'anan in "The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis," Problems of Communism, XV:2 (MarchApril, 1966) p. 41, discusses in deTTail the talks on nuclear assistance between Peking and Djakarta. 148 Responsibility and Response (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967) p. 5b. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === Moreover, an Indonesia, aggressive and belligerent in close league with Communist China, would be considerably more than just a troublemaker; such a configuration might well change the strategic balance of forces in Southern 149 Asia, leading to unforeseen serious consequences. the least a Sino-Indonesian alliance would seriously challenge a central tenet of America's Asian policy: "...That no single Asian nation should either control or exert dominant influence over other nations in the area, either in the area as a whole or in any significant region of it." ISO An Indonesia, both pro-Chinese and Communist (as many were predicting it soon would be), promised grave problems for the American intervention in the Vietnam confdict. By no means the least effect would be to undercut the Administration’s contention, based on the so-called "domino theory" that if Vietnam fell entirely to Communism the rest of Southeast Asia was almost certain to follow, and inversely, if Vietnam could be saved, Southeast Asia would be safe. If Indonesia— the biggest domino down the line— I/40 D.E. Kennedy in his book, The Security of Southern Asia (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1965) PP. 212-214, proposes a number of interesting scenarios based on the Sino-Indonesian alignment. •*-5°Bundy, "The United States and Asia," p. 16. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 166] === 158 fell first, the American policy would be vitiated and a severe breach made in the wall of containment which the United States had so carefully erected around China since the late 19^0s. Despite these dangerous prospects, the United States responded to the Indonesian situation with restraint and caution. Realistically, it could do little else. Its military capabilities already stretched tightly by the demands of the Vietnam War and other worldwide commitments, Washington could ill afford to take on vast new responsibilities in offshore Southeast Asia. While there may well have been those who urged direct military action against Indonesia be fore it succumbed to Communism and China, they were not 151 heeded. Former Presidential Assistant Richard N. Goodwin has written: "Our government was fully resigned to the po tential domination of Indonesia by a Communist Party close to Peking,since armed invasion seemed the only way to prevent 152 Robert Kennedy also has noted that the United States There have been unsubstantiated reports that in 1965 American policy makers seriously debated whether to send a military expedition to prevent a Communist takeover of Indonesia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly warned, however, that it would take a World War II-scale invasion to occupy the islands. 152 Triumph or Tragedy: Reflections on Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1966) p. 15. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 167] === 159 was "quite prepared to accept the spread of Communism to Indonesia...." 153 With intervention determined to be infeasible, the Johnson Administration chose an opposite course. It reduced its Involvement, lowered its visibility, and, in general, adopted a "hands off" attitude. In the meantime, Asian specialists in Washington and diplomats on the scene simply waited for the Indonesians to work out their own future — a future in which the United States might once again play a part. They would not have to wait long. 153 To Seek a Newer World (New York: Bantam Books, 1968) p. ljjfT. This view is shared by Bartlett and Weintal, op. cit., who say: "Most of the planning for Indonesia was hinged on the assumption that the island nation would go Communist and elaborate countermeasures were projected to dull the effects of a Communist takeover." p. 184. Interventions Against Communism, Herbert S. Dinerstein writes: 11...When it was generally assumed that the liklihood of a Communist take-over in Indonesia was high, no serious proposals for intervention against that contingency, nor plans for intervention after the fact, seem to have been made." (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Center cf Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1967) p. 3d. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 168] === CHAPTER III THE SEPTEMBER 30 MOVEMENT AND I T S A FT E R M A T H On October 1, 1965, a group calling itself the "September 30 Movement," under the announced leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Untung, commandant of a battalion of the Tjakrablrawa, President Sukarno's personal bodyguard, struck at Indonesia's established political order. They kidnapped and murdered six high-ranking Army generals and only narrowly missed taking Defense Minister Nasution; they captured the Djakarta studios of the Indonesian national radio network, the central telecommunications office and other key points in the capital city; and they announced the formation of an Indonesian Revolutionary Council to exer cise the entire authority of the state. By that afternoon the Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Suharto, in a series of expert and largely bloodless maneuvers, had mounted a successful counterattack. Before midnight, Radio Indonesia had fallen to the Army and by the next morn ing, the plotters were in full flight, Now in complete command in Djakarta, the Army announced that a revolt had been crushed and declared martial law throughout the country. This period of something less than two days— together with events leading up to it and following from it— subsequently R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 169] === 161 has been the subject of considerable investigation and controversy.’'" While the passage of time has provided answers to many of the questions surrounding the September 30 Movement,a number of key points remain to be explained. It is not the purpose here to explore the details, nuances and complexities of the coup attempt itself. Equally important, from the standpoint of American policy toward Two book length, journalistic treatments of the attempted coup in Indonesia already are in print. They are John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1967) and Tarzie Vittaehi, The Fall of Sukarno (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers’^ T9F7)T Twoother lengthy treatments are reported to be in process, of a more scholarly approach, by Guy Pauker of the RAND Corporation and by Victor Fic of Nanyang University, Singa pore. In addition, Indonesia has published a semi-official account of events by Colonel Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, entitled The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Move ment" in Indonesia (Djakarta: P.T. Pembimbing Masa, 1968). A government "white paper" on the same subject is expected to be issued at a later date. In addition, many articles have been written on the subject, including those listed below: Frederick Bunnell, "Indonesia's Quasi-Military Regime," Current History (January, 1967); Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," The China Quarterly, No. 25 (January-March, 1966)5 Donald HTndley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indo nesia," The Journal of Aslan Studies XXVI:2 (February, 1967); Justus M. van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia," Orbis, X:2 (Summer, 1966); Daniel Lev, "Indonesia: The Year of the Coup," Asian Survey (February, 1966); Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: The Year of Transition, "Asian Survey (February, 1967) and "Toward a New Order in Indonesia,'* Foreign Affairs. ^5:3 (April, 1967); Lucien Rey, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama," New Left Review, No. 32 (March-April, 1966); John 0. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: Crush Malaysia and Gestapu," Before and After the Untung Coup, Pacific Affairs XXXIX:1/2.(Spring-Summer, 1966); and Denis Warner, "Indonesia: The Generals Who Got Away," The Reporter (October 21, 1965). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === 162 Indonesia, are the perceptions of those events held by American officials. While individuals in the State Department and Pentagon hierarchies still differ in their judgment of details, a consensus on the broad outlines of the situation gradually has emerged. An American View of Gestapu In general, American officials have accepted the Indonesian Army's version of the events surrounding Gestapu as factual and accurate, although still incomplete in de tails. Diplomats on the scene have found credible much of the evidence elicited from accused plotters during session of the "Mahmilub," the special military tribunal appointed by presidential decree for the purpose of trying the cases of those accused of complicity in the plot. Reconstructing the situation from these sources, it would appear that the entire affair was masterminded by D.N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, working through clandestine "Gestapu" is the common acronym by which Indonesians refer to the September Thirty Movement. It is constructed from the Indonesian "Gerakan September Tiga Puluh" and is preferred by anti-Communist elements because, sounding so much like the Nazi's "Gestapo," it has an overtone of evil. Per haps for this same reason Sukarno, one of his country's leading acronymists, has preferred "Gestok:Gerakan Satu Oktober," since the plotters did not actually strike until October 1. Material on the U.S. view of Gestapu has been gathered from interviews, public statements, and other sources. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === 163 operatives connected to the party's so-called "Special Bureau," which linked the visible Party machinery to its covert activities in Indonesia. Using gullible or opportunistic military officers like Untung, Commander of the Air Force Marshal Omar Dhani, and Brigadier General Supardjo, the PKI was not attempting to establish an outright Communist regime, but rather hoped to move the political constellation in Indonesia sufficiently to the left to insure a safe transition for the party into a post-Sukarno era. Such an effort was made necessary by the failure to obtain sanction from the Sukarno government for the arming of a "people's militia" or "Fifth Force" which would have provided the PKI with shock troops in a showdown with the Indonesian Army. Further, there was reason to believe that such a "moment of truth" might be imminent. During the summer of 1965 it was generally rumored Whether, and to what extent, the PKI were involved in the Gestapu affair has been the subject of no little con troversy. The thesis that the Gestapu was almost entirely an internal army affair— which, as we shall see later, was developed by individuals connected with the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell University— is reflected in the articles by Bunnell, Wertheim, Lev and Rey noted in footnote no. 2. The articles by Dommen, van der Kroef and Sutter propose that the PKI was deeply involved in the planning "for the attempted coup, as do Hughes and Vittachi in their books. Pauker at first believed the coup to be an affair involving Army dissidents, but changed his mind following attendance at trials of the plotters and his being shown other evidence by the Indonesian military. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 172] === 164 both inside and outside of Indonesia, that Sukarno's days were numbered. His single remaining kidney continued to be troublesome and he apparently suffered two heart seizures during that period. The generally low state of the Indo nesian President's health apparently led the team of Chinese specialists who had attended him since i960 to believe that he might not live long. Their opinion was communicated to Aidit and Peking: It is not surprising, therefore, that people began to think of the time when 'the old man' is no longer around. What would happen if his ominpresence was suddenly terminated, either by paralyzing illness or by death?^ For the PKI this prospect was not a pleasant one. With Sukarno out of the way a direct clash with the Army seemed inevitable— a clash which the party would face largely unarmed. Survival under such circumstances seemed questionable. Pressed by both Peking and "young Turk" elements within the party, Aidit struck on a plan to achieve Nugroho and Saleh, ojo. cit., p. 6. U.S. intelligence estimates at the time were that if Sukarno died, the Army would step in and attempt to destroy the PKI. General Ibrahim Adjie, then commander of the Siliwangi Division, once told the press that the Army intended to prevent the Communists from taking over in Indo nesia. "We knocked them out before. We knock them again if necessary." Quoted by Vittachi, o£. cit., p. 72. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === 165 two different but interdependent objectives. The first and narrower objective was to remove the strongly anti-Communist Army leadership and see to its replacement by a commander and general staff who would not be antagonistic toward the PKI. The second and larger goal was to achieve what the PKI and Sukarno himself had been calling a "Nasakom" regime, a coalition government in which the Communists played a major role, one which they could use as a springboard to eventual total power. Because the PKI's goals were essen tially limited ones, its operation was more in the nature of a putsch than of an outright revolution. This strategem had the advantage of involving relatively few people and thus maintaining secrecy since surprise was essential. Further, if the September 30 Movement could be made to look like an internal Army affair it would be less likely to invite foreign intervention and its failure would not necessarily implicate the Communist Party. It is a generally accepted State Department view that the plan came very close to.succeeding. The plotters’ fatal mistakes were in letting Nasution escape and in overlooking Suharto— a general with troops in Djakarta under this command— for liquidation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 174] === 166 Although the general outlines of the Gestapu now seem clear, a number of detail remain murky. Why, for example, were the bodies of the generals so horribly muti lated before being thrown into a well at Halim Airbase? The desecration was certain to bring down the wrath of the Army on those responsible if the putsch failed and to evoke mass hostility toward those blamed for murdering the gen erals, several of them revered heroes of the Indonesian Revolution. Nor is the role of Sukarno in the affair yet clear to American observers. Few believe him to have been innocent of all complicity in the events, particularly after he was implicated by the testimony of Dhani and Subandrio during their trials. in question. The degree of.his involvement remains It is generally agreed, however, that Sukarno's ultimate indecision about casting his lot with the conspirators helped doom that bloody enterprise. If presidential endorse ment had been forthcoming, the result might well have been public acceptance of the September 30 Movement or, possibly, civil war in which many Army units would have supported the Gestapu elements and Sukarno. ^Roger Paget, who was in Djakarta at the time of these events, rules out the latter possibility. He states that if Sukarno had approved the coup, "it seems certain that no political group would subsequently have been so bold as to voice objection, much less organize violent opposition." "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs. XL:3/^ (Fall and Winter, 1967-1968) p. 297. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === 167 As for the role of the Army in the events of late September and early October, American officials appear to have accepted the Army's own explanation— without neces sarily believing all of it. The initial statement of Lt. Col. Untung emphasized that the September 30 Movement had for ius main objective forestalling a "counter-revolutionary coup" by a "Council of Generals" who had interided to make a show of force on or before October 5> Armed Forces Day. The Army has denied that any such council existed. There admittedly was, however, a committee of generals called "Wandjakti," whose function ostensibly was to evaluate the performance of high-ranking officers and recommend promotions. While U.S. diplomats do not believe that the generals were planning a coup, it is thought that the Wandjakti or a similar, perhaps more informal, grouping of top Army men had been working on contingency plans in case Sukarno died or was incapacitated. The Army's own historian, Colonel Nugroho Notosusanto, suggested as much when he noted that because See text in "Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and its Epilogue," Indonesia 1:1 The Army's previous reluctance to strike for power, the unwariness of the generals at the time of Gestapu, and the subsequent hesitation of military leaders to move against Sukarno tend to bear out that conclusion. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 176] === 168 of the both state sides Sukarno of S u k a r n o ' s began er a. " health it w a s "quite calculating their chances natural t ha t i n the p o s t - There is additional evidence of Army contingency plan ning in the revelation by General Suharto in August, 1966, that he had secret contacts with the Malaysian government prior to Gestapu, for the purpose of considering what terms Kuala Lumpur might accept for termination of "Konfrontasi. His representative on that occasion in the summer of 1965 was Col. Ali Murtopo, who later was active in negotiations to end the Indonesian-Malaysian strife. Many American offi cials seem to be unaware of this incident although it is well known and readily admitted by officials of the Indonesian ^Col. Nugraho adds: "An important aspect of the problem was whether the passing of the President would be a gradual process whereby the people concerned would be given ample time to prepare themselves for the critical hour, or •whether the event would come suddenly or even prematurely." Nugroho and Saleh, o£. clt., p. 7. ^°This revelation is all the more astounding when one considers that Suharto was second in command, behind Marshal Dhani, of the Malaysia Front. It is almost as if General Westmoreland had treated with the North Vietnamese without telling the Johnson Administration. Suharto talked at a press conference which made front page, banner headline ("Suharto Lets Out a Secret") in the Straits Times on August 3, 1966. The Singapore newspaper saicH "He did not elaborate or say who gave him the authority, but said he began the secret negotiation in August." The story apparently did not appear in the American press. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === 169 government. A c c o r d i n g to Brig. Gen. Sudjono Humardani, Suharto undertook to send Murtopo to Malaysia on his own authority. He did so without the knowledge of Sukarno, Subandrio or Dhani and not as a representative of the Army general staff, but as an individual deeply concerned about the future of Indonesia following Sukarno's demise, according to General Sudjono, who is now special assistant to President Suharto. 11 Malaysian officials have a con siderably different view of who or what Murtopo was repre senting. It was their understanding that he came on behalf of a group of dissident Army generals, led by Nasution and Yani, who were disenchanted with the confrontation and wanted to see it ended as soon as possible. According to Zainal Abidin bin Sulong, Principal Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Southeast Asia), General Suharto at that time was considered only a minor figure and not the originator of Murtopo's mission. 12 Discounting General Sudjono's version ■^Interview, Djakarta, September 17, 1968. He indicated that similar contacts had been made in Singapore and the Philippines. 12 Enche Zainal was an active figure in the talks with Murtopo both prior to and after Gestapu. Interview, September 27, 1968. He indicated that he believes that there was, indeed, a "Council of Generals" which was at least interested in re placing the Sukarno regime's policy on Malaysia, if not the Sukarno regime itself. Enche Zainal's version was corroborated by Samad Ismail, editor of Berlta Harlan, the Malaysian lan guage version of the Straits Times and others. Interviews, September 27, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === 170 as a natural effort at myth-building around his superior, it would appear that there was more than a little justifi cation for the PKI charges that the Army was working at cross purposes to the Sukarno regime and that its activities were being guided by a high-level group within the general staff. The United States and the Army Not only did Untung allege that a "Council of Generals" had planned a coup in his initial statement of October 1, but he also charged that the council was "a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA." 13 This was not the first time that the Army and American intelligence activities had been linked. In the Spring, 1965* a purported document which be came known as the "Gilchrist Letter" had come to light. Believed to have been fabricated by the PKI, perhaps by the Special Bureau, it was a photocopy of a two-page letter allegedly written by British Ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist to the British Foreign Office and found in the home of William Palmer, the American representative of AMPAI motion picture distributors whom many Indonesians suspected of being a CIA agent. Conveying the contents of an alleged conversa tion between Gilchrist and Ambassador Jones, the letter said that the Americans and British planned an attack on Indonesia, -^Loc. cit. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === 171 which would be adied "bv our local army friends," apparently referring to pro-Western elements of the Indonesian Army. Although there was little to substantiate the authenticity of the document, it was accepted as valid by Subandrio who passed it on to Sukarno. This matter, as well as rumors about the Council of Generals, was discussed by Sukarno at a meeting of KOTI (The Supreme Operations Command) on May 25, 1965, which was at tended by the chief commanders of all four services — Navy, Air Force and National Police. Army, The Gilchrist Letter was a prime topic of discussion as Sukarno asked General Yani directly about the "local army friends" referred to in the document and also about the rumors concerning a generals' council. Yani strongly denied that any Army officers had cooperated with the British or Americans and disclaimed knowledge of the existence of a council other than the ^ T h e letter appears to have been behind Sukarno's statement on May 28 that "imperialists" were plotting to assassinate him. If the attempt failed, these same unnamed powers would then attack Indonesia. He contended that he had "documents" giving details of the alleged plot, but he did not reveal their contents. Dispatch from Djakarta, The New York Times. May 29, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === 172 Wanjdakti promotion committee. 15 In spite of General Yani's denials, Subandrio con tinued to treat the Gilchrist letter as authentic and to link it with the alleged Council of Generals. Thus, on May 26 at a mass conference celebration of the 45th anni versary of the founding of the Communist Party in Indonesia, the Foreign Minister announced that the government had documentary proof of an impending counter-revolutionary plot linked to unfriendly foreign powers. According to one observer, "This was calculated move to involve the President and provide the PKI's propaganda mills with a highly credible conspiracy theory." 16 In July the letter came to public notice when it was published in the Cairo, Egypt, newspaper 15 Details of this meeting became public at the time of Subandrio*s trial in October, 1966. Ambassador Green believes that, despite Yani's disclaimer, Sukarno was fearful of a possible Army move against himself and that the PKI was skillfully playing on this anxiety. One of the embassy's contacts with the palace during the summer of 1965 was a French newswoman who was a friend of Madame Dewi. She reported that Sukarno seemed deeply worried much of the time and that she had the impression that leftist elements were harassing him in some way. Green believes the Communists were urging him to take action against the generals because of their alleged plots. Sukarno was hesitant to move, Green suggests, because of the chances such a step would involve, but found the situation very depressing. •^Victor M. Fic. September 30th Movement in Indonesia: 1965 Gamble That Failed. A paper delivered to the International Conference on Asian History, August 5-10, 1968, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Mimeographed) p. 17. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 181] === 173 A1 Ahram, touching off a virulent anti-Western press campaign in Djakarta and demonstration marches by students in front of the American Embassy. denials were emphatic. British and American "I never wrote any such letter," Ambassador Gilchrist said in a press statement. Charge d'Affaires Francis J. Galbraith termed the letter "very obviously a spurious document" and, in effect, called 17 upon the Indonesian government to deny its authenticity. No denial was received, however, and the Communist-controlled Antara news service and the Communist press continued to develop what Brackman has called a "CIA syndrome," There were repeated, unsubstantiated charges that the American intelligence agency was behind a plot to overthrow the Sukarno The New York Times, July 10, 1965. At his trial, Subandrio said he reproduced the document and gave copies to leaders in Egypt, Syria, Brazzaville Congo, Ghana and Algeria. He said he intended to publicize the document at the Afro-Asian Conference, but had not bothered to check its authenticity. Djakarta Times, October 4, 1966. According to Donald Kirk, the Foreign Minister planted the letter among nonaligned governments abroad in order to keep Malaysia as a "puppet" of Britain, out of the conference. "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," The New Leader (November 7, 1966) p. 5. To Subandrio's allegation that the letter had been found in his bungalow, William Palmer replied "ridiculous" and denied all knowledge of the mvtter. Djakarta Times, October 6, 1966. Southeast Asia's Second Front, p. 291. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 182] === 174 government, was seeking to murder the President himself, and was backing attempts to create an independent state of Papua in West Irian. Indonesian employees of the American Embassy were subjected to interrogation about alleged sub versive activities, the travel of U.S. diplomatic personnel was restricted, William Palmer was expelled from the country, 19 and an American missionary living in West Irian was arrested as a CIA spy fomenting unrest among the Papuans. Just 72 hours before the Untung coup, the Indonesian Herald, which reflected the Foreign Office view, called on a forth coming conference against military bases to "devote special attention to the role of the CIA" in using foreign bases for "acts of intervention and subversion against the national integrity of new emerging countries." 20 ■^Ambassador Jones has denied emphatically that Palmer was a CIA agent. Calling Palmer"one of the best friends the country had,"he asserted that: "There was not one iota of truth in this or the accusation that the CIA was working against Sukarno." He emphasized that as ambassador in Indo nesia every government agency represented there reported to him and that, as a result, he spoke with authority on Palmer's status and other CIA activities. See "Indonesian Coup Was a Red Bobble," The Washlngton Pos t, Outlook Section (October 10, 1965) p. 1. Despite denials many Indonesians even today believe Palmer was a CIA operative. 20 September 27, 1965. On September 24, Antara had re ported the arrest of 10 CIA agents in Menado, North Celebes, who allegedly had been smuggded into Indonesia from the Philippines. U.S. spokesmen denied the report the following day and the story appears to have been fabricated and without any substance. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === 175 In such an atmosphere, it was natural that Untung's initial statement on behalf of the September 30 Movement should link the Army with the CIA. Similarly, the Communist Party newspaper, Harlan Rakjat, in editorially endorsing the coup, on October 2, included a crude cartoon which portrayed a large fist smashing into the face of an Indo nesian general, who had dollar signs for epaulettes, wore the letters "CIA" on his cap and was being propped up by a repulsive-looking Uncle Sam. Although the United States officially denied that the CIA was involved in the Indonesian revolt, rumors of American participation persisted into the post-Gestapu period. These were fanned by innuendoes and allusions from Sukarno, Subandrio, Saleh and others in their efforts to discredit the Army during the subsequent struggle for power. 21 Communist Chinese propaganda organs also were emphasizing that line. 22 Second Deputy Chairman Njoto of of the Indonesian Communist Party, while being held in pri son, asserted a role for the CIA, but was vague about where its efforts had been directed: 21 See Chapter IV. Subandrio at his trial admitted that he had flung about charges of CIA involvement in Gestapu without any foundation. Newsweek, October 17, 1966, p. 61, 22 See, for examole, Peking Review, No. 43 (October 22, 1965) P. 11. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === 176 Necollm activities, in particular the CIA of the United States, were there not only before, but also during and after the 30 September affair.... It is certain that there are connections between the CIA and the prologue and epilogue of 30 September. I cannot yet say whether the CIA stood on that side or this side. ^ For leftist American journalist William Worthy, writing in the pro-Maoist periodical, The Minority of O n e, events in Indonesia added up "to the most massive of Washington’s repeated interventions in the affairs of the world's sixth largest nation." Despite such claims, however, there has never been any evidence to support a contention that the Central Intel ligence Agency was working in collusion with the Indonesian generals to defeat the Communists and swing Indonesia toward a pro-Western alignment. Investigations by able, on-thescene journalists such as John Hughes of the Christian Science Monitor and Seymour Topping of the New York Times failed to turn up any proof for allegations by leftist 23 In answer to questions from two Japanese corres pondents in Djakarta. Transcript reprinted as a document in New Left Review (London) No. 36 (March-April, 1966) p. 37. Nj oto *s vagueness about the CIA role was calculated to fit the PKI line that the entire affair had been an internal Army affair of which it had no inside knowledge. “^"Confrontation in Indonesia," VIII:3(76) (March, 1966) p. 9. The Minority of One also featured an editorial charging CIA "meddling in Indonesia" entitled, "Indonesia, Too, on the Installment Plan," IX:2(87), February, 1967, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === 177 elements against the C I A. 2 ^ For skeptics, perhaps even more convincing testimony to C I A non-involvement has been provided by the Swedish journalist, Christer Hogstedt, writing in the leftist paper Tldsignal of Stockholm. Reporting the conclusions of his investigation, Hogstedt said: To be sure, the methods used correspond well to what I have seen of the CIA in Latin America and Southeast Asia, but personally I do not believe that the CIA has been mixed up in the latest event in Indonesia, even though the CIA has been delighted at developments. For once, they do not seem 4;o have been needed; events have played into their hands nevertheless. 25nughes noted: "If the CIA was involved in this operation, it must be the most brilliantly disguised secret in the entire history of the agency." He also pointed out that there was no attempt by the plotters to extract an admission implicating the CIA, indicating a curious lack of curiosity about details of a plot they said was designed to overthrow the legitimate government. Instead, their prime interest seemed to be killing the generals and getting them out of the way. O p. cit., p. 106 Topping says that suggestions of a clandestine role for the U.S. in defeating the 30 September Movement "are not supported by the evidence that senior diplomats and scholars provided or by the information obtained by this reporter in Jakarta and in the former concentrations of Communist strength." The New York Times, August 23., 1966 "Indonesia’s Political History and the 1 October Coup — A Swedish View," Joint Publications Research Service Translation, No. 37,363 (August 3d, 1966) p. 3. From the Tidslgnal, June 15-21. John Roche, White House assistant and former president of the Americans for Democratic Action,has said: "I suspect, by the way, that the American obsession with Vietnam may have helped in our not getting mixed up in Indonesia. In other words, we were so busy worrying about Vietnam that our cloak-and-dagger boys didn't get a chance to monkey around in Indonesia." "Containing China: A Roundtable Discussion," Commentary 41:5 (May, 1966) pp. 26-27. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === 178 Corroborating these accounts is research done by the author both in Washington and Djakarta. Following the 1958 fiasco the role of the CIA in Indonesia had been a muted one. Policy-making power was firmly in the hands of the State Department and, locally, of the ambassador. U.S. policy was one of waiting out — Sukarno. not overthrowing — Nor could dissident generals have made contacts with the CIA without severely jeopardizing their careers — their lives — high. and perhaps even since anti-American feeling was running so If, as seems likely, there was a council of generals planning toward the contingency of Sukarno's death, it almost certainly did not have ties to an American intelli gence agency. Thus Gestapu and the Army counter-moves came as a surprise to American officials both in Djakarta and in 27 Washington. 27 Hughes notes that on the night of September 30, Ambassador Green went to a party of gamelan music and wayang performances given by the New Zealand minister: "There is no clue that either he or any other American officials had the slightest hint of the drama about to begin elsewhere in the capital that night." One embassy official recalled later that at a staff meeting the previous day, someone had mentioned that truckloads of young Indonesians wearing empty pistol belts had been passing his house in the morning and returning at night. As it turned out the youths were young Communists preparing for their role in the coup attempt. "At the time, the incident was dismissed as vaguely puzzling and there is no evidence that the American Embassy had any foreknowledge of what was to come." Ojo. cit., p. 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === 179 At the same time, it would be a mistake to dismiss completely contacts between the Indonesian Army and the United States. More than 1,200 Indonesian officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force had been trained in the United States under military assistance programs, including senior officers like General Yani. 28 As the result of this experi ence, numerous friendships and contacts existed between the Indonesian and American Army establishments. Other top-ranking Indonesian generals, such as Defense Minister Nasution, had friends in the United States and elsewhere in the West. At the time of President Kennedy’s death, Nasution and his wife were visiting in the United States and stayed as the official Indonesian representatives at the funeral. Denis Warner has noted, all of the generals killed in Gestapu "either had friendly relations with Westerners in 29 Djakarta or had been trained in the United States." 28 Hughes quotes Mrs. Yani as saying that her husband was particularly fond of his Fort Leavenworth ring, received during attendance at an officers’ training course in the United States. Several other Indonesian officers trained in the U.S., to whom the author has spoken, were similarly enthusiastic about their experiences in this country. Hughes, op. cit., p. 36. ^"Indonesia: The Generals Who Got Away," op. cit., p. 39. Indonesian Journalist Nono Makarim, noting the use of this criterion by the PKI in choosing its victims, calls them "nostalgic," i.e., more interested in killing those who had opposed them in the past than in liquidating those who might R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === 180 Some American officials have seen the events of September-October, 1965, as justification for the American policy of continuing to supply training and aid to the Indonesian military in spite of criticism at home and abroad that the U.S. was only strengthening Indonesia for aggression. According to a State Department source, W. Averell Harriman has conjectured that the Indonesian situa tion might have "gone the other way" had not the United States trained so many top-ranking Indonesians. And in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this colloquy ensued between Alabama's Senator John Sparkman and Secretary of Defense McNamara: SPARKMAN: At a time when Indonesia was kicking up pretty badly— when we were getting a lot of criticism for continuing military aid— at that time we could not say what that military aid was for. Is it secret any more? McNAMARA: I think in retrospect, that the aid was well justified. hurt them in the future. fatal mistake. Thus, Suharto was overlooked, a Ambassador Green says he had met only one of the generals who were later killed, Brigadier General D. I. Pandjaitan. Meeting him at a private function, Green asked his help in ridding the Surabaya consulate of the "goons" who were surrounding it. Pandjaitan called General Yani who subsequently instructed troops to clear the grounds. Interview, November 28, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 189] === SPARKMAN: McNAMARA: You think it paid dividends? 30 I do, sir. Other officials, however, believe that it is possible to overrate the importance of the U.S. military participation program as a factor in the Indonesian situation. They point out that proportionately more Indonesian Marines were trained in the United States than Army men, but the Marines were riddled with Communist sympathizers and were not con sidered a reliable anti-Gestapu force at the time of crisis. It also has been noted that Colonel Suherman, one of the leaders of the rebellion in Central Java, had only recently returned from a training course at Port Leavenworth. 31 According to this line of thinking, the Indonesian Army would have been a source of anti-Communist strength in Indonesia whether or not key officers had come to the United States. The most important figure in the Army's crushing of United States Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Assistance, 1966, Hearings on H.R. 12449, H.R. 12450, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Govern ment Printing Office, 1966) p. 693. Exchange took place on May 11, 1966. ^ C o l o n e l Nugroho said that it was not uncommon for Indonesians just back from the United States to quickly join the Communist Party. The Army historian laid this to their possibly having a "bad experience" in America. He noted that a joke in Indonesia had been: "Don't send people to the U.S.; they return Communists." Interview, September 18, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === 182 the attempted coup— Lieutenant General Suharto— not only had never trained in or visited the United States, he was virtually unknown to U.S. Embassy personnel in Djakarta, even to specialists in Indonesian military affairs. 82 Without overrating the importance of the military training programs it is possible to see two significant effects in the Indonesian situation. Had the U.S. not provided such assistance, the officers might well have been sent to other countries (for example, the Soviet bloc as a whole trained more Indonesians than did the United States) from which they might have returned with a rather different outlook. it was, some observers believed that the Indonesian Army had moved close to the U.S.S.R. as the result of its almost $1 billion in military loans and might look to Moscow for support in the post-Gestapu era. A second effect of U.S. military assistance was the contacts which had been made with the Indonesian Army. If these were not particularly useful before the attempted coup, they would become so almost immediately afterward. As we shall see, channels of commun ication were opened between the American Embassy and the 32 Gathered from interviews with Green and other U.S. Embassy personnel in Djakarta. According to one source, only one American even recalled ever seeing Suharto before. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === 183 Army command almost immediately after the Djakarta uprising; had been quelled and some measure of cooperation was possi ble. Thus it may be said as Stanley Hoffmann does that: Although American contacts with Indonesia's army...had an indirect impact on the events of 1965, the spectacular reversal of 1965 owed nothing to American intervention.33 The Bloodbath In the aftermath of the September 30th Movement's coup attempt, Indonesia erupted into one of history's worst orgies of savage violence. 34 Hundreds of thousands of Indo nesians and Chinese living in Indonesia were shot, slashed, or chopped to death for being members or sympathizers of the Communist Party. Estimates of the numbers killed have varied from the 87,000 admitted by Sukarno to a figure of one million dead which reportedly was the conclusion of 150 Indonesian ^ Gulliver1s Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New Y o r k: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1968) p. 370. 3^More detailed accounts of the bloodbath may be found in Hughes, o£. cit.; Seth S. King, "The Great Furge in Indonesia," The New York Times Magazine (May 3, 1966); Donald Kirk, "Bali Exorcises an Evil Spirit," The Reporter (December 15, 1966); Don Moser, "Haunted Face of a Red Defeat," Life (July 1, 1966) and Horace Sutton, "Indonesia's Night of Terror," The Saturday Review (February 4, 1967). For news paper accounts see Stanley Karnow in the Washington Post, April 17, 1966, and Seymour Topping, The New York Times, August 24, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === 184 university graduates who studied the slaughter on assignment from the Army.35 It is generally accepted that from 300,000 to 500,000 people died. The purge apparently began in late October and extended through the following January. Most of the killing was done by militant youth groups of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Scholars) Party, sometimes armed and trained, and almost always encouraged, by the Army. Beheading was the most common form of killing, but in some locations local Army commanders used firing squads for mass executions. Among the victims were many whose con nection with the PKI was, at best, tenuous and others died simply as a result of old grudges or "mistaken identity." It was an example of mass violence virtually unparalleled in the history of modern Asia, save perhaps for the 1947 partition of British India in which an estimated one-half million lost their lives and 12 million left their homes. It is generally agreed that the flame which touched off the explosion was the sight of the generals’ bodies being exhumed from the well in which they had been thrown by "Indonesia: One Million Dead?" The Economist (London), August 20, 1966, pp. 727-728. The breakdown figures was: 800,000 in East and Central Java, 100,000 and Sumatra, and the remainder in the other islands. of those In Bali Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 193] === 185 the plotters. Grisly photographs and written accounts were communicated to the Indonesian people by the Army using the national television and radio network, newspapers, and handbills. News of the dead, first reported on October A, sent a shudder throughout the country as the mutilations and tortures of the revolutionary heroes were seen to be "un-Indonesian" and the work of a dark and alien force within the society. Other proximate causes which have been suggested were the killing of non-Communists by cer tain desperate PKI elements determined to make a stand in mountainous areas of the Klaten-Solo-Bojoali triangle in Central Java, and the force used by Communist elements in rural areas prior to Gestapu to effect land reform. While these certainly were factors in the purge, in a deeper sense the retribution visited on the PKI had heavily religious overtones. Feeling was widespread that the crushing of the September 30 Movement had been the will of God who at last had expressed his displeasure with this dark element within Indonesian society. Now it was the responsibility of 3^The fact that the generals had been slashed by razors was seen as characteristically Chinese by many people, an idea which helped bolster the idea that a pro-Peking group was behind the murders. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 194] === the people themselves to carry out God's will and exterminate 37 t he Communi s t s. From a psychological standpoint, the underlying causes of the bloodbath have been attributed to the "amok" phenomenon which is said to be particularly prevalent among Malay peoples ("amok" is a Malay word), to the "bersiap" (violent action) mentality which some specialists have seen as characteristic of the Indonesians for certain historical reasons, and to the "anomy" which has been prevalent in emerging societies throughout the de-colonialized world. 37 An educated, cosmopilitan Indonesian diplomat who was in the United States at the time of Gestapu has told me that his first reaction to the news about the discovery of the generals was, "Kill them, [the Communists] kill them all." The strength of the reaction of an intelligent Indo nesian far from the scene indicates how strong feelings must have been among the mass in Indonesia. •^According to C.L. Sulzberger, writing from Djakarta, "This time an entire nation ran amok." The New York Times, April 13, 1966. For an exposition of the "amok" phenomenon, one which distinguishes it from other disorders, see P.M. Yap, "Unusual Forms of Mental Disorder in Different Cultures, East-West Center Today, 6:4 (July, 1966) p. 10. Yap defines "amok" as a state of morbid hostility in which aggression finds no specific target. For a discussion of the "bersiap" mentality see Justus van der Kroef's, Communism in Indonesia, p. 310. Of this state of mind, van der Kroef s a y s: "The choice of victim in such conditions of personality disorganization is often al most accidental and tends itself to a high degree of rational ization in which the factor of availability usually pre dominates." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 195] === 187 Western nations— and most particularly the United States— have been severely criticized for not having taken effective action to halt the killings, or at least to have raised voices of protest. There were a few demands for American backing of investigations into the situation by the United Mations, the International League for Human Rights, and the International Lawyer's Commission of Geneva. No such action was taken, however, and no U.S. Government official was publicly critical of the Indonesian government or the Army for the bloodshed. Calling the slaughter "a deed of appalling evil which demands universal condemnation," Dissent magazine asked: "Why has the American government been silent on this? Would it have remained silent if the slaughter had been done by Communists?" In a similar attack, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia said: The Indonesian rightist can "liquidate" hundreds of thousands of Indonesian Communists (arbitrarily classified as such, at least) without our Asian or Western censors mentioning aggression. No doubt for them it is moral "to send back to hell" those."sons of Satan" as Marxists are seen by their eyes. 0 39»siaughterhouse in Indonesia," Editorial signed "S.P.," (probably for Stanley Plastrik, editorial board member), March-April, 1966, p. 131. ^°"De-Asianed Asians," Editorial in Monthly Illustrated Review, reprinted in Congressional Record, August 1~, 1966, p. 18569. Writing in Christian Century, Carnegie D. Calian said: "The bloodbath went virtually unnoticed by the Christian West...." "Dialogue in an Age of Convergence." (May 2H, 1967) p. 683. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === 188 Another critic was the Swedish Economist Gunnar Myrdal who has suggested that had a similar number of white men been put to death in a similar way, a tremendous outrage would have been unleashed in the West. Silence on the Indonesian slaughter, he said, helps spread the feeling in Asia "that the lives of colored people by the whites are considered cheap." ill Still others have suggested that by remaining silent, both the United States and the United Nations abrogated some of their traditional responsibilities as guarantors of individual rights and thus weakened the cause of international human rights. It is wrong, however, to assume that there was no protest in America. Wisconsin's Senator Proxmire, in the Senate, implicitly accused the Indonesians of genocide, declaring that the civilized world "must react to such "The Role and Realty of Race," (A paper delivered at Convocation "Toward the Year 2018: The Challenge to American Foreign Policy," sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association, New York, May 28, 1968), mimeographed, p. 9. William Worthy, oo_. cit., p. 11, makes a similar point. Coughlin, Richard j;, "Guarantying Traditional Guarantors of Human Rights," Journal of Asian Studies (November, 1967) p. 176. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 197] === 189 senseless violence with shock and horror." For the most part, however, the physical destruction of the PKI was reported and discussed in the United States simply as a political victory for the anti-Communist cause. Thus a Time article full of details about the mass killings, called the Indonesian developments: "The West’s best news for years in Asia."^^ U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Undersecretary of State, told the Far-East Council of Commerce and Industry: The reversal of the Communist tide in the great country of Indonesia...has been an event that will probably rank along with the Vietnamese war as perhaps the most historic turning point of ^Congressional Record, May 4, 1967, P D. S6359-S6360. The Washington Post took a similar view: "That events in Indonesia constitute a severe setback to Chinese Communism will not diminish the horror with which civilized men must look upon the slaughter of thousands and thousands of Chinese men and women." Both Proxmire and the Post appar ently believed that the Chinese were the prime target for killing. Editorial, January 25, 1966. See also Post editorial February 21, 1966. Without emphasizing the Chinese killings— which do not seem to have the majority of deaths— Horace Sutton, o£. cit. called the PKI and its sympathizers "victims of a genocide not seen since the gas chambers of Buchenwald and Dachau. The dead outnumbered the toll at Hiroshima by a third, were more than all those killed on both sides in Vietnam since the fight began against the French fifteen years ago." p. 27. 44 July 15, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 198] === 190 Asia in this decade. It has been accompanied by a great loss of life and bloodshed and difficult political and economic problems remain.45 American officials defend this non-censorious approach to the Indonesian bloodbath primarily on two grounds. First, they contend that most of the killing had already occurred by 45 Speech in New York City, October 4, 1966, Department of State Press Release, (Mimeographed) p. 3. There was also a feeling in Washington that the Communists had brought down vengeance on their own heads. Thus, Rep. Zablocki said: "Without in any way condoning the slaughter, we may note that it undoubtedly resudted from deep-seated animosities which Communist arrogance and highhanded activities had engendered in the Indonesian people." Congressional Record, August 17, 1966, p • A4358. Congressman Broomfield said: n"Just how many Communists were killed is still not known. But the best estimates are between three and five hundred thousand. Nov; Indonesia... is on our side. In a few years I think it will prove to be one of our strongest allies." Congressional Record, April 26, 1967, p. A2058. Some have sought to blame Sukarno's misrule for the slaughter, among them, Guy Pauker in "Indonesia: The Year of Transition," Asian Survey VII:2 (February, 1967) p. 141. The British Ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist seemed to be thinking along similar lines when he said: "There is a tendency outside Indonesia to assume that Indonesia is pop ulated by monsters and devils; this is by no means true." Most Indonesians were very decent people, Gilchrist said, and "better elements" had been increasingly gaining control. Reuters Singapore Dispatch, Antara, April 14, 1966. Some Indonesians have sought to excuse the killings of Communist prisoners by the Army by pointing out these summary executions were motivated by fear that Sukarno would order them to let the prisoners go. Among them is Colonel Nugroho, Interview, Djakarta, September 18, 1968. When Amnesty International, an organization devoted to the aid of political prisoners worldwide, complained in July, 1966, that executions of prisoners were continuing, Adam Malik told the press that the matter was an "internal affair" and re fused to invite Red Cross inspection of prisoner facilities. Antara, Judy 11, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === 191 the time Western embassies was ta k i n g place. had been declared embassy personnel tions of various Following t he coup throughout t he country was first Indonesian newspapers came press in late first became was official that come until the that the scope Army killings country. figure command they While restored local the dence link S u h a r t o extermination. almost test s h o u l d be made and observa of t he of many the remaining press reports 87,000 the b ut the dead did same time perceived, taking steps in v a r i o u s parts the stop the the permitted elements, there was evi a policy circumstances, against scale 100,000, being law had or N a s u tio n to k n o w w i t h and dead commanders of PKI U n d e r the impossible t o be control Army liquidation the October. slaughter was the Western announcement appeared couraged first grown travel operation T he following the the of w h a t martial from the that disrupted had and was been and estimated government not central had since aware attempt, travelers known, silent. December mid-January restricted. returning slaughter active in D j a k a r t a b e c a m e systematic it w o u l d any p r e c i s i o n what. have been whom a pro- 46 F r o m E m b a s s y source in D jak arta. It is m o r e t h a n a l i t t l e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s is a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of, a n d n o t a r e a s o n for, A m e r i c a n b e h a v i o r i n the s i t u a t i o n. Much w o u l d d e p e n d o n t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === 192 Perhaps an even more pressing reason for the lack of American protest was the almost automatic decision by U.S. officials to throw their support— limited though it might be— behind the Army leadership. The objective of Ameri can policy since 1958 had, after all, been to strengthen the hand of anti-Communist elements in Indonesia. That hand was now strongly engaged in exterminating Communist influ ence from Indonesia. While the methods of the Army and its allies were not those envisaged by Washington policy makers, they were being favored by those whom the U.S. had favored. Sukarno and his adherents were attempting to make an issue of the bloodshed; for American authorities to make a similar protest would only have enhanced elements they hoped to weaken and would have weakened elements the U.S. hoped to enhance— and this without a guarantee that an American protest would save additional lives. "It would not have made any sense to criticize the Army at that point," Army stop cent r a l command was not r e s p o n s i b l e w h e n p o s s i b l e, t he k i l l i n g s. for, and tried Perhaps an effort to offset international criticism was a report from the Indonesian Army that information in the diaries of 600 PKI members had revealed a campaign to murder and mutilate tens of thousands in a large-scale terror campaign if the coup had succeeded, including American, British and other Western diplomats and their families. view of Aidit's interest in not provoking outside interven tion, this seems very unlikely and the story was never substantiated. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === 193 Ambassador cases rule and Green let chapter, the extremely that the the any, this v ie w, critical the g o on. as w e between one October of the o n ly see Indonesia. American supporting Army have und ercut in t h e those on a l l The posture certain circumstances subjects moral following no m e a n s Under silent in many a nd M a r c h w a s it w a s on top. largely s t a n d by We were shall in w h i c h emerge situation critics it d i d Criticism would period chose to "although killing Army w o u l d g e s t e d by t he Indonesia. According cerning said, con issues received sug l i t tl e, consideration. Decline and Fall of the PKI The after-effects of the abortive coup had a devastating impact on the position of the PKI in Indonesian political life. In audition to widespread killing of party ^Interview, November 8, 1968. There was a tendency on the part of some U.S. officials to dismiss criticism as naive or leftist-inspired. Yet Dr. Thomas Schelling of Harvard, to whom neither of the categories seem to apply, has said: "If we do decide that the present regime deserves to be supported, then we have to decide whether we want to give overt reward to a regime that seems to have encouraged what you have described as the slaughter of 75,000 to 100,000 people. No matter what their membership in the Communist Party, they deserved better than being executed in the streets by mobs." United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Com mittee, United States Policy Toward Asia, Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966) p. 116 (Hereafter referred to as Asia Hearings, 1966). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === 19** members, leading Indonesian communists— including Aidit— were captumed and executed. Property of the party or of its fronts was destroyed or confiscated. The once-powerful Communist organization was broken, its principal leaders killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile, and— as of March, ig66— the party was officially outlawed. Le Monde referred to it as "the most costly defeat in the history of interhO national Communism" and there has been general agreement that the Communists suffered a stunning setback. A study by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research pointed out that total Communist party membership in the nonCommunist world dropped 42 percent (from 4.5 million to 2.6 million) as a result of the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party. 49 Having briefly described how the PKI was crushed, it remains to determine why it was so easily disposed of, par ticularly in the light of American and other Western estimates of its great strength and power. Although some leftist elements have hinted that Indonesian Communism was a victim h ft Le Monde. December 30, 1965. 49 yWorld Strength of Communist Party Organizations. 1966 Edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966) pp. 69-70. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === 195 of machinations by the intelligence arms of Western powers, in particular from the United States, there is no evidence to support such a conclusion. Rather the swift collapse of the PKI under pressures from the Army and Its allies must be traced to internal weaknesses in the party itself. before — in 1926 and in 19*18 — Twice the PKI had sought to alter sharply the Indonesian political picture and had failed with disasterous results for Itself. Although each of the abortive efforts occurred in different historical circumstances, a pattern of errors in party organization and policy has emerged. Throughout its history the PKI, faced with the problem of a largely non-revolutionary population, typically has turned to a broad, free, loose organization and a mass follow ing rather than the development of an elite corps of revo lutionaries. As a result party leaders — perhaps without knowing it — were dependent upon a membership whose political orientation was limited to little more than slogans. Although this weakness was evident in 1926 and 19*18, the party's Cen tral Committee, under Aidit's leadership, declared in 1952 50other authors who r.we seen the cyc?.ical nature of the rise and fall of PKI fortunes are Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, and Ann Ruth Willner, "The Communist Phoenix and the”’!ndonesinn Garuda: Reflections on Cyclical History," World Politic s. XIX:3 (April, 1967), pp. 500-521. Van der Kroef. however, failed to foresee the 1965 debacle, believing that the Aidit leadership had over come the errors which had led to previous party defeats. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 === [PDF page 204] === 196 t h at: "Quantity Claiming that achieve during the from necessary a large order quantity higher quality, the 1950s 1960s. Khrushchev's and warning early to Aidit was PKI built that the build quality." far more a mass doing easy membership ignored strength Communist movement is judged not by numbers but by militancy. 51 Closely allied to the P K I ' s failure to distinguish between quantity and quality of support has been its inability to educate its members in Communist doctrine in sufficient numbers or to the degree where they could be considered full-fledged cadres. Haphazard ideological training char acterized the pre-1926 and pre-19^8 party and was recognized as a weakness by the Aidit leadership. Yet announced inten tions of thoroughly indoctrinating the membership appear to have been forgotten in the effort to build party numbers. In early 1965, the P K I leadership appears to have become alarmed at the low qualities of its cadres and cut down its recruiting. But by that time it was too late. - ^ D u r i n g a v i s i t to I n d o n e s i a, t h e S o v i e t p a r t y leader admonished: "Th e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y is n o t a g r o c e r y s t o r e w h e r e t he m o r e c u s t o m e r s y o u a t t r a c t, t h e m o r e s o a p, ro t t e n h e r r i n g or other s p oil ed goods you sell, the more y ou gain." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 205] === 197 A third failure of the PKI was its historic inability to impose discipline, particularly in times of crisis. Both the 1926 and 19^8 incidents had seen the PKI adversely affected by activities of adherents acting independent of 52 party discipline. Although the post-Madiun party beat its breast over this weakness, and Aidit planned an elaborate system of organization in which discipline would be a para mount objective, the effort at best was an erratic one. In the events surrounding the September 30 Movement, there may well have been a critical lapse of discipline which led to the torture and mutilation of the generals. It is diffi cult to believe that Aidit ordered the atrocities, knowing as he must have that the reaction — fail — should the coup attempt would be draconian suppression of all elements suspected of complicity in the plot. 53 A fourth common denominator of PKI attempts at a power bid has been the hasty, uncoordinated, ill-prepared nature of each effort. While the party always planned its attempts, Previous errors in enforcing discipline have been admitted by the PKI. Bintang Merah, the party's theoretical journal, has pointed out that during the 1926 uprisings and the 1 9 ^ - 1 9 ^ 8 period, principles of a Lenin-type party were not observed, particularly discipline and democratic centralism. 53 It has been suggested that somewhere down the line of PKI command what had begun as a clever plot to eliminate the opposition was twisted into a crude murder plot. Who or what was responsible has not yet been determined. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === 198 they either were sketchy improvisations or failed to take into account important contingencies. In the Gestapu affair the plans of the Special Bureau and its allies in the armed services have been described as elaborate. Yet as the situ ation developed in ways unforeseen by the conspirators, the planning apparently became lost in a welter of confusion. Another persistent problem for the Indonesian Communist Party has been its inability to rally popular support to its cause once its members have broken into open revolt. The same mass public apathy to its defeat which had doomed the PKI in 1926 and 19^8, was clearly evident in 1965. Sudjiomo, second secretary of the PKI Jogjakarta Regional Committee pronounced the verdict from his jail cell: It happened that the PKI's Revolutionary Council did not get the support of the revolutionary masses, j-ij which subsequently led to the failure of the movement. Related to its traditional inability to stir the masses to its cause in times of crisis, was the PKI's psychological dependence upon outside assistance during such periods. both 1926 and 19*18 there were indications that many Indonesian Communists expected their comrades in Marxism from the U.S.S.R. •^Indonesian Herald, November 25, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 207] === 199 to intervene in the situation as "dea ex machina" and win the day for them. In 1965, the PKI apparently looked to China for aid in the wake of Gestapu, but to no avail. (See Chapter VII) Merely describing these patterns, however, does not explain why they should have occurred. The 1 9 ^ - 1 9 ^ 8 PKI leadership might reasonably have profited by the experience of 1926. Further, it is evident that Aidit and his lieu tenants recognized many of the mistakes which the Communists had made in the past. Yet, in the final accounting, they were found wanting in many of the same ways. The answer to the PKI's failures may be found in its success. The party has had no problem attracting members and sympathizers, and its appeals to local grievances and nationa listic feelings have resulted in the enlistment of millions of adherents. In a sense the PKI leaders have shown them selves to be astute "ward" politicians. The party interceded with officials, gave employment, provided food, and per formed countless social services which earned the appreciation of common people. Because its dominant strategy required these political proprieties, it was not able to concentrate on developing a "hard core" membership, carefully trained in R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === 200 techniques cally subversion, devoted t he t o the indispensable While excellently disciplined, Communist cause which, basis times for party leadership created a practical political tionary movement, a change appears indicating found w i thi n the that preference fo r decisions, but types s h i p s. There and seek sial f in d issues. carries all almost requirements relationships, philosophy, organization, tempt for those curred deep may well a revolu PKI p r o b l e m s character. social effect may well Indonesians not only and political middle creating issues. operates ground doctrine, it h a d in rea chin g relation leaders on c o n t r o v e r on the conflict, have o t h e r hand, exacerbating Basically a Western political effi unquestioning discipline, and utter con particularly other persuasions. among their efficient, that decision, t o be aims of p o w e r. a clear-cut purposefulness. its key Communist resentments have been not Lenin, their ou t the compromise, polarizing cient recognized fanati a compulsion within political for Communism take-over to have bee n powerless a satisfactory Classic according organization, Indonesian a cultural eventual and Indonesians seriousness, The What PKI's against the Communists their dedication, desire (not organized, mobilized, a nd al l p o s i t i v e features o f th e always ruthless a nd realized) in car ryi ng Communist Party R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === 201 model — ran head on into the deep cultural preferences of the Indonesian people. 55 This then is the central dilemma which the PKI histori cally has faced: When it has concentrated on building a practical political organization it has found acceptance among the Indonesians, but at the cost of its revolutionary spirit and potential for the seizure of power. Yet when the Party has attempted to be a militant, conspiratorial force in Indonesia, it has encountered massive resistence from the people and eventual destruction. It may be that this problem troubled Aidit and his associates very deeply beneath their outwardly confident stance, and was the underlying reason that the strategy for September 30 Movement was chosen. The benefits of their practical political and organization skills were tangible and consoling. But their Marxist creed required them to es chew practicality and popularity to achieve power — ultimate prize. the In this situation, the Gestapu conspiracy 55 -'-'Soedjatmoko, Indonesian scholar and ambassador to the United States, has said, speaking of the PKI: "You cannot gain power in Indonesia by throwing your weight around too long." He suggested that such a course unleashes other forces of great strength. "As the PKI found out." Statement at meeting of Southeast Asian Development Group (SEADAG), Asia House, New York City, June 20, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === 202 offered a convenient middle way. If successful, it would neither involve the PKI in an outright revolution, nor would it be simply waiting for Indonesia to drop like a ripe 56 fruit into their hands. Vietnam and Indonesia If the reversals suffered by the PKI were the result of indigenous forces at work in Indonesian society, what then of frequently-heard assertions that American involvement in the Vietnam conflict had a direct effect on post-September 30th events in Indonesia? It was largely in self-justification that many propo nents of American involvement in Vietnam claimed that the Communist reversal in Indonesia was an unforeseen but welcome side effect of the U.S. military build-up on the Indochina Peninsula. The Vietnam war was becoming progressively larger and more expensive, both in terms of money and men. Moreover, the Increasing commitment of American troops to fight a war which the President had only recently said was for the South ^ D u r i n g his interview with Aidit, Njoto,and Lukman in early 1965, Neil Sheehan, oja. cit., asked the PKI leaders directly how they reconciled their publicly-proclaimed gradualist policy with traditional Marxist doctrine that at some point a Communist Party must attempt to seize power. Aidit and Njoto avoided answering and Lukman said simply, "It cannot be calculated." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === 203 Vietnamese themselves to win had significantly intensified domestic criticism of the Administration's policy in South east Asia. Now the American people were being told again and again through the news media that: As our war in Asia gets bigger a largely unnoticed victory over the Communists has been decisively won in Southeast Asia. In fact, it is the single biggest defeat ever handed the Communists anywhere in the world and it was won without a single American soldier, American dollar or bomb. ' Unwilling to accept the implications in such a view of the Indonesian situation, and eager to present the American public with some tangible evidence of progress against the Communists, the White House began to declare favorable developments in Indonesia as a dividend on its policy of a strong military posture in Vietnam. The President and other top Administra tion officials told friendly newsmen, on a non-attribution basis, that America's resistance in Vietnam had demonstrably shored up the anti-Communist forces in Indonesia and allowed the crushing of the Communists, the moderating of government ^NBC News, "Indonesia: The Troubled Victory," The Battle for Asia, Part II I. Telecast nationwide February 19, 1967, (Transcript) p. 1. Produced and directed by Ted Yates, well-known producer of documentaries, the program was given considerable advance publicity by the network, using the theme above. In a similar vein, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. noted that: "The two heaviest blows recently suffered by Peking — the destruction of the Communist Party in Indonesia and the declaration of independence by North Korea — took place without benefit of American patronage or rhetoric." The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 19^1-1966 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 196?) pi T5~- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === 204 policies, and the decline of Chinese influence in the archi58 pelago. "In equally undeniable truth," American weakness in Vietnam would have subverted the anti-Communist counter revolution, it was contended. "You cannot tell me," said President Johnson at a Democratic fund-raising dinner in Des Moines, "that those who live in freedom in Indonesia have not been encouraged by our commitment and our determination in Vietnam. In ensuing months the link between America's Vietnam commitment and events in Indonesia was emphasized by such friends and associates of the President as Edward Clark, U.S. Ambassador to Australia and a Texan; Adolph Berle, New York lawyer and former Roosevelt Administration official; and Hobart Taylor Jr., a director of the Export-Import Bank and 58 In the words of William S. White, The Washington P o s t. October 18, 1966. Columnist White, known to be close to the President and to reflect his thinking on many issues, also said that "...Historic events in Indonesia would not have been possible had not the United States persisted through three presidential administrations in its pledge not to let the cornerstone of Southeast Asia fall into Communist aggression in Vietnam." For other reflections of this view see Earl W. Foell, Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 1966; "A Success for the United States: The Story in Non-Communist Asia," and "The Turning Point Has Come," written by William Randolph Hearst Jr. and published in the Hearst newspapers January 15, 1967. -^June 3 0, 1966. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 11:26 (July 4, 196b) p. B75. ItT Ts" a sidelight that Indian officials were contending about the same time that it was the strains caused by the Sukarno regime's sup port for Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war which tipped the balance against the leftist forces. See Sharokh Sabavala, Christian Science Monitor, October 4, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 213] === 205 former White th e counsel.^ P r e s i d e n t ’s s u p p o r t e r s Indonesian almost situation daily in that House attacks body. behind the Senator Henry cautious ticut Democrat, seized upon Senate the Asian policies Ind o n e s i a would know and this on V i e t n a m States a counter-argument Jackson, more United Chinese A m e r i c a ’s p r e s e n c e In t h e a fac t Bamboo strong that Curtain stand Democrat approach, against the prominent it w e r e not "doves" today for in V i e t n a m, " declared of W a s h i n g t o n. ^ Somewhat Senator Thomas Dodd, Connec contended: I do n o t t h i n k it is t o o m u c h t o c l a i m t h a t o u r r e s i s t e n c e i n V i e t n a m p l a y e d a r o l e in e n c o u r a g i n g at l e a s t s o m e of th e l o y a l i s t o f f i c e r s to s t a n d up a g a i n s t the C o m m u n i s t t h r e a t. A nd, in t h i s s e n s e, it p r o b a b l y m a d e the m a r g i n a l d i f f e r e n c e n e c e s s a r y to w r e s t v i c t o r y f r o m w h a t b r i e f l y a p p e a r e d to be t o t a l d e f e a t. 52 60 Clark, Address before a.joint session of the Texas Legislature, Austin, Texas, March 22, 1967. Reprinted Congres sional Record, April 3, 1967, p. SAAAO; Berle, Signed editorial in the New York Times, January lA, 1967; Taylor, Interview with Vera Glaser, Chattanooga Times. April 28, 1967. Reprinted in Congressional Record, April 28, 1967, p. A2096. ^ Congressional Record, February 2A, 1967, p. S258A. ^ Congressional Record. December 8, 1967, P. S18168. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, Iowa Republican, said similarly: "I think there is a very persuasive school of thought that argues quite well that the Indonesian people would not have had the courage and the strength and the stimulation to stand up to that situation and throw Sukarno out if they had not felt that, well, after all, the United States was sympathetic to them, and was standing fast in Vietnam, and other places, and the British were at Borneo." U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Asia, the Pacific and the United States. Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session TLinotype proof) p. 19. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 214] === 206 This opinion encouraged United States a White House Minister on t h e p a r t statements in the from struggde. luncheon Harold of s o - c a l l e d Holt on J u n e Asian Vietnam leaders "hawks," was allied with exchange the of t o a s t s 29, 1966, A u s t r a l i a n P r i m e said: Do you believe, does anyone believe, that we would have had this hopeful emergence of favor able developments in Indonesia if it had not been for the fact that you were sticking on in South Vietnam, that it had become clear to the whole of Asia that the resolution was there...?°3 Another was President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines who had supported the dispatch of Filipino engineering battalions to Vietnam over considerable domestic opposition. "It was only the American presence In Vietnam, I feel, which pre vented the fall of the Indonesian government into Communist hands," Marcos tol^ Columnist Roscoe Drummond during a visit to the United States in September 1966. The Philippine Pres ident declared that the Communists had planned the coup long ago upon the assumption that the Chinese People's Republic would be able to send aid, but whdn the U.S. Increased its commitment to Vietnam "leaders who were wavering" deserted the movement and the Chinese were both unwilling and unable to send help. But by then, according to Marcos, the PKI had begun the initial moves of their operation and it was too late ^ Department of State Bulletin (July 25, 1966) p. 136. Sir Robert Menzies, Holt's predecessor, shared this view. Interviewed in New York, he said: "Admittedly, the Communist coup in Indonesia failed only because of free world resistence in Vietnam." Quoted in America, February 4, 1967, p. 170. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === 207 for t h e m to p u l l Thanat Khoman forces rose they could the t he Gestapu order "hawks" officials, sure sought the send obtain L os Angeles Mayor Sam that succeeded. Malik Yorty had Communist told position Minister in v i e w a group sustain the milit ary agreed on t h i s posiquestion, from top Adam Malik. example, announced readily not, because 65 confirmation For anti-Communist "volunteers" examining their Minister of Com mun ism reportedly including Foreign they F a r Ea st. fortify The China would and pu blishers thought resistence that Thanat two program Indonesia in V i e t n a m, forces, the some fairly editors T h a i l a n d ’s F o r e i g n similar position. and pu r g e d action American tion took a back, Indonesian least world-traveling on a n a t i o n a l television with American aggression against h i m that So u t h V i e t n a m was "And very few people know this," said Marcos, but "that is exactly what happened." Reprinted in the Congressional Record, September 20, 1966, pp. A4866-A4867. From facts which have come to light about the September 30th Movement, it would appear that Marcos’ explanation is at best a faulty hypothesis. He, like Johnson, was under pressure at home to show some good effects of participation in Vietnam. Later, in a speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress Marcos put forward a somewhat watered-down version. He said he "personally knew for a fact" that U.S. presence In Vietnam had given encouragement to anti-Communists in Indonesia, although "unintentionally." He said U.S. power had rendered inoperative the Peking-Djakarta axis which the PKI might otherwise have invoked. Department of State Bulletin (October 10, 1966) p. 5**2. 6S Quoted by A. Monroe Courtright, publisher of the Westerville (Ohio) Public Opinion. Reprinted in the Congressional Record, July 10, 1967, p. H8399. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === 208 a major factor In the successful resistence to the attempted coup in Indonesia.^ Columnist Joseph Alsop came away from an afternoon's talk with Malik in Bangkok believing that there had been two "underlying assumptions": Indonesia's Com munists would have won In the end somehow if the U.S. had abandoned Vietnam, and Indonesia's future was still dependent in great measure on a successful outcome in Vietnam. Yorty and Alsop apparently were victims of their own enthu siasm and the traditional Indonesia reluctance to disagree with the strongly held views of another. For their versions of Malik's position are sharply at variance with the Indone sian foreign minister's many statements opposing the American involvement in Vietnam. They are at variance as well with the general unwillingness of Indonesians in leadership posi tions to assent to the idea that there was any connection whatsoever between what happened in their country and the war in Vietnam. In reply to direct questions on the subject, Yorty made the statement on the NBC Tonight Show, February 27, 1967. In a subsequent letter to the author, the mayor said his conversation with Malik took place at the latter's home in Djakarta on the evening of Tuesday, February 21, 1967. The Washington Post, September 9, 1966. fc\ft For example, on May 5, 1966, Malik told his Parliament: "Indonesia intends to smooth relations (with the United States) ....But the Indonesian Government is still firmly of the opinion that it supports the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. military intervention.... Indonesia maintains her demand that the U.S. withdraw its military forces from Vietnam, and leave the settlement of the Vietnamese problem to the Vietnamese people themselves." Berita Yudha, May 6, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === 209 Indonesian authorities will most often point out that the generals who were responsible for thwarting the coup attempt were fighting for their very lives. This gave them little time for contemplating the strategic comforts of having Americans in Vietnam, hundreds of miles away. The problems of Indonesia were indigenous, they say with nationalistic pride, and indigenous forces solved them. 69 Despite the attitudes of the President and other Washington officials, U.S. Embassy personnel serving in Indo nesia during the coup period agree with the Indonesians and see no real connection between events in the two countries. According to one U.S. diplomat, "We have been extremely cau tious about putting forward the Vietnam posture as having had an impact on what happened in Indonesia." Theories about a linkage, he said, were rationalized after the fact. 70 Ambassa dor Green also has denied any direct connection or that the Indonesian military somehow had more confidence when they set about to destroy the September 30th Movement because of the U.S. ^ T h i s observation is the direct result of a number of interviews of high-ranking Indonesians, both in Djakarta and Washington. This same attitude was found by Newsman Crosby Noyes, The Washington Star, February 11, 1967 (He found some who said the destruction of Communism in Indonesia might have happened sooner if South Vietnam had fallen under Communist domination). 70 Lydman, Interview, September 8, 1968, Djakarta. Murray Marder of the Washington Post similarly found U.S. dip lomats in Djakarta.discounting any causal links between Vietnam and Indonesia. See his dispatch from Indonesia, reprinted The Milwaukee Journal, October 30, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 218] === 210 presence has in Viet na m. been less The been reticence shared by of S t a t e Philip Rusk, Johnson top times on t h a t poi nt. of t h o s e levels Far East in the past, actually o f th e Secretary Habib— a principal however, Indonesia on a n u m b e r however, this State on the advocate of occa sions. assumption and and White House made a convincing chain has Secretary Bundy's apologist claimed for U.S. not deputy, for the Communism's presence in V i e t - 72 came the scene Department. Bundy, a dividend Green 71 A dm i n i s t r a t i o n V i e t n a m p o l i c y — have reversal nam precise to be increasingly a determined circumstances effort challenged linking Vietnam construct and Indonesia. 71 I n t e r v i e w, N o v e m b e r 28, 1968, W a s h i n g t o n D.C. Green s o m e w h a t r u e f u l l y a d m i t t e d t h a t he m ay, in s o m e w a y, be p a r tially re spo nsib le for President Johnson's fixation. The P r e s i d e n t at th e en d o f a W h i t e H o u s e f u n c t i o n c a s u a l l y a s k e d h i m if t h er e wer e any conn ecti on. VJith no t i m e to e x p l a i n or q u a l i f y hi s a n s w e r, G r e e n s a i d " G e n e r a l l y, y e s. " T o d a y he w o u l d a d d " v e r y g e n e r a l l y. " S o m e U.S. c o n g r e s s m e n a l s o c l a i m to h a v e b e e n t o l d by G r e e n in a b r i e f i n g t h a t the U.S. f o r c e s in V i e t n a m w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e for event s in Indo nesi a. See C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d, M a r c h 27, 1968, p. K2307. Habib ^ T h e a u t h o r w a s p r e s e n t at tw o b r i e f i n g s d u r i n g w h i c h m a d e s u c h an a s s e r t i o n. F o r a t h i r d o c c a s i o n, s e e be l o w. ‘- F o r e x a m p l e, se e the d e b a t e o n t h e q u e s t i o n b e t w e e n Senator H a rtke of Indiana, a Senate "dove" and Senator Jackson o n t h e S e n a t e F l o o r, F e b r u a r y 24, 1967. Congress ion al Record pp. S2584-S2587. Also a r e j o i n d e r to S e n a t o r J a c k s o n by S e n a t o r C l a r k of P e n n s y l v a n i a, F e b r u a r y 27, 1967. Congressional R e c o r d, p. S2662. T h e s e s e n a t o r s a c c e p t e d the I n d o n e s i a n pos i t i o n t h a t th e g e n e r a l s w e r e t o o b u s y f i g h t i n g fo r t h e i r l i v e s t o w o r r y a b o u t t h e U.S. in V i e t n a m. A nd H a r t k e i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a d d i s c u s s e d t h e m a t t e r w i t h M a l i k h i m s e l f. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === 211 By h is own Thomson, account, a later s ai d: (I t r i e d tion an Bast article "The White Thomson could not theirs. Herman difficulty") cause o f U.S. Movement Indonesia succeeded, least stood firm .1o i n i n g White House V i e t n a m policy, months Thomson f alse. careful confess staff. investigafailure,)" a credible theory others offered conceived a scenario (although he admitted t he Saigon to r ein f o r c e a renewed balance on the is u n d o u b t e d l y had to in w h i c h with six to.Tames with failure settle a nd come up choice allegation House on M a l a y s i a. tried assigned of U. S. during Dressures was soecialist critical Kahn "with task Asia Indonesian to p r o v e the the a result, civil wa r Sukarno. and regime collapsed cutting new Malaysia, acouiescence ^his, an eouiv ale nt seouence, of t he "with Indonesia either China ally." in V i e t n a m, none a firm of this Communist facing the Indonesia, turned September t he turning Communist Because occurred. the 75 ^ " H o w C o u l d V i e t n a m H a p p e n, " T h e At 1 a n t i c ( Ap r i l, 1 968 ) R e p r i n t e d i n t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d " JTpril lb, 196 8, p. S*J239. A n i n t e r e s t i n g e n c o u n t e r b e t w e e n T h o m s o n a n d H a b i b o c c u r r e d at at t h e 2 0 t h A n n u a l M e e t i n g of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of A s i a n S t u d i e s i n P h i l a d e l p h i a in l a te M a r c h, 1968. H a b i b g a v e t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t v e r s i o n o f the V i e t n a m s i t u a t i o n, m e n t i o n i n g the " I n d o n e s i a n div idend" along the way. During the question o e r i o d, T h o m s o n c h a l l e n g e d h i m on t h e o o i n t f r o m t he f l o o r, p o i n t i n g out h i s o w n i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e s e a r c h f o r a lin k. ^"Under ^ire," Book Week (April 30, 1 96 7) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === 212 Yet another theory, apparently popular within defense intelli gence circles, was that the American build-up in Vietnam during the spring and summer of 1965 was the trigger which forced the PKI, possibly on orders from China but certainly with its approval, to step up the schedule for the coup. The coup failed primarily, according to this conception, because it was too hastily planned and coordinated. By forcing this haste, therefore, the American intervention in Vietnam had helped bring about the coup's collapse. Like Marcos' 76 explanation, both the Kahn scenario and the "PKI trigger" theory have serious difficulties. Kahn's Rube Goldberg-like chain of events completely ignores the time element which was so important in the Indonesian situation. It was evident to many in Indonesia that events had been build ing to a climax from the previous summer, as the result of anxiety on all sides about the health of the President. is almost inconceivable that— assuming an American withdrawal in February, 1965— Vietnamese (or perhaps Chinese) Communists could have consolidated their gains in the South sufficiently early to have been able to affect the Indonesian situation "^Robert Shaplen proposes this in "The Coup That Failed," The New York Times Book Review (September 10, 1965) p. 3. The author has heard a similar theory from military intelligence specialists. William Bundy has seemed to hint at this interpretation of events in a February 16, 1968, speech to the Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, when he talked of Aidit and the PKI having "need to force their luck" because of the landing of U.S. troops in Vietnam. State Department release (Mimeographed) p. 18. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === 213 through Malaysia, or by any means. The idea that the U.S. Vietnam build-up panicked the Indonesian Communists into rash acts is similarly improbable. Although Aidit did hurry back from Peking in August and began concrete planning for the coup, the events which provoked his haste were reports of Sukarno’s failing health, not the Americanization of the 77 Vietnam war. While China nay have been concerned about the strategic balance in Southeast Asia and perhaps pressed Aidit to move soon, the Indonesian party leader obviously was much more concerned about hostile Indonesian divisions at homt than very busy American troops in Vietnam. Further, as Bernard Fall pointed out in one of his last articles before his death, the Indonesian coup broke out at a time when there were two weak American divisions in Vietnam, "and there was not yet a certitude of their survival, let alone a build-up." Rather than accept one of these infirm theories, the Johnson Administration ultimately fell back on the "shield" concept; that is the idea that because of America's stand in Vietnam peoples elsewhere in Asia had taken new heart and that a great many changes favorable to the United States "were taking shape behind our defense of South Vietnam." 79 In this ^ S e e Fic, o£. cit., pp. 23-24. ^®"The American Commitment in Vietnam," The Saturday Review (February 4, 1967) P« 40. In typical Fall fashion, he termed those who believed that the anti-Communist upsurge in Indonesia was the result of American "success" in Vietnam "naive souls." ^ S p e e c h of President Johnson, July 12, 1966. Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1966, pp. 160-161 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 222] === 214 configuration, Indonesian developments became one in a list of events which the White House and State Department could take comfort in, despite the general lack of progress in the Vietnam War. 80 The concept was general enough to be embraced by those not brash enough to assert a direct link between the American presence in Vietnam and the crushing of Gestapu. Thus, Dean Rusk could say, during a major address before the National Industrial Conference Board: We have a vast stake in the security and progress of the free nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific. The protective shield we are helping to provide for those countries is already yielding important results. Prom Australia on the South to Korea and Japan on the North, the free nations of that area are moving forward with renewed confidence. Indonesia, potentially a very rich country, has turned away from adventurism and is coming to grips with its economic and social problems. ^ fin Among other such developments credited to the American "shield" by the President were Japanese-Korean mutual cooperation treaty, the quickening of economic growth rates in Asia, the end of the Indo-Pak War, increased Japanese efforts to assist in developing Southeast Asia..Ibid. In time other encouraging signs would be added to the list including increasing regional cooperation in Asia, lessening of regional tensions, increased interest in security on the part of Asian leaders. For a point by point refutation of cause-effect relationships see George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: A Delta Book, 1967) pp. 306ff. ®^New York City, September 21, 1966. State Department release (Mimeographed). In an earlier speech Rusk claimed: "The fact is that, behind the shield which the United States is helping to provide, the free nations of the Western Pacific are moving ahead economically and socially....Indonesia has turned an im portant corner, although it still faces difficult problems." The vagueness and ambiguity of the "shield" concept re sulted in a small diplomatic flap following President Johnson's 1968 State of the Union address in which he mentioned the shield and numbered Indonesia as among the nations behind it. The reference startled Indonesian diplomats into making inquiries about whether their country had been given some new defense guarantee by the U.S., of which they were unaware. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === 215 The most sophisticated version of the shield concept came from Far East Secretary Bundy. While granting a para mount position to "the work of heroic and dedicated nonCommunists" in turning events in Indonesia, Bundy asserted that if the U.S. had not stood firm in Vietnam in 1965 and prevented a North Vietnamese takeover of the country: ...Aidit and company would not have needed to force their luck and the morale of the non-Communists would not have been equal to the very tight struggle for power that ensued for the next six months. Hence, it is the widely accepted judgment in the area— which I share— that the dramatic change in Indonesia would have been far less likely, if not impossible, without the stand that we and others took in Viet-Nam. The American shield, the Secretary asserted, provided a climate of security and confidence as a backdrop for events in Indonesia. The shield concept, as it was described by Johnson Administration officials, actually has little relevance to Address to a foreign policy conference in Miami, Florida, on January 16, 1968. It is interesting to note that virtually the same ideas were expressed in a speech by Bundy to the Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, February 16, 1968, but the assertion about the morale of the nonCommunist forces not being equal to the six-month struggle without the U.S. in Vietnam was qualified with a "probably". State Department Releases (Mimeographed). Earlier, Bundy had seemed to handle this same theme more gingerly. During a January, 1967, address to the Common wealth Club of California at San Francisco, Bundy declared that the U.S. stand in Vietnam had bought time for the rest of Southeast Asia. Among the constructive trends which he noticed occurring behind the American "security shield" was the change in Indonesia. The Assistant Secretary fell considerably short of stating a positive cause-effect relationship, when, at the end of his remarks, he noted only that: "Without what we have done in Vietnam I doubt very much if a considerable number of the favorable developments I have spoken of would have occurred." January 20, 1967. Department of State Press Release. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 224] === 216 the Indonesian situation. early 1949 w h e n the For Indonesia has been shielded United States embarked "forward" policy in Asia and sent the Seventh Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Force to the Western Pacific. The only country from which Indonesia could logically desire shielding is the People's Republic of China. Yet, as John Roche has pointed out, "The Chinese can't walk on water." 83 At the same time, neither Peking's navy nor its air force is strong enough to attempt an invasion of Indonesia, particularly when it might reasonably expect interdiction by elements of the Seventh Fleet, acting either unilaterally for the United States or under United Nations auspices. In their strategic planning, Indonesia's military commanders for a long time have counted on assistance from American air and sea oower should the Chinese attempt a foray across the South China Sea. 84 In that regard, American assistance to India when it was attacked over the Himalayas by Communist China— assistance given despite the lack of a mutual defense treaty— has not gone unnoticed in Djakarta. Because of an American presence in the Western Pacific, therefore, the Indonesian generals were free to deal "Containing China: Commentary, o p. clt. p. 26. A Roundtable Discussion," 84 The Seventh Fleet as a factor in Indonesian military planning was mentioned several times by members of the Army general staff during Interviews in Djakarta. It is clear Indonesians regard it— and the commitment it implies— as their ultimate line of defense against attack from Mainland China, remote as that possibility might be at present. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 225] === 217 with the Communists at home without looking over their shoulders at the Chinese reaction. To this basic confidence in their security from attack— the result of 19^9 American action— the 1965 U.S. build-up in Vietnam added nothing. In fact, because Vietnam combat engaged the attention of much of the fleet from 1965 on, it theoretically at least was 85 less available to guard the shores of Indonesia. In the final analysis then, the thwarting of the Sep tember 30 Movement and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party were essentially the results of of indigenous political dynamics, unabetted and uncomplicated by the inter vention of outside forces. This explanation may not satisfy those who must see the fine hand of the Central Intelligence Agency behind all reversals In Communist fortunes. Nor will it convince those whose commitment obliges them to see "dividends" from America's Vietnam policy in every seemingly ^Approaching this idea from another angle, Guy Pauker has suggested that if the U.S. had decided that Asia was in the Chinese sphere of influence in 19^9 and had pulled back its forces to Hawaii, the Indonesian generals, facing an Asian land mass dominated by Communists, might long before Gestapu have made their peace with PKI out of a feeling of abandonment. "But our presence in Asia made it clear that Communism can be resisted, that they were not left alone. Consequently, they were able to stick to their convictions and found themselves on a collision course with the Communist Party which was bound to lead sooner or later to a clash." United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, The Future United States Role in Asia and the Pacific, Hearings of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968) pp. 279-280. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 226] === 218 constructive advantages development over as k n o w n a n d squarely t o be) the o n th e rightful price U nder the to a n e s i a was Chinese trous o n al l drawing its in r e v e r s e. " venient the Indonesia orbit, the outcome the fo r U.S. to b e result people, the United longer was fo r Indonesian Sukarno military. allowed th e and the facts happened they want or— considering shame. American con Indo intervention had been slipping its well into the have been agencies in e f f e c t, PKI, or a n disas an d w i t h "intervened American presence A policy Indonesian th e clear States, th e tw o interests might closing down (where to t h e i r If A m e r i c a n seemed principal true for w hat in b l o o d — possibly favorable it h a s in h i s t o r y s i de s. target effectively themselves circumstances, Communist But credit do nothing. attempted when 86 responsibility Indonesians to their tribution Asi a. other theories: it p l a c e s terrible a con embarrassment of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n crisis to w o r k itself out. ® ^ A m o n g t h o s e w h o h a v e e m b r a c e d th e " s h i e l d " c o n c e p t vis a vis I n d o n e s i a is R i c h a r d N i x o n. In an a r t i c l e for F o r e i g n A f f a i r s w r i t t e n b e f o r e h i s e l e c t i o n, N i x o n s ai d: "T he U. S. p r e s e n c e....was a v i t a l f a c t o r i n t h e t u r n a r o u n d in I n d o n e s i a, w h e r e a t e n d e n c y t o w a r d f a t a l i s m is a n a t i o n a l i s t i c characteristic. It p r o v i d e d a s h i e l d b e h i n d w h i c h t h e a n t i c o m m u n i s t f o r c e s f o u n d the c o u r a g e a n d c a p a c i t y t o s t a g e t h e i r c o u n t e r - c o u p and, at t h e f i n a l m o m e n t, t o r e s c u e t h e i r c o u n t r y f r o m the C h i n e s e o r b i t. " " A s i a A f t e r V i e t n a m, " 4 6: 1 ( O c t o b e r, 1967) P. 111. ^ T h e phrase is Richard Strout's as "T.R.B." in the New Republic (March 26, 1966) p. 6. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 227] === 219 Although, that as J o h n H u g h e s American policy-makers of p r e - G e s t a p u rational Indonesia, assumptions alternatives. To the given: the the if n o t credit there was do u nde r the the p o l i c y spoiled little and else circumstances adopted spirited debate responsible, for having having was a lengthy officials credit f o r not 8 8 0 d. c i t., p. 88 out, could following l ea s t pointed shaped credit events, must the m. 290. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 228] === CHAPTER TV THE GOING OF THE OLD ORDER The Wayang traditionally kulit, the puppet divided into three lasting from nine duction; deals with until, over the four see of a l l the power chapter, affairs, of i n t e n s e the A r my, and that first serves wayang 1967, between the from final toward which there those events is t h e drama unfold, whose they solution good overused a strong temp Sukarno's The surrounding the on this present subject two t e r ms. characters t he an intro is a s o m e w h a t an i n t r o d u c t i o n t he Indonesian section, p.m. to t wo a. m., from Gestapu until provided Briefly, t he of Java, the section, Indonesia, span personages t he the dealing with the a conclusion. third presents in March, denouement watching c as e: time struggle the the inside has a struggle Finally, t he Recognizing for events Gestapu from ele ven perhaps, previous t he section, and t a t i o n to Before eleven p.m., plot; evil. stage, second p a rt s: until the analogy l os s shadow theater the period national c h a p t e r is directed. C h a p t e r F i ve. is n e c e s s a r y interaction moves a re and Sukarno scrutinize this story the Sukarnoists, students. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === 221 Sukarno: 11U n f o r g e t t a b l e Even shifts his fierce det ract ors Bun,1?; K a r n o: manipulate Character" his resiliency i n the talent imparting a sense polyethnic country. a man for rich sympathies and character," has ideas and written. own adversity and, antipathies; one of a l l, unity short, of h i s his h is to a d i f f u s e, recollection and ability purposes, most of n a t i o n a l personal the mani fol d oratory,'*' his political imagination A d a m Gallic, admit spellbinding o t h e r m e n t o h is fa ce must of h i m direct in b o t h his an un for gettable most outspoken adversaries Sukarno, wa s born baya. and and in h i s open Dutch l ik e June 1901, the age the who protege out for t he fifteen, prisons Indonesian collaboration East Indonesians has Indies. with the one n am e, Sura city nationalist w as for years, ardent Japanese as t h e early Sukarno independence, Recognized only eastern Javanese of T j o k r o a m i n o t o, a p r o m i n e n t of D u t c h fight many even nationalist. never wavered r e s o r t i n g to when they overran the paramount nationalist ^Donald Kirk has written that even thouge he could not understand Indonesian he believtd Sukarno "was still the best speaker I have ever seen or heard." "Here Lies Bung Karno," The New Leader (April 10, 1967) p. 9. ^"Promise in Indonesia," Foreign Affairs 46:2 (January, 1968) p. 292. ^.Many W e s t e r n p u b l i c a t i o n s a n d w r i t e r s p e r s i s t i n p r o v i d i n g Su karn o with the given name "Achmed." It is an e r r o r w h i c h has i r r i t a t e d him. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === 222 leader, August was 17, principles President Sukarno who o f th e the declared proclaimed Indonesian Republic. once and of p a r l i a m e n t a r y era Restless down system and the a symbolic image Revolution independence and and President Basically organization, manuever o n hi s the he was a man among the that Indonesian to be the a,j e l l y l i k e became his backbone country power over people." a ’w e a k l i n g the depended other he w i s h e d with Supreme without hold Dutch had began however, named own Leader first largely achieved Indonesia. Sukarno hi s th e been five helped bring "Guided Democracy" the Indonesian f o r L i f e. 4* Sukarno charismatic declared the government replaced of h i m s e l f and was position became from leader, independence " p a n t j a s i l a, " the state; This ceremonial the Indonesian t he support a political fo r h i s p o w e r o n his centers in t he to r e a d, If t o n g u e, then Indonesia. a result people with "Bung Indonesia imperialism, small and once Karno, a l s o — to his had party ability society I n d o n e s i a n masses. epitaph tongue mind— become he believed: heart. V o r an a c c o u n t of S u k a r n o ' s e a r l y y e a r s, h i s A u t o b i og rap hy prov ide s a b s o r b i n g and e n l i g h t e n i n g reading. Few n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n so c a n d i d in t h e i r m e m o i r s as S u k a r n o is a b o q t c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of h i s life. A n a c c o u n t of S u k a r n o ' s r o l e in t h e d e m i s e of t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y s y s t e m c a n be found in Fei t h ' s The D e c l i n e of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D e m o c r a c y in I n d o n e s i a. 5 A u t o b i o g r a p h y, p. 33 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === 223 I n d o n e s i a he national of t he sought purpose. impart Shaping this on-going revolution, militancy effort and around he d e c l a r e d strength the himself mystique among those: ... Wh o a r e b o u n d in s p i r i t u a l l o n g i n g by the R o m a n t i c i s m of R e v o l u t i o n. I am inspired by it, I a m f a s c i n a t e d by it, I a m c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d by it, I a m c r a z e d, I a m o b s e s s e d by the R o m a n t i c i s m o f R e v o l u t i o n. 6 Bu t t he meters Indonesian o f h is President's own archipelago. damn world a n e w, " 7 he declared. little ment vision a new world interest In t he went are beyond going difficult or i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n. Following of M a n k i n d " Indonesia would conventional process g r o w t h...unfamiliar to w o r l d. A r o u n d a dazzling galaxy Manipol-Usdek, progress h is ideology revolution, acronyms and slogans, Necolim, Resopim and of the by a t he had develop course "Revolution Sukarno of ec onomic in t h e this the w o r l d objectives, tasks para to change o f h a p p i n e s s — to b u i l d rea c h i n g his th e "nonoutside Sukarno assembled among them Nasacom, B e r d i k a r i. 9 His terminology T o w a r d F r e e d o m a n d th e D i g n i t y o f M a n ( D j a k a r t a: I n d o n e s i a n D e p a r t m e n t of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s, 1961) p. 33. T h i s is a c o l l e c t i o n of f i v e of S u k a r n o ' s m a j o r s p e e c h e s. 7 I b i d.. pp. 1 2 9 - 1 30. R e f l e c t i o n s U p o n t he I n d o n e s i a n R e v o l u t i o n ( W a s h i n g t o n: I n f o r m a t i o n D i v i s i o n, E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, 1964) p. 13. ^ T r a n s l a t i o n: N a s a c o m: national ism, re li g i o n and c o m m u n i s m as the t h r e e p i l l a r s of t h e R e v o l u t i o n; M a n i p o l - U s d e k: M a n i f e s t o P o l i t i k, t i t l e o f the 1959 I n d e p e n d e n c e D a y s p e e c h by S u k a r n o and th e i n i t i a l s of the f i v e m a j o r p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s p e e c h, a b a s i c d o c u m e n t of S u k a r n o ' s r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h o u g h t; N e c o l i m: neo-colonia lis ts, col onia lis ts and i mpe rialists; Resopim: a b b r e v i a t e d t i t l e of t h e 1961 I n d e p e n d e n c e D a y s p e e ch; B e r d i k a r i: to s t a n d on o n e ' s o w n feet. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === 224 became t he common currency transactions wit h Indonesia. Sukarno, of mo dern leaders seems whose in r e t r o s p e c t, gifts in a c h ievi ng a revoluti ona ry all p o l i t i c a l made belonged them particularly success, but i r r e l e v a n t — or e v e n d a n g e r o u s — i n t he task of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e to t h at consolidation and rendered group valuable them large post-revolutionary national discipline. Others are Trotsky, Gandhi, and Mao. Trotsky was exiled Gandhi assassinated before they could disrupt systems had helped petual create. Mao revolutionaries, t h e m to t he s ide helped plunge it w a s th e having their "Cultural Understanding and Sukarno lived an d efforts failed, these respective nations Revolution," Sukarno's t he however, administrators revolutionary into ch aos. f or S u k a r n o, philosophical a nd they per shunt romantics For Mao "Gestapu." predisposition, Some authors have dismissed Sukarno's rhetoric and ideological conceptions as empty justifications for author itarianism. See Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen (Mew York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, Inc., 1965) pp. 224-225 and I. R. Sinai, The Challenge of Modernization: T h e W e s t ' s I m p a c t on t h e N o n - W e s t e r n W o r l d T N e w York: N o r t o n a n d C o m p a n y, 1 9 6 4 )~rT. 2^6. A m o r e — and p e r h a p s o v e r l y — r e s p e c t f u l v i e w is a c c o r d e d by D o n a l d E. W e a t h e r b e e, I d e o l o g y in I n d o n e s i a: S u k a r n o ' s I n d o n e s i a n R e v o l u t i o n (New H a v e n, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series, 1966). 'Weatherbee's contention that Sukarno's heirs would find it useful to continue to use the ideological framework established by him does not appear to have occurred. See Malik, op. cit., pp. 2 9 3 - 2 9 4, scorning Sukarno’s conceptions. Another interest ing view of Sukarno the ideologue is provided by Willard Range, "Sukarnoism: An Interpretation," Orbis, X: 2 (Summer, 1966) pp. 488-507. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === 225 with clear its By h i s ures that basically could conservative own account, from early Washington, himself— his Revere.^ Century material success, States. Out these power, Thomas those era Y et an d colored he w a s th e to his l ik i n g. Jefferson, like resemblance a t t r a c t e d by impressions fig George were— little influence Sukarno's States, peopled with personages a nd b o r e conflicting love-hate emotion which United disposition, But America. the found the U n i t e d childhood world was from a revolutionary have American history: P au l to Twentieth t he hardly of t h e grew the United a complex relationships with States. A crucial time in the formation of this attitude was the Indonesian President’s 1956 visit to the United States, at the sought-for invitation of Secretary of State Dulles. almost speech a ny before siastic, standards a joint the session s t and ing ovation. he r e c e i v e d a warm welcome the West."-1-2 N ew s from coast-to-coast spectfully t h is trip was coverage cities one w h o also was editorials Asian of Congress In the a success. w as received enthu itinerary "still a h e r o to favorable Americans s t a t e s m a n who was on his generally advised S u k a r n o ’s the and listen "George ^•■'■wy b o y h o o d w a s s p e n t w o r s h i p i n g A m e r i c a ' s f o u n d i n g fathers. I w a n t e d to e m u l a t e h e r h e r o e s. "Autobiography, p. 39. 1 2 I b i d., o 275. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 234] === 226 Washington the Luce of I n d o n e s i a. " publications, of S u k a r n o. bedecked vate critics uniform, openly a nd Thus with American publications began and and complaining and favorite driven the and seized h i m as press, however, were critical on t h e vanity of h is medal the scandals correspondents of U.S. President's from it w a s news complaining bitterly n o t, the i ng, and heaped Kennedy n ot was control properly the according to the an d Moscow. The sympathetic nation's F o l l o w i n g his being free tour custom b ut offending possible, a frequent S u kar no was Kennedy indignities, during lampoon upon him from America. explained that could the United of n o n - ali gne d Communists f eu d Finally 1961 v i s i t to W a s h i n g t o n a b o u t which were longtime became President pri poli Indonesia when media. his petty banning his ridicule a Mussolini-like R e t a l i a t i n g by loudly when particularly Life, Indonesian press. target of the discussed dismissed tician. the Time The l if e, Some gave States 1 95 6, leaders— visited h i m the adulation Sukarno— Peking desired l a rg e, m a g a z i n e - s t y l e b o o k l e t c o n t a i n i n g c l i p p i n g s o f S u k a r n o ' s v i s i t f r o m A m e r i c a n n e w s p a p e r s w as p u b l i s h e d f o l l o w i n g the visit. S e e P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o 's V i s i t to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s: M a y 16 t o J u n e 3, ^ 9 5 6 ( W a s h i n g t o n: I n f o r m a t i o n D i v i s i o n, E m b a s s y o f- I n d o n e s i a, 1 9 56 ). ■ ^ W h e r e S u k a r n o h a d not w a r m e d t o E i s e n h o w e r n o r l a t e r to P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n, his a f f e c t i o n for K e n n e d y w a s c l e a r. " J o h n F. K e n n e d y a n d I l i k e d e a c h o t h e r at o n c e, " S u k a r n o s a i d in h i s A u t o b i o g r a p h y, p. 7. This pre sum ed r e c i p r o c a t i o n of wa r m t h from K e n n e d y m a y h a v e b e e n i n er ror. A c c o r d i n g to Robert Kennedy, S u k a r n o a n d P r i m e M i n i s t e r D i e f e n b a k e r w e r e t he t w o h e a d s o f s t a t e w h o m his b r o t h e r d i s l i k e d m os t. ( T o l d to Dr. P e y t o n V. Ly on of C a r l t o n U n i v e r s i t y, Can ada, d u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w. ) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 235] === 227 and wi th a model found United critical States. technical had Mainland China, the Moscow could its and little was provide the material the the were using much the same not only of p e r s o n a l to t h e the problems was Further, complex than abundance, other hand, pleasure. le s s high degree relevance impressed Chinese to d u l l e mul ati on much With perience which for progress Sukar no was press freedom, American of Indonesia. easier to u n d e r s t a n d. simplified methods in d e v e l o p i n g the of in dustry their nation. was a nation which story, b ut here example, but foreign assistance American revolution had well. Moreover, long since come static newly run and liberalism. the its emerging scoffingly people, the h i g h seen not contain of s o c i a l plined produced one w h i c h the Sukarno's they The offered American not into little justice Day and address. only their not on ly and "free interests a strong nation. Communist borrowed much because said proven and evolved, more Indonesians model, a disparate r u n by Independence s o c i a l i s m but to weld fight" superficially socialism...," necessary "Guided Democracy" inspiration it p e r m i t t e d. The had be s y s t e m he c h a r a c t e r i z e d democracy a society was institutions American Declaration contained control the America's of e x p l o i t a t i o n social people t ha t "fifty-plus-one" that hand, course. outmoded; i 960 I n d e p e n d e n c e other believed peoples. degree have does i n his on t h e techniques undisci therefore, from Marx R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a nd === [PDF page 236] === 228 Lenin than After did 1956 ritation with White House United during his Johnson's the Congress, a n d — as e v e r — t he the American press. bee the New the U n i t e d pointed ou t, Sukarno defined it w a s in the w o r l d. " 16 Yet America's ai ds ing the a visit Johnson's as w e hostile attacks seen, very a common denominator President and dynamism. United States inauguration the in J a n u a r y. "strings" on hi m h is United Sukarno time It ’was verbal States' to be was As W e a t h e r - "Mefo-ness," In D e c e m b e r, t he the speeches intense. continued that against h i m to Washi ngt on have fiad g r o w n f or i r Eisenhower resentment merciless t o 'Western n e w s m e n the invite "hostility fathers.1^ reasons 'World's E ir, 1965, Indonesian allurement confided York States has a snub i 960 v i s i t, failure founding find many States: saults American Sukarno would the aid, time f r o m the role drawn 1 9 64 his contemplat of P r e s i d e n t a trial balloon •'•^Including t o t a l i t a r i a n m e t h o d s o f p o l i t i c a l i n t i m i dation. A c c o r d i n g to Ad am Ma lik: "He w a s a b l e t o d i s c r e d i t a ny p o l i t i c i a n s w h o d i d not s h a r e h i s p o l i t i c a l v i e w s. Orders to j a i l a n y o n e w h o o p p o s e d t h e P r e s i d e n t h u n g l i k e a s w o r d o f D a m o c l e s a b o v e t he h e a d s n ot o n l y of p o l i t i c i a n s but of i n t e l l e c t u a l s and art ists, inde e d any o n e and e v e r y o n e who w a s i n d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h h i m. " Oo.. C i t., p. 292. For another c r i t i c a l v i e w s e e t h e i n t e r e s t i n g, but b i a s e d, c h a p t e r on S u k a r n o i n W i l l a r d H a n n a ' s E i g h t N a t i o n m a k e r s: A s i a 's C h a r i s m a t i c S ta tesmen (New YOrk: St. M a r t i n ' s P r e s s, 1 9 64 ). 1 6 O p. c i t., p. 70. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 237] === to t e s t W a s h i n g t o n 1s r e a c t i o n. unfavorable and the trip were being interviewed his contract f or L i f e magazine, f r o m t he islands, an d h i s clan memoirs the to Mrs. of A m e r i c a n scribed th e which dropped. had willingness Cindy journalists. basic r e a c t i o n wa s plans vein was of his interest Th e ambivalence Adams, 17 In a s i m i l a r a writer long; s i n c e trust a member Thomas distinctly of S u k a r n o ' s banned the w r i t i n g Morgan under that d e s p i s e d has aptly feelings toward U n i t e d States: E v e n t h o u g h the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s his f a v o r i t e s y m b o l of h a t e d i m p e r i a l i s m, his a n t i A m e r i c a n i s m d i f f e r e d f r o m t h a t of the C o m m u n i s t s. W e i g h i n g a m a i n s t i d e o l o g y w as a w e a k n e s s he c o u l d no t hide: h i s v a n i t y.... A m e r i c a was s t i l l the e p i t o m e of g l a m o r f o r h i m, t h e g o a l and standard of achievement. p or b e t t e r or w o r s e, he w a n t e d t o be k n o w n in the U n i t e d S t a t e s. 18 Similar some ambivalence Sukarno's top aids. though vocally States fo r hi s e d u c a t i o n. is r e p o r t e d even how very to h a v e Foreign anti-American, to h a v e formulate seems said. policies." Minister s en t l o n g to his hear keeps 19 possessed to the American sh ar p. Chaerul lea st Subandrio, son United thought, That's Saleh, th e 17 See John Hughes dispatch from Djakarta, Christian S c i e n c e M o n i t o r, D e c e m b e r 21, 1964. In the S e n a t e, P e t e r D o m i n i c k, R e p u b l i c a n of C o l o r a d o, n o t e d t h a t S u k a r n o w o u l d no t get " r e d c a r p e t " t r e a t m e n t in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s. w h i c h the I n d o n e s i a n n e w s p a p e r, S u l u h I n d o n e s i a, said S u k a r n o wa s n o t b e g g i n g to be i n v i t e d to t he I n a u g u r a t i o n an d c a l l e d Do minick "insane." See ’ W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, D e c e m b e r 27, 1964. 1 ^ 0 d. c i t., p. 91 ^ C i n d y Adams, My F r i e n d t h e D i c t a t o r K e r r i l l C o m p a n y, I nc., 19& 7) p. 267. ( Mew Yor k: Bobbs- R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === 230 number three mingled that Sukarno hierarchy, of a s t r o n g l y evidenced le a s t, secretly The in the statements others w h i c h man respect some likewise anti-American fo r U.S. observers inter b ia s with institutions— enough believed him to be pro-American Army: "L a t i n Americanism?" By Sukarno's account the People's Army of the Republic was born on October 5 3 19**5, a rag-tag group of volunteers with one gun for every five men. By the end of the revolu tionary Deriod this aggregation had been welded into reasonably effective fighting force. It has drawn its officer corps from three different sources: a small number were educated by the Dutch before 19*12, a larger group ’ was trained by the Japanese during their occupation and a third group began their military careers during the fight for independence. Many have subsequently received training in the United States and other Western countries as well as in Communist bloc and nonaligned nations. Aided by large amounts of military assistance from both the United States and the Soviet Union, the Indonesian Army and the other armed services were, by 1965, the largest and best equipped fighting force in South east Asia. Because of its popular i t s e l f to be merely the which joined elements origins an i n s t r u m e n t the of th e Army state. s p a r k — and to w i n — has never the one f el t revolution, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === 231 it has always felt itself to be a shareholder, participating intimately in the development of Indonesian society as guardian of what is called the "Mandate of the People's Suffering" or "Ampera." For their part, the Indonesian people grew accustomed during the years of revolution to re lying on the man with the gun. peacetime. This habit carried over into There civil administration had not yet been firmly established in rural areas, it was to the Army that the peopie looked for security and other services. 20 From its privileged position in Indonesian society, the Indonesian military, most particularly the Army, has not hesitated to operate with a heavy hand in the political affairs of the nation. Strongly nationalistic and antago nistic to "scheming noliticians" the Army was a major force for dismantling the system of parliamentary democracy. The objective of an abortive "half-coup" in October, 1965, the dissolution of constitutionalism was finally achieved in proclamation "Guided of m a r t i a l Democracy." lav: i n M a r c h, In p l a c e 1957, a n d th e t r a n s i t i o n of t h e corruption, confusion 20"if they were sick it was the local platoon leader who supplied medicine. If they wanted a stepladder, the bestsupplied outfit in the areas was the Army. Theirs is a trust given them by the citizenry. To this day, the military feels bound to uphold it." Sukarno, Autobiography, n. 266. 2^See Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 59ff, for a detailed discussion of the TTrmy's role in the 1957-1959 period. For a wider view see Guy Pauker, "The Pole of the Military in Indonesia," in The Role of the Military in Under developed Countries. John J. Johnson, editor (Princeton, li.o.: Princeton University Press, 1962) pp. 185-231. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === 232 and w r a n g l i n g elements of p o l i t i c a l o f th e tral control. into the Ar my sought Martial political life outer islands, exercise administration the that machinery For its some under martial assume was it s military firm they were down Army denying nationalist martial d'etat." Indonesian military the Army running conducted of t h e given the those actually 1 95 8 Nor revolts e a r n i n g the the humane operations." a corruptor Army. had effectively in t h e for govern stat e. of b l o o d s h e d, appreciation th e did not consistently a minimum power the rose civil law coup the in t h e o v e r the "creeping dissidents leaders officer particularly was cen entry control always power proved Army's influence Although tight taking extensive, in w h i c h and conscious authorities Th e So much Ar m y well-deserved civili zed way Moreover, extensive s i de. "with discipline opportunity, however, When politically nation. country. control the military responsibility oppressive. put the a kind l aw w a s and "soft" attempt the s a w t he al l t h a t, distinctly Indonesian took mental advantage civic lav; g a v e corps evidence parties, of the Revolutionary 22 selfunity ^ G u y Pauker, Indonesia: Toward Development as Expansionism (Santa Monida, Calif.: A RAND Corporation Report, 1963). Feith and Lev mvke the same point in the "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36 (Spring, 196.3) P. 2,2. Because of its civility, Pauker questioned w hether the Indonesian army and political elite would be able to stomach the harsh mtasures needed to destroy the PKI with its millions of followers. The bloodbath of 1965-1966 answered that question affirmatively. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === 233 and elan was replaced hy Inter- and intra-service rivalries and jealousies. United against the parliamentary system, the officer corps failed to agree on a positive program and began to use its energies in pursuit of private ambitions. The confiscation of Dutch properties and their assignment to military administration in 1957 opened new vistas of economic gain. Popular will and the common good was lost sight of in the scramble for power, influence and money. 23 In these circumstances the Army became prey to the master manipulatory powers of Sukarno who 'was able to use internal tensions within the armed services to perpetuate his own rule. Some politically conscious officers, like Nasution, continued to try to formulate legitimate functions for the military to perform within Indonesian society. Excesses of territorial rule and military civic missions could lead to the birth of a special privileged class, the Defense Minister ’warned. This was "Latin Americanism" — a form of militarism which he found at variance with the original objectives of the Indonesian army. 24 To many Americans, Nasution and other ^And brought this condemnation from Guy Pauker: "These developments suggest that the revolutionary officer corns of Indonesia is becoming a militarist elite. It controls the country or at least participates in its government, not to ful fill a mission, not to realize an ideal, but for selfish ad vantage...." "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," p. 224. 24 In a typical expression of this, Nasution said that the Indonesian Army "could not just become the government's tools like in Western democratic countries, and at the same time could not develop into a monopolistic rule like in Latin American countries." Antara. July 17, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 242] === officers like him seemed the hope for stability with integrity in Indonesia. How this group— which was to come into increased power frllowing Gestapu— saw the United States is another matter. As nationalists, they carried a natural resentment for the Anglo-American domination of the Southwest Pacific. Thus, General Nasution on more than one occasion bitterly attacked the West for allowing its warships to run "amok" off the coast of Indonesia. 25 While these outbursts were discounted in Washington as attempts to demonstrate independence of the American embrace, they apoear to have been more: the anguish of a military commander at not being the master of his own neighborhood. Although the Indonesian Army and the United States shared a common antioathv to Communism, there 'was little else to bind them ideologically. The Army had rejected— and helped— destroy— the forms of representative democracy as they existed in Indonesia. It sought no model in American political institution nor demonstrated particular fascination with American governmental techniques. Prom the Indonesian point of view the relationship was largely prag matic. When the United States refused to provide weapons to Indonesia, therefore, Nasution— for all his anti-Communism did not hesitate to go to ’'os cow 'with his request. 25>jasution also accused Britain and the United States of encircling Indonesia with naval forces and said the British were planning to establish a permanent task force in the Indian Ocean. The Mew York Times, December 21, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === 235 Some of the benefits of the American military training program in Indonesia already have been noted, particularly the personal ties between American and Indonesian military personnel. Those kept open the channels of communication and cooperation during periods of tension. 26 But perhaps the most pervasive effect of U.S. military aid programs (also an effect of Communist bloc military assistance) was to create a military establishment created in the image of those in industrialized states. 27 Western style boots and fatigues. The Indonesian Army wears It is organized in divisions and companies and its members ride in jeeps, tanks and jet planes. It has many of the same modern weapons avail able to soldiers in the American and Russian armies. More important, it has dynamic younger officers, trained in staff schools abroad, for whom Sukarno’s refusal to operate accord ing to normal cause-effect relationships was profoundly To go beyond this personal level to find adoption of American values by Indonesian personnel trained in the U.S. is unwarranted. Although U.S. training programs for foreign officers include English instruction, general orientation about America, trips to various parts of the country and visits to homes, the MAP program does not involve any sys tematic exposure to the United States, its culture or its intellectual heritage. See W. Phillips Davidson, International Political Communications (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965) p. 2E>2. ^ A r n o l d Toynbee has noted that when two civilizations collide it is the military officers of the civilization intruded upon who first learn the ways and skills of the in truders. Cited by Amos Jordan, Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: The Frederick A“ Fraeger, PubTTshers, 1962) p. 187. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === 236 disturbing. They could see the economic chaos into which Indonesia was being plunged. If only in terms of the Army budget, this group understood the financial reckoning which was not far off for their nation. In Weberian terms, Sukarno and his followers represented charismatic authority in Indo nesian society and the Army, bureaucratic authority. such they were bound to be in opposition and eventually to clash. 28 Insofar as foreign military training programs— regardless of ideological hue— instilled anti-charismatic, pro-bureaucrat modes of thinking and acting in the Indonesian officer corps they were contributing to the dynamics which resulted in the eventual destruction of the Old Order in Indonesia. The Students: Generation of *66 The surprise actor on the Indonesian political stage were the students, a group long considered to be largely apolitical, more interested in obtaining a good job after university graduation than in participating actively in The theoretical framework of German sociologist Max Weber has interesting applications in the Indonesian situa tion. If the coup had been successful, then the PKI would have become the bureaucratic authority and certainly would have found it necessary, within a short time, to dispose of Sukarno. The Army was aided in its efforts by the represen tatives of patriarchal or traditional authority in Indonesia, that is, the strongly Moslem leaders. As we shall see, however, once charismatic authority, in the figure of Sukarno, had been eliminated, the bureaucratic and traditional authorities began to come increasingly into conflict. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 245] === 237 political affairs. this attitude: Donald Hindley has seen two causes for First, many of the students were the children of government officials with whom a tradition of non-partici pation in politics was a safeguard for future promotions. Second, very few job opportunities existed for students outside government, and the Sukarno government looked with disfavor on political parties. Unwilling to risk their own future welfare and status, they kept out of the'political 29 sphere. At the same time, the Sukarno government was mak ing active efforts to indoctrinate them in the dogmas of Guided Democracy. Weekly "indoktrinasi" classes were com pulsory for all university students and failure of an "indoktrinasi" exam could mean suspension of a student from all studies. Much of the time, although not always, the course 30 was given by Communist lecturers. With this went attacks on academic freedom and professors whose work seemed to deviate from the Sukarnoist line. Given the sum of these factors one might reasonably have expected a generation of ideologically "safe" students 29 The Communist Party of Indonesia, p. 198. 30 Paul van'tVeer, "Flunking the Doctrine," Atlas, 13:6 (June, 1967) p. 33. In his article, translated from Vrij Nederland of Amsterdam, van't Veer says of the indoctrina tion course: "Many students and professors told me that it was nothing but a course in propaganda, which, for example, studied Sukarno's latest speeches and 'explained' Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === 238 and Sukarno-followers. Beneath the surface appearance, however, a different reality was emerging. As the importance of party-oriented student organizations declined following 1957, there was corresponding growth in the significance and social activity of elected student councils within each university. Almost without exception these councils were controlled by non-Communist students who were gaining valu able leadership training through their activities. As the PKI stepped up its efforts to subvert the universities during 1964 and 1965, the intra-mural student government became a particular target of Communist youth fronts. This aroused a reactive militancy in the university leaders and led to the formation of semi-secret, anti-Communist cells in a number of universities, including those at Bandung and Djakarta, during 1965— before Gestapu. In general, these cells cut across religious and party lines and were united by personal friendships and a common hostility to the Communists. 31 A common denominator among them might be found in their social origins. The great majority of Indonesian university students come from social classes above the workers and poor 31 J This material was obtained as the result of inter views with a number of student leaders and former student leaders in Bandung and Djakarta, during September, 1968. For another view of the Indonesian student movement, see Princeton M. Lyman, "Students and Politics in Indonesia and Korea," Pacific Affairs. XXXVIII:3/4 (Fall-Winter, 1965- 66) pp. 282-294. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === 239 and medium peasants and their leaders were no exception. ^ If the Communists took over Indonesia, they would be suspect as "compradore bourgeoisie" 33 and their expectations for future personal advancement would be considerably dimmed. With the question one of survival, the students shook off their political lethargy and began to prepare for unknown future contingencies. Among their activities were discussions of Western and Communist political thought, and the transla tion into Indonesian,and distribution to other students, of articles appearing in American and Western European publica tions.^ Another important reason for the emergence of the Indo nesian students as political force to reckon with was their growing weariness of high-sounding slogans, frenzied mass rallies, squandering of funds on meaningless monuments to the detriment of needed projects and the general economic 32 Of the student leaders interviewed by the author none was of peasant origins and only one could be considered to have a working class background (and he was a Christian). There appeared to be a high incidence among the student leaders of cosmopolitan contacts, either having lived abroad them selves or having close relatives who had done so. 33 J Defined by the Aidit leadership as those sections of the bourgeoisie which were pro-Western, or not so outspokenly anti-Western, and which were avowedly anti-Communist. See Hindley, p. t3. 34 According to Nono Makarim, Encounter, the British political journal, was particularly important in shaping the student thinking. Interview, Djakarta, September 12, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 248] === decline. Knowing the level of Indonesia's technology, they were embarrassed by government announcements that Indonesia would put its first astronaut into orbit in 1968. Blueprint Hall, a modern building in Djakarta devoted to the Indonesia of tomorrow showed them models of hydroelectric dam projects, telecommunication systems, television stations, and nuclear reactors against realities of farmers using wooden ploughs and women reaping rice by hand. Designed to capture the imagina tion of youth, slogans like "The People of Indonesia Must Become Space Conscious," were instead objects of derision. Nor did Sukarno have the charismatic hold on these stu dents that he did on their parents' generation. Because their motives and objectives were different, they had no need of him and he seemed anachronistic. "His teachings are too confusing, a student leader told Seth King. "We can take part of them. But all of them just do not apply to us and what we want."35 With the inbuilt cynicism of university students, they could successfully parrot Sukarno's doctrine without necessarily be lieving it.36 Student's dissent from the repetitious, acronymic jargon and semi-magical themes of Sukarno's regime was, in essence, 35April 2, 1966. 3^"We learned it as a lesson in which nobody believed, including most of our professors," Paul van't Veer was told. "We had an exam in it; as long as you knew the right words, you passed." Ojd. cit., p. 3^. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 249] === attributable to their training in scientific method and causeeffect logic. What was acceptable to Sukarno's animistic, rural "marhaen," became so much rhetoric to young men and women edu cated in practical techniques of problem solving. In that con nection, it is interesting to note that, while humanities students have generally been in the forefront of protest groups, in Indon esia it was the engineering students of the Institute of Technol ogy at Bandung who early formed the militant vanguard of what was later to be KAMI, the national student "action front." 37 In the aftermath of Gestapu the student cell leaders found the opportunity they had been waiting for. Not only was their cause now a national one to which the generally inert mass of students would rally, but they could, in general, strike at the Communists with impunity, aided and abetted by the Army. Early in the post-Gestapu period the Army general staff, some of whom had sons, daughters, or brothers among the activists, determined to make the students their allies in destroying the old political order. They provided the young people with radio 3^Wimar Witoelar, one of the original founders of KAMI from ITB, explained anti-Sukarnoist feelings among students this way: "Scientific thinking does not allow for cant." Interview, Bandung, September 10, 1968. Speaking at a sym posium on the "Awakening of the 66'Spirit," Hatta explained that the university students had been taught to think scientif ically, to believe that science was to find truth and that the scientist was to safeguard truth. In this situation indoc trination could manacle the minds of the students only tempor arily, he said, gradually, however, the scientific mind caught truth from falsehood. Djakarta Times, May 8, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 250] === equipment, trucks, military guards and other forms of assis tance and subsidy. KAMI itself was formed on the evening of October 23 in the home of General Sharif Thajeb, a Harvardeducated pediatrician who was minister of higher education in Sukarno’s cabinet and a protege of Nasution. At the same time, the Indonesian student movement was not simply a creature of the military. The student protest operated for the most part independently, resisting encroachments by the Army almost as strenuously (if not as loudly) as it fought the Old Order of Sukarno and his ad h e r e n t s. ^ The ultimate proof of the move ment's freedom of action came in March, 1966, when it succeed ed in forcing Sukarno to relinquish his executive powers, while the Army, at least initially, hung back. 7 To call the Indonesian students "pro-American" is a mis leading over-simplification. There were, of course, the usual unproven charges that KAMI was being financed by the U.S. Cen tral Intelligence Agency and, in truth, some leading student demonstrators had spent a year in the United States during sec ondary school under the American Field Service student exchange 3®Again and again student leaders told of Army attempts to dictate tactics, censor statements, veto projects and other encroachments. By their own account, they were able to evade such pressures by a combination of brazenness and guile. ■^The author has been surprised again and again by the willingness of important Indonesian military figures to ad mit the pivotal role played by the students in ousting Sukarno. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 251] === program.1*0 But the groups of students who would call "Long live America" as they passed the American embassy were bal anced by others who shouted anti-American slogans as their Army trucks sped them to the next anti-Communist rally. John Hughes recounting the experience from the standpoint of an American newsman, recalls that plunging into a crowd of anti-Communist students "was like passing through eddies of hot and cold water One group would be friendly and encourage picture-taking, but another band a few yards on, demonstrating in the identical cause, would be hostile.1*^ ^°The American Field Service (AFS) program was bit terly attacked by the PKI in its efforts to force the govern ment into withdrawing all Indonesians studying in the United States. The program has been particularly controversial in Indonesia because of the personality and value changes created in the teenaged youngsters by a year living with an American family and going to an American school. For this reason the Sukarto regime has been reluctant to permit the re-establish ment of the AFS program in Indonesia. Major General Machmud, commander of the military dis trict of Djakarta, defended KAMI against charges that its members had received C.I.A. payments. He said there was no evidence the American intelligence agency was giving encourage ment to the students. ^ T h o s e students would, according to Hughes, "thump and pummel you, brand you Necolim agents, and tell you to get out. This was Indonesia's business, they would say, and they did not want us there." Indonesian Upheaval, p. 216. A similar phenomenon was noted by Donald Kirk in "The Struggle for Power in Indonesia," The Reporter (February 24, 1966) p. 39. A typical student protest statement would both urge the dissolution of the PKI and denounce the "barbarity of American imperialists" for actions in Vietnam and other locations. See Indonesian Herald, November 3, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 252] === 244 With certain exceptions, most Indonesian students, including student leaders, have only a superficial knowledge of the United States. At the same time, the technological pro gress and affluence which America symbolizes exert a powerful magnetism on their interest and imaginations. Even during the blackest period of Indonesian-American relations, the American Embassy continued to receive frequent requests from young people seeking information on possibilities of visiting or being educated in the United States. In the same way, offi cials noted the hunger for American books and magazines among the Indonesian students. matrix of progress. men: For many the United States was the Demonstrating students told American news "Your country has put a man in space and we cannot even stabilize the price of rice in the market." Some have seen American educational aid programs, both public and private, as significantly responsible for the at titudes of the Indonesian students. While it is true that the American contribution to Indonesian education has been consid erable, ^3 the direct impact has been largely at faculty and administrative levels and only indirectly upon the students Thomas Morgan tells the story of meeting a young antiNecolim demonstrator during a protest rally who asked for his autograph and said he wanted most of all to visit and perhaps to study in the United States. O p. clt., p. 81 49 JFor a pre-Gestapu view of educational exchange as a "saving thread" between the U.S. and Indonesia, see Philip H. Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) pp. 104-10FT R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 253] === 245 themselves. Because of the sensitivity of the Indonesian government to foreign, particularly American, books in the social sciences, the book import programs of U.S. agencies had largely been restricted to texts on technical and scientific subjects. It would, therefore, be presumptious to assume that ideas of a distinctly American character had been absorbed by the Indonesian students and were part of their motivation in helping oust Sukarno. Rather the American contribution would seem to be a more general one: by assisting Indonesia in establishing and supplying modern institutions of higher learn ing, the United States was participating in the formation of students who would shift from the folk image of man and society common to the mass of Indonesians and adopt a more-or-less "scientific" attitude. The effects of such a change, as Kenneth Boulding has pointed out,^^ are an increase in selfconsciousness by the individual, both of himself and his society. The second effect is to instill a systematic, cause-effect ap proach to problems. In combination, they provided a basis for a rational critique of Sukarno's Indonesia and the desire for rapid change. (It should be pointed out that Soviet textbooks and educational aid also encouraged these r e s u l t s w h e t h e r the United States deserves any credit or self-congratulations ^ T h e Meaning of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) pp. 63-67. -'Soviet textbooks distributed in Indonesia were gen erally in English, which has become the chief second lanquage in Indonesia, replacing Dutch. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 254] === 246 about the emergence of an anti-Communist student movement in Indonesia is irrelevant. More significant is the exist ence of such a student generation and their potential for future leadership within Indonesia. In a sense the experience of the Indonesian students parallels that of the officer corps. The officers sprang from a modernized Army; the student leaders from a modernized educational system. In common they would scorn the haphazard, semi-mystical approach to the nation’s problems employed by the Sukarno regime. And, more important, they would set out to replace it with something better. Political Repercussions of the Aborted Coup The days immediately following on the crushing of the September 30 Movement were ones of intense confusion and ques tioning in Indonesia. Nothing was certain in the swirl of activity about the various power centers in Djakarta and elsewhere in Java. For the moment, the Army appeared to be in control of the capital city but what of the rest of the country? President? Would the PKI go into open revolt? And what of the Had he been an accessory to the putsch attempt and what would be his future? No one could rule out a return to the status quo, or even a series of future coups which might leave Indonesia splintered into several new sovereignties. Few, if any, however, expected that the situation would remain in flux for as long as it did, almost one-half year from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === 247 October, 1965, until the following March. American officials have seen it as an extremely crucial period in Indonesia's history during which the struggle between Sukarnoist ele ments and the Army with its supporters might have gone either way. One U.S. diplomat remembered it as "the itchy period," and to Ambassador Green: "It was all so very dicey." 46 In spite of the many uncertainties, the U.S. Embassy, in a fortuitous move, almost immediately contacted Army leaders to express support. By October 2, the Embassy's defense at tache, Col. Willis G. Ethel, was in touch with an Indonesian acquaintance who was an aid to Nasution. Through this channel, U.S. officials sought to obtain information about the Army's future plans and pledged assistance. It was learned that Nasution, Suharto and other surviving members of the Army's top command were having serious communications problems. Because of a lack of reliable radio equipment, they were unable to keep in close touch and the problem of coordination threatened ^ S e e Sutton, op. clt., p. 80. William Bundy expressed a similar view when he noted that the coup attempt in Indo nesia was defeated "in a struggle that extended eventually over many tricky months..." Address before the National Executive Committee of the American Legion, Indianapolis, May 3, 1967. Department of State Press Release. There is a distinctly minority view on the subject which contends that the Army was in control all the way after October 1 and the threatened comeback by Sukarno was simply window dressing. Among those are Mohammed Hatta, former vice presi dent of Indonesia. Interviewed by author, Honolulu, September 4, 1968. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 256] === 248 the effectiveness of the mopping up action against the conspirators and their forces: being jeopardized. The very momentum of the counter-coup was Recognizing the Army's grave need and de siring to make a good-will gesture, American diplomats in Djakarta asked for, and received, permission from Washington to loan the Indonesian military about two dozen walky-talky radios. These sets were stored in the embassy building for use by American personnel during emergency situations. Despite the fact that by contributing them to the Indonesian Army, the Embassy was stripping itself of a vital communications re source at a crucial time, it was believed much more important to establish this early tie. The equipment was received gratefully by the Indonesians who immediately assigned the sets to key individuals and locations. 47 In yet another early American approach to the antiCommunist, anti-Sukarno forces in Indonesia, the U.S. govern ment, through parties in a third country, financed the sale of about $400,000 worth of pharmaceuticals and radio equipment to the Army. The transaction occurred during the height of the campaign to crush the PKI when the Army was facing serious shortages of needed commodities. American officials apparently believed that the Army's general staff would arrange the re-sale 47 'Material on early U.S. help to the Indonesian Army was obtained from Indonesian and American sources, whose identity the author is not at liberty to divulge. These sources are believed, however, to be highly reliable. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 257] === of the drugs in order to raise necessary funds for the pur chase of food, ammunition and other items. While it is not yet clear to what use the U.S. aid was put by the Army, the gesture enhanced the rapport between the two parties. Also important from the standDoint of both, the sale was successfully disguised so that it could not be used as propaganda by the opposition. The first, opportunity for the U.S. Embassy to make a public show of solidarity with the Indonesian Army and its civilian support came on October 5. Originally designated as the date of a huge Armed Forces Day parade, the occasion became instead a massive and somber state funeral for the six generals murdered by the September 30th Movement conspira tors. As the funeral procession passed through the streets of Djakarta thousands of emotionally shaken Indonesians bid farewell to the newly-fallen heroes. At Kaliba Cemetery near the city's edge, a sizeable American presence stood among the diplomatic corps, including military attaches from the U.S. Embassy and prominent in the front rank, United States Ambassador It is this transaction to which Columnist James Peston apparently referred In The New York ^imes, June 19, 1966. According to the influential and usually well informed Washing ton newsman, General Suharto’s forces had been receiving aid from the U.S. through third countries in its anti-Communist campaign. Reston credited the operation to an unnamed "very high official in Washington" who had contacts with anti-Communist forces in Indonesia. The author's attempt to identify this in dividual have been fruitless and it well may be that his role has been exaggerated by Reston. The newsman also contended that without U.S. aid, the anti-Communist campaign could not have been sustained. There is no proof for such a statement. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === 250 Marshall Green. Noticeably absent from the ceremonies was a delegation from Communist China and President Sukarno himself. In a subtle way, the funeral helped to underscore the sides as they were being drawn up in the coming struggle for power. There could be little doubt among Indonesians after October 5, iiq just where the United States stood, But support for the Army, public and private, was only part of the task facing American authorities. In the critical months which followed the Gestapu affairs, the accomplishment of three objectives became vital: (1) establishing and main taining a dialogue with key figures in the situation; (2) swift and accurate reporting of events as they occurred and their cor rect interpretation to anticipate future trends; and (3) avoid ing any statements or actions which might tend to adversely affect the anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno cause. As previously noted, contacts with the Indonesian Army leadership were made almost immediately following the crushing of the coup attempt. This began a diplomatic dialogue with the general staff which, with one exceptional period, has been main tained ever since. The fluid situation in the capital also allowed the re-establishment of contacts between Americans and key Indonesian civilians, relationships suspended during the ^ F o r an eye-witness account of the funeral see Hughes, o p. cit., pp. 124-126 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === 251 late Guided Democracy period for fear of reprisals against the Indonesians involved. One such key person was Adam Malik, whose ideological disposition and unquestioned ability seemed destined to bring him to the fore in hte post-Gestapu era. A former journalist and a leader of the "national Communist" Murba Party, Malik had served as ambassador to both Moscow and Peking and as minister of trade under Sukarno. While in the latter post, he had helped form the ill-fated Body for the Protection of Sukarnoism. When it and the Murba Party fell into disfavor, he was stripped of his official duties and was under virtual house arrest at his suburban Djakarta home when Gestapu erupted. 50 Ambassador Green had known Malik from previous contacts, including the Indonesian's stay in the United States during the negotiations over West Irian. Upon his arrival in Djakarta, the U.S. Ambassador had met quietly with Malik several times "at the home of a mutual friend"-^ near Djakarta. The two experienced diplomats had carried on long 5 Malik, however, still retained the title of minister, although he had no administrative authority. U.S. diplomats believe Sukarno did not deal more harshly with Malik because he respected the Sumatran's brilliance, although he did not trust him. It should also be noted that as trade minister Malik was bold enough in 1964 to buck the trend of the times and endorse the continued importation of American films into Indonesia on the set ratio of sixty percent from the West and forty percent from NEFO countries. The Communist-front "Boycott U.S. Film Action Committee" immediately launched an attack on Malik and Aidit called him a "Manipolis-Munafikla," an Indonesian acronym for a phoney supporter of Manipol. 51 Green's words, interview cited. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 260] === 252 conversations about the shape of Indonesian-American relations and had come to know each other increasingly well. Thus, fol lowing Gestapu, the groundwork had been laid for a vastly in tensified dialogue between Green and Malik, who was known to have the respect and confidence of top Army commanders. Even before Malik's elevation to foreign minister, therefore, a mutually useful relationship had been established. Relatively blunt and incisively-spoken, Malik was the type of Asian Ameri cans like to talk to. He was not pro-American, U.S. diplomats emphasize, but "he was for the same things we were for in Indonesia. At the same time, the United States was forced to recog nize that Sukarno was still President of Indonesia and Subandrio still foreign minister. advantage. Here Green was at a definite dis He and Sukarno regarded each other with scarcely concealed antipathy and the President had consistently refused to see him. Nor had Green's reputation for candid talk gained him friends within the Foreign Office. One opportunity for making soundings inside the regime came with the impending re turn to Washington of Francis Galbraith, who had spent several tours in Indonesia, was charge'under both Jones and Green, and had broad acquaintance with Indonesian officials. In making his farewells, Galbraith visited Sukarno, Subandrio, Arudji 52Ibid. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 261] === 253 Kartawinata, speaker of the Indonesian House of Representatives, and others. He came away from those meetings with an im proved idea of the thinking within the Sukarnoist faction.^3 Another, less formal, contact with the Presidential Palace was in the person of Mrs. Cindy Adams, whose assistance in pre paring his autobiography had brought her close to Sukarno and to his young, beautiful, Japanese-born fourth wife, Dewi. Dewi had come to the fore in the post-Gestapu period as a pro-Western, pro-Army influence on her husband, urging him to reach an accomodation with the generals. When it was learned that Mrs. Adams would be returning to Indonesia in January, 1966, as a correspondent for ABC-TV News, she was called to Washington for a discussion of Indonesian-American relations with Presi dential Assistant Jack Valenti and meetings with State Department officials.55 pjer access to the Indonesian President at a time 53interview with Francis Galbraith, Singapore, September 24, 1968. Galbraith, who became ambassador to Singapore, said his visits were not calculated to gather information, but ad mitted that they were helpful and he had the ambassador's per mission to make them. Subandrio used the opportunity of Galbraith's visit to issue a statement on U.S.-Indonesian re lations: "To us we are always prepared and have an open heart to establish good relations with the United States as well as other countries provided they do not interfere in our domestic affairs." Antara, November 25, 1965. 5^Dewi's role in post-Gestapu events has the fascination peculiar to the picture of a beautiful woman at the side of an aging and beset dictator. Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has ac cused her of being an American agent sent to seduce Sukarno into marriage and then abandoning him after fulfilling her mis sion of helping to engineer his overthrow and the shift in Indonesian foreign policy. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, September 26, 1967. (FBIS Translation: September 27, 1967.) 55See Mrs. Adams book, My Friend the Dictator (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 19F 7 ) for other details of her experiences in Indonesia. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 262] === 25** when other Americans were barred from seeing him made her particularly valuable to the American Embassy and she was able to carry out a number of diplomatic assignments for the ambassador.^ As important as maintaining contacts for the American Embassy was the task of keeping abreast of the fast-moving events in Indonesia. Piercing together the fragmentary re ports which were reaching the Embassy fell to the political section. The staff, which has been praised as particularly compentent by officials in Djakarta and in Washington, worked long hours into the evening attempting to construct a coherent picture of developments from personal contacts, newspaper accounts, rumors, and reported conversations. During particular ly critical periods Ambassador Green slept in his office in order to be close to communications facilities in case of un expected developments in the Indonesian situation or an urgent message from Washington. 57 As a result of its concerted effort By her own account, Mrs. Adams' unique position vis a vis Sukarno also caused Malik to ask her to influence the President to take a trip abroad in order to allow certain governmental changes. "I am afraid to bring it up myself and that is why I suggest it to you," she quotes Malik as having told her. Ibid., p. 297. At this same time Dewi Sukarno was re ported also to be urging her husband to leave Indonesia for an extended trip abroad. But the President would have none of it. 57 J There was a curfew in Djakarta and Green feared that if he went home and something important came up, he might not be able to return to the Embassy. According to Lydman, some foreign service officers were working 1*1 hours a day, seven days a week, in the immediate post-Gestapu period. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 263] === 255 the American mission was accounted to be generally abreast of the situation and third country diplomats became accustomed to visiting the U.S. Embassy to find out the late news. addition to providing the factual basis for formulating effective policies, the information gathered also served another useful purpose. On the advice of a consultant, the Voice of America had increased the length of its programming into Indonesia even before Gestapu. By December, 1965, it was transmitting some five hours daily in Indonesian, principally music and news. The latter proved to be particularly valuable to the anti-Sukarno forces since the national radio-television system was still in the hands of Sukarno loyalists and there was little attention given to the many instances of unrest and dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime. Such incidents were, however, given full treatment by VOA and student groups began taping newscasts for re-broadcast on their own unauthorized stations— a number of which had sprung up around Indonesia following the coup attempt. Some Indonesian student leaders have credited VOA with keeping stu dent cells informed of other protest activities elsewhere in Indonesia and of thus aiding morale. ^Information obtained from interviews with USIS personnel and Indonesian student leaders. The Voice of America has received letters from Indonesia, expressing gratitude for the news programs, from students, civil servants and military personnel. Some said the programs were the only way to know what was occurring in other areas of Indonesia, according to a USIA source. At the time VOA was attempting to broadcast all reliable and verifiable news stories it could to Indonesia, and as swiftly as possible. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 264] === 256 For a time after the coup attempt, American foreign service officers could expect to brief and gather information from, a group of American press representatives who appeared on the scene almost immediately following the September 30 Movement's demise. Although it previously had been difficult for U.S. journalists to obtain visas, the pro-Western Indo nesian Ambassador to Thailand, Mohammad Diah— apparently on his own authority— granted entry to a number of Western newsmen early in October. Among them were John Hughes of the Christian Science Monitor, Seth King of the New York Times, and Robert Hewett of Associated Press. It quickly became clear to these reporters that the anti-Sukarno elements were interested in having them report events surrounding Gestapu in the West, to offset possible reactions to the reprisals being meted to Communists. In some cases, they were allowed to travel In areas which had been closed to foreigners by military authorities and could report back observations of interest to American diplomats. J ^ Hewe t t, for example, was allowed to accompany the military governor of Central Java during his first official inspection tour of villages in which the PKI had made attempts to seize control but had ultimately been defeated by the Army. Hewett believes the Indonesians were interested In having him report details of atrocities com mitted against some village headmen by the Communists and the fact that order had been restored by Army efforts. Interview, Honolulu, September 2, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 265] === 257 The presence of newsmen was, however, a distinctly mixed blessing from the standpoint of American officials. The stories which correspondents were sending back to the United States always threatened to stir up new waves on the already stormy Indonesian political seas. On the other hand, the motto of the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta and the State De partment was quite emphatically, "don't rock the boat." there was any temptation in Washington to gloat, boast or proclaim "sic semper tyrannis" over the events in Indonesia, it was successfully squelched. Dean Rusk told reporters: I think it would not be right for me to attempt any evaluation. I think it is better for the United States not to involve itself directly by comment or by action in that situation. So that a judgment by me at this time, I think, would be untimely. I just prefer not to attempt that.°0 Diplomats on the scene were equally reticent to comment on the situation. The Voice of America, while broadcasting news, offered no editorial comment. From the White House down, officials were convinced that the slightest gesture of U.S. interest, or expression of American pleasure at developments, could have undesirable consequences. Statements to the press emphasized an American posture of watchful waiting as events continued to unfold. No emphasis was given to the presumed Given in answer to a reporter's question about Rusk's assessment of recent events in Indonesia and their signifi cance for Indonesian-American relations. Pepartment of State Bulletin, November 29, 1965, p. 855. Press conference of November 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 266] === 258 anti-Communist bias of the A r m y ^ and officials warned that no matter what the outcome, there was not likely to be any sudden or basic shift in Indonesia's policy toward the 62 Wes t. Despite diplomatic efforts to keep in the background of the Indonesian situation, several events conspired to upset those plans and give undesired prominence to the American position vis a vis Indonesia. One such occurrence was the publication of an article on the coup attempt by former Am bassador Howard P. Jones. Writing in the editorial section of the Sunday Washington Post on October 10, a scant nine days after Gestapu had been crushed, Jones aired his views on what had happened in Indonesia. In most respects his assessment*^ was remarkably prescient. The new chancellor of the East-West Center, Jones asserted that only the complicity of top Communists, including Aidit, could have designed a coup of such proportions. He speculated that party leaders believed ^ C o l u m n i s t and frrmer USIA director Carl Rowan reported that Nasution and his colleagues had "expressed care" to American diplomats that they be spared a "kiss of death" by the United States. The Washington Star, February 27, 1968. 62 For reflections of this official position, see David Willis, The Christian Science Monitor, October 9, 1965; "Indonesia: Losing Face." Newsweek (October 25, 1965) p. 53; and "Indonesia: To Brink of Civil War," U.S. News and World Report (October 25, 1965) p. 36. ^ R e p e a t e d in stories by the Associated Press (see the Washington S t a r, October 13, 1965) and The New York Times, Oct ober ll, 196FI R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 267] === 259 Sukarno to be critically ill, and were determined to neutralize the Army in a bid for power. The former Ambassador also predicted that the PKI faced "liquidation" at the hands of an outraged Indonesian public. 64 In spite of these in sights, Jones did not in any way link President Sukarno with the September 30 Movement and seemed instead to promote an enhanced leadership role for the Indonesian leader in the post-coup period. He depicted Sukarno as one whose overriding interest was the creation of a unified nation and saw him using his power to help re-unify the Indonesian people follow ing the rending of their society by the Communists. "The Jones article came down like a ton of bricks in Indonesia," one diplomat recalled. To everyone concerned— and most particularly to the Army leaders— it appeared that this prominent Indonesian "hand" has absolving Sukarno of all blame in the Gestapu affair. Anxious to discredit the Presi dent, the anti-Sukarno forces were deeply concerned lest the United States accept the Jones' version and thus raise 64 Quoted by the Associated Press, The Washington Star. October 13, 1965. "I think there has been a strong antiCommunist feeling in Indonesia among a great many people, possibly a majority of the people," Jones is reported to have said. "This has been suppressed for a long time, but it has been released by the horrible series of happenings with the mutilation and death of six generals. I think it is going to be very difficult to stop these strong antiCommunist feelings, even if somebody wants to stop them" Elsewhere, Jones said he shared the emotional reaction of the Indonesians since the slain generals "were personal friends despite differences of view between us." Washington Post. October 10, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 268] === 260 questions about the legitimacy of their own drive for power. Representations were made to a sympathetic Ambassador Green, who had no love for Sukarno and believed that both Indonesia and the United States would be better off if he were removed from power. Subsequently, therefore, U.S. intelligence sources in Washington told selected newsmen that they had incontroverti ble evidence that President Sukarno was in league with Indonesian Communists in the abortive coup. The information, the sources said, came from confessions of men deeply involved In the af fair who had been captured and interrogated by the Army. Following publication of this calculated "leak" in prominent newspapers such as The Washington Post and The Times of London, 65 the Indonesian Ambassador Lambertus N. Palar delivered a stiff protest to the State Department. Calling the charges against Sukarno "ridiculous," Palar asserted that the report had originated with the Central Intelligence Agen c y. ^ The State Department and Secretary of State Rusk hastened to deny the report and any knowledge of its source. "We have no prodf that he (Sukarno) was involved in that situation," the Secretary b 5post story by Chalmers M. Robert, October 13, 1965; Times, October 14, 1965. fsfi And he probably was right. The Times article noted that "the fresh but secret evidence appears to have come from the Central Intelligence Agency." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 269] === 261 told n e w s m e n. ^ Despite denials, however, the story had the desired effect. In the minds of governing elites— at least in western capitals— Sukarno had been linked with the coup attempt, including the murder of the generals, and to that extent stood discredited. A second "boat rocking" development originated in the White House when President Johnson gave the order that wives and children of embassy officials were to be evacuated from Indonesia just two weeks after the Gestapu affair. The Pres ident had been the target of severe criticism from Congress and the press over the lack of protection afforded Americans caught in renewed fighting in the Congo some months earlier and he had determined never again to allow such a situation to develop. Anywhere anarchy or revolution was likely to break out, en dangering American lives, embassy dependents were to be evacuated. The Washington Post, October 1^, 1965. And State Department Press Officer Marshall Wright told reporters "there is absolutely no basis for that report" and added that the Department has not "reached any definitive conclusions that we are prepared to make public concerning the origins." The Post story continued that other sources privately confirmed the report but lamented that it surfaced from Washington rather than from Djakarta. According to one source, there was a group within the State Department, identified with the Jones' policy, who shared the former ambassador's reluctance to link Sukarno to the coup. They were responsible for scotching stories about arms caches at the CONEPO site and other items which might have impli cated Sukarno from being broadcast by VOA, since they did not want any direct attacks on Sukarno. According to the source, this created some friction as some VOA officials wanted to put pressure on the Indonesian President. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 270] === 262 In Indonesia the decision had been weighed as early as August, 1965. But embassy personnel were adamantly against it, arguing that the move would discourage America's "friends" in Indonesia at a crucial time. As a result, it was decided that all per sonnel who wished to send their dependents home at government expense, could. No one took up the offer, however, and dip lomats' wives and children were in the country when the Gestapu affair erupted. Although no Americans were killed or injured in the ensuing fighting, Washington became anxious about the direction of events. In succeeding days while it was still unclear whether the PKI would begin a civil war or large-scale guerrilla action, the White House demanded that American de pendents be returned to the United States. The decision was received with "gnashing of teeth" the American Embassy in Djakarta. ftR Many staff members were bitterly opposed to the move, arguing that their wives and children had been present during the bitterest period of antiAmericanism in Indonesia when the Embassy was a constant tar get of Communist-inspired attack. threatened. Not one had been harmed or Now, when the PKI was on the defensive and the Army apparently in control, at least in Djakarta, dependents were to be removed. The action also would appear to reflect ^ Q u o t i n g Francis Galbraith, Interview. According to the State Department, at the time of the coup, there were 2,144 Americans in Indonesia, most of them in Djakarta. A minority were connected with government agencies, most of them being em ployees of American oil companies and their families. No Ameri cans were reported injured during the coup or its aftermath. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 271] === 263 an American lack of confidence in the Indonesian military. When the matter was discussed with the Indonesians, both Malik and Suharto pleaded that the step not be taken, fearing it would have unfavorable consequences for their drive against leftists and Sukarnoists. Although this information was com municated to Washington, the President would not be swayed. As a result, on October 11, Ambassador Green announced the evacuation of all 170 American diplomatic dependents, in cluding his own wife. In an attempt to put the best possible face on the action, he stated that it was "a precautionary 'step not related to any specific events of the past few d a y s. " ^ Despite the disclaimers, the decision caused a stir of concern in Djakarta's diplomatic corps. Representatives of other em bassies were dispatched to the American mission, or sought out U.S. newsmen, to discover the trusreasons behind the evacuation. To such inquiries, U.S. authorities simply pointed out the ob vious uncertainties in the Indonesian situation and their unwil lingness to risk American lives. If the U.S. was to err, it would be on the side of caution. ^ Q u o t e d in The New York Times. October 12, 1965. Green's position on the evacuation was ambivalent. On the one hand he did not relish the "boat rocking" effects of the move; on the other, his was the responsibility for the dependents' lives and he could not give guarantees to the President that a dangerous situation would not evolve. "^Hughes, oj3. cit., quotes Green as answering questioners thus: "Would you 5e prepared to take the responsibility for keeping those women and children here when the decision might mean the difference between their living or dying?" p. 139 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 272] === At the same time, however, Washington was being incau tious— at least from the Indonesian military’s point of view— in supporting, even nominally, the Malaysian military build-up against confrontation tactics. Wide publicity was given to the visit of an American military mission to Kuala Lumpur in November, 1965, and it was linked to an announced increase in Malaysian defense spending by the T u n k u. ^ The Malaysian premier had announced that the air force expected by buy helicopters, light and medium troop transports, and thirty more light jet air craft suitable for trainers and g?ound attack purposes in 1966. This military equipment, much of which by implication was to be obtained in the United States, was— at least in part— to be used in a planned retaliation base to strike Indonesian bases should the latter nation step up its confrontation. by Malaysia was a significant one. This step Although the British military build-up in Singapore, Labuan, and various towns in Borneo had been nettling to the Indonesians, no retaliations against In donesian territory had been launched from those bases, which heretofore had served solely defensive purposes. Establishment of a "strike" base, as the Manchester Guardian pointed out, would change the whole concept of the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict "Indonesians will no longer be free to hit, run and seek sanctuary on their side of the border." 72 ?-*-See dispatches in the Indonesian Herald for November 13, 22, and 25. 72 Quoted in the Washington Post, December 21, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 273] === 265 The prospect of direct attacks on Indonesia was deeply disturbing to its military elite. There was some fear that the Malaysian and British might take advantage of Indonesia's internally chaotic situation to launch an attack. Striving to restore security and sdministrative control throughout a large nation, crush the PKI, and enforce unity within the armed services, while at the same time holding off Sukarno, the Nasution/Suharto forces were already badly strained. An es calation in the intensity of the conflict with Malaysia could only strengthen the opposition. As a result, the Malaysian plans drew sharp criticism from Indonesian military figures and the Army-controlled press; the United States and Great Britain were blamed for their aid to M a l a y s i a. ^3 The Army Ascendant Despite these several disrupting factors, the American posture of watchful waiting continued to demonstrate the wis dom of its choice. As events played themselves out, it be came apparent that the anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno forces— which included the Nasution/Suharto Army leadership with its "^The announcement of the Malaysian strike base plans probably were the immediate occasion of Nasution's charge that Anglo-American forces were running amok off the coast of Indonesia. The Washington Post, December 21, 1965. The Soviet Union sought to exploit this irritant. Tass charged that U.S. military aid to Malaysia was a springboard to action against Indonesia and national liberation movements in Southeast Asia. Quoted in the Indonesian Herald, November 25, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 274] === 266 civilian and student allies— were in the ascendancy. mid-December it was amply clear that the ability of the PKI to wage an effective, major-scale guerrilla war had been decisively broken by the Army. Military control and security had been re-established in all but a few areas. The overt appar atus of the Communist Party had been smashed and prominent PKI members were either dead, imprisoned, or in hiding. reliable military units had been broken up or re-assigned to remote areas of the country. The military high command was revised under the direction of General Suharto; individuals sus pected of complicity in the September 30 Movement, such as Air Vice Marshal Omar Dhani, were replaced; and military control was extended to the civilian intelligence agency which had been headed by Subandrio. As the Army-PKI balance was shattered, Sukarno lost a major source of his power. No longer would he be able to stay at the top of the pyramid by balancing one group off against another. The Increasingly open criticism being leveled at him from students, intellectuals, and devout Moslems also indicated considerable erosion in this popular support. Initially, however, there were only minor indications of the changes taking place. For example, at the time of the September 30th coup many observers expected that a previously-planned Conference on Foreign Bases would be postponed or even cancelled because of the unsettled conditions in Djakarta. The meeting, called "Kiapma," Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 275] === 267 by the Indonesians, was one of a series of Sukarno-sponsored gatherings of non-aligned and Communist nations to denounce neocolonialism, colonialism, and imperialism generally, and the United States in particular.^ But Sukarno deterred from one of his cherished dreams. would not be Postponing the event by only one week, he was able to open it on October 17, with flags of the "New Emerging Forces" flying outside the Hotel Indonesia. Americanism. 75 The oonference itself was an orgy of antione after the other the delegates rose to de nounce the location of American bases around the world and American actions in Vietnam. There was a tape from Bertrand Russell and a telegram from the American writer and Peking-resi dent, Anna Louise Strong, both condemning American "aggression" in Vietnam. hi s accustomed attempt, When Sukarno fire. he w a r n e d rose Without against speak, directly "subversion" seemed to have ref e r r i n g to the stooges coup of imperialism. 7^Kiapma billboards showed the people of Indonesia slaughtering "necolim" Americans with "kris," long-bladed "golok," and farming rakes. By the time the conference was held, Indone sians were slaughtering each other with such weapons. ^^For accounts of Kiapma from a leftist point of view see: N.S.C., "The October Conference In Djakarta," Eastern Horizon V:I (January, 1966) pp. 47-49 and "For Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases," Peking Review (November 5, 1965) pp. 16-19. A Western view of Kiapma is provided by Seth King, The New York Times, October 18, 1965. 7^An unnamed "American delegate" to the conference told of the U.S. being responsible in Vietnam for the killing of 170,000 civilians, 800,000 maimed by torture, 5>000 burned alive, disembowelled or beheaded, 100,000 killed or maimed by chemical poisons, and 400,000 detained and savagely treated. Quoted by N.S.C., o£. clt., p. 48. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 276] === 268 Sukarno charged that agents of the CIA had once again been trying to upset the "New Emerging Forces" in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But there were differences about this conference. Mrs. Utami Surjadarma, a Communist selected to organize it, was superseded as chairman by a more moderate leftist Moslem, and paratroopers raided the premises during the proceedings to arrest five Indonesian members of the conference secre tariat. It was clear to all who attended that times were changing in Indonesia. 77 As the Army continued to press its advantage against the Communists, Sukarno himself became increasingly aware of 78 his own weakened position. Unable to arrive at a formula which would return the old balance with the Army and Moslems on the right and the Communists on the left, the Indonesian President spoke of establishing a new "nationalist" (that is, nonChinese lining) Communist Party. But it was only rhetoric. Despite twice-repeated orders to anti-Communist demonstrators to stop destroying property and homes of those believed to be 77 See report by William Worthy, o£. cit., p. 11. Every effort was being made to hide this fact before the world. Seth King quoted an unnamed "highly-placed government source" (possibly Subandrio or Ruslan Abdulgani) to say that Sukarno "has not even been dented here or abroad by this coup. Vis-a-vis the outside world we can still say "to hell with the United States and to hell with China." The New York Times, October 14, 1965. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 277] === 269 associated with the September 30th Movement, the pillage continued. An order to the Army to shoot demonstrators brought silent but firm non-compliance. To save his seemingly fast-ebbing power, Sukarno fell back on a ploy which had served him well in previous efforts to stir up popular sup port: He and his associates hinted, implied, insinuated, intimated, suggested— and sometimes openly charged— that American imperialists, working through the Central Intelligence Agency, were responsible for the chaos in which Indonesia found itself and for the anti-Left campaign being conducted by the Army and its allies. If the military leadership could be depicted as puppets, carrying out the will of "Necolim," it might be brought to heel once again. Following a meeting of Sukarno’s Cabinet Presidium, Saleh told the press that: We are also aware that American imperialists are now making efforts to dissociate Indonesia from its close friend, People’s China, but our close relations with China couldn’t be easily broken by American imperialism. About the same time, Foreign Minister Subandrio charged that some anti-Communist newspapers in Djakarta had been financed by the CIA. And the mouthpiece for his ministry, The Indonesian Herald, said editorially: America "...We can deduce that and its insufferable CIA would very much love to 79 Quoted in A.P. dispatch from Djakarta, The Washington Post. October 21, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 278] === 270 sway events in Indonesia in their own direction.” 80 pre-Gestapu timts such an assault would almost certainly have cowed Sukarno's enemies, but now there were vigorous ripostes from those under attack. Following Subandrio's charge about CIA-funded publications, the editors of twelve Djakarta newspapers and magazines met to issue a statement challenging the Foreign Minister to specify the newspapers and to prove his charges. This forced a damaging admittance from Subandrio that he had no proof beyond hearsay. Moreover, the Army turned references to the CIA to its own uses. There were now two CIA's, the Army-controlled Jakarta Mall editorialized: the American agency and the "Chinese Intel ligence Agency." Indonesia did not like either, the newspaper said, and had had enough meddling from abroad. 81 Moreover, General Suharto could justify the Army's pressure on the Communists in terms of its obligation to get all the facts on events leading to the coup and the counter-coup. "This includes the fact of whether the slander against the Army, that a general's council was planning to overthrow the November 2, 1965. The editorial also stated: "...For Indonesian politicians to be denounced by American newspapers is by no means something new; In fact, it is a certificate of good orientation. On the other hand, for an Indonesian to be hailed by the American press is a sign he is sumely on the wrong road." See John Hughes' dispatch from Djakarta, The Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 279] === government with help of the CIA, is true,” he reportedly told Sukarno. 82 No doubt noting the relative failure of his associates' attempts to link the United States with the Army's purge of the PKI, Sukarno, in a dramatic escalation of allega tions, charged that the United States had once offered him a large personal bribe to spread Western ideas throughout Indonesia. In an address to the Cabinet broadcast nation wide from Bogor on November 6, the Indonesian President ac cused former Amkassador Jones of having offered him 150 million rupiahs (apparently about $3.3 million at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time the offer allegedly was made) in order to "develop the free world ideology in Indonesia." also claimed that shortly after the coup attempt he had been approached by Ambassador Green who had said, "We love Indonesia' 82 cSeth King, dispatch from Djakarta, The New York Times, October 24, 1965. "If it is not true," Suharto is said to have continued, "we hope that the President bears this in mind, because this would mean that the Army was slandered and the Great Leader of the Revolution [Sukarno] was also slandered, as the Army is a tool of the revolution." Sukarno may well have gotten the idea for this gam bit from an incident in Singapore the previous August. Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister, said he had been offered a bribe of $3 million to keep quiet about a CIA attempt to buy secrets about Communist China from Singapore undercover men. The incident drew worldwide attention as the State Department first denied Lee's charge, but was later forced to admit that it was the truth when he produced documentary proof. The entire matter was a diplomatic blunder for the U.S. For accounts of the speech see Kosut, od. c it., p. 114, and New York Times, November 7, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 280] === 272 we want to help President that implied several Sukarno's Despite ing policy comment. he had American rejected both they were being backed charges l in e s. th a t in o f f e r i n g captured radical-Moslem Darul confessed that its Indonesia" of an that, American bribe however, of silence Privately the the offers, Indonesian Army officials Embassy offer by the Agency Development, ministry, a result to p r o v i d e of a request elementary offer ha d been presented mission had proval. file his Because textbooks seemingly amounts construed American diplomats concluded that tation to w h i c h apparently tortions. Moreover, Islam were patently the false the were its file The and A m b a s s a d o r aid and the and ideas, this American The Embassy's Indonesians education letter of ap comparable had b e e n about cer International spreading Western charges and Indonesian enthusiastic States. consideration Sukarno had referred. c o n v i n c e d th e opened textbooks. for of money approach might th e school to S ukarno United situation— refused th e old charged Department— maintain editors, than year and offer made world hea d tain Djakarta newspaper a more The Islam rebels had th e State Indonesian aid. presen of S u k a r n o ' s a i d to t h e Green's dis Darul approach, i f it had indeed occurred, was h a r d l y of a c o n s p i ratorial nature, The a u t h o r was unable to estab lish conclusively w h e t h e r G r e e n d i d or d i d no t s e e S u k a r n o i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e cou p. The general American policy, Sukarno's constant refusals t o m e e t w i t h G r e e n, a n d r e p o r t s t h a t t he U. S. a m b a s s a d o r d i d no t s e e e i t h e r N a s u t i o n or S u k a r n o f o r m o r e t h a n a m o n t h a f t e r G e s t a p u w o u l d l e a d o n e t o b e l i e v e t h a t S u k a r n o w a s m a k i n g up th e m e e t i n g. However, inquiries made of U.S. officials have not r e c e i v e d c a t e g o r i c a l d e n i a l s t h a t a n y s u c h a p p r o a c h h a d b e e n m a d e by G r e e n. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 281] === 273 The net result, according to one American official, was to discredit Sukarno even further among the Indonesian political elite. Increasingly Sukarno appeared to be at bay. His di rectives largely unheeded, his policies and personal life under attack, the Indonesian President seemed to be faltering badly. There were rumors of mental deterioration. 85 December 7, in a seemingly intemperate mood, he dared the People's Consultive Assembly to vote him out of office. Finally, on December 14, Sukarno was forced to transform his Supreme Operational Command into a triumvirate which was to rule as an executive body under him. The three sub-commanders were Nasution, who was to handle military affairs; Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, governor of the Jogjakarta district, for economic matters; and Ruslan Abdulgani, for social and political affairs. In the shift, Foreign Minister Subandrio was eliminated from his former post as commander of the Indonesian National Front. The move represented a distinct triumph for the Nasution/Suharto Army leadership. The Sultan, a former Defense Minister, subscribed to its objectives, and Abdulgani, although a longtime Sukarnoist, was acceptable. ^ A m o n g those who believe that Sukarno was suffering severe mental fatigue during this and subsequent periods are Hatta and Galbraith (Interviews) and Mrs. Adams, on. c i t., p. 215. Other U.S. officials warn against putting too much emphasis on the point since he demonstrably retained a good deal of his former cunning and political abilities. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 282] === 27b To observers it appeared that Sukarno's power effectively had been circumscribed. At the same time there were unmistakable signs of an abatement in anti-West, anti-American feeling. Lurid bill boards with ugly caricatures of Uncle Sam were torn down. Djakarta graffiti turned from anti-American slogans to such admonitions as "Hang Aidit" and "Crush the PKI." The chair man of the Nahdatul Ulama appeared as a speaker before the American Men's Association in Djakarta; a reception for the departing Francis Galbraith drew scores of Indonesians; and the strains of American popular music, once banned by Sukarno, could be heard drifting from Djakarta record shops. At the same time, American officials were growing less reti cent to discuss U,S.-Indonesian relations. In reply to a newsman's observations about the decline in anti-American feeling, Ambassador Green called it "understandable": Our policy is directed toward trying to maintain the true independence of this country. This is what the Indonesians really want. have no difference over this.°° Symptomatic of the thaw in Indonesian-American relations were renewed public contacts. On December 10, Green met with the first deputy foreign minister, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, to discuSs "the standpoints of the two governments on various Seth King, Djakarta dispatch, The New York Times, December 5, 1965. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 283] === 275 international say with that issues.” th e United States I n d o n e s i a by the return PK I ability Suwito stages. of A m e r i c a n to wage 88 hoped One dependents civil war emerged the m e e t i n g to normalize relations of t h e from first w o u l d be Indonesia. now destroyed, With plans the were laid 89 return About the the w omen and children same the Army time the United States. the President "Their a n d t o th e in e a r l y J a n u a r y. leadership mission was American sent only emissaries e x p l a i n to government what the situ- 90 a t i o n in I n d o n e s i a is like," General Suharto later explained. Indonesian Information Service, Djakarta, December Even the a n t i - A m e r i c a n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s we r e polite. W h e n f o r t y t r u c k l o a d s of s t u d e n t s f r o m K A M I s t a g e d a d e m o n s t r a t i o n a g a i n s t th e V i e t n a m W a r, t h e y m e r e l y h a n d e d a p r o t e s t n o t e t o A m b a s s a d o r G r e e n w h i c h he p r o m i s e d to f o r w a r d to Washington. Th e y t h e n p r o c e e d e d to the Chinese Embassy w hich w a s c l o s e d a n d l o c k e d w h e n t h e y a r r i v e d, so t h a t s o m e s t u d e n t s t r i e d to t e a r d o w n th e e m b a s s y gates. 11, 1965. S u w i t o t o l d the p r e s s t h a t G r e e n d i d n ot s e e m e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t t o u c h i n g on t h e M a l a y s i a n q u e s t i o n. The United S t a t e s, i n p r i n c i p l e, d i d no t w i s h t o get t o o i n v o l v e d in the c o n f r o n t a t i o n d i s p u t e, he a d d e d, S u w i t o f u r t h e r t o l d n e w s m e n t h a t he h a d r e c e i v e d t h e i m p r e s s i o n f r o m G r e e n t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s n o w h a d a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o b j e c t i v e s a n d a s p i r a t i o n s by I n d o n e s i a n s o c i e t y. I b i d. S u w i t o e a r l i e r had ope n e d the do o r to talks w i t h Green w h e n o n a t r i p t o T h a i l a n d in N o v e m b e r he s a i d I n d o n e s i a w a s a w a r e t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i s h e d t o i m p r o v e r e l a t i o n s an d t h a t "we w i l l d o o u r b e s t t o i m p r o v e r e l a t i o n s. " Antara, D i s p a t c h f r o m B a n g k o k, N o v e m b e r 16, 1965. 89 December T h e w i f e of A m b a s s a d o r G r e e n, h o w e v e r, r e t u r n e d in a c c o r d i n g t o th e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, D e c e m b e r 20, 1965. ^interview with Bernard Krisher, Newsweek, September 5, 1966, p. 43. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 284] === 276 There were also some tentative moves toward reviving certain forms of foreign aid. In early January, the American ambassa dor met with Achmad Jusuf, the Indonesian Trade Minister, to discuss economic cooperation. A prime topic was the Indonesians' desire for the United States to supply rice, which was in short supply domestically at the time, a condi tion which represented a further threat to internal order. The American mission subsequently denied, however, that there were any plans for resuming a foreign aid program in Indonesia. 91 Undoubtedly, however, first steps toward its re vival had been taken. Sukarno Makes a Comeback American observers— like many of his domestic antago nists— had, however, underestimated Sukarno's staying power and ability to re-establish himself at the helm of Indonesia's ship of state. Although it appeared that the Indonesian President, famous up to that time for his political flair and intuition, had lost his understanding of, and ability to control, the tide of events in Indonesia, he continued to retain considerable power and maneuverability. In a canny effort to sweeten his image internationally, for example, he authorized the publication and distribution of his autobiography. Although it depicted some of the seamier 9-'•The New York Times, January 10, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 285] === 277 sides of his personality, the book's major theme was Sukarno as the spark of the Indonesian revolution, the father of his country, a man who had suffered much, worked long, borne the burden of the independence struggle and stood like 92 a colossus above other figures on the Indonesian landscape. The portrait which emerged from the autobiography was, as John Allison, America's former ambassador to Indonesia, put it: "a man who cannot be ignored and who must not be underrated." 93 The publication was successful in focusing the attention of political elites worldwide on Sukarno the leader. According to Mrs. Adams, to make sur»e the books reached the right hands, Sukarno ordered Indonesian chiefs of mission in every land to buy twenty-five copies out of their personal 914 funds for distribution to politicians in the host country. Meanwhile, at home, Sukarno was moving to consolidate his support within the Indonesian government. As the result of his skillful penetration of the state apparatus and the continual accumulation of power in his hands since 1957, many officials in influential positions owed their appointments 92 The book devoted 263 pages to Sukarno's career prior to independence and only 49 to the events of the fifteen years which followed. ^ The Saturday Review (November 20, 1965) p. 37. 7 O p. clt., p. 272. "...Sukarno's image had been badly dented. He prepared to hammer it back into shape with the fortuitously timed publication of his autobiography," she noted. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 286] === 278 to him. 95 Now as their President called upon them for sup port and loyalty, they responded, fearing for their own futures in any radical change. Sukarno also sought to exploit differences within the army hierarchy. No one, for example, was more vigorously anti-Communist than General Ibrahim Adjie, commander of the Siliwangi Division. Yet Adjie continued to support Sukarno and without the assured loyalty of the Siliwangi, no direct move by the President's opponents was possible. There also were those in the polit ical parties who had succumbed to Sukarno's charisma or for whom he was a source of patronage. Finally, there was Sukarno's hold on the Indonesian masses— its strength and depth uncertain. But since those who opposed him feared the consequences of removing him by force— including the danger of civil war— Sukarno was able to hold this threat above their heads like the sword of Damocles. The turning point for Sukarno— and one of the most cru cial days in the life of General Nasution— came on December 18, Just four days after the President had been forced to ac cept governmental changes which brought two of his opponents For an interesting and extensive list of these positions, see 0. G. Roeder, "No Journey's End," The Far Eastern Economic Review LI:3 (January 20, 1965) p. 85-88. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 287] === 279 to positions of power second only to the presidency itself. At a meeting in the Presidential Palace, Nasution, in his new position as subcommander of KOTI, confronted Sukarno with an Army-backed plan for reforming the government. The plan, in effect, would have established a kind of "super-government" with military personnel assigned to oversee the operations of each agency. Sukarno quickly saw through the scheme as a thinly disguised attempt by his enemies to seize control of governmental machinery. In an angry exchange of words, Sukarno refused to approve the idea. Whereupon Nasution vowed that the plan would be forced through despite the President's 97 opposition. He then went home and did nothing. 96 The events recounted here were reconstructed from accounts by highly reliable diplomatic sources. To the author’s knowledge, no account of this crucial NasutionSukarno confrontation has appeared elsewhere. The events of December 18 go far toward explaining some subsequent occurrences which have never been adequately understood. * This incident marked the apex of Nasution’s power and the beginning of its decline. His inability to face off against Sukarno would gain him the lasting sobriquet of "Indonesia's Hamlet.1' Moreover, his subordinate, General Suharto, would soon displace him at the top of the Army hierarchy and as leader of the anti-Sukarno forces. For Americans who had placed much confidence in Nasution as a future non-Communist leader of Indonesia, it was a distinct shock that he should prove to be wanting in the time of crisis and would be replaced by a man who was almost totally unknown to them. A.s one diplomat put it: "We tended to project abilities and objectives for Nasution which he just did not have." Interview with Mr. Frank Under hill, Manila, September 4, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 288] === 280 Sensing weakness and indecision in this response, Sukarno once again went on the offensive. He appealed for an end to Sino-Indonesian frictions in the interests of in tensifying the struggle against "necolim," and reasserted his belief in the necessity of the Djakarta-Pnom Penh-HanoiPeking-Pyongyang "axis." He stepped up attempts to protect the PKI and called the Communist Party the one which had contributed most to Indonesia. Perhaps his most notable ploy came in mid-January when he promoted— initially through Dr. Subandrio and later personally--the formation of a "Sukarno Front" with branches throughout Indonesia. was to be political organization around which his remaining followers and sympathizers could rally in his support against the military. Moreover, to demonstrate his strength before the rest of the world, he issued a declaration on January 11 ordering that all American correspondents be expelled from Indonesia. 98 The same day three American newsmen, R. E. Stannard Jr. of United Press International, Donald Kirk of the New York Times Sukarno had previously given some warning about such a ban in a November 20 speech in Bogor. The Indonesian Herald, November 23-V 1965. In typical fashion, he chose a dramatic way of announcing it. Turning on a small cluster of newsmen at Merdeka Palace duping a ceremony installing a new Indo nesian ambassador to Syria, Sukarno said: "I told you before that I would kick out all foreign correspondents who report lies. To hell with your lies! All correspondents out!" Time, January 21, 1966, p. 25B. See also The Washington Post, January 12, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 289] === 281 and Antoine Yard of Associated Press received letters of expulsion from the Foreign Office. The letters accused the Americans of filing stories hostile to the people of Indo nesia, meddling into Indonesia's internal affairs, reporting fabrications and slandering the nation's le a d e r s. ^ The real reason for the expulsion, and one scarcely concealed by Sukarno, were stories which had appeared in the American press implying that the President had been stripped of his power and that the Army was not running the government. His prestige and pride hurt, he retaliated by banning the correspondents. Given the anti-Americanism still rampant in Indonesia, his action was not likely to meet any domestic opposition, while at the same time guaranteeing worldwide headlines. Sukarno and his associates also stepped up their efforts to encourage the belief among the ordinary people of Indo nesia that there had been a rightwing conspiracy, financed from abroad, of which Gestapu and the purge of the PKI had been a part. On January 20, the President said he had "ample and clear proof" that attempts had been made to overthrow him, 100 not only by "necolim" but also by their agents in Indonesia. 9^Text of letter in Antara News Bulletin, January 13, 1965. The trio was given a week from January 12 to put their affairs in order and leave. On January 19, the Indonesian Journalists Association demanded that Communist Chinese cor respondents also be expelled. 100Antara, January 20, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 290] === 282 Foreign Minister Subandrio spoke darkly of "secret attempts to turn the Indonesian revolution to the right," X01 and Chaerul Saleh, at a rally of the pro-Sukarno Indonesian National Student Movement, linked the American Central Intel ligence Agency with an attempt to overthrow the Sukarno regime. -*-02 Moreover, the Sukarno clique may well have believed that it had in custody, if not an American "super spy," then certainly a hostage who might be used in a propaganda effort aimed at discrediting the United States and Indonesian moderates,or as barter with the West in some future contin gency. The prisoner was the Reverend Harold Lovestrand, an American missionary who had been arrested with his family 103 in West Irian during a local Papuan revolt in mid-1965. Although his wife and children soon were released, Lovestrand Quoted by Sukarno at student rally, Djakarta Domestic Service in Indonesia, February 28, 1966. (FBIS trans lation, March 1, 1966). 102 Ibid. See also Subandrio's statement to the Sukarno Front secretariat on March 7 in which he dwelled on the role of the CIA in subverting revolutionary countries. Indonesian Information Service in English, Djakarta. Saleh also hinted that British diplomats had been responsible for some student demonstrations. Vietnam also provided an excuse for antiAmerican statements. Subandrio, for example, declared that a victory by the Vietnamese over the American "imperialists" would also be a victory for the Indonesian people. Antara, February 21, 1966. 103 Harold Lovestrand has told his own story in a book, Hostage in Djakarta (Chicago: The Moody Bible Press, 1967). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 291] === himself was transferred to a Djakarta prison where efforts were made to obtain a confession from him that he was a CIA agent sent to Irian to stir up local tribesmen. But Indo nesian authorities were unable to budge the missionary from 10 4 his denial of any knowledge about the Papuan revolt. Meanwhile, the State Department, working through the Indo nesian embassy in Washington and the American embassy in Djakarta, were making repeatedly unsuccessful efforts to have Lovestrand released. The entire matter was kept away from the press to avoid publicity unfavorable to Indonesia which might, it was felt, adversely affect the missionary’s eventual chances of release. An American university student with access to Sukarno asked the President to intervene per sonally, but he refused, claiming to know little about the case. Mrs. Adams obtained Subandrio’s promise to release Lovestrand, but the Foreign Minister later backed down and it was not until after the climactic events of mid-March, 1966, that the missionary was released and expelled from the country. Throughout the entire "tricky period," therefore, the American embassy had the additional concern of an American citizen whose future well-being seemed to depend upon his use as a 104 Althouge Lovestrand suffered from illness and mal nutrition, and some trickery was involved in their approach, the Indonesians do not appear to have applied methods of extracting confessions which have been developed In totali tarian states. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 292] === 284 pawn in the Sukarnoists' 105 ascendancy. life-or-death efforts to achieve By mid-February, 1966, Sukarno felt strong enough to move against his principal rival, Nasution. In a bold stroke that apparently took anti-Sukarno forces by sumprise, the President on February 21, dismissed the Sumatran general from all his official capacities: minister of defense, chief of staff of the armed forces and deputy commander of KOTI,^^^ and undertook a major cabinet reorganization designed to halt or slow the anti-Communist campaign. Fourteen other ministers and subministers with military affiliations were ousted, including Vice Admiral R. E. Martadinata, a leading anti-Communist and protege of Nasution. The Army general staff was dissolved and KOTI was converted into KOGAM (Command for the Crushing of 'Malaysia'). Sukarno himself headed KOGAM, but General Suharto, retaining his post as Army chief, became KOGAM's chief of staff. With this act, Nasution's private humiliation at the hands of Sukarno became public. Although the general was believed aware of his coming dismissal, 105 This incident has been reconstructed from the booklength account by Lovestrand himself; Mrs. Adams, o j d. c l t., p. 287ff; and conversations with U.S. officials. The author is particularly indebted to Mr. Robert Rich of the State Department, who regularly visited Lovestrand in prison, for information concerning this case. "^^In January, Sukarno had blocked a move by Nasution and his supporters to fill the vacant vice presidential post with Nasution. Having attempted to seize new power and having failed, this faction had lost some prestige and elan. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 293] === 285 he evidently did little to save himself. Once the news was announced, he virtually dropped from sight, save for a radio appeal to the Indonesian people to "defend the unity of the armed forces, the masses and the great leader of the revolution, President Sukarno." 107 A seeming reaffirmation of Sukarno’s power, these events were a severe blow to his opponents. The development of late February also came as a shock to the United States which had placed its hopes and confidence in General Nasution. Forbidding even private comment on the situation, however, the State Department braced itself and resumed a public posture of watchful waiting. were not encouraging. Initial signs Two days after Nasution was down graded, three hundred pro-Sukarno demonstrators broke into the grounds of the American Embassy. Climbing over the iron fence in front of the mission building, they shouted "Go home Yankees" and "To Hell with Green" ripping down the 108 American flag from its staff. 107 The New York Times, March 1, 1966. The general also was reported by Djakarta radio to say that certain groups were waging "political guerrilla warfare to defend the actions of the Indonesian Communist Party." IrtQ See the New York Times, February 24, 1966. The Embassy protested the incident to the Foreign Ministry and in Washington an anonymous spokesman broke official silence to comment that it was hoped recent signs of improvement in U.S.-Indonesian relations would not be jeopardized by a recurrence of such demonstrations. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 294] === 286 At least equally disturbing was an announcement by a government official that the American-owned Stanvac Oil Company would be taken over by Indonesia in a few days. This threat was the result of a breakdown in negotiations between the Indonesians and the three oil companies in December. The companies had refused to completely "Indonesianize" their operations by January 1, 1966, maintaining that they needed at least a few of their top-echelon men to oversee operations. Rather than submit, Royal Dutch-Shell Oil Com pany sold its oil fields, refineries and other facilities to the Indonesian government for $110 million. Stanvac and Caltex, however, stood firm (possibly because of their read ing of the changed political climate) and now faced outright confiscation. With Sukarno back in power, that eventuality seemed assured. The Final, Crucial Days By far the most serious concern of the American mission, however, was the state of near anarchy which reigned in Djakarta in the days which followed Sukarno's dismissal of Nasution. Day after day the leaders of KAMI and KAPPI, the secondary school student organization, sent tens of thousands 109 of student members into the streets of the capital city. ^ • ^ A c c o r d i n g to Nono Makarim, at the height of their power, the student leaders could put 30,000 demonstrators into action at less than three hours notice. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 295] === 287 Their activities brought traffic to a virtual halt and fences and walls along every important street were scrawled with slogans demanding the removal of Subandrio and the Communist Party. The Foreign Minister became a particular target and massive protest rallies were held In front of his offices on March 1, 3 and 5, while next door, American Embassy offi cials watched with mixed anxiety and fascination. The crucial date was March 8. On that day, student demonstrators stormed the Foreign Ministry, sacked it, and held the building for five hours until police disbursed them with tear gas. Afterward, Sukarno regime officials would claim that secret documents had been stolen and put in the hands of American and British diplomats. The following day, as Sukarno inspected the damage personally, he charged that agents of "Necolim" were behind the demonstrations and hinted that he knew of agents who had paid the students to rampage. With the increase in student militancy had come an intensified, government-backed anti-American campaign, a desperate effort to divert attention from student unrest and 110The Army was later to announce that documents taken on that occasion had linked Subandrio to a plot to kill the re maining anti-Communist generals which had been arranged with the Communist Chinese. Student leader Witoelar, who was among those seizing the documents, told the author that they were turned over to the military and he has no idea what they contained. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 296] === 288 dissent * On the same day that the KAMI and KAPPI demonstrators had reduced the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to a shambles, the worst assault ever was unleashed against the United States Embassy. A well-trained group of some two hundred young men charged the high fence surrounding the Embassy compound. It was easily scaled and the attackers poured onto the grounds. Halted by the grillwork which Ambassador Green had ordered constructed across the face of the embassy build ing, they began bombarding the building and its next-door annex with rocks. Several smashed through the windows of the Ambassador's office.111 Armed with fire bombs and Molotov cocktails, the attackers had apparently come with the intention of burning out the Embassy building. But their bombs, including one thrown inside Green's office, either fizzled or were put out. There were, however, about twenty-five American vehicles parked in the compound. A number were burned and almost all suffered damage. Before they left the demonstrators tore down 112 the American flag and replaced it with the Indonesian flag. 111 Thereafter, as a conversation piece for his office, Green displayed a chunk of rough rock, one of the missiles which had been thrown by demonstrators, atop a piece of marble which had been thrown at the Embassy from a mob in the early 1960s. It suggested, according to the Ambassador, a deterio ration in quality among Indonesian demonstrations. 112 For a more detailed account of the attack on the U.S. Embassy, see Hughes, o£. cit., pp. 223-226. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 297] === 289 The attack had caught the Embassy staff by surprise. Green himself was at home eating lunch when word came that the mission was beseiged. Although his impulse was to return immediately to the Embassy, security officials strongly umged him to stay at home. Returning only after the demonstrators had gone, Green and his staff set to work preparing for subsequent onslaughts which seemed sure to come. Workmen were dispatched to weld barbed wire to the top of the ladder like, easily-scaled compound fence. Personnel began to burn sensitive documents lest they fall into the hands of looters. Monitoring Djakarta radio that evening, U.S. diplomats heard the crowd at a Sukarno speech screaming, "Chase out Green! Chase out Green!" Although the following day brought news that antiCommunist students had stormed and sacked the villa housing Hsinhua, China's official news agency, there also were credible reports that the Sukarnoists were mustering their forces for even more serious action against the American mission. formation was that plans had been made for a March 12 "burn out" against American personnel similar to the one which had been directed against the British in September, 1963, following the formation of Malaysia. The prospect was a distinctly chilling one for Ambassador Green and his staff. The Embassy R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 298] === 290 wives and children had only recently returned to Indonesia. 113 Families of American diplomats lived in many parts of Djakarta; protection for each one seemed out of the question, particu larly with some of the city's police in the control of proSukarno elements. On the other hand, gathering everyone in one location— such as the Embassy building— posed equally impossible problems of logistics and security. For a time it appeared that the Congo-like kind of rescue operation which the President had sought to avoid in Indonesia might even be necessary to save lives. worried," admitted one diplomat. 114 "We were very, very Late in the afternoon of March 10, however, the Ambassador received word that General Suharto and the Army had the situation under control. Every one breathed a bit easier. It was becoming clear that Sukarno's resurgence had reached its peak and that his power was waning fast. His bold moves had been calculated on inaction by the Army. He had not, however, reckoned on the student protest. Goaded on by the demands of the youth, military leaders, including General wife of the cultural affairs attache'had been stopped by demonstrators on March 8 as she drove toward the embassy. Although her car was set ablaze and gutted, she was not harmed. 114 The withdrawal of American dependents at a time when there was no danger and their return when the situation was critical has caused some criticism. Diplomats point out the perpetual superiority of hindsight and contend that the decision made in both instances were the result of careful consideration of reasonable estimates of the situation as it appeared at the time. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 299] === 291 Suharto and Nasution, met in early March and solidified support against Sukarno. Among those participating was General Adjie, the Siliwangi commander, who by this time had been convinced of the President's complicity in Gestapu. Acting on behalf of this group, Brig. Gen. Amir Machmud, the Djakarta garrison commander, on March 11 handed Sukarno an ultimatum demanding that he dismiss Foreign Minister Subandrio and turn over government powers to the Army in view of the threat to public safety from anti-government riots. This confrontation took place at the Presidential Residence in Bogor where the President, with Subandrio and Saleh, had fled by helicopter following reports that troops had sur rounded the palace and were advancing. The soldiers were the para-commandos of General Sarwo Edhy. In reserve around the city were other battalions, including elements of General Adjie's Siliwangi Division. Recognizing his own impossible situation and perhaps fearing for his personal safety, Sukarno capitulated. The President signed an order authorizing General Suharto to "take necessary steps to assure security, to ensure stability of the government, and to maintain the course of the Revolution." In return, Suharto was instructed to 115 "guarantee the personal safety" of the President. ^■^Press release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1966. Even in defeat, however, Sukarno continued to be defiant. On March 12, as students and troops paraded in the streets of Djakarta, celebrating their victory, the President, through Minister of Information Achmadi, commented that: "The national revolution is being undermined both by R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 300] === Given what seemed to be virtually unlimited powers, General Suharto quickly issued a ban on the PKI. Within a week, Dr. Subandrio and fourteen other leftist cabinet members had been arrested, including Third Deputy Premier Chaerul Saleh, Information Minister Achmadi, Nationalist Party leader and former premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Jusuf Dalam, governor of the Indonesian state bank. In the next week, Suharto and his supporters reached agreement with Sukarno on a compromise cabinet reshuffle. Real power was vested in an "inner cabinet" of six deputy premiers. Three of them were Sukarno holdovers: Johannes Lemeina, Idham Chalid, and Ruslan Abdulgani. The other three were Suharto himself, Adam Malik and the Sultan of Jogjakarta. Although the changes were not all that Sukarno's opposition, particu larly the students, had hoped for, it brought to key positions the three men who would bring a "New Order" to Indonesia in coming months: Suharto's task was to maintain security, order and control throughout the archipelago with his mili tary forces; the Sultan would attempt to save the nation's badly faltering economy from total collapse; and Malik would try to restore Indonesia's damaged image before the world in order to gain needed political and economic support. the imperialists and the counter-revolutionaries.... There are 400 ways to topple a government, among them the employ ment of children to block streets and roads— as stated in a CIA handbook, which has been studied carefully by Bung Karno. Quoted by 0. G. Roeder, Far East Economic Review, LI:12 (March 24, 1966) p. 550. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 301] === 293 These developments were recelv ad by American officials with hardly concealed satisfaction, delight, and optimism. Despite an early announcement by the military that its foreign policy would be anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and gen erally anti-West, such talk was discounted as meant for home consumption only. More important than rhetoric were the ties which had been cultivated between the U.S. and the Indonesian military over the years, ties cemented by America's early and unquestioning support for the Nasution/Suharto leadership. The period of watchful waiting having ended, Ambassador Green broke official silence to tell the American Broadcasting Com pany by telephone on March 12 that Indonesia's political troubles were being handled in a "peaceful and favorable" manner. He added that he expected the military regime to move against Indonesia's leftists. Asked by newsmen whether economic assistance would be granted to Indonesia, State Departmtnt Spokesman McCloskey said on March l1* that the United States had "never ruled out the resumption of aid for now or for ever to Indonesia." On the same day a USIA release stated: H ^ T h e following day former Ambassador Jones described Suharto's coming to power as a "logical move In the mainte nance of law and order." He said he was particularly satis fied with Suharto's reputation as "a strong anti-Communist." Quoted by the Peking Review, "Applause from U.S., Britain and Malaysia," (April d, lf/66) p. 13. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 302] === 294 Concerning aid to Indonesia, other U.S. officials pointed out that at no time has the United States ruled out the possibility that it would resume its assistance at some future d a t e. H 7 Washington clearly was holding out the possibility of future aid to help rescue Indonesia's economy. For American diplomats in Djakarta and Washington, there was elation over the political demise of Sukarno; it was seen as a mark of success for United States' policy. Cutting back America's programs and presence in Indonesia, adopting a detached view toward Sukarno, making use of opportunities to assist the Army in small but significant ways,maintaining diplomatic silence for months as the situation continued in flux— all had been debatable moves, but the attempt at prudent statecraft had proven itself. Although Roger Hilsman would later contend that the United States "could no longer take credit for having strengthened" anti-Communist forces -l-i O in Indonesia, himself. the former Far Eastern Secretary was deluding By drastically reducing the American presence and commitment when the situation seemed to require it, and by • ^ P r e s s release, United States Information Agency, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1966. To Move a Nation, p. 409. Hilsman, of course, was seeking to justify the policy which was followed during his tenure, as against the one which followed it. In order to do so, however, he sharply slanted his interpretation of events. The author has discussed the Hilsman interpretation with a number of Indonesian specialists, both in and out of govern ment, and has yet to find one who finds it persuasive. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 303] === 295 acting decisively to throw some support to the Army in a crucial transitional period, the United States, while far from engineering the events in Indonesia— could take some satisfaction from the political outcome. America's long dark night in Indonesia was over, it seemed, and a new dawn had appeared. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 304] === CHAPTER V ESTABLISHING A NEW ORDER Although American officials made little effort to hide their pleasure at events in Indonesia, there was no rush to embrace the new regime with foreign aid or other forms of support. There were several reasons for this reticence: In the first place, the cold war atmosphere which had gener ated generous U.S. responses to nations like Iran and Guate mala after they threw out leftist regimes had abated con siderably. The destruction of Communist power in Indonesia was important, but equally so were the prospects of "New Order" forces to bring stability and responsibility to the government of their country. Furthermore, as Vietnam came to require greater and greater expenditures, both the Admin istration and Congress were reluctant to take on new foreign aid commitments, particularly in countries where previous experience had been discouraging. Approximately $800 million given by the United States to Indonesia in various forms, had neither created a prosperous economy in Indonesia nor had it led to friendly and cooperatively relations.1 ■’■Of the $800 million total, only $225 million was repay able in dollars, while $2^3 million was repayable in Indonesian currency. An additional $302 million was not to be repaid at all since it had been given as an outright grant. In another breakdown of the $800 million figure, Ambassador Green said of the total, some $68 million represented post-war relief. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 305] === 297 Past failures, however, did not deterministically affect the American response; rather, the changed conditions in Indonesia provided an ideal setting for the adoption and development of new methods and techniques. In Indonesia, the U.S. was starting with virtually a "clean slate." The aid program was at a standstill, agencies like the Peace Corps and the United States Information Service were either out of business altogether or virtually so, and the American Embassy itself had a reduced staff. Moves could be made without too much concern for vested bureaucratic interests. During the dark days of pre-Gestapu 1965 Marshall Green had prepared a paper on what he called "relaxed diplomacy." His main the sis was that the United States might achieve as good or better results with its foreign policy in the "Third World" if it was not so much in evidence at every turning in those countries. A less visible American presence, he suggested, could reduce friction points between the U.S. and the people of the host country. American objectives might better be carried out through multilateral organizations or through the program^ in 1946-48, $280 million was assistance provided through A.I.D. and predecessor agencies, $290 million was provided in surplus U.S. good and fiber under P.L. 480 and $162 million was in the form of Export-Import Bank loans. At a press conference in Djakarta, December 20, 1966. Reported in a news release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., January 24, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 306] === offices of friendly third countries. Conditions in pre- Gestapu Indonesia had virtually forced the adoption of such a policy there in 1965. It had proven its worth then and during the period of watchful waiting which followed. Now Green and his embassy staff would seek to carry the policy through into what hopefully would be a period of reconcili ation and reconstruction in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia. The Triumvirate: Suharto, Malik, and the Sultan Of the three top figures in the "New Order" scheme, two— Adam Malik and the Sultan of Jogjakarta— were well known to the Americans and respected for their abilities. But the key figure in the triumvirate and the one with the Army behind him, Suharto, was relatively unknown. graphical facts were clear but of little help: The bio Born on February 20, 1921, in Djogjakarta, Central Java, General Suharto had entered a Dutch military cadre school in Gombong following elementary and secondary school training. During the Japanese Occupation he joined the PETA, Indonesian home defense corps, and held several commanding positions during ^Interview, October 28, 1968. "I looked around and saw that the Japanese and Australians were better liked and seemingly more effective than we were in certain situa tions. And I thought, bhy not let them do things for us?" Green, of course, is not the only one who has espoused such ideas. Others have been George Kennan, Senator Fulbright, Kenneth Young of the Asia Society, and John D. Rockefeller III all of whom have written on the problem of American "overpresence"and high visibility abroad. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 307] === 299 the independence struggle. His rise through the Army ranks had been steady but not spectacular, and his reputation had been built on his abilities as a military technician, not as a politician, A Moslem with a strong affinity for Javanese mysticism, Suharto was reputed to be a strong anti-Communist. Unknown, however, were his views on policies toward the West, his interest in economic reconstruction for Indonesia, and his attitudes on an appropriate governmental system, including the measure of political and social freedom to be allowed. On the last count, however, there were early favorable signs. On May 17 > 1966, the regime began releasing political prisoners, many of them jailed by Sukarno for more than four years without trial. Among them were Mohammed Roem, former foreign minister and a leader of the moderate Moslem Masjumi Party; Editor Mochtar Lubis; and Anak Agung Gde Agung, another former foreign minister. The movement for their release had gained momentum with the death in Switzerland of Sutan Sjahrir. Imprisoned in early 1962, he had been allowed to go abroad in 1965 in order to seek medical treatment. Fifteen political prisoners were released in time to attend the funeral of revolutionary hero and thirteen others, jailed for involvement ^For a detailed biography of General Suharto, see Focus on Indonesia, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C. (August, 1967) pp. 6-7. The general is married monogamously and has six children. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 308] === 300 in the PRRI-Permesta revolt, were later given their freedom. ** Increased freedom of the press was another indication of the restoral of personal liberties in Indonesia. "The Government wants to guarantee freedom of expression and opinion consistent with Indonesia's Constitution," declared Adam Malik. As practical proof of these intention, journal ists suspended for participating in the ill-fated Body for the Protection of Sukarnoism were rehabilitated. Within a few days after March 11, Sukarno's Information Minister Achmadi was arrested, press restrictions he had enforced were revoked, his successor pledged not to attempt to dictate to the press, and, as a result, the Indonesian press showed signs of new freedom in its reporting and new courage in its editorials.^ Sjahrir's funeral was the occasion of a funeral oration by Hatta in which he criticized Sukarno indirectly for having imprisoned Sjahrir on false evidence and looked toward a more just future: "May the sacrifice paid by Sutan Sjahrir with his death make us aware that we should, as soon as possible, restore the direction of the state to its right track. The Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pantjasila, should promote truth, justice and humanitarianism, to achieve... happiness and social justice for the people." Antara, Djakarta, April 19, 1966. Quoted in the New York Times, June 29, 1966. ^For example, Kompas, the Catholic Party weekly, said: "From now on our target must be the present government, which must work aware that the press will be a social control on them [sic] ready to hit them whenever they deviate." Quoted in the New York Times.December 4, 1965. For a survey of the Indonesian press between 1954-1964, see the author's "The Press and Politics in Indonesia," Journalism Quarterly, 44:1 (Spring, 1967) pp. 99-106. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 309] === 301 Reported In the American press, indications of a more liberal rule in Indonesia impressed many politically-aware Americans and convinced them that— as President Johnson put it: "In Indonesia there are 100 million people that enjoy a measure of freedom today that they didn't enjoy yesterday." On the economic front, there were similar encouraging words from Sultan Hamengku Bowono. The former Indonesian minister of state and defense minister had been appointed auditing minister by Sukarno in 1964. Since that post was constitutionally independent from the executive branch and be cause it Interested Sukarno very little, the hereditary Moslem ruler was given a relatively free hand to study the problems of Indonesia's finances. This experience would serve him well when the responsibility was at last his to find solutions. Indonesia's economic problem was simple and stark. a nation can be bankrupt, Indonesia was in 1966. nearly $2.5 billion to creditor nations. It owed To pay the 1966 carrying charges on the debt, together with interest defaulted in 1965, would require about $470 million. That figure was approximately equal to the amount which Indonesia had set for its export goal in 1966. Excluding food, imports were expected In remarks to U.S. servicemen at Camp Stanley, South Korea, November 1, 1966. Department of State Bulletin, No vember 21, 1966, p. 773. It is possiBTe to overemphasize the impact of such feelings on policy itself, however. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 310] === 302 to cost $300 million, with rice purchases reaching an additional $50 million. Other costs, such as shipping goods in foreign ships, insurance, private remittances, travel ex penditures and embassy expenses abroad, would exceed $100 million. Therefore, without paying off one dollar on the interest or principal of its foreign debt, Indonesia would be operating within $20 million of what it earned abroad. Some of that amount, in addition, would be consumed by local expenses requiring dollars or "hard" currencies. By the time the New Order came into power, Indonesia's credit had been destroyed in the international market. When the Bank of Indonesia failed to honor letters of credit, the Japanese government, the country's major creditor, decided to stop guaranteeing exports to Indonesia. This came at a time when Indonesia badly needed foreign exchange and credits to buy food and clothing. In the meantime, inflation was rampant domestically (it would reach more than 650 percent in 1966) and those Indonesians within the money economy were faced with the grim prospect of ever spiraling upward food prices. Into this perilous situation, the Sultan of Jogjakarta stepped with what he called an "eight-point economic recovery program." In statements to the Indonesian press and public on April 4 and April 12, he made these principal points: R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 311] === 303 In a candid assessment, the Sultan admitted that Indonesia was unable to repay its foreign debts and still be able to finance essential imports from existing foreign exchange earnings. He announced that the government would approach the country's creditors about rescheduling the debts. Government policy, both domestic and foreign, was to be judged by economic considerations, not ideological or political ones. "We will welcome foreign aid without politi cal strings from all countries if given with due respect for national sovereignty and national sensibilities," he said. The program emphasized the need to rehabilitate the economic infra-structure, particularly the nation's creaking transportation system, by importation of spare parts for all types of vehicles. There was to be increased economic decentraliza tion, with the regions allowed to play a more active and positive role In development. The taxation system would be surveyed and improved. Government-owned enterprises were to be operated along rational economic lines. Antara, Djakarta, April 4, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 312] === 304 While socialism was declared to be the long-range goal of the Indonesian state, private enterprise was to be given an opportunity to develop in order to assist in the rehabilitation and stabilization of the economy. The Sultan promised that the government "would cease to consider big and moderate-sized businesses as enemies of our state." Instead, regulations hobbling the private sector would be reviewed and private enterprise encouraged by extending credit and facili- 10 tie s. In total, the economic recovery program bespoke a pragmatic effort by the regime to return sanity and rationality to Indonesia's econmic life. The points emphasized were aimed at convincing the West (although 60 percent of the nation's debt was owed to Communist countries) of Indonesia's good intentions. Further, it was recognized by American other Western diplomats that the program was not simply the result of governmental discussions in the short time that the New Order had been in power. Rather, it represented the thinking of moderate elements within Indonesian society, ideas devel oped before Gestapu when free discussion of the economy was not encouraged. Djakarta Dispatch to The New York Times, April 13, 1966. 1°A lengthy study of the economic policy of the "Orde Baru" as expressed in this and other early statements and ac tions is contained in J. Panglaykim and K. D. Thomas, "The New Order and the Economy," pp. 73-119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 313] === 305 A key group was preparing programs for economic de velopment in Indonesia against the day when it might be heard. Composed of members of the faculty of economics at the Uni versity of Indonesia, Djakarta, it was an able team of five relatively young professors: Widjojo Nitisustro, Emil Salim, Ali Wardana, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto. The first three received their degrees at the University of California at Berkeley, Sadli studied at the Massachusetts Institute of 11 Technology, and Subroto at Harvard Business School. Upon their return to Indonesia, they joined the faculty of the University of Indonesia and,on the side, several of them began to teach courses in economics and the social sciences at the Army's Staff and Command School of Bandung. It was a conscious attempt by these economists to cultivate personal and intellectual ties with men who might be heirs to power in the nation. After Gestapu, these relationships became particularly important. Sadli is reported to have said: The Army, having gained power, needed ideas to orient its political role. On the other hand, during 1966, the professors often acted as relays between the military and the students, two groups they knew well. When various seminars were organized...on political and economic problems, the professors supplied the intellec tual ammunition for their military friends. These men were beneficiaries of the Ford Foundation pro gram in Indonesia. Even in the dark days of the Sukarno era, the Ford Foundation had kept up its assistance to Indonesian uni versities and continued to arrange for promising students to come to the United States for advanced degrees. These five professors were among them. 12 Quoted by Jacques Decornoy, "Indonesia: The Sleeping Volcano," a series of articles in Le Monde (Paris), December 1-6, 1967 (Joint Publications Research Service translation: January 19, 1968). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 314] === 306 Although General Suharto himself was not one of the officer students of the five, some of his close associates were. Through them, the economists moved to the center of influ ence within the New Order. In the background at the time of the Sultan's initial pronouncements on economic policy, they emerged in July, 1966, when— at a meeting of the MPRS— they advanced their "new economic principles." Their Army friends proved to be convincingand able lobbyists on their behalf, and Suharto himself became a convert. In September, 1966, all five were appointed members of the general's personal staff to assist him in his role as chairman of the Economic 13 Stabilization Council. The increasing influence of the professors (sometimes called Indonesia's "Whiz Kids") was greeted as a distinctly favorable development by American diplomats in Djakarta and Washington. All five men had many close personal contacts with Americans, generally followed the lines of American economic thought, and were known to be very approachable for discussions on Indonesia's economic problems. Their presence in the inner circle of economic decision-making of the New Order could only be accounted as a plus factor so far as the United States was concerned. ■^Eventually three of the professors would be raised to cabinet-level posts: Widjojo as head of the National Development Planning Council, Sadli as director of the foreign investment program and Salim as Widjojo's deputy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 315] === 307 As in economics, so in foreign policy there were signs of favorable change. At an April 4 press conference and again before the Gotong Royong Parliament on May 5, the Foreign Minister Adam Malik laid down the principles on which Indo nesian policy would be based in the New Order era. The prime objective was to restore world confidence in the Republic, re-establish the nation’s political identity in the "true sense of its principles and goals," and toward the outside world show the goodwill of the Indonesian people, so long suppressed under the old order. As a corollary, foreign policy was to be pursued principally to attain economic goals, rather than for purely political ends as had been the case in the past. All of this, however, was to be accomplished within the framework of Indonesia's traditional "active and inde pendent" foreign policy. In more practical terms, Malik set down several immediate obj ectives: "In compliance with the people's wishes," he said, the government would consider participation in international bodies, including the United Nations, as one of the means of gaining possible benefits. 15 Antara, Djakarta, May 6, 1966. 15 This unqualified expression of interest in re-joining the U.N. was made on April 4. By May 6, internal pressures, probably from Sukarno, made Malik qualify his earlier state ment to include the proviso that reforms would have to be undertaken by the world body to meet Indonesia's criticisms. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 316] === 308 On the Malaysia issue, the government would continue its confrontation policy, but would keep the door open for a peaceful solution of the matter. An early step would be an invitation to Singapore to resume normal relations. In an indirect reference to Communist China, Malik pledged continued observance of the Bandung Conference prin ciples, especially "no interference in the internal affairs of another country," and warned that Indonesia expected other countries to do likewise. He offered an open invitation for economic and fi nancial assistance to Indonesia from other countries, East or West, so long as there were no conditions "detrimental to the national interest." 16 As for the United States, Malik said the Indonesian government had lately noticed a better American understanding of the nation's foreign policy. He stressed the new regime's intention to improve its relations with Washington especially in the fields of economic cooperation, trade and technology. At the same time, however, he said the Indonesian government still supported "the struggle of the Vietnamese people against This treatment summarizes several statements made in April and May, 1966, on foreign policy by Malik. For the texts see: News Release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., April 5> 1966; Djakarta Domestic Service, May 5, 1966 (FBIS translation: May 6, 1966); Indonesian Information Service in English to Diplomatic Missions, Djakarta, May 7, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 317] === 309 Amtrican military intervention." The Foreign Minister added that, in the view of his government, the United States should withdraw its military forces from Vietnam and leave the settle17 ment of the issue to the Vietnamese people themselves. the same time, informal approaches were being made to the American mission asking for a resumption of foreign aid. The American Reaction Although Washington could not have been particularly pleased at Malik's emphasis on Vietnam, his statements prof fering friendship were received graciously at the State Depart ment. A spokesman there said the U.S. had noted the Foreign Minister's remarks and it shared the Indonesian government's hopes that better and smoother relations could be accomplished."*" A more concrete demonstration of American interest was the signing of U.S.-Indonesian agreement on April 18 to help ease the food crisis which faced the New Order. The agreement called for the U.S. to provide 50,000 tons of rice under Title IV of Public Law 480, the "Food for Peace" Act. Amounting to $8,998,000, repayment was to be in dollars, one year after 17 Indonesian Information Service in English to Diplomatic Missions, Djakarta, May 7, 1966. Earlier, in an interview with a Japanese newsman, Malik, asked how Indonesia's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union would develop in the future, replied that Indonesia would maintain the best possible friendly relations with both nations. Antara Dispatch from Tokyo, April 4,1966. 18 U.S. Information Bulletin, Americam Embassy, Djakarta, April 5, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 318] === 310 the date of the last delivery In five roughly equal annual Installments at an interest rate of *1.875 percent. Although New Order spokesmen promptly hailed the offer as a sign of 19 success for its new "economic diplomacy," the rice trans action was little more than a straight commercial transaction and was described as such by American officials. Although the U.S. was not expected to press hard for repayment, it had im posed on the Indonesians relatively harsh terms and high rate of interest. In contrast to its public posture, the Indonesian government was privately disturbed at America's tightfisted attitude, and the transaction was discussed in several meetings between Malik and Ambassador Green. Following one such con ference in early June the Foreign Office announced that re payment for the rice would be in rupiahs. Later it was forced to "clarify" this detail by admitting that repayment would be required in American dollars. 20 No doubt reflecting ^According to Antara, April 27, 1966, Malid said Indo nesia was now "flooded" with economic aid offers from a large number of countries to help the Indonesian government restore economic and political stability. He disclosed that the offers had come from the U.S., Thailand, Japan, Burma, Australia, and some nations in Europe. Later, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, refer ring to the rice transaction, told newsmen that the United States already had begun to give aid to Indonesia "without strings." D.1 akarta Timfes, September 23, 1966. That no strings were in volved was true. It must be seen, however, in terms of the commercial nature of the transaction. 20 The first version was in a June 6 Antara dispatch. Clarification came in a press release from the Foreign Ministry •ublished in the Indonesian Herald, June 9. The incident may well have been a ploy by the Indonesian government to "embarrass" the United States into giving more liberal terms. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 319] === 311 the feelings of the Foreign Office on the rice deal, the Indonesian Herald editorialized: It is a common practice to take advantage of someone who is in a difficult position. We see that money lenders often succeed to [sic] exact much more heavier [sic] interest from those who are in most urgent need of financial loan. This applies to the practice among nations as well.^1 On June 28, the United States and Indonesia concluded another commodity agreement: cotton worth $10,508,000. one to provide 75,000 bales of The succeeding agreement was, how ever, less stringent in its terms and carried a lower interest rate. 22 Both agreements included provisos whereby the Indo nesian government could use the rupiahs it obtained in its sales of the U.S. commodities for financing various economic, social and developmental programs domestically, upon further mutual agreement with the United States. To do so, however, would have negated any anti-inflationary benefits which might 21 April 20, 1966. Note that this editorial follows the signing of the rice agreement; by only two days. The Indonesians also were disturbed by American insistence that it would allow credits for shipping only if the commodities were carried in American ships, which were somewhat more expensive in rates than ships registered in other countries. Shipping costs alone on the first 50,000 tons amounted to $1,222,000. 22 The cotton transaction called for repayment in dollars beginning two years after the date of the last shipment, in roughly fifteen equal annual installments at an interest rate of 3.5 percent. It should also be noted that Indonesia in 1966 received about $2 million worth of U.S. surplus commodities under Title Til of P.L. 480, This was humanitarian assistance under which the government donated the food to three American private chari table organizations operating in Indonesia which, in turn, dis tributed it to needy people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 320] === 312 result from the transaction and would require the kind of American participation in Indonesia's internal affairs which was still unacceptable to both parties. In that sense, there fore, the commodity agreements were only — as Adam Malik described them — that is for "rescue or stop-gap aid — purposes which have quick yielding and substantial leverage effects." 23 At the same time, however, the Indonesian govern ment was deeply interested in obtaining substantial American assistance for its longrange economic recovery and development programs. To those advances, the United States, at least initially, was distinctly cool. Although Ambassador Green would later claim that, "When the government of Indonesia came to us in June, 1966, we were fully responsive," this was not quite the ^Before the American Men's Association of Djakarta. Quoted by 0. G. Roeder, "Friends Again," Far Eastern Economic Review LIV:3 (October 20, 1966) p. 175. 24 Press conference in Djakarta, December 20, 1966. Reported in news release, Embassy of United States, Djakarta, January 24, 1967. Green also was reported to have said on that occasion that the U.S. "believed then, as we do now, that the new government was seriously endeavoring to work for the interest of the people and of the country, and that it was about to embark upon a sound and sensibly-conceived program drawn up by competent officials." Both statements can be.laid to diplomatic exaggeration. The American attitude on aid to Indonesia had more of a "show me" tone to it than the diplomat found easy to admit. Green also ignored the fact that in Washington, officials were assuring members of Congress that although emergency aid was being extended to Indonesia, it did not mean the inevitable resumption of regular aid. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 321] === 313 case. Rather, when Malik presented a request for aid, Green countered by suggesting that the U.S. mission draw up a re quest for the Indonesians which could be approved quickly, since failure would be politically damaging to the regime. Malik agreed and the result was the cotton agreement June. This fell far short, however, of what the Indonesians really wanted. of late Moreover, in late May when Secretary of State Rusk was asked during a press conference about indications from Indonesia that it could use $1.3 billion in economic assistance, his reply was distinctly vague and unencouraging. Noting Indonesia's problems of debt and inflation, the Sec retary supposed that its government would be discussing those problems "with a number of governments and institutions in the weeks and months ahead." Adding that the initiative would have to come from the Indonesians themselves, Rusk concluded: We would hope to be able to play our part when the time comes, but we would be one of several who I think would be interested in doing so under the right circumstances. 5 What Rusk had i n d i c a t e d by in di r e c t i o n was made explicit mid-July by David Bell, director of the Agency for International Development. prospects were Indonesia. In reply d i m f or the While a newsman's noting early question, resumption favorable trends, ^ ^ N e w s C o n f e r e n c e o f Ma y 27, D e p a r t m e n t B u l l e t i n, J u n e 13, 1966, p. 923. said that American aid he w a r n e d that of S t a t e Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 322] === 314 the Southeast Aslan difficult hurdles" help, any but ahead. faced The decision would international financing countries like would n ot country Japan. playing United "very States terrible would be m a d e institutions and other States, Bell role" in this The some United "leadership and like conjunction with creditor emphasized, process. There were several reasons for this continuing American restraint. In the first place, Washington was still cautious lest any American expression of goodwill toward the new re gime should call into question its nationalism or in any way provide propaganda fodder for Sukarnoists or other remaining leftist groups. While Sukarno was seen to have been tre mendously weakened by the events of March, 1966, he had before shown remarkable powers of resurgence and could not be counted out of the Indonesian political scene entirely. In that re gard, American diplomats could not help but notice the healthy respect being shown by Suharto and other allied to the New Order for the symbol and father of Indonesian unity. Bell made these statements during a question period following a speech at the National Press Club in Washington. Antara-Reuters Dispatch, July 15, 1966. That the Indonesians were expecting something more was evidenced in a joke which was making the rounds in Djakarta about that time. Reference was made to a statue erected in the capital by the Russians which depicted a woman kneeling by the side of an Indonesian freedom fighter, offering him a rice bowl. It was pointed out to tourists that the bowl was empty and that the woman was holding it out in the general direction of the American Embassy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 323] === 315 An example of this was Suharto's announcement on March 16, less than a week after Sukarno had given him emergency powers, that there had been no power take-over or toppling of the President's leadership. Instead, he insisted in a special announcement to the foreign press, the instructions he had received from Sukarno were the same as his orders following the October coup attempt. The general warned the foreign press not to use "wrong terms" when referring to the duties given him by the President. 27 For his part, Sukarno continued to talk and act as if he were the same undisputed ruler he had always been. Seldom losing an opportunity to reiterate his authority, he warned his ministers not "to view me as a puppet." He appointed them, Sukarno reminded, and they were to serve under him. "I am actively carrying out the leadership of the state," he declared at the first session of the revised cabinet. 28 Sukarno's influence and brake on the regime's intention to continue the move rightward was felt in a number of ways. His dogmatic insistence that Conefo be held and that Indonesia not rejoin the United Nations probably retarded state action 2^Press Release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1966. Similarly, in an interview with a Japanese newsman, Suharto insisted that Sukarno remained President of Indonesia and now realized that some "false leaders" had tried to separate him from the people "who have always loved him." News release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., May 6, 1966. 2 % e x t of speech, Djakarta Domestic Service, April 21, 1966 (FBIS Translation, April 22, 1966). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 324] === 316 in that direction. He also was able to gain temporary cancellation cf an MPRS session which he knew would take action against him. Although it was later clear the "mouthpiece of the Indonesian people" was only able to delay actions — veto them entirely — not some Americans in Washington and Djakarta believed that holding back on aid might force Suharto out of his seeming reticence to move against Sukarno. Others in the State Department believed that Suharto needed economic strength and successes before he could dare to act decisively. 29 The net result of the debate was to delay any action until the situation became clearer. A far more important consideration In Wa shington's calculations, however, was the desire to see some concrete performance on the part of the New Order regime. While the Sultan conscientious of J o g j a k a r t a and Adam Malik were seen public servants, it was clear that real power in the New Order lay with the military. 30 Many officers, after all, had served under Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime and had proven 29 See the column by former USIA director Carl Rowan, datelined Djakarta, December 28, 1966. ^°The U.S. had a previously disappointing experience depending on Djuanda's assurances about Indonesia's economic reform in 1963 when he did not have the assent of Sukarno. It did not wish to make the same mistake twice. For informed discussions of the military vested interests in Indonesia, see Frederick Bunnell, "Indonesia's Quasi-Military Regime, Current History (January, 1967) pp. 22-29, and Roger K. Paget, "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power." Pacific Affairs, XL:3/4 (Fall and Winter, 1967-68) PP. 29^-315. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 325] === 317 just as corrupt and willing to sacrifice the public gDod as some ardent supporters of the President. The New Order might simply be the Old Order minus the Communists and with a weakened Sukarno. Nor was it yet clear how Suharto would see his new public role: as a servant of the Indonesian state or its most recent plunderer. There were, indeed, signs which pointed to the latter conclusion. Almost immediately after the new regime became established, and particularly during the summer of 1966, Indonesian generals began to show up in the United States seeking to make "deals" in surplus commodities. Many times they carried vaguely-worded letters signed by Suharto, which American diplomats came to refer to as "hunting licenses." Their approach was distressing to observers because of the unstated but basic assumption that Indonesia was too vital to the interests of the United States and the West to be allowed to dissolve in chaos, implying that others inevitably would come to their rescue. These military men also conveyed the feeling, either directly or indirectly, that while the United States was spending billions of dollars to kill Communists in ^1Among the early Indonesian military visitors to Washington was General Soerjo Wirjohadipoetro whose self prepared "aid memory," dated May 9, 1966, proclaimed the purpose of his trip "the acquisition of financing of approx imately 400,000 tons of rice..." Another was a four-man delegation headed by Colonel Harsono, chief of the Press and Public Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Information. Among his objectives was obtaining supplies of newsprint and spare parts for Indonesia's printing shops, including 15 new printing units. Antara, April 26, 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 326] === 318 Vietnam, the Indonesians had killed hundreds of thousands of their own without a cent from the Americans. In that sense, America "owed" Indonesia a billion or two in foreign aid. 32 If this approach was naive, some Indonesian military men were capable of more sophisticated methods. A common gambit was to approach an American rice shipper or dealer in Texas cotton as a representative of General Suharto empowered to make purchases— providing appropriate credits could be ob tained from the American government. Implicit in these approaches was a tacit (or direct) agreement for a percent age of the sale as a bonus for the Indonesian military man. It was, in the words of Ambassador Green, "the time honored system of squeeze." If such procedures had been conceded as inevitable in the past, the American mission was determined to make a fresh start, including keeping as clear as possible from tainted transactions. 33 Thus, when lower-echelon officers, some of them armed with "hunting licenses" began to seek out massive 32 The author had the opportunity to speak with a number of visiting Indonesian generals on Capitol Hill. Many came to see congressmen as part of their "hunting trip." 33 In his article, however, Jacques Decorney, og_. cit., said: "One might wonder why the United States is allowing a notoriously corrupt officer to profit from its gifts: in December, the United States is going to deliver 100,000 tons of rice to Djakarta; Berdikari, the company headed by General Suhardiman, is to have exclusive control of the pur chase and sale of these shipments and there is already talk of huge profits." p. 19. American diplomats,however, deny the accuracy of this report. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 327] === 319 American aid in late 1965 and early 1966, Green asked Malik to contact the Nasution/Suharto leadership to find out if the aid requests had their approval. After some delay, Malik returned to say that the Army leadership and he did not believe the time was yet ripe for a resumption of aid. By dealing with the military through Malik, the Ambassador signalled that he was prepared to deal only through regular channels. Eventually, as a result of American encouragement, the Indonesian govern ment established a single coordinating body, empowered to speak f o r t he with government, the continue, Embassy. however, to r e s u m e c om i n g. Economic following approach Manila assistance generals troublesome the perceived United would one. States the new regime was determined assistance of tan gible performance Although and political measures which the example, October. The failure Kennedy ^ F r o m interviews and Washington. New Order reforms, for the or m i l i t a r y April, during ambitious economic government. of e conomic th e signs factors, evidence talked a particularly of n e g a t i v e Indonesian had proposed problem large-scale til there was the The with qutstions Persuasion and other per ti n e n t not dealt to be America* s Frie n d l y Because which began of the Administration with American slow had Jogjakarta "carrot had part officials change was Sultan only the and shown diplomats implemented stick" the in Djakarta, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 328] === 320 impracticality of giving foreign aid in order to obtain leverage within a foreign government. The very fact that aid tied donor and recipient countries together in a rather close relationship, it was seen, cut down on the donor country’s flexibility of approach and drew resentment of "strings" on aid from the recipient. A far more workable arrangement was to entice a nation's leaders to carry out specific policy changes in order to qualify for foreign assistance. Unlike the "carrot and stick" method, this was a "pot of gold" approach. If Indonesia fol lowed a multi-faceted "rainbow" of reforms, it was promised to find a treasure of foreign assistance. This technique, of course, was never described publicly but it was made very clear to the Indonesians through a multitude of hints, sug gestions, diplomatic signals, and contacts, both formal and informal, in Washington, Indonesia, and various third countries. The conditions placed on the resumption of aid to Indonesia by the United States were several: Indonesia would be obliged to end its confrontation of Malaysia, either formally or in some de_ facto way. there is a government continuing in authority [in IndonesiaJ which is interested in peace in the area...we might be very willing to entertain such requests...." for aid, A.I.D. Administrator Bell d e c l a r e d. 35 on the other hand, Washington ^ D i s p a t c h from Washington, Antara-Reuters, July 15,1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 329] === 321 had no interest in creating renewed Anglo-American frictions, alienating the Malaysians, and spending millions simply to help Indonesia carry on its reckless foreign policies. The close relationship between the granting of aid and the end of confrontation is pointed up by a meeting between Green and Malik at the Foreign Office on May 24, 1966. According to "well-informed sources" the two diplomats discussed at length matters relating to economic relations between their two coun tries. This was just one day before Malik would announce his plans to go to Bangkok for talks with representatives of the Malaysian government, a meeting which proved to be the first step toward liquidation of the conflict.36 Indonesia would be required to re-enter the United Nations and to join both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The nation's return to the U.N. would be a symbol that it had renounced its renegade status on the world scene and was returning to a more responsible course. Member ships in the IMF and World Bank would allow expert economists from both organizations to prepare an impartial estimate of Indonesia's economic situation and to make recommendations to donor nations or a group of nations on the amount and type of assistance to be given. 37 3^For an account of the May 24 meeting, see Antara story of May 24, 1966. 37speaking of the IMF and World Bank, Rusk said: "...I have no doubt that those institutions will be very much interested in the economic plans of Indonesia for its own R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 330] === 322 Property nationalized by the Sukarno regime would be returned to American or British owners, or "prompt, ade quate and effective" compensation given instead. Any re sumption of large-scale aid to Indonesia would oblige the President to make the determination required by the Broomfield Amendment that such assistance was in the "national Interest." So long as the Indonesian government continued to control American investments without any gestures at returning them, a determination by the Chief Executive was unthinkable. Not only would such action have angered Congress, but it also would have run athwart the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which required cutting off aid funds to governments confiscating American properties without proper compensation. The United States was interested in Indonesia being open to private foreign investment. As Rusk put it: "Here is a country, with enormous natural resources and highly intelli gent pe o p l e. " ^ Indonesia's ultimate prosperity depended on the exploitation of its resources. Since that process could economic revival." Statement at News Conference, August 5, 1966. Department of State Press Release (Mimeographed) p. 21. On July 22, the Secretary had told a group in Australia: "We think it would be appropriate for them to discuss...ques tions initially with some of the great international bodies that are highly expert in such affairs, such as the Monetary Fund, perhaps the World Bank." To the National Press Club, Canberra, reported in Djakarta Times, July 22, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 331] === not be financed adequately either by public Indonesian funds or by foreign aid, it was logical to open the country to active private foreign capital. If Indonesia proved to be cooperative in these matters, the United States was prepared to support convening a group of Indonesia's creditors for serious talks on re-scheduling the nation's debts, thereby lifting some of the financial burden from the shoulders of New Order officials. Washington also indicated that it would be interested in joining a con sortium of nations to provide significant economic aid for long range development purposes and in resuming a measure of bilateral aid. While the United States was firm on the measure of performance expected from the New Order regime, it was far from dragooning the Indonesians into unwarranted, unpopular, or counter-productive policies. Rather, what the Americans were counseling informally, Indonesia's economic and political leaders— such as the Sultan, Malik and the economics professors already had given formal assent to. America's posture simply 39 Usha Mahajani in her article "Indonesia's New Order and the Diplomacy of Aid," Australian Outlook (August, 1967) pp. 21^-23^, implies that the primary reason for American reticence in granting foreign aid to Indonesia was the lack of concrete assurances by the Indonesians that private foreign investment would be allowed. That assumption is unwarranted in the face of the numerous other reasons for caution on the part of the U.S. While it was indeed a factor it was far from being the most important one. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 332] === 324 strengthened their hand in dealing with those in the Army or bureaucracy who were recalcitrant on the reforms and policy changes required. Development-oriented officials could successfully threaten the loss of prospects for American aid to help carry home their own arguments and obtain com pliance for their programs. Moreover, American officials were consistently stress ing Indonesia’s responsibility to solve its own financial problems. Djakarta was to take the initiative in approaching the international banking institutions. And after receiving their advice, Secretary of State Rusk pointed out, "it is for the Indonesians to proceed on the basis of a plan worked out in the light of their own position and realistic pros40 pects for the future." It was made very clear to the Indo nesians and the world that the United States was not at all interested in creating yet another client state relation ship in Southeast Asia. While hoping that relations with Indonesia would develop on a constructive and friendly basis, Rusk told newsmen, "we fully respect the Indonesian desire to 41 be non-aligned in this total world situation." This statement 40 Speech to National Press Club, Canberra, Djakarta Times, July 22, 1966. ^ N e w s Conference of August 5, 1966. State Press Release. Department of R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 333] === 325 was more than rhetoric. If something had been learned from the Vietnam situation, it was the costliness of client states and open-ended commitments. "...The United States would not again be tied up or committed in helping Indonesia as it had been in Vietnam," an Indonesian newsman reported. As we have seen, without needing any prompting from the United States, the Indonesian Army had been anxious to end the confrontation with Malaysia as early as August, 1965. Consequently, the New Order early began to make efforts at burying the conflict. When peace had been restored, J the Indonesians found that their efforts at reconciliation had paid several, perhaps not entirely expected dividends. a result of the ending of hostilities, Britain offered Indo nesia an unconditional credit of one million pounds. also expressed, for the first time, real interest in joining other creditors in an attempt to reschedule Indonesia’s debts. In addition, the nation gained a chamoion for its cause in Tunku Abdul Rahman. Just prior to a visit by President Lyndon Johnson to Malaysia in October, 1966, the Tunku told newsmen that he would make a personal appeal to the American Chief Executive to help Indonesia in its struggle to rehabilitate Rengkoe, 0£. clt. The following chapter deals with the end of con frontation in detail. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 334] === 326 the country economically. He already had made a similar appeal at a Commonwealth meeting, the Malaysian leader said. 44 Indonesia Rej olns the Unltdd Nations Indonesia's return to the United Nations followed an erratic course, caused principally by Sukarno's unbending opposition. After Adam Malik had announced on April 4 Indonesia's intention to rejoin the world body, the President, in a defiant speech at the State Palace three days later, declared: I am asking all reporters, Indonesian and foreign, to record clearly that Indonesia has no intention of reentering the United Nations as long as the United Nations remains the s a m e. 5 The President continued to insist that the Conference on the New Emerging Forces be held in Djakarta, despite the fact that construction had stopped at the Conefo site because of com plaints that the project was consuming too much money, and political objections expressed by some 84 engineering students who walked off the job on April 13. The conference could go on whether the site was completed or not, Sukarno insisted. ^ A g e n t Presse France dispatch in the Dj akarta Times, October 14, 1966. The Tunku praised the New Order regime as headed by "honest and sincere men" who needed substantial foreign aid in order to successfully tackle the problems of their country. ^ D j a k a r t a Domestic Service, April 7, 1966 (FBIS trans lation, April 8, 1966). All future references to Indonesian radio broadcasts may be assumed to have come from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 335] === 327 Meanwhile, New Order Officials were tempering their statements on Indonesia's potential reentry into the U.N. and largely ignoring Conefo. Quietly, however, the groundwork was being laid for Indonesia's smooth return into the U.N. fold. If Indonesia were forced to apply for totally new mem bership in the United Nations Organization, the process would be a lengthy and painfully embarrassing one. Unforeseen events might provide Sukarno with added ammunition for his anti-U.N. campaign. In June, however, an exchange of letters between Foreign Minister Malik and Secretary General U Thant was dis closed which appeared to put Indonesia's situation in a new light. According to an interpretation accepted by both parties, Indonesia had never withdrawn officially from the world body buy had simply withheld its active participation since 1965. Therefore, the only action required by Indonesia would be a letter to the Secretary General stating that it wanted to resume "active cooperation" in U.N. affairs.^ 46 See a statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito com menting on this exchange of letters. Antara, 15 June 1966. Suwito pointed out, in defense of this position, that Indonesia had never been struck from the membership lists of the U.N., that its name still appeared on reserved seats in the Special ized Agencies, and that the Indonesian national red-and-white flag still fluttered from the flag pole outside the United Nations headquarters in New York. On the strength of this interpretation, Indonesia re jected offers from several Asian statesmen to serve as "mediators" with the U.N. These included Pakistan's Z. Ali Bhutto and the Philippines Narciso Ramos. Malik said: will return to the world body without an Intermediary." News Release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C., August 26, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 336] === 328 On the strength of this understanding the MPRS in August passed a resolution urging the government to return to the U.N. before the opening of the 21st General Assembly on September 20. For his part, Sukarno continued to press for the convening of Conefo. In his 1966 Independence Day address he devoted con siderable attention to the united "anti-imperialist front" organization and declared: "I myself, Insja Allah, am fully determined to press on with the organizing of Conefo. Three days later, however, Adam Malik stated publicly that Indonesia definitely would rejoin the United Nations and "whether we like it or not, we have to drop Conefo." September 19, L. N. Palar, Indonesia's ambassador to the United States and its permanent representative to the United Nations (and the man who had written the original letter of withdrawal) sent a telegram to U Thant informing him of his government's decision "to resume full cooperation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities" the 21st Session of the General Assembly. beginning with On September 28, the President of the General Assembly, H. E. Pazhwak of Pakistan, ^ Never Leave History (Djakarta: Republic of Indonesia Department of Information, 1966 p. 3^. **®The New York Times, August 20, 1966, Dispatch from Djakarta. Malik was also quoted as saying: "Arguments in favor of Conefo and against the United Nations are not based on facts." Earlier Malik bad contended that the United Nations did, indeed, need reform but if Indonesia wanted to change it, the best way was from within, in concert with other afro-Asian countries which felt the same way. Antara, June 30, 196 6. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 337] === 329 informed the members that it appeared Indonesia’s absence from the organization was based not upon an outright withdrawal from the U.N. but by a "cessation of cooperation." If there were a consensus on that interpretation he would seat Indonesia imil Q mediately. y Although several nations including the United States, had warned that Indonesia would be re-admitted to the world body only by applying as a new state, there was no ob jection. Not even Albania, which had ruined other attempts at consensus rulings on orders from Peking, raised its voice. The transition was a smooth one, save for one small incident,50 and even Sukarno was depicted as giving his approval.^'*' American and other Western diplomats were pleased with ^ Y e h u d a J. Blum, lecturer in international law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has raised some interesting questions on the legal aspects of Indonesia's readmittance under the procedures chosen. He questions the wisdom of the U.N. in not coming to grips with the membership question and leaving it purposely vague. See Blum's "Indonesia's Return to the United Nations," International Law Quarterly, 16:2 (April, 1967) pp. 522-531. An uproar broke out in the gallery during discussion of Indonesia's "re-participation." Guards struggled with men and women who screamed epithets against the new regime in Indonesia. One man carried a banner which read, "United States puppets killed one million Indonesians." Proceedings were held up while guards restored order. Nine demonstrators were ar rested. They said they belong to an American organization called "Youth against War and Fascism." Djakarta Times, September 30, 1966. As if to belie any "puppetry" Malik, in his opening address before the General Assembly, decried the war in Vietnam. 5^Antara, Djakarta, October 18, 1966. Report of U.N. delegation reporting to Sukarno who was said to have given "his approval to them and instructed that the follow-up of Indonesia's activities in the world body be continued." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 338] === 330 Indonesia’s return to the U.N. for several reasons. First, it helped restore the universal character of the organization. Second, it marked the final failure of Sukarno, aided by the Communist Chinese, to create a rival grouping of Afro-Asian nations. Third, it helped restore the organization's author ity which had been badly shattered in the financial crisis over voting rights. And, finally, Indonesia’s membership would render it eligible for United Nations technic other valuable forms of economic help. ssistance and As if to emphasize this last point, David Owen, co-administrator of the United Nations Development Program, became the first U.N. official to visit Indonesia since the rift. After talks with Malik, Owen stated that before its U.N. break Indonesia had received $2.6 million annually in aid from the world organization, and he hoped that figure could be resumed soon. 52 One by one, Indonesia resumed participation in the U.N.'s specialized agencies, including the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization and UNESCO— and began to receive some assistance from those bodies as well. The New Order and Private Investment Just as Indonesia's termination of "Confrontation" and its reentry into the United Nations were seen as entirely fav orable developments by Washington, so too was the increasing emphasis being placed by the New Order on private foreign akarta Times, November 12, 1966 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 339] === 331 Investment. Subsidies to state-run enterprises were cut back sharply and in their place the government substituted incen tives to "healthy production units," public or private. The pressure of nationalization was taken off the American oil companies. Djakarta also began to indicate its interest in granting concessions to private firms abroad for the explora tion and exploitation of such natural resources as copper, sulphur and timber. Of first priority was the return of foreign companies confiscated from their owners and placed under state control by the Sukarno regime. It was recognized that unless such action was taken there would be little incentive for outside investors. Accordingly, on December 12, 1966, General Suharto decreed that the appropriate cabinet ministers should begin at once discussing with owners the restoration of their proper ties. At the same time, the general set down the guidelines under which his government would be willing to negotiate. They required that foreign owners (1 ) make speedy and effective efforts toward production rehabilitation;53 (2 ) bear the cost of restoring the property to its original condition; carry out "Indonesianization," that is, replacement of foreign personnel with Indonesians as speedily as possible; (4) establish training programs for Indonesian nationals and (5) supply technical 53At many of the plants, plantations and other facilities placed under "custody/control" teams, production had fallen off to but a fraction of what it had been. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 340] === 332 information and research aid in cooperation with Indonesian enterprises.5^ Although the negotiations did not proceed as rapidly as the Indonesian government apparently had hoped, 55 by late Spring, 1967, many foreign properties had been returned, including those owned by Unilever, Procter and Gamble, National Carbon Company, Union Carbide Corporation, Singer Company and National Cash Register Company. While the American mission had been extremely active in representing the Interests of U.S. corporations being pressured by the Indonesian government during pre-Gestapu timts, it was able to assume a relatively relaxed position on the negotiations to return the properties. "We never had to weigh in heavily;" said one American official, "it was enough simply to communicate 5^The agreement reached with the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company for the return of its tire factory at Bogor was typical of the concrete programs worked out. Goodyear agreed to spend $13 million through 1973 to rehabilitate its plant and increase daily production of tires from 500 to 4,000 units per day. also agreed to help develop Indonesian national tire factories by providing opportunities for their managements to do research work at Goodyear facilities in the United States, by helping to train their personnel and by establishing a rubber research center in cooperation with the Indonesian government. The Amer ican rubber company promised to (1 ) provide an opportunity for Indonesian capital to buy into Goodyear Indonesia within a frame work of "joint enterprise" in which Goodyear would be majority owner and retain executive control; (2) allow at least one Indo nesian to sit on the board of directors; and (3) rehire all em ployees except those involved in Gestapu. 55Acccrding to the Financial Times of London, January 25, 1967, the delays resulted from interposition of the fasting period of Ramadan, the somewhat uncertain political climate at this time, and resentment by the Indonesian supervision of the jcompanies who would much rather havt maintained the status quo. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 341] === 333 to the Indonesians the details of the Hickenlooper Amendment.” 56 U.S. diplomats were happy to note the friendly atmosphere, lack of serious problems, and speedy settlements which resulted. There was pleasure too at the serious effort which the Indonesian government was making toward passage of a new law designed to protect and encourage foreign investment. The work of drafting the legislation was entrusted to a team headed by Selo Sumardjan, a respected American-educated professor and an assistant to the Sultan of Jogjakarta. Admittedly inexper ienced in their task, the group drew heavily from the foreign investment laws of other nations and, occasionally, on informal advice from American economises on the embassy staff. ^ The assumptions which provided the basis for their effort were that Indonesia would be competing for foreign capital with a number of other developing countries. Because of the country's undesir able past dealings with private foreign capital and its still uncertain political climate, the government would be required to minimize the "risk burden," while maximizing incentives for ^ A c c o r d i n g to Paul McCusker, chief of the economics section at the American Embassy, Interview, Djakarta, September 22, 1968 57 Sumardjan noted, however, that Americans were able to be of only limited help since none of them had ever drafted such a bill either. Thus, the Indonesians were forced mainly to use their own resources and a book on comparative foreign investment laws published in the United States. Interview, Djakarta, September 14, 1968 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 342] === 334 Investment.58 the same time Indonesia would be required to protect itself against creating within its economy "islands of economic and technical progress within an ocean of backwardness and poverty'*59 The final Foreign Capital Investment Act re flected these concerns.^® It provided procedural guarantees against expropriation or undue government interference in management. Incentives Included a corporate tax holiday up to five years and exemptions from certain other taxes. The law also provided for the free transfer of profits as well as legitimate costs such as expenses for patents, royalties, in surance and part of the salaries for expatriate employees. Once the tax holiday had ended, repatriation of capital would be allowed. The government reserved to itself investments in roads, harbors, railroads, communications, aviation, utilities, and fields which were integral to national defense. Encouraged were joint ventures between Western and domestic firms which could "produce a blend of Western technology and management with local human and social c a p a c i t i e s T h e act bore the 5&AS examples of this thinking see Finance Minister Frans Seda's statement in Bangkok (Djakarta Times, December 2, 1966) and the speech by the Sultan of Jogjakarta before the Far EastAmerica Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc. in New York City on September 3* 1966. (Mimeographed typescript) p. 12. 59Ibid. 60por the text of the Indonesian law see "Law No. 1 of 1967 Concerning Investment of Foreign Capital," Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C. (Mimeographed) or the Congressional Record. June 13, 1967, pp. 2976-2978 ^ A d a m Malik, "Promise in Indonesia," p. 300. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 343] === 335 personal endorsement of General Suharto who declared that foreign Investment was preferable to foreign aid loans be cause the risks remained with the investors and the Indonesian people would not be obliged to pay interest. Reflecting this changed climate toward foreign capital, the Indonesian Parlia ment quickly passed the measure. As an indication of American approval for this step, U.S. diplomats almost immediately contacted the Indonesian government suggesting that an investment guarantee agreement be concluded between the two nations. ^ Serious conversations were immediately begun between representatives of the two na tions and by January 7, 1967, a pact was signed at the Indonesian Foreign M i n i s t r y. ^ providing new procedural safe-guards for American investors in the Indonesian economy, the agreement allowed the U.S. government to provide guarantees to its citizens against possible loss through nationalization, incontrovertibility, and domestic upheavals. The occasion was hailed by Malik as "again a step forward in the improvement and "development of ^ A c c o r d i n g to Selo Sumardjan, when American officials first proposed an investment guarantee agreement, he and other Indonesian officials were startled because they had not known such an arrangement existed. They were, however, delighted at the opportunity and encouraged at the speed of the American response to their investment law. Interview. °3For the text of the agreement see copy published by Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C., January 7, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 344] === 336 the economic relations between out two governments."6^ number of American companies, the Foreign Minister said, were interested in investing in Indonesia. One of them, Freeport Sulphur Company ultimately became the first foreign investor approved by the Indonesian government under the new law as the firm pledged $75-100 million to develop sulphur mines and processing facilities in West Irian. Indonesia's door was open wide to American capital.^5 The I.M.F., World Bank and Debt Re-Scheduling Following Washington's persistent suggestions that Indonesia seek assistance from the International Monetary fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel opment (IBRD or World Bank), the New Order regime early began to re-establish connections with those two international financial institutions from which the country had withdrawn in 1965. late May, 1966, the Sultan of Jogjakarta announced that Indo nesia would return to both bodies and formal application was ^ Q u o t e d in the Djakarta Times (published by the Indo nesian Foreign Office) on January 9, 1967. a report entitled "Indonesia: The Road Back," the First National City Bank of New York concluded that Indonesia provided opportunities for trade and investment by private business on a mutally beneficial basis. Cited by Antara, April 7, 1967. American investors and prospective investors were early the clear leaders in the list of foreign investors in the country. In addition to American Express, which was the first to open a branch office in Indonesia in March, 1968, American banks which have established themselves in Djakarta are Bank of America, First National City Bank, and the Chase Manhattan Bank. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 345] === 337 made the following; July. Despite problems of unpaid obliga tions to the IMF, the readmission process was made as smooth as possible and the application was accepted at the annual meetings of both institutions in September. Heavily influenced by the United States' desires, the IMF and World Bank were predisposed to essay complementary roles as Indonesia's financial guardians. example, an In early May, for IMF official said his organization would gladly help Indonesia stabilize its economy. Within the next three months two IMF missions visited Indonesia to survey its economic situation and plans. The teams made a series of recommendations designed to restore fiscal discipline to the Indonesian economy. They suggested, for example, an import program of only $298.8 million, less than half the amount initially envisaged by Indonesian officials. An expenditure buxget was to be established that would require ministries and agencies to estimate their needs in advance and account for expenditures. Consumer subsidies on kerosene and other commodities were to be curtailed. According to one observer: "...The IMF has never before concentrated so much effort in a single country. Although recognizing that many of these economic reforms would be politically damaging, the Mew Order regime pressed ^ R o b e r t Lubar, "Indonesia's Potholed Road Back," Fortune (June 1, 1968) p. 132. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 346] === 338 ahead with them. Equally strong was the realization that unless it cooperated with Western economic experts, chances of obtaining re-scheduling of its debts were gone. By adopt ing the IMP remedies it could demonstrate its sincere pur pose and gain a champion in the IMP representation to a conference of its creditors. That "moment of truth" with those creditors occurred on September 19 in Tokyo. Present were Japan, the United States, West Germany, Prance, Holland, Italy, and the United Kingdom, with Australia and New Zealand as observers. Omitted from the list of those invited was Indonesia's largest creditor, the Soviet Union. After hearing a recital of Indonesia's economic woes, the creditor nations withdrew to discuss the situation and, in the end, agreed only In principle to re schedule Indonesia's debts without making any concrete pledges. Although the lack of action was disappointing to the Indo nesians, the creditor nations had several plausible reasons for postponing a final decision until a subsequent meeting in Paris in December. In the first place, the Tokyo Club may may have wished more concrete assurances, as Mahajani has noted, 68 that the New Order government's 1967 budget would ^ A l t h o u g h the United States was interested in gaining Soviet cooperation in dealing with Indonesia, there was some fear that it would use the opportunity for obstruction. Also, the Soviet Union could not be invited without also inviting the bloc countries and West Germany was unwilling to sit down with East Germany. It is doubtful if the USSR would have come in any case. ftfi O p. c i t., pp. 226-227. This was not, however, the vmrst important reason for stalling asihe implies. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 347] === 339 reflect th e Parliament volved nesia th e interest October, t he when— schedule Indonesia's American officials Soviet response i n the Johnson the for nations hands their the almost rudely agreed debts made but that th e U S S R w o u l d visit the Tokyo ga me similar to r e firm commitments. concerned any 69 him off u nti l o f a p e r si s t e n t f e a r Administration Indohowever, in p r i n c i p l e were particularly because put return. scheduled to a cat-and-mouse likewise delay, in what had been to t h e financial problem before if p l a y i n g o f t h e W e s t — it in state creditors originally Russians still reason of W e s t e r n the some in e n c o u r a g i n g important to discuss Conference, companies Malik when presented Secondly, interested most Although Moscow that October. and were t he had private Probably was IMP r e c om mend ati ons about th e Congress an d aid to I ndon e s i a 70 might used least on e hopes o f U.S. to s ervice of the constructive motivations officials role the that R u s s i a n debt. for the the in I n d o n e s i a ' s This frequently Soviet Union wa s expressed would play stabilization. When, finally, ^ I t s e e m s c l e a r t h a t t h e I n d o n e s i a n s fe l t t h a t th i s w a s a f a c t o r w h e n S u h a r t o ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t o n r e t u r n i n g al l s e i z e d p r o p e r t i e s c a m e b a r e l y a w e e k b e f o r e t h e o p e n i n g of t h e P a r i s C o n f e r e n c e a n d an a t t e m p t w a s m a d e to e n a c t t h e F o r e i g n I n v e s t m e n t L a w b e f o r e th e m e e t i n g. 70 See Antara story by its W a s h i n g t o n correspondent, Marius Rengkoe, touching on this point, April 23, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 348] === the Russians appeared to accept similar terms as Western creditors, this was explicitly pointed out to Congress. 71 Although the consensus at the Tokyo Conference was that the creditors would only permit a two-year moratorium on payments and that Indonesia should begin repayment in 1969, the United States and the IMP were pressing for more liberal treatment of the Indonesians. As a result, it was agreed at Paris to allow postponement of repayment until 1971 on $357 million owed. Still, this agreement fell considerably short of what the Indonesian delegates had hoped to obtain, seeking particularly a repayment moratorium until 1973 on a larger portion of its debt. The New Order also had sought discussion of new credits at Paris, but found that subject deferred until a February meeting in Amsterdam. The U.S. position was that Indonesia had done about as well as it possibly could, although only short-term relief had been afforded in its balance of payments problem. Perhaps more important than economic consequences had been the conference's political impact. Said Eugene W. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs: ^1In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, William Bundy said: "The Soviet Union...negotiated bilaterally a similar rescheduling agreement on very liberal terms. It seems clear that the U.S.S.R. is conforming its own debt arrangements to those extended by other creditors including ourselves." May 2, 1967. Mimeographed typescript, p. 27. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 349] === At a timt when Suharto's Triumvirate and Sukarno are encaged in protracted and critical struggle over who in Indonesia is to shape its future policies, the Paris meeting gives needed support to leaders who promise to have the capacity to pursue responsible policies.?2 U.S. Bilateral Aid to Indonesia As the United States continued to support Indonesia in multilateral contexts, bilateral relations also were improving rapidly. August, 1966, was the pivotal month. From the inception of the new alignment in March, Indonesian officials had looked expectantly to the United States for the resumption of an aid program similar to that which had flourished in the early 1960s. "What we want Is aid in the form of credits to exploit our natural resources," said Suharto. only "And money but in t h e also realization foreign engineers s u c h credits,, and need contractors." Yet the U.S. persisted in its detached attitude. not 73 As late as August 9, Foreign Minister Malik met with Ambassador Green to discuss the resumption of economic aid. The Indonesian states man emerged from the conference to state that: "The United L e t t e r t o key m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s r e p o r t i n g on the P a r i s m e e t i n g, d a t e d J a n u a r y 1*1, 1967. R o s t o w h e a d e d th e U.S. d e l e g a t i o n t o P a r i s, u n d e r s c o r i n g o n c e a g a i n t h e i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h t h e U. S. p l a c e d on t h i s e f f o r t. The Under Secreta ry was c red i t e d with p l a y i n g a key role in gaining the final agreement. "^Bernard Krisher, "A Talk with General Suharto," Newsweek (September 5, 1966) p. M3. Earlier Malik had spoken of the U.S. providing food and spare machinery parts. Christian Science Monitor, June 27, 1966 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 350] === 342 States was very careful not to make any promises." 74 Following the August 11 signing of the IndonesianMalaysian agreement to "normalize relations," the State Department was reported reparing a memorandum to the Presi dent recommending that he issue the "Presidential determina tion" which would be necessary for the resumption of largescale American aid. It cited as favorable developments Indonesia's settlement of its differences with Malaysia and the decisions of the MPRS downgrading Sukarno and approving the New Order changes in economic and foreign policies. The report, which the American mission in Djakarta played a large part in preparing, further recommended that the United States comply with at least a few of Indonesia's requests for aid on an emergency basis before the end of the year. ^ 74 Quoted in the New York Times, August 9, 1966. This was, it should be noted, two days before the signing of the Indonesian-Malaysian peace statemtnt while Sukarno was still making efforts to stymie progress. Kirk has called the signing "The Great Divide" in the reorientation of Indonesian foreign policy, "Slow Turn in Djakarta," p. 7. This certainly seems true from the standpoint of the blos soming of U.S.-Indonesian relations. ^^See the New York Times, August 27, 1966, and The Washington Post, A.ugust 2 8, 1967 ~ R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 351] === The recommendation was approved by the White H o u s e, ^ and on September 1*4 President Johnson notified the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the national interest required the resumption of economic aid to Indonesia. "We think the leaders of that country are doing their best to build a stable government," the President later said. be helpful. that action." "We felt ourselves in a position to The need was great. 77 I am glad that we have taken With the announcement came word that the United States and Indonesia were moving toward the conclusion of an agreement covering credit sales of about $*10 million in badly needed commodities. According to officials, the transaction was considered "interim" to differentiate it from the possible resumption of a full economic aid program later. Included in the aid "package" was $26,359,000 for the purchase of 150,000 bales of cotton and 50,000 tons of American rice, ^Acco r d i n g to Weintal and Bartlett, op. c it., the de cision to begin aiding Indonesia again was maae as one of the first acts of a high-ranking Senior Departmental Group (or SIG) created in the Johnson Administration’s 1966 re-organization of the State Department. In a meeting of the body chaired by Under secretary of State Ball the issue was discussed: "After quickly canvassing the opinions of his SIG associates, Ball decided to renew the Indonesian aid program." 77 At a news conference of October 6, 1966. Weekly Compila tion of Presidential Documents, October 10, 1966, p"I 1*417. ^®The terms of the rice deal were considerably more lenient than those required by the U.S. in the commodity transactions of the previous Spring: Repayment in dollars two years after the date of the last delivery in 19 roughly equal installments at an interest rate of 2.5 percent. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 352] === 344 a $10 million loan for the purchase of spare machinery parts and raw materials, assistance. 79 and several smaller programs of te chnical Not long after A.I.D. announced a "food for work" grant to aid a flood control and irrigation program in D e m a k, Central J ava. An A m e r i c a n contribution of $70,200 in corn and vegetable oils would help feed 4,000 workers on the project and their families for a three-month period. To administer these programs, A.I.D. established a new office of Indonesian Affairs within its Bureau of the Far East and, early in 1967, sent a resident representative to Indonesia. A key figure in the step-by-step, gradually accelerating cooperation between the United States and Indonesia was the American Ambassador, Marshall Green. In the months which followed the establishment of the New Order regime, he met often, both privately and publicly, with key figures in the 79The se latter included 1) A participant training program in which 80 Indonesians were invited to the United States for training in various scientific, economic and social fields at a cost of about $560,000; 2) A delivery of $200,000 worth of educational materials and library books and 3) the provision of $60,000 of science books to the Indonesian Council of Science. Because Congress had appropriated no money for Indonesian aid in 1966, these programs and the spare parts loan were funded from the contingency funds of the Agency for International Development. 80 The director of the Office of Indonesian Affairs was Sherwood M. Fine, a career Foreign Service Officer. Appointed to head the A.I.D. mission was Stokes Tolbert, a former World Bank official, whom the Washington Post called: "an able pro fessional with a substantial background of experience in Asia and...an excellent choice for this sensitive post." January 29, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 353] === 345 government, including General Suharto himself. A particularly warm rapport marked the relationship between Green and Adam Malik. "We understand each other," the American ambassador 81 said simply. It was Green's task to keep the Indonesians reminded of the quality of performance which was being ex pected from them by Washington, to keep them, so to speak, looking to the rainbow and thinking of the pot of gold which lay at the end. Although admittedly impatient at the slow erosion process chosen by Suharto to downgrade President 82 Sukarno, the American ambassador was careful not to press the issue too hard. He rapidly gained a reputation for com bining a vigorous, blunt manner with a sensitivity to the complexities of the Indonesian political scene born of hard work in assembling and assimilating information. Although not the popular figure in Djakarta that Ambassador Jones had 81 Interview by author. For a detailed description of the close working relationship which had been established between Green and Malik, see Donald Kirk, "Slow Turn in Djakarta," The New Leader, September 12, 1966, p. 6. Green later said that, upon looking back, he believed Suharto was masterful in his handling of Sukarno. At the time, however, the American diplomat did not believe it was a good idea to "keep the old man around" since every policy decision had to be cleared through him and he was a drag on progress. But by keeping Sukarno around, Green asserts, Suharto was able to put some of the blame for Indonesia's economic problems on the shoulders of the President. Interview. Of him the Djakarta newspaper Warta Harlan editoria lized: "It is said that Ambassador Green owes his meteoric rise in his career to his ability and alertness in collecting data. Age apparently does not make him less lively." September 20, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 354] === 346 been, Green was respected for his ability by the Indonesian elites and his influence with the New Order regime was unquestioned. Moreover, it was recognized that Green’s views weighed heavily in Washington’s councils and decisions affecting Indonesia. Early in 1966, Vice President Hubert Humphrey had traveled to Asia. In Thailand, he met Mohammad DIah, Indonesia's ambassador and a strong proponent of the New Order. Diah urged that the United States begin at once to restore economic and military assistance to his country as a sign of support for the anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno forces. The Vice President, who long had been interested in Indonesia, was impressed with the diplomat's arguments and forwarded the suggestion to the White House. Asked by the President for his advice, Green was against immediate resumption of aid, noting that the time was not yet ripe for such a move by the United States. The President accepted Green's position and the matter was explained to Humphrey, who is said to have understood. 85 84 Wertheim, op. clt., noted that the new power structure in Indonesia was being referred to by "the man in the street" as "empat hidjan": "the four greens." Said Wertheim: "Green is the color of Islam; of the berets of the shock troops; of the reactionary student union, KAMI; and last but not least, there is the American Ambassador, Marshall Green." p. 126. fie -'From diplomatic sources in Washington and Djakarta. Green himself says that the President backed every one of his recommendations during this period. He also cited Humphrey as one from whom he obtained close cooperation. Interview. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 355] === As the architect-engineer of the step-by-step approach to increasing cooperation with Indonesia, it was Green who suggested to Washington that a logical and politic step to follow resumption of American aid would be an invitation to Foreign Minister Adam Malik to visit Washington for face-toface meetings with top Administration officials, including the President himself. On September 2, Malik revealed that he had received such an invitation and said he had accepted but no fixed date had been set. 86 The obvious opportunity, of course, would be late September when the Foreign Minister was expected to be in New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly session during which Indonesia was expected to seek "re-participation." The State Department confirmed the invitation with a particularly warm statement of welcome several days later. Thus on September 27, the Indonesian Foreign Minister paid a call on President Johnson at the White House and later the same day met with Secretary of State Rusk at the State Department. In a joint statement following their conference, News Release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1966, p. 4. Earlier, Malik had told a Japanese newsman, however, that relations with the U.S. were going very smoothly and that he would consider visiting Washington if In donesia attended the U.N. session. Antara, September 1, 1966. Earlier, Malik had seen Vice President Humphrey and key members of Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fulbright, Dr. Thomas Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Rep. Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Sukcommittee. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 356] === the two officials noted the improvement of relations between their governments in recent months and expressed desire to expand areas of cooperation between Indonesia and the United States. They reviewed Indonesia's economic situation, its position in the world community of nations and the problem of achieving political stability and economic growth in the Far East, including Vietnam. The U.S., Indonesia and Vietnam This last Issue— Vietnam— was perhaps the most serious political obstacle to closer Indonesian-American ties. Sukarno had made the Vietnam policies of the United States a central issue in his anti-American campaign of 196^ and 1965 and, indeed, continued to be vehement on the subject. "By what right do the imperialists do such things in Vietnam? what right do they kill, burn, bomb, spread poison gas, destroy everything beautiful?" the Indonesian leader said in his 1966 Independence Day address. get out of Vietnam!" 89 "Please., America, please While other Indonesians may not have shared the extravagance of Sukarno's utterances on the sub ject, there was a general consensus among the Indonesian political elites, both left and right, that the conflict should State Department Foreign Policy Briefs, X V I:9 (October 10, 1966) p. 2. 89 Never Leave History, p. 26. Although students heckled Sukarno throughout this address, the mention of Vietnam was the single place in the speech where Sukarno received enthusiastic applause. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 357] === 349 be solved by the Vietnamese themselves, without outside interference. Peeling some kinship with fellow Asians, the Indonesians particularly deplored the bombing of North Vietnam by American warplanes. Malik himself had told the Indonesian Parliament that the nation supported the "struggle of the Vietnamese against United States intervention" and urged the U.S. to pull out its military forces from South Vietnam and allow a settlement to be achieved by indigenous 90 elements. As cordiality returned to American-Indonesian relations, U.S. spokesmen continually emphasized the lack of interest in "orbiting Indonesia as an American satellite," to use Suharto’s imagery. 91 "Neither we nor the Indonesians are pressing for one or another specific orientation in Indonesia's foreign policy," said Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson: Dedication to peace and world order is sufficient basis for developing friendly and constructive ties between the U.S. and Indonesia....92 ^ Q u o t e d in the Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1966. Malik said he hoped to see the conflict resolved on the basis of "wishes freely stated by the people without intervention by any party." 91 Time, July 15, 1966, quoted the general as saying, with a broad smile, "It Is hoped that America will not try to orbit uS as an American satellite." ^ A d d r e s s at the Par East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, New York, October 4, 1965, Department of State Press Release. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 358] === 350 For his part, Secretary of State Rusk consistently emphasized America's interest in maintaining Indonesia as a "nonaligned bastion of freedom in Asia." 93 Despite such protestations, however, the Johnson Administration could hardly have been pleased with the out spoken opposition to its Asian policies from Indonesian leaders. Similar statements from Indian government figures had drawn the wrath of the White House and reportedly accounted for delays in food shipments to India. Because of the Johnson Adminis tration's deep commitment to the Vietnam conflict, it was early made clear to the Indonesians that continuing attac' s on the American posture could only impede chances for the re sumption of large-scale economic help. Thus, in his opening speech to the General Assembly, Malik had considerably toned down his remarks from the previous May: The Indonesian people who had the same experience during their fight for independence, understand and share the innermost feelings of our brothers in Vietnam.... Our hearts go out to them. The Government of Indonesia will support every sincere effort to put an end to the war in Vietnam, in order that the Vietnamese people may decide their future by themselves in peace without outside interference.° ^ A d d r e s s to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, New York, August 22, 1966, Department of State Press Release. The emphasis is the author's. 94 News release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1966. This statement omits any mention of the United States, its forces in Vietnam or its bombing of the North. It is innocuous enough to be acceptable even to proponents of the war. Subsequently, Malik made virtually R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 359] === 351 Visiting Tokyo on his return to Asia from the United States, the Indonesian Foreign Minister was even more cautious. The United States should withdraw from Vietnam "after a peaceful solution" had been reached in Vietnam, Malik told the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan.95 This position paralleled that of American spokesmen, including the U.S. President, who had pledged a speedy troop withdrawal once peace had been restored, and was far from the Indonesian's earlier contention that the Americans must first leave Vietnam in order to make a settlement possible. If the New Order tempered its criti cism of American policy in Vietnam too conspicuously, how ever, or lapsed into silence on the issue, undesirable con sequences were to be feared for its attempts to gain economic aid from Communist states, for its status among the nonaligned nations, and for its nationalist legitimacy in the eyes of the Indonesian people. the same remarks during a speech at the World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, on October 5. See News Release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., October 17, 1966. It would be wrong, however, to assume that only American pressures were responsible for this change of policy. the interim between May and October, Indonesia had come under increasing attack from North Vietnam for its repression of domestic Communists. The Indonesian Herald, May 19, 1966, warned editorially that Hanoi should ponder the possible con sequences of continued unfriendly attitude toward the Indone sian government. ^ Q u o t e d in the New York Times, October 12, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 360] === 352 To escape this dilemma, Malik struck on the ploy of casting Indonesia as a possible mediator of the Vietnam con flict, not an implausible role since Djakarta was one of the few capitals which had diplomatic relations with Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. The Foreign Minister also hinted 96 that his government had contacts with the Vietcong. The role of possible mediator had two distinct advantages: First, by playing international peacemaker, Indonesia could help erase its image as an aggressive "outlaw" nation and enhance its prestige on the international scene. 07 Second, it could keep clear of involvement with, and ward off criticisms from, each side by seeming to be seriously intent on establishing a position from which it might act as a mediator. To the Americans, the government could justify its continuing criticism of bombing 98 of North Vietnam, by the necessity of keeping alive its 96 See The Dj akarta Times, November 5, 1967. 97 ' Thus the Indonesian press was pleased to point out that Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines had approached Indonesia to use its good offices in ending the war in Vietnam. Dj akarta T imes, September 231' 1966. It would seem more like that the first allusions had come from the Indonesians themselves. Malik was soon to find that the prestige connected with Vietnam peace efforts drew a crowd. Tunku Abdul Razak, Malaysian foreign minister, announced he would talk to Malik about peace efforts at the U. N. and Ferdinand Marcos revealed to the press that Indonesia already was working for a settlement. Malik made it seem that Marcos had asked him to work for a settlement and then told the press and public about it, "thus tying my feet before I could move." Antara, October 5, 1966. 98 ^ See Malik statements calling on U.S. to stop bombing. Dj akarta Times, March 15, 1967, and July 25, 1967. The second statement was in a government policy report to the Parliament. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 361] === 353 credibility and impartiality with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. To the Vietnamese, it could explain away on the same basis statements noting American "achievements" in Vietnam, including favorable comments on U.S. generosity to the people of the South and the demonstrated quality, of American 99 fighting men. The same posture, of course, was useful in answering domestic critics. "Indonesia would not brand the United States as an aggressor," Malik asserted, "because if we did, then we would be taking sides in the Vietnam conflict. Throughout?4alik's trip to New York for the U.N. session and during his visit to Japan, there were constant allusions, hints, suggestions, and calculated "leaks" about Indonesia undertaking a mediatory role in the Vietnam War. Although the subject does not appear to have been seriously discussed by Malik with State Department officials, the Indonesian diplomat told the Japanese press that "several countries" on both sides of the conflict had sounded out Indonesia about its willingness 59,gee the editorial "The Vietnamese Drama" in the Indonesian Herald for May 27, 1966. ^°°Dj_akarta Times, March 16, 1967. "We certainly do not want to see the fatal war in Vietnam continue," said the same newspaper editorially, "so we must not easily make commitments to either party in the dispute." Ibid.. comment ing on Malik statement. (The Dj akarta Times succeeded the Herald as the English-language voice of the Foreign Office in September, 1966. Although banned by law from being owned by the agency as the Herald was, the Times continued to reflect closely the thinking of the government.j R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 362] === 354 to undertake mediation in Vietnam.'1'^"*' Coming as he had from the United States, there was a clear imoression that the Americans were interested. Next Malik visited Moscow for discussions on debt rescheduling, and again the Foreign Min ister declared that his country had been approached to mediate the Vietnam war by both sides. If, as seems likely, by such revelations he hoped to attract a concrete proposal, he was to be disappointed. The word from Moscow was that diplomats believed Indonesia's chances of nlaying any significant role 102 were limited. Upon his return from Eastern Europe and con versations with Czech and Polish officials on Vietnam solutions, Malik said that the possibility of Indonesia becoming a media tor had not been touched upon, a sure sign that little interest 103 had been shown by the Communists. In the meantime, W. Averell Harriman, roving ambassador and special envoy of President Johnson, arrived in Djakarta on October 27 to report the results of the Manila "summit" meeting on Vietnam to the Indonesian government. Asked about Indonesian mediation, the veteran American diplomat told newsmen upon arrival that the U.S. ’ was anxious to encourage anyone with the ability and desire to mediate to help solve the problem. ~*~01Dj akarta Times, October 10, 1966, Dispatch from Tokyo by APF-Reuters. IPO Reuters dispatch from Moscow, Dj akarta Times, October 19, 1966. ^ ^Dj a k a r t a Times, November 1, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 363] === 355 He added that he could not yet judge the fitness of Indonesia 10 ^ for such a task. Following talks with General Suharto, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, and Acting Foreign Minister Mohammad Diah, Harriman was asked if Indonesian mediation was mentioned. The American said he had not raised the matter of mediation, but commented that: Indonesia shows concern for all Asian problems and there is no doubt that Indonesia will play a prominent role in this area.l°5 This was a clear implication that while some Indonesians might be interested in a mediation role, the U.S., at least for the time being, was not willing to such an effort. throw diplomatic support behind The apathy of the powers involved toIndo nesia’s "trial balloons" put Djakarta in the position of the girl who brought her harp to a party and no one asked her to play. The frustration was evident. Commenting on a subse quent statement by a State Department spokesman which welcomed Indonesia's reported offer to mediate the Vietnam War, Malik sharply asserted that a "welcome" by the U.S. government was not enough encouragement to take an intiative. American offi cials should ask Indonesia to undertake the effort, he declared. Antara, October 27. 1966. 105 Antara, October 29, 1966. 106 Djakarta Times. August 19, 1967. The State Department was reacting to a statement by Acting President Suharto in an August 16 "State of the State" address. Suharto said that Indonesia was willing to offer its good offices to settle the conflict, should they be needed. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 === [PDF page 364] === And again when rumors spread that Vice President Humphrey had requested Indonesia to be mediator, Malik denied the re ports but added: "...We are willing to do our share to help both sides if they asked." 107 It was clear that neither side had. There were cogent reasons for the tacit rejection of Indonesia's offers. If in an earlier day, Indonesia might have been a logical choice because of its "special connections with the Communist bloc, this was no longer true after Gestapu European Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, were suspicious and reserved, and Indonesia had no standing at all in Peking. 108 Its Hanoi embassy was headed by a junior diplomat incapable of conducting top-level talks with the North Vietnamese leadership since the former Indonesian am bassador there had defected to China. Hanoi radio had villifled Indonesia's anti-Communist leadership almost as much as had Radio Peking. In short, there was no evidence that the North Vietnamese wanted Indonesian mediation or reposed enough trust in Indonesia's leaders to see them as a neutral party to the dispute. Moreover, Indonesia, besides being plagued with domestic problems, was just finding its way back to an "Independent and active" foreign policy. The kind of ^ ^ Djakarta Times, November 7, 1967. 3.08 See Chapter VII for a detailed treatment of Indonesian relations with Communist countries. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 365] === 357 effort required by a mediation attempt might prove distracting to domestic projects and hold dangers for Indonesia's nonaligned position. Although some Indonesians counseled against 109 involvement in the conflict, even as mediator, the oppor tunities present for making worldwide headlines in the global tensions on Vietnam proved to be too strong on several occasions. The Aid Indonesia Consortium For the United States, the Indonesian's erratic notions of getting involved in the Vietnam War as peacemaker were no particular nuisance and the American willingness to provide large-scale foreign assistance increased. Following up on Malik's visit, the Sultan of Jogjakarta visited Washington from September 28-30 at the head of an economic mission. Although the primary purpose of the visit was to rejoin the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the Indonesian delegation found time to witness the signing of the $26.3 million U.S. credit to Indonesia for the purchase of rice and cotton, and for serious talks with U.S. officials. Although the Indonesians reported that the United States "stated a desire "...The wisdom to concentrate on an international problem such as Vietnam, which has so far defied solution, is to say the least doubtful." said The Dj akarta Times in an editorial on October 18, 1966. Malik himself indicated his understanding of the dangers of being referee in a donnybrook. Asked about mediation in March, 1967, he replied: "We do not want to get shot from both sides...." The Djakarta Times, March 31, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 366] === 358 to reactivate her economic cooperation with Indonesia, " H O American officials had no intentions of returning to the type and scope of programs which had marked the aid effort during the early 1960s. Washington had made it very clear that it was interested in a permanent program of aiding Indonesia only within a multilateral context, in concert with the in dustrialized countries of Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific. During a visit to Australia in July, 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk urged that nation's leaders to join in such an effort. "I would hope that we and you, and good many other countries, would find a way to be helpful because they do need assistance from the international community. Initially, the Indonesians were reluctant to accept the consortium idea. By approaching each of the aid-giving nations separately, it was argued, Indonesia would have more bargaining power and could extract larger amounts of assistance. Gradually, however, the New Order regime became convinced that the United States would have it no other way. The climate of opinion on foreign assistance had changed sharply in the United States in recent years. Those who had called for multilateral approaches to aid were now being heard and some, like Senator ■^^News release, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C. September 30, 1966, p. 2. -^Indonesian Herald, July 22, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 367] === 359 Fulbright, were in a position to make their will felt. 112 These facts of life were pointed out to the Indonesians in November, 1966, by Eugene Black, former head of the World Bank, and a special envoy of President Johnson, who visited Indonesia as part of an extensive trip through Asia to study economic and social developments. Stressing multilateral aspects of economic assistance almost exclusively, Black strongly en couraged the Indonesians to participate in the IMF, World Bank, the United Nations and its regional body, ECAFE, and the Asian Developmtnt Bank. The United States, he said, was prepared to give aid "without any strings attached whatsoever" in a cooperative setting with other nations. Moreover, Black pledged "friendly U.S. support" to the New Order leadership in 113 achieving its goals in relationships with other countries. On August 29* commenting on what he called "obviously inspired stories" about resumption of U.S. aid to Indonesia, Senator Fulbright questioned the wisdom of renewing aid in the bilateral pattern: "I would hope the Administration would do everything it can to make Indonesia a trial case for the inauguration of a multilateral aid program so that the United States will not need to bear the burden of the rich patron help ing and guiding the impoverished poor relation." Congressional Record — Senate» August 29, 1966, p. 20190. 113 See The Djakarta Times, November 11 and 12, 1966. Black, while praising the practical approach to solving problems which had been adopted in Indonesia, pointed out that not all plans had been implemented. Mahajani has interpreted this as an American effort to speed action on the private investment law, og_. cit., p. 231. Rather, Black was concerned about the entire economic reform program in Indonesia, which was slow getting underway, of which the foreign investment program was only a part. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 368] === 360 U.S. support was important in promoting IMF and World Bank interest in Indonesia, in liberalizing terms from other creditor nations, and in securing it a place of responsibility within the Asian Development Bank. America's most energetic and far-reaching efforts on behalf of Indonesia, however, were directed to the formation of an "Aid Indonesia" consortium or Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) as it is officially known. Composed of the same group of creditor nations which had met at Tokyo and Paris to re schedule Indonesia's foreign debt, the first consortium meeting which opened at Amsterdam on February 23, also drew observers from Austria, Canada, Mew Zealand, Norway, Switzer land, the IMF, World Bank, United Nations Development Program, the OECD and the Asian Development Bank. The Indonesian negotiators, backed by IMF studies, asked the assembled national delegates to provide "balance of pay ment" assistance amounting to about $200 million rather than project aid. Instead of wanting dollar allocations for spe cific economic activities, Indonesia was seeking cash equal to its foreign exchange deficit in order to help put into the operation of the nation's recently re-established free At the November, 1966, meeting at which Indonesia was admitted to the bank, it was also elected as one of the seven directors. It was somewhat of a coup for the Indo nesians since they had been members for so short a time and was accomplished, with U.S. backing, over some nations' initial opposition to the nomination. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 369] === 361 market system. Under the plan, Indonesian entrepreneurs would be allowed to purchase dollars for the import of a restricted list of production materials, spare parts and 115 essential consumer commodities. Called the Bonus Export (B.E.) system, the procedure was a sharp departure from regular foreign aid practices. Its adoption would have the effect of loosening considerably the control of the aid-giving nations over the funds, particularly to the ex tent that they could no longer determine that commodities purchased from them with credits were those they wished most particularly to sell. Further, the B.E. system, unless tightly supervised, could result in a misuse of foreign assistance, it was feared. The Amsterdam Conference was decidedly a mixed success. On the positive side, the nations present endorsed in principle the multilateral approach to Indonesian aid as championed by the United States. They also accepted the IMF-certified figure of $200 million as Indonesia's 1967 foreign exchange needs and, despite reported reservations on the nart of some 115«we want to give evidence that the market mechanism is superior to the old system of centralized government and we will ask the creditors to let us make a test case, to let uS try it out," said Prof. Widjojo, who was one of Indonesia's negotiators. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 370] === 362 countries, 116 expressed confidence in the Indonesian stabili zation program, including the Bonus Export system. The Amsterdam Conference's final communique concluded as well that Indonesia should have new aid "on as soft terms as possible" within the first half of 1967 in order to assure 117 the country a steady flow of imports. This last point was an attempt by delegates to paper over severe differences among the nations and their reti cence to make concrete commitments. Prance, for example, had adopted a very reserved posture on giving new loans and urged instead that Djakarta's debts be cleared up first. The United States campaigned for a 2.5 percent interest rate on new loans, while other nations, particularly Japan and Great Britain, wanted a somewhat higher rate. 118 Nor, at first, See O.G. Roeder, "Indebted Diplomacy," Par Eastern Economic Review, L V:10 (March 9, 1967) p. ^39. He reported that the Lutch and the Germans seemed to have reservations about the B.E. system. The difficulty from the American po sition probably was reconciling the B.E. approach with the many Congressional directives governing the administration of aid funds which were geared to project aid, rather than this new departure. 117 See the statement of American officials quoted in article by J.Y. Smith, the Washingfcon Post, March 2, 1967 118 Japan and Great Britain were said to have been ac cused by the Netherlands of seeking higher than standard interest rates on new loans and of being "politically and economically responsible for the failure of the Conference." See O.G. Roeder, "Indebted Diplomacy," pp. 139-1^0. Later the Japanese would be criticized by the Indonesia press for its "tough and busi nesslike attitude" on Indonesia aid. Was the Japanese governmtnt attempting to "blackmail" Indonesia in its time of need?, the Army-run newspaper Nusantara asked on March 6, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 371] === 363 was there a willingness by any nation to Diedge a definite amount to Indonesia. Instead, another meeting was set for June. At the time, however, the delegates, particularly the Americans, were keenly aware that if the meeting adjourned without firm promises of help, the New Order regime might be in considerable political trouble. In complying with the recommendations of the IMP,the government had removed sub sidies from gasoline, oil and public utilities resulting in higher prices and considerable public protest. If the Indone sian delegation was forced to go hone empty-handed, after doing what the West had asked, opponents of the Mew Order would be given considerable aid and comfort. "There is no time to be wasted and there is no occasion to be complacent," the Sultan of Jogjakarta had warned. 119 In order to prevent the political weakening of the Indonesian government and to force action by the other nations, the United States— during the last half hour of the Amsterdam meeting— pledged to meet one-third or roughly $65 million of the $200 million Indonesia lacked in necessary foreign exchange. Despite the U.S. desire for a multilaterial framework for its aid, conditions had forced this uni lateral declaration of intent. At the same time, the offer was 119 Quoted by Alfred Friendly Jr., dispatch from Djakarta, The New York Times, February 20, 1967. The Sultan also said: "If no tangible results come from the forthcoming Amsterdam meetingf I am afraid the high hopes of the Indonesian people will turn into disappointmtnt, which may in turn diminish their confidence in the cabinet." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 372] === 364 calculated to pressure other nations to follow suit. he made the pledge of U.S. aid, Robert W. Barnett, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, asserted that only one-half the amount would be available prior to June 30. The remainder would be given to Indonesia only after a "careful review" of Indonesian self-help measures and the aid pledges made in the interim by other industrialized nations. Implicit in this arrangement was the threat that the United States would withhold part of the aid unless its con ditions were met. Yhe American initiative proved to be successful. Not only did the $65 million pledge put the $200 million needed by Indonesia "within reach" of the other nations, it also heartened the New Order. Asserting confidently that his country would eventually receive the full amount, Adam Malik denied that the Amsterdam meeting could be called a failure. 120 Almost immedi ately the Foreign Minister began talks with Ambassador Green on his government's proposals for implementing the U.S. pledge of credits. At the same time, Indonesia opened bilateral talks with Japan and certain other nations seeking the commitment of con crete amounts. After strenuous negotiations lasting some three months, the Japanese agreed to provide a $60 million at three percent interest, repayable over 20 years with a seven •^^See The D.jakarta Times, March 2, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 373] === 365 year grace period. 121 With the two largest shares already committed, Western European nations came forth with the remain ing amount to fill Indonesia's need. This outcome was considered by Americans and Indonesians alike as a triumph for American diplomacy and became a major factor in building further good 122 will between the two nations. The Pall of Sukarno As the Indonesian government pursued its "economic diplomacy" on the international scene, domestically it was taking two main lines of action, both aimed at Sukarno and the "Old Order." First, there was an effort to revive the powers of the Provisional Consultative People's Congress (MPRS) in order to create a new political system to replace the President and his "Guided Democracy" scheme. Second, there was emphasis on the Mahmilub trials as a means of revealing the abuses and degradations of the Sukarno regime. Delayed by Sukarno's obstructionist tactics, the first MPRS session under the Mew Order was held from.Tune 20 to July 5. These terms were close to what the Indonesians had wanted from Japan and far from the 5.25$ interest the Japanese reportedly had sought at Amsterdam. When Malik was in Tokyo in early April he was reported to have asked for a $60 million loan at no more than three percent, repayable over twenty-five years and carrying a seven year grace period. The only dif ference between this request and final agreement was five years less for repaying the loan. 122 During the author's conversations with Indonesian off.cials, the Amsterdam Conference and the American role was often cited as a definite sign of U.S. friendship. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 374] === 366 The highest policy-making body in the nation under Indonesia's 123 19^5 constitution, the MPRS had been purged of PKI and other leftist representatives and a number of military men and their adherents had been added. The total number now stood at 541 delegates, of whom 239 were members of Parliament, 191 from functional groups and 111 serving as regional represen tatives. Although considerable civilian support was evidenced, the MPRS session clearly was dominated by the military. General Nasution was elected Speaker of the MPRS and final decisions of that body came very close to policies which had been urged on the 120 military men participating in the Congress through position papers drafted by a committee of the armed forces, under the direction of General Suharto. Among actions taken by the MPRS was ratification of the banning of the PKI and the outlawing of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia. The March 11 order giving emergency powers to General Suharto was ratified and the MPRS decreed that if the President were incapacitated, General 12 3 According to Article I, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of 1945, "sovereignty is vested in the people and exercised fully by the Consultative People's Congress," which would con sist of "the members of Parliament" and of "delegates of the regions and other groups." For accounts of the year between Suharto's being given emergency powers and his being made "Acting President" with the downgrading of Sukarno, see Justus van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Fall," Orbls X I:2 (Summer, 1 9 6 7 ) pp. 4 9 1 - 5 3 2; and Guy Pauker's Indonesia in 1 9 6 6: The Year of Transition (Santa Monica: A RAND Corporation Report, 1 9 6 7 T and Toward a New Order in Indonesia (Santa Monica: A RAND Corporation Report, 1 9 F T ). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 375] === 367 Suharto should assume the powers of acting president. earlier MPRS decree making Sukarno "President-for-life" was repealed and elections were set for July, 1968. Unchastened by these events, however, Sukarno, in a speech to the MPRS, denied its power to strip him entirely of the presidency, as some students and military men had urged. As a further sisn of his lingering strength, the Presi dent also was able to gain several compromises from the New Order reeime on the make-up of the "Ampera" Cabinet, formed on July 25. Although the change generally strengthened the powers of the Suharto-Malik-Sultan triumvirate, the cabinet included representatives of the PNI and NT J parties known to be sympa thetic to the President, and Sukarno insisted that he had helped form it with General Suharto. Taking advantage of the Army’s reluctance to move against him, Sukarno launched a full-fledged counterattack in the latter months of 1966. he had so many times in the past, Sukarno began his campaign by raising the specter of a conspiracy against himself engi neered from abroad. He alleged proof that CIA-financed snipers had been located at several places ready to assassinate him. In November, Sukarno followed up this theme by claiming that the American millionaire H. L. Hunt had paid for attempts •'•‘^Indonesian Herald, September 8, 1966. At the same time, the President was reasserting his Marxist leanings. "I am a Marxist, Marxism is in my heart," he declared in the same speech. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 === [PDF page 376] === 368 to undermine him, citing as evidence an article in Newsweek magazine in which Hunt had described Indonesia as one of the row victories for the United States in the Cold War. Subse quently, in a speech on December 20, the President reiterated his charges, this time waving a copy of Playboy magazine which included a twelve-page interview with Hunt. "Do you see this man?" he asked, pointing to a picture of the American. "He is Mr. Hunt, who had admitted again that he had a hand 125 in subverting me." To his sympathetic audience on that occasion, he also disassociated himself from the Army-controlled governm nt by declaring that he was not of the "New Order" but of the "Original Order." In his drive to retrieve power and influence, and, correspondingly to undermine the legitimacy of the New Order regime, Sukarno also was assisted by an analysis of the September 30 Movement prepared by specialists connected with The D.j akarta Times, December 21, 1966. What Hunt had said in the Playboy interview was this: Asked if the U.S. was losing the Cold War, Hunt replied: "Almost everywhere. Right now we don't seem to be losing to Communist infiltration in Indonesia and a few other countries, but I think this is almost entirely because of Admiral Raborn, whom President Johnson put in charge of the CIA." The Indonesian government's reply to Sukarno's charges was made by Attorney General Sugiharto who stated that there was no proof of the activities of Hunt in Indonesia. The New Order official characterized the American champion of right-wing causes as "an American with a lot of money who did not know what to do with it." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 377] === 369 the Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project. Entitled "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia," the 162-page paper concluded that the weight of the evidence and "logic of probabilities" indicated that the coup was neither the work of the PKI or Sukarno. Both were seen as victims of events rather than their initiators. The origin of the coup, according to the paper, was among dis affected middle-level Javanese officers of the Diponegoro Division who distrusted the Army general staff in Djakarta for having succumbed to the corruptions of Djakarta elite living and for having opposed the domestic and international 126 policies of Sukarno. This theory first was publicly espoused by Dr. George McT. Kahin during testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Par East and Pacific on January 27, 1966. Kahin, director of the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell, contended that: The author has not read the complete paper since copies have not been published in the normal sense of that word. He has, however, a six-page "Provisional SynoDsis of the Coup Analysis," which summarises the findings of the paper, reportedly authored principally by Dr. Benedict Anderson and Dr. Ruth McVey, two Indonesian specialists at Cornell. The Synopsis Is taken directly from the paper itself. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 378] === 370 But what did happen was something that arose internally in Indonesia from within Indonesian Army politics. It certainly caught President Sukarno off balance as well. And once it developed, it com promised the position of the C o m m u n i s t s. •'-^7 Then, in March, 1965, Columnist Joseph Kraft used the Cornell paper and thesis as the basis of an article in which he ques tioned the wisdom of Washington’s support for the Indonesian military, particularly in view of the slaughter of the Communists. If the military did ultimately gain power, he predicted, "the recent past assumes that it will be a jackboot regime, holding power by terror and vulnerable to the favorite,128 Communist tactic of peasant resistance in a guerrilla war." Although the article subsequently drew a letter of disclaimer from Kahin in which he noted that Kraft’s remarks had gone considerably beyond the discussion of events in the paper 129 to more recent developments, the Cornell thesis continued to circulate both inside the United States and abroad, and was the basis for several articles on Indonesia by individuals connected directly or indirectly with the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. All of these articles tended to play down 127 United States Congress, House, United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings by the Subcomm.ttee on the Far East and Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Comm.ttee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966) p. 115. ^ ^ The Washington Post, March 5, 1966 1^^The Washington Post, March 10, 1966. Kraft acknowl edged the correctness of kahin's letter and apologized for any misleading impressions. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 379] === 371 the Communist involvement in the coup in favor of its being an Internal Army affair According to Ambassador Green,the Cornell Paper "was not simply a footnote" to the ongoing struggle between the Mew Order and its opponents, but a matter of deep concern since it called into question the legitimacy of Suharto and Nasution’s right to rule and thereby strengthened and en131 couraged the Sukarnoists. Circulated within Indonesia to a small group of government officials, intellectuals and journalists, the paper seems to have elicited general scep132 ticism. But the chief worry was its reception abroad where the Indonesian government was trying to rebuild a favorable image following the chaos and bloodshed of 1965 and early 1966. The paper and articles reflecting its thesis, "besides forming public opinion which is unfavorable and misinterpreting the New Order...are also effectively used by the PKI political guerrillas and their stooges abroad," declared one Indonesian Among the articles were Lev, "Indonesia, 1965: The Year of the Coup, Asian Survey (February, 1966); Bunnell, "Indonesia's Quasi-Military Regime," Current History (January, 1967); and Lucien Re.y, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama, New Left Review (March-April, 1966). As we have seen, of course, the term "internal Army affair" is the same given by the PKI in its statement after October 1, 1965. According to testimony at the Mahmilub Trials, this was the cover-up which Aidit had decided upon should the coup fail. 131 Interview. -*-32See Minggu Slnar Harapan editorial, June *t, 1967> and Kompas, June 13f 1967> article by H. Rosihan Anwar. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 380] === 372 .-journal. J When Indonesian officials made anxious inquiries at the American missions about the Cornell version of the coup, they were assured that it did not represent the view of the Ameri can government. As if to underscore this point with the Indonesians, Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, in an appear ance before the Subcommittee on the Par East and Pacific, took pains to emphasize that the United States had reason to be lieve that the Communists were closely involved in the planning and execution of the September 30 Movement. During a visit to Indonesia in 1967, Dr. Kahin himself was reported to have denounced the paper as "sarcastic and childish." 134 Although more than three years has passed since the paper was issued, it continues to be a sore point with the Indonesians and a 135 source of controversy in American academic circles. Whatever advantage the Cornell thesis was to Sukarno in his attemDted comeback, the President's reputation was struck 133iqjngp.u Sinar Harapan, June 4, 1967. The D.1akarta Times. Dr. Kahin later denied havinsr made such a statement, but Col. Nugroho, who was present at the time, stands by the original story. Interview. In a state ment to the author, Dr. Kahin said he now believes the Commu nists played more than a peripheral role in the coup, but still believes the paper to be the most satisfactory explana tion of the coup attempt. -*-35see, for example, statements by Dr. Guy Pauker in Harlan K a m i. February 27, 1968, and before the Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific, Future U.S. Role in Asia and the Pacific, Hearings, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968) p. 280. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 381] === 373 a serious blow by the evidence produced by the Extraordinary Military Court (Mahmilub) trials of three former Cabinet members between September and December, 1966. The three, all sentenced to death, were.Jusuf Muda Dalam, former minister for central bank affairs and governor of the State Bank; Dr. Subandrio, former foreign minister, and Omar Dhani, once commander of the Air Force. The trials occasioned disclosures about the moral decadence and financial corruption of the Sukarno regime and provided new details on Indonesia’s preGestapu association with Communist China. More Important, the trials, which were broadcast and telecast to the Indonesian public, saw both Dhani and Subandrio testify that they were merely implementing Sukarno’s policies when they took the actions for which they stood accused. Although the Mahmilub proceedings had some of the trappings of "show" trials, the findings and sentences meted seem to have been generally accepted by the Indonesian public, and gave rise to renewed questioning of the President’s knowledge of, and role in, the events surrounding Gestapu. During July, 1966, the MPRS had asked Sukarno give an account of his own activities in connection with Gestapu and he had refused to comply. Following Dhani's trial, in which Sukarno was alleged to have made no effort to stop the con spirators and even to have praised their deeds as part of Indonesia's ongoing revolution, there was mounting pressure R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 382] === 374 and student demonstrations toward obtaining an explanation from the President. For example, on December 21, 1966, the commanders of the Armed Forces issued a joint statement threatening to take action against any one refusing to carry out the decision of the MPRS. In a conscious act of defiance, however, Sukarno delayed sending a reply until January 10, 1967, a reply that, as one observer has put it, "sealed his 136 political doom." Instead of explaining himself, Sukarno challenged the right of the MPRS to question him. He added only that the Gestapu affair had been a complete surprise to him, thus reiterating a statement he had made twice before in written testimony submitted to Mahmilub. The President's defiant attitude galvanized his opponents once more. With the approval of the Army, KAMI and KAPPI returned to the streets to demand that he be removed from office. Two weeks later, General Wasution, in his role as Speaker of the MPRS, announced that there was sufficient evidence to believe that Sukarno had been involved in the Gestapu affair and that the MPRS would meet in March or April to discuss the ^resident's continuance in office. On February 9> the Standing Executive Committee of the MPRS resolved to demand the removal of Sukarno and the creation of a court to try him, and on February 16, It rejected an •*-3^van der Kroef, "The Fall of Sukarno," p. 519. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 383] === 375 eleventh-hour supolenentary statement from the President as not meeting the requirements of the MPRS mandate. As it became increasingly clearer that the New Order recrime had resolved to end "dualism" in the government and that his own supporters had been effectively cowed into silence, Sukarno finally took the step which his opponents had urged on him for months: On February 20, he transferred all governmental executive authority to General Suharto who be came "Acting President" while Sukarno himself retained the now almost meaningless title of "President." 137 In something less than one year after the President had empowered General Suharto to take steps to guarantee tranquillity and security, Sukarno had lost all power and the New Order regime was firmly established, complete with the trappings of legitimacy. To American diplomats, the news brought more a sense of relief than outright exaltation. his final months in power, Sukarno had periodically caused serious concern by his almost unbelievable ability to muster support just when it seemed he finally had been rendered powerless. A wide range of generals, politicians and religious leaders, 137 Press Release, Embasy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1967. Although Sukarno was said to have made the transfer of power on February 20, the public announcement by Indonesian Information Minister Diah did not come until two days later, leading to speculation about the actual events surrounding the action. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 384] === 376 including some antl-Communists, had shown a willingness to side with the President for short-term gains. Although Sukarno lacked the power to block government action cormoletelv, the residual powers of his office, which made it necessary to obtain his approval for many decisions, allowed him to cause frustrating delays in the implementation of Mew Order economic, political and social programs. While marvelling at Sukarno's "rat-like" ability to cling to power, the Americans also were puzzled by his stubbornness and inability to compromise his revolutionary ideals. 138 If to many in the U.S. mission Sukarno's demise had been all to slow, now that it had been accomplished there was frank admiration for General Suharto and his subtle ways of moving against the President. There was hope too for the implementation of reforms and the consolidation of progressive steps which had been taken during the previous eleven months. At the same time, however, American diplomats recognized that the period to come would contain its own particular challenges. In the past, Indonesia's economic difficulties could be blamed on Sukarno; now, the New Order would have no scapegoat. For better or worse, the regime would be obliged to stand on its own. ■^®In interviews with embassy personnel, the author found many willing to subscribe to Malik's description of Sukarno as "a spoiled old man" as an explanation of his unbending attitude. Some coupled this with speculation about mental deterioration. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 385] === CHAPTER VI INDONESIA AMD REGIONAL COOPERATION Given the Dre-Oestapu contacts which the Indonesian military had made with Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia's leaders probably were justified in believing that, after the ascendancy of the Army in October, 1965, the end of Confrontation was in sight. Throughout the six-month period of struggle which followed the crushing of the coup, however, armed clashes continued along Indonesian-Malaysian borders and harsh words still flowed from Djakarta. As a result, Malaysian defense planning went ahead as if the conflict might progress to even more intense stages. Throughout this oeriod, however, communications, if only of a spasmodic character, almost certainly continued between those on both sides who were anxious to see an early end to the fighting. Intentions and signals were relayed through a series of intermediaries and "contact men" — unofficial — both official and the sum of whose activities played an important -*-For example, General Nasution was reported to say peace between Indonesia and Malaysia could come only when the latter was disintegrated and the foreign military bases in Singapore dismantled. This may have been a signal to Kuala Lumpur not to tip the negotiations which already had been going on since Nasution on the same occasion denied rumors that the Armed Forces had sent peace "feelers" to Malaysia— rumors which Suharto later admitted. Indonesian Herald, February 3, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 386] === 378 role in the ultimate demise of Confrontation. Following the "rant of emergency powers to General Suharto, the Malaysians ooenly predicted the end of Confrontation. Abdul Tunku Rahman ceased to attend National Defense Council meetings as "just a waste of time for me," and suggested that Singapore's representatives were also absent because "they too have lost interest."^ Although aware that assistance from the West depended upon the liquidation of Confrontation, the Mew Order regime at first moved slowly on the issue. It faced problems of re orienting public opinion toward Malaysia, of copine- with Sukarno's continued hostility to a settlement, and of estab lishing at least some kind of bargaining position which would allow Indonesia to "save face." Following a trip to Manila during which Indonesian-philippine relations were strengthened, Adam Malik returned to D;jakarta to declare that Indonesia had no desire to protract the conflict: "...We want to settle the issue as soon as possible." At the same time, he indicated ^See the Far Eastern Economic Review, LII:9 (June 9 } 1966) p. 470. Among the intermediaries was Dr. Sumitro, who was living in exile in Malaysia as one of the former leaders of the PRRI revolt. Engaged in business, he at the same time had connections within Indonesia and access to top figures of the lialaysian government. ■^Quoted in the Far Eastern Economic Review, LI: 12 (March 24, 1966). See also statements by Foreign Minister Razak about this same time, predicting the end of Confronta tion. Antara, Djakarta, May 4, 1966. Earlier Malik had said Indonesia would settle confrontation "tomorrow, if possible." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 387] === 379 that the government would be willing to drop several of the pre-conditions which it had set to peace. May 16, 1966, General Nasution joined the effort by declaring that the Malaysia issufe should be settled instead of being allowed to drift on indefinitely. A few days later it was announced by both capitals that the their foreign ministers would meet in Bangkok before the end of May to discuss ending of Indonesia's undeclared war against Malaysia. Before the diplomats could meet, however, the Indonesian military, in a highly unusual step, sent a surprise delegation of high-ranking officers to Kuala Lumpur. Composed of eight commanders in charge of units whose nrevious mission ostensibly was to "crush" the Malaysian federation, the delegation symbo lized the desire of the Indonesian military for recognition as being pre-eminent (over civilian diplomats) in the search for peace, and as not having been beaten in the struggle against the Malaysians since it had never really put any heart In the fight, following a meeting with this delegation, Abdul Razak declared that Confrontation was unofficially ended and predicted that peace talks would succeed. Razak also said, "You could even say that after today's visit there is nothing much to talk about." The New York Times, May 28, 1966. This indicates the eagerness that the military displayed toward liquidating the conflict once and for all. Malaysian diplomats told the author that the military representatives were much easier to deal with on the issues, because of this attitude, than were the professional diplomats. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 388] === 380 Whatever damage this military delegation had done to his bargaining effort, Malik nevertheless made the most of a weak position in his talks in Bangkok. On June 1, 1966, Malik and Razak announced an agreement on "practical steps" toward ending Confrontation. In a document which was not signed, but was read in the presence of the two ministers, it was agreed to "submit for approval to their respective governments the principles upon which practical steps to restore friendly relations... should be based." In Malaysia, the Bangkok Accord was hailed as signal ing Indonesia’s acceptance of the Federation as an independent, sovereign nation and the termination of Confrontation. more cautious attitude prevailed in Djakarta. Although the military endorsed Malik's work, Sukarno was still to be reckoned with. The President quickly condemned the agreement as unacceptable, insisting that a Malaysian promise to hold referendums in Sabah and Sarawak before Indonesia would agree to restore normal relations. Because of Sukarno's hatred for Malik, it was arranged that further negotiations at least officially would be handled by General Suharto. ^The Singapore correspondent of Die Welt quoted an unnamed high-ranking Malaysian as saying: "Dr. Subandrio talked at least with only two tongues; whereas Malik talks with at least twenty." Cited by Antara, June 11, 1966. The New York Times, June 2, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 389] === 381 The General's tactic of playing for time in an effort to circumvent the President's opposition occasioned a two month delay in implementing the agreements at Bangkok. the interim, there were Indonesian-Malaysian talks on the issue of elections in Sabah and Sarawak. Finally, on August 11, in a ceremony in the Pantjasila Hall of the Foreign Ministry Building in Djakarta, Malik and Razak signed an agreement normalizing relations between the two nations. its part of the accord, the Government of Malaysia agreed to: ...Afford the people of Sabah and Sarawak, who are directly Involved, an opportunity to reaffirm, as soon as practicable, in free and democratic manner, through general elections, their previous decision about their status in Malaysia.9 Although this proviso was so generally worded as to mean little in a practical political sense, it provided just enough of a face-saving device to allow general Indonesian acceptance, including that of the President who subsequently claimed that much of his opposition to a Malaysian settlement was simply Dr. Michael Leifer has suggested that the delay was caused not so much by internal political difficulties as by the Indonesian government's desire to continue with Confronta tion and to promote the further fragmentation of Malaysia by covert rather than military means. "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face of Confrontation," The World Today 22:9 This author finds no justification for such a conclusion. A more satisfactory account of this period can be found in John Sutter's, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: "Crush Malaysia" and the Gestaou." Aslan Survey (October, 1966) pp. 523-5^6. ^From text released by Indonesian Information Service, August 11, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 390] === 382 to give "a little backbone" to General Suharto in reaching a satisfactory accord. 10 On August 22, the Supreme Operations Command resumed its old name, KOTI, dropping the "KOGAM" ("Crush Malaysia") designation, and military spokesmen made clear their intentions to continue improving relations with Malaysia. The American Reaction Although the United States attached great significance to the liquidation of the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, it played no central role in settling the issue. Mo nation could be more D i e a s e d than the U.S. to see the problem solved, said Secretary of State Rusk, who observed: My guess is that they are likely to be able to resolve these matters better without us than with us, and we are perfectly prepared to cheer from the sidelines on something like this and wish them well. 1 At the same time, however, the American role was something more than a mere spectator. Indonesia had early been apprised that the resumption of American economic aid was directly tied to its actions on the Malaysian question. Further, SEATO allies See Sukarno’s 1966 Independence Day speech, given a week after the signing, for an interesting explanation by the President of his actions. He hinted, for example, that the Bangkok Accord reached by Malik had contained elements which could have overthrown the Republic. At news conference of May 27, 1966. State Bulletin, June 13, 1966,p. 923. Department of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 391] === 383 Thailand and the Philippines received U.S. encouragement to extend their influence and their good offices toward making a solution less difficult for the combatants. 12 The United States had several reasons to be grateful for ending of hostilities. In the first d a c e, although the level of fighting and casualties had been kept low throughout the three-year Confrontation, 13 there was a constant threat of a rapid and bloody escalation of the conflict. Such a develop ment would have required the attention of several American allies, including those helping in Vietnam, and would have made America's already burdensome military effort on the Indochina Peninsula even more difficult. Beyond that, if Southeast Asia had become a general war zone, as Confrontation threatened, the peril of escalation to a conflict involving China and both Superpowers was intensified greatly. "A hostile Indonesia could over time have undermined everything we were doing to It is interesting to note that the final communique of the 11th SEATO Council Meeting, held in Canberra in June, 1966, — pointing up the role of SEATO members — said: "The Council noted with satisfaction the improvement in relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.... The Council expressed its admiration for the part played in this improvement by its mem bers, particularly the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the Secretary of Foreign A.ffairs of the Philippines." SEATO Record, V:4 (August, 1966) p. 4. 13 According to casualty figures published by the Far Eastern Economic Review, LII:9 (June 9, 1966) p. 469, the Indonesians lost 580 killed, 220 wounded and 750 captured. The Malaysian tosses, including civilians and troops of Britain (including Gurkhas) and Australia/New Zealand, were: 148 killed, 229 wounded, and 4 captured. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 392] === 384 defend Vietnam and preserve the security of the rest of 14 Southeast Asia," said William Bundy. The United States also was gratified, as Dean Rusk put it, "by improved relations and increased cooperation among the nations of the Western pacific," 1s which had resulted with the termination of the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict. For example, on the day after the Bangnok Accord it was announced that the Philipoines had given full diplomatic recognition to Malaysia, thereby ending an era of less-than-satisfactory re lations between two nations with Western t i e s. ^ Singapore, which had threatened to turn British bases over to the Rus sians following its expulsion from the Malaysian Federation and whose heavily Chinese population gave pause to its neigh bors, became considerably less a concern with the establish ment of amicable relations between D/Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The development also allowed closer Indonesia-Australian cooperation including a joint survey to demarcate the border separating the territories of che two nations in New Guinea, thus eliminating a possible future cause of conflict. Pakistan, which had broken relations with Malaysia in support of the 14 Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 2, 1967. (Typescript) p. 26. 'L'’ln speech before the SEATO Ministerial Council, June 27, 1966. Department of State Bulletin. August 1, 1966, p. 171. ■^"We welcome the re-establishment of diplomatic rela tions between Malaysia and the Philippines," said Rusk. Ibid. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 393] === 385 Indonesian-Communist Chinese nosition, changed its attitude following a visit of its Foreign Minister, Zulfikar All Bhutto, to Djakarta and ultimately Malaysian-Pakistani re lations were restored. The termination of Confrontation also allowed the development of closer relations between Indonesia and India, and Indonesia and Japan — both nations which the United States was anxious to see play a more active role in Southeast Asia. In short, the Confrontation had bred distrust and antagonism among a number of Asian nations which the United States counted as allies (Australia, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines) and those with which it wished to be "friends" (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore). With the struggle’s termination came new opoortunities for coooerative bilateral relations which not only made the U.S. diplomatic task in Asia much easier but also raised prospects of longrange stability and peaceful resolution of inter-nation conflicts. Interested as it has traditionally been in the "preservation and encouragemfent of orderly process" In Asia, 17 the U.S. was •^This phrase, first used in a letter from Secretary of State Hull to Vice President Garner in 1938 to describe American Interests in the Far East, Is— despite its vagueness— descriptive of the view that peaceful intercourse among the nations of Asia has positive connotations for the United States. Rusk, for example, has emphasized Indonesia's "own desire to establish good relations with its neighbors" as of prime importance among post-Gestapu changes. News Conference, August 4, 1966. Department of State Press Release (Mimeo graphed) p. 21. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 394] === pleased by the "era of good feeling" among Western pacific neighbors which replaced the bitterness and recriminations of Confrontation. It ooened the way, William Bundy asserted, "to a Southeast Asian community of nations living at peace, adopting international postures each may choose, and making human betterment their central objective." 18 Bundy's emphasis on a "Southeast Asian community of nations" reflected Washington's increasing interest in the establishment of geographical groupings of states which together would have the economic, social and political ability to ward off internal subversion and external aggression. As Presidential Assistant Walt Whitman Rostow put it, the United States had found in regionalism a new relationship "some where between the overwhelming responsibility we assumed in the postwar years— as we moved in to fill vacuums of power and to deal with war devastation— and a return to isolationism. The emphasis on regionalism in Asia was a direct result of the American experience in Vietnam. That commitment had been made 18 Speech before the National Executive Committee of the American Legion, Indianapolis, May 3, 1967. Departmtnt of State Press Release (Mimeographed) p. tJ. 19 Commencement address before the graduating class of Middlebury College, Middlebury, V t., June 12, 1967. The New York Tim e s. June 13, 1967. Rostow said that it was his belief that **one of the most important, if unnoticed, transitions in policy under President Johnson" was that the United States was now actively supporting the establishment of regional institutions in Latin America, Asia and Africa. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 395] === 387 under the auspices of SEATO, an organization established through U.S. guidance at the height of the Cold War to fill the power vacuum in Southeast Asia left by the 195^ withdrawal of the French. The weakness of SEATO as the situation de veloped in Vietnam and the improbability of America’s ever again undertaking such an involvement seemed to require the devising of a whole new security system for Asia. In such a system a stable Indonesia— as the most populous, potentially richest and most powerful nation of Southeast Asia — be an essential element. would Linked to the Philippines, Malaysia, and perhaps to Thailand, Cambodia and Burma, it could, the New York Times declared editorially, "provide a solid anchor in Southeast Asia." 20 The premature and extravagant praise accorded to "Maphilindo" by American spokesmen in 1963 had, for the most part, been occasioned by desires for such an anchor. 21 By 1966, with the accumulated wisdom of three years fighting in Vietnam, those feelings had been greatly intensified. The Formation of A S E A N 22 These American aspirations seemingly had their equi valents among the statesmen of Asia. As he waited in Bangkok 20May 30, 1966. 21 The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) which included Thailand, Philippines and Malaya, for example, never received the attention accorded Maphilindo. The chief difference was that one contained Indonesia, the other did not and therefore could play only a minor regional role. 22 The author must acknowledge here with special gratitude the work which has been done on the formation of ASEAN by R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 396] === 388 to board his return flight to Djakarta after reaching agree ment with Razak on termination of Confrontation, Adam Malik announced that Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand had decided to join Indonesia in a new union of Southeast Asia nations. The Thai foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, who was present agreed "in principle" with Malik's statement and wel comed the step. A Malaysian official who was also on hand, however, would say only that some proposals had been made. 23 The Indonesian foreign minister's announcement apparently was premature, Derhaps an attempt to put a better face on the negotiations with Malaysia, for there was no further public discussion of the new grouping. At the August signing of the agreement with Malaysia, for example, Malik spoke only of bilateral cultural, economic and possibly military cooperation with Malaysia. 2** in the meantime, however, Malik had Droposed a "Greater Asian Federation" which would include JaDan, and Finance Minister Frans Seda had asserted that Indonesia had Dr. Bernard Gordon, who has provided insights and information on Asian regionalism, both through published and unpublished materials. ^D i s p a t c h of the Times of London, datelined Bangkok, June 2, The New York Times, June 3, 1966. The military cooperation to which Malik probably was referring was the coordination of efforts by both governments to eliminate the marauding bands of Chinese guerrillas armed by Indonesia whe continued to fight long after Confrontation had been declared at an end. These joint efforts began in the autumn of 1966 along the Sarawak-Kalimantan border. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 397] === 389 taken Initiatives to establish an Asian common market"^— clear indications that the Indonesia government had no firm plans for a new regional organization. In truth, so long as Sukarno continued as President, it probably would have been difficult for Indonesia to join any organization in which Malaysia or a strong Western adherent like Thailand participated. His presence did not, however, prevent discussions of regional cooperation from continuing. As a result considerable diplomatic activity focussed on the issue, including visits by the Philippines foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos and Thailand's Thanat to Djakarta in August, 1966. Late in that year, Thanat had prepared a draft proposal for an organization which he circulated to the ministers of foreign affairs in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. It was, according to one who read it, a "careful and conscious blending of the ourposes of A.S.A. along with much of the style and flavor of Maphilindo." 26 This merger was designed to please both the Malaysians, some of whom thought Indonesia should join the Association of Southeast Asia (A.S.A.)^ and ^Antara-AFP Dispatch from Tokyo, June 8, 1966, carried Malik's suggestion for a "Greater Asian Federation." Seda's remarks were carried by Antara, July 7, I9 66. p iT Dr. Bernard Gordon, Aslan Re g i o n a l i s m: implications for Policy (McLean, V a.: The Research Analysis Corp., 1 9 6 8 ) p. 5 8. ^ A b d u l Tunku Rahman was one who believed Indonesia should join A.S.A. and opposed any new grouping. Malik closed the door on that idea when, after meeting with Rahman in Bangkok in May, 1967, he declared that there was "no place" for Indonesia in A.S.A. and said prospects were "good" for a new regional organi zation. The Djakarta Times, May 25, 196?. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 398] === 390 the Indonesians, who retained some nostalgia for the Maphilindo concept. The proposed grouping, tentatively called the South-East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SF.AARC), became the sub.lect of study in Southeast Asian capitals for more than one-half year as one obstacle after another appeared to slow consideration. In the meantime, Indonesia was being urged to join the Asian and Pacific Council (A.SPAC) which had come into existence in 1966. Consisting of Japan, Australia, Thailand, South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Taiwan and Malaysia, the organization had a definite anti-Communist political coloration. In April, 1967, Malik ruled out Indo nesia's joining the organization, even in the status of observer. By becoming an ASPAC member, the Foreign Minister said, Indonesia would move away from its "active and inde pendent" foreign policy and toward a pact which some Asian countries [meaning China] could easily see as a political and 28 military pact against them. Antara, April 2, 1967. Japan continued, however, to want to hold out ASPAC membership to Indonesia. The issue caused some friction with the South Korean delegation be cause of Indonesia's relations with North Korea. Antara, August 19, 1967. There also was some feeling that without Indonesia, ASPAC was not representative of the whole region, and that Djakarta might someday come to feel that ASPAC was an American and Commonwealth attempt to surround her. See The Djakarta Times, July 8, 1967, for a Reuters dispatch from Bangkok duning the second annual meeting of ASPAC. In August, 1968, however, Malik said Indonesia would eventually join ASPAC when the time was ripe. Antara, August 10, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 399] === 391 Instead, the Indonesian diplomat— working with Thailand's Thanat— continued to press for a new confederation which would have "a broader base than A.S.A." and better or ganization than Maphilindo. In addition to the four nations immediately concerned, he envisaged participation by Cambodia, Burma, Laos and Singapore. With the explicit blessings of the Thais, Malik in late May visited both Cambodia and Bumma to seek their views on joining. He found their response to a regional alliance "good" insofar as neither had objections to the idea. At the same time, however, neither was prepared 29 to join. With Laos precluded by its internationally neu tral status from joining any oacts, only Singaoore remained as an active candidate for membershio. After playing coy for some months, it agreed to join. Thus, on August 6, 1967, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, r^alaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore met at Bangsaen, a seaside resort near Bangkok to sign a seven-point declaration establishing a new regional organi zation to be known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The principal point of controversy at the “^ M a l i k ' s initial statement that Burma and Cambodia had responded well to his initiatives was interpreted to mean that they intended to join an alliance. It was made in Manila on May 27. The following day the Indonesian Foreign Minister was forced to clarify his remarks. See The Djakarta Times, May 27 and 28, 1967. 30 The earlier name was discarded because SEAARC was thought to sound too much like "shark" to some and too much like SEATO to others. See Djakarta Times, August 8, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 400] === 392 meeting was the question of foreign bases. The issue— at the instigation of Indonesia— had been discussed previously in the negotiations which led to the Manila Declaration of August 5, 1963, and the formation of Maphilindo. In that case, the final communique of the Malayan, Indonesian, and Philippines heads of state asserted agreement that: ...Foreign bases— temporary in nature— should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the "Bandung Declaration" the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective security to serve the particular interests of any of the Big P o w e r s. ’ 1 This statement caused some concern in the United States because of its implied effect on the American bases in the Philippines, and in Singapore, which relied for much of its employment and income on the British military presence. The controversy had died quickly as Maphilindo went directly from birth to a lingering demise. The issue was revived, however, in the ministerial discussions which led to the formation of ASSAM. The SEAARC ^ F o r the text of the Manila Declaration (August 3, 1963) see "The Manila Summit Conference," L a r a w a n, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C. (Mimeographed, unpaged). Or the documents as released by Hie Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., August 6, 1 9 6 3. 32 At a press conference in the U.S. several months later, Philippines Foreign Secretary Lopez said that the declaration did not apply to SEATO "because the American bases— in the Philippines and SEATO itself— are not intended for aggression, never were intended for aggression." Press release, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C., October 24, 1963. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 401] === 393 document circulated by Malik and Thanat contained a statement in its preamble drawn from the Manila Declaration of 1963 stating that foreign bases in the region were "temporary" in nature. The SEAARC draft, moreover, went somewhat further to declare that "collective security arrangements" were not to be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers. Of the five ASEAN nations, four— the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand— had foreign bases on their soil and two— the Philippines and Thailand— belonged to SEATO, the primary collective security treaty of the region. Although vaguely worded, such provisions could be used— as Sukarno had done with the Manila Declaration— as the legalistic basis for criticizing a nation's Western ties. With the principal objections coming from the Philippines government, the refer ence to collective security arrangements was drooped from the final ASEAN draft and that version simply affirmed: ...That all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area....33 33The ASEAN Declaration, Press Release, Thailand Mission to the United Nations, August 8, 1967. This wording would seem to be a direct legacy of the PPRI/Permesta Revolt in which both British bases in Singapore and Malaysia and America's Clark Field in the Philippines were used in support of the Indonesian rebels. F o p the wording of the SEAARC draft and the Philippine reaction see The DJakarta Times, July 29, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 402] === 3 94 The Indonesians, however, continued to pursue the matter at Bangsaen where Malik suggested that the presence of foreign bases and troops in some prospective member countries m i g t detract from the character of the new organization as a non military and strictly economic grouping. While Malaysia's Razak and Singapore's Foreign Minister Rajaratham were content to give assurances that British troops in their countries would soon be withdrawn, Philippines Foreign Minister Ramos objected to this line of thinking and defended the presence of American troops in his country. With the exception of the matter of foreign bases, the final ASEAN Declaration was non-political in tone and re flected the earlier ASA agreement in its declared aims and purposes. The new organization was to provide "active collab oration and mutual assistance" among the members on a wide variety of practical programs related to developmental needs. Particular attention was given to the more efficient use of natural resources and to the study of common problems in trade, transportation, and communications. While announcing no con crete projects immediately, the members established a "stand ing committee" in Djakarta, chaired by an Indonesian, to develop Reuters Dispatch from Bangkok, in The Djakarta Times, August 8, 1967. American officials had undoubtedly been shown a copy of the SEAARC draft and may well have made some representations to the Philippine government on the subject as it affected the U.S. bases and SEATO. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 403] === 395 specific programs of cooperation. 35 In the immediate wake of ASEAN's formation delegates to ASA met in late August in Kuala Lumpur. There it was decided to allow the organization's current projects to be assumed by ASEAN and for ASA simply to "wither away" rather than be formally dissolved. The reaction to ASEAN among other non-Communist Asian nations was favorable. Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, welcomed the organization as "a further step in Indonesia's cooperative association with the region."36 The Taiwanese and South Koreans also hailed the new regional effort and expressed the hooe for cooperation with parallel organizations in Asia like ASPAC. The Indian government was favorable and prominent opposition members of the Indian conservative opposition urged their country to seek membership.^ Answering criticisms that the ASEAN Declaration was too vague, Razak of Malaysia said: "First you must have an or ganization and machinery, then you can consider specific Drojects." Quoted by The New York T imes, August 18, 1967. •^Quoted In The D.j akarta Times, August 21. At the same time, Hasluck added that military alliances to which Australia became a Darty should be understood by the Indonesian government as serving objectives which were in the Interest of Indonesia, even though Djakarta did not officially adhere to them. 3"^The question of membership for India was quickly dis missed by Malik who told the press that ASEAN was confined to Southeast Asian nations. On those grounds, India would not be accepted if interested, nor would Taiwan. The Indonesian Foreign Minister added, however, that Ceylon might become a mem ber, as urged earlier by Thanat, because "it is situated on the sam line xvith us." The Djakarta Times, September 6, 1967. Subsequently, the Ceylonese Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake said he saw no urgency for his country to join ASEAN, during a visit with Tunku Rahman in Malaysia. Reuters dispatch, October 8, 1967, in The Djakarta Times, October 10, 1968. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 404] === 396 From Communist countries, however, there was sharply critical comment. Peking's initial reaction was to brand the organi zation as aimed against itself, Joining as it did a number of countries hostile to China. The Soviet Union also was wary of ASEAN, apnarently seeing the organization as an American scheme to join Indonesia in alliance with such strongly pro-Western states as the Philipoines and Thailand. The American Peactlon to ASEAN The State Department's initial comment on ASEAN was reserved, almost cryptic. A spokesman would say onlv that the endeavor had been taken on the sole initiative of the Asian states concerned without any intervention by the United States. This attitude was perhaps dictated by a fear that too eager an American embrace would put a "made in U.S.A." label on the fledgling regional body and do it political injury before it had a chance to operate. Subsequently,the U.S. was forced to deny a false news report out of Asia that it had sought membership in ASEAN and once again to stress the indigenous inspiration behind the organization's creation. 39 3®See the following chapter for more extended treatment of Communist attitudes. 39 The misimpression arose from an erroneous headline in a Bangkok newspaper, quoting Thanat Khoman on the U.S. rela tionship to ASEAN, on November 2, 1967. According to Malik, Khoman was referring to U.S. aid to ASEAN, not actual member ship: "We welcome U.S. aid to A.SEAN but that does not imply that the U.S. will join into this organization," Malik said. "Any help from whatever countries will be appreciated." The Djakarta T i m e s, November 24, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 405] === 397 Despite an official "hands off" posture on ASEAN, American policymakers were delighted with the development. As noted, the Johnson Administration had made the encourage ment of regional cooperation an important element in its foreign policy, particularly in Asia where it saw "the most dramatic emergence of a new regional spirit and policy. Officials soon began adding the formation of ASEAN to the list of those accomplishments which had taken place behind the American 'Ishield" in Vietnam. While there was no attempt to assert that America's efforts in Vietnam had caused Asian regionalism or ASEAN, the military commitment was seen as helping to create an environment conducive to them. In an appearance on Meet the Press, Walt W. Rostow made the connec tion explicit. In the several years since the U.S. made the decision to fight in Vietnam, he declared, the peoole of Asia had gathered confidence in their future: They believe that we are going to see it through, and on that basis they are beginning to build their futures, and in one of the most exciting of the post-war developments I know, namely this move toward Asian regionalism. This is a view confined not only to those who have put fighting troops in. The people in Singapore and in Indonesia and in Malaysia have drawn the same conclusion. ^°Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Quoted by The New York Times, June 13, 1967. ill Transcript of interview, July 9, 1967, published by the Merkle Press, Washington, D.C. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 406] === 398 Rostow's statement, coming less than one month before the Bangsaen Conference, clearly referred to the efforts being made toward the formation of ASEAN. Britain's decision to pull its military forces out of Malaysia and Singapore by 1971 reenforced American interest in ASEAN. That decision announced by the British only after an extended period of government vacillation and over the strong protests of the United States, appeared to open two alternatives to American policymakers: either to pick up the responsibilities being dropped by the U.K. or to encourage the countries of the region to do so. Given the American re action to new commitments which had resulted from the Vietnam War, the second alternative apoeared much more desirable, albeit more difficult to acconrolish. Thus, a few days after the British announcement, Under Secretary of State for Politi cal Affairs Eugene V. Rostov; said in an interview on the Voice of America: We shall with other countries in both these regions, and with the British, be actively considering security arrangements to replace those which have now been abandoned. Primarily the responsibility for safety in the Persian Gulf and in the Far East rests with the coun tries of those regions. We do not expect to have to rush to fill a power vacuum. I think steps are well under way to fill those vacuums. We shall, of course, be very much interested to see to it that they are filled.^2 ^ The New York Times, January 20, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 407] === 399 As much as what he said, it is notable that Rostow's state ment was made over the international public voice of the Amtrican government. It was an obvious attempt to signal U.S. encouragement for indigenous security arrangements in the affected areas. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Singapore would be the two states hardest hit by by British pullout. While both have since moved to strengthen their own defenses, they have limited resources for such a formidable task. In addition, the representatives of those two nations have held discussions with delegations from Australia, New Zealand and Brunei to determine some common security system to replace the British presence. To date, however, the negotiations have been marked by lack of coordination and agreement as each party seeks maximum security at the lowest cost to itself. Even if a new defense grouping is created among the five Commonwealth nations, it would be less than comprehensive since it would See the author's article, "Peace in Vietnam 'Won't Pacify Asia," in the National Catholic Reporter, November 6, 1968, for further personal observations on this subject gathered from conversations with diplomats in Southeast Asia. Reprinted in the St. Louis Post-Dlsoatch, November 16, 1968. Since the article was written, Australia has indicated greater willingness to make commitments to a new defense grouping of Commonwealth countries in Southeast Asia. The opposition Australian Labor Party, however, has favored a de fense pact with Indonesia rather than attempt to mold the other, essentially weak nations into a new bloc. Reuters dispatch from Canberra in The Djakarta Times, July 31, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 408] === 400 not include the one nation which must be considered the "keystone" of any rep-ional security arrangement in Southeast Asia: Indonesia. For this reason, some Americans have pre ferred to see ASEAN, perhaps with Australia in full or associate membership, develop military as well as economic obj ectives. This point of view has been encouraged by statements from top-ranking Indonesian generals indicating an interest discussing a new defense grouping in Southeast Asia. December, 1966, Lieutenant Oeneral Panggabean, deputy (and now Acting) Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Army, spoke of the need for a "joint defense setup" in face of the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Communist China. To face the chal lenge, he asserted, Indonesia's armed forces "must be able to operate in any neighbor country needing defense assist44 ance." In April, 1967, he reiterated his beliefs in a message to military leaders, emphasizing that beside oursuing economic and political stability through beneficial coordi nation with other nations, the military benefits of regional 45 cooperation should be "well cherished" and not overlooked. Similarly, L t. Gen. A. J. Mokoginta, as commander of Army forces on Sumatra, told Malaysian officials that a military ^ Q u o t e d in The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1967. ^ Antara, April 12, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 409] === 401 alliance between Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Southeast 46 Asian countries "might soon become a necessity." Seizing on such statements, some have believed the time to be ripe for the development of an indigenous security alliance in Southeast Asia, possibly using the vehicle of ASEAN. Although no U.S. officials have formally endorsed the idea, it has been discussed before a congressional sub committee studying the future U.S. role in the Pacific by Dr. Bernard K. Gordon, project chairman on Southeast Asia at the Army-sponsored Research Analysis Corporation and chairman of the regional development seminar of the U.S.sponsored Southeast Asian Development Advisory Group (SEADAG). In Southeast Asia, Dr. Gordon told the subcommittee: The low-level conflict, the subversions threat, the guerrilla war variety— these are the main problems. It is for that reason that I think we are not as far removed from an ASEAN defense format as might appear. The Indonesia Army represents more than 300,000 men under arms. The Thai Army has, I understand, 85,000....There is within Southeast Asia a level of military manpower which could, by a relatively small ^ The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1967. General Mokoginta has since fallen from effective power and is now the Indonesian ambassador to Egypt, in effect, a kind of banishment. Another Indonesian who has called for a Southeast Asian defense pact is Husein Kartasasmita, deputy chairman of the Parliament's Committee on Defense and International Affairs. See his statement in The DJakarta Times. February 18, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 410] === 402 diversion of that manpower, lead to the establishment of a small, but highly mobile, Southeast Asian, if you like, ASEAN defense force. ’ Dr. Gordon concluded that developments along those lines 48 might occur and "we ought not to be blocking trends." One such trend was the increased inter-ASEAN military con tacts which have been reported. In early February, 1967, a fifty-man Indonesian military delegation headed by Vice Admiral K. Djelani visited Thailand under the slogan of 49 "strengthening relations between members of ASEAN." The visit was later reciprocated by a slightly larger delegation of Thailand's Forces College, led by General P. Amatayakul. In the Philippines, Admiral Muljadi, Commander of the Indo nesian Navy, came to an agreement with his Filipino counter- ^Subcommittee on Asian and pacific Affairs, The Future U.S. Role in Asia and the Pacific, op. cit., p. 107. 48 I bid. Another specialist who has seen ASEAN as a future regional security organization is Dr. Donald Nutchterlein, a civilian official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. See his article, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey. VIII:9 (September, 1968) pp. 806-817. ^ C i t e d by H.C. Taussig in his editorial "Will Indonesia Join a Military Bloc," for Eastern World (London), May-June, 1968, p. 5. Taussig has asserted: "It rather looks as if the ultimate purpose of ASEAN is of an U.S.-inspired military nature, to create a defense ring against China...Indonesia has up to now resisted the transformation of ASEAN into a regional military organization, but will be interesting to see what pressures may force it to change its mind." See "The Role of ASEAN," Eastern World, March/Anri 1, 1968, p. 7. Taussig repeated these same ideas in an interview with the author, London, October 12, 1968. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 411] === parts early 1968 Cooperation was nesian military smugglers Asia, the fo r r e l e a s e however, members in the Straits ASEAN from old the or n e w policymakers regionalism, besetting regional cooperation the the same late kind drawn from Western in the case Soviet Union collective nations) governments of t h o u g h t s • ^T h e not early historical that the Indonesians Communist attitudes alliance, 50 the M e w York T i m e s, June and Assistant "becoming seized Europe parallels m ay b e m i s l e a d i n g Europeans who threat (a n d p e r h a p s the p r o b Asia. historical physical C h i n a as examine of A S E A N gripped Western experience direct, in S o u t h e a s t in S o u t h e a s t 1950's," a single, see Indo and carefully in A s i a w e r e Unlike the should of P r e s i d e n t i a l Indonesia. action, and a n s w e r to A m e r i c a ' s a military assertion 1 9 JJ0's a n d pirates commitments and Malaysian navies. of M a l a c c a, becoming men th e two Regionalism v i e w of th e of t he against its Rostov; that countermeasures American Despite with cooperation achieved between seizing Indonesian lems View Before prayer also operating Indonesian on c l o s e clear s a w the requiring other ASEAN and prese nt 13, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 412] === 404 external danger to their security. Professor David Monzingo has pointed out that Indonesia and other offshore Southeast Asian states, desoite the Chinese nuclear canability and future missile delivery system, believe themselves to be geographically beyond Peking's power. 52 Lacking a modern navy or air force, the Chinese ability to strike across large expanses of water is seen as definitely limited. Chinese armies, while formidable, are a threat only to those neighbors sharing a contiguous land mass with C h i n e. 53 A more pressing problem of the region to the Indonesian mind are subversive activities directed and supported from the outside. In that sense, Peking is more dangerous through its manipulations of the Overseas Chinese, than for its massed troops. Mot,1ust 51 Exceptions may be generals like Panggabean and Mokoginta. It well may be, however, that their thinking on China is shaped bv the knowledge that if such a threat is es tablished it may assist the Army in obtaining military aid from abroad, especially the U.S. It should be noted that General Panggabean's speech on the Chinese threat included the require ment for Indonesia to obtain both a fast transport caoability and nuclear weapons within the near future. These could only be obtained from the West. See The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1967. 52 "Containment in Asia Re-Considered," World Politics, 53A s an example of this thinking, General Sunarso, director of Indonesia's ASEAN Secretariat, told the author that China's armed strength was feared primarily for a ground attack against Thailand which, if allowed to fall, would expose the Kra Ithmus and the Malay Peninsula, thus putting Sumatra and then Java within reach. Since the fall of South Vietnam to Communism would have no such "domino" effect, it was of less concern. Interview, September 23, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 413] === 405 Communist United China, States however, a nd bases w ithi n the feres l oc a l is seen in Britain, region, affairs, such p e r s p e c t i v e. lone; as and Moscow, are they similarly in S o u t h e a s t Asian regional that cooperation" constitute "a s t r o n g as w e l l a decisive world. A united asserted, the bulwark countries regional foreign problems themselves nesian of t h e security vulnerable and economic Southeast region, best and subversion strongest could and asserted, from abroad. weapon against manipulations all for and many face t im e s, years. they will that Communist the among Indo less sense: Asia similar cooperate fields, of t h e interven very in Southeast any would end learn inter believed Dart of w h i c h cooperation has in this f o r so economic nations domination Asia a ll Asian military Adam Malik, imperialist and de velo ome nt M i n i s t e r has regional front extent action, factor influence, in t e c h n o l o g i c a l Foreign against stabilizing tion wh ich had p l a g u e d the Southeast the suspect. as a l e a d e r "tight maintain The "Cultural is the influence 55 the region." style" If this collective organization and concept security nations accepted, alliance— with gathering to sign then the a highly formal "oldstructured document— -^Speech to KAMI in West Java. December 16, 1966. The Djakarta Times, December 17, 1966. A united Southeast Asia, he said could stem "yellow as well as white" imperialism. ■^Malik quoted in T h e D,1a k a r t a T i m e s, M a r c h 16, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 414] === 406 becomes irrelevant. "It is not necessary to have a Pacific pact," Malik told Dr. Frances L. Starner. "If you have good relations with Asian countries, if there is an open attack, you feel it together." 56 To illustrate this idea, the Indonesians cite the /Joint efforts of Malaysia and Indonesia in combatting terrorism on the Sarawak-Kalimantan border as evidence that countries can work together in solving mutual security problems without formal treaties. 57 General Panggabean himself seems to have been converted to this point of view. In a speech before the Army Staff and Command School in February, 1968, the Army commander emphasized that "military cooperation does not have to take the form of a military pact" but could be accomplished with less formal means of coordi nation. Priority, he added, must be given to economic develop ment and cooperation as "an absolute precondition for maturity,58 and self-sustaining progress." 56 "Through Malik's Eyes," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1968, p. 469. ^ I n d o n e s i a h a s r e c e i v e d " no p r o f i t s f r o m t h e B r i t i s h b a s e s a n d M a l a y s i a a n d I n d o n e s i a h a v e a l r e a d y s o l v e d t he p r o b l e m of s u b v e r s i o n in Kal i m a n t a n, " M alik told S tarner, Ibid. 58 H e r e th e g e n e r a l w a s r e t r e a t i n g c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m h is e a r l i e r c a l l f o r a d e f e n s e p a c t i n S o u t h e a s t A s ia, p r o b a b l y as a r e a c t i o n t o M a l i k ' s s t a t e m t n t a b o u t his i d e a s. Commenting "in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h various sources w hic h d e m a n d e d a joint defense o r g a n i z a t i o n In Southea st Asia," the F o r e i g n Mini ste r said his governmtnt always opposed mil itar y p acts d i r e c t e d against a n o t h e r country. The Djakarta. T i m e s, J a n u a r y 6, 1967. G e n e r a l P a n g g a b e a n ' s l a t e r s t a t e m e n t w a s r e p o r t e d in W a r t a H a r l a n, F e b r u a r y 27, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 415] === 407 A severe disadvantage of a formal defense alliance from the Indonesian point of view is the danger that it ivould act as a goad to Communist China which would see such a pact as directed against itself and might react by steoping up the level of its support for subversion in member countries. Indonesia could not openly afford to support a military pact in Southeast Asia for fear of frightening "other nations," Major General Sjarif Thajeb has explained, clearly meaning the People's Republic of China. Any discussion of security matters, he added, would have to be done quietly, through diplomatic channels. In addition to external impediments to a Southeast Asian defense alliance, there are severe intra-regional obstacles. Despite the broader vision of some national leaders in the area, at this stage of Asian nationalism there are many mutual suspicions and narrow prejudices which cripple any move to effective political or military cooperation. For example, in November, 1967, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore warned world powers against arming Southeast Asian countries, particularly his nation's ASEAM-partner, Indonesia. While noting with satisfaction that the USSR had stopped arms shipments to Djakarta, the Prime Minister feared that the United States might step in. Such action, Lee asserted, "might ^ i n t e r v i e w in The Djakarta Times, August 25, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 416] === 408 push Singapore defend itself. create to t he w a l l " 60 l o n g as a security fruitless. From and force such Indonesian point of v i e w, achievement bilateral a nd multilateral arrangements, of visits and information, an d cooperative efforts. In a n o t h e r with its neighbors a n c e — at least Although Sukarno mrandiose strong and expansive "Indonesia will stage informal contacts Indonesian the Indonesian country dangerous and ob.lectives ad h oc a full-fledged l o n g e r on be c o n t a i n e d exchanges of o t h e r foreign policy favor for the in t h e the rather than this destiny feeling m or e practical, constant a multitude efforts and p r o b a b l y much informal, 61 sense, I n d o n e s i a 'would s e e m from s t ep s prevail, difficult immediate and to t a k e attitudes alliance will may result that scene long security alli to d e s c r i b e Indonesia its agreements development. people, within there too dynamic o wn a r c h i p e l a g o. its energies are k ep t 6C*The D,j akarta Times, November 8, 1967. Lee has been par ticular ly-HTsFurtTecPby the anti-Chinese bias of the New Order regime and its tendency to resist Chinese influence by appeals to Malay nationalism. "...This kind of thinking means I'm trapped," said Lee,vhose city-state is predominantly Chinese in population. Quoted in the Mirror (Singapore), November 11, 1967, p. 4. ^ D r. G u y P a u k e r, w h o h a d b e e n an a d v o c a t e of a p u r e l y S o u t h e a s t A s i a n s e c u r i t y a g r e e m e n t, c h a n g e d hi s m i n d a b o ut p r a c t i c a l i t y o f s u c h a n e f f o r t f o l l o w i n g a t r i p to S o u t h e a s t A s i a a n d c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h A s i a n l e a d e r s, i n c l u d i n g A d a m M a l i k. He c o n cluded .The b e s t h o p e w o u l d s e e m t o li e in p r a g m a t i c a n d ad h o c s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s b e t w e e n the c o u n t r i e s o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a a n d of t he S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c i n c l u d i n g A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w Z e a l a n d. " T e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t he H o u s e S u b c o m m i t t e e o n A s i a n and a n d P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, T h e F u t u r e U n i t e d S t a t e s R o l e i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c, p. 275 a n d 283. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 417] === hog within itself," an Indonesian general said. our future on a larger scale." "We must work out A common assumption among its elites is that Indonesia has a place as leader of Southeast Asia, with the other nations freely acknowledging its para63 mount position. At present, however, the nation's severely weakened economic condition and desire for the best possible relations with all countries does not permit it to claim to be first among eouals in Southeast Asia. It can only work to reduce the foreign influences in the region, as for example, Djakarta's support for emphasizing the "temporary"nature of foreign bases in the ASEAN Charter. Indonesia can also be expected to ODpose any new defense alliance among Southeast Asian nations which might exclude it from participation. When a member of the Malaysian Parliament, for instance, sug gested a defense pact with Thailand and the Philippines in early 1967, The Djakarta Times saw such an alliance as "doomed to failure." The idea of leaving Indonesia out of any kind of Southeast Asian economic or military regional cooperation or agreemtnt, the newspaper insisted, "must have the aualifi6h cation of being far from reality." 62 General Sunarso, Interview, Djakarta, September 21, 1968. ^Typical of this attitude was a comment by Harlan Kami the leading student newspaper, on the Sabah dispute"! It urged Indonesia not to adopt a neutral attitude but "to lead its younger Malaysian and Philippine brothers to take the best possible road...and preserve Southeast Asia's security." September 28, 1968. The emphasis is the author's. January 27, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 418] === 410 At the same time, Indonesian leaders have indicated they would not consider provocative a continuation or even a build-up of Australia's military presence in Malaysia or Singapore following the British withdrawal from "East of Suez." Any moves by Canberra to fill whatever"vacuum" resudts, however, will probably be accomplished through its existing ties with the two Commonwealth states and not by form ing a new security organization. Further, the Australians have been very solicitous about keeping Djakarta informed about any new defense moves and reassuring Indonesian leaders of their shared value for Indonesia. 65 What the Indonesians are w i l l i n g to grant without protest to the Australians, they may also be interested in doing themselves. possible that Indonesia has For example, it is entirely sought, or w i l l soon s e e k, understanding with Singapore which would allow it to intervene 66 in certain future contingencies. Such arrangements would In June, 1968, for example, Australian Prime Minister Gorton visited Djakarta to discuss future arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia following the British withdrawal. During that visit President Suharto formally rejected any suggestion of Indonesian participation in a regional security pact. the same time he said Australian defense arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore would not cause concern to Indonesia or other countries in Southeast Asia. In fact, one Indonesian general assured the author, even under persistent questioning, that some such agreement with Singapore already existed which could be used to justify an Indonesian intervention. The Indonesian's fear that Singapore's heavily Chinese population will make it the eventual instrument of Chinese Communist influence in Southeast Asia. Malik himself seemed to hint something similar when, during a visit to Singapore In March, 1968, he said Indonesia Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 419] === 411 provide Djakarta with considerably more flexibility in dealing with its neighbors than might a formal pact containing legalistic restraints. Whatever their fastly o ne opposed Indonesian motives, assigning journal the a formal expressed Indonesians security role have stead to ASEAN. A S E A N is n ot a f o r u m f or e s t a b l i s h i n g c o o p e r a t i o n i n t he f o r m of a m i l i t a r y p a c t b u t its a c t i v i t i e s c an b e i n c r e a s e d t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e a i m s of m a i n t a i n i n g p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y i n e a c h o f t he m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s. ' While they have taken the lead in disclaiming any military purpose of ASEAN, the Indonesians have not been alone in this attitude among members. On August 21, 1967, after returning from the Bangsaen meeting, Tun Abdul Razak assured the Malaysian Parliament that ASEAN would not be turned into an alliance of mutual security like SEATO. About the same time, similar statements were being made in their own countries by Singa pore's Foreign Minister Rajaratnam and by the Philippine Ambassador to t h e United Nations, Salvador P. L o p e z. 68 Nor has was prepared to defend the city-state after the British withdrawal. "The 200 million people in ASEAN need not worry about any Com munist threat. We shall protect them even if the threat comes from Genghis Khan." Indonesian Information Service, Djakarta, March 21, 1968. 670perasi, July 23, 1968. For Razak's statement see AFP Disoatch from Kuala Lumpur, The Djakarta Times, August 23, 1968. For Rajaratnam's statement, Reuters dispatch from Singapore in The Djakarta Times, September 11, 1967. And for Lopez's, a Reuters dispatch from Manila, The Dj akarta Times, September 9, 1967. Lopez noted that the new organization would not be military as "SEATO will always be there in addition to bilateral defense agreements of Asian countries with the United States." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 420] === 412 it been only Indonesian leaders like Malik who have insisted that the great powers, including the United States, not attempt to influence the course of ASEAN or imoede its freedom to map its own future. On August 30, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman— considered to be a strong friend of the U.S.— warned that ASEAN wanted no "big brothers" manipulating it from the outside. "The fundamental philosophy of Southeast Asia is one of equal partnership," Thanat told newsmen, "We want to share and share alike." Problems of ASEAN If such expressions of Asian sensitivity about outside influence on their regional organization is not enough to discourage any notions by policy planners in Washington to include ASEAN as part of a "grand design" for an Asian power balance, then the history of the organization for the first eighteen months of its existence may. This period of ASEAN infancy haa been notable for its lack of significant progress toward the coordination of regional activities, and for crises in relations between members of the organization. In hard economic terms, ASEAN has produced little in the way of joint endeavors or even agreement on joint projects. Initially, the organization's Standing Committee in Djakarta began studying the possibilities of a joint shipping line, joint fishing projects and common promo'tion of tourism. 69 ^Reuters dispatch from Bangkok, August 30, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 421] === iJ13 the three, In June, the last appears A S E A N Ad H o c to a p p r o v e tourism, regional "Visit ASEAN ministers been some Attempts proposals have championed t he Less trade is w i t h competitive been cast from the Malaysia o f th e an d the creation another, rather than has proposal port of its not so w e l l. even "common percent of the been for d i s c u s s i o n the of experts work and market" economies to study the proposed Bangkok Post, October have a result, fo r agenda. in O c t o b e r, are strong objections members ha s member nations’ gain approval ASEAN*s regional or c u s t o m s reservations ties. been stalled ha s Further shadows and has to the Philippines their market able there far-reaching The ASEAN Commonwealth 1970 projects. ambitious, Singapore and promrtion recommendations complimentary. in S i n g a p o r e In a d d i t i o n, however, fruitful. met designation its fo r a c o m m o n however, same way, steel o f an than twenty-one because form a group more fared nearly duty-free compromise, not one the action. initiate most cooperation i n.joint e d u c a t i o n a l the on T o u r i s m submitted final over hopes Philippines program including and for progress union. Committee eiget-point ASEAN Year," to h a v e b e e n 1968, the inclusion a weak agreed customs union. on a c o l l a b o r a t i v e industry. fOsee the 3, 19 6 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 iron === [PDF page 422] === 414 The most serious obstacles been the several bitter political The most serious of t h e s e, almost foundered, and Malaysia was th e key in 1963 Philippines. received tember th e President aries Borneo Ferdinand Marcos territory, including were of t h i s sorat t o the formation 1968 p r i m a r i l y Malaysians i n th e and a bill, d e l i n e a t i n g th e over which from Filipino p o l i t i had passed signed, Jurisdiction a result relations f r o m the Congress issue, major parties statements replies Philippines including people. matic hot the members. Philippines That again have organization the opposition li f e between its the in Sa b a h. between Provocative quarrels on w h i c h initial flared issue ASEAN's progress dispute between over sovereignty a political cians the to M a n i l a ' s of M a l a y s i a was on e the Sep which nation's former British 30,000 s q u a r e m i l e s "cartographic s u s p e n d e d b e t ween the A victim of the conflict was ASEAN. two North 500,000 and aggression," nations. bound diplo- 71 Although both governments had assured Indonesian officials that they would not allow their quarrel to spill over into the activities of the regional organization, it soon did. ASEAN conferences were disrupted by caustic name-calling as the Philiopines delegations questioned the right of the Malaysians to claim to represent 71 s e e th e Involve F o r e l a b o r a t i o n o f the S a b a h d i s p u t e at i ts h e i g h t, a u t h o r ' s a r t i c l e, " D i s p u t e O v e r S a b a h T h r e a t e n s to U. S., " T h e M i l w a u k e e J o u r n a l, S e p t e m b e r 29, 1928. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 423] === 415 Sabah. Efforts offices "cooling sian arranging off" period turned broken home. "on the standstill and had political verge the all b u t Almost over dinner 1968, hopes extend mood effect. Philippine helpful after diolomats Adam t he 72 regional Its w o r k was cooperation suddenly 1968, it h a d arisen, a desoerate Thailand's Foreign in B a n g k o k, persuaded th e attempt one year while th e issue through presumably will defer th e dispute until held in b o t h countries which are and remove the dispute between optimist t o be the t wo from the countries renewed within might point fact the heat were ASEAN that mediation Philippines settle elections an d made the Malaysian efforts cooperation at a- Thanat controversy and that Minister the Relations in S o u t h e a s t however, shelve thus vanished. This eye Malik had dec la r e d foreign ministers were and M a l a y u nder the collapse." for little th e immediately storm subsided. in De c e m b e r, had Djakarta, November, ASEAN was Indonesia to established almost and a settlement foreign ministers Malik was Asia Thailand t he for quiet diplomacy a f t e r t he general during of domestic Khoman, return 196 9 politics. to normal framework. While dispute was negotiated Q u o t e d i n P e d o m a n, D e c e m b e r 11, 1 9 6 8. T un ku Abdul Rahman was similarl y discouraged. Asked about the p r o s pects fo r an A S E A N m e e t i n g t o d i s c u s s d e v e l o p m e n t s in V i e t n a m, he s a i d t h e t i m e w a s n o t r i p e: "We o u r s e l v e s are q u a r r e l i n g lik e mad." A F P D i s p a t c h f r o m S i n g a p o r e, N o v e m b e r 6, 1968. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 424] === inside there the t he ASEAN family and without denying that regional dynamism th e from Sabah ASEAN extra-regional dispute drained and w a s t e d addition the M a l a y s i a n - P h i l i p p i n e also were a number "second dash hopes 1968, for South e a s t for instance, the quarrels Asian regionalism. Singapore government much valuable line" intervention, tim e. dispute, which there helped On O c t o b e r executed 17, two Indonesian marines convicted of dynamiting the Australian High Commission Headquarters during Confrontation. The in S i n g a p o r e action was three years taken despite before strong appeals from Adam Malik and the Suharto government, and resulted in t h e its sacking staff personnel Minister for of t h e SingaDore Indonesian Malik refused a break legacy to h e e d in relations of bitterness. dispute with fishermen Malaysia on c h a r g e s in the narrow Straits claimed a twelve-mile Embassy with 73 over mobs. demands of v i o l a t i n g the has also lef t had fifteen Malaysian Indonesian Hundreds incident Indonesia of M a l a c c a w h e r e b o t h limi t. residences from ultra-nationalists 1968, arrest th e Although Foreign Singapore, In Ma y, its and territorial waters nations of M a l a y s i a n have fishermen "^The United States T r anslation U n i t Press Reviews f r o m O c t o b e r 17 u n t i l O c t o b e r 22 w e r e f i l l e d w i t h a n g r y a r t i c l e s a n d e d i t o r i a l s f r o m th e D j a k a r t a p r e s s, No one h a d r e a l l y e x p e c t e d S i n g a p o r e t o f o l l o w t h r o u g h on t h e e x e c u t i o n s a f t e r so l o n g a t i m e a n d the I n d o n e s i a n a p p e a l s. T h u s t h e a c t c a m e as a p a r t i c u l a r s h o c k. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 425] === 417 were for reported fear litical and arrest. lying 74 Idle, And, economic, frightened to put finally, caused numerous frictions sea disputes, Malaysia and between Singapore. The effect and petty, cooperation may all foreign has of t h e s e been to d a mpen i n th e have minds tried Minister intra-ASEAN enthusiasm Asians do t o o Eajaratnam, quarrels, the soon," serious possibilities themselves. much too who fo r both "I t h i n k said Singapore's added: What we need are reali s t i c b i l a t e r a l and t r i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t s on s p e c i f i c o r o j e c t s. T h e n, i f w e s u c c e e d w i t h t h o s e, we c o u l d s l i p.,,more naturally into meaningful regional cooperation. Given present United off" policy its only would be well regarding neighbors regional grouping, such maintaining internal fresh ^ Straits that T i m e s, M ay 27, assume in S o u t h e a s t antagonisms. The th e "hands Pressuring ASEAN, security Asia, to m a i n t a i n Asian regionalism. grounds result in S o u t h e a s t advised on t h e a new for States circumstances Indonesia essential tha t responsibility Asia," desirability can a local 1968. Q u o t e d by T e r e n c e S m i t h in T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s, N o v e m b e r 1, 196 8. S m i t h, l i k e th e a u t h o r, is p e s s i m i s t i c a b o u t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n in S o u t h e a s t Asia f o l l o w i n g a t o u r of A S E A N c a p i t a l s. Similar conclusions have b e e n d r a w n by D o n a l d K i r k in T h e W a s h i n g t o n S t a r, N o v e m b e r 18, 1968. Nutchterlein, oio. c i t., p. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 426] === arrangement substituting for the British, and eventually the American, presence should not blind policy makers to the evident disabilities of Southeast Asian nations. A more practical immediate approach might be support for bilateral security arrangemtnts initiated in the area by Australia. Moreover, although some alterations in America's posture will be necessary following the settlement of the Vietnam War, a "forward strategy" of some sort for the United States in the Pacific would appear to be necessary for the foreseeable future.77 As for ASF,AN, it is a beginning toward meaningful cooperation among nations in an area which for too long has existed as one of the world's "shatterbelt." a beginning. But it is only ASEAN and its Asian members must,as Kenneth Young has emphasized, be "left to develop by themselves for the time being." While respecting the desire of ASEAN members to be free of outside interference in the direction of the organization, the United States can assist the process 77This is also the view of another advocate of a regional balance of power solution to the problem of Asian security, Fred Green in U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by the McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1 9 6 8 ) p. 169. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 427] === 419 of regional integration by providing economic assistance to ASEAN's multi-national regional projects. Such aid should not, however, be diverted from amounts which might otherwise go to economic programs of individual nations in Southeast Asia, for that will result in bitterness and jealousies disruptive of regional cooperation. Rather, funds given to ASEAN should be in addition to bilateral programs. 79 ^ A d a m Malik has made this point strongly. In his Foreign Affairs article, "Promise in Indonesia," he stated: "The £act is...that the aid given directly to Indonesia or other countries of the area is much smaller than their needs. cause of this, and also because aid varies in kind and pur pose from country to country, a diversion of any part of it does not seem feasible without curtailing the programs already under way." p. 302. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 428] === CHAPTER VII INDONESIA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD The severe shifts in foreign and domestic policies which have occurred in Indonesia since October, 1965, have made their impact on the world's Communist states as much as, if not more than, on the West. Indonesia had seemed to be on the verge of becoming the latest and third largest Communist country before the events of October 1, 1965. Djakarta's subsequent rightward swing was certain to cause concern and not a little anguish in Moscow and most par ticularly in Peking. In the arithmetic of the Cold War, Indonesia has come to represent a net "loss" to the Communist world and a gain for the West, particularly the United States. This development has resulted in considerable introspection within both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, and vehement discussion between them. An important element in all these deliberations has been the Indo-American relationship. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 429] === 421 China: A Role in Gestapu? From the point of view of world power alignments, the People's Republic of China has lost the most by the turn of events in Indonesia. In the days immediately preceding Gestapu, China and Indonesia had moved very close together. In Djakarta, President Sukarno was proclaiming a new "axis" with China and Indonesia as its principal partners. over, with Peking's applause, More Indonesia had pulled out of the United Nations and was planning a new organization of radical states, Conefo, within which China was certain to be dominant. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia was aiding Peking's policies by opposing, with force, the formation of Malaysia, thus opening a "second front" in the struggle for the region and posing a new threat for the United States during a critical period of the Vietnam conflict. Following the defeat of the September 30th Movement, both the axis and China were condemned, Conefo was abandoned as Indonesia rejoined the United Nations, and the Malaysian confrontation was settled, to be replaced by cooperative efforts at curbing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 430] === 422 Did Peking have a hand in shaping its own "defeat" in Indonesia by participation in the ill-fated attempt to shift Djakarta’s diraction even further left? Certainly the Indonesians have continued to proclaim Peking's involvement in Gestapu — an accusation generally believed among the Indonesian elites and masses. Moreover, it is now a firmly established policy principle of the New Order that China was implicated. In September, 1966, Adam Malik openly accused Peking of having intervened in the coup and noted that the Indonesia people were well aware of the close ties between the PKI and the Chinese Communists. this with an assertion that: General Suharto followed "It is an established fact that the CPR has directly or indirectly supported the 30 September Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party...."'1' Although the Indonesians frequently have spoken of the "evidence" for ^Speech to the Indonesian Parliament, August 16, 1967, Antara, Djakarta. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 431] === 423 this accusation, the proof of direct support which has been so far been revealed has been largely circumstantial and something less than conclusive. During the trial of former Foreign Minister Subandrio, it was testified that he had plotted with the Chinese Communists to accept some 100,000 small arms which would be imported into Indonesia without the knowledge of Defense Minister Nasution or the Army. Moreover, during his trial, former Air Force Commander Omar Dhani testified that in mid-September, 1965, he had been in Peking on a secret mission for Sukarno during which he also discussed the deliver of small arms with Chinese officials. These weapons were to be provided to the "fifth force" which the Chinese and the PKI were pressing Sukarno to establish in Indonesia. Whether any arms were actually delivered is still unclear. In a statement by Anwar S a m, acting chairman of the Indonesian delegation, to the United Nations on Chinese mem bership in that body, he stated that "Indonesia maintained its position [for China's admittance] in spite of the involve ment of the Government of the People's Republic of China in the abortive coup d'etat of October, 1965...." Indonesian News and Views, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., December, 1967, p. 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 432] === 424 There have been reports, as yet unsubstantiated, that Chinese weapons were smuggled into Indonesia in crates marked as containing building materials for the construc tion of the Conefo headquarters and meeting halls. These boxes were allegedly spared customs inspection through the personal intervention of Subandrio. Other circumstantial evidence that the Chinese knew of the coup attempt and may have encouraged it has been provided by British Historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, who was visiting Peking in the fall of 1965 as a governing member of the British "Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding." At the time of the coup, he has reported, his Chinese hosts "certainly took credit for it as soon as it had happened, For more details on these charges see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture," The China Quarterly (Summer, 1968) pp. 19-20. Van der kroef points out that even before Gestapu stories had appeared alleging that China was covertly sending military supplies to the PKI. O. G. Roeder made the same point in his November 4, 1965, article in Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 189. He says such reports were generally greeted with scepticism because of the difficulty of such an undertaking. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 433] === 425 and until it was known to have failed." While not willing to state definitely that the Chinese played a part in Gestapu, Trevor-Roper asserts that they viewed it as their own triumph. In addition, following the March 11, 1966, transfer of power which established the New Order, the Indonesian Army claimed to have gained possession of a document signed by Subandrio and the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chen Y i, that revealed a plot to wipe out Indonesia’s military leadership. The document reportedly had been discovered by Indonesian students who had found it during the ransacking of the Foreign Office and had turned it over "Understanding Mao; Or, Look Back to Stalin," The New York Times Magazine (February 12, 1967) p. 93. See also Trevor-Roper's article, "All’s So Smugly Right in Red China," The Washington Post, November 14, 1965, pp. E1-E2. Clarence W. Hall has reported to other similar instances which prove Chinese knowledge of the coup attempt. To some non-Communist members of a delegation of Indonesians in China at the time, Chou En-lai is to have said: "Something will happen in your country tonight." Hall also alleges that a Communist Chinese newspaper, reporting on the coup, gave a list of generals captured which included Nasution who had escaped and editorially hailed the triumph. These instances have not been corroborated, however, and may be apocryphal. See Hall's "Indonesia: Night of Terror; Dawn of Hope," The Reader's Digest (October, 1966) pp. 275-312. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 434] === 426 to the Army. Allegedly hatched several months after Gestapu, the plot contemplated a new series of assassinations to be carried out by civilians and disaffected military units.^ This story and the pervasive belief that the mutilations inflicted on the slain generals had shown a Chinese influence gave additional early impetus to growing belief that Gestapu had been inspired by Peking. Despite the lack of firm evidence, American officials also have seen Peking behind the September 30th Movement. The Communist Chinese, according to Walt W. Rostow, "probably played some role in triggering the attempted Communist take over in Indonesia."^ Similarly, William Bundy, in describing the methods used by Communist China to subvert governments, See The New York Times. March 16, 1965. The docu ment in question, to the author's knowledge, has never been made public. A student who led the students in the attack on the Foreign Office could not verify that such a document existed, noting that the items taken from the ministry were turned over to the Army unread. Col. Nugroho, the Army historian, would neither affirm nor deny the existence of the SubandriQ-Chen Yi agreement. All this gives rise to scepticism about the document and the motives behind the Army's release of the story. Sir Montague Burton Lecture, University of Leeds, February 23, 196 7. Department of State Press Release (Mimeographed), p. 4. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 435] === 427 asserted that support of "liberation fronts" was a direct method and that "a variant tactic was reflected in the Communist Chinese role in support of the PKI in Indonesia." This view is also implicit in the statements of American leaders viewing the turn of events in Indonesia as a blow to Peking's policies. Thus, on April 11, 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the Communist Chinese "...had a major setback in Indonesia because of their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of that country." In a later televised interview, the Secretary reiterated this assumption about Chinese involvement when he noted: Speech before the Associated Students of Pumona College, Pomona, California, February 12, 1966. During his appearance before the House Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific on March 17, 1966, Bundy very specifically linked Peking and the coup, saying that information received from Indonesia had led to the conclusion. His statements to the subcommittee were, however, eventually deleted from the final printed transcript of the hearings. On the C.B.S. program "Face the Nation," March 20, 1966. Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1966, p. 567. Several days earlier Rusk had told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Chinese "...have suffered a major setback in Indonesia — the Indonesian Communist Party has been decimated." March 16, 1966. Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1966, p. 687. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 436] === 428 After all, people just don't like to be pushed around too much....We have seen the reactions in Indonesia. We have seen demonstrations of the fact that people don't want what Peking is trying to offer or impose upon them.^ In a similar vein, John Roche, a special assistant to President Johnson, has described Mao as being responsible "internally and externally, for one disaster after another, with Indonesia as the culmination." Terming the develop ments in Indonesia probably the most important in Asia since the fall of Mainland China, Roche declared the turn of events to be "a matter of sheer bungling by the Communists." "*■*"* Apart from the fact that America's formal opposition to Communist China has made it easy for government authori ties to assume it guilty of flagrant intervention in Indonesia, it is reasonable to believe that the Communist Department of State Bulletin, May 16, 1966, pp. 774-775. When talking on this same point before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rusk was somewhat more cautious about blaming the Chinese. To the Committee he said: "The Indonesians are convinced that the Chinese made a major effort in 1965 to help with a Communist takeover in Indo nesia. " Excerpts from the Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 11-12, 1968. U.S. State Department (Mimeographed), p. 20. ■^"Containing China: Commentary, pp. 27-28. A Round-Table Discussion," Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 437] === 429 Chinese had advanced knowledge probably encouraged implausibly could have including weapons. clear possibly to b r i n g th e made and with after m a t h of indisposition. life m ay well have th e PKI the the " i n e x o r a b l e m a r c h of that touch both with they achieved Sukarno's leadership, Peking clash which would occur seemingly Chinese come the a violent push Sukarno's th e to C o m m u n i s m a n d aware of From and not followers have In c l o s e certainly was keenly an d h i s the w o r l d physicians inspired assistance, think h i s t o r y m u s t be g i ven Chinese a t t e m p t e d coup, some material Mao d e s i r e d r e s u l t s.^ th e provided t h a t th e y do n o t b e l i e v e history" i m p e n d i n g d e a t h or awareness inspiration these for the facts PK I m o v e. In a s t a t e m e n t w h i c h i r o n i c a l l y w o u l d s e e m to i m p l i c a t e t h e PKI, the p r o - P e k i n g N e w Z e a l a n d C o m m u n i s t P a r t y said s h o r t l y after Gestapu: " W h a t e v e r the s i t u a t i o n, it w i l l n o t t a k e t h e C o m m u n i s t s b y s u r p r i s e. They have n e v e r f a l l e n v i c t i m to the i l l u s i o n s p r e a d b y th e r e v i s i o n i s t s t h a t the t r a n s i t i o n to s o c i a l i s m c a n b e a c h i e v e d p e a c e fully." P e k i n g R e v i e w, N o v e m b e r 5, 1965, p. 23. 12 The n o t e d Indian s p e c i a l i s t on Chinese affairs, V i d y a P r a k a s h D u t t, c o n c u r s in t h i s a s s e s s m e n t. See China a n d th e W o r l d ( N e w Yor k: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, Inc., I 9 6 6 ) p. 3 2 7 f f. Yet another author who has seen C h i n e s e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n I n d o n e s i a is H i s t o r i a n A r n o l d Toynbee. S e e t h e u n t i t l e d r e p r i n t of h i s a r t i c l e o n C h i n a R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 438] === 430 In the d a y s affair, the to d i s p e l l events. immediately following attitude the sent a note th e Chinese to t h e for 13, the Chinese refusing the s i x gen e r a l s spokesman also d e p l o r e d a representative absence the th e University center complicity Embassy in D j a k a r t a their flag who had been failure the a Chinese m e s s a g e of sympathy. flag be lowered. demonstrations the g r o u n d and th e allegedly riots, Chinese-owned invaded the to s e n d an d the Subsequently a second request In t h e e n s u i n g an d mast A ministry Chinese the ge nerals to c o m p l y w i t h "reprimanding" at h a l f slain. the f u n e r a l anti-Chinese burned its Chinese Embassy refused that their Indonesian Foreign Ministry to f l y m e m o r y of Gestapu Communist Chinese did nothing the g r o w i n g s u s p i c i o n On October t he anti-Communist, students wrecked "Res Chinese an d Publica" commercial in D j a k a r t a. a n d I n d o n e s i a in I n d o n e s i a n N e w s a n d V i e w s, E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., M a y 17, 1966, p. 5-6. Se e a l s o S t u a r t R. S c h r a m, " W h a t Is M a o i s m: T h e M a n an d H i s D o c t r i n e, " P r o b l e m s of C o m m u n i s m, X V: 5 (S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r, 196 6) p. 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 439] === 431 The Battle of W o r d s Although the support rhetorical attacks t im e. Sukarno a g a i n s t the attacks In e n d i n g October 19, September Radio, about Its the complained China and continuously had been made accused th e th e the p r e s e n t the checked, coup was Communists October outcries and that capitulating was beginning Peking warned, s u p p o r t of implicating "the while an i n t e r n a l and P e k i n g and slanders" had been heard all k i n d s there. threats The Chinese to r i g h t - w i n g g e n e r a l s the subsequently had " li e s condoning outrages w h i c h w e r e b y no means "anti-China wave" situation reported by Hsinhua anti-Chinese Indonesian P K I 1s i n i t i a l against Chinese missions Sukarno thi s Indonesian tacitly that that since Indonesia to e x p r e s s i o n s and continued Indonesian statements, crushing replaced by vituperative which have thus t he concept, Indonesian military defended restricted "axis" soon was maintaining reaction was and his 30th Movement, affairs insisted. initial its s i l e n c e Peking simultaneously Begins 30th Movement moderation government, army Peking's September for and Deeds accidental. Indonesia a n d if n o t c o n s e q u e n c e s w o u l d be serious." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 440] === 432 It d e m a n d e d and apology, a guarantee Finally, th e against similar incidents th e i n th e elements future. accused anti-PKI actions Indonesian authorities. the Indonesian Fore i g n Ministry, S o v i e t U n i o n of Indonesian H e r a l d, editorially it directly, ideology" replies anti— Chinese Chinese mentioning and t he In r e s p o n s e, the punishment came calculated joined; while upon conspiring Indonesia. from the insults it w o u l d accused Even more without "impose its w i l l direct military-controlled affronts continue steadily for the a nd s t r i d e n t press. constant relations through China, and Sino-Indonesian supporting The battle had been next deteriorated — two y e a r s but without a diplomatic b r e a k. ^ During through that period p r o t e s t notes, a ccu s e d D j a k a r t a of i ts presence it s the Chinese news People's agency, and Radio constant provocations Indonesia, and Republic, Peking, a g a i n s t itself, its n a t i o n a l s residing th e r e. 13 F o r an e x t e n d e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s c o n f l i c t se e S h e l d o n W. S i m o n, T h e B r o k e n T r i a n g l e: P e k i n g, D j a karta and the P K I ( B a l t i m o r e: T h e J o h n s H o p k i n s P r e s s, 196 8 ). Also see V a n d e r K r o e f ' s " S i n o - I n d o n e s i a n R u p t u r e, " ojd. c i t. A s h o r t s u m m a r y of t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e c o n f l i c t is p r o v i d e d in the a u t h o r ' s " P e k i n g B a r k s S h i n s o n I n d o n e s i a, " T h e N a t i o n a l C a t h o l i c R e p o r t e r, S e p t e m b e r 7, 1 96 6. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 441] === 433 It w a s particularly exercised diplomatic property, Chinese, and dents Indonesia. Chinese country's With for spreading domestic raids b y mobs schools and k i l l i n g of an a i r o f b l a n d shrugged off slander affairs. In a h a r s h n o t e on J u l y shutting the p e r s e c u t i o n Indonesian officials the the about its for overseas Chinese resi indifference, the c h a r g e s and and m e d d l i n g assailed in t h e i r 14 to t h e Indonesian Foreign Ministry 1966, for example, the Chinese their diplomatic institutions had suffered eight "facist atrocities" Indonesians. these, spectacu lar mob from action was on A p r i l 15. a rampage youths ("hooligans swarmed into clubs the they and and a s s a u l t on They cut the fascist armymen" doors, windows and that Chinese about said Using embassy 1,000 the Chinese) iron bars and furniture telephone wires, automobiles, the mos t of d e s t r u c t i o n embassy compound. smashed the rooms. equipment the a direct asserted s et fire looted documents and in m o s t to b u i l d i n g s, and property. 14 In a t y p i c a l s t a t e m e n t, D j a k a r t a R a d i o o n J u n e 4, 1 9 6 6 s a i d C h i n a w a s r e a c t i n g to "the n e w d a w n t h a t h a s a r i s e n in S o u t h e a s t A s i a... a s if i t h a d r e c e i v e d s o m e b a d n e w s f r o m a c o m b a t c o m m a n d e r w h o h a d l o s t h i s s w o r d o n the battlefield." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 442] === 434 One young Chinese melee. Flown hero's welcome The stration blamed a hospital an d Indonesians which Antara embassy employee made no called "the b i g g e s t concern served with Chinese nationals the overseas teachers about Chinese killings Seeking fo r overseas CPR residing charged lost Chinese demon to o p e n the their Peking of pa r institutions Indonesia. 200,000 sons o u t of jobs and In a M a y revulsion school, 10,000 t he b r o a d m a s s thrown a t th e n e w s centered 22 and d a u g h t e r s Indonesia had been also had contact and influence that to e x p l o i t Indonesia, incident, Malik blithely Chinese was those Chinese had been forced three m illion failing 15 a petition from demonstrators. instruments and staff h a d distress. for C h e n Yi. the Indonesian history. Chinese in t h e accorded and m o s t violent" to P e k i n g b e c a u s e long protest, to r e c e i v e Closing schools ticular he was a t t e m p t to p l a y d o w n a f f a i r o n the compound gate Peking, shot a visit from Foreign Minister against China the allegedly was its into of mass fire on ^ W h o, a c c o r d i n g to t h e s c e n a r i o p r o v i d e d b y P e k i n g, t o o k t he y o u n g m a n ' s h a n d in h i s a n d said: " B l o o d m u s t be p a i d for in blood." T h i s t h r e a t w o u l d b e u t t e r e d o n man y, m a n y o c c a s i o n s in the f u t u r e a g a i n s t I n d o n e s i a n p r o v o c a t i o n s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 443] === 435 physical violence and murder of the slaughter aimed were killed. Although C o m m u n i s t Par t y, the wealth explode an d some and w e r e During undoubtedly front groups, Peking-oriented. and need into small — Peking thousands 16 Chinese little have the supported Further, for their provocation violent repression. Chinese killed during hundred killed — Chinese resented resident power, their prejudices been relatively nationals. few actually held membership always commercial number of PKI, many belonged party financially Indonesians have th e at the Chinese 17 Although the b l o o d b a t h m a y have itself claims continued only several to e x p e r i e n c e 16 Richard Elegant has contended that w i thout Chinese m o n e y th e P K I c o u l d n o t h a v e e m e r g e d as the n a t i o n ' s s e c o n d l a r g e s t p a r t y an d as a p o w e r to b e f e a r e d. D r a g o n 1s S e e d: P e k i n g a n d t he O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e ( N e w Yor k: St. M a r t i n ' s P r e s s, 1959) p. 249. O f f i c i a l I n d o n e s i a n e s t i m a t e s p l a c e the t o t a l n u m b e r of C h i n e s e i n I n d o n e s i a at t h r e e m i l l i o n, h a l f of w h o m a r e c o n s i d e r e d to be C h i n e s e n a t i o n a l s a n d th e o t h e r half Indonesian citizens. It is b e l i e v e d, h o w e v e r, t h a t o n l y 1 0 0, 0 0 0 o f the 1.5 m i l l i o n C h i n e s e c i t i z e n s h a v e v a l i d p a s s p o r t s a n d m a n y o f the a l i e n s d o n o t h a v e p e r m a n e n t resident permits. 17 In e x p l a i n i n g the I n d o n e s i a n p o s i t i o n to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s, i ts c h i e f d e l e g a t e A n w a r S a n i said: "It m a y b e r e c a l l e d t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h e c o l o n i a l s y s t e m o f the past, th e i n d i g e n o u s I n d o n e s i a n m i d d l e c l a s s o f t r a d e r s a n d m i d d l e men has been eliminated. In i t s p l a c e c a m e t h e C h i n e s e who, making good use of t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n, became R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 444] === 436 persecution, th e both official Indonesians The and unofficial, in r e c e n t y e a r s. t he overseas Chinese in i t s st rategy for e xtending it s Asia. They given support traditionally have to r e g i m e s could protect countries. Chinese attempt wished t he leave their into Southeast loyalties however, and powerful and shown up simply could frustrations was nationals In A p r i l, Indonesian government provide has protection Peking's the M a i n l a n d Indonesia. from harrassment by host its p r o m i s e s o f Symptom atic of to r e t u r n abroad an important role influence Indonesian debacle, impotence: n o t be kept. play frustrating o n th e M a i n l a n d w h i c h w e r e Chinese The the h a n d s 18 situation has been particularly Peking because 1966, ships for who its it claimed it d e m a n d e d that that purpose. i n c r e a s i n g l y strong. In th e e n d t h e y o c c u p i e d an i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i o n i n th e n a t i o n ' s e c o n o m i c lif e, w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t of t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a is n o w t r y i n g to u s e as an i n s t r u m e n t of its s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s a n d its d i r e c t i n t e r f e r e n c e in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f th e I n d o n e s i a n people." I n d o n e s i a n N e w s an d V i e w s, E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., D e c e m b e r, 1967, p. 7. 18 " L i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r m o s t of t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y, w h e t h e r I n d o n e s i a n c i t i z e n s or a l i e n s, b e c a m e i m m e a s u r a b l y m o r e d i f f i c u l t d u r i n g the 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7 p e r i o d. " Van der Kroef, " S i n o - I n d o n e s i a n R u p t u r e, " p. 31. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 445] === 43 7 The Indonesians funds for such replied a p r o j e c t b u t h a d no Chinese leaving. it w o u l d send initiated points were its for Two wee k s later own and ships facilitating embarkation. unaware of The Chinese list of names. This Peking a n d th e charge wanted the n a m e s list was in e a r l y M a y refused in o r d e r and talks suggested to h a r a s s lived number similar delays, three ships leave late 1966 situation, New Order was the Chinese course, able open Efforts were was to h e a p that they asked for reactionaries" while camps. Chinese The large After 196 7. This several in w h i c h the indignities emigrants and early from discontented.. in e m i g r a n t just one the p r o u d M a o and leadership. In r e t r i b u t i o n, were said protest for months Chinese roar of the permitted and "fascist military groups were the Chinese replied leave another crammed the that negotiations t he m o v e m e n t o f stalled lacked objections Indonesians elicited they Peking grudgingly who wished that that the Chinese took what t h e m w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g to made to d i s p l a c e Indonesian delegations armed reorganized to A f r o - A s i a n limited steps intervention. non-leftist conferences Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 446] === 438 P e k i n g - o r i e n t e d exiles. Indonesian exiles were several defecting representative exiles have coup, there said N e w Order. m ay be aiding 1967, from other 19 There "Sarawak the evade literature individuals t h a t the Chinese Guerrilla Movement" P G R S ) which involved the includes a border guerrilla confrontation and Indonesians. In O c t o b e r, Indonesian Army had uncovered and f iv e-star they had guerrilla warfare" also evide nce training from "Gestapuin P e k i n g, These "political Djakarta's These arrest because countries. Sawawak — (North Borneo) already residing People's coup. Indonesians Indonesian-Malaysian and th e 700 including them Djawato, time of th e Chinese who were Antara reported Kalimantan Maoist Sarawak ar m s or w e r e Geilja Rakjat army during at the an e s t i m a t e d in Ch i n a, among to b e d i r e c t i n g at the received ambassadors, who managed the had gathered ethnic asylum been described by left before (P a s e r k a n given to P e k i n g PKI f u gitiv es" have b e e n In a d d i t i o n, s w e e p in W e s t arms cache with Communist Chinese insignias. 19 S e e T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s, N o v e m b e r 23, 1967. Among the p r o p a g a n d a p u b l i c a t i o n i s s u e d b y these e x i l e s was one call ed The V oice of Indonesian Y o u t h. Stanley Karnow c o r r o b o r a t e s t h e 700 f i g u r e a n d n o t e s t h a t t h e y "can h a r d l y exert any influence at home." The W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, D e c e m b e r 7, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 447] === 439 Subsequently th e ment statements under Indonesian press regarding the d i r e c t i o n Indonesian border. pledged that subversive a "Vietcong-type Pek i n g, On October 196 7, the PGRS local killing hundreds Chinese, connections. the control, insurgencies 20 FBIS area have along the Sarawakto "eradicate in W e s t K a l i m m t a n. " w e n t on a reaction a rampage and making m o s t of t h e m In r e c e n t m o n t h s troubled action under aid others, area who insurgency" continue triggered of the govern 17 F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r M a l i k Communist China hunting Dayaks t h o u s a n d s of operating the g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d acts by In N o v e m b e r, carried official from head against refugees i n n o c e n t of insurgent I n d o n e s i a n-Ma laysian sweeps seemingly brought t he g u e r r i l l a bu t peking since has been blamed in S u m a t r a 20 and E a s t Java. D j a k a r t a Domestic Radio Translation. Service, for 21 October 17, 1967. 21 In D e c e m b e r, 1967, Brig. Gen. I s h a k D j u a r s a, m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r of S o u t h S u m a t r a, s a i d S u m a t r a an d K a l i m a n t a n w e r e tw o m a i n o b j e c t i v e s of C h i n e s e e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c y, u s i n g C h i n e s e n a t i o n a l s in the r e g i o n s as a " f i f t h column." A n t a r a, D e c e m b e r 1, 1967. It s h o u l d a l s o be n o t e d t h a t P e k i n g h a s c o n t i n u o u s l y n o t e d i ts s u p p o r t at l e a s t v e r b a l l y f o r the v a r i o u s p o c k e t s o f i n s u r g e n t s p l a g u i n g th e Indonesian government. U.S. o f f i c i a l s h a v e t e n d e d to s e e C h i n a b e h i n d these g u e r r i l l a movements. U. S. U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 448] === 440 Given conflicts, th e b r e a d t h and intensity of a d i s r u p t i o n of relations was eventually inevitable. Although Malik with Peking, apparently because th e Chinese residing in August, matic th e "most u r g e n t tions with 1967, th e furniture their nati o n a l s attack consecutive nights the th e e m b a s s y w i t h and automobiles. from all It p r o v o k e d the Chinese of d e m o n s t r a Peking which it s Embassy end for d i p l o and da y s still the C h i n e s e the tw o A s i a n n a t i o n s. Indonesian mission the b u r n i n g of ments, for a complete break a move might relieve and strongest protest" an d f i v e against serious such m a r k e d t h e b e g i n n i n g of contacts between government had resisted of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Indonesia, Sino-Indonesian ended contents, docu- 22 K a t z e n b a c h a c c u s e d the C h i n e s e o f " a s s i s t i n g i n s u r r e c t i o n a r y g r o u p s " in I n d o n e s i a i n a s p e e c h M a y 21, 1968, b e f o r e the N a t i o n a l P r e s s Clu b. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e r e l e a s e ( M i m e o g r a p h e d ) p. 10. 22 B e f o r e the U. N. the I n d o n e s i a n s d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e i r c i t i z e n s ' a s s a u l t s o n the C h i n e s e E m b a s s y a n d t h e C h i n e s e a t t a c k on t h e i r s: "In D j a k a r t a, t h e I n d o n e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a s a l w a y s f u l f i l l e d its o b l i g a t i o n to p r o t e c t t h e C h i n e s e E m b a s s y a n d it s p e r s o n n e l, w h i l e i n P e k i n g, o n th e o t h e r h a n d, the d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w e r e o r g a n i z e d a n d c a r r i e d o u t w i t h the f u l l k n o w l e d g e and c o m p l i c i t y o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a, " s a i d A n w a r Sani. I n d onesian News and V i e w s, E m b a s s y of Indonesia, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., p. 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 449] === 441 In m i d - S e p t e m b e r expelled two C h i n e s e officers who not to p e r f o r m able t he diplomats remained Chinese for Chinese Embassy October Peking. and s h o r t of that between suspension suggested the N e w that two equivalent cuts continued relatively some 23 has st e p. in t h e with on October continued break, diplomatic relations have been announced 23 to d e n y b u t has f ir s t, In s u c c e e d i n g "limbo" state, easy resumption ties significant ramification th e Indonesia's "unilateral D j a k a r t a D o m e s t i c Service, T r a n s l a t i o n, O c t o b e r 11, 1967). 31 necessary communi a complete months the p o s s i b i l i t y o f of dip l o m a t s Malik an i d e n t i c a l sion has the th e m o v e w a s to h a n d l e take future date. student Order government exchange Indonesia would relations a raid on acts of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s states. if P e k i n g that they were of g r o w i n g including of C a m b o d i a th e face its f i v e of h o s t i l e a complete break, a homeward th e d e s i g n a t i o n cations "suspension" accompanied by declaring In t h e a complete break, Just called home their duties because government. and in Peking, demands on O c t o b e r the I n d o n e s i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y rescheduling" October 10, with suspen 1 9 6 7 (FBIS R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 450] === 442 its e s t i m a t e d $58 m i l l i o n d e b t China since talks are p o s s iM b l e.24 attacked number the m o n t h s the N e w Order regime grounds. tion w ith Malaysia, cam p, accusing Lumpur It h a s also found 1967, and total Indonesia aiding Because Taipei the the rather Gestapu, consistently on a c o u n t r y it has th e relegated g o v e r n m e n t of Chinese abominable efforts trade ties w i t h s u s p e n s i o n of steps to e s t a b l i s h the Peking's Indonesian Taiwan. Following China during in e a r l y commercial roundly 196 5 September, rela condemned propaganda organs. Indonesian government will however, enemy assisting Kuala commerce The m oves were the p o p u l a t i o n of Malaysia. trade w i t h M a i n l a n d "Chiang gang" government, Peking has collobora- Suharto took tions w i t h Taiwan. since It h a s d e p l o r e d D j a k a r t a ' s to e s t a b l i s h a rapid decline 1966 the supressing government and and y e a r s not recognize negotiations have been the slow 24 S e e s t a t e m e n t b y I s m a e l M. T h a j e b, d i r e c t o r g e n e r a l f o r F o r e i g n e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s of t he F o r e i g n O f f i c e, A n t a r a, D j a k a r t a, J a n u a r y 18, 196 8. A c c o r d i n g t o U. S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e e s t i m a t e s, I n d o n e s i a h a s r e c e i v e d a t o t a l of $ 1 0 7 m i l l i o n in c r e d i t s a n d g r a n t s f r o m C h i n a. T h i s f i g u r e is s o m e w h a t h i g h e r t h a n t h e a m o u n t a c t u a l l y u t i l i z e d b y Indonesia. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 451] === 443 between the two opment. the same elicit see bilateral ASEAN from scheme for China on th e Not General Chinese, Indonesia's States. time aggression the The for the Chinese United however, 25 quoted the is c e r t a i n criticizing Chinese have been quick anti-communist, villified imperialist Mainland. have saved their improving relations Sukarno's Peking's States' formation devel Indonesia accused Malik "subserviance future activities a g a i n s t the "right-wing generals the addition the regional it s after Suharto, for The Maoist regime has rapidly long relations, alliances. promise any trade w i t h T a i w a n Peking. it s m u l t i l a t e r a l, anti-Chinese but hold time, protest from Indonesia's countries New clique side. 25 initial with t r a n s f e r of p o w e r Indonesia" Later that States." fire the U n i t e d China News Agency of b a s i n g N e w O r d e r United special accused of g o i n g o v e r same m onth the fo r e i g n p o l i c y on 26 A p r i l 6, 1966. (FBIS t r a n s l a t i o n of this Chinese materials, unless otherwise noted.) and all N C N A, P e k i n g, A p r i l 22, 1966. On the same d a y a J e n - m i n J i h - p a o e d i t o r i a l a c c u s e d th e I n d o n e s i a n s o f o p e n l y t h r o w i n g t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e l a p of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s, h e a d e d b y the U n i t e d States accomplices and of h a v i n g joined their a n ti-Chinese chorus. P e k i n g R e v i e w, A p r i l 22, 1966, p. 12. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 452] === 444 In a t t a c k i n g United States themes. Central the Indonesia over Chinese have the f i r s t p l a c e, they have I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y of h a v i n g of e a r l y O c t o b e r, organization, according Nasution start to s u p p o r t i n g 1965. Peking, credited with having rightists troops The Chinese as p a r t o f a l arg e, anti-Communist its cordon t he official the e n d of taken have a direct part coup, intelligence " F ree V o i c e o f Indonesia" and encourage interest plan "organize in A s i a... i n It w a s order October 21, Indonesia tighten a g a i n s t this background, declared, I n d o n e s i a ’s c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h M a l a y s i a Peking, students 27 government paper Jen-min Jih-pau ^^NCNA, and addition "rightwing disturbances capitalist master around China." several colluded with Suharto seen American alliance the the A m e r i c a n The U.S. instigated create to s e i z e p o w e r. " new accused a counterrevolutionary a clandestine radio and r e a c t i o n a r y the toward consistently stressed in t h e e v e n t s which i ts p o l i c y and that its 196 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 453] === 445 moves toward regional coop eration was Suharto regime has...made together a military bloc to b u i l d a hostile to be a tremendous serving effort the U. S. ring encircling seen. China," 28 "The to k n o c k imperialist plot 29 Peking has asserted. It h a s accused the "running dogs of capitalism" particularly American, rejoin seen stated, "is o n l y skin as to T h e v i s i t of the in t h a t l i g h t. too g l a d 196 7, w a s reported to b e Nasution clique aid. IMF to h a v e Moves an d its it s interpreted promising for their by Djakarta the W o r l d and Bank have P e o p l e 1s D a i l y lap dog p u t on human foul President Humphrey of b e c o m i n g to g a i n W e s t e r n, America, carry out better Vice leaders in o r d e r foreign the U n i t e d Nations, all b e e n ber, New Order canine missions." I n d o n e s i a in N o v e m that light. Humphrey was "more p a y o f f s " assistance aiding 30 the Suhartothe d e s igns 28 " W h o m d o e s the I n d o n e s i a n R i g h t - W i n g S e r v e? " P e k i n g R e v i e w, S e p t e m b e r 9, 1966, p. 36. S ee a l s o "The S h i f t in U.S. G l o b a l S t r a t e g y, " P e k i n g R e v i e w, F e b r u a r y 1966, pp. 16-17; a n d " E a s t w a r d S h i f t of U.S. G l o b a l S t r a t e g y, " P e k i n g R e v i e w, M a r c h 4, 1966, p. 3. 29 N C N A, Peking, April 13, 11, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 454] === 446 aggressive Indonesian capitalism people against themselves. No dou b t betr a y i n g interest thorough and ingness Indonesia, private the w o r d s the b e a u t i f u l resources. Peking, the p e n e t r a t i o n 32 "thrown Chinese industry, they have concerned with American oil the m o s t to h e l p e x p l o i t doors capital the and mineral fisheries, for and turned islands accused into Indonesian resources and banking, But most particularly accused of which clique, wide open a b o u t the d i s p o s i t i o n companies the their own Suharto-Nasution have timber The N ew Order has been and the N e w O r d e r ' s w i l l the off" fields given a thousand and communications. oil. The transportation been have for investors c o u n t r y of The "auctioning in t h e has reason imperialist monopoly and rich colony." interests Chinese allow American prime attention natural leaders the Communism 31 imaginative the n a t i o n ' s American the China, signing allow them Indonesian agreements to r u t h l e s s l y 31 S e e N C N A, P e k i n g, N o v e m b e r 8 a n d 9, 1 967. Humphrey, a c c o r d i n g to t h e C h i n e s e, w e n t to D j a k a r t a to g i v e "a s h o t i n the a r m " to the A m e r i c a n l a c k e y s i n p o w e r t h e r e. 32 NCNA, Peking, June 24, 1968. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 455] === 447 plunder Indonesia's virtually been imperialism turned hand pictured by Peking supplies, as b e i n g suggests its exploiting enemies Finally, t he "states that, the Indonesia tary on various some A m e r i c a n civic allowing the t he w o r k This Peking, the intense Soviet to h e l p p o w e r Chinese their nation. action projects assistance. 34 at s e e i n g have to e s t a b l i s h These an A m e r i c a n d e f e n s e supervise companies frustration the a state" w i t h Indonesian oil r e c e n t days, inside oil dependent upon resource. d i s p a t c h of Indonesia. this f o r U.S. aggression within suffering Indonesians American in m o r e three m i l i t a r y bas es and 33 "Indonesia has supply base its p o l i c y it s t r o n g l y d e s i r e s industry followed an o i l activities its g r o w i n g accused resources. NCNA declared. in s u b v e r s i v e reaction into in p u r s u a n c e Southeast Asia," have been petroleum charges liaison team Indonesian mili which have received these projects are 33 D e c e m b e r 19, 1 968. The Indonesian g o v e r n m e n t has d e n i e d t h a t a n y I n d o n e s i a n o i l h a s g o n e to h e l p f u e l A m e r i c a n or a l l i e d f o r c e s in the V i e t n a m War. 34 N C N A, P e k i n g, A u g u s t 25, 1 9 6 7. W i t h some truth t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s, t h e C h i n e s e h a r k b a c k to h e l p g i v e n to PRRI r e b e l s b y A m e r i c a n oil i n t e r e s t s in Sumatra. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 456] === 448 "aggressive military" bases presence has Indonesian Americans "reactionary" speed "This provides c o n s t r u c t i o n of a bridgehead lover sum, toward Indonesia. turns for its Peking are b e i n g alleged made enemies, to b e that China has the secret a dead that Hell, t he rule turned in A s i a. " like a jilted United States it believes the p o l i c y itself an d a g a i n United States. It h a s suggest the it w o u l d a jealous and military benefits accession to p o w e r o f see m, has fury the like scorned. 35 NCNA, November 2 and N o v e m b e r 35 and for economic, received from government. the th e facilities: aggression reacted terms w hich political, taught how regime has been loss the The that Indonesia under imperialist particularly it s o u t r a g e States. anti-Chinese the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n which America has Suharto United fascist military Communist It h a s passion over troops f o r U.S. Indonesia expressed the been declared evidence further proof Suharto-Nasution into for 28, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 457] === 449 The Soviet Union and Indonesia's 1956 h a d b e e n affronts Moscow made Soviet Turned and their Indonesian mission suspicions. atmosphere offense Although Khruschev of w a r m t h b y by his attitude. visiting 36 The for w e a p ons supplies and m i l i t a r y against United their were greeted warmly their lists credits first Mig-15 jet fig hters IL-28 bombers, manned by Soviet extended for military appeared, arms include Iran. requests, of mil lions supplies. to b e Mig-21 the they 1958 followed by Indonesian pilots. to M o s c o w w h e r e and gran t e d hundreds together by the D u t c h o v e r W e s t States shopping dollar-value aid was the r e s u l t o f drawn th e took Soviet Union until Indonesia ultimately were campaign the than warm, the f i r s t too gave desire Indonesians less strong mutual down to c r e a t e Union Djakarta's support something and of Indonesia, relations with Stalin efforts In d o n e s i a the a few Thereafter, fighters, armed 36 "He w a s f r e q u e n t l y v i s i b l y b o r e d w i t h the I n d o n e s i a n d a n c e s, t h e v i s i t s to o l d t e m p l e s. H i s r e m a r k to P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o d u r i n g a v i s i t to a b a t i k f a c t o r y in J o g j a k a r t a, where skilled artisans have hand-printed designs on fabric f o r c e n t u r i e s wa s, 'They c o u l d d o i t f a s t e r w i t h m a c h i n e s. ' " R o b e r t K e n n e d y in J u s t F r i e n d s a n d B r a v e E n e m i e s, p. 211. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 458] === 450 with air-to-air missiles and TU-16 m e dium bombers air-to-surface missiles. amphibious and tan k s a number military and of s u b m a r i n e s instructors were Soviet Union This was attached th e s t r e n g t h of was the d e g r e e the Navy, receiving considerable government the A r m y o b t a i n e d and destroyers. and satellite it was belie ved and his and B y 1962, services intensive the trouble a nd the and United States encouraging Sukarno in S o u t h e a s t A s i a u s i n g Unknown allegiance which officers m ight feel toward the S o v i e t Un io n, lost an o p p o r t u n i t y to p o s e their benefactor. same time, however, the K r e m l i n w a s risk that it s a r m s w o u l d n o t b e u s e d b y the Soviet training their Soviet-provided weapons. of d e p e n d e n c e 37 Indonesian military concern for that M oscow was to f o m e n t all a cruiser states. Soviet p enetration of a c a u s e of since addition, artillery, Indonesian officers were t he carrying taking Indonesian which never the a calculated Indonesian 37 A c c o r d i n g to o n e s o u r c e, the c r u i s e r w a s u s e d to s t e a m p a s t S u k a r n o ' s r e v i e w i n g s t a n d at the S u r a b a y a N a v y Yard on ceremonial occasions. As m o n e y b e c a m e more scarce, i t h a d to b e t o w e d b y an d f i n a l l y w a s s i m p l y a n c h o r e d so t h a t S u k a r n o c o u l d l o o k at it. Only one side reputedl y was painted — t h a t w h i c h f a c e d th e P r e s i d e n t. It is t h i s s h i p w h i c h t h e I n d o n e s i a n s o f f e r e d to the w a r r i n g p a r t i e s i n V i e t n a m as t he s i t e f o r p r e l i m i n a r y p e a c e talks. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 459] === 451 military court to s u p p r e s s Sukarno for w o r l d assisting officers 38 for the A s i a n larger than the the the ing an e l e c t r i c a n t i - C o m m u n i s t views. a $12.5 m i l l i o n sports and and atomic reactor United Soviets other power plant Kalimantan, Technological University States. signed at S i g u r a g u r a and slightly In F e b r u a protocol Soviet-aid projects, in T j i l a t j a p, road-building about including one g i v e n b y the plant caution several Games a broader design largesse were i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of superphosphate i ts its e a g e r n e s s the S o v i e t Indonesians for p a r t of overwhelmed projects center 1964, Apparently of w e l l - k n o w n included showy prestige ary, PKI. and his government, influence, Also the a steel mill th e at Ambon. in A s a h a n, includ in Tjilegon, c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new 39 38 Z b i g n i e w B r z e n z i n s k i in A l t e r n a t i v e to P a r t i t i o n, ( N e w Yor k: M c G r a w - H i l l C o m p a n y, 1965) s a y s t h a t the c o u r t s h i p of n a t i o n a l i s t leaders like S u k arno and N a s s e r w a s an e f f o r t to f o r g e a n i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i f f u s e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m, b a s e d o n c o m m o n h o s t i l i t y to the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d l e d b y th e US S R, p. 208. 39 S e e i n g e v i d e n c e of S o v i e t aid, S j a h r i r is r e p o r t e d to h a v e said: "Those p o o r Russians; I s y m p a t h i z e w i t h the m. T h e y c o u l d s p e n d t e n p e r c e n t of t h e i r n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t o n t h i s c o u n t r y f o r the n e x t t e n y e a r s a n d s t i l l n o t b e s u r e o f the r e s u l t. " C i t e d b y D e n i s W a r n e r in R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 460] === 452 Whatever the Soviet expectations "leverage" I n d o n e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t h a v e been, disappointed. noticeably Sukarno in the began provocative backing B y the F a l l Chinese imitate attitudes t he K r e m l i n opposing President the the for a moratorium chose to b e deteriorate. 1965, limited 1965, that this spare parts chief socialist and h o s t i l e Peking considered turn, from military the and USSR were and r e p a i r w o r k s h o p s th e A r m y, toward th e at various A frocountries attitude with and debts, and D j akarta b egan Army purchases the d e p u t y "so m e Moscow full Indonesia's to b e the Confrontation align himself a result relations between antagonistic Spring, increasingly Despite the M a l a y s i a n to b e PKI were following taking represented conferences. complained PKI b y they were and the the in o r d e r Asian increasingly and by right nation in J u l y, camp Aidit Soviet Union's Asian economic 1962, toward Moscow. a Soviet agreement on Indonesian within ar e General Suprapto, showing Indonesia" and T h e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, A p r i l 20, 196 6. Time later estimated t h a t $ 3 0 0 m i l l i o n in S o v i e t c r e d i t s v a n i s h e d w i t h o u t a trace. J u l y 3, 1964, p. 38. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 461] === 453 refusing to s e l l coup period, hostility in i t s The therefore, from Sukarno relations with Soviets and Unlike completely the th e and the on October 10 Anastas immediate pre faced prospects leftists and a chill Indonesian military. the one, Soviets Gestapu the Prime the c o n t i n u a t i o n of his reflecting affair, Kremlin rule the coup influence signed by congratulated and wished initial a belief first official Minister Aleksei Brezhnev, Their a f t e r m a t h of a net gain for following apparently were affair. no d oubt Soviet government's Mikoyan, C h a i r m a n L. Soviets th e increased Army power The In the Coup a cautious Indonesia. 40 Indonesia's Chinese, s uppre s s i o n m i g h t be the arms. th e surprised by r e a c t i o n was that further communique President Kosygin, and P arty President Sukarno Indonesia success 40 Q u o t e d b y B e r i t a Y u d h a, A r m y n e w s p a p e r, J u l y 19, 196 5. E a r l i e r A i d i t h a d c o m p l a i n e d t h a t the " m o d e r n r e v i s i o n i s t s " h a d g i v e n w e a p o n s to t h e m i l i t a r y i n s t e a d of the p e o p l e ' s "fifth for c e " w h i c h the C h i nese we r e supporting. For a c c o u n t s of a s p e c t s of t h i s p e r i o d in I n d o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s s e e U r i Ra' a n a n, "The C o u p T h a t F a i l e d: A Background A n a l y s i s, " P r o b l e m s o f C o m m u n i s m, X V: 2 ( M a r c h - A p r i l, 1966) pp. 3 7 - 4 3, a n d W i l l i a m M c L a u g h l i n, "Mr. A i d i t ' s H o l i d a y, " R e p o r t f r o m the R e s e a r c h D e p a r t m e n t s of Radio Free Europe, A u g u s t 6, 196 5, ( M i m e o g r a p h e d ). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 462] === 454 it s revolution warned against fighting P a r t y ]." and struggle attempts imperialism Indonesia agents" Soviets and their th e Indonesian government, were of A m e r i c a n complicity mid-October took it s hours after cipation th e the party organ, Soviets "the forces the coup PKI admitted Politburo It a l s o most actively Communist at his task Instead, for t he 1967, the coup Communist parti gradually had played the a part Pravda reported without a m e m b e r of Indonesian that A i d i t accusation seeming stupidity Although leaders against Izvestia R a k j a t, in s u p p o r t i n g Sudisman, trial "imperialists intrigues at f i r s t denied, the that there was no d i r e c t that PKI in t h e crushed. In J u l y, testimony by Committee Harian admit attempt. 42 implied in G e s t a p u. it had been early involved in G e s t a p u w a s came comment abolish imperialism. 41 A l t h o u g h the against th e Central C o m m u n i s t Party, and o t h e r PKI who leaders 41 P r a v d a. O c t o b e r 10, 1965. This translation and other s u c c e e d i n g r e f e r e n c e s to th e S o v i e t p r e s s a re f r o m T h e C u r r e n t D i g e s t of t he S o v i e t P r e s s, u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e n o t e d. 42 "... T h e i m p e r i a l i s t s an d t h e i r a g e n t s h a v e b e e n, a n d are, c o n s t a n t l y i n t r i g u i n g a g a i n s t I n d o n e s i a, c r e a t i n g a t h r e a t to its s e c u r i t y a n d i n t e g r i t y. " P r a v d a. O c t o b e r 12, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 463] === 455 had supported th e coup, gating or organizing I. A n t o n o v, PKI, had t he 4 7 t h asserted explaining the to d o but denied affair. any P arty role Earlier, a n n i v e r s a r y of t h a t th e Indonesian about Gestapu an d insti Soviet Journalist the f o u n d i n g of the Communists had some its aftermath: It f o l l o w s f r o m d o c u m e n t s c i r c u l a t e d r e c e n t l y b y v a r i o u s p a r t y g r o u p s in I n d o n e s i a t h a t the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p h a d v i o l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s o f the p a r t y p r o g r a m and, in the y e a r s p r e c e d i n g the e v e n t s o f September 30 had committed serious mistakes, which w e a k e n e d t h e u n i t y of the p a r t y a n d l e d to its d e f e a t. 43 Moscow a ls o d e l i b e r a t e l y s t r e s s e d t h a t were alien that th e to M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t t e a c h i n g s, P KI w a s d o n e leftist" p o l i c i e s of Whatever Aidit's folly, solidarity campaign in b y f o l l o w i n g the K r e m l i n ' s the some Communists the b u l k o f t h e p a r t y w a s P r a v d a, May indicated "infantile 28, satisfaction over o n e of subsequent and b l o o d b a t h w hich d estroye d and should n o t have been 43 private its p u b l i c p o s t u r e w a s g u i l t of the and coups Peking. in c o n d e m n i n g the p o s s i b l e insisted, adventurous subject socialist anti-Communist the PKI. leaders, Despite the S o v i e t s i n n o c e n t of w r o n g d o i n g to p e r s e c u t i o n. 196 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 464] === 456 October the 26, Bator t he s i g n i n g of news "persecution of Communists." "the government in J a n u a r y, disturbing" Party Congress, from 44 Indonesia While the p e r s e c u t i o n o f and for blaming th e Brezhnev Soviet forces" terror to l o n g address the applause an e n d heroic fighters interests persecution on for O n the "deeply continuing and " f i r s t of the Communist emphatic all in c o n d e m n i n g Indonesia with profound "We d e m a n d t he there was m o r e aid. treaty alluded Indonesia because Chairman Reportedly Communists 1966, In a l a t e r th e Brezhnev declared: to s t o p P r a v d a, appealed a Soviet-Mongolian progressive anti-Communist nation." Sovi e t p arty organ, and t h r e a t e n e d w i t h d r a w a l o c c a s i o n of th e the Indonesian Communists Ulan 1965, indig from party delegates, to t h e the criminal independence murder the w o r k i n g p e o p l e. " 45 "right-wing reactionary 44 P r a v d a, J a n u a r y 16, 1966. The final communique i s s u e d j o i n t l y b y t h e R u s s i a n s a n d M o n g o l i a n s (1) e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n a b o u t e v e n t s in I n d o n e s i a; (2) c o n d e m n e d t h e r e p r e s s i o n s; a n d (3) e x p r e s s e d c o n f i d e n c e in th e a b i l i t y o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n p e o p l e a n d d e m o c r a t i c f o r c e s to f r u s t r a t e t h e s c h e m e s o f the i m p e r i a l i s t s. P r a v d a, J a n u a r y 18, 1966. ^ Pravda, March 30, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 465] === 457 forces," Chinese 46 within did — m i l itary or control to b l a m e bands seized identify reign of terror on in e n t i r e blame the found it c o n v e n i e n t absolve the Kosygin 1 965 h a d early a sharp 1966, change Indonesia. the New Order Indonesians sued the th e K r e m l i n ' s tended sai d to h a v e 47 regime imperialists against attitude. a ls o the Malaysian for peace. peace from Soviet Union condemned Malaysia Indonesian-Malaysian complete they who were it s p o s t u r e British and American the th e Indonesian a springboard for provocations s i g n i n g of "reactionary vigilante regions confrontation Rather, to no o n e " change the in v i r t u a l l y anti-Communist bloodbath, did not — forces with they were are r e s p o n s i b l e Being willing used Soviets the D j a k a r t a g overnment. control c r e a t i o n of the those indicate that t he that Indonesia, Although an a r t i f i c i a l which was being Indonesia, the agreement signaled On December 16, Izvestia declared: 46 A P r a v d a e d i t o r i a l of F e b r u a r y 16, 1966, s p o k e of th e k i l l i n g a n d j a i l i n g o f t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s of C o m m u n i s t s. It a s k e d w h y s u c h r e p r i s a l s w e r e b e i n g t a k e n s i n c e o n l y a s m a l l n u m b e r of P K I m e m b e r s h a d b e e n i n v o l v e d in G e s t a p u a n d b l a m e d th e " u n b r i d l e d t y r a n n y o f r i g h t - w i n g r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s." ^Pravda, September 29, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 466] === 458 T h e c o n f l i c t s t h a t f l a r e u p r e d o u n d to t h e a d v a n t a g e o n l y o f t h o s e w h o w o u l d s e e k to f i s h in t r o u b l e d w a t e r s. T h i s is a t t e s t e d b y the "exper i e n c e " of Confrontation, i n s p i r e d from without, b e t w e e n M a l a y s i a and Indonesia, countries t h a t h a v e f a r m o r e in c o m m o n in t he d e v e l o p m e n t o f t heir e c o n o m i e s and the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of their s o v e reignty than they have differences.^® Following t he the Soviets the h a n d s Indonesian began President's suggest that Peking b y his final Sukarno p o l i c y of fall from power, had played confrontation into against Malaysia. Another and conciliatory gesture a much more reschedule the important one I n d o n e s i a n debt, Talks between Malik and the began shortly after the March, General Suharto. a firmly 49 negative position, was th e about ambassador 1966, Soviet Union — it s w i l l i n g n e s s set at Soviet Initially, from $1.2 b i l l i o n. about the t r a nsfer of however, condemning power debt the K r e m l i n r e t a i n e d th e m e e t i n g o f W e s t e r n B y V. M a t v e y e v. D u r i n g h e r v i s i t to M o s c o w in J u l y, 1 96 6, I n d i a ' s P r e m i e r, M r s. G a n d h i, h a d r e f e r r e d to the e n d of C o n f r o n t a t i o n v e r y favorably. 49 A M a y m e e t i n g b e t w e e n the two d i p l o m a t s p r o d u c e d n o a g r e e m e n t o n a d a t e f o r M a l i k ' s t r i p to t h e U S S R f o r t a l k s o n r e s c h e d u l i n g, b u t th e R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r, M. D. S y t e n k o, d i d p r o v i d e r e l i e f a s s i s t a n c e w o r t h $ 2 8, 0 0 0 to h e l p care for victims of n atu r a l disasters w h i c h had R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 467] === 459 creditors a n a t t e m p t to to p a r t i c i p a t e any brusquely postponing talks until officials an d full detailed were after joint prepared rescheduling the T o k y o payment for all allow. 50 Indonesia's gratitude and p o l i t i c a l and and refu s i n g conference. from amounts, and the In r e p l y, t he Soviet the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r overdue immediate and read o u t time limits they Malik emphasized Soviet Union s o u g h t to After to M o s c o w f o r c r e d i t o r s 1 meeting, Indonesian debts support Indonesia a visit by Adam'Malik first demanded list of "pressure" for reassure its f i n a n c i a l the Russians o c c u r r e d in v a r i o u s p a r t s o f I n d o n e s i a. News Release, M a y 27, 1966, E m b a s s y o f I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D.C. In a d d i t i o n to th e d e b t o w e d t h e U SS R, I n d o n e s i a h a d i n c u r r e d l o n g - a n d s h o r t - t e r m d e b t s to E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s in th e f o l l o w i n g a m o u n t s: Czechoslovakia, $65.6 million; E a s t Germany, $52.6 million; Hungary, $14.8 million; and Bulgaria, $1.4 million. N o t e d b y The D j a k a r t a T i m e s, N o v e m b e r 14, 196 7. ^ " 1 w a s r e a l l y a s h a m e d, " M a l i k h a s b e e n q u o t e d as sa y i n g a bout c o m p l a i n t s f r o m the S o v i e t s that Indon e s i a had n e v e r p a i d i n s t a l l m e n t s o r e v e n the i n t e r e s t o n the d e b t. H e t o l d t h e m t h a t f a i l u r e to p a y d e b t s w a s o n e r e a s o n S u b a n d r i o h a d b e e n p u t o n t r i a l in I n d o n e s i a. The W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, N o v e m b e r 23, 1966. M a l i k c h o s e to r e v e a l t h e s e d e t a i l s of h is r e c e p t i o n in M o s c o w o n l y a d a y b e f o r e the two c o u n t r i e s r e a c h e d a g r e e m e n t o n r e s c h e d u l i n g. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 468] === 460 that post-Gestapu events should not disturb t w e e n M o s c o w and Djakarta. Whether tion that the it were from their deliveries honeyed words might ignore realiza the d e b t initial Although ruling out further except demands. f or c a s h p a y m e n t, in m e d i u m - gressive scale d e b t of $14 m i l l i o n, three installments proved to b e h a r d pleased with they agreed including 1967 1969 the r e s u l t s. The including and e x t e n d on until arrears, bargainers, to r e s c h e d u l e Repayment would begin thirteen years from s o o n b a c k e d off and l o n g - t e r m debts, installments beginning April for Soviets the the in m i l i t a r y a i d d e b t s. the d e b t cancel not rescheduled, million million 51 it w a s M a l i k ' s Indonesians relations 1969. the 52 1981. was immediate to the U S S R h a d b e e n d e f e r r e d. a pro Short-term to b e Although Indonesians $523 were repaid t he Soviets not dis crushing burden Indonesian officials 51 F o r a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t of M a l i k ' s p o s i t i o n m talks w i t h the R u s s i a n s see N e w s R e l e a s e, O c t o b e r 24, 1966, E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C. M a l i k r e t u r n e d to d e c l a r e t h a t h e h a d l a i d the f o u n d a t i o n f o r b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n I n d o n e s i a and the S o v i e t U n i o n. 52 Economic O. G. R o e d e r, Review, LV:10 "Indebted Diplomacy," Far Eastern ( M a r c h 9, 1967) p. 440, a n d d e t a i l s Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 469] === 461 could, held therefore, "in an showed atmosphere "good will In t h e s e cancel To be mill b u t o n l y on credits and f o u r while road projects armed talks, the T j i l e g o n factory, Soviet Union Indonesian the concerning in K a l i m a n t a n superphosphate the friendship" as h a v i n g b e e n in w h i c h b o t h p a r t i e s and g r e a t u n dersta nding." postponed were Kalimantan the d i s c u s s i o n and subsequent protocols a steel describe were indicated Soviet Union would be for steel mill to b e projects. and the T j i l a t j a p u n i v e r s i t y and continued. parts agreed c o n s t r u c t i o n of agricultural the A m b o n spare sides the its w i l l i n g n e s s forces with a cash basis. both 53 for In a d d i t i o n, supply t he Russian weapons, Indonesian military trainees f i n a n c e d b y the U S S R under still existing c o n t r a c 4t.s. 5 4 d i s c l o s e d b y M a l i k to the I n d o n e s i a n P a r l i a m e n t, A n t a r a, M a y 20, 1968. The negotiations were carried out after Malik left b y a n I n d o n e s i a n t e a m h e a d e d b y M a j. Gen. S u p r a j o g i, Indonesia's auditor general. 53 Moscow N o t e d b y J u s t u s M. V a n d e r K r o e f, " J a k a r t a B e t w e e n a n d P e k i n g, " E a s t e r n W o r l d ( M a r c h / A p r i l, 1967) p. 9. 54 A n t a r a, M a y 20, 1968. Discussions about military t r a i n i n g a n d s u p p l i e s w e r e h e l d in M o s c o w d u r i n g S e p t e m b e r, 1967, d u r i n g a v i s i t b y M i n i s t e r - N a v a l C o m m a n d e r A d m i r a l Muljadi. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 470] === 462 Another accommodate it s attitude have sought Communist alleged P a r t y organ, that Czechoslovakia, Order return them own these for Indonesia has country. was exiles, example, forced activities A n w a r Dharma, Moscow because from his the g o v e r n m e n t s o f the Rumania, and Bulgaria had Communist in C h i n a also students who Indonesia.^5 1967, associa it w a s S o v i e t Union, taken Indonesian u n i v e r s i t y students, refuge states R a k j a t. the In A u g u s t, take China the U S S R e x p e l l e d leave resulting Hungary, been Unlike Chinese mission. in s c r e e n i n g willingness Indonesian exiles who their 1966, action against pro-Peking European inside journalist associated with Harian w i t h th e forcing Soviet Union's to c h a n g e s sanctuary anti-Soviet disclosed the a haven outside On S ep tember Indonesian tions itself toward pro-Communist w h i c h has given t he m. instance Earlier or A l b a n i a. apparently showed the assisted signs The the N e w of w a n t i n g Indonesian government 55 D j a k a r t a D o m e s t i c S e r v i c e, J u l y 29, 1 9 6 7 (FBIS translation). A t the s a m e t i m e i t w a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t Yugos l a v i a was taking similar action against these elements, k n o w n to N e w O r d e r as " G e s t a p u - P K I r e m n a n t s a b r o a d. " The a c t i o n b y the Com m u n i s t s states f o l l o w e d v i g o r o u s d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s b y the I n d o n e s i a n who f e a r e d the p o l i t i c a l m i s c h i e f w h i c h th e p r o - M a o e x i l e s m i g h t do. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 471] === 463 had indicated its d e e p c o n c e r n and o t h e r Indonesian exiles, Communist states, in t h e were eyes "discredit received with deep to t h e same internal indicated message power Kremlin the President became mention the the transfer independence so-called "Father its Sukarno to A d a m Malik, favorably noted military pacts first the anti— colonialist ^Djakarta struggles. Domestic Service, sensitivity post-coup In i t s 1966 Independence." the had sole personal r e j e c t i o n of Sukarno's April any party newspaper supporting 57 its Soviets now the o f f i c i a l statements therefore, Pravda omitted the n e w F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ' s and h i s Indonesia a non-person Indonesian extravagantly, Although power. day, past on similar occasions generally praised students N e w Order. Indonesia. the 1966, indicated Indonesia, March, expulsions, Sukarno Indonesia's an d The for mention was the struggle article 56 support foll o w i n g his While the g o o d n a m e appreciation time, the e f f o r t s including ex-ambassadors of world opinion." At the had about 25, anti-imperialist final fall 1967 (FBIS from translation). ^Article Skalkin, August 17, 1966. R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 472] === 464 power was marked with initial reaction — "wait see." and Pravda blamed for engaging dent, th e supporting helped "too 58 ruin early however, adventures." suggested, had confrontation the course was whose Komsomolskaya coexistence Th e followed Indonesian economy. judge Russians the p r e s s for o p p o s i n g p e a c e f u l the M a l a y s i a n the In m i d - M a r c h, "dangerous article interest by the as r e f l e c t e d Sukarno intense former the a nd b y While the new and Presi Peking line so d o i n g had declaring Indonesian govern ment, " the Soviet publication expressed satisfaction with statements clearly was in b e i n g For gestures its leaders. The the w i n n i n g s i d e its p a r t, Kremlin Indonesia. the N e w O r der goodwill and in g e n e r a l, however, these regime friendship have been toward interested 59 has made the rhetorical numerous S o v i e t Union; a n d of 58 S e e Tass, M o s c o w, F e b r u a r y 23, 1967, a n d c o m m e n t a r y b y B o r i s K o l y a g i n, M o s c o w D o m e s t i c S e r v i c e, F e b r u a r y 25, 1967. B o t h i t e m s are f a c t u a l a n d o b j e c t i v e in t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t of th e s i t u a t i o n, v e n t u r i n g o n l y t h a t I n d o n e s i a h a s m o v e d i n t o "a n e w p h a s e " in i t s p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e. 59 C o m m e n t a r y b y V. V e r b e n k o, K o m s o m o l s k a y a P r a v d a, M a r c h 19, 1967. Although General Suharto initially was d e s c r i b e d i n t h e S o v i e t p r e s s as a " m i l i t a n t a n t i - C o m m u n i s t, " in t i m e c o m m e n t s a b o u t the n e w I n d o n e s i a n l e a d e r w e r e r e s trained and stre s s e d his moderation. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 473] === 465 limited practical significance. The M o s c o w w a r m mes sages of g re etings priate occasions, and ha v e supported Nations. and struggle for t he y o k e the take initiatives for w o r k i n g strations by KAMI i n the U n i t e d for solving "hand-in-hand countries the the the in the and peoples under 60 satisfaction or th e M P R S d u r i n g appro Soviet officials, th e A f r o - A s i a n d e l e g a t i o n s agony over sent Indonesian delegate praised liberation of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m highly in s u c h w o r d s continuing the colonialism." Whatever by high a Soviet proposal iss ue, with an d g o o d w i s h e s o n visits some Russ i a n Czechs United Nations may invited In e n d o r s i n g Southwest Africa Russians have Indonesians have of p r a i s e the ar e mo r e Indonesians* in t h e i r its June, students solace which country. 1966, against the S o v i e t s than offset by ban on the its teaching The ban was e n a c t e d session following demon a l l o w i n g th e p r o p a g a t i o n 60 R e u t e r s, N e w Yor k, M a y 3, 1967, in T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s, M a y 5, 1967. E a r l i e r, the I n d o n e s i a n H e r a l d h a d n o t e d w i t h f a v o r t r e n d s in S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y in d e a l i n g with A f r o - A s i a n states. "In the l i g h t o f t h e s e p o s i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t s I n d o n e s i a s e e s a b e t t e r p r o s p e c t of c l o s e r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t he S o v i e t U n i o n. " M a y 17, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 474] === 466 Communist a special ideas. t e a m of formulating 61 Following up on Indonesian officials a l i s t of b o o k s teachings. Under not sold, circulated or finally made kep t, public it bann e d a large works of L e n i n and Marx t he S o v i e t U n i o n. Moscow Radio identified books forget their Soviets and these publications traded. The va riety of literature including and p r o p a g a n d a periodicals Russian the reaction was were list was S u k a r n o ’s th e produced strong. Indonesian book-banning with stormtroopers by their " w a n t to m a k e ancient friendly the containing following reactionaries" and magazines law, charged with 1967, The b o o k - b u r n i n g of H i t l e r ' s "Indonesian th e in M a r c h, fal l; was and m a g a z i n e s Communist to b e the M P R S d i r e c t i v e, joint struggle and action charged against th e that against Soviet the p e o p l e ties w i t h the Indonesia l a n d of imperialism th e and 61 O n A p r i l 25, 1966, U n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s d e m a n d e d t h a t the S o v i e t C u l t u r a l C e n t e r i n D j a k a r t a s t o p s h o w i n g movies about Lenin. L a t e r, K A M I p r o t e s t e d t h e h o l d i n g of a L e n i n C o m m e m o r a t i o n E x h i b i t i o n a t th e s a m e l o c a t i o n, c a l l i n g i t " u n t i m e l y " a n d " u n t a c t f u l " in v i e w o f c i r c u m stances. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 475] === 467 neocolonialism." Indonesian leaders face a freeze came in a P r avda USSR circulate Moscow might freely. campaign or The w a r n i n g that: official Nations relations th e Indonesia which with the continued. Marxist-Leninist and Soviet There was unless 63 "Marxismarticle American reconsider In h i s in mind, that while banned, Indonesian debts curbed. f r i e n d l y or normal that fact complained were warned the new anti-Communist the S o v i e t p e o p l e. " to m a i n t a i n materials the Kremlin is n o w r e g a r d e d w i t h h o s t i l i t y should keep It a l s o to s t o p the article which pointed o u t the o u t l o o k o f wished Subsequently in M o s c o w - D j a k a r t a r e l a t i o n s. Leninism which 62 publications implied threat allowed that its agreement th e anti-Communist efforts were comment on were th e reschedule th e S oviet warning, 62 A c c o r d i n g to t h e S o v i e t s, t h e I n d o n e s i a n l i s t i n c l u d e d th e w r i t i n g s of C h e k h o v, b o o k s s h o w i n g R u s s i a n f e a t s in W o r l d W a r II, m a g a z i n e s o n S o v i e t w o m e n, c u l t u r e a n d life, i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs and o t her "periodicals w h i c h throw l i g h t o n t h e l i f e o f S o v i e t p e o p l e a n d th e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t heir ties w i t h the p e o p l e s of S o u t h e a s t A s i a. " Moscow R a d i o, M a r c h 20, 1967. 63 R e u t e r s d i s p a t c h f r o m M o s c o w, i n th e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, M a r c h 27, 196 7. The Pravda article was signed by " C o m m e n t a t o r " V. B e l o z e r s k y b u t w a s b a c k e d b y M o s c o w R a d i o as " c l e a r l y a n d f i r m l y " s t a t i n g t h e v i e w o f t h e S o v i e t people. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 476] === 468 Foreign Minister Malik his belief relations that th e between Pravda th e Soviet party organ's Indonesian press simply expressed USSR article and official should make would reply and independent" and o b liquely w a r n i n g ference country's point continued The Russians prominent many the to b e PKI a sore and the one USSR affairs. however, also were leaders accused. internal not, that "active policy was added Russian foreign literature Malik the stressing Communist Ign o r i n g the It d i d, the an d n o t e d not harm good Indonesia. status, Indonesia's surprise 65 journal. against 64 inter- The b a n on rescinded an d the with Moscow. upset by the M a h m i l u b the sentences Charging the death that the trials passed trials had become 64 T h e D ] a k a r t a T i m e s, M a r c h 29, 1 9 6 7. O n M a r c h 31, Moscow Radio criticized Malik's statement without mentioning h i m b y n a m e, b u t o n l y as "an I n d o n e s i a n o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b l e for foreign policy." It s o u g h t to c l a r i f y th e e a r l i e r a r t i c l e, no t i n g t hat w hile S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n f r i e n d s h i p endured: "...This does n o t mean that we agree w i t h everything w hich h a s b e e n g o i n g o n in I n d o n e s i a in t he p a s t 18 m o n t h s. " ^ T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s, M a r c h 26, 19 6 7: "We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U S S R g o v e r n m e n t is n o t as n a r r o w m i n d e d as Mr. B e l o z e r s k y a n d w e h o p e o u r b e l i e f is tru e. Angkatan B e r s e n d j a t a, M a r c h 26, 196 7, s t r e s s e d t h a t I n d o n e s i a r e j e c t e d a n y i n t e r f e r e n c e in i t s h o m e a f f a i r s, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e c o u n t r y f r o m w h i c h it c a m e. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 477] === 469 "a m o c k e r y of merely justice as t h e y s e n t e n c e for h o l d i n g d i f f e r e n t v iews," execution order for the Committee, PKI Central similar c o n c e r n was the labor PKI Sudisman, leader, a member Njono. both sentence Sudisman bitter meted and N j ono we r e recriminations demonstrated at h is for Nationalist Party the led a bloc of a resolute Soviets anti-imperialist progressive Party for Q u o t e d b y Tass, the all en t r e a t i e s, Similar which has been the 66 Despite spared subsequently executed with Moslem Masjumi that Njono be trial. Later, Soviets continuing purge and gove r n m e n t 66 The The political 1967. Politburo the f a t e leftist elements. and the the over " e x e c u t i o n of condemned Kremlin from Moscow. (PNI) to d e a t h the Communist parties who requested death Pravda in A u g u s t, voiced b y people have policy been Indonesian forced to r i d branded this itself effort to u p r o o t d e m o c r a t i c from and ha v e spearheading Moscow, the elements life...." concern has the August Indonesian blamed th e b a n n e d anti-PNI drive. 67 1967. 67 R a d i o M o s c o w in I n d o n e s i a n to I n d o n e s i a, O c t o b e r 24, 1967, (F B I S t r a n s l a t i o n ). A m o n g th e r i g h t - w i n g r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s w h i c h t h e S o v i e t s h a v e i d e n t i f i e d in I n d o n e s i a, t h e M o s l e m g r o u p s h a v e b e e n the chief o b j e c t of criticism, as w e l l as s o m e e l e m e n t s of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 478] === 470 The USSR on Indo-American Undoubtedly Indonesia for the in r e l a t i o n s has Relations the m o s t d i s t u r b i n g d e v e l o p m e n t Soviet Union has w i t h the Unite d not repeatedly blamed Agency for Although th e K r e m l i n t he A m e r i c a n Central Intelligence affair agents behind some The CIA has been accused of as h a v e events Jones editor 150 m i l l i o n r u p i a h s propaganda life. campaign Taking in the Palmer, setting up "a w i d e n e t w o r k islands Indonesia." the Sumitro country have Chinese, in t h e F a l l (about suspicion the $375,000) c o u n t r y fo r 1966. Indonesian to l a u n c h have to A m e r i c a n accused h i m of spies and troublemakers Named among th e chief been former and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. and the A m e r i c a n w a y of adhering Soviets it h a s the b l o o d b a t h charged with bribing advantage of businessman William the encouraging Ambassador for has been the g r o w i n g w a r m t h States. the G e s t a p u seen been Masjumi agents leaders all t he like 68 68 R a d i o M o s c o w o n J u l y 17, 196 7 a n d A u g u s t 3, 1967. (F B I S t r a n s l a t i o n s. ) T h e R u s s i a n s h a v e h a r k e d b a c k to th e U. S. s u p p o r t f o r M a s j u m i l e a d e r s d u r i n g the P R R I / P e r m e s t a r e v o l t a d d i n g that: " e v e n t o d a y m o s t o f the M a s j u m i l e a d e r s are p a i d August agents the U n i t e d States." Radio Moscow, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 479] === 471 common early theme Indonesia was that th e m a s s elements and weakened the r e s i s t e n c e Western countries. created unity and 69 propaganda assults were leveled at the T o k y o for "pressuring" country had a result, States th e imperialist forefront. theme was acts t he Indonesia abandoned in f a v o r cooperation by and o t her W e s t e r n nations. Conference th e d e b t o r country, seen been shown over concessions the Attacks creditors capital "opening a broad road P r a v d a, J a n u a r y 13, 1967. ex pressed by Radio Moscow, Ja n u a r y 1967. (FB IS t r a n s l a t i o n. ) May Indonesia's and at Indonesia by monopolistic Radio Moscow, the chaos. 69 70 line, undermined national specific inve s t m e n t bill w h i c h was concern has infiltration by situation, th i s g e n e r a l i z e d th e U.S. i n v a s i o n of the g o v e r n m e n t h a d "the f r e s h o n s l a u g h t b y Indonesian with this Communist anti-Communist hysteria which political w i t h the U n i t e d In t i m e aggravated economic before from I n d o n e s i a to According crippled by a tense lay helpless powers," c o m mentary on events destruction of th e p u r g e of l e f t i s t s been severely had in S o v i e t capital." an d 70 contracts Some signed This same theme was 16, 196 7, a n d J a n u a r y 25, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 480] === 472 the N e w O r d e r g o v e r n m e n t natural resources, but this Soviets that to t h e much more tions i t is interested of W e s t e r n d i v e r s i o n of resources example, Soviets the have Indonesia principally channeled craft. East oil The boycott, 1 968, war imposed a ban on have when effort. faced The political penetration the the suggested the A r a b became "Suppose oil e x p o r t s — the Indonesia's Kremlin has for the seemed and mili t a r y r a m i f i c a Indonesia than Communist the g r o u n d s use fixation that the states. challenged A m e r i c a n oil Indonesian oil American would not been South Vietnam for Soviets have c r i s i s of has away from the e x p l o i t a t i o n Chinese. the economic for For operations the p e t r o l e u m in U.S. military that during air the M i d d l e countries declared the p r i m e sources their for t he Indonesian government had the U. S. an e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t Army in V i e t n a m situation." 71 71 R a d i o M o s c o w, S e p t e m b e r 29, 1 9 67. The I n d o n e s i a n s and A m e r i c a n officials have both denied that any sizeable a m o u n t s o f I n d o n e s i a n o i l h a v e a s s i s t e d the V i e t n a m w a r effort. F o r o t h e r a r t i c l e s o n the e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n I n d o n e s i a a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s e e P r a v d a, J u l y 17, 1 9 6 7, " F o r W h o m A r e the D o o r s B e i n g O p e n e d, " a n d O c t o b e r 1, 1967, "A B i l l i o n a i r e T r a v e l s " — th e l a t t e r a b o u t the v i s i t o f J o h n D. R o c k e f e l l e r I I I to I n d o n e s i a. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 481] === 473 The Russians about prospects away from tinued t h a t the policy by Indonesia professed Armed Forces concern Malik economy. Soviets, The purpose to s i d e t r a c k and b r i n g it into This attitude has b e e n the f o r m a t i o n Sout h e a s t Asia. nations' urge While the Russians flage for t he p r o m o t i o n Asia and have vehicles the A m e r i c a n of n e w expressed somewhat milder training economic orbit. the and the Indo according i ts p o l i c y o f camp. heart regional the of A m e r i c a n into developments and Soviet groupings l e g i t i m a c y of A s i a n and cultural opposed both ASA countries further the moves, the foreign infiltration of con but s e c t o r s of these the Suharto, into k e y for d r awing the U.S. General assistance admitting for regional t ion, and Indonesia independent" Indonesia from neutrality opposition favorably and about American investment may be weaning noted "active through military e n try of Ame r i c a n been particularly bothered States They have Foreign Minister have the United nonalignment. emphasis nesian apparently have coopera and ASPAC interests camou in S o u t h e a s t previously non-aligned On ASEAN, misgivings, the K r e m l i n has apparently the o r g a n i z a t i o n before awaiting taking Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 482] === 474 firmer that stand. the U n i t e d nucleus context, seen the participation its the goes the A s i a n States the g r o u p i n g coalition seen States: countries seen been largest nation SEATO members like the an o m i n o u s d e v e l o p m e n t. a new anti-Communist actual m e m b e r "The m a j o r r o l e a new bloc which the U n i t e d ar e b o u n d 72 a n o t h e r m e t h o d of to a b a n d o n its "It is no accident," Moscow been visited by the In t h i s in A S E A N h a s the fear Indonesia b y prominent American officials Indonesia Secretary that by military commitment." been the to f o r m in A s i a. Indonesia cooperation with pointed out United Visits has use expressed in S o u t h e a s t A s i a w o u l d n o t r e q u i r e ship by it h a s significant. and Thailand Radio Moscow has coalition time anti-Communist as p a r t i c u l a r l y Philippines same States will S o u t h e a s t Asia, have the State traditional Radio suspicious Bundy, and foreign m inister s applying pressure Special states non-aligned posture. declared, people such "that Dja k a r t a Assistant Roving Ambassador Harriman, connected to W a s h i n g t o n b y 72 D e c e m b e r 25, 1968. Other comments on Asian region a l i s m a n d A S E A N, w e r e b r o a d c a s t b y M o s c o w R a d i o o n A u g u s t 13, 1967, S e p t e m b e r 25, 1967, a n d O c t o b e r 7, 196 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 483] === 475 military treaties." Indonesia the The in November, to g a i n cipation — 73 v i s i t of V i c e 1967, Indonesian was declared support — i ts V i e t n a m e f f o r t. weakened economic position, promises of m i l i t a r y the President Humphrey and p r o b a b l y p a r t i M a k i n g u s e of Vice and economic an a t t e m p t b y President, assistance, to e n l i s t D j a k a r t a ' s h e l p f o r U. S. Indonesia's through was "aggression" seen trying in S o u t h e a s t A* s i• a. 74 Objections efforts the Indonesia. s h i p m e n t of literature tional own also hav e b e e n into of E n g l i s h lies Indonesia the a second have required cases 73 in order M a y 6, and complained and fact that to a s s u r e about to e d u c a the the w i d e s p r e a d advantage. translate Part of cultural scientific its d i s t r i b u t i o n language a competitive in s o m e have and libraries. Americans been Russians to A m e r i c a n USIA financed educational establishments chagrin The raised Soviet^ adoption Indonesia has given a result, their own books an a u d i e n c e for the Russians into E n g l i s h them. 1967. 74 M o s c o w R a d i o, D o m e s t i c S e r v i c e in R u s s i a n, N o v e m b e r 1967 (FBIS t r a n s l ation). Se e a l s o q u o t a t i o n s f r o m P r a v d a c i t e d i n D u t a M a s j a r a k a t ( D j a k a r t a ) D e c e m b e r 1, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 484] === In sum, then, the Soviets have seen benefiting significantly from the Unlike Chinese, not finally written the Indonesian they have th e they have situation continued country while as an u t t e r to p r o t e s t issues "Gestapu" exiles. Indonesia at th e the reaction forces actions against diplomatic leftists condemned for and for ties w i t h W a s hington. Those thus however, identified Order Moreover, "patriotic forces which th e regime. come out ranks of Despite Moscow has th e i n f a v o r of the fighters 75 Boris Kolyagin 75 e x p u l s i o n of Indonesia's against On one with side and the N e w are n a, retaining and Radio, forces its p l a c e imperialism. Soviet-Indonesian Moscow not to p u t f a i t h political colonialism commentary, that elements have continued country's a marked deterioration with D j a karta on forging political been directly inside taking further military far, actions th e at presen t." the Rather, they have maintained crossroads are off los s. and States Indonesia. cooperate like debt r e scheduling In so d o i n g anti-Communist being willing practical changes the U n i t e d relations August 17, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 485] === 477 over th e p a s t their hope several for "patriotic years, the u l t i m a t e f o r c e s ” (much th e Russians have t r i u m p h of the U. S. anti-Communist forces during present cannot look hopeful trends point of concede the K r e m l i n, that the a lasting have common, Indonesia the there and the Because approaches the The ripe regime, in t h e Indonesia. seen from leaders have th e th e th e view refused Indonesian always a chance for another and a nd Peking's want to b e considerably different and the Indonesian Sino-Soviet Soviets Conflict affair the th e sharp friendship. subsequent coming situa t i o n has become conflict. Peking for the contended Communist that the t r o u b l e "export revolution" in A s i a o n a brilliant Ignoring Although instability" They have decision that era). in the Russians have blamed assumption there. Gestapu issue its h o p e "politics Sino-Soviet the began with Mao's the arms of M o s c o w New Order an i m p o r t a n t debacle open when the s w i n g of g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y — ready with held c h a p t e r h a s b e e n w r i t t e n in In a c o u n t r y w h e r e their pro— Soviet Sukarno Soviet history. been the clung revolutionary situation was s o v e r e i g n t y of n e i g h b o r i n g states, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 486] === 478 including ones w h i c h were friendly, th e M a o i s t s th e p ath of p r o v o k i n g d i s o r d e r s and Indonesia, Chinese fere this directly forced strategy led the follow internal their openly intensifying affairs leaders the took subversion. inter PKI w h i c h they recommendations: T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s p o l i c y w e r e th e e v e n t s of 30 S e p t e m b e r 196 5 i n w h i c h the p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s of I n d o n e s i a w e r e r e p r e s s e d d u r i n g an a d v e n t u r o u s c o u p d ' e t a t, a n d b e c a m e t h e v i c t i m s of a b l o o d y t e r r o r i s t c a m p a i g n l a s t i n g m a n y m o n t h s. 77 The weakness Gestapu the th e onslaught for help, Peking Maoists according essence Chinese to m a k e order and thus the Soviets, 77 Vietnam, members, Sergeyev J u l y 12, i t is claimed. Indonesian axis." obscured th e These Communist the PKI's whom the President's developments, u n d e r s t a n d i n g of paralyzed Peking for h e g e m o n y Indonesian the caused differences commentary, 1967. With wit h Sukarno, their plan supported the p o s t - at the d o o r of the friends of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m, rank-and-file laid P a r t y to used to p u s h "Peking-Djakarta Communist been interests, tried and A f r i c a idea of The selfish needed Indonesian also h a s Russians. Party Asia Moscow Radio th e "consciences" and splits among in V i e t n a m e s e R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 487] === 479 progressives, and nonparty masses For alienated who were t h e i r par t, that socialism r oa d, could be by p eaceful means. revisionism began sympathetic with the t h e p a r t y ’s a d h e r e n c e the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y f r o m Chinese have the S o v i e t reached through a result, infiltrate into the in t h e p a s t. blamed 78 PKI w e a k n e s s e s Communist position the p a r l i a m e n t a r y Peking cl ai m s, modern the p a r t y: It was p r e c i s e l y this r e v i s i o n i s t line that caus e d t h e I n d o n e s i a n p e o p l e a n d I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n i s t s to be c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d in t he t e r r o r of the a r m e d c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s o f t h e f i n e s t s o n s a n d d a u g h t e r s of the I n d o n e s i a n p e o p l e w e r e m a s s a c r e d. 79 Further, the u n i t e d especially front policy pursued by the u n i t e d f r o n t w i t h Sukarno, th e was PKI leaders, essentially P e r h a p s th e m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e s t a t e m e n t o f C h i n a ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r w e a k e n i n g the P K I c a m e i n a n a r t i c l e b y a p r o - M o s c o w Indonesian, Dartono, whose article was published in t h e R a b o t n i c h e s k o D e l o o f S o f i a, B u l g a r i a, o n A p r i l 4, 1968. A n o t h e r s i m i l a r c r i t i q u e of a s t r o n g a n t i - P e k i n g, p r o Mo s c o w flavor has been published by self-styled "MarxistL e n i n i s t " g r o u p o f f o r m e r P K I m e m b e r s in C e y l o n. It is e n t i t l e d To B r o t h e r s a t H o m e a n d C o m r a d e s A b r o a d F i g h t i n g A g a i n s t I m p e r i a l i s m. for I n d e p e n d e n c e, P e a c e, D e m o c r a c y and S o c i a l i s m (Colombo: T r i b u n e Publishers, 1967). 79 F r o m an a r t i c l e b y J u s u f A d j i t o r o p, m e m b e r o f t h e P o l i t b u r o o f t h e P K I C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e, i n t h e P e o p l e 1s D a i l y, F e b r u a r y 21, 1968. A d j i t o r o p w a s o n e o f th e I n d o n e s i a n e x i l e s in C h i n a w h o w a s a c t i v e i n p r o p a g a n d a e f f o r t s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 488] === 480 p o l i c y of thought, grows class collaboration which especially o u t of th e thesis th e b a r r e l a gun." In a d d i t i o n PKI's Liu disaster, Chao-chi Indonesia. the the M a o i s t s for The r e sult of to b l a m i n g former the counter to M a o i s t "political power revisionism for the excoriated former president effects Chinese Cultural that Soviet have alleged bad ran of his leader, Revolution, now 196 3 visit in d i s g r a c e cited for having glorified Indonesian bourgeois political power bourgeois leader, an a t t e m p t to d e c e i v e a n d demoralize spreading the the Sukarno, Indonesian people. fallacies "th e m o s t d e s p i c a b l e their w h i c h were, betrayal interests." In th e p o s t - G e s t a p u ideologically purer from the peasant ashes alliance Soviets with 80 Liu Khrushchev revisionist revolutionary s e l l o u t of PKI, armed sabotaging December line also and counter asserted, Indonesian people and a 80 era, th e Communist struggle. this th e charged with Peking Radio Chinese imbued with Maoist the o l d for of t h e an d Party have thought, to l e a d It has seen rising a workercharged e f fort b e c ause of the their 1968 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 489] === 481 co n t i n u i n g relat i o n s with, government. going from Th e al l o u t taking an d assistance the N e w O r d e r "Soviet r e v i s i o n i s t renegades" to p r e v e n t th e Indonesians, are s a i d led b y the PKI, "the invicible revolutionary path pointed out Chairman Mao" in w a g i n g a p e o p l e ' s war, rural bases areas and e n c i r c l i n g the establishing cities from the country side. The Soviets, Chinese the o t h e r hand, stepping up subversive and elsewhere in A s i a b e c a u s e Mao which envisions th e Tse-tung" state in Asia, include Vietnam, Cambodia, purposes, overseas erroneous the Indonesia Laos Russians Chinese claimed, citizens policies an d Burma. and Indonesia "Grand Strategy Plan c r e a t i o n of a vast super controlled from Peking. along w i t h Korea, and a c c used the activities one w hic h w o u l d be It w o u l d have 81 For Mongolia, these t he M a o i s t s are e n c o u r a g i n g Communist parties ill-advised revolts. chauvinist to e n g a g e those grounds 81 T h e i d e a o f M a o ' s " s u p e r s t a t e " w a s p u t f o r w a r d in an a r t i c l e in M o s c o w ' s L i t e r a r y G a z e t t e a n d l a t e r w a s r e p r i n t e d in E n g l i s h b y S u r v i v a l. a L o n d o n p u b l i c a t i o n. T h e a u t h o r is E r n s t H e n r i, a p s e u d o n y m f o r an i n f l u e n t i a l R u s s i a n c o m m e n t a tor Rostovsky. The p r i n c i p l e ideas were s u m m a r i z e d b y C. L. S u l z b e r g e r in h i s c o l u m n f o r the N e w Y o r k T i m e s, J a n u a r y 10, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 490] === 482 the Russians Kalimantan where blamed have disapproved and the J a v a d u r i n g the forces were September the de a t h s previous The adventurist Mao July an d called the Soviets have designs. them accused "The the U n i t e d from different Moscow sides, toward th e in t h e w o r l d. Peking nationalism the who...fought 83 Red "victims of th e for States." contends, victims "the and d emocracy," Although 83 Tass, Moscow, September 1967. Tass, Moscow, September 196 7. the the pushing and Peking anti-imperialist infernal mixture expanionism" Indonesia but the r e a c t i o n a r y Washington The and r acism w i t h peace 82 weakening Chinese c h auvin ist line of same goal: Communists 82 Communists capturing many l e a d e r s h i p...o b j e c t i v e l y m e r g e s w i t h only been Pravda and A u g u s t w h e n g o v e r n m e n t i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i c y of forces and e l s e for example, thousands of teachings." assisting American ar e m o v i n g actions in E a s t J a v a 14, in k i l l i n g Soviet paper Moreover, Peking successful insurgents. PGRS g u e r r i l l a "pocket revolts" Indonesia. China for the also other t h a t is, th e have not "patriots leftist R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 491] === 483 elements on whom gains Indonesia. The Chinese plotting with economic, Each has the the and m i l i t a r y seen by United States People's in t u r n h a v e United conciliatory been Kremlin has step States China. rightwing military regime," ruling Soviet revisionist clique more closely have been of p a r r o t i n g to v i s i t M o s c o w f o r d e b t describing leaders. the regime Friendly gestures invariably are criticisms unrecorded by 84 New Order April attacked by Soviets overall the N e w Or d e r toward the than political, regime. Indonesians "the cooperating with ever." a U.S. the and the Radio declared, 84 "line" re-scheduling the The Russians for inviting talks and for as b e i n g h e a d e d b y n a t i o n a l i s t t he Soviet Union the Chinese, Indonesia while Moscow's anti-Communist policies Peking are d i s c o u n t e d 19, Indonesia's New Order future cooperation with Marxism-Leninism Peking imperialists Malik the "In f o s t e r i n g accused a sign of true its h o p e s f o r to p r o v i d e taken by M oscow in o p p o s i n g accused assistance Peking Republic placed either camouflage. 196 7 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 492] === 484 From an A m e r i c a n p o i n t bickering provides insights into Certainly in t h e a fascinating the e v e n t s the w i l l i n g n e s s Gestapu the contention the M a o i s t to b e Chinese "defeat" t h w a r t i n g of trusted, with North anger, wide, was succeeding. Djakarta Chinese While to p r o v o k e retaliation, has toppling a heartening energetic marked and some new Indonesia since October, 1965. and has aims the the leadership the several of p o l i t i c a l Korea, Peking in C h i n e s e the A m e r i c a n aggressively hostile its neighbors. The it d i d w i t h t he in Ghana, and expres s i o n s to W a s h i n g t o n diplomatic officials Chinese responses criteria on which and economic implicate the A l g i e r s A f r o - A s i a n of N k r u m a h sign coming Although demonstrated hostility helped enforce they obviously have Indonesian Sino— Soviet especially by Conference, relations adjunct the S o v i e t s Indonesia, Peking's the strengthened belief complicity with and n o t PKI affair has that of view, the cooling Cuban t h a t the w o r l d offensive was not probably would not want the p o i n t enjoyed the of m i l i t a r y audacity which Chinese words toward China has the has support, and deeds. n o t b e e n one based a c o m m o n a l i t y of its g r a n t feeling Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 493] === 485 between has Indonesians helped to f o r g e and A m e r i c a n s about closer friendship and have, however, felt ties the P e k i n g r e g i m e coopera tion. American different about Indonesia. number of take policy makers th e f u t u r e role occasions active role to e s t a b l i s h i n g already USSR makes its development while private sector. little interest Indon esia of t he a positive p o l i c y of "ad h o c " aid United t he latter the assistance in t h e contribution to t h e the the p u b l i c its h e l p o n have and the continuing the shown to t h e N e w O r d e r comparable wi t h efforts country USSR Indonesia country, Russians i n h i b i t e d no d o u b t b y t h e campaign its p o s i t i o n arrangement concentrates however, in p r o v i d i n g u r g i n g the favorably disposed contribution States To date, assistance consistent with Ind i a. any magn i t u d e They have been Communist the k i n d of economic sector, Soviet Union see Washington has been exists the in p r o v i d i n g responsibilities a w o r l d power, indicated on to u n d e r t a k e have their desire In l i n e w i t h t h e U. S. that Soviet Union State Department officials Indonesia. th e considerably India. antiramifications which Indonesian economy would have Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 494] === 486 the their continuing struggle the U SSR however, to r e - e s t a b l i s h Certainly relations. adverse States 85 Indonesian interference. likely left to b e the refused the d o o r open f or friendlier Washington probably would not time, so r a s h Communists, It w i l l b e to d e c i d e the d e g r e e i n v a s i o n of such th e U n i t e d intervene since gratuitous in t h e s e it k n o w s w e l l the a n d k i n d of the S o v i e t Union. the S o v i e t d r a s t i c p u r g e of however, left entirely lay i n g the g r o u n d w o r k fo r Following Indonesia. in D j a k a r t a ' s the same for s e n s i t i v i t y to o u t s i d e is d e s i r a b l e w i t h to be possible assistance program to s o m e m o d e r a t i o n on behalf themselves its To h a s t e n t h a t day, is n o t matters leadership it m a y w e l l b e c o m e the R u s s i a n s h a v e leftist element. the China for C o m m u n i s t world. In time, with advice Indonesians cooperation which Adam Malik has a future seemed understanding. Czechoslovakia, to b o w to h e a v y s t u d e n t p r e s s u r e s a nd for instance, (perhaps b a c k e d 85 F o r e x a m p l e, t he e x e c u t i o n o r d e r s o n c e r t a i n C o m m u n i s t l e a d e r s m i g h t b e r e s c i n d e d a n d s e n t e n c e s c o m m u t e d to l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t or exile. N e w b i t t e r n e s s is e n g e n d e r e d b y e a c h r e j e c t i o n of w o r l d C o m m u n i s t a p p e a l s f o r c l e m e n c y — e s p e c i a l l y in t h e U S S R w h o s e a b s o l u t e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s to h e l p d o o m e d c o m r a d e s in v i v i d l y p o i n t e d o u t in t h e s e i n c i d e n t s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 495] === 48 7 the the military) to u s e Indonesian debt Such Indonesia's burden would ease long run would foreign aid assistance. incident to R u s s i a. argued, th e th e certainly hurt It w a s clear an e x c u s e a unilateral for to c a n c e l act, t he p r e s e n t, the n a t i o n ' s that he h ad but search for future Russian in m i n d. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 496] === CHAPTER VIII NEW ORDER ECONOMICS AND THE UNITED STATES has bee n noted, Indonesia durin g March, a shambles. During had experienced capita War when income the stood 1966, years almost no the N e w O r d e r Food production w ith popu l a t i o n growth, economic but export earnings dropped because effects were almost felt and 19 65. With all in t h e Dutch nationals were than before failed Indonesia's tin indu s t r y w h i c h out following crippled by materials and lack of twelve agricultural and The m o s t m a r k e d suffered when the facturing was caused World to k e e p p a c e regressed. takeover of m i n i n g e n t erpr ises capacity, per the e x c e p t i o n of petroleum, government's plant country of d e c l i n i n g p r o d u c t i o n sectors forced the and real actually declined by 1954 production development level to p o w e r economy was independence not only had percent between falling world prices. the n a t i o n ' s since at a lower came Sukarno 195 7. Manu i n c r e a s i n g u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t of largely by spare parts. th e shortage Production raw also was R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 497] === 489 hampered by inadequate maintenance i n s u f f i c i e n t e l ectric power, managers badly, and workers. as d i d its economy economic inflation. During areas a perpetual th e and others. to p e t t y result was available. crime chaos. a n d p r e s s i n g of soared the astronomic 2,500 percent. saw few revenues evasion behind in t h e and m o r e p a p e r bills. was the d e v e l o p m e n t of for gover n m e n t employees, or e x t o r t i o n of The jobs, their regular collected cities expenditures. Many held multiple a week the e x p e r i e n c e d President's revenues an d "I n d o n e s i a n i z e " years system which existence two last spiral transportation, the g a l l o p i n g and wides p r e a d a few hours resorted The tax inflationary military of m u c h deteriorated Sukarno was to p r i n t m o r e hand-to-mouth only the l a g of expedient was loss ills u n d e r cost-of-living inefficient in rural the competent roads decision the m o s t d a n g e r o u s Indonesia's the inter-island equipment, Indonesia's which had been Undoubtedly tenure capital shortages The g o v e r n m e n t ' s resulted foreign manpower M o s t of railroads, port facilities. the and insured Th e fiscal On e result a scrambling, the spending employment; others Chinese businessmen. transportation and distribution R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 498] === 490 systems bogged paralyzed, The down, government and b u siness es activities operated were a ll but haphazardly. Road Back Backed by Suharto's confidence t h e g r o u p of p r o f e s s i o n a l economists Indonesia's stabilization effort the p r o b l e m inflation made inflation. the efforts impose The 1966, end of had t he y e a r been but not these consumer goods reforms to b e not off their the discipline attack root cause almost immediate international stabilization was some remained acutely as n o t e d they s t a b i l i z a t i o n program, i n i t i a t e d business and "promising there was of d o m e s t i c ample impact. market value and B y th e the imported rupiah a substantial prices. depression but The the cost supplies items, while th e A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y, closely following developments, seemed had the was fiscal strengthened significantly were spearheaded focussed Diagnosing New Order complete scarcer, who severely u nbalanced g overnment budget, C h a p t e r V. October, and MPRS directives, stabilization which effort start."1 1Indonesian Economic Summary — Forth Quarter, 1966, E m b a s s y, D j a k a r t a, F e b r u a r y 16, 1967, p. 3. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 499] === 491 This promise continued through much of New Order government demonstrated ahead with and r e s t r a i n i n g were the r a i s e d sharply, of b a l a n c i n g issuance industrial stopped, an e f f o r t w a s m a d e employment, and tax projects of b a n k was collections were by fifty percent (to k e e p u p w i t h percent the austerity measures, business sector. business and professional pressure and almost "Along with better known all s t a t e - Although of g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s inflation) and a twenty - f i v e however, there was stagnation impatient, elites began to g e t a truly r e l a t i v e l y small. continued to p u t in t he Indonesian increasing the e c o n o m y m o v i n g. cabinet ministers, economists who are u n d e r fiscal Import duties improved. Although not unduly the g o v e r n m e n t of p r o f e s s i o n a l credits. ration prevented the d e f i c i t w a s in u n e m p l o y m e n t program salaries their rice increase classical to h a l t e x p a n s i o n of g o v e r n m e n t increasing b a lanced budget, in p u s h i n g s h a r ply curtailed or the n e c e s s i t y of increase the th e g o v e r n m e n t b u d g e t c o n s t r u c t i o n of financed r e s u l t of determination an a u s t e r i t y p r o g r a m b u i l t o n and m o n e t a r y me a s u r e s 196 7 as fathered c l o s e s c r u t i n y...," the s m a l l the c u r r e n t team austerity reported American R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 500] === 492 Embassy officials. zation received confidence threatened steady setback. improve price in th e past market to k e e p siderably the for stabili September, brought crisis the p r i c e Although After remaining it was began rising a normal committed rice food to k e e p i n g is a b o u t 40 purchases. rice down, a long dry summer had stocks and this w a s concluded with however, regaining "injected" the price reduced food situation occurred which rice since Indonesian's the g o v e r n m e n t h a d were program. stable economic plans inflationary the g o v e r n m e n t w a s average agreement however, Indonesians a rice 1967. index relatively percent the the e n t i r e and August, upswing, 1968, and in m o n e y, in September, seasonal rice and early to d e s t r o y in J u l y sharply 1967 a severe was b e ginning the the o u t l o o k a p p e a r e d good. In l a t e their Nevertheless, th e United allowed government a temporary halt to t h e p r i c e now While i n t o th e con impossible. States injections in m i d which increases. Indonesian Economic Trends and Their Implications for the U n i t e d S t a t e s, A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y, D j a k a r t a, S e p t e m b e r 29, 1967, ( M i m e o g r a p h e d ) p. 6. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 501] === 493 By November, rice panic was th e Spring, had rice b egan rise. however, in f u l l rice the e f f e c t h a d wo r n swing. reached to h o a r d From 35 rupiahs the N e w O r d e r regime began the U n i t e d situation. tion, Although American domestic and States rice a world 200,000 they sensed acreage, shortage tons demands of rice who a further price to be b e l a b o r e d b y rice comply. for rice made to e a s e the u r g e n c y o f could not Some an u r g e n t r e q u e s t w a s for officials and a liter by November. it s p e c u l a t i n g o n student street demonstrations, 12 r u p i a h s off the th e situa Limitations from South Vietnam stocks which had increased prices combined to p r e v e n t a stop-gap measure, signed two agreements metric tons of b u l g a r, simulates "t h i s rice. foodstuff immediate the U n i t e d in N o v e m b e r for response. States and Indonesia t h e s h i p m e n t of 25,000 a processed wheat product which Although Malik will be optimistically predicted acceptable the that Indonesian C a r l R o w a n h a s q u o t e d s o m e u n n a m e d U. S. o f f i c i a l s as a r g u i n g t h a t S e n a t o r A l l e n E l l e n d e r, C h a i r m a n o f th e S e n a t e A g r i c u l t u r e Committee, h a d set D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e p o l i c i e s, h o l d i n g b a c k r i c e p r o d u c t i o n i n o r d e r n o t to h a v e surpluses w h i c h m i g h t depress prices and require storage. W h e n t h e c r i s i s came, the U. S. s i m p l y w a s n o t in a p o s i t i o n to r e s p o n d. T h e E v e n i n g S t a r o f W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., N o v e m b e r 15, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 502] === 494 people," it soon b e ca me fit o n l y for in p l a c e animals. part middlemen who late a liter. other student marches Parliament economic the often were to th e soared sold poorest elements. 80 r u p i a h s and f o r e i g n exchange, and a n e r v o u s market. editorials and voices reform had been excessive emphasis It w a s on growth the s e v e r e s t and even t e s t of response the crisis the r e f o r m g o a l s. scarce stabilization program's for more from other its had some reforms. government's using rice and fiscal resulted. commitment ration shortages that they called a cash basis prices, contended if b u d g e t d e f i c i t s t he N e w O r d e r in D j a k a r t a to g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s the p r o d u c t continued, on m o n e t a r y unsuccessful; firm rice cons u m e r goods, a result its their then pe d d l e d Some The Supplies given 19 6 7 t h e p r i c e skyrocketed emphasis widely ridiculed countries It i m p o r t e d at h i g h foreign exchange demonstrated rice commercial earnings, and Press Release, D j a k a r t a, S e p t e m b e r 6, United 1968. States Information Service, S t u d e n t d e m a n d s i n c l u d e d c a l l s for the r e s i g n a t i o n of th e F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r a n d G o v e r n o r o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank, a n d e v e n t h e r e t u r n co th e c l a s s r o o m o f P r e s i d e n t S u h a r t o ' s professorial economists. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 503] === 495 concluded United another States the m a r k e t PL-480 transaction in February, as n e e d e d. 1968. Further, speculators and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of impeding rice markets mination the illegal and to s t o p Central by placing road the amounts the injected Suharto into condemned imposed by Army elements stocks. showed foreign also visi t e d the g o v e r n m e n t ' s spiral. the r u p i a h rice w i t h was General inflationary Eank defended large Rice tolls in o t h e r w a y s for the deter D u r i n g January, against further erosion exchange into t he m o n e y market. But No m o v e s there there was were any confidence made compromise to r e c e n t r a l i z e indication that government pressed ahead balanced budget 1968 arrival the economy, institutions. in P a r l i a m e n t the p r i c e o f the m a r k e t s for Instead, the lost in a d v i c e the adoption of and a l i b e r a l i z e d bank i n g t h e n a t i o n ’s c o m m o d i t y and nor was leadership had the W e s t e r n - t r a i n e d e c o n o m i s t s financial re-stabilized, the economic program. the N e w O r d e r from international late F e b r u a r y law. and m o n e y market had rice had decreased with t he n e w c r o p. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 504] === 496 Although inflation 65 the s t o r m w a s w e a t h e r e d, rate h a d percent was cut The a 635 p e r c e n t including When 1967 p e r f o rmance index increase it h a d been i n f l a t i o n rat e. compared seemed for Djakarta 1966, when Budgetary accounts government deficit; the r i c e p u r c h a s e s, th e was government responsible against for 70 p e r c e n t 1966. the p e c u l i a r In a d d i t i o n an u n u s u a l Christmas the th e rice shortage have emphasized circumstances contributing factors de m a n d for rice late which caused a l r e a d y no te d, there 1967 because Lebaran, important Moslem holiday, season feasting. mismanagement by supervises analyses combination of Indonesia's most the almost twice targeted. 35 p e r c e n t of m o n e t a r y e x p a n s i o n Post-crisis was the consumer price a r e l a t i v e l y small spending, about however, to o n e - s i x t h o f w h a t registered showed to 125 p e r c e n t, limit which had been w i t h p a s t years, success. soared th e n a t i o n ' s coincided with U n d o u b t e d l y too, there was the A r m y - o p e r a t e d L o g i s t i c s D e p a r t m e n t w h i c h procurement a nd d i s t r i b u t i o n of rice, an d p r o b a b l y R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 505] === 49 7 some speculation by high military officials. diplomats generally believe one-time event which with introduction the Indonesia. additional future rice The with subsidies crisis to r e c u r, "miracle however, economy to h a v e b e e n particularly rice" has strains pushed in t h e n a m e Principal among for kerosene, into through of p r e v e n t i n g them have been gasoline, cuts electricity fares. The the of n e w in t h e shortages. in g o v e r n m e n t and b us is u n l i k e l y government, reforms the rice American year 1968 m i g h t be New Order moved from its painful rehabilitation. characterized concentration adjustments In D e c e m b e r, for in w h i c h on stabilization, the public, 1967, as o n e General the j o b of Suharto had S t u d e n t l e a d e r s to w h o m the a u t h o r s p o k e g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d in m i l i t a r y g u i l t for the crisis. They have recog n i z e d t h a t their d e m o n s t r a t i o n s d e m a n d i n g t h a t p r i c e s be l o w e r e d w e r e u n r e a l i s t i c in t h e l i g h t o f the s i t u a t i o n, b u t i n s i s t that the culp r i t s were A r m y speculators. S e e P r e s i d e n t S u h a r t o ' s A p r i l 24, 1968, s p e e c h o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f the g o v e r n m e n t ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t o f i n c r e a s e s in o i l a n d g a s o l e n e p r i c e s. It w a s S u h a r t o ' s f i r s t a d d r e s s to t h e p e o p l e s i n c e h i s a p p o i n t m e n t as P r e s i d e n t and h e e l a b o r a t e d o n the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c s i t uation. Focus on I n d o n e s i a, E m b a s s y o f I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., 1:3 (July, 196 8) pp. 8 - 1 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 506] === 498 issued a warning that final hope the the coming year m i g h t be limit of the p e o p l e ' s "the y e a r patience, w h i c h has, indeed, been nearly exhausted." technical expertise dropped five g e n e r a l s th e It a l s o d r o p p e d criticism "bunglers" Ministry, t he M i n i s t r y of the Communications Djojohadikusomo were who among those was the Frans had in J u n e civilian come u nder Seda from cabinet -- which appointed w a s Dr. the Moslem opposition, and Maritime Affairs. the Among soon became Sumitro i m p o r t a n t p o s t of of t h e p r o f e s s o r i a l economists recei v i n g posts. 1968 w o r e it became clearer stabilization policies were bearing New Order civilians who Cabinet — Several to b r i n g m o r e them with five a n d s h i f t e d Dr. th e D e v e l o p m e n t trade minister. three an e f f o r t the where he had d r awn eight replacements known cabinet, and repl a c e d experts. Finance Djakarta Domestic translation.) Service, that fruit. December t he N e w O r d e r Prices 13, steadied 1967. (FB I S S u m i t r o 1s a p p o i n t m e n t w a s a c o n t r o v e r s i a l o n e s i n c e h e h a d b e e n a l e a d e r o f t h e P R R I r e v o l t, a n d w a s f o r c e d i nt o e x i l e f o r s i x y e a r s to e s c a p e p u n i s h m e n t. A t the same time he r e t a i n e d t h e r e p u t a t i o n as a " m i r a c l e - w o r k i n g " o f f i c i a l a n d h i s i n c l u s i o n in t h e c a b i n e t a s s i s t e d in r e s t o r i n g c o n f i d e n c e in th e g o v e r n m e n t, s h a k e n b y th e r i c e c r i s i s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 507] === 499 generally a result and the c o s t of a bumper over target) level for purchases dropped spring harvest that the government for k i l o g r a m of rice was fertilizer. There earnings. rice equal was Imports, the were $914 million, exports. The inflation rate was commodities, slightly. For pendence it had figure than only 1968 which the f irst a million decreeing fifteen percent kept 85 and the p r i c e time rice, since a balanced budget, optimistically an d Indonesian p e r c e n t of index of nine actually declined the country's although about end, Indonesia's inde at a h i g h e r th e n a t i o n ' s planners economic President Suharto had unveiled a five-year "Repelita" Indonesian — agriculturally th e self-sufficient development.'*'^ ■^General p la n m a y be 196 7. By the year's industrial that one in e x p o r t $67 m i l l i o n b e l o w includes ton s one kilogram increase a minimum price the p r i c e basic fixed a ten p e r c e n t however, a month during (half commodity, estimated percent so s u b s t a n t i a l l y found and lay O u t of Suharto's in The designed talking "take-off" plan — to m a k e and called th e country the g r o u n d w o r k for billion development p r e s entation of Basic Pattern were the the five-year National R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 508] === 500 program f or the h a l f - d e c a d e, to b e spent on production tons the 1974, aim agriculture a fifty percent as b y e x p a n d i n g In th e sector, industries which save support industries with ratio, industries promoting primary chemicals, light textiles, industries, Indonesian attention a high to b e pulp, paper, metals and a 90 p e r c e n t increase. rather labor regional given to printing, during The pla n given particular agricultural importing, than imported capital development. fertilizer, light machines. industrial production This currency by require domestic Th us, th e foreign materials, and 1968. cultivation. that would otherwise industries which process 15.4 million intensification the p l a n has industries which $800 m i l l i o n In r i c e increase over sector p roducing goods production acreage under industrial irrigation. agricultural emphasis and an a n n u a l accomplished through well almost one-third cement, pharmaceuticals, The target for the n e x t five years also h a s similar ambitious G eneral P r o g r a m and the F i v e - Y e a r D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m, E m b a s s y o f I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., J u n e 27, 1968, a n d T e x t of S u h a r t o s p e e c h to P a r l i a m e n t, J a n u a r y 14, 1969, R a d i o D j a k a r t a. "Repelita" stands for Rentjana Pembanguna Li m a Tahun which t r a n s l a t e s as " f i v e - y e a r d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n. " R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 509] === 501 goals f o r r o a d repair, vocational cantly, improvements training for defense the e x p a n s i o n Indonesian s p e n d i n g is to be Low numerous econo mic comeback. reforms occasions. signifi 2.6 p e r c e n t of State Suharto has taken up responsible fashion active in a s s i s t i n g It i n d i c a t e d strong support and P r e s i d e n t Suharto's l e a d e r s h i p on S e c r e t a r y of country's to o n l y Very Profile The U n ited States has been for New Order labor. and b u d g e t. 11 The U. S. R o l e: Indonesia's in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a statement to C o n g r e s s, Rusk pointedly noted that the r e i n s 12 the instance, "President l e a d e r s h i p in f i r m a n d d e s e r v e s m u c h of steady recovery...." fo r and c r e d i t for his Indonesian audience, In p r e s e n t i n g th e p l a n to the I n d o n e s i a n P a r l i a m e n t, P r e s i d e n t S u h a r t o said: "In t h e n e x t f i v e y e a r s d e f e n s e s e c u r i t y d e v e l o p m e n t w i l l b e r e s t r i c t e d to b a s i c n e e d s, c o n s o l i d a t i o n a n d s t a b i l i z a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s, i m p r o v e m e n t o f A B R I 's d y n a m i s m a n d i m p r o v e m e n t in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of civic operations." I b i d. Of total g o v e r n m e n t spending, h o w e v e r, d e f e n s e w i l l a c c o u n t f o r 25 p e r c e n t r o u g h l y, w h i c h is, e v e n so, a r e d u c t i o n f r o m p a s t l e v e l s. 12 May S t a t e m e n t b e f o r e the H o u s e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e, 1968, S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t R e l e a s e ( M i m e o g r a p h e d ) p. 13. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 510] === 502 Ambassador w h e n he Green was strongly on the side the N e w Order said: W e h a v e a l s o a d m i r e d the r e s o l u t e p e r f o r m a n c e o f y o u r g o v e r n m e n t, u n d e r the a b l e l e a d e r s h i p o f G e n e r a l S u h a r t o, in m o v i n g a h e a d w i t h a r e a l i s t i c s t a b i l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m as w e l l as w i t h o t h e r economic measures, wisely directed toward improving c o n d i t i o n s o f l i f e f o r the p e o p l e of t h i s c o u n t r y. 13 Although for such statements the N e w O r d e r fro m A m e r i c a n frequent, the U n i t e d S t a t e s restrained posture which waning d a y s of t h e N e w Order. warmer climate into h i g h l y improve officials regime the m e t h o d of a p o l i c y of policy Green's come "lo w p r o f i l e " d e v e l o p e d by the Embas s y ' s relations, of h o w can Based "relaxed diplomacy" stance. political in the blossomed the U. S. to b e k n o w n the the n e c e s s i t y has, in d e v e l o p i n g nations. operation has approach" more the and the w a x i n g of sophisticated prototype it s p e r f o r m a n c e and support have become largely retained Indonesian-American originally on Ambassador humble encouragement characterized Sukarno What began has concepts, "America's It h a s b e e n and economics staffs 13 Q u o t e d in a r a d i o a n d t e l e v i s i o n a d d r e s s to the I n d o n e s i a n p e o p l e on U.S. I n d e p e n d e n c e Day. The Djakarta T i m e s, J u l y 5, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 511] === 503 into a concrete its goal program of to f o s t e r intruding American causing sians one political about — have and present 14 and Indonesia the testing ground, knowledge and approval success not hide their optimism that something new w h i c h m i g h t well Djakarta, frictionconvince social with, policy, their and convinced scientists have course, the Although not the full yet officials almost evangelical the consciously made responsible is b e i n g d o n e b y be e m u l a t e d Indone economic modernization which of W a s h i n g t o n. this the ' A m e r i c a n i z a t i o n, ‘" s aid mission personnel claiming into Conversant with — contributed by American for w h i c h has not necessarily mean certainly not officer. decade,^ 14 ideas trying does ideas on political been and are 'modernization' 'Westernization' (and inaction) Indonesian development without personnel situations. that action beliefs Indonesia elsewhere. Paul Gardner, P o l i t i c a l Officer, I n t e r v i e w, S e p t e m b e r 10, 1968. Embassy, 15 Embassy personnel seem particularly familiar with t h e S t u d i e s in P o l i t i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t s p o n s o r e d b y t h e C o m m i t t e e on C o m p a r a t i v e P o l i t i c s of the Soc i a l S c i e n c e R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l u n d e r a g r a n t f r o m t h e F o r d F o u n d a t i o n in 1960-1963. A n o t h e r a p p a r e n t l y w e l l - k n o w n w o r k is L u c i a n W. P y e 's P o l i t i c s, P e r s o n a l i t y a n d N a t i o n - B u i l d i n g: Burma's Search for Identity. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I. T. Press, 1962). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 512] === 504 The these: should be ment basic far given advice tenets the "low p r o f i l e " approach American as p o s s i b l e, through multilateral should with American also counsel come aid assistance simple program without a gaudy proliferation or personnel. aid should be objective strengthening "modernizers" (5) A i d sense should provided Now sources minimum. be k e p t those a way the p a r t of review each a decent, commitments given with government in s u c h should the h a n d s Indonesia's responsibility administering greater within (2) D e v e l o p informal (3) A m e r i c a n b i l a t e r a l All Indonesia channels. from multilateral being kept are the conscious identified and society. to m a x i m i z e those nationals these points t he detail. Multilateral Aid The United a multilateral sense, this marks States has framework continued for c o n t i n u i t y with, Kennedy Administration attempt cut short, as w e have stress Indonesian the n e c e s s i t y aid. and a triumph to e s t a b l i s h consortium of developed nations attempt its for, t he an i n t e r n a t i o n a l aid Indonesia — seen, Sukarno's persistence Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 513] === 505 adventurous foreign policies. Like its p r e d e c e s s o r, Johnson Administration emphasized that essential m u s t be p r o v i d e d the o u t s i d e a stable from and u s e f u l nation proved a t th e A m s t e r d a m successful. credits needs nations. a favorable noted, Netherlands, Japan together held zation conditional for $32 5 pledged accounted that it r e q u ir e d at S c h e v e n i n g e n, for final third. European 16 the W e s t e r n d o n o r n a t i o n s 1967, in assistance and rehabilitation program. declared $65 m i l l i o n from other donor t hird a n d the the 1967, foreign exchange another in N o v e m b e r, million to b e c o m e a consortium g r a n t of Indonesia's response for in F e b r u a r y, a subsequent meeting further meeting in A m s t e r d a m request Indonesia was initiatives conference The U.S. nations and to m e e t o n e - t h i r d o f provoked assistance in S o u t h e a s t Asia. American persistence approach the consider for its $250 m i l l i o n for Indonesia's 1968 The New Order was stabili government stabilization 16 I m m e d i a t e p l e d g e s o f h e l p w e r e r e c e i v e d f r o m the F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y ($25 m i l l i o n ), t h e N e t h e r l a n d s ($15 m i l l i o n ) a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n ( $ 1. 4 m i l l i o n ). This was m o n e y to h e l p I n d o n e s i a o v e r c o m e i t s f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e g a p a n d w a s i n a d d i t i o n to p r o g r a m s o f t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e b y p a r t i c i pating countries. In a d d i t i o n, o t h e r c o u n t r i e s s a i d t h e y w o u l d soon contribute. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 514] === 506 support a n d $75 m i l l i o n f o r p r o j e c t a favorable the W o r l d senting make assessment of Bank, the IGGI amounts which use of in t he separately pledged those agreed assistance. figures by accept Indonesia needed the them light IMF a n d as r e p r e and could effectively c o m i n g year. Once its to p r o v i d e intention In the again the Uni t e d States o n e - t h i r d of the amount on th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g the o t h e r d o n o r s w o u l d m e e t the remaining requirements, the e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e the Indonesian government quarter 1968, and continued good. Indonesia had received total e nd of the first aid commitments $121 m i l l i o n. 1 ^ Once again, difficult. taken flew however, In A p r i l, 1968, t h e o a t h of o f f i c e to J a p a n to o b t a i n apparently under aid pledge virtually just twelve P r e s i d e n t of that the hours to b e after he h ad Indonesia, impression Th e J a p a n e s e it c o u l d n o t proved Suharto aid c o m m i t m e n t f r o m his A s i a n roughly o ne-third or assured. position the J a p a n e s e a solid neighbors, th e By the t h a t the J a p a n e s e $10 0 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s w a s government, commit itself however, over took and above 17 T h e s e c o m p r i s e d ai d c o m m i t m e n t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ($6 0 m i l l i o n ), the N e t h e r l a n d s ( $ 2 6. 2 m i l l i o n ), G e r m a n y (19.4 m i l l i o n ), A u s t r a l i a ($14.2 m i l l i o n ) and the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ($1. 2 m i l l i o n ). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 515] === 507 a request for had made of the $60 m i l l i o n the Diet. Indonesian trade disturbed by the state visits. regime if m o r e United States in J u n e, lent of 1969, the 1968, to s y m b o l i z e W a r n e d of announced that as p a r t of t h e i r aid, stay, r e c o v e r y of the close response, in a i d 1969 visit by ties Suharto, refused to s i g n th e u s u a l for practice the Suharto and p r e s s u r e d b y they would fiscal state consequences a more generous it a l r e a d y Indonesia, not forthcoming 100 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s economic dire t he and agreement aid which five-day a t t h e e n d of h i s aid were for the linking Japan l a c k of a joint communique Indonesian Although leader was and friendship 18 t he the J a p a n e s e extend the equiva Indonesia by March, responsibilities archipelago. The aid assist included 18 S e e the N e w Y o r k T i m e s o f A p r i l 4 b y T o m B u c k l e y in Djakarta. N o t l o n g b e f o r e t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t b y t he J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e R u s k, i n an e x c l u s i v e i n t e r v i e w for Bungei S h u m j u of Tokyo, s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e d A m e r i c a ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s o f J a p a n e s e h e l p to l e s s d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s. "... I t is r i g h t t h a t p r o s p e r o u s n a t i o n s s h o u l d h e l p t h e i r p o o r e r n e i g h b o r s b u i l d a b e t t e r l i f e for their p e o p l e, " R u s k said. N o t i n g J a p a n e s e e f f o r t s a t a i d i n g I n d o n e s i a, the S e c r e t a r y of State e x p r e s s e d c o n f i d e n c e of "even g r e a t e r m e a s u r e of c o o p e r a t i o n " b e t w e e n t h e t w o n a t i o n s in t h e f u t u r e. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e P r e s s R e l e a s e, M a y 28, 1968. D u r i n g his J u n e, 1968, v i s i t to A s i a, W o r l d B a n k P r e s i d e n t R o b e r t S. M c N a m a r a a l s o p r e s s e d the J a p a n e s e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r c o n t r i bution Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 516] === 508 an e s t i m a t e d $80 m i l l i o n m i l l i o n w o r t h of The the full Japanese contribution made to r a i s e its o r i g i n a l $350 million, a step made economic damage extended in t h e f o r m of e m e r g e n c y aid given under and grains, ment loan for Indonesia's hearing statements IGGI d e l e g a t e s $20 rice, cotton 1968, food for concluded Indonesia had aid from necessary by the assistance shipments. all for American in P L - 4 8 0 commodities with the International Develop of m a n u f a c t u r e d goods. the d o n o r the pledge and b u l g a r wheat, nations m e t once ai d r e q u i r e m e n t s from it possible it r e p r e s e n t e d formula was the p u r c h a s e discuss for IGG I crisis; a $25 m i l l i o n A g e n c y In O c t o b e r, pects th e r i c e the mainly e x c e p t i o n of and industrial goods. IGGI e v e n t u a l l y $325 m i l l i o n in m a n u f a c t u r e d p r o d u c t s IMF for 196 9. and World 19 Bank representatives, improved markedly (in t h e w a k e th e r i c e pledges to c o n t i n u e its r a t i o n a l crisis) After that economic developments meeting again since and financial and p ros the A p r i l that Indonesia's policies would 19 The m e e ting was preceded by a Paris conference on I n d o n e s i a n d e b t s f a l l i n g d ue in 1969. A decision was made to r e s c h e d u l e $ 70 m i l l i o n of t h e m to b e p a i d d u r i n g the p e r i o d of 19 73 to 1980. P a r t i c i p a t i n g w e r e the I G G I n a t i o n s, th e IMF, th e W o r l d B a n k a n d the O E C D. Switzerland attended an o b s e r v e r. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 517] === 509 allow acceleration of reh a b i l i t a t i o n Accordingly, the donor estimate 1969 food, organization requirements raw materials and other the I MF and W o r l d Ban k, the sustain a b o u t the same level Once again the U n i t e d to m a t c h o n e — t h i r d th e Representatives that there was dure foreign should be them marked into its estimating financing, the extended. success 196 9 its w i l l i n g n e s s meeting the agreed IGGI p r o c e aggregated need preferred means under Indonesia 20 1968, for of A m e r i c a n the which framework. assistance the U.S. to p u t Although desired for of d e t e r m i n i n g multilateral efforts Supported admission from donor nations, sceptical amount. Indonesia's th e indicated substitute imports products. imports October, and forms This international operations terms initially t he programs. Indonesian amount would enable States the the $500 m i l l i o n for required no p r a c t i c a l a w a y of collectively accepted commercial 196 8. and d e v e l o p m e n t not some approach, Indonesian aid as f o r m a l i z e d the IGGI thus 20 A c c o r d i n g t o the e s t i m a t e s o f the I M F a n d W o r l d Bank, d i s b u r s e m e n t s o f a i d i n 1 9 6 9 w o u l d o n l y b e 10 to 15 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n 1 9 6 8 if t h e t o t a l a m o u n t r e q u e s t e d w a s f u l l y committed. I n d o n e s i a n N e w s a n d V i e w s, O c t o b e r, 19 6 8, p. 1. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 518] === 510 far has proved aiding Indonesia. conflicts to b e among a workable the th e d o n o r n a t i o n s Minister Netherlands. ment." 21 the tain amount acquire in c h a r g e "But this Prospects meetings, the now it s Multilateral Advice character," a healthy developregularized the the d o n o r s semi-annual latter meeting an d the in o b t a i n i n g the former credits e c o n o m y back on funding come m u ltilateral on the methods have Americans "Ou r set ascer and on rehabilitation program. develo p m e n t p rogram has derailed appears, resolved. dramatic say, Hand-in-hand with multilateral Indonesians of D e v e l o p m e n t A i d f o r the I would ar e f o r progress maintaining are b e i n g a less S p r i n g a nd Fall, to b e m e t b y Indonesia's i m p e r f e c t m e t h o d of With each succeeding meeting, meetings may gradually declared to b e u s e d the tracks tell the N e w O rder advice in g e t t i n g once again. government how Indonesia's the their Rather than to r u n its 21 A d d r e s s of H. E. Mr. B. J. U d i n k, a t t h e o p e n i n g of th e I G G I C o n f e r e n c e, R o t t e r d a m, A p r i l 21, 1 9 6 8. (Mimeo g r a p h e d ) p. 4. T h i s t r e n d m ay, h o w e v e r, b e r e v e r s e d w h e n t h e a m o u n t s r e q u e s t e d f o r I n d o n e s i a i n c r e a s e s u b s t a n t i a l l y, as planned. It m a y b e c o m e p r o g r e s s i v e l y m o r e d i f f i c u l t to r a i s e the r e q u i r e d c r e d i t s. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 519] === 511 affairs and thereby risk tation which such r e l i e d on the Fund and outside help a relationship expert services the W o r l d Bank pressures, th e institutions that c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the the I MF headed by Indonesia Indonesia Later a fiscal Largely a position financial to g i v e advice considerations in e a r l y Kemal Siber, 1967. moved and and thought. Its into consultations initial mission, the Central Bank with bank officials Seda on r e s cuing the Indonesian chaos inherited from the S u k a r n o advisory team was added to t h e m i s s i o n f o r professionals worked such tax closely with administration, government expenditures, regulations has insulated from Indonesian Finance Ministry. irri International Monetary d uty w i t h the areas for and e n c o u r a g e m e n t of Washington, Minister Frans t he the the U.S. international to b e g i n d a i l y economy from implies, best Western economic Turk, opportunities short-run political approval the and Finance sister the came ar e p r e s u m a b l y is f r e e With the m y r i a d customs and r e v i s i o n of Almost without exception the New There six Order officials tax policy, procedures, trade policies reforms regime. control IMF anti-smuggling and tariff initiated by rates. the N e w R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 520] === 512 Order these Backed by Fund's areas have a task force resident mission prepare for influenced by also has of p o s sible IMF revised debt needs and have helped which In a d d i t i o n provided th e financial country's planning for given when came destroy into the when at the financial line warranted the r i c e which IGGI meetings. the Indonesia. a new the e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s elaborated on foreign exchange assistance, it j u d g e d c o n d i t i o n s 1968, have might reasonably expect conferences set forth alternative its e x i s t i n g debt, the e x t e n s i o n in F e b r u a r y, have presented assistance agreement rescheduling assistance schedules, to t e c h n i c a l re-entry and set the f igures Indonesia has the assisted New Order officials advisors e c o n o m i c goals w h i c h the n a t i o n attain, IMF a d v i c e. IMF W a s h i n g t o n h e a d q u a r t e r s, th e d e b t r e - s c h e d u l i n g with donor nations. models been Following on body the IMF h a s and IMF b e g a n credit action. crisis a new to b e The time threatened a l r eady h a d been made. The b anking organization e n tered a stand-by agreement with Indonesia for totalling a twelve-month million which was used situation. line to h e l p Satisfied with credit stabilize Indonesia's the $52 shaky fiscal subsequent economic R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 521] === performance, the Fund Indonesia early s t a n d - b y help. the stabilization ties role, been to e v a l u a t e one. advice the financing. measure its Bank has provided provided tation project, technical a new request for Indonesia from the provided Indonesians it or Because IMF, through a $5 m i l l i o n and assistance its projects. Its has e s s e n t i a l l y i ts e c o n o m y in b r i n g i n g d e v e l o p m e n t other donors could provide Indonesia does not for By the credit for credit yet loans, "soft w i n d o w, " the (IDA). a $2 m i l l i o n activi the N e w O r d e r g o v e r n own stringent requirements aid th e importance. on the m o d e r n i z a t i o n tional De v e l o p m e n t A s s o c iation IDA h a d team from Washington and development, increased The Bank has the p o i n t wh e r e in c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the n e c e s s a r y shifted Bank have assisted inspection to r e h a b i l i t a t i o n ment with expert projects 1969 emphasis has undertaken and it has 22 the W o r l d a dual sent close the Interna irrigation 1968, rehabil to f u n d v a r i o u s Overseeing these ventures and 22 S e e the I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d r e p o r t, I n d o n e s i a Recent E c onomic D e v e l o p m e n t s, prepared b y the Asian D e p a r t m e n t a n d t h e E x c h a n g e a n d T r a d e R e l a t i o n s D e p a r t m e n t, A p r i l 17, 1968. (Mimeographed.) R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 522] === 514 developing new projects professional was jointly staff based agreed by 1968. Just established by developing th e two with the emerged demands effort Bank a unique than we have Thwarted by Indonesia disposal the IDA, it was institution McNamara's the World of D e f e n s e experts, ambassadors the U n i t e d N a t i o n s that and a g r e a t e r i n a b i l i t y of the anywhere the conferred from Indo the IMF, Development and heard, in the w o r l d. " to m a k e with For Indonesia limited resources McNamara, trip out concentration else Bank Bank. had seen "your p r o b l e m applied however, first Secretary and and h o b b l e d b y a visit to b e and r e p r e s e ntatives solution resident mission the f i r s t ever impressed by w h a t he to d e c l a r e a ten-man IBRD d u r i n g banking as p r e s i d e n t o f nations, Obviously the P r e s i d e n t R o b e r t S. M c N a m a r a too economic Asian Development and This th e m i s s i o n w a s f o r m e r U.S. debtor Program. States Indonesian nesia's Bank financing in D j a k a r t a. international country, United days the outside Indonesian Indonesia by World in June, for a loan 23 a t the some personal 23 F o r a m o r e d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f M c N a m a r a ' s v i s i t to I n d o n e s i a see I n d o n e s i a n N e w s a nd V i e w s, E m b a s s y of I n d o nesia, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., J u n e / J u l y, 196 8. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 523] === 515 frustration, has help. financial ment a sign of progress," asserted, ment been unable th e the capital "But the v e r y our the for t he lack officials Bank and the have seen The country. have played funds for donor states foreign increased Rather into returns. nations data interest, New the W o r l d for they being relied on and recommendations. financial institutions to o b t a i n p l e d g e s exchange needs contributions has than b eing resentful its of d e v e l o p - the p o w e r w h i c h coordinating efforts for source representatives international in D j a k a r t a. foreigners statistical Indonesia's Indonesia's Ultimately, immediate their member the o r g a n i z a t i o n s ' have said. involve 24 aware IMF h a v e w i t h part which both Bank's c o m m i t m e n t to a major significant for the amount been heartened by McNamara's are well nations o n l y a small f a c t of and our Bank would become Order by donor concern IBRD p r e s i d e n t has Indonesians despite to m a r s h a l innermost economic and in p r e s s u r i n g not gone unnoticed a b o u t the intrusion sanctums, the New 24 T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s, J a n u a r y 17, 1969. In t h i s a r t i c l e b y M c N a m a r a he e l a b o r a t e s a t s o m e l e n g t h a b o u t the p r o b l e m s of I n d o n e s i a and the d i l e m m a w h i c h a s s i s t i n g it has posed to h i m a n d h i s organization. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 524] === 516 Order gove r n m e n t has expressed pride IBRD h a v e there The little sole Order" national financial psyche has intervention, o r no e v i d e n c e complaint has disinterest seemed sufficient positions international with p r e s u m a b l y might be their motherland. U. S. Bi-lateral th e at t h i s that because 25 ti m e. the " Old to h o l d top-ranking look o u t for people who the interests Aid IGGI assistance such damage this 26 context — and relatively moderate cal Indonesia. charged, financial bodies, and Indonesia does not have training counted on some have to b e The A m e rican bi-lateral outside IMF suffered because of in e c o n o m i c s, nationals with the placed one-of-a-kind resident missions Indonesia's outside that both aid program —. carried on deliberately has in siz e. and food donations Main under been kept components Title are II o f simple techni PL-480. 25 F o l l o w i n g an a r o u n d t h e w o r l d tr i p, S e l i g H a r r i s o n, c o r r e s p o n d e n t f o r th e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, m a d e the a s s e r t i o n to t h e a u t h o r in J u l y, 1968. 26 S e e s p e e c h e s b y Dr. B a r m a w i e A l w i e, p r e s i d e n t of t h e I n d o n e s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t Bank, T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s, F e b r u a r y 9, 1967, a n d F r a n s Sed a, T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s, N o v e m b e r 27, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 525] === 517 The technical fiscal year emphasis assistance 1968 and $6 m i l l i o n here has bee n on the e d u c a t i o n o f 300 budget was 1968) for a significant number either i n the the success rehabilitation program. technical advice, and according to o n e paramount considerations ment active 1968, Also being one in m a n y technical advisors industrial agronomist. The provided a third and "maximum The that (some country technical skills stabilization and education materials, such projects, formulated with the Indonesian involvelarge-scale return 27 there was 1969. Indonesians are All were technical sectors year Indonesian official, agreement, professional the $3 m i l l i o n training," States commodities. I n d o n e s i a of A m e r i c a n been two United in t h e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s. " By joint in fiscal "participant to h e l p s u p p l y m a n a g e r i a l, required roughly the were management limited nature advisors, who had once Indonesian economy. the scene specialist this Only in t h e F a l l and the o t h e r and o t h e r p r o g r a m s 27 S t a t e m e n t o f the H o n. R u t h e r f o r d M. P o a t s, a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r for the Far East, A g e n c y for I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t b e f o r e the H o u s e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s M a y 2, 1 9 6 7 ( M i m e o g r a p h e d ) p. 12. Committee. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 526] === 518 permitted had been a considerably the case for comparable was reputed only in p r e - N e w O r d e r countries to h a v e secretaries. Indonesia or and pr o g r a m s. the w o r l d ' s thirty Americans, and e i g h t smaller American AID mission twenty-two 28 The reached early personnel was required to m o n i t o r e x p a n d i n g pr o g r a m s. agencies and Food in F Y 1 9 6 8 The most important Semarang, corn and v e g e t a b l e workers expanded capital Central oil w e r e labor c e i l i n g of an e s t i m a t e d The 40,000 work, Java. staff was voluntary $6.1 m i l l i o n been to s o m e took nine at D e m a k, American-supplied in c l e a r i n g m u d 44, the f o l l o w i n g y e a r. project has provided which people totalled canal whi c h had been n e glected the D u t c h. 28 somewhat staff members additional programs Food for Work in r e t u r n for irrigation for Work projects, and w e r e near for the 1969 Indonesia mission with professional however, Food donations, is u s u a l smallest AID than 4,000 from since months, needy ancient the d e p a r t u r e benefited a food-shortage, drought-ridden Djakarta, B y Stokes Tolbert, m i s s i o n director, S e p t e m b e r 23, 1968. By comparison, technical Americans Dominican a s s i s t a n c e p r o g r a m alone in T u r k e y in t h e m i s s i o n, a n d a $ 5. 4 m i l l i o n R e p u b l i c, 75 p e o p l e. in a n i n t e r v i e w, a $4.9 m i l l i o n r e q u i r e d 95 p r o g r a m in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 527] === 519 area and has been heralded Encouraged by of M a n p o w e r additional have an o u t s t a n d i n g the D e m a ^ k experiment, submitted proposals projects the resumed bilateral a military following aid, assistance a l a p s e of the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of limited been Indonesian Ministry the A I D m i s s i o n i s l a n d of Java, two the D e f e n s e program years, government had requested military Under the success. for 37 some of w h i c h since been undertaken. In o t h e r 1967 to c i v i c the economy. action support program, trained th e several civic aid (MAP) Department for after the N e w O r d e r a means construction promoting The p r o g r a m h as b e e n and no weapons hundred Indonesia are involved. Indonesian officers at m i l i t a r y have engineering 29 "Th e i m p a c t of t h i s p r o j e c t h a s g i v e n h o p e a n d p r i d e o f a c h i e v e m e n t to al l i n v o l v e d. V i l l a g e r s are e a g e r for e m p l o y m e n t in the a c t i v i t y and in a d d i t i o n v o l u n t a r i l y c o n s t r u c t e d s e c o n d a r y a n d t e r t i a r y c a n a l s b r i n g i n g w a t e r to small land holdings." D a t a sheet, U.S. E m b a s s y, D j a k a r t a, N o v e m b e r 1, 196 7. 30 S e g m e n t s o f the I n d o n e s i a n m i l i t a r y h a v e b e e n p r e s s i n g f o r a r m s aid, h o w e v e r, a n d e v e n S u h a r t o h a s m a d e r e q u e s t s fo r w e a p o n s a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the U.S. According to Brig. Gen. S u d j o n o H u m a r d a n i, the A r m y h a s b e e n i n t e r e s t e d i n r e c e i v i n g b o t h s m a l l a n d h e a v y a r m s f r o m t h e U. S. to replace Russian equipment which has become unusable because o f the I n d o n e s i a n i n a b i l i t y to f i n a n c e s p a r e p a r t s. Inter view, Djakarta, September 17, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 528] === 520 training bases provided era, for dozers been States. trucks, civic armed forces road graders, w i t h U.S. roads assistance for in W e s t and Central The p r o g r a m, one 196 7 o f $2 m i l l i o n, has been sent t he Sukarno bull Among Indonesian and i m p r o v e m e n t Central Java, and emergency lava flows had more and other a modest than doubled by expansion. included, Indonesia. Java, been new equipment, c o a s t of which began scheduled for further combat equipment has been the tractors, repair t he s o u t h disasters. the areas hit by floods, some undertaken by natural and cranes, help were T j i l a tj a p on re p a i r of 1969 parts have construction machinery. action projects the p o r t o f Spare followed by deliveries and special-purpose initial the U n i t e d construction machinery given during and have including however, Since no M A P m i s s i o n 31 31 A c c o r d i n g to p r e s s a c c o u n t s t h e J o h n s o n A d m i n i s t r a tion w as h e s i t a n t about providing even non-c o m b a t aid under M A P a u s p i c e s to I n d o n e s i a. This h e s i t a n c y a p parently arose b e c a u s e of t h e s e n s i t i v i t y t o c r i t i c i s m f r o m t he S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e t h a t m i l i t a r y a i d c o u l d l e a d to e v e r d e e p e r c o m m i t m e n t s, as i t h a d i n V i e t n a m, a n d f r o m a r e l u c t a n c e to e m b a r r a s s t h e N e w O r d e r g o v e r n m e n t b y s e e m i n g to i d e n t i f y i t m i l i t a r i l y w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s. Another m o t i v e m a y h a v e b e e n a b a s i c d i s t a s t e w i t h i n t he S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t for m i l i t a r y forms of assistance. S e e J o h n W. Finney, d i s p a t c h f r o m W ashington, The N e w York T i m e s, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 529] === 521 Perhaps reinstated Although the restoration Indonesia were open libraries place and opposed made center, with no p l a n s Indonesia. re-opening staff. a board on w h i c h "Low p r o f i l e " any o ther USIS the the U S I S h a s Indonesian representation, facilities there an A m e r i c a n proponents unless a si m i l a r basis. t he A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y h a s From time to t i m e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Malik, the w a n i n g d a y s has made however, th e N e w O r d e r g o v e r n m e n t to r e t u r n. a desire cities facility, Indonesian Similarly, to p r e s s and States in m a j o r a bi-national American director, is d o n e again been receptive ended during the U n i t e d t he D j a k a r t a is e q u a l programs which were those w h i c h have n o t been. of USIA programs established as t h e Indonesian government has G uided Democracy, have significant let soundings have the A m e r i c a n on the issue to p e r m i t been unwilling the P e a c e Indonesian officials, made public volunteers statements come back Corps including indicating and have in p r i v a t e w i t h A m b a s s a d o r Green. J a n u a r y 15, 1967. M a r s h a l l Greener d o e s n o t a p p e a r to h a v e s h a r e d this suspicion. D u r i n g a t o u r o f C e n t r a l J a v a in S e p t e m b e r, 1967, h e w a s r e p o r t e d to h a v e s a i d t h a t t h e A r m y ' s c i v i c a c t i o n p r o g r a m w a s " f a r t o o s m a l l " a n d t h a t he w o u l d a s k t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r i n c r e a s e d a i d to I n d o n e s i a to e x p a n d the r o a d work. A n t a r a, S e p t e m b e r 19, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 530] === 522 The A m erican diplomat has anxious to h a v e the Peace from elements who believe "inexpensive" teachers institutions States. The that Foreign Minister contingent made simply insisted the that that Malik such useful a request would please made one, it clear seemed reluctant the U n i t e d the a Peace Corps b u t n o r e q u e s t s h o u l d be the U n i t e d th e p e t i t i o n b e p u t Indonesian educational Indonesia may receive a favor its o w n h a l f - h e a r t e d is n o t is u n d e r p r e s s u r e c o r p s m e n w o u l d be ambassador has that himself Corps back but of E n g l i s h it r e a l l y w a n t s government has Aiding sensed States. in w r i t i n g, to d o — also h a s which the an i n d i c a t i o n o f attitude the P e ace Corps the h e a r t o f the "low p r o f i l e " is s u e. 32 the E c o n o m i s t s Close the d e l i b e r a t e effort by United States policy officials to b u i l d F r o m s o u r c e s at the A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y, D j a k a r t a. M i s s i o n e m p l o y e e s, d e d i c a t e d to t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a d d i t i o n a l A m e r i c a n s in I n d o n e s i a w i l l p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l f r i c t i o n p o i n t s, are n o t f a v o r a b l e to a r e t u r n o f the P e a c e Cor p s, b e l i e v i n g t h a t it w o u l d b e a n e w a n d u n n e c e s s a r y complication. T h e s u g g e s t i o n h a s b e e n m a d e t h a t if I n d o n e s i a r e a l l y n e e d s y o u n g s p e c i a l i s t s, i t m i g h t i n v i t e s o m e o f the P e a c e C o r p s - t y p e e x p e r t s f r o m s o m e 34 n a t i o n s. Under such a m u l t i l a t e r a l s e t - u p, th e U.S. P e a c e C o r p s m i g h t b e c o m e o n e contingent within a larger framework. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 531] === 523 significantly the p r e s t i g e, th e A m e r i c a n - t r a i n e d professors inner has circles t he clear mission. marked the N e w Order, stepped from relative along the w a y support their they have The frequent, friendly the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n and certain key made it p o s s i b l e economic individuals to c o o r d i n a t e reform measures over progress enjoyed and the the their the g e n e r a l s they w e n t the w a y diplomat. "And the the generals clustered without his knowledge determined t h a t the tim e. aided the A m e r i c a n contacts which advised," not get aid until said one A m e r i c a n made without Suharto, system" strength by making and permission "spoils has been the r u l i n g elite. however, around the in p u s h i n g t h r o u g h Indonesia would economists not, group Indonesian economists top leaders b e l i e v e d The p o i n t was Some that small o p p o s i t i o n of more consciously clear from the in a s h o r t informal efforts to i n c r e a s e this the A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y h a v e traditionalist-minded members tried Seen obscurity of g o v e r n m e n t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g At many points and effectiveness Indonesian economists. foremost modernizers within power a fight. w h e t h e r w i t h or is n o t cl e a r, were w h i c h h a d so l o n g R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 532] === 524 characterized Indonesian that reached they had th e p e r p e t r a t o r s which, culty th e one United States Malik. Yusuf military politely made critical instance involved and d i f f i General Mohammad t he A u t u m n Pentagon. a promise $500 m i l l i o n the study the Yusuf told the received Suharto and during officials a breakdown w ith his Indonesian in W a s h i n g t o n and that the D e p a r t a delicate situation, $500 million. t he United States placed Green tried to w o r k out a m e e t i n g of Y u s u f list was it w a s given, however, had pledged the c h e c k l i s t of officials impress representatives m e n t of D e f e n s e Indonesian military Whether because abilities, came 1966 w i t h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Although or over - e a g e r press Ambassador licenses" anguish brought with him communication With little i n n e r - c i r c l e, who commitments. American "hunting to D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e and These men were the N e w O r d e r the fund-raising power. the caus e d no equipment desired by presented meeting seen, retained now State Department. The m o s t Yusuf, w o u l d be the p i n n a c l e and purveyors as w e h a v e for politics the p r o b l e m b y s e t t i n g u p and M a l i k w i t h A s s i s t a n t Secretary Bundy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 533] === 525 Apparently knowing what was avoid who the m e e t i n g made give 33 clear United American Indonesia the opportunities for aid an o b s t a c l e "squeeze s t o r y was Green. Hoping his recall, cut off They spread Nasution the either a n u m b e r of the A c t i n g a rumor change generals President their for the s a w the ambitions and t o l e r a t e d b y the U n i t e d close from attitude or force Suharto conspired the A m e r i c a n A m b a s s a d o r. conspiring with General and were apart from March until c i r c u l a t e d t h a t the Green's that Green was Indonesia. Some generals intend m o n e y, " a customary practice to o v e r t h r o w S u h a r t o t wo m e n tried closeted with Bundy the m o n e y b u t Indonesia which previously had been States. Yusuf States did not provided of A m b a s s a d o r diplomat United a m o u n t of States w o u l d have opposition offing, e ventually was that the any such k i n d Back but in t h e successful July, 1967. in k e e p i n g This period 33 T h i s b e h a v i o r b y Y u s u f h a s l e d s o m e to q u e s t i o n h i s intentions. I t is f e l t t h a t h e m a y h a v e b e l i e v e d t h a t b y a n n o u n c i n g th e g r a n t h e w o u l d p u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o n a h o o k a n d w o u l d h a v e n o o t h e r " f a c e - s a v i n g " r e c o u r s e b u t to c a v e and g i v e the assistance. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 534] === 526 conceded to b e exceeding even Green's the pre- G e s t a p u I n May, appointments, unless most difficult General Alamsjah, refused pledged $200 m i l l i o n appointment upon representative business ment that Green replied forced finally was arrange for the Green able without Suharto, in W a s h i n g t o n. approached arrange After Green reviewed to r e p o r t this treat In e n s u i n g day s, With other could guarantee the full b a c k i n g some weeks an a p p o i n t m e n t any concession. could n o t do if G r e e n executive. refused. that the A m e r i c a n d i p l o m a t appointment chief Suharto would get and w o u l d be of Washington, with assurance that way Suharto Angered, s a i d he w o u l d p e r m i t their meeting. superiors President I n d o n e s i a n of bla c k m a i l, P r e s i d e n t he "good news" Humardani aid. the A m e r i c a n around promising in A m e r i c a n and Suharto's the A c t i n g to h i s figures Green's during see accused the whereupon Alamsjah backed down 34 who handled to l e t G r e e n t he A m e r i c a n A m b a s s a d o r "good news" days. as A m b a s s a d o r, During the e v e n t s the A m b a s s a d o r t h r o u g h Gen. Sujono a four hour meeting the p a s t w e e k s and 34 These details and those w h i c h fo l l o w were obtained i n t e r v i e w s w i t h U.S. and I n d o n e s i a n o f f i c i a l s, b o t h in Dj a k a r t a and Washington. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 535] === 527 made it clear that the United States would not give aid under the conditions which the "palace guard" had sought to impose. The two men agreed that such approaches would be at an end and the problem did not reoccur. American officials in Djakarta have seen the U.S. refusal to deal in time-honored ways with the Indonesian power elite as a kind of economic reform imposed from without. By its unwillingness to tolerate traditional "squeeze money" practices, the American Embassy helped to break the power of the profiteering generals around Suharto. At the same time, the outcome tended to strengthen the hand of the appropriate ministers and their professional economists since the palace guard had tended to be a substitute for the cabinet. The total impact has been seen by some Americans as profoundly affecting the course of Indonesia's economic policies and progress, the New Order. and as striking a blow for the modernists in 35 35 John Montgomery has noted that while foreign aid must be offered with equal respect for the requirements of economic development and the "politics of sovereignty," economic advance does not necessarily produce a decent political order and this justifies a strong conscious support by the United States for the "forces for decency and orderly R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 536] === 528 Responsibility to the Indonesians Through experience and the findings of social scientists, the United States has become painfully aware that many former colonial peoples subconsciously seek for foreign props as an escape from responsibility and the need to stand on their own feet — ultra-nationalistic rhetoric. tion to this phenomenon. even while indulging in Indonesia has been no excep Under such conditions foreign aid can be a crutch which in reality prevents a nation from walking on its own. In the past, U.S. aid projects too often have been initiated by Americans, financed by America, and carried out by Americans. Although foreign governments have permitted the programs, there was no genuine national commitment to them. As a result, when the Americans leave all too often the completed project falls into disuse or disrepair. The U.S. mission in Indonesia has attempted to avoid that pitfall by continuing to remind the New Order government that the burden of economic development rests on its shoulders progress at work in any developing society." The Politics of Foreign A i d: American Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962) p. 195. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 537] === 529 alone. "We came to learn that the best results were achieved when...the Indonesian government had already drawn up and launched a good program or project," said Ambassador Green. 36 The responsibility for initiating projects has remained with the Indonesians themselves. While it has access to advice from expert sources like the World Bank and the IMF, the Indonesian government alone has the power to accept or reject the counsel and must live with the conse quences of its decision. Similarly, the American mission has quietly ignored some Congressional stipulations that require Americans to monitor the distribution of aid down to the regional level. The Ambassador and his staff has believed that it is an Indonesian responsibility to assure than American assistance is not diluted through corruption. It was announced Embassy policy that if honest distribution was not carried out, the aid being wasted would be cancelled. As a result, it was not until 1968, when U.S. aid to Indonesia amounted to more than $150 million, that the first auditor was 36 Quoted by Cary A. Aminoff, "Restraint in Resuming U.S. Aid to Indonesia," The New Republic (February 11, 1967) p. 13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 538] === 530 assigned to the AID mission in Djakarta. 37 While it is too early to assess the success of this philosophy, it must be pointed out that, as yet, there have been no scandals concerning U.S. aid in Indonesia. By emphasizing the responsibility of the Indonesians in making the best use of aid, the U.S. reaps double divi dends. First, it respects Indonesian sensibilities and prevents charges that the New Order is a tool of American "imperialists." warned that: Speaking of U.S. assistance, Suharto has "The most important thing to remember is not to push the Indonesians to think like the Americans or for them to impose their wishes on us simply because of U.S. aid." The low profile policy avoids that problem, while building up the Indonesians' own self-esteem over their ability to take responsibility for their country's future welfare and progress. As a result there have been encouraging signs that the Indonesians recognize that their own self-help efforts are central to economic development and foreign aid 37 According to Stokes Tolbert, AID mission director, the lack of an auditor initially had made the U.S. program "vulnerable" to corruption and misappropriation. The presence of an accountant has made it possible to monitor the use of aid more thoroughly. Interview, Djakarta. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 539] === 531 is only auxiliary support. Without panic, Indonesian officials have noted the worldwide reductions in foreign aid and have described the effects of this trend as only peripherally relevant to the success or failure of their development plans. Of this new sense of self-reliance, Vice President Humphrey commented: ...We don't want it to appear that what happened here is because we made it happen. We haven't. happened because they made it happen, because the leaders of Indonesia wanted a new day.3® "Low Profile" Critics The "low profile" approach to Indonesia has not been without its critics. To some, particularly those who have longtime associations with Indonesians, the American policy appeared to be dealing niggardly with a nation which had on its own eliminated a Communist threat and now seemed 38 Quoted by Carolyn K. Colwell, Indonesia: Political and Economic Developments, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, October 1, 1968). Mimeographed, p. 45. Appropos to this discussion was a statement by Indonesia's Information Minister Budiardjo, in answer to a question about cuts in the American aid budget. The minister emphasized that in carrying out their development program Indonesians must not depend too much on foreign aid. Djakarta Radio, June 20, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 540] === 532 firmly on a course of friendship with the West. Americans has been Robert Delson, Among those a Washington-based attorney who has been adviser to the Indonesian Embassy for more than twenty-two years. Criticizing as too little the credits provided through the IGGI conferences, Delson has declared that the West has not sufficiently rewarded Indonesia for ridding itself of Communists and thus aiding world peace. Said Delson: "I am of the view that the disparity between U.S. expenditures in Vietnam and U.S. aid to Indonesia is 39 unjustifiable." Similarly, Guy Pauker, a leading Indonesian specialist, has noted that: ...It is difficult to explain why the level of expenditure considered appropriate to Indonesia must be restricted to one half of one percent of the cost of our security expenditures on the main land of Southeast Asia. Although acknowledging the initial wisdom of a low profile approach, Pauker believes it has become outdated now that 39 Interview with Nusantara reprinted in The Djakarta Times, November 25, 1967. 40 How and Why Indonesia Should Receive Economic Aid from the United States (Santa Monica: A RAND Corporation Report, July, 1968) p. 6. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 541] === 533 General Suharto Indonesian appears firmly specialist has determining declared aid upon which th e has been dictated by political tions. The actual needs program was program." th e dictated by 41 country immediate perhaps Army's the the p r o c e s s than economic not considera reasonably insisted, Pauker has ar e b a s e d, rather "In o t h e r w o r d s, budget, is s l i p p i n g b a c k c o u l d be than on the the b u d g e t b y concluded, the th e increasingly paralyzed in t o apathy. He has urged and v i g orous A m e r i c a n p r o g r a m of e c o n o m i c it s research attempt to r e c o m m e n d civic he has The American contributions rather is b e c o m i n g sociologically-oriented government IGGI country: a result, Indonesian government and the that aid r e q u e s t was b a s e d on w h a t e x pected from donor nations, th e in c o n t r o l. to g u i d e to m o b i l i z e a p r o g r a m of th e N e w O r d e r t he p o p u l a t i o n, expanded and assistance and the action program. 41 I b i d.. p. 7. J o u r n a l i s t R o b e r t L u b a r, op. p i t., also has n oted that "...Washington m i g h t well ponder whether t h e p r e s e n t p a r s i m o n i o u s p o l i c y is the b e s t w a y to h e l p the p r o g r e s s i v e - m i n d e d m e n in D j a k a r t a to o v e r c o m e t h e o b s t a c l e s to c h a n g e. If t h e y o p e n t h e d o o r to r e f r e s h i n g f o r e i g n b r e e z e s a n d a ll t h e y g e t is a c o l d d r a f t, t h e y ar e g o i n g to have a h a r d time w i n n i n g their struggle for Indonesia's future." R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 542] === 534 Texas' who has recommended more Indonesia. the changes Senator John Tower Styled by Senate," 42 vigorous an a i d as Indonesia study economic phere more investment. duced b y w h i c h the a bill creating Economic Development" economic plan t i o n s." for arms" these ideas, "Advisory authorized Indonesia the Indonesia that reform measures, create an a t m o s and private foreign th e intro senator Commission to d r a w u p "based on Indonesia and suggested Order might to p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s implement another against meeting and r e c o m m e n d New cooperation with "defender of economists situation conducive 43 "with f o l d e d team of American including ways bilateral Tower has w a r n e d an e x p e r t th e free Indonesian a comprehensive economic institu- 44 42 T h e aid, J e r r y F r i e n d h e i m, w a s q u o t e d b y A n t a r a ' s W a s h i n g t o n c o r r e s p o n d e n t, N o v e m b e r 22, 1967. 43 for May Se e T o w e r ' s s t a t e m e n t in the 25, 1967, pp. S 7 4 4 0 - S 7 4 4 1. Congressional Record 44 The I n d o n e s i a n s w e r e i n i t i a l l y at l e a s t p l e a s e d b y th e C o n g r e s s i o n a l a t t e n t i o n i m p l i e d b y th e T o w e r b i l l. S o u n d i n g s b y the I n d o n e s i a n a m b a s s a d o r S u w i t o, h o w e v e r, f o u n d o t h e r m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s c o o l to t h e idea, f e a r i n g t h a t i t w o u l d i n v o l v e the U.S. to o d e e p l y in t he i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f the c o u n t r y. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 543] === 535 Also were conspiring two o t h e r a g a i n s t the forces: th e bureaucratic dynamism. the w i s d o m many have seen Order, blood. runs the signaling for constant refrain, tendencies a continued "low p rofile" advantage in o r d e r in t h e appropriated by approach. country. problem, the firm opposition the The growth the There have challenged been constant and p e r s onnel seen low levels a good aid the p e r s o n n e l balance of pa yments of A m b a s s a d o r trend gradual Communist natural also have in r e c e n t y e a r s, imposed because staff have k e p t 45 relatively the N e w Indonesian officials w hat has been The restrictions and g i f t of to m u l t i p l y p r o g r a m s to g a i n Congress aid." country, trust for of m a n y of b u r e a u c r a c y from Washington Indonesia Indonesia's "more recognized aiding their a lack approach an d A m e r i c a n Indonesians conversations expansionist pressures some restraint ingratitude Through th e Indonesians While of A m e r i c a n "low p rofile" and Green an d h i s contained; 45 T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n is t h e a u t h o r ' s a f t e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s with a number of Indonesian officials. Typical was General T h a j e b w h o e x p r e s s e d f e a r s t h a t t h e c o n s o r t i u m a p p r o a c h to a i d i n g I n d o n e s i a w o u l d be w o r k b e c a u s e the o t h e r n a t i o n s d i d n o t h a v e t h e s a m e i n t e r e s t i n the c o u n t r y t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s did. C o n v e r s a t i o n, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., J u n e 1, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 544] === 536 under altered m i g h t be in t h e o f f i n g. The champions circumstances Capitol the m u l t i l a t e r a l McGee (Wyo. being careful nation...." Conte 47 (Mass. c o n c e p t has, Hill. framework Senator of U.S. "It is g o o d and y e t Following - Rep.) a new Ambassador, changes 46 "low p r o f i l e " and aid returned and to s e e found Fulbright has also m o v i n g a visit however, appreciated to S e n a t o r the U n i t e d ahead Indonesia, Gale States assist that Rep. Silvio to d e c l a r e: W e m u s t g i v e u p th e p u b l i c i t y a n d p r o p a g a n d a benefits for a quieter but more effective gain on b e h a l f of the I n d o n e s i a n economy. U.S. p o l i c y m u s t be c a r e f u l l y a d m i n i s t e r e d n e i t h e r o v e r s t i m u l a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s a m o n g th e Indonesians, n o r lag too far behind. During hearings Zablocki Asian (Wis. t he - Dem.), 1968 foreign then and Pacific Affairs, a i d b il l, c h a i r m a n of told AID Rep. C l e m e n t J. the S u b c o m m i t t e e officials that although 46 Some forei gn service and m i l i t a r y people, r ecalling I n d o n e s i a ' s i n f l a t i o n h e y d a y s, r e m e m b e r t h a t $25 w o u l d b u y a r o u n d - t r i p t i c k e t f r o m D j a k a r t a to B a l i a n d a w e e k e n d v a c a tion. T h e y r e m e m b e r i t as P a r a d i s e, o n e d i p l o m a t t o l d me, a n d t h e y w a n t to r e t u r n. 47 48 Congressional Record, January 30, 1967, S1086. Congressional Record, January 30, 1967, H746. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 545] === 537 deeply interested are still a bit American presence private, era and concerned extent, a virtue time w h e n Congress and tration was prodigal which had attitude officials have another and promised Indonesia. "lo w p r o f i l e " The c o m i n g of t h e N e w O r d e r w e r e the tides among about America's Indonesia end of the Sukarno accomplished world role w e r e b e i n g c o n t e x t of t h e Vietnam experi running against global involvements the A m e r i c a n p e o p l e, the U.S. forsaken policy in t h e restrained from which restraint build up Both publicly o u t of n e c e s s i t y. assumptions With 49 and AID the thoroughly re-examined ence. it w i l l "L o w P r o f i l e " some the economic development: that too r a p i d l y. " a p o l i c y of A s s e s s m e n t of made Indonesia's State Department continue has the e a g e r th e Johnson Adminis e m b r a c e of the Indonesian previously had bestowed on nations the f l e s h p o t s the U n i t e d S t a t e s Communism. The new —. d e s c r ibed b y some 49 U. S. C o n g r e s s, H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s, C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n Affairs, Fo r e i g n A s s i s t a n c e A c t of 1 9 6 8, Heari n g s o n H. R. 1 5 263, 9 0 t h C o n g r e s s, 2 n d S e s s i o n ( W a s h i n g t o n: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e, 1968) p. 108. Z a b l o c k i added: "... M y c o n c e r n is h a v i n g a l a r g e p r e s e n c e of U.S. p e r s o n n e l Indonesia." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 546] === 538 "neo-isolationism" smaller for amounts foreign which was reflected the Congress assistance. new program for have been out of policy and a more g i v i n g which, crete time, scientists sophisticated as h a s b e e n ascribe (see the went and informed the d e v e l o p m e n t theories 15). While this p o l i c y terms Indonesia, cant accomplishing part zation and reh ab i l i t a t i o n the Sukarno the r i g h t r oa d; that Should the "low p r o f i l e " regime. applied wish to r e c e i v e, c o n c e p t of apply aidin a con of A m e r i c a n social of s t r i d e s it has p l a y e d toward a signifi approach — and e r r o r s helped put is no m e a n from Indonesia accomplishment. t he Indonesian countries which receive, assistance the p r e l i m i n a r y s t a b i l i aid p o l i c y has in itself to o t h e r t he necessity. r e q u i r e d b y the exc e s s e s financial it wo u l d be pre m a t u r e economic development by model aid, in D j a k a r t a, beyond mere sought and useful for refinements noted, success reduced funds the A m e r i c a n m i s s i o n from Washington, situation appropriate Indonesia would almost certainly however, as c a r r i e d o u t b y It w a s the q u e s t i o n. the s a m e supported was willing In v i e w o f a massive in t h e p r o g r e s s i v e l y the U n i t e d States? R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 547] === 539 Ambassador believed gram Green that and m a n y the concepts is b a s e d m i g h t w e l l The Alliance for and economic either social what was possible Indonesia, affect basic But the a i d-giving has While stance realities Indonesian model Indonesian began it s it was not elsewhere. failed has the to b r i n g stick the neither t he sufficiently elites continued, to n o assumptions states as d i d about the Sukarno government. ruling b y the operated on same less-developed conversion aid pro linked aid-giving with however, approach in L a t i n A m e r i c a political into practice and e m b o d i e d the attitudes Indonesian seemingly has in m a n y c a s e s tempting e nough nore in D j a k a r t a significant economic development th e Kennedy Administration the w hich has That program, carrot-and-stick basis be p u t reform, justice the A m e r i c a n m i s s i o n on which Progress, social Latin America. carrot has been threatening in L a t i n A m e r i c a. certain effect. "low p r o f i l e " and elsewhere might prove salutary, probably preclude adoption of the in t o t a l. In a v e r y r e a l situation was unique re-involvement because there with s hackled or h i n d e r e d b y sense, th e the U n i t e d a perfectly States c l e a n slate: the r e q u i r e m e n t s R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 548] === 540 existing programs. in m a n y other The d r a s t i c Th i s w o u l d n o t be nations which surgery which had Indonesia skeletal proportions v o luntary on the p a r t m ent of the u n h e a l t h y climate like otherwise see unlikely such paring Peace technical In a s e n s e, youth in L a mb's the smoking r i c h a n d good. can be the tale about ruins of the remember, but a require again, and USIS like th e will find a way house too. As yet like the Chinese r o a s t pork. it h a s house libraries. remains whether the but would the painful cherished programs States "burning or w h e t h e r p o l i c y - m a k e r s and keep and to h e l p. United States re-created the d i s c o v e r y The q u e s t i o n not, The an o l d p o l i c y achieved only by roast port was itself willingly assistance, United might want the A m e r i c a n p r e s e n c e there. conditions away old in L a t i n A m e r i c a of W a s h i n g t o n, inflict on o p e r a t i o n of Corps, the U.S. reduced entirely hardly true found something th e down" to h a v e Out same effect elsewhere their is to o early tell. American Investment At the ment aid has same time Indonesia that America's government-to-governbee n mark e d by reticence, strong encouragement R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 549] === 541 has been g i v e n private th e State Department. th e New Order government has expressed to t h e has become has has b e e n the Fo r e i g n essential investment been more itself, its d e e p i n t e r e s t country. chairman of This foreign which Indonesia than match ed again and again attracting foreign n o t e d b y Dr. Investment Board, Indonesia's capital Mohammad Sadli, this type capital d e v e l o p m e n t plans: We r e a l i z e f u l l y th a t aid m o n e y has r e c e n t l y beco me scarce, that trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n concessions ar e g r a n t e d o n l y g r u d g i n g l y a n d d i s m a l l y b y the a d v a n c e d c o u n t r i e s, t h a t t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e h a s its own limitations. The inflow of fo r e i g n private i n v e s t m e n t, t h e r e f o r e, is of u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e f o r a co untry like Indonesia where natural factors such r e s o u r c e s, m a r k e t s a n d m a n p o w e r ar e in a m p l e s u p p l y. Citing th e opportunities for e x p l o i t a t i o n of their rich resources, Indonesia's foreign investment country's untapped ambassadors in the and p r o s p e c t i v e l y th e U n i t e d S t a t e s 50 S p e e c h o n " P r o m o t i o n of F o r e i g n I n v e s t m e n t m Indone s i a, " I n d o n e s i a n News and Views, S p e cial edition, J u n e, 1968, p. 1. Sadli spoke at a s e m i n a r o n "Aspects and P o s s i b i l i t i e s o f F o r e i g n I n v e s t m e n t in I n d o n e s i a, h e l d a t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Hous e, the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a, Berkeley, June 21-22. P e r h a p s the m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t a b o u t th e s e m i n a r is t h a t i t w a s o r g a n i z e d b y the I n d o n e s i a n S t u d e n t s Association the U n i t e d States (Permitas). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 550] === 542 and o t h e r representatives throughout America efforts, press, been Indonesia business the Washington and Djakarta, traveled attention for Indonesia. 53 in the A m e r i c a n 52 investment.'’ executives, investment guarantee have Their for reviving considerable as a s i t e s i g n i n g of missions favorable responsible Some American energetically interest American businessmen. which received have interest have spurred by th e agreement between s p o n s o r e d trade an d investment Notable for his leadership in this In J a n u a r y, 1968, I n d o n e s i a e s t a b l i s h e d a n o f f i c e f o r P e r t a m i n a, its N a t i o n a l O i l a n d G a s M i n i n g E n t e r p r i s e, in N e w Y o r k City, w h i c h h a s a i d e d t h i s e f f o r t. F o r the a n n i v e r s a r y s p e e c h b y M a j. G en. Dr. Ibnu S u t o w o, p r e s i d e n t d i r e c t o r of P e r t a m i n a, se e C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d. J a n u a r y 6, 1969, p. E 6 1. 52 See W a s h i n g t o n S t a r, June 18, 1968. 53 F o r e x a m p l e, the G r e a t e r S a n F r a n c i s c o C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e t r a d e m i s s i o n v i s i t e d in A p r i l, 1968, and a g r o u p of g o v e r n m e n t a n d b u s i n e s s o f f i c i a l s c a l l e d U.S. M i n e r a l R e s o u r c e s T r a d e M i s s i o n t o u r e d in J a n u a r y, 1967. O f f i c i a l U.S. i n t e r e s t in s p u r r i n g i n v e s t m e n t in Indonesia was expressed by Amba s s a d o r Green in hailing t h e f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t l a w as a "w i s e d e c i s i o n ": The s u b s e q u e n t f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t a g r e e m e n t, h e said, " p o i n t s to a n e w e r a o f c o o p e r a t i o n in w h i c h A m e r i c a n a n d o t h e r i n v e s t o r s c a n m a k e l a r g e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o w a r d the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d u t i l i z a t i o n of I n d o n e s i a ' s r e s o u r c e s a n d m a n p o w e r. " T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s. J u l y 4, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 551] === 543 eff o r t has been James Linen, president of addition to p u b l i c i z i n g Indonesia's company's publications, Linen meeting in G e n e v a o f b u s i n e s s and J a p a n to d i s c u s s Indonesia. Foreign M i n i s t e r Malik, government economic to w o r k Indonesia, about legal topple order, the the g o v e r n m e n t the p o l i t i c a l government, has b e e n the and the N e w O r d e r climate absence of and the n e g a t i v e continuing They have seen stability made t he somewhat reticent possible seeming determina leadership a more for economic constitutional, significant opposition the displayed by Western governments institutions. investment in i n v e s t i n g been capital. e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the convened Jogjakarta a proper interest Indonesian national in h i s stability. commitments factors the recovery, Sultan of c r e a t i o n of considerable by military-civilian t i o n of the in t h e W e s t e r n w o r l d for p r i v a t e American businessmen have actual favorable the leaders 196 7, b o t h of w h o m p l e d g e d toward and p o l i t i c a l Despite both Inc. opportunities in N o v e m b e r, possibilities Present were Time, confidence whi c h has been and international side, and inflation, a cause financial caution, e x a m p l e s of R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 552] === 544 weakened public machinery and Stories men seeking going disciplines, rampant corruption are common anyone w ith Overcoming the sometimes attempt and, areas. to f i n d foreign capital, dissipated ment, proves too red of A m e r i c a n b u s i n e s s formidable at h i g h trust that and "squeeze" for companies their m oney to m o r e a n d d i s t r u s t of levels the N e w O r d e r; this th e g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d p r o v i d e and protection. the transactions. foreign businessmen have lingering resentment even spent days approve tape, they d i r e c t Still other discouraged by authority a result, claimed been civil officials. to g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c e w i t h o u t communications, obstacles cooperation among in D j a k a r t a from government office attractive inefficient government investment opportunities who have encountering has Finally, insistence generally unproven some outsiders that competence, have Indonesian manage m u s t be utilized a large extent. Because role it h a d plac ed foreign capital so m u c h investment the N e w O r d e r w a s embarrassed by c a p i t a l i s t West. For almost the a full initial emphasis the its d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n s, slow response year after from the th e e n a c t m e n t R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 553] === 545 of t h e new foreign opening the progress 1967, door investment funds in n e g o t i a t i o n s Sumitro, the g o v e r n m e n t, investment. Foreign for the g r o w t h could become itself." the 54 Army directly, criticism the Equally initial and "brokers," mining limited the valuable known broker, 54 used that rights the the firms. said, for was regime, little should advisers was the only become the country challenge a springboard the President. government's bona capital, seeking foreign not willing situation for at l e a s t fide investors concessions and other opportunities who had only themselves a money-raising have disadvantage and by some Indonesian News 10-11. In S e p t e m b e r, to d e v e l o p individuals backing concessions considerable foreign to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n financial concession there and able embarrassing timber abroad, hailed and d e v e l o p m e n t of d o m e s t i c economic inability had been against over-reliance strong Opponents which returned from exile but not yet capital, "whip" from with newly warned law, been let but who to u s e advantage. A number to b r o k e r s, often the Indonesia. accounts sought Perhaps the b e s t a well-intentioned and V i e w s, September, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 554] === 546 o n e,^ was was Joseph Kennedy, g iven ni n e t y days a towering framework just of g i r d e r s they were when work was early post-Gestapu borrowed, Kennedy began raise additional the sharp criticism for businessmen companies commodities Working from slim cranes Build in p l a c e capital, again but was and w a s f o r c e d fiasco m o s t of unable stop. resulted th e g o v e r n m e n t This in c o n s i d e r and for Ame r i c a n generally. Equally disillusioning the wo r k funds with Nusantara stopped for ec o n o m y reasons days. highly-visible, well-publicized able ex-missionary who to f i n i s h D j a k a r t a ' s ing, in t h e an A m e r i c a n for m o n o p o l y o r to the positions exploit particular Indonesians to m a r k e t certain natural resources. their text book k n o w l e d g e of ment officials often were surprised were demands capitalism, govern to f i n d W e s t e r n m o n e y - m e n Francis Underhill, former Indonesian desk officer in W a s h i n g t o n, b e l i e v e s t h a t K e n n e d y w a s m o t i v a t e d b y a d e s i r e to h e l p t h e I n d o n e s i a n s w h e n he u n d e r t o o k the p r o jec t. He noted, however, that w h e n his f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n b e c a m e d i f f i c u l t, K e n n e d y t r i e d to e n l i s t U.S. s u p p o r t, c l a i m i n g t h a t a f a i l u r e w o u l d d a m a g e the n a t i o n in the e y e s o f th e I n d o n e s i a n s. M i s s i o n o f f i c i a l s t u r n e d h i m down. I n t e r v i e w, S e p t e m b e r 6, 1968. F o r c r i t i c i s m of K e n n e d y s e e M e r d e k a, A u g u s t 14, 1967. and other brokers, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 555] === 547 uninterested where their own speeches have in m a r k e t p l a c e m e c h a n i s m s often Indonesian officials included as u n w o r t h y o f Indonesia business investments were true and free concerned. to A m e r i c a n business groups of m o n o p o l i s t i c p r a c t i c e s entrepreneurs and exhortations "rational procedures its d e a l i n g s numbers of b u s i n e s s and financial I ndonesian official, foreigners m a n y of negotiating under resulted from time a nd s o u n d with foreign businessmen the N e w O r d e r h a s b e e n h a m p e r e d b y would to h e l p practices. firms, "every a result, condemnations in e s t a b l i s h i n g In a l l one competition specialists. a new point was to r e t i r e position. sufficient According the de l a y s e x p e r ienced by Indonesian investment a l a c k of e x p e r i e n c e forced government's the a lack of and some law by New Order officials, raised during discussions, for time to c o n s i d e r We h a d no p r e c e d e n t s the to g u i d e " ^ S t a t e m e n t b y A m b a s s a d o r S o e d j a t m o k o b e f o r e the A m e r i c a n - I n d o n e s i a n C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e i n N e w Y o r k City, J u n e 13, 1968. S ee the e d i t o r i a l " I n d o n e s i a a n d Its F r i e n d s " the W a s h i n g t o n S t a r, June 18, 1968. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 556] === 548 u s. " 57 The nation incorruptible companies figures little s h o r t of auditors and accountants operating Indonesia guarantee is not. to e d u c a t e before is w o e f u l l y and, that Indonesia in d e e d, reason foreign a nd the b o o k s a result, to b e l i e v e accountants, investors check is g e t t i n g A l t h o u g h the N e w O r d e r h a s and d e p l o y competent and v e r i f y p r o f i t s u b m i t t e d to t h e g o v e r n m e n t. in taxes, also i ts that there legal share in m a n y cases accelerated efforts it m a y be a re p u t u n d e r some years adequate financial surveillance. Despite foreign ing of the p r o b l e m s investment activity experienced b y both sides transactions, in t h a t area. 1968 This saw was A m e r i c a n Express was in M a r c h, 1968. the first More banks to o p e n followed, a decided quicken a i d e d b y t he l i s h m e n t of br a n c h e s b y A m e r i c a n b a n k i n g estab institutions. an o f f i c e including in D j a k a r t a B a n k of 57 Interview wit h Selo Sumardjan, Djakarta, S e p t e m b e r 14, 1968. Sumardjan blamed Sukarno's negative attitude t o w a r d f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t as h a v i n g l e d to t h i s s i t u a t i o n. The Indonesians have been particu l a r l y resentful a t w h a t t h e y c o n s i d e r to b e u n f a i r b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e s a n d advantages taken by Japanese businessmen, who have a collective bad reputation. American businessmen, despite a f e w b a d e x p e r i e n c e s, g e n e r a l l y s e e m to h a v e a m u c h b e t t e r name among the urban elites. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 557] === 549 America, Bank. Their presence into Indonesia capital new First National investment the new new foreign B y t h e e n d of Board, could report construction of Indonesia by t he F r e e p o r t a sizeable mining in W e s t Iran. Another 1968 of f o r e i g n the thos e, of s i x t y - s i x eleven a m o u n t of project was concerned $111,487,000. Company, Inc., and exploration communications and Telegraph the station Corporation F i r m s, a c t i v i t i e s a n d a m o u n t s w e r e as f o l l o w s: F r e e p o r t S u l p h u r, m i n i n g, $ 7 6, 5 0 0, 0 0 0; G o o d y e a r T i r e an d R u b b e r Co., tires, $ 1 3, 0 0 0, 0 0 0; I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e p h o n e a n d Telegraph, satellite communications, $6,100,000; Singer S e w i n g Machine, $1,100,000; A M C O A s i a Corp., real estate, $ 2, 0 0 0, 0 0 0 a n d $ 3, 0 0 0, 0 0 0; T o y o M e n k a, Inc., i r o n s h e e t s, $ 1, 7 0 0, 0 0 0; C a r l H a n s e n, Inc., s c o o t e r a s s e m b l y a n d m a n u f a c ture, $ 5, 0 0 0, 0 0 0; V i r g i n i a I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o r p., r u b b e r, $ 4 0 0, 0 0 0; G o r d o n L. N e s s o f C a l i f o r n i a, e l e c t r o n i c s a s s e m b l y, $ 3 7, 0 0 0, a n d U n i o n C a r b i d e E a s t e r n, Inc., d r y c e l l b a t t e r y industries, $2,650,000. ( D e c e m b e r, 1968) p. 21. Source: Focus a $76,500,000 i mportan t p r o j e c t was Telephone Capital administering approval Sulphur i n f l u x of the F o r e i g n for concession an e a r t h s a t e l l i t e International Chase Manhattan transfer responsible largest single American for the for a total d ollar investment pledge by exchange and The thereby quickened investment projects. companies The rights an d i n v e s t m e n t law, American Bank, facilitated funds. Investment Technical City I n d o n e s i a, 1:4 R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 558] === 550 under The a twenty-year station is d e s i g n e d international and contract from the to p r o v i d e communications, Indonesian government. Indonesia with modern including telephone, telex television.^ Just important this renewal and Indonesian government. t he cooperation between Indonesia's principal source in N e w O r d e r p l a n n i n g h a s opment programs and other agreements with Pertamina. Middle and th e A m e r i c a n - f i n a n c e d oil companies oil ex p o r t s are a key factor the m a j o r e x p a n s i o n and devel l a u n c h e d b y Caltex, Stanvac oil the state companies which have oil largest oil-producing California, oil foreign exchange, of A m e r i c a n concractual East Because which have been subsidiaries i n v e s t m e n t has b e e n American-owned been new company, region between Indonesia has been operations since the the 19 20 's. site the Development T h e s t a t i o n is to b e c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m U. S. m a t e r i a l s and equipment supplied b y ITT's Defense Communications Division. A f t e r c o n s t r u c t i o n the s t a t i o n w i l l be o w n e d b y t he G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d o n e s i a, w h i c h w i l l l e a s e the f a c i l i t y to I n d o s a t, a w h o l l y - o w n e d s u b s i d i a r y o f I TT f o r t w e n t y y e a r s for a share of the n e t profits. See A g e n c y fo r I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t p r e s s r e l e a s e, M a r c h 15, 1968. AID was involved in t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s i n c e i t p r o v i d e d an " e x t e n d e d r i s k " l o a n g u a r a n t e e to t he B a n k o f A m e r i c a w h o f i n a n c e d the project. and a group of co-lenders R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 559] === 551 the country's the frequent the oil industry, crises however, which have stability brought by beset the N e w O r d e r cooperation b y government officials, increasing rapidly, has b een hampered the region. and the With renewal oil production has a n d r e p o r t e d l y is been approaching full potential. The government's welcome caused some resentment the c o n c e s s i o n s among those among Former Vice th e treatment on outside down domestic business contends, restrictions extreme, paper, has Bahar become placed on the a fair foreign the e n t i r e quoted an u n n a m e d g o v e r n m e n t b a n k job of "screening, capital" government. economic th e had passed from and more its regime's most outspoken opposition that weighing investors. policies Bahar chance ( r e p o r t e d l y N a v y - p r o t e c t e d ), attack on th e while Local businessmen, are n o t b e i n g g i v e n as v o i c e d b y capital, with taxes. should be President Hatta N ew Order for h aving bes t o w e d preferential Hatta investment has Indonesian businessmen because involved. critical to f o r e i g n On July receiving 16, and Indonesian hands this criticism and financial 1968, for example, official saying controlling foreign into th e h a n d s R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 560] === 552 the IMF. Such s t r a i n of face statements offer reminders economic nationalism Indonesia, still that a strong runs beneath of w h i c h p r o s p e c t i v e investors t he sur m u s t be aware. I n d o n e s i an-Arneri c a n T r a d e Improved relations Indonesia has had relatively ing patterns between despite announced economic upon foreign and are the 1965 o n l y interested a source true Indonesians, they ar e d e p e n d e n t for earning foreign a vast, rich market representatives have to f a c i l i t a t i n g They have welcomed warmly which have t h a t th e b u s i n e s s m e n in t h e i r country of m a t e r i a l imports. visited a potential trad increased For the their dedication trade. find for since New Order trading missions sides vehicle far and This has b e e n intense impact thus commerce. the m a i n again stressed Indonesian-American since United States nations. is m o r e to e x p l o i t several American two through Recognizing sure how again trade th e little i nterest on b o t h the d e s i r e exchange. not the cooperation course, between a result, the Indonesia them generally market, both not sides R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 561] === 553 sometimes have gone away from such encounters with feelings of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t. From and 1965, a p e r i o d of imports from oil. intense remained included rubber, pepper and ot h e r In a b s o l u t e terms, American significantly, from million in t h e this increase can, exports of r i c e, wheat, foreign aid f i r s t nine loans Prospects bright on either however, raw spices, food for future trade do not stable. 60 and p a l m Indonesia have 1965 Most, and spare PL-480 Although 1968. side. tea explained cotton rule and petroleum exports level remarkably $ 68 m i l l i o n months absolute the petroleum coffee, climbed Sukarno's anti-Americanism, Indonesia has Purchases have products, the last y e a r of $122 if n o t in t e r m s parts all, tied shipments. the appear particularly United States government 60 T h e s t a t i s t i c s o f U. S. t r a d e w i t h I n d o n e s i a are: U.S. i m p o r t s (in m i l l i o n s ) f r o m I n d o n e s i a, 1965, $ 1 6 5. 2; 1966, $ 1 7 9. 0; 1967, $181.9; 1968, $ 1 7 4. 5. U. S. e x p o r t s to Indonesia: 1965, $41.6; 1966, $67.6; 1967, $68.4; a n d 1968, $169.2. A l t h o u g h t h e 1968 e x p o r t f i g u r e s a p p e a r s to b e a d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e o v e r the p a s t, m u c h o f t he a m o u n t r e f l e c t s U.S. A I D - f i n a n c e d p u r c h a s e s of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s a n d spare parts. T h e r e w a s an i n c r e a s e i n r e g u l a r c o m m e r c i a l e x p o r t s t o I n d o n e s i a in 1968, b u t o n l y a s m a l l o n e. Figures s u p p l i e d to a u t h o r b y U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 562] === 554 once again offering Federal for Commerce shipments term sales Insurance Act Indonesia, and guarantees and basis. to o b t a i n importers funds cent deposit necessary Credit were greater when buying costs American suppliers provided t h r o u g h AID. "bonus export" deposit until that the easing of little goods these exports B e c a u s e of th e See importers for for International 10 0 p e r credit. th e m o r e distant to p o s t p o n e the bank is w i l l i n g ar e eligible for annually facilities. restrictions, level the provided any sign i f i c a n t low earning Indonesia, industrial I n d o n e s i a in exports at e i g h t p e r c e n t and other likelihood commercial Also, and m e d i u m - importers using AID are d e l i v e r e d credits in c a p i t a l from Bank in u s i n g e v e n f u n d s however, foreign exchange payment. letters the h a d to b o r r o w to m a k e are b e i n g p e r m i t t e d the g o o d s year government bring and ca u s e d d e l a y s credits Indonesian guarantee to o b t a i n o p e n Now, short- F u r t h e r U. S. been hindered because interest rates through the E x p o r t - I m p o r t i t is o n l y f o r a case-by-case Indonesia have at h i g h insurance the the Commerce, January 13, there in U.S. foreseeable average they Despite however, increase threefuture. Indonesian 1969, 38. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 563] === 555 and g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s d i s c o u r a g i n g American Perhaps consumer goods have but imports the m o s t p r o m i s i n g export items are transport construction and mining equipment. Sales of limited continued international shortage of f o r e i g n Barring unforeseen to t h e increase. are not Unless the in o r d e r facts United to g i v e countries, likely States the these and Indonesia's any dramatic competition revises treatment have abundant is k e e n. its tariff the U. S. these sought to g a i n tradedisposals by gaining reductions from national stockpiles strategic materials rubber and Stockpile national markets economic and laws to d e v e l o p i n g Recognizing Indonesians exports related benefits tin and items Indonesian Indonesian goods static. equipment are g e n e r a l l y drastically preferential largely life, exports and sales the m a r k e t for to b e markets Indonesia. exchange. to e x p e r i e n c e Its r a w m a t e r i a l supply on w o r l d competition circumstances, likely i tems, fertilizer, processing machinery, luxury a limited market agricultural will by encouraging A m e r i c a n tourism. disposals tin have posed and rubber a problem since 1963 for when inter Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 564] === 556 Executive Stockpile Committee, reported large excesses of M a r c h 1965, for example, 35 p e r c e n t. shadow — there was representing upon sales chiefly have Th e these 535 a p o i n t of e c o n o m i c disposals by frequent Council the U. S. from the long tons has dampened the considerable have Indonesians. 1964-1965, eliciting about 825,000 percent. for From longer long tons, For nations d e pendent these stockpile and political criticism disruption releases sensitivity. about with th e have its at t i m e s th e released an o f f i c i a l note of p r o t e s t f r o m accused tin market. serious level tin International the w o r l d even more a disposal a surplus foreign exchange Indonesians elicited commodities. c a s t an e v e n "consultations" in L o n d o n, disposals and o t h e r stockpile two p r o d u c t s 1966, by President Kennedy, tin stockpile had I n d o n e s i a and M a l a y s i a — been Rubber the a surplus Although the Tin in t h o s e rubber an excess formed protests about 170,000 60,000 tons th e Indonesian 62 In A p r i l, 1966, f o r e x a m p l e, G e n e r a l R. P i r n g a d i e, c h a i r m a n o f t h e G e n e r a l M a n a g i n g B o a r d of I n d o n e s i a n T i n C o r p o r a t i o n s, c h a r g e d that the s a les m e t h o d s and p rice p o l i c i e s of th e U.S. o n t i n h a d b e e n c h a n g e d c o n t r a r y to a g r e e m e n t s w i t h th e t i n c o u n c i l and, as a r e s u l t, the w o r l d m a r k e t p rice w o u l d be depressed. Indonesian H e r a l d, A p r i l 15, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 565] === 557 government. the It s t r o n g l y d e p l o r e d lack of the action, criticized consultation w ith rubber-producing nations, cited American policies for not heeding Indonesia's a nd economic *.63 interests. S u b s e q u e n t U.S. situation. In O c t o b e r, 120,000 tons were limited tons of natural equal 1966, annually and resolved principle with stockpile. rubber, th e th e issue; tended in J u l y, whichever 64 with th e rate was 1967, rubber or sales 70,000 in a p p r o x i m a t e l y reductions Indonesians D j akarta has th e cut back stockpile is h i g h e r, These important, suffered to r e l i e v e the d i s p o s a l the W a s h i n g t o n on Equally s e e m i n g l y have have a c t u a l g o v e r n m e n t u s e of quarterly quantities. consultation by have actions and increased over disposals actually agreed th e w i s d o m o f d e p l e t i n g Indonesia's rubber little or no e f fect from the sales the A m e r i c a n disposals. Indonesia's efforts to e n l a r g e tourist dollar has i n c l u d e d the l u x u r y hotels, Samudra 63 64 the Press release, share construction of Beach Hotel See A n t a r a D a i l y News its on Java Bulletin, American Embassy, July the two n e w and the Ba l i 196 6. Djakarta, June 14, 196 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 566] === 558 Beach Hotel Bali. Indonesian hopes The to m a k e exchange. The runways lengthened accommodate encouraged include plans that a re u n d e r w a y and a civil Indonesia Indonesia airline, expand Bali modern Bali a ir The in D j a k a r t a on J a n u a r y the r o u t e o f n u m b e r s of to b e c o m e a major there accommodations, tourist the g r e a t "package tours," th e b e a u t y and and art of tourists was the U n i t e d S t a t e s 1358. It e n a b l e d its n a t i o n a l carriers especially Americans, 65 Indonesia cannot realistically center — are d r a m a t i c transport, amounts foreign Indonesia. tourists, hope ar e b e i n g Garuda Airways, in r e c e n t yea r s, Because airlines 15, the k e y ar e b e i n g and p e r m i t t e d A m e r i c a n increased until source i n f l u x of A m e r i c a n have hotel jet s, their their e x i s t i n g network airport agreement signed by to S a n F r a n c i s c o beauties a prime to c o m m e r c i a l i z e to e x p a n d While island has b e c o m e tourism a t the Pacific paradise. aided by latter despite its n a t u r a l improvements and recreation of f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e in i t s opportunities. required by 65 Col. H a d i d j a, v i c e c h a i r m a n o f the I n d o n e s i a n T o u r i s t C o u n c i l h a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t in th e f i r s t h a l f of 1 9 6 8 A m e r i c a n t o u r i s t s c o m p r i s e d o n e - h a l f o f t h e t o t a l n u m b e r of tourists v i s i t i n g Indonesia. I n d o n e s i a n O b s e r v e r, A u g u s t 30, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 567] === 559 intensive potential Economic program of in t h a t s e c t o r economic numerous since into future economic its the is n o t likely th e competence Indonesia. For problems inception will future. c a r r y on, t h e m m u s t be which have definite example, continued racial the instilled insecurity th e a r c h i p e l a g o. Among businessmen whose small retail trade. they ar e n o Indonesians related, educated Indonesians cultural uneducated or o t h e r realized aversion soon. them structured added Chinese an e s t i m a t e d and m a r k e t s skills the d i s i n c l i n a t i o n those there Yet of m a n y a trade because labor. tendency indiscipline causes th e u r b a n capital. types situations country 1.1 m i l l i o n dominate and For residents or dispossesed, the implications. t h r o u g h o u t the overseas their critically, socio-political economic are the the N e w O r d e r if s o m e w h a t l e s s are u p r o o t e d to p r e d i c t th e m o s t p a r t to e n t e r b u s i n e s s Indonesians Western observers. in t h e shops problem this p a p e r outbursts to r e p l a c e another, to b e which have beset difficulties have Indonesia's Outlook It is b e y o n d the tourist promotion, And among in w o r k concern for many Swedish Eco n o m i s t Gunnar Myrdal has R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 568] === 560 suggested, for example, virtual lawlessness will be necessary which wants " wil l have American with and the plagued specialist, right sufficient decade 66 67 The near food years and following Quoted Interview, the new the that The N e w food will its 67 face are m o r e reforms that Indonesia shortages. agricultural rice improve Indonesia will end Indonesia. is s e e n to b e "miracle" situation that convinced future "not i m p r e s s e d the e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m of emphasis the problems Benda, American officials are g e n e r a l l y track." in f o o d b y similarly as t h e y d o they introduction three Harry which and economic the m a n y d i f f i c u l t i e s Believing that Indonesian government the g r a v e 66 firm measures granting government's expected country particularly with the the long p e r i o d s of economic development" With the two with the N e w Order, "is o n t h e grips the any future economic progress, optimistic. a dictatorship." the p r o s p e c t s Indonesia's that Indonesian While experienced come to b e that because production strains, markedly become five year i t is selfplan. For ( or a p p r o x i m a t e l y u n t i l 1984), York T i m e s, March Singapore, September 25, 11, 1968. 1 9 68. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 569] === 561 according cant to t h i s strides thinking, toward 68 the n a t i o n a l the d e v e l o p m e n t self-sufficient economy marked by The looming one of has longrange popu l a t i o n problem, about area of two-thirds the covers country; approximately only kilometer compared with r e s t of clouded by areas the already th e w o r l d. estimated 120 m i l l i o n about 80 mill i o n close New York 500 65 p e r people State. in an The p o p u l a inhabitants per square land kilometer square for the Indonesia. Under tion was President Sukarno, viewed family planning done Pakistan, a national and p o p u l a t i o n in s o m e th e m i g r a t i o n of "About increasingly a b o u t s e v e n p e r c e n t of t h e size of of J a v a however, p a r t i c u l a r l y o n J av a, t h a t is the a balanced, signifi a steady economic growth. Indonesia's tion de n s i t y as w a s t he m o s t d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d population but area estimate ma y make other asset. Instead control countries people to t h e E x p r e s s e d by, Interview, Washington, adopting a national of Asia, Guided Democracy regime two m i l l i o n people 68 Indonesia's booming popula like emphasized India and trans sparsely populated outer should be m i g r a t e d policy islands. annually, among others, A m b a s s a d o r D. C., N o v e m b e r 8, 1968. or six G re e n, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 570] === 562 th ousand weekly, said Sukarno. surveys" million made 19 6 5 Sumatra, Lampung was Population" Day, the realism on Suharto 1967, public from Java 1968, sample some three Sumatra, 70 Atjeh, optimistic. the N e w O r d e r g o v e r n m e n t leaders to s i g n the a t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s a document which declares i n t e r e s t of b o t h 1961 Western estimates the q u e s t i o n o f p o p u l a t i o n. presented per d a y, " and M a d u r a d u r i n g were North been less among world the v ital and K alimantan. coming of families "socio-economic and made transmigration have a new tw o h u n d r e d Major destinations With According persons migrated 196 5. South 69 this m e a n s that arrived President "Declaration on Human Rights "family planning the n a t i o n and the f a m i l y.... " 71 69 Quoted m News Release, Indonesian Embassy, Washington, D. C., A p r i l 26, 1966. H e c a l l e d f o r " t w e n t y - f i v e to t h r i t y - f i v e b i g s h i p s " to m o v e the p e o p l e a n d s u g g e s t e d t h a t it w o u l d n o t b e p o s s i b l e to f i n d all t h e s e p e o p l e j o b s in i n d u s t r i e s s i n c e th e i n d u s t r i a l s i t u a t i o n h a d n o t y e t a d v a n c e d s u f f i c i e n t l y. T h e l a c k of a n y i n d u s t r y o n m o s t of the o u t e r i s l a n d s a n d the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f b u y i n g th e n e c e s s a r y shi p s, i n d i c a t e t h e a i r y na ture of Sukarno's transmigra tion plans. 70 Indonesian Information Service, Djakarta, June 12, 71 the W o r l d L e aders D e c l a r a t i o n o n P o p u l a t i o n, P u b l i s h e d P o p u l a t i o n C o u n c i l, N e w Y o r k, D e c e m b e r, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1968. === [PDF page 571] === 563 Despite this planning rhetorical and expressions Indonesia has program of population the clinics limitations been i ss u e. couched p l aced on t he m o t h e r, progress than a result, Indonesia's five-year countries t h r o u g h AID. like a result, India have and family pla nning for th e p h y s i c a l plays only faced economic income. a minor part despite to h e l p f i n a n c e w e l l - b e i n g of p a r t of capita national the the interested persons. almost exclusively control Noting announcements which emphasized d e v e l o p m e n t pla n, th e U n i t e d S t a t e s programs been as an e s s e n t i a l birth a national and the g o v e r n m e n t has seen a n d an i n c r e a s e d p e r 72 and in l a n g u a g e f r o m t h e West, implementing contraceptives particularly rather idea of family Opposition from Moslem assistance family planning h ealth problem, n e s s of the strong a v a i l a b i l i t y of have Further, control. has been r e l u c t a n t to f o r c e the of e n c o u r a g e m e n t m o v e d ve r y s l o w l y in Catholic groups about support for t he w i l l i n g population control problems which underdeveloped in c u t t i n g p o p u l a t i o n e v e n 72 A l a n Guttmacher, p r e s i d e n t of the A m e r i c a n P l a n n e d Parenthood A s s n., has predicted success for Indonesian e f f o r t s b e c a u s e of the (1) a n n o u n c e d g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t; (2) a p p r o v a l of th e n a t i o n ' s d o c t o r s a n d (3) w e l l - p l a n n e d leadership and program. T h i s a n a l y s i s is e n t i r e l y too sanguine. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 572] === 564 with a vigorous, h i g h - p r i o r i t y p r o g r a m of Indonesia's birth control appreciable effect on coming generations tion of human may Indonesia's to h a v e p o p u l a t i o n growth. see cro w d i n g on Java, for are u n l i k e l y the n a t i o n ' s result, ramifications efforts f amily limitation, a drastic intensifica with predicatably economic, any social serious and p o l i t i c a l future. In sum, about the it is n o t p o s s i b l e long-range prospects development. the s a m e archipelago have been tion w hich adopted approach which reflects "inner circle" times startling model for economic growth. Immediate and application to G e s t a p u. progress times Initial may be foreseen the the situa a "textbook" and d e v e l o p m e n t th e n a t i o n ' s economists. applied for The N e w Order has rehabilitation they have economic i m p r o v e d f r o m the academic background of rigor been Indonesia's short-run prospects of A m e r i c a n - t r a i n e d future could not have time, very optimistic through difficult stabilization, the for considerably prevailed prior and maintained to be With some a Western-approved success has been marked. speeded by events which 1965: "miracle grains" first, with the d e v e l o p m e n t their d r a m a t i c R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 573] === 565 impact on oil food production, deposits and, second, Indonesia which greatly t h e d i s c o v e r y of exceed previous expectations. Whether other pleasant horizon made cannot be on present curve. From economy, depend on concerted national including the i t is await over e s t i m a t e s m u s t be the population growth clear that country mustering Indonesia's a disci a ll sectors a campaign unmatched during its s h o r t h i s t o r y of will economics. Whether effort the far task depends as d o e s Instead, that perspective, independence. national calculated. indicators, development will plined, surprises or n o t a v a r i e t y of Indonesia factors, and l e a d e r s h i p — It m a y b e occur will be assumed, slow is e q u a l some of outside the however, that them — the this like r e a l m of such growth and oft en painful. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 574] === CHAPTER IX THE U.S. AND INDONESIA: Within between had the U n i t e d American support the visit Indonesia of U.S. in N o v e m b e r The Humphrey had Humphrey than social, they poli and the J o h n s o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n. thi s new The amity and of government in D j a k a r t a Humphrey 1967. visit marked was seen of N o v e m b e r the in I n d o n e s i a n - arrival formally 4 which often the ending the from Sukarno's the F oreign Office, come a new high Inside Indonesia, which had resulted The Djakarta Times relations generally very satisfactory V i c e P r e s i d e n t H u b e r t H. American vice president sentiments closer economic, the p o s t - S u k a r n o state relations. estrangement of G e s t a p u Visit Humphrey's American were demonstration for failure and Indonesia were and m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s significant the The New Order the State Depar t m e n t most was after States ever been before. tical two years THE CONTINUING ENCOUNTER foreign policy. reflects th e noted editorially that to In do n e s i a d u r i n g the first nine months R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 575] === 567 after he a s s u m e d office, go hornet" and continued, he w o u l d be g iv en had away turned turned he would have to H e l l with your course to p l a n t good sign for th e v i s i t would result Indonesia from Part c o m i n g to the a better a whirlwind I n d o n e s i a was to p r a i s e, presentatives arrival the p a p e r because Indonesia and had re foreign policy." and H u m p h r e y was for...closer f u t u r e. " ' 1' "Yankee, seen relations" There were increased The and candid hopes economic assistance that fo r the U n i t e d States. in I n d o n e s i a n - A m e r i c a n intended seeds Now, orientations in her fac e - t o - f a c e m e e t i n g of Suhart o good soil aid." a warm welcome from pro-communist "the r i g h t been met with not tour of Asian designed relations; to p r e a c h capitals, accentuate th e p o s i t i v e the effusive Vice President as h a d s o m e p r e v i o u s th e J o h n s o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n. the K e m a j o r a n Airport, Humphrey's declared Upon his that the American "^Similar e d i t o r i a l w e l c o m e s a p p e a r e d in th e d a i l y N u s a n t a r a. N o v e m b e r 3, M e r d e k a. N o v e m b e r 3, A n g k a t a n B e r s e n d j a t a. N o v e m b e r 3, M i m b a r B u r u h. ^ F o r e x a m p l e, t h e v i s i t s of E u g e n e B l a c k a n d W. A v e r e l l H a r r i m a n, S e e C h a p t e r V. S p e a k i n g to t h e A m e r i c a n a n d I n d o n e s i a n e m p l o y e e s a t t he U. S. m i s s i o n, H u m p h r e y sai d: "I d o n o t c o m e t o I n d o n e s i a to p a s s j u d g m e n t, b u t I c o m e h e r e in t he s p i r i t of f r i e n d s h i p. " S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t B u l l e t i n. D e c e m b e r 11, 1967, 790. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 576] === 568 people shown "admire t he c o u r a g e o u s initiative in p l a n n i n g t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n, your g o v e r n m e n t has rehabilitation and d e v e l o p m e n t of your nation." p a r e d to l e a v e of p r aise "I h a v e for the archipelago, the Suharto for he declared. a fuller U p o n his return for all as h e p r e the same a n d its s p i r i t of life later stressed government learned much of the it s p r o m i s e Four days theme accomplishments. the N e w Order a n d of the p e o p l e Indonesia," to W a s h i n g t o n h e w o u l d r e p o r t to P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n a n d t h e A m e r i c a n p e o p l e, "the n e w s pirit of progress which Indonesia and the achievements Indonesia has made a n d is c o n t i n u i n g to m a k e During the period between Vice President met with key arrival figures ing then Acting President Suharto; Speaker of P a r l i a m e n t, leaders. In al l p i t c h his remarks every day." in t h e N e w O r d e r, General Nasution; Sjaichu; these discussions, to c o n f o r m Press Release, U nited States D j a k a r t a, N o v e m b e r 4, 1967. th e includ the and some non-governmental H umphrey was t he r a t i o n a l e ^T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s. N o v e m b e r and departure, careful the "low 1967. Information Service, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 577] === 569 profile" policy. aid projects for There Indonesia, the V i c e Pres i d e n t, ness were no of the U n i t e d announcements a not uncommon practice but only States a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of cooperate government in e c o n o m i c deve l o p m e n t work. Nor was United States there joined, any attempt with Rather, the note restraint and humility: the for to s e e visits the r e a d i Indonesian an i n t e r n a t i o n a l even rhetorically, venture. of n e w b i l a t e r a l Indonesia and in some great struck by H u m p h r e y was one frame the common ...The Indonesians have been doing a very good job for themselves — a v e r y g o o d job of b u i l d i n g their own nation. T h e y h a v e all k i n d s o f t r o u b l e s. But let us not be too boastful, we Americans. Indonesians have been d o i n g for Indonesia what I n d o n e s i a n e e d s as t h e y s e e it. A n d w e as A m e r i c a n s h a v e b e e n a b l e to w i t n e s s a m i g h t y c r u s a d e in this c o u n t r y for the f r e e d o m a n d p r o g r e s s a n d t h e s u c c e s s of t h e I n d o n e s i a n people. I am v e r y p r o u d of them. But I d i d n ' t c o m e h e r e to t e l l t h e m t h a t w e m a d e it p o s s i b l e, b e c a u s e t h a t w o u l d n o t b e true. 5 The reports 196 7. Vice President made that U.S. actions a particular point to d e n y in V i e t n a m w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e 5S p e e c h at the A m e r i c a n Embassy, Dj a k a r t a, D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e B u l l e t i n. D e c e m b e r 11, for the November 1967, p. 791-792. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 578] === 570 failure of G e s t a p u and t h e o v e r t h r o w of Sukarno, talk which had want been received to a p p e a r happened that's in this day...." with by m any any p l a c e country not true," is b e c a u s e adversely subjects that its the U.S. troops Vietnam only was to f i g h t because happened here to h a v e seeking and General avoiding painful government deficiencies, like it h a p p e n, Indonesia t r e a t i n g the N e w O r d e r effusive praise, present beca u s e we made in I n d o n e s i a wa nt also d enied "I d o n ' t that w h a t has "What's Indonesia or d e s i r e d any time Humphrey declared. leaders Indonesians. a new alliance in V i e t n a m. Suharto mentions of p a s t treating controversial circumspectly, and by attempting In i t s e d i t o r i a l o f w e l c o m e to H u m p h r e y, t h e A r m y i n f l u e n c e d n e w s p a p e r, A n q k a t a n B e r s e n d j a t a s t r e s s e d i ts o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t some A m e r i c a n leaders' ideas that the p r e s e n c e o f U. S. f o r c e s in V i e t n a m h a d i n f l u e n c e d t h e c r u s h i n g of Gestapu. "...This fals^ idea can be u s e d by Communists to d i s c r e d i t G e n e r a l S u h a r t o ' s l e a d e r s h i p, " t h e p a p e r n o t e d. N o v e m b e r 3, 1 9 6 7. ^ S p e e c h at t h e A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y, o j d. c i t. It is i r o n i c that H u m p h r e y s h o u l d be a d m o n i s h i n g the U.S. m i s s i o n staff a b o u t c r e d i t i n g the U.S. w i t h I n d o n e s i a ' s tur n fr o m a P e k i n g o r i e n t a t i o n w h e n it was t h e y w ho w e r e e m b a t t l e d in m a k i n g t h i s p o i n t c l e a r to h i g h l e v e l s in W a s h i n g t o n, i n c l u d i n g President Johnson himself. S e e C h a p t e r III. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 579] === 571 smooth American nesia over some remaining relations, could Humphrey irritants assured t h a t his accounted successful. communique speaks atmosphere" and The the discussions contributing toward in I n d o n e s i a n visit final joint being held in a Indo "cordial increase of understanding." gave a strong its m o s t that boost severe regime a powerful And, States, test a large could be friend the r i c e its cause it had. just crisis. reception had seen not Indonesia. a picket, visit it was m e e t i n g While disappointed credits the thought that Indonesia, it h a d m a d e in W a s h i n g t o n. Upon his Vice President Humphrey waxed his the H u m p h r e y figure had not brought with him new offer consoled for indeed, important, to t h e N e w O r d e r the A m e r i c a n political "good news" the Unspoken but more return t he U n i t e d enthusiastic To r e p o r t e r s nor heard about he recalled that an u n k i n d w or d about America: In Indonesia, there were a m i l l i o n p e o p l e on the roads. A l l t h e y d i d w a s to s h o u t: "Thank America! Department State Bulletin. December 11, 1967, 792. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 580] === 572 Thank America! Love America!" The he a t was u n bearable — 115 in t h e s h a d e, b u t t h e r e w a s no shade — b u t they w e r e there. a result Humphrey mined said to d o m y this later, utmost" the U n i t e d States sentiments did not Minnesota Democrat Presidency and other during impressions returned and by the 1968 far "deter Indonesia, industrialized n a t i o n s. S u c h go u n n o t i c e d b y was Indonesia, th e U n i t e d S t a t e s stimulate help other the th e Indonesians favorite election, for and the the A m e r i c a n a l t h o u g h Mr. Nixon also h a d v i s i t e d Indonesia.'*’'1' Q uoted by Betty Beale m T h e E v e n i n g S t a r of W a s h i n g t o n, N o v e m b e r 9, 1967. H u m p h r e y also m e n t i o n e d the f a v o r a b l e i m p r e s s i o n o f t h e c r o w d s in " V i c e P r e s i d e n t H u m p h r e y Reports on S o utheast Asia," a booklet d escribing his i m p r e s s i o n s of the t r i p p u b l i s h e d by the D e m o c r a t i c National Committee. S e e p a g e 12- 1 3. "*"^"Vice P r e s i d e n t H u m p h r e y R e p o r t s o p. c i t., p. 13. on Sout h e a s t Asia," "^The author was in I n d o n e s i a w h ile the A m e r i c a n e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n w a s g e t t i n g i n t o f u l l s w i n g, i n S e p t e m b e r, 1968. N i x o n v i s i t e d I n d o n e s i a i n A p r i l, 1967. He visited with M a l i k and Suharto, sa i d h e was i m p r e s s e d w i t h the c o u n try's e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s, a n d p r o m i s e d to u r g e h i s f r i e n d s i n t h e U. S. g o v e r n m e n t to h e l p I n d o n e s i a ' s e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t. T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s. A p r i l 18, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 581] === Indonesia and Vietnam i n a se ns e, designed for success, in S o u t h e a s t A s i a, communique Humphrey's there was i s s u e d at t h e reported position that e n d of said solution pretations mediation tha t, a n d so a central Although "good to h a v e to t h e th e o f f i c i a l intentions" news the U n i t e d States, services its u t m o s t involved it w a s solu a mediator. that th e in s e e k i n g an o f f i c i a l 12 government's toward a peaceful Vietnam question. agency, if t h o s e replied with the hope this e x c h a n g e issue the final that S u h arto had r e i t e r a t e d his I n d o n e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d do peaceful avoiding the A m e r i c a n Vice P r e s i d e n t ' s and had offer ed Indonesia's Humphrey to I n d o n e s i a wa s t h e w a r w o u l d be s e t t l e d o n l y would demonstrate tion, the V i e t n a m War. visit did not mention Vietnam, Antara, visit Despite request inter for something less than a c knowledged subseq u e n t l y by A d a m Malik. 12 O n e s u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a p p e a r e d in t h e T h a i - e d i t e d, S E A T O R e c o r d f o r D e c e m b e r, 1967, w h i c h a p p a r e n t l y c o n s t r u e d t h e A n t a r a r e p o r t to m e a n an o f f i c i a l U. S. r e q u e s t. A trans l a t i o n o f t h e A n t a r a r e p o r t d o n e b y th e U. S. e m b a s s y d o e s not reveal any such direct intention. R a t h e r, it i n d i c a t e s a r a t h e r n o n c o m m i t a l r e p l y b y H u m p h r e y, to a p r o p o s a l p u t by Suharto. T h e A n t a r a r e p o r t w a s d a t e d N o v e m b e r 5, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 582] === 574 Humphrey's inquiry, remark part panied American Despite was sufficient sally people diplomatic its arrival, motivation and r eported from there was no on N o v e m b e r and to m a k e immediate 22. than for Vietnamese would 14 be p r e p a r e d Djakarta, Radio Djakarta, Humphrey's reply another thereby exercising a week its its own before Humphrey's Vietnam with President DeGaulle there w ere no d i f f e r e n c e s its the issue.^ renewed mediation from Hanoi, as M a l i k assertions that to h o l d p e a c e October November the press, Thai F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r n e s i a n i n i t i a t i v e and u r g e d full 27, 1967. 1967. Buoyed effort, 14 but admitted a disappointing response foreign minister's Radio Vietnam. contact wi t h North Vietnam, Indonesian 13 accom to u n d e r t a k e Indon e s i a on reply This was an e a r n e s t foreign policy before Less Thailand Indonesia sought over for D j a k a r t a "in g e n e r a l " between France support campaigns had discussed that shadow-boxing which the V i e t n a m War, the world. Malik response calculated vagueness, and independent" and opinion a cautious the p o l i t i c a l at m e d i a t i n g "active was to the the North negotiations with In a s t a t e m e n t Thanat welcomed s u p p o r t f o r its the Indo activities. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 583] === 575 the U n i t e d States, step ending Washington firm and the bombing. that suggestion criticism 15 than Perhaps It was reaction concerned that clear lead Indonesia V i e t n a m War, some influential been urging, 17 on December Hanoi. that meeting, the Indonesian that his ■^Malik took w o u l d w a n t to s p e a k for which lack lack talks. the U n i t e d Ambassador government for that the the N o r t h interest its it s p o s i t i o n o n the and groups ambassador upon Pham would had finally met returning from Binh reportedly told "promptly into enter t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t it w a s u n l i k e l y of p e a c e w h i l e h i s h o m e w a s b e i n g example, States newspapers 9 in Djakarta, 16 to s h i f t the N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e with Malik from a spokesman mediator. mediation might fo r first anti-Communist press acted more a neutral the an o v e r t u r e a bombing halt would bring Indonesia's had took and h a d rej e c t e d b r o u g h t no from foreign minister Vietnamese the A m e r i c a n s had heard before assurances Malik's provided A m p e r a. November 13, someone bombed. 1967. 17 " I t i t n o t i m p e r a t i v e to r e v i e w o u r p o l i c y o n th e V i e t n a m War?" a s k e d the A r m e d F o r c e s D a i l y New s p a p e r, A n q k a t a n B e r s e n d j a t a, in s u p p o r t o f the S o u t h V i e t n a m e s e p o s i t i o n. O c t o b e r 23, N o v e m b e r 1, 1967. 1967. See also editorial from D j a k a r t a. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 584] === 576 peace negotiations ditional bombing with cessation." Washington for Ambassador to N o r t h Although the the United States study. Nugroho, the p eace negotiation had fallen close i n j u r e d no the The was declined the time Malik public foreign of h i s gave opinion talks with interview and pu b l i c Vietnamese and d o m e s t i c continued to o p p o s e confidence Vietcong. " N o w it they tired of 18 19 consultation. in H a n o i the status bombs but had seemed officials while anti-Communist the U.S. to o late South for know their toward to s w a y accepting s i l e n c i n g his Malik Vietnam A l t h o u g h he e m p h a s i z e d his to r e j e c t the C o m m u n i s t s atrocities, Evening S t a r. December the in South "The p e o p l e k n o w The Washington Daily N e w s. January The Washington journalist calculated critics. bombing, reportedly declared. the m, the N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e to A m e r i c a n t h e i r wor d, the p e a s a n t r y Vietnam," are fo r that American Indonesian mission Richard Critchfield which perhaps the North Indonesian to c o m m e n t noted employees. ambassador, the called home effort, an u n c o n - offer was r e l a y e d the meantime, Vietnam envoy, 18 after their them, tactics." 1967. 1 96 7. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 === [PDF page 585] === Whatever the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ' s Vietnamese Communists, peace talks and Malik there later was the bombing halt later, therefore, ator. site 21 But for The United States capital acceptable Vietnam, cruiser Irian for negotiate in C a m b o d i a — talks toward the l a c k settlement. came to o f f e r D j a k a r t a and offered site" for after a medias an d W a s h i n g t o n. included sites 20 two mo n t h s quick between Hanoi unfulfilled put the forward spurned by North the R u s s i a n - b u i l t the of P r e s i d e n t John s o n ' s any th e still the o f f e r was undaunted, anyplace, 20 time" about a peaceful fifteen When a "floating stung by reminders further progress favorably among some location. Indonesia, was talks responded criticizing own re ti r e m e n t I nd onesia was the g o v e r n m e n t by P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n of and his t he p r e l i m i n a r y Indonesian for announcement partial complained sincere desire on both sides When motive talks. pledge Th e U.S. a subsequent refusal accepted swiftly, despite doubts D j a k a r t a R a d i o, F e b r u a r y 1, 1968. He repeated i d e a o n F e b r u a r y 18 a f t e r t h e T e t O f f e n s i v e. this 21 R a t h e r iro n i c a l l y, in the interim, N o r t h K o r e a h a d s e i z e d the A m e r i c a n spy ship, Pueblo, p r e c i p i t a t i n g a n o t h e r international crisis. Although there were some reported R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 586] === 5 78 among diplomats vessel. "A n e u t r a l meeting place," Christian. Paris about 22 chosen instance, "realization played ministers was has t he 1 5, 4 5 0 - ton s e a w o u l d be a good Secretary George disagreed, however, an d th e site. to p l a y its some role self-image continued in t h e Vietnam a leading power to b e e v i d e n t. in V i e t n a m w a s the P a ris a rol e. to e x c h a n g e th e p r e r o g a t i v e In N o v e m b e r, Foreign Minister Malik declared that of p e a c e " e n l a r g e d s e s s i o n of nations a neutral desire as b e f i t t i n g of S o u t h e a s t Asia, for ship on The North Vietnamese Indonesia's 1968, seaworthiness said White House Press finally was settlement, th e views talks suggested of T h a i l a n d dependant upon in w h i c h other the interested a m e e t i n g of A S E A N the subject, as t h e noting that "most interested" s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t D j a k a r t a a c t as i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n t h e U.S. a n d N o r t h K o r e a, a g a i n t h e U.S. s h o w e d l i t t l e i n t e r e s t as i n d i c a t e d by M a l i k in a J a n u a r y 30 p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e. 22 T h e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t. M a y 2, 1969. If t h e t a l k s h a d b e e n h e l d o n th e ship, t h e l e s s - t h a n - d e s i r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s m i g h t h a v e m o v e d things a l o n g m u c h f a s t e r than in Paris, w h e r e o n e c a n d a w d l e in l u x u r y. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 587] === 5 79 call such sequently was an A S E A N meeting. When rejected as b e i n g p r e m a t u r e, positively be sent Malik sai d, Nations. attack. East crises this suggestion, 'let A s i a n s that the orders th e p r o p o s a l combatants 23 did were request the 23 force, from ASEAN I n d o n e s i a would, in t h e C o n g o to d o so b y t h e U n i t e d brought Malik under independent newspaper published no request h a d sides troops it h a d Diah, Q u o t e d by The N e w York "that we imperialist United States When come agreement, troops, sa i d the F o r e i g n would mean criticism an d o t h e r o f f i c i a l s, an I n d o n e s i a n p e a c e both if i m p l e m e n t e d, fight Asians.'" requested Information Minister carried out until Vietnam that force. conditioned offer from General Nasution for sub Indonesia responsed from Thanat T h e D a i l y M e r d e k a. an Minister's noting however, a peace-keeping send troops Even former have 1969, a suggestion to V i e t n a m and M i d d l e idea Thanat dropped. In F e b r u a r y, the Thailand's also came Malik retreated, from Hanoi or W a s h i n g t o n th at no r e q u e s t w ou ld and even if t h e Indonesia would not be T i m e s. February come able 1969. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 588] === 580 to accept if the stationing was not in accord with the United Nations charter. 24 Indonesia1s Defense While the Foreign Ministry engaged in diplomatic feints over the Vietnam War, there was growing fear among anti communist military officers in Indonesia that the future of Southeast Asia might somehow hinge on the outcome in Vietnam. In calling for a reassessment of the nation's neutral policy on the war, the Army paper Angkatan Bersendjata declared: Actually our national interest necessitates us to remove Communist danger as far away as possible from the Indonesian boundary, and it is obvious that we do not want to see that the Communist danger, on the contrary, is coming nearer to our door.25 In the same vein, the publication Djakarta noted that American troops in the Indochina Peninsula "are a shield against the CPR's expansion to Southeast Asia." If the U.S. military withdrew to Australia and New Zealand, as had been suggested, it would be very easy for China to pursue its aggression and 24 Djakarta Radio, February 8, 1969. 25 Djakarta, October 23, 1967. Quoted in Translation, Indonesian News and Views. August 13, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 589] === 581 expansion to the south, the periodical declared. 26 "I do not think the American troops should leave Vietnam," an Indonesian Army lieutenant told Donald Kirk. "If the Americans go away, we are afraid someday the Communists will attack Indonesia." 27 Some unsubstantiated newspaper reports to the contrary, U.S. diplomats assert that the United States has not attempted to capitalize on these deep-seated anti-Chinese and anti communist feelings to bring Indonesia into the Vietnam War as an active participant or to bind Djakarta to Washington through a mutual security arrangement. Rumors of U.S. mili tary personnel approaching Indonesians to suggest that their country send forces to Vietnam in exchange for massive American aid have cropped up from time to time. So too have stories 26 November 1, 1967. Reprinted in the Congressional Record, November 14, 1967, p. A5596. 27 "Southeast Asia Faces the Future," The New Leader (February 3, 1969), p. 6. 28 David Van Praagh, writing in the Washington S t a r. October 15, 1967, intimated that the U.S. was playing on these fears and was not ruling out the possibility of Indonesia sending troops to fight in Vietnam in the future. In a similar vein, the Asia Letter, August 30, 1966, reported a Pentagon proposal for an enlarged SEATO which would include Indonesia and Malaysia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 590] === 582 about Indonesian generals offering troops in exchange for dollars. 29 Neither version is true, State Department offi cials contend most emphatically. By putting its own house in order and achieving internal stability, according to Ambassador Green, Indonesia is serving the cause of peace quite well enough in Southeast Asia. To tax the nation's resources and political consensus by urging a contribution to the Vietnam War effort would be tragically shortsighted. At the same time, however, U.S. diplomats will admit that there are Americans, particularly in the Pentagon, who like to think of Indonesia as "our newest friend and ally" in Asia. Visits by American military personnel to Indonesia have been not infrequent since the New Order came to power. For example, in April, 1967, a team of 35 U.S. officers representing the National War College toured Indonesian 29 In August, 1968, a story by British Newsman Peter Job alleging that Indonesia had offered to send troops to Vietnam in exchange for $500 million, but the move had failed because the Indonesian Foreign Office had opposed it and because of a lack of American encouragement. Denied emphatically by Malik, the story may have its seeds in the $500 million General Yusuf sought from the U.S., American diplomats believe. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 591] === 583 military installations and armed forces cemetaries as the guest of the Indonesian National Institute of Defense. May, the Indonesian Army observed U.S. Armed Forces Day by sponsoring a television program which included a congratula tory speech and a Pentagon film on the striking power of the U.S. in the r e g i o n. I n August, 1967, there were visits by the American missile-carrying frigate Coontz to the port of Tandung Priok — 1963 — the first call by a U.S. warship since and by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Pacific Air Force, Lt. Gen. Edmundson. The general emerged from a meeting with General Suharto to tell the press the U.S. would consider providing military aid to Indonesia, especially spare parts for planes of the Indonesian Air Force and im provement of the nation's airfields. Edmundson warned, however, that any such aid would require Congressional approval first. 31 To date, however, no such request has come to 30 A columnist for The Dj akarta Times. commenting on the propriety of the program, wondered if it would become an Indonesian tradition to celebrate other nations' armed forces days. May 30. 1967. "Cocky’s Corner." 31 Reported in Anqkatan Bersendjata. August 25, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 592] === Capitol Hill, indicating opposition to the proposition at high levels in the Executive Branch. In the future, however, pressures from both the Pentagon and the Indonesian military may result in a resump tion of U.S. military aid. There is little doubt some Americans see Indonesia as a potential bulwark against Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia and would favor arming the nation on thai assumption. This prospect has caused some concern among Indonesia's neighbors, particularly Singapore. During Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 visit to the United States, he discussed the issue with State Department official who, he later said, accused him of having too fertile an imagination in visualizing a new threat from Indonesia. Despite assurances, however, the fears have persisted. 32 military aid is eventually given to Indonesia by the U.S. it probably would be in carefully measured amounts, lest the weapons assistance set off an arms race in Southeast Asia. 32 Reported the London Observer of January 14, 1968: "Singapore could not turn to the United States for help with any confidence, for diplomatic reports indicate that at least some prominent American hawks are so keen to groom a docile Indonesia, with 110 million inhabitants, for the role of anti-Communist Big Brother in this region that they would 'accq?t the sacrifice if the Indonesians swallowed Singapore. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 593] === 585 America's caution has been evident in its distinctly un favorable reaction to Malaysia's efforts to obtain sophis ticated fighter aircraft from Britain or France. While the United States eventually may be willing to build up Indo nesia militarily as a bulwark against Chinese expansion, the effort would be a gradual and cautious one, sensitive to the attitudes of other U.S. allies in the region and the effect on Indonesia's progress toward economic development. While the Indonesians have continued to press for renewed arms aid from the United States, there has been recognition in Djakarta of the need for self-sufficiency in weapons to the extent possible. "We have not forgotten our bitter experience with Russia," General Panggabean has explained. "We have no spare parts for our airplanes because relations are not as good as in the past." 33 As a result, Indonesia had tried to build its own arms industry and already has manufactured light weapons including machine-guns and mortars. For more sophisticated weaponry the military has sought, without success, to buy arms on credit from 33 Agence France Presse dispatch from Singapore, February 10, 1969. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 594] === 586 France and Germany, in order to lessen its reliance on either the USSR or the United States for help. General Nasution reportedly expressed the desire for less dependence on the West and the r e s t o r a t i o n good relations with the Communist camp, including Mainland China "when the internal situation of the country changes." 34 In the same vein. New Order officials have maintained official opposition to foreign bases in Southeast Asia, claiming that the United States could buy more security by using its money to assist the nations of the region become economically strong and able to defend themselves. 35 Such statements may be recognized as echoes of Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy as it was pursued under President Sukarno. That they have survived his political demise indicates the deep-seated feeling for non-alignment and against foreign bases among Indonesian political elites. 34 Quoted by the Japan Press Service, February 21, 1969, from an interview with Nasution by Tokyo Shimbun, February 21. The paper noted that Nasution's statement suggested a growing, delicate antagonism within the Suharto regime over foreign poli c y. 35 See, for example, Suharto's statement to a group of 50 American industrialists, publishers and businessmen who met with the Indonesian President on March 3, 1969. Antara, March 3. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 595] === 587 Indonesia's Foreign Poli cy With these several exceptions, the New Order government has interpreted Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy in a considerably different way from its predecessor regime. By comparison with the flamboyant posturing in international affairs which delighted Sukarno, the present leadership has maintained a purposely and distinctly muted style in its dealings abroad. In a 1967 speech to top-level Indonesian diplomats, for example, President Suharto emphas ized that foreign policy "realistically and pragmatically" should assist the domestic development of the New Order. President outlined two goals of policy. The The first, a short term objective, was "to achieve stability in our foreign relations and the creation of a climate of sound relations, mutual understanding and mutual respect..." Under such conditions, he stated, it would be possible to prevent the "political guerrilla tactics" of the Indonesian government's detractors abroad, thereby aiding political stability at home and improving the New Order image worldwide. The long range objective of Indonesian policy, Suharto continued, was to help attract economic assistance, in capital investments. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 596] === 588 loans, grants and other forms. "...We will put more emphasis on economic rather than political considerations," he told the assembled Indonesian diplomats. 36 In other words, Indonesia will not go out of its way to offend Western nations, especially the United States, on whom the government relies for substantial economic assistance. Instead it must maintain the aura of stability and respect ability necessary to attract foreign loans and investment. In practical terms the New Order re-structuring of foreign policy has meant many changes in style and substance since the Sukarno era. Missions which had been opened in small, remote African and other countries have been closed or consolidated. Indonesian representatives no longer are sent to every conference or meeting called in the developing world. While Sukarno met regularly with leaders like Nasser, Tito, and Nehru as one of the "directorate" for the Third World, Suharto up to the end of 1968 had gone abroad only once, to Japan and Cambodia, and the sole head of state 36 Indonesian Information Service, October 6, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 597] === 589 to visit Indonesia was Emperor Hailie Selassie of Ethopia. 37 So little priority was placed on Third World activities by the New Order that Adam Malik, explaining the purpose of his trip to India early in 1969, felt constrained to explain that Indonesia was not only a member of ASEAN but also of the group of nonaligned nations. 38 While Indonesia has continued to speak in behalf of the interests of developing countries, including the need for increased economic assis tance from "have" nations, and has verbally maintained opposition to racism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, the statements have lost their shrill tone and crusading zeal. In the United States, Indonesia has continued to support membership for Communist China. It has used the opportunity, however, to launch attacks on the Peking govern ment for its interference in the internal affairs of the archipelago. Moreover, on the important issue of whether the admission of the Chinese People's Republic is to be 37 Although Suharto had scheduled a trip to Yugoslavia for 1969, Tito was forced to cancel it in late April, because of objections by hard-line Communist factions within his country to the Indonesian President. 38 Antara, March 4, 1969. As an example of the low-key approach presently employed by the New Order, Malik suggested R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 598] === 590 decided by a majority or two-thirds vote, the Indonesian dele gation has joined the United States in supporting the latter position. This marked a distinct break with past policy. 39 Perhaps the most difficult international issue with which Indonesia has had to grapple is the Middle East situation. As a predominantly Moslem nation, there have been strong domes tic pressures for the government to side actively with the Arabs in their dispute with Israel. Moslem organizations have held meetings, rallies and demonstrations in support of their co-religionists and have faulted the New Order regime for its reluctance to intervene directly. Other pressures have been applied externally by the Arab nations involved, which wish to see Djakarta commit resources of men, supplies and money to the fight. During the tense period which preceded the June, 1967, war, Indonesia apparently was one of the nations contacted by the Egyptians for assistance. After a top-level meeting that members of the Indonesian community in India should do their best to explain the Indonesian situation to the Indian government. This is a far cry from the personal and intense diplomacy carried on by Sukarno. 39 Apparently in an effort to explain the shift, the Indonesians in 1968 noted that the U.S. delegate to the U.S., James Russell Wiggins, while rejecting CPR membership, had promised to continue to exert best efforts to come to an agree ment with Peking on membership. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 599] === 591 between Malik and Suharto on May 31, Adam Malik withheld tangible support but gave verbal approval to the closing of the Gulf of Aquaba to Israeli shipping — later ignited hostilities. the spark which As in other capitals, in Djakarta the news of the smashing defeat inflicted upon the combined Arab nations by an inspired Israeli strategy came as a shocking surprise. The Indonesian delegation at the UN was one of the first to call for an emergency session of the international organization to consider the Middle East crisis and, in general, on the issue. fell in line behind Soviet initiatives At the same time, the Indonesian Foreign Office recalled its ambassadors from a number of countries involved for consultation. Among those returning home was Suwito, Djakarta's envoy to the United States. Indonesia was extremely interested in the U.S. position, Malik indicated, because it did not want to see the Americans get involved in the Middle East crisis. Just as important, perhaps, was Indonesia's fear that U.S. economic sponsorship for its stabilization program might be jeopardized if it took too vigorous a stand on the Arab side. Privately in Washington, Indonesians were conveying to American officials their R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 600] === 592 dilemma in an attempt to elicit understanding, sympathy and tolerance. These contacts were climaxed by a meeting in New York between Secretary of State Rusk and Adam Malik who was in the U.S. to attend the U.'N. emergency session. 40 Although no report of the meeting was divulged, the two foreign ministers apparently reached a general under standing. Malik pledged not to send troops or weapons to the Arabs; Rusk expressed a tolerant attitude toward Djakarta's verbal commitment to Israel's antagonists. On the matter of the United Nations action, the Secretary of State may well have suggested that Indonesia not slavishly follow the Soviet lead on every issue brought to a vote during the emergency session. At any rate, on at least one key pro cedural vote, Indonesia broke away from the Soviet-Arab phalanx and abstained. The absention aroused a considerable storm of protest in the Indonesian Parliament and a rumor arose that Israel 40 They apparently met over lunch at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel on or about June 28, 1967. Rusk was well aware of the pressures on the New Order. Earlier that month 19 Moslem organizations in Indonesia had met to condemn the "strongly provocative actions by the United States and Britain against Arab countries" and had dispatched the resolution to Ambassador Green. Anqkatan Bersendjata. June 13, 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 601] === 593 had offered spare parts Soviet-built MIG before that the Israel fighters. legislative had offered ter p a s s e d off little import. told "principle," assured, guine 42 in t h e i r body on have for weeks the n ew ambassador designate And grounded, was obliged September conduct th e always foreign minis as of the m a t t e r In m a t t e r s supported been somewhat the Denying at t h e U.N. abstained Indonesia interpretation some its the p a r l i a m e ntarians. Arab nations d e l a y e d for Mokoginta. Adam Malik aircraft parts, a retaliatory measure, ment 41 "Indonesia only cause. I n d o n e s i a for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s procedures," Arab less th e san Indonesian position. example, the accepting the to C a i r o, the U n i t e d N a t ions, Egyptian Govern credentials Gen. Achmad Arab delegates were 41 The r e p ort was carried m the a r m y - s u p p o r t e d n e w s paper, B e r i t a Y u d h a. q u o t i n g r e l i a b l e s o u rces and was p i c k e d u p b y t h e F r e n c h n e w s a g e n c y, AF P. The s t o r y cl a i m e d that a s p e c i a l e n v o y of I s r a e l i D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r M o s h e D a y a n h a d a r r i v e d in D j a k a r t a to o f f e r t h e p a r t s. The sources were q u o t e d as s a y i n g t h a t t h e y d i d n o t k n o w w h e t h e r th e p a r t s w e r e f r o m U A R p l a n e s c a p t u r e d d u r i n g t h e J u n e war. AFP, S i n g a p o r e, A u g u s t 11, 1967. 42 The Djakarta T i m e s, September 11, 1967. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 602] === 594 said to be reason avoiding Indonesian for A r a b sus p i c i o n s to j o i n in t h e oi l nations. Middle disruptions as E u r o p e boycott Eastern in A r a b i a n and J a p a n considerable oil their c a n be look extent, traced against for cau s e. Assembly the q u i c k e n i n g since 1968, and other Western also been interest it s war, verbal the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and demanded troops w i t h d r a w to their pre-June 5 position crisis." 45 This position, solution while the Indo the General condemned of A r a b lands a comprehensive s u p p o r t of "invasion" for Indonesia 44 1967, Adam Malik that in I n d o n e s i a n Israeli first step aware have benefited turmoil. the June, Speaking before on O ctober have Another refusal alternative sources. nesian government has m a intained Arab t he U. S. supplies to t h e M i d e a s t In t h e m o n t h s 43 no doubt was D j akar ta's capitals oi l counterparts. the that Tel Av i v ' s "t h e n e c e s s a r y the Middle East consistent with Arab demands 43 T h e r e p o r t of s n u b s to I n d o n e s i a b y A r a b s l i k e l y w a s a d e l i b e r a t e l e a k of the I n d o n e s i a n F o r e i g n Mi n i s t r y, s i n c e it a p p e a r e d i n i t i a l l y in T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s — a l t h o u g h an o f f i cial g o v e r n m e n t d i s c l a i m e r w a s f o r t h c o m i n g later, b u t onl y f o l l o w i n g t h e a c c e p t a n c e of M o k o g i n t a ' s c r e d e n t i a l s by N a s s e r. 44 N e w York, 45 S e e a s t o r y b y L a u r e n c e F. S t u n t z, A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s, r e p r i n t e d in T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s, A u g u s t 30, 1967. Indonesian News and V i e w s. October, 1968, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 603] === and Soviet proposals, and language. the s a m e c r i t i c i s m of the Ar a b s nesian press influence Middle somewhat more moderate the gro u n d s that to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n East. 46 While Suharto Organization Central Council, not like The West interfere Irian East from the In d o allowed too m u c h crisis, sustain the N e w entanglement following the t he Islamic the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s " I ndonesian p e o p l e do other people's affairs." 47 Issue The United States, well disposed non-involvement i n t he M i d d l e reciprocated by its o w n n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e 46 told the A f r o - A s i a n aggression, increasing c a n be e x p e c t e d aloof General Israeli they have the M i d d l e c o n d e m n a t i o n of been and Communist China Indonesia government will k e e p dispute. there has and particularly Nasser i ts p r o - A r a b p o s i t i o n o n Order time, in style East to I n d o n e s i a ' s crisis, has in a s e n s e in t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g "...Had Nasser not wrongly fallen into M o s c o w ' s lap th e f i g h t a g a i n s t I s r a e l w o u l d b e b e t t e r o r g a n i z e d a n d m o r e e f f e c t i v e, " O p e r a s i. N o v e m b e r 1, 1968. See also editorial, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i s t A t t e m p t s to C o n t r o l the A r a b W o rld," Nusantara, 47 October 28, 1 96 8. A n t a r a, J u l y 2, 1 967. zation Central Council h a d met The Afro-Asian Islamic Organi i n D j a k a r t a a n d v o t e d its R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 604] === 596 current international determination The issue of W e s t 1963 N e w Yo r k agreement which territory ified the p o p u l a t i o n make "act of whether Although Sukarno the N e w O r d e r pectability, meet the their rebels occurred ever territory, 1966, field the meantime, between continue given 1969 movement. the level of the of v iol e n c e Djakarta reported i ts t he R e p u b l i c. this proviso, international res readiness 48 stepped up Although the activities clashes government control increased m i n o r i t y of armed Indonesian 3,600 rebels spec the question a troublesome Indonesia obtained th e control repudiated agreement. however, and troops and d e c l a r e d racially Papuans, since selfan o p p o r t u n i t y to b e p a r t a bid for the N e w York "Free Papua" the transferred Indonesian later unilaterally reversed the p o p u l a t i o n, would be government, terms from Dutch determination" they wished Indonesia, Irian. New,Guinea that involving killed had the th e m i d - I 9 6 0 ' s. in W e s t Irian. condemnation. It was m a d e clear that S u h a r t o was d i s t i n g u i s h in g his p o s i t i o n (and tha t of the N e w Order) fro m the Council's. 48 O n F e b r u a r y 15, 1968, f o r e x a m p l e, A d a m M a l i k s a i d the N e w York a g r e e m e n t on a p l e b i s c i t e in W e s t Irian w ould be c a r r i e d o u t and th a t p r e p a r a t i o n s for it w e r e b e i n g planned. D j a k a r t a Radio, February 15, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 605] === SSI Although the region has r o u g h l y one rebels apparently have with no great difficulty December, paign 1968, the 6,000 able the Indonesians struggle refugees new, that A r m y large The excesses cause feeling of P a p u a n s, who ethnically are some Indonesia. had resulted the a tall, and Their high-nosed, was fired exhortations from certain local D utch of r e s o u r c e s which Indonesia has pu t the ar e a, officials and by the often have a i r of brought cultural increase indicated There were in the cam strongholds that reports, f ormat ion of the population. insurgency the l a r gest subsequent 49 the n a t i o n a l i s t i c dark-skinned people culturally distinct cause fight. New Guinea success. among the the replacements nationalist Irian. to A u s t r a l i a n guerrilla bands root recruit launched against rebel campaign had met with however, and have k e p t up th e n o r t h w e s t r e g i o n o f W e s t of poli t i c a l been million population, from (at l e a s t th e M a l a y s initially) residents, the lack to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t superiority which Djakarta's their work in t h e territory. 49 told that Reports from Canberra said that Papuan refugees had s t o r i e s of I n d o n e s i a n m i l i t a r y atr o c i t i e s and h a d c l a i m e d t h e s i t u a t i o n h a d g r o w n w o r s e as t h e U. N. d e a d l i n e f o r elections approached. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 606] === 598 Although initially Djakarta allocate sufficient ment, hard 50 t he austerity budgets that observers been to t h e closer, been made with believe that the remote, th e willingness holiday time for strange West than other 1968, and N e w Years for the rebel example, greetings conferred with Papuan rebel for m a k i n g p e a c e West Irian New Order with and p l e d g e d along with also has President cation Irian: They the country. drawn During Suharto the C h r i s t i a n an i m m e d i a t e t h e r e s t of announced captured rebels. the area a display of groups. leaders some Irian areas of the u p r i s i n g who were believed hiding also the gov e r n m e n t t h e A c t of D e t e r m i n a t i o n h a s to n e g o t i a t e w i t h its d e v e l o p - an e v e n han d, Indonesian government has made season Christmas area for Although have the an e f f o r t th e N e w O r d e r h a v e h i t cuts affected more deeply resources t he f o r m e r W e s t N e w G u i n e a. insists has apparently made its the sent leaders in t h e jungle. a b out the prosp e c t s start on developing Indonesian state. an e n l i g h t e n e d p o l i c y are b e i n g trained, Th e in d e a l i n g a c c o r d i n g to 5 ^"There has clearly been muc h public-spirited ded i to t h e c a u s e o f W e s t I r i a n, " M. A. J a s p a n, " W e s t The F i r s t Two Years," The Austr a l i a n Quarterly X X X V I I:2 (June, 196 5 ), 9-22. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 607] === 559 Suharto, f or future ment projects. appeals for continued has of t h e s e and has f o r th e for voted free the there have been widely circulated with promises to be for a plebiscite. choice assembly — the legislature, was u n c o n v i n c i n g to o u t s i d e insisted that probably never More for some it s recently, acceptable members picked Because however, the the the W e s t by D j a karta vote allegiance legiti macy of The in H o l l a n d, where abide sub an a c t remain in the f o l d of observers. Indonesia the N e w O r d e r three occasions Irian will very "act of free it is n o t n e c e s s a r y and that W e s t controversial th e u n r e s t h a s the p l e d g e d casting about that efforts, enthusiasm Indonesian R e p u b l i c. ^ have develop intensive dampened its b e l i e f particularly territory's West Irianese. Irian legislative has their themselves th e f i r s t p l a c e — appeared stitute to g i v e t h o s e w h o do. In s p i t e choice" addition, for rebels leniency great employment by native owed the e x p r e s s i o n issue has been conservatives demands that the 51 A d a m M a l i k h i m s e l f g a v e c a u t i o u s a p p r o v a l to the l e g i s l a t i v e a s s e m b l y p o s i t i o n as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e f e e l i n g s o f t h e W e s t I r i a n p e o p l e, b u t s t o p p e d s h o r t o f s e e i n g its i m p o r t as e n o u g h to s u b s t i t u t e f o r a p l e b i s c i t e. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 608] === 600 plebiscite be When conducted under a the New Order made conducting tions protests the D u t c h g o v e r n m e n t a planned visit to H o l l a n d a compromise "one-man, one-vote" developed coastal of c o n s u l t a t i o n b e carried "musjawarah mufakat" one thousand local set f o r Ma y, intention of W e s t out Irian this one Suharto to defer proposed in t h e idea that a method interior. in f a v o r o f for the entire territory. accepted b y the Uni t e d Nations, leaders w i l l make the the relatively and that in the p r i m i t i v e rejected 1969. Nations followed rule. angry demonstra asked General consultation,^ a plan ultimately in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s. the United regions one-vote" it h a d there w e r e formula be The Djak a r t a g o v e r n m e n t Under that such a referendum, and newspaper result, clear "one-man, decision about on b e h a l f 52 This rebuff, t o g ether w i t h the r e q u e s t e d p o s t p o n e m e n t b y the Y u g o s l a v government, and the r e s i g n a t i o n of Degaulle, cau s e d S u h a r t o on A p r i l 30 to a n n o u n c e t h a t h i s E u r o p e a n t r i p was being called off entirely. A F P Dispatch from Djakarta, A p r i l 30, 1 9 6 9. 53 The traditional Javanese community decision-making p r o c e s s, " m u s j a w a r a h m u f a k a t " is n o t i n d i g e n o u s t o t h e c u l t u r a l l y d i s t i n c t p e o p l e o f W e s t I r ian, b u t t h e n n e i t h e r is W e s t e r n "one-man, o n e - v o t e " democracy. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 609] === 601 800,000 people Even the g o v e r n m e n t givings the about the consultative ardize good drafting 1969 Nations had tion" the 54 the agreement and being in H o l l a n d Irian, See The Ne w York and its 55 acceptance silence considered Amer 1968 the "self-determina would not have th e N e w Order and the U n i t e d Nations T i m e s. May 54 jeoprole (se e C h a p t e r their issue. and Australia. the U n i t e d Indonesian plan the securing 1962 conspicuous issue was concurred a major firm ly on d e m o c r a t i c meth ods for W e s t accepted States played 1969. expressed mis apparently unwilling Indonesians were finally Indonesia over th e U n i t e d and d e b a t e d insisted with for August, which had Indonesian plans, referendum, and ican officials scheduled of A u s t r a l i a, t he N e w Y o r k the D u t c h early a vote relations Although would have 1969. 55 T h e A u s t r a l i a n M i n i s t e r f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s, Mr. G o r d o n F r e e t h, i n an A p r i l v i s i t to D j a k a r t a, s a i d h i s c o u n try "understood" the r e a s o n s the I n d o n e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d r e j e c t e d a p a r t i a l o n e - m a n, o n e - v o t e f o r m u l a a n d t h a t it "respected the decision." M e l b o u r n e Overseas Service, A p r i l 26, 1969. T h e A u s t r a l i a n. a r e s p e c t e d n a t i o n a l n e w s p a p e r sa i d: "... I n t h e l o n g r u n A u s t r a l i a ' s m a j o r i n t e r e s t s l i e n o t in i n s i s t i n g u p o n a fair and just s e t t l e m e n t for the W e s t Irianese but in c o n t i n u e d g o o d r e l a t i o n s w i t h Indonesia," Q u o t e d in The N e w York Times. May 196 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 610] === 602 been forced clude alter at l e a s t some its p l a n s such demands. for th i s reticence. this Irian author territory could see no issue the Papu ans ities There First, spoke had to be reason again. the Soviet Union been no willingness emotional topic such issues China issues such considered as V i e t n a m, South Indonesian rule by in n e w i n s t a b i l to o p p o s e D j a k a r t a o n far m o r e the Middle an d and painful or M a i n l a n d China. the o t h e r hand, a significant United States tion. the West cr e a t e n e w areas Irian when and for Third, it h a s p r o v e d important East tract in W a s h i n g t o n, t h e s e a t i n g of the Uni t e d Nations. Critics, been as W e s t diplomats Indonesia an o l d certainly result and possibly reasons considered ab ro g a t i o n of almost three i n t e r e s t e d U.S. there has able at least long since the State Department a p e r m a n e n t p a r t of in S o u t h e a s t A s i a p e n e t r a t i o n by are But for r e s u r r e c t i n g Second, would the p l e b i s c i t e direct voting. made whom for has force behind the N e w York continuing responsibility Insisting on Vietnam, may point the importance it should h a r d l y do out agreement, to its of o n e -man, less that, in West having th e implementa one-vote Irian where R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 611] === 603 such a formula might American inaction on proposed 1962 just t he non-democratic th e N e w O r d e r and t o d a y U.S. as r e a l i s t i c a l l y reinforces applied. "act of free the s u s p i c i o n p o l i c y makers have not been interested in s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n New Guinea in b u r y i n g for the p e o p l e a particularly choice" that both so m u c h of W e s t e r n troublesome political problem. Indonesian Diplomatic Much States East, and Gestapu first, era whose from age Lambertus energy between West Irian, carried on th e M i d d l e at th e U n i t e d in e a c h G r e e n has the U n i t e d country. continued Indonesian government has a s u c c e s s i o n of wa s a hold-over three from N e w Order early sought the other "Guided Democracy" fr o m his line. the S u k a r n o the one too-enthusiastic Consequently replace him with General anti-smuggling activities been ambassadors. and r e p u t a t i o n b o t h had diminished, ill-health, the the Palar, adherence whose been while Marshall in W a s h i n g t o n and like the d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s in D j a k a r t a — represented discussion issues and China has and by ambassador The the official I n d o n e s i a on Vietnam Nations Since Contacts in S u m a t r a w e r e th e Mokoginta, a cause R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 612] === 604 anguish proved to p o w e r f u l figures to b e r e l u c t a n t representative, t he in t h e g o v e r n m e n t. to a c c e p t choice fell had been second-ranking member since a military man on Suwito K u s u m o w i d a g d o, who the Indonesian Foreign Office who had known him Indonesia, w as k n o w n as a c o m p e t e n t b u r e a u c r a t and diplomats found even under conditions it p o s s i b l e the S u k arno acceptable with o t h e r han d, chief years, as D j a k a r t a ' s 1957. To A mericans When Washington regime. assistant was was a m a n w i t h w h o m U.S. Thus th e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t. the news Suwito to w o r k his closely the adverse a p p o i n t m e n t wa s In I n d o n e s i a, greeted with outrage to F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Suwito fo r O l d Ord e r. Disliked inside top m i l i t a r y leaders, the d i p l o m a t wa s for his associations with Subandrio, whom he u l tim ately had t h e U.S. to p r e s e n t one columnist ing that country 56 Cocky a smiling suggested, to h i s the F o r e i g n O f f i c e testified. face since heart's "Cocky's eight the pol i c i e s the Indonesian press and suspect criticized in the against It w o u l d n o t b e e a s y fo r t h e n e w ambassador,. "he h a d b e e n d i l i g e n t l y content" Corner" the and opposition. Subandrio identified with in t h e p a s t. 56 The D j a k a r t a Times, villifyIt October 1966. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12, === [PDF page 613] === 605 was alleged selection had that after issued Sukarno has some 15 0 o f f i c i a l s a resolution position of Secretary asking General D uring his months difficult between been responsible Most the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the N e w Order. Department officials, e n g a g e d in the Vietnam ordinates with military the and of w h o m situation. to s e e s o m e t o p S t a t e were almost Within his associations th e p r e s s. attractive personal freely with American traits in h i s was a n d of mission attacks sub a c c u s e d of b e i n g associations, which would elites, totally were openly contemptuous Suwito and restrictive figures and perso n a l l y unimpressive, in I n d o nesia, "defensive" against th e p o w e r Meanwhile, toiled being carried and u n c o o p e r a t i v e. continued 57 important business Green it d i f f i c u l t many Suwito I ndo nesia was Physically from the the Department. in D j a k a r t a b e t ween A m b a s s a d o r found removal in Washington, circumstances. apparently the F o r e i g n O f f i c e for h is Suwito for S u w i t o ' s allow him lacking to o to m i n g l e too l i m i t e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s 57 A c t u a l l y, it m o r e l i k e l y w a s M a l i k w h o w a n t e d S u w i t o i n W a s h i n g t o n, as o n e w a y o f g e t t i n g h i m o u t o f t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y post. In f a c t a C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r s t o r y a b o u t S u w i t o r e p o r t e d t h a t S u k a r n o o b j e c t e d s t r o n g l y to t h e appointment and only after s i g n th e n e c e s s a r y p a p e r s. several months' delay agreed R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 614] === 606 in p r o m o t i n g come Indonesia's consider withdrawing declared Journalist the U n i t e d S t a t e s. some reputation ferred more interests. To replace contacts Rosihan Anwar ambassador, after he had Suwito, had been th e the Sukarno a small N e w Order, t he publishing business. Soedjatmoko Social i s t P a r t y b u t ment, and 58 instead, arrived intellectual the S o c i a l i s t Party, was was trans Scandanavia little in Wash i n g t o n. selected Soedjatmoko, close member concentrated sought the to r e v i v e Indonesian to W a s h i n g t o n, during c o m i n g of to h a v e the with limbo and had With the a visit he was in p o l i t i c a l refused 59 and writer regime in W a s h i n g established specialists. reported dispatched K o m p a s. September all the N e w O r d e r to m a n y A m e r i c a n A s i a n time has following "journeyman" as e n v o y the from his p ost Suwito had Indonesian latter years think Although assignment than one year a well-known 58 Suwito despite govern only 1967. 59 One State Depar t m e n t official complimented Suwito for h i s e n e r g y and d e n i e d r e p o r t s c i r c u l a t e d in I n d o n e s i a t h a t t h e I n d o n e s i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t to see Ass i s t a n t Secr e t a r y of State for the Far East W illiam Bundy. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 615] === 607 limited diplomatic Indonesia th e experience. To Am eri c a n s appointment was a particularly Many had known study Indonesian was New, specialists modernity the Invited transition characterized and progress 1969, after the Marshall responsible for A m e r i c a n p o l i c y the a member Green the was the U.S. in March, Pedoman in Djakarta. sai d, a meeting the n e w a m b a s s a d o r accolades. the Old Order elements of r a t i o n years individual Indonesia — Sent team on Secretary served the The in D j a k a r t a. the one 1969. the m a n w hom he h a d attend and one-half negotiating appointed Assistant assignment paper Green — during periods in W a s h i n g t o n h a d b e g u n incoming Nixon Administration. Eastern Affairs Bundy, best g r a t i f y i n g one. Indonesian society. three Ambassador, Cit y, from the A m e r i c a n p r e s e n c e and h e a p i n g Indonesian presence approximate Early the and m e n t o r in N e w Y o r k a standing ovation Soedjatmoko stature a companion in D j a k a r t a. represented ality, and work given Suwito him interested Thus singly most was r e a s s i g n e d first to P a r i s t h e V i e t n a m W ar, of State for Far he replaced William as d e p u t y b e f o r e Upon his an individual departure taking the n e w s Green may not immediately R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 616] === 608 make people feel d i p l o m a t he certainly Marshall Green served briefly 1965 before States some discussion the those significant elites th e grown up and the a high reputation Indonesians. Cooperation between complete without educational public attitudes spent on A man and cultural and p r i v a t e era. efforts the Sukarno years m ay have had an i m p a c t o n the m i l l i o n s Singapore. in the p o s t - G e s t a p u who had evolving relations scientific, during Galbraith, choice with and Cultural seen previously, sectors but to r e p l a c e and I n donesia w ould to him, Assigned in I n d o n e s i a a popular c o operation which has we have 60 Ambassador experience consideration attracted chief of m i s s i o n u nder G ree n b e c o m i n g U.S. Sc i e n t i f i c. Educational the U n i t e d efficient." as d e p u t y G a l b r a i t h was in D j a k a r t a w a s F r a n c i s w ith m any years there, at e a s e the Indonesian foreign economic aid. Those 6 0 " T h a n k Y o u L B J, " J a n u a r y 13, 1969. The as sessment o f G r e e n b y t h e n e w s p a p e r w o u l d a p p e a r to b e the g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n of t h e A m e r i c a n d i p l o m a t p r e v a l e n t in D j a k a r t a. A d m i r e d for h i s e n e r g e t i c a p p l i c a t i o n and b u s i n e s s l i k e mien, the I n d o n e s i a n s m a y h a v e f o u n d l a c k i n g in h i m those lovable, h u m a n q u a l i t i e s w h i c h m a d e H o w a r d J o n e s so popular. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 617] === 609 programs helped of g r atitude impart habits and bonds rattling of Sukarno's pletely. Emerging attitudes helped speed the U n i t e d of r a t i o n a l thought, friendship which nationalism the h y s t e r i c a l could not in t h e p o s t - G e s t a p u the t r a n s i t i o n feelings era, stifle those com Indonesian to r a p p r o c h m e n t w i t h States. The sole government-sponsored p rogram the anti-American era in Indonesia was project under which Washington has provided unclassified information cin e, in t h e p e a c e f u l agriculture, reactor a n d fuel, the reactor and a g rant of cost. Although agreement with Djakarta, and on January Senate. By mid-1966, n u m b e r of use s; $350,000 the U.S. 20, 1966, cover not a portion to r e n e w sent was a p p r o v e d b y t h e U.S. help, the B a n d u n g n u c l e a r completely operational. including a few h a d been u r g e d by Indonesian-made radio-isotopes fields, fo r m e d i a 250-kilowatt the n e w treaty was w i t h U.S. installation had become produced training of in th e U n i t e d S t a t e s Congress has "Atoms-for-Peace" atomic energy the in p e a c e f u l anti-Sukarno partisans the u s e of and biology; Indonesian scientists the to s u r v i v e applications The reactor for u s e analysis of s o i l R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 618] === 610 conditions, of p r i d e symbol water to t h e Although applications interest flamboyant Indonesia advanced The reactor has been w ho device it m o r e t h a n an of a p r e s t i g e instrument with many age s c i e n c e the Sukarno a realistic is a b l e find a source their p r e - m e c h a n i z e d society. in s p a c e claims been replaced era have approach to p l a y still runs high, vanished the and have th e m o d e s t p a r t activities involving technology.^1 Another under Indonesians, and educational practical which and minerals. important educational government-to-government tribution literature, together I ndon esia of economics, with copies were given free even transportation D i s t r i b u t e d by program auspices has English-language drama, business, costs been books medicine of s t a ndard r eference charge carried out the d i s on science, a n d law, tex ts. The books by A m e r i c a n p u b l i s h i n g houses and were p r o v i d e d by American the U S I A of f i c e in D j a k a r t a shippers. to u n i v e r s i t i e s, 61 In M a r c h, 1966, f or e x a m p l e, t h e d i r e c t o r of N a t i o n a l A v i a t i o n a n d S p a c e I n s t i t u t e s fo r I n d o n e s i a, Dr. Kusumanto, n o t e d that Indonesia was a long way from launchin g a r o c k e t u n l e s s i t b o u g h t one. H e n o t e d, h o w e v e r, t h a t t he n a t i o n c o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e s p a c e a g e b y c o o p e r a t i n g in projects on telecommunications, television and weather satel lites. The Indonesian H e r a l d. March 24, 1966. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 619] === 611 schools, youth groups th e v o l u m e s students have been eagerly in b o o k - p o o r the books Other throughout sought by Indonesia. totalled $200,000 $300,000 during from and libraries teachers During and was Indonesia, 1967 and the expected value to r e a c h 1968. assistance for Indonesian education has come the Fo r d F o u n d a t i o n w h i c h r e - o p e n e d its J a k a r t a of f i c e 1968 Indonesia package after h a v i n g been $245,000 for upgr a d i n g to t h e the skills in I n d o n e s i a; n i a at B e r k e l e y U n i v e r s i t y of grants Indonesia; twelve universities; for a $1 m i l l i o n 1968 were four aid English-language secondary the U n i v e r s i t y the facu l t y $280,000 and $45,000 institute within of Ne w York Indonesian scholars skills close do w n o p e r a t i o n ^ State University to a s s i s t help clerical Among a n n o u n c e d by the F o u n d a t i o n education; teachers 1965. forced in e c o n o m i c s of C a l i f o r th e to H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y continue graduate for school the in Dj a k a r t a. creation of 62 studies a national addition, ^ T h e E v e n i n g S t a r o f W a s h i n g t o n, J a n u a r y 8, 1969. The o t h e r g r a n t s w e n t to e s t a b l i s h b i r t h c o n t r o l c l i n i c s i n J a v a a n d to a s s i s t t h e A g r i c u l t u r e M i n i s t r y in e f f o r t s to r a i s e rice production. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 620] === 612 several large American universities aid programs, providing personnel administrators. and for are now e x c hange of carrying on students, Some have provided Indonesian counterpart institutions with equipment and r e s e a r c h facilities. As A m b a s s a d o r has pointed very few. out, by American emphasis has rather than States where has been the Service program study these for work bringing Indonesian or w h e r e the U n i t e d changes therefore, which sponsors States still investments 63 The Indonesia the U n i t e d outweigh loyalty the A m e r i c a n in i m p r e s s i o n a b l e the A m e r i c a n secondary has help students introduction Green Indonesia. its to s t a y m a y character a result, their laboratory are long-term private the U.S. temptations books, arrangements and u n i v e r s i t i e s transporting the M o t h e r l a n d young minds. called colleges environment may however, teaching students not been renewed Field for a year 63 See Cynthia Parson's story from Djakarta, The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r, M a r c h 2, 1968. See also the e d i t o r i a l in t h e M o n i t o r. e n t i t l e d " I o w a i n I n d o n e s i a " M a r c h 6, 1968. A m o n g U. S. u n i v e r s i t i e s w i t h t i e s to I n d o n e s i a are: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a (Berkeley), Cornell U n i v e r s i t y, I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y a n d t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 621] === 613 Indonesia. According to N e w O r d e r officials, a modern American family after having tional family can Indonesian shocks" on y o u n g me n and women. American popular tolerated — Indonesia. a re not T i m e. Life and and once showings are U.S.-owned again films, A m e r i c a has fully compensation from th e tradi and pyschological again acceptable the demand, become inside shown. operations the programs even for back banned under involving copies, the S i nce m o s t of th e M o t i o n P i c t u r e condemned t h e R e a d e r 1s D i g e s t m a g a z i n e s are b eing "bootleg" "mental once American motion pictures, regime, from 64 culture has actually extremely popular is h i g h. inflict come living with Sukarno the confiscated Export Association illegal, Indonesian government has sought and has p r e v e n t e d 64 S e e T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s. O c t o b e r 26, 1966. p r o b a b l y was n o t l o s t on the I n d o n e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t t h a t m a n y of the s t u d e n t s w h o led t he d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the S u k a r n o r e g i m e d u r i n g t h e s i x m o n t h s b e t w e e n O c t o b e r, 1965, a n d M a r c h, 196 6, h a d s t u d i e d i n th e U. S. u n d e r t h e A m e r i c a n F ield Service. American Embassy officials made a hobby o f p i c k i n g o u t t h e A F S r e t u r n e e s w i t h i n a s t u d e n t mo b. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 622] === 614 any n e w A m e r i c a n films from theless, films the old "The G r e a t E scape" entering titles continue the like country. Never "The Q u i e t Man" and to be p o p u l a r fare for the Indonesian m ovie patron. In m u s i c, surfaced with the r o c k - n - r o l l, jaz z, the demise remained popular, Indonesians of Amer i c a avidly get class taped among bands, complete in h o t e l s are and resorts. fast steps regime music that with tight a favorite While which sounds and have from th e slacks, Many Voice are li s t e n e d and m e m o r i z a t i o n afterward. cowboy entertainment Moslem prohibitions inhibit many youngsters, children do Beatles the y o u n g people. broadcasts for replay and electric guitars against dancing Sukarno their West e r n popular and often feature the particularly and A u s t r a l i a n American-style boots and the urban m iddleapproximate their Western 65 Paul M c C u s k e r of the U.S. E m b a s s y says that the f i l m s i t u a t i o n h a s t u r n e d o u t t o b e t h e m o s t k n o t t y o f th e c o n f i s c a t i o n - r e t u r n p r o b l e m s and th a t the r e c o r d of the N e w O r d e r on the i s sue h a s L a e n less t h a n s a t i s f a c t o r y. is s u s p e c t e d t h a t t h e p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e s e f i l m s in m a n y c a s e s g o to c o r r u p t A r m y a n d m i l i t a r y p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a n d o t h e r government officials. S e e T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s. J u n e 19, 1966. By late 1968 the s i t u a t i o n h a d still n o t b e e n r e c t i f i e d and n o r e c e n t U.S. f i l m s w e r e b e i n g a l l o w e d i n t o I n d o n e s i a. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 623] === 615 counterparts. pastimes scene, In r e c e n t m o n t h s of A m e r i c a n some culture have including drug-taking, the l e s s innocent appeared on the f a s t d r i v i n g in Indonesian "hot rods," and p u l p y p i n - u p magazines. These manifestations in t h e W e s t e r n countries, run th e lace take up risk h aving p u t on lies care the customs, to i l for 66 culture" Indonesians. said their the technical one N e w from lif e. devotion The young Order official, o w n lan d. Moreover, of m o d e r n i t y the inroads and p r o m ote Moslem students liberal university groups demanded official action against tight M o s l e m student, increas have disrupted by m o r e To o n e they competence which undersponsored skirts. the general p o p u To d e v o u t M o s l e m s, threaten religious spawned the U n i t e d States, surface manifestations ing s e c u l a r i z a t i o n of dances by ma ny foreigners t h e W e s t e r n way. Westernism "youth of s e p a r a t i n g themselves and becoming do not these the particularly viewed with deep misgivings people who clothing "the fl i g h t of and have and m i n i the y o u n g 66 S u y o t o S u d y o d i p u r o, h e a d of t h e A m e r i c a n D i r e c t o r a t e, D e p a r t m e n t o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s, I n t e r v i e w, D j a k a r t a, S e p t e m b e r 13, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 624] === 616 g e n e r a t i o n...into the r e s u l t spiritual has symmetry the into dance, feel for l a c k the b e s t carving and media, the U n i t e d running Through and Americans the U. S. in the mass however, interchange. design, and the h i p p i e s in l i f e Indonesia a o ne-w ay street, Indonesians introduce Beatles dominance a r e ' being taken, into interested music, they interchange between Steps the 67 of A m e r i c a n been primarily East. emptiness satisfaction." Because cultural the w o r l d of States from Wes t introduce more cooperation efforts have the Indonesian and literature. For been made art, example, at least three American universities now give courses in the art of p e r f o r m i n g g a m e l a n music. magazine, I n d o n e s i a. at C o r n e l l important event. cultural reports ben t, week which has a forum which might otherwise have 67 Adnan Bujong Nasution of N o v e m b e r, 1968. The University The periodical, has p r o v i d e d 68 for founding of in 1 9 6 6 w a s another a definite socio translations b e e n of the and too l i m i t e d interest in M i m b a r D e m o k r a s i. fi r s t 68 T h e y are: The U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a at L o s A n g e l e s, t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n at A n n A r b o r, a n d W e s l e y a n University, M i d d l e t o w n, Conn. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 625] === 617 to h a v e been published. sources, have steadily much into sales signs, is o n the rise Some Conclusions While interest been treated task even to d e s c r i b e and "why" these pages things still more In s u c h and suggestive circumstances, rather than f o r us a b a l a n c e d v i e w of make some the same judgments time, about the p a s t half-decade. 69 The Indonesian events clearly which have a difficult Congressional the and, The information conclusions said: this however, must "It will enormous R e c o r d. March tenta Senate take is p o s s i b l e as a n y t h i n g, 13, com e s time island Indonesian-American As m u c h "how" times, firm or dogmatic. Mike Mansfield has 69 taxing additional Majority Leader nation." to r e a d too accurately what happened. to l i g h t. form things t h a t i t is o f t e n to u n d e r s t a n d u n t i l art objects is p o s s i b l e ar e m a n y o f t h e impossible tive embassy th e U n i t e d S t a t e s. contemporaneous to I n d o n e s i a n Indonesian produced increased. such According encounter perhaps, 1969, the S28 7 0. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 626] === the situation both nations benefit years both the errors Indonesia War. Djakarta's terms of A m e r i c a ' s the p o l i t i c a l led th e U n i t e d Indonesian aid with rebels, successive struggle States into instance, th e d o w n - t r o d d e n and even cynical depth With the its and minuses Union. This view timidity security _o th e P R R I - P e r m e s t a Irian issue. c hampion of With elites each who had anti-colonialism intentions. the P R R l - P c r m o s t a a hard lesion n a t i o n a l i s m wa s accession calculated became progressive?y disillusioned Washington policy-makers the the i n th e C o l d mistakes: Indonesian political from as a n o b j e c t aio The early fiat '.o o v e r m u t u a l the West about U.S. failure almost the Soviet the warped perceptions some gross a Jeffersonian and sheeL of pluses government, States of policy were with independence, only own balance inaction seen America The existed a b i l i t y of relations. States permutations the Wilopo and were marred the U n itec the the U n i t e d in b i - l a t e r a l encounter sides. beginning, represented but particularly by pas t Indonesia has of H o w a r d Jones adventure about taught Indonesia: that to b e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d. the ambassadorial R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 627] === 619 post Indonesia, a n d its right toward a realistic enough. mistakes. First, completely with just of p o l i c y, the t h a t U.S. agencies, act to s h a p e Thus the U.S. the th e T h e new, vagaries country's with clung and views smashed its berately pulled its programs which away from relations well p r epared While more this two second, could the further it b e l i e v e d long nation. after it s o w n way. been identified The U.S. deli identification with Sukarno; From such to r i d e all but a f e w u.. t h e extensive a position, out almost Sukarno, Indonesian approach has by scrapping it w a s in s o m e w a y and stick Green. provided Indonesia, of o n e man, and gone had required America's in I n dones ian society. States was carrot the wagon more realistic in the l a ter and later, independence; eno u g h money, of A m e r i c a n Indonesian nationalism a m b a s s a d o r s h i p of M a r s h a l l simplified first Washington made emerging structure had the d o n k e y h a d a result, nationalism an o b j e c t, u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it i d e n t i f i e d the father th e not the K e n n e d y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n. not nearly with a subject, a cornerstone the country's the Eisenhower Administration tensively, a start to b e concern became years recognition involvement the U n i t e d the p o l i t i c a l storms R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 628] === 620 which roared over and e arly sensible 1966. the This Indonesian landscape during late 1965 lean presence r e - s t r u c t u r i n g of Indonesian-American relations the p o s t - S u k a r n o p e r i o d — wh a t has low profile policy. This policy, nesians that its simply and to r e c o g n i z e its anti-Communism — assistance. tionship between restrained together This 1958, State they have the k e y the views the N e w O r d e r h a s th e b l u e p r i n t Pleased with as the forced the th e confidence and taken government. are not to A m e r i c a n two n a t i o n s support a rela while closer adopted in a n t i - C o m m u n i s t "moderate" bureaucrats satisfaction On m o s t States. a program carries the N e w Order's as e a r l y in t h e D e p a r t m e n t s from In th e the p e r f o r m a n c e international c o m p a t i b l e wit h, the U n i t e d at l e a s t, Indo and I n d o n e s i a which, brought ever been before. their and Defense have Indonesia's positions turn, United States policy-makers th e N e w O r d e r to be k n o w n economic performance — was has Indonesian Army officers the U n i t e d States Having placed come understanding has made possible and correct, than also m a d e po s s i b l e issues if n o t i d e n t i c a l e c o n o m i c sph e r e, of d e v e l o p m e n t which, an A m e r i c a n activities imprimatur. in f o r e i g n and economic R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 629] === 621 affairs, diplomats to a m i l i t a r y r e g i m e with authoritarianism whose the d e a t h s them. are not h a u n t e d by tendencies leaders, is p l a c e d o n and press under t he N e w O r d e r brought order during 1968, P r e s i d e n t of ratified by increased and corruption and c e r t a i n l y do n o t r e g r e t f reedom of the s tabilit y a country w h i c h has k n o w n the speech regime little peace and the p a s t q u a r t e r - c e n t u r y. a result, th e r e g i m e ' s Jul y, the toward they did not conspire a half m i llion people, Emphasis has their propinquity decision and representatives to c a n c e l appoint General th e R e p u b l i c for elections Suharto a five a hand-picked MPRS w e r e u n t r o u b l e d by year on March t h e U. S. at first had looked to G e n e r a l l e a d e r of an a n t i - C o m m u n i s t, pro-Western scheduled the office term, 27, for a decision 1968. Nasution 70 Although as p o s s i b l e Indonesia, th e ^ I t is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t t h e m a j o r s t e p s b y S u h a r t o to f u l l p o w e r in I n d o n e s i a h a v e b e e n a l m o s t e x a c t l y o n e y e a r apa r t. O n M a r c h 11, 1966, S u h a r t o w a s g r a n t e d e m e r g e n c y powers by Sukarno acting u nder A r m y and s t u d e n t pressure. M a r c h 12, 1967, t h e M P R S c o m p l e t e d t h e t a s k of s t r i p p i n g S u k a r n o of all a u t h o r i t y a n d d e s i g n a t e d S u h a r t o " A c t i n g President." M a r c h 27, 1968, b r o u g h t t h e f u l l p r e s i d e n c y to the General for a five year term. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 630] === 622 Sumatran general's with Sukarno has vacillation forfeited support interested Americans. was in c r u c i a l fo r h i s In t h e m e a n t i m e, an u n k n o w n q u a n t i t y, strength, particularly American diplomats gained respect in his appears dealings particularly even while dealing with While not nearly tion — for them daily on approachable, American is k n o w n make if n o t diplomats. frequent one wished Nevertheless, friendly comparable in the may that he has between the cunning a bland, typically a keen political been rivals government business. behavior as N a s u a favorite Suharto has found visits and been it p o s s i b l e w i t h him. While th e J o n e s - S u k a r n o c o m plica ted and m u t e d riva l r y grown up between Suharto Frictions initially i t t o be. which has feel for h i s thoroughly understandable and the r e l a t i o n s h i p was not friendship, who consult with Ambassador Green informal Suharto, with in h i s soothsayer when making major decisions found among for u n d e r c u t t i n g his p o l i t i c a l "Westernized" example, leadership with Sukarno. to c o m b i n e consensus-seeking Javanese personality astuteness, confrontations abandoned Indonesian and Nasution, t he by h i s A m e r i c a n leaders latter friends. surfaced most R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 631] === 623 evidently Army in e a r l y set out complicity Moslems were 1968 w h e n "retool" with the summarily the S u h a r t o the Parliament. "old order" stricken from favorable to S u h a r t o way for the MPRS directive giving at m o s t, is S p e a k e r, "People's the Javanese base rests the general resisted partially a five a two for Suharto. year term support, American officials 71 and rep l a c e d thus p aving the maintaining Indonesia's favored holding some A m e r i c a n While whose power of w h i c h h e accused full powers.^ Nasution, Suharto. the being fanatic the rolls individuals MPRS, Members or of with presidential faction within a "hands scheduled as s e e m s off" were n o t unhappy economic efforts could 72 about If h e he was the the term elections likely, attitude year for 1968 counted disappointed. iss u e, the outcome. only have been har m e d by The P a r l i a m e n t m a k e s u p o n e - h a l f of the M P R S C o n s u l t a t i v e C o n g r e s s " w h e n it meats. 72 S e e s t o r y b y T. J e f f W i l l i a m s, t h e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t, M a r c h 10, 1968. Williams was exp e l l e d from Indonesia w ithout e x p l a n a t i o n s h o r t l y after, a p p a r e n t l y for s t o r i e s c r i t i c a l o f t h e N e w O r d e r a n d f o r d i s c l o s i n g a s p e c t s of t h e N a s u t i o n Suharto rivalry. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 632] === 624 political maneuvering election. Moreover, factionalism within building, some p o i n t e d out, t i o n of the the and disorders the Indonesia, argued. will first results end one system will Challenges have term before for Suharto, the s c h e d u l e d t h a t time, brightened evolved. and termina hopefully, a rational 73 to t h e N e w O r d e r This revival have the the d e trim ent of nationfive year year a general might have emphasized f i v e - y e a r plan. economic picture will political accompanying attitude by soon by S u k a r n o the Un i t e d States t he C o m m u n i s t s. presupposes 74 And, indeed, 73 Nas u t i o n can take cold comfort from that p r o s p e c t s i n c e h i s o w n c h a n c e s at t h e p r e s i d e n c y c a n be e x p e c t e d to h a v e d i m i n i s h e d c o n s i d e r a b l y b y 1973. His once close r ela t i o n s w i t h t h e U.S. e m b a s s y h a v e c o o l e d c o n s i d e r a b l y as A m e r i c a n diplomats courted Suharto. Nasution has continued to c r i t i c i z e t h e r e g i m e d i r e c t l y in s p e e c h e s h e h a s m a d e a l l u d i n g to " t h e p r e s e n t i n c a p a b i l i t y o f c o n v e r t i n g t h e count r y ' s p o t e n t i a l s and r e s o u r c e s into d e v e l o p i n g forces" a n d c a l l i n g f o r a p u r g e of t h e u p p e r r a n k s of g o v e r n m e n t officialdom. A n t a r a, M a y 28, 1968. 74 Indeed, the W a s h i n g t o n P o s t s u g g e s t e d e d i t o r i a l l y that the r e a s o n for S u h a r t o ' s p o p u l a r i t y w i t h A m e r i c a n s was h i s s u c c e s s in t u r n i n g b o t h S u k a r n o a n d t h e C o m m u n i s t s o u t of power. March 30, 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 633] === 625 challenges from both quarters with successfully. power has have was made swift flared best reported attempt by Sukarno d ealt with q u i e t l y by Suharto. and b l o o d y r e p l y in v a r i o u s p a r t s these he has his apparently have been dealt not hesitated troops. there have 76 Despite the By c o n t r a s t he to C o m m u n i s t r e v o l t s which the crush to u s e archipelago, archipelago. significant numbers th i s u s e been recurring reports various parts 75 to r e g a i n fo rce, of u n r e s t however, and r e v olts a p p a r e n t l y of l e f t - w i n g origin. A c c u s e d o f p l o t t i n g to r e i n s t a t e h i m s e l f in O c t o b e r, 1968, S u k a r n o a n d h i s w i f e, H a r t i n i, w e r e b r o u g h t to D j a k a r t a from their Bogor home and interrogated. Sukarno reportedly a d m i t t e d c o n t a c t s w i t h f o r m e r a s s o c i a t e s s t i l l in g o v e r n m e n t. D e s p i t e p r e s s u r e s to b r i n g h i m a t l a s t to trial, S u h a r t o r e s i s t e d i n f a v o r of c l o s e r s u p e r v i s i o n o f S u k a r n o ' s a c t i v i t i e s. S e e B a n g k o k W o r l d. O c t o b e r 3, 1968, a n d T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s, O c t o b e r 27, 1968. 76 For example, sent 7,000 troops to q u e l l the PGRS r e b e l l i o n in W e s t K a l i m a n t a n t h e f i r s t y e a r a n d l a t e r r e i n f o r c e d t h e m w i t h a n a d d i t i o n a l 1, 8 0 0 t r o o p s of t h e c r a c k Siliwangi Division. D u r i n g the PKI revolt at Blitar, six b a t t a l i o n s, e s t i m a t e d a t 5, 0 0 0 me n, w e r e m o v e d i n t o t h e area. B y A u g u s t t h e y h a d a c c o u n t e d fo r a n e s t i m a t e d 1, 0 0 0 r e b e l s k i l l e d o r c a p t u r e d, i n c l u d i n g t e n o f f i f t e e n m e m b e r s of the PKI Central Committee. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 634] === 626 Suharto also has with other potential been challenges militant student movement apathy temporarily successful to h i s all intercine bickering Sukarno. The continued willingness ear if n o t availability of act on — j ob s student to m u t e p r o t e s t. valv e, defines victim in o u s t i n g the N e w Order complaints, For the p r o b a b l e to l e n d and within the the the p r e s e n t, non-violent student demonstration, steam pressure the success for u n i v e r s i t y gradu a t e s establishment serves occasional following coping The oncebut moribund, and regime. acting limits student agitation. Potentially more dangerous the g r o w i n g rift b e t ween th e g o v e r n m e n t they were th e s a n g u i n a r y l e d to a t t a c k s "modernist" and traditional essential b e e n d e n i e d th e the to t h e N e w O r d e r h a s in p u r g i n g Moslem forces elements allied with who the old order — task of di sp a t c h i n g Communists fruits of victory. on Christians. 77 Their been believe particularly but have f r u s tration has Suharto has responded by " ^ P e r h a p s t h e m o s t s e r i o u s i n c i d e n t o c c u r r e d in M a k a s s a r o n O c t o b e r 1, 1967, w h e n M o s l e m y o u t h s d e s t r o y e d t e n P r o t e s t a n t and C a t holic churches, a small theological college, a C a t holic h i g h s c h o o l a n d t h e s e c r e t a r i a t b u i l d i n g o f th e I n d o n e s i a n Christian Student Association. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 635] === 627 permitting (PMI), the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of in r e a l i t y standard Suharto's in the New Order U n i t e d States, brought insufficient doubt, the m i g h t rally. ability to m a n e u v e r the p a r t inspire of the decisions have been noted that in I n d o n e s i a h a s techniques economic problems. has 79 and There is no e r o d e d its o w n middle-class and giving prefe r e n c e 78 improvement t he r e g i m e commercial a political Soedjatmoko has a t t e n t i o n to p o l i t i c a l among subsidies regime an o v e r - r e l i a n c e that f l exibility has helped for e c o n o m i c for example, support Moslems expedient nature. need forth the Masjumi, most New Order political a short-run, the dominant Indonesiam Moslem Party demonstrated competing groups with confidence to whi c h m o r e m o d e r a t e Although among a rebirth the foreign by curtailing capital. 80 Among 78 F o r a r e c e n t a c c o u n t o f t h e P M I 1s b i r t h s e e A l l a n A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian P ol itics," Asian Survey VII:12 ( D e c e m b e r, 1968) pp. 1 0 0 1 - 1 0 1 8. 79 S t a t e m e n t of the I n d o n e s i a n S e m i n a r of the S o u t h e a s t A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t Gro u p (SEADAG), A s i a n House, N e w York, June 20, 1968. See r e port o n t he meeting, 80 Soedjatmoko noted that foreign economic advisors, t h r o u g h i n s e n s i t i v i t y to s o c i e t y i n w h i c h t h e y o p e r a t e, c a n i g n o r e t h e n e c e s s i t y of o r g a n i z i n g p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e programs they recommend. T he p o l i t i c a l costs of e c o n o m i c m ov e s m u s t be assessed, he said. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 636] === 628 intellectuals been and others a s t r o n g s e n s e of th e limited roles s u p p r e s s i o n of the riate political need the drift Indonesia P N I, and system. ienced both establishment without a clear notion workable solution — been instability the both sides easy task can findor felt keenly and with a constant exper the leadercall for country, elites what changes in w h i c h such end the scene such an innovation. characteristic must competing groups pride and satisfaction. implement the Indonesian political take some approp within which will a military-civilian marriage la w " the p a r t one for the d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s in t h e p r e s e n t p o l i c y w o u l d b e r e q u i r e d b y continuing con government the "rule of the create meaningful future engendered the the Thus there has search there has p o i n t e d out, and a reaction 81 tortuous life with parliamentary ship principle." parties, Guy Pauker has for public" and demoraliza tion, the foundations today "political allowed political to n o r m a l i z e p o l i t i c a l stitutional the include within It w i l l b e no a solution. G u y J. P a u k e r, Indonesia's Co n v a l e s c e n c e (Santa Monica: A H a n d C o r p o r a t i o n R e p o r t, 1 9 6 7) p. 3. For another account of Indone sia's p o l i t i c a l s e a r c h see H e r b e r t Feith, " S u h a r t o ' s S e a r c h f o r a P o l i t i c a l F o r m a t, " I n d o n e s i a VI (October) 88-106. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 637] === 629 second, related problem stability ruption. To A m b a s s a d o r G r e e n worrisome short-range political the m i l i t a r y "creeping militarism" and and the mass have been accused bankers "tolls." free problem Officers offer their roles stop guns the contraband, avoid customs armed dise troops their gets and smugglers. into at r a n d o m services for stores collect "guardians" a percentage some Army ga i n, for commanders the are by providing military vehicles soldiers inspection. aboard among for p e r s o n a l wander traffic bribes, to a i d s m u g g l e r s corruption extortionists business. haul Military men in return In r e t u r n for Indonesia's most the n a t i o n ' s poor. and traders, cor intellectuals, of p u r s u i n g goods attendant among Chinese-owned businesses willing its a nd o t h e r s, Enlisted men brandishing machine and d e m a n d with the r e a c t i o n p r o d u c e d students, becoming affecting Indonesia's smuggler's to M a l a y s i a n w a t e r s to g u a r d 20 p e r c e n t boats safely. and f o r g e d p a p e r s cut m a y to m a k e sure even buy the merchan- 82 82 C ited by Robert Keatley, The Wall Street J o u r n a l. M a y 2, 1967. K e a t l e y ' s a r t i c l e, t h o u g h c r i t i c a l of the c o r r u p t i o n in t h e N e w O r d e r, w a s r e p r i n t e d in T h e D j a k a r t a T i m e s. The latter paper noted editorially: "Everything Keatley put d o w n i n t h e s t o r y is k n o w n to t h e c o m m o n p e o p l e h e r e. The R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 638] === 630 again Although President Suharto has and that Army power again ism or m i l i t a r y dictatorship, representatives not reassuring. against press the 83 corruption. campaign New Order personal staff established Nor forces a special 1967, because corruption targeted including important team 84 measures. malpractices in fact b e e n have The in m i l i t a r increase moved against several on his agencies, corruption team, strongly a vigorous figures financial to c o m b a t and preven t a t i v e " country in k e y g o v e r n m e n t p o s i t i o n s the P r e s i d e n t and in gove r n m e n t the not result th e c o n t i n u e d has In l a t e against officials, armed will assured headed an o p e n s e c r e t. Suharto "by r e p r e s s i v e the There is n o r e a s o n f o r u s t o g e t i r r i t a t e d at K e a t l e y ' s a c c o u n t. Con v e r s e l y, w e s h o u l d a p p r e c i a t e h i s w o r k a n d m a k e e f f o r t s to end such malpractices." M a y 16, 1967. I n O c t o b e r, 1968, the c h a i r m a n of the I n d o n e s i a n E x p o r t e r s Assn. e s t i m a t e d that $200 m i l l i o n worth of r a w ma terials were bei n g smuggled out of the c o u n t r y annually. 83 S u h a r t o ' s p o s i t i o n is t h a t t h e A r m y h a s t w o f u n c t i o n s. F i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t i t is to d e f e n d t h e n a t i o n a n d p r e s e r v e internal security. Second, it f u l fills a " s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l " f u n c t i o n b y t a k i n g a n a c t i v e p a r t " i n al l p u b l i c a n d s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s t o w a r d t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f n a t i o n a l g o a l s as s t a t e d i n t h e p r e a m b l e of the 1 9 4 5 C o n s t i t u t i o n. " D j a k a r t a Radio, F e b r u a r y 5, 1969. 84 From the announcement by Suharto, Antara, December 1967. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 639] === 631 A ttorney General, vise the a c t i v i t i e s investigating gaged in b y rampant for all S u g i h a r t o, was directed law-enforcement agencies, and p r o s e c u t i n g civilians the m o s t p a r t, target are are v i r t u a l l y all circles, moved slowly Chinese who friendless th e m a j o r i t y of m i l i t a r y a f a c t whi c h has drawn forms of the m i l i t a r y. in h i g h g o v e r n m e n t favorite they M a j. Gen. to s u p e r corruption Because venality t he a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l against malefactors. operate outside within th e regime. c o r ruption goes frequent protest the has, law, for Meanwhile, on u n d i s t u r b e d — from students and intellectuals. While inevitable, a k i n d of 85 some military irregularities unsavory practices self-escalating appear internal m a y be p r a c t i c a l l y to b e i n c r e a s i n g dynamism. Although some 85 G u y P a u k e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t th e s t a t e b u d g e t in I n d o n e s i a t r a d i t i o n a l l y p a y s o n l y a p a r t o f th e c o s t o f s u p p o r t i n g t r o o p s, w h o m u s t b e fed, c l o t h e d a n d p a i d i n o r d e r to p r e v e n t u n r e s t an d d i s a f f e c t i o n. The smuggling and b u s i n e s s a r r a n g e m e n t s of c o m m a n d e r s o f t e n m u s t be u n d e r t a k e n to p r o v i d e f o r the w e l f a r e o f w h o l e u n i t s, r a t h e r t h a n p r i n c i p a l l y to e n r i c h i n d i v i d u a l m i l i t a r y men. Pauker points out, h o w e v e r, t h e l i n e d i v i d i n g c o r r u p t i o n a n d th i s k i n d o f " s p e c i a l f i n a n c i a l a r r a n g e m e n t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of k e e p i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t h e t r o o p s " is a t h i n o n e a n d c a n g e t o u t of hand easily without a strong hand at t h e controls. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 640] === 632 developmental mental effects practices recent literature are have Gunn ar M y r d a l, for corruption irrationality wherever that his In A sian D r a m a. forcefully points out that and introduces a destructive e l e m e n t of economic planning. are a Communist Suharto tolerant. more thwarts into there that such of governments, Asian governments Indonesia, rationalizing the d e t r i stability country had been tually less example, totalitarian regimes, the to p l a y d o w n in d e v e l o p i n g countries, been endangers nation-building, tended corruption, "natural" studies has the has given place take-over suggested that to m i l i t a r y was m a d e p o s s i b l e "softened" by massive fears corruption will that comeback. reluctant government rests have to ris k its they believe he must move Critics because 86 lead even recognize, alienating support. against corruption. however, the A r m y be cause On b a l a n c e, corruption lest however, it u n d e r m i n e 86 C i t e d b y T a r z i e V i t t a c h i, T h e C a n b e r r a T i m e s. J u l y 10, 196 8. S e e a l s o M y r d a l 's l e c t u r e a t t h e S e c o n d A s i a n R e g i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e o f P u b l i c S e r v i c e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l in S i n g a p o r e, N o v e m b e r 14, 1968, r e p r i n t e d in T h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d. F e b r u a r y 3, 1969, pp. E 7 0 5 - 7 0 6. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 641] === 633 everything he Suharto has himself, attempted judging to d o in t h e from his economic inaction, sphere. is n o t con vinced. Uncertainty over reform clear itself its commitment development Mindful suggests the that in I n d o n e s i a Indonesia's leader can be rather than single group The lessons regime in Djakarta. of p o l i t i c a l instability model of h o w q u i c k l y a supposed toppled, the past in w a y s policy makers built been unsuccessful productive future. in the brought than ever before. the and should ambitions made a low profile clear. Indonesian an i n t e r i o r comprehensible around coercions the p a s t contrast, and critics necessary and rewards the the has to b e m o r e "low profile" the U n i t e d see logic to o u t s i d e r s. a n d is u n l i k e l y Indonesia While seem defined only p a r tially An American policy approach has and p o l i t i c a l in Indonesia. nationalism moves which may the should make economic Order history avoid entangling American prestige any the N e w the U n i t e d S t a t e s to o b j e c t i v e s the r ecent Paki s t a n i popular abi l i t y of States closer circumstances at o n e p e r i o d which as h a v i n g R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 642] === 634 disappeared like melting Indonesian-American a cause. will, The The sooner relations, Indonesians later, alternative g ood or slogans ill. react Less can be found seems the b e s t credited and influence for the less confident. J u s t so, f or and approach. limitations another interests the success Indonesia. guarantee protective, has an e f f e c t a paternalistic recognizes in m u tual is m o r e d e t a c h e d States against ability this posture restraint have rejected colonialism It d e a l s or rhetoric. the n e w w a r m t h they mistake a policy which p l a c e d on o n e n a t i o n ' s for ice wi thin either rather than apprehensive, this p o l i c y which the United a policy of r e s t r a i n t a continuing successful encounter. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 643] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, BOOKS Cindy. My; F r i e n d the D i c t a t o r. B o b b s - M e r r i l l C o m p a n y, 1967. N e w York: T he A l i s j a h b a n a, S. T a k d i r. I n d o n e s i a: Social and Cultural Revolution. London: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966. Boulding, Kenneth. The M e a n i n g of the T w e n t i e t h N e w York: H a r p e r a n d R o w C o l o p h o n Books, Brackman, Arn o l d N e w York: Century. 1964. Indonesian Communism: A H i s t o r y. F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1963. S o u t h e a s t A s i a *s S e c o n d F r o n t: T h e P o w e r In the Malay Archipelago. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1966. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Alternative M c G r a w - H i l l C o m p a n y, 1965. to P a r t i t i o n. N e w York: Clubb, O l i v e r E., Jr. T h e U. S. an d the S i n o - S o v i e t B l o c S o u t h e a s t A s i a. Washi n g t o n, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n, 1962. Coombs, P h i l i p H. The F o u r t h D i m e n s i o n N e w York: H a r p e r a n d Row, 1964. Crozier, Brian. Southeast Asia P e n g u i n Boo k s, 1965. of Fore ign P o l i c y. in T u r m o i l. Baltimore: D a v i d s o n, W. P h i l l i p s. International Political tions. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, 1965. Communica Publishers, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 644] === 636 Toledano, Ralph. R F K: The M a n Who W o u l d N e w York: S i g n e t Books, 1967. Draper, Dutt, Theodore. The A b use V i k i n g Pres s, 1967. Power. President. N e w York: The Vidya Prakash. C h i n a a n d the W o r l d. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1966. E l e g a n t, R o b e r t S. Th e D r a g o n 1s S e e d: P e k i n g a n d th e Overseas Chinese. N e w York: St. M a r t i n ' s Press, 1959. Feith, Herbert. Th e D e c l i n e o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D e m o c r a c y Indonesia. Ithaca, N. Y.: The Cornell Uni v e r s i t y Pre s s, 1962. F i f i e l d, R u s s e l l H. Yor k: Harper T h e D i p l o m a c y of a nd Row, 1958. Southeast A s i a. New S o u t h e a s t A s i a in U n i t e d S t a t e s P o l i c y. F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1963. F i t z g e r a l d, C. P. The Third C h i n a: C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t i e s in Sout h - E a s t A s i a. London: A n g u s an d R o b e r t s o n f o r the A u s t r a l i a n I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s, 1965. Geyelin, Philip. L y n d o n J o h n s o n and the W o r l d. F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1966. N e w Yor k: G o o d w i n, R i c h a r d N. Vietnam: Triumph or Tragedy? Y or k: R a n d o m H o u s e, 1966. New Goold-Adams, Richard. John Foster D u l l e s: A Re-Appraisal. N e w York: A p p l e t o n, C e n t u r y, C r o f t s, 1962. Gordon, B e r n a r d K. T h e D i m e n s i o n s o f C o n f l i c t in S o u t h e a s t A s i a. N e w York: P r e n t i c e - H a l l S p e c t r u m Boo k s, 1966. Gould, J a m e s W. 1961. Americans in S u m a t r a. The Hague: Nijhoff, R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 645] === 637 Gra n t, Bruce, Indonesia. Baltimore: Penguin Bo ok s, 1967. Green, Fred. U. S. P o l i c y a n d the S e c u r i t y o f A s i a. N e w York: P u b l i s h e d f o r the C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y the M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o m p a n y, 1968. Policies Toward C h i n a: Views from Six Continents. N e w Yor k: P u b l i s h e d for the Council o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y th e M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o m p a n y, 1965. Hanna, Willard. Eight Nation-Makers: S o u t h e a s t A s i a 1s Charismatic Statesmen. N e w Yor k: St. M a r t i n ' s P r e s s, 1964. H e n d e r s o n, W i l l i a m (ed.). S o u t h e a s t A s i a: Problems of United States P o l i c y. Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1963. Hilsman, Roger. Doubleday To M o v e a N a t i o n. a n d C o m p a n y, 196 7. Garden City, Hindley, Donald. T h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y of I n d o n e s i a, 1 9 5 1 1963. B e r k e l e y and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s, 1964. Hinton, H a r o l d C. C o m m u n i s t C h i n a in W o r l d H o u g h t o n — M i f f l i n C o m p a n y, 1966. Politics. Bost o n: Hoffmann, Stanley. G u l l i v e r 1s T r o u b l e s, O r t h e S e t t i n g of American Foreign Policy. P u b l i s h e d for the C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y th e M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o m p a n y, 1968. Hohenberg, John. B e t w e e n Two W o r l d s: P o l i c y. Press and Public O p i n i o n in A s i a n - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s. New Yor k: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1967. Hughes, John. Indonesian Upheaval. C o m p a n y, Inc., 1967. N e w Yor k: David McKay R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 646] === 638 Hyde, Douglas. Confrontation B o d l e y H e a d, 1965. the E a s t. London: The J o h n s o n, R o s s a l l J., D a l e L. M c K e e n a n d L e o n A. M e a r s. B u s i n e s s E n v i r o n m e n t in a n E m e r g i n g N a t i o n: P r o f i l e s of the I n d o n e s i a n E c o n o m y. E v a n s t o n, 111.: N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s, 1966. Jordan, A m o s A., Jr. Foreign Aid Southeast A s i a. Ne w York: P u b l i s h e r s, 1962. a n d t h e D e f e n s e of F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, Kahin, G e o r g e M c T. ( e d. ). G o v e r n m e n t s and P o l i t i c s of Southeast A s i a. Second edition. I t haca, N.Y.: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s, 1964. N a t i o n a l i s m a n d R e v o l u t i o n in I n d o n e s i a. C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s, 1952. The United N e w York: A D e l t a B ook, 1967. States Ithaca, in V i e t n a m. Kaznacheev, Alex. I n s i d e _a S o v i e t E m b a s s y: E x p e r i e n c e s of a R u s s i a n D i p l o m a t in B u r m a. N e w York: The Lippincott C o m p a n y, 1962. K e n n e d y, D. E. The F r e d e r i c k A. Security of Southern A s i a. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1965. K e n n e d y, R o b e r t F. Just Friends H a r p e r a n d Row, 1962. 1968. Seek and a^ N e w e r W o r l d. Brave N e w York: Enemies. N e w York: Bantam New York: Books, Kersteins, Thom. T h e N e w E l i t e in A s i a a n d A f r i c a: A Com parative Study of Ind on e s i a and G h a n a. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1966. Kosut, H a l (ed.). Indonesia: The F a c t s o n F i l e, Inc., 1 967. Sukarno Years. N e w York: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 647] === 639 Lovestrand, Harold. M o o d y Press, Mason, Hostage 1967. in D j a k a r t a. Colin. S u k a r n o 1s I n d o n e s i a. 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Minneapolis: U n i v e r s i t y of M i n n e s o t a P r e s s, 1964. Mintz, J e a n n e S. M o h a m m e d, M a r x a n d M a r h a e n: T h e R o o t s of I n d o n e s i a n S o c i a l i s m. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1965. M o n t g o m e r y, John. The P o l i t i c s of F o r e i g n A i d: E x p e r i e n c e in S o u t h e a s t A s i a. N e w Y or k: P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1962. Morgan, Thomas. Rinehart Mossman, James. London: A m o n g t he A n t i - A m e r i c a n s. a n d W i n s t o n, 1967. R e b e l s in P a r a d i s e: J o n a t h a n Cape, 19 6 1. Melbourne American F r e d e r i c k A. N e w Yor k: Ho l t, I n d o n e s i a 1s C i v i l W a r. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 648] === 640 Myrdal, Gunnar. A s i a n D r a m a: A n I n q u i r y i n t o the P o v e r t y of N a t i o n s. 3 vols. 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N e w Yor k: The D a v i d M c K a y C o m p a n y, 1964. Vandenbosch, Amry. Lexington: T h e C h a n g i n g F a c e of S o u t h e a s t A s i a. U n i v e r s i t y o f K e n t u c k y P r e s s, 1966. V a n d e r K r o e f, J u s t u s M. The C o m m u n i s t P a r t y of I n d o n e s i a: Its H i s t o r y. P r o g r a m a n d T a c t i c s. Vancouver, Canada: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a P u b l i c a t i o n s C e n t e r, 1965. __________. T h e W e s t N e w G u i n e a D i s p u t e. of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s, 1958. N e w Y or k: Institute Vittachi, N e w York: Frederick Warner, Tarzie. Praeger, Th e F a l l o f S u k a r n o. P u b l i s h e r s, 1967. D e n i s A. Reporting South-East A s i a. T r i - O c e a n P r e s s, 1966. San Francisco: R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 650] === 642 W e i n t a l, E d w a r d an d C h a r l e s B a r t l e t t. F a c i n g the B r i n k: A n I n t i m a t e S t u d y of C r i s i s D i p l o m a c y. N e w Yor k: S c r i b n e r s, 1967. White, T h e o d o r e H. T h e M a k i n g of the P r e s i d e n t, 1 9 6 4. N e w York: A t h e n e u m P u b l i s h e r s, 1965. W i l l i a m s, L e a E. T h e F u t u r e o f th e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e in Southeast A s i a. New York: The McGraw-Hill Book C o m p a n y, 1966. Williams, Maslyn. Five Journeys from J a k a r t a: Inside Sukarno's Indonesia. N e w Yor k: William Morrow Co., 1965. Wise, D a v i d, a n d T h o m a s B. R o s s. The Ne w York: R a n d o m H o u s e, 1964. Invisible Wolf, C h a r l e s Jr. Foreign A i d: Theory Southern A s i a. Princeton, N.J.: Pre s s, 1960. and Government. a nd P r a c t i c e in Princeton University __________. T h e I n d o n e s i a n S t o r y. N e w Yor k: The Institute f o r P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s a n d th e J o h n D a y C o m p a n y, 1948. 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Political Stability and Economic S e c u r i t y T h r o u g h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s. M a n i l a: [no p u b l i s h e r ], 1966. "Will S u k a r n o G e t the B o m b. " R e p o r t f r o m th e R e s e a r c h Department, Radio Free Europe. N e w York: July 196 5. Sayres, Sinaga, P a u l W. A R e p o r t o n I n d o n e s i a in T r a n s i t i o n Between E ast and W e s t. H a r t s d a l e, N.Y.: The S a y r e s C o m p a n y, 1966. 29, Paul E d w a r d D. A N e w C h a p t e r in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s I n d o n e s i a n R e l a t i o n s. A s t u d y p r e p a r e d at the r e q u e s t o f S e n a t o r H u b e r t H. H u m p h r e y. W ashington, D.C.: O c t o b e r, 1962. S u l l i v a n, J o h n H. P o r t r a i t of A m e r i c a as _a T e c h n o c r a t i c Bully. R e s e a r c h P a p e r P r e p a r e d at t he A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., 1966. (Mimeographed.) R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 653] === 645 W e a t h e r b e e, D o n a l d E. I d e o l o g y in I n d o n e s i a: S u k a r n o 1s Indonesian Revolution. N e w H a v e n, Conn.: Southeast A s i a S t u d i e s M o n o g r a p h S e r i e s, Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y, 1966. W i l l n e r, A n n Ruth. T h e N e o - t r a d i t i o n a l A c c o m m o d a t i o n to Political Independence: T h e C a s e of I n d o n e s i a. P r i n c e t o n, N.J.; c e n t e r of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s M o n o g r a p h, P r i n c e t o n, U n i v e r s i t y, S e p t e m b e r 30, 1966. Young, K e n n e t h T., Jr. S o u t h e a s t A s i a C r i s i s. N e w York: W o r k i n g P a p e r f o r th e H a m m a r s k j o l d F o r u m s, Th e A s s n. o f the B a r of t h e C i t y o f N e w York, 1965. ESSAYS AND ARTICLES IN C O L L E C T I O N S A l l i s o n, J o h n M. "United S t a t e s D i p l o m a c y in S o u t h e a s t Asia: Th e L i m i t s of P o l i c y, " S o u t h e a s t A s i a: Problems of U n i t e d States P o l i c y, W i l l i a m Henderson, editor. Cambridge: M I T P re s s, 1963. B r a c k m a n, A r n o l d C. "T h e M a l a y W o r l d a nd C h i n a: P a r t n e r or B a r r i e r, " Pol i c i e s T o w a r d C h i n a: Views fr o m Six C o n t i n e n t s, A. M. H a l p e r n, e d i t o r. N e w York: P u b l i s h e d f o r t h e C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y the M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o m p a n y, 1965. Bundy, W i l l i a m P. "The U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d A s i a, " C h i n a an d t h e P e a c e of A s i a, A l a s t a i r B u c h a n, e d i t o r. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k A. Pre a g ^ -, P u b l i s h e r s, 1965. Geertz, Clifford. " S o c i a l - C u l t u r a l C o n t e x t o f P o l i c y in S o u t h e a s t A s i a, " S o u t h e a s t A s i a: P r o b l e m s of U n i t e d States P o l i c y. Cambridge: M I T Pr e s s, 1963. L i n e b a r g e r, P a u l M. a n d G e n e v i e v e. "Th e P s y c h o l o g i c a l I n s t r u m e n t s o f P o w e r in S o u t h e a s t A s i a, " S o u t h e a s t Asia: P r o b l e m s of U n i t e d S t a t e s P o l i c y. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963. 227-249. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 654] === 646 Modelski, George. " I n d o n e s i a and H e r N e i g h b o r s, " C h i n a the P e a c e of A s i a, A l a s t a i r B u c h a n, e d i t o r. New York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1965. an d McV e y, R u t h T. "Indonesian Communism and the Transition G u i d e d D e m o c r a c y, " C o m m u n i s t S t r a t e g i e s in A s i a, A. D o a k B a r n e t t, e d i t o r. N e w Yor k: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r, P u b l i s h e r s, 1964. Pauker, G u y J. "The M i l i t a r y in I n d o n e s i a, " T h e R o l e o f the M i l i t a r y in U n d e r d e v e l o p e d C o u n t r i e s, J o h n J. J o h n s o n, editor. P r i n c e t o n, N. J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Pres s, 1962. "The P K I ' s R o a d to P o w e r, " T h e C o m m u n i s t R e v o l u t i o n in A s i a, R o b e r t A. S c a l a p i n o, e d i t o r. Englewood Cli f f s, N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l, Inc., 1965. P y e, L u c i a n W. " T r a n s i t i o n a l A s i a a n d t h e D y n a m i c s of N a t i o n Bui l d i n g, " World Pressures on Foreign P o l i c y, Marian D. Irish, e d i t o r. N e w York: Prentice-Hall Company, 1964. R e i s c h a u e r, E d w i n O. " T rans-Pacific Relati o n s, " A g e n d a for th e N a t i o n, K e r m i t G o r d o n, e d i t o r. Washington, D.C.: T h e B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n, 1968. Wurfel, David. "The P a t t e r n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n R e s p o n s e to International Politics," Southeast A s i a: P r o b l e m s of Uni t e d States P o l i c y, W i l l i a m Henderson, editor. N e w York: The M I T Pre s s, 1963. Pp. 71-108. ESSAYS AND ARTICLES IN P E R I O D I C A L S Allison, John. "Suk a r n o: A n A u t o b i o g r a p h y " (A R e v i e w ), T h e S a t u r d a y R e v i e w ( N o v e m b e r 20, 1965) p. 37. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 655] === 647 Amery, Julian. " E a s t of S u e z U p f o r G r a b s, " T h e A t l a n t i c C o m m u n i t y Q u a r t e r l y ( S u m m e r, 1967) pp. 2 0 9 - 2 1 9. A m i n o f f, C a r y A. " R e s t r a i n t in R e s u m i n g U.S. A i d I n d o n e s i a, " T h e N e w R e p u b l i c ( F e b r u a r y 11, pp. 13-14. 1967) A n d e r s o n, B e n e d i c t R. "Indonesia: United Against Progress," C u r r e n t H i s t o r y. 4 8: 2 8 2 ( F e b r u a r y, 1965) pp. 75- 82. " A p p l a u s e f r o m U.S., B r i t a i n a n d M a l a y s i a, " ( A p r i l 8, 1966) pp. 13- 14. Blum, Peking Review Y e h u d a J. " I n d o n e s i a ' s R e t u r n to th e Unitec. N a t i o n s, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w Q u a r t e r l y, 16: 2 (April, 1967) Bunnell, Frederick 1960-1965," "Guided D e m o c r a c y F o r e i g n Policy: I n d o n e s i a, II ( O c t o b e r, 1966) pp. 3 7- 7 7. "Indonesia's Q u a si-Military Regime," H i s t o r y ( J a n u a r y, 1 9 6 7 ) pp. 22-2 8. Butwell, Richard. "The F a l l of S u k a r n o, " 3 0: 9 ( S e p t e m b e r, 1 9 6 6 ) pp. 34- 3 8. Calian, C a r n e g i e D. " D i a l o g u e in C h r i s t i a n C e n t u r y ( M a y 24, " C o n t a i n i n g China: (May, 1966) The a n A g e of 1967) pp. Current Progressive. Convergence," 682-684. A Roundtable Discussion," Commentary C o u g h l i n, R i c h a r d J. "Guarantying Traditional Guarantors of H u m a n R i g h t s," J o u r n a l o f A s i a n S t u d i e s ( N o v e m b e r, 196 7). " D a t a on the C u r r e n t M i l i t a r y E l i t e, " P r e p a r e d b y I n d o n e s i a, I I I vrt.pi.il, 1967 ) pp. 2 0 5 - 2 1 7. Dommen, the Editors, Arthur. "The A t t e m p t e d C o u p i n I n d o n e s i a, " T h e C h i n a Q u a r t e r l y, X X V (J a n u a r y - M a r c h, 1966) pp. 1 4 4 - 1 6 8. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 656] === 648 " E a s t w a r d S h i f t of U.S. G l o b a l ( M a r c h 4, 1966) p. 3. Strategy," Peking Review Eder, Richard. New York "A Q u i e t A m e r i c a n G o e s to V i e t n a m, " T h e T i m e s M a g a z i n e ( M a r c h 26, 1967) p p. 2 7 - 2 9 f f. Fall, Bernard. "The A m e r i c a n C o m m i t m e n t in V i e t n a m, " T h e S a t u r d a y R e v i e w ( F e b r u a r y 4, 1 967 ) pp. 3 9 - 4 1. Feith, Herbert. "Indonesia — The N e w R e p u b l i c (April Revolution," B l o t o n the N e w O r d e r, " 13, 1968) pp. 1 7 - 2 1. Lev, " The E n d o f the I n d o n e s i a n P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, X X X V I (Spring, 1963). "Suharto's S e a r c h for a Political Format," I n d o n e s i a, VI ( O c t o b e r, 1968) pp. 8 6 - 1 0 6. " For L i q u i d a t i o n o f F o r e i g n M i l i t a r y ( N o v e m b e r 5, 1965) pp. 1 6 - 1 9. Gass, Bases," Peking Review Oscar. " D e m o c r a c y a n d R e v o l u t i o n II: America, C z e choslovakia, and I n donesia," C o m m e n t a r y (February, 1960) pp. 1 5 5 - 1 6 2. Gordon, B e r n a r d K. " P r o b l e m s of R e g i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n in S o u t h e a s t A s i a, " W o r l d P o l i t i c s ( J a n u a r y, 1 96 4) Graham, S t u a r t L. " A s s e s s m e n t s o f t he P K I, " A u s t r a l i a 1s N e i g h b o r s (J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y, 1966) pp. 4-7. Hall, C l a r e n c e W. "Indonesia: N i g h t of T e r r o r, " D i g e s t ( O c t o b e r, 1 966 ) pp. 2 7 5 - 3 1 2. The Reader's Hatta, Mohammad. " I n d o n e s i a B e t w e e n the P o w e r B l o c s, " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s, X X X V I: 3 (Ap ril, 1 958 ) pp. 4 8 0 - 4 9 1. Hindley, Donald. " F o r e i g n A i d to I n d o n e s i a a n d Its C o n s e q u e n c e s, " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s (S u m m e r, 1963) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 657] === 649 " P o l i t i c a l P o w e r a n d the O c t o b e r, 1965, C o u p I n d o n e s i a, " J o u r n a l of A s i a n S t u d i e s, X X V I:2 ( F e b r u a r y, 1967) pp. 23 7-2 4 9. Jaspan, " W e s t Iri a n: The F i r s t Two Y e a rs," A u s t r a l i a n Q u a r t e r l y, X X X V I I: 2 (June, 1965) pp. 9-22. The J o h n s o n, F r a n k J. "U.S. S t a k e i n I n d o n e s i a, " A m e r i c a n S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l W a s h i n g t o n R e p o r t ( F e b r u a r y 20, Jones, Howard Center "Asia T h r o u g h I n d o n e s i a Eyes," T o d a y. V I:2 (Ma r c h, 1 9 6 6 ) pp. 3-5. Josey, Alex. "Indonesia: ( N o v e m b e r 20, 1966) Hope After Massacre," "Under F i r e, " W a s h i n g t o n 30, 1967) p. 2. Post East-West The Nation Kahn, Herman. (April Book Week King, Seth. "T h e G r e a t P u r g e T i m e s M a g a z i n e ( M a y 8, Kirk, Donald. "The A n t i - C o m m u n i s t C r u s a d e o f I n d o n e s i a ' s M o s l e m s, " T h e R e p o r t e r ( J a n u a r y 27, 196 6 ) pp. 4 1 - 4 4. in I n d o n e s i a, " T he N e w Y o r k 196 6 ) pp. 25ff. __________. "Ba l i E x o r c i s e s an E v i l S p i r i t, " ( D e c e m b e r 15, 1 9 6 6 ) pp. 4 2 - 4 4. __________. "He r e L i e s B u n g K a r n o," T h e ( April, 196 7 ) pp. 8-10. The New Leader __________. " I n d o n e s i a ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y J u s t i c e, " L e a d e r ( N o v e m b e r 7, 196 6 ) pp. 4-6. __________. " S l o w T u r n in J a k a r t a, " T h e ( S e p t e m b e r 12, 1966) pp. 6-8. Reporter The New New Leader __________. " S o u t h e a s t A s i a F a c e s the F u t u r e, " ( F e b r u a r y 3, 196 9 ) pp. 6-8. T he N e w L e a d e r R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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"Indonesia: A Dissent," 8, 1965) pp. 4 7 6 - 4 8 1. Commonweal (January D a n i e l S. "Indonesia: T h e Y e a r o f th e C o u p, " A s i a n S u r v e y V I: 2 ( F e b r u a r y, 1966) pp. 1 0 3 - 1 1 0. "The P o l i t i c a l R o l e o f the A r m y i n I n d o n e s i a, " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s X X X V I ( W i n t e r, 1 9 6 3 - 6 4 ) pp. 3 4 9 - 3 6 4. Lubar, Robert. ( J u n e 1, "Indonesia's Potholed 196 8) pp. 1 0 4 - 1 0 7 f f. Road Back," Fortune Lyman, P r i n c e t o n M.. " S t u d e n t s a n d P o l i t i c s i n I n d o n e s i a a n d K o r e a, " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, X X V I I I: 3 / 4 (Fa l l a n d W i n t e r, M ahajani, Usha. " I n d o n e s i a ' s N e w O r d e r a n d t h e D i p l o m a c y of A i d, " A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k, X X I: 2 ( A u g u s t, 1967) pp. 214-234. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 659] === 651 Malik, Adam. XLVI:2 "Promise in Indonesia," Fo r e i g n Affairs (January, 1968) pp. 2 9 2 - 3 0 4. Monzingo, David. " C o n t a i n m e n t in A s i a R e - C o n s i d e r e d, " W o r l d P o l i t i c s, XIX: 3 (April, 1967). Moser, Don. " H a u n t e d F a c e of a R e d D e f e a t, " ( J a n u a r y 1, 1966) pp. 24-33. Life Nixon, R i c h a r d N. "Asia A f t e r V i e t n a m, " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s, X X X V I I:4 (Octob er, 1967) pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 6. N.S.C. "The O c t o b e r C o n f e r e n c e i n D j a k a r t a, " E a s t e r n H o r i z o n, V: 1 ( J a n u a r y, 1966) pp. 47- 4 9. Nuechterlein, Donald. "Prospects for Regional Security in S o u t h e a s t A s i a, " A s i a n S u r v e y, V I I I: 9 ( S e p t e m b e r, 1968) pp. 8 0 6 - 8 1 7. Oei, H o n g Lan. "Indonesia's E c o n o m i c S t a b i l i z a t i o n and Rehabilitation Program: An Evaluation," Indonesia, V (April, 1968) pp. 1 3 5 - 1 7 4. "One M i l l i o n D e a d? " pp. 727-72 8. Ott, The Econ o m i s t Marvin. "China's N e a r M i s s in II (Autumn, 1966) pp. 13-18. (Lon d o n ), August Indonesia," SAIS 20, 1966, Review, P a c k a r d, G e o r g e R., III. "Indonesia Wobbles Toward Recover," T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s M a g a z i n e ( O c t o b e r 1, 196 7) pp. 3 4ff. Paget, Roger. "Djakarta Newspapers, 1965-1967: C o m m e n t s, " I n d o n e s i a, IV ( O c t o b e r, 1967) "The M i l i t a r y in I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s: B u r d e n of P o w e r, " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, X L: 3 / 4 W i n t e r, 1 9 6 7 - 6 8 ) pp. 2 9 4 - 3 1 5. Preliminary The (Fall/ P a n g l a y k i m, Dr. J. " O p t i m i s m in D j a k a r t a, " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w ( Ju n e 23, 1966) pp. 6 0 6 - 6 0 8. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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" The C o u p T h a t F a i l e d: A Background Analysis," P r o b l e m s of C o m m u n i s m, X V:2 ( M a r c h / A p r i l, 1966) pp. 3 7— 44, Range, Willard. "Sukarnoism: X: 2 ( S u m m e r, 1966) pp. "Report on Rey, Indonesia," 12 -2 0. Lucien. Review An Interpretation," 488-507. The A t l a n t i c, 217:1 " D o s s i e r o f the (London), X XXVI Orbis (January, 1966) Indonesian Drama," New Left ( M a r c h / A p r i l, 1966) pp. 2 6 - 4 1. Rieffel, Alexis. "Population Growth and Eco n o m i c D evelop m e n t, " I n d o n e s i a n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w, 1: 4 ( Aug u s t, 1968) pp. 15-1 8. Roeder, "Friends Again," L I V: 3 ( O c t o b e r 20, 1966) Far Eastern Economic Review "Indebted D i p l o m a c y, " Far Eastern Economic R e v i e w, L V: 1 0 ( M a r c h 9, 196 7) pp. 4 3 9 - 4 4 1. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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New York "The Shift 11, Singh, "A S i m p l e M a n in P u r s u i t o f P o w e r, " T h e T i m e s M a g a z i n e ( A u g u s t 15, 1965) pp. 9ff. in U.S. G l o b a l S t r a t e g y, " 1966) pp. 16- 1 7. Asian "Dynamics of Survey, VII:9 Peking Review (February Indian-Indonesian Relations," ( S e p t e m b e r, 196 7 ) pp. 6 5 5 - 6 6 6. Soedjatmoko. " I n d o n e s i a a n d the W o r l d, " ( D y a s o n M e m o r i a l L e c t u r e II) The A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k ( D e c e m b e r, 1967 ) pp. 28 7-306. "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," (Dyason Memorial Lecture I ), A u stralian Outlook ( D e c e m b e r, 1967) pp. 2 6 3 - 2 8 6. (Stanley Plastrik). "Slaughterhouse D i s s e n t ( M a r c h / A p r i l, 196 6 ) p. 131. Indonesia," Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 662] === 654 S t a r n e r, F r a n c i s L. " M y s t e r i e s of M a p h i l i n d o, " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w ( M a y 14, 1964) pp. 3 3 5 - 3 3 7. "Through Malik's Eyes," Far Eastern Economic E c o n o m i c R e v i e w ( S e p t e m b e r 5, 1968) pp. 4 6 8 - 4 7 0. Sudono. " P o l i t i c a l P r i s o n e r s in I n d o n e s i a, " R e v i e w. X I: 3 (March, 1967) pp. 9 0 - 9 1. World Marxist Suhanjo. " I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n i s t P a r t y a n d the P e a s a n t s, " W o r l d M a r x i s t R e v i e w, V I I I: 7 (July, 1965) pp. 4 5 - 5 1. S u l l i v a n, J o h n H. "The P r e s s and J o u r n a l i s m Q u a r t e r l y, 44:1 Politics ( S p ring, in I n d o n e s i a, " 1967) pp. 9 6 - 1 0 6. Sutter, J o h n O. "Two F a c e s o f K o n f r o n t a s i: and the G e s t a p u, " A s i a n S u r v e y. VI:10 pp. 5 2 3 — 546. Sutton, Horace. "Indonesia's N i g h t of Terror," R e v i e w ( F e b r u a r y 4, 1967) pp. 2 5 - 3 1 f f. Tan, " I n d o n e s i a ' s G u i d e d E c o n o m y a n d Its I m p l e m e n t a tion: 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 5, " The A u s t r a l i a n Q u a r t e r l y. X X X V I I I: 2 (June, 1 966) pp. 9 -2 9. 'Crush M a l a y s i a 1 ( O c t o b e r, 1966) Saturday T a u s s i g, H. C. "Will I n d o n e s i a J o i n a M i l i t a r y B l o c? " E a s t e r n W o r l d ( L o n d o n ) ( M a y - J u n e, 1968) pp. 5-6. Trager, F r a n k N. "The U. S. a n d I n d o n e s i a — D i p l o m a c y, " The New York Times Magazine 196 5) p p. 2 6 f f. Tragedy (August 29, T r e v o r - R o p e r, H. R. " U n d e r s t a n d i n g Mao; or, L o o k B a c k to S t a l i n, " T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s M a g a z i n e ( F e b r u a r y 12, 1967) p p. 28— 2 9 f f. Van der K r o e f, J u s t u s M. "Exporting Indonesia's Revolution," E a s t e r n W o r l d, X V I I I (July, 1 9 6 4 ) pp. 1 3-16. "'Gestapu' in Indonesia," 196 6) pp. 4 5 8 - 4 8 8. O r b i s, X:2 (Summer, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 663] === 655 __________. " H o w D e a d Is t h e I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n i s t P a r t y? " C o m m u n i s t A f f a i r s ( J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y, 1967) pp. 3-10. __________. " I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n i s m ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y G y m n a s t i c s, " A s i a n S u r v e y (May, 196 5 ) pp. 2 1 7 - 2 3 2. __________. " J a k a r t a B e t w e e n M o s c o w a n d P e k i n g, " ( M a r c h / A p r i l, 1967) pp. 9 - l l f f. Eastern World __________. "The S i n o - I n d o n e s i a n P a r t n e r s h i p, " (Su m m e r, 196 4 ) pp. 3 3 2 - 3 5 7. O r b i s, VIII:2 __________. "The S i n o - I n d o n e s i a n R u p t u r e, " T h e Q u a r t e r l y ( S u m m e r, 1 9 6 8 ) pp. 19-46. China __________. " S u k a r n o, the I d e o l o g u e: A Review Article," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s, X L I: 2 ( S u m m e r, 1968) pp. 2 4 5 - 2 6 1. Fall," O r b i s, X I: 2 (Summ e r, 1967) __________. "The V o c a b u l a r y o f I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n i s m, " P r o b l e m s of C o m m u n i s m, X I V: 3 ( M a y / J u n e, 1965) pp. 1-10. S u r v e y, V I I: 8 (August, The U n c e r t a i n F uture," 1968 ) pp. 6 9 1 - 7 0 8. V a n ' t V e e r, Paul. "Flunking the D o c t r i n e, " (June, 196 7) pp. 3 3 - 3 4. Asian Atlas. XIII:6 Von Langenberg, Michael. "Dr. S u b a n d r i o: An Assessment," A u s t r a l i a n Q u a r t e r l y, X X X V I I I I: 4 ( D e c e m b e r, 1966) pp. 6 7-80. Warner, Denis. " A f t e r the B l o o d b a t h: Indonesia," L o o k ( F e b r u a r y 2, A Second 196 9 ). Chance for __________. " F i r s t S t e p T o w a r d an A s i a n C o m m o n M a r k e t, " T h e R e p o r t e r ( M a y 18, 196 7 ) pp. 27-30. Down But Not Out," T h e R e p o r t e r ( N o v e m b e r 18, 1965) pp. 23- 26. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 664] === 656 "Indonesia: The G e n e r a l s W h o G ot A w a y, " The R e p o r t e r ( O c t o b e r 2, 1965) pp. 39-40. "The P e k i n g - D j a k a r t a A x i s, " Th e R e p o r t e r ( S e p t e m b e r 23, 1965) pp. 25-28. W e a t h e r b e e, D o n a l d E. "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confronta t i o n in S o u t h e a s t A s i a, " O r b i s, V I I: 2 (S ummer, 1963) p p. 33 6-35 1. Weng, B y r o n S. "Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward t he U n i t e d N a t i o n s, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (Au tumn, 1966) pp. 1-26. W e r t h e i m, W. F. " I n d o n e s i a B e f o r e an d A f t e r t h e U n t u n g Coup," Pacific A f f a i r s, XXXIX:l/2 (Spring/Summer, " W h o m D o e s the I n d o n e s i a n R i g h t - W i n g ( S e p t e m b e r 9, 1966) p. 36. W i l l n e r, A n n R. "The V i e w f r o m J a k a r t a, " ( M a r c h 15, 1965) pp. 12-15. 1966) Peking Review The N e w Leader "The C o m m u n i s t P h o e n i x a n d th e I n d o n e s i a n G a r u d a: Reflections on Cyclical History," W orld Politics X I X:3 (April, 196 7) pp. 5 0 0 - 5 2 1. Worthy, William. " C o n f r o n t a t i o n in I n d o n e s i a, " T h e M i n o r i t y o f O n e, V I I I: 3 ( 7 6 ) (March, 1966) pp. 9-11. Yap, "Unusual F o r m s of M e n t a l D i s o r d e r in D i f f e r e n t C u l t u r e s, " E a s t - W e s t C e n t e r T o d a y, V I: 4 (July, 1966) Zagoria, D onald New York " W h o ' s A f r a i d of the D o m i n o T h e o r y? " T i m e s M a g a z i n e (Apr i l 21, 1968) pp. 28ff. 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Washington, D.C.: The L i b r a r y of Congress, L e g i s l a t i v e R e f e r e n c e S e r v i c e, O c t o b e r 1, 1968. (Mimeographed.) Congressional Record, The. File: D e p a r t m e n t of State Bulletin. D e p a r t m e n t of State Press 1962-1969. File: Releases. 1963-1969. File: 1965-1969. "Fact Sheet, Indonesia." U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State. ton, D. C.: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g Office, June, Foreign Broadcast 1966-1969. Information "Communist China." "Asia and Pacific." Service Dally File: File: Washing 1963. R e p o r t, File: 1967-1969. 1967-1969. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 666] === 658 K e n n e d y, P r e s i d e n t J o h n F. L e t t e r to P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o a n d Reply. D a t e d S e p t e m b e r 13 a n d 17. Mimeographed by E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C. "Indonesia, Briefing." E m b a s s y of th e U n i t e d S t a t e s, D j a k a r t a, O c t o b e r, 196 2 ( M i m e o g r a p h e d ). "Indonesia." I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m e r c e. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., J a n u a r y 13, 1969. Indonesian Economic Summary — Fourth Quarter, E m b a s s y, D j a k a r t a, F e b r u a r y 16, 195 7. 1966. I n d o n e s i a n E c o n o m i c T r e n d s a n d T h e i r I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the United S t a t e s. U.S. E m b a s s y, D j a k a r t a, S e p t e m b e r 27, 1967. Indonesia: P e r s p e c t i v e s and P r o p o s a l s for U n i t e d S t a t e s. R e p o r t to the P r e s i d e n t b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s E c o n o m i c S u r v e y T e a m to I n d o n e s i a (The H u m p h r e y R e p o r t ), W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., 1962. Leng, R u s s e l l J. I n d o n e s i a n S p e e c h e s a n d A c t s of an A n t i American Nature Since 1 9 6 1: A C h r o n o l o g y. Washington, L i b r a r y of Congress, L e g i s l a t i v e R e f e r e n c e S e r v i c e, 1965. (Mimeographed.) Poats, Rostow, R u t h e r f o r d M. A s s i s t a n t A d m i n i s t r a t o r of A I D for Far East. S t a t e m e n t to the H o u s e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e o n t h e F o r e i g n A i d B i l l of 1967, M a y 2, (Mimeographed.) Wal t Whitman. J u l y 9, 1967. 1967. Interview with. W ashington, D.C.: th e 196 7. " M e e t the P r e s s, " The M e r k l e Press, T h e G r e a t T r a n s i t i o n: T a s k s of t h e F i r s t a n d Second Postwar Generations. Sir Montague Burton L e c t u r e, U n i v e r s i t y of L e e d s, L e e d s, E n g l a n d, F e b r u a r y 23, 1967. (Mimeographed.) R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 667] === 659 Rusk, Dean. " E x c e r p t s f r o m th e T e s t i m o n y of S e c r e t a r y of State D e a n Rusk Bef o r e the Se n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e, " M a r c h 1 1 - 1 2, 1968. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, W a s h i n g t o n, D.C. (Mimeographed.) Scope and D i s t r i b u t i o n of U n i t e d St a t e s M i l i t a r y and Economic Assistance Programs. R e p o r t to t h e P r e s i d e n t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s f r o m th e C o m m i t t e e to S t r e n g t h e n th e S e c u r i t y of t h e F r e e W o r l d (The C l a y R e p o r t ). Washington, D.C.: D e p a r t m e n t o f Sta t e, M a r c h 20, 1 96 3. United S t a t e s C o n g r e s s, H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s, C o m m i t t e e on Foreign Affairs. F o r e i g n A s s i s t a n c e A c t of 1 9 6 3, Hearings, 88th through 90th Congresses. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963-1968. F u t u r e U.S_. R o l e in A s i a a n d the P a c i f i c. H e a r i n g s o f the S u b c o m m i t t e e o n A s i a n a n d P a c i f i c Affairs, 90th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e, 1968. __________. R e p o r t o f t h e S p e c i a l S t u d y M i s s i o n to S o u t h e a s t A s i a, ( O c t o b e r 3 - 1 9, 19 6 3 ), 8 8 t h C o n g r e s s, 1 s t S e s s i o n. Washington: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e, 1963. United States Policy Toward A s i a. H e a r i n g s of S u b c o m m i t t e e on the F a r E a s t and Pacific, 8 9 t h Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e, 1966. United th e States Congress, Senate, Fo r e i g n Relations Committee. A s i a, P a c i f i c, a n d th e U n i t e d S t a t e s, H e a r i n g s, 9 0 t h Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e, 1 96 7. Foreign A s s i s t a n c e, 1 9 6 6, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g Office, 196 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 668] === 660 D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e, B u r e a u o f I n t e l l i g e n c e an d R e s e a r c h. W o r l d S t r e n g t h of C o m m u n i s t P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s, 1 96 6 Edition. Washington: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g Office, 1966. IJ.jS. E m b a s s y T r a n s l a t i o n Fil e: 1966-1969. United USIA States File: Information 1966-1968. United Press Service, Correspondent, Washington, Review. Djakarta. Fil e: Djakarta. Press 1965-1968. W e e k l y F i l e of P r e s i d e n t i a l D o c u m e n t s, W a s h i n g t o n, Fil e: 1966-1968. Release Indonesian Basic P a t t e r n o f th e N a t i o n a l G e n e r a l P r o g r a m a n d th e F i v e Y e a r D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m. E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., J u n e 27, 19 6 8. (Mimeographed.) D e c i s i o n o f the P r e s i d i u m of the D w i k o r a C a b i n e t No. Aa/D/26/1965. G o vern ment of Indonesia (Mimeographed). E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., N e w s R e l e a s e s. File: 1965-1968. (Includes newsletter, News and V i e w s. ) Focus on I n d o n e s i a. E m b a s s y of Indonesia, J a n u a r y, 1 9 6 7 - J a n u a r y, 1969. Washington, " I n v e s t m e n t G u a r a n t e e A g r e e m e n t B e t w e e n I n d o n e s i a a n d the United States." E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., J a n u a r y 7, 1967. (Mimeographed.) " L a w No. 1 C o n c e r n I n v e s t m e n t o f F o r e i g n C a p i t a l. " Embassy of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C. (Mimeographed.) P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o 1s V i s i t to th e U n i t e d S t a t e s: M a y 16 to J u n e 2/ 1 9 5 6. Washington: Information Division, E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, 1956. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 669] === 661 R e p o r t o n I n d o n e s i a. E m b a s s y of D. C., A u g u s t, 1962. Indonesia, " S e l e c t e d D o c u m e n t s R e l a t i n g to the a n d Its E p i l o g u e, " I n d o n e s i a Washington, 'September 30th Movement' (April, 1966) pp. 1 3 1 - 2 0 3. Soedjatmoko. R e p o r t on h is S p e e c h at the I n d o n e s i a n S e m i n a r of the S o u t h e a s t A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t G r o u p (S E A D A G ), A s i a H o u s e, N e w Y o r k City, J u n e 20, 1968. Suharto. S p e e c h a t th e O p e n of the P l e n a r y S e s s i o n o f A m p e r a C a b i n e t, D j a k a r t a, D e c e m b e r 12, 196 7. (Mimeographed.) the Sukarno. T r a n s c r i p t of I n t e r v i e w w i t h CBS N e w s C o r r e s p o n d e n t s, T e l e v i s e d J a n u a r y 31, 1965. E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D.C. Never Leave H i s t o r y. Djakarta: R e p u b l i c of I n d o n e s i a, D e p a r t m e n t of I n f o r m a t i o n, 1966. R e f l e c t i o n s U p o n the I n d o n e s i a n R e v o l u t i o n. Washington: I n f o r m a t i o n D i v i s i o n, E m b a s s y of I n d o n e s i a, 1964. T o w a r d the F r e e d o m a n d D i g n i t y of M a n. D j a k a r t a: I n d o n e s i a n D e p a r t m e n t of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s, 1961. "A Y e a r of D a n g e r o u s L i v i n g. " A u g u s t 17, 1965. Antara News Bulletin. Others "The A S E A N D e c l a r a t i o n. " the U n i t e d States, P r e s s R e l e a s e, T h a i l a n d M i s s i o n to A u g u s t 8, 1967. I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y Fund. Indonesia: Recent Developments. R e p o r t p r e p a r e d b y the A s i a n D e p a r t m e n t an d th e E x c h a n g e a n d T r a d e D e p a r t m e n t, A p r i l 17, 1 9 6 8 (M i m e o g r a p h e d ). R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 670] === 662 M a l a y s i a n B u l l e t i n. E m b a s s y of M a l a ysia, Fil e: 1963-1965. "The M a n i l a S u m m i t C o n f e r e n c e, " Philippines, Washington, Washington, L a r a w a n. E m b a s s y of t he P h i l i p p i n e s, E m b a s s y of. W a s h i n g t o n, D.C. J u n e 14, 1963. (Mimeographed.) The S E A T O R e c o r d. Bangkok, U d i n k, Mr. April 21, Address 1968. Thailand. the I GG I Press File: Release, 1965-1969. Conference, Rotterdam, (Mimeographed.) W o r l d L e a d e r s ' D e c l a r a t i o n o n P o p u l a t i o n (at the U n i t e d Nations). N e w York: P o p u l a t i o n Council, December, INTERVIEWS Galbraith, Francis. F o r m e r D e p u t y Chief of Mission, I n t e r v i e w, S i n g a p o r e, S e p t e m b e r 24, 1968. Djakarta. G a r d n e r, Paul. Polit i c a l Officer, U.S. Embassy, I n t e r v i e w, D j a k a r t a, S e p t e m b e r 10, 1968. Djakarta. Green, Marshall. Interview, U.S. A m b a s s a d o r to I n d o n e s i a, W a s h i n g t o n, D. C., O c t o b e r 28, 1965-1969. 1968. Hatta, Mohammad. Interview, F o r m e r V i c e P r e s i d e n t of I n d o n e s i a. H o n o l u l u, S e p t e m b e r 4, 1968. Hewett, Robert. Former UPI Interview, Honolulu, Lydman, Jack. D e p u t y Chief, U.S. Mission, Djakarta. I n t e r v i e w, D j a k a r t a, S e p t e m b e r 9, 1968. M akarim, Nono. KAMI Leader Interview, Djakarta, 1967. C o r r e s p o n d e n t f o r S. E. A s i a. S e p t e m b e r 3, 1968. a n d M e m b e r of S e p t e m b e r 12, Parliament. 1968. R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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